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TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF JANUARY 30, 1964.
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SUMMARY OF JANUARY 30, 1964 MEETING
AGENDA FOR JANUARY 30, 1964 MEETING
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2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
MINUTES.
O F
MEETING.
OF
JANUARY 30, 1964
206-10001-10002
NW
NW 185
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 30, 1964
ITEM
TIME
SUBJECT
1.
9:00
10:00
2.
10:00 11:00
3.
11:00
-
11:30
Chairman's Time
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Lt. General Marshall Carter
Executive Session
4.
11:30 - 12:30
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Under Secretary Brockway McMillan, USAF
5.
12:30 1:45
6.
1:45 - 2:30
7.
2:30 - 4:00
8.
4:00 - 5:00
9.
5:00 - End of
Day
Executive Session
Lunch--White House Mess
Consideration of Report to the President
Meeting with the President
Executive Session and Discussion of
Future Board Business.
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hend you
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
January 20, 15641
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER JENKINS
Following up on the recent conversation which you
had with Mr, Clark Clifford, Chairman of the President
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, there are listed
below the names of the personnel of the Board who are
scheduled to meet w with the President on January 30 ab
4:00 PM
Clark Clifford
William 0
Bater
Con Temer Do 11ttle
Gordon Gre
Dr. Edwin II. Land
William L Langer
Robert D. Mayphy
Frank Paco, Jr.
J. Patrick Coyno
Washington, D. C.
Murray Hill, N. J.
Redondo Beach, Calif.
Washington, D. C.
Cambridge, Phas
Cambridge, Mass
New York, N. Y.
New York, N. Y.
Washington, D. C.
Copies of this memorandum are being provided to
Mr. Kenneth O'Donnell and Mr. Pierre Salinger for their
information.
Mr. Kenneth O'Donnell
Mr. Pierre Salinger
3. Patrick Coyra
Executive Secretary
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Attached memoranda (Tabs A through H) were used
by the Chairman as the basis for an oral briefing
on the Origin of the Board at the PFIAB meeting
with President Johnson on January 30, 1964.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
This document con
No.
4
_o 16 Copters, Bories
pages
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December 1, 1963.
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
(3)
Origin of the Board: From 1946 to 1954 a variety of ad hoc groups
were constituted at the Presidential level to review selected aspects
of the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort.
In 1955 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government recommended a permanent bi-partisan "Watch
Dog Committee" (to be composed of members of both Houses of Congress
and of public-spirited citizens) to make periodic surveys of the
organization, functions, policies and effectiveness of the foreign
intelligence activities of the several Government agencies concerned,
reporting thereon both to the Congress and the President. President'
Eisenhower rejected this proposal.
In February 1956, as a tactic to forestall creation of a Watch
Dog Committee, President Eisenhower issued an Executive Order (Tab A)
establishing his own Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities, to maintain a continuing, independent review of all U.S.
foreign intelligence activities. President Eisenhower's Board
functioned continuously from February 1956 to January 1961.
membership of the Eisenhower Board is listed under Tab B.)
(The
In January 1961, President Kennedy decided that there was a
continuing need for a Presidential advisory board on foreign intelli-
gence, but deferred temporarily the appointment of new members. In
the interim he requested that the Executive Secretary of the prior.
Board remain in office and that he continue to review and report
to the President on the conduct of our foreign intelligence effort.
Mission of the Board: On May 4, 1961 following the disaster suffered
by the U.S. at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the President, by Executive Order
No. 10938 (Tab C), established the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. This Order directs the Board (a) to conduct a con-
tinuing, independent review and assessment of all functions of the
departments and agencies having responsibilities in "the foreign
intelligence and related fields" and (b) to advise the President with
respect to the objectives and conduct of these activities, which
are required in the interest of foreign policy, national defense
and security. The phrase "related fields" pertains to highly
sensitive covert operations relating to political action, propaganda,
economic warfare, sabotage, escape and evasion, subversion against
hostile states or groups and support of indigenous and anti-communist
elements in threatened countries of the free world. These covert.
operations are to be conducted in such manner that, if uncovered,
the U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim responsibility for them.
Membership of the Board: President Kennedy's Executive Order
provides that "members of the Board shall be appointed from among.
qualified persons outside the Government. All appointments to
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the Board have been made on that basis. (The Board's membership is.
listed under Tab D.) The Board was chaired initially by Dr.
James Killian, Jr. In April 1963 when Dr. Killian resigned, President
Kennedy appointed Mr. Clark Clifford as Chairman. In appointing
Mr. Clifford, the President directed that the Board "continue to
perform the highly important function of maintaining an independent
review and assessment of the objectives and conduct of the foreign
intelligence and related activities of the departments and agencies
having responsibilities in this field." (Tab E):
Coincident with Mr. Clifford's appointment, the President
made a public announcement emphasizing that he would "continue to
look to the Board for non-partisan, objective appraisals of the
activities of our intelligence agencies in order to assure their
efficient management and maximum effectiveness. (Tab F.).
It
Review Procedures of the Board: The Board maintains its continuing,
independent review and assessment of U.S. foreign intelligence
activities and covert action operations through the following means:
(1) Panels (composed of designated Board Members and the
Executive Secretary) which are responsible for keeping the full
Board informed with respect to significant actions, problems, gaps,
overlaps, and deficiencies in specified areas of the overall foreign
intelligence effort.
(2) On-the-scene reviews, both in the U.S. and abroad, of
intelligence-related activities. These reviews (made by designated
Members and/or the Executive Secretary) encompass pertinent activ
ities of the CIA, the Departments of State and Defense, the Unified
and Specified Commands; the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the
Such
National Security Agency and the Service Cryptologic Agency in the
reviews have been made at the Seat of Government, elsewhere..
Continental U.S., in Latin America, Scandanavia, Europe, Africa,
the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East.
(3) Review of periodic progress reports and special reports
submitted to the Board by the military and civilian intelligence
agencies.
(4) Review of major intelligence publications, produced on a
daily, weekly, monthly, or "spot" basis by the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and
by the U.S. intelligence community collectively. These publications
include current intelligence reports and appraisals of significant.
day-to-day developments, National Intelligence Estimates, Special
Intelligence Estimates, and the intelligence results of satellite
and aircraft reconnaissance missions.
(5) Briefings on selected intelligence topics from agency.
heads and other officials associated with the several U.S.
agencies
Discussions as appropriate with the Secretaries of
State and Defense the Chairman JCS, the President's Special
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Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Heads of the several intelligence agencies.
(7) Frequent meetings of the full Board. A
Meetings of the Board: From May 1961 through November 1963,
President Kennedy's Board held 25 separate meetings covering a
total of 39 days. These meetings included sessions with the
President, which provided opportunities for discussion of topics of
major significance. (President Eisenhower's Board held 18 meetings.
covering a total of 39 days during its five-year tenure.).
Recommendations of the Board: During the past 2 years the Board
submitted to the President a total of 170 recommendations, summar-
ized under Tab G. (During its five year tenure the Eisenhower
Board made 42 recommendations; these are summarized under Tab H.)
A large percentage of the recommendations made by President Kennedy's
Board involved activities internal to the Department of Defense; a
lesser proportion involved activities internal to the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Department of State; a number of them
related to activities of joint interest to two or more member
agencies of the Intelligence Community. Of the 170 recommendations,
the President approved 125, disapproved 2, and temporarily deferred
final action on the remainder. Of the 125 approved recommendations
implementing actions on 85 have been substantially completed. The
remaining Presidentially-approved recommendations deal with
substantive intelligence matters warranting continued Board attention
and, possibly, the submission of further Board recommendations to
the President.
Intelligence Areas of Major Concern: These include:
tes
(1) The ever-increasing cost, size and complexity of the
overall intelligence effort. This fiscal year the effort will
cost $3.7 billion. Its personnel strength is in excess of 149,000.
(Of this number, over 131,000 are in, the Department of Defense and
17,000 in CIA.) The effort is diffused throughout a number of
Government agencies including the Departments of State, Defense,
Army, Navy, Air Force; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the
National Security Agency; the Service Cryptologic Agencies; the
Unified, Specified and Component Commands; and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(2) The acquisition on a priority basis of crucially-needed
intelligence on the long-range missile capability of the Sino-Soviet
bloc
(3) The National Reconnaissance Program for the collection of
photographic and signals intelligence through surveillance satellites,
manned aircraft and drones (e.g. CORONA, LANYARD, GAMBIT, ARGON, U-2,
OXCART TAGBOARD).
(4) The Signals Intelligence Program for the interception and
analysis of the governmental and military communications of foreign
governments, and of electronics emanations associated with their
missile and space vehicle activities
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(5) The handling and analysis of intelligence information
(received in massive amounts) as the basis for (a) the preparation
of appraisals of current intelligence indicators, and early warn-
ing data for timely consideration by the President and other.
officials, and (b) the formulation of longer-range national
intelligence estimates for use in the policy-making process..
(6), The U. S. clandestine espionage effort for the collection
of vitally-needed intelligence concerning the plans, actions and
capabilities of the Sino-Soviet bloc in areas significantly affect-
ing our national defense and security.
(7) The safeguarding of sensitive U.S. information (including
intelligence and intelligence sources and techniques) by means of
(a) positive counterespionage penetration of Soviet bloc intelli-
gence operations targeted against our Government on a world-wide
basis, (b) the security screening and security supervision of
personnel engaged in sensitive U.S. Government activities, and
(c) physical security measures for the protection of sensitive
U.S. material, installations and operations.
(8) The covert operations conducted by the CIA in political
action, propaganda and related fields with the objective of
influencing the complexion and orientation of selected foreign
governments.
(9) The budgeting and management, particularly in the
Department of Defense, of the complex programs which make up our
total foreign intelligence effort. (Over 85% of our foreign >
intelligence dollar expenditures falls within the management and
control responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.)
(10) The coordination and guidance of all significant aspects
of our entire foreign intelligence effort as a means of achieving
maximum effectiveness in meeting critical intelligence needs of
our Government.
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December 1, 1963
(i)
Rec. #1:
(1).
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED TO
THE PRESIDENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
May 1961
November 22, 1963
Board Reports of July 2, July 18,
October 4, and October 17, 1961.
The Board made a series of 17 recommendations
calling for (1) a redefinition of the role of
the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
and (2) a reorganization and redirection of
the activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). These recommendations were
submitted on the basis of a Board study re-
quested by the President in anticipation of
the appointment of a new DCI which subsequently
took place on November 29, 1961. The Board
recommended as follows:
That the President designate the DCI as the.
Government's chief intelligence officer having
primary responsibility for lending coordination
and guidance to the total U. S. foreign intel-
ligence effort.
That the DCI consider establishing a small
staff to assist him in providing coordination
and guidance to the intelligence effort.
That the DCI, although retaining over-all
responsibility for the CIA, be directed by the
President to assign to the Deputy DCI the
day-to-day operational direction of the CIA.
That the DCI be housed in the Executive Office
of the President, in order to emphasize his
role as chief intelligence officer of the
United States.
That the DCI consider taking with him to the
Executive Office those CIA personnel engaged
in the preparation of national intelligence
estimates and evaluations.
