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157-10014-10067
HEARINGS
09-H-08
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM: TWEEDY, BRONSON
TO :
TITLE :
DATE: 09/09/75
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
76
CONGO
ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA
CIA
DOCUMENT TYPE:
TRANSCRIPT
1A
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
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NW 50955
DocId: 32423455 Page 1
Date: 08/06/95
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ORIGINAL
Vol.
The Nuited States Senate
Report of Proceedings
ORMATION.
re Subject
R1124
3/17/27
६८
100 69%
Hearing held before
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Tuesday, September 9, 1975
Washington, D. C.
(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)
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TESTIMONY OF
Bronson Tweedy
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CONTENTS
EXHIBITS
NUMBER
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Tweedy Exhibit No. 1
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Tweedy Exhibit No. 2
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Tweedy Exhibit No. 3
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Tweedy Exhibit No. 4
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Tweedy Exhibit No. 5
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Tweedy Exhibit No. 6
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Tweedy Exhibit No.7
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(The above exhibits were retained by counsel.)
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EXECUTIVE SESSION
امرا
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Tuesday, September 9, 1975
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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m.,
in Room 443, Russell Office Building, Senator Walter F.
Mondale presiding.
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Also present:
Rhett Dawson and Frederick Baron,
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Professional Staff Members.
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Present: Senator Mondale (presiding).
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...
Senator Mondale.
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Do you swear the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Tweedy. I do.
Mr.Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have
the right to counsel here today?
Mr. Tweedy.
I am.
Mr. Baron. And are you appearing voluntarily here
today without counsel?
Mr. Tweedy. I am.
(At this point, the hearing was removed to Room 608,
Carroll Arms Hotel.)
Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that all of your
Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, includ-
ing your Fifth Amendment rights?
Mr. Tweedy. I am.
Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have
the right to cease answering questions at any time and
consult with an attorney?
Mr. Tweedy. Yes. I gather that was implicit in what
you said in the Senator's office.
Mr. Baron.
It was.
Now, that we are no longer in the Senator's presence
I would like to make it clear to you that you are under no
obligation to continue testifying, although the Committed
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would obviously appreciate it if you would.
Are you willing to do so?
Mr. Tweedy.
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I have no intention of not cooperating.
Mr. Baron. And you are willing to continue to testify
to the truth as best you can?
Mr. Tweedy. Indeed I will.
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Mr. Baron.
Perhaps we should begin by putting on the
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9
record a bit of your background in Agency activities leading
to the point at which you assumed the position as Chief of
the African Division.
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TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY
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Mr. Tweedy. I came aborad the Agency in the first of
May, 1947 and after training was sent to Switzerland.
I
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returned in 1950 and did a series of desk jobs in what was known
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as the Central European Division, I guess, and went through
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a number of different assignments at that time, until May
15-14
of 1953 when I went out as Chief of Station to Vienna, Austria
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I was there until the middle of 1956 and returned very
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briefly to the States, went to endonas Deputy Chief of
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بانی
Station there. I took over as Chief of Station there in the
middle of 1958 and was then replaced by Frank Wisner, in
15-1
London early in October 1959, and I took over the
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African Division I should think somewhere around between the
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15th and 18th of November 1959.
That brings me up to date.
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Mr. Baron. And how long did you serve as Chief of
the African Division?
Mr. Tweedy.
Until September of 163.
Mr. Baron. In that position did you consult frequent
with people in policy-making positions at the State Department?
Mr. Tweedy.
Well, as I was explaining to you as we
were strolling around, the simple answer to that is yes.
These consultations would take many, many different forms.
On the Congo, for example, the State Department
obviously was just as involved as practically the rest of the
U.S. Government and they had a Congolese task force. I
would attend their meetings or a representative of mine would
attend their meetings. They took place almost daily,
sometimes I guess even more than once daily.
Mr. Baron.
Mr. Tweedy.
During what period of time?
Oh, Lord, from the time the Congo thing;
really hotted up, and I am talking then particularly under the
Kennedy Administration, when Mennen Williams organized the
task force and Wayne Fredericks was his deputy; those meet-
ings were State's meetings, they weren't CIA meetings, they
weren't meetings primarily to discuss the CIA policy, but
we had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast of what the
policy was.
Mr. Baron. If we could focus our attention on the
period between the independence of the Congo in June of '60
and the announcement of the death of Lumumba in February of 1.
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Mr. Tweedy.
WAS that the month of his death?
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Mr. Baron.
The month the death was announced.
As you know, there is a lot of mystery surrounding his
death and the probable cause of his death. AS far as the U..
investigation was concerned it was January 17 or perhaps
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January 18, 1961.
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Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
Mr. Baron. What was the nature of your contact with
the State Department during that period of time?
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Mr. Tweedy. My recollection of this is far less
Congo and far more general, as I was mentioning to you as
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we strolled, and particularly my talks with Jim Penfield, to
whom Joe Satterswate was dedicated.
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together. He had the minister.
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Joe Satterswate, who was Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, and Penfield and I were colleagues in Vienna
But we did a great deal of
talking together about CIA deployment in Africa.
forming a division both at home and abroad and I had a lot
32
I was
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of things to negotiate with him about fente enver for
Statens and he naturally had his views on a lot of the thim.
we wanted to do, and we spent a great deal of time arguing
these things out, making arrangements and so on and so forth.
To be frank with you, I have far less recollection al
intimate policy talks on places like the Congo with that
particular group than I did after 19-what, the beginning of
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the Kennedy Administration.
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Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration
that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were
geared up.
Mr. Tweedy. All that happened then, absolutely.
Mr. Baron. Do you remember discussions with Livingstone
Merchant in the State Department before the turn of Adminis-
trations?
Mr. Tweedy. I knew Livingstone Merchant but specific
discussions with him I really do not recall, no.
Later on
I remember having a couple of meetings along with Mr. Rusk.
Mr. Baron. Did any of those neetings concern Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy. No, Mr. Rusk, I think they exclusively
concerned Portuguese Africa.
Mr. Baron. Do you remember having any meetings alone
with Herter, Secretary Herter, about Lumumba?
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Mr. Tweedy.
T
sure
am not
I have had a meeting with Mr.
Berter.
r. Baron.
Did you have any meetings with Secretary
Herter or Douglas Dillon or Livingstone Merchant?
Mr. Tweedy.
Never not Mr. Dillon.
Mr. Baron. About Congolese affairs?
Never met Mr. Dillon and I do not
recall
I may
Mr. Tweedy.
having met with Livingstone Merchant on the Congo.
have done so but I really don't recall, I had very little
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professional contact with Mr. Merchant.
I knew him mostly
slightly socially.
Mr. Baron. When you met regularly with Mr. Satterswate
or Mr. Penfield did you discuss Lumumba with them?
Mr. Tweedy.
I am sure we discussed Lumumba in the
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sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa-
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tion, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congo
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was heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of the
African situations, individual African country situations.
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We would spend a great deal of time, their points of
view, our point of view, cur perspective, their perspective,
but never as an action matter that I can recall.
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Mr. Baron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba
ever contemplated or raised in those meetings?
Mr. Tweedy.
Never.
Mr. Baron. Did you meet regularly in this period
between Congolese independence and the announced death of
Lumumba with people at the NSC level or people in the white
House?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall so at all. For example, if
President Eisenhower had an African representative the same
way President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who he
President Kennedy had two. The first name escapes
was.
me.
He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassador
and one that I saw most of for a considerable period of
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time was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the School of
Advanced Studies in Princeton.
Mr. Baron.
During the Eisenhower Administration did
you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster
with reference to Congolese affairs.
You are shaking your head and we have to put it on
the record.
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no.
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Mr. Tweedy. I am alsmot convinced that the answer is
I know Gordon Gray quite well.
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I am just thinking.
don't recall ever having policy discussions with him at all,
I think the answer is certainly no.
nor General Goodpaster.
Mr. Baron. You mentioned to me earlier that you had
attended only two National Security Council meetings in your
memory and that those two meetings were both long after the
death of Lumumba, is that correct?
Mr. Tweedy. I can only imagine that they must have been
because this was well into
the Kennedy Administration.
wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now.
Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John
I
McCone at CIA?
Mr. Tweedy.
Yes, that is without question.
And
Yes, it must have been
McBundy was at the meetings.
well after the death of Lumumba, maybe even the following
year.
Mr. Baron.
During the latter part of the Eisenhower
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Administration when events in Congo were heating up, after
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Congolese independence, what was the general atmosphere in
the State Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba,
the general attitude toward Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by
saying what was the general assessment of the situation in
the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you
came down to.
