File #:
62-116395
Serial Scope:
1-50
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 1
Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025
OPTIONAL EQRM NO. 10
"
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO. RNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
:
Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
CONFIDENTIAL
: W. O.) Crega INFORMATION CONTAINED
0
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
-56/01/6
1
-
1
-
DATE:
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
3/10/75
Dir
Tep AD Adm
De AD Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst...
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
1 Each Assistant Directorent.
IES INCLASSIFIED EXCEPT, 1
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
RECLASSIFIED IN SEZ REINI
07 11-7-00
-
Mr. Cregar
1/8/15
House
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
ལྟ་
Legal Count
Plans & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of CREAR
the Intelligence Community, (hereafter referred to as the
Group), held on 3/7/75.
The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made
up of representatives of agencies and departments having
membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future
testimony before various Congressional committees..
At the meeting of the Group on 3/7/75 the following
items were discussed:
Congressman Robert McClory has been designated as
the minority leader of the House Select Committee. Copies of
the annexes prepared by various members of the Intelligence
Community have been delivered to both the majority and minority
leader of the House Select Committee. Congressman McClory. is
very security conscious, is concerned that sensitive relation-
ships are not inadvertently disclosed during forthcoming hearings
and according to Mr. John Clarke appears to have no questions
regarding FBI authority to engage in domestic surveillances.
CIA has prepared a draft letter to Senator Church releasing
CIA employees from any obligations imposed upon them by CIA's
Secrecy Agreement (draft copy furnished the Legal Counsel
Division). Prior to releasing the letter to Senator Church,
CIA is having it reviewed by the White House to determine if
they have any objections to its
262-11:25
REC-37
50
CIA anticipates that staff employees of the Senate
Select Committee (SSC) will have direct access to CIA_buildings
but will not have direct access to CIA files or CIA personNET.1975
Arrangements for the staff of the SSC to interview CIA personnel
will be made through Mr. John Clarke.
(13-162OZ .
NT
ick 6/1/8
WOC:ebc
(17)
است.
XEROI
JUN 11 1975
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Briedi
Ꮌ Ꮐ ᎪᎨᏒ 1 1 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 2
APP
CONFIDENTIAL:
8
EGAL COUNSEL
1
1
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
SENSTUDY 75
RE:
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney
General, and Mr. John Warner, General Counsel, CIA, will
have a meeting with the Counsel of the SSC on Tuesday,
3/11/75, to work out precise wording for a Secrecy Agreement
that all members of the SSC staff have agreed to sign.
On 3/10/75 the staff of the SSC will convene to
develop a list of requirements that they expect to levy on
all agencies making up the Intelligence Community. Hopefully
Mr. Clarke will have some information on these requirements
prior to the time they are levied on the individual agencies.
As a result of Mr. Colby's appearance before the
House Government Information in Individual Rights Subcommittee,
Government Operations Committee, 3/5/75, CIA is getting many,
many, calls from Senators and Congressmen asking how they can
find out whether CIA has a file on them and what its contents
are.
Mr. Clarke noted that members of the Group should
anticipate receiving similar calls from Congressmen. ✗(v)
Mr. Hank Knocke, who heads up the CIA task force
responsive to the Rockefeller Commission, advised that staff
members of the Rockefeller Commission have been issued CIA¨
badges, occupy CIA office space, and have authority to
personally contact any CIA employee without clearing such
contact with CIA officials. In addition, the Rockefeller
'Commission staff employees have been granted access to CIA
files. After reviewing these files, if the staff decides to
make certain portions of the files a matter of official
Commission business, CIA has a right to excise the names of
any sensitive sources. In the event information contained in
these files originates with another Agency of the Government
CIA has insisted and the staff concurs that the originating
Agency must be consulted before such information can be
released to the staff.
Mr. Knocke also advised that it is his understanding
that both Mr. Kelley and Mr. Colby will receive in the mail
shortly a request from the Commission to prepare a joint
response covering the activities of foreign intelligence officials
in the U. S.
·A(v)
2
CON
CONTINUED
-
OVER
KMW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 3
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
CONFIDENTIAL
CIA as well as the rest of the Intelligence
Community is concerned over requests received Morton
Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act. Treasury,
National Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency,
CIA, State Department and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), have received requests from Halperin.
According to Mr. Clarke, a meeting will be convened by the
OMB involving interested parties in an effort to coordinate
a response. Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of
Central Intelligence, is very concerned that in responding
to Halperin's requests one Agency does not deny providing
information to Halperin that another Agency expects to give
Halperin. To date the Bureau has not received a request
from Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
wewfou
gasi
X(U)
This may possibly be considered a
Conspiracy to
deny 30I rights.
We should artaid
all such implications,
Note: Cregar of Legal Counsel
3/14/15 
people advisers
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 4
-
3
-
CONFIDENTIAL
Assistant Attorney General for Administration
Hank
Nicholas P. Callahan
Associate Director, FEN
ARZ ENFORMATION CONTAINE
REIN IS UNGLASSEBIN
DAZE 11-7-00
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD
Asst Dir.
Adria
:
Inv
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs _
Filos & Com.
-
Gon. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection.
Intall.
SENSTudy 75
INQUIRY BY GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) AND
THE OFFICE DE MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (OMB)
CONCERN INRELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
March 7, 1975
APPROPRIATIONS- 1974.
On the afternoon of March 7, 1975, Mr. James F. Hoobler,
Director, Management Programs and Budget Staff, furnished a copy of a
memorandum from GAO to the Deputy Director of the OMB which requested
information concerning appropriations, outlays and legislative authority
for such appropriations and expenditures.
With regard to the FBI's Intelligence Division, a response
was requested concerning the amounts of budget authority for fiscal years
1974 and 1975 and actual outlays for fiscal year 1974; an indication of where
in the Federal budget these amounts or any portion of them appear; any
language in the budget which explains or indicates the purpose or pirposes
for which such amounts will be spent; and the legislative authority for each,
of the listed appropriations and expenditures.
EX 10+
66-17
94
Original Filed in 66-19125-94
The FBI does not receive budget authority or account for
„budget outlays specifically for internal security or intelligence activities or
for any organizational component handling such matters. The FBI's budget
request for funds to handle internal security or intelligence matters is set
forth under the budget activity "urity and Criminal Investigations.”
Based ou manpower fullestion surveys which have been conducted, it is
estimated that approximately 25 percent of the FBI's resources go to support
activities under the supervision of the Intelligence Division. It is estimated,
therefore, that in the fiscal year 1974 the FBI's budget authority contalnod
fands amounting to some $1 million and that it had outlays of about $63 million
apart the motives. The amout contained in the FBI's budget authority
or the fecal year 1976 is autimated to be $103 million.
The pergoes for which these finds are enged are set forth
in justification materia}apeonyanying Indgot estimates submitted to the Conger.
LCG:jb
2 ENCLOSURE
qu
62-116395-
See designated and note on page two....
NOT RECORDED.
Spoc. Inv.
Deining
BWV 88608 DO 2989530 Page 5
VILETYPE UNT
MAY 1-1975
-
Assistant Attorney General for Administration
In the FBI's material for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 these purposes are
set forth under the section "Objective" and they are captioned "Domestic
Intelligence" and "Coordination and Dissemination of Security Data."
Additional data is furnished in each of those years under the section "Statas
of Base Program" and is captioned "Internal Security Operations."
The legislative authority for the appropriation and expenditures
for the fiscal year 1974 is contained in the Departments of State, Justice,
Commerce, and The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1974
(Public Law 93-162). The legislative authority for fiscal year 1975 is
contained in the Appropriation Act for the same agencies (Public Law 98-433).
1 – Mr. James F.-Hoobler, Director
1
-
Management Programs and Budget Staff
Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
1 Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
-
1
-
Mr. Moore
Enclosure
NOTE: The attached inquiry from GAO is being coordinated by the OMB. It
was received by us from the Department at 1:14 p. m., 3/7/75, with a request
that the information be furnished by the close of business the same data.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 6
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 7
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ROUTE SLIP
To Mr. Hoobler
Take necessary action
Approval or signature
Comment
Prepare reply
Discuss with me
For your information
Soc remarks below
FROM
Jim Purcell
J
im
3-7-75
DATE
REMARKS
Mr. Hoobler:
Will you please provide the requested
information indicated by Mr. Scantleburg's
memo of February 24 pertaining to the FBI.
Item "8" which refers to the FBI Internal
Security Division should be interpreted
as the FBI's Intelligence Division.
I would appreciate having this information,
if possible, by close of business, today.
·62-116395-
ENCLOSURE
#MDR16
ALL FEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
FERIND 
UNCLASSIEEELD
DATE =7-00 B SP & ALL196
ONE FORM A
EV AUG 7L
2b 1978
Repres
DIVISION OF FINANCIAL AND
GENERAL MANAGEMENT STUDIES
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUIN OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543
FEB 24 1975
Mr. Paul II. O'Neill
Deputy Director
Office of Management and Budget
Dear Mr. O'Neill:'
We have recently received a request from a Member of the Senate
Budget Committee for our assistance in obtaining budget data with
respect to various intelligence activities of the Federal Government.
We have the budget data that is publicly available. However, as you are:
aware, most of the requested information is not readily available and
is usually provided to the Congress in limited briefings. We have
discussed this matter with representatives of the Senate Budget Committee.
and it is their desire to obtain the requested data by other than oral
briefings.
The request involves amounts of budget authority for fiscal years
л.974 and 1975 by each of the following agencies, and the actual outlays
by each such agency during FY 1974.
1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. National Security Agency
3. Defense Intelligence Agency
4. Army Intelligence
5.
Naval Intelligence
6.
7.
8.
Air Force Intelligence (including the National
Reconnaissance Office)
State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Federal Bureau of Investigation Internal Security
Division
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 8
62-116375-
ENCLOSURE
:
9.
10.
Atomic Energy Commission Division of Intelligence
Treasury Department Intelligence Division
The Committee would also like to know the following:
"Where in the federal budget does each or any portion
of the above-mentioned amounts appear? Indicate to
the closest possible degree of specificity, designating
such amounts by the accounts or line items, or combina-
tions of accounts or line items, under which the
amounts are included, and any language in the budget
which explains or indicates the purpose or purposes
for which such amounts will be spent.
"What is the legislative authority for each of the
above-listed appropriations and expenditures?"
We would appreciate your reviewing these items and responding at
your earliest convenience. We have advised members of your staff of
this request. We will be happy to work directly with your staff to meet
this congressional need. To the extent that any of this information is
not available, we will need, in writing, the legislative citations or
precedents for not supplying the data.
i
•
Sincerely yours,
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 9
D. L. Scantlebury
Director
-2-
ΤΟ
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10' *
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 57
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. CALLAHAN
FROM
:
J. B. ADAMS
ADAMES Ja
DATE:
3/7/75
#MDR16.
ALL INFORMATION GONTĂIMO
HERRIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP-2 ALM/176
SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
"(Senstudy
dy - 75
15
)
70
Mr. Kelley asked that in connection with future festimony
Dep. AD Adm
-Dep.
Asst. Dir
Diri
Admin.
Compy Syste
Affairs
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plon. & Eval. _
Spoc. Inv.
Training
Coen. I
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
we prepare two papers. One is to be a dissertation about our procedures
in opening and closing domestic security cases, including the application
of criteria for opening such cases and determining how long the cases
should remain in a pending status ②The second paper is to involve the
jurisdiction of the President to authorize unusual investigative techniques
in foreign intelligence investigations such as wiretaps, microphones
and surreptitious entries. This should include a definition of his
Constitutional powers and the derivative authority invested in the Attorney
General and the FBI.
In connection with these two papers, it is desired that there be
coordination between the Intelligence Division, Legal Counsel Division
and writers in the External Affairs Division, who should participate in the
basic research and discussions and prepare the final paper outlining the
research and analysis of the other two divisions.
Mr. Kelley's purpose is to have papers available on various topics
such as this which reduce technical dissertations to a style which can be
used for argumentative purposes in an easily understood form. The types
of questions he receives generally do not require a highly technical response
but a concise presentation of the issues involved and the propriety of our
procedures.
.ACTION:
62-116395
NOT RECORDED A
48 APR 17 1975.
MAR 26 1975
M
N
ORIGINAL FILED IN65
For information.
JBA:ams
(6)
1
Mr. Jenkins
1
Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Mintz
-
1 Mr. Wannall
(1) Ti Undds ok, Dave & Liv
Ⓒ Whylay, Dive & G
89530 Page 10
5

ť
ΤΟ
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. RIG. N° 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES (VERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
*FROM
Legal Counsel
дотрудн
KHOUS
DATE: 3-6-75
SUBJECT HOUSÉ GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN
R
05 committee ON GORNew
l Rights
"I
پر سارنگ
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE
#mori6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE N-7-00 BY SP-2ACH/296
THE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE
HEARING, MARCH 5, 1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dop. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admín.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
[dent.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm!
Director Sec'y
Senate Select Commitee ON INTELLIGONce Activities
This Committee which is chaired by Congresswoman Bella S.
Abzug (D-N.Y.) convened on March 5th to hear testimony from Director of
the CIA, William E. Colby. It was brought out at the hearing that the
Central Intelligence Agency had furnished information in their files pertaining
to Congresswoman Abzug the previous evening, March 4th, with the exception
of information which could not be disclosed without compromising a sensitive
source or intelligence gathering procedure. Director Colby also advised
Congresswoman Abzug in response to her inquiry that the source of some
items that she was in receipt of had been concealed because it was from
another agency. Colby did not disclose the identity of that agency.
the
IN
12 - My > > 7 – D
ORIGINAL FILED
Mg
Congresswoman Abzug asked Colby, and he agreed to
communicate with that agency and have them contact Congresswoman Abzug
concerning the aforementioned information. By way of background according/
to a memorandum captioned "Bella S. Abzug (D-N.Y.)," dated 3-4-75,
CIA asked for and received permission from this Bureau to release the PORTION OF
contents of unclassified reports furnished the CIA by the FBI and could be
furnished by the CIA to Congresswoman Abzug. From the remarks made
by Director Colby, it would appear that the topic of discussion between
Congresswoman Abzug and Director Colby pertained to these documents
and that we can expect some communication from the CIA in accordance
with Congresswoman Abzug's request.
RECAO 67 47229 296
During the question and answer portion of Director Colby's
testimony, Director Colby stated that the CIA would obtain information
pertaining to American citizens in only two instances in the future. (1) Infor-
mation developed incidental to their surveillance of a foreign target-
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
PVD:dkg (8)
del
dity
54
AP5 1975+
MAY 28 1975 cm
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 11
1 - Mr. McCreight
1 - Mr. Daly
1
Mr. Hotis
62-116395
NOT RECORDED
MAY 2-8 1975
BANZ
1 APR 1 1975
LEGA
CONTINUED
Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams Memo
Re: HOUSE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION IN
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE
1515
J
(2) Investigations conducted pursuant to FBI requests. He was asked
what the CIA's response would be to an improper request for investigation
concerning American citizens. He indicated that they would refuse such
a request and had done so in the past. The implication being from the
context of the question that the FBI had made an improper request of
the CIA.
In view of the wide scope of authority enjoyed by
Congresswoman Abzug's Committee and the realistic expectation the
FBI will have to testify before this Committee, it would be to our advantage
for the Intelligence Division, through liaison, with the Central Intelligence
Agency to obtain a transcript of this Committee hearing so that same
might be reviewed and possible questions contained therein concerning
FBI investigations be analyzed and responses prepared.
RECOMMENDATION:
pra
Intelligence Division take action in line with the above.
AB
джи
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 12
Brand
-2-
FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)
#MDR16
12 AL/116
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINEL
HERE IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/25/00 
PYSP
(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
In Our Opinion
Assign Congress
To Hunt Bombers
Here we go again.
The bombing of a State Department
restroom and followup phone call from;
someone calling itself the "Weather Un-
derground" is reminiscent of times past.
The bombers are apparently protest-
ing any economic aid to non-Communists
in South Vietnam and Cambodia.
•
There's a certain irony in the timing.
At the very moment the CIA and FBI are
being raked over the coals by self-right-.
eous members of Congress, a radical
group like the ones under surveillance
in the late '60s and early '70s pulls off
errorist act.
We wouldn't blame the FBI for turn-
ing the investigation of the latest bomb-`
ing over to the congressional committee
investigating government surveillance.
Let the legislators handle it.
Some measure of watchfulness must
he maintained over agencies like the
IBI and CIA. The repugnant aspect
it all is congressmen leading the media
bandwagon to roast the agencies.
F-32
0 MAR 31 1975
KW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 13
Dir.
Dep. A
DQDA.
Asst. Din
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Hairs
Fil & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspect
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Jav.
Training
un.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
(Indicate page, name of
newspaper, city and state.)
Pg. 4
state.)
The Star Beacon
Ashtabula, Ohio
Sensterdy-75-
Many of these congressmen and sen-
ators knew bloody well what these agen-
bies were doing in years past, but never
raised a whisper, let alone a howl. Now,
with home-grown terrorism seemingly.
behind us, the legislators play dumb
and feign shock or outrage over what
they call "disturbing revelations."
You can bet if a bomb went off in the
Senate or House chambers, Congress.
Iwould call out the FBI, CIA and any other
agency versed in intelligence gathering.
What's more, the legislators would.
wonder why the FBI and CIA couldn't.
immediately produce the 10 most likely
suspects.
"Where's your surveillance mechan-
jism," some senator would demand.
. L
Hate:
dition:
uthor:
'ditor:
itle:
1-30-75
Don Rowley
Miscellaneous
-
ORIGINAL #HA) K
104-58ba-A
haracter:
Public relation
or
Matters
Assification:
What we have, folks, is Congress at t
its hypocritical worst.
62.116395-A
CLIC
NOT RECORDED
40 MAR 28 1975
upmitting Office: Cleveland
Being Investigated
file
CV
80-0
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSAN.. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
ΤΟ
UNITED STATES GO
RNMENT
1
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannali
FROM
: W.
butleregar
`SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
PERET IS UNCLASSIFIED
#MOR 16
DATE 9/26/0031 SP-2 ALM/JTG
Mr. Carlahan
1 Mr. Adams
-n
DATE: 3/21/75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AP Adm.
Dep. Abslav
Asst. D
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Each Assistant Director dont..
1
-
1
-
Mr. Cregar
K
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting of
the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on
Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, (hereafter
referred to as the Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the even-
ing of 3/20/75.
This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). In attendance were
Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Deputy AG Laurence
Silberman; Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter; Mr. John
Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI, as well as officials from
Defense, Treasury and the Energy Research and Development
Administration (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission).
The meeting was called to have all agencies identify
(1) Types of information that could not be disclosed to Con-
gressional Committees, (2) Types of information the disclosure
of which was arguable, and (3) Types of information that could
be disclosed to Congressional Committees. The FBI was asked to
lead off the presentation. The Group was informed that we were
reluctant to discuss sensitive matters in such a large group
and we asked that the Group be reduced to a select few people
who would have to have knowledge of sensitive FBI operations.
After some discussion, the White House agreed this was a good
procedure and it now appears that Mr. Buchen of the White House,
one of his associates and probably Mr. Silberman will arrange
at some future date to discuss the sensitive type information
'embraced in the above three questions. No definite date was
set for this review and presumably either Mr. Clarke's office
or Mr. Silberman will be in contact with the Bureau regarding
this.
REC-28 62-116395-49
49
-
Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by Mr. Clarke
which attempts to outline a course the DCI can take In coordinating
inquiries from the Senate and House Select Committees. Although
01 APR 9 1975
Enclosure
WOC:ebc
(17)
APR 16 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 14
CONTINUED
-
OVER
5-100-6
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
this paper was on the agenda for this meeting, it was never
discussed because of the length of meeting, concluding at
approximately 8:30 p.m. Following the meeting, Assistant
Director Mintz and Mr. Cregar had a discussion with Mr. Wilderotter.
During this discussion Mr. Mintz pointed out to Mr. Wilderotter
that it was imperative that this Executive Committee clearly
define how responses to the Select Committees would be coordinated
and how matters dealing with policy would be cleared with the
White House. Mr. Wilderotter described the following procedure.
All questions received by agencies of the Intelligence Community
from Select Committees would be furnished to Mr. Clarke.
As a
matter of fact, Mr. Wilderotter advised a copy of the questions
received by the Department from the Senate Select Committee
requiring responses from the FBI had already been turned over to
Mr. Clarke by Mr. Wilderotter. Upon receipt of a copy of such
questions, Mr. Clarke would review them and attempt to identify
which questions involve policy matters of interest to the White
House. He would then inform all agencies involved in such a
response that such a question involved policy. Those agencies
would be obliged to discuss the response between themselves and .
arrive at a coordinated answer. That answer would then be
furnished to Mr. Clarke who would in turn make a decision as to
whether it should go forward to the White House for resolution.
Answers to questions which did not involve policy matters would
also have to be furnished to Mr. Clarke to insure that there was
some coordinating mechanism in the Community and to insure that this
mechanism was in possession of all questions and all answers which
might be provided the Select Committees.
Mr. Mintz made it quite clear to Mr. Wilderotter that
this was not the Bureau's understanding of how the coordination
process would work and was of the belief that no other agency
represented on the Executive Committee was aware of this procedure.
Mr. Wilderotter was asked to develop such a procedure for pre-
sentation to the Group to insure everybody was in agreement as to
how this process would work.
On the morning of 3/21/75, Mr. Clarke advised that
as a result of the meeting during the evening of 3/20/75 he was
completely confused and was at a loss as to how the coordination
process was going to work. He advised Mr. Cregar that he would
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 15
2.
-
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
attempt to get some clarification and hopefully be in a
position to provide some information as to how the White House,
Mr. Silberman and Mr. Wilderotter wanted to proceed.
It is the opinion of both Mr. Mintz and Mr. Wannall
that the Bureau must immediately set up a Task Force to handle
the tremendous amount of information that will be required
from the FBI, including the coordination of our responses with
other agencies who might be involved in such an answer, as well
as to insure that both the Department of Justice and the White
House are fully informed. We can anticipate very short deadlines
and requests for information that are not readily retrievable
from Bureau records without considerable research involving
several divisions in the Bureau.
ACTION:
That a Task Force be immediately created within the
Bureau to facilitate the collation of information as well as
the coordination of such information responsive to the requests
we can anticipate receiving from Select Committees of the Congress.
701
13/27/73
- Menes per paved
Cresactle Wars
.
will 
bew
2h
appears we are
gearing ourselves
To quick response-
Why 
can't we get
agreement as
an
awas
to a reasonable.
response time
*
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 16
Note: Principal responsibility for the
Task Force would be the Intelligence 
Division
in terms of personnel 
and collection and review
of information and 
documents, however, an
individual should 
be designation in each other
division as contacts to 
handle receipt of
requists of the division 
and to expedite 
responses
Those designat
from his 
division.
be briefed as 
to 
the roles 
of the Senate
and House Select 
Commutes and the
Urgency of the 
requests anticipated
.
Div. 
should consider development 
of 
51-01
Services 
that would 
assist in this effort
.
Legal Counsel 
will continue 
to seal with
the committees 
and help elseific 
as necesser 
1.,
3
-
да
PLM
Files
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
In Gregor
20 March 1975
This represents a working paper. It attempts
to outline a course the DCI can take in dealing
with the Senate/House Select Committees'
inquiries. The details herein have not yet
been discussed or coordinated with representa-
¨tives of the Ad Hoc Group of USIB.
Bi
John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC
bark also plone to
- fin
CANE AT
Session Grosing
ACTION
#MDRIS.
FBI.
9/26/00 SP-2 ALM/776
GLOS
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 17.
62-116395-49
A. RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUPPORT
In treating with Congressional inquiries, the Director of Central
Intelligence will provide leadership to the Intelligence Community.
The Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community,
supported by the Intelligence Community Staff, will provide the
principal staff direction and congressional liaison for the DCI in these
matters. He will serve as a focal point for coordination among Community
entities and assure communication with the Executive Office as appropriate.
The IC Staff with the assistance of USIB Agencies will provide legal, .
security, substantive, and registry support structured so as to assure
Cappropriate support to the DCI and the Intelligence Community. The
AD/DCI/IC will chair an Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of USIB as a
principal mechanism for exchanging information and coordinating USIB
activities with respect to the inquiry where needed. The AD/DCI/IC and
the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group will establish periodic and special
time sensitive reporting to keep the DCI, the USIB principals, and involved
Executive Branch agencies advised on UȘIB Agencies' liaison relationships
with the Select Committees and on substantive exchanges in response to
Select Committee inquiries. Where useful, common standards and procedures
will be developed by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group.
B.
COORDINATION
1. Physical security is proceeding well. The Chairman of the Security
Committee of USIB has been assigned as the principal Intelligence Community
officer on physical security and clearance matters. Agreements have been
reached with the Senate Select Committee on physical security standards.
These standards have been provided to the House Select Committee Staff.
The Senate has arranged for central facilities which meet the physical
security standards and has appointed a full-time security officer who will
provide certification of personnel clearances. The House at the present
time is not planning central facilities and we understand will be dispersed
in at least three different locations.
* Discussion of classified information will occur outside of the
security-approved Committee rooms and particularly in the offices of the
members of the Select Committee. Agreement has been reached that the FBI
will approach the House and Senate Staff Directors and offer technical sweep
services for the Congressional offices involved.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 18
QUICLOSE
62-116395-4'")
2. Personnel security investigations on Select Committee Staff are
under way by the FBI. It is understood that upon completion of Staff
investigations, the Select Committee Chairman will certify to the DCI
the Top Secret clearances of Committee Staff. The DCI, through his
Intelligence Community Staff, will pass along the certification to the
security elements of the respective agencies. Compartmented clearance
arrangements and certification also have been agreed with the Senate Select
Committee Staff. Similar arrangements have been discussed with the House
Select Committee Staff.
3. Secrecy agreements for the Senate Select Committee Staff employees
are being drafted and the AD/DCI/IC, supported by the CIA General Counsel
and the Associate Deputy Attorney General, will negotiate similar arrange-
ments with the House. The DCI policy is to insist upon secrecy agreements.
4. Arrangements will be established by the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating
Group for the recording of documents, testimony and transcripts, and for
procedures to protect sources and methods which may be contained in the
material flowing to the Select Committees from all agencies. A central
index service will be provided by the Intelligence Community Staff to serve
the DCI and USIB Agencies. The following describes the general content
of this central index.
a.
All requests received by USIB Agencies from the Select
Committees.
نے
b. All other communications from Select Committees on subject ✓
of interest to more than one agency.
c. Reports and responses by other non-intelligence elements of the
Executive Branch (if desired by those elements).
d. Identification of document responses provided to the requests
and listing of subjects covered.
e. Prepared statements and transcripts of testimony made to
Select Committees..
.f. Selective material released or denied under the Freedom of
Information legislation which relates to subjects of interest to the
Select Committees.
✓
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 19
2
Under this concept, all USIB Agencies would have a reporting
responsibility to keep the central index current. Procedures will be
developed. All agencies would retain responsibility for the physical
possession and accessibility of their documents. The third agency rule
will apply in providing documents to the Select Committees.
C. PROTECTION AND HANDLING OF MATERIALS
1. It is suggested that in general there are four levels of security
applied to documents supplied to the Committees.
a. The bulk of historical dața, organizational directives, budgets,
cash flow, command and control procedures, etc. should be made available
to the Committees on request and transmitted by the agencies concerned ·
directly to the Select Committees. This material will be under the control
of the Select Committees. It should be properly classified as appropriate
to assure downgrading under the Freedom of Information Act is consistent
with the judgment of the originating agency. The agencies will inform the
central registry of the IC Staff of such transmissions and provide a
description of the materials. The record file will be maintained by the
originating agency so that it may be retrieved if necessary for use by
authorized persons.
b. A second level of material will involve more sensitive data where
sanitization or compartmented arrangements may be desired. Agencies will
be responsible for these determinations. The IC Staff and the USIB Security
Committee will develop general guidelines for application of sanitization
· procedures. Emphasis will be placed on protecting sources and methods
while providing meaningful response and documentation to the Select
Committees. The record copy of all such material will be available in the
originating agencies. The existence of the original file and its sanitized
version and location will be recorded with the registry. Keys to sanitized
versions will be held by the agencies concerned.
C. A third type of material will be made available to Select
Committee members or staff at the originating agency or if desirable at
a central point to be determined. (Facilities for a central reading room
can be established by the IC Staff, if desired.) This material would be
provided in the presence of an authorized representative of the originating
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 20
.3

agency. These "fondling" files may have specific limiations placed upon
them by the agencies concerned. Where such search limitations are
determined, they should be consistent with the agreements contained in the
DCI letter to Senator Church or with ground rules agreed among responsible
agencies or with the Select Committees. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
provides one forum for such determinations where interagency discussions
are useful.
A fourth type of material for numerous reasons will not be
available to Select Committee Staff in its raw form, e.g., memoranda to
or from the President, especially sensitive matters where Executive Branch
prerogatives are involved. This material can be used to prepare briefs or
provide briefings to Select Committee Staff or members bur specific
documentatious normally will not be provided. If such briefs or briefings
I do not satisfy the Select Committees, negotiations will be undertaken with
the Committees. The DCI should be kept advised in all such instances.
Normally, if after negotiations there is provision of raw data, such data
will be hand-carried to the Committees and read by the Committee or
Staff members in the presence of an authorized representative of the
originating agency as in c. above. This shall be made a matter of record
by memorandum of the originating agency to the DCI and recorded in the
IC registry along with the ground rules negotiated with the committees
and the agencies in their negotiations. These ground rules will normally
be an agenda item on the Aḍ Hoc Coordinating Group agenda.
جاور الواحة
2. Testimony given in informal interview with Select Committee Staff
will be recorded normally in a memorandum of record and filed in the agency
concerned. Employees not wishing to report such testimony are free from
doing so. Notification will be given to the IC central index of the existence
of the file, its location and access rules. To the degree possible, the
registry will cross-reference all materials provided the Committees and will
prepare current reports on such materials.
D. LEGAL SUPPORT AND QUALITY CONTROLS
1. The Intelligence Community Ștaff has several lawyers who will be
assigned to provide support to legal matters relating to this inquiry. The
leader of this group will be expected to have regular consultation with the
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 21
General Counsels of all USIB Agencies and the Department of Justice,
the NSC, the OMB, and other Executive Branch elements involved in the
inquiry. Since the inquiry can résult in the introduction of legislation,
the IC Staff lawyers will also provide to the DCI appropriate legal briefs
for his use. The recording of these briefs will also be made by the
central index. The lawyers will also assist the DCI and USIB in ensuring
that the Select Committees' procedures are developed in consideration
of the legal and constitutional position of the USIB agencies and employees
thereof.
2. We can anticipate the Select Committees will have 40-50 staff
personnel involved in the inquiries and that they will normally proceed
directly to the agencies concerned within their functional areas of interest.
Cross agency activity coordination and substantive comparisons will occur
within the Select Committees' staffs. It is in the interest of the USIB
Agencies to assure equally good coordination between and among the
members and Executive Branch elements as appropriate in the material
and testimony provided and that a general quality control of the product
is exercised. The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group provides the forum for keeping
USIB Agencies informed on responses provided in the course of the inquiry
and avoiding surprise. Further, the IC Staff will establish a small quality
control and evaluative function and be alert to the indicators available as
the investigations proceed of potential actions or further inquiries that could
derive from materials or testimony provided by the various agencies.
3. There will be a range of "skeletons" and allegations which may
surface in the course of the inquiry. USIB Agencies will seek to assure that
all the facts are found and addressed so as to be responsive to the Select
Committee inquiry and in consideration of the Administration.
E. ALLEGATIONS AND PUBLICITY
1. The nature of the investigation will undoubtedly continue to afford
considerable public discourse. Many press allegations will cause further
inquiry. A system to check the veracity of such allegations should be
established by each USIB Agency. The IC Staff will also undertake to
monitor press allegations and discuss them with the agencies involved
as appropriate.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 22
2. Senator Church intends to provide the press with commentary on
selective testimony or facts pertaining to the inquiry. He has advised that
he will clear with the Director these releases, to avoid inadvertent disclosure
harmful to U.S. intelligence agencies. Review of such releases will be
undertaken by the IC Staff in concert with appropriate agencies.
3. In preparing statements or testimony to be given in open or closed
hearings, senior intelligence officials should avail themselves of all
previous related testimony or material furnished by other sources.
4.
The DCI, through his IC Staff, will assure regular consultation with
Executive Branch agencies on press matters and take steps to foster good
communication between USIB entities and political officials.
Notification of all inquiries from press officials to intelligence
agencies concemed should be provided to the IC Staff and a record of these
inquiries maintained in the central registry.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 23
:
TO
FROM
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W.R. Wannall wpw|TUL
www/.Tul
w.oegar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
1
Mr. N.P. Callahan
1
-
Mr. J.B. Adams
DATE: March 27, 1975
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep
Asst Dir.:
1 Each Assistant Director
1
-
Mr. W.O. Cregar
This memorandum is responsive to a request by the
Director, that is, "It appears we are gearing ourselves to
quick responses--why can't we get an agreement as to a
reasonable response time?"
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated
3/21/75, captioned as above, described in considerable detail
problems concerned with coordinating responses to the Select
Committees of Congress. One of the significant problems is
the very short deadlines we anticipate receiving from the
Select Committees.
Responsive to the Director's question, should we
get unreasonable deadlines from the Select Committees
requiring extensive file reviews, our legislative liaison
will personally contact Senator Church or Congressman Nedzi,
pointing out to them the problems attendant to the short
deadline and requesting an extension in order that we may
be completely responsive to their requests.
ACTION:
negotiating
62-116395-48
REC-28
1 APR 8 1975
For the Director's information.
q
WOC:bcw
(17)
TADRIG
bew
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
TEREIN 
IS UNCLAUSTWIED
D/139/26/00 S: SP2 ALm/776
04APR 10
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 24
ок
Off 
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56106
NW 88608-Docid:32989530- Page 25
#MOR 1
ON THIS
ENVELOPE
P 9/26/00 SP-2 ALM 716
300
7
L
m
DIRECTOR
#MOR 16
DECLASSIFIED BY SPA ALM) ITG
OH 
9/25/00
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. G.
August 24, 1936.
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
ROOSEVELT
This morning, in accordance with the request of the President
conveyed to me personally by him last Wednesday in New York City, I called
at the White House at 9:15 and was with the President until 10:15.
He was desirous of discussing the question of the subversive
activities in the United States, particularly Fascism and Communism. He
had previously received the memorandum which I had prepared covering my
conversation with General Smedley Butler and the effort of Father Coughlin
to have General Butler head an expedition to Mexico. I informed the President
concerning certain recent developments in the Communist activities in the
country, particularly the efforts of the Bridges organization in Sen Fran-
cisco and their progressive control of the shipping on the Pacific Coast,
the Gulf Coast and their recent expansion to shipping operations on the
Atlantic Coast. I told him that while their contrast will expire on
September 30, 1936, they are endeavoring to have it temporarily extended
until April 1, 1937, in order to conform to the same date that the United
'Mine Workers' contract expires, which organization is headed by John L.
Lewis. I told him that the Bridges organization was practically controlled
by Communists and that the Communists had now decided to make very definite
plans to get control of the Lewis organization.
I called his attention to the activities of the Newspaper Guild
headed by Heywood Broun, which has strong Communistic leanings, and which
has been responsible for putting out of operation the Seattle Post Intel-¨
ligencer. I told him that my information was that the Communists had plarned
to get control of these three groups and by doing so they would be able at
any time to paralyze the country in that they could stop all shipping in
and out through the Bridges organization; stop the operation of industry
through the Mining Union of Lewis; and stop publication of any newspapers
of the country through the Newspaper Guild.
I also related to him the activities which have recently oc-
curred within Governmental service inspired by Communists, particularly
in some of the Departments and in the National Labor Relations Board.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 26
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
- 2 -
8-24-36
I likewise informed him that I had received information to the
effect that the Communist Internationale in Moscow has recently issued in-
structions for all Communists in the United States to vote for President
Roosevelt for reelection and against Governor Landon because of the fact
that Governor Landon is opposed to class warfare.
The President stated that he had been considerably concerned
about the movements of the Communists and of Fascism in the United States
and that while the Secret Service of the Treasury Department had assured
him that they had informants in every Communist group, he believed that
if that was true it was solely for the purpose of getting any information
upon plots upon his life, whereas what he was interested in was obtaining
a broad picture of the general movement and its activities as may affect the
economic and political life of the country as a whole. I told him that there
is at the present time no governmental organization which is getting any
so-called "general intelligence information" upon this subject. He inquired
what suggestions i might offer relative to this matter. I told him that
the appropriation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contains a provi-
sion that it might investigate any matters referred to it by the Department
of State and that if the State Department should ask for us to conduct such
an investigation we could do so under our present authority in the appro-
priation already granted. He stated that he is reluctant to have a formal
request come through the State Department because of the many leaks therein,
`but that what he would do would be to put a handwritten memorandum of his
´own in his safe in the White House, stating he had instructed the Secretary
of State to request this information to be obtained by the Department of
Justice. He stated he would have the Secretary of State at the White House
tomorrow afternoon, and asked me to call at the White House at 1:45 p.m.
to see him, the President, and the Secretary of State, at which time the
matter could be further discussed and an oral request could be made of me
by the Secretary of State for investigation so as to avoid any possibility
of any leak.
He suggested that I endeavor to coordinate any investigation
along similar lines which might be made by the Military or Naval Intelligence
Services. He stated that the Secret Service was not being brought in on this
investigation as they should confine themselves strictly to the matter of
protecting his life and the survey which he desired to have made was on a
much broader field.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 27
John Edgar Hoover.
Jiv Link
DIRECTOR
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
August 25, 1936.
EMPIRE SITIAL
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
#mde16
PETLASSIFIED 
BY 
SPZ ALM 1776
0
* 9-25-00-
Today, in line with the request of the President, I called at the
White House at 1:45 p.m., and present at the conference were the President,
the Secretary of State and myself. The President related to the Secretary of
State his concern relative to Communist activities in this country, as well as
Fascist activities. He stated that he was very desirous of having a survey
made of these conditions and informed the Secretary of State that this survey
could be made by the Department of Justice if the Secretary of State requested
the Department to conduct the inquiry, as under the Appropriation Act this
Bureau would have authority to make such investigation if asked to do so by
the Secretary of State. The President pointed out that both of these move-
ments were international in scope and that Communism particularly was directed
from Moscow, and that there had been certain indications that Oumansky, at-
tached to the Russian Soviet Embassy, was a leading figure in some of the
activities in this country, so consequently, it was a matter which fell within
the scope of foreign affairs over which the State Department would have a right
to request an inquiry to be made.
"The Secretary of State inquiry if a request should be made in
writing. The President indicated that it should not be since he desired the
matter to be handled quite confidentially and that it would be sufficient that
the President, the Secretary of State and I should be the ones aware of this
request.
-
The Secretary of State asked that the investigation be made and then
made several suggestions one, relative to the making of a protest, either
formally or informally, to the Russian Government relative to its interference
with affairs in this country, Discussion was also had as to the information
obtained indicating that the Third Internationale had indicated preference for
Roosevelt as against Landon. It was the opinion of the President that some
statement should be made along this line by the Attorney General at an early
date. The President asked that I speak to the Attorney General, upon his re-
turn to the city, about this matter, and he suggested to the Secretary of
State that he talk over the technique to be followed in this particular aspect,
with the Attorney General.
•X Julverine activities Investigations
4.7
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 28
John Edgar Hoover.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 29
62-116395-47
་་ ་་
ENTE
4017MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/HIG
Office of the Attorney Erneral
Washington, D.C.
September 14, 1967.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Although the bulk of criminal offenses occurring
in the course of recent riots have been local rather
than federal in nature, the question as to whether
there was an organization which (a) had made advanced
plans for, and (b) was active during any of the riots
in the summer of 1967 is one that cannot always be
readily resolved by local authorities. In view of the
seriousness of the riot activity across the country.
it is most important that you use the maximum available
resources, investigative and intelligence, to collect
and report all facts bearing upon the question as to
whether there has been or is a scheme or conspiracy by
any group of whatever size, effectiveness or affiliation,
to plan, promote or aggravate riot activity.
In this connection the following federal statutes
“could be applicable depending, of course, upon the factual
situation that develops:
☐
Title 18, USC, Section 2383, which proscribes
the inciting or engaging in any rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the
United States.
Title 18, USC, Section 2384, which proscribes
conspiring to overthrow or to destroy by force
the Government of the United States or to
oppose by force the authority thereof or by
· force to prevent, hinder or delay the execution
of any law of the United States.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 30

