14-00000
104-10227-10000
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CLA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMITTEL ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS
FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME:
INCLUSIVE DATES:
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:
ROOM:
DELETIONS, IF ANY:
TS Material from Deryalia Safe
DATE
DATE
RECEIVED RETURNED
REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
14-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT, (Ophonel)
CONFIDENTIAL
☐ SECRET
KOUTING AND RECORD SHEET
FROM
Rodger S. Gabrielson
OLC/C&R
TO, (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
Mr. N. Shepanek.
1.
MAX DAY*XX
EXTENSION NO.
REF TO: Con. No. TS191722
"Thru C
1133
Dall
19 June 1978
DATE-
OFFICER 3
INITIALS
DECEMIO PORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
SA/DO/O Tube: * Green
2.
Mat Jack Sattivan
es
Tub
3.
.3.
6.
7.
Afg
iwinger
Attached is a letter
from the House Select
Committee on Assassinations
dated
Please respond as soon as
possible.
Shep: Please have CI look
at this. It's the
T. S. material
from Deryabin's safe request
by Blakey. Thanks,
Rodge
it 7: cistoff
adigar abou
day's lay may
Bei
to Blakey
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-02
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
1°
14-00000
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when blank--TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded to SECRET when
filled in form is.detached from controlled 
document.
Source
Due No.
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
SR/CI/K
XAAZ-17241
Dr. Date 20 APR 1964
-
Cups No.
Number of Pages
Repro 2
38
Number of Attachments
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
REGISTRY
• CIA Control No.
TS# 191722
Date Document Received
15
1979
Logged By
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret faryment received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classi
fied Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document 
un such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside
of CIA Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top 
Secret Control personnal and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top.
Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached 
Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left.
hand columne provided. Each individual who sees the Top Decret 
document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right hand columns.
REFERRED TO
Office
DDP(TSCO)
RECEIVED
Bignature
B. Ligg
Date
RELEASED
Time
Date
Time
15/197
1070
.
1579
Signature
BEEN BY
Office/Div.
Date
Sicols
DCHOLC flestes.
Brickwridge
15. Jove
Doo from B. Longg
☑
1215
nick-1 (arkey)
000/Eco. B. Bigg
DC110C / Receler 20
Breckinridge or Habrilson
SPD0/7500
TO
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this fo
mitted to Central Top Secret Control for ri
By (Signature)
DOWNGRADED
19
678
15
19 June 78 19
20770
JUN
2017
1379
rear completed in the appropriate spaces below and trans.
When finished with these documents return
them 
to DDO/TSCO as we are 
the control Office
for these documents,
TS# 191722
OFFICE
FORM
6-64
26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(OP-1)
DATE
TS# 191722A
TS 191722B
LATEST VERSION
Lived in Nikol
TS#
191722C
Entered "zero"
Moved to Lening
and then direct
then director c
cessively on UI
Pr. Maksima Cor
(different ones
8×6k
Father appointe
missar of Shipt
Commissar. Fan
at Ul. Serafimc
year school No.
Polyanka.
June
1941
Completed 6th
with parents whe
(40)
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
MECRE
14-00000
TOP SECRET
INCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded to SECRET when
filled in-form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
Source
Doc. No.
SR
XAAZ-17241/1
Doc. Date 11 MAY 1964
Copy No.
# Repro 2
28
Number of Pages
Number of Attachments
CIA Control No.
191722A
Date Document Received
15%
JUN
1076
Logged By
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classi-
fied Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to 
the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside
of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret 
Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top
Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached 
Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-
hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret 
document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
Office
RECEIVED
Signatura
DDP(TSCO)
@bigg
Scott Briepewnity
RELEASED
Date
Time
Date
Time
1570N
1976
1 ta
1975
DADO/1500. B.
125.
SH/00/0
AC/CI (127)
NADO/ESCO
B
Livigg
19167
19,
3. Swigg
2007
Breckenridgeer Aubriels
700/1500
18 1975
JAIN
19
JUN
978
JUN
20 1978
Signature
SEEN BY
Office/Div.
Date
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and trans.
mitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
ΤΟ
By (Signature)
OFFICE
FORM
6-64
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(OP.1)
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CLA)
ΤΟ
BY Sgnature)
DATE
OFFICE
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
_
DATE
109
SWUR
(40)
14-00000
i
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document--Automatically downgraded to SECRET when
filled in form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
Source
༄
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Doc. No.
Doc. Date
Copy No.
SR/CI/K
XAAZ-17241/2
19 MAY 1964
Repro 2
Number of Pages 22
Number of Attachments
REGISTRY
CIA Control No.
TS# 191722B
Date Document Received
אי 15
Logged By
1070
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classi
hed Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded
, destroyed, or transmitted outside
of CIA Access to Top Secret matter 
is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals 
whose official Juties relate to the matier. Top
Secret Control Officers who receive 
and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign 
this form and indicate period of custody in the left-
hand columns provided. Each 
individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the 
date of handling in the right hand columns.
REFERRED TO
Office
DDP(TSCO)
RECEIVED
Signature
--
Swigg
DC7/04 Corder 15 Jul
Scold. 
Bickenridge
RELEASED
Date
Time
Dato
Time
159pm
$78
Signature
SEEN BY
Office/Div.
Date
3/5 B. Bigg
ESCO
140115
1920
1370
197
The 19 to 193 75
прозворотом учи
14/04/0
Ac/1 (Nicky)
DDOKSCO B. Swigg
SCI/000
er Gabrielson
Breckinridge o
DDO/1500
2015
JUN
1978
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and trans-
mitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
TO
By (Signature)
OFFICE
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
FORM
6-64
26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(OP 1)
TOP SECRET
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
GROUP
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
DATE
(40)
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded to SECRET when
filled in form is detached from controled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
CIA Control No.
Source
C/SR
TS# 191722C.
Date Document Received
Doc. No. CSCI-3/781.491
Doc. Date 19 May 1964
Copy No.
# Repro 2
Number of Pages 2.
Number of Attachments
15 JUN
1970
Logged By
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on the of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classi
fred Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded
. destroyed, or transmitted outside
of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to 
the matter. Top
Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period 
of custody in the left-
hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of 
handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
Office
DDP(TSCO)
DCI/06
Scott
RECEIVED
Signature
B. Bigg
Coth Breckinridge
RELEASED
Date
Time
Dato
Timo
1529N
1970
Signature
SEEN BY
Office/Div.
Date
200/1500 B.
15215
B. Swigg
197
UN
JUN
19 Jun 78 179 18
10/00/0p 17/978
AC/C1(n(Coy)
DO/TSCO B. Swigg
DCI/OLE
Breckinridge or Garaielsen
200/75do
20 UN
20JUN
1970
078
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form a detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and trans.
mitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
TO
By (Signature)
OFFICE
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
FORM
6-64
26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(OP.1)
TOP SECRET
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
DATE
(40)
101
SECRET
14-00000
DEFECTORS NOSENKO
TAB
TITLE
Report on: Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet
Attachments:
DATE
2 Apr 64
1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject:
Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on
Nosenko Case
2. Memo for Director of Security from Lawrence R.
Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors
3. Memo. Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter
Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard
Helms. Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
(Forms I-125 and background data attached)
Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E.
Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenkom
2 Apr 64
3 Apr 64
Jan 75
20 Oct 69
9 Oct. 69
24 July 69
Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R..
White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO
18 Jul 69
Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to
DD/OS
13 Feb 64
Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, 11 Feb 64
Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko
Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall
S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko
12 Feb 64
Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes
Charge by Soviet
Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys
talk to Defector
4. Mazo for Acting Chief. Support Branch from Jack
M. Bauman
5. Meno for Special Agent in Charge District Field
Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George
M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
15 Feb 64
:
12 May 64
10 Jul 64
14-00000
3
TAB
TITLE
Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr.,
Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions
Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment: Emergency
Instructions (2)
6.
Memo for the Record from John M. Maury,
Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts
on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att
Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum
Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements
Between the CIA and Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko
Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge,
Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON,
NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD
DATE
1 Jul 64
5 Aug 69
4 Feb 64
21 Apr 69.
31 Dec 74.
Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge,
Subject: Nosenko
13 Jan 75
Attachments:
1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yurily
Ivanovich Nosenko;
9 Jan 75
1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64,
Subject: Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko
12 Feb 64
Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet
Defector Nosenko
Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case
67
Attachment:
1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the
Nosenko Case
:
14-00000
Yurity Ivanovich NOSENKO
DANNAin
IDENTIFICATION:
BACKGROUND
APPROVAL
NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet
KGB 
officer who defected in 1964 and
was subsequently involuntarily con-
fined 
in the U.S. by the Agency for
a period of approximately three years.
NOSENKO first contacted Agency per-
sonnel 
in Switzerland in June 1962
and subsequently defected in January
1964. 
NOSENKO was brought to the U.S.
and after 
a period of relative freedom
he 
was 
involuntarily confined in
April 1964. From April 1964 to
August 1965, he was confined at an
Agency controlled site in Clinton,
Maryland. From August 1965 to
October 1967, NOSENKO was confined
at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October
1967, 
he was returned to the Washington
area, 
given increasing amounts of
freedom until he was given total free-
dom in 
April 1969. NOSENKO became a
U.S. 
citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO
was employed by the Agency, as a
consultant in March 1969 and continues
under 
contract to date. His present
salary is 
$23,500 per year.
(1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO
against his will was discussed by
Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with
the 
Deputy Attorney General on 2 April
1964 (
Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the
Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence
Houston, advised the Director of Security
by 
memorandum that such confinement was
proper (Tab 2).
(2) There are a series of letters from
the DDCI, DCI and others to various
agencies, including the Department of
Justice and 
the White House, covering
the 
period 1964 to 1969, evidencing
awareness of these agencies of the
NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).
(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confine-
ment were established by the Office of
Security (Tabs 4 & 5).
:
14-00000
RESULTS
TERMINATION :
COMMENTS
By memorandum dated 2 October 1968,
the Director of Security forwarded
two reports to the DDCT summarizing
the results of the NOSENKO case to
that date. The reports are voluminous.
One was prepared by the Office of
Security and the other by the FBI.
Both reports conclude that NOSENKO
was a bona fide defector. A draft
memorandum attached to this file,
dated 21 October 1968 and prepared
by the CI Staff, raises question
regarding NOSENKO's bona fides
and challenges the above two reports.
NOSENKO continues under contract to
the Agency. He is brought to Washington
periodically to consult on matters
germane to his background and experience.
Various reports are available in the
files of the Office of Security which
detail financial aspects of this case.
No final accounting has been made since
the project continues.
(1) While the Office of Security files
do document the rationale for the original
confinement of NOSENKO, they do not
document the rationale for his continued
confinement over so long a period of time.
A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states
that various congressional staff officers
were briefed on NOSENKO and states that
concern for his safety, as well as con-
cern regarding his bona fides, prompted
the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)
(2) Office of Security files document
a period in 1969 during which a mail
cover was placed on NOŠENKO.
(3) During the above period, NOSENKO
was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida.
During this trip, Agency personnel, with
apparent Headquarters approval, obtained
the services of prostitutes. This
apparently occurred on at least two
occasions.
2

14-00000
i
FILES
Office of Security files on NOSENKO
are maintained in the following
locations:
OS/SSD (Contact Mr. Charles Phalen)
-
OS/SAG (Contact Mr. Bruce Solic)
-
3
14-00000
SECRET
EVPLY
2 April 1964.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT:
Discussion with Deputy Attorney.
General on Nosenko Case
1. Nr lielas, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy met with
the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to
discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's.
staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Reis.
2. Mr. Helms explained the Nosenko case briefly
and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what
we at least considered to be two problems on which we
would like the advice of the Department of Justice.
First, wo would secon feel compelled to begin hostile
interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth
with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered
what the legal position would be in circumstances in
which we detained Nosenko against his will for this pur-
poso. Second, we would have to be ready after determin-
ing that we could obtain no additional information from
Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to
Germany and transferring him to Sovist custody in Borlin
where this has been done a number of times in the past.
3. There was some discussion of whether deportation
to another country might be a consideration. Mr. Helms
explained we would probably face publicity problems in
"deporting to a third country of the kind we would en-
counter if he were free in the U. S. Nr. Helms noted
there were many items of information which we and the
FBI realize are of no significance because of the file
holdings we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man
could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped
and it was the consensus that Berlin was probably the best
place.
4. The question of the basis for detention was again
raised and related by Mr. Foloy to the conditions under
which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "ox-
clusion and parole case" which means he has not been
admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is
responsible for his while he is in this country. This
SECRET
EYED ONLY
14-00000
う
SECRET
EYES CY
parole can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific
locale 
which would provide some justification for our.
detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out,
however, that if 
he said he wished to leave the country
to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not
be 
able t 
to detain his further. In this event, we would
be faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly
and for 
this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest
and deportation was probably the best instrument.
5. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into
this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston.
Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA
Office of Security officials to get the background of
their liaison 
with the INS on these matters.
6. Mr. Helms thanked. Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance
and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to
"The 
Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected
to 
happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall"
in Berlin.
David E. Murphy'
Chief, SR Division
SECRET
SCILLY
4-00000
SEGUET
C/SB
OGC 64-0903
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Security
SUBJECT:
3 April 1964
Parole Status of Defectors
1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department
of Justice 
on the status 
of aliens whose inspection by I& NS is deferred
upon arrival at our request 
and who are then paroled to this Agency.
It was the position of 
the Department of Justice that we were responsible
for taking any action necessary 
to carry out the terms of the parole.
1. 2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the
Attorney 
General and the DCI 
on 10 February 1955. After setting up
conditions for authorizing 
parole in any one case, the agreement states:
"After parole of such aliens, the 
Central Intelligence Agency will assume
responsibility for care, 
supervision and control of a kind and degree it
believes consistent with the 
internal security needs of the United States
during continuance of 
their parole status.
" This means that the
responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary
to protect the internal 
security needs of the United States.
"minimum" 
is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good
The word
judgment must be used as to 
what kind and degree of action is necessary.
..
3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the
parolee's 
intelligence or 
operational purposes in the United States or if
internal security reasons 
so require, the alien will be removed from
this country through 
arrangements made by the Agency and, in such
case, the Agency will 
inform the Service in advance of each proposed
departure.
Lawrence
D. Huistion
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
Cc: DD/P
C/SR
SROTET
i
14-00000
January 1975
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United
States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles
had appeared in the public media..
2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as
the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of
NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several
occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was
also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of
NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet
in the presence of NS 
and State Department officials
officials/
and NOSENKO 
reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in
the United States.
14-00000
ASSISTANT FOR C
INTER DEN
5-28
SECHET
Department of Justice.
Washington 20530
October 20, 1963
Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
R
Dear Mr. Helms:
Re:
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
(ER 69-5003/1)
Reference is made to your letter dated October 9. 1969,
concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence
of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-
named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United
States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the
Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.
The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has
informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service
and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of
any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your
proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United
States for permanent residence under the authority of the
foregoing statute.
Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consid-
eration and your statement of recommendation and approval
which carries with it your determination that the entry of the
individual concerned is in the interest of national security
and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission,
I concur in your recommendation that the admission for perma-
nent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the
provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949, as amended.
SECRET
Respectfully,
For the Attorney General
I. volte grogley
Assistant Attorney General
matemati:
grating and
sification
E
Da
14-00000
,
SECRET
9 OCT 1967
ER 69-5003/1
Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. Ca
Dear Mr. Farrell:
SUBJECT: Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO
Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended,
I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance
of subject into the United States for permanent residence.
since his entry is in the interest of the national security
and unsential to the furtherance of the national Intelligence
mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in
Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this
© matter to the Attorney General for his approval.
Since bis defection in February 1964, the subject has.
provided valuable information to this Agency and he will
continue to be of value in the future.
Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a
´period of five years and has submitted to a technical inter-
rogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and
should any. Information be developed definitely disproving his
bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the
Attorney General..
180 1
SECRET
Just
4t
14-00000
SECRET
There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data,
in duplicate, concerning the subject.
Enclosures.
ORIGINATOR:
Sincerely,
Richard Helms
Director
/s/ H. J. Osborn
Howard J. Ocbern
Director of Soenrity
8 October 1969
Date
Distribution: Orig.
-
Andressee
Signor's copy
-
DECI
- 32
- 53 Div.
- CI Staff
-- DDP.
-
QGC
-
CS Files
SECRET
14-00000
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)
30 October 1927
Male
Soviet
Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR
Brown Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches
Divorced
Caucasian
14-00000
SECRET
RICGRAPHIC DATA
SUBJECTI
AXAS
DPORT
MARITAL STATUS:
CHILDREN
EDUCATIO
EMPLOYMENTI
MILITART:
PATIONALITY
PRESENT AND FAST
POLITICAL AFFIL-
LATIONS:
Yuzly Ivanovich KOSZNZO
Tari NOSSENKO
35 October 1927, Nicolayov, Ukraine, USSR
1946 - Married and divorced Flavia
MOSEMEO (Nee: SHIHOV).
1946-Married Augustins K. HOJENZO-
(A001 TZLAGIM), 1949
1951 – diverend.
P
separated and,
23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Taliana
TOSENKO (7a) KOZHETNIKOVA), January
1964 - se7azzled and 1759 - Üvorced,
•
.
Daughters Czana NOSENZO, born 21 August
1954, Moscow; Tamara XOPENKO, bern
13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both living in USZN)
1942-1943 – Attended various U352, Naval
Schools.
-
1945-1955 – Attended Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, Moscow,
March 1951-March 1933 - Boviet Naval RU.
(Naval Intelligence)os
-
March 1953-Februszy 1954 Cineer is RCD.
(The Committen for State Security)..
Lieutenant in C3SR Navy while in school and
during 107 service.
Soviet
1943-1954
Member Komecizol, U322
1756) - Candidata Communist Party
1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, US32
SECRET
..
18

