2000AA
104-10332-10002
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
25 June 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief, Historical Review Group
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
DD1093-1586
work wit
Chief, Information Management Service
Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
John Berg
Special Assistant to the Associate Deputy
Director for Operations
Release of JFK Assassination Records
A. Memorandum from DDO dated 9 June 1993:
Subject: Release of JFK Assassination
Records
B.
Differences;
Memorandum by Dave Gries of 22 June 1993:
Subject: JFK Assassination Records-- Proposal
for discussion
1. Regarding the items discussed in the referenced memos,
it appears that a further interpretation is required.
--On the subject of cryptonyms, we cannot give wholesale
approval for their release, but if the crypts have been
previously blown or exposed they can be released. There may be
cases in which, if the crypt has been retired, does not relate
to existing or another project and does not contain a valid
digraph, it may also be released. Note, however, that crypts
which are related to a series (ZZBOAT/1, ZZBOAT/2 etc.), would,
when exposed, link operations or assets to one another or which
refer to other operations or projects cannot be released.
--On the subject of pseudonyms, if the pseudonym has been
previously blown, there is no objection to its release. Note
that release of pseudonyms serves to link officers with
assets/operations and this "guilt by association" could lead to
futher, undesireable, exposures. Care must also be taken so
that the release of pseudonyms is not done in such a manner so
as to enable a researcher to accummulate through an inspection
of numerous documents the approximate size of a given station.
(The sense of this is to mean that only a small number of
pseudonyms would be considered for release.)
SECRET.
13-00000
SUBJECT:
SECRET
Release of JFK Assassination Records
-On the subject of cable, dispatch and file numbers, there
is no objection to the release of this information as it
pertains to Mexico City, to include 201 numbers of key players
in the JFK story. All hqs cable numbers can be released as can
dispatch numbers to Mexico City. The release of cable/dispatch
numbers from other Stations can only be done if there has been
prior public identification of a Station in that location. The
release of file numbers pe se, however, would reveal the
methodology by which we file/store and retrieve information…
which is still in practice today and thus we cannot approve it
on a blanket basis. Blanket release of 201 numbers reveals
similar information as well as targeting/acquistion.
methodologies which we similarly need to continue to protect.
2. I realize that the above guidelines continue to mean
that much information will be "blacked out." As bad as it may
appear, none of this information is substantive and its
omission does not detract from the "story." Its release,
however, could permit detailed analyses of our commo,
methodology, contacts and staffing which we cannot accept.
New Subject:
Release of William Pawley's name
3. It is agreed that an attempt will be made to locate
Pawley's next of kin to request their permission to release
information pertaining to his relationship with CIA. If the
next of kin cannot be indentified or located, the subject can
be revisited. (Note: the information in the Congressional
record or in the book "Deadly Secrets" notes that there was
contact and even support between Pawley and the CIA but does
not identify the full extent of that relationship.)
lendy дам
SECRET
John Berg
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A
MEMORANDUM FOR: Linda Flor
C/MRS/LA/MRS
1 November 1993
FROM
:
Joanne Harris
SUBJECT
: JFK Project
-
Review of Cuban Files
I reviewed 106 files to ascertain the status of Cuban assets which
were listed in the attached. Seventeen were found to be former assets,
pre-1970, and most of the seventeen were involved in the Bay of Pig Operation.
Additionally, the following five appear to be candidates for protection
from public disclosure.
a. AMIRE/1
201-274049
A Career Agent, (AMIRE/1 died of natural causes in October
or November 1968. The DCI sent a letter of condolence to his wife.
b. WILDCAT - 201-294213
FBI Double Agent. PNINFINITE assisted in ops in Mexico.
He was still active as of March 1982.
C.
WKSCARLET/3
-
201-300985
Formally terminated in 1974. (Caracas Station had contact
with him until circa 1976, at which time he was implicated in bombing of a
Cuban plane and was incarcerated in Venezuela. As of March 1993, he was still
involved in questionable activities.
d. AMICE-14
-
201-307337
Worked for PNINFINITE through early 1970's.
AMMUG/1 - 201-749651
e.
Cuban defector. He was terminated in 1967, but was used
through 1971.
SECRET
13-00000
7. June 1995
Memo for File
Subject: ARRB request re “slug line” deletions
The policy of deleting ALL crypts & designators in the slug
line was questioned by ARRB members at the 18 May meeting
with CIA. The DO representatives present (Sander & McNair)
deferred to the Office of Communications.
Per 6 June 1995 discussion with Don Hatch, DA/IRO, “the slug
line is strictly an internal distribution line", and the
release of crypts or other designators in the slug line is
not a communications issue; slug crypts are not "commo
generated”. The DA has no objection to the release of
otherwise releasable crypts in the slug line of CIA cables.