Title 18, USC, Section 2385, which proscribes,
inter adia, advocacy of overthrowing the
Government of the United States or the Govern-
ment of any state, territory, District or,
possession thereof, or the Government of any
political subdivision therein by force or
violence.
Activities Affecting Armed Forces, 18 USC 2388
Selective Service, 50 USC (App.) 462
Travel and Interstate Transportation,
18 USC 1952 (Arson)
18 USC 831-33 (Explosive)
Assault and Killing of Federal Officers and
Employees, 18 USC 111, 114 and 2231
Destruction of Government Property, 18 USC 1361 et al.
Federal Firearms Act, 15 USC 901-909
Crimes on Federal Reservations, 18 USC 13, 81 et al.
I appreciate that the Bureau has constantly been
alert to this problem and is currently submitting intelli-
gence reports to us about riots and about the activity of
certain groups and individuals before, during and after
a riot. Indeed, the President has said both publicly and
privately that the FBI is conducting extensive and comprehen-
sive investigations of these matters.
There persists, however, a widespread belief that
there is more organized activity in the riots than we
presently know about. We must recognize, I believe, that
this is a relatively new area of investigation and intelli-
gence reporting for the FBI and the Department of Justice.
We have not heretofore had to deal with the possibility
of an organized pattern of violence, constituting a
violation of federal law, by a group of persons who make
the urban ghetto their base of operation and whose
activities may not have been regularly monitored by
existing intelligence sources.
In these circumstances, we must be certain that
every attempt is being made to get all information
bearing upon these problems; to take every step possible
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 31
to determine whether the rioting is pre-planned or
organized; and, if so, to determine the identity of
the people and interests involved; and to deter this
activity by prompt and vigorous legal action.
As a part of the broad investigation which must
necessarily be conducted, it is requested that all
available information be reported and analyzed regard-
-- -ing each sniper caught in any riot or extremist
activity and regarding those arrested during the course
of a riot or significant racial disturbances who were
not residents of the general area. Moreover, sources
or informants in black nationalist organizations, SNCC
and other less publicized groups should be developed
and expanded to determine the size and purpose of these
groups and their relationship to other groups, and also
to determine the whereabouts of persons who might be
Involved in instigating rist activity in violation of
federal law. Further, we need to investigate fully
allegations of conspiratorial activity that come to our
attention from outside sources such as those reported
regarding Newark in Life Magazine for July 28, 1967,
and those regarding the Detroit riot which were furnished
to the Department by Walter Sheridan of the National
Broadcasting Company (summary of latter is attached).
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 32
RAMSEY CLARK
Attorney General
3
IL FEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
#MDR16
ALM 1256
RENT IS UNCLASSINUND
ONE111-7-00 BY
DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
DECEMBER 15, 1953
:
"On September 6, 1939, January 8, 1943, and July 24,
1950, Presidential Directives were issued requesting all enforce-
ment officers, both Federal and State, to report promptly all
information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities
and related matters to the nearest field representative of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
| "The Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with
investigating all violations of the Atomic Energy Act, including
the illegal export or import of fissionable material, the illegal
possession or transportation of fissionable material and the
illegal production, transf, or possession of any equipment or
device upilling ficsionable materiel or atomic energy as a military
Weapon. Fissionable material' means plutonium, uranium-235 ór
other material which the Atomic Energy Commission has determined
to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through
nuclear Chain reaction. I am requesting that all enforcement
officers; both Federal and State, report all information relating
to violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest field repre-
sentative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
"I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals
likewise report all such information to the. Federal Bureau of
Ir vestigation in the same manner."
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 33
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1950
7B7
#ADRIG
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
REIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 EX SP 2 ALM) 176
INFORMATION RELATING TO DOMESTIC ESPIONAGE,
SABOTAGE, SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND RELATED MATTERS
On September 6, 1939 and January 8, 1943 a Presi-
dential Directive was issued providing that the Federal Bureau
of Dvostigation of the Department of Justice should take
charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage,
sabotago, subversive activities and related matters. It was
pointed out that the' investigations must be conducted in a
comprehensive manner on a National basis and all information
carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion.
I should like to again call the attention of all Enforcement
Officers, both Federal and State, to the request that they re-
port all information in the above onumerated fields promptly
to the nerast Field Representative of the Federal Bureau of .
Investigation, which is charged with tipe responsibility of
correlating this material and referring matters which are under
the jurisdiction of any other Federal Agency with responsibili-
tles in this field to the appropriate agency.
1
I suggest that all patriotic organizations and
individuals likewise report all such information relating to
espionage, sabotage and subversive activities to the Foderal
Bureau of Investigation in this same manner.
:
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 34
< Jok
'
REPORT SECURITY MATTERS TO FBI
"On September 6, 1939, I issued a di-
+
rective providing that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the Department of Justice
should take charge of investigative work in
matters relating to espionage, sabotage and
violations of the neutrality regulations,
pointing out that the investigations must be
conducted in a comprehensive manner, on a
national basis, and all ipformation carefully.
sifted out and correlated in order to avoid
confusion and irresponsibility. I then
requested all police officers, sheriffs, and
other law enforcement officers in the United
States, promptly to turn over to the nearest
representative of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation any such information.
"I am again calling the attention of all
enforcement officers to the request that they
report all such information promptly
the
nearest field representative of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, which is charged
with the responsibility of correlating this.
material and referring matters which are
under the jurisdiction of any other Federal
agency with responsibilities in this field
to the appropriate agency.
"I suggest that all patriotic organiza-
tions and individuals likewise report all
such information relating to espionage and
related matters to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in
in 
the same manner.
"I am confident that all law enforcement
officers, who are now rendering such invalu-
able assistance toward the success of the
internal safety of our country will cooperate
in this matter.
January 8, 2943
Frituursavele
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 35
m0R16
UCLANSIFIED
ALY, INFORMATION CONTAINED
9-25-00 SP-2 ALm/776
A mainisanova, si boðskatukan
When
DIRECTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
SEPTEMBER 6, 1939
The Attorney General has been requested by me to instruct
the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice
to take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espić ugo
sabotage, and violations of the neutrality r`gulations.
"This task must be conducted in a comprehensive and
effective manner on a national basis, and all information must be
carefully sifted out and correlated in order to avoid confusion and
irresponsibility.
"To this end I request all police officers, sheriffs, and
all other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to
turn over to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation any information obtained by them relating to espionage,
counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and violations of
the neutrality laws."
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 36
FBZ
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
FD
9/25/00 SPAJALM/JTG
"
September 10, 1953.
#MDR16
Strictly
Conta
25:00.
SRI ALALIG
MEMORANDU: FOR MR.
In talking with the Attorney General today.
concerning the radical situation, Is informed
hin of the conference which I had with the Presi
dont on September 1, 1953, at which time the
cretary of State was procent, and at which
time the Secretary of State, at the President's
suggestion, requested of me, the representative.
of the Department of Justice, to have investigu
tion made of the subversive activities in this
country, including communism and fascism. I
transmitted this request to the Attorney General,
and the Attorney General verbally directed mo tol
proceed with this investigation and to coordinate,
as the President suggested, information upon
these matters in the possession of the military
Intelligence Divsion, the Naval Intelligence Divi-
sion, and the State Department. This, therefore,.
is the pathority, upon which to proceed in the
conduct of this Investigation, which should, of
course, be handled in a most discreet and cor-
fidential manner.
Very truly yours,
John Edgar Hoover,
Director.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 37
ت
****
COILING
912424
9/25/00 SP-2 ALN/776
Kr
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
1
1
-
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
April 4, 1975
Legal Counsel Division
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Reference is made to a letter from the Senate
Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain
documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation,
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes
an initial response to the various requests set forth in
referenced letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed
for your récords. Processing of the additional requests
is continuing on an expeditious basis and further responses
will be forthcoming.
Enclosures (10)
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(5)
f
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
2-ENCLOSURE
4/4 P
Training APR 171975
Legal Coun.
Telephone
Director Se
75
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 38
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TELETYPE UNIT
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APR 8 1975
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GPO 954-545
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- 9/25/00 SP2 ALM 1756
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
STATES
-
1
1
-
Legal Counsel Division
Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 4, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIEŠ
Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975,
to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned
Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents
and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI).
Attached are various documents which constitute an
initial and partial response to the Committee's request.
These documents are described as follows:
✓1. A memorandum from Attorney General Ramsey Clark
to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, dated September 14, 1967.
2. Two FBI memoranda recording instructions
received from President Franklin D. Roosevelt by FBI Director
Hoover concerning FBI investigations of subversive activities
and which indicate meetings between President Roosevelt and
Director Hoover on August 24 and 25, 1936.
3. A memorandum from Director Hoover to FDI
Associate Director E. A, Tamm, dated September 10, 1936.
4.
Prosidential directives dated September 6, 1939;
January 8, 1943; July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1953.
The various other requests contained in the
Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention
and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible
timo.
Enclosures (8)
1
-
The Attorney General
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NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 39
The Attorney Genoral
REC-46
Director, FBI (1
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
46²
37-463
1
1
1
-
-
-
March 31, 1975
Mr. N.P. Callahan
Mr.
J.B. Adams
Mr. J.A. Mintz
-
Mr. W.R. Wannall
1
-
Mr. W.O. Cregar
Reference is made to a telephone convorsation
between Associate Deputy Attorney Gonoral James A. Wilderotter
and Inspector John B. Hotis on March 25, 1975.
This will confirm the authorization provided by
Mr. Wilderotter to Mr. Hotis with regard to permitting CIA
to furnish a menorandum dated February 7, 1960, entitled
"CIA Operations in the United States," to the staff of the
Sonate Select Committee.
It is our understanding that Mr. William G. Millor,
Staff Director, Sonate Select Committee, telephonically
contacted Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director
of Contral Intelligence, and requested a copy of the above-
described memorandum.
1 The Doputy Attorney General
WOC:bcw
(9)
NOTE:
#mpR16
9/25/00 SP2 ALM/776
See memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall,
dated 3/24/75, captioned "Senstudy 75," prepared by WOC:ebc.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
MAILED 6
MAR & 1 1975
-FBI
T
Director Sec A MAIL, ROOMŰ
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 40
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FROM
OPTIONAL FORM.NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GO
5010-106
MENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
: W.
look
Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
G
CHIVIO GIRI UTV
mt47a
ALM
DATE 9/25/00x
3/25/75
406
3/24/75
-
Mr.
DATE:
1
1
1
1
-
Adams
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dop. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _
This memorandum reports that on the morning of
3/24/75 Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating
Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community,
telephonically advised Section Chief William O. Cregar, the
Bureau's representative on this Group, that the Senate Select
Committee (SSC) has requested a copy of the 2/7/66 FBI CIA
Understanding, entitled "CIA operations in the United States,"
-
We have previously received requests from the House
Appropriations Committee as well as the Rockefeller Commission
for copies of the FBI CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66. In
both instances Deputy AG Laurence Silberman authorized the
release of the FBI CIA Understanding to the House Appropria-
tions Committee as well as the Rockefeller Commission.
-
-
yil
们
On the morning of 3/24/75 Mr. John Clarke telephonically
advised that CIA has received a request from the SSC to provide
the SSC with a copy of the FBI CIA Understanding. Inasmuch as
we have previously provided a copy of this Understanding to
another Congressional committee, it would appear that we have no
choice but to furnish a copy of this Understanding to the SSC;
however, clearance should be obtained from Deputy AG Silberman.
Inasmuch as a timely response to the SSC is desired,
it would appear reasonable for the Legal Counsel Division to
telephonically inquire from Mr. Silberman whether he interposes
any objection to CIA furnishing a copy of the Understanding to
the SSC. If oral authority is obtained, the Intelligence Division
will confirm such authority from the Deputy AG in writing.
ACTION:
REC-46 62-116375
انا
4.
If approved, the Legal Counsel Division'
sion 
111 1975
attempt
to obtain Mr. Silberman's authority for FBI to advise CIA that
this Bureau interposes no objection to CIA furnishing a copy of
the FBI - CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66 to the SSC staff. This
authority will be confirmed in writing if granted.
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On 3/25/75, Assic Depanty H.
James Wilderetter and
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NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 41
LEGED
C
EXP. PROC.
MAR 21 1975
#MOR16
9/25/00 SP2 ALIN/1.16
NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENC
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
20 March 1975
Assoc. Dir. -
Dep.-A.Adm
Dep.-An
Asst. Dir.:
Adim.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535
Dear Mr. Kelley:
(Occuctely mis
Thank you for forwarding me a copy of your letter to
Bill Cotter covering postal-related matters which might come
up in the Select Committees' review of U.S. intelligence. I
have passed this communication to John Clarke and can reaffirm
that John will be in touch with Bill as these matters evolve. I
want to assure that subjects dealing with any postal relationships
are properly coordinated.
I am furnishing Mr. Cotter with a copy of this letter.
cc: Mr. Cotter
REC-19 EX-110
Sincerely,
Bel
E. Colby
Director
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APR 1 1975
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58 APR 8 19751
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 42
ķ
5-Wra
-
Assoc. Dir.
CODE
TELETYPE
#MDR16
TO ALL SACS
*TX 7
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
9/25/00
NITEL
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
30UPATIONS SECTION
MAR 24 1975
Tipp 12:50mm.
Ⓒ SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVISTYPE
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE (TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMA-
TION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN
OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD
SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION,
SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS
AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT
ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPRO-
PRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS
INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL
1 - Each Assistant Director
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm..
Director Sec'y
62-11653975-44
NOTE: By letter dated 3/19/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelli-
gence Activities, made an initial request for data concerning the FBI's legal
authority, jurisdictional agreements, organization and staffing, policies and
procedures and studies and reports concerning internal security and counter-
intelligence activities. It is necessary to contact the field offices to obtain
26 
1975
specific information concerning the current agent staff assigned to these
matters.
DWA:jmb
1
MAIL ROOM TELETHE
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 43-
✓gmy
UNIT
تلاشی
TELETYPE TO ALL SACS
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD
BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 44
2
EMDRIG
५
FROM
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall, for
: W. olleregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATIGO CONTAINS
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFI
DATE 11-7-00
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
DATE:
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
3/18/75
Mr. Mintz
-
Mr.
Wannall
Mr. Farrington
1
-
Mr. Cregar
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of
the Intelligence Community, (hereafter-referred to as the
Group), held on 3/14/75.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Ad
Dep. AD
ir.:
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made
up of representatives of agencies and departments having
membership on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future
testimony before various Congressional committees.
At a meeting of the Group on 3/14/75 the following
items were discussed:
Freedom of Information:
Mr. Clarke asked all agencies to report on the
volume of requests that are received under the Freedom of
Information Act. The CIA representative pointed out that
as of 3/10/75 CIA had received 93 requests. Since 3/10/75
the requests are averaging approximately 50
per day. The
National Security Agency has received approximately 35 requests.
None of the other agencies reported any high volume of requests
and those requests that had been received did not impact on
the Intelligence Community,
Security Arrangements:
EX 104°
REC-38 62-116395-43
-
CIA's Director of Security, Mr. Charles Kane, and
the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, Mr. Donald E. Moore,
have met with Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer for the Senate
Select Committee (SSC), and are encouraged by the physical and
document security arrangements the SSC intends to employ. Attached
is a letter from Senator Church to Mr. Colby expressing Senator
Church's appreciation for the help provided by Mr. Colby's staff
in developing security precautions.
Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(7) 4
6
ENCLOSURE
CONTINUED OVER
-A
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 45
$
I
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
The FBI CIA 1966 Understanding:
-
ame
Mr. Clarke advised that the Rockefeller Commission
requested a copy of the FBI - CIA Understanding of 1966 and
inquired whether one could be made available to the Commission.
I advised Mr. Clarke that we had made the 1966 Understanding
available to Congressional committees and I saw no reason why
a copy of the Understanding could not be furnished to the
Rockefeller Commission but I would have to defer to Deputy AG
Silberman (also in attendance). Mr. Silberman said by all means
we would have to respond to the Rockefeller Commission and he
authorized Clarke to furnish a copy of the Understanding to
the Rockefeller Commission.
Clearances for Staff Members of the SSC:
"
Attached hereto is a copy of a letter to the Staff
Director of the SSC from Mr. Clarke outlining procedures for
the certification of clearances granted to SSC staff members.
As an enclosure to this attachment is a suggested format which
the SSC could use in certifying that staff members who have
received a security investigation by the FBI meet the require-
ments of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified informa-
tion up to and including "Top Secret. A second enclosure to
Clarke's letter to Miller contains a copy of Director of Central
Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14 which sets up the Uniform
Personnel Security Standards and Practices Governing Access to
Sensitive Compartmented Information. Clearances for access to
compartmented information are the responsibility of CIA and such
clearances will be issued to select members of the SSC on a
"need-to-know" basis.
Staff Members on Whom Substantial Derogatory Information is
Developed:
Mr. Clarke asked if I could describe for the Group
what procedures had been worked out with Senator Church when
information was developed of a significant derogatory nature
regarding potential staff employees. I advised the Group that
upon such a determination a Bureau official would bring the
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 46
-2-
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
written results of the investigation personally to the
attention of Senator Church or his Staff Director. Follow-
ing that a copy of this investigation would be made available
to Mr. Colby as the Director of Central Intelligence and that
Senator Church or the Staff Director would welcome any comments
from Mr. Colby as to the security ramifications attendant to
the employment of this person. Mr. Clarke agreed this was a
very desirable procedure and the Group fully endorsed this
arrangement.
Organization of the SSC:
Attached is Mr. Clarke's understanding of how the
SSC will be organized. It is noted it will be broken down into
four Task Forces, each with a Task Force Director, a lawyer or
lawyers assigned, each with several researchers. As noted from
this enclosure, Task Force three concerns domestic activities
including the FBI and those parts of the CIA that relate to
domestic matters. Army counterintelligence activities may also
come under the cognizance of this Task Force. Staffing for Task
Force number three is still in process and no Task Force Director
has yet been appointed.
CIA Secrecy Agreement and Employee Bulletin:
Attached hereto is a letter to Senator Church from
Mr. Colby designed to relieve current CIA employees from any
obligation of secrecy. It is noted all CIA employees sign a
Secrecy Agreement as a prerequisite to employment. Also attached
is a copy of an Employee Bulletin, dated 3/12/75, advising CIA
employees as to the procedures he should follow if he is selected
to be interviewed by a member of the SSC or its staff. It is to
be noted that both the Employee Bulletin and Colby's letter to
Senator Church were reviewed by the White House and the Department
of Justice.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 47
3.
-
CONTINUED
-
OVER
I
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
CIA Requirements Received from the SSC:
Attached herewith is a letter from Senator Church
to Mr. Colby enclosing the initial request for CIA documents
for transmittal to the SSC. According to Mr. Clarke, it is
his understanding that similar requests if not already received
are being prepared by the SSC for other members of the Group.
Executive Session:
At the conclusion of the formal meeting, Mr. Clarke
asked for an executive meeting to include the following persons:
Deputy AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter;
Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; Mr. Chamberlain,
Inspector General, CIA; Mr. Thomas Latimer, Department of Defense
and myself.
According to Mr. Clarke the purpose of this meeting
was to develop strategy as to how the Group would respond to
the anticipated requests from the SSC. Both Mr. Buchen of
the White House and Mr. Silberman, acting in his capacity as the
President's Counsel for Congressional Inquiries, insisted that
all requests as well as the responses to all such requests be
coordinated through the above Group. Much discussion was had as
to how this could be accomplished. No definitive decision was
arrived at. However, it was agreed that the CIA would prepare
a paper outlining how they would respond to the questions that
they had already received, defining the level of response, the
area of coordination and identification of sensitive problems.
It was not quite clear to the Group as to exactly what form CIA's
paper would take. It was proposed by Mr. Buchen and agreed that
the same Executive Group would meet at CIA Headquarters on 3/19/75
to review the paper developed by CIA.
In view of the various legal questions involved and
because of the direct involvement of Congressional committees,
the question of the Bureau's representation was discussed with
Mr. Adams. It was agreed that in addition to Mr. Cregar, the
Bureau would be represented by Assistant Director Mintz. This
proposal was discussed with Mr. Clarke and he readily agreed that
certainly Mr. Mintz' presence would be a valuable asset to the Group.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 48
4.
-
CONTINUED OVER
I
I
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
As a result, Mr. Mintz and Mr. Cregar will attend the meeting
of the Group on Wednesday, 3/19/75, at CIA Headquarters, at
10:30 a.m.
Senator Towers had requested the Bureau to conduct
a counteraudio sweep of his personal office inasmuch as he
anticipated having sensitive conversations in his office: con-
cerning the business of the SSC. Mr. Cregar was asked to raise
the question of a counteraudio sweep during the executive session
to get an expression from the Group as to whether counteraudio
sweeps should be done. Both Mr. Silberman and Mr. Buchen felt
it was desirable to conduct such sweeps and strongly recommended
that they be done. No commitment was made as to who would do
the sweeps at the time. However, after consultation with Assistant
Directors Wannall and White, Mr. Adams and Mr. Callahan, it was
agreed that the Bureau should do the sweeps inasmuch as it was
a domestic matter. Mr. White indicated that he did have the
personnel and the equipment to conduct such sweeps. As a result
of that decision Mr. Clarke was telephonically advised that the
Bureau would conduct counteraudio sweeps of the personal offices
of both the Senate and House Select Committees providing such
was in accord with the desires of both Committees. Our Legisla-
tive Liaison is currently contacting both Senator Church and
Congressman Nedzi to confirm that both Committees desire this
counteraudio check. It is to be noted that these sweeps will not
include the outer offices of the Senators or Congressmen and will
not include the offices of the employees of both staffs.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
этае
дна
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 49
- 5 -
-
|
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICĘ CHAIT
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINE
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAK R., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
¡VILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
Vlnited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 14TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
March 12, 1975
Excutive. Registry
75-1266
Ad Hoc Staff
-75-103
#MDR16
Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Colby:
On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I want to thank
your for your letter of March 11, and the copy of the Employee Bulletin
you have issued to all CIA employees. As we jointly recognize, in
order for the Committee to carry out a thorough inquiry, in accordance
with the mandate contained in S. Res. 21, the Agency's full cooperation
will be necessary. Your recognition that our mandate authorizes all,
past and present, agency employees to cooperate fully, and without
impediment due to secrecy agreements, will serve to facilitate our
expeditious collection of material relative to that mandate.
I particularly appreciate your statement recognizing our security
precautions. As you know, your staff was very helpful to the Committee's
staff in designing those precautions.
The Staff Director and the Chief Counsel will; under the direction
of the Committee, notify Mr. John Clarke of the members of the Committee
who have been designated to carry out studies, inquiries and investigations
required to meet the tasks specified in S. Res. 21.
It is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committee
and designated staff will have access to any and all information which
the Committee determines is necessary for its inquiry. We recognize,
however, that the Committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, such
as the identity of CIA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations
whose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the event
that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matters
we have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discuss
jointly, and as you suggest quickly, what procedures might be followed
should the Committee decide it requires more information in these specific
areas.
NW 88608. Docld:32989530 Page 50
01776

Mr. William Colby
Page Two
March 12, 1975
I welcome these first steps in close cooperation and hope that
it forecasts an expeditious and thorough inquiry that will result in
the strengthening of our nation's intelligence activities under the
law.
✓ merely
Sincerely,
ranch
Frank Church
Chairman
Turch
NW 88608, Docld:32989530 Page 51
CONFIDENTIAL
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
13 March 1975
DRIG
-7.00
Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Bill:
Following up on our brief discussion Tuesday on the clearances of
Committee Staff, I thought it might be helpful to outline a procedure
which you may consider reasonable to use.
As I understand your current ground rules, you are submitting your
staff applicants to the FBI for full field security investigation and on report
from the Bureau, under the authority of Senate Resolution 21, the Chairman.
and/or the Committee will take action to grant or deny clearance.
The next step requires a notification to the Director of Central
Intelligence of the Chairman's decision and certification of the clearances
granted. I've attached a suggested format for this which you could use.
On receipt of the certification we will advise the USIB security elements
of the people so certified.
I also promised to go over with you the range of compartmented
clearances that exist and I am prepared to do that when we next get
together. You will recall these are the clearances for which you will
want to determine the "need-to-know" for selected members of your
staff. We need to establish agreed procedures here as well. Access to
this information requires that an individual meet security standards set
forth in DCID 1/14, a copy of which is attached.
Classified by
006805
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of E.O. 11652, Exemption
Category: 58 (1), (2), (3) or (4)
Declassified only on approval of the
Director of Central Intelligence
MALO SECURITY INFORMATION
62-116375-43
ENCLOSURE
This document may be
X:
( Unclassified
i detached.
Subject to
tions.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 52
CONFIDENTIAL
1
CONFIDENTIAL
-
say,
I would like to suggest that you appoint a member of your staff
Ben Marshall as a focal point for handling compartmented information
access approvals and assign him the responsibility of insuring that these
security standards are met by persons selected to participate in this
sensitive area.
The CIA operates a Compartmented Information Branch as a service
of common concern to the intelligence community which records the names
of all individuals in the Government with access to compartmented information.
Your personnel would be similarly recorded which would considerably ease
the access certifications to all organizations for the duration of your inquiry.
As indicated, I am prepared to discuss this with you at any time.
Sincerely,
Attachments:
1 - DCID 1/14
2 - Suggested Format
2
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 53
CONFIDENTIAL
DCID No. 1/14
(New Series)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/14
1 mol barona
UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PRACTICES
GOVERNING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION¹
(Effective 1 July 1968*)
Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1 (New Series, revised 4 March.
1964), paragraph 2, subparagraph a. (5) and in order to ensure uniform
protection of sensitive compartmented information, the following per-
sonnel security standards and practices are established for all United
States Government civilian and military personnel, Government con-
sultants; and employees-of-Government contractors who require access
to sensitive compartmented information or to information which reveals
the manner, methods and operational details by which sensitive com-
partmented information is collected. The standards and practices estab-
lished herein are to be considered minimal and the departments and
agencies may establish internally such additional security steps as may
be considered necessary and appropriate to ensure that effective security
is maintained. Access to sensitive compartmented information shall be
under the strictest application of the "need-to-know" principle and in
full accordance with the existing authorities and regulations which
govern access thereto.
(2):
annen ons
Purpose.
9
doo
bad si
p.
1. The continued protection of sensitive compartmented information
within any one participating agency or among Government contractors
affects and is a matter of serious security concern to all participating
“agencies. The provisions of this Directive shall apply to all persons-
under the jurisdiction or cognizance of the Executive Branch, without:
regard to civilian or military status, form of employment, official rank’
or position, or length of service. The establishment of uniform person-
nel security standards and practices as well as continuing security pro
grams should enhance the security protection of such information and
at the same time facilitate the security certification process among
*The term "Sensitive compartmented information" as used in this Directive is
intended to include all information and materials bearing special community
controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community
intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community
systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. The
term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section 11, Public Law 585,'
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
.
** This directive supersedes DCID 1/14, approved 23 June 1967.
#MDRIG
ALL FEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAY 11-7-00 BY SP 2 ALM/JTG.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 54
1
CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE
62.1163
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
:
COPY NO 301
43
The following Staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as
identified below by date and place of birth and social security number
have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified
as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to
classified information up to and including Top Secret.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 55
!
CONFIDENTIAL
Government departments and agencies when access to sensitive com-
partmented information is required.
2. Individuals who do not meet the minimum security criteria con-
tained herein and who are, therefore, denied access to sensitive compart-
mented information shall not, solely for this reason, be considered in-
eligible for access to other classified information. However, individuals
whose access to sensitive compartmented information has been author-
ized as an exception granted in accordance with paragraph 5, shall not.
_solely for that reason be considered eligible for access to other classified
information.
5
Personnel Security Approval Criteria
"
3. Criteria for security approval of an individual on a need-to-know.
basis for access to sensitive compartmented information are as follows:-
a. The individual shall be stable, of excellent character and discre-
tion and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States."
b. Except where there is a compelling need and a determination
has been made by competent authority as described in paragraph 5
below that every reasonable assurance has been obtained that under.
the circumstances the security risk is negligible.
(1) Both the individual and the members of his immediate family
shall be U.S. citizens. For these purposes, “immediate family” is
defined as including the individual's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters
and children.
__
A
(2) The members of the individual's family and those persons to
whom he is bound by affection or obligation should neither be sub-`
ject to physical, mental and other forms of duress by a foreign
power nor advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the
Government of the United States nor the alteration of the form of
Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
8.
4. When there is compelling need to grant access to sensitive com-
partmented information prior to completion of the full prescribed in-
vestigation, such investigative checks as are immediately possible shall
be made at once, and shall include a personal interview by trained
security or counterintelligence personnel whenever feasible. Access in
such cases shall be strictly controlled, and the full prescribed investiga-
tion and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable
moment.
Exceptions
5. The exceptions to paragraph 3.b. (1) (2) above may be granted only
by the Senior Intelligence Officer of the parent organization represented
on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), including military de-
partments, or his designee, unless such authority has been specifically
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 56
2
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
im
For Committe
Guida
clounces for
delegated to the head of an office or organization as set forth in inter->.
departmental agreements. All exceptions granted will be a common
sense determination based on all available information, and shall be
recorded by the agency making the exception. In those cases in which
the individual has lived outside of the United States for a substantial.
period of his life, a thorough assessment of the adequacy of the investiga
tion in terms of fulfillment of the minimum investigative requirements,
and: a judicious review of the information therein must be made before
an exception is considered. kanst
Investigative Requirements
plan
6. The investigation conducted on an individual under consideration
for access to sensitive compartmented information shall be thorough and
shall be designed to develop information as to whether the individual
clearly meets the above Personnel Security Approval Criteria
7. The investigation shall be accomplished through personal interviews
by trained investigative personnel and shall establish affirmatively to the
adjudicating agency complete continuity of identity to include birth,
residences, education, emloyments and military service. Where the
circumstances of a case indicate, the investigation shall exceed the basic
requirements set out below to ensure that: those responsible for adju-
dicating access eligibility have in their possession all the relevant facts
available.java
.
8. During the course of the investigation the individual shall furnish
a signed personal history statement and a certificate of non-affiliation
with those organizations designated by the Attorney General pursuant
to Executive Order 10450, Fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be obtained. Photographs of the
individual shall also be obtained where additional corroboration of
identity is required.
19. The individual under investigation shall be given a personal inter-
view by trained security or counterintelligence personnel whenever
feasible
* Luck :
10. Minimum standards for the investigation are as follows:
the
a Verification of date and place of birth and citizenship of the
individual.
b. Check of the subversive and criminal files of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, including submission of fingerprint charts, and other
national agencies as appropriate. An additional check of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service records shall be made if members of
the individual's immediate family are other than United States citizens ·
by birth. ⠀⠀ (97
c. Local checks in all areas of the United States where the individual
has resided for at least six (6) months during the past fifteen years
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 57
3
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
COPY NO 301
CONFIDENTIAL
· or since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Such. period
of coverage shall include the following:
'< (1) Check of police and credit records.
where fear til?
feantile?
(2) Interviews with neighbors at present residence regardless of
duration and, to the extent considered to be productive and practical,
any other address at which the individual has resided..
d. Confirmation of all employment during the past fifteen years or
since age eighteen, whichever is the shorter period. Personal inter-.
views with supervisors and co-workers who had personal contact with
the individual shall be accomplished to the extent possible and prac
tical.
being hits (sohva da mi ve
e. Attendance at institutes of higher learning or at the most recently
attended secondary school shall be verified in all instances. During
these inquiries collateral verification of prior educational records shall
be made and personal interviews with faculty members who had per-
sonal contact with the individual shall be accomplished to the extent
possible and practical.
☐7
f. Review of appropriate military records.
க எ
g. Interviews with a sufficient number of personal references given
by the individual and with a minimum of two other persons who can
furnish information on the basis of personal knowledge concerning
the individual's character, discretion and loyalty.
h. When employment, education or residence, except U.S. Govern-
ment service, has occurred overseas during the past fifteen years, or
since age eighteen, a check of the records will be made at the Passport
Office/Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and other
appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop informants
who knew the individual overseas in order to cover employment, edu-
cation or residence during this period.
i." The spouse of the individual and members of the immediate family
shall be investigated to the extent necessary and appropriate to permit
affirmative determination by the adjudicating agency that the provi-
sions of paragraph 3, Personnel Security Approval Criteria, above, are
met. In all cases, the spouse shall be checked through the subversive
files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other national agencies, ·
as appropriate.
Previous Investigation
11. Where a previous investigation has been conducted within the past
five years which substantially meets the above minimum standards, it
may serve as a basis for granting access approval provided a review of the
personnel and security files does not reveal substantive changes in the
individual's security eligibility. If a previous investigation does not
substantially meet the minimum standards or if it is more than five years
4
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 58
CONFIDENTIAL
DHO
old, a current investigation shall be required but may be limited to that
necessary to bring the individual's file up to date in accordance with the
investigative requirements set forth in paragraph 4, above. Should new
information be developed during the current investigation which bears
unfavorably upon the individual's activities. covered by the previous..
_ investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to
develop full details of this new information.
Evaluation
12. The evaluation of the information developed by investigation on
an individual's loyalty and suitability shall be performed by analysts of
broad knowledge, good judgment and wide experience in security and
counterintelligence. When all other information developed on an in-
dividual is favorable, a minor investigative requirement which has not
been met will not preclude favorable adjudication. In all evaluations -
the protection of the national interest is paramount. Any doubt con-
cerning personnel having access to sensitive compartmented information
shall be resolved in favor of the national security. The ultimate deter-
mination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the
interests of national security shall be an over-all common sense deter-
mination based on all available information.
Security Programs
13. In order to facilitate the attainment of the highest standard of
personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and
the investigative requirements established by this Directive, . member
departments and agencies shall institute continuing Security Programs
for all individuals having access to compartmented information.. In
addition to security indoctrinations, these programs shall be tailored to
create mutually supporting procedures under which no issue will escape
notice or be left unresolved which brings into question an individual's
loyalty and integrity or suggests the possibility of his being subject to
undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable
personal conduct. When an individual is assigned to perform sensitive
compartmented work requiring access to sensitive compartmented infor-
mation and operations, the department, agency or Government program
to which he is assigned shall assume a continuing security and counter-
intelligence responsibility for that individual throughout the period of
his assignment.
14. The Security Programs shall include the following:
a. Security Education Programs to ensure that individuals who are
granted access to sensitive compartmented information are initially
and periodically thereafter indoctrinated as to its unique sensitivity
and that they understand their personal responsibility for its protec-
tion. These indoctrinations should be conducted by individuals having
5
CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded fram automatic)
downgrading and
declassification
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 59
COPY
No 301
CONFIDENTIAL
extensive background and experience regarding the nature and special
vulnerabilities of the particular type of compartmented information
involved..
- wisq
b. Security Supervisory Programs to ensure that supervisory per-
sonnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility for main-
taining the security of sensitive information. Such programs shall
provide practical guidance as to indicators which may signal matters
of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting pro-
cedures shall be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to
take timely corrective action to safeguard the-security of the United
States as well as to provide all necessary help to the individual con-
cerned to neutralize- his vulnerability....
c. Security Review Programs to ensure that appropriate security
· authorities invariably receive and exchange, in a timely manner, all
information bearing on the security posture of persons having access
-to sensitive information. Personnel history information shall be kept
current Security and related files shall be kept under continuing
review. Departments and agencies shall develop security programs
under which at intervals no greater than 5 years; checks are made
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as all relevant police
and credit sources and, where feasible, each individual is given a per-
sonal interview by trained security or counterintelligence personnel.
15. Whenever indicated during the course of these Security Programs,
appropriate investigations shall be conducted on a timely basis. In the
absence of such indication the tempo of additional investigation shall be
tailored by the adjudicating agency to the circumstances surrounding
the individual under consideration as well as the breadth of knowledge.
and degree of sensitivity involyed in his access. The investigation shall
be sufficient in scope to ensure that continued utilization of the individual
in activities requiring sensitive compartmented information is clearly
consistent with the interests of the national security.
Effective Date
16. This Directive declares the policy of USIB concerning Uniform
Personnel Security Standards and Practices for Access to Sensitive Com-
partmented Information.. This policy shall become effective as soon as
practicable after approval of this Directive but in no case later than
1 July 1968. Existing directives, 2 regulations, agreements, and such
other references governing access to sensitive compartmented informa
tion as defined herein shall be revised accordingly.
Richard Helms'
Director of Central Intelligence
* These include pertinent provisions of the Clearance Standards and Investiga-
tion and Evaluation sections of DCID 6/3.
NW.88608 Docid:32989530 Page 60
6
CONFIDENTIAL

--
This is a preliminary view and is provided
as a report for information to the Ad Hoc Group.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 61
ALL TEL
TUL-200
#msel6
The Organization of the Senate Select Committee
-
*-
ALL FINFORMATION CONTAL.
EDWELL IS UNCLASSIFED
11-2-00
Rough Structure
The Committee will organize into four Task Forces - each with a Task
Force Director, each with a lawyer or lawyers assigned and each with
several researchers. Total professionals - 30/40.
Task Force One
→
Foreign Intelligence
i
|
This will deal with the CIA as a line Agency and with the institution of
the Director of Central Intelligence in his responsibility under NSCID #1.
USIB intelligence entities, i. e., State, Treasury, AEC and the military
establishments collecting, processing or producing foreign intelligence
will be reviewed in this context as well. CIA covert action is also covered here.
They plan to begin with basic papers being prepared on USIB agencies
their missions, functions, organizations and general contribution so as to
provide the Committee with a "sound understanding on the role, nature,
performance and structure of intelligence looking toward legislation which
would address national intelligence needs, and provide adequate oversight
of national and defense intelligence entities and their relationships in
foreign policy generally! William Bator is designated the Task Force
Director.
Task Force Two
-
Military Intelligence
This Task Force will deal with the organizational entities within the
Department of Defense collecting, processing, or producing intelligence
including the DIA, the Services Agencies, and the National Security Agency,
the NRO, and other collection entities such as AEDS, Attaches, etc. The
interrelationships between Task Force One and Task Force Two according
to the Staff Director will be accommodated by regular communication among
the Select Committee staff and be addressed by the Committee in the broader.
context of considering possible legislation for alternative structures. The
staffing for this Task Force is still in process and no Task Force Director
has yet been appointed.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 62
34
Task Force Three Domestic Activities
-
This Task Force will concern itself with intelligence organizations
engaged in domestic activities and including the FBI, those parts of the
CIA that relate to domestic matters, and possibly Army counterintelligence
activities. The staffing for this Task Force is still in process and no
Task Force Director has yet been appointed.
Task Force Four Executive Branch Command and Control
----
This Task Force will be concerned with the tasking of the intelligence
community its oversight, the use of intelligence, and the adequacy
thereof and mesh with the DCI's role as principal intelligencè advisor to
the President. It will treat with the National Security Council's activities,
functions, and structure. It will address the variety of sub-committees
thereunder as well as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB). David Aaron will be the Task Force Director. Note: Covert
Action direction and oversight is also included herein.
The Staff Director has indicated that the Committee is interested in dealing
with Agencies and documents therefrom in the most efficient fashion consistent
with security and economy of time. He is not committed at this time to any
particular procedure. He has stated a desire to work selectively inside the
Agencies where access and screening of selective records could take place.
He wishes to avoid shipping in loads of data to the Committee.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
11 MAR 1975
#MDR16
0 =111-7-002 SP2 ALM/JTE
The Honorable Frank Church
Chairman
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This letter will confirm and reduce to writing some
of the matters agreed upon at our recent meeting.
At the outset, I should like to express my deep
personal appreciation for the candor and helpfulness of
you and Senator Tower in that meeting and for your
sensitivity to the respective responsibilities under our
Constitutional framework of the Select Committee and the
Central Intelligence Agency in the area of your review.
For my part, I should like to renew again, for myself and
the CIA, my promise of cooperation with respect to the
important work of the Select Committee. In my judgment,
a spirit of good faith and cooperative effort is not only
necessary to enable your Committee to discharge its
responsibilities fully and expeditiously, but is indeed in
the best interests of the intelligence community as well.
I am convinced that a responsible and thorough review of
U.S. intelligence activities will serve to vindicate the
CIA and enhance the public's understanding of the important
contribution that the intelligence efforts of this nation
can make toward the goal of preserving and strengthening
our democracy.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 64
ENCLOSURE
62-116395
-2-
I am particularly appreciative of your recognition
that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence
activities must receive special consideration and treatment
by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we
discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive
sources, the material provided to us by cooperating foreign
intelligence services, the details of technical devices and
systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain
of our employees who could be targets of kidnapping or
assassination, the identities of American citizens and
organizations who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence, and
some additional materials the public disclosure of which would
create serious foreign policy or national security problems,
should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from
the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect
certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,
might impair the privacy rights of individuals. Where these
kinds of considerations are present, I anticipate that appro-
priate understandings can be arrived at to avoid the risk of
exposing such matters and at the same time to satisfy the
Select Committee's need for a full understanding of our
activities.
As I stated to you, employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency will be available to the Select Committee for staff
interviews and for testimony. As we have discussed, this
might require, in some circumstances, special arrangements to
protect the identity of particular employees whose physical
safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.
I anticipate that suitable safeguards can be established to
avoid such dangers. I assume the Committee will make its own
arrangements with respect to ex-employees as to whom I no
longer have the authority to direct their cooperation.
I am available for whatever assistance I can provide in this
regard.
However,
As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency are required to sign a secrecy agreement when they enter
on duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires
that they keep forever secret all classified information gained
during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement
further requires that they may not disclose classified informa-
tion, either orally or by publication, without prior authoriza-
tion from the Director of Central Intelligence. Under the
secrecy agreement, an employee's obligations with respect to
the protection of classified information continue after his
employment with the CIA has been terminated.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 65
1
-3-
It is my desire that the secrecy agreements signed by
our employees shall not impair the necessary work of the
Select Committee. To accomplish this, and in recognition
of the security protection contemplated by the Select
Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise
protected information to the Select Committee or its designated
staff members will constitute an authorized provision of infor-
mation within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. This
letter may be used to indicate such authorization for any
Agency employee or ex-employee to furnish information to
the Select Committee or appropriate staff members on matters
which would otherwise be covered by their secrecy agreement,
but which are not among the particularly sensitive matters
such as mentioned above. With respect to those particularly
sensitive matters, different procedures are obviously neces
sary. Accordingly, where any matter included in these sensi-
tive categories would be involved in responding to the Com-
mittee, the employee should express his concern and, if
possible, propose a way of responding to the Committee without
exposing such sensitive details. If the Committee believes
that a disclosure of those aspects is nevertheless necessary,
the matter will be discussed between the Committee and the
Agency. I am prepared to consult with the Committee at any
time to avoid difficulties in this area and quickly determine
together the appropriate course of action to be taken.
With the good faith evident in our discussions on these
matters, I believe that these arrangements will enable me to
discharge my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same
time to provide the Select Committee with all the information
it needs to accomplish its task.
As we have agreed, it is in the national interest as well
as that of the Select Committee and the U.S. intelligence
community to ensure that your review proceed as smoothly and
as expeditiously as possible. Toward that end, I have in-
structed all CIA personnel to respond in a spirit of coopera-
tion.
Sincerely,
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 66
W. E. Colby
Director
"J
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
UNITED ST
STATES
AMERICA
No. 442
AGENCY
EMPLOYEE
BULLETIN
Senate Select Committee To Review
U.S. Intelligence Activities
ALLENTORI
#MDRIE
KON CONTAINED)
111-7.00 $85PƏ ALM/776
12 March 1975
Senate Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the
Senate to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls
for a comprehensive review of the total U.S. intelligence effort
and is not restricted to the recent charges and allegations against
CIA alone. Consequently, it is likely to be far-ranging in its impact.
It is in all of our interests to see that the Select Committee
receives full understanding of our activities and their contribution
to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence
that the inquiry will be responsible, and constructive, and will pro-
duce new understanding of, and improvements in, the American
intelligence system.
It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal coop-
eration and that of the CIA. I have advised Senators Church and Tower,
the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, that employees of the
CIA will be available to the Select Committee for Staff interviews and
for testimony. We are working with the Committee Staff to design
procedures to facilitate their work in examining topics of concern.
Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Senator
Church. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in
recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee,
I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information
to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute
authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy
Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the special proce-
dures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly
sensitive matters. Senator Church has agreed that reference to sensi-
tive data in any Committee report will be subject to consultation between
the Committee and the Agency.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 67
:
The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee
and its Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of
Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise
employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any
interview or other appearance.
When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed
by the Select Committee Staff, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel
will normally notify Mr. John M. Clarke, who is my principal
liaison with the Committee and its Staff. Mr. Clarke, in turn, will
notify the employee. The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the
work of the Committee. It is intended to allow time for the employee
to gain general legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security
guidance from an appropriate senior officer.
My own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelli-
gence activities, the Committee will address needed legislative
changes and will reaffirm their confidence in the importance and
contribution of U.S. intelligence programs.
uffall
W. E. Colby
Director
Attachment: a/s
DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 68
2
•
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS. VICE CHAIR
PHILIP A. KART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAK
BARRY GOLDWAY
R., TENN.
ARIZ,
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
I
'
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO 3. RES. 21, 24TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
Executive Registry
75-1265
Ad Hoc Staff
75-104
March 12, 1975
JEMDR16
REGATIONS GOTIATIO
JAIMETE
Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Colby:
Enclosed is an initial request for documents approved
by the Committee at its meeting this afternoon.
Our respective staffs have discussed the request in its
draft form and I trust that they will continue to work together
in the spirit of mutual cooperation which we both recognize is
necessary to ensure a thorough and expeditious investigation.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
°
Frank Church
Chairman
Church
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 69
ENCLOSURE
62-11639543
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 70
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-43
EX

