File #:
62-116395
Serial Scope:
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 1
267 Three 268
268×1
269
269X1 Three 275
277 THRU 280
282 THRU 288
290 THRU 293
295 THRU 299
Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025
62-116395
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1
.
Mr W. R. Wannall
1
Mr. W. O. Cregar
June 17, 1975
1
-
Mr. K. A. Mendenhall
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE:
SUPERSEDED SECTIONS OF THE
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS
Reference is made to the SSC memorandum, with
attached appendices, dated April 30, 1975, requesting
I certain documents and other information from the FBI.
Part one of referenced memorandum requested this
Bureau to make available for review various superseded
sections of the Manual of Instructions (MOI), Appendix A
attached to referenced memorandum set forth the sections
requested for review. Mr. Mark Gitenstein, SSC Staff
Member, has advised FBI Special Agent Paul V. Daly that
revisions to the MOI should cover the period January 1,
1960, to the present.
These superseded sections are now ready for
review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared
personnel of the SSC Staff. It should be noted that for the
period January 1, 1960, to the present, there were no
revisions of MOI Sections 95 and 97.
1 The Attorney General
KAM: sdjs sdjs
(8)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SPACI
MDR-16
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
whee
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _ MAIL ROOM
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 2
TELETYPE UNIT
"
Релі
-2991
в
KAM
J
GPO 1975 O-569-920
62-116-7S
CLOSURE
2
(1
1
-
Mr.
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
1
(
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
W. R. Wannall
June 17, 1975
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. K. A. Mendenhall
сад
Reference is made to a memorandum from the SSC
dated April 30, 1975, with attached appendices A thru C
requesting certain documents and other information from
the FBI.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to SSC
is the original of a memorandum which responds to one of the
requests contained in above SSC memorandum.
A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for
your records.
| Enclosures (2)
62-116395
1 The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
KAM:sdjs
(9)
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
REC-102
62-116875-299
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
ENCLOSURE
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Evol.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Se
_
1975 ROOM
"Docid 32989609 Page 3
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
SPEACHY
: DATE 10-25-2000 BYS
MIR-16
TELETYPE UNIT
PLM
дн
W. PROREGAR. 4063 gett
-
1969
5-8
Re:
NOTE:
Superseded Sections of the
Manual of Instructions
Pursuant to a prior SSC request, we furnished them
current MOI Sections 36, 84, 86, 87, 88, 95, 97 and 122.
Due to the sensitive nature of Sections 105, 107 and 130,
these were made available for review only at FBIHQ.
Listed below are the Intelligence Division
representatives and the MOI sections reviewed for this
project:
Section 36-Espionage
Section 84-Registration Act
Section 86-Sabotage
Section 87-Investigations of
Subversive Organizations and
Individuals
Section 88-Sedition
Section 105-Internal Security-
Nationalistic Tendency
Section 107-Internal Security
Informants and Confidential
Sources; and Foreign Counter-
intelligence Assets
Section 122-Extremist Matters
and Civil Unrest
James W. Johnson
Dennis R. Dickson
CI-1
CI-3
Louis J. Brune
IS-2
William N. Preusse
IS-2
Thomas J. McNiff
IS-2
George J. Lex
IS-2
James W. Johnson
CI-1
Howard W. Dare, Jr.
CI-2
CI-3
IS-2
CI-1
CI-2
CI-3
IS-1
IS-1
Dennis R. Dickson
Edward P. Grigalus
James W. Johnson
Howard W. Dare, Jr.
Dennis R. Dickson
Robert D. Shea
Section 130-Extremist Informants Robert D. Shea
and Sources
As previously noted, there were no MOI revisions
during the period of interest to Section 95-Treason and
Section 97-Voorhis Act.
The revisions of the MOI requested by SSC consists
of approximately 2,200 pages and is approximately 9" in
height. Due to the bulkiness of these revisions, they are
not being attached to this memorandum.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 4
2
a
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Addressee:
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
☐ Memo ☐ Report dated
6/17/75
LTR ☑ LHM
U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Superseded
Caption of Document: Sections of the Manual of Instructns
Part I SSC memorandum 4/30/75.
Originating
FBI
Ray Date:
Delivered by:
i
Re Sived by:
6/20/75
3:10
PM
1. Title of age
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 5
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 
BY SP
MDR-16
дастров
•
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
TO:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
FROM:
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
x
SSC
C. Benz, Office Manager
6/17/75
HSC
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Superseded Sections of the Manual of Instructions
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part I.
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
*****
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Operating Procedures
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY
MDR-16
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
At the request of SSC, specified superseded sections of
this Bureau's Manual of Instructions, covering the period 1/1/60
to the present, have been made available at FBIHQ for review by
SSC Members.
TREAT AS YELLOW
шосето
En
62-116395
TJM:1hb
(4)
3791 (6-75)
5-74
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 6
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
INSTRUCTIONS
☛ Type or print clearly in ink.
•
•
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 7
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
0
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
2
1
I
MA. Mintz
(1 Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
1
-
1
-
Mr. R. D. Shea
June 17,
1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training _
Legal Coun.
Telephone
Reference is made to a letter, and appendices thereto,
from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents
and other information from the FBI.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is an original of a memorandum which is responsive
to their request.
records.
A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for your
Enclosures (2)
62-116395
1 The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
RDS: jmnjmv
(9)
ENCLOS
IL ROOM
-Docla MA09 Page 8
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
REC-102
H
62.116315-298
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE BY SPAC
MDR-46
TELETYPE UNIT
Jod
Pin
god
L 2 1975
Tril
wered to C. Ben de
Loud Cui
дом
GPO 1975 O-569-920
62-116395
2
1
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
-
Mr. W. O.
Cregar
1
Mr. R. D. Shea
June 17, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTED
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE:
REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
Reference is made to SSC letter to the Attorney General,
with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain
documents and other information from the FBI.
In Appendix D, captioned "Request Pertaining to
Electronic Surveillance," the SSC desired a response to the
following request:
Item 15. "All July and August memoranda from former
Special Agent (SA) Leo T. Clark to the Assistant Special Agent
in Charge (ASAC) or the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the
Newark, New Jersey, Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), captioned 'Protection of the President White House
Inquiry.
# #
In regard to the aforementioned, a thorough review of
the files of the Newark Office of the FBI did not reveal the
existence of a file bearing the caption, "Protection of the
President White House Inquiry." However, this review did
disclose the existence of a file bearing the caption, "Protection
of the President." A thorough review of this file failed to
uncover any remoranda emanating from former SA Leo T. Clark at
any time.
In addition, a thorough review of other files main-
tained at the Newark Office believed relevant to the subject
matter of this inquiry, did not reveal any memoranda, lotters
or other type communications prepared by former SA Clark.
A thorough review of pertinent FBIHQ files discloses
no nemoranda emanating from former SA Clark regarding this
ratter.
1
-
The Attorney General
RDS:jmn
(8)
pur gut
jmn
TELETYPE UNIT
ENCLOSURE
MAIL ROOM
KW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 9
шкил
T√M
SEE NOTE PAGE 2
62.116378-79%
GPO 1975 O-569-920
:
Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance
NOTE:
Telephonic instructions were issued to the Newark
Office to respond to Item 15, in SSC letter 5/14/75. By airtel
dated 5/30/75 and teletype dated 6/5/75, Newark advised that
their review regarding Item 15 was negative. Material reviewed
at FBIHQ included, the "Disruption of Democratic National
Convention; Information Concerning" file; records of the
Inspection Division regarding the "Special Squad, Atlantic City,
New Jersey, National Convention, August 22-28, 1964," personnel
files of former Assistant to the Director DeLoach, Assistant
Director W. C. Sullivan, former SA's Leo T. Clark and Frederick
Baumgardner. Above material did not make reference to or con-
tain any memoranda prepared by SA Clark regarding the Democratic
National Convention held at Atlantic City, New Jersey, from
8/22-28/64. File review conducted by SA Robert D. Shea.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 10
1
2.

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Adressee:
LTR
☑ LHM
Senate Select Committee
☐ Memo ☐ Report dated
6/17/75
Re:
S. SSC to Study Govt Operations with Respect
Caption of Document: to Intelligence Activities.
Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance
Originating Office:
Richapo
Delivered by:
Rabeived by:
Title:
FBI
chagh Jaylor, Jr.
Off
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
Date:
6/20/75 30 PM
3:10
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 11
ALL DIFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1053000 BY SPRAWN
MDR-TY
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
FROM:
TO:
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
2. DATE PROVIDED
6/17/75
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
x SSC
C. BENZ, Office Manager
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix D, Item 15.
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
111311
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Surveillance
8.
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
F
SSC requested all July and August, 1964, memoranda captioned ·
"Protection of the President - White House Inquiry," prepared by
a former Special Agent of our Philadelphia Office. Search of
Bureau records failed to uncover the existence of any such
documents.
62-116395
TJM:1hb
(4)
3791 (6-75)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-20 BY S
MDR-16
TREAT AS YELLOW
Live
Eus
जू
5-74
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-75
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 12
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
>
INSTRUCTIONS
•
Type or print clearly in ink.
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship tò Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided 3 that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 13
>
7. Revy, 6/23/7
RTE
L
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
О
22
-
Mr. D. W. Moore
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
June 17, 1975
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
-
Mr. R. L. Moore
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
AEM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 16-25-2000 BY.
MDR-16
By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices,
the SSC requested certain information and documents from the
FBI.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum and enclosures which
serve as a response to one of the SSC requests.
There does not appear to be any relation between the
elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division and the mandate
of the Committee contained in Senate Resolution 21.
You may
wish to give specific consideration to this observation before
approving the forwarding of the enclosed documents to the
Committee.
A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being
furnished for your records.
Enclosures
(20)
62-116395
1
REC-102 / 2-116=15-297
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
3 2 1975
F. Dir.
1. AD Adm. -RLM:mam
p. AD Inv. _
. Dir.:
min.
imp. Syst.
3. Affairs
'es & Com.
h. Inv.
nt.
pection
fell.
Laboratory _
an. & Eval. _
c. Inv.
ining
Coun.
one Rm.
(10))
✓ ENCLOSURE
Se3 MAI 1975M ☐
Sed'
TELETYPE UNIT
WWW 86608 Docld:32989609 Page 14
тут
aree
Рем
زیری ك
дет
S-TSM
کا
GPO 1975 O-569-920
Cat
Assoc. Dir.
62-116395
12
1
1
-
-
-
Mr. D. W. Moore
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
June 17, 1975
Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 Mr. R. L. Moore
UNITED STATES SLJATA SELECT CONVITE (850)
IO GIUDI GOVERILITAL OFERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO IIWILLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE:
FURTHER DOCULLETTS PERTAINING TO THE
FBI AID DEPARTI 117 OF JUSTICE
ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND JURISDICTION
Reference is mado to 800 letter dated Day 14,
1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain
documents and other information from the FBI.
Fursuant to your request in Appendix B, Fart II,
Iton number 15, for all remoranda and other materialo
relating to the elimination of the FBI Crime Records
Division in late 1972 or early 1973, enclosed aro coples
of nino FBI communications.
Inclosures (9)
1
The Attorney General
RLM:mam
(9)man)
NOTE:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SPEDUN
SPA
MDR-16
дли
The material furnished contains available information
with reference to the change in name and later elimination of
the Crime Records Division during the period 10/16/72 to 1/3/73.
This matter has been coordinated with Mr. David Divan of the
External Affairs Division. An extensive search by the Files and
Dep. AD Adm. _Communications Division has failed to locate the 10/4/72 memorandum
Dep. AD Inv.-referenced in M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop memorandum, 10/16/72, and
the L. M. Walters memorandum to Mr. Felt, 12/14/72. The letter to
Comp. Syst. Mr. Fletcher Thompson mentioned in the second recommendation,
Ext. Affers page 3, of the 10/16/72 Jones to Bishop memorandum is a letter of
appreciation for the suggestion with reference to the change in
name of the Crime Records Division.
FRLM
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Evol.
Spec. inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _
This document is prepared in response to request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 15
16275-247
ENCLOSURE
Peri
180
Thi
GPO 1975 O-569-920
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Addressee:
☐ LTR ☑ LHM
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Senate Select Committee
Memo
Report dated 6/10/75
U.S. SSC to Study Govt Operations with Respect
Caption of Document: to Intelligence Activities. Re;
Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Dept.
of Justice; Organization, Structure, and
Jurisdiction.
Delivered by: Richard
Received by:
Title:
FBI appendix B, Part II, Stem 15
Being
Office Man
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
300
Date:
6/23/15 20/91
1
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2000 BY SPRAVA Pup
MDR-16
ΤΟ
IONAL
GE 4
NO. 10
אס
EG. NO. 27
D
-010-106
UNITED STA"
GO
RNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. Bishop
FROM
: M. A./Jones
SUBJECT:
SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE
CRIME RECORDS DIVISION
DATE: 10-16-72
By memorandum dated· 10-4-72, attached, it was
indicated that
has suggested
•
a name change for the Crime Records Division to Office
of Public Information or some other more meaningful designation.
It was pointed out that
suggestion
was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop)
have had with members of your staff concerning a possible
name change for the Division.
In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that
he "can think of many reasons for changing the name.
What have been the nature of the reasons for change discussed?"
With the formation of the Computer Systems Division
and the resultant reassignment of the personnel and
the work of the Uniform Crime Reporting Section, including
the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal
Histories file from Crime Records to Computer Systems,
the title "Crime Records," as
has indicated,
is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this
Division is concerned.
"Office of Public Information," which was
suggested by
would inaccurately reflect
the activities and responsibilities of this Division
and could result in confusion with the Office of Public
Information in the Department of Justice. This, of
course, would be undesirable.
Enclosures
:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN LID
HEREIN IS U
DATE 10-26-3000 BY S/CAL/
MDR-16
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use i: limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 17
M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop Memo
RE:
SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION
;
.
It is noted that this Division, which is presently
comprised of the Crime Research Section, and the Correspondence
and Tours Section, is primarily responsible for conducting
extensive research pertaining to crime, crime prevention,..
and other related matters in the law enforcement field.
This Division is involved in the review “and preparation
of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction
and operations received from law enforcement, other Government
agencies, and the general public in those instances where
the Bureau has a responsibility to disseminate such information.
....
"The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin," which is the
official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed
by Crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the
instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law
enforcement profession and the general public. This Division
is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities
for Government officials, law enforcement authorities,
and the general public; directs the program of distributing
informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives
to various media for the purpose of effecting the location
and apprehension of these criminals with the help of citizen
cooperation; and coordinates and supervises the Bureau's
interests in the utilization of radio, television, and
publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsi-
bilities in the law enforcement field by acquainting the
public with the FBI's operations and activities.
In addition, this Division has the custody of'
a number of research and reference files which are maintained
in a current status and which are essential to the Division
in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.
:
Further, this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-
Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as "The FBI" television
series, both of which involve research for their sustenance
and success.
.D
While it is recognized, based on the foregoing,
that this Division is not completely absorbed in research
to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 18
CONTINUED
1
2
-
OVER
܀܀܀
M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop Memo
RE: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION
more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is
*»•»felt, than any other title suggested. It is noted the
more likely alternatives discussed were "Research and
Information Division" and "Research and Correspondence
Division."
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That Mr. Gray approve the renaming of the
Crime. Records Division to Crime Research Division.
pod Gr..
10/22
4:02A
2. That in line with the foregoing, the attached
be approved and sent.
letter to A
Jon
Gr 10122
11:02
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 19
I
3
1
-
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
你
འ་
125
TEAU
*
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535.
(Typed October 27, 1972)
“PERSONAL ATTENTION
Memorandum to All Special Agents in Charge:
RE: NAME CHANGE OF CRIME RECORDS DIVISION
TO CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
In view of the transfer of the record functions
of the Crime Records Division to the Computer Systems
Division, I have approved changing the name of the Crime
Records Division to the Crime Research Division effective
immediately. The Section formerly known as the Crime
Research Section has been renamed Research and Service
Section. Manual changes are forthcoming,
L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting. Director
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
m/p
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SALM
ThDR-16
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 20

то
UPTIONAL FORS, NO. 19
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. BEG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVE INMENT .
Memorandum
THE ACTING DIRECTOR
FROM : W. M. FELT
DATE: 12-1-72
SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION.
S
-
Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is
being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special
assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.
Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of
a major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This
is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the
officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the
ramifications of major cases. Mr. Bishop, with his extensive field back-
ground, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited
to handle this assignment.
"
If he has time. Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop
meaningful practical cases which will enable new agents to meet present-
day needs.
I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities
to be used by Mr. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report
to Mr. Jenkins on Monday, 12-4-72.
1/ ..
is being diverted from his current
inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate
survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the
transfer of its functions to other divisions or to your office.
RECOMMENDATION:
None. For information.
!
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFI
DATE 
10-26-2000 
BYS
MDR-16
n/ap
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation is your comes” Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee c the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 21
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memoran im.
TO
MR. FELT
DATE:
12/6/72
FROM
:
SUBJECT:
.L. M. WALTERSV
SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRİME RESEARCH DIVISION
i
:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 
1-26-2000 BY 
SPRAM
MDR-16
To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer
of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based
on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.
PURPOSE:
"
Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together
with appropriate personnel as follows:
·OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other
nows media formerly handled by Assistant Director Bishop, his front office Agent
personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressional liaison).
Functions and Related Responsibilties:
Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional
telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review
of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public
and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.
Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning
press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commentat:
liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of editorials
and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News
Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding.
press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible.
future use from FBIHQ Divisions.
Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major
public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches
to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.
Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical
of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;.:
This document is prepared in response to or request and is not for dissemi
nation outside your Comm. ec. It's is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
. CONTINUED - OVER
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 22
Supervisory Reorgan, tion of Functions and
*Personnel; Crime Rarch Division
special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison
matters..
Recommended Agent Transfer:
OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
"
To assume review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director
and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence.] Formerly handled by
the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director
and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the
public and requests for publications).
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions;
-file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background
of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and
requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on
local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with
correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news
media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government
representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for
publications.
Recommended Agent Transfer:
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National
District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,
Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formed y
handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal
briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).
Recommended Agent Transfer:
lo.
-2-
CONTINUED - OVER
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 28
for Mr. Felt
3: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;
Crime Research Division
began ala
TRAINING DIVISION
To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation
and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special
interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of
material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the
public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research.
and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the
Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements
of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI,
These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,
Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other
Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone
directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and
other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific
magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance.
of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a
lending library to Bureau employees.
Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination
of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly
announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue
of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,
preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";.
preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and
correlation and usage of FBI human interest items. ·
Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance
of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and
evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;
day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau
officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with
policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies;
custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together
with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and
matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;
maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis-
quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of
information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 24
-3-
CONTINUED OVER
-
mo for Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and
Personnel; Crime Research Division
Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-
line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation
of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine.
and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request.
FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material
presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data
requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials
Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;
analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent
to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders,
parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics
concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile..
project.
Recommended Agent Transfer:
**
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,
meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors
to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-.
town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formed y handled among
the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour
Unit.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph
of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job
training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be
fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or
personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National
Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding
the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour àreas;
prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging
publication in their home-town newspapers.
NW 88608. Docld:32989609 Page 25
CONTINUED - OVER
1
°
for Mr. Felt
Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and
Personnel; Crime Research Division
Recommended Agent Transfer::
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,
_ compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special
tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background
memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative
memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly
handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit. (In past years these functions were
performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)
Recommended Agent. Transfer:
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all
available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive
Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and
dissemination of material concerning fugitives maintenance of special indices concern
distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with
pēisons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning matters within the
jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly
handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.
Recommended Agent Transfer:
OBSERVATIONS
Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with
in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggested
.that clerical functions and personnel now simply move with the Agent desks and
units to which they are attached. Questions of space also have not been covered
and it is readily apparent that a substantial portion of the functions and personnel
suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico
(e. g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Training:
Division. are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and
Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should-
remain at Headquarters. Accordingly.
formerly in the
Front Office of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training
Division in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coordinator
of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico.
1.
**
Ho!/
The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and
relocation of units and functions to Quantico demand greater study and inasmuch
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 26
-5-
for Mr. Felt
:: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;
Crime Research Division
as Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these.
matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated
in consultation with Administrative Division. It is the purpose of this memorandum
to promptly effect the desired transfers of functions among affected Divisions in
order to provide for immediate routing of mail and upper level review and
supervision of the work product of all units previously composing Crime Research
Division.
RECOMMENDATION:
That transfers as outlined herein be approved.
Sum of W.M. FALT
that this iffin serial and penibile. If suns devils
Y
:
the Reich fits which
we can realit. Jame
should be amigued then I come believe that
thiration should to 
be there is
from its other 
mate
امان ناکام جاری احمد ساده میشوم
épül (diſe there is a
that the FBIH Library to find the
a avantico except in the Libor Bugaccingly rema
lat FBI dir
ہے۔ یہ جی نے کی۔
بستان که آره
life. Siin..
in whan a devily ban by bec
The invece ule which the wasto
ར
in this Building om die weed and in fact is badly m
affron the tran
In the mistic 
indicat
-functions
و
that of sormet be consiste
part
✓
Ogure
that
you m
구
(FOREGOING typed
ON
followING PAGE).
Congressiona
Administrative Recentht to
Change
Services Chid
of
·4:30P
NW-88608-Docld:32989609 Page 27
-fi-
ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT
12-6-72
WMF:crt
Stavridad This appears logical and feasible... If, snags develop we can
readjust. I agree that the Research and Service functions, which will remain
under A
should be reassigned to the Training
Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Quantico,
however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material
. at Headquarters and occasional contacts with the public. Furthermore, there
iş no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly,
I recommend that the FBIHQ Library. be moved into the Library Building at
Quantico. We would need to retain at FBIHQ the telephone directories and
encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The
space into which the FBIHQ Library was to have been moved in the 9th and D
Building can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence
Division which is very crowded.
I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and
that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by separate
memoranda.
<
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 28
10-
6
OSAGEN, HG, IT
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
*Memorandum
ΓΟ
MR. FELT
FROM
L. M. WALTERS
SUBJECT:
DATE: December 14, 1972
.
wh
SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
per prior approval of Mr. Gray
Effective immediately all functions and personnel formerly assigned
to the Crime Research Division are reassigned as indicated below. Recipient
Inspectors, Section and Unit Chiefs promptly report to respective offices of
assignment.
Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical
personnel utilized in handling these assignments are to transfer with listed Agents
in accordance with the functions formerly handled by them.
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and
other news media formerly handled in the Front Office of the Crime Research
Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated
as the Congressional Services Unit and will be handled by
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINEDO
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-200 BY SM Aund
MDR-16
Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional
telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review
of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public
and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.
Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concer:
press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a com-
mentator;liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of
editorials and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington
News Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding
press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible"
future use from FBIHQ Divisions.
This document is prepared in resporse to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Comi
Confessatsclosed to unauthorized person-
[mited_to_official: proceedings bu
nel without
NW 88608 Docld:3298360339cxpress approval of the FBI
1
Memo for Mr. Felt
Re Reorganization of Q
Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major
public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches:
to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts...
Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critica
of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;
special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison
matters,
OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR.
To assume review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director
and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled b
the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director
and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the
public and requests for publications).
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field.
divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent
background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to
inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government
representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field
offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public.
relations, general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement
officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail;
and requests for publications.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
:
To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National
District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,
Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly
handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legai
briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).
-2-
CONTINUED - OVER
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 30

Memo for Mr. Felt
Re: Reorganization of C D
TRAINING DIVISION...
To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation
and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest.
in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of
material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the
public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research
and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the
Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements
of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI.
These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,
Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
_ Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other.
Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telepho
directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and
other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific
magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance
of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a
lending library to Bureau employees.
Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination
of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly
announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue
of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,
preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";
preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices;
and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.
Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintena
of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and
evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;
day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Burcau
officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with
policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies
custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together
with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and
-3-
CONTINUED - OVER
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 31
Memo for Mr. Felt
Re: Reorganization of
matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;
maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis
quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of
information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and
organizations.
Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-
line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation
of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine
and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request
FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material
presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data
requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.
Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI:
analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent
to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders,
parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics/
concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile
project.
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION,
To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,
meetings, and photographs, with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitor..
to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-
town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formed y handled among
the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
詈
b
Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autogra
of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job
training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be
fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or
personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National
Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding
the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas;
prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging
publication in their home-town newspapers.
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 32
CONTATTILAN
חזז
Memo for Mr. Felt
Re: Reorganization of C
To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence,
compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special
tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of backgrou
memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informati
memoranda pertaining to organizations, asking for data. These functions formerly
handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all
´available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive
Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and
dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices
concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct
interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning
matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These
functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment
of space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.
2. That recipient offices promptly survey clerical functions and
responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with
any needed realignment of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational
charts.
3. That attached airtel to all offices be approved.
'
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 33
-5-
gria
To: SAC, Albany
airtel
December 15,
1972
From: For the Acting Director, FBI
W. Mark Felt
Acting Associate Director
SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-20 BY
MDR-16
For information of all offices, the functions and personnel formerly
assigned to the Crime Research Division have been realigned at FBIHQ.¨
Mr. Gray has assumed supervision of contacts with the Congress,
press and other news media.
Remaining functions of the Crime Research Division have been
reorganized and assigned as follows:
OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
Review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director and
the FBI and preparation of replies to correspondence.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
Formal liaison with the American Bar Association and other legal _
organizations.
TRAINING DIVISION
Operation and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation and
dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest
2 - All Offices
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 34
2-1
.
Airtel to Albany
Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel;
Crime Research Division
in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of
material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement
and the public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized
research and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested
by the Director and other Bureau officials; research for speeches and policy
statements of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning
the FBI
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION.
*
Special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities, meetings and photographs
with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors to the Bureau.
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
White House name checks and appropriate correspondence; compilation
of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special tours
or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background
memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of
informative memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
Overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all available
media; prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive Program,
research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and
dissemination of material concerning fugitives.
Above furnished for guidance in routing communications to FBIHQ.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 35
4
2
53
-15
MAY 1962 EDITION
OSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
MR. FELT
DATE:
12/18/72
FROM N. P. CALLAHAN
"
SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the
reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research
Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The
purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned
to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes.
in appropriate records.
For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise
of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related
responsibilities reassigned to the respective Office or Division. All clerical
personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted
for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if'
there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical
personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative
or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under
the respective Office or Division.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 16-29-2000 BY SPALM
MDR-16
RECOMMENDATION:
That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former
Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results
furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can
be adjusted.
your request and is not for dissemi-
wild 
to official proceedings by
ed to 
thorized person-
This document is prepared in response
nation outside your 
Com./**
your 
Committee and the coi'ni
zel ivithout 
the express approval of the St
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 36
P
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 SITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104
NMENT
UNITED STATES GO RNMENT
Memorandum.
TO
Mr. Felt
FROM :
T. J. Jenkins
SUBJECT:
DATE: December 21, 1972
SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt,
dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.
Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters
A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and
personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200
corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-200D 
BY
MDR-16
Arm/p
From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the
library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books
and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI
Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters.
From the survey, it was determined these books can be maintained in two rooms
presently occupied by the library, thus freeing four rooms as surplus space."
°
• In the library is a lending library which has about 100 members.
These members pay $1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege
of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposin
that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the
books at the end of that period to Quantico.
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
pel without the express approval af the FBI.
CONTINUED - OVER
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 37.
Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division
:
From the survey, I believe that the two library technicians, who are
presently assigned to the library, can handle the remaining reference books and
telephone directories and that when
I returns to work a decision can be
made as to what can be done with her.
Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico,
it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books,
lending library, and out-of-ton telephone directories be transferred to the Academy
at Quantico.
(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending
library, over the next six-month period.
(3) That
be transferred to Quantico
as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy.
°
(4) That
transferred to the Academy at Quantico.
1.
(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that
be reassigned.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 38
2-
be
Memorandum T. J. Jenkins. to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division W
7
Ma Teana dira(6) That the two library technicians;
Magadan,
, be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories
remaining at FBI Headquarters.
(7) If above transfers are approved, Administrative Division will
handle.
Apprord. G
12/27
1:18P
- 3 -
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 39-
OSA GEN. REC. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GO NMENT
Memoranaum
ΤΟ
Mr. Felt
FROM :
T.. J. Jenkins
DATE: January 3,
1973*
SUBJECT:
SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS- AND PERSONNEL
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
Reference is made to the memorandum bf.Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt,
dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assigned
to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly
the Research and Service Section. As you know,
>
has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs
Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters
into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Section.
This would eliminate one section chief.
་་
As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that the
Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal
that the formei Library Unit, what is left of it here at FBI fleadquai leis, be merged
with the Research Unit leaving three units from the former Research and Service
Section; namely, the Research Unit; Special Productions Unit and Publications
Unit.
I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggestions.
Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the Administrative
Division and he is agreeable. This would mean an addition to his division of one
Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Training
Division would remain as is.
:
This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed
at FBI Headquarters a total of 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I
believe that current Section Chief_
is capable of handling this
assignment as Section Chief, particularly if
Number One Man of the Section.
1
is retained as
has served as Number One Man in the
former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 
BY 
SRVALM
MDR-16
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. "Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI
1
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 40 .