The worry in Washington about the situation in the
Congo was that here was the largest geographical expression
in Africa that thretened to go up in smoke, up because the
Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because
vulnerable to.
it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that
those African countries in their early years were at least
The only trouble with the Congo was if it
happened there the side effects would have been infinitely
greater than, of course, if it had happened anywhere else.
Mr. Baron. What would those side effects have been?
Mr. Tweedy.
All one culd do was assess those, but it
would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring
country by which great store was set by the West was Nigeria
and if the same infection crossed that border one was afraid
that this would go up in smoke and that in effect there
was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it
really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis.
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This was the concern.
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Mr. Baron.
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Were these political side effects only
that were being taken into account or were there also
fears for American business interests in the Congo that
were part of the side effects?
Mr. Tweedy.
Insofar as my assessments were concerned,
and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall
with the State Department, American business was just not a
great factor.
If you want to talk about business, the big factor, of
course, was Katanga and eventually when Tachombe threatened to
succeed resulting in the great involvement of both the U.N. and
the U.S. in the Congo affair, the fear there was that if you
put together the Congo without Katanga it was like construct-
ing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station.
Mr. Baron.
That is because Kutanga is the home of
most of the natural resources that are in the Congo.
Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that keeps that
country going.
Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic con-
siderations in back of that but these were political
economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is
what was going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor inso-
far as I recall.
Mr. Baron. So the primary concern was for political
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stability in Africa.
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Mr. Tweedy.
Yes, political stability in Africa.
In
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a quick phrase you put your foot right on that.
Mr. Dawson.
During the summer of 1960 you mentioned
earlier that in the time frame you did not think the
Kremlin was ready to march in there, as that was a fear with
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you but
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Mr. Tweedy.
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I don't mean to say this was nothing that
anybody was worred about but it was not the primary concern.
Mr. Dawson. But there was significant Soviet interest
in infiltrating and taking advantage of the situation in the
Congo?
I think it would be much more
accurate
Mr. Tweedy.
to say it was our assumption, we were not privy to Soviet
intentions with respect to Africa, which I suspect in those
days like a great many other things about African culture
round the globe were ill informed at that point, and un-
doubtedly seeking their own polcies in Africa just the way this
It was obviously a worry.
country was.
Mr. Baron.. Was it also our assumption if the Soviets
moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have been
little doubt in our minds that that would have been the case.
Mr. Baron. And is it also true that the general perception
at the Agency and in the State Department was that Lumumba
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posed the threat in the Congo beyond the mere threat of
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political instability because of his closeness to the Soviets
or his willingness to accept aid from the Soviets?
Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese more binding but I
don't think we had any information indicating there was
any close umbilicus between the Soviets and Lumumba but it
was potentially there.
Mr. Baron. And that potential
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Mr. Tweedy.
This increased one's nervousness about the
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situation.
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Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of the African
Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive
orders?
1/
Mr. Tweedy. Well, the normal chain of command was
through DDD, Dick Bissell and
--
Mr. Baron. Would you meet regularly with Richard
Bissell during this period of time?
Mr. Tweedy.
Regularly would be a big word. Not
necessarily that often. We might talk on the phone. То
say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. It
would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but
Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the
Congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook
any major operation.
Mr. Tweedy. Well, depending on what you mean by
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major operation.
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Major operation per se, if you are not
talking about just intelligence operations, call for in-
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structions and formalization either inside the Agency or out-
side.
Mr. Baron. So any major covert action would be
formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the
DCI, Allen Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels
77
than that.
00
Mr. Tweedy.
I suppose the DCI, if Bissell felt that
was necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the
DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instruc-
tions I would receive from time to time undoubtedly stem from
conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and
funnelled down to me.
I didn't always know who talked to whom before I re-
ceived instructions.
Mr. Baron. So if you received an instruction from
Richard Bissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that
instruction on the assumption it was fully authorized above
the level of DDP?
Mr. Tweedy. I think I would proceed with it on the
basis that he was authorized to give me instructions
and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered
to tell me to do.
I couldn't run his affairs for him to that extent, but
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by and large I reckon the Agency worked and that was the way
it was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to
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say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to
Allen Dulles first I would think is nonsense.
Mr. Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question
Bissell about the source of authority for some covert action
he was asking you to undertake?
7
Mr. Tweedy.
I would have never hesitated to do if
I felt that it was necessary to do so.
I can't recall having done so. He and I used to have
disagreements philosophically on operations.
We were very
good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him
when I thought he didn't make any sense but
Mr. Dawson. Could you describe that philosophical
difference, or is it describable?
Mr. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. I think Dick was
by and large inclined to feel that almost anything was
possible, you know, in the clandestine service, if they put
their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case.
Mr. Dawson.
Mr. Baron.
Thank you.
Did you ever discuss the question of
assassinating Lumumba with Richard Bissell?
Mr. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing
came up in the first instance.
I can't remember how it came
up except undoubtedly we had a conversation.
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Mr. Baron. Do you recall when it came up?
Mr. Tweedy.
No, I don't. It obviously must have
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come up, I assume, what, the fall of 1960. But I have no
way of putting a date to it.
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Mr. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or
perhaps I should backtrack first and ask whether this was
discussion or a series of discussions?
one
Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have discussed it more than
once. I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have
said we probably better be thinking about whether it might
ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which
case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we
could do it or not successfully.
Mr. Baron.
Mr. Tweedy.
Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?
Yes, but it was never discussed with him
in any other sense but a planning exercise, but a planning
exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed
to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether
such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of
Station be thinking along those lines as well.
Mr. Baron. So, in effect you were asked to move
ahead at least as far as developing the capability to
carry of an assassination if an order should be given?
Mr. Tweedy.
Well, or to examine the potential for
doing that.
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Mr. Dawson. I know that you have indicated you
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won't be able to put a precise date to this conversation
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with Bissell or conversations with Bissell, but maybe we can
narrow it down a little bit.
Would you assume that it would be after the proclama-
tion of the Congolese independence on June 30, 19607
Mr. Tweedy.
oh, yes.
Mr. Dawson. Would you assume it would be before
Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on
September15, 19607
Mr. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes. I
didn't realize he had gone into custody that early.
Mr. Baron. So then it would be sometime during the
summer or early fall of '607
Mr. Tweedy. What happened to Lumumba after that?
Mr. Baron. He was in protective custody at the United
Nations force from mid-September until late November and
it was in late November that he left to go traveling
towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops
at that point in very early December and from early December
until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in
prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was
flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death
was announced shortly thereafter.
Mr. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it
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was sometime after September 15th.
Mr. Baron.
Mr. Tweedy.
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I don't know.
When you say "after"
After you put September 15 the day he
came under. The only thing is I have no recollection that
it would have happened as early as, say, early August or
early September.
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Mr. Baron.
It was in August or early September that
Lumumba was Premier of the Congo?
Mr. Tweedy.
Mr. Baron.
Yes.
And there was obviously a struggle for power
between Lumumba and Kasavubu going on.
Mr. Dawson. I guess the crucial question.
Mr. Tweedy. You have really got me at this point.
Mr. Dawson. It would be whether or not you would have
considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody.
If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think
any more precision in the date would necessarily be productive.
Mr. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would
be that only purpose of the exercise would have been to have
a plan when he was in nobody's custody.
Mr. Baron. That would have been before
Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense
to me, September, because
Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on.
In a moment I will show you some cable traffic that
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went back and forth between headquarters and the Congo after
1
he was in U.N. custody to see if that refreshes your recollec-
2
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tion about the general attitude with regard to Lumumba at
that time.
Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
Mr. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would
only make sense to you that
Mr. Tweedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me
8
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Mr. Baron.
GT G
that this initial consideration of the
feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bissell
and yourself?
Mr. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have
been during the period when he was in effect in power. I
should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong.
Mr. Baron.
Did you have any discussion with Bissell
where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassina-
tion of Lumumba had moved beyond the realm of possibility to
an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking
steps to carry out.
Mr. Tweedy.
I cannot recall a conversation with
Bissell where in effect he said, let's move from A to B or C
My
to D or something like this. I do not recall that.
recollection of the whole interval when this was under con-
sideration was that it was a planning interval and at no point
25
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can I recall that I even felt it was imminent that somebody
would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was
2
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5.
by
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a
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go-able. or anything really very close to it. It was
always my assumption that at the time anything like this should
occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the
problem at probably a very considerable policy level within
the Agency at which somebody would have said something
more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call
or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and say
go to it.
Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would
merely implement plan so-and-s0. We never got that far.
Mr. Baron.
You didn't have any action plans for
17
14
assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware
of?
Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever
got anywhere.
Mr. Baron. What kind of planning was done?
Mr. Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one
asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of
accers one might ever have had to Lumumba for whatever purpose.
