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104-10423-10337
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
CLASSIFICATION
TAL
Commission Fit
PROCESSING
DISPATCH
S-E-C-R-E-T
ΤΟ
Chiefs of all Stations
INFO.
FROM
SUBJECT
Chief, KUDOVE
PRO.
POSED
Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts
ACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCES
FYI
ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
✗
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM
1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of
President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem
involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is
our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every
support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory
responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President
travels abroad.
2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission
produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem
of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation,
which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These
include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation,
coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be
interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren
Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent
portions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading
by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and
overseas.
к
FLETCHER M. KNIGHT
| CROSS REFERENCE TO
1
CLASSIFICATION
S-E-C-R-E-T
AC.COM-
PLISHED
DATE TYPED
23 Dec. 1964
DATE DISPATCHED
2 FEB
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
Book Dispatch No. 4726
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
100-300-12
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Distribution For.
Book Dispatch No. 4726
AF Division
Abidjan
Accra [
Addis Ababa
Algiers
Bamako
Brazzaville
EE Division
Athens
Bern
Frankfurt
Nicosia
Vienna
Bujumbura
Conakry
Dakar
'Dar-es-Salaam
Freetown
Kampala
Khartoum
Lagos
Leopoldville
Lome]
Lusaka
Mogadiscio
Monrovia
Nairobi
Pretoria]
Rabat
Salisbury
Tananarive
Tripoli
Tunis]
Yaounde
The above listing has been
reviewed in the EE Division.
FE Division
Bangkok
Djakarta
Hong Kong
Honolulu
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Manila
Melbourne
Okinawa
Rangoon)
(Initials)
Saigon
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Taipei
The above listing has been
reviewed in the AF Division.
Tokyo
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(Initials)
S-E-C-R-E-T
The above listing has been
reviewed in the FF Division.
(Initials)
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Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726
NE Division
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Cairo]
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Kuwait
New Delhi
Tehran'
WE Division
Brussels
Copenhagen
The Hague
Helsinki
Lisbon
London
Luxembourg]
Madrid
Oslo 1
Ottawa
Paris
Paris/LCPIPIT
Reykjavik.
Rome
Stockholm
The above listing has been
reviewed in the NE Division.
(Initials)
The above listing has been
reviewed in the WE Division.
ip
(Initials)
-2-
S-E-C-R-E-T
5"
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WH Division
Asuncion
Bogota
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Georgetown_
Guatemala City]
Kingston
La Paz
Lima
Managua
Mexico City
Montevideo
Panama City
Paramaribo
Port-au-Prince)
Port of Spain
Quito
Rio de Janeiro
San Jose
San Salvador]
Santiago
Santo Domingo
(Tegucigalpa
The above listing has been
reviewed in the WH Division.
Fy
(Initials)
S-E-C-R-E-T
-3-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Distribution For
Book Dispatch No. 4726
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Headquarters Distribution for
Book Dispatch No. 4726
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Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext. 7468/23 December 1964
and MR. A.E. Dooley, Ext. 6748
S-E-C-R-E-T
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ALAN H. BELMONT, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI
MAY 6, 1964
Mr. STERN. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the
exact answer on the record, and I thought it might–
The CHAIRMAN. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would
think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase
that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be
abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove.
If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to
ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right.
But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great
care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.
Mr. STERN. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would
like to add or amplify in these questions?
Mr. BELMONT. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view
of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make
clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest
in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959
we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection.
And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our
files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a
fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.
We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our
fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country
unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately
notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind
that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him
whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner.
That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have hap-
pened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.
Mr. STERN. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a
stop in the files that you just referred to?
Mr. BELMONT. We merely notify our identification division to place what we
call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he
be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division,
in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man
had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to
center our attention on him.
Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother
had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960
and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he
would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.
So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see
whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while
they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up
at the college.
Mr. STERN. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer
to the first question.
Mr. DULLES. I have one question. I would like to put to you on the first ques-
tion and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833-the Bureau's letter
of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald
was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second
full paragraph you state, “A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as
communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those
communications were placed in his file."
The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does
show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department
as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known
about it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. We received a number of communications from other
agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State
Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings
with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had
all information in the State Department file.
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བྷཱསུ;་་་pa;
MAYA
We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.
Mr. DULLES. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad
who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can
take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we
pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise,
we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and
establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the
information they will do so upon our request.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
'
Mr. STERN. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the
second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald
after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview
him upon his arrival in New York?
Mr. BELMONT. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an
individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there,
there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service
has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency,
to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere
to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is
a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.
Mr. STERN. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was
it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his
first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?
Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed
Oswald on June 26, 1963-1962, I believe it was, was it not?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; 1962.
Mr. BELMONT. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information
he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.
Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate
period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of
the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first
interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was
satisfied.
Mr. STERN. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to
the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector,
or unusual?
Mr. BELMONT. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an
individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the
individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.
Mr. STERN. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got
a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?
Mr. BELMONT. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our
interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the
Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was con-
tacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a
question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was
when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the inter-
viewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the
hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and
apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.
When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay
in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the
Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in
such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary
for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather
bad light if he didn't say yes.
Mr. STERN. Turning to-
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report
and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that
there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?
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Mr. BELMONT. No evidence whatsoever.
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in view of the fact that we have practically-we have all the reports, he says
we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing
old straw to go over it and over it again.
Mr. McCLOY. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from
the Embassy?
Mr. BELMONT. You are looking at
Mr. McCLOY. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico.
We don't have these in our files, for example.
Do we have that?
You see your area
Mr. BELMONT. This is subsequent to the assassination.
of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the
assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come
in subsequent to the assassination, you see.
Mr. McCLOY. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine
that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I
don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There
is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant.
Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not pro-
ducing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of.
We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative proc-
esses as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have
this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given
the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that
we ought not to have somebody go through it.
Mr. DULLES. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked
off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file
probably.
Mr. McCLOY. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All
right, proceed, Mr. Stern.
Mr. STERN. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file
then until we can give you the information.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Mr. STERN. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time,
Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There are no security matters in this?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for
identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with
an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission
Exhibit No. 835?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission
from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover.
Mr. STERN. What is the subject?
Mr. BELMONT. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant
of the FBI.
Mr. DULLES. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew
some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean
for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this
sense?
Mr. BELMONT. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to
cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or with-
out payment.
Mr. STERN. Thank you.
Mr. BELMONT. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to
whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his
possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out informa-
tion at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal
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matters.
In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic
citizens as informants.
Mr. STERN. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an in-
formant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other
agents have told us about?
Mr. BELMONT. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in
no way.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information
contained here?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. And you are familiar with it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; I am.
Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state
the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered
in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?
Mr. BELMONT. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement
and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.
Mr. STERN. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than
an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?
Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not.
'
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation
from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his
handling of the Oswald case?
Mr. BELMONT. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and de-
cided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently
working in Texas and very happy, I understand.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
MT. BELMONT. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is
concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. And a year before the assassination.
Mr. BELMONT. Frankly, I don't recall.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.
Mr. STERN. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the
record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the
FBI?
Mr. BELMONT. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.
Mr. STERN. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testi-
mony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subse-
quently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us
that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testi-
mony before the Commission.
Mr. STERN. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr.
Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an in-
formant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. The Commission's letter so advised us.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835
for identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a
number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yester-
day, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for
identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us?
Mr. BELMONT. In order to be sure I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated
February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits
of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in
a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?
Mr. BELMONT. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves.
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1.
I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent
over with this letter.
Mr. STERN. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before
the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. To your knowledge, are they accurate?
Mr. BELMONT. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.
Mr. STERN. Are they complete?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. STERN. In connection with the material they cover?
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. STERN. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest
we admit this document.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as No. 825.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825
for identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from
Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with
a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked for
identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from
the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the
type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our
relations or liaison with Secret Service.
Mr. STERN. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?
Mr. BELMONT. I did.
Mr. STERN. Have you reviewed it recently?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it is.
:
Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the
matters covered?
Mr. BELMONT. Well
Mr. DULLES. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to
the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the
time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider.
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Serv-
ice and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents
prior to the assassination and the current instructions.
Mr. DULLES. Subsequent to the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. Yes..
Mr. STERN. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to
employ before the assassination in determining what information should be
reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members
of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President?
Mr. BELMONT. These are contained in detail in the attachments which repre-
sent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our
personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI
handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. (These
instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an at-
tempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be
referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the
nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Wash-
ington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has
been furnished to Secret Service.
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"
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**
Mr. STERN. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that
is before the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. Yes.
Specifically the kind?
Mr. BELMONT. Any information indicating the possibility of threat against
the President and Vice President and members of the family.
Mr. STERN. Have you broadened―――――
Mr. BELMONT. I may say, sir-
Mr. STERN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find
that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years
that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a
practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have
a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our re-
sponsibility and duty to furnish this information.
Mr. STERN. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with
the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information
they were interested in?
Mr. BELMONT. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt
that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I
Would assume it has come up, particularly as we were constantly furnishing
information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should
be furnished.
Mr. STERN. That is, established by the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of-
Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not.
Mr. STERN. This liaison function.
Mr. BELMONT. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we
consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes.
As you
know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other
high officials when it appears desirable.
Mr. STERN. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your in-
structions to special agents in this respect?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instruc-
tions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret
Service concerning the security of the President.
The Chairman. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont?
Mr. BELMONT. They appear as an attachment-working from the back, I think,
Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, “Manual of In-
structions Section 83."
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have it.
Mr. BELMONT. The first page is the same information that we previously fur-
nished to Secret Service involving threats.
The CHAIRMAN. The first page is intact, as it was before.
Mr. BELMONT. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially
it is the same dealing with possible threats.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commis-
sion's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is
quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case
to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination
or as of the present date?
Mr. BELMONT. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do
it with the staff, or can I help you here?
Mr. DULLES. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful
when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have
those dates available to us on each one of the attachments.
Mr. BELMONT. Very good.
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Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
Mr. BELMONT. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other
dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set
forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dis-
semination to “subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (a) possessing
emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of
bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government
or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong
or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-
making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d)
whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against
organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional,
and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that
might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963.
Mr. STERN. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through
any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service?
Mr. BELMONT. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide
any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of
assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President.
Mr. DULLES. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly
changing in section (d) the word “and” to “or” whose prior acts or statements
depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads “and hatred against
organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity
for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government
has.
Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change that.
Mr. DULLES. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it.
Mr. BELMONT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.
Mr. STERN. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont,
should that “and” before (d) be “and” or “or”? Do you mean these-
Mr. BELMONT. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together
if that is your thought.
Mr. STERN. That is right.
Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an “or”.
Mr. STERN. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives,
ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume
which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean
the volume of your references to the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more
than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria.
The CHAIRMAN. In what period of time?
Mr. BELMONT. Since we put them out.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Mr. BELMONT. Which was December 26.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. McCLOY. Have you included defectors in this list?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.
Mr. STERN. You mean as of December 26, 1963?
Mr. BELMONT. Correct.
Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty
for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under
the expanded criteria?
Mr. BELMONT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security
against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government
of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means
an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his
individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time
you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In
some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty.
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Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately
rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities
have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we
enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches
this whole field of security-I am not boring you with this, am I?
The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.
Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tre-
mendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a
sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security
field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than
weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are
trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their
approach to the entire security fleld, which inevitably touches on control of
thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the
terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to
meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as such above the rights
of the individual or to increase these controls beyond what is absolutely essential
is the first step toward the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.
We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all Commu-
nists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that if action,
unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group of people, a precedent
is set which can be seized on in the future by power-hungry or unscrupulous
authorities as a precedent, and which inevitably will gnaw away at this free
society we have, and sooner or later will be applied to the very individuals who
are seeking this action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously
and carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately on a
local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis, any and all infor-
mation that in any way was indicated to be a possible threat against the
President. This permitted Secret Service to take such action as was required
against these individuals who had by their action set the stage for appropriate
restraint or observation based on something they did. Therefore, they were not
in a position to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed
set in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since the
assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of dissemination
in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question that we could have said,
"No; we won't go any further." But we felt that it was our responsibility to do
whatever we could do and, hence, we have broadened these criteria, and we have
distributed thousands of pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.
(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the hearing
room.)
We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these broadened
criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have not made a threat
against the President, people who have expressed beliefs, who have belonged or
do belong to organizations which believe in violent revolution or taking things
into their own hands. Unless such information is handled with judgment and
care, it can be dangerous.
For example, we know that in one city when the President recently visited, the
police went to these people and told them, "You stay in the house while the
President is here or if you go out, we will go with you." We know that these
people have threatened to consult attorneys, have threatened to make a public
issue of the matter on the theory that this is restraint that is not justified as
they have made no threats against the President. Now, when you examine this
a bit further, we give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do
something with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the
police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this picture any further,
that when you get away from a specific act or deed of threats against the Presi-
dent, and you go into the broader area of what, perhaps, a man is thinking and,
therefore, he may be a threat, and you take action against the man on the basis
of that, there is a danger.
That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional information
and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I may be permitted to
continue, this is inherent in the entire approach of the FBI to the security field.
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We go as far in our investigations as is necessary. But we go no further. We
do not harass people. We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what
he may be thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out this
responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics of harassment or
unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue a security matter beyond
that which is essential to carry out our responsibilities. Now, I say that because
that is the broad field of our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because
I know. I have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative
field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and I know the
policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care with which this
problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.
Mr. MOCLOY. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret
Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have been
used to having.
Mr. BELMONT. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.
Mr. McCLOY. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that the
Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it something that
you feel
Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required to call on
the police for assistance in this field when the President visits a city. I do not
know the exact complement of personnel of Secret Service, but they are a
relatively small organization.
Mr. McCLOY. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their procedures
to cope with this, won't they?
Mr. BELMONT. I do not know.
Mr. McCLOY. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All investiga-
tive personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists,
racists, and Fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior."
That may include a good many people in the United States and maybe some mem-
bers of this Commission-I am speaking for myself. There is irrational be-
havior that I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean
you are going to send everybody over there, but the names that-all those under
your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that classification
unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason behind it. In other words,
you are selective in this list. You purport to be selective in the numbers that
you are going to convey to, the names you are going to convey to, the Secret
Service.
Mr. BELMONT. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you indicate
there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who knows when someone
may adopt abnormal behavior.
You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be as
helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our best judgment.
But this will broaden considerably the type of people and the number of people
who go to the Secret Service.
Mr. McCLOY. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are not
saying that all those people that you characterize here under this paragraph 2.
will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service every time the President makes
a move. This simply says that all investigative personnel should be alert in that
situation; am I right in that?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say, "If
cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret
Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the information.
Mr. McCLOY. So without any further ado all the people in your list who are
in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service when there is an
occasion, when the President travels?
Mr. BELMONT. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during
our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or category, and
this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret Service with a brief
description of him, and Secret Service then has that filed and is in a position
to know that that individual has been referred to them.
20
20
Mr. McCLOY. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally made.
13-00000
This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on the Secret Service,
one which they have not heretofore presumably had placed on their shoulders.
