200000
104-10306-10021
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
SECRET
EYES ONLY
2 January 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
PRESENT:
Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 2 January 1964.
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
Colonel Steakley was present for Items 3 and 4.
1.
-
Cuba Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations During
January 1964.
The infiltration/exfiltration operations in the January 1964
forecast were approved. Three sabotage operation's, numbers 3111,
414, and 417, were approved by the Special Group subject to the
concurrence of higher authority. Decision was deferred on a sabotage
operation, number 413, against the petroleum refinery and storage
facilities near Santiago. Mr. Johnson said that before he could
exercise judgment as to the importance of this operation he must have
an analysis as to what effect the total or partial destruction of
this refinery would have on Cuban petroleum production and economy
generally. The Group agreed that such an analysis should be prepared
and be presented along with this sabotage operation for Special Group
action at its next meeting.
2. Cuba
Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations During December 1963.
Mr. FitzGerald reviewed the accomplishments during the month of
December. He emphasized a successful exfiltration activity of a
recently activated ratline. This is the second time in two months
that this ratline has successfully exfiltrated agents in danger of
arrest. He also gave a resume of the underwater demolition operation
(number 3117) which damaged a Cuban PT boat (Soviet-type P-6). Also,
during the same operation self-destroying anti-boat mines were placed
in the harbor entrance to inhibit pursuit. • One of the mines was detected
resulting in a Cuban government directive to all ports to take precaution-
ary measures.
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98
3.
DOD Honthly Reconnaissance Forecast
Mr. Johnson presented a paper dated 30 December 1963 expressing
the State Department's concern regarding a number of the missions
described in the January 1964 schedule of the Joint Reconnaissance
Venter. Mr. Johnson enumerated the types of missions which he regarded
as particularly sensitive, such as: (a) coordinated or dual missions
involving two planes in the same area at the same time; (b) those flown
too close to Soviet territory; (c) radical changes in altitude of planes
while under surveillance of Soviet radar; and (4) other radical variations
of route.
Mr. Johnson listed 14 BOX TC? missions on which State Department
needed further study before approval would be given. These missions are
as follows: Jane, Paula, Ruby, Cliff, Alf, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight,
Karl, Lloyd, Everett, Hugh, and Calvin. The Special Group requested a
coordinated position on these missions as to their necessity and whether
they can be run without a significant or provocative pattern change while
under Soviet radar surveillance. This coordinated position is to be
presented to the Special Group at its next meeting. All other missions
in the JRC forecast were approved..
CRO
98.
NRO Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast.
The NRO forecast (paper dated 20 December 1963) was approved as
presented. General Carter gave a resume of the excellence and uniqueness
of the information obtained in the "T" and "C" series.]
5.
The North Vietnam Working Group. 98
Mr. Johnson reported that the Interdepartmental Working Group on
North Vietnam Operations has about concluded its report. All members
of the Special Group agreed that the report should be critically noted
at the highest levels of the Government. It should then be reviewed by
the Special Group and presented to higher authority for decision. 7
Paul Sobel
Paul Eckel
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone
SECRET
EYES ONLY
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2
10 January 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
PRESENT:
Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 9 January 1964
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.
The Attorney General and Mr. FitzGerald were present
for Items 1 and 2.
Colonel Steakley and Mr. Kiefer were present for Item 3.
Cuba
-
Consideration of Sabotage Operations.
Mr. FitzGerald requested the Special Group to approve a sabotage
operation against the petroleum refinery and storage facilities near
Santiago.. The proposal was disapproved.
Another sabotage proposal was made by Mr. FitzGerald against a
sawmill located on the north coast of Oriente Province. The attack
is to be conducted by a commando team which will place incendiaries
and demolitions at critical locations throughout the installation.
A second target, which may be attacked as security factors permit, is
a large floating crane which has been anchored in the area and which
appears to be used in loading ore from a near-by mine. This operational
proposal with its two targets was approved subject to the concurrence of
higher authority. Also, it was the consensus of the Group that the
views of higher authority should be obtained on what is desired generally
in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba.
