124-10168-10040
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER:
124-10168-10040
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
62-116391-41X
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
PAPICH, SAM
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DIRECTOR, FBI
DATE: 03/13/1970
PAGES:
85
SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL
NEW
Secret
CLASSIFICATION:
CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE:
11/03/1998
UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS
Redact
RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (1)(A)
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)
JFK Act 6 (1)(C)
COMMENTS:
EBF, INC ADMIN PAGES
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MAI
"
ITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
The Director
FROM
SA Sam Papich
SUBJECT RELATIONS WITH CIA
Prior Release was made to
Rockefeller Commission
3/16/81
DATE: 3/23/19/20
CLASS. & EXT. BY SP
REASON-FCIM II, 1/2.4.2 23,
DATE OF REVIEW 3/13/90
7079#22,330
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
L
H
CIA INFO ON pg 216 22
only
مدرن
Declassed per
John E. Bacon 8/27/80
Reference is made to my letters dated March 2 and
March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it
is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce
an extensive list of justified grievances.". It is my under-
standing that the Director desired that this list be identified.
Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items. M
This list should not be considered absolutely complete.
Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a
review of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and
specifically accurate would necesitate the review of thousands
of files. The enclosed list can be supported by Bureau records.
What CIA records reflect on the same items is unknown.
also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation
of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.
Inas
I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but
(if the Director feels that our Bureau work can benefit by a
personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am
available until April 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area.
immediately thereafter for an extended period.
ACTION:
Enclosure
1
-
1
-
-
.
Mr.
For information.
DeLoach
REC-
ST 102
CHA HAS NO OBJECTION\TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND DA
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
Mr. Sullivan IN THIS DOCUMENT
Mr. Papich
SJP:
(4)
2/9/98
INCLOSURES,
FREE SLO
RP/8198
56685LD/GEL
(JFK)
Classified by
12
Exempt from CD Category 2x3
Date of Declassification definite
(1-11-75)
62-80750-478
10 APR-1 1990
11935 2913 ADDIGAT
(JFK)
OADR
Classified by
Daclessity On:
NW 50953 DocId: 32169180 Page 2
ENCE
AGENCY
SEGRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
AS BRACKETED RG.3
20 March 1970.
KP 1/8/98
The Honorable. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Hoover:
FBI INFO
5668 SLD/G
J(6)
(JFK) 2/9/98 4/2/98
5 2/9/98
We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence
collection engendered by your letter of 11 March 1970. We warmly
welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implemen
tation of the 19óó agreement and the collection of positive intelligence
which you proposed. I concur also with your comments that there is
a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and
counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I agree that it
is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a
continuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is
of growing importance to the national security and to the United States
Intelligence Community. Therefore we endorse your proposal for a
reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be
conducted.
7
With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to
the then Director, Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., the compe-
tent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an
effective and realistic agreement. I welcome your statement that no
major problems have been encountered since its adoption.
I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar
importance to the national security, which warrant periodic reexamina-
⚫tion since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection
of positive intelligence.
REC &
EXP PROG.
MAR 20 1970.
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MAY 6 1970
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
Cowngrading and
Ceclassification
OLUITAS
As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe
that the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration:
(1) Audio coverage. Audio coverage provides timely
intelligence of inestimable worth to U.S. officials for
policy planning, early warning, and accurate guidance
necessary for the improvement of operational and collec-
tion activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique
production because it is readily subject to local cross-
checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and
costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on
targets which affect directly the national interests.
For several years your Bureau had been recep-
tive to requirements and leads which resulted in valuable
coverage. The quality of your production proved that
your Burcau alone possesses capabilities and exporionco
which cannot be duplicated by any other U.S. agency.
On 2 October 1969 two related requests for audio
coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to
positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connec
tions. (I refer to the case of
Sand
Your Bureau replied that henceforth the
Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney
General for approval.
It is suggested that the question of audio coverage
be reopened between representatives of your Bureau and
this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observa-
tions on this subject.
I wish to assure you that I believe that this sensitive
type of collection should be implemented under rigid and
stringent controls. This is absolutely necessary in order to
maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting
(An
the coverage and for the exploitation of the product.
excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective
and secure production of SCOPE. ))(3)
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(2) Mail Coverage. Another much needed intelli-
gence tool is mail coverage.. Its importance has been
proven in the past. I have the impression that it has
been discontinued, and I would suggest that our represen-
tatives should confer and examine together whether this
asset might be deployed against communications of the
Soviet Block the New Left, and identified foreign agents.
(3) CIA Technical Services. A significant expendi-
ture of this Agency's money and personnel has been com-
mitted to research and development for the improvement
of technical aids. This Agency has provided your Bureau
with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and
has offered you at cost or gratis our most sophisticated
equipment. FOXCORNEA
($)
5)
| Although we will continue these services, we would welcome
any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the
technical field including proposals how these assets` can be
better employed. Your comments will be particularly
appreciated in view of our mutual interests in implementing
Operation
(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and
Reporting. Since the collection and reporting of positive
foreign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your
main internal security and counterintelligence responsibiļi-
ties, I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a dis-
advantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting
processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence.
At our 1966 conference, we offered to institute positive intel-
ligence training courses, including reports writing and
* this section describes sounces
technical intelligence 3
13 
Collection.
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analysis; for FBI personnel.
In soliciting your views on
the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate
It would be
our willingness to provide such instruction.
designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community
in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting
List (CIRL) more meaningful to your personnel.
(5) Se
Seminars on Opposition Services. Given the
growing sophistication and increased capabilities of hostile
intelligence services, it is suggested that CLA and FBI
experts in this field meet as required at our respective
Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices,
in order to keep abreast of new developments, modus
operandi, operational tasks, and diverse missions of
opposition services. I know that you will agree with me
that no opportunities for improvement should be over-
Hanked which might hein to negate the efforts of hostile
services who are charged with undermining the security
of the United States. These sessions should also provide
an opportunity to explore and devise new means to pene-
trate and neutralize these inimical forces.
