200000
104-10306-10010.
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
18 June 1964
りえ
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964
1. Item I: Autonomous Operations.
This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for
$25,000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to
Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray
were discussed, ranging from cutting him off altogether to giving him
the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement
with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore
it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement,
that he must find a base of operations outside the United States and if he does
we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico,
and that we will give him financial support.
24
2. With respect to Artime, it was pointed out that Artime's
operations are very costly. CIA has put $4.6 million into this operation
this year
the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald
reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted
he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to
feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained
for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is
not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S.
or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was
suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless
courses of action.
3. There was a long discussion on the implications of the CIA
June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading
Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group.
It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to
put us on notice and therefore we should not fail to take appropriate precautionary
actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was
carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of
Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action
against the individuals involved.
I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was
inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than
definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have
investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking
action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to
discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.
13-00000-
[2]･
I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent
to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been
no conversation on the subject.
ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms
steps we should take to establish the
credibility of the report; also communicate
with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I
should call the Attorney General personally.
4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using
the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on
U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV
cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt
we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of
those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation
might overlook. He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release
of the leaflets.
'am/mfb
- 2 -
13-00000
TE IF Ø34
00 RUEPIA.
6. TOP SECRET
NON-CIA TELETYPED MESSAGE 09143
ACTION: FE 1-8
10 Jum 01 09 10:
A
DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/0641Z
0 180627Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE
RUEPDA/SECSTATE
RUE PDA/O SD
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON-
RUHPA/CAS HONO
TS 94/
HT
1of3
ん
9-DCI
10-DDCI
11-DDD
12-ADDP
13-500
14-FILE
15-VR
16-RF
18 JU 64 IN 09143
TOP SECRET MAC SOG 5050
"
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS
WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND
HELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB LODGE
AND NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT..
A. OPLAN 34A
1. IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND
JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY TWO MILLION LEAFLETS
TOP SECRET
#9
13-00000
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOP SECRET
IN_
PAGE
2 of 3
WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE
PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF
OTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS.
2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR
DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN
34A OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITABLE
UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND
TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.
3. REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED
HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION
TO UNITED STATES MUST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIR-
CUMSTANCES:
A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE OB-
TAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SOURCES AND IS
ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY
CONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS
COULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.
B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OPLAN 34A ACTIONS TO US
COULD BE MORE READILY SUBSTANTIATED BY DRV PRODUCING AGENT
PERSONNEL OR MORE CRITICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS
TEAM OPERATIONS.
.:
C. PAPER STOCK IT SELF IS NOT ONLY ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM,
BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE
PRINTED MATTER.
D. IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO
IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER.
USE OF US PAPER AND INDIRECT INDICATION OF US INVOLVEMENT
IRECT
TOP SECRET
13-00000
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOP SECRET
IN 09143
PAGE
зова
TEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE.
E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER
USED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK.
F. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A
ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE
COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS.
4. REQUEST APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISSEMINATION OF PRE-
PARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN
SOURCE PAPER STOCK CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS.
5. IN ORDER TO MEET CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY
WITHIN 48 HOURS.
GP-1
BT
TOP SECRET
13-00000
C
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412)
-
2 April 1964.
3 April
4/14
1. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A,
All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing.
I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of
organization had past, we might get some better results.
98
The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except
for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this
flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release
of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.
ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld.
USIB
and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting
On Wednesday, the 8th.]
98
2. [Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT
and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries
and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must. It was agreed
that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an
interim basis.
ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appro-
priate actions by the Department of Defense through their
representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement,
compensation and care of these captains.]
98
3. Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved
after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia.
It was agreed that the field would be instructed to carefully observe
'operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked
up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians,
the matter should be resubmitted for reconsideration.
ACTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACV:]
98
4. Review of ground rules for U-2 in North Viet Nam as outlined.
Secretary Vance's paper was approved. J
4/mc
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98
5. The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension.
DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations
which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing
the operations by means of overflying Laos. State held very positive view
against Laotian-overflights.
6. The proposed in filtration and exfiltration operations in Cuba
were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with
agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular
Cache involved money and other things, but no arms. The caching of
small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved.
Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no
instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question
of future sabotage operations was discussed. Mr. Bundy agreed to bring
the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly.
98
7. [The Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of
April 1st was approved. It was pointed out that since the paper was
drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about)
the handling of funds ☐☐
98
8. Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller
gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the
British. Understood that implementation of this paper was to be
coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in
London.
OTHER MATTERS:
98
✓ ✓ ✓ Statement was made that a CIA U-2 was "painted" with radar
was
on February 24th, implication being that the CIA U-2s in the vicinity of
Phnom Penh.
ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this . ]
98
2. Question was raised about need for continuing the 30 mile
intrusion into Cambodi³:
'
and Laos. Indications were that the photography
I had produced no useful information for MACV.
ACTION: This question should be studied and brought
up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable
Carter to investigate fully. J
JAM/mfb
5/nc
13-00000
27 February 1964
!
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group
98
1. The question of the extent of the SAC planes operations in South
Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's
letter of February 26th.
1. Overflights of South Vietnam O.K.
--
2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles
of South Vietnam or of the coast line..
3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South
Vietnamese border.
4. That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles
from South Vietnam.
With respect to 4., instructions were to be given that the primary
purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot
is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing
McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the
21st parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the
proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the
question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over
North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being "off
course". All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either
limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country. It was
decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision. I interposed
no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the
position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they
should cover the entire country.
--
--
2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved
with the exception of one operation operation #434 about which
Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were
under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of
deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and
1/mc
13-00000
medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached.
Otherwise the operation was approved.
Alexis Johnson and Mr. Bundy raised questions of the consequences
of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the
OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that
we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th
Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the
feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy
toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for
slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our
Cuban program was in complete disarray. We had no policy or covert
operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our
economic denial program was failing, while Castro is making significant
progress.
98
3. (The forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.]
98
4. [The status report on political action in Kenya was approved.)
JAM/mfb
2
2/MC
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TOP
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
SENSITIVE
File
February 10, 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
Attached is a paper which I would like to table for
discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group.
Cymre
Cyrus R. Vance
Quce
Attachment
In Jessays.
circulate
love you intend to mention is
ask 'A forms's puple to bring man
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ham Clevis talk chisch will him,
mfos
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE

13-00000
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
February 10, 1964
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba
The objective of the U. S. Government is to overthrow.
the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing its
objective, the U. S. is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at
this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its
Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this
country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program
should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks.
Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine
program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba.
In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when
it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.
Actions Against Cuba
1. Sabotage. A low level campaign of sabotage and
harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the
Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such as the
one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships
(such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible,
it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have
come from within Cuba. Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged
by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).
2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.
a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of
overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading
with Cuba. In this connection, develop a comprehensive list
of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known
DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that
appropriate retaliation can be applied against those suppliers.
b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive
devices in cargoes and on ships bound for Cuba and subse-
quently "tip off" port or shipping officials so that they will
search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity.
SECRET EYES CARLY
COPY No.
☐
of 6
COPIES
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(
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
3. Covert Economic Activities.
a) Intensify covert activities directed against
critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if
necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclu-
sive buying.
b) Make it known discreetly through the press
that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing
with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records
constitute a potential "blacklist.
11
c) Form a group of responsible and qualified
Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms
trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have
no future in a post-Castro Cuba.
-
4. To the extent possible, encourage dissidence
among different factions in Cuba Peking, Moscow,
Nationalist
by spreading rumors, internal and
external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose
(such as actions against homes of leaders, etc)..
--
Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America
1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin
America against whom a concentrated program of bribery,
blackmail and coercion can be instituted.
2. Carefully select key Latin American members of
the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping,
and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to
attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute
the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow
supporters.
Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against
a background of Ú. S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and
political activity designed to increase internal dissension within
Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting
with our allies over the Cuban issue and to reduce, and perhaps
eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition,
surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.
2
PILLED EYES ONLY
COPY No.
of
6
COPIES