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14-00000
104-10216-10398
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
NET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris,
15 February 1965
1.
31 January to 3 February 1965
AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965
and was 
set for a very brief 
meeting the same night by ONTRICH
in order to arrange a meeting 
for the following day.
following subjects were 
discussed at the two meetings on 1 and
The
2 February 1965:
a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1
before 
his planned return 
to Cuba was to brief him on the
security implications involved 
in the infiltration and
possible capture of 
Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA
Bebo Orozco, who 
infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964.
Orozco, according to his 
wife, went to Cuba to rescue Jose
Vasquez Herey and three 
others who were hiding in the
home of a woman named 
Gloria Cabrera, who lived at No. 72
27th Street, between N & O
, Apartment 3, Vedado, Havana.
Orozco's capture, if he has 
been captured, presents an
indirect threat to the security 
of AMLASH-1 and a more
direct threat to the 
security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco
in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through 
the rat line established
by AMICK-14 (Miguelito). 
Upon his return to Cuba,
AMLASH-1 will check the 
above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if
Orozco is under the control 
of the security service, will
decide and communicate with Miami 
whether AMLASH-1 and
AMTRUNK-10 believe it 
necessary to exfiltrate AMTRUNK-10.
AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a 
letter to UNSNAFU-9 to
indicate whether Orozco 
has been arrested or whether he is
still in hiding. If the 
letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a
good and pleasant return trip
, this will mean that Orozco
is not under the control of 
the security service.
letter talks abouta 
long, tiring trip, this will indicate
If the
that Orozco has been arrested.
to send a report on the above and any complications which
AMLASH-1 was also requested
have developed or may develop from 
Orozco's infiltration.
b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles,"
which 
we have been using for 
the past three years, be
changed to "Gerardo."
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c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer
pills 
and carbon. He planned to 
take the S/W material
back with him to Havana. AMLASH
-1 again reviewed with
UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris
case officer all letters regardless 
of how received from
AMLASH-1 to either UNSNAFU-9 or 
letters that may be addresse
to his parents-in-law. AMLASH-1 also 
agreed to send S/W
out in letters addressed to Juan Ventura (AMWHIP-1's
business partner) in Geneva 
or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed
to inform Ventura that any letters he received from
AMLASH-1 should be immediately 
air mailed to AMWHIP-1
in New York. Since AMLASH-1 
will probably find it
necessary some time not to 
sign the letters to Ventura
in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was 
also briefed to inform
Ventura to forward to New York 
any letter received from
Cuba addressed to him and 
signed by a person unknown to
him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should 
continue to be
addressed to Ernestina 
Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8,
Esquina Calles 25 y H.
be sent to AMLASH-1's mother.
In an 
emergency a letter can also
d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had
been 
put down for him in Matanzas.
had 
previously reported and attempted to answer most of
He repeated what he
the questions in the WAVE cable.
was 
sent from Paris to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb.
A cable on this subject
AMLASH-1 was requested to send a 
message either through
his channel or through AMTRUNK-10's 
S/W channel reporting
how much of the radio equipment and 
other material had
been recovered from the cache.
e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in
Cuba 
whom he could recruit and who 
could be inserted into
the Cuban Intelligence Service 
with the idea of attempting
to get the DGI to assign this man to 
Caracas, Venezuela.
AMLASH-1 could think of only 
one possibility, an individual
known as Gustavo Gonzalez. AMLASH-1 has 
full confidence
in Gustavo and Gustavo has previously been approached on
several occasions by Pinero to work 
for him.
return to Cuba AMLASH
-1 will check to find out if Gustavo
Upon his
can still get himself recruited 
by Pinero and then be
sent on a mission abroad, 
hopefully to Caracas.
who also knows Gustavo, 
will provide the background infor-
mation upon his return to New York.)
(AMWHIP-1,
f. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections
on 10 
February 1965. AMLASH-1 
stated that Crombet, the
president of the Communist Youth, 
will become the new.
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1.
president and that his man, Lazaro Mora, would be one of
the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent
to Headquarters from Paris.)
g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Fizzolo
regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage
of the locmotives being shipped from France to Cuba;
specifically, how carefully do they check the placement
of the seals, are they special seals or regular load
seals, are there going to be any additional checks once
the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and
lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run
the locomotives under their own power or are they towed.
AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above
requirements and pass the information to his contact in
the Paris Station. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find
out and pass to the Paris Station through UNSNAFU-9 the
names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.
h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with
whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or
through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela.
ANLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and
had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a
friend which was the only reason for writing to him.
1. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence
Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from
Paris to Headquarters.
J. A cable was sent from Paris to Headquarters
suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to AMTRUNK-10 stating:
"Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."
k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the fol-
lowing persons:
AMLASH-1
(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes.
reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and
is a good and brave man.
(2) Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations
of the General Staff of the Occidental Army.
AMLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare
type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't
involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has
heard nothing bad about Lusson.
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(3) Cadte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of
Artillery of the Occidental Army.
(4)
Elpidio Baez Bigo.
Baez is a trusted Fidelman.
According to AMLASH-1,
(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to
the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security
people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young
and has for several years been with Pinero and the
Cuban IS.
(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close
friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime
rises or falls as does that of Faustino.
(7) Sergio Tolton. Code clerk in the Embassy in
Paris. Tolyon is staying in Paris at the request of
Ambassador Carrillo.
1. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary
conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems,
although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do
cause some problems. The purification of water has been
a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the
sickness in the country.
1. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invited
him to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him
back because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1
did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not
return to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for his
trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does
not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragones
does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1
decides to stay out.
B. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on
the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and
December since he had been out of the country since early
November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems
between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and
explained the issues, the background and personalities
involved.
0. Soviet advice or influence in political and economic
matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level
Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.
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P. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of
their influence in making national policy. Raul is still
the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara.
After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has
any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy.
President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since
he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative
ability and is able to work within the general outline laid
down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence
and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in
positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any
political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the
military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers.
Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and
has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority
because of his earlier policy of industrialization.
Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays
a very small role in the political field. He is serious
and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1,
who has worked seven days a week without leave since the
revolution. Emilio Aragones holds an important position
as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the
official who was always at the office of the National
Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the
officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating
role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former
13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but,
according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that
Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR
people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large
degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries,
the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation.
Other DR people who continue to hold important positionS
in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and
Jose Naranjo.
q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any
specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador
Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and
welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the
Embassy. in Madrid.
r.
According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante
is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will
probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a
decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to
location.
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8. AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando
Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern, is
approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime.
AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches,
Cuban Ambassador in Pabat, is approachable if approached
and 
developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez
assigned to 
the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy
in Rabat, AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels
money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo,
AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could
probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character
and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in
a compromising situation, Ambassador Carrillo is a close
friend of Lucy Echevarria.
2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list
of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to pro-
vide 
information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the
requirements on which he did provide information.
cc: WH/EA/EOB
WHISA/MGB
File:
AMLASH-1 201
Internal Op
077
Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/SA/AMWORLD
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