(6) Live Bloc Sources. The record of our coopera-.
tion and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defec-
tors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual
effort.
I believe that there is room for substantial improve-
ment in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation
of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these
sensitive sources. I would invite your thoughts on how we
may better coordinate requirements for these sources and
establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive
intelligence production before it is given general dissemina-
tion within the Government. Our review would suggest that
there are good reasons for consultation to explore the
development of higher quality live sources, for example
code clerks. K(S)
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(7) Live Sources in the Non-Bloc Area. Sources
such as code clerks and diplomats are a fertile field for
procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the
activities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern
countries which are expanding their subversive and
terrorist activities, even to the United States. I do not.
[feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited
the full potential of this field, and would urge that this
subject be explored by our respective representatives.
(8) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already
a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limi-
tations of manpower raise a serious question as to whether
both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable
developments. The increasingly close connection between
these forces in the United States and hostile elements
abroad has been well established by both of our agencies.
I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how
we can best employ more wisely our limited manpower,
knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings,
hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforce-
ment officers, is international in scope.
(9)
Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal
Attaches. I do not feel that there are any serious conflicts
in this area but there may be room for improving the quality
of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection.
Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic
re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies
to make mutually-agreed adjustments.
Mr. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal
I know that your
judgment in affairs bearing on the national security.
experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our
country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the
foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item
which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.
Faithfully yours,
Michaidhun
Richard Helms
Director
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CASES AND/
SITUATIONS
INVOLVING CONLICTS WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
(1) NOCASE (THY BORIS MORRCS CASE)^
IN TAD DEVMENT,KP 1/8/98
This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case.
which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most
I part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifi-
cations and historically has been, and undoubtedly
will be, one of the most important and involved cases
of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We
did not disseminate any information of significance
in this case until 1954. On various occasions when
the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated argu-
ments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise
this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to
cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA
was that it should have been advised regarding the
Soviet operational activity in foreign countries,
claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity
to develop more information of significance, identify
Soviet agits, and possibly prepare conditions for
, recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did
not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the
extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not
permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to
Ithe MOCASE until 1957.
In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had
every right to have received the information earlier
because many aspects of the MICCASE pertained to CIA
employees and operations. CIA further argued that it
had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out
the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the
Agency at the same time that the case was publicized.
'The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to
coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case
permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a
dominating role in Europe.
POR MANGOLD RELEASE (C88-1826)
5668 Sco/Gee
(1)(6)
(JFK) 2/9/98 4/2/98
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How much information CIA has developed over
the years concerning our operational activity in
Mexico City is unknown. However, we should bear-in
mind that former Special Agent George Munro Handled"
many of our operations in Mexico, including key infor-
mants, and subsequently began performing services for
CIA after he left the Bureau. We also should not
forget that Americans operating in Latin American
countries for one agency are heavily exposed to the
resources of another U, S. intelligence or investigative.
agency. This Agent knows from personal experience that
operating in these areas constitutes a "very small world"
and the exposure to leaks and errors is considerable.
(3) THE ABEL CASE
Although CIA has not raised the point for
several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably
still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with
CIA in the Ahol age by not making certain that the
Agency was given the proper recognition for its contri-
butions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would
not have been any U. S. access or availability to the
source in this case, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA tock
the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France
to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and
responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined
to become involved in any operation designed to transport
Hayhanen to the U. S. It should be noted that Hayhanen
was an alcoholic and that his first contacts, with CIA
in Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental
\stability.
After Hayhanen arrived in the U. S., WC
arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of
which was to obtain a complete story of his intelli-
gence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly
interested in identifying all of his associates, es-
pecially the man who later was identified as Rudolph
Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we
dropped Hayhanen because he became a problem.
an extremely critical situation because we had not yet
identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility
for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but we
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countries with far better impressions than in the
past. In addition, we have learned more about these
countries, their services,
by spending a few minutes with fir security chiefs
Needless to say,
this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped
our Legal Attaclies.
(7) CIA
-
(S)
DUTCH INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY
In 1965, the Butch Internal Security Service ](s)
was in the process of investigating individuals in
Holland Who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage
activity.
The Dutch wanted to have certain individuals
make
in the U. S. interviewed and approached
inquiry at the Bureau. At that time, our relations
with the Dutch had been practically nonexistent because
the Dutch shad failed to honestly deal with us in the
case of Joseph Petersen, a Dutch Official who had been
clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National
Security Agency. When CIApproached us, we told
the Agency that the Dutch could submit their request
through diplomatic channels. We subsequently told CIA (5)
we would not handle the interviews for the Dutch JS We
stuck to our position. [CIA surrendered but felt that
we were impairing their efforts to gather information
concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe.
(Walter G. Krivitsky, Bufile 100-11146)
-
(8) COLONEL JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)
Colonel John Grombach was a retired U. S.
Army officer who, during World War II, established a
private intelligence network, operating throughout the
world but primarily in Europe. His sources included
any number of European exiles who came to the U. S.
While he was in business, he was financed by the State
Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the
later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. Grombach
established contact with the Bureau through one of
his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called
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CIA
on us and furnished information which Grombach felt
was of interest up. This dissemination through
Pat O'Brien continued during the period of Grombach's
relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we
were receiving such information which also was of
interest to the Agency. It is possible that Grombach
had given the same data to CIA but we do not know.
and Grombach clashed and the relationship was severed
in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last
years of its dealings with Gronbach, the Agency Shad
successfully penetrated the latter's organization and
allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA
hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware
of the relationship between Grombach's organization
and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about
this relationship is not known but if its penetrations
were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence
to justify a charge that the Bureau had withheld infor-
mation from CIA, particularly when we were receiving.
the data from an organization which was financed by
the Agonoy) (Dufile 82-77806)
(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
(Herbert Hoover Commission 1954)
-
In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned
Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under
the leadership of General Mark W. Clark. In January, 1955,
we were advised by a representative of the task force
that Senator Joseph McCarthy had furnished the group a
list of CIA employees who were considered subversive.