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(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
That the DCI participate with the Bureau of the
Budget in its review of the intelligence budgets
of the various U. S. intelligence agencies.
That the DCI be responsible for (1) overseeing
the preparation of national, intelligence estimates
by the intelligence community, (2) assuring the
timely flow of intelligence to the White House,
and (3) providing intelligence briefings to the
President and other White House officials as
required.
That the DCI serve as Chairman of the U. S.
Intelligence Board (USIB) and represent the
President on intelligence policy matters at
the national level.
That CIA (1) place increasing emphasis on the
acquisition of "hard" intelligence, and
(2) decrease the excessive emphasis being
placed upon covert action programs.
That CIA devise means for identifying and
eliminating covert action programs of low.
potential.
That CIA consider the feasibility of trans-
ferring clandestine operations and covert.
operations from CIA to some other agency.
That, if feasible, the headquarters administra-
tion of all or portions of clandestine
activities be relocated to points outside
of Washington (e.g., to New York City, and
other appropriate points).
(13)
That deeper cover be achieved for all clandestine
activities and covert actions.
(14)
That efforts be made to reduce the visibility
of our foreign intelligence activities
through (1) action by the DCI to reduce to
a minimum the appearances of CIA officials
before Congressional Committees) and (2) action
by officials of all intelligence agencies to
refrain from public statements concerning
substantive intelligence matters.
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Rec. #2
Rec
Rec. #4
Rec.
#5
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(15)
That improvements be achieved in the quality
of CIA personnel.
(16)
That consideration be given to a possible
change in the name of the CIA..
(17)
That there be realignments in the organiza-
tion and staffing of the CIAS with a view toe
increasing its effectiveness.
That positive action on the new leadership
of CIA be taken as soon as possible.
Board Report of July 2, 1961
oce
That the Department of State and the CIA conduct
a study of the number of CIA representatives
serving overseas under official State Department
cover, with a view to an orderly reduction of
such cover positions in appropriate instances.
That the U. S. Intelligence Board create t
the
means for assessing and reporting early warning-c
indications of developing "cold war" crisis udsetery
situations in any part of the world (such early
warning to be handled separately from
indications dealt with in the National Indica-
tions Center of the U. S. Intelligence Board's
Watch Committee).
hot war
That there be a strengthening of the capabilities
of the National Security Agency (NSA) in the
acquiring and processing of Communications
Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence,
through the following means: (1) new legislation
authorizing the Department of Defense to
summarily deny or revoke
employment at NSA
of any person unless such loyment is found
to be consistent with national security interests;
(2) ne legislation exempting the NSA from
statutes and regulations governing employment in.
the U. S. civil service, as required to enable
NSA to accomplish its sensitive and vital mission;
(3) a requirement for full management and budgetary
control of NSA by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense; (4) central supervision by NSA of all:
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Rec. #6:
Rec. #7:
Rec. #8:
Rec. #9:
Rec. #10:
Rec. #11:
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collection and processing of Electronics
Intelligence (ELINT) done by military intel-
·ligence elements within the Department of
Defense; (5) a realistic re-examination of
the system followed by the U. S. Intelligence
Board in levying intelligence collection re-
quirements upon the NSA; and (6) support by
the Defense Department to meet such vital needs
of NSA as ship-borne intercept stations, and
equipment for intercept coverage of submarines
and critical land areas, in order to meet
national as distinct from purely military
requirements.
That the President support the Secretary of
Defense in a reorganization of Defense Depart-
ment intelligence activities through the establish-
ment of a Defense Intelligence Agency.
(This recommendation, on the subject of possibly
changing the name of the CIA, is dealt with in
the summary of Rec. #1 (16), above)..
That the President oppose: (1) the establishment.
of a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign
Intelligence; and (2) Congressional investigations
of the CIA.
That every effort be made to protect the Presi-
dent against public identification with specific
clan-
destine espionage activities, and (2) covert
political, propaganda, psychological, para-
military and related activities.
That the President lend his influence in
persuading Congress to reduce its demands for
testimony by officials of the CIA.
That the Departments of State and Defense, and
the CIA, be requested to report semiannually
on the status of their respective actions to
implement the 43 recommendations made on
December 15, 1961, by the Joint Study Group
on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
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Rec. #12:
Rec. #13
Rec. %14:
That the President lend his prestige (in the
period of transition involving the selection of
a new DCI, and related matters) to support and
enhance the morale of the intelligence.com-
munity, and to restore public confidence in
the CIA, by: (1) a Presidential statement
commending the work of those serving in our
intelligence agencies; and (2) an indication
by the President of appreciation for the
long, distinguished and pioneering work of
Allen Dulles in the foreign intelligence field.
Board Report of July 18, 1961
That CIA review its plans for occupancy of the
newly-completed CIA Headquarters Building at
Langley, and consider the feasibility of housing.
at some other place the administration of
CIA's clandestine activities.
That the mechanism of the Special NSC 5412/2
Group be employed in such a manner as to ensure:
(1) political control of all covert actions
(including paramilitary operations whether or
not assigned to the Department of Defense); with
an opportunity for the Department of State
to bring suggestions and judgments to bear on
covert action operations in the planning and
execution stages; (2) the submission for resolu-
tion by the President of matters involving
disagreement by any member of the Special
Group with respect to a proposed, covert action
operation; and (3) a current review and evaluation
by the Special Group: of all
izations then in effent, in on rt action authori
that the
Department of State might be fully informed of
all such authorizations.
Rec #15:
Board Report of October 4, 1961
That the U. S. Intelligence Board make a thorough
assessment with a view to improving the collection,
coordination and analysis of intelligence con-
cerning scientific and technical capabilities
of the Soviet bloc.
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Rec. #16:
Rec. #17:
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That, because the need for intelligence on
Soviet nuclear and missile capabilities is
more urgent than the current need for geodetic
and mapping information, urgent action be
taken as follows: (1) the scheduling of as
many additional CORONA shots as possible
in, the coming months, with postponement of
ARGON shots, if necessary; (2) the THOR-CORONA
system to be relied upon as the photographic
reconnaissance "work horse" while other systems
are in the developmental stage; (3) a sufficient
number of CORONA systems be made available to
meet basic needs, either by ordering long
lead-time items beyond the present CORONA
system, or by ordering additional CORONA
systems until advanced systems are improved;
and (4) steps be taken to ensure launch pad
availability to permit future CORONA flights
for quasi-tactical objectives.
(Subsequently, based on information obtained
in the course of its continuing review of
the National Reconnaissance Program, the Board
submitted to the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs a report
dated July 5, 1963, in which the Board:
(1) noted a sugnificant series of failures
which had occurred in photographic reconnaissance
satellite missions, because of malfunctions of
booster and other systems; and (2) suggested
that the President's office appropriately re-.
emphasize the urgent need for achieving and
maintaining a dependable and continuing photo-
graphic reconnaissance satellite capability
lest our Government be denied vitally-needed
intelligence essential to our intelligence-
estimating and policy-formulating processes
relative to the Sino-Soviet bloc.)
That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group re-evaluate
and make recommendations to the President 
on 
the
desirability and feasibility of conducting
(under special security safeguards) U-2 photo-
graphic reconnaissance missions over selected
areas of the China mainland.
6.
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Rec. #18:
Rec. #19:
Rec. #20:
Rec. #21:
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That the DCI, as Chairman of the U. S. Intel-
ligence Board, explore the feasibility of
expediting the operational readiness date
(April 1963) of the new National Photographic
Interpretation Center at the Naval Weapons
Plant.
That (1) the Defense Department report on
the feasibility and status of two technical
projects initiated by the U. S. Air Force
to eliminate delays in the transmission of
critical Communications Intelligence and
Electronics Intelligence data to Strategic
Air Command Headquarters; and (2) the
Department of Defense comment on the adequacy
of interim remedial measures which the Board
had proposed as a tentative means of reducing
delays in the transmission of such intel-
ligence data to SAC headquarters.
That preparatory to a Board review of the
security of U. S, classified intelligence;
and intelligence sources and methods, the
DCI submit a detailed report on the imple-
mentation of the following: (1) Section 102-d-3
of the National Security Act of 1947 which
provides that the DCI shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure; and (2) Section 3
of National Security Council Directive No. 1
which prescribes methods by which the DCI,
in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board,
shall ensure the development of policies and
procedures for the protection of intelligence,
and intelligence sources and methods, from
unauthorized disclosure.
That at the earliest possible date action be
taken on the Board's previous recommendations
for a redefinition of the role of the DCI
and for an improved organization of CIA activities.
(See Rec. #1, above.)
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'
Rec. #22:
Rec. #23-8:
Rec. #23-b:
Rec. #23-0:
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Board Report of October 17, 1961
↑
The Board re-emphasized to the President its
convictions to the importance of outlining
to the newly-chosen DCI the objectives of
previous Board recommendations concerning
the coordinating role of the DCI. (See Rec. #1.)
With respect to the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), the Board proposed that it
review, with the Defense Department and the
CIA, the contemplated organizational structure
of the NRO for purposes of clarifying its
responsibilities and increasing its effective-
ness in the coordinated management and operation.
of all satellite and overhead reconnaissance
projects.
Board Report of June 26, 1962
With further reference to the National Recon-
naissance Office, the Board noted that the
NRO agreement between the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI was not adequate to support an
efficient NRO organization; and the Board recom-
mended further study to achieve a better
documentary basis for the NRO with particular.
reference to National Security Council directives
possibly in conflict with the NRO plan then
existing.
Board Report of March 8, 1963
With further reference to the National Recon-
naissance Office (NRO) the Board recommended
that a recently-completed draft of a new NRC
agreement be adopted by the Secretary of Defense
and the DCI, and that in the implementation of
the NRO plan there be: (1) a clear channel of
guidance and authorization from the policy
decisions of the President to the Secretary of
Defense and to the DCI; (2) a clear and effective
connection between the advance technology and
planning of the National Reconnaissance Program
and the development of plans for reconnaissance
capabilities for the Department of Defense
and the military services; (3) plans for improved
continuity of management of the NRO, particularly
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Rec. #24:
Rec. #25:
Rec. #26:
with respect to the availability of career
specialists heavily engaged in meeting schedules
for new satellites, aircraft and other recon-
naissance instruments; (4) action to ensure
that Department of Defense directives which
guide the National Reconnaissance Program
are consistent with pertinent directives from
higher authority, such as National Security
Council Intelligence Directives; and (5) within
the Defense Department a clarification of
present and planned relationships as between
the NRO, the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the National Security Agency.
Board Report of October 17, 1961
That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group review the
paramilitary operations being carried out by
the CIA in Laos (and elsewhere) to determine
whether those operations, given their present
scale, are properly assigned to the CIA.
(Not a recommendation this was a report to
the President on the progress achieved by the
Defense Department in performance of its share
of the responsibility for the efficiency of
the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network
for the quick transmittal of vital early warn-
ing and other intelligence data from oversea..
posts to headquarters in Washington.)
