176-10033-10145
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RECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10145
RECORD SERIES: Church Committee
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM
TO
Schlessinger, Jr.
Kennedy, John F
TITLE: CIA Reorganization
DATE: 6/30/1961
PAGES: 15
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE: Paper, Textual
CLASSIFICATION: Declassified
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 2/14/2001
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
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SANITIZED
My: 11.261 â 5/12
SECRETI
June 30, 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization
6
Cia
I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the
war and served as a periodic CLA consultant in the years since.
On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the
nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence
agency are unknowný; all the public hears about (or should hear
about) are its errøve. But, again in the nature of the case, an
agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few
visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my
judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has
about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically
non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably
in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly
reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for
developments of which it is wholly innocent.
The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced
to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate;
and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) än inadequate
doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of
the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate
#Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its
occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable
publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost
nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed
them (e. g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The
Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, NN. 6,
13, 1954).
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conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence.
The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these prob-
lems can perhaps be alleviated.
CIA Autonomny
GIA conducts three main forms of secret works clandestine intellt.
gence collections covert political operations; and paramilitary
activities. It cassies on these functions with relative autonomy.
The reasons for the autonomy are historical.
When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in
terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this
new venture with suspicion and remunced the opportunity to acize
firm control of CIA operations. I did not, for example, try tò
establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and
come ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what GIA was up to
in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and
the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed
CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.
In the meantime, CIA grew in sise and power. · During the fifties it
began in some areas to onfetrip the State Department in the quality of
ite personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even
more perhaps because Alten Dulles gave his people courageque pro-
tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold
a large number of able and independent-saindad men, The more it
added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations
developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.
By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problerne
created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had tong since minced
the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State re-
tained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, thie wae
to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation
almost as à fält accompli; State never had title to control evert
clandestine intelligence collections and it had tost ground in such
areas as evert political reporting and even in the maintenence of
overt diplomatic contactér
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3.
For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral-
leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of
the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political
desks and military staffa; it has in effect its own foreign service;
it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air
force. Its annual budget is about times that of the State Depart-
ment. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristica
of a state within a state.
II. Doctrine
Though GIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been
able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our donduct of
clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA in the extent
to which ita various clandestine missions are compatible with a free
and open society.
Yet
It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such,
we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in con•
opiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organi-
sation is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means
contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order
to give more freedom to GIA, no one seriously wishes to do that.
I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits
which the maintenance of an open caciety places on secret activity.
Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and under-
steed. The problem which must be faced in; what sort of secret
activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?
We must begin. I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States
will continue to be a nation in which politiciano will ask questions and
make speeches, reportere will dig out stories, newspapere will pub-
lish editorials, individuals, driven by promptinge of conscience, will
blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on We do not wish to
change these thinge and could not do so without violating the essence
of our society. These things make up the framework to which CIA
must operate, In short, they constitute the problems and, as
General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the
problem."
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There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret
activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the
principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be
permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and
practices.
Each form of secret activity presents ite own problem. Clandestine
intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national
state. Es rules and usages are fairly well established. In the
main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no
great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook
and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the
limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for
· example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and
whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to barm other activities
of the government.
Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions
arise when it is necessary to subsidico newspapers, politiciano and
organisations in other countries. But cerruption of the political life
of another mation is not a responsibility to bë lightly assumed. I
wonder whether GIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it.
Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if
only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.
In general, I would suggests that any secret operation whose, success to
dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and
journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken
only when the criste is so considerable that the gains really seem to
outweigh the disadvantages. This suggeste that the size of the pro»
posed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations esa
bo done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater
the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on
thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society,
the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it to that an overwhelming
case be made for its necesalty,
In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only
esk whether the operation to technically feasible in its own terms; we
must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any
serious way false to its own principles.
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III. Operations and Policy
Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context
of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their
relationship to United States foreign policy.
CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U. 6.
foreign policy.
1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from
State Department control. "This fact exposes American foreign poltay
to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting
· agents or developing sourace in a friendly country. The recent
Singapore case, when GIA, without notice to the Consul General,
tried to subvest a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore ·
Polico provides an instructive example. After complications of
Iudicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to
a lis-detector test, It turned out that the secruit had long since
informed his superiore of the CIA approach and was leading CIA
into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrass-
ment to relations between the US and the Singapore government.
There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in
Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sascho
to work in a CIA-NGA operation).
CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Depart-
ment in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation,
In short, no one knows how many potential problems for UB foreign
policy \-- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are
boing created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations,
Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the
advantage to be gained by the operation (esg., the information derivable
from an agent within the Special Branch of the Stagapore Palice) out»
weighs the rick feŋgy, assaporating the local goverament and shaking
its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense), Clandestine
intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Depart-
ment of State and (anve for exceptional instances and on agreement of
the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassados.
