30/11
8127178
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
Date: 09/14/94
Page: 1
AGENCY INFORMATION CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
8/20198
AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER
:
135-10001-10246
RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR :
ROCK
FROM :
CARGILL, MASON
ΤΟ :
FILE
TITLE :
DATE :
04/22/75
PAGES :
27
SUBJECTS :
MCCONE PAPERS.
DOCUMENT TYPE
:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION
:
S
CURRENT STATUS :
RESTRICTIONS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/14/94
OPENING CRITERIA :
OPEN IN FULL
○
Postponed
COMMENTS :
KP 12 apr 99
к
2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
'NW 78141
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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500
April 22, 1975
MEMORANDUM
To:
File
From:
Mason Cargill
Subject: MC CONE PAPERS
MC
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
74
8 Aug
(this page only)
I have gone through most of the papers remaining
at the Agency prepared by DCI McCone from November 29, 1961,
through December 31, 1964. Attached are notes on portions
of them dealing in any way with possible assassination
attempts and contacts with the Warren Commission.
Enclosures
RMC:clb
(2)
NW 78141
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-SECRET
SENSITIVE
MATERIAL ATTACHED
-SECRET SENSITIVE
-
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
DECEMBER 31, 1964
MC CONE PAPERS
NOVEMBER 24, 1961
REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS,
WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS
8 Aug 94
Cafe 1-12
only)
BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD
File: November 29, 1961
-
April 5, 1962
December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy
"Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12.
December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy
"Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5.
-
January 22, 1962, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy
Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412
Committee plus Robert Kennedy.
April 5, 1962, Memos on Special Group/Mongoose Project
General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.
File: April 7, 1962
-
August 21, 1962
(40) April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that
Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling
people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney
General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day.
(61)
-
July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General
included a short discussion of "Reuther plan" for labor
operations apparently in Italy.
-
(86) August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis
Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence,
General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy a general discussion
of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's
are discovered in Cuba:
"McNamara expressed strong feelings
that we should take every possible aggressive
action in the fields of intelligence, sabo-
tage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans
and do such other things as might be indi-
cated to divide the Castro regime.
(emphasis added)
"
NW 78141
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SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET
- 2
SENSITIVE
File: August 24, 1962
(97)
-
December 31, 1962
October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy:
McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba Bundy was
more conservative. (No specifics)
(118)
-
December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on
Cuba [MISSING]
[Apparently not a meeting or phone call]
(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)
-
December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba
(119)
[MISSING]
(120) December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba
[MISSING]
File: June 1, 1963
-
February 9, 1963
(12) January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and
Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba.
assassination.)
File:
(36)
-
(No mention of
February 9, 1963 April 9, 1963
March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney
General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]
[According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]
(38)
-
March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney
General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission]
[DESTROYED]
(52)
-
March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and
Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]
File: April 15, 1963
(68)
-
-
June 4, 1963
Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts
developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem
and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by
representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during
his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains
the following:
NW 78141
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SECRET
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-
3
"I agree with the ONE estimate that
Castro's political position will im-
prove within the next year (barring
assassination)."
The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not
proposing this.
(77)
-
statement:
DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this
"Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassi-
nation, will survive the efforts of internal opposition
elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or
considering assassination.
(61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney
General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/
Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED]
(62)
-
April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about:
"Helms/Angleton Project..." [DESTROYED]
File: June 5, 1963
Nothing Relevant
-
July 20, 1963
File:
-
July 23, 1963 November 26, 1963
(133)
-
August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan,
Tom Ross of Chicago Sun Times [MISSING]
-
September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group"
(138)
[MISSING]
(138)
September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]
(138) September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at
Justice Department [MISSING]
(158.5)
-
October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at
Kennedy's house [MISSING]
-
(168) November 26, 1963, DCÌ and Bundy on message about
Kennedy assassination [MISSING]
NW 78141
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SECRET
SENSITIVI
-
(168) November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said
that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked
if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI
said no.
1
ང་ར་སང་ཟླ་ ་ཁང་པའི་ འ་ར་མིན་ད་་ ་ང་དང་ང་་་དང་་ང་ཡང་ང་ཡང་ས་
File: November 27, 1963
December 31, 1963
[Entire contents of file missing.]
From titles, nothing here appears relevant.
File: January 1, 1964 February 11, 1964
Nothing relevant.
File:
February 12, 1964 April 5, 1964
-
[Entire contents of file missing.]
(25.5)
Meeting
(36.1)
(46)
-
-
-
-
"White House.
February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald:
Situation Room Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]
-
March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms
[DESTROYED]
April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: "EYES ONLY
NO DISTRIBUTION FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan;
Republican Platform of 1960."