14-00000
2
SECRET
SP-1687
18 JUL 1969
Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice:
Washington, D. C
Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos
Dear Sir:
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO
Reference is made to previous correspondence
in this 
case..
Subject continues to be of operational interest
to this 
Agency. 
Therefore, it is requested subject's
parole to this 
Agency be extended for an additional
period of six (6) 
months beyond the expiration date of
his stay of 16 
August 1969.
Your cooperation in this matter is very much ap-
preciated
.
Sincerely,
SIGHED
السلام
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969
NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR SYSIBITED
TO ANYONE HITMONT PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
SECRET
GROEP 1
tat
2:1
i
14-00000
SECRET
NITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536
MAN ADDS UPLY TO
July 24, 1969
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowski
Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.
AND NOTE To huo.
A13 724 817
п
Dear Sir:
As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the
-subject-has-been-given-a-further-period of stay 
to expire on
February 16, 1970.
Sincerely,
Frank Warts
Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Division
CU. 16 Jan. 1970
ابنه
SECRET
automatic
and
14-00000
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
11 February 1954.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO
1. This memorandum refers to the State Department
release 
of 10 February on subject 
case and provides addl-
tional background as well as information 
on his current
status
..
2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENIO is regularly:
assigned 
to the Counterintelligence 
Directorate of the
XG3 in Noscow but was included 
in the Soviet dolegation.
to the Disarmament Conference as 
part of a cover arrange.
ment which permitted him to carry out 
intelligence and
security functions in Geneva on 
behalf of the KGB..
3. HOSENZO also attended various sessions of the
.Disarmament 
Conference held in 
Genova in 1962.
the course of these 
sessions NOSENKO sought contact with
During
officials of the U. S. Government
, informed these officials
that he was affiliated with the Soviet 
State Security ap-
paratus and volunteered to aid the U. 
S. Government in
dotecting Soviet subversive 
activity directed against the
U. S. Government. During the course 
of his contact with
U. S. authorities NOSENKO stated 
that his cooperation with
the U. S. Government originated with 
his distaste and hatred
for the Soviet regime is general, with his 
desirs to obtain
revenge 
for the unjust death of his father
, a senior official
in the Soviet shipbuilding industry
, and with the general
admiration of the Americans with whom 
he had come in con-
tact 
within the Soviet Union.
4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Conava,
again 
masquerading as a member of the 
Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament Conference.
his CIA 
contacts in the United States concerning his prese
Subject secretly notified
once in Geneva and arranged to meet 
with those contacts.
During a series of meetings NOSENXO 
provided information
including documents concerning 
Soviet State Security acti-
vities within the USSR and abroad and 
a detailed account.
of the KG3 operation against U. S. 
Professor Barghoora
which NOSENKO said he had personally 
supervised at the
direction of SEMICIASTNIY, the 
Chairman of the Committee
for State Security (KGB).
TOP
EYES ONLY
14-00000
8
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced
his 
desire to leave the USSR permanently 
and seek his futura
in the west. He claimed his new work 
in the KGB (First
Deputy Chief of that department 
charged with the surveillance
and recruitment of American visitors 
to the USSR) was `ox”
panding and that he would not be 
able to visit the West
with any frequency. Accordingly
, he prepared a request for
political asylum in the United States.
Frankfurt, 
Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-
Ho 
was taken to
gation. Plans are now being made to 
remove him to the U. S.
6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject.
has not 
been extensive and that we 
will require additional
thorough interrogation to establish 
Subject's bona fides.
It should also be noted that NOSENXO's 
duties were not con-
corned with substantive aspects 
of the Disarmament Conference,
and he therefore is not expected to be 
able to shad much, if
any, light on that area of our interest,
7. The possibility that NOSENIO's defection was de-
signed 
to wreck the conference was 
most carefully considered.
The decision to accept his was taken 
on the conviction that
the 
Soviets would not have chosen such 
a vulnerable agent
(staff officer of the XC3) for 
this kind of move,
CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64.
Distribution:
Thomas H. Karamessines
- Acting Deputy Director
for Plans.
Orig
2 CC
1 cc
1 CC
-
Adse
SR/CI/X-Downey
-
C/CI
-
CSR
CC DD/OS
->>
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
14-00000
TOP SET
EYES ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 23, D. C
OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGENCE
12 February 1964
NEMORANDUMN FOR:
United States Intelligence Board Members
:
SUBJECT:
Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO
1. This memorandum refers to the State Department
Toloase 
of 10 February on 
subject case and provides addi-
tional background as well as 
information on his current
status.
2. As a XGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly
assigned 
to the 
Counterintelligence Directorate of tho
KCB in Moscow but was 
included in the Sovist delegation
to the Disarmament 
Conference as part of a cover arrange-
sent which permitted him to 
carry out intelligence and
security functions in Gonova 
on behalf of the KG3.
i 3. 'NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the
Disarmament Conforance 
hold in Ganova in 1962,
course of 
these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with
During 
the
officials of the U. S. 
Government, informed these officials
that he was affiliated with 
the Soviet State Security ap-
paratus and volunteered to aid 
the U. S. Government in
detecting Soviet 
subversive activity directed against the
U. S. Government. During the 
course of his contact with
U. S. authorities, NOSENKO 
stated that his cooperation with
the U, S. Government originated 
with his distaste and hatred
for the Soviet regime in 
general, with his desire to obtain
revenge for the unjust death of 
his father, a senior official
in the Soviet shipbuilding 
industry, and with the general
admiration of the Americans with 
whom he had come in con-
tact within the Soviet Union
.
4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva,
again 
masquerading as a 
member of the Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament Conference
.
his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his pres-
Subject secretly notified
ence in Geneva and arranged 
to meet with these contacts.
During a series of meetings 
NOSENT provided information
including decuments 
concerning Soviet State Security acti-
vities within the USSR and abroad 
and a detailed account
TOP SUBRET
EYES ONLY
14-00000
of the XG3 operation against U. S. Professor Barzhoora
which NOSENXO said ho had personally supervised at the
direction of SEMICHASTRIY, the Chairman of the Committed
for State Security (KGB).
5. During these most recent meetings NOSENIO announced
his desire to leave the US52 permanently and seek his futuro
in the West. He claimed his new work in the ICB (First
Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance
and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was ax-
panding and that he would not be able to visit the Most
with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for
political asylum in the United States. He was taken to
Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-
gation. Plans are now being made to renova his to the U. S.
60 It should be noted that CIA contact with Subjoct
has not been extensive and that we will require additional
thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides.
It should also be noted that NOSENKO's juties were not con-
corned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference,
and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed such, if
any, light on that area of our interest.
7. The possibility that NOSENXO's defection was de-¨¨
signed to wrock the conference was most carefully considered.
The decision to accept his was taken on the conviction that.
the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent
(staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant Goneral, USA
Deputy Director
14-00200
Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet
By TAD SZULO
to The New York Th
WASHINGTON, Feb. 17
Defection Preceded Report Service. Officials of the State
Department, the Central In-)
the
to Swise Police Apparently telligence Agency And
Raling Out Negligence
Immigration and Naturalization]
service were also present.
Mr. Norenka was described as
having been completely relaxed
Juring the interview.
Yurt I: Nosenko told a Soviet
Embassy official at there: can-
frontation here last Friday that
ha lest Switzerland on the way
to the Unitat States 28 hours:
before his defection was re-Swiss diplomat had been per
ported by the 
Russians to the mitted to Lulic separately with the Soviet diplomat during their
He is understood to have told
)
Swiss authorities.
Mr. Nosenko
businesslike conference that hu
:
This statement by the former Information made available defected of his own volition.
stat
: officer of the Soviet Com-today has thrown new 
light without any outside pressure
[
mittee of State Security, the on the defection
'secret 
police, appeared to amount The Soviet delegation inled, did not allay Soviet resent-
His statements, it was report
to a denial of the Soviet charge, Geneva, it was reported, 
toldiment against Swiss authorities.
that 
the Swiss authorities had the Swiss police at 5 PC Feb. 
Diplomate reports reaching the
been negligent in preventing his 5 that Mr. Nosenko was miss
-State Department said that So-
defection.
Ing. But Mr. Nosenko's 
state- viet diplomats in foreign capi
Mr: Nosenko, who quit as a ments. In the presence of the tals continued to register com-
member of the Soviet delegation Soviet Embassy official are 
said plaints about alleged negligence
to the Geneva disarmament con- to have. shown that his 
actuallarter Mr. Nasenko's conference
ference Feb 4, was allowed to defection took place 
at 1. P.M. with the Soviet diplomat
meet with a Soviet diplomat the preceding day.
There in the presence of United The Soviet delegation an
States officialsnounced Mr. Nosenko's disap-
The State 
Department an-pearance Feb
nounced at the ume that the The meeting between Mr.
'confrontation was taking place Nosenko and the "Soviet Em-
in Washington at the request of bassy official took place in the
the Soviet Embassy, but no headquarters of the Washing-
other details,were made public. ton field_office of the
The department said that almigration and Naturalization
m
196
14-00000
U.S. Lets Swiss
And Red Envoys
Talk to Defector
Nosenko Again
Voices Desire.
Fór Asylum
By Chalmers M. Roberts.
་ Staff Reporter
Soviet secret police des
fector Yuri I Nosenko is
in the United States where
he was Interviewed yester:
day by officials of both the
Russian and Swiss Em-
bassies..
The State Department said
each Interview lasted less than
an hour and that a Department
official was present each time:
Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier
request for asyum in the
United States and it will be-
granted..
1. State Department spokesman-
Richard. I. Phillips, in giving
out this information, declined
(to say where the interviews
took place or to give any de
tails. Earlier he had said
was possible that newsmen
there will be allowed to tak
with Nosenka
Soviet Kicks up Fuss
оп
☐ These developments came
as the Soviet Union kicked up
a diplomatic fuss over the dis-
appearance of Nosenko
Feb. 4, from Geneva, where
The had been assigned as an
"expert" in the Soviet delega
tion at the 17-nation disarme
meat conference. Phillpps
said he was "on temporary
'duty from KGB. (secret po-
fice) headquarters in Mos
cow."
Up to yesterday Mosco
had been directing its public
diplomatic wrath
the
at
with
Swiss, charging them
loose security. The provision
for a Swiss diplomat to inter-
view Nosenko was to assure.
the Swiss that the United
States had taken part in co
illegal act on their soil
The Swiss already had
strongly rejected the Soviet
charges.
On Wednesday, Phillips re-
See DEFECTOR, 15, Col. 1
Asal fisting
2/15/14
14-00000
Swiss, Soviets
See Defector
ported.. yesterday, a Soviet called in American Ambassa
· Embassy messenger brought a dor Fay Kobler and charged
message. to the State Depart the United States with m
ment asking for information permissable acts In the case.
"as to the manner in which He stopped short of a kidnap
Mr. Nosenko presented him-ing charza however. Kohler
self, to the US authorities replied that on behalf of the
and requested an opportunity United States he rejected anx
to Interview him. The De- implication of American wrong
#partment agreed to the inter doing
Review with American officials
Serious Effects Hinted
presentand said Nosenko
also was agreeable: A reply In Geneva Soviet officials.
about the defection also was including Tsarapkin himself.
given to the Soviet Embassy.
Also on Wednesday, in Gen- Privately spread to the press
evá, Soviet disarmament dele hints; of serious consequences
.
gate SemyonKTsarapkin Soon; there were rumors that
gave newsmen an angry state. Moscow would pull out its dele-
N mentalmed at the Swiss and gation, but up, to last night noy
charging":"provocative activi
such threat; had actually been
agents. Up to then-Tsarapkin made, according to word reach
bad been saying both private ing Washington
1. by unspecified Western
ly and publicly that the No-In publię Taarapkin said only
senkor defection would not af have nothing to say, Lam
4. fect the disarmament talks
Yesterday the Soviets stopped; not in the position to tell you
up their protest in two places, anything
Moscow and Geneva
At some so far unspecified
In Moscow: Soviet Foreign dates Nosenko, who had ap
Minister Andrei Gromykoparently crossed from Switzer-
land: to: France was down to
the United States is as.
sumed he is in the hands of
the Central Intelligence Agen
cy the normal course for, de-
fectors 3
here yesterday
were knocking down the ideal
that he was a particularly big
fish that he knew any atomic
secrets or that he knew any:
thing about Soviet disarma
ment strategy: Rather, they there had been no word up to
said
, he was a KGB staff off last night of the defection on
cer, a security man operating.
as-is the Soviet practice, in the Soviet radio, or in the
a tight compartments That press though word of mouth.
would mean he would have reports had spread through
useful and perhaps important the capital
knowledge of part of the KGB It was felt here that Moscow)
but probably not much more. might have stepped up. its
Belioved Genuine
protest after Tsarapkin had
publicly downgraded the case
It is assumed here that thelia Goneva. At any rate U.S.
36-year-old Nosenko is a gendisarmament negotiator Wil-
uine defector though the positiam C. Foster and Tsarapkin,
'sibility of his being a double held another business session)
agent has not been overlook in Geneva yesterday at which
ed. It also is felt here that they said the case was not dis
the Soviet. protest was CO cussed
stronger than, could be ex It also was noted here that
pected The request: for an the Soviet. Communist Party
interview rare but not un-Central Committee has been
precedented, was granted. in meeting in Moscow all this
hopes of reciprocal treatment week. But whether the No-
should the occasion arise. senko case was, discussed was
Moscow dispatches said not known.
WASH Post
2/15/64
Solic
:
†4-00000
12 May 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch
FROM
SUBJECT
nat
Chief, Operational Support Division
AEFOXTROT
#262 622
DDRVIOS
ADDR/ICS
ACST/IOS
0/07
C/D
CAD
C
HEATHT
2 ye
LLTS
PILS
1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will
record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May.
1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane,
Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs.
Bagley, Karpovich (pro). McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.
2. The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting
Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:
Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following
procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the
Subject:
(1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated
portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings,"
but may have the necessary silverware with which to
eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be
exercised with regard to controlling the silverware,
and it was suggested that at least two of the guards.
be required to count the silverware in and out; that
the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner
where it could be observed before the guards enter
the room, etc.)
(2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of
adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a
comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is under-
stood that there is quite a bit of equipment available
through Logistics channels.)
(3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear;
change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.
SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.
(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.
(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut,
cigarette are not to be considered as something to be
done on a regular schedule. We will await specific
instructions from SR Division as to when these items
"are to be accomplished in the future.)
(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the
Subject only on Tuesday each week.
(7) In addition to the above, it must be emphasized that
our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely
the same, and our security procedures, including
searches, will continue to be at maximum control.
It was further ascertained that we will have custody of
the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may
wish 
to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel
or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support
Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to
devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an
emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should
be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors.
and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed
as to their responsibilities in this matter.
Cal
Jack M. Bauman
Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)
SEGRET
14-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR : Special Agent in Charge
District Field Office
SUBJECT
: BESHARK, George M.
Headquarters
10 JUL 1964
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody or).
#262 622 C- 
80/1
1. Reference is made to the outline of exergency instructiona
submitted 
by you on 1 July 
1964 for Headquarters approval.
2.
The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented
immediately
..
OBIASSEN: dr
DDS/10S JULY 1964
ADDS/ICS PPLEMENTAL
ASST/IOS
C/ID
C/OSD
DC/OSD
C/SRD
C/8:3
1 C/S3
C/ID/
ALTS
14-00000
TO SE CTENED BY ADDRESSES CHE
1 July 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters
SUBJECT
: LESTICK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
#262 622 .C SD/1
1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in
the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health,
safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where'
SUBJECT is currently being held.
2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part,
are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the
District Field UNICE we are concerned with this case.
3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of
the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters
approval.
Attachment:
Emergency Instructions (2)
for Special
JOHN D. NOBLE
Special Agent
of 2
Arge
July 4
0123---187
જ ર ક ત થળ
TO BE CREED ET ACCRESCE CHLY
14-00000
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS:
Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling
of 
emergency situations such as fire, 
the escape or attempted escape
of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or 
serious injury to the SUBJECT.
Should such situations arise, it might 
be necessary to call on the
Police, the Fire Department, or outside 
modical facilities for assistance.
It is possible that in such an event 
representatives of the press or
curiosity-seekers in the local community 
might be attracted to the site,
thereby creating security problems with 
respect to the custody and
protection of the SUBJECT from a 
publicity standpoint.
In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these in-
structions 
be thoroughly understood 
and memorized by all personnel
assigned to the Special Security 
Detail on this case.
FIRE
(Main House)
1. In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the
fire 
should apply the nearest fire 
extinguisher, unless, in his judgment,
the fire has reached such proportions where 
available equipment would be
useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch 
another member of the Security
Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA
) and the other occupants
of the house. If no one is available in the 
immediate vicinity, the
person discovering the fire should 
alert others in the house by shouting
"FIRE".
2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for
directing 
the fighting of the fire, 
protecting classified and sensitive
documents and equipment on the premises, 
calling the local Fire Department
if circumstances warrant, and evacuating 
personnel. Also, at the first
available opportunity, the SSA should 
call the SAC or ASAC, or if they
cannot be reached, a senior DEO Agent, and 
furnish him with full particulars
concerning the situation and the action being 
taken.
3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire,
it 
should be borne in mind that two guards 
must be maintained on the
third floor at all times, so long as 
the SUBJECT remains confined to
his quarters. If it should become 
necessary to remove the SUBJECT from
his quarters during an emergency, a minimum 
of four guards should be
present unless circumstances are such 
as to make this infeasible.
In
14-00000
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued).
any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during
the movement of EUBJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other
restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody
and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.
4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely
to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting
equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the
Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should
move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to
arrival of the Pire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an
automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and
driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone
calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is received, the
cognizant DEO official should be contacted. for instructions as to whether
to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.
FIRE
(Tenant House)
1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof
should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use
any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless
the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed
towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be
clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the
Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole respon-
sibility of the SSA.
2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person
notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching
of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If,
in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach,
proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting
equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire
Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the
observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who
might be attracted to the scene.
-2-
14-00000
:
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)
3. At the first available opportunity, the CSA should call the
SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and
furnish him with full particulars cerning the situation and the
action being taken.
ESCAPE OR AN ESCAPE
1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a
24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to
discourage and prevent the SUV's escape. If SUBJECT should make
an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary
under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain
custody and contral over him. gre, unnecessary brutality and the
indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.
2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty
at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or
other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt.
Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA.
shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of
the SUBJECT by all means available.
3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in
extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circum-
stances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's
total escape, may direct a qualiNed Nrearms-trained agent to fire
shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt.
In no
event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot
directly at the SUBJECT.
4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his
absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all
the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall
the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.
ILLNESS OR INARY
1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBUR,
Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event
1400000
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)
of his absence, should be immediately notified and advice obtained as
to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival.
Likewise, the CAC or ASAC/570 should be notified immediately after
talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation
and any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless
of any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken to
remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital
or ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.
2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital
or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution
should be taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to
prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized
persons.
1
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION
. 1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under
constant observation twenty-four hours a day.
2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while
confined to third floor.
3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation
room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for
removal signal from visitors.
4. Coveralls taken from SEJECT at 2200 hours and returned the
following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and
undershirt overnight.
5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at
all times when in presence of SEJECT.
6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted
every time SUBJECT leaves cell.
7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever
anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.
-4-
14-00000
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)
2. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms
on 
3rd floor to be closed and 
locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order
to prevent his becoming 
oriented to surroundings.
9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with EJECT or
among 
agents, nor shall 
any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's
hearing.
10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor
permitted 
to hear radio or television
, nor shall there be any discussion
of news events within his hearing. 
He may be provided selected reading.
material upon authorization of 
Headquarters personnel concerned with the
case.
11.
Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up
any comments 
by SUBJECT or 
conversation between him and the doctor or
other operational 
personnel.
12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities
of 
GJEJECT to be promptly 
brought to the attention of the SSA.
13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel,
as 
well as photographs and 
physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained
in a secure place for ready 
reference by the SSA.
14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police
or 
Fire Department 
regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with
specific reference to the 
SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled
by the SSA with the 
senior Police or Fire Department official on the
scene. The SSA should 
converse in private with such official, and
identify himself by utilizing 
his DODD credential.
briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased
He should explain
and that it is used occasionally 
for training purposes.
concerning the 
SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if
All inquiries
necessary, it may be explained 
that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder
which sometimes 
requires special treatment.
under 
his alias or otherwise.
He should not be identified
The SSA should tactfully but firmly request
that his own identity, plus his 
DOD 
affiliation, be held in strict confidence,
especially with regard to the press. 
Inquiries by members of the press
or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that
the site is rented by a private 
group who meet periodically for recreation.
-5-
14-00000
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)
SPECIAL CONTACTS
1. George PANEGAULIS, Chief of Folice, Prince Georges County..
(Personally known to SHODDY under GOLIATH)
2.
3.
Lieutenant 14DON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf,
Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to PEPPALL
under GOLIATH)
Emergency Ambulance
.
Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department.
(Can be cotained through SHODDY)
Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.
-6-
14-00000
OLC (69-0676
5 August 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Briefing of bay Congieational Contacts on the
Yuriy Ivanovich Museuko Case
1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo
of 17. June 
1959 
(copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional
contacts 
on the history and status of the Yurly Ivanovich Nosekno case, I
have 
briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcom
mittosa along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:
Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House
Armed Services Committee 23 July 1759
William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Sonate
Appropriations Committee 24 July 1969
--
Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed
Services Committee
-―
24 July 1969
Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, liouse Appropriations
Committee
..
29 July 1969
2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective
chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers
registered particular concera or curiosity about the case and I think it
doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Neverthelesa, I
think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it
further at this 
time.
Attachment:
Dutribution:
-
Original CLC Subject Alle
1- DOP
1 - Chief, CI Staff
I
-
Chef, SB Division
1
-
D.Security
1 - CCC
- CLC Chrace
اما یک پیام
JOHN MALAY
Legislative Counsel

14-00000
DRAFT:JMM
-
19 June 1969
SECRET EVES COILY
1-9-12-1/2
SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko.Case
case.
;
The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key
congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have
been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that
the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees
be briefed along the lines indicated.
:.
1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall
having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has receivéd
press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.
2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for
State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Ship-
building in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on
4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has
since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debrieüngs
by officers of the Agency and the FBI.
SECRET FVES CHLY
14-00000
SECRET BVRS Gar
3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years
at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of
counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence.
For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major
hostile penetration in Great Britain. Whero appropriate, his information
has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and
forsign Haison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing
investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of
Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful
information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and
its techniques and methods.
:
:
4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged
and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government,
was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own
importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when
weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some
doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing,
arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure
conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases
at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal
protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB ofücer,
i
2 SECRET EVES ONLY
14-00000
SECTET
88 PUV
he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover
hio whereabouts: With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered
to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's
situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning
his bona fides.
5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to
look into those questionable aspects of the caso, while remaining alert to
the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his
stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and
with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our
current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, ›
independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own™
private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance. -------
6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal
problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the
fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an
individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable
or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that
Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash
action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences,
particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this
calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.
14-00000
Question #1
-
R
SEOT
NOSENKO
Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at
Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment?
Prisoner? Treatment?
Answer:
During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko
was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Question #2
Answer:
-
Confinement in single room except for
periods of interrogation.
Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour
visual observation with regular room search.
Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient
quantity but limited in variety.
No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio
and television were not allowed, newspapers or
any information concerning current events were
forbidden and reading material was extremely
limited.
Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.
During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967,
conditons cited above were basically maintained with the
following additons or changes:
a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was
furnished no reading material.
b.
c.
d.
After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given
a different volume of the Encyclopaedia.
Britannica to read.
From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko
was not permitted cigarettes.
Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small
confined area outside the building when weather
permitted.
SELL
14-00000
Question #3
-
3
SELE
Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this:
What?
Answer:
Office of Security records contain only limited information
in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the
responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late
October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the
Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was
at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko, and the
conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be
based on SE records.
Question #4 Where is Nosenko working now?
Answer:
Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned
residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and
analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB
and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. arca
for several days approximately every six weeks for direct
interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.
Question #5
Answer:
-
Is he working for CIA?
Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time
contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract
has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration,
primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late
1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary
not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition,
on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release
of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence
Agency from any claims prior to that date.
Question #6
Answer:
-
What is his legal status?
Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in
April 1974.
EYES
SECRET
14-00000
61300323)
SECREL
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General
SUBJECT
: The Nosenko Case
Attached please find a summary of a document written in
1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and
explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to
Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967
Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was
advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any
location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words,
from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man.
That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his
attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to
October 1967.
While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept
incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore
presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document
does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns
of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts
about, Hosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet
plant. There was no country to which he could be deported
save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return
there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from
society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to
national security.
Recognizing that only legal experts can judge defini-
tively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that
the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko incommunicado
pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to
the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee
to the Agency. As a parolec, Nosenko de facto from the date
of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil
rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in
a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018307
14-00000
SECRET
conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to
believe that full and 
total release of Nosenko would be an
abrogation 
by the Agency of its legal responsibility.
gainsay 
that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error.
To
In sum, the act of 
defection places the defector at the mercy
of the laws of the 
country to which he defects. It is the
obligation of 
the accepting country to see to it that the
laws are followed. 
In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that
the Agency 
acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that
its responsibility 
for the defector was met. While it was
unfortunate that it 
took so long to resolve the matter, we
can find no fault 
with the fact that the Agency met its
responsibility 
to both the United States and to Nosenko
himself.
Attachment: A/S
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was
provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum
sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the
Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through
that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposi-
tion of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to
the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967
in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that
should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime.
He gradually created a new life for himself in the United
States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds
no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.
Background
Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA repre-
sentatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a
staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and
offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer
was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings
in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva
again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet
disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his
CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly
taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border
on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity
documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt,
Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political
asylum from the U.S. Government.
:
Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had
arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both
in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was orig-
inally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and
assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving
Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action
by the Soviet. Government in respect to the defection of one
of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February,
unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the
press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the
Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had dis-
appeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.
2
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
!
Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included
much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or
disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department
would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's
request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a
member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 Feb-
ruary, the Sovict Government delivered a note to the American
Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and
requesting an immediate interview with him and his release.
On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Confer-
ence TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he
accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in
locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected
these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recom-
mended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko
to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of
his own free will.
On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director,
He travelled by
Nosenko was brought to the United States.
commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification,
and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true
name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
3
SECRET

-14-00000
SECRET
On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet
Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that
they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in
Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador
KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part
of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took
an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused
the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 Sep-
tember, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss
Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At
these interviews, which were also attended by State Department
and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland
of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition,
he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative
to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship.
On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made.
a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a
brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had
been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain
in this country.
From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko
was housed in the Washington area. During this period, reg-
ular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was
SECRET
......
14-00000
SECRET
3.2..
made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing
on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed
out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all
times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a
two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by caso offi-
cers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that
he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious
that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve
the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen
without changing the conditions in which he was being held.
Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially
when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed
for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance
of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's
heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing
increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with
keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in
accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear
that it was only a matter of time before he created a public
More importantly, he was in a position to communi-
cate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.
On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph
examination. The results of this examination indicated deception
scandal.
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
:
on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent
by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved
his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was
!
decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's
stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if
the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsi
bilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement.
a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could
be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were
suspended pending resolution of bona fides.
It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action
but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that
we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions
on the basis of his information. The results of some of these
actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government
politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For exam
ple, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that
he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately,
involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.
Bona Fides
Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted
to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated)
and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral
6
SECRET
14-0000
SECRET
investigations. We concluded that it had been established
beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who.
established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB
instructions, and that he came to the United States on a
deception mission. The implications of this mission had a
grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although
our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph
examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in
a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had
not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgres-
sion of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was.
placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable
means of communication with the KGB.
Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders
or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted,
however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history
and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials,
both before and after arriving in the United States.
Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies
USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling
relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile
intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was dis-
cussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an
7
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
ad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assis-
tant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge
Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 Febru-
It was
ary 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive
session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to
USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that
Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established.
agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that
he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In
fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped
off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no
positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the
community.
The President was informed of the full extent of our
suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director,
Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Nr. Patrick Coyne, Executive
Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by
Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.
Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently
informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.
;
8
SECRET
་
14-00000
SECRET
The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other
senior officials in the Department of State were informed of
our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that
he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the
possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary
of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction
that such a move might have on other potential defectors.
The Director of Security, State Department, was informed
of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked
closely with this office since then on the problem of eval-
uating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects
the security interests of the State Department.
Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S.
internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary
responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was
a XC2 plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain
FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views
about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating
and investigating him from the moment of his defection.
FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's
bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the
FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan,
were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major
The
9
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
aspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long
meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review
Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objec-
tions to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and
commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI for
mally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the
extent that "On considering carefully the results of your
interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his
statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he
purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to
draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is
possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent pro-
vocateur.
"
The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach
(and several members of his staff) were apprised of our res-
ervations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was
sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion
and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the
event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this
country.
Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of
Nosenko's True Status
From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to
this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were
10
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to
plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential
that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness
of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge
of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and
the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people
in the Agency and the intelligence community.
Nonetheless,
we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intel-
ligence community, even though this carried the inevitable
risk of leakage.
Soviet Inspired Inquiries
In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets
were making a serious effort to find out what happened to.
Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant
and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist,
Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine
Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials
for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According
to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an
international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain
compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandon-
ment of her and her children. In responding to this approach
we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself,
i
11
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
:
to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to repre-
sent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB
and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing
to an interview or in any other way.
Nosenko's Status
To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on
12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions
of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by
the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed
by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955,
which states:
"After parole of such aliens, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency will assume responsibility for
care, supervison and control of a kind and
degree it believes consistent with the internal
security needs of the United States during con-
tinuance of their parole status."
In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and
because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious
and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we.
ensured that he was under our direct observation and control
at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United
1
12
SECRET
..
14-00000
SECRET
States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to
keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain
amount of movement and of contact with the outside world.
After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was
necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is
known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within
it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country
under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically
extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Although his freedom of movement had been severely
restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no com-
plaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several
written statements from him in which he stated that our..
handling of him was justified and even beneficial.
Disposal
From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country
we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation
as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it
might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda
drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko
has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time,
however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his
real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what
13
SECRET

14-00000
2
h
SECRET
this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems
stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a
third country.
USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous
occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR,
and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such
a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end
with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death,
ctc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with
Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of
State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for
the adverse effect this might have on other potential defec-
tors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against
long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse
violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United
States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession"
by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and
I might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to
be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again
playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on
the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.
Third Country: Although we believed it likely that
Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country,
14
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
there is certainly no country in the free world on which we
could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first inform-
ing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a
desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department
of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplic-
on the basis of the political risks involved. teps
15
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO
vative
Nos ento
NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected
He was subsequently brought to the
in Switzerland in 1964.
U.S., and after a short period of relative 
freedom, he 
was
confined under 
strict and relatively austere conditions
Commencing in
for a period of approximately 
three years.
1967, he was given 
increasing amounts of 
freedom 
until 
he
He subsequently married
was allowed toral 
freedom in 1969.
a U.S. citizen, settled 
in the 
Southeastern 
United States
He is presently under
itizen in 1974.
and became a U.S.
contract to the Agency, providing consultative 
services
and information 
on subjects germane to his background.
NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing
substantive questions 
were raised concerning his bona fides,
NOSENKO's 
debriefing
and his general 
behavior raised further concern 
about his
emotional health 
and general safet✓.
The advice of the
and confinement were ended 
when it 
was concluded 
that he
✓ his confine-
was not a threat to 
national security.
Justice Department was obtained 
at the 
time of
ment, and the FBI 
participated in his subsequent 
debrie
NOSENKO's initial entry 
into the U.S. was coordinated 
wit..
the Department of State, 
and they were periodically advised
of his status during his 
confinement up to the time of his
final settlement.
fing.
.h
The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were
intended to convey to him the seriousness 
of his position
as a suspected disinformation 
agent and to make clear to 
him that
his free settlement in 
the U.S. was precluded as long as
It was understood, however,
this issue was unresolved
.
that at any time he could have elected to end his confine-
OS files do not 
document
ment and return to the 
Soviet Union.
that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to
NOSENKO, however, it is 
the recollection of senior 
staff
officers (ADD/O and D/OS
) that such was the case, and 
further
that it was a condition routinely 
applied to other defectors
whose bona fides were 
in doubt.
SECRET
:
14-00000
SEGRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
.SUBJECT
B
:
Nosenko
131275
1375-4
We have
Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the aware.
ness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS).
been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could
elect to leave the U. S.., but that he could not be ensured of immediate
liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under
the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this
latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.
S. D. Breckinridge
_ Attachment: a/s
SEGRET
013.46
i
14-00000
.
"
NCR
AGENCY
TOR SECRET
EYES ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 23, D. C
OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
already dised
12 February 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board Members.
SUBJECT:
Yuri Ivanovich HOSENKO
1. This memorandus refers to the State Department
release of 10 February on subject case and providos addi-
tional background as well as information on his current
status...
22 As a KGB staff officer, NOSENXO is regularly
assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of tho
KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrange-
sent which permitted his to carry out intelligence and
security functions in Goneys on behalf of the XG2.
133210 2150 at various sessions of the
Disarmament Conference hold in Genova in 1962. During the
course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with
officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials
that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security ap-
paratus and volunteered to aid the U. 3. Government in
detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the
U. S. Goverment. During the course of his contact with.
U. S. authorities, NOSENIG stated that his cooperation with
"the U., S. Government originated with his distists and hatred
for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain
revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official
in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general
admiration of the Americans with show he had como in con-
tact within the Soviet Unica.
4. In late January 1964, ROSENZO arrived in Geneva,
again asquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified
his CLA contacts in the United States concerning his pres-
ence in Geasy and arranged to set with these contacts,
During a series of meetings 305ENKO provided informatica
including documents concerning Soviet State Security ati-
vities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed accouat
E2 IMPDET
THE SECRET CL BY 063344
✓
FYES DALY
HR 10-23
9 January 1975
14-00000
SECRET”.
of the KG3 operation against U. S. Professor Sarghoora
which NOSENKO said he had 
personally supervised at the
direction of SEMICHASTNIY, the 
Chairman of the Committee
for State Security 
(KGB).
5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced.
his 
desire to leave the 
USSR permanently and seek his future
in the West. He claimed his 
new work in the XG3 (First
Deputy Chief of that 
départment charged with the surveillance.
and recruitment of American 
visitors to the USSR) was ax-
panding and that be 
would not be able to visit the Most
with any frequency. 
Accordingly, he prepared a request for
political asylum in the United 
States. He was taken to
Frankfurt, Germany 
where he is currently undergoing interro-
gation. Plans are now being 
made to remove his to the U. S.
6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject
has 
not been extensive 
and that we will require additional
thorough interrogation 
to establish Subject's bona fides.
It should also be noted that 
NOSENKO's duties were not con-
cerned with substantive 
aspects of the Disarmament Conference,
and he therefore to notice 
to be able to shed auch, if
pany, light on that area of our 
interest.
7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was da-
signed 
to wreck the 
conference was most carefully considered.
The decision to accept 
his was taken on the conviction that
the Soviets would not have 
chosen such a vulnerable agent
(staff officer of the KGB) 
for this kind of mova.
Marshall S. Carter
Lloutenant Canoral, USA
Deputy Director
SCGVET
14-20000
ン
EXES CAY
31 December 1974
1374-0735
MEMORA
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
SUBJECT
: Office of Security reports on PARAGON,
NOSENKO
, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II
and 
MOCKINGBIRD
1.
Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum
from the 
Acting Director 
of Security on subject activities. The
material represents 
responses to questions posed by your office.
Obviously, the next phase of 
the investigation will require more
detailed reviews of each 
activity.
2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:
PARAGON
We should spell out what is meant by the
statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage
to the 
Office of Security," how it was expressed and
what form it took
.
The taping of two conversations does not seem
to constitute 
"
electronic surveillance" in the usual
sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance.
A little 
more detail on the equipment will be wanted.
NOSENKO
We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI
knowledge
, 
and report such information as we get.
AELADLE
We will want to verify
DDCI's
approval of entry.
[2 suc
... CLI
14-00000
CELOTEX I
SECRET
ERS
We will want more detail on the actual
surveillance, including possible higher approval.
This is responsive to the DCI's request for
newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.
CELOTEX II
Questions similar to CELOTEX I.
We may want actual copies of newspaper
stories for display, in addition to memos, should.
DCI wish to use it.
MOCKINGBIRD
No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by
Attorney General. It may be that Justice will
have a copy.
Does this raise a question of surveillance
of congressmen if one is contacted by someone.
under surveillance?
3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA,
REDFE, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB
Thursday.
Attachments a/s
#
.О. Вимова
S. D. Breckinridge
EYES CHALY
:
14-00000
j
SEGRET
EYES ONLY
31 DEC 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
: Deputy Director for Administration
VIA
SUBJECT
:
PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD
1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics
which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office.
As you will note, the report is in a question and answer
format with attachments.
2. This Office is still gathering material in regard
to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other
files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist,
on the above mentioned projects.
Atts
Distribution:
Original Adse
1
-
DDA
EYES ONLY
Sidney
Acting Di
Stembridge
tor of Security
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010249
-2
14-00000
REQUEST
I, Yurly Ivanovich Rosenko, request the Government of
the United States of America to grant me political asylum
in the United States of America. This decision has been
taken by ne as the result of considering this question
over the course of several years without any pressure on
Over the course
the part of anyone whosoever. I absolutely do not believe
in the truth of the Socialist system. ducking in tlie KGB
the truth 
of the
and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about
the internal situation, the mood of the people and the
policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that
in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real
freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist
Party Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries
of the est, I was able correctly to understand and become
aware of the oxistence of a real and actual free world.
The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the
·Communist movement are for no vivid examples and confiraa-
tion of the correctness of my own decision to break forevor
with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Covernment of
the United States of America that I will devote all ny
strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the
United States of America.
.
To
4 February 1964
/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