CIA became cognizant of this development and there was
talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished
the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was
informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency
to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did.
What information CIA may have had on this matter as it
pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that
the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge
that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee.
(Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-80750)
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0.
(10) INTERNAL. SECURITY LEADS. IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
21
During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches
numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in
the U. S. In many instances we did not see fit to
notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that
you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-
intelligence, namely a lead in France pertaining to a
communist in the US, warranted advising CIA, if not,
at least asking the Agency to handle the lend. In the
last several years, it is not believed that there is
any basis for complaint since we have regularly been
notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel
abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is
notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There
have been exceptions where we have taken the position
that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity
of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to
CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we
should bear in mind that with our Legal Attaches inves
tigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials
normally contacted by CIA. How many of those foreign
officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll,
is unknown.
(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA
We operated informants in Cuba when we had a
Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported
on activities of communists and other subversives in
that country. During the period we operated these
informants, we did not coordinate our operations with
CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such
sources However, in 1960, after Castro came on the
scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants
in a secure manner. C✓ Approval was granted to turn certain
informants over to CIA. What these informants may have
subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is
unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had
evidence to establish that we had been operational in
Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant
to Directives. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont, February 5,
1960, re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64-200-210, 2377
and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, February 3, 1960, re:
"Narcisco Tauler Beneficto,
Deneficto, 
134-3539-4) (S)
134-339-4)s)
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(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL, 1959.
In 1959 the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused
our Legal Attache of engagin in uncoordinated covert
intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe
exceeds his terms of reference. "1 The Ambassador further
indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's
activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador
that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from
a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This
situation arose as a result of the Legal Attaches
operation of an informant in Brazil Some of the
information that he received from the informant was
of a derogatory nature and related to a Brazilian ho
was being touted as a Presidential candidate. CIA
asked for the identity of the informant and we told
the Agency that the person could not be identified
because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed.
This case is being cited because CIA may have evidence
that we had been operational in Brazil Shad not coordi-
nated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was
further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability.
of the information. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont,
May 1, 1959, re: "William 1. Friedman, Legal Attache,
Rio de Janeiro," 67-429840) and (Memorandum Roach to
Belmont, May 25, 1959 re: "Soviet-Satellite Activities
Brazil 134-70667-48)
(S)
(13) BORDER COVERAGE
In June, 1957, our Phoenix Office presented a
problem concerning the Bureau's handling of informants
on the Mexican border. These informants were operating
inside Mexico. The problem was predicated on situations
which might arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to
develop informants who already were being handled by the
Bureau. It was pointed out that CIA logically could
come in contact with such sources and could make approaches
for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that
in order to protect our coverage in the border area,
valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would
continue to be utilized even if he were contaced by CIA.
Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to
the Agency.
a
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10
100
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How much CTA learned about our border coverage
is not known. Again, it is pointed out that former
Bureau Agent George Munro Say have been knowledgeable.
As indicated, he later began performing services for
CIA. If CIA learned that we were operating informants
in Mexico, it could use such information as additional
evidence or Bureau failure to cooperate and coordinate
with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum
Roach to Belmont, June 14, 1957, re"Communist Coverage
Along the Mexican Border, Relations with CIA," abo
100-356015-1238)
(14) CARPORT CASE
In May, 1957, the Bureau's double Agent in the
captioned case was advised by his Soviet contact that he
was to have a meeting in Switzerland during the period
June 16-19 957. A question arose as to whether CIA
should be informed concerning the double Agentia (ravel
to Switzerland(s)It was recommended and approved that we
not advise CIA.
The
What is important here is that CIA established
contact with our double agent at one point. The Agency
may have had further contact without our knowledge.
Agency may have also picked up the contact with the Soviet]
in Switzerland. The case is being highlighted since we
cannot exclude the possibility that the Agency hag evidence
to demonstra that we were operational (in Europe and we
did not coordinate with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan
to Belmont, June 10, 1957, re;B C CARFORT," 105-25453-1325)
(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR LEREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.
On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W. C.
Sullivan could give a lecture on the communist movement
in the U. S. It was recommended that Sullivan give the
lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts
of the Government. The Director made the notation "We
cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit." The
Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal
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f
to cooperate on a most important subject of interest
to both agencies. (Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont,
October 1, 1958, re: "Request for Lecture on Communism.
by CIA,").
(16) CASE OF
On July 9, 1956, an official of the State.
Department confidentially advised
dvised 
the Bureau that
1 a CIA employee in Moscow, had been
involved in an affair with a Soviet girl. According
to our source, ☑ allegedly had furnished information
to the viet girl. We checked with the State Department
and CIA and we confirmed that had been involved in
an affair and that he had been recalled. According to
CIA and State Deportment, there was no indication that
had been involved in any espionage against the
U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau
to identify its source and then changed its mind.
Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where
the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the
source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that
should be kept in mind. (Bufile
(17)THE
OPERATION
In April, 1963, we became involved with CIA in
that Agency's efforts to collect sensitive information
relating to French Government Intentions to conduct
espionage against the U. Sa CIA had access to a sensitive
source, HICKS
who was in a position to make
available highly important French documents. On
available for that document in Paris
11,
locally contacted CIA concerning this matter. CIA Head-
quarters was highly disturbed because its office in Paris]s)
had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted
to be informed regarding the nature and the extent of our
dissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We
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determi
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Pari that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in
Tand has had
to sensitive information
had an outstanding cap-
response to leads which had been sent from Bureaur
Headquarters. This matter is being highlighted because
it was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency.
had received indications that information had been leaked
to French authorities. We have no evidence or reason to
believe that the Legal Attache Office ever involved itself
in any such leak. However, we should not, under any cir-
cumstances, discount the fact that CIA has penetrated
French services ma
in Paris.) The French shave
ability of tapping phones and installing microphones in
Paris. Such coverage on U. S. officials, including their
residences, should never be excluded. The information we
had conveyed to our Legal Attache possibly may have been
acquired by the French through clandestine coverage. CIA
possibly could charge us with handling their sensitive
information in an insecure manner by transmitting it to
Paris without conferring with the Agency.
