157-10002-10152
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Date: 10/05/93
Page: 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10002-10152
RECORDS SERIES :
INTERVIEW SUMMARY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
INTERVIEW WITH SAM PAPICH
DATE: 05/29/75
PAGES: 21
SUBJECTS :
PAPICH
FBI
CIA
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
CUBA
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
CASTRO
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
Box 256
Folder 4
COMMENTS :
NW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 1
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
INTERVIEW WITH:
REGARDING:
DATE-TIME-LOCATION:
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Sam Papich
SECRET
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
May 29, 1975; 9 a.m.; Carroll Arms
PRESENT: morning:
John ELLIFF, Mike Epstein, John Bayly
afternoon: John ELLIFF, Burt Wides, John Bayly
HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:
FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:
TOP SCOP
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):
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REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 5/5/9483
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RELEASE IN PART
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EXECUTIVE SESSION:
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NW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 2
SECRET
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
SECRET
Page 1 of 21
Papich began with a brief summary of his experi-
ence in the FBI. During World War II and there-
after he ran certain operations in Latin America.
In 1945-47, he ran counterintelligence operations
in Brazil against the Communist Party of Brazil
and bloc intelligence agents. In 1952 he became
FBI liaison with CIA charged with coordinating
and planning, including the development of sources.
He also had special assignments overseas for Hoover.
Papich presented the following overview of the
issues. He has a high respect and regard for the
Soviet intelligence service, its efficiency, and
effectiveness. He must be shown that their
philosophy has changed since 1970.
The pro
SECRET
ample,
be-
bructure.
new defectors
Lowing that the
of the U. S. intelligence community rece
KGB and GRU is very limited. In 1958
the U. S. intelligence community had
lieved was good information on
This had to be readily revi
and new operations succeede
premises were false. Papion stated "they've taken
us to the cleaners in the last few years". There
is no estimate of how many Soviet illegals are in
the United States. The old view was that illegals
would aim at middle-class government and business
positions. It has been discovered that they take
jobs like dishwasher to develop an employment
background. There is no knowledge of Soviet
objectives. Illegals may do nothing for years so
they can be tapped for the future. There may be
100, 500, or 5,000 of them. Some were sent in as
early as the 20's and 30's. They are the Rudolph
Abel-type. His network was never identified.
Therefore, Papich is clearly unhappy with U. S.
results in identifying Soviet operations in the
United States.
Papich stated that he played a controversial
"devil's advocate" role between the FBI and the
CIA. He did not confer with Attorney General
Mitchell after Helms called his name to Mitchell's
attention. Papich assumes Helms wanted Mitchell
to get a review of the history of FBI-CIA relations.
Papich would not have gone to Mitchell without
checking with other FBI officials.
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FILE:
FBI into
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.
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page 2 of 21
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FILE:
To understand decisions in 1966 or 1970 it is
necessary to go back to World 
War II, according
to Papich. President 
Roosevelt got the FBI into
the foreign intelligence 
field in World War II.
Overnight the FBI had 
to generate the capability
to move into Latin America 
against the German
espionage operation which 
included business 
covers,
radio networks, and 
influence in Latin American
governments. The FBI had 
no precedent or guidance
.
Assistant FBI Director 
Hugh Klegg conferred with
FBI agents
the British in London 
for assistance.
went into Latin America first 
under 
business covers,
then in the embassies, which 
was thin cover.
legal attaches established 
official liaison 
wi
local authorities. The 
FBI's role was prima
counterintelligence but some 
positive int
was gathered about the 
stability of
Mog
FBI agents learned on the job.
headquarters was ridiculous until
were reported back.
The OSS ran operations i
as Latin America.
The
from
periences
TOP SECR
Donova a
operations in the United States.
by Donald Downs.
and Asia as well
ran undercover
See the book
OSS had a very close relation-
The British also ran
No
ship with MI 5 and MI 6.
operations in the United States in 1939-41.
They saw the FBI as 
neophytes.
one knows how many.
The 
British
knowing little about the business.
developed closer relations 
to OSS 
than to FBI.
At first, Donovan and Hoover were friendly but
Hoover received complaints 
of OSS operations 
in
the United States, for 
example, the OSS bugging
☐ Other complaints came 
from
of the Spanish Embassy
.
The friction between Hoover 
and
Latin America.
Donovan is important background for Hoover's view
Donovan 
would recruit persons regard-
of the CIA.
less of their background if he thought 
they had
the capability to penetrate 
the access.
use of Communists "
shook the hell" out 
of Hoover,
as did OSS discussions in 
Moscow of cooperation
Hoover 
would never work with
with the NKVD.
Hoover saw CIA roots in OSS
.
Communists.
The OSS
Papich
stressed that OSS had some great people, extremely
capable and dedicated, 
but OSS had an element that
Hoover would never buy.