.3.
Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime
Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of
the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and
Research Section.
(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals
and Chief Clerk Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the
Administrative Division.
(3) That
> current Section Chief in the Training
Division be retired as Section Chief. OF THE
NE
SE NON
(4) That
this new Section in the Training Division.
OFSIKUMTHO
be retained as Number One Man of
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 41
1 .
1
ܐ܂
ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 1-4-73
I think ********
I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed
new name Training Programs Processing and Research Section
this sounds pompous and cumbersome. I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has
agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section.
I recommend approval with this modification.
Apprord.
9:40P
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page-42
1
a
3 -
TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 CATION.
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
3210-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. Felt
FROM
: T. J.
Jenkins
SUBJECT:
DATE: January 3, 1973
SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
T
Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt,
dated 12/14/72, in captioned matter. A review has been made of the units assigned
to the Training Division from the former Crime Research Division, particularly
the Research and Service Section. As you know, the Section Chief of that Section,
Milton A. Jones, has retired. I believe we can consolidate the Training Programs
Processing Section and the Research and Service Section at FBI Headquarters
into one section, calling it the Training Programs Processing and Research Section.
This would eliminate one section chief.
As you know, we have recommended and it has been approved that the
Library in the Crime Research Section be moved to Quantico. It is my proposal
that the former Library Unit, what is left of it here al FBI Headquailers, be merged
with the Research Unit leaving three units from the former Research and Service
Section; namely, the Research Unit, Special Productions Unit and Publications
Unit.
I have discussed with Mr. Callahan the transferring of the Suggestions,
Forms, Reports Management, Manuals and Chief Clerk Matters to the Administrative
Division and he is agreeable. This would mean an addition to his division of one
Special Agent and seven clerical staff. The remaining units presently in the Training
Division would remain as is.
This would give the Section Chief of the Training Division stationed
at FBI Headquarters a total of 18 Agents and 53 clerks under his supervision. I
believe that current Section Chief, T. J. Brownfield, is capable of handling this
assignment as Section Chief, particularly if Mr. Lawrence J. Heim is retained as
Number One Man of the Section. Mr. Heim has served as Number One Man in the
former Research and Service Section of the Crime Research Division.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SPRAEM/B
. This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approal of "
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 43
1
_2
Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That the old Research and Service Section of the former Crime
Research Division be combined with the Training Programs Processing Section of
the Training Division and be given the name Training Programs Processing and
Research Section.
3
(2) That the Suggestions, Forms, Reports Management, Manuals
and Chief Clerk Matters be transferred from the Training Division to the
Administrative Division.
(3) That SA T. J. Brownfield current Section Chief in the Training
DESIGNAT
Division be retamed as Section Chief. OF THE NING SI nov
OFSILUATKO
(4) That SA Lawrence J. Heim be rotated as Number One Man of
this new Section in the Training Division.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 44
ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT 1-4-73
།
I am in agreement with the above except for the proposed
new name Training Programs Processing and Research Section. I think
this sounds pompous and cumbersome. I suggest and Mr. Jenkins has
agreed to naming the new section Police Training and Research Section.
I recommend approval with this modification.
F
Apprord.
9:40 p
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 45
1560
3.
-
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
2. DATE PROVIDED
x
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
SSC
C. Benz, Office Manager
6/17/75
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.
5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter 5/14/75%; Appendix B, Part II, Item 15.
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Organization and Staffing
8.
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
At the request of the SSC, documents relating to the
elimination of the FBI Crime Records Division in late 1972
were furnished to the SSC for review.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-06-2000 BY SIZALM
MDR
-16
TREAT AS YELLOW
62-116395
TJM:1hb
(4)
шое
5-J
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75. LFS 7-2-25
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
3791 (6-75)
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 46
INSTRUCTIONS
•
•
Type or print clearly in ink.
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 47
W.
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
3010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum..
Mr. Felt'
ΤΟ
FROM
T. J. Jenkins
ke it out of
DATE: December 21, 1972
SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
TT.
pa
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-36-2ND BY SPRAUM
MDR-14
Reference is made to memorandum L. M. Walters to Mr. Felt,
dated December 14, 1972, in captioned matter.
Bureau Library at FBI Headquarters
A survey has been made of the library, its books, facility and
personnel. At the present time, the library is housed in six rooms in the 4200
corridor at FBI Headquarters and has a staff of the following:
Inspector Bernand M. Suttler, GS-16
Librarian Iona Swann, GS-9/
G7
Assistant Librarian Eleanor L. Denish, GS-6
Secretary Connie Hutchison, GS-4 (position is GS-5)
3 Librarian Technicians
Alica Brand, GS-4 (on extended leave without pay - due to illness)
Patricia Lauber, GS-3 (GS-4 position)
Ester Villanueva, GS-4
From a survey of the books, all books can be removed from the
library to the library at Quantico with exception to certain reference books.
and out-of-town telephone directories which are necessary to be maintained at FBI
Headquarters for ready-reference purposes by the Bureau staff at Headquarters.
From the survey, it was determined these books can be maintained in two rooms”
presently occupied by the library, thus freeing four rooms as surplus space.
In the library is a lending library which has about 100 members.
These members pay $1 every six months for membership dues and have the privilege
of using the library. Because of the minor use of this lending library, I am proposing
that we phase out this part of the library during the next six months, removing the
books at the end of that period to Quantico.
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person
mel without the express approval of the FBI .
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 48
CONTINUED
→
OVER
Memorandum T.,J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division
From the survey; I believe that the two library technicians, who are.
presently assigned to the library, can handle the remaining reference books and
telephone directories and that when Miss Brand returns to work a decision can be
made as to what can be done with her.
Since practically all of the library will be transferred to Quantico,
it will be necessary to transfer certain employees of the library unit.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That all the books with the exception of the reference books,
lending library, and out-of-towy telephone directories be transferred to the Academy
at Quantico.
(2) That authority be granted to gradually phase out the lending
library over the next six-month period.
(3) That Inspector Bernard M. Suttler be transferred to Quantico
as Assistant Librarian and for lecture purposes at the Academy.
3
(4) That Miss Iona G. Swann and Miss Eleanor L. Benish be
transferred to the Academy at Quantico.
(5) That the position of secretary be abolished and that Miss Connie
Hutchison be reassigned.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 49
1
Memorandum T. J. Jenkins to Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of
Functions and Personnel
Crime Research Division
********(6) That the two library technicians; Patricia Lauber and Ester:
Villanueva, be retained to handle the reference books and telephone directories
remaining at FBI Headquarters.
handle.
(7) If above transfers are approved, Administrative Division will
Apprord. G
12/27
1:18P
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 50
- 3 ·

ONAL
NO. 10
.ON
010-106
TO
1.
FROM
GEEG. NO. 27
•
UNITED STA" * GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. Bishop
: M. A./Jones
SUBJECT:
SUGGESTED NAME. CHANGE
CRIME RECORDS DIVISION
DATE: 10-16-72
By memorandum dated 10-4-72, attached, it was
indicated that Fletcher D. Thompson, SAC, Omaha, has suggested
a name change for the Crime Records Division to Office
of Public Information or some other more meaningful designation.
It was pointed out that Mr. Thompson's suggestion
was in line with informal discussions you (Mr. Bishop)
have had with members of your staff concerning a possible
name change for the Division.
In this connection, Mr. Gray has noted that
he "can think of many reasons for changing the name.
What have been the nature of the reasons for change discussed?"
With the formation of the Computer Systems Division'.
and the resultant reassignment of the personnel and
the work of the Uniform Crime Reporting Section, including
the National Crime Information Center/Computerized Criminal
Histories file from Crime Records to Computer Systems,
the title "Crime Records," as Mr. Thompson has indicated,
is no longer meaningful insofar as the work of this
Division is concerned.
"Office of Public Information," which was
suggested by Mr. Thompson, would inaccurately reflect
the activities and responsibilities of this Division
and could result in confusion with the Office of Public
Information in the Department of Justice. This, of
course, would be undesirable.
う
Enclosures
1 .
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-26-2000 BY SI2A/127
MDR16
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 51
M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop Memo
RE:” SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION-
;
It is noted that this Division, which is presently
comprised of the Crime Research Section, and the Correspondences
and Tours Section, is primarily responsible for conducting
extensive research pertaining to crime, crime prevention,
and other related matters in the law enforcement field.
**This Division is involved in the review and preparation
of replies to correspondence regarding FBI Jurisdiction
and operations received from law enforcement, other Government
agencies, and the general public in those instances where
the Bureau has a responsibility to disseminate such information.
.
"
"The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin," which is the
official publication of the FBI, is prepared and distributed
by Crime Records, as well as numerous pamphlets for the
instruction and information of Bureau employees, the law
enforcement profession and the general public. This Division
is responsible for supervision of tours of Bureau facilities
for Government officials, law enforcement authorities,
and the general public; directs the program of distributing
informative and illustrative material on Bureau fugitives
to various media for the purpose of effecting the location
and apprehension of these criminals with the help of citizen
cooperation; and coordinates and supervises the Bureau's
interests in the utilization of radio, television, and
publication outlets to enhance the discharge of our responsi-
bilities in the law enforcement field by acquainting the
public with the FBI's operations and activities.
In addition, this Division has the custody of
a number of research and reference files which are maintained
in a current status and which are essential to the Division
in the fulfillment of its responsibilities to the Bureau.
Further, this Division supervises the "Ten-Most-
Wanted Fugitives" Program, as well as "The FBI" television
series, both of which involve research for their sustenance
and success.
While it is recognized, based on the foregoing,
that this Division is not completely absorbed in research
to the exclusion of other activities, "Crime Research"
CONTINUED OVER
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 52
2
-
:
M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop Memo
RE: SUGGESTED NAME CHANGE, CRIME RECORDS DIVISION
:
:
:
more accurately describes our responsibilities, it is
felt, than any other title suggested. It is noted the
more likely alternatives discussed were "Research and
Information Division" and "Research and Correspondence..
Division.".
RECOMMENDATIONS:
10
That Mr. Gray approve the renaming of the
Crime Records Division to Crime Research Division.
2.
000
Approved. You 10/23
0:02A
That in line with the foregoing, the attached
letter to Mr. Thompson be approved and sent.
چی
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 53
10122
-
3 -
UPTIONAL FOR NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
•
THE ACTING DIRECTOR
DATE: 12-1-72
FROM
: W. M. FELT
SA
SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION - CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
སཱསུ ཏི ཡོ॰ ཏནུཔུཏེ , ཝཱ དྷསྶ ༦༤༧ མ དོལ༹ར, ཀཙྪཱདྷཱཏུཏྟཾ
ཧདཔག་གཅུག ;•?
Pursuant to your instructions, Assistant Director Bishop is
being temporarily attached to the Training Division at Quantico for special
assignment until the effective date of his retirement, 2-1-73.
Mr. Bishop will be assigned to the research and development of
a 'major case practical problem for use in the National Academy. This
is extremely important because our experience indicates that most of the
officers attending the Academy are unable to understand and handle the
ramifications of major cases. Mr. Bishop, with his extensive field back-
ground, plus his familiarity with news media problems, is ideally suited
to handle this assignment.
1
If he has time, Mr. Bishop will also analyze and develop
· meaningful practical cases which will enable new agents to meet present-
day needs.
I have arranged with Mr. Jenkins for suitable office facilities
to be used by Mr. Bishop at Quantico and have instructed Bishop to report
to Mr. Jenkins on Monday, 12-4-72.
Inspector Wilburn K.X/DeBruler is being diverted from his current
inspection assignment in the Office of Legal Counsel to begin an immediate
survey of the Crime Research Division to determine the feasibility of the
transfer of its functions to other divisions or to your office.
RECOMMENDATION:
1.
**
None. For information.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20-2000 BY
MDR-16
постра
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee., Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 54
ΤΟ
MAY 1912 6 NON
NOSA GL 1977. HQ. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. FELT
FROM
L. M. WALTERS
DATE: December 14, 1972
SUBJECT:
SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 10-26-2006 BY SPRAC
MDR16
per prior approval of Mr. Gray
Effective immediately all functions and personnel formerly assigned
to the Crime Research Division are reassigned as indicated below. Recipient
Inspectors, Section and Unit Chiefs promptly report to respective offices of
assignment.
:
Agent personnel are set forth together with assigned functions. Clerical
personnel utilized in handling these assignments are to transfer with listed Agents
in accordance with the functions formerly handled by them.
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
Inspectors James F. Bland, David W. Bowers, Jack E. Herington and
SA Harold P. Leinbaugh.
To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and
other news media formerly handled in the Front Office of the Crime Research
Division as well as the Administrative Review Unit which has been redesignated
as the Congressional Services Unit and will be handled by Inspectors Jack E.
Herington and David W. Bowers.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional
telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review
of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public
and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.
Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concern
press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a com-
mentator;liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of
editorials and articles review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington
News Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding
press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible s
future use from FBIHQ Divisions.
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committees. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
Committee and the content. y not be disclosed to unauthorized person
NW 88608 Docld:3298 the express approval of the FBI.
.
* Memo for Mr. Felt
c.
☐
Re: Reorganization of CND
Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major: </
public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches
to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.
Review material for publication, first name salutation mail, matters critica
of and complaints regarding FBI; letters enclosing autographed photographs;
special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison
matters
OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR ga
Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt and SAs Homer R. Hauer (Number One
Man), Ralph W. Engelmeier, Marion S. Ramey, Paul L. Andrews, John W. Dalseg,
Robert C. Dean and Richard E. White.
…. To assume review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director
and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence. Formerly handled by
the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director
and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the
public and requests for publications).
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field
divisions; file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent
background of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to
inquiries and requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government
representatives on local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field
offices in connection with correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public
relations, general news media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement
officials, Government representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail;
and requests for publications.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
SA James C. Farrington.
To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National
District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,
Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formerly
handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal
briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit).
-2-
CONTINUED - OVER
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 56
:
1
Memo for Mr. Felt
Re: Reorganization of C
dabad TRAINING DIVISION madawała po
Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Inspectors Bernard M. Suttler and
George T. Quin, and SAS Lawrence J. Heim, John H. Campbell, Edward H.
Gooderham, David L. Divan, Carl J. Hall, Louis S. Lear, Donald G. Haniring,
Rchert B. Davenport, Robert C. Fay, George William Gunn and Fern C.
Stukenbroeker
To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation
and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special interest
in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of
material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the
public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research
and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the
Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements
of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI.
These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,
Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from. other . .
Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephon
directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and
other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific
magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance
of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a
lending library to Bureau employees.
Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination
of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly
announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue
of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,
preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";
preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices;
and correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.
Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenan
of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and
evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;
day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau
officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with
policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies;
custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together
with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and
03-
CONTINUED
CONT
-
OVER
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 57
Memo for Mr. Felt
'Re: Reorganization of C
matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;
maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis-
quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of
information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and
organizations.
•
Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by
line articles and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation
of memorauda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine
and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request
FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material**
presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data
requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials.
*
Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI:
analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent
to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders,
parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics /
concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile,
project.
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
SA William H. Stapleton.
To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,
meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors
to the Bureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home -
town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formed y handled among
the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour Unit.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
"
Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograp
of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstratious, on-the-job
training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be
fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or
personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National
Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding
the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas;
prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging
publication in their home-town newspapers.
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
SAs Edward J. Kilday, III, and Anthony Edward Schiappa
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 58
A
CONTINUIR
-
OVER
"Memo for Mr. Felt
Re: Reorganization of Ch
To assume White House.name.checks and appropriate correspondence,
compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special
tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of backgroun
memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative
memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions.formerly....
handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION.
SA Thomas B. Coll
To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all
available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive
Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and .
dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices
concerning distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct
interviews with persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning
matters within the jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These
functions were formerly handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That the Administrative Division arrange any necessary realignment
of space and handle memoranda instructing transfers.
2. That recipient offices promptly survey clerical functions and
responsibilities and submit appropriate recommendations in connection with
any needed realignment of clerical personnel; also prepare updated organizational
charts.
1.
3. That attached airtel to all offices be approved.
-5-
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 59
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
3010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
MR. FELT
:
i
DATE:
12/18/72
FROM N. P. CALLAHAN
SUBJECT: SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2000 BY SP2 ALM/20
MDR-16
By memo dated 12/14/72 from Mr. Walters to Mr. Felt the
reassignment of Special Agent personnel of the former Crime Research
Division to other Offices and Divisions at Headquarters was set forth. The
purpose of this memo is to establish what clerical personnel will be assigned
to each Office or Division. This information is necessary to effect changes
in appropriate records.
For control purposes, each of the listed individuals should advise
of the clerical personnel needed to carry out the functions and related
responsibilities reassigned to the respective Office or Division. All clerical
personnel assigned to the former Crime Research Division must be accounted
for. Accordingly, the listed individuals should consult with each other if'
there is any question concerning assignment, excessive or needed clerical
personnel, coordinating information with appropriate Office representative
or Division head. Identities, positions and grades should be set forth under
the respective Office or Division.
Inspector James F. Bland, Office of the Acting Director
Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt, Office of the Acting
Associate Director
SA James C. Farrington, Office of Legal Counsel
Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Training Division
SA William H. Stapleton, Administrative Division
SA Edward J. Kilday III, General Investigative Division
SA Thomas B. Coll, Special Investigative Division
RECOMMENDATION:
That the reassignment of the clerical personnel of the former
Crime Research Division be accomplished as set forth above with results
furnished to the Administrative Division so that appropriate records can
be adjusted.
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee
. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content 
may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express 
approval of the FBI .
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 60

TO
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memoranaum
: MR. FELT
FROM
:
L. M. WALTERSV
DATE:
12/6/72
SUBJECT:
SUPERVISORY REORGANIZATION OF
FUNCTIONS AND PERSONNEL;
CRIME RESEARCH DIVISION
PURPOSE:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2000 BY
• ANDR-16
/B
To recommend immediate supervisory reorganization and transfer
of all functions and personnel of the Crime Research Division based
on survey and analysis conducted by Inspection Division.
Recommended transfer of functions and related responsibilities together
with appropriate personnel as follows:
. OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
To assume supervision of contacts with the Congress, press and other
news media formerly handled by Assistant Director Bishop, his front office Agent
personnel and the Administrative Review Unit (Congressional liaison).
Functions and Related Responsibilties:
Congressional liaison; Congressional correspondence; Congressional
telephone calls; progress of legislation of interest to or affecting the FBI; review
of bills and resolutions introduced into both Houses of Congress and all public
and private laws enacted; and review and analysis of the Congressional Record.
1
Press, radio, television and motion picture contacts; field matters concerning
press, radio and television; correspondence relating to an editorial or to a commentato
liaison with the White House and Department press offices; review of editorials
and articles; review of magazines, newspaper clippings and Washington News
Service ticker items; news releases and press inquiries; SAC calls regarding.
press releases; press contact program; coordinate press matters of possible
future use from FBIHQ Divisions.
:
Review statements and speeches by Director or matters affecting major.
public relations; invitations for speeches by the Director; assignment of speeches
to FBIHQ speakers; review speech manuscripts.
:
Review material for publication, first-name salutation mail, matters critical
of and complaints regarding FBI: letters enclosing autographed photographs;
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to officiat proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
CONTINUED - OVER.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 61
1
or Mr. Felt
Supervisory Reorgan
tion of Functions and
Personnel; Crime Research Division
special photographs in Director's Office; American Legion and veteran liaison
matters.
Recommended Agent Transfer:
Inspectors James F. Bland, David W. Bowers and Jack E. Herington.
OFFICE OF ACTING ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
To assume/review and analysis of correspondence received by the Director
and the FBI and preparation of replies to the correspondence.] Formerly handled by
the Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence of special importance to Director
and Nation) and the Non-Special Correspondence Unit (correspondence from the
public and requests for publications).
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Replies to correspondence regarding subversive activities and field divisions;
-file reviews and necessary research to determine identity and pertinent background
of the correspondent; file review and research necessary to reply to inquiries and
requests from private citizens, law enforcement, Government representatives on.
local, state and national level; initiate instructions to field offices in connection with
correspondence; processing of letters dealing with public relations, general news
media; requests and inquiries from law enforcement officials, Government
representatives and others in foreign countries; chronic mail; and requests for
publications.
Recommended Agent Transfer:
Section Chief Gordon E. Malmfeldt and SAs Homer R. Hauer (Number One
Man), Ralph W. Engelmeier, Marion S. Ramey, Paul L. Andrews, John W. Dalseg,
Robert C. Dean and Richard E. White.
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
To assume formal liaison with the American Bar Association, National
District Attorneys Association, National Association of Attorneys General,
Federal Bar Association, and the American Law Institute. These functions formed y
handled by the Administrative Review Unit. Also research and preparation of legal
briefs in connection with urgent policy matters (formerly handled by Research Unit). ⠀
Recommended Agent Transfer:
SA James C. Farrington..
-2-
CONTINUED - OVER
-NW-88608-Docid:32989609 Page 62
for Mr. Felt
Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;
Crime Research Division
TRAINING DIVISION
To assume operations and maintenance of the FBI Library; preparation
and dissemination of pamphlets, reprints and related material of special
interest in law enforcement and the crime problem; coordination and compilation of
material for presenting FBI operations and jurisdiction to law enforcement and the.
public through movies, television and other news media; and specialized research
and preparation of material in connection with memoranda requested by the
Director and other Bureau officials, research for speeches and policy statements”
of the Director and analysis of articles and statements made concerning the FBI,{
These functions were formerly handled by the Library Unit, Publications Unit,
Special Productions Unit and Research Unit.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Reference service to FBI officials, employees, and authorities from other
Government agencies and individuals authorized; maintenance of out-of-town telephone
directories covering United States; preparation of memoranda for Director and
other officials based on review of current periodicals, police journals and scientific
magazines; purchase and sale of books to Bureau employees and the maintenance.
of the inventory and financial records pertinent to this project and operation of a
lending library to Bureau employees.
Liaison with the Government Printing Office; preparation and dissemination
of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (LEB); research for the Director's monthly
announcement on an important phase of law enforcement or crime for each issue
of the LEB; requesting and coordinating material from the field, editing,
preparation and distribution of "The Investigator"; preparation of "FBI Notes";
preparation of Interesting Case Memoranda and maintenance of related indices; and
correlation and usage of FBI human interest items.
Monitoring movies and television for proper portrayal of FBI and maintenance
of a running brief on developments pertinent to Bureau operations; surveys and
evaluations of matters for presentment to the public by information media;
day-to-day surveys of the media for consideration of the Director and Bureau
officials; custody and maintenance of recordings of the Director in connection with
policy statements or interviews with law enforcement or other Government agencies;
custody and maintenance of the general and official Bureau photograph file together
with indices; writing of radio and television scripts involving FBI fugitives and
matters of FBI jurisdiction; distribution of Uniform Crime Reports Bulletin;
maintenance of cartoon file, illustrations depicting FBI and reference file on mis-
quotes of Director in news media releases; monthly review of FBI dissemination of
information to the public, law enforcement and authorized individuals and organizations
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 63
-3-
CONTINUED - OVER
mo for Mr. Felt
Re: Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and
Personnel; Crime Research Division
Research and coordination of materials in connection with speeches, by-
line articies and feature stories made or published by the Director; preparation
of memoranda concerning books on law enforcement; review and analysis of magazine.
and newspaper manuscripts concerning FBI prepared by outside authors who request.
: `FBI review for accuracy; compilation of data and narrative form of material
presented in the FBI's Annual Reports; outlines and research for speech data
requested by Bureau officials; maintenance of indices on research materials
Supervision of Public Law 670 concerning misuse of the name of the FBI;
analysis of Young American Medals Awards; maintenance of reference files pertinent
to FBI jurisdiction and law enforcement policies; reference files on sex offenders,
parole and probation violators, pornographic literature; supervision and statistics
concerning FBI speech program; and supervision and direction of Bureau juvenile
project.
Recommended Agent Transfer:
Section Chief Milton A. Jones, Inspectors Bernard M. Suttler and George T.
Quinn and SAS Harold P. Leinbaugh, Lawrence J. Heim, John H. Campbell,
Edward H. Gooderham; David L. Divan, Carl J. Hall, Louis S. Lear, Donald C.
Hanning, Robert B. Davenport, Robert C. Fay, George William Gunn and Fern C.
Stukenbrocker.
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
To assume supervision for special visitors on tours of Bureau facilities,
meetings and photographs with the Director and all other tours conducted for visitors
to the Eureau. Preparation of data on Bureau employees for publication in home-
town newspapers as recruitment aids. These functions formed y. handled among
the Fugitive Publicity Unit, Special Productions Unit, Research Unit and Tour
Unit.
Functions and Related Responsibilities:
Handling and processing photographs and other matters for personal autograph
of the Director; interviews, testing, lectures, classroom demonstrations, on-the-job
training and supervision of tour leaders; fingerprinting individuals requesting to be
fingerprinted in connection with Government employment, security clearances or
personal identification; telephone inquiries relating to law enforcement, National.
Academy, services and responsibilities of the FBI and background data regarding
the Director; maintain tour statistics of visitors and security of all tour areas;
prepare data on background and work functions of Bureau employees for arranging
publication in their home-town newspapers.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 64
4-
CONTINUED OVER
-
for Mr. Felt
Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and
Personnel; Crime Research Division
Recommended Agent Transfer:
SA William H. Stapleton
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
To assume White House name checks and appropriate correspondence;
compilation of data and preparation of memoranda on individuals requesting special
tours or meetings with the Director; compilation of data and preparation of background
memoranda for dissemination to authorized individuals; and preparation of informative-
memoranda pertaining to organizations asking for data. These functions formerly
handled by the Summary Memoranda Unit. (In past years these functions were
performed in Name Check Section of General Investigative Division.)
Recommended Agent Transfer:
SAs Edward J. Kilday, III, and Anthony Edward Schiappa
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
To assume overall responsibility for publicizing FBI fugitives through all
available media, prepare narrative and illustrative data for Top Ten Fugitive
Program, research and preparation of feature fugitive articles; preparation and
dissemination of material concerning fugitives; maintenance of special indices concerni
distribution and cancellation of fugitive material to media; and conduct interviews with
persons making telephonic or personal calls to FBIHQ concerning matters within the
jurisdiction of the FBI or of interest to the Bureau. These functions were formerly
handled by the Fugitive Publicity Unit.
Recommended Agent Transfer:
SA Thomas B. Coll
OBSERVATIONS
Agent personnel and supervisory functions have been analyzed and dealt with
in the foregoing proposed reallocations; clerical functions have not. It is suggested -
that clerical functions and personnel now simply move with the Agent desks and
units to which they are attached. Questions of space also have not been covered.
and it is readily apparent that a substantial portion of the functions and personnel
suggested for transfer to Training Division might feasibly operate at Quantico'
(e. g. Library, Special Productions and Publications Unit). Five units of Training:
Division are now located at Headquarters and the Research Unit of Research and
Service Section proposed herein for transfer to Training Division, likewise should-
remain at Headquarters. Accordingly, SA Har old P. Leinbaugh, formerly in the
Front Office of Crime Research Division, has been proposed for transfer to Training
Division in order to act, during this transition period, as a special coordinator
of functions that may be divided between Headquarters and Quantico.
No!!
The questions of adequacy of clerical personnel, space reallocation, and
relocation of units and functions to Quantico demand greater study and inasmuch
NW 
Docid:
32989609 Page 65
7
1
SINA?
Jior Mr. Felt
Supervisory Reorganization of Functions and Personnel;
Crime Research Division
as Training Division is scheduled for regular annual inspection next week, these
matters will be gone into in depth in connection with that inspection and coordinated
in consultation with Administrative Division. It is the purpose of this memorandum
to promptly effect the desired transfers of functions among affected Divisions in:
order to provide for immediate routing of mail and upper level review and
supervision of the work product of all units previously composing Crime Research
Division.
RECOMMENDATION:
That transfers as outlined herein be approved.
SA
Leinbaugh
affiorrest reccept the SA
will remain with 
fronts 
office to
Bland & Herington
that dispecture Bland &
Leinbaugh will 
remain 
in place,
Apam of W.m..FERT
بحرية لا خه ntent
The flame local and frankly. If smp develop we can honan Chief Hilton
that the Research: série fintio
service finition
, which will 
do
w.daily
Ajover, should be reassigned 
to 
thing 
on. I do not 
believe that
This Dection should be 
fed to be there 
is
for 
thermal at H
cuts with the 
public there 
is notable for
at quantico west in the Liban, accvlingh
that the FBIHG Library to main, th
2
mcclu
alhe, encore
daily basis by
would we aim at FBIH the time direct
was to have been 
moved
lapcolites which 
are uses on a
The space 
into which the FH 
Lubing was 
to
in the 9th 
Building can be used and in fact 
is bolly
In the 
mistic neciligence 
division which 
women, 
crewster
recommend that 
you affrow the
lign
TH
that any necessary of prosornet be consistere
-finations and
reparati
Aquel
7
Change Administrative Review this to
Services Chrix
Congressional
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 66
4:20 P
-fi-
ADDENDUM OF W. M. FELT
12-6-72
WMF:crt
This appears logical and feasible. If snags develop we can
readjust. I agree that the Research and Service functions, which will remain.
under Section Chief Milton A. Jones, should be reassigned to the Training i
Division. I do not believe that this Section should be transferred to Quantico,
however, because there is daily need for access to files and other material
at Headquarters and occasional contacts with the public. Furthermore, there¨.
is no available space at Quantico except in the Library Building. Accordingly,
I recommend that the FBIHQ Library be moved into the Library Building at
Quantico. We would need to retain at FBIHQ the telephone directories and
encyclopedias which are used on a daily basis by other Divisions. The
space into which the FBIHQ Library was to have been moved in the 9th and D
Building can be used and in fact is badly needed by the Domestic Intelligence
Division which is very crowded.
I recommend that you approve now the transfer of functions and
that any necessary realignment of personnel be considered by separate
memoranda.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 67
- 6 -
:
:
ہو تم
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv
Training
Legal Coul
Telephone Rm
Director Sec'y
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
1
1
1
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
June 17,
1975
1
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
-
1 Mr. S. F. Phillips
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2.2081 BYSPYJRMIU
6070
Enclosed for your information is the original
of a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member
of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent
Ernest H. Belter. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed
for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate
Counsel to the President.
Enclosures
62-116395
-
2
1 The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor REC- 102
-
1 67-
1
100-106670
-
SFP: 1hb lhb
3
(11)
edm
WRW/'S
✓ MAIL ROOM
1075
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination,
17.112:1-296
(Personnel File Former SA Ernest H. Belter)
(Martin Luther King, Jr.)
6/18/754 d. Fut U. Wally
////
PUD/
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 68
джа
3 JUL 2 1975
Pen
vw.o.c
+4863954
ة
дна
GPO 1975 O-569-920
10-12670 a
T
i
62-116395
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Phillips
-
Mr. S. F.
June 17, 1975
1
11111
cof
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
2.70-81
U. S. SEIATE SELECT COMMITTED TO
STUDY COVERSTESITAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
USPECIAL AGENT (SA) ERNEST 1.
BELTER BY SSC STAFF LEIBER
SPYJRmin
6026
Set out below is information voluntarily furnished
by Mr. Belter to the FBI on June 11, 1975. Bolter served
in the FDI as an SA from July 19, 1943, until his retirement
on January 29, 1973.
On June 10, 1975, Beltor was contacted by SSC
Staff Member Michael Epstein who requested to interview
Belter at the SSC office. On June 11, 1975, Belter was advised
by Epstein that the interview would concern Martin Luther
King, Jr., and FBI coverage of King at the Willard Hotel in
Washington, D. C., some years ago and that the interview
would take place at 3:00 p.m. that day, June 11, 1975.
Belter was interviewed by Epstein in SSC quarters
during the period of approximately 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. on
June 11, 1975. The interview was not under oath and vas not
pursuant to a subpoena. The details of the interview are
set out below, not necessarily in chronological order.
Bolter was asked and furnished the period of time
Dep. AD Adm. - he had served in the Washington Field Office (IPO) of the FBI
and the date of his retirement. He was asked and furnished
information as to his duties in WTO at the time he retired
and what they were in 1964. Ile informed Epstein that he was
the Supervisor of a Squad which handled electronic surveillances,
including both microphone and telephone surveillances.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
-
1
Plan. & Eval. 1
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
-
67-
(Personnel File Former SA Ernest H. Belter).
100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
Inb
SFP:1hb (10)
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
Jon
SEE NOTE PAGE 5
116375
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 69
soku
When,
GPO 1975 O-569-920
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE:
INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC
he was asked how many men worked under him on his Squad, he
told Epstein that he desired to consult with the FBI
representative who had accompanied him to the interview but
who was not present during the actual interview, that
representative remaining in an outer lobby of the SSC quarters.
Belter requested this consultation privilege as he believed
the question was outside the indicated scope of the interview.
Epstein indicated he was withdrawing the question, thus
eliminating the necessity for the consultation.
Belter was questioned and furnished information
concerning the organization of VFO,
in Charge down to the squad level.
from the Special Agent
Belter indicated that
there were several squads handling criminal cases, some
handling applicant-type investigations, and other squads
handling security work. He indicated that the security squads
were under a security coordinator, Ludwig W. R. Oberndorf,
now deceased.
Epstein advised Belter that the SSC Staff had
read Belter's deposition in the Halperin case. (Morton H.
Halperin, et al, vs. Henry A. Kissinger, et al, United States
District Court, District of Columbia Civil Action File
Number 1187-73.) On the basis of the deposition, Epstein
indicated he was familiar with the administrative procedure
for instituting telephone surveillances and asked Belter
about the administrative procedures for instituting microphone
surveillances. It was Belter's reply that the administrative
procedures were essentially the same for both types of
surveillances.
Epstein then had Belter recite the procedure from
when an SA would request from FBI Headquarters by form letter
authority for installing a microphone surveillance. Belter
told how the Headquarters would first authorize the field to
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 70
-
2 -
-