MOR16.
TO:
FROM:
REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION
March 12, 1975
The Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities
Guidelines
1. The attached request is not intended to call for a general file search
of the Agency. Rather it is intended to call for various significant documents
available in the upper levels of the Agency. Without foreclosing any further
file review that may seem appropriate to agency personnel familiar with agency
files, we would suggest the following offices (current and past files) as likely
sources for initial review:
(i) The U.S. Intelligence Board staff and ICS
(ii) Offices of the Director and the Deputy Director/CIA
(iii) Offices of the General Counsel and Legislative Counsel/CIA
(iv) Offices of the Comptroller, Inspector General, Historical Studies, and
Finance/CIA
2. The requests are addressed to the Director, both in his capacity as
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and as Director of Central Intelligence
and Chief Executive of the United States Intelligence Board.
3. Rather than waiting until all materials are available, it would be helpful
if any particular group is produced when ready.
4. As previously discussed, please advise if there are categories of material
where it would be appropriate for Committee staff members to review called for.
material on the Agency premises in order to cull out the most pertinent materials.
:
5. The request covers documents in the covered offices wherever originated
(including other departments or agencies). If any document referred to is believed
by the Agency to be in the possession only of another agency or department, advice
to that effect plus an indication that the Agency would not object to its being
made available to the Committee, would facilitate an expeditious inquiry.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 71
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
:.
OUTSTANDING RE ESTS
The Agency has agreed to provide the Committee with (1) charts indicating
the organizational history of the CIA; (2) identification of headquarters per-
sonnel; and (3) budgetary and cash flow information. The following is a further
elaboration of the kind of material in each of these categories which is necess-
ary for the Committee's basic understanding of the Agency:
A. Organization Charts and Personnel
-
The charts reflecting CIA organizational
history down to the Branch level should be accompanied by annotations or a nar-
rative explaining when particular units were formed, merged, expanded or abolished.
The narrative should also indicate any changes in lines of authority, reporting
responsibilities, and functions for each unit. Changes in unit designation which
were not accompanied by substantive changes should be noted.
The charts should include the organization and staffing arrangements of the USIB,
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and its predecessors, and
the Forty Committee and its predecessors.
The identification of personnel should include all officials and supervisors down
to the Branch Chief and Deputy Branch Chief level, and to the executive assistants
for the directors or deputy directors of all Divisions, Offices and Staffs and
similar assistants for any officials above those levels.
B. Budget and Cash Flow The budgetary information should include both the budgets
proposed to OMB and the final budgets approved. The cash flow data should include
the funds actually appropriated, their location in the appropriations for other
Departments and agencies, and an indication of whether funds transferred from par-
ticular agencies are earmarked for particular uses within the CIA.
II. SPECIAL REPORTS OR STUDIES
The following are requested in their unexpurgated form (at the highest level
of classification) with all appendices, annexes and transmittal documents:
1. The Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report on the Intelligence Community
2. 1949 and 1955 Hoover Commissions, Intelligence Task Force Reports
3. 1953 Historical Study of the Expenditure of Confidential Funds prepared
by the General Counsel's Office.
4.
1954 General Doolittle Report on the CIA
5. 1960 Bureau of The Budget study of intelligence activities
6. 1961 Taylor Report on covert action and the intelligence community
7. 1962 Organizational study of the CIA initiated by John A. McCone
8. 1964 Study by John A. Bross, Frederick Nolting and Major General
John Reynolds
9. 1965 Study of CIA initiated by Admiral Raborn
10. 1965 Study for the Director on CIA air propriataries
11. 1967 Internal CIA study for the Director on CIA activities at educational
facilities in the United States
12. 1967 Katzenbach Study (with John Gardner and Richard Helms) on CIA
domestic activity
13. 1967 Cunningham Study on the intelligence community
14. 1967 (or 1968) Eaton Committee Report for the DCI on NSA and the National
Intelligence Resources Board Study for DCI on NSA
15. 1967 (or 1968) report for DCI by the Senior Executive Group on the intelligence
community
16. 1970 Study under Admiral Wilfred McNeil on CIA Financial procedures
17. 1971 OMB study under James Schlesinger of the intelligence community
18. Executive Order of November 5, 1971 restructuring the intelligence community.
19. 1973 CIA internal review prepared for James Schlesinger on the CIA
Additional studies specified in Appendix D of book furnished the
20.
Committee staff on March 5, 1975
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
Legal Authority
A.
1.
All files dealing with the history of the 1949 CIA Act and the CIA sections
of the 1947 National Security Act.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 72
B.
C.
dim
-2-
2. All agreements on jurisdiction or operational authority between the
CIA and other U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
3. All legal opinions, memoranda or other materials analyzing the 1947
and 1949 Acts, Executive Orders or National Security Intelligence Directives
in regard to:
(a) the authority of CIA to conduct covert actions
(b) the authority of CIA to conduct particular categories of activity,
or specific activities, within the U.S., including without limitation:
(i) the collection or maintenance of information or files on U.S.
citizens;
(ii) the conduct of domestic surveillance on U.S. citizens or foreign
nationals;
(iii)
the organization and operation of proprietary organizations
(c) the appropriate scope or application of the agreements requested in
#2 supra, including documents prepared in connection with their
negotiation
(d) the applicability to CIA of restrictions placed by Congress on the use
. of funds included in appropriations from which CIA funds are transferred
` (e) the generation or use of funds from any source other than appropriations
transferred to CIA, and the investment for profit of funds from any source
.4. All legal opinions, memoranda or other material analyzing the desireability
or effect of legislation proposed or considered to alter the authority of
the DCI or the nature, structure or powers of the Agency in areas other than
employee compensation and benefits or headquarters construction. This should
include analyses of the CIA amendment to the 1974 Military Aid Act, whether
prepared before or after its adoption.
5. All Director Central Intelligence Directives ("DCIDS").
Operating Procedures
1. An index of all major directives, guidelines, regulations, manuals or similar
materials which prescribe or explain authorization and reporting procedures
Directives, guidelines, manuals or similar materials describing the various
filing systems of the Agency
2.
3
3. Specifically, all directives, guidelines, manuals or other materials prescribing
or explaining procedures to be followed and the authorization and documentation C
required in connection with covert operations, including without limitation:
field or headquarters initiation of proposals
(b)
planning and modification of proposals
approval for commencement, continuation or renewal, and termination
field reports on the conduct or results of operations
(e) evaluations following operations
3 The materials should indicate the criteria which determine the level of
authorization required--Division Director, Deputy Director for Operations,
DCI or Forty Committee--for a particular operation. They should also indicate
the procedures and documentation involved in CIA inter-agency staff coordination
and CIA staffing for the review by the principals on the Forty Committee. To
the extent the procedures described differ from those previously in effect,
furnish earlier directives, guidelines, manuals or similar material regarding
such previous procedures and provide a narrative description of how and when
these procedures have changed from 1948 to present.
(Request #3 is confined to procedures so that the Committee can subsequently
better understand CIA operations in the covert action area.)
Financial Procedures
In addtion to budgetary and cash flow figures, the Committee will need explanatory
information to understand the financial operations of CIA. This request consists
of all directives, guidelines, manuals and other materials governing or describing:
1. Procedures for preparing and discussing budgets with OMB, including ident-
fication of the documents involved in the process
2. The general procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing which
are used either within the CIA or in connection with Executive or Congressional
oversight
3.
All special procedures for expenditure approval, accounting or auditing in
regard to particular funds or types of activity, e.g., proprietary organiza-
tions, currency transactions, or the discretionary fund of the Director.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 73
D.
-3-
4. All Bureau of the Budget and OMB examiners' reports on the Agency, and
all memoranda and reports provided by the Intelligence Community Staff
to OMB
All Annual Reports of the Inspector General and all Inspector General reports
for the past five years on all components of the Agency.
E.
The Agency's "Allegations and Responses" files
IV.
DIRECTOR COLBY'S JANUARY 15, 1975 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE
All materials reviewed or used by the Office of the Director in preparation for
Director Colby's testimony on January 15, 1975 before the Senate Appropriations
Committee, including materials referred to in such testimony, (a representative
list of which has been furnished to Central Intelligence Agency staff by the
Senate Select Committee staff).
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 74
IV. DIRECTOR COLBY'S PUBLIC SENATE TESTIMONY ON DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
#MOR
Reference is made to Director Colby's public testimony January 15, 1975
before the Senate Appro
several documents basic
ations Committee, in which Di stor Colby identified
an understanding of the Agency's domestic operations.
The following requests are based on that testimony. Parenthetical page references
after each request indicate the page of Director Colby's testimony where the
the items requested were identified.
1. The directive or other documents establishing the Domestic Operations Division,
defining its authority and stating its missions; all subsequent directives or other
documents revising its authority or missions; (p.13)
2. The directive or other documents in 1972 redesignating the Domestic Operations
Division the Foreign Resources Division; (p.13)
3. The directive or other documents defining the authority of the "cover and
commercial staff" and stating its missions (p.13)
4. The directive or other documents establishing on August 15, 1967, a unit within
the Counterintelligence Office "to look into the possibility of foreign links
to American dissident elements," or defining the units authority and stating
¯ its missions%3B (p. 19)
5. The August 29, 1967 letter from the Executive Director to the Kerner Commission;
The September 1, 1967 reply of the DCI to the Kerner Commission and all attachments
thereto; (p.19).
-
6. The directive or other documents establishing CIA participation in "an interagency
program in support of the National Commission, among others." (p.20)
7. The document resulting from the DCI's review of the unit created on August 15,1967
in which he concluded it was proper, "while strictly observing statutory and de
facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvement;" (p.20)
8. The directive or documents governing CIA participation in the preparation of the
Ad Hoc Interagency Committee Plan ( the "Huston Plan"), and the directive or
documents governing CIA participation in the Interagency Evaluation Committee
when the Huston Plan was abandoned. (p.20-21)
9. The document authorizing the operation in which. "the Agency recruited or inserted
about a dozen individuals into American dissident circles in order to establish
their credentials for operations abroad; (1.22)
10. The 1973 directive limiting the program described in request #9; (p.22) ·
11. The directive or other documents which in march 1974 terminated the program
described in request #9 (p. 22)
12. The directive or other documents authorizing the elimination from files of material
Americans generated from the program descscribed in request. #29%; (p.23)
13. The directive or document authorizing the destruction- in March 1974 of the IDIU
tape listing of 10,000 Americans received by CIA in May 1970; (p.23)
14. The directive orother documents authorizing the program to insert agents into.
dissident organizations in the D.C. area to protect CIA installations, personnel,
and information.%; if a new unit was established within the Office of Security
to operate this program, the directive or other documents establishing the new unit,
definiting its authority or stating its missions. (p.23)
14. The directive or other documents terminating the program described in request #14
(p.24).
:
which do appear
15.. Indicate all lists "developed at various times in the past
questionable under CIA's authority" ( do not supply lists); (p.26) .
16. All "current directives" prohibiting maintainance of the kinds of lists described
in request # 15; (p.26)
17. May 9, 1973 directive requesting employees to report questionable activity; all
written responses and all other documents reflecting oral responses to this; (p. 27)
18. The documents prepared for or constituting the internal review" which resulted
from the responses described in Request # 17; (p. 27)
19. All documents containing "policy determinations and guidance that (Agency)
activities remain within proper limits "issued in August 1973; (p.27)
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 75
ENCLOSURE
62116395
5
- 4.
20. The directive
21.
† }
programs with
other documents establishing
the CIA or at its direction t
any mail inspection
feen 1953 and February, 1973;(p.
The directive or other document terminating mail inspection programs in
February, 1973; (p.32)
22. The documents prepared for the review of CIA assistance to other federal, state
and local government components; all documents terminating or modifying such
assistance as a result of that review; (p.33)
23. All directives subsequent to the directive of May 9, 1973 which similarly
requested employees to report questionable activity; all written responses and
all other documents reflecting oral responses to such directives; (p.34)
24. All internal regulations, policy statements or similar documents pursuant to
the recommendations of the Katzenbacj task force in 1967. (p.35)
25. The Presidential Directive of October 9, 1974 regarding reorganization of the
intelligence community.
NW 88608. Docld:32989530 Page 76
i
ΤΟ
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO ÉRNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. Adams
FROM
: Legal Counsel
ECT.
AMDR16
DATE: 2-20-75
ALL INFORMATION OCHITAINED
ITARMIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 9/25/00 EXSP-2 ALm lane
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Hotogra
soc. Dr.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD Inv
Asst. Dirt
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Jan
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. ✗
Director Sec'y
On 2-19-75 Inspector Bowers talked with William Miller,
Staff Director of captioned Committee. Miller was asked if the Committee
had established a possible timetable concerning hearings. He stated they
are "months" away from formal hearings but that they expect to begin taking
testimony in closed sessions to "build a record" in about two weeks.
Miller said these sessions will be conducted by a Member of the
Committee but will basically involve questioning of various agency officials,
not at the Director level, to provide basic information about the administrative
structure, legal basis, objectives and mission, and budget of the various
agencies in which the Committee will have an interest. Miller was requested
to give us specific notification as far in advance as possible concerning such
testimony sessions so that we would have sufficient time to prepare the necessary
material. Miller said this would be done.
Miller stated he would doubt that the Director would be needed
for any testimony for some time unless the Director wishes to be involved in
the early stages of providing basic information.
It seems apparent that the Committee still is uncertain of its
course of action. Miller commented that the Committee will probably follow
much the same procedure as used in the impeachment hearings where extensive
testimony was taken in closed sessions and used by the Members and staff to
prepare for the later public hearings. It seems apparent that John Doar and his
staff who worked on the impeachment hearings will play a major role in the
Select Committee operations. Doar and a number of his former impeachment staff,
members already are working with the Select Committee our 2-116395-43
ST-112
REC
25
To date, we have received 13 requests from the Select Committee
for investigations of potential staff people in connection with the clearance of these
people by CIA following certification by the Committee. These investigations are.
being handled by the Special Investigative Division on a two-week deadline basis
RECOMMENDATION:
1
For information.
Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Cleveland
DWB:kjs (8)
A
NW 88608 Docld 32989530 Page 77
1
да
Dusz
1
- Mr. Walsh
1 - Mr. Mintz
1
-
Mr. Farrington
-
Mr. Bowers
JUN 12 1975
Amk / oz
62-116395-42.x,
CHANGED TO
62-116464-1
4-528
,
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 78
#MDRIS
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ON THIS
Form
DATE 9/25/00 BTSP-2 ALIN26
'
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES
5010-106
ERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
17
FROM
Legal Counse
cans of
Inse
SUBJECT SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
#f
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
DATE: 3/14/75
#MDR16
AIL INFORMATION CONTAINED
REIN IN URGLASIFIED
DATE 9-25-00 DYSP2 ALMITTE
Assoc. Dir.
Dep: AD/Adm.
Dep. AD Inv
Asst Dir.
Adm
dmth.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
ec. Inv.
Spec.
Fraining
Legal Cen
Telephone km.
Director Sec'y _
During a meeting attended by Section Chief Cregar, Intelligence
Division, on March 14, 1975, it was approved by the Deputy Attorney
General and Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President, and concurred
in by William Colby, Director of CIA, that the Chairman of the two captioned
committees should be approached and asked whether they would make
a Committee request for the offices of members to be examined for any
electronic surveillance devices. Offices occupied by staff members
would not be included in their proposed search.
RECOMMENDATION:
The Legal Analysis Office will contact Senator Church and
Congressman Nedzi to inquire of they,, acting as Chairman of their
respective committees, would make a committee request for such
a search to be conducted. If requested by Chain wre
FBI is 
headel serally,
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1
-
1
1
1
-
Mr. White
Mr. Farrington
-
Mr. Bowers
-
Mr. Hotis
1
-
Mr. Mintz
джа
2
джа
дет
لنا
**
CC destroyed 5/1/15 -
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
JAM:mfd
56 MAR 31 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 79
MA 27 1976
EX-101
REC-23
Legal Cried
62-112-1925
XEROX
JUN 11 1975
• MAR 21 1975
LEGAL
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
KAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES CVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
: Mr. Adams
FROM
: Legal Counsel
0
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DATE: 2-6-75
#MDR 16
AIL, INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BISP-2 ALTITE
Jew39
Reference McDermott to Jenkins memorandum of 1-31-75
recommending contact with Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) concerning the
procedure for clearing staff personnel for captioned Committee.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
PAD
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Co
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
Contact was made with the Senator's office on the morning of
2-6-75 to arrange an appointment. The Senator's secretary advised that his
schedule was so crowded that it would be impossible for him to discuss this
matter for several days. She said he requested that we discuss this situation with
William Miller, who the Senator intends to have head the Select Committee staff.
Miller was contacted on the morning of 2-6-75 by Inspector
Bowers, accompanied by Inspector Hotis. It was explained to him that the FBI
has no authority to issue clearances as such but that in conference with Central
Intelligence Agency officials it had been agreed that the FBI will investigate
prospective staff personnel, furnish results of the investigation to Senator Church/
as the Select Committee Chairman, and CIA will issue actual clearances based
on certification from Church. Miller agreed to this procedure. He was furnished
a small supply of SF 86, Security Investigation Data for Sensitive Position forms.
It was pointed out to him these forms should be filled out in complete detail and
furnished to us along with a current set of fingerprints. It was suggested the
applicants for these positions
"REC-71 62-116375-40
Expenfingerprinted by the Capitol Police Department.
Miller stated they would need results of these investigations as
soon as possible and after some discussion he agreed that a two week deadline
would be reasonable. It was suggested to him that in cases involving clerical-
type personnel that perhaps a longer deadline might be in order, and he said he
would keep this in mind. It was pointed out to Miller that results of the investigations
will be furnished to Senator Church personally. He also was advised that
representatives of various intelligence agencies currently are drawing up proposed
guidelines to suggest to the Committee for use in determining whether or not an
1
A
Mr. Callahan
1
-
Mr. Adams
1
-
Mr. Wannall
5
DWB:kjs (9)
19
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 80
1 - Mr. Cregar
1COMAR BOwers
1
Mr. Cleveland
1
"
Mr. Mintz
1
-
Mr. McDermott
CONTINUED
-
OVER
11-
-85

Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
applicant qualifies for security clearance as well as proposed guidelines to
deal with the maintenance of classified material received by the Committee. He
was told someone will be in touch with Senator Church regarding this in the near
future.
Miller stated that the Committee is going to set up offices in the
auditorium of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the same space used by the
Senate Watergate Committee. This space currently is being altered to meet
Committee requirements.
Miller stated that the Committee probably will bring on board as staff
personnel most of the "security team" used by the House Judiciary Committee
during the impeachment hearings. He said this group has a proven track record
with respect to leaks of information since all leaks resulting from the impeachment
proceedings have been traced to Members following hearings rather than staff
personnel. This is the group headed by former Assistant Attorney General John
Doar, and Miller indicated Doar will play a major role on the Senate Select
Committee staff.
Miller will furnish Bowers the completed SF 86 forms and
fingerprint cards on proposed staff personnel as soon as possible and these will
be furnished directly to Assistant Director Cleveland for handling. This matter
already has been discussed with Mr. Cleveland.
RECOMMENDATION:
For information.
DWM
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- 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 81
TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITYON.
GSA, GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES C VERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. Jenkins
FROM : J. J. McDermott
0
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DATE: 1-31-75
#DR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HAZEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 EXSP-2 ALM/4
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep AD inv.
st. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory _
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. In
aining
Train
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rip
Director Sec'y
We have received the enclosed letter dated 1-29-75 from Senator
Frank Church (D-Idaho) writing in his capacity as the Chairman of the recently
established Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. The Senator states that to
carry out the task of the Committee, it will be necessary for the Members and
designated staff to have access to the most sensitive classified material. He
said the Committee is in the process of gathering a staff, adding that it is likely
many members of the staff will not have current security clearances. He stated
he would be most grateful if the FBI could expedite clearances on designated
staff so that work can proceed as expeditiously as possible. He points out the
standard clearance agreed upon during debate on the resolution creating the
Committee would be the equivalent of a "Q" clearance.
William E. Colby, as Director of Central Intelligence, is
coordinating the compilation from various agencies of the intelligence community
suggested guidelines dealing with clearances and the handling of security information
to be presented for consideration to the Select Committee. FBI representatives
from the Intelligence Division have been participating in this matter.
EX-110
REC-70 62-116395-39
This matter was discussed with Mr. Mintz and Mr. Adams, and
it was agreed that the Intelligence Division representative. should explore with
CIA whether or not that agency would agree to issue clearances for the Select
Committee staff if the FBI handled the investigations. Section Chief William O.
Cregar took this matter up on the afternoon of 1-30-75 with John M. Clarkę,
Associate Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence. Cregar advised Clarke
had obtained Colby's agreement to the following procedure. The FBI will handle
investigations of potential staff members named by the Select Committee. Results
of the investigations would be furnished to Church as Chairman of the Select
Committee and the Committee would determine whether or not the individual meets
the necessary criteria for clearance. Following such certification by the
Committee, CIA would issue the appropriate clearance. A Sub Group of the
Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community
was to meet on 1-31-75 to draw up proposed guidelines to be presented to the
Enclosure
1
-
Mr. Callahan - Enclosure
MAR 20 1975
200
1 Mr. Adams Enclosure
1 Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
-
-
1 - Mr. Cleveland Enclosure
DWB kjs (9)
NW 88608 Docid:329895305Page 82
:2
1 Mr. Mintz - Enclosure
tr
1 - Mr. McDermott - Enclosure)
-
1 Mr. Bowers - Enclosure
1
-
Mr. Cregar - Enclosure
CONTINUED - OVER
18-11
J. J. McDermott to Jenkins Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Committee regarding the storage of information and the clearance of the staff.
This group consists of representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA, and Atomic
Energy Commission. These guidelines, once approved by the Select Committee,
would be followed in determining whether or not potential staff members should
receive clearances.
Cregar said there is no objections to the FBI discussing the
foregoing procedure--FBI investigation, Select Committee certification, followed
by issuance of clearance by CIA with Senator Church. Senator Church will be
told at the same time that proposed guidelines regarding a clearance decision
will be presented to him as soon as they are compiled.
RECOMMENDATION:
acknowledge the 1/29/75 letter and
That Inspector Bowers/inform Senator Church of the above
procedure and work out with him appropriate arrangements for the referral
of potential staff members to us for investigation.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 83
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дат
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
CO-CHAIRMEN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.
ADLAI E. STEVENSON III, ILL.
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.
JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
CLIFFORD P. HANSEN, WYO,
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
THOMAS A. DINE, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER
Info
United States Senate
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.
Asst. Dir
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL EMERGENCIES Gen. Inv.
AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 242, 93D CONGRESS)
ROOM 252, RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
January 29, 1975
handle
K
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Iny.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
PROC.
JAN-20-1975
1½3-17
The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Kelley:
°Sonate Select Commenter on
Intelligence Activities
The Senate, on January 27, created a Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect to All Intelligence Activities.
I am confident that the Federal Bureau of Investigation will make
every effort to assist the Select Committee in its work, and I look
forward to working together with you in completing this important task.
In order to carry out the necessary tasks mandated by the vote
of the Senate, it will be necessary for Senators and designated staff
to have access to the most sensitive classified material. The Select
Committee is now in the process of bringing together a staff to assist
in carrying out its work. In this regard, it is likely that many members
of the staff who will be hired will not have current security clearances.
On behalf of the Select Committee, I would be most grateful to
you if you could expedite, as a priority matter, clearances on designated
staff so that the work of the committee can proceed as expeditiously
as possible. In debate, prior to passage of S. Res. 21, the standard
of clearance agreed upon by the Senate was equivalent to the standard
applicable to a "Q" clearance.
#INDR16
With kind regards,
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 EX SP-2 ALM/FTE
REC-71
777
62-116395-
Sincerely,
#ronk
Murch
Frank Church
(D-IDAND)
_ MAR 20 1975
தி
Me Down to Jenkins
1-31-75 DWB
/kj
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57 APR 1 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989530
84
18
TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM : Legal
а
coun
unsel
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
DATE: 3/14/75
1053
Assoc. Dir.
Der. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Int
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y -
Reference is made to memorandum of W. O. Cregar
to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 3/10/75, captioned as above.
Page three of that memorandum referred to the CIA, as well
as the rest of the Intelligence Community, being concerned
over the request received for access to their files by Morton
Halperin under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). It was
also noted that the Bureau had not received a request as of
that time from Halperin under the FOIA.
The Department has now referred over to us today,
3/14/75, a request from Mr. Halperin to "inspect and, if I
choose, to copy files marked 'Official and Confidential' or
'OC' kept in the private office of J. Edgar Hoover." This
request is being processed in the FOIA Unit.
RECOMMENDATION:
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
For information.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
Each Assistant Director
Mr. Cregar
JCF:ms (17)
My
#mDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
PREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
JeF
DATE 9/25/00 BXSP-2 14m/176
心
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 85
K
EX-110
**
REC-10 62.-111
62-111·3% -37
MAR 21 1975
ン
LLEGE
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO ERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM : W.
Cregar
WRW/TUL
DATE:
1
1
1
-
-
-
3/7/75
Mr. Adams
Mr. Mintz
Mr.
-
Wannall
Mr. Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION 00]TAINED
DATE 11-6-00 DSP-2.
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFI
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep.
Asst. Dir
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
while
11.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
This memorandum reports the results of conversations
with Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
for Congressional Inquiry, referred to hereafter as the Group,
reporting steps taken to insure that Mr. William Cotter, Chief
Postal Inspector, is invited to any discussions of the Group
wherein the question of opening U. S. mail is addressed in
the context of Congressional hearings.
In a memorandum to Mr. Adams and Mr. Wannall, dated
3/4/75, Mr. Kelley reported the results of his meeting with
Mr. Cotter on that date. Cotter advised the Director that the
Postmaster General has become alarmed about the opening of mail
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Mr. Cotter asked the
Director if the FBI knew this was going on and did we actually
receive the benefits of it. Mr. Kelley pointed out to Mr. Cotter
that the FBI knew and did get information on the procedure
from CIA.
REC-10 62 116375 36
During the course of their conversation, Mr. Kelley.
told Mr. Cotter that he should be joined in the group of
investigative organizations headed by Mr. Colby, Director of
CIA, to consider actions in the Select Committee's probe.
Mr. Wannall was instructed to make sure the Postal Serv
included in the Group.
7 MAR 21 1975
On 3/6/75 Mr. William O. Cregar, the Bureau's
representative on this Group, discussed this matter with
Mr. John Clarke. Mr. Clarke advised that inasmuch as member-
ship on the Group is made up of United States Intelligence
Board (USIB) agencies and departments he felt most matters
discussed at future meetings of the Group would not be of interest
to the Postal Service and would be a waste of Mr. Cotter's time.
However, he assured Mr. Cregar that should a question involving
opening of U. S. mails be addressed by the Group or any questions
involving matters of interest to the Postmaster General, he
would see to it that Mr. Cotter or his designated representative
Enclosure-Sent 3-13-75
#MDRIG
WOC:ebc
لو (5)
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 86
edm
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
was invited to the meeting. In addition, Mr. Clarke
indicated he would be in telephonic contact with Mr. Cotter
to arrange for any discussions Mr. Cotter might desire to
have with him.
ACTION:
Pursuant to the Director's instructions, attached
is a letter to Mr. Cotter setting forth the arrangements
that have been made with Mr. Clarke regarding future atten-
dance of Postal Service representatives at meetings of the
Group. A copy of this letter is being furnished to Mr. Colby
for his records.
TUL
да
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 87
2
дет
You
D9/25/00 SP-2/76
#MDR 16
ALL INRARATION CONTAD
REC-40-110
Honorable William J. Cotter
Chief Postal Inspector
U. S. Postal Service
Washington, D. C.
Dear Bill:
-36
March 13, 1975
BY LIAISON
1
1
1
1
-
-
Mr.
Adams
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
orgenal of deter
During our meeting in my office on March 4,
1975, we discussed your participation in the group of
investigative organizations headed by Mr. William
Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to consider
Community actions resulting from Select Committee
probes.
CE
LAC
ce of other
delinish
CIA
Habe
LFS/LAC
On March 6, 1975, Ir. William O. Cregar, my
representative on this Group, discussed the matter with
Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of
Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community and
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congres-
sional Inquiry. Mr. Clarke advised that membership on
this Group is made up of representatives from the U. S.
Intelligence Board agencies and departments and that the
major portion of information discussed at this Group
would not involve the Postal Service. However, Mr. Clarke
has assured Mr. Cregar that should any questions regarding
matters of interest to the Postmaster General be scheduled
fór`discussion before this Group, he would see to it that
your office is so advised in order that either you or
your designated representative can attend the meeting.
addition, Mr. Clarke indicated he would be in telephonic
Dep. AD contact with you to arrange for any discussions you might
desire to have with him.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intel
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone R
Se
Director Sel
WOC:ebc
(7) {
MAIL ROOM-
-
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 88
ہے ہوں
In
6003
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
4920371-34
Honorable William J. Cotter
I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Colby
for his records.
Sincerely yours,
Clarence M. Kelley
Director
1
-
Honorable William E. Colby
(BY LIAISON)
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
NOTE:
See memo W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,
dated 3/7/75, captioned "SENSTUDY 75," prepared by WOC:ebc.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 89
2
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. MINTZ
DATE: 3/17/75
Attention: Legislative Matters Section
FROM R. J. GALLAGHER
SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75
Falkton
In reference to memorandum from Legal Counsel to
J. B. Adams dated 3/12/75, SA Johnny L. Evans will be the
contact and coordinator for OPE in regard to the captioned matter.
Mr. Evans' extension is 2854.
OPE has no input into captioned matter at this time.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y —
کار
JLE:DW
(6)
1 - Mr. Mintz
1
-
Mr. Gallagher
1 Mr. Matheson
-
1 - Mr. Colwell
1
-
Mr.
Evans
бе
I
#MDR 16
ATT. INFORMATION CONTAINED
I MAY 
IS UISLASSIFIED
DA: 9-25-00 XSR2 ALM/196
EX-110
REC-10
62-116395-35
21 MAR 21 1975
70 MAR 27 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 90
LEGAL
LED Ty

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
AMWAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES
VERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ : Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM :
Legal Counsel,
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY-75
EU
DATE 8/27/82 DY SPREKE
TH
1
DATE:
2-14-75
LETTER FROM SENATORS MANSFIELD AND SCOTT
RE DESTRUCTION OF RECORDS
JANUARY 27, 1975
In a letter to Mr. Kelley dated 1-27-75,
Hatujen
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD ny
Asst. Di
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intel
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Senators Mike Mansfield (D - Mont.) and Hugh Scott (R - Pa.)
requested we not destroy any documents or files that may be of interest
to the Senate in the forthcoming hearings on intelligence activities.
A memorandum from H. R. Hauer to Mr. LaPrade dated
1-31-75 captioned "Destruction of Files and Records, Files and Com-
munications Division," pointed out that our destruction program is governed
by the Federal Records Act of 1950 and regulations of the National Archives
and Records Service. Our current practice is to destroy files over
25 years old relating to subversive activities which are based on unsub-
stantiated allegations and have not resulted in prosecution. Criminal
files over 10 years old are reduced to microfilm and the paper records
are destroyed. In addition, all duplicate copies of communications are
destroyed when they no longer serve a useful purpose. The Files and
Communications Division asked the Legal Counsel Division to determine
whether the Senators request applied to our current destruction program.
Mr. Callahan noted "Discuss with SSC staff."
EX-110th
REC-10
62-116395--34
On 2-10-75 Inspector J. B. Hotis, Legal Counsel Division,
met with William G. Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Adivities, concerning this matter. Miller was told that our
destruction program has been suspended until we can determine whether
any documents are involved that might be of interest to the Committees 1915
Miller said he doubted that the Committee would inquire into intelligence
matters that were over 25 years old but asked that we withhold destruction
of files until he consulted with Senator Church. He said he would contact
us later this week.
Enclosures (2) - sent 2-19-75
1
-
Mr. Callahan
1- Mr. Adams
1
-
Mr. Jenkins
1 Mr Mintz
57MAR2 M17 Farrington
NW 88608 Decide91
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Ash
1
-
1
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Bowers
-
1 - Mr. Hotis
MAP 25 1975
(CONTINUED - OVER)
-до
66-3216
X800 WITHODIUM
Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY
Letter from Senators Mansfield and Scott
Re Destruction of Records; 1-27-75
RECOMMENDATION:
Attached are letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott
acknowledging their letter to the Director and advising them that we
have suspended our destruction program until the matter is clarified.
be sent.
That the attached letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott
wpwful
DWM
ту
Det
Груз
870
оже
Per
дна
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 92
- 2 -
ΤΟ
DATE: 3/10/75
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO ERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
: W. O.
0. je gar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
FMDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Mr.
Adams
DATE 11-7-00 BY SP-2 ALMlY 7°
Mr. D.W. Moore
1
Mr. Wannall
1
-
Mr.
Cregar
Mr. Mintz
This reports information received telephonically
from Mr. Robert Gambino, Office of Security, CIA, on the
morning of 3/1/75.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep-AP/Adm
Den AB Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intel
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
According to Mr. Gambino, a CIA officer employed
by CIA's Office of Security, Mr. Richard Kuh, has been
called to testify before the Rockefeller Commission on 3/3/75.
The purpose of this testimony is to discuss CIA's recruitment
of approximately 10 dissidents. The dissidents were to be
infiltrated into extremist and revolutionary groups active in
the Washington, D. C., area in 1967 in order that CIA could
obtain firsthand knowledge as to whether any of these extremist
or revolutionary groups were planning any physical damage
or attack on CIA installations throughout the Washington, D. C.,
area.
In preparation for this testimony CIA was reviewing
all records in their Office of Security. In this connection
they came across a note from CIA Security Officer Paul Gaynor
reflecting a conversation he had with myself. During that time
I had liaison responsibilities with CIA's Office of Security.
The note, signed by Paul Gaynor, read as follows: "Discussed with
William O. Cregar, FBI, 4/4-6/67. Says go ahead after conferring
with Mr. William Sullivan, Assistant Director, FBI. 'They never
heard of this matter.'" Copies of this note are being furnished
to the Rockefeller Commission contemporaneous with Kuh's testimony.
f
I have reviewed all possible Bureau records in an
effort to locate any memoranda that might have been prepared.
I have found no such memoranda and am inclined to believe that
I did not make a record of my conversation with Mr. Gaynor in
view of the quotation, "They never heard of this matter.”
:
WOC:ebc
(6)
PRECT/10-116325
MAR 18 1975
EX-112
CONTINUED OVER
33
ZAR 2:5.19765530 Page 93
5-743
'
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
Although I have no specific recollection of the
conversation with Mr. Gaynor, I do have some recollection
that such a conversation did take place with him as well as
with Mr. Osborn, the Director of Security, CIA. This is
somewhat reinforced by the fact that I can recall CIA and
specifically Mr. Osborn was concerned about the security of
CIA's installations. There was considerable campus unrest
during this period of time. I can recall CIA recruiters
were attacked and beaten. As a matter of fact, I am almost
sure that CIA's recruiters were forced off campus and did
potential employees' interviews in Federal buildings.
Recognizing that both Osborn, as the Director of Security, and
CIA generally were very security conscious, I can understand
and believe it was probably likely that the Office of Security,
CIA, began to plan the security and physical protection of
all their offices throughout the U. S. The fact is that
approximately one and one-half years after my reported con-
versation with Mr. Gaynor one of CIA's offices in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, was bombed, resulting in the now famous Keith
decision. In the interim Martin Luther King was assassinated
4/4/68 and parts of the District were burned; Resurrection City
existed during May and June, 1968. All of these events remind
one of the situation that existed at that time and helps me at
least put into perspective why CIA's Office of Security was
concerned about the security of their installations.
Although I cannot recall the specific conversation
with Mr. Gaynor, I did periodically speak to him during my
eight-year liaison assignment. Had I received such a request
as reported on Mr. Gaynor's note, I would have discussed it with
the Assistant Director at that time. It is likely that
Mr. Sullivan who was then the Assistant Director would have
reacted as reported in Gaynor's quotation. I say this because
if the facts are true, no operational activity to collect
intelligence was envisioned. CIA merely proposed to place assets
in a position to know if any violent activity was planned against
CIA establishments and the Bureau was merely interposing no
objections to such activity on the part of CIA.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 94
CONTINUED
-
OVER
2.
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
I have attempted to reconstruct the events in
my own mind as well as to view other activities that
transpired during the approximately eight years of my
liaison assignment. In all honesty I cannot recall any
case wherein I was requested or instructed to make an
arrangement with CIA without making a specific record of
it in Bureau files.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
K
для
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 95
- 3 ·
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOGERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
:
Legal Couns
OSENATE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
SUBJECT:
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DATE: 3/12/75
#MDR 16
ATT, INFORMATION CONTAINED
PARLY TE UNCLASSIFIED
CAR: 19/25/00 35P-2 ALM/118
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adni.
Depe Ab-Inv✓
Asst. D.:
Admin!
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv. _
Training
Legal Copy
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On March 12, 1975, Associate Deputy Attorney General
Wilderotter advised me that he was just advised that the Senate
Committee staff has compiled a lengthy list of requests for documents
to be furnished by CIA to the Senate Committee. He said that the list
will be submitted to the Committee today for their approval in
requesting the material from CIA' He described the list as unrealistic.
Mr. Wilderotter said that we may anticipate that the FBI will receive a
similar list requesting documents in great detail. He said that his
assignment in the Department at the present time is to assist in coordinating
the Department responses with the White House in regard to requests from
the Senate Committee and he requested me to advise him at once upon
receipt of such a request from the Senate Committee.
RECOMMENDATION:
That upon receipt of request from the Senate Committee,
as described above, Mr. Wilderotter be immediately informed.
62-116395
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 Mr. Moore
Mr. Farrington
Mr. Hotis
1- Mr. Mintz
1
-
1
-
JAM:mfd
(7)
ساوی شهر
дже
REC 68
m
62-116395-32
MAR 18 1975
701227075
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 96
LEGAL CO
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GEN. RES. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GØVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W.R. Wannalh
FROM : W.
regar
SUBJECT: ŠENSTUDY 75
ALM1776
#MPR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERRIN IS VERLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2
Mr. N.P. Callahan
1
1
-
Mr. J.B. Adams
DATE:
March 5, 1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. Delny.
Asst. D.
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Each Assistant Director Inspertide
1
-
1
-
Mr. W.O. Cregar
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of
the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the
Group) held on 2/27/75 at CIA Headquarters.
The Group is chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and is made
up of representatives of agencies and departments having
membership on the U.S. Intelligence Board. Its purpose is
to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future testimony
before various Congressional committees.
At the meeting of the Group on 2/27/75 several
items of interest were discussed, which items are set forth -
hereinafter.
He assured
Intel
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Her
-31
Mr. Colby, in his role as Director of Central
Intelligence, and Mr. Clarke met with Senator Frank Church
on the morning of 2/27/75. Church advised that it is not
his intention to harass the intelligence community and he
hopes to reaffirm to both the Congress and the people of the
United States that there is a valid and critical need for
intelligence. Church is concerned that no inadvertent dis-
closures result from these hearings Wich could prejudice
sensitive intelligence community interest.
Mr. Colby that he would continue to cons him on any
sensitive matters that come before the Committee to avoids
such inadvertencies. Senator Church was appreciative of
the security guidelines furnished to him for the handling
of sensitive information and documents and assured Mr. Colby.
that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) would abide by these
guidelines. With regard to the Secrecy Agreement, which
heretofor Senator Church has been somewhat reluctant to har 12 1975
his staff personnel complete, it is now acceptable to the
Senator. However, he does want to have the Chief Counsel of
the SSC review the Secrecy Agreement and will probably propose
certain changes in its wording. (A Secrecy Agreement was
'developed by a subcommittee of the Group in concert with the
Justice Department.)
Enclosures
WOC:bcw (16),
107
NW 88608 Docld2930,,Page 97
SURE
CONTINUED
OVER
5-116
Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
Senator Church stated that it was the Committee's
intention to investigate all agencies' participation in "covert
action" with primary emphasis on CIA activities overseas.
(Roughly interpreted, this could involve the Bureau's COINTEL
Program.) The SSC hopes to avoid any confrontation with any
members of the intelligence community over the release of
sensitive documents or testimony and it is Senator Church's
intention for him and Senator John G. Tower to consult with
both the President and the Vice President to resolve this
matter. In this regard, Mr. Clarke advised members of the
Group that Deputy Attorney General Laurence H. Silberman has
been designated by the President to act as his counsel in
dealing with both the Senate and the House select committees.
It is Mr. Clarke's opinion that Mr. Silberman will act in this
capacity only as long as he remains Deputy Attorney General.
It is the feeling of Senator Church at this time that
all staff employees of the SSC will be afforded "Q" clearances.
(issued by the successor to the Atomic Energy Commission.)
However, there is some question as to whether this in fact will
be true and Clarke hopes to get further clarification on this
point.
Mr. Colby advised Senator Church that CIA requires
all employees to sign a CIA secrecy agreement. It is
Mr. Colby's intention, as he did in the case of the Rockefeller
Commission, to issue an agency notice to all employees releasing
them from their obligation under the secrecy agreement in the
event an employee is called before the SSC. Additionally,
Mr. Colby intends to write a letter to the SSC advising it that
he has so relieved CIA employees from this obligation. (Attached
is a draft copy of an Agency notice circulated within CIA. Also
attached is a copy of the letter Mr. Colby forwarded to the
Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller advising the Rockefeller Commission
that he was relieving Agency employees from any obligation under
the secrecy agreement.)
Inasmuch as the Bureau requires all employees to
complete a secrecy agreement, the Intelligence Division believes
that the Legal Counsel Division should review what action, if
any, the Bureau should take in anticipation of FBI personnel
'being called to testify.
With regard to deleting the names of Agents and
confidential sources from documents furnished to the SSC,
Senator Church agreed that this would be acceptable providing
he or members of his staff could consult with officials of the
submitting agency if it was deemed necessary that the names of
Agents or sources had to be revealed.
2
CONTINUED
-
OVER
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 98
Memorandum to Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
During the Colby/Church meeting, Church advised
that he anticipates asking all agencies and departments of
the intelligence community for the following three items
as their initial request: 1) Organizational charts, broken
down to a branch level, going back as far as 1947; 2) Copies
of all budgets since 1947; and 3) Documents reflecting all
cash flows since 1947.
With regard to items 2 and 3, Mr. Clarke indicated
that he will seek clarification with regard to budget and cash
flow submission and will hopefully have additional information
for members of the Group in the near future as to exactly what
the SSC desires.
During the course of the meeting of the Group,
Mr. Clarke advised that the Bureau should consider advising
Mr. Colby of any "bad apples" that are uncovered during the
Bureau's investigation of staff personnel. This was not
intended to try to eliminate a candidate as a staff employee
where there is some derogatory information but if the Bureau
develops very substantial information indicating the subject
is a definite security risk, it is conceivable that Mr. Colby
could at least discuss that individual's possible employment
with Senator Church to prevent the Committee from hiring
anyone that could later prove embarrassing to the SSC.
Prior to the adjournment of the meeting of the
Group, Mr. Clarke queried all members as to what provisions
they have made for handling the onslaught of paper and
requests he anticipates all agencies will receive from the
SSC. As an example, CIA has had to Xerox over 15,000 pages
of CIA documents in the last ten days in response to requests
from the Rockefeller Commission. Clarke feels strongly that
each agency should develop a task force within their ranks
supplemented by stenographic personnel to prepare themselves
for what he believes will be very extensive requests from the
SSC with relatively short deadlines.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 99
3
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
ACTION:
The matters of interest reported in this memorandum
were discussed at Mr. Callahan's conference on 3/3/75 and
are being addressed separately in accordance with decisions
made at that conference.
эта
wRw
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 100
4 -
-

:
DRAFT
1
22 February 1975
AGENCY NOTICE
CIA INTERNAL USE
16:00
As you are aware, the President on 4 January 1975
ONLY
#MDR15
MATION CONTAINED
12 ALM/273
established a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United
+:
States to look into allegations that certain Agency activities
conducted within this country exceeded our charter and
statutory authority..
Upon completion of its inquiry, the Commission will issue
its findings and submit recommendations to the President and to
telligen
the Director of Central Intelligence.
The President has directed that the Agency extend support
and assistance to the Commission, and I have pledged my coopera-.
tion to the Commission and its Staff.
I have also told the Commission that any current employee
of the Agency is available to the Commission and its Staff for
discussions.
The Agency and the Commission Staff have now developed
sufficient working experience so that we can design additional
procedures to facilitate the Staff's work in examining topics
of concern.
All members of the Commission Staff have received security
clearances and have been given badges providing them with
access to Agency offices in the Washington, D. C. area.
:
NW 88608 Doçld:32989530 Page 101
7
62-116395-31
CLOSURE!
-2-
The Commission Staff will, during their inquiries in CIA
Headquarters, Area Offices, be given access to Agency files
related to the Commission's fields of responsibility. The
use of specific sensitive data from these files in any
unclassified report by the Commission will be subject to
consultation between the Director and the Commission.
To facilitate interviews by the Commission Staff Officers
with CIA employees, I have advised the Commission that employees
are authorized to furnish classified information with certain
exceptions. My letter to the Vice President, the Chairman of
the Commission, is attached. It sets forth guidelines for the
furnishing of classified information.
The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Com-
mission and its Staff must at the same time take account of the
: rights of Agency employees. Like other citizens, they have the
right to remain silent. The Commission Staff will advise
employees of their rights at the beginning of any interview or
other appearance.
My own belief, after careful review of all activities in
question, is that legal action will not be taken against
individuals. The final decision, however, must rest with the
Department of Justice and other legal authorities and risk of
"
such action is a judgment each employee must make for himself.
NM 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 102.
-3-
When a current Agency employee is asked to be interviewed
by a member of the Commission Staff, the Staff member should notify
Mr. E. H. Knoche who is my assistant in charge of liaison with
the Commission and its Staff.
Mr. Knoche, in turn, will see the employee, that The
purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of Staff members.
It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general
legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security guidance
from an appropriate senior officer.
Normally, we think an employee would advise his supervisor
or other Agency authorities on the nature of the interview. It
should be understood, however, that this is not mandatory.
In arranging the interviews, I am acutely aware of the need
to avoid the appearance as well as the fact of collusion between
Agency and employee. None of us has any intention to fabricate
:
or mislead. I am convinced that being forthcoming white-perkaps
embarrassing in a few details, will on the wholes vindicate the
·Agency and its eminent service to our country-
In keeping with my long-standing policy, employees with
any knowledge of activities conducted within the United States,
now or in the past, which they believe to be of a questionable
nature can follow the customary practice within the Agency of
calling the matter to my attention or that of the Inspector
General. This will ensure my ability to continue to be forthcoming
with all those involved in external reviews of Agency activities.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 103
-4-
Employees should also feel free to bring any such matters
directly to the attention of the Commission or the Commission
Staff outside of Agency channels if they so desire. In doing
so, however, employees should bear in mind that the Commission's
field of interest iș CIA activities within this country.
..
To contact the Commission, employees can call the Executive
Director, Mr. David. Belin on 456-7010.or the Counsel, Mr. Marvin
Gray, Jr., on 456-7014. The mail address is:
Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States
712 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20500
Names of the members of the Commission Staff and their
.badge numbers are attached.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 104
W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
COPY
INFORMATION CONTAINED
EDIS UNCLASSIFED)
5 February 1975
-6-00 SPALM 1776
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Chairman, Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States
712 Jackson Place, N. W.
Washington, D.C.
20500
Dear Mr. Vice President:
As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency are required to sign secrecy agreements when they enter on
duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires that they
keep forever secret all classified information gained during the
course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further re-
quires that they may not disclose classified information in inter-
views or by publication without prior authorization from the Director
of Central Intelligence. There is a provision in the secrecy agree-
ment that the conditions and obligations with respect to the protection
of classified information by the agreement continue after employment
with the Agency has been terminated.
As I have stated to the Commission, I will make available any
employee of this Agency to the Commission for staff interview and
for testimony before the Commission. This letter will serve as
authorization for any such employees or ex-employees to furnish
information as requested by the Commission or its staff on matters
that may be classified. As has been discussed with the Commission,
there are certain sensitive items which should receive special han-
dling. Such items include names of sources, specific details of
technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels
by the Agency, names of employees, names of persons who may be
targets of kidnapping or assassination by foreign intelligence organi-
zations, names of organizations cooperating with the Agency, and
detailed information which would pinpoint any of the above. Some
information might also conflict with a subject's right of privacy.
ST (02-116395-31
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 105
COPY
Attachment to Agency Notice
IN DAVID W.
A-6442
BAKER, HAROLD A.
A-6428
CARGILL, MASON
A-6439
GELLHORN, ERNEST
A-6429
· GRAY, MARVIN L., JR.
A-6444
GREENE, RONALD J.
A-6435
HARDY, TIMOTHY
A-6433
!
MANFREDI, GEORGE
A-6432
OLSEN, ROBERT
A-6434
ROETHE, JAMES
A-6427
SCHWARZER. WILLIAM
A-4768
WEIDNER, JAMES.
A-6447
CLAPPER, PETER
A-6440
NW-88608 Docid:32989530 Page 106
COPY
-2-
There is no purpose here to impede in any way the Commission's
investigation. I believe, however, in most cases these specific
identifying names and details are not necessary for an understanding
of our activities. Where the Commission or the staff believes that
specific identification is necessary to the purpose of the testimony
or the staff interrogation, the matter will be discussed between the
Commission and the Agency, and I will be prepared to consult with
you and the Commission to determine the course of action to be taken.
Where in the judgment of the employee a specific identification is
especially sensitive as outlined in this paragraph, an identity number
will be assigned pending resolution of the matter between the Com-
mission and the Agency, and in the meantime the identity will not be
divulged by the employee.
I appreciate the cooperation of the Commission and of Agency
employees in this regard. I am still responsible under the statute
and as a professional for the protection of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure. In many situations the inad-
vertent disclosure of a name or identification could have serious
repercussions, including placing lives in jeopardy, and I cannot in
good conscience put such information at risk.
This arrangement of course does not affect the Commission's.
procedures for advising prospective witnesses of their rights, secur-
ing waivers, nor the employee's or ex-employee's right not to answer
certain questions if they are concerned that the answers might tend
to incriminate them.
Respectfully,
COPY
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 107
SIGNED
W. E. Colby
Director
"
"
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
:W.
Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
PAZSFIED BY JALSA
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_
91294#
SECRET,
-
1
-
Mr. Adams
Mr. Callahan
DATE: 2/27/75
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Da D Inv✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Imell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y.
Clark
A
This memorandum recommends that we keep Mr. Colby
apprised, as the Director of Central Intelligence, through the
✓ Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry of any
proposed or completed FBI testimony before congressional com-
mittees when such FBI testimony impacts on other members of
the Intelligence Community, could result in other members of
the Intelligence Community being called to testify, or any
questions are asked of the FBI which are of proprietary interest
to another agency or department of the Intelligence Community.
The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry,
chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the Director of
Central Intelligence, is made up of representatives of agencies
and departments having membership on the United States Intelli-
gence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating
mechanism for future testimony before congressional hearings.
At a meeting of the USIB on 2/26/75, Chairman Colby
commented on the effective manner in which the Ad Hoc Group
was functioning. However, he noted that it is imperative all
members of USIB be extremely sensitive to the need for prior
coordination to insure that the basic interests of the Intel-
|ligence Community are served and that any testimony or documents
furnished congressional committees are factual and accurate.
He hoped that all members will be made aware of what other members
are testifying to before a congressional committee as well as the
identity of that congressional committee. Mr. Colby noted that
it is highly likely that members of the Intelligence Community
will be called before various congressional committees other
than the Senate and House Select Committees
REC-6 62-116395-30
The Intelligence Division believes this type of
coordination is vital to insure that one agency's testimony
is not in conflict with that of another through misunderstanding
62-116395
WOC:ebc
(7)
PRANON
O MAR 1 2 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 108
SEGRET
6 MAR 7 1975
CONTINUED - OVER
5-1086
14
Memo for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
or inadvertency.
As an example of this coordination, Mr. Colby
has furnished the Bureau and other members of the Intelligence
Community the statement he plans to make as the lead-off witness
before the Senate Select Committee (SSC). This statement has
been reviewed by the Intelligence Division and a memorandum
has been prepared which notes that there is nothing objectionable
from the Bureau's standpoint in Colby's proposed statement.
A second point Colby made at the USIB meeting was his
desire that all members understand that no agency representative
should discuss with a congressional committee information or
techniques which are of proprietary interest to another agency
without prior consultation. This is certainly a valid request
and we should concur. ✓ As an example, the FBI would not want
the National Security Agency to discuss with a congressional
committee FBI support of National Security Agency's TELEX effort
without first clearing with us. Likewise, the Bureau representa-
tive should not discuss National Security Agency's exploitation
of teletype traffic furnished to them by the FBI without prior
() coordination with NSA. Recently a congressional committee asked
CIA for copies of any written agreements between FBI and CIA.
CIA felt they had no alternative but to provide the committee
with copies of the FBI CIA Understanding dated 2/7/66. However,
before doing so CIA did obtain FBI approval.
-
ACTION:
13/6/75
If approved, through the Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Coordinating Group on Congressional Inquiry, representatives
of the Intelligence Division will keep Mr. Colby and the
Intelligence Community advised of any FBI testimony before
congressional committees wherein such testimony could impact
on other members of the Intelligence Community, could result
in other members of the Intelligence Community being called to
testify, or where questions are asked which are of proprietary
interest to another member of the Community.
TUL
Rec. explice of
G. H. & joues alte
used 2/27/75 bare 
Edusents:
NW 88608 Docid:32989500 Page 109
Relable to
•Ad Hoc
ma
A
шки
سانه انواع
O, NONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GORNMENT
Memorandum
مسائل التے ہیں
ΤΟ
: Mr. W.R. Wannall
FROM
H.A. Boynton, Jr.
NB
Mr Adams
1
1
-
Mr
#annall
DATE: 3/4/75
1
Mr. Boynton
1
-
Mr. Schwartz
SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) EMPLOYEE
SECRECY AGREEMENTS
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
tudy - 75
Assec. ir.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Infoll.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director secy
Concerning a news article appearing in the 2/28/75/der
edition of the Washington Post newspaper (copy attached)
entitled "Colby Will Lift CIA Secrecy Pledge to Cooperate
With Senate Probe," the Director noted "Can we determine what
the agreement includes?"
On 3/4/75 Mr. Steve Kuhn, Office of Security, CIA,
advised that all CIA employees prior to commencing employ--
ment with that Agency are required to execute an "Entrance on
Duty Secrecy Agreement" and upon terminating their Agency
employment are requested to execute a "Termination Secrecy
Agreement" (copies of both attached). Briefly, these agree-
ments require that CIA employees keep forever secret all
classified information gained during the course of their
employment. Both agreements further require that CIA employees
may not disclose classified information during interviews
or by publication without prior authority from the Director
of Central Intelligence. Both agreements specifically set
forth that the employee has read the provisions of the
espionage laws (Sections 793, 794 and 798 of Title 18, U.S.
Code), is aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified
information relating to the national defense could lead to
prosecution and has reviewed the provisions of the National
Security Act of 1947, which specifically charges the Director
of Central Intelligence with protecting intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure. In this connec-
tion, the "Termination Secrecy Agreement" notes that the
employee has also read the provisions of Section 1001, Title 18,
U.S. Code, and is aware that making a false statement "herein
or otherwise" may be punished as a felony. The "Termination
Secrecy Agreement" consists of a four-page form, pages
three and four of which are entitled "Excerpts From Title 18
United States Code",
Enclosures
BPM: tdp (5)
-
de and specifically sets forth the provisions
CLOSU
233
62-116395
56 MAR 24 1975
-NW-88608-Docid:32989530_Page_110.
CONTINUED OVER
UNAROUND
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 13 1975
G1 MAR 13 1575
www.t's
ORIGINAL FILED IN 62 -80271

