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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
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TITLE
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA
FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 6, 1962 OF THE BOARD'S CUBAN
PANEL
DATE : 12/06/62
PAGES :
SUBJECTS
:
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
10
AGENDA FOR DECEMBER 6, 1962 MEETING.
SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 6, 1962 MEETING
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
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CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/06/98 08/01/2024
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2025 Release under the President John F.
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2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF DECEMBER 6, 1962
OF THE BOARD'S CUBAN PANEL
Subject
Review of Data Assembled by Board Staff
Depart for CIA Headquartere
Item
Timo
1.
10:00
12:10
Cuba
2.
12:10
12:30
4:00
Discussions with DCI's Cuban Review Committee.
(Consisting of Messrs. McCone and Wisman,
and Generals Carrolly Blake, and Carter)
(Lunch will be served in the course of this
meeting.)
At approximately 4:00 P.M. or whenever
the Board Panel terminates its discussions
with the DCI's Committed, the Panel will
return to the Executive Office Building
to continue its review of the material
referred to in Item
SANI
6:00
Discussions of the full Board with
Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defonse
Research and Engineering
5:30
Killian join this meeting at about 1:45 P.M.
Murphy
Gray
10.
Doolittle
Clifford Gem
Pace
6:30pm
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
TENTATIVE AGENDA POR MEETING OF DECEMBER 7, 1962
Item
Tame
1.
9:00 - 9:30
Subject
not taken up
Status of Implementation of Prior Board
Recommendations
Mr. Ash
2.
9:30 - 10:30
Oral Report by Board's Cuban Canel
13.
10:30- 1:00
Discussions with DCI's Cuban Task Force
(Messrs. Notone, Carroll,
an
and Captar)
Kirkpatrick Helms
4
1:00 -2:00
Lunch
5,
2:00 2:30
45
6.
2:30
3:25
7
4:00
5:30
5:30
End
Executive Session
Discussion with Dr. Charyn (Capt Salleren).
Status Report on the Organization, Programs
and Plans of NRO
(Messrs. Charyk, Scoville and Carroll
so joined by the DCI) patrick
小
Discussion of Board's Preliminary
Conclusions
- and Recommendations. on the Cuba Problem..
Discussion of Juture
cure Board Business
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:
SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
December 6 and 7, 1962.
The Board convened on December 6, 1962, at the call of the Chairman,
Dr. Killian, for a two-day meeting at the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive
Office Building.
Beginning at 10:00 a.m., Board members Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, and Baker
reviewed materials and summary memoranda which had been assembled as the result
of a study conducted by the Board staff of information then available concerning
intelligence aspects of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba.
At 12:30 p.m. the Board Panel on Cuba (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Doolittle),
and Messrs. Coyne and Ash, proceeded to CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia.
Purpose of the visit was to discuss with DCI and the members of the DCI's ad hoc
committee that committee's interim findings which had been reached thus far
in its study and preparation of a report on the actions taken by the U. S.
intelligence community relating to the Soviet buildup in Cuba prior to October 14,
1962 (Details of the Board Panel's discussion with the DCI, et al., are set forth
in a separate memorandum in the Board's files.)
At 6:00 p.m. Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense, joined the Board meeting for a discussion of some aspects
of advanced intelligence collection capabilities. Those present were Messrs.
Killian, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Baker, Clifford, and Pace, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.
Dr. Killian informed Dr. Brown that the Board had in mind discussing Project
OXCART with the President and the Board anticipated that the President would have
Tremore STM CUMIN
PROJECTS
IDEALIS
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to maintaining coverage of activities in Cuba,
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Dr. Killiar next informed the Board that he was somewhat troubled by the
position of the Board with respect to the following: (1) Mr. Bundy once told
Dr. Killian that inasmuch as a special Cuban operation had beer, laid on with the
Attorney General involved, the MONGOOSE group would have particular jurisdiction with
respect to Cuba (2) during the height of the Cuba crisis the Board had not been
to Juba (2) during the height of the Cuba
included in the designated recipients of intelligence regarding strategic missiles
in Cuba, and (3) it would appear essential that the Board have an opportunity.
to examine the records of the Special Group.
Mr. Gray pointed to an additional matter of concern to the Board, namely,
the view expressed by Dr. Charyk that different interpretations had resulted from
the analysis of satellite and U-2 photography of the same areas.
