176-10036-10073
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RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10073
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR :
FROM Johnson
TO: Rostow
TITLE: Meeting of Vietnam Ṭask Force June 19 1961
DATE: 6/20/1961
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 193; Vietnam General 6/19/1961-*¨*
.6/30/1961. Box 1
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June 20, 1961
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Sanitized
NLK-75-26
NLX 02-310, 1/03
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961
Intelligence Briefing
At
Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence
briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian
border problem. Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of
Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem.
present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily as a safe
haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from
which operations are mounted. The Embassy provided specific
information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested,
should be shown to Sihanouk. There was also a report that the
Indian member of the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body
should investigate subversion. This was said to have caused
the Polish member to ask for a recess of the ICC in order to
permit him to prepare a reply. (This report, if confirmed, is
in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions
along these lines had gone to the Indian member of the ICC.).
It was also reported that on Friday there may have been a
clash between Pathet Lao and South Vietnamese forces just in-
side Laos on the highway connecting Laos and South Viet Nam.
(South Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.)
The following table on operations for May was also presented.
Viet Cong
GVN
Killed
824
240
Captured
30
158
Surrendered
37
none
Deserted
none
41'
The Local Currency: Costs Problem
Mr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the
problem of meeting the local currency costs of the 20,000 man
increase. A message has been sent to Saigon requesting the
Embassy to undertake negotiations with the GVN and offering
three alternatives in descending order of preference:
a. The U. S. would commit $5.1 million equivalent in
piasters, provided the GVN proceeds without delay with
mobilization and meets the balance of the local currency
costs from its own resources.
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b. If the proposal under a above is not adequate to
obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85
million in piasters. This is estimated to be sufficient
to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of
the additional 20,000 men.
C.
If neither of the above proposals proves accept-
able, the U. S. would offer an additional $4.55 million in
assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a dollar/
piaster rate of 73, would be sufficient to meet the plaster
cost for 1961.
'As of yesterday afternoon, no reaction had been obtained
from Saigon.. In a long conversation with Ben Wood, the Deputy
Director of the Task Force, Thuan was told before he left the
U. S. of our offer under a above. On the basis of this offer,
he indicated that he would send instructions to Saigon to in-
itiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a
final agreement. This problem, therefore, seems on its way
toward solution.
The Situation in Lãos in Relationship to South Viet Nam
A large part of the meeting was devoted to discussion of
a draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force con-
taining his ideas with respect to the situation in Laos and
what should be done about it. You are generally familiar with
his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him.
.I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but
his proposal runs along the following lines.
Cottrell does not believe that any arrangement to create
a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we
should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos. The French
cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment
of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former
Indo-Chinese states: The military situation in Laos is alarming.
The Pathet Lao are now posing a serious threat in southern Laos.
Cottrell proposes that we seize upon some plausible excuse to
break off the Geneva Conference. The failure of the ICC to
stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse. He would
then introduce Thai special forces and "hunter-killer" forces
now being trained in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an
effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there. In the
discussion of his proposal, the question was raised as to.
whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary.
Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real possibility and
emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in
Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that should
prove necessary.
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Members of the Task Force were asked for their reactions
to the paper.
There was a rather surprising degree of agree-
ment that something along this line must be done or it will be
virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet
Nam. (There was no State Department representative present at
the time except Cottrell himself.). The ICA member and the
representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to
whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was
not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than
military action in Laos.
:
I made the following points about the proposal:
First, I
observed that this would seem to me to raise important questions
of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at
the highest levels of government. I. indicated that I would be
unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I ex-
pressed some surprise about the apparent unanimity of view that,
unless we undertake military action in Lãos, it would be
virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in
Viet Nam. I said that, while I could see no objection to the
Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed to me
that they should be raised much more clearly in the context of
the Viet Nam problem. That is, the proposed memorandum should
make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it
difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program
against the Viet Cong in Viet Nam. Cottrell agreed to take
✓ account of this suggestion (with which there seemed to be some
agreement in the Task Force).
some of
✓
understand the feeling of frustration which has
prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum. I specifically
share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into
Laos. (I had thought that this proposal had been dropped as a
result of adverse reaction from various sectors.) The Cottrell
proposals, however, raise very directly the question of U. S.
military intervention in Laos. It seems to me inconceivable.
that his objective could be achieved without such intervention.
The proposals also would have the effect, it seems to me, of
merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam. I do not
think that this would be a good idea.
.
I think that there is a serious question as to whether the
situation in Laos is not deteriorating so
that any
likely political solution will at leave it as a serious source
of infiltration into both Viet Nam and Thailand. But I wonder
whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context
of contingency planning for Laos itself. In this connection,
I do feel that the military contingency plan that we have seen.
for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency i.e., a
clear failure to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a
cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the
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possibility that the Geneva Conference will be prolonged in-
definitely and that meanwhile the PL will take over Southern
Laos piece by piece and bit by bit as it appears to be doing.
I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson
on the status of contingency planning? I wonder whether it
isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the
Laos situation?
Other Matters
I raised the question as to the next step in consideration
of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces. I
It was
was told that the matter was being studied in Defense.
the view of the DoD representative that the possibility of such
an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it
would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized
and the 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would
be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using a 170,000 man base.).
I also raised the question of whether food supplies were
being cut off by the Viet Cong (as suggested to you by a
Vietnamese.) I was told that the only evidence of Viet Cong
action in this area was the recent seizure of seven barges
carrying sugar. However, it was also stated that the GVN has
given this fear as an explanation for reduction in rice ex-
ports. That is, the GVN has withheld rice from international
markets because of a fear that the rice may be needed in Viet
Nam if the VC should begin to cut food supply lines. Thus it
may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange
evenuesŸ” eserves."
There seemed to be no great concern in the Task Force
with this as a current real problem. Following the meeting I
talked to the ICA representative about whether it would be de-
sirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of
their fear that rice supplies may be cut off and thus to per-
mit them to sell more of their rice abroad. He indicated that
politically it was very difficult to justify export of rice to
Viet Nam which was itself a rice exporter.
(Today I talked with Jack King of CIA (ONE) about this
question. He had not made a specific study of it, of course.
It was his impression that, while there was some VC interference
with rice movements, the problem was not one of independently
serious proportions. That is, it was a reflection of the
general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a causе
for alarm. It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice
had been surprisingly well maintained..)
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Finally, I raised the question of what planning was being
done to internationalize the border problem. In response
Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the
șituation in Laos. Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State
about the same point. He referred to the arrangements that are
being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries
in the area sometime in July at which the border problem,
among others, will be discussed. He also referred to the fact
that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan
to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked
to prepare such a plan but had failed to do so. (I find a
great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy,
whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means
to involve the international community in the border question.
Neither Cottrell nor the State Department representatives seem
very much. interested. Have you ever discussed this question
with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do so.)
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Following the meeting I followed up with Cottrell on the
conversation you had had with him in the morning, asking him
whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General
Taylor to South Viet Nam to consider the request for a 100,000
man increase and also to make sure that our military activities
in South Viet Nam were really being reoriented. He reacted
negatively to this proposal, taking the view that it was un-
desirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work
of people in the field. In a later conversation with someone
else in State I got a much more favorable reaction to this idea.
The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would
be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about
the situation.
BN
Robert H. Johnson
i
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