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Vol
2 of 3
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions:
The United States Senate
22784
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Tuesday, March 9, 1976
Washington, D. C.
(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)
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324-1
WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.;
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
(202) 544-6000
TOP SECRET
5
Fi
A
1.1
14
INTRECT INVESTIGATION
Foreign & Military Subcommittee Meeting
Tuesday, Ma
1976
United States Senate,
Selist Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities.
Washington,
C.
8...
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10.30 o'clock
in Room S-407, the Capitoli Senator Walter D. Huddleston.
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) n presiding.
Present. Senators Huddleston. presiding. Hart of
16
14
Colorado, and Mathias.
17
Also present:
William Miller, Staff Director.
Joseph
12
HiGenova. Charles Kirbow. Ellict Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreth,
1.9
!!!
Johnston and Britt Snider. Professional Staff Members.
Jan Orloff. William Bader Lynn Davis. Al Quanbeck, Charles
Lombard. Rick. Inderfurth, Bob Kelley. Greg Treverton Jim
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Senator Huddleston.
EDINGS
Let's come to order.
Mr. Aaron. The agenda today is to proceed with the DCI
section and in addition we would like to get the Subcommittee's
if you will substantive: arrroval of the paper on the production
of intelligence so that it might go to the Agency and we could
an through the process of clearing its details.
but
I don't know which of those you wish to take up first
Mr. Kirhow. We should really take up the paper first
because it already went out this morning.
Mr. Aaron. Well they are realing it but we have not
negotiated with them yet..
!
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17
18
19
20
201
Senator Huddleston.
Any comment on that paper?
Mr. Miller. Which paper?
Senator Huddleston.
The production of intelligence.
Mr. Aaron. It is in the larger book.
Mr. Kirbow.
Senater, I have
have 
some comments but I
defer to the Senators if they have some comments first
¡r. Aaron. It's at Tab DTI 06.
Senator Huddleston. Charley, ne ahead,
Mr. Kirbow. Thank yo
The concern that has begu expressed by the serior
DA-L
of the cofmond Ey
not only before this ca but al a matter of record for
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the Senators. I'm sure
that the hig fight
in
the llouse last vear was to avoid the excruciating details on
budget fiqures and I think we had kind of discussed perhaps
publishing 3 or 4 major features I'd like to point out that in
this particular document, sucy great detail as that portion of the
CIA, the DDI which produces intelligence, we speak of an
authorized project to $70.9 million with 2.269 employees, exact
percentage of the Agency's toidust and the ex ct percentage of the
personnel. That one page of this document is probably the most
classified single compilation.
Senator Huddleston What page is that?
7
11
12
Mr. Kirbow. Page 3.
Senator Huddleston.
Of course it's out of the Agency.
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12
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50
I would assume they would have some comment on it.
Mr. Aaron. The point was not, the view was not to
produce these precise numbers but A, to have them for the
Subcommittee so that they could understand them and much as
in the case of the DCI's original paper to expect that these
things will be modified and to lay the basis for an appropriate
discussion with them as to how one might modify it and yet
capture the essence of the argument, and we'll ijust see how
far that aces in trying to roach
Certainly we laatia
intention of
this Department
represents a substanti
nditure with a large number of
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employees?
Mr. Kirbow. Wel! if I could tell you what my position
on it is, in speaking to Beth Bloomfield last night I specificall
asked her wall, she says that's to give them something out
there to take out so that we'll have enough left in here that
would be a worthwhile document at the end.
And I think that if we are kidding ourselves
that we
P
have either the time or
and w should not have the inclination
ດ
12
13
14
16
17
12
in my opinion to waste the time of the people at the Agency
For anything by "putting in things which will give Mr. Boldin
something to gnaw on so he wron bother the rest of the thing,"
I just didn't think that we were going to get into that kind
of dealing with the Agency people. I thought we were going to
be forthright in what we thought we should put in and what we
would put in a document like this because the whole production
of intelligence thing or the whole theme of the paper is
this inadequate attention given to the analytical portion of
production.
And if we are doing this and sending it out there in
19
20
this classified form full well knowing at the outset
she
21
says well, that's not even material. If they want to take it
out. just take it out.
Well, if it's not mate
I would hope that we're not
04
wasting both our
read hout 10,000 in the
last month,
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ཨཽ ོནྟུ
10
Senator Huddleston.
think it's probably material to
also to have a firmer grase when we start discussing and defending
the report mayhe, even to the extent of having specific figures.
I think it's highly unlikely that they will let that stay
in there and we'll probably have to modify it.. I see your point
in a way that we might save ourselves time by scaling it down
to begin with to what we think will be acceptable, but on the
other hand. we may not ques right.
Mr. Kirbow. Well. For the record then. Senator. I do
have exception to this type writing where we deliberately beef
it un with known classified information full well knowing
that
10
13
it's going to be taken out and not ge' to the point that we
are trying to make. But I won't dwell on it any further.
Senator Huddleston.
Do you have any
comment on that
aspect, Senator Hart?
14
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Senator Hart. No.
Senator Huddleston.
All right, that one's ready to go.
Mr. Aaron. Thank you.
Now we left off yesterday on page 25. We had discussed
two oral proposals by way of recommendations.
The first was
to set a tone for the DCT which was rejected and the second
was to confirm the new community wide deputy for the DCI to
have him subject to Senate
firmation to establish him as,
in effect the first denied at the DCI, the man who would succeed
in his place
35
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✓
We also discussed
fly the recommendation number 16
and we agreed that we would make some change in the language
relating to what in effect is the re-establishment of the board
of national estimates to make clear that they weren't there just
for the purpose of endorsing estimates but from the standpoint
that they are there for the purpose of reviewing them.
So the next recommendation is recommendation 17, and it
Essentially what the recommendation
is long and complicated.
does is spell out more precisely what the DCI's responsibilities
10 will be for the overall allocation of resources and coordination
1
15
- -
of the community's activities apart from the production of
finished intelligence, which is the purpose of recommendation:
16.
Now what it does, the first paragraph summarizes the
essential responsibilities along the lines of the President's
16 Executive Order.
17
18
19
Now it is slightly different from the Executive Order
in the following sense. The Executive Order establishes an
NSC Committee, gives the Committee the responsibility of
20 preparing a national intelligence budget, makes the DCI the
24
Chairman of that Committee and gives the PCI in his person,
if you will, the responsibility for presenting that budget to the
President
24
26
Now yo
of cut through that somewhat complicated and
not entirely clear allocation of authority to the DCI by simply
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*
10
16
18
00
saving he is responsible for breharing the community'e budget,
and he has this Committer for this purpose in trying to place
responsibility squarely on him to do that.
Now this would not mean, however, that the Secretary of
Defense he senior to him in the cabinet. I mean the National
Security Council could not make a reclama and could not go over
his head.
That situation will still exist and this Committee is
in fact a committee of the National Security Council. so there
de another layer at which inter-Agency disputes, if they continue
beyond the level of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
where they could be resolved.
Now the first
it also designates him as responsible
for preparing the budget and providing quidance for operations
programs in general terms and puts him in as chairman of the
appropriate NSC committee, and then we reference the CFI and
then authorize the following specific responsibilities.
First of all, the establishment of national intelligence
requirements for the entire community and it empowers him to
draw upon representatives of the members of the intelligence
community to help him in the task of establishing these requiremen
Now this is an increase in his authority from his
current posture. He has now the authority to issue guidance
in the preparation of requirements but he can't coèlle say do
this or do that.
These are the things we want.
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AUL

10
11
12
13
16
1.7
Now as a practical watter. I think it's fair to say that
he goes pretty far in getting his way at the present time, but
on some of these requirements on a national basis, this would
give him the clear authority to ask them to do things.
Now his requirements. the level of detail and so forth,
would obviously be something that would have to be negotiated
out in the course of his work.
Now that is the recommendation of the first paragraph
and paragraph A.
I might just say it also gives the PCI in connection with
the requirements process. it refers here to the fact that he
may determine the success of various agencies in fulfilling and
in fact what the caragraph seats up is a system whereby the
DCI can establish requirements and then through the budget
process and in the process of evaluating requirements make .
some estimate of how well the community is doing and either add
to the budgets or take away in certain areas and so forth.
18
This provides some of the real system as opposed to a
0 paper system which he has had in the past.
80
21
Faragraph B describes the preparation of the national
intelligence: budget and caints-out that he should prepare this
budget, present it to the President and to the Congress who
would make some referoncs hara to the language in the President's
Executive Order t thin
It makes the fu
、་,་
"pint that the definition of the
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SECRE
elements to be included within a national intelligence budget
in other words, what parts of the community would fit into that.
where you draw the line between technical and national intelli-
dence, between departmental and national intelligence.
This definition would be established by the Congress in
consultation with the Executive Branch.
It further points out that he should be involved early in
18
the process of preparing budgets in the budg't cucle, and then
9
it makes come hortatory kind of statements about how he should
10
☐☐
try to consider trade-offs between programs and between collection
and production and so forth.
12
13
another word besides trade-off.
Senator Huddleston. I would suggest there that we use
While it is common for us to
14
715
16
"
12
.19
use it up here in committee work. I don't think it conveys the
best connotation to the hublia.
What we're saying is that he balances out or apportions
resources, whatever.
Mr. Aaron. Now I think the final sentence is this
important one, and the Sonators should note this. The proposal
and perhaps this ought to he made somewhat more clear than it
to who will do this, but the authority
30
21
is now as
03
I'm sorry,
it is clear. But the outherity of the DCI to reprogram funds
within the intelligence bidect should be limited by statute.
The President.
is to the Come on
Borsion Inhallineneruskan
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the authority to rRNA
the
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inn PAUL
iu
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national intelligence budget, but to reprogram meneys within
that budget.
Now our estimate te that that budget would be on the
order of $3, 4, perhaps up to $5 billion, depending on what is
included in it, and I asked the White House, the NSC member of
that Committee what the purpose of that particular provision
was and I asked him specifically did this mean that you would
be able to, as in the case of Angola, reprogram money away
From some other part of the hudget. NSA,
some other major
program, and put it into the covert military, para-military
action program?
NRO
And he said ves. that is the reason that he is given
a sort of broad authority to reprogram money.
13
14
Senator Huddleston.
LE
weren't they?
Well, they were doing some of that.
1.7
20
21
Mr. Aaron. To some extent I believe that's true, but
I personally don't know what that extent was.
Now to the extent we will see later that we place some
or make some recommendations concerning limitations on the
authority to draw upon different funds and to replenish certain
Funds for the purposes of covert action this squares with that
proposal by saving that there should be by statute certain
23
limitations on the reprogramming of funds.
We'rd
* those qught to be there really
25
thinking that the oversight
mites would have to work out.
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- DS K
1
10
13
14
16
16
17
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Now the next paragraph.
Mr. Kirbow. Could the take these one at a time because
these are rather critical?
Mr. Chairman, one of the things that came before this
Committee when I guess it was Mr. Colby testifying and at each
meeting that Mr. Miller and the staff had with the people from
the White House and the CIA when we were preparing the oversight
bill. we heard many good reasons why we should not. deprive the
DCI of this ability to sign certifying out of certain funds
and being able to expend them without a great big red tape
machine to hinder that type of oneration.
If, as David, savs, his recommendation here is to prevent
reprogramming, except within very narrowly defined statutory
limits. is a first step toward restricting that further
activity. I would like to except on this and have it discussed
before the Full Committee, or in the absence of that, or
connected with it, have the record that we have that shows us
that we should restrict by legislation here
Senator Huddleston. What is the major thrust there?
Is it to in fact limit or restrict or is it to actually have
it defined and specified in the statute as to what circumstances
20
27
22
might prevail?
23
Mr. Aaron. The thrust here is as follows.
The UCI
can now Kourogram money drhin his own agency to some extent.
That budget. depending on the parts he can reproquam.
I don't
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F
1 believe belcan reprogram to within about $750 million of his
10
11
5
16.
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own appropriation.
Senator Huddleston. No can't take something out of the
MSA now and put it over?
Mr. Aaron. No. we can't do that. But in his new
responsibilities as DCI for preparing the budget of the entire
national intelligence program, he will now be in a position to
reprogram the entire budget and therefore it's a much larger
kind of flexibility.
Now the thrust of this particular proposal is not really
aimed, this particular one later one we do have one which
does place some constraints and the purpose is to make it clear
where the money comes from and where it's going to go to
make it clear to the Congress at least. But this particular
one simply says that because this is a much wider reprogramming
flexibility, that it ought to be subject to certain kinds of
definitions and consider the limitations so that the Congress
knows what is happening to the moneys that it appropriates for
particular purposes.
19
20
Senator Huddleston.
27
then.
or not?
Well, for this particular paragraph
would define or specify, suffice the word limited,
Mr. Aaron. It should be defined. That's correct.
Mr. Kirhain
to point out, Mr. Chairman. that
that is a donarture from the staplard reprogramming process tha
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R. PAUL
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1
A
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has been adopted in the shorte over the last 10 or 15 years
for instance, with the Committee on Armed Services.
Senator Huddleston. For other departments?
Mr. Kirbow.
Where there is an authorizing and an
appropriations type action in the Congress, as Senator Hart
will know from his experience on that committee, if they wish
to reprogram missile money over to aircraft, for instance, it
has to be approved by 1 tone of those committers, both
Arms Services and both appropriations committees with the
exact transfer of the amounts of money and the justifications
given therefore.
My concern is not that the Congress should not have a
control of this or that you could make it so rigid by making
recommendations that leave the oversight committee and the
appropriations committee ho flexibility to do this. And I would
think that unless we have a very good record on this, we should
recommend that this should be a matter that the oversight
committee in its new role gives good consideration to.
Mr. Miller. The oversight committees and the appropriation
committees would have flepibility. Every appropriations act is
a statute, after all,
Mr. Kirbow. They
ertainly would unless you restrict
them by statute.
24
Someter Th
which the new oversial
not we are, suggesting a statute
itten that has passed,
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ן.
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14.
15.
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so far would have legislation authority over. So we're really
just recommending here that in this statute they provide the
framework under which these kinds of reprogramming can be
done in view of the fact that we are extending the DCI from his
own little bailiwick to the entire intelligence community.
Mr. Kirbow. If that's the intent of the committee, I
have no reservations about it.
Senator Huddleston I don't think the military people.
would object to that kind of language. They'd like to have
some definite framework for a man to reach into his budget.
Mr. Kirbow. I think all the various agencies would like
to have that kind of protection.
Senator Huddleston Okay.
Mr. Davis. Number C, the DCI should have responsibility
to review all intelligence activities and intelligence resource
allocations, including tactical military intelligence in order
to carry out his more general responsibilities.
We've used the word "review" very carefully here. This
is not a responsibility to direct those operations but simply
to be able to look at the whole in order to sort of balance it
22
25
out
We're not saving that he's taking over responsibility.
from the military commander
the language is differant
If you read the Executive Order
ays that the CPT and the
DCI will not have resensibility for tactical militare
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wing & PAUL
intelligence.
But then it uses the word guidance. That is that
the DCI will provide guidance on the relationship between the
two and that is ambiguous to us and so we wanted to make sure
that the DCI would be able to look at the whole but not have
responsibility for directing the tactical military intelligence
prograris.
10
12
Mr. diGenova. The original drafting of that Section C,
I think it's actually clearer than the way it's drafted now.
The original draft says, while the DCI shall not have responsibil
for directing tactical military operations. the DCI shall have
responsibility to review all intelligence activities, et cetera.
I think the original one is better because it makes it
clearer what you are trying to say
Mr. Kirbow. If you're going to use that for Senate.
vou have to say tactical military intelligence operations.
17
14
16
16
Mr. diGenova. Yes.
There's a word missing from the
original formulation.
17
18
12
Mr. Davis. The reason it was taken out is because it
was a negative and there was the thought that this is saying what
he does do and leaving what he doesn't do not to be said. It's
un to the Committee how you want to
1
32
די רי
24
05
Mr. diGenova. But you don't want to do the same thing
the President did and leate the thing ambiguous.
Mr. Davia.
I´have na-ngoblem mining that first statement
Senator Judd lamben
IF
you want to be positive you can
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4
say while the responsibi
for directing tactical military
operations resides with whoever it is the DCI still shall have
the review.
Mr. Davis. Well, review is, I think, the right word
because he's going to try to look at the whole.
6
Senator Huddleston.
I think Joe makes a point there
10
11
13
14
16
16
17
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13
because that could lead to some misinterpretation.
Mr. navis. Section noes on to ask the Director of
Central Intelligence to establish a staff to support him in
these responsibilities and to draw a staff as widely and from
the best talent that he can
Senator Hart. Is this another staff or is this the
staff that is in being?
Mr. Davis. This is the staff in being. He has always
had people to help him in this role.
Senator Hart. Why do we have to authorize him to do
something he's already doing?
Mr. Davis. We don't want him not to do that. I mean
we want him to have a special staff to carry out these
responsibilities.
20
21
Senator Huddleston.
This is about the second or third
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time we've referred to him having the staff.
Senator Mathias, Why don't you Say maintain instead of
establisht
25
Conator Hart
the if he esn't want the staff?
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PAUL.
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5.
Mr. Davis. He's nutherized. He doesn't have to.
Mr. Kirbow. He's authorized to have a staff under the
President's executive order or in any other normal course of
business.
This appears to be diering down below the kind of
statutory authority position that you have and telling them how t
structure all of the organizations, underneath.
That's my objection to that particular aspect of the
recommendation.
I kind of side with Senator Hart. He has the
authority to do his business and. I don't think anyone in their
wildest imagination would think that the Congressional record
or history in this would establish that he's supposed to do it
by himself.
Senator Hart. You took the words right out of my mouth.
Mr. Kirbow. And I once more say this is one of the
recommendations that we recommend be taken out.
Senator Hart. Who's we?
Mr. Kirbow. The staff had had discussions at the staff
level where several recommendations that things like this be
taken out for that very reason be considered. and I think it
is inadvertent that they are hack in the redraft.
13
Senator Huddleston.
ou have no strong feeling about that?
22
Let's omit that paragraph.
23
Seaster Mark.
but I'd like to back w
correction and I hate to do this
Did sailed right by this
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:1
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name '24, recommendation 16. The Director also would he empowered
to establish a board of senior advisors.
Now who is that? Who is that board?
Mr. Davis. This would be something similar to the board
of national estimates.
Senator Hart. Is he empowered to do that now?
Mr. Aaron. He is not empowered to do that now because it
was abolished on him.
him.
Mr. Davis. But he could do it.
Mr. Aaron. I don't think that's correct.
Mr. Maxwell. He abolished it. It was not abolished on
Senator Hart. Could Mr. Bush reconstitute it if he
13
11
Wants?
Mr. Bader.
Senator, this is in a way a call to the
16
47
1.8
19
00
DCI. It is based. I think. on really extensive testimony we
have taken here about the utility of the board of national
estimates.
Senator Huddleston. It may be more a recommendation than
an authorization.
Mr. Davis. At the same time we didn't want to tell him
he had to because it is more or less up to him because if he
doesn't ant to run his chon that way
Senator Hart
Mr. Davis. In
these people?
at they have been former senior
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19
officials and academics who would serve to review the estimates
and comment on them for the director.
Senator Hart. Do they perform any function? Have they
in the past?
