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TITLE : MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF JUNE 4, 1964
DATE : 06/04/64
PAGES :
SUBJECTS
:
29
AGENDA FOR JUNE 4, 1964 MEETING
SUMMARY OF JUNE 4, 1964 MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
:
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:
1A, 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
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MINUTES.
OF
BOARD
MEETING
O F
JUNE 4,
1964
206-10001-10013
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JUNE 4, 1964
Bir minerte
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9:30
1.2 10:00.
Doolittl
ITEN
TIME
1. 9:00-19:30
2. 9:30 9:45
3. 9:45 - 10:00
10:00 10:15
う。 10:15
-
6. 11:00 - 11:45
Chairman's Time'
SUBJECT
National Reconnaissance Program Status Report:
Mr. Coyne
Audio Penetrations of U.S. Embassy, Moscow
Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne
Executive Session
USIB Actions Related to Audio, Pentration
Mostow
Mr. Robert Bennerman
Chairman
Security Committee, USIB
Mr. G. Marvin Gentile
Director of Security, Department of State
Assessment of Potential Damage to Cryptographic
Systems Caused by Audio Penetrations--Moscow
Lt. General Cordon Blake
Director, National Security Agency
Dr. Louis Tordella
Deputy Director, National Security Agency
7. 12:45-12:00 Executive Session
3.
12:00-1:00.
2:15
9. 1:00 2:00
Lunch The White House Mess
Current Intelligence Briefing on:
Chi-Com Capabilities and Intentions as
related to Southeast Asia, India and USSR
The Situations in South Vietnam, Laos,
Cambodia and North Vietnam
The Cyprus Situation
d. The Cuba Situation.
Mr. Ray Cline f. Jack Smith
Deputy Director of Intelligence, SIA
with 
Mr. Clinton
Conger
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AGENDA FOR JUNE 4, 1964 (Continued)
ITEM
TIME
2,115
10.
2100 - 2:45
11.
2:45 - 3:00.
8:45
12.
8:00 - 3:30
13.
3:30 - 4:00
14.
4:00 - 5:30.
SUBJECT
Status Report on Military (peripheral and
overflight) Reconnaissance Programs
(other than satellite)
Colonel Ralph D. Steakley, USAF
Director, Joint Reconnaissance Center
Pentagon
C
Executive Session.
On-the-Scene Review at Moscow Embassy.
of State Department's Counter-audio surveil-
lance Measures to Safeguard U. S. Classified
Systems and Information
Dr. Jerome Wiesner 1 3 Keene
M.I.T. (White House Consultant and former.
Science Advisor to the President)"
Status Report on the Implementation of
Prior Board Recommendations.
Mr. Ash
Discussions with the Director of
Central Intelligence/
Mr. John A. McCone
it Kukpatrick
Deam and Fitzgerald
-5:30-6:30 Executive Session Remys
15.
16.
6:30. 8:00
545
17.
18:00
End
of Day
9:30
Dinner. Metropolitan Club
a) Discussion of peripheral and over
flight reconnaissance
b) Discussion of audio problem
c) Consideration of up-dated requirements
for Annual Reports to the Board by:
State, Defense, CI, and the DCI.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON.
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19
This document consists of
No. 1 at 2 Copics, Series
June 17,
1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Meeting,
June 4, 1964.
This regularly scheduled meeting of the Board convened at 9:00 a.m.,
June 4, 1964, in the Board offices, 297 Executive Office Building. Previously
scheduled as a 2-day meeting, it was compressed into one day in order to
accommodate other commitments and to permit the holding of Board Panel sessions
on the following day. Present were Chairman Clifford and Messrs. Pace, Murphy,
General Doolittle was
Langer and Gray; and J. Patrick Coyne and A. R. Ash.
Messrs.
unable to attend because of transportation difficulties in Alaska.
Baker and Land were unavoidably late in arriving, and upon their arrival later
in the morning received a fill-in from the Chairman concerning the matters
which had been discussed up to that point.
Chairman Clifford pointed out that the business of this meeting was
confined to major subjects of particular importance: (1) recent developments
following the submission to the President of the Board's May 2 report and
recommendations on the National Reconnaissance Program (2) the recent discovery
a most
of extensive microphone installations in the U. S. Embassy, Moscow
serious penetration which had prompted the Chairman to request a Board Panel
study immediately upon his learning of the discovery, and (3) the subject of
acquiring intelligence on Communist China, a problem highlighted by remarks of
the Secretary of Defense when he was recently visited by Chairman Clifford,
Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne -- at which time Secretary McNamara expressed deep con-
cern over the absence of f meaningful intelligence on Chinese capabilities,
intentions and activities 
(Mr. McNamara said that the USIB is not adequate 
for
his purposes in this regard; he has to make de
decisions without the benefit of
adequate intelligence support; if he can't get help from the US IB and CIA he
will attempt to get the required intelligence through other sources; and he
would welcome any assistance the Board might provide as a means of resolving
this intelligence collection problem.
With reference to the Board's report on the National Reconnaissance
Program, Mr. Clifford said that it had gone to the White House on May 2.
Thereafter two appointments with the President had to be cancelled, thereby
preventing discussion of the report with the President. Accordingly,
Mr. Clifford suggested to Mr. McGeorge Bundy that the matter was urgent.
The same day, Mr. Bundy took up the report with the President, with the
resulting decision that Mr. Bundy would obtain the views and comments of the
Secretary of Defense and of the DCI, Mr. McCone, concerning the Board's report
and recommendations, in order that further consideration might be given by
the President.
Handle via BYEMAN
Control System
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At Mr. Clifford's request, Mr. Coyne summarized the comments which had
been submitted on the NRP report by the two officials in response to Mr. Bundy's
memorandum. The June 2, 1964, response from Deputy Secretary Vance expressed
concurrence of the Department of Defense in the report and its readiness to
carry out the recommendations when instructed to do so. However, in his May 28
memorandum to Mr. Bundy, the DCI reported that he found it difficult to distill
his thoughts in time for a written expression of views for immediate consideration;
that he would be able to discuss the matter orally with the Board at this meeting;
that his written views could be submitted by June 15; and that meanwhile he
intended to discuss with the Director, NRO, any management problems the latter
might have in mind.
Chairman Clifford thought it gratifying that the Defense Department had
accepted the Board's NRP report and recommendations in toto, and he referred to
informally received indications that the Department of Defense is anxious to
get on with the actions proposed in the Board's report. Noting that the pre-
liminary reply from the DCI was noncommital, Mr. Clifford thought it best that
the Board not engage in a discussion of the NRP report with the DCI when he
joined the Board meeting later in the day. Mr. Clifford observed that the Board
had studied the subject in depth; it had reached conclusions and made recommenda-
tions to the President; Mr. Bundy had asked for comments to the President by
Messrs. McNamara and McCone; and it was desirable to keep the matter in that
channel, rather than reopening discussions with the DCI at this Board meeting.
:
(Dr. Baker arrived at the Board meeting at this point.)
At the Chairman's request, Mr. Coyne summarized for the Board the reported
successes and failures of satellite reconnaissance photographic missions since
January 1, 1964 (4 successful missions; 3 failures) and the NRO mission schedule
for the remainder of the year. (He also referred to the NRO report that OXCART
has been flown at Mach 3.2 at 81,700 feet.)
Chairman Clifford noted that the manner in which the NRO reports on its
satellite missions leaves much to be desired. He felt that the Board should ask
for more meaningful reports from NRO, reflecting the number of missions scheduled
the number that were launched, how many succeeded, and how many failed anú why.
Also Mr. Clifford thought that the Board should be fully informed on how the
USIB determines that the NRO has a capability to meet specified intelligence.
requirements through the launching of "X" number of missions over a given future
period, e.g., "two flights per month".
t
Dr. Baker added that no one has efficiently organized the process of
analyzing the photographic take from satellite missions, for the purpose of
identifying intelligence targets which warrant further "point search" on future
missions.