4-00000
قی
que lignite blade Aayana,
ciqyanthaal water to stinks
Card NH A NE V map they bas p
Sl altcarte te bepaalt bezgan -
10.0258 pézelić ockeromili rucolóaj o sijaper-
munity a aby mapoolsey (unwatseray was
ار دو دو
ناشرین
558X
Con Int
ponleatonové jabukizubes a proge, 250
моед ней и не будет бравы и щий свобода
pustqua parpaded toway -
Histguurstee Magnus. Presumab'tiziju piline
ith Festage & Baccer Upoblaciste
Upolinesite 
letten?.
a cockunat syngivabilaste pacines a gedenbu
."
godandu-
take beca
Лісовий в Бенерий Pret bepasie; pastiest
Pangku PREVO glinoma alzaino gay dass
Apruan papa pequelinead
å bilenenena Corison.
Cory antipri Spelette &
doo ole packy ze Sakthi ke To hime evenly
Request lec
• !??༥
2
14-00000
I
UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY
In consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely
acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the
1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there
are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior
associations with the Agency. fully understand that the current arrange-
ments between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are
intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever
made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Tacknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States
by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current
arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert
under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely,
totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other
government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist
Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member
of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches
opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become
a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other
totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future: advocate
the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world
communism.
th.
I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past,
present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and
my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including
all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with
the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that
violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under
the espionage laws (18 U.S. C.-793, 794) and other applicable laws and
regulations. I understand that this is a solemn and permanent undertaking
which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other
arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition,
I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not
authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under
the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to
ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not
information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.
I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental
reservations or purpose of evasion.
:
14-00000
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and seat
21
this
day of
More
1969.
(SEAL
1969.
/8/
IDEN 1
(L.S.)
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2/24 day of art.
/s/ IDEN 7
Notary Public
My commission expires September 24, 1963
THE
14-00000
די : י:
IDEN
1
Dear
IDEN 1
The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under
the following terms and conditions:
1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an
independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an
employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this
contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times
to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment
or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. Instructions furnished to you pursuant to
this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you....
´as if included in the written terms hereof.
COMMUNICATION In all relationships with the CENTRAL
끄는
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant
instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the
"Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized
to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this
i
contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of
assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your
relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your
responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made
regarding cover and general security conditions,
You may be required
14-00000
to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover
arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documenta
are solely for the purpose
cover and security and confer no additional
legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with
respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from
this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be
provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized
Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely
to such instructions.
4.
COMPENSATION.
You will be compensated by the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($16,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be
monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized
Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income
taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of
residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes.
The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with
applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized
ཀན་ཤ
Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an
automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor,
up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00). Payment of all
taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal
obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security
instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government
Representative.
_
-
-2-
14-00000
§. PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will
be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is
; specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after
mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances.
All of
the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and
the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any
such expenses.
6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the
course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary
allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary
allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations.
in the course o
"course 
of this contract, you are directed to travel or are
authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will
be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial
accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
regulations.
If,
7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance
C¢ གསནྡྷ© གཡེ
covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could
be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and
hospitalization:
8. SECRECY OBLIGATION.
You will be required to keep forever
secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason
hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such
-3-
14-00000
secrecy may subj. et
iminal prosecution under the expionage laws.
as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship
with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be
kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and
contract with any person other than the Authorized Government
Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.
No promises or
9. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS.
commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those
expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto.
shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
10. TERM.
This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969
and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this
contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of
termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the
elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically,
on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any
time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon
termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments,
if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist
you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation
to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of
living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of
this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations
ཅ་ནད་སྙ་
:
-4-
1
1400000
":
imposed on you by paragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of
any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Date:
ACCEPTED:
21. Mpril 1949
WITNESS:
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:
Contracting Officer
2/s/ IDEN 1
Date:
· 21 april 1969
Date:
/s/ IDEN 7
.5-
14-00000
Dear
IDEN I
IDEN 1
Reh rence is made to your contract with the UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT
, as 
represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
effective March 1969. Effective 
March 1970 said contract is herein
terminated by 
mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof
the following agreement 
is substituted.
The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the
CENTRAL 
INTELLICENCE 
AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under
the following terms and 
conditions:
1. STATUS. "Your legal status under this contract is that of an
independent 
contractor 
or consultant. You are not considered an employee
of the UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract.
will be required 
to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests
You
made of you by the 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to
tasks requested of you by 
the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
will refrain from 
engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until
You
approval has been received 
from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Instructions furnished 
to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms
hereof shall be as binding 
upon you as if included in the written terms
hereof.
2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant
instructions from an individual 
hereinafter referred to as the "Actiorized
Government 
Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss
matters with you 
relating to your responsibilities under this contract
including, but not limited 
to, cover arrangements, place of assignment,
conditions of work or any other 
matters relating to your relationship with
the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY.
ཙྩཱ !
-
3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your
“responsibilities 
hereunder, 
appropriate arrangements will be made
regarding cover and 
general security conditions. You may be required
to execute certain documents 
in the course of establishing cover
arrangements 
but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are
solely for the purpose 
of cover and security and confer no additional
legal rights or 
obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with
respect to the CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this
agreement. In 
connection with cover and security you will be provided
from time to time 
specific instructions by the Authorized Government
Representative and 
you will be required to adhere precisely to such
instructions.
SECRET
Other
dagga d
Hurst
સૂનને નવા
14-00000
SECRET
4. COMPENSATION. You will be compensated by the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($18,500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be
monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized
Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income taxes.
and 
to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence.
Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes, The current
rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and
the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative.|
Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your
personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security
instructions 
which will be furnished by the Authorized Government
Representative.
5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the
course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary
allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary
allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations.
If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are
authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will ben
made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance
with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.
6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.
You presently have a private health insurance plan for
yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to
the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums
on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a
health insurance program for selected contract individuals
of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to
all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either
insurance coverage until-1-March 1972. However, any new
Contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this
organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of
any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.
6. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor
to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with
a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional
accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will
be your personal responsibility. The current premium charge
is $12.00 per month.
SECRET
แ

14-00000
SECRET
(1) Subject to the priorities of work you are herein
authorized twenty-one (21) work days vacation with pay per
contract year to be taken only at times and places approved
in 
advance by the Authorized Government Representative,
Vacation 
time is not ate ruable and will not be carried over
from year to year. Payment for unused vacation time will
not be authorized.
(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury
and the like, your compensation may be continued for perioda
not to 
exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract
year. 
Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive
days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time,
this benefit 
is not acèruable and will not be carried over from
year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be
authorized.
7. SECRECY OBLIGATION.
You will be required to keep forever
secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason
hereof (unless released 
in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY from 
such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such
secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage lawn,
as amended, and 
other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship
with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY and this contract must be
kept secret 
and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and
contract 
with any person other than the Authorized Government
Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.
8. UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or
commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than thos
expressly 
stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto
shall be binding 
on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
F
9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and
shall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract
shall be deemed 
to be-renewed for another year unless
ten has been furnished 
to
termination
notice of
you thirty (30) days in
Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms
advance.
and conditions
. This contract may be terminated at any time by either
party upon 
furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination
of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the
CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in
obtaining 
gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to
jassure you 
that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of
Eliving. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of
SECRET
14-00000
:
SECRET
this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations
imposed on you 
by paragraph of this contract and the provisions of any
secrecy 
agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Date:
ACCEPTED:
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:
IDEN 6
Contracting Officer'
BIDEN 1
March 6, 1970
Date:
WITNESS:
/B/ IDEN 2
Date:
ch 1970
SECRET
14-00000
i
25 October 1972
Received this date from an Authorized Government Repre-
*sentative three Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:
#AI 25-349
Schroder Trust Company
$15,000.00
#FE 54779 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 10,000.00
#A593613
Harris Trust & Savings Bank
10,000.00
ས
This is an advance against a back salary payment covering
the period April 1964 to March 1969 which was approved on 18 October
1972. I understand that this advance, $35,000.00, will be deducted
from the total back salary payment covering the specified period when
the finalization of this payment is made in the near future.
་
// IDEN ļa
/8/
IDEN 5
Witness
>
Date:
Coteler 25, 1972.
+
400000
NING VI MA
100%
16 NOV 1972
Received this date from an Authorized Government Repre-
sentative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:
#155784
Riggs National Bank
#01-028564 Union Trust Company
#0661511
American Security & Trust
$15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
#2-442275 The National Bank of Washington 7,052.00
The above amount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00
advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back
salary covering the period April 1964 to March 1969.
/s/ IDEN 1
/s/ IDEN 5
Witness:
Date:
Movember 16, 1972.
ブ
14-00000
UNITED STATES ( VERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
:
Files
FROM :
IDEN 2
SUBJECT:
IDEN 1
3012-130
DATE:
13 July 1973
1. On 12-July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and
Release which 
was 
prepared by the General Counsel was signed by
the 
Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the
undersigned. 
There were no problems involved in obtaining the
signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he
would 
sign such a document if he would receive the $15,000.00 which,
Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964
before 
his defection.
2. Subject understood that the attached did not affect the
existing contractual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations
in that 
contract were valid and continuing.
3.
Also attached is a copy of the $13,000.00 Cashier's
Check given to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed
sum 
of $15,000.00, the Subject having previously received $2,000.00.
which was a part of the agreed sum.
'/s/IDEN 2
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
الا می برد
14-00000
WHEREAS,
ACKNOWLEDCEMENT. AND RELEASE.
IDEN 1
a former citizen of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and an employee of the Committee for State
Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Govern-
ment and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and,
WHEREAS,
IDEN 1 was promised certain sums of money for
his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been
paid to him; and,
WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by
IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency;
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
for himself and for his heirs, executors, admini-
IDEN 1
strators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United
States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its
employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him
for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims
demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way
connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Govern-
ment and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document,
12 July 1973.
WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL:
WITNESS;
On Behalf of the United States Government
/s/ IDEN 2
/s/ IDEN 1
SEAL)
IDEN 1
14-00000
:
IDEN 1
Dear IDEN 1
Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government,
as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.
Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first
sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:
"You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency
at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars
($23,750) per year. "
•
All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and
effect.
Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BY /s/ IDEN 3
Special Contracting Officer
ACCEPTED:
_ /s/ IDENT
George Martin Rosnek
WITNESS:
/s/ IDEN 2
way I 1974
Date
APPROVED:
/s/ IDEN 4
97may 1974
Date
177374
Date
EZIMPDET
CL by: 063837
14-00000
TAB
1
2
DEFECTORS.
:
TITLE
Memo for Mr. Garrison from S. D. Breckinridge, Cubj:
Information 
on Detention of Defector
:
Memo for IG from Jerrold B. Brown, Subj:
Information (re: Report that DCI fired an employee
Request 
for
for abusing a 
defector)
MFR from Walter Elder, Sub: Rockefeller Commission
Contact (re: 
Report that DGI fired an employee for
abusing a defector)
Memo for IG from C. W. Kane. Subj: Alleged Illegal
Activities (
Unidentified Subject Alleged Abuse of
Defector)
با ما
Routing Slip to S. Breckinridge from F. Bucci
Att: 
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General
of the United States and 
the Central Intelligence Agency
for the Entry of 
Aliens of Interest to the Central
Intelligence Agency under Specific Circumstances
Momo for Inspector General from Jerrold B. Brown, dated
18 Juno 1975, Subject: 
Request for Information
(re- DCI firing 
an employee for abusing a defector)
DATE
30 Jan 75
18 Jun 75
23 Jun 75
27 Jun 75
22 Jan 75
10 Feb 55
18 June 1975
14-00000
SECRET
Defecto
3
Review Staff: 75/880
Mr. Ryan
INERICTOR GIMIM
75-2.276 76
18 June 1975.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT
Request For Information
The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170)
says 
the DCI fired 
an employee for abusing a de-
fector. Can 
you uncover the details on this in-
cident? 
Is it the only such domestic incident
known 
to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no
knowledge of "
any piece of paper" sent to the
Commission 
on the reported incident or of any
others. 
He suggests checking Office of Security)
CC: DDO
John Waller
:
SECRET
Jerro
Jerry
-
BB
B.
Brown
neil
P
DAI HASA
14-00000
:
Prekia
S-E-C-RE-1
SAHIRIT 2
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR THE ENTRY 
OF ALLENS OF INTEREST TO
THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNDER SPECIFIC 
CIRCUNSTANCES
The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent nood for the covert
terbary 
entry of aliens into the United States 
for intelligence and
operational purposes within its jurisdiction
.
To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency.
will 
submit each such alien's case, in writing to 
the Commissioner of
Immigration 
and 
Naturalization with the request 
to defor inspection of
the 
subject upon arrival and parole to the 
Central Intelligence Agency
under 
the authority of Section 212(d)(5) of 
the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such
mentries 
not be outwoighed by the dangers, 
if any, to the internal security
of the United States by the presence of such aliens
, the Contral Intelligence
Agency 
agrees that it will take all necessary steps 
to establish the bona
fides of each 
prospective entrant prior to 
submittal to the Immigration and
Naturalization 
Service.
will only be 
utilized where it is strictly in the national interest; (b) That
It further agrees: (a) That 
this method of entry
each request will be accompanied by a summary of 
pertinent background and blo-
graphical data 
with particular emphasis on aspects 
bearing on internal
security and 
admissibility under the immigration 
laws, as well as the results
of a 
current check of the FBJ file; and (c) That the 
placo,-time-and-manner
of-arrival will 
be coordinated with the Service in 
advance theroof.
Fach alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under the
foregoing 
procedure will be paroled for such 
period of time as may be agreed
on by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Service
, in-no-Instance to
exceed one-year
. Further extensions of parole, 
similarly limited, may be
authorized 
thereafter on a written statement of need
, which include the
results of 
a current security check.
Upon arrival each allen will execute an agreement acknowlodging
parole 
status in a form satisfactory to the 
Central Intelligence Agency and
the Service.
After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will
assume 
responsibility for care, supervision 
and control of a kind and degree
it believes consistent with the interral security needs 
of the United States
during 
continuance of their parole status. 
Further, in the case of any alien
whose 
physical custody is not to be maintained or is 
to be terminated, the.
Central 
Intelligence Agency will arrange for 
presentation of each alien for
registration 
pursuant to law at a time and place 
satisfactory to the Service.
SECRET

14-00000
S.E-C-R
EXHIBIT 2
Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in
the United 
States
, or if internal security reasons so require, these allens
will be removed 
therefrom through the arrangements and at the expense of
the Central 
Intelligence Agency, except in those cases in which other dis-
position 
is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also, the Central
Intelligence Agency 
will inform the Service sufficiently in advance of each
proposed departure as to permit verification thereof if the Service so elects.
In accordance with past practice, the Servico will apprise the FBI of
the entry 
and 
departure or other disposition of these aliens.
The Service will maintain separato and secure files under this
agreement.
- 2
5/5
Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General
✓ Allen W. Dilles”
Director of Central Intelligence.
(Feb 10 1955) A
S-E-CR-E-T
14-00000
ཨ
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
☐
1.. ERMAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
CONF.__NTIAL
☐ SECKET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Alleged Illegal Activities
(Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security
в
6777
DATE
27 JUN 1975
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
buildingj
DAT!
RECESSED KANARVED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. 
Draw a line acrons column after each comment.)
1.
DDA
2.
30 JUN 1975
3.
3.
6.
7.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-32
Inspector General
Att:
Mr. Ainslic
Dr. Chamberlain
SUB.
the
n
3-5:
Attached was prepared in
response to an 18 June:
request from Jerry Brown.
Per 23 Jun, MFR by Walt
Elder, source of the story
is a deposition by Mr. Helms
Thir
befire
610EVIOUS
EDITIONS
☐ SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
14-00000
SECRET
INSPECTOR GENERAL
15-21
7 JUN 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ATTENTION
VIA
A 177
SUBJECT
:
Inspector General
Mr. Neil Ainslie
Deputy Director for Administration.
Alleged Illegal Activities
(Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse
of Defector)
1.
Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request
for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to
provide information pertinent to a case mentioned on page
170 of the 
Report to the President by the Commission on CIA
activities 
within the United States..
2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission
Report 
is 
quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector'
was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The
Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee in-
volved."
3. A search of Office of Security file resources has
reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector
_ was-physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency
employee was later terminated by the DCI. It is not known
whether the following case is identical to the referenced
case on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts
appear to be quite similar.
4. Information developed by this Office of possible in-
terest 
to the 
Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats,
an ex-
CIA employee, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.
5. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a
naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by
CIA 
in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961.
file 
information reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found
guilty of 
mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry Board
The
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 011018
53922
$4-00000
SECRET
in Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was Eduard
Oun, an Estonian who 
defected from Estonia through Sweden
in 1955.
6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of
Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges
of physical abuse included 
the striking of Oun with the fist;
application 
of turpentine and ointments to various parts of
the body, the 
scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forc
ing Oun to stand in the nude 
as long as eight days during
interrogations 
with only very brief rest periods.
7. Torpats was returned to Headquarters and was brought
before 
an Employment 
Review Board for consideration of separa-
tion from the Agency. 
The Board's recommendations initially
were that Torpats be "t
'
transferred to an area outside the
Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a
later 
recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14
to GS-13. Torpats 
later received unsatisfactory fitness re-
ports 
and engaged in various "in house" Battles with Agency
officials 
concerning his employment.
8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the
authority granted the DCI under Section 102 (C) of the National
Security Act 
of 1947, as ammended, "effective 30 January 1961.
Later in 
1961,
Torpats filed suit-against-the-DCI contesting
his dismissal, 
and the 
U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia 
granted the government's motion for summary judgment
against Torpats. 
Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S.
Court of 
Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling
that Torpats' termination was legal..>
ཡུས 2ན 
3.༢ 6, ༢ ཁས —7,.༢༠༠༩ མ•ད༤པ་ -ཝ"A མ
9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained
little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956.
It was not clear from file 
information whether Oun entered the
United States 
after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent
document 
contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September
1956 and 
noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and
found qualified for 
Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S.
under Public Law 203..
2
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained
only 
fragmentary information 
in regard to certain areas of the
Torpats' case. File review 
indicated, however, the DDO, OGC
and the Inspector General's 
office will probably have addition-
al information concerning this 
matter.
3
SECRET
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security
14-00000
SECRET
78-2644.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Rockefeller Commission Contact
6:24
Live Reging
75-6942
Review Staff:
23 June 1975
75/1008
Mason Cargill told me today that the reference
in the Commission report to an employee who was fired
because he abused a 
defector came from a deposition by
Dick Helms Helms 
could not remember an exact name,
but from the description 
which
on which 
he gave on his
it is clear that the employee who was fired was John
gave on his 
deposition,
Torpats. 
He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.
Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working
in the 
Defector 
Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany.
In the course of 
interrogating another Lithuanian
defector, 
Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired,
he sued the Director (
then McCone). He lost the case.
West Elder
Walter Elder
сс
éc
сс
-
-
DCI
IG
OGC
RE" -1 ་ ་
,:ར ོན ་ ག་ཁང་
SECRET
CB:
007789
E2 IMPDET
:
14-00000
SECRET
Review Staff: /5/880
mi. Kijan
INSDICTOR CINEM
75-2276
18 June 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT
Request For Information
The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170).
says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a de-
fector. "Can you uncover the details on this in-
cident? Is it the only such domestic incident
known to us?' (John Waller says the DDO has no
knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the
Commission on the reported incident or of any
others. He suggests checking Office of Security)
CC:
DDO
John Waller
BB
Jerrold B. Brown'
SE/DDC
Fit.C. Mardirosion.
Dick St-1#3
57-143
C/CE
SECRET
!
14-00000
SECRET
16 7.5 -0385
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Garrison
SUBJECT
30 January 1975
1: Information on Detention of Defector.
1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents
bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the
considerations at the time such decisions were made and
reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record,
staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the
later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to
move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release
him.
2. The assumption is that following the initial decision
this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that
those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the
Agency
Original
-
-
Addressee
SDB Chrono.
Judy for QA files
7s/ S. D. Creati
S. D. Breckinridgę
SECRET
GL
14-00000
☐
Excerpts from Meeting No. 2 with Nosenko
Real No. 1, 11 June 1962 (The quality of the tape is very poor,)
Translated from Russian by P. DA
(N. talks about surveillance of Soviet personnel in the United States.)
Nosenko: Let me tell you'
another name.
-
I (---) I was also in the States, although under
I had a certain business there
Q. This was (?) in Washington (?)? `
Nosenko: Yes, I was there.
Q: On TDY?
Nosenko: 19 days, 19 days only.
Q: Under what name?
Nosenko: NIKOLAYEV.
Q: NIKOLAYEV?
Nosenko: In England I was NIKOLAYEV and in your country I was NIKOLAYEV.
Q: first and middle name?
Nosenko: Yes, Yuriy, Yurly, also Yuriy.
Q: And in England you also were for a short time?
Nosenko: In England I was for ten and fifteen days
Note:
During the interrogation of Nosenko in 1964, he denied that he ever
said that he was in the United States.
2. You stated previously that while traveling to England and Cuba, you were
documented as Nikolayev. Under what cover did you travel to those countries?
What was your Legend-Biography?
3.
Note: Any KGB officer going abroad under another name and under
cover prepares a Legend-Biography to cover up his real
identity. If Nosenko travelled as Nikolayev, then his legend
omitted "the fact" that he was a son of a Minister because.
there was no Minister of Shipbuilding Industry with the name
of Nikolayev, etc., etc.)
'
You stated previously that in January 1960 you were processed to go to the
US with the Soviet Automotive Delegation. You obtained a passport in your
true name, Nosenko, but the date was postponed, then cancelled. Who
selected your candidacy for the trip? What were you supposed to do in
the USA? Why was the trip postponed? Why were you processed in your
true name, Nosenko, and not under the name Nikolayev, under which you
visited Erstand en vaa vaatu
14-00000
N
4. In 1962 you stated that while working with the KGB, you personally
:
recruited ten Americans. Please give us their names and how you
recruited them.
Note:
Nosenko was asked why he was chosen to go to Geneva in 1962
instead of an officer from the Department (KGB) Delegation.
Answering this question he mentioned the recruitment of ten
Americans.
Excerpts from; Meeting No. 2 with Nosenko
11 June 1962
Nosenko: Gribanov, the chief of the whole counterintelligence. (His name)
Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov, .. so, Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov
decided you go, that I must be here (in Geneva). I said, "Be my
guest, Oleg Mikhaylovich. I am not saying no. "So Gribanov
• •
decided "You will go. That's all" (Nosenko knocked on the desk).
.. Who have I recruitted?
Well, what am I?
•
Ten Americans,
no more than that.
•
⋅
(and Gribanov said) "You will go! You must go!"
III. Soviet visas and other regulations for tourists traveling to the USSR.
L
1.
Didn't you know or remember how Oswald's visa was processed and
from what country Oswald entered the USSR? Is it possible that he
entered the USSR on a "podvisnaya" visa?
n
✓ 2. You previously said that you saw Oswald's visa application, but you could
not say from what country Oswald came to the USSR. In your opinion, is
it possible that Oswald received his visa application in some other European-
country, then went to Finland and through Finland entered the USSR without
contacting the Soviet consulate in Helsinki? Did you hear any talk about the
possibility that is described above? If so, when did you hear it and from
whom?
3. On 3 July 1964 you stated that you have seen Oswald's anketa (visa
application). Do you remember what was in that anketa? Did you read
the anketa? What did you mean that you saw the anketa? Was it in the
naine Lee Harvey Oswald, or was there another name? Did you see the
name of the person who signed the anketa?
3