IB (FBI)
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JO
14
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
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FILER
SECRET
In 1943-45, the government began looking toward
a worldwide intelligence system. The alternatives
were the military', OSS, State, and FBI. FDR
allegedly assured Hoover that he would be respon-
sible for setting up the post-war system. Papich
never saw any documents showing that Hoover wanted
this job. The Latin American operation was
successful but Hoover never understood or had a
feel for the problems. He felt insecure. He never
traveled outside the U. S., and only saw things
from Washington, D. C.
Under President Truman, Hoover did not have a
"warm" relationship with the President. When the
Central Intelligence group was formed and the 1947
Act drafted, Hoover's attitute was mistrust and
lack of confidence in the group creating CIA.
were a different type of people, not law-er
oriented. Ivy League students of foreti
did not speak Hoover's language.
Papich states it was a "bles
not get the job. Hoover
confronted with worldwide
Hoover did
omfortable" when
He did not under-
stand relationships and operations abroad. In the
U. S., for instance, if Hoover had a problem with
a police chief, he just cut off relations. He
couldn't do that with foreign police. A foreign
intelligence service cannot operate like a domestic
intelligence agency.
In 1952, when Papich became FBI-CIA liaison, rela-
tionships between the agencies were a mess. Beedle
Smith was CIA director. There were many flaps
between FBI and CIA over CIA political and psycho-
logical warfare, especially regarding the funding
of labor groups, student groups, and political
parties. At the time of the 1947 Act, these tech-
niques of "covert action" were the subject of
tremendously heated battles between CIA and State.
There were fewer flaps in the counterintelligence
field.
In the field of political and psychological warfare
operations, the CIA didn't want stereotyped people.
The CIA was not disciplined and ignored jurisdictional
agreements. It would contact a U. S. newsman about a
SECRE
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19
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
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FILE
SECRET
possible assignment, the newsman would contact
the FBI to ask what was going on, this would go
to Hoover, who would raise hell with the CIA
director. But Beedle Smith was tough. Communi-
cation between the FBI and CIA was almost non-
existent by 1952.
Papich had no CIA counterpart since the CIA is
so compartmented. He had contacts at all levels,
exchanging ideas for operations. He would push
CIA ideas in the FBI. Flaps would come up. He
would stamp them out and say "get on with the job".
The FBI was easier to control since it was cen
tralized. Papich's relations with Hoover wo
go up and down. He frequently asked to go
field
and sometimes Hoover considered
him there. But by the 1950's, most,
foreign intelligence talent had dis
TOP
No formal consideration was
to limiting its role to 1
probably thought it shoul
expressed a desire to give
within the FBI
cement. Tolson
Hoover never
his intelligence
job. Nobody, including Tolson, knew Hoover's
reasons for doing what he did.
He had his own
conversations and contacts in the White House,
Congress, and his personal sources. He knew what
he was doing and had "a nose and ear for the
political climate in Washington". This was true
for "risky" operations.
Papich believes it would be disastrous to give
both foreign and domestic intelligence duties to
a CIA. While there would be advantages in
coordinating fragmented sources, it is a risk to
liberty, like a national police.
Papich did not recall any significant plan to
improve coordination in 1958 when FBI joined USIB.
FBI was part of the USIB predecessor group.
The CIA would suggest joint field operations but
Hoover would rarely buy it. This was like his
reluctance to join any operation with any other
agencies. He thought the FBI should always have
control, a commanding role. For example, Allan
Dulles discussed the United Nations with Hoover.
(s)
IB (FBI)
SECRET
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page 5 of 21
(s)
He knew Soviet agents and other countries' agents,
were in the Secretariat.Dulles stressed that
there was little coverage or penetration at the
U.N. The FBI "religiously observed" the ban on
operating in the U.N. compound. Papich was present
when Hoover and Dulles met. When Hoover objected
to the plan, Dulles dropped it. Another example:
Angelton might be disturbed about our lack of
information about KGB operations out of the embassy
He would discuss with Papich how to penetrate the
KGB.
Friction would develop in "the gray area" of posi-
tive intelligence. For example, a top foreign
official came to the United States for medical
treatment. The CIA knew he was coming to the U. S.
and wanted to know his relationship with Communists
and wanted intelligence on the instability in the
country. The CIA wants him surveilled to find out
his contacts, what he's saying, and a wiretap or
bug. The FBI would not do this since he was not
an intelligence agent and not within FBI jurisdi.
tion. The CIA would be upset. There were
cases like this, one involving a Boliviar
Over the years, Papich sold Hoover on,
but it was always a gray area. The N
tion never worked with the FBI,
Coordina-
✓ friction were
In summary, the sources of
(1) the OSS experience, (2) political and psychological
warfare by CIA, and (3) the CIA desire for positive
intelligence gathering in the U. S.
There was no major issue regarding CIA's desire to
develop "friends"-in the U.S. Papich recalls no
more than three to six instances of disagreement.
The FBI never helped the CIA create an organization
for deep cover. It never needed FBI help because
it moved on its own. The CIA Office of Security
advised Papich that they had a relationship with
- the National Student Association. This never gave
the FBI a problem.
