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JOHN A. MCCONE
THE SIXTH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
By
Walter Elder
Edited by Mary S. McAuliffe, DCI Staff Historian
1987
The attached is a draft history
which has not been forwarded for
review outside the DCI History Staff.
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CHAPTER IV
In the meanwhile, Cuba remained a sore point for both the CIA and
the Kennedys.
Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy asked General
Maxwell Taylor to chair a small commission, consisting of Robert
Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleign Burke, to investigate.
Highly critical of the piecemeal and acquiescent administrative
decisions which had accompaned the operation's progress, the Taylor
report was mild in comparison with the severely critical internal
report prepared by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick.
Robert Kennedy also produced a personal Bay of Pigs report to the
President, which he discussed with McCone in late November 1961. The
Attorney General was especially critical of Richard Bissell, Deputy
Director for Plans, because Bissell had told the President the
operation was likely to succeed. Robert Kennedy was also highly
critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for spending only twenty
minutes studying the planned operation before making its first report
´ to the President endorsing the operation.
It is worth noting that McCone was the only official in the
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government privy to all the studies of the Bay of Pigs operation,
including the Taylor report, Robert Kennedy's personal report, the
Kirkpatrick report, and the views of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
McCone did not dwell on the Bay of Pigs after he took office, but
he did draw several conclusions. Firmly believing the decision to go
ahead was a mistake, he nevertheless thought it an even worse mistake
to dismember the operation once underway, contending that the CIA
should have appealed directly to the President to reverse the
decision to stand down the air strikes. Concluding as well that the
members of the Taylor commission had been too closely involved with
the events to have sufficient perspective, he believed the CIA and
JCS had to bear special responsibility for advising the new President
to go ahead, since at that time these were the only two Washington
organizations dealing with international affairs which possessed
complete continuity.
Taking a detached view of the operation, McCone was able to
concentrate on what the Agency could do to avoid similar mistakes in
the future. Leery of large-scale operations involving the Agency's
paramilitary capability, McCone strove, with mixed results, to remove
the CIA from such enterprises. He also stressed the importance of
planning an operation from beginning to end (an attitude which
dominated his approach during the Cuban missile crisis). Finally, he
insisted that the Agency's estimative function be privy to planned
operations, providing early and frequent judgments.
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Cuba, however, remained a subject of considerable concern. In
April 1961, shortly after President Kennedy established the Taylor
Commission, Presidential adviser Walt Rostow speculated that Cuba
might join with the Soviet Union in setting up an offensive air or
missile base. He additionally posed that Cuba might build its
conventional military strength and develop its subversive network to
threaten other Latin American nations from without and within. "Its
ideological contours are a moral and political offense to us," he
concluded, "and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove
that offense...."
The Kennedy administration proceeded to address the situation
directly. At a White House meeting which McCone attended in late
November 1961, the President announced that General Edward Lansdale,
acting under the direction of the Attorney General, had already begun
to study possible actions to overthrow the Castro regime. These
covert activities, explained Robert Kennedy, included anything
possible to create internal dissension and discredit Castro. He then
proposed that, to accomplish this goal, Lansdale head up a committee
made up of representatives of Defense, State, USIA, and CIA, which
would cut across organizational lines.
McCone decided that the administration and the Agency both seemed
in a state of shock so far as Cuba was concerned. Although skeptical
from the beginning about the Lansdale program's prospects for
success, he nevertheless recognized that the CIA had a special role
and responsibility so far as Cuba was concerned.
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He himself
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supported the notion of dynamic action, but urged that such action
not be reckless. Consequently, he recommended that the Lansdale
group report to the 5412 oversight committee, which was properly
qualified to give political guidance and evaluate proposals for
action. In addition, although McCone agreed the facilities of all
agencies should be made available for such high-priority operations,
he emphasized that these should remain in place and not be removed to
form a new unit under Lansdale.
In this way, MONGOOSE, as it came to be known, was launched.
With the White House's decision to go ahead (keeping the 5412
Committee fully informed), McCone proceeded to discuss the Lansdale
operation with top Agency officials. Acknowledging that the project
had to be closely held--Lansdale had asked that the CIA'S
representative, Richard Helms, report only to the DCI--McCone
nevertheless stated he intended to skip no appropriate echelon of the
Agency, as such a course would deprive him of the advice of other
senior officers. Action would be at the Helms level, and the Agency
would offer Lansdale all necessary support and assistance, but
without excluding the participation of other Agency members within
the strict security guidelines laid down by the President. Further,
McCone directed the Board of National Estimates and the DD/I to
undertake a continuing evaluation of MONGOOSE, viewing such
precautions as a major step toward overcoming the compartmentation
which had excluded the DD/I from any advance knowledge of the Bay of
Pigs landing.
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Most
Significantly, McCone insisted on bringing analytical and
estimative functions to bear on Cuban operations from the beginning.
Further, he insisted that truly clandestine actions be small.
importantly, he required that careful records be kept of actions and
conversations, himself setting an example by keeping meticulous
memoranda for the record.
MONGOOSE represented McCone's first working encounter with Robert
Kennedy. The Attorney General, McCone immediately realized, was a
dynamic force with a keen interest in the intelligence community, as
well as a strong influence on the President. McCone became quite
close to him. MONGOOSE also reinforced McCone's awareness of the
extent of the administration's obsession with Cuba. He consequently
accepted as a personal charge the administration's desire to
overthrow Castro. He was not, however, about to allow Lansdale or
anyone else dictate the use of CIA sources. Had he detached Agency
resources for Lansdale's use, McCone would have lost control.
further insisted on the checks and balances of 5412 committee
overview.
He
The Special Group (5412 Committee), made up of the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other appropriate
representatives, had been established in 1955 by National Security
Council Directive 5412/2 to provide interdepartmental coordination of
covert actions. In general, the Group's cognizance extended to any
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covert activity which, because of its impact, could, if exposed,
reflect on the official position of the United States. Thus, a
sizeable activity aimed solely at intelligence collection through
clandestine methods could come under the Group's scrutiny.
Conversely, small political actions, with little flap potential,
could be undertaken without referring the activity to the Group.
The Kennedys, however, were sufficiently alarmed over the threat
of Communist subversion and covert aggression that, in January 1962,
another special committee, Special Group (Counterinsurgency),
appeared.
