200000
104-10332-10007
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
document had 47
20 page count
DIF.
pg
is wrongs
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CONFIDENTIAL
104-10332-10007
file
CDO guide
name
Cuba
7 January 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR:
J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
FROM:
Bryant Rogers
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
MEETING WITH LINDA FLORES
On 6 Jan we met with Linda Flores from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well
known Cubans and Cuban Organizations.
The outcome of this discussion was that the DO agrees that we can release the names of those major players with whom CIA
worked with as long as we stay within the 60-63 time frame, with some overlap into 1964 for continuity, when needed. We then
discussed our relationships with major anti-Castro organizations. It was agreed that we could release the fact that as a funding vehicle
for the US Govt, CIA provided support including funding in general terms. In some cases we may find it necessary to reveal gross ballpark
figures for annual budgets. The DO would prefer that we continue to protect specific funding amounts where possible. They were
specifically concerned about releasing specific amounts paid to individuals or families of Bay of Pigs members where individuals could
claim that one was paid more than another. In supporting these organizations it was acknowledged by the DO that we could release
generic operational activities such as publishing journals or financing goodwill tours by prominent exile Cubans to Latin America The DO
reminded us that in reviewing these relationships with Cubans and organizations, it was important to protect CIA personnel, agents and
assets and any specifics on tradecraft.
When asked about Bay of Pigs training sites, Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected in spite of the fact that
they have been mentioned in open literature.
With regard to DO location numbers (19 for Cuba) she thought this was OK for the 60-63 time frame but would check with LA
Div. She had no problem with the release of the Bell location in cables since it was no longer used.
CC:
J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
Richard D. Kovar-Y- @ DA
John F. Pereira @ DA
CONFIDENTIAL
13-00000
SECRET
8 November 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Jeremy Gunn,
ARRB Staff
Barry Harrelson,
CIS/CSI/HRG
Issues re Cryptonyms, Country
Designators, Action Indicators and
Employee True Names (U)
Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the
ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country
designators, action indicators and employee true names. The
memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your
staff and complements information provided in previous
discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss
these issues with your staff. (U)
Attachment
Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment.
SECRET
Bay
во
13-00000
SECRET
JFK
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief, Historical Review Group
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB
Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country
Designators, Action Indicators and Employee True
Names
During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has
considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been
addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK
collection and by stating our position up front we hope to
facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will
be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.
Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to "
operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami,
the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and
withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms
in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals
and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK
investigation and render an easier reading of the written
material.
-
Country File Designators We will delete the first
element of operational activity and operational interest
files in those instances when the credibility of the
narrative is not affected. The first element of the file
number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the
country name which is easily discernible, whereas the
subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or
interest and specific subject.
-
Generally, we will
Action Indicator (Slug) Lines
release the entire action indicator line of a document.
Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the
SECRET
CL BY 0695930
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action
Indicators and Employee True Names
context identifies a source or a relationship with a
specific liaison service.
In most instances we
True Names of Staff Employees
will release names of employees who have retired in an overt
status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a
document. We will continue to protect the true names of
employees cited as serving in a field position. References.
to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since
pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between
Headquarters and the field.
for
Fredrick. Wickham, Jr.
2
SECRET
13-00000
REVIEW
RECORDS
BOARD
November 9, 1995
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
•
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457
HAND DELIVERED
Mr. John Pereira, Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C., 20505
Re: ARRB requests for evidence
Dear John:
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
I thought that it might be helpful to you if I were to provide you with our current
assessment of the status of our review of the Agency's assassination records and point
to where we would like to proceed in the future.
I would like to begin by acknowledging the efforts made by the Historical Review
Group to facilitate our review of records. It has been, as you know, a difficult and time-
consuming process both for the Agency and the Review Board. We very much
appreciate the personal cooperation of you and your staff.
We continue to be concerned by the slow progress that has been made. Although we
perceive that the task has been more difficult and time-consuming than Congress
anticipated, we have found that the careful education process in which we have been
involved has helped educate us with respect to your concerns and, we hope, has helped
demonstrate to you the Review Board's concerns.
We must, however, begin to pick up the pace. In many circumstances we are reviewing
and then re-reviewing the same documents over and over again. We are also
frequently put in the position of not being provided with evidence in a timely manner
so that we can make our presentations to the Board. While many of these difficulties
are understandable- and perhaps even inherent to the start-up of the process in which
we are engaged -- we must expedite the process. Rather than dealing with dozens of
records at Board meetings, we need to move towards a schedule where hundreds of
records will be reviewed at Board meetings. From our perspective, it seems that it is
essential that the Agency be prepared to allocate significant additional resources to the
process of reviewing the records and making evidence available to the Board.
BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall William L. Joyce Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell.
13-00000
Mr. John Pereira
November 9, 1995
Page 2
We also believe that the Agency still is not providing the type of evidence that will be
the most convincing to the Board. Where issues exist that the Board has not yet
addressed, and where the Agency would like to see postponements upheld, specific
information must be provided to support a postponement. General statements, while
useful in identifying the underlying issues involved, do not provide the Board with the
complete knowledge and understanding of the issue that is necessary to make an
informed judgment regarding release of the information.
The Board is looking forward to receiving the CIA's evidence in support of the
postponement of true names. As you know, we have planned for some time to devote
the December (12 and 13) meeting to this important issue.
Additionally, you will find enclosed with this letter the next in our series of information
requests, covering boxes 7-9 of the Oswald collection. We are submitting these requests
now in an attempt to give HRG as much advance notice as possible of which records we
will be reviewing for the January 4 meeting. Evidence for records to be reviewed
January 4 should be provided no later than December 13, 1995.
We hope that during HRG's review of the January documents, the standards outlined in
this letter will be kept in mind. If at any point an issue is deemed so sensitive that a
briefing is required, ARRB staff will meet with you at your convenience.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely yours,
David Mawell
David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Enclosures
1
:
13-00000
SECRET
11 December 1995
NOTE FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover
1. On 1 December Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of the
Office of Central Cover, briefed the Executive Director of
the Assassinations Records Review Board and other Board
staff members. Also participating from CIA were John Goins
and Eleanor Neiman of IMS; Linda Cipriani, `OGC; and Barry
Harrelson and I from HRG.
2. The focus of the briefing was on the need to protect
the names of former Agency employees that appeared in the
JFK records. Gibson discussed the risks involved for people
who retired under cover if they were identified in the
public record as former CIA employees. He discussed the
efforts made by his office to obtain written statements from
the more than 100 individuals whose names appear.
3. The purpose of the briefing was to assist the Board
in its review of names when it meets on 12-13 De
December The
Agency was asked in particular to present, in writing,
evidence of risk for each of the names that will be
discussed at the Board's meeting.
The Parsin
John F. Pereira
SECRET
CL BY: 0185904
CL REASON:
DECL ON:
DRV FROM:.
Cov 2-82 1-56
☑I
AHB 70-9
13-00000
MEMORANDUM
March 20, 1996
To:
Review Board
CC:
David Marwell
CIA Team
From:
T. Jeremy Gunn
Subject:
Board Guidelines on Release of CIA Officer Names
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
The Staff understands the Review Board to accept the following general guidelines on
the release of true names of CIA officers:
When the true name of a CIA officer (i.e. past or present employee of CIA) appears in a
document, the Board will bring to its review a presumption that the true name will be
released. In order to overcome this presumption of release, CIA must provide evidence
demonstrating that release of the name would be harmful. In order to meet its burden
of proving harm, CIA must tailor the evidence to satisfy one of the three categories
identified in Part I (below). However, when the name of an officer is of such
importance that the public interest would not be served in postponing a name, the
Board may release the true name consistent with the principles identified in Part II
(below).
Part I. Categories of Officers.
1. Living officers. For living (present or former) officers, CIA must prove that.
(a) the officer is living outside the United States (or reasonably is expected to
reside or travel outside the United States in the foreseeable future); (b) the officer
is either working or is retired under cover; and (c) the officer objects to the
release of his or her true name. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board
presumptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the
officer's true name until the year 2010.
2. Where current status of former officer is unknown. Where CIA has been
unable to contact the former officer because his or her location is unknown, CIA
must present a good faith showing that reasonable attempts have been made to
locate the officer. If the Board is convinced that CIA has made a good faith
showing that it was unable to locate the former officer, the Board will postpone
the true name until June 1, 1997. However, the Board may postpone the true
13-00000
-2-
name beyond June 1, 1997, if CIA provides to the Board, prior to May 1, 1997,
additional evidence that satisfies the criteria of either category 1 (above) or
category 3 (below).
3. Names having effect on current intelligence interests. If CIA believes that
the release of a true name may compromise currently existing intelligence
operations or might otherwise cause an identifiable harm, it must provide
evidence that: (a) the officer currently is engaged in clandestine activities; (b) the
release of the true name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or
would compromise operations with current intelligence value; (c) the release of
the true name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living
person (including family members), or (d) the release of the true name would
cause a significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the
United States. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part II
below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the true name until 2010 or until
such other date as CIA reasonably shows to be a date on which the release could
be made without causing harm.
Part II. Names of Officers Who Are Important to the Assassination Story.
The Board presumptively will postpone the release of names consistent with
categories 1-3 of Part I. However, for certain persons whose names appear in a
context that is important to the assassination story, the Board may nevertheless
vote to release the true name. In all such instances, the Board will notify CIA of
the importance of such a person and provide CIA with the opportunity to
provide additional information in support of postponing the release of the
names. These names shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with due
consideration being given to the importance of the person to the assassination
story and such evidence of harm as CIA may provide.

13-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani
NOTE FOR:
Barry R. Gibson @ DO
FROM:
DATE:
Elaine S. Mathias @ DO
Linda C. Cipriani
03/04/96 09:26:53 AM
OGC
SUBJECT:
JFK Central Cover appeal
The General Counsel and I met with the JFK Review Board on Friday and discussed, among other things, how to deal with the potential
public release of the identities of former employees retired under cover. The Board clearly wants to do the right thing here, but they feel:
they are not getting enough information to make that decision.
Jeremy Gunn (JFK Board's General Counsel) will soon provided me with some of the Board's suggestions on how to deal with this which i
will pass on to you (including how to deal with Whitten). I would at the very least like to be able suggest that we attempt contact again
(either through CIA or the Board) with those retirees who have not yet responded to our letter. Of course, any suggestions you have at
this point will be extremely helpful. My sense is that this issue of protecting retirees is something everyone at CIA will want to appeal
just on the principal of it, but that we should do everything possible to avoid an appeal. (Until we work out an agreement with the Board,
you should continue to prepare that appeal you are drafting]
In the meantime, can you please provided me the following figures:
available:,
1. The # of people we sent letters to regarding the potential Board releases. (isn't it 150?) and the following breakdown if
- # living abroad
- # of those retired under cover vs. those whose cover has been rolled back or lifted
⚫ # of those who still work for us in covert/overt capacity
2. The # of responses we received to date.
3. The # of responses to date requesting that we don't release.
4. The # of responses to date saying that they didn't care.
I realize you are all out of the office these days, but I would appreciate getting this as soon as you can. Thanks.
CC:
J. Barry Harrelson
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
Frederick Wickham @ DO
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
J. Barry Harellson
John Pereira
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD
JFK March 18 Board Meeting
.