In connection with alleged French espionage
activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with
the efforts made by the Bureau. The Agency possibly could
take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations
and did not pursue a ma er which, in their eyes, merited
a more aggressive approach. (Bufile
For some time, CIA has held to,
the French Intelligence Service (SDEC position that
is penetrated by
the Soviets. The Agency has pointed out that if the [French] (S)
are Collecting sensitive information in the U. S., the
product is ending up in C✓ Moscow JS/In January 1964 e
reviewed the status of our investigation of French] Intel-
ligence activities in the U. S. The Director commented
"I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part
of CIA which has been played as a sucker by
.
I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA
restrictions are removed. CIA did impose restrictions
by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it
feared that its sensitive source would be jeopardized.
(Bufile
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from CIA.
We did not obtain clearance from CIA for
the inclusion of this information in our monograph.
Clearance approval was not obtained because of the
of the document. CIA was irritated because
urgency.
it considered our action a distinct violation of the
third agency rule. The Agency "never made any protest.
(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN GUATEMALA](s)
In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants
in Guatemala (S)At the inception of our operational ac-
tivity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally
were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA
whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant
in Guatemala)(6) In the second instance, we established an
agreement with CIA in October, 1967, that we could con-
tinue handling an informant in Guatemala with the under
standing that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each
visit, would confer with the local CIA office on political
information collected from the informant.
had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the
definite impression that we had been running these
informants before we had finally coordinated with them.
It is true that the CIA Chierin Guatemala was much
incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and
the matter was put to rest.
These two cases
CIA may have developed concrete evidence that
we were operating in Guatemala bearing in mind that in
a plage such as Guatemala City shit would not be difficult
for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in
contact with Guatemalans] 6 Our potential vulnerability is
that we were operating in Guatemala without coordinating
with CIA,
(22)
The information emanating from the caption d
sensitive Eureau operation has been disseminated to CIA
The sensitive
and other agencies for several years.
source has traveled abroad numerous times and his trips
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(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH
DUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE)
1960
In_
1960, our Legal Attache, Bonn,
traveled tod for the purpose of exploring arrange-
The
ments for liaison with appropriate Dutch Authorities.
U. S. Ambassador raised questions, mointing out that over
the years, all relations with the Dutch authorities had
been handled through CIA☑He indicated that before there
was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for
CIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen
Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his
Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to
exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred
with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all
parties concerned.
Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where
we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with
National Security Council Directives.. (Memorandum: Frohbose
to Belmont, March 3, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations
Norway, lonmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, 66-18973-123)
In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to
establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The
purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform
CIA of our intentions. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont,
January 14, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations, The
Netherlands," 66-18973-113)
(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES
-
1962
By letter dated November 7, 1962, CIA raised
questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination
of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence
services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to
information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the
Greek Intelligence Service concerning KGB operations.
took the position that pursuant to the coordinating
CIA
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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with
CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data
had emanated from one of our sensitive
Sources
We respded to CIA by stating that the
information was the product of an internal security
operation and did not relate to any operational activity
abroad. CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue
that it was responsible for following Soviet matters
with the Greens Intelligence Service and that we had an
obligation of coordinating with the Agency.
Branigan to Sullivan, November 9, 1962, re:
(27) "THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, "A BOOK AUTHORED BY
DAVIN WISE AND THOMAS ROSS
(Memorandum
In August, 1963, we received information indi-
cating that Wise and Ross were in the process of gathering
material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S.
intelligencivities. Both Ross, and Wise contacted
the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise
CIA that these two individuals were preparing a book con-
cerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted
"I see no reason doing so.'
"
It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact
with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subsequently published the
book which contained extremely derogatory information
concerning CIA. (Memorandum Jones to DeLoach, re: "David
Wise of the "New York Herald Tribune" and Thomas Ross of
the "Chicago Sun Times")
(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES AFRICA
-
In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would
give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward
developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the
services of any Negro informant who might be available.
The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the
Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as
an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to
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In the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau..
would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on
3 who CIA felt was a key figure in the
transmitt 1 of scientific intelligence data to the
Intelligence service we declined to reinstitute
the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because
of its relationship to the Mideast Crisis. ·JG)
On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future
requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage
should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the
Attorney General.
CIA has never made any official comment or
protest but it has considered the aforo-mentioned action
by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency
has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and
as the only organization having the resources and capabilities
of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.
LANEOUS
པ་འ་ པ་
A
The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of othe
situations or conflicts which occured over the years and
which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism.
The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is
necessary to acquire the required data. There was one
instance early in the 1950's which involved information
received from a source of unknown reliability charging
Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while
in Europe. We disseminated the information to several
agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.
The Agent also has recollection of instances when
CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by
Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of
interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a
violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard
core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an
important informant was lost. CIA never made any official
issue or protest.
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LIST OF BUAHAU GRIEVANCES
1.
ATTACKS GAINST BURFAU (MEXICO CITY AND FRANCE
-
1951)
Although Agent Papich did not borin handling Liaison
with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly signi-
ficant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious.
conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in Mexico City
and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the
Bureau, were endeavoring to place us in an unfavorable light,
were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging
remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by
characterizing it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming
largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.
then
In October, 1951, General Walter Beddíl Smith,
Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other
Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the
existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any
covert hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there
was a general feeling of respect for us. He admitted that
there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA
must accept its share of responsibility.
It is my recollection that the Director and other
Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time
guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations
between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum
of record covering this meeting. (
2. PROSELYTING OF BUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIA
The Agent clearly recalls that early in the 1950's
We encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly
was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. We vigorously pro-
tested, and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow
a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until
the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period
of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the back-
ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is pos-
sible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file
of some former Bureau Agent.