It was this kind of thing, as best I recollect.
Mr. Baron. Did you send cables raising the question of
gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating
3
him?
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Mr. Tweedy.
I suspect that was the first cable that
ever went out. In other words, the first cable that ever
went out to Larry Hedgman.
He must have realized, he would
have been perfectly clear on his end, the way one's minds were
running even though it was purely a contingency.
Mr. Baron. I am sorry.
I don't think I understood
6
that.
7
3
9
You say the first cable that went out.
Mr. Tweedy.
That was the first way that Hedgman was
10
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ever advised that there was any thinking of that kind in
Washington, was via our cable. I am sure he wasn't back in
the States over anything of this kind.
Mr. Baron.
Today you distinctly remember a cable sent?
Mr. Tweedy. I think I remember that much more distinct-
ly than anything I remember in the last few minutes that it
14.
was
16
17
a cable which asked him to be thinking of that.
Mr. Baron.
That was pursuant to your conversation
with Mr. Bissell7
Mr. Tweedy.
That was.
Mr. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissell
send that cable.
Mr. Tweedy. It probably would have been a cable I
wouldhave written and probably released by him.
Mr. Baron. Do you know what was in that cable?
Mr. Tweedy. God knows, I don't.
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Mr. Baron.
2
Mr. Tweedy.
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For the effect of the language in the cable?
The effect of the language in the cable
would be to get Hedgman to be thinking along these lines.
Would you describe the purpose?
Mr. Dawson.
Mr. Tweedy.
might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.
It would have been the eventuality that we
Mr. Dawson.
Is that language you think might have
been used or that is how you think it might have been done?
I couldn't even start to reproduce the
9
Mr. Tweedy.
cable.
10
Mr. Baron.
1]
Did you send a number of such cables to
the Chief of Station?
Mr. Tweedy. I imagine there were a few over a period
of time. It was not an intensive correspondence as I
remember it.
Mr. Baron.
It wouldn't be thenormal practice to
have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject,
would it?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever
had one but I have had very sensitive subjects, operationally
sensitive subjects that I have dealt with in extensive
cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this
nature whatsoever.
Mr. Baron. Were these cables from headquarters to
the Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a specially
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restricted channel?
Mr. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are sent in
various types of restricted channels I am sure you aware.
Mr. Baron.
22
This channel even more tightly held and
closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that would
flow to the Chief of Station?
Mr. Tweedy.
7
yes.
8
That would be a very fair statement,
Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included in-
structions to destroy it after reading it?
Mr. Tweedy.
That wouldn't have been normal.
Mr. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this
such an instruction would have been given?
Mr. Tweedy.
It would really be up to the Chief of
Station, I think. It would be up to the Chief of Station
what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he
needed to maintain a record for quick reference purposes in
the future.
But, he was perfectly capable of keeping a file
which would be accessable only to him and the station and
if he was sure of his own security within the station I don't
think this would have been a problem for him, but to answer your
question I don't know what Hedgman himself did.
Mr. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from
Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville?
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Mr. Tweedy.
It was a serious answer.
I can't do
1
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better than that. It was a serious answer. It wasn't argu-
mentative, I guess it started to discuss, not the pros and
cons of policy, at least I don't recall it did, but what it
was that he might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply
to an instruction from headquarters.
he had of gaining access to Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy.
Mr. Baron.
Did he mention any specific means that
I don't recall now. I don't recall.
I
think he said it was certainly not beyond the question that
means could either be developed or might arise but I certainly
do not recall that he came up with any very specific ideas in
On that I am afraid I am terribly hedgy.
At the time that you were requesting the
the first instance.
Mr. Baron.
Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access
to Lumumba for the purpose of eliminating him, was this
access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of.
personal access that would be needed?
at
Mr. Tweedy.
I am sure that must have been covered
some point,i.e., in perhaps a series of types of accesses.
Mr. Baron. Would this be access to shoot him or would
this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?
Mr. Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might
have been considered.
Mr. Baron.
But this was not access in the sense of
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1
finding a way to sneak inside the U.N. guard to simply
2
snatch Lumumba from custody, this was clearly access to assassin-
ate him, is that correct?
Mr. Tweedy. That would certainly be my recollection.
Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or even
considered, at least I don't remember it.
Mr. Baron.
In your discussions with Richard Bissell
about the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention to
you that he had had similar discussions with Justin O'Donnell?
ལསཀཔི མིས ས པ
Mr. Tweedy. I was reminded of Justin O'Donnell's
role in all this. As you may recall, when I talked to you
and Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I had forgotten
that (Justin O'Donnell played any role whatsoever and now
that it has been brought to my recollection I recall it.
I recall it almost in detail.
I remember being told that he had expressed reservations
or disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and I
think my response to you was if he said that I would believe
him but I didn't recall it.
Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
that he had asked (Justin O'Donnell to go to the Congo to
assassinate Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy. Well, he must have indeed have told me
that he was going to ask O'Donnelly to go to the Congo to
examine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever
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saying, I am going to send O'Donnell to the Congo to knock
off Lumumba, not in those words.
Mr. Baron. When you say examine the thing on the ground
you mean he would send O'Donnell to the Congo to take a
first-hand look at the means?
Mr. Tweedy.
Yes,
conceivably I suppose this all
might have resulted in a climax there but at least my recollec-
tion certainly was never that he told me that I am sending
'Donnell, to the Congo to knock off Lumumba in those words
but that he, I am sure the philosophy was that if anything
was done you would want to keep it as separate from the
station as possible and thus a man from the outside.
It was Bissell's idea that O'Connell might be the man.
Mr. Baron. The man from outside?
Mr. Tweedy.
Mr. Baron.
Mr. Tweedy.
Mr. Baron.
carry out
Mr. Tweedy.
Outside the station.
The CIA station in the Congo?
Right.
That such a man would be necessary to
an assassination operation if one were to be mounted?
That if one was mounted it would
obviously be desirable to do it under auspices which would
protect the security of the station or involvement of the
station.
That I am sure was the philosophy behind it.
Mr. Baron. But it is your recollection that O'Donnell,
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was sent to the Congo to assess the possibility for
assassinating Lumumba rather than to mount some sort of kid-
napping plan to draw Lumumba out from the U.N. guard and put
him in the hands of Congolese authorities?
Mr. Tweedy.
That is certainly my recollection but I
would not want to put too high a value on it.
I
just don't recall kidnapping as a factor is all.
Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bussell ever mention to you that
lethal biological agents had been developed in the CIA
laboratories for possible use in the Congo to assassinate Lumum-
ba? Or they were available for such use?
Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be closer that TSD
probably had the capability or had the agent or whatever it
was. When I say agent I mean chemical agent. I suspect I
1:
17
14
heard that, yes.
1:
Sian
Mr. Baron. Would this have been under Sidney. Gottlieb's
auspices or direction in TSD?
Mr. Tweedy. If he was Chief of TSD at the time it would
have been. I don't recall.
Mr. Baron.
Was he? I think he was.
Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
directly that Sidney Gottlieb was involved in developing
j
poisons that might be used for assassination?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all..
Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about
the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons
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come up as one means that was being considered and which
the Chief of Station should explore?
Mr. Tweedy.
I am sure it must have. After all,
27
there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison
him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something
5
like that.
6
But basically you are talking about a contingency
7
plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the
involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it
8
9
10
in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right
word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the
}:
list of possibilities.
Mr. Baron.
Did the Chief of Station ever make a
W
16
33
response to you via cable which indicated that he was ex-
ploring means of gaining access to Lumumba for the possible
use of poisoning
D D
purpose of poisoning him.
Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he must have done that. I
don't recall specifically, but that effect is what he was
charged to do in the first instance, examine the possibilities.
I would be very surprised if Hedgman didn't come back
and in effect comment on this but the nature of his comments
I really don't recall.
Mr. Dawson. When you and Bissell had your conversa-
tions, whatever time it was, concerning this matter, did he
3:4
mention to you that he had approval or direction from highest
authority to undertake. to assassinate Lumumba?
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Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, no.
the impression when he talked to me that
I guess I was under
I don't know
whether this is fair or not I honestly don't know what
my impression was at the time whether this was something that
Bissell had in effect sucked out of his own thumb as a
contingency plan which he then raised with higher authority, and
because it was contingency planning I don't think at that
#! stage I was particularly concerned.
question I just don't know.
But to answer the
Mr. Dawson. You stated earlier you knew Gordon
Gray very well.
14
Mr. Tweedy. I didn't say that.
Gray far better since than I did then.. I knew Gordon Gray
very slightly indeed then, and I am not sure I ever had a
I have known Gordon
--
while he was in office
--
A
that I ever had a personal conversa-
tion with him. I have seen a lot of him since he was on the
President's Board.