Mr. BELMONT. I think you are correct.
Mr. McCLOY. The reason I am asking these questions is because by implica-
tion, at least, one of our directives is to look into this situation for the future
protection of the President, and we want to see that we have got something that
is practical as well as cautious.
Mr. DULLES. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit indicate
what classes were so identified for investigation under the procedures existing
at the time of the assassination and what change has been made, how it has been
extended?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. If you-
Mr. DULLES. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of Instruc-
tions.
Mr. BELMONT. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets
forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.
Mr. DULLES. That is paragraph 1?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. What are the various categories given now at the top of page 2
of this exhibit which have been added?
Mr. BELMONT. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that should
be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the individual is and
the background information that was furnished to Secret Service so that we,
too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.
Representative FORD. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have gone.
to the Secret Service automatically?
Mr. BELMONT. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all defectors
automatically.
Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set forth is a
question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all defectors.
Representative FORD. Defectors are for the time being at least a special cate-
gory other than what is set forth here unless for some other reason they would
fall into one of these categories.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. McCLOY. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. McCLOY. All Communists, yes.
Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise for the
record at this point to read into the record, in view of the importance of this,
this paragraph which we are now discussing and which, as I understand it,
contains the new definition of investigative cases?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we can put it into the record.
Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set forth
in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section 83; is that
correct?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. McCLOY. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's Exhibit
No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?
Mr. STERN. That is right number of the exhibit.
Mr. McCLOY. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.
Mr. DULLES. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be included
that we add the dates and the page numbers.
Mr. STERN. I think the witness can do this immediately.
The CHAIRMAN. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy it
and incorporate it later in the record.
(Paragraph 2 reads as follows:)
"Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President.
All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives,
ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or
irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials
21
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Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir; that is right.
Mr. McCLOY. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some
selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and
they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet this
criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would get out
of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and our agents
are capable of applying the judgment.
Representative FORD. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service to
this greater flow of information that they have received?
Mr. BELMONT. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction, to
my knowledge.
Representative FORD. Have they objected to the greater burden?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I would like to say, I don't know whether you are
going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret Service are
excellent. We work closely together.
As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of Mr. Rowley,
we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the protection of the Presi-
dent, which is primarily a function of Secret Service, but as a cooperative
gesture we have on a number of occasions made agents available at the request
of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure runs to something like 139 agents—yes, 139
agents that we have made available.
We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat of
Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at the seat
of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch with Secret Service,
to cut redtape and produce results both for Secret Service and for the FBI; to
see that the problems are handled immediately. He has direct access to Mr.
Rowley, and we have on a number of occasions at the request of Secret Service,
sent one of our agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad,
particularly where we have a representative in the countries being visited,
because our relations with the law enforcement officials in those countries
have been built up over the years, and we are thus in a position to assist
Secret Service in establishing the necessary security measures and the flow of
information to serve their purpose.
In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our offices to
advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel of the President,
and we set up a supervisor back here to receive that information and cable it
or get it immediately to our man who is accompanying the President when he
makes this trip.
This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the invitation
and request of Secret Service.
Representative FORD. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the
assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their help in
these instances?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was offered
to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit a city and
Secret Service does not have sufficient personnel in that particular city to
cover what they consider is necessary, they need specialized help from us, they
will make the request to us and we will authorize our local agent in charge to
make those men, the designated number, available to the Secret Service
representative, who then uses their services while the President is there.
Representative FORD. I gather that prior to the assassination such requests,
specific requests, had not come from Secret Service to the Bureau.
Mr. BELMONT. No. There were never any such requests before.
Mr. STERN. At the level at which the requests have been made so far, have
they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI?
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of some-
thing like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have, and our agents
are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the country, ranging from matters
of immediate urgency to matters which can be handled in due time, and whenever
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our agents are putting in an average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily,
the loan of 139 men will be felt.
Representative FORD. 169.
Mr. BELMONT. I believe it was 139, sir. I think the letter says 139.
Mr. STERN. 139 on 16 separate occasions.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not complaining.
We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase its per-
sonnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is properly their
problem. But meanwhile we are following this procedure and we are not
complaining.
Mr. DULLES. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr. Belmont
was hère, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going back to the assassi-
nation day, a clear definition of the respective functions of the FBI and the
Secret Service prior to and immediately after the assassination. There seemed
to have been at one time a little confusion there. Naturally in a situation of this
kind it always happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to-
Mr. BELMONT. At the time of the assassination?
Mr. DULLES. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were just
before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the functions of the
Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the
President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is a basic
responsibility.
Mr. DULLES. And you have no auxiliary function to that-
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.
'
Mr. DULLES. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a primary
responsibility and function of Secret Service.
Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish to
Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that we have
done religiously.
After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation of the
assassination which changed the picture as far as this particular case was
concerned.
Mr. DULLES. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the assassina-
tion?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. And there was a period there, there was a period though, after
the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of office did this
order come to you during that period or after he had taken the oath of office?
Mr. BELMONT. It was very rapid, probably within a day.
Mr. DULLES. I see. It wasn't immediately after.
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. DULLES. 'It wasn't this period I am speaking of.
Mr. BELMONT. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no juris
diction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder and was
within the province of the local police who immediately took hold of it and
started the investigation.
Mr. DULLES. I realize that.
Mr. BELMONT. And started the investigation and it was theirs.
Mr. DULLES. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by
courtesy of the local authorities.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went to the Dallas Police Department and immedi-
ately went into action because of what had happened, and there was no time
for us to stand on priorities. But we felt we should be of the utmost assistance,
and we sent men to the police department to assist in the interview and do
anything else we could. This wasn't a time, of course, to sit back and say,
"This isn't our job."
Mr. DULLES. I understand.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any legisla-
25
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AREDRERANANar
tion in recent years that might have been introduced in the Congress to make
an attack upon the President a Federal offense?
Mr. BELMONT.. I do know that there is legislation presently pending.
The CHAIRMAN. Since the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Since the assassination.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know it
had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were there any
recent legislation to that effect?
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven't done research
on it, and I just don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily.
Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, just the other day in the House of Repre
sentatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right to take certain
action when a chief of state from a foreign country was within the United
States; a broadening of their authority when they had a suspicion or they had
some reason to believe that an attack was being made on a foreign dignitary.
At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question you
just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific legislative matters
pending before any committee on this particular point.
Mr. BELMONT. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection is
that it was called to our attention-I cannot pinpoint it for you-but I think
there is pending legislation now in this matter.
Mr. McCLOY. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to the
fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the wastebasket.
The CHAIRMAN. That is true.
Mr. McCLOY. In respect of other incidents.
The CHAIRMAN. When the emotion died down.
Mr. McCLOY. When the emotion died down, that is true.
I have some further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Stern?
Mr. STERN. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday. Mr.
Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if possible,
when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on October 29,
November 1, and November 5. He wasn't certain, except that he thought it had
been done after the assassination. Have you caused a check to be made on that?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we checked with our Dallas office, and they do not have
a specific record of when that information was recorded.
Mr. STERN. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some con-
temporaneous communication?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I recall
correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of Mrs. Paine and
had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL.
Mr. STERN. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64 and
67, just so the record is straight.
Mr. BELMONT. Item 64 is an AIRTEL from the Dallas office to the head-
quarters dateo October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview that he had
had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine.
On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIRTEL the results of his con-
tact with Mrs. Paine on November 1, so that the results of his interviews were
incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4, but the actual insert for the
report was not prepared until some time later. To the best of Hosty's recollec-
tion it was after the 22d and prior to December 2, but he was already on record
by these AIRTELS.
Mr. STERN. Thank you, Mr. Belmont.
I have no further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloy.
Mr. McCLOY. I have one or two questions.
Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald
was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever
that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an agent
or an informant of the FBI?
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Mr. BELMONT. I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr. McCloy,
and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never was, an agent
or an informant of the FBI.
Mr. McCLOY. In the course of your investigation do you have any reason to
make you believe that he was an agent of any other country?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have no reason to believe that he was an agent of
any other country.
Mr. McCLOY. Or any other agency of the United States?
Mr. BELMONT. Or any other agency of the United States.
Mr. McCLOY. You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr. Hosty
said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in connection with
it are still of constant concern to the FBI.
Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at the
present time require or justify further investigation other than routine check-
ups that have not already been undertaken?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; frankly, I don't. I will say that from the requests we
have received from the Commission, you have explored this most thoroughly.
We do not have any unexplored areas in this investigation that should be
explored. There are some pending requests that you have made, and we are
running them out as rapidly as we can.
Mr. McCLOY. Maybe this isn't a fair question to ask you, but, after all, you
have had a long record of criminal investigation, and you have had a long
exposure to investigation in this case.
As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any credible evidence
thus far which would support a conclusion or an opinion that the death of the
President was the result of a conspiracy or anything other than the act of a
single individual?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have no evidence, and I could support no conclu-
sion that this was other than an act of Oswald.
Mr. McCLOY. Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that he
was the President's assassin?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCLOY. Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever—you or
the agency have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker, case?
Mr. BELMONT No, sir; that was a matter handled by the Dallas police. I
am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the incident,
we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered-
Mr. McCLOY. Bullets.
Mr. BELMONT. And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that we
did not conduct the examination of the bullets until subsequent to the assassina-
tion itself.
Mr. McCLOY. Until recently.
Mr. BELMONT. No; we had no connection with it, with that investigation.
Mr. McCLOY. In your investigation of the President's assassination, did you
have occasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby's background
or Ruby's relationship to Oswald?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went into that very thoroughly.
Mr. McCLOY. Have we got all your reports on that?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCLOY. Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to
Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any?
Mr. BELMONT. The reports, of course, speak for themselves. But in summa-
tion, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is anything that
would stand up to indicate that there was any association between Ruby and
Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out extensively and care-
fully, but there is nothing, no information, that would stand up to show there
was an association between them.
Mr. McCLOY. Maybe this is in the record, but do you-by reason of your very
close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this question―do
you, from your knowledge of the investigation find-was there any evidence in
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Mr. DULLES. Do you have some more?
Mr. McCLOY. I think I have got all the questions I wanted to ask.
(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the hearing
room.)
Mr. DULLES. I have two or three questions.
As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors that have
been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the assassination.
I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published in
England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called "Who Killed Kennedy," by
Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Secker and Warburg. I have
not had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have read a good deal of the
background material on which it is based.
'I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we will
make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly, whether you
would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in the Bureau familiar
with the case or yourself, and possibly give us your views with regard to certain
of the allegations here within your particular competence.
Mr. BELMONT. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is probably a compilation
of the articles that he wrote in the French press.
Mr. DULLES. Express; yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we received
them.
Mr. DULLES. That is correct.
'
Mr. BELMONT. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they are
filled with false statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions, misinformation,
and certainly what I would term false journalism. In other words, he has
stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many things which the Commission's
investigation has disproved completely.
We will be glad to read the book and to furnish you with a general comment
on it. But to take down each statement in there and go into it would probably
result in a critique of 500 pages.
Mr. DULLES. We do not want that. I don't think we need that.
Mr. BELMONT. Where actually many of these allegations have already been
resolved by the Commission, I am sure. We will be glad to read it and give
you a―
Mr. DULLES. I think that would be useful for the Commission to have, Mr.
Chairman. Do you agree?
The CHAIRMAN. Very well; yes. If you find any factual matters in there that
contradict your findings, we would expect you to call it to our attention.
Mr. BELMONT. Most certainly, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. But otherwise I don't think we want a review of the book.
That is your idea, is it?
Mr. DULLES. Not a review of the book, but if there are allegations there, any
evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to have it.
Mr. McCLOY. Do you have any record of Buchanan? Do you know anything.
about Buchanan's background?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not recall.
Mr. DULLES. I wish you would check.
Mr. BELMONT. We can send you a letter.
The CHAIRMAN. We have the record.
Mr. McCLOY. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School
and Yale.
Mr. DULLES. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a Communist
at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington Star, I am ad-
vised, and I believe, according to the information I have, that he was terminated
by the Star some years ago.
Mr. BELMONT. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission.
The CHAIRMAN. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement which
we have recorded. His testimony wasn't taken. He just walked in off the
street.
Mr. DULLES. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman.
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J. EDGAR Hoover
MAY 14, 1964
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. HOOVER. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin will carry on the examination, Mr. Director.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, do you want to tell him briefly what our
purpose is?
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; it is our practice to make a brief statement before
the testimony of each witness, and I will do it now.
Mr. Hoover will be asked to testify in regard to whethe. Lee H. Oswald
was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in any capacity at any time, and
whether he knows of any credible evidence of any conspiracy, either domestic
or foreign, involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.
What he has to say about an article in the National Enquirer, Commission
Exhibit No. 837, and concerning the failure to include the name and informa-
tion concerning special agent Hosty in the initial report of the Oswald address
book and any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning im-
provements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the
United States. Now, Mr. Rankin, you may proceed.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, will you state for the record your name and.
position?
Mr. HOOVER. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation of the Department of Justice.
Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live, Mr. Hoover?
Mr. Hoover. I live at 4936 30th Place, Northwest, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Rankin. And you have been Director of the Bureau for some 40 years
according to the newspapers?
Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; since 1924.
Mr. RANKIN. You have furnished us a considerable amount of information,
Mr. Hoover, about whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent or
acting for the Bureau in any capacity as informer or otherwise at any time.
Are those statements correct?
Mr. HOOVER. They are correct. I can most emphatically say that at no time
was he ever an employee of the Bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as
a special employee, or as an informant.
Mr. RANKIN. I call your particular attention to Exhibit 835, and suggest
that you will find that that is your letter, together with your affidavit about
this subject matter, and other matters that you furnished to us concerning
this particular subject.
Mr. HOOVER. That is correct.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you wish to add anything?
Mr. HOOVER. No; there is nothing that I desire to add to what appears in this
letter and my affidavit which accompanied it to the Commission.
Mr. RANKIN. You have provided many things to us in assisting the Commis-
sion in connection with this investigation and I assume, at least in a general
way, you are familiar with the investigation of the assassination of President
Kennedy, is that correct?
Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. When President Johnson returned to Washington
he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and asked the Bureau to
pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there
is no Federal jurisdiction for such an investigation. It is not a Federal crime
to kill or attack the President or the Vice President or any of the continuity of
officers who would succeed to the Presidency.
However, the President has a right to request the Bureau to make special
investigations, and in this instance he asked that this investigation be made. I
immediately assigned a special force headed by the special agent in charge at
Dallas, Tex., to initiate the investigation, and to get all details and facts con-
cerning it, which we obtained, and then prepared a report which we submitted
to the Attorney General for transmission to the President.
Mr. RANKIN. From your study of this entire matter of the assassination and
work in connection with it, do you know of any credible evidence that has ever
come to your attention that there was a conspiracy either foreign or domestic
involved in the assassination?
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Mr. HOOVER. I know of no substantial evidence of any type that would support
any contention of that character. I have read all of the requests that have
come to the Bureau from this Commission, and I have read and signed all the
replies that have come to the Commission.