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC
conduct a feasibility survey, results of which would be
furnished Headquarters. Thereafter, if the installation was
feasible and justified, Headquarters would authorize by
correspondence the installation. Epstein asked whether the
authorizing communication from Headquarters would mention
that the Attorney General (AG) had authorized the surveillance.
Belter told Epstein that in recent years he believed that the
Bureau communication authorizing a surveillance would indicate
that the AG authorization had been obtained; but Belter could
not recall whether or not this indication was shown during
1964.
Belter also told Epstein that at one time he thought
that former FBI Director Hoover did not need to have AG approval
in advance for a specific microphone surveillance. Epstein
indicated he was already aware of this.
Epstein then inquired concerning a microphone
surveillance which the FBI had installed at the Willard Hotel
in Washington, D. C., concerning King. Belter was unable
to pinpoint when this occurred and told Epstein that he,
Belter, was bypassed in practically all matters relating to
this surveillance. The entire matter was handled by Security
Coordinator Oberndorf and Belter never saw any of the correspond-
ence relating thereto. Belter was only asked to furnish some
support personnel from his Squad for the purpose of monitoring
the surveillance. In response to further specific questions,
Belter advised Epstein that he did not see any correspondence,
logs, tapes, or any other material relating to this surveillance.
Epstein inquired about the procedure of an Inspector
checking on such a surveillance at the time of a periodic
inspection of WFO. He asked if the Inspector would examine
the required correspondence relating to all microphone
surveillances the office had conducted. Belter replied that
an Inspector would look over matters of this nature but that
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 71
- 3 -
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC
in the case of the King microphone surveillance, as with
certain other extremely sensitive ones, Oberndorf would have
possession of the correspondence and Belter would be unaware
of any examination of such correspondence by an Inspector.
Belter explained that this was part of the security precautions
taken in highly sensitive matters which were restricted
within WFO to a need-to-know basis.
Epstein inquired as to whether Belter knew of any
other microphone surveillance on King in the Washington, D. C.,
area at any time and Belter replied that he did not know of
any. Belter was asked if he was aware of any interest or
participation by the Washington, D. C., Police Department in
the microphone surveillance at the Willard Hotel and he
responded that he was not aware of same.
Epstein inquired as to the actual installation of
the microphone surveillance at the Willard Hotel and wanted
to know who performed the installation. It was Balter's
recollection that the installation was made by SA Wilfred
Bergeron, probably assisted by SA William D. Campbell. Epstein
volunteered the name of SA Richard Suter and this refreshed
Belter's recollection to the extent that Belter indicated that
Suter also probably assisted. On Epstein's inquiry as to the
whereabouts of these three individuals, Belter advised that
Bergeron is retired, residing in Bethesda, Maryland; Campbell
is assigned at FBI Headquarters; and Suter is assigned to the
Houston Field Office.
Epstein inquired whether Bergeron mentioned King's
name when Bergeron asked for assistance of support personnel
for monitoring purposes and Belter replied that King's name
was mentioned.
At the close of the interview, Epstein remarked that,
"We may be in touch with you again.'
"
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 72
-
4
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI SA BY SSC
NOTE:
Prior to Belter's interview, he contacted FBIHQ
to alert us and ask for assistance in the form of an SA for
possible consultation purposes. Belter had been previously
alerted by our Baltimore Office, pursuant to Bureau teletype,
that he might be contacted by the SSC and that we would assist
him on his request. Belter was therefore appropriately
briefed by Assistant Director Mintz; as well as Supervisor
S. F. Phillips of INID who accompanied Belter to the interview.
Debriefing of Belter as reported herein was by Phillips.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 73
- 5 -
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
$
TO:
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM:
FBI
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
絲 INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
6/17/75
SSC
HSC
The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to
the White House
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum reporting results of an interview by an SSC Staff
Member of retired FBI Special Agent Ernest H. Belter
5. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
NA
U
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Intelligence collection
Intelligence activities, domestic
Organization and staffing
Surveillance
8.
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
Interview covered following topics:
Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Organization of the FBI Washington (D. C.) Field Office,
Administrative procedures of FBI regarding electronic surveillance.
SFP 1hb
(4)
3791 (6-75)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
EREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ATE 10-25-200) BY S
MOR-
16
TREAT AS YELLOW
шос
است که
5.
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN
CONNECTION WITH (SENSTUDY 75.
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
LFS 7-2-75
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 74
INSTRUCTIONS
.
•
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
.e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
pracy
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 75.
तक
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
о
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
2
1
1
1
1
1
fal food H
MAL
-
-
S
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
ata
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. H. N. Bassett
June 12, 1975
Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. T. E. Burns
By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached
appendices, the SSC requested certain information and
documents from the FBI.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to
the Committee is the original of a memorandum containing
a response to one of the Committee's requests.
A copy of this nonorandun is being furnished
for your records.
Enclosures
2
62-116395
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
3. DATE 10-25-2dbusy
1 The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
MDR-16
Intelligence Coordination
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. In
Training
Legal Cou
Telephone Rm. _
TEB:dmt
(11)
ENCLOSURE
REC- 102
62-116315
پین
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
WZ88408 ocld92989609 Page 76
Ina
ест
295
10%
JUL 2 1975
Fine
GPO 951-546
62-116395
2 Mr. J. A. Mintz
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
(1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. H. N. Bassett
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. T. E. Burns
June 12, 1975
1 Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE:
FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ...
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and
other information from the FBI.
Pursuant to your request in Appendix B, Part I,
Item 7, for guidelines used by the FBI Inspection Division
for inspecting field offices and for inspecting Divisions
of the FBI, we currently have such material available for
review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately cleared personnel
of the Committee.
1
-
The Attorney General
TEB:dmt
(10)
NOTE:
JB
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
சோதிது
DATE 11-25-2000 BYSP2
MDR-16
See H. N. Bassett memorandum to Mr. Wannall June 2,
1975, captioned "Senstudy 75," wherein the Inspection Division
advised it has no objection to a review of the field and
headquarters inspection manuals by members of the Committee
staff provided the review is conducted in FBI space with an
Inspection Division representative present. When SSC review
is requested, we will have the Inspection Division representative
make the manuals available.
MAIL ROOM
спе
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 77
Has
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2
Jantzit
ENCLOSURE
шк
WA
295
TIPO 951-546
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
NOTE CONTINUED:
-
The FBIHQ and field inspection manuals were reviewed
by Special Agent (SA) Thomas E. Burns, Jr. Determination to
furnish questionable field inspection manual sections concerning
PROSAB (Section 4 J 2.), AFSAM (Section 5 L 10.) and BUPLANS
(Section 5 P.) was coordinated with IS 2 (SA Edward P. Grigalus)
and IS
3 (SA Russell H. Horner) of the Intelligence Division
and the Laboratory Division, Cryptanalysis Unit (P. W. Paddock),
and it was ascertained there is no objection to a Committee
review of these sections.
-
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 78
-
2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 79
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Senate Select Committee
Addressee:
☐ LTR ☑ LHM
☐ Memo
Report dated
Caption of Document:
and Procedures
U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re:
6-12-75
Policies
Cinating Office
D₁
FBI
Date:
Pieced by Richard T. Taylor, Pine 16 Jun 75
Sherry Towell
>..
eived by:
Title: Asst O. Mnr
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 10-25-2010 BY S
MDR-16
TE:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
FROM:
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
2. DATE PROVIDED
器
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
FOR REVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
器
SSC
Sherry Towell, Assistant Office Manager
6/12/75
HSC
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Further Documents Pertaining to the FBI and Department of Justice.
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter 5/14/75; Appendix B, Part I, Item 7.
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
****
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Operating Procedures
8.
SUMMARY (see reverse side'þefore completing this item)
At the request of SSC, material containing the guidelines
used by the FBI Inspection Division for inspecting various aspects
of the Bureau's operations has been made available at FBIHQ for
review by SSC members.
62-116395
TJM:1hb
(4)
3791 (6-75)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
ม
DATE: 16-2530 BY SPRAUM/90
MDR-16
TREAT AS YELLOW
Woe
5-731
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN
CONNECTION WITH 'SENSTUDY 75.
72-75
LFS
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 80

INSTRUCTIONS
• Type or print clearly in ink.
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a prèviously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
i
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 81
MI
RETAINED
NR. 009 TP CODE
5:30 PM NITEL JUNE 30, 1975 JMM
TO:
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN
TELETYPE
Mull
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection +
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
-
(62-116395)
FROM: TAMPA (105-0-1121)
SENSTUDY 75.
RE BUREAU NITEL JUNE 28, 1975.
JAMES E. MC MAHON, 3110 COCOS ROAD, TAMPA, FLORIDA 33618,
AND DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY, TAMPA,
LORIDA, WAS CONTACTED ON JUNE 30, 1975, AND ADVISED OF THE
NTENTS OF REFERENCED BUREAU NITEL. MR. MC MAHON ADVISED
AT IF HE IS CONTACTED BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HE
WOULD IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE SAC OF THE TAMPA OFFICE AND
WILL
CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO ASSIST HIM AS TO
HIS OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENT IAL ITY OF FURNISHING INFORMATÏON
ACQUIRED AS AN FBI EMPLOYEE
END
HOLD
COPY
ес
Rebor
67-
(He Malion
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 
10252000) BY
MDR-16
REC-102 10.2-116395-293
JUL 1976
NW8608cld:32989609
JUL 1975
.
NW 88608' Docid:32989609 Page 82
5
PR008 CG PLAIN
6:15PM NITEL 6/30/75 EMM
TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM CHICAGO (62-6211)
SENSTUDY $75.
LING
PERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN
TELETYPE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-20 BY
REBUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.
MDR-16 SPRAWNSTON
SA JOHN R. BASSETT, CHICAGO DIVISION, HAS BEEN ADVISED
CONTENTS OF REBUIEL; HOWEVER, IT IS POINTED OUT TO THE
}
BUREAU THAT SA BASSETT HAS BEEN DISPATCHED TO PINE
3
RIDGE, SOUTH DAKOTA, TO ASSIST IN BUREAU SPECIAL RESMURS.
"
THTHIS TIME, CHICAGO HAS NO IDEA WHEN SA BASSETT MAY
RETURN.
ABOVE FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU IN EVENT THEY MAY
DESIRE TO ADVISE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE OF SA BASSETT'S
PRESENT UNAVAILABILITY.
END
REC-102
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fils & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
'Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
На-
62-116-395--292
3 JUL 2 1975
HOLD
84 JUL 2 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 83
CC:67-
(Bonett)
5.
Pip
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
DATE:
6/24/75
W
FROM
:
W. O. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-25-204 BY
MDR-16
PURPOSE:
ORIGINAL ONLY
[To advise that CIA has agreed to have Bureau
representatives review 693 page CIA document containing
information relating to joint ventures; involving CIA and
other members of the intelligence community in sensitive
matters, and decision of CIA to furnish FBI with copies
of any document contained therein having a bearing on
FBI activities.
DETAILS:
:s.]
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
ви
[My memorandum to you captioned as above dated
6/20/75, advised that a representative of the Intelligence…
Community Staff on that date, at FBI Headquarters,' briefed
appropriate Intelligence Division personnel of the contents
of a 693 page document prepared by CIA which contains
numerous memoranda relating to a wide variety of operations
in which CIA, to some degree, had contact or cooperated
with other members of the intelligence community in sensitive
matters. You were advised that members of the Senate
Select Committee have already had access to, if not actual
possession of, this document, and that a number of the operations
cited in the document are of extremely sensitive nature
involving this Bureau. ] REC-102
3 JUL 2 19753
-291
[In order to enable this Bureau to be in a position
to knowledgeably and accurately reply to SSC inquiries and
to fully identify operations listed in the document of
interest to this Bureau, contact was initiated with John Clarke,
Associate Deputy to Director of Central Intelligence for the
Intelligence Community, for the purpose of obtaining a copy
of this document. On 6/23/75, Mr. Clarke advised that CIA
Director William Colby authorized the reviewing of this ]
62-116395
84 JUL 2 1975M:adn
NW ‍88608 Docid:32989609 Page 84
CONTINUED
-
OVER
5.M
UNEXCISED VERSIONS OF DOCUMENTS FURNISHED
TO SSC
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 85
I
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY
62-116395
(693 page document by Bureau representatives and this Bureau's
obtaining a copy of any memorandum contained therein having
a bearing on FBI activities. (
As the above authorization appears to be responsive to
this Bureau's need for reviewing the document for information
having a bearing on this Bureau's operations, arrangements
have been effected for Mrs. Harriett Mowitt, Executive Secretary,
Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of Intelligence
Community, to bring this 693 page document to FBI Headquarters
on 6/25/75 for review by selected personnel of the Intelligence
Division. Copies will be obtained of any memorandum contained
therein believed to have a bearing on any phase of this Bureau's
activities.
RECOMMENDATION:
Upon completion of above review you will be advised
of pertinent information obtained, accompanied by recommendations
as to additional action believed necessary in this matter.
Tom Euf
Appl
JEA
всм
wRw
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 86
وگیر
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Intelligence Community Staff
Ss, study
DCI/IC-75-0619
18 JUN 1975
75
MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
SUBJECT
Organization for Liaison with Select Committees
The attached CIA Employee Bulletin lays out the DCI's
organization for dealing with the Senate and House Select
Committees. It is provided to you for information.
Attachment:
as stated
John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
Ho
✓ ENCLOSURE
JUL 2 1975
88608 Docld:32989609 Page 87
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
ETHREOT IS UNICLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-200 Y Serpm/emp].
MDR-16
REC-102
62-116395-290 3
File
3 JUL 2 1975.
5-6.
62-116395
CENTRAL
TELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 452
AGENCY
EMPLOYEE
BULLETIN
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
**** Wmc***pa4* t 4#*#
10 June 1975
Mr. E. H. Knoche has been named the focal point within
the Agency for liaison with the Senate and House Select
Committees investigating intelligence activities. Mr. John
Clarke will continue in his capacity as focal point for the
Intelligence Community on that same subject. Any Agency
employee contacted directly by a Select Committee staff
member should refer the caller to the Select Committee Review
Staff under Mr. Knoche, on X4086.
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
FELINS UNJOLAQSIFIED
DATE:11-15-200 EXSPRAEM/B
DISTRIBUTION: All Employees
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 88.
62.116375-290
NCLOSURE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NRØØI AL CODE
3:47 PM NITEL JUNE 28, 1975 LW.
TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM ALBANY
(62-2368)
SENSTIDY 75
RE BUTEL JUNE 28, 1975.
JUN 28 1975
TELETYPE
heatfield
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIND
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DIVER 10-24-2001 SPA/
MDR-16
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection w
Intell.WE
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
ON JUNE 28, 1975, FORMER SA HENRY G. ROWSE, JR., WAS
CONTACTED BY ASAC JOHN J. HINCHCLIFFE AND ADVISED CONTENTS
RE BUTEL. ROWSE, STATED THAT SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY SCC, HE
WILL CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION. ROWSE CIRRENTLY
RESIDING C/O P.O. BOX 65, SHELDON, VT., 05483, TELEPHONE NO.
802-848-7418, OR 73 HIGHLAND AVE., RICHFORD, 2517°C 395-
END
LRF FIHQ CLR
REC-102
JUL 1 1975
(Rocess)
-
-
-
На
=288.
568
84 JUL 1 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989609. Page 89
cc.67-
PERSIBE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 29 1975
TELETYPE
wer/b
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
-
-
NR002 AT CODED.
7:44 PM NITEL JUNE 29, 1975 TLL
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR, FBI
ATLANTA
SENSTUDY *75.
RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES JUNE 28, 1975.
FORMER SA MARION CHEEK CONTACTED BY SAC, ATLANTA, JUNE
29, 1975, IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN RE TEL.
END
TOW FBIHQ CLR
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFTI
DATE
24-200BY.
MDR-16
SerpentBy
REC- 102
шов
Ho
मैं
84 JUL 1 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 90
cc 67-
(CHEER)
62-116395=2873
3 JUL 1 1975
FERS

ll.
for
вог
002 AT CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 28 1975
RMS
TELETYPE
10:40 AM NITEL JUNE 28, 1975 PG
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
✓ FROM: ATLANTA
SENSTUDY 75
RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA AND OTHER OFFICES, JUNE 28, 1975.
ALL CURRENT AND FORMER AGENTS WITHIN ATLANTA DIVISION
CONTACTED BY SAC, ATLANTA, JUNE 28, 1975, WITH EXCEPTION OF
FORMER SA MARION CHEEK AND ADVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INSTRUCTIONS, RE TEL.
FORMER SA CHEEK CURRENTLY BOATING ON SUWANEE RIVER IN
REMOTE AREA, FLORIDA, AND NO POTENTIAL FOR LOCATING UNTIL
EVENING OF JUNE 29, 1975, NEXT. CHEEK WILL BE CONTACTED BY
SAC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, JUNE 29, 1975, AND BUREAU IMMEDIATELY
ADVISED OF CONTACT.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm..
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspecti
Intell✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Wab
-
END
LRF FBIHQ CLR
REC-102
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 120-21 BY DZALM
MOR-16
SPRAM/
62-116395-286
3 JUL 1 1975
5 Chang
84 JUL 1 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 91
NT OF
13
"OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D\\C.
C. 20530
JUN 20 1975
CRICANA
Mo
TO: Antonin Scalia
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel
Douglas R. Marvin
Special Assistant to the
Attorney General
FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Deputy Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
6/19
SUBJECT:
ALL FRIZWFORMATION CONTAINIO
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-2007 S
MDR-16
matorias
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED,
DATE 10
BY
Senstudy
'75
-
Senate Select Committee Request: Appendix D, Item 17 -
Joseph Kraft
дат
The SSC's request of Item 17, Appendix D, seeks "All memo-
randa and other materials reflecting written or oral authorization
and re-authorization by the Attorney General and/or the Director of
the FBI for electronic surveillance of Joseph Kraft".
By letter of May 2, 1975, to Kraft's attorney, Lloyd Cutler,
the Attorney General gave, inter alia, the following assurances:
"Pending further Departmental action relating to the policies
which will govern records of the type involved in Mr. Kraft's
case, all documents, recordings, or other records of any type in
the Department's custody or control which constitute, summarize,
or describe the contents of the overhearings obtained as the result
of any electronic surveillance directed against Mr. Kraft and
members of his family will be placed under seal"., (emphasis mine)
REC-102 62-116395-285
It is my view (shared by Mr. O'Connor) and articulated, as
well, by Cutler in telephone conversations with me on June 12, and
June 16, 1975 (the second call came after Cutler had conferred with
Kraft) that the material sought by the Senate Select Committee is
distinct from that protected by seal and that, therefore, the
requested material be found, reviewed and forwarded to the SSC.
(Cutler advised that the Ervin Committee was given same).
May I have your views on this matter?
3 JUL 1 1975
responsive to request item 17 appendi
fumishar Dept. 6/20/35 for consideration with respect to
restrictions noted in above memo.
REVOLUTION
BICE
Ewo
62-116392
E111ceived by hand delivery from Negt. 58. 6/20/75.
JUL
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 92
5-aut
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
$010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr
SECRET
DATE: February 13, 1970
FROM: S. J. Papich
SUBJECT: UNION FOR REVOLUTION
11-15-2000
CLASSIFIED BY
SP24CM/184P
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X /
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
✓ CIA, furnished the following to the
Liaison Agent on 2/10/70. (S)
[ CIA has established a U.S. based notional organization
representing itself as being communist oriented and having the
following mailing addresses: P.O. Box 444, Boston, Massachusetts,
02102 and P.O. Box 8272, General Post Office, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 19101. The organization's activity in the U.S.
will be restricted to production of propaganda in the form of
pamphlets, etc., which material will be mailed to various Left
Wing groups in foreign countries. The primary objective of
this operation is to develop penetrations and/or sources in
revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. The organization
is completely notional in character in that there will be no
offices in the U.S. (only p.o. boxes) and even the officials
will bear fictitious names. CIA hopes that once the propaganda
begins circulating, Arab groups will become interested and will
endeavor to establish contact with "officials" of the organization
If this develops, CIA will then proceed to use its own personnel
under "suitable" cover to make the contact. From then on CIA
will maneuver to penetrate the target group.
In
In response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA will
furnish us samples of propaganda. The Agent also asked that we
be given copies of communications sent to the mailing addresses
by any organizations or individuals. We should have such data
so that we can take the necessary investigative action in the
event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest
in the captioned group. We, of course, will also be interested
in international ramifications which could have a bearing on.
the activities of Left Wing activity in this country. The Agent
also asked for the names of the officials which will be related
to the Union for Revolution. ✗(S)
[At
དྭེ*སྙམ, སྱཱ ཊྛཱ*
At this stage there does not appear to be any conditions
or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our
operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately
informed. CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming
to our attention concerning the organization. CIA further requests
that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureau and that
this information be handled on a need-to-know basis. (
SJP:wmk
(6) Classified/6283
62-116395
SECRE
CONTINUED
-
OVER
ENCLOSURE
Exempt from GDS, Category
NW 88608 Docid:32989809 ages93cation Indefinite
284
F-36
SECRET
Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.
UNION FOR REVOLUTION
RE:
ACTION:
The above information is being directed to the
attention of the Internal Security Section and the
Nationalities Intelligence Section. Liaison will follow
in order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to
above and will again reiterate that we be furnished copies
of communications transmitted to the mailing addresses.
S
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 94
SECRE
I
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
* CSA GEN. REG.. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES G ERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
: Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr
DATE: February 13, 1970
FROM: S. J. Papich
i
SUBJECT: UNION FOR REVOLUTION
Liaison Agent on 2/10/70 : 3 (S)
11-15-2000
'CLASSIFIED BY SPALM Br
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_
h.DR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
(Norman Garrett, CIA, furnished the following to the
&
followi
[CIA has established a U.S. based notional organization
representing itself as being communist oriented and having the
following mailing addresses: P.O. Box 444, Boston, Massachusetts,
02102 and P.O. Box 8272, General Post Office, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 19101. The organization's activity in the U.S.
will be restricted to production of propaganda in the form of
pamphlets, etc., which material will be mailed to various Left
Wing groups in foreign countries. The primary objective of
this operation is to develop penetrations and/or sources in
revolutionary Arab groups in the Middle East. The organization
is completely notional in character in that there will be no
offices in the U.S. (only p.o. boxes) and even the officials
will bear fictitious names. CIA hopes that once the propaganda
begins circulating, Arab groups will become interested and will
endeavor to establish contact with "officials" of the organization
If this develops, CIA will then proceed to use its own personnel
under "suitable" cover to make the contact. From then on CIA
will maneuver to penetrate the target group. 1(5)
(In response to the Liaison Agent's request, CIA will
furnish us samples of propaganda. The Agent also asked that we
be given copies of communications sent to the mailing addresses
by any organizations or individuals. We should have such data
so that we can take the necessary investigative action in the
event any persons or organizations in the U.S. take an interest
in the captioned group. We, of course, will also be interested
in international ramifications which could have a bearing on.
the activities of Left Wing activity in this country, The Agent
also asked for the names of the officials which will be related
to the Union for Revolution. (5)
4**
[At this stage there dos not appear to be any conditions
or developments which would have an adverse bearing on our
operations or jurisdiction providing that CIA keeps us adequately
informed. CIA asks that it be apprised of any information coming
to our attention concerning the organization. CIA further requests
that its interest not be revealed outside of the Bureau and that
this information be handled on a need-to-know basis. :))
SJP: wmk Classified by 6283
Exempt from CDS, Category
"(6)
SECRET!
Date of Declassification Indefinite
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 95
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.
UNION FOR REVOLUTION
RE:
ACTION:
[The above information is being directed to the
attention of the Internal Security Section and the
Nationalities Intelligence Section. Liaison will follow
in order to obtain samples of the propaganda referred to
above and will again reiterate that we be furnished copies
of communications transmitted to the mailing addresses: (CSC)
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 96
BECKER
--->
2
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Addressee:
Senate Select Committee
☐ LT.R ☑ LHM
Memo
Report dated 6/11/75
Caption of Document:
U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Other
Specific FBI Practices and Procedure
Item #24, Part III, Appendix C
Originating Office:
Delivered by:
Received by:
Title:
Fault daly
Je
FBI
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
Date:
6/13/75
#3
fr
89609 Page 97
0
Gr
✔
W
O Commer
6/12
-12:30
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 98
"
1
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 99
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1.0-24-2009 BY SPEAK/B
MDR-16
:
་
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-284
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
TO:
✓ Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information
FROM:
OTE:
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SECRET
Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75
✗
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
☑
4.
SSC
HSC
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN 
OTHERWISE..
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Other Specific FBI Practices and Programs
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix C, Part III, Item 24.
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
"S"
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
8.
COVERT ACTIVITIES
((s)
12-15-2000
CLASSIFIED BY SPZALM/Br
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
MDR-16
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
With agreement of CIA, SSC was furnished with copy of
documents maintained by the Bureau relating to establishment by
CIA in this country of a "notional" Marxist-Leninist organization.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-3-00
hote:
Original
BY
via Liaison to Central Community Index
in connection with Sensus.
TJM:1hb
(4)
62-116395
3791 (6-75)
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 100
T
6-24-75 CFS
75
TREET AS YELLOW
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
हजू
5-7519
SECRET
7284
ENCLOSURE
62-1163957.

INSTRUCTIONS
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 101
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
2
1
J. A. Hintz
Mr J. B. Hotis)
R. Vannall
W. O. Cregar
B. T. Palmer
H. W. Dare,
JUDO
1975
590190
Debrews to Can
کاشت کی
WITED STATES SHAKS SILICT QUITIE
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Reference is made to memorandus from SeERTO
Select Committes, dated May 14, 1975, and appendicem
thereto, requesting certain documents and other informa-
tion from the FBI.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee in the original of a smorandus and an enclosure
which is responsive to one of the Committee's requests.
A copy of the memorandum and its enclosure is
being provided for your recorde.
Racloseres (4)
966911-69
1 - The Daputy Attorney General
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE10-31-00 BYST
тормо
Sttention: E. Willies O'Conner
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
VP. V.ly
Room 45 09 JB"
your
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
HWD:prd
(10)
prd
edm
Plan. & Eval.A
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Direct Sex MAIL 1975M ☑
NWC88608 Docid:32989609 Page 102
Nov. d delivered
6-12-75 
b.
P.U. Daly
PUP/
TELETYPE UNIT
in
REC-102
62-116395-284
300
Ри
SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
3 JUL 1 1975
White Faul
Hus
GPO 954-546
63-116395
CLASSIFIED BY SPACE/
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_
MDR-16
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director
SECRET
1
1
1
-
-
Mr. J. A. Kintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. V. R. Wannall
Hr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. B. T. Palmer
Mr. H. F. Dare, Jr.
June 11, 1975
UNITED STATES SKRATE SELECT ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL EN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE: OTHER SPECIFIC FBI PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
Reference is nade to sesorandun from captioned
Committee dated May 14, 1975, and the appendices thereto,
which contained requests for information from the FBI
concerning all memoranda and other materials reflecting
conversations, contacts, or communications between the
YBI and the CIA on the subject of the establishment or
creation of "national” Narxist-Leninist organizations
within the United States.
Part III, Appendix C,
nonorandum from
dated February 13,
which sets forth
response to Iten number 24,
esclosed for the Committee is a copy of
8. J. Papich to Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr,
1970, captioned "Union For Revolution,
information from CIA advising of the establishment of a
"notional" Marxist-Louisist organization by the CIA,
Although the FBI did, as noted in other responses to the
Committee, establish and direct such notional organizations,
no information has been developed indicating the FBI
consulted with CIA regarding their establishment or creation.
Inclosure
The Attorney General
HWD:prd
(9)
prd
ASSIGNED BY
11700
MDR-16
PLM
Classified by 6183
www/ful
SEE NOTE PAGE 2
Exempt from GDB, Category Number
Date of Declassification Indefinite
sclassifies
SECRET
MAIL ROOM
62-116375-284
TELETYPE UNIT
ENCLOSURE
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 103
HWD
GPO 954-546
The Attorney General
NOTE:
SECRET
SECRET
✓ See
_See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Hr. W. R. Wannall,
dated 6/6/75, which advised of CIA's clearance to forward
memorandum dated 2/13/70 to the Committee. In enclosure
dated 2/13/70, the name of the CIA Agent who furnished
the information has been excised per CIA's request.
Memorandum dated 3/23/70 and captioned "Union For
Revolution," mentioned in V. O. Cregar memorandum to
Mr. V. R. Wannall, dated 6/6/75 is not being forwarded to
the Committee since it is not responsive to the Committee's
specific request. That memorandum deals with an evaluation
of CIA's notional operation by this Bureau,
[Classified "Secret" in accordance with CIA's
classification of its information per Mr. Walt Elder,
(CIA. J⑤
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 104
2
SECRET
SECRET
i
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPAIR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM/I
: Legal Counsel
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
DATE 11-24-22000878216
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
91-78074
DATE: 6-9-75
Tu
By memorandum dated 6-4-75 you were advised that
captioned Committee was preparing what they termed case studies on
COINTELPROS in four separate areas. The areas defined were Black
Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of
Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the
Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was
killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).
Mr. Lester B. Seidel advised SA Paul V. Daly 6-9-75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. ADVE
Asst. Dite:
Admin
Comp Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Wispection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval!
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
that in addition to the aforementioned areas he also wanted to include the
Muhammad Kenyatta case in Philadelphia. As an observation, two of the
areas cited by Mr. Seidel are areas where the Bureau currently is facing
lawsuits, namely, the Hampton and Kenyatta cases, and a third area is
one which we could well be involved in a lawsuit, that being the Starsky
case. Mr. Seidel indicated the Bureau can expect correspondence from
the Committee concerning these matters.
REC-102
RECOMMENDATION:
For information.
62-116395
1
Mr. Wannall
1
Mr. Mintz
1
Mr. Cregar
-
Mr. Hotis
دران
42-1163%-783
7/1
JISH LOND
JBA
مل
1
1
1
-
Mr. Daly
Inspector J. T. Kelly
PVD:kjs (8)
84 JUL 1975
Buy US. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
NW 88608Qocid:32989609 Page 105
CODE
TELE
URGENT
де
жават
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-2420BY SP
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Bal four-1
TO BAC SAN FRANCISCO
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
SENSTUDY 75
REC-102
-
Mr. Wannall
6-9-75
Attn: Cregar
1 Mr. Gebhardt
-
Mintz
(62-116395) -2821 - Mr. Hotis
-
1 Mr. Daly
THIS IS TO ADVISE YOU THAT PURSUANT TO REQUEST FROM THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC) I HAVE
RELEASED YOU AND FORMER SA DAVID E. TOED FROM APPLICABLE
EMPLOYEE SECRECY AGREEMENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A STAFF INTERVIEW
BY SSC CONCERNING COINTELPRO AND THE INVESTIGATION AT
SAN FRANCISCO OF THE BPF. LESTER B. SEIDEL, STAFF MEMBER OF SI
WILL TRAVEL TO SAN FRANCISCO TO CONDUCT THE INTERVIEWS IN
SAPPROXIMATELY TWO WEEKS.
AN AGENT WILL BE AVAILABLE DURING INTERVIEW TO ASSIST IN
MAKING A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT A PARTICULAR
QUESTION SHOULD BE RESPONTED TO. THIS AGENT IS NOT TO BE
CONSIDERED PRIVATE COUNSEL AND WILL NOT BE PRESENT DURING INTER-
VIEW.
YOU, AN ASAC, OR SENIOR SUPERVISOR CONTACT FORMER SA DAVID
E. TODD TO ADVISE HIM OF THE WAIVER OF THE APPLICABLE SECRECY
AGREEMENT AND DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS DESIROUS OF HAVING AN
PVD:eek
(7) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
43 1975
ephone Rm.
COM
JUN 09 1975
1045
TELETYPE
PJBY
Pin
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 106
7
IBM pos
4017
JE 1+
дат
GPO 954-546
PAGE TWO 62-116395
AGENT AVAILABLE DURING INTERVIEW. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION
TODD HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH LEGAL COUNSEL
DIVISION CONCERNING THIS INTERVIEW AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED
CONCERNING HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, ETC.
SUTEL RESULTS OF CONTACT WITH TODD. YOU SHOULD CONTACT
LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING
YOUR INTERVIEW.
NOTE:
By memo 6–2–75 captioned as above it was recommended
and approved that SAC Charles W. Bates, former SA David E. Todd,
and Assistnat Director Robert E. Gebhardt be released from
applicable secrecy agreements for purposes of interview by SSC.
We are separately advising Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt
of this decision.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 107
-2-
ΤΟ
FROM
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
Legal Counsel
(SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
JECT
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-O BY SP
56/6/9
PiD/OL
91-71
DATE: 6-2-75
барбай
трактр
Assoc. Dir
Dep. Apm.
Dep. AP Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm. —
Director Sec'y
The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that
Lester B. Seidell, staff member of the Senate Select Committee, has
informed us that the Committee intends to interview former SA David E.
Todd, SAC Charles W. Bates, and Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt
and to request that the aforementioned employees be released from existing
employment and/or secrecy agreement for purposes of a staff interview.
On the evening of 5-29-75, Lester B. Seidell telephonically
advised SA Paul V. Daly of this Division that in accordance with the
"guidelines" existing between the Committee and the various intelligence
agencies under review, he was giving notice that he as a representative
of the Committee was going to San Francisco in approximately two to three
weeks, and it was his intention to interview SAC Charles W. Bates, former
|SA David E. Todd, and former Assistant to the Director Alan H. Belmont.
He also requested Assistant Director Gebhardt be made available for staff
interview in Washington, D. C. He asked that the Bureau take the necessary
steps to release the Agents from any existing employment or secrecy
agreements. For the purposes of this interview, he stated he would inquire
of each of the interviewees as to their knowledge and participation in counter-
intelligence activities directed against the Black Panther Party. With regards
to this discussion, he specifically mentioned a Bureau airtel to San Francisco
dated 5-11-70, titled "Counterintelligence and Special Operations (Research
Section)." He stated this document was one of the documents released by
the court in the suit by newscaster Carl Stern. He was asked as to whether
he could define more precisely the areas to be covered in the interviews and
stated he could not inasmuch as he did it now the Jarious aspects of the 282
counterintelligence program against the Black Panther Party in the San Francisco
area. Additionally, he advised he was making a request for documents,
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1
-
Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1
-
3 JUL 1 1975
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 Mr Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
Personnel File, SAC Charles W. Bates
Dad
1 - Personnel File, Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt
1 - Personnel File, former SA David E. Todd
PVD:dkg (12)
V
CONTINUED - OVER
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
NW 88608i.Doçid:32989609 Page 108
Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75
in writing, which would coincide with the aforementioned topic of interview.
He described these interviews as being "abuse" interviews which according
to the Committee's understanding precludes the presence of an agency
representative during interview. However, an Agent may be available for
consultation purposes.
Mr. Seidell was advised by SA Daly that former Assistant
to the Director Belmont was in poor health and that before attempting interview
of Mr. Belmont, he should ascertain his current physical condition. Mr. Seidell
requested SA Daly determine Mr. Belmont's physical condition. Assistant
Director Cleveland advised SA Daly on 5-30-75 that Mr. Belmont was very
seriously ill and was suffering from the Shy Drager Syndrome. This informa-
tion was brought to the attention of John Elliff, Task Force Director on
Domestic Intelligence Activities of captioned Committee, and Elliff expressed
dismay that Seidell had made an inquiry concerning the interview of Belmont.
Elliff requested that we not take any action concerning Seidell's request as
to Belmont at this time.
Former SA David E. Todd had previously contacted this
Division and as set forth in memorandum dated 5-16-75 from Legal Counsel
to J. B. Adams, he was advised of his rights, the existence of an employment
secrecy agreement signed by him, of the provisions of Attorney General
Order 501-73, and to his right to a private attorney. He was also advised
that an Agent would be made available for consultation during the interview
if he so desired. Mr. Todd did not indicate at this point whether he was
desirous of having a Bureau representative available for consultation during
interview. Todd, according to Seidell, stated he would not consider to be
interviewed in the absence of a release of a secrecy agreement by the Bureau.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That former SA David E. Todd, Assistant Director
Robert E. Gebhardt, and SAC Charles W. Bates be released from their
employment and secrecy agreements for purposes of a staff interview concerning
our Cointelpro activities against the Black Panther Party.
V V
RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 109
- 2 -
Teletypes
*
699175
Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams Memorandum
Re: SENSTUDY 75
(2) If approved, the employees and former employee will
be advised and briefed generally concerning the making available of a
Bureau representative for consulation during such an interview and
other pertinent matters to be considered during interview.
рид твпрод
Рем
дна
дра
was
дена
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 110
-3-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSAYGEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
TO
(
FROM
: W.
egar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
DECLASSIFIED BY SPEALM,
10-24-2000
MDR-16
NO
SECRET
1
-
2
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr.
(1
-
J. A. Mintz
J. B. Hotis)
DATE: 6/17/75
1
-
1
1
-
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. H. E. Helgeson
W. O. Cregar
Mr.
-
MC:
J. P. Thomas
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Adm
Dep. AD I
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
WRI
This is to record meeting of Task Force (TF)
leaders with Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the
President, at the Executive Office Building on 6/13/75.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y.
Aforementioned meeting was called and chaired by
Mr. Wilderotter, and was attended by representatives of The
White House, Justice, Defense, FBI, CIA, and State. Project
Manager W. O. Cregar and Supervisor J. P. Thomas, Section CI-2,
INTD, represented the FBI.
Mr. Wilderotter reported that the Senate Select
Committee (SSC) has agreed to specifically identify a limited
number of "abuse areas" which it will investigate from top to
bottom. "Notices" should be issued to agencies very shortly
defining certain terms and specifying the SSC targets.
If
these areas can be fully investigated, with assistance of the
intelligence community, the SSC agrees to not extend its inquiries
beyond the specified areas. If the SSC does so limit its
inquiries, this will be to the advantage of the intelligence
community in that it will minimize the SSC's straying into
various nonpertinent matters; the TFs can present the intelli-
gence community's side on the topics examined; the TFs should
be able to expedite the Committee's inquiries and thereby limit
the duration of the SSC investigation.
The FBI has responsibility for the TES on "Political
Abuses," TF leader Insp. H. E. Helgeson, and "Use of Notional
Organizations," TF leader Supv. J. P. Thomas. We cannot fully
address either topic until receiving the SSC notices defining
the extent of the proposed inquiries.
Contrary to the initial concept of the TFs, they will
not prepare comprehensive papers regarding their topics, but in
some areas it may be advantageous for a TF to prepare an
"opening statement" type paper for the SSC.
Enclosure
62-116395
REC-100
.
62-116375-280
CONTINUED
-
OVER
JPT:bkbbkb
(8)
ECRET
Classified by 6875
17 JUN 27 1975-
Exempt from CDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
NW88608 17:32989609 Page 111
5.
-Euf
SECRET
1
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
The purpose of the TF and functions of the TF
leaders were discussed. Briefly, each TF leader is to become
a substantive expert on the particular topic assigned to him
(e.g. political abuses), locate all documents, identify
potential witnesses, develop strategy for presenting subject
matter to the SSC and work to minimize any delays which might
be caused by the Third Agency Rule. TF leaders will not
themselves be witnesses unless their activities other than as
TF leaders are subjects of testimony. TF leaders will, in
consultation with legal counsel, define terms pertinent to
their topics. They will outline directly to the SSC staff,
insofar as the SSC is receptive, the scope and direction of
pertinent inquiry, who is and is not competent to testify,
what documents are available, and what areas may or may not be
pertinent to the Committee's interests. TF leaders will prepare
themselves to be able to answer any inquiries from the
White House on their topics. Although TF leaders must know
the location of all documents pertinent, the documents them-
selves will be made available to the SSC by the agency having
custody of same and each agency may negotiate with the SSC
regarding access by the Committee to material on a case by
case basis. The agencies will, of course, coordinate first
with their own legal counsel and then with the White House
before releasing documents.
On sensitive matters, such as notional organizations
or proprietary organizations, the SSC has agreed that it will
not be necessary for agencies to furnish the names of U. S.
citizens and companies who have cooperated with the U. S. unless
those persons or companies have received notoriety (e.g. Hughes
Tool Company, Sam Giancana). It is reportedly understood that
agencies must protect their ongoing operations. Agencies are
free to attempt to negotiate with the SSC regarding the extent
and form of their responses.
Attached is a copy of an intelligence community staff
memorandum 6/10/75 showing the TF assignments and, in the left
margin notes as to the agencies expected to have input into
each subject.
ACTION:
For record purposes.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 112
JPT
SECRET
2
Q
get
Рем
wry)
Jum
i
Intelligence Community Staff
SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
SUBJECT
DCI/IC-75-0119
10 June 1975
Memorandum dated 6 June 1975 re
Task Force Assignments
1.
This memorandum is a follow-on to subject memorandum
and in addition to completing the principal officer assignments also
lists task force members assigned by other agencies:
1
Subject
Principal
Agency
CIA
State Assassinations
White House
DOD
Principal
Officer.
Mr. Wilderotter
IDS 145-7094
Hunter Helgeson
John Thomas
CIA
Army
Drug Abuse.
(Testing of drugs)
CIA
Sayre Stevens
IDS 143-4303
FBI,CIA
W. House Political Abuses
FBI
DofJ
(1964)
ALL
Domestic
(incl. 17 taps,
324-4609
IDS 17-4885
Green 1303
John Martin
Justice
* IDS 187-4555
Task Force
Assignments
James Gardner,
State Dept.
·IDS 101-29034
Malcolm Lawrence
State Dept.
IDS 101-28694
Charles Kane
CIA
IDS 143-6777
Verne St. Mars
State Dept.
IDS 101-29448
Surveillance
Huston Plan, etc.)
ALL FEI INFORMATION CONTAINED.
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 
ILIGAND
•MDR-14
102714375-200
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 113
ENCLOSURE
CLASSIFIED BY
006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCRFTULE OF + 0. 1103, XXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5~(1, ©, (3) or (4) (sirds one or more)
AUTUMNALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
AmpOSSIBLE TO DETRAWE
(unless impossible, insert date or event)
*b
FBI
DOD
Subject
Electronic
CIA(Clarke Surveillance
1. and Warrantless
SECRET
Principal
Officer
Principal
Agency
Justice
IDS 187-4401
George Calhoun
Task Force
Assignments
William Jones.
State Dept.
IDS 101-20370
Wiretap
FBI
CIA, DOD
Use of Notional
Organizations
FBI
FBI
Use of Proprietary
CIA
CIA
Organizations
.
"
John Thomas
324-4609
1
IDS 174609
GREEN V303
Erich-Isenstead
Green 3140
Lee Peters.
State Dept..
IDS 101-29403
Ernest Tsikerdancs
'CiA
IDS-143-6348.
FBI.
CIA
Mail Cover and
DOD
Intercept
Justice
Phil White
IDS 187-4674
(to be
Watch List
DOD
Benson Buffham.
defined
NSA
by SSC)
1.688-7222
+1
DOD
Army
DoD
Surveillance
Dr. David Cooke
695-4436
:
2. The following officers from the Department of State have been
named to assist in the CIA preparation of comprehensive papers on the .
following geographic and subject areas:
Greece
Dominican Republic
James Gardner
IDS 101-29034
1.
James Gardner
IDS 101-29034
The Congo
Indonesia
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 114
James Henderson
East Asia Bureau
Bayard King
IDS 101-21504
Patricia Barnett
IDS 101-22369
sex
SECRET
Katzenbach Report
Emerson Brown
IDS 101-21504
3. The proposed DCI's letter to the Chairman of the House
Select Committee on Intelligence is in final coordination and is expected
to be available for Community review shortly. Following this,
Mr. Wilderotter will meet with the General Counsels to review and
coordinate on the final language.
351-4055
cc: Mr. Buchen
Mr. Hills
Distribution:
I
1
-
Mr. Wilderotter
Mr. Latimer
į - Mr. Hyland
1. - Mr. Morell
1
Mr. O'Connor
1- Mr. Cregar
Mr. Knoche
Mr. Clarke
Hand Moure
Harriett Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
NW-88608-Docld:32989609 Page 115
4-3? (Rev. 1 11-43)
Date of Mail
6/12/75
Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
MDR-16
See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.
Subject
JUNE MAIL SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Removed By
79 JUN 27 1975
File Number
62-116395-279
Permanent Serial Charge Out
DOJ/FB!
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 116
1
1
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GERNMENT
· Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
: Legal Counsel
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-200084
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
1 - Mr. McDermott-Enc. Asst. Dir.:
1 - Mr. Wannall-Enc.
1 - Mr. Mintz-Enc.
DATE: 6-11-75
1 - Mr. Cregar-Enc.
1 - Mr. Hotis-Enc.
1
-
Mr. Daly-Enc.
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On 6-10-75, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, furnished
Inspector John B. Hotis a copy of a letter from Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho)
to the Attorney General dated 5-28-75, requesting any files or documents\
in the Department or the FBI concerning five members of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities. The files requested pertain to Senators
Gary Hart (D-Colo.), Walter D. Huddleston (D-Ky.), Charles McC. Mathias
(R-Md.), Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.), and Robert Morgan (D-N.C.).
Senator Church emphasized that the request is made pursuant to Senate
Resolution 21, which established the Select Committee and not under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Mr. O'Connor also provided a draft of a proposed response
to the Senator's letter by the Attorney General. General Levi pledges
cooperation in this matter and suggests that the scope of the request should
be clarified. He also states that while the request is not made under FOIA,
exemptions in the Act indicate the kind of concerns the Committee might
want the Department to bring to its attention before disclosure is made.
The implication is that certain information in the files, particularly materials
which would violate individual privacy may be withheld.
It should also be noted that the Attorney General intends to
advise Senator Church that he is preparing the necessary materials and
asks for early discussions to determine how best to proceed. Accordingly,
it is felt that we should promptly review any files that might exist concerning
each of the above-named Senators and be prepared to furnish appropriate
information to the Attorney General upon request.
RECOMMENDATION:
EX-115 TREC-49 62-111-395-2784
1 MAR 19 1976,
That the FOLA Section, Files and Communications Division,
institute an immediate review of Bureau files for any documents or other
records concerning each of the above-named Senators.
-
3 ENCLOSURE
ackets
7/15/75 DRW: MLH
Milno
Enclosure
JBH:dkg (8)
NW 88608-Rocid:32988609 Buy US. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Page 117°
J
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, & HAIRN
JOHN G. TOWER? TEXAS, VICE CHAI
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE. MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN,-N.C.
GARY HARTT COLO
3
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. σ SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL,
RECEIVED
JUN 12
☑
27709775
JUSTICE
Alnited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 14TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
#c2si
ALL FRIENFORMATION CONTAINED
TINTUREN IS UNICLABSINTED
MDR-16
SP24CM/2
wen1-11
The Honorable Edward H. Levi
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
May 28,-1975.**
JUN 09 1975
O.L.A.
D
On behalf of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, we write to
request the delivery forthwith to the members whose names are listed
in the attachment hereto of any files on them or documents concern-
ing them that are in the possession, custody or control of the
Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This request is made pursuant to the mandate of the Senate,
contained in S. Res. 21. That Resolution requires us to investigate
the "conduct of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence opera-
tions against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or any other Federal agency".
One means of accomplishing this objective is to review the
material, if any, which the Department of Justice has gathered on
members of the United States Senate.
This request is made pursuant to the Committee's mandate and
not under the Freedom of Information Act. The exemptions to that
Act are designed to allow federal agencies and departments the
degree of confidentiality necessary to conduct the ongoing activities
of the Executive Branch, not to prevent a duly constituted Congres-
sional Committee from understanding the nature, legality, and
propriety of some of those activities. Whether as a matter of agree-
ment between the Committee and the Department some material that may
be in any such files should be withheld depends upon an analysis of
the weight of the particular reason put forward for the proposed
withholding balanced against the Committee's need to exercise its
mandate.
FBI
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE)
Obviously, material received by the members of the Select
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
--116395-11
DATE BY SP
"
PL
торже
ENCLOSURE
8
JUN 6 1975
R.A.0.
RICE OF GASLATE AFAN
མཱརཱ…ཨཽ"་ནསམ་
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 118
บ
Committee would be handled in a secure manner, consistent with the
Rules of Procedure of the Committee and other arrangements for the
special handling of particularly sensitive material.
We look forward to receiving the material responsive to this
request as soon as possible.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 119
Sincerely,
Frank Church
Chairman
Kürch
hm Tower
John G. Tower
Vice Chairman
2
Select Committee Members Requesting Files
Senator Gary Hart
Senator Walter D. Huddleston
Senator Charles McC. Mathias
Senator Walter F. Mondale
Senator Robert Morgan
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
FGREINUNGLASKI 
END
DATE: 11-14-2015 SPZALM/Bmp
MDR-16
62-111-395-2701
ENCLOSURE
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 120
K