Board Report of January 11, 1962
Based on a review of advance intelligence con-
cerning the Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup incidents,
the Board recommended that: (1) a sense of urgency
be imparted at field and headquarters levels of
U. S. intelligence agencies, with a view to
ensuring timely reporting, dissemination and
assessment of intelligence indicating the im-
minence of crisis situations which are of potential
significance to the foreign policy and national
security interests of the United States;
(2) without imposing undue delay on the trans-
mission of raw intelligence to Washington,
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Rec. #27:
TOP SECRET
State Department officials at overseas posts:
prepare periodic appraisals of developing crisis
situations, for use at the field level and for
consideration at Washington in the preparation
of intelligence analyses and estimates;
(3) procedures of the U. S. Intelligence Board,
and its subsidiaries such as the Watch: Committee,
ensure that intelligence appraisals reflect
significant differences of view which may develop
in the intelligence estimative process; and
(4) in keeping with the DCI's responsibility for
the timely flow of intelligence to the White
House, the DCI be requested to review arrange-
ments and procedures to ensure that (a) CIA'S
intelligence assessments and spot reports on
developing crisis situations are made available
for timely consideration by the President
and other officials, and (b) copies of assess-
ments and spot reports to the White House from
other agencies are furnished to the DOI for
information and for use in preparing intelligence
estimates.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Board Report of January 20, 1962
Based on an on-the-scene review. (made by
representatives of the Board) of U. S. intel-
ligence activities in Egypt, Lebanon, Iran,
Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Israel, the Board
recommended as follows:
That U. S. Ambassadors be given an opportunity
to comment on the drafts of proposed National
Intelligence Estimates prepared in Washington
with respect to foreign countries to which
the Ambassadors are assigned.
That Political Sections and Ambassadors at
U. S. Embassies be given an opportunity to
comment on all political intelligence at the
time it is being sent to headquarters, except
when this would unduly delay the reporting
process.
That U. S. Ambassadors be made aware of the
capability and security of emergency clandestine
radio stations installed in selected U. S.
Embassies.
10
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(4).
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8).
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
TOP SECRET
That U. S. intelligence personnel be assigned
to overseas posts where best use can be m. de
of their language abilities.
That when intelligence information is reported
that later proves erroneous, appropriate
corrective notification be given to recipients
of the erroneous reports.
That the DCI and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, ensure the validity of intelligence
collection requirements levied upon the CIA
for support of the military in wartime.
That the Defense Department review the Attache
Systems of the three Military Services to
determine the advisability of establishing
a single Military Attache System.
That the Defense Department ensure adequate
foreign language. training of Military Attaches
prior to their assignment to overseas posts.
That the Defense Department staff Military
Attache posts on the basis of specific intel-
ligence needs and on the basis of linguistic
and other specialized talents.
That the Defense Department, for intelligence-
related purposes, ensure efficient allocation
of aircraft to Military Attaches at overseas
posts..
That the Defense Department equip field elements
of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Net-
work with capability for rapid communication of
critical messages among major and sub-
ordinate military commands in the field.
ہم
That the DCI review NSC 5412/2 and related National
Security Council Intelligence Directives, and
recommend. any necessary revisions to ensure
adequate guidance to U. S. Ambassadors and CIA
Station Chiefs overseas, with regard to
(1) covert actions directed at targets within
foreign countries, and (2) covert actions
directed against third country targets.
TOP SECRET
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(13)
(24)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
/
That the Signals Intelligence Panel of the
President's Board, in the course of its
review of National Security Agency operations,
determine whether significant intelligence
gathered by NSA intercept stations in the
field is being furnished to U. S. intelligence
agency consumers (and to field consumers) in
timely fashion.
That the U. S. Intelligence Board review
(1) the adequacy of criteria used for the
selection of a particular Military Crypto-
logic Service or the CIA for Communications
Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence
intercept operations in a given country;
and (2) the grounds for selecting targets
for such operations in a given foreign country.
That improvements be made in the communica-.
tions of the U. S. Embassy in Cairo,
particularly under emergency circumstances
which would not permit use of commercial
communications channels.
That the Defense Department consider changing
the Army Attache station in Lebanon from a
"hardship" to a "regular" post, to permit
longer tours of duty and continuity of
experience.
That the DCI and the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Army, improve the coordination
of clandestine espionage activities conducted
by the Army and the CIA in Iran (as called for
in National Security Council Intelligence
Directive No. 5).
That the National Security Agency make an
on-the-scene technical review of CIA's covert
Communications/Electronics Intelligence col-
lection effort in Behshahr, Iran, to ensure
maximum technical use of this strategically-
positioned activity against Soviet missile and
satellite operations.
-
12.
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(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
That the National Security Agency take steps
in Iran to ensure that: (1) the U. 
S. Embassy
.
is furnished significant intelligence developed
by the U. S. Army Security Agency 
intercept
detachment which is housed on the 
Embassy
grounds, and (2) the National Security Agency
provides to the Teheran CIA Station 
Chief any
data developed by the Army Security 
Agency
detachment, concerning (a) communications of
the Iranian security and intelligence forces,
and (b) illicit Soviet agent communications
networks targeted against Iran from 
Odessa.
That the State Department and CIA review the
situation in Iran with a view to
: (1) 
improving
the coordination of U. S. intelligence activities
in that country; (2) agreeing on procedures 
for
the handling by the U. S. Embassy of 
political
intelligence developed by the CIA in 
Iran;
and (3) maintaining an appropriate proportion
between the numbers of Foreign Service Officers
and CIA representatives assigned to the Political
Section of the Embassy in Iran..
That the DCI ensure that: (1) in Cyprus increasing
emphasis is placed on covert operations, particu-
larly in the trade union and newspaper 
fields;
and (2) the CIA Stations in Greece and 
Turkey
provide support to the covert action operations
of the CIA Station in Cyprus.
That the DCI ensure that the CIA Station Chief
in Cyprus keeps the U. S. Ambassador informed
of the nature of a clandestine intelligence
program in which the CIA Station Chief is engaged
with the Cypriot Minister of the Interior
.
That the DCI ensure that the U. S. Ambassador
in Athens is adequately informed about the
substantive nature of the special relationship
between the CIA Station Chief and the ruling
and policy-making officials of the Greek Govern-
ment.
That the DCI reassign CIA personnel who are in
excess of the requirements of the CIA 
Station
in Athens.
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(25)
(26)
That the DCI consider furnishing the U. S.
Ambassador in Tel Aviv with details of
CIA-Israeli intelligence undertakings
involving Africa.
That the DCI consider the proposal (made
to Board representatives by the Israeli
Intelligence and Security Service) calling
for (1) extended CIA-Israeli coordination
of intelligence activities in Latin America,
Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere; and
(2) a cooperative mechanism for the 
review
,
discussion and assessment of intelligence
problems relating to the Middle East and
peripheral countries.
(27) That the Air Force consider the assignment.
to Tel Aviv of an Air Force Attache 
having
jet fighter experience, because of the
intelligence significance of jet aircraft
operating in this area of the Middle East.
(28)
(29)
That officials making up the Special NSC
5412/2 Group: (1) examine the Turkish
government's request for access to operational
and early warning data of the NSA-
Service
Cryptologic intercept sites in Turkey;
CO-
(2) consider assigning to the U. S. Ambassador
in Turkey the responsibility for negotiating
the Turkish request; and (3) assure
ordination of the efforts of the many U. S.
elements in and out of Turkey which are working
on various aspects of the strategically-placed
U. S. Signals Intelligence activity in Turkey.
That the National Security Agency take steps
to ensure that: (1) the U. S. Army Security
Agency Detachments at Ankara pass significant
intelligence to the U. S. Ambassador, the
Embassy Political Section, the CIA Station
Chief, and to CIA headquarters in Washington;
and (2) improvement is made in the communications
capabilities of selected intercept sites in
Turkey, including the Tropospheric 
Scatter
System.
TOP SECRET
.14.
.
(30)
Rec. #28:
Rec. #29:
Rec. #30-a:
Rec. #30-b:
!
TOP SECRET
That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group review
the desirability and feasibility of C-130
aircraft reconnaissance flights over Iran
from Turkish bases, with a view to covering
Soviet missile tests and related activities..
That highest priority be placed on the ac-
quisition of crucially-needed intelligence..
on the Soviet ICBM capability, with special
and intensive efforts to advance the photo-.
graphic reconnaissance capabilities of the
OXCART and GAMBIT projects even earlier
than now programmed..
That, with regard to CORONA, OXCART and
other advanced intelligence collection pro-
jects: (1) prompt and stringent measures be
taken, within the intelligence community
and with outside contractors, to keep to.
the absolute, practicable minimum the number
of persons cleared for access to information
concerning such sensitive projects, and
(2) there be periodic security indoctrinations
of all persons cleared for access to such
information, including knowledge of the special
photographic capabilities involved.
That there be brought to the urgent attention
of the Secretary of State the intelligence
aspects of the U. S. space satellite program,
for consideration in connection with a United
Nations requirement for the registration by
member nations of all satellite launchings.
Board Report of May 16, 1962.
Subsequently, in a May 16, 1962 letter to the
President, the Board: (1) pointed out the
intelligence implications to the United States
of international discussions of agreements to
provide information on U. S. satellite launchings
to the United Nations and its Committee on
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; (2) urged that
U. S. control of the development of space
capabilities for national defense and intel-
ligence purposes not be foreclosed, diminished
or compromised; and (3) noted that the United
States, unlike the USSR, would lose a
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Rec. #31:
Rec. #32:
Rec. #33:
TOP SECR
crucially-needed intelligence, capability if
international agreements probibiting military'
uses of cuter space should preclude 
continued
use of our Government's highly effective
reconnaissance satellite intelligence activi-
ties. Accordingly, the Board recommended that:
(1) the United States formulate a 
clear position
.
on the relationship of our reconnaissance
satellite intelligence programs to international
discussion of peaceful uses of outer space;
(2) the President review and approve the position
to be taken by the United States on this subject
;
(3) U. S. representatives involved in UN
, Geneva
and other discussions be appropriately briefed
on the sensitive U. S. intelligence collection
program involved; and (4) differing points 
of
view among U. S. Government officials 
on this
subject be resolved as soon as possible.
Board Report of January 20, 1962
That there be a re-examination of the scatus,
of the DCI, to determine whether his relative
position and salary are in keeping with 
the
newly-defined role and responsibility 
of 
the
DCI for coordinating and guiding the 
U. S.
foreign intelligence effort, as provided in
the President's January 16, 1962 
memorandum
.
to the DCI.
That the DCI, in consultation with the U. S.
Intelligence Board, review the functions of
the U. S. Intelligence Board's 
Watch 
Committee
and National Indications Center, to 
determine
their effectiveness in carrying out their
mission of providing early warning.
Board Report of June 26, 1962
That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group ensure that:
(1) adequate cover stories are approved 
and
ready for release by responsible parties, if
required, with respect to the U-2, OXCART and
satellite reconnaissance programs; (2) adequate
-
16
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Rec. #34:
Rec. #35:
procedures are in readiness for making such
releases; and (3) that U-2 and OXCART pilots
are instructed as to appropriate action to
be taken in case of mission failures.