Turning to the matter of the technical penetration of the U. S. Embassy,
Moscow, Mr. Clifford recalled that he had asked the Board's Baker Panel and
Mr. Coyne to go into the subject immediately upon Mr. Clifford's learning of the
discovery of the first of the 41 microphones on April 23. He noted that
Mr. Bundy had asked Dr. Jerome Wiesner to make an on-the-scene assessment of
the penetration during Dr. Wiesner's visit to Moscow this past week on other
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business, and he would join the Board meeting later in the day to report on
that assessment. Also, Mr. Clifford noted, the Board meeting would later
be joined by Dr. Tordella of NSA, Mr. Bannerman of CIA who chairs the USIB
Security Committee, and Mr. Gentile who serves as Director of Security in
the State Department.
Mr. Coyne summarized for Board members the highlights of the discovery
of the technical penetration of the Embassy in Moscow, with indications that
the 41 microphones, the 3 coaxial cables, the wiring, and the fixed antenna
in the wall, have all been in place since 1952 when the Soviet Union completed
construction on the Embassy building in preparation for U. S. occupancy which
took place in 1953.
(Dr. Land arrived at the Board meeting at this point.)
Mr. Coyne drew attention to the fact that the microphone installations
included coverage of the Embassy code room. He referred in this connection
to the NSA damage evaluation dealt with in Tab C of the June 1 "Preliminary
Damage Assessment" which had just been received from the USIB Security Committee.
Mr. Coyne thought it regrettable that the State Department security people in
Moscow had cut the cables upon discovery of the microphone and related in-
stallations. Mr. Clifford agreed, recalling that when he first learned of the
development from Mr. Coyne he urged that efforts he made to keep the discovered
items in place for the time being. Mr. Coyne said that this was urged on the
State Department but certain State Department officials thought the Board was
getting into operations, and a cable went out to Ambassador Kohler instructing
him to proceed and to lodge a protest with the Soviet government.
Mr. Coyne called Board members' attention to the summary of U. S.
Ambassadors' assessments (appearing in the USIB's Security Committee report)
which discounted the likelihood of damage to the U. S. from the technical
penetration of the Embassy.
Mr. Coyne pointed to the 1962 report of the Soviet defector who informed
CIA (which in turn informed the State Department) that the Embassy in Moscow
was bugged at various strategic locations. Mr. Coyne said that he had recently
asked State Department representatives what had been done on the basis of the
defector's 1962 report, and it appeared that no action had been taken by State
Department security technicians until recent digging operations were begun
following receipt of a report from a second Soviet defector early in 1964 that
microphones were in place in specific Embassy office locations.
Mr. Coyne'
also related the substance of his inquiries made of the State Department Chief
of Communications (Mr. Coffey) in the summer of 1963 when Khrushchev boasted to
Governor Harriman that he could produce a copy of a message which Ambassador
Kohler had sent to Washington regarding the U. S. position on Soviet pipe-line
negotiations with West Germany (Mr. Coffey's finding was to the effect that
no communications penetration could in fact be established).
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Chairman Clifford expressed the view that there appeared to have been
raised in this discussion a fundamental question to which the Board might
well give its attent:lon 1.e., the overall attitude of the U. S. Government
toward counterintelligence, intelligence and the security of intelligence
matters. In this instance the Board had raised an important point in urging
that the penetration cables not be cut precipitously when discovered in the
Embassy, but the Board's urging was ignored. Mr. Clifford thought it appropriate
to determine just what forum does have cognizance in such important developments
as this one, i. e., whether the USIB, or the Special 5412 Group, or other group,
has cognizance in these matters. Mr. Coyna read from NSC 5618 the policy re-
quirement that upon the discovery of listening devices, U. S. agencies are
required to obtain high level determinations as to whether the devices should
be left in place for purposes of exploitation against the foreign intelligence
service involved.
Mr. Gray expressed concern about the possibility that the Moscow penetration
enabled the Soviets to learn what the U. S. was doing and about to do with regard
to Cuba in the Fall of 1962.
In answer to the Chairman's inquiry, Mr. Coyne reported that U. S. security
technicians do not today have a device capable of detecting a shielded cable
microphone imbedded 7 inches in the wall, as in the case of the 41 microphones
found in the U. S. Embassy, Moscow.
At 10:30 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Bannerman of CIA
(Chairman of the USTB Security Committee); Dr. Tordella, Deputy Director of NSA;
and Mr. Marvin Gentile, since March 1964, Director of the Office of Security,
U. S. Department of State. Mr. Clifford indicated the Board's interest in being
fully informed on the facts relating to the recent discovery of the penetration
in Moscow; the effectiveness of detection methods used at the Embassy previously
and those available at present; and the information which led to the recent
discoveries. Mr. Bannerman said that he could speak to the assessment of damage,
leaving to Mr. Gentile the discussion of the history and effectiveness of tests
to detect the presence of listening devices.
Referring to the USIB Security Committee's June 1 "Preliminary Damage
Assessment", Mr. Bannerman explained that Army, Navy and Air Force had conducted
interviews of personnel formerly assigned to the Embassy (now scattered) but
the inquiries were along the line of possible compromise of military attache type
of information, exclusive of the compromise of communications. On the other
hand, State Department interviews of personnel previously assigned at the Embassy
were made on the assumption that the Soviets had access to conversations and to
communications as well. (Army, Navy and Air Force are still in the process of
reviewing their old traffic in an effort to see whether their communications
were compromised.) Mr. Bannerman pointed to the State Department conclusion that
no damage to U. S. foreign policy can be detected as a result of the bugging of
our Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Bannerman pointed to the conclusion in the USIB
assessment to the effect that the Soviets did get information on operations,
and on military attache movements, and on the intelligence targets in which they
were interested. He pointed out that the agencies report that important decisions
were not discussed aloud, but in whispers or in the form of written notes.
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(Chairman Clifford thought it remarkable that such precautions would have
been consistently maintained over such a long period of 11 years.)
In answer to Mr. Coyne's inquiry, Mr. Bannerman said that the Security
Committee's preliminary assessment had been "noted" by the USB and USIB had
approved the recommendations, with the request that the Security Committee
complete a final assessment.
Mr. Bannerman said that it is most difficult to attempt to assess the
damage to U. S. interests resulting from the Moscow penetration. First is the
task of identifying information to which the Soviets may have obtained access.
The next task is to try and find instances in which Soviet reaction provides
evidence that a compromise of information was effected. Moreover, since this
was a Soviet intelligence operation, the information obtained by the intelligence
operators would not be passed on to Soviet political desks or to Soviet bloc
allies without attributing to some source other than the technical penetration.
Dr. Langer thought that, nevertheless, all such information obtained by technical
penetration of the U. S. Embassy would be reviewed and utilized where possible by the
Soviet government. Mr. Bannerman acknowledged that this would be the case; but he
emphasized the difficulty in observing and identifying Soviet reactions and actions
as being based on compromised U. S. information or communications. Dr. Land
expressed the view that it is dangerous to assume that our information' was not
compromised because we cannot observe specific Soviet reactions to such informa-
tion. Dr. Baker wondered whether the assessment of the 3 U. S. Ambassadors
that no damage was done is in essence a finding that intelligence is worthless,
is not needed, or is not used when it is obtained.
Chairman Clifford asked whether it is possible to relate compromised
U. S. information to Soviet actions with respect to Cuba. Mr. Bannerman referred
to the USIB Security Committee assessment on that point. Mr. Gentile pointed'
out that by 1962 an acoustically shielded conference room and an electronically
shielded code room had been installed in the Embassy, and in addition the
practice has always been followed of writing out sensitive information. Mr. Gray
thought that the State Department assessment referred to in the Conclusions of.
the US IB Security Committee report should be amended by adding to the effect
that "or, if the information was compromised, it was used by the Soviets with
such skill as to conceal whether in fact the information was compromised".