14-00000
:
レ
4.
Do you have any information to the effect that Oswald might not have
come to the Soviet consulate or to the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki to
obtain his visa? Could he have gbtained a vina în Switzerland or. Sweden
then nave come to reisinki and, without reporting to the Soviet consulate
in Helsinki, have taken a train to Leningrad and then to MoHCOW?
5. According to your previous information, "any tourist
-
he buys a tour
to the Soviet Union, makes out the anketa, and then comes to Moscow."
In what country did Oswald buy a tour to the USSR?
country
In what country did
Oswald fill in the anketa? If the anketa goes to Moscow, to what office
-
in Moscow does it go? To MID, KGB? Is it possible that all the data on
Oswald from his anketa was sent to Moscow by a cable? Did you see and
.
read Oswald's anketa or a telegram that Oswald is coming to Moscow?
If you did not read the anketa, who among the KGB officers of the Second
Chief Directorate or the First Chief Directorate read the anketa or had
access to it? Who would logically have access to the anketa?
6. According to your previous information, any person who wants to visit the
USSR has to buy a tour in a foreign tourist firm in his home country or any
other country, and the tourist firm will make arrangements for his stay in
the USSR. It is understood that he must fill in the anketa, and in addition to
the general questions, the common tourist should make requests for the
cities he intends to visit and for the accommodations he wants. The tourist
would know in advance when he receives his visa his date of arrival in
"
Moscow, in what hotel he is going to stay, and what kind of accommodations
he would be given. The question, then, is do you know when Intourist
received Oswald's request and application and when it answered him that
his demands are met and that he is welcome in Moscow?
✓ 7. From your knowledge, when Oswald arrived in Moscow, was he handled by
the Intourist Agency or by Sputnik, the Youth Tourist Bureau of the USSR,
or by the Central Council for Tourism of the Soviet Trade Unions?
Note: The Central Council for Tourism of the Soviet Trade Unions organizes
exchanges 
of tourists between trade unions of the USSR and other
countries. Sputnik was organized in June 1958 for the exchange of
of tourists (students and other youths).
4
:
14-00000
.:
8.
What is the procedure after a tourist applica for a Soviet vina"
Do you
✓ 9.
✓ 10.
11.
know at what tourist agency or in what foreign country Oswald applied..
for a visa to the USSR or bought a tour to the USSR? Who was the
Soviet Intourist representative in that country who took Oswald's visa
application to the Soviet Embassy?
You stated previously that Oswald was not considered a defector.
was not a defector, then what was he?
Note:
If he
If the KGB did not consider Oswald to be a defector, then it is
possible that Oswald was known to the KGB long before his arrival
in the USSR as a tourist and Oswald was assured that when he
arrived in the USSR he would be given Soviet citizenship or at
least a permanent residence permit. Although he would be a defector
anyway, it could be that Oswald did not like the word defector
and the KGB decided not to call him a defector but, let us say, a
volunteer. The Soviet-Constitution states that the USSR grants the
Fright of asylum to all foreign citizens "who are persecuted for
`safeguarding the interests of the working class or who are persecuted
for scientific activities, for national-liberation struggle.". (Article
129 of the USSR Constitution of 1936.)
You stated previously that "since about 1960, every Soviet ambassador-
can give a visa in three to five days. If so, what was so special for the
Soviet government that the ambassador would be personally involved in
issuing a visa to Oswald?
Note: It is known that in 1957 the Soviet government adopted some measures
to improve travel for foreign tourists in the USSR. They mostly
concerned currency exchange. The 1957 regulations said nothing
about visas. Nosenko should be questioned about the 1957 decision
of the Soviet government to determine if he is not mistaking the 1957
decision with that of 1960.
You stated previously that since about 1960, every Soviet ambassador
can give visas in from three to five days. The available information
published by the Soviets unmistakenly states that a visa cannot be obtained
in less than seven days (in some cases it takes five to seven days). Following
are excerpts from a book entitled Moscow, A Tourists Companion, published
in Moscow in 1969, and from the magazine Soviet Life, May 1978, p. 59.
Soviet Life stated that "visas are issued within 10 days of receipt of
application at a Soviet consulate."
5
14-00000
Formalities
All your word for a
national passport and
visit and the itinerary
Pi Asa rule, vivo
him and trand an
Visas ar pasi be
bas day afte
ated treat to
Soviet border an
mesensi sit.
Soviet Hush "is your
180 mets dang the time of your
are adtuned for travellers by tourer
11. 
you can get your viva yourweit
1 consular offices in every country five
The visa is valid for the indic
E pounts of entry and exit on the
2. lege ndung in your route.
11. you decide to extend your visit or alter the itinerary, apply
to the serving bureau at 
your hotel. If Intourist is able to provide
the nerowary accommodation, 
your visa will be altered accord-
ingly. Visas, and 
subsequent alterations in them, are free of
charge
Visas for transit travel via the U.S.S.R. by railway or mot
are issued if you have 
the pertinent visa of the country neigh
bouring on the U.S.SR. 
You need no Suvict visa if you travel
248
Intourist takes care of you
via USSR. by air, provided you do not stay in Soviet transfer
towns for more 
than 24 hours.
Intourist does not service travellers who coine on visits to vela-
tives 
in the Soviet Union. Neither does it offer services in
towns where Intourist. agencies are unavailable In such cases,
apply to a Suviet 
consulate abroad.
Under reciprocal agreements between the Soviet Union and
some other countries, no visas are necessary for nationale of
these 
countries for travel in the U.S.S.R. and for Savictstouriste
visiting these countries. =
Medical Formalities. An international amallpoxžinoculation certi
hrate is requied for entry to the Soviet Union from African,
Asian and 
South American countries, and in addition, a cholera
certihoate for entry froni India and Eastern Pakistan.
Customs. Personal belongings-garments shoes tourist and
sports gear, 
perfumery and cosmetics, etc in quantities neces
sary for the time of stay/
in-the Soviet Union depending on the
sesun, 
are duty-free. Besides, travellers may bring duty-free.
(per person; two canicras, one amateur cinecamera and a
reasonable 
(non-commercial) amount of souvenirs., Persons com-
ing 
to the Soviet Union on a hunting four (provided they have
a certificate 
issued by Intourist or a foreign travel firm confirm
ing this purpose of their trip! may bring spating rifles,
To make sure passage home is unhindered, please register the
foreign 
currency you have brought with you with the customs.
which will 
issue you a pertinent certificate.
It is prohibited to bring to the U.S.S.R. Son! carrency, Soviet
government 
bends, annulled securities, atm
and appliates for smoking them, obscene mata
blus, records, etc., politically and economically
the US.S.R.
All objects and articles (except those produto –
be shipped out of the USSR. in any quotes
have 
been purchased with Soviet money
Vneshtorg Bank of the USSR. or the ath.
State Bank of the USSR
bank
!
an and hashish
vals, and books,
prejudicious” to
to Low; may
provided they
ikel at the
arries of the
chased with
foreign convertible currency. For the wounded 1 passage of
such goods 
make sure you have the pectin-ut bank certificates
er shop's bills
S
:
14-00000
"
་་ probabided to hap
securities Antique and ...
provided you of this "
Culture and have post
cent of the percen
Detaded ous!
innalty ..
BUSSR Stunt alled
and may
be shaped nut.
wine from the Ministry of
duty amounting to fol per
..1
on the forest. Mema
Dave Exchange
"
adable at all
border prouts A
4t..
wyd test huteis
Service Burcanda wache with co
fours et memes Vanging calces
abbess and office
.
A
JIJ
Rules be Platographers and Cine camera, Bites " "
tourist who feargoes the pleasures of pho staples, an a foreign
· countex
f. The Now it tason temas pie crapt expesthes, and every.
white save objects ava ng under the head of the
des
tence. This applies to all types of military technology, seaports,
major hydrotechnical objects, railway junctions, tunnels, railway
bridges, industrial enterprises, and the like. Aurial photography
and terrestrial panoramic, photography, and photography within
25 kilometres from the frontier are produbited. Ask for permis-
sion of the administration beton you
Factories, research in
too, that when you pi. 2
consent
If you intend to make a to
subsequent showing at imones
Sovesportfilm (7. Maly "..
tel. 229-32 02 Bear m mane
paper, etc on sal
Agla and is
Latourist Se
Every hotel
has an Intouren
we advise vo
a staffed with peop
will have no difficulty
•
"
the
your camera inside
It stands to reason,
must first obtain their
mtaercial purposes (fot
16. television, cie) apply to
kovsky Perculek, Moscow).
susative colour materials (films,
Union' are adapted solely for
so where in the Soviet Union)
It is very uncul to tourists
if on arrival The service Lurcaus
who speak foreign languages, and you
unicating with thein.
One of their majut functions is to exchange the vouchers issued
to you by your travel agent for Intourist coupons, and to
provide all other services.
المرح
Intrist takes care of you
The service bureau will relieve you of all travel cares and book.
tickets for you on internal and international railway and air-
lines. It will help you extend your visa and perform all other
pertinent formalities
The service bureau books tickets to theatres, concerts, cinemas
and sports comests. Make sure that you book tickets well in
advance, for every Muscovite is an avid theatre-goer and sports-
fan and tickets are scarce.
The price of a theatre and concert ticket is 2 to 3.50 rubles,
aat of a cum ma ticket 40 to 70 kopeks.
The service, bureau will tell you what is showing at Moscow's
Plattes, comert halls and cinemas,
If your four does not cover excursions and you wish to see the
sights of Moscow; the service bureau will be glad to recommend
the best sightseeing itineraries.
If you need a guide interpreter, the service bureau will be happy
to provide one. Intourist guides speak English.. Bulgarian. Spanish.
Italian, Chinese, Hungarian, German. Polish Portuguese, Ruman-
ian. Serbo-Croatian. Finnish, French, Czech, Swedish and Jap
anese The services of a guide-interpreto cost up to 3 hours-
rubles, for every subsequent late-1 rubles to kopeks.
You can hire a cat for a sightseeing too of Moscow and it
environs or order a long-distance, telegd one call through
service bureau
If you are unwell, the service bureau will summon a doctor
you. As you know, medical services in the Soviet Union are v
of charge.
Approach your hote! service bureau with anything that
interest or trouble you The receptioaist will be glad yea
advise you and to render all the necessary assistance
...
t
If You Are Pussing Through Masera
If you are passing through Moscow and have only a day i
is what we recominiend you to see.
1. Excursion by car or tourist nach A three hour to wit:
will give you a general ader of ald and new Moscow. The
starts from Hotel Naternal in the heart and for
7
14-00000
231
..
4. Maurice. Therez Kanbankment (formerly Sophuskaya'. Kel
Squate. Segallay Square. along Gorky Street. Sadovige
Kudtso, Kulinarska Prospekt. Deninsky Prospekt, past Moton
University on the Foam Hills back in the National.
2. To the Kunden and Red Square & visit to the Kremlin
cathode is and the Armony The four takes" three hours
1 vs have another day in Moss, he stay to visit the Exhibi
.
that of Economic Whancement of the USSR for p. 60).
which will give v. eved ideas of contemporary Soviet life
ced 
the cultural or troonemic achievements of Moscow and the
test of the Soviet Union The excursion takes four hours In
The afternoon, pay a visit be the famous Tretyakov Art Gallery
ep 150), the treasure trove of Russian hoe art. The excur
n there takes something like three hours.
The your best, too, to see Moscow's glorious Bolshoi Theatre
hollet.
1: you have a few mon days in Moscow, pick tours to suit your
ste and inclinations.
Continue Your Trip
Home Moscow you can make a tour of the Soviet Union-the
Anopics of the Black Sea coast and the Siberian taiga, the
Kainian steppelands, the mountains of the Caucasus, and the
nient towns of Russia and Central Asia.
re is the list of cities wher: Intourist offers its services:
ingrad, cradle of the Russian revolution. a city of magni-
ent architecture:
wik Sea health of Batumi, Odessa, Sochi, Sukhumi and
ta:
rian and Fur Fastern cities:
sibirsk the largest industrial centre and city of science in
stern Siberia;
sk, a new Siberian town neighbouring on the Bratsk Hydro-
Station on the Angara, which is one of the world's
**kutsk, the city near the legendary Lake Baikal;
- kabarovsk, a major Soviet Far Eastern city.
Additional information on Visas
QUESTION: I would like to are un article about
Intourist arevices, prices, etc. (C. C. Krause,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; M. Suparaf, Peshoro,
Massachusetts; and many other renders)
ANSWER Intourist is our state-operated commercial
travel agency. It works with wome 700 firms and trans
port companies in nearly 1900 countries, including about
100 in the United States Intourist arranges tours for
Soviet citizens abroad and for foreigners in the Soviet
Union. We estimate that 25 million: foreign travelers
will visit our country between 1976 and 1980 and that
18 million Soviet people will po abroad.
We will deal here only with Intourist services for
foreign travelers. They include sightseeing excursions,
trips to muscuras and theaters, meetings with. Soviet
workers at factories and farms and with Soviet students,
round table discussions and other
Intourist offers alovest 20 different kinds of group
or individual tours
Mw.fortin
fishing, international computat
2.
funting.
and symposiums, excursions for schoolchildren and
youth, cruises, art festivals and more.
Many visitors come for test and medical treatment
at pas in the North Caucasus (Essentuki, Zhelez
novodsk, Ki-budak Pestigunkt or on the Black Sea
(Sochi, Yalta, Odessa, Such a tour mel;des a room.
at a sanatorium, specid diet meals, medical care and
other services,
A new tour called the Russian Language Seminar is
rapidly gaining popularity. Besides seeing the country.
the traveler has a chance to brush up on Russian with
special courses.
Cost depends on the claw and type of the tour, dis-
tance, season and number of services, Intourist offers a
discount on off season tours, frequently as low as one
fourth of the full price. There are special cut rates for
youth and student groups, as well as for children.
Entry visas are issued within 10 days of receipt of
applications at a Soviet Consulate. Foreign currency
formalities are limited to declaring your currency at
customs. Intourist also accepts credit cards from
foreign banks and firmns.
Itineraries include 135 cities of the country and are
designed to suit all tastes. You can choose a separate,
republic or the whole country, the Caucasus, -Siberia,
Central Asia, the Far East, the leading cultural centers,
health resents or ancient het
For instance, Gener‚'1 *. fac., one of Intourist's
major U.S. partners, other the following tours:
1) “Spotlight on Russia and the Crimea"--16 days,
Moscow--Kiev-alta-Leningrad, price 999 to 1.123
dollars, depending on the city of departure by air to
the Soviet Poop it on the win (The cast includes
air fare, hotel accommodationis --much cheaper f
than for one-three meals a day and guide services)
2) "Destination Black Sea and Caucastis". – 16 dayą,
Leningrad-Suchi--Thilis--Yerevan - Moscow, 1,159
to 1.458 dollars.
two
The American Express Company, another major In-
tourist partner, offers a 22-day "The Complete USSR"
Sean Life, May 1975, 257
tour through Moscow, Bratsk, Irkutsk, Tarlıkemi, Dok.
ha:, Samarkand, Bakit and Leningrad, for 1099 to
2,085 dollars.
Incidentally, if you do plan to come, for more details
get in touch with the intourist office:
Vitaliy kuryazhev, Intourist Travel Information, 43
East Forty-ninth Street, New York, New York, 10017.
Telephone: (212) 371-6953.
00000-1
14-00000
"
12. Some questions about visas could be put to Nusenko based on information:
provided in the book, Your Trip to the USSR (A Tourists Manual), The
book is published by Foreign languages Publication House, Moscow,
Although there is no date of publication in this book, the information
provided in the book strongly suggests that it was published no later
than 1962. The information states that "it should not take more than
a week to receive one's visa." The applicant must fill in and sign an
application form (sample enclosed) and enclose three photographs of
passport size as well as a copy of the Intourist or Intourist contractor.
firm voucher to the effect that the applicant has paid the full cost of the
tour. The tourist need not apply to the Soviet consulate in person
as the tourist firm will take care of the matter.
APPLICATION FORM
For Persons Who Wish to Obtain an Entry Visa
the U.S.S.R. or a Transit Visa Through the U.S.S.R.
Write clearly in ink or type all answers in full)
1. Surname.
QUESTIONS
name and patronymic
(person who have more than one
surname, or who have pen nanies,
must list them in full; married
women and widows inust Five
their maiden name and their hus
band's surname)
2. Date and place of birth
3. Nationality
4 Citizenship. If you were former-
By a tizen or subject of another
country, indicate former citizen
ship
ANSWERS
1 are
བ་་pu
F
present
and profe
-17.
34
i
10
14-00000
6. Reason for to the U.S.S.R.,
duration 专
Note Person
... and itinerary
sing for a trans-
it visa though the U.S. R. must
have an
the
transit visa of
which or through
a lear
S.R.
7. If minors under 16 years of age
aro accompanying you, indicate
the surname, name and patronym
ic of each child
* Were ..
·before: it
de USSR.
indicate when,
where and purpose of stay)
9. Surnames, names, patronymics
and addresses of close relatives
in the US S.R.
10. Your inalie ...
:
(day, month, year)
Date
1.35
Signature
DOCUMENTS
Visus
To enter and leave
the U.S.S.R., a for-
riyn tourist must
have a valid national
passport and Soviet
entry and exit visa3.
It should not take
more than a week to receive one's vlsa.
Citizens of foreign countries are issued Soviet visas
through Consulates of the U.S.S.R. in their own coun
try. The applicant must fill in and sign an application
form (see sample and enclose three photographs of
passport size, as well as a copy of the Intourist or In-
tourist contractor firm voucher to the effect that the
applicant has paid the full cost of the tour. The tourist
need not apply to the Soviet Consulate in person, as the
tourist firm will take care of the matter.
Citizens of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democrat--
ic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the
Chinese People's Republic, the Korean People's Demo-
cratic Republic, the People's Republic of Mongolia, Po-
land, Rumania and the Czechoslovak Republic have the
right, according to a reciprocal agreciment, to enter and
leave the Sovit Union without applying for Soviet visas,
on the basis of their national passports alone.
'
3:6
11
:
14-00000
A person's national passport should not exp
the date of his departure from the U.S.s.R.
A Soviet tourist - vesa - iv” valid for entry into
USSR, and exit during the time specified and is valid
- ting the cities enumerated in the visa. A tourist
4 in and leaves the U.S.S.R. only through the hors
an' indicated in his Soviet visa
Should your plans change unexpectedly, your visa
may be extended, the itinerary altérädand the border
patry and exit points changed without ans,
form dities if Intourist is able to provide accommoda-
tions and transportation to comply with the change. In
all events, you must nouity Intourist of a change in plans.
few days ahead,
Visitors visas for visiting: relatives in the U.S.S.R.
are granted through tw asad channels
Group Visas may be cound to toată 's on cruises and
to large tourist groups travelling together,
Visas .rr issued, exte schal, and itineraries and
border-points of ruth,
te altered free of
charge.
Transit Visas
...
soviet transit visas are issued is his three days of
team by Soviet En
No So.
• transit visas are necesse for jetsons of any na-
tinality flying over the territory of the U.S.S.R., on
condition that all reservations (of no longer than 24
ours' stay in any given point of change) have been
36
made for him along the entire route through the
U.S.S.R. and that the passenger has the right to enter
the next contiguous country.
Health Certificates
י
matists an Africa, South America and Asia must
have an International Vaccination Certificate, and tour-
ists from India and Eastern Pakistan niust have a certifi-
cate stating that they have been inoculated against
cholera. Tourists from other countries do not need to
present any health certificates and there will be no med-
ical ex alione
officer.
U.S.S.R. Public Health
inal proof of health from
tourists arriving from countries known to have an epi-
demic at the time of arrival.
-
37
12
14-00000
× 13,
It would be useful to ask Nosento his comments on the information on
"Passports and Other Formalities" taken from the book, A Motorist's
Guide to the Soviet Union by Viktor Louis and his wife Jennifer Louin.
The book was published in Moscow in 1967.
Note: Viktor Louis and his wife are "slightly" known to Nosenko.
30
Motorist's Guide
hand-embroidered shirt or bias (15 roubles upwards); toys; gramophone se
cords (12 in. LP--1 rouble); teeks (comparatively inexpensive); traditiona
silver-gilt-and-enamel ware (eg. tiny fork for lemon or butterballs-1 rouble
'child's spoon with animal handle roubles); wood, alabaster or potter
ornaments.
If you would like to visit the markets, you should go as early as possibl
in the day. You will be able to find in the market good quality fresh fruit
which is often lacking in the heels. Also on sale there are honey, fresh egæ
and dairy products; there may be various items of local handwork as well. Th
markets close at 5:00 p.m.
PASSPORTS AND OTHER FORMALITIES
In order to enter and leave the Soviet Union a foreign tourist must have
a valid national passport and a Soviet entry visa. Soviet visas are issues
free of charge usually within a seven-day period from the time of
application to the Soviet Embassy or Consulate in the tourist's own country
The horder points through which the tourist enters and leaves the Sovie
Union must be those indicated in the Soviet visa.
Foreign touriste arrivals in the Soviet Union are registered when they firs
hand over their passports at the first Intourist service point indicated on the visa
In addition to Soviet vitas, it is required that the citizens of inost Western
European countries obtain vises for the Communist countries through which
they will drive on their way to and from the Soviet Union: East Germany
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania or Bulgaria; East German visa
are obtainable on entry to that country,
Besides an International Driving Permit, motorists must bring an inter-
national automobile registration certificate of the country of departure, sti
pulated in the 1926 International Automobile Traffic Convention. Tourists'
cars can be brought into the St L'on and taken out again without payment
of duty on condition that the owner gives a written guarantee to take the car
out of the country upon departure. This guarantee is to be handed over to the
customs authorities at the Soviet border.
It is forbidden to bring the following into the Soviet Union:
(a) arms and ammunition
(b) printed matter, films, phographs, negatives, drawings, etc. "which are
hostile to the U.S.S.R. in political or economic respects".
Printed matter, plants (frust, seeds, etc.) and animals are liable to inspection
by customs authorities.
It is forbidden to take out of the Soviet Union:
(a) arms and arnmunition
13