2. Cuba
-
Proposed Clandestine Intelligence Operations.
The Department of the Army requested approval for two operations:
(a) the establishment of a clandestine net using the Second National
Front of the Escambray, and (b) the infiltration of a radio operator
agent into Cuba. CIA has agreed to provide support for both these
proposals. The two operations were approved.
EYES CURLY
See special minutes
for additional item
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98
3.
Revised January Peripheral Reconnaissance Schedule.
The JRC paper dated 8 January 1964 was approved as amended.
No change was made in the following BOX TOP missions: Jane, Paula,
Ruby, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Lloyd, Karl, Everett, and Hugh.
Operations Cliff and Alf were amended resulting in the cancellation
of Operation Cliff. Mission Calvin's track was changed permitting
it to approach the Latvian coast no closer than 25 nautical miles
rather than 20 miles as originally proposed.
Mr. McCone raised the question of the increasing number of flights
authorized by the JRC. Colonel Steakley said that the number of sup-
porting flights required for every reconnaissance platform was largely
responsible for the increase. He also pointed out that there is
currently a review of COMOR requirements for Cuba being prepared to
determine whether they can be eased in order to permit a considerably
lessened operational schedule. ]
98
: Monthly Report No. 12 on North Vietnam.
This report was noted by the Special Group]
Pau Pone
-Paul Eckel
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr.
McCone
EYES ONLY
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31 January 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP
SUBJECT: Proposed Cuban Operations for February 1964.
Special Group members approved by telephone the following
infiltration/exfiltration operations proposed for February:
Numbers 411, 415, 421, 422, 423, 425, 3121, and 3126.
Operations involving sabotage (Numbers 414, 424, 3111, and
3112) were not considered by Group members pending an overall
review of Cuban operations, now completed but not yet studied.
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
MI.
Vance
RcCona
Peter Jasoup
13-00000:
SECRET
EYES ONLY
14 February 1964
MSC
File
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
:
SUBJECT:
PRESENT:
Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 13 February 1964
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
General Maxwell D. Taylor, Mr. Thomas A. Mann, and
Mr. Desmond FitzGerald were present for Item 1.
Lt. General Marshall A. Carter was present for
Items 1 and 2.
1.
Cuba Covert Activities.
A lengthy discussion took place on covert action potential
to weaken the Castro regime. The first part of the discussion
constituted an exchange of opinion of a general nature.
The following points were emphasized: Continued covert
action received support although divergence on the level of
activity was registered. There was a consensus that the present
level of operations was no longer effective in attaining the
basic objective of toppling Castro but harassment might keep
the regime off balance. There was an area of disagreement on
proofs of effectiveness of current and past measures.
Mr. Bundy summarized the dilemma by noting that the high
risk, dangerous operations are the rewarding ones and the low
noise, innocuous operations prove to be unrewarding.
Mr. Mann emphasized that considerably more homework had
to be completed before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled).
Mr. Bundy indicated that a Cabinet level meeting with higher
authority would have to be held eventually to determine how far
the United States was willing to go. Mr. Bundy turned the discussion
to the specific Department of Defense paper.
On Sabotage, Mr. Vance stated that he could speak for
the Secretary of Defense%; his attitude had turned to a harder
line.
On Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba, para-
graph 2.a. was considered work in progress. On paragraph 2.b...
the attitude was negative, particularly as to ships of other
than Cuban flag.
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On Covert Economic Activities, paragraph 3.a. is
part of the present program. Paragraphs 3.b. and c.
are part of an overall blacklisting problem which remains
to be explored.
On Encouraging Dissidence Among Factions,
consensus was to intensify these activities.
the
Actions against Cuban Subversion in Latin America,
paragraphs 1 and 2: A good look should be taken at this
type of activity and a determination should be made on a
country-by-country and case-by-case basis.
On the last paragraph of the paper, it was decided
that these efforts constitute work in progress with the
exception of shipping surveillance which is under active
study by the Department of Defense. A paper on this
problem will be ready next week. It was understood that
this was an expression of members' opinion on types of
action but that specific operational proposals would be
submitted to the Special Group as heretofore.
Mr. Bundy then asked Mr. Mann to prepare papers covering
the major issues of Caribbean surveillance, the blacklisting
of firms trading with Havana, covert actions, and types of
retaliation.
2.
Review Programs
On the review programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan,
and China, it was agreed that the papers as prepared were the
most useful way to present the material to members. Mr. Vance
indicated he had a number of questions in depth but that he would
not take the time at this meeting. Mr. McCone then directed that.
the area specialists would be made available at Mr. Vance's con-
venience to answer any questions he might have. Mr. Bundy
concluded that since a time factor was not involved, formal approval
of these papers could be made at a future meeting. Mr. Johnson
remarked that State had already registered its approval.
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone
TAEH SH
Peter Jessu
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24 February 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 20 February 1964
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
98
✓ The "Proposed Covert Funding of the Somali Parliamentary
Elections" was approved by the Special Group.
The previously considered review program papers on France,
Japan, Tibet, Taiwan, and China also were approved. J
The minutes of the Special Group meeting of 13 February 1964
were modified at the request of Mr. Vance in the following context:
In paragraph one under "Cuba Covert Activities," subheading
Sabotage, the phrase "he fully supported the paper under discussion"
has been substituted for "his attitude had turned to a harder line."
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Peter fromp
Peter Jessup
Distribution
Mr.
Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone
See Special Minutes
for additional item
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28 February 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 27 February 1964
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
Mr. Bruce Cheever was also present for Item 1.
1. Cuba
The Special Group approved the following infiltration/exfiltration
and/or caching and resupply operations: Numbers 411, 3121, 415, 422,
431, 3126, 432, 423, 416, 433, 434, and 3122, with the proviso that
in regard to Number 434, a double agent operation, the cache would
contain money and medicine but no weapons in case the Cubans decide
to terminate the operation and publicize the cache.
The four sabotage missions, specifically Numbers 414, 3111, 424,
and 3112, were again placed in abeyance pending eventual resolution.
by higher authority of the entire problem of higher noise level
operations.
2.
Kenya
-98.
The Political Action Operation on Kenya was approved without
discussion..
・コ
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone
Palin
Peter Jessu
Please see special minute
for additional items.
Yonc
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3 April 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
PRESENT:
Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 2 April 1964
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. John Waller was present for Item 3.
Colonel Ralph D. Steakley was present for Item 4.
Cuba
-
Proposed Operations during April 1964.
In discussing the proposed Cuban operations for the month of
April 1964 and three separate papers submitted to all members for
noting, the following conclusions were reached: The five infiltra-
Ation/exfiltration operations were approved as were the five caching
operations. However, the five sabotage proposals were tabled.
Referring to the paper entitled, "Status of Sabotage and Raiding
Capability against Cuba," Mr. FitzGerald emphasized the economic and
morale aspects of maintaining this potential and the influences of
deterioration when it remains in stand-by status. Mr. Bundy then
stated that the time was overdue for submitting to higher authority
the entire question of covert operations against Cuba. The problem
of autonomous exile groups and their potential for conducting oper-
ations on their own and the momentum of these groups even if support
should be cut off was also discussed. It was clear that the groups
headed by Artime and Ray constitute a considerable threat.
Mr. Bundy indicated that next week he would call a meeting with
higher authority and the Secretaries of Defense and State. Mr.
FitzGerald would outline the current status of operations against
Cuba, and it was hoped that definite policy lines could be determined
for future covert activity against Castro.
98
2.
Chile
-
Support for Chilean Presidential Elections of
4 September 1964.
The paper, "Support for Chilean Presidential Elections," was
approved. Mr. FitzGerald announced that a solution to the slight
difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the CAS in Santiago
Please see special minute
for additional items.
