176-10030-10422
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10030-10422
RECORD SERIES: Sorensen Papers
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR :
FROM
Schlesinger, Jr.
TO President Kennedy
TITLE : Memo to President CIA Reorganization
DATE 6/30/1961
PAGES: 15
SUBJECTS: CIA
DOCUMENT TYPE: Memoranda
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: 1C
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 8/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Sorensen Papers: Classified Subject Files 1961-64 Box 47, CIA,
Document 1a.
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June 30, 1961
MEMORANDUM FL. THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: CLA Reorganization
SEE SANITIZED
VERSION
NLK-84-149
ARRB/C.C. 9/02
T
.la
I submit the following views as one who worked in CSS during the
war and served as a periodic CLA consultant in the years since.
Un balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the
nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence
agency are unknown"; all the public hears about (or should hear
about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case,
agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned isw
visible errors. The important thing to recognise today, la my
judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has
about used up its quota. As margin for future error is practically
non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably
in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly
reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for
developments of which it is wholly innocent.
"
The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced
to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate,
and that this autonoray is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequatë
doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of
the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate
For should be
gross and repeated CIA failing has been
ocessional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable
publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost
nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed
tham (e. g. the articles by rd and Gladys Harkness,
Mysterious-Doings of CIA,
Evening Post, Cet. 30,
13, 1954).
"
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2.
conception of the reintionship between operations and intelligence,
The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these prob-
lems can perhaps be allevisted”
L CIA Autonomy
CIA conducts three main forms of secret work; clandestine intelii-
gence collection; co-art political operations; and paramilitary
activities. It carries as these functions with relative autonomy.
The reasons for the autonomy are historical.
Whoa CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in
terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, losked on this
new venture with suspicion and renounced the oppertunity to seize
firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to
establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and
some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to
in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and
the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed
· CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.
In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it
began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of
ite personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even
møre perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous pro-
tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and held
large number of able and independent-minded men, The mare it.
added brilliant activists to its staff, the mere mementum its operations
developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.
While Stat
By the time that Stato had begun to be fully aware of the problems
created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed
the chance to establish its own ultimate authority,
tained a nominal supervisiem over covert political
´some degree offact by CIA's tendency to present
simest as a fait accompli; State never had title to
clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in
areas as overt political reporting and
to
art diplomatic contacta.
the
ions, this
roposed ope
overt
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For its part. CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral-
leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of
the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political
desks and military #afls; it has in effect its own foreign service;
it has (or has had) his own combat forces; it even has its own air
force. As annual budget is about times that of the State Depart-
ment.
The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics
of a state within a state.
-
IL Doctrine
Though CLA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been
able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of
clandestine operations, The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent
to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free
and open society.
Yet
It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-sech,
we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed murtured in con.
spiracy: and the whole point of Communist social and political organi -
sation is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means
contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order
to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that.
I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits
which the maintenance of an open society places on oscret activity.
Until this is done, CIA's rale will not be clearly defined and under-
stood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret ·
activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?
We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States
will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and
maks speechos, reportere will dig out stories, newspapers will pub-
lish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will
blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to
change these things and could not do so without violating the essence
of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA
·raust operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and,
General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the
problem.
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There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret
activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the
principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to
permissible when their effect is to corrupt those principles and
practices.
Each
Each form of secre: activity presents its own problem. Clandestine
intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national
state. its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the
main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no
great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook
and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the
limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for
example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and".
whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other act
1 of the government.
I
Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions
arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians anc
organisations in other countries. But corruption of the political life
of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed.
wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. .
Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if
only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.
In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is
dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and
journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken
only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to
outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the sise of the pro-
posed operation may be of crucial importance. Smail operations can
be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater.
the visibility of the operation, the more its success dependa
thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society,
the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that overwhelming
case be made for its necessity.
must not only
In short, when confronted with a proposed operation,
ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms;
must ask whether its success requires our open seristy to be in
serious way false to its own principles.
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II. Operations and olicy
Clandestine activitie should be assessed not only in the context
of their relationship -o an open society but also in the content of their
relationship to United States foreign policy.
CIA operations have not been held affectively subordinate to U. S.
foreign policy.
1. Clandestins intelligence collection is, by charter, free from
State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy
to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting
agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent
Singapore case, when CIA, without notics to the Consul General,
tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore
Police provides an instructive example. After complications of
Indierons complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to
a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since
informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA
into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrass-
ment to relations between the US and the Singapore government.
There have been troubles of a¨comparable sort in Pakistan and in
Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo
to work in a CIA-NSA operation).