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani
8 March 1996
NOTE FOR:
Paula A. Sweeney @ DCI
Robert O. Davis @ DC!
Robert D. Caudle @ DCI
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
Linda C. Cipriani
03/08/96 02:50:39 PM
JFK March 18 Board Meeting
I have been informed that Dave Edgers will be attending the next JFK Board meeting. If this is the case, it would seem that Jeff should
go as well.
Two issues need to be discussed with the Board: stations and cover employees.
1.
Jeff and the Board agreed in principal to a "window" in which all stations would be opened (1960-64). Of course, if
there are particular stations which need to be exempted from this the Board will consider it upon the presentation of substantive
evidence.
- HRG and the Board think this is a good idea that would enable them to avoid raising potential appeals every month
Dave Edger needs to be signed onto this idea.
- Jeff, last month, presented additional information on Oslo, Stockholm, and Copenhagen. Jeff and Dave should be
prepared to answer questions or provide more information so that the Board will agree to protect these stations.
2. The Board recently released the names of 16 cover employees. An appeal is being prepared (or so I am told). The
thirty days runs on March 18. We need to finalize with the Board how to handle this issue. At the last meeting the Board agreed that
this was a really important decision, but that they were not getting the information they need to make the right decision. At the last
meeting, the Board intimated that they might be willing to delay this release, if CIA and the Board could come to a mutually agreeable
way to deal with cover employees. I understood from Jeff that this is an issue that CIA will appeal on just the principal. If this is true,
the Board should understand what our ultimate position is on this, but that we are willing to cooperate with them to find a suitable
alternative (using pseudos or generic descriptions like "case officer")
3.
I will be out all next week but Barry Harellson/HRG (30292) and John Pereira/CSI) (30373) will be happy to fill you
in on the details. Barry will be contacting Bob Caudle next week to find out how the March 18 meeting will be handled.
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000
ADMINIST
INTERNAL USE ONLY
29 July 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief Historical Review Group
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB
Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
1. Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting
clandestine operations. We are concerned about individuals that
continue to be dependent on particular cover legends and on the
organizations that cooperatively work with us to provide those
cover legends. The following proposal is offered to streamline
the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage
an inappropriate release could cause.
A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:
a. We will release the occurrence of a name when a
common last name appears by itself or in conjunction
with a
common first name such that it does not tend
to specifically identify the individual.
b. We will release the occurrence of a name if it
remains unidentified after a reasonable search is
conducted.
B.
overtly:
Identifiable names for employees that retired
In most cases, overt employees' names will be released,
but in some cases overt employees may have a
portion of their employment remain under cover.
cases will require the same review as that of an
employee who remained under cover into retirement.
Such
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY.
13-00000
ADMINISTRATIVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
Identifiable names for employees that retired
C.
covertly:
a.
We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a
current address and contact the person. If the person
objects to the release of his or her name for reasons
associated with current life style issues, we will
object to the release of the name. If the person does
not have objections based upon personal circumstances we
will review the name for organizational issues, (See
para C. c.)
para
b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the
current address, but it can be determined that the
individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or
other benefit based upon cover legend, we will need to
continue to protect the name since source of income or
benefits can not be altered without prior notification
to the individual. If we fail to identify a pension or
other active benefit, we will review the name for
organizational issues. (See para C. c.)
C. We will make a reasonable attempt to review the
name to look for identifiable harm to the person's
safety, family, ongoing operational activities, national
security or foreign relations. Assuming that none of
the previous concerns are identified, we will review the
potential damage to the cover mechanism or cover
provider by the specific occurrence of the name if
released.
2. Because families of deceased employees could be the
beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees
cover legend, we must review them the same as we would the
employee. We also have second and third generation officers
following in the footsteps of their parents that could be
negatively impacted by the revelation..
3. Our efforts to locate current addresses will include all
internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel
Security, Retirement Branch and Insurance Branch. We will
include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches
ADMINISTRATIVE
2
INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000
ADMINIS
INTERNAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
within the documentation when requesting continued protection of
the name.
4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during
our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based
upon the fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover.
arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an
unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
ADMINISTRATIVE
3
INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000
IVE
INTERNAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names
IMS/RPG Fwickham: mjk (29 July 1996)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 Addressee
l
-
C/OCC
1
1
1
-
IMS/ESG/ALB
-
IMS/ESG/IRB
-
-
1
-
IMS/ESG/HCS
IMS/ESG-OIT/MSG/RDP
ESG Chrono
A
4
13-00000
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000
Doc6dcare
11 February 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC
SUBJECT:
Comparison of ARRB and DO Memoranda re
Treatment of CIA Officer Names in JFK
Collection
1.
This memorandum is in response to an assignment to
compare a 20 March 1996 ARRB memorandum written by T. Jeremy
Gunn and The Directorate of Operations response dated 20
July 1966, authored by Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr. Both deal
with the treatment of CIA officer true names which appear in
the JFK collection when they will be postponed and when
--
they will be released.
2. First the ARRB Memorandum
Gunn describes in legal
terms the Board's position on the postponement or release of
CIA officers' true names. He makes a proffer which states
that there is a presumption in favor of release akin to a
legal evidentuary rule which causes a burden to shift to the
other party (CIA) to prove something. In this instance, it
is factual evidence/proof sufficient to shift the burden not
only back to neutral but to the other side of neutral which
permits postponement.
3.
The Gunn memorandum then sets out the criteria
required to meet the burden under several situations.
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A. For officers who are still alive he states that the
proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in
number and all three must be met:
i.
The officer must be living outside of the U.S.
OR,
(R) easonably be expected to travel outside of
the U.S. in the foreseeable future;
AND .
ii. The officer is either working ……. (presumably
a current staff officer, contract employee,
or independent contractor) or is retired
under cover;
AND
iii. The officer objects to the release of his or
COMMENT:
her true name.
Mr. Gunn's criteria are a little confusing
and reach beyond the Board's authority.
First, note again
that the three elements are joined by an AND meaning all
Second, the
elements must be met to satisfy a postponement.
first requirement of living or traveling outside of the U.S.
is not tied to cover. Many officers who do not work
under cover all of the time are, in fact,
provided cover
for overseas TDY's. Thus, any officer who might
reasonably' be expected to travel outside of the U.S.
would warrant postponement of his true name. This would
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seem to include every CIA employee, contract employee and
independent contractor past and present.
With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the
Board are simply in error. To my knowledge they have no
authority to require that an individual be consulted
concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having
his or her true name postponed, or to give up his cover,
thus having the name released. This decision does not lie
in the first instance with the individual but is an
institutional decision which lies solely within the purview
of the Agency and the executive branch of the government.
CIA as an executive agency charged with the creation,
.
maintenance, and dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only
entity competent to make such a decision. It alone knows if
release of an officer's true name will compromise an
existing cover mechanism which will, in turn, expose others
who share or have shared the same cover. It alone knows if
release of an officer's name will expose CIA sponsorship (a
cover entity) of a sensitive activity. It alone knows if
release of an officer's name will violate a promise of
confidentiality to a commercial cover sponsor which could
cause both embarrassment and possibly, financial hardship to
the sponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's
ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.
Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer
(either current or retired) vis a vis staying with his or
her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current
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employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If,
after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong
position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer
should be permitted to decide. He or she should be
counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have
an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With
respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency
does not object to the removal from cover, the individual
should be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to
As a historical note, the
this inquiry will be mixed.
Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum
with respect to cover into retirement cover for
life, etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard
unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired
and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. . There will be
those officers who do not want their cover lifted under any
circumstance.
By way of summary, it is CIA not the Board and not the
individual
individual 
officer who makes the initial decision concerning
the maintenance or lifting of cover.
B. Former officers, status unknown. While the
heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does
not know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former
officers, the section does not rally deal with this issue.
Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the
fact the CIA may not be able to find all of its former
officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under

13-00000
cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board
and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year is
a good faith showing that reasonable attempts were made
to locate the officer and failed.
The section contains the additional provision which
advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June
of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the
board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either
category 1 or category 3. Such additional evidence must
be provided by 1 May 1977.
The requirements or tests of this section for the
Agency are not onerous but should be set-out as a series of
uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to
locate each current status unknown officer. The record
of these actions could then be presented to the ARRB in
support of a request for continued to postponement. The DO
Memorandum mentions of the possibility of asking the IRS or
the OPM for assistance in this regard and this should
probably be done. I recall however, that the Service will
assist, through cleared contacts at the National Office, but
only to the extent of determining the whereabouts of the
individual and then contacting him and ask that he be in
touch with his former employer. I have no current knowledge
of cleared contacts at the OPM but they existed in the past
and I assume they continue.
C. Names having effect on current intelligence
interests. The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher
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level of concern to this section and its criteria than the
previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the
criteria of all three sections are inextricable.
It sets
out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its
burden, i.e. provides sufficient evidence to prove any one
of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year
2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate
ones, each separated by a comma and between numbers 3 and 4
and "OR." They are:
i. The officer must be currently engaged in
clandestine activities; OR,
ii. The release of the officer's name would
compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations
with current intelligence value (presumably, the latter
permits a review into the officer's past activities, agent
relationships, and cover positions); OR,
to a
living
iii. The release of the officer's true name would
reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to
person (including family members); (read broadly, this
provision would include, the individual, former agents,
anyone who shared the same cover or cover position, i.e. a
dedicated Department of State slot within an embassy); OR,
iv. The release of the officer's name would cause a
significant harm to the national security or the foreign
relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to
drive the proverbial Mack truck through) .
L
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4.
In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of
what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of
* importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of
harm.
Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh
the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name
being considered for postponement is important to the
assassination story, the Board will release it. This means
for those few individuals who may be viewed as important
to the story, truly substantial evidence must be brought
to bear. Absent such evidence, the Board will release, and
the only recourse left to the Agency would be an appeal to
the President.
5. The Directorate of Operations Memorandum.
The
basic concern with the steps for handling names as contained
within the memorandum is as follows.
For officers who
Per the
retired under cover, the first step will be to contact them
and ask if they want their true name released.
comments on page three supra, this should be the last step
of the review, not the first.
A. Other Comments. The resources and data bases
which will be researched for each name should be clearly
established and followed in a uniform manner. Deviation
from a set, orderly process will open CIA determinations to
criticism, objections and dismissal, i.e. release of a name
that should be postponed.
B. In addition to the data bases described
retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of
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security, insurance lists
consideration might be given
to the Northwest Federal Credit Union, and overt data bases
such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union
might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an
address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact
an individual and ask that he be in touch.
C. A comment must be made about the idea of
universally releasing the true names of overt employees.
the extent that any current employee, even overt employee,
may be sent overseas on TDY under light cover, the release
of his or her true name via these JFK documents which will
receive widespread review could jeopardize his overseas
mission and possibly, place his life in danger.
To
6. These thoughts are intended to be talking points as
we commence to sort out the manner in which we will deal
with the true names. Clearly, we need to begin to quickly
identify those names which can be released, those on which
there is some question, and those few on which we really
really
need to dig in our heals.
6. I would be glad to discuss with you any of the
issues raised herein.
Gary M. Breneman
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SECRET
-
WORKING PAPER
Memorandum For: Chief/HRG
From:
Barry Harrelson
5 March, 1997
Subject:
Reference:
Name Issue / Status of Review
Meetings with ARRB staff (Marwell & Gunn)
4 March 1997.
wark fil
Name Issue
I met with Gunn and Marwell (separate meetings) to
discuss the reopening of the names issue per my memo to you.