14-00000
"
IV.
Belorussian KGB and MVD.
1. It would be useful to question Nosenko about his knowledge of the chiefs
of the KGB and the MVD in the Belorussian Republic. A list of names
follows:
KGB and MVD Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of the Belorussian SSSR.
Chiefs
Lt. General Lavrently Fomich Tsanava
-
NKVD, MGB (State Security) 1941-1953.
1
Maj. General Mikhail Ivanovich Baskakov MVD 1952-1954.
-
Lt. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn - KGB (State Security) 1954-1959.
Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov
Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov
-
-
MVD 1960-1965.
KGB (State Security) 1959-1973.
Lt. General Yakov Prokopyevich Nikulkin
Deputies
-
KGB (State Security) 1973-
Maj. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn
MVD 1952-1954
Arkadiy Denisovich Rudak KGB (State Security) 1959-
Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov
Maj. General Stepan Alekseyevich Smorodinskiy
KGB (State Security) 1959-1960.
-
KGB (State Security) 1962-
Ivan Leopoldovich Lysakovskiy - KGB (State Security) 1971-
2. What do you know about Aleksandr Nikiforovich Aksenov?
Note: (a) Aksenov was Deputy Chairman of the KGB of Belorussia
from 1959 to 1960. It is assumed that when Oswald arrived
in Minsk in January 1960, Aksenov was Deputy Chairman of
of the KGB and would definitely know about the Oswald case.
From 1960 to 1965, Aksenov was MVD Minister of Belorussia.
Therefore it would be under his direction that Oswald's passport
and the departure of Oswald and Marina from Minsk was
arranged. If Nosenko had access to Oswald's file, he must
know about Aksenov. From 1965 to 1971, Aksenov was First
Secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom of CP Belorussia, and since
1971, Aksenov has been Second Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Belorussian CP. He has been a member of
the CC CPSU since 1976, and he is also a deputy to the USSR
Supreme Soviet. On May 9, 1978, Aksenov arrived in Columbia
He headed the Soviet delegation on the invitation of the Columbian
Communist Party.
14
14-00000
13.
(b) A. N. Aksenov is no doubt identical with a Colonel Nikolay
Aksenov with whom, according to Epstein's book, (page 146)
Marina Oswald had an interview in 1961. Aksenov is also
mentioned in McMillan's book (pages 132-133). Aksenov
allegedly said to Marina; "Tell your husband not to worry. I
believe your request will be granted." Also see page 125 of
the same book.
Did you know or know of Arkadiy Denisovich Rudak?
Note: Rudak was Deputy Chairman of the KGB during 1959 to 1960 and
might have taken part in the Oswald case while Oswald lived
in Minsk.
4. Did you know or know of Major General Stepan Alekseyevich Smorodinskiy?
Note: Smorodinskiy was Deputy Chairman of the KGB for Belorussia in
1962 and most likely know about the Oswald case. His name
would most likely appear in the Oswald file.
✓ 5. Do you know Lt. General Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov?
Note: Petrov was KGB Chairman for Belorussia from 1959 to 1973.
Therefore, it would be his agency, the KGB, which would watch
Oswald in Minsk. It is safe to assume that after the assassination
of President Kennedy in 1963, Petrov, as Chairman of the KGB
of Belorussia, would review the Oswald file and send it to Moscow.
He would also have been called to Moscow KGB headquarters to
take part in the preparation of the spravka (summary) of the
Oswald file.
1 6. What do you know about Lt. General Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepelitsyn?
Note: Perepelitsyn was Chairman of the KGB of the Belorussian Republic
from 1954 to 1959. Nosenko should know him or at least about him.
Nosenko should be asked if Perepelitsyn took any part in the
investigation of Oswald. (Perepelitsyn was Deputy Chairman of
the KGB of the USSR from 1959 to 1967. He died in Moscow.)
7.
What part, if any, was played by General Sergey Grigoryevich Bannikov
in the Oswald case, especially after the assassination of President Kennedy?
Note: Bannikov was mentioned by Nosenko as one of the Deputy Chiefs of
the Second Chief Directorate and later on as one of the Deputy
Chairmen of the KGB of the USSR. From 1968 to 1978, Bannikov
was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Supreme Court.
V. Nosenko
1.
Nikolayev
Can you explain why you went to England and Cuba under the name Nikolayev
and to Geneva using your true name, Nosenko? What would have happened
if some Englishman or English intelligence officer had met you in Geneva
in 1962 or in 1964 and greeted you in the presence of the other delegates
15
14-00000
i
:
with the words, "Oh, Mr. Nikolayev! How are you?
You visited England with the team of boxers."
I remember you.
VT
1.
2.
GRU (Military JI“:nl:siist}
From where did you learn that the GRU was not informed about Oswald's
presence in the USSR? Wouldn't the GRU officer in Intourist, whom you
mentioned earlier, have known about Oswald's presence in the USSR?
Did you ever hear that Oswald possibly had contact with the Soviet
intelligence during his service in Japan?
You stated previously that there was no information that Oswald offered
to give information on the US Marine Corps. You did not read the file.
Then how do you know this to be the case? How do you know that the KGB
and GRU made no attempt to debrief Oswald about his service in the
US Marine Corps?
3. Previously you mentioned one Colonel Voloshin as an officer of the
Defense Ministry of the USSR. Can you provide any additional information
on this Voloshin? Could it be possible that he was a KGB officer instead
of in the Defense Ministry?
Note: (a) According to Epstein's book, one Pavel T. Voloshin was an
administrator at Patrice Lumumba University and was a KGB
officer who accompanied a group of Russian dancers to Los Angeles
in 1959 at just 
about the same time that Oswald was making
weekend trips there to get his passport and possibly to make other
arrangements for trip to Moscow. A few weeks after Oswald
decided to return to the United States, he received a letter from
Patrice Lumumba University signed by Voloshin. (page 111)
(b) P. D. 
knew one KGB officer by the name of Voloshin (first
and middle name forgotten) who used to work in SMERSH
(military CI) and later in the late 1940's and beginning of the
1950's in S & T Department of the KGB.
VIL
Marina.
From where did you pick up the information that Marina was a "simple.
obyvatel" (a politically unaware person) and that she was not anti-Soviet
if
you did not read the Oswald file?
16
14-00000
$
2. You stated previously that Marina was an obyvatel. Do you have any
comments on the following: "We knew each time you had a date.
Wo
knew when you applied for your marriage license. We know the date of
"
your wedding. ' These were the words of the Komsomol secretary in
Minsk when Marina was expelled from the Komsomol.
3. Do you have any comments on Marina's statement when she said,
"Our governinent (Soviet) knows every move I make." She make this
comment shortly after her expulsion from the Konisomol.
4.
Did you know that while in Minsk Marina belonged to a group of youths
who gathered together to listen to Voice of America and BBC? Would
that be enough for the KGB to have Marina in its card files? Is it
r
.
possible that Marina was the KGB agent reporting on
them?
5. You stated that if Marina had been recruited by the KGB, you would
know about it and it would be in the file. But you did not read the file.
How then do you know that she was not recruited?
✓ 6.
You said that among Marina's relatives there was an officer of the Minsk
Militia, a Lt. Colonel. Do you have any comments on Marina's
revelation that her real father was a traitor and that he was shot? If
her father was a traitor and he was shot, would his name be in the KGB
card file? Would the name of Marina's mother be in the KGB card file
as the wife of a traitor? Is it then possible that Marina's name also
would be in the KGB card file somewhere?
Л
✓ 7. You stated previously that KGB had no interest in Marina prior to her
meeting Oswald and that the KGB investigated her only after Oswald
applied for permission to register marriage with Marina. How do you
know that? Did you read a special file on Marina? Marina revealed
lately that while she was living in Leningrad in 1958 or 1959, she met
a diplomat from Afghanistan who lured her to his hotel room and tried
to make love to her. Do you think the KGB in Leningrad would know
about this diplomat and whom he lured to his hotel? Is it possible that
17
14-00000
い
S.
9.
Marina was already a RGB agent and she was directed to lure the
diplomat to the hotel? In either case, the KGB would definitely know
་ ་ ་
about Marina and if she was used by the KGB as a bait for foreigners,
རཱུ་
might she have already been an experienced KGB agent?
You stated previously that you saw Oswald's file only briefly and you
Then how would you know that Marina was never
read only a summary.
used by the KGB? Did you personally make a direct check on whether or
not Marina was a KGB informant?
In your previous testimony, you categorically denied that Marina was a
KGB-MVD agent or informer. Do you have any comments on Marina's
statement to Life Magazine that she was a "Soviet agent"? Is there any
possibility that the KGB or MVD in Belorussia or in Leningrad, where
Marina had lived previously, had recruitted her as an agent or informer
and she continued to work for the KGB or the MVD until her departure to
the US? Did you have any information about the possibility that there was
another file in the KGB on Marina, a file for an agent or informer of the
KGB or MVD? If such a file existed, it must be reflected in the Oswald
file, as well as in the summary which you read.
10. Did you hear or know that while in Leningrad Marina dated one Oleg
Tarussin, a student who had ambitions to enter the Soviet diplomatic
service and who had some trouble with the authorities over a minor
political incident?
11. Was there any information in Oswald's file to show that after Oswald.
married Marina, Marina was in the hospital for about five days?
12. What do you know about Marina's vacation in Kharkov shortly after
13.
she married Oswald?
Note: She may have been in Moscow instead of Kharkov.
Did you know that while in Minsk Oswald was in the Fourth Clinical
Hospital for surgery on his adenoids? (Oswald got special attention from
the doctors.)
Note:
Marina's Aunt Valya, whose husband was an MVD Colonel, sent
eggs to Oswald while he was in the hospital.
wys
✓..
18
:
14-00000
<
1.1.
You previously stated that the reason that there were no difficulties in
in the way of Marina'n marriage to a foreigner and her departure from.
the Soviet Union was because Oswald was already living and working in
the Soviet Union. How would the KGB have reacted to Oswald's marriage
MA
if they had knows that Quald wrote a letter to the American Embassy
before his marriage about his desire to return to the United States?
desire
15. Did you know that Oswald asked the American Embassy for permission
to return to the United States before he married Marina?
VIII.
✓ 1
Nosenko and Oswald case file
Describe in detail your personal involvement with Oswald and with the
Oswald case from the day Oswald arrived in the USSR to the day of his
:
departure from the USSR. What positions in the KGB did you personally
hold at that time?
2. Describe in detail your personal involvement with the Oswald case after
the assassination of President Kennedy from 23 November 1963 to the day
of your defection to the US.
3. In what activities were you involved in connection with the Oswald case and
the assassination of President Kennedy while you were in Geneva at the end
of 1963 and the beginning of 1964? Name any Soviet diplomats or officers
of Soviet intelligence (KGB, GRU) with whom you discussed the Oswald
case and the death of the American President in Geneva.
4. Are you sure that there was no file on Oswald in the KGB before he
arrived in the USSR? How do you know this? Did you personally check it?
¡ 5. You previously told American authorities that on the cover of Oswald's
file "there definitely was a 'klichka'." But you said you did not remember
the klichka. Do you remember
A whether the klichka was one word or two. As you did not read the file,
is it possible that it was an old file, opened a few years previously by
the First Chief Directorate or by the GRU?
19
14-00000
""
7.
8.
9.
You stated previously that nobody from the KGB had an interest in Onwald,
but Oswald admitted that he had been interviewed by officials of the MVD
(or KGB) at least twice on his arrival in the USSR and again before his
departure. What was said about these interviews in the Oswald file or
in the summary (sprayka) of Oswald's file? Do you know the names of
the people who talked to Oswald? Was it the KGB, MVD, or both?
What do you know about the "Intourist guide" Rosa Agafonova who
visited Oswald in his hotel room shortly after his arrival in Moscow?
Did you personally know Rimma Shirokova, the Intourist guide or
interpreter? Was she a KGB officer or KGB agent working for Intourist?
Was there a report in the Oswald file that Rimma Shirokova sent two
postcards to Oswald in Minsk from some vacation places in the south
of the USSR? Did you know that Rimma Shirokova visited Oswald in
Minsk? (See Epstein's book, page 124.)
Note: Oswald and Shirokova allegedly talked about the possibility of
Oswald 
studying at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. It
also 
should be noted that Shirokova visited Minsk shortly after
Oswald and his wife Marina decided to go to the United States.
How did you know that Officer Krupnov wrote a request and opened a case
file on Oswald? Did you see when Krupnov was writing it? Did you read
the request or hear about it from somebody? If you saw it, who approved
and sanctioned the request? If the KGB had no interest in Oswald, then
why was a file opened?
10. Previously, on many occasions, you stated that the KGB had no interest
"
in Oswald, that he was not normal, and that he should leave the country.
Who among the KGB junior and senior officers made the decision that the
KGB had no interest in Oswald and that he should leave the country?
Describe in detail how you learned about it, from whom, from what
documents, and when.
11. How did you know that there was no microphone in the Hotel Berlin room
where Oswald stayed? Did you personally check the room before Oswald
arrived?
20
14-00000
་
45°
12.
You stated that no KGB officer was ever in contact with Oswall,
:
could you make such a statement if you did not read the file?
How
You were
not responsible for it, and, according to your information, you did not
visit Minsk to study the Oswald case,
Note: Oswald's diary clearly shows that most of the students he met were
most likely not students at all. They were more likely KGB officers
under cover as students.
13. You stated previously that it was Officer Krupnov who wrote a request
and opened the case file on Oswald, which was later sent to Minsk.
Name other officers who participated in making the decision to open
the file, who handled the file, and who sent the file to Minsk. What
part did you personally play in Oswald's case while Oswald was in Moscow?
You stated previously that the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB was
not interest in Oswald because it was concerned only "with internal.
matters." Isn't it true that the Second Chief Directorate is the internal
14.
counterintelligence organization and is responsible for foreigners whọ
enter the Soviet Union for any reason? Isn't it true that the tourist
department of the Second Chief Directorate is responsible for foreign
tourists such as Oswald? Then why wasn't the Second Chief Directorate
interested in Oswald? Do you see any contradictions in your statement?
✓ 15. You stated that there was no attempt made to exploit Oswald for
propaganda purposes, such as Radio Moscow broadcasts, TV, lectures,
etc. How do you know this? Do you have any comments on the following:
"On October 19 (1960), Lee (Oswald) was interviewed in his room at the
Hotel Berlin by a correspondent of Radio Moscow, Lev Setyayev, who
was ostensibly seeking his impressions as a tourist to use in propaganda
Was there an officer in the KGB by the name of
broadcasts overseas. "
Setyayev? Was this interview organized by the KGB?
16. Do you have any information that Oswald might have been met in
Leningrad by Intourist and then made all the arrangements to go to Moscow?
21
14-00000
17
Who tolt Intourist that there was no KGB interent in Onwald?
What
V
し
in the name of the officer and his department who did no? While in
Moscow, Oswald was interviewed by at least three American correspondents.
Is it your opinion that the Second Chief Directorate was not interested to
3.
find out why Onwald talked to these newspapermen and who they were?
Isn't that part of the KGB's responsibilitios?
18. According to your statement, Oswald was not considered normal, Who
determined that he was not normal? How many doctors, from what
institutions, concluded that Oswald was not normal? The Second Chief
Directorate and Intourist officers could not conclude that Oswald was
abnormal without medical expertise.
19. If Oswald was abnormal, then why did Soviet authorities, for example,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not inform the American Embassy about
✓ 20.
it?
Note: In his previous interrogation, Nosenko hesitated in answering these
questions.
You stated previously that Oswald was in the hospital, the hospital said
that Oswald was not normal, and there was no action taken to inform the
American Embassy. How do you know all of this without reading the
Oswald file?
21. Why do you think that the American Embassy would not have taken Oswald
n.
if he had been turned over to them? Do you know that any Soviet
government office contacted the American Embassy and informed them
about Oswald's presence and the suicide attempt in Moscow?
22. Was the only reason that the Soviet Government did not inform the
American Embassy of Oswald's alleged suicide attempt that it was feared
that he might try it again?
- 23.
You stated that there was no psychological assessment of Oswald by the
KGB nor by the hospital, and that there was no report of that nature.
You did not read the file. You read only summaries.
....
Then how could
you know that there was no such report? How long was the summary--
100 pages?
22
14-00000
::
24.
25.
Do you know when and by whom a stateless passport was issued to
Oswald? Where was it issued? Are stateless passports usually
issued by the MVD on the recquumendation and approval of the KGB?.
What would happen if the MVD issued a stateless passport without
KGB knowledge or if the KGB was against it?
You stated previously that the KGB considered Oswald to have retained
his American citizenship while he was in the Soviet Union. Do you have
any comments on the fact that after his arrival in the USSR, and after
having made oral requests for Soviet citizenship, he returned to the
American Embassy, denounced his US citizenship and threw out his
American passport to the American Consul at the Embassy.
Do you think the KGB monitored Oswald's conversations with the
"
American Consulate officers or received reports from the American
Embassy (from Soviet employees there or Soviet agents there) about
Oswald's denunciation of US citizenship? Did the KGB instruct Oswald
to denounce his American citizenship at the American Embassy before
he would be permitted to apply for Soviet citizenship?
26. You stated that the decision to give Oswald a stipend was made by the
Red Cross. Explain in detail how the Red Cross learned that Oswald
arrived in the USSR. Who informed the Red Cross that there was an
American who needed help? Why was it decided to give help from the
Red Cross and not from the Trade Union? It is understandable that
n
Oswald might not have had enough money to start a new life in the USSR,
but he was not a poor beggar who needed to be turned to the Red Cross
instead of the Trade Union. How did you find out that it was the Red Cross
that made the decision? According to available information, the Red
Cross does not assign money to anybody without the recommendation of
some other Soviet office. Which office was it: the KGB, MVD, the
Council of Ministers, Intourist, or the USSR Supreme Soviet? Who
23

14-00000
B
✓
started it first" Who made the decision on the amount to pay Oswald?
Why was it decided to pay him 700 rubles a month instead of 500 or
1000? What was your salary as a KGB officer? Approximately
A
i
400 rubles a month, new money? Isn't it true that Oswald received
more than you did?
27. If it was decided by the KGB officers and by Soviet doctors that Oswald was
✓ 28.
abnormal, then why was he permitted to marry a Soviet citizen?
Note:
According to Soviet law, in every union republic, including
Belorussia, the "marriage cannot be permitted between persons
if one of them is pronounced a mental case or imbecile. "
Did you have any information that the Minsk KGB reported to Moscow
headquarters Oswald's intention to marry a Soviet citizen, in this case,
Marina?
You stated previously that Oswald's file was sent to the Second Directorate
of the Belorussian KGB. How do you know that it was sent specifically
to the Second Directorate and not to the KGB chairman or his deputy
with a special instruction?
29. What do you mean "to keep an eye on him" (Oswald)? That, according
to your words, was the instruction from the Seventh Department of the
"
Second Chief Directorate to the Belorussian Second Directorate of the KGB.
30. You stated that there was no visible surveillance of Oswald, there was no
microphone in his apartment, but you stated his mail was monitered and
that there were agents around Oswald in places where he worked and lived.
Explain how you learned about it. Do you know tha names of any
agents who reported on Oswald? If you did not read the file on Oswald,
!
how could you know about it?
31. Previously you stated that Oswald was handled no differently than any
other American defector. ་
....
The only difference was that he was not
to be allowed to stay, and he was considered to be abnormal." If this was
the only difference, and it is quite a big one, then why was he allowed to
stay in the USSR? If Oswald was "not normal" according to the KGB
officers, then this should be noted in the Oswald file which was sent to
24
14-00000
i
✓ 32.
the Belorussian KGB. Therefore, the KGB and MVD in Belorussia knew
about it. Then how and why was Oswald permitted to have a shotgun
which he kept in his apartment in Minsk?
Do you have any information that while in the USSR, especially during
the year 1960-1961, Oswald might have been visiting Cuba?
Note: Nosenko claimed that during October-November 1960, he (Nosenko)
went to Cuba with a group of STATE PLANNING COMMISSION'S
METALURGISTS headed by Ivan Strigen. He stayed in Cuba for
two months.
33. Do you have any comments on the statement made by Marina's uncle,
the MVD colonel: "I thought that Alik (Oswald) had not only given up
his American citizenship but had become a citizen of the USSR."
Note: The question is that if an MVD colonel thought or could be fooled
by the KGB that Oswald was a Soviet citizen, it is possible that
he really was a citizen or that the KGB spread the rumor that he
✓ 34.
v
35.
was.
What do you know about Oswald's association with the Foreign Language
Institute in Minsk?
To your knowledge, what KGB, GRU, and other intelligence schools
or training courses were in Belorussia during your work with the KGB?
C✓✓ 36. What do you know about Oswald's application to attend Patrice Lumumba
University in Moscow? Why was Oswald denied entrance to the University?
Note: At that time, Colonel Yerzin, senior KGB officer, was a
deputy director of Patrice Lumumba University. (P.D.)
37. Did you know that Oswald took with him to the American Embassy
a letter from his friend Ziger in Minsk? Oswald left that fetter at the
American Embassy.
38.
39.
What do you know about the fact that Oswald, while in Minsk, received
American magazines and other publications? Do you think the KGB knew
about it?
Did you know that Oswald was helped to study Russian at the Minsk plant
by one of his co-workers and by one of his friends, Erich, and by a girl
at the Foreign Language Institute? Do you know the names of those people?
25
14-00000
:
}
i
40. What do you know about Oswald's association and friendship with foreign
41.
12.
students in the USSR in Minsk and Moscow? Do the names Mary Louise
Patterson and Mrs. Roberto, Camacho mean anything to you?
What do Oswald's files show about his contacts with Cuban students in Minsk?
Note: McMillan's book stated that Oswald began to seek out the Cuban
students in 
Minsk, of whom there were 300 or so, to learn what
he could of 
Castro's revolution. (See page 127.)
you read?
You stated previously that Oswald was a poor shot and that during his
hunting trips he did not kill anything. Was this information in the summary
Do you have any comments on the fact that according to the
Warren Commission Report and the records of Oswald's service in the
Marines that he, Oswald, was a sharp shooter and marksman? Was
the "fact" that Oswald was a poor shot mentioned in the summary?
:
43. You stated previously (27 and 29 July 1964) that you saw the file on
Oswald only briefly and that the file was at the Seventh Department ·
for only 35-40 minutes. Then how do you know that nobody in the
Soviet Union, including KGB officers, ever sat down with Oswald and
got all the information on Oswald? Was everything that you told to
US authorities about Oswald picked up from the summary during those
35-40 minutes?
44. Describe in detail how you and other officers of the Seventh Department
of the Second Chief Directorate worked together on writing the first
Spravka (summary) on Oswald. You also stated that this spravka
(the first one) was prepared in Moscow before the Oswald file from Minsk
arrived in Moscow. What material did you use in preparing the spravka?
Was there another file on Oswald in Moscow or was it a control file
(Kontrolnoye delo)?
Note: In important cases the real file is in the place where the subject
lives and 
works. In this case, the Oswald file was in Minsk.
Moscow 
would have an almost identical file on the subject for
control purposes and for instructions on how to handle and
develop the case. This headquarters file is called the Control
File. This 
file exists on the person who is already an agent or
who is under 
development or training.
26
14-00000
:
45.
You stated that when the file on Oswald arrived from Minsk, yoù,
together with other officers looked quickly through the file, then senior
officers Fedoseyev and Matveyev of the First Department of the Second-
Chief Directorate took the file and you never saw it again. Because the
file was in your department only 20-30 minutes (in other places Nosenko
said 35-40 minutes), the Spravka could not be written in such a short
time, and because the file was taken away to the higher authorities of
the Second Chief Directorate and to the KGB chairman, you had no chance
to see the second Spravka. Then again the question is which summary
did you read--the second or the first or both? Describe in detail how
long the summary was, what was in it, and how long it took for you to
read-it. Did you make any notes from the summary in case later on you
had to report the "facts" to US intelligence?
46. What do you know about Oswald's visit (from Minsk) to the American
Embassy in Moscow on July 8, 1961?
Note:
Oswald flew from Minsk to Moscow allegedly without permission
from the Soviet authority.
What do you know about Marina's visit to Moscow on July 10, 1961?
What part did the KGB play in the arrangements of Marina's visit to
the American Embassy in Moscow without checking her papers and
without stopping her at the gates. In what hotel in Moscow did Oswald
and Marina stay at that time?
47. You stated previously that the First Chief Directorate provided no
information about Oswald before Oswald went to Mexico. What
information did the First Chief Directorate give to the Second Chief
Directorate before he went to Mexico? Did you read this information?
If you did not personally read it, then how did you learn the contents of
the First Chief Directorate information? Who from the First Chief
talked
Directorate particularly to the officers of the Second Chief Directorate
and with whom did they talk?
:
27
14-00000
48. How did you learn what Oswald said at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City?
Who told you that Oswald wanted to return to the USSR? Was this written
In the summary?
28
Pai
14-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
☐
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: 10phonell
FROM:
CONFIDENTIAL
☐ SECRET
KOUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Rodger S. Gabrielson
OLC/C&R
TO: (Offer designation, room number, and
building)
EXTENSION NO
REF TO: Con. No. TS191722
"Thru C
1133
Dafi
19 June 1978
DATE
OFFICERS
INITIALS
намо FORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom.
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)
Mr. N. Shepanek.
1.
XNX D୪AIG***
SA/DO/0 Tube: **6-Green
2.
Mr. Jack Gultivan
96
Pub
3.
4.
3.
A
Hiwinger
Attached is a letter-
from the House Select
Committee on Assassinations
dated
Please respond as soon as
possible.
Shep: Please have CI look
at this. It's the T.S. material
from Deryabin's safe
by Blakey. Thanks,
-
requeste
Rodge
6.
7.
Rediger
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-02
Haberle
Be.
day's day many
Two Blakey.
610
use vous
COCTIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
☐
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
14-00000
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIE() when brank-TOP SECHEE when attached to Top Secret Uscument-Automatically downgraded to SECRET when
filled in form is detached from controlled document
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
Source
Dox Purj
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
SR/CI/K
KAAZ-17241
Date 20 APR 1964
Repro 2
[
Copy No.
Phumber of Pages 38
Number of Attachments
REGISTRY
C:A Control No.
TS 191722
Date Document Received
15 ALLM
10:9
Logged By
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret daryment received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classi
hed Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document ultime as if it downgraded, destrayed, or transmiffed outside
of CIA Arcase in Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personal and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter Top
Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate perind of cusindy in the left.
hand columne provided Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right hand columns.
REFERRED TO
Office
DDP(SCO) B
RECEIVED
Signature
B. Ligg
DCI 106 C Klingles 15. Jua
icols Brickwridge
DADO/1900
Door B. Lingg
1215
15%
000/ESCO. B. Bigg
RELEASED
TITTLE
Date
Trong
15/
1970
19
1578
1579
139
1379
.78.19
19 june 29
2010
2017
DCI/OUS fem feceler definit
Breckinridge or Savielson
SPDO/TSCO
TO
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this fo
mitted to Central Top Secret Control for r
By (Signature)
DOWNGRADED
Signature
mit te zemstates.
SEEN BY
Office/Div.
Date
ropriate spaces below and trans.
When finished with these documents return
them 
to DDO/TSCO as we 
are the control Office
for these documents,
TS 191722
OFFICE
FORM
6-66
DATE
26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(OP I)
TS# 191722A
TS 1917228
TS: 191722C
1938
une
fro
with parents whe
(40)
TOP SECRET
EYES
ONLY
109
1
14-00000
TOP SECRET
UNCLASS LED when blank--TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document-Automatically downgraded to SECRET when
filled in form is detached from controlled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Source
SR
Doc. No.
XAAZ-17241/1
Doc. Date 11 MAY 1964
Copy No.
Number of Pages
Repro 2.
28
CIA Control No.
191722A
REGISTRY
Date Document Received
15 JUN
1976
LOGEN BY
Number of Attachments
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classi-
fred Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to 
the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside
of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control 
personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top
• Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached 
Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-
hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the 
Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
Office
DDP(TSCO) ②.
RECEIVED
Signature
Bigg
(DC=10LC Kingler 15 Jone
Scs of Breckenritje
RELEASED
Date
Time
Date
Time
1549
1078
Signature
SEEN BY
Office/Div.
Date
DADO/ASCO.
Booksco B. Livigg
125
The panet
DADO/TSCOB
B. Swigg
Breckenridgeer Gabrielson
100/1500
19JUN
19
1978
17/1
19cum
1973
20 JUN
ROYUN
1976
1970
TO
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and trans.
mitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
By (Signature)
OFFICE
FORM
6-61
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(OP-1)
TOP SECRET
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
DATE
(40)
109
SECRET
i
14:00000.
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when blank-1OP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document---Automatically downgraded to SECRET when
filed in form is detached from 
controlled document.
.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
Source
Doc. No.
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Doc. Date
Copy No.
SR/CI/K
XMZ-17241/2
19 MAY 1964
Repro 2
Number of Pages 22
--
Number of Attachments
REGISTRY
CIA Control No.
TS# 191722B
Date Document Received
15
Logged By
JUN
1070
B
ATTENTION. This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classi
fred Top Secret within the CIA and will 
remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside
of CIA Access to Top Secret matter 
is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official Juties relate to the matier. Top
Secret Control Officers who 
receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-
hand columns provided. Each individual 
who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right hand columns.
REFERRED TO
Office
DDP(TSCO)
RECEIVED
Signature
3. Swigg
DC=10cc Wörder 15 June
Scolt. Bickenridge
RELEASED
Date
Time
Date
Time
154
Signature
SEEN BY
Office/Div.
Date
220/50 B. Liga
14Q
1920%
JUN
Thepard 194
the
Thepare 17 to 19 75
11/00/0
Ack1 (1981)
DDOYsco B. Swigg
Острост
Breckinridge or Gabrielson
DDO/SCO
2017
23
JUN
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and trans.
mitted to Central Top Secret Control for record
.
TO
By (Signature)
OFFICE
ད༠བས
6-66
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(OF 1)
TOP SECRET
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
TO
BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DE CLASSIFICATION
DATE
TOP
SECKw
(40)
14-00000
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED when blank--TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document--Automatically downgraded to SECRET when
filled in fornt is detached from controled document.
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
Source
C/SR
Doc. No. CSC1-3/781,491.
Doc. Date 19 May 1964_
Copy No.
# Repro 2
2
Number of Pages
Number of Attachments
REGISTRY
CIA Control No.
TS# 191722C.
Date Document Received
15 JUN
Logged By
1970
B
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on the of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classi
fied Top Secret within the CIA and will reman attached to the document 
until such time as if it downgraded. destroyed, or transmitted outside
of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those 
individuals whose official duties relate to the matter Top
Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret 
material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left.
hand columne provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document 
will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
Office
DDP(TSCO)
DCI/06
RECEIVED
Signature
B. Bigg
RELEASED
Date
Time
Date
Time
Messi to ne
Scott Breckinridge
11070
Signature
SEEN BY
Office/Div.
Date
10:00/1500 13.
15215
Slipecte
B. Largg
15 JU
976
נו
19 UN
10/50/2 p 1978 179 18
Ac/1(^/cc4)
200/7sco B. Lungg
DCI/OLG
Breckinridge or Gabrielsen.
200/7500
201978
20%
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and trans.
mitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
ΤΟ
By (Signature)
OFFICE
FORM
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
BY (Signature)
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
(OP 1)
TOP SECRET
ΤΟ
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
BY (Signature)
DATE
OFFICE
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
DATE
(40)
109
SECKWI