ок
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98
had been reached and that attribution of U.S. support would be
inferred but there should be no evidence of proof. Mr. FitzGerald
indicated that this was operationally feasible.
98
3. Zanzibar
-
Proposed Political Action
The paper on Proposed Political Action in Zanzibar was
approved. Mr. Waller gave a short briefing on the operational
climate which emphasized the cooperative attitude of the British
services and the growing likelihood that Jomo Kenyatta could be
persuaded to support the West more actively.
98
JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast.
The JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast for April 1964 was
approved.
C
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone
Peter Jessup
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SECRET
23
BYE 2656-64
28 APR 1964
Series B, Copy 1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Overflight of Cuba on 1 May
1. Although it may, in fact, have little substance, the thought occurs
that if Castro is seriously considering a "shoot-down" of a U-2, from
a propaganda standpoint he could not select a better time than 1 May,
the traditional Communist holiday, and more significantly the Fourth
'Anniversary of the "infamous" Francis Gary Powers incident.
2. From a psychological viewpoint, identification of a new U-2
shoot-down with that incident on May Day four years ago might have
considerable appeal to Fidel and might conceivably influence his judg-
ment in reaching a determination to take such action.
3. Recognizing that this association is rather tenuous, it might
still be worth considering a stand-down of U-2 overflights on that one
day. This would not seriously impair our intelligence effort and it
would deprive Castro of the opportunity to exploit this rather unique
circumstance should he have any inclination to do so.
•OK?
Jenis A.
JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)
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TOLL
EYES ONLY
1 May 1964
MITMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
PRESENT:
Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Croup, 30 April 1964
General Carter
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Vance,/and Mr. McCone.
Colonel J. C. King and Assistant Secretary of State Mann
were present for Item 1.
Mr. Bruce Cheever and Mr. Theodore Shackley were present
for Item 2. Assistant Secretary Mann was also present
for Item 2.
1.
The Chilean Situation
98
a. During a 35-minute discussion of the 4 September Chilean
election, Assistant Secretary of State Mann and Colonel J.C. King
outlined some of the problems and prospects for the Frei candidacy.
Colonel King, who had recently returned from Santiago, outlined some
of the covert efforts planned or underway which included financial
support to Frei, Italian CDU assistance, emphasis on the woman's vote,
Catholic and labor union assistance, fragmentizing the opposition
Socialist party, distribution of propaganda, and possible assistance
from long-standing United States industrial interests.
b. Some of the obstacles faced by the democratic forces were
underscored: the strong Chilean anti-clerical tradition, the unimpeded
rise in the cost of living, the formidable outside support being afforded
Allende, the political apathy of the military and the third man candidacy
of Duran.
C. The Special Group decided: (a) that contact should be made with
Ambassador Cole to urge his return for a visit in the coming weeks,
(b) that talks with American business interests should proceed to deter-
mine the amount and method of their support, and (c) It was further decided
that higher authority would be apprised of the closeness and importance of
this Chilean election and that the Group itself would continue to review
the problem in the coming weeks. J
2. The Current Cuban Operational Climate and the Proposed Operations
for May 1964.
a. A 25-minute briefing was provided on Cuban operations by the Chief
of CAS, Miami, Mr. Theodore Shackley. He gave a thorough summary of the
policy framework in which programs have been established and provided detail
on the techniques used to accomplish these missions. He enumerated successes
achieved to date and indicated the types of difficulty encountered.
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The briefing was well received and members expressed the opinion
that the session had been extremely useful.
b. The Special Group approved the proposed infiltration/
exfiltration operations into Cuba during May 1964.
3.
98
Recruitment of Chinat Personnel for Maritime Operations of 34-A.
a.
