JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10017
RECORDS SERIES: HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 05-H-01
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM:
TO :
TITLE :
DATE: 02/11/76
PAGES: 106
SUBJECTS:
Date: 08/04/95
Page:
1
AMLASH
CIA
Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025
CASTRO,
FIDEL
DOCUMENT TYPE:
TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Box 2
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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The United States Senate
12574
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Wednesday, February 11,1976
Washington, D. C.
(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)
WARD & PAUL
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2 TESTIMONY OF:
3 AMLASH Case Officer
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CONTENTS
EXHIBITS
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AMLASH Case Officer Exhibit No. 1
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EXECUTIVE SESSION
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Wednesday, February 11, 1976
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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 o'clock
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am., in Room 608, Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richard
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S. Schweiker presiding.
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Present:
Senator Schweiker (presiding).
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Staff: Paul Wallach, Ed Greissing, Jim Johnston, Dan Dwyer
and Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Members.
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PROCEEDINGS
Senator Schweiker. Will you stand and raise your right
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to
give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth,
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so help you God?"
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AMLASH Case Officer.
I do.
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Mr. Johnston.
First of all, sir, we'll start with some
procedural matters.
I'm not going to ask you to state your
name for the record because we have agreed before beginning
here today that you would testify under an alias so as not to
jeopardize your ongoing activities.
Is that the way you understand our agreement?
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TESTIMONY OF AMLASH CASE OFFICER
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
Mr. Johnston. Is that satisfactory to you?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
Mr. Johnston. Now, you understand that at any time we
refer to your participation or your authorship of a document or
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receipt of a document, we are prepared to substantiate the
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reference that we are making, and we are not trying to avoid
proving the fact that it is indeed you that were involved in
the incident. It is simply because we were not able to use
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your name.
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
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Mr. Johnston. Now, you've previously testified before this
Committee, and I assume you've had a copy of the Committee
rules, and we have another copy available in case you want to
refer to them.
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And are you appearing here voluntarily today without
a counsel?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, I am.
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Mr. Johnston. Do you understand that at any point during
this examination you are free to stop answering any questions
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and request the advice of Counsel?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
I do.
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Mr. Johnston. And do you understand as well that all your
constitutional rights are intact here before the Committee
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1 including the Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent, if you
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choose.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
I do.
Mr. Johnston. All right.
Let me state that the purpose of this interview is to
refine and clarify certain questions about the AMLASH operation.
It is my understanding that you were the case officer on
the AMLASH operation from the time period, say, of the first
of September on through, for all relevant purposes, December $6.7,
and November '64, is that correct?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
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Mr. Johnston. At this time you were a member of what was
called the Special Affairs Staff, is that correct?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
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Mr. Johnston.
And that's abbreviated SAS.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Right.
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Mr. Johnston. Would you describe your position in SAS
and your relationship to Mr. Fitzgerald, who was Chief of
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SAS?
AMLASH Case Officer.
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I was a special assistant to Mr.
Fitzgerald, charged with the responsibility of attempting to-
organize a military coup inside Cuba against Fidel Castro.
Mr. Johnston. Did you report directly to Mr. Fitzgerald
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or your work?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes,
I did.
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Mr. Johnston.
Was there anyone else knowledgeable in
SAS of what you were doing?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Only the other people who were
involved working on the project.
Mr. Johnston. What was the relationship between SAS and
the Western Hemisphere Division under, at that time, I believe,
Mr. J. C. King?
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall exactly what the
organizational relationship was at that time.
I do know that
I wouldn't say autonomous basis
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we operated on a somewhat
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from Mr. Fitzgerald, not necessarily through the Division
from the Division itself, but the chain of command was certainly
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Mr. Johnston. Who was Mr. Helms.
AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.
Mr. Johnston. In other words, there could be direct
reporting from Mr. Fitzgerald to Mr. Helms.
AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.
Mr. Johnston. Is it necessary that Mr. King was knowledgeable
of all operations of SAS?
AMLASH Case Officer. Not necessarily.
I don't know if he
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was kept fully advised of all the operations or not.
Mr. Johnston. Did he know generally what you were doing?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Mr. Johnston.
I presume he did, yes.
And how often did he and Mr. Fitzgerald
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meet to coordinate.
They do coordination of their work?
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I wasn't involved
in that part of it.
Mr. Johnston. Was SAS targeted directly at Cuba, or
were there other countries under its jurisdiction?
AMLASH Case Officer. No. SAS was strictly a task force
set up to deal with the Cuban problem.
Mr. Johnston. And finally on this general matter, who
--
who gave the counterintelligence support for SAS operations?
AMLASH Case Officer. We had a Counterintelligence Branch
within SAS.
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did
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Mr. Johnston. Who headed that in the fall of '637
AMLASH Case Officer.
I don't recall. There was a change.
I don't recall the name.
--
Mr. Johnston. Let me as I stated earlier, you of
course have testified before, and I have before me the
transcript and I'm not proposing really to trap you in any nature
with this transcript. However, there are some things that were
not asked before that I would like to clarify.
First of all, how and why was AMLASH first contacted to
set up the September meeting that you attended?
AMLASH Case Officer. He had been contacted the year before
in Helsinki, and we found out at that time that he was coming
out to a sporting event in the Western Hemisphere, so we went
down and contacted him.
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Mr.
Johnston.
In my review of the file
--
and I don't think
we have the document here today, but my notes indicate there
was a cable from Langley to Rome on 19 June 1963, that is in
q the AMLASH file.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Would you repeat the question?
Mr. Johnston. In my review of the AMLASH file, there is
a cable from headquarters to Rome on 19 June 1963 which states
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that AMWHIP, who was your contact with AMLASH, had sent a letter
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as part of "an activation effort to reluctant dragon."
I ask do you have any recollection or any knowledge
'
that this was a sign to AMLASH that CIA was back in contact
with him or wanted to go back in contact with him?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
I can't comment on that because
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I didn't get into the operation until September of '63, and
this took place before I became involved in that part of the
AMLASH operation.
Mr. Johnston. So in other words, you're saying you don't
really know who made the contact with AMLASH?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
We had contact with AMLASH from the
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year before.
He had been contacted by a CIA case officer in
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Helsinki.
Mr.
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Johnston. In July and August, 1962.
AMLASH Case Officer.
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Right.
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Mr. Johnston.
Then he returned to Cuba.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
And this was the first time, to
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the best of my knowledge, that he had come out from Cuba
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Mr. Johnston. In other words, you're not aware of any
prior contact between CIA or an intermediary and AMLASH?
AMLASH Case Officer. Not between that period of time.
Mr. Johnston.
All right.
You met with AMLASH in Brazil
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on September 5th through 9th.
I don't mean you specifically,
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instructions to the effect
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but the general meetings with AMLASH were in that time frame.
Is that your recollection?
AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.
Mr. Johnston. Do you recall seeing a cable, or receiving
and this is
instructions from headquarters to the effect
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after your series of meetings
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that headquarters felt that AMLASH appeared hopeless as an
intelligence performer, and should be approached as a chief
conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts.
He should
be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him
initially in FI and ops reporting and then progress to sabotage
and more serious matters on a more orderly basis.
Do you recall seeing something to that effect after your
Brazil meetings with him?
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall the cable
in line with the thinking
itself, but certainly that would be
at that time.
If I may state, he was not considered a controlled asset,
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shall we say, and it was somebody with whom we felt that we
could collaborate in organizing the internal group.
Mr. Johnston. But my summary of the cable would indicate
4 that on September 9th, or after your meetings in Brazil, you
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really didn't think of him as a gatherer of information, but
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as someone who wanted to go on to other things, as a
conspirator of some kind.
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
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Mr. Johnston. The file also has a document in it, the
AMLASH file, dated 16 September, marked OFPA 72775. I don't
really know what an OFPA is.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
It's a dispatch.
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Mr. Johnston. In any event, it reports a transcript of
the conversation, and to the best of my ability to understand
the document, it's a conversation of an intercept in the Cuban
Embassy in Paris The document says "Mary: I don't want to
imagine things, but this thing of" AMLASH uses his real
--
name.
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I have sanitized this
--
"Moreno.
It is either a
п
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tremendous secret or a top secret matter. And then there is an
unreadable portion, and then a word either "treason" or
3 "reason" I'm not sure what is referred to, and then a partici-
22 pant whose name is Betty says, "I believe it is a top secret
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matter."
My question to you is, did you, in September of '63, know
about this intercept?
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AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall today
that I would have known about it. I presume if we had it in
3 file, that I was working with it, that I would have seen it.
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Mr. Johnston. Do you have any information about any recollec-
5 tion about something on this order?
AMLASH Case Officer. No.
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Mr. Johnston. And assume that at least the portion I
quoted seems to reflect on the Cubans' view of AMLASH's
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activities in Paris.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, it may have. As I recall, I
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think that he was also at that time I may be wrong, and we
would have to go back to the files to check, but he was rather
outspoken to some of his closer friends in the fact that he was
no longer happy with the revolution, with Castro.
Mr. Johnston. I don't want to dwell on this, if you don't
have a recollection, but this conversation seems to indicate
that the employees in the Cuban-embassy think that AMLASH is
there on a top secret mission.
bassy]
AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so because of his independent
way of comportment. He didn't answer to anybody.
--
Senator Schweiker.
What was his role in government at
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that point?
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AMLASH Case Officer. He was
excuse me, this must have
been '63.
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He was a personal representative of Castro to the
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games, first in Brazil, and
I don't think he had a specific
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post in '63, as I recall.
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He had been Deputy Minister of
Interior. He had been a military attache in Spain.
he had a specific post at that time.
I don't think
Excuse me, if I may add just one more point. Before that he
had been President of the Student Federation at the University
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of Havana. He may still have been in that post, or about the
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time that he was getting out of it, and this is, I think, where
really the trouble between this particular fellow and the Castrol
brothers more or less came to ahead.
Mr. Johnston.
On the 19th of September, Jim Wave sent a
message to headquarters basically warning, giving a warning,
12 making the statement that there was an anti-Communist group in
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Cuba,
and the name AMLASH is part of that group, and it concluded
by saying that Fidel is allegedly aware of both the anti-Communist
group and a Communist group, and that he acts as a moderator
between them in order to maintain cohesion in the government of
Cuba.
Do you recall receiving that information?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
I don't recall specifically receiving
that information, but I do recall that at that time Fidel
--
was concerned about a
Castro himself was talking about
Communist takeover of the revolution, and he did meet with the
subject and some other friends of his in order to prevent this.
When was this?
Mr. Johnston.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
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This was in the early '60s sometime.
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Senator Schweiker.
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What year were you in?
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Mr. Johnston.
'63.
ارم
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AMLASH Case Officer.
This was before '63.
This must have
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Mr. Wallach.