The Katzenbach report would not give the FBI prob-
lems but many good CIA contacts overseas went down
the drain when contacts through student groups were
curtailed. Papich believes that if these contacts
FILE:
(FBI)
(FBI
(FBI
(5) (FBI
(pic)
SECRET
IB
90575
per
CIA
(CIA)
NW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 7
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07
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
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SECRET
had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence
community could have dealt with the New Left
later. The CIA would have had assets to assess
the issues. Such questions involved New Left
travels overseas and relationships with foreign
agents.
FILE:
(S) (FBI) IB
The FBI and CIA did discuss developing a cover
in the U. S. to get into China. Travelers gained
very little. The immediate problem was the pro-
posal for a joint approach. When Papich was there,
it got no further than discussion. If the CIA did
set up cover in the U. S., the FBI provided no
support. However, if the CIA desired to use a
company it would ask for a check of FBI files.
Papich is not aware of any political organization
created by the CIA, although it may have been
in the 50's or 60's. There was discussion
FBI about creating its own group aimed
and discussion of whether or not to
know about it. There had to be cotton with
CIA. Papich does not know if plans to
organizations were implemented
have been at Hoover's level
reate
(s)
The decision would
TOP
FBI informant travel oversed
was limited mainly
to CPUSA members. The FBI would not tell CIA
about informant trips to Moscow or Paris before-
hand. The reason was that the CIA would have
notified its field agencies that the informant's
life should be protected. Instead, the FBI informed
the CIA of the results upon the informant's return.
The FBI liaison section was made up of six or seven
agents. Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA.
Creager dealt specifically with USIB, the Security
Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, and
the Office of Security. Papich and Creager backed
each other up in their respective areas. There
were several liaison agents at the Pentagon. The
liaison at State was Oren Bartlett. The other
liaison agents were not so deeply involved in in-
telligence operations as was Papich. FBI liaison
at NSA was Bill McDonnell, although Papich was also
involved with NSA:
(S)
Gay/B
Requires
NSA.
Review,
(FBI
NW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 8
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16
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page 2 of 21
Regarding FBI service and support to other agencies,
Hoover was "goddamned careful". He was sensitive
to any "risks" and thus any request for FBI support
had to be established firmly. Hoover never
responded "let them do it" within the United
States. Hoover did not give other agencies any
blessing or approval for questionable domestic
activities such as the case of the Bolivian official
mentioned above.
In both the FBI and the CIA, Papich stimulated
interest in covering and recruiting people in
the United States, for example embassy officials.g
The CIA wanted to use its sources to recruit
foreign officials in the United States before the
officials went home. These officials were not
spies, therefore, when the CIA asked the BI to
recruit them, Hoover said no. Thi
ups and downs, depending on the
times Papich did convince Hooy.
recruit a foreign official
Ate had its
Some-
the CIA
S.
requests dif-
since he considered
e Secretary of State
Hoover treated State Deptre
ferently than CIA requi
them to be requests
rather than the DC1A
_Hoover was back-stop
TOP
on bugs or taps (8)(u)
becausë
the issue went
If NSA asked for help
He
to the Attorney General.
getting codes Hoover sometimes refused.
based his evaluation on the feasibility of the
operation. Neither NSA nor State had their own
capabilities and there was no formal discussion
of their developing it. Papich stressed that
(s)
(s)
FILE:
(1)(c)
SECRET
10 NOV 13
(perCIA)
1* (FBI)
LB
B (FBI)
(CIA) reques
NBA (FBI)
(CIA) Review
Hoover treated State, CIA, and NSA] each differently. (5)/(CIA)
There were flaps in the 1950's when the CIA
recruited without clearing with the FBI. The CIA
asked for FBI wiretaps no more than five or six
times. Papich was asked by FBI officials whether
the CIA ever went to the Attorney General directly
for wiretap authority. Papich says this may have
happened, but not to his knowledge. Few Attorneys
General would have stuck their neck out. It was a
possibility with McCone and Robert Kennedy, where
the relationship was unusually close. Papich says
CIA wiretapping could only have happened once or
twice since the FBI would have detected it most of
the time. If it was done it would be through CIA
NW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 9
DB (FBI)
BB
✓ 
(FBI)
HB (FBI)
SECRET
$5
IB
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
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FILE:SECRET
Office of Security, although that office had an
excellent relationship with FBI. Allan Dulles
would not have condoned it since he had great
respect for the FBI. Papich believes the same
is true of McCone and Helms. Papich also con-
cedes the possibility of entries by the CIA,
citing the independent operation conducted regard-
ing the Bolivian official) Hoover opposed going.
to CIA or NSA for technical support) in a joint)
surveillance operation. The FBI would only
For equipment for its own operation (S)
Regarding the memorandum of understar
CIA and FBI, the general problem wa
sources in the United States amo
as many as 12,000 of them a year
United States. CIA tried to
the 50's. FBI involvement,
some thought a new FBI d
$
tween
oping
ugn officials%3
hed to the
source in
off and on" and
would be needed
did not have
for it. The FBI as const.
trained personnel or carability to develop foreign
targets. The CIA had this capability. Papich
proposed that FBI permit CIA to recruit in the
United States. CIA would advise FBI of its interest
in a target, the purposes of the contact, and any
results. If the FBI had no interest in the target,
that is, an interest in a KGB contact for example,
it would OK the CIA contact. FBI required that
CIA furnish it any information relevant to its
needs, that is regarding KGB contacts (the New Left
was handled separately from the memorandum of under-
standing procedures).