In addition, I have read many of the reports that our agents have made and
I have been unable to find any scintilla of evidence showing any foreign con-
spiracy or any domestic conspiracy that culminated in the assassination of
President Kennedy.
Representative FORD. May I ask this, Mr. Hoover. As I understand your
testimony, it is based on the evidence that has been accumulated thus far?
Mr. HOOVER. That is correct, sir.
Representative FORD. Is the Federal Bureau of Investigation continuing its
investigation of all possible ramifications of this assassination?
Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. We are receiving and we, I expect, will con-
tinue to receive for days or weeks to come, letters from individuals that normally
would probably be in the category of what we would call crank letters in which
various weird allegations are made or in which people have reported psychic
vibrations. We are still running out letters of that character and in turn
making a report to this Commission upon it, notwithstanding the fact that
on the face of it the allegation is without any foundation. Individuals who could
not have known any of the facts have made, some very strange statements.
There have been publications and books written, the contents of which have been
absurd and without a scintilla of foundation of fact. I feel, from my experience
in the Bureau, where we are in constant receipt over the years of these so-called
crank letters, that such allegations will be going on possibly for some yearè
to come.
I, personally, feel that any finding of the Commission will not be accepted by
everybody, because there are bound to be some extremists who have very pro-
nounced views, without any foundation for them, who will disagree violently
with whatever findings the Commission makes. But I think it is essential that
the FBI investigate the allegations that are received in the future so it can't be
said that we had ignored them or that the case is closed and forgotten.
Representative FORD. Could you give us some idea of how many agents are
currently working to one degree or another on any aspects of this case?
Mr. Hoover. I would estimate, Congressman Ford, that there are at the
present time at least 50 or 60 men giving their entire time to various aspects of
the investigation, because while Dallas is the office of origin, investigation is
required in auxiliary offices such as Los Angeles or San Francisco, and even in
some foreign countries like Mexico. We have representatives in Mexico City.
At the outset of the investigation, following the assassination, it was the
desire of the President to have this report completed by the Bureau just as
quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible, and I would say we had about
150 men at that time working on the report in the field, and at Washington, D.C.
Now, all the reports that come in from the field are, of course, reviewed at
Washington by the supervisor in charge of the case, and then in turn by the
assistant director of the division, and then in turn by Mr. Belmont, who is the
assistant to the Director.
Reports in which there is a controversial issue or where statements have
been made of the existence of some particular thing that we have never heard
of before, I myself, go over these to see that we haven't missed anything or
haven't had any gap in the investigation so it can be tied down.
Recently the National Enquirer had a fantastic article in it as to the existence
of a letter that had been written or a request that had been made by the Depart-
ment of Justice to Chief Curry of the Dallas Police Department, to withhold
arresting Rubinstein, or Ruby, and Oswald after the Oswald attempt on Gen-
eral Walker's life.
First, I had the agent in charge at Dallas interview Chief Curry and I have
sent to the Commission a letter as to what Chief Curry had to say. He branded
it as an entire lie that he had never received any request of that kind. I had
our files searched to be certain we had not written any such letter as that and
found we had not. I requested the Department of Justice to advise me whether
they had written any such letter and Mr. Katzenbach advises there is no ref-
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erence in the Department files to the alleged letter from any Department of
Justice official to Chief Curry nor any reference that an FBI official was asked
to request the Dallas police not to arrest Oswald or Ruby. A letter is being
sent to the Commission today setting forth this information.
Representative FORD. The point that I think ought to be made is that despite
the magnitude of the effort that has been made by the FBI and by other agencies,
and despite the tremendous effort that has been made, I believe, by the Com-
mission to help and assist and to consolidate all of the evidence that we possibly
could, that there is always the possibility at some future date that some evidence
might come to the surface.
Mr. HOOVER. That is, of course, possible; yes.
Representative FORD. I want just to be sure that no leads, no evidence regard-
less of its credibility will be ignored, that it will be pursued by the Bureau or
any other agency to make certain that it is good, bad or of no value.
Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned, the case
will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any informa-
tion coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly
investigated, so that we will be able to either prove or disprove the allegation.
We found in the course of our investigations that individuals have made state-
ments. Yet, when we investigate they will frankly admit that the statement
is an entire falsehood, or that they don't know why they wrote the letter or
why they made the statement. But, nevertheless, we have the record and
generally in those instances we try to get a signed statement from that individual
so it can be made a part of the record.
Representative FORD. Under your authority from the President, the authority
which gave you the FBI, the responsibility to conduct this investigation it is
not an authority with a terminal point. It is an authority that goes on
indefinitely?
Mr. HOOVER. Very definitely so. The President wanted a full and thorough
investigation made of this matter, and we have tried to do so. As I have
stated, I think we will continue to receive allegations. I think this will be a
matter of controversy for years to come, just like the Lincoln assassination.
There will be questions raised by individuals, either for publicity purposes or
otherwise, that will raise some new angle or new aspect of it. I think we must,
and certainly we intend in the FBI to continue to run down any such allegations
or reports of that kind.
Representative BOGGS. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Boggs.
Representative BOGGS. Mr. Hoover, I don't want any cover-to cover any
ground which has been covered but I just have one or two questions. First, let
me say that you and the Bureau have been very cooperative with this Commis-
sion.
Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.
Representative. BOGGS. And tremendously helpful. I have been concerned
about some of these wild press reports and concerned about what impact it may
have ultimately on the history of this thing. For instance there is a man
named Buchanan who has written a series of articles.
Mr. DULLES. A book now. A book is out; yes.
Representative BOGGS. A book now. I understand they have been widely
circulated in the European press, and this man came here and was, as I got it
from some other sources, he took in some people here, some American journal-
ists, and I am told that this man has a Communist background, and in addition
to that is a most unreliable person. He has made these allegations that the
Dallas police force was involved in the assassination and so on.
Would you have any suggestions on how this Commission should deal with
this sort of thing?
Mr. HOOVER. We have received a request from the Commission to review that
book and to make a report upon any, portions of it that can be contradicted
or substantiated by actual facts or documents. I know Buchanan's background.
He worked on the Washington Star and he was dismissed from the Washington
Star because he was a member of the Communist Party. He spent much of his
time in recent years in France writing for French newspapers. I have fol-
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lowed the articles that he has written about this matter and they are what I
would call "journalistic garbage." There is not a scintilla of truth to most
of the things he has written in these articles and in his book which I have had
a chance to scan but haven't actually reviewed yet. It is being reviewed by
my research section. Some of the allegations are utterly fantastic. I often
wonder where some of these individuals get such ideas and why they make
such statements without foundation.
Now, he makes many wild charges there, and to read it, a person not know-
ing him, or his views, or his background, would be inclined to wonder. I think
you are going to have that problem, as I say, for years to come. I don't know
how you can handle individuals like him other than to have the record clear
upon the facts of the case, and either substantiate or disprove his statements.
I don't think too much time should be given to these individuals who have
such unsavory backgrounds as Buchanan has and who makes statements that
have been proved to be untrue. But, at the same time I think when a book
like that comes out or an article of that type comes out that deals with the
assassination of the late President, I think it should be gone into from an in-
vestigative point of view. We should then submit to this Commission, even
after it has concluded its hearings, for record purposes, what we have found
in each particular instance.
Representative BOGGS. Now, on the other side of the fence-
Mr. DULLES. May I add one other thing just to interrupt. I wish you would
add to your list a book called "The Red Roses of Dallas" by a man named Gun.
He is a more reliable correspondent.
Mr. HOOVER. He is a Philadelphia correspondent.
Mr. DULLES. He has been living in this country since 1946. I have met him
over here. Let's see, he was at Dallas at the time. He was then reporting, I
think, for the Italian newspaper Epoca.
Mr. HOOVER. That is not the same one.
Mr. DULLES. He might have been lying. This book is full of lies. But I
think it is a book that ought to be added, too, and I will see that a copy is sent
to the Bureau.
Mr. HOOVER. I would appreciate that.
Representative BOGGS. On the other side of the spectrum some professor out
at the University of Illinois wrote a piece in which he alleged the President
was a Communist agent, President Kennedy, and Buchanan's allegations are
that the extreme right assassinated the President and this fellow's allegations
are that the Communists assassinated the President. Would you care to com-
ment? Have you read that piece?
Mr. HOOVER. I have read that piece. My comment on it is. this in general:
I think the extreme right is just as much a danger to the freedom of this
country as the extreme left. There are groups, organizations, and individuals
on the extreme right who make these very violent statements, allegations that
General Eisenhower was a Communist, disparaging references to the Chief
Justice and at the other end of the spectrum you have these leftists who make
wild statements charging almost anybody with being a Fascist or belonging
to some of these so-called extreme right societies. Now, I have felt, and I have
said publicly in speeches, that they are just as much a danger, at either end
of the spectrum. They don't deal with facts. Anybody who will allege that
General Eisenhower was a Communist agent, has something wrong with him.
A lot of people read such allegations because I get some of the weirdest letters
wanting to know whether we have inquired to find out whether that is true. I
have known General Eisenhower quite well myself and I have found him to be
a sound, level-headed man.
In New York City there is a woman by the name of Kraus who must be
mentally deranged as she stands on a Broadway corner there handing out
leaflets in which she charges me with being in the conspiracy with the Com-
munists to overthrow this Government and so forth.
Well now, if any person has fought communism, I certainly have fought
it. We have tried to fight it and expose it in democratic ways I think that is
the thing we have to very definitely keep in mind in this whole problem in the
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security of the President and the successor to office. Just how far you are going
to go for his protection and his security. I don't think you can get absolute
security without almost establishing a police state, and we don't want that.
You can't put security in a black groove or a white groove. It is in a gray
groove, and certain chances have to be taken. You are dealing with a human
being when you are dealing with the President of the United States. President
Johnson is a very down to earth human being, and it makes the security prob-
lem all the more difficult, but you can't bar him from the people.
There are certain things that can be done, and I submitted a memorandum
to the Secret Service, and to the White House on certain security steps that
might be taken and tightened up. But you are dealing with the general public
and that is what has given me great concern in the recent expansion, of the
criteria for dissemination that we adopted after the assassination.
Prior to that time we reported to the Secret Service all information that
dealt with individuals who were potential killers or by whom acts of violence
might be anticipated. The Secret Service would take that information and
would do with it as they saw fit. I gave great consideration to it because I am
not very happy with the criteria expansion, but I felt we had to include subver-
sives of various character, and extremists. We have, in turn, furnished their
names to the Secret Service. I think 5,000 names up to the present time already
have been submitted and there are at least three or four thousand more that
will be submitted within the next few months.
Then you come to the problem of what you are going to do when the Secret
Service gets those names. They have to call upon the local authorities. Just
recently, in the city of Chicago, when the President was there, the local au-
thorities were asked to give assistance as they usually do to the Secret Serv-
ice and they went to the homes of some of these people, and it resulted really
almost in a house arrest.
Now, I don't think there is any place in this country for that kind of thing,
but these people who belonged to extreme subversive organizations or organiza-
tions that advocated the overthrow of government by force and violence were
told that they couldn't leave their house or if they did they would be ac-
companied by a police officer. That gives me great concern because in New
York City alone, you run into maybe three or four thousand such individuals
who would be members of subversive organizations, and then you get into the
twilight zone of subversive fronts.
Now, there again, merely because a man belongs to a subversive front organi-
zation, in my estimation doesn't mean that he is blacklisted and is a menace
to the country for life. If he belongs to 20 of them, it certainly shows either
one of two things, he is either very gullible and dumb or he is a menace. That
has been my attitude in regard to Government service where you find a Gov-
ernment employee who belonged to one or two, maybe in his early days. I
don't believe this necessarily makes him a security risk. Rather, this would
be dependent on the degree of his activity in the front group and his purpose and
intent in associating himself with it. But where he has belonged to 15, 18, 20
of them, I don't think he has enough good judgment to be in the Government.
Some ministers get drawn into organizations, some of which are under the
domination of the Communist Party. Now, those ministers don't know that.
They are just as loyal and patriotic as you and I are, but they happen to belong.
Now, that is where the question of human judgment has to be used. We try
to use it in selecting these names. But I was startled when I learned of
the incident in Chicago because there you come pretty close to a house arrest
and we don't want that. We don't want a gestapo. We have to, I think, main-
tain an even balance.
I think it was very well expressed―
Mr. DULLES. May I ask you, Mr. Hoover, was this house arrest based on
names you had furnished the Secret Service and they furnished the local
authorities?
Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.
Representative Booos. That brings me back to the question I think I heard
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1
Congressman Ford ask you as I came into the room, because I think this is the
crux of our investigation.
I read the FBI report very carefully and the whole implication of the report
is that, number one, Oswald shot the President; number two, that he was not
connected with any conspiracy of any kind, nature or description.
Mr. HOOVER. Correct.
Representative BOGGS. Do you still subscribe to that?
Mr. HOOVER. I subscribe to it even more strongly today than I did at the time
that the report was written. You see, the original idea was that there would
be an investigation by the FBI and a report would be prepared in such form that
it could be released to the public.
Representative BOGGS. Surely.
Mr. HOOVER. Then a few days later, after further consideration, the President
decided to form a commission, which I think was very wise, because I feel that
the report of any agency of Government investigating what might be some short-
comings on the part of other agencies of Government ought to be reviewed by
an impartial group such as this Commission. And the more I have read these
reports, the more I am convinced that Oswald was the man who fired the
gun; and he fired three times, killed the President, and wounded Governor
Connally.
And I also am further convinced that there is absolutely no association be-
tween Oswald or Ruby. There was no such evidence ever established.
Mr. DULLES. Or Oswald and anybody else? Would you go that far?
Mr. HOOVER. Anybody else who might be
Mr. DULLES. In connection with the assassination?
Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I would certainly go that far. There was suspicion at first
this might be a Castro act.
.
Representative BOGGS. Right.
Mr. HOOVER. We had information that had been obtained in Mexico City by
another intelligence agency indicating there was a man who had seen a certain
amount of money passed to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate. I think it was
$6,000 that was passed. We went into that very thoroughly. The man later
retracted his statement and stated it was not true. He was asked whether he
would take a lie detector test, and he did. The lie detector test showed that
he was telling a lie.
As to the lie detector, I do want to make this comment on it. I have always
held to the opinion that it is not a perfect piece of machinery. It is an inter-
pretation made by human beings of what the machine, the polygraph, shows. I
would never want to convict or to send to the penitentiary any person solely
on the evidence of the lie detector. It is a contribution in an investigation,
a more or less psychological contribution.
But I have seen individuals who have failed the lie detector test and who
were just as innocent as they could be. That particular lead in Mexico City
was completely disproved; there was no foundation for it.
We found no associations between Oswald and Ruby. There has been a story
printed that Ruby and Oswald worked together and were close friends.
There was no evidence, there was never any indication that we could find
that Oswald had ever been in Ruby's nightclub or had had any association with
him..
Ruby comes from Chicago, he was on the fringe of what you might call the
elements of the underworld there. He came to Dallas, opened up the nightclub
and it was a place where, certainly not the better class of people went, but it
wasn't any so-called “joint," to use the vernacular. It was just another night-
club. So far as we have been able to establish there was no relationship or
contact between Oswald and Ruby or anyone else allegedly involved in this
assassination.