Mr. Dawson. That answers my question.
Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell never made a representation
to you one way or the other as to whether he had approval from
any authority higher than DDP for this consideration of
assassinating Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not recall 50.
Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
that he was directly in contact with the Chief of Station in
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Leopoldville or that he had means of dealing directly with
the Chief of Station in Leopoldville without going through
you?
Mr. Tweedy. He always said that any DDP, of course,
4
that has the capability, and right, it was
5
never my impression
that he was using it and going around me, no. But that he
6
7
B
9
did, but he might have done it, I wouldn't gainsay it, he
certainly had the right and capability to go into it.
Mr. Dawson. Can we go into how the right was able to be
exercised?
10
11
Mr. Tweedy. All he had to do was send a cable. He
could establish his own channel to Leopoldville with his own
12
13
set of slugs which would exclude the Chief of African Division.
He has the right to do that.
14
Mr. Baron. It would not be improper for a DDP to send
15
16
17
31
22
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25
a cable or messenger to the Chief of Station in another
country?
Mr. Tweedy. I wouldn't comment on the appropriateness.
He obviously had the authority. My relationships with
Bissell were such that I do not believe it.
I never had the impression that he ever had any inten-
tion or desire to go around me on matters of this kind.
Who else other than the DDP or DCI
Mr. Dawson.
would have such authority?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.
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Mr. Baron.
1
Would the President?
2
Mr. Tweedy.
5
"
5
60
777
8
9
10
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17
.
14
Yes, but he would probably have to come
to the Agency to find out how to do it.
I imagine the Presi-
dent could send a personal representative, I am damn sure he
would have no way of knowing how to send a cable out there.
He would make a muck of it if he did.
Mr. Baron. Did you learn at any point that lethal bio-
logical substances were actually in the custody of the Chief
of Station in Congo?
Mr. Tweedy.
This was mentioned when I talked to you and
Mr. Wides and my answer was that I don't recall it, but that
it was perfectly possible for them to be sent there.
Mr. Baron.
How would they have been sent?
Mr. Tweedy.
They could have been sent one or
two ways,
16
12
25
they would have been sent through the pouch with the whole
thing wrapped in and addressed in such manner that it would be
opened only by the Chief of Station or somebody coming out
by hand of officer or hand of somebody either way it could be
done.
Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger
from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide
the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry
out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also pro-
vide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination,
namely, poisons and medical equipment for administering them?
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Mr. Tweedy.
No, I do not.
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Mr. Baron.
Let me represent to you that we have
testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that
point that he had received a cable from headquarters saying that
a messenger would arrive in the Congo and would be
someone that he would recognize and this messenger would give
him instructions that he was to carry out.
Congo?
Did you ever know of such a cable being sent to the
Mr. Tweedy. I should be very surprised if I didn't,
but I certainly have no recollection of it-whatsoever.
Mr. Baron. And the Chief of Station further testified
that shortly after receiving such a cable he received a visit
from Signey Cottlich who arrived in
Leopoldville and
made himself known to the Chief of Station, the Chief of
cheider
Station said that he immediately recognized Cottliebjas an
officer of the Agency, and as the messenger that this
cable referred to.
ir
Subsequently, the Chief of Station said he had meetings
with Dr. Gottlieb in his apartment in Leopoldville where Dr
Gottlieb gave him instructions that he said came from the
headquarters to carry out the assassination of Lumumba and
Dr. Gottlich also, according to the Chief of Station, gave
him lethal biological substances and medical equipment with
which to administer them.
4:0 First Street, Washington D75003
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Were you aware of that chain of events?
Mr. Tweedy.
32
That sounds far more definitive than any-
thing I have any recollection of at all.
heider
If I understand what you said was, Gottlieb would have
left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have
empowered the Chief of Station at the conclusion of their
conversations, to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any
further recourse or reference to headquarters?
If that is the case I don't believe it.
Mr. Baron.
That is
9
10
Mr. Tweedy.
Mr. Baron.
11
1:
That is the essence of the testimony that
the Chief of Station although he did say that he was not anxious
to carry out an assassination mission. lle didn't think it was
practical or wise and he probably would have gone back
14
to headquarters to consult with them if he thought he
16
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was in a position to move immediately to carry out the assass-
1.
ination plan, but it was his opinion that the policy decision
had been made and that he had authority to move ahead
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although he doubted
Mr. Tweedy.
that far.
My recollection doesn't go anywhere near
Mr. Dawson. He checked that authority by immediately
cabling back to headquarters saying, this guy has made himself
available to me as well as he has delivered something and
has told me that he had the approval of the highest authority
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in the land to order me to do what he so ordered, which got
another cable back through the specially slugged cable saying
yes, what he told you is correct.
Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, which surprises
me, because once again I would be very surprised, I wouldn't
have been privy to those.
Mr. Baron. If a request
such as the plan Mr. Dawson
☑
9
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1.
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outlined had been sent from the Congo to headquarters and it
were in more narrow cryptic terms, for instance, if it had
said simply I have seen your messenger and received instruc-
tions and request confirmation that I am to carry them out,
would that refresh your recollection as to whether you had
seen such a cable?
Mr. Tweedy.
I can't be at all sure it will refresh
my recollection but if you and Hedgman say that such a cable
was sent, I am not going to gainsay it.
Mr. Baron. Would that be the manner in which
confirmation for such a sensitive operation would be requested?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't know because I never saw one be-
fore or since but it sounds highly reasonable to me.
This
is the way, this would be the way I should have thought any
two sensible people would confer on sensitive matters when
each knew that the other knew exactly what he was talking
1.
about and, of course, you don't have to use unnecessary words
24
25
but beyond the likelihood of this I can't say that is what
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Mr. Dawson.
This leaves us with one or two alter-
2 natives, either the Chief of Station who has appeared and
testified although not necessarily reluctantly, but certainly
ان
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reluctantly as to substance of his testimony, is not telling
us the truth, or he is telling us the truth and you were: not
privy to what was going on.
Mr. Tweedy.
Or I literally don't recall it. This is my
problem. I will tell you quite frankly with these things --
It is 15 years ago.
Mr. Dawson.
Mr. Tweedy. I really am having trouble with this. I
had to be reminded of so many things about the things that
I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences
were basically the things I was basically concerned with all
the time which was putting this division together and the
11
12
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14
rest of it.
15
10
When it comes to operational detail I start getting
17
18
1
fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking
about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to
bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this
wasn't the case.
3
22
24
25
I spent days in a
row not even giving Lumumba one
This is my problem.
single bloody thought.
Mr. Dawson.
Let's try to jog your memory on this.
Do you recall any time during that period of any dis-
cussions of the use of Dr Gottlieb whatsoever as a courier?
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Mr. Tweedy.
Mr. Dawson.
2
No.
All right.
3
Mr. Tweedy.
But if he went as a courier, I will bet
I knew it, but I don't recall it.
Mr. Baron.
Having heard this story, would it be your
assumption it is more likely to be true than not?
Mr. Tweedy.
Well, I put it purely this way.
Mr. Baron. I am asking you for your expert opinion
here as someone experienced.
Mr. Tweedy.
Expert opinion.
Mr. Dawson. You had been the person responsible for
promoting this Chief of Station or at least appointing him
Chief of Station, I assume?
Mr. Tweedy. That in actual fact isn't true. His
appointment was already in the works when I came aboard and
I had met Hedgman in London on his previous assignment which,
if I remember correctly, was in Brussels and he came to Lon-
don to discuss an operational matter with me which had
nothing whatsoever to do with that and we had a very good
discussion. It was only, I think, when I got back to
headquarters as it were, took up the reins after the division
that I learned that he had been appointed Chief of Station
in the Congo, a decision with which I took absolutely no
exception whatsoever, but as a number of assignments may be
made before I came they had to be they couldn't wait for me
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to get the word.
1
Mr. Dawson.
2
17
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6
Have you ever had any occasion to doubt
his veracity or integrity?
Mr. Tweedy. I have not.
I think when I say yes to your basic question, it would
be that I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his
integrity.
2
=
Mr. Baron.
Mr. Tweedy.
you gave it to me.
We don't question it.
All of this happened pretty much the way
The aspect of it I find very difficult to
believe it that at any time headquarters said on receipt of
10
11
Mr. Baron.
That would be your
--
Mr. Tweedy.
13
17
14
difficult to
--
15
and I believe
10
17
these instructions, go ahead and do it. This I find very
I do not recall and I find difficult to believe
implicitly the reaction he gave you which was,
reaction, that if he found it not feasible he sure ав
hell would have referred again to headquarters before he did
it.