-
[DESTROYED]
File: April 6, 1964
-
July 8, 1964
"Met in
(49) April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren,
Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject:
DCI's Office" [MISSING]
(58) May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms Subject: "Warren
Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission
transcript and returned it to the commission." "No MR
expected" [MISSING]
-
"Memos
NO DISTRIBUTION
(69) June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce:
used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME"
nothing on assassinations.
NW 78141
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-
SECRET
5
SENSITIVE
File: July 8, 1964
-
August 12, 1964
(No file under these dates.)
File: August 12, 1964. September 10, 1964
Nothing relevant.
File: September 11, 1964 October 31, 1964
-
"NO DISTRIBUTION
(138) October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich
discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter. [DESTROYED]
་་
(143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In
Presidential Suite, NYC Personal discussion EYES ONLY
[DESTROYED]
JAM
-
NO DISTRIBUTION"
-
File: November 1, 1964
Nothing relevant.
-
December 31, 1964
BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT
File:
October 25, 1961
-
July 31, 1962
(B)
-
December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President
and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were
possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassi-
nation attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela,
which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.
(6)
February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President,
Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one
Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life
magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently, the
article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.
(12)
-
May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and
Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail.
No mention of assassinations.
NW 78141
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SECRET SENSITIVE
-SECRET
SENSITIVE
6.
File: July 31, 1962 November 29, 1962 [actually covering
through Dec. 18, 1962] .
-
(28) July 20, 1962: At a meeting with the President,
Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed.
mention of assassination.
-
Νο
(52) October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive
Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.
(55) - October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential
Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups;
estop Alpha 66%; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press.
[MISSING]
(70) November 29, 1962: At a meeting of the NSC
Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed
Mongoose. No mention of assassination.
File:
(7)
January 1, 1963 March 31, 1963
11
January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President,
DCI, and Helms. No memo present. Listing does not indicate
whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally
indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note
of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file"
(8)
-
January 23, 1963 (4:45 p.m.): Meeting between DCI
and President missing memo; same situation as %23 (7) above.
(28)
-
-
March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI
"reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance
intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within
the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk
with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.
༤ཁས་པ་ བར་ན་ལུས་་ངག་=་ཟླ
File:
-
April 1, 1963 July 1, 1963
DCI
(33) April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President,
discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working
on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to
remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of
Castro by means which could be developed after the rėmoval
of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination.
NW 78141
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-7-
(43) May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and
others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were
discussed. No mention of assassination.
(50) June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and
others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against
Cuba, including "external sabotage.
"t Vague memo of record
by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.
File: July 1, 1963
-
November 12, 1963
(74) November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI,
and others, "McCone emphasized that to a very considerable
extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and
forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect
some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking."
(This was in a general discussion of covert actions against
Cuba; no mention of assassination.)
File: November 23, 1963
December 31, 1963
(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told
Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City.
DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City:
"...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by
Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."
(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In
meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed
"contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent inves-
tigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the
DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.
(4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B.
Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest
developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list
of "late developments" is in file, to be used for this purpose.
(Obtain copy.)
File: January 1, 1964
Nothing relevant.
-
April 2, 1964
NW 78141
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SECRET
SENSIT
File: April 3,
1964
-
May 20, 1964
(19)
-
April 7, 1964:
re Cuba Covert Action.
Meeting of DCI, President, and others
Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective
set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective
of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the
military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the
eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the
elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba. (emphasis added)
[OBTAIN COPYI
File: May 21, 1964 October 5, 1964
"
September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to
discuss "Warren Commission Report (to set up Presidential
Committee)" No memo indicated to have been prepared.
-
File: October 6, 1964
-
December 28, 1964
Nothing Relevant.
BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP,
CHRONO (1962)
File: 303
-
January December, 1963
-
Several sets of minutes have the following notations after
paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special
minutes for additional items." No such "special minutes'
appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same nota-
tion appeared in connection with other subjects.
This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem.
Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of
Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.
Nothing else relevant.
File: January December, 1964
Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to
"explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in
the immediate future." (May 12, 1964)
*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.
NW 78141
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Escope

SECRET
SENSITIVE
- 9 -
The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964)
contained the following: [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)
"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve
the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders.
Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and
stated that he would like to go into the matter further.
Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was
being put on notice and should do everything in its power to
ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then under-
´take prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the
matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law
enforcement."
Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this
meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same
information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA
memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate
leading Cuban government leaders." This memo apparently had
been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General.
[OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following:
"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we
should take to establish the credibility of the report; also
communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should
call the Attorney General personally."
The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee
meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report)
contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba.
Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had
only the following reference to Cuba:
"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for
August were approved and the July operations were noted."
File:
Counterinsurgency
Nothing relevant.