Kiilian
agreed that this presents a most serious problem, because our Government could
induced to adopt an unwarranted attitude of disbelief regarding Soviet milita
capabilities in the same way that an attitude of disbelief was engendered with
respect to the likelihood of the Soviet introduction of an offensive missile
capability into Cuba.
Mr. Gray, referring again to comments made to him by Dr. Churyk, thought
that Dr Charyk had identified two additional problems which would seem to be of
concern to the Board, namely (1) the near shortage of photographic film which
prevailed during the week of October 15, and (2) the fact that when U. 6. intelligence
operations detected the presence of C-Band radar in Cuba, the U. S. was surprised
by this and had no C-Band jammers available except a laboratory model in the
possession of a Government contractor, despite the fact that we had discovered
as early as 1961 that the Soviets possessed this radar capability. With respect
to the latter point
Baker affirmed the seriousness of the problem, noting
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that our ELINT coverage had revealed that this radar capability was deployed in
the USSR against our SAC forces but nevertheless our B-52-s still have not
been equipped with a capability to jam this Soviet radar.
Mr. Clifford expressed the view that the Board has a peculiar and particular
responsibility to the President in assessing intelligence aspects of the Cuba
experience, particularly in the light of the earlier debacle at the Bay of Pigs.
at which time the President stated privately that he could not make correct
decisions without correct intelligence, and that he could not endure another
Cuba"
Therefore, Mr. Clifford recalled, the President had established this Board
and one of the reas is for doing so was to bring professionalism into the field
of U. S. foreign intelligence. Now the possibility arises that valid refugee
Mr. Clifford
Mr. Clifford also feared
reports on Soviet use of Cuban caves may be disregarded.
that the Administration may now have adopted the view that everything is all right
again now that the missiles and the bombers are out of Cuba.
acknowledged that no policy advisory officials like to have a check mede on the
advice they give to the President, and this is understandable, but on the other_
hand the President looks to the Board to assess the intelligence aspects of the
Mr. Clifford believed that CIA had made errors in not
policy advisory function.
conducting sufficient overflights, and top level Presidential advisers erred in not
And now that the Cuba crisis was
proposing sufficient overflights of Cuba.
successfully met by the President, the feeling in responsible parts of Government
seems to be that things turned out all right so why bother the President.
Mr. Clifford said that he of course could not say what the President thinks about
the U. S. intelligence job that was done regarding Cuba, but the President did
say to the recent meeting of the Business Advisory Council that the DCI had been
This prompted
the only one who had called the shots on what was going on in Cuba
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Mr. Clifford to observe that if the President thinks a good intelligence operation
took place, this could have dangerous implications, and therefore the Board should
push on with its thorough review of the subject no matter what attitudes of
resistance are encountered among the Government agencies involved.
expressed complete agreement with these observations of Mr. Clifford.
Dr. Killian.
General Doolittle questioned whether the Board was certain that the President,
Dr Killian
was not informed of the views expressed by the DCI in the cables which he dispatched
to CIA from: France. Dr. Killian said he did not know the answer to this, but he
was disturbed at the manner in which the DCI was making this case for himself
Mr. Murphy advised the Board that he had been told by the DCI that General Carter
had not informed the President about the cables received from the DCI.
thought that this question of whether the DCI had communicated with the President
should be pursued with the DCI when he joined the Board meeting today. General
Doolittle added that it would be appropriate to ask whether General Carter had
been instructed by the DCI to make the DCI's views known to the President
Mr. Clifford surmised that General Carter could have thought that the DCI would
have returned if he considered his views urgent.
Mr. Gray was of the opinion that it was in the area of CIA's Deputy DCI/
Intelligence where the DCI's messages were ignored, and therefore it would be
well for the Board to talk to that Deputy.
Mr. Pace felt that the intelligence weaknesses apparent in the Cuba situation.
He thought that in highlighting the
indicate the presence of broader weaknesses.
weaknesses observed in the Cuba matter, the Board would be in a position to make
recommendations for broader improvements in the foreign intelligence effort.
Dr Langer cautioned the Board to consider, however,
that out of the thousands
of refugee reports coming in there were bound to be reports containing false and
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misleading information.
Mr Pace observed that if that line of thinking were
pursued to its conclusion the question would arise as to why we should have a
refugee interrogation program. Mr. Pace was of the opinion, however, that the
interrogation program offered an unprecedented opportunity to obtain information
and CIA should have made the most of it. Mr. Pace recalled that the Board had
received articulate briefings on Cuba from Mr. Cline of CIA, who also reportedly
briefed Prime Minister MacMillan, the President and others, but Mr. Pace wondered
on what firm intelligence basis these briefings had been conducted Mr. Murphy
noted that Mr. Coyne's study reflected that on August 14 Mr. Cline had issued an
order not to publish any information on missile bases unless it had been checked
out with NPIC. Dr. Killian then suggested, and Board members agreed, that an
effort should be made to have a discussion with Mr. Cline during this meeting
of the Board.
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Secretary of Defense. (Dr. Killian expressed the view that the DCI, as coordinator
of the overall U. S. intelligence effort, should certainly have the right to look
at the budget of any element of the intelligence community, and Mr. McCone said
he thought that he could work this out.) The DCI went on to say that the total
Department of Defense Budget is $3 billion whereas the CIA budget is around $400
million and the Defense budget is up over the previous $2 billion figure because
the Secretary of Defense has added the cost of the reconnaissance program.
result is, Mr. McCone said, that the USIB is unable to look at this large budget
and therefore Mr. McCone is endeavoring to discuss it with Secretary McNamara.
As for the CIA budget, Mr. McCone had thought that it could be kept at last year's
level through reorganization steps and cutting down on wasteful expenditures, and
at the same time an effort has been made to absorb salary increases within the
existing budget. The DCI said that despite hard work on the CIA budget by all CIA
elements, then there had to be added on the cost of the Cuba operations, so the
former budget of CIA is up to $425 million, exclusive of $146 million involved in
OXCART and NRO. The Bureau of the Budget cut this down to $381 million by charging
the Cuba budget to the CIA's Contingency Reserve over the opposition of the DCI who
feels that the Reserve should be held intact for use in unforeseeable emergencies,
Mr. McCone said he was not sure how all this would finally be resolved with the
Bureau of the Budget.
Turning to another subject, Mr. McCone explained the MONGOOSE project in
answer to an inquiry from Mr. Clifford The DCI said that this project developed
out of a discussion last Fall between himself, the President and the Attorney Generaís
The objective is to create dissensions in Cuba
11 lead to revolt against
the Castro regime and to the unseating of Castro, leaving the Cubans to form a
government of their own choosing.
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to activities authorized by the MONGOOSE Committee (Composed of the Special Group,
plus the Attorney General and 2 or 3 other officials).
MONGOOSE plans are developed
under the coordination of General Lansdale who works with State, Defense, CIA and
USIA elements for this purpose. Mr. McCone said that the first phase of the project
The second phase was to involve sabotage,
was an intelligence gathering effort.
The DCI said he was
insurgency and other actions which were tentatively agreed upon at the MONGOOSE
meeting of August 10 but which then fell into limbo during the Cuban crisis until
two days ago when the Executive Committee of the NSC tentatively renewed consideration
of the project. Mr. McCone said that he personally does not favor sabotage or
guerilla activity for a few months until the dust settles.
disturbed over the possibility of a new confrontation by the Soviets who could take
the stand that there had been compliance with U. 3. demands for removal of offensive
weapons and therefore any continuance of U. S. aerial surveillance of Cuba will be
Dr. Langer suggested
countered by shoot-downs of our surveillance aircraft by SA-2's.
that the SA-2 defenses might be for the purpose of meeting an anticipated invasion of
Cuba by the U. S., but Mr. McCone thought not, pointing out that the SA-2's would
be easy to knock out if an invasion should take place.
Turning to the NRO, Mr. McCone said that the Defense Department/CIA agreement
had not worked out too well because the Director of NRO feels he should have fiscal
control over Department of Defense as well as CIA resources, through a review of
This approach, Mr. McCone
programs and the allocation of funds on a monthly basis.
stated, puts accounting and fiscal responsibility into NRO, i.e., into the Air Force,
in effect. Mr McCone said that he favors more CIA control because it is necessary)
for CIA moneys spent for NRO purposes have to be defended before special Congressional
Committees in a special way, and since $150 million of this CIA money is tied up in
NRO (OXCART) the DCI feels he will have a hard time explaining how this money got
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