14-00000
104-10169-10139
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
SEPARATE COVER ATTACSIENT TO
2008-14304, 31 January 1968
IDENTITY
Bram, & urity officer on TDY
Headquarters.
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14-00000
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☐ CLASSIFIED – ☐ ONLY
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CONF ANTIAL
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UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT:
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
NO.
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15.
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1 DEC 30
610
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UNCLASSIFIED
& GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1918 0-676788.
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SEA AND NO
EGOT-14004
HEASAGNAITERS FILE NO.
ΤΟ
NO
Chief. EX (ATIN:
Chief, SH (ATTHI
Chief, b (ATTN:
Matthew L. CARSON)
Sherman G. CUSICX)
Leonard P. SACKETT)
FROM
CATE
SUBJECT
Chief of Station, Germany
ADMINISTRATIVE
Handling of a Soviet Defector
ACTION REQUIRED
See below.
REFERENCERSI
31 January 1962
RE: "433" - (CHECK YONE)
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED
BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
1. I suggest that the story of ABLADLE, from the moment he walked into the
home of Martin A. HOODINE until he was safely under alia custody in the United
States, deserves compiling, analysis, and publication in the form of an Opera-
tional Ald. It richly illustrates the many problems which must and can be sur
mounted, and could be highly instructive to Chiefs of Station in all countries
where the next Soviet defeator might appear.
j. 2. Here is the Frankfurt contribution (written at my request) to such a
compilation: a eliffhanger from start to finian, but also a commentary on the
many types of problems which can arise, and the fact that it takes hard work and
skillful improvisation to solve them. it was a cliffhanger both before and after
the Frankfurt chapter (1 nominate HOUDINE for a modal for his part) and ought to
make excellent reading.
02
3. The handling of defectors obviously is not a new responsibility to the
German Station. The CZONE facility which existe primarily for the receipt,
establishment of bona fides, debriefing, and resettlement of defectors has existed
hare for the last decade. Nor is the movement by black evacuation of operational
personnel a unique task for us to perform. We have accomplished this many times
by use of our o integrated (DUNIT facility and also by the furnishing of alias
documentation to the person of interest and accomplishing the transport via
scheduled MATS flights. The significant points which made the ARLADLE case unique.
my never again in their entirety be duplicated but in part they may well be,
and therefore should be enumerated:
a. A Soviet diplomat, and number of the HIS, stationed in a non-
Satellite but politically sensitive country, which at the time of &ELADLE'■
defection was under considerable Soviet pressure.
b. The fact that the actual circumtapees concerning his at of
defection were such that an immediate decision by the man on the scene and
to be made to take advantage of the opportunity.
c. The fact that little alternative could be given, under the facts
as described in (a) above, except to believe the defeator's statements
and sequiesce in his demands, 1.s., he possessed information of a significant
and perishable nature and would disclose it completely only upon arrival in
the United States.
d. The fact that once the commitments in (c) above were made every
reasonable effort had to be made to accommodate the defector's demand.
In order to accomplish all this an untried method of evacuation, i.e.,
black evacuation via commercial aircraft had to be accomplished in order to
successfully proceed with the undertaking.
4. A retrospective analysis as to how this case commenced, and the unique
factors connected with it as enumerated above, lead to suggest for Headquarters
study what I refer to as "Findings" and "areas of study,' What 1 have labeled as
"rindings in effect represent facts which, if not present, quite probably would
imve deprived us in Germany of participating successfully in the movement of the
ARLADIE family. The "areas of study," on the other hand, represent either anseer-
able questions or matters in areas wherein operational discussions may well take
place to see if some type of school-book solution can be devised.
5. I will elaborate below, where appropriate, on some of these "findings" but
will first record them
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8. Tra »isdom u? ALMAK mintaining in the European area at least one field
installation having assigned to it persunal representing the many competencies
necessary in the intelligence undertaking has been recufirmad.