On the proposal to recruit Chinat personnel for maritime operations
of 34-A, Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone were in favor and felt that enactment of
the maritime program was long overdue. It was noted that the Ambassador
had already registered approval. State, however, requested that the matter
be held in abeyance until the return from Ottawa on 1 May of Alexis Johnson
and Secretary of State Rusk. Mr. Hughes felt that the introduction of
additional Chinese Nationalists into this theatre was not in accordance
with existing policy. Mr. Bundy was of the opinion that the proposed
temporary introduction of 64 persons for sea operations was not a signi-
ficant number.
b. As the minutes were going to press on 1 May, the Secretary of
the Special Group was informed by telephone that State Department agreement
was obtained with the following proviso: That an intensive and high
priority effort on training of South Vietnam Nationals be undertaken as
rapidly as possible "for future maritime operations.")
4.
-
Action 29 OPLAN 34-A
98
Action 29, OPLAN 34-a, proposed by DOD was disapproved.
5.'
Monthly Forecasts
98
a. The NRO Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved.
b.
The JRC Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved.
Peta
Peter Jessup
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone
EYES ONLY
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SUBJECT:
ROM HE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS
TO THE SPECIAL GROW
Standby Capability for the Launching of
Propaganda Leaflet Balloons
6 JAN A
1. The purpose of this sesorandum is to present for
your consideration and approval, a proposal to modify
current status of the CIA propaganda balloon launching
capability. If approved, CIA proposes to cease the rental
of helium and tanks, which vill mean that if utilisation of
the capability is desired, either Department of Defense
will have to provide the helius or it will have to be
commercially procured at
considered acceptable.
time. These alternates are
2. BACKOROURED: In the fall of 1963 the CIA as part of
the NEWGOGUE program, as approved by the Special Group
(Augmented), developed a covert capability for the launching
propaganda leaflet balloons targetted against
capability consisted of a properly outfitted merekant
vemael, ostensibly chartered and operated by Cuban exilem.
In December 1962 and in the early months of 1963, several
proposals were made by
utilize this capability
13-00000
but each time they were tabled for further consideration.
In April 1963 a specific proposal to launch propaganda
balloons on May Day 1969 ves submitted to the Special Group
and on 9 April 1863, the proposal me dimpproved by higher
authority (see Nemerandus for Mosbers of the Special Group
from Mr. Thomas Parrott, dated 9 April 1963). In view of
he prevailing mituation, the CIA proposed to dismantle the
capability as it was expensive to mintain and its security
to deteriorate. However, at the 18 April 1963
meeting of the Special Group, several members of the Group
felt that in a crisis such a capability might be useful and
it me agreed the CIA would stockpile the balloons, helium
and other equipment and be prepared to ssust operations se
required utilising U.B, Navy or
vessels and crews,
(See Minutes
provided by the Department of Defense.
of 18 April 1963 Meeting of the Apesial Group.) In accord-
ance with this directive, the CIA has stered the required
equipment and has been keeping heliuma on band on a rental
baata.
3. The annual expense for maintaining this capability
99
on a standby basis has been approximately [$20,000] of which
99
$18,500 has benn for the rental of helium tanks and
presser. ▲ review of the capability lends the CIA to the
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conclusion that the empability can be maintained at an
neceptable degree of readiness without having the helium
tanks on hand. In the event utilimatica is desired, the
Department of Defense would be able to provide the helium
as well as the launching vessele and creme or if necessary,
helium could be commercially precured within the time
factor necessary to ready the other composeats of the
CIA therefore proposes to terminate its
current arrangements for the rental of the helium tanks
and ongressor.
4. It is requested thi approval be granted for the
CIA to proceed, as outlined in paragraph 2 above, with the
termination of rental contracts for helium tanks and coa—
presser.
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EYES ONLY
4 June 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
PRESENT:
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 4 June 1964
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
98
Litaly
At the request of Mr. McCone, the paper on the covert action.
program in Italy for FY-1965 was deferred until he had time to study
it more carefully J
2.