Mr. Miller. Oh, yes.
Llewelyn Thompson, for example.
There are senior diplomats. senior military men from the outside
people of distinction, people who have seen a lot and have
something to contribute.
Sevator Hart.
Have they had something to contribute?
11
14
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19
19.
Mr. Miller. Yes..
Mr.
Aaron. There are two functions they can perform.
More or less. they can bring their wisdom to bear on the product.
Senator Hart. I want to know what they have done in
the past.
Mr. Miller. Soviet matters. Llewelyn Thompson's roles,
for example.
Mr. Aaron. And the second thing they have done was to
provide some senior support for the DCI and the judgements he
is making.
Now the extent to which that support has been translated
into horsepower is unclear, except it was sufficiently strong that
it was of concern to the previous administration and was one of
the reasons that the board
0 others was dis established.
Senator. Hare Mov prevented any problems in the
cast that we know o57
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15
Mr. Inderfurth. T think that's in relation to helping
to insulate the DCI from pressures to modify him, In the
Dast, the board of national estimates insulated the DCI
from pressures.
- Senator llart. Chile, Angola, all these cases where the
DCI comes in and says we don't really want to do that but the
President made us, does he bring in the senior advisor to the
President and say,
Llewely 1 Thompson doesn't want us to, either.
Mr. Lombard. I think part of the problem here. Senator,
is that the office of estimates was created under the Eisenhower
Administration and fitted very well into the formalistic way
in which foreign policy, was evolved Juring that administration
Perhaps as a matter of fact it's been criticized as being overly
formalistic and the board of estimates was viewed as being
somewhat too long-range and somewhat other world and not
16
geared to what the President perceived as being his day to
day needs on estimates.
18
19
20
27
Now I don't know where the equities lie in this thing,
but it seems as though these insitutions have changed according
to individual Presidents.
So really beginning with the Kennedy administration,
you had the decline of the office of national estimates because
it no longer seemed to fit theo Fabric.
Mr Aaron
I'm not sure that's really a fair picture
of the history of the
Perhaps, you could tell us since
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11
12
13
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you were associated with nat
Mr. Kirbow. I want to talk about the testimony that
was given before the committee on this from two of the former
DCIS. Mr. Colby, at both the breakfast briefings he gave and
in testimony, favored the use of individual intelligence offices
around in these various agencies, originating estimates and
everything else: whereas Nr. Helms, when he testified here,
says I really don't know how that system is working right now.
I didn't favor it when Mr. Colby established it, and I had the
other system and it worked well for me
So I think here again you are talking about a man
staffing requirements as they suit the particular times and
the individual as to how he wants to run the intelligence
community and what apparently suited Mr. Helms fine didn't
suit Mr. Colby and he used a different system which he says
works great. And I say that that is, again, a step down thing.
17 Unless you want to encourage him to do it in a recommendation
18
20
01
22
03
105
and not mandate that he do it, it kind of makes him run his
business the way you want it run and to no apparent abuse
problems or anything like that.
Senator Hart. Well, my only thought here is that some
future oversight committer or select committee is going to be
trying to binpoint resoonáibility, and there are so many boards
and committees and rocks to hide behim! that a DCI has or
a President or anybody has that
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6
7
9
10
11
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14
So again, my intent here is not to be a know-nothing.
just to keep the structure as clean as possible to identify
responsibility. That's all. And if this is important to do,
let's do it.
Mr. Bader. The record, Senator, and I can only speak
from personal experience with the board of national estimates
I certainly know of at least four estimates with which I had
It
a part of which the board's sole was very important in shielding
both the PCI and indeed the analyst from the ravages in two
cases of the military who felt very strongly that the
continuation of our bases in the Azores was much more important
than say some hard political realities about the future of
Portugese Africa..
And I could cite other cases where this kind of
insulating function was enormously important. It had a great
deal to do with the experience. the background and the very´
presence of some of these board members.
16
17
12
19
They also play a rols as the chairman of the coordinating
sessions of these national estimates.
There's not just an
20
advisory board that sits culte far from the process. Each
21
22
national intelligence estimate one of these board members
becomes the chairman.
#317
So they do play a
active role in the preparation.
24
Mr. Aaron
concern about the augm
antion that in this connection your
Tik nuoblem, which I think is a
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:3
10
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ig
14
15
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fair one. ve have testires that Helms' disposition on this
was very clear. When he signed the estimate it was his estimate
and it really wasn't the board's estimate.
Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps it might be useful because I think
it is clear that he is empowered to do it. Two, if the
committee desires to make clear that as a recommendation, on
the basis of the committee's examination of their record that
this is a desirable thing wither than saving that it would be
empowered, by statute, because he does have that nower.
Mr. Kirbow. Is it the desire of the Committee though,
to change the current system which the present director has
not seen fit to change vet, which he has full authority
change if he wishes to do go and which the previous DCI
established and developed into a working mechanism?
Mr. Miller. The records show that the function of
the board had been official results. Then it seems to me we
should so state that it is a desirable structure.
Mr. Kirbow. I had one difference with Bill. I don't
know that it is desirable to insulate the DCI from the opinions
of the respective military departments if they have a vested
21
interest in the outcome of the decision being rendered.
Mr. Miller. The heard has distinguished members from
the militery.
Mr. Kirbosz
TH
isolate.
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י.
know how it can be used to
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Mr. Miller.
24.
Insulate the political pressure.
That's
ว
ין
12
13
14
1.5
the point. Not the point of view of opinion.
Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I move that this paragraph
stay in. that we move on.
Senator Huddleston.
I think we discussed that
thoroughly yesterday, as a matter of fact.
Mr. Aaron. On E, this is the clause which, in effect,
makes clear that there is a definite limit to the DCI's authority
and the limit being the conduct of warfare, at which time there
should be a clear system and process whereby these activities
of the intelligence community over which he has responsiblity
in some general sense here for hudget and so forth, that these
basic activities come under the Secretary of Defense. It's
simply recognizing the fact that we really have two problems.
On the one hand. the conduct of intelligence in what is essential:
Deacetime and the conduct of intelligence in wartime.
16
1.7
Mr. Inderfurth. David. could we get some examples of
J.S
70
...
20
22
23
what high tension means?
Mr. Kirbow. We recommended that that come out. Everyone
had agreed on that and I think it was put back in. It's something
that you can't define. The Secretary of Defense may feel there'.
very high tension but the pot may not be willing to give up
bis centrol at that time and you wind up with a wrestling
match.
Genater Hart.
Where' a phrase of art
national
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emergency maybe?..
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75
Mr. Aaron.
Well.
T think the way we came on it was to
7
α
simply say if you have the process for a time of war, the
President may exercise it. and he may exercise it if he feels
it's a crisis.
The point was just to have a process and have it understood
what happens.
Mr. diGenova. Is it good to have a system that is
0 operating all right in peacetime and then when you come to the
10 time you really need, you give it to someone else to run?
1]
Mr. Aaron. Well, the requirements change in time of
12
13
1.1
15
16
18
10
20
23
24
war.
Mr. Quanbeck. The collection would become almost
completely operational. The sites would be dedicated to
opeational purposes and there'd be no purpose to have direction
from the DCI.
In that case it would be a supporting military operation.
Similarly, the new satellite systems would he used to support
ongoing operations.
Nr. dicenova. In other words, you're saving there wouldn't
be very many national intelligence needs.
Mr. Quanbeck. Well economic intelligence would he
relatively unimportant. Verification of arms control agreements
would not bola matter of
25
My dicenova.
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talking about the use of hardware.
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Mr. Quanbeck.
Mr. Kirbow.
There's no difference of opinion between.
the former DCI's I don't know Mr. Bush's position
or the
:1 former Secretaries of Defense. Everyone concedes that the
control of intelligence should go for Defense's purposes in
ני
10
time of war. the principal control.
Mr. Davis. The point is, too, the argument in the past
has been the Secretary of Cense needs the control he has.
had in order to prepare for war and now you're saving the
DCI's going to do more but von don't want to upset the
And this is a way of saying that we
understand that in wartime it is going to go back. It is more
11
military commanders.
12
13
symbolic.
1.4
15
16
17
Mr. Kirbow. One of the recommendations in the military
area we'll come to later is on this same subject with the bulk
of the work I guess on the subject being done by that group.
∙Mr. Davis. This also happens with the clandestine
18
19
service today. In war the clandestine service comes under the
military commander in the field.
20
21
Mr. Aaron .. There are some arrangements of this character
because of the expanded authority of the DCI that is granted
both in the order and our proposed statute particularly in the
area of requirements.
It's important to have this careat, if you will.
Now recommendation 11 really suggests that the oversight
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by &
committee look at carrying the budget process a step further
and instead of appropriating or authorizing the appropriation
funds to the different departments for intelligence purposes,
that in fact they are authorized to the DCI who would then
parcel them out, and it doesn't come down hard to say that this
ought to be done but that this is the next logical step in this
process and it is something for the oversight committee's
10
11
LA
17
agenda.
Now number 19
Mr. Kirbow. I would like to except on that until such
time as the whole subject of the budget and release of the
the
figures and everything else is considered. the whole budget
aspect at the same time.
Senator Hart. I don't understand this exception procedure.
How does that work?
Mr. Kirbow. Senator Tower has asked the Chairman that
if there was anything that had not been in agreement among the
staff, that it could be brought before that it would certainly
come to the subcommittee.
16
17
18
19
20
21
Senator Hart. Well, the Subcommittee can go ahead
and vote on something, can't they?
Mr. Kirbow. Yes.
Senator Hart. I think every member of the Full Committee
reserves his right when ans matter comes before the Full
Committee. I don't think there reed to be excentions filed.
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PAUL

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10
11
12
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It's all de novo when it gen 18 to the Full Committen anyway.
Mr. Kirbow. I simply indicated to the Chairman earlier
that I didn't want to have a reservation like that and not
point it out to him because I didn't want the absent member
to appear to be sandbagging the subcommittee.
Senator Huddleston. Ha's putting us on notice.
Mr. Aaron. Option 13, this option steps up to the
question of whether the DCI in his new capacity as the overall
manager of the community, and by manager I don't mean down in
the nuts and bolts but having the general management responsibilit
of interpreting the budget in terms of requirements, in terms
of general guidance for the management of some of these
activities. whether that function should be separated from that
of running the CIA as an agency.
Now we have heard some testimony about the inconsistency
I think the arguments, if
15
16
between those two responsibilities.
19
20
23
I can set them on the two sides, would be as follows.
And
by the way, there's a difference of opinion in the staff as
to which of these is the right one to follow. The argument
in favor of going ahead nowy to separate them is that these
are inconsistent, that one could have, you remove the DCI
from a conflict of interas" "ituation in which he is both running
one of the principal avancing responsible for not only clandestine
activities but foi in
develorirant of certa n
ין
quent of rimals intallicence, the
rab and development programs that are
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29
of great interest to the community, and you take him out of the
position of having to judue other people's research and
development, programs and other people's SIGINT programs, and
:
.1. other activities when he is the overall director of Central
Intelligence, and that therefore this separation, his removal
from that, would be a good idea.
7
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
The second argument is that you really want to place the
authority squarely on the new director of this agency who's
going to be responsible for clandestine activities. If he
still has a boss above him who is kind of responsible but who
in fact because of his increased responsibilities won't be
able to give the day to day attention to clandestine activities
that he might, if he didn't have these greater responsibilities.
one should make the lines of authority clear and place the
responsibility for the head of this agency on that agency
and leave it there.
17
Now the argument against that is that
well, there are
18
two kinds of arguments against.
One is that the situation now
19 is justified and that this is a a good thing and we don't need
20
to make any change and there are good reasons to believe that.
21
The second argument might follow in the middle and says,
well, there is some inconsistency potentially. There might
be some advantages to separating them as well as some custs,
but we have now fat in tuted this new system whoyob you have
24
195
broader respousibiliti
for the [CI.
Let's see
how 14 works for
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10
awhile before stepping us to the diestion of whether he can
really adequately perform and wear both hats.
Those are essentially, I think, the aromments. If there.
are others that ought to be offered in explanation of the choice.
Mr. Bader. I would just underline that, Mr. Chairman,
the second point that David has made about recommending the
situation to stay the way it is today. That is, that the
two hats would stay together.
I think some of us feel that the period in front of us
will be a period of experimentation and tasting where there are
new responsibilities that will flow to the DCI. We'll see how
they work, we'll see where his authority takes us.
13
11
1.5°
16
17
We'll see
whether he really will in fact establish himself as the
responsible director of; in a DCI sense; and we argued here that
the oversight committee should be attentive to this to see how
it works out and that if somatime in the future after we've had
a chance to see how these expanded responsibilities work in
10 practice. that will be a time to see whether the DCI and the
Director of CIA function should be separated.
20
Mr. Aaron. I think that to argue the first case a little
more strongly, if I could, there are two additional points to be
made about it.
One is that in fad
haping the second half running the
denay sill be in luns
to him
fectively runnian the
25
operall community.
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1
So it isn't really lush a question. I would argue,
of seeing where the current system takes us. It's a matter of
looking at what we have learned as a result of our inquiry
and saying, in fact. this is going to be an impediment and it
is my personal opinion and I think supported at least by some
testimony that that would be the case.
The second argument. I think, is a somewhat broader one,
But we've had an
B
and I quess I'm not prepared to make it.
inquiry into the CIA, some of its problems. some of its
accountability problems. some of its management problems,
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
and
คร a result of this inquiry there is, at least it strikes the
as being some inconsistency to be argued between having this
broad inquiry and ending up with a much stronger, larger, and
more powerful Central Intelligence Agency in every respect
with greater authority over other elements of the intelligence
community.
Now you can only carry that so far but it seems to me
that there is a serious question here as to, and it is seen in
part by other elements of the intelligence community who really
20 are concerned that by wearing the two bats, the DCI will still
21
really be representing the Agency vis a vis their particular
22
23
agencies like NSA and the others.
That's the choicel
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25
Mr. diden a
If I could just note for
the record that of the singses ho testified before the
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Committee. I believe the record reflects that Mr. Schlesinger
was the only former DCI who was in favor of separating the
3 Agency from the Director and all those who were still alive
1
نزیم
10
15
to testify who were former directors favored it, most notably
Mr. McCone and also Mr. Heling, Mr. Helms characterizing the
director as ending up with a disembodied spirit if he were
deprived of this analytical vehicle.
So I think as far as the record goes. I think the record
is against divesting the director of the Agency, although
there
is certainly evidence from those who felt that he should be..
Mr. Aaron. Let me see if I can clarify that record a
little more.
First of all, the proposal is not to divest him from the
1.5.
16
analytical and production function.
That we clearly
provide
for and that would not take place.
The second point is that I believe the record goes to
17
the question of sorting out or separating the director as he
has to this time existed in the sort of general kind of overseer
18
12
80
21
27.
35
and the kind of jawbone authority that he has had. And the
questions that have been put to the witnesses generally have
been put in the context, of what wasy up until recently, his
authority in that capacity, and I might say personally I would
agree with that.
I think if von word divorce the director who essentially
only had dar bone authority from an agency and the specific
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gravity that that gave him. then he would be a disembodied
spirit. But we're talking about a somewhat different situation
now where he has real authority over the budget.
Mr. Kirbow. But also presupposes. Mr. Chairman, that you
have decided already that you're going to separate the analytical
side of the house up there from the clandestine side of the
house and put them into separate agencies.
I don't believe the committee has decided that. The
staff mav.have.
Mr. Treverton. It doesn't necessarily presuppose that.
Mr. Kirbow. If he's going to put the analytical side
of the house over there with the DCI
Mr. Treverton. Well, in any situation we would leave
the DCI with his responsibility for estimates and a staff to
34
35
do that.
16
17
18
70
I grant that the argument for separating the DCI from
the CIA is stronger.
Senator Huddleston. Well, he wouldn't be without authority
over the Central Intelligence Agency. He recommands the budget
and tasks them. He gived them the responsibility and apportions
80
21
the resources.
22
Mr. Lombard. I won for t I could ask a question.
We have had previous DUIs who have testified that you
23
24
should not have
25
that was based upon
4.1..
of the PAT from the agency but
nination as they then knew it.
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14
2
.4
Now my question is this. Assuming that we were to achieve
all of the measures in the recommendations that we have here
for the DCI budget and all the rest, it seems to me that that
is an awful lot of work without having to be concerned with the
day to day operations of the CIA.
I don't know. I irst raise the question.
Senator Huddleston. I think that's a good point.
Mr. Lombard. He first of all has to present the budget
He has to defend the budget up on the hill,
to the President.
10
and that's in at least four committees.
And then he's got to
12
7 A
have an analytical base, and presumably the national estimate
function and on top of that, worrying about the day to day
operations of the Agency.
I don't know if that is more than one may should be
asked to do..
1.8
19
Senator Huddleston.
Well, when we talk about major
reorganization and re-assignment of functions, almost, and .
we're probably confusing that by continuing to call the man
who is going to supervise all of the intelligence
the OCI.
Mr. Bader. Senator, what we
are entering into here is
20
P
a period of transition for the DCI where he has new responsibiliti
which are not certain at this point how they will be implemented.
Part of our problem with this decision is, as a been
stated and noted, magt of the festions of farmer bete
i
against the bankaround of
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it is not really relevant to the (mestion of what the DCI will
be doing if, and I underling the word if, these new responsibili
ties that are being thrust on him by both the Executive and
by the Congress, are in fact implemented.
The argument I would make here is that the oversight.
committee should take some time and consider this, certainly
in light of how these reforms, if they are reforms, are
carried out.
Seuator Huddleston. So that's option one.
Mr. Davis. The Executive Order is an attempt to look
at the problem and to make one step which says there will be
two deputies, and therefore, the DCI will have someone who is
managing his operations and takes some of the burden off and
that's why they did it. And in a sense. they recognized the
conflict of interest and thia wag a
step in that direction
15
16
which we are accepting.
And when you say who prepares the budget. you have to
be a little careful as to what that means. I mean the money
19
is still authorized to the departments.
20
They will still have
their own budgetary process, and how exactly he gets control
over that at this point is unclear. We're giving him language
about how it's going to binnen, and I think that's the
argument for waiting a short time to see whether or not he
actually done got control.
Aaron. I tight
that we have to look at
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5
this recommendation as
not simply in the context of the
President's own proposals and own measures that he has taken but
in terms of the measures which we propose be taken in statute.
which of course the oversight committee or whatever responsible
legislative committee will have the power to dispose of these
proposals or recommendations.
But in that context it's very clear that we do give
very unambiguous authority, very strong authority
I think I've
noted a few other points where we actually strengthened the
10
thrust of the Executive Order. And so when we look at the
question of whether he should or should not, whether we should
☐ 1
13
14
15
or should not recommend that in the context of this kind of
authority there will also be development of a statute that
would separate these functions, it has to be seen against what
we propose and not what the President just proposed.
16
17
20
ā
22
Senator Huddleston.
The fact is that if everything
we have recommended so far should come to bass and the DCI
should have the expanded ressionsibility and authority, he
would he a more powerful man if he was separated from the
operation of the Agency. He would be a more powerful man then
than he is now as running the Agency and being the so-called
coordinator, would he not?.