5. The wisdom of obtaining appropriate security clearances, and having
Stations brief and make sitting of at least an AIS contact, the resident senior
United States citizen personnel of United States flag air carriers operating
sitain any Station's area.
c. The fallacy of depending on marginal or obsolescent equipment to
accomplish sensitive tasks of high priority. we here refer to 17-year C-54 air-
craft.
d. A realization that a ratio exists between the number of people unde
aware of a given undertaking in relation to the obstacles encountered in success-
fully accomp.laning trat undertaking.
127
6. A few words of elaboration are in order on the four pruneading points.
Because the initial endeavor at black evacuation by Klinik aircraft aborted, wo were
given an opportunity to see with great clarity the application of these points. If
the attempt to evacuate by Al-assigned aircraft had been successful, then
knowledge of the defection could have been held to approximately six staff and
assigned military personnel. Because that endeavor was unsuccessful, at least nine
additional staff and military personnel. becamo-generally or specifically aware of the
matter, plus the Consul General and one of his senior officers. Additionally one
private United States citizen, the senior Pan American official in Frankfurt, became
very much asare of this sensitive case. This increase in the number of individuale
come about because of an immediate noed late in the evening of Saturday, 16 December,
to use to staffers to assist in the safehousing function, a total of six
NATOPAZ staffers (documentation, graphics, photographie) to prepare and issue.
framulent and alles passports, and an assigned enlisted man to act as a safehouse
guard. The Consulate Jeneral had to affix visas to the fraudulent passports. The
most crucial individual involved," however, was the Pan American official who to a
certain degree put his position in jeopardy by being as cooperative on the matter (a.
he was without previously having cleared and briefed this official (His counter-
part in Thi is also so cleared and briefed) the whole undertaking would rave been
precluded. It would have been impossible to accomplish departure without documenta-
tion on a commercial aircraft without the connivance of the commercial airline
involved. Indeed with auan cunnivance it was difficult and risky enough. Finally,
the point concerning cbsolescent equipment speaks for itself. Headquarters is fully
amare of the feelings of this Station concerning the inadequacy for our purposes
of assigned aircraft. Suffice it to say that when defectors apparently of signifi-
cant value refuse to ride such aircraft matter merita thorough study.
7. The matter of "areas of study" appears to un to encompass at least the
fellexing!
Average time differences in transmitting high precedence electrical
gemmlestions between and among representative groupings of station Tae
German Station is extremely fortunate in having AW-26 circuite with load-
quarters. It affords un a fhoility for instantaneous communication. не сил
make certain rough estimates as to how long it might take appropriate lead-
quarters officials to answer our queries and we can then approximants the
arrival time of answers to high precedence traffic. Other Stations, however,
do not have KM-26 equipment, all do not have the same type of cryptological
equipment, and there is a different pattern as to the type of circuitry, i.e.,
direct leased lines, tux, straight commercial servics, etc. Na Selieve there
is merit in the appropriate Headquarters unit endeavoring to group geographie.
Jeally Stations and then based on the type of communications and cryptuingical
equipment and the channel of transmission to come up with predictions au to
the average length of time the transmission of a priority or operational.
immediate cable would take betreen and among the various representative
groupinga. In the case under study, which represented a rather fast-breaking
situation, it was not possible for us to estimate the length of time it took
to transmit an operational immediate cable beton Studkan Prankfurt.
It would have been of value to us to have had some this miter.
b. Coordinatium between U.8. Air Attachon and Cus. to believe it would
be worthwhile to request each Chief of Station in a location where the Air.
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MKT-14004, 31 January 1962
Force or Navy has an assigned attache plans to establish procedures whereby the
Air or Naval Attache will advise COS of any absence of the attaone plane, the
point of designation of the aircraft, and the duration of the absence. There
have been previous defections where attache planes were used as the initial
vehicle of black evacuation. In the evacuation plan of Stock for ABLADLE
He are
they informed us by cable that they proposal to use the attache plane.
of the opinion that when the statement was ande/Stockholm made the assumption.
the plane was immediately available. As was later discovered by us the
particular plano in question was at Wiesbaden and not stol. This, however,
was some six hours after Station] stated its intent to use that aircraft.
