Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025
The Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter of
July 14, 1975, to K. William O'Connor, Esq., requested
a response to Item #3.
Item #3 is set forth as follows:
"All memoranda and any other materials which
relate to or reflect discussions about the Ku Klux Klan
at the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958, and
all memoranda and any other materials which relate to or
reflect recommendations, proposals, and decisions made
either prior to or following said conference."
A diligent, extensive, exhaustive search was
conducted in an effort to obtain a copy of the minutes
of the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958.
However, this search disclosed no memorandum reflecting
an Executive Conference being held on October 1, 1958.
Executive Conference memoranda for the year 1958 were
reviewed. This review did not disclose any memorandum
which related to discussions about the Ku Klux Klan.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 1
The Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter of
July 14, 1975, to K. William O'Connor, Esq., requested
a response to Item #3.
Item #3 is set forth as follows:
"All memoranda and any other materials which
relate to or reflect discussions about the Ku Klux Klan
at the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958, and
all memoranda and any other materials which relate to or
reflect recommendations, proposals, and decisions made
either prior to or following said conference.'
"
A diligent, extensive, exhaustive search was
conducted in an effort to obtain a copy of the minutes
of the Executive Conference held on October 1, 1958.
However, this search disclosed no memorandum reflecting
an Executive Conference being held on October 1, 1958.
Executive Conference memoranda for the year 1958 were
reviewed. This review did not disclose any memorandum
which related to discussions about the Ku Klux Klan.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 2
UNITED STATES GOV NMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
FROM:
DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, JACKSONVILLE
SUBJECT:
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE-PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DATE: 9/23/64
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
(TWO-WAY RADIO UNITS) .
ReBulet 9/15/64.
The Jacksonville Office has carefully noted the
obvious intent of reBulet and agrees that there is a real
strong possibility for taking some counter-intelligence
action against the Klan through this medium.
'was re-contacted and he stated at the
present time there is no additional information concerning
the use of two-way radios nor has the local Klan in Jackson-
ville formulated any code. This would indicate that at the
present time, while a number of local Klansmen have radios,
there is no opportunity to introduce deceptive transmissions
as the Klan has no "missions" on the planning board. The
above informant has reported that it is anticipated addi-
tional Klansmen will purchase more two-way radio equipment
which would be indicative of an expansion in plans of the
Klan to use this method of communication. To date there has
been no operation of the Klan where two-way radio communica-
tions have played an integral part.
This office through its informants, particularly
will remain alert and will promptly advise the
Bureau whenever information is received indicating the Klan
has a sizeable "mission" in the planning stages wherein
radios will play an important part. Depending upon the
purpose of the "mission" plans could be formulated for some
deceptive attacks on the Klan itself.
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Sta
NITED STATES GOT NMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR, FBI
SẮC, LCKSONVILS
SUBJECT:
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE-PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DATE: 9/23/64
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
(TWO-WAY RADIO UNITS)
ReBulet 9/15/64.
The Jacksonville Office has carefully noted the
obvious intent of reBulet and agrees that there is a real
strong possibility for taking some counter-intelligence
action agzinst the Klan through this medium.
JK-143 B was re-contacted and he stated at the
present time there is no additional information concerning
the use of two-way radios nor has the local Klan in Jackson-
ville formulated any code. This would indicate that at the
present time, while a number of local Klansmen have radios,
there is no opportunity to introduce deceptive transmissions
as the Klan has no "missions" on the planning board. The
above informant has reported that it is anticipated addi-
tional Klansmen will purchase more two-way radio equipment
which would be indicative of an expansion in plans of the
Klan to use this method of communication. To date there has
been no operation of the Klan where two-way radio communica-
tions have played an integral part.
This office through its informants, particularly
JI 143-5, will remain alert and will promptly advise the
Bureau whenever information is received indicating the Klan
has a sizeable "mission" in the planning stages wherein
radios will play an important part. Depending upon the
purpose of the "mission" plans could be formulated for some
deceptive attacks on the Klan itself.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 4
UNITED STATES GOVE MENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM SAC, JACKSON
SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM,
INTERNAL SECURITY,
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE:
10-15-64
Re Bureau letter to Atlanta dated 9-2-64.
To implement a counterintelligence program as
outlined in referenced letter, this office has been and will
continue to penetrate klan and hate organizations with
continued informant coverage. This is the first step to learn
the complete organizational structure, members, their activities,
sympathizers and followers, action they plan, including actions
of violence and distruction of property.
Once their activities, etc., are determined through
informant coverage proper action can be taken to disrupt and
neutralize their activities and efforts can be directed to
frustrate their plans. In addition, those specifically
responsible for unlawful actions are determined through informant.
coverage.
Informant coverage will be specifically concentrated
on the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan since this is the
largest and most important of the klan groups in Mississippi.
Other pertinent organizations considered for counterintelligence
action are:
Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
United Klans of America, Inc.,
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
Americans for the Preservation of the White Race.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 5
The pertinent individuals to first consider are the
state officers of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
are:
:
They
SAMUEL BOWERS, Laurel, Mississippi, Imperial Wizard
JULIUS HARPER, Crystal Springs, Mississippi, Grand
Dragon
=
BILLY BUCKLES, Roxie, Mississippi, Grand Giant.
AC HARRINGTON,. Ruth, Mississippi, State Organizer
ERNEST GILBERT, Brookhaven, Mississippi, Chief of
the Klans' Bureau of Investigation (KBI).
PAUL FOSTER, Natchez, Mississippi, State Chaplain
ACE WEATHERS, Hattiesburg, Mississippi, Contact
Leader for the County and Secretary
Informant coverage will be supplemented by technical
installations where practical. Specifically, it has been
learned through an informant that a klan group holds meetings
in a building especially built for this purpose in Copiah
County. These meetings are held on a weekly basis. The
building is in a rural area several miles from the nearest town
and has access by only one road. During meetings guards are
placed at strategic points outside the building to insure
complete privacy. An appropriate survey is being made to
determine the feasibility of a technical installation in this
building. The Bureau will be advised by separate communication
regarding this. Other logical points are being determined for
this type of coverage.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTION
1. Liaison is established with the governor's office
to bring pressure to bear on local officials, such as mayors,
chiefs of police, sheriffs, etc., to solve recent bombings,
church burnings, and other acts of violence.
-NW-88608-Docid:32989629_Page_6_
2
1
EXAMPLE:
Jackson teletype to the Bureau dated 10-11-06
captioned UNSUBS; EXPLOSION ON LAWN OF RESIDENCE OF MAZER-
JOHN NOSSER NATCHEZ, MISSISSIPPI, 9-25-64, stated that an
Investigator of the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol (MHSP)
advised he was instructed by Governor-PAUL BJOHNSON to
inform Adams-County Sheriff ODELL ANDERS that the governor
was seriously considering sending the National Guard into
Adams County to close down all gambling and liquor activity
in the county.
Sheriff ANDERS advised he is in the process
of contacting all gambling and liquor establishments in Adams
County to inform operators that if pertinent information regarding
Natchez bombings are not in his possession by October 15 he
will close all such establishments on October 16..
The Jackson Office will, in each instant that presents
itself in other localities and counties, arrange for similar
action and follow through on each.
2. Repeated contacts and constant interviews of
known and suspected klan members are being conducted each
Saturday. This has been done since July, 1964, and is being
continued. This has a three fold purpose. It lets the klansmen
know the FBI is interested and will be around. It also enables
FBI to know their whereabouts on that day, become better
acquainted with their habits and gain more background information
regarding the person being interviewed. In several instances
during such interviews it has been possible to convert certain
klansmen into informants. During interviews of klansmen who
are completely unco-operative and who want to know how we got
their name and why they are being interviewed we can flip
through the cards and pick out a name of another klansman
is completely unco-operative. This is a disruptive tactic
which can breed suspicion among themselves.
who
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 7
3
30
Consideration is being gien to invite the State
Police to make raids at known klan meetings. the local
of course, will not be invited to participice since chly wi
most likely in on the klan meetings. MHSP Investigators at
McComb have indicated they seemed interested in this sort of
thing and it is believed this will have the backing of the
governor since he has indicated such to them. This type of
thing, of course, will be used at places where technical
installations are not feasible or productive.
This
4. Will participate with the governor in press
releases on the arrests of klansmen when appropriate.
has been done in the recent arrests in McComb, Mississippi,
in connection with recent bombings in that area.
5. Information has been developed through an informant
that a faction of the klan is interested in putting another
man in office rather than the present person. More information
is being obtained on this so as to exploit all possibilities.
and create dissention among the leaders, and by doing so the
opportunity may present itself to have the informant put in a
high office.
The above is some of the potential counterintelligence
action contemplated by this office. It is being studied on a
day to day basis. The Bureau will be furnished with complete
details on all the above plans as the opportunities are made.
and present themselves, prior to any specific action being
taken by this office.
ACTION GROUPS
Recent actions of violence in McComb, Mississippi,
were for the most part believed to be carried out by an "action
group". As a result of an intensive investigation and informant
coverage, 11 men were arrested. One had a membership card in
the Ku Klux Klan and another a card for membership in the
"Americans for the Preservation of the White Race". Some
4
NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 8
acts of violence such as bombings are, according to
planned with great secrecy by small groups who us
determine which ones do the job. Often cal
others not officially under klan orders, pretend to represent
the klan as a cover for acts of violence.
.3,
Recommendations for specific counterintelligence
action will be submitted by separate communications and the
status letter required will be submitted beginning 1-1-65.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 9
5
Memorandum
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR, FBI
FR༥:
SAC, CHARLOTTE
SUBJECT:
COUNTERI
TERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE:
10/12/64
ReBulet 9/2/64 to Atlanta and other offices.
It is noted this letter lists as one of the target organizations“,
as No. 7 on page 2, the Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn, S. C.-
Since this organization is no longer active or in existence, it
is suggested it be deleted from this list.
---
Since the major organization in Charlotte Division
is the United Klans of America, Inc., of which Birmingham is
origin, a copy of this letter is being designated to Birmingham
for information.
The following represents the consensus of Charlotte
Agents familiar with Klan activity:
1. Disruptive activity should not be undertaken at
a particular Klavern; as a general rule, unless there is
. sufficient well established informant coverage to be able to
tell the effect of the action when instituted. Such action
[would probably serve to "tighten up" the organization and make
it more difficult to get an informant in thereafter,
2. It is considered doubtful that newspaper publicity,
of only a generally unfavorable nature against the Klan organi-
zation, is effective in reducing new applicants or causing any
large number of present members to drop out. The "Charlotte
Observer, which has wide distribution throughout North and
South Carolina, published in August and September, 1964, a series
of articles, copies of which were sent the Bureau by Charlotte
letter of 9/15/64. These arcles ridiculed the United Klans
33
NW 88608 Docid:32989629-Page-10-

of America, Inc., in North Carolina, and published both photos
and names of a number of members. So far as has been learned
from informants, this had very little adverse effect upon the
organization. It was alleged that two to five members were
discharged from their jobs, or warned about continuing member-
ship, but the identities of these alleged persons is not known,
North Carolina Grand Dragon JAMES R.ONES has stated, both
publicly and privately to informants, that this publicity was
very valuable to the growth of the organization. One informant
reported that the day after the articles published his name as
a local leader, three persons contacted him and applied for
membership, stating they had not previously known whom to contact.
It is considered that pubricity¨ of this type generally
deters from joining only those persons who would not be
interested in joining in the first place. It is believed that
a large proportion of those persons who are potential members
are seeking status and recognition, and publicity is no deterrent
to them; it makes them feel important and members of an important
group,
The major apparent effect of the series of newspaper
articles referred to has been a tightening up of security, and
refusal of leaders to allow newspaper photos of individual
Klansmen to be taken at public rallies.
3. Disruptive activity, wherever possible, should be of
a nature which does not expose the fact that the Bureau, or the
"Federal Government", is behind the activity. It is believed
that open action, to a large extent, can backfire and create
resentment and sympathy. It must be remembered that Klan
membership, in many sections, does not by any means carry the
odium that alleged Communist membership or sympathy does in
almost any section of society.
4.
Along this same line, there is probably no point in
trying disruptive activity, at least not at this stage, on a
local Klan group which is small, inactive, and peaceful. Any
such activity which is not completely discreet and concealed
would likely have the effect of stirring it up.
5. By letter of 9/26/64, Charlotte furnished the Bureau
a sample of a lapel pin which was adopted at the Imperial
2.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 11
Klonvocation of United Klans of America at Birmingham on
9/5-6/64. This is to be sold to members for $2 each and
there is apparently considerable demand for it. Since it is
not apparent to the unitiated that it has anything to do
with "the Klan," it is expected that members will wear it.
openly as a secret recognition signal. If it does become
widely adopted and worn, consideration should then be given to
giving widespread publicity to the fact of what it represents.
This should have the result of discouraging some persons who
do not want their Klan membership publicly known.
6. It is considered that possibly the most effective
way of discouraging membership, or causing existing members
to withdraw, is to establish that someone in the organization
is getting rich off it, or embezzling the proceeds, Charlotte
is endeavoring to develop information along these lines, but
nothing specific has yet been developed.
7 The following are suggested tactics that appear
useful on a selected basis against individual Klansmen,
particularly those whose employers might object to their Klan
membership:
a. Anonymous letter or phone call to the employer
telling of the Klan membership.
b. Enter on behalf of the member a subscription to
the "Fiery Cross," United Klans of America publication, and have
it mailed to his employment.
C.
When a particular member is away from home at a
Klavern meeting, have a female phone his home and indicate he
was to meet her and is late. This might have the effect of
making it difficult for him to get away from home at night
thereafter. This should be limited to particular individuals
who are considered potential ones to stir up trouble in a Klavern.
3,
NW-88608 Decld:32989629 Page 12
!
-
.8.
ROBERT-ECHOLS-SCOGGINS, Aka., Charlotte file 105-991,om
Bureau file 157-1530, is South-Carolina Grand Dragon-of United
Klans of America. Charlotte reports by SA JOHN-ALDEN-MUNN,
1/31/64 and 3/27/64, show that he is receiving over $300 per
month from the Veterans Administration as a 100 per cent.
disabled veteran. At the same time he operates a plumbing
business and is active in United Klans of America, making
public speeches, etc. Charlotte furnished extra copies of
those reports to the Bureau, with the suggestion furnishing
them to VA be considered.
It is suggested consideration be given to asking the
VA to re-evaluate his disability rating, in view of his employment
and activities. It is believed this should be done on a SCG
level, to reduce the possibility of-SCOGGINS learning that such.
a suggestion came from the FBI.
9. "Action Groups." No particular such groups, given
to violence, are known within Klan organizations in Charlotte
territory. As the Bureau is aware, United Klans of America has
instituted what it calls "Security Guards," who wear military
type uniforms and have military ranks. These function at
public rallies for the purpose of keeping order, watching for
"spies," etc. It is expected that if violence is undertaken,
these will probably be the ones to do it, but no such under-
takings have been learned.
Specific individual recommendations for counter-
intelligence action will be submitted by subsequent letters as
developed.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 13
4.
ROM
SUBJECT:
MAY 1
CO
GA GIN REG NO 21
UNITED STATES ĠOVERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, LITTLE ROCK
DATE: 10/13/64
COINTELPRO
ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Offices, 9/2/54:
Set out below are an analysis and recommendations
under captioned program,
NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)
The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive
in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the excep-.
tion of placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for
President and Vice President of the United States, It is
not recommended that any action be taken against this group
at this time.
ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN
(AAK)
The AAK in Arkansas is made up of three klaverns
located at Little Rock, Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and
it has no affiliation with any national klan group. There
are no "action" groups within any of these three klaverns.
The three klaverns do not own or lease any property for
meeting places. The four Little Rock members usually
meet in the home of a member. The Texarkana Klavern has
not held any klavern meetings as such in several months,
The Pine Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to
business places of klavern members.
State meetings are held at irregular intervals
on an average of about once per month or less. There is
no regular meeting place for the state meetings, which are
held in various Arkansas towns including towns in which
there are no klaverns. The state meetings are attended
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 14
by from one to five members of each of the three
klaverns and are well covered by informants, The State
Grand-Dragon-BILL-WILLIAMS has continually cautioned
members against violence and any type of illegal activitios,
None of the klaverns have engaged in violence.
1. LITTLE ROCK KLAVERN
Of the four members who attend weekly meetings
JOE JV/VERTER, who is considered the
head of this small group, draws a pension from the Federal
Government and, according to informants, is afraid to
engage in any illegal activity or to let his name be used
in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension.
The two informants maintain the full confidence of the
other two members. In recent months the klavern ran a
series of small ads in a Little Rock daily newspaper in
an effort to renew interest and gain new members. The
klavern received a number of responses, but no action
whatsoever has been taken by the klavern to take in any
new members. The klavern has no organized activity other
than the weekly meetings described by informants as
being "bull sessions" with the principal topic being.
politics.
No recommendation for counterintelligence is
being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern.
20
TEXARKANA KLAVERN
:
This klavern has not held any klavern meetings
as such in several months, and it appears that the
principal reason for the lack of meetings ws the inter-
view of members and leaders concerning the assassination
of President KENNEDY. Klavern representatives regularly.
attend state meetings, one reason being that State Grand-
Dragon BILL WILLIAMS, who officiates at state meetings,·
is a member of the Texarkana Klavern. Of the five or
· six members who from time to time attend state meetings,
two are informants. On 10/1/64 advised that the
Grand Dragon had stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern
members will meet with the Bivins Kildare, Texas,
Klavern of the AAK.
-
NW 88608 Docid:32989629-Page-15-
-2-
Grand Dragon WILLIAMS, according to informants,
is active in politics in Bowie County, Texas, is a former
member of the Board of Regents of Texarkana Junior College,
Texarkana foxas, and in recent months has been dubbated
for election to the Board of Regents of that college and
defeated as a candidate for the City Council of Texarkana,
.Texas. He cannot afford to become involved in any illegal
activities because of his activities in legitimate enter-
prises. He has continually cautioned Texarkana Klavern
members as well as members of other klaverns attending
state meetings against any violence and/or illegal
activities.
No recommendation is being made for counterintel-
ligence against the Texarkana Klavern except as it is
effected by a recommendation set out hereafter under the
Pine Bluff Klavern.
3. PINE BLUFF KLAVERN
The Pine Bluff Klavern has a membership of approxi-
mately twenty to twenty-five. It meets once a week in
different business locations of its members, and average
weekly attendance is twelve. Among the twelve, one. or
two informants meet with them and furnish full coverage
of their activities.
The klavern's main activity has been to dis-
courage integration by legal means and to get members
elected to school board positions. The klavern collected
the funds and donated the money for the campaign expense
of two of its members who ran for a position on the Pine
Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board. These
two members made a miserable showing and were defeated.
The klavern was behind and organized the National
Patriots League (NPL) to further its non-integration
program publicly. The Exalted (Cyclops, or president, of
the Klavern is chairman of the NPL. The NPL actually is
a front organization for the klavern. The main activity
of the NPL was to organize a private country club, which
is known as the Butran Country Club. The purpose of the
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 16
-3-
.
club was to build a swimming pool for white only.
construction of the pool itself was comploted but not
sufficiently to place it in use this sorbok Hom
in Butram Country Club is $25. The majority of the
members are not aware of the fact that the klavern was
behind its organization. Membership in the Butram Country
Club was easily obtained as the public pool for whites
and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the
summer of 1964 when Negroes attempted to integrate the
white pool. This left no public pool open in Pine Bluff.
Bvice president of the klavern, donated the
land for the Butram Country Club; as he owns land sur-
rounding the club, he will benefit financially from the
sale of this land for building lots. The NPL has also
distributed a limited number of leaflets publicly dis-
couraging people from patronizing certain restaurants and
businesses which had hired or served Negroes,
Members of the klavern were responsible for
forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and
a klavern member is leader of this chapter. Approximately
eight to ten people attend the monthly meetings of the
John Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who attend,
all are klavern members with the exception of one man.
Members of the klavern completely control and dominate
the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. They,
however, only conduct John Birch Society business. Like-
wise, the members of the klavern further the John Birch
Society program through the klavern.
Members of the klavern are working individually
in politics for the re-election of Governor. ORVAL-E.
FAUBUS and for the election of BARRY-GOLDWATER:
The klavern has not advocated any violence but
on occasion has cautioned its members against violence.
As an example, klavern members were cautioned to stay.
away from Ray's Truck Stop, a location which Negroes were
attempting to integrate, in the spring of 1964 so that
no violence would occur.
Members of the klavern recently distributed a
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new members and
"NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-17-
stating requests for applications be directed to P. O.
Box 1182, Pine Blufí. In this leaflet it was pointed
out that the KKK was striving for a lawful settlement
of the difficulties brought on by the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAAC) and
that it is opposed to violence. This leaflet further set
forth that this was a chartered, legalized movement and
it is no more illegal to be a member of it than to be a.
member of other organizations.
At various times in the past the klavern has
attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern,
but of each occasion the project has died from lack of
interest.
In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of
information, the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff
Klavern have been disseminated confidentially to Chief
of Police KORMAN.D. YOUNG, Pine Bluff, (NA) on a regular
basis. Chief. YOUNG-has exerted every effort to keep down
the possibility of violence. Through his confidential
sources he is also well aware of the identities of the
klavern members and their activities. He personally
has warned particulr klavern members against any violence
and has stated they will be met with immediate arrest
if any violence occurs. As an example, Chief-YOUNG¨was
advised through his own confidential source of the time
and location of the klavern meeting on the night of
October 5, 1964. Chief Versent a lieutenant of his
department in uniform to check the location, record
license numbers, and to be seen checking the meeting so
that the klavern members would know that he was checking
on them. This has had a strong influence on making the
klavern follow a line of legal activity. It has also
resulted in the more responsible leading citizens of the
community being made aware of certain klavern members,
causing these klavern members to be discredited in the
eyes of the public, This was borne out in the recent
school board election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members,
one of whom is J.; F; BUTRAM, were miserably defeated.
The klavern has during the past few months
urgod its members to solicit and obtain new members.
The ineffectiveness of their program is shown by the
NW 88608 Docld:32989629-Page 18-
-5-
fact that only one new member was initiated,
member is a non-organizational indomamx el olv
Rock Division. Likewise, as a result of the IX leaf
lets distributed encouraging people to write for appli-
cations they have received only two letters; and neither
of the writers have become a member. The leaflet has
met with complete failure in its effort to build up its
membership.
At this time the following are the only specific
counterintelligence action being recommended:
1. An anonymous letter be mailed to the National
Office of John Birch Society, Belmont, Massachusetts,
pointing out that the KKK is in full control of the John .
Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. In this letter
specifically mention the name of one or two of the more
leading klan members who are also leading the John Birch
Society in Pine Bluff.
20
¨an anonymous letter be mailed to CHARLES-D:
CUTHBERTSON, Exalted Cyclops of the Pine Bluff Klavern,
and a copy mailed to BILL WILLIAMS, State-Grand Dragon,
with the letters to be mailed to the Post Office Box in
Pine Bluff and in Texarkana, Arkansas, of the AAK. The
letter should be a complaining letter from a member who
was active in the past and who recently found one of the
KKK leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged
membership. The letter would let them know why he has
not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out
because of such leadership as J-EX BUTRAM, who has used
the klan for personal gain as BUTAhad a residence on
his property remodeled at klavern expense and then made
the klavern stop holding meetings there; that BUTRAM
has now donated land for the Butram Country Club so that
he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at
an
exorbitant price. The letter should also set forth
the fact he heard BUTRAM was discharged from the Army
for mental deficiency (moron). This letter should be
mailed from Little Rock.
Interviews of klan members and leaders in the
past (for example, at the time of the assassination of
President KENNEDY and on particular bombing matter cases)
-6-
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 19
have had deterring effect on the klan.
For example,
the Texarkana Klavern has not held a klavern meeting
as such since that time. One Little Rock member has
dropped out as a result of being intorviswod; and,
according to an informant, this member is a "changed
man, " meaning that he is not as radical as previously.
In interviews with members of the Pine Bluff Klavern,
agents have not met with any hostility and have been
treated cordially and with respect. Individual members
during these interviews have indicated they are opposed .
to violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner.
A number of the members have said that through political
pressure and voting are the only ways any change can
be made. However, they have stated they are still avid
segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any
manner.
When and if it appears that interest may be
renewing in the AAK in Arkansas, consideration will be
given to another interview program. It is noted, that
particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic
basis in regard to leads from surrounding field offices
on bombing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to
deter any violent activity on the part of klavern members.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 20
-7-
Live

FROM
SUBJECT:
MAY
IMAGEN B
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, ЗВІ
SAC, LITTLE ROCK
'
COINTELPRO
DATE: 10/13/64
:
ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Offices, 9/2/64.
Set out below are an analysis and recommendations..
under captioned program.
NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP).
The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive
in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the excep-
tion of placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for
President and Vice President of the United States. It is
not recommended that any action be taken against this group
at this time.
ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN
(AAK)
The AAK in Arkansas is made up of three klaverns
located at Little Rock, Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and
it has no affiliation with any national klan group. There
are no "action" groups within any of these three klaverns.
The three klaverns do not own or lease any property for
meeting places. The four Little Rock members usually
meet in the home of a member. The Texarkana Klavern has
not held any klavern meetings as such in several months.
The Pine Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to
business places of klavern members.
State meetings are held at irregular intervals
on an average of about once per month or less. There is
no regular meeting place for the state meetings, which are.
held in various Arkansas towns including towns in which
there are no klaverns. The state meetings are attended
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 21
:
by from one to five members of each of the three
klaverns and are well covered by informants. The State
Grand-Dragon BILL WILLIAMS has continually cautioned
members against violence and any type of illegal activities.
None of the klaverns have engaged in violence.
1. LITTLE ROCK KLAVERN
. Of the four members who attend weekly meetings
two are informants. JOBFERMER, who is considered the
head of this small-group, draws a pension from the Foderal
Government and, according to informants, is afraid to
engage in any illegal activity or to let his name be used
in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension.
The two informants maintain the full confidence of the
other two members. In recent months the klavern ran a
series of small ads in a Little Rock daily newspaper in
an effort to renew interest and gain new members. The
klavern received a number of responses, but no action
whatsoever has been taken by the klavern to take in any
new members. The klavern has no organized activity other
than the weekly meetings described by informants as
being "bull sessions" with the principal topić being.
politics.
No recommendation for counterintelligence is
being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern.
2. TEXARKANA KLAVERN
This klavern has not held any klavern meetings
as such in several months, and it appears that the
principal reason for the lack of meetings ws the inter-
view of members and leaders concerning the assassination
of President KENNEDY, Klavern representatives regularly.
attend state meetings, one reason being that State Grands
Dragon BILL WILLIAMS, who officiates at state meetings,
is a member of the Texarkana Klavern. Of the five or
six members who from time to time attend state meetings,
two are informants. On 10/1/64 LR 577 advised that the
Grand Dragon had stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern
members will meet with the Bivins Kildare, Texas,
Klavern of the AAK.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-22-
-2-
Grand Dragon WILLIAMS, according to informants,
is active in politics in Bowie County, Texas, is a former
member of the Board of Regents of Texarkana Junior College,
Texarkana, Texas, and in recent months has boon
for election to the Board of Regents of that college and
defeated as a candidate for the City Council of Texarkana,
Texas. He cannot afford to become involved in any illegal
activities because of his activities in legitimate enter-
prises. He has continually cautioned Texarkana Klavern
members as well as members of other klaverns attending
state meetings against any violence and/or illegal
activities.
No recommendation is being made for counterintel-
ligence against the Texarkana Klavern except as it is
effected by a recommendation set out hereafter under the
Pine Bluff Klavern.
3° PINE BLUFF KLAVERN
The Pine Bluff Klavern has a membership of approxi-
mately twenty to twenty-five. It meets once a week in
different business locations of its members, and average
weekly attendance is twelve. Among the twelve, one, or
two informants meet with them and furnish full coverage
of their activities.
The klavern's main activity has been to dis-
courage integration by legal means and to get members
elected to school board positions. The klavern collected
the funds and donated the money for the campaign expense
of two of its members who ran for a position on the Pine
Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board. These
two members made a miserable showing and were defeated.
>
The klavern was behind and organized the National
Patriots League (NPL) to further its non-integration
program publicly. The Exalted Cyclops, or president, of
the Klavern is chairman of the NPL. The NPL actually is
a front organization for the klavern. The main activity
of the NPL was to organize a private country club, which
is known as the Butram Country Club. The purpose of the
•
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 23
-3-
1
club was to build a swimming pool for white only,
construction of the pool itself was complotod but not
sufficiently to place it in use this scoon, Mont
in Butram Country Club is $25, The majority of the
members are not aware of the fact that the klavern was
behind its organization. Membership in the Butram Country
Club was easily obtained as the public pool for whites
and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the
summer of 1964 when Negroes attempted to integrate the.
white pool. This left no public pool open in Pine Bluff,
SP BR, vice president of the klavern, donated the
land for the Butram Country Club; as he owns land sur-
rounding the club, he will benefit financially from the
sale of this land for building lots. The NPL has also
distributed a limited number of leaflets publicly dis-
couraging people from patronizing certain restaurants and
businesses which had hired or served Negroes.
Members of the klavern were responsible for
forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and
a klavern member is leader of this chapter. Approximately
eight to ten people attend the monthly meetings of the
John Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who attend,
all are klavern members with the exception of one man.
Members of the klavern completely control and dominate
the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff.
however, only conduct John Birch Society business.
wise, the members of the klavern further the John Birch
Society program through the klavern.
They,
Like-
Members of the klavern are working individually
in politics for the re-election of Governor- ORVALE.
FAUBUS and for the election of BARRY GOLDWATER:
The klavern has not advocated any violence but
on occasion has cautioned its members against violence.
As an example, klavern members were cautioned to stay.
away from Ray's Truck Stop, a location which Negroes were
attempting to integrate, in the spring of 1964 so that
no violence would occur.
Members of the klavern recently distributed a
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new members and
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-24-
__
stating requests for applications be directed to P. O.
Box 1182, Pine Bluff. In this leaflet it was pointed
out that the KKK was striving for a lawful settlement
of the difficulties brought on by the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAAC) and
that it is opposed to violence, This leaflet further set
forth that this was a chartered, legalized movement and
it is no more, illegal to be a member of it than to be a
member of other organizations.
At various times in the past the klavern has
attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern,
but on each occasion the project has died from lack of
interest.
In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of
information, the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff
Klavern have been disseminated confidentially to Chief
of Police NORMAN.D. YOUNG, Pine Bluff, (NA) on a regular
basis. Chief: YOUNG-has exerted every effort to keep down
the possibility of violence. Through his confidential
sources he is also well aware of the identities of the
klavern members and their activities. He personally
has warned particula klavern members against any violence
and has stated they will be met with immediate arrest
if any violence occurs. As an example, Chief-YOUNG was
advised through his own confidential source of the time
and location of the klavern meeting on the night of
October 5, 1964. Chief YOUNG sent a lieutenant of his
department in uniform to check the location, record
license numbers, and to be seen checking the meeting so
that the klavern members would know that he was checking
on them. This has had a strong influence on making the
klavern follow a line of legal activity. It has also
resulted in the more responsible leading citizens of the
community being made aware of certain klavern members,
causing these klavern members to be discredited in the
eyes of the public. This was borne out in the recent
school board election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members,
one of whom is JF BUTRAM, were miserably defeated.
The klavern has during the past few months
urged its members to solicit and obtain new members.
The ineffectiveness of their program is shown by the
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-25-
-5-
fact that only one new member was initiated,
member is a non-organizational indown a l
Rock Division, Likewise, as a result of the IK leaï-
lets distributed encouraging people to write for appli-
cations they have received only two letters; and neither
of the writers have become a member. The leaflet has
met with complete failure in its effort to build up its
membership.
At this time the following are the only specific
counterintelligence action being recommended:
1. An anonymous letter be mailed to the National
Office of John Birch Society, Belmont, Massachusetts,
pointing out that the KKK is in full control of the John
Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. In this letter
specifically mention the name of one or two of the more
leading klan members who are also leading the John Birch.
Society in Pine Bluff,
-
:
2. An anonymous letter be mailed to CHARLES D
CUTHBERTSON, Exarted Syclops of the Pine Bluff Klavern,
and a copy mailed to BILL WILLIAMS, State Grand- Dragon;
with the letters to be mailed to the Post Office Box in
Pine Bluff and in Texarkana, Arkansas, of the AAK. The
letter should be a complaining letter from a member who
was active in the past and who recently found one of the
KKK leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged
membership. The letter would let them know why he has
not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out
because of such leadership as J ER BUTRAM, who has used
the klan for personal gain as Bhad a residence on
his property remodeled at klavern expense and then made.
the klavern stop holding meetings there%3B that BUTRAM
has now donated land for the Butram Country Club so that
he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at
an
exorbitant price. The letter should also set forth
the fact he heard BUTRA was discharged from the Army
for mental deficiency (moron). This letter should be
mailed from Little Rock.
Interviews of klan members and leaders in the
past (for example, at the time of the assassination of
President KENNEDY and on particular bombing matter cases)
-5-
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 26
have had deterring effect on the klan. For example,
the Texarkana Klavern has not held a klavern meeting
as such since that time. One Little Rock member has
dropped out as a result of being interviewed; and,
according to an informant, this member is a "changed
⠀ man," meaning that he is not as radical as previously.
In interviews with members of the Pine Bluff Klavern,
agents have not met with any hostility and have been
treated cordially and with respect. Individual members
during these interviews have indicated they are opposed .
to violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner.
A number of the members have said that through political
pressure and voting are the only ways any change can
be made. However, they have stated they are still avid
segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any
manner.
When and if it appears that interest may be
renewing in the AAK in Arkansas, consideration will be
given to another interview program. It is noted that
particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic
basis in regard to leads from surrounding field offices
on bombing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to
deter any violent activity on the part of klaveṛn members.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 27
-7-
ΤΟ
Memorandum
: Director, FBI
FROM &
SAC, Birmingham
SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE:
10/13/64
Re Bulet to Atlanta 9/2/64
The Klan-type and bate organizations operating in
Birmingham territory and which are potential objects of a
counterintelligence program are the United Klans of
America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the National
States Rights Party,
Recently Mr. VINCENT TOWNSEND, Vice-President and
Assistant Publisher,--Birmingham-News, and-SAG-Contact;
advised SAC EVERETT J. INGRAM that he read a story in the
Chicago Daily News concerning Klan activity in Mississippi
and felt the story could not have been prepared without
FBI cooperation. He was impressed with this and has indicated
a strong interest in similar material for the Birmingham
News. He promised to protect the Bureaus interest in
any such endeavor. He is a well known civic leader in
Birmingham. A review of the files in the Birmingham Office
is being made for suitable information in this connection.
Bureau instructed in referenced letter that
specific mention be made of "Action Groups" in Klan
organizations, At the present time the weekly meetings of
Eastview Klavern No, 13, which has been the leading Klavern in
United Klans of America, Inc., in this terribry, have been
poorly attended. The principal members of the "Action Group"
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 28
in this Klavera are HARRY--ĦALKER, CECIL-HENSON, EUGENE
REEVES, and RONNIE-TIDWELE, Efforts are being made to
secure information suitable for disruption purposes in
connection with this group,
Investigation is being conducted concerning
ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON. The Atlanta Office has been
requested to ascertain why E. L-EDWARDS; now deceased,
ousted SHELTON-from his then position of Grand-Dragon of
the U. S. Klans. A copy of the article appearing in
the "Birmingham-News" for April-30, 1960, entitled "SHELTON
ousted from Klan Post," has been obtained. The article did
not disclose the exact nature of the charges against
SURLTON, Records of the Alabama Secretary of State reflect
that SMELTON was dropped as the Klan's authorized agent
and was replaced by Rey,.__ALVIN HORN of Talladega, Alabama,
EL EDWARDS; Imperial-Fizard, U. S. Klans, Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, was quoted as saying "We had to have
a grand dragon in Alabama and we didn't have one in
ROBERT M. SHELTON, He told reporters that SHELTON was
replaced as grand dragon and agent of the "Klan" in
Alabama "for conduct unbecoming a Klansman and attempting
to use the organization for selfish purposes," The
article said EDWARDS did not elaborate on what is considered
conduct unbecoming a Klansman,
Informants are being contacted for any information
of a derogatory nature concerning SHELTON. Discreet inquiriès
are being made in Tuscaloosa concerning his financial status.
In view of recent information from the Bureau no request is
being made for a mail cover on Shelton or the United Klans.
The information on LOE ROGERS, and WILLIAMA-HOLT;ER
will be afforded prompt attention,
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 29.
2
دريسي
}
As the Bureau is aware, some few months ago several
individuals, who had been active officials and/or dedicated
members of the National States Rights Party (NSRP), left
the NSRP. They are trying to form and make a going party.
of the American States Rights Party (ASRP) with its head-
quarters in Birmingham.
Since the group pulled out of the NSRP, both
the ASRP and NSRP leaders have been belittling, berating
and making extremely derogatory remarks concerning each
other. Both groups are using the same mailing list,
(the NSRP's list), which the ASRP group obtained. before
pulling out of the NSRP, and they disseminate their
derogatory remarks in the literature they distribute,
The Bureau has also been advised that -GEORGE-
LINCOLN-ROCKWELL, American Nazi Party (ANP) leader has
recently filed a $550,000.00 libel suit in the U, S.
District Court, Birmingham,--Alabama, against Dry-EDWARD-R.
FIELDS, Information Director of the NSRP, and others
connected with the NSRP,
Birmingham contemplates furnishing certain items,
on a confidential basis to a few trusted, reliable newsmen
(established SAC contacts), concerning the NSRP, the ASRP
and the ANP for the purpose of possibly causing further
disruption of any unified actions or working arrangements
between these groups, Such newsmen may be used to contact
the leaders of one group to inquire about or confirm something of
a derogatory nature reportedly made by some leader of one of
the other groups,
Birmingham also contemplates working closely
with other law enforcement agencies to see that any
activity of such groups are known, covered and where .
considered desirable, the group will be made cognizant
that their activity is known,
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 30
3

Birmingham also is considering having some racial
informants drop remarks to or for the benefit of the leaders
of the NSRP, etc., that will tend to cause the leaders of
one group to retaliate in like manner against the other
groups,
If the Bureau has any material on disruptive
tactics or results of efforts, which is not already in
all field offices, Birmingham would be glad to receive
it.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 31
་་
3
ΤΟ
MAY WEESTIONS
GEA GEN. NO. 27
UNITED STATES G ERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM
SUBJECT:
SAC, NEW YORK
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
DATE:
10/14/64
ReBulet, Y14104.
NY has case files on the following organizations
which were listed in relet:
f
AMERICAN NAZI- PARTY (ANP) .(NY-137-13)
00:RH
Available information reflects that there is
currently no ANP activity in the NYC area and the organization
appears to be defunct.
FIGHTING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS (FAN) (NY-157-195)
00:BA
Available information reflects that FAN has ceased
to exist as a separate organization and is merely a name used
on occasion by the American Nazi Party.
NATIONAL RENAISSANCE PARTY (NRP) (NY-105-6112) -
00:NY
The NRP is now defunct in NYC and available
information makes it appear unlikely that it will be
reactivated.
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-32-
NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)
00:51
The ASHP in NYC is operated by WILLZA egy
Hanway, Stoy Drooklyn, NY, self-identified as the NY
State-Director of the NSRP. This is a one man organization
in NYC with no membership other than HOFF who utilizes
2.0 Box 1243, GBQ Brooklyn NY, as his NSRP mailing
address. Because of this there are no meetings of this
organization in NYC.
WRITE YOUTH CORPS (NYC),
00:00
No information has been developed by NY
indicating the WYC exists in NY.
Recommendations
In view of the above, NY has no specific recommenda-
tions at the present time. Logical persons handling above
captioned and related matters are alert to captioned
program, and in the event information is developed which
would make some counterintelligence activity feasible,
the Bureau will be advised.
NY will again review the above files so that
a letter will reach the Bureau on or before 1/1/65.
-NW-88608-Docid:32989629_Page_33
-2-
1
TO
FROM
SUBJECT:
MAY WE CUITION
GSA SEN. G. 1.0. 27
UNITED STATES G ERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, NEW YORK
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
DATE: 10/14/64
ReBulet, 714104.
NY has case files on the following organizations
which were listed in relet:
AMERICAN NAZI PARTY (ANP) (NY-157-13)
00:RH
Available information reflects that there is
currently no ANP activity in the NYC area and the organization
appears to be defunct.
FIGHTING AMERICAN NATIONALISTS (FAN) (NV-157-195)
00:BA
Available information reflects that FAN has ceased
to exist as a separate organization and is merely a name used
on occasion by the American Nazi Party.
NATIONAL RENAISSANCE PARTY (NRP) (NY 105-6112)
00:NY
The NRP is now defunct in NYC and available
information makes it appear unlikely that it will be
reactivated.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-34-
NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)
00:BA
The NSP in NYC is operated by W
self-identified as the NY
Spec Director of the NSRP. This is a one man organization
in AYC with no membership other than HOFF who utilizes
PO Box 12435-620 Brooklyn, NY, as his NSRP mailing
address. Because of this there are no meetings of this
organization in NYC.
WHITE YOUTH CORPS (WYC).
00:06
No information has been developed by NY
indicating the WYC exists in NY.
Recommendations
ង
In view of the above, NY has no specific recommenda-
tions at the present time. Logical persons handling above
captioned and related matters are alert to captioned
program, and in the event information is developed which
would make some counterintelligence activity feasible,
the Bureau will be advised.
NY will again review the above files so that
a letter will reach the Bureau on or before 1/1/65.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 35
-2-
F BI
Date:
10/14/64
Transmit the following in
Type in picin text or code)
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC,
KEMPHIS
(Priority)
SUBJECT: COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
Relet Bureau to. Atlanta, copies Memphis, 9/2/64.
The Hemphis Division has carefully reviewed the
contents of relet, including the list of organizations
designated for action pursuant to this program.
3
None of these organizations are currently active
in the territory covered by the Memphis FBI Division.
Similarly, there are no so-called "action groups'
known to exist or to have existed in this territory.
"
This office will continue to be alert for
possibilities and methods of implementation of this program.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 36
1
t
F BI
Date:
10/14/64
Transmit the following in
(Type in plain text or code)
(Priority)
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
K SAC, MEMPHIS
FROM:K
SUBJECT COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
F
Relet Bureau to. Atlanta, copies Memphis, 9/2/64.
The Memphis Division has carefully reviewed the
contents of relet, including the list of organizations
designated for action pursuant to this program.
None of these organizations are currently active
in the territory covered by the Memphis FBI Division.
Similarly, there are no so-called "action groups"
known to exist or to have existed in this territory.
This office will continue to be alert for
possibilities and methods of implementation of this program.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 37
3010-114
.
UNITED STATES ( ERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM :
SAC, MIAMI
DATE:
10/14/54
SUBJECT:
COUNTERINTELLIGINCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS..
Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.
The following news media can be utilized in the.
Cointelpro upon confirmation of any action group forming,
in Miami and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward
Counties):
Newspapers
"Miami Herald"
A morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper
GEORGE SEEBE, Managing Editor (SAC Contact)-
"The Kiami News"
An evening local Miami, Florida, newspaper
WILLTAN. CÓ BAGGS, Dior (SAC Contact).
"The Ft. Lauderdale News"
A daily Broward County newspaper
HILTON KELLS, Editor
TV Stations
WCKT-TV, Channel 7, NBC
GENZA STRUFL, News Director
WLBW-TV, Channel 10, ABC
CHARLES HATODWILLER; General Tanager (SAC Contact) ·
CHARLES MATTHEWS National Sales Director-
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 38
Radio Stations.
WGBS, BOBKURTIN, News-
WIOD, JANÉS LE CATE
At Sebring, Florida
(Highlands County)
United Florida Ku Klux Klan
Sebring Klavern
Through recent information furnished by
it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying
out. Attendance at the weekly meetings has been very poor
with a maximum of 3 to 4 in attendance. On the last two
scheduled meeting dates, the only ones present were the
Exalted Cyclops, CHARLES FRITZ and C
ARLED
In view of the above, the Sebring Klavern will
probably become inactive in the very near future. It is
felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time
would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping
by the members rather than the desired results.
:
Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near
future, it is then felt that information could be confi-
dentially furnished to Highlands County Sheriff BROWARD. COKER,
Sebring, as to time, date and location of the Ku Klux Klan
meetings. Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the
area in an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings
and cause concern among those in attendance.
Sheriff COKER has been very cooperative and has
reflected a distaste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in his
county. It is not felt that Sheriff COKER would in any
way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.
It is felt that counterintelligence contact with
the Sebring press would be unwise.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 39
2
_
:
i
Reported Attempts to Organize Klavern
of United Florida Ku Klux Klan in
Sebastian, Florida (Indian River County)
It is recommended that immediately upon confirmation
of the attempted organization of a Ku Klux Klan Klavern in
Indian River County, that counterintelligence steps be taken
to discourage same.
The 'Ft. Pierce News Tribune,' a daily newspaper
with circulation including. Indian River County, could be
utilized. Mr. CHOPLESMILEY, Editor, is an SAC-contact of
the Miami Division and has proven reliable and cooperative
in past dealings. Through information furnished to MILEY,
the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian,
Florida, could be exposed to the community. Community leaders
would then likely take steps to counteract the formation of
this organization.
It is not felt that Er. MILEY would in any way
reveal the Sureau's interest or betray our confidence.
It is also recommended that LE-BRUNLEY; Chief-
Deputy, Indian River County Sheriff's Office be furnished
information regarding the attempted Ku Klux Klan organization
in Sebastian. BROMLEY could arrange for patrol cars to cover
the Ku Klux Klan meetings in an obvious fashion. This would
likely discourage attendance and cause concern.
Chief-Deputy-BRUMLEY is a National Academy graduate
and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents.
It is not felt that BRUMLEY would in any way reveal the
Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 40
- 3 -

At West Palm Beach, Florida
(Palm Beach County)
Council For Statehood
West Palm Beach, Florida
The Council for Statehood has been found to
be not an action group but rather a mailing facility
for the writings of MARY DAVISON. These writings
are disseminated to local and national legislators and
all are filed with the Library of Congress in Washington.
The dissemination of writings by this group has now become
practically negligible. The group is said to have
political overtones as a republican group.
It is not recommended that any positive
harassment activities be undertaken with regard to this
group at this time, since such action, in all probability,
would enhance the activities of this group rather than
accomplish the desired effect.
United Free Hen
West Palm Beach, Florida
This organization is now defunct.
*
*
At the present time there are no known "action
groups" within the Miami Division.
SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO
(1) Many hate groups send literature, to
individuals on their mailing lists, which has been
distorted or is out of context, regarding individuals and
organizations. The literature is intended to promote a
hostile and unfavorable image of the organization, and/or
individual. Favorite targets in this regard are the United
Nations and U. S. Supreme Court Justice EARL WARREN..
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 41
4
4
It is noted the United Nations has considerable
literature setting forth favorable 'information regarding
accomplishments and the desirability of having a United
Nations. It would appear appropriate to offset the
literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out
favorable information concerning the organization or
individual under attack.
(2) Any hate organizations tend to disguise
their true identity under the pretext of being a religious
study group. Using such a disguise, they find it easy
and inexpensive to obtain the facilities of an established
church to hold special or organizational meetings.
By using an appropriate pretext, such as a
-
free lance reporter for the local paper, or through a
reliable news contact, the individual responsible for the
facility could be contacted shortly prior to the planned
meeting. At this time, the true identity of the hatė
organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable
disruption, especially if the use of the facilities are
canceled at the last moment.
In September, 1962, and December, 1963, STONER-
spent several weeks in Florida, including visits to Miami
and Vero Beach, Florida, attempting to organize and promote
the NSRP. To date the NSRP has failed to gain any "foot
hold" within the Miami Division. It is not known if this
article was responsible for 's failure, however, it
does represent a type of counterintelligence.
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-42-
-
- 5 -
ţ
15
3010-114
UNITED STATES ( ERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM :
SAC, MIAMI
DATE:
10/14/64
SUBJECT:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS..
Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.
The following news media can be utilized in the
Cointelpro upon confirmation of any action group forming
in Miami and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward
Counties):
Newspapers
"Miami Herald"
A morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper
GEORGE SEEBE, Managing Editor (SAC Contact)
"The Miami News"
An evening local Miami, Florida, newspaper
WILLIAM CÓ BAGES, Editor (SAC Contact)
"The Ft. Lauderdale News"
A daily Broward County newspaper
MILTON KELLY, Editor
TV Stations
WCKT-TV, Channel 7, NBC
GENEL STRUHL, News Director
WLBW-TV, Channel, 10, ABC
CHARLES H.XTODWILLER; General Manager (SAC Contact)
CHARLES MATTHEWS, National Sales Director
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 43
Radio Stations
WGBS, BOBKARTIN, News
4
WIOD,
CATE
At Sebring, Florida
(Highlands County)
United Florida Ku Klux Klan
Sebring Klavern
Through recent information furnished by
it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying
out. Attendance at the weekly meetings has been very poor
with a maximum of 3 to 4 in attendance. On the last two
scheduled meeting dates, the only ones present were the
Exalted Cyclops, CHARLES FRITZ-and
In view of the above, the Sebring Klavern will
probably become inactive in the very near future. It is
felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time
would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping
by the members rather than the desired results.
Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near
future, it is then felt that information could be confi-
dentially furnished to Highlands County Sheriff · BROWARD: COKER,
Sebring, as to time, date and location of the Ku Klux Klan
meetings. Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the
area in an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings
and cause concern among those in attendance.
Sheriff COFER has been very cooperative and has
reflected a distaste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in his
county. It is not felt that Sheriff COKER would in any
way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.
It is felt that counterintelligence contact with
the Sebring press would be unwise.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 44
2
-
NW-88608-Docid:32989629_Page_45
Reported Attempts to Organize Klavern
of United Florida Ku Klux Klan in
Sebastian, Florida (Indian River County)
It is recommended that immediately upon confirmation
of the attempted organization of a Ku Klux Klan Klavern in
•Indian River County, that counterintelligence steps be taken
to discourage same.
YT
The 'Ft. Pierce News Tribune, a daily newspaper
with circulation including Indian River County, could be
utilized. Mr. CHARLES MILEY, Editor, is an SAC contact of
the Miami Division and has proven reliable and cooperative
in past dealings. Through information furnished to MILEY,
the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian,
Florida, could be exposed to the community. Community leaders
would then likely take steps to counteract the formation of
this organization.
It is not felt that EMILEY would in any way
reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.
It is also recommended that LEM-BRUMLEY™ Chief
Deputy, Indian River County Sheriff's Office be furnished
information regarding the attempted Ku Klux Klan organization
in Sebastian. BRLRY could arrange for patrol cars to cover
the Ku Klux Klan meetings in an obvious fashion. This would
likely discourage attendance and cause concern.
Chief Deputy BRUMLEY is a National Academy graduate
and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents.
It is not felt that BRUMLEY would in any way reveal the
Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.
w
At West Palm Beach, Florida
(Palm Beach County)
[
Council For Statehood
West Palm Beach, Florida
The Council for Statehood has been found to
be not an action group but rather a mailing facility
for the writings of MARY M¼DAVISON.
These writings
are disseminated to local and national legislators and
all are filed with the Library of Congress in Washington.
The dissemination of writings by this group has now become
practically negligible. The group is said to have
political overtones as a republican group.
It is not recommended that any positive
harassment activities be undertaken with regard to this
group at this time, since such action, in all probability,
would enhance the activities of this group rather than
accomplish the desired effect.
United Free Men
West Palm Beach, Florida
This organization is now defunct.
*
*
At the present time there are no known "action
groups" within the Miami Division.
SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO
(1) Many hate groups send literature, to
individuals on their mailing lists, which has been
distorted or is out of context, regarding individuals and
organizations, The literature is intended to promote a
hostile and unfavorable image of the organization and/or
individual. Favorite targets in this regard are the United
Nations and U. S. Supreme Court Justice EARL-WARREN,.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 46
-
4
It is noted the United Nations has considerable
literature setting forth favorable information regarding
accomplishments and the desirability of having a United
Nations. It would appear appropriate to offset the
literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out
favorable information concerning the organization or
individual under attack.
(2) Any hate organizations tend to disguise
their true identity under the pretext of being a religious
study group. Using such a disguise, they find it easy
and inexpensive to obtain, the facilities of an established
church to hold special or organizational meetings.
By using an appropriate pretext, such as a
.
free lance reporter for the local paper, or through a
reliable news contact, the individual responsible for the
facility could be contacted shortly prior to the planned
meeting. At this time, the true identity of the hatė
organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable
disruption, especially if the use of the facilities are
canceled at the last moment.
the Bureau is one copy of the
National Federation of Labor News," dated!
prepared and distributed by
he was discontinued Novem
evidence of indiscretion an
noted that
for many years until
1961 in view of continuing
of poor judgment.
regarding
the National States Rights Party (NSRP) and 3.XSTONER.
This
as prepared and distributed by
of
his own volition, as a means of keeping the NSRP out of
South Florida.
In September, 1962, and December, 1963, STONER
spent several weeks in Florida, including visits to Miami
and Vero Beach, Florida, attempting to organize and promote
the NSRP. To date the NSRP has failed to gain any "foot
hold" within the Miami Division. It is not known if this
article was responsible for s failure, however, it
does represent a type of counterintelligence.
5 -
NW 88608-Docid:32989629-Page-47-
5010-104
UNITED STATES C ERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
:
DIRECTOR, FBI
:
FROM :
SUBJECT:
SAC, MIAMI (
2
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
DATE:
10/14/64
Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.
The following news media can be utilized in the
Cointelpro upon confirmation of any action group forming,
in Miami and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Dade and Broward
Counties):
Newspapers
"Miami Herald"
A morning Miami, Florida, daily newspaper
GEORGE BEEBE, Managing Editor (SAC-Contact).
"The Miami News"
An evening local Miami, Florida, newspaper
WILLIAM CK BAGGS, Editor (SAC Contact)
"The Ft. Lauderdale News"
A daily Broward County newspaper
HILTON KELLY; Editor
TV Stations
WCKT-TV, Channel 7,
NBC
CENEX (STRUHL, News Director
WLBW-TV, Channel 10, ABC
CHARLES HOPMILLER, -General Manager_(SAC. Contact)
CHARLES, MATTHEWS, National Sales Director.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 48
Radio Stations
WGBS, BOB MARTIN, News-
BOBY
WIOD, JAMES LD CATE
At Sebring, Florida
(Highlands County)
United Florida Ku Klux Klan
Sebring Klavern
842–1,
Through recent information furnished by
it is noted that the Sebring Klavern is apparently dying
out. Attendance at the weekly meetings has been very poor
with a maximum of 3 to 4 in attendance. On the last two
scheduled meeting dates, the only ones present were the
Exalted Cyclops, CHARLES FRITZ and MM 842-R.
In view of the above, the Sebring Klavern will
probably become inactive in the very near future. It is
felt that any counterintelligence move at the present time
would possibly result in a renewed interest and regrouping
by the members rather than the desired results.
Should the Sebring Klavern not disband in the near
future, it is then felt that information could be confi-
dentially furnished to Highlands County Sheriff BROWARD- COKER,
Sebring, as to time, date and location of the Ku Klux Klan
meetings. Sheriff's Department patrol cars could patrol the
area in an obvious fashion in order to disrupt the meetings
and cause concern among those in attendance.
Sheriff COKER has been very cooperative and has
reflected a distaste for any Ku Klux Klan activity in his
county. It is not felt that Sheriff COKER would in any
way reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.
It is felt that counterintelligence contact with
the Sebring press would be unwise.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 49
-
2
Reported Attempts to Organize Klavern
of United Florida Ku Klux Klan in
Sebastian, Florida (Indian River County)
It is recommended that immediately upon confirmation
of the attempted organization of a Ku Klux Klan Klavern in
Indian River County, that counterintelligence steps be taken
to discourage same.
The 'Ft. Pierce News Tribune,
r
a daily newspaper
with circulation including. Indian River County, could be
utilized. Mr. CHARLES MILEY, Editor, is an SAC-contact of
the Miami Division and has proven reliable and cooperative
in past dealings. Through information furnished to MILY
the attempt at organizing the Ku Klux Klan in Sebastian,
Florida, could be exposed to the community. Community leaders
would then likely take steps to counteract the formation of
this organization.
It is not felt that Mr.-MILEY would in any way
reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.
It is also recommended that LEM--BRUMLEY; ~Chief-
Deputy, Indian River County Sheriff's Office be furnished
information regarding the attempted Ku Klux Klan organization
in Sebastian. BRUMLEY could arrange for patrol cars to cover
the Ku Klux Klan meetings in an obvious fashion. This would
likely discourage attendance and cause concern.
Chief Deputy-BRUMLEY is a National Academy graduate
and has been completely cooperative with contacting Agents.
It is not felt that BRUMLEY would in any way reveal the
Bureau's interest or betray our confidence.
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 50
3
-

At West Palm Beach, Florida
(Palm Beach County)
Council For Statehood
West Palm Beach, Florida
The Council for Statehood has been found to
be not an action group but rather a mailing facility
for the writings of MARY MCDAVISON. These writings
are disseminated to local and national legislators and
all are filed with the Library of Congress in Washington.
The dissemination of writings by this group has now become
practically negligible. The group is said to have
political overtones as a republican group.
It is not recommended that any positive
harassment activities be undertaken with regard to this
group at this time, since such action, in all probability,
would enhance the activities of this group rather than
accomplish the desired effect.
United Free Men
West Palm Beach;. Florida
This organization is now defunct.
**
At the present time there are no known "action
groups" within the Miami Division.
SUGGESTIONS FOR COINTELPRO
(1) Many hate groups send literature, to
individuals on their mailing lists, which has been
distorted or is out of context, regarding individuals and
organizations. The literature is intended to promote a
hostile and unfavorable image of the organization and/or
individual. Favorite targets in this regard are the United
Nations and U. S. Supreme Court Justice ZARL WARREN.
}
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 51
4.
It is noted the United Nations has considerable
´literature setting forth favorable information regarding
accomplishments and the desirability of having a United
Nations. It would appear appropriate to offset the
literature sent out by the hate groups, by sending out
favorable information concerning the organization or
individual under attack.
(2) Any hate organizations tend to disguise
their true identity under the pretext of being a religious
study group. Using such a disguise, they find it easy
and inexpensive to obtain, the facilities of an established
church to hold special or organizational meetings.
By using an appropriate pretext, such as a
free lance reporter for the local paper, or through à
reliable news contact, the individual responsible for the
facility could be contacted shortly prior to the planned
meeting. At this time, the true identity of the hatė
organization could be exposed, resulting in considerable
disruption, especially if the use of the facilities are
canceled at the last moment.
(3) Enclosed for the Bureau is one copy of the
"National Federation of Labor News, " dated September, 1963,
prepared and distributed by WILLIAM SOMERSETT, formerly-
607-C. (RAC), Bureau file 66-16458. It is noted that
SOMERSETT was formerly a Bureau informant for many years until
he was discontinued November, 1961, in view of continuing
evidence of indiscretion and use of poor judgment. Page 3
of this paper sets forth an article by SOMERSETT regarding
the National States Rights Party (NSRP) and JBSTONER
This article was prepared and distributed by SOMERSETT of -
his own volition, as a means of keeping the NSRP out of
South Florida.
In September, 1962, and December, 1963, STONER
spent several weeks in Florida, including visits to Miami
and Vero Beach, Florida, attempting to organize and promote
the NSRP. To date the NSRP has failed to gain any "foot
hold" within the Miami Division. It is not known if this
article was responsible for failure, however, it
does represent a type of counterintelligence.
-NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 52
-
- 5 -
R
150
SUBJECT:
KINUD STATES G ERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FEI
SAC, CHICAGO,
COINTELPRO
DATE:
6/25/31
Re Bureau letter to SAC, Atlanta 9/2/34.
Referenced communication advises the following
hate organizations operating within the Chicago Division
as included in this program:
American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)
White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago).
Regarding the White Youth Corps it is noted
confidential informants of this division have advised
that the White Youth Corps in Chicago did not, in fact,
exist as a organization per se but was considered rather
a "level of affiliation" within the structure of the
American Nazi Party at Chicago, Illinois. All operations
of this unit were subsequently combined with those of the
American Nazi Party and were carried on under that name
only. The White Youth Corps was determined to no longer
exist in any way in Chicago and no information has developed
to indicate the possible reorganization of this group.
CG 6535 R On October 12, 1954, confidential informan
furnished reliable information in the past, advised that
the White Youth Corps no longer exists in any capacity
in Chicago. To sources' knowledge the White Youth Corps
does not operate as an organization in any other locale
known to them. These sources further advised that as of
this date no information is available to indicate possible
interest in reorganizing the White Youth Corps.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 53
Symbol
Numbers
In view of the above, Chicago
further inquiry regarding the Miss %}
and in that the White Youth Corps is no
it will not be considered in connection with this program.
Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose,
disrupt and otherwise neutralize the American Nazi Party
in Chicago, Illinois, the following is submitted for the
-Bureau's consideration:
I. Proposal To Increase Financial Burden
of the American Nazi Party
Brief Resume of Current
Economic Problems
The principal weakness in the Chicago unit of the
American Nazi Party exists in their lack of funds to operate.
This fact alone has forestalled all the participation of the
Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other
activities in that sufficient monies are not available to
provide necessary bonds and/or fines should members be
arrested during the course of such activity.
Further, the Chicago American Nazi Party has
recently purchased a building which they utilize as a
headquarters. The building is old and in dire need of
repair. Mortgage payments and maintenance alone absorb
the bulk of all funds which the Chicago unit collects.
Proposed Plan of Approach
In that it is the desire of the local American
Nazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building at
all costs, it is apparent that the first line of approach
to increase the organization's financial burden is to
direct our efforts at the headquarters building itself.
Discreet inquiry and observation has shown the
building has numerous building code violations, some of
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 54
.
-
2
-
:
which make the building mainly uninhabitable until such
violations are rectified such as electrical wiring and
plumbing. It is recognized that building code authorities
will allow such deficiencies to exist for a reasonable
period of time and during such time habitation on the
premises is permitted. Violations such as those mentioned
are known to be costly to eliminate and are of the type
that cannot or should not be "do-it-yourself" projects
since repairs made are subject to inspection by building
authorities.
In that the American Nazi' Party has in the past
and still levels its attacks at persons of the Jewish faith,
Chicago Jewish organizations are most desirable of accumulating
information which can serve to initiate an attack by these
organizations against the American Nazi Party. Prominent
among such organizations are the Jewish War Veterans and
the Anti-Defamation League B'nai B'rith.
The Chicago Division, either by direct approach
to established sources in these organizations, or through
use of suitable pretext, can make available to appropriate
officials information establishing the fact that such building
code violations do exist. There is no doubt that should
Such information become available to proper individuals within
these organizations, great pressure will be brought to bear
to insist that these building code violations are corrected
and the possibility strongly exists that court action may
follow and fines may be levied.
As an alternative, a direct approach can be made
to established contacts within the city government to bring
such building code violations to the attention of appropriate
authorities.
Anticipated Results
A penetrating analysis of the present economic
situation of the American Nazi Party strongly indicates
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-55-
-
3
that by firmly increasing the financial burden of this
group the following results are certainl
I.
2.
3.
American Nazi Party public activity will be '
held to the barest minimum due to fear of
ssible arrest resulting in further economic
hardship..
مينا
Funds will not be available to bring about ·
necessary repairs on the headquarters building
Funds for the printing and distribution of
literature locally for recruiting purposes
would not be available
3.
Morale of the organization in Chicago, which
is now at low ebb would be further lessened
thus creating feelings of dissatisfaction among
the membership
As a direct result of items above the attractivenes:
of the American Nazi Party to possible recruits
would be held at a minimum
II. Proposal
Divide Loyalty of Membership
Against Present Leaders
Brief Resume of Leadership
Problems
At the present time the Chicago American Nazi Party
has no established leaders. One of the members, JOHN-WALLACE,
was appointed by GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL, the group's national
commander, however, has failed to undertake the
responsibilities of leadership and as a result certain dis-.
satisfaction exists among members.
As a result of a
failure current activities
of the organization are being directed by CHRISTOPHER.
VIDHJEVICH who is operating without authority of the national
headquarters.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 56
Because of the inactivity and the failure of, the
Chicago organization to demonstrate progress the so-called
"hard core" of the membership have raised numerous questions
in the recent past challenging the adequacy and capability
of HALLÅSE and VIDNOBVICH to head their organization in Chicago.
Proposed Plan of Approach
It is anticipated that through established sources
all of whom are current members of the American Nahi Denby
in Chicago, feelings of discontent can be initiated. Further,
communications which would indicate a thorough and substantial
knowledge of the Chicago organization could be directed at
the National Commander GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL either anonymously
or under the signature of a likely member who is known to be
in disagreement with local leadership and practices.
Anticipated Results
;
By concentrating the efforts of this program in a
firm but carefully concealed manner it is strongly believed
that the following results will be obtained:
1. Loyalties of the membership will be divided
and dissension will be created
2.
3.
The national headquarters of the American Nazi
Party will have sufficient reason to question
the adequacy and capabilities of local leadership
Through established sources programs proposed by
those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged
whereby the confidence of both the national
headquarters and the local membership will be
shattered
It is recognized that the Bureau considers it vital
that the functions and membership of these organizations be
Chicago does not deem
brought into the "public spotlight".
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-57–
- 5 -
ས
such an approach appropriate at this time due to t
membership which at this time consists of three esisted
informants of long standing. Activity to bring public
pressure to bear at this particular time could jeopardize
the position of the three informants who furnish valuable
information to this Bureau concerning the membership and
activities of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.
It is requested that the Bureau consider the above
detailed approaches in connection with this program and authorize
their institution in Chicago.
NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 58
- 6
TO
SUBJECT:
G. ANO. 27
UNITED STATES GERNMENT
Memorandum
: DIRECTOR, FBI
: SAC, CHICAGO
COINTELPRO
DATE: 10/15/61
Re Bureau letter to SAC, Atlanta 9/2/64.
Referenced communication advises the following
hate organizations operating within the Chicago Division ·
as included in this program:
American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)
White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago).
Regarding the White Youth Corps it is noted
confidential informants of this division have advised
that the White Youth Corps in Chicago did not, in fact,
exist as a organization per se but was considered rather
a "level of affiliation" within the structure of the
American Nazi Party at Chicago, Illinois. All operations
of this unit were subsequently combined with those of the
American Nazi Party and were carried on under that name
only. The White Youth Corps was determined to no longer
exist in any way in Chicago and no information has developed
to indicate the possible reorganization of this group.
On October 12, 1964, confidential informants
all of whom have
furnished reliable information in the past, advised that
(the White Youth Corps no longer exists in any capacity
in Chicago. To sources knowledge the White Youth Corps
does not operate as an organization in any other locale
known to them. These sources further advised that as of
this date no information is available to indicate possible
interest in reorganizing the White Youth Corps.
NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-59-
:
In view of the above, Chicago contemplat
further inquiry regarding the White Youth J
and in that the White Youth Corps is no longer in chistence,
it will not be considered in connection with this program.
Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose,
disrupt and otherwise neutralize the American Nazi Party
in Chicago, Illinois, the following is submitted for the
Bureau's consideration:
I. Proposal - To Increase Financial Burden
of the American Nazi Party
Brief Resume of Current
Economic Problems
The principal weakness in the Chicago unit of the
American Nazi Party exists in their lack of funds to operate.
This fact alone has forestalled all the participation of the
Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other.
activities in that sufficient monies are not available to
provide necessary bonds and/or fines should members be
arrested during the course of such activity.
Further, the Chicago American Nazi Party has
recently purchased a building which they utilize as a
headquarters. The building is old and in dire need of
repair. Mortgage payments and maintenance alone absorb
the bulk of all funds which the Chicago unit collects.
Proposed Plan of Approach
In that it is the desire of the local American
Nazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building at
all costs, it is apparent that the first line of approach
to increase the organization's financial burden is to
direct our efforts at the headquarters building itself.
Discreet inquiry and observation has shown the
building has numerous building code violations, some of
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 60-
-
2

->
which make the building mainly uninhabitable until such
violations are rectified such as electrical wiring and
plumbing. It is recognized that building code authorities
will allow such deficiencies to exist for a reasonable
period of time and during such time habitation on the
premises is permitted. Violations such as those mentioned
are known to be costly to eliminate and are of the type
that cannot or should not be "do-it-yourself" projects
since repairs made are subject to inspection by building
1. authorities.
In that the American Nazi Party has in the past
and still levels its attacks at persons of the Jewish faith,
Chicago Jewish organizations are most desirable of accumulating
information which can serve to initiate an attack by these
organizations against the American Nazi Party. Prominent
among such organization's are the Jewish War Veterans and
the Anti-Defamation League B'nai B'rith. ·
The Chicago Division, either by direct approach
to established sources in these organizations, or through
use of suitable pretext, can make available to appropriate
officials information establishing the fact that such building
code violations do exist. There is no doubt that should
Such information become available to proper individuals within
these organizations, great pressure will be brought to bear
to insist that these building code violations are corrected
and the possibility strongly exists that court action may
follow and fines may be levied.
As an alternative, a direct approach can be made
to established contacts within the city government to bring
such building code violations to the attention of appropriate
authorities.
Anticipated Results
A penetrating analysis of the present economic
situation of the American Nazi Party strongly indicates
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 61
3
-
that by firmly increasing the financial burden of this
group the following results are certain:
1.
127
3.
4.
5.
,
American Nazi Party public activity will be
held to the barest minimum due to fear of
Kssible arrest resulting in further economic
hardship.
Funds will not be available to bring about-
necessary repairs on the headquarters building
Funds for the printing and distribution of
literature locally for recruiting purposes
would not be available
Morale of the organization in Chicago, which
is now at low ebb would be further lessened
thus creating feelings of dissatisfaction among
the membership
As a direct result of items above the attractivenes
of the American Nazi Party to possible recruits
would be held at a minimum
II. Proposal
Divide Loyalty of Membership
Against Present Leaders
Brief Resume of Leadership
Problems
At the present time the Chicago American Nazi Party
has no established leaders. One of the members, JOHN WALLACE,.
was appointed by GEORGE LINCOLN ROC, the group's national..
commander; however, AGE has failed to undertake the
responsibilities of leadership and as a result certain dis-
satisfaction exists among members.
As a result of WALLÁS failure current activities
of the organization are being directed by CHRISTOPHER.
VEDEVICE, who is operating without authority of the national
headquarters.
NW 88608 Doçid:32989629 Page 62
4 -
Because of the inactivity and the failure of the
Chicago organization to demonstrate progress the so-called
"hard core" of the membership have raised numerous questions
in the recent past challenging the adequacy and capability
of WLACE and VIDNOBVICH to head their organization in Chicago.
Proposed Plan of Approach
It is anticipated that through established sources
all of whom are current members of the American Nazi Party
in Chicago, feelings of discontent can be initiated. Further,
communications which would indicate.a thorough and substantial
knowledge of the Chicago organization could be directed at
the National Commander GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL either anonymously
or under the signature of a likely member who is known to be
in disagreement with local leadership and practices.
Anticipated Results
By concentrating the efforts of this program in a
firm but carefully concealed manner it is strongly believed
that the following results will be obtained:
1.
2.
•
Loyalties of the membership will be divided
and dissension will be created
The national headquarters of the American Nazi
Party will have sufficient reason to question
the adequacy and capabilities of local leadership
3. Through established sources programs proposed by
those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged
whereby the confidence of both the national
headquarters and the local membership will be
shattered
It is recognized that the Bureau considers it vital
that the functions and membership of these organizations be
brought into the "public spotlight". Chicago does not deem
NW-88608 Doeld:32989629 Page 63.
5
-
such an approach appropriate at this time due to the small
membership which at this time consists of three established
informants of long standing. Activity to bring public
pressure to bear at this particular time could jeopardize
the position of the three informants who furnish valuable
information to this Bureau concerning the membership and
activities of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.
It is requested that the Bureau consider the above
☐ detailed approaches in connection with this program and authorize
their institution in Chicago.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 64
:
- 6 -
TO
G. AN.
UNITED STATES G ERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM :
SAC, CHICAGO
SUBJECT:
COINTELPRO
DATE: 10/15/31
Re Bureau letter to SAC, Atlanta 9/2/64.
Referenced communication advises the following
hate organizations operating within the Chicago Division ·
as included in this program:
American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)`
White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago).
Regarding the White Youth Corps it is noted
confidential informants of this division have advised
that the White Youth Corps in Chicago did not, in fact,
exist as a organization per se but was considered rather
a "level of affiliation" within the structure of the
American Nazi Party at Chicago, Illinois. All operations
of this unit were subsequently combined with those of the
American Nazi Party and were carried on under that name
only. The White Youth Corps was determined to no longer
exist in any way in Chicago and no information has developed
to indicate the possible reorganization of this group.
On October 12, 1964, confidential informants
all of whom have
furnished reliable information in the past, advised that
the White Youth Corps no longer exists in any capacity
in Chicago. To sources' knowledge the White Youth Corps
does not operate as an organization in any other locale
khown to them. These sources further advised that as of
this date no information is available to indicate possible
interest in reorganizing the White Youth Corps.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629-Page-65-
In view of the above, Chicago conteng
further inquiry regarding the White Youth
and in that the White Youth Corps is no longer in chistence,
it will not be considered in connection with this program.
Regarding Chicago's proposed plan to expose,
disrupt and otherwise neutralize the American Nazi Party
in Chicago, Illinois, the following is submitted for the
.Bureau's consideration:
I. Proposal
To Increase Financial Burden
of the American Nazi Party
Brief Resume of Current
Economic Problems
The principal weakness in the Chicago unit of the
American Nazi Party exists in their lack of funds to operate.
This fact alone has forestalled all the participation of the
Chicago organization in public demonstrations and other
activities in that sufficient monies are not available to
provide necessary bonds and/or fines should members be
arrested during the course of such activity.
Further, the Chicago American Nazi Party has
recently purchased a building which they utilize as a
headquarters. The building is old and in dire need of
repair. Mortgage payments and maintenance alone absorb
the bulk of all funds which the Chicago unit collects.
Proposed Plan of Approach
In that it is the desire of the local American
Nazi Party to "hold onto" their headquarters building at
all costs, it is apparent that the first line of approach
to increase the organization's financial burden is to
direct our efforts at the headquarters building itself.
Discreet inquiry and observation has shown the
building has numerous building code violations, some of
NW 88608 Doçld:32989629 Page 66
-
2
which make the building mainly uninhabitable until such
violations are rectified such as electrical wiring and
plumbing. It is recognized that building code authorities
will allow such deficiencies to exist for a reasonable
period of time and during such time habitation on the
premises is permitted. Violations such as those mentioned
are known to be costly to eliminate and are of the type
that cannot or should not be "do-it-yourself" projects
since repairs made are subject to inspection by building
○ authorities.
"
In that the American Nazi Party has in the past
and still levels its attacks at persons of the Jewish faith,
Chicago Jewish organizations are most desirable of accumulating
information which can serve to initiate an attack by these
organizations against the American Nazi Party. Prominent
anong such organizations are the Jewish War Veterans and
the Anti-Defamation League B'nai B'rith.
The Chicago Division, either by direct approach
to established sources in these organizations, or through
use of suitable pretext, can make available to appropriate
officials information` establishing the fact that such building
code violations do exist. There is no doubt that should
such information become available to proper individuals within
these organizations, great pressure will be brought to bear
to insist that these building code violations are corrected
and the possibility strongly exists that court action may
follow and fines may be levied.
As an alternative, a direct approach can be made
to established contacts within the city government to bring
such building code violations to the attention of appropriate
authorities.
Anticipated Results
·A penetrating analysis of the present economic
situation of the American Nazi Party strongly indicates
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 67
3
-
C
that by firmly increasing the financial burden of this
group the following results are certain:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
American Nazi Party public activity will be
held to the barest minimum due to fear of
Kssible arrest resulting in further economic
hardship.
Funds will not be available to bring about
necessary repairs on the headquarters building
Funds for the printing and distribution of
literature locally for recruiting purposes
would not be available
Morale of the organization in Chicago, which
is now at low ebb would be further lessened
thus creating feelings of dissatisfaction among
the membership
As a direct result of items above the attractivenes
of the American Nazi Party to possible recruits
would be held at a minimum
II. Proposal
Divide Loyalty of Membership
Against Present Leaders
Brief Resume of Leadership
Problems
has
At the present time the Chicago American Nazi Party
no established leaders. One of the members, JOHN WALLACE,
was appointed by CEORGE LINCOLN ROCAWBES, the group's national.
commander; however, WA has failed to undertake the
responsibilities of leadership and as a result certain dis-
satisfaction exists among members.
As a result of WALLAC failure current activities
of the organization are being directed by CHRISTOPHER
VIBNJEVICH; who is operating without authority of the national
headquarters.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 68
:
4
-
1
Because of the inactivity and the failure of the
Chicago organization to demonstrate progress the so-called
"hard core" of the membership have raised numerous questions
in the recent past challenging the adequacy and capability
of and VibXJB÷ICH to head their organization in Chicago.
Proposed Plan of Approach
It is anticipated that through established sources
all of whom are current members of the American Nazi Posty
in Chicago, feelings of discontent can be initiated. Further,
communications which would indicate a thorough and substantial
knowledge of the Chicago organization could be directed at
the Nationan Commander GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL either anonymously
or under the signature of a likely member who is known to be
in disagreement with local leadership and practices.
Anticipated Results
By concentrating the efforts of this program in a
firm but carefully concealed manner it is strongly believed
that the following results will be obtained:
1. Loyalties of the membership will be divided
and dissension will be created
The national headquarters of the American Nazi
Party will have sufficient reason to question
the adequacy and capabilities of local leadership
3. Through established sources programs proposed by
those in leadership capacities can be sabotaged
whereby the confidence of both the national
headquarters and the local membership will be
shattered
It is recognized that the Bureau considers it vital
that the functions and membership of these organizations be
brought into the "public spotlight". Chicago does not deem
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-69-
5 -
such an approach appropriate at this time due to the small
membership which at this time consists of three established
informants of long standing. Activity to bring public
pressure to bear at this particular time could jeopardize
the position of the three informants who furnish valuable
information to this Bureau concerning the membership and
activities of the American Nazi Party at Chicago.
It is requested that the Bureau consider the above
detailed approaches in connection with this program and authorize
their institution in Chicago.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 70
- 6 -

ΤΟ
MATEN. 1.0.27
UNITED STATES GOI NMENT
Memorandum,
DIRECTOR, FBI 1
FROM
SAC, KNOXVILLE
SUBJECT:\
DATE: 10/15/64
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
ReBulet to Atlanta 9/2/64.
In compliance with referenced letter, the Knoxville
Office has opened an active control file captioned as above
and has assigned this matter to an Agent who is experienced
in the investigation of hate and racist-type organizations.
The Knoxville Office currently has under investigation
two klan organizations. The Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, Inc. (DK, KKKK) has its national headquarters in
Chattanooga, Tennessee, and presently has one chapter active
in that area. Information reflects that the weekly meetings
of the chapter of this organization are attended by approxi-
mately 25 members, although the actual membership is reported
to be approximately 45 members. The other klan organization
under investigation in this division is the United Klans of
America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA, KKKK). The
national headquarters of this organization is located within
the Birmingham Division. The organization has active chapters
within the Knoxville territory at Harriman, Maryville, Knox-
ville and Sevierville. The Maryville chapter has approximately
127 members and the other three chapters have less than 30
members.
Investigation and information obtained from informants
disclose no information that there are any "Action groups"
within either of the two klan organizations. Informants have
been continually reminded to be alert for any members within
the groups who might organize strong-arm groups to engage in
any violent actions and they have reported no information_of_
this nature.
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 71
In considering various disruptive actions wit
be excrcised against these groups, it should be bon
that neither the DK, KKKK nor the UKA, KI have
on the Attorney General's list under 10 10400, Although
Knoxville territory does not lie within the traditionally
deep South, there is, of course, some sympathy for organizations
such as the klans within the territory as evidenced by the
increased growth and activity of these organizations in recent
years. Within the Knoxville territory there have been no acts.
of violence within recent years which were attributable to the
klan. Although there may not be any public sympathy for the
klan in this area, there is certainly no antagonism toward
¨. the organization and many persons have a passive feeling
toward its membership and activities. In some instances,
politicians have solicited the support of the klan in local
elections. Just recently, one of the informants of the Knoxville
Office, who is a high official in the ÚKA, KKKK, reported that
one of the candidates for U. S. Congress running from the
Knoxville district had contacted him and solicited the support
of klan members on his behalf.
2
Because of such factors as the above, it is not believed
that the cooperation of individuals can be utilized for plans
of disruptive action such as might be available if the targets
were Communist front organizations or related groups. In this
regard, although news media are very cooperative with the
Bureau in this territory, it is not believed that in a program
such as this was, it would be feasible, to utilize news media
in any counterintelligence operation in this area.
This matter has been discussed with Agents handling.
investigations of the klan organizations in the Knoxville
Division and the following plans have been suggested as feasible
for operation against the DK, KKKK and UKA, KKKK in this terri-
tory:
It is suggested that anonymous telephone calls be made
to employers of klan members inferring to the employer that
his company or business must be following a racist policy in
view of the fact that he has an employee (giving his identity)
NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 72
1
2
who is a member of the klan organization. These calls wou
be limited to those instances where the klan member is only
by some large company or leading business who would possibly
bo concerned about the picture they present to the public con-
cerning racial matters.
In view of the previously expressed desires of the
officials of the Knoxville Police Department to maintain racial
harmony in Knoxville, it is believed that arrangements could
be made with the Chief of Police to have one or more squad cars
visible in the vicinity of the meeting hall of the Knoxville
Klavern on the nights of their meetings. It is believed that
if the members saw these squad cars parked in the vicinity on
a continuing basis, it would cause them some apprehension
and would act as a deterrent to their activities, as well as
possible recruitment of new members.
:
The UKA, KKKK often holds public meetings on private
property leased for that purpose. At these meetings, officials
make speeches and invite spectators to make application for
membership. Informants report that the actual purpose of such
a meeting is to publicize the klan and secure new members.
In a few instances, informants have reported that some members
arriving at the meetings have intentionally covered their
license plate with a confederate flag metal insignia or with
a facsimile. On occasions, both the rear and front license
plates have been obscured or usually only the front license
obscured. It is believed through the cooperation of the High-
ray Patrol on a command level, that patrolmen might be assigned
to the area where the meeting is held so that if the klan
members leaving the meeting continue to have their license plate
obscured, they may be arrested for violation of the state law
prohibiting such.
In connection with the informant program of the Knoxville
Office, certain persons are interviewed to ascertain their
cooperation and their potentials as a possible informant.
It is believed that in such cases where antagonism is shown
to the Agents' contact, that a later anonymous call might be
made to other members accusing the person contacted by the
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 73
3 -
-
.
FBI as being an informant. This would cause a disruptive in-
fluence among the rank and file and would arouse cuspicion and
distrust. This same plan could be pursued further and calls
be made to members even though they had not actually been con-
tacted by an Agent in connection with the informant program.
Additional ideas and tactics were discussed but were
not considered feasible. Many of the ideas were discarded
because it was believed that other actions proposed would
greatly jeopardize our present informant coverage. As the
Bureau is aware, this office has informant coverage in these
organizations on a very high level and we have been able to
secure detailed information on membership rolls and appli-
cations, as well as detailed information on personal activities
of members, as well as detailed activity of the membership as
a group. The Bureau has previously been advised that the program
of `interviewing klan members at the time of the assassination
of President KENNEDY and later in connection with the bombings
in Birmingham tended to jeopardize our informant coverage,
due to their high-level positions and the fact that some of
the klan members felt that the information in the possession
of the FBI could only have been obtained from some high official
source in the klan..
Agent personnel responsible for the klan investigations
are continuing to give this program thought and attention, and
as the investigations progress, expect that additional ideas
will be submitted to the Bureau in connection with the status.
reports. The implementation of any of the above-listed plans,
of course, will not be put into effect without Bureau approval ·
and benefit of Bureau suggestions.
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-74-
ས
1
1
TO
AN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GO1 NMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
ROM
SAC, KCTOXVILLE
SUBJECT:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE:
10/15/64
ReBulet to Atlanta 9/2/64.
In compliance with referenced letter, the Knoxville
Office has opened an active control file captioned as above
and has assigned this matter to an Agent who is experienced
in the investigation of hate and racist-type organizations.
. .
The Knoxville Office currently has under investigation
two klan organizations. The Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, Inc. (DX, KKKK) has its national headquarters in
Chattanooga, Tennessee, and presently has one chapter active
-in that area. Information reflects that the weekly meetings
of the chapter of this organization are attended by approxi-
mately 25 members, although the actual membership is reported
to be approximately 45 members. The other klan organization
under investigation in this division is the United Klans of
America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA, KKKK). The
national headquarters of this organization is located within
the Birmingham Division. The organization has active chapters
within the Knoxville territory at Harriman, Maryville, Knox-
ville and Sevierville. The Maryville chapter has approximately
127 members and the other three chapters have less than 30
members.
Investigation and information obtained from informants
disclose no information that there are any "Action groups"
within either of the two klan organizations. Informants have
been continually reminded to be alert for any members within
the groups who might organize strong-arm groups to engage in
any violent actions and they have reported no information_of_
this nature.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 75
In considering various disruptive actions
be exercised against these groups, it should be bo
that neither the DK, KKKK nor the UKA, Kve but
on the Attorney General's list under 30 10450.
Knoxville territory does not lie within the traditionally
deep South, there is, of course, some sympathy for organizations
such as the klans within the territory as evidenced by the
increased growth and activity of these organizations in recent
years. Within the Knoxville territory there have been no acts.
of violence within recent years which were attributable to the
klan. Although there may not be any public sympathy for the
klan in this area, there is certainly no antagonism toward
the organization and many persons have a passive feeling
toward its membership and activities. In some instances,.
politicians have solicited the support of the klan in local
elections. Just recently, one of the informants of the Knoxville
Office, who is a high official in the UKA, KKKK, reported that
one of the candidates for U. S.. Congress running from the
Knoxville district had contacted him and solicited the support
of klan members on his behalf.
Because of such factors as the above, it is not believed
that the cooperation of individuals can be utilized for plans
of disruptive action such as might be available if the targets
were Communist front organizations or related groups. In this
regard, although news media are very cooperative with the
Bureau in this territory, it is not believed that in a program
such as this was, it would be feasible, to utilize news media
in any counterintelligence operation in this area.
This matter has been discussed with Agents handling
investigations of the klan organizations in the Knoxville
Division and the following plans have been suggested as feasible
for operation against the DK, KKKK and UKA, KKKK in this terri-
tory:
It is suggested that anonymous telephone calls be madė
to employers of klan members inferring to the employer that
his company or business must be following a racist policy in
view of the fact that he has an employee (giving his identity)
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 76
2
who is a member of the klan organization. These calls wou
be limited to those instances where the klan member is y
by some large company or leading business who would possibly
be concerned about the picture they present to the public con-
cerning racial matters.
In view of the previously expressed desires of the
officials of the Knoxville Police Department to maintain racial
harmony in Knoxville, it is believed that arrangements could
be made with the Chief of Police to have one or more squad cars
visible in the vicinity of the meeting hall of the Knoxville
Klavern on the nights of their meetings. It is believed that
if the members saw these squad cars parked in the vicinity on
a continuing basis, it would cause them some apprehension
and would act as a deterrent to their activities, as well as
possible recruitment of new members.
:,
The UKA, KKKK often holds public meetings on private
· property leased for that purpose. At these meetings, officials
make speeches and invite spectators to make application for
membership. Informants report that the actual purpose of such
a meeting is to publicize the klan and secure new members.
In a few instances, informants have reported that some members
arriving at the meetings have intentionally covered their
license plate with a confederate flag metal insignia or with
a facsimile. On occasions, both the rear and front license
plates have been obscured or usually only the front license
obscured. It is believed through the cooperation of the High-
way Patrol on a command level, that patrolmen might be assigned
to the area where the meeting is held so that if the klan
members leaving the meeting continue to have their license plate
obscured, they may be arrested for violation of the state law
prohibiting such.
In connection with the informant program of the Knoxville
Office, certain persons are interviewed to ascertain their
cooperation and their potentials as a possible informant..
It is believed that in such cases where antagonism is shown
to the Agents' contact, that a later anonymous call might be
made to other members accusing the person contacted by the
NW-88608 Docid:32989629_Page 77
-
3
FBI as being an informant. This would cause a disruptive in-
fluence among the rank and file and would arouse suspicion and
distrust. This same plan could be pursued further and calls
be made to members even though they had not actually been con-
tacted by an Agent in connection with the informant program.
Additional ideas and tactics were discussed but were
not considered feasible. Many of the ideas were discarded
because it was believed that other actions proposed would
greatly jeopardize our present infórmant coverage. As the
Bureau is aware, this office has informant coverage in these
organizations on a very high level and we have been able to
secure detailed information on membership rolls and appli-
cations, as well as detailed information on personal activities
of members, as well as detailed activity of the membership as
a group. The Bureau has previously been advised that the program
of interviewing klan members at the time of the assassination
of President KENNEDY and later in connection with the bombings
in Birmingham tended to jeopardize our informant coverage,
due to their high-level positions and the fact that some of
the klan members felt that the information in the possession
of the FBI could only have been obtained from some high official
source in the klan.
Agent personnel responsible for the klan investigations
are continuing to give this program thought and attention, and
as the investigations progress, expect that additional ideas
will be submitted to the Bureau in connection with the status.
reports. The implementation of any of the above-listed plans,
of course, will not be put into effect without Bureau approval ·
and benefit of Bureau suggestions.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-78-
།
1
TO
"
MAY
GGA NR. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GC RNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM
:
SAC, RICHMOND
SUBJECT:
DATE:
10/15/64
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
ReBulet to Atlanta, dated 9/2/64.
The following is an analysis of potential counter-
intelligence action against the American Nazi Party (ANP),
the only hate or Klan organization currently active in the
Richmond territory.
The ANP is headed by GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL,
a white American citizen, who resides with his "Army" at
6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. Headquarters of ANP
is located at 928 North "Randolph St., Arlington, Va.
The ANP "Army" consists of about fifteen nondescript
individuals from all parts of the country who have no place to
go. They are between the ages of 18 to 40. ANP also has
members throughout the country, totaling about 200.
GEORGE LINCOEN ROCKWELL has many personal idio-
syncrasies or weaknesses which make him vulnerable for attack.
He cannot stand criticism%3B he is afraid for his own personal
safety; he continually believes that he has been infiltrated
by the Anti-Defamation League, the FBI and hate groups. He is
suspicious of all members, believing they will be potential
assassins of himself or spies within his group.
In view of these characteristics, it is suggested
that consideration be given for a careful campaign of corres-
pondence to be sent to ROCKWELL. from unnamed individuals
to warn him concerning a new member who plans to do bodily
harm to him.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 79
Y
Further, in this connection, correspondence
should be directed to ROCKWELL to plant the seed of suspicion
concerning new members, identifying them as "spies." or the
Anti-Defamation League or hate groups such as the National
States Rights Party (NSRP).
It is noted that both buildings leased by the ANP
from "sympathizers' are in poor condition and would be, most
likely, in violation of local law. It is suggested that con-
sideration be given to contacting officials of the Arlington
County Board of Health and the Arlington County Fire Depart-
ment for an official investigation of ANP premises.
Furthermore, in this regard it is believed that if
reliable news sources were apprised of the investigation,
there would be an expose of the true conditions of the ANP,
resulting in public criticism of ROCKWELL. Also, the publicity
would tend to frustrate efforts to recruit new and youthful
adherents who hold any grandeur of ANP when apprised of the
true picture.
ROCKWELL maintains a printing press at ANP Head-
quarters, 928 N. Randolph St., and without this printing
press, ANP activities would be greatly impaired. This, printing
press is actually owned by a former member, CHRISTOPER AVERY
BAILEY, who leased the printing press to ROCKWELL for $1,00
per year.
Information recently received indicates that BAILEY
has expressed interest in getting back his printing press.
It is suggested that consideration be given to approaching
BAILEY, through a third party, to seek the return of the
printing press and possibly entertainment of a law suit which
seeks the return of the printing press. BAILEY is presently
residing in the Washington, D. C. area.
It is noted animosity exists between ROCKWELL and
EDWARD RFIELDS, head of NSRP. Furthermore, it is noted
that ROCKELL recently brought suit against FIELDS for slander
in a letter written to a third party. It is suggested that
this relationship could be further antogonized by inflammatory
correspondence, ostensibly sent to ROCKWELL by NSRP officials
in Birmingham, Alabama. It is thought such correspondence might
also result in disruptive action of NSRP.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 80
2

It is recommended that consideration be given
to the potential counterintelligence actions against ANP
and if the Bureau approves, specific recommendations will
be immediately submitted.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 81
- 3-
72
TO
... 27
- UNITED STATES GO RNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FEI
FROM
:
SAC, RICHMOND
SUBJECT:
DATE:
10/15/64
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
ReBulet to Atlanta, dated 9/2/64.
The following is an analysis of potential counter-
intelligence action against the American Nazi Party (ANP),
the only hate or Klan organization currently active in the
Richmond territory.
The ANP is headed by GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL,
a white American citizen, who resides with his "Army" at
6150 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Va. Headquarters of ANP
is located at 928 North "Randolph St., Arlington, Va.
The ANP "Army" consists of about fifteen nondescript
individuals from all parts of the country who have no place to
60. They are between the ages of 18 to 40. ANP also has
members throughout the country, totaling about 200.
GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL has many personal idio-
syncrasies or weaknesses which make him vulnerable for attack.
He cannot stand criticism; he is afraid for his own personal
safety; he continually believes that he has been infiltrated
by the Anti-Defamation League, the FBI and hate groups. He is
suspicious of all members, believing they will be potential
assassins of himself or spies within his group.
In view of these characteristics, it is suggested
that consideration be given for a careful campaign of corres- :
pondence to be sent to ROCKWELL from unnamed individuals
to warn him concerning a new member who plans to do bodily
harm to him,
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 `Page 82
Further, in this connection, correspondence
should be directed to ROCKWELL to plant the seed of suspicion
concerning new members, identifying them as "spies." or the
Anti-Defamation League or hate groups such as the National
States Rights Party (NSRP).
11
It is noted that both buildings leased by the ANP
from "sympathizers are in poor condition and would be, most
likely, in violation of local law. It is suggested that con-
sideration be given to contacting officials of the Arlington
County Board of Health and the Arlington County Fire Depart-
ment for an official investigation of ANP premises.
Furthermore, in this regard it is believed that if
reliable news sources were apprised of the investigation,
there would be an expose of the true conditions of the ANP,
resulting in public criticism of ROCKWELL. Also, the publicity 3
would tend to frustrate efforts to recruit new and youthful
adherents who hold any grandeur of ANP when apprised of the
true picture.
ROCKWELL maintains a printing press at ANP Head-
quarters, 928 N. Randolph St., and without this printing
press, ANP activities would be greatly impaired. This printing
press is actually owned by a former member, CHRISTOPER AVERY
BAILEY, who leased the printing press to ROCKWELL for $1.00
per year.
Information recently received indicates that BAILEY
has expressed interest in getting back his printing press.
It is suggested that consideration be given to approaching
BAILEY, through a third party, to seek the return of the
printing press and possibly entertainment of a law suit which
seeks the return of the printing press. ·BAILEY is preséntly
residing in the Washington, D. C. area.
It is noted animosity exists between ROCKWELL and
EDWARD RAPFIELDS, head of NSRP, Furthermore, it is noted
that ROCKWELL recently brought suit against FIELDS for slander
in a letter written to a third party. It is suggested that
this relationship could be further antogonized by inflammatory
correspondence, ostensibly sent to ROCKWELL by NSRP officials
in Birmingham, Alabama. It is thought such correspondence might
also result in disruptive action of NSRP.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page.83
2
It is recommended that consideration be given
to the potential counterintelligence actions against ANP
and if the Sureau approves, specific recommendations will
be immediately submitted.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 84
:
- 3 -
KAMIN NAT
UNITED STATES G ERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM / SAC, SAVANTITAT
DATE:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM -
SUBJECT:
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/2/64.
The Savannah Office has the following klan orgáni
zations currently under active investigation.
1.
2.
Association of Georgia Klanṣ
This klan has only one klavern, Klavern #2A:
located in Savannah, Georgia. It has recently
been attempting to organize a klavern in
Brunswick, Georgia, but has mot met with any
success.
CHARLES-HAMADDOX, the reader of this group,
is ineffective in that he talks a great deal
about what they should do and what the officers
and members should do, but does not take any
specific action.
Association of South Carolina Klans, KKKK
This klan now has only one active klavern within
the Savannah Division and that is Klavern #335
in West Columbia, S. C. This klan has conducted
several rallies in South Carolina for the purpose.
of building up their klavern and starting new
Elaverns, and may have a new klavern in
Hemingway, S. C.
The active leader of this klan group appears to
be ROBERT HODGES, 2 post-office employee in
Columbia, S. C., although he carries the title
only of secretary. There have been recent
indications that members of the Board of Association
of South Carolina Klans feel HODGES is usurping
their authority and making decisions_without_
consulting them.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 85
3. United Klans of America, Inc., KKKK
This klan group has the following active Hlavorno
located within the Savannah Division:
a.
b.
C.
مارات
Klavern #4, Olanta, S. C.
This klavern moved about a year ago from
Effingham to Olanta in anticipation of
attracting more members; but still attracts
a maximum of 9 members to its meetings.
Klavern #41, Savannah, Georgia.
The attendants at the meetings of this klavern
have fallen off to usually a maximum of 6.
It did sponsor one rally in the summer of
1964 which was considered a failure.
Klavern #314, Swainsboro, Georgia.
This Klavern is one of the most active, but
meets only once a month. Many members- also
meet with Klavern #310, Waynesboro, Georgia,
but neither klavern has engaged in any activity
other than one street walk held in Waynesboro
this past summer. The active membership has
fallen off apparently due to lack of activity
during the past year.
Klavern # 310, Waynesboro, Georgia
This klavern has only 8 to 10 members in
attendance at their monthly meetings and has
lost membership during the past year.
e. Klavern #301, Washington, Georgia.
This klavern has reportedly been in a doubtful
state for the past two years. The klavern
was torn by dissension over financial matters
about two years ago and has rarely had sufficient
members in attendance since that time to hold
a meeting.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 86
-2-
2.
Altamaha Men's Club #72, Baxley, Ga.
སྐ་ ་*
This klavern is the newest active klavern
and has about 40 members, of which about
16 are active. They ousted one Exalted
Cyclops who indicated he favored aggressive
action, and several members have quit because
of the views of this Exalted Cyclops. This
is the only klavern in the Savannah Division
believed to have an "action" group within
the klavern.
At a meeting on 7/27/64, the Exalted Cyclops
stated CAN CRAIG; SEEte Grand Dragon,
had
advised thom to start a military unit. They
plan to have this unit trained in a secret
type of training. It was indicated that in
the event the Communists and Negroes attempt
to take over public facilities, that the klan
would take over operation of the railroads.
At a meeting on 8/11/64, it was decided the
military unit would be called the "Brothers
of Patriots" and that they have a bank account
as such. A fee is charged to join, and they
are going to teach the members judo.
The most effective disruptive action taken against the
Ilan so far was the interviewing of klan members in connection
with the "Bapbomb" case.
It is believed the most effective counterintelligence
program would be a program that would reveal to the members
of this organization that their identities are known to the
FBI. This would include a program of harassment by setting up
"not too discréet" stake out of the meeting places or roads
leading to meeting places to obtain license numbers, interview
of the klan members, neighborhood investigations and inquiry
at their places of employment concerning the members' activity.
in the klan.
It is further believed that efforts should be made
during the course of these inquiries to obtain knowledge
concerning the individual member's personal life which might
-3-
NW-88608 Docid:32989629_Page 87
Harish information that could be used in a campaign of
anonymous telephone calls or notes to his family or employer.
During interviews of members, inferences or slight
hints could be dropped indicating another specific member
of the klavern as the source of information.
On 9/25/64, Chief - STROM (NA), South Carolina
Law Enforcement Division (SCLED), Columbia, S. C., advised
his organization had arrested five persons from the vicinity
of West Columbia, S. C., in connection with the burning of a
cross on the grounds of the Governor's Mansion, Columbia,
"S. C.
These persons admitted they are members of a recently
formed group of the United Klans of America, Inc., at West
Columbia, S. C.
Chief. STROM said he desires to call in several
responsible newspapermen from throughout South Carolina, and
ask them to publish articles in the leading South Carolina
newspapers, pointing out to the public how membership in a klan
organization may hurt an individual, his family or his children
in later life. Chief: STROM requested that the FBI assist him
in gathering information concerning this matter such as how.
Xian F-mbership may affect the opportunity for the klan member
or members of his family in obtaining employment with the
US Government.
In addition, some klan informants are in a position
to take the side of dissident groups within the klaberns and
help to create or increase dissension.
It is requested that the Bureau give consideration
to helping ChiefSION OF the SCLED in connection with
his request for information as to how…klan membership may
prevent employment by klan members or members of their families
By the Federal Government.
W
It is also suggested that the Atlanta Office ascertain
applicable state laws that could be used in the State of
Georgia in discouraging klan membership, particularly on the
part of state or local employees or appointees.
-NW-88608-Docid:32989629_Page 88
-4-
TO
NG. 27
UNITED STATES G ERNMENT
IMemorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM
SAC, SAVANNAHI
SUBJECT:
:
DATE:
10
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/2/64.
The Savannah Office has the following klan, organi-
zations currently under active investigation. .
1.
2.
Association of Georgia Klans
1
This klan has only one klavern, Klavern #2A:
located in Savannah, Georgia. It has recently
been attempting to organize a klavern in
Brunswick, Géorgia, but has not met with any
success.
=
CHARLES HAMADDOX, the leader of this group,
is ineffective in that he talks a great deal
about what they should do and what the officers'
and members should do, but does not take any
specific action.
Association of South Carolina Klans, KKKK
This klan now has only one active klavern within
the Savannah Division and that is Klavern #335
in West Columbia, S. C. This klan has conducted
several rallies in South Carolina for the purpose
of building up their klavern and starting new
klaverns, and may have a new klavern in
Hemingway, S. C.
The active leader of this klan group appears to
be ROSE AUCES, a post office employee in
Columbia, S. C.. although he carries the title
only of secretary. There have been recent
indications that members of the Board of Association
of South Carolina Klans feel HODGES. is usurping
their authority and making decisions_without_
consulting them.
-
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 89
3. United Klans of America, Inc., KKKK
This klan group has the following active Hlaverno
located within the Savannah Division:
a.
b.
C.
Klavern #4, Olanta, S. C.
This klavern moved about a year ago from
Effingham to Olanta in anticipation of
attracting mbre members; but still attracts
a maximum of 9 members to its meetings.
Klavern #41, Savannah, Georgia.
The attendants at the meetings of this klavern
have fallen off to usually a maximum of 6.
It did sponsor one rally in the summer of
1964 which was considered a failure.
.
=
Klavern #314, Swainsboro, Georgia.
This klavern is one of the most active, but
meets only once a month. Many members also
meet with Klavern #310, Waynesboro, Georgia,
but neither klavern has engaged in any activity
other than one street walk held in Waynesboro
this past summer. The active membership has
fallen off apparently due to lack of activity
during the past year.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 90
d.
Klavern #310, Waynesboro, Georgia
e.
This klavern has only 8 to 10 members in
attendance at their monthly meetings and has
lost membership during the past year.
Klavern #301, Washington, Georgia.
This klavern has reportedly been in a doubtful
state for the past two years. The klavern
was torn by dissension over financial matters
about two years ago and has rarely had sufficient
members in attendance since that time to hold
a meeting.
-2-

31-1
f.
Altamaha Men's Club #72, Baxley, Ga.
This klavern is the newest active klavern
and has about 40 members, of which about
16 are active. They ousted one Exalted
Cyclops who indicated he favored aggressive
action, and several members have quit because
of the views of this Exalted Cyclops. This
is the only klavern in the Savannah Division
believed to have an "action" group within
the klavern.
At a meeting á 7/27/64, the Exalted Cyclops
stated CALA CRAIG; State Grand Aragon, had
advised thom to start a military unit. They
plan to have this unit trained in a secret
type of training. It was indicated that in
the event the Communists and Negroes attempt
to take over public facilities, that the klan
would take over operation of the railroads.
At a meeting on 8/11/64, it was decided the
military unit would be called the "Brothers
of Patriots" and that they have a bank account
as such. A fee is charged to join, and they
are going to teach the members judo.
The most effective disruptive action taken against the
klan so far was the interviewing of klan members in connection
with the "Bapbomb" case.
It is believed the most effective counterintelligence
program would be a program that would reveal to the members
of this organization that their identities are known to the
F31. This would include a program of harassment by setting up
"not too discreet" stake out of the meeting places or roads
leading to meeting places to obtain license numbers, interview
of the klan members, neighborhood investigations and inquiry
at their places of employment concerning the members' activity.
in the Klan.
It is further believed that efforts should be made'
during the course of these inquiries to obtain knowledge
concerning the individual member's personal life which might
-3-
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-91-
:
rish information that could be used in a campaign of
anonymous telephone calls or notes to his family or employer.
During interviews of members, inferences or slight
hints could be dropped indicating another specific momber
of the klavern as the source of information.
On 9/25/64, Chief DSTROM (NA), South Carolina
Law Enforcement Division (SCLED), Columbia, S. C., advised
his organization had arrested five persons from the vicinity
of West Columbia, S. C., in connection with the burning of a
cross on the grounds of the Governor's Mansion, Columbia,
"S. C.
These persons admitted they are members of a recently
formed group of the United Klans of America, Inc., at West
Columbia, S. C.
Chief STROM said he desires to call in several
responsible newspapermen from throughout South Carolina, and
ask them to publish articles in the leading South Carolina
newspapers, pointing out to the public how membership in a klan
organization may hurt an individual, his family or his children
in later life. Chief STROH requested that the FBI assist him
in gathering information concerning this matter such as how.
xian membership may affect the opportunity for the klan member
or members of his family in obtaining employment with the
US Government™
In addition, some klan informants are in a position
to take the side of dissident groups within the klaberns and
help to create or increase dissension.
}
It is requested that the Bureau give consideration
to helping Chief STROM of the SCLED in connection with
his request for information as to how klan membership may
Provent employment by klan members or
I members 
or 
members of their families
By the Federal Government.
13 the be
It is also suggested that the Atlanta Office ascertain
applicable state laws that could be used in the State of
Georgia in discouraging klan membership, particularly on the
part of state or local employees or appointees.
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page 92
_ Memorandum
TO
DIRECTOR,
FBI
ROM
:
SAC, BALTIMORE
SUBJECT:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE:
October 15, 1964
Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta dated
September 2, 1964.
A review of Baltimore files reflects that there are
presently no Klan organizations operating within the territory
covered by the Baltimore Office. Baltimore files reflect that there
are several alleged members of the American Nazi Party (ANP)
living in the Baltimore area. However these individuals are
associated with the ANP located in the territory covered by the
Richmond Office and there are no ANP groups in the Baltimore
territory. The Fighting American Nationalists
organization in the Baltimore area is defunct.
(FAN)
The National States Rights Party (NSRP) was τα some
extent active on the Eastern Shore of Maryland during the Spring
and early Summer of 1964 but there has been no reported_
activity there in recent months. The only evidence of current
activity by the NSRP in the Baltimore area are news stories which
appeared in the September 28 and September 30, 1964, editions of the
Baltimore Evening Sun, which reflected that two Baltimore County
Councilmen received letters from WILLIAM BRAILSFORD, organizer
of the NSRP, threatening to "paper" their districts with
derogatory pamphlets if they voted for a proposed civil rights
bill in Baltimore County. Information was also received that
a leaflet put out by the NSRP entitled "A Stab in the Back" was
being distributed in the Towson, Maryland, area of Baltimore
County.
In view of the current lack of activity by Klan and
hate groups within the Baltimore Division territory, the Baltimore
Office is not in a position at this time to make any specific
recommendations for counterintelligence action.:
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 93
The Baltimore Office will be alert for any
opportunities for potential counterintelligence action against
pertinent organizations or individuals active within the
Baltimore Office territory.
_ NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 94
-2-
ROM
-Memorandum
1.
SUBJECT:
DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE:
Octo e 15, 1964
SAC, BALTIMORE
:
į
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
Reference Bureau letter to Atlanta dated
September 2, 1964.
A review of Baltimore files reflects that there are
presently no Klan organizations operating within the territory
covered by the Baltimore Office. Baltimore files reflect that there
are several alleged members of the American Nazi Party (ANP)
living in the Baltimore area. However these individuals are
associated with the ANP located in the territory covered by the
Richmond Office and there are no ANP groups in the Baltimore
territory. The Fighting American Nationalists
organization in the Baltimore area is defunct.
(FAN)
The National States Rights Party (NSRP) was to some
extent active on the Eastern Shore of Maryland during the Spring
and early Summer of 1964 but there has been no reported
activity there in recent months. The only evidence of current
activity by the NSRP in the Baltimore area are news stories which
appeared in the September 28 and September 30, 1964, editions of the
Baltimore Evening Sun, which reflected that two Baltimore County
Councilmen received letters from WILLIAM BRAILSFORD, organizer
of the NSRP, threatening to "paper" their districts with
derogatory pamphlets if they voted for a proposed civil rights
bili in Baltimore County. Information was also received that
a leaflet put out by the NSRP entitled "A Stab in the Back" was
being distributed in the Towson, Maryland, area of Baltimore
County.
In view of the current lack of activity by Klan and
hate groups within the Baltimore Division territory, the Baltimore
Office is not in a position at this time to make any specific
recommendations for counterintelligence action..
:
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 95
The Baltimore Office will be alert for any
opportunities for potential counterintelligence action against
bertinent organizations or individuals active within the
Baltimore Office territory.
-NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 96
-2-
20
TROM
SUBJECT:
167709
7. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOV NMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FEI
UOBILE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE:
10/12
Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.
Analysis of Potential CI Action Against
Organizations and Personnel of United
Klans of America, Inc., KKKK (UKA);
Improved Order of the U.S. Klans, KKKK,
Inc. (IOUSK); and the Alabama States
Rights Party (SRP)
☐
Files on captioned organizations have been reviewed
at the Mobile Office to discover any information of the
kind which would prevent a potential for effective CI
action. This review of files includes the files of the
organizations themselves and of individuals known to be
officers and members of the organization. It is the under-
standing of this office that this information would consist
1 situations involving potential friction between individual
members or between rival organizations; or would consist of
information reflecting immorality, particularly sexual
immorality, on the part of one or more members, possibly
involving the wife or wives of other members; or consisting
generally of information of a highly unfavorable or embarrass-
ing nature pertaining to a member or group of members which.
would be not known, and the exposure of which could produce
cuitable conflicts. A minimum of such information is con-
tained in Mobile files pertaining to Klan and States Rights
Panty personnel, There have been conflicts between individuals
Within groups and between rembers of different groups, but
these conflicts have already matured and have already pro-
duced the division and animosity of which the situations
were odpable, Unlike personnel of Communist organizations,
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page 97
r
1 klin organizations are not particularly
1 immorality, and no information has been
Madleasing promiscuity on the part of a Klansman's wife en
O the port of a Klansman, although informants who furnish
mation pertaining to these individuals are faily well
acquainted with many of them. Approximately two years ago,
one Alansman did become jealous when a single Klan member
(unmarried) flirted with his wife at a social function.
However, the married member is no longer active, and there
is not known to have been any further development of that
situation.
Pertinent to this analysis is the following
observation: Within the past 70 days, Montgomery, Ala.,
where activity of UKA and ASRP are centralized, has
experienced desegregation of restaurants, hotels, motels,
and public schools, pursuant to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and pursuant to orders of the United States District
Court at Montgomery. Initially, particularly on 7/4 and
7/6/64, following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Not, there was an attempt by Klansmen to gather and con-
spire for the purpose of interfering with the desegregation
of movie theaters and restaurants in downtown Montgomery.
However, Mobile informants furnished information well in
advance of the actual proposed action, enabling Mobile to
gotify the Montgomery Police Department. The Police Depart-
Hont acted very promptly and effectively, disbursing Klansmen
who had gathered in the danger area, and making it quite
clear that no unlawful activity or interference with the
onforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act would be tolerated.
Both the fact that the information was leaked to authorities'
and the fact that the authorities took effective action
were highly demoralizing to the Klan personnel (who are
also the only significant personnel of the ASRP). The
demoralization was so complete that when Montgomery public
schools were desegregated, Klansmen did not even appear in.
the vicinities of the schools and took no action of any
kind, either at the schools or in any other place, in any
effort to interfere with the desegregation.
It is therefore fully evident that the purposes
sought by the CI program, that is the demoralization and
the rendering ineffective of such organizations, was
accomplished by direct investigation and Police action.
No Implication is intended that the work of the Mobile
Office has been finally done pertaining to these organizations,
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 98
2
ind, in fet, the current program of the Mobile Office is
to intensify and make more extensive the informant cover-
age of pertinent organizations. These informants will be
particularly alert for personal information of the kind
which might be suitable for the institution of CI action
in the future, and such information will be diligently
sought by Agents' conducting investigation concerning these
organizations and individuals. Mobile will also continue
to be alert for any opportunity to utilize the system which
has been effective in the past, that of cooperating with
local law enforcement to take the kind of action which dis-
courages unlawful action on the part of the Klan groups.
Recommendation
The Mobile Office has no recommendation for any
logical immediate CI action at this time.
Action Groups
Mobile racial informants have furnished the
identities of most individuals within the UKA and ASRP who
are considered the most. likely to commit acts of violence
or intimidation, Host of these persons have been under
investigation for some time, and in many instances Summary
Reports have been furnished to the Bureau pertaining to them.
In each of the instances of bombings in the vicinity of
Montgomery, Ala., including the bombings in Mississippi in
recent weeks, Agents have interviewed neighbors and employers
of these individuals and have made visual checks, particularly
late at night, in efforts to ascertain whether or not the
persons themselves were home or whether or not their auto-
mobiles were puked at their residences. In many cases,
and probably in most cases, these Klan personnel become
aware of these inquiries and on several situations it is
known that they observed Agents checking their cars and
observing their residences at night. These persons are
therefore under the impression that Bureau Agents have thèm
under virtually constant surveillance. They remarked to
each other in the presence of informants on occasion that
they feel that their telephones are tapped and they have
also expressed the fear that their meeting places are
subjected to microphone devices. It is believed that this:
read on their part constitutes a very effective deterrent,
and may very well be a principal reason for their failure
to salto any unlawfuli measures in connection with the racial
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 99
3
Nation in this area within recent weeks: Through in-
fortabs and through observations of license tags of auto-
Diles parked at meeting places, Mobile Office is constantly
Ibarning of the identities of new persons who have come
potential fr violence, In all such cases, a case file is
opened on that individual, his identity being established
and his background being obtained. No particular effort is
made to keep these investigations so discreet that the Klans-.
man will not learn that the FBI is inquiring about him.
This practice is deemed to be effective with respect to
these individuals.
As set forth hereinbefore, Mobile will intensify
its efforts to discover information, which can be used in
the CI program,
F
Pertaining to the possibility of exposure of
Klen and Klan-type activities through reliable news media,
It should be observed that it is the firm policy of news
ods in the Montgomery, Ala., area to completely ignore
those Klan groups, and to give them no publicity at all.
recent months, UKA has held several public rallies,
advertising some with leaflet distribution and even one
ace of a paid spot radio advertisement. They have
ited the press to attend these rallies, hoping to secure
publicity from them. Again, it is believed that the
policy of the press to ignore these groups has had the
most desirable effect, both in frustrating them in their
search for publicity, and in avoiding advertising them
which, if done, night rally more persons to the Klan cause
and result in their increasing their membership. Because
of these considerations, it is believed that at least in
this area, the current press policy of ignoring the Klan
is more effective than would be a policy of exposure of
the evils of the organizations.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 100
4
ماس

Attached hereto is the response to Item #2 in
the Senate Select Committee (SSC)
O'Connor, Esq. on July 14, 1975.
as follows:
letter to Mr. K. William
Item #2 is set forth
"All memoranda and any other materials which
contain or reflect studies of 'counterintelligence and
disruption tactics' and the making of 'appropriate
recommendation' as mentioned in approved Recommendation #3
on page 5 of the July 30, 1964 memorandum captioned
'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups'
from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson."
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 101
Attached hereto is the response to Item #2 in
the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter to Mr. K. William
O'Connor, Esq. on July 14, 1975. Item #2 is set forth
as follows:
"All memoranda and any other materials which
contain or reflect studies of 'counterintelligence and
disruption tactics' and the making of 'appropriate
recommendation' as mentioned in approved Recommendation #3
on page 5 of the July 30, 1964 memorandum captioned
'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups'
from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson."
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 102
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN.REG. NO. 27
GEN.
UNITED STATES GC
UNITE
5010-106
RNMENT
Memorandum
: MR. TOLSON
FROM
:
J. H. GA
GALதிதே
DATE:
July 30, 1964
Toison
✓✓ mont
Mohr
✓
Conrad
✓ Delbach
Ev
Bose
Suivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
SUBJECT: * INVESTIGATION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE
سر آپ
GROUPS
j
2 سه
Mr. Sullivan has proposed that the development of informants in the Ku Klux
Klan (KKK) and other hate groups as well as tne investigation and penetration of these
organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General
Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). He bases his
recommendations on the premise that organizations like the KKK and supporting
groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses
of action that are inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist
Party. He does not maintain that the actions of the hate groups constitute the same
menace as the Communist Party inasmuch as they are not controlled by a foreign
power. Counterintelligen Program - Disruption Of Hate Groups-ba
He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the
penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources,
sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of
a highly specialized nature, etc., and that his division could put this experience
to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.
Mr. Sullivan feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a
disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups
with the same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party
is concerned. He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to
¡instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly
specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question. He states the
Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial matters and
civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KKK and similar
organizations to confuse the issue. He feels that because of the stepped up
activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent marked confusion
from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative
and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DID assumes these responsibilities.
H
The functions in question were formerly handled by the DID up until 1958
when they were transferred to the General Investigative Division. This matter was
considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/58 and the transfer recommended.
1 - Mr. Rosen 1 - Mr. Sullivan
1
-
Mr. Belmont 1 - Mr. Mohr_
BEL
i
34
REC 30
30
EX-108
A
SEP 28 1964 V
T
JHG;wmj (7) Enclosures.OX
DA OCT
16 SEP 281-54
NW 88608 Doeld:32989629 Page-103<
SENT DIRECTOR
7-31-64
UNICORDED COPY PILED IM
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups
☐ 1
One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these responsibilities from the
DID in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the
racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such
incidents after their occurrence.
!
Mr. Rosen was opposed to the transfer of the functions in question to the
General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that
he maintains that the development of informants and the penetration of the Klan
and other hate groups are primarily intelligence functions which should be handled
by the DID as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Reson feels that the Direct on
best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united
in one division as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Rosen points out that the
development, supervision and administrative handling of racial and security
informants are analogous.
Mr. Rosen feels that there is a tendency toward oversimplification
in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups. He points out that the
murders of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination of President
Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate group members
whereas investigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of
Evers and Moore were without organization affiliation and the President was
slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Mr. Rosen and Mr. Sullivan both agree that the investigation of individual
cases, i. e. bombings, murders, police brutality, etc., should be handled by the
General Investigative Division. Mr. Rosen feels that whether subject or victims
are Klan members, Communist Party members or completely without organizational
affiliation has no more bearing on our supervision of the substantive civil rights
violation than it would have if the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment,
Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act.
Mr. Belmont disagrees with Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan and feels
that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative
to the Domestic Intelligence Division is theoretically appealing, it is not a
practical answer to our problem. He states that at the time of the 1958 transfer
of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the
activities of the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation.
He feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958, because, over-
whelmingly, our interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with
integration and civil rights. Mr. Belmont believes the transfer of functions would
create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance
to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc., is through
information developed from the inside as a result of coverage established in the
-2-
NW 88608 Docld:32989629. Page 104.
!
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups
1
1
community where the crime occurred; i. e. informants and sources in the Klan, hate
groups, subversive organizations, but also sources not connected with any group,
who will report potential violence and individuals prone to violence. We are following
the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence even though they
have not violated a Federal law as yet. He feels that the Division that is going to
investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose.
Mr. Belmont does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the
Bureau from an investigative standpoint nor in meeting the heavy responsibilities we no
have in this area.
VIEWS OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION:
Ilrea
Inspector feels there is certainly some merit and logic in Mr. Belmont's
reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white.
Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of
information between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions
in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters of information
are brought to the attention of each other as they arise from matters for which
each Division is primarily responsible. However, it seems the real issue today
just as in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question.
In 1958 it clearly lay in the General Investigative Division because, according to
information available to the Bureau at that time, in practically no instances had
racial incidents been caused or inspired by Communist Party elements although
the Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after they occurred. Also,
in 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations.
Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic
Intelligence Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced a definite interest
in the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be
exploiting it to an ever-increasing extent. Although prosecution for civil rights
and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite
need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so as
to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities. This seems more
properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division.
Analysis was made by Inspector relative to coverage of the Klan and other
hate groups. The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of
pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed
the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage on certain key
Klan figures, have interviewed at least once all known Klan members all Klan.
leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations
have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan member. A
weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning informant development.
However, undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns
that have been formed since the civil rights bill passed. There is no question about
This
complained
after ?
ناة
hove by tlacial troper cover
thing rod been done unti
NW 88608 Docld: 2989629 Page 105-
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups
the fact that the DID has had broad experience in the penetration of sɩ oversive
organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the (ommunist
Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this
experience and know-how could be put to good advantage in penetrating the Klan
and other hate groups.
The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the
direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division
as outlined by Mr. Sullivan and Ifr. Rosen cutweigh the advantages of laring the
hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases.
Under the proposed transfer of phases of the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence
Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, Mr. Rosen
to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations and
other criminal violations. This dual responsibility, however, should pose no
problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled
in the Bureau today. In this regard it will be noted that the administrative handling
of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative
Division which includes the informants being utilized on General Investigative
Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles
the informant and intelligence aspects of organized crime. However, the General
Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy,
Extortion, Assaulting a Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment
violations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing
Criminal Intelligence informants. It is understood that there have been no in-
soluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble
problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information
between the General Investigative Division and the DID.
In any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and.
supervision on the field if these functions are transferred. The same Agents
in the field will be working the cases and developing the informants. However,
it is felt that the DID should be given a chance to demonstrate whether their
broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration
tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups. It is felt
that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly
merits further consideration. It is also felt that the proposed series of field con-
ferences on this problem should be favorably considered.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 106
- 4 -
A
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups
RECOMMENDATIONS:
-
1. That the responsibility for development of informants and
gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate groups be transferred from
the General Investigative Division to the DID. (If approved, appropriate memorandum
will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution
of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DID.)
для
OK.
Q
1
2. That a series of regional field conferences be held by appropriate
Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and
aggressive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration. (If
approved, to be coordinated by Mr. Belmont.)
* * *
для
OK
H.
3. That counter-intelligence and disruption tactics be given further
study by DID and appropriate recommendations made.
для
Am
ok
め
1/31
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 107
- 5 -
ΤΟ
{TONAL FORM NO. 10
1962 EDITION
GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GC RNMENT
Memorandum
"MR. TOLSON
FROM
J. H. GAI
GALநிதே
Bison
Mohr
Casper
DATE: July 30, 1964
Conraa
Delpach
ven
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
SUBJECT: * INVESTIGATION OF KU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER HATE
GROUPS
1
سو
Holmes
Ws
andy
Mr. Sullivan has proposed that the development of informants in the Ku Klux
Klan (KKK) and other hate groups as well as tne investigation and penetration of these
organizations from an intelligence standpoint be transferred from the General
Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). He bases his
recommendations on the premise that organizations like the KKK and supporting
groups are essentially subversive in that they hold principles and recommend courses
of action that are inimical to the Constitution as are the viewpoints of the Communist
Party. He does not maintain that the actions of the hate groups constitute the same
menace as the Communist Party inasmuch as they are not controlled by a foreign
power. Counterintellige Prograin- Disruption of Hate Group';_GW!
He feels that the DID over the years has developed wide experience in the
penetration of subversive organizations through informants, anonymous sources,
sophisticated microphone and technical surveillances, interview programs of
a highly specialized nature, etc., and that his division could put this experience
to excellent use in penetrating the Klan and other hate groups.
Mr. Sullivan feels that the DID would be in a position to launch a
disruptive counter-intelligence program against the Klan and other hate groups
with the same effectiveness that they are now doing insofar as the Communist Party
is concerned. He also proposes an immediate series of regional conferences to
instruct pertinent field personnel and to devise imaginative, aggressive and highly
specialized programs to carry out the responsibilities in question. He states the
Communist Party is increasing its activities in the field of racial matters and
civil rights, directing more and more of its fire against the KKK and similar
organizations to confuse the issue. He feels that because of the stepped up
activities of the Communist Party in this area it would help prevent marked confusion
from developing in the areas of activities being handled by the General Investigative
and Domestic Intelligence Divisions if the DID assumes these responsibilities.
H.
The functions in question were formerly handled by the DID up until 1958
when they were transferred to the General Investigative Division. This matter was
considered by the Executives Conference 10/1/58 and the transfer recommended.
REC 30
姦
1 - Mr. Rosen'
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont 1
-O
Mr. Mohr_
SENT DIRECTOR
7-31-64
JHG: wmj (7) Enclosures ..OX
1620154
NW/88608 Docld:32989629 Page-1085-
EX-108
i
C
34
SEP 28 1964
SEC AW
RENCONDID COPY VILED IN
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups
One of the prime factors in the decision to transfer these responsibilities from the
DID in 1958 was the almost complete absence of Communist Party activity in the
racial area although at that time the Communist Party sought to capitalize on such
incidents after their occurrence.
Mr. Rosen was opposed to the transfer of the functions in question to the
General Investigative Division in 1958 and his present position is consistent in that
he maintains that the development of informants and the penetration of the Klan
and other hate groups are primarily intelligence functions which should be handled
by the DID as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Roson feels that the Dureau con
best keep abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united
in one division as suggested by Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Rosen points out that the
development, supervision and administrative handling of racial and security
informants are analogous.
Mr. Rosen feels that there is a tendency toward oversimplification
in blaming all racial murders on Klansmen and hate groups. He points out that the
murders of Medgar Evers, Postman Moore and even the assassination of President
Kennedy were initially and generally attributed to Klan and hate group members
whereas investigation showed that the individuals charged with the murders of
Evers and Moore were without organization affiliation and the President was
slain by an avowed Marxist who was active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Mr. Rosen and Mr. Sullivan both agree that the investigation of individual
cases, i. e. bombings, murders, police brutality, etc., should be handled by the
General Investigative Division. Mr. Rosen feels that whether subject or victims
are Klan members, Communist Party members or completely without organizational
affiliation has no more bearing on our supervision of the substantive civil rights
violation than it would have if the violation involved were Theft from Interstate Shipment,
Bank Robbery or White Slave Traffic Act.
Mr. Belmont disagrees with Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan and feels
that while the proposed transfer of functions from the General Investigative
to the Domestic Intelligence Division is theoretically appealing, it is not a
practical answer to our problem.. He states that at the time of the 1958 transfer
of functions in question the basis was the close inter-relationship between the
activities of the Klan and hate groups and the entire civil rights field of investigation.
He feels this argument has even more strength today than in 1958, because, over-
whelmingly, our interest in Klan and hate groups today is their relationship with
integration and civil rights. Mr. Belmont believes the transfer of functions would
create an undesirable division of authority and responsibility; that our best chance
to break major civil rights cases such as bombings, murders, etc., is through
information developed from the inside as a result of coverage established in the
-2-
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 109
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups
community where the crime occurred; i. e. informants and sources in the Klan, hate
groups, subversive organizations, but also sources not connected with ny group,
who will report potential violence and individuals prone to violence. W are following
the policy of aggressively seeking out persons addicted to violence even though they
have not violated a Federal law as yet. He feels that the Division that is going to
investigate these cases should forge the necessary tools to use for this purpose.
Mr. Belmont does not feel that the transfer of this responsibility will be helpful to the
Bureau from an investigative standpoint nor in meeting the heavy responsibilities we now
have in this area.
VIEWS OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION:
Inspector feels there is certainly some merit and logic in Mr. Belmont's
reasoning and it is felt instant issue is not one that is completely black or white.
Under the present setup there is coordination and daily exchange of
information between Domestic Intelligence and General Investigative Divisions
in that both Divisions insure that communications and other matters of information
are brought to the attention of each other as they arise from matters for which
each Division is primarily responsible. However, it seems the real issue today
just as in 1958, is where does the weight of the interest lie in the racial question.
In 1958 it clearly lay in the General Investigative Division because, according to
information available to the Bureau at that time, in practically no instances had
racial incidents been caused or inspired by Communist Party elements although
the Party naturally sought to capitalize on incidents after they occurred. Also,
in 1958, it was felt that consolidation would streamline certain operations.
Today it seems clear from information developed by Domestic
Intelligence Division that the Communist Party now has evidenced a definite interest
in the racial problem, is becoming deeply enmeshed therein, and appears to be
exploiting it to an ever-increasing extent. Although prosecution for civil rights
and other criminal violations is still an ultimate objective, there is definite
need for an intelligence type penetration of these racial and hate groups so as
to keep abreast of and ahead of their plans and activities. This seems more
properly the function of the Domestic Intelligence Division.
Analysis was made by Inspector relative to coverage of the Klan and other
hate groups. The General Investigative Division has been putting a great deal of
pressure on the field to increase informant coverage. They have recently instructed
the field to conduct surveys relative to instituting technical coverage on certain key
Klan figures, have interviewed at least once all known Klan members all Klan
leaders have been investigated from intelligence standpoint and recommendations
have been made that intelligence type cases be opened on each Klan member. A
weekly progress airtel is being obtained from field concerning informant development.
However, undoubtedly additional coverage is needed particularly in the Klaverns
that have been formed since the civil rights bill passed. There is no question about
none & these bring covera
od been done unti
bber
NW 88608 Bold 32989622 Rage 110 ained
2
3
"
✓

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups
the fact that the DID has had broad experience in the penetration of subversive
organizations and has achieved noteworthy results in infiltrating the Communist
Party and Soviet intelligence operations. It is felt that unquestionably this
experience and know-how could be put to good advantage in penetrating the Klan
and other hate groups.
The Inspection Division feels that the advantages in having the
direction of all informant and intelligence matters in the racial field in one division
as outlined by Mr. Sullivan and Ir. Resen outweigh the advantages of laving the
hate group informants and intelligence functions with the substantive civil rights cases.
Under the proposed transfer of phases of the racial problem to Domestic Intelligence
Division there will still be definite responsibility in both divisions, Mr. Rosen
to retain responsibility for supervision of substantive civil rights violations and
other criminal violations. This dual responsibility, however, should pose no
problem because there are numerous examples of it successfully being handled
in the Bureau today. In this regard it will be noted that the administrative handling
of the entire criminal informant program is handled by the Special Investigative
Division which includes the informants being utilized on General Investigative
Division cases. It will also be noted that the Special Investigative Division handles
the informant and intelligence aspects of organized crime. However, the General
Investigative Division handles key substantive violations such as Bankruptcy,
Extortion, Assaulting a Federal Officer, and Theft from Interstate Shipment
violations committed by members of the organized criminal syndicate utilizing
Criminal Intelligence informants. It is understood that there have been no in-
soluble problems in this regard and it is felt that there should be no insoluble
problems in the coordination of racial intelligence and informant information
between the General Investigative Division and the DID.
In any event there will certainly be no lessening of pressure and
supervision on the field if these functions are transferred. The same Agents
in the field will be working the cases and developing the informants. However,
it is felt that the DID should be given a chance to demonstrate whether their
broad knowledge of and experience in penetration techniques and infiltration
tactics can possibly increase our penetration of these hate groups. It is felt
that a study of counter-intelligence and disruption tactics against the Klan certainly
merits further consideration. It is also felt that the proposed series of field con-
ferences on this problem should be favorably considered.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 111
- 4 -
入
:
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and Other Hate Groups
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That the responsibility for development of informants and
gathering of intelligence on the KKK and other hate groups be transferred from
the General Investigative Division to the DID. (If approved, appropriate memorandum
will be submitted by Inspection Division concerning realignment and distribution
of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the DID.)
для
OK.
•
2
d
2. That a series of regional field conferences be held by appropriate
Bureau official to instruct personnel and attempt to develop further imaginative and
aggressive highly specialized programs to carry out desired penetration. (If
approved, to be coordinated by Mr. Belmont.)
для
OK.
A.
3. That counter-intelligence and disruption tactics be given further
study by DID and appropriate recommendations made.
для
Am Litere
ok
め
57/31
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 112
- 5-
است
BAC, Atlanta
Director, FBI (157-9-Ha in}
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
INTENIAL SECURITY
DISTUSTIC OF HAD GOOUPS.
1
1
I
-
-
MTX.
14
September 2, 1964
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Belmont
Mr.
Sullivan
1
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Gray
Mr. Trainor I
-
Mr. Ryan.
Offices
Effective immediately, the Bureau is instituting
a coordinated Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro)
directed against sian-type and hate organizations.
receiving copies of this letter are instructed to immediately
open an active control file, captioned as above, and to
assign responsibility for this program to an experienced
and imaginative Special Agent who is well versed in
investigation of hate and racist-type organizations and
their membership.
که او را دارت
SEP 7 4 57 PH 'EW
FELD READING ROOM
FBI
The purpose of this program is to expose, disrupt
and otherwise neutralize the activities of the various Klans
and hate organizations, their leadership and adherents.
The activities of these groups must be followed on a
continuous basis so we may take advantage of all oppor-
tunities for counterintelligence and also inspire action
in instances where circumstances warrant. The devious
* maneuvers and duplicity of these groups must be exposed
to public scrutiny through the cooperation of reliable
news media sources, both locally and at the Seat of
Government. We must frustrate any effort of the groups
to consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful
adherents. In every instance, consideration should be
given to disrupting the organized activity of these groups
and no opportunity should be missed to capitalize upon
organizational and personal conflicts of their leadership.
-
Baltimore
Birmingham
2 - Charlotte
22222222
-
Chicago
Jacksonville
-
-
Jackson
-
Knoxville
-
Little Rock
MAILED 6
Memphis
Hamil
-
2
-
Hobile
SER 3 19642
SEP 3
COMM-FBI
-
2
2
-
-
2
2
-
REAL
MC
12 SEP 4/1964
New Orleans'
New York
Richmond
Savannah
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
2 - Tampa
100-3-101-Main (CPUSA, Cointelpro)
NOTE:
See memo Baumgardner to Sullivan, 8/27/64, same caption,
DR: bgc.
-DR: bgc (42)
MAIL ROOM
'
TELETYPE:UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989629-Page-113-
RR-812RB
AR
"
Letter to Atlanta
RE:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main
The following Elan organizations, durrently
under active investigation, should be considered for
counterintelligence action:
1. Association of Arkansas Klans of the
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
2. Association of Georgia Klans.
3. Association of South Carolina Klans,
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
4. Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,
Hinton, West Virginia.
5. Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, Inc.
6. Improved Order of the U. S. Klans,
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
7. Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn.
Independent Klan Unit, St. Augustine,
Florida.
8.
9.
10.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Aka.
Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
11. National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
12.
13.
14.
Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.
Pioneer Club, Orlando, Florida.
United Florida Ku Klux Klan.
15. United Klans of America, Inc., Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan.
16. U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, Inc.
17. White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of
Mississippi.
The following hate organizations currently being
afforded active investigation are included in this program.
1. Alabama States Rights Party (Origin: Mobile)
American Nazi Party (Origin: Richmond)
2.
22
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 114
Letter to Atlanta
RE:
1
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main
3. Council for Statehood, aka, Freemen
4.
5.
(Origin: Miand)
Fighting American Nationalists
(Origin: Daltivore)
National DUNG I Party
(Origin: Birmingham)
6. National Renaissance Party
7.
8.
9.
(Origin: New York)
.:
United Freeron (Origin: Miami)
Viking Youth of America' (Origin: Tampa)
White Youth Corps (Origin: Chicago)
On or before 10/15/04, participating offices
are instructed to submit to the Bureau a detailed analysis
of potential counterintelligence action against pertinent
organizations and individuals active within their respective
territories and specific recommendations should be included
for any logical immediate counterintelligence action.
Recommendations submitted under this program must include
all nocessary facts to enable the Bureau to intelligently
pass upon the feasibility of the proposed action. In
instances where a reliable and cooperative news media
representative or other source outside the Bureau is to
be contacted or utilized in connection with a proposed
counterintelligence operation, it will be incumbent upon
the recommending office to furnish assurances the source
will not reveal the Bureau's interest or betray our
confidence.
Offices participating in this program who have
investigative responsibility for Elan organizations should
specifically comment in the initial letter to the Bureau
regarding "Action Groups." As these offices are aware,
these groups have been described as the relatively few
individuals in each organization who use strong-arm tactics
and violent actions to achieve their ends. Often these
groups act without the approval of the Klan organization
Ro
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 115
Letter to Atlanta
RE:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main
or membership.
The Bureau considers it vital that we
expose the identities and activities of such groups and
where possible disrupt their efforts. Those groups should
be subjected to combing compellboo action,
No counterintelligence action may be initiated
by the field without specific Bureau authorization.
Commencing 1/1/65 and every 3 months thereafter,
each participating office should submit to the Bureau a
status letter covering the prior 3-month period, including
comments under the following captions:
1. Potential Counterintelligence Action
2. Pending Counterintelligence Action
3. Tangible Results
If necessary, a 4th caption "Miscellaneous"
may be utilized for additional comments.
Recommendations for counterintelligence action
should not be included in 90-day status letters to the
Bureau but following the initial analysis due 10/15/64,
should be submitted individually by separate letter.
All Special Agent personnel responsible for
the investigation of Klan-type and hate organizations
and their membership should be alerted to our counter-
intelligence plans relating to these groups. Counter-
intelligence action, directed at these groups is intended to
complement and stimulate our accelerated intelligence
investigations. Each investigative Agent has a responsi-
bility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence
coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing
the program.
You are cautioned that the nature of this
new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should
the existence of the program be made known outside the
Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be
afforded this sensitive operation.
༣
NW 88608 Docid:32989629-Page-1-16-
1
Letter to Atlanta
RE:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main
The Bureau is pleased with past successes
achieved by our counterintelligence efforts in other
phases of our investigative responsibilities. ΤΟ
insure our success in this now boavo, to gont to
whom the program is assigned in each office must have
a detailed knowledge of the activities of the racist
groups in the territory and that knowledge must be
coupled with interest, initiative and imagination.
The Agent must be alert for information which has a
disruptive potential. The information will not come
to him
he must look for it. The most effective
way of being assured of keeping on top of the situation
is to maintain close contact with those Agents who handle
the investigation of the racial and hate groups and their
membership and also to periodically review relevant files.
-
-
If an enthusiastic approach is made to this
new endeavor, there is no reason why the results
achieved under this program will not equal or surpass
our achievements in similar-type programs directed
against subversives.
3
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 117°
2
RONAL FORM NO. 10
1962 EDITION
GEN. REG. NO. 27
3010-104
NITED STATES GC., ERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
1
Mr. W. C. Sullivan
FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner
SUBJECT:
DATE: August 27, 1964
終わる
1
-
Mr. Belmont
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
1
1
-
-
1
-
Mr. Sullivan
Mr
Mr.
Baumgardner
Gray
1 - Mr. Trainor ②
1
-
Mr. Ryan
HIN
Tolsón
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Contad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tave
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated 7/30/64
captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups" was
approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence
Division to give consideration to the application of counterintel-
ligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter
make appropriate recommendations. It is our recommendation that
we immediately initiate a hard-hitting, closely supervised,
coordinated counterintelligence program to expose, disrupt and
otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and specified other
hate groups.
This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage
of our experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques
successfully applied against the Communist Party, USA, and related
organizations since 1956. Primarily, we intend to expose to public
scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups;
to frustrate any efforts or plans they may have to consolidate
their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or youthful
adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent
.or violate the law. Our counterintelligence efforts against hate
groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complement
our expanded intelligence investigations directed at these
organizations.
We are furnishing general instructions to 17 field
\offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation
of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations, and New York, Chicago
and Baltimore, who have active investigative responsibilities
for one hate organization each) relating to the administration
and prompt enactment of this new counterintelligence program.
Briefly, these instructions require the 17 participating offices
to submit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of
possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific
recommendations for action. Thereafter (commencing 1/1/65) the
participating offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting
Encent 9-3-64
157-9-Main
GOT-X
1 - 100-3-104-Main (CPUSA, Cointelpro)
DR: bgc 8 SEP 301964 CONTINUED
NW 88608 Docld:32989629-Page-118-
-
OVER
REC 20
151-9-2
4
SEP 241504
lassifie
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
· DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main
forth a summary of current, possible, and successfully achieved
counterintelligence activity during the prior &-month period.
Each office will be insused de oyen wi finding
investigation relating to this program and to assign a Special
Agent on a part-time basis as the program coordinator responsible
for following and initiating counterintelligence action.
As is the instance in our established counterintelligence
program against the Communist Party, USA, and in our current 90-day
trial counterintelligence program directed against Soviet-Satellite
intelligence all recommended counterintelligence action against
Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be approved
at the Seat of Government.
This new counterintelligence program directed at Klan
and hate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government
by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar programs
directed against the Communist Party, USA, and Soviet-Satellite
intelligence. His efforts will be closely coordinated with
supervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations
of the Klans and hate organizations and their membership. An annual
memorandum justifying continuance of the program will be submitted
and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised
of techniques which have been found to be most successful. At
such time as the program is considered to be successfully under
way, a status memorandum will be submitted which will include any
additional recommendations relating to manpower or other administrative
requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized
to immediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence program
directed at exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing the
17 active Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations.
* Portion in brackets
classified sicket
by #183
5/7/7445
NW 88608 "Docld:32989629- Page 1-19
-->
LoveR
'
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main
2. That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17
field offices slated to participate in this new counterintelligence
program setting forth instructions for the administration and
immediate enactment of the program.
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NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 120
-
3.
-

TO
OPTIONAL RM NO. 10
"MAY 196
ATION
95 GEN. EG. NO. 27
5010-106
"UNITED STATES GC.VERNMENT
Memorandum
0
Sullivan
Mr. W. C. Sullivan
ذيب
FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner
SUBJECT:
DATE: August 27, 1964
FBB
1
-
Mr. Belmont
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
1
1
I
-
-
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Baumgardner
Mr. Gray
1 - Mr. Trainor②
I
-
Mr. Ryan
Toisón
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Contad
Evans
**Gale
Posen
WINK
Sullivan t
Tcvefts.
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy'
Memorandum from Mr. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated 7/30/64.
captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups" was
approved by the Director authorizing the Domestic Intelligence
Division to give consideration to the application of counterintel-
ligence and disruptive tactics to hate groups and to thereafter
make appropriate recommendations. It is our recommendation that
we immediately initiate a hard-hitting, closely supervised,
coordinated counterintelligence program to expose, disrupt and
otherwise neutralize the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and specified other
hate groups.
This new counterintelligence effort will take advantage
of cur experience with a variety of sophisticated techniques
successfully applied against the Communist Party, USA, and related
organizations since 1956. Primarily, we intend to expose to public
scrutiny the devious maneuvers and duplicity of the hate groups;
to frustrate any efforts or plans they may have to consolidate
their forces; to discourage their recruitment of new or youthful
adherents; and to disrupt or eliminate their efforts to circumvent
.or violate the law. Our counterintelligence efforts against hate
groups will be closely supervised and coordinated to complement
our expanded intelligence investigations directed at these
organizations.
We are furnishing general instructions to 17 field
offices (14 Southern offices responsible for active investigation
of 17 Klan groups and 6 hate organizations, and New York, Chicago
and Baltimore, who have active investigative responsibilities
for one hate organization each) relating to the administration
and prompt enactment of this new counterintelligence program.
Briefly, these instructions require the 17 participating offices
to submit to the Bureau on or before 10/15/64 an analysis of
possible counterintelligence operations, including any specific
recommendations for action. Thereafter (commencing 1/1/65) the
participating offices will submit a 90-day status letter setting
REC 20
Encent 9-3-64
157-9-Main
GOT-X
1100-3-104-Main (CPUSA, Cointelpro)
DR: bgc 8 SEP 30 1964 CONTINUED
NW-88608 Doold+32989629_Page 121
-
OVER
157-2-2
SEP 241504
J
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main
forth a summary of current, possible, and successfully achieved
counterintelligence activity during the prior 3-month period.
Each office will be zucndu to byla and mintada a jinding
investigation relating to this program and to assign a Special
Agent on a part-time basis as the program coordinator responsible
for following and initiating counterintelligence action.
As is the instance in our established counterintelligence
program against the Communist Party, USA, and in our current 90-day
trial counterintelligence program directed against Soviet-Satellite
intelligence all recommended counterintelligence action against
Klan-type and hate organizations will be required to be approved
at the Seat of Government.
..:
This new counterintelligence program directed at Klan
and hate organizations will be supervised at the Seat of Government
by the Special Agent supervisor responsible for our similar programs
directed against the Communist Party, USA, and Soviet-Satellite
intelligence. His efforts will be closely coordinated with
supervisory personnel responsible for the intelligence investigations
of the Klans and hate organizations and their membership. An annual
memorandum justifying continuance of the program will be submitted
and the participating field offices will be periodically apprised
of techniques which have been found to be most successful. At
such time as the program is considered to be successfully under
way, a status memorandum will be submitted which will include any
additional recommendations relating to manpower or other administrative
requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That the Domestic Intelligence Division be authorized
to immediately initiate a coordinated counterintelligence program
directed at exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing the
17 active Klan organizations and 9 active racial hate organizations.
Portion in brackets
classifica secret
by 77 183
5/7/74F45
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 -Page -122
-2-
LoveR
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
157-9-Main
i
2. That the attached letter be forwarded to the 17
field offices slated to participate in this new counterintelligence
program setting forth instructions for the administration and
immediate enactment of the program.
git
जर
wel
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NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 123
- 3 -
4
FROM :
SUBJECT:
DAY 1942 CDITION
A GEN. 327
UNITED STATES & RNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI.
TAMPA
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
!
DATE:
9/9/64
above.
Re Bureau letter dated 9/2/64 captioned as
On Page 3 Bureau listed the Viking Youth of
America, Tampa origin, as one of the hate groups currently
being afforded active investigation and included in
captioned program.
Reference is now made to Tampa letter to the
Bureau dated 5/6/64 which made reference in turn to
Jacksonville letter dated 4/30/64 wherein GEORGE-FRANKLIN
MARCHELOS stated that the Viking Youth of America never
became organized in the United States and that he never
made an actual active attempt to recruit members in this
organization. The Tampa file in this matter is closed.
We have not been able to determine that any active chapters
of this group are in existence or that any members were
recruited for the group. It is therefore felt that there
would be no point in our attempting any disruptive tactics
in connection with this group..
The Bureau is requested to advise Tampa whether
it would be satisfactory not to initiate any action on
the Viking Youth of America and to substitute some other
organization for this purpose.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 124
FROM
:
SUBJECT:
HAYO
༢॰, ༢་:༢,、 ..
"UNITED STATES G RNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
TANPA
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE: 9/9/64
above.
Re Bureau letter dated 9/2/64 captioned as
On Page 3 Bureau listed the Viking Youth of
America, Tampa origin, as one of the hate groups currently
being afforded active investigation and included in
captioned program.
.
Reference is now made to Tampa letter to the
Bureau dated 5/6/64 which made reference in turn to
Jacksonville letter dated 4/30/64 wherein GEORGE FRANKLIN
MARCHELOS stated that the Viking Youth of America never
became organized in the United States and that he never
made an actual active attempt to recruit members in this
organization. The Tampa file in this matter is closed.
We have not been able to determine that any active chapters
of this group are in existence or that any members were
recruited for the group. It is therefore felt that there
would be no point in our attempting any disruptive tactics
in connection with this group.
The Bureau is requested to advise Tampa whether
it would be satisfactory not to initiate any action on
the Viking Youth of America and to substitute some other
organization for this purpose.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 125
UNITED STATES GO' RNMENT
Memorandum
Director, 731
ROM
:
SHC, New Orleans
SUBJECT:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY'
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
9/9/64
DATE:
ReBulet to Atlanta and interested offices 9/2/64.
1)
Potential Counterintelligence Action
The majority of members of klan-type organi-
zations in the New Orleans area are located in rural areas and;
in small communities. In order to effectively expose the
identities and activities of individuals in these groups,
individual cases are being opened on members and a background";
type of investigation is being instituted by the New Orleans
Office on these individual members.
These individual investigations of course, will
become known through contact with various individuals in the
developing of background, The mere knowledge that their
identities are known to the FBI will have disruptive force on
the individual's activities.
To highlight and further cause consternation,
interviews of one or two specifically hand-picked members will
be conducted by Agents in these areas, after which background
investigations will be instituted immediately on other known
members in the particular community.
The individuals to be interviewed will be members.
of "wrecking crews". The mere fact of these investigations
will plant the seeds of mistrust among the members and leader-
ship in the particular community.
Bureau authority is requested to immediately
initiate the above counterintelligence activity.
2) Pending Counterintelligence Action
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 126
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 127
Surveys are being conducted at Monroe, West
Honroe, Alexandria and Bogalusa, Louisiana, pursuant to Bureau
authority by airtel dated 9/4/64.
.3)
Tangible Results
Tangible results of such potential and pending
counterintelligence action will be furnished the Bureau afto::
inauguration of the above.
4)
Miscellaneous
A completed initial analysis will reach the
Bureau on 10/15/64 concerning this matter.
2*
i
50
•
ROM
GAN R
UNITED STATES GO RNMENT
Memorandum
Director, FBI
SAC, New Orleans
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
"INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
C
SUBJECT:
9/9/64
DATE:
ReBulet to Atlanta and interested offices 9/2/64.
1)
Potential Counterintelligence Action
The majority of members of klan-type organi-
zations in the New Orleans area are located in rural areas and,
in small communities. In order to effectively expose the
identities and activities of individuals in these groups,
individual cases are being opened on members and a background"
type of investigation is being instituted by the New Orleans
Office on these individual members.
:
These individual investigations of course, will
become known through contact with various individuals in the
developing of background. The mere knowledge that their
identities are known to the FBI will have disruptive force on
the individual's activities.
To highlight and further cause consternation,
interviews of one or two specifically hand-picked members will
be conducted by Agents in these areas, after which background
investigations will be instituted immediately on other known
members in the particular community.
The individuals to be interviewed will be members.
of "wrecking crews". The mere fact of these investigations
will plant the seeds of mistrust among the members and leader-
ship in the particular community.
Bureau authority is requested to immediately
initiate the above counterintelligence activity.
2) Pending Counterintelligence Action
NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-128-
Surveys are being conducted at Monroe, West
Monroe, Alexandria and Bogalusa, Louisiana, pursuant to Bureau
authority by airtel dated 9/4/64.
3)
Tangible Results
Tangible results of such potential and pending
counterintelligence action will be furnished the Bureau afto:
inauguration of the above.
4)
Miscellaneous
A completed initial analysis will reach the
Bureau on 10/15/64 concerning this matter.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 129
2*
i
ΤΟ
FROM
SUBJECT:
OTIONAL FORM NO. 10
PAY 1562 EDITION
SA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03
UNITED STATES GO CRNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main)
SAC, ATLANTA (157-826) (P)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN)
ReBulet 9/2/64.
DATE: 9/16/64
In 1960, a comparatively small group of
Klansmen pulled out of U. S. Klans, Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and formed a new Klan group called
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
The Imperial Wizard of this new group was
ROBERT LING of Jonesboro, Georgia. In the Summer
of 1961, following a meeting between BING and officials
of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan (United Klans), the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, Inc., were merged into United Klans and BING was
given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans
held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64. At this meeting,
BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by
a Georgia State Klan
-"
Officer.
✓ and J.
D.XJOHNWON,
V
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 130

то
FROM
SUBJECT:
PTIONAL FORM NO. 10
FAY 1962 EDITION
SA GEN. REG. NO. 27
2010-106-03 1
UNITED STATES GO RNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main)
SAC, ATLANTA (157-826) (P)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN)
ReBulet 9/2/64.
DATE: 9/16/64
In 1960, a comparatively small group of
Klansmen pulled out of U. S. Klans, Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and formed a new Klan group called
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
The Imperial Wizard of this new group was
ROBERT LRING of Jonesboro, Georgia. In the Summer
of 1961, following a meeting between BING and officials
of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan (United Klans), the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, Inc., were merged into United Klans and BING was
given the position of Imperial Klokård of United Klans
held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64. At this meeting,
BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by
and J. D. JOHNWON, a Georgia State Klan
Officer.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 131-
ΤΟ
FROM
SUBJECT:
Symbol
Number
OPTIC
MAY
FORM NO. 10
EDITION
GSA GEN REG. NO. 27
5010-108-03
UNITED STATES GO RNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI (157-9-Main)
(SAC, ATLANTA (157-826) (P)
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
(UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,
KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN)
ReBulet 9/2/64.
DATE: 9/16/64
In 1960, a comparatively small group of
Klansmen pulled out of U. S. Klans, Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, Inc., and formed a new Klan group called
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
The Imperial Wizard of this new group was
ROBERT LBING of Jonesboro, Georgia. In the Summer
of 1961, following a meeting between BING and officials
of United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan (United Klans), the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, Inc., were merged into United Klans and BING.was
given the position of Imperial Klokard of United Klans
held at Birmingham, Alabama, 9/5-6/64. At this meeting,
BING was opposed for election as Imperial Klokard by
AT 1705-R and J. D. JOHNWON, a Georgia State Klan
Officer.
CALVIN CRAIG, Grand Dragon for Georgia of
United Klans, through his support and influence to
AT 1705-R, AT 1705-R was elected Imperial Klokard.
AT 1652-R, AT 1705-R, AT 1700-R, AT 1720-R, and
AT 1761-R have all reported that BING is extremely bitter,
· particularly at CRAIG, over his defeat.
Recently, BING made a trip to Macon, Georgia,
and contacted ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON, JR. He asked DAVIDSON
to join with him in an effort to get CRAIG removed as
Grand Dragon for Georgia. DAVIDSON did not commit himself
but told BING he would think it over and notify him when he
had reached a decision.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 132.
ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON, JR., is a racial informant
of the Atlanta Office He was formerly Imperial Wizard
of first U. S. Klans Nights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.,
and later of United Klans. He is presently not a member
of any Klan group; however, he has considerable influence
and contacts among many of the members of United Klans.
This situation appears to offer an opportunity to
capitalize upon the personal conflict of two Klan leaders.
We propose the following action:
Instruct Racial Informant ROBERT LEE DAVIDSON,
JR., to agree to help BING oust CRAIG as Grand Dragon for
Géorgia and instruct DAVIDSON to actively work with BING
to achieve CRAIG's ouster.
BING has considerable following, particularly
in the rural area south of Atlanta. DAVIDSON has contacts
in the Klan throughout Georgia. We believe that with
DAVIDSON's assistance, BING could disrupt much of the
United Klans' organization in Georgia,
action.
The Bureau is requested to authorize the above
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 133
IN formant
Маме
-2-
UNITED STATES GOV NMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 9/23/64
FROM:
SAC, JACKSONVILLE
SUBJECT:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE-PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS.
(TWO-WAY RADIO UNITS)
ReBulet 9/15/64.
The Jacksonville Office has carefully noted the
obvious intent of reBulet and agrees that there is a real
strong possibility for taking some counter-intelligence
action against the Klan through this medium.
was re-contacted and he stated at the
present time there is no additional information concerning
the use of two-way radios nor has the local Klan in Jackson-
ville formulated any code. This would indicate that at the
present time, while a number of local Klansmen have radios,
there is no opportunity to introduce deceptive transmissions
as the Klan has no "missions" on the planning board. The
above informant has reported that it is anticipated addi-
tional Klansmen will purchase more two-way radio equipment
which would be indicative of an expansion in plans of the
Klan to use this method of communication. To date there has
been no operation of the Klan where two-way radio communica-
tions have played an integral part.
This office through its informants, particularly
will remain alert and will promptly advise the
Bureau whenever information is received indicating the Klan
has a sizeable "mission" in the planning stages wherein
radios will play an important part. Depending upon the
purpose of the "mission" plans could be formulated for some
deceptive attacks on the Klan itself.
-NW-88608-Doeld:32989629 Page 134.
:
kisana
TO
MAY 2
SUA NO. 17
UNITED STATES GOV NMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
TROM
:
310, MOBILE
SUBJECT:
DATE: 10/12, 64.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
· DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
Re Bureau letter to Atlanta, 9/2/64.
Analysis of Potential CI Action Against
Organizations and Personnel of United
Klans of America, Inc., KKKK (UKA);
Improved Order of the U.S. Klans, KKKK,
Inc. (IOUSK); and the Alabama States
Rights Party (ASRP)
Files on captioned organizations have been reviewed
at the Mobile Office to discover any information of the
tind which would prevent a potential for effective CI
Lotion, This review of files includes the files of the
organizations themselves and of individuals known to be
officers and members of the organization. It is the under-
standing of this office that this information would consist
of situations involving potential friction between individual
mumbers or between rival organizations; or would consist of
information reflecting immorality, particularly sexual
irmorality, on the part of one or more members, possibly
involving the wife or wives of other members; or consisting
generally of information of a highly unfavorable or embarrass-
ing nature pertaining to a member or group of members which
would be not known, and the exposure of which could produce
suitable conflicts. A minimum of such information is con-
tained in Mobile files pertaining to Klan and States Rights
Danby personnel. There have been conflicts between individuals
within groups and between members of different groups, but
these conflicts have already matured and have already pro-
duced the division and animosity of which the situations
were supable, Unlike personnel of Communist organizations,
NW-88608-Doeld+32989629 Page 135
organizations are not particularly prom
lity, and no information has Leon runnin
Indicesing promiscuity on the part of a Klancran's wife or
te pops of a flansman, although informants who furnish
sich pertaining to these individuals are fairly well
acq ninted with many of them. Approximately two years ago,
ond lansuan did become jealous when a single Klan member
(unramied) flirted with his wife at a social function.
However, the married member is no longer active, and there
is not knom to have been any further development of that
situacion.
Pertinent to this analysis is the following
observation: Within the past 70 days, Montgomery, Ala.,
where activity of UKA and ASRP are centralized, has
experienced desegregation of restaurants, hotels, motels,
and public schools, pursuant to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and pursuant to orders of the United States District
Court at Montgomery. Initially, particularly on 7/4 and
7/6/54, following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights
Koo, there was an attempt by Klansmen to gather and con-
Spiro for the purpose of interfering with the desegregation
of movie theaters and restaurants in downtown Montgomery.
However, Hobile informants furnished information well in
auvance of the actual proposed action, enabling Mobile to
gotify the Monugomery Police Department. The Police Depart-
lent acted very promptly and effectively, disbursing Klansmen
who had gathered in the danger area, and making it quite
clear that no unlawful activity or interference with the
enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act would be tolerated.
Both the fact that the information was leaked to authorities
and the fact that the authorities took effective action
were highly demoralizing to the Klan personnel (who are
also the only significant personnel of the ASRP). The
demoralization was so complete that when Montgomery public
schools were desegregated, Klansmen did not even appear in.
the vicinities of the schools and took no action of any
kind, either at the schools or in any other place, in any
effort to interfere with the desegregation.
It is therefore fully evident that the purposes
sought by the CI program, that is the demoralization and
the rendering ineffective of such organizations, was
accomplished by direct investigation and Police action.
No blication is intended that the work of the Mobile
office mas been finally done pertaining to these organizations,
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 136
2
in feet, the current program of the Mobile Office is
Jonsify and make more extensive the informant cover-
age of pertinent organizations. These informants will be
particularly alert for personal information of the kind
which might be suitable for the institution of CI action
in the future, and such information will be diligently
sought by Agents' conducting investigation concerning these
organizations and individuals, Mobile will also continue
to be alert for any opportunity to utilize the system which
has been effective in the past, that of cooperating with
Local law enforcement to take the kind of action which dis-
courages unlawful action on the part of the Klan groups.
Recommendation
The Mobile Office has no recommendation for any
logical immediate CI action at this time.
Action Groups
ly
Mobile racial informants have furnished the
identities of most individuals within the UKA and ASRP who
are considered the most. likely to commit acts of violence
or intimidation, Host of these persons have been under
investigation for some time, and in many instances Summary
Reporvi havo Leon furnished to the Bureau pertaining to them.
In of the instances of bombings in the vicinity of
Hontgomor3, Ala., including the bombings in Mississippi in
recont weeks, Agents have interviewed neighbors and employers
of these individuals and have made visual checks, particularl
late at night, in efforts to ascertain whether or not the
persons themselves were home or whether or not their auto-
mobiles were furled at their residences.
In many cases,
and probably in most cases, these Klan personnel become
anure of these inquiries and on several situations it is
known that they observed Agents checking their cars and
observing their residences at night. These persons are
therefore under the impression that Bureau Agents have thèm
under virtually constant surveillance. They remarked to
each other in the presence of informants on occasion that
they feel that their telephones are tapped and they have
also expressed the fear that their meeting places are
subjected to microphone devices. It is believed that this
Year ch their part constitutes a very effective deterrent,
and la vory well be a principal reason for their failure
to paid any unlawfull measures in connection with the racial
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 137
3
this ared within recent weeks: Through in-
through observations of license tags of auto-
obiles parked at meeting places, Mobile Office is constantly
Darning of the identities of new persons who have poac
potential violence. In all such cases, a case file is
opened on that individual, his identity being established
and his background being obtained. No particular effort is
made to keep these investigations so discreet that the Klans-
man will not learn that the FBI is inquiring about him.
This practice is deemed to be effective with respect to
these individuals,
As set forth hereinbefore, Mobile will intensify
its efforts to discover information which can be used in
the CI program,
Pertaining to the possibility of exposure of
Klan And Ilan-type activities through reliable news media,
it should be observed that it is the firm policy of news
Media in the Montgomery, Ala., area to completely ignore
these Klan groups, and to give them no publicity at all.
Nithin recent months, (XC) has held several public rallies,
advising some with leaflet distribution and even one
Instace a paid spot radio advertisement. They have
Invited the press to attend those rallies, hoping to secure
publicity from them. Again, it is believed that the
policy of the press to ignore these groups has had the
most desirable effect, both in frustrating them in their
search for publicity, and in avoiding advertising them
which, if done, right rally more persons to the Klan cause
and result in their increasing their membership. Because
of these considerations, it is believed that at least in
this area, the current press policy of ignoring the Klan
is more effective than would be a policy of exposure of
the evils of the organizations.
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 138
ལ་
Memorandum
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR, FBI
ུÚེཟེབཻཅ་
SAC, CHARLOTTS
SUBJECT:
CCOUNTERI
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE:
10/12/64
ReBulet 9/2/64 to Atlanta and other offices,
It is noted this letter lists as one of the target organizations,
as No. 7 on page 2, the Independent Klavern, Fountain Inn, S. C.-
Since this organization is no longer active or in existence, it
is suggested it be deleted from this list.
Since the major organization in Charlotte Division
is the United Klans of America, Inc., of which Birmingham is
origin, a copy of this letter is being designated to Birmingham
for information.
The following represents the consensus of* Charlotte
Agents familiar with Klan activity:
1. Disruptive activity should not be undertaken at
a particular Klavern, as a general rule, unless there is
sufficient well established informant coverage to be able to
tell the effect of the action when instituted. Such action
would probably serve to "tighten up" the organization and make
it more difficult to get an informant in thereafter,
2. It is considered doubtful that newspaper publicity,
of only a generally unfavorable nature against the Klan organi-
zation, is effective in reducing new applicants or causing any
large number of present members to drop out. The "Charlotte
Observer," which has wide distribution throughout North and
South Carolina, published in August and September, 1964, a series
of articles, copies of which were sent the Bureau by Charlotte
letter of 9/15/64. These artes ridiculed the United Klanş
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-139-
of America, Inc., in North Carolina, and published both photos
and names of a number of members. So far as has been learned
from informants, this had very little adverse effect upon the
organization. It was alleged that two to five members were
discharged from their jobs, or warned about continuing member-
ship, but the identities of these alleged persons is not known,
North Carolina Grand Dragon JAMES RONES has stated, both
publicly and privately to informants, that this publicity was
very valuable to the growth of the organization. One informant
reported that the day after the articles published his name as
a local leader, three persons contacted him and applied for
membership, stating they had not previously known whom to contact.
It is considered that publicity of this type generally
deters from joining only those persons who would not be
interested in joining in the first place. It is believed that
a large proportion of those persons who are potential members
are seeking status and recognition, and publicity is no deterrent
to them; it makes them feel important and members of an important
group.
The major apparent effect of the series of newspaper
articles referred to has been a tightening up of security, and
refusal of leaders to allow newspaper photos of individual
Klansmen to be taken at public rallies.
3. Disruptive activity, wherever possible, should be of
a nature which does not expose the fact that the Bureau, or the
"Federal Government", is behind the activity. It is believed
that open action, to a large extent, can backfire and create
resentment and sympathy. It must be remembered that Klan
membership, in many sections, does not by any means carry the
odium that alleged Communist membership or sympathy does in
almost any section of society.
4. Along this same line, there is probably no point in
trying disruptive activity, at least not at this stage, on a
local Klan group which is small, inactive, and peaceful. Any
such activity which is not completely discreet and concealed
would likely have the effect of stirring it up,
5. By letter of 9/26/64, Charlotte furnished the Bureau
a sample of a lapel pin which was adopted at the Imperial
2,
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 140

Klonvocation of United Klans of America at Birmingham on
9/5-6/64. This is to be sold to members for $2 each and
there is apparently considerable demand for it. Since it is
not apparent to the unitiated that it has anything to do
with "the Klan," it is expected that members will wear it
openly as a secret recognition signal. If it does become
widely adopted and worn, consideration should then be given to
giving widespread publicity to the fact of what it represents.
This should have the result of discouraging some persons who
do not want their Klan membership publicly known.
6. It is considered that possibly the most effective
way of discouraging membership, or causing existing members
to withdraw, is to establish that someone in the organization
is getting rich off it, or embezzling the proceeds. Charlotte
is endeavoring to develop information along these lines, but
nothing specific has yet been developed.
7. The following are suggested tactics that appear
useful on a selected basis against individual Klansmen,
particularly those whose employers might object to their Klan
membership:
a, Anonymous letter or phone call to the employer
telling of the Klan membership.
b. Enter on behalf of the member a subscription to
the "Fiery Cross," United Klans of America publication, and have
it mailed to his employment.
C. When a particular member is away from home at a
Klavern meeting, have a female phone his home and indicate he
was to meet her and is late. This might have the effect of
making it difficult for him to get away from home at night
thereafter. This should be limited to particular individuals
who are considered potential ones to stir up trouble in a Klavern.
3.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 141
8. ROBERT-ECHOLS SCOGGINS, Aka., Charlotte file-105-9917-
Bureau file-157-1530, is South-Caroliña Grand-Dragon of United
Klans of America. Charlotte reports by SA JOHN-ALDEN-MUNN;
1/31/64 and 3/27/64, show that he is receiving over $300 per
month from the Veterans Administration as a 100 percent.
disabled veteran. At the same time he operates a plumbing
business and is active in United Klans of America, making
public speeches, etc. Charlotte furnished extra copies of
those reports to the Bureau, with the suggestion furnishing
them to VA be considered.
It is suggested consideration be given to asking the
VA to re-evaluate his disability rating, in view of his employment
and activities. It is believed this should be done on a SOG
level, to reduce the possibility of -SCOGGINS learning that such
a suggestion came from the FBI.
9. "Action Groups." No particular such groups, given
to violence, are known within Klan organizations in Charlotte
territory. As the Bureau is aware, United Klans of America has
instituted what it calls "Security Guards,
" who wear military
$}
type uniforms and have military ranks. These function at
public rallies for the purpose of keeping order, watching for
"spies, etc. It is expected that if violence is undertaken,
these will probably be the ones to do it, but no such under-
takings have been learned.
Specific individual recommendations for counter-
intelligence action will be submitted by subsequent letters as
developed.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 142
4.
TO
FROM &
Memorandum
: Director, FBI
?
SAC, Birmingham
SUBJECT: COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
INTERNAL SECURITY
DISRUPTION OF HATE GROUPS
DATE:
10/13/64-
Re Bulet to Atlanta 9/2/64
The Klan-type and hate organizations operating in
Birmingham territory and which are potential objects of a
counterintelligence program are the United Klans of
America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the National
States Rights Party,
Recently Mr. VINCENT TOWNSEND;- Vice-President and
Assistant Publisher, Birmingham-News, and-SAC-Contact
advised SAC EVERETT J. INGRAM that he read a story in the
Chicago Daily News concerning Klan activity in Mississippi
and felt the story could not have been prepared without
FBI cooperation. He was impressed with this and has indicated
a strong interest in similar material for the Birmingham
News. He promised to protect the Bureaus interest in
any such endeavor. He is a well known civic leader in
Birmingham. A review of the files in the Birmingham Office
is being made for suitable information in this connection.
Bureau instructed in referenced letter that
specific mention be made of "Action Groups" in Klan
organizations, At the present time the weekly meetings of
Eastview Klavern No. 13, which has been the leading Klavern in
United Klans of America, Inc., in this territory, have been
poorly attended. The principal members of the "Action Group"
-NW-88608-Decld:32989629_Page_143
in this Klavern are HARRY-WALKER, CECIL-HENSON, EUGENE
REEVES, and RONNIE TIDWELL, Efforts are being made to
secure information suitable for disruption purposes in
connection with this group.
Investigation is being conducted concerning
ROBERT MARVIN SHELTON. The Atlanta Office has been
requested to ascertain why E.-L.-BDWARDS, now deceased,
ousted SHELTON-from his then position of Grand-Dragon of
the U. S. Klans, A copy of the article appearing in
the "Birmingham-News" for April-30, 1960, entitled "SHELTON.
ousted from Klan Post," has been obtained. The article did
not disclose the exact nature of the charges against
SHELTON, Records of the Alabama Secretary of State reflect
that SMELTON was dropped as the Klan's authorized agent
and was replaced by Rev. ALVIN HORN of Talladega, Alabama,
EL EDWARDS, Imperial-Wizard, U. S. Klans, Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, was quoted as saying "We had to have
a grand dragon in Alabama and we didn't have one in
ROBERT H-SHELTON, He told reporters that SHELTON was
replaced as grand dragon and agent of the "Klan" in
Alabama "for conduct unbecoming a Klansman and attempting
to use the organization for selfish purposes," The
article said EDWARDS did not elaborate on what is considered
conduct unbecoming a Klansman,
"
Informants are being contacted for any information
of a derogatory nature concerning SHELTON.. Discreet inquiries
are being made in Tuscaloosa concerning his financial status.
In view of recent information from the Bureau no request is
being made for a mail cover on Shelton or the United Klans,
The information on LOEL ROGERS, and WILLIAMA,HOLIR.
will be afforded prompt attention.
NW-88608 Docid:32989629_Page_144
21
As the Bureau is aware, some few months ago several
individuals, who had been active officials and/or dedicated
members of the National States Rights Party (NSRP), left
the NSRP. They are trying to form and make a going party
of the American States Rights Party (ASRP) with its head- .
quarters in Birmingham.
Since the group pulled out of the NSRP, both
the ASRP and NSRP leaders have been belittling, berating
and making extremely derogatory remarks concerning each
other. Both groups are using the same mailing list,
(the NSRP's list), which the ASRP group obtained. before
pulling out of the NSRP, and they disseminate their
derogatory remarks in the literature they distribute,
The Bureau has also been advised that GEORGE
LINCOLN ROCKWELL, American Nazi Party (ANP) leader has
recently filed a $550,000.00 libel suit in the U. S..
District Court, Birmingham, Alabama, against Dr.-EDWARDR
FIELDS, Information -Director of the NSRP, and others
connected with the NSRP,
Birmingham contemplates furnishing certain items,
on a confidential basis to a few trusted, reliable newsmen
(established SAC contacts), concerning the NSRP, the ASRP
and the ANP for the purpose of possibly causing further
disruption of any unified actions or working arrangements
between these groups, Such newsmen may be used to contact
the leaders of one group to inquire about or confirm something of
a derogatory nature reportedly made by some leader of one of
the other groups,
Birmingham also contemplates working closely
with other law enforcement agencies to see that any
activity of such groups are known, covered and where .
considered desirable, the group will be made cognizant
that their activity is known,
i
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 145
3
1
(
Birmingham also is considering having some racial
informants drop remarks to or for the benefit of the leaders
of the NSRP, etc., that will tend to cause the leaders of
one group to retaliate in like manner against the other
groups,
If the Bureau has any material on disruptive
tactics or results of efforts, which is not already in
all field offices, Birmingham would be glad to receive
it,
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 146
711
20
:
. ROM
SUBJECT:
MAY
Cos
A NO. 21
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, F31
SAC, LITTLE ROCK
COINTELPRO
:
DATE: 10/13/64
ReBulet to Atlanta and Other Offices, 9/2/54:
Set out below are an anglysis and recommendations
under captioned program.
NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)
The Arkansas branch of NSRP has been inactive
in the State of Arkansas for the past year with the excep-"
tion of placing on the Arkansas ballot candidates for
President and Vice President of the United States. It is
not recommended that any action be taken against this group
at this time.
ASSOCIATION OF ARKANSAS KLANS
OF THE KU KLUX KLAN
(AAK)
The AAK in Arkansas is made up of three klaverns
located at Little Rock, Texarkana, and Pine Bluff; and
it has no affiliation with any national klan group. There,
are no "action" groups within any of these three klaverns,'
The three klaverns do not own or lease any property for
meeting places. The four Little Rock members usually
meet in the home of a member. The Texarkana Klavern has
not held any klavern meetings as such in several months.
The Pine Bluff Klavern meetings vary from residences to
business places of klavern members.
State meetings are held at irregular intervals
on an average of about once per month or less. There is
no regular meeting place for the state meetings, which arej
held in various Arkansas towns including towns in which
there are no klaverns. The state meetings are attended
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 147
'
:
by from one to five members of each of the three
klaverns and are well covered by informants, The State
Grand-Dragon BILL WILLIAMS has continually cautioned
members against violence and any type of illegal activities,
None of the klaverns have engaged in violence.
1. LITTLE ROCK KLAVERN
•
Of the four members who attend weekly meetings
JOBS/WERNER, who is considered the
head of this small group, draws a pension from the Fodersi
Government and, according to informants, is afraid to
engage in any illegal activity or to let his name be used
in connection with the klan for fear of losing his pension.
The two informants maintain the full confidence of the
other two members. In recent months the klavern ran a
series of small ads in a Little Rock daily newspaper in
an effort to renew interest and gain new members. The
klavern received a number of responses, but no action
whatsoever has been taken by the klavern to take in any
new members. The. klavern has no organized activity other
than the weekly meetings described by informants as
being "bull sessions" with the principal topic being.
politics.
No recommendation for counterintelligence is
being made concerning the Little Rock Klavern.
20
TEXARKANA KLAVERN
This klavern has not held any klavern meetings
as such in several months, and it appears that the
principal reason for the lack of meetings was the inter-
view of members and leaders concerning the assassination
of President KENNEDY. Klavern representatives regularly.
attend state meetings, one reason being that State Erand-
Dragon BILL WILLIAMS, who officiates at state meetings,
is a member of the Texarkana Klavern. Of the five or
six members who from time to time attend state meetings,
two are informants. On 10/1/64
advised that the
Grand Dragon had stated that hereafter Texarkana Klavern
members will meet with the Bivins Kildare, Texas,
Klavern of the AAK.
-
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-148-
-2-
Grant Dragon WILLIAMS, according to informants,
is active in politics in Bowie County, Texas, is a former
member of the Board of Regents of Texarkana Junior College,
Texarkana Pexes, and in recent mentas son
for election to the Board of Regents of that college and
defeated as a candidate for the City Council of Texarkana,
.Texas. He cannot afford to become involved in any illegal
activities because of his activities in legitimate enter-
prises. He has continually cautioned Texarkana Klavern
members as well as members of other klaverns attending
state meetings against any violence and/or illegal
activities.
No recommendation is being made for counterintel-
ligence against the Texarkana Klavern except as it is
effected by a recommendation set out hereafter under the
Pine Bluff Klavern.
3。 PINE BLUFF KLAVERŇ
The Pine Bluff Klavern has a membership of approxi-
mately twenty to twenty-five. It meets once a week in
different business locations of its members, and average
weekly attendance is twelve. Among the twelve, one, or
two informants meet with them and furnish full coverage
of their activities.
The klavern's main activity has been to dis-
courage integration by legal means and to get members
elected to school board positions. The klavern collected
the funds and donated the money for the campaign expense
of two of its members who ran for a position on the Pine
Bluff School Board and the Dollarway School Board, These
two members made a miserable showing and were defeated.
The klavern was behind and organized the National
Patriots League (NPL) to further its non-integration
program publicly. The Exalted (Cyclops, or president, of
the Klavern is chairman of the NPL. The NPL actually is
a front organization for the klavern. The main activity
of the NPL was to organize a private country club, which
is known as the Butram Country Club. The purpose of the
NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-149-
-3-
club was to build a swimming pool for white only.
construction of the pool itself was complated but not
sufficiently to place it in use this sub2;
in Butram Country Club is $25. The majority of the
members are not aware of the fact that the klavern was
behind its organization. Membership in the Butram Country
Club was easily obtained as the public pool for whites
and public pool for Negroes were both closed during the
summer of 1964 when Negroes attempted to integrate the
white pool. This left no public pool open in Pine Bluff.
SB, vice president of the klavern, donated the
land for the Butram Country Club; as he owns land sur-
rounding the club, he will benefit financially from the
sale of this land for building lots. The NPL has also
distributed a limited number of leaflets publicly dis-
couraging peopb from patronizing certain restaurants and
businesses which had hired or served Negroes.
Members of the klavern were responsible for
forming a John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff, and
a klavern member is leader of this chapter. Approximately
eight to ten people attend the monthly meetings of the
John Birch Society Chapter; and of the men who attend,
all are klavern members with the exception of one man.
Members of the klavern completely control and dominate
the John Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff.
however, only conduct John Birch Society business.
wise, the members of the klavern further the John Birch
Society program through the klavern.
They,
Like-
Members of the klavern are working individually
in politics for the re-election of Governor-ORVAL-E.
FAUBUS and for the election of BARRY-GOLDWATER:
The klavern has not advocated any violence but
on occasion has cautioned its members against violence.
As an example, klavern members were cautioned to stay.
away from Ray's Truck Stop, a location which Negroes were
attempting to integrate, in the spring of 1964 so that
no violence would occur.
Members of the klavern recently distributed a
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leaflet seeking new members and
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-150-
-4-

stating requests for applications be directed to P. O.
Box 1182, Pine Bluff. In this leaflet it was pointed
out that the KKK was striving for a lawful settlement
of the difficulties brought on by the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAAC) and
that it is opposed to violence. This leaflet further set
forth that this was a chartered, legalized movement and
it is no more illegal to be a member of it than to be a
member of other organizations.
At various times in the past the klavern has
attempted to organize "action" groups within the klavern, .
but on each occasion the project has died from lack of
interest.
In line with Bureau policy of dissemination of
information, the main activities regarding the Pine Bluff
Klavern have been disseminated confidentially to Chief
_of_Police KORMAN.D. YOUNG, Pine Bluff, (NA) on a regular
basis. Chief: YOUNG-has exerted every effort to keep down
the possibility of violence. Through his confidential
sources he is also well aware of the identities of the
klavorn members and their activities. He personally
has warned particulr klavern members against any violence
and has stated they will be met with immediate arrest
if any violence occurs. As an example, Chief YOUNG was
advised through his own confidential source of the time
and location of the klavern meeting on the night of
October 5, 1964. Chief YOUNG sent a lieutenant of his
department in uniform to check the location, record
license numbers, and to be seen checking the meeting so
that the klavern members would know that he was checking
on them. This has had a strong influence on making the
klavorn follow a line of legal activity. It has also
resulted in the more responsible leading citizens of the
community being made aware of certain klavern members,
causing these klavern members to be discredited in the
eyes of the public. This was borne out in the recent
school board election on 9/29/64 when two klavern members,
one of whom is JF: BUTRAM, were miserably defeated.
The klavern has during the past few months
urged its members to solicit and obtain new members.
The ineffectiveness of their program is shown by the
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-151-
-5-
fact that only one new member was initiated,
member is a non-organizational indom 0.
Rock Division, Likewise, as a result of the IX leaf-
lets distributed encouraging people to write for appli-
cations they have received only two letters; and neither
of the writers have become a member, The leaflet has
met with complete failure in its effort to build up its
membership.
At this time the following are the only specific
counterintelligence action being recommended:
1. An anonymous letter be mailed to the National
Office of John Birch Society, Belmont, Massachusetts,
pointing out that the KKK is in full control of the John .
Birch Society Chapter in Pine Bluff. In this letter
specifically mention the name of one or two of the more
leading klan members who are also leading the John Birch
Society in Pine Bluff.
+
2. an anonymous letter be mailed to CHARLES D;
CUTHBERTSON, Exaited Cyclops of the Pine Bluff Klavern,
and a copy mailed to BILL WILLIAMS, State-Grand Dragon,
with the letters to be mailed to the Post Office Box in
Pine Bluff and in Texarkana, Arkansas, of the AAK. The
letter should be a complaining letter from a member who
was active in the past and who recently found one of the
KKK leaflets in his automobile which leaflet encouraged
membership. The letter would let them know why he has
not rejoined; it would point out that he dropped out.
because of such leadership as J. BUTRAM, who has used
the klan for personal gain as BUT had a residence on
his property remodeled at klavern expense and then made
the klavern stop holding meetings there; that BUTRAM
has now donated land for the Butram Country Club so that
he can sell his surrounding land for building lots at
an
exorbitant price. The letter should also set forth
the fact he heard BUTRAM was discharged from the Army
for mental deficiency (moron). This letter should be
mailed from Little Rock.
Interviews of klan members and leaders in the
past (for example, at the time of the assassination of
President KENNEDY and on particular bombing matter cases)
-6-
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 152
have had deterring effect on the klaņ. For example,
the Texarkana Klavern has not held a klavern meeting
as such since that time. One Little Rock member has
dropped out as a result of being intorvisvod; and,
according to an informant, this member is a "changed
⠀ man," meaning that he is not as radical as previously.
In interviews with members of the Pine Bluff Klavern,
agents have not met with any hostility and have been
treated cordially and with respect. Individual members
during these interviews have indicated they are opposed
to violence and advocate proceeding in a legal manner.,
A number of the members have said that through political
pressure and voting are the only ways any change can
be made. However, they have stated they are still avid
segregationists and do not condone race mixing in any
manner.
When and if it appears that interest may be
renewing in the AAK in Arkansas, consideration will be
given to another interview program. It is noted that
particular klan members are interviewed on a spasmodic
basis in regard to leads from surrounding field offices
on bombing matter cases, and this has had a tendency to
deter any violent activity on the part of klavern members.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page_153
-7-
62-116395-551
The Attorney General
enc.
30
EWL:1hb 8/8/75
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTE
ON INTELL ACTVIS (SSC)
Re 7/28/75 superseding req for FBI materials rec'd
that date from SSC. Enclsd is memo for forwarding
to Committee which responds to req identified as
Roman numerals set frth below. As indicated in
memo, V. G. is being delivered by separate commu-
nicatn 8/8/75. Also enclsd for ur records is ec
of memo prepared for Committee.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 154
Attached hereto is the response to Item #1 in
the Senate Select Committee (SSC) letter to Mr. K. William
O'Connor, Esq. on July 14, 1975. Item #1 is set forth
as follows:
"All memoranda and any other materials prepared
in or by the General Investigative Division, the Domestic
Intelligence Division, and the Inspection Division, which
relate to, are referred to, or alluded to in, or portions
of which are summarized or described in, the July 30, 1964,
memorandum captioned 'Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and
Other Hate Groups" from J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson. (See
attachment to your letter of June 17, 1975.)"
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 155
-2.
July 24, 1964
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Mr. Hoover:
Thank you very much for your letter of July 17, 1964.
I have been giving this racial problem constant thought. Paren-
thetically, I did what I could yesterday in New York to get that
office moving faster and more effectively in this matter,
matters
You asked for suggestions and this is what I now offer
you for whatever little value it has.
W
(1) After writing you I recommended to the
Inspection Division that a study be made
relative to whether or not the Domestic
Intelligence Division can better handle
certain aspects of the Civil Rights-Racial
problem. Mr. Gale is very much in favor
of this inquiry and is moving promptly in
this matter. I think the results of his
inquiry will be most helpful in evaluating
the situation.
(2) What I have in mind basically is this:
You may want to, in light of his inquiry,
consider transferring the responsibility
for the development of informants in the
Klu Klux Klan White Citizens Council and
related "hate" organizations to the Division
while leaving the responsibility for
investigating bombings, killings, and so
forth where it now is. My idea is: This
Division can bring to bear all the techniques,
skills, and procedures which it has used
to successfully penetrate the Communist Party
and espionage organizations to now penetrate
these hate organizations causing us so much
trouble. (In talking to Mr. Tolson this
morning I mentioned this briefly to him.)
If
(3)/my idea is operationally sound, and if this
is done, I would immediately hold some
regional conferences in areas where the
racial issue is acute and get under way in
these offices, special and aggressive
programs to carry out this high level quality
informant development. You are completely
A651993
REG
20%2
8 AUG.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 156
right when you say that informant develop-
ment of the right kind is essentially the
solution to our current problem. The number
of informants per se as we both know, are of
no significance. What we must have is the
right kind of informants on the right level.
The old saying "The proof of the pudding is
in the eating" is relevant here because if
we had this kind of informant penetration,
we wouldn't have some of these unsolved cases now
causing us so much concern. This is simply a
hard, stubborn fact we cannot theorize away.
(4) Further, we should expand our informant
penetration to cover some of these legitimate
but extremist organizations which we have up
to now ignored in this respect. They often
are "supporting" forces for such as the K.K.K.
etc. and we ought to be on the inside of them.
This then is my response to your letter for now. As
I have said, the Inspection Division is making the inquiry to
ascertain the operational facts and the feasibility of what I
suggest.
Cordially,
Bill Chullivan
William C. Sullivan
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 157
Expedits
-
- 2 -
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GC RNMENT
• Memorandum
کانات کان کے
ΤΟ
:
Mr. Belmonť.
FROM
: A. Rosen
Phud
SUBJECT: RACIAL MATTERS
Toison
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DATE: July 27, 1964
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
1 Mr. Mohr
1
Mr. Gale
Gandy
1
Mr. Belmont
1
1
-
Mr. Rosen
-
Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
Certainly, the items mentioned by Mr. Sullivan *are
such as to be handled by the Bureau on an intelligence basis. The
racial field is a most fertile field for Communist Party and other
subversive groups. There are indications of this such as in the
cases of Martin Luther King and Michael Schwerner, one of the
missing civil rights workers from Philadelphia, Mississippi, and
other situations. Also there are reports of foreign funds being used
to support the current actions of Malcolm X. The racial strife and
disorder are of such major significance as to have international
aspects and this is tailor-made for the disruptive tactics of subversive
elements both right and left.
We cannot afford to divorce the national racial program from
its possible international aspects. The devices and tactics presently
in use in the security field should be utilized to the fullest in
developing intelligence information regarding national as well as
international developments in the racial strife. The tense racial
potential in major cities is a fertile field for subversive activities
both right and left.
We have seen from the killings in the South, for example,
the killing of Medgar Evers, that such appear to be isolated incidents
usually carried out by one man or a small unattached group occurring
on the spur-of-the-moment, such as the killing of the Lieutenant Colonel
near Colbert, Georgia, and the assaulting of a minister in the streets
in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
[REC-9" -284
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170
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UG 21 1964
The investigation of the Klan and hate groups as well as the
development of informants in such organizations must, out of necessity,"
be handled as a whole. The following of the informants cannot be isolated
from the over-all investigation of the organizations just as the informants
in the Communist Party cannot be isolated from the organizations they are
connected with.
CLM/nkr
(7)
70 SEP 21064
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 158
*in letter to the Director dated 7/24/64
1
Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: RACIAL MATTERS
Of course, any specific offenses such as, for example,
the case of the three missing civil rights workers in Philadelphia,
Mississippi, ‘or cases involving brutality, bombings or any other
violations these individual investigations should be handled by the
appropriate substantive desks such as the Civil Rights Desk.
The over-all racial field is specifically an intelligence operation
for the Bureau. It can best be organized when all facets are followed
and directed by one Division. The communist potential for activities
in this field would seem to be a major factor as evidenced by the doings
of Martin Luther King and his associates. The Bureau can best keep
abreast of the whole field by having all angles of the racial field united
in one Division utilizing the tactics which Mr. Sullivan has suggested
as being effective.
R
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 159
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FROM :
SUBJECT:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
AGEN. RE NO. 27
i
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. TOLSON
GALE S
J. H. "GALE
DATE:
August 4, 1964
Qw
PERSONNEL TRANSFERS TO EFFECT PROPOSED
REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES
IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RACIAL INFORMANTS
Tolson
Belmont
Casper
Callahan
Contad
Del och
Evans
Gale
Sullivan
Tave!
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
By memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson 7/30/64 it was recommended, and
now approved by the Director, that supervisory responsibility over Racial Matters
and Racial Informants be transferred from the General Investigative Division to the
Domestic Intelligence Division. In accordance with this approval, proposed realignment
and distribution of personnel from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic
Intelligence Division are being submitted.
Inasmuch as approximately 75% of the work of this Unit is now represented in
the categories being transferred to Division 5, appropriate personnel transfers.
consistent therewith should be made:
Category
Caseload, June, 1964
Percent
miftu
Racial Matter's
Racial Informants
Bombing Matters
870
51.5%
481
28.5
183
10.8.
Federal Train Wreck
80
4.7.
Statute
Destruction of Aircraft or
74
4. 5
Motor Vehicles .
147000-2946
Total
1,688
REC-143
28.
38/100.0%
The current supervisory responsibility among the seven Agent Supervisors in this
Unit, including Supervisor in Charge Joseph C. Trainor, is as follows:
ཏ
SA J. C. Trainor supervises classifications (other than racial informants
· and organizations) for Atlantic Seaboard offices north of Virginia,
18 SEP 244964
SA J. G. Deegan has responsibility for racial informants for all field
divisions and supervises other classifications for the Virginia and Florida.
3 Xerox 8-19-25 Lim
koffices.
1 - Mr. Callahan
tr
Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont
**
SEE NEXT PAGE
7mj (7)
√(7)
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 160
0106
SENT DIRECTOR
8-5-64
PERS. REC. UNIT
سلام 37

Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Personnel Transfers to Effect Proposed
Reassignment of Supervisory Responsibilities
in Racial Matters and Racial Informants
SA F. H. Freund has responsibility for Klan organizations for all
field divisions and supervises other classifications for 11 western and
midwestern offices.
SA L. A. Giovanetti has alternate responsibility for Klan organizations
for all field divisions and supervises other classifications for Atlanta,
Little Rock, Savannah and 4 other midwestern offices.
SA C. A. Parkis has responsibility for other hate organizations (8
currently active) for all field divisions and supervises other classifications
for Birmingham, Mobile, Cleveland and the 4 Texas offices.
SA F. P. Smith supervises classifications (other than racial informants
and organizations) for New Orleans, Memphis, Knoxville and 7 western
offices, and special cases.
SA H. E. Trent supervises classifications (other than racial informants
and organizations) for Charlotte, Savannah, Baltimore, Washington Field
office, Louisville and 2 midwestern offices.
Based on the distribution of work, Inspector's analysis reflects that it would
take 5 of the 7 men assigned to the Organizations Unit to handle racial matters and
racial informants under the approved change of responsibilities. There are 7 clerical
employees assigned to the Organizations Unit of the Civil Rights Section and it is
felt that 5 of these clerical employees who generally handle the work being transferred
from the General Investigative Division to the Done stic Intelligence Division be
transferred along with the supervisors. Assistant Directors Rosen and Sullivan are
in accord that the proposed personnel changes are equitable, consistent and correspond
with the transfer of responsibilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That Supervisor in Charge Joseph C. Trainor and Agent Supervisors
Deegan, Freund, Giovanetti and Parkis be transferred to Division 5 (Domestic Intelligence
Division) concomitant to the transfer to that Division of supervisory responsibility over
racial matters and racial informants (if approved to be handled by Mr. Mohr's Office).
R
Jhs
peep
9-18-64
ajh
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 161
transfer letts an agents prep
8/11/64
2.3pc
27
SEE NEXT PAGE
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Personnel Transfers to Effect Proposed
Reassignment of Supervisory Responsibilities
in Racial Matters and Racial Informants
2. That the remaining Agent Supervisors, Smith and Trent, be retained in
the Civil Rights Section to supervise bombing matters, Destruction of Aircraft
or Motor Vehicles, Federal Train Wreck Statute, and special cases.
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3. That the following clerical employees be transferred (presently assigned
to the Organizations Unit) to the Domestic Intelligence Division (if approved, to be
handled by the Administrative Division):
Mary A. Cammann - stenographer
Kathryn T. Chernitsky - stenographer
Sue E. Waller - stenographer
Carol Ann Hancock - clerk
Wilbur Lane Perkins
P.A.U. to handlek
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ADDENDUM:
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The personnel changes as recommended are acceptable
to this Division at this time. Contingent upon our thorough
analysis of this situation and upon developments which will
take place in the coming months, the personnel requirements
may be either reduced or increased depending upon the volume
of work and related ramifications.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 162
Ber
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FROM
:
SUBJECT:
ORTIONAL FORM, NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GC
5010-106
ERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. Belmont
W. C. Sullivan
Rosen
✗AGR
DATE:
August 17, 1964
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Belmont
AGREEMENT REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY.
RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN,
OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS -
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evanst
Gale!
Sullivan
Tavėl
Trotter
#
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
1 - Mr. Rosen
Blo
Grily
Reference is made to the memoranda of Mr. Gale to
Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, and August 4, 1964.
PURPOSE:
ده ایم که
The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the
responsibilities of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the General
Investigative Division following the reassignment of supervisory
responsibilities involving the Ku Klux Klan, other hate groups,
and racial matters. To clarify this matter, it is set forth in two
parts. Part I will set forth the responsibilities of the Domestic
Intelligence Division. Part II will define the responsibilities of
the General Investigative Division.
PART I
RECIES
I. The Domestic Intelligence Division will be responsible for
the investigation of all Klan and hate-type organizations and
their members on a selective basis.
Several inquiries are presently pending in the field
regarding additional organizations to determine whether
such organizations are, in fact, hate groups.
II. The Domestic Intelligence Division will assume the responsibility
for the development of quality informants in all such organizations.
REC-18 66 1455-S
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SEP 1964
SEP
SEAT 1964
$7 SEP
NW-88608 -Docld:32989629 Page-163
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4 ÎN ITU ORICOTINO
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CONTINUED
OVER 9-9.
9-7-2
1964
☐ TON
1-XEROX 808R.B
Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: AGREEMENT REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY
RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN,
OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS
III. The Domestic Intelligence Division will assume the responsibility
for formulating and carrying out disruptive counterintelligence
programs against such organizations.
IV. The Domestic Intelligence Division, in addition, is willing to go
beyond the recommendations approved by the Director related to
the above and will, with Bureau approval, develop highly placed,
quality informants in certain legitimate organizations whose
activities generally relate to racial matters, such as
National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP)
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)
Student Nonviolence Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
-
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) · headed
by Martin Luther King
White Citizens Council
(Each one, of course, will be handled on a carefully selected
basis and the action approved individually by the Bureau.)
V. Similarly, the Domestic Intelligence Division is willing to go beyond
what was originally approved and will, with Bureau authorization,
proceed to establish informants and sources in Negro communities
throughout the Nation for the purpose of developing intelligence
information relating to the degree of racial tension; the possibility
of violence erupting in the form of riots, etc.; and will disseminate
this material to all interested persons inside and outside the Bureau.
The organizations and objectives as set forth in paragraphs IV and V
above are being made the subject of a separate memorandum inasmuch
as this involves a matter of policy and will have to be acted on
separately subject to approval by the Director.
2
CONTINUED - OVER
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 164
Memorandum to Mr. selmont
RE: AGREEMENT REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PROPOSED REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY
RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVING THE KU KLUX KLAN,
OTHER HATE GROUPS, AND RACIAL MATTERS
VI. The Domestic Intelligence Division will follow and disseminate
information concerning demonstrations, picketing activities,
racial disturbances, riots and incidents relating to matters of
a racial nature. Any violations of a local nature which occur
during the above and are not Federal violations should be
disseminated by the Domestic Intelligence Division.
(However, if during the course of any of the above situations,
a Federal violation is indicated, this should be immediately
referred to the General Investigative Division. It will be
the responsibility of the General Investigative Division
to conduct any necessary investigation of the specific
Federal violation which occurs. It will also have the
responsibility of disseminating such information to
persons entitled to receive same. Where special cases arise
which are not Federal violations and an investigation is requested
by the White House or Attorney General, determination will be made
at that time based upon the pertinent factors involved as to which
PART II Division has the responsibility.)
I. The General Investigative Division will have the responsibility for
the Bureau's supervision relative to the enforcement of all Civil
✓ Rights legislation. It will also have the responsibility for the
supervision, accumulation of information, and dissemination of
material relating to civil actions being undertaken to enforce
compliance with the various elements of the Civil Rights laws.
II. The General Investigative Division will have the responsibility for
investigating bombings, police brutality and all other Federal
violations now assigned to the General Investigative Division.
III. The daily racial matters memorandum disseminated to the White
House, the Attorney General, etc., which is coordinated by a
representative of Mr. DeLoach's Office, will be prepared in
Headquarters building. This requires the use of a stenographer
who reports on duty at midnight each night in order to complete
the memorandum by 8:00 a. m., in the morning. This duty should
be alternated, a week at a time, between Division 5 and Division 6.
R
Wes.... Jik
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NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 165
-
ΤΟ
FROM
t
SUBJECT:
CATIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 12 EDITION
GSA REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Now
MR. BELMONT
ROSE: Wi
A. ROSEN
:
DATE:
8/18/64
آرٹ
PERSONNEL TRANSFERS TO EFFECT PROPOSED
REASSIGNMENT OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES
IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RACIAL INFORMANTS
A
M
لجو
Toison
Belmont
Kohr
Casper
Calistan V
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
#
love
will g
Pursuant to Mr. Gale's memorandum of 8/4/64, to Mr. Tolsona.
in the above-captioned matter, the personnel on the attached list will
be transferred from the Civil Rights Section, General Investigative
Division, effective 9 a. m., 8/19/64, to the Domestic Intelligence
Division.
Enclosure
AR:WW
:(12)
1
-
.R
Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
Mr.. Malley
1 Mr. McGowan
-
"
1
-
Mr. Callahan - Att: Movement
1
-D
Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan - Att: Voucher Statistical Section, Rm. 6221 IB
1 Mr. Evans
-1
-
Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1.
9-21-64
REMOVED BY SRD
riah
☐ 65
att
3 Xerox 8-19-65
sd/m 17-149000-2960
REC-143
XEROX
OCT 8 1964
-38
Mombered
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 166
$139
злат
ས
☐
NAME
Joseph G Deegan
TITLE
GRADE
SALARY
Special Agent
GS-13
$13, 26513, 755
Frederick H. Freund, Jr.
Special Agent (A)
GS-14
15, 415 16, 130
A
Louis A. Giovanetti
Special Agent
GS-14
14, 515 15, 150
Charles A. Parkis, Jr.
Special Agent (A)
GS-14
14, 515 15, 150
Joseph
rainor.
Special Agent
GS-14
15, 415 16, 130
Mary A. Cammann
Kathryn T. Chernitsky
Sue E. Waller
Clerk-Stenographer GS-5
Clerk-Stenographer GS-A/5
Clerk-Stenographer GS-5
4690 5000
42154480 5000
46905000
:
Carol Ann Hancock
Clerk
GS-4
47755080
Wilbur Lane Perkins
Land/Per
Clerk
GS-4
4915 5230
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 167
Excised Copy
NW 88608 lodd2/9896/9 Page 168
__
:
-NW-88608 Doeld 32989629-Page 169
✓ ✓
April 29, 1966
39
THE ROLE OF THE FBI IN CLANDESTINE FORFION
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
CIA
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 170
10190=10113

***
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE.
1
B.
INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY,
2
C.
THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES..
8';
1.
2.
3.
4.
-
Prior to World War II...
During World War II (1941 1945)
National Intelligence Authority (NIA)
Responsibilities of CIA....
a.
b.
d.
e.
I
g.
The National Security Act of 1947.
National Security Council Intelligence
Directive...
Director of Central Intelligence
Directives....
Dulles Committee, 1949...
Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955
The Doolittle Committee, 1954..
The Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities of the
United States Government....
Responsibilities of the FBI.
a. Laws and Directives.
b.
•
• •
•
15
•
20
20
•
26
29
..
*3522 22233
8
8
C.
Requests From Other Agencies.
FBI's Role in the United States
Intelligence Board....
d.
The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB)...
e.
The Director's Stand Over the Years..
1440 00000
45
46
48
50
D. THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S.
55.
E. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE
UNITED STATES.
59
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 171
vap a uns an unas que quer
TABLE OF CONTENTS
F
Page
64
CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI.
1.
Manpower Being Devoted...
64
2.
Number of Microphone and Telephone
3.
Surveillances With Evaluation of Product.
Live Sources With Evaluation..
65
66
67
Anagram Program.
Double Agents and Informants
Additional Potential....
67
°
* 3 22222
74
68
69
4.
5.
6.
-
G. AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI CIA..
H. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA.
I.
EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES.
1. Overt Collection Activities.
2.
Clandestine Gathering Activities.
J. GENERAL FINDINGS...
79
82
2 33 3
77
86
K.
RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION.
• °
Authorization....
86
..
Selection of Targets..
·Technical Surveillance of Targets.
Technical Surveillance Controls.
87
90
91
Anagram Program.
91
Live Sources.
91
Training of Personnel.
93.
.
Reporting Procedures.
94
•
Language Capabilities..
94
j
Relations With Other Agencies..
Administrative Reorganization.
95
97
ALTERNATIVES.
99
NW 88608 Docld:32989629. Page 172-
ii
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this study is to define
a new role for the Bureau in the field of clandestine
collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S.
This action is necessary and most timely because
of our Government's vital need for increased foreign
intelligence and because of CIA's expanding interests
in the United States. There is a decided need for
a new Bureau concept, the implementation of which
could greatly increase our effectiveness and could deter
CIA from becoming a threat to our operational interests.
The study encompasses a review of history
as it relates to foreign intelligence collection in
the U. S. Analysis is made of the need and the
potential for such intelligence; the capabilities of
the Bureau and CIA in this field; and the responsibilities
of over-all (overt and covert) collection of foreign
intelligence in the U. S. We have submitted our general
findings, and we recommend a plan of action for a new
Bureau role.
This study was not designed to eliminate once
and for all the many problems relating to collection
of foreign intelligence in the U. S. It would have been
a Utopian objective to recommend a plan which would
produce maximum intelligence collection, remove existing
defects within the U. S. intelligence community, and
establish complete harmony among interested agencies.
We did not go that far. Careful and exhaustive analysis
dictated that we endeavor to reach a reasonable goal
consistent with prudent planning and sound operational
implementation. We feel that the recommended plan
meets such guidelines, that it is a decidedly major step
forward for the Bureau, and it strongly conforms with
the national security needs.
It should be noted that this document does
not deal with our law enforcement or internal security
functions, although it is fully recognized that
internal security and clandestine collection of foreign.
intelligence are closely linked. Any plan on our part
to produce foreign intelligence will affect our
capabilities in the field of counterintelligence.
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 173.
B.
INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY
People who do not speak and understand a common
language have difficulty in communicating their ideas. Even
in a country such as ours where English is the common language,
words take on different meanings in different geographical
locales and in different social, political, and economic
environments. Likewise, in professional fields, varying
backgrounds and experiences have conveyed different meanings
to terms in the professional vocabulary.
In the field of security, intelligence, and counter-
intelligence operations, certain professional terminology has
developed ostensibly to assist in the exchange of ideas by
persons in this field. However, as progress is made in a
field or a special segment of the field, new horizons develop
which require additional terminology or cause an evolution in
existing terminology. This development or evolution in security
and intelligence terminology, coupled with individualistic usage,
brings further problems in meaning which we also face in the
broader aspects of the English language. We have all noted
that our dictionaries do not always provide a single meaning
and we must be careful in daily conversation that we are not
misunderstood when merely using a conversational vocabulary.
We face a similar problem in the use of professional terminol-
、ogy in security and intelligence matters as this terminology
takes on new meaning with additional experience and takes on
varying meanings to different persons.
An additional factor to consider in understanding
the meaning of terminology is the context in which a term is
used.
For example, the term "intelligence" may be vague and
confusing without the knowledge of the context in which it is
used. It can, as a generic term, pertain to the whole field
of activities undertaken by a government the collection of
information, the protection of its institutions, and the con-
duct of nonattributable activities to facilitate the formation
and implementation of government policy. Also, it can relate
to the organization devoted to the collection and production
of information necessary to the government. In addition,
it may pertain to the whole body of theory and practice on
the basis of which, an intelligence organization operates.
Finally, the word "intelligence" may be utilized to mean
any part or all of the above.
The following definitions do not include all possible
meanings that have been utilized but, instead, are designed ..
to assist the reader in digesting this study.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 174
BASIC INTELLIGENCE is that factual intelligence which results
from the collation of encyclopedia information of a fundamental
and more or less permanent nature and which, as a result of
evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best
available.
BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE is intelligence concerning individuals.
CLANDESTINE COLLECTION A coordinated complex of collection
activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counter-
intelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted
by a governmental department or agency, or jointly by two or
more such entities, in such a way as to assure secrecy or
concealment.
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
-situations,
i
f
is military intelligence for use in combat
This is commonly referred to as tactical,
COUNTERESPIONAGE is identifying, penetrating, manipulating
.or repressing inimical espionage organizations.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE is defined as that intelligence activity,
with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the
effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and
which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation,
and its personnel, information, and installations against
espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence
includes the process of procuring, developing, recording,
disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine
activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing
individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable
of conducting such activity.
and
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, is that intelligence of all types and forms
of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without
the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.
DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which any
department or agency requires to execute its own mission.
- 3
… NW 88608 "Docid:32989629 Page 175
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE concerns information and investigation
of espionage, counterespionage, etc., which pertains to the
internal security of the U.S. and, therefore, is in subject
matter pertinent to the internal affairs of the U.S.
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the potentialities, utilization,
and vulnerabilities of a nation's natural and human resources.
ESPIONAGE is defined as that intelligence activity which is
directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine
operations.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE pertains to foreign affairs and subject
matters pertinent to foreign countries. The word "foreign"
as used here denotes the target of the intelligence and is
distinct from the geographic location of the source providing
the information. For example, refugees, defectors, and immigrants
from target countries (such as the Soviet Union) have the
potential for supplying intelligence regarding their countries
to United States authorities. Although physically located in
the United States, they are potential foreign intelligence sources.
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the meterology, hydrography,
topography, and basic natural resources of an area.
- INTELLIGENCE is the product derived from information collected
for the formulation and execution of Government policy and for
safeguarding the national welfare.
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION is information collected for intelli-
gence purposes that has not been evaluated by comparison with
:: the existing body of knowledge on the subject reported on; the
raw material of intelligence.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is integrated departmental
intelligence which is required by departments and agencies
of the Government for the execution of their missions; but
which transcends the exclusive competence of a single depart-
ment or agency to produce.··
'NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 176
INTERNAL SECURITY relates to the defense and protection within
the United States and its territories and possessions of the
people, the government, the institutions, and the installations
of critical importance from all hostile or destructive action.
INVESTIGATION means systematic and direct inquiries or pro-
cedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighbor-
hood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an
individual's activities or background; investigation does not
include the acceptance or the development of information through
social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in
discharging their cover functions.
See Combat Intelligence and Strategic
=
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:
Intelligence.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which is required
for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more
than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive
competence of a single department or agency.
OVERT COLLECTION is collection activities conducted in such
a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the
sponsoring government.
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns foreign and domestic policies
of governments and the activities of political movements,
POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE may be described as a comprehensive
product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis,
and interpretation of all available information relating to
national security and concerning other countries where such
information is significant to our Government's development and
execution of plans, policies, and courses of action. Such
intelligence can be divided into various categories, such as
basic, biographic, combat, current, departmental, economic,
geographic, interdepartmental, military, national, political,
scientific, sociological, strategic, tactical, and technical.
Perhaps the most simple definition would be that positive
intelligence is all the things you should know in advance of
initiating a course of action.
5
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629 Page 177
There appears to be much confusion in professional
circles regarding the use of the term "positive intelligence.
Some professionals use the term "positive intelligence" synonymously
with the term "foreign intelligence." In still anothor
usage, "positive intelligence" and "intelligence" are used
interchangeably.
In another useage, which is closely related
to the definition utilized in this study, "positive intelli-
gence" is described as what is left of the entire field after
"security intelligence" has been subtracted. This source
continues that both "positive intelligence" and "security
intelligence" can be against domestic targets, as well as
against foreign targets. For example, the Department of State,
in connection with its formulation of foreign policy, encounters
a large number of organizations of Americans whose parents came
from foreign countries. Many of these organizations--the Poles
for example--have strong views on what United States policy
should be toward Poland. The views of these organizations
regarding our foreign policy is likely to be a matter of some
importance to the Department of State in its policy formula-
tion. The knowledge of what these organizations think and
do can be a very significant phase of what might be called
"domestic positive intelligence," In addition, the connections
which these organizations may have with the foreign country
such as Poland sometimes provide a source of "foreign positive
intelligence."
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE pertains to the progress of scientific
research and development and usually this intelligence is
within the framework of how it affects military or economic
potential of a nation.
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE is basically the intelligence behind the
police function to protect the nation and its members from
those working to our national and individual detriment. For
example, this would include intelligence regarding clandestine
agents sent to the United States by a foreign power.
SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE pertains to the social, cultural,
psychological, or ethnic structure and characteristics of a
people.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
is the intelligence required for broad
and usually long-range planning; especially with regard to
military operations.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page. 178
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE See Combat Intelligence.
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns devices, equipment, and
special procossos. This is related to Scientific Intelli-
gence, but tends to be differentiated from it as practice
differs from theory.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629--Page 179-
0.
THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES
1. Prior to World War II
A study of the history and progress of foreign
intelligence collection in the United States reveals that
prior to World War II such collection efforts were incidental
and in direct proportion to the intensity of the coverage
maintained in the counterintelligence field. Accordingly,
the history of foreign intelligence collection in the
United States prior to World War II is primarily a history of
counterintelligence and internal security coverage, of which
foreign intelligence was a by-product. Historical highlights
of the developments in this field are as follows:
(a) In August, 1914, when German espionage agents
Count Johann Von Bernstorff and Dr. Heinrich Albert of the
German Embassy, Washington, D. C., arrived in the
United States with $150,000,000 in German treasury notes to
finance the first foreign espionage and sabotage apparatus
to be organized in this country, United States Government
intelligence work was handled for the most part by five
small organizations (Bureau of Investigation of the
Department of Justice, Secret Service, Army, State and Navy),
all operating on their own with small staffs and without
.coordination and sufficient delineation of responsibilities.
(b) On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war against
Germany and President Woodrow Wilson gave the Bureau of
Investigation the task of enforcing his proclamation
governing the conduct of enemy aliens. The Bureau at the time
had 300 Agents but shortly after the outbreak of the war
the staff was increased to 400.
(c) As result of a rash of bombings believed
executed by Bolsheviks, Attorney General Palmer appointed
Francis P. Garvan of New York as Assistant Attorney General
to deal with the problem. He created a General Intelligence
Division under command of J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. Hoover was
instructed to make a study of subversive activities in the
United States to determine their scope and the potential
for prosecution.
8
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 180

ན། b. བནtuefkeitL-
(d) On May 9, 1934, President Roosevelt called
a White House conference attended by the Attorney General,
Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director of FBI
and Chief of United States Secret Service to deal with
the problem of growth of fascist organizations in the
United States. The conference agreed that there should be
an investigation of these groups and their activities for
intelligence purposes. Since the only Federal law believed
applicable at the time was the Immigration Law, the President
decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
Service would confer with the Chief of Secret Service and the
Director of the FBI to work out details of the investigation..
Mr. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI
personnel to conduct an intensive and confidential investi-
gation of the Nazi movement. This was the first general
intelligence investigation made by the Government into
fascist activities in this country.
(e) As a result of President Franklin Roosevelt's
concern over activities of the communists and other subversive'
groups, a series of conferences was hold in the latter part
of August and early September, 1936, participated in by the
President, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.
As a result of his concern over the international character
of communism and fascism, the President stated the FBI should
conduct necessary investigations and coordinate information
upon these matters in the possession of the Military
Ertegence Division, the Naval Intelligence Division and
the State Department.
It is noteworthy that it was specified the
investigation was to be for intelligence purposes only.
The Presidential Order was implemented by the
Director in a letter to all Special Agents in Charge,
September 5, 1936.
(f) As a result of opposition primarily by the
State Department against accepting the FBI as the coordinating
agency in the investigations of all subversive activities in
the United States, President Roosevelt, on June 26, 1939, issued
a confidential directive to Cabinet members which established an
Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee composed
of the FBI and the Intelligence Divisions of the War Department
and the Navy. He named the FBI as the coordinating agency to
receive all reports on subversive activities.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629_Page_181
'
(g) President Roosevelt publicly designated the FBI
to investigate matters relating to espionage, sabotage and
violations of the neutrality regulations by Presidential
Directive dated September 6, 1939.
(h) On May 21, 1940, President Roosevelt in a
memorandum to the then Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson,
authorized and directed the Attorney General in such cases as
he might approve to authorize the use of listening devices
directed to the conversations or other communications of
persons suspected of subversive activity against the Government
of the United States, including suspected spies.
Pursuant to such authorization, commencing on June 1,
1940, technical surveillances were installed on diplomatic
establishments throughout the United States of such countries
as Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and France. These
installations in addition to providing counterintelligence
information of value produced a substantial quantity of foreign
intelligence information.
(i) Although lines of responsibility were established
for domestic intelligence work in connection with the September 6,
1939, Presidential Directive, there were no clearly defined areas
of responsibility of overseas intelligence operations and as
time passed the need for decisions in that field grew more evident.
As a result, the Special Intelligence Service (SIS)
came into being. By Presidential Directive June 24, 1940,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt set forth lines of responsibility
in the operations of United States intelligence agencies in the
foreign field. This Directive grew out of a series of meetings
involving representatives of State Department, Army and Navy
intelligence and the FBI wherein it was agreed that the SIS would
act as a service agency, furnishing the State Department, the
military, the FBI and other governmental agencies with information
having to do with financial, economic, political and subversive
activities detrimental to the security of the United States. The
June 24th Directive placed the responsibility for nonmilitary
intelligence coverage in the Western Hemisphere on the FBI.
than thirty days thereafter the FBI had organized an SIS operation.
Less
Through World War II and until approximately March 31,
1947, the FBI continued its SIS operations. The culmination of
our activities in this field came about as a result of the
January 22, 1946, Presidential Directive establishing the
Central Intelligence Group and giving it the responsibility of
collecting foreign intelligence abroad.
- 10
ate
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 182"
During World War II (1941
20
The FBI's Role
ac
1945)
During World War II, as prior to the war, foreign
intelligence collection in this country was geared to and
principally a product of our intensive efforts in the counter-
intelligence field. It is also significant to note that a
steady stream of foreign intelligence continued to be developed
from our technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of
enemy-bloc countries, as well as other sensitive countries
such as Russia, Argentina, Portugal and Spain.
In line with the Presidential Directive of
September 6, 1939, the FBI continued to be in charge of all
investigative work in matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage,
counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the
neutrality laws.
On January 8, 1943, the President issued another
Directive in which he reiterated the previous Directive of
September 6, 1939.
In ordering the FBI to take charge in the foregoing
areas, President Roosevelt did not define the various types of
intelligence involved but placed the entire intelligence and
internal security responsibilities involved under the
'jurisdiction of the FBI. As a matter of fact, in carrying out
these responsibilities we did produce foreign intelligence in
substantial quantity especially through our technical coverage
of foreign diplomatic establishments.
b. Office of Strategic Services
The position of Colonel William J. Donovan as
Coordinator of Information (COI) was created by Presidential
Directive dated July 11, 1941. On July 14, 1941, President
Roosevelt sent a letter to the Attorney General stating the
position was created, ""in order to provide a central point in
the Government for the analysis of information and data which
bears upon national security.
The President described
Donovan's duties as "assist me and the various Departments and
agencies of the Government in assembling and correlating
information which may be useful in the formulation of basic
plans for the defense of the nation."
- 11
•
NW-88608-Docid:32989629-Page-183-
"
In the letter President Roosevelt clearly limited
Donovan's jurisdiction with the following statement: "I
should like to emphasize that Colonel Donovan's work is not
intended to supersede or duplicate or involve any direction
of the activities of established agencies already obtaining
and interpreting defense information."
The Presidential order dated September 11, 1941,
established the position of COI with clear cut authority to
collect and analyze information bearing on national security;
correlate and make such information available to the President
and other Government officials as the President may determine.
COI was finally authorized to carry out, when requested by
the President, supplementary activities as might facilitate
the securing of information not then available to the
Government.
"
Donovan, in a memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF
-ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION,' expanded
on the President's directive in general terms. Under his
plan for procedure there was a Coordinator of Strategic
Information responsible directly to the President. (Note
this same organizational set up was later adopted by the
Director of Central Intelligence.) Donovan noted, however,
in his memorandum, "The proposed centralized unit will
neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy
Intelligence, or any other Department of the Government."
(62-64427, serials 23 and X3.)
Our file on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
reveals that that organization continued its organizational,
training, and operational activities in this country based
on Donovan's premise that he was the central clearing point
for anti-Axis espionage and counterespionage. An interesting
insight into OSS operations in this country is provided in
the nonfiction work "The Scarlet Thread" by former OSS agent
Donald Downes. Downes noted that he was a former British
intelligence agent serving for that organization in New York
when he was recruited by OSS immediately after Pearl Harbor.
He tells of his recruitment by Allan Dulles, his association
with Donovan, and his work in the counterespionage field in
New York City and Washington, D. C., with other OSS agents,
including the current United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. Downes detailed attempts
by him and other OSS agents to steal diplomatic codes from
•
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 184
12
W
"friendly" or "neutral" country embassies in Washington in
the early 1940's and frequently referred to the fact that
this was being done by OSS with knowledge that its juris-
diction in this country was based only on the theory that
a foreign Embassy is not American soil and is technically
outside the jurisdiction of the FBI, which had full juris-
diction for counterintelligence in the western hemisphere.
Our file on the OSS is replete with incidents
indicating OSS recruitment and counterespionage activities
in this country during the early 1940's.
By memorandum dated May 22, 1945, Stanley J. Tracey,
advised of a conversation overheard between two high-ranking
State Department officials. The conversation dealt with OSS
attempts to take over Bureau SIS operations in Latin America
with one of the State Department officials, Aura Warren,
stating that officials of OSS felt that organization was
-better equipped to handle work than FBI personnel attached
to various American Embassies in South America. In response
☐ to this attempt of OSS to take over our duties, the Director
commented: "i would like to know where Warren gets this.
According to Ladd our contacts in State Department have no
knowledge of such OSS efforts. Also Tracey should point
out it is State Department duty to initiate it as we would
'service it' and the State Department in fact started the
SIS project. H" (62-64427-1059.)
An interesting evaluation of OSS operations is
provided in a report prepared by Colonel Richard Park of
the War Department as a result of a survey of OSS operations
made as a special and confidential mission for the President
in 1944 and 1945. Colonel Park commented: "Without going
into details I was everywhere left with the same impression
of utter incompetency on the part of OSS leadership....
"Everywhere that the subject of OSS came up,
unsolicited remarks clearly brought out the very well known
amateurish nature of the organization.
"The OSS has been restricted from active operations
in South America by Presidential directive...."
:
Despite the absence of any jurisdiction in or
responsibility for counterintelligence operations in the
western hemisphere, an officer of OSS was reported to have
}
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 185
a
13
0
attempted to obtain cover. for an OSS agent in South America
under guise of employment by an organization doing business
in South America.
A closing paragraph of Colonel Park's report
commented on observations made by an official of OSS as
follows:
"This official of OSS added that it was the policy
of his agency not to give any more information than necessary
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He pointed out that
OSS instructors in their school in the United States had
discussed the FBI in an unfavorable light and had painted
the picture of OSS replacing the Federal Bureau of
Investigation not only outside the United States but in
the domestic field. The publicity campaign referred to
was to be one of the means adopted to accomplish this
purpose."
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 186
14
CIO
.
3. National Intelligence Authority (NIA)
"
.
On January 22, 1946, President Harry S. Truman
addressed a Directive to the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of War, and the Secretary of the Navy stating, in part, "I
hereby designate you, together with another person to be named
by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelli-
gence Authority. . .” The Directive provided that each of these
three Secretaries would from time to time assign personnel and
facilities from their respective departments "which persons
shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group" (CIG)
under a Director of Central Intelligence. It was provided that
the latter would be responsible to the NIA.
President Truman then stated that subject to the
existing law the Director of Central Intelligence should
(a) accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence
and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
results; (b) plan for the coordination of such activities of
the intelligence agencies of the three departments involved as
related to the national security; (c) perform such services of
common concern as the NIA determined could be more effectively
accomplished centrally; and (d) perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence as the President and the
NIA might from time to time direct.
The Presidential Directive said that no police, law
enforcement or internal security functions should be exercised
under the Directive; that certain intelligence should be freely
available to the Director of Central Intelligence "for correlation,
evaluation or dissemination"; and that "the existing intelligence
agencies of your departments shall continue to collect, evaluate,
correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence." The ninth
provision of the Directive stated, "Nothing herein shall be
construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the
continental limits of the United States and its possessions,
except as provided by law and Presidential directives.'
"
On
A series of communications between the Bureau and
Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg; who was designated as
Director of the Central Intelligence Group, then followed.
June 21, 1946, a memorandum analyzed a communication from
Vandenberg which submitted a proposed memorandum to the NIA and
a proposed Directive to be issued by NIA extending the powers
and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Directive
provided, in essence, the following additional functions and
powers for the Director of Central Intelligence:
- 15
NW.88608. Docid:32989629 Pagé 187--
(1) Undertake such basic research and analysis of
intelligence and counterintelligence as may in his opinion be
required.
(2) Act as the executive agent of this authority
(NIA) in coordinating and in supervising all Federal foreign
intelligence activities.
(3) Perform the following services of common concern:
(a) conduct all Federal espionage and counterespionage operations
for the collection of foreign intelligence; (b) conduct all
Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign
powers for the collection of intelligence information.
In discussing this Directive which Vandenberg desired
issued, the memorandum stated the Directive did not conform
with the original plan proposed by the President or which was
envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the
President issued his Directive. The original plan, insofar as
the Bureau was advised, contemplated the setting up of solely
a coordinating agency which was given the power to perform certain
functions which it would be determined could more adequately and
economically be performed centrally for the benefit of all
Government agencies. The memorandum noted that "undoubtedly if
this Directive is approved and the Central Intelligence Group
is successful in setting up complete foreign coverage, the
Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a 'second rate' position
insofar as purely intelligence functions are concerned in the
domestic field. . . It is inevitable that the Central Intelli-
gence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar
as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign
intelligence existing in that field. Also, it is impossible to
separate entirely foreign intelligence and the domestic functions
performed by the Bureau."*
In reply to the Directive proposed by General Vandenberg,
a letter was sent to him June 25, 1946, which stated that the
Directive was approved with certain changes suggested "for
clarification purposes only." The Director suggested that to
the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence acting
*
*** **** * * * * * * ****
With respect to this last quoted statement, Mr. E. A. Tamm and
Mr. C. A. Tolson noted an exception by placing an addendum on the
memorandum. The Director's comments were set forth. This is
more fully reported below under the heading, "Director's Comments,"
---NW 88608- Docld:32989629-Page-188
-
16 -
__
---
as the executive agent of National Intelligence Authority
in coordinating and supervising all foreign intelligence
activitios there should be added "performed outside the
United States and its possessions relating to the national
security in accordance with the overall policies and objectives
established by this Authority." With respect to the proposal
that the Director of Central Intelligence direct all espionage
and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign
intelligence, it was proposed that the phrase "outside the
United States and its possessions" also be inserted in this
provision.
On July 29, 1946, General Vandenberg sent over
a memorandum on the subject "Exploitation of American
Business Concerns With Connections Abroad as Sources of
Foreign Intelligence Information." He added a proposed
Directive. The Director replied by letter August 6, 1946,
"I should like to comment that there appears to have been
an addition to the field encompassed by CIG Directive #11
calling for a survey of the exploitation of American business
concerns. I note that in your report and in the proposed
NIA Directive, you refer not only to American business con-
cerns but to other private groups with connections abroad.
This latter phrase, in my opinion, is extremely broad and
could be taken to include all types of organizations,
including Foreign Nationality Groups. In fact, I feel that
the report and proposed Directive should confine themselves to
the discussion of American business concerns and that no
references at all should be made to 'private groups'. .
I feel that at a later date the question of exploitation of
these private groups by CIG representatives might be worked
out by discussing them individually with the FBI when their
identities are determined." This matter remained unresolved.
On August 22, 1946, General Vandenberg submitted
another proposed Directive concerning exploitation of American
business concerns, nongovernmental groups, and individuals (in
the United States) with connections abroad as sources of foreign
intelligence information. A memorandum analyzing this on
August 22, 1946, pointed out the new Directive was even more
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page 189-
17
obnoxious than the one originally proposed. The Directive
noted, in part, "CIG field representatives will establish
and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local
Army and Navy headquarters and Air Force headquarters, if
present, through the medium of local interagency offices."
The analyzing memorandum nointed out, "If this means the
CIG is going to maintain field representatives in the United
States or establish offices, it certainly is something new and
a provision that we did not understand was intended in the
President's Directive. . Attached to the proposed Directive
is a discussion which is more or less the same as was attached
to the original proposed Directive. It, however, makes the
following statement which the Bureau cannot subscribe to and
it would seem must oppose, that is, 'Foreign Intelligence
Information related to the national security, although it may
be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the
limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely
a part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination
- of which is specifically a function of the National Intelli-
gence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter
of 22 January 1946.'
In pointing out the Bureau's objections, the
analyzing memorandum of August 22, 1946, stated, "Therę
is now involved in this Directive the fundamental question
of just what rights the Central Intelligence Group has with
reference to operations within the United States. Carrying
to a logical conclusion the statements set forth above contained
in the discussion, they could cover all foreign embassies in
the United States, take charge of double agents we are operating
or radio stations we are operating as double agent set-ups, etc.,
because essentially these operations engaged in by the Bureau
do not directly involve enforcement of the laws but rather are
concerned with obtaining information in the nature of foreign
intelligence which, of course, is related to internal security
as is all foreign intelligence. Essentially, the Bureau's
domestic operations in intelligence involve the determining
of the aims, intentions, and activities of foreign countries
or their representatives."
The memorandum of analysis stated that our position).
would be the Bureau would not consent to any provisions except
thoso rolated to Amorican business: concerns with connections
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 190-
- 18

abroad. On August 23, 1946, the Director sent a letter to
Genoral Vandenberg stating in part, "I must advise that the
proposed Directive does not incorporate the changes suggested
in my letter of August 6, 1946, and I, therefore, cannot
approve it. This new directive also includes provisions
and statements in which I cannot concur and, in fact, must
oppose.".
The strong stand of the Director obviously led to
a conference between General Vandenberg and the Director
which was reported in a memorandum of September 13, 1946,
which the Director prepared. As stated in the Director's
memorandum the conference concerned CIG's desire to gather
contacts among "nongovernmental groups and individuals with
connections abroad." The entire conference was on this subject
matter and did not enter into collection of foreign intelli-
gence from foreign embassies or from foreign officials or,
in fact, from any other source. The Director wrote, "I told
the General that I could well appreciate that there would be
cases in which his organization would be desirous of making
contacts in the United States for the purpose of obtaining
information from abroad and that the Bureau was not interested
in such contacts except in those situations wherein the individual
or the group might be engaged in activities within the United
States that were either under investigation by the Bureau or
might possibly be the medium of obtaining information con-
cerning the activities of a subversive character being carried
'on within the United States. I told the General that I would
be perfectly agreeable to his suggestion, with the added
provision that if CIG was desirous of contacting any
individuals of the character that he had indicated, before
doing so it would check with the FBI."
The foregoing has been set forth rather extensively
since it shows the strong stand the Bureau took against CIG's
operating in the United States. Actually, as will be reported
hereinafter,. Directives were adopted permitting CIG to collect
positive intelligence in this country by contacting United
States citizens, American businessmen, aliens (with prior
ぷ
FBI approval) through the foreign language press and in later
years through contacts with United States governmental personnel.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 191
19.
4.
Responsibilities of CIA
The National Security Act of 1947
This Act, which is reported in 50 USC 401 et seq.,
established the National Security Council (NSC) and under it
the Central Intelligence Agency. It provided that when the
Director of Central Intelligence was appointed the NIA should.
cease to exist.
L
There was much discussion concerning the powers and
authorities to be vested in the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Many individuals, especially in Congress, expressed
fears that CIA could develop into a gestapo if permitted to
become operational in the United States. The following two
excerpts, of interest in this connection, are from a
Congressional publication related to hearings prior to passage
of the National Security Act of 1947. The publication is
entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments, House of Representatives, 80th Congress,
1st Session on H. R. 2319 (National Security Act of 1947)":
Page 127
m
During testimony concerning authority for
and scope of CIA, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy,
stated:
"The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority
are limited definitely to purposes outside of this
country, except the collation of information gathered
by other government agencies.
"Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration
with General Vandenberg. He relies upon them for domestic
activities."
Page 438
-
Congressman Clarence J..Brown of Ohio in
speaking about the National Security Act of 1947, which was
under scrutiny before passage, stated:
"I want to write a lot of other safeguards into the
section that deals with the Central Intelligence Agency.
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 192.
20
"I want to make certain that the activities and the -
functions of the Central Intelligence Agency were care-
fully confined to international matters, to military
matters, and to matters of national security. We have
enough people now running around butting into overybody
else's business in this country without establishing
another agency to do so..
"What we ought to do is to eliminate 90 percent of
the present snoopers instead of adding to them.
L
"I do not think it would be the Central Intelligence
Agency's right, authority, or responsibility to check on
the ordinary domestic activities of the average American .
citizen, and yet they could have the power and authority
to do it under this bill as written."
7/26/47.
The National Security Act of 1947 was approved
It provided that for the purpose of coordinating the
intelligence activities of the several Government departments
and agencies in the interest of national security, the, Agency
under the direction of the NSC was:
(1) To advise NSC in matters concerning such
intelligence activities of the Government departments
and agencies of the Government as relate to the
national security,
(2) To make recommendations to the NSC for the
.coordination of such activities,
(3) To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to national security and provide for its appropriate
dissemination within the Government: Provided, That the
Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers, or internal security responsibilities,
(4) To perform such additional services of common
concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally,
(5) To perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting national security as the
NSC may from time to time direct..
NW-88608 Docld:32989629_Page_193
C+
21
There is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e)
of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers
information affecting the national security. This section
provides:
(e) To the extent recommended by the NSC and approved
by the President, such intelligence of the departments and
agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided,
relating to the national security shall be open to the
inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and
such intelligence as relates to the national security and
is possessed by such departments and other agencies of
the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall
be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence
for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided,
however, That upon the written request of the Director
of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI shall
make available to the Director of Central Intelligence
such information for correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination as may be essential to the national security.
b. National Security Council Intelligence Directives
To implement the authority granted to it under the
National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council
has issued a series of "National Security Council Intelligence
Directives," usually referred to as NSCID's and commonly called
"Nonscids." The first of these was issued December 12, 1947, and
provided for the establishing of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully
effective integration of the national intelligence effort. By
Directive dated September 15, 1958, the U. S. Intelligence Board
(USIB) was formally created as successor to the Intelligence Advisory
Committee and a counterpart known as the U. S. Communications
Intelligence Board.
NSCID No. 1 provided that the Director of Central
Intelligence should coordinate the foreign intelligence activities
of the United States, such coordination to include both special
and other forms of intelligence. The USIB under this Directive
shall "advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence as
he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsi-
bilities." It is the Board which is empowered to establish
policies, define intelligence objectives, make recommendations
to appropriate U. S. officials, develop standards for protection
of intelligence, and formulate policies with respect to arrange-
ments with foreign governments. The Director of Central
~ NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 194
22
Intelligence is designated as Chairman of this Board and in
this capacity is distinguished from the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. A more complete discussion with
regard to the Bureau's role in this over-all setup is set forth
heroinafter under the caption "FBI Rolations With tho
United States Intelligence Board."
National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 1, originally issued 12/12/47, defines the various types
of intelligence in Section 4.
(a) National Intelligence is that intelligence
which is required for the formulation of national security
policy, concerns more than one department or agency,
and transcends the exclusive competence of a single
department or agency, The Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall produce* national intelligence with the
support of the U. S. Intelligence Board.
(b) Departmental Intelligence is that intelligence
'which any department or agency requires to execute its own
mission..
(c) Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated
departmental intelligence which is required by departments
and agencies of the Government for the execution of their
missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence
of a single department or agency to produce.
subcommittee structure of the U. S. Intelligence Board
may be utilized for the production and dissemination of
interdepartmental intelligence.
The
Director of Central Intelligence is then authorized
to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental
intelligence provided it is done consistent with statutes and
Presidential policy, and provided further "that any disclosure
of FBI intelligence information shall be cleared with that
agency prior to dissemination."
This acknowledges that FBI information includes both
national and interdepartmental intelligence.
* * * *** *******
*************
*A footnote here states: "By 'produce' is meant 'to correlate
and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security' as
provided in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
Section 102..(d) (3)."
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page-195-
23
1
NSCID No. 2 issued 1/13/48, relates to coordination.
of foreign intelligence collection activities "not covered
by other NSC Directives."
The Director of Central Intelligence has responsi-
bility for planning to assure there is no undesirable
duplication and that coverage is adequate.
Responsibilities are then assigned as follows:
(1) The Department of State shall have primary
responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of
common concern, the collection abroad (i.e., outside
the U. S. and its possessions) of political, sociological,
economic, scientific and technical information.
(2) The Department of Defense shall have primary
responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of
common concern, the collection of military intelligence
information. Owing to the importance of scientific and
technical intelligence to the Department of Defense
and the military services, this collection responsibility
shall include scientific and technical, as well as economic;
information directly pertinent to Department of Defense
missions. (It seems significant that while State Depart-
ment primary responsibility was limited by the phrase
"the collection abroad," there was no such limitation
on the Department of Defense in its responsibility.)
(3) The Central Intelligence Agency may collect
abroad intelligence information in support of assigned func-
tions or as a byproduct of assigned functions: Provided,
that this collection involves no undesirable duplication
of any of the specific assignments to State and Defense
Departments, and Provided, that any such overt collection
is coordinated with the Department of State or with the
Senior U. S. Representative.
In Section 7 of NSCID No. 2 there is delegated to
CIA responsibility for overt collection of foreign intelligence
in the U. S. as follows:
"The Central Intelligence Agency, as a service of
common concern, shall be responsible for the selective
exploitation within the United States of non-governmental
organizations and individuals as sources of foreign
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 196
-
24
and
intelligence information, in accordance with policies,
procedures and practices established as provided in
paragraph 3a of NSCID No. 1, by the Director of Central
Intelligence with the concurrences of the U. S. Intelli-
gence Board."
Section 9 of the same Directive provides that CIA
"shall conduct the exploitation of foreign language publications
for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of
common concern. When this function is carried out in the U. S.,
this also constitutes overt collection of foreign intelligence
by that Agency in this country.
It may be worthy to note at this point that NSCID
No.'s 1 and 2 were discussed, approved, and issued in their
original forms prior to 7/7/49 when the FBI was designated a
member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
NSCID No. 3 on Coordination of Intelligence Production
contains definitions of various types of intelligence (including
those defined in NSCID No. 1) and then delineates primary
responsibilities for "producing" intelligence among various
agencies, stating with respect to CIA:
"The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce
economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and
scientific and technical intelligence as a service of
common concern. Further, the Central Intelligence
Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be
necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities
of the Director of Central Intelligence."
Since, as noted hereinbefore, "collection" activities
are defined in NSCID No. 2; it would seem to follow that the
word "produce" as used in NSCID No. 3 has the same definition
as set out in a footnote to NSCID No. 1, paragraph 4, i.e., "to
correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security." Thus, NSCID No. 3 would not appear to extend CIA's
jurisdiction to collect intelligence or be operational in any way.
The remaining NSCID's appear to have no bearing on
the subject matter of foreign intelligence collection in the
United States.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Pagė 197-
- 25
3
C. Director of Central Intelligence Directives
To implement the National Security Act of 1947 as
amended and the various National Security Council Intelligence
Directives issued pursuant thereto, the Director of Central
Intelligence has issued numerous Directives (DCID's), The
first of these having a direct bearing on jurisdictional matters
is DCID No. 2/3, captioned "Domestic Exploitation of
Nongovernmental Organizations and Individuals." NSCID No. 2,
paragraph 7, states that CIA shall be responsible for the
selective exploitation within the U. S. of such organizations
and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information,
We, therefore, have avoided, and should avoid, any operations
among nongovernmental organizations and individuals designed
solely to produce foreign intelligence without CIA prior
approval or nullification of these provisions.
DCID No. 2/3 provides for exploitation of nongovernmental
U. S. citizens by CIA domestic field offices and states, "In
cases where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has indicated an
operational interest in a U. S. citizen, Central Intelligence
Agency will coordinate with that agency prior to further contact."
This DCID also provides for exploitation by CIA
domestic field offices of aliens, following a prior name check
with FBI so our statutory obligations may be properly met without
CIA interference.
It is of possible interest to note that in dealing with
these two matters, DCID No. 2/3 refers to nongovernmental U. S.
citizens but only to aliens (without the restrictive adjective).
The NSCID on which it is based refers to nongrovernmental
individuals without distinguishing between citizens and aliens.
Thus, there appears to have been an intention to confine CIA's
intelligence exploitation functions within the U. S. A review
of our file on CIA (62-80750) indicates this might well have
been a concession to the Bureau since we went on record opposing
delegation of any intelligence collection functions within the
U. S. to CIA in letters to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
(then Director of Central Intelligence Group) on June 25, 1946,
(Serial 96), August 6, 1946, (Serial 138), and August 23, 1946,
(Serial 222), which have been discussed more fully under the
heading "National Intelligence Authority.
"
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 198.
26
:
DCID No. 2/8 is captioned "Domestic Exploitation of
U. S. Government Organizations and Officials." It begins in
very general terms, "Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1
and NSCID No. 2. . . " It provides, "The Central Intelligence
Agency shall coordinate and have the primary responsibility for
'exploitation of the foreign intelligence potential of non-USIB
organizations and officials to meet community needs as a
service of common concern."
As set forth above, there seems to be no basis for
such CIA jurisdiction in NSCID No. 1 and No. 2. Paragraph 7
of NSCID No. 2 specifically restricts CIA in this area of
operations to nongovernmental organizations and individuals.
A review of our U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) file,
62-90718, shows following apropos this matter:
The Draft Minutes of the 3/21/61 USIB
meeting report that the Board approved the
draft of a DCID on "Domestic Exploitation of
U. S. Government Organizations and Officials,"
which would be issued as DCID No. 2/8, effective
3/21/61. Mr. Belmont was present at this USIB
meeting as the FBI representative. (unnumbered
serial between serials 1131 & 1132, USIB file)
Tracing this subject matter back through
the USIB file it was learned that it apparently
was first considered at the meeting held 2/23/60
at which the Bureau was represented by Fred A.
Frohbose. The minutes for that meeting reported
the Board agreed in principle that a directive on
Intelligence Exploitation of U. S. Governmental
officials would be desirable. However, the
matter was referred to the Committee on Domestic
Exploitation for further study and the submission
of a revised draft for Board consideration.
(unnumbered serial between serials 1040 & 1041,
USIB file)
From the foregoing it would appear that the Bureau
concurred in the issuance of this particular Directive and thus
to an extension of CIA's overt collection activities in the
U. S. if this should, in fact, be interpreted as an extension.
DCID 4/1 provides for the establishment of the
Interagency Defector Committee.
NW-88608-Docid:32989629-Page-199--
cas
27
DCID's 4/2 and 4/3 relate to the Defector Program
abroad and domestically, respectively. The latter one dwells on
division of responsibilities between FBI and CIA in the handling
of defectors within the continental limits of the United States.
It provides that exploitation of such defectors shall be conducted:
1. To obtain internal security information or other
data required by FBI in view of its statutory responsibilities
in the internal security field.
2.
To obtain foreign intelligence information required
in the interests of national security by the member agencies of
the USIB.
3. For such other purposes as are deemed to be in the
interests of national security.
The very next sentence then gives the implication that
exploitation of the defector for foreign intelligence purposes is
- the principal responsibility of CIA, for it reads, "Decision as
to the relative importance of internal security exploitation by
FBI and foreign intelligence exploitation by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) shall be made jointly by representatives of
CIA and FBI.'
There then follows a listing of nine specific FBI
responsibilities, one of which is to make available to CIA foreign
intelligence information resulting from the initial exploitation
of defectors. There is no subsequent specific delineation of CIA
responsibility over foreign intelligence exploitation until there
is a transfer of responsibility for handling a defector from FBI
to CIA after FBI interests have been fully satisfied. There is a
general assignment of such responsibility to CIA in the terms,
"CIA shall be responsible for: a. Coordinating the activities of .
other departments and agencies concerned with defector matters,
except those responsibilities assigned exclusively to FBI . .
"
As a matter of practice, if it is determined there is
little or no importance from an internal security standpoint in
connection with a particular defection, we do not take over but in
effect give clearance to CIA to proceed from a foreign intelli-
gence standpoint.
DCID's in the 5/ series (numbers one through five) were
issued principally to implement NSCID Number 5 which deals with
U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities
abroad. There appears to be no conflict with FBI jurisdiction in
this series.
All other DCID's relate to Elint Critical Intelligence
and other matters which appear to have no bearing on possible
conflicts between CIA and FBI responsibilities.
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NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 200-

1
Dulles Committee, 1949
The Dulles Committee was appointed February 3, 1948,
by the National Security Council (NSC) to make a "comprehensive,
impartial and objective survey of the organization, activities
and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)." The
Committee was instructed to report its findings and recommendations
on the following matters:
(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the
organization structure of CIA.
(b)
The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.
(c) The relationship of these activities to those of
other departments and agencies.
(d). The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel.
The Committee's scope was extended on March 17, 1948,
to include the following provisions: "This survey will comprise
primarily a thorough and comprehensive examination of the
structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relation-
ships of the CIA as outlined in the resolution of the National
Security Council. It will also include an examination of such
intelligence activities of other Government departments and
agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make
recommendations for their effective operation and overall
coordination. . ."
It
This report, which is dated January 1, 1949, for the
most part concerned itself with administrative matters affecting
CIA and the necessity for reorganization within that Agency.
notes, however, that the National Security Act, as implemented
by directives of the NSC, imposed upon CIA responsibility for
carrying out three essential functions:
(1) The coordination of intelligence activities.
(2)
The correlation and evaluation of intelligence
relating to the national security, which has been interpreted
by directive as meaning the production* of national intelligence.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* See definition of "produce" in footnote to NSCID No. 1, Section
4b as "correlate and evaluate,' " the reverse of connotation given
here.
-NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-201-
29
(3) The performance centrally, subject to NSC
direction, of certain intelligence and related functions of
common concern to various departments of the Government.
The report noted that Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 established a framework for a sound
intelligence system and no amendment to that Section of the
Act was deemed necessary.
Although the coordination of intelligence activities
of the several departments and agencies concerned with national
security was a primary reason for establishing CIA, the report
noted the National Security Act does not give CIA independent
authority to coordinate intelligence activities, as final
responsibility to establish policies was vested in the NSC.
The statutory limitations upon the authority of CIA
to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of
* the NSC were, according to the report, obviously designed to
protect the autonomy and internal arrangements of the various
departments and agencies performing intelligence functions.
In spite of these calculated limitations on the authority of
CIA, the report noted, it was clear the Agency was expected to
provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated
intelligence system. In practice, the NSC has almost without
exception approved the recommendations submitted to it by CIA
for the coordination of intelligence activities.
The National Security Act does not define the
"intelligence activities" which were to be coordinated by CIA
under the direction of the NSC or specify the departments
whose activities were covered. Presumably, according to the
report, all intelligence activities relating to the national
security were included, from collecting information in the first
instance to the preparation and dissemination of finished
intelligence reports and estimates. "The criterion," which the
report noted was a very broad one, was "such intelligence
activities.
as relate to the national security and not
the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or
locale of the intelligence activity." Thus, the report noted,
practically no limitations are set upon the scope of the intelli-
gence activities with which the Central Intelligence Agency is'
to concern itself.
. . .
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 202.:'
-.30
The report noted another broad field requiring
coordination is that of foreign intelligence derived from
domestic sources and the allied field of domestic counter-
intelligence. This includes the exploitation of intelligence
from United States business firms, travellers, etc., exploitation
of the intelligence possibilities of groups and individuals of
foreign nationality in the United States, the rolating of
domostic counterintelligence to foreign intelligence and the
coordination of domestic counterespionage with counterespionage
abroad. Except for the exploitation of private sources of
foreign intelligence in the United States which is centralized
in the Office of Operations, CIA, responsibility for other
activities is scattered among the State Department, the armed
services, the FBI and CIA.
The FBI, which has primary security and law enforce-
ment responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important
area of intelligence. This includes domestic counterespionage
and countersabotage, control of communist and other subversive
activities and surveillances of alien individuals and groups.
All of these functions, according to the report, are closely
related to the comparable activities abroad of the CIA.
The report noted the FBI was not part of the then
\ existing machinery for coordination of intelligence through
the Intelligence Advisory Committee and there was no continuing
manner whereby domestic intelligence and counterintelligence
were related to overall national intelligence in order to serve
'the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act,
which was set forth as "of coordinating the intelligence activities
of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security."
It was the opinion of the authors of the Dulles Report
that CIA had the duty under the Act to concern itself with the
problem of coordinating those phases of domestic intelligence
and counterintelligence which relate to the national security.
and CIA should submit recommendations on this subject to the
-NSC. The report noted this was not inconsistent with the
stipulation of the National Security Act that CIA "shall have no
· police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security
functions.
-NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 203.
31:
853
The Dulles Commission recommended that the FBI
should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
to improve coordination of domestic intelligence and counter-
intelligence insofar as these matters related to the national
security.
While discussing the production of National
Intelligence Estimates by CIA, the report noted, "There is
no systematic way of tapping that domestic intelligence
information, which should be chiefly in the hands of the FBI,
having a bearing on broader intelligence issues and there
is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by the
FBI and for the use of intelligence from domestic sources in
a national estimate."
National Security Council Intelligence Directive
Number 7 provided that CIA shall be responsible for the
exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United
States of business concerns, other non-Governmental organizations
and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.
The report concluded the amount of foreign intelligence which
can be obtained through the exploitation of non-Governmental
· sources in the United States is considerable and its quality.
could be very high if appropriate arrangements were made and
discrimination was employed. It was felt the vast number of
organizations, institutions and individuals having foreign
interests and knowledge represented a potential source of .
intelligence that in many ways was superior to any other,
as it was felt that they were in a position to provide
information obtained from their foreign contacts and from the
findings on their own people abroad. ..
A further important source of information, the
exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign individuals
and groups in the United States was also being developed. The
report noted that these individuals and groups as well as
political refugees and former foreign government officials
were often engaged in political activity with significant
international implications.
☑
CIA and other intelligence agencies had not developed
coordinated and effective policies and procedures for the
exploitation of intelligence in this important field. The FBI,
according to the report, had a major interest in foreign
_ 32.
,*、,
NW-88608 Bocld 32989629-Page-204-
individuals and groups in the United States because of
possible security implications. The report indicated the
FBI possessed considerable information concerning many
individuals and groups but this information had been obtained
primarily with security rather than intelligence considerations
in mind and was not normally given the kind of interpretation
or dissemination that intelligence required if it was to be
properly used. It was also noted the FBI was, in cases where
it had a security interest, reluctant on security grounds to
have intelligence exploitation by outside agencies. The general
result of this situation, according to the report, was that an
important source of intelligence was not being fully exploited.
The report noted that the question of the
exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign groups and¨
individuals in the United States was a clear example where
the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the FBI being added
- as a member, should establish principles and rules for
coordination.
In discussing the administrative handling of
espionage and counterespionage matters within the CIA, the
report noted the FBI was charged with all counterespionage
responsibilities in the United States except those affecting
personnel of the armed services. The Dulles Commission
recommended the counterespionage activities of CIA should be
increased in scope and emphasis and that closer liaison in
this field should be established with the FBI.
The only effect the Dulles Report had on the FBI
was its inclusion as a member of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee by amendment to HSCID Number 1 dated July 7, 1949.
e. Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955
Task forces of the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission)
conducted surveys of CIA operations from 1947 to 1949 (under F.
Eberstadt) and from 1953 to 1955 (under General Mark Clark).
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 205
33
The Commission concerned itself principally with
the efficiency with which CIA was fulfilling its statutory.
missions of coordination, correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination of the intelligence product of other Government
agencies and departments. The Commission examined agency
activity in light of the CIA primary mission of advising
NSC and performing services and duties related to
intelligence and national security as the NSC directed.
.
(la)
Eberstadt Task Force Report
The results of the first examination of CIA by the
Hoover Commission were more or less apologetic in tone,
emphasizing the soundness of directives setting up NSC and its
direction of the Agency. The report pointed out, however,
that CIA and its parent, NSC, had had little time to actually
implement the coordination necessary for leadership in the
field. The Task Force clearly defined its understanding of
the CIA mission as:
" "......coordinate intelligence activities
of Federal agencies concerned with national security."
The duties of CIA were listed as:
1. Advise National Security Council on national
security intelligence activities of Federal departments and
agencies.
2.
Recommend necessary coordination of such
´activities to National Security Council.
3. Correlate, evaluate and disseminate national
security intelligence.
4. Render intelligence services for other Federal
departments and agencies." (62-88575-3 enclosure behind file.)
In discussing the duties of the CIA the Task Force
noted, “Under the statute CIA is entrusted with the performance
of such services of common concern as the National Security
Council shall determine. At present these include, apart from
Scientific Intelligence, which is discussed separately: (a).
maintenance of central indexes of report, records, and documents
having intelligence value; (b) examination of foreign documents
from which intelligence material is extracted and disseminated;
(c) maintenance of central map facilities; (d) monitoring of
foreign broadcasts; and (e) collection of the information by
clandestine means and counterespionage abroad."
.34
-----ཝོ་ -↑་་-ཥ༠ ༈༙
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 206
__
In evaluating the operations and location of CIA
counterespionage the Task Force commented as follows:
"The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear
properly integrated with CIA's other clandestine operations.
Although arguments have been made in favor of extending CIA's
authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this
Country, such an extension of jurisdiction does not a present
appear justified. For one thing, concentration of power over
counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director
of Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might
justifiably arouse public suspicion and opposition. Conceivably
it could form the basis for a charge that a gestapo is in
process of creating even though the power to arrest were
specifically withheld. To transfer responsibility for domestic
counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established
organization and long tradition, to CIA, which is not equipped
for the assignment, would probably create more problems than it
would solve. It is doubtful whether the logical benefit of
having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout
the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such
a transfer would inevitably occasion."
"CIA representatives have indicated that their present
working liaison with FBI is satisfactory, but the Committee
doubts that FBI-CIA relationships are completely adequate. The
Director of FBI declined the Committee's invitation to appear
before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its
representatives on the ground that he knew too little of its
activities.
"
The groundwork for CIA acceptance was laid by the
Committee recommendation and finding: "CIA is not now properly
organized. Co-equal improvement in G-2, FBI, ONI, State
Department, and other Government intelligence services is also
essential. Spirit of teamwork must govern interagency
intelligence relationships. CIA deserves and must have greater
degree of acceptance and support from old-line intelligence
✓ services than it has had in the past."
A pitch was made for a single agency controlling
internal security in the Committee's finding: "The committee
believes that responsibility for internal security policies.
should be immediately focused in one agency. A more thorough
study of the subject than any yet made must be prosecuted, and
interagency frictions must be ended." It is noted that the
committee commented elsewhere in its report:
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NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-207
पुर
"Detailed study of organization and activities of
intelligence divisions of the Government, including CIA, is
being made by a committee consisting of Messrs. Allen Dulles,
William H. Jackson, and Mathias Correa, assisted by a staff
of four directed by Mr. Robert Blum of the Office of
Secretary of Defense." With this statement it may be assumed
the Task Force excused omissions it may have made with the
observation that the Dulles group was conducting almost the
same survey carried on in the Hoover Commission so far as
CIA was involved.
(lb) Clark Task Force Report
The Task Force headed by General Mark Clark
submitted a Top Secret report dated in May, 1955, setting
forth results of the second Hoover Commission survey of the
organization of CIA. The report pointed out the survey
was of departments and agencies with entire or prime
responsibility in the field of positive foreign intelligence
as it pertains to national defense and security. It
qualified this survey when speaking of the FBI, noting
survey was limited to survey of Bureau only to the extent
that it dealt in security intelligence.
Again the Hoover Commission through its Task
Force pinned CIA jurisdiction down to the areas defined by statute,
and emphasized the Agency was subordinate only to the National
Security Council in its coordination, correlation, dissemination
´and collection of intelligence data. The Task Force noted
that since CIA is charged with the over-all responsibility
for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces, the
Task Force was giving special attention to the work of that
Agency.
In the Task Force Report a review of the FBI
functions in the intelligence community was set forth. The
committee noted that the FBI had only limited activities in the
positive intelligence field but noted additionally that FBI
functions in the current intelligence effort were of interest
in order to fill out the intelligence picture.
-NW-88608 Doeld:32989629--Page 208-
36..
___
The FBI was cited as one of the four members of
the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), created
by the NSC, approved by the President 3/23/49, to coordinate
"the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterospionage,
sabotage, subversion, and other related matters affecting
internal security."
It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb
responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory
action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete
investigative coverage in compliance with the needs of the
IIC, which had full responsibility for coordination of the ·
investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage,
et cetera, affecting internal security.
The Committee stated, "The Central Intelligence
Agency is, by law, excluded from duplicating the internal
security functions of the FBI. However, the CIA does develop
within and without the U. S., sources for foreign (positive)
intelligence, and incidental thereto may develop leads as to
subversive activities within this country. In such cases
CIA though liaison gives its information to the FBI."
A Task Force survey revealed, "Through the Central
Intelligence Agency's domestic field offices, contacts are
made on a highly selective basis with business concerns and
other nongovernmental agencies, as well as with previously
cleared individuals who travel abroad
Under the
provisions of DCID 7/1, each member of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee is required to establish in Washington
•
a focal office for the purpose of interviewing nongovernment
visitors.
Any visitors to these offices demonstrating
good intelligence potential are referred to the CIA for further
•
exploitation."
The Task Force noted that as far back as 1939
President Roosevelt by executive order directed the FBI to
coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities.
In 1949, according to the Committee's survey, the IIC was
formalized and by charter restricted to coordinating investi-
gations in intelligence matters domestically.
NW-88608-Deeld:32989629-Page 209-
ng
37
-
བབསམཐ---ས་བབབས་མབ་ "ག"ཟོ" པས་
C
_
In commenting on the role of the FBI the Committee
further noted, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however,
is the recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal
security including counterintelligence within the United States
and its possessions."
With regard to the use and surfacing of sources,
the Committee noted that CIA was not bound to disclose its
sources; however, it commented on the excellent liaison
system of the FBI which had overcome this restriction so far
as internal security within the U. S. is concerned.
"Now,
as a matter of practice the CIA usually refers domestic sources
to the FBI, the only exception being where the source is to be
used in foreign intelligence work by the CIA." In the area
of defectors within this country, the Committee noted that
the FBI will receive from CIA or by a direct interrogation of
a CIA-controlled defector information which the defector may
have concerning internal security. Persons who defect within
this country, on the other hand, were found to be under the
cognizance of the FBI. Then the reverse of the above situation
comes into play and CIA has access to the defector for developing
leads in the foreign intelligence field. The Committee
commented, "It is the duty of the FBI to conduct investigations
of all cases involving foreign nationals in the United States
as set forth in the Delimitations Agreement."
A review of the Commission report lends one important
fact to our study of this subject matter. This was pointed
up by the membership of the various groups at the disposal
of the National Security Council within the field of national
intelligence. Ten subcommittees or working groups with member-
ship from separate departments or interested agencies acted
in advisory capacities to the IAC parent committee. In each
of these subcommittees the chairman was a representative of
the Director of CIA and the working groups were individually
serviced by a secretariat furnished by CIA. From the top-
heavy alignment of CIA personnel in IAC and its working groups
it was obvious in which direction advisory opinions would be
slanted when dissenting matters were presented by the IAC and
CIA to the NSC.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-210
38

