14-00
104-10102-10237
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
TO
INFO.
DISPATCH
Chief, Special Affairs Staff
CLASSIFICATION
PRO-
POSED
*
PROCESSING
ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM.
ACCOM
PLISHED
FROM
d
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
We
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review
ACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCES
PRIORITY
ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or
termination of Project AMTRUNK.
1. Attached herewith is an operațional review of and progress
report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March.
Station views on the operation are summarized below.
20
The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-
nesses:
A.
MPREND
The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working
"with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if
they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents
will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It
is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would
diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation,
since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational
successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no
hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major re-
fugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to
do so.
It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is
most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es-
cambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed
by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his
own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special
attention because of his ZRMETAL connections and he will not hesi
tate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID
or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the
AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according
to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may
be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.
Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/attchs.
red from Esogast AMTRUNK 19-6-8;;
19-6-843 196 SL, STATE
Ja: VOLSKY
168-496/16
/
-1-2009-
1 CROSS REFERENCE(TO from
DESENSITIZED
109 89% 43-45
Cowngrading and
sfication
ASSIFICATION
CRET
DATE TYPED
DATE DISPATCHED
APP
"
15 April 1963
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-8381
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
#12922
CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH
“GLASSIFICATION
LET
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA
-
8381
:
AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed.
There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.
B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK
agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will
KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the
operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed,
and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper The latter could prove to be most
embarrassing and should be fully recognized as a possibility, if
not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into
Castro's hands.
WENYACK TIMES
C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects.
At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees
prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents.
AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of
their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/27
is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con-
tacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between
AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on
29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14
the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban.
This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a
possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made
such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.
D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were
made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an
area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily
develop.
10
E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within
five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently
patrolled by sea.
RABEL nung
F This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 opera-
tions aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same
purposes. Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the
possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same
individual will be present.
3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK
group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the
four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a
number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex-
pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have
been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods
ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type
of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.
4.
Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and
disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE
Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible
moment. Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level
it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision
In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Head-
quarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time,
operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as
formulated.
END OF MESSAGE
1
See DIR 3:748
FORM
5-60 53a
'40'
CLASSIFICATION
USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
SECRET
CONTINUED
PAGE NO.
2.
SABIC RET
31 March 1963
PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW
I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.
II.
The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2,
and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164
on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from
headquarters, was already at the training site when the team
was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS
and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite
until 16 March during which time he conducted training in
clandestine methods and techniques. This training included
security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica-
tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management,
and operational planning and reporting. The training included
group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate
operational situations, several problems, and daily physical
training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or
VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average
of two or three hours with the group in operational dis-
cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March,
both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group,
debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin
out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing
their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through
30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass
and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons
familiarization and firing. During the period under dis-
cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed
by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series
of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for
alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were
further processed on cover and finance problems. The re-
sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters
under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR
26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time.
Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS
report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as
attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the
AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the
training report for the week of 25 March.
AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE.
The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the
existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among
high level military and civilian leaders of the government
culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and
DESENSITIZED
per CSH-43-45
STE
Removed from Project AMTRUNK
Fold:
20168-496/16
7
48-9-61
14-00000
III.
SECRET
2
=
the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate
mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the
populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable
of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission
is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of
the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions,
the operation has been split into two initial phases, which
will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves.
the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast
of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into
Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then
exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated.
Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of
black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast
of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into
Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black.
These two phases are discussed in detail in following para-
graphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations
designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to
make initial contacts among certain select high level military
figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these
phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed
operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de-
veloped.
PHASE I.
A.. AMTRUNK Personnel
1.
AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his
years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine opera-
tions. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for
two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's
takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido
Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported
the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that
Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his
university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged
in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials.
Following the Playa Giron invasiona̸ great many in the Havana
underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He
continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba
via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider
himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout
histraining. He is a pensive individual who displays good
judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to
be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is con-
scientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.
SECRET
14-00000
SEC
3
B.
His
2. AMTRUNK/3. a 225 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is
volatile immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is
quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his
fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground
as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage.
underground work began while he was in secondary school
when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista.
In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and
began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack
down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection
and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally
when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for
Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily
in his training up to date, his performance falls far short
of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only
function as support for this operation and should not inter-
fere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his
role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears
willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless,
direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.
TASKS
1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira
(AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at
A/3's father's farm in the Galera section CAMS 3835 L4D2
Coords 993614)
2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2
to Guanaba or Havana.
3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's
farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine
communications. Having completed this he would then be ex-
filtrated at Punta Jijira.
4.
A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational
support through his contacts.
5.
A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with
high level connections within the Rebel Army.
6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandes-
tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for
his exfiltration..
7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido
(AMS 3885 II).
!
TLC
14-00000
C.
D.
INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
1.
The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at
Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make
their way to A/3's fathers farm one kilometer from the coast
and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go
to Guanabo or Havana.
2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his
infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.
3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31
May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels
that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for
exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be
necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged
telegram signal would indicate his preference.
4.
The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for
maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule
will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2
considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his
contacts..
OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA
1.
Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the
two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by A/S
father and Santos SUAREZ, located kilometer from the point
of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of
the farm named Pedro CRUZ. CRUZ is 35 to 40 years of age,
is married and has an elementary school education. He has
no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon
CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain
transportation to Guanabo or Havana:
a.
Roman HERNANDEZ, who lives a few kilometers away in
Sierra del Arzobispo. HERNANDEZ owns a small farm and a
butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is
37 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children.
He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-
revolutionary activities.
b. If CRUZ is unsuccessful in getting HERNANDEZ truck
he will contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next
to A3 's father's farm. He is 45 50 years old, married,
no children, wife's name is Alicia. He was the mayor of
Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.