While in this particular case matters eventually worked out successfully the
story might be otherwise in a different set of facts.
e. Priority furnishing of traces. When a Station is alerted to a request
to render operational support to the movement of a defector and simultaneously
answers a request in the negative if it can furnish traces, the following
procedure is worthy of study. If Headquarters pussesses, and time permits, wa
believe it worthwhile to forward an immediate summary to the Station rendaring
support if the background of the defeater is much that it would be a matter of
local interest. This would have been the case in ABLADLE. As subsequent head-
quarters debriefing developed (and we assumed it would have been disclosed in
Headquarters traces) AKLADLE had previously been stationed in Berlin. Had such
facts been known here, and had time allowed, certain debriefing on the Berlin
period designed to elicit any matter of immediate concern could have been under-
taken.
20z
JOEL. D. BRETLAN
Attachment
Namo dated 18 Dec 1951 h/v
Identities une/tap
Distribution
2 - EB w/atta
✓ - SR w/atts
- ME w/asta
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1940 530
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--
TO EGOT-14004, 31 Jan 1962
18 December 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
The Record
Handling at German Station 16 and 17 December of
Soviet Defector from Russian Embassy at Helsinki
1. This memorandum is designed to record, soon after the event,
all facts pertaining to the handling within the German Station of the
evacuation of a 
Soviet Vice Counsel (and member of the RIS) from the
Russian Embassy at 
Helsinki. At the time of this writing there is
still lacking 
certain information to complete the entire story. How-
ever, it is felt 
worthwhile to record all events while the memory is
still fresh. 
In the following paragraphs the defector is referred to
as "subject" and 
pseudonyms and identities are used in all other cases.
2. At approximately 0730 hours Saturday, 16 December, Arnold J.
LYACK 
(Chief,
CABEZONE) contacted me at my home and asked me to proceed
immediately to the residence 
of Joel D. BENTHAM (Chief of Station).
Upon arrival 
at BENTHAM's residence,
M's intent to endeavor to
143 the Stockholm cable which announced and LYACK briefed me on
fly subject and family "black" from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard the
Air Attache 
aircraft. Cable also requested Frankfurt to have an air-
craft 
available to receive immediately subject and family and take off
forthwith 
to the United States. LYACK also mentioned an IN cable from
DIR which requested 
[Stockholm] to move family soonest to (CAMEZONE in
Frankfurt for establishment 
of bona fides.
02
3. We then adjourned to the office and awaited more word from
either Stockhole which would advise on the arrival time of the family
at Frankfurt, or from 
Headquarters concurring in [Stockholm's] request
for immediate departure 
of the family for the United States upon.
arrival at 
Frankfurt. RAQB was immediately alerted and they made
arrangements 
to have a C-54 with augmented crew prepared to depart for
the United 
States by 1200 hours. A compartment for the subject's
family was put in the C-54 and the regularly assigned tail number was
removed and 
a false number put on the aircraft. Conrad V. LAPOLLA
(Acting 
Chief: COS/KUSODA) was contacted and asked to come to the office
immediately. 
Discussions were then held with LYACK and Carl T. UPDILL
as 
to 
the availability of a KUDOVE onse officer with Hussian language
capability to act as escort.
RYDAT
had
14-00000
14-3
Having heard nothing from either (Stockholm] or Headquarters
0945 hours QPIM traffic was sent in both directions telling them
Germany 
was prepared 
to receive and effect immediate black evacuation
of the family to the 
United States. In the meantime, it had been
determined that IDENTITY 
A would be used as the security escort and
Russel K. MUCHANE (AD/PI Staff
) would be on standby to serve as a
KEDVE escort. This was a 
contingency arrangement because we lacked
knowledge whether or not a KUDOVE 
officer from either Helsinki or
143 (Stockholm who prepared to travel with subject all the way to washing-
ton.
5. Around 1100 hours I asked Edward P. TOCHENSKY (Chief; EAQB)
to 
establish contact with 
the Wiesbaden Air Bagestower and lay on
rangements to monitor the flight of 
the Stockholm Air Attache plane.
his was done because we have had 
previous instances of "black"
arrivals at 
Wiesbaden where the aircraft actually arrived before the
ETA cable from the station 
dispatching the body/4-At about 1115 hours
TOCHENSKY informed me by telephone that the [Stockholm
] Air Attache
aircraft, a C-45, was and 
had been at the Wiesbaden Air Base since
12 December. At about 1130 
we cabled this information to Stockholm] 14-3
and DIR and also offered to dispatch 
an aircraft to Copenhagen to make
the pickup if [Stockholm could move 
the body there. Because of
technical difficulties involving air clearances and lengths of runways,
we could not immediately get into any 
field north of Copenhagen.