14-00000
TAS
DEFECTORS
-
NOSENKO
TITLE
Report on: Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko, Soviet
Attachments:
DATE
2 Apr 64
1. Memo for Record from David E. Murphy, Subject:
Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on
Nosenko Case
2 Apr 64
2. Meme for Director of Security from Lawrence R.
Houston, Subject: Parole Status of Defectors
3. Memo. Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
Letter for Mr. Richard Helms from J. Walter
Yeagley, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Richard
Helms, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
(Forms I-125 and background data attached)
Letter for Mr. Louis Wienckowski from Frank E.
Bartos, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko
3 Apr 64
Jan 75
20 Oct 69
9 Oct 69
24 July 69
Letter for Mr. Raymond F. Farrell from Victor R.
White, Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO
18 Jul 69
Routing Sheet from Chief, SR Division to
DD/OS
13 Feb 64
Memo for Mr. McGeorge Bundy from Thomas H. Karamessines, 11 Feb 64
Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko
Memo for US Intelligence Board Members from Marshall
S. Carter, Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko
12 Feb 64
Newspaper clipping: Nosenko's Account Disputes
Charge by Soviet
Newspaper clipping: U.S. Lets Swiss and Red Envoys
talk to Defector
4. Mero for Acting Chief, Support Branch from Jack
M. Bauman
5. Mero for Special Agent in Charge District Field
Office from Victor R. White, Subject: LESNIK, George
M. (Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)
15 Feb 64
12 May 64
:
:
10 Jul 64
14-00000
TAB
--
TITLE
DATE
/ 2
Memo for Headquarters from John D. Noble, Jr.,
Subject: LESNIK, George M. (Emergency Instructions
Regarding Custody Of) with Attachment:
Instructions (2)
1 Jul 64
Emergency
5 Aug 69
6. Memo for the Record from John M. Maury,
Subject: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts
on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case w/att
Nosenko's Request for Political Asylum
Secrecy Agreements and Financial Arrangements
Between the CIA and Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko
Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge,
Subject: Office of Security Reports on PARAGON.
NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II and MOCKINGBIRD
Memo for General Counsel from S. Breckinridge,
Subject: Nosenko
4 Feb 64
21 Apr 69
31 Dec 74
13 Jan 75
5
Attachments:
1. Memo for IG from C. W. Kane, Subject: Yurily
Ivanovich Nosenko;
9 Jan 75
1A. Memo for USIB Members from M. Carter, 12 Feb 64,
Subject: Yurily Ivanovich Nosenko
12 Feb 64
Questions and Answers Concerning the Treatment of Soviet
Defector Nosenko
Memo for the IG, Subject: The Nosenko Case
67
Attachment:
1. Summary of 1967 Document Which Outlines the
Nosenko Case
14-00000
Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO
IDENTIFICATION:
BACKGROUND
APPROVAL
:
NOSENKO, Yurily Ivanovich, a Soviet
KGB officer who defected in 1964 and
was subsequently involuntarily con-
fined in the U.S. by the Agency for
a period of approximately three years.
NOSENKO first contacted Agency per-
sonnel in Switzerland in June 1962
and subsequently defected in January
1964. NOSENKO was brought to the .S.
and after a period of relative freedom
he was involuntarily confined in
April 1964. From April 1964 to
August 1965, he was confined at an
Agency controlled site in Clinton,
Maryland. From August 1965 to
October 1967, NOSENKO was confined
at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October
1967, he was returned to the Washington
area, given increasing amounts of
freedom until he was given total free-
dom in April 1969. NOSENKO became 3
U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO
was employed by the Agency as a
consultant in March 1969 and continues
under contract to date. His present
salary is $23,500 per year.
(1) The legal basis to confine NOSESKO.
against his will was discussed by
Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with
the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April
1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the
Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence
Houston, advised the Director of Security
by memorandum that such confinement was
proper (Tab 2).
(2) There are a series of letters from
the DDCI, DCI and others to various
agencies, including the Department of
Justice and the White House, covering
the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing
awareness of these agencies of the
NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).
(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confine-
ment were established by the Office of
Security (Tabs 4 & 5).
14-00000
RESULTS
:
TERMINATION :
COMMENTS
By memorandum dated 2 October 1968,
the Director of Security forwarded
two reports to the DDCI summarizing
the results of the NOSENKO case to
that date. The reports are voluminous.
One was prepared by the Office of
Security and the other by the FBI.
Both reports conclude that NOSENKO
was a bona fide defector. A draft
memorandum attached to this file,
dated 21 October 1968 and prepared
by the CI Staff, raises question
regarding NOSENKO's bona fides
and challenges the above two reports.
NOSENKO continues under contract to
the Agency. He is brought to Washington
periodically to consult on matters
germane to his background and experience.
Various reports are available in the
files of the Office of Security which
detail financial aspects of this case.
No final accounting has been made since
the project continues.
(1) While the Office of Security files
do document the rationale for the original
confinement of NOSENKO, they do not
document the rationale for his continued
confinement over so long a period of time.
A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states.
that various congressional staff officers
were briefed on NOSENKO and states that
concern for his safety, as well as con-
cern regarding his bona fides, prompted
the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)
(2) Office of Security files document
a period in 1969 during which a mail
cover was placed on NOSENKO.
(3) During the above period, NOSENKO
was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida.
During this trip, Agency personnel, with
apparent Headquarters approval, obtained
the services of prostitutes.
This
apparently occurred on at least two
occasions.
14-00000
FILES
Office of Security files on NOSENKO
are maintained in the following
locations :
OS/SSD (Contact Mr. Charles Phalen)
OS/SAG (Contact
-
Mr. Bruce Solic)
14-00000
SECRET
EVERLY
2 April 1964.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT:
Discussion with Deputy Attorney.
General on Nosenko Case
I. Nr lelas, Mr. Houston and Mr. Murphy not with
the Deputy Attorney General and members of his staff to
discuss subject case. Present from Mr. Katzenbach's.
staff were Messrs. Foley, Yeagley and Rais.
2. Mr. Holms explained the Nosenko case briefly
and indicated that shortly we would be faced with what
we at least considered to be two problems on which we
would like the advice of the Department of Justice.
First, wo would sooon feel compelled to begin hostile
interrogation of Nosenko in order to arrive at the truth
with respect to his mission for the KGB and we wondered
what the legal position would be in circumstances in
which we detained Nosenko against his will for this pur-
pose. Second, we would have to be ready after determin-
ing that we could obtain no additional information fros
Nosenko to deport him. We had thought of taking him to
Germany and transferring him to Sovist custody in Borlin
where this has been done a number of times in the past.
.
3. There was some discussion of whether deportation
to another country might be a consideration. Nr. Helms
explained wo would probably face publicity problems in
deporting to a third country of the kind we would en-
counter if he were free in the U. S. Nr. Helms noted
there were many items of information which we and the
FBI realize are of no significance because of the file
holdings-we have but which an unscrupulous newspaper man
could use to create mischief. This aspect was then dropped
and it was the consensus that Serlin was probably the best
place.
4. The question of the basis for detention was again
raised and related by Mr. Foloy to the conditions under
which Nosenko is in this country. He is here as an "ox-
clusion and parole case" which means he has not been
admitted and has been paroled to the Agency which is
responsible for him while he is in this country.
SECRET
EVED ONLY
This
14-00000
SECRET
EYES (Y
parole can be interpreted to moan parole to a specific
locale which would provide sone justification for our
detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out,
however, that if he said he wished to leave the country
to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not
be able to detain his further. In this event, we would
bo faced with the need to deport him quickly and quietly
and for this purpose the immigration warrant of arrest
and deportation was probably the best instrument.
5. Hr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check into
this and Mr. Foley will in turn contact Mr. Houston.
Mr. Houston will in turn discuss the problem with CIA
Office of Security officials to get the background of
their liaison with the INS on these matters,
6. Mr. Holms thanked. Mr. Katzenbach for his assistance
and we departed amid some jovial banter with respect to
"The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" about what we expected
to happen to him when he started to climb over that "wall"
in Berlin.
David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division
SEGRET
173 ONLY
14-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Security
SUBJECT:
3 April 1964
Parole Status of Defectors
C/SB
OGC 64-0903
1. On 2 April 1964 we had a discussion with the Department
of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by I&NS is deferred
upon arrival at our request and who are then paroled to this Agency.
It was the position of the Department of Justice that we were responsible
for taking any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole.
2. As you know, a basic parole agreement was executed by the
Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955. After setting up
conditions for authorizing parole in any one case, the agreement states:
"After 
parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume
responsibility for care, supervision and control of a kind and degree it
believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States
during continuance of their parole status." This means that the
responsible Agency officials must take the minimum action necessary
. to protect the internal security needs of the United States. The word
"minimum" is not necessarily a limitation. It merely means that good
judgment must be used as to what kind and degree of action is necessary.
.
3. The agreement further provides that upon completion of the
parolee's intelligence or operational purposes in the United States or if
internal security reasons so require, the alien will be removed from
this country through arrangements made by the Agency and, in such
case, the Agency will inform the Service in advance of each proposed
departure.
Lawrence
Division
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
Cc: DD/P
C/SR
SEQUIT
14-00000
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
:
January 1975
1. Information that NOSENKO had defected and was in the United
States in February 1964 was known to appropriate agencies and articles
had appeared in the public media.
.
2. NOSENKO was in the United States under an I&NS parole as
the responsibility of CIA. The FBI was fully advised of the presence of
NOSENKO in the United States and interviewed NOSENKO on several
occasions in March 1964. The United States Intelligence Board was
also formally advised on 12 February 1964 concerning the defection of
NOSENKO. On 14 February 1964, NOSENKO was interviewed by Soviet
in the presence 
of NS and State Department officials
officials/
and NOSENKO 
reaffirmed his previous request for asylum in
the United States.
14-00000
Assistant An
INTERNAL SECUENTE VISION
SECHET
Department of Justice.
Washington 20530
October 20, 1963
Mr. Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
го
R
:
Dear Mr. Helms:
Re:
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
(ER 69-5003/1)
Reference is made to your letter dated October 9, 1969,
concerning the above case, in which you urge the concurrence
of the Attorney General in your proposal to have the above-
named alien admitted for permanent residence in the United
States in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the
Contral Intelligence Act of 1949, as amended.
The Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization has
informed me that on the basis of the records of his Service
and the information furnished by you, and in the absence of
any other evidence adverse to the alien, he concurs in your
proposal that the alien be permitted to enter the United
States for permanent residence under the authority of the
foregoing statute.
Upon the basis of all the evidence received for consid-
eration and your statement of recommendation and approval
which carries with it your determination that the entry of the
individual concerned is in the interest of national security
and in the furtherance of the national intelligence mission,
perma-
I concur in your recommendation that the admission for
nent residence of the subject alien be authorized under the
provisions of Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949, as amended.
SECRET
Respectfully,
For the Attorney General
لان
J. Molte progley
Assistant Attorney General
ing and
rificatio

14-00000
SECRET
9 OCT 197
ER 69-500311
Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C
Dear Mr. Farrell:
SUBJECT: Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO
Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 7 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended,
I approve and recommend for your approval the entrance
of subject into the United States for permanent residence
since his entry is in the interest of the national security
and essential to the furtherance of the national Intelligence.
mission. In accordance with previous correspondence in
Section 7 cases, it is understood that you will present this
matter to the Attorney General for his approval.
Since bis defection in February 1964, the subject has
provided valuable information to this Agency and he will
continue to be of value in the future,
Subject has been investigated abroad and here over a
period of five years and has submitted to a technical inter-
rogation. The question of bona fides is a continuing one and
should any information be developed definitely disproving his
bona fides, it shall be made available to your Service and the
Attorney General..
SECRET
151
Jack T 1650)
11
:
14-00000
SECRET
There are enclosed Forms I-125 and background data,
ia duplicate, concerning the subfact,
Enclosures.
ORIGINATOR:
Sincerely,
Richard Helms
Director
/s/ H. J. Osborn
Howard J. Obern
Director of Security
->>
Distribution: Orig. & 1. Andressee
8 October 1969
1 - Signor's copy
Date
-
DEC
-32
53 Div.
- CI Staff
-- DDP
-
-
CS Files
SECRET
14-00000
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO (Aka: Yuri NOSSENKO)
30 October 1927
Male
Soviet
Nicolayev, Ukraine, USSR
Brown Blue/Gray 5ft. 11 inches
Divorced
Caucasian
-
14-00000
SECRET
RICGRAPHIC DATA
SUBJECT)
AXAS
DPOR
MARITAL STATUS:
CHILDRENS
EDUCATION:
Yuzly IvanovicĖ NOSENZO
Tari MOSSENKO
33 October 1927, Nicolayev, Ukraine, VISA
1946-Married and divorced Flavia
MOSIMKO (Nes: SHISHOY).
1946 - Married Augustins K. KCJENZO-
(A
TZLIGIM), 1949 • 3eparated and,
1951 – divorced..
23 June 1953 - Married Ludmila Tallaccina
TOSENKO (Tea) KOZHETNIKOVA), January
1964-beparated and 1969-red
-
Daughters Czana HOSENED, born 11 August
1954, Moscow; Tamara XOZZMKO, ber
13 July 1958, Moscow. (Both Living in USAR)
1942-1943 – Attended various USER Raval.
Schools.
1942-1952 - Attended Iactitats al Interán.
tional Aciations, Moscow,
EMPLOYMENT:
March 1951-March 1993 – Soviet Naval RO
(Naval Intelligence)..
MILITARTI
NATIONALITY
PRESENT AND PAST
POLITICAL AFFIL-
LATIONS:
March 1933-Februzzy 1954 – Officer in KCB.
(The Committen for State Jaearity);
Lieutenant in C3SR Navy while in school and
during service.
Savies
1943-1754
1756
Member Romssizol, 0322
-
Candidata Commult Party
1957-1964 - Member Communist Party, USSR
SECRET
s
:
14-00000
SECRET
SP-1687
18 JUL 1969
Mr. Raymond F. Farrell
Commissioner of Immigration
and Naturalization
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C...
Attention: Mr. Frank E. Bartos
Dear Sir:
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSSENKO
Reference is made to previous correspondence
in this caso
Subject continues to be of operational interest
to this Agency. Therefore, it is requested subject's
parole to this Agency be extended for an additional
period of six (6) months beyond the expiration date of
his stay of 16 August 1969.
Your cooperation in this matter is very much ap-
preciated.
Sincerely,
SIGHED
OS/AAS!
Victor R. White
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
OS/AAS/LW:es 16 July 1969
NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED FURTHER OR SYSTBITED
TO ANYONE HITTONT PRIOR PERMISSICH OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
SECRET
GROUP 1
21
5.
14-00000
SECRET
NITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUST
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20536
July 24, 1969
Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Operational Support)
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
Attention: Mr. Louis Wienckowali
Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nossenko,
Your SP-1687.
AMADOUTO
NO NOTE TO THE SE NO.
A13 724 817
п
Dear Sir:
February 16, 1970.
As you requested in your letter dated July 18, 1969, the
subject-bas-been-given-a-further-period of stay to expire on
Sincerely,
Frank baits
Frank E. Bartos
Chief Intelligence Officer
Field Inspection and Security Division
C.U. 16 Jan. 1970
fir
انشان
12102
SECRET
from automatic
and
:
14-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
11 February 1354.
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Yuri Ivanovich NOSENIO
1. This monorandum refers to the State Department
release 
of 10 
February on subject case and provides addi-
tional background as well 
as information on his current
status..
2. As a IGB staff officer, NOSENIO is regularly:
assigned 
to the 
Counterintelligence Directorate of the
KGB in Moscow but 
was included in the Soviet dolegation.
to the Disarmament 
Conference as part of a cover arrange-
ment which permitted him to 
carry out intelligence and
security functions 
in Geneva on behalf of the KGB...
3. HOSENIO also attended various sessions of the
Disarmament Conference held in Genova in 1962. During:
the course of these 
sessions NOSENKO sought contact with
officials of the U. 
S. Government, informed these officials
that he was affiliated 
with the Sovist State Security ap-
paratus and volunteered 
to aid the U. S. Government in
detecting 
Soviet subversive activity directed against the
U. S. Government. During 
the course of his contact with
U. S. authorities 
NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with
the U. S. 
Government originated with his distaste and hatred
for the Soviet regime 
in general, with his desire to obtain
revenge for the unjust death 
of his father, a sonior official
in the Soviet 
shipbuilding industry, and with the general
admiration of the Americans 
with whom he had come in con-
tact within the Soviet 
Union.
4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Conava,
again 
masquerading 
as a member of the Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament 
Conference.
his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his pres-
Subject secretly notified
ence in Geneva and 
arranged to meet with these contacts,
During a series of 
meetings NOSENXO provided information
including documents 
concerning Soviet State Security acti̟-
vities within the USSR and 
abroad and a detailed account
of the KG3 
operation against U. S. Professor Barghoora
which NOSENKO said 
he had personally supervised at the
direction of SEHICHASTNIY
, the Chairman of the Committee
for State 
Security (KGS).
EVES ONLY
.
14-00000
TUP SEGNET
XYRS DEN
5. During these most recent meetings NOSENKO announced
his 
desire to leave the USSR 
paraanently and seek his future
in the xost. He claimed his new work 
in the X63 (First
Deputy Chief of that department 
charged with the surveillance
and recruitment of American visitors 
to the USSR) was ox-
panding and that he would not be 
able to visit the est
with any frequency. Accordingly
, he prepared a request for
political asylum in the United States.
Frankfurt
, Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-
Ho was taken to
gation. Plans are now being made to 
remove him to the U. S.
6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject.
has not 
been extensive and that we 
will require additional
thorough interrogation to 
establish Subject's bona fides.
It should also be noted that NOSENXO's 
duties were not con-
corned with substantive aspects 
of the Disarmament Conferonca,
and he therefore is not expected to be 
able to shad much, if
any, light on that area of our interest
.
.
7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was do-
signed 
to wreck the conference 
was most carefully considered.
The decision to accept him was taken on 
the conviction that
the Soviets would not have chosen 
such a vulnerable agent
(staff officer of the XC3) for 
this kind of moyo.
CSR/DEM/jif 0 11 Feb 64
Distribution:
Orig Adse
2 cc
1 cc
1 CC
CC
-
SR/CI/X-Downey
-
C/CI
- CSR
DD/OS
Thomas H. Karamessines
· Acting Deputy Director
for Plans.
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
14-00000
ASPICY
TOP SET
EYES CHLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 23, D. C.
OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
12 February 1964
NEMORANDUM FOR:
United States Intelligence Board Members
SUBJECT:
Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO
1. This memorandum refers to the State Department
release 
of 10 February 
on subject case and providos addi-
tional background as 
well as information on his current
status.
2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly.
assigned 
to the 
Counterintelligence Directorate of the
XG3 in Moscow but 
was included in the Sovist delegation
to the Disarmament 
Conference as part of a cover arrange-
sent which permitted him 
to carry out intelligence and
Security functions in 
Conova on behalf of the KG3.
.
3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the
Disarmament Conforance hold in Geneva in 1962. During the
course of these 
sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with
officials of the U. S. 
Government, informed those officials
that he was affiliated 
with the Soviet State Security ap-
paratus and volunteered to 
aid the U. 3. Government in
detecting Soviet 
subversive activity directed against the
U. S. Goverment. 
During the course of his contact with
U. S. authorities
, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with
the U. S. Government originated 
with his distaste and hatred
for the Sovist regine 
in general, with his desire to obtain
ravenge for the unjust death 
of his father, 2 senior official
in the Soviet 
shipbuilding industry, and with the general
admiration of the Americans 
with when he had come in con-
tact within the Soviet 
Union.
4. In late January 1964, NOSENIO arrived in Genova,
again 
masquerading as a 
member of the Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament 
Conference.
his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his pros-
Subject secretly notified
ence in Geneva and 
arranged to meet with these contacts.
During a series of 
meetings NOSENTO provided information
including decuments 
concerning Soviet State Security acti
vities within the USSR and 
abroad and a detailed account
SUP SUBRET
EYES ONLY
14-00000
of the XG3 operation against U. S. Professor Barzhoora
which NOSENKO said he had personally supervised at the
direction of SEXICHASTRIY, the Chairman of the Committee
for State Security (KGB).
5. During these most recent postings NOSENIO announced
his desire to leave the USS2 permanently and seek his futura
in the Nest. He claimed his now work in the ICB (First
Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance
and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was ax-
panding and that he would not be able to visit the Most
with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for .
political asylum in the United States. He was taken to
Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-
gation. Plans are now being nude to remove his to the U. S.
6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subjoct
has not been extensive and that we will require additional
thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides.
It should also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not con-
'corned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conforonca,
and he therefore is not expected to be able to shed such, if ·
any, light on that area of our interest.
7. The possibility that NOSENXO's defection was do-
signed to wrock the conference was most carefully considered.
The decision to accept him was taken on the conviction that.
the Soviets would not have chosen such a vulnerable agent
(staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