--
CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Depart-
ment in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation.
In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign
policy and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are
being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations.
Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the
advantage to be gained by the operation (s. 8. information derivakia
´from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) out-
weighs the risk (s; g., exasperating the local government and shaking
its confidence both in our purposes and in our sonse), Clandestine
intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Depart-
ment of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of
the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador,
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2. Covert political operations technically require State
Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been
able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost
to that of a rubber stamp,
This has been partly de consequence of the superior drive and
activism of CLA pertsonel, especially as compared with the diffiderne
of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA
with the assignment or developing covert political campaigns or
organising coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men
naturally fall to work with ingenuity and seal; they probably feel that
they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organine as many
coups as possible, The concept of 'contingency planning' has
legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumabi y
in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency
planning, ' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of
personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms coutin-
gencies into apparent necessities, Thus, if a group is assembled
and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the
project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and
alienation of the group: so the pressure increases to follow through
on what had started sa a pure apoculation. This was a central factor,
of course, in the Cuban decision the fact that disbandment of the
Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and
embarrassments. Having entered inte relations with personalities in
foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must there-
after do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security
or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on
-->
occasion the prisoners of our own agents.
We become prisoners of our agente in another senne tro. The Cuban
episode leaves the strong impression that CLA is not able to control its
own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are mon
of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are some -
times tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their owun
and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes
of the operation. ∙Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council,
such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reported!
trained Cubans in methods of torture, such opisodes as the detention
third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfa Nodal Tarais
16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest the things
go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only direly
acquainted.
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It has meant too the the State Department, often apprised of an
operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to
endorse the operatio, as already mounted because of the alleged
evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tem
Mann's remark the say the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba:
"I would never have igvored initiating this operation; but, since it
has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off. ⠀
Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism,
State, when it questions CLA operations or initiatives, casts itself in
a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities
seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles
as the reputation of the United States; world public spinion, "What
do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly
idealistic, legalistic and 'saft. '
:
The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been
to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department.
This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote
in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committe,
"The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. "
Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many
parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know
that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not
a state of mind calcuinted to stimulate friendly feelings toward the
United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example. .
This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifica
State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US
interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed
of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception
and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will con-
tinue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on
foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reason –
able control.
3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) representa a particula:
aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today
has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State
3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department covas
--
MIX
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(the other 2200 are ɔresumably under military or other nen-State
official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for
CIA personnal was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary.
The Dulles-Correa-. ackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should
not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems,
but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in
this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel,
find a way to tempe: its demands upon the State Department. None
theless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for afficial cover.
"
There are several reasons vahy CLA has abandoned its original intention
of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange covar
through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the
security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a
picasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the
CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.
in some missions, I understand, CAS personnal outnumbers regular
State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna,
out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List. Re
being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers
listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the
13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile,
11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent
of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS.
Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, bas
more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than
the Ambassador. Liten he has direct access to the local Prime
Minister. Somati:nes (as during a critical period in Laos) he puraven
a different policy from that of the Ambassador, Also he is generally
well known locally as the CIA representative.
!
CIA in Paris
In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA poopla.
´has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally
occupied by State. The CIÀ men doing overt internal political reporting
outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA hes
even sought to monopolise contact with certain French political perscali
ties, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occuɔ
the top floor of the Faris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and
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the night of the Gen-rals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted
with amusement that the top floor was ablase with lights. (I am
Informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that
night to the CIA offices only with difficulty. )
:
CLA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a
permanent solution for its problems. R is pressing to have CIA
people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control uí
more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS
becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would
seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control
over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive
of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with
an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.
4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarteru
as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and there-
fore a proper function of the Department of Defense.
almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent
context than paramilitary warfare.
Yet there is
the political
There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary
operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby,
as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open
society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the
training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics er to the
support of already existing guerrilla activitioa) For another, the
moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for
Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are
doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear
to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to
compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian
episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a
paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And,
us.
as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send
men to possible death, we camnet lightly write them off and close the
books. The Communists, the other hand, have no scruples about
liquidating a losing show,
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18.
Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military
men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla
succeeds when his program enliste grassroots support; and it is
very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with hirn.
Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the
guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 50, 000 men out there
and will clean the situation up in the three months. " Marshall,
who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines,
replied, “It won't is so easy. You will find that they will bloed
you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over-
coming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.
Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since
the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tite's defectica
closed the northern worder; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. L:
the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the
combination of political and military countermeasures.
The struggl
in Malaya, as field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for
the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only i
paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organization
of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence.