NW-88608 Docld:32989530 Page 111
:
Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) EMPLOYEE
SECRECY AGREEMENTS
of Sections 793, 794, 798, and 1001. Both Secrecy Agree-
ments also state that the conditions and obligations with
respect to the protection of classified information con-
tinue after Agency employment has terminated.
The FBI, of course, utilizes Form FD-291 "Employ-
ment Agreement," which has been executed by all current
employees and must be signed by all new personnel entering
on duty, to cover the foregoing situation. The "Employment
Agreement" (copy attached) covers essentially the same
points noted in the attached CIA Secrecy Agreements. While
we do not have an exit secrecy agreement signed by the
terminating employee, Form FD-193 "Report of Exit and
Separation" requires (under Paragraph D, Page 2) that the
exiting employee be cautioned regarding divulging con-
fidential information and reminded that such improper action
may violate Department of Justice regulations as well as
Federal statutes providing for substantial fines and lengthy
imprisonment or both.
ACTION:
вем
Above for information.
:
1
2.-
джа
т
☐
"
#mpe 16
ALL INFORMATION COALI
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFER
DATE:11-6-00 BI SP-2-ALU
:. Dir.
. AD Adm.
Trap. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
March 4, 1075
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ADAMS
MR. WANNALL
f
о
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
Inquiry re Opening of Mail by the
Central Intelligence Agency
On March 4, 1975, William Cotter, Chief Postal Inspector, came
to see me. He said the Postmaster General has become alarmed about the Niy
opening of mail by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for many years.
Mr. Cotter vent to CIA and received a listing, by year, of the activity in
this regard. This list further stimulated the alarm of the Postmaster
General.
De
Ir. Cotter advised that ho had Immown of this project since the 1950s
when he was assigned to New York as an Inspector. He said that several of
the Postmaster Generals were informed of the project and no protest was
made. He said the gonoral feeling was that these were possible enemics of the
nation and, therefore, the method was considered as necessary. The present
Postmaster General feels the procedure might be highly criticized, and
Mr. Cotter came to me to get my assuranco no such activity was now going
on. I informed him it is not.
Mr. Cotter further asked me if we know it was going on and did wo
actually receive the benefits of it. I informed him we knew of it and did get
information on the procedure from CIA.
I then told Mr. Cotter I thought he should be joined in the group of
investigative organizations, hended by Mr. Colby, Director of CIA, to consider
our actions in the Select Committee's probe. Mr. Cotter said they had been
invited to the first meeting, but to none since.
Assistant Director Vannall should check to make sure they are included
and we should confirm to Mr. Cotter that his organization has been established
as a participant.
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
lephone Rm.
vector Sec'y
MÁR
کن
MAIL ROOM
SENT FROM D. Ú
TIME
P
DATE 2/113
BY
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608CD+cd132989530) Page 112
1
EX-10
REC-11
62-116375-29
Very truly yours,
стки
Claronco M. Kelley,
Director
MAR 175
ΤΟ
FROM
SUBJECT
"Hald
OPTIONAL FORM NO. io
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES
5010-106
NMENT
Memorandum
:Mr. White
White /
w/1385
дж
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINE
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
7-7.00
DATE
-00
BY.
34063 ELW/BCE/A
J. H. Mortimer'
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TÂMM
FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936;
✗CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY
DATE: February 27, 1975
75
Security Jurisdiction
DC,
JOHN EDGARY HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936.
C.
E..
F.
G+
10
the
LJ"
P:
Spr
T.
Lag.
Tei
Diran
On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence
Division delivered the above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory
with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in
the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction
of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation
was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters
used to write the memoranda were in use on the dates appearing
on the memoranda.
SC
It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm
from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared
on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which
has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the
"Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25;
1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington
typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been m
use since October, 1935.
62-116375-
The memoranda were returned to ȘA Lacey.
RECOMMENDATION:
NOT RECORDED
MAY 2
The result of this examination forwarded to the
Intelligence Division
1
1
1
-
Mr. Wannall
-
Mr. Lacey
Mr. White
1 Mr. Mortimer
1
Mr. Oberg
Thank
W WSO : mrg X
(6)
MAY 2 1975
57APR)-94975
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 113
REG-40
15 MAR
14-20
GOVEN
who
6424-184 1
6.30-5
Filed In
Original
-
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
: W.
of
C
Cregar
www.gm
1
-
1
DATE:
1
1
1
-
-
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
FATE: 9/25/00 BY SP- ZALM/z
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
MINIS UNCLASSIFIED
9120W#
0
>
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
2/14/75
Mr.
Mintz
Mr.
Wannall
Mr. Cregar
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of
the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the
Group) held on the morning of 2/14/75 at CIA Headquarters
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Woofer
The Group chaired by Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, is made up
of representatives of agencies and departments having member-
ship on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). Its
purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism for future
testimony before various congressional meetings.
At the meeting of the Group on 2/14/75 several items
of interest were discussed. They were:
62-11/-391-
62-4-871
(1) A Secrecy Agreement (copy attached) was presented
to Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC), with the request that all staff employees of
the Committee, which may number as high as 40, be requested to sign.
Miller was rather cool to the suggestion and indicated that the
SSC and Senator Church would take it under advisement. It is
to be noted that this draft of the Secrecy Agreement was prepares
by the Security Committee of USIB in concert with Mr. Kevin T.
Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice. Although this was considered the final
draft of the Secrecy Agreement, the Treasury representative on
the Group was hopeful additional language could be incorporated
into the Agreement to cover other than classified information
such as the confidentiality of Internal Revenue returns.
(2) Memorandum Cregar to Wannall, dated 2/4/75,
advised that Mr. Colby, in his role as the Director of Central
Intelligence, had been instructed by the White House to identify
what information the Intelligence Community felt could not under
any circumstances be discussed with a congressional committee.
Enclosures
62-116395
WOC:ebc
درا
ENCLOSURE
MÁR 0 5 1975
F185
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 114
REC-40 62-116395-
EX-VR
5 FEB 281975
CONTINUED
OVER
-
UNRECORDED COX)
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
Attached is a copy of the paper Colby provided to the White
House responsive to this request. It does encompass recom-
mendations of member agencies of the Group including the FBI.
At a subsequent meeting Mr. Colby had with unidentified
persons at the White House, the above list was discussed. Colby
recommended the Intelligence Community had three options to deny
a congressional committee sensitive information. They were:
to refuse providing sensitive information to a congressional
committee and face the possibility of a contempt citation,
(B) have the President refuse\to authorize the release of such
information, presumably through the exercise of Executive Privilege,
or (C) the President could call the majority and minority leaders
of the congressional committee to the White House, furnish to them
the answer to the question with the added caveat that they were
the only persons being informed of the answers and, therefore,
would be personally accountable for any leak of information.
Representatives of the White House were not very enthusiastic to
the options put forth by Mr. Colby and indicated that they would
be calling a meeting at the White House of senior officials of
the Department of Defense, Justice Department, CIA and the FBI
to review what position the Intelligence Community should take
in responding to a request for extremely sensitive and highly
classified information.
(3) Members of the Group were allowed to read an
internal memorandum from Mr. David W. Belkin, Executive Director
of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the U. S. (The Rockefeller
Commission), to Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President.
This memorandum reports the results of a conversation between
Mr. Bellin and Mr. William Miller, Chief of Staff for the SSC.
The memorandum revealed that Miller believes that within two weeks
his staff will be in three-quarters gear. He plans to have a total
staff of about 40, 10 to 12 of whom will be lawyers. The initial
work of the staff will concentrate on a review of documents,
interviews, and what Miller called "depositions." Miller does not
plan to have any hearings of the SSC for several months and believes
the September deadline could not be met, rather that the investiga-
tion would take at least the rest of the year.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 115
- 2 -
CONTINUED OVER
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
Bellin's memorandum also noted that the thrust of
the SSC's investigation will include the whole range of
intelligence gathering agencies; will delve into the basic
matters of policy, including whether or not there is a need
for all of the agencies; what the results are; related public
policy matters, as well as rights of privacy.
Miller also advised Bellin that the SSC would operate
out of a room referred to as "the auditorium, " which Miller
thought gave the best security. He said there would be rigid
standards imposed to seal off any leaks. These standards would
include having everything in a central filing area with a specific
check-out system permitted to particular people so that if leaks
occurred the source of such leaks could be readily ascertained.
Xeroxing would be severely limited. In response to a question
from Bellin to Miller as to why the Senate and House did not
create a joint Senate/House committee as opposed to individual
Senate and House Select Committees, Miller advised that it was too
difficult to arrange because of matters of protocol.
It is noted that although a House Select Committee
is being formed with basically the same charter as the SSC, no
chairman of the House Select Committee has been designated and
the Group estimates that it will be a month before the House
Select Committee can get started.
ACTION:
For information.
WRWITUL
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 116
Ja
до
- 3 -
SECRECY AGREEMENT
I,
in accepting employment
or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the
special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified infor-
mation from unauthorized disclosure.
I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth
below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with
the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United
States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter
referred to as the Select Committee.
It is my under standing that in the course of my employment
or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to
information from departments and agencies of the Government which
is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive
Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information
so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the
property of the United States of America and I further agree to
surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee
or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee,
any classified material which has come into my possession as a
result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.
I hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if
information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or
reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified
information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my
employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior
written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate cr
their duly authorized representative.
#MDR 16
རྫོངས་ནས་
5.00 SP2 ALMIZIG
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 117
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-1
I hereby agree that any information learned during my
employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related
to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to
the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized
representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher,
editor or lițerary agent for the purpose of determining whether said
material contains any classified information as defined in Executive
Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee,
President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has
the authority to make the final determination as to whether information
is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.
I have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S. C. 793, 794,
798 and 952; and 50 U.S. C. 783 (b); and 42 U.S. C. 2274; and Executive
Order 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified infor-
mation, and understand their meaning.
Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the
Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material.
I understand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agree-
ment could subject me to legal and/or administrative action.
I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed
on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this
agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employ-
ment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.
I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any
mental reservations or purpose of evasion.
WITNESS:
Signature
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 'Page 118
Date
Signature
Date
SECRET/SENSITIVE
CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER
THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTECTION
I.
The names of agents, informants, covert liaison contacts and
operations or other identifying characteristics of sensitive
clandestine sources
2. Agent or informant names or operational information
revealing them.
b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive
methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source
collection (2) employed by the FBI for internal security and counter-
∙intelligence purposes.
--The numbers, locations, times and other indications of
recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organiza-
tions.
--Specific statements of the use of technical devices in
agent operations.
--The total extent of recruitment or investigative effectiveness
against any given target organization or individual, or lack
thereof.
--Names of selected agency and/or ex-agency employees
if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility.
--Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise, who would
be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.
II. Relationships with Other Intelligence Services
a. Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly
and neutral countries.
Classified by
056047
Exempt from general declassification schedulo
of E. O. 11532, exemption category:
<< (site or more)
Ally dedansited on
DATE
OUBLE TO DETERANS
(unless impose only
ALL FEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 119
SECRET SENSITIVE
62-11--395-18
b. Identifying collaborative operations between the United States
intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison scrvices
against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within
a jointly targetted third country.
C. The nature of support provided, or arrangements with foreign
intelligence services supporting US technical collection operations.
d. Material and information provided to the US by a foreign service
under conditions of continued secrecy.
III. Cryptologic and Communications Activities
a.
Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material.
b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations.
C.
-
-
Activities taken with the manufacturers of cryptologic devices
in the U.S. and abroad.
d. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations
of foreigners or foreign facilities (U.S. and aiıvadj.
e. Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and
unfriendly targets in the U. S. and abroad.
:
f. Covert signals intelligence collection including (1) assistance
arrangements with commercial U. S. and foreign companies (2) taps
(3) and from US installations abroad..
g- Collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence
collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be
politically embarrassing in the countries involved.
h. Protectivè communications security measures.
i. Efforts to collect exotic signals and locate transmissions
especially critical to our work in AṢW.
IV.
Technical Intelligence
a. Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical
vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.
.
2
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 120
SECRET/SENSITIVE.

b. Details of specific covert communications systems, including
secret writing, special agent equipment, etc.
i
C. Specific, identification of foreign technical collection installations
involving high political sensitivity in the host. country.
$
d. Identification of technical counter-measures techniques.
e. Characterization of emplacement of devices for technical
collection of foreign intelligence, including techniques of emplacement.
芝。 Details of secure U.S. communications systems. .
V.
Other
a.
Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass
the U.S. Government or frustrate the purpose of the operation.
b. Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with U.S. and
foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence
operations.
C. Specific information on special relationships with private firms
established-with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes
names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged.
customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations.
780
d. Names of firms collaborating with U. S. intelligence agencies
in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large
foreign clienteles).
e.
Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and
covert tax arrangements.
f. Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations.
against foreign intelligence targets.
g。 The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRC diplomatic or
military intentions toward the United States or on the state of our
intelligence on military technologies of these nations.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 121
SECRET/SENSITIVE
苡
Mr W.R. Wannall
4
W.O. Cregar
February 19, 1975
SENSTUDY 75
والسرور
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALIN
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 
AL 
196
Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. V.R. Wannall,
БУ
dated 2/10/75, recommended that a paper entitled "Origin
and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished to Mr. Colby
in his role as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for
inclusion as an annex in a series of annexes Mr. Colby intends
to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion
of his appearance as the lead-off witness. This memorandum
was approved and the annex entitled "Origin and Disposition
of the Huston Plan" was furnished to Mr. Colby for his use.
In anticipation that Mr. Kelley will appear before
the SSC, # cony of the annex entitled "Origin and Disposition
of the Huston Plan" is being furnished to the Legal Counsel
Division for inclusion in the briefing book being prepared for
the Director relative to his anticipated appearance before the
SBC..
ACTION:
The attached copy of the FBI paper entitled "Origin
and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished to the Legal
Counsel Division for their use in connection with the preparation
of a briefing book for the Director's anticipated appearance
before the SSC.
Enclosure
1 - Mr. J.A. Mintz
1
Mr.
W.R. Wannall
1 Mr. W.O. Cregar
REC 862-116395&MX
WOC:bow (4)
ST 112
16 MAY 27 1975
Original cannot be located
and is not on record. When
xinal is received in, Recorts
༢, ག སྭཱ!, *+
84 MAY 30 1975
No
- thar
5-23-75
indication orig Recorde
Sabugal
NW 88608 Docfd32989530 Page 122 5-23-75-7/3
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
"UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
FROM : H.A. Boynton, Jr.
: Mr. W.R. Wannall
What
B
1
-
1
1
DATE:
1
1
-
-
Mr. Adams
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
2/12/75
Mr. Boynton
Mr. Schwartz
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Pursuant to request of Mr. Adams, Liaison Officer
L.F. Schwartz contacted Mr. John Clark of the Intelligence
Community Staff on 2/11/75 with regard to suggested security,
procedures for the handling of classified information by
the Select Committee.
De
Mr. Clark advised that on 2/10/75 he had met
personally with Mr. William Miller who has been designated
to head the Select Committee Staff. He stated that he dis-
cussed with Mr. Miller the proposed guidelines for security
and the proposed secrecy agreement for staff members and
furnished Miller with copies of both these items. Mr. Clark
stated that Miller was generally receptive to the proposed
guidelines and felt that they would be acceptable subject
to the approval of Senator Church. Mr. Miller was decidedly
cool concerning the idea of staff members signing a secrecy
agreement but indicated that a final decision regarding this.
would be made by Senator Church.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD
Asst. Dir.
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inte
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director See
Mr. Clark stated that he raised two specific questions
which Mr. Colby considers most important with regard to any
presentation made to the Select Committee. He advised Miller
that the Intelligence Community would desire to not identify
specific agents or the details of sensitive operations which
might reveal the identities of sensitive sources. Mr. Miller
was agreeable to this and foresaw no problem with the Select
'Committee accepting this proposal. Secondly, Mr. Clark
advised Mr. Miller that Mr. Colby, speaking for the Intelli-
gence Community, was opposed to having any dealings with staff
members of the various Senators and Representatives other
than those assigned to work directly under Mr. Miller as part
of the Select Committee Staff. Mr. Miller stated that this
was also acceptable to him and he assured Mr. Clark that all
of his staff members would be subject to an FBI background
investigation and the issuance of a security clearance by CIA.
"REC- 104 62-116395
LFS:tdp (6)
84 MAR 3 1975
• tij
MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
CONTINUED
OVER
62-116395-26X
5 FEB 24 1975
EX SP-2 ALM/176
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 123
i
Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
During the conversation with Mr. Clark he advised
further that it is not the intention of Mr. Colby to use
as any part of the CIA's defense for alleged domestic
activities the allegation that such activities were under-
taken because the FBI had failed or was unwilling to carry
out its responsibilities in the domestic area. Mr. Clark
noted that he is aware that there have been references to
such a claim in the newspapers but he assured SA Schwartz
that Mr. Colby does not support this position in any way.
Mr. Clark volunteered to arrange a personal meeting between
Mr. Colby and an appropriate FBI official to discuss this
point, if the Bureau so desired.
ACTION:
For information.
LFS/ese Web
шов
WRW/TWL
джа
No Need unles
Certin
Change,
- 2
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 124
-
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}
H
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962. EDITION
GSX GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
: W.
Cregar
☐ SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
1
1
-
DATE:
Mr. Adams
Mr. Mintz
2/18/75
1 • Mr. Wannall
1
-
Mr. Cregar
AmoR16
ALL INFORMATION COUZAIŃS
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 116-00 BY SP-2 AM 1776
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep: AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Dir
.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Interl
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
This memorandum reports that on 2/14/75 Mr. John
Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on
Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, tele-
phonically advised Section Chief, W. O. Cregar, the Bureau's
representative on this Group, that Mr. Samuel R. Preston,
Senior Staff Member of the House Appropriations Committee,
requested that CIA provide the House Appropriations Committee
with any written agreements between CIA änd the FBI.
The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review
of the Intelligence Community is made up of representatives-of
agencies and departments having membership on the U. S. Intelli-
gence Board.
Its purpose is to serve as a coordinating mechanism
for future testimony before various congressional committees.
On the late afternoon of 2/14/75, Mr. John Clarke,
telephonically advised Mr. Cregar that he had received a
telephone call from Mr. Samuel R. Preston. The purpose of the
call was to request any written agreements that existed between
the CIA and the FBI. Clarke advised the only written agreement
he could identify existing between the FBI and CIA was one dated
2/7/66 (copy attached).
Clarke stated that inasmuch as he had gotten this
specific request from Mr. Preston he felt CIA had no alternative
but to provide a copy of the Agreement to him.
However, Clarke
wanted to be sure the FBI concurred in this action.
27
Subsequent to MrExcharke's call, Mr. Adams telephonically
-
contacted Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman and explained
the problem to him. Mr. Silberman authorized the release of a
copy of the FBI
CIA Agreement to Mr. Preston. On the afternoon
of 2/14/75 Mr. Cregar advised Mr. Clarke that the FBI interposed
no objection to the release of a copy of the 1966 Agreement to
Mr. Preston.
Enclosures
62-116395
WOC:ebc (5)
58 MAR 4 1975
-
sent 2-20-75
| ENCLOSURE:
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 125
FEB 25 1975
CONTINUED
-
5106
OVER
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
Attached is a memorandum to the Attorney General
with a copy for the Deputy Attorney General confirming
the conversation between Mr. Adams and Mr. Silberman on the
afternoon of 2/14/75.
ACTION:
sent.
That the memorandum to the Attorney General be
WRW/TU
дна
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 126
་
2
-
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
#MOR16 17-6-00
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CLASSIFIED BY SPZ ALM 27
DECLASSIFY ON: 23X 1
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIND
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFÏTO RICOVS
MESTARUNAZO KAÓNS TAHL
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
February 7, 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any
foreign official in the United States without the concurrence
and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term
“investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or
procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances
or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information
concerning an individual's activities or background;
"investigation" does not include the acceptance or the
development of information through social contacts or contacts:
normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover
functions. (5)
(2)
CIA will seek concurrence and coordination of
the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign
official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States.
The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action
does not conflict with any operation, current or planned,
including active investigation of the FCBBIT. (S)
(3) CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned
meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or
communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to
the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials
and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social
development. (s)
(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic
American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited
abroad who come to the United States will be identified to
the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on
the national security interest involved: CD:D:D:D:D:D:D)
(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent
arrives in the United States for a visit or for an
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 127
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
(5)
62-116345-27
SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency
Operations in the United States
assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies
will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the
United States. It is recognized that each case will have
its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will
be positive intelligence interest as weighed against
internal security factors. CIA will continue its
contractual relationship for the purpose of handling
the training, the procurement of positive foreign
intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to
the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his
next assignment abroad:D:D:D:D:D:D:D)_
(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its
agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security
or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the
FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence
or internal security matters, including the scope and
nature of the agent's access to information and the
identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly
in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA
servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal security.
interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent.
:
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 128
1
SECRET
CODE
TELETYPE
IMMEDIATE
דיי
Ditt 8/89/82 Spychwane
JEE BURT 4)-1174-55
CATE 8/21/78
IN CIVIL DISCOVERY
FILE PROCESSED FOR RELEASE
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
TO ALL SACS AND ALL LEGATS
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
i
1
95
DESTRUCTION OF FIELD FILES AND RECORDS.
1-29-75
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 29 1975
11
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSED INVESTIGATION AND
STUDY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE REQUESTED
THE BUREAU NOT TO DESTROY, REMOVE FROM OUR POSSESSION
OR CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OR PERMIT DISPOSAL QF
ANY RECORDS OR DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE A BEARING ON
SUBJECTS UNDER INVESTIGATION. ACCORDINGLY, UPON RECEIPT
OF THIS COMMUNICATION, RECIPIENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD
IN ABEYANCE ANY RECORDS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY
APPROVED BY STATUTE OR REGULATIONS. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
31 FEB 28 1975
pik ba
REC²² 62 - 116373-26
IN THIS MATTER WILL BE ISSUED UPON RECEIPT.
1
-
1
-
Foreign Liaison Unit (sent direct)
Mr. Callahan (sent direct)
1 Mr. Jenkins (sent direct)
-
1 Mr. Adams (sent direct)
-
1 - Each Assistant Director (sent direct)
PFS:bpr
(19)
NOTE: Reference letter to the Director dated 1-27-75 from Hugh Scott,
Republican Leader, and Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader, United
States Senate...
elephone Rm.
y
MAIL ROOM
irector Sec'y
ENTIALEV
197EMED TONS OFFICE
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 129
до
дня
424381
EX-10)
REC-23/
11637-25
1- Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Jenkins
Mr. McDermott
1
February 19, 1975
Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Scott:
1
Mr. Ash
Mr. Wannall
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
1
-
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Farrington
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Hotis
We have received the letter of January 27, 1975, with
enclosure, from you and Senator Mike Mansfield which requests that
we not destroy or otherwise dispose of any records or documents
relating to a forthcoming Senate investigation of intelligence activities.
MAILED 6
FEB 19 1975
-FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
PEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/27/8
BY SPY ELWC
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
-
Plan. & Eval. _'
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone R
Director Sec'y
Cur procedures regarding the destruction of documents
in our files are governed by the Federal Records Act of 1959 and regu-
lations of the National Archives and Records Service. It is our current
policy to destroy all records over twenty-five years old pertaining to sub-
versive activities which were based on unsubstantiated allegations and
did not result in prosecutive action. In addition, all criminal files over
ten years old are reduced to microfilm and the original records are
destroyed. We also destroy the duplicate copies of all documents when
thece copies no longer serve a useful purpose.
Upon receipt of your letter, we immediately suspended
our destruction program and are attempting to determine whether any
documents are involved that might relate to matters set out in section 2
of Sonate Resolution 21. We also contacted William G. Caller, Staff
Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, who
adviced us that he will consult with Senator Church and advise us
accordingly.
You may be assured that we are taking every possible
measure to preserve those records or documents relating to intelligence
activities that might be of interest to the Senate. It is certainly our
intention to cooperate fully with the Select Committee in this very
important inquiry.
1
FEE 27 1975
JBH:mbk
(15)
WAR 6 1975
*MAIL ROOM
Duri
IBN
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 130
Sincerely yours,
Per
же
Clarence Kelley
Clarence M. Kelley
Director
(See NOTE next page).
GPC
KY
REDED COPY MILLD.

1
Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
NOTE: See memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 2-14-75
captioned "SENSTUDY, Letter from Senators Mansfield and Hugh Scott
re Destruction of Records, 1-27-75," JBH:mbk. Neither Senator Mansfield
nor Senator Scott is on the Bureau's mailing list.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 131
- 2 -
ΤΟ
FROM :
SUBJECT:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1862 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. LaPrade
DATE:
prend such a letter
Howe need to
scheduly 
forte
1-31-75 with
up-to
Kj
DK..
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. Ab
Asst. Dir
Dir
Admin
Comp. Syst..
ww
Ext. Affairs
Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
H. R. Hauer
Hauer
DESTRUCTION OF FILES AND RECORDS
FILES AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION
As you are aware, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Republican-
Leader Hugh Scott, in a letter to the Director dated 1-27-75, requested the Bureau
not to destroy, remove from our possession or control, or otherwise dispose or
permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on
subject's under investigation proposed by Senate. Accordingly, Files and
Communications Division is holding in abeyance any destruction program previously
approved by statute or regulation and has issued instructions to all field offices
and Legats to do likewise until clarification of above request is received. Recommend
Office of Legal Counsel prepare letter to Senators Mansfield and Scott asking clarifi-
cation of their request and whether or not it includes existing destruction procedures,
previously approved by the Archivist of the United States.
Regulations of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS), General
Services Administration, which are based on Title 44, Chapter 33, Sections 3301
and 3302, U. S. Code, govern the type of material which we must maintain. NARS
regulations also govern what material may be destroyed. Record material is
described as including "all books, papers, maps, photographs, or other documen-
tary materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received
by an agency of the U.S. Government under Federal law or in connection with the
transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that
agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or
because of the information value of data contained therein." Our destruction pro-
grams are conducted in compliance with NARS regulations to conserve space and
1 manpower. In those instances where we have more than one copy of a communication,
it is our policy to file only the original of the communication and to destroy any
copies when they no longer
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
Mr. Callahan
62.-116393
ALL INFORMATION erve a useful purpose. Examples follow:
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Adams
Mr.
Mr. Ash
Mintz
PFS:bpr
CUNTA
SED
BRATE 8/27/82 SPHEN/WPE0-23
HERE IS
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Rage 132
FEE 2
1. FEB 28 1975
CONTINUED - OVER
Twe
!
}
Memo Hauer to LaPrade
Re: Destruction of Files and Records
Files and Communications Division
1
Identification Division has purge-type projects in both the criminal and
civil fingerprint files involving the destruction of certain fingerprint cards and
related name index cards, primarily duplicate-type cards on persons considered
inactive because of age.
Insofar as destruction of material by Files and Communications Division
is concerned, files, index cards, and related material over 25 years old maintained
at FBI Headquarters pertaining to unfounded allegations of subversive activities,
membership in subversive organizations, subversive sympathies and tendencies on
the part of individuals and organizations are approved for destruction by NARS when
investigations revealed allegations predicated upon rumor, nebulous complaints and
nonspecific allegations from which no prosecutive action occurred. Archival
authority has been obtained to destroy FBI Headquarters files in connection with
Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles cases, Selective Service Act
cases, Destruction of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles cases (provided no prosecution
results from the inquiries conducted and the case had been closed ten years);
and Archival authority has been obtained for destruction of
files at FBI Headquarters in unknown subject cases in which there was no criminal
prosecution (no time limit set regarding the destruction of unknown subject cases).
In addition to the above authority for the outright destruction of FBI
Headquarters records, Archival authority has also been obtained to microfilm any
closed criminal file:
after the case has been
closed for ten or more years. Thereafter, the paper records may be destroyed.
We currently have on hand 38, 601 index cards to be destroyed which pertain to
paper record material which has been destroyed previously under NARS regulations
and authority.
In addition, personnel files concerning employees who have been separated
more than one year are reviewed and temporary records contained therein which no
longer serve a useful purpose are purged and only those permanent records as
described in the Federal Personnel Manual are retained in the official personnel
folder.
Also files, index cards and related material, over 15 years old, maintained
at FBI Headquarters relating to laboratory examinations requested by various local,
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 133
Memo Hauer to LaPrade
Re: Destruction of Files and Records.
Files and Communications Division
state and Federal law enforcement organizations in cases other than FBI cases
wherein positive identification was not effected are also purged. These files
no longer possess sufficient reference or evidentiary value to merit retention.
Administrative and noninvestigative records maintained in the various
field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are purged also. This material
is retained in the field offices until necessary action has been taken or it has served
its purpose.
RECOMMENDATION:
That Office of Legal Counsel prepare an appropriate reply to Senators
Mansfield and Scott to determine if their request not to destroy records and
documents was intended to include the destruction programs enumerated above.
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NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 134
MAILED 6
ALL IN
FEB 19 1975
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFED
DATE 0/27/821 SPIELW/End
Assoc. Dir.
EX-105
REC-11
Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Mansfield:
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. McDermott
11635-4uary 19, 1375
1 Mr. Ash
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Farrington
-
Mr. Bowers
1 - Mr. Hotis
We have received the letter of January 27, 1975, with
enclosure, from you and Senator Hugh Scott which requests that we not
destroy or othervice dispose of any records or documents relating to a
forthcoming Senate investigation of intelligence activities.
Our procedures regarding the destruction of documents
in our files are governed by the Federal Records Act of 1950 and regu-
lations of the National Archives and Records Service. It is our current
policy to destroy all records over twenty-five years old pertaining to sub-
veraive activities which were based on unsubstantiated allegations and
did not result in prosecutive action. In addition, all criminal files over
ten years old are reduced to microfilm and the original records are
destroyed. We also destroy the duplicate copies of all documents when
there copies no longer serve a useful purpose.
Upon receipt of your letter, we immediately suspended
our destruction program and are attempting to determine whether any
documents are involved that might relate to matters set cut in section 2
of Senate Resolution 21. We also contacted William G. Millor, Staff
Director, Senato Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, who
adviced us that he will consult with Senator Church and advise us
accordingly.
You may be assured that we are taking every possible
measure to preserve those records or documents relating to intelligence
Dep. AD Adm. activities that might be of interest to the Senate. It is certainly our
intention to cooperate fully with the Select Committce in this very
Comp. Syst. Important inquiry.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Evals _
Spec. Inv
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KW 88 608 Docld: 3989630 Page 135
TELETYPE UNIT
Sincerely yours,
C. M. Kelley,
Clarence Holley
Director
UNRECORDED COPY IM
(See NOTE next page)
GPO 954-545
Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
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NOTE: See memorandum Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams dated 2-14-75
captioned "SENSTUDY, Letter from Senators Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott
re Destruction of Records, 1-27-75," JBH:mbk. Neither Senator Mansfield
nor Senator Scott is on the Bueau's mailing list.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 136
- 2 -
十
MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA
-
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510
January 27, 1975
Honorable Clarence M. Kelley
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535
Dear Mr. Director:
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
IIFFIN
,IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM/276
O Senatury- "15"
As you may be aware, the Senate is to conduct
an investigation and study of government operations with
respect to intelligence activities. The scope of the
investigation is set out in S. Res. 21, a copy of which
has been enclosed for your information.
We are writing to request that you not destroy,
remove from your possession or control, or otherwise
dispose or permit the disposal of any records or documents
which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation,
including but not limited to all records or documents pertain-
ing in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res. 21
Hugh
HUGH SCOTT, REPUBLICAN LEADER
Enclosure
Sincerely yours,
Mike mafies
MIKE MANSFIELD, MAJORITY LEADE
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REC-11
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Senators Scott Mandfield
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ENCLOSURE
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and requested no destruction of
until further notice. Jam
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 137
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MR. CALLAHAN
MR. JENKINS
MR. ADAMS
MR. ASH
MR. BASSETT
MR. CLEVELAND
MR. DECKER.
MR. GALLAGHER
MR. GEBHARDT
MR. JAMIESON
MR. LA PRADE.
MR. MC DERMOTT
MR. MINTZ.
MR. WALSH
4+1 670
MR. WANNALL
MR. WHITE
MR. COLEMAN
MR. REED
TELE. ROOM
MRS. METCALF
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALMLITE
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NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 138
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-24
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 9/25/00 EX SP.2-ALM/ZTG
94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
*S. RES. 21
Calendar No. 2
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 21, 1975
Mr. PASTORE submitted the following resolution; which was ordered to be placed
on the calendar (under general orders)
RESOLUTION
To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an in-
vestigation and study with respect to intelligence activities
carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.
1
Resolved, To establish a select committee of the Senate
2 to conduct an investigation and study of governmental oper-
3 ations with respect to intelligence activities and of the
4 extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical ac-
5 tivities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal
6 Government or by any persons, acting individually or in
7 combination with others, with respect to any intelligence
8 activity carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Govern-
9 ment; be it further
10
V
Resolved, That (a) there is hereby established a select
REC-11-11689.-24
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 139
2
1 committee of the Senate which may be called, for con-
2 venience of expression, the Select Committee To Study
3 Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Ac-
4 tivities to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if
5 any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were
6 engaged in by any agency or by any persons, acting either
7 individually or in combination with others, in carrying out
8 any intelligence or surveillance activities by or on behalf
9 of any agency of the Federal Government.
10
(b) The select committee created by this resolution
11 shall consist of eleven members of the Senate, six to be
12 appointed by the President of the Senate from the majority
13 members of the Senate upon the recommendation of the
14 majority leader of the Senate, and five minority members of
15 the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate
16 upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the
17 Senate. For the purposes of paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the
18 Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a
19 member, chairman, or vice chairman of the select committee
20 shall not be taken into account.
21
22
(c) The majority members of the committee shall select
a chairman and the minority members shall select a vice
23 chairman and the committee shall adopt rules and procedures
24 to govern its proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside
25 over meetings of the select committee during the absence
HW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 140
叫

3
1 of the chairman, and discharge such other responsibilities
2 as may be assigned to him by the select committee or the
3 chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select com-
4 mittee shall not affect the authority of the remaining mem-
5 bers to execute the functions of the select committee and
6 shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments
7 to it are made.
8
(d) A majority of the members of the select committee
9 shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but
10 the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quorum
11 for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions.
12
SEC. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed
13 to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the in-
14 vestigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the
15 first section. Without abridging in any way the authority
16 conferred upon the select committee by the preceding
17 sentence, the Senate further expressly authorizes and directs
18 the select committee to make a complete investigation and
19 study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons
or groups of persons or organizations of any kind which
21 have any tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to
20
22 the following matters or questions:
(1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has
conducted an illegal domestic intelligence operation in
23
24
25
the United States.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 141
1
2
3
4
20
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6
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8
6
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
22
21
22
23
24
25
4
(2) The conduct of domestic intelligence or coun-
terintelligence operations against United States citizens
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other
Federal agency.
(3) The origin and disposition of the so-called Hus-
ton Plan to apply United States intelligence agency
capabilities against individuals or organizations within
the United States.
(4) The extent to which the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other
Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies coordi-
nate their respective activities, any agreements which
govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack
of coordination has contributed to activities or actions
which are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or con-
trary to the intent of Congress.
(5) The extent to which the operation of domestic
intelligence or counterintelligence activities and the
operation of any other activities within the United States.
by the Central Intelligence Agency conforms to the leg-
islative charter of that Agency and the intent of the
Congress.
(6) The past and present interpretation by the
Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility to
protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates to
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 142
5
1 the provision in section 102 (d) (3) of the National
2
3
4
5
6
7
00
8
9
10
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
22
21
22
23
24
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 (d) (3)) that
"... that the agency shall have no police, subpena, law
enforcement powers, or internal security functions. "
(7) Nature and extent of executive branch over-
sight of all United States intelligence activities.
(8) The need for specific legislative authority to
govern the operations of any intelligence agencies of
the Federal Government now existing without that
explicit statutory authority, including but not limited to,
agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and
the National Security Agency.
The nature and extent to which Federal agencies
cooperate and exchange intelligence information and
the adequacy of any regulations or statutes which
govern such .cooperation and exchange of intelligence
information.
(9) The extent to which United States intelligence
agencies are governed by Executive orders, rules, or
regulations either published or secret and the extent
to which those Executive orders, rules, or regulations
interpret, expand, or are in conflict with specific legis-
lative authority.
(10) The violation or suspected violation of any
S. Res. 21-2
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 143
6
State or Federal statute by any intelligence agency or
2 by any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency
of the Federal Government including but not limited
to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wiretaps, or eaves-
dropping, illegal opening of the United States mail, or
the monitoring of the United States mail.
.4.
5
6
7'
.9
* 10
11
12
13
14.
15
.16.
17
11 199
18
19
(11) The need for improved, strengthened, or con-
solidated oversight of United States intelligence ac-
tivities by the Congress.
(12) Whether any of the existing laws of the
· United States are inadequate, either in their provisions
or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of
American citizens, to improve executive and legislative
control of intelligence and related activities, and to re-
solve uncertainties as to the authority of United States
intelligence and related agencies.
(13) Whether there is unnecessary duplication of
expenditure and effort in the collection and processing
: of intelligence information by United States agencies.
20
21
22
23
(14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert
intelligence activities in the United States and abroad.
(15) Such other related matters as the committee
deems necessary in order to carry out its responsibilities
24
under section (a)..
25
SEC. 3. (a) To enable the select committee to make
KW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 1144
7
1 the investigation and study authorized and directed by this
2 resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select committee
3 as an 'agency of the Senate (1) to employ and fix the com-
4 pensation of such clerical, investigatory, legal, technical,
5 and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate,
6 but it may not exceed the normal Senate salary schedules;
7 (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions,
8 recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; (3) to hold
9 hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive docu-
10 mentary or physical evidence relating to the matters and
11 questions it is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to
12 require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses
13 of any persons who the select committee believes have
14 knowledge or information concerning any of the matters
or questions it is authorized to investigate and study; (5)
16 to require by subpena or order any department, agency,
17 officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United
18 States Government, or any private person, firm, or corpora-
19 tion, to produce for its consideration or for use as evidence
20 in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled
21 checks, correspondence, communications, document, papers,
22 physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials re-
23 lating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to
24 investigate and study which they or any of them may have
25 in their custody or under their control; (6) to make to the
15
NW-88608 Docld:32989530 Page 145
1
2
8
Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate in respect
to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer ques-
3 tions or give testimony in his character as a witness during
his
4 appearance before it or in respect to the willful failure
5
6
9
or refusal of any officer or employee of the executive branch
of the United States Government or any person, firm, or
7 corporation to produce before the committee any books,
8 checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications,
document, financial records, papers, physical evidence,
10 records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any
11 subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other testi-
12 mony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any
13 other country; (8) to procure the temporary or intermit-
14 tent services of individual consultants, or organizations there-
15 of, in the same manner and under the same conditions as
16 a standing committee of the Senate may procure such serv-
17 ices under section 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganiza-
18 tion Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reimbursable basis, with
the prior consent of the Committee on Rules and Adminis-
20 tration, the services of personnel of any such department
19
21
or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis or other-
22 wise with the prior consent of the chairman of any sub-
23 committee of any committee of the Senate the facilities or
24
services of any members of the staffs of such other Senate
25 committees or any subcommittees of such other Senate com-
NW188608 Docid:32989530 Page 1146
:
9
1 m'ttecs whenever the select committee or its chairman deems
2 that such action is necessary or appropriate to enable the
3 select committee to make the investigation and study author-
4 ized and directed by this resolution; (11) to have direct
5 access through the agency of any members of the select
6 committee or any of its investigatory or legal assistants
7 designated by it or its chairman or the ranking minority
8 member to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis,
9. or document or papers, relating to any of the matters or
10 questions which it is authorized and directed to investigate
11 and study in the custody or under the control of any depart-
12 ment, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch
13 of the United States Government, including any department,
14 agency, officer, or employee of the United States Govern-
15 ment having the power under the laws of the United States
16 to investigate any alleged criminal activities or to prosecute
17 persons charged with crimes against the United States and
18 any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United
19 States Government having the authority to conduct intelli-
20 gence or surveillance within or outside the United States,
21 without regard to the jurisdiction or authority of any other
22 Senate committee, which will aid the select committee to
23 prepare for or conduct the investigation and study authorized
24 and directed by this resolution; and (12) to expend to the
25 extent it determines necessary or appropriate any moneys
EM 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 147
10
1 made available to it by the Senate to perform the duties
2 and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution
3 and to make the investigation and study it is authorized by
4 this resolution to make.
5
10
(b) Subpenas may be issued by the select committee
6 acting through the chairman or any other member designated
7 by him, and may be served by any person designated by
8 such chairman or other member anywhere within the borders
9 of the United States. The chairman of the select committee,
or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to admin-
11 ister oaths to any witnesses appearing before the committee.
(c) In preparing for or conducting the investigation
13 and study authorized and directed by this resolution, the
14 select committee shall be empowered to exercise the powers
15 conferred upon committees of the Senate by section 6002 of
16 title 18, United States Code, or any other Act of Congress
17 regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses.
12
18
SEC. 4. The select committee shall have authority to
19 recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the
20 amendment of any existing statute which it considers neces-
sary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national secu-
22 rity, intelligence, or surveillance activities of the United
23 States and to protect the rights of United States citizens
24 with regard to those activities.
21
25
SEC. 5. The select committee shall make a final report
NW 8860% odd:798600) Page 148
11
1 of the results of the investigation and study conducted by
2
it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings and
3 its recommendations as to new congressional legislation it
4 deems necessary or desirable, to the Senate at the earliest
5 practicable date, but no later than September 1, 1975. The
6 select committee may also submit to the Senate such interim
7 reports as it considers appropriate. After submission of its
8 final report, the select committee shall have three calendar
9 months to close its affairs, and on the expiration of such
10 three calendar months shall cease to exist.
11
SEC. 6. The expenses of the select committee through
12 September 1, 1975, under this resolution shall not exceed
13 $750,000 of which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be
14 available for the procurement of the services of individual
15 consultants or organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be
16
paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers
17 approved by the chairman of the select committee.
NW-88608 Docld:32989530-Page-149-
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 150
94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
Calendar No. 2
S. RES. 21
RESOLUTION
To establish a select committee of the Senate to
conduct an investigation and study with re-
spect to intelligence activities carried out by
or on behalf of the Federal Government.
By Mr. PASTORE
JANUARY 21, 1975
Ordered to be placed on the calendar (under general
orders)

ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall,
FROM
:w. d) Cregar
SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75
#MORIE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFU
DATE 11/6/00 BXSP-
"2/14/75
Wes
1
-
1
1
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1
1
1
-
-
-
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Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
DATE:
2/11/75
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. A. B. Fulton
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled
"The Role of Counterintelligence" be furnished to Mr. Colby
as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for inclusion
as an annex in a series of annexes Mr. Colby intends to provide
the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his
appearance as the leadoff witness. The FBI was given the
responsibility for preparing this paper by the Ad Hoc Coordinating
Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.
The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review
of the Intelligence Community is made up of representatives of
agencies and departments having membership on the U. S.
Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a
coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various
Congressional committees.
Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by the
Intelligence Division entitled "The Role of Counterintelligence.
It is a basic paper and describes what counterintelligence means
from an intelligence community viewpoint. It incorporates a
considerable amount of input from the CIA, as well as from the
Intelligence Division of the FBI. The paper has been circulated
as a draft to representatives of CIA, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force
and NSA, All have concurred in its content and have recommended
it be furnished to Mr. Colby for use as an annex in connection
with his forthcoming appearance before the SSC.
ACTION:
EX-117
REC-38
62-116=45-23
If approved, the paper entitled "The Role of
Counterintelligence" will be furnished to Mr. Colby for his use
as an annex. to his prepared statement before the SSC.
'Enclosures (2)
WOC:dln
(7)
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ENCLOSURE
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5-706
"
MAR 3. . 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 151)
SECRET
FmDelb
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DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM LITE
ON 11/6/00.
THE ROLE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
-21
national defense.
Counterintelligence is an integral part of our
By definition and by its very nature
counterintelligence is a defensive posture to the extent
that it reacts primarily to intelligence initiatives of
hostile intelligence services. As any good defense,
however, it cannot be static or passive. It is based
upon knowledge of this country's adversaries; it seeks
out and engages hostile agents and the intelligence
services that employ them. The national counterintelli-
gence defense, in other words, requires both sound preven-
tive measures and an energetic and sustained counterattack.
The purpose of defensive and aggressive counter-
intelligence is to ensure that adversaries who do not want
to risk open confrontation cannot attain the same objectives
through stealth. In more concrete terms, the purpose of
counterintelligence is to identify and neutralize spies
and their masters who serve our opponents.
Spycatching, by itself, is not enough, because
spies are replaceable. American counterintelligence must
also know who sent the spies and who supported and directed
their work in this country and in friendly nations. And
beyond identifying these agent handlers--the officers of
the KGB and other such clandestine communist organizations--
our counterintelligence must know how these people are moti-
vated, recruited, trained, structured, rewarded, and
punished. We need to know how they communicate with each
other--from New York or Washington, for example, to Moscow
or Prague. In short, we need to know everything we can
find out about them, as individuals and as organizations.
And finally, what we know must be shared appropriately with
other services equally concerned.
This need is even more acute today than in the
1950s and 1960s. We know from hard experience that the
clandestine communist services always increase the range
and the intensity of their operations during periods of
Western relaxation, when the openness and multiplicity of
exchanges provide favorable conditions and opportunities
for launching intelligence operations against our country.
62-116395-23
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 152
15
SECRET
SECRET
:
The growth in communist-bloc intelligence
representation over the past several years, not only in
the United States but also throughout the rest of the
world, is statistically and operationally demonstrable.
For convenient reference there is attached to this paper
a fact sheet documenting this growth based on information
recorded by the CIA and FBI. In considering the number
of communist-bloc nationals posted to official establish-
ments outside their countries, it is important to recognize
that a substantial proportion of these are intelligence
officers. These officers have a primary mission to conduct
intelligence operations and official duties involved in
their cover positions, if required at all, are secondary
and serve mainly to legitimize their cover. In the Soviet
case, it is an estimate accepted by the United States.
intelligence community that at least 40 per cent of the
officials are intelligence officers. Indeed, some defector
sources have estimated that 70 per cent to 80 per cent of
Soviet officials have some intelligence connection,
although this figure includes officials who act only in a
minimal support capacity and only occasionally.
The most effective way to achieve the counter-
intelligence purpose is to recruit personnel from hostile
secret services. It is also the hardest of counterintelli-
gence tasks, a goal usually requiring years of close study
and meticulous planning. Even if the effort succeeds, we
cannot accept at face value what the penetration source
tells us.
His reports must be most carefully crosschecked
against everything known from all other sources. Otherwise
we may be duped by an adversary who uses "our" agent to
tell us what he wants us to hear.
If there is no penetration of the adversary, or
none at the level of seniority, all the other sources
(hostile agents whom we have detected and "doubled," inter-
cepted communications, defectors, etc.) become all the more
important.
If counterintelligence is to identify and then
contain or control secret action directed against the
United States, it must be closely coordinated. The adver-
sary services do not run uncoordinated, haphazard operations
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2
-
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against us, All their major programs of espionage, counter-
espionage, subversion, sabotage, deception, and disinforma-
tion are intertwined. For example, a computer program
designed to keep track of CIA personnel at home and abroad
was planned in the Soviet Union, is maintained in
Czechoslovakia, and draws upon information from East
Germany, Hungary, and elsewhere. Another example: informa-
tion from multiple defector sources indicates that the
Cuban security service, the DGI, since 1968-69, has agreed
to operate against the United States and American intelli-
gence in areas where the Soviets are at an operational
disadvantage.
A second reason why United States counterintelli-
gence must be coordinated is the need for effective liaison
with counterintelligence services abroad. No one Western
service can cope by itself with the worldwide, centrally
directed, attack of the Soviets, the bloc (including the
Cubans), and the whole array of Communist Party auxiliaries.
A counterintelligence defense which stops at a border is
ño defense at all.
The work within our borders is equally essential.
to our safety. Because the United States continues to be
the main site of hostile clandestine operations, it is
also the main site of American counterintelligence.
Both forms of counterintelligence--the security
´ of our own operations and the penetration of operations
against us--have to be sustained if the Director of Central
Intelligence is to be able to protect United States intelli-
gence methods and sources, as required by law.
Counterintelligence has three values which flow
from its functions. The value of its security function is
that it prevents our adversaries from gaining information
that the United States Government does not want to make
public. Counterintelligence cannot perform this security
role by rote and routines. And it cannot depend entirely
upon guards, safes, and other passive measures. It must be
active to prevent the subversion of those people to whom
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3
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the United States Government has entrusted its classified
information. Some of these persons are members in American
intelligence and counterintelligence organizations.1
It must also prevent leakage of sensitive
United States information from foreign services to whom
American secrets are necessarily confided as a matter of
common concern but which in turn have been penetrated by
enemy agents.
The value of what might be called an anticipatory
defense is not always evident because when it succeeds,
nothing happens. It is like preventive medicine. Its
value becomes dramatically clear only when it fails.
The second value of counterintelligence is that
it provides information about hostile clandestine intentions
and capabilities. This information is the more valuable if
our adversaries do not know that we have it.
Finally, the third value of counterintelligence is
the large amount of straight intelligence obtained as a by-
product by counterintelligence agents in the normal course
of their business.
1 Some specific and subsequently publicized examples of
Soviet success in the recruitment of American officials, in
most cases exposed and frustrated by the FBI, are: Nelson
Drummond (1962), Jack Dunlap (1963), William Whelan (1963),
Robert Johnson (1965), Herbert Boeckenhaupt (1966), and
Ulysis Harris (1967)..
2 There may be cited here some of the completed counter-
intelligence cases which resulted in the identification and
suppression of high-level Soviet penetrations of Western
intelligence services and which were directly attributable
to CIA counterintelligence work: George Blake (UK - 1961),
Heinz Felfe (West Germany 1961), Harold Adrian Russell
("Kim") Philby (UK - 1963), George Paques (France
1964),
Giorgio Rinaldi Ghislieri (Italy, Spain
1967), Yuriy
-
-
1967), Nahit Imre (Turkey
1969).
Loginov (South Africa
and Francis Roussilhe (France
-
-
-
1968),
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All United States governmental components have
some individual internal responsibility for the security
of personnel, records, and physical facilities. Aside
from these basic security functions, the overall counter-
intelligence role in the United States Government is shared
by several specific intelligence agencies. The conduct of
counterintelligence overseas is one of CIA's original
functions flowing from the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, and specifically spelled out and developed in:
a series of National Security Council Intelligence Directives.
The FBI has the general responsibility for conduct of
counterintelligence operations within the United States
based on statutory responsibilities (enforcement of espionage,
sabotage, neutrality, registration acts, and related matters)
as well as a series of Presidential Directives and Attorney
General orders.
Success of United States counterintelligence is
proportionate to the extent to which it exists as an
integrated, unified concept with fullest coordination among
the separate agencies. It did not exist as such until
World War II; and only small progress was made after that
war, despite the National Security Act of 1947. An
integrated system first began to take shape in 1958, when
the National Security Council moved directly into the
problem. Intelligence and counterintelligence directives
which established the basic ground rules were formulated
and placed in effect. As a result the United States has a
set of counterintelligence concepts and precepts that
organize our experience and hold us together. Throughout
the recent years interagency coordination and cooperation
have become a working reality, becoming more and more
effective as the level of coordination continues to rise.
In
The effectiveness of counterintelligence also`
requires recognition of its separateness as a function.
CIA and elsewhere, before the mid-1950s, counterintelligence
was often identified only with security and the ad hoc
exchange of limited amounts of information in liaison. It
was sometimes regarded as an adjunct to other specialities,
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 156
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RET
5
#
SEC
usually espionage. This subordination degraded the function
to its lowest level, to such necessary but elementary work
as nametracing and operational bookkeeping. But these
are only the elementary building blocks of the masonry of
counterintelligence. If it is restricted to nothing more
than that, American counterintelligence will inevitably
degenerate to parochialism and departmentalism. It will
not be responsive to a central and vital philosophy.
It
will tend to yield the initiative to the adversary and to
the writing of damage reports after we have been hurt
instead of seeking the adversary out and engaging him
before he can hurt us.
In summary, the value of counterintelligence as
an integral part of national defense requires a continuity
of doctrine, an organization of experience, and must be
sustained by a full-time, experienced cadre of specialists
with continuing emphasis on interagency understanding and
coordination.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 157
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6
.
SECRET
FACT SHEET
COMMUNIST-BLOC INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATION
There are presently 667 intelligence and security
services operating throughout the world.
The 13 countries comprising the Soviet Union and
other communist states, including Cuba, operate 52 services
of domestic and foreign intelligence and security. Some
23 of these work outside their own frontiers. The principal
service in action throughout the world against the
United States and Americans--which our highest grade
documentary sources confirm are termed "The Main Enemy'
(Glavny Vrag)--is the Soviet State Security Service (KGB),
together with Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, headed
by a senior KGB officer.
Soviet intelligence representation in the Free
World has been massively increasing for at least the past
lộ years, as the following data show:
Year
Persons
1959
1,500
1966
2,490
1971
2,106.
· January,·
1974
3,100 (est.):-
ཧཱུྂ་
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and the Soviet intelligence services also
direct communist parties--or, more accurately, certain
sections of and individuals in such parties--for purposes
of espionage and subversion abroad. During the period
1969-73, Soviet funding of non-bloc communist parties showed
actual and estimated annual costs to be almost $17 million.
But we do not have the quality of sources that would guarantee
this as anything but a minimal figure.
The scope of the clandestine attack upon the
United States is suggested by the number of identifiable
recruitment approaches made to Americans by Soviet, bloc,
Cuban, and Chinese services during the 9 years from 1965
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 158
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62-116395-43
SECRET
through 1973, which totals 742. This averages out to
82 per year, or better than one recruitment attempt per
week. These are the things we know. Our primary concerns
now are those recruitment approaches that have been
successful and where there has been no volunteering of
information.
Communist-bloc officials assigned to
legal establishments in the United States.
Date
Soviets
Other
Total
9/61
333
285
518
· 9/71
707
459
1,166
☐ 1/75
1,078
1,015
2,093
Temporary visitors
1972
1973
1974
Soviet Commercial Groups
Individuals
81
-641
370
1,299.
466
1,500
Soviet Special Exchange-
-330-
429
486-
Groups
Individuals
1,944
2,024
2,683
Visits by Soviet Ships
26
Crew members
1,300
267
13,000
219.
Not available
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 159
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1
i
..
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY
962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
:
Mr. J. B. Adams
SECRET
-
SENSITIVE
FROM
:
W. R. Wannall
1
SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
DATE: February 7,
1975
9/25/00
SP2
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Ad
Dep. AD In
Asst Dire
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv
Ident.
CLASSIFIED BY AL∙M/776 Inspe
DESLACSIFY ON: 25XL
#MDR 
16
-
Sensitive since the
This communication is Secret
information herein and in the attachments has been so classi-
fied by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (5)
Intel
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On 2/6/75 the writer was furnished the attached material
by Mr. William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, during
a meeting in his office which was also attended by Lt. General
Lew Allen, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA)
General Allen was provided copies of the same material. It includes
a three-page statement containing a listing of categories of activities
of subject matters that require stringent protection during testimony
before the captioned Committee by any members of the U.S. Intelligence
Community. The FBI had input in connection with the compilation of
this information and the material we furnished has been included. (S)
Also among the material is a copy of a statement which
Mr. Colby is hopeful of securing permission to present at the very
beginning of the Select Committee hearings in order that he can
emphasize the importance of and need for intelligence operations,
its-processes, the processes for collection of intelligence, how
they are controlled and overseen, why there is an overriding need
for secrecy in certain areas and what Congress can do to enhance
U.S. intelligence collections. (5)
The third paper lists eleven papers which Mr. Colby intends
to turn over to the Committee whether or not he is permitted to
make his opening statement. These papers supplement his statement
and have been the subject of previous memoranda. The FBI has
prepared the last two papers listed and is coordinating with all
other interested Intelligence Community members to assure that all
of the papers will be in such form as not to conflict with Bureau
interests. (5)
•
EX-11%
REC-3862-116395-22
A review of Mr. Colby's proposed opening statement has been
Among the highlights are the following: (5)
He points out (page 2) that it is important that FF 29-
gence activities be viewed in proper perspective and that the few (S)
Enclosures
WRW: 1m1 (6)
1
-
Mr. Callahan (with enclosures)
1 Mr. Adams (with enclosures)
- Mr. Mintz (with enclosures)
-
Mr Cregar (with enclosures)
Mr. Wannall (with enclosures)
84 MAR 3 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 160
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943-5

SECRET
SENSITIVE
Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
instances of failure or error that may have occurred in the past
be understood in context. He states we cannot operate effectively
without more precise provisions in the law to protect our secrets.
Referring on page 5 specifically to the FBI, he notes that
intelligence collection on a worldwide basis contributes to our
internal security. The efforts of foreign nations to penetrate our
society and to manipulate our citizens are well documented. There
are several hundred foreign members of the KGB and intelligence
operatives in this country seeking information about the United
States and its plans and their efforts must be met by an intensive
counterintelligence effort. He states "Within the United States,
(5)
this is the function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Abroad, it is CIA's responsibility to identify the foreign agent
before he arrives in America or to learn of the plans of foreign
groups to try to subvert our institutions. To this traditional
danger has been added a new threat of international terrorism.
CIA's foreign and the FBI's domestic intelligence activities have
collaborated to frustrate several plans to bring to America and its
citizens the kind of hijacking and indiscriminate terrorist bombings
that characterize too many areas of the world." (5)
Beginning at page 7, Mr. Colby undertakes to explain the
processes of collecting intelligence and on page 10 briefly goes
into the roles of the various intelligence components and the
legislative bases for their activities. For example, he states
the intelligence roles of the other members of the Intelligence
Community in part stem from the 1947 Act and in part from separate
legislation, such as that charging the FBI with responsibility for
internal security, which I consider a correct statement. (S)
On page 11, he notes that all intelligence elements operate
within legal authority and are given further direction by the
National Security Council, but (page 13) "each of us in the Intelli-
gence Community takes full personal responsibility for the actions
recommended or taken in conformance with such general guidance and
policy." (S
'(s)
He explains the role of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB) whose "members are an impressive group of
responsible Americans who report their independent views of the
accomplishments and weaknesses of the Intelligence Community directly
to the President." (s)
Following this, he notes that in addition to responding to
various Congressional committees, the National Security Council and
the PFIAB, all of which exercise oversight-type functions, Catch:C:CE:CE:C)
2
SECRET
-
SENSITIVE
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 161
Memorandum to Mr. Adams
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Re: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
intelligence agencies are exposed to audit-type functions exercised
by the Office of Management and Budget, internal audit systems, the
General Accounting Office, and the Director of Central Intelligence. (S)
On page 14, after referring to the manner in which the
Intelligence Community functions through a series of committees
and boards, Mr. Colby states that the work of such committees and
boards is limited to foreign intelligence, "as internal security
falls solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI participates
in the Intelligence Community effort, however, so that any contribu-
tions that foreign intelligence might make to internal security can
be properly handled." ')
On page 17, Mr. Colby expresses confidence that the American
people not only support but insist upon an effective intelligence
apparatus to protect their security and intelligence. Thereafter,
referring to Congress, on page 17, he states "Just tell us in the
intelligence business what the Nation wants and does not want, and
we will do our best to satisfy it. But also give us a way openly
to change these rules when the Nation expects them to be changed."
He then calls upon Congress to organize itself to protect the
necessary secrecy of our intelligence operations while exercising
its responsibility for oversight. (5)
A review of Mr. Colby's proposed statement has revealed
no information which I feel would be objectionable from the Bureau's
standpoint.
ACTION:
For the Director's information.
3
-
SECRET
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 162
дна
SENSITIVE.
шки
SECRET/SENSITIVE
CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES OF SUBJECT MATTER
THAT NEED STRINGENT PROTECTION
I.
The names of agents, informants, covert liaison contacts and
operations or other identifying characteristics of sensitive
clandestine sources
a, Agent or informant names or operational information
revealing them.
b. Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive
methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source
collection (2) employed by the FBI for internal security and counter-
intelligence purposes.
--The numbers, locations, times and other indications of
recruitment or emplacement of personnel within target organiza-
tions.
--Specific statements of the use of technical devices in
agent operations.
--The total extent of recruitment or investigative effectiveness
against any given target organization or individual, or lack
thereof.
--Names of selected agency and/or ex-agency employees
if revealed would endanger lives, operations or future utility.
--Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise, who would
be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.
II. Relationships with Other Intelligence Services
а. Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly
and neutral countries.
#moel6
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
(
-6:00 BY 322 ALM/
776
CLOSURE
Classified by
056047
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. O. 11532, exemption category:
30 (*) þeircle se for more)
Asterially denied on
DATE WOUBLE TO DETERMINE
(unless imposite or event)
SECRET/SENSITIVE
62-116395-22:
NW 88608. Docld:32989530 Page 163.
OLURL][LV] ] V L
b. Identifying collaborative operations between the United States
intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services
against targets within the country extending the collaboration or within
a jointly targetted third country.
C. The nature of support provided or arrangements with foreign
intelligence services supporting US technical collection operations.
d. Material and information provided to the US by a foreign service
under conditions of continued secrecy.
III. Cryptologic and Communications Activities
a.
Clandestine procurement of foreign cryptologic material.
b. Operations against foreign cryptologic installations.
c.
Activities taken with the manufacturers of cryptologic devices
in the U. S. and abroad.
d. Product of telephone taps or technical surveillance operations
of foreigners or foreign facilities (U.S. and abroad).
e. Success of cryptologic operations against both friendly and
unfriendly targets in the U. S. and abroad.
:
f. Covert signals intelligence collection including (1) assistance
arrangements with commercial U. S. and foreign companies (2) taps
(3) and from US installations abroad.
g. Collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence
collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be
politically embarrassing in the countries involved.
h. Protective communications security measures.
i. Efforts to collect exotic signals and locate transmissions
especially critical to our work in ASW.
IV. Technical Intelligence
a. Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical
vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.
2
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 164
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:
b. Details of specific covert communications systems, including
secret writing, special agent equipment, etc.
i
C. Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations
involving high political sensitivity in the host country.
;
d. Identification of technical counter-measures techniques.
e.
Characterization of emplacement of devices for technical
collection of foreign intelligence, including techniques of emplacement,
f. Details of secure U.S. communications systems. .
V. Other
a. Reference to covert action operations that would embarrass
the U. S. Government or frustrate the purpose of the operation.
Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with U.S. and
foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence
operations.
c. Specific information on special relationships with private firms
established-with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes
names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged
customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations.
d. Names of firms collaborating with U.S. intelligence agencies
in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large
foreign clienteles).
e.
Details of covert contract techniques, covert contractors, and
covert tax arrangements.
f. Nature of support to and from other agencies for operations
against foreign intelligence targets.
g. The state of our intelligence on Soviet or PRC diplomatic or
military intentions toward the United States or on the state of our
intelligence on military technologies of these nations.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 165
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee
This Committee's inquiry and its conclusions and recom-
mendations can open a new era in American intelligence and
even in the intelligence profession worldwide. Historically,
the intelligence activities of a state have been considered
an essential function, but one conducted outside normal Gov-
ernment processes. Indeed, one foreign official recently
expressed some surprise to me that our intelligence rests
upon legislation enacted by the Congress and is subject to
oversight and annual appropriation by the Congress. He com-
mented that he had always considered it a matter private to
the Executive. This Committee's charter demonstrates the
contrary in America.
America has made many innovations in the intelligence
process, and I believe we have brought ours to the highest
peak of efficiency of any intelligence service in the world.
Our Government's policies can now be based on factual in-
formation and demonstrable analysis rather than on hunches,
circumstantial evidence, and overly qualified judgments
that alone were available a few years ago.
With the assistance of my Intelligence Community col-
leagues, I hope to give this Committee the broadest possible
look at these intelligence efforts of the United States.
Ffmoris
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-6-00 
BY SP 2 
ALMITE
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 166
FLOSUN
62-116395-22
1
I will also offer ideas for improvements that could help us
do our job¨better.
It is important that our intelligence activities be
viewed in proper perspective and that the few instances of
failure or error that may have occurred in the past be
understood in context.
mission assigned to American intelligence.
:
We will welcome clear statements of the authority and
I believe the
public, including those engaged in the intelligence profession,
are entitled to and are prepared to accept clarifications
and new definitions. The Congress and the American people
do not expect intelligence to be carried on in the shadows
of euphemism and ambiguity. Nor can we operate effectively
without more precise provisions in the law to protect our
secrets. I believe our nation is ready to accept the nec-
essity of reasonable secrecy in our intelligence operations
in the same way it accepts the need for secrecy in diplomatic
negotiations, in development of war plans, or in protecting
newspaper sources.
I.
The Importance of Intelligence
Mr. Chairman, American intelligence helps protect our
country, it helps maintain peace in the world, and it helps
our Government make better decisions affecting the welfare
of every one of our citizens. It is not only responsible
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 167
-2-
for warning us of imminent attack by a hostile power, these
days it must also look into the future and warn of the research
and development of new weapons systems which, unless countered
or negotiated away, would affect the security of our citizens
ten years hence.
Missile Crisis.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the contribution of
intelligence to our security occurred in 1962 in the Cuban
But this story began long before in the
secret development of the U-2 aircraft to give us access to
areas where we had always been blinded. Its flight over
Cuba on October 14, 1962, provided the first certain evidence
of the deployment of offensive missiles there, but intelligence
during that crisis involved far more than the U-2. Through
the entire apparatus of intelligence, a close watch was main-
tained over all the ways in which our national security might
have been jeopardized, and it was precisely this centralized
analysis of thousands of individual bits of information that
provided our Government with reasoned assessments and
estimates during the critical days of October 1962. These
assessments drew on all types of technical, diplomatic, and
military intelligence, and they were substantially assisted
by the contribution made by at least one foreign agent who
--
paid for his commitment with his life.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 168
t
-3-
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Community has not been idle
since the development of the U-2, and the improvements that
have been made have added a new dimension to the importance
of intelligence today--its contribution to the maintenance
of peace in the world.
As I believe is well known, the breakthrough in the Strategic
Arms Limitations negotiations followed the development of our
ability to monitor whether or not the other side is complying
with the agreements made. To do so with respect to closed and
suspicious societies, intelligence has had to invest hundreds
of millions of dollars and heavy doses of imagination and
technical genius.
We have not yet convinced all the nations that might
pose a threat to us that our system of openness is the best
for them as well as for us, so we must depend upon our intel-
ligence to give us the means with which to negotiate with
them and, at least, to limit, if not eliminate, the risks we
both run in today's world.
arms.
The peace-keeping role of intelligence goes beyond strategic
There are a number of situations in which our knowledge
of some local situation around the world was better than that
of the participants. By bringing this knowledge to both sides,
or to the one about to make a mistaken military move, intel-
ligence has several times assisted in defusing a potential
- ན ག༥ཡemམགརམ གས****
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 169
-4-
.
な
.
crisis and thus disproving our own predictions. This is a
contribution of which we are proud, for our purpose is not
merely to record facts pertaining to foreign situations
but to help maintain security and peace as well.
Intelligence likewise contributes to our internal secu-
rity. The efforts of foreign nations to penetrate our society
and to manipulate our citizens are well documented.
There
are several hundred foreign members of the KGB and intelligence
operatives in this country seeking information about the
United States and its plans, and their efforts must be met by
an intensive counterintelligence offort. Within the United
States, this is the function of the Federal Bureau of Invest-
igation. Abroad, it is CIA's responsibility to identify the
foreign agent before he arrives in America or to learn of
the plans of foreign groups to try to subvert our institutions.
To this traditional danger has been added a new threat
of international terrorism. CIA's foreign and the FBI's domestic
intelligence activities have collaborated to frustrate several
plans to bring to America and its citizens the kind of hijack-
ing and indiscriminate terrorist bombings that characterize
too many areas of the world. Intelligence has also contributed
to the identification of international narcotics traffickers,
reducing the threat this pernicious activity poses to the
health of our citizens.
-5-
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 170

Major political and economic decisions are regularly made
by our Government and by our Congress with assistance from our
intelligence. These decisions range from the appropriate level
of our defense budget to economic and monetary policy. In the
past several years the Intelligence Community--CIA, and parts
;
of State, and Treasury in particular--has paid considerable
attention to international economics and related political
issues. The interdependence of the world with respect to energy,
food, raw materials, and service industries is increasing at
a very rapid rate. The accompanying shifts in economic power
and control can require future adjustments of grave importance
to our country. American intelligence keeps watch on such
foreign activities. Stated another way, it is becoming as
important to our national security to watch the machinations
of foreign cartel arrangements as to follow Soviet or Chinese
missile development. Intelligence is critical to our coun-
try's economic negotiations and we are contributing materially.
Mr. Chairman, I indicated at the outset the importance
of this Committee's getting a full appreciation for the con-
tribution intelligence is making to our country. But foremost
in this process is the Intelligence Community's reputation for
objectivity in our intelligence assessments. We do not claim
that intelligence analysis provides a scientific procedure for
reaching decisions. We do feel it provides an essential
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 171
-6-
mechanism for giving visibility to the issues for the policy-
maker. Our job is to provide an independent and objective
analysis based upon a wide range of confidential sources and
technical inputs. The organization of the Intelligence Com-
munity is designed to provide this independence and objectivity.
II. The American Intelligence Process
Mr. Chairman, I would like to cover briefly the American
intelligence process, as I believe it is grossly misunderstood
by many quarters who associate it almost exclusively with the
spectacular images of James Bond, Mata Hari, or even Maxwell
Smart. American intelligence is first and foremost an intel-
·lectual exercise that encompasses the following steps:
1. The collection and assembly of raw informa-
tion from all sources available to the U.S. Govern-
ment, ranging from overt news dispatches to data
from the most secret technical devices or agents;
2. The assessment of the validity of the raw
information;
3. The analysis of the information and the
development of objective conclusions and judg-
ments; and
4. The presentation of the findings to policy
makers in a clear, succinct, and timely fashion.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 172
-7-
The collection process involves acquiring open informa-
tion wherever this is possible. This information largely comes
from abroad but also here in the United States from knowledge-
able citizens and Government officers whose missions are well
understood and accepted in international life, such as Foreign
Service Officers, Defense, Treasury, and even Commercial and
Agricultural Attaches. To this is added the information col-
lected by technical means. Today these give us access to
areas never before seen. Electronic marvels identify details
we never hoped to know, and computers select and store masses
of detail never before manageable. These ways to collect are
supplemented by clandestine collection for those matters and
in those societies where open or technical collection cannot
provide the secret war plans, the research idea before it is
visible, or a perception of authoritarian political dynamics.
After the material is collected, it must be processed
or analyzed. Again the electronic and computer worlds have
added new dimensions to our potential to extract valuable
information from hitherto incomprehensible indicators, al-
though, alas, the computer has also increased the incompre-
hensibility of some of the systems we try to identify.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 173
-8-
The analytical process is the smallest of our categories
of expenditure, but upon the integrity, the objectivity, and
the expertise of this body of men and women rests the real
fruit of the whole process--reasoned assessments of develop-
ments abroad today and in the future.
An essential element of the process is the presentation
of intelligence to those who make the decisions for our nation.
In our society this is not restricted to the Executive but also
includes the Congress and the public. As a consequence, intel-
ligence has endeavored to bring its product to the Congress and
even to the public through unclassified publications where
possible, through classified testimony in executive session that
is later reviewed so we can release all information that does not
reveal our sources and methods, and through informal discussion
with journalists and the academic community where conclusions
can be debated but sources omitted.
In addition, the Department of Defense has regularly made
available the results of the intelligence process, the best
example perhaps being the way we followed in the news media
the development and testing of the generation of Soviet missiles
now being deployed. When such material is consciously released,
it can be done in a form that allows the Congress and the public
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 174
-9-
to benefit from the conclusions and assessments involved but
still protects the sources and methods by which we reach them.
Unfortunately, their revelation by individuals without author-
ization can result in the exposure of the source or technique
by which we learn the information.
i
Mr. Chairman, the National Security Act of 1947 was the
foundation stone for this American intelligence process.
At
Thus,
that time, intelligence was deemed by our country to be a mat-
ter which should be protected from public exposure.
the specifics of the intelligence process and its authorities
were deliberately expressed in general language and left by
that statute to be specified in classified directives by the
National Security Council. The CIA Act of 1949 further rec-
ognized the importance of this secrecy to intelligence and
specifically exempted the CIA from the publication of the
"organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries,
or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.
}
The intelligence roles of the other members of the
Intelligence Community in part stem from the 1947 Act and
in part from separate legislation, such as that charging the
FBI with responsibility for internal security, the AEC, now
ERDA; with its security authorities, and other laws such as
Public Law 86-36, which provides the National Security
Agency the authority to function without disclosing
-10-
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 175
information that would endanger its cryptologic functions.
intelligence elements operate within legal authority.
All
All are
given further direction by the National Security Council.
Those Acts, however, were not the end of Congress' role
with respect to intelligence. Intelligence operates on an-
nual appropriations, it reports to a variety of Congressional
committees, and the Director and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence are appointed with the advice and consent of the
Senate after hearings which, in the cases of General Walters
and me, included open sessions.
Congress long ago made special arrangements to handle
The consistent
oversight and appropriations for intelligence.
position of the Executive Branch in this regard has been that
it would respond to any way in which the Congress organized.
itself to conduct this oversight and appropriations process.
To this, as indicated earlier, I add my own concern that this
process be conducted in a manner that preserves the secrecy
upon which intelligence must rest.
S
In tune with the times, we have in more recent years,
and not just in my Directorship, become increasingly re-
sponsive to Congress both in executive session and in open
session. For example, in 1974, I appeared before thirteen
committees or subcommittees on twenty-five occasions.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 176
-11-
-part dra har titta úrodl
These were supplemented by informal responses or briefings to
interested members on a frequent basis. The result has been
greater exposure of the substance of our intelligence process
to assist Congress in its decisionmaking, as well as a few.
untoward exposures of our sources and methods.
I hope that
this Committee sets out clearer arrangements with both houses
so that we can make available the substance of our intelligence
to assist in your decisionmaking while protecting the intel-
ligence sources and methods.
The Executive Branch directs and supervises the intel-
ligence apparatus to insure that our intelligence agencies
work together for the common goal without duplication or
bureaucratic conflict. At the head of the structure is, of
course, the National Security Council, pursuant to statute.
The Council itself has issued general directives to the Intelli-
gence Community, and the subcommittees established under the
Council give more frequent guidance and direction to our effort.
Certain subcommittees focus on current crises and call for in-
telligence coverage thereof, certain work on longer term problems
that require intelligence analysis, and certain review the
work of the Intelligence Community in specified fields. I
will not get into the bureaucratic detail necessary to clarify
this at this session, although I certainly expect to do so in
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 177
-12-
the future. I would like, however, to state my belief that
the Intelligence Community receives appropriate general guid-
ance and direction from the National Security Council and its
committees. However, the Intelligence Community itself is
responsible for recommending actions needed or for recommend-
ing the best way to accomplish the general goals set out by
policy leaders.
Thus, general policy direction stems from
the National Security Council, but each of us in the Intelli-
gence Community takes full personal responsibility for the
actions recommended or taken in conformance with such general
guidance and policy.
An independent review of the effectiveness of our intel-
ligence effort is conducted by the President's Foreign Intel-
ligence Advisory Board. This Board over the years has had
an important role in stimulating and supporting improvements
in our intelligence machinery. Its members are an impressive
group of responsible Americans who report their independent
views of the accomplishments and the weaknesses of the Intel-
ligence Community directly to the President.
Also in the Executive Branch, the Office of Management
and Budget conducts through a compartmented unit the same type
of budget review of the work of the Intelligence Community as
it does of any department.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 178
-13-
The Intelligence Community is also subject to intensive
audit, both internally within the departments and agencies
involved, and to the extent feasible by the General Accounting
Office. Even in those areas exempted by law from GAO review,
our internal procedures follow the same standards and practices
of audit and accounting that apply to the other components of the
Government.
Lastly, consistent with the policy outlined in Section
102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of
Central Intelligence has been charged by the President with
providing overall leadership to the Intelligence Community.
He has been directed to review all expenditures for foreign
intelligence within the Government and make an annual recom-
mendation to the President as to the appropriate level thereof.
This charge requires him to insure that the intelligence ac-
tivities of the various departments and agencies give us the
best intelligence product at the least cost.
The Intelligence Community functions through a series of
committees and boards that bring the different agencies to-
gether. I have submitted an annèx to this presentation out-
lining these relationships.
یا
The work of these committees and
boards is limited to foreign intelligence, as internal secu-
rity falls solely within the jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 179
-14-
participates in the Intelligence Community effort, however,
so that any contributions that foreign intelligence might
make to internal security can be properly handled. I will
not take your time here to describe all of these bureaucratic
:
arrangements, but I would like to stress the scope and com-
plexity of the Community so that its individual elements can
be understood.
The collection of raw information consumes the highest
percentage of the resources devoted to intelligence. Large
sums are required for the complex technical systems I mentioned
earlier. In addition, the very substantial increases in mili-
tary and civilian personnel costs over recent years have put
a large burden on our intelligence budget despite reductions in
personnel. In conformity with the Senate's vote on June 4th,
1974, I do not propose to discuss these figures publicly, but
I do believe that you will be impressed with the way the In-
telligence Community has increased its productivity over the
years and also reduced its size and focused its effort in
order to adjust to inflation.
III.
The Needs of Intelligence
Mr. Chairman, in recognition of the fundamental purpose
of this Select Committee, I indicated early in my statement
that I wanted to outline for you some of the ways in which our
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 180
-15-

era in American intelligence.
· Intelligence Community might be improved so as to open a new
In this context, I believe this
Committee may want to focus particularly on the role and pro-
cedures of intelligence in the future as well as in the past.
First, Mr. Chairman, I believe it essential to clarify
for the Congress and the people of America, as well as the
personnel in our Intelligence Community, the authorities, the
limitations, and the mission of American intelligence. When
President Eisenhower assumed full responsibility for sending
a U-2 over the Soviet Union, and President Kennedy for the Bay
of Pigs, they repudiated in the name of the American people
the old concept of intelligence being disowned. I am confident
that our people not only support but insist upon an effective
intelligence apparatus to protect their security and welfare.
I believe, however, that they want the role of intelligence
clearly spelled out, they want controls adequate to pre-
vent abuse, and they also want necessary secrecy protected.
In my confirmation hearing, I suggested the word "foreign"
be inserted each time the word "intelligence" appears in the
charter of the CIA, to make crystal clear its proper function
and to end any possible "gray area" in its authority. Legisla-
tion was introduced in the last Congress that would do this
and would also clarify the proper role of the Agency within
the United States. I welcome such clarification of our authority
-16-
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 181
and any limitation on our activities desired by the people
of this country.
Just tell us in the intelligence business
what the nation wants and does not want, and we will do our
best to satisfy it. But also give us a way openly to change
:
these rules when the nation expects them to be changed.
With respect to oversight of our activities, Mr. Chairman,
I believe they are
I have described the current procedures.
I do
sufficient on the Executive side, and I reiterate that the
organization of the Congress to carry out its responsibilities
is not a matter for my determination or recommendation.
honestly request and trust, however, that the Congress will
organize itself to protect the necessary secrecy of our
intelligence operations while exercising its responsibilities
for oversight.
Lastly, I most earnestly request of the Congress some
improvement in our ability to protect the secrets necessary
to effective intelligence operations. The spectacle that we
are presenting to the world of being unable to prevent ex-
employees from revealing their knowledge of intimate relations
with individuals and friendly intelligence services who put
their trust in us is raising a substantial question as to
our ability to obtain information from such sources in the
future. The revelation of our activities from a series of
leaks of supposedly secret testimony makes it impossible to
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 182
-17-
contemplate the initiation of sensitive operations today
under procedures that require their exposure to a large num-
ber of reviewing bodies. The issue of whether we should
again adopt Secretary Stimson's view that "gentlemen do not
read each other's mail" (and that we live in a world of
gentlemen) should be faced squarely and openly by the Con-
gress and not through irresponsible individual exposures.
Cooperation with the Committee
IV.
There
Mr. Chairman, I assure you, as I did on the telephone
when you were named, of my most sincere intention to cooperate
with you and this Committee in its work. I look forward to
your, as well as our, contribution of ideas to the shaping of
the new era that American intelligence can have if we do our
work well. By my presence here I indicate my intention to be
as open and public as I can be during your proceedings.
will be, however, many matters which, I am sure you will agree,
can only be handled effectively in executive session. For this
purpose, your staffs have been given appropriate clearances by
the committee, and I urge that you take steps to insure not
only that they will abide by the Committee's rules but also that
you have the legal ability similar to the one we use for our
employees to require any later exposure of such matters to occur
only after you have had a chance to review whether they may
improperly reveal sensitive information.
t
-18-
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 183
There are some matters, Mr. Chairman, which I am required
under the statute and as a professional to protect against any
chance of exposure.
The names of our agents, the names of many
patriotic Americans who have worked with us, and the specifics
of a number of our costly and delicate technical systems are
so important, Mr. Chairman, that I believe an additional level
of secrecy is necessary to protect them. The lives of
individuals are at stake, and we cannot put them to risk.
There are also cases where the reputations and future prospects
of a number of patriotic Americans who have helped or con-
tributed to our intelligence process could be jeopardized if
their associations are revealed openly and then twisted in
the press through misunderstanding or by hostile opponents.
American intelligence cannot hope to have any future if it
repudiates the understanding of confidentiality upon which
cooperation was extended to it. There are also a range of
specific methods for gathering information which needs to be
secret. Hundreds of millions of dollars in complex technical
equipment can be made worthless if the access it provides to
foreign secrets is exposed
An exposure is a one-time sensation, and American in-
telligence today is suffering internally and abroad from a
series of exposures and sensational exaggerations which have
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 184
-19-
raised questions among many of our foreign individual and of-
ficial sources, and also among our personnel. Whether the
Intelligence Community can continue its contribution to our
nation's security and welfare and the maintenance of peace in
the world will depend on our ability to conduct this review
without further exposures. Thus, I do not propose to provide
these details, but if one becomes of particular importance
to the work of the Committee, I will certainly consult with
you and the ranking minority member to determine the best
course of action. I stress this, Mr. Chairman, as we have
but one chance to avoid unwarranted disclosures which can ruin
the lives or the futures of people and institutions which
put their trust in our nation through its intelligence
service. I believe that you and the Committee will want to
fulfill that trust, and that this Committee's inquiry can be
comprehensive and searching without violating it.
Mr. Chairman, I have not discussed the newspaper al-
legations that led to this Committee's formation. I have
reported fully on this to the President, to the President's
Commission, and to the Senate Appropriations and Armed
Services Committees. I am submitting for the record of this
Committee my remarks there and am, of course, prepared to
་་
expand on them. I believe it only appropriate here to deny
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 185
-20-
flatly, as I have already, that CIA conducted a "massive
illegal domestic intelligence operation.'
:
"1
I have also submitted for the record a number of annexes
to this statement, mostly in classified form, in order to set
out for the use of the Committee and its staff some further
detail about our intelligence apparatus and its work.
I am,
of course, available for further questioning here today and
to cover classfied questions in Executive Session when this
may prove to be necessary. I hope that out of the Committee's
work will come a better public understanding of the role
and functioning of American intelligence today and that the
Committee's recommendations for improvements in our authority,
procedures, and protection may indeed be looked back on in the
future as the initiation of a new era in American intelligence.
We in American intelligence are proud to be of service
' to our country, and we firmly believe that the personnel of
American intelligence, and my predecessors in this post, have
served their country well over the years. We are equally con-
vinced that our intelligence profession will serve the country
well in the new era of American intelligence being launched by
this Committee.
Thank you.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 186
-21-
1
SECRET
LIST OF ANNEXES
A.
The Nature and Purpose of Intelligence
B.
The Intelligence Process
Drafter
CIA
DIA
C.
Mission and Functions Statements for all
Elements of the Intelligence Community
DCI/IC
D.
Intelligence Community Oversight and DCI Role
DCI/IC
E.
Description of Intelligence Community Resources
and Capabilities
DCI/IC
F.
A Description of the Committees of the USIB and IRAC
DCI/IC
G.
Intelligence and the Law: Description of Suggested
Changes Now Before the Congress
CIA/JUSTICE/
`DCI/IC
H.
A Listing of External Reviews of Intelligence Community
Agencies
DCI/IC
J.
The Role of Security in CIA and the Intelligence
Community
K.
The Nature and Purpose of Counterintelligence
CIA
FBI/CIA
L.
The Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan
(Will also cover Intelligence Evaluation Committee
and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Unit)
#MDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATIC CONWEDD
HERCY IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-600 BY SP2 ALM\758
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 187
62-116395-201
CLOSURE
SECHET
FBI/Justice Dept.
Classified by 056047
Exempt from caneral denlassification schedule
of E. O., exemption calegory:
er (circa one or more)
died on
DATE MASCICLE NO DETERMING
The Attorney Coneral
Director, FDI
#MDR 16.
AMATE
DILECT CO FITTED
- February 30,
1975
r Mr. Adams
Mr. Mintz
1
9/25/001592 ALM/37e;
1
1
HOW
-
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
Pozoronco io nado to a tolophono conversation
between Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman and
Fr. Jamos Adars, Coputy Associate Director, IDI, on
Tebruary 14, 1075.
This will confirm the authorization provided by
Mr. Silbernan to Mr. Adams with regard to pornitting CIA
to furnish a nemorandum dated February 7, 1000, entitled
"Contral Intelligence Agency Operations in the United States,
to Mr. Samuel I. Preston, Senior Staff Member, House Appro-
priations Committee. For your information, attacked is a
copy of this memorandum.
It is our understanding that Ifr. Preston tolo-
phonically contacted Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to
the Director of Central Intelligence, and requested all
pritton agreements between the FBI and CIA be furnished hia
For the use of the House Appropriations Committeo.
Enclosure
02-110305
REC-59
1 - The Deputy Attorney Conoral (Inclosure)
**
MAILED 2
FEB 20 1975
F3I
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs _
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident. -
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
See'y
WOC:ebc
(8),
NOTE:
Werk
21
6-12
20 FEB 21 1975
See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. Wannall, dated
2/18/75, captioned "SENSTUDY 75," prepared by WOC:ebc.
джа
Director Ses 2 (MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Doeld:32989530 Page 188
490
4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)
Date of Mail
2/7/75
Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ON THIS
Form
DATE 9/25/00 BX SP-2 ALM 1776
Subject
JUNE MAIL
SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
179 MAR 3 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 189
Removed By
File Number
62-116395-20
Permanent Serial Charge Out
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
WRWITUL
ΤΟ
: Mr. W. R. Wannall.
FROM
: W. O. Negar
✓ BJECT: SENSTUDY 75)
1
-
1
-
1
-
DATE:
1
1
-
1
-W
1
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
Mr. Bassett
2/7/75
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Fulton
Mr. Cregar
Jen 14
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD
Asst. Dir.:
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inte
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett, dated
2/6/75, recommended that Section Chief William O. Cregar,
the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community, be
authorized to concur in recommendations dealing with proposals
to protect the integrity of classified documents which will
necessarily be provided to the Select Committee of the Senate
(SCS) during forthcoming hearings. Referenced memorandum
was approved subject to a recommended change by Inspector J.E.
Herington, Legal Counsel Division.
The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional
Review of the Intelligence Community met on the morning of
2/7/75, at which time the above-described Paper was considered.
The change of language offered by Inspector Herington was
submitted to the Group for consideration and was adopted. No
substantive changes in the Paper were made and the over-all
Paper was approved.
These security proposals will now be discussed with
Senator Church and his staff by Mr. Colby's staff in an effort
to insure proper protection of classified documents that might
be presented during forthcoming SCS testimony.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
62-116395
WOC:ebc
(8)
REC-59 62-116395-
EX-112
ут
FEB 19 1975
зел
84 FEB 26 1975
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
PERCH IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 38 SP-2 ALM/ATE
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 190
BY
5-618