Largely the brainchild of General Maxwell Taylor, Special
Group (CI) aimed at identifying those areas where an insurgent threat
existed or threatened to emerge, directing the use of appropriate
resources to counter that threat.
In practice, the CIA had always been reluctant to
expose its
activities to an interdepartmental body. The Defense Department had
been similarly reluctant to submit its extensive program of
peripheral reconnaissance flights to Special Group review, although,
beginning in June 1961; the group began to consider these flights.
The Special Group's influence depended, in the final analysis, on the
attitude of the President and the Special Group chairman, as well as
on the temper of the DCI. Allen Dulles served as an advocate for the
CIA's proposed activities. John McCone took the position that, as
DCI, he was a personal adviser to the President and thus free to
approve or disapprove the CIA's proposals as he saw fit.
The entire Cuban situation was difficult from the outset, and
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[With the
approval of
McCone was careful to warn the President and Attorney General that he
'anticipated no quick or easy road to success.
Ambassador Alphand, a close personal friend of McCone, the French
embassy in Havana had agreed to serve as the Agency's Cuban eyes and
ears, with Philippe de Vosjoli, SDECE's Washington representative,
reporting directly to McCone. De Vosjoli reported that at least
ninety percent of all Cubans supported Castro, while McCone added
that of twenty-seven or twenty-eight CIA agents in Cuba, only twelve
presently were in communication. Contact even with these was
infrequent, and an additional team of seven, infiltrated in December,
had been captured (with two featured on a television "confession"
show).
Nevertheless, at a Special Group meeting in April 1962, McCone
urged a review of our national policy toward Cuba and asked that we
consider more aggressive action, including direct military
intervention. Noting that various intelligence reports suggested
that Castro was in deep trouble, he questioned whether the military
strength of the Castro government was as large and as effective as
had been understood. In response to objections that such a course
might lose us friends in Latin America, McCone countered that a show
of strength was more likely to win than lose us friends.
1
Shortly thereafter, McCone learned from the Attorney General that
there was some movement afoot to exchange our prisoners from the Bay
of Pigs for food. (Castro had offered to release the prisoners in
exchange for a large quantity of drugs and medicines).
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early June, McCone suggested forming a committee to negotiate such a
release. Robert Kennedy was generally sympathetic, but did not at
that time request covert support for the project. The subject was
left for further discussion, with an agreement that it would not be
discussed with anyone in CIA, Defense, or State who was active in
Cuba operations.
In mid-July, McCone and Robert Kennedy reviewed the Cuban
situation in considerable detail. Kennedy thought that, although
considerable intelligence had been acquired, the program's action
phases had been disappointing. Shortly after, McCone had the
opportunity to review MONGOOSE with the President. Since the
beginning of February, McCone reported, nine intelligence collection
teams (about half the originally-planned number) had been infiltrated
into Cuba and maintained in place, thousands of Cuban refugees had
been systematically interrogated in Florida, and a number of
third-country agents recruited inside Cuba. U-2 overflights were
being conducted on a regular two-a-month schedule. The operation was
costing the CIA about $1 million per month in direct costs and even
more in indirect support costs.
Although McCone was skeptical about the aims and operations of
MONGOOSE, he believed the CIA bore a special responsibility to
collect intelligence on Cuba. He therefore told the President that
this collection effort had produced a substantial amount of hard
intelligence on conditions inside Cuba, and a continuation would
provide additional intelligence, possibly revealing opportunities for
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political, guerrilla or insurgent activities designed to overthrow
Castro. McCone added, however, that many individuals felt that more
dynamic actions were called for, including mass landings and military
activity. McCone did not agree. Our intelligence, he said, did not
support this point of view, and any such attempts would face disaster
unless the United States was prepared to commit large military forces
to support them.
In the meantime, Castro had officially cast his lot with the
Soviet Union, and indications were increasing that the USSR was
willing to invest substantial amounts of money, not only to keep the
Cuban leader afloat, but to enhance his capability to create mischief
for the United States. After 1 February 1962, our U-2 flights over
Cuba increased from one to two per month, and intelligence reports
revealed steady Soviet shipments of military as well as economic aid.
On August 4, McCone learned that eleven Soviet ships believed to
be carrying arms were bound for Cuba. McCone asked for further
details. On August 5, he received a breakdown on the ships, and he
directed immediate U-2 coverage (which began the following day).
According to reports, up to 5,000 Soviet technicians had arrived, in
addition to military communications equipment. The preliminary U-2
readout, however, was not very helpful, and another flight was
planned for August 11.
On August 10, McCone met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
presidential military adviser General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy,
Deputy Secrety of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Attorney.
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General. It was during this meeting, which approved intensifying
MONGOOSE operations, that McCone first shared outside the CIA his
fear that the Soviets might introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.
His statement had little immediate impact. The experts unanimously
and adamantly agreed that this was beyond the realm of possibility.
McCone's conclusion that the USSR might put offensive missiles
into Cuba was set in motion by the continuing influx of Soviet
military equipment. It was intensified by the arrival of Soviet
personnel, then brought to a head by reports which suggested that the
Soviet Union was preparing to install surface-to-air missiles (SAMS)
there.
Why, asked McCone, would the Soviet Union place SAMs in Cuba? If
the United States were to launch a military attack, the SAMs could be
easily and quickly destroyed.
protect Cuban canecutters;
The SAMs were not being put there to
therefore, McCone argued, their real
purpose was to blind the United States by deterring further U-2
overflights. This action would then permit the Soviet Union to take
further steps which they could reveal at a time of their own choosing.
McCone then asked himself what he would do if he were in
Khrushchev's shoes. The United States and Soviet Union were balanced
in nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but the USSR had a
decided edge in intermediate and medium-range missiles. These
missiles could not, however, reach the United States from Soviet
launch pads. The USSR had not deployed these missiles outside its
borders, presumably because they could be redirected against the
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As
Soviet Union if they fell into the wrong hands. However, Cuba was
one place where the Soviets could safely put their missiles.
McCone put it, "If I were Khrushchev, I'd put offensive missiles in
Cuba. Then I'd bang my shoe on the desk and say to the United
States, 'How do you like looking down the end of a gun barrel for a
change? Now, let's talk about Berlin and any other subject that I
choose, including all your overseas bases.
$ 11
McCone had confidence in the logic of his conviction and was
prepared to alert the top policy levels. He recognized that he
lacked hard evidence, but was convinced that the implications of
putting Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba would be so serious for
American national security interests that the contingency should be
considered as soon as possible.