ડે.
Alan Belmont headed the FBI Intelligence Division
before Sullivan. A capable administrator, he
operated behind the scene, stayed out of politics,
had good rapport with agents, and was able to
handle Hoover. When Belmont retired, the FBI "lost
a rudder". This was a crucial point in FBI history,
with Hoover getting old. Belmont stressed to his
subordinates the need to develop a strong case for
any proposal going to Hoover. Once that case was
ready, Belmont would push it hard, but Papich and
Belmont did disagree on such matters as counter-
intelligence operations against the KGB.
(OKC)
(perCIA)
-requise USA ( FB)
(
FBI)
(FBI)
IB (FSI)
NW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 10
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人

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page 9 of 21
Regarding the CIA and domestic dissidents, in
the 50's the CIA's general attitude was not to
investigate or surveil Americans overseas. FBI-
CIA communications rarely involved U. S. citizen
targets unless they clearly involved a KGB agent.
In the 1960's, Papich recalls two early incidents
of FBI requests for CIA coverage overseas. One
was the Republic of New Africa, a black group
with contacts with Communists and foreign radicals
(note by Elliff the individual was Robert
Williams?). The second was Stokely Carmichael, who
traveled around the world. The FBI asked the CIA
for coverage of Carmichael's contacts overseas
but there were no results since the 'CIA had no
capability. In retrospect, Papich thinks his
importance was exaggerated.
the
otiet Union.
Problem.
abroad since
Papich does not recall any case or interest of the
CIA regarding Dr. King. The FBI levied no requests
on the CIA regarding Dr. King. Papich recalls that
the FBI thought a black Communist Party mer
contacts with King. The assumption wa
CPUSA was supported and financed
This influenced the FBI's view of
There was no way the CIA
the CIA had no penetral
the Communist Party
in Russia. The CIA had
on the CPUSA links
to the Soviet Union.
put little or no effort
abroad into developing information on this. It
was not a CIA priority. CIA was satisfied with FBI
coverage of the Communist Party. If the KGB was
using it for espionage or influence, the FBI would
uncover it. The FBI would inform CIA of CPUSA
activities. Regarding CPUSA, FBI determined that
there was Soviet financial support into the 1960's.
The FBI attitude as early as the 50's was that the
CIA did not have the capability to discover CPUSA
links to the Soviet Union. There were no leads for
the CIA to explore in France, Czechoslovakia, etc.
If a Communist Party member went to Rome or London,
then FBI would ask CIA coverage, but the CIA gave
it low priority and produced little. This led to
FBI dissatisfaction with CIA, so FBI went through
its legal attaches, who would contact foreign
security services. Normally, the CIA was informed
but sometimes the CIA was not notified if the FBI
called it "an internal security" matter. Papich
FILE: SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 11
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in
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page 10 of 21
stresses that this is a problem. What is the dif-
ference between "internal security" and "counter-
intelligence" and "positive intelligence"? FBI
would use these distinctions as an excuse not to
notify CIA.
Regarding the legal attaches, Papich was in Rio
de Janerio after World War II. The FBI had moved
out when the CIA moved in, but Hoover wanted to
have someone there anyway. Papich stayed a year
but wanted out since he disliked doing only
liaison work with local police and CIA. The legal
attaches were never operations and dealt with
foreign security police and criminal police. A
major exception was Mexico City where, with CIA
acquiescence, the FBI was operational.
age was through sources going back,
and may still exist. The targeter
and CPUSA officials and
ing fugitives.
The 14
It
FILE:
SECRET
(S)(u) B (FBI)
II
iminals
as apprehend-
ها
cover the Buvietas (S) IB
Borders
There were six or seven legal attache offices
from the 1950's until Papich left in 1970. Papich
feels that if the FBI has legal attaches they should
be closely coordinated with the CIA so that their
assets and sources do not duplicate the CIA. A
FBI man abroad can be useful to the intelligence
community through his liaison with local police.
Coverage in the counterintelligence field of a
Soviet officer should be by the CIA.
(S) J
Coverage of
a CPUSA member should be joint FBI-CIA. There
never has been such coordination. The legal
attache should be involved in operations through
his liaison contacts.
Papich gave the following example: the CIA and
the French DST have good liaison for counterintel-
ligence coverage. If a joint CIA French coverage
target is coming to the U. S., the FBI Tegal
attache should be involved in France to prepare
for the transfer of coverage to FBI in the U.S.
