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1 April 64 SRC Copy Detached
FR 1964
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11.
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12.
13.
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RID/FI
FILE TITLE
MICROFILMED
APR 9 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.
78: Hoje, both
AMGARDEN-1 and AMCARISON-z
its: Citizengo Newsp
riptive. Believe they
social contact: RECTMARY
it some tips?
been
appropriate here.
HR. they ... S. Co
22
believe that was
as calle difor. Note arrow,
106
Bert has not been brick
chart. I've used WAVE for
biographic cute in order to
incheté
cer
TRACE
REQUEST
DATE MICROFILMED
ABSTRACT
INDEX
- ORM
610a
1.63
t'. PREVIOUS
FULTIONS
K
FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)
DOCUMENT DE 21-746416
DOCUMENT NUMBER
UFGA
14781
7 apr/964
SECRET
Pr
44037
64
41400
14-00000
DISPATCH
Chief, Special Affairs Staff
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
"
MICROFILMED
APR9 1981
DOC: MICRO. SER.
PRO.
POSED
✗
PROCESSING
ACTION
ACCOM
PLISHED
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM
201-746416
Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with AMCARBON-1
EQUIRED REFERENCES
Paragraph 10
ACTION REQUIRED:
REFERENCES
:
A.
1.
WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962
D.
E.
DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964
INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review
This review.
of the nature of its relationship with AMCARBON-2.
indicates that the relationship with AMCARBON-2 evolved from that
action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security
breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was
being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the
establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT
South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some
way related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARBON-2
stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis
situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the
Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain.
As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made
that JMWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida
news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news
media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity
spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might
come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established
with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE
might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of
achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3,
which would simultaneously insure the security of JMWAVE's operations
and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for
surfacing certain select propaganda items.
Attachments:
A
-
B
-
USC
att'd in RID/AN
Five Newspaper Clippings'
Identities
Distribution:
INDEX
3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts,
GROUP 1
1 CROSS REFERENCE TO
In the period October to
(CONTINUED)
201-746416
DATE TYPED
DATE DISPATCHED
19 March 64.
APR 2 1964
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-14781
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
duri
durils
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
3. AMCARBON 1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER.
♦ 201-
AMCARBON-1 originally
started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk,
and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment
which entailed covering major political developments in Florida.
At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the
Identity 3.
Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made
the Identity 4. This assignment was considered to be a significant
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December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3
was handled via AMCARBON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARBON-2
ade the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARBON-1
In order that there be a backup contact, in the event that
AMCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as
REUTEMAN
EUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3.
greed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARBON-2
osted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the 
Miami Club in the
Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced
IMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial 
meeting 
on
12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with
AMCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes
In view of
to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission
.
this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the
nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during 
the
period December 1962 to March 1964.
As
this
2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JMWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARBON-1
When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCARBON-2
reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating
with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for 
AMCARBON-1's
benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of
reference which should prevail in his relationships 
with 
REUTEMAN.
In this review, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that it was the policy
of the Identity 3 that it would take no action 
which would
purposely, embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida 
operations
.
a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KUBARK's operations
in South Florida did come to the attention of the 
Identity 3,
material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate 
attention.
AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that 
such items should 
be
In addition, AMCARBON-2
discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner.·
made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1
should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative 
to how any 
particularly
embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, 
so that it
would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the 
same time, would
not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of 
the Identity 3.
In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if 
AMCARBON-1 
brought
a potentially embarrassing item 
to REUTEMAN's attention and
remedial action on the matter was not taken 
by REUTEMAN 
within
a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would 
feel 
free
AMCARBON-2 pointed
to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's 
part.
out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3,
REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available 
for contact 
by
telephone or periodic personal meetings at 
which AMCARBON-1
and AMCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends 
and developments 
in
Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised 
AMCARBON-1 that 
this
arrangement did not mean that AMCARBON-1 could 
expect to obtain
The 
point was also
any classified information from REUTEMAN.
made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of
classified information, but he should be alert to 
steering 
tips
which REUTEMAN might furnish him on 
fast-breaking news stories.
AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood 
the frame of reference
This 
frame of reference
which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2.
has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1
during the period December 1962 to 
March 1964.
3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER.
AMCARBON--1 originally
started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk,
and subsequently advanced from this assignment 
to an 
assignment
which entailed covering major political 
developments in Florida
.
At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a 
feature writer for the
Identity 3.
Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made
the Identity 4. This assignment was considered 
to be a 
significant
s
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promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by
the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert
on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area
and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a
long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned
about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCARBON-1 is regarded
in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has
a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American
affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse
of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin
AMCARBON-1
American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles.
has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting
to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion 
that
AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist,
and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact
who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, 
bearing
in mind that he does have long-term potential.
4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the
traditional pattern of source protection which is common to
newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers,
AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true 
identity of all of his
sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON
-1 has 
identified
some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order 
that meaningful evaluations
could be made of that information which AMCAREON
-1 had passed to
KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting 
identifications
of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations 
with
AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON
-1's sources 
include
the following persons:
a.
*R
Luis FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general
of the DRE.
b.
Manolo RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.
C.
Havana Times.
Carlos HODD
y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct
d.
e.
AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437)
Aureliano
SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA.
AMCARBON-1
✓f. Edmund LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau.
regards this source as being particularly interesting
, 
in view
of the fact that LEAHY's daughter 
is a secretary in the office 
of
Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.
R
g. Frank FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and
adventurer.
N
h
j.
11
Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.
SUAREZ
Luis MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.
Juan BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of
the Dominican Republic.
k. Charles KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.
1. Jorge WVOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of ||
AMCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY
USIA in Miami.
is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York 
Times, but 
this
does not deter AMCARBON-1 
from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a
source of information.
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5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used
In such 
instances,
to carry out certain operational 
support tasks.
AMCARBON-1 makes his inquiries 
or carries out 
the required action
within the context of his normal 
journalistic activities.
use of AMCARBON-1 for operational 
support tasks enables 
JMWAVE to
Several
harness the investigative 
facilities of the Identity 3.
examples of how AMCARBON-1 
has been used in operational 
support
tasks are outlined below:
The
201-356 702,
a. Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew' *ORDONO
Camps, PPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara
, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived
The details of this
in Miami and was given 
routine CAC processing.
processing are contained in 
MIAM-0085, dated 
12 March 1963.
being released by CAC, 
ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 
3, and
In view of this story, JMWAVE
This effort was not productive,
AMCARBON-1 did locate
a sensational story was developed.
tried to locate ORDONO 
for 
debriefing.
thus AMCARBON-1 was asked 
to locate 
ORDONO.
ORDONO in Houston,
details.
Texas.
After
See WAVE--6307, dated 25 March 1963, for
b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group.
In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, 
Headquarters suggested that
JMWAVE might be able to 
discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611)
of the MRR splinter group 
as a result of BANDIN's overinflated 
claims
Headquarters' interest in
relative to his faction 
invading Cuba.
discrediting BANDIN was also 
stimulated 
by the fact that 
BANDIN's
irresponsible publicity 
stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-
1.
As a result of Headquarters
' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had
a luncheon session with 
AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at 
which
AMCARBON-1 was advised 
that the BANDIN faction of the MRR 
was less
than accurate in its claims 
relative to its activities in 
Cuba.
In view of this, REUTEMAN 
suggested that the Identity 3 might 
want
to soft peddle any future 
war communiques which the BANDIN faction
AMCARBON
-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's
might release.
comments, the Identity 3 would not only 
soft peddle, but 
would
Once BANDİN was 
discredited
ignore the BANDIN 
faction in the future.
As a result
with AMCARBON-1, the word 
was soon leaked 
by AMCARBON-1 
to 
other
newspapermen that 
BANDIN was not a reliable source.
of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage
in South Florida 
since September 1963.
