178-10003-10090
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Date:
Identification Form
8/27/201
Agency Information
AGENCY: KISS/SCOW
RECORD NUMBER:
178-10003-10090
RECORD SERIES: CHURCH COM.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 7506462 (2)
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
NSC
FROM:
TO:
RECORD
TITLE:
MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62
09/06/1962
DATE:
PAGES:
5
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
MEMORANDUM
Unclassified
IC
Redact
07/16/1993
Attached to 1781000310069. Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET.
v9.1
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approvdo my
B
DRAFT MONGOOSE Minutes
TAP/mmm
88--8
9/6/62
じ
Lee
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on
Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962
PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin;
Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and
General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow
1. Sabotage Operation
General Carter reported that information should be available by
Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr.
Bundy requested that the White House be informed as
soon as the
information is obtained.
2. General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 31st.
He noted that some of the operational representatives had questioned
whether this was responsive to the changed situation engendered by the
issuance of NSAM 181, but said that this plan had been prepared within
the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16).
Mr. Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to. NSAM 181 has
been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified
the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that the approach
taken in the August 31st paper was satisfactory.
13. The following specific comments were then made on Activities
listed in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not
given to the paper at this meeting.)
3. Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that
he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal
UNMARKED
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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•
2.
is prepared. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that
details should be presented to the Group, to include the content of
the leaflets which would be dropped, and specifics as to the method
and place of launching, the technical details of the release of
leaflets, etc., etc.
b. Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ("discovery" of caches of
arms) involves an important aspect of timing. He said, and the Group
agreed, that any such action should be coordinated with U.S. objectives
toward Cuba rather than confusing it with activities in connection with
a third country. Mr. Bundy emphasized that any such undertaking should
be done with the idea of providing a pretext for further action.
.
C. In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported
by State, said that Radio Swan (number 23) should be continued even
though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of
the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr.
Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount
against U.S. radio stations, and said that he felt on balance it would.
not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare.
asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such
intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared.
d.
:
The Group
At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directed
at Bloc personnel in Cuba) was assigned to USIA and CIA, rather than
just to the latter.
e.
On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose
was changed from crippling to harrassing Cuban commerce.
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MD
:
:f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed
to selected.
8. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to
be undertaken by other Hemisphere goverments) would not be expected
overnight.
ih. General Carter urged titrat, in connection with number 22
((submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude
in working up other deception possibilities. Mr.. Bundy Felt, on the
other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-
measures which had been outlined by Mr.. Murrow, the (Group should look
at other possibilities in some detail.
1..
General Carter felt that a determination should be made as
to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions.
He emphasized that mabotage operations such as those under number 27
will not in themselves be especially effective in tracking the Cuban
economy.
14.9
Perler brand
The Group then turned to a discussion of mumber 32 (agricultural
sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any
such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-
thing going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to
the U.S. He went on to say,, however, that it would be possible to
accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in
He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop
the paper..
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failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear
to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about
any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result
of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must
avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc.,
they could be completely covered up.
unless
5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which
could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated.
General Carter
explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can
be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination
to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of
Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.
7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against
exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.
8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked
into further.
9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government,
within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be
a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great
degree.
10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program.
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- 5 -
He mentioned as examples what the U.S. response should be in the event
of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mounted.
The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military continger
plans already prepared, must be pursued.
Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the
Sugges
MONGOOSE framework, Mr. Bundy felt that General Lansdale's group,
milch
particularly the State representative, could do the initial exploration
of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the
Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General
Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates
were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible
decisions of this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time
available for MONGOOSE operations. This matter was left open for further
. consideration at a meeting next week.
CC-Gen Lansdal - destroyed 4/8/63.
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