-
f. The Doolittle Committee, 1954
In July, 1954, we received information from the
White House that the President had appointed Lieutenant
General James H. Doolittle to study in collaboration with
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certain aspects of
the national intelligence effort. By letter dated
July 28, 1954, Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President,
requested that the Bureau brief General Doolittle's group
concerning the relationship that existed between the Bureau
and CIA. We subsequently learned that at approximately the
same time a survey would be conducted by the Hoover
Commission under the chairmanship of General Mark Clark.
We learned from Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, that the
* President strongly believed that General Clark should not
permit the survey to get into CIA covert operations,
particularly in the field of political and psychológical
warfare. The President had told Dulles that he was selecting
General Doolittle to study CIA's covert operations.
General Doolittle's group was briefed on
August 25, 1954, at which time the Bureau's position in
the intelligence field was described and the manner in
which the Bureau transacted business with CIA was explained.
In addition, certain constructive criticism concerning
problems and conflicts experienced in dealing with CIA was
furnished General Doolittle's group. The following salient
features of the criticism appear to bear on the current study:
We were critical of a policy of the Office of
Operations, CIA, which precluded that Division from
identifying any of its sources in the United States when
such sources possessed information bearing on the internal
security of the United States. The Office of Operations as
of 1954 collected foreign intelligence information in the
United States from aliens, businessmen, and others, and
periodically would receive information of interest to the
Bureau. Instances arose where the Bureau desired to interview
the original source but was prevented from getting to the
-NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 211
39
%
source by CIA policy. We were of the opinion that CIA's
policy could be modified to allow us direct access to
the source in the United States when such was necessary.
As of 1954, CIA had interest in various
organizations such as Radio Free Europe and others and
from time to time the Bureau would get involved in.
investigation of organizations only to learn they were
being supported or guided by CIA. Our opinion was that
if we had been appropriately notified of CIA's interest
considerable investigative time and manpower could have
been saved and in addition we would have been in a position
to notify CIA when anything of interest came to our
attention.
✓
Concerning CIA investigations in the United
States, we readily acknowledged CIA's right to investi-
gate its own applicants or consultants. We did object
to CIA's undertaking any investigation in this country
when the facts indicated the case was clearly within
Bureau jurisdiction and pointed out that the Bureau had
· recently become involved in investigating an individual
suspected of espionage activity. We were in contact with
CIA and had solicited its help concerning certain aspects
in the case but it was a few weeks before we learned CIA
had conducted a very close investigation of this same
individual. We made the observations that close and open
cooperation between the Bureau and CIA was vital to the
·proper handling of espionage cases.
The Bureau pointed out that as of 1954 it had
received little or no significant information concerning
espionage or sabotage agents coming to the United States.
We excluded diplomatic personnel in this matter but clearly
indicated that CIA should be in a position to give us some
advance notification when spies were coming to this country. \……
NW 88608 Docid:32989629. Page 212.
40
•
Possibly this latter was the strongest criticism
we had since we did not feel CIA with its resources and
overseas contacts was performing one of its prime functions
in the intelligence field; that is, identifying foreign
illegals who are en route to the United States. During our
briefing of General Doolittle's group, we described the
Bureau's collection of intelligence information for the
interested Government agencies as a major operation. Our
discharge of our intelligence operation concerning the
Communist Party and Soviet and Satellite diplomats was
explained in detail to the satisfaction of all personnel
attending the briefing.
General Doolittle asked for recommendations as to
what could be done to improve CIA so the Bureau would get
better service. It was suggested that corrective action be
taken on the matters which had been criticized constructively;
CIA should establish adequate coverage (although not
specifically noted, this obviously regarded advance notice
of foreign intelligence personnel coming to the United States);
and finally CIA should transmit information developed in an
expedite fashion.
Prior to submitting the report to the President,
General Doolittle expressed a desire to see Mr. Hoover, whom
he regarded as the outstanding intelligence authority in the
world. The General visited the Director on October 5, 1954,
during which visit CIA's operations were discussed and
generally the points of the previous meeting were reiterated.
General Doolittle felt the ideal solution would be to wipe out
·CIA entirely and start all over again, but since this was
impractical his committee would point out certain weaknesses
and make certain recommendations and suggestions to the
President for the correction of these weaknesses.
· We do not have the contents of General Doolittle's
report and there is nothing to indicate an executive order
was issued from it which in any way delineated the respective
jurisdiction of the Bureau or of CIA.
g. The Joint. Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities
of the United States Government
Captioned report was prepared by the Study Group
and issued 12/15/60. The Group was under the chairmanship of
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page 213
41
-
z
Lyman B. Kirtkpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), acting as a representative of the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI). The other four members of the
Study Group represented the Department of State, Secretary of
Defense, Bureau of the Budget, and the National Security.
Council (NSC).
The stateḍ targets of examination by the Group were
'organizational and management aspects within the intelligence
effort relating to all aspects of foreign intelligence. In
the confines of these objectives the Bureau was not considered
for examination by the Group in view of the Bureau's lack of
operational jurisdiction in matters outside of this country.
Mr. Belmont, acting for the Bureau, gave a briefing before the
Group on 7/29/60 regarding the Bureau's relations with other
United States intelligence agencies. There was no mention
made of the Bureau in the report except in one of its
recommendations relative to reorganization of the membership
of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which will be.
dealt with in more detail later.
The 141 page report submitted by the Group appeared
to be apologetic in tone for any shortcomings of CIA. The
reader obtains the definite impression the report was used as
a sounding board for differences of opinion as to methods and
administration for collection of foreign intelligence (overt
and covert) abroad.
The main basis for conclusions and recommendations
made by the Group rested in delineation of duties of DCI as
coordinator of intelligence as opposed to DCI secondary
responsibility as head of CIA. The Group recognized service
jealousies apparently resulting from refusal to accept the
fact that DCI could control and coordinate intelligence effort
without affording preferential treatment to CIA which was his
operational and administrative arm.
There is no reference in the report to a clear
definition of CIA operational responsibilities or jurisdiction
within continental United States.
The Group found that DCI through heads of missions
abroad and designated DCI representatives in foreign countries
had principal responsibility for control and coordination of
foreign collection efforts. The CIA's operations abroad were
recognized in almost all 43 of the Group's recommendations.
-NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-214-
42
་་་་
Recommendation number 17 emphasized that CIA
should place emphasis on the establishment of unofficial
cover throughout the world; recommendation number 20 was
that CIA should increase intelligence support to unified and
component commanders by direct dissemination from pertinent
field stations.
The report noted that CIA's main requirements
problem related to clandestine collection and concerned
the great number of requirements served on the Agency.
The main tone of the report was that greater
cooperation was required between the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), Department of State, and CIA in carrying out foreign
intelligence collection missions. The recommendations of
the Group were all directed toward this end and had no
bearing on internal espionage or counterespionage activities
within the United States.
In commenting on the coordination duties of the
DCI, the Group pointed out that USIB had been officially
directed to "establish policies and develop programs for
the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned; the
DCI is authorized to make such surveys of departmental
intelligence activities or the various departments and
agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his
duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence effort
of the United States." The report interpreted these official
directions to indicate that USIB should assume a greater
proportion of the actual direction and control of the
intelligence community of which the Bureau was noted to be
a member.
To strengthen USIB position as a director,
coordinator, and controller of intelligence effort, the
Group recommended (recommendation number 30) that the USIB
should be reduced to four members who should be the DCI
(chairman) and representatives of Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI and the Atomic
Energy Commission would be relegated to ad hoc representation
on the Board.
NW 88608-Docld:32989629-Page-215.
43
It should be noted in considering the proposed
change of USIB membership that the Bureau was a member of
six of the twenty-six subcommittees which formed the committee
make-up of the USIB.
Memorandum January 10, 1961, Mr: Belmont to
Mr. Parsons outlined the proposed USIB membership change
for the Director. It recommended that Bureau make no issue
of the proposed recommendation. The Director underlined
a passage of the memorandum which stated "In one sense of
the word it could be argued the FBI would lose prestige
by changing from a regular member to an ad hoc member."
The Director approved the recommendation of the memorandum
with the following notation: "O.K. but I am not enthusiastic
about the change of our status. H." Our status, however, was
not changed and the Bureau has continued to hold full member-
ship on the Board.
In brief, the Joint Study Group Report noted that
the majority of the recommendations of the Study Group had
boon favorably received by the intelligence community in
that positive action had been taken to place most of them
in effect. Many of the recommendations of the Group were
felt to have been met by the creation of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) which acted as a coordinator and
overseer of the intelligence effort of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. There is no comment made in this report which
would bear on our present survey of CIA jurisdiction or
activities within the United States in conflict with our own
jurisdictional and investigative interests. The only
reference to the Bureau in this latter report was as
previously mentioned in the comment relative to reorganization
of the membership of the USIB.
5. Responsibilities of the FBI
a.
Laws and Directives
No information has been developed with respect to
any laws passed or directives issued specifically delegating
to the FBI responsibilities for the positive acquisition of
foreign intelligence in the United States. As has been set
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 2.16
forth above under the caption, "The History of Foreign Intelligence
Collection in the United States Prior to World War II,"
M
President Roosevelt conducted certain conferences following
which he issued instructions with regard to investigations of
fascist and communist activities in the United States. Those
investigations were to be for intelligence purposes. For the
most part, they took on a counterintelligence' aspect; however,
during the course of them foreign intelligence information was ·
developed either as an outgrowth of investigative activity or
through the conducting of technical surveillances.
We found no record regarding the designation of the
FBI as the agency responsible for collection of foreign intelligence
information in the United States as of the time the Office of
Coordinator of Information was created on 7/11/41. Neither did
we find any record indicating such responsibility had been
delegated to any other agency.
b. Requests From Other Agencies
From time to time the Bureau has received specific
requests from other agencies based upon which we have undertaken
the collection of foreign intelligence information in the
United States in a clandestine fashion. Two instances of this
nature were based on requests from the Department of State and
from the White House.
-
(1) Department of State Request Recognizing a gap
in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments, on
10/21/55 we discussed with the then Deputy Undersecretary of
State, Robert Murphy, the question of instituting limited
discreet technical surveillances on official establishments of
selected foreign nations, principally those located in world
trouble areas. We pointed out that the FBI stood ready to
institute such coverage as might be desired by the Department
of State.
Mr. Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating
that limited coverage sufficiently flexible to change with
changing world conditions might be highly desirable, After
further discussions it was agreed that a program, "progressive"
in nature, would be instituted. By this, Mr. Murphy explained
that he did not feel at that time that all desirable coverage
should be instituted at a given date, but rather that coverage
should be placed on one country at a time as moving events abroad
might dictate. On this basis this type coverage was instituted
_ 45
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 217
based on a specific request from Mr. Murphy on 12/5/55 that we
place technical surveillances on all Egyptian establishments
in the United States. Since then, technical surveillances have
been placed on numerous establishments of foreign countries
for either extended or limited periods of time, depending upon
developments on the international scene.
(2) White House Request
c06
In May, 1965, President
Johnson advised the Director he wanted the FBI to set up a
group in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of taking charge
of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advising
the Government of those who might try to infiltrate Government
ranks. This was the basis for opening our Santo Domingo Office,
which has continued operation since 5/21/65.
As a result of maintaining our Dominican Office and
assisting in its mission, we have instituted various technical
surveillances and developed numerous live sources in the
United States from which we regularly acquire foreign intelligence
information. Since the President has relied on the Bureau to
keep him apprised of developments from an intelligence standpoint
as well as developments with respect to communist influence,
these sources are regularly contacted for information which.
fits within the terms of foreign intelligence data.
C. FBI's Role in the United States Intelligence Board
The predecessor to the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB) was the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC).
the IAC was established by National Security Council Intelligence
Directive (NSCID) number 1 dated 12/12/47. By amendment to
this Directive dated 7/7/49, the Bureau was designated a
member of the IAC for the purpose of coordinating domestic
intelligence with foreign intelligence. NSCID 1 has been
revised several times. Subsequent to a revision dated 4/21/58,
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board merged the
IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board into one
body known as the United States Intelligence Board. National
Security Council Directive dated 9/15/58, approved by the
President, formally created the United States Intelligence Board
as successor to the IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence
Board.
The USIB in its present form is chaired by the
Director of Central Intelligence. The. Director of Central:
NW-88608 Docld:32989629-Page-218-
_ 46 -
Intelligence is distinguished from the Director of Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that the Director of Central
Intelligence as Chairman of the United States Intelligence
Board is considered the President's principal advisor on
foreign intelligence. Membership on the United Statos
Intelligence Board consists of the Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Director of CIA;
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director
of the National Security Agency; the Assistant General Manager
for Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Assistant
Director of the FBI. The primary responsibility of the USIB
is the coordination of intelligence activities. In this
regard, USIB's major effort is concerned with the preparation
and approval of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) for use
by policy makers.
As a rule, the Bureau does not participate in the
preparation of NIE's inasmuch as the subject matter is usually
outside the jurisdiction of this Bureau. We have in the past.
participated in some selective NIE's such as certain estimates
on Cuba, world communism, the clandestine introduction of
nuclear weapons into the United States and on the Dominican.
Republic.
As part of its staffing procedure, USIB has
created numerous committees in some of which the Bureau
maintains membership. The USIB committees on which the
Bureau has representation are the Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures Committee, the Signal Intelligence Committee,
the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile
Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Security Committee,
and the Committee on Documentation. As a general rule,
attendance at Committee sessions is handled by the Liaison
Section. Attendance at meetings is in the main restricted to
the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the
Security Committee, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
· Committee and the Committee on Documentation. The Bureau has
a primary interest in the business of these five committees.
All decisions made by these committees, which are subsequently
approved by the USIB, are the subject of individual memoranda.
submitted to the Director for his approval.
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page 219-
.47
☑
Over the years, consideration has been given to
the Bureau's withdrawing its membership from USIB. On each
occasion the Director has chosen to have the Bureau retain
its membership on the Board. The last such occasion occurred
in 1964 during the period when John McCone was Chairman of
the United States Intelligence Board. At that time, the military
services were removed from membership on the Board and replaced
by the Defense Intelligence Agency. At the time, Mr. Belmont,
then Assistant to the Director, orally discussed with the
Director the possibility of the Bureau's withdrawing from the
USIB. The Director's comments were that we would not request
removal from membership on the Board but would withdraw our
membership only if so requested by the Director of Central
Intelligence in his role as Chairman of the USIB. The Bureau's
withdrawal would, of course, require action on the part of
the National Security Council.
d. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
This group was originally organized in January, 1956,
as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activity. Its primary function at that time was to review
periodically the Government's foreign intelligence efforts
with specific emphasis on the operations of the Central
Intelligence Agency. It was established as a result of
recommendations by the Hoover Commission. In the later years
of the Eisenhower Administration the activity of the group
fell off and it was re-organized in its present form with the
advent of the Kennedy Administration.
Our relationship with this Board has historically
been one of informal liaison in view of the fact that the
primary function of the Board is concerned with foreign
intelligence. There have been occasions where representatives
of the Bureau briefed individual members and/or panels of
the Board concerning our jurisdiction, techniques and
accomplishments in the intelligence field. These briefings
have been received with a receptive and sympathetic attitude.
Our main concern in following the activities of this Board
has been to assure that the Central Intelligence Agency: does¨¨
not encroach upon our jurisdiction and upon the functions of
the various intelligence communities in which we hold membership.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629-Page 220..
-
48

.i
The case involving Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap,
a former employee of the National Security Agency who was
a Soviet espionage agent, was thoroughly reviewed by the
present PFIAB in view of the most serious ramifications it
presented. This case concerned the penetration by the
Soviets of the National Security Agency. The report which
emanated from the PFIAB study included proposals which affect
the responsibilities and activities of several agencies within
the intelligence community. All of the twenty-one recommendations.
of the Board dealt with various aspects of achieving a
strengthened counterintelligence capability to guard against
penetration of our security establishments by hostile intelli-
gence agencies. Nineteen of the recommendations of the Board
were approved by the President and three of these related
directly to Bureau activity. They are as follows:
#18: "That steps be taken to assure that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate
agent resources to effect the required domestic
counterintelligence coverage of both bloc and
nonbloc official installations and personnel who
may be engaged in intelligence and related
activities inimical to the national security."
#19: "That the policies of the Department of
State with respect to authorizing technical
'coverage (use of wiretapping and listening
devices) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
of foreign official: installations and personnel
in this country be re-examined with a view to
liberalization to the extent necessary to provide
the counterintelligence coverage required in the
interest of national security."
#20:
"That, in future, when consideration is
given to exchanging detected Soviet-bloc intelli-
gence agents for imprisoned American personnel in
bloc countries, advance consultations be held with
Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to assure that adequate attention
Towømis given all intelligence aspects of such proposed
exchanges in the interest of the national security,
weighed against the political gains to be achieved."
NW-88608- Docld:32989629--Page-221--
* 49
**
177
A
i
e.
The Director's Stand Over the Years
The Director's stand over the years with respect
to jurisdiction concerning foreign intelligence matters
within the United States is reflected in numerous comments
he has made dating back to the days when the Central
Intelligence Group (CIG) was being formed.
In June, 1946, General Vandenberg, then head of
CIG, sent a memorandum to the Director proposing that the
National Intelligence Authority issue a directive extending
the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence,
which position General Vandenberg occupied. The memorandum
was analyzed on June 21, 1946, in a memorandum from C. H.
Carson to D. M. Ladd in which it was pointed out that it
was inevitable that CIG must enter into the domestic
picture because of sources of foreign intelligence in that
field. An addendum was placed on the memorandum by Mr. Edward A.
Tamm and Mr. C. A. Tolson which was followed by comments by
the Director which is most pertinent to the subject matter.
under discussion. The addendum read:
"Mr. Tolson and Mr. Tamm do not concur with
the conclusion expressed in this memorandum that
'It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence
Group must enter into the domestic field picture
insofar as intelligence is concerned because of .
the sources of foreign intelligence existing in
that field.' They feel that a coordinated pro-
gram for the exchange of information between the
Central Intelligence Authority and the FBI,
., permitting a free and comprehensive exchange of
information in matters of mutual interest, will
enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field
without interference from the Central Intelligence
Authority in the same manner that the Bureau works,
for example, with local police departments or other
governmental agencies within defined jurisdictional
lines. We believe that the attached letter to
General Vandenberg is satisfactory."
The Director commented as follows:
"I am not as optimistic as are Tolson & Tamm.
I think it is inevitable that there will be a
collision with CIG over our domestic jurisdiction
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 222
-
50
or rather their expansion into it on intelligence
matters. It ought not occur but this new memo
of CIG shows how greedy it is. It is the
Donovan plan almost in toto & is boing slyly
put over. It means we must zealously guard our
domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch & be
ever alert to resist any encroachment."
On March 27, 1953, the Director testified before the
Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations. In response to a question
from Senator McCarran concerning liaison between FBI and CIA,
the Director stated: "There is close liaison. CIA has
exclusive jurisdiction abroad for intelligence. We have
exclusive jurisdiction within the United States. We maintain
continuous liaison with CIA Headquarters in Washington through
a liaison representative of our Bureau in order to facilitate
the transmission of material from them to us and from our
service to them."
In October, 1958, CIA approached us requesting
cur concurrence in CIA's establishing physical and technical
surveillance in the United States on the
CIA had an operational interest in
this individual. By memorandum it was recommended that the
Bureau not become involved in this CIA operation and that CIA
be informed that this would not establish a precedent for
approval of future CIA activities in the United States.
Responsive to continuing to present problems, the Director
noted: "This is an understatement particularly if we are
going to adopt a macaroni backbone attitude instead of standing
up forthrightly for our rights and jurisdiction."
CIA, in April, 1959, advised us that one of its
sources would be visiting the United States, and
requested our concurrence in CIA's establishing coverage
including technical surveillance. It was recommended we stay
out of this matter and inform CIA that this was not to be
construed as a precedent for approval of future CIA counter-
´intelligence activity in the United States. The Director
commented on the memorandum: "The trend has gone so far we
have become nothing but a rubber stamp for CIA yet they won't
even allow us to perform liaison functions abroad much less
operational ones."
'NW-88608-Docid:32989629-Page-223-
51
"
In January, 1960, CIA agreed to comply with
conditions imposed by the Bureau with regard to developing
positive intelligence information through contacts between
U. S. residents and visitors from Iron Curtain countrios.
CIA agreed to contact us first before promoting such
associations.
In March, 1960, CIA inquired if it might obtain
Bureau clearance at the field level for such contacts in the
intorest of expodioncy. Mr. Tolson noted: "More and more wo
are agreeing to CIA operations in the U. S. I am opposed
to this relaxation. We can exercise better control here than
through our field offices." The Director added: "I share
"
· Tolson's views. CIA was advised clearance was to be obtained
through Bureau headquarters.
A source.
furnished information alleging
then
penetration of American intelligence. One Serge Karlow, a
CIA officer, was developed as a suspect. On 2/9/62, we took
over the investigation. On 2/26/62, Sheffield Edwards,
CIA Director of Security, admitted CIA had had technical
coverage on Karlow from February, 1961 to 2/9/62. Edwards
claimed his reluctance to tell us of this situation earlier
because of obvious possible jeopardy to prosecution, plus
embarrassment to his Agency should the Bureau raise an
objection to CIA's maintaining such coverage. The Director
noted: "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can
never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly
my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion but on
specific instances all too many in number. Yet there exists
wistful belief that 'the leopard has changed his spots'."
-
to
In April, 1962, we received information on a
strictly confidential basis from Jay Sourwine of the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that an
unidentified CIA representative had talked to Senator Eastland
concerning an alleged move to place CIA in charge of all
intelligence-gathering operations for the Government
include Soviet espionage in the U. S. The Director noted:
"I am not surprised at the above alleged effort. There is no
doubt in many quarters a desire to eliminate the FBI in
dealing with espionage and subversion for we are a thorn not
only in the side of communists but also the ADA and Fabian
Socialists. CIA which failed again and again to know what
is actually going on abroad could be counted upon to blunder
the same way in the USA.
❤ 52
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(
'
8
In April, 1963, we received information indicating
that CIA Director John McCone was considering expansion of
CIA operations in the United States -- specifically intelligence
coverage and the development of sources in this country. The
Director made a note on the memorandum recording this: "McCone
is trying to do another 'Donovan. If he injects himself into
the U. S., the FBI gets out. Too many cooks spoil the broth."
In December, 1963, the Director inquired as to the
nature and extent of intelligence operations wherein CIA had
established contact with a diplomat, operated him in the U. S.
with our coordination, and continued to operate him upon his
having departed this country. Four such cases were cited. On
the memorandum, the Director noted: "I have little confidence
in CIA abiding by agreements if it serves its purpose better
not to do so. 18
In January, 1964, CIA advised us it had reorganized
its activities in the U. S. The Domestic Operations Division,
CIA, had established field offices in this country under
appropriate cover. A memorandum was prepared describing the
history of CIA operations in the U. S. and recommending action
designed to protect our interests. A letter went to CIA with
ground rules which the Bureau expected CIA to follow in all
matters requiring coordination. The Director noted; "OK, but
I hope you are not being taken in. I can't forget CIA
withholding the French espionage activities in the U. S. nor
the false story concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, only
to mention two of their instances of double dealing."
The New York Office, by letter 2/14/64, set forth
its observations concerning a briefing given that office on the
matter of CIA operations in the U. S. The Director commented:
"I think this domestic operations expansion of CIA is very
dangerous and will inevitably 'muddy' the waters."
In May, 1964, the Bureau reconsidered its stand
with respect to permitting CIA to approach sources at foreign
establishments in the United States for intelligence purposes.
The following policy was proposed and subsequently approved:
:
(1) Where there was no indication a source would
be leaving the United States, we would deny CIA clearance
for contact until we had fully explored the person's
potential for our own purposes.
If we decided we had no
- 53
5%
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page:225 :
-
mary to a
"
interest and CIA contact would not jeopardize any FBI
investigations, we would grant CIA approval to proceed
with its contact with proviso we be kept informed of
information developed of possible interest to us.
(2) Where it appeared source 'would be returning
to a foreign country shortly we would normally grant
CIA clearance for preliminary contact with proviso we
be kept informed of results. We reserved the right to
take direct access to the source as our needs required.
(3) Where there was an overlapping of interests
and source expected to continue in United States for
fairly extended period of time, in those instances where
CIA had entree and no Bureau investigation would be
jeopardized we would permit CIA to explore matter and
make preliminary contact keeping us advised of progress
and getting our specific clearance before a direct
recruitment approach; however, where factors indicated
it would be to best Bureau interests to operate source,
we would undertake the recruitment and keep CIA advised
of information of interest to that Agency.
When these matters were submitted for approval
Mr. Tolson commented, "Looks okay, but we will have to watch
this very closely." The Director concurred in Mr. Tolson's
remark.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 226–
☐ 54
*
D.
THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S.
In 1941, the U. S. allegedly had in its
possession practically all of the foreign intelligence
it needed regarding military and strategic targets in
Japan. The information was scattered among various
individuals who had personal knowledge or was located
in libraries, various Government agencies, private
business firms, institutions, et cetera. Tragically,
the U. S. Government did not have any mechanism to
collect, record and evaluate such information.
Intelligence was badly needed in 1941, and we paid
dearly in lives and financial resources to accomplish
certain missions because the information was not
readily available.
Today, the need for foreign intelligence is
greater than ever. The stakes of foreign policy have
never been higher. The U. S., being a dominating world
power, has assumed vast responsibilities enmeshed in
delicate political situations throughout the world.
The ever-existing threat of an atomic war with communist
countries demands a continuing acquirement of knowledge
so that policies and courses of action can be designed
in the most effective manner possible. The information
needed applies to numerous fields of activity, a major
area being scientific research and development. In this
connection, the revolutionary break-throughs in the :
scientific category are occurring with unusually high
frequency, and if the U. S. is to remain in the
forefront, it is absolutely necessary that we obtain
an accurate evaluation of the enemy's capabilities and
intentions. We have been fortunate to collect high
quality positive intelligence through sophisticated
collection methods, i.e high altitude photography and
research in this area is proceeding at an accelerated
pace. Nevertheless, electronic gadgets and machines
will never produce all that is required. We still need
supplementary coverage on a heavy scale, and the human
being still continues to be a vital source of information.
The individual talks and volunteers information. He talks
and his statements are intercepted. All of this produces
valuable increments of intelligence. The individual can
i
still provide badly needed data either through his
voluntary contribution or through his unwitting divulging
༧བཅས-ཡ
55-
F
NW-88608_Docld:32989629 Page 227
of intelligence. The importance of the individual
is further omphasized when we realize that' as each
sophisticated collection technique is introduced,
science also introduces newly designed countertechniques
of covoring, protecting, and camouflaging important
assets. In essence, technology eventually hits an
inpenetrable or leveling-off depth.
Foreign intelligence is not geographically
restricted. Information regarding Chinese Communists
can be obtained anywhere in the world, and even if it
is of a fragmentary nature, the data can be of
significant value. The demand for information is
heavy and is sought by every agency in the Government.
Because of this, it has been necessary for the
U. S. Government to map a program of collection on
a priority basis. This has been done through the
creation of a committee which is attached to the
U. S. Intelligence Board. The committee maintains
a list of priorities on a current basis. A recent
list of guidelines for the collection of foreign
intelligence pertaining to scientific affairs in
Communist China included approximately 170, items,
i.e.
In the U. S. proper, the sources of foreign
intelligence are voluminous. Most of these sources
overtly provide information through newspapers,
scientific publications, libraries, tourists, visiting
professors and students, journalists, and immigrants.
The compilation, collation, analysis, and reporting
of such information involves an extensive program
and, needless to say, the U. S. today does not have
the capability of tapping all available sources on
a current basis.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 228-
56
For the purpose of this paper, we are
thinking about the search for knowledge considered
vital for national survival. One could suggest
that clandestine collection of intelligence is
overemphasized and that our Government could readily
protect its interests through overt collection and
the employment of our best analysts and evaluators.
If we take this approach, we may as well discount
the importance of the Bureau's activities in the
counterintelligence field, which essentially are
of a clandestine nature and which have produced time
and again vital intelligence. We, therefore, must
move on the assumption that the clandestine
collection of foreign intelligence is very definitely
a most necessary element of our over-all intelligence
capabilities.
In addition to the overt sources, there
exists a rich potential in the U. S. among the foreign
diplomatic establishments including the U. N., the
officials of foreign governments, and visitors such
as students, professors, and scientists. A certain
amount of information from such sources can be
obtained in an overt fashion, but the high quality
data is normally acquired through clandestine means.
This can be done through technical monitoring,
development of live sources, access to records,
files, et cetera. There are approximately 10,000
foreign officials in the U. S. assigned to embassies,
consulates, trade missions, U. N., and other
international organizations. This excludes
dependents. During the fiscal year ending June 30,
1965, 38,544 foreign government officials visited
the U. S.; about 1500 of these came from communist-bloc
countries. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965,
approximately 50,000 foreign students came to the U. S.;
733 of these came from the communist bloc. During the
same fiscal year, there were 2,075,967 visitors from
all countries. Everyone of the foregoing is a potential
“source of foreign intelligence. As can be readily
accepted, the U. S. Government does not have a capa-
bility of assessing each and every one of these sources
for foreign intelligence, We can say at this point
that the FBI and CIA are just scratching the surface.
It is recognized that a program designed to assess
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 229-
མའ
- 57
or attempt to recruit each potential source would be
out of the question. Such a massive undertaking would
not be compatible with U. S. Government foreign policy.
There' is no question that there must be selectivity of
a judicious and prudent nature.
Since the U. S. is such a major power,
Washington, D. C. is the center of diplomatic activity
involving practically all foreign nations. The location
of the U. N. in New York City presents us with another
area of intensified activity. Most countries send their
most able diplomats to the U. S. so we are confronted
with hundreds of highly talented people. The day-to-day
activities in diplomatic establishments, conferences,
meetings, negotiations, liaison between countries, all
create a tremendous reservoir of foreign intelligence
potential.
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- 58' -

E. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES
In order that there may not be any
misunderstanding regarding CIA's capabilities to
collect foreign intelligence in the United States,
we should first clarify that one of the components
of the Agency which has offices in the United States
does not engage in this particular activity.
The Office of Security, which is responsible for
personnel and physical security, maintains several
offices in the United States under authorized
Treasury Department cover. Personnel of this
office conduct investigations of applicants, firms
or individuals who may be utilized by CIA on
a contract basis to support intelligence operations
overseas.
The overt collection of intelligence by
CIA is handled by the Domestic Contact Service (DCS)
(formerly called Contact Division). CIA estimates
that DCS has a capability of tapping approximately
15 per cent of the total potential of intelligence in
the U. S. This Division has 18 field offices and
16 resident agencies in the United States, and each
office is openly identified as being connected with
CIA. Personnel totaling approximately 140 carry CIA
credentials. The Division regularly has a number of
officers from the various military services who are
assigned to this Division on a temporary basis.
These military officers concentrate on the collection
of that foreign intelligence which relates to the
immediate United States military needs. The personnel
of DCS interview aliens, tourists, officials of
import-export firms, students, scientists, and the
information collected covers a very broad spectrum in
the positive intelligence category. DCS claims to have
contact with about 7200 organizations, institutions, or
businesses and has approximately 60,000 contacts or
sources of information. The information is reported in
the form of "Information Reports," which is disseminated
throughout the intelligence community. During/1965,
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 231
59
;
DCS disseminated 26,000 such reports. DCS does not
have any responsibilities in the clandestine collection
of intelligence, and in that sense it is very ·
specifically not operational. DCS definitely cannot
engage in any activity of an internal security nature,
and within CIA it is clearly understood that DCS is
not to be operational under any circumstances.
DCS has been the subject of some controversy within
CIA. There is one school of thought which maintains
that DCS should be an appendage of the Deputy Director
of Plans, who is responsible for all clandestine
operations. The other school which has prevailed
holds to the line that DCS should be separate and..
continue under the supervision of the Deputy Director
of Intelligence (DDI). This situation not only has
caused headaches for CIA but also for the Bureau because
of situations which arise where the "left hand does not
know what the right hand is doing.".
DCS is essentially carrying out CIA's
responsibilities emanating from National Security Council
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 2 which has its roots
in a similar airective issued under the National
Intelligence Authority in 1946. It has been in business
for approximately twenty years. Per agreement, DCS
cannot interview an alien without first clearing with
the Bureau. This is done on a daily basis. With regard
to American citizens, Bureau approval is not required
unless the Bureau has indicated a prior interest in the
individual; however, DCS nevertheless submits name
checks on Americans, and if it so happens that the
subject of such an inquiry is a Bureau source or
involved in a Bureau investigation, we are in a position
to move to protect our interests. It should be noted
that although DCS is engaged primarily in positive
intelligence collection, it is required to be on the
alert for sources who possibly might be useful to CIA's
clandestine operations. For example, if DCS encounters
an alien who can be utilized in an overseas operation,
the lead is passed on to the appropriate division.
At the present time, DCS alerts the newly created
.Domestic Operations Division (explained below) regarding
potential sources.
Our current controls with regard to DCS are
functioning efficiently. We regularly examine the
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 232
'60
status of this relationship, and we periodically
make adjustments in order to make certain there
is no "freewheeling" and to take advantage of the
information which DCS gains. and which is of interest
to the Buroau. For example, we are currently working
out arrangements where our field offices can contact
the local DCS offices concerning Chinese aliens who
might be of interest to us either as subjects for
investigation or as potential informants. This liaison
at the field level was deemed desirable so that we
could get information at the "horse's mouth" rather
than wait for a reply from CIA headquarters, which is
often prolonged and, when transmitted, is sometimes
stripped of pieces of information. This occurs
because of the involved and sometimes complicated
maze of bureaucratic compartmentation within CIA.
In the latter part of 1963, CIA created its
Domestic Operations Division (DOD), which was to be
responsible for any clandestine development of sources
in the United States. Prior to the establishment of
this Division, CIA activity in this field was managed
from each individual area division at Washington
headquarters. The pressing need for more clandestine
sources, coupled with the recognition of the vast
potential in the United States, prompted CIA to create
a new division which would be responsible for all of
the area division interests. DOD has headquarters
at Washington, D. C., and currently has field offices
at New York City, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Washington, D. C., proper.
Approximately 40 intelligence officers are assigned to
the task of engaging in assessment and/or recruitment
of positive intelligence sources, primarily in the
diplomatic field. Some of the personnel are assigned
to the handling of firms or organizations which may
be supporting certain CIA operations abroad. DOD personnel
in the field operate under authorized Department of Defense
cover. The heads of these field offices are known to us,
and we have established a satisfactory liaison area at
the field level.
DOD is also responsible for the handling of
CIA agents (informants) who have been recruited abroad
and who come to the United States for assignments either
on a temporary basis or for the duration of a normal
diplomatic assignment.
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པ་་
C
The creation of DOD within CIA was and still
is a somewhat controversial Agency subject. DCS saw
DOD as an interfering element. The area desks were
reluctant to have a new division to take over their
agonts. Some of the DOD personnel are very capable
and seasoned intelligence officers. Many of them are
considered of mediocre capability, and there is
a frequent rumor that other CIA divisions send their
misfits to DOD. From CIA's standpoint there appears
to be a definite need for a much stronger team within DOD.
Theoretically, DOD is required to be on the
alert for all potential sources who can be used by CIA
in its intelligence operations, and the approach is
basically one of a long-range nature. DOD is required
to make use of all leads emanating from fellow employees
who may have developed social contacts or associations
with foreigners abroad or who might meet potential.
sources in the United States. Since CIA personnel
· operate under diplomatic cover when abroad, they do get
the opportunity to move in diplomatic circles. Similarly,
undercover agents of CIA traveling throughout the world
also make contacts which offer potential exploitation if
and when the target stops in the United States.
Since January, 1964, when DOD actually began
moving, it has recruited approximately ten individuals
in the diplomatic field. Most of these were in the
noncommunist-bloc area. All of those recruited appear
to have been in a fairly low-level category. All of them
were career diplomats, and there was no evidence that
the individuals were connected with any intelligence
service.
In addition to the activities of DCS and DOD,
there is a certain amount of CIA operational movements
which do not fall under either of the foregoing divisions.
One example is the CIA base in Miami which was set up
for CIA's operations directed against the Cuban Government.
This base is used for the training and dispatching of
agents into Cuba and to some extent into other countries
in the Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic.
This base is directly responsible to the Western
Hemisphere Division of CIA, which could be called the
Latin American Division.
-NW-88608-Bocid:32989629 Page 234
62
CIA also becomes involved in political and
psychological warfare type of programs directed against
targets in foreign countries. The Agency broadly refers
to this activity as "covert action." The programs are
essentially designed to influence individuals, organizations
or governments through various news media, and this will
include the utilization of "agents of influence." This
activity falls under the International Organizations
Division (IOD) of CIA, which has no responsibility to
collect information. IOD does use people in the
United States to help implement the overseas programs.
Quite often the Agency uses cutouts or covers for such
an operation. Although IOD does not engage in intelligence
collection, it is a CIA division which should be kept in
mind, since its activities quite often will be tangent to
matters of interest to the Bureau. For example, IOD
becomes involved in the World Youth Festival, where its
objective is to neutralize communist influence.
We, of
course, have had an interest in the Festival because of the
participation of Americans, including members of the CPUSA.
Theoretically, IOD is required to coordinate closely with
other appropriate components of CIA. We do not believe
that this coordination has been effective enougn.
There is no doubt that there are individuals
in CIA who aspire to broaden the Agency's operational
activities in the United States. Such individuals would
like to see an arrangement similar to one currently in
force in England where MI-6 has a free hand to assess and
recruit all foreigners, including diplomats, where there
is no evidence that they are engaged in intelligence
activity. If such evidence is obtained, MI-6 is required
to coordinate with MI-5. There are people in CIA who
would like to see similar machinery and in addition would
want the freedom to conduct certain investigations and
maybe even institute technical surveillances.
-
In summary, CIA so far has a very limited
capability to recruit foreign diplomatic sources in the
United States, but the Agency appears to have done fairly
well with a relatively small staff; however, it can be
anticipated that this capability will increase. CIA's
effectiveness will probably be adversely affected for
1: some time to come because of the Agency's well-known
deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, loose admin- .
istration, and lack of skilled and talented personnel..
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 235.
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F.
CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI
1.
Manpower Being Devoted
. It is most difficult to give any specific figures as to
how much manpower the FBI is currently devoting strictly to
foreign intelligence collection, separate and apart from the
Bureau's internal security and counterintelligence functions.
Much of the foreign intelligence developed by the Bureau is an
outgrowth of our internal security investigations and cannot be
neatly separated in terms of manpower or time.
A substantial amount of our foreign intelligence activity
is concentrated in two offices where most of the diplomatic
establishments in the United States are located; namely, New York
and Washington Field. Both offices were requested to furnish
estimates as to how much manpower is being allocated to foreign
intelligence matters, including both live sources developed and
technical coverage. In both cases, the estimates provided were
highly tentative and both offices stress that manpower commitments
in this area fluctuate widely from week to week depending on
international politics and other unpredictable factors. For
instance, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both offices
greatly increased their normal manpower commitment to the develop-
ment or current foreign intelligence. The present Dominican crisis
which involves production of foreign intelligence to a large extent
represents another "abnormal" situation.
$
However, for what it is worth, WFO and New York have
estimated that at the present time they are allocating approxi-
mately 35 Agents and 20 clerical employees to the full time task
of foreign intelligence collection. Virtually all of the clerical
time and about 40 per cent of the Agent time is related to
technical coverage and the balance is aimed at the development of
live sources.
In addition, of course, all of the other offices, including
our Legal Attaches abroad, have devoted manpower to foreign
intelligence collection in varying degrees.
operations
conducted in different field offices have involved the assignment
of as many as 10 or 12 Agents for temporary periods. In connection
¨¨*with its responsibilities in the Cuban and Latin-American fields,
the Miami and San Juan offices have devoted considerable manpower
to the development of foreign intelligence in recent years. The
Chicago Office in connection with its handling of our
informant has devoted manpower to the development of foreign
intelligence. These represent only a few examples.
+
"
On an overall basis and bearing in mind the difficulty lin
citing any precise figures, it is estimated that the Bureau probably
averages approximately 50 to 75 Agents and 25 to 30 clerks assigned
primarily to foreign intelligence work.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 236
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64
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2.
Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances with
Evaluation of Product
At present, Bureau has only one microphone surveillance in
foreign intelligence field and this is in connection with a special
National Security Agency project directed against
coded
communications. Concerning technical surveillancos, wo are now
operating about 70 foreign intelligence installations on various
diplomatic establishments in this country. The majority of these
are in Washington Field and New York with scattered installations
in Chicago, Miami, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and San Juan. Under
current Bureau policy, we are limited to 80 foreign intelligence
technical surveillances and no microphone surveillances with the
exception of one on the
In addition, during recent years, we have maintained
approximately 50 so-called "telex" surveillances on the teletype
facilities of various foreign establishments. This has been done
at the specific request of the National Security Agency,
in
connection with its efforts to break foreign codes and to read
foreign government communications.
We have had excellent results from these technical
installations. Any compilation of items of value to the U.S.
Intelligence Community and policy-making officials developed
through this coverage would run many hundreds of pages. The results
have ranged from information regarding plans and activities of
key foreign countries in the diplomatic field to information
regarding intelligence, political, economic and military develop-
ments in the countries concerned. In many instances, we have been
able to forewarn the White House, the State Department and other
interested agencies of impending developments and to furnish data
giving an insight into the thinking and strategy of key foreign
officials and governments. This coverage has proved specially
valuable during crisis periods such as the Cuban missile crisis of
1962 and during the tense negotiations involving the Panama Canal
in 1964. On many occasions, top-ranking United States officials
have commented on the effectiveness of this data. The particular
importance of this information has been its timeliness to current
events as well as the fact that it represents a penetration of
foreign diplomatic circles which is only infrequently available
through live sources.………
In some instances; of course, this type coverage on a
particular foreign establishment or official has not paid off.
We have had cases where this technique has been unproductive for
sustained periods of time on a particular country. This is to be
expected and we have sought to overcome this by rotating our
installations, correlating our technical operations with shifting
international developments and putting coverage on those countries
which appear to offer the most promise for worthwhile intelligence.
65
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ANUTE
3.
Live Sources With Evaluation
At present we are making active efforts to develop live
informant coverage in the diplomatic establishments of 37 non-
Soviet bloc countries. This list of so-called "target countries"
varies from time to time but essentially we are seeking informant
coverage in countries considered critical from an intelligence
standpoint such as those leaning towards the Soviet bloc or
countries in which the United States has paramount political or
military interests or which are otherwise of primary concern.
current list includes virtually all Latin-American countries, a
number of Middle East countries, and scattered countries throughout
Africa and the Far East.
The
Our program was initiated in the early 1950s, and we
' are now using some 50 sources (This number fluctuates due to
transfers, resignations, etc.).. In each case, we clear with
State Department prior to designating any country as a "target"
and we also clear with State prior to conducting interviews with
employees at the "target" establishment. In a number of instances,
including most Latin-American countries, State has asked us to
restrict our efforts to American citizens. This, of course, is
a highly limiting factor.
on
Over the years this live informant coverage has on many
occasions produced foreign intelligence of real value. Our sources
have frequently provided data regarding proposed political,
diplomatic or economic action by the countries concerned,
occasion in advance of other forewarning to U.S. intelligence.
They have also been able to furnish a considerable amount of
information regarding the whereabouts, background and general
activities of individual foreign officials of security interest,
thereby saving investigative time. These sources have been
especially valuable in connection with the
Program and
other sophisticated attacks on foreign establishments, providing
us with data regarding the physical security, location of code
rooms, etc., of the various foreign establishments.
In addition to so-called "target" countries which are
in the non-Soviet bloc area, the Bureau has developed a number of
informants and defectors-in-place in Soviet-bloc establishments
who have been able to furnish a substantial amount of foreign
intelligence. In the Soviet-bloc field, we have also developed
a number of sources in quasi-official establishments, such as
trade missions, who have produced valuable foreign intelligence.
In the Soviet-bloc field, of course, our live informant development
has been aimed essentially at internal security and counterintelli-
gence needs of the Bureau.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 238
66
It is significant that we have been able to operate for
many years in the development of live sources in foreign diplomatic
establishments, both Soviet bloc and non-bloc, without encountering
any serious incidents embarrassing to the FBI or the United States
Government..
In assessing the product of such live sources in a number
of instances in the non-Sov..et field, State Department has
requested that we restrict our efforts to American citizens. То
a considerable degree, this has limited the effectiveness of our
program in the con-Soviet field since U.S. employees of foreign
establishments will normally not have access to top-grade data.
Thus, especially in the non-Soviet bloc field we are not tapping
the full potential which exists for high-level foreign intelligence.
This can only be realized through the development of high quality
sources.
4.
(This material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign
intelligence operation, will be covered in a briefing
to be arranged by the Counsel to the President)
5.
Double Agents and Informants
7
In a number of instances, Bureau double agents and informants,
developed to assist us in connection with our internal security and
counterintelligence responsibilities, have been able to provide
significant high-level information of foreign intelligence value.
For example, in the Soviet field, we have developed a
number of top-level sources such as
who have
provided current intelligence regarding the organizational structure,
personnel, and operations of the KGB and GRU, both in the Soviet
Union and abroad; a description of various technical equipment used
by Soviet intelligence; data regarding current relations between the
Soviet Union and Communist China; and data regarding Soviet foreign
policy, political and military developments, etc. Similar informa-
tion of foreign intelligence value has been developed through FBI
informants, double agents and defectors-in-place operating against
. 67
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Wan
Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian and other communist-bloc
countries. For instance, in the Cuban field on several occasions,
FBI informants have been able to develop high-level or current
intelligence regarding conditions in Cuba, and policies of the
Castro regime through personal contacts with ranking Cuban officials
both in the U.S. and abroad.
_
Through our coverage of the Communist Party, USA, and
related organizations we have also frequently produced foreign
intelligence, although to a lesser extent than in our operations in.
the foreign nationality field. One of our best sources of foreign
intelligence in the domestic area is our so-called *
wherein we have informants acting in a
'capacity between the
Communist Party, USA, and foreign communist groups, including the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have developed information
through this operation regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, social
and political conditions in various countries, both in and outside
the Soviet bloc, and tactics of the international communist movement.
6. Additional Potential
As indicated in the foregoing subsections, the Bureau is
currently producing a considerable volume of foreign intelligence
through covert means, much of it of a significant nature. Most of
this data is an outgrowth of informants, technical coverage and
investigative programs targeted primarily to fulfill our internal
security and counterintelligence objectives and relatively speaking,
we have committed only a small percentage of our assets exclusively
in the direction of foreign intelligence.
It is believed that the Bureau possesses considerable
potential for the development of foreign intelligence which could
be realized with a fairly modest expenditure of manpower and costs
if we were to make foreign intelligence collection a primary aim.
For example, with existing equipment and facilities, we could
expand our technical coverage of foreign establishments to include
additional 30 to 40 foreign establishments provided we could assign
about 25 additional personnel to this field. With the assignment
of an additional 75 to 100 Agents, we could greatly intensify our
foreign intelligence collection through live informants, primarily
through the development and exploitation of additional sources at
foreign diplomatic establishments. We could place more stress on..
foreign intelligence collection in our training programs and
conferences to make more effective use of our already available ass
We could, for example, add specialized classes on foreign intellig.
collection to our In-Service schedules or designate selected Burea
personnel to attend training sessions operated by other U.S. agenc
regarding this subject.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 240
68
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* identifies a peculiarly sensitive foreign
counterintelligence operation.

G. AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI CIA
:
Any differences between FBI and CIA are first
related to a basic problem existing in any country among
the major powers, namely. "How does a law enforcement
agency coordinate its internal security functions with an
intelligence organization which must operate as a clandestine
service?" The very nature of the functions of the two
organizations immediately introduces potential areas of
conflict. One essentially operates overtly and the other
covertly. This alone is enough to create an atmosphere.
fraught with controversies and onfusion. Because each
agency was molded differently and because responsibilities
differ, there naturally will be conflicting approaches to
national security objectives. For example, in the field
of intelligence the Bureau is basically a counterintelligence
body. CIA, to the contrary, has a much broader responsibility
in intelligence, which includes collection of foreign
intelligence, political and psychological warfare, inter-
agency coordinating, evaluation, research, etc. Counter-
intelligence within CIA is actually a relatively small
component of the agency. Personnel in the two organizations
is recruited under different criteria and standards.
Training is likewise at variance. In a final analysis,
the experienced FBI Agent and the seasoned CIA intelligence
officer are not of the same mold but certainly are tailored
as two entirely and distinctly different instruments. We
should bear in mind that little has been done to introduce
truly substantive cross-fertilisation of outlook, approach
and operational philosophy between the two agencies. This
could be advocated from a Utopian point of view, but it
also could be argued that there are distinct advantages to
maintaining sound compartmentation.
Separate from the above basic and fundamental
situation, the differences between FBI and CIA also relate
to other factors such as:
1) FBI was first on the scene and was well
established long before CIA came to life. This led to a
conception in the early years that CIA was an intruder.
2) The seed of CIA was the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), an organization whose personnel, activities
and free-wheeling were the sources of numerous conflicts
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-241-
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69
with the Bureau during World War II. It was during
these years that an atmosphere of mistrust and lack of
confidence was created.
3) CIA was established as our first over-all,
worldwide intelligence agency. The events and the
maneuvering which led to this certainly, did not bring
with them a harmonious relationship.
4) Unfortunately, CIA grew big and grew fast,
particularly because of an unsettled atomic world and
developments such as the Korean War. The Agency did not
jell effectively as an organization, and with this came
: numerous difficulties, many of which exist to this day.
5) Each organization has lacked adequate
knowledge of the other's operational machinery, objectives,
and "ways and means of doing things."
6) An element of rivalry actually developed over
the years, and this, when not tempered with prudence and
sound judgment, creates unhealthy situations.
7) A growing tendency on the part of CIA to
expand its operational activities not originally contemplated
in the formation of that agency.
It can be recognized that with this background it
has not been an easy matter to establish a good working
relationship with CIA without frequent conflicts, and
sometimes agonizing negotiations. It could be suggested
that the ideal situation would be to remove CIA from the
U. S. with the understanding that we would assume respon-
sibility for any and all activity in the intelligence field.
As described in another section of this report, such a
move would be highly infeasible for the Bureau.
It is to our credit that despite the problems of
the past there have been some highly constructive develop-
"ments in FBI-CIA" relations, particularly as they affect
..activities in the U. S. Several years ago arrangements
were made whereby CIA's Office of Security could conduct'
applicant investigations without infringing upon our juris-
diction. For several years we have been permitting CIA to
interview aliens for foreign intelligence information under
…ground; rules which have been very successful. Our liaison..
-NW-88608 Docld:32989629. Page 242
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70.—
mechanism has been functioning effectively. We have
frequent conferences. Bureau personnel lectures before
CIA officers. Dissemination of information is excellent.
The atmosphere for negotiating and discussing unusually
complicated problems is very good. Personnel can work in
the same area with a minimum of problems, as evidenced in
the Dominican Republic. We attend USIB meetings and are
actively engaged in the work of several committees attached
to USIB. All of this is commendable progress and certainly
beneficial to national security.
All of the foregoing was set forth in the way of
background in order to better understand the current source
of differences with CIA, namely the Agency's desire to assess
and recruit foreign intelligence sources in the U.S. in the
foreign diplomatic establishments, including United Nations,
and to some extent among foreign visitors. CIA fully
acknowledges our internal security and counterintelligence
responsibilities. This is clear-cut and free of any
debatable question%; however, CIA feels that we have no
legally-established responsibility in foreign intelligence
collection and that somebody (in this case, CIA) should
be fully exploiting the foreign intelligence potential in
the United States, bearing in mind that there are approxi-
mately 10,000 foreign officials and employees in this country.
CIA argues that a foreign diplomat can be recruited anywhere
in the world but maintains that there is no better place
than the United States for assessment, recruitment, training
and orientation of an informant. CIA further maintains that
if the Agency moves on a target, such as an Argentine
diplomat who may be a career officer not connected with a
foreign intelligence service, there should not be any con-
flict because the activity is in no way related to the
internal security functions of the Bureau. CIA has also
expressed the attitude that in the communist-bloc field
CIA should be permitted to assess and recruit those
individuals not connected with an intelligence or internal
security service.
There are some people in CIA who are of the
opinion that in the field of foreign intelligence the Bureau.
should be exerting more effort to actually assist CIA in
spotting sources and, when needed, give CIA support in
developing an individual through such means as surveillances,
neighborhood investigations, etc. When CIA is permitted to
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71
-
recruit a source in the U. S., the Agency takes the
position that if the source can be of help to the Bureau
we should levy requirements on CIA and not ask for access
to the source unless it clearly appears that only through
access we can properly discharge our responsibilities.
CIA takes a very strong. view that once a source is
developed it is basically unsound to introduce another
agency into the relationship. The developing agency
may have used techniques peculiar to its own organization
and may have developed a relationship under varied cir-
cumstances, and when a new agency is introduced this
relationship with the source could be unfavorably disturbed.
CIA does not dispute the fact that informant and Agent
turnovers sometimes are absolutely necessary.
CIA maintains that if the Bureau is given access
to a CIA source we would be responsible for the counter-
intelligence aspects, but if the source produces foreign
intelligence CIA should be responsible for handling this
information, including the dissemination. CIA's position
is that it is better qualified to evaluate the information
and correlate it with the foreign intelligence being
developed abroad. For example, if a Nigerian source of CIA.
also available to the Bureau, furnishes information regarding
the Nigerian Foreign Office, CIA claims that it can better
handle the report and dissemination.
Discussions and agreements with CIA, including
the actions stemming from meetings with the representatives
of that agency in November 1965, have resulted in a greatly
improved coordinating machinery. There still are areas of
potential conflict which will necessitate improvement.
They are:
3) DOD personnel receives leads or tips pertaining
to possible access to Soviet-bloc diplomats. This CIA
Division pursues these leads and is inclined to take the
position that such individuals contacted by CIA are their `
"CIA-controlled sources. If we permitted this to go on
over a period of time, CIA would have a vast network of
sources not directly available to the Bureau. This is
basically unsound, and there is no reason CIA shouldn't
immediately give us the lead or tip for exploitation.
We can recognize that, depending upon circumstances,
it
might be favorable to us and CIA for the Agency to handle
a particular individual, and if so, it would be clearly
72
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 244
coordinated. This would be most important if the
individual in any way was connected with or associated
with an intelligence service.
2) DOD is anxious to have freedom to assess
and recruit Bloc diplomats not known to be engaged in
intelligence activity. On the surface, this does not
appoar to present a problem, but realistically speaking
it is impossible for us to know that a Soviet diplomat,
not known to be engaged in intelligence activity one
day, appears on the scene the following week as an agent
or coopted agent. To give CIA wide latitude in this field
could create a truly undesirable mess. We believe that
if CIA is permitted to move on such targets it should be
done on a selective basis and with maximum coordination.
3) CIA's organizational and operational
deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, poor internal
coordination, unsatisfactory records, all introduce head-
aches which undoubtedly will continue to exist for many
years.
4) There continues to be an element of mistrust
I and misunderstanding between the two organizations because
of the historical reasons described above..
5) Continuing lack of one agency's appreciation
.for the other's objectives, responsibilities and operational
philosophy.
6)
The absence of a clearly defined Bureau policy
and objectives in the field of foreign intelligence collec-
tion. CIA really does not know the nature and the extent
of our interests, and consequently this lends to confusion
and misunderstanding.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page 245
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73
WW
H.
CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA
1. According to SAC Letter 59 dated 5/24/49, CIA and FBI
had reached agreement whereby clearance would be requested of FBI
before CIA conducted an interview with an alion in the U.S. This
clearance would consist of a review of Bureau files concerning
individual in question.
According to same SAC Letter, agreement had been reached
by the FBI and CIA whereby CIA was allowed to contact American
businessmen without obtaining clearance from FBI in order to̟
obtain positive foreign intelligence information and arrange covers
for CIA personnel abroad. This agreement was based strictly on
collection of foreign intelligence and positively did not allow for
the formulation of a network of confidential informants for CIA
in the U.S.
Regarding FBI-CIA agreement that CIA would clear with us
prior to interviewing aliens in U.S., following documentation has
been located. By letter 2/19/48 Director of CIA Hillenkoetter
wrote Director and referred to National Security Council Intelli-
gence Directive No. 7, 2/12/48. This Directive states in part that
ČIA will be responsible for expbitation on highly selective basis
within U.S. of business concerns, other nongovernmental organiza-
tions and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.
Hillenkoetter commented that CIA had been interviewing foreign
businessmen, immigrants and refugees on small scale, always clearing
matter first with FBI office in area concerned. He asked Director's
views as to possible expansion of this activity.
In
By letter 2/26/48 Director replied to Hillenkoetter.
part, this letter pointed out FBI had no objection to CIA inter-
viewing individuals enumerated above for foreign intelligence
purposes; however, it was suggested that prior to interview such
individual matters be cleared with FBI Headquarters.
2. Bureau letter to CIA 1/16/64 confirmed results of meetings
between CIA and Bureau via liaison in discussing reorganization of
CIA's Domestic Operations Division (DOD). Letter recognized CIA
needs (recruitment of sources in U.S. who may be used abroad;
recruitment of diplomats, including UN representatives, who might be
useful to CIA in overseas operations or who might be transferred to
Soviet-bloc countries; training of agents recruited; handling of
agents developed abroad who come to U.S. for a visit or assignment;
and approaches to foreign officials and visitors to assess their
potential as sources when they leave the U.S.). Our letter to CIA
set forth the following ground rules to be followed in connection with
CIA's operations in order to avoid operational conflicts and
embarrassment:
"NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 246
and
74
we
*****
:
CIA would not conduct investigation of any foreign
official in U.S. and if CIA felt such investigation warranted, FBI
should be consulted.
b. No foreign official would be approached for recruit-
ment by CIA without its conferring with FBI.
C. When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for visit or assign-
ment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding
handling of agent in this country, it being recognized each case
has its individual peculiarities.
d. Before approaching any foreign official or visitor for
recruitment assessment, CIA will clear with FBI.
3.
As result of conference with CIA in January, 1966, the
above "ground rules" were modified and expanded and agreed upon by
both agencies early this year (Confirmed by letter to Admiral
Raborn 2/7/66). New ground rules in summary are as follows:
2. CIA will not initiate investigation of any foreign
official in U.S.. without concurrence of FBI. (Comment: This is
essentially same as (a) in January, 1964, ground rules. Only
difference is that wording of this modification implies more
sympathetic FBI attitude towards any proposed CIA investigations.)
b. CIA will seek FBI concurrence before approaching for
recruitment any foreign official or communist bloc visitor in U.S.
FBI will concur if CIA action does not conflict with any FBI
operations. (Comment: This is similar to (b) and (c) ground rules
adopted in January, 1964, with two differences. First, it drops
requirement that CIA clear with us before approaching a non-Soviet
visitor although it must still do so with regard to non-Soviet
officials. Secondly, it specifically commits the FBI to concur if
proposed CIA action does not conflict with FBI operations.)
C. CIA will advise FBI prior to meetings between CIA
assets and foreign officials or communist bloc visitors of interest
to FBI. (Comment: This was not included in previous set of
ground rules.)
..:
"
d: Agents of CIA who come to U.S. will be identified to
FBI by name or appropriate description depending on national security
interest involved.
e. When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for a visit or assign-
ment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding
handling of agent in U.S. It is recognized each case will have
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 247
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75.
--
individual peculiarities and governing principle will be positive
intelligence weighed against internal security factors.
CIA may,
however, continue its contractual relationship for purpose of handling
training, procurement of positive foreign intelligence, (under-
lining added) fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent and
preparation for next assignment abroad.
f. Where CIA will be handling its agent in U.S., CIA
will service FBI security or counterintelligence 'requirements and
will provido FBI all information bearing on counterintelligence or
internal security matters. Where CIA servicing is inadequate for
FBI internal security interests, FBI will have direct access to
agent. (Comment: Rules (d), (e) and (f) represent greatly expanded
and refined version of rule (c) of January, 1964, agreement. Old
ground rules provided considerable latitude with regard to who
would handle CIA source in the U.S. and this has led to some
disagreements with CIA. The current ground rules clearly provide
for CIA to retain contact with its agents not only for training,
financing, etc., but also for "procurement of positive foreign
intelligence." In addition, they make it clear that the FBI should
not ask for direct access unless there is a specific internal
security need.)
4. In addition to the above, there is one agreement we have
reached with CIA which is of possible relevance; namely, our recent
agreement relative to treatment of Soviet students in the U.S.
By way of background, there are a number of Soviet exchange students
currently attending various U.S. universities. Each student, of
course, is not only a possible Soviet intelligence agent but also
a potential source for the U.S. after he returns to his homeland.
Accordingly, both FBI and CIA have an interest in these students.
:
Per memo dated 1/14/64 we advised CIA via liaison on 1/20/64
that the Bureau would adopt following procedure relative to Soviet
students here. FBI will take responsibility for collecting material
regarding each student on expedite basis, furnishing results to
CIA as developed. At logical point FBI will confer with CIA to
decide on case-by-case basis re possible recruitment. If Bureau
recruits Soviet student, we will resolve whether we should turn
him over to CIA before he leaves U.S. Under this procedure, CIA
will not make any inquiries (through its sources in U.S.) unless
it has some unusual source in a university not available to FBI
who could furnish data on the student. In latter case, we would
allow CIA to obtain data and advise us.
The foregoing represent all of the major agreements we
have reached to date with CIA with respect to CIA operations here.
in foreign intelligence field.
"
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 248
- 76
I EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION
OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
1.
Overt Collection Activities
:
It is evident from the National Security Act of
1947 and the succeeding National Security Council Intelligence
Directives as well as the directives of the Director of
Central Intelligence that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
is charged with major responsibilities in the overt collection
of foreign intelligence in the United States. In pursuit of
this, CIA exploits non-governmental organizations and
individuals, foreign language publications and aliens.
CIA claims to have contacts with about 7,200 organizations
and businesses as well as about 60,000 sources of information
as a result of its overt activities for this purpose, CIA
estimates it is reaching only 15 per cent of the foreign
intelligence information available in this country.
Although
The question we must consider here is whether the
FBI should take over the overt collection of foreign intelligence
in the United States, thereby making CIA operational only in
areas outside the limits of FBI's jurisdiction. In this
connection, the following would have to be considered;
(a) Reporting:
The Bureau is a fact-finding agency which has
traditionally gathered evidence and presented its findings
without bias or conclusions. This would not change.
Intelligence developed by the FBI would be evaluated by the
users in the intelligence community. Our report writing
format might have to be geared to the needs and established
procedures of the United States intelligence community.
(b)
Coordination With Other Government Agencies:
Foreign intelligence is a commodity produced for
the benefit of many separate agencies of the United States.
Government. Because of this, if the Bureau were to have
full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign
intelligence in this country, we would have to greatly
expand our liaison services, not only for dissemination
purposes but to assure that we are kept fully informed
regarding all matters dealing with intelligence priorities.
- 77
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 249
Our role in preparation of National Intelligence Estimates
would be more active as a result of our increased contribution
under this program. It might be necessary to utilize the
assistance of highly trained personnel of other agencies to
assist us poriodically on interviews dealing with complicated
military or scientific matters.
(c)
Manpower:
..
While no manpower requirements can be presently
estimated should we assume full responsibility for overt
foreign intelligence collection, CIA is currently using
approximately employees throughout the United States to
interview individuals in connection with its overt intelligence
gathering activities, and is reaching what it estimates to be
only 15 per cent of available foreign intelligence information.
These
CIA employees do not include personnel required at
CIA Headquarters to correlate, evaluate and disseminate the
data gathered in the field. We would want to more effectively
exploit this intelligence potential.
To merely handle the necessary review of the vast
number of foreign language publications would require many
additional employees proficient in foreign languages and
with backgrounds in scientific or technical fields.
(d) Selection and Training of Personnel:
To assume full responsibility for the overt
collection of foreign intelligence in this country, would
require that we vastly broaden our selection and training
procedures. We would require applicants with degrees in
the sciences, languages, history, government and economics.
Our basic training and In-Service agenda would have to be
geared to meet our new responsibilities. We would undoubtedly
desire to utilize the services of outstanding lecturers from
the agencies constituting our intelligence community, and in
turn, we would wish to afford our personnel training at the
War Colleges operated by the Department of Defense, and from
time to time furnish them the opportunity of specialized
training and briefings provided by the members of the U. S.
Intelligence Board.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 250
78
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.(e) Legislation:
CIA currently has the duty to correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to the national security and to provide
for appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the
Government. This is set out in Title 50, USC, Section 40%
The overt collection of foreign intelligence is not the subject
of legislation but rather of National Security Council Intelligence
Directives which would have to be revised in order to give the
Bureau this authority now lodged with CIA.
(f)
Organizational Changes:
To carry out a program committing the Bureau to
the full responsibility for the overt collecting of foreign
intelligence in this country would necessitate a substantial
increase to the headquarters staffs of the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division and the Laboratory Divison, as well to the.
personnel assigned to the New York and Washington Field Offices
where diplomatic establishments and international organizations
are mainly located. In all probability the creation of a new
division at the Seat of Government devoted entirely to overt
collection responsibilities, would be required.
(g)
Observations:
17
The many responsibilities that would be ours under
a program making the Bureau accountable for the overt collection
of all foreign intelligence in this country would (1) require
an enormous increase in our own personnel, trained in many
specialized fields, or (2) the delegation of varied intelligence
functions to other governmental agencies and close supervision
of such agencies to insure efficient execution of the tasks
levied upon them. These overt collection responsibilities
would undoubtedly be subject to the scrutiny of many sources,
some of them hostile, and we would have to face the charges,
unjust though they might be, that the Bureau had ceased to
perform the duties for which it was originally created and
had developed into a gigantic bureaucratic octopus.
2. Clandestine Gathering Activities
There are no statutory provisions for the clandestine
gathering of foreign intelligence in the United States. We
have in the past produced substantial foreign intelligence .
while carrying out our present responsibilities.
CIA established its Domestic Operations Division (DOD)
in 1963 and began to clandestinely gather foreign intelligence
in this country. It now has field offices with approximately
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 251
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79
a
intelligence officers assigned to these matters'. It is
anticipated that DOD's efforts will become more extensive.
CIA estimates there are approximately 10,000 employees
and dependents assigned to the diplomatic establishments and
international organizations represented in this country by
approximately 120 foreign nations. It can readily be seen that
wo would have to establish priorities and well-defined objectives
in order to cope effectively with the problem presented by the
vast number of persons and establishments which could be
considered for clandestine coverage.
Today there are approximately 40 nations in addition
to the Soviet-bloc countries, whose establishments in this
country we consider "target" countries for the purpose of
developing live sources therein. In the absence of more
precise criteria, our initial efforts in a program designed
to expand our clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence,
could be directed against these "target" nations.
(a) Objectives:
·Under a program confined to the clandestine gathering
of foreign intelligence in this country, and consistent with
the intelligence needs of this (Government, we would have as
our objectives:
(1)
Increasing substantially the number of live
sources of high quality in diplomatic establishments,
trade missions, consular offices or international
organizations located within the United States;
(2) Expanding our present technical and microphone
coverage in such establishments.
1
(This material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign
intelligence operation, will be covered in a briefing
to be arranged by the Counsel to the President.)
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 252
80
-
سید
(b) Observations:
While a program limited to the clandestine gathering
of foreign intelligence would require a substantial increase
in manpower, both in the field and at the Bureau's headquarters,
as well as an expansion c_ our personnel selection and training
procedures, our liaison responsibilities and our filing and
data processing facilities, however; in none of these phases
would the increase be nearly as great as that which would be
required should we assume full responsibility for the overt
gathering of such foreign intelligence.
:
:
{
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 253
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- 81 -
Ji
GENERAL FINDINGS
The study conducted by the Committee has
produced the following significant findings:
(1) There definitely is a vast potential
for collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S.
available through overt and clandestine channels.
Even with the available capabilities of existing
agencies, there is a large reservoir of untapped
sources.
(2) CIA has been authorized by statute
and implementing directives to collect foreign
intelligence in the U. S. through overt methods and
has been involved in such collection since the
establishment of the Agency. This includes review
of foreign language press and interviews with
selected individuals such as American businessmen,
aliens, and students. In addition, CIA has established
an elaborate system of processing, storing, evaluating,
and disseminating this information.
(3) Such overt collection by CIA does not
present any threat or infringement on FBI jurisdiction
or operations. The present Bureau controls for such/
CIA activity are satisfactory.
(4) We concluded that it would be highly
undesirable for the Bureau to become responsible for
overt collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S.
The necessary reorganization, expansion of facilities
and manpower, and heavy task of information collection
and processing could place a damaging burden on the
Bureau.
(5)
There has never been any statutory or
similar provision for the clandestine development by
CIA of foreign intelligence in the United States.
There are instances where the FBI has received specific
assignments which encompassed foreign intelligence
collection in the United States (SIS operations covering
entire Western Hemisphere in World War II; present¨
operations concerning Dominican Republic). There is
no statute or directive which assigns or confirms
exclusive FBI jurisdiction in clandestine development
82 -
-
NW.88608 Docid:32989629 Page 254
of foreign intelligence in the United States. As a
result of our internal security and counterintelligence
responsibilities, we have produced a volume of foreign
intelligence covertly. In addition, either at the
specific request of other U. S. agencies or on our
own initiative in response to national intelligence
needs, we have produced such intelligence. We have
done this on a selective basis and have not assumed
full responsibility in this area. As indicative of
this, certain agreements have been made with CIA
permitting that Agency to assess and recruit after
coordination with the FBI covert foreign intelligence
sources in the United States (principally for use
abroad). We have reserved the right to take over
such sources if internal security factors are paramount.
In the absence of such factors, CIA is permitted to
utilize these sources for foreign intelligence purposes.
(6) We concluded that the expanded development
of clandestine foreign intelligence sources is essential
if national security interests are to be effectively
served.
(7) Exploitation of foreign diplomatic targets
fortifies our efforts in the internal security and
counterintelligence fields. Information developed
increases over-all knowledge and produces leads or ties
to intelligence activity being carried out by foreign
intelligence and security services.
(8) The U. S. intelligence community currently
does not provide an organization or a mechanism which can
effectively exploit the intelligence potential in the foreign
diplomatic field. There have been expressions of concern
and certain limited action taken by FBI and CIA, but there
has not been a well-organized or united effort and most
important of all, there has been a decided lack of leader-
ship directed toward attacking the problem and at the
same time inducing an atmosphere of harmonious application
of all available resources
"
(9) We concluded there is an excellent
opportunity for the Bureau to assume leadership in this
matter and in so doing, enhance national security and
ཉྙིཉྩནྟི u, ཨེ, iཀ2 ཤོ9,6? རཱཛྫི
NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 255
1
83
-
:
the capabilities of the Burcsa. The time has arrived
for us to adopt and implement a new concept toward
foreign intelligence collosion. It would be unwise
if the Bureau did move into a leading role and
instead applied perdey nd tastics conforming with
a "holding action." This, in popinion, is not
consistent with the reputation of a progressive and
ruforward looking orgasm.
(10) The purcate dona have talent and
capability to assume a notative role in clandestine
collection of foreign inteligence. We have the
potential to handle clandestine collection of foreign
intelligence in the U. S. in a more effective manner
than any other agency. This can be done in a constructive
and prudent manner.
(11) It is recognized that a new approach by
the Bureau will involve operational risks. If one is
to progress, he must take zichs. We feel that we have
the capability to succeed with a minimum of losses
or debits.
(12) We feel that if we do not adopt a new
role characterized with an aggressive approach, a door
is left open for other agentïes such as CIA to
progressively, introduce programs designed to fill the
vacuum. CIA currently does not have the capability¨
to inject a rapid "tese-over" of operational areas.
We do feel that such would be accelerated not by CIA's
strength, but by our weaknesses,
:
(13) CIA is progressively expanding its
objectives and capabilities to conduct clandestine
intelligence operations in the U. S... This presents
a potential for areas of conflict between CIA 
and 
FBI.
;
(14) We definitely must define our role in
the field of clandestine foreign intelligence collection
licy and objectives are clear-cut. Not 
only
sonnel but other agencies including CIA should
know ezadsly where we stand,
our
>
(15) CIA can be permitted to develop
clandestine sources of foreign intelligence under the
"NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 256
84
established ground rules which do protect Bureau
interests. A new approach being recommended would
heavily deter CIA from extensive development of
clandestine sources and would really leave the
Agency in a minor or subordinate role.
:
*
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 257
85
ཙཱཔནམསྶ
K.
RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION
A penetrative and objective study of the
Bureau's position has led us to conclude that the Bureau
should play a much more active and influential role in
the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the
United States. We are recommending the implementation of
a plan which will lead to a valuable Contribution to our
national security effort and concurrently will improve our
internal security capabilities. This plan presents
concept of an FBI as an Agency primarily responsible for
internal security, but supplementing its coverage with a
substantially expanded capability in the clandestine collec-
tion of positive intelligence. We believe that we have the
capability of developing this new look knowing that at the
same time we can institute a badly needed leadership to
eliminate a gap in the acquirement of high-quality intelli-
gence in the United States. The main features of this plan
are:
1) Establishment of a list of foreign diplomatic
targets consistent with the needs of the Government.
2) Expansion of our technical surveillance
capabilities with emphasis on misurs.
3) Expansion of live sources characterized with
selectivity and high-quality value.
4) The FBI assuming a role of leadership in the
clandestine exploitation of positive intelligence in the
U. S., and in so doing making maximum use of the talent and
capabilities of other appropriate U. S. Agencies.
Authorization
The plan would be implemented under proper executive
authorization (Presidential) and furthermore would be coordi-
nated with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). A
letter from the President authorizing the Bureau to expand
its capabilities in clandestine positive intelligence collec-
tion, consistent with the needs of the government, would
suffice. In order to avoid any misunderstanding or confusion
within the intelligence community; USIB would be apprised of
the Presidential authorization. The letter from the President
would not require any details regarding the nature and the
scope of the action to be taken by the Bureau but could be
NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 258
-
86
-
W
expressed in general terms. This same authorization could.
be further defined by the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
It is realized that it would be necessary to
discuss this plan with the President so that he fully under-
stood the purpose, scope and the controlling features. With
his approval, the plan could also be discussed with the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
Selection of Targets
6
Priority on targets can be established by appli-
cation of the following criteria:
1)
Review of requests or requirements levied on
us by the President and U. S. Intelligence Agencies,
2) Review of priority listed by the USIB. (This
is done on a regular basis.)
3) Our own analysis and evaluation of international
political developments. This primarily will be done at SCG,
but we should be so organized that the field would be free
to submit recommendations.
As of March, 1966, the following could be set
forth as a tentative list of priority targets in the United
States:
3)
USSR
a. Indications of significant changes in
Soviet policies, particularly with respect to relations
with the West and with Communist China.
:
b.
Background information illuminating the
decisions of the 23rd Party Congress, especially indications
of policy disputes or political rivalries; repercussions in
other Communist parties.
C.
Developments in Soviet space programs in
the wake of Luna 9.
2) Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia
2. Chinese Communist, Soviet and North Viet-
namese capabilities, intentions, and actions with respect to
Vietnam/Laos and to US activities in the area.
87
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 259
b.
Indications of Soviet deployment of surface-to-
surface missiles to North Vietnam..
c. Changes in the attitudes and policies of influential
South Vietnamese, especially Buddhist leaders, toward the
war effort or the US.
d.
Indications of a major change in Viet Cong/PAVN
and Pathet Lao military capabilities and tactics.
e.
Information pertaining to the location, size, and
types of Chinese troop units in Indochina.
1. Evidence of Viet Cong/PAVN/Chinese Communist use of
Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating base, or source of supply;
Cambodian Government attitudes toward such uses.
3) Communist China
2.
Military, logistic, transportation, and economic
information bearing on Communist China's capability to fight
a war in Southeast Asia and indications of Chinese intentions
rospecting direct involvement in this area..
b. Movements of Chinese submarines out of their normal
bases or operating areas, particularly toward the South China
Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin.
C. Increased air defense capability, particularly
production and deployment of advanced fighter/interceptor
aircraft.
d. Military activities in other border areas.
4) France
a. French foreign policy, especially concerning NATO,
the USSR, the war in Vietnam/Laos and estrangement or com-
petition with the US.
5) The Dominican Republic
2. The character, strength, influence and potential of
the contending parties and factions; their capabilities
and intentions to conduct coups or insurrectionist activities;
their attitudes toward the June elections; capabilities. of
the Provisional Government to maintain control.
88-'
NW-88608-Docid:32989629-Page-260-

6)
India-Pakistan
a Developments in Indo-Pakistani relations and
attitudes toward the US, the USSR and Communist China.
¨7) Latin America
a. Evidence of increased external Communist assistance
to insurgency movements in Latin America in the wake of
the January conferences in Havana.
8)
Indonesia and Malaysia/Singapore
a.
Political aims of the Indonesian military; Sukarno's
health and political intentions and capabilities%;B moves to
rebuild a Communist party.
b. Indonesian intentions to continue or reduce the
conflict with Malaysia.
C. Changes in Soviet or Chinese policy toward Indonesia
resulting from the current internal conflict.
9) Thailand and Burma
!!
Communist subversive activity and external support;
government capabilities to oppose subversion.
10) Africa
a. African and Communist support to Southern Rhodesian
black nationalists; nationalist capabilities to act against.
the Smith regime; white opposition to the Smith regime;
South African and Portuguese assistance to the Smith regime.
b. Effect of recent coups on the stability of other
African states.
11) Yemen
a. Evidence of intentions and actions of the UAR and
Saudi Arabia with respect to the Yemeni situation.
NW 88608-Docld:32989629 Page 261
M
89
Technical Surveillance of Targets
Coverage in this field will be divided into the
following categories:
I)
2)
3)
Technical Surveillances
Microphone Surveillances
More sophisticated electronic monitoring,
i.e. code machines.
At the present time we are handling a very limited
number of installations. With existing capabilities, we
could virtually double our present technical coverage.
Once we have established reasonable priority listing) it
is believed we should systematically expand our operations.
In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:
1) Heavy emphasis should be placed on microphone
surveillances.
2) Today we are placing greater stress on
coverage of official establishments. The new program asks
for an expansion of coverage on individuals and/or residences
of individuals. Here again selectivity will be a dominating
characteristic.
3)
The program should be so flexible that we
would be able to deactivate any installation for security
reasons or for non-productivity and whenever possible employ
techniques which would permit easy reactivation.
4) Except for current intelligence requiring
immediate dissemination, the product should be handled as
communications intelligence and dissemination would be
subjected to well-established Comint controls of the
National Security Agency (NSA) plus any additional restric-
tions the Bureau felt should be imposed.
5) The product would be transmitted to NSA by us
for dissemination within the intelligence community. NSA
would be responsible for handling any needed translation.
We must recognize that the program will produce voluminous
information and the responsibility for processing the data
should be fixed with an agency which is organized and
equipped to handle the job. It is believed that if the
Bureau assumed this responsibility we would be burdened with
a gigantic task of information processing to the point that
this element would adversely affect other phases of the
program.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 262
-
- 90
-
6) If the information collected by us suggested
a potential for the development of an operation, 1.0.
double agent, the Bureau could assume complete control
of this operation including the dissemination of the
information.
7) Our involvement in the "sophisticated"
category should be increased by expanded research and
development bearing in mind we should be utilizing the
most productive equipment available. The importance of
this field cannot be exaggerated in light of the rapid
developments in the scientific world.
Technical Surveillance Controls
Under this plan we could furnish the President
and the Attorney General a listing of technical surveillance
targets and do so on a periodic basis. This could even
include an annual evaluation of the program.
i
(This material, which is a peculiarly sensitive foreign
intelligence operation, will be covered in a briefing to be
arranged by the Counsel to the President)
0
Live Sources
The category of "live sources" when broadly inter-
preted includes every individual from the casual contact
to the controlled informant who is delivering high quality
information at an obvious risk. At the present time, our
sources in diplomatic establishments are for the most part
Américan citizens. This situation is largely due to an
undesirable, arrangement where we must first, obtain clearance
from the State Department before we proceed to recruit any
employee or officials of a diplomatic establishment. This
places State in the "driver's seat" and that Department,
therefore, is practically controlling our efforts. We Zeel
that such an arrangement is certainly not, conducive to
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 263
-
91
producing the best results. In our opinion this can be
removed by the President's advising the Secretary of
State that the FBI is being authorized to develop
penetrations in foreign diplomatic establishments without
obtaining clearances from State. It would be understood
that the Bureau would proceed in a discreet and secure
manner. Periodic contact with the Secretary of State or
other top State officials to discuss gonoral dovolopments
and any potential problems will provide a mechanism for
healthy coordination with State. We recognize that a
source can turn "sour" and, therefore, there is the danger
of potential embarrassment. However, it should be noted
that our record in this regard has been outstanding over.
the years.
Any efficient investigative agency needs sources
of all categories and we are no exception. Therefore, we
should continue our present program of general source
development, and this would include contacts who can
produce information on an occasional basis or who might
be in a position to be of assistance in a particular
investigation. In diplomatic establishments the reception
clerk, chauffeur, the maid, can always be of assistance.
However, the primary emphasis of this new program
would be directed toward high quality sources, such as:
1) Code clerks
2) Officials who have access to files, records,
or communications
3) Officials or employees who are in a position
to penetrate communist-bloc circles or establishments
4) Members of foreign intelligence and security
services.
Our existing programs of seeking penetrations in
communist-bloc installations naturally must continue but
will require an increased effort toward production of-
- information relating to personality data, and this should
be done on a larger number of individual targets. "We
realize that Bloc personnel does live in a fairly insulated
world, and elementary investigative techniques do not produce
voluminous and highly significant data. It is therefore
believed that our techniques should become more sophisticated
through additional coverage on the residences of individuals
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 264
92
Such efforts naturally fall in line with our internal
security responsibilities, but the coverage may also
provide leads for development of sources in the positive
intelligence field. Every Soviet is not a member of KGB
or GRU, but ho novortheless could offer information of
value, and he could be most useful on a long-range basis.
Our program very definitely should have this philosophy
in mind, and it is an element which must be impressed
upon our personnel in our training programs. In this
regard, we must recognize that at some point it may become
necessary to turn over recruited sources to another agency
such as CIA or one of the military services. Such turnover
will, of course, depend on the circumstances. The guiding
principle should be the preservation of the source under
the best security.
In the non-communist bloc field we would con-
centrate on development of high-quality sources to meet the
priority needs of the Government.
Training of Personnel
At the present time, our personnel are not properly.
oriented to effectively engage in a program as recommended.
To accommodate to a new approach, it will be necessary to:
1) Include in our training classes lectures which
will cover a more detailed picture of U. S. intelligence, its
history, definition of terms, functions of intelligence
agencies.
2) Include lectures regarding the foreign intel-
ligence needs of the U. S. Government.
3) Use outstanding officials of other agencies to
lecture on special intelligence matters. This would include
the critical areas throughout the world..
4) Disseminate a bulletin to the field on a
regular basis to emphasize foreign intelligence needs as
they relate to our capabilities.
5) Institute a special In-Service class (once
or twice per year) which will concentrate on foreign ¨.-
intelligence. This will be designed to develop the leaders
or the specialists in the field.
-NW-88608-Daeld:32989629-Page-265-
93-
,
6) Arrange for attendance of selected/Bureau
personnel to schools of other agencies such as State
Department, CIA, and the military services.
7) Arrange for attendance of selected personnel
at War Colleges.
8) Expand the training of Agents in the handling
of technical surveillance installations,
Reporting Procedures
This program will not require any basic departure
from our present reporting procedures. The Bureau should
not become involved in evaluating, estimating, etc. We
should endeavor to adhere to our traditional position of
reporting the facts as collected. We may wish to give
consideration to adding one feature to our regular reporting
on individuals. This could be an annex for "Personality
Data." The objective would be to maintain an up-to-date
book on everything collected relating to the subject's
character, habits, family life, interests, weaknesses, etc.
Language Capabilities
j
An expanded program for collection of foreign
intelligence would require increased capability to handle
foreign languages. As explained above, the material
collected through technical surveillances should be handled
as communications intelligence, and the major translating
responsibility would, therefore, be placed on NSA.
We do, however, recognize that it is necessary to
maintain a strong foreign language capability in the field
wherever it may be useful to develop live sources. In
offices such as New Cork City and Washington, D. C., we
should expand the number of Agents who are fluent in French,
Russian, Polish, Czech, German, Chinese, and Spanish. An
office which is well equipped with a capability in the
foregoing is generally able to handle most situations which
arise.
NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 266
94
"
Relations with Other Agencies
If this program is adopted, other intelligence
agencies would be officially apprised of the Presidential
authority granted to the FBI to collect foreign intelligence
in the United States. Other agencies would be informed
regarding the nature and the extent of the authority boing
delegated to the Bureau. It would be necessary to make
clear that the Bureau was not assuming responsibility for
the clandestine collection of all foreign intelligence in
the United States, but we were taking a constructive step
in an effort to increase the production of foreign intel-
ligence through assets available to us. We would clearly
point out that the FBI was not taking this approach as a
solution to all of the problems relating to foreign intel-
ligence collection in this country. We would emphasize
that we would move against targets in line with established
priorities and that we would do so on a selective basis.
We would have it understood that operational activities
would be properly coordinated wherever it was obviously
necessary.
With regard to the handling of the product of
technical surveillances, it would be necessary to effect a
working agreement with NSA. To do this we might be obliged
to discuss this at the USIB level so that NSA could obtain
the required authority to support the hiring of additional
personnel and purchase of equipment for the processing of
our product. Our arrangement with NSA would include ground.
rules for processing, translation, and classification and
dissemination.
Since any announcement that we were in the foreign
intelligence field would prompt unusual interest and very
likely queries, we should brief CIA regarding the objectives
of our program. Our plan will not abrogate the existing
ground rules which permit CIA to assess and recruit positive
intelligence sources in this country under certain conditions.
¨ Since both Agencies will have. foreign intelligence sources
in the U.S., we undoubtedly will find it useful to work out
an agreement whereby one Agency knows that the other has
coverage in a particular area or establishment. We already
receive the identities of CIA sources. It would not be
necessary for us to identify our sources, but we could.
……………indicate to CIA that we had an asset in a particular area.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629- Page 267 ·
95
-
}
Ci
us,
This would permit CIA to levy requirements on
For example, if we recruited the Third Secretary
of the French Embassy, CIA might wish to ask any number
of questions dealing with the French political situation.
If we felt that the request was reasonable, we could
handle this through our source.
It will be noted that the program doos not
preclude CIA from development of foreign intelligence
sources in the U. S. for fulfillment of CIA responsibilities.
CIA will continue to operate under existing ground rules
which are designed to protect Bureau interests.
We believe that if the program is implemented
and jells we will be in a position to "spot" sources
required by CIA and other agencies to discharge their
responsibilities. This would apply to cases where the
target was in the U. S. for a visit or if he had some
specialized knowledge not related to our internal security
responsibilities. These would be targets which other
agencies could handle without interfering with our operations
and without making us carry a load for another agency..
This particular concept should include a Bureau attitude
that any and every source handled by another agency in the
U. S. potentially ca.. be useful to us. We should have an
outlook that all sources should be exploited to the fullest
extent and under secure conditions. If another agency has
a capability to open a door we should take advantage of the
situation.
Our
In those instances where CIA has a source in the
United States, we should prod that agency to seek information
of interest to the Bureau, and where obviously necessary we
should arrange access to the CIA source. The important
feature of this new concept is that we assume the role of
projecting initiative, leadership and aggressiveness.
position should be such that we push the other agencies to
use their resources even to the point of healthy irritation.
We have looked at CIA as the "other agency" in
this picture, but we should not neglect. the potential of
agencies such as ACSI, Air Force, ONI and State. All of
them have entree to diplomatic circles. The day-to-day
contacts which officials of these agencies have with
personnel of foreign governments produce many "pieces" of
personality data which, when added up over a period of time,
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 268
96
can prove to be extremely useful. We should confer with
these agencies regarding ways and means of recruiting
sources either to be handled by us jointly or by one of
the intelligence agencies. Here again, the Bureau can
be the dominant and pushing source.
It is believed that if we moved along the lines
described above, the Bureau, over a period of time, would
have collected valuable information regarding numerous
personalities and the inner workings of the many diplomatic
establishments. The acquirement of data of this type
creates operational strength. It places us in a position
to exploit the development of new sources, bearing in mind
that in planning our approaches we will be equipped with
ammunition not gained through casual surveillances and
observations. With the knowledge that we gain, we can
plan high quality operations. It is interesting to note
that during the past two years the information received
from CIA's sources in the United States has been fairly
voluminous and very definitely valuable. It is a good
illustration of the Bureau's gaining useful data from
another agency with a minimum of Bureau expense and effort,
but still maintaining very effective control of our juris-
dictional rights.
Undoubtedly related to the utilization of other
agencies' resources is the considerably vast potential
offered by friendly foreign security services. If the
services of Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Italy,
Australia and Canada provided us information collected in
Washington, D. C. and New York resulting from contacts with
communist-bloc officials, we would have another valuable
source of information. We should bear in mind that we do
spend hundreds and thousands of man-hours seeking such
information through other difficult channels.
We should utilize the friendly liaison services
along the lines described above.
Administrative Reorganization
The present administrative framework at the Seat
of Government and in the field would not be adequate to
implement the recommended program. Placing the additional
load on our existing. supervisory structure is, of course,
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 269
97
out of the question. We definitely would require
increase in supervisory personnel in the Domestic
Intelligence Division. In addition, there would be a
need for more manpower in our Laboratory to handle
expansion in the technical surveillance field. There
would be a need for additional personnel to be assigned
for the development of live sources in the, field. It
would be necessary to have field personnell assigned to
technical surveillance installations on a continued basis
and, of course, there would be a need for support related
to such activities as preliminary security surveys.
It is outside the scope of this Committee's .
competency to outline any specific administrative re-
organization and propose what personnel, equipment and
facilities would be needed. We feel that this could be
best handled only after the objectives of the program are
approved. At that point, officials from the Seat of
Government and the field could meet to map out the necessary
reorganization. The extent of reorganization will hinge on
our decision as to the pace we should set. We recommend
that we proceed at a steady, even pace, making certain that
we lay solid groundwork for all of our activity. We should
refrain from becoming involved in a "crash" program unless
national security interests obviously warrant such an
approach.
(1) The number
In connection with any planning for reorganization,
it would be unwise to proceed without first obtaining a
reliable inventory of our current resources.
Such an
inventory would encompass the following:
of Agents currently assigned to strictly positive intel-
ligence collection%; (2) Our foreign language capabilities;
(3) Our current sources and informants with an objective
assessment of capabilities; (4) Number of supervisors at
the Seat of Government currently handling positive intel-
ligence matters.
In connection with any plans for reorganization,
we should not neglect to give consideration to the problems
which we will encounter as time goes on in the areas of ·
information. Storage and retrieval. We, therefore, should
· realize that it would be unwise to exclude research or..
study regarding the computerizing of information..
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 270
98

G
L.
ALTERNATIVES
In addition to the recommended plan set forth in
preceeding sections, there are several alternative courses
of action we might take:
1. We could take the position, and seek ways to implement
it, that the entire field of foreign intelligence collection
in the U. S., both overt and covert, should be handled by
the FBI. Such an across-tho-board approach would exclude
CIA and other U. S. agencies from foreign intelligence
collection in this country and would place exclusive
responsibility and jurisdiction in this field on the FBI.
As indicated in Section I, this would require a revamping
of existing legislation and directives and would necessitate
drastic changes in the Bureau's operations, including major
increases in personnel and costs and a substantial expansion
in our recruitment and training programs, and other reorganiza-
tion. We do not feel this approach is warranted nor do we
believe it would be a practical and sound one.
20
We could recommend that CIA continue to be
responsible for overt collection of foreign intelligence in
this country but that the FBI exclusively handle covert
foreign intelligence collection. This has several obvious
drawbacks. First, we would be assuming a wide range of
heavy and fixed responsibilities which in many cases would
be completely divorced from the Bureau's internal security
and counterintelligence interests. Second, we would become
to a large extent a service group for other U. S. agencies
and departments (including CIA, State, the military and others)
in the handling of a host of foreign intelligence requirements
levied by other agencies. This would involve a considerable
commitment of manpower, communication costs, etc. on the part
of the Bureau. In addition, such an approach would necessitate
significant changes in our recruitment and training procedures
and would also place on our shoulders a definite accountability
in connection with any failures in U. S. intelligence foreign
collection. It is not elieved that this approach is as sound
or desirable as our recommended plan of action; namely, that
we expand our foreign intelligence collection efforts but on
a selective basis and without our assuming full responsibility.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 271
99
Laran
3. We cou endeavor to work out a ‹ision of
responsibility and work in this area whereby the Bureau
and CIA would each have certain primary areas of operation.
For example, the FBI could make known its willingness to
.contribute more heavily in support of U. S. foreign intelligence
collection efforts and propose this field be broken into
two categories; namely, technical coverage (this would include
and live informant development among
foreign diplomats. We could propose that the FBI continuo
to operate exclusively in the first category (technical
coverage) with CIA continuing to stay entirely out of this
fiold.
In this regard, the Bureau is better equipped than
CIA to handle technical surveillances and
operations
by reason of our long experience and expertise in this area.
With regard to the second category (live sources)
we could propose that CIA conduct no operations involving
countries where the Bureau's counterintelligence interests
are paramount or significant. This would include the Sino-
Soviet-bloc countries and could also include certain other
countries, such as the Dominican Republic, where we have
already developed strong capabilities or where there are
unique factors.
With regard to other countries (non-Bluc), we
could propose that CIA should assume primary responsibility
for developing live diplomatic sources. However, this
would be with the clear proviso that, in the event the FBI
should develop significant internal security interests, we
would have the prerogative of levying requirements on CIA
sources, having direct access to CIA sources when needed, or
as a final step, developing our own sources if CIA could
not satisify our needs.
This alternative plan would not involve as much
manpower or other expense to the Bureau as our recommended
plan. However, it would involve our approval of CIA opera-
tions in the live informant field and would risk CIA infring-
ing on FBI interests. It is our consensus that this approach
not be adopted.
4. We could recommend that the FBI could withdraw
entirely from the field of covert foreign intiligence collection
allowing CIA to handle all aspects, including··
and both live and technical coverage. We are strongly
opposed to such an approach on the grounds that it would
drastically diminish the FBI's role in the intelligence
community, would give CIA carte blanche to operate in the
U. S., and in many instances would certainly result in CIAS"
compromising on internal security and counterintelligence
operations.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 272
-
100
-
.
5. Finally, we could take no action to change the
current situation and, in effect, adopt a "status quo"
approach. We are opposed to this. As indicated in this
study, U. S. Government needs for foreign intelligence
are growing on an almost daily basis and CIA has made
definite efforts to move more actively into this field.
If we were to adopt a "status quo" attitude, it is only
a question of time until this matter comes to a head;
for example, in the U. S. Intelligence Board or the
President's Foreign Intolligence Advisory Board. If and
when this occurs, the decision as to the FBI's role would,
of course, be subject to the thinking and aims of people
outside the FBI, possibly including individuals who are
not sympathetic to our views. We would not be in a position
to maintain control of developmenta.
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101
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III,
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--
April 29, 1966
super cute gaur
THE ROLE OF 312 2DL
AT WODETEN
-
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE UNITED STATES
.or.....
Papick Rapart
CIA
TABLE
0 F CONTENTS
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE.
B.
C.
Page
1
.......
2
INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY.
C.
THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES..
1.
2.
3.
4.
Prior to World War II.
°
..
During World War II (1941 1945)
National Intelligence Authority (NIA)
Responsibilities of CIA..
8.
b.
The National Security Act of 1947.
National Security Council Intelligence
Directive....
8%
Director of Central Intelligence
Directives...
d.
Dulles Committee, 1949.
e.
I.
Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955..
The Doolittle Committee, 1954..
885222 2238
15
20
20
26
29
33
5.
g.
The Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities of the
United States Government....
Responsibilities of the FBI..
a. Laws and Directives.....
b.
C.
d.
e.
Requests From Other Agencies.
FBI's Role in the United States
Intelligence Board.....
The President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB).
..
The Director's Stand Over the Years.
D. THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S.
E. CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION FIELD IN THE ·
UNITED STATES.
--NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-277-
41
45
46
2440 % %
48
50
55.
59
254
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Off
FA
1.
2.
CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI.
Manpower Being Devoted..
..
Number of Microphone and Telephone
Surveillances With Evaluation of Product.
64
64
65
3.
Live Sources With Evaluation.
66
4.
Anagram Program....
67
5.
6.
Double Agents and Informants.
Additional Potential...
67
·
68
G. AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI – CIA.
69
H.
CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA.
74
.I
EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES.
77
20
J.
GENERAL FINDINGS.
1. Overt Collection Activities.
Clandestine Gathering Activities
77
79
'
82
•
86
.
RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION.
Authorization...
Selection of Targets.
· Technical Surveillance of Targets
Technical Surveillance Controls.
Anagram Program.
Live Sources...
Training of Personnel
Reporting Procedures.
Language Capabilities..
•
Relations With Other Agencies
Administrative Reorganization,
L. ALTERNATIVES.
NVW 88608 Docid:32989629. Page 278
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ii -
86
87
90
91
•
91
91
93
94
94
95
•
97
199
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this study is to define
a new role for the Bureau in the field of clandestine
collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S.
This action is necessary and most timely because
of our Government's vital need for increased foreign
intelligence and because of CIA's expanding interests
in the United States. There is a decided need for
a new Bureau concept, the implementation of which
could greatly increase our effectiveness and could deter
CIA from becoming a threat to our operational interests.
The study encompasses a review of history
as it relates to foreign intelligence collection in
the U. S. Analysis is made of the need and the
potential for such intelligence; the capabilities of
the Bureau and CIA in this field; and the responsibilities
of over-all (overt and covert) collection of foreign
intelligence in the U. S. We have submitted our general
findings, and we recommend a plan of action for a new
Bureau role.
.
This study was not designed to eliminate once
and for all the many problems relating to collection
of foreign intelligence in the U. S. It would have been.
a Utopian objective to recommend a plan which would
produce maximum intelligence collection, remove existing
defects within the U. S. intelligence community, and
establish complete harmony among interested agencies.
We did not go that far. Careful and exhaustive analysis
dictated that we endeavor to reach a reasonable goal
consistent with prudent planning and sound operational
implementation. We feel that the recommended plan
meets such guidelines, that it is a decidedly major step
forward for the Bureau, and it strongly conforms with
the national security needs.
It should be noted that this document does
not deal with our law enforcement or internal security
functions, although it is fully recognized that
internal security and clandestine collection of foreign.
intelligence are closely linked. Any plan on our part
to produce foreign intelligence will affect our
capabilities in the field of counterintelligence.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 279
B.
INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY
People who do not speak and understand a common
language have difficulty in communicating their ideas. Even
in a country such as ours where English is the common language,·
words take on different meanings in different geographical
locales and in different social, political, and economic
environments. Likewise, in professional fields, varying
backgrounds and experiences have conveyed different meanings
to terms in the professional vocabulary.
In the field of security, intelligence, and counter-
intelligence operations, certain professional terminology has
developed ostensibly to assist in the exchange of ideas by
persons in this field. However, as progress is made in a
field or a special segment of the field, new horizons develop
which require additional terminology or cause an evolution in
existing terminology. This development or evolution in security
and intelligence terminology, coupled with individualistic usage,
brings further problems in meaning which we also face in the
broader aspects of the English language. We have all noted
that our dictionaries do not always provide a single meaning
and we must be careful in daily conversation that we are not
misunderstood when merely using a conversational vocabulary.
we face a similar problem in the use of professional terminol-
、ogy in security and intelligence matters as this terminology
takes on new meaning with additional experience and takes on
varying meanings to different persons.
An additional factor to consider in understanding
the meaning of terminology is the context in which a term is
used.
For example, the term "intelligence" may be vague and
confusing without the knowledge of the context in which it is
used. It can, as a generic term, pertain to the whole field
of activities undertaken by a government in the collection of
∙information, the protection of its institutions, and the con-
duct of nonattributable activities to facilitate the formation
and implementation of government policy. Also, it can relate
to the organization devoted to the collection and production
of information necessary to the government. In addition,
it may pertain to the whole body of theory and practice on'
the basis of which an intelligence organization operates.
Finally, the word "intelligence" may be utilized to mean
any part or all of the above.
The following definitions do not include all possible
meanings that have been utilized but, instead, are designed
to assist the reader in digesting this study.
2
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BASIC INTELLIGENCE is that factual intelligence which results
from the collation of encyclopedia information of a fundamental
and more or less permanent nature and which, as a result of
evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best
available.
BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE is intelligence concerning individuals.
CLANDESTINE COLLECTION A coordinated complex of collection
activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counter-
intelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted
by a governmental department or agency, or jointly by two or
more such entities, in such a way as to assure secrecy or
concealment.
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
situations.
is military intelligence for use in combat
This is commonly referred to as tactical.
COUNTERESPIONAGE
is identifying, penetrating, manipulating
.or repressing inimical espionage organizations.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE is defined as that intelligence activity,
with its resultant product, which is devoted to destroying the
effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and
which is undertaken to protect the security of the nation,
and its personnel, information, and installations against
espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Counterintelligence
includes the process of procuring, developing, recording, and
disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine
activity and of penetrating, manipulating, or repressing
individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or capable
of conducting such activity.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. is that intelligence of all types and forms
of immediate interest which is usually disseminated without
the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.
DEPARTMENTAL “INTELLIGENCE is that intelligence which any
department or agency requires to execute its own mission.
- 3
NW 88608 "Docld:32989629 Page 281
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE concerns information and investigation
of espionage, counterespionage, etc., which pertains to the
internal security of the U.S. and, therefore, is in subject
matter pertinent to the internal affairs of the U.S.
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the potentialities, utilization,
and vulnerabilities of a nation's natural and human resources.
ESPIONAGE is defined as that intelligence activity which is
directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine
operations.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE pertains to foreign affairs and subject
matters pertinent to foreign countries. The word "foreign"
as used here denotes the target of the intelligence and is
distinct from the geographic location of the source providing
the information. For example, refugees, defectors, and immigrants
from target countries (such as the Soviet Union) have the
potential for supplying intelligence regarding their countries
to United States authorities. Although physically located in
♪ the United States, they are potential foreign intelligence sources.
· GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE concerns the meterology, hydrography,
topography, and basic natural resources of an area.
INTELLIGENCE is the product derived from information collected
for the formulation and execution of Government policy and for
safeguarding the national welfare.
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION is information collected for intelli-
gence purposes that has not been evaluated by comparison with
the existing body of knowledge on the subject reported on; the
raw material of intelligence.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE is integrated departmental
intelligence which is required by departments and agencies
of the Government for the execution of their missions; but
which transcends the exclusive competence of a single depart-
ment or agency to produce.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 282
:
INTERNAL SECURITY relates to the defense and protection within
the United States and its territories and possessions of the
people, the government, the institutions, and the installations
of critical importance from all hostile or destructive action.
INVESTIGATION
means systematic and direct inquiries or pro-
cedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighbor-
hood inquiries) aiming at developing information concerning an
individual's activities or background; investigation does not
include the acceptance or the development of information through
social contacts or contacts normally made by CIA agents in
discharging their cover functions.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:
Intelligence.
See Combat Intelligence and Strategic
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
is that intelligence which is required
for the formulation of national security policy, concerns more
than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive
competence of a single department or agency,
OVERT COLLECTION is collection activities conducted in such
a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the
sponsoring government.
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns foreign and domestic policies
of governments and the activities of political movements.
Such
POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE may be described as a comprehensive
product resulting from collection, evaluation, collation, analysis,
and interpretation of all available information relating to
national security and concerning other countries where such
information is significant to our Government's development and
execution of plans, policies, and courses of action.
intelligence can be divided into various categories, such as
basic, biographic, combat, current, departmental, economic,
geographic, interdepartmental, military, national, political,
scientific, sociological, strategic, tactical, and technical.
Perhaps the most simple definition would be that positive
intelligence is all the things you should know in advance of
initiating a course of action.
NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 283″
"
There appears to be much confusion in professional
circles regarding the use of the term "positive intelligence.
Some professionals use the term "positive intelligence" synonymously
with the torm "foreign intelligence. In still anothor
usage, "positive intelligence" and "intelligence" are used
interchangeably. In another useage, which is closely related
to the definition utilized in this study, "positive intelli-
gence" is described as what is left of the entire field after
"security intelligence" has been subtracted. This source
continues that both "positive intelligence" and "security
intelligence" can be against domestic targets, as well as
against foreign targets. For example, the Department of State,
in connection with its formulation of foreign policy, encounters
a large number of organizations of Americans whose parents came
from foreign countries. Many of these organizations--the Poles
for example--have strong views on what United States policy
should be toward Poland. The views of these organizations
regarding our foreign policy is likely to be a matter of some
importance to the Department of State in its policy formula-
tion. The knowledge of what these organizations think and
do can be a very significant phase of what might be called
"domestic positive intelligence. In addition, the connections
which these organizations may have with the foreign country
such as Poland sometimes provide a source of "foreign positive
intelligence."
"
:
SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE pertains to the progress of scientific
research and development and usually this intelligence is
within the framework of how it affects military or economic
potential of a nation.
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE is basically the intelligence behind the
police function to protect the nation and its members from
those working to our national and individual detriment. For
example, this would include intelligence regarding clandestine
agents sent to the United States by a foreign power.
SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE pertains to the social, cultural,
psychological, or ethnic structure and characteristics of a
people.
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
is the intelligence required for broad
and usually long-range planning; especially with regard to
military operations.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 284
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE See Combat Intelligence.
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE concerns devices, equipment, and
special processos. This is related to Scientific Intelli-e
gence, but tends to be differentiated from it as practice
differs from theory.
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:.
C.
THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES
1. Prior to World War II
A study of the history and progress of foreign
intelligence collection in the United States reveals that
prior to World War II such collection efforts were incidental
and in direct proportion to the intensity of the coverage
maintained in the counterintelligence field. Accordingly,
the history of foreign intelligence collection in the
United States prior to World War II is primarily a history of
counterintelligence and internal security coverage, of which
foreign intelligence was a by-product. Historical highlights
of the developments in this field are as follows:
(a) In August, 1914, when German espionage agents
Count Johann Von Bernstorff and Dr. Heinrich Albert of the
German Embassy, Washington, D. C., arrived in the
United States with $150,000,000 in German treasury notes to
finance the first foreign espionage and sabotage apparatus
to be organized in this country, United States Government
intelligence work was handled for the most part by five
small organizations (Bureau of Investigation of the
Department of Justice, Secret Service, Army, State and Navy),
all operating on their own with small staffs and without
coordination and sufficient delineation of responsibilities.
(b)
On April 6, 1917, Congress declared war against
Germany and President Woodrow Wilson gave the Bureau of
Investigation the task of enforcing his proclamation
governing the conduct of enemy aliens. The Bureau at the time
had 300 Agents but shortly after the outbreak of the war
the staff was increased to 400.
(c) As result of a rash of bombings believed
executed by Bolsheviks, Attorney General Palmer appointed
Francis P. Garvan of New York as Assistant Attorney General
to deal with the problem. He created a General Intelligence
Division under command of J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. Hoover was
instructed to make a study of subversive activities in the
United States to determine their scope and the potential
for prosecution.
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 286
- 8
2013
(d) On May 9, 1934, President Roosevelt called
a White House conference attended by the Attorney General,
Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Labor, Director of FBI
and Chief of United States Secret Service to deal with
the problem of growth of fascist organizations in the
United States. The conference agreed that there should be
an investigation of these groups and their activities for
intelligence purposes. Since the only Federal law believed
applicable at the time was the Immigration Law, the President
decided that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
Service would confer with the Chief of Secret Service and the
Director of the FBI to work out details of the investigation.
Mr. Hoover immediately issued orders to FBI
personnel to conduct an intensive and confidential investi-
gation of the Nazi movement. This was the first general
intelligence investigation made by the Government into
fascist activities in this country.
(e) As a result of President Franklin Roosevelt's
concern over activities of the communists and other subversive
groups, a series of conferences was held in the latter part
of August and early September, 1936, participated in by the
President, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.
As a result of his concern over the international character
of communism and fascism, the President stated the FBI should
conduct necessary investigations and coordinate information
upon these matters in the possession of the Military
Inteligence Division, the Naval Intelligence Division and
the State Department.
It is noteworthy that it was specified the
investigation was to be for intelligence purposes only.
The Presidential Order was implemented by the
Director in a letter to all Special Agents in Charge,
September 5, 1936.
(f) As a result of opposition primarily by the
State Department against accepting the FBI as the coordinating
agency in the investigations of all subversive activities in
the United States, President Roosevelt, on June 26, 1939, issued
a confidential directive to Cabinet members which established an
Interdepartmental Intelligence Coordinating Committee composed
of the FBI and the Intelligence Divisions of the War Department
and the Navy. He named the FBI as the coordinating agency to
receive all reports on subversive activities.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629_Page_287
:
(g) President Roosevelt publicly designated the FBI
to investigate matters relating to espionage, sabotage and
violations of the neutrality regulations by Presidential
Directive dated September 6, 1939.
(h)
On May 21, 1940, President Roosevelt in a
memorandum to the then Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson,
authorized and directed the Attorney General in such cases as
he might approve to authorize the use of listening devices
directed to the conversations or other communications of
persons suspected of subversive activity against the Government
of the United States, including suspected spies.
Pursuant to such authorization, commencing on June 1,
1940, technical surveillances were installed on diplomatic
establishments throughout the United States of such countries
as Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and France. These
installations in addition to providing counterintelligence
information of value produced a substantial quantity of foreign
intelligence information.
(i) Although lines of responsibility were established
for domestic intelligence work in connection with the September 6,
1939, Presidential Directive, there were no clearly defined areas
of responsibility of overseas intelligence operations and as
time passed the need for decisions in that field grew more evident.
As a result, the Special Intelligence Service (SIS)
came into being. By Presidential Directive June 24, 1940,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt set forth lines of responsibility
in the operations of United States intelligence agencies in the
foreign field. This Directive grew out of a series of meetings
involving representatives of State Department, Army and Navy
intelligence and the FBI wherein it was agreed that the SIS would
act as a service agency, furnishing the State Department, the
military, the FBI and other governmental agencies with information
having to do with financial, economic, political and subversive
activities detrimental to the security of the United States.
June 24th Directive placed the responsibility for nonmilitary
intelligence coverage in the Western Hemisphere on the FBI.
than thirty days thereafter the FBI had organized an SIS operation.
The
Less
Through World War II and until approximately March 31,
1947, the FBI continued its SIS operations. The culmination of
our activities in this field came about as a result of the
January 22, 1946, Presidential Directive establishing the
Central Intelligence Group and giving it the responsibility of
collecting foreign intelligence abroad.
10
--་གཉ་པ་མ་
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 288
2.
During World War II (1941
1945)
The FBI's Role
During World War II, as prior to the war, foreign
intelligence collection in this country was geared to and
principally a product of our intensive efforts in the counter-
intelligence field. It is also significant to note that a
steady stream of foreign intelligence continued to be developed
from our technical coverage of diplomatic establishments of
enemy-bloc countries, as well as other sensitive countries
such as Russia, Argentina, Portugal and Spain.
In line with the Presidential Directive of
September 6, 1939, the FBI continued to be in charge of all
investigative work in matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage,
counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the
neutrality laws.
On January 8, 1943, the President issued another
Directive in which he reiterated the previous Directive of
September 6, 1939.
In ordering the FBI to take charge in the foregoing
areas, President Roosevelt did not define the various types of
intelligence involved but placed the entire intelligence and
internal security responsibilities involved under the
'jurisdiction of the FBI. As a matter of fact, in carrying out
these responsibilities we did produce foreign intelligence in
substantial quantity especially through our technical coverage
of foreign diplomatic establishments.
b. Office of Strategic Services
%
The position of Colonel William J. Donovan as
Coordinator of Information (COI) was created by Presidential
Directive dated July 11, 1941. On July 14, 1941, President
Roosevelt sent a letter to the Attorney General stațing the
position was created, "in order to provide a central point in
the Government for the analysis of information and data which
bears upon national security. .
The President described
Donovan's duties as "assist me and the various Departments and
agencies of the Government in assembling and correlating
information which may be useful in the formulation of basic
plans for the defense of the nation."
- 11
NW-88608 Docld:32989629-Page-289-
:
In the letter President Roosevelt clearly limited
Donovan's jurisdiction with the following statement: "I
should like to emphasize that Colonel Donovan's work is not
intended to supersede or duplicate or involve any direction
of the activities of established agencies already obtaining
and interpreting defense information."
The Presidential order dated September 11, 1941,
established the position of COI with clear cut authority to
collect and analyze information bearing on national security;
correlate and make such information available to the President
and other Government officials as the President may determine.
COI was finally authorized to carry out, when requested by
the President, supplementary activities as might facilitate
The securing of information not then available to the
Government.
Donovan, in a memorandum captioned "MEMORANDUM OF
-ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION," expanded
on the President's directive in general terms. Under his
plan for procedure there was a Coordinator of Strategic
Information responsible directly to the President. (Note
this same organizational set up was later adopted by the
Director of Central Intelligence.-) Donovan noted, however,
in his memorandum, "The proposed centralized unit will
neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy
Intelligence, or any other Department of the Government."
(62-64427, serials 23 and X3.)
Our file on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
reveals that that organization continued its organizational,
training, and operational activities in this country based
on Donovan's premise that he was the central clearing point
for anti-Axis espionage and counterespionage. An interesting
insight into OSS operations in this country is provided in
the nonfiction work "The Scarlet Thread" by former OSS agent
Donald Downes. Downes noted that he was a former British
intelligence agent serving for that organization in New York
when he was recruited by OSS immediately after Pearl Harbor.
He tells of his recruitment by Allan Dulles, his association
with Donovan, and his work in the counterespionage field in
New York City and Washington, D. C., with other OSS agents,
including the current United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, Arthur Goldberg. Downes detailed attempts
by him and other OSS agents to steal diplomatic codes from
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page 290-
CIB
12
Q

"friendly" or "neutral" country embassies in Washington in
the early 1940's and frequently referred to the fact that .
this was being done by OSS with knowledge that its juris-
diction in this country was based only on the theory that
a foreign Embassy is not American soil and is technically
outside the jurisdiction of the FBI, which had full juris-
diction for counterintelligence in the western hemisphere.
Our file on the OSS is replete with incidents
indicating OSS recruitment and counterespionage activities
in this country during the early 1940's.
By memorandum dated May 22, 1945, Stanley J. Tracey,
advised of a conversation overheard between two high-ranking
State Department officials. The conversation dealt with OSS
attempts to take over Bureau SIS operations in Latin America
with one of the State Department officials, Aura Warren,
stating that officials of OSS felt that organization was
-better equipped to handle work than FBI personnel attached
to various American Embassies in South America. In response
to this attempt of OSS to take over our duties, the Director
commented: "I would like to know where Warren gets this.
According to Ladd our contacts in State Department have no
knowledge of such OSS efforts. Also Tracey should point
out it is State Department duty to initiate it as we would
'service it' and the State Department in fact started the
SIS project. H" (62-64427-1059.)
An interesting evaluation of OSS operations is
provided in a report prepared by Colonel Richard Park of
the War Department as a result of a survey of OSS operations
made as a special and confidential mission for the President
in 1944 and 1945. Colonel Park commented: "Without going
into details I was everywhere left with the same impression
of utter incompetency on the part of OSS leadership....
"Everywhere that the subject of OSS.came up,
unsolicited remarks clearly brought out the very well known
amateurish nature of the organization.
"The OSS has been restricted from active operations
in South America by Presidential directive....”
Despite the absence of any jurisdiction in or
responsibility for counterintelligence operations in the
western hemisphere, an officer of OSS was reported to have
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 291.
-
13
attempted to obtain cover. for an OSS agent in South America
under guise of employment by an organization doing business
in South America.
A closing paragraph of Colonel Park's report
commented on observations made by an official of OSS as
follows:
"This official of OSS added that it was the policy
of his agency not to give any more information than necessary
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He pointed out that
OSS instructors in their school in the United States had
discussed the FBI in an unfavorable light and had painted
the picture of OSS replacing the Federal Bureau of
Investigation not only outside the United States but in
the domestic field. The publicity campaign referred to
was to be one of the means adopted to accomplish this
purpose.".
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 292-
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14
30
National Intelligence Authority (NIA)
On January 22, 1946, President Harry S. Truman
addressed a Directive to the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of War, and the Secretary of the Navy stating, in part, "I
hereby designate you, together with another person to be named
by me as my personal representative, as the National Intelli-
gence Authority. . ." The Directive provided that each of these
three Secretaries would from time to time assign personnel and
facilities from their respective departments "which persons
shall collectively form a Central Intelligence Group" (CIG)
under a Director of Central Intelligence. It was provided that
the latter would be responsible to the NIA.
President Truman then stated that subject to the
existing law the Director of Central Intelligence should
(a) accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence
and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
results; (b) plan for the coordination of such activities of
the intelligence agencies of the three departments involved as
related to the national security; (c) perform such services of
common concern as the NIA determined could be more effectively
accomplished centrally; and (d) perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence as the President and the
NIA might from time to time direct.
The Presidential Directive said that no police, law
enforcement or internal security functions should be exercised
under the Directive; that certain intelligence should be freely
available to the Director of Central Intelligence "for correlation,
evaluation or dissemination"; and that "the existing intelligence
agencies of your departments shall continue to collect, evaluate,
correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence. The ninth
provision of the Directive stated, "Nothing herein shall be
construed to authorize the making of investigations inside the
continental limits of the United States and its possessions,
except as provided by law and Presidential directives."
"
On
A series of communications between the Bureau and
Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg; who was designated as
Director of the Central Intelligence Group, then followed.
June 21, 1946, a memorandum analyzed a communication from
Vandenberg which submitted a proposed memorandum to the NIA and
a proposed Directive to be issued by NIA extending the powers
and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Directive
provided, in essence, the following additional functions and
powers for the Director of Central Intelligence:
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 293
15
-
(1) Undertake such basic research and analysis of
intelligence and counterintelligence as may in his opinion be
required.
--
(2) Act as the executive agent of this authority
(NIA) in coordinating and in supervising all Federal foreign
intelligence activities.
(3)
Perform the following services of common concern:
(a) conduct all Federal espionage and counterespionage operations
for the collection of foreign intelligence; (b) conduct all
Federal monitoring of press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign
powers for the collection of intelligence information.
In discussing this Directive which Vandenberg desired
issued, the memorandum stated the Directive did not conform
with the original plan proposed by the President or which was
envisioned by the discussions occurring prior to the time the
President issued his Directive. The original plan, insofar as
the Bureau was advised, contemplated the setting up of solely
a coordinating agency which was given the power to perform certain
functions which it would be determined could more adequately and
economically be performed centrally for the benefit of all
Government agencies. The memorandum noted that "undoubtedly if
this Directive is approved and the Central Intelligence Group
is successful in setting up complete foreign coverage, the
Bureau would undoubtedly be pushed into a 'second rate' position
insofar as purely intelligence functions are concerned in the
domestic field. . . It is inevitable that the Central Intelli-
gence Group must enter into the domestic field picture insofar
as intelligence is concerned because of the sources of foreign
intelligence existing in that field. Also, it is impossible to
separate entirely foreign intelligence and the domestic functions
performed by the Bureau."*
In reply to the Directive proposed by General Vandenberg,
a letter was sent to him June 25, 1946, which stated that the
Directive was approved with certain changes suggested "for
clarification purposes only." The Director șuggested that to
the item relating to the Director of Central Intelligence acting
*
******
**** * * * * **
With respect to this last quoted statement, Mr. E. A. Tamm and
Mr. C. A. Tolson noted an exception by placing an addendum on the
memorandum. The Director's comments were set forth. This is
more fully reported below under the heading, "Director's Comments."
16 -
-NW-88608 Docld:32989629-Page-294
as the executive agent of National Intelligence Authority
in coordinating and supervising all foreign intelligence
activities there should be added "performed outside the
United States and its possessions relating to the national
security in accordance with the overall policies and objectives
established by this Authority." With respect to the proposal
that the Director of Central Intelligence direct all espionage
and counterespionage operations for the collection of foreign
intelligence, it was proposed that the phrase "outside the
United States and its possessions" also be inserted in this
provision.
On July 29, 1946, General Vandenberg sent over
a memorandum on the subject "Exploitation of American
Business Concerns With Connections Abroad as Sources of
Foreign Intelligence Information." He added a proposed
Directive. The Director replied by letter August 6, 1946,
"I should like to comment that there appears to have been
an addition to the field encompassed by CIG Directive #11
calling for a survey of the exploitation of American business
concerns. I note that in your report and in the proposed
NIA Directive, you refer not only to American business con-
cerns but to other private groups with connections abroad.
This latter phrase, in my opinion, is extremely broad and
could be taken to include all types of organizations,
including Foreign Nationality Groups. In fact, I feel that
the report and proposed Directive should confine themselves to
the discussion of American business concerns and that no
references at all should be made to 'private groups'
.
I feel that at a later date the question of exploitation of
these private groups by CIG representatives might be worked
out by discussing them individually with the FBI when their
identities are determined." This matter remained unresolved.
On August 22, 1946, General Vandenberg submitted
another proposed Directive concerning exploitation of American
business concerns, nongovernmental groups, and individuals (in
“the United States) with connections abroad as sources of foreign a
intelligence information. A memorandum analyzing this on
"
1. August 22, 1946, pointed out the new Directive was even more
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page 295
-
17
obnoxious than the one originally proposed. The Directive
noted, in part, "CIG field representatives will establish
and maintain liaison with the intelligence officers of local
Army and Navy headquarters and Air Force headquarters, if
present, through the medium of local interagency offices."
The analyzing memorandum "ointed out, "If this means the
CIG is going to maintain field representatives in the United
States or establish offices, it certainly is something new and
a provision that we did not understand was intended in the
President's Directive. . Attached to the proposed Directive
is a discussion which is more or less the same as was attached
to the original proposed Directive. It, however, makes the
following statement which the Bureau cannot subscribe to and
it would seem must oppose, that is, 'Foreign Intelligence
Information related to the national security, although it may
be collected from sources whose headquarters are within the
limits of the United States and its possessions, is definitely
a part of the national intelligence mission, the coordination
of which is specifically a function of the National Intelli-
gence Authority under the provisions of the President's letter
of 22 January 1946.*"
In pointing out the Bureau's objections, the
analyzing memorandum of August 22, 1946, stated, "There
is now involved in this Directive the fundamental question
of just what rights the Central Intelligence Group has with
reference to operations within the United States. Carrying
to a logical conclusion the statements set forth above contained
in the discussion, they could cover all foreign embassies in
the United States, take charge of double agents we are operating
or radio stations we are operating as double agent set-ups, etc.,
because essentially these operations engaged in by the Bureau
do not directly involve enforcement of the laws but rather are
concerned with obtaining information in the nature of foreign
intelligence which, of course, is related to internal security
as is all foreign intelligence. Essentially, the Bureau's
domestic operations in intelligence involve the determining
of the aims, intentions, and activities of foreign countries
or their representatives."ala prote
:
The memorandum of analysis stated that our position
would be the Bureau would not consent to any provisions except
those related to American business concerns with connections
NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 296-
18
abroad. On August 23, 1946, the Director sent a letter to
General Vandenborg stating in part, "I must advise that the
proposed Directive does not incorporate the changes suggested
in my letter of August 6, 1946, and I, therefore, cannot
approve it. This new directive also includes provisions
and statements in which I cannot concur and, in fact, must
oppose.".
The strong stand of the Director obviously led to
a conference between General Vandenberg and the Director
which was reported in a memorandum of September 13, 1946,
which the Director prepared. As stated in the Director's
memorandum the conference concerned CIG's desire to gather
contacts among "nongovernmental groups and individuals with
connections abroad." The entire conference was on this subject
matter and did not enter into collection of foreign intelli-
gence from foreign embassies or from foreign officials or,
in fact, from any other source. The Director wrote, "I told
the General that I could well appreciate that there would be
cases in which his organization would be desirous of making
'contacts in the United States for the purpose of obtaining
information from abroad and that the Bureau was not interested
in such contacts except in those situations wherein the individual
or the group might be engaged in activities within the United
States that were either under investigation by the Bureau or
might possibly be the medium of obtaining information con-
cerning the activities of a subversive character being carried
´on within the United States. I told the General that I would
be perfectly agreeable to his suggestion, with the added
provision that if CIG was desirous of contacting any
individuals of the character that he had indicated, before
doing so it would check with the FBI."
The foregoing has been set forth rather extensively
since it shows the strong stand the Bureau took against CIG's
operating in the United States. Actually, as will be reported
“hereinafter, Directives were adopted permitting CIG to collect
positive intelligence in this country by contacting United ·¨*
States citizens, American businessmen, aliens (with prior
FBI approval) through the foreign language press. and in later
years through contacts with United States governmental personnel.
:
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 297-
-
19.
4.
a.
Responsibilities of CIA
The National Security Act of 1947
This Act, which is reported in 50 USC 401 et seq.,
established the National Security Council (NSC) and under it
the Central Intelligence Agency. It provided that when the
Director of Central Intelligence was appointed the NIA should
cease to exist.
1
There was much discussion concerning the powers and
authorities to be vested in the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Many individuals, especially in Congress, expressed
fears that CIA could develop into a gestapo if permitted to
become operational in the United States. The following two
excerpts, of interest in this connection, are from a
Congressional publication related to hearings prior to passage
of the National Security Act of 1947. The publication is
** entitled "Hearings Before the Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments, House of Representatives, 80th Congress,
1st Session on H. R. 2319 (National Security Act of 1947)":
Page 127
-
During testimony concerning authority for
‘and scope of CIA, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy,
stated:
"The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority
are limited definitely to purposes outside of this
country, except the collation of information gathered
by other government agencies.
"Regarding domestic operations, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation is working at all times in collaboration
with General Vandenberg. He relies upon them for domestic
activities."
Page 438
800
Congressman Clarence J.. Brown of Ohio in
speaking about the National Security Act of 1947, which was
under scrutiny before passage, stated:
"I want to write a lot of other safeguards into the
section that deals with, the Central Intelligence Agency.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 298
20
"I want to make certain that the activities and the -
functions of the Central Intelligence Agency were care-
fully confined to international matters, to military
matters, and to matters of national security. We have
enough people now running around butting into everybody
else's business in this country without establishing
another agency to do so..
"What we ought to do is to eliminate 90 percent of
the present snoopers instead of adding to them.
ޑ
"I do not think it would be the Central Intelligence
Agency's right, authority, or responsibility to check on
the ordinary domestic activities of the average American.
citizen, and yet they could have the power and authority
to do it under this bill as written."
7/26/47.
The National Security Act of 1947 was approved
It provided that for the purpose of coordinating the
intelligence activities of the several Government departments
and agencies in the interest of national security, the, Agency
under the direction of the NSC was:
(1) To advise NSC in matters concerning such
intelligence activities of the Government departments
and agencies of the Government as relate to the
national security,
(2) To make recommendations to the NSC for the
coordination of such activities,
(3) Tó correlate and evaluate intelligence relating
to national security and provide for its appropriate
dissemination within the Government: Provided, That the
Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement
powers, or internal security responsibilities,
(4) To perform such additional services of common
concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally,
y
:
(5) To perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting national security as the..
NSC may from time to time direct.
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 299
21
There is tacit acknowledgement in Section 403 (e)
of the National Security Act of 1947 that the FBI gathers
information affecting the national security. This section
provides:
b.
'
(e) To the extent recommended by the NSC and approved
by the President, such intelligence of the departments and
agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided,
relating to the national security shall be open to the
inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and
such intelligence as relates to the national security and
is possessed by such departments and other agencies of
the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall
be made available to the Director of Central Intelligence
for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination: Provided,
however, That upon the written request of the Director
of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI shall
make available to the Director of Central Intelligence
such information for correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination as may be essential to the national security.
National Security Council Intelligence Directives
To implement the authority granted to it under the
National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council
has issued a series of "National Security Council Intelligence
Directives," usually referred to as NSCID's and commonly called
"Nonscids." The first of these was issued December 12, 1947, and
provided for the establishing of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee to maintain the relationship necessary for a fully
effective integration of the national intelligence effort. By
Directive dated September 15, 1958, the U. S. Intelligence Board
(USIB) was formally created as successor to the Intelligence Advisory
Committee and a counterpart known as the U. S. Communications
Intelligence Board.
NSCID No. 1 provided that the Director of Central
Intelligence should coordinate the foreign intelligence activities
of the United States, such coordination to include both special
and other forms of intelligence. The USIB under this Directive
shall advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence as
he may require in the discharge of his statutory responsi-
bilities." It is the Board which is empowered to establish
policies, define intelligence objectives, make recommendations
to appropriate U. S. officials, develop standards for protection
of intelligence, and formulate policies with respect to arrange-
ments with foreign governments. The Director of Central
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 300
22

Intelligence is designated as Chairman of this Board and in
this capacity is distinguished from the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. A more complete discussion with
regard to the Bureau's role in this over-all setup is set forth
hereinafter under the caption "FBI Relations With the
United States Intelligence Board."
National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 1, originally issued 12/12/47, defines the various types
of intelligence in Section 4.
(a) National Intelligence is that intelligence
which is required for the formulation of national security
policy, concerns more than one department or agency,
and transcends the exclusive competence of a single
department or agency. The Director of Central Intelli-
gence shall produce* national intelligence with the
support of the U. S. Intelligence Board.
(b) Departmental Intelligence is that intelligence
"which any department or agency requires to execute its own
mission.
(c) Interdepartmental Intelligence is integrated
departmental intelligence which is required by departments
and agencies of the Government for the execution of their
missions, but which transcends the exclusive competence
of a single department or agency to produce.
The
subcommittee structure of the U. S. Intelligence Board
may be utilized for the production and dissemination of
interdepartmental intelligence.
Director of Central Intelligence is then authorized
to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental
intelligence provided it is done consistent with statutes and
Presidential policy, and provided further "that any disclosure
of FBI intelligence information shall be cleared with that
agency prior to dissemination."
*** This acknowledges:that FBI information includes both
national and interdepartmental intelligence.
******
*A footnote here states: "By 'produce' is meant 'to correlate
and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security' as
provided in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended,
Section 102, (d) (3)."
NW-88608-Deeld:32989629-Page-301-
23
NSCID No. 2 issued 1/13/48, relates to coordination.
of foreign intelligence collection activities "not covered
by other NSC Directives."
The Director of Central Intelligence has responsi-
bility for planning to assure there is no undesirable
duplication and that coverage is adequate.
Responsibilities are then assigned as follows:
(1) The Department of State shall have primary
responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of
common concern, the collection abroad (i.e., outside
the U. S. and its possessions) of political, sociological,
economic, scientific and technical information.
(2) The Department of Defense shall have primary
responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of
common concern, the collection of military intelligence
information. Owing to the importance of scientific and
technical intelligence to the Department of Defense
and the military services, this collection responsibility
shall include scientific and--technical, as well as economic,
information directly pertinent to Department of Defense
missions. (It seems significant that while State Depart-
ment primary responsibility was limited by the phrase
"the collection abroad," there was no such limitation
`on the Department of Defense in its responsibility.)
(3) The Central Intelligence Agency may collect
abroad intelligence information in support of assigned func-
tions or as a byproduct of assigned functions: Provided,
that this collection involves no undesirable duplication
of any of the specific assignments to State and Defense
Departments, and Provided, that any such overt collection
is coordinated with the Department of State or with the
Senior U. S. Representative.
In Section 7 of NSCID No. 2 there is delegated to
CIA responsibility for overt collection of foreign intelligence
in the U. S. as follows:
"The Central Intelligence Agency, as a service of
common concern, shall be responsible for the selective
exploitation within the United States of non-governmental
organizations and individuals as sources of foreign
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 302
-
24
1
intelligence information, in accordance with policies,
procedures and practices established as provided in
paragraph 3a of NSCID No. 1, by the Director of Central
Intelligence with the concurrences of the U. S. Intelli-
gence Board."
Section 9 of the same Directive provides that CIA
"shall conduct the exploitation of foreign language publications
for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of
common concern. When this function is carried out in the U. S.,
this also constitutes overt collection of foreign intelligence
by that Agency in this country.
:
It may be worthy to note at this point that NSCID
No.'s 1 and 2 were discussed, approved, and issued in their
original forms prior to 7/7/49 when the FBI was designated a
member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
NSCID No. 3 on Coordination of Intelligence Production
contains definitions of various types of intelligence (including
those defined in NSCID No. 1) and then delineates primary
responsibilities for "producing" intelligence among various
agencies, stating with respect to CIA:
"The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce
economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and
scientific and technical intelligence as a service of
common concern. Further, the Central Intelligence
Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be
necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities
of the Director of Central Intelligence."
Since, as noted hereinbefore, "collection" activities
are defined in NSCID No. 2, it would seem to follow that the
word "produce" as used in NSCID No. 3 has the same definition
as set out in a footnote to NSCID No. 1, paragraph 4, i.e., "to
correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security." Thus, NSCID No. 3 would not appear to extend CIA's
jurisdiction to collect intelligence or be operational in any way.
The remaining NSCID's appear to have no bearing on
the subject matter of foreign intelligence collection in the
United States.
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-303-
25
c.
Director of Central Intelligence Directives
To implement the National Security Act of 1947 as
amended and the various National Security Council Intelligence
Directives issued pursuant thereto, the Director of Central
Intelligence has issued numerous Directives (DCID's). The
first of these having a direct bearing on jurisdictional matters.
is DCID No. 2/3, captioned "Domestic Exploitation of
Nongovernmental Organizations and Individuals." NSCID No. 2,
paragraph 7, states that CIA shall be responsible for the
selective exploitation within the U. S. of such organizations
and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.
We, therefore, have avoided, and should avoid, any operations
among nongovernmental organizations and individuals designed
solely to produce foreign intelligence without CIA prior
approval or nullification of these provisions.
.
DCID No. 2/3 provides for exploitation of nongovernmental
U. S. citizens by CIA domestic field offices and states, "In
cases where the Federal Bureau of Investigation has indicated an
operational interest in a U. S. citizen, Central Intelligence
Agency will coordinate with that agency prior to further contact."
This DCID also provides for exploitation by CIA
domestic field offices of aliens, following a prior name check
with FBI so our statutory obligations may be properly met without
CIA interference.
:
It is of possible interest to note that in dealing with
these two matters, DCID No. 2/3 refers to nongovernmental U. S.
citizens but only to aliens (without the restrictive adjective).
The NSCID on which it is based refers to nongrovernmental
individuals without distinguishing between citizens and aliens.
Thus, there appears to have been an intention to confine CIA's
intelligence exploitation functions within the U. S. A review
of our file on CIA (62-80750) indicates this might well have
been a concession to the Bureau since we went on record opposing
delegation of any intelligence collection functions within the
U. S. to CIA in letters to Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
(then Director of Central Intelligence Group) on June 25, 1946,
(Serial 96), August 6, 1946, (Serial 138), and August 23, 1946,
(Serial 222), which have been discussed more fully under the
heading "National Intelligence Authority."
NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 304
** 26
DCID No. 2/8 is captioned "Domestic Exploitation of
U. S. Government Organizations and Officials," It begins in
very general terms, "Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID No. 1
and NSCID No. 2. .coff It provides, "The Central Intelligence
Agency shall coordinate and have the primary responsibility for
exploitation of the foreign intelligence potential of non-USIB
organizations and officials to meet community needs as a
service of common concern.
"
As set forth above, there seems to be no basis for
such CIA jurisdiction in NSCID No. 1 and No. 2. Paragraph 7
of NSCID No. 2 specifically restricts CIA in this area of
operations to nongovernmental organizations and individuals.
A review of our U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) file,
62-90718, shows following apropos this matter:
The Draft Minutes of the 3/21/61 USIB
meeting report that the Board approved the
draft of a DCID on "Domestic Exploitation of
U. S. Government Organizations and Officials,"
which would be issued as DCID No. 2/6, effective
3/21/61. Mr. Belmont was present at this USIB
meeting as the FBI representative. (unnumbered
serial between serials 1131 & 1132, USIB file)
Tracing this subject matter back through
the USIB file it was learned that it apparently
was first considered at the meeting held 2/23/60
at which the Bureau was represented by Fred A.
Frohbose. The minutes for that meeting reported
the Board agreed in principle that a directive on
Intelligence Exploitation of U. S. Governmental
officials would be desirable. However, the
matter was referred to the Committee on Domestic
Exploitation for further study and the submission
of a revised draft for Board consideration.
(unnumbered serial between serials 1040 & 1041,
USIB file)
From the foregoing it would appear that the Bureau
concurred in the issuance of this particular Directive and thus
to an extension of CIA's overt collection activities in the
U. S. if this should, in fact, be interpreted as an extension.
DCID 4/1 provides for the establishment of the
Interagency Defector Committee.
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629--Page-305-
- 27
DCID's 4/2 and 4/3 relate to the Defector Program
abroad and domestically, respectively. The latter one dwells on
division of responsibilities between FBI and CIA in the handling
of defectors within the continental limits of the United Statos.
It provides that exploitation of such defectors shall be conducted:
1. To obtain internal security information or other
data required by FBI in view of its statutory responsibilities
in the internal security field.
2. To obtain foreign intelligence information required
in the interests of national security by the member agencies of
the USIB.
3.
For such other purposes as are deemed to be in the
interests of national security.
The very next sentence then gives the implication that
exploitation of the defector for foreign intelligence purposes is
the principal responsibility of CIA, for it reads, "Decision as
to the relative importance of internal security exploitation by
FBI and foreign intelligence exploitation by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) shall be made jointly by representatives of
CIA and FBI."
There then follows a listing of nine specific FBI
responsibilities, one of which is to make available to CIA foreign
intelligence information resulting from the initial exploitation
of defectors. There is no subsequent specific delineation of CIA
responsibility over foreign intelligence exploitation until there
is a transfer of responsibility for handling a defector from FBI
to CIA after FBI interests have been fully satisfied. There is a
general assignment of such responsibility to CIA in the terms,
"CIA shall be responsible for: a. Coordinating the activities of.
other departments and agencies concerned with defector matters,
except those responsibilities assigned exclusively to FBI . .
$8
As a matter of practice, if it is determined there is
little or no importance from an internal security standpoint in
connection with a particular defection, we do not take over but in
effect give clearance to CIA to proceed from a foreign intelli-
gence standpoint.
DCID's in the 5/ series (numbers one through five) were
issued principally to implement NSCID Number 5 which deals with
U. S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities
abroad. There appears to be no conflict with FBI jurisdiction in
this series.
All other DCID's relate to Elint Critical Intelligence
and other matters which appear to have no bearing on possible
conflicts between CIA and FBI responsibilities.
28 -
"NW-88608 Docld:32989629 Page 306-
d.
Dulles Committee, 1949
The Dulles Committee was appointed February 3, 1948,
by the National Security Council (NSC) to make a "comprehensive,
impartial and objective survey of the organization, activities
and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)." The
Committee was instructed to report its findings and recommendations
on the following matters:
(a) The adequacy and effectiveness of the
organization structure of CIA.
(b) The value and efficiency of existing CIA activities.
(c) The relationship of these activities to those of
other departments and agencies.
(d), The utilization and qualifications of CIA personnel.
The Committee's scope was extended on March 17, 1948,
to include the following provisions: "This survey will comprise
primarily a thorough and comprehensive examination of the
structure, administration, activities and inter-agency relation-
ships of the CIA as outlined in the resolution of the National
Security Council. It will also include an examination of such
intelligence activities of other Government departments and
agencies as relate to the national security, in order to make
recommendations for their effective operation and overall
coordination.
t
It
This report, which is dated January 1, 1949, for the
most part concerned itself with administrative matters affecting
CIA and the necessity for reorganization within that Agency.
notes, however, that the National Security Act, as implemented
.by directives of the NSC, imposed upon CIA responsibility for
carrying out three essential functions:
(1) The coordination of intelligence activities.
(2) The correlation and evaluation of intelligence
relating to the national security, which has been interpreted
by directive as meaning the production* of national intelligence.
* * *
"..
**** * * * * * * * * *
*. See definition of "produce" in footnote to NSCID No. 1, Section
4b as "correlate and evaluate," the reverse of connotation given
here.
NW-88608-Deeld:32989629 Page 307.
29
(3) The performance centrally, subject to NSC
direction, of certain intelligence and related functions of
common concern to various departments of the Government.
The report noted that Section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947 established a framework for a sound
intelligence system and no amendment to that Section of the
Act was deemed necessary.
Although the coordination of intelligence activities
of the several departments and agencies concerned with national
security was a primary reason for establishing CIA, the report
noted the National Security Act does not give CIA independent
authority to coordinate intelligence activities, as final
responsibility to establish policies was vested in the NSC.
The statutory limitations upon the authority of CIA
to coordinate intelligence activities without the approval of
* the NSC were, according to the report, obviously designed to
protect the autonomy and internal arrangements of the various
departments and agencies performing intelligence functions.
In spite of these calculated limitations on the authority of
CIA, the report noted, it was clear the Agency was expected to
provide the initiative and leadership in developing a coordinated
intelligence system. In practice, the NSC has almost without
exception approved the recommendations submitted to it by CIA
for the coordination of intelligence activities.
The National Security Act does not define the
"intelligence activities" which were to be coordinated by CIA
under the direction of the NSC or specify the departments
whose activities were covered. Presumably, according to the
report, all intelligence activities relating to the national
security were included, from collecting information in the first
instance to the preparation and dissemination of finished
intelligence reports and estimates. "The criterion," which the
report noted was a very broad one, was "such intelligence
activities.
as relate to the national security and not
the identity of the departments concerned or the nature or
locale of the intelligence activity." Thus, the report noted,
practically no limitations are set upon the scope of the intelli-
gence activities with which the Central Intelligence Agency is
to concern itself.
.
.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 308-
―.30
"O
The report noted another broad field requiring
coordination is that of foreign intelligence derived from
domestic sources and the allied field of domestic counter-
intelligence. This includes the exploitation of intelligonce
from United States business firms, travellers, etc., exploitation
of the intelligence possibilities of groups and individuals of
foreign nationality in the United States, the relating of
domestic counterintelligence to foreign intelligence and the
coordination of domestic counterespionage with counterespionage
abroad. Except for the exploitation of private sources of
foreign intelligence in the United States which is centralized
in the Office of Operations, CIA, responsibility for other
activities is scattered among the State Department, the armed
services, the FBI and CIA.
The FBI, which has primary security and law enforce-
ment responsibilities, is concerned in fact with an important
area of intelligence. This includes domestic counterespionage
and countersabotage, control of communist and other subversive
activities and surveillances of alien individuals and groups.
All of these functions, according to the report, are closely
related to the comparable activities abroad of the CIA.
The report noted the FBI was not part of the then
! existing machinery for courdination of intelligence through
the Intelligence Advisory Committee and there was no continuing
manner whereby domestic intelligence and counterintelligence
were related to overall national intelligence in order to serve
the general purpose set forth in the National Security Act,
which was set forth as "of coordinating the intelligence activities
of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security."
It was the opinion of the authors of the Dulles Report
that CIA had the duty under the Act to concern itself with the
problem of coordinating those phases of domestic intelligence
and counterintelligence which relate to the national security ·
and CIA should submit recommendations on this subject to the
NSC. The report noted this was not inconsistent with the .
stipulation of the National Security Act that CIA "shall have no
police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security.
functions.".
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 309
The Dulles Commission recommended that the FBI
should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
to improve coordination of domestic intelligence and counter-
intelligence insofar as these matters related to the national
security.
While discussing the production of National
Intelligence Estimates by CIA, the report noted, "There is
no systematic way of tapping that domestic intelligence
information, which should be chiefly in the hands of the FBI,
having a bearing on broader intelligence issues and there
is no regular and agreed arrangement for participation by the
FBI and for the use of intelligence from domestic sources in
a national estimate."
National Security Council Intelligence Directive
Number 7 provided that CIA shall be responsible for the
exploitation, on a highly selective basis, within the United
States of business concerns, other non-Governmental organizations
and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.
The report concluded the amount of foreign intelligence which
can be obtained through the exploitation of non-Governmental
sources in the United States is considerable and its quality
could be very high if appropriate arrangements were made and
discrimination was employed. It was felt the vast number of
organizations, institutions and individuals having foreign
interests and knowledge represented a potential source of .
intelligence that in many ways was superior to any other,
'as it was felt that they were in a position to provide
information obtained from their foreign contacts and from the
findings on their own people abroad. ..
A further important source of information, the
exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign individuals
and groups in the United States was also being developed. The
report noted that these individuals and groups as well as
political refugees and former foreign government officials
were often engaged in political activity with significant
international implications.
CIA and other intelligence agencies had not developed
coordinated and effective policies and procedures for the
exploitation of intelligence in this important field.
The FBI,
according to the report, had a major interest in foreign
32. “
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-310-

individuals and groups in the United States because of
possible security implications. The report indicated the
FBI possessed considerable information concerning many
individuals and groups but this information had been obtained
primarily with security rather than intelligence considerations
in mind and was not normally given the kind of interpretation
or dissemination that intelligence required if it was to be
properly used. It was also noted the FBI was, in cases where
it had a security interest, reluctant on security grounds to
have intelligence exploitation by outside agencies. The general
result of this situation, according to the report, was that an
important source of intelligence was not being fully exploited.
The report noted that the question of the
exploitation for intelligence purposes of foreign groups and
individuals in the United States was a clear example where
the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with the FBI being added
„as a member, should establish principles and rules for
coordination.
In discussing the administrative handling of
espionage and counterespionage matters within the CIA, the
report noted the FBI was charged with all counterespionage
responsibilities in the United States except those affecting
personnel of the armed services. The Dulles Commission
recommended the counterespionage activities of CIA should be
increased in scope and emphasis and that closer liaison in
this field should be established with the FBI.
The only effect the Dulles Report had on the FBI
was its inclusion as a member of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee by amendment to HSCID Number 1 dated July 7, 1949.
.e. Hoover Commission, 1948 and 1955
Task forces of the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission)
conducted surveys of CIA operations from 1947 to 1949 (under F.
Eberstadt) and from 1953 to 1955 (under General Mark Clark).
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 311
33
The Commission concerned itself principally with
the efficiency with which CIA was fulfilling its statutory.
missions of coordination, correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination of the intelligence product of other Government
agencies and departments. The Commission examined agency
activity in light of the CIA primary mission of advising
NSC and performing services and duties related to
intelligence and national security as the NSC directed.
(la)
Eberstadt Task Force Report
The results of the first examination of CIA by the
Hoover Commission were more or less apologetic in tone,
emphasizing the soundness of directives setting up NSC and its
direction of the Agency. The report pointed out, however,
that CIA and its parent, NSC, had had little time to actually
implement the coordination necessary for leadership in the
field. The Task Force clearly defined its understanding of
the CIA mission as: "
, coordinate intelligence activities
•
of Federal agencies concerned with national security."
The duties of CIA were listed as:
1. Advise National Security Council on national
security intelligence activities of Federal departments and
agencies.
2. Recommend necessary coordination of such
´activities to National Security Council.
.
3.
Correlate, evaluate and disseminate national
security intelligence.
4. Render intelligence services for other Federal
departments and agencies." (62-88575-3 enclosure behind file.)
In discussing the duties of the CIA the Task Force
noted, "Under the statute CIA is entrusted with the performance
of such services of common concern as the National Security
Council shall determine. At present these include, apart from
Scientific Intelligence, which is discussed separately: (a)
maintenance of central indexes of report, records, and documents
having intelligence value; (b) examination of foreign documents
from which intelligence material is extracted and disseminated;
(c) maintenance of central map facilities; (d) monitoring of
foreign broadcasts; and (e) collection of the information by
clandestine means and counterespionage abroad."
34
-NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page-312---
In evaluating the operations and location of CIA
counterespionage the Task Force commented as follows:
"The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear
properly integrated with CIA's other clandestine operations.
Although arguments have been made in favor of extending CIA's
authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this
Country, such an extension of jurisdiction does not a present
appear justified. For one thing, concentration of power over
counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director
of Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might
justifiably arouse public suspicion and opposition. Conceivably
it could form the basis for a charge that a gestapo is in
process of creating even though the power to arrest were
specifically withheld. To transfer responsibility for domestic
counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established
organization and long tradition, to CIA, which is not equipped
for the assignment, would probably create more problems than it
would solve. It is doubtful whether the logical benefit of
having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout
the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such
a transfer would inevitably occasion."
"CIA representatives have indicated that their present
working liaison with FBI is satisfactory, but the Committee
doubts that FBI-CIA relationships are completely adequate. The
Director of FBI declined the Committee's invitation to appear
before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its
representatives on the ground that he knew too little of its
activities."
The groundwork for CIA acceptance was laid by the
Committee recommendation and finding: "CIA is not now properly
organized. Co-equal improvement in G-2, FBI, ONI, State
Department, and other Government intelligence services is also
essential. Spirit of teamwork must govern interagency
intelligence relationships. CIA deserves and must have greater
degree of acceptance and support from old-line intelligence
services than it has had in the past.
"
A pitch was made for a single agency controlling
internal security in the Committee's finding: "The committee
believes that responsibility for internal security policies
should be immediately focused in one agency. A more thorough
study of the subject than any yet made must be prosecuted, and
interagency frictions must be ended." It is noted that the
committee commented elsewhere in its report:
NW 88608 Docid:32989629-Page-313-
35.
* 1010
ཅལ་
"Detailed study of organization and activities of
intelligence divisions of the Government, including CIA, is
being made by a committee consisting of Messrs. Allen Dulles,
William H. Jackson, and Mathias Correa, assisted by a staff
of four directed by Mr. Robert Blum of the Office of
Secretary of Defense." With this statement it may be assumed
the Task Force excused omissions it may have made with the
observation that the Dulles group was conducting almost the
same survey carried on in the Hoover Commission so far as
CIA was involved.
(lb) Clark Task Force Report
The Task Force headed by General Mark Clark
submitted a Top Secret report dated in May, 1955, setting
forth results of the second Hoover Commission survey of the
organization of CIA. The report pointed out the survey
was of departments and agencies with entire or prime
responsibility in the field of positive foreign intelligence
as it pertains to national defense and security. It
qualified this survey when speaking of the FBI, noting
survey was limited to survey of Bureau only to the extent
that it dealt in security intelligence.
Again the Hoover Commission through its Task
Force pinned CIA jurisdiction down to the areas defined by statute,
and emphasized the Agency was subordinate only to the National
Security Council in its coordination, correlation, dissemination
´and collection of intelligence data. The Task Force noted
that since CIA is charged with the over-all responsibility
for coordinating the output of all intelligence forces, the
Task Force was giving special attention to the work of that
Agency.
In the Task Force Report a review of the FBI
functions in the intelligence community was set forth. The
committee noted that the FBI had only limited activities in the
positive intelligence field but noted additionally that FBI
functions in the current intelligence effort were of interest
in order to fill out the intelligence picture.
" AAAm:= མ-----
36
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629- Page 314-
☐
The FBI was cited as one of the four members of
the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), created
by the NSC, approved by the President 3/23/49, to coordinate
"the investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage,
sabotage, subversion, and other related matters affecting
internal security."
It was noted that the IIC charter did not disturb
responsibilities of its member agencies but made mandatory
action by those agencies deemed necessary to insure complete
investigative coverage in compliance with the needs of the
IIC, which had full responsibility for coordination of the
investigation of all domestic espionage, counterespionage,
et cetera, affecting internal security.
The Committee stated, "The Central Intelligence
Agency is, by law, excluded from duplicating the internal
security functions of the FBI. However, the CIA does develop
within and without the U. S., sources for foreign (positive)
intelligence, and incidental thereto may develop leads as to
subversive activities within this country. In such cases
CIA through liaison gives its information to the FBI."
A Task Force survey revealed, "Through the Central
Intelligence Agency's domestic field offices, contacts are
made on a highly selective basis with business concerns and
other nongovernmental agencies, as well as with previously
cleared individuals who travel abroad
Under the
.
.. provisions of DCID 7/1, each member of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee is required to establish in Washington
a focal office for the purpose of interviewing nongovernment
visitors. . Any visitors to these offices demonstrating
good intelligence potential are referred to the CIA for further
exploitation."
The Task Force noted that as far back as 1939
President Roosevelt by executive order directed the FBI to
coordinate and conduct domestic counterintelligence activities.
In 1949, according to the Committee's survey, the IIC was
formalized and by charter restricted to coordinating investi-
gations in intelligence matters domestically.
:
NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 315
37
In commenting on the role of the FBI the Committee
further noted, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, however,
is the recognized center of the domestic aspect of internal
security including counterintelligence within the United States
and its possessions."
With regard to the use and surfacing of sources,
the Committee noted that CIA was not bound to disclose its
sources; however, it commented on the excellent liaison
system of the FBI which had overcome this restriction so far
as internal security within the U. S. is concerned. "Now,
as a matter of practice the CIA usually refers domestic sources
to the FBI, the only exception being where the source is to be
used in foreign intelligence work by the CIA." In the area
of defectors within this country, the Committee noted that
the FBI will receive from CIA or by a direct interrogation of
a CIA-controlled defector information which the defector may
have concerning internal security. Persons who defect within
this country, on the other hand, were found to be under the
cognizance of the FBI. Then the reverse of the above situation
comes into play and CIA has access to the defector for developing
leads in the foreign intelligence field. The Committee
commented, "It is the duty of the FBI to conduct investigations
of all cases involving f、reign nationals in the United States
as set forth in the Delimitations Agreement."
A review of the Commission report lends one important
fact to our study of this subject matter. This was pointed
up by the membership of the various groups at the disposal
of the National Security Council within the field of national
intelligence. Ten subcommittees or working groups with member-
ship from separate departments or interested agencies acted
in advisory capacities to the IAC parent committee. In each
of these subcommittees the chairman was a representative of
the Director of CIA and the working groups were individually
serviced by a secretariat furnished by CIA. From the top-
heavy alignment of CIA personnel in IAC and its working groups
it was obvious in which direction advisory opinions would be
slanted when dissenting matters were presented by the IAC and
CIA to the NSC.
* *m་་་་་་་་་་་t-བ་ཊt hཇམས་
NW-88608_Docid:32989629 Page 316
-
38
I. The Doolittle Committee, 1954
!
In July, 1954, we received information from the
White House that the President had appointed Lieutenant
General James H. Doolittle to study in collaboration with
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certain aspects of
the national intelligence effort. By letter dated
July 28, 1954, Sherman Adams, the Assistant to the President,
requested that the Bureau brief General Doolittle's group
concerning the relationship that existed between the Bureau
and CIA. We subsequently learned that at approximately the
same time a survey would be conducted by the Hoover
Commission under the chairmanship of General Mark Clark.
We learned from Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, that the
President strongly believed that General Clark should not
permit the survey to get into CIA covert operations,
particularly in the field of political and psychológical
warfare. The President had told Dulles that he was selecting
General Doolittle to study CIA's covert operations.
General Doolittle's group was briefed on
August 25, 1954, at which time the Bureau's position in
the intelligence field was described and the manner in
which the Bureau transacted business with CIA was explained.
In addition, certain constructive criticism concerning
problems and conflicts experienced in dealing with CIA was
furnished General Doolittle's group. The following salient
features of the criticism appear to bear on the current study:
We were critical of a policy of the Office of
Operations, CIA, which precluded that Division from
identifying any of its sources in the United States when
such sources possessed information bearing on the internal
security of the United States. The Office of Operations as
of 1954 collected foreign intelligence information in the
United States from aliens, businessmen, and others, and
periodically would receive information of interest to the
Bureau. Instances arose where the Bureau desired to interview
the original source but was prevented from getting to the
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 317
39
2
source by CIA policy. We were of the opinion that CIA's
policy could be modified to allow us direct access to
the source in the United States when such was necessary.
As of 1954, CIA had interest in various
organizations such as Radio Free Europe and others and
from time to time the Bureau would get involved in
investigation of organizations only to learn they were
being supported or guided by CIA. Our opinion was that
if we had been appropriately notified of CIA's interest
considerable investigative time and manpower could have
been saved and in addition we would have been in a position
to notify CIA when anything of interest came to our
attention.
✓
Concerning CIA investigations in the United
States, we readily acknowledged CIA's right to investi-
gate its own applicants or consultants. We did object
to CIA's undertaking any investigation in this country
when the facts indicated the case was clearly within
Bureau jurisdiction and pointed out that the Bureau had
recently become involved in investigating an individual
suspected of espionage activity. We were in contact with
CIA and had solicited its help concerning certain aspects
in the case but it was a few weeks before we learned CIA
had conducted a very close investigation of this same
´individual. We made the observations that close and open
cooperation between the Bureau and CIA was vital to the
proper handling of espionage cases.
The Bureau pointed out that as of 1954 it had
received little or no significant information concerning
espionage' or sabotage agents coming to the United States.
We excluded diplomatic personnel in this matter but clearly
indicated that CIA should be in a position to give us some
- advance notification when spies were coming to this country.¯..
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page: 318
-
40
Possibly this latter was the strongest criticism
we had since we did not feel CIA with its resources and
overseas contacts was performing one of its prime functions
in the intelligence field; that is, identifying foroign
illegals who are en route to the United States. During our
briefing of General Doolittle's group, we described the
Bureau's collection of intelligence information for the
interested Government agencies as a major operation. Our
discharge of our intelligence operation concerning the
Communist Party and Soviet and Satellite diplomats was
explained in detail to the satisfaction of all personnel
attending the briefing.
General Doolittle asked for recommendations as to
what could be done to improve CIA so the Bureau would get
better service. It was suggested that corrective action be
taken on the matters which had been criticized constructively;
CIA should establish adequate coverage (although not
specifically noted, this obviously regarded advance notice
of foreign intelligence personnel coming to the United States);.
and finally CIA should transmit information developed in an
cxpedite fashion.
Prior to submitting the report to the President,
General Doolittle expressed a desire to see Mr. Hoover, whom
he regarded as the outstanding intelligence authority in the
world.. The General visited the Director on October 5, 1954,
during which visit CIA's operations were discussed and
generally the points of the previous meeting were reiterated.
General Doolittle felt the ideal solution would be to wipe out
·CIA entirely and start all over again, but since this was
impractical his committee would point out certain weaknesses
and make certain recommendations and suggestions to the
President for the correction of these weaknesses.
We do not have the contents of General Doolittle's
report and there is nothing to indicate an executive order
was issued from it which in any way delineated the respective
jurisdiction of the Bureau or of CIA...
g.
The Joint. Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities
of the United States Government
Captioned report was prepared by the Study Group
and issued 12/15/60. The Group was under the chairmanship of
-NW-88608-Docld:32989629 Page 319
-
41
Lyman B. Kirtkpatrick, Inspector General, Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), acting as a representative of the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI). The other four members of the
Study Group represented the Department of State, Secretary of
Defense, Bureau of the Budget, and the National Security.
Council (NSC).
1
The stateḍ targets of examination by the Group were
‘organizational and management aspects within the intelligence
effort relating to all aspects of foreign intelligence. In
the confines of these objectives the Bureau was not considered
for examination by the Group in view of the Bureau's lack of
operational jurisdiction in matters outside of this country.
Mr. Belmont, acting for the Bureau, gave a briefing before the
Group on 7/29/60 regarding the Bureau's relations with other
United States intelligence agencies. There was no mention
made of the Bureau in the report except in one of its
recommendations relative to reorganization of the membership
of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) which will be.
dealt with in more detail later.
The 141 page report submitted by the Group appeared
to be apologetic in tone for any shortcomings of CIA. The
reader obtains the definite impression the report was used as
a sounding board for differences of opinion as to methods and
administration for collection of foreign intelligence (overt
and covert) abroad.
The main basis for conclusions and recommendations
made by the Group rested in delineation of duties of DCI as
coordinator of intelligence as opposed to DCI secondary
responsibility as head of CIA. The Group recognized service
jealousies apparently resulting from refusal to accept the
fact that DCI could control and coordinate intelligence effort
without affording preferential treatment to CIA which was his
operational and administrative arm.
There is no reference in the report to a clear
definition of CIA operational responsibilities or jurisdiction
within continental United States.
The Group found that DCI through heads of missions
abroad and designated DCI representatives in foreign countries
had principal responsibility for control and coordination of
foreign collection efforts. The CIA's operations abroad were
recognized in almost all 43 of the Group's recommendations.
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 320
42

Recommendation number 17 emphasized that CIA
should place emphasis on the establishment of unofficial
cover throughout the world; recommendation number 20 was
that CIA should increase intelligence support to unified and
component commanders by direct dissomination from pertinent
field stations.
☐
The report noted that CIA's main requirements
problem related to clandestine collection and concerned
the great number of requirements served on the Agency.
The main tone of the report was that greater
cooperation was required between the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), Department of State, and CIA in carrying out foreign
intelligence collection missions. The recommendations of
the Group were all directed toward this end and had no
bearing on internal espionage or counterespionage activities
within the United States.
In commenting on the coordination duties of the
DCI, the Group pointed out that USIB had been officially
directed to "establish policies and develop programs for
the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned; the
DCI is authorized to make such surveys of departmental
intelligence activities or the various departments and
agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his
duty to advise the NSC and coordinate the intelligence effort
of the United States." The report interpreted these official
directions to indicate that USIB should assume a greater
proportion of the actual direction and control of the
intelligence community of which the Bureau was noted to be
a member.
To strengthen USIB position as a director,
coordinator, and controller of intelligence effort, the
Group recommended (recommendation number 30) that the USIB
should be reduced to four members who should be the DCI
(chairman) and representatives of Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI and the Atomic
Energy Commission would be relegated to ad hoc representation
on the Board.
NW.88608 Docld:32989629--Page-321-
-
43
It should be noted in considering the proposed
change of USIB membership that the Bureau was a member of
six of the twenty-six subcommittees which formed the committee
make-up of the USIB.
Memorandum January 10, 1961, Mr: Belmont to
Mr. Parsons outlined the proposed USIB membership change
for the Director. It recommended that Bureau make no issue
of the proposed recommendation. The Director underlined
a passage of the memorandum which stated "In one sense of
the word it could be argued the FBI would lose prestige
by changing from a regular member to an ad hoc member."
The Director approved the recommendation of the memorandum
with the following notation: "O.K. but I am not enthusiastic
about the change of our status. H." Our status, however, was
not changed and the Bureau has continued to hold full member-
ship on the Board.
In brief, the Joint Study Group Report noted that
the majority of the recommendations of the Study Group had
been favorably received by the intelligence community in
that positive action had been taken to place most of them
in effect. Many of the recommendations of the Group were
felt to have been met by the creation of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) which acted as a coordinator and
overseer of the intelligence effort of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. There is no comment made in this report which
would bear on our present survey of CIA jurisdiction or
activities within the United States in conflict with our own
jurisdictional and investigative interests. The only
reference to the Bureau in this latter report was as
previously mentioned in the comment relative to reorganization
of the membership of the USIB.
5. Responsibilities of the FBI
8.
Laws and Directives
No information has been developed with respect to
any laws passed or directives issued specifically delegating
to the FBI responsibilities for the positive acquisition of
foreign intelligence in the United States. As has been set
NW-88608-docid:32989629 Page 322¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
“ 44
forth above under the caption, "The History of Foreign Intelligence
Collection in the United States Prior to World War II,"
President Roosevelt conducted certain conferences following
which he issued instructions with regard to investigations of
fascist and communist activities in the United States. Those
investigations were to be for intelligence purposes. For the
most part, they took on a counterintelligence aspect; however,
during the course of them foreign intelligence information was .
developed either as an outgrowth of investigative activity or
through the conducting of technical surveillances.
We found no record regarding the designation of the
FBI as the agency responsible for collection of foreign intelligence
information in the United States as of the time the Office of
Coordinator of Information was created on 7/11/41. Neither did
we find any record indicating such responsibility had been
delegated to any other agency.
b. Requests From Other Agencies
From time to time the Bureau has received specific
requests from other agencies based upon which we have undertaken
the collection of foreign intelligence information in the
United States in a clandestine fashion. Two instances of this
nature were based on requests from the Department of State and
from the White House.
-
(1) Department of State Request Recognizing a gap
in our intelligence coverage of friendly governments, on
10/21/55 we discussed with the then Deputy Undersecretary of
State, Robert Murphy, the question of instituting limited
discreet technical surveillances on official establishments of
selected foreign nations, principally those located in world
trouble areas. We pointed out that the FBI stood ready to
institute such coverage as might be desired by the Department
of State.
Mr. Murphy was quite receptive to this idea, stating
that limited coverage sufficiently flexible to change with
changing world conditions might be highly desirable, After
further discussions it was agreed that a program, "progressive".
in nature, would be instituted. By this, Mr. Murphy explained
that he did not feel at that time that all desirable coverage
should be instituted at a given date, but rather that coverage
should be placed on one country at a time as moving events abroad
might dictate. On this basis this type coverage was instituted.
45
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page
based on a specific request from Mr. Murphy on 12/5/55 that we
place technical surveillances on all Egyptian establishments
in the United States. Since then, technical surveillances have
been placed on numerous establishments of foreign countries
for either extended or limited periods of time, depending upon
developments on the international scene.
(2) White House Request In May, 1965, President
Johnson advised the Director he wanted the FBI to set up a
group in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of taking charge
of cleaning out communists in the Dominican Government and advising
the Government of those who might try to infiltrate Government
This was the basis for opening our Santo Domingo Office,
which has continued operation since, 5/21/65.
ranks.
As a result of maintaining our Dominican Office and
assisting in its mission, we have instituted various technical
surveillances and developed numerous live sources in the
United States from which we regularly acquire foreign intelligence
-information. Since the President has relied on the Bureau to
keep him apprised of developments from an intelligence standpoint
as well as developments with respect to communist influence,
these sources are regularly contacted for information which
fits within the terms of foreign intelligence data.
C.
FBI's Role in the United States Intelligence Board
The predecessor to the United States Intelligence
Board (USIB) was the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC).
the IAC was established by National Security Council Intelligence
Directive (NSCID) number 1 dated 12/12/47. By amendment to
this Directive dated 7/7/49, the Bureau was designated a
member of the IAC for the purpose of coordinating domestic
intelligence with foreign intelligence. NSCID 1 has been
revised several times. Subsequent to a revision dated 4/21/58,
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board merged the
IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board into one
body known as the United States Intelligence Board. National
Security Council Directive dated 9/15/58, approved by the
President, formally created the United States Intelligence Board
as successor to the IAC and the U. S. Communications Intelligence
Board.
The USIB in its present form is chaired by the
Director of Central Intelligence. The Director of Central
☐ 46
NW 88608 Docid:32989629-Page 324-
Intelligence is distinguished from the Director of Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in that the Director of Central
Intelligence as Chairman of the United States Intelligence
Board is considered the President's principal advisor on
foreign intelligence. Membership on the United States
Intelligence Board consists of the Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State; the Deputy Director of CIA;
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director
of the National Security Agency; the Assistant General Manager
for Administration, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Assistant
Director of the FBI. The primary responsibility of the USIB
is the coordination of intelligence activities. In this
regard, USIB's major effort is concerned with the preparation
and approval of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) for use
by policy makers.
As a rule, the Bureau does not participate in the
preparation of NIE's inasmuch as the subject matter is usually
outside the jurisdiction of this Bureau. We have in the past.
participated in some selective NIE's such as certain estimates
on Cuba, world communism, the clandestine introduction of
nuclear weapons into the United States and on the Dominican
Republic.
As part of its staffing procedure, USIB has
created numerous committees in some of which the Bureau
maintains membership. The USIB committees on which the
Bureau has representation are the Technical Surveillance
Countermeasures Committee, the Signal Intelligence Committee,
the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile
Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Security Committee,
and the Committee on Documentation. As a general rule,
attendance at Committee sessions is handled by the Liaison
Section. Attendance at meetings is in the main restricted to
the Interagency Defector Committee, the Watch Committee, the
Security Committee, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures
· Committee and the Committee on Documentation. The Bureau has
a primary interest in the business of these five committees.
All decisions made by these committees, which are subsequently
approved by the USIB, are the subject of individual memoranda .
submitted to the Director for his approval.
NW.88608 Docld:32989629-Page-325-
47
193
Over the years, consideration has been given to
the Bureau's withdrawing its membership from USIB. On each
occasion the Director has chosen to have the Bureau retain
its membership on the Board. The last such occasion occurred
in 1964 during the period when John McCone was Chairman of
the United States Intelligence Board. At that time, the military
services were removed from membership on the Board and replaced
by the Defense Intelligence Agency. At the time, Mr. Belmont,
then Assistant to the Director, orally discussed with the
Director the possibility of the Bureau's withdrawing from the
USIB. The Director's comments were that we would not request
removal from membership on the Board but would withdraw our
membership only if so requested by the Director of Central
Intelligence in his role as Chairman of the USIB. The Bureau's
withdrawal would, of course, require action on the part of
the National Security Council.
d. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB)
This group was originally organized in January, 1956,
as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activity. Its primary function at that time was to review
periodically the Government's foreign intelligence efforts
with specific emphasis on the operations of the Central
Intelligence Agency. It was established as a result of
recommendations by the Hoover Commission. In the later years
of the Eisenhower Administration the activity of the group
fell off and it was re-organized in its present form with the
advent of the Kennedy Administration.
Our relationship with this Board has historically
been one of informal liaison in view of the fact that the
primary function of the Board is concerned with foreign
intelligence. There have been occasions where representatives
of the Bureau briefed individual members and/or panels of
the Board concerning our jurisdiction, techniques and
accomplishments in the intelligence field. These briefings
have been received with a receptive and sympathetic attitude.
Our main concern in following the activities of this Board
has been to assure that the Central Intelligence Agency does
not encroach upon our jurisdiction and upon the functions of
the various intelligence communities in which we hold membership
-
48
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 326
The case involving Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap,
a former employee of the National Security Agency who was
a Soviet espionage agent, was thoroughly reviewed by the
present PFIAB in view of the most serious ramifications it
presented. This case concerned the penetration by the
Soviets of the National Security Agency. The report which
emanated from the PFIAB study included proposals which affect
the responsibilities and activities of several agencies within
the intelligence community. All of the twenty-one recommendations.
of the Board dealt with various aspects of achieving a
strengthened counterintelligence capability to guard against
penetration of our security establishments by hostile intelli-
gence agencies. Nineteen of the recommendations of the Board
were approved by the President and three of these related
directly to Bureau activity. They are as follows:
#18: "That steps be taken to assure that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation has adequate
agent resources to effect the required domestic
counterintelligence coverage of both bloc and
nonbloc official installations and personnel who´
may be engaged in intelligence and related
activities inimical to the national security."
#19: "That the policies of the Department of
State with respect to authorizing technical
coverage (use of wiretapping and listening
devices) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
of foreign official: installations and personnel
in this country be re-examined with a view to
liberalization to the extent necessary to provide
the counterintelligence coverage required in the
interest of national security."
#20: "That, in future, when consideration is
given to exchanging detected Soviet-bloc intelli-
gence agents for imprisoned American personnel in
bloc countries, advance consultations be held with
** Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to assure that adequate attention
is given all intelligence aspects of such proposed
exchanges in the interest of the national security,
weighed against the political gains to be achieved."
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 327
49
e.
The Director's Stand Over the Years
The Director's stand over the years with respect
to jurisdiction concerning foreign intelligence matters
within the United States is reflected in numerous comments
he has made dating back to the days when the Central
Intelligence Group (CIG) was being formed.
In June, 1946, General Vandenberg, then head of
CIG, sent a memorandum to the Director proposing that the
National Intelligence Authority issue a directive extending
the powers and duties of the Director of Central Intelligence,
which position General Vandenberg occupied. The memorandum
was analyzed on June 21, 1946, in a memorandum from C. H.
Carson to D. M. Ladd in which it was pointed out that it
was inevitable that CIG must enter into the domestic
picture because of sources of foreign intelligence in that
field. An addendum was placed on the memorandum by Mr. Edward A.
Tamm and Mr. C. A. Tolson which was followed by comments by
the Director which is most pertinent to the subject matter
under discussion. The addendum read:
"Mr. Tolson and Mr. Tamm do not concur with
the conclusion expressed in this memorandum that
'It is inevitable that the Central Intelligence
Group must enter into the domestic field picture
insofar as intelligence'is concerned because of
the sources of foreign intelligence existing in
that field.' They feel that a coordinated pro-
gram for the exchange of information between the
Central Intelligence Authority and the FBI,
.; permitting a free and comprehensive exchange of
information in matters of mutual interest, will
enable the Bureau to work in the domestic field
without interference from the Central Intelligence
Authority in the same manner that the Bureau works,
for example, with local police departments or other
governmental agencies within defined jurisdictional
lines. We believe that the attached letter to
General Vandenberg is satisfactory."
The Director commented as follows:
"I am not as optimistic as are Tolson & Tamm.
I think it is inevitable that there will be a
collision with CIG over our domestic jurisdiction
NW-88608-Docid:32989629 Page 328
-
50
or rather their expansion into it on intelligence
matters. It ought not occur but this new memo
of CIG shows how greedy it is. It is the
Donovan plan almost in toto & is being slyly
put over. It means we must zealously guard our
domestic jurisdiction & not yield an inch & be
ever alert to resist any encroachment."
On March 27, 1953, the Director testified before the
Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations. In response to a question
from Senator McCarran concerning liaison between FBI and CIA,
the Director stated: "There is close liaison. CIA has
exclusive jurisdiction abroad for intelligence. We have
exclusive jurisdiction within the United States. We maintain
continuous liaison with CIA Headquarters in Washington through
a liaison representative of our Bureau in order to facilitate
the transmission of material from them to us and from our
service to them."
In October, 1958, CIA approached us requesting
our concurrence in CIA's establishing physical and technical
surveillance in the United States on the brother of the then
current ruler of Yemen CIA had an operational interest in
this individual. By memorandum it was recommended that the
Bureau not become involved in this CIA operation and that CIA
be informed that this would not establish a precedent for
approval of future CIA activities in the United States.
Responsive to continuing to present problems, the Director
noted: "This is an understatement particularly if we are
going to adopt a macaroni backbone attitude instead of standing
up forthrightly for our rights and jurisdiction."
CIA, in April, 1959, advised us that one of its
[Egyptian] sources would be visiting the United States, and
requested our concurrence in CIA's establishing coverage
including technical surveillance. It was recommended we stay
out of this matter and inform CIA that this was not to be
construed as a precedent for approval of future CIA counter-
intelligence activity in the United States. The Director
commented on the memorandum: "The trend has gone so far we
have become nothing but a rubber stamp for CIA yet they won't
even allow us to perform liaison functions abroad much less
operational ones."
܀܀
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 329.
---
- 51
In January, 1960, CIA agreed to comply with
conditions imposed by the Bureau with regard to developing
positive intelligence information through contacts between
U. S. residents and visitors from Iron Curtain countries.
CIA agreed to contact us first before promoting such
associations.
In March, 1960, CIA inquired if it might obtain
Bureau clearance at the field level for such contacts in the
interest of expediency. Mr. Tolson noted: "More and more we
are agreeing to CIA operations in the U. S. I am opposed
to this relaxation. We can exercise better control here than
through our field offices." The Director added: "I share
· Tolson's views." CIA was advised clearance was to be obtained
through Bureau headquarters.
A source
Anatoli Golitzyn, a Soviet, defected in Finland
in December, 1961, and furnished information alleging
penetration of American intelligence. One Serge Karlow, a.
CIA officer, was developed as a suspect. On 2/9/62, we took
over the investigation. On 2/26/62, Sheffield Edwards, then
CIA Director of Security, admitted CIA had had technical
coverage on Karlow from February, 1961 to 2/9/62. Edwards
claimed his reluctance to tell us of this situation earlier
because of obvious possible jeopardy to prosecution, plus
embarrassment to his Agency should the Bureau raise an
objection to CIA's maintaining such coverage. The Director
noted: "I only wish we would eventually realize CIA can
never be depended upon to deal forthrightly with us. Certainly
my skepticism isn't based on prejudice nor suspicion but on
specific instances all too many in number. Yet there exists
´wistful belief that 'the leopard has changed his spots'."
St
to
In April, 1962, we received information on a
strictly confidential basis from Jay Sourwine of the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that an
unidentified CIA representative had talked to Senator Eastland
concerning an alleged move to place CIA in charge of all
intelligence-gathering operations for the Government
include Soviet espionage in the U. S. The Director noted:
"I am not surprised at the above alleged effort. There is no
doubt in many quarters a desire to eliminate the FBI in
dealing with espionage and subversion for we are a thorn not
only in the side of communists but also the ADA and Fabian
Socialists. CIA which failed again and again to know what
is actually going on abroad could be counted upon to blunder
the same way in the USA.
18
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 330
52

In April, 1963, we received information indicating
that CIA Director John McCone was considering expansion of
CIA operations in the United States specifically intelligence
coverage and the development of sources in this country.
The
Director made a note on the memorandum recording this: "McCone
is trying to do another *Donovan.* If he injects himself into
the U. S., the FBI gets out. Too many cooks spoil the broth."
In December, 1963, the Director inquired as to the
nature and extent of intelligence operations wherein CIA had
established contact with a diplomat, operated him in the U. S.
with our coordination, and continued to operate him upon his
having departed this country. Four such cases were cited. On
the memorandum, the Director noted: "I have little confidence
in CIA abiding by agreements if it serves its purpose better
not to do so. 警察
In January, 1964, CIA advised us it had reorganized
its activities in the U. S. The Domestic Operations Division,
· CIA, had established field offices in this country under
appropriate cover. A memorandum was prepared describing the
history of CIA operations in the U.-S. and recommending action
designed to protect our interests. A letter went to CIA with
ground rules which the Bureau expected CIA to follow in all
matters requiring coordination. The Director noted: "OK, but
I hope you are not being taken in. I can't forget CIA
withholding the French espionage activities in the U. S. nor
the false story concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, only
to mention two of their instances of double dealing."
The New York Office, by letter 2/14/64, set forth
its observations concerning a briefing given that office on the
matter of CIA operations in the U. S. The Director commented:
"I think this domestic operations expansion of CIA is very
dangerous and will inevitably 'muddy' the waters."
In May, 1964, the Bureau reconsidered its stand
with respect to permitting CIA to approach sources at foreign
establishments in the United States for intelligence purposes.
The following policy was proposed and subsequently approved:
**
(1) Where there was no indication a source would
be leaving the United States, we would deny CIA clearance
for contact until we had fully explored the person's
potential for our own purposes.
If we decided we had no
- 53
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 331
interest and CIA contact would not jeopardize any FBI
investigations, we would grant CIA approval to proceed
with its contact with proviso we be kept informed of
information developed of possible interest to us.
(2) Where it appeared source would be returning
to a foreign country shortly we would normally grant
CIA clearance for preliminary contact with proviso we
be kept informed of results. 'We reserved the right to
take direct access to the source as our needs required.
(3) Where there was an overlapping of interests
and source expected to continue in United States for
fairly extended period of time, in those instances where
CIA had entree and no Bureau investigation would be
jeopardized we would permit CIA to explore matter and
make preliminary contact keeping us advised of progress
and getting our specific clearance before a direct
recruitment approach; however, where factors indicated
it would be to best Bureau interests to operate source,
we would undertake the recruitment and keep CIA advised
of information of interest to that Agency.
When these matters were submitted for approval
Mr. Tolson commented, "Looks okay, but we will have to watch
this very closely. The Director concurred in Mr. Tolson's
remark.
;
NW-88608 Docld:32989629- Page 332-
54
_
-
D.
THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL FOR
•
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE U. S.
;
In 1941, the U. S. allegedly had in its
possession practically all of the foreign intelligence
it needed regarding military and strategic targets in
Japan. The information was scattered among various
individuals who had personal knowledge or was located
in libraries, various Government agencies, private
business firms, institutions, et cetéra. Tragically,
the U. S. Government did not have any mechanism to
collect, record and evaluate such information.
Intelligence was badly needed in 1941, and we paid
dearly in lives and financial resources to accomplish
certain missions because the information was not
readily available.
Today, the need for foreign intelligence is
greater than ever. The stakes of foreign policy have
never been higher. The U. S., being a dominating world
power, has assumed vast responsibilities enmeshed in
delicate political situations throughout the world.
The ever-existing threat of an atomic war with communist :
countries demands a continuing acquirement of knowledge
so that policies and courses of action can be designed
in the most effective manner possible. The information
needed applies to numerous fields of activity, a major
area being scientific research and development. In this
connection, the revolutionary break-throughs in the :
scientific category are occurring with unusually high
frequency, and if the U. S. is to remain in the
forefront, it is absolutely necessary that we obtain
an accurate evaluation of the enemy's capabilities and
intentions. We have been fortunate to collect high
quality positive intelligence through sophisticated
collection methods, i.e high altitude photography and
research in this area is proceeding at an accelerated
pace. Nevertheless, electronic gadgets and machines
will never produce all that is required. We still need
supplementary coverage on a heavy scale, and the human
being still continues to be a vital source of information.
The individual talks and volunteers information. He talks
and his statements are intercepted. All of this produces
valuable increments of intelligence. The individual can
still provide badly needed data either through his
i
voluntary contribution or through his unwitting divulging
NW-88608-Docld:32989629-Page-333-
55
F
✓
:
:
of intelligence. The importance of the individual
is further emphasized when we realize that as each
sophisticated collection technique is introduced,
science also introduces newly designed countertechniques
of covering, protocting, and camouflaging important
assets. In essence, technology eventually hits an
impenetrable or leveling-off depth.
Foreign intelligence is not geographically
restricted. Information regarding Chinese Communists
can be obtained anywhere in the world, and even if it
is of a fragmentary nature, the data can be of
significant value. The demand for information is
heavy and is sought by every agency in the Government.
Because of this, it has been necessary for the
U. S. Government to map a program of collection on
a priority basis. This has been done through the
creation of a committee which is attached to the
U. S. Intelligence Board. The committee maintains
a list of priorities on a current basis. A recent
list of guidelines for the collection of foreign
intelligence pertaining to scientific affairs in
Communist China included approximately 170 items,
i.e✓ long-range planning of Communist China in the
nuclear field; nature of research in oceanography;
computer capabilities of Shantung University; climate
modification and cloud physics research; development
of meteorological rockets; development of nuclear
weapons; location of uranium refineries; strength
of Naval forces; intentions along the Sino-Indian
border; types of equipment being supplied to Laos
and North Vietnam.
In the U. S. proper, the sources of foreign
intelligence are voluminous. Most of these sources
overtly provide information through newspapers,
scientific publications, libraries, tourists, visiting
professors and students, journalists, and immigrants.
The compilation, collation, analysis, and reporting
of such information involves an extensive program
and, needless to say, the U. S. today does not have
the capability of tapping all available sources on
a current basis.
NW-88608-Deeld:32989629-Page-334-
56
For the purpose of this paper, we are
thinking about the search for knowledge considered
· vital for national survival. One could suggest
that clandestine collection of intelligence is
overemphasized and that our Government could readily
protect its interests through overt collection and
the employment of our best analysts and evaluators.
If we take this approach, we may as well discount
the importance of the Bureau's activities in the
counterintelligence field, which essentially are
of a clandestine nature and which have produced time
and again vital intelligence. We, therefore, must
move on the assumption that the clandestine
collection of foreign intelligence is very definitely
a most necessary element of our over-all intelligence
capabilities.
In addition to the overt sources, there
exists a rich potential in the U. S. among the foreign
diplomatic establishments including the U. N., the
officials of foreign governments, and visitors such
as students, professors, and scientists. A certain
amount of information from such sources can be
obtained in an overt fashion, but the high quality
data is normally acquired through clandestine means.
This can be done through technical monitoring,
development of live sources, access to records,
files, et cetera. There are approximately 10,000
foreign officials in the U. S. assigned to embassies,
consulates, trade missions, U. N., and other
international organizations. This excludes
dependents. During the fiscal year ending June 30,
1965, 38,544 foreign government officials visited
the U. S.; about 1500 of these came from communist-bloc
countries. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965,
approximately 50,000 foreign students came to the U. S.;
733 of these came from the communist bloc. During the
same fiscal year, there were 2,075,967 visitors from
all countries. Everyone of the foregoing is a potential
source of foreign intelligence. As can be readily
accepted, the U. S. Government does not have a capa-
bility of assessing each and every one of these sources
for foreign intelligence. We can say at this point
that the FBI and CIA are just scratching the surface.
It is recognized that a program designed to assess
---
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 335.
-
57
or attempt to recruit each potential source would be
out of the question. Such a massive undertaking would
not be compatible with U. S. Government foreign policy.
There is no question that there must be selectivity of
a judicious and prudent nature.
Since the U. S. is such a major power,
Washington, D. C. is the center of diplomatic activity
involving practically all foreign nations. The location.
of the U. N. in New York City presents us with another
area of intensified activity. Most countries send their
most able diplomats to the U. S. so we are confronted
with hundreds of highly talented people. The day-to-day
activities in diplomatic establishments, conferences,
meetings, negotiations, liaison between countries, all
create a tremendous reservoir of foreign intelligence
potential.
:
NW-88608 Docid:32989629 Page 336
and
58
རྩོམ་མ་མ་ད་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ར་ས་མ་ར་མ་ར་མ་ར་
E.
CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF CIA IN
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
FIELD IN THE UNITED STATES
In order that there may not be any
misunderstanding regarding CIA's capabilities to
collect foreign intelligence in the United States,
we should first clarify that one of the components
of the Agency which has offices in the United States
does not engage in this particular activity.
The Office of Security, which is responsible for
personnel and physical security, maintains several
offices in the United States under authorized
Treasury Department cover. Personnel of this
office conduct investigations of applicants, firms
or individuals who may be utilized by CIA on
a contract basis to support intelligence operations
overseas.
The overt collection of intelligence by
CIA is handled by the Domestic Contact Service (DCS)
(formerly called Contact Division). CIA estimates
that DCS has a capability of tapping approximately
15 per cent of the total potential of intelligence in
the U. S. This Division has 18 field offices and
16 resident agencies in the United States, and each
office is openly identified as being connected with
CIA. Personnel totaling approximately 140 carry CIA
credentials. The Division regularly has a number of
officers from the various military services who are
assigned to this Division on a temporary basis.
These military officers concentrate on the collection
of that foreign intelligence which relates to the
immediate United States military needs. The personnel
of DCS interview aliens, tourists, officials of
import-export firms, students, scientists, and the
information collected covers a very broad spectrum in
the positive intelligence category. DCS claims to have
contact with about 7200 organizations, institutions, or
businesses and has approximately 60,000 contacts or
sources of information. The information is reported in
the form of "Information Reports," which is disseminated
throughout the intelligence community. During 1965,
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 337
59
=
DCS disseminated 26,000 such reports. DCS does not
have any responsibilities in the clandestine collection
of intelligence, and in that sense it is very ·
specifically not operational. DCS definitely cannot
engage in any activity of an internal security nature,
and within CIA it is clearly understood that DCS is
not to be operational under any circumstances,
DCS has been the subject of some controversy within
CIA. There is one school of thought which maintains
that DCS should be an appendage of the Deputy Director
of Plans, who is responsible for all clandestine
operations. The other school which has prevailed
holds to the line that DCS should be separate and..
continue under the supervision of the Deputy Director
of Intelligence (DDI). This situation not only has
caused headaches for CIA but also for the Bureau because
of situations which arise where the "left hand does not
know what the right hand is doing."
DCS is essentially carrying out CIA's
responsibilities emanating from National Security Council
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 2 which has its roots
in a similar directive issued under tho National
Intelligence Authority in 1946. It has been in business
for approximately twenty years. Per agreement, DCS
cannot interview an alien without first clearing with
the Bureau. This is done on a daily basis. With regard
to American citizens, Bureau approval is not required
unless the Bureau has indicated a prior interest in the
individual; however, DCS nevertheless submits name
checks on Americans, and if it so happens that the
subject of such an inquiry is a Bureau source or
involved in a Bureau investigation, we are in a position
to move to protect our interests. It should be noted
that although DCS is engaged primarily in positive
intelligence collection, it is required to be on the
alert for sources who possibly might be useful to CIA's
clandestine operations. For example, if DCS encounters
an alien who can be utilized in an overseas operation,
the lead is passed on to the appropriate division...
At the present time, DCS alerts the newly created
.Domestic Operations Division (explained below) regarding
potential sources.
Our current controls with regard to DCS are
functioning efficiently. We regularly examine the
NW-88608-Doeld:32989629-Page 338-
60
C
status of this relationship, and we periodically
make adjustments in order to make certain there
is no "freewheeling" and to take advantage of the
information which DCS gains. and which is of interest
to the Buroau. For example, we are currently working
out arrangements where our field offices can contact
the local DCS offices concerning Chinese aliens who
might be of interest to us either as subjects for
investigation or as potential informants. This liaison
at the field level was deemed desirable so that we
could get information at the "horse's mouth" rather
than wait for a reply from CIA headquarters, which is
often prolonged and, when transmitted, is sometimes
stripped of pieces of information. This occurs
because of the involved and sometimes complicated
maze of bureaucratic compartmentation within CIA.
In the latter part of 1963, CIA created its
Domestic Operations Division (DOD), which was to be
responsible for any clandestine development of sources
in the United States. Prior to the establishment of
this Division, CIA activity in this field was managed
from each individual area division at Washington
headquarters. The pressing need for more clandestine
sources, coupled with the recognition of the vast
potential in the United States, prompted CIA to create
a new division which would be responsible for all of
the area division interests. DOD has headquarters
at Washington, D. C., and currently has field offices
at New York City, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Washington, D. C., proper.
Approximately 40 intelligence officers are assigned to
the task of engaging in assessment and/or recruitment
of positive intelligence sources, primarily in the
diplomatic field. Some of the personnel are assigned
to the handling of firms or organizations which may
be supporting certain CIA operations abroad. DOD personnel
in the field operate under authorized Department of Defense
cover. The heads of these field offices are known to us,
and we have established a satisfactory liaison area at
the field level.
DOD is also responsible for the handling of
CIA agents (informants) who have been recruited abroad
and who come to the United States for assignments either
on a temporary basis or for the duration of a normal
diplomatic assignment.
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61
The creation of DOD within CIA was and still
is a somewhat controversial Agency subject. DCS saw
DOD as an interfering element. The area desks were
reluctant to have a new division to take over their
agents. Some of the DOD personnel are vory capable
and seasoned intelligence officers. Many of them are
considered of mediocre capability, and there is
a frequent rumor that other CIA divisions send their
misfits to DOD. From CIA's standpoint there appears
to be a definite need for a much stronger team within DOD.
Theoretically, DOD is required to be on the
alert for all potential sources who can be used by CIA
in its intelligence operations, and the approach is
basically one of a long-range nature. DOD is required
to make use of all leads emanating from fellow employees
who may have developed social contacts or associations
with foreigners abroad or who might meet potential.
sources in the United States. Since CIA personnel
operate under diplomatic cover when abroad, they do get
the opportunity to move in diplomatic circles. Similarly,
undercover agents of CIA traveling throughout the world
also make contacts which offer potential exploitation if
and when the target stops in the United States,
Since January, 1964, when DOD actually began
moving, it has recruited approximately ten individuals
in the diplomatic field. Most of these were in the
noncommunist-bloc area. All of those recruited appear
to have been in a fairly low-level category. All of them
were career diplomats, and there was no evidence that
the individuals were connected with any intelligence
service.
In addition to the activities of DCS and DOD,
there is a certain amount of CIA operational movements
which do not fall under either of the foregoing divisions.
One example is the CIA base in Miami which was set up
for CIA's operations directed against the Cuban Government.
This base is used for the training and dispatching of
agents into Cuba and to some extent into other countries
in the Caribbean, particularly the Dominican Republic.
This base is directly responsible to the Western
Hemisphere Division of CIA, which could be called the
Latin American Division.
☺
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 340