Mr. Baron. Why did you find it difficult to believe
such an instruction would have been given?
22
25
Mr. Tweedy.
That way I would have said in such a
matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a
last
word up to the last minute.
Not one of these things that Gottlieb runs off to the
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37
Congo and by the time he has found Hedgman, given his instruc-
1
tions and all of which could have been four or five or six
2
days later and Hedgman in turn had found a way to do it
5
6
7
even then set about his leisure to do it or without further
reference to headquarters that is not the way my organization
has ever run operations.
Mr. Baron. Was it likely at all that Dr. Göttlich
would have gone off on his own with these poisons to the
8
Congo to deliver them to the Chief of Station?
9
10
Mr. Tweedy. I should have said quite impossible.
Mr. Baron.
Without an instruction from the DDP at
least?
Mr. Tweedy.
That is quite impossible.
<here'
Mr. Baron.
Would (Dr. Gottlieb have proceeded to the
Congo in the way the organization normally worked if the
DCI had tasked him directly with such a mission?
Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid I don't quite understand.
Scheider
Mr. Baron. If the DCI had given Dr. Gottlieb an
instruction to go to the Congo and deliver poisons to the
Chief of Station would he have done it without consulting
with the DDP?
Mr. Tweedy.
I suppose so.
But I don't believe it. I don't believe it ever happened.
To answer your question, I suppose if anybody got a
personal private instruction from the DCI, and was instructed
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to proceed without reference to anybody else he would pre-
sumably go ahead and do so.
Mr. Baron. But, because the feasibility of this
assassination of Lumumba had been discussed, this was not such
a tightly held subject that the DDP would have been circum-
vented?
Mr. Tweedy. DDP as far as I was concerned was the
person with whom the division first discussed the matter on-
tirely. I don't recall ever having discussed it with Allen
Dulles. I am sure when I say I am sure I assume Bissell dis-
cussed it with Allen Dulles but, this was never a matter
which was between the DCI's office and the Leopoldville
station insofar as I was aware, and to this day I don't
believe it ever was.
Mr. Baron. Just to clarify something we talked about
earlier when I think we were jumbling two questions together,
it is your expert opinion, expert in the sense of your knowl-
edge of the Agency, and your opinion as a participant at that
time that the testimony, the basic testimony we have received
about poisons being delivered to the Congo by Dr. Gottlieb with
instructions to use them in the assassination of Lumumba,
if possible, would be true testimony?
Mr. Tweedy. Only way I can answer that question, Mr.
Baron, is to say I see not the slightest reason and do not
believe that you would have been lied to on this point.
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39
But, there is nothing in my experience with the Agency
which would really bear on that point whatsoever.
Mr. Baron.
Did you travel to the Congo shortly
before the independence of the Congo was declared?
Mr. Tweedy. That was my first visit to the Congo as I
recall, it was two weeks before independence.
I made a
6
long trip through Sub-Saharan Africa which culminated in
7
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9
10
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a drive from Kampala to Sambura and I flow from Sambura, I
guess, to Albertville and from Albertville to Leopoldville
and that is thefirst time I ever saw Leopoldville.
Mr. Dawson.
Do you know whether Mr. Hedgman was
there at that time?
13
not.
14
Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Hedgman I am almost sure was
His predecessor was there. He had many children, I
can't remember his name.
Mr. Baron.
And you left the Congo before
independence was declared.
Mr. Tweedy.
Yes, I was only there for, I suppose I
was there for four or five days and I thought I was going to
end my whole tour there and whole trip there but eventually
I had to go up to the Ivory Coast to settle an unexpected
problem.
Mr. Baron.
For the record would you agree with me
that independence was declared about June 30, 19607
Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
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1
Mr. Baron.
Did you make another trip during which
you visited the Congo at some point before the death of
Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy.
Yes, well, it is this one that I regurgi-
5
6
0
9
tated finally which must have been as near as the early
part of December and which had started with a visit to Rome
in the latter part of November, followed by a trip to Nairobi
followed by a brief visit to South Africa, then I think Congo,
then briefly Brazzaville and home via Europe.
Mr. Baron.
And this meeting in November '60 in
Rome was a meeting of Aftican
Mr. Tweedy. South - Northern African Station Chiefs.
The Maghrch and these would have been chiefs of stations of
Muzneco, Algeria, Libya,
Mr. Baron.
And the Congo?
Mr. Tweedy.
No.
Mr. Baron.
So the Congo Chief of Station would not
normally have been
Mr. Tweedy. If he came up he must have come up to see
Bisscll.
Mr.
Baron. Richard Bissell was traveling with you on
this
Mr. Tweedy.
No.
Mr. Baron.
tour to Rome and Nairobi?
Mr. Tweedy. He called the meetings. The whole purpose
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1
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དཔ
5
of the exercise was that he wanted to meet a large number of
our new Chiefs of Stations in Africa and rather than make a trip
around Africa, which he hardly had time, he used a device
which we often used, which is to hold regional meetings at
a central point to which these people could have ready access
it was easy for people on the north Mediter-
and, therefore,
6
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&
9
ranean littoral or South Mediterranean littoral to proceed to
Rome,
and the same way it was easy for East African Station
Chiefs to proceed to Nairobi, and he had the meetings there,
each one two or three days, I suppose.
Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station in the Congo
attend the meeting in Rome?
Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he would not. In other words,
if he saw Bissell he would have merely come to Rome and have
seen him, but he would have had no reason whatsoever, in
fact it would have been ridiculous for Bissell to invite a
man who didn't belong in the North African meetings and merely
raised the question whether ledgman was there.
.'
Mr. Baron. What region in the CIA organization chart
would the Chief of Station in the Congo belong to?
Mr. Tweedy.
We change around there. We had in
those days, we had the North African branch, we had the
African branch, we had a southen African branch, which
Rhodesia, probably. rtuguese Africa,
included South Africa
maybe the Congo in those days.
Later on the Congo was
sort
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of Sui Generis but in that early time I suspect it
42
fell down in Southern Africa but I am not absolutely sure.
It might have fallen just in French-speaking West Africa.
We always had acrench West Africa, an English-speaking,
*West-Africa.
Mr. Baron. We have received testimony from the Chief
of Station in the Congo at that point that he did come to
Rome to meet with Richard Bissell and he belives that he also
met with yourself and Mr. Karamessines at Mr. Karamessines'
9
house.
10
11
17
Mr. Tweedy. I doubt if he saw Mr. Karamessines.
It
would only be because Mr. Karamessines was host as Chief of
Station in Rome. But I am sure he was not discussing any
policy problems with Mr. Karamessines who had absolutely no
jurisdiction over them in those days whatsoever.
Mr. Baron. That was his testimony, but it was incidental,
but if, as he has testified, that he met with Mr. Bissell and
yourself, you wouldn't dispute that testimony?
Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely not.
Mr. Baron. And that would be due to the intensity of
activity in the Congo at this point and the intensity of
concern over that activity?
Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.
It was obviously becoming more
and more of a commitment of both the U.S. Government and
thus the agency.
I think leaving Lumumba entirely aside this
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was the main reason that I am sure I went to the Congo
43
at that point was the fact that it obviously was going to become
a major personnel drain, if you like, on the Division
and a major commitment both at headquarters and in the
field, thus it was important I sort of look the thing over.
Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection about
this meeting between the Chief of Station and Mr. Bissell and
yourself in Rome, do you recall what was discussed when you
were together?
Mr. Tweedy. I can only assume that some of the things
that we discussed by cable traffic were discussed.
The other thing I am sure must have been discussed was
what I would call the general assessment of the Congolese
situation and what the station might be required to do, thus
the sort of support headquarters was going to have to give
the Station.
Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion of the assassination
of Lumumba or the prospect of
Mr. Tweedy. I would be immensely surprised if it
wasn't discussed but I don't recall in what context it was
discussed. In fact, I don't believe it wasn't discussed.
It was after all on the agenda, as it were, at least I
assume it was, at that point.
Mr. Baron.
The prospect of assassinating Lumumba con-
tinued to be on the agenda of the Agency until the point that
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Lumumba was actually dead?
I don't recall.
44
Mr. Tweedy.
You probably are much more
knowledgeable on that than I am. I don't recall when in
effect we no longer considered it or it no longer was a
factor. I just don't remember.
But, just now you were assuming that that
Mr. Baron.
50
6
would have the case?
"7
8
Mr. Tweedy. If it was still on, it was still on
9
Mr. Baron.
1:
the agenda, inevitably we must have discussed it.
off the agenda then no, but I honestly don't remember.