Representative BOGGS. The FBI interviewed practically everybody who ever
associated with Oswald?
Mr. HOOVER. It did.
Representative BOGGS. You didn't find any indication of why anyone should
even suspect that Oswald would do this, did you?
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slowly. It wasn't going at a high rate of speed, so that he had perfect oppor-
tunity to do it.
Now, some people have raised the question: Why didn't he shoot the Presi-
dent as the car came toward the storehouse where he was working?
The reason for that is, I think, the fact there were some trees between his
window on the sixth floor and the cars as they turned and went through the
park. So he waited until the car got out from under the trees, and the limbs,
and then he had a perfectly clear view of the occupants of the car, and I
think he took aim, either on the President or Connally, and I personally believe
it was the President in view of the twisted mentality the man had.
But he had given no indication of that-we had interviewed him, I think,
three times. Of course, our interviews were predicated to find out whether he
had been recruited by the Russian intelligence service, because they frequently
do that.
Representative BOGGS. And had he been?
Mr. HOOVER. He had not been, so he said, and we have no proof that he was.
He had been over there long enough but they never gave him citizenship in
Russia at all. I think they probably looked upon him more as a kind of a
queer sort of individual and they didn't trust him too strongly.
But just the day before yesterday information came to me indicating that
there is an espionage training school outside of Minsk-I don't know whether
it is true and that he was trained at that school to come back to this country
to become what they call a "sleeper," that is a man who will remain dormant
for 3 or 4 years and in case of international hostilities rise up and be used.
I don't know of any espionage school at Minsk or near Minsk, and I don't
know how you could find out if there ever was one because the Russians won't
tell you if you asked them.
They do have espionage and sabotage schools in Russia and they do have
an assassination squad that is used by them but there is no indication he had
any association with anything of that kind.
Representative BOGGS. Now we have some people, including this man's mother,
talk about Oswald having been an agent of the Government of the United States.
I think his mother mentioned the CIA; she has made these statements publicly
for money, apparently.
Mr. HOOVER. Yes; she has.
Representative BOGGS. Just for the purpose of the record, I think it would be
well if you would comment on that, Mr. Director.
Mr. HOOVER. Of course, we have interviewed his mother and his wife, and
all his relatives, and everybody that he is known to have associated with. His
mother I would put in a category of being emotionally unstable. She has
been around the country making speeches, and the first indication of her
emotional instability was the retaining of a lawyer that anyone would not
have retained if they really were serious in trying to get down to the facts.
But she has been in New York City; she has been in Chicago; I think other
parts of the country, always speaking for money.
Now, that kind of an individual is the type we have seen over the years,
who will say almost anything to draw a crowd. Just to be able to say some-
thing sensational. Many times we have gone out to such people and asked
them specifically, "Now, what is your basis for this?" And they will say,
"Well, I just had a feeling that that was true, so I said it.”
She has never made that statement to us, but we have many other instances
where that kind of statement is made. They don't have the legal evidence that
you must have if you are going to take any positive action. I would put very
little credence in anything that his mother said.
I think his wife was a far more reliable person in statements that she made,
so far as we were able to ascertain, than his mother. I think the mother had
in mind, naturally, the fact she wanted to clear her son's name, which was
a natural instinct, but more importantly she was going to see how much money
she could make, and I believe she has made a substantial sum.
Representative BOGGS. And the allegations she has made about this man being
an agent either of the CIA or the FBI are false?
Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can certainly speak for the FBI that it is false, and I
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have discussed the matter, naturally, with Mr. McCone, the Director of CIA,
and he, of course, will no doubt appear himself, but there is no indication at
all that he was employed by them. We frequently get that kind of a story
from individuals who, when they get into some kind of difficulty, will claim they
were working for the CIA or they were working for the FBI.
Representative BOGGS. Surely.
Mr. HOOVER. Now, no one can work for the FBI without the approval being
given at Washington and a record kept of it, even of the confidential informants.
That is very tightly controlled. We have no so-called lump sum that we can
use to hire people. So there has to be a voucher and specific details of payment.
And I know at no time was he an informant or agent or a special employee or
working in any capacity for the FBI.
As to the interviews we had with him in which he gave us some informa-
tion, some of it was not the truth, but this was not particularly significant.
The interviews we had with him I would not term as talking with an informant.
He was interviewed while under arrest by the New Orleans police, and then
after he had committed this act of assassination we interviewed him in police
headquarters in Dallas. But they were the only contacts we had, I think
four contacts altogether, and he received no money of any kind, no promise
of any kind, and there was no indication that he was rendering assistance to
the U.S. Government. We looked upon him as a criminal after the assassination,
of course, and prior to that time we looked upon him as an individual who we
suspected might become an agent of the Soviet government. There was no
proof of that, and we checked him carefully.
We knew of his contact with the Soviet Embassy here at Washington, his
contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and his contact
with the Worker publication in New York. And none of those contacts gave
any indication of any tendency to commit violence.
There are many people who read the Daily Worker, or what is now the
Worker, and you certainly can't brand them as hazards to the security of the
country or as potential assassins. It is in that area that I am particularly
concerned that we don't become hysterical and go too far in restricting the
citizens of our country from exercising their civil and constitutional rights.
The mere fact a person disagrees with you in a matter on communism doesn't
mean he should be arrested. Many Communists make very violent speeches,
and we know them, but I don't feel that the time has come that they should be
arrested. If they have violated the laws of the United States, we will, then,
proceed with prosecution, and the cases can then go through the courts. Such
cases last for years before they get to the Supreme Court, and even then such
cases often start over on some legal angle. But, all in all, I think that the
enforcement of security and the enforcement of laws dealing with subversion
ought to be handled in the American manner.
I am criticized by the extreme right for that. They put me in the category,
I guess, along with General Eisenhower. But the extreme left criticizes me,
saying I believe that any person who has on a red necktie may be addicted to
communism, and, therefore, is a great danger. That is why I say the extremists
at both ends are bad, and I have repeated that several times publicly.
Representative BOGGS. No doubt about the problem being a difficult one.
I remember some years back when these fanatics started shooting up the
House of Representatives..
Mr. HOOVER. I recall that.
Representative BOGGS. I happened to be there on the occasion and there were
many suggestions that we build a bulletproof glass enclosure around the Mem-
bers of Congress and so on. Of course, all of us rejected those ideas because
it would be totally incompatible with our democratic institutions and this,
obviously, becomes a problem in the security of the President; that is what
you are telling us, isn't it?
Mr. HOOVER. That is the great problem. We have participated in the pro-
tection of the President since the assassination. The Secret Service indicates
how many agents it needs when the President is traveling somewhere or going
somewhere in Washington, and then I assign that number of agents to the
Secret Service. They are not under my direction. They are under the direction
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of the Secret Service because under law they are charged with the protection
of the President. We have never done that before, but I felt that it was some-
thing we must do if the Secret Service desired it. Sometimes, such as at the
funeral of the late President Kennedy, the procession walked up Connecticut
Avenue, which created a very, very grave security problem because they were
walking with these tall building on either side. As I recall, we had the respon-
sibility for the Cathedral, and we had 43 agents in the Cathedral during the
services. I was more concerned about these tall buildings, because all the
small buildings have been torn down along Connecticut Avenue, and there were
about six or seven blocks to walk. Not only the high officials of this Government,
including the President, but the Queen of Greece. General de Gaulle, Emperor
Haile Selassie, and many Prime Ministers were present. They were a perfect
target for someone in some window.
Now, you can't empty these buildings. It is impossible to do that, because
you can't go to the Mayflower Hotel and say all front rooms must be vacated.
Other office buildings are there, even taller than the Mayflower, and you can't
make them keep everybody out of the front offices because then you get into
a police state.
The Secret Service does try to check to find out who have these various offices.
We also check so if there is anything in our files on those individuals the Secret
Service is at once advised. When the President goes to a banquet or a social
occasion, all of the employees in the hotel, the cooks, waiters, and busboys,
and so forth, are all checked by Secret Service to be certain there is no one
with a background that would indicate a hazard to the President. But that
is as far as I think you can go. You can't put in a whole new staff of waiters
and you can't make people move out. People going to a Presidential function
are generally invited by card or by list. and that is very carefully checked at
the entrance by the Secret Service.
We suggested a few more things that possibly could be done, and some of
which I have doubts about. You speak about this matter of glass around the
galleries in the House. One of the suggestions that we made was that there
be bulletproof glass in front of the President's lectern. In my own mind, I
question whether that is wise. Knowing this President as this President is, he
wants to get close to the audience; he wants to reach over and shake hands
with people. That concerns me because you never know when an emotionally
unstable person may be in that crowd. As you noted, he has frequently brought
groups into the White House gardens and walked around with people he didn't
know. I know the Secret Service people are concerned about it. I am con-
cerned about it.
President Truman last week expressed his concern that the President was
taking unnecessary chances.
But the governmental agency having the responsibility for guarding him, the
Secret Service, has a natural hesitancy to say, "You can't do this."
Representative BOGGS. Of course, for the record, President Kennedy had the
same difficulty.
Mr. HOOVER. That is right. It was best expressed at Parkland Hospital.
One of President Kennedy's staff made the statement that the whole fault in
this matter was that, in the choice between politics and security, politics was.
chosen. That is exactly what happened. It was an open car. I am thoroughly
opposed to the President riding in an open car.
They did not have any armored car in the Secret Service at that time.
I have now sent one of our armored cars over for the President, but it is a
closed limousine. But on occasion, such as at Gettysburg and Atlanta the other
day, the President got out of the armored car which had been flown there for
his use, and commandeered the car of the Secret Service which is wide open,
so he could wave and see the people. Now, that is a great hazard. I think
he should always be in an armored car that is closed, that can't have the
top put down. But as you recall, President Kennedy had the bubble top off
of the car that he was in. It was not armored and the bubble top was made
of plastic so a bullet could have gone through it very easily.
Representative FORD. Mr. Hoover, you have categorically testified that the
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FBI never at any time had Oswald as an agent, as an informant, or in any
other way.
Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. I couldn't make it more emphatic.
Representative FORD. And Mr. Belmont testified to the same last week when
he was before us.
Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. Both you and he would be fully familiar with all of
the records of the FBI in this regard?
Mr. HOOVER. We would, and we would not only be fully familiar with it
because while Mr. Belmont is in charge of the Investigative Branch of the
Bureau we have two assistants to the Director, one in charge of administrative
work and the other in charge of investigative work-we have also checked the
administrative records where vouchers or payments would have been made and
there is no indication that any money was ever paid to Oswald. We have
obtained, and they are on file with the Commission, the affidavits of the agents,
who at various times were in contact with Oswald, to the effect that he was not
an informant; that they had never paid him anything; that he was being
questioned as to possible recruitment by the Soviet intelligence; so there was
no evidence at any time indicating employment by the FBI.
Representative FORD. And you were not under any limitation or restriction
from any other authority in this regard?
Mr. HOOVER. Absolutely not. I have the entire control of whether a man
shall be an informant or shall not be an informant. That comes under my
chain of command from the local office which has the matter at hand. They
can't just put on an informant without our approval. The recommendation
on security informants comes to the Bureau; it goes through the Assistant
Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and, in significant cases, goes
to Mr. Belmont, and then to my desk for my specific approval. So I, or my
seat-of-government staff, have to approve every one of those who are used as
informants in all classes of cases, not only in intelligence cases but in white-
slave cases, automobile thefts, and all of these cases.
Representative FORD. There is no limitation on what you can tell us about
this situation?
Mr. HOOVER. None whatsoever.
Representative FORD. No limitation; no restrictions?
Mr. HOOVER. No restriction.
So far as the record of vouchers in the Bureau
are concerned, they are open to the inspection of this Commission at any time
going back as far as you may want to go.
Senator COOPER. May I ask just one question there? I think you have an-
swered it, but in your examination of this aspect as to whether or not Oswald
was an informer or employee or held any relationship to the FBI, you, yourself,
have looked into all of the means you have of determining that fact when you
make the statement to us?
Mr. HOOVER. I have personally looked into that for two reasons: Because the
President asked me personally to take charge of this investigation and to direct
it, and I knew that the report ultimately would be made to him. For that rea-
son I became familiar with every step and every action that was taken. Then
when the allegation was made by someone-I think it was the mother of Os-
wald first, if I recall correctly-that he was employed by some Government
agency, the CIA, or FBI, and maybe both, I insisted upon a check being made
and any record showing any indication of that being brought to me. When
they could find none, I then asked for affidavits from the field force that had
dealt with Oswald as to whether they had hired him or paid him anything or
given him anything, and the affidavits are on file here that they had not.
Senator COOPER. I think you have said there is no sum available to the FBI
which would enable these men, these agents, to employ him out of any funds
that are made available to them.
Mr. HOOVER. Oh, no; it must be done by voucher, and those vouchers are ex-
amined by the General Accounting Office every year or so. We have no lump
sum in the field offices for employment of informants as such which is not sup-
ported by vouchers.
Senator COOPER. I have just about two questions, I may have to go in a few
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minutes to the Senate. I would like to direct your attention to that period
of time when Oswald was a defector, beginning when he left the United States
and when he returned.
Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.
Senator COOPER. During that period, did the FBI have any jurisdiction over
intelligence regarding him, or any capacity to know?
Mr. HOOVER. While he was in Russia?
Senator CoOPER. Yes.
Mr. HOOVER. No; we did not. We were interested in knowing what he might
say in Russia that appeared in the press. That was our first intimation that
this man had defected, when we read it in a newspaper article. We were, of
course, interested in knowing when he would return or if he would return.
We had no jurisdiction as to what he was doing in Russia after he had gone
there.
Senator COOPER. As I understand it, you had no capacity at that time to
follow his activities?
Mr. HOOVER. That is true. We have no agents in Russia. Foreign intelli-
gence is handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, and our responsibility is
domestic. We work very closely together.
Senator COOPER. Have you had the jurisdiction since the assassination or
the occasion to examine persons connected with the State Department concern-
ing the activities of Oswald in Russia?
Mr. HOOVER. Well-
Senator COOPER. Would that be a matter for some other agency?
Mr. HOOVER. That could be a matter for CIA or for us after Oswald had re-
turned here.
Senator CoOPER. Yes.
Mr. HOOVER. Then he becomes a civilian in the country here. Now, there is
what we call a delimitation agreement among the Government intelligence
agencies. For instance, the military branches of the Government have their
own intelligence services and they handle all military deviations in regard
to espionage or things of that kind. If they want our assistance and ask for
it we, of course, will always cooperate. In regard to CIA, there are many cases
which CIA and the FBI work jointly on, of individuals that may have been
recruited over in Europe by the CIA, not by us, because we don't have authority
to do that abroad, but when that man comes to this country, the best ends of
intelligence are served by having the two agencies work very closely together,
conduct joint interviews, and exchange information very, very freely. That
has been going on ever since I can recall CIA being existence.
Mr. DULLES. I would like to testify to the fact that that cooperation existed
during the whole period I was Director, and I am sure it has continued now
with great cooperation on both sides.