He stood absolutely alone.
(
At noon on August 21, he met with Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, the
Attorney General, Maxwell Taylor, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff), and McGeorge Bundy to review the Cuban
situation. He noted that since their last meeting on Cuba, the CIA
had received intelligence indicating an enormous increase in Soviet
military support to Cuba. Further, there now were indications of
construction work by Soviet personnel, as well as technicians to
handle the newly-delivered Soviet equipment. While the nature of the
construction remained unknown, McCone warned that it could be missile
sites. For, he emphasized, we had to consider the possibility that
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the Soviets would install offensive weapons in Cuba.
The group proceeded to consider various courses of action open to
the United States should the Soviets place MRBMs in Cuba.
some other
McCone had
a three-part proposal already in hand, calling for 1) an immediate
aggressive political action program to awaken Latin America and the
Free World; 2) a provocative action against Guantanamo or
vital American interest, leading to instant United States
retaliation; and, 3) immediate commitment of sufficient U.S.
military forces to occupy Cuba, destroy the regime, free the people,
and establish Cuba as a member of the community of American States.
McCone noted that the group was reluctant to consider committing U.S.
military forces, however, both because of the magnitude of the task
and because of concern about Soviet retaliatory actions elsewhere in
the world.
Reaching no conclusions on any course of action, the group at
length asked McCone to brief the President on the situation. The
following day, McCone reported in detail to the President, adding the
personal report of De Vosjoli, who had recently visited Cuba. The
President, who appeared quite familiar with the situation, expressed
concern, but agreed with General Taylor and McCone that policy
decisions should wait until the next day, when he would meet with his
principal advisers.
On August 23, therefore, President Kennedy met with Rusk,
McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone to discuss Cuba. The
President requested an analysis of the threat which offensive
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missiles located in Cuba posed to the United States and Latin'
America. He requested as well a continuing analysis of the numbers.
and types of Soviet and Oriental (as reported by De Vosjoli)
personnel being introduced, the quantities and types of equipment,
their probable uses, and all construction activity in Cuba. In
response to the President's question about our ability to
discriminate between SAM and surface-to-surface missile sites, McCone
said we probably could not differentiate between SAM sites and
350-mile surface-to-surface missiles, but that MRBMs and IRBMs could
McNamara noted that portable missiles could not be
be distinguished.
located under any circumstances.
The President wondered whether we should make a statement of our
position in advance, outlining the courses of action open to us in
the event that the Soviets should install missiles in Cuba. He also
asked what we could do against such missile sites. Could we take
them out by air action, or would ground action be required?
Could
they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla action? He also asked
what we should do in Cuba if the Soviets decided to precipitate a
crisis in Berlin.
Secretary Rusk received approval for his proposal that the United
States inform its NATO allies, particularly Canada, of the growing
seriousness of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however,
strongly opposed his recommendation to remove restrictions on
MONGOOSE operations operating out of Guantanamo. McCone again
proposed his three-part program to combat the current Cuban
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situation.
After consideration, the President directed the Defense
Department to prepare contingency plans for possible military action
against Cuba. He and his advisors agreed, however, that no steps
should be taken until full agreement was reached on a policy aimed at
completely solving the Cuban problem.
Cuba was our most serious problem, McCone shortly afterward told
Robert Kennedy, adding that, in comparison, he would readily give up
our missile bases in Italy and Turkey. Cuba, he told the Attorney
General, was more important than Berlin. It was the key to Latin
America; and if Castro succeeded, then most of Latin America would.
fall to Soviet influence and domination.
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forty-eight hours should the President's terms not be met.
Sunday morning, October 28, with U-2 overflights continuing and
no evidence of slow-down on the Cuban missile sites, Moscow
broadcast yet another Khrushchev communique--this one announcing
that, in the interest of world peace, the Soviet Union had agreed to
dismantle and return the Cuban missiles under United Nations
verification. Not waiting for the official text, the President
drafted a quick acceptance.
The immediate crisis was over.
Serious problems, however, remained. It had become clear to
McCone that removing Castro no longer was an objective of American
policy, and he was concerned that, as a result of Soviet military
and economic aid, Castro would be left in a position to create much
mischief. Since no agreement had been reached for on-site
inspection, and the SAM system remained in place to limit aerial
inspection, the DCI and intelligence community would not be able to
verify the removal or check on possible future reintroduction of
Cuban missiles. Further, the MONGOOSE operation, tasked with
toppling Castro, was in disarray. Lansdale complained he was not
being kept informed of JCS planning and that the CIA's Cuban Task
Force was acting outside MONGOOSE channels. At the height of the
missile crisis (on October 26), a high-level meeting on MONGOOSE
agreed to recall intelligence collection teams and discontinue
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sabotage operations while relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union were so delicate.
the Sovie
On November 3, McCone informed the Executive Committee that,
despite indications that the missiles were being dismantled, there
also were signs that the Soviets were taking steps which might
represent a continuing threat to the United States. More IL-28s had
been uncrated; some fourteen Soviet ships were en route to Cuba,
and there were indications that the Soviets were proceeding with
plans to develop a submarine support base at Banes. Stressing the
unprecedented nature of the SAM system deployment and the fact that
the system remained in place to provide a shield from aerial
inspection, McCone emphasized that we did not and could not know the
exact number of offensive missiles originally placed in Cuba or
whether all in fact had been removed. Indeed, McCone pointed out,
there remained a distinct possibility that missile complexes could
be hidden from view in Cuba's caves.
The President listened to McCone's warning but appeared more
concerned about the question of past intelligence failures. For by
this time postmortems had begun to surface alleging either a near
intelligence failure or the withholding of vital intelligence
information on the Cuban missile build-up. Deeply concerned, McCone
had already ordered an intensive internal investigation. Now the
President himself requested a review of the entire intelligence
community, seeking a judgment as to whether better intelligence and
intelligence evaluation could have forecast Cuban developments more
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“however, that the United States continue its surveillance and be
prepared to act if a plane were shot down.
98
With the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the completion
of Donovan's mission, McCone again pressed for low-level flights
over Cuba--a recommendation supported by the USIB but opposed by
both McNamara and Rusk because of its possible political
consequences. Noting that the administration could not very well
ignore the views of the DCI and USIB, President Kennedy proposed
three sorties on a trial basis. But, after considering the pros and
cons, the President on May 21 decided to postpone a subsequent
low-level mission on the grounds of insufficient urgency.