6. At approximately 1145 hours a cable was received from Head-
quarters 
concurring in 
the immediate evacuation from Wiesbaden by EAOB
aircraft of subject's family upon 
arrival.
arranged 
we were then requested to hold subject and family at (CABEZONE.
If such could not be
02
214-3
7. Having heard nothing from (Stockholm by approximately 1600
hours 
we again sent them OPIM 
traffic asking that they inform us
immediately of their intentions
.
about 1430 hours in order to get some lunch and take re of one or !
I had previously left the office
te personal items. I had called 
Nelson R. POLIAKOFF (Deputy for
Administration Staff) in to cover 
for me and had briefed him on the
then current situation. When I 
returned at 1600 hours MUCHANE had
came into the office prepared 
for the trip. We then sent the above-
mentioned cable and suggested that 
MUCHANE return to his quarters and
await further developments.
and his communicator return to their quarters. LAPOLLA, in the mean-
I 
phoned TOCHENSKY and suggested that he
time, had gone to Rhein/Main Airport 
to meet an incoming staffer oarry-
ing classified material and get him 
through Customs.
to his home. I left 
word with the Signal Center Watch Officer that
He then returned
any incoming traffic on subject's 
trip should be telephoned immediately
to LAPOLIA who would come in, review 
the traffic and contact mộ. The
SECRET
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Watch Officer was also asked to immediately phon: the Wiesbaden Com-
municator who in turn would 
contact TOCHENSKY and both of them would
go to their office.
8. At approximately 1900 hours LAFOLLA contacted me at home from
the 
Signal Center and 
informed me that an ETA and other information was
in from Stockholm] I told him 
to stand by and I would immediately come
in. Based on Stockholm's 
cabled statement that Martin K. ROODINE (Chief 27, 14-1
of Station, Helsinki) was escorting subject to the United States, Ye
told LAPOLLA not 
to alert MUCHANE. 
I arrived at the office at 1930
hours and immediately 
dispatched the Guard Sergeant to buy certain
types of foods and magazines 
that (Stockholm asked to be put aboard the
United States-bound aircraft. We 
contacted TOCHENSKY and ascertained
that EAOB was in a state of 
immediate readiness.
| 
(
COS/KUSODA Office) then arrived with IDENTITY A.
David R. MULFALL
a 
general briefing on the mission and his responsibility following
IDENTITY A was 
given
which he and LAPOLLA took 
off immediately for Wiesbaden. They took
with them the purchases 
of the Guard Sergeant.
9. I then proceeded to the home of Ronald M. CORBANE (COS Lawyer)
where 
we were guests for dinner. 
At approximately 2200 hours I received
a call from LAPOLIA that subject and family had arrived, the turnover
was made, and that the EAOB 
aircraft was airborne at approximately 2150
hours. I telephoned this information 
to BENTHAM.
Immedi
10. At approximately 2245 hours I received a call from the Signal
Center 
Watch Officer who relayed 
to me the following message from the
Wiesbaden Communicator. That 
message stated the EAOB aircraft was
immediately returning 
to Wiesbaden because of a sick passenger.
ately thereafter I 
received a call from LAPOLIA who was at the quarters
of Arthur G. DREIBERLIS (EAOB) in 
Wiesbaden.
had gotten hold of the Air Base Flight Surgeon and was proceeding to
LAPOLIA stated that he
the Air Base. He w at that time 
no other details.
B. FAGERLUND (
COS Medical Officer) and myself would leave immediately
I told him 
Chester
for Wiesbaden Air Base.