Mr. Davis. That's correct, that's the rurpose
24
Senator Matias.
da ne have qui testimony
from other amener head, he then would wow this question?
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Mr. Lombard. We
*!¢ %!}} ¥ from the DIA.
Senator Huddleston. The DIA would favor separating the
A
10
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12
14
1.5
16
18
two.
Mr. Miller. General Allen has also said that.
Mr. Kirbow. General Allen at the meeting when this
wan discussed, he indicated that this has not created any
problem for him, that he didn't see any favoritism being
displayed on the part of Mr. Colby and the prople he dealt with.
Mr. Maxwell. I think that's part of the reason why a
number of us had favored oction number one, was that a great
deal of the trouble with the President's Executive Order and
Your recommendations was to give the DCT more authority. But
For
the period of time in which that has not been sorted out
and we don't have a recoril for, to take away or recommend taking
away essentially the troops that the DCI had used, which in
the future honefully he would not need if recommendations on
both sides come into being would he to weaken him at a crucial
time as people try to fill in the vacuum that is created.
19
20
00
Senator Huddleston.
I think the question then is whether
or not what we are recommending actually comes to pass. If it
does come to pass. then this is an issue that needs to be
addressed.
in the
Now, the other question is should wa remain silent on it
It as it is until such Win
antion
indicates here, leave
it has been determined that it
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whan PAUL

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0
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9
0
10
would be advantageous
wrate them.
Is that what we're enving there?
Mr. Aaron.
Yes.
I think there are really three options.
One is to leave the stuff out, and my own personal preference
would be to leave it out entirely if the committee did not
feel that, if it didn't want to recommend that. It's kind of
a half-hearted
Senator Hart. Has the Administration already taken a
step in this direction with the reorganization?
Mr:
Aaron. It has by charging the new deputy out there
and saving he's going to have more authority.
Senator Hart. How does one redister disagreement with
Vote for option one?
Mr. Aaron. If you thought that was inadequate. you.
would vote for number one.
11
12
13
that?
14
16
16
17
it's wrong..
I vote for option one.
18
19
Mr. Inderfurth, This also comes ur under part 5(d).
this whole discussion of options separating out.
Senator Hart. I don't think it's inadequate, I think:
20
Mr. Aaron.
That's a separable question, the question
21
of the structure of the Ag itself.
Mr.
Davis.
Under
The Executive Order this new deputy
for the intelligence commun
Langley and comic devengt
25
as well Of the separat
is physically moving cut of
That's supposed to be symbolic
the two roles.
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A PAUL
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Sa
Senator Huddleston.
Would we solve it by just having a
narrative statement at the and of all of these recommendations
relating to the DCI to say that the foregoing, preceding
recommendations would, if carried out, substantially strengthen
the role of the DCI or they are intended to do that?
And this brings up the question as to whether or not
in this expanded role he should also at the same time he
essentially responsible for the operation of one of the agencies
and that this matter, as his duties are expanded, this matter
needs to be considered further and a determination made whether
13
14
15
or not it's appropriate that he continue to hold that
responsibility.
That's not a recommendation. It's just a commentary on
what we have done.
Mr. Kirbow. It highlights the problem and passes it
to the oversight committee, which would have time to conduct
hearings on it after some history had been established on the
16
17
18
new role.
19
Senator. Mathias. Hould Senator Hart elaborate on his
20
brief statement of position?
21
Senator llart. I think the division out there that
22
apparently the President has worked out is a bad one.
and I
23
for one would like to go on record somewhere or another
as
opposing it.
Mr. Willer.
vest mean. Tenator that
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Senator Hart. T
think this little dotted line
means a damned thing, frankly. I've never seen an organization
like that work in my lifa.
This is the
Ms. Culbreth.
That's ours.
Mr. Kirbow. At the present time. Senator, the Executive
Order leaves the DCI as head of the CIA with a strong kind of
executive deputy out there what does the day to day rurning of
that.
Senator Hart. Woll I like that equally less well. That's
the same thing.
Mr. Aaron. Senator do you ha
is there another
solution that we haven't considered?
Senator Hart. Yes
Leave it the way it is now
Mr. Aaron Make him run it but give him other
responsibilities in other areas?
Senator Hart. Well, I don't want to name any names but
some of the sort of nameless, faceless people that have been
out there running operations in affect with some vague respon-
sibility to report upward.
Senator Huddleston. Well, we
hay that in bractice when
these other if indeed there other recommendations go into effect
and he dos a assume thic additional authority over the total
once
geo whather or not
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then
U ought to be roedowed to
Phot
additional authority still ought to
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2.
operating head.
You know, that can be a dissipation of his accountability.
You have a man that is so inolved in so many other things
that some nameless nerson is under him calling the shots.
But
if we were to move him away from that, then that nameless person
becomes the man that we're looking to as far as the operation
of the CIA is concerned.
Mr. Kirbow. At that time too wouldn't YOU expect that
that person would be named as the Director of the CIA. would
he nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate?·
Mr. Miller. What's wrong with having the DCI in charge
of the community as long as the deputis under his directi
control?
14
USA.
15
DCI.
16
17
Senator Huddleston.
Well you have the community of the
You don't call the director out there the director of the
We should be consistent.
19
20
3
Mr. Aaron.
Option 2 we'd have a clear deputy, we'd
know who he was. He'd be confirmed by the Senate. He'd be a
man of stature and be wouldn't be anybody's deputy. He would
be responsible.
Mr. Kirbow. He wouldn't be a deputy at all. He'd be
the director of CIA.
Senator Huddleston
I just elevate the deputy for
operations
the
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L
Senator Mathias, tap that in effect today
except for
2
8
the titles?
.
Mr. Aaron. Not exactly because he still reports to the
Maybe part of your question, goes to who that person ought
to be and what kind of requirements there ought to be on that,
whether you want to describe the kind of person you want out
there.
Senator Mathias. Action 2 is really the President's order
except for the semantics.
10
Mr. Bader. Not really. Senator.
Mr. Quanbeck, Option 2 actually separates. The DCI
would be different from the Director of CIA.
12.
13
14
1.5
16
18
20
Mr. Aaron. The auv you would hold
responsible under
the current system still has to be the DC. Under option 2
the guv
you would hold responsible would be the head of that
agency and not Mr. Bush, in effect.
back?
Senator Huddleston. If Me do to my narrative paragraph
Senator Hart. Can we have that written up and brought
Senator Mathias. T think this could be a critical
recommendation.
Senator Huddleston. 1 was going to say we might add a
Line in there that a reason to review it and possibly to change
it would be tai
on
re rongibility for the
84
es Lectual onotatio
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Intelligence: Adendy,
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HD FUL
That would be the
T
that would think that
won would move the DCI y From that.
Senator Mathias.
But it does not appear to me that you
exonerate vour national intelligence officer, whatever you
call him. just because you have someone else you can also point
to
I think you'd get two fish on the same hook if something
12
11
16
17
12
PO
goes wrong
Mr. Aaron. I think that would be in part true depending
upon what the particular problem was.
Senator Mathias. Well, sure, if their checkwriter
out of wack and they haven't called in the renairman. they
might confine the responsibility to
Senator Huddleston. Actually, you don't exonerate him.
717 I see it for the operations of the Central Intelligence
Agency you have added to him the responsibility for the
onarations of the other intelligence agencies, too, and he has
to review authority and be in fact would be the focal point of
any misdeed or wrong dard that may occur. whether it's in
NSA or CIA or whatever.
Mr. Aaron. It would really be very similar to the role
he would now have under the Ryecutive Order to the NSA. It's
much closer to that.
this aftereben, or
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!
metaph and present it either
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......
4.4'
0
10
☐ 1
19
71
Now the next seri
Agency in general.
refers to the Central Intelligence
Now because so much of our inquiry is
Focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather
long series of recommendations regarding it.
Now the sections are briefly these
these dealing with
the charter for the Agency. for its conduct of espionage,
counter intelligence and covert action, and the question of
covert action itself, how i might be conducted and what limitati
might specifically, or rules and regulations might aply to
it.
The production of intelligence, which is on its way, but
it's not in here, there is another section. Then the impact on
the domestic world of these activities both intelligence
collection and covert action and I believe you had a good
discussion of that longer paper prepared by Mr. Bader the
15
16
other day.
17
12
20
And then finally, some discussions of the inspection
system. the general counsell the inspector general and so forth.
and some recommendations in regard to that.
Those are the central, parts of it. It included of course,
such matters as proprietarion, cover and so forth.
Now if we could time te the first set of recommendations,
23
let me just make sure
04
Port that need
relara bot disagreements
n the
Pention.
thin'
are. There ar
; that
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2
45
are agreed upon at the
loyal that were left out.
Mr. Aaron. I have one here.
Mr. Kirbow. Well just for your information. there
annears to be several things which were not just an occasional
one but several things that were agreed on at the staff level
that subsequently found their way back her in the exact
original language.
But I won't dwell or thek, now.
Mr. Baron. I'd be baw to take that out to see what we
can do about it.
Now the first bracket that I find is o'
rage 36.
13
16
16
13
20
there are bay others before that that people have. WP man take
that up.
Mr. Maxwell. There's one on 32. It's not, a bracket but
was a statement that would have been included as to the
committee's findings as to internal controls on espionage
activities by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Aaron Yes. I recall that one.
Mr. Maxwell. Also on thit page there's no affective
machinery to make sure that *hose outside the clandestine
21
service.
think that was addressed to the CIA because unless
a finding is made at the CON that the DCT at this noift. the
Die stor
Anion.. T dan
tand
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Mr. Naxwell. The
and full parauraph on 33
the way
it reads. it assumes that the Director of the Central Intelligenc
Agency who is outside the glandestine service is not able to
ensure
Mr. Aaron. I understand.
You're right. Okay, if these
are agreed things and they have been dropped out, then let's
just get them back in. I don't know that we have to take the
subcommittee's time to do i
But if we missed some that were disagreed and need
to be brought to the subcommittee.
I'd like to make sure we
1
get them out.
Senator Huddleston. At the bottom of the page on 33,
1
maybe it's just not coming through to me but the CIA engages
14
15
16
19
00
in both overt and clandestine activity within the United States
for the nurnose of foreign intelligence collection by evert
means from American citizens.
Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry. I think that foreign intelligence
collection. period, and then the rest of that sentence comes
out.
And then it says the domestic collection does the overt,
and the foreign resources does the covert.
Okay, my first bracket is on page 36 and it is that the
Committee questions. the practice of reatriting for foreign
Gerionage burunge
The desiring Aparican citizenshin.
A
The ite
White have in the mast been
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H
1
instances in which those
immigrants to the United States
who wished to have citi chin were then approached by the
intelligence agencies and either sent back as legal travellers
and what have you and the question being the point of concern
being that their vulnerable status of wanting to have permanent
citizership in the country made them more susceptible to
either actual or implied or even imagined threats or imagined
coercion.
Mr, diGenova.
ask a question about that? I'm
10
16
12
PO
3
totally unfamiliar with the bubject and I'd like to know what
the evidence was on the record.
Mr. Aaron. It came in two cases that I recall and
I'd like for Bill to speak to one of them: One case involved
the Chinese in which the Chinese were approached and used for
this purpose. I am not aware of any testimony that there was
in fact coercion involved. The question was the practice and
whather it has within it elements of coercion or at least the
potential for it.
Now the second case. I think you can sneak to.
Mr. Bader.
We have received testimony from a professor
from a university in the Southwest that said that he had acted
or was the middleman in an
operation of recruitment of Jewish
to the United States who to particular
Russian Jevich immfaronha who
23
Fussian immigrants, who came
were interested
quite nommin ber
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9. a
1
would return to the United States. I mean the Soviet Union.
2
We did not take that testimony any further than receiving his
testimony. That is, we have not taken it to the point of
1
9
10
11
12
13
14
asking the agency whether in fact they have such a program
in the Southwest. So the testimony was limited to that one
charge which I personally gave some real credibility to.
Ms. Culbreth. Can you explain just what the charge is
here? What is the wrong that has been done?
Mr.,
Kirbow. What's wrong with that? That's the question
I had in the original suggestion at the staff level.
The only human collection we are getting from behind
the Iron Curtain in Russia today is principally either through
our cooperation with the Israeli intelligence community using
just this sort of individual and sending them back, or sending
this type of individual from the United States back inside.
15
16
We're not getting the other human intelligence.
17
Mr. Bader.
I was only responding to the question of
18
19
20
what the testimony was.
To go on to the further issue which I think is going
to be addressed by the Committee. it's not the question of
2.1
22
07
65
whether we should, the Central Intelligence Agency should be
recruiting foreigners in this country for intelligence purposes,
people who may return to their country of origin.
The question in whether the individual who is in the
process of seeking Ame 1.
ཌ、,;
citizenship are in ductes
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3
A
5
to exploitation for such purposes and whether in that shading
the Committee would want to take a position about recruitment
of that particular group.
Mr. diGenova. My position is this. Bill. The first
time I heard about this was when I read it in these findings
6.
My
and corclusions. I never saw a hearing on it, I never saw a
document about it; I never had a chance to comment on it as
8.
9
10
11
12
a designee, and I never had a chance to bring it up with my
Senator.
I'm not sure that we want to say this, ask the Senators
to say this, without having something in a report about what
the practice is, how it's been conducted, who has objected to
13
it what's the extent of it. before we start making a
1”
18
19
14
15
16
recommendation.
We're saying we question the practice of recruiting.
I have no objection to the Committee ultimately making
a statement like this. I just don't know what the record is.
This is the first time I've ever
seen this.
Mr. Bader. That's why I wanted it bracketed so it could
20
be so discussed.
21
Senator Hart. What if we said we urge the permanent
دیری
oversight committee to look into this question?
Mr. Aaron. I think it would make some
sense to have
23
24
gotten the Agency on the record that in fact this is practice
25
or something that happen.
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Senator Hart. If it's happening, I don't think it should.
If we have to sacrifice some human intelligence, I don't think
we ought to have a CIA guy tugging on somebody's sleeve who's
filling out his immigration forms because it is a very subtle
and very powerful form of coercion.
I don't think it should go on if it is going on but
I think the oversight committee should find out.
Mr. Bader. It's my personal position on this that
we don't have the evidence. We have not taken it through to
come to a conclusion on this :
I personally think that it's a problem that should be
pointed out, and I think perhans niv own view is that the
formulation of a recommenation to look into this as a possible,
as a problem would be my recommendation.
I don't believe that is David's recommendation.
Senator Mathias. I would think that you might as you
contemplate this thing. there are all types of opportunities
for this and I don't have any idea whether it's been done or not,
but I would think an illegal alien, for example, would be a
17
18
19
20
tremendous target.
21
Mr. Aaron. I might just sav
22
Senator Mathias.
23
24
was involved in a
It's a different problem,
25
Mr. Aaron. It's a subtle problem because abroad I personall
case in which someone seaking to onigrate to
the United States. his desire to do that was ekploited abroad
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for the purpose of gettion him into the Agency.
Senator Mathias. this is the kind of situation I'm
3
5
6
་
ry
8
บ
thinking of, perhaps not an illegal alien. but someone who is
in this country in some sort of legal status but which is of
temporary duration and he wants to change his status.
Senator Iluddleston. I can see that. Of course you're.
not going to get one unless there's something he wants. Most.
of them, it's either money or some change in his status.
MI.
Aaron. We drafted this language to make clear that
they were really immigrants and they were not illegal aliens⠀
10
11
or people here changing their status or people outside trying
12
to get in, but people who are inside applying for their
13
14
15
16
17
19
19
20
21
22
23
citizenshin.
Senator Hart. We could offer an option to have the
Statue of Liberty say give us your huddled masses if you work
for the CIA.
Senator Huddleston. I think there's a legitimate concern
and that exploiting people who legitimately want to be United
States citizens.
I also believe that, particularly anyone from the Soviet
Union over here trying to become an American citizen, it's
going to pretty well diminish his changes if he does go back
to the Soviet Union that he's going to be taken into the
confidence of very many people over there.
85
Mr. Kirhow.
This is not an uncommon practice for the
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United States. We've barn doing it in the United States
"
2 military for generations in giving earlier consideration for.
10
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8
10
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12
13
1.4
15
citizenship if he serves on active duty as an alien in the
United States armed forces.
It's been done as long as I can remember and I was in
the military over 25 years.
Mr. Maxwell. I think the only question is if we m
recommend against this practice if we don't even know
Senator Huddleston. It bothers me that we would indict
the Agency with such scant evidence we have.
Mr. Aaron. My recommendation is that we get the Agency
on record as to whether this is the practice or not.
Mr. Kirhow. I recommend it be dropped from this if
We had only one witness and we've not heard the Agency or
that we develop a record to support both that and the same
part of that first paragraph, which don't think we have a
16
17
record on either.
18
Mr. Aaron. We do have a record on that.
It's an
19
interview record, it's not a
20
21
22
sworn testimony record. But the
first sentence. there is an interview to support that.
Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman. I think the subcommittee then
should carefully consider whether or not it is concerned about
23
the use of American companies in the pursuit of foreign
24
intelligence and if so, how this impacts on anybody's rights
25
or otherwise.
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SELKAI
53
We just went through this the other day with the labor
unions. The whole paragraph.
Senator Huddleston. I have some concern with that too.
When we talk about expressly prohibiting penetration of
5 American companies, it seems to me that the question is whether
6
or not we're penetrating those companies with company executives
Mr. Aaron. That's the point.
7
being unwitting or whether
Բ
9
10
11
12
Sevator Huddleston. It seems to me the real problem is
when we were doing it secretly.
Mr. Aaron. And that's the point.
Senator Huddleston, The company ought to have the
right to make a determination as to whether or not its interest
would be severely jeopardized if this were to happen.
13
14
15
Mr.
Treverton.
I think this language probably isn't.
16:
clear enough. If we did human
penetration without the
17
18
19
20
21
22
knowledge of the company on the operation of the company
primarily
Mr. Kirbow. We're talking about a corporate operation
against a U.S. company in the United States?
Mr. Treverton. Presumably it would not be in the U.S.
Mr. Kirbow. If that's what's intended, it does not
convey it to even an informed reader:
23
Senator (luddlestor. Hell, we
24
25
collection.
sa foreign intelligence
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2
Mr. diGenova. May I ask in this regard, it ends up
by saying, although according to CIA officials such activity
3
has not taken place
"Y
R.
.1.0
11
12
13
14
15
what's the other evidence that it has
which created the sentence?
Mr. Aaron. In looking at what the foreign resources
division does in the way of penetration of businesses as
opposed to collecting agents on campuses or in some other
walk of life, we found that the FPD actually runs agents in
only a few cases.
The cases are Americans employed by local industries in
the United States or consulates.
In other words, in diplomat consulate establishments
in which there are few cases in which indeed the Americans
working for those diplomatic establishments are agents of the
CIA through the foreign resources division; and the Americans
are not officers of the CIA but they were agents of the CIA
in that respect.
Mr. Kirbow. They work in the embassies as you say?
Mr.
16
17
18
19
20
21
situation.
22
23
Aaron. Yes, here in the United States, and this
is talking about domestic impact.
This is not the foreign
24
25
There has been at least one case and I belive there are
two but only one I can specify: in which the FRD had an
American agent in a foreign company. a foreign-based company.