SECRET
19-6-
14-00000
2.
SECRET
5
c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADIGER
age 21.
single, 8th grade education. He provided support in
the form of food and safehousing to underground workers
in the past. His home address is Corojo #1, Cotornox
Havana. He owns a butcher shop in the Cotorre section
of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs
to be safehoused in Havana.
The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after
arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order
listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and
vehicles for A/2.
a. Elsa Maria NEGE
years of age, born in Havana.
A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University
of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she
lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained cor-
respondence with her. She has helped previously in
providing safehousing for the underground. She also has
a car.
b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55, born in Havana.
He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in
Havana. IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activi-
ties previously. He has a brother, two daughters and
a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in'
New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months
ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano,
an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicines
at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he re-
signed. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRINO
C. Sergio MENDEZ, age about 50 born in Cienfuegos, a
former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the
Railroad System in Cuba Subject was originally a member
of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK con-
fidante during Castro's takeover. MENDEZ has an apart-
ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under-
ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the
government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The
husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara,
A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZ,
d. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single.
Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private
tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's
English teacher and offered support to the underground.
MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a
close friend of A/2 and his wife.
SECRET,
14-00000
3.
e.
Gloria BAMCTALLA age 23-24, born in Havana, single,
mother and father deceased. She attended the University
of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became
a close friend of A/2 during their student days in
Havana. She has no record of underground work. She
lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he
might attempt to contact her if she was living at
Guanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessar
The following two operational assets will be contacted by
A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be
to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.
a. Jorge VALS age late 30s early 40s, married. Subject
holds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is not
presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's
during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains
some contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has been
working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was
originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo
groups. VALS primary interest has been trying to or-
ganize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel.
A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who has
not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by
the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALS and
trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALS in
1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.
b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa, age early 40s, served in the
US Army during World War II. According to A/2,
DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District
by Camilio Cienfliegos). Following the disappearance of
Cienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and pre-
sently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties
from property confiscated by the government. He said
QUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP
under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military
secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in
plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was
rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the
MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually
DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according
to A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subject
has good connections within the Rebel Army and re-
volutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual
and has confidence in him as a potential operational
lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention
DUARTE as an opportunist.
SECRET
14-00000
E.
F.
SECRET
= 7 -
C. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following
operational asset if he has an opportunity to make
contact.
Lester RODRIGUEZ, age late 30s early 40s, married,
former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He
fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area.
Following the Castro takeover he served as head of
one of the military zones within Havana province.
Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2
thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province.
He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group
during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting
weapons and materials.
COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS
1.
Cover
A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee
of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be
issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana.
Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional
items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc.
The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.
2.
Communications
Primary communications will be established through an SW
system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be
issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction
and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited
assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-
arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via
telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place
and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an
OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case
of an emergency.
OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION
1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which
has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The
area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile
site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are
known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals.
Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before
their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his
father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his
father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the
farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on
leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the
problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3
SECRE
14-00000
T
SECRET
to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may
jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and
patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-
He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under-
take a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3
step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2
ness.
has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi-
ness competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.
For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards
developing assets around his father's farm with maritime
reception capabilities.
2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe
of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana
However, he has not seen (VALS and DUARTE for over a year. In
addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army
organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness
in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on DUARTE, con-
flict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no
evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been
a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an
opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's
rebuttal to these remarks is that DUARTE has assisted him in
the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him
in his underground activities. This still leaves a question
mark next to the worth of DUARTE which unfortunately can only
be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are
other security implications which should be discussed in this
evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-
curity conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a
contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case
officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking
contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip
was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters
not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres-
sion. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his
operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to
Miami and being safehoused, He explained that he was joining
AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them
first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go
to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also
stated that a man named DUARTE would be one of their con-
tacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that
KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candi-
date for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated
three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will
gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he
presents.
13
SECRET

14-0
IV.
9
3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security
weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses
are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the
intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re-
cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime
operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results
which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter
for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential.
Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close
watching in terms of security and control for these factors
will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position
if not properly contained..
PHASE II
A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL
1.
AMICE/27.
'
, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41
year old PERUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family.
His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law
and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself
graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising
lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos.
Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959,
A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities.
In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-
Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground
activities. had come to the attention of the government and
he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy.
He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late
1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti-
vated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary
activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for
learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego,
and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to
take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion
of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply re-
sents any implication that he is working for KUBARK He
states that he is working for the overthrow of the present
regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid
and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude
although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre-
sents a difficult handling problem.
2. AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a
law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been in-
volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities.
Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME.He
is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has
a very highly developed security consciousness, developed
from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January
to July 1961 he made four black infiltration/exfiltration
trips to and from Cuba and PBPRIME, and has an excellent
knowledge of the northewi Matanzas area. He is easy to work
19-6-84
14-04
ECRE
10
-
with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-
KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.
3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a year old fisherman from the
Parea who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963.
He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will
be used as a maritime guide.
B. TASKS
C.
1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small
boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact
individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil
operations.
:
2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline
into 
the mainland, including making arrangements for trans-
portation into Havana.
3..
!
Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana
and obtain safehousing and operational support.
4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-
tration and future infiltrations.
5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts
among important military figures.
6. Establish internal and external communications.
7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.
INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
It is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14,
and AMTRUNK/4 
into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about
23 
April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor
into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately
three 
days, during which time they will remain black, keep
the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals
known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements
with 
contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14
on the 
mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747)
and 
contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be
worked out at this time with these contacts for a second in-
at which time AMICE/27
Titration in the latter part of Mayo Leguas and expect to be
and AMICE/14 will again go into
passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will
exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met
by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz
del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).
SECRET