C
Following the missile crisis, Cuban exile groups escalated their
activities, but the Executive Committee was unable to come to a firm
agreement on how to respond. Similarly, the Special Group to
consider Cuban sabotage operations met with disagreement and
indecision. It was clear McCone stood virtually alone in his view
that the United States should sustain an aggressive approach towards
Cuba, with the dual aim of getting rid of both the Soviet presence
and Castro. No senior officials went so far as to propose that the
covert action program be stopped; but the original impetus which
had given birth to the program had all but disappeared.
°
American policy towards Cuba, and especially the Agency's role
in supporting this policy, remained ambigious for the rest of
Officially, the United States held the Soviet
McCone's tenure.
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military presence in and Castro's control over Cuba to be
unacceptable. Practically, however, the disposition to take strong.
actions had weakened. Instead, the administration was willing to
accept the removal of the missiles as an adequate foreign policy
achievement.
McCone never accepted this juḍgment; he never was comfortable
with the policy restrictions placed on Cuban operations, and he
never wavered in his conviction that in order to carry out the tasks
levied on him as DCI, he needed the freedom to carry out intensive
reconnaissance and covert operations.
Under President Johnson, there were flurries of concern about
Cuba; but, after the missile crisis, the momentum had largely
disappeared.
The United States government turned its attention to.
other issues, and McCone found himself once again fully engaged.
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CHAPTER XVIII
Shortly before the coup began, on 1 November 1963, Diem suddenly
became cooperative.
Lodge and Admiral Harry Felt (CINCPAC) had been at the
Presidential palace until almost noon. Rather than see Felt off at
the airport, Diem asked if Lodge would remain. Lodge stayed, and
Diem proceded to tell him that, he could understand President
Kennedy's concerns about South Vietnam. Lodge should assure the
President that he, Diem, was prepared to take almost any steps the
United States considered appropriate to correct existing problems
and improve relations.
Diem's concessions--if that was what they were--came too late.
At about the same time, General Don's aide-de-camp directed Lou
Conein to go at once to the Joint General Ștaff headquarters.
Assigned a private telephone, Conein proceeded to provide a
comprehensive, current and coherent account of the coup to the CIA
station in Saigon. The station, in turn, informed Washington.
The first reports reached Washington shortly after midnight.
mid-morning it was clear the coup was likely to succeed.
time, however, both Diem and Nhu were dead, and the President was
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concerned about the circumstances.
When the facts became known, he
said, he hoped the new government would be able to state that the
Ngo brothers had either committed suicide or violated their
surrender agreement, rather than been murdered in cold blood.
The President was also concerned that the new government might
be tempted to offer anmesty to the Viet Cong. He consequently was
emphatic that we watch with care the type of political leadership
the military group might install. Warning against the installation
of ultra-liberals or quasi-Communists with a free hand in political
affairs, he remarked that he was more interested in an effective
than a "pretty" government.
As a result, President Kennedy sent William Colby, in the
capacity of Presidential representative, to Saigon--an assignment
which McCone noted with pleasure as a mark of great confidence in
both Colby and the CIA.
On November 18, McCone, Rusk, McNamara and Bundy flew to
Honolulu to confer with Lodge and Harkins. McCone later reported
that the formal briefing sessions had gone fairly predictably until
an economist named Silver from AID had discussed the South
Vietnamese economy, with its huge deficits and unfavorable balance
of trade. This briefing triggered a lively discussion and the
general conclusion that the Vietnamese economic situation was bleak,
with no apparent solution in sight.
There was other bad news as well. In some areas, the Viet Cong
reportedly had a better strategic hamlet and school system than the
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government.
And it was clear to everyone present that the military
situation was far from rosy, although Harkins tried to put it in a
good light. The meeting decided that a major effort should be made
to construct strategic hamlets and to wage anti-guerrilla warfare in
the delta region, but McCone returned more discouraged than ever
about Vietnam and believed McNamara and Bundy shared this
impression. Lodge, McCone remarked, would emerge from Vietnam
either as a fourteen-foot-tall political giant or as a thoroughly
washed-up government official.
*
The end of the Diem era marked one kind of transition in
Vietnam;
another.
President Kennedy's assassination, on November 22, marked
The day after the assassination, as official Washington and the
world were trying to come to grips with the shocking news, McCone
told his morning meeting that he knew very little about the new
President's personal relationships around Washington or his position
on current issues. In late August, Lyndon Johnson as Vice President
had been opposed to ousting the Diem regime, but McCone had not even
spoken with him since the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange.
McCone then reviewed the CIA memorandum on world reactions to
the President's assassination and ordered that it be disseminated.
He also reviewed the President's Intelligence Checklist and directed
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that it be delivered to the White House as usual.
Johnson was
unaware of the checklist, having previously received the Current
Intelligence Bulletin. McCone reported that Johnson had told
McGeorge Bundy to carry on as before, and that the Agency should
therefore continue to move its publications through the usual
channels until directed otherwise.
In other ways, McCone attempted to carry on as before. Before
the morning meeting, he had instructed Walt Elder to telephone
Johnson's secretary to tell her that he would be at the White House
at 9:00 a.m. as usual, to give the President his regular morning
intelligence briefing. This message was relayed as a statement of
fact. The only question was whether Johnson would be going to his
old office in the Executive Office Building or to the Oval Office.
The word came back that Johnson was on his way to the White House.
McCone accordingly was at the White House by 9:00 a.m. At 9:15,
President Johnson arrived.
Johnson opened the conversation by recalling a long background
of association and friendship with McCone. On a number of issues
which had arisen since McCone had become DCI, Johnson said he and
McCone had seen eye to eye. Expressing great respect for the CIA
and complete confidence in McCone as DCI, Johnson said he wanted
McCone to continue in the future doing exactly as he had done in the
past.
After McCone in turn expressed his confidence in the President
and stated his desire to support him in every way, he reviewed some
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of the items from the President's checklist, explaining the nature
of the publication.
Johnson asked that, for the next few days,
McCone continue to brief him personally every morning and that
senior CIA officials brief the President's staff. Johnson also
directed that any urgent matter of importance be brought to his
personal attention at any hour of the day or night. In this, he
designated no intermediary.
