JFK
124-10185-10099
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
File
23JUN
1972
.1)(8)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
VIA
SUBJECT
: Acting Deputy Director for Plans ·
:
Сс
Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service
(USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July
1972) and National Republican (21-24 August
1972) Conventions
4355.
1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive
Director/Comptroller.
2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service
for the Deriocratic and Republican National Conventions is con-
tained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI Staff to
the CCI which was concurred in by the ACUP and approved by the
DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).
ine(cos,
JFK (1)(B)
JFK
3. On 13 April 1972 the C05, WH/Miami net with the Miami
USSS representative and Mr. Nastrovito of BSSS Headquarters to
discuss preliminary planning for Station Niazi support to the (i)(B)
USSS prior to and during fubject conventions. un 17 Anril 1972
tho(C/1/000 and C/CI/LSN met with "r. Hastrovito at Headquarters
to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in tiani and
to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the
USSS.
4. The basic agreement Eutually concurred in by the USSS
and leadquarters representatives provided that:
JFK (1)(B)
Va. (Station WH/Miami would conduct name traces on
all Cubans of interest to the USSS.
· b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on
all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.
C.
CIA would keen the USSS informed of any events
in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would
have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during
the convention periods. This would include briefings
on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and
on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which
could affect the security of the conventions.
00576
502-
JFK
JFK (₁) (B)
d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the
United States would be the responsibility of the FBI
since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly
targeted against these groups since it was now considered
an internal security function.
It
.S. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffer office
of Station N/Miami
with the USSS Chief of Communica-
tions, Station personnel and a Headquarters representative.
was agreed that name traces would be handled by Miami security
field office courier from the USSS to offer office until the USSS
ostablished communications links from their command post in
convention center, at which time trace requests would be sent
from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA
Headquarters. Cuban nane traces are relayed to Station Alliam
by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted by WH/COS.USS
Replies to USSS requests on non-Cubans are coordinated With
(CI/SO.] JPK()(15)
JFK.
(1)(B)
JFK
JFK (1)(e) 6. (Station W/Miami] has arranged the rental of a safehouse
[about five minutes from convention center) which will provide a
secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnal.
This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both JFK
conventions. A Headquarters officer will TY[to "iami prior to (.)(B)
the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to
assist the Station in providing the support described in paragraph
four above.
JFK (1) (D)
(•)(B)
.
7. [Station WP/Miami) is in daily contact with the USSS in
Miami, utilizing buffer office as a meeting site when necessary. The
location of Station WH/iani]
has not been revealed to
the USSS. (Station is located some distance from buffer office.)
Additionally, the (Hiani Security Field Office] maintains normal
liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.
JFK (1)(B)
8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present
at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment
unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other
facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.
SECRET
1:
i
00577
SUBJECT:
May 1973
Request for Information on Sensitive Activities
You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972,
I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI.
These funds may still be possibly held in a special
account for that use. This is one of the areas where
TSD has been very much involved.
Chuck Briggs would
have the details as this was handled through the Executive.
Director's office and of course Angleton would have
additional information.
Signed
LEN-RA
Chief
Missions and Programs Staff
دیا
EYES ONLY
SECRET
E2 IMPDET CL BY 357737.
00582
j.
-
ད.
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR :
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT
Areas of Possible Embarrassment
to the Agency
1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John
Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to
the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was
non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with
the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the
President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.
2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the
Agency on this subject:
a.
b.
C.
i
Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director
Helms.
Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI,
General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation).
Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and
John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels
were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by
the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.
3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since
¨ it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to
uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve-
ment of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity.
The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were
coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this sub-,
ject died down and we did not pursue it further.
:
4. Please return the attachments when they have served your
purpose.
SECRET
EZ MPDE
E2 IMPDET CL BY 05451 ?
00593
and
5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation JFK (1) (B)
Committee and Staff prepared by [Richard Ober.] The original
meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House
and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then
Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian
and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.
Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and¨it is always
possible that he might draw in the Agency.
JFK(1)(B)
6. Before appointing [Ober] to the IES Staff as the Agency
representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings pre-
sided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms
that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-
perience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split
between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis
one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly
passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This
was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from
the Bureau.
Attachments (5)
[psboun] JFK (1)(a)
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
SECRET
"
00584
JFK
(1)(B)
DEN-168
JPK
(i)(B)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT
: Counter Intelligence Staff,
[Police Group] Activities JFK (1)(B)
JFK(1)(B)
1. Counter Intelligence Staff, [Police Group] (CI[PG)]
JPKG)(B)
is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office
of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and
programs involving: assistance to foreign police/security JFK (.)(B).
forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and
programs for intelligence purposes.J
JFK (1)(B)
2. CI [PG] maintains liaison with the Office of Public
Safety, Agency for International Development (GPS/ND)
and its training facility, the International Police Academy
(IP\). CIP also administers and suvorvises Project
IDEN-171 and its training proprietory facility, DEN-172.
In addition, CILPG coordinates a joint OPS/ATD Tecifical
Services Division, Contral Intelligence Agency (TS/CIA)
Technical Investigations Course.1 CIAⒶ✓ provides guidance
and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters portaining
to police/security functions and activities.] Specific
details of these functions are as follows:
JFK (1) (®) {
LIAISON WITH OPS/AID
JFK(1)(3)
CIPG] liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a
daily basis and consists principally of:
A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some
of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are
of interest to Agency components,
B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored partici-
pants in IPA/OPS/AID training prograns,
C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AIN briefings and tours for
foreira police/security representatives sponsored]
by CIA Area Divisions,]
JFK(i)(B)
JFK (1)(B)
00597
SECEFT
Monet Ol my 55.21 &
2.
D. obtaining biographic and assessment data.on
IPA/OPS/AID trainces,.
E. providing general information pertaining to
police/security organizations, activities, equip-
ment, and personalities requested by Agency
operating components,
F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the
Technical Investigations Course designed to
familiarize the trainees with the technique
required to pronerly investigate terrorist
activities wherein explosives have been utilized,
G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve.
abroad. At one time as many as 50 CIA employees
were covered in Latin America, the Far East and
Africa. This total has been reduced during the
_past several years to 10 serving in Thailand, *
H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID
sponsored participants.
JFK (₁) (B)
JFK
(1)(B)
JFK
(1)(15)
PROJECT IDEN-171
-
PROPRIETARY IDEN-172- fearning
function of
IDEN-168
sells in
IDEN-172 Training Academy is a commercial internrise.
It was incornorated under the laws of the State of Maryland
in 1952 and conducts its business in the District of
Colombia. It is engaged principally in training foreign
police/security personnel under an overt contract with
OPS/AID, and selling police/security equipment to foreign
police/security personnel and organizations.IDEN-172 also
provides special training programs and briefings to
foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency
operating divisions. It provides biographic and assessment
data on trainees to country desks. RecentlyIDEN-172 has
acquired the capability of providing training to foreign
police/security personnel in VIP protective security
for Chiefs of State.
* CIA personnel under this cover will not be replaced as
such and all will be phased out by June 1974.
0592
Consuici
Servis
JFKC)
JFK
] (to)
SEOGET
00598
- 3 -
COMMENT
CI/PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison
JFK with any law enforcement organization, local or federal,
(1) (5) at home or abroad ] Then the need arises, such contact is
JFK:(1)(RS)
JFKG)(B)
sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or [DEN-172 without
divulging Agency interest. OPS/AID has such contacts
-
JFK (1) (B)
at home and abroad because of the nature of its activitics
(training of forcign nolice/security personnel at home
and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the
world. IDEN-172 has such contacts at hore local and
federal level - because its personnel are personally
acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the
United States. Members of the [DEN-172 staff (not identified)
as CIA) have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal
institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S.
Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.
3. In. addition to the liaison mentioned in the
JPK()
previous paragraph, (the Agency maintains liaison in varying JFK(1)(B)
degrees with foreign police/security organizations through
its field stations. The existence and extent thereof,
however, is a decision to be made by the Area Division,
and is not the responsibility of CI/PG. JFK (1)(B)
4. The CIA station as a member of the Country Team in
Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had sone contact with ban
Mitrione, Tho was murdered by the Tupanaros. Dan 'itrione,
an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, was
a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission
in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.
[es] JPK(1) (B)
James Angleton'
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
00593
STARET
i
SENSITIVE
May 73
.s. cetizens.
§.
freak.
SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program
1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for
clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign
efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic
U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,
North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the
Arab fedayeen.
2. The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct-
ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection
purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented
activity in the United States has been of two types:
a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel
abroad in connection with their extremist activity
and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile
foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups
have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters
officers. The briefing has included appropriate
operational guidance, including defensive advice.
b. Americans with existing extremist creden-
tials have been assessed, recruited, tested and
dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract
agents, primarily sources offered for such use by
the FBI. When abroad they collect information re-
sponsive to MICHAOS program requirements, as well
as other Agency requirements. They are thus used
primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Com-
munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back-
ground and their particular access permits. It
should be noted that the NPTROIKA aspect of the
MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is
similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.
3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign pro-
gram, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity
described above. The program is and has been managed so
as to achieve the maximum feasible utilizațion of exist-
ing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets
00501
WARRING HOLIGE
SENSITIVE CHILTUMERCE SOURCES
AND HOGG ARVAVED
SENSITIVE
SECRET
2 IMPORT CL DY
i
SECRET,
JPKB
CORPORATE COVER
1.
Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the
placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover
of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.S. This
process involves the selection of companies; research on
their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts
with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency;
arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the
companies, including letters of understanding; funding of
salaries, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitor-
ing of each integrated case throughout the course of the
cover use. The overall objective is to match the individual
being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner
that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and pro-
tection of the company integrity.
2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover
is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in
47 foreign countrics and 12 are located in the United States.
To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are re-
searching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies
at any given time.
3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating
company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in
the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has
been established policy that no more than two individuals
would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present
time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total
number of companies now being used and efforts are under-
way to effect further reductions toward the goal of one
individual per company.
4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function
described in paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing
contact with two U.S. car rental firms and two U.S. .credit
card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit
cards in alias for operational use in the United States and
abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being
used by 34 individuals.
SECRET,
JFK (1)(A)
00514

SECRET
DEVISED FACILITIES COVER
:
:
1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-
stopped notional facilities which were created to pro-
vide cover for Agency personnel in the United States
and abroad and to provide an attributable source for
Agency funds used in operations and requiring conceal-
ment of Agency or U.S. Government interest. The facilities
comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover,
payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscel-
laneous support such as title to property, funding, etc.;
61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational
cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207
non-registered companies providing support for high risk
operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reim-
bursements, and proprietary funding.
2.
224 Agency personnel engaged in operational
activities are payrolled by the facilities, an essential
procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salaries with-
out documenting the Agency as the source.
3. The facilities provide a capability for passing
Agency funds to 30 Agency proprietaries and 97 bona fide
companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts
located in 36 banks throughout the United States provide
the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.
SECRET
JFKW)(A)
OUT CL BY HE
00515
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. W. R. WANNALL
✓ WANNALE R
FROM
MR. W.
UGAR
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
10/10/00 SPZALM/JTE
ALCATION CON ALL. is
dan ka
1
1
1
-
-
-
Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
Mr. R. J. Gallagher
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar]
DATE: July 24,
1
-
1
-
1
1
1
11 1
-
-
1
1
-
1975
Mr. W. A. Branigan
Mr. A. B. Fulton
Mr. J. G. Deegan
Mr. R. L. Shackelford
Mr. F. S. Putman
Mr. J. W. Redfield
Mr. T. J. McNiff
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. -
'Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gon. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intoll.
Labaratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Secy
My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised
you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency
((CIA) 190 pages extracted from a 693-page document prepared by
CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities
may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities
cited in this document include references to Bureau operations of
an extremely sensitive nature, and it was also noted that the Senate
Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended
that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to
the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section
believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for
the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an
assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation
Cis involved.
This is to advise that the following pages from the docu-
ment were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of
the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose
of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:
General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, Z
Laboratory Division
-
Intelligence Division
Section CI-1
62-116395
155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180,
181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354
Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221,
222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were
furnished for information purposes as these
pages contained information concerning
techniques used and/or developed by CIA
which may be of interest). •J JFK ax(6)
REC-88
102-116375-441
Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, 77, 136, 140-142,
298, 329, 582, 615, and 628.
TJM:ekw (12)
84 JUL 31 1975
еки
3 JUL 31 1975
CONTINUED OVER
1
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
Section CI-2
Pages 30 and 329
Section CI-3
Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361–363,
368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468–470, 591-593,
and 615.
Section IS-1
Pages 188, 189, 283, 330
Section IS-2
Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203,
330, and 482.
Section IS-3
Pages 521 and 549
Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to
above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the
Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.
ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requested
assessment.
JFK
Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the
information contained therein should be closely
guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know
basis.
TAM
지새
2
..
i
ROJECT MOCKINGBIRD]
✓ Project Mockingbird] a telephone intercept activity, was conducted
between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-
based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles
based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency
and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.
Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's
office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections
were established with the assistance of a telephone company official
'who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.
Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr.
John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted
the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),
the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to
Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and
• research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency
officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector_
General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence
Houston).
The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-
tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources
of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they
received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators
and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,
of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff
member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an
Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number
of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span
of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through
these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official
data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen
for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines
were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.
Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, those materials related
it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access
of two Office of Security professionals.
542-116375-47500021
ENCLOSURE
SECRET EYES ONLY
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
SUN RETUDOS IMAN VE.)
SECRET
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SUBJECT: L Soviet Defector
मलाही
(JPN)(c)
A Soviet defector,
:].
defected to a representative of this Agency in
.1964. The responsibility for
his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of
the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country
After initial interrogation by
.
representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-
house in .
Maryland,.
where he
was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote
wooded area at ISOLATION. The SR Division was convinced
that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long
period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their
contention and he was confined at/ISOLATION in an effort
to convince him to "confess."
.This Office together with the Office of General
Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality
of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under
these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong
representations were made to the Director ((Mr. Helms)] by
this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the
Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the
responsibility for his
further handling was transferred
to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.
The Soviet defector
.
was moved to a comfortable safehouse in
the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,
sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr.
Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent
that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to
more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom
of independent movement and has continued to cooperate
fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
Office since that time. He has proven to be the most
JAK
SECRET (DA)
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[CL
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 000988]
00023
i
SECRET
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ONLY
valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever
had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were
explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution
of Soviet
recruited agents
-in several
countries throughout the world. He currently is living
under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife
and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,
and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states
"while I regret my
years of incarceration, I have.
no bitterness and now understand how it could happen.'
"
2
SECRET
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00024
:
!
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I..
JFKNA)
5741161
JFK
SURVEILLANCE'S
A. SIESTA
"
During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May
and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of
Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and
Orlando Toro Nunez, a. Cuban national with whom
Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emo-
tionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon
information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from
employees information in Information Processing Division
files, and that employees were visiting a photographic
studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax
City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance,
one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was
made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez
was aborted because of a door lock problem.
B.
PARAGON
Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved
by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69
and her associates at various times from May to September
1971. Iden 69 ", an acknowledged Latin American revolu-
tionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and
had given information regarding a plot to assassinate
or kidnap Vice President Agnow and the DC. [Surveil
lances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69.
during two visits to the United States, technical cover-
age of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives
in New York City, and surveillance, including mail cover-
age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of
the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in
New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals
-included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.
C.
CELOTEXT
At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was con-
ducted of Iden 180
of the Washington Post during
SECRET
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JERNED
E2 IMPDET
[CL BY 000988
00026
:
J4106)
JM
(c)
SECRET
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the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971
and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical sur-
veillance, an observation post was maintained in the
Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-
tained of the building housing his office. The sur-
veillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources
of classified information of interest to the Agency
which had appeared in a number of his columns.
D. MUDHEN
At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was con-
ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg
men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear,
from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the
physical surveillance, an observation post was main-
tained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite
Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance
was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for
highly classified Agency information appearing in his
syndicated columns.
E. BUTANE
At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was
conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to
20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was
to determine his activities and contacts both with
Agency employees and other individuals in regard to
his proposed book and published magazine articles ex-
posing Agency operations.
II. POLICE SUPPORT
A.
During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions,
the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police
Department was provided a communications system to
monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the
Washington area. This system consisted of a radio
receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division
Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency
Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans-
mitters and manned by two Agency employees, as wèll as; a
representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan
Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that
the communications over this system were monitored at
the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of
possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in-
stallations.
2
SECRET EYES ONLY
00027
SECRET
EYES ONLY
B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several
items of positive audio equipment consisting pri-
marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone
dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan
Police Department, Fairfax-County,-Virginia, Police
Department, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police
Department, New-York-City Police Department, and the
San Francisco, California, Police Department.
III. GENERAL SUPPORT
JFKMC)
DC,
A. SRPOINTER-
Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-
cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail
and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy
Airport in New York City. This operation included not
only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-
tious opening and photographing of selected items of
mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-
nal security interest which was disseminated to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now
in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether
the operation will be continued or abolished.
B. AELADLE
.
For several years the Office of Security has pro-
vided support to
a Russian defector of
interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted
of numerous things, including documentation for a change
of identity
on three occasions.
(DCC)
C. REDFACE I
In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious
entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu-
pied by a former defector working under contract for
the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and
3
SEGRET
EYES ONLY
100028.
JFK
JHK (NB)
SECRET
EYES ONLY
sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering
a safe within the vault. The purpose of the opera-
tion was to determine whether the individual had
any unauthorized classified information in his
possession.
D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
In January 1971, the Director approved a request
from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security
clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished
through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of
Security
operating in·
Falls Church, Virginia. Support
includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,
medical clearance, and training. It has been divided
into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-
viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal
activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment
of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)
Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD
but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is
known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.
In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and
other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reim-
bursable basis.
E. KITTENS PROJECT]
JFK
JFKCQA)
As a result of a request from the Department of
State, [approved by the DCI] this office has, since
October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis
to two sons of a foreign leader who are attending school
in the United States.
This support includes
the financing of the protection and the detail to the
Department of State of six armed Agents of this office
who are documented as State Department Office of Security
employees.
F. MERR-IMAG
From February 1967 to November 1971,
Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled
several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring
an
SECRET
EYES ONLY
00023