'
ش
CIA also becomes involved in political and
psychological warfare type of programs directed against
targets in foreign countries. The Agency broadly refers
to this activity as "covert action." The programs are
essentially dosigned to influence individuals, organizations
or governments through various news media, and this will
include the utilization of "agents of influence." This
activity falls under the International Organizations
Division (IOD) of CIA, which has no responsibility to
collect information. IOD does use people in the
United States to help implement the overseas programs.
Quite often the Agency uses cutouts or covers for such
an operation. Although IOD does not engage in intelligence
collection, it is a CIA division which should be kept in
mind, since its activities quite often will be tangent to
matters of interest to the Bureau. For example, IOD
becomes involved in the World Youth Festival, where its
objective is to neutralize communist influence.
We, of
course, have had an interest in the Festival because of the
participation of Americans, including members of the CPUSA.
Theoretically, IOD is required to coordinate closely with
other appropriate components of CIA. We do not believe
that this coordination has been effective enough,
There is no doubt that there are individuals
in CIA who aspire to broaden the Agency's operational
activities in the United States. Such individuals would
like to see an arrangement similar to one currently in
force in England where MI-6 has a free hand to assess and
recruit all foreigners, including diplomats, where there
is no evidence that they are engaged in intelligence
activity. If such evidence is obtained, MI-6 is required
to coordinate with MI-5. There are people in CIA who
would like to see similar machinery and in addition would
want the freedom to conduct certain investigations and
maybe even institute technical surveillances.
In summary, CIA so far has a very limited
capability to recruit foreign diplomatic sources in the
United States, but the Agency appears to have done fairly...
well with a relatively small staff; however, it can be
anticipated that this capability will increase. CIA's
effectiveness will probably be adversely affected for
some time to come because of the Agency's well-known
deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, loose admin-
istration, and lack of skilled and talented personnel..
NW 88608 Docid:32989629 Page 341..
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63-
F.
CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE FBI
1.
Manpower Being Devoted
It is most difficult to give any specific figures as to
how much manpower the FBI is currently devoting strictly to
foreign intelligence collection, separate and apart from the
Bureau's internal security and counterintelligence functions.
Much of the foreign intelligence developed by the Bureau is an
outgrowth of our internal security investigations and cannot be
neatly separated in terms of manpower or time.
A substantial amount of our foreign intelligence activity
is concentrated in two offices where most of the diplomatic
establishments in the United States are located; namely, New York
and Washington Field. Both offices were requested to furnish
estimates as to how much manpower is being allocated to foreign
intelligence matters, including both live sources developed and
technical coverage. In both cases, the estimates provided were
highly tentative and both cifices stress that manpower commitments
in this area fluctuate widely from week to week depending on
international politics and other unpredictable factors. For
instance, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both offices
greatly increased their normal manpower commitment to the develop-
ment or current foreign intelligence. The present Dominican crisis
which involves production of foreign intelligence to a large extent
represents another "abnormal" situation.
However, for what it is worth, WFO and New York have
estimated that at the present time they are allocating approxi-
mately 35 Agents and 20 clerical employees to the full time task
of foreign intelligence collection. Virtually all of the clerical
time and about 40 per cent of the Agent time is related to
technical coverage and the balance is aimed at the development of
live sources.
In addition, of course, all of the other offices, including
our Legal Attaches abroad, have devoted manpower to foreign
intelligence collection in varying degrees. Anagram operations
conducted in different field offices have involved the assignment
of as many as 10 or 12 Agents for temporary periods. In connection
with its responsibilities in the Cuban and Latin-American fields,
the Miami and San Juan offices have devoted considerable manpower
to the development of foreign intelligence in recent years. The
Chicago Office in connection with its handling of our top-level
Sold informant has devoted manpower to the development of foreign
intelligence. These represent only a few examples.
•
On an overall basis and bearing in mind the difficultyiin
citing any precise figures, it is estimated that the Bureau probably
averages approximately 50 to 75 Agents and 25 to 30 clerks assigned
primarily to foreign intelligence work.
64
NW 88608 Docld:32989629 Page 342
2
Number of Microphone and Telephone Surveillances with
Evaluation of Product
At present, Bureau has only one microphone surveillance in
foreign intelligence field and this is in connection with a special
National Security Agency project directed against Turkish coded
communications. Concerning technical surveillances, we are now
operating about 70 foreign intelligence installations on various
diplomatic establishments in this country. The majority of these
are in Washington Field and New York with scattered installations
in Chicago, Miami, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and San Juan. Under
current Bureau policy, we are limited to 80 foreign intelligence
technical surveillances and no microphone surveillances with the
exception of one on the Turkish United Nations Mission
In addition, during recent years, we have maintained
approximately 50 so-called "telex" surveillances on the teletype
facilities of various foreign establishments. This has been done
at the specific request of the National Security Agency, in
connection with its efforts to break foreign codes and to read
foreign government communications.
We have had excellent results from these technical
installations. Any compilation of items of value to the U.S.
Intelligence Community and policy-making officials developed
through this coverage would run many hundreds of pages. The results
have ranged from information regarding plans and activities of
key foreign countries in the diplomatic field to information
regarding intelligence, political, economic and military develop-
ments in the countries concerned. In many instances, we have been
able to forewarn the White House, the State Department and other
interested agencies of impending developments and to furnish data
giving an insight into the thinking and strategy of key foreign
officials and governments. This coverage has proved specially
valuable during crisis periods such as the Cuban missile crisis of
1962 and during the tense negotiations involving the Panama Canal
in 1964. On many occasions, top-ranking United States officials
have commented on the effectiveness of this data. The particular
importance of this information has been its timeliness to current
events as well as the fact that it represents a penetration of
foreign diplomatic circles which is only infrequently available
through live sources.¨*
17:
In some instances, of course, this type coverage on a
particular foreign establishment or official has not paid off.
We have had cases where this technique has been unproductive for
sustained periods of time on a particular country. This is to be
expected and we have sought to overcome this by rotating our
installations, correlating our technical operations with shifting
international developments and putting coverage on those countries
which appear to offer the most promise for worthwhile intelligence.
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3.
Live Sources With Evaluation
At present we are making active efforts to develop live
informant coverage in the diplomatic establishments of 37 non-
Soviet bloc countries. This list of so-called "target countries"
varies from time to time but essentially we are seeking informant
coverage in countries considered critical from an intelligence
standpoint such as those leaning towards the Soviet bloc or
countries in which the United States has paramount political or
military interests or which are otherwise of primary concern. The
current list includes virtually all Latin-American countries, a
number of Middle East countries, and scattered countries throughout
Africa and the Far East.
Our program was initiated in the early 1950s, and we
are now using some 50 sources (This number fluctuates due to
transfers, resignations, etc.). In each case, we clear with
State Department prior to designating any country as a "target"
and we also clear with State prior to conducting interviews with
employees at the "target" establishment. In a number of instances,
including most Latin-American countries, State has asked us to
restrict our efforts to American citizens. This, of course, is
a highly limiting factor.
Over the years this live informant coverage has on many
occasions produced foreign intelligence of real value. Our sources
have frequently provided data regarding proposed political,
diplomatic or economic action by the countries concerned, on
occasion in advance of other forewarning to U.S. intelligence.
They have also been able to furnish a considerable amount of
information regarding the whereabouts, background and general
activities of individual foreign officials of security interest,
thereby saving investigative time. These sources have been
especially valuable in connection with the Anagram Program and
other sophisticated attacks on foreign establishments, providing
us with data regarding the physical security, location of code
rooms, etc., of the various foreign establishments.
In addition to so-called "target" countries which are
in the non-Soviet bloc area, the Bureau has developed a number of
informants and defectors-in-place in Soviet-bloc establishments
who have been able to furnish a substantial amount of foreign
intelligence. In the Soviet-bloc field, we have also developed ¨¨
a number of sources in quasi-official establishments, such as
trade missions, who have produced valuable foreign intelligence.
In the Soviet-bloc field, of course, our live informant development
has been aimed essentially at internal security and counterintelli-
gence needs of the Bureau.
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It is significant that we have been able to operate for
many years in the development of live sources in foreign diplomatic
establishments, both Soviet bloc and non-bloc, without encountering
any serious incidents embarrassing to the FBI or the United States
Government.
1
In assessing the product of such live sources in a number
of instances in the non-Sov..et field State Department has
requested that we restrict our efforts to American citizens.
To
a considerable degree, this has limited the effectiveness of our
program in the ron-Soviet field since U.S. employees of foreign
establishments will normally not have access to top-grade data.
Thus, especially in the non-Soviet bloc field we are not tapping
the full potential which exists for high-level foreign intelligence.
This can only be realized through the development of high quality
sources.
4. Anagram Program
peculifily
This material, which is a
sensitive foreign intelligent operation
Anagram is code word for FBI program to penetrate foreign
diplomatic establishments in U.S. for purpose of securing crypto-
graphic material. This material is primarily of value to National
Security Agency in its communications intelligence efforts.
Since inception of program in 1954, we have conducted Anagram
operations involving 38 different foreign countries and a total of
57 separate establishments. Approximately 10 FBI field offices ·
have participated in the program. Our operations under this
program have resulted in monetory savings to the Government estimated
at better than $13,000,000 and it has provided data of incalculable
intelligence value. While it has been of primary value to NSA, we
have on occasion produced information of primary interest to the
Bureau. For example, in April, 1963, we affected a successful
penetration in the Polish field which produced material disclosing
the activities of Polish Intelligence Service in this country.
.5. Double Agents and Informants
In a number of instances, Bureau double agents and informants,
developed to assist us in connection with our internal security and
○ counterintelligence responsibilities, have been able to provide
significant high-level information of foreign intelligence value.
For example, in the Soviet field, we have developed a
number of top-level sources such as Fedora and Tophat who have
provided current intelligence regarding the organizational structure,
personnel, and operations of the KGB and GRU, both in the Soviet
Union and abroad; a description of various technical equipment used
by Soviet intelligence; data regarding current relations between the
Soviet Union and Communist China; and data regarding Soviet foreign
policy, political and military developments, etc. Similar informa-
tion of foreign intelligence value has been developed through FBI
informants, double agents and defectors-in-place operating against
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Polish, Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian and other communist-bloc
countries. For instance, in the Cuban field on several occasions,
FBI informants have been able to develop high-level or current
intelligence regarding conditions in Cuba, and policies of the
Castro regime through personal contacts with ranking Cuban officials
both in the U.S. and abroad.
Through our coverage of the Communist Party, USA, and
related organizations we have also frequently produced foreign
intelligence, although to a lesser extent than in our operations in.
the foreign nationality field. One of our best sources of foreign
intelligence in the domestic area is our so-called Solo operation*
wherein we have informants acting in a liaison/capacity between the
Communist Party, USA, and foreign communist groups, including the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have developed information
through this operation regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute, social
and political conditions in various countries, both in and outside
the Soviet bloc, and tactics of the international communist movement.
Additional Potential
6.
As indicated in the foregoing subsections, the Bureau is
currently producing a considerable volume of foreign intelligence
through covert means, much of it of a significant nature. Most of
this data is an outgrowth of informants, technical coverage and
investigative programs targeted primarily to fulfill our internal
security and counterintelligence objectives and relatively speaking,
we have committed only a small percentage of our assets exclusively
in the direction of foreign intelligence.
It is believed that the Bureau possesses considerable
potential for the development of foreign intelligence which could
be realized with a fairly modest expenditure of manpower and costs
if we were to make foreign intelligence collection a primary aim.
For example, with existing equipment and facilities, we could
expand our technical coverage of foreign establishments to include a
additional 30 to 40 foreign establishments provided we could assign
about 25 additional personnel to this field. With the assignment
of an additional 75 to 100 Agents, we could greatly intensify our
foreign intelligence collection through live informants, primarily
through the development and exploitation of additional sources at
foreign diplomatic establishments. We could place more stress on
foreign intelligence collection in our training programs and
conferences to make more effective use of our already available ass
We could, for example, add specialized classes on foreign intellige
collection to our In-Service schedules or designate selected Bureau
personnel to attend training sessions operated by other U.S. agenci
regarding this subject.
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* identifies a partiliaily
sensitive foreign
intelligenes operation
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G. AREAS OF CONFLICT, FBI CIA
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Any differences between FBI and CIA are first
related to a basic problem existing in any country among
the major powers, namely. "How does a law enforcement
agency coordinate its internal security functions with an
intelligence organization which must operate as a clandestine
service?" The very nature of the functions of the two
organizations immediately introduces potential areas of
conflict. One essentially operates overtly and the other
covertly. This alone is enough to create an atmosphere.
fraught with controversies and confusion. Because each
agency was molded differently and because responsibilities
differ, there naturally will be conflicting approaches to
national security objectives. For example, in the field
of intelligence the Bureau is basically a counterintelligence
body. CIA, to the contrary, has a much broader responsibility
in intelligence, which includes collection of foreign
intelligence, political and psychological warfare, inter-
agency coordinating, evaluation, research, etc. Counter-
intelligence within CIA is actually a relatively small
component of the agency. Personnel in the two organizations
is recruited under different criteria and standards.
Training is likewise at variance. In a final analysis,
the experienced FBI Agent and the seasoned CIA intelligence
officer are not of the same mold but certainly are tailored
as two entirely and distinctly different instruments. We
should bear in mind that little has been done to introduce
truly substantive cross-fertilization of outlook, approach
and operational philosophy between the two agencies. This
could be advocated from a Utopian point of view, but it
also could be argued that there are distinct advantages to
maintaining sound compartmentation.
Separate from the above basic and fundamental
situation, the differences between FBI and CIA also relate
to other factors such as:
1) FBI was first on the scene and was well
established long before CIA came to life. This led to a
conception in the early years that CIA was an intruder.
2) The seed of CIA was the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), an organization whose personnel, activities
and free-wheeling were the sources of numerous conflicts
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with the Bureau during World War II.
It was during
these years that an atmosphere of mistrust and lack of
confidence was created.
3) CIA was established as our first over-all,
worldwide intelligence agency. The events and the
maneuvering which led to this certainly did not bring
with them a harmonious relationship.
4) Unfortunately, CIA grew big and grew fast,
particularly because of an unsettled atomic world and
developments such as the Korean War. The Agency did not
jell effectively as an organization, and with this came
numerous difficulties, many of which exist to this day.
5) Each organization has lacked adequate
knowledge of the other's operational machinery, objectives,
and "ways and means of doing things."
6) An element of rivalry actually developed over
the years, and this, when not tempered with prudence and
sound judgment, creates unhealthy situations.
7) A growing tendency on the part of CIA to
expand its operational activities not originally contemplated
in the formation of that agency.
It can be recognized that with this background it
has not been an easy matter to establish a good working
relationship with CIA without frequent conflicts, and
sometimes agonizing negotiations. It could be suggested
that the ideal situation would be to remove CIA from the
U. S. with the understanding that we would assume respon-
sibility for any and all activity in the intelligence field.
As described in another section of this report, such a
move would be highly infeasible for the Bureau.
It is to our credit that despite the problems of
the past there have been some highly constructive develop-
ments in FBI-CIA relations; pärticularly as they affect ¨
activities in the U. S. Several years ago arrangements
were made whereby CIA's Office of Security could conduct
applicant investigations without infringing upon our juris-
diction. For several years we have been permitting CIA to
interview aliens for foreign intelligence information under
…… ground rules which have been very successful. Our. liaison
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mechanism has been functioning effectively. We have
frequent conferences. Bureau personnel lectures before
CIA officers. Dissemination of information is excellent.
The atmosphere for negotiating and discussing unusually
complicated problems is very good. Personnel can work in
the same area with a minimum of problems, as evidenced in
the Dominican Republic. We attend USIB meetings and aro
actively engaged in the work of several committees attached
to USIB. All of this is commendable progress and certainly
beneficial to national security.
All of the foregoing was set forth in the way of
background in order to better understand the current source
of differences with CIA, namely the Agency's desire to assess
and recruit foreign intelligence sources in the U.S. in the
foreign diplomatic establishments, including United Nations,
and to some extent among foreign visitors. CIA fully
acknowledges our internal security and counterintelligonce
responsibilities. This is clear-cut and free of any
debatable question; however, CIA feels that we have no
legally-established responsibility in foreign intelligence
collection and that somebody (in this case, CIA) should
be fully exploiting the foreign intelligence potential in
the United States, bearing in mind that there are approxi-
mately 10,000 foreign officials and employees in this country.
CIA argues that a foreign diplomat can be recruited anywhere
in the world but maintains that there is no better place
than the United States for assessment, recruitment, training
and orientation of an informant. CIA further maintains that
if the Agency moves on a target, such as an Argentine
diplomat who may be a career officer not connected with a
foreign intelligence service, there should not be any con-
flict because the activity is in no way related to the
internal security functions of the Bureau. CIA has also
expressed the attitude that in the communist-bloc fiold
CIA should be permitted to assess and recruit those
individuals not connected with an intelligence or intornal
security service.
There are some people in CIA who are of the
opinion that in the field of foreign intelligence the Bureau.
should be exerting more effort to actually assist CIA in
spotting sources and, when needed, give CIA support in
developing an individual through such means as surveillances,
neighborhood investigations, etc. When CIA is permitted to
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recruit a source in the U. S., the Agency takes the
position that if the source can be of help to the Bureau
we should levy requirements on CIA and not ask for access
to the source unless it clearly appears that only through
access we can properly discharge our responsibilities.
CIA takes a very strong. view that once a source is
developed it is basically unsound to introduce another
agency into the relationship. The developing agency
may have used techniques peculiar to its own organization
and may have developed a relationship under varied cir-
cumstances, and when a new agency is introduced this
relationship with the source could be unfavorably disturbed.
CIA does not dispute the fact that informant and Agent
turnovers sometimes are absolutely necessary.
CIA maintains that if the Bureau is given access
to a CIA source we would be responsible for the counter-
intelligence aspects, but if the source produces foreign
intelligence CIA should be responsible for handling this
information, including the dissemination. CIA's position
is that it is better qualified to evaluate the information
and correlate it with the foreign intelligence being
developed abroad. For example, if a Nigerian source of CIA,
also available to the Bureau, furnishes information regarding
the Nigerian Foreign Office, CIA claims that it can better
handle the report and dissemination.
Discussions and agreements with CIA, including
the actions stemming from meetings with the representatives
of that agency in November 1965, have resulted in a greatly
improved coordinating machinery. There still are areas of
potential conflict which will necessitate improvement.
They are:
1) DOD personnel receives leads or tips pertaining
to possible access to Soviet-bloc diplomats. This CIA
Division pursues these leads and is inclined to take the
position that such individuals contacted by CIA are their
"CIA-controlled sources." If we permitted this to go on
over a period of time, CIA would have a vast network of
sources not directly available to the Bureau. This is
basically unsound, and there is no reason CIA shouldn't
immediately give us the lead or tip for exploitation.
We can recognize that, depending upon circumstances,
it
might be favorable to us and CIA for the Agency to handle
a particular individual, and if so, it would be clearly
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coordinated. This would be most important if the
individual in any way was connected with or associated
with an intelligence service.
2) DOD is anxious to have freedom to assess
and recruit Bloc diplomats not known to be engaged in
intelligence activity. On the surface, this does not
appear to present a problem, but realistically speaking
it is impossible for us to know that a Soviet diplomat,
not known to be engaged in intelligence activity one
day, appears on the scene the following week as an agent
or coopted agent. To give CIA wide latitude in this field
could create a truly undesirable mess. We believe that
if CIA is permitted to move on such targets it should be
done on a selective basis and with maximum coordination.
3) CIA's organizational and operational
deficiencies, such as lack of discipline, poor internal
coordination, unsatisfactory records, all\introduce head-
aches which undoubtedly will continue to exist for many
years.
4) There continues to be an element of mistrust
and misunderstanding between the two organizations because
of the historical reasons described above..
5) Continuing lack of one agency's appreciation
.for the other's objectives, responsibilities and operational
philosophy.
6) The absence of a clearly defined Bureau policy
and objectives in the field of foreign intelligence collec-
tion. CIA really does not know the nature and the extent
of our interests, and consequently this lends to confusion
and misunderstanding.
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4
H. CURRENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FBI AND CIA
1. According to SAC Letter 59 dated 5/24/49, CIA and FBI
had reached agreement whereby clearance would be requested of FBI
before CIA conducted an interview with an alion in the U.S. This
clearance would consist of a review of Bureau files concerning
individual in question.
According to same SAC Letter, agreement had been reached
by the FBI and CIA whereby CIA was allowed to contact American
businessmen without obtaining clearance from FBI in order to
obtain positive foreign intelligence information and arrange covers
for CIA personnel abroad. This agreement was based strictly on
collection of foreign intelligence and positively did not allow for
the formulation of a network of confidential informants for CIA
in the U.S.
Regarding FBI-CIA agreement that CIA would clear with us
prior to interviewing aliens in U.S., following documentation has
been located. By letter 2/19/48 Director of CIA Hillenkoetter
wrote Director and referred to National Security Council Intelli-
gence Directive No. 7, 2/12/48. This Directive states in part that
ČÏA will be responsible for exploitation on highly selective basis
within U.S. of business concerns, other nongovernmental organiza-
tions and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information.
Hillenkoetter commented that CIA had been interviewing foreign
businessmen, immigrants and refugees on small scale, always clearing
matter first with FBI office in area concerned. He asked Director's
views as to possible expansion of this activity.
By letter 2/26/48 Director replied to Hillenkoetter. In
part, this letter pointed out FBI had no objection to CIA inter-
viewing individuals enumerated above for foreign intelligence
purposes; however, it was suggested that prior to interview such
individual matters be cleared with FBI Headquarters.
ngeta
2. Bureau letter to CIA 1/16/64 confirmed results of meetings
between CIA and Bureau via liaison in discussing reorganization of
CIA's Domestic Operations Division (DOD). Letter recognized CIA
needs (recruitment of sources in U.S. who may be used abroad;
recruitment of diplomats, including UN representatives, who might be
useful to CIA in overseas operations or who might be transferred to
Soviet-bloc countries; training of agents recruited; handling of
agents developed abroad who come to U.S. for a visit or assignment;
…and approaches to foreign officials and visitors to assess their
potential as sources when they leave the U.S.). Our letter to CIA
set forth the following ground rules to be followed in connection with
CIA's operations in order to avoid operational conflicts and
embarrassment;
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CIA would not conduct investigation of any foreign
official in U.S. and if CIA felt such investigation warranted, FBI
should be consulted.
b. No foreign official would be approached for recruit-
ment by CIA without its conferring with FBI.
C. When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for visit or assign-
ment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding
handling of agent in this country, it being recognized each case
has its individual peculiarities.
d. Before approaching any foreign official or visitor for
recruitment assessment, CIA will clear with FBI.
3. As result of conference with CIA in January, 1966, the
above "ground rules" were modified and expanded and agreed upon by
both agencies early this year (Confirmed by letter to Admiral
Raborn 2/7/66). New ground rules in summary are as follows:
a. CIA will not initiate investigation of any foreign
official in U.S.. without concurrence of FBI. (Comment: This is
essentially same as (a) in January, 1964, ground rules. Only
difference is that wording of this modification implies more
sympathetic FBI attitude towards any proposed CIA investigations.)
○ b. CIA will seek FBI concurrence before approaching for
recruitment any foreign official or communist bloc visitor in U.S.
FBI will concur if CIA action does not conflict with any FBI
operations. (Comment: This is similar to (b) and (c) ground rules
adopted in January, 1964, with two differences. First, it drops
requirement that CIA clear with us before approaching a non-Soviet
visitor although it must still do so with regard to non-Soviet
officials. Secondly, it specifically commits the FBI to concur if
proposed CIA action does not conflict with FBI operations.)
C. CIA will advise FBI prior to meetings between CIA
assets and foreign officials or communist bloc visitors of interest
to FBI. (Comment: This was not included in previous set of
ground rules.)
d:Agents of CIA who come to U.S. will be identified to..
FBI by name or appropriate description depending on national security
interest involved.
12:
e. When CIA agent arrives in U.S. for a visit or assign-
ment, FBI will be advised and two agencies will confer regarding
handling of agent in U.S. It is recognized each case will have,
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75.
individual' peculiarities and governing principle will be positive
intelligence weighed against internal security factors.
CIA may,
however, continue its contractual relationship for purpose of handling
training, procurement of positive foreign intelligence, (under-
lining added) fulfillment of CIA commitments to the agent and
preparation for next assignment abroad.
f. Where CIA will be handling its agent in U.S., CIA
will service FBI security or counterintelligence requirements and
will provido FBI all information bearing on counterintelligence or
internal security matters. Where CIA servicing is inadequate for
FBI internal security interests, FBI will have direct access to
agent. (Comment: Rules (d), (e) and (f) represent greatly expanded
and refined version of rule (c) of January, 1964, agreement. Old
ground rules provided considerable latitude with regard to who
would handle CIA source in the U.S. and this has led to some
disagreements with CIA. The current ground rules clearly provide
for CIA to retain contact with its agents not only for training,
financing, etc., but also for "procurement of positive foreign
intelligence." In addition, they make it clear that the FBI should
not ask for direct access unless there is a specific internal
security need.)
4. In addition to the above, there is one agreement we have
reached with CIA which is of possible relevance; namely, our recent
agreement relative to treatment of Soviet students in the U.S.
By way of background, there are a number of Soviet exchange students
currently attending various U.S. universities. Each student, of
course, is not only a possible Soviet intelligence agent but also:
a potential source for the U.S. after he returns to his homeland.
Accordingly, both FBI and CIA have an interest in these students.
Per memo dated 1/14/64 we advised CIA via liaison on 1/20/64
that the Bureau would adopt following procedure relative to Soviet
students here. FBI will take responsibility for collecting material
regarding each student on expedite basis, furnishing results to
CIA as developed. At logical point FBI will confer with CIA to
decide on case-by-case basis re possible recruitment. If Bureau
recruits Soviet student, we will resolve whether we should turn
him over to CIA before he leaves U.S. Under this procedure, CIA
will not make any inquiries (through its sources in U.S.) unless
it has some unusual source in a university not available to FBI
who could furnish data on the student. In latter case, we would
allow CIA to obtain data and advise us..
•
The foregoing represent all of the major agreements we
have reached to date with. CIA. with respect to CIA operations here
in foreign intelligence field.
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I
EFFECT ON THE FBI OF FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR COLLECTION
OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
1. Overt Collection Activities
It is evident from the National Security Act of
1947 and the succeeding National Security Council Intelligence
Directives as well as the directives of the Director of
Central Intelligence that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
is charged with major responsibilities in the overt collection
of foreign intelligence in the United States. In pursuit of
this, CIA exploits non-governmental organizations and
individuals, foreign language publications and aliens.
CIA claims to have contacts with about 7,200 organizations.
and businesses as well as about 60,000 sources of information
as a result of its overt activities for this purpose, CIA
estimates it is reaching only 15 per cent of the foreign
intelligence information available in this country.
Although
The question we must consider here is whether the
FBI should take over the overt collection of foreign intelligence
in the United States, thereby making CIA operational only in
areas outside the limits of FBI's jurisdiction. In this
connection, the following would have to be considered:
(a) Reporting:
The Bureau is a fact-finding agency which has
traditionally gathered evidence and presented its findings
without bias or conclusions. This would not change.
Intelligence developed by the FBI would be evaluated by the
users in the intelligence community. Our report writing
format might have to be geared to the needs and established
procedures of the United States intelligence community.
(b)
Coordination With Other Government Agencies:
Foreign intelligence is a commodity produced for
the benefit of many separate agencies of the United States
Government. Because of this, if the Bureau were to have.
full responsibility for the overt collection of foreign
intelligence in this country, we would have to greatly
expand our liaison services, not only for dissemination
purposes but to assure that we are kept fully informed
regarding all matters dealing with intelligence priorities.
AP:
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Our role in preparation of National Intelligence Estimates
would be more active as a result of our increased contribution
under this program. It might be necessary to utilize the
assistance of highly trained personnel of other agencies to
assist us periodically on interviews dealing with complicated
military or scientific matters.
(c)
Manpower:
While no manpower requirements can be presently
estimated should we assume full responsibility for overt
foreign intelligence collection, CIA is currently using
approximately/140 employees throughout the United States to
interview individuals in connection with its overt intelligence
gathering activities, and is reaching what it estimates to be
only 15 per cent of available foreign intelligence information.
These 140 CIA employees do not include personnel required at
CIA Headquarters to correlate, evaluate and disseminate the
data gathered in the field. We would want to more effectively
exploit this intelligence potential.
To merely handle the necessary review of the vast
number of foreign language publications would require many
additional employees proficient in foreign languages and
with backgrounds in scientific or technical fields.
(d)
Selection and Training of Personnel:
To assume full responsibility for the overt
collection of foreign intelligence in this country, would
require that we vastly broaden our selection and training
procedures. We would require applicants with degrees in
the sciences, languages, history, government and economics.
Our basic training and In-Service agenda would have to be
geared to meet our new responsibilities. We would undoubtedly
desire to utilize the services of outstanding lecturers from
the agencies constituting our intelligence community, and in
turn, we would wish to afford our personnel training at the
War Colleges operated by the Department of Defense, and from
* time to time furnish them the opportunity of specialized
training, and briefings, provided by the members of the U. S.
Intelligence. Board.
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(e) Legislation:
CIA currently has the duty to correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to the national security and to provide
for appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the
Government. This is set out in Title 50, USC, Section 40%
The overt collection of foreign intelligence is not the subject
of legislation but rather of National Security Council Intelligence
Directives which would have to be revised in order to give the
Bureau this authority now lodged with CIA.
(f)
Organizational Changes:
To carry out a program committing the Bureau to
the full responsibility for the overt collecting of foreign
intelligence in this country would necessitate a substantial
increase to the headquarters staffs of the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division and the Laboratory Divison, as well to the.
personnel assigned to the New York and Washington Field Offices
where diplomatic establishments and international organizations
are mainly located In all probability the creation of a new
division at the Seat of Government devoted entirely to overt
collection responsibilities, would be required.
(g)
Observations:
The many responsibilities that would be ours under
a program making the Bureau accountable for the overt collection
of all foreign intelligence in this country would (1) require
an enormous increase in our own personnel, trained in many
specialized fields, or (2) the delegation of varied intelligence
functions to other governmental agencies and close supervision
of such agencies to insure efficient execution of the tasks
levied upon them. These overt collection responsibilities
would undoubtedly be subject to the scrutiny of many sources,
some of them hostile, and we would have to face the charges,
unjust though they might be, that the Bureau had ceased to
perform the duties for which it was originally created and.
had developed into a gigantic bureaucratic octopus.
2. Clandestine Gathering Activities
There are no statutory provisions for the clandestine
gathering of foreign intelligence in the United States. We
have in the past produced substantial foreign intelligence
while carrying out our present responsibilities.
CIA established its Domestic Operations Division (DOD)
in 1963 and began to clandestinely gather foreign intelligence
in this country. It now has six field offices with approximately
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C
40 intelligence officers assigned to these matters. It is
antidpated that DOD's efforts will become more extensive,
CIA estimates there are approximately 10,000 employees
and dependents assigned to the diplomatic establishments and
international organizations represented in this country by
approximately 120 foreign nations. It can readily be seen that
we would have to establish priorities and well-defined objectives
in order to cope effectively with the problem presented by the
vast number of persons and establishments which could be
considered for clandestine coverage.
Today there are approximately 40 nations in addition
to the Soviet-bloc countries, whose establishments in this
country we consider "target" countries for the purpose of
developing live sources therein. In the absence of more
precise criteria, our initial efforts in a program designed
to expand our clandestine gathering of foreign intelligence,
could be directed against these "target" nations.
(a) Objectives:
Under a program confined to the clandestine gathering
of foreign intelligence in this country, and consistent with
the intelligence needs of this (Government, we would have as
our objectives:
(1)
Increasing substantially the number of live
sources of high quality in diplomatic establishments,
trade missions, consular offices or international
organizations located within the United States;
(2) Expanding our present technical and microphone
coverage in such establishments.
We would, of course, maintain our "Anagram" program
which has been so successful in the clandestine acquisition of
the cryptographic systems of various foreign nations, as well
as our "Telex" program which is the technical coverage we afford
the teletype facilities of certain foreign countries.
same wording
as page
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(b)
Observations:
While a program limited to the clandestine gathering
of foreign intelligence would require a substantial increase
in manpower, both in the field and at the Bureau's headquarters,
as well as an expansion c_ our personnel selection and training
procedures, our liaison responsibilities and our filing and
data processing facilities, however; in none of these phases
would the increase be nearly as great as that which would be
required should we assume full responsibility for the overt
gathering of such foreign intelligence.
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J.
GENERAL FINDINGS
:
The study conducted by the Committee has
produced the following significant findings:
(1) There definitely is a vast potential
for collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S.
available through overt and clandestine channels.
Even with the available capabilities of existing
agencies, there is a large reservoir of untapped
sources.
(2) CIA has been authorized by statute
and implementing directives to collect foreign
intelligence in the U. S. through overt methods and
has been involved in such collection since the
establishment of the Agency. This includes review
of foreign language press and interviews with
selected individuals such as American businessmen,
aliens, and students. In addition, CIA has established
an elaborate system of processing, storing, evaluating,
and disseminating this information.
(3) Such overt collection by CIA does not
present any threat or infringement on FBI jurisdiction
or operations. The present Bureau controls for such/
CIA activity are satisfactory.
(4) We concluded that it would be highly
undesirable for the Bureau to become responsible for
overt collection of foreign intelligence in the U. S.
The necessary reorganization, expansion of facilities
and manpower, and heavy task of information collection
and processing could place a damaging burden on the
Bureau.
(5)
There has never been any statutory or
similar provision for the clandestine development by
CIA of foreign intelligence in the United States.
and as There are instances where the FBI has received specific
assignments which encompassed foreign intelligence
collection in the United States (SIS operations covering
entire Western Hemisphere in World War II; present
operations concerning Dominican Republic). There is
no statute or directive which assigns or confirms
exclusive, FBI jurisdiction. in clandestine development.
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of foreign intelligence in the United States.
As a
result of our internal security and counterintelligence
responsibilities, we have produced a volume of foreign
intelligence covertly. In addition, either at the
specific request of other U. S. agencies or on our
own initiative in response to national intelligence
needs, we have produced such intelligence. We have
done this on a solective basis and have not assumed
full responsibility in this area. As indicative of
this, certain agreements have been made with CIA
permitting that Agency to assess and recruit after
coordination with the FBI covert foreign intelligence
sources in the United States (principally for use
abroad). We have reserved the right to take over
such sources if internal security factors are paramount.
In the absence of such factors, CIA is permitted to
utilize these sources for foreign intelligence purposes.
(6) We concluded that the expanded development
of clandestine foreign intelligence sources is essential
if national security interests are to be effectively
served.
(7) Exploitation of foreign diplomatic targets.
fortifies our efforts in the internal security and
counterintelligence fields. Information developed
increases over-all knowledge and produces leads or ties
to intelligence activity being carried out by foreign
intelligence and security services.
(8) The U. S. intelligence community currently
does not provide an organization or a mechanism which can
effectively exploit the intelligence potential in the foreign
diplomatic field. There have been expressions of concern
and certain limited action taken by FBI and CIA, but there
has not been a well-organized or united effort and most
important of all, there has been a decided lack of leader-
ship directed toward attacking the problem and at the
same time inducing an atmosphere of harmonious application
of all available resources.*
f....
(9) We concluded there is an excellent
opportunity for the Bureau to assume leadership in this
matter and in so doing, enhance national security and
NW-88608-Deeld:32989629 Page 361
83.
the capabil dies of the Bureau. The le has arrived
for us to adopt and implement a new concept toward
foreign intelligence collection. It would be unwise
if the Bureau did not move into a leading role and
instead applied policy and tactics conforming with
a "holding action." This, in our opinion, is not
consistent with the reputation of a progressive and
forward looking organization.
(10) The Bureau does have talent and
capability to assume a more active role in clandestine
collection of foreign intelligence. We have the
potential to handle clandestine collection of foreign
intelligence in the U. S. in a more effective manner
than any other agency. This can be done in a constructive
and prudent manner.
(11) It is recognized that a new approach by
the Bureau will involve operational risks. If one is
to progress, he must take risks. We feel that we have
the capability to succeed with a minimum of losses
or debits.
(12) We feel that if we do not adopt a new
role characterized with an aggressive approach, a door
is left open for other agencies such as CIA to
progressively introduce programs designed to fill the
vacuum. CIA currently does not have the capability
to inject a rapid "take-over" of operational areas.
We do feel that such would be accelerated not by CIA's
strength, but by our weaknesses.
(13) CIA is progressively expanding its
objectives and capabilities to conduct clandestine
intelligence operations in the U. S. This presents
a potential for areas of conflict between CIA and FBI.
(14) We definitely must define our role in
the field of clandestine foreign intelligence collection
so that policy and objectives are clear-cut.. Not only
our own personnel but other agencies including CIA should
know exactly where we stand.
(15) CIA can be permitted to develop
clandestine sources of foreign intelligence under the
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established ground rules which do protect Bureau
interests. A new approach being recommended would
heavily deter CIA from extensive development of
clandestine sources and would really leave the
Agency in a minor or subordinate role.
85
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*
K. RECOMMENDED PLAN OF ACTION
A penetrative and objective study of the
Bureau's position has led us to conclude that the Bureau
should play a much more active and influential role in
the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the
United States. We are recommending the implementation of
a plan which will lead to a valuable contribution to our
national security effort and concurrently will improve our
internal security capabilities. This plan presents a
concept of an FBI as an Agency primarily responsible for
internal security, but supplementing its coverage with a
substantially expanded capability in the clandestine collec-
tion of positive intelligence. We believe that we have the
capability of developing this new look knowing that at the
same time we can institute a badly needed leadership to
eliminate a gap in the acquirement of high-quality intelli-
gence in the United States. The main features of this plan
are:
1) Establishment of a list of foreign diplomatic
targets consistent with the needs of the Government.
2)
Expansion of our technical surveillance
capabilities with emphasis on misurs.
3) Expansion of live sources characterized with
selectivity and high-quality valué.
4) The FBI assuming a role of leadership in the
clandestine exploita' ion of positive intelligence in the
U. S., and in so doing making maximum use of the talent and
capabilities of other appropriate U. S. Agencies.
Authorization
The plan would be implemented under proper executive
authorization (Presidential) and furthermore would be coordi-
nated with the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). A
letter from the President authorizing the Bureau to expand
its capabilities in clandestine positive intelligence collec-
tion, consistent with the needs of the government, would
suffice. In order to avoid any misunderstanding or confusion
within the intelligence community; USIB would be apprised of
the Presidential authorization. The letter from the President
Would not require any details regarding the nature and the
scope of the action to be taken by the Bureau but could be
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Ad
(
expressed in general terms. This same authorization could.
be further defined by the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
-
It is realized that it would be necessary to
discuss this plan with the President so that he fully under-
stood the purpose, scope and the controlling features. With
his approval, the plan could also be discussed with the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
Selection of Targets
B
Priority on targets can be established by appli-
cation of the following criteria:
1)
Review of requests or requirements levied on
us by the President and U. S. Intelligence Agencies.
Review of priority listed by the USIB. (This
2)
is done on a regular basis.)
3)
Our own analysis and evaluation of international
political developments. This primarily will be done at SOG,
but we should be so organized that the field would be free
to submit recommendations.
As of March, 1966, the following could be set
forth as a tentative list of priority targets in the United
States:
1)
USSR
a. Indications of significant changes in
Soviet policies, particularly with respect to relations
with the West and with Communist China.
b.
Background information illuminating the
decisions of the 23rd Party Congress, especially indications
of policy disputes or political rivalries; repercussions in
other Communist parties.
C.
Developments in Soviet space programs in
the wake of Luna 9.
2) Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia
2. Chinese Communist, Soviet and North Viet-
namese capabilities, intentions, and actions with respect to
Vietnam/Laos and to US activities in the area.
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:
b.
Indications of Soviet deployment of surface-to-
surface missiles to North Vietnam.
Changes in the attitudes and policies of influential
South Vietnamese, especially Buddhist leaders, toward the
war effort or the US.
d. Indications of a major change in Viet Cong/PAVN
and Pathet Lao military capabilities and tactics.
e. Information pertaining to the location, size, and
types of Chinese troop units in Indochina.
f. Evidence of Viet Cong/PAVN/Chinese Communist use of
Cambodia as a sanctuary, operating base, or source of supply;
Cambodian Government attitudes toward such uses.
3) Communist China
20.
Military, logistic, transportation, and economic
information bearing on Communist China's capability to fight
à war in Southeast Asia and indications of Chinese intentions
respecting direct involvement in this area,
b. Movements of Chinese submarines out of their normal
bases or operating areas, particularly toward the South China
Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin.
C. Increased air defense capability, particularly
production and deployment of advanced fighter/interceptor
aircraft.
d. Military activities in other border areas.
4) France
a.
French foreign policy, especially concerning NATO,
the USSR, the war in Vietnam/Laos and estrangement or com-
petition with the US.
5) The Dominican Republic
a. The character, strength, influence and potential of
the contending parties and factions; their capabilities
and intentions to conduct coups or insurrectionist activities;
their attitudes toward the June elections; capabilities. of
the Provisional Government to maintain control.
88-'
NW-88608_Docid:32989629-Page 366-
6)
India-Pakistan
Developments in Indo-Pakistani relations and
attitudes toward the US, the USSR and Communist China.
2..
·7) Latin America
a. Evidence of increased external Communist assistance
to insurgency movements in Latin America in the wake of
the January conferences in Havana.
8)
Indonesia and Malaysia/Singapore
a.
Political aims of the Indonesian military; Sukarno's
health and political intentions and capabilities; moves to
rebuild a Communist party.
b. Indonesian intentions to continue or reduce the
conflict with Malaysia.
Changes in Soviet or Chinese policy toward Indonesia
resulting from the current internal conflict.
C.
9) Thailand and Burma
2.
!!
Communist subversive activity and external support;
government capabilities to oppose subversion.
10) Africa
a.
African and Communist support to Southern Rhodesian
black nationalists; nationalist capabilities to act against
the Smith regime; white opposition to the Smith regime;
South African and Portuguese assistance to the Smith regime.
Effect of recent coups on the stability of other
African states.
๖.
11) Yemen
a. Evidence of intentions and actions of the UAR and
Saudi Arabia with respect to the Yemeni situation.
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Technical Surveillance of Targets
Coverage in this field will be divided into the
following categories:
1)
2)
3)
Technical Surveillances
Microphone Surveillances
Lectronic
More sophisticated electronic monitoring,
i.e. code machines.
At the present time we are handling a very limited
number of installations. With existing capabilities, we
could virtually double our present technical coverage.
Once we have established reasonable priority listing, it
is believed we should systematically expand our operations.
In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:
1) Heavy emphasis should be placed on microphone
surveillances.
2)
Today we are placing greater stress on
coverage of official establishments. The new program asks
for an expansion of coverage on individuals and/or residences
of individuals. Here again selectivity will be a dominating
characteristic.
3) The program should be so flexible that we
would be able to deactivate any installation for security
reasons or for non-productivity and whenever possible employ
techniques which would permit easy reactivation.
4) Except for current intelligence requiring
immediate dissemination, the product should be handled as
communications intelligence and dissemination would be
subjected to well-established Comint controls of the
National Security Agency (NSA) plus any additional restric-
tions the Bureau felt should be imposed.
5) The product would be transmitted to NSA by us
for dissemination within the intelligence community. NSA
would be responsible for handling any needed translation.
We must recognize that the program will produce voluminous
information and the responsibility for processing the data
should be fixed with an agency which is organized and
equipped to handle the job. It is believed that if the
Bureau assumed this responsibility we would be burdened with
a gigantic task of information processing to the point that
this element would adversely affect other phases of the
program.
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6) If the information collected by us suggested
a potential for the development of an operation, i.e.
double agent, the Bureau could assume complete control
of this operation including the dissemination of the
information.
7) Our involvement in the "sophisticated"
category should be increased by expanded research and
development bearing in mind we should be utilizing the
most productive equipment available. The importance of
this field cannot be exaggerated in light of the rapid
developments in the scientific world.
Technical Surveillance Controls
Under this plan we could furnish the President
and the Attorney General a listing of technical surveillance
targets and do so on a periodic basis. This could even
include an annual evaluation of the program.
Anagram Program (Clandestine collection of cryptographic
material)
This has been one of the more productive programs
handled by the Bureau throughout the years. We definitely
believe that this program should continue and where feasible
we should accelerate. The product would continue to be
disseminated to NSA.
Live Sources
The category of "live sources" when broadly inter-
preted includes every individual from the casual contact
to the controlled informant who is delivering high quality
information at an obvious risk. At the present time, our
sources in diplomatic establishments are for the most part
'American citizens. This situation is largely due to an
undesirable arrangement where we must first obtain clearance
from the State Department before we proceed to recruit any
employee or officials of a diplomatic establishment. This
places State in the "driver's seat" and that Department,
therefore, is practically controlling our efforts.
that such an arrangement is certainly not conducive to matter
We feel
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0
producing the best results. In our opinion this can be
removed by the President's advising the Secretary of
State that the FBI is being authorized to develop
penetrations in foreign diplomatic establishments without
obtaining clearances from State. It would be understood
that the Bureau would proceed in a discreet and secure
manner. Periodic contact with the Secretary of State or
other top State officials to discuss general developments
and any potential problems will provide a mechanism for
healthy coordination with State. We recognize that a
source can turn "sour" and, therefore, there is the danger
of potential embarrassment. However, it should be noted
that our record in this regard has been outstanding over·
the years.
Any efficient investigative agency needs sources
of all categories and we are no exception. Therefore, we
should continue our present program of general source
development, and this would include contacts who can
produce information on an occasional basis or who might
be in a position to be of assistance in a particular
investigation. In diplomatic establishments the reception
clerk, chauffeur, the maid, can always be of assistance.
However, the primary emphasis of this new program
would be directed toward high quality sources, such as:
Code clerks
1)
2) Officials who have access to files, records,
or communications
3) Officials or employees who are in a position
to penetrate communist-bloc circles or establishments
4) Members of foreign intelligence and security
services.
We
Our existing programs of seeking penetrations in
communist-bloc installations naturally must continue but
will require an increased effort toward production of-
information relating to personality data, and this should
be done on a larger number of individual targets.
realize that Bloc personnel does live in a fairly insulated
world, and elementary investigative techniques do not produce
voluminous and highly significant data. It is therefore
believed that our techniques should become more sophisticated
through additional coverage on the residences of individuals.
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Such efforts naturally fall in line with our internal
security responsibilities, but the coverage may also
provide leads for development of sources in the positive
intelligence field. Every Soviet is not a member of KGB
or GRU, but ho novertheless could offer information of
value, and he could be most useful on a long-range basis.
Our program very definitely should have this philosophy
in mind, and it is an element which must be impressed
upon our personnel in our training programs. In this
regard, we must recognize that at some point it may become
necessary to turn over recruited sources to another agency
such as CIA or one of the military services. Such turnover
will, of course, depend on the circumstances. The guiding
principle should be the preservation of the source under
the best security.
In the non-communist bloc field we would con-
centrate on development of high-quality sources to meet the
priority needs of the Government.
· Training of Personnel
At the present time, our personnel are not properly.
oriented to effectively engage in a program as recommended.
To accommodate to a new approach, it will be necessary to:
1) Include in our training classes lectures which
will cover a more detailed picture of U. S. intelligence, its
history, definition of terms, functions of intelligence
agencies.
2) Include lectures regarding the foreign intel-
ligence needs of the U. S. Government.
3) Use outstanding officials of other agencies to
lecture on special intelligence matters. This would include
the critical areas throughout the world..
4)
Disseminate a bulletin to the field on a
regular basis to emphasize foreign intelligence needs as
they relate to our capabilities.
:-
5) Institute a special In-Service class (once
or twice per year) which will concentrate on foreign
intelligence. This will be designed to develop the leaders.
or the specialists in the field.
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6) Arrange for attendance of selected/Bureau
personnel to schools of other agencies such as State
Department, CIA, and the military services.
7)
Arrange for attendance of selected personnel
at War Colleges.
8) Expand the training of Agents in the handling
of technical surveillance installations,
Reporting Procedures
This program will not require any basic departure
from our present reporting procedures. The Bureau should
not become involved in evaluating, estimating, etc. We
should endeavor to adhere to our traditional position of
reporting the facts as collected. We may wish to give
consideration to adding one feature to our regular reporting
on individuals. This could be an annex for "Personality
Data." The objective would be to maintain an up-to-date
book on everything collected relating to the subject's.
character, habits, family life, interests, weaknesses, etc.
Language Capabilities
;
An expanded program for collection of foreign
intelligence would require increased capability to handle
foreign languages. As explained above, the material
collected through technical surveillances should be handled
as communications intelligence, and the major translating
responsibility would, therefore, be placed on NSA.
We do, however, recognize that it is necessary to
maintain a strong foreign language capability in the field
wherever it may be useful to develop live sources. In
offices such as New Jork City and Washington, D. C., we
should expand the number of Agents who are fluent in French,
Russian, Polish, Czech, German, Chinese, and Spanish. An
office which is well equipped with a capability in the
foregoing is generally able to handle most situations which
arise.
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Relations with Other Agencies
If this program is adopted, other intelligence
agencies would be officially apprised of the Presidential
authority granted to the FBI to collect foreign intelligence
in the United States. Other agencies would be informed
regarding the nature and the extent of the authority boing
delegated to the Bureau. It would be necessary to make
clear that the Bureau was not assuming responsibility for
the clandestine collection of all foreign intelligence in
the United States, but we were taking a constructive step
in an effort to increase the production of foreign intel-
ligence through assets available to us. We would clearly
point out that the FBI was not taking this approach as a
solution to all of the problems relating to foreign intel-
ligence collection in this country. We would emphasize
that we would move against targets in line with established
priorities and that we would do so on a selective basis.
We would have it understood that operational activities
would be properly coordinated wherever it was obviously
necessary.
With regard to the handling of the product of
technical surveillances, it would be necessary to effect a
working agreement with NSA. To do this we might be obliged
to discuss this at the USIB level so that NSA could obtain
the required authority to support the hiring of additional
personnel and purchase of equipment for the processing of
our product. Our arrangement with NSA would include ground.
rules for processing, translation, and classification and
dissemination.
Since any announcement that we were in the foreign
intelligence field would prompt unusual interest and very
likely queries, we should brief CIA regarding the objectives
of our program. Our plan will not abrogate the existing
ground rules which permit CIA to assess and recruit positive
intelligence sources in this country under certain conditions.
Since both Agencies will have. foreign intelligence sources
in the U.S., we undoubtedly will find it useful to work out
an agreement whoreby one Agency knows that the other has
coverage in a particular area or establishment. We already
receive the identities of CIA sources. It would not be
necessary for us to identify our sources, but we could.
indicate to CIA that we had an asset in a particular area.
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us.
This would permit CIA to levy requirements on
For example, if we recruited the Third Secretary
of the French Embassy, CIA might wish to ask any number
of questions dealing with the French political situation.
If we felt that the request was reasonable, we could
handle this through our source.
It will be noted that the program doos not
preclude CIA from development of foreign intelligence
sources in the U. S. for fulfillment of CIA responsibilities.
CIA will continue to operate under existing ground rules
which are designed to protect Bureau interests.
We believe that if the program is implemented
and jells we will be in a position to "spot" sources
required by CIA and other agencies to discharge their
responsibilities. This would apply to cases where the
target was in the U. S. for a visit or if he had some
specialized knowledge not related to our internal security
responsibilities. These would be targets which other
agencies could handle without interfering with our operations
and without making us carry a load for another agency.
This particular concept should include a Bureau attitude
that any and every source handled by another agenty in tho
U. S. potentially ca.. be useful to us. We should have an
outlook that all sources should be exploited to the fullest
extent and under secure conditions. If another agency has
a capability to open a door we should take advantage of the
situation.
Our
In those instances where CIA has a source in the
United States, we should prod that agency to seek information
of interest to the Bureau, and where obviously necessary we
should arrange access to the CIA source. The important
feature of this new concept is that we assume the role of
projecting initiative, leadership and aggressiveness.
position should be such that we push the other agencies to
use their resources even to the point of healthy irritation.
We have looked at CIA as the "other agency" in
this picture, but we should not neglect. the potential of
agencies such as ACSI, Air Force, CNI and State. All of
them have entree to diplomatic circles. The day-to-day
contacts which officials of these agencies have with
personnel of foreign governments produce many "pieces" of
personality data which, when added up over a period of time,
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can prove to be extremely useful. We should confer with
these agencies regarding ways and means of recruiting
sources either to be handled by us jointly or by one of
the intelligence agencies. Here again, the Bureau can
be the dominant and pushing source.
It is believed that if we moved along the lines
described above, the Bureau, over a period of time, would
have collected valuable information regarding numerous
personalities and the inner workings of the many diplomatic
establishments. The acquirement of data of this type
creates operational strength. It places us in a position
to exploit the development of new sources, bearing in mind
that in planning our approaches we will be equipped with
ammunition not gained through casual surveillances and
observations. With the knowledge that we gain, we can
plan high quality operations. It is interesting to note
that during the past two years the information received
from CIA's sources in the United States has been fairly
voluminous and very definitely valuable. It is a good
illustration of the Bureau's gaining useful data from
another agency with a minimum of Bureau expense and effort,
but still maintaining very effective control of our juris-
dictional rights.
Undoubtedly related to the utilization of other
agencies' resources is the considerably vast potential
offered by friendly foreign security services. If the
services of Great Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Italy,
Australia and Canada provided us information collected in
Washington, D. C. and New York resulting from contacts with
communist-bloc officials, we would have another valuable
source of information. We should bear in mind that we do
spend hundreds and thousands of man-hours seeking such
information through other difficult channels.
We should utilize the friendly liaison services
along the lines described above.
Administrative Reorganization
:
=
The present administrative framework at the Seat
of Government and in the field would not be adequate to..
implement the recommended program. Placing the additional
load on our existing supervisory structure is, of course,
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out of the question. We definitely would require
increase in supervisory personnel in the Domestic
Intelligence Division. In addition, there would be a
need for more manpower in our Laboratory to handle
expansion in the technical surveillance field. There
would be a need for additional personnel to be assigned
for the development of live sources in the field. It
would be necessary to have field personnel assigned to
technical surveillance installations on a continued basis
and, of course, there would be a need for support related
to such activities as preliminary security surveys.
It is outside the scope of this Committee's
competency to outline any specific administrative re-
organization and propose what personnel, equipment and
facilities would be needed. We feel that this could be
best handled only after the objectives of the program are
approved. At that point, officials from the Seat of
Government and the field could meet to map out the necessary
reorganization. The extent of reorganization will hinge on
our decision as to the pace we should set. We recommend
that we proceed at a steady, even pace, making certain that
we lay solid groundwork for all of our activity. We should
refrain from becoming involved in a "crash" program unieŝs
national security interests obviously warrant such an
approach.
In connection with any planning for reorganization,
it would be unwise to proceed without first obtaining a
reliable inventory of our current resources. Such an
inventory would encompass the following: (1) The number
of Agents currently assigned to strictly positive intel-
ligence collection; (2) Our foreign language capabilities;
(3)
Our current sources and informants with an objective
assessment of capabilities; (4) Number of supervisors at
the Seat of Government currently handling positive intel-
ligence matters.
In connection with any plans for reorganization,
we should not neglect to give consideration to the problems
which we will encounter as time goes on in the areas of ato verts, tas våg
information storage and retrieval. We, therefore, should
realize that it would be unwise to exclude research or
study regarding the computerizing of information..
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4. ALTERNATIVES
In addition to the recommended plan set forth in
preceeding sections, there are several alternative courses
of action we might take:
1. We could take the position, and seek ways to implement
it, that the entire field of foreign intelligence collection
in the U. S., both overt and covert, should be handled by
the FBI. Such an across-tho-board approach would exclude
CIA and other U. S. agencies from foreign intelligence
collection in this country and would place exclusive
responsibility and jurisdiction in this field on the FBI.
As indicated in Section I, this would require a revamping
of existing legislation and directives and would necessitate
drastic changes in the Bureau's operations, including major
increases in personnel and costs and a substantial expansion
in our recruitment and training programs, and other reorganiza-
tion. We do not feel this approach is warranted nor do we
believe it would be a practical and sound one.
......
2. We could recommend that CIA continue to be
responsible for overt collection of foreign intelligence in
this country but that the FBI exclusively handle covert
foreign intelligence collection. This has several obvious
drawbacks. First, we would be assuming a wide range of
heavy and fixed responsibilities which in many cases would
be completely divorced from the Bureau's internal security
and counterintelligence interests. Second, we would become
to a large extent a service group for other U. S. agencies
and departments (including CIA, State, the military and others)
in the handling of a host of foreign intelligence requirements
levied by other agencies. This would involve a considerable
commitment of manpower, communication costs, etc. on the part
of the Bureau. In addition, such an approach would necessitate
significant changes in our recruitment and training procedures
and would also place on our shoulders a definite accountability
in connection with any failures in U. S. intelligence foreign
collection. It is not elieved that this approach is as sound
or desirable as our recommended plan of action: namely,' that
we expand our foreign intelligence collection efforts but on
a selective basis and without our assuming full responsibility.
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3.
We could endeavor to work out a division of
responsibility and work in this area whereby the Bureau
and CIA would each have certain primary areas of operation.
For example, the FBI could make known its willingness to
contribute more heavily in support of U. S. foreign intelligence
collection efforts and propose this field be broken into
two categories; namely, technical coverage (this would include
Anagram operations) and live informant development among
Foroign diplomats. We could propose that the FBI continue
to operate exclusively in the first category (technical
coverage) with CIA continuing to stay entirely out of this
field.
In this regard, the Bureau is better equipped than
CIA to handle technical surveillances and Anagram operations
by reason of our long experience and expertise in this area.
With regard to the second category (live sources)
we could propose that CIA conduct no operations involving
countries where the Bureau's counterintelligence interests
are paramount or significant. This would include the Sino-
Soviet-bloc countries and could also include certain other
countries, such as the Dominican Republic, where we have
already developed strong capabilities or where there are
unique factors.
With regard to other countries (nou-Bloc), wê
could propose that CIA should assume primary responsibility
for developing live diplomatic sources. However, this
would be with the clear proviso that, in the event the FBI
should develop significant internal security interests, we
would have the prerogative of levying requirements on CIA
sources, having direct access to CIA sources when needed, or
as a final step, developing our own sources if CIA could
not satisify our needs.
This alternative plan would not involve as much
manpower or other expense to the Bureau as our recommended
plan. However, it would involve our approval of CIA opera-
tions in the live informant field and would risk CIA infring-
ing on FBI interests. It is our consensus that this approach
not be adopted.
4. We could recommend that the FBI could withdraw
entirely from the field of covert foreign inteligence collection
allowing CIA to handle all aspects, including Anagram opera-
tions and both live and technical coverage. We are strongly
opposed to such an approach on the grounds that it would
drastically diminish the FBI's role in the intelligence
community, would give CIA carte blanche to operate in the
U. S., and in many instances would certainly result in CIAs
compromising on internal security and counterintelligence
operations.
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5. Finally, we could take no action to change the
current situation and, in effect, adopt a "status quo"
approach. We are opposed to this. As indicated in this
study, U. S. Government needs for foreign intelligence
are growing on an almost daily basis and CIA has made
definite efforts to move more actively into this field.
If we were to adopt a "status quo" attitude, it is only.
a question of time until this matter comes to a head;
for example, in the U. S. Intelligence Board or the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. If and
when this occurs, the decision as to the FBI's role would,
of course, be subject to the thinking and aims of people
outside the FBI, possibly including individuals who are
not sympathetic to our views. We would not be in a position
to maintain control of developments.
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