178-10004-10054
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ORIGINATOR:
PFIAB
KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN
FROM:
TO:
RECORD
Date:
4/17/201
TITLE:
MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBLAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M.
DATE:
PAGES:
12/28/1962
10
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS:
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
PFIAB
MC CONE, JOHN
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES
MEMORANDUM
Top Secret
1B
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CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENT'S POREION INFELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MERTINGS OF DECEMBER 27 - 28, 1962.
SUBJECT
The Chairman's Tim
TIME
December 27th
1.
9:00
9:30
2.
9:30 - 10:00
3.
10:00 12:45
Review of Board's Draft Interim Report
to the President
Review of Draft Report on Intelligerice
Commurity Activities Helating to the
Cuban Arma Bulldup (Received from DOI
on December 26, 1962)
Depart for Lunch
-
The Hay-Adams Hotel
(Quests of Dr. Longer)
12:
5.
1:00 - 2:30
Janah
6.
2:30 - 2:30
7.
81
1
3:30 End of
Day
7:30 p.m.
9.
9:00
-
10.
9:30
9:30
1:00
--
Review of the World Situation
Fr. Ray-Oling, Peputy DirectoryIntelligence,
Resume Review of Report on Cuban Auma
Buildup
Dinne at Residence of Me. John McCone
(3025 Whitehaven Street, Northwest, D. C.)
Cattended by all Brabus spept Healy,
December 25th
The Chandra's Time
Cancrich)
Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms
Build up with the Following Key Intelli-.
gence Community Officials:
0. 9:30-10:30 Mr. John McCone
b. 10:30-11:00 Est. General M. Carter,
Deputy Director, CIA
951512100
c. 11:00-11:30 _ Lt. General G. Blake,
Director, NSA
1. 11:30-12:00 MF. Thomas Hughes, Deputy
Director, Intelligence and
18:35-/30 Research, Department of Stat
c. 12:00-1:00 At. General Joseph Carroll,
Director, DIA
CONFIDENTIAL,
(December afth Continued)
ITEM
TIMS
11.
1:00
2:30
ja.
2:30
CONFIDENTIAL
Lunch
SUBJECT
Room 21, Executive Office Building
--(3:45) ning com Parrott
3:30
Status of Implementation of Prior-Board
Recommendations
Mp-Russell-sh
Resume Discussion of Report on the OLben
As Buildup and Complete Preparation of
Report to the President.
13.
3:30 - END
CONFIDENTIAL
*
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH NGTON
This Cocumcat serialin formation
SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 28, 1962
-
IDEALIST, CORONA
OXCART
*
Those
The Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27.
present were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy,
Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Clifford and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.
Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft
report which had been furnished to the Board on the preceding
day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, setting
forth the results of the all-source review which the Board had
requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with
respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months
preceding October 22, 1962. The Chairman asked that Board members
make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise
for discussion during this two-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that
he was not sure the DCI's report had the approval of the intelli-
gence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone
was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it
was possible that some of the conclusions and factual details
might not have yet received final approval by the agencies which
contributed to the preparation of the report (CIA, DIA, State and
NSA). Accordingly, the Chaiman noted the importance of the
discussions which the Board would have on the following day with
heads of the intelligence agencies. The Chairman also thought
that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report
to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.
Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr.
McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs
to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelli-
gence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy
assured that the President will understand that the Board is going
into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the
Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr. Bundy
who said that he had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from
a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not
get to the basic issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to
talk to Mr. McCone about this. Dr. Killian stated that he had an
appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he
would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of
this meeting.
Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.
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24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government is equally in the dark
about Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities 'involving
other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking intel-
ligence on Cuba/Communist China' discussions. Mr. Murphy reiterated
his concern that our lack of information on such matters 
as these,
indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to
keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the pre-
sent time and in the future.
...
Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the con-
versation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy. According to
Mr. Bundy, the President is fully aware that the Board is con-
ducting its review of the Cuba situation. The President wants
an objective report from a group of citizens who have no axe to
grind, and he is placing great store, on this effort of the Board.
The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about
the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cuba
matter. However, Mr. Bundy feels there is a bare possibility that.
Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to raise hypo-
thetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having
been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope
that the Board will carefully consider the preparation of a sani-
tised version of the report, but if the Board and the President feel
that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepare a
report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of
the Congress.
Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been
covered in his discussion with Mr. Bundy. He said that Mr. Bundy.
had expressed concern over the failure of the DCI to accept the
suggestion that there be submitted a more adequate report than the
one which the DCI forwarded to the Board on December 26. Mr. Bundy
noted in this connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy
makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to
intelligenge handling.
On the question of availability of Special Group records for
purposes of the Board's study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman
that certainly the Board should examine such records and that
they could be obtained from. Mr. Parrott (Mr. Bundy commented that
the board is the only group which can have this kind of access).
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As to the Board's study, Mr. Bundy told Dr. Killian that."
the Board should include in its review discussions 
with the
Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint.
Chiefs of Staff Mr. Bundy ind: cating that the Secretary 
of
Defense has particular reservations about the DCI's report
.
Another matter mentioned by. Mr. Bundy was his belief that
the morale of the intelligence community as a whole stands 
to
suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and 
report
which is being expected from the Board..
With regard to the interim report which the Board has under
way, Mr. Bundy informed the Chai: man that the report could 
be
delivered to him or it could be presented to the 
Iresident 
directly,
and Mr. Bundy thought it important that the Board present it to
.
the President in person. One other matter discussed 
was the 
Board's
concern about any intelligence let-down in the wake of the Cuba
crisis, it being Mr. Bundy's bel ef that no such let-down 
is in
prospect if present directives and discussions on the subject have
any effect in Government.
(At the conclusion of the Chairman's account of his discussion
with Mr. Bundy, the Board recessed for lunch.)
At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by
Mr. Thomas Lawlor, senior, intelligence officer in CIA's Office of
Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was
on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board
meeting). Mr. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities in-
cluded the handling of current intelligence matters, the selection
and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in
memoranda for the White House), and the preparation of internal in-
telligence notes for use at the CIA working level.
pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis and
production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing of
the Board included, the following subject matters:
Mr, Lawlor
USSR/Chicom relations: Recriminations between the USSR and
Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute
and an open break in party relations is most likely near.
USSR/Cuba: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreig
policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath.
USSR/Berlin: The USSR, is at a diplomatic standstill in Berlin,
and this is traceabl to the USSR Chicon rift.
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The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE activity
presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba..
situation. Mr. McCone said that it had not. He said that.
in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group and the Attorney
· General had given a great deal of consideration to the need
for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but the
intelligence needed. was primarily for covert action rather
than other purposes. "Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity'
contributed to the over-all intelligence collection effort
on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the
collection of intelligence on Cuba, after the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion, and when he took office in November 1961 Mr. McCone
was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees.
was aking place. Thereafter;" following discussions with
the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee;
interrogations under way.
Mr.
Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in
intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident.
McCone said that this took place before his time, but he
assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and
other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's
question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in
store in the wake of the Cuba: crisis, Mr. McCone said that
there was in fact a great danger of such a development following
what some officials consider was an "intelligence victory"
for the United States. Mr. McCone, noting that the Soviet
SA-2's remain in Cuba,' said he had brought this up forcefully.
a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and the
President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any inter-
ference with our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba would be
considered as being most grave and Messrs. McCloy and
Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCone:
added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have been
suspended, should any ominous development 'occur,it will be.
necessary to obtain Presidential: approval of the resumption
of low-level flights
--
Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were any prohibitions
on the conduct of intelligence operations with regard to Cuba
Mr. McCone said yes, it is desired to follow a more aggressive
pattern of, agent infiltration into. Cuba. . He would like to see
a 3 or 4 month effort directed toward the obtaining of straight
intelligence on Cuba (in lieu of political warfare, for example)
to determine the trend of Soviet plans in Cuba. The DCI noted
that the Soviets may quietly get out of Cuba, or they may in
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fact take one step back and two steps forward, and hold on to
the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base,
as a means of keeping Castro 'urder control, or in order to.
retain a capability for quick restoration of a Soviet offensive
capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action 
which
the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration 
of the 
Castro
government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent 
teams
in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain 
the 
assistances
of British, French and German representatives in Cuba; (4) the
possible obtaining of useful intelligence from the attorney,
Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) possibly,
the obtaining of useful information from the captain of the
"African Pilot" who had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who
yesterday asked to seeya U. S intelligence officer.
..
Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of
Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and
Mr. McCone said that 
he 
would
related operations against Cubɛ.
not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo
for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support.
for Cuba's demands for U. S. evacuation of the Naval 
Base.
!,
Answering General: Doolittle's question, the DCI stated that
U-2 overflights of Cuba were: going at the rate of two a day, re-.
sulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of:
Mr. Mc Cone said
some important targets (e.g., Harbors) more often.
that COMOR and USIB. list the targets and that he then establishes
flight schedules.
--
Going back to the subject of Guantanamo; Mr. Pace asked whether
the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return that:
would be obtained if-intelligence operations were conducted from.
the Base Mr. Pace, adding that he thought such a study should be
Mr. McCone said.
made before a final policy decision was reached.
that he had not made such a study - He added that in August the
"operators" in CIA had proposed to the MONGOOSE Group that Guan-
tanamo Base be so used, but this was opposed at the policy level.
Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the
proposal at this time In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry, Mr.
McCone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT operations at
Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that NSA had only recently
added two more positions there
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Mr. Murphy asked the DCI to state the meaning of "MONGOOSE.
B PLUS" Mr. McCone explained that in the 
MONGOOSE Group it
was originally conceived that Plase 
I would be one of 
gathering:·
intelligence on the possibilities for the 
organization and supply
of resistance groups within Cuba, but this 
effort was "only fairly
'successful" because Castro has some. 100,000 
informers in place in
Cuba and exercises internal security controls 
through a system of
ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many 
teams into
Cuba as had been hoped. On August 10, Phase 
II was reached with
:
MONGOOSE planning for (a) violent actions (b
) a relatively high
☐ level of actions, or "B-PLUS", "and 
lesser actions, or "B MINUS"
.
Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared 
to endorse proposed
"B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for 
military backing,
because of his own speculation that the U.S. 
would be faced 
with
MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE 
effort became diverted
by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba, 
Mr. McCone stated
.
'
..
In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the
MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that 
he did not 
know✓
whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now serving 
as
Chairman.
With reference to the abserce of photographic evidence of Soviet
offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, 
Mr.
McCone said that if one looks at photography of Cuba 
obtained on
September 5 it is possible to spot evidence of 
activity at the 
San
Cristobal MRBM site, but this activity could have 
been that of
agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile
activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern 
that Soviet cam-
Mr. McCone expressed his
ouflage operations may be deceiving us.
own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage
methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave 
a
certain margin for error, Mr. McCone noted that it 
is 
nevertheless
impossible for us to say that we know all that is going on in 
the
USSR with respect to missile activity. In response 
to Dr. 
Killian's.
comment that public discussions seem to indicate 
that U. S. missile
capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered a
that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and could lead
to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the U. S.
missile program by an economy-minded Congress.; Mr. McCone added
that in his presentations to select Committees of the Congress he
always expresses reservations concerning U S. missile superiority.
Dr. Killian wondered whether the President; the Secretary of
Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that
nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. McCone said 
that
undoubtedly there is a tendenc toward heavy dependence upon photo-
graphic intelligence.
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