Mr. HOOVER. It is a very necessary thing, because the intelligence agency of
many of these foreign countries will cover the whole world and the country
itself. Whereas in this country you have separate agencies covering espionage
activities. CIA covers the foreign activity, and the FBI the domestic activities,
and they must be interlocking. An espionage agent of the Soviet Government
can arrive in New York today by plane from Paris and he can be in Mexico
City tomorrow. Then, CIA would pick him up there. We would not pick him
up there.
We would watch him while in this country, but as soon as he takes
that plane and leaves the United States CIA moves in on him. If he comes
back to the United States, we move in on him. Therefore, we have a very close
liaison.
As a matter of fact, what we have done in government agencies is to have
a liaison agent in our Bureau assigned to contact CIA, the Pentagon, State
Department, and various other agencies to cut out the red tape of writing letters
back and forth. In order to orally relay information which has come to his
attention, our representative can immediately phone it over to the FBI, and if
there is need, for instance, to meet a plane coming in to New York or a boat that
is docking at New York, it is all accomplished within a matter of 45 minutes or
an hour.
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If you went through this letter-writing process and the paper war that goes
on so often in the Government it might take a week or 10 days.
The FBI does have 10 legal attaches attached to 10 embassies abroad. Their
purpose is not operational. They don't investigate in those countries any matters
that have to be investigated. That, if it is to be done, is handled by CIA. Our
purpose in being there is to maintain liaison with our opposite number such as
the Surete Nationale in France and with the national police in the Philippines,
to exchange information that is vital to our internal security, and also vital to
the internal security of the other country.
Senator CooPER. May I ask one other question?
Is there any, considering the number of defectors in the United States to
Communist countries, which cannot be large, I would assume-
Mr. HOOVER. I think there are about 36.
Senator COOPER. Which would indicate, I would think either a lack of re-
liability on their part and stability or beyond that a dedicated purpose to become
Communists, then upon their return, wouldn't it seem to you they should be given
some special attention?
Mr. HOOVER. We have now-
Senator CooPER. To determine whether they are a risk to become Soviet or
Communist espionage agents or in fact become dangerous?
Mr. HOOVER. We have taken steps to plug that gap.
Prior to the assassination of the President, a 'defector, before he came back
was always cleared for return by a representative of the State Department or
the military abroad. When he came back we immediately interviewed him
if he was a civilian. It had to be done promptly to determine whether he could
be a potential intelligence agent.
Now, in December of last year, following the assassination, we expanded the
criteria of what should be furnished to the Secret Service, and all defectors
automatically go on the list to be furnished to the Secret Service.
There are 36 defectors that we know of in this country who have been under
investigation. Some of those men may have changed their views sincerely.
Some of them may not have. But as a matter of general precaution, as a result
of the Oswald situation, we are seeing that all go to the Secret Service.
Mr. DULLES. That includes military defectors, does it not?
Mr. HOOVER. Military defectors and defectors from any private agency, after
they return to the U.S. and become civilians. Some have defected to China,
to the satellite nations and to Russia.
Senator COOPER. Just one other question, because I have to go.
In the course of this investigation, as you know so well, there have been a
number identified who were very close, at least to Mrs. Oswald, and a few, I
can't say that were close to Oswald yet they had association with him, such as
the man who drove him back and forth, Mrs. Paine, with whom Mrs. Oswald
lived, and others, has there been any credible, I won't say credible because if
you had you would have presented it to us in your report, has there been any
claims by persons that these people are in any way related to the Communist
Party?
Mr. HOOVER. We have had no credible evidence that they have been related
to the Communist Party in this country.
Now, as to Mrs. Oswald, the wife of Oswald, there is no way of knowing
whether she belonged to the Russian Communist Party in Russia. She is a
rather intelligent woman, and notwithstanding that you have to talk with her
through an interpreter, we have had no indication of her association with
Communists in this country, nor have any of her close friends or relatives.
As to his mother, we found no indication she is associated or closely asso-
ciated with the Communists. She is the only one of the group that we have
come in contact with that I would say is somewhat emotionally unstable. Our
agents have interviewed her. She sometimes gets very angry and she won't
answer questions. As to the rest of the group who had been friends of his, or
worked with him in the Texas School Book Depository, none of them have
indicated any Communist associations of any kind.
Senator CoOPER. Thank you.
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Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, I hand you Exhibit 863 and ask you to examine
that and state whether or not that is the letter that you referred to in which
you answered questions of the Commission concerning the National Enquirer
magazine or newspaper?
Mr. HOOVER. This letter of May 8 addressed to the Commission is the letter
that dealt with our interview with Chief Curry and was predicated upon the
article which appeared in the National Enquirer of May 17, 1964.
Mr. RANKIN. I ask you if you would care to add anything to that letter except
what you have already testified to?
Mr. HOOVER. No; I have nothing to add to that. Chief Curry was very spe-
cific, I am told by my agent in charge at Dallas, that this article is an absolute
lie; that none of these things set forth in the article occurred; that he received
no phone call or any request of any kind oral or by phone or in writing from
the Department of Justice or from the FBI. As I stated earlier, the report
from the Department of Justice indicated that they made no request.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit 863, being the letter
just referred to.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 863 for
identification and received in evidence.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, is Exhibit 837 the article that you referred to in
the National Enquirer?
Mr. HOOVER. Yes; that is the one.
Mr. RANKIN. I call your attention to Exhibit 836 and ask you if that is the
letter that you referred to which describes the criteria in the handling of the
security of the President that you have described in your testimony.
Mr. Hoover. This is the letter. It sets forth the criteria which were adopted,
originally about 1942 and later incorporated in the manual of instructions in
1954. It also includes the amended instructions to our field offices, prepared
in December of 1963, which extended the criteria.
Mr. RANKIN. Does that Exhibit correctly set forth the information you had
in regard to those matters?
Mr. HOOVER. It does.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you care to add anything to it?
Mr. HOOVER. No; I have nothing to add to it at all.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, in light of what happened. Mr. Hoover, I think the Com-
mission would desire to have your comments or whatever you care to tell them,
concerning the reasons why you did not furnish the information you had con-
cerning Lee Harvey Oswald to the Secret Service prior to the time of the Presi-
dent's assassination.
Mr. HOOVER. Well, I have gone into that very thoroughly because that was
obviously one of the questions that I had in my mind when the tragedy occurred
in Dallas.
In going back over the record, and I have read each one of the reports dealing
with that and the reports of Mr. Hosty who had dealt with the Oswald situa-
tion largely in Dallas, we had the matter that I have previously referred to, the
report of the State Department that indicated this man was a thoroughly safe
risk, he had changed his views, he was a loyal man now and had seen the light
of day, so to speak.
How intensive or how extensive that interview in Moscow was, I don't know.
But, nevertheless, it was in a State Department document that was furnished
to us.
Now, we interviewed Oswald a few days after he arrived. We did not inter-
view him on arrival at the port of entry because that is always undesirable by
reason of the fact it is heavily covered by press, and any relatives generally
are there, so we prefer to do it after the man has settled down for two or three
days and become composed. We do it in the privacy of our office or wherever
he may be, or in his own home or apartment. We interviewed him twice in
regard to that angle that we were looking for. We had no indication at this
time of anything other than his so-called Marxist leanings, Marxist beliefs.
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We wanted to know whether he had been recruited by the Soviet government
as an intelligence agent, which is a frequent and constant practice. There is
not a year goes by but that individuals and groups of individuals, sometimes on
these cultural exchanges, go through Russia and recruits are enlisted by the
Russian intelligence, usually through blackmail. The individual is threatened
that if he doesn't come back to this country and work for them they will expose
the fact that he is a homosexual or a degenerate or has been indiscrete.
Pictures are usually taken of individuals who become implicated in that sort
of thing, so the individual is really desperate. Such blackmail has occurred
year after year for some time.
In Oswald's case we had no suspicion that any pressure like that had been
brought to bear on him because he had gone voluntarily and had obviously
wanted to live in Russia and had married a Russian woman.
After those interviews had been completed, the next incident was the difficulty
he had at New Orleans. We were concerned there as to whether he was
functioning officially for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which was financed
and supported by Castro and Castro's government, and if he was, where he
obtained money and with whom he had dealt.
He apparently had the leaflets printed himself on plain ordinary paper. There
was no reason for us, then, to have any suspicion that he had any element of
danger in him.
However, we did not ignore or forget the fact that he was still in the country.
We kept track of him when he went from New Orleans to Dallas, and that
was one of the reasons why Hosty went to the home of Mrs. Paine. She told
us where Oswald was working, at the Texas book house. Hosty gave her his
telephone number and his name so that if there was any information or any
contact she wanted to make she could phone him at the Dallas office.
Mrs. Oswald, the wife, took down the license number of Hosty's car which
was incorrect only in one digit. The name, the telephone number, and the
automobile license were later found in Oswald's memorandum book.
However, that in itself was not significant because many times we will go
to see a person and tell him now, “If you think of anything you want to tell
us or you have any information you want to give us, here are my name and
address, telephone number, and call me," and that is what was done with Mrs.
Paine because Hosty wasn't there at the time. He was at work.
Incidentally, those items in Oswald's notebook requiring investigative at-
tention were first set out in an investigative report of our Dallas Office dated
December 23, 1963. This report was not prepared for this Commission but
rather for investigative purposes of the FBI and, therefore, the information
concerning Hosty's name, telephone number and license number was not in-
cluded in the report as the circumstances under which Hosty's name, et cetera,
appeared in Oswald's notebook were fully known to the FBI.
After our investigative report of December 23, 1963, was furnished to the
Commission, we noted that Agent Hosty's name did not appear in the report.
In order that there would be a complète reporting of all items in Oswald's note-
book, this information was incorporated in another investigative report of our
Dallas Office, dated February 11, 1964. Both of the above-mentioned reports
were furnished to the Commission prior to any inquiry concerning this matter
by the President's Commission.
י
There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indica-
tion that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the Presi-
dent or to the Vice President. Up to that time, as has been indicated.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, may I interrupt, you said Hosty was not there at
the time, he was at work-did you mean Mr. Oswald?
Mr. HOOVER. That was my mistake. I meant Mr. Oswald. Hosty talked with
Mrs. Paine and Mrs. Oswald. Mrs. Paine speaks Russian and she could inter-
pret for her.
Oswald was at the Texas Book Co., and then, as I say, Hosty left his tele-
phone number and name, and Mrs. Oswald for some reason took down the
license number. I don't know whether she was convinced this was an agent
of the FBI, or why she did it.
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But, anyway, that was in the book that was later found, and which contained
many other things that Oswald had entered in the book.
Now, as I say, up to that time, there had been no information that would
have warranted our reporting him as a potential danger or hazard to the security
or the safety of the President or the Vice President, so his name was not fur-
nished at the time to Secret Service.
Under the new criteria which we have now put into force and effect, it
would have been furnished because we now include all defectors. As to the
original criteria, which we felt were sound and sufficient and which we felt
no one, not even the most extreme civil rights proponent could take exception to.
we limited the furnishing of names to S.S. to persons potentially dangerous
to the physical well being of the President. We included emotionally unstable
people who had threatened the President or Vice President.
At my office during the course of a week there are sometimes three or four
callers who have to be taken to a Hospital because of their mental condition.
They claim they are being persecuted by radio beams and they want to see
me or the President to have those beams stopped. Now you never know what
tangent they are going to take. If such a person is living in some part of the
country where the President may be going his name would be furnished to the
Secret Service.
One car last year, I think, crashed through the gates of the White House;
the person driving wanted to see the President. The guard wouldn't let him in
and so the car crashed through and got within 20 feet of the first door. The
guards, by that time, had their revolvers out and took him into custody.
Last year a gentleman drove all the way from Arizona to see me. He drove
up the marble step of the Department of Justice, and by that time the guards
had come out and took him into custody. I think he was incarcerated in Arizona.
People of this type are among those we would have furnished to the Secret
Service. They have the potential to harm somebody.
We get names from members of Congress, of people who come to the Capitol
and try to threaten them or harass them. They let us know about it, and we
make the investigation or advise the police. If we can get the family to have
the person put into an institution, we try to do so. If they don't, we may take
steps to have him incarcerated through other legal means.
Mr. DULLES. How many names, Mr. Director, in general, could the Secret
Service process? Aren't their facilities limited as to dealing with vast numbers
of names because of their limited personnel?
Mr. HOOVER. I think they are extremely limited. The Secret Service is a very
small organization and that is why we are fortifying them, so to speak, or supple-
menting them by assigning agents of our Bureau which is, of course, quite
a burden on us. Our agents are assigned about 24 to 25 cases per agent and
cover such involved matters as bankruptcy and antitrust cases.
Now, the Secret Service has a very small group and I would estimate that
the names we have sent over number some 5,000. I would guess there are about
another 4,000 that will go over in the next month to them. Frankly, I don't
see how they can go out and recheck those names. We keep the records up to
date; if additional information comes in on these names we furnish it to the
Secret Service. They will have to call upon the local authorities, unless the
Secret Service force is enlarged considerably so that they can handle it entirely
on their own. I think the Secret Service is entirely too small a force today
to handle the duties that they are handling. The great crowds that are at the
White House all the time, around the gates, that go to church where the President
goes, all of those things, of course, have to be checked over by them. They
always check in advance and just recently, a few Sundays ago, they found
some individuals in the basement of St. Mark's church in Washington, where
he was going to attend on Sunday morning. His arrival was held up until they
could ascertain who they were. They were deaf mutes whose identity had not
been cleared with the Secret Service.
Now, the Presidential party was delayed about 5 or 10 minutes in reaching
the church by reason of the radio call to the White House to hold it up.
We are giving to Secret Service more and more names. The total, in addition
to the names they already had, will reach 10,000. I don't see how they are
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going to be able to handle the situation as they would want to handle it. They
have to depend upon local police organizations. Many local police departments
are capable and efficient; some are not. Many have good judgment and some
have not. Wherever you have a police department of 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 men
you are bound to find a few who will just barge in and do something which
better judgment would dictate should not be done, as in the incident which
occurred in the Midwest where they placed people practically under house arrest.
I think it was very bad judgment and should not have been done but the Secret
Service, of course, turned the names over to the local authorities, and the local
authorities do what they think is right.
Now, I guess their attitude with all justice to them is, "Well, we will resolve
the risk in our favor. If we keep these people under surveillance and keep
them in the house until the President gets out of town nothing can happen
from them." That is what you would call totalitarian security. I don't think
you can have that kind of security in this country without having a great wave
of criticism against it. There is a great tendency for people to expect the intelli-
gence forces and the law enforcement agencies to be able to go out and airest
people and bring them in and hold them endlessly and talk to them. We can't
arrest a person, without probable cause, or unless he commits a crime in our
presence. We have to arraign him promptly and if not done promptly, the
confession that he may have made generally cannot be used against him.
Just as a collateral matter we faced that problem in California in the case
of the kidnapping of Frank Sinatra, Jr. One of the kidnappers we arrested
near San Diego confessed but we didn't arraign him because the other kidnap-
pers would have left California and it would have been difficult to find them.
However, the next day after arraignment he made changes in the confession
and signed it so the court held that it was admissible.