Dear
John Acton for FRI
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 11-14-20-0338 812ACIA. Bry
MDR-16
FIREMEN
I have just today received your letter dated May 28.
It apparently reached the Department of Justice on June 8.
It requests "the delivery forthwith to the members whose
names are listed in the attachment hereto of any files on
them or documents concerning them that are in the possession,
custody, or control of the Department of Justice, including
the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
The Department wants to cooperate with you on this
.matter. But I think we first ought to clarify the scope
of your request. I assume, for example, that your request
is not intended to encompass copies of all letters between
the members and the Department. I would suggest that we can
reach an understanding on issues of this kind by consulta-
tions between us.
Your letter says that "Whether as a matter of agree-
ment between the Committee and the Department some material
that may be in any such files should be withheld depends upon
an analysis of the weight of the particular reason put forward
for the proposed withholding balanced against the Committee's
need to exercise its mandate.'
11
I take that to mean you would like us to go over the
files and to raise with the Committee such problems with dis-
closure as may or may not exist. I realize this request is
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE SPACE/P
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 121
62-116375=745
ENCLOSURE
ļ
1
✓
-2-
not made under the Freedom of Information Act, but as we
review the material in the file, exemptions in the act
indicate, I think, the kind of concerns the Committee might
want the Department to bring to its attention before dis-
closure is made. For example, if material in a file would
violate the privacy of an individual other than the member
if it were revealed, would the Committee insist that such
material be revealed?
We are beginning to prepare the material so that
and
no time will be wasted, but I would like discussions to
begin quickly so that we can agree on how to proceed. That
done, I would think that we could deliver the documents that
you have requested.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 122
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
(Memorandum
ΤΟ
:
Mr. W. R. Wanna
-
1 Mr. J. B. Adams
1
funt fund fund fund fund fand
FROM
W.
o. Velegar
1
1
1
SUBJECT: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
LEGISLATION
1
75
Senate
-
-
-
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
-
(1 Mr. J. B. Hotis)
DATE: 6/11/75
Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. R. H. Horner
Mr. B. P. Murphy
Mr. L. F. Schwartz
Hote
Attached is a copy of a memorandum dated 5/27/75,
which was furnished by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
for the Intelligence Community with advice that it had been
prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
租
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
M
Kelsaftoric
The memorandum analyzes current pending legislation
(S. 743, H. R. 141 and H. R. 214) all of which would repeal
the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
If
passed, such legislation could seriously affect the Bureau
and other agencies of the intelligence community.
RECOMMENDATION:
Attached memorandum should be forwarded to the Legal
Analysis Unit of the Office of Legal Counsel for its use in
any analysis that it may be making of the legislation
described above.
IFS
EuL
L ENCLOSTRE
Enclosure
LFS:mjg mys
(10)
84 JUN 27.197609
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 123
Wich/fo
JUA
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINEO
VEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-1-2000 BY
MDR-16
REC-100
//
Pen
S
6- Kids
ހ
62-1163595--278
SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
12 JUN 27 1975
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Electronic Surveillance Legislation
27 May 1975
Rec'd fin
6/10/75-LES
1. Over a dozen bills have been introduced in Congress to date
aimed at restricting electronic surveillance conducted on national security
grounds. Although impelled by concern for the Fourth Amendment rights of
American citizens, the major bills in this area (S. 743, H.R. 141, H.R. 214)
are characterized by a heavy-handed approach which poses a serious threat
to the exploitation of foreign SIGINT sources, both within the United States
and overseas. (Signals intelligence subsumes communications intelligence
and electronic intelligence.)
2. The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C.
2510, et seq.) established certain procedures which require the Government
to obtain a court order issued on probable cause prior to conducting wire or
oral communication interception in the investigation of certain offenses. In
section 2511(3) of that Act, Congress specifically disavows any limitation on
the constitutional powers of the President in national security matters and
recognizes that the President has inherent constitutional authority to engage
in certain foreign intelligence activities:
(n)othing contained in this chapter or in
section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934 shall limit the constitutional power of
the President to obtain foreign intelli-
gence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States, or to protect
national security information against foreign
intelligence activities. (emphasis added)
The emphasized language implicitly recognizes that foreign intelligence
surveillances may be distinguished from national security surveillances
aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminal conspiracies and activity.
3. In reliance on these Presidential powers and congressional
recognition thereof, foreign intelligence signal and communication interceptions
may be conducted within the United States without judicial warrant.
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
EURREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATA 14-14-2000 BY
MDR-16
62-116395--278
ENCLOSURE
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 124
SECRET
SEGRET
4. Sentiment that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) (quoted above).
are incompatible with Fourth Amendment rights has spawned a Senate bill and
over a dozen House bills (some of these identical) aimed at closing what the
sponsors view as "the national security loophole" in current surveillance laws.
A distinctive approach to national security surveillance is taking shape which
would prohibit the use of warrantless surveillance for any reason whatsoever,
treating national security surveillance under a single rubric, without distin-
guishing between gathering foreign intelligence on the one hand, and national
security surveillances aimed at the discovery and prosecution of criminality,
on the other.
(a) S. 743 by Senators Nelson and Kennedy would amend
18 U.S.C. 2510, et seq., as follows: First, repeal 18 U.S.C.
2511(3) thereby withdrawing whatever congressional recognition
that section gave the foreign intelligence surveillance powers of
the President. Second, prohibit intercepting the communications
of an American citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence
until a prior judicial warrant is obtained issued on probable cause
that a specific crime, e.g., espionage, has been or is about to be
committed. Third, prohibit intercepting the communication of a
foreign power or its agent until a prior judicial warrant is obtained
by establishing probable cause (a) that such interception is
necessary to protect the national defense (note narrower standard
than national security); (b) that the interception will be consistent
with the international obligations of the United States; and (c) that
the target is a foreign power or foreign agent. (A foreign agent is
defined as any person, not an American citizen or alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, whose activities are intended
to serve the interests of a foreign power and to undermine the
national defense. Each application for such an interception would
be made to the D. C. Federal District Court on personal and written
authorization of the President and would provide detailed informa-
tion on the target, the purposes and justification of the interception.)
Upon court approval, only the FBI would be authorized to intercept
the communication. Fourth, require that every American citizen
targetted be informed of the specifics of the surveillance within a
month of the last authorized interception. (This disclosure could
be postponed if the Government satisfies the court that the target
is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise or that disclosure
would endanger national security interests. A foreign power or
its agent need not be informed of interceptions.) Fifth, require the
Attorney General to report to the Congress, at least quarterly, the
details of each interception undertaken on national security
grounds, to be filed with the Senate Foreign Relations and
Judiciary Committees and the House International Relations and
Judiciary Committees.
NW 88608. Docld:32989609 Page 125
2
SECRET
(b) H. R. 141 by Representative Kastenmeier, Chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice, which has legislative jurisdiction for
surveillance, is similar to the above bill. It would repeal
18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and amend Title 18 to permit communications
interception in national security cases only under court order
issued on probable cause that an individual has committed one of
several enumerated offenses or is engaged in activities intended to
serve the interests of a foreign principal and to undermine the
national security. (From the language of the bill, it could be
argued that the foreign agent's activities would have to constitute
a criminal offense before a warrant could be issued.) The bill
does not mention the communications of a foreign power.
Each application for an interception would have to be authorized
by the Attorney General and made to a Federal judge of com-
petent jurisdiction. The targetted individual would be informed
of the surveillance within ninety days. The President, Attorney
General, and all Government agencies would be required to
supply Congress, through the Senate Judiciary and Foreign
Relations Committees and the House Judiciary and International
Relations Committees, any information regarding any interception
applied for.
· (c) H. R. 214 by Mr. Mosher and seven identical bills
co-sponsored by over 70 Congressmen from both parties, would
prohibit any interception of communications, surreptitious entry,
mail-opening, or the procuring and inspection of records of
telephone, bank, credit, medical, or other business or private.
transactions of any individual without court order issued on
probable cause that a crime has been committed. Like S. 743
and H. R. 141, reviewed above, H.R. 214 would repeal 18 U.S.C.
2511(3). Unlike the above bills, H.R. 214 does not provide for non-
law enforcement surveillance. It would also strike out pro-
visions for summary procedures for intercepting communications
during emergencies and would require that detailed information
on each application for a communication interception be reported
to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.
5. Intelligence Community Interests: These bills, through
imposing judiciary administration over all surveillance, would impair existing
responsibility to conduct electronic surveillance in gathering foreign positive
intelligence, which now reaches wholly domestic communications, those both
transmitted and received within the United States; wholly foreign communications,
those both transmitted and received abroad; and transnational communications,
international communications received in or transmitted from the United States.
3
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 126
SECRET
SECRET
SIGINT provides a broad range of foreign intelligence ranging from early
warning indicators to the most mundane information. The importance of any
single intercept or series of interceptions cannot be anticipated in advance;
therefore, the probable cause standard and the proposed requirements of
"particularity" are inappropriate in connection with this method of foreign intelli-
gence collection. (Furthermore, the House bills would impair existing responsibility
for using other intelligence gathering techniques against foreign subjects within the
United States, e.g., medicepts, photo surveillance, etc.)
6. Effect on Intelligence Community Interests: The bills reviewed above
would severely restrict domestic communications interception for foreign intelligence
gathering purposes; raise serious questions respecting authority to intercept
transnational communications; and would even raise questions concerning the
foreign intelligence community's authority to conduct electronic surveillance abroad
free from judicial intrusion or other conditions. (Moreover, the House bills
would restrict the use of other intelligence gathering techniques against foreign
targets within the United States.)
(a) Domestic Electronic Surveillance: An operation
mounted against a foreign target within the United States to
gather foreign positive intelligence would apparently not meet the
court test unless the specific message targetted involved an anti-
cipated, demonstrable and direct threat to the national defense.
S. 743 explicitly confers interception authority to the FBI alone.
It also explicitly raises the issue of the consistency of surveillance
with international obligations, e.g., the Vienna Convention, and
thus challenges the position taken by the State Department that no
current international obligation precludes targetting foreign
facilities within the United States.
(b) Transnational Electronic Surveillance: Proposed
legislation would apparently subject the interception of trans-
national communications from a situs within the United States to
the probable cause standard. It could also provide grounds for
arguing that interceptions of transnational communications from
facilities outside the United States would be subject to the same
standard.
(c) Foreign Electronic Surveillance: The bills
reviewed above are broadly written and the prohibitions are not
expressly limited to the territory of the United States. While the
reach of this legislation should be subject to the built-in limitation
that the authority of a federal court to issue warrants is confined
to its territorial limits, repeal of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and the
articulation of probable cause standards for foreign intelligence
gathering activities could have a grave impact on overseas
intelligence collection by bringing into play a body of exclusionary
rule case law (developed in ruling on the admissability in a
Federal criminal trial of evidence obtained overseas by electronic
surveillance). Suffice it, here, to say that this could result in
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 127
SEGRET
SECRET
subjecting overseas foreign intelligence surveillance to the proposed
probable cause standards as a test of the "reasonableness" required
by Fourth Amendment protections. Moreover, this legislation could
raise complex questions in situations where an element of the inter-
ception process falls within the jurisdiction of the federal court, e.g.,
the physical presence of the surveillance device. Even if these bills
would not directly affect authority to conduct foreign electronic
surveillance, they could ultimately weaken it by raising the
opportunity to argue that this authority rests only on three
bases--assertion of inherent Presidential intelligence-gathering
powers, congressional recognition and judicial acceptance. Repeal
of 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) may be viewed as weakening the argument that
Congress has recognized foreign intelligence gathering authority
inherent in the President and delegated to his Executive branch agents.
7. Summary:
--Proposed legislation would repeal 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and would
impose judicial administration of a "probable cause" standard over foreign intelli-
gence electronic surveillance. At the very least, this would restrict communications
interceptions against foreign targets within the United States to situations
involving an anticipated, demonstrable and direct threat to the national defense.
Also, this would probably subject the interception of transnational communica-
tions, from either an overseas or domestic situs, to the same judicial standards.
Finally, this would raise difficult questions concerning the ability of CIA, NSA,
and the service cryptologic agencies to conduct electronic surveillance overseas
against foreign targets without conforming to the standards of Fourth Amendment
"reasonableness" articulated in this legislation. In sum, enactment of proposed
legislation would severely restrict the collection and processing of foreign.
SIGINT and would seriously impair the production of all-source intelligence.
--By repealing 18 U.S.C. 2511(3) and by introjecting the judiciary
into the field of foreign intelligence gathering, proposed legislation raises a
.constitutional challenge insofar as it purports to withdraw sanction of and
place limitations on the President's inherent power to conduct foreign
surveillance. This infringement could undermine the Executive sources of
authority upon which the intelligence community depends. To be sure, the
proposed requirement of prior judicial authorization of foreign intelligence
surveillances is altogether impractical. But the fundamental constitutional
objection is that it purports to share Executive authority with judicial officers
having no expertise in or responsibility for national security or foreign
affairs. The necessity of a foreign intelligence surveillance is simply
inappropriate for judicial resolution. It is a matter committed to the Executive
branch by the Constitution and an area for which there are no judicially
manageable standards. An arrangement by which federal judges decide
what foreign intelligence the President may have in his conduct of foreign
5
SECRET
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 128
SECRET
relations is incompatible with the Chief Executive's inherent foreign
intelligence gathering powers. Since this Presidential authority is
constitutional in nature and stems from a fundamental separation of
governmental powers, a Congressional attempt to require its sharing
with the judiciary would certainly lead to protracted constitutional
litigation. Moreover, Congress implicitly authorized the use of elec-
tronic surveillance in foreign intelligence activities and this legislation
would circumscribe the very functions which Congress intended the
Agency to perform.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 129
SECRET
3
Mr. . A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)
1
Mr. W. R. Wannall
1
Mr. W. O. Cregar
The Attorney General
June 4, 1975
1
-
Mr. E. W. Larson
Director, FBI
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT_COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD In
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _'
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm..
Director Sec'
Reference is made to my letter dated May 6, 1975,
enclosing a memorandum, same date, which proposed that an
FBI position paper dated July 31, 1972, be withheld from the
Senate Select Committee on the basis that it was considered
to be an internal deliberative document.
Reference is also made to a conversation May 28,
1975, between Deputy Assistant Attorney General K. William
O'Connor and Special Agent Paul V. Daly during which
Mr. O'Connor advised that it was the Department of Justice
decision to make the July 31, 1972, position paper available
to the Senate Select Committee. In view of this decision,
we will make this document available for review at FBI
Headquarters.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum advising the Committee
of the availability of the July 31, 1972, position paper. A
copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.
Enclosures
-
2
62-116395
24
ALL INCONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
STE TRA/Pap
DATE 10-17-2000 
BY
My R16
1 The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
EWL: ekw/1hb/hb
(10)
edm
MAIÐ ROOM
NW 8608-ypoeld:32989609 Rage LETYPE UNIT ☐
130
REC-100
Joa
62-116395-277
SEE NOTE PAGE 2-
Deb 6/4/15 TJAL
PAND
Delinead
Dr. Bolelligen
*77 27 1975
A

The Attorney General
NOTE:
*
By memorandum 5/6/75, we advised the AG that the
position paper in question was an internal deliberative document
which was the direct basis for a formal statement on FBI
authority to conduct internal security investigations embodied
in a memorandum from the Director, FBI, to the AG dated
8/7/73. On this basis, we felt it was inappropriate that
the requested position paper be made available to the SSC.
In conversation between Deputy Assistant Attorney
General O'Connor and SA Daly, referred to above, O'Connor
indicated that it was the decision of the Department to make
this paper available to the SSC. Since we have already expressed
our position concerning the paper to the AG, it does not appear
that there would be any purpose served disputing his decision.
However, since it is an internal deliberative document, it is
felt that the paper should be made available for review rather
than given outright to the SSC. Also, we are setting a
condition that no notes be taken during the initial review,
subject to negotiation of further requests by the Committee.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 131
23
I
1
62-116395
3.
1
1
-
-
-
1
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. E. W. Larson
June 4, 1975
S
44774
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD
Dep. AD inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES
"ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
1-0 
BY <224
MDR-16
DATE
Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975,
to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned
Committee, which enclosed certain requests før documents and
other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Under I., Legal Authorities, a general request was
made for memoranda discussing the legal authority of the FBI to
(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intel-
ligence information, and (3) engage in counterintelligence
activities. Material responsive to this request was delivered
to the Committee during April, 1975.
Since the receipt of the above-mentioned material,
the Committee has indicated a specific interest in a position
paper dated July 31, 1972, discussing the "Scope of FBI
Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic
Intelligence Investigations." This paper has been located and
will be available for review at FBI Headquarters by Mr. John
E111ff and/or Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the Committee staff.
Our position is that the July 31, 1972, paper is an
internal deliberative document the contents of which were
refined in a formal statement on FBI authority to conduct
internal security investigations embodied in a memorandum from
the Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, dated August 7, 1973.
A copy of this latter document has been made available to the
Committee. Under these circumstances, we would request that
the July 31, 1972, document be reviewed in this context and
that no notes be taken during this initial review. Should this
arrangement be unsatisfactory to the Committee, upon completion
of the initial review we will certainly consider any furthor
request for the document in a paraphrase form acceptable to
the Committee.
-
The Attorney General
Plan. & Eval. EWL: ekw/1hb !
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
9)
MAIL ROOM ✓
та
انا شریانیان
ест
ANCLOSURE
TELETYPE UNIT
062-1193
39
271
GPO 954-546
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 132
-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Åddressee:
LTR
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
☑ LHM
6/4
146/7
Memo ☐ Report dated 5/30/75
U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study
Caption of Document: Govt. Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities. Re: Legal
Originating Office:
Delivered by:
Received by:
Title:
FBI
Authorities
"KW Date: 6/5/75
FAO Schw
Ch
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 133
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINE
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-11-200 BYSMAL P
MDR-14
+
POSITION PAPER
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-14-2000 BY
102-16
I
Thomas J. Smith
Chief, Research Section
Domestic Intelligence Division
July 31, 1972
NW 88608 Dgcld:32989609 Page 134
· 116395-277'
ENCLOSURE
1
Background.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Authority Derived Presidential Directives
Authority Conveyed Even Before 1939 Directives.
Presidential Directives Subsequent to 1939.
Implementation of 1939 Directive.
Expansion of Authority Contained In 1939 Directive.
Directives Supplemented or Superseded by Statutes
Validity of the Smith Act .
Directives Versus Legislative Enactment
Investigations Under Statutory Authority.
Preventive Investigations
Intelligence Investigations
Executive Order 10450 .
Statutory Authority and President's
Constitutional Power.
Special White House Request
Page
1
Need for Current Executive Order.
Development of Investigative Policies
Preventive Investigations
Intelligence Investigations and Civil Liberty
Interpretation of Authority by Substantive Sections
Extremist Intelligence Section Views.
Nationalities Intelligence Section Views.
Internal Security Section Views
Revolutionary Activities Section Views.
Official Recognition of Intelligence Investigation.
Former Study of FBI's
Investigative Responsibilities.
Recent Executive Intent
Conclusions
Recommendations
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 135
246 00
10
11
11
12
15
16
18
18
20
22
23
24
26
28
28
28
30
32
34
37
37
39
40
2002
42
as
BACKGROUND
3
SCOPE OF FBI AUTHORITY,
JURISDICTION AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
Over the past several months there have been an increasing
number of public statements made from various quarters questioning
or contesting authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct
domestic intelligence-type investigations, particularly where
there is no clear-cut legislative authority apparent. One of the
most searching inquiries was contained in a paper presented by
Professor John T. Elliff at a two-day conference at Princeton
University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public
Justice.
Professor Elliff addressed himself to the matter of
FBI authority derived from legislative enactments as opposed to
that derived from Presidential directives. He went into some
detail in connection with the Presidential directive issued by
President Roosevelt in September, 1939, which was subsequently
reiterated on three occasions. Elliff questioned whether Roosevelt
was even aware that he was shifting FBI authority from congressional
enactment to Presidential directive when he issued the September,
1939, directive since he probably assumed he had granted such
authority in 1936 when he requested intelligence investigations
of fifth columnists. Elliff accused the FBI of magnifying the
September, 1939, directive into a definitive order.
Over a long period of time Senator Sam J. Ervin has been
probing into the nature and extent of FBI gathering and retention
of domestic intelligence information. In April, 1971,
Senator Ervin made a request of the Department of Justice to
furnish detailed information concerning the Department's (the FBI's)
policy and practice on investigating and reporting the political
beliefs and activities of persons not under investigation for
violating the laws. Of particular interest was specific infor-
mation on the constitutional authority and power exercised by the
Executive Branch to conduct such investigations.
Subsequently, Senator Ervin announced that he intended to
propose legislation to prohibit the FBI from investigating any
person without his consent, unless the Government has reason to
believe that person has committed a crime or is about to commit
a crime. Other Congressmen have either introduced or announced
plans to introduce legislation or resolutions calling for special
activities, particularly in the area of domestic intelligence
operations.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 136
x
B
T
Based on these developments it became apparent that
an in-depth study was in order to clarify any misconceptions
which might have grown up concerning the scope of FBI intelligence
and investigative authority, particularly where it concerns
domestic organizations and/or individuals. A detailed and
exhaustive study has now been completed, and the following is
the result of that study.
AUTHORITY DERIVED PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES
In the testimony of the late Director J. Edgar Hoover
before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on March 2, 1972,
under the subject of justifications on page 2 the statement is
made that "The FBI's responsibilities in the domestic intelligence
field are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential
directives and instructions of the Attorney General. They include
investigative jurisdiction over matters relating to espionage,
counterespionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversion, and
related internal security functions. Subjects of investigation
include the activities of the Communist Party, USA, communist
front groups and other totalitarian organizations, including
individuals or groups who are alleged either to seek overthrow
of the Government of the United States by force or violence or to
conspire against the rights of citizens." Similar language has
appeared in Mr. Hoover's testimony in prior years.
It is assumed that the Presidential directives referred
to in Mr. Hoover's testimony are (1) Directive dated September 6,
1939, and reiterated January 8, 1943, July 24, 1950, and
December 15, 1953; (2) Executive Order 10450 dated April 27, 1953
(and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order 11605
dated July 2, 1971).
It is believed that there is a misconception concerning
the extent of jurisdiction or authority which was conveyed to
the FBI by the Presidential directive dated September 6, 1939.
All of the succeeding directives appear to be hinged on the one
issued in September, 1939. Therefore, the language of that first
directive becomes a very important issue. Perhaps even more
important are the circumstances leading up to the issuance of
that directive and the intent of the President at the time
it was issued.
Prior to the issuance of the September, 1939, directive
President Roosevelt issued a statement or confidential directive
to the heads of the various Government Departments on June 26,
1939, which stated, "It is my desire that the investigation of
all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled
and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the
Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the
War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the
Navy Department. The Directors of these three agencies are to
function as a committee to coordinate their activities."
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 137
I
"No investigations should be conducted by any investi-
gative agency of the Government into matters involving actually
or potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage,
except by the three agencies mentioned above."
"I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all
other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer
immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation any data, information or material that may come
their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage,
counterespionage, or sabotage."
to
It is to be noted that in this statement or directive
the language, with the exception of the word "counterespionage"
deals with matters coming clearly within legislative enactments
The September, 1939, directive stated, "The Attorney
General has been requested by me to instruct the Federal Bureau
of Investigation of the Department of Justice to take charge of
investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage,
and violations of the neutrality regulations.
"This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and
effective manner on a national basis, and all information must be
carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion
and irresponsiblity.
"To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs,
and all other law enforcement officers in the United States
promptly to turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them relating
to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities
and violations of the neutrality laws."
In this document it is particularly important to note
that the language says the FBI is to "take charge of investiga-
tions" and not "assume jurisdiction" or "have authority to
investigate" matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and
violations of the neutrality regulations. The statutory authority
to investigate the enumerated crimes was already present, but the
directive fixed responsibility for the FBI to conduct the
investigations. In other words, this directive conveyed no
authority not already possessed by the FBI by legislative enactment
but merely established that no other investigative agency should
handle the matters.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 138
- 3
↑
The last paragraph of this particular directive, which
was actually a request of all local law enforcement agencies,
used the words "counterespionage" and "subversive activities."
However, the context of the statement appears to merely be
designed to broadly define activities which might touch on the
national security so that all such matters, irrespective of the
legal definition or name, would be turned over to the FBI.
A logical conclusion, based purely on examination of
the language used in the September, 1939, directive, is that
the directive merely put everyone on notice that the FBI had the
responsibility to investigate the statutory crimes named; that
it provided no so-called "constitutional" or "executive
authority" for the FBI to investigate matters not covered by
legislative enactment. This is not to say that the President
has no such constitutional authority (he has), but only that it
was not exercised here.
As a matter of particular interest, Professor Elliff,
in questioning whether President Roosevelt was aware that he
was shifting FBI authority from Congressional enactment to
Presidential directive since he assumed that he had granted such
authority in 1936, was at least half correct. While no shift
of authority appears to have occurred as a result of the 1939.
directive, we have historical evidence to show that the President
instructed the FBI to conduct subversive intelligence-type
investigations of radicals in 1936. In this regard, there appears
to be little doubt that Roosevelt conveyed some degree of
Executive authority to the FBI.
AUTHORITY CONVEYED EVEN BEFORE 1939 DIRECTIVES
Confidential memoranda written by Mr. Hoover in August
and September, 1936, clearly reveal that President Roosevelt was
very concerned about the subversive activities of fascists and
communists in the United States and discussed the matter with
Mr. Hoover during personal meetings. These memoranda indicate
that President Roosevelt was obviously cognizant of the lack of
statutory authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations
of fascism and communism. Yet, the President desired the FBI to
conduct such investigations. Mr. Hoover pointed out that the
FBI appropriation contained a provision for the FBI to conduct
such investigations if such matters were referred to it by the
Department of State. The President was hesitant of having a
formal request come through State Department, however, because
of the many leaks in the State Department.
NW-88608-Docld:32989609 Page 139
4
"
1
However, during a meeting between the President,
Mr. Hoover and the Secretary of State on August 25, 1936, the
Secretary of State did ask the FBI to conduct investigations of
*Fascist and Communist activities, under the provisions of the
Appropriations Act. In the discussion preceding the request,
however, it must be noted that the President stressed the fact that
fascism and communism were international in scope, and that
communism in particular was directed from Moscow; that this was a
matter which fell within the scope of foreign affairs over which
the State Department would have a right to request an inquiry to
be made.
The
According to the information presently available,
President Roosevelt agreed to place a handwritten memorandum of
his own in the White House safe, concerning the request of the
State Department for investigations of fascism and communism.
President asked Mr. Hoover to speak to the Attorney General about
the matter and that the Secretary of State also discuss the
technique to be followed with the Attorney General. Mr. Hoover
recorded that he did inform the Attorney General on September 10,
1936, of a conference he had with the President on September 1, 1936,
at which time the Secretary of State was present, and at which time
the Secretary of State at the President' suggestion requested
of Mr. Hoover to have investigations made of the subversive
activities in this country, including communism and fascism.
The Attorney General verbally directed Mr. Hoover to proceed with
the investigations and to coordinate these matters in the
possession of the Military Intelligence Division, the Naval
Intelligence Division, and the State Department. Mr. Hoover
considered this the authority upon which to proceed.
-
The circumstances surrounding the manner in which the
President had the State Department request investigation very
likely explains why the September, 1939, directive did not contain
any language relating to subversive activities. President Roosevelt
was fully aware that the FBI was already conducting confidential
investigations of the activities of fascists and communists who
represetned a threat to the national security at that time. There
was obviously a private and understandable confidential agreement
between all interested parties, including the other Federal
investigative agencies who had an interest. There was no need
to mention subversive activities in the first part of the directive
since the pertinent Federal agencies were already on notice and
local agencies would turn over all matters relating to the
national security.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 140
- 5.