Let me show you now some cable traffic
between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a
If it was
10
14
151
10
1-
17
%:
series of cables that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed
into U.N. custody, then continues after he was placed in U.N.
custody.
In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the
attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba after he was in U.N.
custody
Mr. Tweedy. Okay.
Mr. Baron.
the first cable which we will mark Tweedy
Exhibit 1 is dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to the
Director.
22
(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for
identification.)
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45
Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were addressed.
I see he sent one specifically to DCI.
Mr. Baron. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Baron. Onthe record.
Let's turn back now.
I believe while we were off the record and axamining this
cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that
this cable was not sent from Leopoldville to the Director but
to Leopoldville; is
rather it was sent from headquarters
that correct?
Mr. Tweedy.
Correct.
Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation
"Allen W. Dulles", at the top of the telegram, that this was
a personal message signed off by the DCI himself to the Chief
of Station.
Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have
drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off.
Mr. Baron.
And let me direct your attention to
the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is
the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high
office the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at
worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the Congo with
disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N. and for
the interests of the Free World generally.
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Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an
1
2
urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditi
this should be a high priority of our covert action.
3
Now, do you believe that LLL refers to Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy.
Mr. Baron.
I do.
And why would three L's have been used in
the cable?
8
9
10
Mr.
Tweedy. I don't know.
Mr. Baron. Would that be a standard way of making sure
that at least one of the L's was clear in transmission?
Mr. Tweedy. I honestly don't know.
Now, that isn't the normal way to do it at all. I
honestly don't know how. His name was Patrice.
Mr. Baron. But it is nonetheless
17
14
LLL does refer to Lumumba?
1:
14
your opinion that
: -
1
Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed.
Mr. Baron. Does this accord with your general sense
of the policy toward Lumumba at that time at the Agency and to
State Department?
Mr. Tweedy. It accords much more with my recollecti
of our attitude toward the potentially disastrous situation
the Congo than it does on he personally, but he obviously
was always in the background.
Mr. Baron.
Where the cable says we conclude that his
removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under
TOP SECRET
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47
existing conditions this should be a high priority of out
is that consistent with the
1
covert action, close quotes,
2
5
6
policy towards Lumumba as you recall it?
In other words, that Lumumba's removal was a prime object;
tive of the covert actions of the Agency.
Mr. Tweedy. We would have given our eye teeth to have
Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would
"7
agree with that.
8
Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated
September 16, 1960.
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(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2
for identification.)

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Mr. Baron.
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48
This contains references to the fact that
"the station ws flooded with reports re outcome Mobutu coup".
And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N.
troops had interferred with Congolese troops and prevented
them from arresting Lumumba.
Now, this cable was sent to the CIA headquarters
from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective
custody from the United Nations and two days after the Mobutu
coup where Mobutu took over the government.
In the cable as it has been sanitized by the Agency
it now reads:
"Station advised two moderate Congolese politician
try work with key Congolese contact in effort eliminate
Lumumba. Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity
to organize counterattack. Only solution is remove him
from scene soonest".
WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point,
as far as you understood it, that the fact that Lumumba
was in U.N. protective custody did not eliminate him as a
threat in the Congo?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't really recall but I think the
chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody
might very well result in his early release or his ability stil
to control matters. I should think that is very probable.
Mr. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be
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2
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49
this fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was
protected by the U.N.
•
Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is probably true.
Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 3 let's turn to a cable dated
September 20, 1960, which is sent
5
6
off the record.
(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for
identification.)
8
(Discussion off the record.)
9
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430 First Street
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Mr. Baron. Back on the record.
:
2
Although the top of this cable does not indicate where
50
5
090
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7
00
8
the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the
cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking
at the designations that this cable must have been sent from
Leopoldville to headquarters, is that correct, Mr. Tweedy?
Mr. Tweedy.
That is correct.
Mr. Baron.
Let me direct your attention to paragraph
7 which says:
9
"Station checking
10
reconcilation.
31
1
24
24
16
recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba
Kasavubu denies Bolikango failed deny
possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly
as vice Premier. Believe some substance to rumor but will
do best prevent if Lumumba allowed even minor role he most apt
come out on top".
Does that indicate to you that the Chief of Station
in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned
that Lumumba should not be allowed even a minor role in the
government of the Congo?
Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.
Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated
January 19, 1961.
28
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(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4
for identification.)
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51
Mr. Baron.
This was sent from the Congo to
Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville info
headquarters, information headquarters.
Mr. Baron.
So that headquarters. would have received
a copy of this cable sent by the base chief in Elizabethville
to the Station Chief in Leopoldville?
Mr. Tweedy.
Right.
Mr. Baron.
And paragraph 1 of this cable says:
"Thanks for Patrice.
If we had known he was coming
9
10
i
wo would have baked a snake".
cable?
Do you have an independent recollection of this
Mr. Tweedy. Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason
of that phrase, which is another way of saying, a lighthearted
13
14
15
way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived
16
in Kutanga and he had no idea he was coming.
Mr. Baron.
。
So this cable does not indicate that there
1:
was any connection between the CIA and. Lumumba's eventual death,
the actual causes of his death in Kutanga?
Mr. Tweedy. Will you say that again? I am not quite
sure I understood that.
Mr. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that
the CI was knowledgeable of the actual causes of Lumumba's
death at the point when it occurred?
In other words, that they were connected to the people
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who caused his death?
52
Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the
question. This means that Lumumba arrived under the Congo-
lese auspices in Kutanga and that Elizabethville, the base at
Elizabethville didn't know he was coming, our base, didn't
know very much, didn't presumably know very much about what
occurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard.
Mr. Baron. Let me put the question in context.
On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Kutanga?
Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
Mr. Baron. And later United Nations investigations con
cluded that it was the 17th or perhaps the 18th that Lumumba
was actually killed in Kutanga.
I was asking you before whether this cable would indi-
cate that the United States would have been involved in
bringing about the death of Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought that it merely in-
dicates that this part of the Agency, 1.e., Elizabethville
had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate
except these few phrases that he put down here and would impl
although it certainly doesn't say so, that he was adding a
little information to what was perhaps an enormously ignorant
Leopoldville which, of course, is the fact of the matter.
We didn't know how all this was occurring and were not able
to follow the event except after the event.
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Mr. Baron.
53
Was the CIA connected in any way to the
events that immediately led to Lumumba's death?
Mr. Tweedy.
None whatsoever.
S
6
8
9
16
Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly
Lumumba from his previous place of imprisonment in Tysville
out to Kutanga where the authorities were known to be so
hostile to him that he would probably meet his death there?
Mr. Tweedy. The fate of Lumumba in the end was purely
an African event.
death?
Mr. Baron. At what point did you learn of Lumumba's
Mr. Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the
world did. No one had a beat on this.
Mr. Baron. You had no advanced warning that Mobutu in-
tended to fly Lumumba to Katanga?
Mr. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am sure the cable
traffic would reflect it if I had.
Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do you recall an asset who was
sent from Europe, where he had been recruited by Arneld]
Silver to the Congo in the fall of 19607
.03
Mr. Tweedy. I think Iwas reminded of this when I talked
to you and Mr. Wides a couple or so months ago.
Mr. Baron.
This would be an asset who went by the
cryptonym of QJWIN.
Mr. Tweedy. So I was reminded then, which was a cryptonym
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1
2
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I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number
of cryptonyms when reminded of them.
Mr. Baron. Aside from the cryptonym, do you recall 03
there was an asset who had been recruited by Arnold silver in
Europe and who was sent to the Congo to perform some mission
in November and December of 19607
Mr. Tweedy. I was
generally reminded of it by that
conversation with you and Mr. Wides but I will confess that
my recollection doesn't go any further than that.
But unlike some of the things I have been reminded
03
of, I think recalled that asset of Arnold silvers) had been
involved. That is just as about as deep as my recollection
goes.
Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection.
first, by relating to you the testimony of Justin O'Donnell
who said that he did make use of QJWIN in the Congo as
a kind of "alter ego" of his, a general operative of his.
Does that remind you at all of the nature of the
mission that QJWIN had in the Congo?
Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn't.
Mr. Baron.
Have you heard the phrase executive ac-
tion?
Mr. Tweedy.
In the newspapers.
Mr. Baron.
During your tenure as
a CIA official you
never heard the phrase executive action discussed as part of
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a CIA program or plan.
Mr. Tweedy. No. Only in bureaucratic Washington
terms of executive action.
Mr. Baron.
Meaning administrative action?
Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any project at CIA to
55
develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of
a foreign leader, if required?
Mr. Tweedy. Will you repeat that?
10
Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA had a project
which operated under the cryptonym ZRRIFLE to develop the mean
11
pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassin-
12
ations if required?