That noon, McCone met with both Johnson and Bundy to relay the
information that Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet
and Cuban embassies in Mexico City. That evening, McCone reviewed
this information with Secretary Rusk, in addition volunteering the
Agency's assistance in coping with the flood of official visitors
coming to attend the funeral. Rusk agreed to call on him for help.
After informing his November 24 morning meeting that he would
make an effort to dispel the widely-held view that it was somehow
"immoral" for the DCI to be seen openly in his role as a direct
adviser to the President, McCone briefed Johnson for about twenty
minutes in his private residence. The President, McCone suggested,
should receive an early briefing on the Soviet long-range striking
capability, air defense posture, and the condition of the Soviet
economy. McCone also suggested that the President learn about the
CIA's operational programs, adding that the Agency was watching
Venezuela and Ecuador very closely because of Cuban subversive
activities.
That afternoon, McCone met with the President, Rusk, Ball,
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McNamara, Bundy and Lodge to discuss the situation in Vietnam.
Lodge reported that the United States was in no way responsible for
the deaths of Diem and Nhu (had they followed his advice, he said,
they would be alive today) and said he was hopeful about the
future. The change in South Vietnam's government had been an
improvement, and by February or March we would see marked progress.
McCone, concerned lest Lodge's statements leave the President
with the impression that we were on the road to victory, disagreed.
The Agency, he cautioned, had observed a continuing increase in Viet
Cong activities since November 1, including military attacks. It
had also observed a high volume of messages on the Viet Cong
military and political communications networks, which could indicate
preparations for sustained guerrilla attacks. Moreover, the new
government's military leaders were having considerable difficulty in
organizing the government's political structure and were receiving
little if any help from civilians, who were staying on the sidelines
in their traidtional role as critics. In consequence, McCone could
not at this time offer an optimistic appraisal of Vietnam's future
prospects.
Here, President Johnson observed that he approached the
situation in Vietnam with some misgivings.
A great number of
Americans had questioned the United States' role in supporting the
coup, and there were those in Congress who strongly believed we
should get out of Vietnam. Both of these factors caused him
considerable anxiety. He was not at all sure the United States had
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followed the right course in upsetting the Diem regime;
but now
that it was done, we had to see that we accomplished our objectives.
In addition, Johnson now told them, he had never been happy with
American operations in Vietnam. The dissensions within the American
community there displeased him, and he told Lodge that he wanted the
situation cleaned up. Any official who did not go along with agreed
U.S. policy there should be removed.
At this point, Bundy remarked that we were searching for a
successor to William Trueheart as Saigon Deputy Chief of Mission.
What was needed was a capable administrator to run the country
team. In response, Johnson repeated that the Ambassador was in
charge and that he, the President, was holding him personally
responsible for the situation.
Vietnam's economy was the subject of particular concern, and
McNamara now commented that the United States would have to be
generous with its aid, not expecting the South Vietnamese government
to produce miracles. Johnson replied that he supported the concept
of generous aid but wanted it made abundantly clear that he did not
think we had to re-make every Asian after our own image. Too often,
he observed, when the United States became involved in the affairs
of another country, it felt an obligation to reform the country .
along American lines. This, he said, was a mistake. He himself was
anxious to get on with winning the war; he did not want so much
effort devoted to so-called social reforms.
Following this meeting, Bundy issued a statement saying that the
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United States would continue the late President Kennedy's Vietnam
policies as they had been confirmed at a mid-November meeting in
Honolulu. McCone also observed that, for the first time, he had
received an indication of what the Johnson tone would be.
McCone did not brief Johnson on November 25, the day of
President Kennedy's funeral, and at a State Department reception
that evening, the President apologized to McCone for it. Were there
were any developments which required his personal attention?, he
McCone replied that there were not and that he would call
asked.
him if any developed.
The following day, McCone met with the President for about
twenty minutes. Johnson asked whether all appropriate Agency
resources were being made available to support the FBI's
investigation of the assassination.
He then told McCone with
considerable contempt that certain Justice Department officials had
proposed an independent panel, headed by someone like Thomas E.
Dewey, to investigate the assassination.
Johnson had rejected this
proposal, only to learn that an identical plan would appear as lead
editorial in the Washington Post. Furious at what he believed was a
deliberate leak, he had finally succeeded in killing the editorial
by intervening personally with Katherine Graham
98
McCone met again with the President on November 28 for about
thirty minutes. After reviewing the checklist, Johnson questioned
him about South Vietnam, Venezuela, Greece, Turkey, Rumania and
Yugoslavia. He asked McCone to recommend someone as Ambassador to
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McCone History
CHRONOLOGY
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CHRONOLOGY
10 November 1960
President-elect Kennedy announces that
Allen W. Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover will
continue in their positions.
17 April 1961
Landing at the Bay of Pigs
22 April 1961
4 May 1961
28 June 1961
Study group formed (Maxwell Taylor,
Arleigh Burke, Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles)
'to examine Bay of Pigs operation.
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board (PFIAB) reconstituted with James
Killian as chairman.
Taylor named Military Representative to the
President and Chairman of the Special Group
(5412).
30 August 1961
7 September 1961
USSR resumes nuclear testing in the atmos-
phere
President Kennedy confers with John McCone
on nuclear issues.
19 September 1961
Kennedy asks McCone to become the Director
of Central Intelligence.
27 September 1961
Kennedy announces the appointment of McCone.
13 October 1961
McCone becomes consultant; travels to
the Far East until 23 October.
1
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28 October 1961
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Dulles and McCone visit Western Europe
until 13 November.
21 November 1961
29 November 1961
30 November 1961
30 November 1961
McCone meets with President and Robert
Kennedy to discuss new program for Cuba.
McCone sworn in by Chief Justice Warren,
McCone attends meeting of NSC committee.
on nuclear testing.
.McCone attends first meeting of United
States Intelligence Board (USIB) as chairman.
1 December 1961
McCone attends first meeting of Special
Group (5412) as DCI.
4 December 1961
McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric
to discuss NSA and national estimates
5 December 1961
6 December 1961.
McCone establishes study group under
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr..
Mrs. McCone dies.
11 December 1961
12 December 1961
13 December 1961
15 December 1961
McCone meets with President Kennedy alone.
McCone calls on J. Edgar Hoover.
DDCI becomes CIA representative on USIB.
McCone meets with Phillipe de Vosjoli.
2
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27 December 1961
5 January 1962
SECRET
General Cabell announces retirement
effective 31 January 1962.