14-00000
Nosenko's Account Disputes Charge by Soviet
By TAD SZULO
Special to The New York The
WASHINGTON, Feb. 17-
Turt 1: Nosenko told a Soviet
Defection Preceded Report Service. Officials of the State
| Department
, the Central In-
"
to Swis Police, Apparently once Agency and the
Embassy official at there can-Raling Out Negligence
frontation here last Friday that
Nest Switzerland on the way
to the United States 28 hours.
Immigration and Naturalization)
service were also present.
Mr. Norenka was described as
having been completely relaxed
during the interview.
Netere his defection was Swiss diplomat had been per
ported 
by the Russians to the mitted to talk separately with the Sovet diplomat during their
He is understood to have told)
Mr. Nosenko
businessive conterence that hu
Swiss authorities
This statement by the former: Information made: avaliable defected of his own volition.
(start 
officer of the Soviet Com-today has thrown new light 
without any outside pressure:
mites of State Security, the on the defection :
'
secret 
police, appeared to amount)The Soviet delegation ined, did not all Soviet resent-
His statements, it was report-
]
to a denial of the Soviet charge, Geneva, it was reported, 
toldiment against Swiss authorities.
that the Swiss authorities had the Swiss police at 5 PML 
Feo. Diplomatic reports reaching the
jbeen negligent in preventing his 3 that Mr. Nosenko 
was miss-State Department said that So-
defection.
But Mr.. 
Nosenko's state viet diplomats in foreign capi
Mr. Nosenko, who quit 'as a ments. In the presence of the tals continued to register com-
member of the Soviet delegation Soviet Embassy 
official are said plaints about alleged negligence
to the Geneva disarmament con- to have. shown that his 
actuallaiter Mr. Nasenko's conference
ference Feb 4, was allowed to defection. took place 
at 1 P.M. with the Soviet diploma_
meet with Soviet diplomat the 
preceding day.
States official
There in the presence of United The Soviet delegation an
☐ nounced Mr. Nesenko's disap-
The State Department an-pearance Feb 98
nounced at the time that the) The meeting between Mel
confrontation was taking place Nosenko and the Soviet: Em-
to Washington at the request of bassy official took place in the
the Soviet. Embassy, but no headquarters of the Washing-
other details were made public. ton field office of the
The department said that almigration and Naturalization
m
✓
196.
14-00000
U.S. Lets Swiss
And Red Envoys
Talk to Defector
Nosenko Again
"Voices Desire.
For Asyluni
By Chalmers .. Roberts
Staff Repert
Soviet secret police des
fector Yuri I. Nosenko la
in the United States where.
he was interviewed yester:
day by officials of both the
Russian and Swiss Em-
bassies..
The State Department said
each Interview lasted less than
an hour and that a Department
official was present each times
Nosenko reaffirmed his earlier
request for alum in the
United States and it will te
granted..
1. State Department spokesman
Richard. I. Phillip in giving
out this information, declined"
to say where the interviews
took place or to give any de
Stails. Earlier he had said
was. possible that newsmen
here will be allowed to tak
anth Nosenka
Sorlet Kicks up fuss
These developments came
as the Soviet Union kicked up
a diplomatic fuss over the dis
appearance of Nosenko on
Feb. 4, from Geneva, where
he had been assigned as 22
"expert" in the Soviet deleza
tion at the 17-nation disarma
conference. Philipps
meat
said he was "on temporary
duty from KGB (secret po-
lice) headquarters in Mos
!เวท"
Up to yesterday Mosco
had been directing its pubite
diplomatic wrath at the
Swiss, charging them with
loose security. The provision
for a Swiss diplomat to inter-
view Nosenko was to assure.
the Swiss that the United
States had taken part in co
illegal act on their soil
The
had
Swiss already
strongly rejected the Soviet
charges.
On Wednesday, Phillips re-
See DEFECTOR, 15, Col. 1
ht
Asal fisting
2/15/24
14-00000
Swiss, Soviets
See Defector
ported, yesterday, a Soviet called in American Amba
Embassy messenger brought a dor For Kooler and charged
message to the State Depart the United States with Im
ment asking for information permissable acts in the case.
"as `to` the imanner in which He stopped short of a kidnap
Mr. Nosenko presented himing charge, however. "Kohler
selfs to the US authorities replied that on behalf of the
and requested an opportunity United States he rejected anx
to interview” him." The De-implication of American wrong
partment agreed to the inter doing
eview with American-officials
S present and said Nosenko
Serious Effects Hiated
น
also was agreeable."A reply In Geneva Soviet officials,
about the defection also was including Tearapkin himself
given to the Soviet Embassy privately spread to the press
Also on Wednesday, in Gen-
eva, Soviet disarmament dele-hints of serious consequences.
gate Semyon, K. Tsarapkin Soun; there were rumors that
gave newsmen an angry states Moscow would pull out its dele-
ment aimed at the Swiss and gation, but up to last night no
chargingprovocative activi such threat; had actually deed
1. ty by 
unspecified Western
agents. Up to then Tsarapkin made, according to word reach
had been saying both private in Washington
ly and publicly, that the No.
senko defection would not af
☐ fect the disarmament: talks.
.......
In public Tsarapkin said only
have nothing to say, I am
not in the position to tell you
Yesterday the Soviets stopped]
up their protest in two places, anything
Moscow and Geneva
At some su far unspecified
In Moscow. Soviet Foreign date: Notenko, who had ap
Minister Andrer Gromykoparently crossed from Switzer-
land-to: France was down to
the United States. Its as
sumed he is in the hands of
the Central Intelligence Agen
cythe normal course for, de-
fectors
Ocohere yesterday
were knocking down the ideal
that he was a particularly big)
fish that he knew any, atomic
secretso: that he knew any:
thing about Soviet disarma
ment strategy: Rather they there had been no word up to
said, he was a KGB 
stoffl
last night of the defection on
icer, a security man operating.
as is the Soviet practice, in the Soviet radio or in the
2 light compartment. That press though word of mouth
would mean he would have reports had. spread through
useful and perhaps important the capital
3.2.
knowledge of part of the KGB; It was felt here that Moscow
but probably not much more. might have stepped up its.
Believed Genuine
protest after Tsarapkin had
publicly downgraded the case
It is assumed here that the in Geneva. At any rate U.S.
36
-
year-old Nosenko is a gendisarmament negotiator Wil-
uine defector though the pos-iam C. Foster and Tsarapkinj
sibility of his being a double held another business session)
agent has not been overlook-jin Geneva yesterday at which!
ed. It also is felt here that they said the case was not dis
the Soviet protest" was Cоcussed
stronger than, could be ex- It also was noted here that
pected. The request for an the Soviet Communist Party:
interview rare but not un-Central Committee has been
precedented, was granted. ialmeeting in Moscow all this;
hopes of reciprocal treatment; week. But whether the Nuit
should the occasion arise. isenko case was, discuss
Moscow dispatches; said; not known.
Folie
4so
HSHP?
2/15/64
:
14-00000
12 May 1964
nAt
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Support Branch
FROM
SUBJECT
:
Chief, Operational Support Division
AEFOXTROT
#262 622
12
DONVICS
AEDR/ICS
ACST/IOS
C/22
C/D
CAD
10...
ALTS
184175
1. This memorandum is primarily for the record and will
record the essence of a meeting held on the morning of 12 May.
1964, at which the following were present: Messrs. Charles Kane,
Jack Bauman, OS; Dr. Charles Bohrer, Medical Staff; Messrs.
Bagley, Karpovich (pc), McMahon and David Murphy, SR Division.
2.
The essence of this meeting was furnished to the Acting
Chief, Support Branch on 12 May 1964, as follows:
Effective immediately or as soon as practicable, the following
procedures will apply with regard to the handling of the
Subject:
(1) Subject will receive a regular diet with modest regulated
portions. He is to have no dessert or "trimmings, "
but may have the necessary silverware with which to
eat properly. (CAUTION--Extreme care should be
exercised with regard to controlling the silverware,
and it was suggested that at least two of the guards
be required to count the silverware in and out; that
the silverware be placed on the tray in a manner
where it could be observed before the guards enter
the room, etc.)
(2) Arrangements are to be made for the installation of
adequate air-conditioning equipment to insure that a
comfortable temperature is maintained. (It is under-
stood that there is quite a bit of equipment available
through Logistics channels.)
(3) Subject is to receive a bath; change of underwear;
change of uniform; and a change of linen for his bed.
SEGRET
14-00000
SECRET
(4) Subject is to receive a haircut, the shorter the better.
(5) Subject is to receive one cigarette on 12 May 1964.
(NOTE--These changes with regard to the bath, haircut,
cigarette are not to be considered as something to be
done on a regular schedule. We will await specific
* instructions from SR Division as to when these items
are to be accomplished in the future.)
(6) Effective immediately, Dr. Bohrer will visit the
Subject only on Tuesday each week.
(7) In addition to the above, it matist be emphasized that
our attitude toward the Subject will remain precisely
the same, and our security procedures, including
searches, will continue to be at maximum control.”
_
3. It was further ascertained that we will have custody of
.the Subject until at least July. It was suggested that perhaps we may
wish to explore some modifications in the assignment of personnel
or schedule of assignments. In addition, the Acting Chief, Support
Branch has suggested that immediate consideration be given to
devising necessary procedures to be followed in the event of an
emergency involving loss of control of the Subject. This should
be discussed immediately with the responsible DFO supervisors -
and specific procedures devised, and all guards properly informed
as to their responsibilities in this matter.
Call Kimm
Jack M. Bauman
Bauman/ewd(5-12-64)
SEGRET
2
14-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE
Headquarters
10 JUL 1984
MZMORANDUM FOR
: Special Agent in Cherge
District Field Office
SUBJECT
: LESHIK, George M.
(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody or).
#
262 
622 C
8D/1
1. Reference is sede to the outline of emergency instructions
submitted 
by you on 1 
July 1964 for Headquarters approval.
2. The plan as outlined is approved and should be implemented
immediately
..
EOBIASSEN: dr
DDS/10SC JULY 1964
ADDS/10S PPLEMENTAL
ASST/IOS
C/ID
C/CSD
DC/OSD
C/SRD
C/S:3
✓ C/S3
C/ID/
L&TS
White
14-00000
TO DE CPENED BY ADDRECOCE CHL.
1 July 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Headquarters
SUBJECT
LEWK, George M.
(Exergency Instructions Regarding Custory of)
#262 622 C SD/1
1. Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in
the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT'z health,
safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where
SUBJECT is currently being held.
2. This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part,
are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the
District Field Office who are concerned with this case.
3. Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of
the Special Security Letail will be made upon notification of Headquarters
approval.
Attachment:
Emergency Instructions (2)
0123-
for Special
JOHN D. NUTLE
Special Agent
rge
2 July 64
ટ્રેન તળ
TO BE CREED BY ADRESURE ONLY
DY
14-00000
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
Instructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling
of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape
of SUBJECT, 
and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT.
Should 
such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the
Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance.
It is 
possible that in such an event representatives of the press or
curiosity-
seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site,
thereby creating 
security problems with respect to the custody and
protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.
In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these in-
structions be thoroughly understood and momorized by all personnel
assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.
1.
FIRE
(Main House)
In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the
fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment,
the fire has reached 
such proportions where available equipment would be
useless. Simultaneously, he 
should dispatch another member of the Security™
Detail 
to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants
of the house. 
If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the
person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting
'FIRE".
2. Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for
directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive
documents 
and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department
if circumstances 
warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first
available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they
cannot 
be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars
concerning the situation 
and the action-being taken.
3. In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire,
it 
should be 
borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the
third floor at all times. so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to
his 
quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from
his quarters 
during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be
present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible.
In
14-00000
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued).
any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during
the movement of EURJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other
restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody
and control over the EUBJECT and prevent his escape.
4. If, in the Judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely
to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefighting
equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the
Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should
move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to
arrival of the Pire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an
automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and
driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone
calls should be made to the safehouse. If no answer is receivedi, the
cognizant DEO codicial should be contacted.for instructions as to whether
to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternate site.
FIRE
(Tenant House)
す
1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereo:
should be instructed to immediately notify the Main House and to use
any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless
the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed
It should te
towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises.
clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the
Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole respon-
sibility of the SSA.
2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person
notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching
of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If,
in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach,
proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting
equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire
Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the
observation of the SUBJECT by firemen or other unauthorized persons who
might be attracted to the scene.
-2-
:
14-00000
:
EMERGENCY DISTRUCTIONS
(Continued)
3. At the first available opportunity, the CSA should call the
SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and
furnish him with full particulars oncerning the situation and the
action being taken.
ESCAPE OR ATINGED ESCAPE
1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a
24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to
If SUBJECT should make
discourage and prevent the SUBVENT's escape.
an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary
under the circumstances in order to subdue the EUBJECT and maintain
custody and control over him. Here, unnecessary brutality and the
indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.
2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty
at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or
other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt.
Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA.
shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of
the SUBJECT by all means available.
3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in
extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circun-
stances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT's
total escape, may direct a qualiNael Nrearms-trained agent to fire
I 
no
shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warming to halt.
event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot
directly at the SUBJECT.
4. At the first available opportunity, the SAC/DFO, or in his
absence, one of the ASAC3. should be telephonically advised of all
In no case 
shall
the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt.
the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.
ILLNESS SRITY
1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBVENT,
Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event
:

14-00000
EVERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)
of his absence, should be imediately notified and advice obtained as
to any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival.
Likewise
, the CAC or ASAC/DC should be notified immediately after
talking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situation
and any 
instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardless
of any 
instructions given by the doctor, no action chall be taken to
remove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospital
or ambulance 
service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAC.
2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital
or other location away from the premises, every possible precaution
should be 
taken to maintain close custody and control over him, and to
prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized
persons.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION
1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under
constant observation twenty-four hours a day.
:
2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while
confined to third floor.
3.. Six men in attendance benever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation
room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for
removal signal 
from visitors.
4. Coveralls taken from: SUBJECT at 2200 hours and returned the
following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and
undershirt overnight.
5. Military appearance and prompt shift schedules maintained at
all times when in presence of SEJECT.
6. Careful room search, including clothes and bunk, to be conducted
every 
time SUBJECT 
leaves cell.
7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing well whenever
anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.
14-00000
EVPIPSENCY INSTRUCTIONS
(Continued)
2. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms
on 
3rd floor to 
be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order
to prevent his 
becoming oriented to surroundings.
9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or
among 
agents, 
nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT's
hearing.
་
12. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor
permitted 
to hear radio or 
television, nor shall there be any discussion
of news events within his 
hearing. He may be provided selected reading
material upon authorization 
of Headquarters personnel concerned with the
case.
11.
Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up
any comments 
by SUBJECT 
or conversation between him and the doctor or
other operational 
personnel.
12.
Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities
of EJECT 
to 
be promptly brought to the attention of the ESA.
13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel,
as well 
as 
photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained
in a secure place 
for ready reference by the SSA.
14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police
or 
Fire Department 
regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with
specific reference 
to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled
by the SSA 
with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the
scene. The SSA should 
converse in private with such official, and
identify himself 
by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain
briefly, and only to 
the extent necessary, that the property is leased
and that it is used 
occasionally for training purposes.
concerning 
the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if
All 
inquiries
necessary, it may 
be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder
which 
sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified
under his alias or otherwise
. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request
that his cm identity, plus 
his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence,
especially with regard to 
the press. Inquiries by members of the press
or members of the 
civilian population should be answered by stating that
the site is rented 
by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.
-50
14-00000
EMERGENCY INETRICTIONS
(Continued)
SPECIAL CONTACTS
1. George PANEGAULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County.
(Personally known to SMODDY under GOLIATH)
2.
Lieutenant 14OON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf,
Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FERPALL.
under GOLIATH)
3. Emergency Ambulance
-
Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department.
(Can be cotained through SNODDY)
Above not to be contacted unless authorized by SAC or ASAC.
-6-
14-00000
OLC 60-0673
5 August 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
QUBJECT: Briefing of bey Congres Ional Contacts on the
Yuriy Ivanovich Nuscako Case
:
1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo
of 17.June 
1959 (copy 
attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional
contacts on the 
history and status of the Yurly Ivanovich Nosekno case,
have briefed the 
following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcom
mittees along the 
lines proposed on the dates indicated:
Fraak Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House
Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1759
William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Sunate
Appropriations Committed 24 July 1969
--
Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed
Services Committee
--
24 July 1969
Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations
Committee -->
27 July 1969
I
2. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective
chairmen 
when 
and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officera
registered particular 
concera or curiosity about the case and I think it
doubtful that 
all of our chairmon have been informed. Nevertheless, I
think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it
further at this time.
Machateat:
Diatribation:
Original - CLC Subject Allo
1-20P
1- Chief, CI Stat
1 - Chief, SE Division
1-
D.Security
1 - CLC Chroso
PEDRET
JOHN M. MACAY
Legislative Counsel
14-00000
11-9-17-1/2
SECRET EYES GLY
ONLY
· DRAFT:JMM
-
19 June 1969
SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko.Case
The following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key
congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have
been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that
the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees
be briefed along the lines indicated.
: .
1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall
having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received
press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.
2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for
State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Ship-
building in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on
4 February 1964. He
was then brought to the United States where he has
since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debrieüngs
by officers of the Agency and the FBI.
SECRET YES CILV
14-00000
SECRET PYRS GAY
3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years
at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of
counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence.
For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major
hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information:
has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and
foreign Haison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing
investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of
Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful
information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and
its techniques and methods.
•
4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged
and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government,
was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own
importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when
weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some
doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing,
arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure
conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases
at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal
protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB ofücer,
SECRET I
2 SECRET EVES ONLY
Et:༢
14-00000
:
BB CUY
he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover
hio whereabouts: With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered
to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's
situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning
his bona fides.
5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to
look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert t
to
the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his
stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and
:
with the other officers responsible for his aafety and welfare, and our
current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal,.
independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own
private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.
6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal
problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the
fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an
individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable
or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that
Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash
action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences,
particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this
calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal lifa.
14-00000
:
Question #1
-
SEB
NOSENKO
Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at
Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment?
Prisoner? Treatment?
Answer:
During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko
was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:
3.
b.
C.
d.
Confinement in single room except for
periods of interrogation.
Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour
visual observation with regular room search.
Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient
quantity but limited in variety.
No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio
and television were not allowed, newspapers or
any information concerning current events were
forbidden and reading material was extremely
limited.
Question #2 Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.
Answer:
-
During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967,
conditons cited above were basically maintained with the
following additons or changes:
a.
b.
c.
d.
From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was
furnished no reading material.
After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given
a different volume of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica to read.
From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko
was not permitted cigarettes.
Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small
confined area outside the building when weather
permitted.
_
SIL
14-00000
2
Question #3
-
1
Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this:
What?
Answer:
Office of Security records contain only limited information
in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the
responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late
October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the
Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was
at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the
conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be
based on SE records.
Question #4
Answer:
-
Where is Nosenko working now?
Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned
residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and
analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB
and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area
for several days approximately every six weeks for direct
interviews by the FBI. and Office of Security personnel.
Question #5
Answer:
-
Is he working for CIAP
Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time
contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract
has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration,
primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late
1971, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary
not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition,
on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release
of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence
Agency from any claims prior to that date.
Question #6
Answer:
->
What is his legal status?
Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in
April 1974.
EYES
SEGRET
14-00000
'
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General
SUBJECT
: The Nosenko Case
:
Attached please find a summary of a document written in
1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and
explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to _
Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967
Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was
advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any
location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words,
from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man.
That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his
attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to
October 1967.
While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept
incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore
presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document
does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns
of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts
about. Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet
plant. There was no country to which he could be deported
save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return
there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from
society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to
national security.
Recognizing that only legal experts can judge defini-
tively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that
the Agency had no choice but to hold Rosenko incommunicado.
pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to
the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee
to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date
of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil
rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in
a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for his
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018307
|

14-00000
SECRET
conduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to
believe 
that full and total release of Nosenko would be an
abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To
gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error.
In sum, 
the act of defection places the defector at the mercy
of 
the 
laws of the country to which he defects. It is the
obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the
laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that
the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that
its 
responsibility for the defector was met. While it was.
unfortunate that 
it took so long to resolve the matter, we
can 
find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its
responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko
himself.
Attachment: A/S
2
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
In early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was
provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum
sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the
Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through
that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposi-
tion of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to
the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967
in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that
should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime.
He gradually created a new life for himself in the United
States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds
no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.
Background
Nosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA repre-
sentatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a
staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and
offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer
was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place and
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
信
debriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings
in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva
again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet
disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his
CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly
taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border
on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity
documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt,
Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political
asylum from the U.S. Government.
Because serious doubts about Nosenko's bona fides had
arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both
in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was orig-
inally planned to do a detailed bona fides debriefing and
assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving.
Nosenko to the United States. However, unprecedented action
by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one
of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February,
unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the
press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the
Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had dis-
appeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.
2
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
1
:
Because of mounting pressure from the press, which included
much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or
disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department
would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's
request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a
member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 Feb-
ruary, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American
Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and
requesting an immediate interview with him and his release.
On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Confer-
ence TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he
accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in
locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected
these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recom-
mended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko
to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of
his own free will.
On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director,
Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by
commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification,
and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true
name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
- **་"" ། -"་
3
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
On 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and Soviet
Embassies in Washington advised the State Department that
they desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, in
Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in Ambassador
KOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the part
of the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen took
an even harder line to Western correspondents, and accused
the U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 Sep-
tember, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to Swiss
Embassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. At
these interviews, which were also attended by State Department
and INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerland
of his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition,
he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representative
to the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship.
On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department made
a brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued a
brief statement to the press noting that the interviews had
been held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remain
in this country.
From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenko
was housed in the Washington area. During this period, reg-
ular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
made available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing
on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed
out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all
times accompanied by O/S personnel.
In addition, he took a
two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case offi-
cers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that
he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious
that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve
the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen
without changing the conditions in which he was being held.
Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially
when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed
for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance
of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's
heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing
increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with
keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in
It was clear
accordance with Agency local responsibility.
scandal..
that it was only a matter of time before he created a public.
More importantly, he was in a position to communi-
cate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.
On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph
examination. The results of this examination indicated deception
5
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
1
on a number of critical points indicating that he was sent
by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved
his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was
decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's
stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if
the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsi-
bilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement.
a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could
be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were
suspended pending resolution of bona fides.
:
As
It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action
but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that
we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions
en the basis of his information. The results of some of these
actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government
politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For exam-
ple, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that
he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately,
involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.
Bona Fides
Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted
to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated)
and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral
6
SECRET
14-0000
SECRET
investigations. We concluded that it had been established
beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who
established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB
instructions, and that he came to the United States on a
deception mission. The implications of this mission had a
grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although
our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph
examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in
a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had
not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgres-
sion of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was.
placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable
means of communication with the KGB.
Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders
or that he came to the U.S. on a KGE mission. He has admitted,
however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history
and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials,
both before and after arriving in the United States.”
Coordination with Other U.S. Government Agencies
USIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling
relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile
intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was dis-
cussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an
7
SECRET
1
14-00000
SECRET
ad hoc basis.
Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assis-
tant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge
Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately.
On S Febru-
ary 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an exécutive
session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to
USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that
Nosenko's bona fides had not yet been established. It was
agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that
he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In
fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped
off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no
positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the
community.
The President was informed of the full extent of our
suspicions about Nosenko's bona fides by the then Director,
Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Nr. Patrick Coyne, Executive
Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by
Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.
Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently
informed of the problems about Nosenko's bona fides.
:
8
SECRET
:
14-00000
SECRET
The Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other
senior officials in the Department of State were informed of
our reservations about Nosenko's bona fides and our fears that
he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the
possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary
of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction
that such a move might have on other potential defectors.
The Director of Security, State Department, was informed
of the bona fides problem at an early date. We have worked
closely with this office since then on the problem of eval-
uating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects
the security interests of the State Department.
Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S.
internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary
responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was
a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain
FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views
about Nosenko's bona fides and our progress in interrogating
and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The
FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's
bona fides as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the
FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan,
were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major
9
SECRET
i

14-00000
SECRET
aspects of our handling Nosenko with them.
After a long
meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review
Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objec-
tions to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and
commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI for-
mally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the
extent that "On considering carefully the results of your
interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his
statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he
purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to
draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is
possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent pro-
vocateur."
The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach
(and several members of his staff) were apprised of our res-
ervations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was
sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion
and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the
event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this
country.
Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of
Noserio's True Status
From the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to
this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were
10
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
to have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and to
plan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essential
that we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awareness
of Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledge
of the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, and
the implications thereof, was restricted to a very few people
in the Agency and the intelligence community.
Nonetheless,
we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intel-
ligence community, even though this carried the inevitable
risk of leakage.
Soviet Inspired Inquiries
In 1966 there were several indications that the Soviets
were making a serious effort to find out what happened to
Nosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatant
and unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist,
Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine
Paris Match with an offer to provide photographs and materials
for an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. According
to Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to an
international juridicial organization in an effort to obtain
compensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandon-
ment of her and her children. In responding to this approach
we quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself,
11
SECRET
"
14-00000
SECRET
to the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to repre-
sent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB
and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing
to an interview or in any other way.
Nosenko's Status
To recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on
12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions
of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by
the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed
by the Attorney General and the CCI on 10 February 1955,
which states:
"After parole of such aliens, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency will assume responsibility for
care, supervison and control of a kind and
degree it believes consistent with the internal.
security needs of the United States during con-
tinuance of their parole status."
In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and
because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious
and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we
ensured that he was under our direct observation and control
at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United
12
SECRET
1
14-00000
SECRET
States. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to
keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain
amount of movement and of contact with the outside world.
After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was
necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is
known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within
it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country
under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically
extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Although his freedom of movement had been severely
restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no com-
plaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several
written statements from him in which he stated that our
handling of him was justified and even beneficial.
Disposal
From the time that Nosenko was brought to this country
we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation
as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it
might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda
drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko
has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time,
however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his
real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what
13
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
this implied, it was apparent that great practical problems
stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a
third country.
USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous
occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR,
and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such
a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end
with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death,
ctc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with
Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of
State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for
the adverse effect this might have on other potential defec-
tors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against
long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse
violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United
States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession"
by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and
might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to
be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again
playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on
the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.
Third Country: Although we believed it likely that
Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country,
14
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
there is certainly no country in the free world on which we
could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first inform-
ing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a
desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department
of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplic-
ity on the basis of the political risks involved.
15
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
Yurily Ivanovich NOSENKO
NOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected
He was subsequently brought to the
in Switzerland in 1964
.
U.S.,
and after a short period of relative 
freedom, he 
was
confined under strict 
and relatively austere conditions
Commencing 
in
for a period of approximately 
three years.
1967, he was given 
increasing amounts of 
freedom 
until 
he
He subsequently married
was allowed total 
freedom in 1969.
a U.S. citizen, Fettled 
in the 
Southeastern 
United States
He is presently under
and became a U.S. 
itizen in 1974.
contract to the Agency, 
providing 
consultative services
and information 
on subjects germane to his background.
NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing
substantive questions 
were raised concerning his bona fides,
NOSENKO's 
debriefing
and his general 
behavior raised further concern 
about his
emotional health 
and generai safet Y.
The advice of the
and confinement were 
ended when it 
was concluded 
that he
his confine-
was not a threat to 
national security.
infing.
Justice Department was obtained 
at the 
time of
ment, and the FBI participated 
in his subsequent 
debri
NOSENKO's initial entry 
into the U.S. was coordinated 
wit..
the Department of State, 
and they were periodically advised
of his status during his 
confinement up to the time of his
final settlement.
The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were
intended to convey to him the 
seriousness of his position
as a suspected disinformation 
agent and to make clear to 
him that
his free settlement in 
the U.S. was precluded as long as
It was understood, however,
this issue was unresolved.
that at any time he could have elected to end his confine-
OS files do not 
document..
ment and return to the 
Soviet Union.
that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to
NOSENKO, however, it is the 
recollection of senior 
staff
officers (ADD/O and D/OS) 
that such was the case, and 
further
that it was a condition 
routinely applied to other defectors.
whose bona fides were 
in doubt.
14-00000
SEALT
MEMORANDUM FOF: General Counsel
SUBJECT
Nosenko
191275
We have
Attached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the aware.
ness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS).
been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could
elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of Immediate
liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under
the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this
latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.
Attachment: a/s
S. D. Breckinridge
013.42
14-00000
PNCR
TOR SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 23. D. C
OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
12 February 1964
HEMORANDUM FOR:
United States Intelligence Board Hembers.
:
SUBJECT:
Yuri Ivanovich HOSENZO
This memorandum refers to the State Department
release of 10 February on subject case and provides addi-
tional background as well as information on his current
status.
22 As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly
assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the
XGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrange-
sent which permitted his to carry out intelligence and..
security functions in Goneys on behalf of the XGD.
2150 attore various sessions of the
During the
[Disarmament Conforenco hold in Genova in 1962.
course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with
officials of the U. 5. Government, informed these officials
that he was affiliated with the Soviot State Security ap-
paratus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in
detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the
U. S. Coverment. During the course of his contact with.
U. E. authorities, NOSENIG stated that his cooperation with
the U.. 3. Goverment originated with his distaste and hatrad
for the Soviet regime in general, with his desirɔ to obtain
revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official
is the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general
admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in con-
tact within the Soviet Unica.
+.
In late January 1964, ROSENKO arrived in Geneva,
again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation
to the Disarmament Conforsacc. Subject secretly notified
his CLA contacts in the United States concerning bis pres-
ence in Geya and arranged to meet with these contacts,
During a series of meetings NOGENXO provided information
including documents concerning Suviet State Security acti-
vities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account
E2 IMPDET.
TORT SECRET CL BY 063344
EYES DALY
HR 10-23
9 January 1975
14-00000
SECRET`.
of the XG3 operation against U. S. Professor Sarghoora
which NOSENKO 
said ho had personally supervised at the
direction of 
SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Committed
for 
State Security (KGB).
5. During those most recent meetings NOSENKO announced.
his desire to leave the US52 permanently and seek his futuro
in the 
Nest. He claimed his new work in the XG3 (First
Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance.
and recruitment 
of American visitors to the USSR) was ax-
panding and that be would not be able to visit the Most
with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for
political 
asylum in the United States. He was taken to
Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-
gation. 
Plans are now being made to remove his to the U. S.
6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject
has not been extensive and that we will require additional
thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides.
It should 
also be noted that NOSENKO's duties were not con-
cerned 
with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference,
and he 
therefore noted to be able to shed auch, it·
any, light 
on that area of our interest.
7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was dis-
signed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered.
The 
decision to accept bis was taken on the conviction that.
the Soviets 
would not have chosea such a vulnerable agent
(staff 
officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.
Marshall S. Carter
Lloutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