SECRET.
TRIOLOSON
KP 1/8/98
BY 5668 Scoleci
H: 25X (1)(6)
62-80750-4784
(JAC) 2/6/98 4/2/98
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7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN
-
DEFECTORS
1954
By letter dated October 13, 1954, a very stron letter
of protest was sent to General T. J. Botts of the Interagency.
Defector Committee at CIA: This letter hade reference to
political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish.
sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government.
General Betts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members
of the Committed had agreed that in view of commitments made
by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to
arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse
effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We
emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been
officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was
informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.
8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION
WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955
On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with
Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was
referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious
situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts
between the two agencies. Dulles was referred to the contacts
of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without
first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The
requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an
established agreement. (62-80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont
September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")
9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)
In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached
a National Academy graduate to utilize his services in Guatemala.
This approach was made while the graduate was attending National
Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for
not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the
Academy graduate. (Re:
10.
In December, 1955, we received information indicating
that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was
developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We
learned that CIA representatives had established contact with
✓ and had given him some advice and guidance without
first checking with the Bureau, We protested to CIA.
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us that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI
would be furnishing operational guidance to him. We had never
become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined
that a CIA official had been an error in making the above
described misrepresentation. We_protosted the CIA official's
handling of this matter. (Re: Dr
(u)
15.
that
reported
and
On July 20, 1953, we determined that onę
had been in contact with the Czec Military Attache
Washington, D. C. We further ascertained that was a
CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1950,
the Agency had no information concerning
contacts with the Czech We later interviewed
it was indicated that
in fact, had been in confact with,
a CIA official concerning his meetings with the Czech Military
Attache We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology.
(Momorum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 1956
16.
In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State
Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly
had advised that the subject, Soviet agent was being per-
mitted to enter the United States so that his activities
could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position
to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of
any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry
The State
of the subject for the purpose described above.
Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA
We were not
employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative.
in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting
investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming
up with the identity. (Re:
17.
By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly pro-
tested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had inter-
viewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining
clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was
a well-established agi cement whereby it was incumbent upon
CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any
alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956,
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18. DARRELL PATRICK HAMMER] 6)
CHanner was a former student at Columbia University
with whom we had been in contact because of his association
r(s)
with a Soviet assigned to the United Nations (5) In December,
1959, Hammer made a trip to Russia where he was contacted by
an unidentified individual and was given). letter indicating
that the writer was a Colonel in the HG and that he was
interested in cooperating with the United States. When Hammer
returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview
the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence inter-
ests. We subsequently interviewed (Hammer) at which time he
informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish
pertinct information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such
statement was mode. (Re: [Darrell Patrick Hammer)(S)
$
19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-
1957
The San Francisco Office furnished information
indicating that CIA had requested a firm in California to fur-
nish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries
pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company.
The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that
CIA was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop
evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction.
did make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA
a pretty wide authority to explore such a field. H"
(Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957, "Flow of
Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through
So-Called Channels")
The Director
20.
On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its repre-
sentatives in the field had interviewed the captioned
alien who had agreed to cooperate with the Agency after he
returned to
CIA conducted this interview without
first obtaining clearance from, the Bureau. Such clearance was
necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous
protest was made to the Agency. (Re:
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21.
CIA REQUEST FOR TOUR FOR COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
REPRESENTATIVES 1957
-
(S)
(S) In July, 1957, CIA requested a tour for several
[Colombian officials who were coming to this country under CIA
invitation CIA was told that no tours would be given to the
[Colombians because in the past a Colombian ambassador had
its
grossly insulted the Bureau after we had arrested the
ambassador's chauffeur on White Slave Traffic Act charge.
If we so desired, we could give consideration to
accusing CIA of trying to impose upon us individuals whom we
considered undesirable in light of the foregoing.
(Memorandum July 15, 1957, Roach to Belmont "Representatives
of Colombian Intelligence Service - Request For Bureau Tour
by CIA")
22.
REQUEST FOR SECURITY SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS NEW YORK CITY 1957
()(u)
On November 15, 1957, our New York Office was con-
tacted by the local CIA representative who desired to be in-
formed if the Bureau could conduct a security survey of the
promises of the Council on Foreign Relations which were located
across the street from a building occupied by the Soviet -
United Nations Delegation The CIA representative indicated
that his visit to our office was pursuant to instructions.
received from Allen Dulles who allegedly was concerned about
the possibility of the Soviets establishing coverage of
conversations and discussions which might be held at the Council.
It should be noted that the Council included as members many
well-known personalities, including officials of the United
States Government.
Pursuant to instructions, Allen Dulles was informed
on November 18, 1957, that we did not like the approach used
by CIA in that such a sensitive matter had been taken up at
the field level rather than through Bureau Headquarters.
(Memorandum Roach to Belmont November 19, 1957, re "Council
on Foreign Relations")
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23.
(s)
In October, 1957, we received information from
indicating that a Polish scientist then visiting in the United
States might defect. We followed developments through
…and we kept CIA advised... The Agency was fully aware of the
situation and particularly know that we were in contact with
Wo subsequently received information indicating that
a CIA employee, established contact with
W for the purpose of developing information concerning the
work of Polish scientists. A protest was made to CIA for not
properly coordinating their interests with us, bearing in mind
that the action taken by HWY possibly could have jeopardized
a Bureau operation. (Re:
(૯)
24.
By letter dated February 10, 1958, we directed a
protest to CIA charging that Agency with interviewing the
subject a Romanian alien, without first obtaining the nec-
cesary clearance from the Bureau. (Re:
25.
ALLEGED IMPERSONATION OF FBI EMPLOYEE
On April 23, 1953, we received information indicating
that a CIA employee allegedly had represented herself as being
with the FBI when she tried to arrange an interview with
an official of the International Association of
Machinists in Washington, D. C.
gave a signed statement
in which he claimed that he had received a phone call from a
Miss who said she was with the FBI. Upon checking with
CIA, we were informed that Miss denied that she had made
such representation. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont April 25,
1953, "Unknown Subject;
26.