Both Gunn and Marwell reacted positively. They found the
proposal to be reasonable one and they are willing to work
with us in approaching the Board. However, both said they
could not predict the Boards reaction. Per Marwell, one
member of the Board (Anna Nelson) seems to believe that if a
person worked for the CIA it should be known.
Apparently our timing is excellent. Marwell is
planning to propose to the Board that they change the
process from the focus on individual postponements to
documents. Under the new approach his staff would have the
authority to negotiate with the Agency on the release of
documents, and only issues/documents of disagreement would
be placed before the Board. Marwell is convinced that even
with an additional year they will not finish the project
with the current approach. He sees our proposal on the
names as an example of how the process would work.
Marwell recommends that we include examples of
documents containing names of little or no connection to the
story. Bob Skwirot (he was in the meeting with Marwell)
said that there were a number of names that appeared in only
one document and that the number of names had reached 590.
Marwell wants to start immediately on preparing a joint list
of important/releasable individuals.
Action: Advise DO, OGC, upper management of our proposal to
reopen the name issue (how?). Need to decide what level
would sign the memo to the Board, and who would prepare the
memo. If you agree I can send a copy of my memo to you to
Linda and Fred for background use.
HRG and DO team will collect examples of documents and
prepare (with ARRB staff) a list of individuals. The DO
should focus on any person on the list that needs protection
and prepare the evidence ASAP (i.e. not wait for the issue
to be resolved).
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SECRET
WORKING PAPER
New ARRB Review Process
Marwell and spent some time discussing how a new
process would work. He would like to test the process for
the April meeting. The following is a rough outline with my
comments:
1) HRG reviewers would review the documents the same
as they do now (postponements would be blue highlighted).
[no change in our procedures]
2) ARRB staff would review the blue highlighted
document.
a) If they agree, they would stamp the document
"ARRB approved” and return it to HRG to process
for NARA.
b) If they disagree they would highlight in
yellow (creating green highlighting). If the two
staffs cannot resolve the issue, then the document
would go before the Board.
[Major change: ARRB staff would no longer record all the
proposed postponements, no DO damage review, no detailed
determination letter requiring HRG reviewers to use the
"grid” to determine what happen.]
3) Non-issue documents would be sent to the ARRB
staff when ready for NARA. At that time the ARRB staff
would prepare a simplified final determination notice and
letter to the Agencies..
[ No action would be required; HRG would file the final
determination notice with the document].
4)
“Green” highlighted documents that go to the Board
would be handled the same as today.
[The expectation is that a lot less documents would require
Board action. ]
Comments: With some fine tuning, I think this process could
work, and we would be able to complete the re-review of
documents released in 1993 and 1994 by Oct. 1998.
Completing the entire project will depend on how quickly the
"non-related” material and the “addition records” are
reviewed by the ARRB staff.
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Pending Issues
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WORKING PAPER
As part of the change in process, Marwell wants the
Board to focus on outstanding substantive issues as opposed
to micro managing the review. We discussed the following:
1) Nosenko. ARRB staff needs to review the non-related
material and make a recommendation to the Board. Marwell
leans toward not treating all of Nosenko as assassination
related. Could be a hard sell with some Board members.
Should we request that Nosenko meet with the Board? Marwell'
thinks they would react favorably.
2) Personnel Files. Again the first step is to have
his staff confirm that only a part of a file is related and
that those documents are in the released material.
3) Gibson). FBI file issue; we need to present case to
the Board
4) LI 9 Continuing to protect will be a hard sell
given that Newman has published identity; we need to present
case to the Board.
5) CRC Financial Files. ARRB staff needs to review
Annual Report and Extension
Marwell ask me to draw you attention to the Annual
Report and the request for an extension. He would still
like a letter from the Agency (could be addressed to him)
along these lines: "reviewed Annual Report"
"note that the Board has ask for extension"
"support the request/feel it is in interest of
Agency and public /or something along these lines”
Other issues (not discussed with Marwell/Gunn)
Linda (OGC) says CI Staff has ask Gunn to rewrite his
notes, and opposes Gunn's suggestion to release pages from
the CI histories he reviewed. Gunn indicated in his notes
that some of the pages should be released and might be
considered assassination records. We are going to run into
similar problems with the other histories. Gunn will be in
HQ tomorrow to re-do his notes. She will discuss the "pages
issue” with the goal of having him drop the request to
release. As to the question of designating the pages as
assassination records, she will inform him that CI will
oppose. If he insist, she will refer back to HRG.
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04/23/97 WED 15:53 FAX 202 724 0457
ARRB
VER
HEE
T
To:
Fax #:
Subject:
Date:
Pages:
J. Barry Harrelson
703-613-3063
Segregated Collections
April 23, 1997
7, including this cover sheet.
Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.
FAX
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
From the desk of...
T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 724-0088
Fax: (202) 724-0457
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АККВ
4356
Assassination Records Review Board
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
Guidelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections
Adopted: April 23, 1997
Background
In order to ensure that the Review Board will be able to complete its task of reviewing
all identified assassination records, the Board recently took two significant steps. First,
on November 13, 1996, it adopted guidelines with respect to reviewing "Segregated
Collections" with regard to information that is “not believed relevant” (NBR) to the
assassination. Second, in February 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to
extend its tenure for one additional year.
It is the Review Board's judgment that, even with the assumption that our operations
may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete
review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of
review. In particular, a reasonable modification of current postponement standards a
would greatly expedite and facilitate the release of additional Information and records.
Otherwise, the Review Board might cease operations without having reviewed claimed
postponements in tens of thousands of pages of FBI and CIA records.
Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections
1
In a further effort to enhance the Review Board's work, the Review Board now issues
these revised guidelines for the review of records in the Segregated Collections.
(These guidelines do not affect the FBI's Core and Related Files or the CIA's 201 file on
Oswald.) The four principal factors that underlie these review guidelines are: first,
continuing, to the greatest reasonable extent, the Review Board's established
guidelines for postponements that have emerged over the past two years; second,
establishing guidelines consistent with the Review Board's decision regarding NBR
records; third, establishing reasonable and workable guidelines that will enable the
'The regulations adopted by the Board on November 13, 1996, define
"Segregated Collections” as including first, FBI records that were requested by: (a) the
House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA”) in conjunction with its
investigation into the Kennedy assassination; (b) the Church Committee in conjunction
with its inquiry into issues related to the Kennedy assassination; and (c) by other bodies
(e.g., Pike Committee, Abzug Committee, etc.) that relate to the Kennedy
assassination; and second, CIA records including (a) the CIA's Sequestered Collection
of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records and the microfilm records (box 64),
and (b) several boxes of CIA staff "working files."
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Review Board, the ARRB staff, the CIA, and the FBI to complete the significant amount
of work that remains; and finally, to provide reasonably consistent standards for the
review of postponements that would apply equally to CIA and FBI records.
The following are, in summary form, guidelines for reviewing postponements in the
Segregated Collections.²
CIA Source and FBI Informant and National Security Asset Postponements
There are, of course, similarities and differences between FBI informants and CIA
sources. Like FBI informants and national security assets, CIA sources may or may not
be paid for the information that they provide and they may or may not be providers of
information over the long-term. When providing information to the Bureau, FBI
informants generally are understood to be cooperating with law enforcement officials for
a legal and legitimate purpose. It is often the case; although not always, that FBI
informants understand that at some point their name might surface in conjunction with a
criminal prosecution and that they may need to testify in court. Foreign CIA sources
and FBI national security assets, however, are not necessarily deemed to be
cooperating with law enforcement officials but may, in fact, be committing the crime of
espionage against their native country by cooperating with US authorities. Furthermore,
unlike FBI informants, CIA sources and FBI national security assets presume that their
names will not be released publicly and they certainly presume (in the ordinary course)
that their identities will not surface in criminal trials. As a practical matter, it is generally
much easier today for the FBI to locate a former informant who resides in the United
States than it is for the CIA and FBI to locate former sources and national security
assets.
Despite these differences -- differences which would generally suggest a greater
degree of protection being owed to CIA sources and FBI national security assets -- the
issues in terms of postponements are fundamentally similar.
"The existing "NBR" guidelines allow the Review Board to remove from detailed
consideration those records or files that truly have no apparent relevance to the
assassination. Nevertheless, a significant number of files in the Segregated Collections
contain records that shed some light on issues that the HSCA explored as potentially
relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. The following criteria would apply
to all records in the Segregated Collections, including records containing some NBR
redactions.
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CIA Sources
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The Review Board established guidelines, during its December 1996 meeting, for
handling CIA source issues and applied those guidelines at the January 1997 meeting.
These guidelines directed the protection of names and identifying information of CIA
sources in cases where the identity of the source is of low public interest or is peripheral
to the JFK assassination. The Board's decision was based on two factors: the concern
that since CIA sources generally live outside the United States, they could risk harm if
their identities were revealed. Moreover, many of the sources referenced in CIA
records appear infrequently and are of relatively low public interest. Therefore, in
records where the identity of the source is of importance for understanding the
assassination, the CIA will be required to provide additional evidence to support the
protection of the source's identity.³ In cases where the identify of the source is
peripheral to the assassination story, the information will be postponed until 2017.
FBI National Security Assets
FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.
FBI Informants
Informant issues represent the largest category of postponements in the FBI's
Segregated Collection, as they do in the "core" FBI assassination files. They also
provide the greatest opportunity for streamlining the review process. Currently, there
are ten members of the Bureau's JFK Task Force who are responsible for researching
individual informants in response to evidence requests from the Review Board. They
retrieve and review the informants' files and attempt, through DMV, Social Security, and
other database, searches, to determine if the informant is alive. Under current Review
Board standards for "core" files, this work is necessary to provide evidence to support
redacting the informant's name, regardless of whether the informant provided
information. Removing the requirement of proving whether informants are alive in the
Segregated Collections would free up significant resources that could be deployed to
reviewing unprocessed HSCA subject files.
The new approach to HSCA subjects is to protect informant-Identifying information,
³An example would be the case of John Scelso (pseud.). The Board found that
his identity is relevant to the assassination story and CIA offered evidence of a
continuing need to protect the identity. In this case, “Scelso" documents would
continue to be scheduled for release in five years.
*Six work full-time on informant evidence, four devote about half their time to
informant evidence.
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without requiring the Bureau to make a showing that the informant is alive. This
protection would extend to individuals characterized as symbol-number informants,
"PSIS," "PCIS," "established sources," "panel sources," and the like - designations that
indicate an ongoing relationship with the FBI. It would not extend to individuals who
requested that their identity be protected in an isolated contact with the FBI or to local
and state law enforcement officers.
The "informant-identifying information" to be protected would include the customary
(i.e., informant-specific) portions of informant symbol numbers and file numbers,
informant names, and -- at least potentially - descriptions of, and information received
from, the informant. How much, if any, of the latter type of information should be
redacted would be the principal focus of staff-level discussions with the FBI. The staff's
principal goal in this process, with regard to each informant, would be to release as
much information that is relevant to understanding the assassination as possible. In
discussions with the FBI, the staff would be prepared, if necessary, to concede
redaction of informant-identifying information that is unrelated to the assassination in
order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.5
The presumption will be that an informant's identity will be released if the informant
provides "positive" information about an assassination-related issue. To overcome this
presumption of release for informants with “positive” information, the FBI would need to
make a particularized showing that the identifying information should not be released.