In the period February 1963
6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
to February 1964, AMCARBON-1 has furnished JMWAVE with operational
intelligence as 
outlined below:
AMCARBON-1
a. In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963,
reported that AMBEND-1 was 
back in Miami and was 
the object of
a great deal of press 
interest in view of AMBEND-1's release 
from
AMCARBON-1 also indicated that 
AMBEND-1 would
a Havana prison.
probably be a knowledgeable source on the 
current 
activities of 
the
Subsequent
This 
operational intelligence was most helpful in
UR in Cuba.
terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on 
AMBEND-1's 
movements.
developments revealed 
that AMCARBON-1 could not contact 
AMBEND-1,
and thus AMBEND
-1's return to the United States 
did not 
cause the
publicity stir that was 
initially anticipated.
b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1
The 
intent 
of this
reported that the Identity 
3 was attempting to research a 
full
feature article on 
the Bay of Pigs invasion.
article was to furnish 
a recapitulation of 
the 
entire tactical
situation. In this 
connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he 
was
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✓ CARLSON,
thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. CAR
residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the
Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were
of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would
soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1 that
he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the
The receipt
opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney.
of this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSON
on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had
played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn,
enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting
with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this
Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story
was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish
his research.
C. In WAVE 1904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-l advised
JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the
Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting
to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic
missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled
JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles
which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.
d.. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1
gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with
This
AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963.
information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1
was telling the press.
e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 
1963 
with
AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence
was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's
representatives-were telling the outside world about their
operational activities.
f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1
informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were
being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK
This
vessels which were located in South Florida waters.
information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was
Armed with this warn-
going to be directed toward the Identity 5.
ing, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity
repercussions from a renewed press interest in the 
Identity 5.
AMCARBON-1
g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963,
reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from
Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to 
one
This lead was examined by JMWAVE,
Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru.
This examination revealed
Headquarters and the Lima Station.
that the letter was written by a crackpot%; thus, there was no
real operational potential in this lead.
the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant
operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.
This incident did underscore
h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1
advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous 
telephone calls
indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who 
had 
defected
from a Cuban fishing vessel might 
be an individual who had 
previously
At the same
been seen in Miami during November or 
December 1963.
time, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought
that these telephone calls indicated that 
GUIROLA was not a bona
fide defector, but was either a GOC agent 
or a KUBARK plant, who
was being used as a means of 
creating an incident which would
embarrass the GOC, as a result of their 
fishing boats 
penetrating
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United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN advised AMCARBON-1
that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation
against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that
it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result
of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check
out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time,
AMCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might
lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a
plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.
7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully,
during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet
through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in
the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed
in this field are outlined below:
a.
AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally
surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de
las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo.
The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-l's information
relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario
de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers
in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series
of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1
was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt
they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions
of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-
was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an
opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a
JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, AMCARBON-1
wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article
in the series received front page headline play. The series of
articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an
excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other
propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up
by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America.
The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated
14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174,
dated 21 October 1963.
b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964,
JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba
to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that
select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over
to them. It was believed that this information would make a good
human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC
propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items
from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States
territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was
given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in
Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out,
and an article outlining the points which were of interest to
JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the
Identity 3.
c. LAYC Story.
The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago,
Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida
newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 
March
1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the
Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering
tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC
to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC 
was
subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition 
of the 
Identity
(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through
c above are attached for Headquarters information.)
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8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to
obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during
the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally
unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of
contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile
intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing
in the overt press. As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of in;
inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently,
As a
he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence.
matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive
intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely
to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political
scene. It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome
this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for
the collection of positive intelligence.
9. COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARBON-1
has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest,
Our
cooperative and who understands the need for security.
relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter
In view of this,
of that information which he passes to KUBARK.
JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARBON-1 in the same manner
that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our rela-
tionship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our
operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relation-
ship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have 
diffi-
As a
culties with the media outlets in the South Florida area
.
result of our continuing relationship with AMCARBON-1, a special
activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.
10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON-1
and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.