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6.
2. Covert political operations technically require State
Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been
able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's sale almost
to that of a rubber stamp.
This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and
· activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence
of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA
with the assignment of developing covert political campaigne or
organising coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men
naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that
they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many
coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' hao
legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably
´in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency
planning, ' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of
personnel, created a vested interest which often transforma contin-
gencies into apparent nécessities. Thus, if a group is assembled
and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the
project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and
allenation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through
on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor,
of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the
Guhan force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and
embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in
foreign lando, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must there.
after do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security
or even go ever to the Comununists. This approach has made us en
ocassion the prisoners of our own agents.
#We become prisoners of our agente in another canse toe. The Cuban
spisode leaves the strong impression that CIA is nat able to central ite
own tow-level operatives, While the CIA people in Washington are mên
of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are some-
times tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own
and not necessartly in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes
of the operation. Such actions as lecking up the Revolutionary Council,
such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly
trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and
third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfa Nodal Tarafa and
16 other democratie Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things
gé on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly
acquainted.
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7.
6
It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of en
opération only in its later stages, is under great pressure fo
endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged
evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Toss
Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Guba:
“I would never have favored initiating this operations but, since it
has gone as far as it has. I do not think we can risk calling it off.
Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activiem,
State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, canto itself in
a prissy, clesy, negative sole. The advocate of clandestine activities
seems 'tough' and realistic: the opponent has to invoke such fotangibles
so the reputation of the United States, world public opinion. "What
∙ do we say in the United Nations?ª, etc., and ecome hopetosely
idealistic, legalistic and 'peft. '
The result of GIA's initiative in covert political operations has been
to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department.
This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote
in his 1947 memorendum to the Senate Armed Bervices Committed,
"The Central Intelligence Agency should have gathing to do with policy,"
Yet, in the yeare since, CLA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many
parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know
that they have even bean targete of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not
a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the
United States. Indonesis, of course, is a prime example.
This experience suggadta that the present system by which CIA nètliteg
State of a projected covert operation to inadequate to protect UB
interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed
of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception
and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will con
timus to confront State with propositions having potential impact on
foreign policy but et too late a point to subject that impact to rënë
able control.
3. The Controllsë American Source (GAS) represents e partienler
aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy making functions. CIA today
has nearly so many people under official cover overness as State --
3900 to 3760. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover
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(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other nan-State
official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for
CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary.
The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should
not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems,
but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in
this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel,
find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department. None-
theless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.
Lf
There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention
of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange dQVER
through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the
security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a
pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the
CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.
In some missions, I understand, GAS personnel outnumbers regular
State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna,
out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List sö
being in the Folitical Section, 16 are CAS persammelt of the 31 officere
listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the
13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile,
11 are CAG. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent
of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS,
Sometimes the CIÀ mission chief has been in the country longer, has
more money at hie diepoast, wields more influence (and is abler) than
the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime
Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he purgues
a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally
well known locally as the CIA representative.
In the Parts Embassy today, there are 128 GLA people. GIA in Paris
has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally
occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting
outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2, CIA hae
even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalt.
ties, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupiss
the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on
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the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted
with amusement that the top floor was ablage with lights. (I am
informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that
night to the CIA offices only with difficulty. }
CIA is apparently now Ärmly committed to the CAS approach as a
permanent solution for its problema. It is pressing to have GIA
· people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses contral of
more and more of its presumed oversess personnel, and before GAS
becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would
seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control
over the local GAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive
of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with
an eye to a steady reduction of CAS persoane).
4. Paramilitery warfare. I gather, is regarded in some quartere
as a purely technical ma assily detachable from policy and there-
fore à proper function of the Department of Defende. Yet there is
almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political
contant than paramilitary warfare.
There are several reasons for this. For one thing, & paramilitary
operation is in its nature à large and attributable operation and thereby.
de suggested above, clashes with the presuppositione of our open
society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the
training of, say, the South Vietnamese in gusseilla tactics or to the
support of stready existing guerrille activities.) For another, the
moral and political price of direct paramliſtary failure is acute for
Còmmuniste, when they stimulate paramilitary setivity, are
doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear
to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to
compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, Be the recent Algerian
episode showed, ante we convince the world that we are committed to a
paramilitary endeavor, wo will be blamed for all sorts of things. And,
as the recent tractors for-prisonera estsode showed, when we do send
men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the
books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about
Liquidating a losing show,
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Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military
men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla
succeede when his program enlists grassroote support; and it is
very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him.
Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the
guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 50, 000 men out there
and will clean the situation up in the three months. Marshall,
who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines,
replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed
you to death.
Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over-
coring guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.
"
"
In
Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since
the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection
closed the northern border: in the Philippines; and in Malaya.
the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the
combination of political and military countermeasures.