The DA response was provide to J. Gunn, ARRB staff, and Bill
McNair, DO/IRO, via phone on 6 June 1995.
Barry Harrelson
CC:
HRG reviewers
DO reviewers
1
13-00000
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW ▪ 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
June 6, 1995
Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear John:
As you know from our meeting with you on May 18, 1995, as well as from previous
meetings with ARRB staff members, CIA's current practice of redacting the sluglines
from its cables in the JFK Assassination Collection is of interest to the Assassination
Records Review Board. As a result of discussion on this topic at the May 18 meeting,
the Board in fact asked those present from CLA to provide it with any additional
information available in support of this practice.
If you have any further information in support of redacting otherwise releasable
cryptonyms when present in cable sluglines, we would appreciate receiving it by this
afternoon, so we can present it to the Board at its meeting tomorrow morning.
With many thanks for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely yours,
216
David G. Marwell
Executive Director
13-00000
27 September 1995
Note to: HRG and DO reviewers
Subject: Phone call from Bill McNair, 21 September, 1995, re
AM crypts
Bill left the following message on my voice mail:
“I have just talked with Peg Sanders, DC/LA Division,
and unless we see a specific incident where giving up an AM
crypt will betray an asset, then let it go . I don't
believe there is any place we will see that. She is will to
give up all AM crypts simply because there are so many
iterations going back...and things have been changed.
"
Barry
HRG Senior Reviewer
13-00000
SECRET
JFK
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief, Historical Review Group
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB
Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country
Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True
Names
During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has
considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been
addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK
collection and by stating our position up front we hope to
facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will
be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.
Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to
operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami,
the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and
withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms
in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals
and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK
investigation and render an easier reading of the written
material.
་
-
Country File Designators We will delete the first
element of operational activity and operational interest
files in those instances when the credibility of the
narrative is not affected. The first element of the file
number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the
country name which is easily discernible, whereas the
subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or
interest and specific subject.
-
Generally, we will
Action Indicator (Slug) Lines
release the entire action indicator line of a document.
Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the
SECRET
CL BY 0695930
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action
Indicators and Employee True Names
context identifies a source or a relationship with a
specific liaison service.
True Names of Staff Employees In most instances we
will release names of employees who have retired in an overt
status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a
document. We will continue to protect the true names of
employees cited as serving in a field position. References
to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since
pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between
Headquarters and the field.
for y
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
2
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—SECRET
reference cop
(do not file)
8 November 1995
Jeremy Gunn,
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ARRB Staff
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Barry Harrelson,
CIS/CSI/HRG
Issues re Cryptonyms, Country
Designators, Action Indicators and
Employee True Names (U)
The
Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the
ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country"
designators, action indicators and employee true names.
memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your
staff and complements information provided in previous
discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss
these issues with your staff. (U)
Attachment
Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment.
SECRET
Вай
خبة
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
CONFIDENTIAL
24 June 1998
Historical Review Program
ATTN: JFK Project Officer
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA
ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS
1. This is further to our memorandum dated 16 June
1998 (attached) wherein the Directorate of Administration
(DA) asked to provide a determination with respect to the
release of ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC.
2. On 16 June, we advised you that these three terms
together with the term MKCOSMOS were reviewed and the DS&T
determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS must be withheld in
their entirety and the DA determined that ISOLATION and
ISOMETRIC must be withheld as well. Please be advised that
the association to this Agency of the locations referred to
by these four crypts is classified in light of the fact that
the locations, themselves, are under military cover.
Accordingly, any crypts, slugs, or other words associated
with the locations and linking them with the CIA must not be
released.
you.
3. We hope the information provided above will assist
Attachment: As Stated
CL BY: 393504
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: LOC 1-82
CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000
30"
SECRET
16 June 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Historical Review Program
ATTN:
JFK Project Officer.
Dasta asta
Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA
ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS
1. This is in response to your request that we review
the attached material and provide you with a determination
as to whether ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC can be
released. We also reviewed the material with respect to
MKCOSMOS as well.
2. The Directorate of Administration (DA) has
completed its review and we have determined that ISOLATION
and ISOMETRIC, must continued to be withheld. We forwarded
your request to the Directorate of Science and Technology
(DS&T) and DS&T has determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS
must continue to be withheld as well. I have identified
below the documents in which these terms are used.
Crypts
Document No.
104-10177-10248
104-10177-10228
104-10177-10231
ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC
ISOMETRIC and MKCOSMOS
104-10177-10230
3. Copies of the documents referred to above are
returned herewith with these terms highlighted in yellow for
deletion. Also returned are three documents that did not
contain this information (10197, 10198 and 10199). This
concludes DA action on this request. If you have any
questions, please call Frieda on 31201 or Becky on 31204.