ΤΟ
:
FROM
NATIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO RNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
Legal Counsel'
0
SUBJECT:
#MDR16
ALL DIPFORMATION COSZAIBLI
HERBIN IS VICLASSIFIED
DATE 11-7-00 BESP-2
DATE: 1-24-75
Jet Sinterdy - 75
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FBI, OVERSIGHT
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Cam.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. iny.
Trainin
Legal-Count
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On 1-23-75 Tom Hart, Professional Staff Member,
Senate Judiciary Committee, advised Inspector John B. Hotis
that the creation in the Senate of a Select Committee on Intelligence
Operations raises serious questions about the future of the FBI
Oversight Subcommittee. The Select Committee will make a final
report to the Senate in September, together with recommendations
as to any new legislation that might be necessary. It is possible that
a new committee dealing solely with the intelligence community may
be created or that recommendations will be made that there be stronger
oversight by the parent committee.
Hart said that he is troubled over the mounting pressures in
the Congress to reduce the power and effectiveness of the Bureau.
He feels that is what is behind the "phony stories" that have suddenly
been circulating about Bureau files on Congressmen. Even some of
the "right wing Republicans," he said, are attempting to capitalize on
the controversy, hoping thereby to take some of the criticism away
from former President Nixon.
$17
REC 68
(62-115675-79
He said that some of the younger Senators are attempting to
take over the oversight responsibilities on the grounds that Senators
Eastland and McClellan have been overly protective of the Bureau.
It is important, therefore, that the Oversight Subcommittee show some
immediate activity. As soon as the confirmation hearings on Attorney
General Designate Levi are completed, Hart will go to the Rules
Committee to get budget approval for the Oversight Subcommittee.
1
Mr. Adams
1
Mr. Wannall
2
-
Mr. Mintz
*SZOWY..yam
62-116-395- DN Y
1 - Congressional Services Unit
1 Mr. Reed
1
-
Mr. Hotis
JBH:mbk
51FEB28975Z
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 191
NOT RECORDED
46 FEB 27 1975
www.
JAN 31/1973
(CONTINUED - OVER)
LEGAL
Cinesa
ORIGINAL FILED IN
62
D.C.
Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
Re: Senate Subcommittee on FBI Oversight
Professor John Elliff and two interns have been preparing materials
for the committee regarding the foreign counterintelligence functions
of the Bureau and it is expected that hearings will be scheduled in
mid-February.
Hart added that he does not know who the new members of
the Oversight Subcommittee will be at this time. It could include
Senators Tunney, Hart, or Kennedy. This determination will be made
later this month.
RECOMMENDATION:
None. For information.
foot
дна
Love
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 192
-2-
K
y
J. B. ADAMS
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
*
*
Senstudy 75
TO MR. KELLEY:
2/12/75
Assoc. Dir
Dep. Ap Adm
Dep. AD W
Asst. Dir
Diff
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inte
Laboratory
The original, after being approve Plan. & Eval.
Mr. Callahan and me, was furnished to Mr
for his use as an annex to his prepared stat
before the Senate Committee.
Spec: Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
JBA:ams
REC-59
-112
J. B. ADAMS
да
62-116395-18
FEB 20 1975
}
bigger
to
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
[
TEREIN,IS UNCLASSIFIED,
DATE 9/25/00 BY SPZ ALM #116
5-106
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 193
7 7
J. B. ADAMS
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
ко
*
JUSTICE
•SINstilig 75
TO MR. KELLEY:
2/12/75
Attached is a memorandum rè
Assoc. Dir. -
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD nyt.
Asst. Dit
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
approval of an annex to be furnished to M
entitled Origin and Disposition of the Hu
Plan. Also enclosed is a proposed anne Legal Coun.
Intelligence Evaluation Committee prepar Director Sec'y
Department since the Committee was a D
function. Both were prepared from existing records,
do not involve any policy statement and, accordingly,
upon approval by Mr. Callahan and myself were
transmitted to Mr. Colby.
-
Arge
Mr. B. ADAMS
REC 59 62-116-395-17
EX-112
FEB 20 1975
JBA:ams
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALMATE
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP2 ALM-7976
808 301589530 Page 194
ок
5-1396
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 195
#mpR16
ALT. INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ON
THIS
ENVELOPE
DATE 9-25-00 BYSP-2 ALm/776
(NO
NO CONTENTS ENCLOSED
●HEN REVIEWED
11.1-13-17
62.11.
ENVELOPE
EMPTY
Official DocLab Instruction(s) - Revised 10-Apr-2014
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 196
ད
January 27, 1975
Honorable John Pastore
United States Senate
Washingtor, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Pastore:
75
I have had an opportunity to read the remarks you
made January 21st on the Senate floor when you presented a
resolution to establish a select committee to conduct a study
of governmental operations with respect to intelligence
activities.
I vant you to know of my sincere appreciation for
your very generous comments concerning me and I am pleased by
your insistence on a completely fair and objective investigation.
I welcome the opportunity to appear before the distinguished
members of the Senate to discuss all matters of interest to the
committed.
#MDR16
9/25/00 SPZ ALMITG
Sincerely yours,
Clarence
Clarence H. Kelley
Director
1
Boston - Enclosure
1
Congressional Services Office
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Rm
-JWS:bjy. (6)
FER
Telephone
Directa Sec's I
+3
MAILED G
76
MAIL ROOM
1078
-F81
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 197
-
EX-110
Enclosure
16
Me
REC-3
22 JAN 29 1975
gan
Jew
که شراره ای
GPO 954-546
$ 524
SENATE RESOLUTION 21-R
TION RELATING TO INVEIGA-
TION AND STUDY OF GOVERN-
MENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AC-
TIVITIES-PLACED UNDER "RES-
OLUTIONS AND MOTIONS OVER,
UNDER THE RULE”
.Mr. MANSFIELD: Mr. President, I
yield to the distinguished Senator from
Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I send
to the desk & resolution and ask for its
immediate consideration.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob
jection? .
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President,
reserving the right to object, I under-
stand that this is the resolution having
to do with the CIA.
Mr. MANSFIELD. With the intelligence
community.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. With the intelli-
gence community.
:
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not think we
*should emphasize the CIA too much, be-
cause it is the intelligence community. I
think that should be understood. ...
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will
report the resolution..
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Resolved, to establish a select committee
of the Senate to conduct an investigation and
study of governmental operations with re-
spect to intelligence activities.
:.
Mr. MANSFIELD addressed the Chair.
Mr HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I
have reserved the right to object.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, I ask.
unanimous consent, so that it will be fully
understood, that the resolution be read in
full.
Mr. PASTORE. That is right.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will
report the resolution in full.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
S. RES. 21
Resolved, To establish è select committee
of the Senate to conduct an investigation
and study of governmental operations with
respect to Intelligence activities and of the
extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or
unethical activities were engaged in by any
agency of the Federal Government or by any
persons, acting individually or in combina-
tion with others, with respect to any intelli-
gence activity carried out by or on behalf
of the Federal Government,
Resolved, That (a) there is hereby estab-
lished a select committee of the Senate
which may be called, for convenience of ex-
pression, the Select Committee to study
Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities to conduct an in-
vestigation and study of the extent, if any,
to which illegal, improper, or unethical activ-
ittes were engaged in, by any agency or by
any persons, soting either Individually or
in combination with others, in carrying out
any intelligence or surveillance activities by
or on behalf of any agency of the Federal
Government.
(b). The select committee created by this
resolution shall consist of eleven Members
of the Senate, six to be appointed by the
President of the Senate from the majority
Members of the Senate upon the recom-
mendation of the Majority Leader of the Sen-
ate, and five minority Members of the Sen-
ate to be appointed by the Fresident of the
Senate upon the recommendation of the Mi-
nority Leader of the Senate.
For the purposes of paragraph 6 of Rule
t to
IMORI
NGRESSIONAL RECORD. SENAT
--
25 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, sel
ice of a Senator as a member, chairman, or
vice chairman of the select committee shall
⚫not be taken into account.
(c) The majority members of the commit-
tee shall select a chairman and the minor-
ity members shall celech a vice chairman
and the committee shall adopt rules and pro-
cedures to govern its proceedings. The vice
chairman shall preside over meetings of the
select committee during the absence of the
chairman, and discharge such other respon-
sibilities as may be assigned to him by the
select committee or the chairman. Vacan-
cies in the membership of the select. com-
mittee shall not affect the authority of the
remaining members to execute the functions
of the select committee and shall be filled in
it are made.
the same manner as original appointments to
(d) A majority of the members of the se-
lect committee shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business, but the se-
lect committee may affix a lesser number as
& quorum for the purpose of taking testi-
mony or depositions.
SEC. 2. The select committee is author-
ized and directed to do everything necessary
or appropriate to make the investigations
and study specified in subsection (a) of the
first section, Without abridging in any way
the authority conferred upon the select
committee by the preceding sentence, the
Senate further expressly authorizes and di-
rects the select committee to make a com-
plete investigation and study of the activi-
ties of any agency or of any and all persons
or groups of persons or organizations of any
kind which have any tendency to reveal the
full facts with respect to the following mat
ters or questions:
(1) Whether the Central Intelligence
Agency has conducted an illegal domestic
intelligence operation in the United States.
(2). The conduct, of domestic intelligence
or counter-intelligence operations against
U.S. citizens by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation or any other Federal agency.
(3) The origin and disposition of the so-
intelligence agency capabilities against in-
balled "Huston Plan" to apply United States
dividuals or organizations within the United
States.
(4) The extent to which the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and other Federal law enforce-
ment or intelligence agencies coordinate
their respective activities, any agreementa
which govern that coordination, and the ex-
tent to which a lack of coordination has
contributed to activities or actions which
are illegal, improper, inefficient, unethical,
or contrary to the intent of Congress.
(5) The extent to which the operation of
domestic intelligence or counter-intelli-
other activities within the United States by
gence activities and the operation of any
the Central Intelligence Agency conforms to
the legislative charter of that agency and
the intent of the Congress.
(6) The past and present interpretation
by the Director of Central Intelligence of the
responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods as it relates to the provision in
section 102(d) (3) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3)) that “…….
that the agency shall have no police, subpena,
law enforcement powers, or internal security
functions..
"
(7) Nature and extent of executive branch
oversight of all United States intelligence
activities.
(8) The need for specific legislative au-
thority to govern the operations of any in-
telligence agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment now existing without that explicit
statutory authority, Including but not lim-
ited to agencies such as the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency and the National Security
Agency.
The nature and extent to which Federal
SAZALINKTG
18/25/06 SRZAL
NW 88608 Docld:32989530. Page 198
ENCLOSURE
January 1, 1975
agencies cooperate and exchange intelll-
gence information and the adequacy of any
regulations or statutes which govern-Buch
cooperation and exchange of intelligence in-
formation.
(9) The extent to which United States in-
telligence agencies tre governed by executive
orders, rules, or regulations either published
or secret and the extent to which those ex-
ecutive orders, rules, or regulations inter-
pret, expand or are in conflict with specific
legislative authority.
(10) The violation or suspected violation
of any State or Federal statute by any in-
telligence agency or by any person by or on
behalf of any intelligence agency of the Fed-
eral Government including but not limited
to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wire-
taps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of tho
United States mail, or the monitoring of
the United States mail.
(11) The need for improved, strengthened,
or consolidated oversight of United States
intelligence activities by the Congress.
(12) Whether any of the existing laws of
the United States are inadequate, either in
their provisions or manner of enforcement,
to safeguard the rights of American citizens,
to improve executive and legislative control
of intelligence and related activities, and to
resolve uncertainties as to the authority of
United States intelligence and related agen-
cles.
(13) Whether there is unnecessary dupli-
cation of expenditure and effort in the col-
lection and processing of intelligence infor-
mation by United States agencies.
(14) The extent and necessity of overt and
covert intelligence activities in the United
States and abroad.
(15) Such other related matters as the
committee deems necessary in order to carry
out its responsibilities under section (a).
SEC. 3(a). To enable the select committee
to make the investigation and study author-
ized and directed by this resolution, the Sen-
ate hereby empowers the select committee
as an agency of the Senate (1) to employ and
fix the compensation of such clerical, inves-
tigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants
as it deems necessary or appropriate, but it
may not exceed the normal Senate salary
schedules; (2) to sit and act at any time or
place during sessions, recesses, and adjourn-
ment periods of the Senate; (3) to hold hear-
ings for taking testimony on oath or to re-
ceive documentary or physical evidence relat-
ing to the matters and questions it is author-
ized to investigate or study; (4) to require by
subpena or otherwise the attendance as wit-
nesses of any persons who the select commit-
tee believes have knowledge or information
concerning any of the matters or questions it
is authorized to investigate and study; (5)
to require by subpena or order any depart-
ment, agency, officer, or employee of the ex-
ecutive branch of the United States Govern-
ment, or any private person, firm, or corpora-
tion, to produce for its consideration or for
'use as evidence in its investigation and study
any books, checks, canceled checks, corre-
spondence, communications, document, pa-
pers, physical evidence, records, recordings,
tapes, or materials relating to any of the mat-
ters or questions it is authorized to inves-
tigate and study which they or any of them
may have in their custody or under their con-
trol; (6) to make to the Senate any recom-
mendations it deems appropriate in respect to
the wilful failure or refusal of any person
to answer questions or give testimony in his
character as a witness during his appearance
before it, or in respect to the willful failure
or refusal of any officer or employee of the
executive branch of the United States Gov-
ernment or any person, firm, or corporation
to produce before the committee any books,
checks, canceled checks, correspondence,
communications, document, financial records,
papers, physical evidence, records, recordings,
tapes, or materials in obedience to any sub-
Sams
January 21, 1975
NGRESSIONAL RECORD. ·SEMA
legislation it deems necessary or desirable,
the Senate at the earliest practicable date,
but no later than September 1, 1975. The
select committee may also submit to the Sen-
ate such interim reports as it considers ap-
propriate. After submission, of its final re-
port, the select committee shall have three
calendar months to close its affairs, and on
the expiration of such three calendar months
chall cease to exist.
- . $ 525
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I do
want to say, while the resolution is be-
fore the Senate, that there is no inten-
tion here to conduct a witch hunt There
is no one in the Senate who has more
appreciation or more respect for the
necessity for a CIA, a civilian intelli-
gence agency, a military inteiligence
agency, and an Fist in order to guar-
antee the security and the survival
of this great Republic. But in recent
weeks and in recent months there have
been charges and counter charges spelled
out on the front page of every newspaper
in this country. The matter has been
discussed over, television and radio. The
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob- people of America are confused. They are
jection to the resolution?
SEC. 6. The expenses of the select com-
mittee through September 1, 1975, under
this resolution shall not exceed $750,000 of
which amount not to exceed $100,000 shall be
available for the procurement of the services
of individual consultants or organizations
thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the
contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers
approved by the chairman of the select
committee.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, I do so in
order, first, to make the point that what
we are really trying to do here is agree on
a time to vote on this resolution if we
can. It may be necessary to object for-
mally to get the matter on the calendar.
If so, I will be prepared to object for that
purpose.
pona or order; (7) to fatto depos & ad
other testimony on cath anywhere wahin the
United States or in any other country; (8) to
procure the temporary or intermittent serv-
ices of individual consultants, or organiza-
tions thereof, in the samo manner and under
the same conditions as a standing committee-
of the Senate may procure such services un-
der section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorga-
nization, Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reim-
bursable bacia, with the prior consent of the
Committee on Rules and Administration, the
services of personnel of any such department
or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis
or otherwise with the prior consent of the
chairman of any subcommittee of any com-
mittee of the Senate the facilities or services
of any members of the staffs of such other
Senate committees or any subcommittees of
such other Sonate committees whenever the
select committes or its chairman deems that,
such action is necessary or appropriate to en-
able the relect committee to make the inves-.
tigation and study authorized and directed.
by this resolation; (11) to have direct access
through the agency of one members of the
select committee or pay of its investigatory
or legal assistants designated by it or its
chairman or the ranking minority member to
any data, evidence, information, report, an-
alyals, or document or papers relating to any
of the matters or questions which it is au-
thorized and directed to investigate and study
in the custody or under the cotrol of any
department, agency, officer, or employee of
the executive, branch of the United States
Government, including any department,
agency, oficer, or employee of the United
States Government haring the power under
the laws of the United States to investigate
any alleged criminat estivities or to prose
cute persons charged with crimes against the
United States and any department, agency,
officer, or employee of the United States Gov-
ernment having the enthority to conduct in-
telligence or surveillance within or outside
the United States, without regard to the jur-
isdiction or authority of any other Senate
committee, which will aid the select commit-
⚫ tee to prepare for or conduct the investiga-
tion and audy authorized and directed by
this resolution; and (12) to expend to the
extent it determines necessary or appropriate Mr. TOWER. I have nothing to add
any money's made evallable to it by the Sen-to what the distinguished Senator from
ate to perform the duties and exercise the
powera 
conferred upon it by this resolution.
and to make the investigation and study it
is authorized by this resolution to make.
(b) Subpemas may be issued by the select
committee ecting through the chairman or
any other member designated by him, and
may be served by any person designated by
such chairman or other member anywhere
within the borders of the United States. The
chairman of the relect committee, or any
other member thereof, is hereby authorized
⚫to administer oaths to any witnesses appear-
ing before the committed.
(0) In preparing for or conducting the in-
vestigation and study authorized, and di-
rected by this resolution, the select com-
mittee shall be empowered to exercise the
power conferred upon committees of the
Senate by section 6002 of title 18 of the
United States Code or any other Act of Con-
gress regulating the granting of immunity
to witnesss..
"
SEC. The select committee, shall have
authority to recommend the enactment of
nny now legislation or the amendment of
any existing statute. which it considers nec-
essary or desirable to strengthen or clarify
the national security, intelligence, or surveil-
lance activities of the United States and to"
protect the rights of United States citizens
with regard to those activities.
SEC. 6. The select committee shall make a
final report of the results of the investigation
and study conducted by it pursuant to this,
resolution, together with its findings and its
recommendations ns to new congressional
.
I am not objecting to the early con-
sideration of the resolution. The distin-
guished majority leader and I have dis-
cussed the possibility of an early vote. I
personally am in accord with that.
I should like to ask one question for
the benefit of the legislative history: It
my understanding that it would be
the intention of the majority that the
vice chairman of the committee will be
& member of the minority party.
"Mr. PASTORE. That is correct, and
it is so specified in the resolution.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I yield to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Texas, if I may,
who may also wish to reserve the right
to object.
Pennsylvania has said, except to express
the hope that when the objection is
formally raised, we can consent to get
the resolution on the calendar as soon as
possible; Monday, if possible.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. For the purpose
of achieving that, I can object now.
I object.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The objection
is heard. The resolution will go over
under the rule.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that notwithstand
Ing the objection, the resolution be placed
on the calendar at this time to save the
time of the Senate. I do so because it, is
not anticipated at the moment that we
will be in tomorrow, and perhaps not
for that reason that I make this unani-
on Thursday. We will be in Friday. It is
mous-consent request.
Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I have no objec-
tion.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered. The resolution
is placed on the calendar.
.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have notified Sen-
ators STENNIS and MCCLELLAN of what
was going to happen today and have also
discussed the matter with the distin-
guished Republican leader and the rank-.
ing member of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, Mr. TOWER.
asking themselves, "What is actually
happening to these organizations which
are essential for the security and the sur-
vival of our great Nation?"...
In order to clear the air, in order to
cleanse whatever abuses there have been
in the past, so that we can put these
agencies on the right track, so that we
can recite, once and for all, the proper
parameters within which they can func-
tion, I am afraid we will do irreparable
harm to the security and the survival of
the country unless we do this.
It was for that reason, Mr. President,
that I introduced this resolution before
the Democratic conference. I made it
plain at the time that in my judgment
there are no three greater Americans
than Colby, Helms, and Kelley, I know
all three, I have worked with all three.
and I have found them to be distin-
guished gentlemen who are patriotic and
Tove this country as much as any other
Americans, without any doubt at all.
But there has been abuse. They have
been influenced in making their judg-
ments, and these influences, I am afraid;
have come from on high, may times right
out of the Oval Room of the White
House, and sometimes from some under-
lings at the White House.
We had the instance before our com-
mittee where Ehrlichman called up the
Deputy Director of the CIA and instruct-
ed him to give disguise paraphernalia to
Mr. Hunt. The question is, Under whose
authority? Who was Ehrlichman? Was it
within the purview of the statute? Was it
in conformity with the charter that es-
tablished the CIA?
These are questions that have to be
resolved, because we want the CIA to
be responsive to the President of the
United States directly, and not indirect-
ly. We want him to be responsible to the
Congress that is responsible, in turn, to
the people of this country. It is for that
reason that this investigation is being
conducted and this resolution is before
this body.
It was argued by the distinguished
Senator from Mississippi that this falls
within the purview and the jurisdiction
of his own Armed Services Committee.
As a matter of fact, when we talk about
jurisdiction, we also have the Foreign
Relations Committee, we have the Ap-
propriations Committee, and I do not
think we are ever going to get around
discussing the question of jurisdiction
unless we get it into a select committee.
If we get it into the Appropriations Com-
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 199
S526
mitts or the Armed Services. munit-
tes, I am afraid we are going back again
to the question of seniority, the seniority
complext that has disturbed so many
people.
A
I am hot against putting senior Mem-
bers on his select committee, but we
have wealth, we have a reservoir of
competence in this body, of people who
have not settled their minds or prej-
udiced my or the other.
Frankly, I ust cay, from my own con-
tact with these two agencies, I am a
little prejudiced, muself, in favor of the
CIA, or military intenzence, and of the
FBI. I ara chairman of the subcommit-
tee Bhar funds the FBI. in my humble
opinion, there is no man i respect more
Than Cit
CREMße Kelley, I think he is a line
American, and I think he excellent
police IGEN, MU QUE Audio u. I have
no 12 and with him, and funda-
ment, Dave no out to find with
anybody, except that we want the right
We are not going to conduct a witch
hunt in this case. We are not out to get
Wir we are trying to do
S to serve Aunerica. Obs an open so
ciety. Even in an open society, sometimes
we have to have a secret organization.
The big question is, To whom are they
responsible Who got us into Cambodia?
Who got us into Laos? Who got us into
the Bay of Pigs? Who got us into Chile?
Who got us in all over the world, and
under whose authority, and why was not
the Congas tolds
NGRESSIONAL RECORD-
Here we are; we passed the war powers
bill in order to restrict the power to de-
- clare war and require that Congress be
consulted, and we find now they can do
"It surreptitiously through the CIA or
through sime other agency of Govern-
ment. This is all wrong. Mr. President,
and it should be rectifed. I hope that
the majority leader and the minority
leader will pick out competent personnel,
of whom we have enough here in the
Senate, and that they will conduct a
hearing, that they will protect the secrecy
of the CIA, the FBI, and the military in-
telligence, and that they will not spread.
it out publicly and thus injure this
Nation.
I think we have that competence. I
think we have, the responsibility to do
that. And after all, the Armed Services
Committee, the Appropriations Commit-
tee, and the Foreign Relations Commit-
tea are not so sanctified that they are
the only ones who can do it...
The only thing I am saying is, let us
spread this out, Let us widen our scope,
and let us pick out men who will devote
themselves to this task, who are not al-
ready too much involved with other re-
sponsibilities in the Senate, and can get
on and do this job that needs to be done,
and report, back to the people.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the
Senator Field?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
Mr. KENNEDY, I wonder if I could
direct the Senator's attention to certain
provisions of the resolution, and ask his
interpretation of such provisions.
*Mr. PASTORE. The Senator may..
Mr. KENNEDY. The first resolve
clause, refers to establishing a "select
STA
committee of the Senate to conduct an
investigation and study," and then I
draw particular attention to these words,
"of Government operations with respect
to intelligence activities."
I want to find out from the author of
the resolution whether he interprets
those particular words to include covert
actions as well as literal intelligence-
gathering activities, including the full
range of Central Intelligence Agency
activities such as the paramilitary
operations, propaganda, subversion, de-
stabilization, operation of proprietary
companies, and counterintelligence. The
inquiry would thus include, for example,
activities like the secret war in Laos,
Operation Phoenix, and destabilization
of the Government of Chile.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The 10 min-
utes of the Senator from Montana has
expired,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for an additional 10 minutes, and yield
that additional time to the distinguished
Senator from Rhode Island.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PASTORE. The answer is "Yes." If
they fall within the purview of any of
the activities of these agencies; and
whether these actions are performed
domestically or abroad, the resolution is
very specific in that respect. The answer
is yes.
Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.
I believe this is again referred to in sub-
section 2(14) of the resolution, where it
concludes with reference to "the extent
and necessity of covert intelligence ac-
tivities in the United States and abroad.
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct.
Mr. KENNEDY. I bring this up be-
cause one might later argue that the
resolution does not cover some of the ac-
tivities the CIA has been involved in be-
cause they are not literally "intelligence
activities," and therefore that they are
not subject to the scope of the resolution.
Mr. PASTORE. No.
Mr. KENNEDY. But quite clearly, as
I have listened to the Senator here on
the floor and also to his explanation in
the caucus, the scope of the resolution
covers all of these matters I have just
referred to, and they would be so in-
cluded in the inquiry authorized by the
resolution.
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct; and
the majority leader will address himself
to that point, that this is not to be con-
strued in any limited way, that it has to
be given a broad interpretation, and that
interpretation will be the interpretation
of the committee itself, and of nobody
else.
+
Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President will
the Senator yield?
January 23, 1975
I expected that such a resolution
would be introduced, and I am very glad
that it has been introduced, and particu-
larly because my friend, the Senator
from Rhode Island, seems to be heading
it up.
Now, the point that I am trying to
get to is, serving on the Armed Services
Committee, there are many times
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we
have order so that those who wish to
can give attention to the debate?
The VICE PRESIDENT. Order.
Mr. GOLDWATER. There are many
times, Mr. President, when we are con-
fronted with testimony that we do not
want to hear. It is of such a highly classi-
fled nature, I do not think, frankly, any-
one outside of the intelligence commu-
nity should hear it.
Now, it is my hope and prayer that
during the course of this investigation,
first that a proper committee be selected.
We do not want to have anyone running
for President on this committee, or any
other office. We want to have people who
are going to be objective and hew to the
line.
Mr. PASTORE. That is correct.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Now intelligence
is not something that we gather on
Americans. It is something we gather on
an enemy. Intelligence is a worldwide
operation and, I must say, we have al-
ready lost from the CIA probably the
world's finest intelligence officer, because
he was not going to put up with what he
thought he would be subjected to in
questioning on the CIA.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator from
Arizona admit that part of that has al-
ready been accomplished by the stories
that have appeared?
Mr. GOLDWATER. I am sorry about
what happened.
Mr. PASTORE. Absolutely.
Mr. GOLDWATER. What I want to
sea prevented is a further diminution of
the intelligence forces we have had.
I never worked too closely with intelli-
gence but I have worked close enough
to know, though, people in these jobs
and in this field are very difficult to come
by, they are very sensitive to exposure,
and are very sensitive to having their
records and discussions brought out in
the press.
So I would hope, when the majority
leader and minority leader get together
to select this committee, that they select
a committee that will weigh all of the
facts and be particularly careful about
what is allowed to leak, because the Wa-
tergate leaked like an old steve, and we
sure do not want that to happen in an
area as sensitive as intelligence.
I might say that we have gone through
a lot of criticism or we have suffered
through a lot of criticism in this country
in the last several years, criticism of the
Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator military. Who is responsible for the mili-
from Arizona.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Serving on the
Armed Services Committee, as I do, I
Ican understand the anxiety and the
interest of other Members of this body
over reports emanating from the New
York Times and other newspapers in the
country relative to the activities, or at
least charged activities, of the CIA.
tary to go to Vietnam? It was not the
Pentagon; it was the President of the
United States who was the only man who
could do it.
Who is responsible for the CIA, FBI,
and DIA and others getting into fields
I have a feeling they did not want to
get into? The President of the United
States. Now should we go that high?
KW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 200

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM W.
regar
SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75
1
1
1
-
-
-
1
-
1
1
☐
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
DATE:
2/10/75
Mr. W. R. Wannall
-
Mr. A. B. Fulton
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Assoc. Dir₂
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y.
This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled
"Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished
Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexs
Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC)
on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The
FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by
the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the
Intelligence Community.
The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review
of the Intelligence Community is chaired by Mr. John Clarke,
Associate Deputy to the DCI. It is made up of representatives
of agencies and departments having membership on the U.S.
Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a
coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various
Congressional committees.
There are enclosed two papers which will be used as
annexs. The first paper, prepared by the Intelligence Division,
is entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan."
Inasmuch as this paper was prepared by the Bureau, we are asking
the Director's clearance for passage to Mr. Colby. The second.
paper entitled "The Intelligence Evaluation Committee" was
prepared by the Justice Department and was submitted to the
Bureau for our concurrence as part of the coordinating process.
The paper on the Huston plan represents a detailed
chronology of the plan from its inception to its disposition.
It is completely footnoted to documents which have been pre-
viously furnished to the Committee on the Judiciary. These
documents appear in published form in the document entitled
"Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant
to H. Res. 803. The paper was reviewed by those members of
Enclosures (2)
WOC: din
(7)
1975
REC=18
#MOR16
members of
62-116375 COT
9/25/00 SP-2ALM/386
NW-88608 Docid:32989530 Page 201
CONTINUED
-
OVER
TEL 10 1975
5- шов
-
Done
2/11/75
Done
2/11/75
.
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
Ad Hoc group who participated in the development of the plan.
No substantive objections were raised regarding the paper and
it was recommended the paper be furnished to Mr. Colby for
use as an annex.
The second annex entitled "Intelligence Evaluation
Committee" prepared by the Department of Justice was provided
to the FBI for our review and concurrence. Here again this
paper provides a detailed chronology of the origin and disposition
of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. It is footnoted to
various internal Departmental memoranda which are identified as
attachments 1 through 6 to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee
paper. This paper was also reviewed by the Ad Hoc group and
it was recommended that this paper also be furnished to
Mr. Colby for his use as an annex to his opening statement.
ACTION:
1. If approved, the paper entitled "Origin and
Disposition of the Huston Plan" will be furnished to Mr. Colby.
2. Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney
General, will be telephonically advised that the FBI
in the paper entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee” for
use as an annex by Mr. Colby.
LET U
TAL
дна
ے کر کے
concurs
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 202
1
2
7
?
ΤΟ
FROM
MA!
GSA GEN.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Minorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
W. O. regar
0.jeregar
SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75
1 Mr. N. P. Callahan
-
1 Mr
1
1
1
I
--
-
-
-
J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
DATE:
2/10/75
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. A. B. Fulton
Mr. W. O. Cregar
#mpe 16
ALL INFORMATION GEOTAYLO
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/06 BY SP2 ALM/7/6
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Ad-,
Dep. AD inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affo'ss -
Files & Con....
Gen. 1. -
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Evel.
Spec. Inv..
Training
Legal Coun.
Felephone Rm.
Director Scc'y
This memorandum recommends that a paper entitled
"Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan" be furnished
Mr. Colby in his role as the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI) for inclusion as an annex in a series of annexs
Mr. Colby intends to provide the Senate Select Committee (SSC)
on the occasion of his appearance as the leadoff witness. The
FBI was given the responsibility for preparing this paper by
the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of the
Intelligence Community.
The Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review
of the Intelligence Community is chaired by Mr. John Clarke,
Associate Deputy to the DCI. It is made up of representatives
of agencies and departments having membership on the U.S.
Intelligence Board (USIB). Its purpose is to serve as a
coordinating mechanism for future testimony before various
Congressional committees.
There are enclosed two papers which will be used as
annexs. The first paper, prepared by the Intelligence Division,
is entitled "Origin and Disposition of the Huston Plan."
Inasmuch as this paper was prepared by the Bureau, we are asking
the Director's clearance for passage to Mr. Colby. The second
paper entitled "The Intelligence Evaluation Committee" was
prepared by the Justice Department and was submitted to the
Bureau for our concurrence as part of the coordinating process.
The paper on the Huston plan represents a detailed
chronology of the plan from its inception to its disposition.
It is completely footnoted to documents which have been pre-
viously furnished to the Committee on the Judiciary. These
documents appear in published form in the document entitled
"Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant
to H. Res. 803.' The paper was reviewed by those members of
Enclosures (2)
WOC: din
(7)
CONTINUED
OVER
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 203
!
* 4*****Ph*
444པསཿལཱ*ཤམཨཱmi*****
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
Ad Hoc group who participated in the development of the plan.
No substantive objections were raised regarding the paper and
it was recommended the paper be furnished to Mr. Colby for
use as an annex.
The second annex entitled "Intelligence Evaluation
Committee" prepared by the Department of Justice was provided
to the FBI for our review and concurrence. Here again this
paper provides a detailed chronology of the origin and disposition
of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee. It is footnoted to
various internal Departmental memoranda which are identified as
attachments 1 through 6 to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee
paper. This paper was also reviewed by the Ad Hoc group and
it was recommended that this paper also be furnished to
Mr. Colby for his use as an annex to his opening statement.
ACTION:
1°
If approved, the paper entitled "Origin and
Disposition of the Huston Plan" will be furnished to Mr. Colby...
concurs
2. Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney
General, will be telephonically advised that the FBI
in the paper entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee for
use as an annex by Mr. Colby.
WRW JUL
для
2
I
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 204
/ por perpe pricing"" to start, jo 2 Playa -
SECRET
11-6-00
#MDR16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALMIZTE.
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
`BACKGROUND:
ORIGIN AND DISPOSITION
OF THE
HUSTON PLAN
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN
HEREIN IS UNÓLASSIFIED EXCE#7
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE,
By letter dated 6/20/69 Tom Charles Huston, Staff
Assistant to the President, addressed a letter to the Director, FBI,
stating that the President had directed that a report on foreign
communist support of revolutionary protest movements in the
United States be prepared for his study. According to the
Huston letter, the President specifically requested that the
report draw upon all the sources available to the intelligence
community, that it be as detailed as possible, and
that the word "support" should be liberally construed
to include all activities by foreign communists designed to
encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the
United States. The letter stated that on the basis of
earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited
aspect of the problem, it was apparent "present" intelligence
collection capabilities in the area were inadequate. Huston
stated the President wanted to know what resources were currently
targeted toward monitoring foreign communist support of
revolutionary youth activities in the United States, how
effective they were, what gaps existed in our (U.S.) intelligence
because of either inadequate resources or low priority of
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 205
SECRET
SECRET
attention and what steps could be taken, if the President
directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these
activities.
The request was also sent to CIA, NSA and DIA
seeking contributions relating to this same problem.
Pursuant to the request, the FBI and CIA submitted available
information on the matter. These responses were handled
unilaterally and without coordination between CIA and FBI.
On 6/5/70 Director Hoover met with President Nixon
at which meeting the President appointed him as chairman of a
special intelligence committee to coordinate a more effective
intelligence-gathering function. He also instructed that
the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security
Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were to
coordinate their efforts to insure that comprehensive informa-
tion would be obtained for the President's use which would
provide him with a worldwide picture of the efforts of new left
and subversive groups in directing dissident activities in
the United States. Present at this meeting were CIA Director
Richard Helms; Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, NSA; General Donald V.
Bennett, DIA; Mr. Tom Charles Huston, White House Staff Assistant;
1 Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, Ninety-third Congress, Second Session Pursuant
to H. Res. 803, "A Resolution Authorizing and Directing the
Committee on the Judiciary to Investigate Whether Sufficient
Grounds Exist for the House of Representatives to Exercise its
Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M. Nixon, President
of the United States of America," Book VII, Part 1, pg. 375.
-NW-88608 Doeld:32989530-Page-206 rum i paun amatnie
2
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ལ
Assistant to the President H. R. Haldeman; Assistant to the
President for Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman and Robert H.
Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare.
An initial meeting of the Interagency Committee on
Intelligence (AD HOC) was held in Mr. Hoover's office on
6/8/70. This meeting was attended by Mr. Helms, Vice: Admiral
Gayler, General Bennett and Mr. Huston Mr. Hoover
emphasized the President's keen interest in the problem of
intelligence collection and outlined the general objectives to
which the Committee was to address itself. He instructed
that a working subcommittee be established composed of
representatives of all the member agencies which subcommittee
was to be headed by FBI Assistant Director William C. Sullivan.
The first meeting of the working subcommittee was
held on 6/9/70. At this meeting Mr. Huston presented
the subcommittee with an outline which he stated the President
desired the subcommittee to follow in preparing its report.
The outline addressed itself mainly to the purpose, procedures
and objectives of the subcommittee's review. The following
from the outline is quoted:
"PURPOSE:
(A)
(B)
(c)
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 207
To define and assess the existing internal
security threat.
To evaluate the collection procedures and
techniques presently employed and to assess
their effectiveness.
To identify gaps in our present collection efforts.
· and recommend steps to close these gaps.
-
3 - "PRODET
(D)
(E)
(F)
SECRET
To review current procedures for inter-
community coordination and cooperation and
to recommend steps to improve these procedures.
To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence
data and to recommend procedures to increase
both its timeliness and usefulness.
To assess the priorities presently attached
to domestic intelligence collection efforts and
to recommend new priorities where appropriate.
PROCEDURES:
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
Although the sub-committee will be officially
constituted within the framework of USIB, it
will in fact be an independent, ad hoc, inter-
agency working group with a limited mandate.
Operational details will be the responsibility
of the chairman. However, the scope and
direction of the review will be determined by
the White House member.
The sub-committee will submit its reports to the
White House and not to USIB. Report will be
due by July 1, 1970.
To insure that the President has all the options
available for consideration, the WH member may
direct detailed interrogatories to individual
agencies in order to ascertain facts relevant
to policy evaluation by the President.
Information resulting from such interrogatories
will, if the contributing agency requests, be
treated on a confidential basis and not be
considered by the sub-committtee as a whole.
OBJECTIVES:
(A)
(B)
(C)
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 208
Maximum coordination and cooperation within the
intelligence community. The sub-committee
may wish to consider the creation of a permanent
Domestic Intelligence Operations Board, or
some other appropriate mechanism to insure
community-wide evaluation of intelligence data.
Higher priority by all intelligence agencies
on internal security collection efforts.
Maximum use of all special investigative
techniques, including increased agent and
informant penetration by both the FBI and CIA.
-
4
SECRET
ག་མཐའི&ས2449a9*mm**% #
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
(I)
SECRET
Clarification of NSA's role in targeting
against communication traffic involving U S.
revolutionary leaders and organizations. (5)
Maximum coverage of the overseas activities
of revolutionary leaders and of foreign support
of U. S. revolutionary activities.
Maximum coverage of campus and student-related
activities of revolutionary leaders and groups.
More detailed information about the sources and
extent of financial support of revolutionary
organizations.
Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence
role of the Armed Services.
Development of procedures for translating
analyzed intelligence information into a format
useful for policy formulation."
At a meeting of the working subcommittee held on
6/23/70 a consensus was reached on a final draft of the Report
to be issued by the Interagency Committee. This Report, which
was captioned "Special Report Interagency Committee on Intelligence
11
(AD HOC), dated June, 1970, and numbering 43 pages was
signed and approved by the heads of each member agency at a
final meeting of the Committee held in Mr. Hoover's office on
6/25/70.3
The Report footnoted several objections by the FBI
4
to certain options contained in the Committee's Report. These
objections are enumerated in a latter portion of this paper.
2 Ibid., pp. 384-431.
3 Ibid., pg. 383.
4 Ibid., pg. 433.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 209
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A copy of the "Special Report" was delivered to Mr. Huston at
the White House on 6/26/70. The "Special Report" was divided
into three main sections: Part One, a summarized estimate of
the internal security threat; Part Two, a summary of various
operational limitations on certain intelligence collection
techniques with cited advantages of maintaining such restrictions
as well as the advantages of relaxing them; and Part Three,
an evaluation of interagency cooperation with suggested
measures to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence
collection.
During the first week of July, 1970, Huston sent
the "Special Report" to H. R. Haldeman with a memorandum
entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection.”
In his memorandum Huston recommended that the President,
from among the options discussed by the "Special Report,
select; in most areas discussed, the options relaxing the
restraints on intelligence collection.
5
On 7/14/70 Haldeman sent a memorandum to Huston
stating the President had approved Huston's recommendations
for relaxing restraints on intelligence collection and
requested a formal decision memorandum be prepared.
6
In a memorandum dated 7/23/70 addressed to the AD HOC
Committee agencies with copies for the President and Mr. Haldeman,
Mr. Huston advised that the President had carefully studied
5 Ibid., pg. 437.
6τbid., pg. 445.
1
7Ibid., pp. 450, 454.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 210
1
6
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7

SEGWEL
the "Special Report" and had made certain decisions with
respect to issues raised therein. The President's decisions
called for a relaxation of certain existing restraints on
intelligence coverage including the following: NSCID-6 was
to be interpreted [to permit NSA to program for coverage the
facilities on
communications of United States citizens using international
facilities; the intelligence community was directed to intensify
electronic surveillance coverage of individuals and groups in
the United States who pose a threat to the internal security;
restrictions on legal mail coverage were to be removed and
restrictions on covert mail coverage relaxed to permit its use
on select targets of priority intelligence; restraints on the
use of surreptitious entry wore to be removed on certain high-
priority targets; the coverage of violence-prone campus and
student-related groups was to be increased; CIA coverage of
American students traveling or living abroad was to be increased;
the restrictions on the use of military undercover agents
were to be retained; each member agency was to submit a
detailed estimate of manpower and monetary needs required to
implement the decisions; and a committee consisting of the
directors of representative agencies or appropriate alternates
was to be constituted effective 8/1/70 to provide
evaluation of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic
domestic intelligence estimates, carry out other objectives
specified in the Report and perform such other duties as
the President should from time to time assign. The Director
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 211
7
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of the FBI was appointed to serve as chairman of this committee.
An attachment to the memorandum from Mr. Huston captioned
"Organization and Operations of the Interagency Group
on Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security (IAG)" set forth
specific composition, operations and duties of this new committee. 8
On receipt of the letter from Mr. Huston the Director,
FBI, addressed a letter to the Attorney General dated 7/27/70
pointing out FBI objections to certain of the decisions reported
in the Huston letter. Mr. Hoover objected to relaxation of
electronic surveillance policy, the implementation of covert mail
coverage, the removal of restrictions on the use of surreptitious
entry of embassies to obtain cryptographic materials, the removal
of controls and restrictions relating to the coverage of
violence-prone campus and student-related groups and the
establishment of a permanent Interagency Committee on Domestic
Intelligence. The Director stated that in the "Special Report"
he had pointed out his opposition to these aspects of the
Report and requested of the Attorney General a prompt
expression of his views concerning the matter. He noted that
no action to implement the instructions contained in Mr. Huston's
letter would be taken pending a reply from the Attorney General.
No further action to implement the Huston letter
subsequent to the 7/27/70 letter to the Attorney General was
instituted by the intelligence community. There is no indication
that the Attorney General ever responded to this communication.
81bid., pg. 456.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 212
- 8
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On or about 7/27/70 each recipient agency of the
7/23/70 memorandum received
telephone call from the
White House instructing that the 'memorandum be returned.
- 9
I
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 213
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#MDR16
ALL FEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
:
INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE
Introduction
Since its existence was first revealed publicly during
the height of the Senate Watergate Committee investigation in
1973, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC) has been the
object of suspicion and misunderstanding. Unfortunately
associated by some politicians and representatives of the
media with such things as political spying, illegal electronic
surveillance and surreptitious entry, it was nothing more than
an effort by the Executive Branch to better coordinate and
disseminate intelligence information received by various in-
telligence and investigative agencies in the Federal Government.
While the fact of its existence was kept secret, which may have
contributed to the misunderstanding of its purpose and function,
the IEC was not an operational entity. That is, it did not
conduct its own investigations as did the FBI and other agencies.
Nor did it engage in surreptitious entries, wiretapping or
other similar activity. It merely received data collected
by the agencies represented on the Committee and put this
information into one comprehensive report or estimate for
dissemination to interested agencies and individuals within the
Executive Branch. The Committee was staffed by career personnel
NW 88608 Doeld 32989530- Page 214
2 -
and it existed for approximately 18 months.
Origin
In November, 1970, then Attorney General John Mitchell
met with John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for
Domestic Affairs; Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General;
Jerris Leonard, Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA); Robert Mardian, Assistant Attorney
General, Internal Security Division; and a consultant from
the State of Washington, former State Judge Morell Sharp, to
discuss the need for an inter-departmental unit capable of
obtaining and evaluating intelligence information from all the
resources of the Federal Government relating to the membership,
status and activities of militant terrorist groups operating
within the United States. The meeting took place on November 10,
1970 in Mr. Mitchell's office and, according to a memorandum
dated November 12, prepared by Mr. Mardian, past attempts to
elicit such cooperation from interested departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch had been unsuccessful.
It
was decided that Judge Sharp, John Dean, then Counsel to the
President, and Mr. Mardian were to contact the heads of
various agencies and explain the wishes of the President and
seek their advice and cooperation. (See Attachment 1).
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 215
3
'
According to a memorandum dated December 17, 1970, from
Mr. Mardian to the Attorney General, a second meeting of the
Intelligence Evaluation Committee took place at 9:00 a.m. in
the Executive Office Building, and was attended by Mr. Mardian,
Judge Sharp, Mr. Dean, Egil Krogh (Deputy Counsel to the
President), Robert Proehkle (Assistant Secretary of Defense),
James Angleton (Central Intelligence Agency), Thomas Kelly
(Secret Service), Benson Buffham (National Security Agency),
George Moore (Federal Bureau of Investigation) and John
Doherty (Department of Justice). It was agreed at that
meeting that on or before January 6, 1971 the agencies repre-
sented would furnish information relating to "organizational
targets and intelligence targets." Judge Sharp was to be
available on a full-time consulting basis beginning January 11,
1971, and the Committee was to have its next meeting on
January 11 at 9:00 a.m. (See Attachment 2).
Judge Sharp attended three meetings of the IEC during
its initial stages of development. He did not attend the
fourth_scheduled mesting on January 25, 1971, at which time
Mr. Mardian explained his absence by stating there had been
several inquiries by the former Judge's acquaintances
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 216
in Congress which caused the Attorney General and the White
House to be concerned that it would be difficult to maintain
appropriate security regarding the Committee's work with
Judge Sharp as its head. Mardian stated that at a meeting at
the White House on January 21, it was decided that Judge
Sharp would be removed from the Committee and assigned other
consultant duties with the Justice Department.
Subsequent memoranda revealed that certain individuals
were designated by their respective agencies as representatives
on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee, and by February 10,
1971 a document outlining the authority, mission, membership,
staff, procedures and functions and office space and facilities
was drafted and presented to each of the member-representatives.
Functions and Purpose i
According to the February 10, memorandum, the purpose of
the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was to provide intelli-
gence estimates to the respective Government departments and
· agencies on a need-to-know basis, in order to effectively
evaluate and anticipate problems for appropriate response to
civil disorders. In carrying out this mission, the Committee
was to have access to all pertinent intelligence in the
possession of the United States Government.
The membership
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 217
5
was to consist of representatives from the Department of
Defense, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, and National
Security Agency and "when necessary, representatives of other
departments and agencies designated by the Committee." 1/
The Committee was to be supported by a permanent staff
consisting of representatives from member departments and
agencies and headed by an Executive Director appointed by the
Committee. The staff was to perform certain functions which
included: (1) when requested by the Committee, agency repré-
sentatives would furnish to the staff all pertinent information
relevant to the stated request of the Committee; (2) prepare
estimates; (3) report information gaps; (4) recommend subjects
for intelligence estimates; (5) prepare relevant studies and
reports; and (6) provide for the secrecy of the information
received and the protection of all sources of the information.
The Department of Justice provided necessary office space,
supplies and incidental administrative support. (See
Attachment 3).
1/ In his report of January 15, 1975 to the Senate Appropri-
ations Committee, Director of Central Intelligence William
E. Colby stated that the State Department was represented
on the IEC. It was not. However, at some time after its
formation, the Treasury Department appointed a representative
to the Committee.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 218.
- 6 -
-
Mr. Hoover initially declined a request from Mr.
Mardian to provide staff support, but on May 17, 1971, the
Attorney General requested that the FBI provide two agents
and one secretary for the permanent working staff of IEC:
Mr. Hoover acceded to this request.
Meetings and Reports
John Doherty of the Department of Justice was named as
the first Executive Director of the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee and with the approval of the Assistant Attorney
General, Internal Security Division, James McGrath, a staff
attorney, was assigned as his assistant.
Subsequently, Bernard
Wells, a former Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation replaced Mr. Doherty, who retired from government service,
as Executive Director in September, 1971. Weekly meetings were
held with representatives of the various agencies and procedures
for agency contribution to IEC estimates or reports were
adopted. (See Attachment 4).
The first estimate or report prepared and disseminated
by the IEC was designated E-l dated February 18, 1971 entitled
"April-May Demonstrations" dealing with the potential for
violence during the anti-war demonstrations in Washington and
other parts of the country planned for April-May 1971. During
the period February 18, 1971 to April 30, 1973, the Committee
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 219
- 7 -
produced and disseminated 31 estimates or reports dealing with
such subjects as anti-war demonstrations, potential for vio-
lence in major cities, black power organizations, Arab
There is
:
terrorist groups, prison riots, and related topics.
attached a complete list of all of the estimates or reports
produced and disseminated by the IEC during its existence.
(See Attachment 5). The estimates were disseminated to the
Counsel to the President; Director, Central Intelligence;
Director, National Security Agency; Director, Secret Service;
Dileclur, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dircctor, Office of
Law Enforcement, Treasury Department; the Assistant Attorney
General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice;
and the Defense Intelligence Agency. No estimates were
produced after April 30, 1973. A communication to all
interested agencies dated June 11, 1973 pointed out that
inasmuch as the end of the war in Vietnam had resulted in the
termination of demonstrations which carried a potential for
violence, there was no longer any useful function to be served
by the IEC and that, effective immediately, the IEC would no
longer be in existence.
During July, 1971, Mr. Mardian, at a meeting of the
IEC, stated that President Nixon had requested a report regard-
ing the handling of classified information, which was prompted
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 220