Based on further continued studies of ways i
and means to strengthen the national Communica-
tions Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence.
effort, under authoritative control and manage-
ment of the National Security Agency, the Board.
recommended: (1) strong control and management
by NSA over these intelligence activities;
(2) concentration NSA on intelligence objec-
tives of greatest national importance, in response
to U. S. Intelligence Board guidance which must
be refined; (3) NSA supervision of all Signals
Intelligence collection and processing, so that
national needs will be met without undue cost
and effort; (4) the completion of long-pending
plans for improved collection and processing
of Electronics Intelligence; (5) increased
Department of Defense leadership now that
responsibility for NSA activities has been
assigned to an Assistant Secretary of Defense;
and (6) within NSA itself, the exercise of
strong leadership competent to meet national
intelligence needs rising beyond specific"
military intelligence interests.
That the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
CIA jointly: (1) make an operational analysis
of present and potential use of audiosurveillance
as an intelligence collection technique;
(2) work up a plan for developing audiosurveil-
lance devices to meet operational clandestine
intelligence requirements; (3) estimate the costs
and results of a major research and development
effort to produce practicable audio systems for
use in clandestine collection and counterintel--
ligence activities; and (4) on the counter-audio
side, install secure rooms (electronically and
acoustically shielded) in sensitive U. S. posts
overseas.
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Rec. #36:
Rec. 37
TOP SECRE
That the U. S. Intelligence Board evaluate
the intelligence potential of the Big
Dish" moongreflector project, and that there-
after the Secretary of Defense reach an early
decision as to the future of this project.
Board Report of August 1, 1962
Based on a review of intelligence disclosures
in a New York Times article by Hanson, Baldwin,
the Board recommended that: (1) the President
emphasize to Government officials his concern
about such disclosures and his intention in this
case to identify and take action against the
source of Government leaks to the newspaper.
writer; (2) the President take drastic action
against the offender if identified by the FBI,
or against the heads of offices from which the
leak emanated; (3) the Departments of State
and Defense and the CIA require their personnel
to make memoranda of record on talks with the
press, and to clear such contacts in advance
with departmental Public Relations Officers;
(4) those responsible for protecting intel-
ligence data and techniques identify selected.
areas of sensitive data requiring special handling;
(5) ways be sought to reduce the number of persons
involved in preparing highly sensitive intel-
ligence estimates; (6) the DCI and the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency be provided with
the investigative capability to run down leaks.
of sensitive intelligence data; (7) a confidential
policy be established within the Executive Branch
as to the degree of disclosure of intelligence
data to be made to Congressional Committees;
(8) a re-study be made of possible proposals
for legislation to protect official secrets;
and (9) a review be made of Government policy
and procedures with a view to declassifying non-
sensitive information and thereby strengthening
programs for the safeguarding of sensitive data.
18
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Rec. #38:
Rec. #39:
Rec. #40:
Rec. #41:
Rec. #42:
Board Report of October 5, 1962
(Based on an on-the-scene review by Board
representatives of U. S. foreign intelligence
and related activities in Southeast Asia
and the Far East)
That the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency
strengthen the intelligence elements of the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Unified
Commands (drawing on resources of the military
intelligence services in the process.)
That the flow of intelligence guidance from
the Defense Intelligence Agency to Unified/Specified
and component commands be oriented toward a con-
trolled, integrated effort on the part of the
numerous U. S. military intelligence organiza-
tions overseas (e.g., in South Vietnam, Thailand
and Japan), in order to make the most effective
use of their substantial resources.
That the Defense Intelligence Agency take action
regarding the military Special Security Offices
(SSO) Communications System for transmitting
sensitive information with a view to: (1) con-
solidating parallel SSO networks running between.
Pacific military commands and Washington
civilian officials, and (2) reorienting the
SSO system to make it a primary service and
support to Commands in the field and command
(as distinguished from Service) elements in
Washington.
That the National Security Agency accelerate
spectrum searches in Thailand in order that the
U. S. Intelligence Board may give guidance to
the U. S. Ambassador in negotiating a permanent
U. S. intercept site in Thailand (which is a
most favorable location for U. S. Signals Intel-
ligence operations against targets in the Soviet
bloc, North Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Tibet and
Communist China.)
That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group consider
authorizing selective, airborne defoliation
operations against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.
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Rec. #43:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4.)
(5)
(6)
Board Report of October 19, 1962
TOP SECRET
Based on an on-the-scene review of U. S. intel-
ligence activities in Southeast Asia and the wes
Far East, the Board made the following sub-
sidiary recommendations:
That the National Security Agency review the
Office of the NSA Pacific Representative with
a view to clarifying its mission, and it
relationship to the Pacific Command structure:
and to other NSA personnel deployed in the
Pacific area.
That the Defense Department consider staggering
the rotation schedules of U. S. Army Intelligence
Advisers to the South Vietnam Government, and
that such advisers be given more extensive
training in the French and Vietnamese languages.
That the DCI and Director of the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency emphasize efforts of U. 3. civilian
and military intelligence elements in South Viet-
nam to improve the capabilities of South Vietnamese
intelligence and security services.
sil reporte
That the DCI and the Defense Intelligence Agency
in their respective areas of responsibility ensure
adequate and timely lateral exchange of intel-
-ligence reporting of the various U. S. intelligence
units in South Vietnam (particularly the intelligence
elements of the Military Assistance Command in
South Vietnam, the U. S. Military Attaches in
Saigon and the CIA Station, Saigon).
That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting
with the three U. S. Military Intelligence Services,
consider the advisability of (1) extending from
two to three years the tours of Service Attaches
in Thailand; and (2) provide Thai language train-
ing for Military Attaches selected for future
assignment to Thailand.
That the Defense Intelligence Agency arrange for
U. S. Air Force photo interpretation personnel, on
Taiwan and at Yokota, Japan, to receive all reports
produced by the Chinat Air Force Photo Interpreta-
tion Center concerning U-2 and other reconnaissance
flights over the China Mainland.
_ TOP SECRET
20
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Rec. #44:
(1)
(2)
That the Defense Intelligence Agency in con-
sultation with Army Intelligence: (1) assess
the organization, management and effectiveness
of clandestine espionage operations conducted
in the Pacific area by Army's 500th. Intelligence
Corps Group; and (2) assure early coordination
with appropriate CIA Station Chiefs of the few
Army Intelligence clandestine operations not
yet coordinated.
That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting
with U. S. military intelligence agencies,
assure that (under guidance by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Unified Commands) maximum 
use
is made of the substantial intelligence potential
of U. S. Military Assistance Groups deployed
in foreign countries.
That the Defense Intelligence Agency make
maximum intelligence use of Service. Attaches
in foreign countries, particularly where intel-
ligence is also being produced by U. S. Military
Assistance Groups and other U. S. military
organizations.
That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting
with the National Security Agency and U. S.
military intelligence agencies, reduce the time
required for security clearances of personnel
assigned to sensitive U. S. installations overseas.
The Board also made the following additional recom-
mendations based on its Southeast Asia and Far
East review:
That the State Department explore with the U. S.
Intelligence Board the practicability of a
mechanism to furnish U. S. Ambassadors in
Southeast Asia with current, regional intelligence
evaluations (of a political, economic and military
nature) concerning the Southeast Asia area.
as proposed by the U. S. Ambassador to Thailand.
--
That the State Department review the manning
table of the Political Section of the U. S. Embassy
at Bangkok, to determine whether an additional
office should be assigned (as recommended by the
Chief of the Political Section of the Embassy).
TOP SECRET
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Rec. #45:
Rec. #46:
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(3.)
(1)
(2)
(3)'
That the CIA renew efforts to convince the
Thai Government of the need for an effective
central intelligence organization in the
Government of Thailand (the State Department
to decide whether the U. S. Ambassador should
make specific overtures to Marshal Sarit in
this regard).
That the CIA explore the feasibility of
intensifying covert actions against the size-
able and effective influence of Communists
among Japanese intelectuals, educators
and students.
Board Report of December 28, 1962
Based on its review of intelligence coverage,
assessment and reporting by U. S. agencies with
respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba
during the months preceding October 22, 
1962,
the Board submitted to the President an interim
report containing the following recommendations:
That the U. S. Government: (1) maintain an
aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy
makers with timely and adequate intelligence
information to meet the possibility of continuing
Soviet confrontations in Cuba; and (2) resist
any tendency toward a let-down in intelligence
coverage of Cuba in the wake of U. S. 
intel-
ligence successes through U. S. military aircraft
reconnaissance of Cuba.
That the United States make intensified, hard-
hitting efforts to obtain significant intelligence
on Cuba through clandestine espionage operations,
including efforts by U. S. intelligence agencies
to lay the groundwork for "deep cover" espionage
operations in Latin American and other foreign
countries (without dependence on official State
Department cover which would not be 
available 
in
the event of a break in diplomatic relations).
That (1) high-level and low-level reconnaissance
of Cuba be continued as a means of acquiring
photographic and Signals Intelligence concerning
Soviet military installations, forces, weapons
,
TOP SECRET
22
1
(4)
(5)
Rec. #2247:
Rec. #48:
TOP SECRET
and highly-sophisticated communications equip-
ment in Cuba; (2) planning be made 
for 
substitute
intelligence techniques in the event that 
our
aerial reconnaissance of Cuba is denied 
us by
Soviet air defense systems on the island;
and (3) that the United States launch a clandestine
agent program to provide on-the-ground photography
of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an 
adjunct
to our aerial reconnaissance photographic coverage
of Cuba.
That, as an adjunct to Signals Intelligence cover-
age of Cuba: (1) a major clandestine 
agent effort
be directed toward obtaining vitally-needed
Signals Intelligence from Soviet encoding machines
through the use of clandestine intercept equip-
ment carried by on-the-ground U. S. espionage
agents in Cuba; and (2) plans be readied 
for
commando-type or covert actions to pre-
empt
Soviet communications equipments in the event
of internal revolt or invasion of Cuba
.
That in instances where exceptional intelligence
collection techniques are suggested to meet
,
priority U. S. intelligence objectives, 
but 
are
opposed because of political or other risks 
in-
volved, the issues be submitted for 
resolution 
at
the Presidential level.
That, in view of Soviet camouflage of missile
installations in Cuba, the Director of 
the
National Reconnaissance Office assign high
priority to experiments to determine the
effectiveness of short and long-range photography
of concealed ground targets, including the use
of new sensing and illuminating methods
.
Board Report of January 19, 1963
That, with regard to the Secretary of Defense/DCI
plan for surfacing military versions 
of OXCART,
intelligence considerations require that
:
(1) no statements or programs should be undertaken
which would result in public (and Soviet
) knowledge
of OXCART or military versions thereof; 
(2) 
although
leaks concerning OXCART will eventually occur
,
such leaks should be avoided as long as possible
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Rec. #49:
(1)
TOP SECRET
in order to postpone Soviet development of
countermeasures against OXCART; and (3) instead
of an OXCART cover story to the effect that.
a new U. S. interceptor aircraft is being
produced, the cover story should be that a
variety of U. S. military aircraft are being
developed. (In making these recommendations
the Board confined itself to the intelligence-
related aspects of the subject, noting the
Board's awareness that the problem involved
military and Congressional considerations:
(the B-70 issue, for example) apart from intel-
ligence concerns. .).