To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017.
CIA Employee Name Postponements
Over the past year the CIA has addressed the employee name issue and has released
some names that it had previously asked the Board to postpone. But during that time
the list of names has grown to a size that had not been imagined at the time the work
began. To date, the Review Board staff has identified in the JFK Collection over 650
names of CIA employees. These names appear in more than 1000 documents already
reviewed by the Board and numerous additional records that have not yet been
processed. While some of these employee names are important to the assassination
story, many appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and seem to add little,
if any, important information.
$In HSCA subjects, there typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or
the assassination itself. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may
be informant reports on Giancana's support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from
the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff
would set a higher priority on release of the former reports than on the latter.
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CIA's argument to protect employee names emphasizes a number of points. First,
since many employees are “under cover," the maintenance of that cover is critical to
gathering intelligence. CIA argues that identification of a name can identify the cover
provider and jeopardize operations, Second, although the majority of names are of
retired CIA employees, CIA has a confidentiality agreement with them and many do not
want their past Agency affiliation released. The argument here is that release may
jeopardize business relationships or personal safety. Such arguments have already
been presented to the Board. Their ment can only be determined on a case-by-case
basis. However, due to the volume of names in the JFK Collection, the individual
review and evaluation of each case would delay significantly the review of documents
and ultimately lead to less total Information becoming available to the public.
CIA has proposed, and the Review Board agrees, that CIA employee names be treated
in a manner similar to that applied to Source names: to postpone until 2017 those
employee names that are of low public interest or are of peripheral interest to the
assassination. It will be presumed that employee names will be released if their
identities are important to the assassination story unless the CIA is able to provide
specific information of a potential harm of release. (CIA acknowledges the presumption
of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm to
national security or to personal safety would result from the release of the employee
name.)
FBI “Foreign Counterintelligence" Postponements
It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for
disclosing "FCI" activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the
HSCA subjects reflect “FCI” activities against other nations that have not been
addressed by the Review Board in the "core" files, the FBI will be allowed to redact
direct discussion of such activities, unless the information in the proposed redaction
meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.
FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements
The criteria for these postponements would not, in the abstract, depart significantly from
the Review Board's current approach of releasing information received through liaison
channels, while protecting direct acknowledgment of the source of the information. In
practice, however, the staff would be more flexible in protecting text that implies,
although may not unambiguously state, that a foreign government is the source of
particular information. Nevertheless, the more significant the information is to any
assassination-related issue, the more information would be released under these
guidelines.
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CIA Stations and Other Issues
Over the past two years the Review Board has established other guidelines that will
continue to guide the review process, some of which will be outlined here. For CIA
stations, all locations related to the Mexico City story will be released during the period
1960-69. Outside of that window, they will be released on a case-by-case basis should
the identity of the station be critical to understanding the assassination. Other stations,
except for those identified as particularly sensitive, will be released from the beginning
of the Kennedy administration until the publication of the Warren Commission report,
(i.e., January 1, 1961 to October 1, 1964). Outside of these windows, stations will be
postponed. Cable prefixes, dispatch prefixes, and field report prefixes would be
postponed or released according to the same windows as the stations to which they
refer. CIA job titles also are redacted or opened along with the station at which the
officer served.
Crypts would be released along lines similar to other information. "All "LI” crypts, except
those considered particularly sensitive would be released through October 1, 1964, as
are "AM" crypts and U.S. govemment crypts. In other areas, only the digraph is
protected. Again, the exception is sensitive crypts, which would be protected in their
entirety. After October 1, 1964, the presumption shifts towards protection of the crypts,
except those that provide meaningful information about the assassination story. (For
example, crypts pertinent to Garrison-era documents would likely carry the same
presumption of release as those generated during the Warren Commission.)
Surveillance methods will be released if the nature of the surveillance has a material
bearing on information related to the assassination unless CIA provides evidence
demonstrating the political or operational sensitivity, in which case the information will
be released in 2017.
e:\arrb\regs\eview.wpd
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APR 15 '97 04:55PM USGOVERNMENT
:
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
15 April 1997
David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
CIA Employees
P.2/14
(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA
once the Review Board has completed it's deliberations on the
issues discussed below.)
1. (U) Issue. The purpose of this memo is to relate
CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of
the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK
Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem
might be addressed.
I. Factual Background
2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA
employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some
of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA
will continue to work with the Review Board to release as
many of these names as possible. Many names, however,
appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and
appear to add nothing to the historical record.
3.
;
(U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board
on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are
presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence
to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to
the employee would likely result from such release. Since
these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly
clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases,
their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this
approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to
SECRET
CL BY:
CL REASON:
DECL ON:
DRV FROM: ·
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1.5 (c)
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P.3/14
protect national security information and the Review Board's
duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a
timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and
informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over
the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some
employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a
"suspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had
received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many
former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons,
even though they might have legitimate needs to protect
their identities.
4. (U) Contacting every named employee and collecting
information on each of them to present to the Review Board
will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had
anticipated. This will have obvious ramifications for how
and when the Review Board releases information to the
public. More importantly, the decision to publicly.
acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30
years under cover is a critical one that should be made not
by default, but rather by careful planning and
consideration.
5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that
the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy
for releasing true names of sources of intelligence
information. It was agreed at that time that there would be
a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where
a source was particularly important to the JFK story and
there was no overriding national security interest, the name
would be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there
are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not
apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and
operational similarities, which are described herein, that
justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is
further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes
that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting
employee names that appear in the Collection, with
exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are
important to the JFK story.
II. Legal Considerationa
6. (U) As both covert CIA employees and clandestine
reporting assets are types of "human sources" of
intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section
11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires
release of information, it takes precedence over all other
laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong
governmental national security interests in protecting the
true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is
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P.4/14
important for the Review Board to reconsider the laws which
protect classified information, because they clearly reflect
a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA
employees from disclosure.
The
7. (U) By Executive order and statute, the President
and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence
responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In his
Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central
Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI
responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment
of CIA, Congress also gave the DCT this responsibility.
National Security Act of 1947, Section 103 (d) (3), codified
at 50 USC §403 (3) (c) (5), requires the DCI to protect.
intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure.
addition, §403 (3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to ensure that
risks to the United States and those involved in the
collection of intelligence through human sources are
minimized..
In
8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working
for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of
particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment
of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress
specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law
requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization,
functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel
employed by the Agency.
9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,
trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving
or potentially involving classified information. Working
with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has
successfully protected the names of CIA employees from
public release even in criminal trials where there are
heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring
disclosure to the defendant of all government information
relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte
hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of
admissibility and relevancy of classified information,
including the identity of CIA employees who may have
information pertaining to the defense, before it is
introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in
open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has
ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense,
but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In
other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information
and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the
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Subject: CIA Employees
defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other
cases, the defense was never notified that CIA even had
information bearing on the case, as the judge ruled that the
mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified
and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover,
under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a
prosecution in those cases where the risk to national
security is too great.
10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA
employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of
a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act
subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a
"covert agent" to prosecution and provides up to 10 years in
prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act
specifically defines a "covert agent" as including "an
officer or employee of an intelligence agency...
П
Although
11. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed
Executive Order 12958 on classified national security
information that became effective in October 1995.
it requires generally that agencies make greater
declassification efforts than under the prior executive
order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of
intelligence information, which would include employees,
extra protection from the declassification provisions.
Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and
having historical value must be declassified within five
years. However, information revealing the identity of a
human source may continue to be protected.
12. (U) The above federal laws show a long-standing
practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from
disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory
obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to
this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a
high priority.
III. Operational Considerations
13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may
appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations
for protecting their identity are similar to those for
sources. Many of these employees have worked "under cover"
for CIA. Cover is used to disassociate entire installations
and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to
enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively
in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and
authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile
elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to
4
SECRET
13-00000.
*APR 15 '97 04:59PM USGOVERNMENT
Subject: CIA Employees
SECRET
P. 6/14
certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent
embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit
plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign
countries.
14.
(U)
The ability to maintain one's cover is
crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or
"friendly" country, should the local service become aware of
who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance
and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible.
In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA
presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local
population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it
becomes known among the locals that certain US Government
officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the
government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and
diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert
employees and their families would face increased risk to
their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our
employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to
ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among
an otherwise benign local population. In any of these
cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly
compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the
field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in
an operationally and physically secure location. Thus,
maintaining cover is important to a case officer's
effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.
15. (S) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is
also important to cover providers. The Review Board will
recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA
employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work
under "official" (e.g., State Department) cover or "non-
official" (e.g., private company) cover. Disclosure of a
covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of
the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also
negatively affect the governmental or business mission of
the cover provider, especially those who provide non-
official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been
under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in
other countries could have a negative impact on the
provider's business interests and activities. It would also
cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and
their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could
affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by
the Agency and Intelligence Community.
16. (S) Although the majority of names that appear in
the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational
considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are
5'
SECRET
13-00000
*APR 15 '97 05:00PM USGOVERNMENT
Subject: CIA Employees
SECRET
P.7/14
not diminished.
Similar to sources, many former employees
still do not want their past affiliation with CIA revealed.
Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not
aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact
could negatively affect personal and professional
relationships. Some former employees still live overseas
where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their
personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on
business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can
threaten their business interests and personal safety.
One example of an employee in this category is Robert
Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the
Collection. Fulton retired under Department of State cover;
he currently has a consultant business and frequently
travels to China. Release of his name would jeopardize not
only his business but perhaps even his safety. A similar
example is Walter McCabe, who also retired under State
cover. He is now working in Russia and several East
European countries for a private firm. He does not want his
name published, because it could be damaging to his current
employer and his professional status.
17. (S) Even if a former employee agrees to the
revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not
be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially
acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing
operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals
recruited by the employee and still providing information to
the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public
acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations
where the employee worked throughout his career, including
some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who
had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and
may have believed they were legitimately providing
information to a US corporate representative would be upset
to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.
18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers
by their own service would have a chilling effect on
prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to
enter into a clandestine relationship with American
intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even
its own staff employees from public disclosure.
IV. Proposal
19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is
important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA
employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions
made for those individuals who are important to the story of
the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a
6
SECRET

13-00000
APR 15 '97 05:01PM USGOVERNMENT
SECRET
Subject: CIA Employees
P. 8/14
substitution for the true name be used. If the Review Board
is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout
the records, a particular identifying substitution can be
used for a particular employee.
20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not
undermine the Review Board's obligations under the JFK Act.
A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84
of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection.
In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals'
identity can add anything of significance to the historical
record; yet there may be some security concerns still
associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur H.
Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in
Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in
the JFK Collection and was subject to public release, he
told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and
believed such a release could pose personal and security
problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name
even appeared in the Collection, since he had no
recollection of being involved in anything related to the
assassination.
21. (S) With regard to the approximately 500 names
that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast
majority of these individuals played almost no role in the
JFK story. One example of this is former DO officer
Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately 20-30
times in the Collection simply because he signed off on name
trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and
retired under cover. The public release of his name would
provide the public with no additional significant
information about JFK. Tom Flores is another example of a
covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but
has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores
retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects
to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent letter to
CIA is also attached for your convenience.