រ
Based on the foregoing, reliance on the September, 1939,
directive or even the earlier confidential arrangement worked
out by the President, whether considered a Presidential directive,
Presidential mandate, or some other manifestation of Executive
power, for current investigative authority appears to be unwise.
Placing the 1939 directive and the earlier arrangement in their
proper perspective is very important. Both were laid in a period
when the world was on the brink of World War II. The concern for
national security was related to two international movements.
were no laws, such as the Smith Act of 1940 or the Internal
Security Act of 1950. Although there were undoubtedly some purely
American groups which received no direction or control from abroad,
there was no national corn for indigenous anarchists or other
groups desiring to overthrow the Government.
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES SUBSEQUENT TO 1939
As mentioned previously, the directive dated
There
September 6, 1939, was reiterated subsequently by directives
dated January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953.
The directive dated January, 1943, signed by President Roosevelt,
was simply a reaffirmation of the earlier 1939 directive and
was broadened only to the extent that it called on all patriotic
organizations and individuals as well as local law enforcement
officers to report information to the FBI. The July, 1950,
directive, signed by President Truman, contained the phrase
"subversive activities and related matters," which on the
surface would indicate that President Truman intended to broaden
the scope of authority it might convey to the FBI. However,
closer examination reveals that the Truman directive actually
misquoted the earlier two directives of President Roosevelt and
included the phrase "subversive activities and related matters"
which did not appear in the Roosevelt directives.
Since no information is available concerning Executive
intent behind the issuance of the 1950 directive, it cannot be
determined whether President Truman was aware of the possible
additional authority he might have conveyed to the FBI as the
result of changing the language of the two prior directives to
include the phrase "subversive activities and related matters."
The fact of the matter is, the United States was at the
time engaged in the "police action" in Korea and there was
unquestionably a great deal of domestic subversive activity
at the time, most of which could be traced to the Communist Party.
We do know that President Truman signed the 1950 directive
on the advice of the National Security Council.
There is one document available which tends to reveal
the concern President Truman had relative to increased subversive
activity involving domestic cases. In a letter dated July 17,
1946, the Attorney General said he felt that in the troubled
period in international affairs, accompanied by an increase in
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 141
-
6 -
រ
subversive activity at home, it was imperative to use special
investigative measures (wire taps) in domestic cases. Mr. Truman
concurred with the Attorney General and authorized the special
investigative measures.
-
There is one important point, however, which bears on
any feelings President Truman might have had on the issue of
domestic subversive activity. When the Congress passed the
Internal Security Act of 1950, consisting of two subchapters,
Truman vetoed the bill, citing as a reason that Title II of
the Bill - The Emergency Detention Act constituted a threat
to the democratic process. In "The American Constitution
Its Origins and Development" by Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A.
Harison, the authors declared that President Truman roundly
condemned the Internal Security Act as grossly unconstitutional.
They said that his veto message called the registration provisions
of the law "the greatest danger to freedom of press, speech and
assembly since the Sedition Act of 1798." A drastic new sedition
statute, derived from the earlier Mundt-Nixon bill which was
bottled up in the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1948, was
incorporated in the Internal Security Act. Mr. Truman thought
the phrase prohibiting a person to "substantially contribute"
to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship so vague as
to cast grave doubts upon whether it met the standards of accuracy
necessary for due process in criminal statutes. These authors
did not even touch on the emergency detention subchapter of the
Act. The political climate at the time, however, in spite of
President Truman's censure and veto, was such that the Internal
Security Act was passed over the veto and became law.
While the 1950 directive of President Truman incorrectly
stated "On September 6, 1939, and January 8, 1943, a Presidential
Directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the Department of Justice should take charge
of investigative work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage,
subversive activities and related matters., " the directive issued
by President Eisenhower on December 15, 1953, said nothing about
the FBI being responsible for such matters. Rather, the 1953
directive began by stating, "On September 6, 1939, January 8,
1943, and July 24, 1950, Presidential Directives were issued
requesting all enforcement officers, both Federal and State,
to report promptly all information relating to espionage, sabotage,
subversive activities, and related matters to the nearest
representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."
This language can, of course, be interpreted to mean
that the FBI is responsible for investigating these matters
otherwise the directive would not have noted that enforcement
officers were requested to furnish all information to the FBI.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 142
- 7
F
The 1953 directive actually did not reiterate either of the
three previous directives except for the language quoted above.
Instead, it cited the FBI's responsibility to investigate all
violations of the Atomic Energy Act and requested all patriotic
organizations and individuals as well as all enforcement officers
to report violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest
representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
IMPLEMENTATION OF 1939 DIRECTIVE
All of the foregoing documents have obviously been
subject to various interpretations. However the language might
be interpreted, the September, 1939, directive, was implemented by
the FBI and Congress was made fully aware of the extent of
investigative activity the FBI was conducting as a result of the
directive. In Mr. Hoover's testimony on November 30, 1939, in
connection with an emergency supplemental appropriations bill,
he said, "In September, 1939, we found it necessary to organize
a General Intelligence Division in Washington. The establishment
of this division was made necessary by the President's proclama-
tion directing that all complaints of violations of the national
defense statutes and proclamations be reported to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. This division now has compiled extensive
indices of individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in
subversive activities, in espionage activities, or any activities
that are possibly detrimental to the internal security of the
United States.
"The indexes have been arranged not only alphabetically
but also geographically, so that at any time, should we enter
into the conflict abroad, we would be able to go into any of
these communities and identify individuals and groups who might
be a
source of grave danger to the security of the country."
During the same testimony Mr. Hoover was asked if any
of the funds being requested in the emergency supplemental
appropriation would be spent for any of the purposes for which
funds were denied at the previous session. Mr. Hoover replied
they would not; that the entire sum would be spent for intelli-
gence work.
Subsequently, in June, 1940, Mr. Hoover again testified
before a House Subcommittee on Appropriations. At that time he
referred to his appearance before the committee the previous fall
wherein he testified that authority had been requested to set up
a separate division with the FBI to handle national defense
matters under an assistant director. Mr Hoover offered a chart
showing the organizational structure of five divisions of the
Bureau, one of which he referred to as the National Defense
Division. He said that this Division would handle and direct all
investigations dealing with espionage, sabotage, national defense
matters, and violations of neutrality statutues.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 143
-
8
-
Mr. Hoover testified that in line with the President's
order of the previous September (September 6, 1939) there had
been close coordination of all the intelligence services. He
pointed out that the President, on September 6, directed the FBI
to coordinate the functions on national defense matters in
intelligence work. Mr. Hoover also related that he wanted to
refer to a general intelligence index which he had mentioned in
previous hearings. He said that that index included the names
of persons who might become potential enemies to our national
security, such as known espionage agents, known sabotuers,
leading members of the Communist Party, and the bund. He
explained that this index had been compiled very carefully,
it was confined solely to persons engaged in activities detrimental
to the United States.
and
Later, on February 19, 1941, when Mr. Hoover appeared
before Congress in connection with a deficiency appropriations
bill for 1941, he went into some detail concerning the activities
of the FBI prior to the then national emergency. In response to
a question concerning this, Mr. Hoover replied that prior to the
emergency our activities covered generally the investigation of
all Federal statutes except counterfeiting, narcotics, income
tax, and postal violations. FBI jurisdiction, he said, included
kidnaping, extortion, bank robbery, white slavery, motor vehicle
theft, impersonation of Government officers, frauds against the
Government, antitrust investigations, etc.
Mr. Hoover then incorporated into the record a list of
major crime laws passed between 1934 and 1941, showing the
legislative jurisdiction of the FBI during the period. With
the exception of nine of these laws, all dealt with criminal-type
violations of law. The exceptions included a prohibition on
the exportation of arms and ammunition to Spain during the civil
war; the prohibition of making photographs, sketches or maps of
vital military and naval defense installations; the Hatch Act,
which among other things related to employment of individuals by
the Government who were members of political parties advocating
the overthrow of the Government%3B amendment of the act requiring
registration of agents of foreign principals; the Neutrality Act
of 1939; amendment of the Espionage Act; the Smith Act of 1940;
act requiring registration of certain organizations (Voorhis Act);
and an amendment to the Sabotage Act. There was a special note
listed under the amendment of the act requiring registration of
agents of foreign principals. This
directive dated September 6, 1939.
can be drawn that the directive was
called attention to the Presidential
From this structure inference
related to this amendment.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 144
9 -
EXPANSION OF AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN 1939 DIRECTIVE
Further in his testimony Mr. Hoover was asked if any other
agencies of the Government were covering the same work that
emergency employees of the FBI were covering. He replied that
he would like to leave the committee a publication listing the
statutes, proclamations and Executive Orders pertaining to
national defense matters. He then stated that the President in
1939 directed that all invest
sabotage, subversive activit. and national defense activities,
would be handled by the FBI ept those arising within the
Army or Navy. He went on to say that other governmental agencies
were instructed under this Executive order to report to the FBI
any information showing any violation dealing with national
defense matters.
ations dealing with espionage,
No Executive Order could be located which contains the
language used by Mr. Hoover in this instance. He might have
been referring to either the directive or statement made by
President Roosevelt in June, 1939, or the directive dated
September 6, 1939. However, the above-quoted language is much
broader than used in either of these documents.
In considering the full impact of the June and September,
1939, Presidential directives, and how they subsequently influenced
FBI jurisdiction and responsibility, it must be borne in mind
that the Nation was at the very brink of World War II. President
Roosevelt issued a proclamation on September 8, 1939, declaring
that state of national emergency existed in connection with the
observance, safeguarding, and enforcement of neutrality, and
strengthening of the national defense within the limits of peace-
time authorizations. An Executive Order (No.8233) dated September 5,
1939, prescribed regulations governing the enforcement of the
neutrality of the United States. The War Department, Navy Department,
Treasury and Commerce Departments, and the Governor of the Panama
Canal were assigned certain enforcement duties. The Justice
Department (FBI) was given responsibility of enforcement of the
neutrality of the United States not especially designated to other
departments, independent offices and establishments of the
United States Government, and prosecution of violations of the
neutrality of the U. S.
Unquestionably in time of national emergency the broadest
possible interpretation was being applied to every statute, resolu-
tion, proclamation, Executive order, Presidential directive or other
lawful order or mandate in the interest of the preservation of peace,
the national defense and general welfare of the country. Undoubtedly
there are many other documents recording Executive intention,
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 145
-
10 -
Executive instructions concerning broad, sweeping authority for the
FBI, which cannot now be found for one reason or another. Certainly
there is indication that at least President Roosevelt had more than
one conversation with Mr. Hoover concerning the necessity for the
-FBI to conduct investigations beyond the statutory authority it
normally used.
DIRECTIVES SUPPLEMENTED OR SUPERSEDED BY STATUTES
Eventually, however, there were legislative enactments
which broadened the scope of our statutory authority, increased
our legal jurisdiction and added to our investigative responsi-
bility. Following the September, 1939, directive, which has
been used as a source of FBI authority to conduct certain types
of domestic intelligence investigations, the Smith Act of 1940
became law. Several successful prosecutions resulted from the
Smith Act, although some parts of it were invalidated by the
Supreme Court. The revised statute (Title 18, U.S.C. 2385) remains
on the books and is enforceable.
Legal Counsel's Office analyzed Title 18, USC 2385,
in June, 1972. It was noted that this statute contains the
substance of the original Smith Act. The House of Representatives
Committee on Judiciary, Report No. 1869, 74th Congress,
First Session, made clear the purpose of the original legislation:
"The reported bill is based on the natural right of
self-preservation inherent in every government.
It simply
authorizes the exercise of the power of the government to defend
itself against those who seek by force and violence to destroy
it." Further clarification of the legislative objective was
made by Representative John W. McCormack, who said, "And by
the way, this bill is not alone aimed at communists%3B this bill
is aimed at anyone who advocates the overthrow of government
by violence and force."
VALIDITY OF THE SMITH ACT
The Supreme Court held in 1951 that teaching the
doctrine of forcible overthrow of the United States Government
was a violation of the Smith Act where there was a clear and
present danger that a substantial public evil would result.
The Court further held that the Act did not violate the First
Amendment. Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote the majority opinion,
used language which must be considered at this time to be
very significant in deciding whether the Government may in
fact conduct preventive-type investigations in the interest
of self-preservation.
*. that h
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 146
-
11 -
:
Justice Vinson wrote, "The rule we deduce from these
cases (a series of earlier Supreme Court decisions · namely the
'question in every case is whether words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.') is that where
an offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress
a conviction relying upon speech or press as evidence
of violation may be sustained only when the speech or publication
created a 'clear and present danger' of attempting or accom-
plishing the prohibited crime."
terms,
In this case, applying this rule, the court said,
"Obviously, these words cannot mean that before the Government
may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed,
the plans have been laid, and the signal is awaited--we must,
therefore, reject the contention that success or probability
of success is the criterion."
In addition to the Smith Act of 1940, Congress also
passed legislation which further increased the authority of
the FBI to deal with subversive activities. The Voorhis Act
(superseded in 1948 along with original Smith Act) which is
now Title 18, USC 2386, provided for registration of organizations
subject to foreign control which engage in political activity
among other things. The Internal Security Act of 1950 was
passed over the veto of President Truman and provided not only
a prohibition of conspiracies or attempts to establish a
totalitarian dictatorship and a long list of measures having.
to do with Communist organizations (Control of Subversive
Activities) but also for the emergency detention of suspected
security risks. Further, in 1954, Congress enacted the Communist
Control Act to provide additional investigative authority in
dealing with the communist threat to national security,
DIRECTIVES VERSUS LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT
These legislative enactments were unquestionably
designed to give the FBI a cloak of statutory authority to
investigate not only the communists, which were a grave concern
to President Roosevelt when he requested investigations of
communism by the FBI in 1936, but also any other group which
engages in activity aimed at overthrow of the Government by
force or violence. And, whereas President Roosevelt relied
on the element of foreign relations and the international
character of the fascist and communist movements to have
State Deparment make a request for FBI investigation, the
statutes referred to above do not require a dependence on
foreign elements, notwithstanding the Congressional finding
of necessity in connection with the Internal Security Act of
1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 147
12
The question to be resolved, then, is divided into
several interrelated parts. First, if the Presidential
directives described heretofore are actually valid. Secondly,
assuming that the directives are completely valid, why have
they been cited as one of the bases of FBI investigative
authority? Thirdly, if, as it appears from the foregoing, the
directives are valid, but do not convey the investigative
authority we have heretofore contended, what effect will this
have on our past and future domestic intelligence investigative
activity?
Insofar as the validity of the Presidential directives
is concerned, there can be no question but that each directive
'was issued completely in accord with the President's executive
power. The evidence shows that the first directive in September,
1939, was not only implemented with the knowledge of Congress,
but by appropriating money to the FBI for its implementation
Congress in effect gave the directive the full force of law.
None of the directives from September, 1939, to the one issued
by President Eisenhower in 1953 have been secret. As a matter
of fact, all were directed to the public at large, asking
support of local law enforcement officials and patriotic
organizations. Numerous times the directives have been cited
in FBI appropriations testimony.
The second part of the question becomes more difficult
to answer. Over the years, whenever it has been necessary and
proper to describe our investigative authority, and this has
been a requirement in justifying our annual budget, we have used
what we have considered all of the different bases for such
authority. Although it now seems obvious that the September,
1939, and July, 1943, directives did not actually order the FBI
to take charge of any investigations not actually covered by
statute, i.e., espionage, sabotage, and neutrality laws, it did
request law enforcement officers to turn over to the nearest
representative of the FBI all information relating to subversive
activities and counterespionage as well as the three statutory
crimes listed. It is apparent that the language here was intended
a catch-all so that law enforcement officers would turn over
information of any sort whatsoever if it might affect the
national security.
as
In analyzing the language used in that first directive
of September, 1939, everything must be put into its proper
perspective. In 1939 the Nation had been conditioned to a state
of near-war. From January 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler became
Chancellor of Germany, through the nonagression pact between
Germany and the Soviet Union in August, 1939, the specter of war
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 148
13
-
hung over America. Anti-German, anti-Italian and anti-Soviet
sentiment swept over the country. People began to look for spies
under their beds. It became very necessary to direct the
Nation's energies in that regard into a single channel. We could
not have every police officer, sheriff and special deputy sheriff
in the country running around investigating spies. By the same
token, it was very necessary for the Government's resources to be
directed towards identification and neutralization of very real
espionage rings and potential saboteurs. The June, 1939, directive
assured that the FBI would take charge of domestic internal
security instead of several agencies working at cross purposes.
The September, 1939, directive placed local law enforcement on
notice and simultaneously provided for information of possible
value to be funneled to the FBI which was responsible for the
coordination and investigation.
A
The September, 1939, directive, although not conveying
any investigative authority to the FBI, did result in an
additional workload for the FBI by virtue of the fact that local
police and other Federal agencies were referring matters to the
FBI for investigative attention which were not previously called
to our attention. While some of the matters could be logically
fit into one of the statutory crimes of espionage, sabotage or
neutrality regulations, others could not be since the original
information was often nonspecific or so nebulous that it could
be categorized only after some inquiry was made locally.
We were also faced with the reality of war and the
fact that Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union had espionage
apparatuses directed against the United States. While we might
not ordinarily institute an investigation before the commission
of a crime, such as the case of a bank robbery, motor vehicle
theft, etc., the crimes of espionage and sabotage relate to the
national security. It would have not only been folly, it would
have been insane to wait until we had evidence of the commission
of crimes of espionage or sabotage. Rather than wait until
we had a complaint alleging the commission of one of these crimes
we went out and conducted intelligence-type investigations to
determine if there were espionage rings operating or if there
were persons conspiring to sabotage the national defense. So the
September, 1939, directive did affect our investigative operations.
Not by giving us some new investigative authority, but by assigning
us the responsibility of coordinating all investigative activity
in this regard. We were, of course, already in the intelligence-
gathering business as a result of the confidential arrangement
agreed upon in August and September, 1936, among
President Roosevelt, Director Hoover, and the Secretary of State.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 149
14.
-
For these reasons, it can be seen why the FBI used the
September, 1939, directive as one of the bases for its investi-
gative authority. The unfortunate thing is that the 1939 directive
was never really updated, in spite of the reiterations of 1943,
1950, and 1953. It was really never broadened to incorporate the
Executive request made in 1936, and to reflect the Executive
intent that became so obvious in the succeeding years up to this
very time.
It would be very difficult to convince someone
examining our legal authority for conducting intelligence-type
investigations that we derive any authority, particularly any
reiterating it. What we have, it appears, is a hold-over or
perpetuation of a concept of authority (or better, responsibility)
which had some basis in 1939, and perhaps even through the
Korean War years, but which has long since ceased to have any
bearing on FBI investigative operations.
?
This leads us to the third part of the question and
that is what effect the lack of authority derived from the
directives will have on past and future domestic intelligence
investigations. Although there is division of opinion by some
supervisors and officials in the Domestic Intelligence Division as
to how much investigative activity has in the past and will in
the future depend on the nebulous authority of the directives
in question, examination of all the evidence leads to the
conclusion that in the past our investigations have to some
degree depended, not on the language of any of the directives,
but rather, on the Executive request of President Roosevelt in
1936 andon basic authority derived from the many statutes.
relating to the national security, both before and after the
issuance of all the directives in question.
INVESTIGATIONS UNDER STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Argument has been advanced by some in the Domestic
Intelligence Division that it will be impossible to carry out
our internal security responsibilities of conducting purely
intelligence-type investigations using statutory authority only;
that the only way we have been able to do this in the past was
from the authority contained in one or more of the directives
in question. If this were true, i.e., that we have conducted
some investigative activity solely on the basis of the directives,
the FBI would be in for a rough time if the efforts on the part
of several congressional figures to look into our operations
ever come to pass. The fact of the matter is, we have had
ample authority to do just what we have done without the
directives. Administratively perhaps, we could have been more
precise in advertising our investigative jurisdiction and
authority. And unquestionably, we could have been more careful
in writing reports and other records of our investigative activity
to show that our investigations were predicated on information
indicating violation or possible violation of statutes.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 150
-
15.
-