If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer
lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse
the countryside. "Without a political goal, “ wrote Mao Tse-tung,
“guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do
not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy,
cooperation and assistance cannot be gained," He added, "Do wo
want the support of the masses ? If we do, we must go among the
masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal
and woe."
ม
For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as
primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a pulitical weapon and
must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight.
It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than
ransferred to Defense.
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5. How to Establish Policy Control?
British experience might not be of value,
Here I wonder whether the
The notable feature of the
British intelligence -ýstem is the determination to keep clandestine
activity under stric, Foreign Office contral. This control is achieved
‘in a number of ways
:
a) Secret intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under
the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a
Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who
is now the Britich representative at the UN) and which includes
the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the
Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well
as the Chief of 115.
b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not
by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the
Foreign Office, uften in consultation with an interdepartmental
Working Group sa International Communist Fronts, and under
the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of
the Permanent Mader-Secretary's Department in the Foreign
Office.
c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only can-
form to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the
appropriate Forsign Office geographical deska.
d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern opera-
tions in special areas, such as, for example, Sine-Sevict rela-
tions or the World Youth Festival..
Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the BLS
Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve toure of duty in SIS
sections.
All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Departm
Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would
retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all
points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be
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enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship
working groups, arm by the infiltration of State Department
persomnél into the intelligence agency.
Obviously this set-- would not succeed, however, unless the
State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred
natite of diffusion. agativism and delay and to take a firm and
purpossful grip on the situation.
IV. Operations and intelligence
The relationship between operations and intelligence raises partien-
larly perplexing questions, 'Intelligence' includes two separable
(activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and
evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelli-
gence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that
"a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . overt,
normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent,
I should estirnate, of the information required for the guidance of our
national policy"}; the second invalves the collation and interpretation:
of all forms of intelligence, . wever obtained and the production oš
estimates.
Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the
Secret Intelligence Service, The research, analysis and estimating:
function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.
Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both
clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Depart.
ment's Bureau of intelligence and Research nise has research and
analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established
control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such
a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to GIA
for acceptance or rejection; in other words, where in Great Britaić
the Foreign Office plays the coordinating rele the intelligence (j«Li¦®
in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA,
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13.
The argument agains: incorporating the research and estimate
function in State was made by Dalles in 1947: "For the proper
judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that
information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to
weigh facts, and to araw conclusions from those facts, without
having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable
and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine
policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to
be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be.
faulty.
"
..
Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against
the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA
1. e.. if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then
those committed to particular operation will tend to select out the
intelligence which validates the operation.
Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment ei
a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&
group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is,
that neither policy or operations will be subjected to adequate
intelligence checks.
The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that
intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the
Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligente judgment. The in-
telligence branch (DOD) of CIA was never informed of the existence
the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never
asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent
had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation.
would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the
Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates
produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these wer
wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I
that, if its
opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different
estimate of the state of opinien in Cubs from that
which the
There existed, in short, the ridiculous
tion was based.
.
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that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars
by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA,
was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch.
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State
knew even less about the Cuban operation.
The
The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independoni
of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case
for vested ideas and intereste yet sufficiently close to be able to
subject projected operations or pelicies to the most intense and
searching scrutiny.
Where could this group be located? If the CIA ware to become
subordinate to State, as Xi-é is to the Foreign Office, then the Flamen
function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde-
pendent of both Stats and CIA, yet closely connected with both in ds, y
to-day operations. The R&F subagency would receive intelligence
from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course,
from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DEY
and State/Intelligence and Research. A might also take over certain
of the service functions new confided to CIA -- photographic interpre….
tation, biographical inta, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collec
tion, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Boardi
with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with
State Department or White House chairman.
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OF THE ORIGINAL.
V. Conclusion.
The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrange
raent of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity
of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to co
so in an affective and purposeful way, If the State Department as
present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is
not. in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganisation
intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State
Department.
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15.
The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this
memorandum would s as follows:
:
:
This
1) The Star Department would be granted general
ciearance authority over all clandestine activity,
might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment
of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who
would act for t! Secretary in these matters and who might
serve as chairmen of a Joint Intelligence Board.
2) The Jon Intelligence Board would include repre-
sentatives from ail elements in the intelligence community
and ales from the White House.
3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be
reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Informa-
tion Servico). This new agency would be charged with responsi-
bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations.
and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance.
In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation.
ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA
presently do.
4)
second semi-independent agency would be set up, again
bearing a blamaless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordi-
nate with the operations agency. ´This agency would be charged
with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would
include¨CIA/DDL, the Eureau of Intelligenes and Research in
State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA:
(photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast
inonitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.).
It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.
The Attorney General.
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan
rthur Schlesinger, jr.
SECKAT