Mr. Pace wondered whether information obtained by the Soviets through
this technical penetration of our Embassy might not have resulted in the
Soviet identification of any defectors serving as intelligence agents for the
U. S. Mr. Bannerman said that this is a possibility in the Perkovsky case,
and CIA is awaiting the assessment reports of other agencies in order to study
this possibility further.
3 Mr. Pace asked whether the USIB, in accepting other agencies' own.
assessments of whether their information had been compromised, was not in
effect accepting self-serving statements rather than performing an abstract
assessment. Mr. Bannerman said that each agency is considered to have the
greatest competence in assessing the extent of any compromise of its own
information.
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Mr. Gentile informed the Board that the Embassy in Moscow was first
designed and built as an apartment house. Then in 1952 it was made available
to the U. S. for lease and occupancy as an Embassy building and apartment
living quarters. The U. S. accepted the building, and in 1952 the Soviets
added three top floors for use as Embassy offices. During the construction
period no U. S. technical inspections were possible because accese to the
construction work was limited to cursory inspections. For a period of 3 weeks
in March 1953 no Americans were given access to the building, and the con-
struction area on the top three floors was covered by plywood screens said to
have been put up to hasten the drying of plaster. The U. S. occupied the
Embassy on May 1, 1953, under the lease. Since that time there have been 27
inspections in an effort to locate listening devices. Plaster was chipped in
spots, floors were taken up in some locations, and various searches made short
of tearing rooms apart all without locating any devices. Meanwhile, over
--
the years Embassy personnel have been briefed and cautioned on the assumption
that the Embassy was penetrated by listening devices.
On June 20, 1962, Mr. Gentile continued, his predecessors in the State
Department Office of Security received from CIA the Soviet defector's 1962
report that the Embassy was bugged. This was made known to the State Department
resident 
security technician who went to Moscow 3 months later. There is nothing
in the files to indicate if any instructions went out or any action taken on
the basis of the 1962 defector report. There is no indication that the
Ambassador was informed.
In February 1964 the State Department resident security technician in
the Moscow Embassy returned to Washington and there was discussed the question
of the possible total destruction of an Embassy room in an effort to find
listening devices. In March 1964 the State Department Security people received
the report given by the second Soviet defector, pinpointing locations of con-
cealed microphones. Accordingly, the destruction of one room was authorized
by the Department of State Security Office (Room 10008 on the top floor) and
on April 23, 1964, the first of the 41 microphones was uncovered.
Mr. Coyne asked about the cutting of the cables. Mr. Gentile said that
this occurred two days after the discovery of the first microphone on April 23.
The decision 
was made in the Security Office of State, by the chief technician
in Moscow. Mr. Clifford asked whether it had occurred to responsible officials
to consider the possibility of exploiting the microphones found. Mr. Gentile
said that in the first place it was assumed that the Soviets had spotted the
technical men who were sent in by State Department, and that the noise of the
jackhammer and other digging operations had alerted the Soviets that the dis-
coveries had been made. Moreover, the microphones discovered were not con-
sidered unique finds requiring any unique technical study. Moreover, as part
of standing 
operations procedure, State notified the CIA and other interested
agencies immediately on making the first find, although this notification was
not made at the Secretary level. It was decided that exploitation was not
feasible.
The decision to cut the cables, however, was made by State Department,
Mr. Gentile said. In answer to Mr. Murphy's question he said that State
Department desk officers and the Ambassadors were told, but their judgments
were not sought as to the matter of cutting the cables.
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Mr. Bannerman stated that the prescribed procedure was followed on
the question of possible exploitation. State Department people discussed this
with counterintelligence officers in CIA (including Mr. Angelton) and it was
decided that no exploitation was possible because the Soviets had undoubtedly
learned of the discovery of the microphones uncovered by extensive and noisy
digging operations.
Mr. Gentile said that much remains to be done, including (1) a complete
technical assessment of the fidelity of the Soviet devices (2) completion of
the examination of the North Wing of the Embassy, and (3) the initiation of a
search of the South Wing.
Mr. Bannerman observed that a key factor is the tremendous disadvantage
to the U. S. resulting from Soviet control of the construction of buildings to
be occupied by U. S. personnel.
As for the level of Soviet capability evidenced by the quality and kind
of microphones discovered, Dr. Tordella said that they are better than the ones
we have for this particular kind of installation.
Dr. Tordella expressed the opinion that the Moscow installation resulted
in a compromise of our encrypted communications, particularly if you accord to
the Soviets the capability of the U. S., U. K., and Germans. From 1953-1959
State used the MCR code machine (identical to that used by U. S. military attaches,
1953-1954) which is vulnerable to audiosurveillance which can detect the plain
text being printed by the machine. Also the MCB machine could be cryptographically
reconstructed by the opposition. (In 1948 an Army code room Sergeant defected
under circumstances indicating that he had photographed materials which would
have given complete information on the machine.) So, from 1953-1959 we must
assume the Soviets were capable of reconstructing the machine, and also of
reading the plain text from which the encryptions were made. All incoming and
outgoing encrypted traffic of the Embassy could have been read, as well as
traffic of other Iron Curtain U. S. posts using this system. From 1959-1962
(before installation of the electronically shielded code room in the Embassy)
all Confidential encypherei material was subject to audio attack. Secret traffic
was vulnerable until 1961, as was Top Secret until 1960 when the use of 1-time'
pads was required. After December 1962 (when the electronically shielded room
was installed), according to tests run by NSA, there was no compromise of
Embassy traffic through audio or electromagnetic penetrations. The screen
grill antenna found in the wall of the North Wing of the Embassy, with coaxial
cables attached, probably served as a Soviet means of electronic intercept of
emanations from the U. S. 1-time teleprinter in the Embassy (and although this
effort was frustrated in October 1960 when such machines were not permitted
to be used at U. S. posts behind the Iron Curtain, that rule was lifted with
respect to our Embassy in the USSR when the acoustically shielded room was
installed in Moscow.)
As for the microwave energy signal which has been beamed at the Embassy
building at least since 1957, Dr. Tordella believes that the purpose of the
signal is to harrass us.
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Ar 12:05 p.m. Messrs. Tordella, Bannerman and Gentile departed the
Board meeting with the thanks of the Chairman for their assistance.
Following lunch, the Board resumed its meeting at 1:00 p.m. at which
time Mr. R. J. Smith of CIA (Deputy to Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy LCI for Intelligence)
presented a briefing of the situation in Laos, South Vietnam, North Vietnam,
Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. (Chairman Clifford left the meeting in
response to a telephone call from the President.)
Mr. Smith outlined some CIA views concerning intentions and capabilities
center
of the Chinese Communists: (1) the Chicoms hope to see China become a
of Communist authority world-wide, setting policy even for the USSR (2) the
Chicom leaders presently wish to avoid high risk actions (3) Communist China
has not achieved a nuclear production capability (4) of the 15 SAM sites in
China, only 4 are operational, and the others lack equipment, and (5) the
CIA
Chicom Air Force is deteriorating and replacements are slow in coming.
believes that Communist China will encourage Hanoi to keep high level of pressure
going in Laos and South Vietnam; will continue efforts to subvert Malaysia; will
avoid hostilities with the U. S.; will avoid a formal breach with the USSR, pre-
ferring to erode Soviet influence around the world; and will continue to support
militant elements of Communist Parties in Africa, Latin America and Southeast
Asia.
In answer to a question by Mr. Pace, Mr. Smith expressed the opinion
that if the U. S. moved against Hanoi in the Air, the Chicoms would not react.
Mr. Smith also mentioned briefly the situations in Cuba and in India.
Mr. Smith concluded his presentation and left the Board meeting at 2:05 p.m.