This is before his trip to the Soviet
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Union?
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Mr. Johnston.
Before Castro's trip?
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Mr. Wallach.
Right.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
MR. Johnston.
The question being put is after your
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AMLASH Case Officer.
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Yes.
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meeting in Brazil with AMLASH, Jim Wave cabled headquarters that
AMLASH was part of a group of anti-Communist Cuban government
leaders and that Castro was
aware of that fact.
My answer to you is that he certainly
was because he had been talking with these people, including
AMLASH, a year before.
Senator Schweiker.
Castro was aware that he was anti-
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Communist?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, that he was one of the anti-
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Communist group.
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Senator Schweiker.
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as anti-Communist?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
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Castro.
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Why would he be so trusted and be the
special representative at that point in time if he was known
Because of the relationship with
Castro himself had not declared his Communist, more or
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less intentions, as of that time.
Senator Schweiker. Wait, this was after the Cuban missile
3 crisis. This was '63, and the Cuban missile crisis was '62.
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I'm confused here.
AMLASH Case Officer. Let's go back to the dates here.
Senator Schweiker. The Jim Wave date is September 1963,
and he knows at this point, allegedly now, that this AMLASH
was a member of an anti-Communist group. I have trouble
reconciling that with not pinpointing AMLASH and his possible
subversive agent. I think that is what Jim is getting to.
AMLASH Case Officer. Again, my answer is I don't know
specifically why or what the origin of the '63 J. M. Wave
cable was.
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Mr. Johnston. Let me move on into October. There was a
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meeting with AMLASH.
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Senator Schweiker.
How long did he tolerate anti-Communist
My answer again to the question is that Castro, from his
previous knowledge, going back to '62, did know and had consulted
with this group of people of which AMLASH was one, who were the
group of Anti-Communist officers in the revolution.
Mr. Johnston. So
--
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know why in '63 this report
would have come out, but it would confirm Castro's knowledge
of this group, yes.
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officers in high positions in his government? I've got to
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believe there's some cutoff here.
I realize the uniqueness and
broadness of his support earlier, but it would just seem to me
that at some point he really had to weed out, nottnecessarily
weed out or be suspect of anti-Communist officers who had too
high decision making in his government, would he not, or am I
missing something?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
No, not really, because out of this
group that was mentioned, and with whom he himself discussed
the need in the early '60s to keep, say, the Communists out,
some of those officers are still in his goverment today.
Now, they may have changed, or Castro may have changed, but
Maybe he won them
he didn't purge all this group of officers.
over, and if they are still there, evidently he has some
confidence in them.
a meeting on
Mr. Johnston. According to the file, there was
October 5th, apparently, in Paris, and I'm not sure that you were
the case officer at that meeting, and the cable from Paris
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sets the tone of that meeting as AMLASH apparently was trying
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to get things off his chest in talking to you.
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Were you the case officer at that meeting?
AMLASH Case Officer.
I was the case officer during that
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period of time.
Go into a little of the detail because we did talk about
these problems.
Mr. Johnston.
There appeared from the file two meetings.
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in early October 1963, the first meeting on or about October
15
2 5th that AMLASH comes in and says I want to get things off my
3 chest, and seems to express great dissatisfaction with the
q CIA's position.
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Then there's a second meeting on October 13th or so where
he specifically asks to meet with Robert Kennedy, and you
previously testified about that second meeting.
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.
Mr. Johnston. Now, the file indicates there was an
earlier meeting on October 5th, and AMLASH was complaining
11
apparently about the low level espionage matters that had been
12 discussed in Brazil, and implying that he had a more valuable
13 role to play, and the file says the case officer provided the
14 necessary assurances that his feelings were not in fact
true, and that his case was receiving the consideration at
the highest levels.
With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering
AMLASH off his chest, a much more relaxed AMLASH departed,
stating his desire to return to Cuba to undertake the big
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job.
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Do you recall that meeting?
AMLASH Case Officer. I think you are getting those two
meetings mixed up. In other words, the later one, yes. I
was there and talking to him in the second meeting.
25 first meeting I don't recall precisely, but there could have
In the
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been a meeting with a contact in Paris, in other words, not a
case officer, but the contact we had in Paris.
I don't remember
who that was, one of the officers there.
Mr. Johnston. In addition to you he was in contact with
AMLASH Case Officer. Only for purposes of contact. I mean,)
6
only to make contact with me, not to carry on the case.
But
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he knew that the other officer was a friend of mine, and he
8
was in touch with him, and when he came to Paris he would get
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in touch with him. So I would be notified.
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Mr. Johnston. I think you have used his name in the
03
prior transcript, Fred Stent, the case officer?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes,
because he was the one who
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furnished the quarters where we had the meetings.
Mr. Johnston. In furnishing the quarters, did you have a
taping system going as to the discussions that would take place?
No, I don't believe we taped any of
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AMLASH Case Officer.
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those meetings?
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Mr. Johnston. Is it procedure to tape meetings with
19
Agents?
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procedure.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Sometimes it is not physically possible.
Mr. Johnston. Let me go back into this meeting of October
5th, which you don't recall that you were at this meeting, is
Sometimes. It is not a standard
24
that correct?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
There probably could have been the
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meeting when he first arrived in Paris, and the meeting that he
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had
--
I don't recall specifically.
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I do recall, if I may, I do recall that he said he was
unhappy
because of the requirements, the intelligence require-
ments that we had levied on him in Brazil, and it is true that
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his position was at that time, even in Brazil, and later in
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to keep us advised as to what was going on.
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Paris, that he was not disposed to cooperate just to furnish
intelligence.
In other words, he felt that he wanted to do
something about the removal of Castro but was not just prepared
He recognized that
this was certainly part of a needed operation, but he did not
consider himself just as a provider of information.
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Mr. Johnston. Let me go off the record for a minute
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Mr. Johnston.
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because I want to use a code name.
(Discussion off the record.)
Having mentioned the code name that is
used in this cable, you now recall you were at the 5 October
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meeting?
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Mr. Johnston.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
And the cable, you can look at it, indicates
that AMLASH was in a confessional mood.
My question to you is, after recalling that meeting, was
it basically one where he was expressing his concern about
the CIA role for him?
Mr. Johnston.
He was expressing his concern for what?
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Mr. Johnston. The CIA's plans for using him.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes. He was concerned as to how and
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in what way he was to cooperate with CIA.
He was also
and
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we must underline this, right from the beginning, dubious
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as to our resolve to really follow through on initiating a
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coup against Castro.
Mr. Johnston.
Is the cable correct in stating that he was
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assured that his case was receiving consideration at the
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highest levels?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
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Mr. Johnston.
Was the word "highest level" used, or was
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a name used?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Highest levels, but at that stage
of the game he knew he was talking to CIA, so highest levels
in CIA is what was meant at that particular time.
Mr. Johnston.
That's the word you used?
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You didn't say Director McCone?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
I did not use names, no.
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Mr. Johnston.
On October 5th, you reassured him that his
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consideration, that his case was receiving consideration at
least at the highest levels of CIA, and the cable reflects
that when he left that meeting he seemed much more relaxed about
the case.
Is that an accurate portrayal of the meeting?
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
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Mr. Johnston. As I mentioned, there was another meeting
on or about October 13th, where, as I understand it, AMLASH
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made his demand or his request to meet with Robert Kennedy, and
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he made that request to meet with Kennedy by name.
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Is that correct?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes,
he did.
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Well, he said somebody such as, somebody high in the
administration, again, to receive the assurances that we were
prepared to that we were serious about developing and
--
organizing a coup.
Mr. Johnston. After that meeting, you were recalled to
Langley for discussions, is that correct?
AMLASH Case Officer. I was traveling back and forth
between Paris and Langley, yes. I don't recall if I was
recalled at that particular time, but I would go there
--
I
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was TDY.
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case.
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Mr. Johnston. I want to set the stage. There is a
message from the Director, 75683, to London, directing you to
return to headquarters for discussion of all facets of the
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This is after you reported that AMLASH wants to meet
with someone like Robert Kennedy.
Do you recall that flow of events?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
Mr. Johnston. What discussions did you have at Langley,
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and I don't want to go through your previous testimony again,
but basically are we correct in understanding that out of the
discussions at Langley came a decision to go to Paris with
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of Robert Kennedy?
AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.
Mr. Johnston. Then you met on October 29, according to
the file, with AMLASH, Mr. Fitzgerald, in Paris.
Is that correct?
AMLASH Case Officer. Excuse me. Can I go off the
record?
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Wallach. I think you stated that AMLASH said that he
would like to meet with one of the U.S. leaders such as
Robert Kennedy?
AMLASH Case Officer. A high representative in the U.S.
Government.
Mr. Wallach. Did he mention any other names that you
recall?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I recall.
Mr. Wallach. Just Robert Kennedy?
AMLASH Case Officer. Such as Robert Kennedy.
Mr. Wallach. Did AMLASH, to the best of your knowledge,
from what he told you, know about any prior assassination
attempts that had been run by the U.S.?
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No.
Mr. Wallach. Did he have any reason to believe that Robert
3 Kennedy had been involved with any of the sabotage operations
as contrasted with any assassination attempts?
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AMLASH Case Officer. If he knew, he never mentioned it to
We never discussed that.
Mr. Wallach. In other words, you didn't say to him,
how did you know that Robert Kennedy -- or why did you pick
Robert Kennedy.
AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all. I mean, it's a
perfectly, I think, logical name to have been mentioned at
that time, because by him, since he was the President's brother
13 and since he was the Attorney General, he wanted somebody high
in the Government; at one time he had mentioned the President,
you know, I want to talk to the President.
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Mr. Wallach. It seems strange to me he didn't pick the
Secretary of State or someone like that.
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AMLASH Case Officer. No.
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Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at
--
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AMLASH Case Officer. He wanted somebody directly to the
In other words, he wanted the assurances
President.
from the highest authority, again, from the President of
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Mr. Wallach.
What I'm trying to get at is we, from our
examination of the alleged assassination attempts, have also
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gone into the sabotage attempts, MONGOOSE, etc, and found out
that Bobby Kennedy did play a role in the sabotage attempts.
What I'm trying to get from you is your understanding of
4 whether or not. AMLASH, from his Cuban side, knew that the
Kennedy's had played that role, and would necessarily say I want
to talk to Robert Kennedy for that reason.
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He never mentioned it, not at
Let me finally go to the October 29th meeting,
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AMLASH Case Officer.
No.
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all in any way.
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Mr. Johnston.
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and before we went on the record this morning, you were
explaining to us how you characterized the AMLASH operation.
Would you repeat in summary form what you told us before
we went on the record?
AMLASH Case Officer. The operation was never conceived,
certainly, carried out during the period I was associated with
it, but was never conceived as an assassination plot.
conceived as a coup in order to organize a military group
within Cuba to overthrow Castro.