Papich sees the implications of this for the need
to have a single counterintelligence agency. There
would be advantages of centralization, communication,
and security.
(FBI)
IB (FBI)
(1) ⑧3)
(1)C)
(perCIA)
(CIA)
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When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence
service for coverage of an FBI target, it asks for
any information rather than specifying the data.
This is because foreign services may be penetrated
by the KGB.
Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft
in France or the "17 wiretaps".
Regarding "leak" cases, over the years back
Eisenhower and Kennedy, the White House bu
through the roof.
Hoover TY
TOP
these investigations.
a source
would be a top officia
nothing would be done.
For example, under P
Kennedy the FBI did
identify a top source of leaks, gave the informa-
tion to Kennedy, and nothing was done. The secu-
rity committee was created to deal with leaks.
Each agency would handle its own, although the
President could still order the FBI to enter the
case.
Papich did not recall anything about Anna
Chennault, but he did recall that during the
Korean War there was a request of a top American
citizen regarding those negotiations. Papich
says he talked them out of it.
Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens,
Papich recalls beginning to request CIA coverage
of New Left travel abroad about 1967. He does not
recall an FBI interest as early as 1965, at the
time of the Hoover meeting at the White House on
antiwar protests.
Papich did not know of the 1967 White House request
to CIA nor did he know when Ober's unit was set up.
He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his
unit but he did know of its existence after it was
established. The FBI was asking CIA about particular
group leaders. The Bureau wanted to know if there
was foreign money or guidance to antiwar leaders.
These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not
know CIA project codewords). There was no CIA
capability to cover antiwar contacts in Hanoi or
Moscow. The CIA's attitude toward this new issue
was similar to the old assumptions about the CPUSA.
NW 50955 DocId: 32281992 Page 13
(S)α)
कार
1+3 (FBI)
SECRET
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
TOD OraRFT
TOP
The accepted view at CIA was that it was impor-
tant to determine if there was foreign support or
sabotage training. After 1967, FBI-CIA contacts
on this topic developed rapidly. There were few
really valuable CIA results nor was much obtained
through the FBI, the legal attaches, or informants
going abroad.
Papich referred to the climate of press commentary,
assassinations, allegations of sabotage plans, and
bombings. There was "a potential for panic within
the intelligence community" since no one had the
coverage they thought they needed. Travel of U.S.
antiwar leaders to Communist nations seemed impor-
tant, although sometimes after inquiry the individuals
were found not to be important. Therefore, time was
spent on targets who should not have been targets
but this was a new task.
Hoover did not understand the issue. He thought
New Left CPUSA links were most important. Papich
never thought the CPUSA responsible for development
of the New Left or SDS. CPUSA did try to use the
New Left. Hoover assumed the Soviets controlled
CPUSA day to day. Some of his assumptions had
been proved wrong. In World War II days, yes,
the Soviets used CPUSA for recruitment. In the
late 40's and 50's, the Soviets changed their
policy, no longer using CPUSA for this purpose.
Hoover was never convinced of this change. Papich
recognized the possibility that there might be a
reversal of Soviet policy regarding CPUSA but
Papich's top concern has always been KGB penetra-
tion of CIA, FBI, NSA, etc., as well as the question
of how good the double agents are.
Regarding the theory of KGB aims) for using U.S.
dissidents, the main problem was lack of knowledge.
In the 40's and 50's, the FBI was confident of its
knowledge of CPUSA and could assess its use to
influence U. S. politics, but in the late 50's
the Bureau's coverage of new groups was tremendously
weak. The FBI recognized this. The CIA stressed
it also for three reasons: (1) the increase in FBI
requests for CIA information, (2) the White House
requests, and (3) CIA officials own concern about
inadequate coverage. The conclusion was that
intelligence regarding people who went abroad was
inadequate.
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Papich had no personal involvement with White
House requests. There was discussion both in the
FBI and between CIA and FBI on expanding coverage
and development of sources. For example, does
CIA have anybody who can have an entree into SDS?
The Katzenbach report had limited the CIA to
foreign sources or to U. S. students recruited
abroad. Papich dealt mainly with Ober on this,
but also with Angleton and Tom Karamenses (DDP).
Papich believes anything Ober said and did
reflected CIA policy from the top. The operation
grew like Topsy. CIA compartmented it very
tightly and Ober was very security consci
the FBI, W. C. Sullivan was concerned,
by the assassinations, riots, and
put on the pressure to find out
He pressed Papich to pressure th
ind it.
Regarding assassination
Ivan was ultimately
convinced and Belmont wa Minced that Oswald
acted alone. No one ha nswered the question
of what Oswald did in the Soviet Union. Did he
get any guidance? Why did they permit him to
leave? Papich had frequent discussions with
Dulles and the CIA regarding the Warren Commission
although he thinks the formal FBI liaison was Jim
Malloy. The question as to whether Oswald was a
U. S. intelligence asset never arose. Critics at
the time said the FBI should have surveilled
Oswald. Papich recalls discussions of a plan to
have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow but no such
plan was ever implemented to his knowledge. It was
not worth the risk. He does not know whether the
CIA did it. He stresses that the FBI was not likely
to use "nuts".