!")
By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested
to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without
first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau.
Such clearance was necessary pursuant to established agreement.
(Re:
-
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30. [GENERAL REINIARD GEHLEN (3) A
The Legal Attache, Bonn, advised by letter dated
June 10, 1953, that he had been invited to visit General Reinhard
Gehlerthe head of the West German Intelligence ServiceCIA
became aware of this invitation, and an Agency representative
informed our Legal Attache that it was not desired that the
Legat visit with Gehlen)Our Legat was instructed by the Bureau
to accept the invitation regardless of the CIA position.
We could evaluate the CIA position in this matter as
being uncooperative. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 17',
1958, "Relations with CIA")
31. CIA INTEREST IN CHINESE ALTENS (S
[CHINESE]
(S)
In June, 1958, we raised the question concerning
CIA's failure to adhere to an agreement relating to CIA's
recruitment of Chinese aliens in the United States for over
sen telligende onerations. Under the agreement, CIA was
not to approach any Chinese alien without first chocking with
us. A situation developed In Illinois indicating that CIA
allegedly had become interested in recruiting an alien and
even took some action without first checking with us. We
expressed our disapproval in a letter to CIA June 12, 1958.
(Memorandum Belmont to Boardman June 9, 1953, "Recruitment
of Chinese Aliens in the United States for Overseas
Intelligence Operations')
32. CIA OFFICIAL'S CRITICISM OF "MASTERS OF DECEIT"
(S)
(s)
Our Legal Attache, Tokyo, obtained a copy of a memo-
randum sent to an official in our Embassy in Tokyo by
Chief of the CIA Office in Japan. In his communication
belittled the value of "Masters of Deceit" as an anticommunist
weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book pertained
only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a
small, ineffective, fraction-ridden organization. He stated
that the author of the book was not an intellectual but rather
a policeman. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont June 12 and 24, 1958,
"Masters of Deceit.")
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(s)
33.
CIA DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT SOURCES IN
THE UNITED STATES:
In May, 1958, CIA. furnished identifying and back-
ground data concerning three individuals
, all employees of the
Indonesian Government and assigned to the United States.
had been developed as a source of information by CIA
had been developed as
in
and volunteered his service come to CIA in Washington, D. C.
services.
a source by CIA and had been furnishing some information to
the Agency. In a letter dated June 24, 1953, we told CIA
that in the case of C, we felt that the Agency should
have notified us at an earlier date in order that we could
have considered exploitation for internal security purposes
at the outset. (Re: Indonesian Activities
34.
MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI
-(S)
-
100-254749)
AKA DR. HEINRICH SCHUTZE
(S)
]⑥
The subject, a former member of the Sintelligence
Service, defected to the United States and furnished extremely
valuable information. The beginnings of this case include
information raising questions concerning CIA cooperation.
In June, 1958, we developed information indicating
that CIA May have opened a letter in Switzerland Shich had
been addressed to the Director by an Individual who had
identified himself as Dr. Heinrich Schutze(s) The writer further
indicated that he might be connected with the Polish Intelligence
Service. The letter addressed to the Director had been placed
in an envelope which, in turn, had ended up in the office of
the United States Ambassador initzerland. We subsequently
received a copy of the particular communication from CIA,
and the contents were such at that time that no action was
required by the Bureau. We asked CIA for particulars. lending
to the alleged opening of the letter which had been addressed
to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the
letter. We were confidentially informed by an Agency repre-
sentative that the Ambassador had opened the letter and then
referred the matter to CIA. The contents were such that inves-
tigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA
in Europe. What actually happened at the United States Embassy
is something we may never know. (Michal Goleniowski 65-65192)
-
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35.
SECRET
(s)
By letter dated June 26, 1958, we voiced our concery
regarding CIA's alleged interview o a Chinese alien whom CIAL
was considering for overseas recruitment. CIA denied that an
approach of the align had been, pado. Our investigation contra-
dicted the statements emanating from CIA.
Bureau fil
.36.
(Rev
(s)[
COMPROMISE OF FRI TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE
On July 18, 1958, CIA requested the Bureau for
permission to play a recording of a telephone" conversation
obtained by the Bureau to King Hussein of Jordan(S) The
Tecording had been developed through our Sensitive coverage
of the Exyptian Embassy in Washington, DC. On June 5, 1958,
we had obtained the contents of a conversation between Mahmoud
Rousan of the Jordanian Embassy and the Egyptian Air Attache (s)
The conversation strongly indicated that Cousan was working
closely with the Egyptiang) Subsequently, CIA developed
information indicating that Rousan has a key figure in a
revolutionary plot, the objective of which was to overthrow
Y(S)
(s)
Rousan returned to Jordan and was imprisoned by
[King Hussein passed upon information made available through CIA.
Rousan Menied any implication in any revolutionary activity and
he was strongly supported by contain top officials in the
Jordanian Government. The Kingold CIA that he was on the
Spot and that he needed proof of Rousan's conspiratorial
activity. CIA asked if we would permit the recording to be
played to the King() stressing that this was the only way King
Hussien could be convinced.
On July 18, 1958, a CIA official was advised that
the Bureau positively would not grant permission to playing
of the recording (S) We maintained that if we granted Such
permission, our other Coverage of a sensitive nature could
be seriously imperiled.
On July 21, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau
would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation
in the Middle East) Pursuant to instructions, CIA was then
told that in view of the position in which the Bureau had been
placed, we acceded to Dulles request. CIA was further told
that we were seriously considering the termination of all of
our technical surveillances be
Because we did not intend to be
placed in such a position in the future.
On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Agent
that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction.
He stated that he was not interested in holding a pistol to
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anybody's head and he further indicated that he was 'deliber-
ating whether or not the recordinghould be used. It was ...
recommended that the Liaison Agent follow the matter for the
'purpose of determining if the recording was to be used by CIA.