At 2:10 the Board meeting was joined by Colonel Steakley, Director of
the Joint Reconnaissance Center of the JCS. Colonel Steakley described in some
detail the various COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry, and photographic collection
programs which are carried out through peripheral and overflight aircraft missions
under the monitorship of the JRC (including surface ship and submarine collection
of COMINT and ELINT along the China coast). Colonel Steakley referred to the
ELINT collection (plus some COMINT and telemetry) through RA-3B peripheral
flights in the Artic; C-130 peripheral flights for COMINT collection in the
Pacific, European and Cuban areas, including KC-135 missions near the Soviet
border; photographic missions (BOW TIE) flown with RF-101 aircraft by Chinat
pilots over coastal areas of Southeast China; covert photo collection on MATS
(C-97 G) flights over Europe and Indonesia; C-135 telemetry collection missions
near the launch areas and impact areas involved in Soviet space and missile
activities; and collection of telemetry from satellites over Africa.
Colonel Steakley described the main functions of the JRC as pertaining to
(1) monitoring of military reconnaissance programs (2) review and evaluation of
missions proposed by the military (3) coordination of reconnaissance operations
at the national level (4) U. S. and allied cooperation (5) monitoring of actual
reconnaissance operations (6) coordination of policies and procedures, and
(7) monitoring of special OPLANS.
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In response to a query from Dr. Baker, Colonel Steakley acknowledged
that our reconnaissance activity gives the Soviets "training" in detection and in
the development of countermeasures.
Mr. Coyne asked whether there is not considerable duplication of in-
telligence collection as a result of the multiplicity of reconnaissance missions
being flown in the same target areas. Colonel Steakley said that some
duplication results, but in any event a single ELINT mission will not always
pick up all the desired intelligence, whereas follow-on missions will pick up
emissions which might not have been encountered on the previous run.
A question was asked by Mr. Coyne about the JRC's working relationship
with the NRO. Colonel Steakley said that this is satisfactory, even though
not documented.
Dr. Baker asked whether the system is fast enough to accommodate urgent
intelligence requirements which might be formulated by non-military agencies,
calling for overflights of denied territory, for example. Colonel Steakley
said that this capability is adequate and he cited the example of the recent
Alaskan earthquake, photographs of which were delivered to Wachington within
15 hours after the request was made for them. In answer to a query by Dr. Baker
along this same line, Colonel Steakley said that the System is capable of
exercising straight-line channel of command to meet intelligence requirement
which, e.g., the Secretary of Defense might suddenly need to have fulfilled
such as a carrier-based U-2 mission over a particular intelligence target all
of a sudden. Colonel Steakley expressed confidence that the JRC mechanism and
resources are such that suddenly-arising intelligence reconnaissance needs can
be met quickly.
Colonel Steakley's visit with the Board was completed and he departed
the meeting at 3:30 p.m.
In executive session (with Dr. Baker in the chair during Mr. Clifford's
absence) Board members considered and approved proposed letters from the
Chairman requesting that State, Defense, CIA and the DCI up-date and revise
the scope
and coverage of their respective annual reports to the Board con-
cerning the conduct of their intelligence-related responsibilities. These
letters were approved and subsequently dispatched by the Chairman.
At 3:55 p.m. Chairman Clifford returned from the President's office and
rejoined the Board meeting.
The Board meeting was joined at this point by the DCI, Mr. McCone; and
Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald, and Meyers of CIA. Chairman Clifford said that
the Board would appreciate hearing from the DCI concerning items of interest
to Board members as set out in the list previously provided to the DCI, as
well as any other matters which the DCI might wish to cover.
At the DCI's suggestion, Mr. Fitzgerald took up the subject of Cuba
which he had discussed previously at the meeting of the Board in April.
He reported the recent defection to the U. S. of a Cuban military officer who
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has been attached to Castro's security service since Castro came to power,
and who is in the process of being interviewed concerning the structure of
Castro's intelligence organization (the defector being primarily knowledgeable
of Cuban external intelligence activities in other Latin American countries).
Mr. Fitzgerald said that there is still the problem of getting agent
photography out of Cuba for examination in the U. S. At present the photo-
graphs are delivered by agents inside Cuba to a friendly foreign diplomatic
mission which forwards them to the CIA in the U. S.
Efforts are still being made to locate the Soviet SIGINT installations
in Cuba. A talkative Soviet truck driver who formerly had access to one of
the Soviet installations has been transferred back; to the Soviet Union, so
that source is no longer available.
New miniaturized radios have now been supplied to 8 agents of the CIA
in Cuba. There has been some difficulty encountered in the operation of an
electronic "dead drop" which involves the use of a static receiver in a
friendly Embassy in Havana, which picks up messages from an agent coming
within a quarter of a mile of the Embassy.
Referring to newspaper reports of exile raids and attempted raids on
Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald said that there have been successful raids on sugar
centrals. The reported executions of 7 "CIA agents" did include 3 who were
once serving as agents but who had been doubled some time ago. The British
capture of a "raiding party" in the Bahamas actually involved the seizure of
Manuel Ray, by female secretary, and two or three others. In any event, these
incidents did cause the Castro government to set up the biggest military alert
in Cuba to date which indicates the uneasiness prevalent there.
(Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting at this point.)
Mr. McCone observed that 2 Soviet, ships have left Cuba for Russia in
the last few weeks, and 4 others are enroute to Cuba, so a further withdrawal
of Soviet personnel is expected. CIA does not know whether the SAM's have
been turned over to Cuban control yet. Castro has said he will shoot down
our U-2's. Khrushchev told Drew Pearson in Cairo that U.. S. U-2 flights over.
Cuba are unacceptable and that the U. S. should rely on its satellite recon-
naissance coverage instead. The word sent by the U. S. to Khrushchev and
Castro is that we will continue U-2 surveillance of Cuba. We are in a difficult
weather season now but are getting satisfactory results from the 2 or 3 U-2
flights flown each week, Mr. McCone said.
Chairman Clifford asked about Cuban capabilities for bringing down our
U-2's. Mr. McCone said that they have that capability. He recalled that a
year ago CIA equipped its U-2's with
but there is a difference of view
within the military as to whether this will be effective; and, moreover, the
JCS do not want the ECM's to be used over Cuba because this might compromise
the SIOP's. (Mr. McCone said that the Secretary of Defense is not much worried
about the latter.) Mr. McCone expressed the belief that U. S. reaction would
be violent if a U-2 is shot down, and plans are in readiness for such an
eventuality. However, if a U-2 is lost it may not be possible to ascertain
for certain what happened to it. (We lost a U-2 six months ago and found
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Mr. Myers referred to the difficulties of effecting agent penetration
of North Vietnam and Laos. South Vietnamese locals are being trained for
infiltration into North Vietnam at the present time. (Mr. Myers concluded
his briefing of the Board at this point.)
'
Mr. McCone answered a question from Mr. Murphy by saying that he feels
that the intelligence situation in Saigon is unsatisfactory. When Diem was
overthrown, the new regime rolled up the former agents of Nu who were operating
under CIA supervision in a penetration of the Viet Cong. One of the problems
is that U. S. military elements in South Vietnam are less interested in broader
national intelligence objectives and are more interested in such data as order-
of-battle information; however, USMACV is planning to drop 6-man teams into
North Vietnam.
With regard to USIB consideration of increased intelligence coverage of
China, Mr. McCone referred to the scheduling of satellite missions and to the
beginning effort in the field of clandestine agen; coverage. However, Mr. McCone
observed, China is a difficult intelligence targ.. There appear to be few
chances for exploitation of dissensions among the Chicoms, even though the
economy is a shambles, and even though the military are not being supplied with
the equipment they have been expecting. At the same time, the Chicoms seem to
be forging ahead in an effort to achieve missile and nuclear capability.
In answer to a question by Mr. Pace, the DCI said that COMINT has proved
to be of great value in covering Chicom troop deployment, i.e., traffic analysis
of Chicom communications has produced such information. Mr. McCone agreed with
Mr. Murphy's comment that the absence of an intelligence capability out of Taiwan
is a disappointment, particularly in view of the fact that large numbers of the
Chicom military force were once under the command of Chiang. Mr. McCone said
that during the last 6 months the Chinats have lost a dozen 6-man intelligence
teams sent into China.