It was
Mr. Johnston. Did you have the understanding that if
necessary AMLASH was proposing to assassinate the Castro
brothers?
AMLASH Case Officer.
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Assassination was not a subject of
discussion that came up at every meeting or contact that we
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had with AMLASH. It was so stated by him that he felt that
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the only way to initiate a coup in Cuba was
to direct the
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first blow at the leadership.
Since we were not willing to discuss specifically eliminating
Castro, this was never discussed in terms of the operation.
We certainly had no doubt that in his mind this was the only
.
way to go about it.
Mr. Johnston. And you dealt with him on that basis?
AMLASH Case Officer. Trying to temporize this, and if
possible we were not looking for a bloody coup at that time,
planning a bloody coup inside Cuba, but we were trying to
certainly get him to think in terms of much more than just the
elimination of the leadership.
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started.
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Mr. Johnston. And to broaden it.
AMLASH Case Officer.
To broaden it into a coup.
Our
interest was the coup, not the specifics of how he got it
Mr. Johnston. You were concerned about whether his
plans were realistic, weren't you?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Very definitely, yes.
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Senator Schweiker. Did you personally evaluate AMLASH
as fully capable of leading a coup and being able to implement
it and carry it out if support were given?
How did you evaluate AMLASH?
As I understand from the dialogue here, and also from
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reading a summary of these, at first the operations talk was
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fairly low level sabotage, which he out of hand rejected, and
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he pictured himself as a leader a top level effort on the
condition that it had assurances of government support and top
3 level support here.
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Now, I guess my question to you is, how, as case officer,
did you evaluate his capability? Did you evaluate him as
someone who could lead a coup and who would, that our government
could put trust in, faith in in terms of his ability to carry it
out or not?
AMLASH Case Officer. At that time we did not evaluate
him as the leader of a coup. He was not our candidate to be
the next ruler of Cuba. He was only evaluated in our dealings
with him on the basis of what he and his group could contribute
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13
to a coup inside
Cuba.
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So I don't recall at any time that he was selected or that
anybody ever talked of him as the next leader in Cuba.
Mr. Baron. Wasn't there some thought that he would be a
good rallying point for strong leaders of a new government in
Cuba, that he had an ability to attract good people to work with
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him?
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AMLASHI Case Officer. He had proven this because he had
been one of the two leaders, or the two top leaders of the
Directorado Revolutionario, which is the Revolutionary Directorate
which is a group not part of the 26th of July Movement, but a
he was one of the leaders, and
separate group, which is
--
became a military commander of that group, separate from the 26
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of July movement.
So he had a group in the DR which we knew about, and he
--
afforded himself very well in the fighting this was in the
4
province of Lasvillas, during the time that Castro was
he
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was in a separate area of the country.
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Mr. Baron. I had a recollection which I haven't checked
against our transcripts that when we discussed this before,
you had said although AMLASH might not be considered the leader
of a new government, that he was a potential candidate for that
job. He might not be a good military leader, but he would have
an ability to bring good people together in a new government.
AMLASH Case Officer. Of the people left in Cuba at that time,
we didn't have much of a choice.
I mean, you know, we weren't
in contact. He was one of the few who could travel.
Senator Schweiker.
necessarily at the top.
You put him up near the top but not
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right, as one being able to
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contribute.
Senator Schweiker. And you didn't have too many options
at that point.
AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.
Mr. Johnston. One of the documents that CIA previously
provided us in a sanitized version is a memorandum for the
record dated 19 November 1963, and the subject is Plans for
AMLASH Contact, and let me just show you that and ask you
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if you not necessarily prepared that document, because it is a
sanitized document, but whether you prepared a document
that that apparently came from, the memorandum for record of
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AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I recall.
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Mr. Johnston. You prepared that document?
AMLASH Case Officer. I believe I prepared the memorandum
from which that extract was made, yes.
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Mr. Johnston.
When did you prepare that?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
It had to be late October sometime.
11
Mr. Johnston.
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November 19th is the date.
AMLASH Case Officer. Early November, certainly after
my October meeting with him in Paris, and before going back,
19 November, that's probably it.
Mr. Johnston. Is that the date you prepared it?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
That's the date I prepared it.
I
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don't remember when I returned from Paris after the October-
18
meetings.
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Mr. Johnston.
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You prepared a memorandum for the record
on the contact before you went to the meeting in Paris on
November 22nd?
AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.
Mr. Johnston. Part of that document, Paragraph 3, states
that you would show AMLASH a copy of the President's speech in
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Miami.
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AMLASH Case Officer. No. I didn't show him a copy of the
speech at all.
Mr. Johnston.
Let me show you Paragraph 3 of that.
They were talking about leading up to the November 22nd
5 meeting with AMLASH.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
It may
been planned to show
him a copy of the speech, but as I recall it was not shown him.
A
I talked to him about it, but I don't recall having shown him
the speech. But it was probably clear that I could have taken
a copy of that speech to him and shown it to him.
Mr. Johnston. Paragraph 4 of that document states --
would you just read it?
AMLASH Case Officer. "Chief SA has requested written
reports on AMLASH operation be kept to a minimum."
Mr. Johnston. And that's Desmond Fitzgerald, is that
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correct?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald tell you that on
November 19th?
That's correct.
14
AMLASH Case Officer.
It might not have been the first
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time he mentioned this because
--
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in other words, on sensitive
operations it was always a case of trying to limit the number
of people aware of sensitive operations and this certainly is
considered in that category.
He reiterated, I presume, since I put it in the memo at
that time that the written communications would be minimized.
Mr. Johnston.
And this is a memorandum for record.
AMLASH Case Officer. Remember also this is primarily the
cables because I had to communicate with headquarters and the
24
station in Paris.
25
I didn't have my independent communications.
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Mr. Johnston.
Where were you on November 19th?
2
AMLASH Case Officer.
At headquarters. He told me this
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personally.
Mr. Johnston. Okay. Is it normal to prepare a memorandum
for the record about plans for contact of an agent?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Normally, yes.
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Mr. Johnston. So there's nothing unusual in your preparing
this memorandum for record.
Is that your testimony?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, there wasn't anything unusual
about it. That's the usual thing unless advised to the contrary
Mr. Johnston. The last time you testified before the
Committee you mentioned on November 22nd you had a pen-like
This memorandum for
device with a hypodermic needle on it.
record of November 19th does not mention that.
Is there some reason that it doesn't?
16
AMLASH Case Officer.
No, I don't remember why it would
17
not have been mentioned.
I don't recall when I left for Paris.
18
I may have left for Paris on the 21st and
--
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Mr. Johnston. I think that's correct.
20
AMLASH Case Officer.
I don't know if the decision had
21
been made that we would even show him something like this
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that time.
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Mr. Johnston.
You're talking about the 19th?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
About the 19th, when I wrote the
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memorandum.
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Mr. Johnston.
When you left for Paris my understanding
is that you carried the device.
AMLASH Case Officer. That's right, I carried it with me.
Mr. Johnston. And you had approval to show it to him?
AMLASH Case Officer. I had approval to show it to him.
Mr. Johnston. The file indicates that AMLASH was contacted
on November 20th, I believe, in order to set up the November
22nd meeting and he was telephoned by, I assume, somebody in
Paris.
11 fact?
12
Did you arrange that or were you knowledgeable of that
13 see him.
14
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I was going to go there to
We would have made arrangements to set the meeting up.
Mr. Johnston. The cable reporting the telephone call on
November 20th states that somebody apparently was in the room
with AMLASH when he was telephoned, and that therefore there
had to be a telephone conversation by the CIA agent calling
him and the CIA agent
--
Pardon me. AMLASH asked if the meeting would be of interest
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to him, and the CIA agent said, I don't know if it's going to
be of interest to you but it's the meeting you requested. And
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I ask you your understanding of what was meant by the meeting
that you requested?
AMLASH Case Officer. Probably to give him an answer on
the caches that he wanted inside Cuba, and I understand that was
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1 the primary point which had not been, he had not been informed
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of this at the previous meeting with Fitzgerald, so were we
going to give him that material.
In other words, it was given
to him later in the caches, was that material going to be given
5
to him?
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Mr. Johnston. What about the pen device?
AMLASH Case Officer. The pen device was something again,
it could have been part of that package.
I don't think he was
specifically asking about the pen device because we had been
so reluctant to even discuss something like this with him and
he knew it that he was primarily concerned with the caches.
Mr. Johnston. Is it correct to say that at the October
29th meeting AMLASH was happy with the U.S. policy but asking
for equipment to do the job?
AMLASH Case Officer. To initiate the coup.
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In other words, he didn't want a massive amount of
equipment but he said we do need some equipment to get the
thing started.
Mr. Johnston. And that that was in his mind on November .
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20th.
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AMLASH Case Officer. When he made the call?
Mr. Johnston. When the call was made to him and he was
told that the November 22nd meeting was the one that he had
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requested.
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AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so.
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on the 20th.
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Mr. Johnston
And that AMLASH would have understood that
that was what you were going to give him, some or all of the.
things discussed at the October 29th meeting.
AMLASH Case Officer, To see what could be given to him,
not if it was or anything like this because Paris didn't know
what we were prepared to tell him at the 22 November meeting.
"
Mr. Johnston. As you said before, you were at Langley
There's a cable indicating you left Washington
arriving in Paris on the morning of November 22nd.
Is that your recollection?
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.
Mr. Johnston. Did anyone go with you from Washington
13
to Paris?
14
AMLASII Case Officer.
No.
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Mr. Johnston.
Mr. Johnston. Mr. Fitzgerald was where at the time?
AMLASH Case Officer. At Langley. He was present at the
meeting, at the late October meeting, not at the 22 November
meeting.
Mr. Johnston. Okay. Let's go then to the November 22nd
meeting. You previously testified as you recall it was late
afternoon or evening because it was dark when you came out.
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
Where was it held? What kind of place
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AMLASH Case Officer.
I don't recall that we used a
safe
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Cos home
Mr Johnston. Who was there at the meeting?
You and
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AMLASH.
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AMLASH Case Officer. The October meeting?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
. Mr. Johnston. I'm sorry, November 22nd meeting.
AMLASH and myself.
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Mr. Johnston.
Nobody else was there?
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AMLASH Case Officer. If it was Red Sconti home, it
may have been in another part of the house but he was not at
the meeting.
Mr. Johnston. Did you have that meeting taped?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
No, not that I recall.
13
Mr. Johnston. If you did have it taped, where would the
14 tape be today?
AMLASH Case Officer. In the file.
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Mr. Johnston. In this file?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes. I don't recall that that
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Mr. Johnston. Who was knowledgeable of that meeting
20
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Generally, were the people at
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AMLASH Case Officer. Not generally, no. It could have
حرب
been the Chief of Station, naturally, and Red Stent
Mr. Johnston. At a meeting like that did you have some
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back-up support so that you could be assured that you were not
under surveillance at the meeting?
AMLASH Case Officer.
No,
I took the necessary precautions
in going to the meeting to assure myself. I didn't have somebody
else following me to tell me if I had any surveillance on me.
Mr. Johnston.
What about AMLASH?
AMLASH Case Officer. We don't know. I don't know if
he was counter-surveilled.
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Senator Schweiker.
Could AMLASH have been a double agent?
I can only
AMLASH Case Officer. That's a good question.
I didn't think so then and even with
give you an opinion.
everything that has happened today, I don't think so today.
Again, that is strictly my opinion.
Senator Schweiker. In a nutshell, and I realize this is
a very difficult, complex area, why don't you think so?
AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the power play that
was taking place in Cuba at that time between certainly the
26th of July people and Castro trying to consolidate his
position, this was the early '60s now, around his people and
his movement, the fact that we had information from several
sources that he was disillusioned with the revolution.
Senator Schweiker.
He,
meaning AMLASH?
AMLASH Case Officer. He, AMLASH, was disillusioned.
Senator Schweiker. And he wasn't in the 26th of July?
AMLASH Case Officer. He was not in the 26th of July.
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He was DR, So he was not"
member of Castro's July 26th movement
2
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He was one of the other revolutionary groups which had student
support primarily and urban support and compared to Castro's
rural so-called support.
So there was a struggle going on there.
In other words,
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this was not an imaginary type of thing.
The background that
7
we could check did not, to the best of my recollection at any
8
time lead us to believe in our relation with him at that time
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that he was playing a double game.
The other reason that I felt that way at the time was that
we had to persuade him to return to Cuba to stay.
He was
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ready to defect, to leave.
13
He didn't want to come to the
United States with all the rest of the Cubans who were here
14
15
But he was ready to leave Cuba and to defect.
because he had stayed on, he felt, too long with the revolution.
He was fed up
16
with the way life was.
A lot of the travel that he did was
17
that he would take any opportunity to get off of the island.
18
He had told us, me personally, that and this was also confirmed
19
by other sources.
Senator Schweiker.
Wouldn't one of your reasons also
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be that he is in jail now?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
That would be a very good reason.
I think I mentioned that the last time, certainly when I was
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talking about this.
If he was taken back
--
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Senator Schweiker.
Are we absolutely certain he's in
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jail now??
AMLASH Case Officer We checked that I believe the last
3 time, I think the last report we had was what, a couple of
4
5
6
years ago?
Mr. Baron. I was given the name of a CIA contact in
Florida who had been on the Island of Piñes at one point and
7
said as far as he knew, although he hadn't been in Cuba for
several years, AMLASH was a prisoner, but he wasn't in prison.
8
He was doing some sort of hospital work which was considered
part of his rehabilitation program.
AMLASH Case Officer. He was a doctor, wasn't he, for
the prison?
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Mr. Baron.
Yes.
AMLASH Case Officer. He had more freedom because he
was being used as a doctor for the prisoner but he still was
still on the Isle of Pines.
Mr. Baron. It is my understanding that he was working
as a doctor even outside the prison and again, this is just
hearsay of one contact that I called on the phone.
Mr. Wallach. Are you positive that someone just not
using his name is there, that he switched over using an alias?
You wouldn't have intelligence of that type?
AMLASII Case Officer. No.
Mr.
Wallach. I want to quickly follow-up on something
that Jim and the Senator were getting at.
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Why were you not willing to discuss with AMLASH the
2 assassination of Castro?.
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AMLASH.Case Officer. We?
Mr. Wallach. You have told us
AMLASH Case Officer. We were very reluctant to discuss
the subject.
Mr. Wallach. Why?
AMLASH Case Office. I guess we didn't want to get involved
in assassinations.
Mr. Wallach. But you had them before this.
11
AMLASII Case Officer.
I didn't know this, and certainly
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first step. AMLASII.
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in this operation the objective of this operation was not to
go in and assassinate Castro but a much bigger type of program.
Mr. Wallach. But that was the first step, or at least
the potential first step.
AMLASH Case Officer. He was convinced that was the only
We weren't convinced that it had to be,
at that time that it had to be the first step, and that's why
19
we didn't want to discuss and we didn't discuss and we were
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reluctant to discuss this subject with him.
Mr. Wallach. At the late October meeting I think you
1-
said before that what did you request that led to the giving
him of the pen, the hypodermic needle?
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AMLASH Case Officer. The pen he requested was
something
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with which to protect himself now.
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Mr. Wallach. A pen with a hypodermic needle would protect
himself?
AMLASH Case Officer. He put himself in a situation and
:
4 asked us the question. He said I may be confronted by Castro
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or by Raoul or by one or the other of Castro's people in a
6 meeting in which I am not armed, and I may be confronted with
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an accusation of plotting against the regime.
And at that time he said this would be before we are
ready to move in formenting the coup, and he said, I would like
to have something with which I can protect myself at that time.
In fact, the words that I think I mentioned here before was,
if I fall, I don't want to be the only one going down.
So he was seeing himself in a situation of going back into
Cuba, of being in a meeting in which he could have been, because,
Fidel Castro himself or Raoul
Castro could confront him in their office, accuse him.
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again, of the relationships.
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Mr. Wallach.
Couldn't he use that pen offensively and
18
not defensively?
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AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he could have.
He was not
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at that time talking about using it offensively and we weren't
discussing the offensive use of that pen.
22
Senator Schweiker.
Following up the point that I
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switched away from as to whether Cuban intelligence might have
been trailing him or following him or observing what you were
doing with him, we have some knowledge, I gather, from a summary
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here that AMLASH's one-time Cuban mistress was believed to be
working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to
3 be Cuban intelligence.
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5
If this is correct, wouldn't that pretty well mean that
whatever he was doing over there might well be observed by
6 Cuban intelligence even though he might have been a straight
7
single agent in terms of working with us and not a double agent
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that they may well have known or monitored what in fact he was
doing with us?
We
AMLASH Case Officer. This is possible, Senator.
had no indication at the time that they were monitoring his
activities. Again, he was at such a level and the people
certainly in Paris and the Cubans overseas knew that he was
at such a level that we never heard that they were ever given
this mission.
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Senator Schweiker.
Have you heard that his Cuban
17
mistress was working with Cuban intelligence?
18
AMLASH Case Officer. Which one of his mistresses,
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because he's had several, including his sister who worked for
the Presidency, his own sister.
Mr. Johnston. We extracted that from a file and I'm
sorry but in the respect and the need to keep that information
compartmented I did not take her name down and I don't think ve
have the file that indicates that.
My recollection is that he had a mistress for a considerable
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period of time who was, who was suspected of being the GI,
W
2 and certainly her brother was actually known to be an employee
of the GI.
3
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AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall the specific case,
5
but let me remind you that he was the Deputy Minister of
6
the Interior, which did have the security services at that time
ገ
under that ministry. So it wouldn't surprise me that there would
8
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AMLASII was?
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be somebody he would know in that ministry.
Mr. Johnston.
AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH was at one time before he
was President of the Student Federation.
Mr. Johnston. Not in '63?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Senator Schweiker.
come under him?
No.
And Cuban intelligence would have
AMLASH Case Officer. Some of the security apparatus
was under the Ministry of Interior, but he was in that job,
I don't recall, a very short period of time.
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you,
from being in that position?
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AMLASH Case Officer. We don't know if at that time that
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he knew that
--
well, he was saying, in other words, he was on
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Mr. Wallach. If Castro knew about the assassination
attempts, you would assume that AMLASH would have known,
wouldn't
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
the radio every day saying that the Yankees were making an
25 attempt on his life but that he knew the specifics of operations,
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I don't think we have that information, or at least I never
have seen it.
After the Bay of Pigs every occasion that he had he would
4 accuse the imperialists of mounting another operation against
him.
Mr. Baron. Just a couple more questions on this point.
Did you take any special precautions aside from the standard
precautions that you would take in dealing with any foreign
contact?
Were special precautions taken in dealing with AMLASHI
to guard against the prospect that he was either a double agent
or under surveillance by Cuban intelligence?
AMLASI Case Officer. What would you mean by special
precautions?
Mr. Baron. You would have to tell me more about the
techniques that you could use, than I could tell you.
17
18
AMLASH Case Officer. What I would do is to make sure
that I wasn't under surveillance in going to the meeting or
19
at the meeting, and we would certainly check the meeting places
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to make sure that the meeting places were not under surveillanca
by them, which would also hopefully would have picked up in
the surveillance that he would have had on him coming to the
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meetings.
I don't recall that we ever put him under surveillance
in Paris, which would have meant disclosing our interest in him
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either to our surveillance team or the French police, or whoever
So we never did that because, again, of our interest in
protecting and minimizing the number of people who knew we were
4 in contact with him.
10
Again, I refer you, I think, to what the Senator raised
before, that he was arrested and sentenced, and as I recall,
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I may be wrong but as I recall the contacts that we had with
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him in Paris never surfaced in that trial. He never, as far
as the transcript that we have of the trial, he never reported,
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he never testified about the contacts that he had with us.
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It was only afterwards when he was in contact with the exile
group.
Mr. Baron. So you never took any affirmative action
against him or investigated him or treated him in any way that
you would treat a person suspected of being a double agent
or being closely watched by an intelligence service?
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AMLASH Case Officer. Not in mounting an investigation
against him because in doing that we would have to show
interest in him to other people, so we did not do that.
our
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What we could do with myself and with the other knowledge-
able people say in Paris, of him, we did do and did everything
we possibly could do.
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In other words, to check where he was and who he was
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seeing and through the telephone taps and to ensure that when
25 he came to meet us that that meeting was secure,
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that we did.
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Mr. Johnston.
Let me go back to the November 22nd
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meeting.
As you recall, after you met AMLASH there, did you give
him the newspaper article about the Kennedy speech?
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall. I may have shown
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him the article. To the best of my recollection, we talked about
the speech and he had, I think, at that time, the article had
10
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9 already appeared in the French newspaper and he had read it.
Mr. Johnston. What did you tell him about the article?
Well, he liked the article.
AMLASH Case Officer.
It
was one in which I think the Administration, as I vaguely recall
13
was taking a rather positive stand.
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Mr. Johnston. Was this Kennedy's speech before the
Inter-American Press Association in Miami on November 18th?
AMLASH Case Officer. I believe so.
Mr. Johnston. I have an extract from that.
18
AMLASII Case Officer. I'm not 100 percent certain, but
19
I think it was.
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Mr. Johnston.
There's an indication that you told him
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that Fitzgerald helped to write the speech.
Do you recall doing that?
AMLASH Case Officer. I could have.
