20000A
104-10408-10027
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
DU/P.1.1220
2796
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans )
SUBJECT
Related Mission Directive for Mexico
1.
Mexico.
Attashed is the revised Related Mission Directive for
2. Your approval is requested.
King
Chief, WH Division
CONCUR:
(Ciga) 3. M. NINES
Chief,
Chie
Royd George
chier,
f.t. Collin
D. N.
© Chier,
24 Jarmary 1961
Distributions
Orig & 2
- MUD
1 PG
I
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CA
CI
SR
FI/Flans
FI/INT
RI
2 0387
APPROVED:
lichards
Definity Director (PICS)
3 JUN 1961
Date Approved
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RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO
I.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
A.
B.
0.
National Policy. The long-range national policy objec-
tives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce
to an ineffectual level the influence of international
Commmunism, to encourage democratic government, and to
keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably in-
clined toward U. 8. policies. Further guidance is given
in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin
America.
Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis
will continue to be placed on glandestine Jeollection 24
24 Operations and covert action operations against the
Tino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.
Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for
activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the
Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and
to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capa-
bilities and direction. In view of the importance and
threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. 8. interests in
Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities
in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under
Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include
refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert
action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The
former task for production of motion pitures and their
distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid
requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible
use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to
develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has
been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been
eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelli-- .29
gence service, and the Station regularly reports on
activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese
Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with
the elimination of the former Priority C section.
D.
ات
Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific
objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from
time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence
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Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected
that these requirements be satisfied utillaing existing
assets. of particular interest on a continuing basis
is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may
be used as a base for clandestine activity directed
against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 88 and 115); (D)
activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially
those that are potentially harmful to 0. 3. interests;
(a) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to
their current importance in attempts to overthrow the
regimes of their respective Latin American countries;
(d) the current alignment and activities of political 24
forces with the potential for assuming control of the
Mexican Governments (e) U. S. Communists residing in
Mexico; and (f) the Spanish]Communist group.
૦૯
It will be noted that certain previous contingency
reporting requirements have been, amended as follows:
The former levy for reporting on the stability of the
Nexican Government has been changed to a more realistic
and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above.
This modification is appropriate, as political changes
in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework
of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting
on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico 24
to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and
has been deleted.
II.
OBJECTIVES
1.
PRIORITY A
Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activi-
ties in Mexico, including those of bloo intelligence
services.
Continue and, where possible, increase physical and
technical surveillance of bloc installations and
residences.
b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor
the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions
warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc
personnel.
24
3/RS
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2.
Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence
personnel.
Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist
and leftist control or influence in key governmental
and non-governmental organisations, political parties,
mass media outlets, and other elements that influence
public or official opinion and policies.
24
24
a. Develop political action penetration agents in key
functional groups, Buch as students, teachers and 24
organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce
their capacity for carrying out action harmful to
0. S. objectives and interests.
b.
6.
Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-
Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico,
as well as the activities and personnel of inter-
national and local] Communist front organizations.
об
Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate
Commmists and pro-Communists from strategic positions
in goverment, educational institutions, state-
controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises,
labor unions, and student organizations.] 24
d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and
organizations that can be induced to produce and dis-
seminate anti-Communist, pro-Free world propaganda_
via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, ZY
and carry out political action operations against
Communist or other enti-U. 9. elements.
Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist
24 political, business or civic leaders to carry out pro-
24 paganda, economic or political actions against Comm-
unist influence and induce them to support views
oeinoiding with U. 3. Government policy interests.
f.
Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth
and student organizations, publications or agents] 24
and when necessary, develop additional assets_in key
[schools in Mexico City and selected provinces)
3
24
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3.
4.
n.
24
Develop and support Covert press assets]:
assets 
on the
staffs of Influential newspapers.
༢༥
Develop access to individuals and organizations
2 in the labor field and support non-Communist
Teaders and groups in key unions.] 27
Obtain information on the organizational structure,
key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities
of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front
organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular
Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U. 5.
groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by Inter-
national Communiom.
b.
Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the
PCM and the PPS] 24
Maintain penetrations of the FCH and saek to
penetrate the anti-INCINA wing of the PCM) 24
24
Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key
source in the Workers' University capable of monitor- 24
ing cultural contacts between the University and bloc
diplomatic installations.
27
Continue to monitor the activities of selected
Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups
through the penetration in the PPST if conditions
warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions 24
or groups?
Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary
activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts
against the CASTRO regime.
.
Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban
Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.
b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in
Cuba.
24
Secure support of high Mexican Government officials
for the conduct of operations against Cuba. 24
Continue to provide operational support for activities
1/RS
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directed against the CASTRO regime in Cube,
२५
Utilize propaganda(media, political action assets,
and other covert means to combat the influence of
Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.
PRIORITY B
24
1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in
Mexico and propagandize the dangers of Communism.
8.
D.
C.
24
Utilize existing media and political action assets
to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.
スケ
Utilize existing media and political action assets to
prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalis
and Communists.
२५
24
Utilize media and political action assets to prevent
or negate the soolo-economic and cultural penetration
plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
24
24
d. Spot and develop] for future covert collaboration young
local figures who show potential for political loader-
ship and who may be influenced to become generally
favorable to U. 8. interests.
24
Obtain information on the Secret intentions and activities
of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly
toward the U. $g, the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.
२५
Continue to develop and influence high level contacts
In the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of
The President and the Foreign Ministry)
3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.
a.
24
Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices
and official government agencies] to obtain advance
information on travellera.
24
Hecruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected
travellers to bloo countries, especially those who will
remain in bloc countries for an extended period and
who may be on scientific missions.
5
12/R1
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Recruit third nationals and Latin American
diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc
countries.
२.४
Obtain Communications intelligence on blos diplo-
matic traffic]
༢༥
Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.
蟲.
Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the
Chinese community.
24
Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in
Mexico and effect penetration of the SNACP]
24