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104-10226-10001
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
MEMORANDUM FOR EXORD
SUBJECT:
21 y 1965
Yuriy Tvinovich “XOSENKO,
1. The DBP and Chief, SR met with Ambasador
Thompson in his office to advise hip of our plans to
proceed to hostile interrogation in order clarify the
2051 case. The DDP explained that while we had reached
a fira conclusion late last year that NO was a pro-
vocateur and that hostile interrogation was in order, we
decided to review these conclusions with representatives
of the FBI. After some unscoidable delay, a series of
meetings was held with the FE at the level of Deputy
Director for Security, Mr. William C. Suffixan. The find-
ings of the FBI, which agreed generally with our own views,
were formulated in a letter to the Director signed by John
Edgar Hoover. A copy of memorandum was shown to. Ambas -
sador Thompson by the DDP with the comment that the 
FBI
and ourselves now have a common understanding on 
the 
case
which was something both the DC1 and the Director, FBI,
agreed would be necessary.
2. DDP seat on to say that we would hope to begin
hostile interrogations in the near future but before we
did, we wanted to discuss the case with Ambassador Thomps on
in light of the various contingencies which might arise
DDP felt that
during the course of these interrogations.
it was preferable to advise Ambassador Thompson well in
advance of our intentions so that if consultations with
the State Department becaar necessary on a contingency
basis, Ambassader Thompson would be in possession of the
background. Ambassador Thompson first asked if we were
sure that NOSENKO could not escape and to himself into
the Soviet Embassy. We told him that we had established
him in a country house with a large security guard which
we felt made escape improbable. Ambassador Thompson then
asked if there was a possibility that MOSEKKO might commit
suicide. We said psychiatrists did not believe he was the
type to do so and that our Security surveillance was such
that we were alert to this possibility and would try to
prevent it. Ambassador Thompson also wondered if there
had been any communications 
concerning NOSESIO from the
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Sovier side. ke replied there had been nonë since the
confrontation Fast year following NOSENKO's arrival in
this 
country. We then mentioned the attempts on several
occasions by NOSENKO's wife and mother 
to contact him
through the Embassy in Moscow but added that these attempts
ceased in 
March 1964 and nothing has been heard from them
since.
3.
Ambassador Thompson then asked if XOSENKO had
provided information which would discrédit any American
officials
: We answered in the negative, pointing out
that 
he had reported on former French and Canadian
ambassadors
. We later qualified the statement on Americans,
pointing 
out that NOSENKO did provide information, on a few
Americans 
of lesser rank as well as private citizens.
.
The DDP then noted that after we reached a
point of no return in our interrogations, we might decide
that NOSENKO 
would have to be turned back. Ambassador
Thompson expressed concern that the Soviets might use this
action to discourage defections. We explained that when we
came to the point that a turn-back appeared desirable, we
would 
hope that a statement could be made by the U. S. Govern-
ment which would 
establish NOSENKO, as a provocateur.
DDP then described 
the AEJOYFUL case in brief terms to
The
Ambassador Thompson, emphasizing the parallel planning and
the possibility 
that a quadripartite statement by the govern -
ments might be considered. 
The DDP did note, however, that
AEJOYFUL was in 
British hands and that they have the major
responsibility even though we and other security and intelli-
gence 
services had agreed on the handling of the case. The
DDP then noted 
that in past cases where we had turned back
people with intelligence backgrounds at their own request,
the Soviets 
had not made publicity capital of these actions.
5. The earlier mention of our discussions with the
FBI recalled to Ambassador Thompson some of the material on
Soviet 
political issues which he has been receiving recently
from the FBI. He commented 
that it was his very strong im-
pression that 
the information was being fed to us by the
Soviets. 
He said that it either consisted of information
we already knew or that which the Soviets would not object
to our having. He asked our views on this. The DDR com-
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pented that it was the opinion of several officers in
the Clandestine 
Services that some of these FBI sources.
were under Soviet 
control whereas the FBJ believed them
to be 
genuine.
0. In summing up our position on the KOSENKO case
for Ambassador Thompson, the DDP referred to the kinds of
information the 
Soviets had given up through XOSENKO.
made particular 
reference to the Jolmson and observed
lie
that if 
the Soviets were prepared to provide this kind of
build-up to insure the 
success of NOSENKO's mission, it
must then be 
very important to them. In conclusion, the
DDP said that he would send a letter for the record to
Mr. 
Hughes on the topic of NOSENKO to which Ambassador
Thompson 
agreed.
David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division