Mr. Johnston. Do you recall specifically?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Specifically, no, but we did discuss
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Mr. Johnston.
You have testified a great deal about the
3 poison pen or the pen device and my only question is what is
4 your best recollection about what happened to the pen? Did
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he take it with him? Did you take it with you when you left
the meeting?
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AMLASH Case Officer. Again, as I mentioned to you the
last time, I don't remember specifically if I kept the pen and
threw it away or if he kept it.
What I do remember was his reaction when I showed him
11
the pen.
I can't today tell you for sure that he kept the
12
pen.
13
Mr. Johnston. It seems to me that's rather compromising
14 evidence, if he kept the pen and you recall that. It's also
I have difficulty believing you
15
such compromising evidence
--
16
would have thrown it away.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, because it was compromising
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evidence. I had carried it one way. I mean I wasn't going to
carry it back.
It was nothing but a Papermate pen in which
a hypodermic needle had been inserted.
In other words, it wasn't a $10,000 piece of equipment
or anything like this.
Mr. Johnston. I agree, but it's a very compromising
piece of evidence to have around.
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right. But what I can't
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recall specifically.
whether it was broken, thrown away or
Mr. Wallach. Why do you believe he wouldn't have taken
3 it with him?
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AMLASII Case Officer. He said he wouldn't. I specifically
remember this. He says, and then later on he says, I'm not
going to take any compromising material back with me.
This would have been a piece of compromising material.
He did not like the pen. The only point probably that we made
with him is that we were willing to consider, because he knew
our opposition to something like this, that we were even willing
to consider showing him something that whether he could
--
9
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again defend himself.
13
He did not think it was a good idea.
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Senator Schweiker.
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could he get that would not compromise him?
What kind of weapon or substance
I'm a little
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what could he
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confused. He wanted something to defend himself, but he
doesn't want anything that will compromise him.
Unless you have a disappearing weapon,
possibly get that would not compromise him to take back?
AMLASH Case Officer. Well, we were talking also about
caches inside Cuba at that time, so it could have been dropped
to him inside Cuba. He didn't exactly have to take it back
with him.
In other words, here again, the whole idea of this was
not to give him something there that he would be able to take
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Mr. Wallach.
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Were arrangements made for caches inside
Cuba if he was worried about defending himself?
AMLASH Case Officer. He had asked for caches inside
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Cuba.
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Mr. Johnston. Can you be positive that he did not leave
the meeting with the pen in his ppssession?
AMLASH Case Officer. I cannot be positive that he didn't.
I'm almost sure that he didn't.
Mr. Johnston. Did you ever ask him for the pen back?
Do you recall asking him to give you the pen back before the
12 meeting concluded or after the conclusion of the meeting?
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AMLASII Case Officer. Since I recollect his reaction to
it that, you know, it's no good, I just can't logically believe
that he would have kept the pen. This is the point. But I
don't specifically recall what was done with it except that
it was probably destroyed.
In other words, you know, broken, throw the needle out
of it and break the pen.
Mr. Johnston. Do you recall asking him to give you the
pen back?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, but I don't recall that he
took it in the first place, because what I recall is, gee, is
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that the best that you can come up with type of thing.
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Mr. Johnston.
Let me ask you, is it correct you did
promise him at this meeting that you would drop rifles with
telescopic sights for him in Cuba?
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
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Mr. Johnston. Was there any mention of paying him money
to support his coup plans?
AMLASH Case Officer. He had never really asked for
money. In promising him full support for the coup, if money
was required I presume that could be conjecture that he could
get that also, but he did not specifically ask for money.
Mr. Johnston. Was there discussion of his escape in
the event he assassinated Castro or killed Castro but did not
pull off the coup?
AMLASH Case Officer. At the last meeting I don't believe
that was discussed.
Mr. Johnston. At your prior meeting?
AMLASII Case Officer. If it was, it was touched upon,
but as I recall, and this is from reading the file afterward.
where this was discussed was a year later when he was in contact
with the exile group. I think it was with the exile group that
22
23
he was then concerned about, how do I get out if something
goes wrong and we can't pull the coup.
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But we did not at the 22 November meeting, I don't balit
we discussed that. In fact, I'm sure we didn't discuss it.
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Mr. Johnston
When did the meeting end?
About what
2
time?
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What time did the meeting end?
AMLASII Case Officer.
Approximately 10:00 in the evening.
Mr. Johnston. And we basically discussed while we
were off the record the fact that the assassination occurred
at 12:30 in Dallas, which we think would have been around 7:30
in Paris, and the meeting was then over at 10:00 o'clock.
When you walked out of the meeting you testified previously
that you heard about the assassination.
Is that correct?
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's correct.
Mr. Johnston. And that's the first word you heard about
the assassination?
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report.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
Mr. Johnston. You previously said that AMLASH made a
comment about that. Was there any other discussion of the
assassination by AMLASH?
AMLASII Case Officer. That was it, because I left hin
at that time.
Mr. Johnston. I don't understand. If the meeting is
either in a house or somewhere else how you would leave together
and you would have access to a radio or something to hear the
AMLASH Case Officer. If it was in the house, it could
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have been the occupant of the house who told us. In fact, I
Iam sure it was the occupant of the house, Red Stent, who told
us he had just heard on the radio about the assassination when
we came out of the meeting. We didn't go or come together
to the house. He left on his own and then I left after he left.
Mr. Johnston. So in other words, what you're saying is
that you're not walking out of the building but you're in the
03
house and the meeting is over and Red Stent knows that the
meeting is over and that he tells you.
9
10
AMLASII Case Officer. We came out of the room, out of
11
the study in which we were holding the meeting, and when we
12 came out of that into his living room he told us what he had
just heard on the radio.
13
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Mr.
Johnston.
And then AMLASII made this comment and
15
walked out of the door?
16
AMLASH Case Officer.
AMLASH made this comment and
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He was
---
19
shortly thereafter I don't recall, we finished our business.
I don't remember the exact quote. You have it on
the record there, like why does it have to happen to somebody
20
like that.
21
Mr. Johnston. Did you know who committed the assassination
22 at this time?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
No.
Mr. Johnston. And even with that you don't recall whether
AMLASH walked out the door with the poison pen?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
don't believe he did,
'don't
2
3
done is pull the hypodermic needle out of it,
4
believe he did and it could very well be that what I would have
that's very
simple, and then it's just a pen, throw the pen away or keep
5
the pen.
6
It's not a complicated object, in other words.
It was
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very simple to just pull the hypodermic needle out of it, and
that's probably what was done. But I don't recall specifically
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that I did it.
12 after.
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Mr. Johnston. Did you do that after the meeting was over?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, it was during the meeting, not
Mr. Johnston. Now there's an indication that you got
instructions from Washington after the meeting to break off
contact with AMLASH.
Do you recall receiving those instructions or instructions
to that effect?
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, there was a cable, I
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23.
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believe, as I recall. It wasn't necessarily to break off contact
with AMLASH because everybody knew that that was the last
meeting. He was preparing to, we knew this, he had been preparing
and we had been talking to him since October since he was out
about his return to Cuba.
Senator Schweiker. Did the arms drop cache ever occur?
AMLASH Case Officer. I had left, I wasn't involved in
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that part of it, Senator. Again, only from the record that I
read afterwards, I think a couple of drops were made to him.
3 In fact, the next year or something like that.
Mr. Johnston. I'm not sure exactly what was left or
what he received or what was available.
AMLASH Case Officer. And I don't know if he ever picked
4
5
6
7
them up.
8
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10
I don't think we know that.
Mr. Wallach. Why did he tell you he wanted the rifles
with telescopic sights?
AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he wanted grenades and he
11
wanted dynamite too to storm the headquarters later on.
We
13
12 said, well, look, could you expand this somewhat too, and he
was talking about, well, yes, and we should probably attack
14
the radio station at the same time. It was a matter of attacking
15
a building, whether it was a radio station or whatever it was,
16
17
in order to, in his mind, he was probably thinking of attacking
the headquarters, Castro's headquarters.
18
Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection.
In
19
20
your previous testimony with the Select Committee on page 114
you stated:
24
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"When we came out of that meeting we heard the news
22
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25
of President Kennedy's assassination and I received a cable
after that which I thought that this was probably the reason
the whole operation was being re-assessed.
AMLASH Case Officer.
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That was strictly my thought at that
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time.
Mr. Johnston. And on page 115 of your prior transcript
you said, "well, the whole Cuban operation, the way interpreted
it, was being called on."
Did you receive a cable to that effect?
AMLASH Case Officer. It was a very cryptic cable saying,,
you know, return to Washington, which I was going to do anyway,
so this is why
AMLASH?
--
Mr. Johnston. Did it say to break off contact with
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that it did but
it didn't make any difference because headquarters knew that
that was the last meeting with him before he was returning to
Cuba anyway.
So there was no reason to tell me to break off contact
with him. This is what I'm trying to say.
17
Mr. Johnston.
Supposedly the 1967 IG report, and I
18
don't know where they got their information, said that was an
19
OPIN cable.
20
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's Operation Immediate.
In
21
other words, it's an immediate cable. That set
precedence
22
on the cable.
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cable or a priority cable.
Mr. Johnston. And what does that mean for transmitting
AMLASH Case Officer. It was transmitted before a routing
It's just the precedence
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Mr.
Johnston.
It has the highest priority next to LAGHT
AMLASI Case Officer.
:
That's the one below FLASHI.
Mr. Johnston. And that tells you to break off the meeting
or to come back to Washington?
AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.
Johnston. Do you recall receiving that?
Yes.
I didn't go into the embassy to read it, so I don't think they
brought the cable out to me but I was told to go on back to
Washington.
6
Mr.
7
AMLASII Case Officer.
8
Mr. Johnston. And you read that?
9
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes,
or I was told about it because
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Mr. Johnston. Let me state that that cable is apparently
not in the AMLASH file and the 1967 Inspector General could not
find that cable.
Does that surprise you?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, it doesn't really because
I don't think there was that much importance given to that
kind of cable at that time.
What you say about the Operation Immediate, we handled
all of our traffic, more or less, in this case on an immediate
basis because of the short periods of time that we had with
23 AMLASH.
24
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So if you are implying that because of the OP AM cable
I don't think that
that there was something else behind this, no,
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there was in any way.
and as I assumed, and
It was just, you know, return to Washington,
assumed at that time that certainly the
whole Cuban operation was going to be re-assessed after what
4 happened to President Kennedy.
0
7
Mr. Johnston. Now there is in the file a cable reporting)
from Paris to Washington reporting that you planned to depart
Paris that morning of November 23rd and arrive in Washington
8
8:10.
9
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12
Did you in fact take that flight?
AMLASH Case Officer. Did you ever find that cable?
Mr. Johnston. I saw the cable of your return to
Washington.