It was very unambiguous that the company was a foreign company
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b
] because in effect it was a public company of a country whose
2
most business enterprises are owned by the government.
But
it's a company and it's business and it was a foreign company
and the question was, and it related to
--
Mr. Kirbow. And this agent was apparently here in the
5
6
United States?
Mr. Aaron.
ry
9
10
11
12
13
14
.1.5
16
Collecting intelligence on the activities of
that company because that company had foreign policy implications
for us.
The next question that was put to, I believe, the chief
of the FRD was do you have any regulations that prohibited
you from doing the same thing with an American company? And
the answer was no, we don't, although we don't do that or
we haven't done that or something to that effect.
That is essentially the story and how it came to pass.
Mr. Maxwell. There's some question on both of these.
whether there are ways of saying things that are important
17
1.8
as recommendations without implying that A, these had gone on
19
and B, that we have a record to support that.
There's also. I guess, a slight question in my mind
20
21
as to the order of magnitude of the recommendations that flow
22
from this in the promulgation of a specific directive.
That's slightly out of synch with the order of some of
The Committee might want to choose
23
the other recommendations.
24
25
to drop that to a footnote or to do it in some other way.
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ach 36
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where?
Mr. Aaron. The recommendation that relates to that is
Mr. Maxwell. I thought that we had made a finding. It
was number 25 on 39.
That's a somewhat different order.
Mr. Aaron. no
take it that
6
ན་
8
10
11.
12
13
14
Senator Huddleston. Is this penetration always in the
context that it's unwitting?
Mr. Aaron. Yes. If it's witting, it's really collaboratio
which is another matter.
Senator Huddleston. So although you could be witting
Mr. Aaron. Well. the penetrating also applies and
maybe we should also make this clear, but for the purposes of
conducting some operation with regard to the organization,
whether to make it do something in the covert action sense
which collect information on it.
If it were simply unwitting cover, that's a different
Mr. Maxwell. I don't think, David, that penetration was
used in a context in the agency in the NH/BOUND
15
16
17
thing.
18
19
20
21
82
23
Mr. diGenova. Penetration was for security purposes.
It's to discover whether or not there is in fact a fly in the
ointment with regard to the security of an American company.
That's the way it was used in MH/BOUND.
24
Senator Huddleston.
25
organization.
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That's putting a spy in the
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]
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Mr. diGenova. Well, ves. In this case they penetrated
Burbank, California and other companies, mostly defense
3 contractors building planes in order to find out they had
4
5
10
6
-2.
security risks, a laborer or an executive inside.
Mr. Maxwell. It was witting to a certain extent.
Mr. Bader. I think one of the problems we have here is
this question of whether in our formal recommendations that we
8 should enjoin the agency from doing things that they don't do.
Mr. Kirbow. The 147 Act prohibits this kind of conduct
9
And where there's no evidence they have any intention
10
11
12.
13
14
15
16
17
within the United States.
Mr. Bader. And I think that that should be carefully:
considered.
We have no evidence that the Central Intelligence
Agency penetrates Congressional staff, but we have not put it
in as
a recommendation that they should not penetrate
Congressional staffs.
I think the other matter that has been raised about the
operational exploitation of recruiting individuals who are in
19 an immigrant status and seeking a change a change in status,
18
.20
21
22
we do at least have what I hold to be a responsible source
=
saving that this practice, he has seen this in practice.
I think we should separate the two issues and on the
second one it seems to me that if we could frame some language
f caution and concern. or we should move very
23
24
that is language
25
-
quickly. it seems to m to take some testimony from the Agency
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1
on that matter before we an talk about the matter of the
2 practice of recruiting because I don't think we can use the
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4
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6
00
9
10
11
12
word practice until such time as we have
Mr. diGenova. I didn't mean to impugn the integrity
of your source.
The question is if the Committee gets asked a question:
about it later on and someone comes back and reviews these
records and sees one person was spoken to or something,
don't really think that's much of a record to go around making
Findings and conclusions in a final report.
It has nothing to do with the integrity of the man from.
whom the information came. He's probably right.
Mr. Aaron. I'd like to recommend that on that particular
coint we tried to nail down with the Agency a little more
13
14
15
carefully what the current policy or practice is and on the
16
question
but I still stand with the view, I might say,
on
17
the second one of expressing concern if indeed there is a
bractice and we do know that some of it has taken place in the
18
19
20
past, if there's still no guard against it, then I think perhaps
Senator Hart's recommendation about how the oversight committee
21
should pursue this question further would be sufficient.
22
Senator Huddleston. Well, paragraph 22 over on 39.
23
24
25
if applied to the FRD. would be a pretty good approach, I think.
Mr. Aaron. That would not necessarily rule out
--
it
would not step up to this mention. This really is aimed abroad
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at the question of duplication with overt reporting by the
military attaches or by the foreign service or whomever.
In other words, it's trying to establish a standard.
Senator Huddleston.
Okay, so where are we?
Mr. Aaron. I think we're at the following point that
as far as the bracketed sentence is concerned, we'll go back
to the Agency and establish what the practice is when review
is necessary of including the paragraph along the lines
suggested by Senator Hart saying the oversight committee should
10 look into this particular practice if indeed it is a practice
with the absence of policy on this point.
11
12
13
14
15
As to the question of American companies, I think I
still need to be directed as to how to deal with that. I
think when in doubt, delete.
Senator Hart: Can we just commend them for that? Can
الم
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13.
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we say it's a good practice?
Mr. Aaron.
"
Well, the Committee notes that it's been
the practice not to do this and that that should continue as
a part of their standard procedures.
Senator Mathias. Have we ever commended them?
Mr. Bader. There is much text here which talks about
sensible, responsible practices,
Senator Mathias. I do think you should mention that we're
talking about their domestic operations of American companies.
Mr. Aaron. Yes.. FRD is supposed to tell you that but:
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it doesn't
Senator Mathias. I think on page 36 and 39 it ought
to refer to domestic operations.
Mr. Kirbow. I think we might want to consider too that
5
there's an extensive section of the domestic activities of the
6
CIA coming into the domestic task force report, the subcommittee's
report. And if don't put in a
1 comment like this, it'll
in that other section.
Whereas here we're
probably all go
dealing with an apparent possibility that sometime in the
10 remote future there could be an abuse and there dealing with
11
the abuse section and this kind of departs from what you'v
12 done otherwise.
13
14
15
Mr. Rader. I would say on that score that this is a
foreign intelligence matter. That is the objective.
think if it's going to be mentioned, it should be mentioned
And I
16
here.
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Mr. Kirbow. It is on the immigrants, but I don't think
whether or not you're penetrating an American company to,
illegally or anything else. if there's any way you can get around
the 1947 Act which prohibits that kind of activity by the
CIA in the United States for whatever purpose, to penetrate
them other than security of your own facility:
Mr. Maxwell. One thing that might make this easier is I
think that if weekpressed and concern in that direction existé
in regard to this practice.
would get one promulgated quite
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quickly.
Mr. Aaron.
I would recommend that we accept the
bi
5
6
8
0
suggestion that we put this in a positive sense and proceed
on that basis and
clarify
that it is the domestic aspect.
the word penetrate and the fact
Mr. Kirbow. Could we ask the Agency to comment in
some way so that at least we don't recommend to you that you
Mr. Aaron. I'd be hanny to do that again.
Senator Huddleston.
Well, now it's 12:00. I hope there's
10 some way we can get through this today, which would include
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
of course a night session which Senator Mathias and I are
available for.
We've done 38 pages out of 160.
Mr. Aaron. I think it will give focus essentially on
the recommendations and the bracketed portions that that
should prove possible to at least break the back of it.
Senator Huddleston. We can at least try.
18
Mr.
If we
Aaron.
come back at 2:00. I think we could
probably have cleared away a couple of the other sections and
12
30
then we will be really ready. We will have the full book here
21
and we can go at it.
22
Senator Mathias. 2.00, I think. would be better for me.
23
Let's say 2:00.
24
Senator Huddleston.
We'll adjourn until 2:00.
25
(Whereupon. at 12:00 o'clock noon. the hearing in
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the above-mentioned matter was recessed, to reconvene
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AFTERNOON SESSION
62a
(2:20 p.m.)
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10
Mr. BAder. Mr. Chairman, before you begin I might
mention that tomorrow morning at either 9 or 10:00, depending
upon whether this subcommittee meets tomorrow morning, we've
5 arranged for representatives of the FRD, the Foreign Resources
3
10
Division of the Central Intelligence Agency, to give us.
testimony on some of these issues that have been raised, such as
the use of immigrants, some of the figures that they've given us,
and this question of penetration of American businesses.
That will be scheduled, as I say, at either ? or 10:00
depending on whether the subcommittee meets tomorrow morning.
We would like to have a Senator swear those witnesses
and then obviously any Senator who would like to attend is
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Senator Huddleston. My thinking now is that we would
meet probably at 10:00.
Mr. Bader. We could certainly do it in an hour's time.
Senator Huddleston. I would like to attend that session.
Mr. Bader. So we'll start at 9:00 promptly:
Senator Huddleston. Senator Mathias had the suggestion
that in view of the fact that there is specific legislation
relating to that subject and that's in the Immigration Act
Mr. Bader. I've asked them to be prepared to speak to
their interpretation of the provisions and restrictions in the
Immigration Act.
Senator Huddleston.
But our recommendation is that
we would review the act and the practices.
Mr. Bader. If we have this room, ag I hope we do, we
would take the testimony right here and if need be, move it
to another room.
Senator Mathias. In the event that I should not be
able to be here, and hone I will, think we ought to look
at this thing pretty closely.
As Senator Huddleston said earlier, you don recruit
these people just out of the blue unless there's some reason
for them to sign up, and I don't think we want to be too
critical of recruiting procedures; to revert to the phrase that
we used yesterday, these consenting adults.
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think what we have to look at is the degree of coercion
which is implied here, the kind of bind that you get these
people in where they really are perhans totally alienated from
wherever they came from and what sort of a crack do you put
them in and that not only goes to the humanitarian aspect of it
but to questions over liability and the rest.
to us.
Senator Huddleston. I think they could be very helpful
Mr. Bader. Senator. I could also try to adjust the time
Senator Mathias. It could be before or after our afternoon
meeting, if that would be more in your reach.
10
11
12
Senator Mathias.
Well, I haven't gotten my walking papers
13
for the morning yet.
Mr. Inderfurth.
14
It's interesting in this respect to th
15
16
17
about Lee Harvey Oswald, about his being over there, and we're
talking about immigrants coming here and defectors and so on.
Senator Mathias. It's the other side of the coin.
18
Senator Huddleston.
There's a question of how many doors
19
we ought to close.
20
Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I regret to raise a
21
further complication.
There's a meeting that I had for 6:00
22
23
24
25
that's now been postponed to 6:30. So it would probably mean
I can't get here until 7:30.
Senator Huddleston. Mavhe 7:30 would be a better time:
I don't know. These people need to get out and get some fresh
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air too, I would expect.
Before we get into the substance here, I understand that
our new mandate is if possible to complete ours no later than
Friday. So we're going to try to shoot for tomorrow.
What the Chairman would like to do would be for us to
have our report in some kind of form that we can give to the
Full Committee by Friday so that they can review it over the
weekend and the Full Committee can start on it on Monday.
Now how do you think you would stand on that proposition?
Mr. Bader. This is the principle findings, conclusions
and recommendations?
12
13
14
50
Senator Huddleston.
Yes, which would mean that whilever
changes we are making here in phraseology and so forth. should
be incorporated and retyped.
We have that problem..
15
16
Mr. Aaron.
I would think that that's do-able. I mean
17
it remains to be seen how extensively you would want to
18
debate some issues and the extent to which you will simply want
19
20
21
to bracket them or identify them and have the principal
discussion take place in the Full Committee.
But I would think that that's feasible.
Senator Huddleston. To delay it past Friday, of course,
22
23
24
would delay the time that the Full Committee could consider it
because they need to have it in their hands at least one day.
26
It might no fast in the Full Committee.
I have no way of
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knowing.
Mr. Kirbow. Bill, because you and I both know Senator
3 Mathias's previous intentions stated in the letter to the
Chairman, was there somewhere a discussion about releasing
this piecemeal ahead of time that might. that should go on the
00
9
record here?
Mr. Miller. If it's agreeable to the Subcommittee, to
get it done by the weekend, he proposes that they take up
in Full Committee the findings and recommendations of the
10 foreign groun.
11
གླལས།
The domestic group is much further behind, so they
would not take it up until about the 24th.
The question of whether to release any information or
any report that may be decided by the Committee
12
13
14
5
Senator Huddleston.
We'll let the Full Committee decide
.16
that when they get the report.
17
18
Now where are we then on the report part?
Mr. Aaron. We have, we're in an extensive program of
19
trying to get the Agency's views as to what information is
20
sources and methods and what is classified for other reasons
21
and what have you.
22
23
by the Agency in one form or another and
We have. I believe, all but four papers have been read
in the process
are
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of
going
25
out there. The four that are not are the Congression
oversight and the CIA budget paper, although the budget section
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of the defense report, which is the substance of that has been
discussed at great length with the Defense Department and they
are happy with it except well, happy with it may be an
exaggeration but they have no problems with it except for the
numbers and the Committee itself will have to step up to the
E question of whether the large number or any subsets of numbers
will be released.
The internal oversight. the Office of General Counsel
and Inspector General has not been.
10
11
Is that right?
Mr. Maxwell. That's right.
No material that was ed
12
13
there was derived from classified material.
Mr. Aaron. So that shouldn't be a problem. The
14
general papers on covert action and espionage have not been
15
16
essentially.
17
given to them. They are just being completed by the staff
All the others, and the chemical and biological
one has not been shared with them.
18
Now beyond that all the others, I believe, have now
19
gone out to the Agency in one form or another.
The only one
30
21
that seems to be approved, or at least we've gotten the go-
ahead on. is the Department of State's paper and the Department
22
23
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requested one deletion, which we are prepared to make.
Serator Huddleston. All right. then. As I understand
it. the Chairman. if we are able to get ours to him so the
Full Committee can begin on findings and recommendations on
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Monday or Tuesday, even his hope is that during the course
.
of the next week the Full Committee will' finish that.
In the meantime, of course, we can still be working on
:
these reports looking toward hopefully, if we could have those
by the end of next week, too, then the Full Committee would
be in a position of at least having the material available to
them if we decided to release everything at one time or if
we needed a few more days to refine the reports themselves.
That's about as much as we can hope for.
Mr. Aaron. Okay. I think that to be realistic about the
longer material, it is a lot longer and I think to be at 1
proud of the material we will want to be sure that we
gone through it.
ve
So therefore I think the end of next week is probably
not realistic of having it in shape for the Full Committee to
bless it.
12
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14
15
16
1.7
18
On the other hand, I think that before the end of the
month it would be possible to have a product, unless we run
19
into some enormous snag.
20
Senator Mathias.
But that does not contemplate the
21
executive review.
22
Mr. Aaron. No. I'm sorry, that is including executive
23
review.
24
Mr. Miller
But it does not contemplate printing.
25
Mr. Aaron.
That d correct.
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Mr. diGenova.
Yesterday, Mr. Bolton indicated to me
when I was there that there was no way that they could complete
sources and methods review by the 15th of March, and I said
I didn't see how they could either, since they had just really
begun having access a week or so ago or whatever it was.
And they seem to think that the end of the month is probably,
considering the rewrites and a chance to look at the rewrites--
Senator Mathias. I have been independently advised of
the same thing, that the end of the month is maybe a little
optimistic.
Mr. Miller. Senator Church just talked to Director Bush
and I talked to Mitch Regovin just prior and worked out an
arrangement on the question of clearances of sensitive material.
and the Chairman told Mr. Bush that he will take whatever time
is required, he asked for expeditious effort on their part.
16
17
18
19
Mr. Bush said that he would urge his troops onward, and he
recognized that there had been snags and difficulties.
Chairman said that he was not going to press beyond the
capability of either side. He wants to do the proper job
The
20
and whatever time is required.
21
22
He said that he hoped that we could cooperate and work
it out so that we could finish by the end of the month.
And
23
Mr. Bush said that he would make every effort to do that.
So that seems amicable between the Chairman and the
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Director.
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Then the question prose about the deadline on the 15th
and the Chairman is going to ask that this deadline be set
aside because of the problems of not being able to finish
security and those other matters.
So he is taking steps to do that now.
Senator Huddleston. But I think it's still encumbent
on us to make a special effort to move as fast as we can, and
we plan to go ahead tonight.
Okay, now we get back.
Mr. Aaron. We're on page 37 and the procedure we're
trying to follow to expedite things is to look particular:
at the recommendations and at the bracketed language.
Now recommendation 20
Senator Huddleston. Before we get to 20, there's a
"
problem in wording. The last paragraph before 20, the
Committee also found that there's no established inter-Agency.
17 mechanisms for establishing the bona fides of defectors."
H
20
21
18
You've used established twice there.
19
Mr. Aaron. I think we can take the first one out.
Ms. Culbreth. We might say, David, that the staff hopes
to take a real editorial shot at this before it gets published,
22
23
anyway, and maybe even before it gets to everybody next week,
and we would hope that we can get a lot of these things.
24
25
But certainly, and that you see that you want us to
he sure that we get to point out.
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Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, on that particular thing, at
the staff level I had bracketed that entire paragraph because
I'm not sure what we're trying to accomplish by what you say
there.
This is probably the most difficult task that faces
a counter-intelligence organization any place in the world
is to establish whether or not a defector that you have just
picked up is a double agent or not.
I listened to the man who has done this all his adult
life at the Agency, Mr. Angleton, and he never made it clear
just how you ever are sure that you have a bona fide.
And then his follow-on said basically the same thin
What do we intend to do with this finding? Do we intend then
to legislate something? What are we going to do with it?
But a
Mr. Aaron. The finding goes to the recommendation later
that there be essentially for other purposes.
subcommittee of the National Security Council on the subject
of counter-intelligence which would look at other matters and
we will get to that in a moment, but among its tasks is that
it would be a forum in which differences of opinion as to the
bona fides of a defector could be discussed and potentially
reconciled.
Mr. Angleton testified and spoke at length in other
23
24
forums with us about the fact that when
25
that at present therd
really is no way that there's a difference between the FBI and
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CIA as to the hona fides of a defector and there's no way for
the government to come to a decision about it.
And this really makes that point and leads to the further
point that we believe there ought to be some mechanism whereby
some decision can be reached. Now people may still have.
reservations, as they do about this particular individual we
refer to here. But in the end one has to make a decision and
simply keeping him in a jail some place is probably not a
useful way, to proceed, and in fact, this is the kind of
recommendation that comes from Mr. Angleton and seems to be
supported by other people. even his successor at the Agenc
Mr. Kirbow. Do we have any place in our findings
discusses the so-called. this single case of some sort here?
lat
13
14
Is there some evidence?
15
نکا
16
17
18
19
Mr. Aaron. Yes.
Mr. Kirbow. It's going to be in the report when somebody
else reads this? They'll be able to go some place else and.
see what you're talking about?
Mr. Aaron. That's correct. It will be in. I believe it's
20
in the paper on counter intelligence.
It's also addressed
21
in the Rockefeller Commission report.