-
by the Pentagon Papers case. Shortly thereafter, the IEC
staff was advised that White House Staff Member Gordon Liddy
had been appointed to work with the IEC regarding its study of
the handling of classified information and by November, 1971
the IEC completed and disseminated a special report entitled
"The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information."
Relationship of the IEC to the "Huston Plan"
In June 1970, J. Edgar Hoover met with President Nixon,
at which time Mr. Hoover was appointed chairman of a special
committee to coordinate more effectively the intelligence-
gathering efforts of the FBI, CIA, NSA, and DIA. The head
of each of these agencies was present at a June 5, 1970 meet-
ing with the President, which included White House Staff
Assistant Tom C. Huston. Subsequently, a working subcommittee
headed by Assistant Director William C. Sullivan of the FBI
was formed, and it held a series of meetings beginning June 9,
1970. A final meeting held in late June 1970, a "Special
Report" was filed and approved by the head of each member
agency.
The "Special Report", which was submitted by Mr. Hoover
to the President, was divided into three sections: a summary
of the internal security threat; summarized limitations on
-NW-88608--Doeld:32989530-Page-221-
9
-
:
certain intelligence collection techniques; and, a brief
evaluation of interagency cooperation, with suggested measures
to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence collec-
tion. Mr. Hoover objected to certain options for relaxation
of restraints on intelligence gathering. Although President
Nixon at first approved the relaxation of certain restraints,
this approval was rescinded about five days later.
Inquiries by Various Committees of
Congress and Other Entities Into
the Operations of the IEC
Since its disclosure, the IEC has been the target of
a number of investigations and inquiries, none of which has
revealed any illegality or impropriety. The Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (Senate Water-
gate Committee) interviewed former IEC personnel in 1973, and
a member of the Committee staff was offered access to all IEC
reports and documents. The final report of the Watergate
Committee published in June 1974 makes no reference to any
improper or illegal activity by the IEC, but devoted a section
to the Huston Plan. (See Attachment 6).
The House Judiciary Committee Investigating the Impeach-
ment of Richard Nixon (Rodino Committee) did not see fit to
conduct any investigation of the IEC, and one may conclude that
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 222
3
10
-
it developed no information which would require scrutiny. The
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights (Ervin Committee),
after submitting voluminous questionnaires to the Department of
Justice beginning in August, 1973 regarding the activities of
the former Internal Security Division, was given complete
information and access to all documents relating to the IEC
and, to date, has reported no finding of impropriety or
illegality.
The Watergate Special Prosecution Force has been given
complete access to the documents and records of the Committoo
and it has conducted interviews of former Committee repre-
sentatives and staff with no report to the Attorney General
of any improper conduct. Moreover, the IEC will continue to
be a target of inquiry by the recently formed Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities (Church Committee).
In his testimony before the Senate Watergate Committee,
former Counsel to the President, John Dean, testified that
"I am unaware of the IEC ever having engaged in any illicit
activities or assignments." See, Hearings Before the Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United
States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., at 916 (1973).
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 223
Attachment I
Form DJ-150
(Ed. 4-26-65)
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
FROM
FROM CO.
Rom
SUBJECT:
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.
SECRET
DATE: 11/12/70
The torney General
Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE UNIT
The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth
the tentative conclusions reached in the discussion in
your office on November 10, 1970, which was attended by
yourself, John Ehrlichman, the Deputy Attorney General,
Jerris Leonard, Justice Morell Sharp, and Robert Mardian.
1. That there was a need for an inter departmental
unit capable of obtaining and caluating intelligence
information from all the resources of the Federal government,
relating to membership, status and anticipated activities
of militant terrorist groups operating within the United
States.
20
"
That previous attempts to elicit the
cooperation of the Departments and Agencies possessing this
information have been unsuccessful for numerous reasons and
that the most recent attempt failed largely because of the
lack of confidence by the Departments and Agencies in the
White House representative responsible for contacting them.
3. That Justice Sharp, John Dean, and Robert
Mardian be appointed as an ad hoc committee to contact the
heads of the affected Departments and Agencies and explain
the wishes of the President in this regard, and to seek
their advice and enlist their cooperation in this effort.
That such contacts would only be made after the heads of the
affected Agencies were advised by the White House of the
appointment and purposes of the ad hoc committee.
cc
Deputy AG
John Dean
Jerris Leonard
NW 88608 Doeld:32989530 Page 224-
SECRET
SECRET
2
MA
:
no
-
4. That the Inter-Departmental Information
Unit(IDIU) of the Department of Justice would be used as
a cover for the proposed domestic intelligence unit.
5. That Justice. Sharp would meet with Jim
Devine of the IDIU for the purpose of informing himself
as to the character of the IDIU operation and developing
with Devine a strategy for the use of the IDIU as the
operating entity for the proposed domestic intelligence unit.
Justice Sharp, Dean, and Mardian met on Wednesday,
November 11, and reviewed the history of the government's
attempt to create a domestic intelligence unit, including
the efforts of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Committee (under the
Chairmanship of Director Hoo_) that recently made a study
of the domestic intelligence gathering process and proposed
steps that could be taken to improve that process.
It was generally agreed that, initially, the
proposed domestic intelligence unit should limit itself to
obtaining and evaluating the available intelligence information
from the existing sources of the government and developing
a more sophisticated method of collating and evaluating such
information.
If you approve the foregoing and will advise us that
preliminary contact has been made with the heads of the
affected Agencies, we will proceed in accordance with your
instructions.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 225
SECRET
Attachment
(Ed. 4-26-65)
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
: The Attorney General
✓ FROM : Robert C. Mardian
SECRET
EYES
EYES ONLY
Rem
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DATE: December 17, 1970
OFFICE OF
RECEIVED
SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee Meeting
THE
* DEC17 1970 *
ATTORNEY GENERAL
The second meeting of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee took
place at the hour of 9 AM in the Conference Room of the Vice
President, Executive Office Building, on Wednesday, December 16,
1970.
Attending were Justice Morell Sharpe, Egil Krogh, John
Dean, Robert Froehlke (DOD), James Angleton (CIA), Thomas Kelly
(Secret Service), Benson Buffham (NSA), George Moore (FBI), John
Doherty (Technical Advisor to the Chairman), and myself.
Assistant Secretary Froehlke explained that he had been requested
by Secretary Laird to attend the preliminary meetings and that
after he had had an opportunity to brief the designee (probably
Colonel Downey) that said designee would attend future meetings.
He requested that I meet with him and Don Bennett of the DIA
preliminary to Secretary Laird's making any designation. This
I agreed to do.
I opened the meeting by briefly outlining the conclusions reached
at our first meeting for the benefit of those who were not present.
We then discussed how best to approach a solution to the problem
and it was unanimously agreed as follows:
That on or before January 6, 1971, the operative agencies
represented would furnish to me under appropriate security
measures: (1) organizational targets and (2) intelli-
gence targets (such as the extent and nature of foreign
influence on our organization targets and the extent and
nature of the financing of our organization targets).
Inspector Moore disclosed that the FBI had compiled a calendar
of demonstrations and events planned by certain of the target
organizations. He agreed to furnish a copy of the calendar to
NW-88608-Docld:32989530 Page 226..
SECRET
-
EYES ONLY
SECRET
-2-
me and it was agreed that I would circulate the calendar_(much
of which is public knowledge) under appropriate security measures
to ascertain whether or not the other agencies represented were
aware of any further planned demonstrations.
We informed the Committee that sufficient space for the evaluation
committee had been provided in FOB #7 and that Justice Sharpe would
be available on a full-time consulting basis starting on January 11,
1971.
The Committee agreed to have its next meeting on Monday, January 11
at 9 AM, at which time I will have engrossed the submissions of
each of the member agencies and further that at the next meeting
we would attempt to establish priorities with respect to our
intelligence targets.
The meeting adjourned at 11:35 AM.
CC: The Honorable John Ehrlichman
The Honorable Robert Haldeman
SECRET
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 227
om DJ-150'
.4-26-65)
UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
: See Addressees Below
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
DRAFT
SECRET
-
EYES ONLY
FROM : Robert C. Mardian'
SUBJECT:
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division
Intelligence Evaluation Committee
DATE: February 10, 1971
I. .
II.
III.
IV.
::
AUTHORITY:
Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances.
MISSION:
To provide intelligence estimates to the responsible
Government departments and agencies on a need-to-know
basis in order to effectively evaluate and anticipate
problems to appropriately respond to civil disorders.
In carrying out this mission, the Committee shall have
access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession
of the United States Government.
MEMBERSHIP:
Members of the Committee shall consist of representatives
of the following departments and agencies: Department of
Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence
Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service;
National Security Agency, and, when necessary, representa-
tives of other departments or agencies designated by the
Committee.
STAFF:
The Committee will be supported by a permanent intelligence
estimation staff* consisting of representatives from member
ised
* The Federal Bureau of Investigation advised it would not provide
personnel for this staff.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 228
SECRET
www
EVES ONLY
DRAFT
SECRET EYES ONLY
-2-
V.
departments and agencies and headed by an executive
director appointed by the Committee.
PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS:
The permanent staff will perform the following functions:
When requested by the Committee, the Departments
or Agencies represented shall furnish to the Committee
staff all pertinent information relevant to the stated
request, of the Committee. Such requests for intélligence
data shall first be approved by the Committee. The
Executive Director of the permanent staff may initiate
requests for information from member agencies subject to
review and approval by the committee.
20
Prepare estimates from time to time as directed by
the Committee.
3°
Report information gaps to the Committee as such
gaps are identified.
令。
จ
Recommend to the Committee no less often than
monthly subjects for intelligence, estimation.
5.
Prepare other relevant studies and reports as
directed by the Committee.
Provide for the security of information received
and the protection of all sources of information-
6°
VI.
OFFICE SPACE AND FACILITIES:
The Department of Justice shall provide necessary office
space, supplies, and incidental administrative support.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 229
SECRET
W
EYES ONLY
SECRET
EYES ONLY
030
ADDRESSEES:
Inspecto: George C. Moore
Mr. Benson Buffham
Mr. Thomas J. Kelley
Colonel John W. Downey
Mr. Richard Ober
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 230
8
1

SECRET
PROCEDURES FOR THE AGENCIES CONTRIBUTION TO IEC ESTIMATES
1. The INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC) has been
charged with the responsibility of providing intelligence
estimates to designated Government departments by effectively
evaluating and anticipating problems of civil disorder.
To evaluate a potential problem it will be necessary for
IEC to request each assisting agency to prepare an
intelligence analysis. The analysis, in the form of
evaluated contributions, will be forwarded to the Executive
Director of IEC. These contributions, pursuant to requirements
set forth by IEC, will become the basis for the IEC's
intelligence estimate of potential problems of civil disorder.
2. The IEC does not desire to receive a voluminous collection
of intelligence data from the member agencies. The
contribution should be an evaluation of the particular
situation based on the data which that agency has in its
possession. The IEC Staff may issue GUIDELINES, to assist the
five agencies in the preparation of their intelligence con-
tribution. Additionally, such GUIDELINES will be of
assistance to IEC in identifying intelligence "gaps" and
the basis for making supplemental requests to the individual
agency for further intelligence information.
3° The following format will be generally used by the IEC
evaluation staff in the preparation of intelligence estimates.
It would be of great assistance if the participating agencies
would follow the same format when submitting the completed
contribution.
1. The Problem
2°
3.
4.
Summary
Conclusions/Comment
Background
5. Discussion
NW-88608 Docld:32989530 Page 231
FORMAT
GROUP I
E-1
April-May Demonstrations
E-2
AltaTRICITC
E-3
Likelihood of New Momentum on the Antiwar
Activities and Forces in View of the Laos
and Cambodian Situation
Likelihood of Kidnapping of any High U. S.
Government Official in the Immediate Future by
Political Terrorists
Calendar of Significant Antiwar Events
E-4
E-5
An Assessment of the Antiwar Movement in the U.S.
E-6
E-7
E-8
E-9
E-10
E-11
E-12
E-13
E-14
E-15
•
An Estimate of JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDL)
Planned Activities During Demonstrations
Scheduled for Lafayette Park on March 21, 1971
The Potential for Violence in the Major Cities
During Summer 1971
Proposed Demonstrations in Washington, D. C.
(for two week periods, beginning w/April 23 - May 5)
The Effect of the Death of Francois Duvalier on
the Internal Security of the U. S.
Plans of the PCPJ and NPAC, and any other organi-
zations to Demonstrate at Military Bases on
May 16, 1971
Likelihood of Demonstrations by the PCPJ or any
other organization at the NATO Conference on
Cities, to be held at Indianapolis, Indiana, on
May 26 31, 1971
Intelligence Calendar of Significant Events (Monthly)
The Planned Disruption at The White House on
June 12, 1971
Antiwar Conferences, June-July 1971, and Their
Effect on the Future Activities of the Antiwar
Community
Interrelationship of Black Power Organizations
Within the Western Hemisphere
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 232
E-16
E-17
E-18
E-19
E-20
E-21
E-22
E-23
Interrelationship of Arab Terrorist Groups and
U. S. Black Militants
D
Jewish Defense League; An Assessment
October-November Antiwar Offensive
Prison Riots
An Assessment of the Communications and Communi-
cations Security Capabilities of Violence-Prone
Groups Within the United States
Unauthorized Disclosures
Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican
National Convention, San Diego, California
Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic
National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida
c
Demonstration and Racial Disturbance Study
Militant Left's Involvement in the Labor Movement
E-24
E-25
Phone Phreaking
E-26
E-27
E-28
E-29
African Liberation Day
Intelligence Requirements List
Protest Demonstrations During Presidential
Inaugururation Ceremonies
E-30
Foreign Students
-
Terrorists
E-31
Events and Personalities Attractive to
Terrorist Attack
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 233
Attachment 6
17
1. THE HUSTON PLAN
The earliest evidence that this concept of presidential power existed
is found in a 1970 top secret document entitled "Operational Restraints
on Intelligence Collection," and the various memorandums from
Tom Charles Huston to H. R. Haldeman which were first revealed by
John Dean. In preparation for his testimony before the Select Com-
mittee, Dean placed these papers, some of which bore the highest se-
curity classification, in the custody of Chief Judge John Sirica of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. This step was taken
by Dean, on the advice of counsel, to avoid violation of any Presidential
directive of Federal laws prohibiting release or Goretum-nt docu-
ments affecting national security. After due consideration, Judge Si-
rica released one copy of these papers to the Department of Justice and
one copy to the Select Committee, pursuant to its motion. (United
States v. John Doe, et al., Misc. No. 77-73, May 14, 1978.)
The committee, with the aid of various intelligence agencies, re-
viewed these documents. While the committee sealed a few items there-
in, which could involve national security considerations, it concluded
that these papers, for the most part, dealt primarily with domestic
affairs and were unrelated to national security matters. The papers,
as sanitized by the committee, were entered into the committee's record
during Dean's testimony."
19
These papers and the President's own statement of May 22, 1973,
disclose that the President approved the use of illegal wiretapping, il-
legal break-ins and illegal mail covers for domestic intelligence pur-
poses. The President was fully advised of the illegality of these intel-
ligence-gathering techniques prior to approving them. In the top secret
document entitled "Operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection,"
the recommendation for surreptitious entries (break-ins) contained
the following statement under the heading "Rationale”:
Use of this technique is clearly illegal. It amounts to
burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great em-
barrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful
1 Exhibit 35. 3 Hearings 1062, 1319.
17 Exhibits 36-40, 42. 3 Hearings 1062, 1324–33, 1338.
13 Hearings 1000, 1062.
1 Exhibits 35-11, 3 Hearings 1062, 1319–37.
NW-88608 Docfd:32989530 Page 234
༩ག་ཁག་གཞཪ:
4
tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be
obtained in any other fashion.°
On July 14, 1970, Haldeman sent a top secret memorandum to
Huston, notifying him of the President's approval of the use of bur-
glaries, illegal wiretaps and illegal mail covers for domestic intelli-
gence. In the memorandum, Haldeman stated:
The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the
review, have been approved by the President. He does not,
however, want to follow the procedure you outlined on page i
of your memorandum regarding implementation. He would
prefer that the thing simply be put into motion on the basis
of this approval. The formal omncial memorandum should,
of course, be prepared and that should be the device by which
to carry it out 21 [emphasis added]
It appears that the next day, July 15, 1970, Huston prepared a deci-
sion memorandum, based on the President's approval, for distribution
to the Federal intelligence agencies involved in the plan-the FBI, the
CIA, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency. In his May 22, 1973, public statement, the President reported
that the decision memorandum was circulated to the agencies involved
on July 23, 1970. However, the decision memorandum is dated July 15,
1970, indicating that it was forwarded to the agencies on that day or
shortly thereafter.-
Huston's recommendations were opposed by J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the FBI. Hoover had served as the chairman of a group
comprised of the heads of the Federal intelligence agencies formed to
study the problems of intelligence-gathering and cooperation among
the various intelligence agencies." In his public statement of May 22,
1973, President Nixon stated:
After reconsideration, however, prompted by the opposi-
tion of Director Hoover, the agencies were notified 5 days
later, on July 26, that the approval had been rescinded.
Haldeman's testimony is to the same effect. 26 Dean, however, testified
that he was not aware of any recision of approval for the plan" and
there apparently is no written record of a recision on July 28 or any
other date. There is, however, clear evidence that, after receipt of the
decision memorandum of July 15, 1970, Mr. Hoover did present strong
objections concerning the plan to Attorney General Mitchell.28
Huston was concerned that Hoover's objections would interfere with
the plan's implementation. On August 5, 1970, 8 days after the Presi-
dent states he ordered recision, Huston sent Haldeman a lengthy top
secret memorandum on the subject, "Domestic Intelligence," which
strongly attacked Hoover's objections and made a number of recom-
mendations concerning a forthcoming meeting regarding the plan
20 Exhibit 35. 3 Hearings 1321.
* Exhibit 36. 3 Hearings 1324.
New York Times, June 7, 1973. p. 36.
New York Times, June 7, 1973.
23 Hearings 016.
Appendix of Legal Documents at p. 628.
7 Hearings 2874.
3 Hearing3 1066.
3 Hearings 916; 4 Hearings 1603.
among Haldeman, the Att
the fact that the plan was
the following language in
At some point. H
has become tox
mental to our dem.
important to reme
knows that the Presi
and Hoover has now
gets his way, it is co
the President. Hent.
against him. T
stand why the AG is
going to look den
Bennett, and the mil
reverse a Presidenti
people worked their
merits, was a first-rate.
It should be noted that
DIA, CIA and the mili..
recommendations.
Two days later, on Aur
memorandum to H
Attorney General and s
that the Director (Ho
and that all intelliges
once." Huston not l
coast to vacation for 3-
the problems surrounding
be into the new school ya
Later, on September
claims the plan was resid
to the Attorney General
our domestic intelligence
added] This memorand
Inter-Agency Domestic
part of the Huston plan.
observed that Hoover was
unit and that it was im
Far from indicating th...
mendation to remove rest.
been withdrawn, Dean, ir
General:
I believe we agreed
any blanket renoval
priate procedure wo.
we need, based on an
29 Exhibit 37, 3 Hearings 1035-00
30 Exhibit 37, 3 Hearing
1 Exhibit 33, 3 Hearing 13
* Ibid.
NW 88608- Docld:32989530 Page 235 na...
ייד
SO I HAVE 13T
.5
among Haldeman, the Attorney General and Hoover. Indicative of
the fact that the plan was still quite alive, but imperiled by Hoover, is
the following language in this memorandum:
...
At some point, Hoover has to be told who is President. He
has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detri-
mental to our domestic intelligence operations It is
important to remember that the entire intelligence community
knows that the President made a positive decision to go ahead
and Hoover has now succeeded in forcing a review. If he
gets his way, it is going to look like he is more powerful than
the President. He had his say in the footnotes and RN decided
against him. That should close the matter and I can't under-
stand why the G is a party in reopening it. All of us are
going to look damned silly in the eyes of Helms, Gayler,
Bennett, and the military chiefs if Iloover can unilaterally
reverse a Presidential decision based on a report that many
people worked their asses off to prepare and which, on the
merits, was a first-rate, objective job.³0
30
It should be noted that this memorandum indicates that the NSA,
DIA, CIA and the military services basically supported the Huston
recommendations.
Two days later, on August 7, 1970, Huston sent a brief, confidential
memorandum to Haldeman urging that Haldeman "meet with the
Attorney General and secure his support for the President's decision,
that the Director (Hoover) be inforined that the decision will stand,
and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement them at
once." 31 Huston noted that: "Mr. Hoover has departed for the west
coast to vacation for 3 weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up
the problems surrounding our domestic intelligence operations, we will
be into the new school year without any preparations." 32
Later, on September 18, 1970 (almost 2 months after the President
claims the plan was rescinded), Dean sent a top secret memorandum
to the Attorney General suggesting certain procedures to "commence
our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as possible." [emphasis
added] This memorandumi specifically called for the creation of an
Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit which had been an integral
part of the Huston plan. Dean's memorandum to the Attorney General
observed that Hoover was strongly opposed to the creation of such a
unit and that it was important "to bring the FBI fully on board."
Far from indicating that the President's approval of Huston's recom-
mendation to remove restraints on illegal intelligence-gathering had
been withdrawn, Dean, in his memorandum, suggested to the Attorney
General:
I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to have
any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appro-
priate procedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence
we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of
29 Exhibit 37, 3 Hearings 1325-29.
Exhibit 37, 3 Hearings 1326.
31 Exhibit 33, 3 Hearings 1330.
22 Ibid.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 236
* *8ཏུ* *
6
this unit, and then proceed to remove the restraints as neces-
sary to obtain such intelligence." [emphasis added]
Dean's remorandum indicated that the creation of the Inter-Agency
Domest Intelligence Unit would go forward and provided recom-
mendat as for the cheesing of a unit director to serve as a "righthand
man" to the Attorney General and for the selection of representatives
from the various intelligence agencies who would serve on it. Dean
closed memorandura with the suggestion that the Attorney Gen-
eral call vekly meetings to monitor problems as they emerged and "to
make crtain that we are moving this program into implementation as
quickly es possible." [emphasis added] Recognizing that Hoover
was still
m. D o filed a note to the bottom of his memorar-
dua Haldeman has engrested to me that if you would like him
to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so." 35
Hoover, however, never did come completely "on board" and the
plan for an Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence Unit was never im-
plemented. A clue to the fate of the Huston plan is provided by the
edited, unahenticated "Submission of Recorded Presidential Con-
versation to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives
by President Richard Nixon", on April 30, 1974, where the following
passage years:
D).
μιν
what Bill Sullivan's desire in life is, is to set up a
national sally intelligenes system, a White House
m. He says wem deficient. He says we have never been
efficit, because over lost his guts several years ago. If
you recall he and Tom Huston worked on it. Tom Huston
had your instructions to go out and do it and the whole thing
just crumbled.
P [Inaudible.] **
Dean tified that the plan for the creation of an Inter-Agency
Domein elligence Chit was the product of White House fear of
demostrations and dissent.37 Haldeman denied that such an atmos-
phere of fer existed in the White House.³s In his statement before the
commitive, Haldeman gave as the reason for White House. interest in
improving intelligence-gathering operations the "critical proportions"
of the domestic security problem in 1970 as illustrated by "a wave of
bombing and explosions, rioting and violence, demonstrations, arson,
gun battles and other disruptive activities across the country-on col-
lege campuses primarily-but also in other areas." 30 On this issue,
Ehrlichman's testimony corroborates Haldeman's."
The ton recommendations themselves refer to "a major threat
to the internal security" and express the belief that "the potential for
even grater violence is present and we have a positive obligation to
take every step within our power to prevent it. for surely drastic
violence and disorder threaten the very fabric of our society."
Extol 41, 3 Hearing* 1335.
Exhloft 41, 3 Hearings 1337.
33 Tbi
* Presidential Conversations, pp. 123-4.
3737916.
37 Hori 2574.
Ꭲ Ꮣ .
6licari 78 2512-13.
Exit 35, 3 Hearings 1319.
12 Exhibit 31, 3 Nearings 1827-26.
17 42
The committee notes
Clellan's Permanent Sub
Committee on Governmun
1970, indicates that, in t...
were significant increases
Government facilities an
against law enforcement c
Dean testified, however
not only toward violent
strations and dissent. As
(During the
happened to t
White House an
stretched out in fre:
me to his office the
the sign in the park
on had to conte d
- Daid
**ee i༅ ་ ་ ་
གས།
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 237
ངྐ་ཡ73ས་༌ལཱ༑༑
:
7
The committee notes that the evidence presented to Senator Mc-
Clellan's Permanent. Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations, in hearings beginning in..July
1970, indicates that, in the several years preceding the hearings, there
were significant increases in illegal acts of violence directed against
Government facilities and a disturbing number of such acts directed
against law enforcement officials.
Dean testified, however, that the White House concern was directed
not only toward violent demonstrations, but also to peaceful demon-
strations and dissent. As an illustration ho said:
..
[Djering the late winter of 1971
the President
happened to look out of the windows of the residence of the
White House and saw a lone man with a large 10-foot sign
stretched out in front of Lafayette Park. Mr. Higby called
me to his office to tell me of the President's displeasure with
the sign in the park and told me that Mr. Haldeman said the
sign had to come down. When I came out of Mr. Higby's office,
I ran into Mr. Dwight Chapin who said that he was going to
get some "thugs" to remove that man from Lafayette Park.
He said it would take him a few hours to get them, but they
could do the job."
NW 88608. Docld:32989530 Page 238°.
TO
:
OPTIONAL FOR NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. BASSETT AND
DATE:
2/6/75
на
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
&##n2N"#89d6
FROM :
F. B. GRIFFITH7
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
IG UNCLASSIFIED
Mate 9/25/00BT SP-2 ALM/716
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
SENSTUDY 75 is the code word for a new control file for all communications
relating to the Senate Select Committee (SSC) to conduct investigation and study of
conventional operations with respect to intelligence activities.
Pursuant to recommendation in memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall
dated 1/27/75 regarding the SSC, I attended a meeting of the Ad Hoc Security Group
of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) Security Committee at CIA Headquarters on
2/5/75. Security representatives from DIA, NSA and CIA were present at this meet-
ing which was concerned with proposals to protect the integrity of classified documents
which will necessarily be provided the SSC during its investigation. Results are set
forth below.
Attached are copies of: (1) proposed agreements the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) will be asked to obtain from the SSC; (2) Aguides for protection
of classifed information and of documents furnished the SSC; and (3) proposed.
secrecy agreement to be executed by SSC staff members and employees. These
items were discussed paragraph by paragraph and revisions agreed upon were
penciled in. These revised drafts will be discussed at a meeting on 2/7/75 of
the Ad Hoc Group of USIB on Congressional Investigations to be attended by
Section Chief W. O. Cregar. At this time a final version will be approved for
presentment to the DCI.
The registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy referred to on
page 2 of the guides was described as a facility geared to handle and account
for classified documents to the satisfaction of the intelligence community. It
is guarded and has a suitable alarm system.
REC-18
-
-14
The guides include the possibility that agencies presenting testimony may
conduct their own security sweeps of the hearing room; calls for a system of
document control as well as control from reproduction and distruction of classified
material. Consideration of secure transcription procedures is requested with the
Enclosures (3)
1 - Messrs Callahan, Adams, Mintz,
FBG:njw 32
84 FEB 2 4 1975
Wannall, Cregar
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 239
CONTINUED - OVER
FIVE-456
TEN
-PS
Memorandum for Mr. Bassett
Re: SENSTUDY 75
possibility that each agency could provide such service. It might be necessary,
however, to provide escort service in the event outside transcribers are utilized.
This would entail security of carbons, waste and notes and return of the transcribed
testimony to the Committee upon completion. It was also suggested that a security
officer be appointed by the SSC who would be a central contact for representatives
of agencies falling within the purview of the SSC investigation. Attached material
was reviewed by Legal Counsel Division by Inspector J. E. Herington who concurred
with the exception of item number 4 of the proposed guidelines dealing with counter-
measures of inspections to preclude,
surreptitious use of transmitters and/or
unauthorized recording devices similar to the device located in the Rayburn House
Office Building on 12 February 1973." He noted this wording could be construed
as placing a limitation on what type of device could be prohibited and suggested
revising the above phraseology by placing a period after "recording devices" and
then stating, "It is noted such a device was located in the . . ."
OBSERVATIONS:
•
At this time it is unknown if the above-mentioned material will be accepted
by the SSC or whether the committee will draw up its own procedures. In any
event, the material to be presented will at least serve as a means of calling the
Senators' attention to the many faceted program involved in the protection of
classified information. It is felt concurrence with the attached material with the
suggested observation of the Legal Counsel Division be accepted is to our best
interest.
ACTION:
It is recommended Section Chief W. O. Cregar offer the revision referred
to above at the meeting on 2/7/75 and be authorized to offer FBI concurrence with
this material.
2/7/75
Wat
were
Cregarle Wannall
M/s/ans/abc. Cats
Agun
WRW/TUL
джа
JPM
70
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 240
-2-

1
AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH
CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES
1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with
the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other
Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, that:
(a) Departments and agencies shall have the right
to request that testimony be given only in executive session,
that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and
that certain testimony be heard only by members and in
some cases only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.
(b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review
and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony
prior to any publication of it.
(c) The "Third-Agency Rule" is binding upon members
of the United States intelligence community and may require
witnesses representing one member of the intelligence
community to decline to testify concerning matters within
the proprietary purview of another community member.
2. It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement
with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies
#MDR16
རཱཝཱཙཱཀན ཨཱདམ
3:05:19/25/00 SP 2 ALM1776
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 241
62-116.395-14
furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from
those documents prior to presentation, the names of their personnel
as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy
may be jeopardized by disclosure.
This would include names of
sources or specific information on highly technical devices and
2
operations in keeping with the DCI's responsibilities to protect
sources and methods.
3. THAT THE DEI
AGREEMENT
ATTEMPT
To
.SECURE AN.
101574
The CHAIRMEN OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEES THAT THEY ENTERTAIN
AND CONSIDER SECURITY PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED,
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 242
2
GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES
+
1. Personnel Security Clearances
(a) Background Investigation
It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that
no staff member is to be given access to any classified material,
testimony or information received or generated by the committees
without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field
investigation.
(b) Secrecy Agreement
It would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a
signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to
the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions:
1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations
FMDR16
79-25-00
is a condition precedent of employment or assignment;
2) Recognizing US Government property rights tọ
classified information;
3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence
of classified information.
4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules
and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the
CONTALTO
-SP-2 ALM 1216
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 243
62-116395-14
signer to administrative and/or legal action under
appropriate statutes;
5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the
agreement.
2. Physical and Document Security
The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the
secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be
preserved. These rules be made known to the individuals and
agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials.
Among these should be rules on physical security and document
security.
(a) Physical Security
It would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following
rules related to physical security:
in Safes
1) All classified material will be stored for safe-
keeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with
the regulations of this registry for classified material,
2) Material should be stored in safes when not in use.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 244
2
$
TWENTY FOUR HOUR
SUPPLEMENTED BY ANTI-INTRUSION
THE STORAGE
ALARMS
23) Guard protection should be required on this area.
3) Areas selected for use in closed session should
be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.
43) Agencies presenting testimony should be permitted
to conduct or arrange with the Sergeant-at-Arms to conduct
audio countermeasures inspections to preclude the possibility
of surreptitious use of transmitters and/or unauthorized
recording devices similar to the device located in the
Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973.
5 %) At the end of each session of the Select Committees,
the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff
officer who will secure any misplaced classified material
or waste.
67) Areas should be designated in which classified
material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure
against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should
not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience
except when necessary for the work of the committees and
should not be transported overnight to the office or residence
of personnel of the committees.
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 245
3
(b) Document Security
1) Committees should select and identify a single
location/and specific personnel authorized to sign acknow-
ledgement of receipt of classified materials provided by to
the committees.
2) A system of document control should be established
to permit control of classified documents to provide for
accountability of documents furnished the committee.
3) Duplication of documents should be controlled so
require
as to permit a record of the document reproduced, the
number of copies reproduced, and the custodian or
receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents.
should be subject to the same controls as the original.
4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for
the destruction of classified waste.
5) Transcripts. The committees should give
consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate
security in the transcription of testimony by committee
transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each.
agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In
some, if not all cases, this might include escort of
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 246
4
materials to the place of transcription, the securing of
carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed
testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance
with committee rules.
6) At the conclusion of the committees' investigations.
classified material should be reviewed for the possibility of
including
disposition by return to contributors, of material submitted
by them
3. Security Officer
It would be desirable if the committees appointed one member
of its staff as a security officer with the responsibility of discharging
the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point
of contact with the departments and agencies of interest to the
committee. It would also be desirable if the committee rules
required each agency of interest to identify a single point of contacţ
1
to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 247
5
20
I,
SECRECY AGREEMENT
in accepting employment
or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the
special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified
information from unauthorized disclosure.
I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth
below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with
the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United
States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, herein after
referred to as the Select Committee.
It is my understanding that in the course of my employment
or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to
information from departments and agencies of the Government which
is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive
Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information
so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the
property of the United States of America and I further agree to
surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or
#MOR16
AILFRINFOR
119/25/00
TION CONTATTT)
SP-2 ALM LITE
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 248
62-116375--14
"
his designees or upon my separation from the Select Committee,
any classified material which has come into my possession as a
result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.
I hereby agree that I will never divulge, publish or reveal
by word, writing, conduct, including interviews for radio and
-television broadcasts or otherwise any classified information which
has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assign-
ment with the Select Committee, without prior written consent of the
Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized
representative.
I hereby agree that any information learned during my
employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is
related to intelligence and prepared for publications by me will be
submitted to the Chairman or the President of the /Senate or their
duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing.
to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of deter-
mining whether said material contains any classified information as
defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the
Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 249
2
representative has the authority to make the final determination
as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted
from the material submitted.
have been informed of the provisions of
I am acquainted with the relevant portions of (Insert relevant
codes and sections as considered appropriate by the Department of
Justice) and understand their meaning.
Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as
the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified
of
material. I understand that any breach on any part of the obligations
for
in this agreement could subject me to legal and administrative action.
I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed
on me with respect to the protection of classified information by
this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during
my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship
has terminated.
I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any
mental reservations or purpose of evasion.
WITNESS:
Signature
NW 88608 Docid:32989530aRage 250
Signature
DATE

ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962-EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
1
1
-
Mr. Adams
Mr. N.P. Callahan
DATE: 1/27/75
1
-
Mr. Bassett
-
Mr. Wannall
1
FROM
: W. 10. Cregar
1
-
SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
10/21
Mr. Cregar
"Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated
1/24/75, entitled "United States Intelligence Board (USIB),
Meeting of 1/24/75," recommended that Section Chief William O.
Cregar's name be provided to the Deputy Director of the
Intelligence Community Staff as a point of contact within (the
FBI to coordinate matters dealing with the Senate Select
Committee (SSC). The mandate of the SSC is to examine the
extent of overt and covert intelligence activities in the U.S.
and abroad..
On the morning of 1/27/75 Mr. John Clarke, Deputy
Director of the Intelligence Community Staff, advised that
Mr. Colby believes it is necessary for security representatives
of FBI, CIA and National Security Agency (NSA), to meet in
order to develop recommendations for the SSC as to how documents
and testimony furnished to the SSC will be protected against
unauthorized disclosure. In this regard, Mr. Donald E. Moore,
former Inspector in the Intelligence Division and currently
Chairman of the USIB Security Committee, will function as the
USIB representative to this group. 62-116385--13
OBSERVATIONS:
REC-111
2 FEB 4 1975
UNRESORDED COPY FILED
62-907
According to the Senate Resolution dated 1/21/75
relating to the investigation and study of governmental opera-
tions with respect to intelligence activities, the SSC is going
to involve all agencies of the Intelligence Community. In
anticipation that Bureau representatives will be called to testify
and asked to supply some extremely sensitive documents regarding
our investigative activity in the U. S., it is believed essential
that we have an input into how such documents and testimony are
going to be handled by staff personnel of the Committee. Unless
we participate in developing security standards, we may find that
sensitive documents and testimony that we are called to provide
to the Committee cannot be adequately protected from public
scrutiny.
WOC:ebc
(6)
(
131975
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN, IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/#TG
NW 88081:32989530 Page 251
5-0/2013/02
CONTINUED
-
OVER
1
XEROX
13 1975
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
ACTION:
ཚ་
If approved, Bureau Supervisor Fred B. Griffith,
Document Classification and Security Coordinator,
be
designated as the Bureau representative to meet with the
Chairman of the USIB Committee and representatives of NSA
and CIA.
WRW/TUL
джа
TBA
Это
Arrangements with USIB, NSA,
CIA are
appropriate as recommended
bere; however contacts 
with the
Senate committee 
+ staff should 
be
made by liaison 
established with
Congress, 
Cooperation of Intelligence
Div. and 
Legal Counsel would
Serve best.
дат
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 252
1
2
I
-
1
FROM
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall wewe
:W. Cregar
SUBJECT: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
BOARD (USIB)
MEETING OF 1/24/75
1
1
1
-
Mr.
Adams
-
DATE:
1
1
1
1
-A
-
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Mintz
1/24/75
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Leavitt
Mr. Mack
Mr.
Boynton
1
-
Mr. Cregar
*MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Ad
Dep. Al lov
Asst. Dir:
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspo fur
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 16 Director Secy -
Am/716
At a meeting of the USIB this morning Chairman
Colby spoke briefly about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
procedures for testifying before the Blue Ribbon Commission
(BRC) investigating CIA as well as anticipated problems that
might arise regarding future testimony at the Senate Select
Committee (SSC) whose membership has not yet been announced.
According to Colby, the mandate of the SSC is to examine the
extent of overt and covert intelligence activities in the
U. S. and abroad. Colby advised that the SSC would involve
all member agencies and departments of the intelligence
community and for that reason he believed the members of the
intelligence community should stay in close communication.
As a result of the above, Colby has selected
Mr. John Clarke, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Community
Staff, to act as a coordinator for the intelligence community
to insure close coordination. He requested that all agencies
and departments represented on USIB designate one individual
in their agency as Clarke's point of contact to insure the
close coordination Colby feels will be necessary during future
appearances before the SSC. The Intelligence Division believes
this is a desirable procedure and recommends that Section Chief
William O. Cregar who is the Bureau's alternate member on USIB
be designated as the Bureau representative to maintain liaison
with Mr. Clarke.
REC-111 62-116345-12
In addition, Colby advised that in his opening
statement before the SSC he intends to make a strong pitch
for the intelligence community. He proposes to show the value
and importance intelligence has played in the past as well as
the future; he expects to outline for the SSC how the intelli-
gence business is run and organized. In addition, he proposes
in his opening statement to make an appeal for legislation to
shore up the protection of sources and methods against planned
and calculated leaks of classified information
WOC:ebc
(9)
File
62-116395
%
XENOX
зава
107
NW 88608 2089500 Page 253
8860820208950
FF 13 1975
12 FEB 5 1975
CONTINUED
62-9)718
GRESONDED COPY
1
+
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
BOARD (USIB)
MEETING OF 1/24/75
Colby advised that any examples member agencies
or departments could provide CIA wherein the acquisition of
intelligence proved useful to the development of U. S.
policies or programs would certainly be appreciated. Colby
stated that in this regard Mr. John Clarke as the over-all
coordinator would be in touch with the designated representa-
tives of USIB departments or agencies to further clarify this
point.
With regard to the BRC chaired by Vice President
Rockefeller, Colby advised that CIA has already obtained an
agreement from that Commission that any documents furnished
to the Commission by CIA would have the names of CIA employees
and/or CIA sources deleted from the document. The purpose of
this deletion was to avoid such names from appearing in press
releases. Colby also hopes to obtain the same agreement from
the SSC.
The Intelligence Division believes that the Bureau
should also attempt to obtain such an agreement from the
BRC and the SSC if at some time FBI representatives are called
to testify or are called to produce FBI documents. This matter
has been discussed with the Office of Legal Counsel and it
concurs in this recommendation.
ACTION:
(1) If approved, Section Chief William O. Cregar's
name will be provided to Mr. Clarke as his point of contact
within the FBI.
www/ht
(2)
Should Bureau representatives be called to testify
before the BRC or the SSC an agreement be obtained to delete any
names of FBI employees and/or sources with the understanding that
the identities could be made available to either the Commission or
Committee if either felt such names were absolutely necessary.
wiw/TUL
Tur
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NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 254
I
2
да
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The Deputy Attorney General
Director, FOI
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
-
1-24-75
Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB
Mr. Adams, 5744 JB
Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB
Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB
Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB
Mr. Gebhardt, 5012 JEH
Mr. Hetherington
NAME CHICK REQUESTS MADE BY
U.S. SATOR HOWARD II. BAKER, JR.,
FOR THE SULLICK SIHIRNE COMMITTE TO
INVESTIGATE INTEI
On January 23, 1975, WU.S. Sonator Howard H. Zaker,
requested name checks of FDI files be made on four
individuals who are to be staff members of the Select Senate
Committco to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.
Senato
In response to Senator Baker's request, attached
are four letterhead nenoranda portaining to Ronald David
Holahan, Arthur Boggess Culahouse, Jr., Howard Leibengood
and Michael J. Hadigon for transmittal to the requesting
Committes.
Enclosures
DTP:ysd
MAILED 6
27 8979
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-
Deputy NG!
in
い
Son.
Sen. 
Blider
An appoined by
Jarne, 
Wilders Ther
fise 
of 
selened,
on 2-3-
75
Jr
Original
116474HL
UNREC COPY AND COPT OF ENCL FILED IN
1862-1163-25= |||
2-11
REC-111 15 JAN 28 1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
--
NOTE: See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75
captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.), Minority
Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence
Agencies, Name Check Request."
ENCLOSURE
4-E
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9/25/00 SP-2 AL16
Director Sect✓ MAIL ROOM A TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Dodid:32989530 Page 255
XE X
FE 13 1975
M
.
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB
Mr. Adams, 5744 JĘ
Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB
Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB
Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB
Mr. Gebhardt, 5012 JEH
Mr
Tandry 975
Hetherington
ARTHUR BOOGESS CULAHOUSE, JR.
Born: July 4, 1948
Athens, Tennessed
The central files of the Federal Bureau of
investigation and the records of the FBI Identification
Division contain no information identifiable with captioned
individual.
#MDR16
9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/776
DTP:
Original and 1
20
-
(10)
Deputy Attorney General
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
NOTE: See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75
captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.),. Minority
Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence
Agencies, Name Check Request."
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 256
ITP
2-116385
اگاد
ENCLOSURE
-
!
HOWARD LEIDINGOOD
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
Mr. Callahan, 5744 JB
Mr. Adams, 5744 JB
Mr. Jenkins, 5744 JB
Mr. McDermott, 5634 JB
Mr. Cleveland, 1742 JB
Mr. Gebhardt, 5012 JEH
JanMy Hetherington
Boxn: December 29, 1942
South Bend, Indiana
The contral files of the Federal Bureau of
investigation and the records of the FDI Identification
Division contain no information identifiable with captioned
individual,
#MDR16
དམ*་་་་ཏན་
9/25/00 SP2 ALM/116
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _ Original and 1
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
-
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
■ Telephone Rm.
DTP:ysc
(10)
-
Deputy Attorney General
NOTE: See J.J. McDermott to Mr. Jenkins memorandum dated 1/23/75
captioned "Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tenn.), Minority
Member, Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence
Agencies, Name Check Request.
11
Director Sec'y
* MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 257
03-116
5-11638
ENCLOSURE
DTP
旧
H
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannallow for
FROM
: W.
Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
Callahan
1
1
-
-
Mr.
Mr. Adams
1
-
Mr. Mintz
DATE: 2/4/75
1
1
Mr.
Mr. Wannall
Fulton
1
-
Mr. Cregar
✓ Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD
Asst. Di
Admun.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Interfuer
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
begal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
SENSTUDY 75 is the code word of a new control
file for all communications regarding matters relating to
the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) to conduct an
investigation and study of governmental operations with respect
to intelligence activities.
On 2/4/75 Mr. John Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry, advised that
Mr. Colby has been instructed to have four items prepared for
the President's consideration by 2/5/75. They are as follows:
(1) an outline as to what Colby plans to say as lead-off
witness before the SCS, (2) two lists identifying what informa-
could be discussed with the SCS as well as what information
could be discussed with the SCS under controlled conditions,
(3) a set of suggested talking points the President should
discuss with the Senate leadership regarding procedures for
the proposed hearings, and (4) a list of annexes that Colby
plans to provide the Chairmanship of the SCS on the occasion of
his initial appearance.
With the Director's approval we have provided Colby
with our suggestions relative to items 2 and 3. With regard
to item 4 we are preparing two annexes which will be furnished
to the Director for his approval prior to furnishing them to
Colby.
REC-111
62-116395-16
Mr. Clarke was asked whether the four items to be
furnished to the President would also be provided to the Bureau.
Clarke assured us that it was his intention to recommend to
Colby that material covering items 1, 2, 3 and 4-be-furnished TO
the FBI as well as other members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
for Congressional Inquiry and he felt confident that fly would
so order.
62-116395
WOC:ebc
(7) све
34.
I
PE16
ALL INFORMAT
CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 SP2 A21/378
NW 886083299405age 258
CONTINUED
-
OVER
5-19506
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
Upon receipt of this information from Mr. Clarke
it will be submitted to the Director with comments where
appropriate for his information.
ACTION:
For information.
Wew | Tul
для
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 259
2
14
(CI-2) 62-116395
-9
1 -
fast foot found fund fund
1
1
1
1
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-
1 -
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr J. B. Adams
•
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. A. Branigan
February 3, 1975
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
REC-111
Dep. AD Inv. —
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AID STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
#MDRIG
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SPAR
The following are deemed to be matters so essential
to the security and survival of the nation that they never
should be discussed outside the intelligence community, and
even within the intelligence community, they should be
discussed only on a strict need-to-know basis:
The names and other identifying characteristics of
sensitive sources.
Details which would permit opposition assessment
of the totality of our effectiveness in the fields of
internal security and foreign counterintelligence, including:
The numbers, locations, tines, and
affiliations of recruitments-in-place of personnel
within target organizations.
Specific subjects of highly sophisticated
intelligence-gathering techniques.
The total extent of our investigative
effectiveness against any given target organization
cr individual, or the lack thereof.
Intelligence information furnished in confidence
by friendly foreign agencies, the disclosure of which could
jeopardize operations of those agencies.
ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON
JPT:HFC:bkb
NOTE:
(g)
See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Plan. & Eval._captioned "Select Committee of the Senate",,2/3/75, prepared
Spec. Inv. by WOC:ebc/bew.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
34
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
☐
NW 88608 Do 10:32989530. Page 2601
GPO 954-545
1