AMLASH Case Officer. If it referred to a cable, that
was the one telling me to come back. This is a travel-type
of exchange.
Mr. Johnston. Did you in fact arrive back in Washington
it would be 18:10, which would be
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I said 8:10. I'm sorry,
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6.00 Washington time.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
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Mr. Johnston. Where did you go when you arrived in
Washington at 6:10 in the evening on November 23rd?
ALASI Case Officer. I don't recall specifically if
I stopped by my home, which is en route to the office, whether
I went right back to the office before going home
Mr. Johnston.
But you did go to the office sometime that
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evening?
find.
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return?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
I may have.
Mr. Johnston. Did you go to the office on the 24th?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Oh, yes.
Mr. Johnston. That was a Sunday?
AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been.
Mr. Wallach. One question about the cable that we can't
Did you have any other business in Paris besides AMLASI!?
AMLASII Case Officer. Not specifically at that time.
Mr. Wallach. Was there a date that you intended to
16
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
Mr. Wallach. When was that date officially?
AMLASII Case Officer. About the time that I returned.
Mr. Wallach. Why would they have sent you a cable
telling you to return if you intended to return that day?
This was probably
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AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know.
19
a reaction to what had happened.
But again, I want to point
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It was
24
just to keep track and record of our personal travel.
out to you that travel cables of this type, even if your plans are
such, and the way I was travelling at that time I was not
travelling on a diplomatic passport or anything like that.
don't even need a regular passport to travel France.
You
25
In other words, it's our security to make sure that
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that headquarters knows that we are coming back and I sent a
cable saying I'm arriving on such and such a date, the same
way I sent a cable to Paris telling them I'm arriving on such
4
and such a date.
5
Mr.
Johnston.
Would you have sent your cable without
6
getting a cable first from them?.
7
AMLASHI Case Officer. I could have, sure.
8
Mr. Johnston.
I'm not sure I understand the purpose
9
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of their cable. Were you saying it's a regular thing that they
will send extra traffic?
AMLASH Case Officer. I can't tell you what the purpose
of their cable was except what I'm trying to explain to you
is that keeping headquarters informed or headquarters inquiring
of you in such circumstances, it's not unusual to get a cable,
you know, advise us when you're going to return or please
return or us sending a cable.
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what had happened.
Mr. Johnston.
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If there was any other reason for sending that cable,
I can only conjecture, I don't know, that it was because of
I'd like the record to show that Senator
Schweiker has left and you are aware that without the Senator
being here you have the prerogative to stop your testimony.
Do you understand that?
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.
Mr. Johnston. And that if we proceed, that you can continue
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to stop at any time during the testimony and ask for it to
continue when we have a Senator present.
Do you understand that?
AMLASH Case Officer. Right.
4
Mr. Johnston.
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Are you willing to continue under the
conditions of not having a Senator here?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes,
I am.
8
Mr. Johnston. We have you back in Washington at 6:10
on November 23rd, and you may or may not have gone to the office
9
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that day and you said you definitely did go to the office on
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November 24th, on Sunday.
AMLASII Case Officer. Probably so. Scratch definitely.
I'm probably not that definite about it, but I'm sure I touched
base with the office as soon as I returned, either telephonically
or physically going there.
Mr. Johnston.
16
Let me refresh your recollection then and
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remind you that Oswald was killed on November 24th, Sunday.
Does that aid you in recalling where you were at that
time?
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AMLASH Case Officer. No. I mean I was home, certainly.
Mr. Johnston. You mean home in Washington?
AMLASII Case Officer. In Washington.
Mr. Johnston. But you don't know whether you were at
the office or at home on that day?
AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on the hour that we
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I may have been working.
If you're going back to asking about normal hours that
we kept during that period of time, Sunday was just another
working day, so you know, it wasn't because it was Sunday that
we would not have been in the office.
Mr. Johnston. But you con't recall being in the office?
AMLASII Case Officer. I don't recall being in the office.
When we heard the information that Oswald was involved, I
could very well have been home.
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Mr. Johnston.
Do you recall being in the office when
11
you heard that Oswald was shot?
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AMLASH! Case Officer.
No.
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Mr. Johnston. Did you hold, when did you first talk
to the chief of the section about your meeting?
15
AMLASH Case Officer.
Specifically, I don't recall when.
16
What would have been ususual is for me to have called the office
17
when I got in and whether I went there or not, I don't recall.
18
And then I either talked to Fitzgerald who would have been,
19
he would have been the only person I would have talked to. If
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Mr. Johnston.
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he was in on that Sunday and I went in, I would have talked to
him on Sunday, and if not, it would have been on Monday.
Did you talk to Mr. Helms about the
November 22nd meeting?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, I did not talk to Helms.
Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. McCone about the
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November 22nd meeting?
AMLASII Cape Officer. No.
Mr. Johnston.
Did you talk to anyone in technical
services about the pen device
"
or the meeting?
AMLASH Case Officer. Not at the time, no.
Mr. Johnston.
So it was your recollection that the only
one you talked to in this time period of November 23rd and
November 24th, November 25th about the meeting in Paris is
Mr. Fitzgerald?
AMLASH Case Officer. To the best of my recollection, yes.
Mr. Johnston. And what is your recollection of that
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discussion?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
The report, as to what had taken
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place, reporting that he had not thought highly of the device
that we had provided him with, that he did not intend to carry
it back, that he was pleased with the fact that we had decided
that we would put caches down for him inside Cuba, the
reaffirmation of U.S. support for his movement inside of Cuba,
the fact that he had decided definitely to return and had
made his reservations to return, and his dismay and his
reaction when he had heard that Kennedy had been assassinated
when we got to the meeting.
Mr. Johnston.
Was there a discussion about any link
between AMLASH or your Cuban operations and the Kennedy
assassination?
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'AMLASH Case Officer None whatsoever that I can remember
Mr. Johnston. No discussion between you and Fitzgerald
at all about any connection?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
No, not that I can recall.
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Mr. Johnston. When you say not that you can recall, are
you saying that it's possible but you don't recall it, or are
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AMLASH Case Officer.
you certain, fairly certain to the best of your recollection?
I'm fairly certain to the best
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of my knowledge that there was no connection between the AMLASII
in other words, that we discussed it, we discussed the Kennedy
I mean who wasn't discussing
assassination. I'm sure we did.
the Kennedy assassination at that time. That we tied the
I don't recall any kind
13 Kennedy assassination in with AMLASHI,
of conversation of that nature.
Mr. Johnston. On November 23rd and November 24th and
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November 25th?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
18
Mr. Johnston..
Right.
All right.
Let me point you to one of
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the documents we wanted to ask you about and it is a contact
report dated 25 November, and let me just show that to you.
let me state for the record what
Is that a document
22
it is.
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It's the original, apparently copy, of the November 25th
contact report
of the November 22nd meeting.
Did you prepare that contact report?
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Mr. Johnston. And is that the document you prepared?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
Mr. Johnston. I'm asking you directly is that the
very document you prepared?
That's a very specific question.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
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Mr. Johnston. When did you prepare that?
AMLASII Case Officer. The date is 25 November.
Mr. Johnston. Is it your recollection that that's the
date you prepared that?
11
AMLASH Case Officer.
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Probably so.
Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection of doing it
on that date?
AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically on the 25th, but
if the document is dated the 25th, I presume that's the day
16
that I did the memorandum.
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Did you
Mr. Johnston. Now how did you prepare it?
dictate it to somebody who then typed it up, or did you yourself
personally prepare it? And in asking you that question, is there
any way to tell from the document how it was prepared?
22
it.
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AMLASH Case Officer. No, the secretary probably typed
I mean I didn't type it myself.
Mr. Johnston. You did not type it yourself.
Is there any way to tell from the document? There are
25 no initials on it or anything that would indicate that it was
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dictated and typed?
AMLASH Case Officer. No. What are you asking me?
Mr. Johnston.
I'm just asking you if you're the one that
prepared that or how it got prepared?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, it's a contact report of my
6
meeting with AMLASH.
7
Mr. Johnston. And you prepared that document?
8
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
9
Mr. Johnston. But you did not type it?
I did not type it, so I could have
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AMLASH Case Officer.
dictated it to a secretary or wrote it out longhand and gave
it to her and she typed it.
Mr. Johnston. What about the fact that on November 19th
in your memorandum for record you indicated that Fitzgerald
wanted written reports to be kept to a mimimum?
report?
With those instructions why did you prepare a contract
AMLASH Case Officer.
Because I probably contacted
Fitzgerald about it and he said prepare the one on this meeting.
Mr. Johnston. Do you recall that?
17
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be a
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Mr. Johnston.
That he would have in effect
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MILASH Case Officer.
I briefed him on this, and t
AMLASH Case Officer.
normal thing.
I don't recall that but that would
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said, let's have a memorandum, a contact report on that.
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when he said minimize the written
In other words,
communications on the operation, he didn't say we won't have any
other communications on any other memos on it or any further
memorandums on it.
So what would happen if you put things within the dates
here, I had briefed him on this and then it was by agreement
:
or maybe by his order that he told me to write up a contact report.
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Mr. Johnston.
Have you had an opportunity to examine
8
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that report either before you came here?
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I'm not sure we've
given you enough opportunity to look at it closely while here.
Maybe you could take that time right now to look at the document.
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
Mr.
Johnston.
Look at page 3 of the document.
Comparc
13
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page 2 and page 3.
Page 3 is in a much different type than
15
page 2.
16
Do you notice that?
It's much fainter.
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes,
it's fainter, and I don't
17
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know if the type looks like it's the same but it's fainter.
Mr. Johnston.
Do you have any explanation for that?
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Mr. Johnston.
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AMLASH Case Officer. No.
Was page 3 what you prepared on November
AMLASH Officer.I didn't personally prepare it again, so
I could have given the secretary my long hand report, something
24
a second page.
could have happened, and then I finished it and she put it on
I don't have any explanation
That is possible.
25
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why it's lighter than the other one
2 same.
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The type appears to be the
Mr. Johnston. Are you saying that the way you prepared it
it's possible that the second page and third page were prepared
on different days?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, it could have been at different
times of the day. If I had writen out the first part of the
contact report and I hadn't finished it, the secretary could
very well have started to type it, and then when I finished it
I would have given her the last page to type because it was all
on the 25th.
Mr. Johnston. Are you saying
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Because there's no date on the
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second page.
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Mr. Johnston. You're stating that your recollection is
that that document was typed on one day by one person.
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, probably .so. That's the
usual case. I have no reason to doubt why it would have been
done any differently.
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Mr. Johnston.
What about the information on page 3?
20
Is that the substance, in fact?