NW 78141
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January June, 1962
-SECRET
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-SECRET
SENSITIVE
-
- 10
-
BOX 7
-
MISCELLANEOUS
Envelope
"Cuba Loose Ends"
No mention of assassination.
લાડોલ
(ત
Much information on Mongoose.
"
-
Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled
'Communism and the Negro Movement A Current Analysis"
contains comments on Dr. King's personal life. Relayed by
J. Edgar Hoover to McCone.
File: "Cuba
-
Background Material"
This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile
crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations.
File: "White House"
This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence
to, from, and of interest to the White House.
NW 78141
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NW 78141
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SENSITIVE
11
BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS
The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this
box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which
purports to list the files in the box.
File: Cuba 1962
Nothing relevant to assassinations.
File: Cuba 1964
February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central
Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs
Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect
to Cuba." This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible
courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with
respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as
an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It,
however, contains no mention or reference to possible assassi-
nation of Castro.
BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS
File:
Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964
Nothing relevant to assassination.
File: "M" File
Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.
File: "D" File
This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen
Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement.
There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.
File: "W" File
Nothing relevant.
Docld:32201331 Page 13
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SECRET
SENSITIVE
-
12 -
-
BOX 4:
MISCELLANEOUS
From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely
to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this
box were not examined.
NW 78141
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པ་་ ་
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500
April 30, 1975
MEMORANDUM
To:
File
From:
Mason Cargill MC.
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
Subject: MONGOOSE MATERIALS RETAINED BY THE CIA
de
8 Aug 94
(1)(c)
(2 pages only)
Joseph Selzer of the Inspector General staff made
available to me all the materials he has been able to assemble
from CIA sources concerning Project MONGOOSE. These consist
of three file folders and one loose-leaf binder. I have
examined them to determine if any reference is made to assassi-
nation, liquidation, or elimination of Castro.
The first document in this pile is a copy of the
minutes of the August 10, 1962, meeting of the special group
augmented, prepared by Tom Parrot. They were forwarded to
Dr. Chamberlain, the CIA Inspector General, by Robroy Ratliff,
a CIA employee detailed to the National Security Council. A
cover memo of April 18, 1975, was attached, may be of some
interest, and reads as follows:
"FYI, We received a request from Belin
of the Vice President's Commission to
examine our files on MONGOOSE and other
Cuban and D.R. files. While this request
has not been resolved, the preliminary
response is not to allow this access.
Signed Robroy Ratliff.
11
The minutes of the August 10, 1962, meeting
contained no mention, implicit or explicit, of assassination.
The first complete file examined was a long green
cardboard file without a title on it. Inside, however, it is
indicated to be a record of Special Group meetings and
B
འན་ན་་མ་ན་་་ང་རབས་དཔ་བས་ཁྱད་ ངས་
NW 78141
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TOP SECRET
SENSITIV
TOP SECRET
SENSI
2
11
Special Group (Augmented) meetings at which General Carter
participated and discussions of Cuba and/or Cuban overflights
during the period August 15 to November 14, 1962. This file
contains a memorandum dated October 16, 1962, from General
Carter to the Special Group Augmented, Subject: "Operation
MONGOOSE Sabotage Proposals. Paragraph 1c of this memorandum
contains a proposal that the CIA undertake grenade attack on
24 the Chinese Communist Embassy in Havana, to be carried out by
a recruited Cuban agent who has access to a roof overlooking
the embassy) garden and who has volunteered for this mission."
24
The second file in this collection is entitled
simply "MONGOOSE." This contains nothing relevant to the
assassination inquiry.
a
I found
Next in this collection in a large manila
envelope on which is written in ink the following notation:
"Separate cover attachment to ER75-5938." This envelope
contains miscellaneous papers related to MONGOOSE. The
documents in this envelope contain, among other things,
long list of potential sabotage targets within Cuba.
no reference to assassination, either explicit or implicit.
The next file examined is marked "Cuba Special
Subject." This file also contains miscellaneous papers
relating to Project MONGOOSE, none of which contain any
references to assassination.
The last item of this MONGOOSE package consists
of a bulky loose-leaf binder of papers assembled for General
Carter's reference of significant things that happened during
the period of August to October, 1962. In this notebook, the
Inspector General has already flagged entries which refer in
any way to Operation MONGOOSE. I have examined all such
entries.
গাস
NW 78141
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500
April 30, 1975
To:
File
From:
Mason Cargill MC
Subject: PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND QJWIN
On April 25, 1975, I was given three file folders
containing material on the above subjects by Mr. Joseph Selzer
of the Inspector General's staff. According to Mr. Selzer, his
review of these files indicates that the basic purpose of
ZRRIFLE and its asset QJWIN was the burglarization of premises
outside the United States for the purpose of obtaining crypto-
logic materials. He assures me that there is nothing in these
files which refer explicitly or implicitly to assassination or
"executive action" in any form. His opinion is that clandes-
tine operatives of the type who wrote the documents contained
in these files would never commit to writing anything having
to do with the subject of assassination.
