JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
Date : 09/24/98
Page:
AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER: 206-10001-10012
RECORDS SERIES: PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
:
ORIGINATOR
FROM :
ΤΟ :
:
PFIAB
DOCUMENT INFORMATION.
TITLE:
DATE :
PAGES :
SUBJECTS :
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA
FOR MEETING OF MARCH 8-9, 1963 (THE BOARD MET WITH THE
PRESIDENT ON MARCH 9, 1963)
03/08/63:
28
AGENDA FOR MARCH 8 AND 9, 1963 MEETING
SUMMARY OF MARCH 8 AND 9, 1963 MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
1B, 1C
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : -08/14/98
OPENING CRITERIA
:
COMMENTS
:
08/01/2024
2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992.
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 88132
Docld:34671887 Page 1
206-10001-10012
NW 185
d:
NW221
Docld:34671887 Page 2
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
MEETING OF MARCH 8 9, 1963 (The Board
-
met with the President on March 9, 1963)
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
206-10001-10012
INW
Doeld 2
NW 88192
Docid:34671887 Page 3
CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD.
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF MARCH 8-9, 1963
ITEM
TIME
March 8th
1.
10:00 10:30
2.
10:30 11:00
3.
11:00 12:00
12:00 12:30
12:30-1:30
5.
6.
1:30
-
2:30.
7.
SUBJECT
The Chairman's Time
Status Report on Implementation
of Prior Board Recommendations
Mr. Russell Ash
Discussions with the Director
of Central Intelligence
Mr. John McCone
Intelligence Briefing on the
Current Situation in Cuba
Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, DDP Staff, CIA
Lunch
Review of DCI's Comments on Board's
Interim Report to the President
dated December 28, 1962
2:30 End of Day Preparation of Report to the President
March 9th
Resume Consideration of Item No. 7.
8.
9:00 - 9:55.
9.
-
10:00 10:30
Meeting with the President.
(Approx.)
10.
10:30 END
Discussion of Future Board Business
CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
March 11, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: March 8 and 9, 1963 Meeting of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Board meeting of March 8 convened at 10:00 a.m., with
the following in attendance: Messrs. Killian, Baker, Clifford,
Doolittle, Gray, Land, Langer, Ash and Coyne. (Mr. Pace was
unable to attend the two-day meeting because of absence from
the country; Mr. Murphy was unable to join the meeting until
later in the day.)
As the first order of business, in executive session, the
Chairman reported on a number of items including the following.
The Chairman advised that on the previous day Mr. Murphy
had informed Mr. Coyne that he had received a telephone call at
his offices in New York from the Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. McCone indicated to Mr. Murphy that the President had talked
with him about the Board's final report on the Cuba situation
dated February 4; that the President had shown Mr. McCone a copy
of the report, indicating that no other distribution was being
made of the report at this time.
was quite emotional in discussing
Board's report, stating that
submitting the report, the top
five people in CIA, including Mr. McCone, would have to resign
from the Agency. Mr. Murphy pointed out to Mr. McCone that the
report had already been formally submitted to the President by the
Board. Mr. McCone then expressed to Mr. Murphy his concern and
disagreement with the references in the report to the failure of
intelligence. Mr. Murphy advised Mr. McCone that in his Judgment,
and indeed he thought in the judgment of all of the Board members,
there was in fact a failure of intelligence and it was the duty of
the Board to so o state in its report to
President. Mr. Murphy
if the Board is going to insist Murphy advised that Mr. McCone
view that
expressed
indicated even
the mild. Mr. McCone
ort was
only about seven of
the thirty-five indicators listed in the report of offensive mis-
siles in Cuba which might be considered valid. Mr. Murphy reiter-
ated that Mr. McCone was quite emotional in discussing the above
matter, saying if the report stood it could lead to resignations
from DIA as well as CIA. At this point e mentioned to Mr. McCone
that he was in New York at a meeting with others and didn't like
discussing this aspect on the telephone and suggested they discuss.
the matter further when they next met.
IDEALIST/CORONA/OXCART
Handle Via TALENT KEYHOLE Channels
Handle via BYEMAN
Control System
TOP SECRET
NW 8812
Docld:34671887 Page 4
NW880324
17
Moving to another subject, the DCI said that he
TOP SECRET
Communist China,
and to a lesser degree he was concerneu about the prospects of such
He 
thought that the prospects of these
a development in Israel.
developments brings up a most serious problem from the 
standpoint
of psychological effect upon 
other nations should these develop-
ments take place, although there 
does not seem to be anything we
can do about them.
about the prospects of a future nuclear explosion was concerned
Insofar as U-2 overflights of Communist China by Chinese
Nationalist pilots are concerned, these 
missions are being 
flown
in "Category 3" weather (instead 
of Category 2 weather conditions
involving a maximum of 25% cloud 
cover) because there is a need 
for
The DCI
that although these missions have
frequent missions.
not produced evidence of said in operation in Communist China,
there are some indications, e.g., a test area in Tibet, and the
President has been alerted to this 
possibility.
As
The DCI said that somewhat of a problem is presented in Israel.
Although we are close to the Israeli government
, it appears to be
withholding information on the extent 
of its nuclear activities.
in the past France is assisting 
Israel and the French government 
is
helping the Israeli 
government build a nuclear reactor at the pre-
sen: time.
In a building next 
to the reactor there is an installa-
tion which could be a chemical separation facility, but the 
Israelis
Moreover
, the DCI pointed out, the
deny that this is the case.
Israelis refuse to submit
energy agency. Mr. McCone stated that he
believes that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by
Israel would have most serious effects 
on countries of the Middle
East and, therefore, Mr. McCone is ready to 
repeat recommendations
which he previously made to President 
Eisenhower that unless Israel
joins in the international safeguards 
we should take certain econ-
Mr. McCone observed that our govern-
omic reprisals against Israel.
the international atomic to international safeguards prescribed by
ment permits tax deductions on Israeli bonds, and we have given Israel
Despite this 
the Israelis could well be
billions of dollars in aid.
proceeding without full knowledge on our part on an atomic energy
program which could trigger grave 
trouble in the Middle East.
Finally, Mr. McCone reported that CIA has concluded that our
policy on intelligence collection within 
the United States is 
wrong.
and particularly as it applies to 
Soviet Bloc Embassies and to tele-
phone intercept coverage as well 
as exploitation of official Soviet
Mr McCone stated that he was
Bloc personnel in the 
United States.
.
going to propose that the CIA intensify its activities on these
matters or that the FBI be directed 
to intensify their activities
in these areas. He noted that basically 
this is an FBI 
responsibility
but that it is his own view that this 
responsibility could more
properly be carried out by the CIA.
