14-00000
104-10106-10143
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS staff MEMBERS
FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME:
HSCA Request Ltr
8 May 1978 OLC 78-1573
RETURN TO C
Yakground Was Ony
INCLUSIVE DATES:
Directorate of S & T Memo 22 June 1978
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:
ROOM:
DELETIONS, IF ANY:
DATE
RECEIVED
DATE
RETURNED
9-778 7-778
REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)
G. ROBERT BLAKEY
7-10-787-10-78
Kenneth
Klein
9-26-78
Johanna Smith
вапна
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICI.
в ловит Slabe
Kennett
Johanne
Smith
NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
14-00000
'
TO:
ROUTING
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE INITIALS
1
Scott Breckenridge, OLC
2
6D15, Hqs.
3
4
ACTION
APPROVAL
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
COMMENT
FILE
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
PREPARE REPLY
RECOMMENDATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
AEO/DDS&T, 6E60, Has., x6561
DATE
Handle Via
COMINT
Channels
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
CONTROL NO. SC-01836-78
Copy 1
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
E2 IMPDET
14-00000
TOP SECRET' - EIDER
CHESS
SC-01836-78
Copy 1
22 JUN 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative Counsel
ATTENTION
:
Scott Breckenridge
SUBJECT
:
HSCA Request
REFERENCE
: HSCA Letter Dated 8 May 78, OLC 78-1573
1. (U)
Reference requests access to information in
six areas pertaining to the U-2 Project. As you know
the U-2 Project files include about 150 boxes and over 650
reels of microfilm, all located at the Records Center. We
have reviewed the shelf listing titles to identify pertinent
files that might be responsive to the areas of request. The
information requested covers an era and an organization which
was not a part of this Directorate. As a result much of the
corporate memory is no longer available and research of the
files by current personnel is time consuming and requires
almost a learning process. We have depended a great deal
on the written History of the U-2 Project for leads to files
and for information contained in this memorandum.
2. (U) The primary interest of reference refers to
the U-2 Project, Detachment C, while stationed in Atsugi,
Japan. Attached are replies keyed to the six areas in the
HSCA letter.
3. (U) We realize that the information supplied by
this memorandum does not fully respond to all the areas
requested. Because of the broad and encompassing nature
of some of the requests in the HSCA letter and the fact
that our files are not organized to readily respond to
such broad requests we request that the HSCA staff review
the material and determine if their requests could be
limited or narrowed in some way.
Attachments:
As stated
Somas G. Ward, Jr.
Ward
Thomas G. Ward
Acting Executive Officer
Directorate of
Science and Technology
TOP SECRET EIDER CHESS
May be downgraded to
Unclassified when
removed from attachment.
CL BY: 469804
14-00000
YPJ
TOP SECRET - EIDER CHESS
-
Attachment To:
SC-01836-78
SUBJECT: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78,
OLC 78-1573
General Background:
Detachment C advance party of
security and communication personnel departed the U.S.
for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1957, the second echelon
of administrative personnel departed 4 March, and the main
body of the detachment with two U-2 aircraft and equipment
began deployment on 15 March. On 29 March Headquarters was
notified that all personnel and equipment were on base.
Operational readiness was forecast for the week of 8 April.
Operating procedures and liaison had been accomplished with
the following major U.S. components:
Far East Air Force
13-3
Far East Command and Theater Commander
Agency's (Tokyo Station and local support unit
54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
Atsugi Naval Air Station
Details or specific operating agreements or procedures
with the above components have not been located.
By mid-May 1957 the Detachment had flown 30 sorties.
All of these operations were preparations for the primary
mission of the Detachment. The first primary mission of the
Detachment, a flight over part of the USSR, occurred on
20 June 1957, however, this mission did not originate or
recover at Atsugi.
The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred
on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight.
This flight, as other previous flights by other Detachments,
was tracked by Russian radar, even though the U-2 aircraft
had anti-radar applications, and a Soviet protest was made
on 5 March 1958 by the Soviet Ambassador to Washington,
Mikhail Menshikov. Attached are copies of the Soviet
Aide Memoires of 5 March and 21 April 1958 (Tab A).
The Detachment continued to perform non-USSR missions
in the Far East area until the Powers flight of 1 May 1960.
Redeployment of the Detachment began in early July, the
last U-2 aircraft departed Japan on 9 July and all personnel
and other equipment cleared the base and turned the facilities
back to the Navy on 19 August 1960.