Schuyler, Coyne added to Kirkpatrick
study group.
McCone attends NSC meeting on Laos.
6 January 1962
8 January 1962
12 January 1962
15 January 1962
McCone meets with Joint Chiefs of Staff.
McCone briefs General Eisenhower in Palm
Desert.
McCone's name submitted to Senate Armed
Services Committee.
16 January 1962
President Kennedy issues letter of in-
structions to DCI.
∙16 January 1962
18 January 1962
18 January 1962
19 January 1962
20 January 1962
6
McCone meets with Ambassador [Alphand] and
Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg.
Confirmation hearings begin
DCI attends first meeting of Special Group
(Counter-Insurgency).
McCone meets with The Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy and the PFIAB.
McCone briefs President Truman at Mayflower
Hotel.
3
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22 January 1962
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McCone meets with House Sub-Committee
on CIA.
28 January 1962
31 January 1962
McCone meets with Chiefs of Station from
Western Hemisphere Division in Panama.
until 2 February.
Senate confirms McCone by floor vote of
71-12; total vote is 84-15.
6 February 1962
8 February 1962
McCone speaks to senior seminar at Foreign
Service Institute.
McCone meets with Senate Sub-Committee on
CIA.
17 February 1962
Richard Bissell resigns as Deputy Director
Plans; succeeded by Richard Helms.
19 February 1962
ate for
Deputy Director/Research established as
new directorate with Herbert A. Scoville,
Jr. as head.
19 February 1962
McCone meets with Board of Inquiry chaired
:
S
by Judge Prettyman to study implication o
Powers' case.
22 February 1962
McCone meets with Major General Marshall
S. Carter.
28 February 1962
Kennedy receives first briefing by
Arthur C. Lundahl
SECKET
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7 March 1962
McCone presents Carter to President
Kennedy; Carter named DDCI on 9 March.
for
30 March 1962
Robert Amory, Jr. resigns as Deputy Director/
Intelligence.
1 April 1962
10 April 1962
Office of General Counsel, Office of
Legislative Counsel, and Office of Comp-
troller moved to Office of the DCI; John
"Bros named Comptroller.
Kirkpatrick named to new position as
Executive Director.
23 April 1962
Ray S. Cline named DD/I
3 May 1962
Jack Earman becomes Inspector General;
Walter Elder named as Executive Assistant
to the DCI.
15 May 1962
DCI attends meeting of National Security
Council with Congressional leaders on
American role in Laos.
3 June 1962
McCone travels to Far East until 17 June;
develops basis position paper on situation
in Southeast Asia.
4 June 1962
Albert D. Wheelon, Jr. named Assistant
Director/Scientific Intelligence.
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29 June 1962
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McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget
to review the projected intelligence community
budget.
10 July 1962
McCone meets with Frank G. Wisner on
latter's future.
12 July 1962
20 July 1962
McCone discusses consultant status with
Allen W. Dulles.
President Kennedy briefed in detail on
information derived from Anatole Golitsen.
1
27 July 1962
28 July 1962
10 August 1962
10 August 1962
McCone becomes immersed in nuclear testing
issue and the role of intelligence in the
event of a treaty banning nuclear testing:
in the atmosphere.
6
McCone meets with [Prince Souvanna Phouma
(of Laos.]
At Cuban meeting, McCone makes first
explicit statement outside Agency on the
possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba.
b
Najeeb Halaky proposes covert development
of super-sonic transport.
21 August 1962
McCone warns senior government officials
about offensive missiles in Cuba.
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21 August 1962
22 August 1962
23 August 1962
29 August 1962
7,10,13,16 and
19 September 1962
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McCone attends meeting to discuss inten-
sified operations against North Vietnam.
McCone advises President Kennedy about
possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba;
also on 23 August with senior advisers
present.
McCone leaves Washington until 24 Sept.
McCone marries Mrs. Paul Piggott in
Seattle; SAMs in Cuba photographed.
McCone sends cables reiterating his concern
about missiles in Cuba.
24 September 1962
27 September 1962
14 October 1962
9 October 1962
10 October 1962
McCone meets with Robert Kennedy on
ransoming brigade prisoners in Cuba..
6,11
McCone meets with President (Ayub of
Pakistan] in New York.
McCone urges Special Group to direct U-2
coverage of Cuba.
Special Group approves U-2 coverage.
President Kennedy briefed on IL-28 crates;
Kennedy orders limitations on dissemination
of information about offensive weapons.
7
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JEUNEI
SAC takes over U-2 overflights of Cuba.
14 October 1962
15 October 1962
16 October 1962
17 October 1962
18 October 1962
U-2 overflies San Cristobal MRBM site.
NPIC identifies MRBMS
McCone notified; returns from Seattle.
McCone develops position paper on Cuba.
IRBM sites identified.
18 October 1962
19 October 1962
'NSC Executive Committee divides into two.
study groups to consider "fast" and "slow"
courses of action.
Special National Intelligence Estimate
concludes that USSR would not risk general
war over Cuba.
19 October 1962
McCone develops position on measures beyond
a blockade.
20 October 1962
Chinese Communists attack India
21 October 1962
21 October 1962
22 October 1962
23 October 1962
McCone briefs Vice-President Johnson on
Cuba. :
Briefers go to London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa.
Meeting with Congressional leadership just
prior to President Kennedy's speech.
President Kennedy signs blockade proclama-
tion.
SECRET
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24 October 1962
27 October 1962
28 October 1962
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Soviet ships near Cuba stop or turn.
Messages from USSR show willingness to
avoid confrontation.
29 October 1962
2 November 1962
5 November 1962
9 November 1962
14 November 1962
McCone orders post-mortem on handling of
intelligence.
Cuban refugee reports on missiles in cave.
President Kennedy requests review of
intelligence handling.
McCone meets with Rusk to protest nibbling
away at approved operational programs.
PFIAB requests post-mortem on intelligence
handling.
17 November 1962
Kennedy and Eisenhower meet at McCone's
residence.
20 November 1962
Kennedy announces lifting of the blockade.
4 December 1962
McCone meets with Gilpatric to discuss
Air Force view of NRO.
17 December 1962
Kennedy approves concept of covert support
to Congo government.
SECRET
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27 December 1962
SECRET
Report on intelligence community's handling
of intelligence relating to Cuban missile
› crisis completed for PFIAB.