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ATTACHMENTS
Attachments: As Stated
SECRET
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
(U)
FROM:
SUBJECT:
SECRET
OIM-98-0084
06 August 1998
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
(U)
Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency
(S)
Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym
1. (S)
This memorandum responds to the Assassination
Records Review Board ("ARRB" or "Board") regarding their current
deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited
information in one document
--
specifically, the actual cryptonym
of a CIA source (IJDECANTER) It is our considered judgment that
the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the
given document ((SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed
(with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would
provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian
counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US ·
intelligence interests.
2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose
and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a
fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym
IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and
would otherwise be releasable.
3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask
the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this
memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly
cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the
conclusion of your deliberations.
4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has
been released almost in its entirety. The released version
reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided
SECRET
CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82
JFK
3
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IJDECANTER Cryptonym
information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It
continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a
credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA
assessment is supported by reporting from another source
✓ (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER) . It concludes by
stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides
fully established (by CIA]." It is this final fact which is
critical to our request. By having released this substantive
information
and by otherwise
having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we
must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence
judgment of CIA is not compromised.
--
"bona fides
...
established"
--
5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI)
hence the issue of damage to national security
four basic questions:
6.
• what information was compromised?
•
and
proceeds from
what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
information?
what understanding of the information did the
service(s) have?
what information did the intelligence service(s)
believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the
detriment of the United States?
(C) The first two questions are largely factual and can
be acquired through a combination of confession's, polygraph
interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three
and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important
for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target
intelligence service.
7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a
foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the
import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and
the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect
example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information
compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a
2
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IJDECANTER Cryptonym
}
satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating
to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other
information they had acquired through signals intelligence,
concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-
operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their
territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-
operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e.,
concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of
intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they
took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was
directly and immediately lost.
8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the
quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service
believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment
of the United States; if they do not, the United States may
escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical
question that a foreign country must answer and it is the
critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in
our fold.
9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by
what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own
knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially
released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The
Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to
the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they
know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he
said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus
incorporated his information into our operational practices and
activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm
to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow
them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a
US intelligence success.
10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,
we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the
Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did
not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed,
the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and
this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the
Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period
of time.
3
SECRET
13-00000
SUBJECT:
SECRET
(S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym
--
11. (S) In sum, question 4 bona fides is the CI key.
The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information
relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must
protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we
are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal
Security Service when they assess this new information in light
of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
of course, information on the public record via the media.
12.
(S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage
is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are
three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:
•
First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the
Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the
United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This
specific release might well be viewed as a public move
to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate
tensions.
Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to
the Russian service. This specific release could
arguably provide them with insights into our capability
to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian
service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not
know this for certain.
And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has
never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector
in our custody and under our control; the CIA has
pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that
it is publicly known at least to some degree. However,
because his wife, child and father remain in Russia
today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and
consider postponement also for this reason. Quite
candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether
the Russian government today would take action against
the family from this proposed release. But I would
urge caution here since the information at issue is
minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and
arguably harmful to living persons.
:
4
SECRET
13-00000
SUBJECT:
(S)
SECRET
Protection of IJ DECANTER Cryptonym
13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in
person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that
this important information can be postponed from public release.
Lee S. Strickland
5
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Protection of (IJDECANTER Cryptonym
OIM/IRG/LSS: blo/31287 (6 August 1998)
Distribution:
Orig
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EXDIR
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1 - D/OPA
1
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D/OIM
DA/IRO
DCI/IRO
DO/IRO
DI/IRO
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LSS signer file
OIM/IRG Chrono
1 - Subject File: ARRB
g:/irg_fr'1\general\lss\arrb_ijd.doc
6
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n
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Office of
OIM
Information Managemen
CIA TALKING
POINTS
re Protection of "IJDECANTER" Cryptonym
Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)
26 AUGUST 1998
The ADDO
--
Jim Pavitt
has asked that I address the Board
on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of
Operations and the CIA.
•
•
We request the postponement of certain very limited
information in one document specifically, the actual
--
cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER)
It is our considered judgment that the release of this
cryptonym, in the particular context of the given
document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed?,
with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997,
would:
provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-
intelligence effort,
result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence
interests, and,
• have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and
prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which
could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.
Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and
objectives, we propose however:
•
a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g.,
"TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or
any other document where it appears and would otherwise
be releasable, and/or,
SECRET
CL BY 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
•
if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the
nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., "a
valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but
not general rank, official in the intelligence service
(KGB) of the former USSR; (specifically, he served in the
Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for
internal counter-intelligence efforts.
As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released
almost in its entirety.
• The released version reports that a Soviet official
(Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect
that OSWALD was a KGB source.
•
It continues by stating that CIA did not believe
ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is
supported by reporting from another source (identity
(redacted but, in fact, (IJDECANTER)
It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER)_has
had his "... bona fides fully established [by_CIA]."
...
It is this final fact which is critical.
...
--
"bona
By having released this substantive information
fides
established" AND by otherwise having
IJDECANTER_known to the public in true name and_crypt,
THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key
intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.
I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some
degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from
this disclosure the disclosure of the crypt in this
particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.
--
2
SECRET
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SECRET
--
The practice of counterintelligence (CI)
issue of damage to national security
basic questions:
--
and hence the
proceeds from four
•
what information was compromised?
•
what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
information?
what understanding of the information did the receiving
intelligence service(s) have?
what information did the receiving intelligence
service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and
to the detriment of the other party?
The first two questions are largely factual and can be
acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph
interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.
•
Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and
the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service
and the target intelligence service.
Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not
really an issue here since the US fully understood the
information presented.
Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for
exploitation.
• If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset
(e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the
detriment of the other service.
3
SECRET

13-00000
SECRET
•
•
If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully
or to some degree.
This is the critical question that a foreign country must
answer and it is the critical information that we must
protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.
In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the
Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and
what they have acquired from the substantially released
document and the Los Angeles Times article.
•
The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER).
defected to the United States;
• they know or suspect what he told the US;
•
.
they know or suspect that we fully understood the import
of what he said;
they do not know, however, whether we believed him and
thus incorporated his information into our operational
practices and activities.
And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to
the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and
allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what
heretofore has been a US intelligence success.
"
In sum, question 4
--
bona fides
--
is the CI key.
• The CIA to date has released all of the substantive
information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular
document.
But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this
particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial
CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when
they assess this new information in light of their
previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
of course, information on the public record via the
media.
There is additional damage that will accrue from not
officially protecting the identity of (IJDECANTER.
Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a
devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence
organization.
It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets
current and past who will logically fear that CIA
--
--
will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at
some future point in time.
• Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take
self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current
assets or public statements by inactive ones).
Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most
assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future
assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA.
Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our
ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly
against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).
There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in
the interests of the Board's time. They are not
insignificant, however.
ONE, is foreign relations.
In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after-
Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of
reprisal.
This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to
embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
5
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the
Russian service.
This specific release could arguably provide them with insights
into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.
The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does
not know this for certain.
THIRD, is an equitable issue.
The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a
defector in our custody and under our control;
•
The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
• While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to
some degree nevertheless his wife, child and father remain
--
in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial
action the current government might take.
Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether
the Russian government today would take action against the
family from this proposed release.
• But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is
minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably
harmful to living persons.
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New Memo\Standard
CL BY: 031682-1998-DO
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COL 1-82
25 September 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Bob Skwirot
FROM:
Charles A. Briggs-Y-
OFFICE:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
DCI/CSI/HRG
Mexico City Station History
The Mexico City Station History contains at least 99 separate cryptonyms, for the most part
concerning projects, but in some cases, individuals, covering the period (1947 to June 1969. In
every case, there is identifying information included with the crypt, ranging from a brief
parenthetical phrase to several pages of detail. Since the information far exceeds that thought
relevant to the JFK story, both in time and substance, an approach designed to provide a maximum
amount of information and guidance for historians concerned with the JFK assassination, with a
minimum of gratuitously useable leads for curious or hostile FOIA requestors concerning CIA
activities generally, was chosen and is reflected in the version the Board has for consideration.
The norm in handling cryptonyms when the entire crypt is not released is to protect the
digraph - the location indicator. What I've done here, to avoid unraveling, in effect, the whole
history of Station activity for subsequent curiousity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the
digraph and protecting the root - specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is
familiar with the decision to release almost all Ll-crypts in full - while protecting identifying
information. The major relevant LI projects (LIENVOY, LITEMPO, LICALLA, etc.) have had both the
full cryptonym and most of the details released.
No
Station-and-Operation-Directorate division histories are among the most sensitive documents
in the Agency. They are very tightly controlled within the area divisions - they are not available to
cleared employees in other directorates or, traditionally, outside of the division within the Operations
Directorate. Thus concern about the release of the Mexico City History pages that, viewed through
the widest of lenses, do not appear to be relevant to the JFK story, is very great.
CC:
New Memo\Standard