17
Mr. Tweedy. You mean just generically?
14
Mr. Baron. Yes.
Mr. Tweedy.
No.
Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had
with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating
Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the
Agency about assassination capabilities?
Mr. Tweedy.
Never.
Mr. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connected with
the Agency into the discussion of the feasibility of
assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in
Congo?
TOP SECRET
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56
gong
Mr.Tweedy.
The only other person who was aware of it
2
was my deputy.
10
5
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7
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sense.
Mr. Baron. That would be?
Mr. Tweedy. Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that
Mr. Baron. Did he take any action in realtion to that
plan or consideration?
Mr. Tweedy. No; just he was in matters of this kind he
would have been my alterego but he was aware of it, that is
9
all.
10
Mr. Baron.
Do you know William Harvey?
11
Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well.
Haven't
1.
seen him in a long while.
24
15
16
12
Mr. Baron. And were you aware that William Harvey
was in contact with Arnold silver to develop the standby
capability for carrying out assassinations?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't know anything about it whatsoever.
Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William
Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo?
Mr. Tweedy.
Not that I remember.
Let me show you a document now that we will
Mr. Baron.
21
Mark Exhibit 5.
22
9
25
(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for
identification.)
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来吧
410 Best Street, 5. F.
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WARD PAUL
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Mr. Baron! This is a dispatch from the Chief of
KUTUBE/D, which I believe is
Mr. Tweedy. That is Staff D.
57
Mr. Baron. In the Foreign Intelligence Division, is
that correct?
Mr. Tweedy.
Yes.
Mr. Baron.
12-10
Written to the Chief of Station in Dakalı
and Chief of Station in Luxemburg through Chief AF and
Chief WE.
Would Chief AF have been yourself, Chief of the African
Division?
Mr. Tweedy. What is the date?
Mr. Baron. The date is November 2, 1960.
Mr. Tweedy.
I would have been.
24
Mr. Baron.
And William Harvey would hve been Chief
of
KU207
17
17
**
Mr. Tweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was
Chief of Staff D, in which case he could have, that is
what he would have been then.
Mr. Baron.
Mr. Tweedy, while we have been off the
record you have had a chance to review this document and
I would like to repeat on the
tell me some things about it
record.
First of all, on this copy of the document there is
typed the words Danuel M. Pressland, under the space for
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officer's signature, and you said to me a moment ago that
58
1
you are almost 100 percent sure that that is the pseudonym
2
3
of William Harvey, is that right?
Mr. Tweedy.
Yes.
Mr. Baron. And you were just pointing to
Mr. Tweedy.
Chief of ID. You told me he was Chief
of ID at the time. He certainly was Chief of ID. You told
7
me he was Chief of ID than, I put those two together
8
and say I am pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was
9
Harvey, I can't swear to it, but I am virtually sure.
10
Mr. Baron.
And do you have any independent recollec-
1:
tion of the subject matter that is discussed in this document?
None at all. It doesn't ring a bell
Mr. Tweedy.
!!
at all.
14
Mr. Baron.
Even after reviewing the document
15
36
do you have any recollection of what QJWIN's mission in the
Congo would be, would have been?
Mr. Tweedy.
Mr. Baron.
1
2.
27
24
25
No.
You said that such a memo
Mr. Tweedy. You told me he was going out there to
work with O'Donnell and when O'Donnell went out there I
guess he was going to look into a number of things for
headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters.
When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't
recollect by any emeans what the full auspices of O'Donnell's
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59
visit to the Congo were and you said that Mr. QJWIN
1
2
A
5
was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he was going
to work for him and act as his general assistant.
Mr. Baron. That was the way Mr. O'Donnell described
it, although in this lengthy memo which apparently precedes
O'Donnell.
the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo there is no mention of Mr.
6
Mr. Tweedy.
This I don't think necessarily has anything
8
to do with (O'Donnell's mission whatsoever.
This, I think, is
9
generic mission, seems to indicate that he is going to
10
11
muck around with Corsicans. I don't recall Corsicans, I
know O'Donnell in the Congo at all.
1:
Mr. Baron.
Would this kind of dispatch have been
13
14
15
16
written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the
Chief of the African Division?
Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote
the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather
17
Cat
from this you see there is also a reference here.
I don't
know what the reference is about.
But I gather that Dakar is
brought into this activity because they wanted to act in a
support capacity to this headquarters activity.
Mr. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission
in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was con-
cerned with?
Mr. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary.
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Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper for the Chief of
1
Staff D to arrange an operation in the Congo directly without
2
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going through the African Division although keeeping the
.
African Chief informed?
Mr. Tweedy. Well, the two are mutually exclusive.
You can't have one without the other. To answer your first
question, it would be quite improper and wouldn't have occurred
that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station
without the African Division being informed. This, however,
makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African
Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terms of
headquarters purposes I don't know but it would
sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate
have been
this with the Division and if the Division had perceived
any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it
before the dispatch went out.
Also I noticed Dakar is also invited to find problems
with this, if it did, and say so.
Mr. Baron.
What kind of missions generally would
Staff D have been carrying out in Africa at this time?
Well, you know what the role of
Mr. Tweedy.
Staff D was.
Mr. Baron.
This would be obtaining codes by surrepti-
tious entry.
Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals
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intelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely.
Mr. Baron.
Would it be surprising to you that QJWIN might.
have been used in some manner in connection with an assassina-
tion plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised
by William Harvey without your knowledge?
Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and
would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn't occur.
After reading this memo, you told me a
Mr. Baron.
moment ago that you thought this might indicate that QJWIN
9
was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activities.
10
Mr. Tweedy.
Well, you mentioned ZRRIFLE, which frankly
This sounds as if he was going to
I hadn't heard before.
have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those
two together but I know nothing about it at all.
Mr. Baron. The dispatch says, "In view of the extreme
sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform
his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do."
Do you have any knowledge of what it was precisely that
QJWIN was asked to do?
Mr. Tweedy. I do not.
Mr. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it says:
"The operation we have in mind is too sensitive
to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets
must be conducted with truly"
which is underscored
--
"minimum risk".
2
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What would these assets have been used for, what was
the search for assets all about?
Mr. Tweedy. I just do not know.
Mr. Baron. Let's turn now to a document that we will
mark Exhibit 6, dated January 11, 1961, which is a memo
for the FN Division from William K. Harvey, Chief of FI
Division D.
In this mamo I will direct your attention to the
sentence that says in that cable COS Luxemburg was told
to TA/A all QJWIN expenses to headquarters since QJWIN was
being used for FI/D purposes.
for?
Do you know what FID purposes QJWIN was being used
MI. Tweedy. I don't know.
Mr. Baron. The memo goes on to say that:
"QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specifically sensi-
tive operational purpose which has been completed".
Were you informed by William Harvey that QJWIN's
mission was completed?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all and don't recall
any aspect of the mission or its completion.
Mr. Baron.
Okay.
Did you know of an asset of the Chief of Station in the
Congo known as WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo after re-
ceiving plastic surgery so that he wouldn't be recognized by
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his fellow Europeans who might be traveling through the
Congo?
63
Mr. Tweedy. I do recollect that and you brought it
to my attention, when you and Mr. Wides and I discussed this
a couple of months ago. I do remember the cryptonym and
remember generally the circumstances in which he was sent as
a sort of general purpose agent to the Congo with the thought
if we got involved in paramilitary activity he would be helpful
and he was recruited on that rather general basis, and when you
discussed with me a later alarming exchange of cables which
indicated that he landed running and made some rather irrespon-
sible remarks and we commented on them to the station.
My best recollection is that in the long haul he stayed
on in the Congo and I think became, I believe he became a
somewhat useful intelligence source, but
Hedgman would
But I do remember
have a much better recollection of that.
quite well his dispatch. He had been seen by two or three
members of my Division, including my deputy. I don't
recall that I ever met him unless I met him in the Congo.
If I did I just don't remember. But I remember he was assessed.
as it were, recruited in the United States and dispatched on
a general purpose mission.
Mr. Baron. So, he would be viewed as one of the major
assets that Hedgman had in the Congo at that point?
Mr. Tweedy. How major I don't know.
He was an
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asset. Only time would have told how major it would have
been.
64
He was thought qualified to perform one of a variety
of things in the Congo by Hedgman.
Mr. Baron. Would one of those things for which he was
qualified have been an assassination mission against Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy. As I told you previously, told you and Mr.
Wides previously, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was
basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance
of the Division, not by me personally, Glenn Fields person-
ally, and he was in effect a station as set mounted by the
Division,
thing.
The Division knew nothing about the balance of this
Mr. Baron. You are saying that Division personnel out-
side of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have known
Mr. Tweedy. To my knowledge.