22
Now as the first recommendation. I think that we have
23
agreed at the staff level to take out the brackets and put a
24
footnote which would make it clear that while the primary
25
mission of the CIA would be to collect denied or protected foreign
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A
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intelligence information, that this would not, you know. that
at the same time the Agency could be directed to perform
other collection tasks as directed by the NSC.
In other words, the point is that certainly they do
such
some overt collection. For example, foreign broadcast information
service is done by them as a service and so forth. But at the
same time the point of giving the CIA a charter is to give it
3.
a charter for its primary mission and as set forth NSCID 5,
for example, that mission is to conduct espionage.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
10
Senator Mathias. What about the role of statistical
11 analysis? That kind of analysis that can be deduced from
study of voluminous quantity of economic information much
of which is public?
I'll go back to the ball bearings. the ball bearing
factory.
Mr. Aaron. Well, this goes to the point really of
the organization of this section. There's a separate section
on the production of intelligence which would authorite the
19
CIA to produce national intelligence.
20
21
That kind of thing.
Central Intelligence Agency as the producer of national
intelligence must be the recipient of all intelligence flowing
The
22
23
into our overall national intelligence effort, and that
intellicence includes overt intelligence as collected from
24
the Treasury Department. From Commerce from Labor attaches
25
abroad, the full scone of information collecting, most of which
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is not secret or clandestine and is available to the CIA and it
would be their job to compile it.
:
And that does not exclude other functions.
For example,
the analytical function is not mentioned here. This is simply
to give it the collection function and that is because the
paper is simply organized in that fashion. It doesn't try to
step up to the whole charter, every aspect of it. We just try.
to break it down.
0
Mr. Maxwell.
Should there be a kind of overt foreign
10
intelligence which the NSC with the mechanism for allocating
11
priorities within the intelligence community
should
12
done by the CIA?
13
14
45
16
It could under the formulation now do that.
Mr. Aaron. That's why for example there's one thing that
they do that's overt. Even their clandestine people abroad
do an overt collection job and that is biographic information
17
and that, while it was once in the State Department, was
18
transferred to the CIA because
they have a lot of clandestine
19
biographic information and as
a matter of centralizing
and
20
efficiency the decision was made to move it over there.
123
That kind of thing would not be precluded and would still
22
exist.
23
24
25
agents within the United States for this purpose.
Now it goes on to state that in doing this we would also
recommend authorizing the CIA to carry out the recruitment of
And it goes
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further to say that there would be an annual review of this
activity by the Senate oversight committee and by the
counter-intelligence committee which we proposed be established
and has been agreed here as a recommendation of the National
Security Council.
Now the further sentence that is in brackets calls upon
to the President and to
the Attorney General to certify
8
Q
10
13
18
13
14
15
16
17
18
the oversight committee that these actions are being taken in
a manner that does not violate the Constitutional rights of
American citizens or any other provision of law.
Trying to keep track of the domestic intelligence
recommendations is a little bit like painting a moving train,
but this tends to coincide with their recommendation, and the
purpose of this is obviously to place a little tighter
restriction and more authority in the hands of the Attorney
General to ensure that these domestic espionage-related actions
that are conducted on a covert or clandestine basis are in
fact not infringing on Constitutional rights or attempting to
break the law in any way.
19
20
21
02
23
24
25
Mr. Kirbow.
You're really talking about recruitments
now.
You're not talking about other clandestine and covert
activities and operations?
Mr. Aaron. That's correct. It's not, for example, if
you were to establish a base in Florida for the purposes of
harassing Cuban shipping.
That would not come up here.
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Mr. Kirbow. And the bracketed information, Mr. Chairman,
2
3
10
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18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
was that I didn't feel at the time we considered this and I
asked that it be bracketed, that the Attorney General who is
never going to operate in this area alone, he is not going
to make these decisions without staff support of some description,
and if he's going to do that with people in the Department of
Justice, which is where he gets the staff, the concern of the
people in the Agency about broadening even within their own
agency these people that know about the agent procurements and
where they are and whom they are is of vital concern.
probably one of the most carefully guarded secrets. Even the
extent that Mr. Colby testified before this Committee under
oath. he said, I don't want to know the names of the agents
because someone may want to decide some day to wrassle it
out of me.
It's
I don't know what the Attorney General certifying here
does for you if on the same subcommittee you have the DCI
who is the President's principal man, you have the secretaries
of state and all these other people apparently at the beck and
call in intelligence matters to put the Attorney General and
his staff into the agent procurement business.
Senator Hart. Not in the agent procurement business.
Mr. Kirbow. I mean with knowledge of agent procurement.
Senator Hart. Well the Attorney General is in the
business of upholding and defending the laws of this country:
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and he can't do that if he doesn't know when one of the agencies
of the Federal government might be breaking them.
It's a chicken and egg situation.
Mr. Kirbow. You think he should approve the policies or
the actual procurement of the agent.
Senator Hart. The procedures. Nothing in here. I mean
we have argued this thing for 13 months, there's nothing here
that requires the Agency to turn over names of their sources
or anything like that.
The Attorney General doesn't need to know the names
12
even more than Bill Colby does. or less. Just to find out that
the procedures of violating the laws of this country, that's
13
all.
14
Ms. Culbreth.
Could I raise another point, Mr.
15 Chairman?
16
17
18
19
20
21
It seems to me that one of the concerns that you have
with having the Attorney General certify in this specific
case to the President and also to the oversight committee
is a consistent problem that think runs throughout our
recommendations.
22
On the one hand, we are describing for accountability
within the Executive Branch of the proper people, and on the
23
24
other hand we are afraid that if we make him accountable, we're
giving him so much power that they are going to disregard the
25
Constitutional obligations.
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In this specific situation, for example. we've already
not the Attorney General being involved with the oversight
responsibilities.
When he takes office he already has the
obligation to see that all the laws and activities of agencies
are carried out as they're supposed to be.
And in addition to that, we are proposing in another.
part of our recommendations that the general counsel and the
inspector general of the CIA be subject to Senate confirmation
so that there are lots of other kinds of checks, and I would
just hope that as the Senators consider additional proposals
like this. that we don't get to the point that the Congress
is hamstringing them inside the agencies on how they carry
out the responsibilities:
Each one of these standing by itself may look like,
well, this is a good idea and we should have this additional
certification or this addition chain of reporting and making
sure you get it authorized.
But I have a fear after having looked through a good
bit of this, that we are getting too many layers in there, and
I would just urge a caution if there are situations where we
maybe have it pretty well covered until we get some opportunity
22
to see how this new set-up is going to work, whether we're
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going to have the kind of abuses we had before!
Maybe we
don't
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need each of these details of Congress going down into the
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agencies and saving how then go about their day to day business.
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Mr. diGenova. Mr. Chairman, I would add in that regard
that with regard to the specific recommendation, this is
not going down into the Agency. This is talking about the
Attorney General who is the head of an agency, first of all,
and the history has shown that other Attorneys General who
took the same oath that this man did didn't do their jobs and
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one of the reasons was that they didn't know about certain
things.
And the purpose of this provision is to make them aware.
of what is going on; to make legal judgements and to advise
the President about the legality of procedures attending
recruitment of agents and other activities within the confines
of the United States.
14
1.5
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17
The provision for confirming the inspector general and
general counsel is a wholly unrelated thing to this although
it doesn't go to the problem of reaching down into the Agency.
I don't see how that does that because he's going to
18
be dealing with the DCI.
19
Senator Huddleston,
Contrary to many of the things that
20
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we do. we provide ways to correct abuses once they've happened
and it seems to me this is a principal way of trying to avoid
22
abuses to start with.
23
If were on the oversight committee
would certainly,
24
and if were
getting the information that we contenblate the
25
committee would get, then that is we would know about these things
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I would certainly want to know whether or not the chief
law enforcement officer of the country thought they were
legal or illegal, or if there was a question about it.
Senator Mathias. I have a real question if I were
Attorney General whether I would sign what we would call for
here.
Senator Huddleston. The certification bothers me a
little bit.
Senator Mathias. How could I as Attorney General say
that I certify that all the actions in this area do not violate
Constitutional rights of American citizens or any other provision
of law?
I have worked in a state law department and had to
sign some certifications much simpler than this, and I agonized
over them. And this is so far beyond the personal knowledge
of the Attorney General for him to make any kind of certification,
should be a certifying.
Senator Huddleston. What's the sten just under actually
certifying?
He could review. He could certainly raise a red flag
17
I think we should get him involved but I question whether it
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His oath would require that he do something.
Senator Mathias. If you force him to certify. I think
vou're doing to get such a wishy-washy thing that to his
knowledge and he was not advised to the contrary and stuff like
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that.
Mr. Aaron. I think that's a fair point. The question,
I quess, the case at which the certification would run most
would
1
add to what already is in the sentence preceeding it which
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is review. by the Committee which the Attorney General is
to chair, would be the case in which the Attorney General is
aware of a particular activity, is aware that it is illegal
but just doesn't do anything about it on the theory that it
is somebody else's business. And he doesn't really, he doesn't
have an obligation in this category of matters to render
a judgment and bring it to the attention of the President or
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the Congress.
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Senator Mathias. Why don't we say this. that the
Attorney General be required to advise the President and the
oversight committee that he is familiar with the procedures
established
to accomplish this purpose and that he is not
aware of any violation of the Constitution or other law in
the execution of the action..
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General
I think you can lay that kind of a burden on the Attorney
•
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Mr. Aaron. Would it he possible to just make it sort.
of a reporting function in which he said, and this is in the
same direction, the Attorney General will be required to
advise the President and the oversight committee if he finds
25
that these options are being taken in a manner that violates?
.
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Gah
Senator Huddleston.
DELKE/
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Yes.
First he must review them.
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Mr. Aaron. And if he finds a violation, evidence of
violation, then he must report to the President and the
oversight committee. Just place the responsibility there.
Senator Huddleston. If in his opinion.
Senator Mathias. I wouldn't have any trouble with that.
Mr.
Maxwell. I have one other point on that paragraph
and that is it provides for annual review by the counter-
intelligence committee of the National Security Council.
I had understood we were dealing with the recruitment
of agents for the United States foreign intelligence purposes,
and the question is whether the counter intelligence committed
which was to focus on resolving issues involving the bona
fides of defectors, issues between the FBI and CIA would be
the body which would have the appropriate knowledge in the
positive intelligence value, or whether it should be assigned
to a counter-intelligence function.
It's simply a question of where the responsibility
should be allocated for reviewing those within the National
Security Council structure, and I wasn't clear whether the
counter-intelligence committee was the appropriate one.
Mr. Aaron. Well, on that point, the purpose of setting
up the counter-intelligence committee is essentially to look
at the domestic impact of our intelligence activities, the
primary ones being in the counter intelligence field but also
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.NW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 86
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יי די
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()()
in the positive intelliane field.
In fact, the resolution of the bona fides problem is
a much smaller aspect of those two problems but the existence
of the committee with some knowledge of the problem of
counter-intelligence makes it possible to have a forum at
the National Security Council level to address it.
Mr. Kirbow. What abuse that has been brought up in the
nast either in the press or accusations about a committee is
this aimeri at?
Was there been abuses that we have documented or
reported that indicate that this has violated the Constituţional
rights of anybody. including these foreigners for this
purpose?
We must be aiming this at something other than just
kind of pulling it out of the air?
Mr. Aaron. I think it really comes more in the category
of questionable practices and I wish I had the domestic
fellow here but it's really a question of, for example. when
You 're in the process of trying to recruit foreign assets
مون
even Americans to perfora foreign intelligence missions
where you may begin collecting information on Americans for the
purposes of assessing whether they are helpful to you in
approaching the particular person or whether the would be
a deed pecess adept or pha Piter van might conduct some other
kinds of surveillances
F'S
Or of a safeguard I think.
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 87
I don't think we're reall
necessarily closing the barn door
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to some enormous abuse.
Mr. Kirbow. I had never heard of one in that area.
Mr. Aaron. I think by and large the FRD's quite clear.
In other words, when we went through the CHAOS and some of
these other programs that were questionable, there were some
cases in which some of the reporting that took place as a result
of the foreign resources diyision got into the CHAOS not.
But the foreign resources division managed to stay clear of
in
general and resisted in Fact the effort on the part of the
CHAOS team to go out and actively recruit in this area on
a clandestine basis.
This is really sort of more in the category of A
Insuring that that doesn't take place and B. giving them help
that they can say no, giving them a place to go if pressures
such as the Huston Plan tyne pressures are brought to hear.
Senator Huddleston. Well, there are several places in
our report findings. several cases indicated in the testimony
we've taken that the Attorney General ought to review and
recommend.
And I'm wondering whether or not rather than at spotting
it at these various places whether we couldn't make a general
recommendation.
We've already got the Attorney Teneral on the
Committen and that he resi
if not all practices
whatever practices; thy sape Taurage, we we're hat
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at least
ing abo
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for this paragraph, that he review and that he advise the
President and the committee if in his opinion any of these
practices violate the Constitutional rights of American citizens
for any other laws.
Mr. Kirbow. I would feel much better about this since
it hasn't been an apparent abuse but to see that go in the
general recommendation that all of the activities of the
intelligence community her viewed by him or be examined in
whatever way you think it should be done for that purnose.
But it would seem that it cuts then to a general preventive
tune mechanism instead of being here kind of put in against the
"
PR, which as we say apparently has been doing it properly"
all along and not in violation of the law.
We don't appear to be accusing them of it here. although
the language may not be quite so specific.
Mr. Aaron.
I might just say that there is a further
recommendation that involves the Attorney General on page 40,
which is number 27 dealing with the same committee, a different
aspect of it.
What this does is it elaborates with the recommendation
number 17. which establishes the counter intelligence committee
and it deals with the two sides of these activities. On the
one hand it's going to review pregram for positiva
foreign
Resting within the United States.
intelligence colleation)
25
and on the other hand
to review the counter intelli
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*
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ograms of the CIA and
that are conducted inside the
United States both from the standpoint of their legality.
Now I think it's possible to consolidate those recommenda-
tions so that we don't say it twice, and I also think it's
possible to take out any implic tion that these programs were
not necessarily conducted properly in the past.
But I would hate to sort of just have, and my personal
Feeling is that I would baby to have a gener 1. kind of thing
that the Attorney General ought to do this because he ought
to do this already. And what we're trying to do is make some
recommendations that are more specifically targeted on the
subiect matter that we have reviewed and give him. in effect,
specific charge.
Senator Huddleston. Well, We are giving him the
ecific char rge of reviewing it, which apparently he didn't
have before. Now before when something came to his attention
he certainly had the responsibility to move on it if in his
opinion it was contrary to Constitutional rights.
18
19.
Mr. Aaron. So
you're discussing the last sentence
20
still,
is that right. not the review point?'
21
Mr. Kirhow. ile
rightfully assumes. as the common law
25
docs, that all government officials in an official position
are performing their duties properly.
Senaton Rdleston) to want be no beyond that. though.
We want him to know what they're doing
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Mr. Pirbow. And
you day he should review it in
kind of a general recommendation, then you talk about all of
the intelligence functions having any possibility of affecting
the laws of the United Statorl
I really would like to see that kind of requirement
placed on the Attorney General as a general requirement instead
of trying to just pick out little specifics unless we have an
abuse connected with it.
Noy in the domestic task force they have specific
abuses and they make specific recommendations of corrective
action, but that doesn't appear to be the case in either of
these here. either the true covert operations
Mr. Aaron. "I might make a suggestion along those lines
just in terms of simplifying some of this. It might be possible.
to take the first part of the review section here, follow it
:
with the recommendation on the top of 27 saving the domestic
counter-intelligence activities of the CIA would be subject to
this review and then follow that with a third recommendation
that the Attorney General would be required to advise the
President and the oversight committee if he found any irregular
ities in either one of these programs.
Senator Mathias. I think that's more reasonable and
it does what you want to do which is to force the Attorney
General's attention
to it.
Mr. Paron.
ALL X
ld we
For a moment to
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tember 27 because it has
bracketed rortion that we might
TA
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B
considerably do away with.
That's page 40.
The bracketed portion says that the NSC would approve
all counter intelligence activities of the CIA in the United
States and it spells out a kind of procedure there.
Now the net effect of this kind of procedure really is
to establish that the FBI without question. I mean the
practical effect is that the PR is without question the
counter-intelligence agency and you've not to get the President
to approve anything that the CIA is going to do in this
field.
And that is really it inside the United States. That's
the net effect of this paragraph,
Now my own personal view of this paragraph is that it's
probably not necessary. We have the NSC dommittee. It is
supposed to resolve the question of where the FBI lets off
and the CIA begins and it is an NSC committe that can report
to the President if they have a disagreement.
I'm not sure I feal strongly about it.
:
Mr. diGenova. I would only add that I spoke to John
21
Elliff about this paragraph and he also feels that it's
22
"
unnecessary to do this. No thinks that this consolidation
would be had. first of all. Soil it's unnecessary second
all.
Mr Miller
ngolication?,
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423509; Page 92
Mr. diGenova.
Mr. Aaron.
Aren't Holl talking about the consolidation?
No, we're talking about the paragraph that
just precedes it. I'm sorry, this is the bracketed portion.
I'll read it out.
"The CIA should receive USC approval of all counter-
intelligence activities within the United States. This approval
should be given by the President and be supported by the
recommendation of the NSC counter-intelligence committee,
Attorney General and the Director of the FBI. All such
projects should be reported annually to the oversight committee
Mr. Maxwell. I would move that we just strike that
"
as unnecessary.
13
Senator Huddleston. That's a vote.
We'll be right
11
back.
(A brief recess was taken)
Senator Huddleston.
Well, it's 3.30. Let's see if
19
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99
We can resolve anything.
Mr. Aaron. Now the next recommendation, which is number
21 goes to the establishment of a special committee of the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence, which would review human
intelligence collection problems.
This is an area where there has been some effort
institutionally to try to get a handle on it but it in
essentially split about as widely in the government an
can do f
You have a State Department that produc
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least
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in volume the most material and according to CIA analysts
most of that information. a large proportion of that is
keved to their report an' yet obviously a great deal of
clandestine collection is carried out by the CIA itself and
the military services account for a significant amount of
collection, some of which is extremely important in countries
with military governments.
The issue then becomes whether there shouldn't be a
particulay mechanism to deal with it and the proposal here is
to create a subcommittee of the CFI for that purpose, or a
special committee of the CFI. And the reason for that is to
nut in the chair the Department of State or the Secretary of
State's designee and representatives of the Secretary of State
and it would e a committes essentially of the CUA. the Department
of State and, the Department of Defense trying to bring some
focus into those programs and making some choices and so forth.
I might have Bill Bader speak to it. I think the
recommendation originates with him.
Mr. Bader. This recommendation is part of two basic
recommendations that deal with the question of human intelligente
19
20.
21
collection.
First is the questio on of the approval mechanism. As you 1:
one of
see when we get into the latter part of the panc
these very strong recommendations that we have as
the committes,
on
or is being offered to tha spunitive as a possible recommenda!
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is that human collection dieets would de to the operations
advisory group for approval. That is. for operational approval.
As you know from our testimony these kinds of projects
do not go to the 40 Committee type organizations where they
deal with covert action projects.