JAKNOZ
Thund
SECRET
EYES ONLY
dissident groups in the Washington area considered
to be potential threats to Agency personnel and
installations. One of these Agents _so_successfully
penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned
over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during
this period, the Office of Security field offices
were tasked with collecting available intelligence
on dissident groups. All such information was in-
cluded in a periodic report distributed to appro-
priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside
Government agencies.
F. ANTLERS
Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff,
and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this
office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of
a European country via commercial transportation and
gain entry into the United States without leaving
any trace of his true identity.
.
5
SECRET
EYES ONLY
00030
5807
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey
11 May 1973
1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence
of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in
RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security
questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a
dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of
three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current
interest.
2. The principal object of Security's interest through this
informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years
until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation
of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does
not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at
the time of her resignation.
3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by
reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance
with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also
being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have
an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also sub-
sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among
clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these
employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.
4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex- -RID
employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the
Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this
capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially
those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought
to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.
N
ok.
SEGRET
00059
IMPOST CL BY.
.
5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,
but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-
Castro organizations. this country. There are all reports that
his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other .
episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part
with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.
JFIXE
:.6.
The Office of Security has had at times a second informant
His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the
in this case.
principal informant.
7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed
interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds.
for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such
file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence
that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent
contact with her friend, the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On
one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions
from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no
knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been
levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of
the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees
except social contacts.
8. (The Office of Security has been running this operation for
over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelli-
gence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which
was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-
sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security.]
As a result, the Office of Security has been inhibited in the actions
it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security
has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com-
promising the operation.
9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied
with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures
to resolve doubts about the case. O/S has followed the course of watch-
ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that
would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge
of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current
Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues
- 2 -
SECRET
00063
•
to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made
any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he
continues to see them ocially. Thus, there is slin þeason to believe
that further waiting will produce a break in the case.
10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now.
It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact
with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might
alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly
since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop
for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could
move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the
security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign
nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's
operation.
11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.
The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing
information on CLA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further
delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban
has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage
to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any. possible gains from
_continuing this CI effort.
Гних
JFLUXA
isi
John O. Lawrence
00061
JFLOWE
A_MINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE JNLY
9 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services
SUBJECT
: Press Allegations re Use of Agency
Polygraph
.1. This memorandum is for your information only
and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier
today.
2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on
American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New
York Times over the by-line of Iden 181.
It was
devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from
a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had
sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President
was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information and directed a sweeping
investigation within the United States Government to
determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation
was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and
Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman,
Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.
3. On the basis of investigations conducted by
State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--
one individual in the Department of Defense and three
individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--
were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted
me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph
the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect
in the Department of Defense.
!
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
00065
AURPRISTRAT
4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time
in matters involving the national security the Agency had
detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State
Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for
his use in polygraphing State Department employees who
were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty.
I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's
approval and that State clearly understood that the examin-
ation was their total responsibility. I further informed
him that this was the only way we could undertake to enter-
tain his request and that even then it would require the
specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to
obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with
Mr. Gentile.
5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile
and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made.
Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same
polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect.
Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an
excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials
to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph
examination.
6. The four individuals were Iden 182
of the Department of Defense and Iden 183
Iden 184
and
Iden 185
of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph
examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the
results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature
to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering
memorandum is attached.
7.
•
Iden 186
a staff writer for The
Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971,
stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees
suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in
July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
ADMINISTRATIVE-ENTERICAL USE ONLY
00066
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
:
Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a
letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph
examinations had been conducted by another agency. Specu-
lation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so,
press speculation in this regard died away.
8.
.
Iden 186
I
apparently has never been satisfied
and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department
spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr.
Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press
conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press
this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by
Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible'
he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State
Department Security officials utilizing an operator and
a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose.
do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide
investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to
Iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the
reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David
Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an
internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the
White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was
the source.
Attachment
JFK
LA)
Howard Chance
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERN
USE ONLY
00067
JFK)
5 une 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT
Items in John Clarke Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973
1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CLA funds
and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-
vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use
against a common target in the U.S.'
"
2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA
being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
buying an apartment building.
There was also
Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem
here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.
3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political action influence
activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
00070
SECRET-EVES ONLY
CLASSIFIED BY.
A
SCHEDULE OF 2. D. 17, 187
§ 511 (3) se to do any
(enles) imgesi, inant ente un event
-LO
funds used., He felt that only Colonel White could supply
additional detai He said Senator Russell a Repre-
sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but
asked not to be briefed in detail.
Attachment
JFKU(A)
alius C. Rechards.
John C. Richards.
Inspector
- 2 -
SECRET-EYES ONLY
00071
9 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central Intelligence
:
SUBJECT
Per your instructions
1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the
Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions
at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment
should be a matter of record.
2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point
raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill
Colby is fully conversant are:
JFken.
JHUDC)
Ro..
- Red.
13/45/17
ishite
--
CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/D.
WHBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and
accumulation of Government capital.
Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U. S.
real estate for FBI and provision of technical
equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against
a common target in the U.S.
Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer
Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J.
trip to SEA.
Jaunc
twe
ohn M. Clarke
-JEKIDA)
00072
EYES ONLY
SECRET
E IMPOET CL BY AKTION.

5 ne 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
· SUBJECT
JFK
(RA)
Ŀ
:: Items : info:_:_Kochen Clarke) M
Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973
JFKA(B)
1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CLA funds
and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FEI and pro-
vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use
against a common target in the U.S."
2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA
being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
buying an apartment building
-
There was also
4
1
Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem
hero was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.
· 3. The second item: "-- Use of CLA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political faction influence
activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
00073
SPERET-EYES SOLD
'
CLASSIFIED BY
SHEMPT FROM GENERAL
SCHALE OF C
:
(nalysing Dev Sarar questi
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown
.in other documents in the Agency. It
has been kept very close with Mr. Yale,
Mr. Magnusson, and possibly Mr. Colby.
All files have been purged.
FORM NO.
1 AUG 54
7:
101
REPLACES FORM 10-101
WHICH MAY BE USED.
00076
(DATE)
(47)
07 MAY 1973
JFAND
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
: Deputy Director for Management and Services
:
Director of Finance
Special Other Government Agency Activities
1. Project MHDOZEN
-
Colonel White, Executive Director-
Comptroller, acting for the Director, authorized the Director
of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate
$2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to
disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be
determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by
the Chief, CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed
by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still
active.
2. LPMEDLEY - Rental of office space in New York City
for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella,
Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines,
Deputy Director for Plans.
-
3. Detailees The Agency has reimbursable and non-
reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of
Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda
between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.
4. Project TWOFOLD - Reimbursement from Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
a domestic Agency Security proprietary.
5. Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the
Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of
$858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated
sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the
Deputy Director for Plans.
SENSITIVE NITELLIMONDI ÞOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
E2 IMPDET
JFCI)(A)
CL BY: 006567
SECRET EYES ONLY
00077
1573
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT
Special Report
1. This memorandum is in response to a request to
provide information on situations or associations that
might appear to be irregular on the surface.
JHUB
-
2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies
Background: For many years the Central Intelligence Agency has
detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House
per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate
office of the President such as the Council on International
Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. We have furnished secretarics, clerical
employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable
and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no
clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White
House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their
Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.
I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as
late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a
laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed
invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds
were apparently available to run the White House and most of
our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees.
CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with
detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and
others on Defense and State and other Government entities
whose employees have Top Secret clearances.
Professional officers have been and are at the present
time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven
clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.
In addition to the above, we have technical specialists
detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and
security officers detailed to the Department of State to
JHULDA).
E 2 IMPDET C1
CONFIDENTIAL
By003
03935
00105
!.
JFKED(A)
.protect foreign visitors. Recently:D:D:D: John Hard was detailed
to the Secretary of the Treasury along with Nur other Agency
employees. We have even, in rare. instances, detailed our·
people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.
.3.
Details to the White House and Government Agencies
Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the
National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other
hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees
currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his
secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made
a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his
present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for
a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112
Served for
over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for
AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during
that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability
retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire
automatically at the expiration of this leave.
Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or
other Government agency has been carefully considered and
approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were
involved.
4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are
providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be .
reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely
sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on
it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.
5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more
general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes
contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out
domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are
domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided
in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of
certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.
6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of
reporting "too much, I would remind you that Contract Personnel
Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American
firms to provide cover for Agency assets. The actual assign-
ments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped,
in the main, in the United States.
2
CONFIDENTIAL
00106
J & K K B ]
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH
SUBJECT
4 MAY 1973
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Sensitive Activities Performed by the
Office of Logistics
1. This memorandum contains information for the Director
of Central Intelligence.
2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given
by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May
that Office Directors report on activities, either under their
cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which
could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed
within the statutory responsibility and authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the
Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein
reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re-
quest of another Agency component. We have prepared ȧ brief
description of each action involved and then have included the
name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for
the requests for action by this Office will have to be deter-
mined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.
3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the
initiative of this Office are as follows:
し
a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedi.
cated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and
related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore,
Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprictary
is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to
obtain such materiel without associating the procurement
action with the United States Government. It is legally
necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the
State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in
Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland
State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE HOLLIGINDE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVES
EYES ONLY
SECRET OL3-2758
00110
2
IMPORT CLOT
.001777
t
•
SUBJECT: Sensitive
Logistics
ctivities Performed by th Office of
The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's
association with this proprietary and have assisted us in
obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a
Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary
through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too,
have been briefed on the Agency's association with this
proprietary.
b. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of the U. S. Code
(1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is
prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local
law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it
almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence
equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship
to the United States Government is made. In order for the
Agency to covertly obtain such equipment and hide any
Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff of the
Procurement Division. has relied on an established working
relationship with a U.S. firm. . This firm, a prominent
supplier located in .
Maryland, deals in a wide
range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment.
The Covert Procurement Staff has, had a relationship with an officer
in the firm
for over 15 years. The officer agreed to
allow us to place orders through his corporation to major
suppliers of this equipment with a billing to an Agency national
proprietary.There is an understanding that. if any inquiry
is raised by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would
immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff
who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact
the Department of Justice, identify the Agency's interest
in the procurement action, and clear the officer
of any
responsibility. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry
about the proprietary
from an FBI agent making a routinė
investigation of the officer's books. Through Office of
Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI,
the agent was informed that it
is an Agency
notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry'
and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry.
Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit
requisitions to us to acquire (surveillance equipment.
majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-
gence service with whom liaison is conducted in various
foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and
The
JFKB;
EYES ONLY
SECRET
00111
7. Contractua Relationship · USJPRS: he Agency
organization, USJPRO, has a contractual association with
approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract
employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that
they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic
activities. _USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research
Service) is a part of FBIS.] They perform a translation service
of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent
contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments
as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated"
into the Bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C.
They are paid and administered by the Bureau. L CIA] reimburses
the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared
in Contract Personnel Division.
˚ 8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of
External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request
from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or
resigning from the Agency.
sent him
Jok
Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38
of EEAB
received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Iden 38 if he had a
retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks.
Iden 38
a resume on Thomas Amato who retired
31 July 1971. Iden 38
did not document his EEAB record
to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who
also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between
March and May 1972.
All of the above information was reported to the Office
of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with
the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.
9. Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract
employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the
External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job
after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was
James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to.
McCord, but Lambert was not hired.
In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from
Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co.,
a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had
CONFIDENTIAL
00107
not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from
the D.C. area.) He aid he had been visited y a Special
Agent of the FBI who told Lambert that his resume had been
found among McCord's papers. The. Agent wanted to know if
Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained
how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him,
Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29
OS were notified immediately.
JAKE(A)
Harry B. Fisher
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel
CONFIDENTIAL
00108
CORPIZENAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Break-in at Identity 61
15 May 1973
1. Information has been received from WH Division
which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61
on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. The Iden 76' Desk
of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that
time.
2.
I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66
of CI Staff (Red 1731), who advised that the FBI did
have coverage of Identity 61,
and the Agency sup-
ported this operation. He indicated that this was identified
as Operation WUDOOR and he would be able д
details on this if Mr. Colby requests it
provide additional
/s/ Identity 10
Acting Executive Officer
CONFIDEITIAL
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008246
00372