Turning to the recent discovery of audio penetration of the U. S. Embassy
in Moscor, Mr. McCone noted that the Board had heard from Mr. Bannerman on this
subject earlier in the day. The DCI said that he was astounded as anyone else
at this development, because he had received the impression that technical sweeps
were made of the Embassy. CIA feels that there was an audio penetration of our
communications. He said that the problem of fixing responsibility is still
being studied, and that as yet no one has gotten to the bottom of the matter.
Dr. Land wondered whether there should not be an over-riding responsibility and
authority to deal with such problems, rather than leaving them to the individual
agencies to solve. Mr. McCone said that he is still studying that question but
is not yet ready to make recommendations. He said that there is a need for
centralizing research and development efforts in the audio field (For instance,
Mr. McCone pointed out that CIA had developed a paint which could have prevented
the audio penetration in Moscow, but CIA could not get it approved for use
because the color did not appeal to some users). He said that State, Defense
and CIA have differing views on how to proceed in the audio field, and there are
several NSC directives which Mr. McCone wishes to sort out before he makes any
recommendations. CIA has found that security instructions were ignored by
officials and other personnel of some agencies, e.g., sensitive information was
dictated and was subject to audio intercept. In the DCI's opinion, great damage
was done to the U. S, by the Soviet Technical penetration of the Embassy in
Moscow.
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Y
Mr. Gray pointed out that assessments appearing in the June 1
preliminary report of the USIB Security Committee differed from the DCI's
estimate that serious damage was done. Mr. McCone said that General Carter
and Mr. Bannerman of CIA think that the damage was very severe; but the
DCI added that he had not studied the USIB report inasmuch as he was out of the
country attending the Honolulu conference.
Chairman Clifford remarked that the Moscow incident indicates a dis-
regard for security on the part of the U. S., for example, the 1962 report of
the Soviet defector was not acted upon. Mr. Clifford thought the question is
what can we as Americans do to bring attention to and correct this fouled-up
situation. Mr. McCone replied that in CIA there is an extremely competent
( group which is devoted to personnel and other security matters.
The Dunlap
case study showed that CIA's personnel security program is particularly good.
Now there is a need for the State Department or some agency to be designated as
responsible for not only technical security sweeps but physical security matters
as well. There must be an insistence on conformance with security safeguards.
(Here Mr. McCone recalled that in Bangkok the U. S. Ambassador mentioned that
he had sent his furniture out to be upholstered by local people; and when the
DCI asked about the possibility of listening devices being planted in the
furniture, the Ambassador said that this had not occurred to him. Mr. McCone
observed that in various parts of the world, CIA would be happy for an oppor-
tunity to take advantage of a situation of that kind, for intelligence purposes.)
1-
Chairman Clifford pointed to the loose security attitude that prevailed
in the Moscow situation, e.g., the cables were cut right away. The DCI thought
that the proper procedure was followed with regard to State and CIA consultation
to determine exploitation possibilities when the first microphone was found
leading to a decision that the Soviets had by then been alerted to the discovery,
making exploitation infeasible. However, Mr. McCone though: that the cutting
of the coaxial cable was proper. Mr. McCone agreed with Mr. Clifford's
statement that there is a need to place responsibility on come appropriate agency
to ensure that security precautions are followed.
Mr. Pace said that there is also a need to ensure effective management
of research and development in the audio field. Mr. McCone replied that there
are jurisdictional problems; the Department of State has responsibility under
NSC directives; and Mr. McCone wants the USIB to consider the matter, and
meanwhile he would defer making any recommendations for now.
Chairman Clifford asked if Mr. McCone would comment on the status of the
DCI's efforts to coordinate the total U. S. intelligence activity. Mr. McCone
said that with regard to the Board's recent report on the National Reconnaissance
Program, he would have some alternative proposals to make along the lines of a
different approach to the problem, but he preferred to reserve this for a later
time.
In another area of the coordination effort, Mr. McCone said that the
intelligence community is faced with the question of the continued availability
of certain overseas bases which are used for intelligence purposes
such as
intercept stations on Cyprus; bases in Pakistan; and AFTAC sites at locations
around the world. In the USIB, an inventory of all overseas intelligence-
--
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related bases is being made with a view to analyzing alternative courses.
of action open to us if we lose specific bases, classified and otherwise.
In the audio field, Mr. McCone said that the USIB will have some
recommendations to make.
As for information processing, the CCI referred to the SCIPS study which
was recently made in the USIB. He considered this study to be a good approach,
although it is difficult to apply a uniform program in all intelligence agencies,
e.g., the State Department requires a coding system different from that which
might be used as a central system in the intelligence community. So, Mr. McCone
is urging that the SCIPS study be used by each agency as a model approach to
the problem.
With reference to contacts with the President, Mr. McCone said that the
CIA sends a daily check list to the President but he does not necessarily wish
to read it every day. CIA also sends over special intelligence items and a
weekly check list which General Clifton hands to the President for reading.
Mr. McCone said that he sees the President frequently including occasions when
others are present, e.g., at conferences on South Vietnam. Some items the DCI
takes to the President directly, when they are of such critical or sensitive
nature that Mr. McCone does not want to handle them through routine channels.
The DCI said that he personally would prefer opportunities for intelligence
briefings of the President with the Secretaries of State and Defense present,
in order that these officials could express any differing views to the President
(for example, it is the Secretary of Defense's view that U-2 overflights of Cuba
are not required, whereas Mr. McCone says he feels that there is a need for them).
With regard to the situation in South Vietnam, Mr. McCone said that this
had been discussed at the Honolulu meeting from which he had just returned.
Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland reported a deterioration of the
situation. For one thing General Khahn has not gained control of the people
as he claimed he would. Mr. McCone said that he differed from others at the
Honolulu meeting who are of the opinion that the situation in South Vietnam
has "bottomed out". To the contrary, Mr. McCone believes that the situation may
well deteriorate further and planning should be made on that basis. He recalled
Ambassador Lodge's comment that South Vietnam is not a country but a place where
a lot of discordant people live.
As for Laos, Mr. McCone noted that the Pathet Lao had stopped its advance
after over-running the western part of the Plain de Jarres. Mr. McCone believes
that the Pathet Lao forces can take over the country if it wants to, without
the aid of the North Vietnamese.
In Mr. McCone's opinion, a token air strike on North Vietnam would probably
not produce a military reaction from either Communist China or North Vietnam.
If a strike were made by South Vietnamese pilots accompanied by U. S. "instructors"
(project FARM GATE) more damage would be done and more reaction would result.
An A-bomb attack would probably produce a strong Chicom reaction. In any event,
the U. S. will have to guarantee to Khahn that we will bail him out as necessary.
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Also, U. S. forces would have to be extensively deployed to meet any reaction,
and the American people would have to be prepared for the situation. Mr. McCone
feels that U. S. public opinion could best be prepared by the adoption of a
Congressional resolution, which would also serve as a meaningful signal to
the Chinese.
In answer to Dr. Langer's question, Mr. McCone thought it unlikely that
Khahn would be unseated by a military coup in South Vietnam, although there are
disgruntled factions for him to contend with.
In answer to Mr. Murphy's query, the DCI saw no immediate prospect for a
South Vietnamese penetration of North Vietnam along the lines of the successful
penetrations which have been made of South Vietnam from the North.
He said that
CIA had plans for such penetration, but they were taken over by U. S. military
forces the first of this year, and the military are now organizing such activity.
the
Mr. McCone made reference to the recently published book "Bay of Pigs" as
being most damaging to the CIA.: A most serious claim in the book is the statement,
the invasion brigade was told by CIA to be prepared to go ahead with the invasion
even if President Kennedy should call it off. Mr. McCone said that he had caused
a thorough inquiry to be made of this allegation, including interviews of
Cubans who were supposed to have made the allegation. Mr. McCone said that the
inquiry produced no evidence whatsoever that any Deputy DCI or other CIA official
zer issued any such order, nor any CIA representative outside of Washington,
the official records do reflect the issuance of any such instruction.