}
R
This brings up another point mentioned by
Professor Elliff in his study. Elliff related that the
FBI had a policy from Mr. Hoover's appointment as Director
until 1936 of "closed end" investigations, but that this policy
gave way to intelligence coverage involving continuing investiga-
tive activity within a broad range of delegated authority. By
"closed end" investigations, Elliff means that a crime was
committed, a prosecutive opinion was received, an investigation
was conducted, a prosecutive opinion was sought and the case
was either prosecuted or closed for want of prosecution. On
the other hand, an intelligence-type investigation would involve
continuing investigation without any thought of closing the
case by virtue of prosecution or inability to prosecute. In
a case involving a purely criminal act, it can be seen that
a "closed end" investigation is possible. But in the fast-moving
world of today, with its organized crime problem tied into space-
age concepts even in purely criminal cases, the "closed end"
investigation is often far from a reality.
PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATIONS
In analyzing the concept of "closed end" investigations
versus continuing intelligence-type investigations, several
factors must be considered, especially where the national security
is involved. Ordinary criminal acts such as the bank robbery,
theft, burglary, fraud, etc., can in no way be compared to crimes
involving the national security. Usually we would have no
occasion to conduct investigation prior to the commission of any
of the above-named crimes. But, a crime against national security
is an entirely different matter. No one but a fool or one
dedicated to the destruction of democracy would advocate that the
Government take no action to prevent a crime which could destroy
the Government. In other words, it would be an unusual case to
conduct a "closed end" investigation of an attempt to overthrow
the Government by force and violence. It would appear that the
FBI would have a constitutional obligation to conduct the
necessary preventive investigation (intelligence?) to insure that
an attempt to overthrow the Government does not occur.
Taking into consideration that any court in the land
would take judicial notice that the Soviet Union and its satellites
are engaged in espionage directed against the United States and
that it employs intelligence-gathering techniques against us, it
logically follows that the same courts would take judicial notice
that the United States Government would have to employ counter-
espionage and counterintelligence methods to combat this threat.
It is believed that the same can be said for other situations where
the facts are such to lead any prudent and cautious individual to
believe that a threat exists to commit sabotage; to incite to
-
16 -
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 151
').
insurrection or rebellion; to engage in seditious conspiracy; or
to plot the overthrow of the Government. Under such circumstances
it would seem that the FBI not only has the duty to conduct
investigations to prevent the crimes, but has the obligation to
do whatever is necessary within the law to neutralize such
threats.
It is true that this type of investigation might be
contrary to the established concept of investigating only after
there is evidence of crime. It is also true that such investi-
gations might take place over a long period of time without any
indication or prospect of presecution. However, as pointed out
by Legal Counsel in his memorandum dated 7/14/72 on Wiretapping,
that "Running through the whole (decision) is a golden thread
of philosophy that when the functions essential to the preservation
of a nation itself are at stake, the nation has the power to take
the action reasonably necessary to protect itself." While this
comment had to do with a particular court decision not related
to the national secuirty, it is very apropos. It would be
unrealistic to contend that the FBI could only investigate
crimes or potential crimes affecting the national security after
the crime has been committed. How ludicrous this would be.
The
Right on point in this regard is another part of the
majority opinion upholding the Smith Act convictions in 1951.
Chief Justice Vinson wrote, "Likewise we are in accord with...
the trial court's finding that the requisite danger existed.
mere fact that from the period of 1945 to 1948 petitioners'
activities did not result in the attempt to overthrow the
Government by force and violence is, of course, no answer to the
fact that there was a group that was ready to make the attempt.
The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy,
with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders,
these petitioners, felt the time had come for action, coupled with
the inflammable nature of the world conditions, similar uprisings in
other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations
with countries with whom the petitioners were in the very least
ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were
justified on this score.
"And this analysis disposes of the contention that a
conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from advocacy itself,
cannot be constitutionally restrained, because it comprises only
the preparation. It is the existence of the conspiracy which
creates the danger. (Emphasis mine) If the ingredients of the
reaction are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until
the catalyst is added."
17
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 152
Some might say, "this is all very well and good where
prosecutive action is used or intended, but what of the cases
where the only purpose of the investigation is to produce
intelligence information, with no hope or intent of prosecutive
action?" There are unquestionably situations where prosecution
would be impossible, but it is doubtful if any situation could be
conjured up involving the national security where the elements of
one or more statutes would be present to lend statutory authority ?
an investigation or reason for investigation.
to
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
Recently, in connection with a lawsuit filed by the
Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee because of investigation
by the FBI relative to a huge demonstration in Washington, D. C.,
the Department of Justice cited Title 28, USC 533, as the lawful
authority of the FBI to conduct the investigations in question.
The investigation at issue had to do with contacting various
transportation facilities in an effort to determine the nature
and size of groups traveling to Washington for the demonstration.
In a sense, this was purely intelligence-type investigation.
statute cited was nothing more than the statute enabling the
Attorney General to direct the FBI to conduct investigations.
The
This same statute has been cited for other types of
investigations where the Department of Justice has requested the
FBI to conduct investigations where we might not have clearly
seen or understood the underlying authority or reason. It can be
seen, however, that under the statutory authority granted to the
President in Title 10, USC 331-333, to call up troops to assist
local governments to put down an insurrection or restore order,
the Attorney General would be within his statutory authority as
the President's Chief Legal Advisor to ask the FBI to provide all
possible information which might assist the President in making a
determination under Title 10. Thus, the FBI would conduct an
intelligence-type investigation under the statutory and constitu-
tional authority flowing from the President, through the
Attorney General to the FBI. In this case we might not immedi-
ately see the potential for prosecutive action, although with the
statutes covering antiriot and civil disorder we would no doubt
be alert for indications that riots or disorders would occur
and that evidence could be collected which would support prosecu-
tion. Here, we would be conducting investigation before a
violation takes place, not only for the intelligence data needed
by the President, but to determine if a Federal violation of law
might also occur.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450
What other authority is also
sometimes lump Presidential directives
one category as if they were the same.
available to the FBI? We
and Executive orders into
This is a common practice,
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 153
- 18 -
even on the Executive level. The Executive orders are numbered,
whereas the directives usually are not. From information
available it appears that Presidential directives and Executive
orders carry equal weight. They take on the force of law if
acknowledged by resolution of Congress and are published in the
Federal Register. All this leads up to a very significant
document which over the years has provided substantial investi-
gative authority to the FBI. It is commonly known as Executive
Order 10450, although it has been revised and will be known as
Executive Order 11605 if it is ever implemented. Executive
Order 10450 is captioned as "Security Requirements for Government
Employment" and, as the name implies, is related to employment
by the Government of individuals who might constitute a national
security risk. This Executive order grew out of Executive
Order 9835, dated March 21, 1947, which provided for an
investigative procedure affecting persons entering competitive
civil service. The order established a Loyalty Review Board
and procedures for handling of cases where loyalty of an
employee was questioned. Executive Order 9835 followed the
establishment of the President's temporary commission on loyalty
under Executive Order 9086, dated November 25, 1946. Executive
Order 10450, dated April 27, 1953, superseded and revoked
Executive Order 9835.
The important thing about these two Executive orders is
that the Attorney General was required to furnish the Loyalty
Review Board current information concerning the subversive nature
of foreign or domestic organizations, including totalitarian
groups. Thus, the FBI, acting under lawful authority of the
Attorney General, was bound to conduct the necessary investiga-
tions to enable the Attorney General to fulfill his responsibility
to the Loyalty Review Board. Executive Order 10450, in revoking
Executive Order 9835, also disbanded the Loyalty Review Board
and provided that the Attorney General would furnish the same
information regarding subversive organizations to the head of
each department and agency. The Attorney General was also
requested to render to the heads of departments and agencies
such advice as may be requisite to enable them to establish and
maintain an appropriate employee-security program.
Under Executive Orders 9835 and 10450. the
Attorney General had the responsibility to designate
organizations as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive,
or as having adopted apolicy of advocating or approving the
commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their
rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking
to alter the form of government of the United States by uncon-
stitutional means. Under provisions of Executive Order 11605,
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 154
19
"ግ
it
dated July 2, 1971, the Attorney General still has the responsi-
bility of furnishing names of organizations to the heads of
departments and agencies. However, instead of the organizations
being designated by the Attorney General, the new Executive
Order provides that the Subversive Activities Control Board
shall, upon petition of the Attorney General, conduct hearings
to make the same determination formerly made by the
Attorney General. The new Executive Order also sets up a much
broader criteria for establishing the subversive nature of
organizations.
Unfortunately, the Subversive Activities Control
Board, which was initially established under the Internal Security
· Act of 1950, is under attack from Congress. Congress refused
to provide any funds for the Subversive Activities Control Board
after July 1, 1972. There has been indication that Congress may
also take steps to repeal the remnants of the Internal Security
Act of 1950. Should this happen, we would lose a broad base of
current authority for conducting many of our security-type
investigations. Executive Order 11605 has not actually been
implemented; therefore, we are bound to the provisions of
Executive Order 10450. Basically, however, the responsibility
under 10450 (or even 11605 if it is ever implemented) falls on
the Attorney General, and for this reason the Department of Justice
should now provide guidance as to what investigations are required
by the FBI to fulfill the Attorney General's obligations under
the existing Exeuctive order.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
and
What other investigative authority or jurisdiction do
we have? Attached to this study is a collection of statutes
documents which grant investigative authority for conducting the
various types of investigations falling with the primary super-
vision of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Included in this
collection of laws are statutes such as civil rights statutes,
which are the basic responsibility of the General Investigative
Division, but which nevertheless convey statutory authority in
investigating totalitarian organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan
and other hate-type groups. Civil rights statutes might also
likely be involved in other situations where organized groups
act in such a manner as to deny other persons their constitutional
rights. The fraud statutes are included since many groups
engage in activities which are covered in one way or another
by such statutes. There are, of course, the basic statutes such
as espionage, sabotage, treason and foreign agents registration
act.
But there are statutes, such as inciting to antiriot,
and others which cover an extremely broad spectrum of subversive
activity. But isn't there some additional authority under the
constitutional power of the President to protect the national
security?
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 155
-
20 -
It was under just such constitutional powers that
President Roosevelt requested the FBI to investigate the fascist
and communist movement. And, of course, it was under just such
constitutional powers that the President authorized the
Attorney General to approve without a warrant electronic sur-
veillances on both domestic and foreign organizations engaged
in activity detrimental to the national security. However, the
Supreme Court has considerably narrowed the President's consti-
tutional authority as a result of the Keith case. In essence,
the court stated that insofar as domestic organizations are
concerned, the President does not have the power to abrogate
the First and Fourth Amendments. In other words, the President
cannot order an act (investigation) which would interfere with
or abridge the First Amendment rights to assemble or redress
grievances, or to enjoy freedom of speech, or the Fourth Amend-
ment rights requiring the issuance of search warrant in connec-
tion with the seizure of evidence.
The courts have considerably broadened their inter-
pretation of both the First and Fourth Amendments. Civil
libertarians have proclaimed that any activity on the part of the
Government which might have a "chilling effect" on an individual's
legitimate right to dissent constitutes a violation of First
Amendment rights. In some cases the courts have adopted this
view. By the same token, Fourth Amendment rights have been
broadened to include overhearings of conversation, and the issue
of invasion of privacy is being raised more and more. With all
these factors being considered there are, however, numerous
situations bearing on the national security where the President
unquestionably has the constitutional authority to have the
FBI obtain information which will enable him to fulfill his
broad responsibilities under the Constituion. With the exception
of the recent Keith decision, the courts have declined to define
or circumscribe the President's constitutional power..
Ordinarily, when we speak of the constitutional
power of the President we think in terms of a specific order
such as a directive or Executive order or some other tangible
evidence. However, over the years, beginning with the years
preceding World War II, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover established a
rapport with the President which resulted in the President
making requests of the FBI under his inherent Executive authority.
The request made by President Roosevelt in 1936 as described
herein is an excellent example of a long series of Presidential
requests extending through a long line of Presidents and at least
until Mr. Hoover's death. Presidents from Roosevelt to Nixon
have confided in Mr. Hoover and sought his advice and product of
FBI investigative skill, particularly in matters affecting the
national security. One very excellent example of the confidence
the President has had in the FBI is the confidential Presidential
?
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 156
-
21
Y.
directive of 1941 instructing that the FBI set up a Special
Intelligence Service covering the Western Hemisphere to handle
and coordinate all intelligence work within the hemisphere.
There are many other examples, but a more recent one is the fact
that President Nixon, in spite of responsibility assigned to
CIA, asked that the FBI establish Legal Attaches in several
countries where there had been a dearth of good intelligence
information.
SPECIAL WHITE HOUSE REQUESTS
Over a period of years the President came to rely on the
FBI to provide first-hand intelligence information concerning
both domestic and foreign situations bearing on policy affecting
the national security. As a result of numerous conferences in
which the various Presidents outlined to Mr. Hoover their needs
for information which would assist him and his staff in their
policy decisions, Mr. Hoover instructed that important developments
concerning the national defense or which might otherwise be of
value to the White House should be reported directly to the
President or one of his high-level staff members. In most
instances the same information was made available to the Attorney
General simultaneously. Over the years it became a common practice
for White House staff members to telephone requests for information
or investigations to Mr. Hoover's office or the office of one of
his officials. Such requests were usually considered as being
within the constitutional Executive power, and for the most part
such requests were completely legitimate and well within the
recognized scope of the FBI investigative authority.
with
-
Occasionally, however, requests were made and complied
which in retrospect appear to have been beyond any recognized
Executive authority. An example is a telephone request to furnish
all available information to the White House concerning a forth-
coming Earth Day rally in 1970. The rally, which was sponsored by
groups concerned with pollution and ecology, attracted the
attention of a few subversive elements, but appeared to be very
much under the control of the sponsors. Senator Edmund S. Muskie
spoke at the rally in Washington, D. C., and Rennie Davis, an
antiwar activist with a subversive background, appeared on the
same platform with Senator Muskie. A few minor disturbances
erupted in some areas, but overall the Earth Day rallies were ·
peaceful and attained their general objective, the calling of
attention to environmental problems. Senator Muskie, who learned
that the FBI covered the rally in Washington, was incensed that
the FBI was involved. We had a poor defense and in this case,
least, it is doubtful that there was any legitimate Executive
authority to have the FBI involved. In any event, it would appear
that such requests should flow through channels, including the
Department of Justice where possible, to assure that unreasonable
and improper requests are made for investigative activity.
at
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 157
-
- 22
-
1
1.
}
It is quite understandable that various staff members
at the White House have assignments or projects to prepare
reports on a wide variety of matters relating to the welfare
of the country. It is also quite understandable that such
individuals would turn to the FBI to develop information through
investigative activity or from its files. However, the fact that
the FBI has specific responsibilities and jurisdiction under
the law may not be known to these staff members and in their
ignorance of the situation they could ask us to engage in activity
beyond the scope of our investigative authority.
Over a long period of time the FBI has disseminated
information directly to the White House as it was developed
when the information had a bearing on national defense or possible
foreign policy planning. The White House has come to expect this
kind of rapid dissemination. Much of the information disseminated
has been of specific interest to the National Security Council
of which the President, Vice President and high level members of
his staff are members. Even though CIA has the basic responsibility
under the National Security Act of 1947 to coordinate all
intelligence data relating to national defense, the nature of
rapid changing situations makes it impractical to disseminate all
important intelligence information to the National Security
Council via CIA channels. It is not believed that the White House
would sit still for the FBI cutting off dissemination on national
security information.
NEED FOR CURRENT EXECUTIVE ORDER
Dissemination, however, is but the product of investi-
gative activity. The question, then, is not to whom we should
or should not disseminate, but rather when and when not should
we investigate. All of which leads to the issue of what consti-
tutes Executive or Presidential authority under the constituion,
and how can such a determination be made? Granting that the
President does have broad constitutional powers which he can
exercise in the interest of national security, how can such
power be conveyed to the FBI to cover possible gaps in our
statutory authority? It is not believed that individual requests,
particularly from lower level White House staff members, actually
convey any power of inherent Executive authority, unless such
requests may have originated from the President himself.
What appears to be sorely needed, then, is a clear-cut memorandum
of understanding possibly in the form of a comprehensive
Executive order or Presidential directive outlining areas of
investigative activity required and the investigative product
needed by the Executive to fulfill his national security
responsibilities.
i
j
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 158
-
23 -
DEVELOPMENT OF INVESTIGATIVE POLICIES
By examining our investigative policies and procedures
over the years it can readily be seen that procedures adopted
out of necessity, such as those developing out of the period
preceding World War II, in time come to be accepted as gospel
both within and outside the FBI. The intelligence-type investi-
gations originally ordered because of circumstances existing in
1936 and even before, continued after World War II, and in reality
became necessary again during the Korean War period. And although
the actual basis of authority in 1949 and 1950 was not the same
as in 1936, we evidently considered it the same and obviously the
Department of Justice and White House did also. Even though the
Congress provided legislative authority to investigate subversive
acts, it appears that we did not feel that the type of investi-
gations necessary could be conducted except under an authority
which did not require collection and preservation of evidence with
a view of eventual prosecution, but rather to gather information
only for the purpose of determining the nature and extent of
subversive activity.
This is not to imply that the statutes were not used.
On the contrary, the statutes were used and a large number of
top level Communist Party functionaries were convicted under the
Smith Act, but we still conducted investigations based on what
we considered to be authority under constitutional power of the
President investigations which Professor Elliff has called
continuing investigative activity within a broad range of delegated
authority. While this study has not gone into the procedures
and policies developed by the FBI in connection with investiga-
tions relating to our Emergency Detention Program, various
documents were examined and it is known that this program preceded
the Emergency Detention Act, which was a part of the Internal
Security Act of 1950. A great deal of investigative activity,
dating back to the 1930's, was conducted concerning the Security
Index, an integral part of the Emergency Detention Program.
matter of interest, the Emergency Detention Program, which was
a program devised to insure that individuals constituting a
threat to national security would be arrested and detained in the
event of a national emergèncy. The Department at one point felt
that the constitutionality of such a program was highly question-
able. However, the program was implemented and was in existence
at the time the Internal Security Act of 1950 was passed.
as a
And most curiously of all is the fact that even after
the Internal Security Act of 1950 became law, providing a legal
basis for the program in existence, it was not until the 1960's
that our Emergency Detention Program was switched over from an
emergency plan under Presidential powers to the authority
vested by statute. Of course, the part of the Internal Security Act
7
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 159
24
authorizing emergency apprehension and detention was repealed
in October, 1971. Under the Emergency Detention Program, while
it existed, a great deal of continuing investigative. activity
was conducted concerning thousands of individuals who were
believed to represent a threat to the national security in time
of national emergency. Some of our investigative practices today
are based on criteria authority growing out of the original
Emergency Detention Program.
Now this is not to say that the FBI is in a position of
having to defend its investigative policies or practices. If there
has been but a single thread of continuity running through our
investigative practices and procedures over the years it is that
the individual's constitutional rights are paramount; that nothing
is so important as a citizen's rights under the law. Legal
Counsel pointed out an extremely important point last year at the
time of the Princeton Conference where a group of FBI critics
gathered to expose the FBI's faults. He noted that for years
preceding the Miranda decision and the Escobedo decision the FBI
had been warning persons of their rights prior to taking any kind
of statement. Every Special Agent knows that the first and
perhaps most important element in preparing for a prosecution is
preserve the individual's rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
The FBI has legally conducted investigations of individuals
and organizations whose philosophies include the overthrow or
destruction of the United States Government by force or violence.
Whether conducted under a Presidential order or statutory
authority any such investigations were absolutely necessary and
continue to be so. For administrative reasons documents reporting
results of investigations often have not always clearly shown the
authority, statutory or otherwise. A caption has usually been
used for routing and supervisory purposes which is not clearly
indicative of the nature or purpose of the investigative activity.
Such captions might well be confusing to one not connected with
the FBI and they might well lead to the conclusion that investi-
gation was not based on any legal authority. For example, the
caption "Security Matter Miscellaneous" or "Internal Security
Revolutionary Activity" means little to someone outside the FBI.
To those in the Domestic Intelligence Divison such designations
identify the type of case and supervising unit at Headquarters.
In other words, there has been nothing wrong with the
conduct of our investigations. Only those deserving of investi-
gation under statutory provisions have been investigated. While
we would have been more precise to predicate our investigations on
a specific authority, whether statutory or Executive order (10450),
we have not engaged in extra-legal investigative activity
simply because we failed to cite any specific authority to
conduct the investigation in such a way as to make it a "closed
end" investigation such as Professor Elliff described.
25 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 160

PREVENTIVE INVESTIGATIONS
While there has been some disagreement by one or two
supervisory personnel in Domestic Intelligence Division as to
how long an investigation may be carried on under statutory
authority or whether a "preventive" investigation can be carried
on under that authority, it is my own contention that intelligence-
type investigations can be carried out under statutory authority;
that there is no constraint imposed by law governing the length
of time in which an investigation can be conducted. There are
many reasons why continuing investigative activity would be
necessary, even when a statutory violation is involved. In most
cases involving the national security a conspiracy of some sort
is involved. Conspiracies frequently go on for years. When
the preservation of the Government is involved, who is to say that
we either prove a conspiracy within a specific period of time or
stop investigating.
Whether a conspiracy is evident or not, the FBI would not
open an investigation of any type unless information was first
received that a violation of Federal law was involved or that the
national security was threatened. This is how our so-called
intelligence-type investigations are usually started.
A citizen,
an informant, or a law enforcement officer furnishes information that
there is a group in existence which includes in its philosophy an
advocacy of overthrow or destruction of the Government of the
United States by force or violence. It would appear to be entirely
logical that under at least three separate Federal statutes a
violation would occur if this group did attempt to overthrow the
Government. And the Supreme Court has said that the Government
does not have to wait until the putsch is about to be executed
and that proof that success or probability of success must be shown.
While the examples cited hereafter might not be good legal
analogy, there does not seem to be any reason why the preservation
of our Government warrants any less consideration under the law.
The courts have upheld cases, such as have been developed in the
Washington, D. C., metropolitan area, where a nearby jurisdiction,
which prohibits importation of liquor from Washington, sets up a
surveillance near the larger purveyors of liquor. When a car
bearing Virginia or Maryland license plates is observed to be
loading up what is obvioulsy more liquor than can be imported into
these states, a surveillance is instituted and when the person
drives across the state line he is arrested and charged with
violation of state liquor laws. it can be argued that such is
possible only because of the broad police powers delegated to
the states by the Constitution.
Perhaps.
But under the same
Constitution it would appear that somewhere there is a rationale
that if a statute exists prohibiting the overthrow or destruction
of our Government, the Government should have the same degree
of power to see that persons do not overthrow it.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 161
-
26 -
But the same problem exists in many areas covered by
Federal statute. In the narcotics field tremendous intelligence
programs are in existence to stop the spiraling increase in drug
addiction and traffic in narcotics by organized crime. Even
broader intelligence programs are being planned. It is true that
violations are occurring. And some arrests are being made as the
result of excellent police work following the violations. But
the Government is also concerned with preventing drugs from even
getting into the United States, and from preventing any that do
get here from being sold to our children. So, we are conducting
preventive investigations in the narcotics field. We are conducting
intelligence-type investigations. Certainly prosecutions will
be sought wherever possible, but we are conducting the same type
of investigations in the narcotics area as we are in the field of
national security. We are doing what has to be done, and the
statutes are the basis of what has to be done.
law.
-
In the field of organized crime we know that the Mafia
and the Cosa Nostra have spread like a cancerous growth into the
very economy of the Nation. Certainly there are violations of
Statutes of some sort are usually involved. Many of the
statutes involved are outside the primary investigative jurisdiction
of the FBI. What has to be done? The individuals controlling
the organizations of crime syndicates must be identified and the
nature of their activity analyzed to see what
if any
Federal,
or even local, crimes are being committed. In other words, we
know that syndicated criminals are engaged in crime, yet we do
not know exactly what crimes. We are therefore conducting
intelligence-type investigations to first identify the criminal
and then identify the crime. I fail to see why there isn't a
parallel between intelligence-type investigations conducted to
prevent criminal depredations on the public at large and the same
kind of investigations to protect the Nation from the nihilists,
anarchists, terrorists, revolutionaries and other subversives.
While drawing a parallel between criminal investigations
and national security investigations, there is no intent here to
show that both types of investigative activity can be or should be
conducted alike. The two types of activity are as diametrically
opposed as the two poles of the earth. One is concerned with the
individuals and organizations which are involved purely for
financial gain. The other is concerned with the individuals and
organizations which are involved purely for ideological and
philosophical reasons. There is a vast difference between the
two. Intelligence-type investigations are necessary in the
field of narcotics and other areas of organized crime and they
are conducted without the need for any inherent Executive power
being conveyed.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 162
- 27 -
origin to the common-law concept of a sovereign's rights to
protect itself to the 1939 et seq, directives and Executive
Orders 9835 and 10450. Included in this group were (1) National
Association of Black Students (NABS) which originally had as its
stated purpose to. serve as an information center and communications
network for blacks on college campuses. This was in 1969.
There was an enormous amount of violence and upheaval on college
campuses at that time. Damage and injuries from arson, sabotage
and malicious vandalism grew into the millions. In a number of
instances black students were in the center of the activity.
NABS was considered a potential source of danger during any major
strife, particularly since the national coordinator of the
group, Gwendolyn Marie Patton, had been a member of an extremist
group cited as an extremist group by the House Committee on
Un-American Activities. The Black Panther Party and other
revolutionary-type organizations attempted to organize and
penetrate black student groups such as this.
(2) The Center for Black Education (CBE) came under
investigation when its founder was determined to be a former member
of the Black Panther Party and described as one of the leading black
militants in San Francisco prior to his move to Washington, D. C.
CBE has been publicly described as an educational institution
designed to train technicians who will work to liberate the
African people and develop the African world. The CBE has as its
goal "the independence of the African People." Members have
engaged in firearms training.
(3) The Drum and Spear Bookstore (DSB) in
Washington, D. C., opened in 1968 and was publicly described as
a retail bookstore having the largest collection of books about
Africa, Asia, and the Negro in America. It also had protest
literature and books concerning the socio-economic conditions in
the U. S. It was determined through investigation that the
bookstore was apparently not being used as a front for underground
or subversive activity and investigation was closed.
(4)
"
The Congress of African Peoples (CAP) was formed in
1970. It initially advocated the unification of all blacks, the
complete rejection of the "white imperialist, capitalist system,
the establishment of a black nation, the formation of a National
African Party and ultimately a World African Party under the
revolutionary ideology of Pan-Africanism.
During a CAP conference in July, 1971, CAP leaders
vociferously advocated the need to engage in disruptions as a
means of ending "acts detrimental to blacks," the formation
of a paramilitary "defense unit," and the establishment of
communication lines with other black revolutionary movements
abroad. The CAP has established communication links with the
Chinese communist diplomatic establishment in Canada.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 163
29
-
☐
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS AND CIVIL LIBERTY
-
One of the biggest distinctions between the criminal
and security-type investigations is the fact that national
security investigations, which involved the ideological factor,
are almost without exception concerned with the concept of
political ideology. No matter how radical the political ideology
might be, it is nevertheless considered by the people involved -
and often by many intellectual idealists as a right guaranteed
under the Constitution. As a result of a great deal of liberal
thinking on the part of the civil libertarians and groups such as
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), there is a much
greater hue and cry when intelligence-type investigations are
surfaced and it developed that the purpose of the investigation
had something to do with an individual's so-called political
beliefs. The potential problem for the FBI in conducting purely
intelligence-type investigations, even when based on statutes,
is when the investigation broaches or gets real close to rights
protected under the First and Fourth Amendments.
As pointed out before, however, the Supreme Court has
emphatically stated that the President has no constitutional
power to abridge these two Amendments. Therefore, no Executive
order, no matter how broadly worded to convey investigative
authority for intelligence-type investigations, could enable the
FBI to avoid the same pitfalls regarding areas of activity
covered by the First and Fourth Amendments. Therefore, even though
a definitive Executive order would be desirable from the stand-
point of fixing our responsibilities and bridging any gaps between
statute and Executive necessity, the FBI would still be in a little
better position than it is at the present time under purely
statutory authority.
INTERPRETATION OF AUTHORITY BY SUBSTANTIVE SECTIONS
At this point it appears appropriate to introduce comments
offered by representatives of the various substantive Sections of
the Domestic Intelligence Division as to their interpretation of
Executive power flowing from the 1939 et seq, directives and
the types of investigative matters that possibly cannot be conducted
solely under statutory authority.
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION VIEWS
The Extremist Intelligence Section described four
investigative matters where it appears that investigation, at
least initially, would not or could not have been grounded in
specific Federal statutes, but where the FBI nevertheless was in
a sense fulfilling intelligence responsibility tracing its
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 164
28 -
1
COMMENT REBUTTAL
It is believed that in at least three of the above-
described situations the FBI would have been able to conduct
investigatons based on statutes relating to advocacy of over-
throw of the Government, seditious conspiracy, inciting to
insurrection or rebellion, civil disorders, antiriot,
neutrality laws (foreign relations) and perhaps sabotage.
questionable case, the Drum and Spear Bookstore, would have
probably been brought adequately to our attention from various
public sources or through our informant coverage of overall
matters affecting the national security.
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION VIEWS
The
The Nationalities Intelligence Section listed four
situations wherein, generally speaking, much of the FBI's
investigative activity has not been based on statutory authority,
but has been designed to develop intelligence data regarding
individuals and organizations which have established themselves
as a potential threat to the security and safety of the
United States Government or its citizens. Listed are the following:
(1)
The Jewish Defense League (JDL). Although involved
in terror-type bombings covered by statute, FBI investigation of
JDL is also developing information regarding future plans and
activities, particularly violent acts against Soviet diplomats
and diplomatic establishments and pro-Soviet groups and indivi-
duals. In the case of JDL, Department of State has a specific
interest from the standpoint of U.S. relations with other
countries. Certain of our intelligence-type investigations of
JDL are aimed at satisfying State Department requirements.
(2) Al Fatah and Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine are two organizations that are well known for violence
potential. In light of statements and actions of members and
leaders, it is obvious that the FBI should conduct intelligence
investigations when these organizations are active in the U.S.
(3) Revolutionary Union and Venceremos Organization are
two groups which adhere to a pro-Chinese communist political
philosophy and pledge overt action through use of weapons to
bring about revolution in this country. With this in mind, we
have undertaken intelligence-type investigations to identify
those involved who may be responsible for carrying out violence
directed against the U. S. Government or the citizens of this
country.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 165
-
· 30 -
(4) Puerto Rican independence groups, specifically those
who seek to bring about independent status for Puerto Rico by
means of force and violence, are the subject of intelligence-
type investigations. No groups seeking independence of Puerto Rico
by lawful means are investigated. The violence-prone groups have
committed acts ranging from attempted assassination of the President,
accompanied by murder, to acts of terrorism involving bombing,
arson, and shootings. Much of the violence-prone groups' activity.
is planned in communist Cuba. Many of the leaders of the violent
pro-independence groups are communists or followers of Leninist-
Marxist philosophy.
Nationalities Intelligence Section is of the opinion that
the aims and activities of the above-mentioned groups and similar
organizations border on statutory violations%3B that while we do not
rely on statutory prohibitions for authority to investigate them,
it must be recognized that the reason investigations are initiated
closely approaches the elements involved in conspiracy violations.
Nationalities Intelligence Section opines that if we must look
toward actual written authority for this kind of investigation,
it appears we must rely on the Executive order (directive?) dated
September 6, 1939, and subsequent reaffirmations of that order,
noting that the 1939 directive and later supporting directives
were published at a time when this country was involved in armed
hostilities abroad.
Nationalities Intelligence Section observed that it
appears necessary at this time to seek a properly worded Executive
order which clearly sets forth the desires of the President in
his capacity as the chief administrator of our country.
Such an
order should carefully distinguish between acts which are clearly
opposed to the constitutional basis under which we operate and
those which, no matter how unpopular, are nothing more than an
expression of ideas. Finally, Nationalities Intelligence suggests
that detailed guidelines from the Attorney General should be
issued, based on the Executive order or directive.
COMMENT
REBUTTAL
While I agree completely with the suggestion that a
detailed Presidential order is needed, along with guildelines
issued by the Attorney General, I disagree that we cannot investigate
the violence-prone Puerto Ricans and the Revolutionary Union and its
spin-off, the Venceremos Organization, under existing statutes.
I feel also that all we need to cover the JDL and the Arab terrorists
like a blanket is a request from the Secretary of State to the
Attorney General under the statutory authority relating to
foreign relations which has previously been described herein
and in accordance with Title 28, USC 533, set forth in the
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 166
-
· 31 ·
-
exhibit accompanying this study. Some additional authority is
also present, at least for the time being, in Executive Order
10450 (based on Executive Order 9835). Additionally, there is
authority, particularly with respect to JDL, under statute
having to do with assaulting foreign diplomats.
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION VIEWS
The Internal Security Section pointed out that the
security investigations supervised within that Section are
conducted within the purview of authority set out in original
position paper of the Domestic Intelligence Divison dated
May 19, 1972, entitled "Investigations of Subversion," which
paper was to have been discussed during meeting of the Bureau's
Executive Staff with Mr. Gray at Quantico the last week of May.
The position paper was abandoned by Mr. Miller in favor of a
different position, the essence of which has been expressed
heretofore in this study.
The authority referred to by Internal Security Section
essentially is based on both statutory and Presidential documents,
including the 1939, et seq, directives. Internal Security pointed
out that it should be stated at the outset that while FBI
investigations conducted with specific reference to a statute
will develop some intelligence it is not possible to base all FBI
activities in the collection of intelligence on statutory
authority alone. Internal Security further points out that it is
true that the initial Presidential directive(s) of 1939 picked
up the term "subversive activities" as incidental to their
primary thrust, but that it is just as true that President Truman's
directive of July 24, 1950, however intentional or
unintentional it may have been specifically stated, said that the
FBI had charge of investigative work in matters relating to
espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.
Internal Security feels that whether or not the initial Presidential
directives fully embraced the concept of subversive activities
would appear irrelevant after such a definitive order signed
by Truman. Internal Security Section is of the opinion that whether
we had it spelled out beforehand is unimportant because obviously
Truman's order of July 24, 1950, made our investigative interest
in subversive activities valid at that time.
COMMENT
-
REBUTTAL
Without going into detailed rebuttal here, the Truman
directive is discussed in detail heretofore, it must be reiterated
that Truman's directive contained a misstatement of fact concerning
the previous directives, and I feel that under the magnification
of a critical analysis of the Truman directive, particularly by
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 167
32
-
individuals unsympathetic to the FBI, we cannot glibly state
that whatever the intention or unintention may have been, Truman
signed the order and therefore it made everything fine.
VIEWS CONTINUED
The Internal Security Section believes that reliance on
statutory authority alone for the collection of intelligence
would severely limit the scope of FBI activities to the detriment
of our national security. They feel that a statutory basis must
impose reasonable and definable limits and for the most part
investigations conducted with regard to statute are "closed end"
type. Internal Security points out that we investigate violations
or allegations of violations%3B that we do not investigate indefinitely
on the supposition or speculation that by "fishing" we may
find somebody who violates a Federal law. Internal Security notes
that such a concept is repugnant to the democratic process and
clearly indicates a police state mentality. They go on to point
out that on the other hand it is also clear that there are some
areas particularly where the integrity of the Government
--
is at stake
--
where we must conduct intelligence-type investigations
to detect conspiracies and actual attempts which go to the very
heart of the Government's existence.
COMMENT
-
REBUTTAL
Here, again, I must interject with a point of rebuttal.
As pointed out before, I feel that investigation under statutory
or other legal authority does not require the so-called "closed
end" type of investigation in every case. But the most important
point I want to bring out is that I cannot see the logic of saying
that investigations based on the possibility of violations to
destroy the Government (intelligence investigations actually)
are repugnant to the democratic process when performed under
statutes forbidding such activity and are indicative of a police
state mentality, whereas there is nothing repugnant, nothing
wrong with conduct the same type of investigations under some
nonspecific Presidential power to protect the integrity of
the Government. I personally, as a citizen, would rather
have a system wherein I could not be investigated unless there
was some indication that I was planning to violate the law,
or had already done so. As a law-abiding citizen I have no
fear of intelligence-type investigations aimed at discovering
plots to violate the law. I would have fear of a government
system which permitted intelligence investigations based on
someone's anyone's, Presidential or otherwise interpretation
-
-
of what an individual may say, do or think. The law is a
guideline and states clearly what may do or not do.
Vague interpretations subject to the caprices of undisciplined
politicians could result in a virtual police state if the law is
not the basis of our investigative activity.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 168
33
VIEWS CONTINUED
Internal Security Section recognizes that our investi-
gations are conducted under both the authority conferred under
Executive orders (10450) and statutes and notes that as a
practical matter the statutory provisions cited as a basis for
intelligence-type investigative authority must bear a reasonable
relationship to the activity investigated and must be brought to
a logical conclusion within a reasonable period of time. They.
also point out that it would be extremely difficult to justify
continued investigative interest in a mere member of the Communist
Party on the basis of the Smith Act or the Internal Security Act
of 1950. It is further pointed out that this points up again
the necessity for reliance not only on statutory authority but
for the broader. intelligence-type authority conferred by
Presidentail directives and Executive orders.
REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES SECTION VIEWS
The Revolutionary Activities Section furnished several
specific examples of work of that Section which does not fall
within the purview of existing Federal statutes. Included in
those examples are the following:
(1) Students for a Democratic Society/Worker
Major
Student Alliance (SDS/WSA) is the largest faction of SDS
in existence at the present time. It has an estimated
membership of 750 members. This group is described as a revolu-
tionary, predominantly campus-based organization dominated and
controlled by the communist Progressive Labor Party.
The group
has engaged in recent widespread anti-Government demonstrations
throughout the country which have led to numerous arrests,
property damage, and injuries to law enforcement officers.
purpose of our investigation of SDS/WSA is to obtain intelligence
data in order to have a day-to-day appraisal of the strength,
dangerousness, and activities of the organization and to keep
the Department of Justice and other interested agencies advised.
Revolutionary Activities Section states that authority
for investigation of SDS/WSA is based on Executive Order 10450,
but that additional authority is derived from Presidential
directives dating from September 6, 1939, 28 Code of Federal
Regulations 0.85 (d) cites FBI authority to carry out Presidential
directives. They also note that "inherent" responsibility of the
President derived from the Constitution to "insure domestic
tranquility," (Preamble) to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, (Article II, Section 3) and to protect the states
against invasion and domestic violence (Article IV, Section 4)
provide power to the President.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 169
34 -
.
(2) The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is the inter-
national Trotskyist movement founded in the 1920's when Leon Trotsky
lost out in a power struggle to Joseph Stalin for control of the
international communist movement. The basic philosophy of the SWP
is that only violent revolution can destroy capitalism; that
all political groups other than their own are counterrevolutionary
and must be destroyed. We rely on Executive Order 10450 for
investigative authority.
(3) The Venceremos Brigade consists of a loosely knit
group of over 1500 individuals who have travelled to Cuba in
separate contingents since November, 1969. Positive information
has been developed that the organization is being used by
various hostile intelligence services for spotting purposes
and recruitment of intelligence agents and support personnel.
The group is under investigation because it appears to be under
the control and domination of a hostile power.
Revolutionary Activities Section states that Presidential
directives (supposedly the 1939, et seq directives) have given
the FBI responsibility to investigate matters relating to the
internal security of the country. They point out that after the
first contingent returned to the U.S. in February, 1970, the
White House (nonspecific) instructed the Director to conduct an
intensive investigation of the group to determine the extent of
indoctrination afforded these individuals while in Cuba and to
assess their potential dangerousness to the country. In addition,
the Department of Justice has requested information to support
indicia that members of various contingents have been trained as
espionage and intelligence agents for the Cubans and North Koreans
and may be operating as such in the U.S.
(4) Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) is a revo-
luationary antiwar group currently of major concern in view of
its potential for violence. The organization is made up of many
Vietnam war veterans who have advanced training in explosives and
weapons and many have records of narcotics use. One VVAW
national coordinator stockpiled arms and ammunition and advocated
"political elimination squads." Revolutionary Activities Section
relies on the Presidential directives (1939 et seq) and Executive
Order 10450 as a basis for investigation in the absence of
specific statutory authority.
(5) Weatherman is the name adopted by a group which is
a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organization dedicated to the
overthrow of the Government through force and violence. A number
of Weatherman leaders are current Bureau fugitives in connection
with violations of Federal antiriot laws, Bombing and Gun Law
statutes, as well as the Fugitive Felon Act. Revolutionary
Activities Section cites as specific authority for investigation
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 170
35