END OF DISPATCH
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THE MIAMI HERALD Friday, March 6, 1064
Latin Youth Group in Chile
Organized by a Cuban Red
By DON BOINING'
of Our Lalin America Staff
A small, but significant
Communist-dominated,
Cuban-inspired Latin youth
group convenes Monday in
Santiago, Chile.
About 400 representatives
of Latin American youth
organizations, for the most
part Communist oriented, are
expected to attend the second
Latin American Youth Con-
gress.
It has an interesting.
anatomy. And whether by
design or accident, both its'
timing and locale have polit
ical significance
Chile is one of five Latin
countries which still
maintains diplomatic rela-
tions with Cuba. It also is
considered the one most like-
ly to vote itself Communist.
Presidential elections will
be held in September, a lead
ing contender is Salvador
Allende, candidate of the
Communist controlled Popu-
lar Action Front (FRAP).
Allende lost by 35,000 votes
in 1958 to outgoing president
Jorge Alessandri.
A provincial election to
name a national deputy will
be held next week, a day:
after the Youth Congress
closes. Outcome of the elec-'
tion may provide an indica-
tion of which way the coun-
try will go in September.
Principal organizer of the
Youth Congress is a 35-to-10.
year old Cuban Communist'
namod Joaquin Mas
Martinez. A U.S. official de
scribes him as "one of the
brainlest" of the Castro'
followers.
Mas stepped in last fall!
when the Congress, originally
scheduled for July of 1963,
faltered Cuban exile groups
claim he gets his Instructions
for the Congress directly
from Moscow.
Mas, a former president of
the School of Social Science
at the University of Havana
'and now vice president of the
University Student Federa-
tion, arrived in Chile in
September.
No quieldy organized the
International Preparation
Comunittes for the CongrCB
National preparation groups
began to sprout up in other
Latin countries at the same
unio.
.
Chilean authorities ordered
him expelled several Unies as
a "foreign agent" Each Ume
Communist and Socialist
party officials intervened in
his behalf.
Mas left Chile Nov. 20 for
Brazil, Bolivia and Venezuela
where he conferred with
other Communist leaders,
then went on to Prague and
Moscow.
Ho returned to Santiago
Dec. 26. He was met at the
Nous Andysis
A January, 1963,
preparatory meeting for the
Second Congress nearly fiz-
zled when the Cuban delega-
tion was detained in Mexico
on its way to Santiago. The
Panamanian representative
flew from Santiago to Mexico.
to confer with the Cubans,
then returned to Chile and
the meeting resumed. The
July date was set, an agenda
agreed on and the theme
"Fight of the Young for
Peace" was adopted
In March, however, another
"International": preparation.
meeting was held in Cuba,
ŕ
country. This time Chilean
Interior minister Dr. Sotero
del Po Intervened and Mas
come back."
But for Mas, the Congress.
may not have come off.
It is an outgrowth of the
first Lation Anierican Youth
Congress held in Cuba in
1000. It was there the "Cuba
SI, Yankee no" theme was
attended only by Cuban
youth representatives. Theme
for the Congress was changed.
to read "For the Liberation
of Latin America" and it
"anti-
took on a more
imperialist" tone.
Nothing more was heard
until mid-summor with little
Interest apparently being
generated among Latin youth
groups. The Congress was re-
scheduled for August and
again didn't take place..
To salvage lost prestige, It
was announced in late August
the Congress would be held in
Ait
'
Santiago consideration of
numerous petitions."
Since its inception, Cuban
exile organizations in Miami
have waged a heated
propaganda campaign against
the Congress.
A letter from a top Soviet
Aldo
youth official to
Alvarez, leader of the Cuban
Nausnal Preparation:
Committee for the Congress,
was reproduced and circulat-
ed by the exiles. In it,
specific instructions for or-
ganizing the Congress are
outlined.
Exile groups have promised
to send representatives to
Santiago when the Congress
convenes to "denounce the
Communist effort to
brainwash the youth of Latin
America."
MIAMI HERALD
6 March 1964
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