The first file reviewed is entitled "ZRRIFLE/QJWIN/
RYBAT OPERATIONAL. The following entries in this file seem
to have some potential relevance:
12-10
1. Dispatch, dated November 1, 1960, to Chief of Station,
Dakar), and Chief of Station, Luxembourg, from Chief, KUTUBE/D
at headquarters. This three-page dispatch apparently deals
with a mission on which a recruited agent, Jose Marie Andre
Mankel, will be sent from Luxembourg, where he was recruited,
to Dakar for the purpose of recruiting certain other agents
from among criminal elements there, specifically Corsicans.
The purpose for which these agents would ultimately be used
is not clear from this dispatch. However, paragraph 2a reads
as follows: "In view of the extreme sensitivity of the
VN
NW 78141
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
Kp 12 Apr 99
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8 Aug 74
(1) (A)
(12)
(iz prizes)
TOP SECRET
SENSIT
-
2 -
(Comment:
objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was
not told precisely what we want him to do. Instead, he was
told that we have evidence of Soviet operations among
nationality groups in Africa, specifically, Corsicans, and
that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend
some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use.
It was thought best to withhold our true, specific require-
ments pending the final decision to use MANKEL.) He agreed
to go on the trip for us." It is not clear from this dispatch
that Chiefs of Station in Luxembourg and (Dakar were completely
witting of the purpose for which Mankel is being sent to Dakar.
Paragraph 3 contains the following sentence: "Rabney gave
Jouvenoy [Chief of Station, Luxembourg] the same briefing p-to
concerning our purposes as he had given to the CACHECKCHECK:D:D:D:D:D:::::::).
The remainder of the dispatch deals with details of the con-
tacts with Americans which Mankel may make in Dakar if he
requires further assistance, including instruction for bringing
about a clandestine meeting.
15-20
"
11
વિજય પી. આમ જ
"Leopoldvill
2. Cable dated November 2, 1960, from (Frankfurt) to th
Director with the notation: "Action: C/FI/D-4. This cab
contains the following statement in paragraph 1: "Altman m <
Mankel 2 November. He accepted offer to procede Leopoldvil
Precise mission not conveyed to him, he only informed that
mission might involve large element of personal risk."
2-10
3. Cable, dated November 3, 1960, from Director to
stations at Luxembourg and (Dakar). This cable contains the
first identification of Mankel with the code name QJWIN.
The cable reads as follows: "(AUDW) 147 on QJWIN trip Dakar
pouched both stations 3 November. Confirm receipt by cable.
2-20" Luxembourg: will advise when to brief him on Dakar
mission after receipt further info from Altman per paragraph¨
to (FRANCE) 16959/(IN36814) on Leopoldville mission." This cable
contains the following code word references: RYBAT, LAURICLE,
ZRACORN.
4.
Cable from Leopoldville to Director, with action
to C/FI/D4, dated 5 November 1960. It contains the following
paragraph:
May
be
released
&
bind
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"Please inform Mankel he should proceed Leopoldville
as soon as shots completed. Not necessary have Congo visa.
Should go Paris and take Air France flight to Brazzaville
and can obtain visa for Brazzaville in Paris."
This cable contains a handwritten note in the margin as
follows: "One copy given to Mr. Bissell by IS/Duty Off.
Saturday. Action to be taken by DDP. E.B."
-
AIR FRANCE
Eéan
Le
released
5. Cable, dated November 9, 1960, to Luxembourg from
Director. It contains the following statement: "Unless yo
advised to contrary by Altman, brief QJWIN on Dakar mission,
using notes left during Rabney visit...Please insure he
thoroughly rehearsed all details since we anticipate he will
go from Leopoldville to Dakar with no opportunity reviewing
briefing..
་་
6. Cable, November 11, 1960, to Director, from
Luxembourg. Paragraph 2 contains the following statement:
"QJWIN recommended two French contacts who agree undertake
unspecified job. Arrangement made for direct access without
QJWIN if Altman interested..."
7. Cable, dated November 12, 1960, to Director, from
Leopoldville. This cable requests the immediate departure
of QJWIN for Leopoldville, and contains the following state-
ment: "Local operational circumstances require immediate
expediting of QJWIN travel to Leopoldville.
"
8. The file contains several documents apparently
describing various Italians in the area of Trieste who have
They
the capability to break and enter and crack safes.
appeared to be of questionable morality. Reports on the safe-
crackers were transmitted in a dispatch from the Chief of
Station in (Rome) to the Chief, KUDOVE/D. The names of the 6
safecrackers in question are (Sabatti), Cuccagna), and (Bernardini).