of the Weatherman organization that Presidential directives have
instructed the FBI to take charge of investigative work
relating to espionage, sabotage and subversive activities and that
Executive Order 10450 provides additional authority.
(6) Unaffiliated individuals who are a part of the New
Left Movement. Revolutionary Activities Section notes that
although the New Left Movement has no definable ideology of its
own, it does have strong Marxist, existentialist, nihilist and
anarchist overtones. In some instances there are individuals
without any organizational affiliation who by their revolutionary
activities and statements, establishing a rejection of law and
order, reveal the individual to be a potential threat to the
security of the U.S. Such individuals do, in fact, engage in
violence or unlawful activities and their potential dangerousness
to the internal security is clearly demonstrated by their state-
ments, conduct and actions. According to Revolutionary Activities
Section, specific authority to conduct our investigations of
unaffiliated individuals is derived from Presidential directives
of September 6, 1939, through December 15, 1953.
This Section states that in all these examples there is
a likelihood that evidence may be developed at some future date
that activities of these organizations and individuals constitute
violations of specific statutes. It is further stated that our
authority to conduct investigations in these cases cannot be
based on the speculation that evidence of some violation might be
developed; however, until such time as we obtain a substantial
allegation that a violation has occurred, we must base our
"intelligence" investigations on the Presidential directives and
Executive orders issued by the President delineating our
responsibility in regard to national security.
COMMENT
-
REBUTTAL
At the risk of being monotonous, there appears to be
ample indication here that a great deal of statutory authority
is present, but not being cited. The Smith Act of 1940 and other
statutes dealing with the national security provide the basis for
investigating all of these groups. The espionage statutes
serve as basis for investigating the Venceremos Brigade. Certainly
the authority conveyed by Executive Order 10450 is not questioned.
And in the case of the Weatherman group, the Fugitive Felon Act
gives us a tremendous latitude for conducting all the intelligence
investigation we may need in an effort to locate the Weatherman
fugitives.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 171
36
OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION
Although the cold facts indicate that the Presidential
directives dating back to 1939 do not convey any authority to
the FBI which it did not have already by legislative enactment,
it is obvious that intelligence-type investigations are necessary
in the protection of the national security. Various documents
emphasize the necessity for developing intelligence data. For
example, the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (Kerner Commission, 1968) emphasized that law enforcement
organizations must develop the means to obtain adequate intelligence
for planning purposes and that law enforcement. should "gather,
evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as well
actual civil disorders."
as
Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest
(1970) took special note of the need for intelligence in effective
law enforcement. The Commission stated in its report, "It is
an undoubted fact that on some campuses there are men and women
who plot, all too often successfully, to burn and bomb, and
sometimes to maim and kill." The report concluded that the
best, and sometimes the only, means law enforcement has to thwart
or prevent such plots is through "clandestine intelligence work."
A memorandum for the Director of the FBI from Attorney
General Ramsey Clark, dated September 14, 1967, stated that "In
view of the seriousness of the riot activity across the country,
it is most important that you use the maximum available resources,
investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts
bearing on the question as to whether there has been or is a
scheme or conspiracy by any group of whatever size, effectiveness,
or affiliation, to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity."
The memorandum went on to state that "In this connection
the following federal statutes could be applicable depending, of
course, upon the factual situation that develops." Ten Federal
statutes were then listed and it is particularly significant to
note that the Attorney General was instructing that the FBI
collect intelligence information not on some specific allegation
that a crime had been committed, but to determine whether there
has been or is a scheme or conspiracy. In other words, the FBI
was instructed by the Attorney General to conduct intelligence
investigations to determine if any of the ten Federal laws might have
been violated in connection with riot activity.
-
FORMER STUDY OF FBI'S INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
In an exhaustive study of the "role of the FBI in
Clandestine Foreign Intelligence Collection in the United States,
conducted and reported in a document dated April 29, 1966, by ·
a committee more commonly referred to as the "Papich Committee"
"
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 172
-
37.
considerable information was brought out concerning the FBI's
investigative authority. Of great interest is the impact the
National Security Act of 1947 had on the gathering of intelligence
in the United States. This Act, which is reported in 50 USC 401
et seq, established the National Security Council (NSC) and under
it the Centeral Intelligence Agency (CIA). The legislative
history of the Act notes the concern Congress had that CIA could
develop into a gestapo if permitted to become operational in the
U.S. James Forestal, then Secretary of the Navy, testified in
a hearing before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments, that "The purposes of the Central Intelligence Agency
are limited definitely to purposes outside of this country, except
collation of information gathered by other government agencies."
He went on to say, "Regarding domestic operations, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation is working at all times in
collaboration with General Vandenberg (then head of CIA). Не
relies upon them for domestic activities." The Papich Committee
study noted that there is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e)
of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers
information affecting the national security: "That upon the written
request of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director of Central
Intelligence such information for correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination as may be essential to the national security."
The Papich Committee report reveals that there is ample
indication that Congress was aware of FBI intelligence functions,
particularly with respect to foreign intelligence activity in
the U.S. The Executive Branch was obviously depending on the FBI
to provide intelligence data which CIA, by law, could not collect
in the U.S. A task force headed by General Mark Clark in 1955
took notice of the fact that the FBI dealt in security intelligence.
The task force report cited the fact that the FBI was one of
four members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC),
created by the National Secuirty Council, approved by the President,
March 23, 1949, to coordinate "the investigation of all domestic
espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related
matters affecting internal security."
It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb
responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory
action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete
investigative coverage in compliance with the needs of the IIC,
which had full responsiblity for coordination of the investigation
of all domestic espionage, counterespionage, etc., affecting
internal security.
The task force mentioned above, in commenting on the role
of the FBI, noted "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however,
is the recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal
security including counterintelligence within the United States
and its possessions." It is to be noted that this task force took
· 38
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 173
cognizance of the fact that President Roosevelt as far back as
1939 had directed the FBI to coordinate and conduct domestic
counterintelligence activities. (Underlined part taken from
Papich Committee report and is not necessarily the actual language
used in the task force report. In any event, we know this is a
very broad interpretation of the 1939 directive.)
RECENT EXECUTIVE INTENT
Even more recently the White House exhibited its own under-
standing of the intelligence role and functions delegated to the
Attorney General and the FBI. By confidential memorandum from
the White House to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and
Commerce; the Attorney General; Director of CIA; Military Represen-
tative of the President%; Administrator, Federal Aviation Agency;
and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, dated June 9, 1962
(National Security Action Memorandum 161), President Kennedy
stated that he would look to the Attorney General to take the
initiative in the Government in insuring the development of plans,
programs, and action proposals to protect the internal security
of the United States. This memorandum directed that the two
interdepartmental committees concerned with internal security
the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Chaired by J. Edgar
Hoover) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
(Chaired by a representative of the Department of Justice) which
had been under the supervision of the National Security Council,
be transferred to the supervision of the Attorney General.
-
-
One of the greatest problems in conducting a study of this
type is the location of pertinent documents and material which
bear on the issues. We have located copies of the documents
related primarily to the heart of this issue, our basic authority
in the national security field - namely, the Presidential directives
and Executive orders which we have cited in addition to statutes
as being our sources of authority but there may be other very
pertinent documents bearing on the Executive intent to have the
FBI conduct intelligence-type investigations. A good example
is evidence used by the Papich Committee, but not found during
this study, which shows that President Roosevelt called a
White House conference on May 9, 1934, attended by the Attorney
General, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director of
FBI, and Chief of the U. S. Secret Service to deal with the problem
of growth of fascist organizations in the United States. The con-
ference agreed that there should be an investigation of these
groups and their activities for intelligence purposes. Since
the only Federal law believed applicable at the time was the
Immigration Law, the President decided that the Commissioner of
Immigration and Naturalization Service should confer with the
Chief of Secret Service and the Director of FBI to work out
details of the investigation.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 174
39.
$
Mr. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI personnel to
conduct an intensive investigation of the Nazi movement. This,
evidently, was the first general intelligence investigation made
by the Government into fascist activities in this country. But
note that this general intelligence investigation was based in
law, namely the Immigration Law. We have here an example of
the exercise of inherent Executive power tempered by the fact
that the Presidential desire for intelligence investigations would
be implemented because there was a statute covering the situation.
Basically, the same applies to the 1936 arrangement between the
President, the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of State.
The law permitting the Secretary of State to request the Attorney
General to investigate certain matters was the legal basis for
the subsequent FBI investigations.
CONCLUSIONS
It
In summary and conclusion, it is believed that the facts
clearly show that while there is a labyrinth of conflicting infor-
mation and opinions concerning the FBI's authority to conduct
intelligence-type investigations in the national security
field, there are a few basic points requiring clarification.
is believed that we must first sweep away the myth that the FBI
now has any investigative authority based on the Presidential
directives dating from 1939, and that any investigative
responsibility we derived from those directives is so outdated as
to be very questionable if not entirely void. This is, of course,
taking into consideration the national situation at the time the
directives were individually issued.
Secondly, it is believed that the FBI does have a valid
reason to conduct intelligence-type investigations based on
the fact that there are laws prohibiting all the various types of
subversion truly affecting the national security and that the
Government has the right to protect itself from destruction by
conducting whatever preventive or intelligence-type investigations
are necessary to see that individuals and organizations
do not do those things, in violation of the law, which could
threaten the national security. Preventive or intelligence-type
investigations would include the use of confidential informants
and sources of information, the calling on law enforcement officers
and patriotic citizens and organizations to furnish all infórmation
concerning subversion to the FBI, the collection of overt
intelligence data from publications and other public source
material, including congressional hearings, and the full scale
investigation of allegations received from all sources.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 175
- 40
Our intelligence-type investigations, however, should
meticulously adhere to guidelines which would clearly prohibit
any intrusion or abridgement of an individual's rights guaranteed
under the Constitution, particularly the First, Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. To assure that the proper guidelines are drawn we
should request the Department of Justice to issue them and then
afford the closest possible supervision of investigation, both
in the field and at Headquarters to see that our intelligence
investigations are kept within these guidelines. The voicing
of this need does not indict our existing guidelines or careful
supervision, but merely recommends that our responsibilities be
described and, where necessary, circumscribed by the Attorney General
whose duty under the law is to supervise our activity.
It appears that the most effective means of laying to
rest the persistent complaints of various critics that the FBI
engages in political surveillance (investigations) in violation of
First and Fourth Amendment rights is to have definitive legislative
enactment carefully state what the FBI must do to protect the
national security. Such could be resolution or statute, but should
cover in complete detail what acts should be investigated by the
FBI, and, in particular, that the FBI must conduct preventive or
intelligence-type investigations to protect the national security.
Under the political climate existing in the country today,
however, the passage of either a statute or a resolution of the
type needed is very remote. Because of the misconceptions and
misapprehensions surrounding investigations relating to subversion,
there is an atmosphere of suspicion in congressional circles that
would likely stifle any attempt to formulate any such legislation
at this time. We should, however, recommend to the Department that
consideration be given immediately to sponsoring some comprehensive
legislative enactment along the lines needed.
In the meantime, for the benefit of the FBI, the
Department of Justice and the rest of the Executive Branch of
Government, including the staff at the White House, it appears
that the next best thing is to have a comprehensive Executive
order issued, under the inherent Executive power, outlining
exactly what responsibilities the FBI has in the protection
of the national security and in furnishing the President
the data he needs to fulfill his responsibilities under the
Constitution.
To be effective such Executive order would have to
clearly define the FBI's intelligence collection responsibilities
and would necessarily have to contain language which would
satisfy the courts that First and Fourth Amendment rights are
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 176
41.
not being abrogated in any manner. Language in such an order
would ideally follow the basic language and purposes of Executive
Order 11605, since this deals with virtually every type of
subversive activity confronting the country today.
It is finally concluded that this study has shown that
the FBI has in the past conducted no intelligence-type investigations
which were not permissible under the law, particularly under the
concept that intelligence-type or preventive-type investigations
are lawful when the product and purpose of the investigation
is to prevent a violation of a statute. It is believed, however,
that every area of our national security investigations should
be reviewed for the purpose of determining what additional
constitutional safeguards should be considered. This is particularly
true in light of the fact that much of our investigative activity
in the past was geared to the Emergency Detention Act, which was
repealed in October, 1971. We should make absolutely certain,
for example, that the procedures adopted in setting up our
Administrative Index, following repeal of the Emergency Detention
Act, are not being used to circumvent the repeal of the
Emergency Detention Act. In this regard, it is to be noted that
a detailed study of the Administrative Index has been underway
and is almost complete as of this date.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That upon completion of a final draft of the study
dealing with this matter, a letter to the Department be prepared
containing the essence of this study, pointing out our findings
and requesting (a) The Department's opinion concerning our findings,
particularly directives discussed herein; (b) The Department's
opinion concerning the legality of intelligence-type or preventive-
type investigations based on existing statutes; (c) Requesting the
Department to issue comprehensive investigative guidelines for
future investigations of the intelligence or preventive type;
(d) Requesting the Department to sponsor comprehensive legislation
spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of
intelligence information relating to the national security; and
(e) Requesting the Department to seek a comprehensive Executive
order which would cover any possible gaps between statutory authority
and Executive necessity in protection of the national security.
2. That a penetrative study be completed at the
earliest possible date concerning all our current national
security investigative guidelines to insure that every possible
safeguard is in effect to protect the individual's rights
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 177
42
I "
protected by the constitution%3B that the current study of
procedures relating to the Administrative Index specifically
determine if any procedures are in effect which could be interpreted
as a means to circumvent repeal of the Emergency Detention Act.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 178
THOMAS J.
SMITH
CHIEF, RESEARCH SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
- 43
.
NOTE:,
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
ONS ON REVERSE
ETING.
FROM:
FBI
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
2. DATE PROVIDED
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING.
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
X SSC
6/4/75
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum advising SSC that a document it desires is available
for review only at FBI-Headquarters.
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter 3/19/75, Part I, Legal Authorities.
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
U
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Authorities
legal
Intelligence activities, domestic 19-NL BY SMA
8.
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
1-19-20111
,
MDR-16
DATE!!
Memorandum advises that in response to SSC request for an FBI
position paper dated 7/31/72, discussing the "Scope of FBI
Authority, Jurisdiction and Responsibility in Domestic Intelli-
gence Investigations," the paper is being made available for
review only at FBI Headquarters and with further condition that
no notes be taken during this initial review.
SFP:1hb
(4)
62-116395
3791(6.75)
TREAT AS YELLOW
use
5,8
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 179
6-24754ES
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
INSTRUCTIONS
• Type or print clearly in ink.
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
"
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 180
2

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
:
MR. WANNALL We
DATE:
FROM
H. N. BASSETT HD
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
6/2/75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
#
IntelITUL
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _
In response to the Church Committee's request for Inspection Division
guidelines used for inspecting field offices and divisions (item #7, Appendix B
of Senator Church's letter to the Attorney General da ed 5/14/75), this Division
has no objection to a review of the field and headquarters inspection manuals by
Members of Committee Staff, provided the review is conducted in FBI space
with an Inspection Division representative present.
1 Mr. Wannall (Mr. Cregar)
1 - Bufile 62-116395
джа
Psm
FBG:wmj
(4)
84 JUN 27 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 181
ALL INFORMATION COF PAIN.
HEREIN IS UNCLASSID
DATE 10-17-2000 BY SMALAY
Installe
REC-100
62-116-395-
-wob
5
275
7 JUN 27 1975
b
EX
FROM
:
:
OPTIONAL, FORATIO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R.Wannall
W. Was
wock
Cregar
SUBJECT
SENSTUDY 75
1.
1
-
1
1
1
-
1
-
-
Mr. T. J. Jenkins
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. E. W. Walsh
5/29/75
DATE:
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. S. F. Phillips
This memorandum recommends that Bureau space be
provided Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff for review of
Bureau material and interviews of Bureau employees.
Assoc. Din
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. 1
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
infeft.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
SSC Staff is in a phase of its inquiry concerning
Bureau operations which includes (1) review of considerable
FBI material (sections of manuals, forms, SAC memoranda, etc.
(2) interviews of Bureau employees; and (3) briefing of Staff
members by Bureau officials and supervisors. For many very
sound reasons it would be to the Bureau's distinct advantage
to provide limited, but suitable space within the J. Edgar
Hoover Building to the SSC Staff. Because we have been able
to obtain the Staff's agreement to review much of our material
at FBIHQ, rather than its insistence on turning the material
over to the Staff, we are in a position of insuring the
security of our material by maintaining it in our space at all
times. Also, by having the SSC Staff conduct its review of
the material in our space, we can have personnel readily
available to answer their inquiries, thus precluding the
necessity for preparing otherwise needless correspondence and
eliminating the necessity for having our personnel present
throughout their reviews if they took place elsewhere.
Further, from a psychological standpoint, it is to our
advantage that our employees be interviewed in our space rather
than in SSC offices. Finally, space made available to SSC
Staff will also provide a desirable site for the various briefings
our people are giving to them. It should be noted that the
providing of the space which this memorandum recommends is
similar to what we have already done for the General Accounting
Office in connection with its audit of our operations.95
62-116395
SFP: mjg/14) ALL INFORMATION CO
(7)
REC-100
CONTINE CONTINUED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIAL-
DATE 10-17-2000 EXSP2
MDR-16
OVE
-214
JUN 241975
488 30219589609 Page 182
معنا که فردا را
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re:
Senstudy 75
62-116395
Handled
6/20/75
дес
Space required should be sufficient to accommodate
three desks and three chairs plus two or three file cabinets;
and including the necessary desks, chairs and cabinets.
Space should approximate that currently used to accommodate
Section Chief's offices in the INTD.
Because the SSC Staff has already commenced some of
its review of Bureau material and has already engaged in some
briefings, it is essential that urgent attention be given this
request. INTD has already surveyed its space and would be
unable to accommodate the need involved.
ACTION:
Upon approval, Administrative Division will
immediately take necessary steps to provide for the necessary
space and equipment described above.
in their area. Woel to
localul peace
be added by
4/59
&
6/11/71
шви
We have initiated space
survey to see if there is any
space 
at all he could free
up for this purpose
.
ок
Рем
Збор
Jona
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 183
- 2
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MA 1962 EDITION
OSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Adams
Memorandum SECAL 13 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
ΤΟ
MR. W. R. WANNALL
www
FROM MR. W.
olpe REGAR
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
OCT 17 2000s
WECLASSIFY ON: 25X
LASSIFIED BY
9)-10 чё
71
DATE:
1
-
(1-J.B.Hotis)
May 27, 1975
(1-Mr.P.V.Daly)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 Mr. T. W. Leavitt.
- Mr. W. A. Branigan
INFORMATION CONTAINED
IS UNPLACCIFIED EXCEPT
SHOWN OTHERWISE. 1
-O
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv
Asst. Dir
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inter
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting * Difector Secty.
between Mr. John Elliff, Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff,
who is in charge of the task force looking into the FBI, and
Messrs. Wannall, Leavitt, Branigan, and Cregar. Purpose of the
meeting was to acquaint Elliff with the work of the Counterintelli-
gence Branch in the Intelligence Division.
House Select Committee (HSC).
Elliff advised that the SSC is concerned with how the
HSC plans to conduct its probe of the intelligence community.
He anticipates HSC may hold hearings very shortly and possibly
prior to the time the SSC gets underway. At the present time,
Elliff knows of no agreement or plans to provide the HSC with copies
of intelligence community documents the SSC has been furnished.
Department of Justice
According to Elliff, Kevin T. Maroney, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, has agreed to allow Staff
Members of the SSC to review the Department's file on the
Intelligence Evaluation Committee (this was a Committee chaired
by the Department and evolved from one of the recommendations set
out in the "Houston Plan." During its existence the Bureau had
several representatives assigned to the IEC).
Mr. Maroney has also advised the SSC Staff that in the
1966-67 period the Department of Justice did an extensive study
on the legal authority for the conduct of electronic surveillances.
Elliff was quite pleased that the Justice Department planned to make
this study available for review by Staff Members of the SSC in the
Department's Building and expressed the hope that the Bureau would
also see fit to allow Staff Members to review research and studies
'the Bureau might have conducted in the area of sensitive investi-
gative techniques.
REC-100
62-116395
WOC:ekw
JUN 27 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 184
*5/22/75 SECRET
2%
62-116395-2
-
OVER
CONTINUED
17 JUN 27 1975
5-woo
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
SECRET
Sensitive Investigative Techniques
Mr. Elliff felt that much could be accomplished in
responding to the SSC request of 5/14/75 if the Bureau could
pull together the basic FBI documents delineating our legal
authority to engage in the following investigative techniques.
(1) Electronic surveillances, including consensual
electronic surveillances%;B (2) all forms of mail surveillances
including covers and openings; (3) physical surveillances
including Special Agent (SA) infiltration of target groups;
photography and remote viewing and sensing devices (laser
beams); (4) surreptitious entries%;B (5) incommunicado interroga-
tions; and (6) bank credit, and other personal information.
It was Elliff's opinion that if the Committee could
be allowed to review the legal authority for such surveillances
along with the documents showing how the decision-making process
worked in instituting, approving and discontinuing such operations,
much of the misunderstandings some members of the Committee have
would be clarified. Elliff also felt a detailed briefing of the
Committee with whatever limitations the Bureau desired to place
on the number and level of those to be briefed would be extremely
helpful in assisting the Committee in developing some authority
for the FBI to legally engage in such sensitive activities in
the future.
Three Top Priority Items of the SSC
Elliff advised that in his judgment the three top
priority items of the SSC regarding the FBI are as follows.
(1) Develop legislation to clearly delineate the Bureau's
jurisdictional authority in the security and counterintelligence
field. (2) Provide the Bureau with some authoritative basis,
either statutory or otherwise, to engage in certain counter-
intelligence activities, i.e., surreptitious entry, electronic
surveillances, incommunicado interviews, in national security
cases when the need for such activity has been clearly established.
(3) To improve the coordination between the FBI and the rest
of the intelligence community.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 185
-
2
SECKE!!
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
SECRET
Elliff was questioned about the reason for the
third priority. He responded by noting that one President
(Nixon) had stated that in 1970 there was a breakdown in the
relations between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence
community. Elliff was informed that this was not so, that the
discontinuance of a formal liaison relationship with Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and subsequently the rest of the
intelligence community in 1970 did not mean that there was a
breakdown in coordination. Elliff asked why the Bureau dis-
continued a formal liaison relationship with CIA in early 1970.
We briefly reviewed for Elliff the Thomas Riha case pointing
out that Mr. Kelley had personally caused a review of that
case in an effort to determine whether it, in fact, was the
reason for the discontinuance of our liaison relationship with
the CIA. Elliff was informed that this was the case. In
addition, we discussed with Elliff the 1966 understanding
between CIA and the FBI and made it quite clear to him that
we felt the relationship with not only CIA but the entire
intelligence community was excellent.
Other Matters of Interest
During the course of the briefing, Elliff was shown
charts depicting the inordinate increase of Sino-Soviet bloc
official presence in the U. S. from 1959 through January, 1975,
the growth of the presence of foreign hostile intelligence
officials in the U. S. during this same period compared with
the static number of SAS we had working against this threat
during this same period. Elliff was concerned over the fact
that the presence of Sino-Soviet bloc officials as well as the
intelligence officers increased substantially while the number
of SAS dedicated to counterintelligence investigations remained
static. He wondered why this was so. Elliff was advised that
it was a question of manpower and priorities. He was told that
during the 1959-1975 period there was a considerable demand for
the use of SA personnel in the fields of organized crime, civil
fights,& ghetto riots. In addition, during that period of time
additional investigative responsibilities were placed upon the
FBI by virtue of new legislation.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 186
3
SALONL
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
SECRET
Elliff was also interested in knowing whether our
legal attaches were operational in the counterintelligence field.
He was advised they were not. Elliff also asked whether CIA
made available to the FBI their latest technical developments.
He was advised that we believed they did.
Finally, Elliff desired to know whether the FBI had
received any documents from another Government agency (CIA)
wherein the Bureau was requested to surreptitiously enter the
Chilean Embassy in Washington, D. C. (5) He was advised that this
would have to be researched and that we would be in touch with
him on this particular subject.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) We have already begun to examine the material asked
for regarding the FBI's legal authority and implication of
sensitive investigative techniques. Once examined and analyzed,
we will submit recommendations as to how we should proceed taking
into consideration the observations and suggestions of Elliff.
(2) We are pulling together the documents regarding
the Chilean Embassy episode and with approval will suggest
Elliff submit his specific request in writing through the AG.
sa
evered by.
cy
16/16/75
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page
дот
187
K
жив
me
Pem
لسعد
дит
-
4-
SECRET
TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM W. O.
crobatant
SUBJECT.S
SUBJECT SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
2
Mr. J. A. Mintz
DATE:
1
1
1
1
-
-
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. APA
Dep. Anv.
Asst. Dir.:
(1 Mr. J. B. Hotis) Admin_
-
June 17, 1975
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
-
Mr. J. W. Dalseg
-
Mr. T. J McNiff
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Reference is made to memorandum from Office of
Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams, dated June 10, 1975, captioned
as above, (copy attached) wherein it was recommended and approved
that representatives of the Intelligence Division meet with.
Mr. K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, for the
purpose of briefing him concerning the contents of a Bureau letter
to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President at
the White House, dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic
Coverage Placed at the Request of the White House."
By way of background, the Senate Select Committee (SSC)
has requested certain documents and information relating to the
so-called "Kissinger 17." Some of this information has already
been prepared and furnished to O'Connor with the caveats that the
Government has not publicly admitted to 15 of the coverages involved
and some material relating to the remaining two has been impounded
by court order due to pending civil suits. The decision was left
to the Department as to whether or not material prepared in response
to SSC requests should be made available to that Committee.
Mr. O'Connor on June 9, 1975, requested of Assistant Director-
John Mintz a briefing as to the contents of the above July 23, 1974,
letter which he believed summarized information available to the
Bureau concerning the 17 wire taps. .
f
RECORDED
After
On June 17, 1975, Special Agents John W. Dalseg and
Thomas J. McNiff met with Mr. William O'Connor and the latter's
assistant, Michael T. Shaheen, in the office of Mr. O'Connor.
a briefing on the contents of the July 23, 1974, letter Mr. O'Commor
concluded that information contained in that letter and its
enclosures is too sketchy to enable a knowledgeable determination
be made as to whether or not requested material should be released
to SSC. Mr. O'Connor stated he believed such a determination could
only be made after a review of the entire file relating to the
Enclosure
62-116395
ENCLOSURE
REC-102
62-116395-272
CONTINUED
-
OVER
17 JUN 26 1975
1 - 65-75085 ALL INFORMATION CONTAISED ADDENDUM PAGE 3
TJM: dmt
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Comp#87,082
(8)
JUN 26 1975
DATE 5/10/82 BY 7858-
788608 Docid:32989609 Page 188
7
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senate Select Committee
62-116395
I
"Kissinger 17" and he stated his office would, in the near future,
prepare a letter to the Director similarly requesting that
Mr. Shaheen or some other designated representative of his staff
be granted authority to review the Bureau file concerning the
matter in question.
OBSERVATIONS:
During the above conversation Mr. O'Connor appeared to
be primarily interested in the completeness of the Bureau file with
regard to matters relating to the "Kissinger 17" and to what degree
information in this file had been made public. It was explained to
Mr. O'Connor, who appeared knowledgeable concerning the history of
these documents, that this file contains all communications known
to be in existence concerning the "Kissinger 17," but no one can
state with certainty, due to the manner in which this material was
handled at the specific request of the White House, that the file
contains all communications prepared in this matter. With regard
to publicity afforded these documents, Mr. O'Connor stated he is
familiar with the documents which had been made available to the
Department for referral to various Committees and he is familiar
with excised versions of these documents which had been published
by these Committees. He indicated that the Department's present
problem is that no record has been located in the Department to
date as to just which material or in what form such material
furnished by the Bureau to the Department was subsequently turned
lover to the Committees by the Department. O'Connor stated it
could be embarrassing at this time to make available to the SSC
material which had not previously been made available to the
Congressional Committees and equally embarrassing to withhold
from the SSC material which was previously furnished Congressional
Committees.
ACTION:
None.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 189
Above submitted for information.
Ews w
Tum
-
2 -
ADDENDUM:
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
TJM:1hb.
6/19/75
In anticipation of Department's request cited in
instant memorandum to review Bureau files concerning the so-called
"Kissinger 17" Special Agent (SA) Robert F. Peterson, Office of
Legal Counsel, on 6/18/75 contacted Department Attorney Edward
Christenbury, who is handling the Halperin Civil Suit, to
:
determine if the United States District Court's (USDC) impoundment
would prevent this Bureau making available this file to
representatives of the Department. Christenbury, late 6/18/75,
advised SA Peterson that he, Christenbury, had contacted plaintiff's
(Halperin) attorney, who advised he had no objection to this
file being made available to a Department representative for
review. Christenbury then attempted to contact USDC Judge
John Lewis Smith, who issued the impoundment order in this matter.
Christenbury spoke to Judge Smith's law clerk, who advised that
in view of the position taken by plaintiff's attorney, he did
not believe that Judge Smith would interpose any objection to
the Department's anticipated request. The law clerk stated,
however, that he would contact Judge Smith at the earliest
opportunity to obtain a ruling and would advise Christenbury of
the results.
You will be advised of the results when received.
том !!!
Jana
I
Chire
'
рем
got
Jean
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 190

TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 262 EDRION"
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM : Legal Counsel J
дет
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
"
DATE: 6/10/75
Assoc. Dir.
Sup. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Camp. Syst.
Est. Affairs
Files & Cam.
Dan. Inv.
Mant.
Inspection
Intell
2
Laboratory
Lagal Coun.
Flan. & Evai..
Sonc. Inv.
Training
Temphane Rm.
Dimector Sec'y.
On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically
advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning
certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the
White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that
he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the
Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information
available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps.
Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter
in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.
It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter
dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams,
Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum
was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned
"Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which
advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy
Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams
at the White House.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved
in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1
-
Mr. Cregar
1
Mr. Hotis
Mr. Daly
1
-
1
-
Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(Bri
WEW/TUL
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Comp # 87,082
DATE 5/10/82 BY 28585e/de/ande
62116395
Рам
NW 8860 Docid:32989609, Page, 191,
272
Phillips
ENCLOSURE
Buy US Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
سها از انسان
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
Legal
Coun
ounsel
дат
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
DATE:
6-18-75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Admi
Dep. AD Inv
Asst. Dir:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _
By memo dated 6-10-75, you were advised that
K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination in the Department, requested he be allowed to
review a summary prepared concerning the so called "Kissinger,
17" wiretaps since the Senate Select Committe had included a
request for information concerning them in their letter of
May 14, 1975. Mr. O'Connor and his Deputy, Michael Shaheen,
reviewed the summaries.
At Mr. O'Connor's request, a conference was held
with Messrs O'Connor and Shaheen and SA Robert Peterson,
SA Paul V. Daly, Inspector John B. Hotis, and Assistant
Director John A. Mintz, present to discuss the SSC request for
documents concerning the "Kissinger 17" wiretaps and his concern
that the furnishing of such documents might adversely impact
on existing litigation involving the Bureau, and may subject the
Bureau to additional lawsuits.` Most of the documents in question
are also under a protective order of the Court in the Halperin
Case and therefore, a release must be orchestrated with the
Court. Mr. O'Connor suggested that a summary of existing
summaries of these wiretaps be prepared by the Department and
with the acquiescence of the Court which issued the protective
order be made available for review by the Committee in the
(Attn: Mr. Cregar)
1
-
Mr. Wannall
-
Mr. Mintz
-
Mr. Hotis
1
1
1
-
Mr. Daly
PVD:eekuck
(6)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SOZAL
MDR-16
62-116395
REC-102
(CONTINUED
-
OVER)
271
84 26 1975
NW 886080-Docid:32989609 Page 192
17 JUN 26 1975
SHERIA
Buy US. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Legal Counsel to Adams, Memo
Re: SENSTUDY 75
Department of Justice. Mr. O'Connor also mentioned that the
summary would, of course, have to set forth the sufficient
information to allow the Committee to make a determination that the
information derived from these wiretaps was not used for political
purposes. Mr. Mintz expressed concern that the publication
or leaking of information from summaries could expand the number
and nature of suits facing the Bureau and suggested the Department
should, in obtaining the Court approval for making the summaries
available, request the Court to issue appropriate safeguards
against publication of such information. Mr. O'Connor stated
that such a recommendation to the Court would be proper and that
this would be done.
Mr. Mintz told Mr. O'Connor that the Bureau at this
time cannot make a commitment to the making available of the
summaries to the Committee without further study and approval,
and an approval would be sought expeditiously. Additionally,
Mr. Mintz requested that the Bureau be given the opportunity to
review the summaries prepared by the Department to insure the
Bureau's interests are protected.
RECOMMENDATION:
That we notify the Department that we are in agreement
concerning the preparation of summaries based on existing
summaries of "Kissinger 17" wiretaps with the provision that
we be given the opportunity to review these summaries prior
to the Department seeking Court approval for making them
available.
риз
JBA
вишав
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 193
Jona
हु
PEM
дам
2
I
1
1
H
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
June 9, 1975
1
-
Mr. R. H. Horner
1
-
Mr. T. E. Burns
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
C
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices,
the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
Committec is the original of a memorandum containing a
response to one of the Committee's requests.
A copy of this memorandum is being furnished for
your records.
Enclosures
* 2
62-116395
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Dj
Sea's
8.2 JUN
1 The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
TEB:dmt
(10)
NB
dint
ENCLOS DE
MAIL
O
Intelligence Coordination
ALL INFORMATION CONTAONA
IS UNCLASSIEL
MDR-16
REC-102
де
Pen
lit
prym
67-116375
17 JUN 26 1975
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 194
We'
GPO 954-34
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
ident.
Inspection
intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
62-116395
2
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
1
-
1
1
-
-
1
-
•
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
•
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. R. H. Horner
Mr. T. B. Burns
June 9, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
KSFEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
MATE 10-11-2000 BY
MDR-16
Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and
other information from the FBI.
Item number 21, Appendix D, requests that with
respect to each occasion on which the Director of the FBI
testified before the House Appropriations Committee from
1965 until the present, the number of warrantless electronic
surveillances in operation be provided for:
(a) The date of such testimony;
(b) 30 days prior to such testimony; and
(c) 30 days subsequent to such testimony.
Set forth below is the number of warrantless
electronic surveillances in operation with respect to each
occasion on which the Director of the FBI testified before
the House Appropriations Committee from 1965 until present.
Also set forth for part of 1967 and all of 1968 through 1972
are the number of such warrantless electronic surveillances
in operation approximately 30 days prior to such testimony
and approximately 30 days subsequent to such testimony. As
a result of the manner in which our filing system is presently
constituted, statistics covering the period 30 days before the
Director's testimony and 30 days following his testimony for
the years 1965, 1966 and part of 1967 are not available as a
practical matter. Furthermore, the number in operation 30 days
TEB:dmt
(9)
MAIL ROOM
doct
до
SEE NOTE PAGE 3
B
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. 
Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the 
content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person
nel without the express approval 
of the FBI
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 195
ENCLOSURE 6211;
270
GO 954-546
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
prior to and 30 days subsequent to the Director's testimony
could not be determined in all instances and therefore, the
figures provided are for dates as close to the 30-day time
frame as practicable.
Finally, the Director ceased testifying before
the House Appropriations Committee regarding the number of
warrantless electronic surveillances in operation subsequent
to his March 2, 1972, appearance and therefore the request
is unanswerable with respect to 1973, 1974 and 1975.
BEFORE
DATE OF
DIRECTOR'S TESTIMONY
March 4, 1965
AFTER
Retrieval not
HNP
Practicable (KNP)
February 10, 1966
32
RNP
ENP
January 15, 1968
33
February 16, 1967
38
March 13, 1967
42
February 23, 1968
33
March 22, 1968
33
March 14, 1969
46
April 17, 1969
49
February 5, 1970
38
March 5, 1970
36
May 15, 1969
50
April 6, 1970
37
February 16, 1971
33
March 17, 1971
33
April 17, 1971
40
January 31, 1972
32
March 2, 1972
34
March 31,
35
1972
1 – The Attorney General
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 196
- 2
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
NOTE:
M
The above material which we are furnishing the
Committee was supplied by the Special Records and Related
Research Unit of IS 3 which has responsibility for
information in the requested area. Similarly, this Unit
determined that the information requested was not retrievable
as a practical matter with regard to 1965, 1966 and part
of 1967, the 30-day time frame, and for the years 1973, 1974
and 1975.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 197
-
3
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
ddressee:
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Senate Select Committee
☐ LTR ☑ LHM ☐ Memo
Report dated 6/9/75
U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Govt.
Caption of Document:
Operations with Respect to Intelli-
gence activities.Re: Request Pertaining to
Electronic Surveillance
Originating Office:
Delivered by:
A
Received by:
1
Title:
FBI
.Date: 6-13-75-
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 198
ALL INFOINEN.
FIEREIN IS UNCLASSI
NATE
10-17-2000 SPA/198
mo2-16
OTE:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
FROM:
TO:
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
X
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
☑
SSC
J. T. Elliff
6/9/75
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 21.
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
"U"
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
SURVEILLANCE
ATICIT CONTAINED
IS UNCLATTIED
The 10-17-3000 BY
MDR-16
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
гастро
Furnishes SSC with number, where available, of warrantless
electronic surveillances operated by FBI at time of Director's
testimony before House Appropriations Committee, as well as
number in effect approximately 30 days prior and subsequent to
such testimony.
NOTE:
Original via Liaison to Central Community Index
in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-234-75 <ES
TREAT AS YELLOW
TJM:1hb
(4)
62-116395
3791 (6-75)
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 199
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
100C
Eas
5-7JM
INSTRUCTIONS
•
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary,
submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 200