Board Report of February 4, 1963
As a follow-up to the Board's interim Cuba
report and recommendations of December 28, 1962,
the Board forwarded to the President 
on
February 4, 1963, the results of the Board's
assessment of the performance of the U. S.
intelligence community in its coverage and
reporting of the Soviet military buildup
in Cuba during 1962.
Board Report of March 8, 1963
On March 8, 1963, the Board submitted to the
President its final report on Cuba (taking into
account views and comments which had been received
from the Director of Central Intelligence
concerning intelligence aspects of the Cuba
experience). The Board made a number of specific
recommendations for strengthening U. S. intel-
ligence coverage of Cuba, and for increasing
the capabilities of the total foreign intelligence
program of our Government, as follows:
That U. S. intelligence planning include attention
to possible Soviet inte tion to create and main-
tain in Cuba a Soviet base for communications
surveillance and military command-and-control"
in the Western Hemisphere (with unprecedented
opportunity to use electronic and other means
to obtain intelligence on U. S. military and
space capabilities).
TOP SECRET
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(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
TOP SECRET
That U. S. intelligence agencies make it a
major goal to discover the terms of Soviet/
Cuban agreements and the programs to carry
out such agreements.
--
That intensified efforts be made for sub-
stantial improvement in U. S. clandestine
espionage coverage of Cuba, because human-
resource espionage operations continue to
be important in spite of noteworthy results.
obtained by the United States in using
scientific and technical intelligence techniques
against Cuba.
That (1) there be a resumption of efforts to
develop a long-focal-length camera for use
in U-2 coverage of Cuba, using color and stereo
photographic methods; (2) that there be a re-
appraisal of the decision to suspend low-level
photographic reconnaissance aircraft missions
over Cuba; and (3) that a vigorous clandestine
agent program be instituted with a view to
obtaining on-the-ground photography of intel-
ligence targets in Cuba, as an essential
supplement to aerial photographic reconnaissance
of the island.
That the current, intensive aerial surveillance
of Cuba be accompanied by priority planning for
adequate substitutes in the event that our aerial
reconnaissance program is cut off by the advanced
Soviet air defenses being installed in Cuba.
That, as recommended earlier, a major clandestine
agent effort be mounted against Cuba, with a
view to intercepting emanations from sophisticated
Soviet code. machines through the use of intercept
equipment capable of concealment on an agent's
person.
That, as previously proposed, the President be.
asked to resolve the issue when exceptional
intelligence techniques are opposed at lesser
levels because of the element of risk.
25
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(9)
(10)
(11)
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That (1) U. S. intelligence officials be less
reluctant to propose to higher authority the
use of extraordinary means (such as the U-2)
to acquire vital intelligence not otherwise
obtainable; and (2) that there be a mechanism
whereby policy officials will be informed of
operational delays or other factors which
call for top-level authorization of new or
revised intelligence missions.
21
That, in order to meet intelligence needs
in simultaneous emergencies, pre-arranged..
plans be made for: (1) the rapid reassignment
of personnel, equipment and other intelligence.
resources; (2) the designation of various
processing centers for the handling of
photographic intelligence; (3) the processing
and communication of vital intelligence to major
users in Government; and (4) planning for such
related intelligence activities to meet the
extra burden if two or more crises should occur
concurrently.
That, in the event that emergency situations
should arise requiring restrictions on the
normal publication and distribution of intel-
ligence data, the U. S. intelligence community.
should monitor the application of such restrictions
to ensure that (1) they are carried through,
and (2) they are not applied in such a way as
to deny critical intelligence to policy-making
and command officials who need such intelligence
data.
That concerted efforts be made to (1) devise
an effective mechanism for the integrated
assessment (and cumulative periodic ppraisals)
of early-warning and indicator-type intelligence
and prompt reporting thereof to policy-making
and command officials; and (2) conduct intensified
research concerning automatic data processing
techniques to facilitate the review and assess-
ment of the great volume of material dealt with
in the United States intelligence community.
(12) That there be a re-examination of present methods
of arriving at national intelligence estimates,
with a view to ensuring that (all indicators
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Rec. #51:
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and other available intelligence information
are considered; (2) the views of intelligence
community members are fully taken into account;
(3) recognition is given to the possibility.
of widely-varying interpretations of a given
body of evidence; (4) consideration is given
to the advisability of preparing two or more
estimates when evidence is susceptible of more.
than one interpretation -- even though under
current practice dissents are noted in foot-
notes to estimates; and (5) that every precaution
be taken to avoid adherence to isolated opinions
or preconceived notions.
That the effectiveness of the National Recon-
naissance Office be strengthened through
specific measures separately summarized in
Rec. #23.
That there be a reorganization and reorientation
of the CIA's scientific and technological acti-
vities in the intelligence field. Specifically
the Board recommended: (1) a research and develop-
ment effort located outside the intelligence
community but coupled with development and engineer-
ing conducted within CIA and other intelligence
Agencies; (2) an administrative arrangement in-
CIA to bring science and technology into contact
with major intelligence programs and projects
of the CIA; (3) the vesting of scientific and
technological intelligence responsibilities in
a top-level official of the CIA; (4) the forma
tion in CIA of special research and development
groups concerned with natural sciences and
behavioral research in studies of such matters.
as camouflage and concealment; and (5) actions
within the Defense Department to emphasize
research on advanced sensing, photographic and
other systems, and advanced research in the
Signals Intelligence field over the next ten years.
Board Proposal of July 11, 1963.
That the Chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board
give continued attention to and report periodically
on measures taken by the U. S. intelligence agencies
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to strengthen our Government's counterintelligence
posture. (Here the Board reiterated its previous
endorsement of a recommendation that: "The
Director of Central Intelligence should focus
community attention on the important area of
counterintelligence and the security of over-
seas personnel, and assign responsibility for
periodic reports thereon to the United States
Intelligence Board.")
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE. FILE
SUBJECT:
January 30, 1964, Meating of the
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No. _
3
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
نة
n
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in regular
meeting at 9:00 a.m.
on January 30, 1964, at the Board's offices, Room 297
Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford and Board members
Gray, Langer, Murphy, Doolittle, Pace, and Land (Dr. Baker was unavoidably
detained in New Jersey and joined the meeting later in the morning); and
Messrs. Coyne and Ash.
Although Presidenc.
In executive session, Chairman Clifford gave Board members a fill-in
on the brief talk he had with President Johnson a few days after the President
took office on November 22. Chairman Clifford had taken the occasion to relate
to the President some of the highlights of the function performed by the Board
for President Kennedy, and the composition of the Board.
Johnson gave no indication that he had previously known of the work of the Board,
he expressed appreciation for the effort which the Board had made on behalf of
President Kennedy. The President said that he was comforted to know that this
group of utstanding citizens is giving attention to the important subject of
intelligence, and he asked Mr. Clifford to inform the Board members that he wished.
them to continue with this important task.
Chairman Clifford referred to the one-hour meeting which the Board would have
with the President later in the day Mr. Clifford spoke of the heavy work schedule
which the President has undertaken and the many demanding matters to which the
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President is giving personal attention.
Mr. Clifford expressed the opinion
Then, in order that the President
that prior to succeeding to office President Johnson has probably had few
occasions on which to obtain more than brief glimpses of intelligence problems.
With that assumption in mind, Mr. Clifford thought that the Board's major
purpose at today's meeting with the President should be one of education
with respect to the foreign intelligence effort and the Board's role in it.
Mr. Clifford proposed that he begin with a background statement to the
President. concerning the circumstances under which President Kennedy estab-
lished the Board (the Bay of Pigs incident), and its responsibilities and
method of performing its assigned functions.
might become better acquainted with the Board membership and some of the more
significant intelligence areas reviewed by the Board, Mr. Clifford said he
would like to call on various members to speak briefly about those areas.
Particularly, the Chairman asked that Dr. Land be prepared to inform the
President about the National Reconnaissance Program; that General Doolittle
be ready to discuss the U-2 OXCART, and TAGBOARD programs; Dr. Baker the
Signals Intelligence Program; and Mr. Gray the Dunlap espionage case..
(The Board agreed with Mr. Coyne's proposal that in the Board's reporting
on the Dunlap case there be only an oral statement to the President, but
nothing in writing, with respect to the closely-held and highly sensitive
In this connection, the
source about which the Board has been informed.
Chairman said that in the course of a recent conversation with former
Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, the latter seemed unaware of the
sensitive source.)
Dr. Land suggested that during the Board meeting with the President the
point be made that the Board's principal function is to determine what the
foreign intelligence program should be and to recommend how to achieve it.
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Dr. Langer
Mr. Pace thought that it would also be well to indicate to the President
the value of the role played by McGeorge Bundy in the staffing of Board
subject matters for the President, and mention should also be made of the
Board's use of Panels in its review of intelligence matters.
thought that brief remarks from selected Board members concerning intelligence
subjects, coming within their special Panel assignments, would be more
appropriate and helpful to the President than for all Board members to be
called upon. Mr. Clifford thanked the members for these suggestions and said
that he would be guided accordingly in making his presentation to the President.
Chairman Clifford then made reference to the recently-discovered Soviet
espionage case involving Army Sergeant Howell, a case which Mr. Clifford
thought might prove to be more damaging than the Dunlap case, and one which
dramatizes the recommendations which the Board has formulated in its report
to the President on the basis of the Dunlap matter. Mr. Clifford recalled
that when he recently discussed the Dunlap case with former Deputy Secretary
of Defense Gilpatric, the latter said that if any progress is made by the
Government in the area of counterintelligence, the impetus will have to come
from the Board, and remedial action cannot be left up to the Defense Department.
The Chairman asked Mr. Coyne to be prepared to brief the Board on the Howell
case later on in the meeting
C
Next, Chairman Clifford directed attention of the members to the list
of topics which he had asked the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone,
to cover at today's meeting -- Mr. Clifford noting that because the DCI is
out of the country he had designated his Deputy, General Carter, to cover
these matters with the Board
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Chairman Clifford then turned to the January 10, 1964, letter which
he had received from the DCI, volunteering information concerning the events
which had led to the recent CIA release of information on the estimate of
the Soviet economy, with resulting critical
editorial reaction in the
United States press.
Mr. Clifford asked that Board members study the DCI's
letter as the basis for later discussion. Mr. Clifford said that he had
found the letter to be curiously defensive, and he expressed concern over the
danger inherent in what appeared to be an almost obsessive interest on the
part of the DCI in regard to the CIA's "image". The Chairman also observed
> that according to newspaper accounts the DCI was at that moment in Europe
visiting several heads of state, presumably on intelligence and other matters.
Mr. Murphy recalled that previously the Board had urged closer relations
between the President and the DCI on intelligence matters and he wondered if
the DCI's current trip abroad is an indication that this close relationship
exists between the DCI and President Johnson, Mr. Clifford said that it
could only be speculated that sometimes a new President is susceptible to
suggestions offered by experienced Presidential advisers, and in this instance
the President may possibly have received a suggestion from the DCI that the
European trip be made and perhaps the President acquiesced in reliance upon
the DCI's judgment.