IDEALIST/CORONA/OXCART
Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels
Mr. Clifford inquired as to
Handle via BLAN
TOP SECRET
Control System
Docld:34671887 Page 5
Doo
NW 888
Docid:34671887 Page 6
18
TOP SECRET
whether the DCI would not encounter difficulty in trying to get
this function transferred from FBI to CIA, and Mr. McCone responded
that he does not care who carries out the responsibility as long as
it is appropriately done and he added that he believes the CIA is
qualified to do it. Dr. Land observed that this activity does not
belong with the FBI%; that coverage of an espionage agent is one thing
but that exploiting Soviet Bloc coverage for intelligence collection
purposes is quite another.
Mr. McCone advised that there is another dimension to this
problem which involves increasing the number of CIA intelligence
representatives in Moscow. He noted that CIA has only three em-
ployees in the Moscow Embassy. He pointed out that in Washington,
D. C. and New York City out of a total of 392 Soviet official rep-
resentatives CIA has identified 176 as intelligence officers of the
KGB and GRU, a proportion of 45%. He added that 23% of the Soviet
official representatives in London are intelligence officers and
in France the figure is 36%.
Before departing the meeting Mr. McCone displayed to the Board
a photograph demonstrating the success of the latest infrared photog-
raphy taken of terrain from an altitude of 3500 feet.
Dr. Killian asked the DCI if the Board could have a copy of the
new draft NRO agreement, and in response to this the DCI made a
copy of the draft available later on in the day. Before Mr. McCone
left the meeting he suggested that if the Board had any questions.
regarding the terms of the draft NRO agreement it would be appropri-
ate to raise them with the Secretary of Defense or Mr. Gilpatric or
Mr. McCone himself, rather than raising such questions at working
levels at the Defense Department or the CIA. The DCI said that he
did not want to inhibit in any way the discussions that the Board
might want to have at any level at any time, and he noted that
Dr. Land was to confer with
(Dr Land assured the DCI dry Gilpatric the following day.
scheduled meeting was to be con-
fined strictly to a technical discussion.)
This concluded the DCI's meeting with the Board and he and
Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 12:30 p.m.
IDEALIST/CORONA/OXCART
Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels
TOP SECRET
Handle via BYEMAN
Ca
19.
TOP SECRET
At 12:30 p.m., Mr. Arthur Lundahl of the NPIC, and Mr. William
Tidwell joined the Board meeting. (Before beginning their presen-
tations, Mr. Lundahl answered a question from a Board member by
stating that the NPIC moved into its new quarters at the Naval Gun
Factory on
ɔn 
January 1, 1963, and it occupies the entire facility
except for the occupancy of a part of one floor by the U. S. Geo-
logical Survey.) Mr. Tidwell proceeded to give the Board a briefing
on the internal situation in Cuba. In essence Mr. Tidwell said that
Cuba is a good example of Latin American Communism in action. The
Castro regime has established very good security, but the internal
political situation is considerably messed up in a controversy
between the Castroites and the old-line members of the Communist
Party of Cuba..
The
The sugar crop in Cuba is off one-third this year.
country will have a hard time economically next year and the
Soviets will have to provide further substantial aid. Although
the rationing program is difficult to enforce in Cuba, the people
have by no means reached a starvation level. Bloc shipping carries
most of the imports into the island, and non-Bloc shipping is neg-
ligable.
Because of the efficiency of the Castro internal security
program, any significant organized revolt efforts have been pre-
vented. Fifty per cent of the refugees who were interrogated
during January thought that as of last summer there was a good
chance of a successful revolution against Castro. After the or
Soviets reached a peak of introducing personnel and armaments
in July, only five per cent thought that a revolt could succeed.
When the Russians subsequently withdrew strategic missiles from
Cuba fifteen per cent of the refugees thought that a revolt might
succeed.
1
Some 1500 students from other Latin American countries have
been given guerilla
training in Cuba. Castro's radio prop-
follow the Cuban
aganda is urging other
Mr. Tidwell said
example. In answer to a question by Dr.
that the Cubans are Jamming U. S. radio broadcasts beamed at Latin
American couns t
indicate that our
Tidwell
America, but Mr. Tidwell had no n to vity. Mr.
Government was jamming the Cuban
then summarized information on the Cuban and Soviet orders of
battle, along the lines of information contained in Current Intel-
ligence Bulletins.
Dr. Baker raised a rhetorical question as to whether the Sov-
iets were not in fact establishing in Cuba a a command-and-control post.
for use in the event of a military offensive against the western Hem-
isphere, and Dr. Baker asked if it were not true that never before
IDEALIST/CORONA/OXCART
Handle vi
Control System
Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels
NW 88132
Docld:34671887 Page 7
TOP SECRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
This document consists of
4
Copioa, Series
WASHINGTON
NW
Docld:34671887 Page 8
TOP SECRET-
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
March 14, 1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
Subject: Board Meeting with the President, March 9, 1963.
At 10:00 A.M., on March 9, 1963, the Board met with the
the Cabinet Room of the White House for the
President in
purpose of 
presenting the Board's report and recommendations
growing out of its completed review of the foreign intel
ligence aspects of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba.
Those present were Messrs. Killian, Doolittle, Land, Langer,
Gray, Clifford, Baker, Murphy, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy was also present.
Dr. Killian informed the President that the Board had
recommendations to present based on the Cuba episode.
He
recalled to the President that the Board had submitted two
previous reports, one an interim report dated December 28,
1962, containing recommendations of such urgency that the
Board forwarded them prior to completing its review of Cuba;
and a more comprehensive report dated February 4, 1963, in
which the Board set forth its complete findings based on a
detailed investigation of the Cuba situation from the stand-
point of foreign intelligence coverage. Dr. Killian said
that the recommendations which the Board was now presenting
should be considered in the light of the two previous reports,
particularly the report dated February 4, 1963.
Dr. Killian then presented the Board's recommendations,
reading from the written report which was forwarded to the
President under date of March 8, 1963. In reading this report.
to the President, Dr. Killian directed attention to the fact
that most of the recommendations which were being presented
were an outgrowth of the Board's study of Cuba, but that two.
of the recommendations dealt with major problems affecting
the over-all foreign intelligence effort.
Dr. Killian stated Fcommendations 1 thr gh 4 of the
March 8, 1963 report.
Following Dr. Killian's statement of Recommendation 4
regarding low-level aerial surveillance flights over Cuba,
the President observed that such flights had not been suspended
but were being g reserved for coverage of particularly critical
intelligence targets should the situation warrant, as, for
example, the February 9, 1963 low-level mission. Mr. Bundy.