کا
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MA74962 EDITION
GSA FPAIR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM : Legal Counsel
70
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75.
ALL INTONATION COFFRAINED
IS UN CLAR BI
D 10-16-2000 BY
MDR-16
DATE:
6-6-75
Notzen
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident. 57
Inspection
Intel.
Laboratory
Legal Count
Plan & Exal
λην.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Mark Gitenstein, staff member of captioned Committee
who has been doing an extensive inquiry into the "official and confidential"
files reportedly maintained in former Director Hoover's office,
telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly 6-5-75 and requested the
identities of the employees who had brought the material from the
Director's office during May, 1972, to Mr. Hoover's residence and
to Mr. Felt's office.
By way of background, Mr. Gitenstein has obtained through
interview of Mr. Felt, former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr,
and other Bureau personnel familiar with the operations of the Director's
office, considerable knowledge concerning the official and confidential
files. There is also an extensive request contained in captioned Committee's
letter of 5-4-75 pertaining to information surrounding these files.
Additionally, we responded to a request of the Committee contained in their
letter of 4-28-75 pertaining to the allegation of removal of certain material
from Mr. Hoover's residence after the death of former Associate Director
Clyde Tolson. We have not, at this point, determined that Bureau documents
have been removed from Bureau space to Mr. Hoover's residence or any
other place outside the Bureau. However, it is apparent that Mr. Gitenstein
has information, or believes he has information, relating to the removal
of Bureau documents.
REC-88 62-11639-269X1
Mr. Gitenstein stated he had recontacted former Assistant
to the Director John P. Mohr on 6-5-75 and Mr. Mohr, in response to
Mr. Gitenstein's question, stated that the identities of employees who may
have brought material from the Director's office to Mr. Hoover's residence
and to Mr. Felt's office subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death could be learned
through an inquiry in the Mechanical Section supply room.
62-116395
1
-
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
1
1
2
-
NO
Mr. Bassett
Mr. Mintz
PVD:kjs (10)
84
NW 88608,Docld:32989609 Page 201
3 J
1 - Mr. Hotis
1- Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Daly
CONTINUED - OVER
31 1975 Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75
In light of this response, Mr. Gitenstein requested that
the Bureau identify the personnel involved and it is his obvious intention
that the personnel will be interviewed.
Inasmuch as the Inspection Division is conducting inquiry
into this matter, it would appear proper for that Division to determine
the identities of such personnel and, if deemed necessary, interview in
connection with the current inquiry. It is also believed that while this
request is oral in nature from the Committee, we should consider
furnishing the information as to the identities of employees to the
Committee inasmuch as if we do not respond to the oral request
Mr. Gitenstein indicated, because of the Committee's interest in this
matter, there would be no problem in his obtaining authority to furnish the
request in writing. It is apparent at this point that we would not be able
to keep such information from the Committee if such a written request were
to be received. Additionally, by responding to the oral request it will
encourage the Committee, in the areas they described as "abuse-type,"
to give us an advance indication as to their inquiries.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the Inspection Division make the necessary inquiry
concerning the identities of the employees and, if deemed advisable,
make available to the Legal Analysis Office that information which will
be furnished to the Committee.
PUD JBH | PUD
574/7
WPITAL
два
Рем
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 202
. 2 -
✓✓
1
Mr. J. B. Adams
1
Mr. J. A. Mintz
1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
SINATE
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
1
1
found fant
I
May 29, 1975
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Enclosed for your information is the original of
a memorandum concerning the interview of retired Special
Agent Charles D. Brennan by members of the Senate Select
Committee Staff. A copy of this memorandum is also enclosed
for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel
to the President.
Enclosures
2
62-116395
WOC:ekwekw
(10)
NOTE:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2.20.81 BY SP4JRm W
6076
See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,
captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 5/28/75, prepared by WOC:ekw.
1 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
-
1
PIV, Ally
67-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennan)
UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN
130 - fotolog.
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. In
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
70
com
MAIL ROOM
6)1975
TELETYPE UNIT
NW-88608 Dodid:32989609 Page 203
Ha
POP
REC-102
7/20/201
PUD/dj
∙116375
17 JUN 26 1975
4062381
(ક)
gir
269
"
GPO 951-346
62-116395
RE:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2.2081 BYSPYJRMIN
6036
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
1
1
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
1
Mr. J. B. Hotis
1
Mr. W. R. Wannall
May 29, 1975
1
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
INTERVIEW OF RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
CHARLES D. BRENNAN BY STAFF MEMBERS OF
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
Set out below is information voluntarily furnished
to the FBI by retired SA Charles D. Brennan following his
voluntary interview by Mark Gitenstein and two other individuals
whose names Brennan did not get. Gitenstein as well as the
two unnamed individuals identified themselves as Staff Members
of the SSC. The interview which took place in Washington, D. C.,
Brennan was
on May 22, 1975, lasted approximately two hours.
not provided with a copy of Senate Resolution 21; was not
provided with a copy of the Rules of Procedure of the SSC;
nor was he advised of his rights including his right to private
counsel.
The interview, which was not conducted under oath,
covered three specific areas: the organizational structure
of the FBI; Martin Luther King, Jr.; and COINTELPRO.
With regard to the organizational structure, they
asked Brennan to describe what a unit, section, and division
constituted at FBI Headquarters. They showed him several copies
of C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan memoranda asking him about
specific facts contained in these memoranda. When Brennan failed
Dep. AD Inv. to have intimate knowledge of the memoranda, they wondered why
he had such a poor memory when in fact they were memoranda from
Comp. Syst. him. Brennan then proceeded to explain how such memoranda were
File A Com prepared. (Memoranda are prepared in the name of the Section Chief,
1.e. Brennan to the Assistant Director, i.e., Sullivan, but this
does not necessarily mean that Brennan would prepare or even see the
Inspection -1 - 67-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennan) memoranda in all
instances.)
WOC:ekw (10)
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Ext. Affairs
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
5
1 100 106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
-
MAIL ROOM
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
TELETYPE UNIT
ENCLOSURE
62--11632
2 p
954-546
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 204
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE: INTERVIEW OF SA CHARLES D. BRENNAN BY SSC
With regard to Martin Luther King, Jr., Brennan advised
that he got the impression from the Staff Members they felt
the Bureau had an "illegitimate" interest in King. Brennan
countered by saying the basis for the FBI interest in King
was predicated on the communist influence surrounding King.
He was asked if the Bureau employed many wiretaps against King
to which he answered that most of the information obtained was
derived from live informants.
Relative to the COINTELPRO, Brennan advised the
Staff Members he couldn't be very specific regarding COINTELPRO
inasmuch as he did not pay too much attention to it. They
questioned him about this statement and Brennan stated that
when you would compare COINTELPRO to such activities as the
Bay of Pigs and the Glomar Explorer, COINTELPRO was "peanuts."
Brennan was asked why he didn't recommend COINTELPRO be dis-
continued to which he replied "If City Hall wants it, you give
them what they want."
NOTE:
See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,
captioned "Senstudy 75," dated 5/28/75, prepared by WOC:ekw.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 205
- 2 -
: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
TO:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
FROM:
FBI
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
5/29/75
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
SSC
Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding
to the White House.
4.
5.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum reporting results of interview by SSC Staff Members
with former FBI Special Agent Charles D. Brennan.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other- 6. CLASSIFICATION OF
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
NA
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
U
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Organization
Operating procedures
ALL RIFORMEATION CO
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-5000 BYSIZAIN
MDR-16
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
Interview covered three specific areas:
1)
Organizational structure of FBI
2) Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.
3) FBI's former counterintelligence programs (COINTELPRO)•
TREAT ASK YELLOW
WoC
5-8
SFP 1hb
(4)
62-116395
3791 (6.75)
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 206
6-24-752FS
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
INSTRUCTIONS
•
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
•
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
:
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 207
DOMINA
OF
THE JUSTIC
STITIA SEQUITU
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
Miki
TO:
John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
SUBJECT:
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
House Select Committee Request
(506911-19)
DEC 19 1975
Attached is a letter from the House Select
Committee requesting access to certain Bureau
information on the U. S. Recording Company. Please
prepare an appropriate response.
Chai
12/24/75 SA Robt Keehan adviser SA Daly has informe of HSC/
плюжиться
to all inquiries conceening
upon completion not internec inquity.
use will pulmitte &
Tim
REC-100
12-114
268X1
let to 11G 2/10/76
REVOLUTION
BICE
jengland
CC:
Paul Daly
Dewey Kanaca, Amp. Mureim,
1-Alf
bed 12/27/75. Kechan
wra ball
12-22-75
FRI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN AD
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 
10-16-2000 
BY
торли
M
1776
FEB 18 1976
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 208
LO FEB 13 G
Implos
5-m
TO:
John A. Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
DEN
FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
SUBJECT: House Select Committee Request
Attached is a letter from the House Select
Committee requesting access to certain Bureau
information on the U. S. Recording Company. Please
prepare an appropriate response.
CC: Paul Daly
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 209
FAI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINE
FOREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-200BYSPRAUN
MDR16
OTIS G. PIKE, N. Y., CHAIRMAN
ROBERT N. GIAIMO, CONN.
JAMES V. STANTON, OHIO
RONALD V. DELLUMS, CALIF.
MORGAN F. MURPHY, ILL.
LES ASPIN, WIS.
DALE MILFORD, TEX.
PHILIP H. HAYES, IND,
WILLIAM LEHMAN, FLA.
ROBERT MC CLORY, ILL.
DAVID C. TREEN, LA.
JAMES P. JOHNSON, COLO.
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WIB.
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. .20515
December 18, 1975
Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Shaheen:
20530
In order to complete our analysis of the cost of
intelligence, we request access to any and all financial
analyses compiled by the FBI with regard to transactions
between the FBI and the U.S. Recording Company.
Since we are under time constraints, we hope you can
provide access to these figures at your earliest possible
convenience.
Sincerely,
A Sand the
L
A. Searle Field
Staff Director
ASF/TO/mas
11 12
213
RECEIVED
VEL 17:975
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
BY
DATE 10-16-2000 BX SPRAUN AP
MDR-16
181
NW 88608 Docid:32989609-Page 210
ENCLOSURE
62-116461. 26851
A. SEARLE FIELD, STAFF DIRECTOR
AARON B. DONNER, COUNSEL
TELEPHONE: (202) 225-9751

OPTIONAL FOM NO. 10
MAY 1962 ESTON
GSA GEN. 'REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. W. R. WANNALL
FROM :MR. W.
CREGAR
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
&&MM to Ate 7/29/20-
шост еки
1
1
1
-
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. J. B. Hotis
DATE: May 28, 1975
1
1
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
L INFORMATION CONTAINED: O. Cregar
FREIN IS UNCA
5.2.20-81 Spisemia,
6075
July
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD
Dep AD av
Asst. Di
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Gom.
Gen. Inv
Ident
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval,
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm..
Directo
This memorandum reports the results of a tele-
phonic conversation with former Special Agent (SA) Charles D.
Brennan and recommends that the attached letter to the Attorney
General with enclosures be sent.
my
H
70
100-106670
On the morning of 5/23/75 the Department of Justice
advised Assistant Director Mintz that former SA Brennan has or was
to be interviewed by Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee
(SSC). On that same date I telephonically contacted Mr. Brennan
to advise him that the Bureau had been alerted to the fact he was
going to be interviewed by the SSC Staff and should he desire, a
representative of the Bureau could be available during the interview
for consultation. It was made clear to Brennan that the role of the
Bureau representative would be to insure that he could consult with
the representative at any time during the interview should the line
of inquiry reveal 3B the identity of sensitive FBI sources, methods
or sensitive investigative techniques; information derived from
third agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services%3B or any
information which Brennan felt could adversely affect sensitive
ongoing FBI investigations.
INRECORDED
Brennan then changed the conversation to personal chitg
chat. At what appeared to be the conclusion of the conversation
Cregar asked Brennan if he had been contacted by the SSC Staff.
Brennan advised that he had received a telephone call earlier in the
week inviting him to an interview in Washington, D. C., and in fact
was interviewed on 5/22 by SSC Staff Members Mark Gitenstein and
two others whose names Brennan did not get.
Brennan showed some concern over the fact that the Staff
had invited him to be interviewed earlier in the week but only
notified the Department subsequent to his interview. (At the
outset of the conversation with Brennan, I had advised him that
the SSC had informed the Department which in turn informed the
62-116395
"REC-102 62-1163951
Enclosures - Sent 5-30-75 edm
1
1
CONTINUED OVER
100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
67-428100 (Personnel File of Charles D. Brennan) 26 1975
WOC:ekw (8) Kw
N88608 18:32983609 Page 211
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
Bureau that he was to be interviewed). Brennan stated he was
not furnished a copy of the Senate Resolution or its Rules of
Procedures and was not advised of his rights or the fact that
he could be represented by counsel. He was not put under oath,
and was not given any indication as to the scope of the inter-
view prior to his appearance in Washington. In response to a
question by Cregar as to what areas the interview covered,
Brennan stated the interview covered three specific topics.
(1) The organizational structure of the Bureau; (2) Martin Luther
King, Jr.; (3) the COINTELPRO.
With regard to the organizational structure Brennan
advised that the Staff Members appear to have little understanding
as to the way the Bureau was structured. He stated they had no
appreciation of what a unit, section, or division was comprised
of. They showed him several copies of memoranda from Brennan to
Sullivan) and proceeded to ask him about the contents of these
memoranda. When Brennan was unable to describe the background
or details surrounding a specific memorandum, they voiced
wonderment as to why he had such little recollection about a
memorandum he apparently wrote. Brennan advised the Staff
Members that just because the memorandum was written from him
to Sullivan did not mean that he necessarily wrote the memorandum
or even saw it.
In respecttto Martin Luther King, Jr., Brennan got
the impression that the Staff Members believed the Bureau was
"illegitimately" interested in King. Brennan advised that he
hit back hard on this stating that the Bureau's interest in
King was predicated on the communist influence surrounding
King. They asked if the Bureau had employed many wiretaps
against King. Brennan advised that most of the information
obtained on King derived from live informants. Brennan voiced
the opinion that the Staff Members were rather disappointed with
Brennan's defense of the Bureau in the King investigation.
Staff Members showed some disappointment in Brennan's
inability to remember circumstances surrounding COINTELPRO.
Brennan responded by saying that he never paid much attention
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 212
-
2.
-
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
SENSTUDY 75
RE:
62-116395
to COINTELPRO and when compared to such activity as to the
Bay of Pigs and the Glomar Explorer, the COINTELPRO was
"peanuts."
At the conclusion of the conversation, Brennan advised
that SSC Staff Members indicated they would want him to return
for additional interviews. I advised Brennan that should he
receive a subpoena to return or should he be invited to return
to Washington, D. C., to be interviewed under oath, it would be
wiseffor him to contact the FBI's Legal Counsel Division for
advice to insure that he was in compliance with the Attorney
General's order relative to the release of information obtained
while an employee of the FBI. Brennan indicated he would contact
the Legal Counsel Division should he be contacted by the SSC and
would probably ask that a Bureau representative be available for
consultation during a subsequent interview or testimony.
ACTION:
If approved, the attached letter to the Attorney General
and its enclosures reflecting the results of the debriefing of
Brennan, be sent.
Par
дна
Jam
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 213
3 -
office of THE DIRECTOR
*
*
OF JUSTICE
1-75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINI
HURRIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000 BY SPE
MOR-16
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Estuly 75
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
May 28, 1975
MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES
RE: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES
All employees are advised that Congress is conducting
an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Congressional staff members are conducting interviews of former
and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation
with the Congress.
You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement
(copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment
in the FBI and following termination of such employment.
Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal
Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:
"No employee or former employee of the Department of
ORIGINAL FILED IN
60-02-2077
Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority,
produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose
any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department,
or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of
the performance of his official duties or because of his official status
without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the
Attorney General in accordance with Section 16.24."
Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order
Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among
other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony
to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.
Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent
with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for
purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as
required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before
furnishing information, testimony, or record material, 16395
Enclosures (3)
84
2 ENCLOSURE
AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
BIC
TENNIAL
1975
NW 88608-Docld:32989609 Page 214
62
-
NOT RECORDED
Cintell
Clarence M. Kelley
Director
26 1975
FD-291 (Rev. 11-1-73)
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United
States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare
that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:
(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the
President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations
issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal
Regulations, Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or un-
authorized disclosure or production of national security information, other
classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of
the FBI;
(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files
of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could
result in impairment of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or
result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects
of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its
responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; there-
fore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge,
publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to
any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the
Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory
files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files,
or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the
performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden
is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed
and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each
such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to
the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand
that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed
in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but
it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be
contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is
in a better position than I to make that determination;
(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official
duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains
the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand
by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any
material relating to such information or property in my possession;
(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal
law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may
be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.
I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment
in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and
following termination of such employment.
(Signature)
(Type or print name)
Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on
19
'
'
by
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 215
(Signature)
针
10-16-200D BY SPRAUM
AIL, INFORMATION CONTAINED
MARTIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
MDR-16
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530
January 18, 1973
ORDER NO.501-73
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Title 28 JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
Chapter -Department of Justice
[Order 501-73]
PART 16—PRODUCTION OR DISCLO-
SURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMA-
TION
Subpart B-Production or Disclosure
in Response to Subpenas or De-
mands of Courts or Other Authori-
ties
This order delegates to certain De-
partment of Justice officials the author-
ity to approve the production or dis-
closure of material or information con-
tained in Department files, or informa-
tion or material acquired by a person
while employed by the Department. It
applies where a subpena, order or other
demand of a court or other authority,
such as an administrative agency, is is-
sued for the production or disclosure of
such information.
By virtue of the authority vested in me
by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301,
Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of
Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is
revised, and its provisions renumbered,
to read as follows:
Subpart B-Production or Disclosure in Response
to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other
Authorities
Sec.
10.21
16.22
Purpose and scope.
Production or disclosure prohibited
unless approved by appropriate De-
partment official.
16.23 Procedure in the event of a demand
for production or disclosure.
16.24 Final action by the appropriate De-
partment official or the Attorney
General.
.6.25 Procedure where a Department deci-
sion concerning a demand is not
made prior to the time a response
to the demand is required.
6.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse
ruling.
AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C.
301.
Subpart B-Production or Disclosure
in Response to Subpenas or De-
mands of Courts or Other Authori-
ties
§ 16.21
Purpose and scope.
(a) This subpart sets forth the pro-
cedures to be followed when a subpena,
order, or other demand (hereinafter re-
other authority is issued for the produc-
tion or disclosure of (1) any material
contained in the files of the Department,
(2) any information relating to material
contained in the files of the Department,
or (3) any information or material
acquired by any person while such per-
son was an employee of the Department
as a part of the performance of his of-
ficial duties or because of his official
status.
(b) For purposes of this subpart, the
term "employee of the Department" in-
cludes all officers and employees of the
United States appointed by, or subject
to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control
of, the Attorney General of the United
States, including U.S. attorneys, U.S.
marshals, and members of the staffs of
those officials.
§ 16.22
Production or disclosure prohib-
ited unless approved by appropriate
Department official.
No employee or former employee of the
Department of Justice shall, in response
to a demand of a court or other au-
thority, produce any material contained
in the files of the Department or disclose
any information relating to material con-
tained in the files of the Department, or
disclose any information or produce any
material acquired as part of the per-
formance of his official duties or because
of his official status without prior ap-
proval of the appropriate Department of-
ficial or the Attorney General in accord-
ance with $ 16.24.
§ 16.23
Procedure in the event of a de-
mand for production or disclosure.
(a) Whenever a demand is made upon
an employee or former employee of the
Department for the production of ma-
terial or the disclosure of information
described in § 16.21(a), he shall im-
mediately notify the U.S. attorney for
the district where the issuing authority
is located. The U.S. attorney shall im-
mediately request instructions from the
appropriate Department official, as desig-
nated in paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) The Department officials author-
ized to approve production or disclosure
under this subpart are:
(1) In the event that the case or other
matter which gave rise to the demanded
material or information is or, if closed,
was within the cognizance of a division
of the Department, the Assistant At-
torney General in charge of that divi-
sion. This authority may be redelegated
to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.
(2) In instances of demands that are
not covered by paragraph (b) (1) of this
ferred to as a "demand") of a couCLOSURE:
-
co62-116395
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 216
verse ruling.
(i) The Director of the Federal Bu- § 16.26 Procedure in the event of an ad-
reau of Investigation, if the demand is
one made on an employee or former em-
ployee of that Bureau for information
or if the demand calls for the production
of material from the files of that Bu-
reau, and
(ii) The Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, if the demand is one made on
an employee or former employee of that
Bureau for information or if the de-
mand calls for the production of ma-
terial from the files of that Bureau.
(3) In instances of demands that are
not covered by paragraph (b) (1) or (2)
of this section, the Deputy Attorney
General.
(c) If oral testimony is sought by the
demand, an affidavit, or, if that is not
feasible, a statement by the party seek-
ing the testimony or his attorney, setting
forth a summary of the testimony de-
sired, must be furnished for submission
by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate
Department official.
§ 16.24 Final action by the appropriate
Department official or the Attorney
General.
(a) If the appropriate Department of-
ficial, as designated in § 16.23(b), ap-
proves a demand for the production of
material or disclosure of information,
he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and
such other persons as circumstances may
warrant.
(b) If the appropriate Department
official, as designated in § 16.23(b),
decides not to approve a demand for the
production of material or disclosure of
information, he shall immediately refer
the demand to the Attorney General for
decision. Upon such referral, the Attor-
ney General shall make the final decision
and give notice thereof to the U.S. attor-
ney and such other persons as circum-
stances may warrant.
§ 16.25 Procedure where a Department
decision concerning a demand is not
made prior to the time a response to
the demand is required.
If response to the demand is required
before the instructions from the appro-
priate Department official or the Attor-
ney General are received, the U.S. attor-
ney or other Department attorney des-
ignated for the purpose shall appear with
the employee or former employee of the
Department upon whom the demand has
been made, and shall furnish the court
or other authority with a copy of the
regulations contained in this subpart and
inform the court or other authority that
the demand has been, or is being, as
the case may be, referred for the
prompt consideration of the appropriate
Department official and shall respect-
fully request the court or authority to
stay the demand pending receipt of the
requested instructions.
If the court or other authority declines
to stay the effect of the demand in re-
sponse to a request made in accordance
with § 16.25 pending receipt of instruc-
tions, or if the court or other authority
rules that the demand must be com-
plied with irrespective of instructions
not to produce the material or disclose
the information sought, in accordance
with § 16.24, the employee or former em-
ployee upon whom the demand has been
made shall respectfully decline to comply
with the demand. “United States ex rel
Touhy v. Ragen," 340 U.S. 462.
Dated: January 11, 1973.
RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc.78-1071 Filed 1-17-73;8:45 am]
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 217
*
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
May 15, 1956
ORDER NO. 116-56
It is the policy of the Department of Justice to extend the fullest
possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from
departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of depart-
ment personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners. The following procedures
are prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be
mutually satisfactory to the congressional committees and to the Department.
(This order supersedes the Deputy Attorney General's Memorandum No. 5, dated
March 23, 1953, and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954. It formal-
izes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing
procedures to permit committees of the Congress and their authorized repre-
sentatives to interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners.
It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order
No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum
of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated
January 13, 1953), insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be
followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees. In
support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter
dated May 17, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney
General's Memorandum which accompanied it.]
A.
REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARTMENT FILES
1. Congressional committee requests for the examination of files
or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by
the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General,
who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and
congressional committees. The request shall state the specific information
sought as well as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy
Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a
reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorney General's signa-
Loture and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINE
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2000
BY 502
M/B-P
2.
If the request concerns a closed case, i. e., one in which
`there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated,
the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence
of the official or employee having custody thereof. The following procedure
shall be followed in such cases:
a. The reply letter will advise the committee that the
file is available for examination and set forth the
name, telephone extension number, and room number of
the person who will have custody of the file to be
reviewed;
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 218
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-
v
2 -
b. Before making the file available to the committee
representative all reports and memoranda from the FBI
as well as investigative reports from any other agency,
will be removed from the file and not be made available
for examination; provided however that if the committee
representative states that it is essential that information
from the FBI reports and memoranda be made available,
he will be advised that the request will be considered
by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents
of the FBI reports and memoranda involved will be
prepared which will not disclose investigative tech-
niques, the identity of confidential informants, or
other matters which might jeopardize the investigative
operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded
by the division to the FBI with a request for advice as
to whether the FBI has any objection to examination of
such summary by the committee representative. The file
will not be physically relinquished from the custody of
the Department. If the committee representative desires
to examine investigative reports from other government
agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he
will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose
reports are concerned.
3. If the request concerns an open case, i. e., one which liti-
gation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, the file may
not be made available for examination by the committee's representative.
The following procedure shall be followed:
B.
3.. The reply letter should advise the committee that
its request concerns a case in which litigation or
administrative action is pending or contemplated, and
state that the file cannot be made available until the
case is completed; and
b.
Should briefly set forth the status of the case in
as much detail as is practicable and prudent without
jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or
administrative action.
REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL
1. Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding
any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing,
signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney
General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the
employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with
the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting
open cases and data in investigative reports;
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 219
4
3-
2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee repre-
sentative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a
copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney
General.
C. EMPLOYEES TESTIFYING BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
1. When an employee is requested to testify before a congressional
committee regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney
General shall be promptly informed. When the Deputy Attorney General's approv-
al is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations
prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;
2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee
on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy
Attorney General. In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229
(Revised) and the President's letter of May 17, 1954, cited at the beginning
of this Order.
3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare
a memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head
and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.
D. REQUESTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS
Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which
their public testimony may affect the discipline and well-being of the institu-
tion, it is the policy of the Department not to deliver Federal prisoners out-
side the penal institution in which they are incarcerated for the purpose of
being interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees. However,
when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be
adversely affected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise
adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath
by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated
under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the
Deputy Attorney General.
1. Arrangements for interviewing and taking of sworn testimony
from a Federal prisoner by a committee of the Congress or the authorized
representatives of such a committee shall be made in the form of a written
request by the chairman of the committee to the Deputy Attorney General.
2. Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days
prior to the requested date for the interview and the taking of testimony
and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the
interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the com-
mittee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the sub-
jects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of
all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who
will be present.
3. A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be
present during the entire time of the interrogation.
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 220
<

2
-
4.
-
4. The warden of the penal institution in which the Federal
prisoner is incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the
time at which the interview takes place, advise the Federal prisoner concerned
of the proposed interview or taking of sworn testimony; and shall further
advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any
other witness who is not a prisoner.
5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete
authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the mainte-
nance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at
the interview and taking of testimony.
6. The warden or his authorized representative shall be present
at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice
shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout
the interview and taking of testimony.
7. The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript
made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy
of the transcript to the Department of Justice.
E. OBSERVERS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS
In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in
matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney
General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and
its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a
congrssional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of
the proceeding which should be sent to the division head and a copy routed
to the Deputy Attorney General.
NW 88608 Docid:32989609 Page 221
/s/ Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General
CODE
TO SAC LOS ANGELES
1
1-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. R. H. Ross
URGENT
1
-
TELETYPE
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
3
(62-116295)
JUNE 17, 1975
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Seç
SENSTUDY 1975
THE FOLLOWING REQUEST IS BEING MADE IN CONNECTION WITH
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HEARINGS. SUTEL REPLY, ATTENTION
INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.
DURING A RECENT HEARING, AN SSC STAFF REPRESENTATIVE QUES-
TIONED A WITNESS WHETHER OR NOT HE KNEW OF MAIL OPENINGS IN
LOS ANGELES BY FBI AGENTS RON MASCAR (PHONETIC) AND (FNU, BUT
POSSIBLY WILLIAM) MILLER. THE WITNESS REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT
KNOWLEDGEABLE ON THIS MATTER AND NEVER HEARD OF THE ABOVE TWO
AGENTS.
IT WAS THE WITNESSES' OPINION THAT THE QUESTION MAY HAVE
BEEN POSED AS A TEST QUESTION ONLY AND ASKED THAT THE INFORMA-
TION BE CAREFULLY HANDLED BY THE FBI.
SO FBIHQ WILL BE IN POSSESSION OF ALL BACKGROUND INFORMA-
TION UPON WHICH WE MAY BE CALLED TO TESTIFY, LOS ANGELES ADVISE
REGARDING ANY DETAILS WHICH MIGHT ILLUMINATE THIS MATTER AND/OR
ajmi
RHR:jmn
(5)
ST. 104
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAIL ROOM
8 27 1975
JUN 17 1975
14" T
TELETYPE
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 'Docid:32989609 Page 222
ALL INFORMATION C
HELENS UNCLASSIFIED
A 10-16-2000 BY SPRAUM/
REC-56
MDR-16
'SEE NOTE PAGE 2
62-116
Wi
3 JIPTA 1075
267
GPO : 1975-569-920
PAGE TWO 62-116395
IDENTIFY SPECIAL AGENTS CONCERNED. IF SUCH ALLEGED ACTION
OCCURRED, ADVISE AS TO ALL DETAILS AND ANY COMMUNICATIONS OR
NOTIFICATION TO FBIHO CONCERNING SAME.
HANDLE ON AN EXPEDITE BASIS.
NOTE:
Inspector John D. Tarpey, U. S. Postal Service advised
Liaison Officer L. A. Crescioli of above incident which occurred
in connection with Tarpey's 6/10/75 testimony before Ssc. Tarpey's.
testimoney did not touch on any FBI mail cover activities and
question was posed to him by SSC staff representative Paul Wallach.
Movement Desk was unable to identify Special Agents based upon
phonetic spellings. Details of above contained in V. V.
Kolombatovic memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/16/75, and
captioned "John D. Tarpey, Assistant Chief Inspector, Office of
Criminal Investigations, U. S. Postal Service, Appearance Before
Senate Select Committee (SSC) 6/10/75."
NW 88608 Docld:32989609 Page 223