At o
the DCI's inquiry turned up only an instance or two where in the heat of the
operation statements were made to the effect that the operation was ready and
nothing could make it fail.
ington, and
most,
Mr. McCone also referred to the book, "Invisible Government", which is
about to be published and has been reviewed in Look Magazine. The book makes a
complete disclosure regarding the Radio Free Europe program and other CIA
proprietaries; it identifies CIA-personnel whose names have never appeared in
public-print before; and specific reference is made to the Special NSC 5412/2
Group by name and function. The authors came to see Mr. McCone last August
and he had a luncheon meeting with them. The authors said that they were just
starting preparation of the book. Mr. McCone asked them to come see him again,
and to submit the manuscript for checking as to accuracy and security, but they
did not do so.. CIA later obtained a manuscript copy from Random House covertly.
Mr. McCone tried to get the publishers to kill the book but was told that it
had already been paid for. Some 2000 copies have already been printed, and
the book is most damaging to the CIA, Mr. McCone said.
Following dinner at the Metropolitan Club, the Board meeting resumed.
Dr. Jerome Wiesner (and Spurgeon Keeny) who had just returned from a "cience
meeting in Moscow, gave the Board a preliminary report on Dr. Wiesner's review
of the recently-discovered microphone penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow.
Dr. Wiesner said that a surprising job had been done by the Soviets. Most of
the microphones found were still operable after 11 years. They were imbedded
in the walls 8 inches deep, with wooden tubes extending out to the wall surface.
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The wires from the microphones ran out inside the exterior building walls
to avoid detection. During construction before the U. S. occupied the
building as an Embassy, our people gave instructions to the Soviets as to
where to run telephone and electrical wiring to serve Embassy offices --
in effect almost giving the Soviets an advance, blueprint of the layout of
Embassy offices. As a result of the Soviet technical installation they had
access to the sounds of machines and conversations in the Embassy up to the
time that shielded rooms were installed. They had microphones in the Embassy
rooms where U. S. intercept operations were going on. The State Department's
resident security technician on the scene (Mr. Musser) is still surveying the
situation, including the significance of the coaxial cables and grid antenna
which have been uncovered in the walls of the Embassy. There is as yet no
real evidence that the Soviets were able to pick up brush sparks from the U. S.
cryptographic machines, but they were certainly able to pick up acoustic signals.
(There was an operable microphone, right next to the printer location prior to
installation of the shielded room.) The microwave signal which is known to
have been beamed at the Embassy since 1957 may be a diversionary activity, or it
could be illuminating passive devices. (The trouble is that Mr. Musser does
not have the resources to determine the use to which the signal is being put.)
An effort should be made to intercept the signal outside the Embassy building
in a line with the direction of the beam which is coming from a Soviet-guarded
apartment building nearby. (For a long time now no active countermeasures have
been tried against the signal, and the attitude seems to have been not to
disturb it.)
Dr. Wiesner said that even if our Embassy security people had dug a trench
around the rooms where microphones were installed this would probably not have
uncovered the devices.
Dr. Wiesner feels that Mr. Musser is an able man but doesn't have the
resources to help him do the job. There is a need for trained people to use
adequate detection devices, and experts to oversee the job. There should be
installed such equipment as a standard video alarm in Embassy rooms, and it
should be possible to develop and use transistorized devices to detect radiation.
(Mr. Musser stated his belief that there could be a duplicate of the Soviet
system as yet undiscovered.). Dr. Wiesner thinks that the teletype machines are
well protected in the electro-shielded rooms. But Mr. Musser needs help which
he seems reluctant to ask for because "hit-and-run" visits by various experts
would hinder the efforts he is now trying to make.
Dr. Wiesner
Chairman Clifford asked what measures Dr. Wiesner would take if he
were charged with responsibility for security of the Moscow Embassy.
said that he would (1) complain to the Soviets about the microwave signal (2)
do a more thorough tearing down of a room to see if other systems are present,
and (3) scan the walls and floors with an appropriate radiation device, e.g.,
radioactive cobalt taken in on the Ambassador's plane although you could not
He added
be sure even then that an eavesdropping system was not installed.
that there is a view that
--
electromagnetic shielding acoustically shielded rooms should also be given
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1
Dr. Wiesner
Mr. Clifford asked whether a defense could be devised, assuming that
we are unable to pass that concealed microphones remain in place.
said that aside from the measures already mentioned, one could literally destroy
It might 
also
1 or 2 rooms, i.e., take them apart thoroughly and rebuild them.
be well to panel, or paint, the office walls, starting with the offices of the
but 
you
Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and the military attaches
could not be certain that this defense would be totally effective.
Dr. Wiesner said that he and Mr. Keeny had visited the 2 intercept rooms
in the Embassy, and the operating personnel talked freely about what they were
doing, with no apparent fear that they were being overheard 
by the Soviets.
Mr. Gray asked why the Soviets would damage the Embassy switchboard and
leave it out of commission as reported in a dispatch just received from Ambassador
Kohler. Dr. Wiesner said one could speculate that this was done to salvage
He 
added 
that
something left behind in the switchboard or telephone system.
the switchboard is on the ground floor area of the Embassy which is guarded by
Soviet guards; and Messrs. Wiesner and Keeny and their wives found it easy to
(Dr. Wiesner and Mr. Keeny
walk through the ground floor area unchallenged.
were not told of the burglary entry and damage to the switchboard even though
they were in conversation with the Ambassador and other Embassy officials after
the incident occurred. They heard about it from their wives who had 
learned of
the incident in conversations with Embassy personnel.)
Dr. Wiesner also questioned the security of the Embassy practice of sending
He 
said that
so many information copies of coded messages to other U. S. posts.
he found no evidence of particular concern on the part of Embassy personnel with
Mr. Musser, on the other hand, was 
working
regard to the bugging development.
around the clock. Dr. Wiesner said that he had lunch with Ambassador Thompson
who said he felt that any Soviet intercept of his conversations in the Embassy,
and of his messages, would only have served to confirm to the Soviets 
the
sympathetic attitude with which he looked upon the problems faced 
by the 
Soviets.
Chairman Clifford, on behalf of the Board, asked Dr. Wiesner to give the
Board a brief memorandum suggesting steps which the U. S. Government should
consider taking in the direction of getting complete security of 
the 
Embassy
in Moscow.
Dr. Wiesner said he would do so, but pointed out that his suggestions
would probably be those already proposed and considered by others, but not acted
He said that Mr. 
Musser's
on for various reasons including lack of funds.
principal need is for more experts on the cene.
Dr. Wiesner and Mr. Keeny completed their visit with the Board and departed
at 9:00 p.m.
1
In executive session, Chairman Clifford emphasized the gravity of the
Moscow penetration development, and stated his intention to have a special
Board Panel study made, as soon as the USIB completes its appraisal 
and 
report
on the subject.
111
With regard to the Board's May 2 report to the President on the National
Reconnaissance Program, Mr. Clifford said that when the DCI's comments 
are
received at the White House, and if the White House asks for 
Board 
recommendations,
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the President will be informed of the Board's view that a Presidential.
Directive should be issued along the lines already proposed. Mr. Pace
thought that the Chairman should proceed in that fashion without necessarily
having to call another Board meeting on the subject.
The Chairman noted approval given to the proposed letters he would
send to Defense, State, CIA and the DCI requesting updated coverage of matters
dealt with in their annual reports to the Board on their intelligence activities.
The next regularly scheduled meeting of the Board was set for August 6
and 7.
The Board adjourned its meeting at 9:35 p. m.