JPK (NB)
8 MAR 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Deputy Director for Operations
WII Comments on Jack Anderson Column
"Chilean
Jack Anderson's Washington Merry-Go-
Round Column of S March 1972:
Break-ins Reflect watergate".
•
1. WII Division has reviewed the referenced column
(copy attached) by Jack Anderson and finds that it con-
tains no new information. To the best knowledge of the
Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that
2. Howard Hunt was engaged on behalf of ITT in breaking
into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and
New York.
Any connection between ITT and these break-ins
is purely conjectural and the column takes care to
point this out.
2.
3.
Harold Hendrix, ITT Latin American representa-
tive, has told us that he had no relationship with
Hunt on this or any ITT matter. He had anticipated
that Anderson might imply such a relationship in his
coluan and had assured us that this was not true.
Attachment: As stated
/s/ Identity 81
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division
ABOROVED FOR A je
CIA HISTORICAL
DECLASSIFIED IN 9803 ROD/Oct
11513/13/94 per GMG (JER)
GmB 3/3/94
(9803 RDD/ged 3/17/94 JFK)
JFK
DA
IUPDAT
CL BY 001804
00373
USS EPS FORM 101
6/70
EALCUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE
INCIDENT REPORT
4. LOCATION
(NATION)
Chile
6. REPORTED BY:
(STREET ODRESSI
1736 Massachusetts Avenue,N.L
7. ADDRESS
5. NATURE OF INCIDENT
11. SERIAL (CASE) NUMBER
DATE OCCUR
FM-72-398
5.13-72-05-15-721
3. 4305
*ཤ∶mཤ•
Burglary It
1705 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va.
8. ..OME FRONE
321-7222
9. OFFICE PE
785-1746
12. HOUR
1330 hrs.
Hernan Navarro
10. OFFICE ASSIGNED
11. DATE
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
-
Sergeant Riley M. Richardson
14.WITNESS
05-15-72
15. ADGRESS
:
N/A
18. WITNESS
N/A
N/A
19. ADDRESS
N/A
13. DAY OF WEEK
(1) ( ) 3
()(")
4
S
T
6 (7)
۴۱
22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT (BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT. CONTINUE ABOVE ITEMS AS NECESSARY INDICATING ITEM)
:
:
" T F
16. NOME PRONE
N/A
17. OFFICE.
OFFIC VA
20. HOME NE
N/A
N/A
21. OFFICE PRONE
At approximately 1330 hours, Monday, May 13, 1972, Foreign Missions Division-
Control Center was advised by K.P.D.C., 3D, that a burglary had taken place-at-lic
Chancery of Chile, 1736 Massachusetts Avarua, H., sometime between 1600 horms on
Friday, May 13, 1972, and on 0845 hours this date.
Sergeant Eiley M. Pichardsen and the undersigned were dispatched at approximately
1335 hours in Cruiser # 23.
The undersigned was advised by Mr. Hernan (MI) Navarro, Administrative Coureslor
of the Embassy of Chile, that the Chancery of Chile was entered and all the officce
were ransacked. At this time the nothod of entry or items taken is unimam.
Mr. Navarro advises that he will contact the Foreign Missions Division-Watch Cour
when determination of missing articles is made. (continued)
22. PHOTз5
□ YES
Jam
(USE EPS FORM 102 - SUPPLEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS)
24. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOS, EYES, ETC.
FSt
LAST NAME
FIRST
MIDCLE
ADDRESS
(1) RACE
.SEX
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES
CATE OF BIRTH
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
LAST NAME
(2)
RACE
SEX
HEIGHT
25. ARREST PO
FIRST
•
MIDDLE
ACORESS
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES
DATE OF SIRTH
26. ARREST NO.
27. ARREST OFFICER {NAME AND BADGE AO.)
N/A
NATIONAL
(KATIONALIT
28. DATE OF ARREST
29. k
30. INCIDENT STATUS
2.
OPEN
31. REPORTY OF SIGNATURE), HOUS
fax
Sergeant Stevens E. Putler
33. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED
N/A
DATE
HOUR
B.}{
CLOSED
05-15-72
1500 hrs.
C. ☐ UNFOUNDED
32. APPROVING OFFICIAL (SIGNATURE)
Cantain Pete 11. Manthos
DATE:
:'
HOUR:
D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST
DATE
HOUR
34. USSS-ID CASE NO.
N/A
05.1
2503.
00376
INCIDENT REPORT - SUPPLEK
1. SERIAL (CASE) A VEZ-
EM-72-398
2. NATURE OF INCIDENT
Burglary II
3. REPORTED BY:
Hernan (NT) Navarro.
7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:
-
4. ADDRESS:
i
5. HOME P-45
321-7721
16. -2.
7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Val
:
765-1716
The following were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifton O. Gill, Badge #147,
M.P.D.C., 3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, M.P.D.C.,3D, also M.P.D.
Print Cruiser # 735.
S/A Michael F. Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.
jam
8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS, IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.
N/A
LAST NAME I
FIRST 1
MIDDLE\
ADDRESS:
:
(0);
RACE 1
SEX
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES
DATE OF BIRTH |
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
NATIONALITY
.LAST NAME
FIRST
MIDDLE
ADDRESS
:
(2);
RACE
SEX. \
KEIGHT
WEIGHT |
KAIR 1
EYES 1
DATE OF BIRTH\
SOCIAL SECURITY HO.
NATIONAL:
9. ARREST POI
10. ARREST NO. |
11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)
1"
12. DATE
13. HOP
14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTIONI
WESPEN
16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION
OPEN
1
17. NCER (SIGNATURE) |
Dili, E. Butler LAR
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
.15. USSS-ID CASE NO.
.
CLOSED|
C. UNFOUNDED
이
D. CLEARED BY ARREST |
N/A
18. DATE!
05-15-72
19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)
Pete man
Captain Peto N. Manthos
0037**
20. CAE
05-2
2. NATURE OF INCIDENT
Burglary II
3. REPORTED BY:
Herman (IRT) Navarro
7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:..
4. ADDRESS
7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Val
5. HOME FONE
321-7707
16. OFFE
785-1745
At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Mr. Navarro contacted Officer
Adrian Roman-Gonzalez at 1310 L. Street, H.W. and stated the following items missing:
(4 Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo AM/FM Portable Radio, two (2) Panasonic AM/FM ROŠL
and one (1) Westinghouse AM/FM/SN Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver,
one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an unknown number of books.
jam
Q
8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.
AT NAME
FIRST 1
MIDDLE
ADDRESS:
N/A
. (1)
RACE
SEX
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES
DATE OF BIRTH |
. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.,
NATIONALITY
.LAST NAME |
FIRST 1
MIDDLE |
ADDRESS
(2)
RACE 1
.SEX.1
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
KAIR!
_EYES \
DATE OF BIRTH
.SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
NATIONALIT:
9. ARREST PD 1
10. ARREST NO. |
11. ARREST OFFICER (HAME & BASSE NO.)
17. DATE
13. how
14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTION\
.15. USSS-ID CASE NO.
. B. CLOSED. 1 C. ☐ UNFOUNDED
D. CLEARED BY ARREST !
N/A
16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION 1
OPEN
17. REPORTING SERIER (SIGNATURE 1X
18. DATE
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
15. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & FITLE
Fete the
05-15-72 Captain Pete N. Manthos
00378
20. DA:
05-15-7
¦ PERSON OR PROPER, 1
14. EX. COPIES 15. DIST.
.30
16. DEAT
17. R. A.
1B. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS E
N/A
19. DESCRIBE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PREMISE
> CHILE EMBASSY
20. VEHICLE USED - TAG NO. AND STATE
فرود
21. YEAR
MAKE
MODEL COLOR(S)
A
Embassy Of Cricke
3. STREET ADDRESS
1736 MASS, Ave N.W.
OYED 5. WHERE EMPLOYED OR SCHOOL ATTE
N/A
7. SEX RACE
DOS
9. LOCATION OF CRIME (ACGress)
8. CRIME
BURG. II
1736 MASS. Ave N.lll.
11. WEAPON, TOOL, FORCE OR MEANS USED
ར
UNK
UNK
248-42"
14. HOME PRONE
N/A
6. BUS. PHONE
785-1740
10. DATE, DAYTIME
See/Te
PHOTOS
☐ YES
ks
☐ NO
--
13. CLASSIFICATION
D
CODE:
O-OWNER R- REPORTING PERSON
C-COMPLAINANT P-PARENT, GUAR
22. NAME (Last, First, M.ddie)
* NAVARRO, HERNAN
23.isrative Counselen
12. METHOD USED
CODE RES. ADDRESS
Springfield HOME PHONE
EUS. PINE
R 7605 Ham/e/ST. VA 321-7121 785-17-
HAMLE/ST.
A
24.
►
25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUMBER (Include Home, Address, Sex, Raze, Age, Height, Weight, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.)
IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (Omit description if arrested)
(1)
N/A
(2)
4
26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION ON BODY
4
20. TRANSPORTED BY
N/A
30. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN
4
UNY
33. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY
36.
Inside Embassy
NARRATIVE:
ITEM
NO.
Y
31. LOSS VALUE
کر رہوں گا
UNK
27. HOSPITALIZED – WHERE?
29. TREATED BY
N
32. TRADEMARKS, ACTIONS 98 CONVERSATION OF SUSPECT
34. POINT OF ENTRY 135. VEHICLE FROM YAG NO. STATE
DUNK
WHICH THEFT
OCCURRED
YEAR AND MAKE
N/A
S
☐ D
☐ FELEA
(1) CONTINUATIONS OF ABOVE NEMS TREE INCLUDE ROSITICIAL SOUF
LINED ABOVE. (2) BRIEFLY DESCRISE INCIDENT AND ACTION TAKEN. (3) DESCRIDE EVIDENCE
PROPERTY INDICATE DISPOSITION AND DESCRIBE ALL PROPERTY INVOLVED. USE CONTINUATION RE
PORT IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED. RECORD VALUE OF LOSS ESTIMATED BY VICTIM.
R-1 Refiorts Between The hours of 1600, 5-15-72 And 0855,
5-15-72 The
Of Chile was entered AND ALL This
Embassy
Offices RANSAKel, UNKNOWN whaT WAS TOKEN AT This i
FULL Report To Follow Later,
CAU 244 SgJ GILLON Scene,
PriNT CRU 735 ON Scene
off. Leitz of E.P.S. Notified AT 1330.hrsc
9391
T.T. NUMBER
39. REPORTING OFFICER UNIT & PAGE NO.
DATE & TIME THIS REPORT
5-15-72 500
40. STATUS (Check Orc) ☐ UNFOUNDED
Ms. Kurdik 50 3770% OPEN ☐ CLOSED ☐ SUSPENDED
43. SECOND OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.
B.L. DUNNING
PD 251 RLVIS&O°3/71
44. SUPERVISOR APPROVING
UNIT & BADGE NO.
STT C. O. Gill 147
OFFICE USE ONLY
37. DATE/TIME TYPE NO.
33. REPROD
41 UNIT REFERRED 10
42. UCR DISFCS::.-
45. REVIEWER
METROPOLITAN POLICE NEVERTHENT WASHINGTON D'À
00379
20.
OGC 73-0930
.25 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Identity 61
Break In on 15 May 1972
:
1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson,
General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if hẹ
ḥad any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved
in a break in at Identity 61
· in Washington, D.C. on
15 May 1972. Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but
suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and
the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive
Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identi-
fied two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from
the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated
15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest
of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy,
and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated
15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of
investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service.
I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison
man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.
2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent
Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received
a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry
about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington
Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd
District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61
between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972.
00384
!
Reported loss at tha
me consisted of four am/fm judios
and one electric razor. The police investigation identified
some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints
was made. Since the reported loss was under $5,000 and there
was no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did
not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported
that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.
John Keaney
JOHN K. CREANTW
Assistant General Counsel
cc: Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
OGC:JKG:cav
Orig Subject: Watergate Case
ג
-
JKG Signer
1 - Chróno
-2-
00385
EYES ONLY
1. June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
SUBJECT:
Special Activities
1.
Following our recent conversation, I have
searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples
of activities which to hostile observers or to someone
without complete knowledge and with a special kind of
motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities
exceeding CIA's charter.
1: charter.] JPK(1)(B)
2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962,
DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists
Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify
their sources for classified information which was appear-
ing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared
to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me
personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA,
orally, which I did. I understand more complete information
on this operation is available from the Director of Security.
I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of
what precise actions were taken, what information was gained,
what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.
3. As a result of a developing relationship with
IDEN-122
theIDEN-123representative in Washington,
,
and also as a result of certain information conveyed by
IDEN-124
James Angleton, with the approval of
Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation
against the
IDEN-95
in Washington. This involved
breaking and entering and the removal of documents from
JIKA
23MPORT CE D1007789
FZES GILY
CHARGE
00457
j
ELESTURTE
EVES ONLY
2
the
IDEN-126
On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and.
Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the
operation without going into operational details. Later
on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed.
Actual breaking and entering occurred, somewhat later, and
on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy
alone and briefed the President on the details of this
new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney
General was briefed and he agreed that he would not
mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised
it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone
with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the
operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed.
On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State
Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed
reservations about the propricty of such an operation.
He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations
with McCone on 17 April 1964. 28 May 1964, and 14 June
1961. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express
grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the
IDEN-95 be informed directly that we knew about their
espionage operations in the United States and ask them
to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed
these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and
President John F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara
was also present, and there is no record that he had
previously been made aware of this operation.
4. Although certain activities never got beyond
the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples
of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.
One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice
'crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved
a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear instal-
lations. Outside the United States Government, General
Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which
assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by
Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence
collection effort against foreign installations in this
country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected
00453
EVES ONLY
тек
⑩(B)
EYES CERT
3
exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the
Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear
to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the
effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and
indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase,
the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy 7 and
generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and
indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between
DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting
taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.
It is clear that the TBI was opposed to any such proposal
then, as now, and the plan never went forward..
5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in
charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office
learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured
the cooperation of several prominent US business firms
in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question
but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-
ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.
6.
On 17 April 1964. Mr. Robert B. Anderson came
to DCI. McCone on behalf of American business interests,
offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a
favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly
after this approach. WDEN-128.
of
IDEN-129
mado a similar proposal to McCone in connection
with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of
the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of
American business could not be accepted. it being neither
a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business.
This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent
ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has
'forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing
to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations
and private business.
7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert
Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy,
McCone injected the Agency, and particularly IDEN-36
JAK
(ตัว)
EYES GE
00459