Mr. Baron
.
would not have known that the assassina-
tion of Lumumba was being considered?
Mr. Tweedy. Considered at all, that is correct.
Mr. Baron.
And
Mr. Tweedy. If they did learn of it I never knew
that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it
through me or Fields.
Mr. Baron. The fact that you left the recruitment and
training of this asset to other people in the Division than
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1
yourself and Fields would indicate to you that he wasn't
2
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it
being considered at that point for an assassination mission?
Mr. Tweedy. I will put it differently.
As far as
I know he was never considered for an assassination mission
at all.
He thought he was presumably being sent ouf for deeds
of daring in the PM field and began to talk rather lusty when
he arrived, but I think he was soon put straight.
Mr. Baron. PM is paramilitary operations?
Mr. Tweedy.
Yes.
Mr. Baron.
Let me show you a document we will mark
Exhibit 7, dated December 17, 1960, which is a cable to
the headquarters, marked to Director from Leopoldville dealing
}
with WIROGUE on an approach, he made to agent QJWIN.
14
(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7
for identification.)
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66
Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that. This is the one we dis-
cussed two months ago and this happens all the time.
Mr. Baron. We are referring specifically to QJWIN's
report that "WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to par-
"member
ticipate in intel net and be member" --I
am sorry
www
6
'execution squad'”.
Mr. Tweedy. Yes; I remember all of this as a result
of your having previously brought it to my attention and I
recall it, it was a typical example of an agent or asset
full of piss and vinegar exceeding his brief and he was
certainly put back on the track very early on.
But in this business do not confuse execution aquad
with anything to do with the assassination of Lumumba or any-
thing else. It had nothing to do with that.
Mr. Baron.
You are saying even though you would
assume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming to
the Congo and instructions to carry out an assassination
coming to the Congo was true, the approach that WIROGUE made
to QJWIN was probably not a part of that mission.
Mr. Tweedy. It was quite specifically not a part of
that mission. There was a chapter of accidents. You have
seen it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times be-
fore, two people who are periphically involved in the same
thing and run into each. her and one smells something on the
other.
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Mr. Baron.
67
Again, why are you so sure that this would
not have been connected in any way to the assassination
mission?
E
"
५
Mr. Tweedy.
I thought I made that clear because
this man went out up to a point through what I would call
the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving
training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing
to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been
handled that way.
Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr.
Hedgman, after he got to the Congo, that he was to undertake
recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination
mission as part of his general duties in the Congo?
Mr. Tweedy. It is purely a speculative question. He
could have been but Hedgman would also have been required
and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him.
That was not the purpose for his being sent. The purpose for
which he was sent out was unspecific at the time, generally
in the PM field.
Mr. Baron. Did this report create a flap at headquarters
at the time when the cable was sent?
Mr. Tweedy. No, not at all.
Mr. Baron. It would have been considered a fairly
usual
Mr. Tweedy. It is not.
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Mr. Baron.
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68
example of free wheeling by an operative?`
Mr. Tweedy. It is the sort of thing that can happen.
What you want to do is put a stop to it. But no great problem.
The problem must have lasted 30 minutes.
Mr. Baron. Have you ever discussed events in the Congo
with Sidney Gottlieb?
Mr. Tweedy.
Have I ever discussed events in the
Congo with Sidney Gottlieb?
I can only assume I must have seen Sid during this
period, during this period, but I don't recall any discussions.
In fact, if there had been any discussions with Sidney-Gott
1
ebon the Congo it would have been at that time.
Mr.
Baron,
Mr. Tweedy.
Why would that be so?
..V.
Otherwise Sidney Gottlieb would have had
no interest in the Congo.
Mr. Baron.
So you mean if there had been any dis-
cussions between yourself and Sidney Cottlieb it probably
would have
--
Mr. Tweedy. It would have surrounded these events.
Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological sub-
stances in his laboratory?
Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir. Not necessarily that, because
as
* ()
I think that would have been Sidney Gottlieb business
what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest pre-
sumably would have been was there anything in his inventory
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69
that could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something.
Mr. Baron.
You might have had at least an exploratory
conversation with him on that subject?
Mr. Tweedy. I would be surprised if I didn't.
Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then I
followed it up, something like that. I would suspect that
R
probably the first conversation would undoubtely have been
"7
held between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb but this is merely
"
what I would suspect was the way it occurred.
Sche
But
ལ་
I don't say that that is the way it occurred.
other than that no conversation with Sidney Gottlieb on the Con-
go at all.
i
Mr. Baron. I am at the end of my questions on specific
facts concerning the Congo during this period of time leading
up to Lumumba's death which, as you know, is the narrow
subject of our inquiry right now, and first of all I want
to say that I appreciate tremendously and know that the
Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony
here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one
narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and un-
pleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble.
I wonder if you have any facts that you would like to att
to the record that you think are necessary to put our dis-
cussion today into context?
Mr. Tweedy. I think the strongest recollection about
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my period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo
let's leave the balance of Africa out
1-
and U.N. and U.S.
70
--
involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen
an element of the Agency so totally involved in a matter which
clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking
about Lumumba, I am talking about the Congo.
There was an extreme sense of urgency at
Mr. Baron.
that time?
!
Mr. Tweedy.
Not only an extreme sense of urgency,
the U.S. was supporting the U.N., the Agency was supporting
the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. What the
Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately
with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostly
State, the White House. I must say the Executive Department
was very much working as a team during these days. AGain for-
get Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And
I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off in-
to left field or that I didn't know the way the White House was
thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking
about things, and the National Security was thinking about
things, and I have no reason to believe they ever felt that they
didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. It was an extra
ordinarily close thing.
I remember Mennen Williams trying to form a
Congo club. When I retired from the African Division I was
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given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one,
71
which would be a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather
typical of the way the government worked on this thing and I
personally felt excellent advised that the U.S. was absolutely
right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been
6
a total disaster if Kutanga had been allowed to succeed,
and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that is
་
Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty
"
well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it
a chance to move the way it has.
There are going to be ups and downs with the things
but that is the way it is. I feel very strongly about it.
Does that somewhat answer your question,
does that help?
Mr. Baron. I simply wanted to give you a chance.
Mr. Tweedy. I felt that very strongly and no other assign
ment that I have ever had was this kind of government team
and cooperation ever really required. because we weren't
engaged or I wasn't engaged in that kind of activity.
Mr. Baron. Is this government team efforts that you are
talking about one that was primarily put together to carry
out the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the
latter part of the 60's, '62, '63.
Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over what -
ever activity the United States Government felt it needed
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to be engaged in in the Congo. This included such things as
purely policy questions of what the Ambassador to the U.N.
might say to the Secretary General of the U.N.or what the
President might want to say conceivably I suppose to the
Chief of the Belgium state on such matters.
Everything
certainly didn't just involve what CIA was going to be
It was the whole policy ball of wax with res-
involved in.
pect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which
the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit.
Mr. Baron. Did this high degree of organization and
intensity of concern begin sometime after the death of Lumumba
or had it gotten rolling?
Mr. Tweedy. I think
Mr. Baron. After the Congolese independence?
Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government was thoroughly
seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating
Congo that started in the earliest days of independence
and continued and, of course, when the Tachombe-Kutanga
thing became a fact of life, which is basically why the U.N.
was there, then, of course, that was it.
In other words, I would say that U.S. involvement, U.S.
concern, merely moved with the events. as anybody could read
them in the press just continued and continued, but one thin.:
was perfectly clear, was that the U.S. was quite determined
to see this thing through.
Nothing had been clearer than
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the way President Kennedy presided over those two meetings.
He was annoyed by the Congo and irritated by it and he was
worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but
he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he
was continually goosing his staff to do just that but
.
in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by
ourselves. It couldn't have been clearer.
Mr. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the
Committee is interested in your wisdom on policy-making and
analysis in the intelligence community generally and there may
be other members of the Committee staff that would like to call
upon you to testify on other subjects because of your long
experience in Agency activities.
But I want to thank you now for your complete coopera-
tion and the tremendous amount of information that you have
provided on this one subject that has been very helpful?
Mr. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can assure you any-
thing I can do to help the Committee in other areas I
will be glad to do it and if I don't think I can help be-
cause I don't think I know enough about the subject I will just
say so, otherwise : am not afraid to put my two bits in.
Mr. Baron.
As far as your two bits goes, we would
be interested in your two bits worth ☐ policy recommendations
in general, institutional, critique or suggestions for change
or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make,
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and we will take that up at some point in the future. But
74
you have obviously had a good deal of experience at the policy
level in the Agency and we like to take advantage of that.
That is all, thank you.
Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much.
(Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)
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