22. (s) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some
names may be particularly important to the JFK story
regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in
the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico
Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee.
In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review
Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA proposes that
the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals
whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose
names should be released to the public. These names would
carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is
provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result
7
SECRET
13-00000
APR 15 '97
05:02PM USGOVERNMENT
SECRET
Subject: CIA Employees
P.9/14
from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate
searches to determine whether release would pose national
security concerns for the US Government or personal safety
concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review
Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are
significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review
of the sequestered collection.
23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review
Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy
regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not
undermine the important principle of protecting those who
work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are
ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.
Attachment
A. Tom Flores' letter
قيلا
Michael J. O'Neil
Acting General Counsel
SECRET
13-00000
- APR 15 '97 05:03PM USGOVERNMENT
Subject: CIA Employees
DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani
OGC-97-50971
SECRET
76124
(10 Apr 97)
Distribution:
Original Addressee
1 - GC
1
1
1
-
Lit File - LDG00021
LCC Signer
-
RDC
-
FYI
1
-
OGC Registry
9
SECRET
P. 10/14
13-00000
Secret
26 June 1997
Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn
From:
Subject:
Reference:
ARRB Staff
Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Office
CIA/CSI/HRG
Employee Names Scheduled for ARRB Review
201 File and “A” Names Lists
(We request that this memorandum and its attachments be
returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its
deliberations on the names discussed below.)
1. The above reference lists identify the protected CIA
employee names in the Oswald 201 file and on the ARRB
staff's key figures list scheduled for action by the ARRB at
its 9-10 July 1997 meeting. This memorandum is a partial
response to the ARRB's request for evidence and addresses
those individuals on the list currently employed by the
Agency and the changes in status of names.
201 List
Current employees requiring continued protection (see
attached Cover Staff reports):
Walter C. D'Andrade (Andrade, FNU)
Robert J. Austin
Robert F. Litviak
Release:
FNU Coplewood
Corrections:
Joan Field
N. Judkins
FNU Patten
Harrison L Scott
Carl Trettin
W. Walker
Remove Kurt Johansson (source)
incorrectly identified as an employee
--
Add Barbara Graham (B. Graham) -
incorrectly dropped from latest list
SECRET
611637
X1
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
CL BY:
DECL ON:
DRV FRM: COV 2-87
13-00000
Secret
•Key Figures (A) List
Release:
FNU Connally
FNU Feinglass
Daniel Flores
Lorna McKay
George Misko
David Wilsted
2. For the remaining 38 names on the lists, we will
provide evidence supporting their cover status and the need
for continued protection as available. By 7 July you should
have either specific evidence or a status of search
statement for each individual.
sthanl
Barry Harrelson
Attachments:
Cover history printouts (3) [available in CIA SCIF]
SECRET
13-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Pilled In)
SECRECY AGREEMENT
#19-297
1. I, Merton Mowbray Palmer II, understand that upon enter-
ing on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a posi-
tion of trust in that Agency of the Government responsible to the Presi-
dent and the National Security Council for intelligence relating to the
security of the United States of America. I understand that in the
course of my employment I will acquire information about the Agency and
its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Agency.
2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title
18, USC, secs. 793 and 794, and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure
of classified information relating to the national defense may subject
me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be
made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any
time thereafter.
any
riza-
3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have
a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to
classified information relating to the Agency without proper
tion. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any
person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central
Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence material under
the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking
is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that
its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other
appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally
binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it.
4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not
information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it,
and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of
the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to
the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my
dismissal.
5. I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature
of a publication or which would reasonably be expected to result in pub-
licity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation
of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM NO. 368 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
1 DEC 55
13-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)
6. I understand that for all grievances and complaints there are estab-
lished procedures within the Agency permitting appeal by any employee of
the Agency and to carry any such grievance or complaint outside the Agency
will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in
paragraph 3. If the appeal procedures are inadequate in any situation,
I am aware that the Inspector General is at all times available to any
employee with a legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint.
7. I further understand and agree that my employment by the Central In-
telligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict
compliance with CIA Security Regulations, and the appendices thereto.
8. Inasmuch as employment by the Government is a privilege not a right,
-in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or
participate in the publication of any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either
during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific
prior approval by the Agency.
9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in con-
nection with my official duties with the Central Intelligence Agency
remains the property of the United States of America, and I will sur-
render, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Agency or upon
separation from the Agency, any material relating to such information
and intelligence in my possession.
10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental
reservations or purpose of evasion.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this.
July
Witness:
,
1962.
Doris Shea
th
g
day of
mator Mowbray Palmer II (Seal)
CONFIDENTIAL
9 JUL 1962
Date
13-00000
SECRET
Morton M. Calmer
2. THE UNCLASSIFIED SAE, COORDINATED IN DRAFT WITH
CCS/OSB, IS AS FOLLOUS:
SUMMARY: TRILINGUAL SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFICER
(DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962-1990) WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE
WORKING WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, MORE THAN 16 YEARS WORKING AND
LIVING IN LATIN AMERICA (ECUADOR, URUGUAY, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL,
PERU AND. MEXICO). "ELEVEN OF THOSE YEARS WERE IN SUPERVISORY'
AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS.. RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE
SERVICE AWARD FOR HAVING MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS TO
OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS HOUSE COMMITTEES CONCERNED
WITH FOREIGN POLICY (TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICE,
APPROPRIATIONS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, SELECT
COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS). THIS WAS
COMPLEMENTED BY INDIVIDUAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION FROM
MAJORITY. AS WELL AS MINORITY MEMBERS OF THOSE COMMITTEES.
MEXICO, MAINTAINED. FRUITFUL CONTACT WITH CABINET MEMBERS AND.
WAS A MAJOR PLAYER IN THE DIALOGUE AND POLICY GUIDANCE BUILDING
UP TO (INTER ALIA) THE DEBT NEGOTIATIONS AGREEMENT AND ENSUING
COMMERCIAL OPENINGS.
DETAILS:
-TOP SECRET AND SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES.
IN
-DRAFTER AND/OR COORDINATOR ON MYRIAD POLICY, POSITION
AND GUIDANCE PAPERS IMPACTING ON US PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEXICO. MAJOR PLAYER IN ENSURING THAT
HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE COMPLEXITIES OF
THE EVOLVING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MEXICO.
-DAILY INTERLOQUTOR WITH MEXICAN CABINET OFFICERS
DURING SLIGHTLY LESS THAN FOUR YEARS IN MEXICO CITY.
-IN PREVIOUS WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENT, DEALT EXTENSIVELY
WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENTS OF THE USG.
GAVE IN HOUSE AS WELL AS NUMEROUS INTER AGENCY SPEECHES ON A
VARIETY OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.
-1980-1984 - FLAGGED THE THEN EMERGING SENDERO LUMINOSO
AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PERUVIAN SECURITY AND WAS THE FIRST
SENIOR OFFICIAL TO INSIST THAT PERUVIAN COCA PRODUCTION WAS TEN
TIMES THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES. (SADLY, BOTH OBSERVATIONS HAVE
TURNED OUT TO BE ALTOGETHER ACCURATE.)
-IN 1978-1980 PERIOD, WORKED FOR THE OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OVERALL RELATIONS
WITH ALL COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. RECEIVED
A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARD AND EFFUSIVE LETTERS OF
APPRECIATION FROM MEMBERS OF SIX COMMITTEES.
-IN VARIOUS MANAGEMENT POSITIONS, TWICE WAS IN CHARGE
OF UNITS WHICH EXCEEDED TWO HUNDRED PERSONS. HIRED, FIRED,
NEGOTIATED, AND PROVIDED ADVICE, GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION AS
APPROPRIATE.
1
SECRET
1
13-00000
I understand that the Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)
defines the outer limits of what I may disclose to unauthorized
persons concerning my employment by the Central Intelligence
Agency. I further understand that disclosure of information
about my Agency employment which is not contained in my SAE may
constitute a violation of my Secrecy Agreement. I promise that
all statements which I make to unauthorized persons concerning
my Agency employment will be consistent with my SAE and limited
by its content.
11 OCT 1989
Date
Mirton
Ma
Signatur
13-00000
SECRET
OCC-95-149
07 DEC 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board
VIA:
Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human
Resources and Programs
FROM:
Eric L. Qualkenbush
SUBJECT:
Chief, Office of Central Cover
Proposed CIA Name Release
1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of
individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or
separated employees. As described below, this action would
breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work
under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover
providers.
2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon
entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the
employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not
been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the
employee to protect such information from unauthorized
disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in
force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities
of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.
3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well
as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency
policy to protect the names of former employees who have
separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually
agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees
who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,
Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire
Agency career as well as into their years after separation from
the Agency, jeopardizes:
• the personal safety of former employees;
WARNING NOTICE
:
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
1
SECRET
CL 0489932
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-87

13-00000
SUBJECT:
SECRET
Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
4.
the second careers of former employees;
• the cover and identity of other employees who worked
with the covert employee whose name is released as
CIA; and,
the protection of sources and methods (what
individual would agree to a clandestine relationship
with American intelligence knowing the secret
association would become public knowledge?).
Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will
affect individuals follows:
• Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State
cover and is currently working in Russia and several
Eastern European countries for a private firm which
converts "wartime" factories into peacetime use.
Revealing his name would damage his relationship
with his current employer, his position with the
firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host
countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's
acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied
as a CIA employee and Attachment C is his signed
secrecy agreement.
Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr.
John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which
shows that he was aware that he would be denied as
an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from
the date he entered on duty through the date of his
departure. Attachment E is a personal letter
received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that
his name might be released in connection with
declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is
Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement. It should
be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.
Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)
written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the
Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr.
Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in
his SAE and understands disclosure of other
information would be in violation of his secrecy
'
2
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's signed
secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr.
Palmer resides in Mexico.
5. Our relationship with cover providers would be
jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing
cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well
raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing
importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of
private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector
would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if
we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert
relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency
operations which in turn could severely damage national security.
In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities
and substantial monetary damages.
6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's
regulation on cover. It states that "cover is required for all
Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including
personnel in PCS or TDY status." HR 240-2, the Agency's
regulation on cover after separation, states that “the
determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his
or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon
the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in
damage to the national security by compromising intelligence
sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm
to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-
by-case basis.". Please note that all Agency employees who retire
abroad must retire under cover.
1
7. Release of names of former employees who separated under
cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and
detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct
sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the
Agency's mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK
Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for
public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true
names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents
in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from
our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage
that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk
officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish
the impact of the documents.
3
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
.
SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
8. After your review and consideration of the above
information, we would appreciate notification of your final
decision prior to taking any action.
Attachments:
As stated above
.CONCUR:
Christine W. Wiley
Associate Deputy Director for
Operations/Human Resources
and Programs
Eric L. Qualkenbush
DEC 08 1995
Date
David N. Eqyer
DEC 08 1995
Associate Deputy Director for
Operations
Date.