TOP SECRET
NW 88139
Docld:34671887 Page 9
TOP SECRET
but
commented that two or three important targets in Cuba have
been identified since the February 9 low-level mission
, b
the approval of low-level coverage of these new 
targets 
is
being held in abeyance pending the completion of 
efforts 
by
Attorney Donovan to obtain the release of 
some twenty Ameri-
cans held prisoner in Cuba, including three 
individuals whom
the United States is particularly desiro of returning 
to
this country. The President asked for 
elaboration on the
Board's recommendation for the development of long focal
Dr. Land explained
length cameras to be used in U-2 aircraft.
that some time ago an effort was made to develop such a camera
but the earlier version was not a success, and the development
efforts were suspended use there was not an immediate
particular capability, 
although
at the present time such a camera would be most useful in
covering such Cuban targets as caves and other installations
suspected of being used for concealment of 
materials and
equipment. Dr. Land thought that the cost of developing a
long focal length camera would be relatively inexpensive in
comparison to the cost of such projects as DISCOVERER.
need for a camera having
Dr. Killian then presented Recommendations 5 through 7
of the March 8 report.
When Dr. Killian stated Recommendation 8 concerning pro-
posals for and the monitoring of unique intelligence operations,
Mr. Bundy made the comment that the Special Group fully 
agrees
with this recommendation and has instituted procedures designed
to assure that the Special Group is informed regarding opera-
tional delays encountered in the course of carrying out surveil-
lance missions previously approved by the Special Group.
Dr. Killian then stated Recommendation 11 of the Board's
report dated March 8.
In connection with Dr. Killian's statement of Recommenda-
tion 12 on the need for improving national intelligence
estimates, Mr. Bundy reiterated the point 
which the 
Board had
made to the effect that the present system for 
producing
national intelligence estimates is being run by the originators
of the system, and the present mechanism for producing 
such
estimates is a a "founders' body. Dr. Langer said 
it is 
true
that the estimative group has a highly trained staff which has
been in existence for many years, but the Board 
has not yet
conducted a specific study of its operations. Dr. 
Killian
summarized the tenor of this recommendation of the 
Board 
by
saying that a monolithic point of view is not necessarily the
best estimate.
TOP SECRET
Do
NW 88
Docid:34671887 Page 10
TOP SECRET.
Turning next to two recommendations of a general nature,
Dr. Killian stated Recommendations 13 and 14 of the March 8.
report dealing with the subjects of scientific intelligence.
resources and the effective organization and management of
the National Reconnaissance Office.
Following Dr.
presentation, the President
expressed his app for the Board's efforts and said
that he would follow through on the recommendations which
had been made.
"
Referring to the thirty-five intelligence reports con-
taining indicator-type data which were dealt with in the
Board's February 4 report, the President observed that these
indications were "pretty thin. The President observed that
first there was the Berlin Wall incident and then the Cuba
development, and in retrospect the President found it extra-
ordinary that our Government had not obtained more advance
information with respect to those situations.
The President said that we should have accomplished a
penetration of the Castro regime at a relatively high level
in the Cuban Government.
Dr. Land stated that he and Dr. Langer had been engaged.
in recent discussions of Dr. Land's concern about the manner
in which our national intelligence estimates are produced.
Dr. Land thought that, under the present system, it seemed
that no meaning could be derived from particular facts or
information unless the information could be fitted into patterns
which the estimators already had in mind. The Board is there-
fore suggesting, Dr. Land said, that the CIA see if there is
not a need for trained professionals who are not only open-
minded
but whose careers are devoted fitting intelligence
information into all possible patterns.
In the Cuba situation
Dr. Land pointed out, there was a fixed pattern in the minds
of estimators to the effect that refugee reports concerning
offensive missiles were in reality reports concerning surface-
to-air missiles and installations. Dr. Land said that the
Board was not proposing a policy under which the President
would review raw intelligence reports, but the Board felt
that the estimators should form the various alternative
patterns which can be reliably derived from an analysis of
intelligence, in order that policy makers may have the benefit:
of such alternatives. Dr. Langer said that on the other hand
the estimators have to act on rationality and cannot assume
that the enemy is acting on an irrational basis.
TOP SECRET

Dodd
NW-83211
Docld:34671887 Page 11
TOP SECRET
.
The President said that looking back on the Cuba situa-
tion it is now apparent that the SAM sites were related to
the deployment of offensive missiles. The President observed
that there has not been made, to his knowledge, an analysis
of the assumption under which the Soviet 3 operated in Cuba,
and it would be of some academic interest, rt least, to know
why the Soviets did not use their SA-2's against our over-
flight operations. Dr.
Land observed that if the Soviet
camouflage teams in Cuba had been up to schedule along with
the Soviet schedule for deployment of offensive missiles,
we would not have found the missiles, and it was by the grace
of God that we did find them.
Mr. Clifford, referring to earlier references to the
need for clandestine agent penetration of Cuba, said that the
Board had concluded that the absence of clandestine coverage
is attributable to a lack of imagination on the part of our
intelligence elements over a long period of years during which
we enjoyed close relations with the Cuban Government. There-
fore, Mr. Clifford said, the Board is concerned about the
adequacy of such coverage at the present time in places like
Brazil and Argentina. Mr. Murphy observed that originally the
CIA set out to use U. S. diplomatic establishments as a cover
for CIA intelligence operations only for an initial period,
but these cover arrangements became permanent. Mr. Murphy
noted that in discussion with the Board the Director of Central
Intelligence has said that it is difficult to achieve deep
cover for clandestine agent operations, and while Mr. Murphy
agrees that this task is of course difficult, he has seen no
evidence that concerted efforts have been made, for example,
to penetrate the Castro regime. Mr. Clifford recalled that
on the preceding day Mr. McCone had directed the Board's
attention to the fact that whereas the CIA has three operatives
in Moscow, the Soviet Union has/153 Intelligence officers in
the United States. Dr. Killian informed the President that.
the Board lays great stress on the need for a real effort to
increase our clandestine agent operations.
Referring again to the reports and findings of the Board,
the President said that one problem is reflected in the instance
where the Secretary of State had recommended that a particular
U-2 surveillance mission over Cuba be broken up into four over-
flight missions. The President said he was not suggesting that
this was not a prudent suggestion by the Secretary of State,
but that this made him conscious of the fact that there is
perhaps a lack of expertise on the part of policy makers with
respect to certain intelligence operations. The President
commented that one flight was flown over an area where the
aircraft could well have been shot down.
TOP SECRET
Doc d 2
NW 88133
Docld:34671887 Page 12
TOP SECRET
The President then referred to the fact that Dr. Killian
The President
was retiring as Chairman of the Board in May.
expressed deep appreciation for the work which Dr. Killian
has done and the valuable contribution which Dr. Killian has
made to the country. The President recalled that the Board
has conducted three post-mortems on intelligence situations,
and that these efforts of the Board have been most useful,.
particularly in the case of Cuba. The President added that
he wished to express his appreciation for the effective manner
in which the Board has carried out its duties in the past.
He stated that the Board's contribution has been most valuable."
the Roard
In addition to its being valuable to the President, awareness
has also contributed in an important way through the
which it has created in the intelligence community of its
continuing operations
g and
activities. The President Continuing review of intelligence
that he was very much indebted
to all of the Board members and is hopeful that the Board will
continue its present operations for he considered them to be
invaluable.