Mr., Clifford left the Board meeting to take a telephone call from
Secretary of Defense McNamara. Upon his return to the meeting Mr. Clifford
said that the Secretary of Defense had called to emphasize the importance
which he placed on the NRO problem which would be related to the Board later
in the day by NRO Director McMillan; and Secretary McNamara had indicated
that he personally was disturbed about the competition and back-knifing which
had become evident in the NRO program Mr Clifford noted that General Carter
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of CIA was about to join the Board meeting, and that it would be well for
>
the Board to defer bringing up the NRO subject at this time. In this
connection, Mr. Clifford stated that he had recently been visited by NRO
Director McMillan who had expressed his views as to the NRO problem and would
repeat them to the Board when he joined the meeting later in the day.
1
At 10:20 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by the Deputy DCI, General
Carter (substituting for Mr. McCone). General Carter was accompanied by
Mr. Knocke (who was introduced as substituting for Mr. Kirkpatrick who was
in the Far East), and by Mr. Fitzgerald (referred to by General Carter as
the CIA's expert on Cuba).
1
Mr. Clifford thanked the CIA officials for their attendance. He pointed
out that today the Board was having its first meeting with President Johnson,
therefore the Board would appreciate being brought up to date; would like to
hear from General Carter on the topics which had been listed in Mr. Clifford's
note to Mr. McCone; and would be glad to hear from General Carter on any
matters which he might also wish to cover.
General Carter said that Mr. McCone's absence from the country, prevented
his meeting with the Board, but that he would endeavor to cover for Mr. McCone
the various matters in which the Board had expressed an interest as set forth
in Mr. Clifford's note to Mr. McConc dated January 16, 1964.
Turning first to the subject of Cuba, Genèral Carter said that all
sabotage efforts have been stood down; that the President and Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara have some serious doubts about our policy toward Cuba;
and that the question had been raised as to whether it is not hypocritical
for the United States Government to talk peace while at the same time
"waging war" against Cuba.
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General Carter added that when Mr. Bundy gets
McCone returns from abroad the following Saturday,
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there will be a meeting to discuss a new policy toward Cuba.
In answer to an
inquiry from Dr. Land, General Carter said that
Mr. Bundy has no deputy to act in his absence; that the DCI briefs the
President on intelligence matters and Mr. Bundy briefs him on foreign policy
matters;
and that the White House staff has not seemed to have settled into
any new mechanism since November 22. General Carter said that the President
gets the CIA daily intelligence check list which is handed to the President
by one or another member of the White House staff, not necessarily the same
one each time. Also, CIA has added a weekly check list review, and it is
understood that the President reads them. Mr. McCone sees the President at
least twice a week and attends all policy meetings except on occasions when
the DCI has to be absent, in which case General Carter attends in his stead.
General Doolittle asked whether there has also been a stand-down in
clandestine intelligence collection efforts with respect to Cuba, and
General Carter answered in the negative. Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the
volativity of the Cuban people is a factor, and over the long run the capability
of CIA to infiltrate intelligence agents into Cuba is affected by the morale
of the Cuban people which in turn is affected by the success of sabotage acts
directed against Cuba.
In answer
to a question from Chairman Clifford, Mr. Fitzgerald said
that no hard facts had been obtained concerning the purpose and subject
matter of Castro's recent talks with Khrushchev in Moscow, although the
Panama and Cuban economic situations may have been discussed Mr. Fitzgerald
agreeing with Murphy that this is all speculation on CIA's part.
--
General Carter said that our Government's economic denial program
against Cuba is also falling by the wayside, as reflected by the actions of
Britain and Spain in trading with Cuba. There is a view, General Carter
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added, that it is difficult for our Government to equate its policy of
wheat sales to Russia with a policy of economic denial against Cuba;
however the President has said that he wants to push the economic denial
program. Mr. Fitzgerald remarked in this connection that the volatility
of the Cuban people transmits itself to Washington.
Mr. Murphy then asked if someone could say what is going on in Cuba.
Mr. Fitzgerald replied that the most important development is the series of
"victories" which Castro has enjoyed: Castro found at year's end that there
was an unanticipated hard currency balance of $100 million from the sugar
crop, thus giving Castro a basis for obtaining extensions of credits for
such transactions as the purchase of British buses; the French are about to
extend Castro credits over a 5-year period; in Panama, although Castro didn't
provoke the anti-U. S. incidents he gets credit for it; and Castro also gets
credit for the Zanzibar coup even though he did not instigate that incident,
either. So, Mr. Fitzgerald noted, "Castro is stronger and his arm is longer".
Dr. Langer asked if CIA is getting intelligence agents into: Cuba, and
information out. Mr. Fitzgerald exhibited a chart depicting the deployment /
of agents in Cuba, pointing out that there was a concentration of agents in
the Havana area. He said, however, that the figures were off because CIA
had sloughed off the poor agents, and because two agent nets had been lost
in the Havana area (although a key agent from each net had been successfully
pulled out). Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has 64 singleton agents; 83 agents
legally resident in Cuba; and 55"black subagents" in one net.
In reply to Dr. Langer's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that about 1200
Latin American and African nationals a year are receiving training in Cuba
and are returning to their respective countries.
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Mr. Pace asked what are the priority intelligence objectives which
are assigned for coverage by CIA agents sent into Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald
said that the agents are targeted against the strategic military situation."
In answer to a query about the question of the use of Cuban caves, Mr.
Fitzgerald said that this question had been pretty well resolved but CIA
is keeping at it..
General Carter stated that CIA presently estimates there are from
4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba who are operating the SAM
sites and providing military training to Cubans, plus about 4,000 non-
military Soviet personnel. He added that by April the Cubans will pro-
bably be ready to take over the air defense systems if the Soviets choose
to turn them over to the Cubans. Mr. Fitzgerald added that a flash had been
received this morning of the first evidence of a Chinese pilot taking part in
air operations in Cuba (this from a COMINT source).
Mr. Murphy inquired as to whether CIA had succeeded in planting agents
in Castro's immediate entourage. Mr. Fitzgerald said that this is another
priority intelligence objective being pursued by CIA, including the objective
of obtaining intelligence on the inter-relationship of factions within the
Castro regime; on the extent of Cuban \counter-insurgency programs (in which
Cuba has a good capability); and on the Soviet bloc training of Cubans in
counterintelligence activities (Cuba has a fairly wide intelligence system
with "plenty in the United States").
Mr. Fitzgerald departed the meeting at this point, upon conclusion
of the discussion of the subject of Cuba.
General Carter next turned to the Panama situation. He noted that CIA.
has regularly reported on the subject of Communist activities in Panama since
1956. General Carter stated that there is no evidence that Communists
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instigated the recent incidents in Panama, although the Communists were
CIA succeeded in photographing
quick to exploit the situation once it arose.
13 Castro-ites who were engaged in fomenting the incident after it started.
Of a total of 45 Communist Castro-ites involved, 13 had been trained in Cuba,
and they distributed leaflets and disseminated propaganda over the radio.
CIA also learned that one Thelma King personally led a mob of Panamanians
in the streets. Dr. Langer wondered if Panamanians and the world at large.
are aware that radio stations in Panama were in the hands of the Communists.
General Carter replied that one could not say that precisely, but it can be
said that 30 minutes after the incident began there were inflamatory broad-
casts on the air. As for the sniper activity, General Carter said that one
sniper had been identified as
a known Communist.
With regard to Vietnam, General Carter said that the bloodless coup
which began yesterday afternoon was accomplished by a group of young generals
General Khanli is the leader.
who are pro-American and anti-neutralist.
General Khin, 3rd Corps Commander, will be chief of staff.
The coup group.
had been plugging for more counter-insurgency effort against the Viet Cong,
and the new leaders will take stronger action.
General Khanh has said that
The will look to U. S. Ambassador Lodge for guidance on political matters in
the immediate Saigon area.
General Carter said that CIA had received advance information from
General Khanh that he was worried about French moves with respect to
Vietnam. (In answer to Mr. Coyne's question as to whether CIA had been
back of yesterday's coup, General Carter replied that it is well known that
the CIA does not instigate coups.) Mr. Murphy, noting the conspiratorial
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1
aspects involving France in the Vietnam situation, asked whether CIA had
received advance intelligence from French sources concerning involvement
of the French Government in Vietnam. General Carter said that none had
been received, despite good CIA penetrations in Paris. Mr. Murphy found it
difficult to understand why there had been no hard intelligence on this matter,
particularly when there had been public statements by the French concerning
Goneral Carter said that
France's neutralist objectives in Southeast Asia.
effort
there had been no evidence of a covert French/agrinst the Vietnam regime.
Chairman Clifford asked whether there had been an improvement in the
Vietnam situation following the previocoup which overthrew the Diem regime.
General Carter said that social reforms have been made but their timing and
He thought it too early to say
acceleration have been disappointing.
whether
the new regime will have the will and ability to intensify the fight against
the Viet Cong.
General Khanh has indicated to Ambassador Lodge a desire to
retain General Minh in the new government.
General Khanh also said that
he saw no malfeasance on the part of the generals in the Minh regime although
they were known to have cooperated with French intelligence in the past.
In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, General Carter said there was no
evidence that the murders of Diem and Nhu in the previous coup were motivating
factors in the recent coup. General Carter answered Dr. Langer's question
by saying that there is no hard evidence of an increased flow of supplies,
arms and men into North Vietnam. (from Communist China).
Turning to the next item which had been indicated as of interest to
to the desirability
the Board, General Carter referred to the question as
to separate the coordinating function of the DCI from the post of head of the
CIA.
Chairman Clifford interposed the comment that from its inception this
Board had been concerned with achieving greater coordination and control
over the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort, the Board still urges it,
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cases whether involving U. S. military personnel or civilians; and
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another recommendation dealing with the criteria for selection of the heads
of sensitive agencies such as the NSA. The Chairman stated that these
proposed recommendations would be taken up at the next Board meeting.
Chairman Clifford directed Board members'
attention to the report and
Paneì
recommendations which had been completed by the Board Panel on Signals
There was agreement with Mr. Clifford's suggestion that the
Intelligence.
report and its recommendations be forwarded to Mr. Bundy for consideration
and action with the agencies involved, rather than presenting this comp
subject to the President today.
lex
Silber
Mr. Clifford mentioned to the Board the recently copyrighted newspaper
article by former President Truman who took the CIA to task for engaging in
activities which were not within the function of CIA as originally created.
Mr. Clifford reminded the Board that while Mr. Truman was President the CIA
was authorized and directed to engage in covert actions (e.g. in Italy) which
had much to do with stemming the Communist tide in post-World War II in
Europe.
1
Chairman Clifford brought up another matter, which he felt could
become more serious, namely, the aggressive campaign being waged by CIA to
improve its "public image". Mr. Clifford asked that the Board members think
about this subject, which would be placed on the agenda of the next Board
meeting. At that time the Board should hear from the DCI regarding this
matter, and consider it in the light of previous Board recommendations that
the DCI and other CIA officials refrain from making public speeches, with a
view to reducing the visibility of intelligence activities.