سل
A. R. Ash
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
June 1, 1964.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD
Audio Penetrations of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Board Agenda Items 3, 5, 6, 12
vened,
Since the last meeting of the Board there have been
discovered 41 microphones concealed in the walls of our
Embassy in Moscow. These have been located at strategic
points covering virtually all of our key offices including
those of the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, the Army
Communications and Code Center, State Department Code Room,
Embassy conference and typing rooms, the office of the Army.
Navy, Air Force, Political, Economic, Agricultural Attaches,
etc.
In addition to conventional bugs deeply imbedded in the
walls of the Embassy, there also have been discovered three
coaxial cables and a large (31 x 91) antenna which may besider-
associated in some manner with the unusual signal which is
known to has been targeted against key offices in the
Embassy for at least seven years.
Shard will be briefed
་་
Immediately following the discovery of the first of the
41 microphones, the Chairman directed that appropriate inquiry
be initiated. In line therewith the Baker Panel was convened,
and discussions were held with appropriate personnel of the
White House, the State and Defense Departments, the NSA, CIA,
etc.
In addition at the request of Mr. Bundy, Dr. Jerome.
Wiesner, former Science Advisor to the President, was briefed
on the subject preparatory to his making an on-the-scene review
in Moscow of the steps being taken by the State Department with
respect to this development. Further, special studies were.
requested on behalf of the Board relative to the degree of
Jeopardy which may have resulted to our encryption systems
a consequence of these penetrations. (A couple of weeks after
the Chairman initiated Board inquiries concerning this matter,
the USIB began a review of the subject and at that time the
USIB was requested by Mr. Bundy to report the results of its
findings and recommendations to the Board in time for consider-
ation at this meeting.)
as
In keeping with the foregoing, the Board will be briefed
on the following significant aspects of the subject (as
reflected in the agenda):
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SECALT
Agenda item 3: The writer will brief the Board on the
details of these penetrations. Dr. Baker will brief the Board
on the technical judgments which have been made on the subject
by the Baker Panel. (See enclosed draft report prepared by
the Panel.) This Panel consists of the following individuals:
Dr. William O. Baker - Board Member
Dr. Edward E. David.
Director, Visual & Acoustic Research,
Bell Telephone Laboratories
.Dr. Andrew M. Gleason- Department of Mathematics
Dr. John W. Tukey
Mr. J. R. Pierce
Agenda item 5:
Harvard University
Department of Mathematics
Princeton University
Research Staff
Bell Telephone Laboratories
Mr. Robert Bannerman, Chairman of the
USIB Security Committee, will brief the Board on the highlights
of the study which his Committee has made thus far with respect
to the general security implications of the audio penetrations
of the Embassy in Moscow. (Hopefully, by Board meeting time,
we will be in possession of a written USIB report on this
subject as requested by Mr. Bundy.) Mr. G. Marvin Gentile,
Director of Security, Department of State, will join the Board
for Mr. Bannerman's presentation and will be prepared to respond
to any questions which the members may have relative to the
internal operations of the State Department's security system.
(In Iron Curtain countries the State Department is primarily
responsible for the security "sweeps" and associated actions
which are taken in an effort to detect and counter hostile
penetrations which may be attempted against official U. S.
installations, personnel and classified information in those
countries.) (See enclosed State memo to Coyne, dated 6-1-64.).
Agenda item 6: General Blake, Director of NSA, and/or
his Deputy, Dr. Tordella, will brief the Board on the technical
assessments thus far made at NSA relative to the impact, if any,
of these penetrations on the cryptographic systems which are
employed by elements of the State and Defense Departments and
CIA in the handling of classified communications between
Washington and our official installations in Iron Curtain
countries and elsewhere.
Agenda item 12: Dr. Jerome Wiesner will discuss with the
Board any findings, conclusions and recommendations, which may
have resulted from his examination at the Moscow Embassy of the
actions taken and contemplated with respect to these very
serious penetrations.
J. Paul Co
Soa
Patrick Coyne
SECRET
SECRET
This document consists of 2 pages
Number 2 of 5 copies, Series A.
June 1, 1964
NW 88132
TO:
Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
Member, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
The White House
Washington, D. C.
FROM:
G. Marvin Gentile
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
In reply to your verbal request for information concerning the 7 June,
1962 CSCI/3/770,797 defector report, the following persons were appraised of
the contents of this report in addition to Mr. Jolin F. Reilly, Deputy Assist
ant Secretary for Security:
Mr. Maclyn Musser - Resident Engineer, Moscow
Mr. Edwin R. Hiller
Mr. Elmer D. Kill
-
Officer in Charge of the
Frankfurt Test Center :
10 to Phico
que tobasay might
ation of per
Office
#ince the con
then Chief of the Division of of cons
Technical Services:
The referenced document was received in the Division of Technical Services
on June 21, 1962, just prior to Mr. Hiller's departure for Frankfurt where, as
Officer in Charge of the Frankfurt Test Center, he was responsible for all of
the Moscow technical inspections.
Mr. Musser, the now Resident Engineer in Moscow, departed for Moscow in
October of 1962 and was aware of this information prior to his arrival in
Moscow.
This report stated the defector "saw reports with the red stripes, in
connection with which were mentioned, he believes, the room or office of the
Ambassador, the Counselor, 'or like that'. Source stated that living quarters
and 'the dacha" are 'beyond question' bugged, as are any Embassy rooms to which
Soviet citizens are permitted access, but that some rooms in the Embassy might
not be covered." Other than calling this memorandum to the attention of per-
sonnel directly involved in the technical program, the records of this Office
indicate no specific action was taken by the Office of Security since the con-
tents of the report apparently were considered only a re-confirmation of con-
victions held that such installations were indeed present. Since Mr. Reilly
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and Mr. Hill are no longer connected with this Office exact reasoning can not
be supplied and only surmised. Inquiry will be made of Mr. Hiller and Mr.
Musser to determine whether they can furnish further pertinent details concern-
ing this matter. The results of this inquiry will be furnished to you as soon as
possible
V. N
the
It should be noted that primary interest in Moscow at that time was in the
resolution of the nature of the microwave signals directed at the west wall of
the Embassy, as little was actually known prior to Mr. Musser's arrival of the
exact characteristics of the signal.
teleg
In regard to your request for the position of the Department of State in
connection with Mr. Khrushchev's allegation that he possessed a State cable,
Mr. John W. Coffey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications, has furnished-
the following statement:
"In response to Mr. Coyne's request we have reviewed the position
of the pipe embargo message as stated last September in the light
of the discovery of microphones in the American Embassy Moscow.
On the basis of evaluations to date, we assume the possibility
that the bulk of classified telegraphic information handled at
Moscow between occupancy of the building in 1953 through 1952 may
have been compromised. Classified telegraphic communications ex-
clusive of Iron Curtain posts would not have been affected. We
assume no penetration of cryptographic systems at Moscow since the
installation of the shielded enclosure in late 1962 for the commun-
ications operations.
"The microphone discovery does not alter our position with respect
to Mr. Khrushchev's allegation unless it is assume that a telegram.
originated in Moscow prior to December 1962 is that in question.
As you know, bassador Kohler, in paragraph
24
May 1964, reiterated his earlier position denying the existence of
the alleged telegram."
SECRET
Russ
Come
ATIONAL
did little to dissipe feeling
any informed A
that the
Premier had overstayed his wel-
Egypt. Right up in the final day
visit, Nikita continued to shock
But long before then
profited from an old
Beda saying as colorful as one of his
wharthy proverbs from the Ukraine:]
Druk: your milk, while fresh, for it will
tarp sour if long kept."
RUSSIA:
The Walls Have Ears
Twelve years ago this summer joseph
Stalin abruptly ordered the U.S. Em-
bassy Moscov mrved out of the con-
ter of town so that he would not have to'
look at it every time he went in and out
occupied by the embassy's ister
counselor, who acts as depchief
of mission,
With crowbars and drills the Marines
took down the inside walls and carefully
carted the debris down to the embassy
basement for sifting. After the wreeking
operation was completed, Washington
revealed last week, more than 40 tiny
'microphones were found in the debris.