The Secret Service, of course, is faced with the same problem. They just
can't arrest people because they may not like their looks. They have to have
facts justifying detention but the public conception is that you have a full right
to go out and do these things. We have stressed in the FBI that there must be
full compliance with the laws of this country and with the decisions of the
Supreme Court. That is the law of the country. Now, whether a person likes
it or not and there are some groups that are very violent against the decisions
of the court while others are very much in favor of them, it is not for the FBI
to take sides. We have a job to do and we do it under the rulings of the courts
and we have been able to do it effectively.
I know when the ruling came down on the prompt arraignment, there was
great shouting and some strong editorials claiming that it was going to wreck
law enforcement. It hasn't wrecked us. It has made it more difficult but I
think we have to face up to the fact that law enforcement in a free country
must abide by the laws of that country irrespective of how difficult it is. Some
persons talk about putting handcuffs on the law enforcement officers and taking
them off the criminals. That is a nice catch phrase to use in a speech or article
but operating within the law has not interfered with our work.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, I ask you about Exhibit 825 which is first a letter
and then encloses certain affidavits of your agents.
Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. You are familiar with that?
Mr. HOOVER. I am familiar with that. I read all of that and signed it.
Mr. RANKIN. You know those are the affidavits in regard to whether Lee
Harvey Oswald was an agent or connected in anyway with the Bureau that you
have just testified to?
Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; and the affidavits of all agents, who had any
contact with him.
Mr. RANKIN. I call your attention to Exhibits 864 and 865, and ask you if
you have seen those before or, you have seen the original of 864 and 865 is a
photostatic copy of your letter to us in answer to 864, is that correct?
Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; yes. I recall very distinctly.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you recall those letters involved an inquiry as to any con-
nections of Lee Harvey Oswald with Communists or any criminal groups or
others that might be conspiratorial?
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refrained from further comment but of course by that time the identification
of the gun was known, the caliber of the gun, where it had come from, where
it had been bought and the information we had run down in Chicago and had
furnished to the Dallas Police Department.
If the case had been in the hands of the FBI none of that information would
have been given out: Because of the publicity you had to face the charge that
the prejudice of the community would require a change of venue. With the
publicity, I don't know where you could have changed the venue to, since news-
papers all over the State covered it. I think a Houston reporter was the first
one who wrote that Oswald was an informant of the FBI. We went to the
newspaper reporter. He refused to tell us his source. He said he had also
heard it from other persons. We asked him the names of these persons and we
interviewed them but none of them would provide the source. In other words,
I was trying to nail down where this lie started. That, of course, is always
the result where you are daily giving out press interviews because the press
wants stories desperately. We have always adopted the policy in the Bureau
of no comment until we have the warrant and make the arrest. Then a release
is prepared briefly stating what the facts are, what the written complaint says,
the fact. The complaint was filed with the Commissioner, and that ends it.
We don't try to run it out for a week or 10 days, It is up to the U.S. attorney
thereafter and the court to try the case.
I was concerned about the demand for change of venue, because all the evidence
was being given out. At that time, of course, we didn't know that Oswald was
going to be killed, and there was a possibility that he might be confronted with
some of this evidence. If it had been kept secret and used in the interrogation
of him, just confronting him with what was found, such as his picture with the
gun might have been helpful.
A small thing can often make a man break and come forward with a full
confession. If he knows in advance that you have certain evidence he will be
on guard against answering questions. Of course, he is always advised of his
rights and that he can have an attorney. We always make a point of this. We
generally have a reputable physician of the community present in our office
while the prisoner is there, to administer to him and be able to testify that he
has not been subjected to third degree methods. He is examined when he comes
in and he is examined before we take him to the commissioner. Taking him
before the commissioner in a case like Oswald's would probably have been done
within 4 or 5 hours. Generally we try to arraign a prisoner within an hour.
That makes it more difficult; you have to work faster. But again I say I am
in favor of having the procedures of law enforcement officers as tightly bound
down as we can, with due respect for the interests of society.
Of course, there must be an equal balance. For years we have had a rule.
against third degree methods, but years ago many police departments used the
third degree. I think very few of them use it now because if they use it they
violate the civil rights statutes and we investigate them for having brutally
handled a prisoner. Many allegations are made unfairly against police officers
that they have used third degree methods and we are able to prove they haven't
in our investigations. That is particularly true where civil rights matters are
involved. We have such cases in many areas where civil rights agitation is
going on.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, to remind you of my question, any suggestions that
you may have concerning the protection of the President, and the information
that the Commission has that you have a special appropriation in that con-
nection for the Bureau?
Mr. HOOVER. We do not have a special appropriation for the protection of the
President. The Secret Service, of course, has that responsibility. On Decem-
ber 2, I prepared this memorandum for the President, and for the chief of the
Secret Service at the request of the President, outlining suggestions that I felt
should be considered to tighten up on the security of the President. If the
Commission desires I will be glad to leave this or I will be glad to read it to the
Commission.
Representative BoGGs. Why don't you ask the Director just to summarize it.
Mr. RANKIN. Will you summarize it?
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Mr. DULLES. Can we have a copy of it?
Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes.
Representative FORD. Could the copy be put in the record as an exhibit?
Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir; that is all right with me. I have no objection to it.
Regarding travel, first, advise the Secret Service as far in advance as possible
of the President's travel plans and proposed itinerary. The reason for that is
there have been Presidents who suddenly decide they are going somewhere and
the Secret Service does not have the chance always to cover the area and check
the neighborhood and check the hotel or place where it may be.
Representative BOGGS. You have one like that right now, Mr. Director.
Mr. HOOVER. I know from experience.
Second, avoid publicizing exact routes of travel as long as possible. Again,
it has been the practice in the past to announce the President is going along a
certain route and, therefore, great crowds will gather along that route. And,
therefore, I thought that was something that should not be given out and the
President should be taken along some routes which are not announced. At
the present time, he goes to cities and he wants to see people and the crowd
wants to see him. In Dallas, the route was publicized at least 24 hours before
so everybody knew where he would be driving.
Third, use a specially armored car with bulletproof glass and have such cars
readily available in locations frequently visited. The President, as I observed
earlier in my testimony, had no armored car. He has one now which I supplied
to Secret Service and they will have one made no doubt in due time for the
President's use. But if it had been armored, I believe President Kennedy would
be alive today.
Fourth, avoid setting a specific pattern of travel or other activity such as
visiting the same church at the same time each Sunday.
Regarding public appearances. First, use maximum feasible screening of
persons in attendance including use of detection devices sensitive to the amount
of metal required in a firearm or grenade.
Second, use a bulletproof shield in front of the entire rostrum in public ap
pearances such as the swearing in ceremony at the Capitol on inauguration day,
the presidential reviewing stand in front of the White House on the same day
and on the rear of trains.
Third, keep to a minimum the President's movements within crowds, remain
on the rostrum after the public addresses rather than mingling with the
audience. Again, there is great difficulty in that field.
Fourth, in appearances at public sporting events such as football games,
remain in one place rather than changing sides during half-time ceremonies.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. DULLES. About the armored car you said if Kennedy had an armored
car that might have saved him. Would the back of the armored car have some
protection to protect his head?
Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes.
Mr. DULLES. Because if the armored car had been open-
Mr. HOOVER. He must never ride in an open car; that has been my recom-
mendation.
Mr. DULLES. The back never comes down?
Mr. HOOVER. The back never comes down, and it is bulletproof. The top,
sides, and underpart are all of bulletproof construction. So that except by
opening a window and waving through the window the occupant is safe. A
person can shoot through the window if the glass window is lowered.
Fifth, limit public appearances by use of television whenever possible.
Sixth, avoid walking in public except when absolutely necessary.
Now, on legislation. First, I recommended that the President and the Vice
President be added to the list of Federal officers set out in section 1114, title 18
of the U.S. Code which deals with assaults which are punishable under Federal
law.
Mr. RANKIN. You would add to that I understood from your prior remarks,
the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore?
Mr. HOOVER. In view of the situation which prevails at the present time the
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Speaker and President pro tempore, in other words, the line of succession
under the Constitution but not below that.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. HOOVER. Second, furnish the Secret Service authority to request assistance
and cooperation from other U.S. agencies including the military, particularly
in connection with foreign travel.
Now, my reason for that is that sometimes requests for assistance have to
clear through red-tape channels here at Washington through some high official
of Government. If an emergency arises abroad, or even in this country, it
may be of such character that you do not have time to telephone back to Wash-
ington or to telephone back to the Pentagon. Aid ought to be immediately
available by calling on the local authorities and the nearest military authority.
Third, improve control of the sale of firearms requiring as a minimum
registration of every firearm sold together with adequate identification of the
purchaser. The problem of firearms control is under extensive debate, in both
the House and Senate at the present time.
The gun that Oswald used was bought by mail order from a mail-order house
in Chicago, no license for it, no permit for it, no checkup on it. The only
way we were able to trace it was to find out where in this country that Italian-
made gun was sold. We found the company in Chicago and later the mail-
order slip that had been sent by Oswald to Chicago to get the gun. Now,
there are arguments, of course-
Mr. DULLES. In a false name.
Mr. HOOVER. In a false name.
There is argument, of course, that by passing firearms legislation you are
going to take the privilege of hunting away from the sportsmen of the country.
I don't share that view with any great degree of sympathy because you have
to get a license to drive an automobile and you have to get a license to have
a dog, and I see no reason why a man shouldn't be willing, if he is a law-abiding
citizen, to have a license to get a firearm whether it be a rifle or revolver or
other firearm.
It is not going to curtail his exercise of shooting for sport because the police
make a check of his background. If he is a man who is entitled to a gun, a
law-abiding citizen, a permit will be granted.
Of course, today firearms control is practically negligible, and I think some
steps should be taken along that line.
Fourth, a ban on picketing within the vicinity of the White House as is now
done at the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court. Some of these pickets are well-
meaning and law-abiding individuals, some are for peace and some are more
or less dedicated Communists.
Representative BOGGS. It is illegal to picket a Federal court now, Mr. Director,
I happen to be the author of that law.
Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I am glad you had that law passed. Of course, they picket
public buildings, they march around the Department of Justice Building, now
and then, but the principal places they prefer to go are the Supreme Court
Building, the Capitol and its grounds and the White House.
I think such picketing at the White House, of large or small groups, should
be forbidden. I think at the White House they tried to get the pickets to
walk across the street along Lafayette Park. That at least takes them away
from being close to the gates at the White House. I think there ought to be
some control. Picketing, of course, is legitimate if it is orderly. Many times
it doesn't continue to be orderly, and sometimes pickets, as in this city, have
thrown themselves on the pavement and the police have to come and pick them
up or drag them away. Then, of course, the charge is made of brutality right
away.
Delegations of colored groups have visited me and asked why I don't arrest
a police officer for hitting some Negro whom he is arresting in a sit-in strike,
lay-in strike or demonstration in some southern cities.
We have no authority to make an arrest of that kind. Under the authority
the Bureau has we have to submit those complaints to the Department of
Justice and if they authorize us to make an arrest we will do it.
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have the number 866 assigned to the memo that Mr. Hoover is going to send about
protection of the President, and have it admitted to this record under that
number.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it may be.
Representative FORD. Also a number for this letter Mr. Hoover is going to
submit.
Mr. RANKIN. May I assign 867?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
(Commission Exhibit Nos. 866 and 867 were marked for identification and
received in evidence.)
TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. MCCONE AND RICHARD M. HELMS
MAY 14,1964
The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be in order.
Director McCone, it is customary for the Chairman to make a short state.
ment to the witness as to the testimony that is expected to be given. I will read
it at this time.
Mr. McCone will be asked to testify on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was
ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the
Central Intelligence Agency in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows
of any credible evidence or of any conspiracy either domestic or foreign in-
volved in the assassination of President Kennedy, also with regard to any
suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or
changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States.
Would you please rise and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony
you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. McCone. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated, please? Mr. Rankin will conduct the
examination.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, will you state your name?
Mr. McCONE. My name is John Alex McCone.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an official position with the U.S. Government?
Mr. MCCONE. Yes, sir; I am Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. RANKIN. Have you been Director for some time?
Mr. McCONE. Yes; a little over 2½ years.
Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live, Mr. McCone?
Mr. MCCONE. I live at 3025 Whitehaven Street in Washington.
Mr. RANKIN. Are you familiar with the records and how they are kept by
the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether a man is acting as an informer,
agent, employee, or in any other capacity for that Agency?
Mr. MCCONE. Yes; I am generally familiar with the procedures and the
records that are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Quite nat-
urally, I am not familiar with all of the records because they are very extensive.
Mr. RANKIN. Have you determined whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald, the
suspect in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy, had any
connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, informer or indirectly as an
employee, or any other capacity?
Mr. McCone. Yes; I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no such
connection, and I would like to read for the record-
_
Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us briefly the extent of your inquiry?
Mr. MCCONE. In a form of affidavit, I have gone into the matter in consider-
able detail personally, in my inquiry with the appropriate people within the
Agency, examined all records in our files relating to Lee Harvey Oswald. We
had knowledge of him, of course, because of his having gone to the Soviet
Union, as he did, putting him in a situation where his name would appear in
our name file. However, my examination has resulted in the conclusion that
Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked
with him, or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or com-
municated with him directly or in any other manner. The Agency never fur-
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nished him with any funds or money or compensated him directly or indirectly
in any fashion, and Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected
When I use
directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency.
the term "Agency," I mean the Central Intelligence Agency, of course.
Representative FORD. Does that include whether or not he was in the United
States, in the Soviet Union, or anyplace?
Mr. McCONE. Anyplace; the United States, Soviet Union, or anyplace.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, is that the affidavit you are going to supply the
Commission in connection with our request for it?
Mr. McCONE. Yes; this is the substance of the affidavit which I will supply
to you.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to mark that Exhibit 870 and have it
introduced in evidence as soon as we receive it from Mr. McCone as a part of
this record.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.
(Commission Exhibit No. 870 was marked for identification and received in
evidence.)
Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell us about your procedures in regard to having
an agent or informer or any person acting in that type of capacity? Does that
have to pass through your hands or come to your attention in the Agency?
Mr. McCONE. No; it does not have to come through my personal hands.
Mr. RANKIN. Without disclosing something that might be a security matter,
could you tell us how that is handled in a general way in the Agency?
Mr. McCoNE. Mr. Helms, who is directly responsible for that division of the
Agency's activities as a Deputy Director, might explain. Would that be
permissible?
Mr. RANKIN. Could we have him sworn then?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn.
Do you
solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. HELMS. I do.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, you heard the inquiry just directed to Mr. McCone.
Could you answer the question directly?
Mr. HELMS. Yes; we have a specific procedure which we follow in all cases
where the Agency is in contact, for the purposes of acquiring intelligence or
whatever the case may be, with an individual. We not only have a record of
the individual's name, but we also usually get information of a biographical
nature. We then check this individual's name against our record. At that
point we make a determination as to whether we desire to use this man or not
to use him. It varies from case to case as to how many officers may be involved
in approving a specific recruitment. May I go off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, did you have anything to do on behalf of your
Agency with determining whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was acting in any
of the capacities I have described in my questions to Mr. McCone?
Mr. HELMS. Yes; I did.
Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us what you did in that regard?