COMPROBEED DISSEN
•
2.4. APR-1972
Foreign Suport for Activities Plann to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY:
There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts
to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to
disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San
Diego, 21 to 23. August 1972. The Students for a Democratic
Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning
actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal
to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstra-
tion in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego
Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting
on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from
the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indica-
tion of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact
will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported
plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the
Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in
Paris.
DEVELOPMENTS:
At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at
the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National
Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate
with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during
a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be
entertained.
The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to
the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a
letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the
· American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the
North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been
circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972,
expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC,
and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant soli-
darity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC
write often and "send us materials you have."
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FORENCH DISSENING DISSEN ABROAD
00556
-
CONTROLEED DISSEM
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
-Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY:
23 MAY 1972
Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
..to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in
_ Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedish
Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-
tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
in the United States against the war based on a submission
by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).
The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
the Republican Convention.
DEVELOPMENTS:
I mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
for V: tnam, who is also an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference
on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish
Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be
hectic right until the elections in the U.S."
The International Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
.ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publica-
tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished
.: by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
included the following entry:
August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego.
Demonstrations organized by the San
Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267,.
San Diego, Ca. 92103.
ריו
0055%
110
CONTROLLED DISSEN
The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically
call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.
tin
CONTROLLED DISSEN
00553
„GURIKOLLED. DISSEMI
14 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY:
The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of
interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to
the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar
organizations in the United States for demonstrations in
connection with the political conventions of both major
parties.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese
Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to
contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent
trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official
gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstra-
tions during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
official stated that he was especially interested in plans
for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican
National Conventions.
NO FOREIGN DISSEN/HO DISSER ABROAD
CONTRULLED DISSEN
00559
Controlled Dissem
28 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
There are no additional indications of any substantial
foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advan-
tage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24
August 1972.
No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem
-.00560
CONTROLLED DISSEM
26 JUL 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY:
New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire,
support, influence, or exploit activities designed to dis-
rupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami,
Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A
leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice
(PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to
take place at United States and allied military installa-
tions abroad during the period immediately before and during
the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that
representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will
participate in activities in connection with the Convention.
*The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization which has
been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the
Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to
Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently
available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican
Convention have been discussed at these meetings.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In an carly July 1972 meeting with prominent members of
foreign antiwar organizations, a representative of the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an impor-
tant position within that organization, discussed the plans
of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign
in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that
during the period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against
Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manu-
facture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and
that similar actions will be organized at United States and
allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representa-
tive further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest
WARNING GORGE
NSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
Auth Mitrine raDAN AZLIN
CONTROLLED DISSEN
NO FACTION BASENNO PIST
CLASSITIO 57
EXHAT A
00564
GENERAL DECLA
SCHE 911.32, INING OM S
5(1)(3) or (i) (chish ene or
AUTOMATICALLY DERMINIEN
Impossible to determine
Qualças impossible, insert date or ..
CONTROLLED DISSEN
of the bombing in ietnam are being organized by the "Repub-
lican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on
21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August
actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the
Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of
the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam.
(Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of
Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United
States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we
have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm
Conference representatives to participate in activities con-
nected with the Republican Convention.)
The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic group engaged in
organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Con-
vention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists
to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolu
tionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party
has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss
the agenda for meetings with the full ANU delegation. Although
no information is presently available indicating that actions
at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are sched-
uled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation
and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AWU
advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials
regarding the stance the AWU should take on certain questions
relating to the presidential elections. It is also known
that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party
about the political mood in the United States. One of the
AWU delegation. members has stated that upon their return to
the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members
will speak at rallics, over the radio, and on television,
to "educate the American people about the consequences of
voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat
Nixon."
The delegation member added that the demonstrations
.at the Republican Convention will be "unique."
CONTROLLED DISSEN
KO FOREIGN DISSONANTO DISSELI ABROAD
00582
1
الم انا
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
2 AUG 1972
•
SUMMARY:
There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to
inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or
harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August
1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between
American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic
of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the
DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the
American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National
Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire
American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials;
at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private
exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than
the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972
for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.
DEVELOPMENTS:
i
In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American
delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to dis-
cussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnam-
ese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar
movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Repub-
lican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen
Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions
of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention."
TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven
Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part,
refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demon-
strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.
00563
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
CONTROLLED DISSEN
NO FOREIGN MARSILA NG DIOSEN ALMOND
CLASSECTED BY
EXPT FROM CONTRAL DECLASSIFI
SCHEDULE OF E. C. 1932,
CATE
§ 55(1), (). (3) en (2) (circle one or m
AUTOMATICALLY DEBTED i
impossible to determine
CONTROLLED DISSEN)
Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation,
the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation.
Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by
the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there
is no information available concerning the substance of these private
exchanges.
A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with
the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972
for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second
group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the
AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for
discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from
his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at
both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's
__ chief target would be the Republican Convention..
CONTROLLED DISSEN
ከላ
00564
CONTROLLED BASEM
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party
in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE LEASE SOURCES
AMIN PETUNNE PYOLVEN
13 FOR
9 AUG 1972
00585
.
TRD DISCENT ADROAS
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEXIT FROM
SCHEDULE OF ECONO
§ (1),0) (7) ŋg (1) 199
AUTOMATICALLY SOULMANN ci
**
impossible to determine
.....

CONTROLLED DESCE C
* 0-6 `MAR· 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
Or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
There are no direct indications thus far of foreign
efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities
designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of
the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept
of coordinated international support for domestic activities
in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent
World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples
of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific
call for international support of disruptive actions at the
American national political conventions.
BACKGROUND:
At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace
and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in
Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of
American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican
and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft
resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" con-
tains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose
goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions
in the United States. It calls for international support
to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations,
from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the state-
ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party
Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."
The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly
for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People"
of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission"
states:
"In the United States particularly, the protest
against the war is voiced more and more strongly,
CONTROLLED DISSEN
HO FAREICH PANITHAIG PERSEU AS
00568
L
CONTROLLED DISSEN
under. various forms, such as draft evasions,
desertions, resistance, demonstrations which
now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
calls for support to these progressive and
antiwar forces in the United States, and asks
the governments to grant asylum to deserters
and to support their right to repatriation.
All together, the peoples of the world will
·efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Govern-
ment the restoration of peace, independence
and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."
_ A
CONTROLLED DIGGEN
00569
CONTINCELED DISSERT
09 MAY 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY:
New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire,
support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt
or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13°
July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the
Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Victnam of a
statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace
and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's
pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international
support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the
United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican
Conventions, but made no specific call for support of dis-
ruptive actions at the conventions themselves.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed,
in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities
conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference
member stated that these actions were part of an international
campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts
during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate
at the election conventions in July and August."
The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the
Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was
a major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement
in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's
"Action Commission." The appendix called for international
support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demon-
strations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with
the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic
Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."
CONTROLLED DISSED
NO FOREIGN DISSOLUTO DISSEN ACRED
OFLEET
00570
HI TORLICH DROSEMARY STORE RERUMIS
CONTROLLED DISSEN
2 3 HAY 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY:
Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish
Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-
tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
in the United States against the war based on a submission
by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PĊPJ).
The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
the Democratic Convention.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference
on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish
Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be
hectic right until the elections in the U.S."
The International Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publica-
tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished
by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
included the following entry:
July 9 12
-
Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.
Demonstrations organised by Florida
People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa,
Florida 33612.
CONTROLLED DISSEM
- NO FORCION DISSELL NO DISDEN APREND
00571
NO [VALION DM1.0 BIJEEN RUND
CONTROLLED DISSEM
The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically
call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.
CONTRALLER DISSEM
NO DISTELL 12340
00572
CONTROLLED DISSEM
7 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
•
SUMMARY:
The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is an expression of interest
by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris
Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations
in the United States for demonstrations in connection with
the political conventions of both major parties.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Dele-
gation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact
him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip
to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave
the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demon-
strations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
-official stated that he was especially interested in plans
for actions in connection with the Democratic and National
Conventions.
CONTROLLED DISSEN
LIA FanFic
misoric.p APEGAD
00573
+
CONTULLED DISSEN
21 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to
disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,
Florida, 10-13 July 1972.
"'n
CONTROLLED DISSEN
rnsian iheet in
00574
00575
:
زت
DB
EYES CHLY
4
V
into the US labor situation, and particularly to try
to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and
Walter Reuther. IDEN-36 steered a very skillful
course in this connection, but the Agency could be
vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back,
or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's
wishes.
'
8. There are three examples of using Agency
funds which I know to be controversial. One was the
expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing
the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of
this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike
Miskovsky
IDEN-131
and James Smith. Second,
as you well know, when Lou Conein received his summons
to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on
1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.
My impression is that the accounting for this and its
use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at
one of the early Special Group meetings attended by
McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend
Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West
Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His
general position was that such expenditures were not
within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow
such spending only on the direct personal request of
the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense,
the White House.
or
9. I raise these issues of funding because I
remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the
House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000
for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors
to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.
10. Under the heading of old business, I know that
any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried
about the fact that conversations within the offices and
over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's.
༼ ༽ ° ཁཱ བར སྙ ཀ
ཡཿག "-ས
00460
SZCART/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
5
tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,
his inner office, his dining room, his office in East
Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven
Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such
an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to
spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this
score.
I
11. Also under the heading of old business,
well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl
Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a
contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet
Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was
a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,
and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard
officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced
with surprisingly little excitement at the time.
12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was
a special arrangement with the Office of Communications
whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA
traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after
Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal
Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy
in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball,
Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to
discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally
quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as
to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.
Ben Read in the Secretary of Stace's office and I spent
several weeks putting this one to rest.
13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know,
operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of
his activities could be misunderstood: One example was
his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and
Maria Callas flown from Rome to. Athens on Air Force KC 135.
Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the
attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John
00462

EYES ONLY
6
میر کرنا
Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for
Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety
of this action.
14. The use of
IDEN-132
aircraft
has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself
forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite
excrcised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the
San Francisco airport for the Republican National Con-
vention in 1964 aboard the IDEN-133
with
the highly visible tail number IDEN-134. This was, I
explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate
charter, but he didn't like it.
15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen
in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a
luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps
indicative of the press's relations with him. However,
in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible
Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher
and the authors to change things. They did not change
a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will over sing
again.
16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle
Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with
the Vatican, including Pope John X X III and Pope Paul
VI,
would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.
17.
The above listing is uneven, but I have a
sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that
allegations from any quarter which cast these things in
the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,
and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight.
If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further
details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point
13 £17
00462
EYES CHLY
1
7
out that I was very much in the position of the
enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers
were aware of these activities and better able to
judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-
.pretation.
Welder
WALTER ELDER
EYES CHILY
00463
SECRET SENSITIVE
SUBJECT:
PLMPLODESTAR
JPK DC
KDO
Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program
which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipu-
lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division
difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various
parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are
often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist,
and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing,
radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset
might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the
Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for
some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his
Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embar-
rassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each
case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is
kept informed on a regular basis.
SECRET SENSITIVE
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061090
00483
SECRET
-
2
6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational
experience we have invited three FBI officers to be
students in our Soviet Operations Course from 14 to 25
May 1973.
7. A Soviet defector
was
confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to
September 1967 while efforts were being made to
establish whether he was a bona fide defector.
Although his present attitude toward the Agency is
quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the
press could cause undesirable publicity if it were
to uncover the story.
avid H.
David H. Blee
Chicf
JFICATI
Bic
Soviet Bloc Division
:
:
SECRET
00522
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby
_ Attached is the material we requested of Dick (588)
Ober:
A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
Republican National Convention
B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
Democratic National Convention
. C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to
Secret Service for Democratic and Republican
Conventions
American
Ober advises that the only American we reported
on to the IEC is Rennie Davis.BE (1.1 May 73)
FORM NO.
1 AUG 54
REPLACES FORM 10-101
101
WHICH MAY BE USED.
☑(DATE)
boses
(47)
7
ΤΟ
2
3
4
5
SENDE.
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
NAME AND ADDRESS
Inspector General
SECRET
DATE
INITIALS
6
ACTION
AREPOVAL
CUT MENT
CONCURRENCE
Remarks:
Mr. Broe:
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
PREPARE POPLY
NATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
FILE
INFORMATION
Dick Ober] has been advised that this package JCC(AGB)
[Dick
is being sent to you. Since knowledge of the
existence of this Committee has been strictly
Urited. Pye asked that it be delivered to you
unopened. Although it has an ER number on it,
it has not been sent through that office
. I gave
then only the day, subject, and originator.
--
Cuisina
00547
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
O/ES/MC/Barbara Pindar
UNCLASSIFIÐ
FORM HO. 237 Use previous editions
1-67
CONFIDENTIAL
DATE
15 May 73
SECRET
(40)
SUBJECT: (Optional)
T
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
FROM:
ER
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
IDEN-73
0/DCI
2.
3.
We
Colby.
.4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
5.
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
1465
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
14 May 1973
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show when
to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.
Attached are:
1. Background note on :
Committee per your reques.
of this morning.
2. Copies of memoranda con-
corning Agency support to
Secret Service (7 April and
23 June 1972).
EYES ONLY
1
610
☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
LITERNAL
USE ONLY
-
00548
UNCLASE FOR
EYES CILY
14 MAY 1973
JEK
SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff
1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce
fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,
including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism
and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chair-
man); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of
Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central
Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of
other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-
pated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive
Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied
by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant
to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney
General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later
William Olson. IES has received requirements directly
From and deli cred reports directly to John eat of the
White House. The White House has insisted that the
existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness
of its existence within this Agency has been limited to
DCI, DRO (DPP), C/CI and Your officers of this office.
2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign
aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or at-
tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign
intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the
Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representa-
tive on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and
as the alternate to the Agency representative on the
Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).
3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure
of Classified Information, November 1971. This study
was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a con-
sequence of the President's concern about the release
of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert
Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking
the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES
Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency partici-
pation was editorial review..
EVES ONLY
SENSITIVE
SECRET
00549
IMPOET CE BY
EYES COILY
1
4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August
1972): At the request of the White House, a series of
estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Dis-
ruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention,
Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from
February through August 1972 periodic contributions for
these estimates concerning foreign support for activi-
ties planned to disrupt or harass the Republican
National Convention (copies attached).
5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July
1972): At the request of the White House, a series of
estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disrup -
tions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami
Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and
July 1972 contributions on forcign support for activi-
ties planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic
National Convention (copics attached).
Attachments: a/s
EYES CULY
SENSITIVE
077/1770
00550
J FOREIGH DISCENTO DESSEN ADROAD
CONTROLLED DISSEN)
23 FEB 1972
.
.
SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
1. There are only limited indications thus far of
foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of
activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23
August 1972.
2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled
World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of
Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles,
attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international
demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican
National Convention. A representative of the San Diego
Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action
groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested
the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World
Assembly to include a specific call for international
support of activities against the Republican convention
in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World
Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too
divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indica-
tions that the proposal would be taken to the floor of
the Assembly.
3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided
financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid
the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representa-
tive of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' repre-
sentative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations
for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.)
Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNON-supported pro-
ject, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC),
of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to
direct New Left protest activities at the Republican
National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative
to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;
it is not known if the Republican National Convention was
discussed.
CONTROLLED DISSEM
00552