11. FAGERLUND was in attendance at the same dinner party and we
departed 
immediately for 
the Air Base. Upon arrival at approximately
2300 hours the EAOB aircraft 
had already landed and reaximum segurity
provisions were observed in 
the area. Air Police had the "Hargar 34
Area" blocked off two blocks in 
either direction.
12. TOCHENSKY met me outside the building and informed me that
immediately 
after take-off 
subject's mix-year-old daughter had become
extremely airsick and suffered 
respiratory difficulties,
administered 
oxygen.
the wa
The mother became hysterical and the father
demanded that the aircraft immediately be returned to its point of
68719515
14-00000
departure. He further stated he would not agree to further travel
to the United States 
except by commercial jet.
Operations Office of the 7405th Flight Squadron where I was introduced
We then entered the
to ROODINE, who recited 
basically the same story as told by TOCHENBAY.
We also ascertained that 
the Flight Surgeon had looked at the daughter
and had found nothing organically 
wrong. We then asked ROODINE to.
bring FAQÆRLUND into the room 
where subject's family was staying and
introduce him as an "Izbrican 
Intelligence Service Medical Officer"
and have FAGERLUND examine 
the child. FAGERLUND's results were the
same as the Flight 
Surgeon and no medication was given the child.
discussion of some 
fifteen minutes then took place as to how best to
A
proceed with onward 
transportation arrangements.
and 
strenuously impressed me with the fact that subject was of the
HOODINE took me 
aside
opinion that certain of 
his information on the matter of Soviet/Finnish
relations was of great 
perishability and that subject deeply felt his
necessity to arrive in Washington 
and state this information within
the next 48 houre. ROODINE 
also stated he concurred in subject's feel-
ings. All KUBARK 
representatives then on the scene again got together
and the undersigned made the 
decision to abort the mission, arrange
immediate safe-housing 
overnight for subject and his family, and
attempt commercial 
transportation on Sunday.
13. Earlier in the day LYACK informed me that he had cleared out
their 
Eschborn safe-house in 
case we should need it.
tried 
to contact LYACK by phone but there was no answer.
I 
immediately
Henry R. GAMLINGAY 
(Deputy for Administration Staff) and asked him to
I then phoned
do for me the following 
things:
02
Contact Stephen R. LACKLEN (CABEZONE) and tell him we had
an immediate need to house a 
family of three, plus two
KUBARK officers 
at Eschborn. To further tell LACKLEN to
be 
standing by at Opel Circle opposite the Minneapolis
Honeywell Building 
at 0100 hours and be prepared to escort
another vehicle to Eschborn
.
2
Phone BENTHAM and tell him we would drop by his house
later that 
evening to brief him on any developments.
0. Phone YACK and tell him we were using Eschborn.
14. All concerned departed Wiesbaden Air Base at approximately
0020 
hours on 17 December and 
arrived at the meeting point at Opel
Circle at exactly (0100 houre
. Subjoot's family plus MULFALL, who had
also gone immediately to Wiesbaden
, followed LACKLEN's ear to Eschborn.
FAOKRLAND, LAPOLLA, ROODING
, and myself went immediately to BENTHAM's
house.
SOPPET
ANA

14-00000
5
15. BENTHAM was then fully briefed on developments and ROODINE
gave certain operational information of a sensitive nature from subject
to BENTHAM. After necessary analysis and discussion the following
decisions were reached:
a. We would endeavor to remove the family out of Frankfurt
by commercial aircraft that day, 1.0., Sunday, 17 December.
b.
In the absence of the ability to accomplish this, we would
endeavor to remove them on an Air Force Medical Evacuation
Flight on Monday, 18 December.
seph Q. KLEBACK (Chief, COB/XURIOT) was contacted by
phone from HENTHAN's residence and said he believed that
his people could affix in the subject's passports a
Federal Republic entry stamp. This was considered neces-
sary in order to prevent embarrassing questions by German
Immigration Authorities on Sunday when the family would
depart by commercial air. The family had entered the
Federal Republic "black" and accordingly there was no
entry permit in their Soviet Diplomatic passports.
We would return LAPOLIA and HOODINE to the safe-house and
I would also send out one enlisted guard with sidearm.