ов
06
9. Cable, dated December 8, 1960, from Leopoldville to
the Director. It indicates that one purpose of QJWIN's
presence in Leopoldville is to recruit a major in the
[Yugoslavian] air force, through framing him up in an illegal
smuggling transaction. This recruitment is apparently for
the purpose of collecting information from within the
Yugoslavian government.
་།
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10. Cable, dated December 14, 1960, from headquarters
to Leopoldville. The cable criticizes Leopoldville for using
QJWIN for the purpose of recruiting the Yugoslav) major, since
this was not his primary purpose in Leopoldville! Cable con-
tains the following statement: "Would like restrict QJWIN to
activity directly pertinent his mission Leopoldville or forth-
coming mission Dakar and possibly elsewhere (e.g., Milan) for
KUTUBE/D purposes. He our only asset of this type and we
wish keep him clean of any operational involvement other than
that originally planned for him." This is the first cable
from headquarters on which the name of William K. Harvey appears.
Cable, dated December 17, 1960, from Leopoldville
to Director. This cable concerned a new asset entering the
picture for the first time, who arrived in Leopoldville on
December 2. The cable states that WIROGUE was the asset with
whom initial contact has been made in Leopoldville. WIROGUE
is living in the same hotel as QJWIN with whom he conversed.
QJWIN has reported: "WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month
to participate in intel net and be member execution squad.
When QJWIN said he not interested, WIROGUE added there would
be bonuses for special jobs. Under QJWIN questioning, WIROGUE
later said he working for PBPRIME service.":
11.
12.
Cable, dated January 19, 1961, from Director to
Luxembourg. This cable apparently indicates that the Agency
plans to use QJWIN in Leopoldville for more than one particular
mission. It contained the following statement: "Inform
QJWIN we planning use him Leopoldville indefinitely as dis-
cussed with him there."
13.
There follows a series of cables reflecting the
fact that QJWIN proceeds to Italy to recruit other assets.
One cable admonishes field agents to tell QJWIN not to give
reason to any of the candidates to be recruited in Italy to
believe that ODYOKE or PBPRIME is involved.
I get the
impression that ODYOKE refers to the U.S. CIA, and PBPRIME
refers to the intelligence service of some other nation.
However, no document uncovered so far confirms this. Cables
which follow seem to indicate that the people QJWIN was to
recruit were intended to be professional burglars. There is
no indication that they are intended to be assassins. There
are many other indications that these recruits were intended
for safecracking and breaking and entering. QJWIN told them
he could offer a job for a large firm which wanted certain
commercial documents stolen.
་་་་་་་་ག་་ མམ་ན་ཐང་ད་ན་བལག་ཁག་གས་་ཁོང་འཐ་
Վիվ
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5 =
14. Subsequent cables and dispatches indicate other
efforts on the part of QJWIN to recruit safecrackers in
France and Italy.
It
15. Dispatch dated June 7, 1961, from headquarters,
Chief, KUTUBE/D to the Chief of Station in Luxembourg.
contains a long discussion of the Agency's relationship with
QJWIN and his main purpose as an agent. This dispatch makes
it clear that the primary purpose of QJWIN's employment by
the Agency is to recruit burglars and safecrackers for use
by the CIA. This dispatch contains the first reference I
have found to the code word ZRRIFLE. The one thing that seems
rather unclear is why QJWIN was initially sent to Leopoldville,
and apparently was contemplated to return to Leopoldville, when
all of his recruiting of safecrackers and burglars takes place
in Europe.
The fact that his return to Leopoldville was con-
templated may be easily seen from paragraph one of this cable.
The releasing officer on this cable was Mr. William K. Harvey.
16. Correspondence and cables indicate that one James
Rabney from CIA headquarters visited Europe in April and
March of 1961 for the purpose of meeting with Mankel to discuss
possible recruits for safecracking operations.
17. Dispatch dated December 15, 1961, from Chief of
Station in Luxembourg to Headquarters, Chief, KUTUBE/D. It.
discusses the efforts of QJWIN to recruit two safecrackers in
Switzerland. It indicates that two French citizens, named
06 Santelli) and Garioni) were asked to come to Switzerland under
false pretenses by QJWIN for the purpose of being interviewed,
The following passage in the dispatch indicates clearly these
men were to be recruited for the purpose of the safecracking of
and surreptitious entry. "During the interview with (Santelli),
06 (Garioni) observed that for a night job he would need an
assistant to help him with carrying the equipment and to act
as lookout. He said he would prefer to do the job during
working hours; for this he would get three or four others to
help him and force someone in the office to open the safe."