Dr. Killian expressed his gratitude for the President's
comments, and then said that, as a footnote to the Board's
present report, the members wished to say to the President
that he has a right to expect high quality performance on thely
part of the intelligence community, and the Board suggests
that the President see fit to emphasize to the intelligencetion
community the necessity for producing adequate information.
The President then referred to current criticisms and
inquiries which have been received from various quartersAJ
concerning the role of the Government in the Bay of Pigs
invasion, and the President wondered whether the Board felt
that the Administration should be more responsive to such
criticisms and inquiries. Mr. Murphy commented that we
would be well advised to follow the practice of Prime Minister
Macmillan who responds to such criticism and inquiries with
a statement to the effect that we do not discuss our intel-
ligence activities in public.
the President that members of the
Dr. Killian reatest extent possible the Adminis
Board feel that to
tration should refrain from making intelligence disclosures.
Mr. Clifford thought
with respect to the Bay of Pigs incident.
that the situation had been summed up humorously and accurately
in a recent statement by Congressman Mahon who questioned
whether the real problem was a lack of intelligence information
n the other hand, a lack of intelligence on the part of
self-appointed critics The President stated that he too was
Congressman Mahon's statement and, in fact,
after the statement appeared in the press, he called Congressman
Mahon and commended him on its content.
or, on
5
TOP SECRET
NW 88-1
Docld:34671887 Page 13
TOP SECRET
The one-hour meeting with the President terminated with
the President repeating his expressions of appreciation for
the work of the Board.
A. R. Ash
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
January 21, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT.
Interim Report to the President by the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, dated December 28, 1962
We have set down the several paragraphs of the subject report followed
by our comments.
Great uncertainties about
The recommendation of the Board.
present Soviet efforts in Cuba indicate the necessity of a continuing aggressive
intelligence effort to equip our policy makers 
with timely and adequate infor-
mation to meet the possibility of 
continuing Soviet confrontation in Cuba. We
must resist any tendency wards a let 
down in our intelligence effort against
Cuba in the wake of intelligence 
successes resulting from our military re-.
connaissance missions over the island. 
In making this observation we are
mindful that in a quite different atmosphere 
the Central Intelligence Agency
did not mount effective clandestine intelligence 
collection operations in Cuba
for an eight-month period following the Bay 
of Pigs invasion.
Comment. We agree
with the principle stated in the first sentence
of the recommendation and the need to continue an aggressive intelligence
effort against Cuba. This view was advanced 
by the Director of Central
Intelligence at the meeting of the Fresident's 
Board on December 7, 1962 
and
again at the meeting of the Board 
on December 28. The DCI informed the
Board at these meetings that it was 
important that there be extensive intelli
gence operations to find out the trend 
of developments in Cuba and that efforts
.
to get agents into Cuba were being 
intensified. It should be noted, however,
that in clandestine intelligence operations 
the allocation of additional manpower
and funds to a task, although helpful, 
does not necessarily assure a corre-
sponding improvement in production or 
accomplishment.
Since early 1962 the CIA has increased its effort to collect intelli-
gence information on Cuba. The operations for this 
purpose have been
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
Doc
NW 88 89
Docld:34671887 Page 14
HANDLE VIA:
Copy 4
TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
SC 01539-63
TOP SECRET
conducted vigorously as a matter of urgency. Following the misfortune at
clandestine effort against Cuba.
Even so, from April 15, 1961 through December 1961 the Clandestino.
Services of CIA disseminated 608 information reports on Cuba,
the Bay of Pigs, there was a decrease in th &
r
The Contact Division/00
of which 406 reports came from sources inside Cuba.
of CIA disseminated 1764 reports on Cuba during the period April 8 to December
1961. During the period from April 1961 through December 1961, seventeen
In addition, five
resident agents were recruited in Cuba and are still active.
resident assets, two with sub-assets, recruited prior to April 1961, were
maintained during this came eight-month period and are still active.
were other recruitments and numerous attempts that failed.
There
The period of sixty days following the Bay of Pigs invasion was a
difficult one for the Agency. The Taylor Committee, composed of General.
Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Allen Dulles, and Admiral Burke, began
its survey of the Bay of Pigs operation on April 22 and continued throughout
May and June. This Committee took much of the time and effort of precisely
those people responsible for Cuban operations, both in Miami and in Washington.
There were demands for written papers and documents, as well as personal
interviews of key people. Changes in the top echelon of the Agency, anticipated
during the summer and implemented in the fall of 1961. had their effect on
Cuban operations. While it was generally agreed and understood that cur
effort to collect information must continue, specific policy guidance was not
given to CLA and funds necessary to carry out expanded programs were not
approved by higher authority until August 4, 1961.
The newly appointed DCI, following his review of the situation in
mid-December 1961, directed that the effort against Cuba be intensified.
This led to the establishment, on March 8, 1962, of Task Force W as a
separate entity within the Agency for the purpose of mounting a maxlinum
effort, particularly in the collection of information, against Cuba. As of
March 8, 1962 the Task Force had a personnel strength in the field and at
Headquarters of 335. As of January 1, 1963, the total number of personnel
Of this 594, 147
dovoting full time to the efforts of the Task Force was 594.
wore from other agencies and other components of the Agency outside the
Clandestine Services. Total financial obligations during fiscal year 1962
were $17,291,000. Estimated obligations for fiscal year 1963 totaled
$28,200,000, but now have been scaled to $24,000,000 with the final figure
dependent upon future policy.
2
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
indle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
Doc
NW 88182
Docld:34671887 Page 15
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT=
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
Dock
NWP88321!
TOP SECRET
2. The commendation of the Board. We recommend intensified, hard-
hitting efforts to increase our capability for obtaining significant intelligence
through clandestine collection operations (espionage). Despite noteworthy
intelligence results obtainable through scientific and technical means, we still
have as great a need as ever for carefully selected, human-resource espiomge
operations professionally executed on the basis of the soundest planning judgments
and the most competent target selection processes which the intelligence cam-
munity can achieve. The Cuban experience is a case in point, for we now have
few meaningful espionage assets on the island and without such assets we have
little hope of developing the kind and degree of hard intelligence which is required:
on such critical matters as: a) the plans and intentions of the Soviet Government
and the Castro regime for future operations within Cuba or for future operations.
launched from Cuba against other Latin American countries; b) the alleged con-
cealment of offensive weapons in caves or other locations which are incapable of
being probed by technical intelligence means; and c) the actual numbers of Soviet
troops in Cuba, their precise deployments, equipments, activities and objectives.