2 January 1963
NPIC moves into Building 213.
3. January 1963
McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric
to discuss A-11, SWITCHBACK, policy towards
Cuba.
10 January 1963
Special Group reviews reconning issance over
Cuba.
10 January 1963.
17 January 1963
McGeorge Bundy discusses DOD-CIA friction;
raises Kennedy's concern over Chinese
Communist nuclear potential.
6,8
McCone meets with [Italian Prime Minister
Fanfani].
21 January 1963
Meeting with President Kennedy on surfacing
A-11.
27 January 1963
McCone meets with Chiefs of Station in
30 January 1963
10
Panama until 29 January.
Col. Delsany, SDECE, admits charges of KGB
penetrations and French espionage against
US nuclear energy program.
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31 January 1963
1 February 1963
6 February 1963
8
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McCone attends meeting with Kennedy to
discuss European problems.
McCone develops basic position paper on
Europe.
Public statement by DCI on Cuba before
Stennis sub-committee; DOD public briefing.
10 February 1963
McCone travels to Paris and London until
17 February.
28 February 1963
McCone talks with Bundy on lack of policy
towards Cuba and problems in the Middle East.
4 March 1963
Meeting with President Kennedy on Cuban
reconnaissance gap.
11 March 1963
Meeting with President Kennedy on the
Middle East with special reference to
Yemen. :
13 March 1963
McCone meets with the President and then
the NSC to discuss Latin America and
policy towards Cuba.
13 March 1963
McCone and Gilpatric sign new NRO agreement.
SECRET
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21 March 1963
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McCone meets with Brockway McMillan, new
Director/NRO.
25 March 1963
Meeting with President Kennedy to discuss
special Agency operation aimed at exposing
the KGB.
26 March 1963
$
Meeting with Dean Rusk to discuss the
Middle East with special reference to
Israel's nuclear potential.
29 March 1963
Executive Committee meeting on raids by
Cuban exiles,
9 April 1963
McCone meets with Stewart Alsop for general
background briefing.
11 April 1963
McCone develops basic position paper on
responsibility for reconnaissance over
denied areas.
11 April 1963
Special Group discusses sabotage operations
against Cuba.
15
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17
April 1963
President Kennedy, the Attorney-General, and
the Secretary of State briefed on special
styr
24
operation against French intelligence]
service.
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At NSC meeting on Laos, President Kennedy
requests study of increased pressures
against North Vietnam.
23 April 1963
Clark Clifford succeeds Killian as Chairman,
PFIAB.
25 April 1963
President approves low-level reconnaissance
flights over Cuba.
25 April 1963
Scoville submits resignation as DD/R
effective 14 June 1963
26 April 1963
McCone travels to Paris, Rome, and
7 May 1963
9 May 1963
13-14 May 1963.
Frankfurt until 8 May.
Penkovsky put on trial in Moscow,
NSC meeting on US support for India.
McCone meets with Rusk to discuss support
.6
for
[Mondlane]
14 May 1963
McCone meets with Clark Clifford.
15 May 1963
McCone meets with President Kennedy to
discuss Penkovsky
13.
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18 May 1963
21 May 1963
3 June 1963
7 June 1963
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McCone develops position paper on Haiti.
McCone attends three meetings with President
Kennedy; low-level reconnaissance over Cuba;
high-yield, large megatonnage nuclear weapons;
Haiti.
McCone develops position paper for dis-
cussion with Gilpatric on Air Force push
to take over all reconnaissance.
McCone presents his view of the world in
speech to National War College.
14 June 1963
McCone meets with Rusk to discuss relations
with France.
19 June 1963
McCone attends three meetings with President
Kennedy; the Profumo case; Laos; Cuba.
21 June 1963
21 June 1963
McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy
"
on
[British Guiana]
McCone meets with Rusk to discuss covert
program on Cuba.
25 June 1963
McCone develops position paper on the role.
of intelligence in a nuclear test ban treaty.
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26 June 1963
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McCone notes Roy Tod's paper on an inventory
of intelligence community assets.
1 July 1963
DCI's Scientific Advisory Board established
under Dr. Kinzel.
"
9 July 1963
President
Kennedy briefed on mosaic of ([Israel]
gas bomb in Yemen, and findings of the
Purcell Panel on reconnaissance satellites.
10 July 1963
McCone writes McNamara on need to review
intelligence community programs.
21 July 1963
McCone meets with Rusk to discuss DeGaulle.
23 July 1963
23 July 1963
30 July 1963
5 August 1963
McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy
to hear John J. McCloy report on the
Middle East.
Sgt. Dunlap commits suicide.
:
McCone attends meeting with President
Kennedy on Laos.
DD/R re-constituted as DD/Science and
Technology with Wheelon as head.
15
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ULUNLI
5, August 1963
Nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow.
16 August 1963
21 August 1963
McCone presents position on test ban
treaty to Stennis sub-committee,
McCone attends meeting with President
Kennedy to discuss actions by Diem govern-
ment against the Buddhests.
24 August 1963
Department of State Telegram 243 sent to
Saigon.
26 August 1963
Saigon station officers in contact with
31 August 1963
Generals Khiem and Minh.
Ambassador Henry Capt
Credentials to South Vieta
Lodge prosaite
John Richardson cables his view that there will
be no coup.
2 September 1963
McCone reviews two papers on Diem government;
one by William Colby; one by George Carver.
4 September 1963
McCone meets with McNamara and Rusk to discuss
terms of reference for review of intelligence
community programs.
9 September 1963
John Bross appointed Deputy to the DCI for
National Intelligence Programs Evaluation.
16
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10 September 1963
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McCone develops position paper for meetings
with President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy on
Vietnam.
11 September 1963
Huntington D. Sheldon cables his views from
Saigon; McCone asks Agency experts to answer
six basic questions on Vietnam.
16 September 1963
A
Ambassador Lodge requests Lansdale as re-
placement for Richardson,
19 September 1963
McCone writes Lodge about COS Saigon.
19 September 1963
20 September 1963
20 September 1963
Colby briefs Special Group on re-vamping
Agency operations in the Far East.
McCone briefs McGeorge Bundy on plans to re-
organize Saigon station and a covert program
aimed at the KGB.
McCone develops basic position paper on
National Reconnaissance Program.
24 September 1963
McCone develops basic position paper on
Agency role in Vietnam.