The struggle
in Malaya, sa Fleid Marshal Terapler understood (and said), was for
the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only
paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organisation
of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence.
If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the and WOT
Iles in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse
the countryside. "Without a political geal," wrote Mao Tse-tung,
"guerrilla warfare must fall, as it must if its političal objectives do
not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy,
cooperation and assistance cannot be gained. "He added, “Do we
want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the
masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal
and woe."
For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as
primarily a military weapon. It te primarily a political weapon and
must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight,
It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than
transforsed to Defense
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Here I wonder whether the
The notable feature of the
5. How to Establieb Policy Control?
British experience might not be of value.
British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine
activity under strict Foreign Office control.
in a number of ways)
This control is achieved
a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6} itself operates undes
the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a
Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrich Dean, who
is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes
the Service Intelligence directore and representatives of the
Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well
as the Chief of 815.
b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not
by 813, but by the Information Research Department in the
Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental
Working Group on International Comesunist Fronts, and under
the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of
the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Fareign
Office.
e) BIS covert political action campaigns must not only con-
form to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the
appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks,
d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern opera-
tique in special áreaò, such ea, for example. Sino-Soviet sela-
tiene es the World Youth Festival,
a Foreign Office Staff Listçon Officer site nest to the 819
Chief, and Forsign Office officials serve toure of duty in 803
sections.
All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Departments.
Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would
retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all
points subject to State Department clearanco »o à clearance to be
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12.
enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of
working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department
persomnel into the intelligence agency.
Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the
State Departraent itself were prepared to overcome its inbred
habite of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and
purposeful grip on the situation.
IV. Gorations and Intelligence
The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particu-
larly perplexing questions. Intelligence' includes two separable
activities: clandestino collections and research, analysis and
evaluation. The first deals with that omali portion of raw intelli-
gence procured by secret means (Ms. Pulles estimated in 1947 that
"a proper analysts of the intelligence obtainable by . west,
normal, and aboveboard moans would supply us with ever 80 percent,
I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of cur
national polley"); the second lnvelves the cellation and interpretation
of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of
estimated.
• •
Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the
Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysie and estimating
function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.
Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both
clandestine collection and research and analyste, The State Depart»
ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and
analyäto responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established
control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such
é way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting ita views to CIA
for àcceptance or rejection. In other words, whose in Great Britain
the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field,
in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA,
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13.
The argument against incorporating the research and estimate
function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper
judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that
information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to
weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facte, without
baving either the facts or the conctustons warped by the inevitable
and even proper prejudices of the maen whose duty it is to determino
policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to
be blind to any facts which might tend to grove the policy to be
faulty.
Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against
the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA »-
1. c., if intelligence is too closely connected with operatione, then
these committed to è particular operation will tend to select out the
intelligence which validates the operation.
Obviously both argumente conclude in a case for the establishment of
a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E
group in too independent, one runa into the opposite danger, that to,
that neither policy nor operationg will be subjected to adsquate
intelligence checké,
The trouble with the Guban operation, for example, was not that
intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the
Cuban operation evaded cystematic intelligence judgment. The in«
telligence branch (DDD) of GLA was never informed of the existence
of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never
salted to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent
had reached the point in Cube where a successful landing operation
would prevoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the
Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates
produced genøral appræfente of the Cuban situation, but these were
wholly independent of the Cuban operation, I gather that, if ite
opinion had been invited, DPI would have given quite a different
entimete of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the opera¬
tion was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation
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14.
that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars
by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA,
was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. Tho
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State
knew even less about the Cuban operation.
The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent
of both policy and operations to røsist the pressure to make the case
for vested ideas and interests ot ❤ yet sufficiently close to be able to
subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and
searching scrutiny.
Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become
subordinate to State, as ME-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E
function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde-
pendent of both State and SIA, yet closely connected with both in day-
to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence
from CIA and from State, #ds well as from the services and, of course,
from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DD!
and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain
of the service functions now confided to CIA¨«« photographic interpre-
tation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collec-
tion, măpê, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board
with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with
State Department or White House chairman.
V. Conclusion..
The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrange●
ment of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity
of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do
so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department es at
present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this te
not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of
intelligence. It is an ergument for a drastic overhaul of the State
Department.
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15.
· The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this
memorandum would be as follows:
This
1) The State Department would be granted general
clearance authority over all clandestine äctivity,
might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment
of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who
would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might
serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.
2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include repre-
sentatives from all elements in the intelligence community
and also from the White House.
3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be
reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Informa•
tion Service). This new agency would be charged with responsi-
bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations
and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance.
In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation●
ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA
presently do.
4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again
bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordi»
nate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged
with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would
include CIA/DDL the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in
State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA
(photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast
monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, avert collection, etc. ),
It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.
cc:
The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan
Arthur Schlesingër, jv.
SECRET