Regarding the Riha incident, Papich says this was
not the reason for his retirement. Instead, there
were problems with Hoover on operations and policy
decisions. Papich was taking an aggressive stand
on coverage of Soviets.
|(s)
Regarding McCone's proposal on expanded FBI cover-
age of Soviets Papich stated that others in the
CIA influenced McCone to press for more coverage.
McCone was aggressive. Papich pushed it too.
This was the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
(s)
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Hoover would agree to expand on certain issues
but proposals for major new operations went to
PFIAB for support. Clifford was chairman. Papich
doesn't know what Hoover said to Clifford, but the
answer on the proposal was negative. The proposal
involved more extensive and sophisticated elec-
tronic surveillance. This was at the time of dis-
covery of microphones in the U. S. Embassy in
Moscow, as well as an increase in the number
KGB attempts to recruit U. S. citizens
does not think COINTELPRO was develope
alternative to this.
an
Не
Hoover's rejection of McCone
an did influence
CIA attitudes toward the
IA saw the FBI as
not being "a clandestine.
y ". CIA's view was
that FBI had to reject CIA proposals as illegal.
When Papich lectured to CIA recruits he attempted
to orient CIA to the FBI's limits. On the other
hand, FBI did not understand CIA functions abroad.
Returning to the Riha incident, Papich stressed
that he clashed with Hoover every year and that
their relationship had declined steadily after
1966. By fall of '69, he saw his value as nil.
In December '69, he decided to retire the follow-
ing. spring. In February 1970, while winding up
his normal business, the Riha incident arose.
Professor Riha disappeared from the university.
There was faculty and press interest in Boulder,
Colorado, and a Congressional inquiry came to FBI.
But FBI opened no case or investigation. In March
of 1970 the president of the University of Colorado
came to a CIA man in domestic contact service in
Boulder to inquire about the disappearance. The
CIA man called two friends in the Denver FBI office.
FBI agent agreed to contact Denver police and dis-
covered that marital problems had led to the dis-
appearance. CIA man told the university president
what he learned from "reliable government sources".
The president told the press. The local district
attorney called the president and asked his source.
The president went back to his CIA source. The CIA
source then promptly contacted the CIA officer in
Denver, who contacted the Denver FBI SAC. The CIA
officer suggested that he and the SAC go to the
district attorney to say that the original source
was local police, but the SAC rejected the idea and
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wanted to know the identity of the FBI agent
who gave the information. The CIA officer
refused and there was a bitter clash. (Things
like this had happened in the past. FBI field
agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always
told them to get on with the job.) The SAC sent
a teletype to Hoover. Hoover said to Papich, go
to Helms and get the identity of the FBI source.
Helms called in the CIA man, who refused to
identify him. Helms sent Hoover a lette
this and said he was "taking the neces
trative action". Hoover noted on t
continue liaison with CIA".
ng
His-
"dis-
of resignation to
- brief resignation
Hoover to reconsider
He also raised
Papich then wrote a long
Hoover instead of his
note. He strongly app
and keep communications open.
serious questions concerning Hoover's past decisions.
Hoover was not happy. Papich says there had been
dozens of incidents like this before. He did not
confer with anyone in the FBI about his letter.
W. C. Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring
things up. (Papich says if it is OK with the FBI
it's OK with him for the Committee to get the
letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover.
The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations.)
Regarding the 1966 cutbacks, Papich thinks it
started with the Long Committee hearings on the
Internal Revenue Service. After the Kennedy
Administration, and especially under Attorney
General Clark, there were cutbacks intelectronic
coverage. This definitely affected CIA interest
in the coverage of Soviets.] CIA would prod the
MBI on the coverage of embassies. [CIA Technical-
Services Division only loaned equipment to FBI (6)
He does recall a four-month joint experimental:
test of equipment in the Washington area.* (S)
W. C. Sullivan saw Angleton and CIA directors at
USIB meetings. Papich would discuss FBI-CIA
problems with Sullivan. Papich stressed the need
for microphone coverage. This was "a`red flag"
to Hoover. The obstacle was that Entry operations
were needed and could be detected.
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Regarding the CIA and local police, the only thing
Papich recalls is discussion of the CIA's relation-
ship with New York City police. The purpose was
not operations, but protection of CIA New York
facilities. He was also aware of relationships
between Washington, D. C., and suburban police for
protection of CIA facilities and personnel. He
knew that some CIA employees joined questionable
groups and that the CIA was concerned about its
personnel associating with radicals and protesters.
The CIA Office of Security informed the FBI in
1967-1970 that it had developed from two to six
sources to assess involvement of CIA personnel in
protest groups. The information provided to the
FBI from these sources about such groups was "crap".