♫ FORDEN DIESEGITTO DISSEN ABRUND
CONTROLLED DISSEM
4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its
barassment of the Republican convention. A working draft
plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a
special television network to broadcast video-taped messages
from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic
demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public
address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese
in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the
United Nations.
CONTROLLED DISSEM
00553
AG6CH
D'ACTI
FURETOR DISSEMINY CISSEM RENUAD
CONTROLLED DISSEL
21 MAR 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts
to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican
Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated
international support for domestic activities in the United
States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for
Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the
Conference issued no specific call for international support of
disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.
BACKGROUND:
At the Sovict-controlled World Assembly for Peace and
Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles
from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans
for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic
National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the
Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted
by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination
for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter-
national support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and
demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with
the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic
Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."
The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the
Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February
1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:
"In the United States particularly, the protest against
the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various
forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demon-
"strations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in
the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum
to deserters and to support their right to repatriation.
All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help
to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace,
and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."
CONTROLLED DISSEM
Laois
HO FORFICH DISSE NO DES D
00554
"YU FURLIER DROSERING, DISSENT ADRUAD
CONTROLLED DISSEM
DEVELOPMENTS:
The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the
'domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Con-
vention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a
"large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72,
which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles
of people all over the world." Plans for activities at
Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special
television network to broadcast video-taped messages from
other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demon-
strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address
systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris
and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.
In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank
NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition
can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries
and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demon-
strations."
00555
CONCHED ARE
MEMORANDUM
-
SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy
in 1971 and 1972
1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in
Washington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of
[this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used
Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed
operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-
Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-
Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was dis-
continued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it
appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before .
Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and
identify this operation as/CIA instigated. 1
2. The operation consisted of the following three
technical devices:
-
aAn AC powered, masked transmitter and
-
two switches in the office occupied by the Deputy.
-Chief of Mission.
..b.
_
An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the
office of the Ambassador's secretary which was
SECRET
00468
JFK(UB)
____
-2-
designed to pick up high quality audio of typing
in the office. It was hoped to break these audio
signals into clear text using advanced computer
techniques developed by Division D. No useful
product, however, was ever obtained.
C.
A battery-powered, masked transmitter
and switch concealed in the
door of the
Embassy, which would supply crytographic information
for NSA.
(Produced excellent quality signals.
until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of
battery failure.)
3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of
the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited
value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations
of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because
of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 government mission
arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level
talks. with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt
_ renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the
-two-countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December
1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting.
"
00469
SECRET
SPRIN(6)
-3-
Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request.
Our request
was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of
this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing
to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the
mounting disclosures about CIA involvement in DEN-76 This
was especially so because of our reservations about maintaining
proper security for the listening post which, as with other
operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.
00470
SECRET
SECRET
JFK
(A)(B)
Alias Social Security Cards. 171 backstopped
accounts have been established for contract personnel
whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed
but who are entitled to Social Security coverage.
Following expiration of the contractual relationship,
at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts
are merged permitting the individual to receive com-
plete benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility.
f.
Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security
numbers have been registered for the purpose of open-
ing 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 in-
dividual tax accounts have been established with IRS
on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.
g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities
(43 corporations: 61 sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers
and 61 telephone answering service addresses are main-
tained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.
h. Alias Signatories on Dank Accounts. 24 aliases
for signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notion-
al company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1
proprietary-hire as follows:
JFK (X(B)
CCS/lIqs
-
5 officers (12 aliases) on 8
proprietary entities and 1
notional company.
CCS/NY PMC*
CCS/NY PMC*
CCS/MD PMC*
-
-
-
3 officers (9 aliases) on 13
proprietary entities.
1 proprietary-hire (1 alias)
on 3 proprietary entities.
1 officer (2 aliases) on 2
proprietary entities.
*Proprietary Management Company
-3-
SECRET
00510.
sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise
of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for
this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured
bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirees
are currently being handled.
k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Non-
official Cover Torsonnel. Dividends (interest) carned
on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover
are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based
on 50 U.S. Code 403g or Internal Revenue Code Section
6041.
Individuals under cover may borrow money from the
Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; however,
the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared
lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).
Paragraph 1. deleted because it contains sensitive
Agency operational methods and techniques.
-5-
1
00512
JPK (MB)
SECRET!
PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER
JFK((B)
1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic
proprietary management companies which provide funding and
operational support for 49 Agency entities; including 13
controlled and directed by CCS.
2. The three proprietary management companies are
staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the
commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going
operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of
entities supporting operations, and provide cover and
funding channels for operational activities as required.
Most importantly, professional services are furnished in
a manner responsive to required security standards and
at a cost considerably less than would be charged by
bona fide management firms.
3.
The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS pro-
vide cover for ten individuals in the United States and
three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide
commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and
serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventory and
aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding
notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government
affiliation or interest.
SECRET,
TAXI CL DY.
00518
JFK
()(
B)
SEGRET
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
Items for Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI
1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to
identify to you for possible briefing of the
Director activities which in certain contexts could
be construed as delicate or inappropriate.
2. At the request of the Director of Security,
from/approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January
1973 safesite number 583 was made available to the
U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence
by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was
under threat of assassination by organized criminal
elements.
3. SB Division over the past three months has
interviewed four graduate students as prospective
candidates for assignments under American business
cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate
cover jobs on their own.
4. For approximately two years the SB Division
has had the cooperation of the Commander of the
Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police
Department in training officers scheduled for
assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to
conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The
arrangement was made through the Office of Security.
Since late 1972/CIA/ has taken part in seven
5.
FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in
response to requests from the FBÍ. We have shared.
with them through lectures and discussions lessons
we have learned which are relevant to their counter-
espionage responsibilities.
JFK
(DA
)
EL SNBT
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059952
00531

SENSITIVE
have been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS
program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploi-
tation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product
capability or a concurrent capability for provision of
information responsive to the program's requirements.
This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-
tion requirements and operational guidance. This collec-
tion program is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-
ment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam
Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division opera-
tions and Korcan Branch operations. Agents who have an
American "Movement" background ‹or who have known connec-
tions with the American "Movement" are useful as access
agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to dis-
cern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and
to develop operationally exploitable relationships with
recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets
are of interest to our targets because of their connec-
tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement."
Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been
approximately 20 important areas of operational interest,
which at the present time have been reduced to about ten:
Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers,
Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.
4. The MICHAOS program also utilizes audio opera-
tions, two of which have been implemented to cover tar-
gets of special interest.
'
Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive
foreign operation.
Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive
Agency foreign operation.
SENSITIVE
SECRET
1
00592
SENSITIVE
5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the
program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted
in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and
who appear to have extremist connections, interests or
background are reported upon. Other individuals are re-
ported upon in response to specific Headquarters require-
ments received from the FBI because such individuals. are
of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.
6.
All cable and dispatch traffic related to the
MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is
not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the In-
formation Services Division. The control and retriev-
ability of information obtained, including information
received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Spe-
cial Operations Group.
7. Information responsive to specific FBI require-
ments is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled
dissemination channels, i.c., by restricted handling cable
traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind
memoranda.
8.
Information of particular significance, when col-
lected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over.
the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to
the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as
to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the
Director of the FBI.
1
SENSITIVE
SECRET
00593
SECRET/SENSITIVE
FR 73-183
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities with Possible Flap Potential
FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May
1973, same subject
1.
The answers to your questions are as follows:
a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?
Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be
used as academic support assets and access agents.
These Americans are used for spotting and assess-
ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-
ments.
Paragraph 1. b. and 1. c. are deleted
because they contain sensitive agency
operational methods and techniques.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223
00611
من الاية
12/
ITIVE
1.
d. Question: What is the arrangement re.recruiting
out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?
Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically
requires approval by the ADDO or DDO for any.
recruitment attempt made in the United States
against an American member of the academic
community or a foreign target attending an American
academic institution. This regulation is presently in
the process of revision in that this approval authority
for academic recruitments in the United States is to
be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority
for recruitment attempts against American students
outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief
of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions
at the present time are those precluding recruitment
attempts against foreign students here in the United States
on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.
2. If you have further questions, please let me know.
signed/IDEN-173
Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division
SECRET/SENSITIVE
00612
SECRET/SENSITIVE
FR 73-180 .
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities with Possible Flap Potential
1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational
activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk
that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency.
We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with
our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under
the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which
FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain some-
what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed
these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:
JFK (1)(B)
a. (The New York Base provides a fairly considerable
amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the
Chinesc. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines
and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other
than the inordinate amount of time spent by New York Base] JFK (1) (B)
personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of
money that has been expended in support of these efforts.
is to be assigned to FR Division. The
under deep
b. A CIA Officer
is presently assigned overseas
CIA Officer
cover; [his cover is the Mullen Corporation.)]) (This is the cor-] JFK (1)(B)
[poration that employed E. Howard Hunt. ] In discussions between
NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would
be pulled out
and reassigned in the United States.
FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.
j
$.
E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223
SECRET SENSITIVE
00611
SECRET/SENSITI . E
12/
We have concluded that the best solution is to have this
officer attend à university in the Midwest for at least
a year, working towards an advanced degree until there
has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan
to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever,
during the period of time that he is attending the university.
Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the、
situation and decide the next course of action at that time.
Paragraph 1. c. is deleted because it contains sensitive
Agency operational methods and techniques.
JFK (.)(B)
JFK (1) (B)
d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the
existence of an audio operation done by the FBI but with close
(TSD support) in San Francisco.
against IDEN-62.
been exceptionally well done.
I
This operation is directed
understand the operation has
However, the responsibility
JFK (1)(B)
for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction JFKG) (B)
with SB Division.
e. Three microphones were planted in various locations
in the IDEN-61
by the FBI. (The equipment was pro-
duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no
CIA personnel have entered the premises.] The operation was
deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however,
are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause
· some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is
unlikely the finger would point to CLA.
JFK ))
SECRETJAINCITIVE
00615
LILO VI:LT
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
'
JFK
(Ⓐ
JH
action would be more economical and eliminate the need for
one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities
readily available from another. ☑ typical example of this
procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the
Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC In
connection with the current reporting requirement, however,
I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and
Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
relevant to the subject of this memorandum.
d. In connection with the disclosures during the sum-
mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly
safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook
two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West
Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87
to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy
himself that classified material furnished them by the
[Agency) was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.
His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior
Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a
letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified
information furnished them by the Agency :) Of residual
interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents
of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-
Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.)
This memorandum reports that EEBIS regularly
disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation]
but that instructions had been issued to cease
distribution of classified reports. While no
other direct dissemination went to Rand, other
USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing
"many" copies of DD/I products to Rand] as au-
thorized under USIB regulations.
The memoran-
dum also states that Rand personnel had
requested searches and document retrieval from
the CRS facility.
"
5. In connection with action taken for the Office of
Security, there are three relevant items:
JAK:
(MA)
a.
The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested
by the Office of Security to print a book written by
(Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was pre-
pared by Mr. My under a Brookings Institution Federal
EYES ONLY
SECRET
100113
SUBJECT: Sensitive
JAKU))
ctivities Performed by th
Office of
Logistics
the DD/____ we will not honor any requisition for surveil-
lance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI
Staff of the DD/03 JFK (124)
equ the LDD/07
4 Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the
following items are pertinent:
JAKU(A)
J44126)
a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then
Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a
meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.
· Colonel White explained that the Technical Services
Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance
to the FBI for a sensitive project
JFKULA)
. Colonel White did not dis-
sub-
close the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD
but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual
matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information
concerning the mission or purpose of Project.
stantive questions concerning the subject should be
addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished
for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made,
however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap-
proximately $1 million, and the complex technical equip-
ment that has been involved in the undertaking.
b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two
requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reim-
bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television
cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200
is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of
these requirements pending further instructions which
will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
and Services.
c.
Over the years, this Agency] has often supported
other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel
standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved
request, supported by a transfer of funds, (the Agency), C6)
would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for
the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by
the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are
legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This
Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
vide a service for, another Government agency when such
EYES ONLY
SECRET
00112
TFIL(IXA)
THEB
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's
What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators."
It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-
formation that may be useful to an investigator. The
book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967.
Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made
in September 1968. The title page of the book gives
attribution to Office of Security), ( Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal
Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential,
and it is our understanding that the distribution was made
to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy
of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if
desired.
Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). requested
that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at
LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It
was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution
to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director
of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
determined that the LEAA request should not be honored be-
cause the Agency) should not put itself in the position of
publishing law enforcement material for general and un- .
classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-
ing facilities.
b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security re-
quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor
vehicles for use in connection with a special support.
operation which would last approximately 3 months. The
Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memo-
randum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has
been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director
· and has his personal approval.” The request was approved.
C.
From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has
requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of
materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by
them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some
of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in
other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made
by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete
listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.
S
EYES ONLY
SECRET
00113
JP
(D)
J
SUBJECT:
Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
.. Logistics
6. In connection with the responsibility held by this
Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all
Agency operating components, the following information is .
relevant.
2.
A safe &ite, identified as "Safehouse 562" which
is Iden 88
'was made available to General Cushman's
office on 23 July 1971.
The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970
as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site
and in keeping with the approved requirement for a com-
plement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use.
The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older
high-rise building along Iden 89.
The nominal
lessee is Iden 90
a security-cleared
Iden 91
attorney with offices located at
•
The cover story utilized is that
Iden 90,
• rents the apartment for business conferences,
meetings, and occasional overnight stays by his staff
and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term
was for a 1-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,
with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby
safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency
components to meet their short-term or crash requirements.
Control of the standby safe site and its security is the
responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of
each user, component, and date of use; however, no record
is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what
purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.).
Such information is maintained by the operating component
requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this
Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made
available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971 in
answer to a telephonic request.
b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance
nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami
Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National
Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National
Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as
a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were
in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering
6
EYES ONLY.
SECRET
00115