TOP SECRET
-
EIDER - CHESS
14-00000
TOP SECRET - EIDER -
-
CHESS
During the deployment of Detachment C it performed
approximately 86 operational missions, of these 
only 43
originated and recovered at Atsugi.
1. Any and all information pertaining to the take-
offs and landings of the U-2 at Atsugi, Japan,
limited to the years 1959 through 1962.
We have been unable to locate files which would
contain logs of all take-offs and landings of the U-2
In addition 
to
aircraft assigned to Detachment C.
the mission flights stated above we must assume that
there were a large number of take-offs and landings
which would include flights for pilot familiarization,
training, equipment testing, transitional and flights
(purely for cover purposes. )32
2. Any and all information concerning the radar
procedures, facilities, and staff involved with
the U-2 flights at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the
years 1959 through 1962.
As stated in the General Background above we have
not located details or specific operating procedures
or agreements with the local Navy base at Atsugi.
3. Any and all information pertaining to contact
between Marine Air Control Squadron #1, Air
Group II, 1st Marine Wing, and U-2 personnel at
Atsugi, Japan, including but not limited to
housing, recreational, and eating facilities
limited to the years 1959 through 1962.
-
On
We have not identified any relationship between
Detachment C and Marine Air Control Squadron #1.
the subject of housing, we have noted that late in
1957 families were permitted at Detachment C and as
a result housing was provided in the compound assigned
to the Agency Support Unit and ten houses were rented
on the local market.
4.
Any and all information pertaining to defectors
with knowledge of the U-2 program.
The DDS&T has not located any information pertaining
to defectors. We defer this request to the DDO.
2 -
TOP SECRET EIDER CHESS
-
14-00000
TOP SECRET - EIDER CHESS
5.
6.
Any and all information within the U-2 program
file pertaining to defectors with knowledge of
the U-2 program.
See above.
Any and all information concerning Soviet knowledge
of the U-2 program previous to May 1, 1960.
Attached is an extract from a report dated
3 March 1958 concerning Soviet Air Defense which
gives a summary of Soviet knowledge of the U-2
overflights between 20 June and 10 July 1956 (Tab B).
Also attached is a copy of the Soviet protest note
of 10 July 1956 concerning Mission 2013 on 4 July 1956
which was the first penetration of the Soviet borders
(Tab C).
3
-
TOP SECRET EIDER - CHESS
..
14-00000
EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AIDE MEMOIRE
5 March 1958
According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at
4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, 
having
appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated 
the state
border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement 
of Velikaya
Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remain-
Thereafter
,
ing over its territory for a considerable period of 
time.
the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south
of the Olga Bay.
The information on this violation has been carefully checked
and there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The military representa-
tives of the United States, who in this case acted possibly 
without the
knowledge of the Government of the United States, will perhaps 
deny
However, such a
the said violation, as has happened in the past.
denial cannot eliminate the fact of violation itself.
Soviet side would have no interest in commenting on this incident if
it had not actually taken place.
In any case, the
A the present time, when negotiations are being conducted
on the holding of a summit meeting which could contribute 
to an 
im-
provement of relations and to strengthening trust 
between states,
the violation of the Soviet border by an American 
military 
aircraft
may be evaluated as an attempt to undermine the 
efforts aimed at
convening such a meeting and to aggravate the international situation.
From the messages of the President of the USA and his con-
versations with the Soviet Ambassador, as well as from 
statements
by other government officials of the USA, it is known to 
the Soviet
Government that the Government of the USA desires 
a 
rapprochement
between our governments and improvement in the relations 
between
them. There can hardly be any doubt that such 
facts of violation of
the borders of the USSR can have only one result--
that of hindering
this cause and upsetting Soviet-American relations.
14-00000
The attention of the Government of the USA is invited to
the fact that in the present situation the violation of the airspace of
the USSR by an American military aircraft takes on a particularly
dangerous character since, as has been repeatedly reported, Ameri-
can military planes make flights around the clock over many countries
The Government of 
the
of the world carrying thermonuclear bombs.
USA cannot fail to be aware of what genuinely catastrophic consequences
' for the cause of peace will ensue when an American plane with such a
load will find itself shot down.
The attention of the Government of the USA has already been
previously directed to cases of violation of the state boundaries of
However, as proven
the Soviet Union by American military aircraft.
by the case cited, the authorities of the USA have not taken the necessary
measures to prevent such violations.
It is absolutely obvious that it is the duty of the governments of
the USSR and the USA to do everything possible to prevent any acts
capable of complicating the situation and the relations between the
Soviet Union and the USA.