18. Dispatch dated February 2, 1962, from Chief of
Station Luxembourg to Headquarters, Chief, KUTUBE/D. It
discusses the efforts of the Luxembourg station to provide
acceptable cover for Mankel in, Germany, where the Agency has
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decided to locate him. The plan seems to be for Mankel to
develop a business as an art dealer in some German town selling
French paintings. It is contemplated that the Agency will
supply the initial capital for the formation of his business.
The final sentence in this dispatch asked headquarters for
projected operational plans for QJWIN.
19. Cable, dated March 17, 1962, from Director to
Luxembourg indicates that the Agency still contemplates some
activity for Mankel in Leopoldville. Paragraph 2 of this cable
reads as follows: "Tell him will at same time discuss
Leopoldville assignment and have him sign contract." The
cable directs Luxembourg to tell Mankel to meet James Rabney
at certain locations in Germany on the 28th and 29th of March,
1961, telling him to be prepared to travel in Europe for about
two weeks.
20. Cable dated April 18, 1962, from Headquarters to
Luxembourg states that another agent (②JBANNER-5) had informed
the Agency that QJWIN is going on trial after Easter on charges
of cobalt smuggling from 1957 or 1958 and could receive up to a
· six-year sentence. Paragraph 2 of the cable states, "Please
contact QJWIN for all details including specific charges and
name prosecutor. If, QJBANNER-5) info true we may wish attempt
quash charges or arrange somehow salvage QJWIN for our purposes."
Paragraph 3 states, "Still do not have basic decisions but
fully anticipate we will need QJWIN.'
"
21.
Cable, dated April 26, 1962, from Luxembourg to
Headquarters indicates that QJWIN's trial will be completed on
April 29. He expects to be fined but not subject to a jail
sentence. Some indication of the Agency's intents with
respect to QJWIN may be discerned from paragraph 4 which
reads as follows: "While we do not know present long-term
plans for QJWIN, he has no lead to other candidates. His
potential appears restricted activation to candidates OLLA
1426 or personal spot action. Suggest either could be done
from Leopold base and question if not preferable move him to
Leopold assignment now. 'There is a handwritten notation
beside the first sentence of paragraph 4 which states, "Not
the point." Beside the last sentence of this paragraph is
the handwritten notation, "How?"
"
་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་་ན་མན----་ ར་ ་འང་དམང་ཚང་དང་ས་ར་དང་སང་་པ་འབ
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22. Cable dated May 24, 1962, to Luxembourg from
Headquarters indicates that the Agency has changed its plans
about assigning QJWIN any duties in Leopoldville. Paragraph 2
reads, "Decision made keep QJWIN Europe. Leopoldville assign-
ment canceled." 
Cable also indicates that headquarters
approves of Mankel's proposed move to Germany, probably
Baden-Baden.
23. Memorandum dated July 3, 1962, WKH [presumably
William K. Harvey] from AMS, re ZRRIFLE. This memo discusses
possible future uses for QJWIN. It seems perfectly consistent
with the use of QJWIN merely for the purpose of recruiting
safecrackers and burglars. Paragraph 4 of this memo refers to
some ZRRIFLE authorization paper: "I have already given you
the ZRRIFLE 
authorization paper signed by Helms and Skip has
been given QJWIN contract, including the extension to 1.
March 1963." An attachment to this memorandum gives details
on two possible candidates for burglary and safecracking. In
this attachment there are two references, however, which may
be somewhat disturbing: One candidate is stated to be "willing
to use gun"; the second "wanted to know if he should be armed
for job--ready to go to the end."
24. Immediately following a dispatch dated
December 7, 1962, from Luxembourg to headquarters, there
appears in the files two pages of penciled notes on yellow
"buck-slip" type paper which are difficult to read but may
be relevant. At the top of the first page appears the word
QJWIN. On this page appears the following words, which are
barely legible: 7"In 1961 by Bill H or Bissell used (Arnold C
Estale (or (Estate) 30 direct action capability established in
B [illegible] QJWIN Luxembourg principal prelim capability
for fourth country. QJWIN spotted three or four--moved to
Italy..."
03
25. Dispatch from Luxembourg to Headquarters Chief,
KUTUBE, dated February 14, 1964, indicates that QJWIN has
been terminated. Paragraph 1 reads in part, "QJWIN has been
terminated. "Rozeney told him on 21 April that the operation
in which he was to play a role had been shelved and therefore
his contract, which ran out on 29 February, was not renewed.
He was reassured that this action did not result from anything
he had done and his past cooperation was appreciated.
It was
mentioned as conceivable that the operation might have been
off and running if he had been able to establish his cover
last year.
"
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8
Another file examined was entitled "ZRRIFLE
Administrative/Financial"; it is a long manila-type file.