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant
operating component on this matter.
7 The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.
2 Atts
CC:
DD/M&S
北
John F. Blake
Director of Logistics
EYES, ONIY
SECRET
00116
ULURET
EYES ONLY
Receiving
U.S. Depart
ment or Agen
Requesting
Office
Date of
Request
Item
Quantity
Unit Cost
OS
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzer
1,350
BNDD
{
TSD
5/16/72
Transmitters, Radio Beacon
8.
313
BNDD
OS
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzer
1
˚ 1,350
00113
White House
'Communicatio
Agency
Air Force
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzers
13
1,400
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzers
°10
1,350
1 State
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzers
2
1,375
AEC
11/16/72
Camera Sets
20
656
FBI
4/17/72
Camera Sets
10
700
FBI
11/18/71
Actuators, Recorders
50
488
FBI
4/19/72 Tessina Cameras
3
700
BNDD
12/7/72
Camera, Video
1
18,045
FBI
10/13/72.
Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance,
Equivalent of WL 30691
1
4,639
FBI
3/26/71
Tubes, Image, W L 30691
2
4,607'
FBI
4/20/73
Cameras, Television
2
18,300
FBI
.
WATHING HOTICE
(SENSITIVE STT SOURCES
VED
EYES ONLY
SECRET.
·JYKRA)
[
JRPORT ENTANT
001277
SECRET
EYES ONLY
Receiving
Requesting
Office
Date of.
Request
Item
TSD
12/14/72
Transmitters, Radio
Quantity
3
Unit Cost
U.S. Depart·
ment or Agenc
313
BNDD
شر
TSD
10/20/72
Actuators, Recorder
25
591
FBI
TSD
10/13/72
Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance,
1
4,639
FBI
Equivalent of W L 30691
TSD
5/26/71
Tube, Image, W L 30691
2
4,639
FBI
TSD
4/22/71
Transmitters'
3
1,372
FBI
TSD
4/22/71
Module, Plug-In
1
1,247
FBI
TSD
4/22/71
Power Supply - UWP-39A
1.
568
FBI
OL
2/25/71
Telephone Analyzers.
2
1,350
OS
1/30/71
Telephone Analyzers
22
1,350
Treasury
Treasury
OL
8/12/70
Cable, Special-Purpose
Electrical
5,000 ft.
.42
White House
00113
Communication
Agency
Immigration a
Naturalizatio
TSD
1/10/73
Ink, Special Formula
1 lot
1,825
Service
TSD
6/28/72
Ink, Special Formula
1 lot
3,700
TSD
7/26/71 Transmitter, Radio Beacon
EYES ONLY
CEPRIT
Immigration »
Naturalizatio
Service
1
728
U.S. Forestry
JPK
"I TES UNLI
JFK (A) LOJCS-594-73
11 KAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
THROUGH
SUBJECT
: Deputy Director for Management and Services
: Activities which might be considered sensitive
issues.
I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of
Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which
might be considered sensitive issues.
Most Sensitive Projects
✓
OJCS
Project Officer
Project
Organization, &
Identification
Telephone
Richard Ober
HYDRA
[SANCA]
CI Staff
Red 1465
Iden 48
Os
:
Red 9298
[ORDSTAT) ( John Hutchings]
ORD
3061
Nature
of
Project
A special pro-
ject initiated
by DCI
Machine
index to
security files
Information
storage & re-
trieval of drug
related data
(ORD's project
OFTEN)
OJCS
Reason for
Listing
Type of
data being
collected.
Type of
data in
index.
Type of
data in
files.
roject JFK-CB
(B)
Sensitive Projects
-
(DRUGGS)
Iden 18
OMS
7792
EYES ONLY
SECRET
Computer file
of drug data.
Type of
data in
file.
00135
2.
E_
036490;
IMPCET CL-BY
J&K
(DXB)
Reason for
Listing
·
Sensitive Projects (Continued)
OJCS.
Project
Identificaf
PROFILES
Project Officer
Organization, &
Nature
OJCS.
of
Telephone
Proid
John Winnie
TSD
362-1922
:
(sterile)
Statistical
analysis of
psychological
data.
Source of
data. Con-
tractors are
involved
with project.
Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern
TILAQ
Robert Hahn ·
SB
Red 1185/
1251
Pattern
analysis of
surveillance
data from
foreign liaison
service
SPYDER
George
Data on
Swegman-
radio frequen-
OS
cies used for
5071
DMVREC
Iden 48
OS
APREGIN
Red 9298
Walter-
Kowalski
CI Staff
Red 9338
Nature of
data. Tech-
:
niques of
support of In-
Place Monitor-
ing System, a
system to identify
unauthorized
transmitters.
File of auto-
mobile license
numbers.
File of Agency
applicants who
were not
hired.
system dis-
cussed with
FBI.
Project
originated by
James McCord.
Nature of
data.
Nature of
data.
EYES ONLY
SECRET
00136
Project Officer
Organization, &
Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)
OJCS
Project
Nature
OJCS
Reason for
of
Identification
Telephone
Iden 187
ISD/DDO
Red 1442
Project
Listing
Cooperative
program with
Iden 188
Association
with the
named
organization.
in
· name grouping
techniques.
10. Daher hus
For
JOHN D. LAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support
EYES ONLY
SECRET
!
00137
[23.9587/
* MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT.
REFERENCE
29 May 1973
: Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to
Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S
.
: D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,
Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or
Indirect Involvement
1. The two notes of 13
by the DCI (at that time Mr.
for a sensitive CS project.
asked that DDO records be
and 20 January 1972 refer to approval
Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K
No further details were given, Mr. Colby
checked.
2. DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a
project called Iden 99. This is a joint operation with the Iden 100
service for the collection of ELINT intelligence. The activity is
handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff.
3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to CI on
13 January 1972. It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that
the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount,ic., $30 to 32K
and not to two separate allocations.
JFK (DXA)
Правите
John C. Richarde
John C. Richards
SEGRET
00145
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
May 1973
EXOCUIVE
73-37
7581
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Watergate Principals
Involvement
-
Direct or Indirect
1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for
a report of any involvement in any capacity since 1 January 1969
with Messrs. Hunt, McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.
2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.
3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime
during the late 1960's when I was Director, Office of Computer
Services. I opposed plans for Technical Division, Office of
Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for
Iden 101.
Ted Hines of DD/S&T (then ORD)
was the computer individual working with TD and, I think, would
have details.
4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his
request, first through OMD, that CIA ſund foreign travel on behalf
of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. Indi-
vidual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency
focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3;
I understand
Copics of
Iden 3
has forwarded relevant documentation.
memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached
also.
5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to
all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will
not be available until tomorrow.
\\8)
J - D\E5R EÅG QUÀ
J
04; & § 1
-
Attachment
As stated
- M* E* Copλ
Jqg'.2266
Dou:
/s/ Charles A. Briggs
Charles A. Briggs
Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting
JFK
TA
00149
SECRET
_IMPDET CL BY
:
4 Feb 72
7 Feb 72
7 Feb. 72
Achment
23 May 1973
.
Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud" Krogh and his deputy,
Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign
travel in connection with their narcotics interests.
Jim was
alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the
travel.
Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips for 3 individuals--
all in FY 72. Cost probably $1CK. Minnick ready to make
first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran
visit.
See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and
follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Colby
(2 Aug 72).
12(7) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/
Minnick attendance at a Latin American den 102
conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd.
+13
White House, was laying on with Iden 32 for
himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Europe.
23 Jun 72
6 Jul 72
2 Aug 72
1 Nov 72
Iden 3
commented on Krogh/Minnick interest
in getting CA activities, including large-scale PM,
on narcotics front. Iden 3
pushing small-scale PP.
Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film.
We will send."
-
Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel
orders ready; need money this FM (No record in my
notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint
recollection of its being to Mexico City). Sam Hines
and, Iden 73.
contacted by Iden 3.
Related? Iden 3 call. Again notes are cryptic:
WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32): Survey ENDD problems/
Mexico."
00150
SECRET
JPH
(DLB)
On Mr. Colby's copy only:
13 Jan 72
20 Jan 72
-
ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30K for sensitive
CS project
no details.
Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.
Ų.
SECRET
00151

19 Jul 972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with J
Jack Bauman
1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I
I dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida.
(Jack) retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due
to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for
about 20 years prior to his retirement.
SEKULA)
JFK
(RA)
2. During a private conversation (Hack) told me that he had
been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with.
the McCord-Hunt affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed,
and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard
Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security
Officer for the Republican Party::: CHCHECK_HK_C_CC_KK_ visited Washington in
January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt
who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. (Jack)
furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him.
Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt
that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in
such activity.
3. According to Jack) during the meeting with Mr. Hunt
they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time
they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program
and a need for a good security system both before and during the
National Convention. (Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that
the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security
programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even.
though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a
problem.
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES SW7
LASTER 37 0876-16
00153
EXEMPT FRO.4 GENERAL DECLARIFICATION
GF E. C. 1992, EXEMPTION CHES034:
$ !{}}{{@) (}} = (4) (cs
CLISHED CY
or ),
less it dateer)//
JFKILA)
JAK
(DA)
4. When Jack declined, he indicated the Mr. Hunt asked
for any other rect mendations he might have. according to Jack
he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the
TAKA_Kency but he did furnish the name of IDEN-108 who might be
possibly ready to retire from the CⒶ_A_:_:_en__cy____
JJEN-
5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau
obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He
said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions
and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning
his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCORD:D:D:D:D:D:D:DCck :)
said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any
knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.
6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch
with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of
the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-
sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being
removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as
originally reported.
7. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr.
Bauman,) and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the
matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name
connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation
took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion
relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record
and for information of the Director of Security.
JAKEDA
Charles W. Kane
CONFIDENTIAL ·
EYES ONLY
ن
00153
DD/M&S 73-1809
JAKQA)
JFKLA)
JIDYA)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT
loth
> : Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter
1. I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central
Intelligence) since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such
significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with
the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of
such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the
proper format to do so.
2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the
Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former
Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida.] In
December 1971 Mr. Bauman] called me from Florida and advised that he
wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's
home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a
former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give (Mr. Baumanla call.
I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message.
I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his
home phone and requested he call/Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for
relaying the message and said that he would call/Mr. Bauman This seemed of
little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17
.:
of the
Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate
situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from
(Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the
Record prepared by Iden 17 has a result of our conversation.
3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida
and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman (Mr. Bauman told me in
a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the
FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact
WARNING LOTICE
SENSITIVE HILLS. POHODES
AND METICUS INCLVED
EYES ONLY SECRE
SECRET
00155
2
011018
E. _ IMPOET CL BY
JFK
(!(B)
J
(2)
with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported
this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for
the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the
memorandum is attached.
4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with
(the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor
have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related
matters now receiving attention in the press.
Atts
JFL
∙D
(A
)
Forne
: Charles W. Kane
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director
for Management and Services
EVES CON SECRET
CIV
00153
17 July 1977.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Charles W. Kane
Iden 108
-JFK (D)(A)
JALA
1. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con-
tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects
worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests.
of this nature were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the
subjects. .
2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on
the "Watergate" case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry.
Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement
and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.
3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised
of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that
the Bureau does not wish to interview them.
4. The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108
the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interviewed.
Alrichy
in The five
7/31
.5. I called (Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence
• and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July.
I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.
JACIA)
:
6. ( Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to
'how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen
Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was
the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned
00160
JFK(DA)
JFD
by the fact that Mr Kane accompanied a technic sweep team
to the Montevicco station. Mr. Kane stated further that around
Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman
who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. (Mr. Bauman asked
1. Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained
Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels
whereupon he passed the number on to Mr. Bauman.)
7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that (Jack Bauman)
has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the
· current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may
have obtained his name from him.
i
JPK
(DA)
(NB).
signed Iden 17
Deputy Director of Security
00161
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH:
SUBJECT:
8 May 1973
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities
JFK
JPK
(B)
1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved
in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:
a. CI Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data
of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists,
Betc.
b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program
for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American
Medical Association records..
c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern
listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.
2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from
New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on
data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).
3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with
possibly sensitive domestic overtones.
a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University
System."
Iḍen 103
for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction
"
b. DDS&T/ORD's Project
" which involved the collection
of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms
terminated this program last Fall.
JRK
(!/A)
SECRET/SENSITIVE
CL DY.CCIAN
00163
JAK
(DA)
CONFIDENTIAL E-2
1ay 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SILJECT: Research Project on Robert Vesco
On 15 October 1972 Heers Freckinridge and Heinzelman)
in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the
Atlantic/Pacific Division of the Office of Economic reports. One
project cited was a overy from the Director, apparently at the re-
quest of Secretary Shults, to the effect, "What do we know about
Vesco," the man then running IOS. Two of OER's analysts were assigned
to the project and, working through the Domestic Contact Service,
spent a day going over the files of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. There apparently was some contact also with EUR Division
of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. The information above is based on rough notes and obviously
is sketchy. It is cited now not to suggest any wrongdoing but because
of the current publicity about Vesco and the probability of continuing
probes into the subject by the press and the courts.
JFK(1)(A)
Scott D. Freckinridge
(H. Henry Heintzelman
00173
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
Bill--
22 May 973
_ Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:
1. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68,
Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).
This document was produced in two versions--one
with the chapter on radical students in America (pages
25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,
and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the
other version without the references to the American
scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the
Agency. This document without the material on the
US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent
to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more
abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General
in March 1969.
2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969),
No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).
:
3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look
(12 June 1970), No.. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign
Dissem (Copy 98).
Please note that these are our record copies and should
be returned.
# I-A
4/10/77.11.
Attachments
-
.2%
Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence
JAKERA)
00171
2
E
Indber
CL 57
013329
SECRET/SENSITIVE
}
i
СА
1

JFKMB)
Cred
£.
D. 3/17/94 1980
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT
: Activities Possibly Outside CIA's
Legislative Charter
1. This memoranduin responds to your instruction to
report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's
legislative charter.
2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate
have reviewed the past and present activities of their components.
I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any
activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into
the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with
three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were
reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two
improper activities:
Hunt:
Mitchell:
Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked
to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation
of a recommendation in support of the Agency's
nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National
Civil Service League Award.
While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General,
an OCI officer was assigned the task of
providing him with daily briefings on
foreign developments.
9803.000/gol...
9803 Ros/gal 
00183
(JFK)
0:1.3/17/94
per
"GMB".
Clerited by
U13329
APPROVED FOR PELTAGE 1003
CIA HISTOLOL MLTILW PROGRAM
GMB 3/3/94
(9803 RDD/gal 3/17/94 JFK)
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
Young:
Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS'
• had frequent contacts with Young during the
summer of 1972 in connection with Executive
Order 11652 and the implementing NSC
directive. This involved visits by Young
to CIA to discuss information storage and
retrieval and several meetings of an inter-
agency group dealing with the implementation
* of the Executive Order and directive.
In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported
domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.
Thaar responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly
within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be
- viewed as borderline.
DCS collects information on foreign students studying
in the US.
DCS collects information on physicians practicing in
the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign
nationals).
DCS accepts information on possible foreign
involvement in US dissident groups and on the
narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal
with. the FBI and BNDD directly.
bcs
assesses the suitability and willingness of
US citizens to cooperate with CIA.
-
DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973,
was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas
calls.
1973,
Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques and methods.
NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery
from NASA programs to identify photography
too "sensitive" for public release.
-2-
EET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
00181
i. .
J.FK (((c)
-
NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special
purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil
disturbances.
OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence
memoranda on possible foreign connections with
the US anti-war movement and world-wide student
dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of
the White House.
CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining
the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to
the Soviet, and occasionally other foreign, embassies
to acquire positive foreign intelligence.
FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work
directly for another agency, c. g., to the FBI to
translate Arabic in Washington.
FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports
covered by copyright. These are circulated within
the Government and stamped "Official Use Only".
This has gone on for three decades without problems.
FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio
broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens
such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda,
and Ramsey Clarke.
FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service
under Department of Commerce cover since 1957.
JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of
unclassified publications in foreign languages
and contracts with private individuals to do this
work. Most of these individuals are not witting.
of the CIA-JPRS relationship.
Attachments
Edward W Puter
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence
-3-
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
00182
:
JFK(D(6)
SECRET
CTA INTERNAL USE ONLY
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
Director of Central Intelligence.
: Deputy Director for Intelligence
:
Director of Current Intelligence
1
: Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism
in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on
black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean
and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states.
Two DDI memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black
Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black
Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970).
In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the
US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned
visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power
activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.
2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to
write a momorandum with special attention to links be-
tween black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of
black power in the US. The record is not clear where
this request originated, but it came through channels
from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially
sensitive and was to include material provided by the
Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff
material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful
evidence of important links between militant blacks in
the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of
the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced
in typescript form and given to the DCI.
SECRET.
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY:
Clasifed by C57
Exempt from repert ned he
Qualion ca. 5.
Back to 133 reliede one or more)
ANA" en
tundes ing und sons
00183
-
:
JFK (B)
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
3. For several months in the first half of 1968
the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda
on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period
when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection
is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only,
although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.
Richard Lehman.'
Director of Current Intelligence
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
00183
ز
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT:
DCS Domestic Activity
7 May 1973
To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any
activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as
illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f
(i) of providing operational support within the US to all
elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are
perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if mis-
interpreted. For example:
1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain
foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and
officials.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.6.
Identify foreign students in the US through collection
of foreign student lists from certain universities.
Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens
to determine their suitability and willingness to
cooperate with the Agency.
Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians
to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA
credentials.
Collect information on possible foreign involvement.
or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a
passive manner and only when the source has refused
to pass the information directly to the FBI.
Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again
only in a passive manner when the source has refused to
pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.
j
00287
SECRET/CENSITIVE
1.2 IMPLET CL AY!!
004176
!
i
Jiki)
SUBJECT:
DCS Domestic Activity
7.
Collect specific information and supply duplicate or
master keys for foreign hotels.
:
8.
9.
Collect medical information from cooperative contacts
on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment
or examinations in the US.
Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing
in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were
foreign nationals, some were US. The taped information
included school, present business address, date of birth,
and specialty.
10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas
telephone calls between persons in the US and persons
overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points
routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted
for approximately six months but has ceased.
11.
This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational-
techniques and methods.
Timer
Date
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service
SEGHEY/CENSITIVE
་་་
00185
SECRET
EYES ONLY
7 May 1973.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA
FROM
⑆
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT
JFK
(RA)
:
Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then
Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of
worldwide student dissidence. Confronted by timult at
campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence
accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University
and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful
dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes;
financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences
hostil to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely
to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.
2. The paper was prepared by Paul Corscadden) of OCI
with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI,
D/OCI, and Corscadden met with Rostow to elicit the reasons
for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the
sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed,
etc.
3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most
sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections.
The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest,
its motivation, histor; and tactics. This section drew
heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students
for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense,
the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page)
typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same
author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's request in
December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)
JFKURAS
SECRET
EYES ONLY
Cinsetired by US$71).
00193
Excerpt from prițial desta»ition schedule
•
King Kor inere)
tate or eve
SECRET
EYES ONLY
A.
Because of the paucity of information on foreign
student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which
then monopolized the field of student action here and
abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--
ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself
as a review of foreign student dissidence.
:
5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the
full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-
wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be
in the Johnson Library.
6. Following the paper's favorable reception by
the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC
on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently
was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.
7 The less sensitive text was disseminated in
September 1968 and then updated and issued again in
March 1969 and August 1970.
Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence
SECRET
EYES ONLY
00191
SL J3289/73
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),
Office of Communications, Operational
Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies
JFKRB
JAKLICA)
1.
Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit, ]
which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact
with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police
and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support
to these activities in monitoring, identification and
DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by
foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater
Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made
through the DO's Chief, WH, Miami.
2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division (D/
DDO requested that the Special Programs Division initiate
a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial
telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America.
The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of
interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of
the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,
the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92
Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-
cepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the
intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1975, all coverage
was terminated by Division D because of possible legal
complications.
3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special
Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal
technical liaison with operating components of the FBI
for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements
for support of specific activities have been made by the
Division D/DDO] Support has been provided in the form of
JFK (D)(A)
Downgraded to Sunt
on 6/7/16 per auto elections
715745780
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
E2 IMPDET CL BYE 061947]
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT, CHANNELS
00140

