14-00000
104-10183-10260.
RANNIKONKURUUNURSINGKABUKEINDS
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
19/P√
MEMORANDUMY
1464
13 October 1961
RETURN TO CIA
„Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
SUBJECT: AMMUG-1 Eperation
12.4.
Curlening in Cuntemala of Chef of tate ieraita)
1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious
the afternoon ofriday
government conference room on
9 october. 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours, thief of tate 08,06
Colonel Peralta Ginister of Government Colonel verrano] 08.06.
08106 and intelligence Chief Colonel Porres attended for the Quate- ||
malans Eaul orb and Andy Rogers of our station) were
present
03,03, 16-2.
27,03
2. At the request of the Caul
prefaced the operational briening with a brief description
of how the .. Intelligence community operates, i the
role of CLA, of the need for compartmentation and security,
and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make
it imperative for the Busternalang to adopt securit, pre-
cautions which will ensure that the information we provide
and the [lat operations] we undertake fire compartmented 24
within the Guatemalan government] (and, in fact, discussed
by the Guatemalan government exclusively with our re-
presentatives in the field). 24
3. Following the introductory remarks outlined
above, 1 briefed the group on the DCL structure, the PCI
operational techniques and specifically on Grains and
operations in Guatemala The presidentent close attention
throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely,
including the til intelligence requirements (for Guatemala 24
and the šalvadoran "Caso Zapote" file]
4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained.
24 our aus in exploiting the floration with regard to the
[recruitment aspect, (the Ca pla), and the control of 5-24
version] in this connection Lasked for Close cooperation 24
and coordination of activities, promising that we shall
do our utmost and making reference to our travel lusts 24.
and watch list.]
- 16/12/
24
with reference the APT case, because
ot the developments my plans in tl salvador)11.c.plained
briefly the status the DALTON case) and the possibilit,
24 of his being transferred to Guatemala. (This was in line
Calvadoshich
with
the
of Station the
1 the Presidcluded our Chief 27
intelligence 08.06
advisor, Colonel Nassed that the Guatemalan24-
government taxe no act: in undess requested by President 24.
IVERA or Colonel DN and said that, if DALTON 24
is transferred, one of our people probaudy would talk to
DASTON in Guatemala
24
6. The Chief of state Peralta]made a rather
impassioned speech in which he covered the following points:
a. His own long experience in the GA, - in Cuba
and in Central America;
b. sile early warnings about Castro--which
were disregirded;
24
c. The extent to win Luatemala has lived up
to its obligations) in the DC to which it has
24 [cooperated in efforts@gainst Castrol and to
which it has looked toward U.. leadership,
'
d. The failure of the U., to take angressive
action against Cuba and the need for taking a
-hard line, incluring the use of force in support of
military activity by the free Cubans and the other
Ainerican countries;
e. ils appreciation that the Soviets will not be
willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;
1. Condelanation of Mexico for her dealings with
Cuta, for failure to abide by her obligations in
the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to
operate out of Mexico against other American
countries;
K.
The need for action against Mexico;
6/p√
h. The effectiveness of his own actions against
Querrillas in Quateriala and his determuation
to “meet violence with violence;
1.
Recognition of the importance of the information
covered in the felin, and of its exploitation;
4.24
J. Reference to the case of the lexican courter]
*orking for Cuban intelligence and now detained 24
in Guatemala (the Abrato case)
✓ Acceptance of security restrictions and his
decision to hold the information to those present.
106
7. In replying to the remarks of Colonel Peralta]
I said that we appreciate the cooperation of Guatemala in the 24
OA and that we shall be most interested in the sploitation
of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter
of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was
not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the
United States Government are based on careful study of
detailed information including Information on Soviet intentions
and capabilities.
فاة
8. At the conclusion of the raceting, Peralta]
asked for a copy of the LGI requirements (which he already
had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study
further.
SECRET
Larold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI