200000
104-10048-10124
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
DISPATCH.
ΤΟ
Chief, Specif
INFO.
FROM
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PRO-
PROCESSING
ACTION
ACCOM.
PLISHED
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS MARKED FOR INDEXING
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT TYPIC/OPERATIONAL
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM
Special Activities Report on JMWAVE's Relationship with ANCARBON-1
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
ACTION REQUIRED:
REFERENCES
1.
Paragraph 10
A.
WAVE 8981, dated 24 September 1962 to Ser
B. WAVE 9169, dated 28 September 1962 norefer
C. WAVE 9343, dated 2 October 1962
.D.
.E.
DIR 40975, dated 6 October 1962
UFGA 14417, dated 4 March 1964
to be,
INTRODUCTION. In Reference E, JMWAVE forwarded a review
of the nature of its relationship with AMCARBON-2. This review
indicates that the relationship with AMCARBON-2 evolved from that
action which was taken in September 1962 to insure that a security
breach would not occur as a result of an investigation which was
being carried out by the Identity 1 relative to the fact that the
establishment of the Identity 2 was being kept from the YOBELT
South Campus as a result of security restrictions which were in some
way, related to JMDUSK. While the relationship with AMCARDON-2
stemmed from the remedial action which had been taken in a crisis
situation, the establishment of a working relationship with the
Identity 3 was an objective which JMWAVE had always hoped to obtain.
As a matter of fact, in Reference A, the recommendation was made
that JUWAVE be given approval to contact the major South Florida
news media in an attempt to work out a relationship with these news
media which would insure that they did not turn the publicity
spotlight on those KUBARK activities in South Florida which might
come to their attention. Thus, when a relationship was established
with AMCARBON-2, it was carefully cultivated in order that JMWAVE
might be able to use this contact at the Identity 3 as a means of
achieving the objective of having a relationship with the Identity 3,
which would simultaneously insure the security of JNWAVE's operations
and give JMWAVE an outlet into the press which could be used for
surfacing certain select propaganda items. In the period October to
(CONTINUED)
Attachments:
A
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USC
Five Newspaper Clippings
B- Identities
Distribution:
1.
.3 - Chief, SAS, w/atts.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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1 - 201 file (O/COST
1-
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DATE TYPED
DATE DISPATCHED
19 March 64
APR 2 1984
CROSS REFERENCE TO
OFFICE
COS
OFFICE SYMBOL
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-14781
"HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
ORIGINATING
OFFICER
TYPIST
201-
Andrew K. REUTEMAN/vtp
DATE
COORDINATING
OFFICER'S NAME
ESEC
OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
D002244
(C) DUDLEY R. WILLINGS
COS/JMWAVE 30/3/4
RELEASING
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
_ (40) MAR 31 1964
ORM
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USE PREVIOUS EDMION. REPLACES FORM 6105S WHICH MAY BE USED.
ANDREW K. REUTEMAN
EXT.
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CONTINUATION OF
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December 1962, all of JMWAVE's business with the Identity 3
was handled via AMCARDON-2. In mid-December 1962, AMCARDON-2
made the suggestion that he introduce REUTEMAN to AMCARDON-1
in order that there be a backup contact, in the event that
AMCARBON-2 were out of town or unavailable at such times as
REUTEMAN might require assistance from the Identity 3. REUTEMAN
agreed to AMCARBON-2's suggestion, and, as a result, AMCARDON-2
hosted a luncheon on 12 December 1962 at the Miami Club in the
Hotel Columbus, Miami, Florida, at which AMCARBON-2 introduced
AMCARBON-1 to REUTEMAN. As a result of this initial meeting on
12 December 1962, an operational relationship has developed with
AMCARBON-1, and it is believed that this relationship contributes
to the fulfillment of the over-all JMWAVE mission. In view of
this, a special activities report is being submitted to cover the
nature of JMWAVE's relationship with AMCARBON-1 during the
period December 1962 to March 1964.
As
2. FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR JHWAVE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMCARBON-1.
When AMCARBON-2 introduced AMCAREON-1 to REUTEMAN, AMCAREON-2
reviewed the ground rules under which he had been cooperating
with REUTEMAN. This review was conducted for AMCARBON-1's
benefit, in order that he might clearly understand the frame of
reference which should prevail in his relationships with REUTEMAN.