JFK
1 SECRET
S. 03289/73
8 May 1973
exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical
assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment.
In the past several years, support has been rendered to
sensitive FBI projects MOHAWK, UNION and WUGRAVEL. Support
has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID
and ROSE. These projects are described in the attached
sealed envelope.
4. An operational test of an NSA-developed HE/DF
system was jointly conducted by NSA, (_ _ Division D/DDO and
OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972.
A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the
tests because of similarity to the actual target site and
environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on
the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site.
A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the
roof. A team member in effect told him that the group
was an advance security segment for the Democratic National
Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests
were completed and the equipment was returned to the
Washington area.
signed Iden 53
:
Chief, Special Programs Division, OC
Att.
Downgraded to sunt
M
14/7/16.dts declose
quild 713745780
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA CONT CHANNEL'S.
00141
SENSITIVE
9
1973
МОНАНК-
-
UNION.
ORKID
-ROSE
WUGRAVEL
-
Electronic survey of Iden 63.
This operation was terminated approximately two'
months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for
two days.
j'
Hen 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by
the Iden 94 Embassy on their diplomatic communi-
cation link. SPD/SEO support terminated two
years ago.
Electronic surveillance of Iden 64
Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning
at this time, (attendance at two meetings).
Electronic surveillance of Iden 62
SPD/CHT personnel performed an
electronic search of the Iden 62 area and SPD/SEO
personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording
· of the spectrum covering 1-to-.6 GHz during the
period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for contin-
ued support by SPD in the future as requested.
Division D operation involving a Ider 95 code clerk.
SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in
use of device and stood by in Iden 97,
Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed.
The operation took place in July 1972.
HANDLE VIA GENMINT CHANNELS
Downg inded to smint
on 6/7/16 per auto whedons
12 J45780.
D&P SHONET
SENSITIVE
i
00142
1
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
TAP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY
7 May 1973
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
: Director of Current Intelligence
JRK
HP(1)
тек
(1)(B)
:
Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. In late 1967 OCT participated in the preparation
of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the
foreign connections of US organizations and activists in-
volved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of
these reports, prepared at the request of the Wnite House,
was to determine whether any links existed between inter-
national Communist elements or foreign governments and the
American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that
there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti-
war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of
direction or formal coordination.
2. In October 1967 President Johnson expressed
interest in this subject and ordered a high level inter-
departmental survey. In response to his personal request
to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect what-
ever information was available through our own sources and
through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which
was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the
President ✓
3. LA book message requirement was sent to all stations
to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this
subject.] Although agent reports on Communist front opera-
tions overseas were of some value, the primary source of
information on the activities of US activists--and that was
quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA,
which had been similarly tasked by the White House.
JPL
(RRB).
Downgraded to secut
on 6/7/16 per auto declass
Guild J13J45780
TOP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY
JPK
хах
Clocited by Qari939
Prep from general delitation sched the
o: 0.
C
:
or em
00193
SECRET UMBRA
TOP U
4.•´A druft memorandum was jointly prepared by
COCI CI Staff and forwarded to the DCL He passed
this typescript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to 
the
President personally. The White House copy is 
now 
in
the fi…us of President Johnson's papers at the library
in Austin.
15 Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and
forwaiued to the White House on 21 December and 17`
Janua 1962. According to our best recollection
, 
no
furthe Finished intelligence reports on international
connections, of the peace movement were produced.
1 1.c.
IINO
Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence
DOR SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY
I
00191
JFK UX c)
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: 0/DDI
SUBJECT:
Involvement In Domestic Affairs
1:
This memorandum responds to the DDI's
request for a listing of any questionable.
involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe
that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable
man could construc as improper.
2. CRS does, of course, have several programs
to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes
and books either privately, secretly or without
acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user.
CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking
at the content of film cans addressed to the
Russian Embassy in Washington. Customs occasionally
also provides access to other film from denied
areas. It may be addressed to private citizens
or organizations or other embassies. These efforts
are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign
information.
3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S.
citizens or organizations. The biographic file-
building criteria specifically excludes U.S.
nationals unless the person has become of such
major importance in the political life of a foreign
country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge,
only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of
the opposition leader of Guyana and the other.
is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include
some persons who are now. U.S. citizens but we
have no way to separate them; we have files on
U.S. defectors to Cuba.)
SECRET
JFK(1)(A)
E. IMPOET ON DY.
004050
00197
SEULET
SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs
4. The CIA Library has several informal
snag files intended to aid the librarians in
answering the kinds of questions that they know
they will get on a continuing basis. An
appointments file is a collection of clippings
on appointed federal officials: who holds what
job when and what is his background? The extremist
files are a collection of folders on a variety
of organizations and a few people with intricate'
organizational links. Any sort of extremism
is grist for these particular files. And a few
persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver,
have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of
clippings from public media. These files are
unclassified and consist mostly of clippings
from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground,
scholarly.
5. I am not aware of any other kind of
involvement in domestic activities that is not
related to development of techniques or logistics
or legitimate training of CRS personnel.
JFK
(DA)
7/1
H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service
-2-
SECRET
00383
SECRET
May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:' DDI
SUBJECT
:Sensitive Activities
JFK (1)(B)
1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg
and Watergate cases.
..
'
From
FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena.
time to time, FRIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of
Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving
close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion.
recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several
FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-
term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg
of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and
that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS
participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with
the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help
in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of
an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe
recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another
Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training
of Chinese Nationalist cadets.
3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-
missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes
some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel,
and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled
by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without
specific addressees, c.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's NCNA,
are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restric-
tion. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the
Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house,
correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private
point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of
material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official
Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor
from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright,
e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the
Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news
SECRET
SEISAKS
JFK
DA
00202
< 2....
OCT
014
JFK ND
SECRET
agency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently,
however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use
Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under
the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into
alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services
with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of
those items vital to the government's business which we must continue
to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against
the risk of present procedures.
4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often
involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio
facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American
POW's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam.
At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the
approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion sub-
mitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as
part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such
cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved,
presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses.
(In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as
an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged
with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this
with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we
rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered
policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.
5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations
is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research
Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which
great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could
be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United
States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA
employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some
risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public
knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after
consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive
Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently
taking a second look.
Ettiknocke
E. H. KNOCHE
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
-2-
SECRET
SAUDITIVE
00203
2:
JFK
(DB)
"SECRET,
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology
TSD Support to Other Agencies
SUBJECT
:
1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires
that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and
other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for
Operations.
2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this
support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department
of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency
for International Development, and the White House.
3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these
services have included training and materials, and in a few in-
stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance,
secret writing and related communications, personal protection,
disguise,
concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-
tion, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.
4. In most instances requirements for this support are
received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director
or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved
is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the
Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for
coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels.
Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development
and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is re-
quired.
=
5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to
the organizations named in Paragraph two.
SECRET
JFK
(1)
(A)
1Ė2 IMPDET
CL BY 059098
00215
- 2 -
This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques and methods.
JFALD (B)
8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters,
whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires.
approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance
would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group
at Headquarters or by the:D:D:D:DECKED Coverseas having responsibility for
coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated
with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration
and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs
Staff.
9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must
be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has
been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support
until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material
is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded
of the outstanding documentation.
Attachment
Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee, w/att
luiz
Sidney Gottlieb
Chief
Technical Services Division
SECRET
00216

JMKV (B)
fr
JFK ((C)
ATTAC MENT
Department of Defense
Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,
flaps and seals} counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses
have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department
of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests
are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at
Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn
these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities
documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing
systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. (Selected
audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type
cases.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau
in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign
targets in the United States.
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for
overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,
SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel
responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.
All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination
with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.
Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS) for his
designee before action by TSD is taken.
Immigration and Naturalization
(CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in
developing tamperproof alien registration cards, 'special
fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests
are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if
technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper-
ational.
SECRET
00217
JFK
DB
Department of State
Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United
States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring
and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been
supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and
exposure of black letter operations against the United States
abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded
to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The
Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,
foreign visas and in the past passports on a priority basis.
Postal Service
1
The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected
personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has
been furnished foreign postal information and has been the
recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent
ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with
the DDO and DDO/EA.) The Post Office has furnished TSD
with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities
for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have
an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert
a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.
Secret Service
Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential
campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID
photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval
for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for
Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.)
U. S. Agency for International Development
We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical
Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border
Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under
Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation
is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are
given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the
Jok
- 2
00213
JFK
D
(B)
request of (CI/PC.) Trainees represent internal security or
national police from all countries participating in AID Police
assistance programs.
White House
Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great
Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy
Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.
Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and
Alexandria
During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes
reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio,
locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry
were given to selected members from the above mentioned
cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of
Centeral Intelligence) and in turn validation was required for
each course from the Director of Security.
SECRET
i
:
00210
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
SE CHLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Sidney Gottlieb
Chief, TSD.
203 South Building
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
DDS &T
2.
3.
4.
5:
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
DATE
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
EXTENSION NO.
LITHA
x-2831 DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
8 May 1973
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment;
Attached herewith are additional
explanations of TSD support to
other U.S. Government agencies.
SECCET-RVES CILY
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
00220
UNICLASSIFIED
YET
ATTACHMENT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over
the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has
been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The
following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were
involved in operations:
(A) Identity 59.
installed.
(B) Identity 60
-
Four masked transmitters were
Two have failed and two remain workable.
A TSD built masked transmitter
was installed to collect emanations from a crypto-
graphic machine. The system continues to function
when samples of the emanations are needed.
(C) Identity 61
Two transmitters have been
installed and are operating. One is specifically
designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the
other is a straight audio transmitter to collect con-
versations. A FBI agent is manning the listening
post. A third system
is not oper-
ating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape.
made from this room
was made by the National
Security Agency before failure.
(D) Identity 62
-
TSD furnished equipment and con-
sultation covering Identity 62
First masked switched trans-
mitters were used in two apartments used as tempor-
ary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters
and microwave transmitters were installed in the
permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa-
tions, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This install-
ation is not fully operational because the full comple-
ment of personnel have not yet arrived.
SECRET
00224
JLUTET
JFK
(108)
(E) Iden 4 This is an operation with additional
participation by National Security Agency. It is
designed in anticipation of the Identity 64
in Washington. The listening post was
obtained by using the Agency covert mechanisms
for procuring the property. New systems are
being designed and produced by using TSD's covert
contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.
(F) Identity 65
Ten masked audio devices pur-
chased from TSD were installed in Identity 65
by the FBI. Part of the equipment was install-
ed in November and December 1971, the remaining
equipment was installed 17.- 25 March 1972. Tests
made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI
listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that
the target equipment no longer functioned and was
believed discovered by the occupants.
(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute
an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and
audio surveillance operations which might not be
known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a
relatively unsophisticated device was used against
a domestic target.
2
SECRET
00222
JFK
(8)(1)
SECRET
し
TSD/SDB Memo #138-73
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD
ATTENTION:
SUBJECT:
Executive Officer
Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations
1..
In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB
provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for
selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police
departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County
police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the train-
ing came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.
2. On occasion during the past few years, under the
auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff
and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiari-
zation to police officers of several domestic police
departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection
Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These tech-
niques had been declassified and are currently available to
the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center
publishes periodic guidance in their uses.
3.
In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities
in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB offi-
cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate
covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City
police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the
Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB offi-
cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference
in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the
recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison
with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete in-
formation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the "
Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.
/s/ Identity 120
C/TSD/OPS/S
00223
E2 IMPOET/CL BY 06193
JFK (RB)
ORD-2328-73
9 MAY 1973
73-23801
Примо
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
JPK
B
JFK
Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
: Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-
Foreign Intelligence Activities
The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined
with respect to all ORD services or dealings with
other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. In
addition, this report covers all our activities deal-
ing with the research and development of intelligence
equipment for foreign use which has been tested in
the United States and might have collected domestic
information. Again, each member of ORD available
today was asked either directly or through his super-
visor to provide the above requested information,
whether he was directly involved or not. We have
used all diligence to search our records available
to us during this time period to ensure this is a
complete and factual list.
Attachments:
for Sayre Statens
Director of Research & Development
1 - Contacts with Other
Government Agencies
2 - Domestic Tests
SUHARTED
AND
JFK
U(A)
SECRET
CLASSIFIED BY
EXT TO
Ӧ
387323
(unks on MS, Takut kare or events
00223
CONTACTS WITH HER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH
COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED
TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
1
JFKUB
JFK.
(I)(B)
Executive Office of the President
[ ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee
of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics
Control that is concerned with research support of
the narcotics control problem.
(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST)
Office of Telecommunications Policy
(Cianci/LS)
Technical surveillance countermeasures and
physical security information was exchanged with
them.
(Noe/TA)
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
Techniques and equipment for navigation and
tracking was discussed with BNDD.
(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)
(Van Dewerker/TA)
(Noe/TA)
Technical information was exchanged relating.
to the development of simple, portable sensor systems
for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and
narcotic laboratory effluents.
(Mr. John Gunn and
Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD)
(Parker/DSP)
Audio tapes were processed to improve their
intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.
(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)
(Scott/An)
00220
SECRET
ATTACHMENT 1
:
JFK
(1)(B)
JFKCRB)
JFK
((B)
SUBJECT:
SECRET
Cont ts With Other U.S. Goverment Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA->
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
BNDD (cont'd)
.
[ BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972
to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning
a Radar People Detector developed for ORD.
(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) ·
ORD.]
Identity 125/LS)
A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed
for the detection of narcotics for application in
Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of
the instrument.
(Dr. Laster/OST)
(Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD).
(Terek/LS)
USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee
Continuing contacts were maintained with the
intelligence community regarding technical surveillance
countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange
of information, reports, and equipment has been con-
ducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves
State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and
Navy.
(Noe/TA)
(Noyes/PD)
State Department
· Two contracts for development of countermeasures
techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.
2
(Noe/TA)
00230
SECRET