16. A cable to Headquarters was drafted on the basis of all this
information and everyone departed the HENTHAM residence for their
respective missions. I proceeded to the Signal Center and released the
drafted cable.
17. I arrived back at my quarters about 0330 hours. At about 0410
hours I received a call from KLEMACK, wanting to get in touch with
LAPOLIA on matters pertaining to the documentation work he was trying
to accomplish. I gave him the telephone number of the Eschborn safe-
house. It turned out that the cold weather had affected telephone 0
munications to Eschborn and the phone was dead. KLEHACK ich went
to Eschborn and discussed his problem with LAPOLIA and HOUDINE. I an
informed, but as yet do not know the teannical reason why, that KURIOT
sould 
not put in the subject's passport the required German entry stamp.
It was decided at the meeting at the Eschborn safe-house that KURIOT
would try to make and have ready by the next morning [Austrian] passports
for subject and his family.
11
18. At about 0600 hours I received a call from the Signal Center
Natch Officer informing me that Headquarters "approved your plan.' I
Ammediately tried to contact the Eschborn safe-house by phone but to no
avail. Around 0630 I contacted KLANACA at the AURior installation and
was then informed by him of his earlier visit to Eschborn around 0400.
He told me during his phone conversation that LAPOLLA was going to get
up about 0700 hours. I surmised that LAPOLIA would proceed immediately
to the office and then did so myself.
14-00000
19. LAPOLIA arrived at the office sometime shortly after 3800.
then 
discussed what our 
possibilities were, based on the situation as
we then saw it. We had no 
guarantee that the [Austrian] passports would
be finished by AURIOT in time to 
be used by an early afternoon United..
States flag commercial jot. We 
discussed again, as we had the previous
evening, contacting Mr. William 
Naylor, the Pan American Senior Officer
in Germany and a cleared and 
witting contact, as to whether or not he
could arrange to board 
passengers without going through German Imigra-
tion, 1.e., Passport Control. 
The question of the availability of seats
was also involved. LAPOLLA 
suggested that we phone Naylor in his
residence in Bad Homburg 
and explain to him we had a matter of serious
urgency and ask him to come 
immediately to the 1.0. Farben Building and
discuss the matter with us. The 
phone call was made and Naylor agreed
to do this. LAPOLLA then contacted 
the MATS Office at Rhein/Main to
așcertain if MATS had 
any commercial jets chartered for departure that
day. Ho discovered that they 
had no commercial jet chartered flights
that day but at midnight on 
Sunday they were dispatching a C-135 con-
figured to carry 66 passengers
. 
He 
was further informed that 36 of
these seats had been given to the Air 
Force and 30 to the Army to be
used only by single military 
personnel departing to the States on
Christmas leave. No families 
could be sent on the flight.
a C-135 is the 
military cargo version of a Boeing 707. LAPOLIA and myself
Inasmuch as
discussed seriously the advisability 
of endeavoring to get military
authority to fly this family 
out.
action for several reasons.
We decided against such course of
We anticipated that there would be too
much conversation among the single military personnel aboard the flight
when they observed five divilians, 
three of whom were obviously a
family, flying on the 
same plane. The fact that the six-year-old
daughter spoke no English also 
contributed to the adverse situation we
anticipated. Secondly, 
subject and family had already been aboard one
cargo type aircraft and were 
reported by ROODINE to have made a series
of uncomplimentary remarks of 
the type transportation that they were
being afforded.
20. Naylor arrived at the office at about 1000 hours and was made
generally 
aware of our problem. 
He was informed that the principal
traveler involved was a 
defecting Russian diplomat, plus wife and child,
and that we were under 
obligation to expeditiously and securely return
them to the United States by jet 
aircraft.
that 
we lacked the proper documentation to board them on the commercial
He was further informed
aircraft through normal 
clearance procedures and we had no guarantee
that we would have the documentation 
by flight departure time of
PAA No. 73 at 1315 hours. We 
then asked him what he considered to
the possibilities of working 
out a procedure to board the party "black"
and to prevent any divulgence 
of their existence to the German Immigra-
tion Authorities. After 
considerable discussion it appeared that there
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existed a very good possibility to get the passengers aboard the air-
craft and successfully circumvent German passport controls. Naylor
contacted his own assistant and the PAA Operations Officer assigned to
Rhein/Main, both of whom are United States citizens, and asked that
they proceed to the airport and stand by to assist him in the handling
of some very important personages who were departing on PAA No. 73.