In numerous countries our serious lack of clandestine agent resources
is compounded by heavy reliance on the use of official cover as a cloak for our
Intelligence-gathering activities abroad. Again, Cuba provides an important
lesson. When the rupture of diplomatic relations in January 1961 forced the
recall of U. S. intelligence personnel who had been operating under diplomatic
over provided by the American Embassy in Havana, we did not have remaining
on the island and we still do not have adequate. deep cover, clandestine
agent networks on which to rely. Priority U. S. intelligence requirements in
Latin America and elsewhere call for intensive efforts by the appropriate
intelligence agencies of the Government to lay the groundwork for deep-cover,
clandestine intelligence operations which are not dependient upon official cover
and which will not be affected by a breach in diplomatic relations. *
"
Events of the past few years suggest that dramatic advances in
advanced intelligence methods such as high altitude and satellite photography
have obscured the role of human beings as collection and transmission media,
trained and equipped with the most sophisticated technical aids, and supported
by essential logistics and communications. We are gravely concerned about
the progressive loss of our capability in the field of clandestine intelligence
operations and in our view there is a need for the preparation of new plans for
the recruiting, training and equipping of agents for comprehensive clandestine
intelligence collection, particularly in Latin America.
The need for clandestine intelligence coverage has been emphasized previously
in reports of advisory bodies constituted by the President to review our foreign
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
Docld:34671887 Page 16
NW8821
TOP SECRET
✓ intelligend
intelligence activities. These advisory groups, which incidentally included
some of the members of your present Board
, have made specific recommen-
dations on the subject. In 1954 the Doolittle 
Committee emphasized the need
for: a) developing nonofficial cover facilities; 
b) the placement of "deep-cover
sleeper agents" with a corresponding decrease 
in dependence upon official
over; c) the creation of a long-range, 
deep-cover planning system; and d
) the
promulgation of cover doctrine and procedure. 
In 1955 the Technological
Capabilities Panel of the President's 
Science Advisory Committee, noting
that "we should today be laying the groundwork 
for extensive covert 
operations
in every country available to our agents", 
recommended that "a heavy long-
term investment should be made in the preparation 
of covert agents as 
eventual
"More 
recently, in its report of July 2,
sources of high-level intelligence.
1761, your Board recommended that the new Director of Central Intelligence
consider the desirability and means of 
achieving a deeper cover for all
clandestine and covert activities of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and 
that
the disproportionate number of CIA personnel 
operating under diplorastic
cover be reduced on an orderly basis, having 
in mind their replacement 
by
agents under deep cover.
Comment. We agree with the principle of intensifying hard-hitting
efforts to increase the production of significant intelligence 
information through
espionage. This we will continue to do 
on a worldwide basis within the limits
of our resources. We strongly support the 
principle expressed in the second
sentence above. We agree that it is important 
for those responsible for the
collection of intelligence information to 
bear in mind that there is much 
sorely
needed information that cannot be collected 
by scientific and technical means.
Such information is often in the human mind or 
the written word, Frequently
information collected by scientific and technical 
means must be supplemented
by information derived from human sources to 
interpret it or to give it true.
significance. As Mr. Helms informed the 
Board on December 7, 1962, there
is an impressive illustration of this interplay 
of information from technical
and human sources in the identification 
of missiles and their sites in Cuba.
Material derived from classic espionage played 
a vital role in the community's
analysis of Soviet missile activities in Cuba 
last October. Specifically, Soviet
TOP SECRET documents acquired by a CIA 
agent concerning the preparation
of R-12 MRBM's for launching, and the layout of 
sites for such missiles,
provided the primary basis for evaluating 
the degree of completion and 
the
These reports also complemented
state of readiness of the MRBM's 
in Cuba.
photo intelligence by providing organizational facts on R-12 units, and
identifying specific ground support 
equipment which appeared in 
photographs.
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM,
Docld:34671887 Page 17
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
TOP SECRET
Material from agent operations also helped interpret COMINT rolating to
Soviet activity in Cuba. Letter-number designations for components of Soviet
missiles and their ground support equipment which appear in material supplied
by a CIA agent have enabled NSA to identify items being shipped from the
USSR to Cuba.
Wo do
In considering the statement that'
at 
"we now have few meaningful
ospionage assets on the island" it should be remembered that meaningful
intelligence is obtained not only on the island but elsewhere as well.
havo assets which report on Cuba, such as Cuban diplomats, liaison services,
Cuban seamen, and audio operations against Cuban installations abroad
, all
of which are not on the island but do provide meaningful information 
about
events inside Cuba. Among these assets are some that do provide us with
insights into the Castro regime's plans and intentions. We have on the island
itself over 130 resident singleton agents who have been and are providing us
with a variety of intelligence information on Cuba. Among these are 
those
agents who furnished the intelligence community with significant reports on
aspects of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba last summer, particularly 
on
SAM'a, cruise missiles, MIG-21's, IL-28's, and strategic missiles. These
agent reports, combined with refugee reports, initially resulted in 
the
targeting for the U-2 flights which identified the SAM's and 
other 
weapons
and later contributed to the targeting for the U-2 flight of October 
14 
which
Ascovered the MRBM site at San Cristobal. Today, there are 
among the
more than 130 resident agents in Cuba approximately twenty agent sources
with a capability of providing significant information on military developments
We
approximately ten with access to significant political information
.
do not have sources with complete access to the "plans and intentions" of the
Castro regime. It must be remembered, however, that agents inside 
Cuba
are operating within a classic denied area with ever-increasing police
controls and where Cubans are largely excluded from Soviet military
installations. We will never be satisfied that we have a sufficient number of
agent resources on the island of Cuba; however, the quantity of agenta is 
not
the most difficult problem. Reaching the targets within a country organized
as Cuba is now organized is the greatest difficulty.
and
The second paragraph of this recommendation appears to confuse
American operatives under nonofficial cover with sources under deep cover
who can survive and report after the severance of diplomatic relations.
There is an inclination by some critics of the current clandestine
effort to consider an increase in nonofficial cover with a corresponding
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
NW 8812
Docld:34671887 Page 18
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
Do
NWF8812211
TOP SECRET
decrease in official cover as the solution to many of the problems of clan-
destine activity in foreign areas. Nonofficial cover as used in this 
sense
means an arragement which provides a plausible reason for 
the American
representative being in the foreign area in a capacity other 
than as a 
repre-
sentative of the Government of the United States. The repetitive 
advocacy 
of
more nonofficial cover and less official cover is usually for reasons 
other
than the superiority of nonofficial cover in the clandestine collection 
of
intelligence information. We realize that there are other important consider-
ations which make it undesirable to have a disproportionate 
number of intell' -
We 
contend, however
,
gence operatives under diplomatic and consular cover.
that only under proper and special conditions is nonofficial cover superior to
official cover in the clandestine gathering of information. By and 
large
official cover is more productive. The question of establishing 
and 
maintaining
under viable deep cover, sources of information who can survive 
and report
through clandestine channels is quite another matter and really 
has little to
do with whether our American intelligence officers are under 
official or 
non-
official cover. These deep cover sources must be of foreign nationality
, at
least appear to be so, to operate effectively in a country hostile 
to the 
United
States and especially in a police state after diplomatic 
relations have been
broken. But the recruitment of such sources and their organization 
can
"sually be done more effectively by American representatives under official
Had all the CIA repre-
cover than by Americans under nonofficial cover.
sentatives in Cuba at the time diplomatic relations were severed in 1961 been.
there under nonofficial cover they would probably have been able 
to remain
only a short time longer than our representatives under official 
cover and
those who did remain could not have operated effectively under 
the 
surveillance
We do agree, of 
course,
that would have undoubtedly been placed on them.
that selectively we should make an effort to lay the groundwork for deep cover,
clandestine operations that can survive a break in diplomatic 
relations and
other crises.