So on the one hand we're hoping to deal with the question
of operational approval. In this particular subcommittee we
go to the question of overall management and direction of
tasking, what should we be doing. what should the United States
be doing in the human collection field? Where should we be
in x number of years? What should the principal objectives
of human collection be?
And in this way we hope to bring the diversity that now
exists in the community from the CIA to the military services
and bring it together under the chairmanship of the Secretary
of State who would help provide this kind of overall direction
and management guidance.
It is not an important elaboration of the committee on
foreign intelligence. It should be there in any event because
19
18
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20
it's a management problem. This gives it focus, this gives
21
the Secretary of State the chairmanship of a committee and I
think properly so. that deals with this larger problem of
whither human intelligence collection.
24
05
Mr. Maxwell.
It's unclear here whether it's chaired
by a representative of the Shoretary of State, and the C1 and
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Secretary of Defense are emerted to attend or whether they're
all supposed to be designee.
I don't know what the protocol is but is it likely that
the Secretary of Defense would attend if it were a designee.
of the Secretary of State?
Mr. Miller.
Sometimas, sure.
Mr. Bader. They certainly did on these other committees
But what would you propose?
Mr diGenova. The Language is a little unclear.
10
11
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Mr. Bader.
Perhaps it should say that the Secretary of
State is chairman and be presumably then could designate whomever
he pleased.
Mr. Kirbow. As a matter of practicality. if the
Secretary of State doesn't show un and the Secretary of
Defense is there, who's going to chair the meeting?.
Mr. Aaron. As a matter of practicality if the Secretary
of State doesn't show up, the Secretary of Defense won't be
17
18
there.
19
Mr. Kirbow. And you digress down because he's never.
20
going to go
to this kind of manting where he takes up the
20
day to day operations,
Aren't you really talking here. don't vou leave the
07
2
language so vaque that you fail to imply that whit you want is
.a. review of the pollaton and not
the day to day
need
wa
one mox
25 agent in Amsterdam and two more in Brussels?
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Mr. Aaron. That is not what we want to convey and so
you are correct.
Mr.
Kirbow. They should review the rolicies and goals
and requirements. really.
Mr. diGenova. How about policy at the end of the first
sentence?
Mr. Aaron. Human intelligence collection policy.
Senator Huddleston. and eliminate the bart about size.
Mr. Bader. Review and make recommendations with regard
to policies and priorities. and then there's a misprint here.
We don't need American U.S. clandestine.
Mr. Kirbow. Down through the verd, the two words. human
collection before the last sentence, vou het inte kind of a
great deal of detail about what they're supposed to consider.
whereas if you said they should consider the policies of human
intelligence, human collection and the trade-offs between
sorts of things you have
covert and overt collection and the
brought to a committee a consideration of this problem which
they have never taken before.
Mr. Bader. I think we could add the word policy here
and policies and we will underline that.
Recommend the ostal lighruent of a special committee of
the CTT to review all Pomptem human intelligenc collection
1 make gorommandations with regard
24
Polic
priorities and
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| יין
1.8. clandestine human coll tic
TOP SECRET
CARO FAUL
operations and choices hereon overt and clandestine homan
collection.
Mr. Kirbow. And Mr. Chairman, without going back and
1 belaboring one of the other recommendations, I think that the
staff should do that in each instance where we may have given
a task to a committee to do a great deal more detail because
even on this domestic counter intelligence activities my
earlier recommendation was that by statute the policies governing
domestic counter-intelligence should be considered.
You don't want them to consider the day to day operation
I don't believe.
Mr. Maron. But I do think that we shouldn't lose sight
of the fact that we are interested particularly in the latter
case and. I think in this case that you're interested in the
16
program.
I mean you just don't want to say it will be the policy
of the U.S. to do some or it would be the policy
I mean
you really want to have an opportunity in a management
sense to
19
look at the overall program
is the program achieving what
20
it's supposed to achieve. is the scale of the program here
21
as opposed to there in the right balance to reflect our
priorities?
In other words I think that..
Mr. Miller
It's not a rubber stamp, you'en en ing.
25
Mr. Aarón. The
right and it isn't just
al with
.
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ords on paner. It tries to get at the problem of what are the
programs and are they do their job?
Mr. diGenova.
The CFI?
Who do they make the recommendations to?
Mr. Aaron. Yes. or the President.
Mr. Maxwell. One romark in connection with
Mr. diGenova.
Let's make that clear. It just says
Q
13
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make recommendations.
Mr. Maxwell. In Bill's fix. to specify. I think it was
it's all human intelligence collection abroad.
intended that
Mr. Aaron. Yes, that's right.
All right. perhans we can
to the next recommendation.
Now this is bracketed. I think it might be better first before.
1740 take up the bracket let's take up what is not bracketed
and just indicate that this is in effect hortatory. if you will.
It urges the oversight committee to examine the question of
clandestine collection to ensure that it's really focused on
things that need clandestine collection that are of high
priority, not only the highest, but certainly deserve that kind
of risk and effort and preas in which clandestine collection
are the only means, available so as to emphasize something of
the extraordinary nature of espionage.
Now beyond that there's the recommendation that the
clandestino carvi est like the military services and the
foreign service, be subject to a manpower ceiling,
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I think this woul 1.'
not sharest that that cailing bela
public fiqure but that the Congress establish a manpower ceiling
for that, just as it has there other services that serve in the
field of national security.
Now I know Charley has some reservations about that.
Mr. Kirbow.. Yes. But to put it in the proper context
and I didn't bring it up at that point, nor did Elliot,
if you look at the bottom of page 32, we in our findings section!
discuss a point on the fact that we don't know whether the
size of the clandestine cortion in the right size.
We also indicate that over the past decade the size has
heen reduced significantly
cnificantly, particularly in the field.
Then we come over here and recommend that there be a
mannower ceiling for the clandestine services only of the
СТА. Today there is a budget coiling on the number of
people in the CIA that is governed by the amount of money that
they get and the amount of money that they put forward to:
support that kind complement.
I objected to kind of the dipping down process of going
into a segment of an agend and limiting its manpower because
if we had a crystal ball, we could do that very carefully and
properly, I think. But I can't see into the future and two.
years from now we may nead: the largest clandestine service we've
lever had because of the nrght me that would confront the nation.
and I think that since it is carefully controlled }... the Congres
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End 36
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through its budget devels and mannower levels, let's let the
agency decide how many peinle it takes to run a segment of its
own organization.
Mr. Inderfurth. A very special segment. though.
Mr. Kirbow. Well, special only because we have concerned
ourselves with the abuse annects of it under the assassination
tyne thing. Of more concern to us should be the fact that the
analytical section out there probably needs strengthening
instead of worrying about remulating the size of the clandestine.
service.
Mr. Inderfurth. Well. that comes up later as well.
Mr. Kirbow Do you think that size in any way contributda
to the plot against Castro for some of these other people?
Mr. Inderfurth. I think it has in covert action throughout
Latin America.
Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, I would support Mr. Kirbow on
this one.
My own view is unless you're going to go to the full
extent of addressing the question of establishing mannower
ceilings throughout the Central Intelligence Agency, to single
out one directorate at this point doesn't really make much
sense to me though I understand the principle behind it.
Senator Huddleston. Well. I do too. I think wa can make
a flat statement that you could get too big. that there may
The a roint somewhere w there hevnd which is a vory dangerous
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situation. But I don't think we have determined that any
specific size has yet been shown to be so detrimental and we
could say that there ought to be a specific level.
I think the rest of that paragraph certainly ought to..
be continuously examined.
Mr. diGenova. The recond part of that paragraph really
assumes that that kind of review would go on and if necessary,
the committee could make a recommendation at the appropriate
time.
Mr. Aaron. It proposes that kind of a review. The
purpose of having a manpower ceiling as it exists, as I say
in other agencies where one could argue that you would have the
13
same problem. the military
14
5
16
17
18
23
might have an emergency next
week which would require an enormous expansion of military
services.
Now the point of it is to give really. simply to give or
suggest that the oversight committee put in its arsenal of
controls over the clandestine activities that the CIA . some
handle on the clandestine services number because it makes a
difference. I mean they could put their money elsewhere.
Senator Mathias. How about saying establish and annually
adjust, or from time to time adjust?.
Mr. Aaron. The point is not just to set
higher limit
but rather to say. to hate This tool, and even ask the Agency
vot know they might well be
25
to tell us what that ċeillus
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under their authorized strength.
Mr. Inderfurth.
Another alternative is to say should
consider establishing a mannower ceiling.
Mr. Kirbow.
Could I make the point that oversight
of any agency necessarily entails looking at the number of
people it has every year because you have to determine how
much money they've got to support and they have to come tell you
that.
If we're going to have an oversight committee, that is
10
one of the functions that it performs.
We do it with our
11
12
15
16
military services. but we don't tell them that we can't put
them all over in. that they can't put all the Navy people in
destrovers.
Senator Huddleston. That's right, but I don't think you
can exactly equate clandestine oneration, with other tynes of
agency operations.
I think there's a difference here in the notential
Mr. Aaron. Should consider establishing?
Senator Huddleston, I think that it ought to follow
19
imract.
'It's a
secret operation.
19
20
21
22
the paragraph. Leave the paragraph as it was and say the
committee should also consider the advisability of establishing
ja mannower ceiling
Sepator Mathias.
Adjustable ceiling.
24
1
Mr
25
Kirbow, I don't really know what such
Commenda Hon
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for this committed
beuteteme nd, to another committee that
maybe they ought to do some
in
but I quess it's all right.
Mr. Aaron. I'm afraid we do that quite a bit.
Mr. Miller.
We're just laying out the agenda.
Mr. Kirbow. Which is not binding on them.
Mr. Miller. In the Government Operations Committee
one of the provisions of the bill. as you know, is an agenda,
and many of the items that in that arends are subsumed in
0
this.
MC:
18
1 1
45
16
18
80
divisions?
Kirbow. Doesn't it go to the make-up of the individual
30.
Overall size of the intelligence community is the
y they recommended it. and I think
way
hat's a reasonable approach.
Mr. Aaron. Turning to the question of the Agency itself
ntber 23. this again is not in the category of statutory
proposals but in the category of urging the Agency to ensure
that the skills of intelligence collection are the primary
criteria for advancement within the clandestine services.
Senator Mathias. Versus management?
Mr. Aaron. Versus covert Sperations.
Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman on this one I can conceive
21
of nothing that would do more harm to either side of this
22
question than to say to a man who wants to devote his life and
23
make a career in the clandestine service, that vei Can
I f
get
promoted on being rood at what you're supnosed to be doing.
25
You got promoted on belan good at this other aspect of it, and.
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C.
think it's just totally cok of keeping with what you want.
If
vou want a good clandestine operation, vou want the best you
can find. and I think that he should get the same amount of
credit for being good at whatever he's assigned to as being in
this other intelligence business.
Mr. Aaron. The intelligence business, of course, is
their primary mission.
Mr. Kirbow. Not if La's a clandestine operator. That's
his primary business and he doesn't have any choice over whether
10 or not he gets assigned when he aces in
11
1.3
out there as
a junior executive to the clandestine side of the day to dạy
operation.
14
יג:
16
Senator
Huddleston. What does this address?
Mr. Maron. This addresses the problem of the clandestine
service which goes to the several things.
collects intelligence.
Primarily it
But it is in the nature of, or at least
77
the past history of the Agency, which Bill can speak more
directly to than I. that the covert operations people get the
It's in part built into the system in
18
12
better advancement.
20
that you can measure the effect of the covert action operation
easier than this endless effort to recruit a good agent many
21
times which will fall through through no fault of the agent
24
25
himself.
Furthermore
concih potion operatives simply come
to
higher level attention caster than somebody who's a good agent:
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handler but who is real
Merating off in 7 very secure and
;
CO
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10
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remote environment.
So in an effort to try to suggest that they make a
real effort to compensate for what we have found in this area,
this particular thing is designed to urge them to do their
best to try to overcome that problem.
Now we wanted to put it in a way that was not pejorative
and that did not exclude the advancement of good covert operators.
If you want to keep covert onerations. I agree with Charley..
you have to have good ones and you've got to reward them..
I don't think that this particular recommendation which.
is to the Agency and not to statute dues what perhaps Charley
foars it would do. It simply urges that they give the proper
weight to what for the clandestine services is their primary
mission.
Mr. Bader. The problem of it is we're not after this
really and perhaps it's a Language problem. We're not trying
to suggest here that the intelligence collectors in the career
catters should be favored over the operator. What we were
after really was that we have noticed over the years and in
the record that the intelligence onerator has tended to move
along much faster.
What he has done. his projects are very quickly visible
while intelliget colleation can be something that runs over
years and it's hard
in the trenches.
And think the
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Mr. Kirbow. I'm sorry.
I don't believe that that's
16
the case.
What I'm really saving is this. Over the years
17
30
from about 1947 on through the '60s. clandestine operations
were a way of life in the CIA. Whether it is in favor today
or not is probably on the side of no. it's not in favor at
the CIA because there are only 165 versus some 500 or 500.
see that a being
I really don't
21
Senator Huddleston
22
relevant.
,?
24
25
As
1. go this it's not a question of what:
Tike
clandestine operal long or tint
Th's chains to me
estion
is whether or not thos: individuals who serve are asking undue
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TARD "AIL.
6.
P
N
Preferential treatment
advancement within the Agency.
Is that what we're trying to get to here?
Mr. Kirbow.. They say it's within the clandestine services,
that the covert operator gets more advancement within the
clandestine services side of the house then the other people,
and I don't think our record supports that.
It may be that you have found more of the directors
being from the covert side of the house but that is not what the
9
attack is.here.
10
Senator Huddleston.
12
14
Can't we may that within the
clandestine services our inquiry indicates that those in the
advanced
covert section have advanced in great r numbers more rapidly?
Mr. Rader. Yes. i think the record is clear on that
within the clandestine services.
Sanctor Huddleston' And the Committee believes that
the Agency ought to ensure that all employees, whatever side;
be given the opportunity based on their actual skills.
Mr. Aaron. That's the thrust of what we're trying to
18
JP
express here.
20
Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman.
I would like to reserve for
Senator Tower on this one because I don't think the record of
the Committee supports that
the central
Mr. diGenova. How about if we said this
Intelligence should ensure that the skills of intelligence
24
85
collection are given cual consideration as
a criterion for
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advancement within the andestine services
Ms. Culbreth. Then you get back in to what we struck
out from the original, which was as opposed to covert action
We deleted that from the earlier thing to try
onerations.
to avoid
Mr. diGenova. I'm trying to just paraphrase what the
Senator just said, what they said was the thrust, which was
cut on an equal
R
that intelligence collection capabilities ar
0
footing, with operations.
10
19
13
11
16
17
18
12
20
22
Mr. Aaron. What think is a better way to put the
point, and it's along that some line, might be to simply say,
to urge that the Agency ensure that the skills of intelligence
collection are given importance in advancement within the
clandestine services of that mission for the clandestine
services. if you will.
In other words, the great bulk of the people in the
clandestine services, as Charley pointed out, are in fact
intelligence collectors. mhay are case officers for trying
to acquire information. and I think that what we're trying to
arrive at here is that it should be diver an importance. that
this skill should be given on importance and significance in
proportion to the significance that the Agency accords to that
23 particular task.
Senator Ma
!!
+1 are
ving to get at here?
Are we netting at the fact that we act some starn who, becaus:
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лий
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196
of their clandestine skits
Cantal] the available promotions
most of them, that they get ahead and I think that that is a
problem. You see it in the armed services all the time.
I remember Commander Buckley who because he was a bic PT
erat an. and he just happened to be called on to take MacArthur
off Corrigedor, ended un au Mairal, and I won't comment further.
Now I think there is such a human resporise to courage
and daring and unusual skill that it'a doin' to be very hard
to deflect that from havin its natural outlet in recognition..
Mr. Caron. As I
lot of the problem is in the
nature of things and the recommendation does to an effort to
on record as truind, bo tomnensate for what
I think
you rightli nav.
Covert action drag aftention to the operator. Clandestine
collection, you do not draw attention to yourself.
Mr. Kirbow. There is a more basic problem to this at the
Nateway. I did spend some considerable time in this business.
The s
llent people, the neone who turn out to be excellent
in the Agency and get the mial promotions are not necessarily
promoted because they are covert operators alone.
Most of the very fing, neaple that they liaze for that they
had in the early years van
to be in that business becausė
and they will end u ith a
that's what being a
majorlim of the
Why shouldn't they
know hed? That's tactly the
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с
decision.
Senator Huddleston
Well there are too many elements
re involved in who ought to be promoted. There are too many
human elements and somebody has to make a decision.
I just don't know how we can advise them on that. I
think I would strike that. I would favor taking it out.
Mr. Aaron. Okay. Number 24 goes to the question of
the relationship between th domestic contac' division and
the directorate of operational or what is otherwise known as
30 the clandestine services.
12
13
14
16
12
19
20
21
M
In 1972. I believe it was, when Mr. Schlesinger went
to the CTA, this directorate whose primary responsibility is
for collecting overt intelligence but which has a support
function for the clandestine collection or the clandestine
recruitment of agents within the United States was then moved
into the directorate of operations.
The Committee's own hearings and testimony on the
subject indicated that a reasonably large portion of their
activity and their contacts are used for the initial stages
of trying to spot, assess. and get people close to foreign
intelligence agent recruitment targets.
Now there are.
concern about that is that unlike
foreign resources Hibisiew whose mission is learly clandestir
the domesticion
Helen enproaches their peente, an an
35
oner basis,
;
Save
not 7 SCV.
I'm not doing any
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10
snying. I am an overt
person.
T belong to the CIA.
I would like you to tell me about your travels or advise us
on some subject or what have you on an open basis, and that
this relationship is completely above board in every way.
And you don't have to worry that this relationship is
going to be used for any invert purpose.
However, it turns out that some of those relationships
are or do or are brought to evolve into support for clandestine
activities in which information is gathered on people who might
he helpful in all the ways and I think we had a pretty good
attendance at that session when this was discussed.
12
13
16
19
20
So the question comes down to this
this blurrings of
the line between an organization as to whether its mission really
is overt or not in every respect. should this be a concern to.
the Committee?
}
And if i is of concern to the Committee, should
we take some steps to try to reinforce its overt character
and separate it out from, the clandestine services where it is
now located and where at least a few of the people in the DCD
have expressed some concern that they will now become ropulated
with real clandestine operators and that they will really sort
of become another are of that organization.
02
Now Bill Bader would like to talk to this point. It
Formerly a part of the directorate of intelliginge
mich is
the more deert aru of the gener to be in with and elected that
information
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In other governments this same function is done. for
example, in Britain it's done by the board of trade because a
lot of the information is technical, economic, or scientific
in nature, which is alsò true for the DCD. as a matter of
fact.
And so the question that is presented to the Committee
is do we want to leave the DCD where it is in the Director of
Clandestine Operations? Do we want to have the clandestine
service, if you will. have a quasi-overt arm within the United
States widely spread out throughout the United States? Would
we want to confine the clandestine activities to the clandestine
service and the overt activities to some overt organization,
be that hack in the directorate of intelligence in the Agency
or
moved out to the State Department or some other organization
which does operate openly as a matter of course?
Mr. Inderfurth. What would that mean in terms of
numbers?
How large is the DCD?
Mr. Aaron. I believe it is about 150 or 200.