He then ascertained that only three first class seats were available
on this flight. He told his assistant to seat two passengers in the
aircraft lounge and he would accept full responsibility for it. This
is somewhat touchy in the airlines business as lounge seats have no
safety belts. He also know additional first class seats were available.
out of London.
21.
In the meantime, KLEMACK and one of his men working on the
documentation had returned to Eschborn to take pictures of subject and
his family that would be necessary for the Austrian passports. The
best reading we could get from the KURIOT people working on the doou-.
ments was that they would not be ready on time. Inasmuch as decisions
had been made, we decided to set the wheels in motica and started the
family to the airport. LAPOLLA accordingly took off for Eschborn and
a plan was agreed upon where he would arrive with the family in front
of the Rhein/Main Departure Building at 1230 hours. Naylor would be
standing by the entrance and take the family via a circuitous airport
building route to the PAA Operations Office which is located on the
second floor of the building beyond Passport Control. Naylor departed
at about the same time as LAPOLIA and went directly to the airport.
22.
Earlier in the morning I had asked BENTHAM if he could effect
arrangements at the Consulate to have a Visa Officer standing by to put
United States visitors' visas for subject's family in the Austrian] pass-
ports. BHAM accomplished this and, at Naylor's suggestion, we asked
if the Consulate officer could go to the PAA Operations Office at Rhein/
Mair, and stand by there to socomplish his visa work. By so Going we
could save approximately 30 minutes time. Ï contacted Mr. Rollie White
of the Consulate office and he agreed to meet us at the airport at
1245 hours.
23. I next phoned BENTHAM and made him aware of our situation. It
did not look as if we would have any unable documentation to pass the
family and would have to take the chance of sireventing the Passport
Control. Our principal concern was that a German Immigration Officer
would be standing by the aircraft departure area and would ask to see
subject's passport. We could not get subject's family aboard the
regular bus that goes from the departure building to the aircraft
because there was no way we would get them to the bus loading area
without going through Passport Control, RENTHAI asked how we evaluated
an ability to withdraw gracefully at plane side if challenged by German
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authorities. I told him the chances were better than even and that we
would appeal to the fact that this was a VIP party being handled out of
the regular airport procedures and that the passports had been left in
the PAA office. he would then put the party back in the vehicle that
took them out and just keep going. BENTHAM authorized us to proceed
with the "black" evacuation.
24. I then made one last call to KURIOT and told them if they could
not complete their work and get the passports to the airport by 1315.
hours to forget it. with that MULFALL and myself left for Rhein/Main.
25. We arrived at Rhein/Main exactly at 1230 hours as subject's
party was drawing up. The group was then taken by a circuitous route
to the PAA Operations office. It was acertained that PAA No. 73 would¨
arrive at 1245 hours, approximately thirty minutes late.
26. During our wait at the PAA Operations Office, ROODINE got
aside three or four times and kept me continuously aware of subject's
fear that an attempt would be made to sabotage his plane. He had
evidenced this concern ever since his arrival in Frankfurt. Subject
told HOODINE he felt sure that Soviet agents would be found among some
of the employees of the commercial airlines and the management of Rhein/
Main Airport. He mentioned the section of the HIS that works specifically
on assassinations and sabotage. He was fearful of any baggage being
loaded very late or any "spare baggage" that might be found aboard the
aircraft. I told ROODINE we were very sympathetic but we were not about
to ask Naylor, who had now gone much further than one could be reasonably
expected to on our behalf, to off-load the baggage of 184 passengers
and search it.
27. Two events happened while we were waiting in the office to
board the parties that were of some disturbance. The airplane Captain
reported to the PAA Operations Officer that a gun was found aboard the
plane. Upon investigation it was determined that this gun belonged to
an Armed Forces courier who had carried classified material on the air-
craft to Frankfurt. The airplane saptain, upon being asked by Naylor
if there had been any unusual activities on the part of the passengers,
then described one party flying in the first-class compartment. This
flight and originated in San Francisco and was flying around the world
westbound. At New Delhi a United States oitizen, a correspondent for
an unknown newspaper, boarded the plane with his wife and a female nurse.
