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104-10210-10020 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
TOP SECRET
1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret
study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
Defector Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for
your review.
2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages
containing information which bears on the security of
ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.
3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A
and Attachment when your review has been completed.
Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
357
WARNING NOTICE
INVOLVED
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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
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E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
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VIII
Top Secret
CONTENTS
SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964)
Deputy Chief of Seventh Department
(July 1962-January 1964)
(Cont.)
PACE
291
KGB Operations
292
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY
292
Investigation of SLESINGER
293
Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN
295
GRU Agent SHUBIN
296
Arrest of BAKGHOORN
298
Investigation of OSWALD
303
Residence in USSR
303
Request to Return to USSR.
305
Post-Assassination Review of KGB File
307
The CHEREPANOV Papers
309
Contents
(--
314
NOSENKO's Travel Document
Purpose of Trip
Visits to KGB Legal Residency
Availability for Meetings with CIA
NOSENKO's Written Notes
315.
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)
316
317
318
318
319
NOSENKO's Defection
The Recall Telegram
320
324
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department
Operations
Operational Activities (July 1962-
January 1964)
Information Furnished the KGB by
George BLAKE
325
326
American Tourists
326
327
KGB Study of American Intelligence
Tourist Operations
NOSENKO's
Information
Summary
Summary and Conclusion
327
330
331
331
བ ེ་
(vi)
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CONTENTS
PAGE
IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE
335
Relationship with General GRIBANOV
335
Communist Party Status
Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures
Awards and Decorations
Sourcing
Ranks
338
342
345
349
350
X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:
355
NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
357
Annex A
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Statements of Soviet Officials About
NOSENKO
361
{
Annex B
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Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text
399
Index of Personalities
437
(vii)
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(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)
1
Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO
The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
officials' statements about him since his defection coin-
cides markedly with NOSUNKO's self-description. According
to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelli-
gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively,
defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he
served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
were overcome through the patronage of KG3 General GRIBANOV,
and in connection with operations against Americans he
occupied positions of progressively greater trust and
responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence)
Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection
wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB
because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American
targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and
disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of
many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to
assassinate him.
These statements are related in chronological order in
Annex A.
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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)
Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.
In a second version (more probable since entry to the Moscow
Special Naval School required prior completion of the
Seventh Class) NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he
and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he
completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned
to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the
Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he
completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943
NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School (then in Baku).
After just six months in Baku, without completing the
Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to
Moscow.
Comment:
HOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran
away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and
that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku
and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of
Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.
NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the
Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he
resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO
received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being
hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.
Comment:
NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by
a jealous naval officer whom he then protected
by stating that the wound was self-inflicted,
and that he actually did accidently shoot him-
quoted
a sensitive sources self.
to
the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid
being sent to the front while attending a naval
college in 1942.
a KGB officer
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Comment:
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(Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized,
Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered
to CIA that he had known the son of the
Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in
Leningrad from 1944 to 1945.
NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-
building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed
the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.
Birth to 1945:
Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
his early life. However, this portion of his claimed
biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his
father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the
schools he claims to have attended.
Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics
(fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's
claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO
and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945
are accepted as true.
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NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute
course was of four years' duration and that he entered the
Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years'
duration and that because he failed a state examination he
was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'
duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it
was of five years' duration but he failed an examination
which delayed his graduation for three months.
Comment:
See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB
upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
The duration of the Institute course and the
date of NOSINKO's completion are material to
the plausibility of his claimed Naval PU service,
which he said followed almost immediately upon
his departure from the Institute.
Naval RU Service (ca. 1951
ca. 1953)
NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at
the Institute of International Relations he entered the
Naval RU, serving in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post,
finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the
intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
A sensitive source
is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO
served in the RU. According to
NOSENKO attended
the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU
Information Department for about a year before securing a
transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO
denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and
has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports)
Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held
Reports assignments.
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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)
A sensitive source
two
U has quoted/KGB officers
respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947
or 1949.
The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact
that he claims it launched his intelligence career and
served as the means through which he secured appointment
to the HCB after once having been rejected. The two or more
years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a
significant period of his adult life. for which he should
have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
actual transfer from the Naval EU to the KGB is critical to
determining the time from which his claims about KG3 service
can be judged credible.
NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his
1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of
his initial retractions and his first admission that he had
earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU
service was consequently prominent in interrogations in
1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations,
challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted
adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the
Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as
challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-
ments with respect to his RU service. The extent of the
still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in
NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
NOSENKO's Information-1982
In
NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations
in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.
[He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.]
September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad,
Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
no one would think he would take advantage of his father's
position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception
unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite
Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by
monitoring the communications of American units operating in
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FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practi-
cally nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited
him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB
nevertheless hoped that FRIFPEL would be reassigned to Mos-
COW at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the
FRIFPEL case.)
Comment:
a sensitive source-
FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice
in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts
he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962,
which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known
to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union
at that time, and there is no apparent reason
why he would make a false claim on this matter.
Recording to
FRIPPEL, who is now
in New York City, is a current target of the
Soviet intelligence service.
✓
Johannes PREISFREUND
The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American
Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and
thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em-
bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take
PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh De-
partment. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however,
he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO
met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,
but did not use him in any operations.
Comment:
PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB
agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175,
and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent
return visits to Moscow, it was only because
NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and
drinking.
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who was [erroneously) .considered to be a CIA officer.
SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1951,
but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-
intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.X.
GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with. SHAKHOV and he
had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United
States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent] by
KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV
liked life in the Unites States, American products, and
money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good"
and 'not wanting to work as an agent".
NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that
service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV
was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being
an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his
trips abroad'
"There was no proof, only suspicions, and
furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of
the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin. According
to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.
Comment:
SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United
States since 1942, when he was assigned to the
Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-
tended the 1945 Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
tended a number of sessions of the UN General
Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet
Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV iden-
tified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is
certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
identified him as "an employee of the
KGB and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN
have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's
face was familiar". An FBI source, however,
in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat"
and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged
in no Soviet intelligence activity until that
time.
a sensitive source
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NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions
of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then
watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American
contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform counter surveillance
tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,
while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had
forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO
revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and
checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared
materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's
conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion,
and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-
turned to KG3 Headquarters from Geneva.
Comment:
Currently in the United States, SHAKHOY is still
"under suspicion", according to
a sensitive source,
Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation
NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-
man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament. Conference and as.
such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the
entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.
TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left
Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.]
To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO
had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB
who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never re-
ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates
in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants
provided him.]
NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days
and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he
pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most
of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was
known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings
at any time.
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Yu. I. GUK
Implying that their friendship was of long standing,
NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly
every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a
few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to
the residency and was able to elicit information about sore
of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big big
friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
only "strong officer" in the residency.
Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A.
because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUR was
dismissed from the KG3.
1
M.S. TSYMBAL
In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and
identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the
KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with
him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.
In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with
TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some
candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back-
ground would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals)
Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-
quarters and ISYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer
to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be
assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had
dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied
by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,
NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency
in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was
granted access in 1964.
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NOSENKO's Information
SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
Chief Directorate because of his business transactions
with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in
whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The
First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that
SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the
Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned
another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he
might make some contacts or do something interesting"
while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to
resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an
agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had
a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the
American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent
of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly
with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet
Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.
SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN.
directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who.
could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication
of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted.
to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,
no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
Soviet Union before, several times.
A sensitive source
Comment:
1 had reported to the
FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to
be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer
"might be trying to develop
SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some
other agent capacity."
NOSENKO's information was substantially
correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER,
reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a
Soviet official who exhibited "intimate
knowledge" of his business in New York
City and had asked whether SLESINGER had
"ever been bothered by the FBI.
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Comment:
(Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGFR reported to the FBI that.
he was in touch with a Moscow photographic
shop proprietor, and he described evidence.
of KGB interest in him during his visit to
Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the
Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in
contact with a number of Soviet officials
from the United Nations.
NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned
of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate
case.
KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent NOS
NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the
USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO
identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for
Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of
Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested
on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTENI
was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific
and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the
agent's name, but from the description he provided he is
believed identical with gink
a KGB S&T
agent
from
identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report
7. a sensitive source.
NOSENKO's Information
KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist
Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War
to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among
dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens,
· particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in
another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts
with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service
has frequently inspired such contacts.)