Mr. Bader. There are 38 offices.
Mr. Aaron. And they are about two or three man offices.
A lot of the personnel in the DCD are in fact succunded from
the military services or ERDA. You know there are different
areas of the country that have different kinds. you know,
example if they're interested !!
or agriculture.
agricultural intelligence
lot
thege people come out of
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10
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agriculture.
I mean it's a funny kind of mixture of people.
The CIA sort of dos this in part as a service of
common concern to the intelligence community and in part at
least heretofore it does the overt collection function as a
service to its own analysts.
This was particularly in the early days when we had
less access to information in the denied areas of the world..
It was a very rich source 0' information for us. It still is
quite a good and important and economical source, and it's
a good program. The question is how much it should be involved
in clandestine support and if you want to find a way to
encourage it, to. if you will. emphasize its overt mission*
Over its covert mission or do you want to put it back into
some overt side of the Agency or the government?
Mr. Maxwell. I have some very mixed feelings about this
recommendation and the problem might be described better by
looking at the flow of information from the end point.
.
16
17
18
19
The FRD now is involved in the recruitment of agents
for foreign intelligence gathering within the United States.
20
A number of times they need, and I think they have indicated
to the Committee that they need some help in determining whether
they should go to an individual and say, can you intro-luce
me to this potential agent of influence in a country can
you introduce ma n the student without that blowing un in
their faces?
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1
The question then a hou can they be provided with the
information that they not to allow them to make a recruitment
that the Committee may find is valuable.
If it is from the PCD. it has all the problems that
1:
6
10
David articulated. and L'appreciate those problems.
The
question the Committee has to face is where they are going to
get that information, whether it should be for the DCD. whether
it's
is located in DDO. from the DoD whether it's located in the
DOI or from the DCD, or located in the State Department or
under State Department control.
My own sense of that is that the decision that was made
by Director Schlesinger in movibia it from the DDI to the DDO
did raise the potential of compromising the overt character,
:
12
13
14
but it also made the liaison which we find important more
efficient and easier to manage and potentially easier to
16
17
19
21
27
24
control if both elements are under the same set of quidelines
and regulations which would govern the DDO as a whole as to
who may be apporoached. who may be used operationally.
If it's put in another directorate or cutside. I think
there's a difficulty in that kind of control and I think it's
also, it obviously raises the question of whether the FRD
was going to get the information that it needed for a valuable
function of recruiting forefawers while they're in the United
States.
I think the Committ
any number of wave but I
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.
J.
17
10
14
15
17
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think that the end produce has to be looked at in the recruitment
of spies, and secondly wen have to look at what kinds of
ausurances could be made in any branch of the government if
overt collection is being done as to whether that information
would be used by another brauch of the government.
If DCD were entirely overt and a promise were made to
Mr. Bader that this would never be used for an operational
DUTPOSe or you would never be asked as a consenting adult to
aid in an operational purmose, then the end production might wel
be that the FRD is going to be sending neuple out covertly
within the United States to covertly obtain information to
determine if they are going to make a covert approach to ai
forsign sDV. and I think that I have real hesitation about.
rather than the information being available from consenting
individuals on an open basis.
Mr. Aaron. If I could add to that. I agree, I think
the question is if you're going to allow the conduct of
recruitments to take place and you're going to allow information
70
to be collected on these neaple. somebody has to do it and
20
21
so you're not going to avoid any of those questions by this.
The issue aces ☐ barb to whether the people who will
initially heain developing that information will be people
with every incentive to ran it within certain Hounds of whether
reas purposes to that.
24
there will be dnechtin
I think that
a situation in which the
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:
5.
nch could legitimately have contant 4th neatenten and large-
numbers of people who otherwise. if our other recommendations
in here are accepted and even some of the internal requlations
of the CIA are written into low. people would be kind of off
bounds for operational use.
Now the DCD, however, because it is overt, is allowed
to deal with these people and the question is well the
incentives to be scrupulous in their activities, keeping them
evert and not trying to use people sort of for operational
support and so forth, the question is would those in entives
be better outside the poor inside the one or would it maķe
difference.
The second point is, and this is a somewhat different
point the nen is having an increasing problem, with frankly,
we have had testimony from Mr. Nelson and others. he's
having a problem because it is associated with the CIA.
Landw
Now people are relicrant to cooperate with them because
•f concern about being associated with the CIA. The fact that
they actually do engage in octational suport doesn'
help
20
that very much.
And so the question is if you really want the Cullest
suploitation of the forsion itelligence open foreign
intelligence potential of the American secule who are
to cooparatelonerly, zhon iðnót
The dous
35
which does not have this
aurs of landestine paliel
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lling
manization
4
associated with it?
That is somewhat separate but relevant.
Mr. Kirhow! Mr. Ghairman. apparently they're not talking
about doing it with any fewer people or any different people,
F but you're talking about calling it something else.
2;
In discussing this with Mr. Nelson, under whom it comes
now. and with Mr. Proctor, under whom it previously came,
R they do not distinquish any of the problems, that they are
having any problems in maintaining contact with over 100,000
American citizens who are kind of returning travellers and
that they are getting the time of information that these
loval citizens are willing to give to them.
10
:11
13
14
These people advertize their address and probably nut
their telephone number in the public telephones in each of these
15
16
38 offices. and all you have to do is look it up and say that's
a CIA function there.
18
It is probably as overt as anything they do except
testify on the Hill, which has become very overt in the past
19
year or two. But just to talk about moving it back into a
20
place where they just moved it out of on the lack of some kind
21
of record that is not working ngoperly now or more properly
22
there. I don't think we're in a position to decide that.
To
decide that you want to move it out of the CIA and into the
Denar Ement of Stata. I think the record is totally oid on
that subject.
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End
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"
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13
16
16
17
18
19
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21
82
24
25
I just hate to see
agapegoamend, taking away On one
clace and putting it sore blad else without a record.
Senator Hart. Can't we recommend that we put it back
in intelligence and the oversight committee consider that
after it's created and so
Senator Huddleston.
Why was it taken out of intelligence?
Mr. Bader. It was a question of consolidation of
collection in one directorate.
You see, while the domestic contract service was under
the DDI. it was a collection service. It was in analytical
branch and Schlesinger, as I understand it, felt that it was
the tidy thing to do to put all collectors under the same
Senator Huddleston.
Overt and covert?
Mr. Bader. Yes. And I think the issues nate have been
very well articulated.
I had very little to add to them. I think it is an
isque. 1 have a personal concern that we have not taken the
responsible officials at any length on the record on this
question of the relative advantages or disadvantages.
My own personal view with some experience is that it
seems to me it would make a great deal of sense for this
function to be under the DDI to emphasize and underline its
overtness and that the individuals who are in this particular
service or office then would flow naturally from the analytical
side and it could be very different kinds of people they tended
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be before 1971, 1972.
Senator Huddleston .. Is there any chance that anybody
would be denied the product of this investigation if we changed
it?
Mr. Bader. One of the things we should hear in mind,
Mr. Chairman. is that if you go down the road and talk about
these various reforms or changes in the intelligence structure,
that moving the DCI function and enhancing his powers and then
nerhaps eventually separating the Director of CIA from the
10 n. that at this point it would seem logical for an overt
13
collection side of an intelligence agency to be with the
DCT
But that is down the road as well and perhaps what we
want to do with something like this is
you don't understand
15
that point?
16
17
!འ
20
Mr. Maxwell. No. I don't.
Mr. Kirbow. What he's really saying is that if you move
all of this overt side out of the DCI. you leave the govert
side out there without any of the support function, which this
group furnishes to them.
Mr. Rader. Down the road when you have a CCI
Mr. Maxwell. If you assume that the DCI is going to
22
take the cuttre DDI
85
24
Senator Muddlegten
Ton M we have
situation there an
> FE
1.
agent might be both se
auch
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5
·1 -
L
Mr. Kirbow. These people out there are not agents.
These are emplovees. And most of them, by the way, are former
employees. They are retired CIA officers.
Senator Huddleston. They are
not mixing the assignments?
Mr. Kirbow.
NO.
They, for example. I don't mind putting
8
11
12
13
14
15
16
this on the record.
We had a large international organization in the company
I was with before I returnal to the Senate. Before we departed
we could get a briefing on the place where we were going to
kind of safeguard against making defense mistakes, and when we
came back, they came and had lunch with you and asked you to
kind of reveal or when you were dealing with the director
of whatever it was in Singanore, what was the situation? What
was the atmosphere? What's going out there because you were
in a business atmosphere and rubbed elbows and they came and
met with you and did this. or occasionally you would stop
by the San Francisco office and you'd do this.
17
18
19
20
22
That's the business these people are in, principally.
Isn't that correct?
this?
Senator Huddleston. Nac do you have any thoughts on
Senator Mathias. I don't think anyone has discussed
oction number 2 while I've been sitting hare, and I haven't
bean sitting here consiste
But is there and valve to
cutting it out and sh
Lo State?
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Just to be the
advocate. one of the values that
occurs to me is to bring the State Department in touch with
reality.
Mr. Kirbow. Well You'll never get me to tell a member
of the Department of State Personal business that I was conductin
for my
company in Singapore Necause I don't think that it
7
would be
کر
I'll put it personal
I don't thin' that I would
have trusted them with the gearets of what my company's operations
Were versus an intelligence organization.
organization like the Denactment of State.
Not an onen
Mr. Aaron. The information collected by the DCD is
13
fully available to every auctcy of the government.
It's not
considered classified or necret or anything else.
15
16
17
Mr. Kirbow. They ask you a lot of questions.
Senator Hart. The principal argument, Mac, is that there's
no record on this and for us just to haphazardly make this
recommendation without our record
18
19:
The compromise I quadacted was
recommended option 1
and that the
20
new committes look at option 2 when it is in
21
22
existence and has made a record.
Senator Huddleston I'm inclined to go with option 1.
I have a question, it save the Committee recom pde the permanent
84
oversight committ
YCONC
01
How is this hot to work?
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Nr. Aaron. I just think that n drafting the charter
actually you can just sav "Ou ecommend by statute or you could
say that the Committee recommends that it be removed or moved
back and you can leave t to the DCI to do it.
Senator uddleston. Just recommend that it be done.
Mr. Kirbow. May I respectfully reserve on that?
Mr. Aaron. All right. Now 25. we're going to get some
testimony komorrow morning 00 25 and 26 as to what they
Sctually do and we will have that on the redord.
And 21 will be moted un. as we have talked about it
earlier. And 28, then, was the order of business, and that is
the proposal that in fact we ought to consider a model rather
lit the Oritish. which is that counter intelligence by the
I'm sorry the author of this is not be
CIA and by
16
hy
the counter intelligence, the CIA. and the CRT, be consoli-
dated into one organization along the lines of NT 5 or 6.
12
20
22
T can siever keep them straight,
Mr. Inderfurth. rive. This would
Senator Huddleston, Where would that agency be in the
structure?
Hr
diGenova. This is the point t was getting at before
that the domestic task force and John Elliff has some problems
with these recommendatione, that T'm just sootlighting this
note
He doesn't man the advisa
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of this He doesn't
ረ
10
12
14
Mr. Hiller. Tha
Terango, he hasn't heard the
recommendations that this be done by others.
Liea to be considered.
It's just an
Mr. Kirhow: He's read it I reserve on this.
Mr. diGenova. I'm not sure that
Mr. Inderfurth. Well the military intelligence services
should be added to this FRT, CIA and military intelligence.
Mr. Aaron.
If won't amin to consolidate that function.
it ought to be consolidated 11 the way around.
Mr. Miller. They're alightly different activities on
the part of the military because they're involved in base
protection.
Isn't that correct?
Mr. Snider. Well, that counter-esrionage cueration
involves their own personnel world-wide.
] 6
Mr. Miller. But in connection with bases', that's their
connection.
12
Mr.
19
20
Spider. Not necessarily bases, but information,
military information. As long as you are consolidating that
function. I don't see why you shouldn't include the military
21
services. It's just a small point.
122
Senator Hart.
Chairman, I certainly favor the
concept that if there's say che area there we
even a little
roque elements.
05
And
am
In the counter-intelligence areas.
know arrosed to further comelico Non of
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the hiding places for ren
Eility ny accountability, But
1.
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I think creation of a separate uit here and consolidation
would enhance accountability rather than make it more difficult.,
We have found out in our look at the Kennedy assassination
and I think in a number of other instances, COINTELPRO and so
on.
there was duplication and overlap and abuse and poor¨
nerformance and misperformance and about everything you can
think of going on here between the FBI and the CIA and maybe.
even the military.
So T think we have to look at something and not just
I think this is a sound
a mandate on counter-intelligence.
recommendation to make.
Sound
Mr. Miller. It doesn't have to be into a new agency.
It may be a relationship that is less than an agency.
Mr. Aaron. Is it the concept here that this organization
would conduct all the counter-intelligence activities abroad?'
I mean in other words, the counter-intelligence functions that
every station has to, in effect, conduct, for example that
establishes; perhaps nuts an agent in a local security service
to make sure that local security service is cooperating with
us and not cooperating with the Soviets.
22
23
24
28
That is the counter intelligence action. Is that somethin
this organization would do as well, or would there be
departmental counter intelligouce permitted?
Kirbow. If we're talking about duplicating in majer
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proportions. major as
agents for dual purposes
the FBI because they use their
if he isn't out here law enforcing
on a Friday afternoon, then he's doing whatever else he's
qualified to do in this field.
Mr. Miller. That's part of the reason perhaps that
some of the abuses have occurred, The grey area becomes very
murky indeed because of the dual nature of the agent's activities,
whereas the pursuit of foreion enemies, and ather than having
the band-offs of the situation that we've had in the past.
that consolidation might remate that problam and it might upon
examination lead to clarification of role and remove the
P
kinds of grey areas that existed in the past. But it's only
a suggestion to look into more thoroughly.
It's nothing more
4
than that and I think it has merit to at least look into
15
it thorough lv.
16
10
20
8
22
25
24
Mr. diGenova. That's a specific recommendation that the
new oversight committes consider that question.
Mr. Kirbow. I was just reminded by my colleagues that
that recommendation is rather innocuous. They can do anything
or not do anything.
I do think here again. as we suggested earlier we should
remove the words during the next year, because if they do
everything that we have recomponded, they won't have time to
do to lunch the s
thipat
the oversight committe
doing. Why don't we
so that
hyd-cosider this?. T think that
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20
21
Dure now directing anoth
committed to do many things within
a short perid of time and they may have more important
r commendations that they consider too.
Mr. Aaron. Now
Senator Huddleston.
I would like for our recommendations
to be more specific, but. I recognize that there are times when
we can't.
Do you
The natural question is going to be to us as members
what about recommending this study? Are you for it?
recommend it's a good thing or a bad thing? And our only
response can be. well, we don't know. We just think we ought
to look at it.
Mr. Aaron'. Well. I think in some cases we're really
talking about some ideas that deserve a measure of legitimacy
to be seriously considered.. I mean, for example, we Were
talking earlier about the DCT being separated from the Agency.
I think the way the Committed came out it was essentially to
Ģive legitimacy to the idea and its practicality or wisdom
one might well question and look at further with the oversight
committee.
I think that sort of falls in that same cafquery
22
Senator Huddleston:
1 it help any to say that
the fact that
because of the nature of this kind of activity
it does land itself to specific abuses, Pat they
de this?
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Mr. Kirbow. Senates the individuals. we don't have any
great big record that there were roque agents out there in the
FUI doing this. There were rogue policies down at the headquarter
Now if you have the same kind of roque policy in a new
agency, you'll have the same end result.
So it doesn't accomplish anything for us to do this and
point at the individuals because it was a principal.
Senator luddleston. I didn't specify individuals.
just said it has happened and it's the area where it is
susceptible.
Mr. Kirbow.
Certainly the potential for abuse is great
in this area and it should be studied carefully and probably
urgently by the Subcommittee.
committee.
I mean the new oversight
Senator Hart. It wasn't potential it was actual. I'd
like to see the committee recommend strongly that they go in
this direction on the basis of our 13 months of looking at the
damn thing.
I don't know how long you have to study some problem
before you do something shout it.
Senator Huddleston: Mall. I'm content to leave it as
it is. taking out during the next year.
Ms. Culbreth. nid
add military servi
de. Miller
That's a cand int
Mr
hows
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counter intelligence functia and lea
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out the agencies individuslļvi
Leave out the PRI and the CIA.
Mr. Miller. I think naming them is a good idea.
Senator Huddleston.
T quess this gets into the domestic
task force also.
Mr. Aaron. Yes.
The Committer will want to look at that
P
10
12
13
15
16
.1.7
12
20
Now if we go on to our next set of recommendations for
covert action. we can he halfway through the report. That
would be morring to page 18. where we will ta' e un a number of
recommendations related to covert action and paramilitary
activities. which relate to what the stated burrose in law
of these activities ought to be, what restrictions might be
placed upon them. what review and accountability procedures
might apply to them and what kind of controls from the Congress
standpoint might be placed on them from the standpoint of
either the budget or some other aspects, particularly the
paramilitary activities.
If we start with the first one on rage 48
Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, don't you think we ought
to skim lightly. Much as we are all desirous to get to that
halfway mark. I think we had better look at the text very lightly
beginning on nage 42. It wouldn't take very long to do that.
(Pause)
Senator Mathias.
ny problem with the Angola
24
reference
What bind of
jolaning to thise?
no
༈ ན ཏ
have a record to support the.
5
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10
Indonesian reference?
Mr. Bader. Yes. No have a maior study to support that.
In fact. one of our biggest studies.
Mr. diGenova.
That raises the issue. if I might say,
of a question that I just want to know as a matter of
information.
Have we resolved the question of whether or not the
Agency agrees to the releas of a second covert action paper.
when there was an agreement apparently reached before that ther:
would he only one covert action raper and that was on Chile?
What's the status of negotiations now to release the
☐
12
Indonesia paper? The one you're talking about.
13
Wasn't there another detailed carer on a covert action
14
maner that we were considering?
Mr. Aaron.
a paramilitary paner on
There was
Laos
15
16
which the Agency would like us to release and they are now
reviewing with the view toward permitting us to do so.
Senator Mathias. What about the Indonesian?
19
Mr. Miller. That's classified.
20
Mr. Kirbow. And the one on Greece?
Mr. Miller. That's classified,
22
support this comment.
Mr. Kirhow.
There is a classified record that will
Where ☐☐ not he
7
public recèrit, but
24
if you read this ther
at ik in our other
ronor
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Senator Huddleston
We nako some kind of a footnote
Mr. Rader. Senator on the result of the Indonesian
operation. the '57 operation is widely known but it was a
failure. We want to see in the Sumatra rebels and they failed
and so did we.
This was when
Pone was shot down.
Senator Huddleston, Pack on page 44. this term sheep.
is that sufficient?
Mr. Aaron. We had a To discussion of that. 25 a matter
Fact. He'll be guided he the Committee.
10
11
Senator Huddleston;
Sterilized equipment, what does
12
that mean?
13
Mr. Aaron. That's squipment whose origin cannot be
14
traced.
16
Serator Mathias. Phoquer is the editor, I hope that
16
some of these howevers that are used to begin sentences with
17
will be put following the first verb instead of at the beginning
19
10
of the sentence.