4
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET'
SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias:lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)
Distribution:
-
Orig & 1 JFK Assassination Records Review Board
1
1
1
-
-
IMS/HRS
ADDO
ADDO/HRP
2 DDO Secretariat
1
-
DO/IRO
1 - OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani
1
-
OCC Chron
1
1
-
- OCC/OSG Chron
OCC/OSG File 785-120-034
5
SECRET
13-00000
1
DEC 11 '95 11:14AM
To:
Fax:
Mr. Burry Harrelson
(703) 351-2114
Subject:
December meeting
Date:
December 11, 1995
Pages:
3, including this cover sheet.
P.1
FAX
COMMENTS:
The types of information that the Board needs to know about each of the true names on
the attached Hut for which CIA seeks continued protection are listed below:
1. Is the individual a current or former CIA employee? If so, in what capacity
did that individual serve, and did he or she serve overtly or covertly? If
currently a retired CIA employee, did the individual retire under cover?
2. If not a CIA officer, did the Individual serve CIA as an agent or asset or in any
other capacity?
3. Is the individual alive or dead? If alive, where is he or she residing, and what
is his or her current activity?
4. What specific and compelling danger would release of this individual's truc
name pose to him or her at this time?
Of course, you do not need to do anything other than identify those individuals whose
true names CIA no longer seeks to protect.
- Secret Attachment-
-
From the deck of...
Noelle G. Gray
Technical Assistant for Reach and Analysis
Assassination Recorda Review Board
800, NW, Second Floor
Washington, DC. 20530
(302) 784-0088
Fat (209) 704-0457.
13.00000
DEC 11 '95 11:18AM
W.L. O'Brien.
104-10017-10042
F.N.U. Parten
Riefe
104-10015-10163
104-10016-10006
Bonnie Raush
104-10015-10138
Dave Reardon
SECRET
Dr. Stanojevic
104-10017-10001
Boria Tarasoff
104-10095-10001
Pelegrin Tomas
104-10018-10062
R.T. Walsh
104-10015-10386
(Same as Mr. Walsh in
104-10017-10035?)
P.1
104-10095-10001
Milly Rodrigues.
104-10095-10001
Jane Roman
104-10015-10163
Tom Ryan
104-10018-10096
D.W. Schroeder
T. Ward
104-10004-10257
Franklin Anthony Wheelock Garcia
104-10015-10192
Zeitner Rick
104-10017-10056
i
104-10017-10042
Forrest Shivers
104-10017-10031
Mr. Snight
104-10015-10)143
Mr. Swenson
104-10015-10233
Swider
104-10015-10298
SECRET
13-00000
VEL &
כל
P.2
SECRET
NAMES WHICHI CIA CONTINUES TO PROTECT IN DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR
THE DECEMBER 12-13; 1995 ARRB MEETING
Charlotte Aburg
Charlie Flick
104-10018-10089
Anderson
104-10095-10001
Ray Brewer
104-10015-10001
Peter Baranoweld
104-10016-10013
104-10095-10001
. Grady
104-10015-10043
Godiner
104-10017-10052
John Harvey
104-10015-10158
Brogdon
Hutchinson
104-10016-10033
Baquero
104-10017-10052
104-10015-10396
Leona Cotter
104-10018-10062
William Johnson
("Johnson" released in 104-10015-
10375)
104-10018-10099
Jim Jung
Dasinti
104-10017-10002
104-10018-10062
Tom Keenan
Duncan
104-10095-10001
104-10015-10043
Pam Lea
DeSanti
104-10015-10160
104-10018-10062
Mullery
D'Alato
104-10015-10110
104-10015-10305
Manell
P.L. Dilloa
104-10015-10339
104-10017-10042
Anne McDonnell
104-10015-10155
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT (Optional)
oposed CIA Name Release
FROM: Elaine Mathias
DC OCC/OSG
6B4403 OHB
TO:
DATE
EXTENSION
3.7076
95
C/OSG
684403
Barry
DC/OCC
Gibson
6B4401 OHB
13. Eric L. Qualkenbush
C/OCC
6B4401 OHB
FORWARDED
√2791
리
ENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
a line across column after each comment.
1 Please call Lisa for
at x32429
EMS/HRS
Records Review Board)
DDO Secretariat
7F27 OHB
Christine W
ADDO HRP
7E17 OHB
David N. Edger
ADDO
7E30 OHB
10 OCC/OSG
6B4403 OHB
13.
14.
1-79
DEC 07 1995
us
610 (EF)
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
OCC-95-149
07 DEC 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board
VIA:
Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human
Resources and Programs
FROM:
Eric L. Qualkenbush
SUBJECT:
Chief, Office of Central Cover
Proposed CIA Name Release
1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of
individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or
separated employees. As described below, this action would
breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work
under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover
providers.
2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon
entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the
employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not
been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the
employee to protect such information from unauthorized
disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in
force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities
of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.
3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well
as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency
policy to protect the names of former employees who have
separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually
agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees
who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,
Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire
Agency career as well as into their years after separation from
the Agency, jeopardizes:
the personal safety of former employees;
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
CL 0489932
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-87
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
•
the second careers of former employees;
4.
• the cover and identity of other employees who worked
with the covert employee whose name is released as
CIA; and,
the protection of sources and methods (what
individual would agree to a clandestine relationship
with American intelligence knowing the secret
association would become public knowledge?).
Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will
affect individuals follows:
•
•
Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State
cover and is currently working in Russia and several
Eastern European countries for a private firm which
converts "wartime" factories into peacetime use.
Revealing his name would damage his relationship
with his current employer, his position with the
firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host
countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's
acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied
as a CIA employee and Attachment. C is his signed.
secrecy agreement.
Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr.
John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which
shows that he was aware that he would be denied as
an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from
the date he entered on duty through the date of his
departure. Attachment E is a personal letter
received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that
his name might be released in connection with
declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is
Mr. Whitten's signed secrecy agreement. It should
be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.
Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)
written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the
Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr.
Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in
his SAE and understands disclosure of other
information would be in violation of his secrecy
2
SECRET

13-000,00
SECRET
SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer's signed
secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr.
Palmer resides in Mexico.
5. Our relationship with cover providers would be
jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing
cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well
raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing
importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of
private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector
would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if
we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert
relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency
operations which in turn could severely damage national security.
In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities
and substantial monetary damages.
6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency's
regulation on cover. It states that "cover is required for all
Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including
personnel in PCS or TDY status." HR 240-2, the Agency's.
regulation on cover after separation, states that “the
determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his
or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon
the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in
damage to the national security by compromising intelligence
sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm
to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-
by-case basis.” Please note that all Agency employees who retire
abroad must retire under cover.
7. Release of names of former employees who separated under
cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and
detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct
sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the
Agency's mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK
Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for
public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true
names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents
in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from
our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage
that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk
officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish
the impact of the documents.
3
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board.
8.. After your review and consideration of the above
information, we would appreciate notification of your final
decision prior to taking any action.
Eu Qualtenbril
Eric L. Qualkenbush
Attachments:
As stated above
CONCUR:
сили
Associate Deputy Director for
Operations/Human Resources
and Programs
8 Dec '95
Date
Daniil
Eury
Associate Deputy Director for
Operations
8 XII 95
Date
4
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board
DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias:lae/37076. (6 Dec 95)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 JFK Assassination Records Review Board
1
1
1
2
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
IMS/HRS
- ADDO
ADDO/HRP
DDO Secretariat
DO/IRO
1 - OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani
1
-
OCC Chron
-
OCC/OSG Chron
- OCC/OSG File 785-120-034
5
SECRET
13-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)
SECRECY OATH
John M. Whitten
,
I,
am about to terminate my association
with the Central Intelligence Agency. I realize that, by virtue of my duties
with that Agency, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which
concerns the present and future security of the United States of America..
I am
aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the
Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794), and by the National Security Act of
1947 which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOL-
LOWS:
1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, cr
otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and
particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, meth-
ods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence Agency operations,
sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, in-
cluding but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private
citizen, or other Government employee or official without the express written
consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.
2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims which I
may have against CIA or the United States Government which may in any way neces-
sitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that
any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however,
that I am not satisfied with the decisions of CIA concerning any present or
future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satis-
faction without prior written notice to CIA, and then only in accordance with
such legal and security advice as CIA will promptly furnish me.
3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified
or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of
the Central Intelligence Agency, having come into my possession as a result of
my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, or otherwise.
4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the
Central Intelligence Agency I have been given an opportunity to report all in-
formation about the Agency, its personnel, and its operations which I consider
should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information,
which it is my duty in the national interest to disclose to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which
I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this
sheet or on other attachments.
FORM
4-62
305
USE PREVIOUS
EDITION.
CONFIDENTIAL
(12)
13-00000
SECRET
SECRECY AGREEMENT
1. I, JOHN M. WHITTEN, understand that by virtue of my duties in the
Central Intelligence Group, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence
which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which be-
longs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the
methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set
in the State, War, and Navy Departments. I have read and understand the pro-
visions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended,
concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I
am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.
2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest,
title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of
collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by
virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Group, but shall always
recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such
mat ters.
3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either
by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence
or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance
with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in
each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.
4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve
me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will
remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United
Stated.
5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Group is
conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security
Regulations CIG," and the appendices thereto.
6 I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.
?
In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 22ndday of AUGUST 1947
Sworn to before me this 22ndday of
at
(711)
hashgh, DS.
Wh
дави жобала
John M. Witten) 
(Soul)
August 2947
SECRET
R.
Ревека Д. 
Дайва
Доловы
My Commission Expires March 22, 1961
13-00000
To Bert Mille:
I object violently. To the revelation of very naime
regardless of the leer, Here
are some reasons:
1. I emigrated to Austra twice, first in 1971 and again
in 1983. 
Both time I 
had to fill out and swear to lengthy
retired State cover
forms 
about 
my background. I used
my
Twice understan
bolle times, thereby committing pegion wither might have been
ald friends in high
laur
My
able to protect me have all retired or, even more, dill.
Pristian justice is notorionally immutable. Do
"go to fail?
да
3.
you
want me
Luving suice retirement in Austin from 1971 * 1950
and from 1983 to the present, I have achieved brigh
positions in varis musical bodies, Board of Directors
The Johan Strauss occity and Dive President 
of
-personally.
the Purina Mim Singing Society, and I own
brown to several recent austan Presidents may
reportion and radio figures. I suffered a disabling stroke
in December 1993 and my wife and I both 75% con
continue to exist here because our 2000 sq. ft. apartment
is withing walking distance of 2 post offices, several small
our dentist,
my
my family physician,
doctor and optician. Ple
within wheel how distance of the concert halls and
super mbrete
urologist, and c
eye
"Where can you
22
the
opera.
3. During my
Broke
I interrogated and
duplicati
This for me?
Visaro
cine
acture correer in Vies around 1959
an
intelliguce swindler who,
had been a Nazi assassin. I promised him secrory of he
confessed, but the US Army put out a burn notres.
m
he
him, forcing b
would love to find
4.
Vierina
is
more
Geomorny.
me and short me.
I am some
full of Islamic terrorists. There have
13-00000
REFERENCE
beln several assassination of a city councelinan, biz
thes in recent years. Under Austrian law, I
foreigner, can not even get a pistol liccuse. You must kin
about the kidnapping and killing if our colleagues
around the world.