Papich was not involved in any meetings with CIA
sources. He is not aware of any CIA activity re-
garding Women's Strike for Peace, nor was he aware
of any CIA intelligence operations for the purpose
of protecting CIA from violent demonstrations.
CIA should have relied on FBI.
Bill Creager was succeeded as liaison with Office
of Security by Fred Cassidy. They provided memo-
randa to the FBI Intelligence Division on all trans-
actions with CIA. Creager kept Papich advised,
especially of the potential for flaps and for
successful operations. Papich believes Office of
Security was restricted both in number of personnel
and by CIA rules. It could claim a need to protect
its own facilities and personnel but it didn't
have significant capability. If it did, it would
have been detected by the FBI.
Regarding the Dominican Republic in 1965, Papich
recalls the fear of another Cuba by the President
and the National Security Council. Johnson may
have asked the FBI for help. An FBI agent from
the office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and possibly
from Mexico City, were sent to the Dominican
Republic. This was done with CIA approval and the
joint effort was successful. There were no flaps.
The FBI agent had sources all over Central America
going back to World War II. Other FBI activities
in the Caribbean grew out of the FBI's role in
Havana before Castro, Jamaica, Miami, and San Juan.
In all these areas the FBI's capability was based
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on personal relationships going back to World
War II. In the late 1960's, the FBI went into
El Salvador and Papich thought this was a waste
of FBI manpower.
Regarding Cubans in Miami, there were many flaps
with CIA. For example, CIA would attempt to
recruit an exile for an operation in Cuba, the
exile would ask the FBI about it, and Hoover would
get mad. The FBI would not be informed about CIA
cover companies screening exiles. The FBI investi-
gated one cover company until it discovered the
CIA cover. CIA tried to recruit FBI sources with-
out checking out FBI. Papich is sure CIA "must
have" used agents to cover local Miami Cubans.
But FBI had excellent coverage and would protest
when CIA took an interest in somebody FBI was
investigating. There would be general protests
to CIA to stay out of counterintelligence.
problems were resolved locally with the FBI agent
(1)(A) in charge. There was minimum FBI contact with
per
Nov
93
CIA
她
CIA operations. Some names involved here are
Freddy Frohbose, deceased; Bill Harvey; and a
Fitzgerald.
Some
Regarding CIA counterintelligence against Cubans
in New York, Papich said the policy was no
counterintelligence by CIA. He has no recollection
of CIA implication in anti-Castro Cuban illegal
activities, but Papich admits he would have learned
only if there was a flap.
Regarding CIA Domestic Operations Division, Papich
formulated the 1966 agreement to ease FBI relation-
ships. The problem, as noted earlier, was CIA
desire to
For at the terview foreign officials in the U. S,
7 Nov 13 agreed to the 1966 understanding.
PA
Hoover finally, reluctantly,
Papich warned
CIA that if there were continuing flaps, Hoover
would withdraw his agreement and "it would be my
butt". There were flaps from 1966 to 1970 where
Domestic Operations Division attempted to recruit
and failed to advise FBI. If CIA was interested
in a Soviet bloc intelligence service recruitment,
FBI said no. If either Domestic Operations Division
or the counterintelligence staff was interested in
any Soviet in the U. S., they touched base with FBI.
But they felt that if FBI had allowed them to
recruit they could have succeeded.
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(S) (FBI)
Regarding postal intercept, CIA came up with the
proposition, said they had entree, and desired it
for positive intelligence. CIA did all the work.,
The focus was air mail to and from Russia, CIA
gave FBI the products where FBI had "stops" on
persons of interest and also where other informa-
tion might be of interest to FBI. It provided
some leads to intelligence agents. Papich recalls
a brief mail intercept in the early 1950's on the
West Coast regarding China. ☐ It was stopped after
a new postmaster arrived. Papich stated that the
New York operation was of greater benefit to the
CIA for positive intelligence regarding the Sovieti
Onional (S)
Papich recalls meetings with CIA and NSA on improv-
ing coverage but not much worthwhile resulted.
There was ¿COMENT in the Miami area Dragand (S)
monitoring. The FBI would get leads for suspects.
70 NOV In CIA; Division D were the COMINT people. Papich
recalls no other areas for DFing in the U. S (S)
sencia
IB
(FBI)
(FPI) (CIA)
regret
NASA review (FBI)
(CIA)
(S) (CIA)
Regarding CIA Domestic Contact Service, FBI would
get positive intelligence reports, for example,
on an alien coming to the United States. The FBI
was interested in his training in Russia as a
possible source regarding Soviet intelligence
activities. The CIA Domestic Contact Service would
provide reports to FBI headquarters or the field
on antiwar, Black Power, and protest groups. They
got the information from faculty and students regard-
ing future riots.
The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities
were set by the intelligence community, for
example, gather whatever they can about missiles.