The Soviet Government cannot but protest against the violations
of Soviet frontiers by an American military aircraft and it expects that
the Government of the United States will punish severely those guilty
of the violation of the airspace of the USSR which has taken place and
that it will take steps to prevent such violations in the future.
Taking into account the present situation, where a summit con-
ference is being prepared, and also the spirit and purpose of the nego-
tiations being conducted between our governments, the Soviet Government
would not like to make this matter public or subject it to discussion in
the UN.
The hope is expressed that this matter will be settled satisfac-
torily between the governments of the USSR and the USA and that there
will be no need for the Soviet Government to resort to other 
means for
its settlement.
(Initialled by M. Menshikov)
Washington, March 5, 1958
14-00000
EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
Note No. 9
21 April 1958
The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United
States of America and, referring to the Aide-Memoire of the Depart-
ment of State dated March 31, 1958 and containing a reply of the
Government of the United States of America to the Aide-Memoire of
the Soviet Government dated March 5 concerning a violation of the
Soviet state border in the Far East by an American military jet air-
craft, has the honor to communicate the following:
In the reply Aide-Memoire of the Department of State an
attempt is made to deny the fact of an American military aircraft.
having violated the Soviet border.
As has already been communicated, the Soviet Government has
at its disposal carefully verified data on this violation, the reliability
of which leaves no room for doubt. According to these data, on March 2,
1958, at 4:05 a. m. Moscow time, an American military reconnaissance
aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction
of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the
area of the settlement Velikaya Kema, 32 kilometers south of that
settlement. Then the violating aircraft deeply penetrated the airspace
of the USSR and, after remaining over its territory for a considerable
period of time, passed beyond the limits of the Soviet territory 45 kilo-
meters south of the Olga Bay at 8:11 a. m.
In the light of the established facts the reply of the Government
of the United States of America can in no way be recognized as satis-
factory. Naturally, the question arises as to how to explain such a
reply of the American Government: whether it was misled deliberately
by its military representatives in the Far East or whether it considered
it possible to protect such persons subordinate to it, who, without re-
gard to the possible consequences, sanction violation of Soviet borders,
thus creating a threat of international complications.
14-00000
Such a reply of the Government of the United States of America
to the communication of the Soviet Government cannot fail to cause
serious concern, the more so since the new case of violation of Soviet
airspace took place after warnings on the part of the Government of
the USSR to the effect that American authorities should take the
necessary steps to prevent such violations.
In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects
that the Government of the United States of America will undertake
further investigation of this act of violation of the airspace of the
USSR by an American military aircraft and will punish severely those
guilty of this violation.
The Soviet Government also expects that the Government of
the United States of America will take the necessary steps to prevent
violations of Soviet airspace by American aircraft in the future and
states that in the event of new violations full responsibility for their
consequences will rest with the Government of the United States.
Washington, D. C.. April 1958

14-00000
14-00000
TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
SC-02164-58
Summary of Initial Missions
In the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense
system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven
occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that
24 (CCHINE) provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet
system.
This is important because it is clear from REGAL material that 24.
considerable air defense business is conducted over landlines and thus not
observed by COMINE. However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from
these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:
1. In spite of the fact that these missions come as a surprise,
none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their
radar coverage extends above (72,000) feet.
24
- 23.
311
TOP SECRET - EIDER-CHESS
14-00000
TOP SECRET ·
-
- EIDER — CHESS
SC-02164-58
2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware
of the 
purpose of the 
missions and were taking counter action.
One positive action 
was the standdown of civil flights while the
mission aircraft was over 
the USSR, and a second action which is
believed related is the 
moving of MIG-19 aircraft into East
Germany and Poland on 7 
July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved
into Hungary at about this 
time.
24
3. The performance of the Soviet system on the 5 July mission,
2014, 
was indeed curious. While the 
action evident from COMINT 24
is not clear an explanation which 
appears to fit the known facts
is offered as follows: As a 
result of the previous missions, the
Soviets had concluded the 
essential facts concerning the missions,
i.e., that they were for reconnaissance, 
that they flew above (65,000)
feet, and that a penetration as 
deep as Moscow was possible.
probably surmised that 
the 5 July mission was headed for Moscow when
They
the track appeared on a 
northeasterly heading.