The following items of possible interest were noted in this
file:
1. Memorandum dated January 11, 1961, to the Finance
Division from William K. Harvey, Chief FI/D deals with the
payments for Mankel's trip to Leopoldville. Paragraph 2 of
this memo states, "In order to avoid any misunderstanding,
it should be noted that QJWIN was sent on this trip for a
specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been
completed. Although future use of QJWIN is not precluded, it
was not deemed fitting during this one use of him to enter
into a continuing contractual relationship or to have him sign
any memorandum of understanding."
2. Memorandum, dated January 31, 1961, for Chief,
Accounts Branch, Finance Division, from Justin E. O'Donnell,
Subject: Payments to QJWIN. Paragraph 1 of this memorandum reads
as follows: "QJWIN was recruited in Frankfurt 1 November 1960
to undertake a one-shot mission to the Belgian Congo. Because
the mission potentially involved great personal risk to him
and he was obliged to separate himself from his business affairs,
it was agreed orally by this writer with QJWIN that his com-
pensation would be at the rate of $1,000 per month, plus his
expenses, for a period of not less than one month and not more
than two months." These two financial memoranda, numbers 1 and
2 here, seem to indicate a one-shot purpose for QJWIN in con-
nection with a Congo operation, which seems inconsistent with
many of the papers in the operational file reviewed above,
which indicated an ongoing relationship with QJWIN for the
purposes of recruiting safecrackers and burglars. These
financial memoranda are certainly quite consistent with a plan
to use QJWIN for a one-shot assassination attempt in the
Belgian Congo. It is unclear that merely recruiting safe-
crackers and burglars or even performing safecracking and
burglary missions, would have involved "potential great
personal risk" to QJWIN.
3.
Memorandum, dated March 24, 1961, for Cable
Secretariat from William K. Harvey, Chief, FI/Division D,
Subject: "Distribution of ZRRIFLE Traffic.' "
Paragraph 1
of this memorandum reads, "Two copies of all cables bearing
the ZRRIFLE indicator are to be delivered in a sealed envelope
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"
No other
directly to Chief, FI/Division D, 1502 L Building.
distribution is to be made without the specific approval in
each instance of the Chief, FI/D. Paragraph 2 reads, "The
above has been personally approved by the Deputy Director
(Plans)." I question whether such close handling of cable
traffic is not unusual even in a case involving safecracking
and burglary. Perhaps Harvey intended traffic of more
sensitive issues to be passed through the ZRRIFLE channel.
Within
4. In a large manila envelope filed immediately
after a dispatch to Luxembourg from the Chief, KUTUBE, dated
September 30, 1963, is a large manila envelope marked
"Documents in Receipt Supporting ZRRIFLE Activities."
this envelope are several smaller manila envelopes, one of
which is entitled "ZRRIFLE, Receipts for Accounting Submitted
by WK Harvey, Receipt for Operational Phone Calls May 15, 1963."
Within this envelope are two sheets of yellow legal size paper
which contain lists of operational expenses submitted by W.K.
Harvey covering the period April 13-21, 1963, all of which are
to be charged as operational expenses to QJWIN/ZRRIFLE. These
expenses cover hotel expenses in Miami and Perine, Florida,
long distance hotel calls for these locations, plus $75 for a
boat chartered for operational purposes at Islamorada, Florida.
A hotel receipt indicates Harvey paid the bill of a Mr. John A.
Wallston of 56510 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
for the nights of April 17, 18, and 19, and a Miami hotel,
probably the Eden Roc. These documents are the first indication
of any activities within the U.S. with respect to ZRRIFLE.
Apparently they did not involve QJWIN but rather other
activity, perhaps directed at Cuba because of his location in
Miami. Perhaps Harvey should be confronted with this listing
and asked to explain it.
A third file was examined, which was marked "ZRRIFLE-
QJWIN Project/Contract. The following items of interest were
found:
"
1. A long memorandum written in ink in longhand on sheets
of yellow, legal size paper at the very back of this file
entitled "Project ZRRIFLE. This is apparently justification
material submitted for the project. The first portion of this
memorandum seems to end abruptly at the end of the second page;
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perhaps the subsequent pages are missing. These first two
pages portray the objective of ZRRIFLE to be that of pro-
curement of code and cipher materials by burglary and safe-
cracking. However, subsequent pages, particularly the last
four legal size pages in this file, contain what appears to
be the outline of something which could be the establishment
of an "executive action capability," although these words are
not mentioned nor is the word "assassination." A copy of these
pages should definitely be obtained. Paragraph 1 of these
pages reads as follows, "Legal, ethical, moral, operational
problems; political nonattributability. Paragraph 2 reads
in part:
"Our own experience (Bangkok) (and affect on DDP)
and experiences with KGB...require most professional, proven
operationally competent ruthless stable CE experience ops
officers..."