It is in order to consider briefly the nature, advantages and limi-
tations of nonofficial cover. It is to be noted first and foremost 
that the CIA
as a matter of avowed policy, is committed to the use of nonofficial cover 
in
all instances, where it is available and its use is justified. 
In many areas 
of
the world, however, nonofficial cover does not exist or, if 
it does, it exists
under such circumstances as to have little use for the conduct of 
espionage.
This is true of the denied areas, more particularly the Bloc 
countries; the
quasi-denied areas such as Iraq and Egypt; and the under
-developed 
countries,
where there are no facilities of science, commerce and 
education from which
6
OP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN,
CONTROL SYSTEM
Docld:34671887 Page 19
HANDLE VIA:
TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
NW88321!
-TOP SECRET
cover might devolve within the society. In those areas where nonofficial
cover may provide legality for an agent's residence in the area and con-
cealment of his ultimate objectives, it still may not give him access to
designated targets. Unless it doos, nonofficial cover is unproductive. The
identification of a target and access to it through a viable cover instrument
is an essential combination in the employment of nonofficial cover.
The more tactical operations (particularly in those countries where
CIA presence is welcome or at least tolerated) are better done by individuals
under official cover. For example, liaison and joint operations are more
effectively and more cheaply carried on from an official installation than from
a nonofficial one, for the simple reason that secure files, work space and
communications are readily at hand. It is poor economy of manpower and
overseas dollars to conduct this collaborative effort through the usage of the
much more expensive nonofficial cover unless some clear advantage is gained
thereby.
No sweeping or general conclusion can be applied to a relationship
of official cover to nonofficial cover, except in those few places where there
is relatively a free choice between the two. But since there are no very many
The augmen-
of those, each country must be considered as a problem in itself.
tation of nonofficial cover assets lies in closer examination of the operational
possibilities of nonofficial cover in each individual station to insure that it is
employed in instances where it is available and will enable the representative
to do his job or accomplish his task. We must start with a consideration of
our objective in a given area and determine if we can reasonably expect to
reach it through nonofficial cover.
To this end, some months ago the CIA initiated a worldwide
planning program. Each station and base chief was asked to evaluate his
operations, present and projected, to determine the most efficient balance.
between staff under official cover and staff under nonofficial cover, to be
achieved, as a target date, five years hence. Practically all of these plans
have now been received in Washington and are in process of Headquarters
evaluation. It was clear even before the planning was undertaken, that
certain stations needed seasoned officers under nonofficial cover and that
there was a big void in the category of the officer who, as a young man,
might locate under nonofficial cover in a given community and spend the
better part of his career serving both the purposes of his cover and CIA.
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM.
Docld:34671887 Page 20
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT.
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY

Dodd
NW-881322
TOP SECRET
During the past year there has been a gratifying improvement on both counts.
These programs will continue to have high priority and be the subject of
intensive efforts.
As evidence of our concentration on this important subject we have
recently established in the Clandestine Services of CIA a new component, the
Domestic Operations Division and Station (DODS), which will be responsible
for the management of relations between the Agency and private enterprise
in the United States. In this component has been placed responsibility for the
maximum utilization of the facilities offered by business, education, foundations,
etc. in furthering and supporting the activities of the Agency. We expect that
the effort of this component will lead to improved nonofficial cover and more
extensive assistance by the nonofficial resources of the U. S. in many aspects
of the Agency's activity.
The best possibility of attaining intelligence assets after a break in
diplomatic relations or a hostile takeover lies in the creation and maintenance
of a dormant skeletal network prior thereto, with activation on signal from
without at some future date. This plan has actually been followed in cooper-
ation with local Services in certain European areas and it has proved to be
burdensome and very costly in terms of both manpower and money.
CIA does
have the capability in addition to its current operations to create and
maintain this type of staybehind on a very large scale. This does not mean
that nothing should be done in those cases where a hostile takeover or a break
in relations appear probable. Efforts to penetrate the communist apparat
and communist cadres should be heavily augmented. Other minority groups
should also be penetrated. Individuals who have not been active in either
espionage or national politics and who might survive the takeover should be
identified, cleared and even approached at a given point in the developing
situation. All in all, more should and can be done in those cases.
answer to the problem of the survival of networks after takeover, however,
does not lie in the deployment of more Americans under nonofficial cover.
The
In each of the last two years, the Department of State and CIA have
jointly made a searching examination of the officer manpower at all posts
(stations and bases) of which there are 165. Officer ceilings for CLA as of
August 1, 1962, were fixed at 470 positions, or an average of 2.8 positions
per post. Giving effect to reductions and adjustments resulting from that
examination, there are at present 7 posts where there are 10 or more FSR
positions, and in addition only 20 posts where the FSR positions are 5 or
8
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
Docld:34671887 Page 21
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
183
Dodd:
TOP SECRET
more, but less than 10.
An informed current estimate is that the Soviet Union employs
worldwide under official cover more than 1300 operations officers (known or
suspect KGB, 652; known or suspect GRU, 328; known or suspect RIS (Service
unidentified), 312). There are about 370 Soviet permanent officials serving
in New York City and Washington, D. C. Of these 370 permanent Soviet
"officials", there are 140 positively identified intelligence officers and 33
who are suspects. In addition, there are hundreds of Soviets who visit the
United States with the U.S. General Assembly or with other Soviet delegations
and groups. Almost without exception, these groups contain Soviet intelligence
officers under official cover. While the Soviet official representation in the
U.S. has included 140 individuals known to be engaged in intelligence activities
the CIA has never had more than four on duty in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
Overseas, the present total of American operatives under non-
official cover is 1000, plus or minus, including a hard core of 300 staff agents
and career agents. The figure of about 1000 compares with a figure of 550 in
1955, the first year the consolidated figures are available. Perhaps more
significant is the fact that the "hard core" totals have risen to 300 from a
total of 200 in 1959. When it comes to the employment of foreign nationals,
figures are much less reliable because the records of secondary agents often
exist only in operational reports. However, in terms of primary agents of
foreign nationality on a worldwide basis, the number is on the order of
10,000.
There has not been a progressive loss of our capability in the field
of clandestine intelligence operations. On the contrary our capability has
increased. As an example during the last half of 1960, 2514 sources produced
23, 034 positive information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services
of CIA. During the last half of 1962,
2, 
2850 sources produced 22, 256 positive:
information reports disseminated by the Clandestine Services of the CIA.
The smaller number of reports during the second period resulted from a
concerted effort to reduce marginal reporting and encourage fewer but better
reports.
On the situation in Latin America, the South America Assessment:
Team in its report of January 10, 1962 stated that in general CIA had es-
tablished a healthy foundation for the collection of intelligence information;
9
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
NW-881622
Docld:34671887 Page 22
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
NW88322
TOP SECRET
that this base should be retained; that what was needed from then on was
expansion, strengthening and refinement of capabilities in various fields.
of activity. During the past year CIA has made progress in 
expanding,
strengthening and refining its capability in the clandestine collection of
intelligence information in Latin America. CIA has opened new stations in
Kingston, Jamaica; Georgetown, British Guiana and the Paramaribo
, 
Dutch,
Guiana and has opened bases in Cordoba, Argentina; Merida, Mexico 
and in
Belem, Belo Horizante, Curitiba and Salvador, Brazil. During the past year,
CIA personnel in the field in Latin America has been increased by 54, in-
This makes a total 
of 365 
officera
cluding 24 officers under nonofficial cover.
in Latin America. A substantial additional number of officers under non-
official cover will be assigned to the field during the coming year. Increased
emphasis on the collection of intelligence information in Latin America during
the past year has resulted in the activation of 263 additional 
clandestine
sources of information. CIA now has 1949 agents approved for use in Latin
America an increase of 242 in the past year. Penetrations 
of Communist
Parties and Front Organisations in Latin America now number 142.
-
We recommend, while it is
3. The recommendation of the Board.
still possible, continued high-level and low-level (as required) aerial re-
connaissance of Cuba as one means of acquiring photographic and signals
(intelligence concerning the military installations, the military forces, the
modern military weaponry and the highly sophisticated 
communications
facilities which the Soviets retain in Cuba. This surveillance 
effort 
must be
sccompanied by priority planning for the development of acceptable substitutes
(such as drones, improved satellite reconnaissance, etc.) 
in lieu of present
aerial reconnaissance coverage, when and if such coverage is denied us by
air defense systems now being installed by the Soviets in Cuba on a 
scale
matched only by Soviet air defense installations in the areas of Moscow and
Leningrad. We also recommend the launching at the earliest possible date
of a vigorous clandestins agent program to provide surreptitious collection
of on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an essential
supplement to aerial surveillance of the island.
Comment. We agree in general with this recommendation. High-
level aerial reconnaissance of Cuba acquiring both photographic and signals
intelligence concerning the military installation, the military forces, the
modern military weaponry, and highly sophisticated communications facilities
in Cuba is continuing. At present low-level reconnaissance is 
not included
in the Cuban reconnaissance program. Authority will be sought for its use
10
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
Docld:34671887 Page 23
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
NW-881322
TOP SECRET
should a sufficiently suspicious objective of potentially offensive character
be reported which cannot be covered by high altitude photography or other
sources.
The United States Intelligence Board has approved SIGINT require.
ments for the use of a drone against Cuba when the circumstances require.
A photographic drone capability exists and separate requirements for its use
can be generated when necessary. This capability is now on a standby basis
and could be activated within 10 days. Present satellite reconnaissance
capabilities cannot provide the detailed information necessary for meeting
our requirements in Cuba. Even though a decision were made to program a
satellite for the southern latitudes, sacrificing the presently achievable
resolution over priority targets in the USSR, it is felt that the results would
not be satisfactory. The best resolution that might be obtained falls far short
of the present requirement. The asset cannot be used on an "on-call" basis
either in terms of launching or in terms of insuring that a pass will cover
Cuba, and if it does that such pass could occur in satisfactory weather
conditions. Whereas improved satellite performance is in the offing, these
factors would still apply for the foreseeable future.
With regard to on-the-ground photography of targets in Cuba, as
pointed out above we are vigorously attempting to infiltrate or recruit agents
In Cuba. Selected agents will be provided photographic equipment. It should
be realized, however, that the photographing of prime intelligence targets in
a denied area, even with cleverly concealed cameras, is difficult.
4. The recommendation of the Board. We urge that without further
delay a major clandestine agent effort be directed to the obtaining of vitally-
needed signals intelligence available from the array of extraordinarily.
nophisticated communications equipment which is being installed and operated
in Cuba by the USSR. Some of the systems already identified appear to be
under command control running from the Ministry of Defense in Moscow to
key Soviet ground, naval and air force commands in Cuba, and their perma-
nent installation on the island marks the first time that they have been
deployed at such distances from the protected confines of the Soviet domain.
The proximity to the United States of this communication equipment presents
our intelligence collectors with unique opportunities to seek the means for
"reading" not only the current traffic carried on highly secure cominunications
systems of the USSR, but also back traffic which has been so securely
protected as to defy our most sophisticated efforts to break it.
We recognize
11
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
Docld:34671887 Page 24
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
TOP SECRET
that continued priority must be devoted to attacking this problem through.
our present and planned use of intercept and direction finding facilities
employed at vantage points on land, in the air and at sea. In addition to
such coverage we strongly recommend that: a) clandestine agent programs
be devised and set in motion at once in Cuba, with a view to acquiring
through surreptitious means, including the use of portable recording equip-
ment capable of concealment on an agent's person, the emanations from
Soviet encoding machines which are captureable at reasonable distance from
the communications centers at which they are employed, and b) that steps be
taken to ensure the readiness of commando-type or covert action plane and
task forces as may be required for the pre-emption of Soviet communication
sites and encryption machines in the event that opportunities for such action
should be provided under circumstances of successful internal revolt or
invasion.
Comment. The collection of Signals Intelligence from within Cuba
has been under way for some time. The most sophisticated of Soviet equip-
ments were not identified as being in Cuba until October 28, 1962, and it has
not yet been possible to identify their precise location, through either electronic
or agent means. Arrangements are now underway which may enable NSA to
provide the Clandestine Services with considerably more accurate supplementary
P/F results. An airborne D/F "homing" technique will be utilized to attempt
to pinpoint the locations of transmitters in other than heavily populated areas.
The first target mission is now scheduled for approximately February 1, 1963.
Under most favorable conditions, however, it is not anticipated that this effort
would yield position accuracy of better than a kilometer. Further refinement
of such results would be dependent upon a clandestine close-in effort to
determine the exact locations where the devices are being used. There is no
information available to indicate that these installations are "permanent",
although there is no doubt, as of this date, that they are under complete Soviet
control. Without question, Cubans are not permitted access to the areas in
which the machines are located nor are Cubans being trained in the use of the
machines. The identification of the more sophisticated equipments comes
from Signals Intelligence, and the variety of agent sources available to us in
Cuba has not reported on any aspect of this equipment, indicating that the
Cuban officials themselves with whom cur agents are in touch are not aware
of the nature of the equipment the Soviets have put into Cuba.