Mr. HELMS. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records searched to see
if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassi-
nation by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald.
We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records.
Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with
those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question
to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been sug-
gested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no ma-
terial in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind
of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated
with him.
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Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms-
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Do you recall or do you know
at what time the name of Lee Harvey Oswald was carded, first came to your
attention so it became a matter of record, in the Agency?
Mr. HELMS. Sir, I would want to consult the record to be absolutely accurate,
but it is my impression that the first time that his name showed up on any
Agency records was when he went to the Soviet Union.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, in connection with your work you have supplied
information to the Commission and we have requested many things from your
Agency. Can you tell the Commission as to whether or not you have supplied
us all the information the Agency has, at least in substance, in regard to Lee
Harvey Oswald?
Mr. HELMS. We have%; all.
Representative FORD. Has a member of the Commission staff had full access
to your files on Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. HELMS. He has, sir.
Representative FORD. They have had the opportunity to personally look at
the entire file?
Mr. HELMS. We invited them to come out to our building in Langley and ac-
tually put the file on the table so that they could examine it.
The CHAIRMAN. I was personally out there, too, and was offered the same op-
portunity. I did not avail myself of it because of the time element, but I was
offered the same opportunity.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, can you explain, according to the limitations of
security, the reasons why we examined materials but did not always take them,
in a general way?
Mr. HELMS. Yes; I can.
In our communications between individuals working overseas and in Wash-
ington, we for security reasons have a method of hiding the identities of individ-
uals in telegrams and dispatches by the use of pseudonyms and cryptonyms. For
this reason, we never allow the original documents to leave our premises. How-
ever, on the occasion when the representatives of the Commission staff looked
at these files, we sat there and identified these pseudonyms and cryptonyms and
related them to the proper names of the individuals concerned, so that they
would know exactly what the correspondence said.
Mr. RANKIN. By that you mean the representatives of the Commission were
able to satisfy themselves that they had all of the information for the benefit
of the Commission without disclosing matters that would be a threat to security;
is that right?
Mr. HELMS. It is my understanding that they were satisfied.
Representative FORD. Mr. McCone, do you have full authority from higher
authority to make full disclosure to this Commission of any information in the
files of the Central Intelligence Agency?
Mr. McCoNE. That is right. It is my understanding that it is the desire of
higher authority that this Commission shall have access to all information of
every nature in our files or in the minds of employees of Central Intelligence
Agency.
Representative FORD. On the basis of that authority, you or the Agency have
made a full disclosure?
Mr. McCoNE. That is correct.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, I have handed you Exhibits 868 and 869 directed
to you acting for the Agency, the first one being from the Commission to you
and the second one, 869, being your answer in regard to your full and complete
disclosure in regard to your records; isn't that correct?
Mr. HELMS. That is correct. May I say, Mr. Rankin, that any information,
though, subsequent to this correspondence which we may obtain we will cer-
tainly continue to forward to the Commission.
Mr. RANKIN. Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask leave to have those two
exhibits, 868 and 869, received in evidence at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under those numbers.
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(Commission Exhibits Nos. 868 and 869 were marked for identification and
received in evidence.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, if I may return to you, I will now ask you if you
have any credible information that you know of or evidence causing you to
believe that there is any or was any conspiracy either domestic or foreign in
connection with the assassination of President Kennedy?
Mr. McCoNE. No; I have no information, Mr. Rankin, that would lead me to
believe or conclude that a conspiracy existed.
Representative FORD. Did the CIA make an investigation of this aspect of
the assassination?
Mr. MCCONE. We made an investigation of all developments after the assas-
sination which came to our attention which might possibly have indicated
a conspiracy, and we determined after these investigations, which were
made promptly and immediately, that we had no evidence to support such an
assumption.
Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any contact
with Oswald during the period of his life in the Soviet Union?
Mr. McCoNE. No; not to my knowledge, nor to the knowledge of those who
would have been in a position to have made such contact, nor according to any
record we have.
Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any personal
contact with Oswald subsequent to his return to the United States?
Mr. McCone. No.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, your Agency made a particular investigation in
connection with any allegations about a conspiracy involving the Soviet Union
or people connected with Cuba, did you not?
Mr. MCCONE. Yes, we did. We made a thorough, a very thorough, investigation
of information that came to us concerning an alleged trip that Oswald made to
Mexico City during which time he made contact with the Cuban Embassy in
Mexico City in an attempt to gain transit privileges from Mexico City to the
Soviet Union via Havana. We investigated that thoroughly.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you also include in your statement that you found no
evidence of conspiracy in all of that investigation?
Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.
Mr. RANKIN. And also the investigation you made of the period that Lee
Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union?
Mr. McCoNE. That is right.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone.
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Does your answer, Mr. McCone,
include a negation of any belief that Oswald was working for or on behalf of
the Soviet Union at any time when you were in contact with him or knew about
his activities?
Mr. MCCONE. As I have already stated, we were never in contact with Oswald.
We have no evidence that he was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union
at any time. According to his diary, Oswald did receive a subsidy from the
Soviet Red Cross which we assume had the approval of the authorities. Such
a payment does not indicate to us that he even worked for the Soviet intelli-
gence services. Furthermore, we have no other evidence that he ever worked
for Soviet intelligence.
Representative FORD. Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any
investigation into this area?
Mr. McCoNE. No, because, at the present time, we have no information in our
files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to our satis-
faction. Naturally, any new information that might come into our hands
would be investigated promptly.
Mr. HELMS. I simply wanted to add that we obviously are interested in any-
thing we can pick up applying to this case, and anything we get will be immedi-
ately sent to the Commission, so that we haven't stopped our inquiries or the
picking up of any information we can from people who might have it. This is
on a continuing basis.
Representative FORD. In other words, the case isn't closed.
Mr. HELMS. It is not closed as far as we are concerned.
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Mr. RANKIN. Would that be true, Mr. Helms, even after the Commission
completed its report, you would keep the matter open if there was anything
new that developed in the future that could be properly presented to the
authorities?
Mr. HELMS. Yes. I would assume the case will never be closed.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, do you have any ideas about improving the security
provisions for the President that you would like to relate to the Commission?
Mr. MCCONE. Well, this is, in my opinion, a very important question which I
am sure this Commission will-has and will-devote a considerable amount of
thought to, and undoubtedly have some recommendations as part of its report.
Mr. RANKIN. Your Agency does have an important function in some aspects.
Mr. MCCONE. We have a very important function in connection with the
foreign travels of the President, and I would like to inform the Commission as
to how we discharge that responsibility by quickly reviewing the chronology
of the Central Intelligence Agency's support of President Kennedy's visit to
Mexico City from the 29th of June to the 2d of July 1962.
Mr. RANKIN. Will you please do that.
The CHAIRMAN. Director, is that a security matter?
Mr. McCoNE. No. I think I can handle this for the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Mr. MCCONE. If I have to make a remark or two off the record I will ask that
privilege.
'
That visit, as I said, started on the 29th of June. On the 28th of April, in
anticipation of the visit, instructions were transmitted to Mexico for the
Ambassador to coordinate planning and informational guidance for the advance
party of the Secret Service..
We asked that the Secret Service be given information on local groups and
persons who would cause disturbances, embarrassments or physical harm, an
estimate of the determination and ability of the Mexican government to prevent
incidents, and preparation for special briefings to the Embassy officials and the
Secret Service, and such additional support and communications personnel that
might be required.
These instructions were given two months before the trip.
On the 15th of May, we received confirmed information that the President
would visit Mexico on the specific dates. On the 1st of June the Secret Service
was supplied by the Agency with the detailed survey of Mexican security forces.
that would be called upon to protect the President.
Friendly and allied governments were informed of the visit and their coopera-
tion and pertinent informational support was solicited. From this date through
the 2d of July daily information reports were furnished to the State Department,
the Secret Service, the FBI and the military services..
That is from the 1st of June to the 2d of July, a period of 31, 32 days. On
the 8th of June the Secret Service advance party was briefed in detail by a
group of officers of the Agency on the Mexican government's plans for the
protection of the President, including current information on the size, strength
and capabilities of potential troublemakers.
Hazardous locations and times in the planned itinerary were identified,
political and economic issues that might be invoked by hostile elements for
demonstrations were specified.
On the 11th of June, the Secret Service advance party left for Mexico sup
ported by additional security personnel to assist in coordinating an informational
report and the followup activity required.
Especially prepared national intelligence estimates on the current security
conditions in Mexico was approved by the United States Intelligence Board
on the 13th of June.
On the 15th of June arrangements were completed to reenforce communica-
tions facilities. On the 24th of June a conference at the State Department was
held at the request of the President for reviewing security measures, and this
meeting I attended personally, and reported to the State Department on the
essence of all that had gone before.
Emergency contingency plans were discussed and a consensus was reached that
the President should make the visit as scheduled.
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On the 27th of June, a final updated special national intelligence estimate was
prepared, and this indicated no basic changes in the security assessment that
Mexican government was prepared to cope with foreseeable security contingencies.
On the 28th of June, a final briefing report was prepared for the Director's
use which indicated the security precautions of the Mexican government had
effectively forestalled major organized incidents, and our informed estimate
was that the President would receive a great welcome.
The report was presented to the President personally by the Director at noon
in a final meeting prior to departure on this trip.
From the 29th of June to the 2d of July in Washington headquarters, head-
quarters components remained on a 24-hour alert for close support of the
embassy and the Secret Service.
So, not only was the Central Intelligence Agency and its various components
involved in this for a period of 2 months in close collaboration with the Secret
Service, but by bringing in the United States Intelligence Board we brought
in all of the intelligence assets of the United States Government in connection
with this particular trip. I thought this procedure which is followed regularly
on all trips that the President makes out of the country would be of interest
to the Commission.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the normal format of your procedures?
Mr. MCCONE. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. When the President goes abroad?
Mr. MCCONE. Yes, I selected this one. The same was true of his trip to
Caracas or Paris or elsewhere.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, in your investigation of the Oswald matter did
you use the same approach or a comparable approach to a liaison with the
other intelligence agencies of government to try to discover anything that
might involve your jurisdiction.
Mr. MCCONE. Yes. We were in very close touch with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and with the Secret Service on a 24-hour basis at all points,
both domestic. and foreign, where information had been received which might
have a bearing on this problem.
Mr. RANKIN. Assassination?
Mr. MCCONE. Assassination.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an opinion, Mr. McCone, as to whether or not
the liaison between the intelligence agencies of the United States Government
might be improved if they had better mechanical, computer or other facilities
of that type, and also some other ideas or methods of dealing with each other?
Mr. MCCONE. There is a great deal of improvement of information that might
be of importance in a matter of this kind through the use of computers and
mechanical means of handling files, and you, Mr. Chief Justice, saw some of
our installations and that was only a beginning of what really can be done.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I did.
Mr. McCoNE. I would certainly urge that all departments of government that
are involved in this area adopt the most modern methods of automatic data
processing with respect to the personnel files and other files relating to indi-
viduals. This would be helpful.
But I emphasize that a computer will not replace the man, and therefore, we
must have at all levels a complete exchange of information and cooperation
between agencies where they share this responsibility, and in going through
this chronology, it points out the type of exchange and cooperation that the
Central Intelligence Agency tries to afford both the Secret Service and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in matters where we have a common respon-
sibility.
I would like to emphasize the very great importance of this exchange, which
is not always easily accomplished because it is cumbersome.
Sometimes it becomes involved in distracting people from other duties, and
so on and so forth.
I have given a good deal of thought to the matter of some incentives to bring
out informers, thinking about the old informer statutes in which some of them
are still on the books, in which people were rewarded for informing when others
conducted themselves in a damaging way.
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Mr. DULLES. Smuggling cases?
Mr. MoCONE. Smuggling cases. But I believe that something could be done.
I call to the attention of this Commission one of the laws relating to atomic
energy, namely the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 wherein a
substantial reward is offered for the apprehension of persons responsible for
the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the United States of such nuclear
material or atomic weapons. It is suggested that the Commission may wish to
recommend that original but similar legislation be enacted which would induce
individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering
a substantial reward and preferential treatment. Substantial reward could
represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel of secret
associations and state security organs abroad who are charged with assassina-
tion and sabotage. We have information that such personnel and police state
apparatuses have expressed and, in certain cases, acted upon their repugnance
for such work and for the political system which requires such duties to be
performed.
Mr.-RANKIN. Is it your belief, Mr. McCone, that the methods for exchange
of information between intelligence agencies of the Government could be mate-
rially improved.
Mr. McCone. I think the exchange between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Secret Service is quite adequate.
I am not informed as to whether the exchanges between the Secret Service
and the FBI are equally adequate. I have not gone into that. I would have
no means to know. Certainly it is most important that it be done.
Mr. DULLES. Looking back now that you have the full record, do you feel that
you received from the State Department adequate information at the time that
they were aware of Oswald's defection and later activities in the Soviet Union,
did you get at the time full information from the State Department on those
particular subjects?
Mr. MCCONE. Well, I am not sure that we got full information, Mr. Dulles.
The fact is we had very little information in our files.
Mr. HELMS. It was probably minimal.
Representative FORD. Why did that happen?
Mr. HELMS. I am not sure, Mr. Ford. I can only assume that the State
Department had a limited amount. Interestingly enough, it is far enough back
now so that it's very hard to find people who were in the Moscow Embassy
at the time familiar with the case, so in trying to run this down one comes
to a lot of dead ends and I, therefore, would not like to hazard any guess.
Representative FORD. Whose responsibility is it; is it CIA's responsibility
to obtain the information, or State Department's responsibility to supply it to
Central Intelligence and to others.
Mr. McCoNE. With respect to a U.S. citizen who goes abroad, it is the respon-
sibility of the State Department through its various echelons, consular service
and embassies and so forth.
For a foreigner coming into the United States, who might be of suspicious
character, coming here for espionage, subversion, assassination and other acts
of violence, we would, and we do exchange this information immediately with
the FBI.
Representative FORD. But in this particular case, Oswald in the Soviet Union,
whose responsibility was it to transmit the information, whatever it was, to
the Central Intelligence Agency?
Mr. MoCONE. Well, it would be the State Department's responsibility to do
that. Whether there really exists an order or orders that information on an
American citizen returning from a foreign country be transmitted to CIA,
I don't believe there are such regulations which exist.
Mr. HELMS. I don't believe they do, either.
Mr. MCCONE. I am not sure they should.
Representative FORD. It wouldn't be your recommendation that you, the head
of Central Intelligence Agency, should have that information?
Mr. DULLES. In a case of an American defecting to a Communist country,
shouldn't you have it?
Mr. McCoNE. Certainly certain types of information.
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What we ought to be
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careful of here, would be to rather clearly define the type of information which
should be transmitted, because after all, there are hundreds of thousands or
millions of Americans going back and forth every year, and those records are
the records of the Immigration Service, the Passport Division.
Mr. DULLES. I was thinking of a person who having defected might, of course,
have become an agent and then reinserted into the United States and if you
were informed of the first steps to that you might help to prevent the second step.
Mr. McCONE. Well, certainly information on defectors or possible recruitments
should be, and I have no question is being, transmitted.