REC-11125-9
1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1
1
1
I
1
-
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
r
Mr. W. A. Branigan
Mr W. O. Cregar
•
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
February 3, 1975
SENATE SELECT COMMITTED
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONG WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Concorn for the security and curvival of the nation
dictates that discussion of details of highly-sophisticated
intelligence-gathering techniques and methods employed by the
FDI be held only under controlled conditions, such as in
Executive Session before only Senators serving as nombors
of the Committee. This includes not only those techniques
and methods used in furtherance of FBI responsibilitios, but
also those utilized in support of missions of other members
of the United States intelligence community.
62-116395
ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON
HFC: JPT:dshir
(9)
NOTE:
See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,
dated 2/3/75, captioned "Select Committee of the Senate,"
prepared by WOC:ebc/bcw.
#MDR16
COUTLIDA
9/25/00 SPOALM/#76
の
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM ☐
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 261
GPO 954
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To
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W.R. Wannall WRIN FIL
FROM : W.O.
Weregar
0
SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
DATE:
-
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
Mr. Mintz
2/3/75
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Fulton
Mr. Cregar
This memorandum recommends that we provide at
Mr. Colby's request two lists: (1) information which the
FBI feels under no circumstances could be discussed with
the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) and (2) items of
information which could be discussed with the SCS under
controlled conditions.
On the afternoon of 2/1/75, Mr. John Clarke, in
his role as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for
Congressional Inquiry, telephonically advised the Bureau's
representative on this Group that a meeting was held at
the White House on the morning of 2/1/75. Participants were
the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and Dr. Henry Kissinger in his role as advisor to the
President on national security affairs. Dr. Kissinger
requested Mr. Colby to prepare two lists for the President's
consideration. The purpose of these lists was to provide
the President with information necessary for him to make a
judgment as to whether certain information should be with-
held from the SCS on the basis of executive privilege.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
✓ Dep. AD Inva
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
#MDR16
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 cm 716
As a result of the White House meeting, Mr. Clarke
requested the Bureau prepare by the close of business, 2/3/75,
two lists: (1) that information proprietary to the FBI which
under no circumstances could be discussed with the SCS and as
a result would require the denial of such presentation by virtue
of executive privilege and (2) a list of information proprietary
to the FBI which could be discussed with the SCS under controlled
conditions (presumably this means discussed in Executive Session
limited to members of the SCS).
REC-11T 62 -116345-9
Attached herewith are the two lists requested by
Mr. Clarke, which will be furnished to Mr. Colby by our liaison
representative with CIA.
ACTION:
62-116395
Enclosures
"
22 FEB 5 1975,
If approved, the attached two lists will be delivered
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(7)
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 262
Kim
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OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
ARTME
DOMINA
January 30, 1975
NOTE TO: William V. Cleveland
FROM:
Special Investigative Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
James A. Wilderotter
Associate Deputy Attorney General
Senate by '75)
--Please handle per our telephone conversation.
Thanks.
9/25/20
#MDR16
ENCLOSURE
Attachment
lell 4 items delivered
Bake 
2-3-75
* Sear
ما
-116395--7
34
53 FEB 1975,
I
KW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 263
REC-111
15 FEB 11 1975
File
Du 18/11
FBI-35
TO
Сток
OPTIONAL
MAY 1962 EDITION
NO. 10
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: The Deputy Attorney General
: Director, FBI
SUBJECT: NAME CHECK REQUESTS. MADE BY
U.S. SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.,
FOR THE SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
DATE:
1-24-75
Baker, Jr.,
On January 23, 1975, U.S. Senator Howard H.
requested name checks of FBI files be made on four
individuals who are to be staff members of the Select Senate
Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.
In response to Senator Baker's request, attached
are four letterhead memoranda pertaining to Ronald David
McMahan, Arthur Boggess Culahouse, Jr., Howard Leibengood
and Michael J. Madigan for transmittal to the requesting
Committee.
Enclosures (4)
#MPR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM 1756
Buy U.
62-116395-8
ENCLOSURE
NW 88608 Docld:329895306 Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
The Deputy Attorney General
Director, FRI
NAME CHECK REQUESTS MADE BY
U.S. SENATOR HOWARD II. BAKER, JR.,
FOR THE SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
1-24-75
On January 23, 1975, U.S. Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.,
requested name checks of FBI files be made on four
individuals who are to be staff members of the Select Senate
Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.
In response to Senator Baker's request, attached
are four letterhead nemoranda pertaining to Ronald David
McHahan, Arthur Boggess Culahouse, Jr., Howard Loibengood
and Michael J. Hadigan for transmittal to the requesting
Committee.
Enclosures (4)
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 265
#Marke
9/25/00
SP-2 ALM/JTG
1
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
:
Legal Counsel
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH
SUBJECT:
DATE:
2-4-75
Study
CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.…….
MEETING WITH THE DIRECTOR
11:30 A. M., FEBRUARY 6, 1975
'75
4
At 2:50 p.m., 2-3-75, Bill Miller, Counsel, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities, advised Inspector John B. Hotis
that Senator Frank Church (D - Idaho), Chairman of the Committee,
would like to meet with Mr. Kelley at his earliest convenience.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eva
Spec. Inv.
Training ✗
Legal Count
Telephone R
Director Sec_
The meeting is an informal one and no other members of
the Committee will be present. The purpose is merely to get acquainted
and discuss in general terms what the Committee hopes to accomplish.
Senator Church also wants to assure Mr. Kelley that it is not his intention
to undermine public confidence in the intelligence agencies of the United
States, But the Committee wants to ascertain whether these agencies
are being run with integrity and in a manner which is consistent with
national goals.
The only time this week which is mutually convenient to
Mr. Kelley and Senator Church is Thursday, 2-6-75, at 11:30 a. m.
This has been verified by Mrs. Metcalf and approved by the Director.
Mr. Adams will accompany the Director to this meeting. Mr. Miller
has been advised and he will inform us as to the precise location of
the meeting.
RECOMMENDATION:
-
1
1
-
1
-
1
-
MCT-12
CH 45
None. For information. REC-111
Mr. Adams
Mr. McDermott
Mrs. Metcalf
Mr. Mintz
1 - Telephone Room
1 - Mr. Hotis
JBH:mbk
(8)
жи
mth
1975
#MDR 16
сте
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
NW 88602983650 Page 266
19/25/00 BY SP-2 ALM/196
62-116375-7
FEB 7 1975
LEGEU COUNSEL
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
1 Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall WRW
FROM
: W.
Wregar
1
1
1
Callahan
-
Mr.
Mr. Adams
-
Mr. Mintz
DATE: 2/3/75
1
-
Mr.
1
-
Wannall
Mr. Fulton
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. Ap Adm
Dep. Abo
AL
Asst. Dir
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
1
-O
Mr. Cregar
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training ✓
Henegal Coun..
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y —
This memorandum recommends that Mr. Colby, in
his role as the Director of Central Intelligence, be furnished
two write-ups for inclusion as annexes in a briefing book he
plans to provide the Select Committee of the Senate (SCS) on
the occasion of his appearance as the lead-off witness before
this Committee. The write-ups are: (1) the role of counter-
intelligence and (2) the origin and disposition of the "Huston
Plan."
A previous memorandum was approved that Section Chief
William O. Cregar be designated as the point of contact within
the FBI to coordinate matters dealing with future testimony.
before the SCS. Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the
Director of Central Intelligence, has been designated as the
coordinator for the Intelligence Community. The points of
contact under Mr. Clarke's auspices have been given the title
of Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry.
'
On 1/31/75 Clarke held a second meeting of this Group
wherein he reiterated that it was Mr. Colby's intention to make
a very strong plea for the Intelligence Community as the lead-
off witness. In addition, Mr. Colby plans to provide to the
SCS a series of annexes, some of which will be classified, which
will address some of the issues to be looked into by the SCS.
Those issues have been generally identified in Senate Résolution
Number 21, dated 1/21/75. Representatives at Mr. Clarke's
meeting were asked to prepare certain of these annexes. The
FBI was requested to prepare the annex on the role of counter-
intelligence as well as the annex on the origin and disposition
of the "Huston Plan."
REC-111
62-116395--6
The Intelligence Division in responding to the request
from Clarke's Group will prepare these two write-ups. It is
anticipated that there will be no problems in connection with
the write-up on counterintelligence and this is going forward.
62-116395
WOC:ebc (7)
el
buz
✓
53 FEB. 3 1975
#MORIG
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BY SP. 2 ALM/Z7G
CONTINUED
OVER
-
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 267
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
62-116395
With regard to the origin and disposition of the "Huston Plan,'
we anticipate having an initial paper ready for discussion
with representatives of the National Security Agency (NSA),
CIA and the Department of Justice by Wednesday, 2/5/75. This
coordination is necessary inasmuch as both CIA and NSA were
actively involved in the development of the Plan. The
Department's participation is necessary inasmuch as the Intel-
ligence Evaluation Committee (IEC), chaired by the Department,
evolved from one of the recommendations set out in the "Huston
Plan."
"
Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy Attorney General,
is a member of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional
Inquiry and is preparing an input to the "Huston Plan" annex,
which input will describe the origin, function and disposition
of the IEC.
use,
Prior to releasing these two annexes for Mr. Colby'
they will be submitted to the Director for his approval.
ACTION:
For information.
www/utm
Josa
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дви
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NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 268
2 -
SP2 ALM/ITE
0015716
91207#
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
REC-111
62-11133,45
1
1
1
1
=
1
-
M
-
-
-
-
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
January 29,
Mr. W. A. Branigan
Mr. W. O. Cregar
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
1975
With regard to legislation proposed by the FBI,
a letter was sent to the Office of Legislative Affairs,
Department of Justice, on August 29, 1974, strongly
recommending that consideration be given to a legislative
proposal that would authorize the Government to conduct
court-approved electronic surveillances in domestic security
cases. This recommendation was based on the Supreme Court
decision which held that electronic surveillances conducted
solely within the discretion of the Executive violated the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and our opinion
that the current standards imposed by Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1970 would be
ineffective techniques in domestic intelligence investigations.
In another legislative bill pending in the United States
Senate, Senate Bill S3001, although the FBI was not the
sponsor of the bill it has a particular interest in its
passage both for internal security and foreign counterintel-
ligence considerations. This bill would make it a Federal
offense to obtain, produce, sell or utilize false documentation.
Of possible interest, in recognition of questions
which have been voiced as to the jurisdiction and authority
of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence investigations
and in order to cover any possible gap between statutory
authority and Executive authority necessary to protect the
national security, this Bureau submitted to the Attorney
General in August, 1973, a proposal for an Executive Order
`ORIGINAL AND ONE TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON
HFC: JPT:dmt/jlb?!
(9)
SEE NOTE PAGE 2
Classified by 63753PT
Exempt from GDS,/Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
TELETYPE UNIT
7 MAIL ROOM T
NW 88808 bocid:329896801 Page 269
wpw
-
GPO 954-546
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
to establish both authoritative and definitive guidelines
for the FBI in this area. The proposed order took cognizance
of the constitutional responsibility of the President to
defend the Constitution and the Government; of continuing
threats to domestic tranquility and the general welfare;
of existing statutes relating to national security and
public safety; and of the President's need for intelligence
information. The proposed Executive Order included an
order by the President that "The Attorney General prepare
and issue guidelines, conforming to the principles of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the
necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations
to assure that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides
on a continuing basis intelligence information essential to
the execution of laws pertaining to subversive activity and
other such activity affecting the national security, domestic
tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."
NOTE:
-
See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall
· 1/28/75, prepared by WOC/ebc, captioned as above.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 270

T
ALL INFORMATION CONTAILS
HEREIN IS
CLASSIFICO MINI
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
REC-11
ECODIT
1
1
fund fund fund fund front front
1
1163975
1
1
-
-
-
-
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. A. Branigan
Mr. W. O. Cregar
January 29, 1975
CT DELICT CONVITEZA
TO COIDUCT AIT XINVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERN LITZAL OPERATIONS WITH DUSPECT TO
11/6/00 #MDR16
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM 1776
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
The FDI hao the czclusive responsibility 203
protection of the internal security of the United Statos.
As regards foreign counterintellig-nce activities in the
United States, the FDI, as a nombor of the United States
intolliconco community, not only has the function of
Cotocting and noutralizing hostilo intelligence activition,
bat is a producor of positive intelligence information of
value to the United States Government.
The FBI's foreign counterintelligence operations
not only thwart tho offorts of hostilo intelligonco corvicos
but contribute to the overall knowledge and cffcctiveness of
the United States Intolliconco comannity. Cinco 1050, moro
than 110 Boviot-bloc intelligence officers and/or aconto
have been removed from their official positions within the
United States or oxcluded from outry or recntry into tho
United States as a result of TDI investigative offorts.
Como notoworthy examples of the FDI's contribution in thio
area and of the types of hostile activity which challenge our
Intolligonce community Follow:
In 1002 tho TDI was successful in torninating on
oporation which was bogun In 1950 when the Esviot intclliponco
corvicos attempted to dovolop an agent of inšluoneo in actorican
politics. A Coviot intolliconco officer caployed at the
United Nations Occretariat cultivated a Now York law student
and oventually offered to finance this individual's campaiga
as a condicate for the New York State Acceably. The I
torninated this operation by exposing it and tho Soviot
Copartod the United States and will not bo pormitted to
return. (5)
ORIGINAL AND ONE TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA, BY LIAISON
HFC: JPT:dshm
(9)
CECILT
Classified by 6078
JPT
SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR
Irompt from GIS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Esplanification Indožinito
HFC
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 271
GPO 954-545
SECRET
SLIATE SELECT COMITTLE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNILAITAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
In July, 1000, a Czech intelligence officer
assigned to the Czech Inbassy in Washington, D. C., was
declared persona non grata following on FBI opcration which
balked his plans to place an electronic listoning dovico
in n Vopartment of Stato office. (s)
In 1907 a Soviot-bloc diplomat defected to the
United States. The history of Soviet-bloc espionage is
colored with the efforts of their services to prevent
defections and take reprisals against those who throw
off the communist yoke. In 1969 the FDI detected a plot
by hostile intelligence against the aforementioned doicctor
who was residing in the United States. The FBI determined
that the hostile service had recruited two individuals
during visits by them to their foreign homeland and assigned
then to locate and photograph the defector. The immigrants
confessed their assignments against the defector and a stern
warning was issued by the Department of State to the offending
nation that such incidents would not be tolerated in the future.(S)
On February 7, 1070, a Soviet national employed at
the United Nations Secrotariat was arrested on espionage
charges in Seattle, Washington. Do had been dispatched to
the United States undercover na a translator at the
United Nations, but his primary job was to collect classified
documents about United States western air dofonse from an
agent the Soviets believed they had developed, but who actually
was a double agont under FBI control. The complaint against
this Soviot was dismissed with the provision that ho cepart
the United States by February 17, 1970. (S
On February 14, 1972, another Soviet national who
was dispatched to the United States under the covor of translator
at the United Nations, was arrested outside of a restaurant on
Long Island in the process of receiving classified documento
portaining to a jot fighter airplane being built for the
United States Navy. Again, an FBI double agent was involved.
EICHIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 272
SECRET
SENATE ULLICT CONIITTEI
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNLITAL OPINATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
On July 21, 1973, a Covict diplomat assigned to
the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C.; ma dotained in
How York City in the process of meeting with a nombor of
the United States military. The United Statoo nilitary man
was arrosto on charges of espionage and upon establishing
the fact that he had diplomatic immunity, the Doviot vas
permitted to depart the United States on August 15, 1973.
By this arrest the FDI provonted the transalscion to the
Soviet Government of over 1,000 classified documents
wolghing nearly 40 pounds and encompassing information
from the entiro United Staton Intelligence community. "(s)
During 1973 three highly explosive dovicos woro
located in the vicinity of three Israeli-connected business
establishments in New York City. The explosivo devices
fortunatoly failed to detonato, thus paving possibly
hundreds of lives. FDI investigation identified an Iraqi
national who had entered the United States on a visitor's
vica during the carly part of 1973 as the individual who planted
these dovicos. It was later dovoloped that the Iraqi national
was a known momber of the Black: September Organization, which
is the cocret torrorist ving of Al Fatah. The Iraqi national
was indicted in Fastorn District New York on May 17, 1073,
onc count, and in Southern District New York on Thy 20, 1973,
on two counts of violations of Title 10, Section 0441. (S)
on
Industrial espionage by hostile intolligonco corvicos,
which causes a drain of valuable technology Iron the
United States, is of increasing concern to the United States
intelligence community. In August, 1978, a Soviot-bloc
industrial representativo, who had untored the United States
ostensibly for comcrcial purposes just a few daya bofore,
was arrested by TBI Agents following on attempt to steal a
cecret gloss process from the Ford Motor Company. The proces0
reportedly cost over one million dollars to develop. (S)
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 273
3
SECRET
SENATE SELECT COMMITTIZ
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Another example of investigations dealing with
communist officials permanently assigned to the United States
was the attempt by another Soviet diplomat during 1971 to
penetrate the secure voice communications syston of the
Presidential command plano, as well as the secure voice
communications systém between The White Ilouse and
Number 10 Downing Street. This operation alsq failed
because of FBI counterintelligence offorts. (S
An attempt of the Soviets to penetrato United Statos
policy-making and legislativo organs camo to the attention
of the FBI during the latter part of 1970 when a Soviet
intelligence officer contacted an aid to a United States
logislator. During this same period the FBI learned that
an individual connected with the Communist Party of the
United States had been encouraged to move to the
Washington, D. C., area to gather all available information
concerning this samo legislator. Coincidontal with this
display of interest in the particular logislator, it was
learned that the wife of another Soviet intelligence officer
attempted to gather all information available concerning this
logislator through the New York Times Information Bank. *
*(s) *
NOTE:
See momorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,
dated 1/28/75, captioned as above, prepared by WOC:ebc.
*bles, Starling turro,
advised Insp. D.W. Bowars that the Soundor not onderh
no objection to use of this motorial come
him, but thought it was a good doo, do
☑
idea,
1/30/20
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 274
SUCRIT
Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 Mr. J. B. Adams
王王王
1
1
1
-
1
-
•
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. A. Branigan
Mr. W.
January 29,
1875°
Cregar
PREC111 62-111-3
REC-1111115
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
1
Assoc. Dir.
Inasmuch as the captioned Committee, to be referred
to hereinafter as the SEC, will, of necessity, be concerned
in part with highly sensitive information relating to
national security, this Bureau suggests that agreement of
the SSC be sought for the adoption of the following security
measures and procedures, both in the interests of national
security and of protection of privacy of individuals:
In the resolution establishing the SSC it was
established that no employee of the SEC or person performing
tasks for the SSC on a contractual basis should be given
access to classified material unless appropriately cleared for
access to such material by the SSC. It was indicated that
the type of clearance would be commensurate with the type
of information to be made available to such persons under
conditions agreed upon by the SSC. In this regard it would
be desirable for the SSC to stipulate that no staff member
who is to be given access to any material, testimony, or
information received or generated by the committee other than
that which is, in essence, public information be granted such
access without prior receipt of a security clearance based on
a full field investigation. Consideration might also be given
by the SSC to assuring itself that its members are appropriately
cleared to receive all material to which they may have access.
The SSC should adopt rules to insure that the
secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated
Dep. AD Adm. by it be preserved and that these rules be made known to the
Dep. AD Inv. _ individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present
testimony or materials.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
BY LIAISON
ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA,
CIA,
#mor16
JPT:bkbbkb
(9)
9/25/00 SP-2 ALM ITS
ALM/776
HFC
SEE NOTE PAGE 3
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 275
JPT
GPO 954-546
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
It should be stipulated that those agencies which
will present documents to the committee be authorized to
excice from those documents, prior to their presentation, the
nares of their personnel as well as those of any other
individuals whose safety or individual privacy might be
jeopardized by unauthorized disclosure of their identities.
It should be stipulated that, as has been customary
in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters,
witnesses shall have the right to request that testimony be
given in executive session, that in some instances testimony
be "off the record," and that certain testimony be heard only
by members of the OCC.
It should further be stipulated that witnesses be
afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/or
correct the record of thoir testimony prior to any publication
of it.
It should be understood by the committee that the
"Third Agency Rule," binding upon members of the United States
intelligence community, may oblige a witness representing
one member of the intelligence community to decline to
testify concerning matters within the proprietary purview of
another community member.
It is the intention of this Bureau to cooperate
fully with the SSC. It will be requested that in attempting
to satisfy requirements of the SSC we be afforded sufficient
time to research these requirements in order to insure that
our answers will be totally responsive and accurate.
Provision should be made for the safeguarding of
information and documentary materials received or generated
by the SEC, consistent with their substance, and, at the
conclusion of the Committee's investigation and study, for
sccure disposition of such records, including return to
contributors of materials submitted by thom.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 276
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
NOTE:
See memorandum W. Q. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,
1/28/75, prepared by WOC/cbc, captioned as above.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 277
-
3
05
1
K
62-116875-5
|REC-111
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
1 -
Mr. N. P. Callahan
1
Mr. J. B. Adams
1
Mr. J. A. Mintz
1
Mr. W. R. Wannall
January 29, 1975
1
-X
Mr. W. A. Branigan
Mr. W. O. Cregar
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
There have been public charges that the FBI has
operated for 50 years without oversight or any external
controls. This is not accurate. In the Congress, several
bodies have had jurisdiction over matters affecting FBI
programs and activities. These include the Appropriations
Committees of both Houses, the Senate Judiciary_Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights and on Administrative Practice and
Procedure, a special Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on Surveillances, the Clouse Judiciary Committee, the former
Ilouse Committee on Internal Security, the Government Operations
Committees of both the House and Senate and the Senate Sub-
committee on FBI Oversight.
During 1972 the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, with the full cooperation of the FBI, con-
ducted detailed and extensive examination of the FBI's activities
as a member of the United States intelligence community.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972
created a Commission on the Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy. That committee made inquiries
of members of the intelligence community regarding the role
of intelligence as it affects the conduct of our foreign policy.
In its research the committee looked into certain pertinent
FBI activities and had contact with FBI representatives both
in the United States and abroad.
Ey direction of Chairman Peter Rodino and the House
of Representatives' Judiciary Committee, the General Accounting
Office (GAO) is currently reviewing the domestic intelligence
operations of the FBI, concentrating on policies, prograns,
procedures and case management.
BY LIAISON
JPT:jlb.
(9)
Telephone Rm. _
MAIL ROOM
ORIGINAL AND ONE FURNISHED TO DIRECTOR COLBY, CIA,
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 278
#MDR16
9/25/00 SPJALMITTE.
TELETYPE UNIT
☐
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
OPG
دورود
GPO 954-546
SENATE SELECT COMMITTED
TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
GAO's audit is covering Headquarters and ton
of the FBI's field offices where a representative number
of the Bureau's domestic investigations are conducted.
NOTE:
See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall,
1/28/75, captioned as above, prepared by WOC:ebc.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 279
*2
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM. NO. 10
MAY 1962 N
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
M
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
: W.
Cregar
1
1
-
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
DATE: 1/28/75
1
-
Mr. Mintz
1 WTOW/Tim
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1
-
SUBJECT: SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
MASTIAN...
Mr. Cregar
FMDR16
ALL INTROVATION CONTAINED
BIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
DATE 9/25/00 DX SP-2 ALM1776 Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y -
This memorandum recommends that the original
and one copy of four memoranda (copies attached) be furnished
to Mr. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, for
his consideration at the time of his forthcoming appearance
before the Select Committee of the Senate.
apple
Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated
1/27/75, captioned as above, advised that Mr. Colby anticipates
'being called as the first witness before the Select Committee
of the Senate responsible for examining the extent of overt
and covert intelligence activities in the U. S. and abroad.
In connection with this appearance, Colby has indicated that
he intends to make a very strong pitch for the Intelligence
Community and has asked all agencies and departments of the
U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) to provide him with memoranda
on the following four subjects: (1) examples of how the FBI
in its counterintelligence role has materially benefited the
U. S. Government, (2) ground rules that the FBI believes should
(1 be discussed with the Committee in order to insure that innocent
persons are not maligned and sources and methods of investigation
are protected, and (3) a chronology of independent boards or
commissions which have examined the efficacy and authority of
the FBI, and (4) any pending or proposed legislation involving
internal security matters submitted by the FBI.
AM
OF GOVERNMetal
© sente Schoot Committed To Contest
Westigation and study to Intelligence Autov
Operations With Rs.
Attached are copies of four memoranda prepared by
the Intelligence Division which we propose to deliver to
Mr. Colby before the close of business, 1/29/75.
ACTION:
な
Fia
62-116397
If approved, the original and one copy of each of the
Four memoranda will be delivered to Mr. Colby's office on the
afternoon of 1/29/75, by liaison. REC-111
Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(6)
ок драм
eby msiba
clarby's 
office, 
com by Tur
Sa 1/29/75
De levered
sa
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 280
10
18
FEB 6-1975
5

ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA CEN.REG. NO. 2
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM W.
اح
1
-
1
1
1
-
1
A
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr
.
J. B. Adams
Mr.T J. Jenkins
.
Each Assistant Director
DATE: 2/3/75
Each Section Chief, INTD
TTC. то
I
Ст
9
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
Asst Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext Affairs
Gas & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y —
SUBJECT SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT
AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
X
Sante
Selent Committee
PURPOSE:
This recommends code word "SENSTUDY 75 be adopted
as title of new control file for communications regarding
subject.
On 1/21/75 the U. S. Senate reported Senate
Resolution 21 to establish captioned committee. The
Committee will look into operations of members of the
U. S. intelligence community including the FBI. The Committee
is being chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho. We have
already received and responded to requests from the Ad Hoc
Coordinating Group for Congressional Inquiry for information
to be used by Mr. William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence,
in preparing for his anticipated initial appearance before the
committee. The Ad Hoc Group is composed of representatives of
U. S. Intelligence Board member agencies and departments to
deal with "SENSTUDY 75."
For administrative convenience, as well as economy,
it is suggested that copies of all communications and material
dealing with the activities of the committee be placed in a
new control file, 62-116395, and that the code word "SENSTUDY 75"
be adopted as a brief title for internal communications
relating to this matter. FBIHQ indices contain no references
to that code word.
62-116395
JPT:bkb LED
#MDR16
(24)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BX SP-2 ALM/116
BY
34:~
3.1975
NW 88608332939530 Page 281
REC-111 62-116375 4
MCT
-10
CH 42
CONTINUERST
OVER
5-146
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re:
Senate Select Committee To Conduct An Investigation
And Study of Governmental Operations With Respect
To Intelligence Activities
ACTION:
With your approval, the Files and Communications
Division will establish file 62-116395 under the caption
"SENSTUDY 75" as a repository for communications dealing with
this matter.
JAY
WRW/TUL
дна
оку
Jai
2
-
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 282
The Attorney i
Director, FDI
1.
1
-
I l
1
-IN
Jomary 50, 1075
W
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
Mr. Mintz
1
-
Mr. Vannall
d
A
-
Mr. Cregar
!
MAILED 6
JAN 30 1973
-FBI
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
Ca January 21, 1979, Devolution 21 cotablished
a Coleet Com18t09 02 to Sonato to cendiet on invobio-
tion and o:dy of govor: batal operations with recgoet
intolligezo netiuition.
Dr. D111103 Colby, in hip role no Biroetar 02
Central Intollirosso cad Cielyan of the United State
Tatolligorce Coard (USID), Ico advised that he anticipates
baing called on the first pit before tho Colcet
Committee of tho Ponate. In his goals; serbo it is
Mr. Colby's intration to cake a strong procentation ca
bobals of the Intelligon Community highlighting cca 62
ito cutatoading acntributions. In addition, to Cipesto
to show that the Commity has over the yogic boon onbjoet
to cerutday by Corcat comision) and d),
In furtherce of a coordinated offork to inc
thoco agozatos and dorostento of the Intelligozoo Community
aro portrayed in o cost Parozabla licht Dr. Colky has
requested points of costaet to cotablished in och GSID
sobey e portout, Dr. John Q. Claxto, Asseciate foruty
to the nicoter of Central Intolliganed for the Intolliconco
Community, is I. Colly'o porconal ropromantativo to Euro
a proper coordinated offert.
In anticipation that the Intelliges Evaluation
which chaired by the forment of Jeotico
night to the cubject of the Colect Ci
Celtic
intorcat,
it is our understand that Ir, Clorio will to in contact
with your offico.
WCC:ebc
(9)
ENCLOSURE
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608/Dogld:3298953) Page 283
#M0R16
9/25/00 SPJ ALM 116
UNCLASSI
REC 11 MCT-106·2-11637-3
Jar
CH 42
0 FEB 3 1975
SEE NOTE PAE
690X64
The Attorney General
Attached is a list of those individuals
representing the USID who have been designated as points
of contact in their respective agencies or departments
for Mr. Clarke.
Enclosure
1
The Deputy Attorney General Enclosure
-
NOTE:
Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated
1/27/75, captioned "Select Committee of the Senate," recom-
mended that Section Chief William O. Cregar's name be provided
Mr. Clarke as the Bureau's point of contact. The Intelligence
Division is currently preparing memoranda for Mr. Colby's
consideration in anticipation of his appearance before the
Senate Select Committee. Such memoranda, of course, will be
furnished to the Director for his approval prior to being
furnished to Mr. Colby.
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 284
1
Dr. John M. Clarke
IC Staff
143 ext5477
Mr. William McAfee
State
101ext21504
Mr. Benson K. Buffham
NSA
(9)688-7222
Mr. Kenneth Geisen
DIA
11ext75101
Mr. J. Foster Collins
Treasury
184ext2421
Mr. Merrill T. Kelly
Captain Donald S. Jones
Colonel Jerry D. Alderson
Mr. William O. Cregar
Army
11ext78419
Navy
.11ext53737
Air Force
llext50006-
FBI
175ext4612
Dr. Charles Cook
SAFSS
1lext78531
Mr. Hank Knoche
CIA
143ext4086.
Mr. John Warner
CIA
143 ext6111
Mr. George Cary
CIA
143ext6121
Mrs. Patricia Taylor
IC Staff
143ext4401
NCLOSURE
MOR16
FEI INFORMATION CONTAT
62
-116395-3
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 285
• Adm.
D Inv.
.:
The Deputy Attorney General
Director, FBI
SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
MINORITY MELIBER
SELECT SENATE COMMITTEG TO
RIVESTIGATE INTCLLIG INC AGENCIES
NACIE CHECK REQUEST
1
1 - Mr. McDermott
1 - Mr. Gebhardt 1
1 - Mr. Mintz
1
Congressional Services
January 24, 1975
1 - Mr. Cleveland
#MDR16
Traj
.....9/25/00 SP-2 ALM/776
This is to confirm a conversation between you and Deputy
Associate Director Adams on January 23, 1975, wherein you authorized
the FBI to honor name check requests on staff employees received
from the Select Senate Committee to Investigate Intelligence Agencies.
You were advised that we presently have a request in this connection
from Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., for name checks on four potential
staff employees.
Senator Baker had also indicated to the FBI that he had no
idea as to who would have the responsibility of conducting the background
investigations which must be conducted, and this is to confirm your
approval that we contact Director William E. Colby of the Central
Intelligence Agency regarding their desires in this matter since they
normally handle background checks of staff employees of committees
receiving sensitive information concerning Central Intelligence Agency
and the FBI normally handles such background investigations on staff
employees of committees receiving sensitive FBI information. Following
discussions with Mr. Colby, contact will be had with the Chairman of the
Select Senate Committee in order to ascertain which agency should conduct
the required background investigations.
t
Jq S
JBA:ams
(9)
0000
REC-111
MAILED 2
دل
FBI
Syst.
airs
Com
ction
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Hedm
3
Fraining FL $119/5
egal Coun.
elephone Rm.
ector Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
JAN 24 1975
TELETYPE UNIT
KW 88608 Doeld:32989530 Page 286
Wigh
68-116375-2
2.11
21 JAN 34-1976
OPTIONAL FORATIO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
: MR. JENKINS
FROM J. J. MC DERMOTT
DATE:
SUBJECT: SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. (R-Tenn.)
MINORITY MEMBER
SELECT SENATE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
URARE INCLINE JANT
NAME CHECK REQUEST
1-23-75
Agfald
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
*..Dép. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst..
Ext Affairs
Ext
Files & Com
☑der
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sea'yi
SA Richard T. Taylor, Jr., WFO, telephoned Inspector
Quinn in my office this morning to advise that he had been
contacted by Senator Baker requesting name checks on three
individuals who are to be staff members of captioned committee.
In this regard, Baker indicated that he anticipated that the
committee would request full field investigations on all staff
members of this committee.
Baker advised that the three names he provided will
be among the ten staffers that the minority representation on
the committee will have. The three are as follows:
NED
#MDR16
9/25/00 SP-2ALM/716
sgUSIFIED
RONALD DAVID MC MAHAN
DOB: 6-22-38, Knoxville, Tennessee
SSN #408-58-9952
Residence: 1904 Whipping Post Way, Vienna, Virginia
ARTHUR BOGGESS CULAHOUSE, JR.
DOB: 7-4-48, Athens, Tennessee
SSN #415-78-7202
Residence:
1015 E Street, S. E., Washington, D. C.
HOWARD LEIBENGOOD
DOB: 12-29-42, South Bend, Indiana
SSN #307-44-9707
Residence: 6304 Wildwood Valley Drive,
Brentwood, Tennessee
Formerly a staff member of the Select Committee
to Investigate Presidential Campaign Activities
LV
62-
375
Baker stated the Could appreciate the results
MCTRI
of these name checks as so possible since it is anticipated
that the select panel will be receiving materials on or about
Tuesday of next week (1-28-75).
GTQ: crit (6)
1 - Mr
1
-
1
-
1
-
McDermott
Gebhardt
Mr.
Mr Mintz
21 JAN 31 1975
Congressional Services Office
(OVER.
3.1975
NW.88608 FER: 32389958 Page 287
Memorandum to Mr. Jenkins
Re:
SENATOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
Baker indicated to Taylor that he has no idea as to
who will have the responsibility of conducting the background
investigations but he would hope that the staff members would
have "Q" clearances or the type of clearances afforded Atomic
Energy Commission.
RECOMMENDATION:
That this memorandum be approved and referred to the
General Investigative Division for appropriate action in line
with Senator Baker's request.
дождя
9th
ADDENDUM: G. T. QUINN/crt
1-23-75
SA Taylor called back at 2:00 p.m. and requested
that the following individual also be subjected to a name
check for Senator Baker:
MICHAEL J. MADIGAN
DOB: 4-18-43, Washington, D. C.
SSN #042-34-3797
Residence:
256 School Street, Acton, Massachusetts
· 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 288
FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)
#MDR16
INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
474-2-8529 00-52-6
(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
No domestic spies?
Allegations and disclosures about CIA and
FBI surveillance of Americans within U. S. bor-
ders have been interpreted by some as a type of
domestic spying that could have a chilling effect
on the exercise of political expression. One
response has been that all domestic intelligence
operations should be eliminated. Recent events
show this would be a non-solution, a patent
overreaction.
Most public opinion and most judicial opin-
ion, we suspect, would not consider it an inva
sion of constitutional rights of privacy if the FBI
infiltrated or otherwise kept an eye on activities
of the Weathermen. That organization not long
ago expressed itself by taking credit for a bomb
explosion in the State Department and for plac-
ing another explosive device at the Armed
Forces Induction Center in Oakland, Calif.
Should members of Fuerzas Armadas de
Liberacion Nacional (FALN), the Puerto Rican
nationalist group that claimed responsibility for
the Jan. 24 bombing three men killed, many
injured — at New York's historic Fraunces Tay-
ern's annex, be exempted from monitoring by
federal police because the act was supposedly
politically inspired? By some remote logic, FALN
believes that bombing Wall Street restaurants
will bring independence to Puerto Rico.
The question answers itselfi Society has the
right and the obligation to protect itself. These
were acts of terrorism, whether or not motivat-
ed by political aims. Imperiling innocent people
to enforce points of view that have been repu̟-
diated by a free, open political process is black-
mail. And blackmail cannot become integral to
any long-sustainable political system.
The Weathermen and FALN, as well as any
other organization that indicates it will use
extra-legal methods to voice dissent, should not
be freed from fear of domestic spying.
The answer is not to eliminate all domestic
political surveillance, It is to set the conditions,
and they should be rigid, under which domestic
spying will be tolerated and under which abuse
by federal agents of such infrequently granted
authority will be met with stern penalties.
56 MAR 31 1975
REC-6
Fulton
MAR
Bep-A.D.-Adm✓
Dep.-A.D. In
Asst. Dirk
Admin.
Comp Syst.
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Km.
Director Sec'y
(Indicate page, name of
newspaper, city and state.)
Editorial
A26 PORTLAND, OREGON
TEX-156
Sen study -75
THE OREGONIAN
12-14-75
Date:
Edition:
Author:
ABY
2-14-75
Editor: J. Richard Nokes
Title:
CIA; FBI
EDITORIAL
Character:
ог
Classification:
Submitting Office:
Being Investigated
Portland
5
mal
le
116398
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 27 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 289
གསྶ ཡཾ ཨཀྑཝཱནཾ, སཙྩུཝཾ ས མཆོད
FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)
wh
(Mount Clipping in Space Below).
#MDM6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN, IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9/25/00 BYSPY ALM/116
Senate And The CIA
The special committee the U. S. Senate is
forming to look into charges of illegal spying
on Americans by the CIA, the FBI or other
agencies can do a lot of good-or harm.
If the committee conducts a sober and re
sponsible inquiry it can determine if the CIA
did in fact overstep the law against domestic
espionage and what corrective measures, if
any, are needed.
If, however, the committee conducts a
Watergate-style probe, complete with televised
hearings and sensationalized leaks, it can se
verely damage the nation's foreign policy and
intelligence capability.
*. *
Incidentally, by voting in caucus 45-7 to es-
tablish the special committee, Senate Demo-
crats delivered a rebuff, which seems to be
unjustified, to President Ford and the com-
mission headed by Vice President Nelson
Rockefeller which Mr. Ford named to inves
tigate the CIA.
The Democrats implicitly stated by their
vote that they did not trust the Rockefeller
commission to perform an objective inquiry.
That amounts to prejudicial prejudgement.
The Rockefeller panel should be given a
chance to do its job. Then if it does come up..
with a whitewash, the criticism would be in
order.
* *
Meanwhile, the investigation into illegal
Yspying widened after the FBI confirmed its
files contain some information on the personal
behavior of some congressmen. Included are
references to their loyalty, character or rep
utation:
|
Many congressmen are indignant about
this. But they should restrain their outrage.
For unlike the CIA, the FBI does have the
duty of conducting domestic investigations
and there are times when members of Con-
gress are proper objects of FBI interest.
Every so often, for example, a congress-
man turns out to be a crook. And in such in-
stances the laws the violates are usually fed-
eral ones.
So the FBI, as the federal government's in-
vestigatory agency, should not be barred from
keeping records on any suspects, even if they
happen to be congressmen.
jerk fashion any time they hear of the FBI
Some people, of course, react with knee-
keeping files on anybody. They immediately
begin screaming about "police state” tactics.
Well, no American citizen in his right mind
should defend police-state actions by any
agency.
But agencies like the FBI and the CIA are
live in. So we dare not emasculate them to
essential, considering the kind of world we
the point where they won't be able to perform
their necessary functions.
Sensturdy -75
Cuch- Letter to Troon
7
/31/75- DLD: 
mbr.
58 MAR 28 1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spéc. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephong Rm.
Director So
(Indicate page, name of
newspaper, city and state.)
24 The Pittsburgh Pres
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Date:
1/23/75
Edition: Final
Author:
Editor: JOHN TROAN
MISC INFO
Title:
Character:
ΟΙ
80-861
Classification:
Submitting Office: Pittsburgh,
Being Investigated
62-16395-A
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 28 1975
G
NW-88608 Docid:32989530 Page 290

FBI Chief Looked for
Skeletons in Closets
of Famous
WASHINGTON
The files
went to the Oval Office under
J. Edgar Hoover's familiar "I
thought you might be inter
ested in knowing" heading,
And what they contained was
always interesting to say
the least.
1
}
From one of the most profi-
cient" information gathering
machines in existence the
FBI J. Edgar Hoover com
piled explicit tales of human
weakness in high places; I
licit sex, drunkeness, homo
sexuality, marital problems.
If any president who re-
ceived such information from
Hoover and all are said to
have ✓ ever rebuked him for
his efforts, it remained as se-
cret as the contents of the
memos themselves. Most were
dutifully grateful.
Old FBI hands say Hoover
began comping formation
on public figures, including
congressmen, very early in his
30-year reign.
R
By the early 1950s field
agents were under a standing
Hoover's penchant for fer-
réting out the Skeltons, in the
closets of the famous was as
well known outside the agency
as within. The absence of
protest against it until now in
dicates that the threat that
those files might be bared
may well have been the major
source of Hoover's power.
"I can't really say how
much of the information ever
was used," said one former
high-ranking bureau official.
ग्
For example, Johnson re-
quested complete bureau in-
vestigations of both Sen.
Spiro Agnew, after he became
vice-president-elect in 1968
Johnson justified the Gold-
water request, one ex-FBI offi-
cial reported, by pointing out
that Goldwater was a reserve
major general, in the Air
Force and "had more secrets
than we do at the White
House."
In 1964 Johnson sent an en
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.....
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inte
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
(Indicate page, name of
newspaper, city and state.)
6B
DETROIT FREE PRESS
DETROIT, MICHIGAN
#MORIG
"But I am convinced that tire team of agents headed by ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
from confrontations with the DeLoach to the Atlantic City HREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
many a politician shied away
director because he did not
know what Hoover had on
him."
THE COMING congres-
sional investigations may not
verify the existence of secret
The official bureau position is
that the momination is stored
in bits and pieces, and was
needed.
only pulled together when
But there are witnesses who
can swear that such dossiers.
existed, perhaps in Hoover's
personal files which have ei-
little spying on friends of Rob
Democratic convention to do a
ert F. Kennedy, whom he
feared might be plotting to
take the nomination away
from him.
And a decade before, it was
Hoover's FBI that supplied-
Sen. Joseph McCarthy with
much of the ammunition in his
now discredited pursuit of al
leged communists.
FBI officials agree, used the
More than one president,
agency to gather information
on personal enemies, including
directive to forward biograph-ther been destroyed or re-elected officials.
ical information on newly
elected congressmen or execu-
tive branch appointees to
Washington for the benefit of
bureau officials who had to
deal with them.
As far as it is known, there
never were any specific or
ders, official or unofficial, for
FBI agents to solicit informa-
tion of an intimate personal
nature.
But one former assistant
FBI director recalled re-
cently: "It was understood
that Hoover was interested in
such material. Some agents
who might come across a little
smut in the course of an inves
tigation would simply ignore.it
and not forward it, But others
saw it as a chance to gain fa-
vor and deliberately wenbolts
of they vay pagemor
CM 271975
moved from the bureau. And
they were readily accessible
to presidents.
Roosevelt, for instance
loosed the FBI on foes of his
lend-lease program. Johnson
“I have personally carried frequently passed information
files to the White House doz-along to allies on Capitol Hill
ens of times and delivered who could stun a Johnson op
them to a secretary," said a ponent by casually 
dropping 
a
former FBI-White House liai-juicy tidbit of gossip 
from his
FBI 
file..
son during the Johnson admin-
Although never documented,
istration. "That was the
it was widely believed in
president could truthfully say.
Johnson
Washington that
he had never talked to the FBI
on a particular matter."
amused himself with bedside
reading of what J. Edgar was
finding out about others.
of the FBI occurred under Ri-
WHILE THE ultimate abuse
chard Nixon, most present and
former FBI officials say Pres-
ident Lyndon B. Johnson, who
had a private telephone line to
the home of assistant directory
Cartha D. DeLoach, did not
hesitate to use Hoover's bu
reau for poncar purposes.
House Speaker Carl Albert,
who like everyone else heard
rumors that the FBI had a
thick file on his personal life,
wrote Hoover and asked him
about it, Hoover responded
equivocally that no such file
existed
1
T39/25/00 BX SPJ Fremf21
DATE
-Sonstudy -73)
Date:
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:
62
1/30/75
JOSEPH H. STROUD
6395-4
Character:
HAMNATUR
NOT RECORDED
Classifica
1975
Submifting Office:
DETROIT
☐ Deing Investigated
Fil
NW 88608 Docld:32989530 Page 291
NW 88608 Docid:32989530 Page 292
دو
The existence of such files
was not punery acknowl
edged until 1973; after Hoo-
ver's death, when the Senate
was considering the appoint-
ment of L. Patrick Gray as his
successor.
Then acting director, Gray
told the Senate Judiciary Com
mittee he had seen files so hot
there was no way of destroy-
ing them without risking hurt
to some subjects.
Saying he would like to burn
them. Gray said the law gives
the National Archives final
say over the documents.
Subsequent news stories dis
closed the existence of files on
Sen: Edward Kennedy then
House Majority Leader Hale
Boggs, and
others.
3.