In this review, AMCAREON-2 pointed out that it was the policy
of the Identity 3 that it would take no action which would
purposely embarrass KUBARK or its South Florida operations.
a result, if any embarrassing items relative to KÜBARK's operations
in South Florida did come to the attention of the Identity 3, this
material would be brought to REUTEMAN's immediate attention.
AMCARBON-2 made it clear to AMCARBON-1 that such items should be
discussed with REUTEMAN in a frank manner. In addition, AMCARBON-2
made the point that, after an item was discussed, AMCARBON-1
should follow REUTEMAN's guidance relative to how any particularly
embarrassing item might be handled by the Identity 3, so that it
would not expose KUBARK operations and, at the same time, would
not jeopardize the journalistic reputation of the Identity 3.
In addition, AMCARBON-2 pointed out that, if AMCARBON-1 brought
a potentially embarrassing item to REUTEMAN's attention and
remedial action on the matter was not taken, by REUTEMAN within
a reasonable period of time, then the Identity 3 would feel free
to expose any ineptness on KUBARK's part. AMCARBON-2 pointed
out that in return for this cooperation from the Identity 3,
REUTEMAN had agreed that he would be available for contact by
telephone or periodic personal meetings at which AMCARBON-1
and ANCARBON-2 could discuss broad trends and developments in
Latin American affairs. AMCARBON-2 advised AMCARBON-1 that this
arrangement did not mean that AMCAREON-1 could expect to obtain
any classified information from REUTEMAN. The point was also
made that AMCARBON-1 should not press for the obtaining of
classified information, but he should be alert to steering tips
which REUTEMAN might furnish him on fast-breaking news stories.
AMCARBON-1 indicated that he understood the frame of reference
which had been outlined by AMCARBON-2. This frame of reference
has prevailed throughout JMWAVE's relationship with AMCAREON-1
during the period December 1962 to March 1964...
•
3. AMCARBON-1'S JOURNALISTIC CAREER. AMCARBON-1 originally
started to work for the Identity 3 in 1957 on the City Desk,
and subsequently advanced from this assignment to an assignment
which entailed covering major political developments in Florida.
At a later date, AMCARBON-1 became a feature writer for the
Then in July or August 1962, AMCARBON-1 was made
This assignment was considered to be a significant
Identity 3.
the Identity 4.
:.
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promotion for AMCARBON-1, and it reflected confidence in him by
the Identity 3 management. AMCARBON-1 is by no means an expert
on Latin America, but he is developing his knowledge on the area
and, at the moment, he gives every indication of wanting to be a
long-term Latin American specialist. QDELF has been questioned
about AMCARBON-1, and he has indicated that AMCAREON-1 is regarded
in the journalistic trade as an extremely likeable fellow who has
a keen mind but who lacks experience in depth on Latin American
affairs. It is QDELF's opinion that given an appropriate lapse
of time, AMCARBON-1 will develop into one of the leading Latin
American specialists in U.S. journalistic circles. AMCARBON-1
has a working command of Spanish, and he is constantly attempting
to improve his language fluency. It is REUTEMAN's opinion that
AMCARBON-1 has developed rapidly as a Latin American specialist,
and he will continue to grow in this field. Thus, he is a contact
who should be developed and harnessed for exploitation, bearing
in mind that he does have long-term potential.
4. AMCARBON-1'S CONTACTS AND SOURCES. In keeping with the
traditional pattern of source protection which is common to
newspapermen, intelligence officers and law enforcement officers,
AMCARBON-1 attempts to guard the true identity of all of his
sources. On the other hand, when pressed, AMCARBON-1 has identified
some of his sources to REUTEMAN, in order that meaningful evaluations
could be made of that information which AMCARBON-1 had passed to
KUBARK. As a result of these occasional witting identifications
of his sources, and, as a result of general conversations with
AMCARBON-1, REUTEMAN has learned that AMCARBON-l's sources include
the following persons:
:
a. Luis FERNANDEZ Rocha (201-316766), secretary general
of the DRE.
b.
C.
Havana Times.
d.
Manolo *RAY Rivero (201-239298), chief of JURE.
Carlos *TODD y Lobo (201-264141) of the defunct
AMBIDDY-1 (201-267437).
e. Aureliano *SANCHEZ Arango (201-019245), leader of the AAA
f. Edmund *LEAHY of the Washington News Bureau. AMCARBON-1
regards this source as being particularly interesting, in view
of the fact that LEAHY's daughter is a secretary in the office of
Attorney General Robert KENNEDY.
g. Frank *FIORINI (201-242256), free-lance pilot and
adventurer.
h. Eduardo *SUAREZ Riva, public relations man for the MRR.