Because of these
many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second
Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation
agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the
Communist Party in the United States.
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NOSENKO's Information
SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-
traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet
Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958
or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of
duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN
was the target of Seventh Department case officer
A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was
placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance
observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense
automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They
very furtively said that they were interested in him,"
from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.
In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name
and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office
and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according
to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by
others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for
having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's
interest in SHUBIN":
L
Comment:
a sensitive source
Earlier,
identified an
agent apparently identical with SHUBIN
and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel
to the USSR in summer 1961 and in
September 1963.
SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport
between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
the Soviet Union during that period it was
not as an American tourist under his true
name. Consequently, he could not then have
been the tourist target of the Seventh
Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.
If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring
to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further
contradiction: NOSENKO could not have
noticed his name while reviewing tourist
lists in the Seventh Department, because
he claims he was in the American Department.
at the time.
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NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHFRE-
PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep
woods, "where a person could los: himself for life". On the
seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku,
where he was on his way to the Iranian border.
A special plane was inmediately sent to Baku, carrying
S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-
cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow,
interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed
to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked
why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and
besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some
money in return for the documents. He confessed that on
4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist
who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he
had given the documents to the American in the entrance
hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also
housed.
Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two
fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the
Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock.
surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB
that if he had detected his surveillants he would have
written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest
against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then
would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
of his guilt.
Comment:
sensitive sources,
Other sources, including
TESZT
have also reported various aspects of the
CHEREPANOV incident.
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the
CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to
his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department at the time.
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The Recall Telegran
HOSENKO'S Information
On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB
Legal Residency once during the morning before he ret with
CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those
times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of
4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there
were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning
of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the
Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and
found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived,
instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to partici-
pate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the
substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence-
forth in CIA custody.
Comment:
Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's
assertion regarding the existence of the recall
telegram. According to Special Intelligence,
there were enciphered communications from Moscow
to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and
later, lut there was none from 1815 on 3
February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours
after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
Top Secret
January 1962-January 1964)
NOSENKO'S Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram
NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations
in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that
it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while
being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been:
no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he
signed the following statement:
W
"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact
in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in
Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in
Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said
at the time that this telegram said that I was
recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB
activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I
maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent
interviews and interrogations by American authorities
in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed.
No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that
the story was a lie. I myself invented this tele-
gram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous
and afraid that my contacts with American Intelli-
gence might be noticed."
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations
The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964
(see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB
operations conducted, against what NOSENKO described as
tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited
in the description of these operations in Annex B, these
operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service
in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
January 1962-January 1964)
Operational Activities
-
July 1962-January 1964:
Summary
To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO
describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY,
the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations
of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV,
his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment
to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as
he described and they were as he described (there are substan-
tial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB
elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical
with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Depart-
ment operations. They do not accurately characterize, as
NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against
tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department
service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to
Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier
assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was
not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization.
indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy
Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would
have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions
which he claimed to have held.
1
KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963
Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed
awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to
:
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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)
Other Sources 1964 and 1965
a sensitive source
As indicated in Annex A,
✓✓ reported
several items of information he stated he obtained from
various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV
was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKC's
defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired
because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that
GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his
protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to
Geneva in 1904 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO
incligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSINKO's
father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief
despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence,
and that GRIDANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party
Lecause he willfully withheld information about NOSLNKO's
procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.
NOSENKO's Information
-
Post 1964
Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to
refer to this special and personal relationship, which
touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service.
Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain
this claim. The extent HOSENKO's statements were retracted
or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by
other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted.
from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote
the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given.
(Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness
reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women
provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two
occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);
recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO
(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in-SMITH recruit-
ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);
NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in
1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador
DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
NOSENNO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
successively senior positions of authority from which he
derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and
results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet
Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim,
he provides an impressive array of information about KGB
personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent
that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his
Lona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-
gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's
clains. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was
senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive
positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust
despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the
greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence",
paralyzed the work of KG3
The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known
facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects
the test to which his accounts were put: whether his
accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known
fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has
from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held.
In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own
accounts?
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