4. I have time testified before House and Sanat
committer about the Kennedy assasination Their full
reports simply called on the "
desk officer" and that h
seemed to satisfy every will not even talk
Needle to say,
do expose my name,
journalist
5. If my
say, if you
any
on so-called historians.
names in exposed, I will obviously have
& leave Sienna, with the whole 
house full
fumitur, picture, library, clothing, etc. 
which 
of packed
and
paid to have moved over 
here in 1983, Became
of my stroke, I will be unable to do 
any packing 
and
the more will be 
very expensive. Where can I
resillte in an 2000 sq ft
. apt. so
located.
6.
My wife and
and leaving would be a
7.
convonimitly
here for many
жани,
I love living here for
a cruel and needton fate.
джді
reg 
and this low as dishonorable and
unworthy of the United States of Cingin. If you
decide against me, I want to app the Board and
eventhe President, whored 
happen to admine. I will
bank to do so, I served 
in 
WWII
"own way book 
to do,
pay my
ipple a
and newer spared myself; in the output I worked hard,
my sypanion (Cord Meyer
fearless in 
dealing with
and Dick Helm can 
testify 
to that) and
Waz
my
adversariz.
I woresdn't even think of threatening to expose things
I will be 
employing
to pressure
pressure
or two, familiar with
I will not deny,
our
an attorney
office, to represent na..
consider you
that I consider
every one else implementing
and
this law to be
engaging in dishonable condunt, unworthing of
our government service,
13-00000
8 In the late 1960's while serving in Verminder.
Tom Kramessines, I was
andered by HQ &
-reveal to Austrian Military artilagine that a low-
rambing Austrian diplomat serving in their informat
in Budapest had also been recounted by
was
* 1026.
I refused
t
offered my resignation.
reporting
cord and offered
dishonorable to betray
accepted
a
his and
out thin
it was
young agent who had
in our..
willen.
our recentment and put forth
promise of secrecy. To my mind an agency
principles can not survive and indeed should
not survive. Tom Karassmen, perhaps
the last honorable men to serve with
onc
کا
us in ligh
proition, frill a strong cald liath and the shameful
order was retracted,
q
I have inverted about $50, as in my
Printment, as key money and improvements.
I leave,
last move
اجو
I will lose all or most of this. -
to Vine cast me about $15,00d in
*
freight and insurance. I will never get on my
knees and ash to be made whole if you expose me
resort to the courts. I am a retired
sex
but may
member of the Virginia Bara
10. Let me
regale you
لا
with an example of how
the historian's mindless down to know everything can
lead to a proud country's designing itself. During
WWII when we
were
4
bang
interrogating German Pows, we
promied them no one would ever learn the bind
" spilled their
"gut, and we all believed are were
honest. But about 25
5 years after WWII the British
de classified all the ADI(K) reports (that's what the
called, and liven
evere
.
the room
"room conversations, transcript
13-00000
office
་
of the conversation POWs had in their rooms,
even including the extremely valuable speicher
make by high-ranking Luftwaffe restors.
high-ranking fellow Pows at "Confor
mansion. Newcomere were vetted by the old
hande for a month
a month 
to make sure
pigeons, before they
addressing their fellow officer
They werent steel
were given the powitage 6.
on some important
one
Luftwaffe
aspect of the war. The excellent brithish mikes picked
it all up recent years, at
years, at 
least
veteran association, that of J.G. 2, The Richthofe
+ London to get
Geschwader, sent people
copsis of the interrogation reports of their pilots, they
did it chronologically and were so shocked at
the vast armant of vital data wiki by their
bidden that, in acinto revulsin, they stoppe
I assumed them that "
looking.
tacked, which is tome
་་
11, J
on my
75
янзы
old party paralyzed
left side from stroke in alec. 1993.
in May
I was nearly fully rehabilitated whem, in
1994, I was hit by
пр
and doron
my
com
चक्ल
magde spo
left side. This rather rare
ponum 
all.
condition, basicitly a sudden super toyhtey
I all the muscle, with after effects lasting unt
have made it increasingly
"The next spor
difficult for me to stand my,
20 many medica
are
walk, or even sit
for
inp
th
very
long.
In a few clays, when all
medicines.
here will begin
for
specialist here.. I can't
Every
well leave
homeopathic cure for the spasum
under Dr. Schrammn, a leading
13-00000
You will be contacted momenting b
I will 
also be in touch with 
my
attorneys.
Com and
Senator
With bitter resolve,
D
пу
довчи
John M. While

13-00000
SECRET
INTELLIGENCE
..
NAME (Last, first, middle)
RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING
WHITTEN, John Moss
GRADE & STEP/
65-1615
RETIREMENT
RESIGNATION
LWOP
AGENCY JOB TITLE
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
FORM
213-12-1338
STAFF OR DIVISION
CCS FILE NO.
FI/OPS
VOUCHERED FUNDS
3562
UNVOUCHERED FUNDS
22 aug 1947
35" July
LAST WORKING DAY
70
AGENCY EOD
3102
SF-2801
ATTACHED
DATE(S)
3
July 1970
FROM
lang 47
May 48
CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY INCLUDING OVERT PERIODS (include both domestic and overseas assignments)
AREA OF ASSIGNMENT
DATE
то
COUNTRY
May 48 Washington
Sept 52
Sept 52 Mar 55
Mar 55 oct 55
10 at 55 July 60
July 60 Mar 62
Mar 12 189μ70
1940170
Germany
CITY
D.C.
Washington Dic.
austria
COVER
DAC
DAC
DAC
Vienna
t
austria
Vienna
DAC
State
Seoul
State
Washington D.c.
Dici
State
Washington D.C.
State
Korea
NOMINAL
INTEGRATED
in Freed
PLACE
No
FORM 2554 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
5-70
EDITIONS
.
CIA IS A MATTER OF RECORD AT (include acknowledgement by OP)
DATE USED
SECRET
PLACE
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
DATE USED
(4 9-12-21)
13-00000
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS
SECRET
U.S..
OVERSEAS
CIVIL SERVICE
CIA
GOVERNMENT
NONGOVERNMENT
RETIREMENT
FOREIGN TRAVEL PLANS
Plans to reside Vienna, austra
OTHER (specify)
SENSITIVE. SPECIAL. OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS
LIST RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY CIA
EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED
EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN
DECLARED
COMPROMISED
CREDIT BUREAU RECORDS INDICATE
MEDALLION
INTELLIGENCE MEDAL
OTHER (specify)
COVER BRIEFING
ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT
CIA AWARDS
CERTIFICATE OF DISTINCTION
LENGTH OF SERVICE CERT.
Hopterund in ces fie
AGENCY
NONAGENCY
DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT. USE INSTRUCTIONS AS OUTLINED BELOW
ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED BELOW
THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY ON PAGE 1 IS THE ACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE. THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW IS THE COVER
STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AGENCY EMPLOYMENT.
DATE
FROM
TO
AREA
OF ASSIGNMENT
TYPE OF
COVER
aug 47 May 48 Washington DAC
May 48 Sept 52 Germany DAC
COVER ORGANIZATION
JOB TITLE
Sept 52 Mar 55 Washington DAC
mur 55 Oct 55 austria DAC
100t55 July 60
"Wa
tia Ont
State
July 60 Mar 62 -Korea
Mar 62/18 cpt 70 Washington t
Int
State
att.
Pol off.
Pol. Off
State
194ph 70
Washington SECRET State-
Prosent officin 2-
13-00000
TYPE HEALTH INSURANCE CARD ISSUED
LIFE INSURANCE
CONVERT
WILL NOT CONVERT
SECRET
OTHER (specify)
AGE
GEHA
NACS
OTHER (specify)
FEGLI
WAEPA
UBLIC
DEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I acknowledge that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on the date
noted below and do understand that I will be
Denied
as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date I entered on duty through
the date of departure in accordance with instructions as outlined above.
I have been informed as to the employment references applicable in my case.
REMARKS
CCS/OCM
15 July 1970
te
SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICER
FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY
John
COORDINATION
CCS/ocs
ccs/oco
SECRET
M. Whiller
SIGNATURE
CCS/NC
13-00000
TAX BRIEFING SUMMARY
BANKING INSTRUCTIONS
SECRET
N.A.
N.A.
FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER
BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
☑
DATE
YES
NO
DATE
"
NOTIFY OFFICE OF FINANCE TO. HANDLE THE CSC COMPUTATION FORMS IN A COVERT
MANNER FOR BLOCKING RECORDS AT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
YES
NO
"
OBTAIN REFUND OF CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT FUNDS IN A COVERT MANNER
IV
RETURN OF CHARD FUNDS FROM CSC
V APPLICATION TO PURCHASE CSC CREDITS
DATE
YES
NO
OVERT
COVERT
OVERT
COVERT
VI CREDIT UNION OUERRIED
FORWARDING ADDRESS
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE
NEW EMPLOYMENT ADDRESS
IDENTITY AND ADDRESS OF EMERGENCY CONTACT
YES
NO
IF SUBJECT HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE DID SUBJECT USE?
HAS SUBJECT BEEN QUESTIONED TO ASSURE HE OR SHE DID NOT USE AGENCY PERSONNEL FOR REFERENCE
SUBJECT
HAS
YES
NO
HAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.
IF BACKSTOPPING IS NECESSARY GIVE REASON
ANNUITY PAYMENT TO BE CHANNELED BY
was under cover forentire period of employment.
Plan to deride abroad after retiremenſ
GREEN CHECK
BANK TRANSFER
NOC
CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS
SUMMARY OF
DATE RECEIVED
AGENCY EMPLOYMENT
MEDICAL RECORDS
WILL REQUEST
SHOULD NOTICE OF RESIGNATION BE RESTRICTED INHOUSE
1099 MAILING INSTRUCTIONS
SECRET
WILL NOT REQUEST
DATE APPROVED
SOCIAL SECURITY CREDITS
YES
NO
13-00000
SECURITY REMINDER
70978
Walter C. McCabe
1. I,
have been reminded
that, by virtue of my duties with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I have been the recipient of classified information and
information concerning intelligence sources and methods, and
that my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement requires me to pro-
tect such data. Moreover, I have been given an opportunity to
review my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement.
2. I have also been reminded that I am not permitted to
retain any documents or other materials which are the property
of the CIA or the custodial responsibility of CIA, and I affirm
that I do not have in my possession, nor am I taking away from
CIA any such documents or materials.
3. Finally, I am aware of my responsibility to notify the
CIA promptly in the event I am called upon by properly constituted
authorities to testify or provide information that I am pledged
not to disclose and I will advise said authority of my secrecy
agreement and request that my obligation to testify be established
before I am required to do so.
Witness:
Brothe
Signature
Jagua
29 Feb. 1980
Date
FORM
2-77
305
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
Signature
Feby
23 & 1980
Date
1
13-00000
SECRECY AGREEMENT
(print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my
being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of
the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Central Intelligence Agency"),
the obligations contained in this agreement.
2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be
given access to information which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12065 as
amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive Order, and other information which, if disclosed in an unauthorized
manner, would jeopardize foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by being granted
access to such information I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect the
information from unauthorized disclosure.
3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I.
hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner any of the following categories of information or
materials, to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency to receive them:
a. information which is classified pursuant to Executive Order and which I have obtained during the course of my
employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency;
b. information, or materials which reveal information, classifiable pursuant to Executive Order and obtained by me
in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency but which, because of
operational circumstance or oversight, is not formally marked as classified in accordance with such Executive Order
and which I know or have reason to know has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency;
c. information obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence
Agency that identifies any person or organization that presently has or formerly has had a relationship with a United
States foreign intelligence organization, which relationship the United States Government has taken affirmative
measures to conceal...
4. I understand that the burden will be upon me to learn whether information or materials within my control are
considered by the Central Intelligence Agency to fit the descriptions set forth in paragraph 3, and whom the Agency has
authorized to receive it.
5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I
hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency all information or materials including works of fiction
which contain any mention of intelligence data or activities, or contain data which may be based upon information
classified pursuant to Executive Order, which I contemplate disclosing publicly or which I have actually prepared for public
disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter,
prior to discussing it with or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to it. I further agree that I will not
take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence
Agency.
6. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an
opportunity to determine whether the information or materials which I contemplate disclosing publicly contain any
information which I have agreed not to disclose. I further understand that the Agency will act upon the materials I submit
and make a response to me within a reasonable time.
7. I understand that all information or materials which I may acquire in the course of my employment or other service
with the Central Intelligence Agency which fit the descriptions set out in paragraph 3 of this agreement are and will remain
the property of the United States Government. I agree to surrender all materials reflecting such information which may
have come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of my employment or other service with the Central
Intelligence Agency, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of
my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.
8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or
congressional authorities to testify about, or provide, information which I have agreed herein not to disclose.
9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities which I
consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President or to any
successor body which the President may establish. I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such
matters to the attention of the Agency's Inspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. I further understand
that any information which I may report to the Intelligence Oversight Board continues to be subject to this agreement for all
other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information.
FORM
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
9.79 368 EDITIONS
13-00000
1. I,
RESTRICTED
SECRECY AGREEMENT
WALTER CASSAH MCCABE
70978
understand that by virtue of my duties in
the Central Intelligence Agency, I may be the recipient of information and intel-
ligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and
which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together
with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to
security standards set by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have read and under-
stand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as
amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense
and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.
2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest,
title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of
collecting or. handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by
virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, but shall always
recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such
matters.
3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either
by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence
or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance
with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in
each case by the Director of Central Intelligence,
4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve
me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will
remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United
States.
5. I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Agency is
conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regula-
tions CIA", and the appendices thereto.
6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or pur-
pose of evasion.
In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this
11th day of FEBRUARY 19.53
16th
Halter
C.
(Seal)
Swal
_day of Jes. 19 53
Witnessed by me this 16
WASHINGTON, D. C.
at
FORM NO. 38-33
OCT 1950
Ревеса Д. Vanglar
RESTRICTED
13-00000
AE (Last, First, Middle)
SECRET
RETIREMENT AND RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING
Mc Cabe, Walter
20 august 28
ADE & STEP SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
EMPLOYEE NO.
R-9274
C
061360
AGENCY EOD
515 445-20-9032 167eb 53
Х
RETIREMENT
CIA ☐ CSC
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT PLANS
REIGN TRAVEL PLANS
RESIGNATION
CIA
CSC
U.S.
OVERSEAS
кн
☑
STAFF OR DIVISION
CCS FILE NO.
STAFF
6353
CONTRACT
OVERT
Doo/Pes
☑
COVERT
LAST WORKING DAY
2/29/80
LWOP
SEPARATION,DATE
2/29/80
MATERNITY LEAVE
DATE OF
DATE OF RETURN
✗ GOVERNMENT =
Contract
NONGOVERNMENT.
TOY's to Western Europe)
on contract-
NSITIVE. SPECIAL. OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS
EMPLOYEE HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED OR COMPROMISED
EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN
DECLARED
BACKSTOPPING IS NECESSARY GIVE REASON
COMPROMISED (specify)
COVER BRIEFING
ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT
DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT, FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS OUTLINED BELOW
ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED BELOW
E EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW IS THE COVER STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE AGENCY.
DATE
FROM
AREA
TO
OF ASSIGNMENT
71653
Aug 64
Rug64
F16 80
TYPE OF
COVER
DAC
State
COVER ORGANIZATION
JOB TITLE
USE PREVIOUS
(4-9-12-21)
2554
EDITIONS
SECRET WNSISM
E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 011180
13-00000
SECRET
FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER
BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
BLOCK CREDIT RECORDS
BLOCK TELEPHONE LOCATOR RECORDS
ISSUE 1.0. CARD
PREPARE
✓ FORM 1551
TYPE: Return
W-2. FORM
X
TYPE: State
x.
EFFECTIVE DATE
YES
NO
EOD /72653
EFFECTIVE DATE
YES
NO
EOD
YES
NO
EOD
HOSPITALIZATION INS. CARD
☑
TYPE: AGE
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE
IF EMPLOYEE HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE WAS USED?
SUBJECT
HAS
MAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION. IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.
RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY CIA (name and relationship)
None:
DEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I certify that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on this date and I
understand that:
I will be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in.
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Cover Briefing Section above.
☑ I will not be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
I have been informed of the employment reference
REMARKS
25 Jun 1980
• Pall teko strip
DATE
ID # 189485, 9-11-78,
SHE: 1570b80
Returning
immid
contract
in
Jile: IPC
сар 1985-
applicable in my case.
U. C
Mn. Che
SIGNATURE
Retirement addrive:
i Local of
2401 "H" ST. NW
Wash, DC
CCS/OCB/M
CCS/OCB/S
CCS/DFB
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICER
You this Hill
'
COORDINATION
CCS/CCB
CCS/COB
SECRET
COMPONENT
CCS/CT.
Cenco 3-03-80
CCS/CSB
DATE
2-25-80
13-00000
DEC 07 '95 11:54AM
1. I.
SECRECY AGREEMENT
P.3/3
(print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my
being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of the
Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Central Intelligence Agency"), the obligations
contained in this agreement.
2. I understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be
given access to information or material that is classified or is in the process of a classification determination in accordance
with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 as amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive order, that if
disclosed in an unauthorized manner would jeopardize intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by
being granted access to such information or material I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become
obligated to protect the information and/or material from unauthorized disclosure.
3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I
hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner, to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence
Agency to receive it, any information or material in either of the following categories:
a. information or material received or obtained in the course of my employment or other service with the Central
Intelligence Agency that is marked as classified or that I know is classified;
b. information or material received or obtained in the course of my employment or other service with the Central
Intelligence Agency that I know is in the process of a classification determination.
4. I understand that it is my responsibility to consult with appropriate management Authorities in the component or
Directorate that employs me or has retained my services, or with the Central Intelligence Agency's Publications Review Board
if I am no longer employed by or associated with the Agency, in order to ensure that I know 1) whether information or material
within my knowledge or control that I have reason to believe might be in either of ✓ categories set forth in paragraph 3 is
fit in either of those categories whom the Agency has authorized to
receive such information or material.
considered by the Central Intelligencence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I here-
5. As a further condition of the special
by agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency any ing or other preparation in any form, including a
work of fiction, which contains any mention on intelligence data or activities or contains any other information or material that
might be based upon either of the categories set forth in paragraph 8. that contemonts disclosing publicly or that I have
actually prepared for public disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or
at any time thereafter, prior to discussing it with or showing it to anyone who is not authorised to have access to the categories
set forth in paragraph 3. I further agree that I will not take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written
permission to do sofrom the Central Intelligence Agency.
6. I understand that the purpose of the review described in paragraph is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an
opportunity to dine whether the information or material that I contemplate disclosing publicly contains any information
or material that I move agreed not to disclose I further understand that the Agency will act upon my submission and make a
response to me with reasonable time. I further understand that if I dispute the Agency's initial determination on the basis
that the information of material in question derives from public sources, I may be called upon to specifically identify such
sources. My failure or refusal to do so may by itself result in denial of permission to publish or otherwise disclose the information
or material in dispute
7. I understand that all information or material that I may gequire in the course of my Employment or other service with
the Central Intelligence Agency that fits either of the categories set forth in paragraph 3.6 this agreement are and will remain
the property of the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an appropriate official or final ruling
of a court of law. I agree to surrender anything constituting, containing or reflecting such information or material upon demand
by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of my employment or other service with
the Central Intelligence Agency.
8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or con-
gressional authorities, or by specially established investigatory bodies of the executive branch, to testify about, or provide, in-
formation or material that I have agreed herein not to disclose. In any communication with any such authority or body, I shall
observe all applicable rules or procedures for ensuring that such information and/or material is handled in a secure manner.
9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities that I con-
sider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President, or to any successor
body that the President may establish, or to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Senate.
I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the attention of the Agency's Inspector
General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. In making any report referred to in this paragraph. I will observe all applicable.
rules or procedures for ensuring the secure handling of any information or material that may be involved. I understand that
any such information or material continues to be subject to this agreement for all other purposes and that such reporting does
not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information or material.
FORM
10-91 368
BEY
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

13-00000 DEC 07 195 11:53AM
P.213
10. I understand that any breach of this agreement by me may result in the Central Intelligence Agency taking admin-
istrative action against me, which can include temporary loss of pay or termination of my employment or other service with
the Central Intelligence Agency. I also understand that if I violate the terms of this agreement, the United States Government
may institute a civil proceeding to seek compensatory damages or other appropriate relief. Further, I understand that the
disclosure of information that I have agreed herein not to disclose can, in some circumstances, constitute a criminal offense.
11. I understand that the United States Government may, prior to any unauthorized disclosure that is threatened by me,
choose to apply to any appropriate court for an order enforcing this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver
on the part of the United States to institute a civil or criminal proceeding for any breach of this agreement by me. Nothing in
this agreement constitutes a wavier on my part of any possible defenses I may have in connection with either civil or criminal
proceedings that may be brought against me.
12. In addition to any other remedy to which the United States Government may become entitled, I hereby assign to the
United States Government all rights, title, and interest in any and all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted
or will result or may result from any divulgence, publication or revelation of information or material by me that is carried out
in breach of paragraph 5 of this agreement or that involves information or material prohibited from disclosure by the terms of
this agreement.
13. I understand and accept that, unless I am provided a written release from this agreement or any portion of it by the
Director of Central Intelligence or the Director's representative, all the conditions and obligations accepted by me in this agree-
ment apply both during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, and at all times thereafter.
14. I understand that the purpose of this agreement is to implement the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, particularly the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods, as specified in the National Security Act of
1947, as amended.
15. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations
rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to
Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing
disclosure to Congress by members of the Military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5. United States Code, as amended by the
Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C., 421 er seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential
Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including
section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950
(50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive
Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.
16. I understand that nothing in this agreement limits or otherwise affects any provision of criminal or other law that
may be applicable to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the espionage laws (sections 793, 794 and
798 of Title 18, United States Code) and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-200; 50 U.S.C., 421 er
seq.).
17. Each of the numbered paragraphs and lettered subparagraphs of this agreement is severable. If a court should find
any of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of this agreement to be unenforceable. I understand that all remaining provisions will
continue in full force.
18. I make this agreement in good faith, and with no purpose of evasion.
19. This agreement shall be interpreted under and in conformance with the law of the United States.
Signature
Date
The execution of this agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who accepted it on behalf of the Central Intelligence
Agency as a prior condition of the employment or other service of the person whose signature appears above.
WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:
Signature
Printed Name
Date