The flight crew had been informed that he was an alcoholic and was being
returned to the United States at the request of the United States Embassy
at New Delhi. For part of the trip he had acted in somewhat of an
obnoxious fashion and had insulted some of the other passengers. The
Captain had investigated the situation and was of the opinion that the
correspondent was now sufficiently drunk and lacked sufficient stamina
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N
to insult anybody. I asked the Captain if there was a purser or a
male attendant assigned to the first-
class section.
particular flight 
all cabin service personnel were female.
He 
stated on this
however, that another 
PAA Captain was flying dead-head on the trip, was
He stated,
a big burly, sort of fellow, and if 
need be, could spend most of the
trip in the lounge to watch 
the correspondent. IDENTITY & expressed
grave reservation about now going forward with the trip because of the
correspondent. It was my opinion, 
however, that between IDENTITY AND
-ROODINE, and the extre PAA Captain 
that if the correspondent again
got obnoxious they could 
sufficiently cope with him. The regular Cap-
tain left the definite impression with 
me that the correspondent was
sufficiently drunk, that he would 
either soon pass out or in any event
would not represent a threat to subject's 
making the trip.
therefore, decided 
that the trip would proceed. IDENTITY A informed
It was,
the Captain that he was a United 
States Government representative escort-
ing & family aboard the plane and requested 
the Captain to keep the door
of the flight deck looked from the inside 
during the length of the
trip. To this the Captain 
agreed.
28. Subject's party, accompanied by Naylor and the PAA Operations
Officer 
departed the office at 1325 
hours, entered a PAA crew bus,
drove immediately to the first-
class ramp and successfully boarded the
aircraft. At about 1335 KLEMACK 
arrived with subject's two original
Russian passports. These were then 
put in a brown manila envelope and
one of Naylor's United States citizen 
employees was asked to proceed
immediately to the aircraft and give 
these to ROODINE.
29. At about 1300 hours we had phoned to KURIOT and told Ralph 0.
NASSBOCK 
that he had another thirty minutes 
to get the Austrian pass-
porta to the airport because of the aircraft's 
delayed departure. The
11 
Austrian passports arrived at 
approximately 1345 hours. Hollie White
immediately started to enter in those passports the United States
visitor's visas. At approximately 
1355 the FAA Ground Crew Gef
notified PAA Operations that 
Flight No. 73 was mechanically cleared for
departure and completely loaded. At that 
time a PAA representative
started to run from the Departure 
Building to the plane with a little
piece of luggage. Naylor was coming 
back from the plane in the crow
bus. He intercepted the PAA employee 
and took the bag and drove it
back to the plane. He later 
told us he opened the bag, one of the
flight bag variety, and on his own 
initiative examined the contents.
It contained items of apparel used 
by ladies that will not be further
identified.
30. At 1400 the Ground Crew Chief stated again the plane was ready
for 
departure and asked why the plane 
was being held up.
held up because White 
had not finished all the entries on the passports.
It was being
However, the PAR Operations Officer informed 
the Ground Crew Chief that
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1:
10
the weight of the loaded plane had been questioned and they were recam
pushing total weight
. At about 1405 the Austrian] passports with United
States visas were 
carried in a brown envelope by a PAA United States
sitäten 
employee and given to ROODINE. The plane was then cleared for
departure and rolled out at 
1414 hours.
>. The only other information known at the time of this writing
is that 
the 
aircraft was diverted to bermuda because of bad weather
conditions in New York. Naylor telephoned me that information about
ure on Monday morning, 18 December.
ROGER I. MCKER
SECRET
S
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:
STOREY
8/0 ATT B TO ENOT-14004, 31 Jan 63
1415162
Kurming
13 FEB 1952
TO
Chief, SR.
GYBAT
ATTN: Sherman 0. CUBICK
FROM: Chief of Station, Germany
SECRET
RYBAS