Mr. Clifford
said that he had learned that one of the subjects which the DOI is now
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discussing in the course of his visit with heads of state overseas is
Cuba.
the advisability of their countries engaging in economic reprisals against
Dr. Baker confirmed this, stating that today he had learned that
CIA is taking specific covert steps to influence cessations of trade with
Cuba, particularly in the case of Spain. Mr. Clifford could only speculate
that the DCI had suggested that the fostering of economic reprisals is
properly a task for the CIA, and the President may have agreed in the absence
of any other advice or consultation. Mr. Clifford thought that the DCI's
meetings with heads of state is the course least likely to succeed in CIA's
efforts to contradict its growing image as becoming a policy-making
organization in the Government. Mr. Clifford repeated that the Board should
hear from the DCI on this at its next meeting and consider making a recommenda
tion to the President.
At 4:00 p.m., until 5:30 p.m., the Board met with the President in the
Cabinet Room of the White House (a pertinent memorandum on the meeting is
filed elsewhere in the Board's records).
When the Board members returned to the Board's offices, Chairman Clifford
remained at the White House at the President's request to confer on other
matters of a non-intelligence nature.
April 2 and 3, 1964, were selected as the dates of the next meeting
of the Board, a two-day session.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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February 4, 1964
SUBJECT: Board Meeting with the President, January 30, 1964
At 4:00 p.m. on January 30, 1964, One Board members and
the writer met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the
White House. The meeting terminated at 5:30 p.m.
highlights of this meeting follow.
1
The
At the outset, Mr. Clifford made reference to his meeting
with the President in early December reporting that immediately
following the meeting he conveyed to the Board personnel the
President's desires that the Board continue to perform its
mission and that each Board member continue to serve with this
advisory body. Mr. Clifford then went on to state that he
considered the Board to be an extraordinary group composed, of
individuals whose diverse backgrounds and experience were of
inestimable value in carrying out the mission of the Board.
By way of example he cited tremendous contributions made in
the fields of communications signals intelligence and missiles
systems by Dr. William O Baker the Head of Research at Bell
Laboratories. He next mentioned the outstanding military career
of Jimmy Doolittle, noting that he has served three Presidents
in reviewing various aspects of intelligence and noting also
the ramified contributions which he has made to the overhead
intelligence reconnaissance programe next mentioned Mr
Gordon Gray, noting that he had earlier served as Secretary of
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the Army, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense
Mobilization and Presidential Assistant for National Security
Affairs. He noted, too, that with Coyne on behalf of the Board,
Mr. Gray has made on-the-scene reviews of intelligence activities
in practically every country in the Near East, Middle East,
The Chairman next mentioned
Southeast Asia and the Far East.
Dr. Land, his Presidency of Polaroid and his outstanding
contributions to photographic reconnaissance techniques having
special application to intelligence. He next mentioned
:
Dr. William Langer, his distinguished academic career and his
He
long association with the intelligence estimating process.
next mentioned Mr. Robert Murphy and his decades of service as
a career diplomat, roving ambassador and Under Secretary of
State. He next mentioned Mr. Frank Pace, noting that his
experience as Director of the Budget Bureau and as Secretary
of the Army, as well as his experience as President of General
Dynamics, expecially equips him to keep abreast of management
and organization problems in the intelligence community and of
Finally Mr. Clifford
the intelligence budgeting process.
mentioned Mr. Coyne, the Executive Secretary of the Board, as
a Presidential appointee and member of the White House staff
who has had some 24 years of experience in the intelligence
field, first as Assistant Director of the FBI and in more
recent years with the staff of the National Security Council
and of the President He observed that prior to President'
Johnson's assuming office, Coyne had served Presidents Truman,
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Eisenhower and Kennedy in various intelligence capacities.
Mr. Clifford then went into some detail with respect to
the history of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
He pointed
Board and predecessor organizations of the Board.
out that following the close of World War II, a variety of
ad hoc groups were formed at the Presidential level to review
selected aspects of the Government's foreign intelligence
effort.. Studies were made from time to time, recommendations.
were submitted, and then in most cases the particular study
its
group disband. with little or no follow-up action on
Mr. Clifford noted that in 1955 the Hoover
recommendations.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch recommended
the creation of a permanent, bipartisan "Watch Dog Committee"
(to be made up of House and Senate members and private citizens)
activities
to make periodic surveys of the foreign intelligence
of our Government agencies, and to report to the Congress and
to the President. President Eisenhower opposed the idea of a
Congressional Watch Dog Committee on Intelligence (as did
President Kennedy after he took office).
Mr. Clifford want on
to state that in February 1956, President Eisenhower formed his
own Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence, made up of
private citizens, responsible for reviewing on his behalf all
foreign intelligence activities of the United States; that
President Eisenhower looked on the Consultants group not only
as a means of obtaining independent appraisals and advice
concerning our foreign intelligence effort, but also as a
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tactic to forestall the creation of a "Watch Dog Committee".
in the Congress. The Board of Consultants served for some
five years until the members submitted their resignations
at the close of President Eisenhower's term of, office.
Mr. Clifford then pointed out that in January 1961.
President Kennedy decided that there was a continuing need
for a Presidential Advisory Board on foreign intelligence,
but deferred temporarily the appointment of new members; that
on May 4, 1961, following the disaster experienced by the
Central Intelligence Agency at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the President
issued an Executive Order establishing this Board. (Mr. Clifford
noted that at that time and on several subsequent occasions;
President Kennedy remarked to him that he could not stand
another intelligence failure like the Bay of Pigs fiasco; that
as President he must have the assurance of adequate intelligence
on which to make important decisions; and that he would depend
heavily on this Board to continually monitor, the activities
of all of the intelligence agencies, providing him with
independent, objective assessments and recommendations concerning
those activities.). Mr. Clifford stated that President Kennedy
had informed him that CIA had provided him with "bad" information
on Cuba and that this had resulted in "bad" decisions. Based
on this experience President Kennedy had emphasized to
Mr. Clifford that he was activating the Board to perform a
continuing mission for the President; that the Board was to
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have three functions (1) investigation (2) recommendation and
(3) follow-up.
Mr. Clifford noted that Dr. Killian served as Chairman
of the Board until April 1963; that he resigned at that time
because of reverses in his health; and thereupon Mr. Clifford
was moved up from member to Chairman.
Mr. Clifford then proceeded to describe in some detail
the work, meetings, review procedures, reporting procedures
and general modus operandi of the Board. He noted that from'
May 1961 until the time of President Kennedy's death, the
Board held 25 separate meetings covering a total of 40 days.
He emphasized that the intelligence community is made up of
a great many departments and agencies and that efforts to
coordinate and control them have thus far barely gotten off
the ground. Some progress has been made but much more remains
to be accomplished.
•
M Clifford then went on to discuss in some detail the
Panels and Task Forces of the Board citing few examples.
The Chairman next went into some detail with respect
to the recommendations which the Board made to President
Kennedy noting that during the past 2 years the Board suoɔmitted
to the President a total of 170 recommendations. A large
!
percentage of the recommendations made by President Kennedy's
Board involved activities internal to the Department of Defense;
a lesser proportion involved activities internal to the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Department of State; a number of
them related to activities of joint interest to two or more
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Of
}
member agencies of the Intelligence Community. Of the 170
recommendations, the President approved 125, disapproved 2,
and temporarily deferred final action on the remainder.
the 125 approved recommendations, implementing actions on 85
have been substantially completed. The remaining Presidentially-
approved recommendations deal with substantive intelligence
matters warranting continued Board attention and, possibly,
the submission of further Board recommendations to the
President.
Next Mr. Clifford cited several examples of intelligence
areas of major and continuing concern to the Board.
included the following:
1.
These
The vast size and cost of the over-all intelligence
effort which involves some 149,000 individuals, 131,000 of whom
are in Defense and 17,000 of whom are in CIA. Mr. Clifford
reported that the effort this year will cost slightly less
than four billion dollars.
2. The National Reconnaissance Program (at this
point Mr. Clifford asked Dr. Land to brief the President for
three or four minutes, which he did, on the highlights of
the satellite reconnaissance programs.) In the course of the
briefing Dr. Land exhibited to the President examples of the
recent Gambit photography taken over Montana.
3. The U-2, Oxcart, Tagboard, programs. At this
point, pursuant to Mr. Clifford's request, General Doolittle
briefed the President for several minutes on the highlights
of these three programs
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The Signals Intelligence Program. Here,
Dr. Baker, at the request of Mr. Clifford, briefed the
President on the highlights of the Signals Intelligence
effort and on the major contribution which is made to the
over-all intelligence effort by elements of the COMINT-ELINT
community.
5. The Counterintelligence Program. At this point
Mr. Clifford advised the President that, following a serious
espionage penetration at the National Security Agency,
President Kennedy requested the Board to make a thorough
examination of the entire situation. Happily Mr. Gray was
able to free himself in order to devote full time, along with
Mr. Coyne, to such a study. Mr. Clifford requested Mr. Gray
to brief the President on the highlights of the Dunlap case
which he did. Thereafter Mr. Gray mentioned briefly the
highlights of the Howell penetration.
Following the Gray
briefing Mr. Clifford presented to the President the report
on the Dunlap case which had been prepared by the Board,
(The
:
noting that it was dated as of November 22, 1963.
President retained the report and later sent it to Mr. Bundy's
...
office for appropriate staffing and it is now in the process.
of being staffed by us.)
with the
In the course of the Board's discussion
President, the following major points were made:
With respect to the recent developments in Panama,
the President was not happy with the way in which CIA
acquitted itself. The President indicated that after the
fact "they told us they had been reporting disturbing
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TOP CONT
developments in Panama for months on end and that perhaps this
was so" but from the President's vantage point there was no
specific information pinpointing development's until after
difficulties had occurred.
In the case of the coup which had occurred in South
Vietnam on the night preceeding our meeting with the President,
he said that he "received no intelligence at all on that
development." In fact it appeared to the President that
General Khanh had advised our intelligence people of a
suspected coup which would be actempted by someone else in
Saigon for the purpose of "pulling us off the track.'
Next the President inquired as to the Board's view on
a request that he had recently received from the Pentagon.
Reading from a communication which he had before him, it
appeared that the President was being informed by the Pentagon
that a proposal had been made to reduce the military membership
on the U. S. Intelligence Board by dropping from the USID the
Directors of G-2, A-2 and ONI, retaining on USIB the DCI,
the Deputy Director of CIA, DIA, NSA, State, AEC and FBI.
Mr. Clifford observed that in our bureaucracy no one having
representation on a committee likes to be removed therefrom
but that it was his personal view that USIB would probably
function as well if not better with reduced membership.
President indicated that the Chiefs of Staff did not agree.
They were, in fact, asking the President to permit their
respective G-2's to continue as regular members of USIB.
Mr. Clifford advised that he and the other Board members
did not agree that this was necessary, particularly now.
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L
that military intelligence activities are being centralized
in the Defense Intelligence Agency along the lines earlier
recommended to the President by the Board.
President Johnson
expressed appreciation for the Board's views on this matter
indicating that it would be helpful to him in responding to
the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Turning to another matter, the President asked whether
the Board believes that Congress is being provided with
enough information on our intelligence activities. Mr. Clifford
:
Mr. Clifford
responded in the affirmative then brought up the fact that
there are increasing pressures for the establishment of a
Congressional Watch, Dog Committee on intelligence.
emphasized to the President the view of the Board that the
creation of such a Watch Dog Committee would be dilatorius
to the national security and national interests because it
would be most difficult to keep our secrets secret under such
a committee.