"
Paragraph 3 of this memo is entitled "Maximum Security";
subparagraph 3b reads: "Within KUBARK one focal point for
control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. DDP authority
in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?"
Paragraph 3c reads as follows: "Max. security cable COMMO
for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; pos-
sibility of one man overseas (Europe) control base with own
(nonstation) COMMO. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re
trips." Paragraph 3f reads as follows, "No use of any agent
who ever worked for a U.S. government agency. Tracing by
opposition would reveal." Paragraph 31 reads, "Pretext:
KUTUBE/D search; this established (e.g., Rome)." Paragraph 3j
reads, "No discussion in stations." Paragraph 3k reads, "No
'team' until ready to go, if at all." Paragraph 4 reads:
"Blackmail: A. No American citizens or residents or people
whoever obtained U.S. visas. B. No chain of connections:
Strictly person to person; singleton ops. C. No meeting any
candidate in home territory. D. Exclude organizations; e.g.,
Sicilians, criminals, those with record of arrest, those with
instability of purpose as criminals. E. Staffers involved--
selection." Paragraph 5 reads, "Cover: Planning should
include provision for blaming Soviets or Czechs in case of
blow."
[This seems to indicate ZRRIFLE is not limited to
burglary of embassies; how could you blame the Soviets or
the Czechs for burglarizing their own embassies?] Paragraph
9 reads, "Should have phoney 201 in records to backstop this
[referring to blaming the Soviets or the Czechs], all documents
therein forged and backdated. Should look like a CE' file."
Paragraph 11 reads, "Silverthorne.
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-
On the following page of these papers, the paragraphs
are numbered again from one. On this page a large ink X has
been placed over the page; however, it is still legible.
Paragraph 1 of this page reads, "Maximum security plus within
KUBARK only (e.g., How much does Sivagusa (?) now know?).
Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering and deciphering.
Guise of LAURICLE objective. Paragraph 5 reads, "No chain
of connections permitting blackmail."
2. Memorandum, dated February 19, 1962, from Richard
Helms, Deputy Director (Plans), to William K. Harvey, Subject:
"Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities." This memorandum
authorizes Harvey to retain the services of agent QJWIN "and
such other principal agents and subagents as may be required."
Memorandum does not state the purpose of the ZRRIFLE project.
3. Filed immediately after a memorandum dated March 6,
1969, from Richard Helms to William K. Harvey, is a normal
business size white envelope containing the following notation
on the front in penciled handwriting, "Lloyd very personal
from Bill H." Within this envelope is a small yellow piece
of paper containing the following notation in penciled hand-
writing, "John Rosselli, alias John Ralston--Wm. Walker.'
"
4. A memorandum dated June 27, 1963, for Chief,
Foreign Intelligence, from William K. Harvey, Subject: QJWIN.
This memo states that QJWIN is currently not being used for
any operational purposes. It discusses whether or not he
should be retained as an agent. Paragraph 2 seems to indicate
that the executive action portion of QJWIN's project, if any,
has been terminated. This paragraph reads: "As far as the
ZRRIFLE aspects of this operation which has been covered under
the QJWIN authorization for security reasons and with which
Fletcher M. Knight is fully familiar as I orally advised you
on June 26, 1963, except for one precautionary 'lifeline,'
aspects of this case have been terminated and need no longer,
except perhaps for minor accountings, be considered as a part
of this project."
A last file of the ZRRIFLE series examined is entitled
"ZRRIFLE Name Traces/Personality Sketches." Items of interest
in this file are as follows:
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1. Piece of thin white paper under tab C, the heading
of which is "Secret-RYBAT." This document is a list of traits
which desired recruits would have. This is similar to the
list of traits deemed desirable in the handwritten memorandum
contained in the far rear of the previous file reviewed. This
set of characteristics, however, could refer to burglars and
safecrackers as well as assassins. This is indicated by
paragraph 8 which reads, "Commercial firms (unspecified) –
industrial documents cover."
2.
об
--
Included under tab M is a dossier of one (Harold
Meltzer) a resident of Los Angeles, with a long criminal
This is the first instance in which I have noted
a U.S. citizen under consideration for any recruitment with
respect to the ZRRIFLE project.
06
record.
3.
Under tab T, information on (Orlando Portale), an
Italian citizen residing in Detroit, is included.
ов
4. At tab Y is a page of information on one (Hanna
Yazbeck The report states, "He often heads up a hatchet
squad when disputes arise between the Moslem and Christian
underworld factions in Beirut." The second paragraph of this
page reads as follows: "During the period I was in Europe
(1950-1958), his chief bodyguard was a convicted murderer who
owed his release from prison to Yazbeck's power. This body-
guard has since been murdered, but: DC_Cacheck:):):) has an available
pool of assassins."
06
5/Ad
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