Is that exactly what you wroto
on November 25th about the contact?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, and in fact I draw your
24
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attention to the part on the secret writing material because
we were very concerned as to how we would continue to communicath
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him inside Cuba and this was one of the subjects that
were discussed at the last meeting, communications.
is not a new subject matter.
So that
That is definitely part of the
subject matter that was discussed at the last meeting, which
was communications with him.
Mr. Johnston. And it's your testimony that this report
as it exists in that file is exactly the report that you prepared
7
8
on November 25th?
9
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes..
10
Mr. Johnston.
You'll note that the report does not
11
mention the pen device or AMLASH's reaction to your giving it
12
to him.
AMLASH Case Officer.
13
That's right.
14
15
Mr. Johnston. You left that out of your original report.
You did not make a written report on
--
AMLASH Case Officer.
16
I did not make a written report
on that.
17
Mr. Johnston.
18
Why was that?
AMLASH Case Officer.
19
Probably because Fitzgerald said
20
not to.
20
Mr. Johnston. Do you recall Fitzgerald saying not to?
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall it, but that's
certainly what I'd have to assume.
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Mr. Johnston.
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In other words, don't include that part of it.
Should it have gone in there in a normal
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report?
AMLASH Case Officer. In a normal report, yes. But this
3 certainly was a rather, again, sensitive subject that we were
4 talking about. He did not accept it and I don't think that at
that time it was felt that anything else should be said about
7
Mr. Johnston. Why is that?
AMLASI Case Officer. I don't know why. Again, because
of the sensitivity, I presume, of the subject.
Mr. Johnston. And again, is it your recollection that
Fitzgerald, is it your testimony that Fitzgerald told you not
to put a reference to the pen device in the report?
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall if he specifically
told me not to put it in or if when I gave him the report he
was satisfied that it was not in.
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already in the file?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Mr. Baron. Why would a reference to the pen device be
any more sensitive than references to arms caches or suggestions
of assassinations or all the other kinds of things that were
Because again, in conjunction with
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this particular operation it was not an assassination operation.
It was a coup operation. This was one of the aberrations of the
operation which we got involved in strictly to provide bona
fides to the man that we were dealing with and we were concerned
for his personal security.
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In other words, it was not part of the operational plan
2
to provide him with any such devices for the
3
purposes of
assassinating Castro. The rifles and the grenades and all of
4 this was something that was necessary to start a coup.
5
6
7
person.
In other words, it was not directed at one particular
I think this was probably the thinking at that time and
why such points did not get into it because this was not part
of the AMLASH plan of operation.
Mr. Baron. For the sake of the accuracy of the records
and the protection of the people who were involved at the CIA,
wouldn't even the tender of such a device to AMLASH for whatever
purporses normally be put into the records?
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don't know, but in the regular contact report which goes into
in other words, say the secretary would'
the regular file
AMLASH Case Officer. Not in a contact report because in
Whether
a contact report this goes into the regular file.
Fitzgerald would have made a note of this some place else I
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know about it and this could have been the other part of it.
In other words, to reduce the number of people, to contain
the number of people.
Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything in your discussions
with Fitzgerald that led you to believe that one of the
factors that was in his mind in assessing the sensitivity of
this tender of a poison pen device was the day on which it
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happened as opposed to simply the fact that such a device was
offered?
AMLASH Case Officer. If it was in his mind, he never
4 stated it to me. I think it was just the overall sensitivity
5
6
7
that the Agency had been, has now, and always has had on
assassinations.
I mean it's not the specific of what had happened that
time. Assassinations were not part of the routine business of
the Agency.
Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, you have mentioned the
secretary who prepared it. Do you recall the name of the
secretary who prepared this document?
13
AMLASII Case Officer.
NO, I don't.
14
Mr. Johnston. Did you have a regular secretary?
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.
15
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Mr. Johnston. What was her name?
AMLASH Case Officer. She could have prepared it or
it could have been Pitzgerald's secretary because, again, of
the days, the Sunday.
19
I don't recall the name. .
20
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by the name of Bobbie Hernandez was still with me.
Mr. Johnston. You don't recall your secretary's name?
AMLASH Case Officer. Well, I don't remember if a girl
She was
my secretary during part of that time.
She was probably my
24
secretary then.
25
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I don't recall Fitzgerald's secretary's
name, and she
could have typed it, but it would have been one of the two girls.
Let me show you the report again and on
Mr. Johnston.
that
page 1 of the report, I think it's paragraph 2 of that.
discusses the newspaper article, the Kennedy speech. Paragraph
6
two:
7
"AMLASH stated he was returning to Cuba","
8
sentence of that is
9
10
11
the President's speech.
12
assurances given by
The second
-- "subject was pleased to read a copy of
President Kennedy's 18 November speech in Miami and was even
more pleased to hear that Fitzgerald had helped to prepare
You the case officer reiterated the
Fitzgerald of full U.S. support if a
13
14
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16
17
real coup against the regime was successful."
AMLASH Case Officer.
Mr. Johnston.
Yes, that's right.
Does that refresh your recollection about
whether or not you gave him the speech?
AMLASII Case Officer.
No, because at that time it
18 could have already been printed in the Paris newspaper and
19
he could very well have read it in one of the Parisian newspaper.
20
But again, I could have had a copy of a newspaper clipping of
21
the speech with me.
22
Mr. Johnston.
But in the least does that refresh your
23
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recollection that you told AMLASH that Fitzgerald helped prepare
the speech?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, Fitzgerald told me that we
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could tell him.
Mr. Johnston.
Would you recall the portion of the
3 speech you pointed out to AMLASH?
4
AMLASH Case Officer.
No portion was pointed out to him.
It was just that Fitzgerald had helped in preparation of the
5
6
speech.
I could show you a copy.
Mr. Johnston.
This is an
7
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extract I have prepared from the November 19th, 1963 Washington
9
Post, page A15, which carries an AP story of November 18th
10
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saying:
"The following is the text of President Kennedy's address
tonight before the Inter-American Press Association."
And I have extracted the only portions as are relevant
to Cuba. Now I'll give you a chance to read it.
Incidentally, I'd like to have this marked as Exhibit 1
for the record.
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(The document referred to
was marked for identification
as AMLASI Case Officer
Exhibit No. 1)
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Mr. Johnston. I point out that in that speech, do you
have a recollection of this being the part of the speech or
you discussed this aspect of the speech?
4
ANLASH Case Officer.
We did not discuss the speech
5
paragraph by paragraph.
All we did was a very small passing
6
remark
about the speech.
lle had
probably to the best of my recollection already
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there, but I don't recall that.
read it in one of the Parisian newspapers, or if I had a news-
paper clipping of the speech, he glanced at it while we were
But he was certainly satisfied
11
with the tone of the speech.
12
Mr. Johnston. You must have read the speech before
13 you mentioned it to him.
Is this the portion that you had in
mind that would satisfy him about the tone of the speech?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Certainly this sets the tone for
16
the whole speech. The extracts that you have made here sets
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the tone for the full speech and specifically the one in which
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once the barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious
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goals which in a few short years stirred the
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to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive
hopes and the
sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.
Mr. Johnston. Was it your intent by making reference to
show that higher
the speech in your meeting with AMLASH to
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authority was behind what you were doing?
25
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, precisely.
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Mr. Johnston. And you felt that this speech coincided
2 with what you were telling AMLASII?
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AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that the U.S. Government was
prepared, the assurances at first that Gerald had given him
and I had been giving him that the U.S. Government was willing
to support the Cuban people.
Mr. Baron. In the excerpt from the speech that we have
just shown you it says:
"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from
my country and from all the American countries. It is the
fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban
people of their freedom and handed over the independence and
soverignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere.
"This and this alone divides us.
Then it continues:
Without it,
As long as this is true, nothing is possible.
everything is possible. Once this barrier is removed, we will
be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people."
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that
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That's the end of the quote.
Is it your understanding that this reference to a small
band of conspirators is a reference to the Castro government?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Precisely.
Mr. Baron. And in your report of November 19th, or your
memorandum for the record of November 19th, you had mentioned
- well, I will simply quote from the report. It says:
"Show AMLASH One copy of President's Miami speech (remark
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to AMLASH One that blank helped with speech)
AMLASH Case Officer. Fitzgerald.
Mr. Baron. Blank is Fitzgerald.
AMLASII Case Officer.
Yes.
This memorandum was written
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before I went to Paris, so, in effect, these were my marching
orders that I could use showing that the U.S. Government, indeed
Mr. Baron. Would support a move against the Castro
government.
Castro.
AMLASH Case Officer. Would support the move against
Mr. Baron. And did you know for a fact that Fitzgerald
helped with the preparation of the speech?
AMLASH Case Officer. Only from what Fitzgerald told
14
me.
Mr. Baron. What did Fitzgerald tell you?
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AMLASH Case Officer. I can't give you a specific quote
17
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but I presume that he had had some input into the speech.
It could
again, wouldn't necessarily be Fitzgerald himself.
This,
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be but it could also be the SAS, the CIA input into the speech,
which is normal in Presidential speeches that there are inputs
from different agencies.
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Mr. Baron: Did Fitzgerald say anything to you about
preparation of this speech that led you to believe that the
President or anyone close to him who had been involved in the
preparation of the speech had been made knowledgeable of the
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AMLASH operation?
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AMLASH Case Officer. No. Fitzgerald never told me
specifically that the President had been apprised of this,
q The general objective, I never had any doubts in my mind that
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the general objective of organizing a coup against Castro did
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not have the highest governmental approval. I mean this was
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know.
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never a question, I don't think, in my mind. Again, not
specifically assassination because what I mentioned before,
I don't think Fitzgerald or Helms or anybody else would
specifically have briefed anybody that the AMLASH operation was
an assassination plot because it wasn't.
Mr. Baron. So you had no basis for believing that the
President was informed that a component of the AMLASH operation
was assassination?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, I have no reason. I don't
Nobody told me that he had or he hadn't.
Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald make it clear to you that
18
in providing input to this speech he had the specific purpose
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in mind of giving a public signal to AMLASHI that he would receive
support from the highest quarters of the U.S. Government if he
would move for a coup?
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, this was my understanding.
Mr. Baron. That the speech was to be a specific signal
to opponents of Castro inside Cuba as opposed to a general
statement of U.S. policy?
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AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.
Mr. Baron. Can you recall anything about your conversation
that produced that understanding?
AMLASHI Case Officer. No, just the general conversation
5
of the time and what we were trying to do.
6
In other words, we were trying to organize a coup
and
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the problems that we had been through specifically with AMLAS!!
in trying to persuade him that the U.S. government was serious
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about supporting Cubans who were opposed to Castro.
So this statement that appeared in the speech was
certainly public notice that this was the case.
Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald or anyone else say anything
to you that led you to believe that the President had been
specifically informed that representations would be made such
as the ones on October 29th that Robert Kennedy or other high
American officials would stand behind AMLASH?