The Director's notation was, "No. The fat is in the-fire now
And it useless to waste any more time on it. We will
probably hear of any details in Pearson's column.
H."
The strong ponition we took in resisting the
dissemination of such sensitive information to a foreign
government was fully justified., (Momorandum Boach to Belmont,
dated July 22, 1958, re "CIA Request for Permission to Play
Technical Surveillance Recording to King Hussien, Jordan")
37.
CIA ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN MEXICAN GOVERNMENT
DEPORTION OF AMERICAN COMMUNISTS
(s)
*(8)w'
In 1958, CIA officially informed us that it was
engaged in a program designed to disrupt overall communist
activity in Mexico. We became concerned because this program
was to involve deportation of undesirables, including American
communists residing in Mexico. The implementation of such a
program would have resulted in the return of American communists
to the United States. CIA denied that it was engaged in any
operation specifically designed to cust American communists.
In September, 1958, we were informed that the Mexican Government
had embarked on a strong anticommunist program and certain
Americ ins were ordered deported. We checked with CIA and the
Agency's chief in Mexico City claimed that his Agency was not
involved.
(u
The Liaison Agent subsequently was informed on a
strictly confidential basis that the American Ambassador had
been in contact with certain Mexican officials concerning
possible anticommunist activities. The Ambassador had consulted
with the local CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans
who could be considered as being deportable. The CIA officer
reportedly furnished a list of approximately 40 names. (memo-
randum Roach to Belmont, September 17, 1958, "Legal Attache's
Office, Mexico City, Relationship with Embassy and CIA)
38.
(u)
We expressed our displeasure to CIA in September,
1958, because of that Agency's unauthorized. investigation in
the United States of a Romanian citizen who was here in connec-
tion with an exchange program.
The Romania and indicated to an
American friend that he was interested in staying in the United
States, but was not ready for actual defection because of
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to notify the Burcau. A letter dated September 16, 1959, was
also sent to
and he was told that the Bureau was
disappointed in him because he had failed to make any objection
to the anticlo and had not aloited us, concerning the impending
attack against the Bureau. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont,
August 27, 1959, "Allen Dulles: America's Global Sherlock,
True Magazine, September, 1959"; and Memorandum. Frohbose to
Belmont, September 4, 1959, "Allen Dulles")
45. ACTIVITIES OF CONTACTS DIVISION OF CIA 1959
})(u)
We received information in September, 1950, that
the Contacts Division of CIA had held interviews with American
businessmen in the Boston area, which dealt with meetings between
the businessmen and visiting Soviets (S)CIA reportedly was inter-
ested in developing positive intelligence information, but it
so happened that one of the Soviets was involved in a double
agent operation being handled by the Bureau. The Bureau already
had notified CIA of our interest in the Soviet.] By letter (5)
dated September 29, 1959, we voiced our objection to the manner
in which CIA had handled this. (Re
file to
46.
Bureau
APPEARANCE OF COLONEL FRANTISEK TISLER BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEL ON UNAMERICAN ACTIVITIES (HCUA) 1959
HCUA
in
On November 6, 1959, information was received
indicating that HCUA was interested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek
Tisler, a Czech defector, to testify before the Committee.
advised us that it had contacted the State Department who,
turn, had conferred with CIA. Allen Dulles allegedly informed
HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Committee
and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security
instructions.
The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority -
to make a defector available to a congressional committee without
first checking with other interested agencies. The Director was
informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National
Security Council directive made it very clear that this could not
be done without processing the matter through the Inter-Agency
Defector Committee. In this particular case the aforementioned
.Committee had not called a mecting, but the chairman, a CIA
official, had made certain phone calls. A Bureau representative
was contacted by phone on November 6, 1959, but at that time we
had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted
the chairman of the Committee and was told that the Committee
had no objection to making Tisler available.
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.
On November 13, 1959, CIA representatives were
informed that we were opposed to making the defector available….
to HCUA. On that same date we were told that CIA was informing
HICUA it was reversing its position and that upon reconsideration;
it did not feel that Tisler could be made available..
By memorandum drted November 14, 1959, the develop-
ments in this matter were reviewed and it was recommended that
at the next Inter-Agency Defector Committee meeting we strongly
protest CIA's dereliction in the handling of the HCUA request.
(Bureau file 105-38088)
47. CRITICISM OF DIRECTOR
On April 11, 1960,
✓ of Reicco
Company, Caracas, Venezuela ✗informed the Bureau that he recently
Theld a conversation with
an official of the U.S.
(Embassy in Caracas.
was a CIA employee(s) took exception
to complimentary statements made by Concerning the Director
and the FBI. C stated that the Director should have retired
five years ago for the good of all concerned. A protest was made
to Allen Dulles on April 20, 1960. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont,
April 21, 100
48.
. CIA OFFICIAL ALLEGEDLY ADVOCATING
RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA 1900
-
NAM.
Position
In February, 1960,
for the Richardson Foundation, volunteered information
concerning statements allegedly made by
a top
CIA official. ☐ allegedly advocated recognition of Red
China.
This matter was called to the attention of Allem
Dulles and on April 20, 1960, Dulles informed the Liaison Agent
that he had conducted an inquiry, had reviewed a tape recording
of
talk, and was satisfied that had not made the
statement attributed to him.
The above is being cited in the event we desire to
dispute the position taken by Dulles. If the evidence clearly
established that had made such a statement, we could ung
the information to support a position that we would have hea
warranted in being most circumspect with CIA.
(Memorandum
Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960,
49.
ALLEGED INSTALLATION OF MICROPHONES ON U.S.