At the top of paga 49 T think you should wake that a
little stronger, effective Congressional oversight, too, if
20
they have the guts to wai
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mean if they don't use it,
22
It isn't worth anything.
Mr
dicenova.
would you mova to Put that
OR
Jauqua In theret
Cuptor Hathi-
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serinng ahr
I though
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I would like to be a 1441
! Core
. N
fi
Fl
Mr. Aaron. If there is the will to exercise it.
Senator Mathias. Because you know, you head into the
Executive Branch and there's an emotional appeal with the flag
waving and the Star Snandled Panuer being played on the Capitol
stops and all that kind of thing. It takes some courage, and
I don't think, we ought to downplay the fact that, just the
mero
fact that you hold the matter of the nurse, that it makes
it an easy nower to exercis
Serator, Huddleston.
All right, we're ready for
13
16
10
20
recommendation number 1 on Dage 43
Mr. Aaron. I'm going to ask Bill Mader to speak to these
recommendations.
He has done the major pork on this. I'll
just simply make one point with regard to the first one, and
that is that in giving the Ateneu a charter and writing down
some of the things that it
to do, including the conduct of
covert operations, the concept would be to use the Title I
device of trying to also set forth some of the purposes of
these missions that the Agongy would he viven and in that
context the general injunctions of
The first recommenation would arise to be sure mented
by the specifics that follow
PA
Mr. Pader. I trust the teroato is clear her
intended in the first justince be underli sa the vie
It is
the
Committee that the use
ction should !
eption
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art and not a routine me
It
is also intended to
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30
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22
underline the Committee mesition that covert action again in
the exceptional nature should he used only when other means
will not do.
And then it goes On to talk about that there should be
procedures for seeing that there is both careful and thoughtful
and thorough consideration of the general policies governing
covert action and that the procedures include participation
of policy.makers at the highest level and be marked by
accountability.
What we're intending to do here is to underline there
various points. the exceptional natur: fill accountability
thorough systematic review.
Mr. Inderfurth. The first is legislation authorizing
the conduct of covert actions makes clear. That seems to be
sort of present legislation. There is none.
Mr. Aaron. It should say, recommendation 1, that the
legislation authorizing the conduct of covert actions make
clear that its purpose is to respond.
Mr. Maxwell. The problem is there isn't following from
the charter section in the first set of recommendations, the
recommendation other than the very early one about MSC that
a charter for the CIA authorising the following functions should
be drawn and that because there is not
in this section.. I thich nigh's
that recommendation
P mmcnt is apprentiatel
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Mr. Inderfurth.
dust add a Line that that charter
should state that and then go into this.
Mr. Kirbow. Are you recommending a revision of the
1947 Act to change the charter of the CIA or to make it clearer
or more specific. or do you want to simply indicate here that
the Committee recommends that by statute, covert operations
12
141
19
13
14
16
12
or covert action be authorized?
Mr. Inderfurth, I thin it should all be in one piece
in the omnibus legislation.
Mr. Maron. Yes. I think that in fact in the beginning
and also in the section it simply says that the CIA is
authorized to conduct, if you will. espionage and that it also
ought to authorize. It also suggests that they're authorized
to conduct a certain amount of counter-intelligence.
Mr. Rader. We can ac now to page 49 where we have
attempted here to lay out for the Subcommittee's consideration.
Mr. Maxwell. Just one comment on 48. The first clause
after the semicolon, there may be a more artful way of saying
12
20
that legislation should make sure that procedures be developed
within the Executive Branch..
Is that designed to do that by legislation or is that
= recommendation?
We made some recommendations by statute to
22
23
set un a machanism, and there may be more artiful way of
24
seving that.
Mr. Bader.
can just go from His procedures
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131
be developed within the dutive Branch.
Mr. Miller. You can do this in various ways by requirement
of reporting to the Congress.
Mr. Bader. On page 49, top of the page! we come to the
hard problems here, and this section is addressed to the question
of specific prohibitions on varieties of covert action. It
notes that the Committee has after its investigation of alleged
assassination attempts has recommended a statute to forbid
R
ດ
such activities.
What we nut before the Committee
11
13
14
for
consideration is
a staff list of other possible recommendations. You can see
the first bracketed one where there is some dispute as to
whether that should be so included is all political assassinations
That is to move from foreign leaders to all political
15
16
assassinations, and we can come back to that. The others you
can see are clear, and we would welcome comment.
Senator Mathias. What about religious assassiations?
Mr. Bader.
That seems to be part of the problem, Senator,
18
with using all political assassinations.
19
20
hard at that stage to be limited.
21
2
24
It becomes a bit
Mr. Davis; The Executive Order bas all political
assassinations.
They are ahead of us.
Sepator Huddleston.
In the hill that we have prepared
and introduced what doce t sayi
Mr. Rader. It does note that the Executive order does
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End
tate 115 a step further,
Senator Huddleston,
we introduced an anti-assassina-
tion bill. didn't we?
Mr. Bader. Yes. That spoke to foreign leaders.
Mr. Maxwell.
The hill itself, I think, would have covered
foreign individuals as well as, because leadership was
broadly defined.
SO
་
7
10
Part of the problem
the recommenda'ion that came out
at the staff level was that anything that re Sa about non-
foreign leaders or domestic assassinations or the liko implied
that the Committee had investigated allegations about that and
1 might imply that some crédence should be given to charges that
the Agency had been involved in attempts to assasinate people
14
15
16
17
18
in the United States, and that was the problem of trying
to word some prohibition that went beyond the bill that has
already been introduced by the Senators.
Mr. Kirbow. Or of some lesser military-type individual
in a foreign country. You know, assassinating a sergeant is
19: pretty bad as far as he is concerned but it would not necessarily
he political.
20
Senator Huddleston, What about neace time? Should that
22
be in there?
27
Mr. Kirbow.
time and war time
I question wheth
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bill distinguished between peace
not having done that before, that
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133
political assassinations need to be discussed forther as a
prohibition at all.
Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps if the Senators think it is
1 desirable to say something, the staff could get language which
would not imply in any way that the Committee has found credible
evidence that the CIA was engaged in activities beyond this.
but which would reflect their desire not to their desire to
make clear that the CI could
10
12
14
6
not do that:
Mr.
Kirbow. It's a
moral
finding that it isn't
necessarily based on wrongdoing in the past.
Senator Mathias. It's repetitive but that's all right.
for emphasis.
Mr. Kirbow. We could work on the language and show it.
to you again.
Senator Mathias,
What about the second one?
16
Mr. Aaron. I'm not quite clear on this first one.
We
17
will draft some language that makes clear that we did not
13
find any evidence of anything other than what we've found?
19
20
Mr. Kirhow. That us didn't find any evidence that would
indicate that they had engaged in these other types of
assassination activities but that we would prohibir
21
anyway,
22
23.
other than political leaders. In that, though, we considered
that major or colonal over in one of; in the health sifuration
:
committen. thing.
and show yon the addit'
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can make this clear
Tebow jos because I
that the
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concern that it not
that we had just not revealed.
that
we had found son evidence
Mr. Bader. Perhaps it would be helpful. Senator, but
at the same time the Administration has come forward with
Language of all political assassinations, which seems
would indicate that it's not a question of a finding.
to me
Senator Huddleston. We ought to recommend passage of
the hill that we have subai Sted. if nothim T Iso;
Kichow. And continue to support that legislation.
I think von could just add right on to this. We recommended it
then and the Committes continues to support enactment of sych
Jeuialation.
Mr. Aaron. Number 2 boring the Committee has already
macommended following its investigation of allegal assassination
attempts, a stature to forbid such activities.
continues to endorse that.
The Committee
Mr. Maxwell. It could say the Committee also endorses
or recommends that by statute the present. Executive Order in
19
regard to permitting any political assassination he acted in
20
21
peace tina.
Senator Huddleston. What about democratically elected
overnments?
22.
Scaator Mathias.
23
na do both? Why don t wa
may the Committee Siberaber
S that nosition and
24
the Presidential Atrager 4
They may not hé atarkly sorallel but
25
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support both.
Mr.
Aaron. Would that include supporting the Executive
Order provision being in the law or just supporting?
Senator Mathias. And the Presidential. why don't
7.742 he ambiguous?
Mr. Kirbow. We endorse the concept.
Mr. Davis. If they're not different.
Mr. Aicenowa. There is a recommendation here that other
times of covert action which should be hamned, nd since we're
talking about a statute which we have submitted which bans
it we would then han hy statute, recommend banning by statute
all political assassinations which would enlarge the President's
Executive order into a law and then the rest of these just
assuming for the sake of argument that the Committee wanted to
do that, it would be a recommandation for legislation which
15
16
would ban all peacetime political assassinations.
Mr. Kirbow. The staff could work on that language a
17
18
C:
little and get it back to you.
I think we know what you want to do here, don't you.
David?
20
Mr. Aaron. Yes. I think we can make a fix, just make
21
22
25
25
the point that the political assassinations point is putting
in law what the Executive Order is as proposed by the mxecutive
Order or as provided by the Trecutive Op
Senator Huddleston.
All right. Je's then to berthrow
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democratically elected
srements.
Mr. Inderfurth. I might mention that Cyrus Vance went
beyond this. He said all interference in the electoral processes.
of a country should be banned, which goes beyond this.
Senator Mathias. Perhaps that was some subliminal
i
influence on me. but I've written down efforts to subvert a
valid electoral process.
It seems to me that that is better because when you
talk about overthrowing a depocratically elected government,
God knows what that is. And I don't know that you're really
going to know what a valid electoral process is. The Republic
of Venice, where they have a very limited electorate, elected
those. But nonetheless, it was their constitution and it
wasn't very democratic. But whatever it is, and this would be
in line with George Cannon's testimony also.
We finally have acknowledged that the Soviet Union has
a legislature of sorts and we acknowledge their electoral
process although we don't think much of it.
Ms. Culbreth. Would your use of the term subvert, would
vou intend to include within that preventing the CIA from
any kind of political or propaganda in connection with the
elections in another country of any kind of support to one of
the candidates that wo night think was a better endddate?
24.
Mr
Kirbow
Wall
idir lth of
Mr. Culbreth. Pat could von not subvert the results by
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2.
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influencing the carrying out of the election?
Senator Huddleston.
every time we run.
we subvert our own elections
Senator Mathias. The original suggestion was efforts
to overthrow democratically elected governments.
of these
I mean both
efforts to subvert the results of a valid electoral
process.
Senator Huddleston.
Mr. Inderfurth.
think that's all right.
In 77 sonse what is a democratically
elected government?
Moynihan says that in the U.N. there are 24, so in
sense we could actually list them.
13
1.1
Mr. diceneva. What about, what is a valid electoral
process? Whatever it is in each country? I mean the communists
have one party and that's a valid electoral process in that.
16
country.
17
Senator Mathias. This would be Cannon's advice.
18
Senator Huddleston.
Well, I think we have to recognize
19
the right of another country to have their electoral process
and it would be valid if someone in that country were attempting
20
21
to circumvent their established constitutional processes.
00
Mr. Maxwell. The qualifier in the Senator's proposal
was democratic, so that ar Toast in some way it restricts the
notion of a dictator.
Senator Buckle
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in there.
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Mr. Miller. What chans would this brohibit?
actions in the past it would prohibit Chile. Iran
in e
In our
Mr. Kirbow. That start of the Chile operation.
Mr. Miller. Guatemala
Senator Huddleston. T would not prohibit Angola..
Mr. Aaron. It would neghibit some things that transpired
Mr Miller. It would prohibit the actions in Italy.
wouldn't it. and Prance?
Sepator Huddleston.
Do wore ingt assisting one
TE depends on the term subversion.
Mr. Myhow. Assisting the head of an cleation during
the election process dopelnot appear to be the intert of
the Committee.
Mr. Aaron, I wouldn't think that what is going on in
Portugal insofar as we know that that is would come under this
prohibition.
Mr. Miller, So it would reall affect the conce like
Iran, Guatemala, and Chila.
Aaron. And Indonesia
Senator Juddleston:
Caba
Aaron
thakor
MEBL NH but I
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Mr. Inderfurth.
just to be a devil's advocate for
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a moment, we don't want to insert then, using your language,
Senator, the efforts to influence or subvert the results of
a valid electoral process?.
Senator Mathias.
That may be too short a leash.
Mr. Inderfurth. But I think that's a question the
Committee has to address. It would be a very short leash.
Senator Huddleston. Hell. there are different ways to
influence and there may be a proner way to influence.
Mr. Inderfurth. If there were A Droner. then perhaps
one could define the improper way. influencing by passing money,
covert propaganda. and that type of thing.
Mr. Kirhow. If the Committes's intention is after
the person is elected and you don't want to prevent that kind
Of
merson being put into office by any means, then you do it
here.
If you do not intend as a committee to preclude using
the press or using other things to influence the outcome of
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the election, then we should be solid on that and stay out
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of that area. But it's up to the committee to decide.
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Bader.
This language speaks to subverting the
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results, not influencing the outcome.
Mr. Kirbow. And he say that was his intent.
Sonater in Heston, This does not preclude u from
Gotting involved asimé Hid in
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Mr. Bader. Or
Senator Huddleston,
}
That's not a subversion of the
process, that's an assistance.
Senator Mathias.
That's participation in the process.
Mr. Inderfurth, What about after an election but prior
to the formation of a coalition government?
Senator Mathias. I would think that would be subverting.
are to ried about who
R
if you get in there and sau
these pecule have elected.
well We
I didn't know it
General Haig until this afternoon
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but I was aware that some American official had made a
threat to Mitterand that he would be in trouble if he were
oldated Prime Minister and attempted to bring some radical
leftists into the French Cabinet.
Now it seems to me that that is a threat to subvert the
French electoral process and if in fact we carried out that
threat I think that that would be prohibited by this language.
Mr. Aaron. I take it the word subvert aces to covert
activities.
In other words, if Ceneral Haig said that privately
but didn't mean it in forms of covert action, he just said the
United States government will
Senator Mathias. I think the President of the United
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States or the Secretary!
F
or the Secretai
of Defense
might were
Felevision cameras and
might say Took, if woning a
nick in the Trench Cabinet
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and under the parliament
then von aive him access to
NATO's secrets, then there's going to be hell to pay and we're
telling you right now.
I don't think that's nɛohibited.
But if ve shadow man around and catch him in some
L
compromising personal position and use the photographs to
blackmail him. or anything of that sort
Mr.
Dader. That's a covert action project.
Sevator Huddleston. There's no bucation that this
10. whole matter of internal, internahtion in another country
Mr. Kirbow, Senator, whatever you say here is going
one of the highest considerations aison br the Full
to be
Committee.
Senator Juddleston T fool there qught to be some
restrictions and constraint on our interference in the
rnment.
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internal operation of the
Mr. Aaron. The next ons
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☐ support for his beliefs or
other internal security - other security grouns which engage
in torturo.
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Senator Huddleston.
Don't we have soins larislation to
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that effect?
Mr. Maron: There
amendments: regarding foreign
aid.
Now this is onen foreign aid. We're talkies about covert
assistance
difonova. This drean't make
S
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Mr. Kirbow. Whic
in torture.
Senator Mathias. Top I make a semantic suggestion here.
that we try to bring this in line with the language in the
Constitution. cruel and jinusualrunishment, because I think
this really reflects. if it's going to mean anything, we ought
to be reflecting our national ethic in both of these, both
in subverting the results of a valid electoral process-
Senator Huddleston,
you get into the question
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of canitaj punishment.
Mr. Maxwell. There's another problem and that is one
of the things that the fortur a engaged in is before a
person has been judged to be guilty of a crime. someone who
is being tortured in an interrogation that nersch would not
be subject to cruel and pausual punishment but the systematic
violation of human rights or some other
Senator Mathias. That's a phrase. though. with which
Americans have been familiar since 1787. and it seems to me
it has some value.
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Senator Hart. alia problem is we don't give serious
thought to the way we treat prisoners in this country.
Senator Mathias.
I think that's a problem.
think
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thing.
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were exposed. 'vou
Someone once said at the time that the Italian bayments
4.1. - Pussians do This
nobody blinka at de
the time and
course, the differance da
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around and reaching all of
the world about our high ethical
standards and then when
are shown that we don't live up to
our own standards, that's what brings us the retribution.
But I still think that we ought to notwithstanding that
this is an opportunity for some linkage with the Constitution.
Put I don't press the point. just offer it.
Senator Huddleston. Dell. I think this is something
we should all give some thought to in the west few hours.
Mr. KirboW. If we are going to do that. way I suggest.
that here we talk about support for polier or internal security
forces.
The remainder of that sentenes
shouldn't we apply it
Otherwise
so that it is the policy of the country involved?
re talking about aid in in covert mannx governed by maybe
an inadvertent, without authority type series of exposures
of torture and whatnot. and you cut off the ail to a country.
Mr. Aaron. Can I speak to that point?
I think that Charley raises an interesting example and
we have sort of that bid of situation beday in Brazil where
it is difficult to ascertain whether it is the polic of the
government or whether the internal security forces which are
very fragmented among the milf cry and the states and what
have you whether these internal security force airlice are
just on their own
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Mr. Aaron.. I think this is the question. It goes to
the point not of assistance to the government in general or
even covertly, but assistance to these particular forces, and
that I think does narrow it down to the problem.
Senator Huddleston.
security forces?
What kind of support do we give the
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Mr. Kirhow. Training.
Mr. Aaron. We have in the past. we can give them
technical, training, electronic devices.
Mr. Kirbow. A whole spectrum except for U.S. military
support.
Mr. diGenova. Some of the proprietaries were used
for exactly that purpose, to provide training and secure
procurement and sale and loan of devices which ultimately
found their way into the hands of foreign torturers.
We certainly don't dentive the Agency of any legitimate
source of intelligence because they themselves claim that they
have never engaged in this activity knowingly and don't want
to.
They say they don't want anything to do with this type
of activity and they say they don't want to be involved with
internal police forces that conduct this type of activity.
They have said recently that they have discontinued
those sorts of liisons, so En prohibit them by banning it
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seems to was to say fine are with you and we will do it.
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Mr.
Aaron. What occurs to me is that it would be helpful
to have a finding on this point.
..
Mr. diGenova. That's the next issue I was going to
raise. We don't write anything about this any place in the
report.
Senator Huddleston.. Does the Agency have a directive
to that effect that they have discontinued or are discontinuing
that we can refer to and say we approve of it?.
Mr. Inderfurth..
As well as in the Chile covert action
study there is discussion of liaison with the current Chilean
internal security forces and that the CIA was saving, wel
we want to talk to them but we don't ant to be involved
what they're doing and we want to try to stop them from their
practices of torture and the rest.
So I mean that's something we can look to as a basis
for our findings.
Mr. diGenova. There's also a parallel with the drug
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Mr. Aaron. Senator shall we try to see
We can
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come back with some language that tries to work in the
Constitutional, point? I must say I personally have a little
difficulty figuring out how you turn this around to try to
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honly to what the police do?
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Senator Matias.
Letis think about it.
Senater Huddleston.
Let's not back at 7:30. That's a
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whole two hours and a half.
(Whereupon, at 5:00 p.m. the hearing in the above
mentioned matter was recessed, to reconvene at 7:30 o'clock.
n.m. of the same day.)
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