1. Luis *MUNOZ Marin, governor of Puerto Rico.
.
ქ. Juan *BOSCH Gavino (201-103272), former president of
the Dominican Republic.
k.
Charles *KEELY of the Copley Wire Service.
1.
Jorge *VOLSKY Kraisler (201-352252), an employee of
USIA in Miami. ANCARBON-1 is well aware of the fact that VOLSKY
is a defacto stringer for Tad SZULC of the New York Times, but this
does not deter AMCARBON-1 from attempting to exploit VOLSKY as a
source of information.
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5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARBON-1 is used
to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instances,
ANCARBON-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action
within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The
use of AMCARBON-1 for operational support tasks enables JMWAVE to
harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several
uxamples of how AMCARBON-1 has been used in operational support
tasks are outlined below:
a.
Andrew ORDONO Camps. In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO
'Camps, DPOB 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived
in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this
processing are contained in MIAM-0085, dated 12 March 1963. After
being released by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and
a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JMWAVE
tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productive,
thus AMCARBON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO. AMCARBON-1 did locate
ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for
details.
b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the MRR Splinter Group.
In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, Headquarters suggested that
JMWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611)
of the MRR splinter group as a result of BANDIN's overinflated claims
relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters' interest in
discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN's
irresponsible publicity stunts were causing problems for AMBIDDY-1.
As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, REUTEMAN had
a luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which
AMCARBON-1 was advised that the BANDIN faction of the MRR was less
than accurate in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba.
In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want
to soft peddle any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction
might release. AMCARBON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN's
comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would
ignore the BANDIN faction in the future. Once BANDIN was discredited
with AMCARBON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other
newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable source. As a result
of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage
in South Florida since September 1963.
6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963
to February 1964, AMCARBON-I has furnished JMWAVE with operational
intelligence as outlined below:
"In WAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of
a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from
a Havana prison. AMCARBON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would
probably be a knowledgeable source on the current activities of the
UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in
terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMBEND-1's movements. Subsequent
developments revealed that ANCAREON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1,
and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the
publicity stir that was initially anticipated.
b. In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full
feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this
article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical
situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was
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thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. *CARLSON,
residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in the
Bay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON were
of any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 would
soft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCARDON-1 that
he had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of the
opinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receipt
of this operational intelligence enabled JUWAVE to brief CARLSON
on the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON had
played in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn,
enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meeting
with AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue this
Bay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the story.
was overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finish
his research.
c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-1 advised
JMWAVE that Mr. Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for the
Saturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attempting
to research a story regarding the possibility that strategic
missiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabled
JMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articles
which might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.
d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1
gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had with
AMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. This
information was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1
was telling the press.
•
In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 with
AMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligence
was useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1's
representatives were telling the outside world about their
operational activities.
f In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1
informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calls which were
being received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARK
vessels which were located in South Florida waters. This
information alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny was
going to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warn-
ing, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicity
repercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.
.
g. In WAVE 7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1
reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter from
Peru which contained an interesting operational lead to one
Carlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE,
Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealed
that the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was no
real operational potential in this lead.
This incident did underscore
the fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significant
operational leads to JMWAVE's attention.
h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1
advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone calls
indicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defected
* from a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previously
been seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the same
time, AMCARDON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thought
that these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bona
fide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, who
was being used as a means of creating an incident which would
embarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating
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United States territorial waters. REUTEMAN aised AMCARDON-1
that KUBARK had played no role in mounting a provocation operation
against the GOC. At the same time, REUTEMAN pointed out that
it was highly unlikely that GUIROLA was a GOC agent. As a result
of this conversation, arrangements were made for JMWAVE to check
out certain aspects of the GUIROLA story. At the same time,
ANCARBON-1 was prevailed upon not to write a story which might
lead the public to speculate on whether GUIROLA was an agent or a
plant in a propaganda play designed to embarrass the GOC.
7. PROPAGANDA OUTLET. AMCARBON-1 has been used successfully,
during the period covered by this report, as a propaganda outlet
through which items of interest to KUBARK could be surfaced in
the free world press. Examples of how AMCARBON-1 has been harnessed
in this field are outlined below:
AMCRAB-1. The AMCRAB-1 defection story originally
surfaced in the Miami area on 13 October 1963 via the Diario de
las Americas, which played up an API release from Montevideo.