The meeting with the President terminated with an
expression on the President's part of deep appreciation to
the Board for the continuing patriotic and substantive contri-
bution which it is making to the national security in
important areas involving foreign intelligence.
(At the suggestion of the President the discussion of
Board business was momentarily suspended in order to let the
Press take pictures of the President in session with his
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.)
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Patrick Coyne
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
January 16, 1964
Miten the
Dear Johni
The next meeting of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board is scheduled to be
held on January 30, 1964, and in line with established
practice it would be very much appreciated if you
Would meet with us on the morning of that day.
proferably from 10:00 to 11:00 a.m.
At the time of your meeting with us, it
would be helpful if you would be prepared to
discuss the subjects outlined in the attachment.
Sincerely,
Attachment
Clark M. Clifford
Chairman
General Center will
attend meeting
The country.
m
Zur.
Mr. John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
Langley, Virginia
JPC:MMC
SECRETS
PRESIDENT'S FORKION
LICENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Subjects Suggested by Board Members for
Discussion by the Director of Contral
Intelligence at the Board Meeting of
30/1964
1. Cuba
(Status and effectivemece of clandestine collection and
dovert action pro
Mumbers and missions of Soviet
personnel in Cubaj Bro's involvement in counter-
insurgency and sub
other countries. bversive programs in Latin merica and
2. South Vietna
3.
4.
5.
F
(Prospects for permeancy of prosent regime; adequacy of
Coordination and effectiveness of indigenous intelligence
organisations.)
Panana
(Availability of pro-crisis intelligence indicators and
timeliness of ourrent reporting thereon; extent of Castro
influence.)
Separation of the office of the Director of Central
Intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency
(Views as to desirability and feasibility.)
U. S. Counterintelligence Posture
(Assessment of damage to U. S. intelligence sources and
operations resulting from Dunlap, and Howell cases.
Status of CIA studies on protection of intelligence,
intelligence sources and methods.
6. Joint Congressional Committee on Porsion Intellige toe
(The DOI's appra
ment would have
foreign intelli
CIA
(The DCI's
of such a Committee strange-
Iveness and security of
lated activities.)
of the estimate and
_ SECRET_
N
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7

C
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
BLD
16 January 1964
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Dear Clark:
As you probably know, I am leaving for Europe on Saturday and
hence will miss an opportunity to visit with you in the immediate future.
However I wish you to know the background of the press incident which
unfortunately has been "blown up" and hence the theme of a great
number of editorials.
Therefore I am attaching a memorandum prepared for my file
to review the series of events which lea up to the release of information
on the Soviet economy with CIA attribution. Also attached is a copy of
a letter from Senator Stennis and my reply. Finally, there is a copy
of the directive which I am issuing today in order to prevent an inadver-
tent-recurrence of the situation.
Frankly I am surprised at the publicity and furthermore I cannot
be overly critical of the attribution because of the long history of CIA's
releases on Soviet economy. We have for 10 years been issuing
volumes on this subject in unclassified form carrying the Central
Intelligence Agency name and these are in universities, libraries, and
In the hands of virtually all economists and newspapermen interested
in the subject. Furthermore, Allen Dulles has testified in open
hearing and on the record on this subject. It was a favorite topic for
speeches by Allen, General Cabell and Bob Amory in the days when
CIA officials were making speeches. Hence the denial of the privilege
of attribution would have, in my opinion, not been respected by
anyone in the press.
this
--
Two additional points which might have something to do with
first, we recently lost Col. Grogan, who has handled press
relations for CLA for years, because of retirement after a heart
attack. His replacement, a capable officer in the field of public
relations was in the process of getting acquainted with the press and
hence was not as sensitive to the tricky problem of press relationship.
as a more experienced press officer might have been. Secondly,
Recid
-20-64
PrsaB
PB
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I have known for some time, as I told you, that there are people in
this Government, most particularly in the State Department, who
enjoy harassing CIA in the press. I think, although I cannot prove
it; that they have not been inclined to pass up this opportunity.
Sincerely,
Attachments as stated
The Honorable Clark Clifford
Chairman, President's Foreign
· Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, D. C.
SECRET
☐ John A. McCone
Director
C
Y
4024
UNITED STATES SENATE
January 13, 1964
Honorable John A. McCone
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. McCone:
Recently I read an article stating that the CIA had held a press
conference during which the Soviet economy was discussed.
My impression is that the holding of press conferences is a
distinct departure from CIA's past practice. I would appreciate it
if you would advise me of the significance of this occurrence and
whether it represents a change of policy which will be a precedent
for the future.
PB 1695
W
Docld:34671877 Page 63
Sincerely,
/S/
John Stennis
United States Senator
5800
P
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
The Honorable John Stennis.
14 January 1961
The United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
Doar Senator Stennis:
This is in reply to your letter of January 13th. As I told you
when I saw you at my meeting with your Committee on Friday
afternoon, the press report of a "CLA press conference" was
something of an over-statement of fact, although circumstances
were such that I can understand the reason for the statement.
What happened was that several reporters received unclassi-
led information on the Soviet economy from us and one of them
featured the CIA attribution. This brought an avalanche of requests
from other reporters who felt that one had been favored with some
"inside information." Therefore our people prepared a brief
memorandum of just what had been told and invited the inquirers
to come out and pick it up. All who inquired were asked to come at
a particular hour. The fact that they were met and talked to by
a CIA officer during the course of distribution of the memorandum
gave rise to the report that it had been a "CIA press conference,"
which, I think, overstates what happened.
I have been concerned over the fact that the CLA attribution
has been given such wide-spread publicity and frankly don't
understand why because in this area, namely Soviet economics, CIA
has been a recognized authority and has for the past 10 years issued
volumes of unclassified reports of one sort of another which have
been distributed to libraries and universitica. Moreover, the subject
was a favorite subject of my predecessor who looked upon it as one.
area which he could treat freely and publicly in open forum. You may
recall there was an open hearing by the Joint Economic Committee on
13 November 1959 at which the Director of Central Intelligence
testified.
P.B.1695
NW
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In view of all this, I cannot criticize the authorized attribution.
The above background of CIA interest in, and continued study of,
the Soviet economy is so well known to the press that a request for
non-attribution would most certainly not have been respected. Never-
theless I have restated our rules so that no such circumstance will
again occur without my consent and approval; and this, I assure you,
would be given only after consultation with all interested parties.
I have tried to answer your questions by the above explanations
but I assure you that there is no change of policy which will be a.
procedent for the future.
Sincerely,
15/
John A. McCone
Director
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P
Y
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Recent CIA Publicity
13 January 1964.
Two recent developments within CIA should be noted:
a. Following the briefings of the NSC and
Congressional leadership, I proposed that CIA
findings on Soviet economy be released to the public
in the United States and Europe in order to (1) influence
curtailment of long-range credits and (2) influence a
number of uncommitted leaders of nations in Africa;
Southeast Asia and Latin America. This plan was
discussed and agreed with the President, Secretaries
Rusk, Harriman, Alexis Johnson and others. My
proposed plan per Memoranda and Notes of Conversation
,was to handle the subject through cut-outs, on an
unattributable basis, and largely through the foreign
press on a carefully timed schedule to avoid the impact
of "sudden propaganda". DDP organized to implement
this program. Additionally, information was to be
furnished (presumably on an unattributable basis) to
Stewart Alsop (SATURDAY EVENING POST) and Charles
Murphy (FORTUNE) who were said to be studying the
subject.
b. I have felt, and expressed myself to the late
President Kennedy, to President Johnson, to Secretary
Rusk and others, that the DCI and CIA image must be
changed. Its basic and primary responsibilities by law
are to assemble all intelligence, analyze, evaluate,
estimate and report such intelligence for the benefit
of policy makers. This function has been submerged
and CIA has been consistently referred to as a "cloak
and dagger" outfit whose activities involve (almost
exclusively) operations designed to overthrow
governments, assassinate Heads of State, involve
itself in political affairs of foreign states, and none
of these activities are either controlled or coordinated.
with the White House or the State Department. This is
#1695.
entirely wrong, both with respect to the activity
and the coordination and control, and I wish to
attempt to change this image. (NOTE: Hundreds
of editorials, and dozens of speeches on the Hill
have dealt with this thesis in one form or another,
and there has been no rebuttal at any time to my
knowledge).
No authorization was given by me for the briefing of press
or other columnists (other than Alsop and Murphy) or for attribution
or for statements or references to CIA's unique capabilities in Soviet
economy or the purpose of the releases.
What has happened is that the two stated purposes "merged"
and journalists, including TIME, NEWSWEEK, HERALD TRIBUNE,
Charles Bartlett and Mr. Dale of the NEW YORK TIMES 
were 
briefed
during late December and early Januy.
In the case of Charles Bartlett and Mr. Dale, permission was
given to attribute the information to CIA by DD/I and PR and apparently
additional information on the depth of CLA's work in studying Soviet
economy was discussed.
As a result the CIA role, the attribution and the fact that it
had finally "spoken out" was of far greater significance than the facts.
When the NEW YORK TIMES featured this side of the story in a front
-
page
article, there was a clamour for like information for others and, as a
result, CIA invited inquiring press men to come down and receive identical
information which was then prepared in a written memorandum.
memorandum was discussed with them and this was interpreted to be a
"formal press conference" which is only partially true.
The
In defense of DDI and PR's activities, it is to be noted that CIA.
has for 10 years issued unclassified publications on the Soviet economy
Mr. Allen Dulles used this subject
and the method used in analyzing it.
in fact,
as a favorite topic for his speeches, which were numerous
Mr. Elder, my assistant, states he has written at least 12 speeches on
this subject for Mr. Dulles. However the timing and manner of release
✓ has given special notice by the press in this instance.
Attribution to President Johnson for authority to do all of the
above is completely wrong, except to the extent that President Johnson
above which were entirely 
separate
knew of, and agreed to, a. and
It was not anticipated that they "merge" as they have.
courses.
NW 88132
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Аргентор
The consequences are as follows:
1. The White House, and more particularly the
State Department, are rightfully disturbed because
they do not know the effect this publicity might have on
their responsibilities.
2. CIA's methodology and findings have been
questioned because a vast amount of information upon
which our conclusions are based was not disclosed
(and much of it cannot be disclosed), and hence the
legitimacy of our conclusions is doubted by some experts
and in the public mind.
13. Congressional leaders (Senators Russell,
Saltonstall, Stennis, Chairmen Vinson and Cannon)
are righully disturbed and have so expressed themselves.
need for a "W
4. All of this will be used to emphasize the
"Watchdog Committee" and legislation on
is is more probable, now than at any time in the past.
this
5. A carefully planned DDP operation for covert
release of information, and developed at my direction, has
been destroyed. The purpose of DCI's trip to brief Heads
of State in Britain,-France, West Germany and Italy has
been impaired if not destroyed.
6. Activities have been contrary to my specific
written and oral orders and warnings of DDCI at staff
meetings when the subject was discussed.
As a result it is my intention to issue instructions for the
conduct of all public relations activities in the future, their careful
coordination at the level of the White House and the State Department,
and until these orders are issued I wish absolutely no contact whatsoever,
no comments, no discussions with the press except with my personal
authorization.