The FBI would not task DCS. If DCS went into opera-
tions, FBI itself was upset. But DCS had good
officers who would note potential for counter-
intelligence use. There was no increase in DCS
traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969.
The creation of DCS in 1947 worried Hoover, who
feared an internal security role. It was set up
by NSCID. Until the 1960's, there was no contact
between FBI and the DCS at the field level. The
procedure developed that if DCS wanted to interview
(CIA)
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TOP S
ct then
an alien, a form was submitted by FBI.
got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so
it could protect any operation.
Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence
agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluates
the potential for a double agent or the possibility
of recruitment. FBI usually goes to the agency and
tells them the situation to prevent access to
sensitive information. Also, the agency can give
FBI assistance. The CIA Office of Security is
"paranoid" on this subject. It is very concerned
if there is a report on a CIA employee associating
with bloc nationals. Before telling the FBI, it
would do as much as it could on its own so there
would be something to discuss. In one case the
CIA was absolutely convinced an employee was a spy,
predicated on its analysts' conclusions from a
photograph. FBI refused to move on the basis of
this alone. There were other cases where FBI and
CIA had different evaluations of evidence. It
depended on what CIA gave FBI. CIA was "jumpier"
than FBI.
If CIA did any electronic surveillance of its own
employees, it never checked with FBI. The same was
true for physical surveillance of its own employees.
If the FBI had known, it would have raised hell,
but it never came to FBI attention and there was
no policy discussion of the subject. If the CIA
wanted to do something with its own assets with
Attorney General or White House approval, it would
not check with FBI. But it would coordinate with
FBI if it saw a risk that FBI would discover.
Papich recalls no CIA surveillance of newsmen.
Papich adds his view that every newsman assigned
to Moscow is useful to the KGB. A newman who may
have been recruited by KGB in Moscow may become a
target in the U. S.
Papich did not recall any problem of CIA activity
"tainting" a criminal case. CIA would make sources
available for criminal prosecutions.
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TOP-050REF
He
Regarding CIA Far East Division, Papich recalls
proposals for developing cover in the U. S. for
going overseas. Ober advised Papich of the develop-
ment of sources in the U. S. to cover overseas
targets. Papich would write a memo on the situa-
tion and provide any relevant FBI information.
also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA
if they travel overseas. Papich stresses that FBI
sources are sent overseas. He encouraged working
through CIA but never got very far. Papich gives
the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and
reported back through CIA.
Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather
information on policy guidance, funding, and train-
ing of U. S. dissidents overseas. There was a large
volume of communication covering names like
Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups.
FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investiga-
tion regarding a possible U. S. crime, CIA must
recognize the evidentiary rules. If there were
prosecutions (very few), it was never necessary to
disclose CIA data. CIA sources were not in a
position to testify. Papich does not recall ask-
ing CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might
have originated with electronic surveillance over-
seas.
If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic
matters, FBI would ask for everything CIA knew
about the sources. CIA memos would be very brief.
Papich would insist on identification of the
sources, since the FBI might want to use it. FBI
did get access to sources, sometimes working through
a CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI.
Papich recalls discussing creation of "notional"
groups targeted at China and Russia,
The program
was not implemented before he left in 1970. It
could have been explored in the FBI Intelligence
Division but they would have come to Papich if
CIA was needed. Papich discussed with Far East
Division in CIA.
(s)
Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer
to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the
entire intelligence community, including the White
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The money
House, to acquire Soviét cable trafi
was for real estat and equipment The FBI would
run the operation to provide bloc traffic product
to NSA Papich was not directly involved, but he
heard of it.
Papich recalls discussion with Technical Services
Division regarding secret inks but he recalls no-
instance where TSD provided documents to FBI and
he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of
CIA alias documentation or other document forging.
If this had been done, it would have had to go
through Papich.
Papich knew nothing about Vesco.
(s)
(s)
On Ober memos to FBI Papich recalls a code
designations (possibly FRI") The purpose was so
that when information came back to CIA from FBI
it could be sent directly to Ober. The counter-
intelligence staff had an office to log communica-
tions. The determination as to what FBI informa-
tion would go to Ober was first based on Ober's
request for specifics and second based on FBI
criteria which considered whether there would be
any possible CIA results. FBI would alert Ober
regarding an individual and ask for any informa-
tion generally about his overseas activity.
Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and enter-
ing operations in the 1960's.
Regarding CIA security research staff, Papich
recalled that it concentrated on developing counter-
intelligence equipment. It also was "an Angleton-
type" operation, doing research on penetration of
the CIA. It also analyzed and evaluated the
exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might
have been Communists or have had World War II
Communist contacts. For example, in Germany until
the mid-50's, CIA was vulnerable to recruitment
by Communist intelligence. CIA brought in brilliant
minds who might still have strong identification
with their home countries in eastern and middle
Europe.
Finally, Papich and Creager felt that "the guts of
liaison" was with DDP on counterintelligence, not
on their internal security problems. With Office
of Security there was a small number of investiga-
tions overlapping FBI.
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