The API Montevideo story highlighted AMCRAB-1's information
relative to GOC activities in Uruguay. The story in the Diario
de las Americas had an extremely limited impact on Spanish readers
in the Miami area. As a result, it was decided to do a series
of feature stories on AMCRAB-1, pointing up the fact that AMCRAB-1
was typical of the veterans of the Granma expedition, who felt
they had been betrayed by CASTRO and had been relegated to positions
of obscurity once the revolution had put CASTRO in power. AMCARBON-]
was briefed in detail on the AMCRAB-1 story, and he was given an
opportunity to debrief AMCRAB-1 under controlled conditions in a
JMWAVE safehouse. After completing his debriefing, ANCARDON-1
wrote a series of feature articles on AMCRAB-1. The first article
in the series received front page headline play. The series of
articles on AMCRAB-1 were well written, and they provided an
excellent peg for JMWAVE to mount a replay operation via other
propaganda assets. AMCARBON-1's story on AMCRAB-1 was picked up
by UPI, API and others, and it was played throughout Latin America.
The details of this surfacing can be found in WAVE 5826, dated
14 October 1963; WAVE 6092, dated 19 October 1963; and, WAVE 6174,
dated 21 October 1963.
•
b. Charles GRIFFIN Shrimp Boat Story. On 26 February 1964,
JMWAVE learned that when Mr. Charles GRIFFIN's sons went to Cuba
to reclaim the hijacked shrimp boat, JOHNNY REB, they found that
select items were missing from the boat when it was turned over
to them. It was believed that this information would make a good
human interest story which JMWAVE assets could use to counter GOC
propaganda claims that United States officials had stolen items
from the Cuban fishing boats which had violated United States
territorial waters. In view of this opinion, a steering tip was
given to AMCARBON-1 to have the Identity 3 representative in
Key West interview Mr. GRIFFIN. This interview was carried out,
and an article outlining the points which were of interest to
JMWAVE was published in the 27 February 1964 edition of the
Identity 3.
C. LAYC Story. The March 1964 LAYC meeting in Santiago,
Chile, was not receiving appropriate coverage in the South Florida
newspapers; as a result, REUTEMAN contacted AMCARBON-1 on 5 March
1964 and suggested that the LAYC meeting was a story which the
Identity 3 should pursue. AMCARBON-1 was grateful for this steering
tip, and he assigned the task of preparing the story on the LAYC
to one of the members of his staff. A story on the LAYC was
subsequently published in the 6 March 1964 edition of the Identity 3
(COMMENT: Copies of the articles cited in subparagraphs a through
c above are attached for Headquarters information.)
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8. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE. Attempts have been made to
obtain disseminable positive intelligence from AMCARBON-1 during
the period covered by this report. This attempt has been generally
unsuccessful, in that AMCARBON-1 does not have a great number of
contacts in Latin America who would give him access to worthwhile
intelligence appreciably in advance of the information appearing
in the overt press. As a result, AMCARBON-1 is usually not aware of p
inside developments in any Latin American country; consequently,
he is not a worthwhile source of positive intelligence.
As a
matter of fact, AMCARBON-1 is less valuable as a source of positive
intelligence than most journalists. This is attributable solely
to his lack of long-standing contacts in the Latin American political
scene. It is believed that AMCARBON-1 will ultimately overcome
this shortcoming; thus, we will continue to attempt to harness him for
the collection of positive intelligence.
9.
Our
COMMENT. In the period covered by this report, AMCARDON-1
has been found to be a straight-forward individual who is honest,
cooperative and who understands the need for security.
relationship also indicates that AMCARBON-1 is an accurate reporter
of that information which he passes to KUBARK. In view of this,
JMWAVE plans to continue to harness AMCARBON-1 in the same manner
that he has been used in the past. It is believed that our rela-
tionship with AMCARBON-1 enhances our ability to conduct our
operational mission in a secure manner. In addition, this relation-
ship tends to minimize the possibility that JMWAVE might have diffi-
culties with the media outlets in the South Florida area.
As a
result of our continuing relationship with ANCARBON-1, a special
activities report will be forwarded at appropriate intervals.
10. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned AMCARBON-1
and that JMWAVE be advised of the number.
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The Miami News
Sunland Training Center for
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The Miami Herald
4 Latin American Editor
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