Inasmuch as the only information on these devices has been derived
by purely cryptanalytic attack, no data are available concerning thei: technical
12
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
Don
NV 881322
Docid:34671887 Page 25
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
NW-88222
TOP SECRET
or possible radiation characteristics. Since it is virtually certain that the
Soviets are aware of the existenco oi possibly 
compromising radiations 
from
cipher equipments as well as from electromechanical 
printing devices which
are at times associated with them, it is 
not considered likely that a radiation
attack, can be accomplished using simple 
detection devices. Additional
support is lent to this opinion by the complete 
absence of Soviet use of 
any
enciphering equipment in any embassy 
or mission outside the iron curtain.
The only exception in the past has been 
the use of one or two cipher equip-
ments by very special VIP parties on Soviet 
naval vessels. In the event 
that
the machines do not have electrical 
circuits, there would be in such case no
radiation or emanations which would be captureable 
at any distance from the
centers in which the machines are located. 
Considerable research is currently
being conducted to overcome the technical difficulties 
in portability and sensi-
tivity which are inherent in an effort to 
intercept by means of clandestine
agents emanations from Soviet equipments.
In view of the lack of information noted above, the clandestine
effort against Soviet COMINT in Cuba must consist of (a) first attempting to
locate the machines themselves, and (b) devising 
possible means of access
to the machines. CIA is currently reviewing all 
possible locations in Cuba
where the machines may possibly be located 
in an effort to develop target
data on each location, including terrain, 
security factors, order of battle
of Soviet units, and personalities on each 
possible installation. In the 
absence
of adequate D/Fing and with the lack of 
information on the location of the
machines, we cannot be too sanguine about 
locating the target installation
with sufficient accuracy to devise ways and 
means of creating a feasible
operational situation within any scheduled phasing
. Every effort in being
made, however, to develop more precise 
targeting data. These efforts 
to
locate the targets and to identify the facilities 
and agents who may eventually
be used, have been given the highest priority.
The Board's recommendation that there be available commando-
type or covert action plans and task forces to take advantage of 
an internal
revolt or an invasion has been the subject 
of past and present planning and
preparation by CIA, and discussions have been 
held with NSA concerning 
the
best means of achieving this end. These 
discussions will continue with NSA
and with DOD with the objective of creating 
the needed stand-by facility and
incorporating it into the appropriate military plans 
with specific assignment
of responsibilities. In addition, CIA has in 
being externally held assets
which can be utilised for a commando-raid 
operation, in the event of a
13
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
Docld:34671887 Page 26
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
NW 88192
TOP SECRET".
significant internal uprising. Without the precise location of the machines,
however, even at such a time it will be difficult to target the commando raid.
with any assurances of success. It must be borne in mind, however, that
any such direct action, short of open U. S. military invasion, is likely to
lead to Soviet reprisals in one form or another against sophisticated U. S.
communications equipments. The Soviets will probably, in such event, not
be hampered by as many considerations as would the U. S., should this lead
to a chain reaction on the part of the Soviets. At the same time, the intelli-
gence value of the equipments obtained must be constantly reviewed if the
information is to be obtained by other than surreptitious means.
In sum, therefore, this is a problem with which the intelligence
community has long been troubled. There are no panaceas, and even though
the location of the equipment, for the first time so close to U. S. shores,
seems, therefore, to make it appear easier to obtain the required intelligence,
the facts of the matter are to the contrary in that the Soviets are still main-
taining full and complete control over the equipment just as they have done in
the past in more contiguous areas to the Soviet Union.
5. The recommendation of the Board. In instances where exceptional
intelligence collection techniques involving unusual risks are proponed to meet
priority intelligence objectives and their use is opposed on ground that elements
of risk are present, the matter should be referred to the Presidential level for
final decision. We recommend this procedure because our Government may
well be faced with the necessity of assuming increasing risks if we are to
acquire a
a 
firm intelligence basis for estimating present and future Soviet
capabilities and intentions in Cuba and in other potential trouble spots.
ons in Cuba and in other pot
Comment. We concur in this recommendation.
term "Presidential level" means the President.
We assume that
6. The recommendation of the Board. In view of evidence from Cuba
that the Soviets are resorting to use of camouflage of missile installations,
we recommend that the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NNO).
assign a high priority to experiments, under controlled conditions, to determine:
the effectiveness of short and long range photography against various types of
camouflage and concealment of photographic targets. We believe that new
sensing and illumination methods may now be available which would be of
assistance in reaching a solution of this critical problem.
14
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
Docld:34671887 Page 27
HANDLE VIA:
-TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY.
TOP SECRET
Comment.. We agree. The Committee on Overhead Reconnais-
sance already has recommended the use of camouflage detection film in
reconnaissance of Cuba. This has never been tried so the COMOR has
requested that tests be made of the available camouflage detection film and
that the results be reported to COMOR in order that it may be aware of the
full nature of the capability should requirements indicate a moed for its use.
In addition, the Committee has requested a briefing by the Joint Reconnais-
sance Center on the full range of FLASH LIGHT photography both low- and
high-altitude so that it may be fully aware of the assets available to meet
requirements.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
15
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle via BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM
HANDLE VIA: -TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY
Dock
NW 88199
Docld:34671887 Page 28:
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Rec.d.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
27 February 1963
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
SUBJECT:
Interim Report to the President by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated
December 28, 1962
Cember 28, 196
At its last meeting the Special Group considered Recommendations 3.
and 5 of your Interim Report to the President dated 
December 28, 
1962,
along with comments on these recommendations 
from the DCI, CIA,
State and Defense.
The Group agreed with the objectives of Recommendation 3, and it has
e question of adequate aerial 
reconnaissance 
of
under continual review the
Cuba. With respect to satellite coverage, it appears that within the
reasonably near future the technical characteristics 
of these vehicles
will make it impossible to cover the intelligence requirements adequately. ·
Drones are available on a standby basis and could be employed 
if necessary
.
The Group agrees further that on-the-ground photography in Cuba is highly
desirable, and some clandestine agents will be 
provided with appropriate
equipment. It was recognized, however, that this is a 
highly risky
endeavor with limited chances of success under 
existing 
circumstances.
Recommendation 5 was noted by the Special Group. The members agreed
completely with the view that unusually risky intelligence 
operations be
referred to the Presidential level for Cecision 
whenever there is a 
serious
need to balance opportunity against risk. On matters 
of this kind the Group
frequently refers the decision to the President, 
and in such cases considers
itself simply as advisory to him. This procedure will 
continue to be followed
.
B
2-28-63
71186
cc: Special Group Members
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS
Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels
Handle via DYEMAN
McGeorge Bundy
SC-02206-63-TKH
Cy
of
6
Cys
NW 88192
Docld:34671887 Page 29
Control System
TOP SECRET