NSAM 303
NSAM 303 was circulated and the new designation for the Special
Group 5412, the 303 Committee, was noted.
3.
North Vietnain
98
a. The DOD paper dated 19 May 1964 entitled "North Vietnam
Operations" was discussed at some length.
b. Each annex of the paper was noted. In Annex A, Physical
Destruction Target List, the members concurred in Mr. Vance's recom-
mendation to accept all targets with the exceptions of 1, 5, and 7.
Target 5 was bracketed with Nos. 14 and 15 in Annex B and is subject
to the same treatment indicated below.
C. In Annex B, Psychological Operations, the listed targets
were approved except that Nos. 14 and 15 were to be examined further
by DOD and CIA on the operational level. Mr. McCone stated that in
regard to the Meo tribesmen (No. 14) this had been a CIA operation for
some months and should be continued to be handled in the same way. He
further felt that tribal operations of this type should be done covertly.
d. In regard to Annex C, Intelligence Operations, the targets
1, 2, and 3 were approved and the Committee agreed to Mr. Vance's veto
of target
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for Additional Item
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4.
Cuba
This minute also notes the telephonic approval obtained from all
members on 30 May for a single emergency exfiltration operation in and
out of Cuba scheduled for early June.
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone
Peter Jessup
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SECRET
EYES ONLY
22 June 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 18 June 1964
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Mann and Mr. FitzGerald were also present.
A general discussion was held on problems arising from increased
activities on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent
adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and the general edginess
and instability on the island.
None of those present appeared to feel that it was either realistic or
practical to sever connections with or to withdraw support from the two
principal emigre organizations, those of Artime and Ray.
The recent escapades and overall capabilities of Manolo Ray were
deplored but it was agreed first: that steps should be taken to get the Puerto
Rican authorities to release his ship; second: that he should be promptly.
advised in accordance with the stated policy established by the late President
to cease forthwith all activities from the United States Mainland and find
himself a new base of operations; third: no monies would be forthcoming,
specifically a requested $25,000, until point two above has been accomplished.
No help was to be offered in finding Ray a new Caribbean base. Mr. Mann
was particularly interested that Ray not be encouraged to transfer to the
Dominican Republic because of the fragility of the regime.
The next subject discussed was the recent visit of Major Oliva to both
the Attorney General and Assistant Secretary Mann. It was pointed out that
Oliva is both a zealot and a man of integrity and that his only interest in life
is leading a return to his homeland. Any attempts to put Oliva into business
would be expensive and undesirable at this time. It was decided that
Mr. Bundy would ask the Attorney General if he would be willing to dampen
Oliva's ardor.
The activities of Artime from Nicaragua were discussed next. Alexis
Johnson pointed out that Artime raids could conceivably provoke Castro into
utilizing Cuban SAM sites; he said this possibility should not be discounted.
But it was also pointed out that Artime's recent sugar mill raid succeeded
in leading Castro to mobilize many persons involved in important sugar
harvesting and thus constituted a successful economic warfare byproduct.

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It was estimated that Artime's schedule of one operation per month was
overly optimistic; one every three months was about all Artime could
accomplish. The decision was to drive home to Artime that his greatest
value was not in hazardous hit-and-run actions but in his survival as a
continuing psychological threat in being.
Mr. FitzGerald, in discussing the current situation in Cuba, stated that
he believed the regime was in considerable difficulty. There has been a
large increase in the number of executions and mass arrests. He also cited
the fact that an entire CIA Pinar del Rio net has been rolled up by Castro's
security forces and the key man executed. The sugar and crop prospects
were not good, the world price having dropped. Some of the members were
surprised at this picture and stated it did not seem to conform to the daily
bulletins. Mr. McCone said that he would ask for a SNIE on the current
situation in Castro Cuba.
A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld
to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical
of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further.
Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on
notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity
of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy
would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law
enforcement.
Distribution:
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr.
McCone
Peter Jessup
SECRET
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