Representative FORD. What I was getting at was whether the procedures were
adequate or inadequate, whether the administration was proper or improper in
this particular case, and if some files you have that started when he attempted
to defect are inadequate why we ought to know, and we ought to know whether
the basic regulations were right or wrong, whether the administration was
proper or improper, that is what I am trying to find out.
I would like your comment on it.
Mr. MCCONE. Well, I think the basic regulations should be examined very
carefully to be sure that they are copper-riveted down and absolutely tight.
What I am saying, however, is because of the vast number of Americans who
go abroad and stay in foreign countries for indefinite periods of time, it would
be an impossible task to transmit all information available in the State De
partment and Immigration Service as files to the Central Intelligence. Agency.
It would not be a productive exercise. What must be transmitted and is being
transmitted, while I cannot recite the exact regulations is information that
is, becomes, known to the various embassies of suspicious Americans that
might have been recruited and defected, and then returned so that they would
be agents in place.
Representative FORD. In this case, Oswald attempted to defect, he did not,
he subsequently sought the right to return to the United States, he had contact
with the Embassy. Was the Central Intelligence Agency informed of these
steps, step by step, by the Department of State?
Mr. MCCONE. You might answer that.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. Ford, in order to answer this question precisely I would
have to have the file in front of me. I have not looked at it in some time so
I don't have it all that clearly in mind. But it is my impression that we were
not informed step by step. When I say that there is no requirement that I am
aware of that the State Department should inform us and when I said a moment
ago that we had minimal information from them, this was not in any sense
a critical comment but a statement of fact.
But an American going to the American Embassy would be handled by the
Embassy officials, either consular or otherwise. This would be a matter
well within the purview of the State Department to keep all the way through,
because we do not have responsibility in the Central Intelligence Agency for
the conduct or behavior or anything else of American citizens when they are
abroad unless there is some special consideration applying to an individual, or
someone in higher authority requests assistance from us. So that the State
Department, I think, quite properly would regard this matter as well within
their purview to handle themselves within the Embassy or from the Embassy
back to the Department of State without involving the Agency in it while these
events were occurring.
Representative FORD. I think it could be argued, however, that the unique
ness of this individual case was such that the Department of State might well
have contacted the Central Intelligence Agency to keep them abreast of the
developments as they transpired. This is not-and when I say this, I mean the
Oswald case is not an ordinary run-of-the-mill-type of case. It is far from
it. Even back in the time, well, from the time he went, and particularly as time
progressed, and he made application to return, there is nothing ordinary about
the whole situation.
Mr. MCCONE. That is quite correct; there is no question about that.
Representative FORD. And I am only suggesting that if the regulations were
not adequate at the time and are not now, maybe something ought to be done
about it.
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Mr. KANKIN. Mr. McCone, when you said that supplying all of the information
about U.S. citizens who went abroad and came back to the country would not
be a profitable exercise, did that comment include the thought that such an
intrusion upon all citizens would be questionable?
Mr. McCone. Such an intrusion?
Mr. RANKIN. Upon their right to travel.
Mr. McCoNE. Well, I think this would have a bearing on it. I did not have
that particular matter in mind when I made that statement, however.
I was
just thinking of the
Mr. RANKIN. Burden?
Mr. MCCONE. Of the burden of vast numbers involved.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any thought in regard to whether it would be an
intrusion upon their rights?
Mr. MCCONE. Well, that would be a matter of how it was handled. Certainly,
if it was handled in a way that the counterpart of providing the information
was to impose restrictions on them, then it would be an intrusion on their
rights.
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
Senator COOPER. May I inquire?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.
Senator COOPER. I missed the first part of Mr. McCone's testimony; I went to
answer a quorum call. Perhaps the question has been asked.
It has been brought into evidence that a number of people in the Embassy
talked to Oswald when he first defected, and the various communications with
the Embassy and, of course, when he left to come back to the United States.
Have we been able to ascertain the names of officials in the Embassy or em-
ployees with whom Oswald talked on these various occasions?
Mr. MCCONE. I am not familiar with them; no.
Mr. HELMS. Neither am I, sir.
Mr. McCoNE. I presume that the Department's inquiries have covered it.
Senator COOPER. Is it possible to ascertain the names of those employees?
Mr. RANKIN. Senator Cooper, I can answer that. We have inquired of the
State Department for that information, and are in the process of obtaining it all.
Senator COOPER. Taking into consideration your answers to the previous ques-
tion, would it have been possible in your judgment to have secured more com-
prehensive information about the activities of Oswald in Russia?
Mr. McCoNE. It would not have been possible for the Central Intelligence
Agency to have secured such information because we do not have the resources
to gain such information.
The CHAIRMAN. Anything more? Congressman Ford?
Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency investigate any
aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes; we did.
Representative FORD. Can you give us any information on that?
Mr. McCoNE. Yes; we were aware that Oswald did make a trip to Mexico
City and it was our judgment that he was there in the interest of insuring
transit privileges and that he made contact with the Cuban Embassy while
he was there.
We do not know the precise results of his effort, but we assumed, because he
returned to the United States, he was unsuccessful. We have examined to
every extent we can, and using all resources available to us every aspect of
his activity and we could not verify that he was there for any other purpose
or that his trip to Mexico was in any way related to his later action in assassinat-
ing President Kennedy.
Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency make any investi-
gation of any alleged connection between Oswald and the Castro government?
Mr. MCCONE. Yes; we investigated that in considerable detail, because infor-
mation came to us through a third party that he had carried on a rather odd
discussion with Cuban officials in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The
allegation was that he had received under rather odd circumstances a substantial
amount of money in the Cuban Embassy, and the statement was made by one
who claimed to have seen this transaction take place. After a very thorough
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and detailed examination of the informer, it finally turned out by the informer's
own admission that the information was entirely erroneous, and was made for
the purpose of advancing the informer's own standing with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the U.S. Government and it was subsequently retracted by
the informer in its entirety.
Representative FORD. Was there any other evidence or alleged evidence-
Mr. MCCONE. Parenthetically, I might add a word for the record that the date
that the informer gave as to the date in time of this alleged transaction was
impossible because through other, from other, information we determined that
Oswald was in the United States at that particular time.
Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency ever make an
investigation or did it ever check on Mr. Ruby's trip to Cuba or any connections
he might have had with the Castro government?
Mr. McCoNE. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. HELMS. We had no information.
Mr. MoCONE. We had no information.
Representative FORD. Central Intelligence Agency has no information of any
connections of Ruby to the Castro government?
Mr. McCoNE. That is right.
Representative FORD. Did you ever make a check of that?
Mr. HELMS. We checked our records to see if we had information and found
we did not.
Representative FORD. What would that indicate, the fact that you checked
your records?
Mr. HELMS. That would indicate that if we had received information from
our own resources, that the Cubans were involved with Mr. Ruby in something
which would be regarded as subversive, we would then have it in our files.
But we received no such information, and I don't, by saying this, mean that
he did not. I simply say we don't have any record of this.
Representative FORD. That is all.
L
The CHAIRMAN. Director, thank you very much, sir, for coming and being
with us and we appreciate the help your department has given to us.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)
Thursday, June 4, 1964
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY, LEO J. GAUTHİER, LYNDAL L.
SHANEYFELT, AND ROBERT A. FRAZIER
The President's Commission met at 2:10 p.m., on June 4, 1964, at 200 Mary-
land Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.
Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman
Cooper, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy,
members.
Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant
counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; Waggoner Carr, attorney general of
Texas; and Charles Murray, observer.
· TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY
(Members present at this point: The Chairman, Representative Ford, Mr.
Dulles, and Mr. McCloy.)
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, we have witnesses today who are Thomas J.
Kelley of the Secret Service; Leo J. Gauthier, Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, and
Robert A. Frazier of the FBI. They are going to testify concerning certain
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JAMES J. ROWLEY, CHIEF, SECRET SERVICE
June18,1964
Mr. ROWLEY. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the man
who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean this makes
a difference in your operation.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in pro-
tecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And is that Commission Exhibit No. 1026?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1026 for
identification.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1026.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit
No. 1026, was received in evidence.,
Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make in
that exhibit?
Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN.. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report about protective activity
subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if
that is the report that you have just referred to.
'
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for
identification.)
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard to
Commission Exhibit No. 1027 concerning security, and whether that should be
that document should be made public? You just take your time if you want to
glance over it.
Mr. ROWLEY. No; as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it can be included.
(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1027.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted..
(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit
No. 1027, was received in evidence.)
(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)
Mr. RANKIN. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the an-
swers to the questions attached to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 that you care
to elaborate on at this time?
I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you anwered
them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that opportunity.
Mr. ROWLEY. No; not at this time.
Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question there?
You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and other
investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald's?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. You think they would?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. You think they understand that?
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, as we stated in the covering letter when we sent this
out we haven't gotten any reaction-we asked for their cooperation and sug-
gestions in connection with such guidelines.
Mr. DULLES. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your criteria?
Mr. ROWLEY. Well, they are given to us now. ☐ We are being furnished the
names of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their background and
history will be furnished to us, and we will be in a position now to determine
whether they represent a risk or not.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley-
Representative BOGGS. May I ask a question there?
Would you have any notion as to why names of defectors were not provided
to you prior to November 22?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; under the broad picture, Mr. Congressman, there was no
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Indication that they had made any threat toward the President or members of
his family. Whenever there was a threat made, we were furnished promptly
by the different agencies the information on the individual's name. And this was
done in voluminous reports by the FBI, and the other agencies. When they got
any information, they would notify the local office, notify their liaison, who
notified us by telephone, and confirmed by memorandum. The same obtained
with respect to the CIA.
Representative BOGGS. This fellow was interviewed by the FBI several times
he was interviewed in New Orleans when he allegedly had his Fair Play Com-
mittee. If my memory serves me correctly, Mrs. Paine was interviewed about
him shortly before the visit of the President, after he had gone to work at the
Texas School Book Depository. I agree that there had been no indication of
a threat on the President's life. But, obviously he was a person in the FBI
files who was under some degree of surveillance. It would seem to me strange
that the FBI did not transmit this information to the Secret Service.
Mr. ROWLEY. The FBI, Mr. Congressman, are concerned with internal security.
And I think their approach was internal security as it related to this individual,
whether or not he was a potential recruit for espionage, intelligence, or some
thing like that.
Their concern was talking to him in this vein, in the course of which there
was no indication that he bore any malice toward anyone, and particularly to
the President of the United States. If someone said that Henry Smith didn't
like the President, and we got his file, we would get to the point where you
have 3 million names in the file. How effective are you going to be then?
Representative BOGGS. Well, that is right.
Mr. ROWLEY. And then you get in the area of civil rights and all, if you start
going into individuals
Representative Boggs. And if I remember correctly, there has never been—
we have had no testimony from anyone that Oswald ever threatened the Presi-
dent of the United States. Is that correct?
Mr. RANKIN. That is correct.
Representative BOGGS. That was the only question I had.
Mr. DULLES. Along that line, I just raise the question as to whether maybe
too much emphasis is not put on the threat angle, because a clever fellow, if he
is going to assassinate the President, the last thing he is going to do is go
around and talk about it and threaten it.
Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. Well, this has been so with loners, too.
As you say, you read the assassinations. Some of them just kept to them-
selves, and traveled, and the next thing you know they confronted their victim.
Sometimes they were successful, other times they were not.
Mr. DULLES. I recognize the difficulty of working out adequate criteria. But
I just think you ought to do some more seeking, and there is more work to be
done on that.
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Senator CooPER. May I ask this question: It hasn't been clear to me. Is it
correct that now a defector does come within the scope of your Service?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; we are furnished the names of defectors by the FBI.
And they investigate these people. And then in their report, if it shows that the
individual has emotional instability or propensity for violence, we pick it up from
there. But all the reports on the known defectors in this country are submitted
to us, and then we evaluate from the case history of the report whether or not
he would be a risk for us subject to investigation.
Senator COOPER. I understood that was the procedure before. But my ques-
tion is now, is the defector per se classed as one of those against whom you
would take protective measures?
Mr. ROWLEY. No, no, sir; not unless we had-
Senator CoOPER. Since the assassination?
Mr. ROWLEY. Not unless we had these three categories of factors we just
enunciated.
Senator COOPER. I would suggest-first, I understand there are not many de-
fectors who have returned to the United States.
Secondly, it seems to me a man who has defected from the United States to
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go to Russia or a Communist country indicates that he has pretty strong con-
victions against the United States, or else there is something questionable about
his mental processes.
I would think that fact alone would make it important to watch his activities
when he came back.
Mr. ROWLEY. It would. And I think the FBI properly conducts the inves-
tigations, from the standpoint of internal security, and furnishes us a report.
And then if there is something in the report that indicates he could be a risk to
the President or the Vice President, we could take it from there.
Representative BOGGS. Mr. Rankin, I have to go to a meeting in 2 or 3 minutes.
There is just one question I would like to ask before leaving.
Is it not a fact that probably the greatest deterrent that you have is the very
fact that the public knows that there is a Secret Service?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.
Representative BOGGS. That you do guard the life of the President. And
that the chances of an assassin escaping with his own life are pretty remote.
So this psychological weapon is one of the things you rely on?
Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.
Representative BOGGS. And you must necessarily keep a degree of secrecy
about the methods you employ.
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; otherwise they could develop countermethods, to thwart
anything we might set up.
'
Representative BOGGS. Exactly. Thank you very much.
Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, do you in the Secret Service obtain the benefit
of cooperation with other governmental agencies in the protection of the
President?
Mr. ROWLEY. We receive cooperation from every agency. If I may name a
few we were scheduled to visit Puerto Rico in 1948 or 1947-I am not quite
certain—with President Truman, who was then vacationing at Key West. We
had no office in Puerto Rico at the time. We did not know the situation other
than that it could be sticky because of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.
(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)
Mr. ROWLEY. Our advance man called me and asked me if I would not talk
to Mr. Hoover to see whether or not we could have the assistance of some of
their agents who were down there in an office established there. And I com-
municated then with the Assistant Director, who said, "I will get back to you"
and got the approval. That was an example of the beginning of the cooperation,
when I was at the White House, with the FBI.
Now, in the years subsequent to World War II, anytime we were abroad, I
made personal contact with Mr. Dulles, and I think for national security we
should go off the record on this, because this is something that pertains today.
(Discussion off the record.)
The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, Chief Rowley, are you familiar with the provisions in the
appropriation act with regard to the FBI concerning their protection of the per-
son of the President?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes.
Mr. RANKIN. You know of that, do you?
Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; I do. Historically, that was first passed in 1910. It stated
that because of the limited number of Secret Service men at that time, that
appropriation—a certain given figure was to be used by the U.S. marshals to
assist the Secret Service.
Mr. RANKIN. Was the Secret Service opposed to that provision in the appro-
priation act for the FBI?
Mr. ROWLEY. No; it has never opposed that provision over the years. I
started to say, Mr. Rankin-subsequently, after the founding of the FBI, this
was transferred, apparently, from the marshals to the FBI, and it has been in
the appropriations as long as I can remember. We have never objected to that
appropriation.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, there is some language in H.R. 4158, I understand, which
deals with the permanent organization of the Government that you are objecting
to; is that right?
473
B