14-00000
EISTY
31 December 1974
137015
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
SUBJECT
: Office of Security reports on PARAGON,
NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and II
and MOCKINGBIRD
1.
Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum
from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The
material represents responses to questions posed by your office.
Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more
detailed reviews of each activity.
2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:
PARAGON
.
We should spell out what is meant by the
statement that the FBI "deferred further coveragė
to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and
what form it took.
The taping of two conversations does not seem
to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual
sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance.
A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.
NOSENKO
We will go to the DDO for any record of DCI
knowledge, and report such information as we get.
AELADLE
We will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.
2 930
CLI
14-00000
SEGRET
CELOTEX I
We will want more detail on the actual
surveillance, including possible higher approval.
This is responsive to the DCI's request for
newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.
CELOTEX II
Questions similar to CELOTEX LI.
We may want actual copies of newspaper.
stories for display, in addition to memos, should
DCI wish to use it.
MOCKINGBIRD
No recorded (in CIA) formal approval by
Attorney General. It may be that Justice will
have a copy. ·
Does this raise a question of surveillance`
of congressmen if one is contacted by someone
under surveillance?
3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA,
REDFEI, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB
Thursday.
..
S. D. Breckinridge
Attachments a/s
EYES QUAY
بات
14-00000
SEGRET
EYES ONLY
1
31 DEC 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Inspector General
VIA
:
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT
:
PARAGON
NOSENKO
AELADLE
CELOTEX I
CELOTEX II
MOCKINGBIRD
1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics
which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office.
As you will note, the report is in a question and answer
format with attachments.
2. This Office is still gathering material in regard
to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other
files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist,
on the above mentioned projects.
Atts
Distribution:
Original
1
-
-
Adse
DDA
Sidney Stembridge
Acting Director of Security
EYES ONLY
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 010249
.2
☑
14-00000
REPUEST
I, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, request the Government of
the United States of America to grant me political asylwi
in the United States of America. This decision has been
taken by ne as the result of considering this question
over the course of several years without any pressure on
the part of anyone whosoever. 1 absolutely do not believe
in the truth of the Socialist system. Working in the KGB
and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about
the internal situation, the mood of the people and the
policies of the Soviet Government, I became convinced that
in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real
freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist
Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries
of the west, I was able correctly to understand and become
aware of the existence of a real and actual free world.
The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the
Communist movement are for me vivid examples and confirma-
tion of the correctness of my own decision to break forever
with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Covernment of
the United States of America that I will devote all my
strength and knowledge to the Goverment and people of the
United States of America.
4 February 1964
1.1. To
112005
/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
14-00000
Aire possess your pepper
ར་དང་ཚེ་སྡེར་
Sl vécarts 15 lei eit vergea
Toetus, pain pagelib or kelomili roccolin; e bijapr-
Aages, species lietus.
نان
op die GqG « Prestig
nem pobijed
up
"Mastersted) hymns. Questa tezajupukių
7
a cocktail spaziosibilupes pactes a goûcatu
slots chréptera kunjan,
ante
в Пенорка
Rotates besuar
Gratitude Beaune, protect
gluncura altrowning
Apruan ifsarpance de bebeple dyin
equire preuve bilerzo
4 Celenzenet Corsona.
Mary suleprovet Sips beraditesile Ale & cur
Pequitone Gaal day
21
14-00000
UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECY
in consideration of arrantements being made by the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely
acknowledge that I have nó outstanding claims of any nature against the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there
are noi commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior
associations with the Agency. 1 fully understand that the current arrange-
aments between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are
intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever
made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
1 acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States
by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current
arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert
under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely,
totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other
government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist
Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member
of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches
opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become
a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other
totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate
the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world
communism,
I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past,
present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and
my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including
all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with
the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that
violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under
the espionage laws (18 U.S. C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and
regulations. I understand that this is a solenu and permanent undertaking
which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other
arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition,
I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not
authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under
the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to
ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not
information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.
I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental
reservations or purpose of evasion.
14-00000
EN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and seal
2.1
this
day of
Apar
1969.
1969.
78/
IDEN 1
(L.S.)
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 day of ori
(SEAL).
Isi IDEN 7
Notary Public
My commission explies September 24, 1967
M
14-00000
JDEN
Dear
IDEN 1
The UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, as represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under
the following terms and conditions:
1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an
independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an
employee of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this
contract. You will be required to hold yourself available at all times
to fulfill requests made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
or to respond to tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY. You will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment
or occupation until approval has been received from the CENTRAL
Instructions furnished to you pursuant to
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
this contract and within the terms hereof shall be as binding upon you...
as if included in the written terms hereof.
2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant
instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the
"Authorized Government Representative." He will be fully authorized
to discuss matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this
i
contract including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of
assignment, conditions of work or any other matters relating to your
relationship with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your
responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made
regarding cover and general security conditions.
You may be required
14-00000
to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover.
i
arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such "documenta
are solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional
legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with
respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from
this agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be
provided from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized
Government Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely
to such instructions.
4. COMPENSATION.
You will be compensated by the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($16, 500.00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be
monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized
Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income
taxes and to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of
residence. Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes.
The current rates and method of payment will be in accordance with
applicable laws and the security instructions issued by the Authorized
Government Representative. To assist you in establishing yourself, the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will assist you in procuring an
automobile and necessary household furnishings, providing funds therefor,
up to a maximum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00).
taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your personal
obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security
Payment of all
instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government
Representative.
-2-
14-00000
PLACE OF RESIDENCE. In the interests of security, you will
be required to live in such State, area, and house or apartment as is
specifically approved by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY after
mutual discussion and due consideration of all circumstances,
All of
the expenses of such leased house or apartment will be borne by you and
the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will not be obligated to pay any
such expenKER.
6. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the
course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary
allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary
allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations.
If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are
authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will
be made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial
accordance with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
regulations.
7. HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICAL CARE. The CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will provide you with reasonable insurance
covering medical care and hospitalization equivalent to that which could
be obtained through standard insurance policies; or, the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY may provide directly such medical care and
hospitalization.
8. SECRECY OBLICATION.
You will be required to keep forever
secret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason
hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such
-3-

14-00000
:
il p
cution under the expionage laws.
secrecy may subj, et you to
as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship
with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be
kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and
contract with any person other than the Authorized Government
Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.
No promises or
9.
UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS.
commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those
expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto
shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
10. TERM.
This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1969
and shall be for a term of one (1) year. At the end of that period this
contract shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of
termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance of the
elapse of one (1) year. Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically
on similar terms and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any
time by either party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon
termination of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments,
if any, the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist
you in obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation
to assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of
living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of
this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations
14-00000
:
imposed on you by peragraph 8 of this contract and the provisions of
any secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Date:
ACCEPTED:
I ril, 1889
WITNESS:
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:
Contracting Officer
/si
IDEN 1
Date:
21 april 1969
Date:
isl IDEN 7
-5-
14-00000
IDEN I
Dear IDEN 1
Rete Pente at made to your contract with the UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, on represente by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
edvctive 1 Atarea 1969. Effective 1 March 1970 said contract is herein
terminated by naituel censent of the parties thereto, and in lien thereof
the following agreement in substituted.
The UNITED STATÈS GOVERNMENT, as represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, hereby contracts with you under
the following terms and conditions:
You
You
1. STATUS. Your legal status under this contract is that of an
independent contractor or consultant. You are not considered an employee
of the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT by virtue of this contract.
will be required to hold yourself available at all times to fulfill requests
made of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY or to respond to
tasks requested of you by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
will refrain from engaging in other gainful employment or occupation until
approval has been received from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Instructions furnished to you pursuant to this contract and within the terms
hereof shall be as binding upon you as if included in the written terms.
hereof.
2. COMMUNICATION. In all relationships with the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY you will accept requests, tasks and relevant
instructions from an individual hereinafter referred to as the "Authorized
Government Representative." He will be fully authorized to discuss
matters with you relating to your responsibilities under this contract
including, but not limited to, cover arrangements, place of assignment,
conditions of work or any other matters relating to your relationship with
the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
3. COVER AND SECURITY. In the performance of your
responsibilities hereunder, appropriate arrangements will be made
regarding cover and general security conditions. You may be required
to execute certain documents in the course of establishing cover
arrangements but it is to be expressly understood that such documents are
solely for the purpose of cover and security and confer no additional
legal rights or obligations and that all of your rights and obligations with
respect to the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY derive solely from this
agreement. In connection with cover and security you will be provided
from time to time specific instructions by the Authorized Government
Representative and you will be required to adhere precisely to such
instructions.
ཐཱ
SECRET
On
04:1
M
14-00000
SECRET
4. COMPENSATION, You will be compensated by the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY at the rate of Fighteen Thousand Rive Hondrest
Dollars ($18, 500, 00) per year. Payment of this compensation shall be
monthly in accordance with arrangements acceptable to the Authorized
Government Representative. This sum is subject to Federal income tax,
and 
to such income tax laws as are applicable to your place of residence.
Additionally, this compensation is subject to FICA taxes. The Current
rates and method of payment will be in accordance with applicable laws and
the security instructions issued by the Authorized Government Representative,
Payment of all taxes and preparation of necessary tax returns are your
personal obligation and responsibility but in accord with appropriate security
instructions which will be furnished by the Authorized Government
Representative.
5. ALLOWANCES, TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES. If, in the
course of fulfilling your responsibilities under this agreement, monetary
allowances would be payable under general UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT rules and regulations, you will be paid such monetary
allowances in substantial accordance with those laws and regulations.
If, in the course of this contract, you are directed to travel or are
authorized to incur other expenses, reimbursement for expenses will be
made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY in substantial accordance
with applicable CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY regulations.
6. NEGOTIATED BENEFITS.
a. You presently have a private health insurance plan for
yourself and your wife paid until late December 1970. Prior to
the expiration date of the current policy the CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY has the option of paying premiums
on the current policy until 1 March 1972 or enrolling you in a
health insurance program for selected contract individuals
of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY subject to
all the terms and conditions of that program. The CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will pay the premiums on either
insurance coverage until 1 March 1972. However, any new
contract will include an appropriate clause providing that this
organization will bear a portion of the total premium cost of
any health insurance and you will bear the remainder.
b. The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will endeavor
to arrange for you to secure a term life insurance policy with
a face value of $15,000.00. This policy contains no additional
accidental death benefits. The premiums for the policy will
be your personal responsibility. The current prémium charge
is $12.00 per month.
SECRET.
..
from
14-00000
SEGRET
balegnet to the priorities of work you are herein
authorized twenty-one (21) woch dayn vacation with pay per
contres! year to be taken only at times and places approved
in advance by the Authorized Government Representative,
Vacation time is not ateruable and will not be carried over
from your to year. Pegment for unused vacation time will
not be authorized,
(2) If incapacitated for work due to illness, injury
and the like, your compensation may be continued for periods.
not to exceed a total of thirteen (13) working days per contract
year. Periods of absence in excess of three (3) consecutive
days will require a doctor's certificate. Like vacation time,
this benefit is not accruable and will not be carried over from
year to year. Cash payment in lieu of this benefit will not be
authorized.
7. SECRECY OBLIGATION. You will be required to keep forever
Becret this agreement and all information which you may obtain by reason
hereof (unless released in writing by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such
secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the espionage lawn,
as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. Your relationship
with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and this contract must be
kept secret and you may not discuss any aspect of this relationship and
contract with any person other than the Authorized Government
Representative or such other person as he may specifically approve.
8.
UNAUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS. No promises or
commitments pertaining to rights, privileges, or benefits other than those
expressly stipulated in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto
shall be binding on the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
9. TERM. This agreement is effective as of 1 March 1970 and
ghall be for a term of two (2) years. At the end of that period this contract
shall be deemed to be renewed for another year unless notice of
termination has been furnished to you thirty (30) days in advance.
Thereafter the contract will be renewed automatically on similar terms
and conditions. This contract may be terminated at any time by either
party upon furnishing thirty (30) days advance notice. Upon termination
of this contract or renewals thereof, including amendments, if any, the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY will undertake to assist you in
obtaining gainful employment or to provide continuing compensation to
assure you that you will be able to maintain a reasonable standard of
living. This undertaking is contingent upon your fulfilling the terms of
SECRET.
!
14-00000
SECRET
this contract and the continuing compliance with the secrecy obligations
impored on you by paragraph of this contract and the provisions of any
secrecy agreement which you have signed with the CENTRAL.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Date:
ACCEPTED:
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As Represented by the
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
By:
IDEN 6
Contracting Officer'
/B/ IDEN 1
Date:
WITNESS:
March 6,
1970
/B/ IDEN 2
Date: 1970
SECRET
14-00000
25 October 1972
Received this date from an Authorized Government Repre-
*sentative three Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:
#AI 25-349
Schroder Trust Company
$15,000.00
#FE 54779
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
10,000.00
#A593613
Harris Trust & Savings Bank
10,000.00
This is an advance against a back salary payment covering
the period April 1964 to March 1969 which was approved on 18 October
1972. I understand that this advance, $35,000.00, will be deducted
from the total back salary payment covering the specified period when
the finalization of this payment is made in the near future.
isl IDEN 1
/s/ IDEN 5
Cotuler 25, 1977
Witness
>
Date:
14-00000
16 HCV 1972
Received this date from an Authorized Government Repre-
sentative four Bank Cashiers Checks drawn on the following banks:
#155784
Riggs National Bank
$15,000.00
#01-028564
Union Trust Company
15,000.00
#0661511
American Security & Trust
15,000.00
#2-442275
The National Bank of Washington 7,052.00
The above amount, $52,052.00, together with the $35,000.00
advance received on 25 October 1972, constitutes full payment for back
salary covering the period April 1964 to March 1969.
IDEN 1
/s/ IDEN 5
Movember 16, 1972.
Date:
Witness:
ブ
14-00000
UNITED STATES ( VERNMENT
Memorandum
10
:
Files
120M
:
IDEN 2
SUBJECT:
IDEN 1
1313-130
DATE:
13 July 1973
1. On 12-July 1973, the attached Acknowledgement and
Release which was prepared by the General Counsel was signed by
the Subject in the presence of IDEN 5 and witnessed by the
undersigned. There were no problems involved in obtaining the
signature of the Subject who had previously voluntarily stated he
would sign such a document if he would receive the $15,000.00 which
Subject considered was the fulfillment of an Agency promise in 1964 :
before his defection.
2. Subject understood that the attached did not affect the
existing contractual agreement with Subject and that all stipulations
in that contract were valid and continuing.
3. Also attached is a copy of the $13,000.00 Cashier's
Check given to Subject on 12 July 1973 which completed the agreed
sum of $15,000.00, the Subject having previously received $2,000.00
which was a part of the agreed sum.
1 /s/ IDEN 2 ---
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
14-00000
WHEREAS,
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND RELEASE.
IDEN 1
a former citizen of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Repablies and an employee of the Committee for State
Security (KGB), first cooperated with Officers of the United States Govern-
ment and then, subsequently, defected to the United States; and,
WHEREAS,
JDEN 1
•
was promised certain sums of money for
his cooperation and defection, only part of which have previously been
paid to him; and,
WHEREAS, there remains a certain balance of money agreed upon by
IDEN 1 and Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency;
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
and 00/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,
for himself and for his heirs, executors, admini-
IDEN 1
strators and assigns, hereby releases and forever discharges the United
States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its
employees and representatives from any claim for money promised to him
for, and/or at the time of his defection, and from any and all other claims
demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever arising out of or in any way
connected with his cooperation and association with the United States Govern-
ment and the Central Intelligence Agency prior to the date of this document,
12 July 1973.
WITNESS THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURE AND SEAL:
WITNESS;
On Behalf of the United States Government
/s/ IDEN 2
1
IDEN 1
{SEAL)
IDEN 1

14-00000
☐
ترین کا
IDEN 1
Dear IDEN 1
Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government,
'as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective 1 March 1970.
Effective 1 March 1974, said contract is amended by revising the first
sentence of paragraph four (4) entitled "Compensation" to read as follows:
"You will be compensated by the Central Intelligence Agency
at the rate of Twenty-Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars
($23,750) per year.
effect.
"
All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and
Please acknowledge by signing in the space provided below.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BY
'/s/ IDEN 3
Special Contracting Officer
ACCEPTED:
/s/IDEN 1
George Martin Rosnek
WITNESS:
kay I 1971
"Date
i
/ɛ/ IDEN 2
APPROVED:
/s/ IDEN 4
-
97may1474
Date
177374
Date
E2IMPDET
CL by: 063837.
☑
.
14-00000
PHFECTORS
TAB
TITLE
DATE
1
Memo for Mr. Garrison from 8. D. Breckinridge, Cubj:
Information on Detention of Defector
30 Jan 75
2
3
Memo for IG from Jerrold F. Brown, Sub): Request for
Information (re: Report that DCI fired an employee
for abusing a defector)
MFR from Walter Elder, Sub: Rockefeller Comiccion
Contact (re: Report that PCT fired an employee for
abusing a defector)
Meno for IG from C. W. Kane. Subi: Alleged lleval
Activities (Unidentified Subject -- Alleged Abuse of
Defector)
Routing Slip to S. Breckinridge from F. Bucci
Att: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General
of the 
United States and the Central Intelligence Agency
for the Entry of Aliens of Interest to the Central
Intelligence Agency under Specific Circumstances
Nomo for Inspector General from Jerrold B.Brown, dated
18 June 
1975, Subject: Request for Information
(ro- DCI firing an employee for abusing a defector)
18 Jun 75:
23 Jun 75
27 Jun 75
22 Jan 75
10 Feb 55
18 June 1975
1
14-00000
SECRET
-
Refector
Review Staff: 75/880
Mr. Ryan
MERECTOR CEN
75-227
18 June 1975.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT
: Request For Information
The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170)
says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a de-
fector. Can you uncover the details on this in-
cident? Is it the only such domestic incident
known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no
knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the
Commission on the reported incident or of any
others.
He suggests checking Office of Security)
IBB
Jerrold B. Brown
CC:
DDO
John Waller
SECRET
mail
14-00000
g
•
S-E-C-R-E-:
EXHIPIT 2
!
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR 
THE ENTRY OF ALLENS OF INTEREST TO
TES CENTRAL INTERNRIENCE AGENCY UNDER 
SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES
The Central Intelligence Agency has frequent mood for the covart
tormonary 
entry of aliens into the United 
States for intolligence and
operational purposes within its 
Jurisdiction.
To effectuate entry in such cases, the Central Intelligence Agency
will 
submit each such alien's case in writing 
to the Commissioner of.
Immigration and Naturalization with 
the request to defer inspection of
the subject upon arrival and parole to 
the Central Intelligence Agency
under the authority of Section 212(d)(
5) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
In order that the intelligence benefits to be derived from such
entries 
not be outweighed by the 
dangers, if any, to the internal security
of the United States by the presence of 
such aliens, the Central Intelligence
Agency agrees that it will take all necessary 
steps to establish the bona
fidos of each prospective entrant 
prior to submittal to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. It further agrees: (
a) That this method of entry
will only be utilized where it is strictly 
in the national interest; (b) That
each request will be accompanied by a summary 
of pertinent background and blo-
graphical data with particular emphasis on 
aspects bearing on internal
security and admissibility under the 
immigration laws, as well as the results
of a current check of the FBI file; and (c) That 
the place, time and manner
of arrival will be coordinated with the Service 
in advance thereof.
Fach alien whose entry is authorized by the Commissioner under the
foregoing 
procedure will be paroled for 
such period of time as may be agreed
on by the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the Service, in no instance to
exceed one year. Further extensions of 
parole, similarly limited, may be
authorized thereafter on a written statement of 
need, which include the
results of a current security check
.
Upon arrival each alien will execute an agreement acknowledging
parole 
status in a form satisfactory to 
the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Service.
After parole of such allons, the Central Intelligence Agency will
assume 
responsibility for care, 
supervision and control of a kind and agree
it believes consistent with the internal security 
needs of the United States
during continuance of their parole.status
.
whose physical 
custody is not to be maintained or is to be terminated, the
Further, in the case of any alien
Central Intelligence Agency will arrange 
for presentation of each alien for
registration pursuant to law at a time and 
place satisfactory to the Service.
SECRET
14-00000
SE-CR
LAHIRIT 2
Upon completion of their intelligence or operational purposes in
the United States, or if internal security reasons so require, these allens
will be removed therefrom through the arrangements and at the expense of
the Central Intelligence Agency, except in those cases in which other dis-
position is made of a nature satisfactory to the Service. Also, the Central
Intelligence Agency will inform the Service sufficiently in advance of each
proposed departure as to permit verification thereof if the Service so olects.
In accordance with past practice, the Servico will apprise the FBI of
the entry and departure or other disposition of these alions.
The Service will maintain separate and secure files under this
agreement.
- 2 -
-
5/5
Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General
.5/5
Allen W. Dilles
Director of Central Intelligence
(Feb 10 1955)
SEC.R-E-T
14-00000
1
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
☐
1.. .RNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT (Optional)
FROM
☐ CONF.NTIAL
☐ SECKET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Alleged Illegal Activities
(Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security
EXTENSION NO
6777
DATE
27 JUN 1975
TO: (for designation, room number, and
buildingj
1.
DDA
2.
3.
4.
Inspector General
Att:
Mr. Ainslie
S.
Dr. Chamberlain
SUB
6.
2422:448
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-32
CATE
OFFICERS
INITIALS
RECEIVED
KANARURD
30 JUN 1875
n
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column offer each comment.)
3-5: Attached was prepared in
response to an 18 June
request from Jerry Brown.
Per 23 Jun, MfR by Walt
Elder, source of the story
is a deposition by Mr. Helms
Thi
befive possi
11
2007
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
☐ CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
14-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRET
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Inspector General
المقتناة
17 JUN 1975
ATTENTION
:
Mr. Neil Ainslic
VIA
SUBJECT
:
Alleged Illegal Activities
: Deputy Director for Administration
(Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse
of Defector)
1. Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request
for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to
provide 
information pertinent to a case mentioned on page
170 of the Report 
to the President by the Commission on CIA
activities 
within the United States.
2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission
Report 
is 
quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector
was physically 
abused, although not seriously injured. The
Director 
of Central Intelligence discharged the employee in-
volved."
3. A search of Office of Security file resources has
reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector
was physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency
employee was 
later terminated by the DCI. It is not known
whether the following case is identical to the referenced
case 
on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts
appear to be quite similar.
4. Information developed by this Office of possible in-
terest 
to the 
Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats,
an ex-CIA employee
, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.
S. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a
naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by
CIA 
in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961. The
file information 
reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found
guilty of 
mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry Board
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 011018
14-00000
SECRET
in Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was Eduard
Oun, an Estonian 
who defected from Estonia through Sweden
in 1955.
6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of
Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges
of physical abuse included the striking of Oun with the fist;
application of turpentine and ointments to various parts of
the body, the scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forc-.
ing 
Oun to stand in the nude as long as eight days during
interrogations with only very brief rest periods.
7. Torpats was returned to Headquarters and was brought
before an Employment Review Board for consideration of separa-
tion 
from the Agency. The Board's recommendations initially
were that Torpats be "
transferred to an area outside the
Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a
later recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14
to GS-13. Torpats later received unsatisfactory fitness re-
ports and engaged in various "in house" battles with Agency
officials concerning his employment.
8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the
authority granted the DCI under Section 102(C) of the National
Security Act of 1947, as ammended, effective 30 January 1961.
Later in 1961, Torpats filed suit against the DCI contesting
his dismissal, and the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment
against Torpats. Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling
that Torpats' termination was legal.
9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained
little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956.
It was not clear 
from file information whether Oun entered the
United States after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent
document contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September
1956 and noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and
found qualified for Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S.
under Public 
Law 203.
2
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained
only 
fragmentary information 
in regard to certain areas of the
Torpats' case. File 
review indicated, however, the DDO, OGC
and the Inspector General's 
office will probably have addition-
al information concerning 
this matter.
3
SECRET
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security
14-00000
SECRET
6724
L75-2644 192
Review Staff:
23 June 1975
75/1008
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Rockefeller Commission Contact
Mason Cargill told me today that the reference
in the Commission report to an employee who was fired
because he abused a defector came from a deposition by
Dick Helms: Helms 
could not remember an exact name,
but 
from the description which he gave on his deposition,
it is clear 
that the employee who was fired was John
Torpats. He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.
Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working
in the Defector Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany.
In the course of interrogating another Lithuanian
defector, Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired,
he 
sued the Director (then McCone). He lost the case.
Wast Elder
Walter Elder
сс
сс
-
1 1 1
-
DCI
IG
OGC
SECRET
CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET
'

14-00000
SECRET
Review Staff: /5/880
Ma kijan
INEDICTOR CINEM
75-2776
18 June 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Inspector General
SUBJECT
:
Request For Information
The Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170)
says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a de-
fector. Can you uncover the details on this in-
cident? Is it the only such domestic incident
known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no
knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the
Commission on the reported incident or of any
others. He suggests checking Office of Security)
BB
B. Brown
cc: DDO
John Waller
Fit.C Flordivasion SEIDDO
Dist
Staff3 cice
SECRET
:
:
14-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Garrison
SUBJECT
30 January 1975
: Information on Detention of Defector.
1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents
bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the
considerations at the time such decisions were made and
reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record.
staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the
later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to
move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release
him.
2. The assumption is that following the initial decision
this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that
those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the
Agency.
Original Addressee
1/- SDB Chrono
1- Judy for QA files
7s/ S. D. Breslaridge
S. D. Breckinridge