PREMISES ADROAD BY CIA
1
A State Department representative informed the unean
that a microphone had been found in the U.S. Embassy, Mexi
that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allepaly
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had maintained that if CIA was to operate effectively, it had
to know what was going on in U.S. establishments. The implication
was left that CIA was covering activities of other U.S. agencies
through technical installations Inquiries developed informg-
tion indicating that CIA had installed a microphone in the Embassy
in 1952 at the request of a State Department official. The Office
of-Security in State Depactment was contacted in an effort to
pin this down in a more specific manner. We were told by State
that their records did not contain any information concerning
the microphone.
Subsequently, a letter was transmitted to all Legal
Attaches instructing them to be on the alert for technical
installations which may affect Bureau operations. (Memorandum
L'Allier to Belmont, May 2, 1000, "Installation of Microphones
on U.D. Promises Abroad by CIA")
50.
We received information indicating that the subject
former Cuban intelligence_agent the subject of a Bureau
investigation, had planned to defect, New York City. ✓ We
pormitted a CIA representan
bt the subject in order
to orient him so that maximum propaganda effect would be derived
through newspaper publicity. We were told that the CIA repre-
sentative in New York: City had been instructed by his headquarters
to tell the subject that he would not be prosecuted by the U.S.
Government. We complained to CIA stressing that the Agency.
had no power or authority to promise the subject immunity.
(Memorandum L'Allior to Belmont, September 30, 1960,
3
51.
(s)
Miss
a CIA employee, obtained a
position as a secretary in the Office of the tim
Delegation
to the United Nations. Prior to receiving this job, I checked
with the Bureau. The Liaison Agent subsequently learned that
Quered had informed the
✓ that she was leaving her job
The
inquired if she could recommend somebody else.
She gave thom the name of another CIA employee, Miss
The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was
out of line by not first checking with the Bureau before recom-
mending
to the
; that the Bureau was interested,
in developing intelligence information which might be useful
to the U.S. Government; and that, in this instance, CIA was
obstructing operations by not appropriately coordinating with
the Bureau. (Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, October 31, 1960,
(W)
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52. CIA USE OF BUREAU INFORMATION IN
A U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD DOCUMENT
On March 30, 1901, the Liaison Agent contacted.
Allen Dulles concerning. CIA's failure to obtain. Bureau clearance.
for use of our information in a U.S. Intelligence Board document.
No, known Manage bad been done, but the Agent stressed the sensi-
tivity of the Bureau information. Dulles requested one of his
subordinates to establish a procedure to prevent a recurrence
of such errors.
(Memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, March 30, 1961,
53. "SPY IN THE U.S." BOOK AUTHORED BY PAWEL. MONAT
It
In July, 1961, our Chicago Office received galley
proofs of the book "Spy in the U.S.," written by Pawel Monat.
A review of these proofs disclosed several references which
portrayed our counterespionage capabilities in an unfavorable
light. Since CIA was responsible for Monat and for any writing
which he might perform, the matter was discussed with CIA.
turned out that CIA had not been following the preparation of
the book. We were told that steps would be taken to protect
Bureau interest. The publishers had indicated to CIA that they
would cooperate on changes. Although some changes were made,
the book still came out with some information which was not.
· entirely favorable to the Bureau. (Pawel Monat, Bureau file
105-40510)
54.
i!
(8).4)
1961
CONFLICT WITH LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY
On October 6, 1961, our Legal Attache, Mexico City3 (8) (4)
received information indicating that the KKCzech Embassy in that
city was planning to protest harassment of its personnel by U.S.
Intelligence. The Legal Attache was told by the local CIA office
that the Agency was not involved. On October 12, 1961, the
same CIA officer changed his position and admitted that CIA had
been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected
to these tactics. It was important to him to know the facts
so he could be guided accordingly. (Memorandum L'Allies to
Sullivan, October 18. 1961, Czechoslovakian Diplomatic
Activities - Mexico :) (X)
55.
€55
CIA TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Ku
-
1941
When he defected in December, 1961,
furnished in rmation concerning alleged penetration of American
intelligence. Inquiries and review conducted by CIA within the
Agency suggested that a CIA intelligence officer,
was a logical suspect. We conferred with CIA and on February 9,
1962, we advised the Agency that we would take over the invești-
gation.
Au
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Instructions were sent to the field and we then learned in
* New York City) that CIA allegedly planned to make, a recruitment
approach. The matter was taken up with CIA headquarters and
a protest was made because of the wide discrepancy in the
reports we received on CIA intentions.' (Mayorandum Brennan to
Sullivan, April, 18, 1966,
(u)
67.
PASSING OF BUREAU DOCUMENTS TO
SENATOR ROSMNT C. BYRD BY CIA EMPLOYEE 1966
In September, 1966, we developed information indicating
that copies of FBI documents had been passed to Senator Byrd by
CIA. The matter was discussed, with the Director of CIA and the
Agency subsequently conducted an investigation and established
that one of its employees,
had submitted
a name check request to the Bureau concerning one
who was the subject of the material in question, At that time
had a responsibility of handling name check requests for
CIA and, in this connection, was in contact with our Name Check
Section. He admitted that he instituted a name check on an "off
the cuff basis" for another CIA employee named
ཀས
It is my recollection that one-on both CIA employees.
were subsequently fired or asked to resign. (Memorandum
Brennan to Sullivan, Soptember 21, 1966, "Leak of FBI Documents
Concerning
to Senator Robert C. Byrd")
68.
ALLEGED COMPROMISE OF BUREAU DOUBLE AGENT
Yu
Corporation in
New Jersey.
In March, 1967, we protested to CIA in connecti
with a matter relating to our mutual interest in a chemist
connected with
We were utilizing the chemist as a double agent in an operations
directed against the Soviet ( CIA had established a relation-
ship with the same person for the purpose of acquiring positive
intelligence relating to the field of
Our Newark
Office received information indicating that a CIA officer
without authorization, compromised our relationship with the
Chemist discussing the matter with the president of the
firm. (Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach, March 15, 1967,
(☑
69.
In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where
the Agency allegedly had failed to report to us concerning a
communication which a Cuban, exile, residing in the United States,
had received from the Cuban Intelligence Service. The particular
communication had instructed the exile to initiate preparations
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