JFK
(1)B)
JFK
((B)
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Some of the AEC Laboratorics, e.g., Savannah
River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop
radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and
devices. These Laboratories have used sampling
techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear
plant releases.
(Mr. B. Benson, AEC)
(Walker/DSP)
At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard
Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the
AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation
occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some
anomalies created by the use of the non-lincar junction
detector.
(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC)
Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)
(Noyes/PD)
Reports and information about the ORD-developed
* Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System
were made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in
August 1972. If they developed the system, it would
be used for civilian crowd and riot control.
(Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA)
Identity 125 /LS)
Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical
security information were exchanged with LEAA.
(Noe/TA)
3
00231
SECRET
JFK
(D)(B)
JFK
(DEA
)
JP4
(1)(B)
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems'
Treasury
( Dr
Dr. 
Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department
to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization
in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug
enforcement administration The request for his services
was made by Identity 3;
the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-
Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the
detailing through Mr. Colby.
nator.'
(Leahy/LS)
Customs/Treasury Department
Technical discussions were held with Customs relating
to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over
the U.S.-Mexico border.
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)
Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS
(Lawrence/DSP)
C About five years ago, assistance was requested in
domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared
scanners. This was turned down.]
(Lawrence/DSP)
Secret Service
We have had numerous discussions with the Secret
Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques
and equipment.
4.
"
(Van Dewerker/TA)
00232
JPKPB
旭
T
(D(B)
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Gove ment Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems -
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
The results of our research work in the detection
of metals (NOLIR) were reported to FAA for possible use
in the detection of hijacker weapons.
(MacAnlis/RP)
National Institute of Health (NIH)
At the request of LORD) OCS assigned a staff technician
to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser
Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was
done in cooperation with NIH.
(Ms. Coniver, NIH)
Identity 125 /LS)
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
(LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order
to structure (ORD'S BW/CW research programs to support
ACDA needs.
:
Identity 125/LS)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Technical information relating to detection of
radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with
them.
(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA)
(Walker/DSP)
SEBKET.
00233
SEGLET
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems"
EPA (cont'd)
Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning
equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land
fill have been conducted.
(Mr. Gene James, EPA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Risinger/DSP)
At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement
techniques germane to removing distortions from some
photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request
for specific support in processing the imagery was turned
down.
Secret Service
FBT
U.S. Customs
(Stephan/IPA)
;
Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies
in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been
in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-
hijacking, or drugs.
(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS)
(Noyes/PD)
(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)
NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)
We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to
develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne
multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.
(Mr. William Ruble, USDA)
(Mr. Leonard Jaffe, NASA)
(General Smart)
(Galinaitis/IPA)
6
00231
SUBJECT:
:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
JFK.
(MB)
JFK
((B)
Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association
would be SECRET)
[The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experi-
mental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat
crop. A part of the information would be obtained from
a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-
truth data will be collected on North American crops. ☐
(Briglia/PAS)
U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs
CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre
Plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington
state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium
poppies.
(Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA)
(Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD)
Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force, Office of the Inspector General
Army, Office of Provost Marshall General
(Lawrence/DSP)
(Cianci/LS)
We have exchanged technical surveillance counter-
measures and physical security information with them.
JFK.
(D)CB)
(Noe/TA)
· U.S. Army
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant,
Toelle Ordnance Depot
LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing,
storage and production facilities in the U.S.
| sto
7
SECTET
Identity 125/LS]
00235
JEKUR(B)
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal
( LS/ORD) is sharing expenses with EA in field testing
an IR remote detector of CW aerosols.`
Identity 125/LS)
JFKCI(B)
U.S. Navy
( BSD/ORD Sturned over about eight trained dolphins
to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued
our dolphin program.
JPK
U.S. Coast Guard
About six years ago
(Lynch/LS)
√ CI
CIA infrared equipment was
made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means
for night search of life boats.
(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG)
(Lawrence/DSP)
JFK
Identity 174
Sheriff's Office
✓ ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.
Polygraph security findings were compared with the
Sheriff's own security findings.)
(Sheriff)
Identity 125/LS)
A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-
ment methods in 1967-68.
(Sheriff)
8
SECTET
Identity 125/LS)
1
00236
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic.
Problems
Chief, San Francisco Police
For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of
a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate
Chinese social groups. (1967)
(Police Chief)
Identity 125/LS)
9
SEGRET
00237
JFK (RB)
DOMESTIC TESTS FOR
AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
1. As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the
research and development of equipment and techniques
for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we
conduct experiments and tests in the United States..
Clearly, the design and development of our intelli-
gence equipments can be done more economically and
more securely in this country. Although most of
the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in
closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating
the foreign environment, some of the tests and experi-
ments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.
2.
A review of the surveillance equipment or
techniques which have at some time or other been
exposed to domestic testing is as follows:
.a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser
probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in
San Francisco under very closely controlled
conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed
portions of the test. Recordings that were
made of laser probe output were carefully
controlled as classified material and it is
believed that the tapes have long since been
destroyed. (Wood/TA)
It
b. Microwave Intercept System About
1968, this system was tested in a light air-
craft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station
in Identity 127, California. This system is
designed to permit intercept of microwave
telephone communication channels of systems
such as
works equally well against the Bell Telephone
TD-2, as they are generically the same. Re-
cordings of these telephone intercepts were
carefully controlled and were destroyed several
years ago.
Identity 130
•
SECRET
ATTACHMENT 2.
n
00238
H₂
SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Research and
Development Efforts
-
-
The objec-.
.C. Telephone Intrusion Study
tive of this current program is to develop a
means to utilize foreign telephone systems as
a communication link without the knowledge of
the host system. In order to carry out this
objective, it is necessary to learn the com-
plete supervisory signalling and sequencing
control system hierarchy for the various foreign
telephone systems. Many of these are patterned
after the U.S. system and, for this reason,
limited monitoring to test the operation of
intercept equipment in the United States is
planned. The data to be collected would be
merely the signal tones from which supervisory
codes can be extracted. Message content is
of no interest and will not be recorded. Over-
scas testing is planned at a subsequent date.
To date, some domestic testing of this concept
has been carried out at the contractor's plant.
No recordings have been made of such data. Ex-
tremely brief tests exercising U.S. and foreign
telephone systems through supervisory tone sig-
nalling have been carried out to verify initial
concepts. The duration of testing was less
than one-half hour.
-
d. Other Sensor Testing Examples of
engineering development tests of special sensors
within the United States include infrared and
high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR
(FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial efflu-
ent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magne-
tometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks).
In all these cases, the data output of such
testing has been used for engineering develop-
ment and the content has been restricted to
dissemination to those in Government involved
with the engineering design.
2
SECRET
.00230
SUBJECT:
Dometic Tests for Agency Research and
Devopment Efforts
JFK
(
AB)
e. Remote Physiological Measurements
An ORD-developed cryogenic magnetometer is
being tested at a contractor's site for use
as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph).
Some test subjects are witting, but most tests
are on naive subjects (they do not know they
are being tested). The magnetometer is com-
pletely harmless to the subject and the test
results are closely helá.
-
f. Personality Structure of Defectors
Study ORD undertook to determine the per-
sonality structure of defectors during the
period 1966-69. The work primarily involved
an analysis of the open literature on known
defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned
with a study of the phenomenon of defection
itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another,
or changing one set of political beliefs for
another. The work was conducted at Stanford
University. Identity 125/LS)
g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained
and tested in the United States to carry small
intelligence collecting packages such as audio
surveillance devices, small cameras, and cur-
rent measuring devices. Any data collected
from unwitting domestic sources would have been
used only for engineering purposes and then
destroyed.
h.
-
In
Communications Link Loading Study
the period from 1970 through 1972 various means
were used to check out an intercept system designed
to operate against Iden 93 communications links.
Under carefully controlled conditions, some U. S.
microwave communications were recorded and passed
through the intercept system under test to prove
quality of performance. All intercept material
connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks
of the time of intercept and the material was never
checked for substantive content. NSA participated
and controlled most elements of the U. S. material.
3
SECRET
00240

:
JFK (D)(B).
SECRET
[ORD-2274-73]
. 7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign
Intelligence Activities
At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief
or his representative was instructed to query all of
his people and report back by this afternoon whether
or not they had provided any services or dealt with
any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.
The attached list is an inventory of all items we
were able to uncover. If additional information on
any of these topics is desired, we can provide either
a verbal or a written report on very short notice.
JFK OXA)
Attachment:
As stated
Sinnis
Charles E. McGinnis
Scientific Advisor
to
Director of Research & Development
CLASSIFIED BY 387323
SCHEDUL
AL.
Syssel to Dit
(les estate or event)
00241
Y:
JFKUB
[Project TAP Fensitive.
Project TAMPER, an on-going program which may be
A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be
politically sensitive.
Narcotics--our foreign activities are well known
JFK
DA
JPK
(1)(B)
A negative report from the Support Staff.
ORD's NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about
three years ago.
No action was taken, to our knowledge.
edge ✓
Robert Scott - Performed intelligibility enhancement
of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.
James M. Stephan
-
At the request of FBI, we described
Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing
distortions from some photography they had on an
alleged bank robber. Request for specific support
in processing the imagery was turned down.
SECRET
00242
C. V. NOYES
7 May 197
My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance
with domestic operations has been in the field of audio sur-
veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Speci-
fically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings.
which included technology exchanges and some equipment ex-
changes on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial.
I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman
of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard
Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening.
(date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies
created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.
Other persons contacted over the years have been:
Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service
Mr. Martin Pera, U. S. Customs ·
Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA
Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI
Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF
Major John Langager, ONI/USN
Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC
!
SECRET
00243
Thomas P. Noe
5/7/73
1.
Continuing contacts with intelligence community.
regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and
\ physical security. ( This is an exchange of information and
reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the
nity.J
USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.
State
Air Force
Army
Navy
US Secret Service
NSA
DIA
FBI
2. .Joint funding of two contracts with State Depart-
ment (TRW/LLL). Two electret microphones were furnished
to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of
one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD
contract (Bureau of Standards).
3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information
collection or exchange only.
ARPA
LEAA/Dept. of Justice
DNA/DOD
Office Telecommunications Policy
Office of Army/Provost Marshal General
Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force/Office of the Inspector General
Air Force/Electronic Systems Division
SIGHET
00241
JFKUB
7 May 1973
LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES
1.
BNDA (Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive
proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector
developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action was approved by
D/ORD.
Navy.
2.
BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the
Time: December 1969
3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System.
Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA
in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for
civilian crowd and riot control.
SECRET
00243
JPK
(D) (D)
4
ULWITLE
29 MAY 1973
JFK CO
Y[CI
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management
SUBJECT
Committee
: Reported Identity 61
Burglary
1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the
reported break-in of Identity 61.
An investigative report
by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the
offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.
2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio
operation conducted against Identity 61
by the FBI, at the
Agency's behest and with its technical support. This presents a
Telated question that should be noted. James McCord's' testimony
indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity
61.
He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping
that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge
the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield,
says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure"
they "were subjects of national security wiretaps.
"
3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the
Identity 75 , run by the FBI, about which CI Staff believes McCord
knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation
against Identity 61
, and assumed that it was also a telephone
tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping
that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and
that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped
because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive
operations. At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in,
and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations
may lead to exposure of the operations.
Attachment:
As Stated Above
.
Villiam V. Broe
Inspector General
00351
SEC.
Ր
(unless past date of event
24 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT
: Reported Burglary of the Identity 61
Identity 61
13-14
1. The press reported a burglary of
May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive
Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a
number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent
fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states
that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61
registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed,
Identity 61
making it clear that they suspected something other than
ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject.
There had been an carlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61
which is described below.
JPKB
2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency proposed to the FBI the instal-
Cration of technical coverage of Identity 61
The opportunity
for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign
Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid
for a contract to renovate Identity 61
Upon securing the
contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate
or install material which would be provided him. (The Agency proposed
to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic
support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community
was cited.
3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned
down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms
sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI
turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and
national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April
the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington
Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.
Wy
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4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the
technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered,
installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency
personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of
equipment in
Identity 61 From May to February Agency tech-
nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions
of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did
they enter Identity 61.
5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 be
stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and
might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61°
was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the
best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972
when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The
request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76
delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on
nationalization of foreign holdings,
While the FBI was still
in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of
State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible.
coverage of Identity 61
and on 22 December 1972 coverage
was partially reinstituted with full coverage in effect by 26 December
1972.
6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against
the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was
not worth continuing. On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI
to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised
that microphone surveillance of Iden 61
was discontinued.
- 2 -
John
3. Richardi.
John C. Richards
00363
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Addendum
ferred to in JCRichards' 24
paragraph 2, re Identity 61
1. The Foreign Resources Division asset/was
who owned the
Identity 78
hv 73 memo to IG,
Break-in
Identity 77
The Agency had initially agreed
to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500. The final
amount of remuneration turned out to be $4,828.53. Another FR
•
asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79
plumber and
elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.
2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening
post were: Identity 80,
Identity 30
of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D.
3.
-
and
Identity 45
00368
VIII.
JFK(1)(8)
T
1
SE C
Coordination.
A.
Internal
In developing its cadre of general support assets
and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact
with the Domestic Contact
[Dome
Service] of
vice of the Directorate for
Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever
possible to support FR's operational activities. То а
more limited degree, FR Basės maintain contacts with Office
of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives,
pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by these officers
and using their entre to specific individuals who can
provide access to targets of operational interest.
B
External
FR officers in the field maintain coordination with
their FBI counterparts. There is limited cooperation
with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving
Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are
of occasional help in operations involving other nationals.
The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the
presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on.
occasion provided backstopping on cases where there was
some flap potential.
Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent
recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between
the Agency and the FBI dated 7 February 1966.
The Bases also have contact with local Immigration
and Naturalization Service offices although these contacts
are less frequent and less important than the contacts
with the FBI offices.
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SECRET
00380