`
target 
when it entered Soviet territory was probably deliberate and
The loss of the
the "red herring" track returning 
to the west was either a dodge
or a convenience to avoid 
broadcasting a track for all the system
to see that a "hostile or intruder
" was coming over Moscow with no
means available to stop it
. This idea is supported by the use
of a raid number assigned in 
the region just beyond the point
where the track had been "lost".
labeled "hostile or intruder" when it was broadcast after it
In addition, the track was 
not
had passed beyond 
Moscow. The reporting of the track when it did
appear was only by 
Moscow and it has been suggested that other
stations had been 
instructed not to broadcast the track. Further, it may
or may not be a coincidence that the height 
broadcast was almost
exactly half of the true 
altitude of the mission aircraft, but on
the next missions, four days 
later, the altitude reporting was
consistently above 50,000 feet
.
4. By 9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recognition of
the 
great height of the mission 
flights, tracking was better and
in general the performance 
of the warning system was much improved.
5. The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air defense warning
system 
closed a 3000 mile track 
with only two short periods of
confusion or track loss. 
Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet
with one plot passed 68,800 
which was only 100 feet off target.
once.
99
99
6. The first eight missions proved that the air defense warning
system 
is deployed in depth. This 
was evident from both the continuity
of track and most forcefully from the 
ELINT data collected.
intercepts of Soviet Bloc 
radars operating in the 3000 mc/s band were
Some 1461
obtained by project ELINT as follows:
PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30.
TOKEN-1331, WHIFF-37,
These numbers cannot be equated to in-
GAGE-26,
dividual radar sets since the same radar may be intercepted more than
618 TOKEN sites were located
, including 213 new sites.
343 
additional TOKEN signals were 
identified but available information
Some
does not permit determination 
of location so that it must be con-
cluded that these signals 
include both known and new sites.
of the limitation of ELINT 
to the 3000 mc/s band and the Soviet
Because
practice of collocating radars 
on different frequencies the total
number of radars may be 
expected to be at least double the number
of sites.
5/A
- 24-
TOP SECRET-EIDER-CHESS
99
14-00000
JECKEI
EIDER LOEDD
1
SC-02164-58
99
7. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the
presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point
has not been determined because of insufficient data.
8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilities
of TOKEN in this role, the introduction of ROCK CAKES and later
developments are discussed in another section. It is believed,
however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction
of ROCK CAKES.
99
elv
- 25-
TOP SECRET - EIDER-CHESS
14-00000
☐
'
14-0000
(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)
}
{rt:
13:
}
}
Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
Note No. 23
10 July 1956
The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics presents its compliments to the Department of
State of the United States of America and, acting on in-
structions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to
state the following:
According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of
this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium
bomber of the United States Air Force appeared from the
American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over
the territory of the German Democratic Republic, entering
the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the
Polish People's Republic at 9:35 in the area of Grodno.
aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union
flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad,
penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of
320 kilometers and remaining over such territory for one
hour and 32 minutes.
The
On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time, a twin-
engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force, coming
from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany,
flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic,
and at 8:54 penetrated the air space of the Soviet Union in
the area of Brest, coming from the direction of the Polish
People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier
of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Bara-
novichi, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet
territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained
one hour and 20 minutes over such territory. The same day
another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force
Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.
14-00000
1
invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated
to a significant depth over Soviet territory.
On July 9 there took place new flights of United
States aircraft into the Soviet air space.
The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers
of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be inter-
preted as other than intentional and conducted for purp-
oses of reconnaissance.
It must be underscored that these gross violations of
the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time
when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and .
other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of
international tensions has been achieved, when relations
between governments are improving, and when mutual confi-
dence between them is growing. Such a development of inter-
national relations is fully supported by the peoples of all
countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.
One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary
circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of coun-
tries are worried by the relaxation of international tension
which has taken place. These circles do everything possible
to interfere with further improvement of relations between
countries and the creation of mutual trust among them.
Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the
American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union,
which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening
peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all
countries, including the United States of America.
In this connection, the fact attracts attention that
the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union
by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General
Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal
Republic of Germany.
The Soviet Government energetically protests to the
Government of the United States against such gross viola-
tion of the air space of the Soviet Union by American mili-
tary aircraft and considers this violation as an intentional
act of certain circles in the United States, planned to ag-
gravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States of America.
2
14-00000
Calling the attention of the Government of the United
States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the
air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the
Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible
consequences of such violations rests with the Government 
of
the United States.
The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken
by the Government of the United States to punish those
guilty for the said violations and to prevent such viola-
tions in the future.
.3
Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956