17
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McCone asks John Richardson to return to
Washington on temporary duty; Dave Smith
acting COS Saigon.
5 October 1963
After hearing trip report by McNamara and
Taylor, President Kennedy states publicly.
that war in Vietnam can be won by the end
of 1965; McCone takes pessimistic view.
7 October 1963
McCone meets with John Richardson.
9 October 1963
President Kennedy answers two questions at
press conference about Richardson and the
Agency.
16 October 1963
17 October 1963
25 October 1963
Far East Division develops basic paper on
re-organization of Saigon station.
McCone discusses role of Air Force and national
intelligence assets with Gilpatric.
McCone develops position paper for meeting
with President Kennedy on coup plotting in
Vietnam.
1 November 1963
Diem government overthrown by Vietnamese
generals.
18
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3 November 1963
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President Kennedy orders Colby to go to Saigon
as Presidential emissary.
12 November 1963
McCone, Helms meet with President Kennedy
for basic discussion of Cuba; President is
shown Cuban rifle captured in Venezuela. ·
18 November 1963
McCone attends conference in Honolulu on
Vietnam until 21 November.
18 November 1963
Executive Director and Comptroller functions
merged under Kirkpatrick.
22 November 1963.
23 November 1963
President Kennedy assassinated in Dallas.
McCone meets with President Johnson alone.
24 November 1963
McCone meets with President Johnson and Lodge
on Vietnam.
28 November 1963
McCone meets with President Johnson who asks
that McCone play an active role as a policy.
advisor.
29 November 1963
McCone attends meeting with President Johnson
on A-11.
19
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5 December 1963
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President Johnson holds first NSC meeting;
McCone presents intelligence briefing.
6 December 1963
McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss
COS, Saigon; Peer de Silva named; Johnson
sends message to Lodge.
7 December 1963
McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss.
, changing the image of the DCI and CIA.
12 December 1963
McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget
to review the Agency's covert action program.
13 December 1963
13 December 1963
McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to
discuss the need for economy in intelligence
operations.
McCone meets with Rusk and Harriman who approve
concept of releasing information on Soviet
economy.
16 December 1963
McCone visits Saigon to install de Silva
until 20 December.
-
21 December 1963.
McCone presents his views on Vietnam to
President Johnson.
20
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27 December 1963
OLVIET
McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ
Ranch; Johnson reiterates his views on
McCone's policy role.
31 December 1963
4 January 1964
7 January 1964
9 January 1964
9 January 1964
13 January 1964
McCone meets with General Eisenhower in
Pasadena and again on 2 January 1964 to discuss
President Johnson's budget plans.
McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ
Ranch to review meetings with General
Eisenhower.
McCone attends meeting to hear General
Krulak discuss proposals for intensified
operations against North Vietnam.
Thomas Dale of The New York Times publishes
article on Soviet economy with attribution
to CIA; other newsmen briefed.
McCone attends meetings with President
:
Johnson on Panama.
McCone develops position paper on how plan to
release information on Soviet economy was
mis handled.
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14 January 1964
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McCone attends meetings on Robert Kennedy's
trip to meet Sukarno.
14 January 1964
Cyrus Vance succeeds Roswell Gilpatric
effective 28 January.
18 January 1964
McCone travels to Paris, London, Rome, Madrid,
7 February 1964.
11 February 1964
Bonn
-
until 1 February.
McCone attends meetings on Cuban fishing
boats and Guantanamo water supply.
McCone develops position paper on reconnais-
sance after Air Force deployment to fly
U-2s out of Clark Field.
28 February 1964
McCone develops position paper in preparation
for trip to Vietnam.
28 February 1964
McCone attends meeting with President
Johnson on surfacing A-11.
4 March 1964
William Bundy succeeds Roger Hilsman as
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs.
4 March 1964
USIB re-organized.
22
SECRET

13-00000
4-5 March 1964
6 March 1964
17 March 1964.
1 April 1964
2 April 1964
SECRET
McCone meets with General Eisenhower who
discusses relations with de Gaulle.
McCone travels to Vietnam until 13 March;
McCone dissents on McNamara's trip report;
reports policy disagreement separately
to President Johnson.
NSC meeting on Vietnam.
McCone develops basic position paper on NRP
for use with Baker panel of PFIAB.
At evening seminar, McCone develops position
paper on operations against North Vietnam.
7 April 1964
.
McGeorge Bundy develops position paper on
Covert Program Against Cuba for use in
meeting with President Johnson.
22 April 1964
McCone talks to McGeorge Bundy about lack of
direct briefings of the President by the DCI.
29 April 1964
McCone talks to President Johnson about lack
of direct access.
2 May 1964
NSC meeting on Cuban overflights.
-23
SECRET
13-00000
T
1
May 1964
5 May 1964
SECRET
McCone sets forth position on "The
Invisible Government.'
$7
McCone attends meeting with President Johnson
on Cuba and Laos; remains for Tuesday lunch
meeting with the President, McNamara, Taylor
and Bundy.
6 May 1964
$
McCone attends meeting with President Johnson
statements about
to consider General Khanh's
war footing and march north.
14 May 1964
McNamara's report on trip to Vietnam discusses
bombing North Vietnam.
16 May 1964
18 May 1964
24 May 1964
25 May 1964
McCone gives President Johnson Agency estimate
on action against North Vietnam. ✓
At meeting on Laos and Vietnam, Rusk raises
question of when does the United States
commit troops.
Meetings all day with President Johnson on
Southeast Asia.
William Bundy paper on Courses of Action on
Southeast Asia.
24
SEZKET
13-00000
I
** 28 May 1964
SECRET
McCone goes to Honolulu for meeting on
Vietnam until 3 June.
4,5,6,7 June
McCone attends meetings with President Johnson
on Laos with the President asking, "What comes
next?"
6 June 1964
McGeorge Bundy and Michael Forrestal raise
with McCone the possibility of an Agency
program along pre-SWITCHBACK lines.
11 June 1964
McCone develops position paper on Southeast
Asia.
11 June 1964
15 June 1964
17 June 1964
McCone writes McGeorge Bundy about PFIAB
report on NRP.
McCone meets with President Johnson to suggest
that McCone leave his post; President asks
that he remain until after the election.
McCone develops position paper on NRP.
30 June 1964
McCone issues guidance for developing re-
quirements for reconnaissance satellites.
25
SECRET