Though the "bugs" had apparently
been installed by Russian workmen
eleven years ago, when the new en
bassy was readied for U.S. occupation,
many were still in working order. Wash
ington, however, feebly attempted to
minimize the security leakage by fasist
ing that the microphones could not have
dona serious damage since matters of
real importance are generally discussed
only in "safe rooms" inside the embassy,
•
Cum
thing since the 1956 H rekoh,
Für some months, Ron
have been trying to pull in fra
Bussian domination. Adroly explating
the Sino-Soviet quarrel, they publicly
affirmed the equality of all world Com
mmmmist parties in their now-famous April.
22 declaration of independence. in pri
vate, they have gone even further, R.
Currently
malian party leaders
travelinghout the mantry, bluntly
dehong the Russians to their oth
rink and Blo
Secret Flights Moscow Roads
arm being told,
their
only meaty for Efteen years. When
President Choorish Cheral Dej re-
Tused to subordinate the nation's indus-
trial development to the Kremlin's plais
for Eastern Europe, Soviet security
agents tried to incite Rumanians to overs
throw his government-and Premier N
kith Khrushchev twice few secretly to
Bucharest to eaten the use of Savict
troops. Finally, Rumanians are being
Aed-as Poles, were in 1926 1
Wideshow Coula-to be prepared to
restat "with all possible means."
Th this explosive situation, what the
Rumanians want most is a statement of
U.S. sympathy for their neutral stance
in world affairs, Concretely. Deputy
Premier Cheorghe Caston Marin, who
wrote most of the Apr 22 declaration
and heads the rent defeon, wh
also like Washington to restore in
tion in Bucharest
US is all for Rumanian
(but if the same
se
dependence,
keto
Associated Press
Associated Pres
U.S. stronghold in Moscow: More than 10 mikes were listening
of the Kremlin. Not long afterward
Stall died-whereupon the Soviet For-
eigi Office apologetically called up U.S.
officials and told them that the embassy
inged not move after all. But U.S. secu-
rity experts, declaring that the new
building selected for the embassy was
a "dream" from the security point of
view, insisted on going through with
the move
☐ within
(A safe room is a 
room
a room
which gives the appearance of being
suspended in space. Its walls, ceiling,
floor and even supports, are made of
transparent plastic so that nothing can
be inserted without being detected.)-
Undoubtedly, more safe rooms will
now be installed in the Moscow em-)
bassy. But the fact that the Soviet wall
microphones had survived three ambas-
sadors and eleven years of security tests"
before being discovered could scarcely
fail to arouse among laymeny some
doubts as to the security experts" assur-
ances that safe rooms are, in fact, safel
RUMANIA:
Last summer it turned out that what
security men thought was a dream had
turned into a nightmare. The..
tip-off
came when Premier Nikita S. Khru
shchev informed. Averell Harim that!
he knew US Ambassador Foy Kohler
was opposed to West Germany selling
the Russins steel pipe. Don't try to
deny it," he told Harriman. "We didn't
learn that from our spies." With that, in-
telligence agents: began looking inside" A Rumanian delegation came to
the U.S. Embassy's walls. 
After a series Washington last week on what seemed
of tests by technicians loaded down with the dullest of errands-negotiating a
metal deterring devices, the US: 
Matrade-expansion agreement. But the mis-
rine guards at the embassy were orsion involved potential political
dered to tear down the office normally (dynamite for Eastern Europe than any)
32
Dynamite
serve its o interests in Eastern Eur
rope by getting the Rumbians to agree
to internal liberalization as a quid pro
quo. To Under Secretary of State W.
Averell Harriman has fallen the delicate
task of advancing both causes, and neat
week's joint communiqué will show just
how successful he has been..
CYPRUS:
Crossed Fingers.
It seemed too good to be trues. For
more than four nights not a shot Had,
been fired in the blood-drenched streets
of Nicosia. "The situation in Cyprus is
improving tremendously," said Thant's
special representative Calo Plaza. "C/
course," he added, "we are keeping our
Angers 
crossed."
And for a fleetingspan last week it
indeed appeared it. Cypos was at
peace. 
Greek and Turkish Cyprals were
busily 
harvesting their crops each a
warin 
Mediterranea sun. Toda sen
timental touch to the springtime amity
the U.N. 
announced that one of its 7,000
soldiers had become engaged 2 to
Greek 
Cypriot girl.
But the hull was short-lived. & patrol
of 
Finnish 
UN. troops sent to a wheat
Newsweek, June 3, 1961
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INTELLIGENCE
PA CENTRAL
AGENCY
TOP SEC
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE'
3 June 1964
The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Spacial Assistant to the President
For National Security Affairs
The White House.
Washington, D.G.
Dear Mr. Bundy:
As requested in your memorandum of 14 May, the
attached Preliminary Damage Assessment of the Technical
Surveillance Penetration of the U.S. Embassy, Moscow,
is transmitted herewith.
The United States Intelligence Board today noted the
attached Security Committee report and approved the
recommendations as contained therein,
As you also requested; copies of the attached report
have been furnished to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
Faithfully yours,
(Signed) Marshall S. Carter
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
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cc: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
at
Meeting
TS-188539-64
Copy No. 2
6-1-64
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
May 29, 1964.
Dear John
The next meeting of the Fresident's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board is scheduled to be
hold on June 4, 1964, and in line with established
practice it would be very much appreciated if you
would beet with us on the afternoon of that day,
beginning at 4:00 p.m.
At the time of your meeting with us, it would.
be helpful if you would be prepared to discuss the
subjects outlined in the attachment.
Sincerely,
Attachment (BYE 0041/54)
Clark M. Clifford
Chairman
Mr John A. McCone
Director of Cantral Intelligence
Langley, Virginia
JPCMC
Handle via BYEMAN
Control System
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
1 do int co
1,
2.
No.
7 Copter Sertes
BYB 0041/64
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD.
Subjects Suggested by Board Members for Discussion
by the Director of Contral Intelligence When He
Meets with the Board on June 4, 1964
ية
Intelligence Community Capabilities for Coverage (other
than SIGINT) or significant Targets on the China Main-
land and in South East Asia,
盘。
Extent of photographic coverage in past
twelve months (particularly of Chicom and North
Vietnam targets) through satellite and manned vehicles.
b. Extent of clandestine agent coverage in
past twelve months (particularly as regards the China
Mainland, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and Chicom-NVN
support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam).
C. Pieasures contemplated by the United States
Intelligence Board to improve collection capabilities
relating to a and b, above,
Cuba
Q. Progress achieved thus far in obtaining
significant intelligence on Cuba through the implementa-
tion of the series of earlier Board recommendations
to the President on this subject.
b. Status of planning for mounting innovative.
clandestine collection activities on Cube, including
agent collection and excluding collection by satellite,
aircraft and drone reconnaissance.
Counterintelligence Responsibilities Relating to Audio
Penetrations of U. S. Installations in Communist Countries.
Arty oral comments the DCI may wish to make in
amplification of the report on the bugging of the Moscow
Embassy to be submitted by the USIB for consideration
At the June 4 meeting of the Board. (See Mr. Bundy's
memorandum of May 14, 1964.)
b. Relationship of this problem to the DCI's
responsibility for protection of intelligence, and
intelligence sources and methods,
CORONA/GAMBIT/IDEALIST
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།
5.
TOP SECRET
Views as to whether either the CIA or
elements of the Department of Defense should perform
any operational 
audiosurveillance countermeasure role
in U, S, installations 
behind the Iron Curtain.
Coordination of U. S. Foreign Intelligence Activities
Identification of major probleme, gaps and
deficiencies 
encountered 
by the DCI in areas involving
the coordination of 
the U. S. Forsign Intelligence
effort; remedial actions 
taken or contempleted.
Any other matters which the DCI may wish to raise with
the Board.
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