AMLASI Case Officer.
NO,
he didn't specifically tell me
Mr. Baron. Did your conversations with Fitzgerald about
this speech, his input to this speech, lead you to believe that
the President had been specifically informed that a poison
pen device was being prepared to be tendered on November 22nd?
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AMLASII Case Officer.
No.
Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you in a different context
now, was there a decision after the assassination to break off
further contacts with AMLASH?
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AMLASH Case Officer.
•
Yes, but that decision evolved,
it wasn't an automatic decision right after the assassination.
In fact, as you recall from my previous testimony we had
4 contact with AMLASH again in late '64 when he came out.
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I
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think the only hesitancy at that time was what's the new policy?
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Does the new President want to continue to, in our attempts
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to organize a plot against Castro, a coup against Castro
--
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That probably was the hesitancy, not the fact that it
was immediately decided to stop contact, which, as I said before),
it wasn't, because we saw him again.
Mr. Johnston. Was there a discussion at all in November
or December 1963 about the relationship between the AMLASII
operation and the assassination of President Kennedy?
AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I recall.
Mr. Johnston. Let me show you, we have in several versions
and the one that is most available is this document here, and
17
I have got the document you're looking at is in Volume 12,
!
I believe, of the AMLASH file.
18
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
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Mr. Johnston. And it is a yellow legal size paper.
Let me correct. It's not a document.
It is evidently somebody's type-written notes of probably the
recollection of what had happened.
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Mr.
Johnston.
Okay, and it's on yellow legal-size paper
25
typed. And I also have a document that I'm sure is in the file
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but we don't have it pointed out,
It
the sanitized version
of a memorandum for the record dated 29 March, 1965, subject
3 AMLASII, and both of them convey the same subject, the same
And on the paragraph that has the marking at the
information.
left and the language of those documents, those documents say
"22 November, 163, Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject
that this Agency would give him everything he needed."
Is that the portion you're reading?
•
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.
Mr. Johnston. "(Telescopic sight, silencer, all the
money he wanted). Situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and
12
13
Kennedy had been assassination.
Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President
Because of this fact, plans
14
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of subject changed and it was decided that this Agency could
have no part in the assassination of a government leader (includi
Castro), and it would not aid subject in his attempt.
"This included the following:
• We would not furnish
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222222
the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination
furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape
from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.""
Did you prepare this document?
AMLASH Case Officer. I did not prepare this document.
I was not with the task force with SAS at the time this document
was prepared on 29 March, 165. I had already left.
Again, the only thing I can state for you here on what
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I knew of the operation) that this was somebody trying to put
together, this was a memo from Chief FI probably in the task
3 force trying to put together by this time, 29 March, what had
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happened. The other document since it's, it's probably a later
date, the yellow document was somebody probably again trying to
reconstruct what had happened. The facts are not as I knew
them at the time.
Both paragraphs have condensed an evolution that took
place over a period of a year and the decision probably was not
made until '65 after I had left the operation, that we were
pulling out.
But the facts as stated here in those two documents are
incorrect, and certainly the timing that they insinuate is
14 wrong.
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Mr. Johnston. I think we should develop that on the
record and if you want to point out what facts are incorrect,
why don't you do so?
AMLASH Case Officer. "The situation changed when Mr.
Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that
President Kennedy had been assassinated." That's incorrect.
Fitzgerald wasn't with me on the 22nd of November meeting.
Mr. Johnston. Okay. What about the sentence before
that, that Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that
this Agency would give him everything he needed, with your
25
22
qualifier that Fitzgerald was not at the meeting?
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AMLASH Case Officer. This was at the meeting in October
and not at the November meeting because that is correct,
3 provided you put it in the right context.
What about the statement, all the money
4
Mr. Johnston.
5
he wanted?
6
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AMLASH Case Officer. Inferred. I mean I don't recall
that money was ever discussed with this man at any time. In
fact I was asked this question before and I couldn't really
recollect:
when I had given him some money.
It turns out that the record shows that I did give him
$350 for his expenses. But money, specifically, again, that
I don't know of any other
is somebody else interpreting.
document or certainly any memorandum for the record that I
prepared in which money specifically was mentioned.
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Mr. Johnston.
19
the money.
Mr. Johnston. But would you disagree with the statement?
AMLASII Case Officer.
Well, the statement as a whole,
if you leave out the money, which again, anything that he needs
Well, that's what we want to leave in.
AMLASI! Case Officer. If he needs the money, I think it
But what I'm saying
2 2 2 2
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was not excluded in the offer.
22
--
Mr. Johnston. This makes a positive statement, him
saying that you and Mr. Fitzgerald assured AMLASH that the
Agency would give him everything he needed, all the money he
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wanted.
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And I'm asking you directly either on October 29th, or
November 22nd did you make that assurance. to him?
AMLASH Case Officer.
I can't recall that such an issue
q
5
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was made of money because he never asked for money and we
specifically didn't have to respond to telling him that we
would give him money. In telling him that the support necessary
all of the support necessary for a coup, I think it is implied
that he would get whatever he needed, which would mean supplies,
but not specifically money, and the reason I state this is that
money was never a subject of contention between the Agency and
AMLASH. He never asked for money, he never was offered
specifically money.
Mr. Johnston. Was he assured that he would get all the
money he wanted?
AMLASII Case Officer. All the support he needed, not
He never asked for money.
Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you what he asked for.
In this thing it says
12
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the money that he wanted.
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I'm asking you what you told him.
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wanted.
21
Did you give that assurance to him?
22
AMLASH Case Officer.
I did not because I did not
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write this document. And the person who wrote this document
that I know of didn't write it from any factual report at any
you assured him that you would give him all the money that he
25
time.
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This is not a document
This is somebody'
notes in
2 putting together.
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These are rough notes typed on yellow, legal
sized paper of somebody trying to reconstruct what happened
here probably two or three years afterwards.
Mr. Johnston. I guess what I'm asking is a yes or
no answer. In October or November, 1963, did you or Mr.
Fitzgerald, to your knowledge, assure AMLASH that he would
receive all the money he wanted?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, and I must qualify that.
11
Unless
you want to infer that in giving him the support that he needed
he would also receive money. But money specifically, all he
12 wanted, was never a part of the conversations, to the best of
my knowledge.
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Mr. Johnston. We have talked about the next sentence
and it continues.
"Because of this fact plans of subject changed and it was
decided the Agency could have no part in the assassination of
a government leader, including Castro."
Is that accurate? I'm giving you an opportunity to
rebut the document.
view
AMLASH Case Officer. It's accurate from the point of
You have to put it in the right time frame, in the
23
right context.
When he was met in late '64, after having visited
24
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and lived in Cuba for a year or almost a year,
he came back more
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convinced than before that the only way a coup could be launched,
in Cuba was the élimination of Castro and when he expressed this
conviction, not in '63 but in late '64, is when the Agency, and
I presume the U.S. Government at that, time felt we can't
continue that directly involved with AMLASI.
Mr. Johnston. And the last sentence of that:
7
"This included the following
--
'We would not furnish
8
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12
the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination.
Furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help the subject
escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.
Was that the substance of the discussion immediately
after the assassination of President Kennedy?
"
13
AMLASH Case Officer.
No.
A year later in November of
14
'64.
15
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Mr. Johnston. And you're saying that this does not
describe the fall AMLASH meeting?
AMLASH Case Officer. It does not. It is a mixture of
what happened over at least a two year period.
Mr. Johnston.
19
It perplexes me somewhat that your
20
21
as to what was going on.
22
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failure to keep written records would so warp later thinkers
I mean take the March, 1965 document.
As of March, 1965 CIA is going on the assumption that you
and Fitzgerald met AMLASH in Paris, that you assured him that
he would get all the money he wanted and that your plans
changed after the meeting because of the Kennedy assassination.
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AMLASH Case Officer. I can't sit here and presume to
give you an explanation for that as to where the person who
prepared that particular memorandum got that information.
The
4 file itself indicates; as you are well aware, that Fitzgerald
He travelled in October.
So the person who prepared the 29 March, 1965 memo came
5
did not travel to Paris in November.
6
7
8
up with this particular type of information, I don't know.
Mr. Johnston. Who is that memo addressed to again?
AMLASH Case Officer.
This is to Chief, PI from Chief,
9
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Reports.
11
Mr. Johnston.
12
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So your only explanation, your explanation
for the memo is that it is inaccurate but even if it is
inaccurate, it indicates that in March, 1965 these people had
it all wrong as to what the AMLASH operation was all about.
AMLASH Case Officer. If you want to interpret exactly
Now I'm not saying
what they wrote here, yes, it was wrong.
17
that it was wrong because it could have been.
I don't know.
18
I'm just saying it could have been that they didn't have access
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to all the restricted files because this operation until it
received its recent publicity was kept on a very restricted
basis.
So the Chief of Reports, I don't even know, well,
probably the Chief of Reports in the division or maybe some
place, probably did not have access to all of the operational
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files.
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Mr
Greissing, You're saying that the information itself
is inaccurate only in a chronological way that it is developed?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Certainly wrong in its chronological
context, definitely because it throws everything into one
4
very small period of time.
in reporting or trying to report
6
what took place over a much longer period of time.
7
8
Mr. Greissing.
But the facts that are there over a
period of a year would be true?
9
AMLASH Case Officer.
But not in this context.
10
11
Mr. Greissing. But I'm saying over the period of a
year from 1 November to the following November when you actually
12
informed AMLASH of the feelings that the Agency had developed
13
at that time, I believe it is the next sentence down.
14
AMLASII Case Officer.
What is wrong here, what is wrong
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--
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is that after we left that meeting, which I presume they left
the meeting, I presume they're talking about, yes, the 22
this is absolutely wrong, that when
November, '63 meeting
we left that meeting to discover that President Kennedy had
been assassinated, we had told him, you know, that this was
all off.
That is wrong. It was not at that meeting that he
was told that.
lle went back after that meeting with the idea
of organizing a coup inside Cuba.
Mr. Graissing.
the next paragraph.
I believe it clarifies that later in
It says that this information was given
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to AMLASII the following November in 1964.
AMLASH Case Officer.
P
Yes. So I don't know why we're
taking that particular piece of information out of context
q
because in that same memorandum it does state that.
Mr. Johnston. Let me move off these documents.
5
The
file on AMLASII contains a November 27th report from Paris which
Mr. Johnston. 1963. A source in the Cuban embassy
in Paris was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating the
revolution.
6
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indicated a source in the Cuban embassy in Paris.
8
AMLASH Case Officer.
Excuse me. November 27th of
9
what year?
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Did you see that report on November 27th, 19637
AMLASH Case Officer. I probably did. I can't
specifically recall that I did.
Mr. Johnston. And as I read the report, or my statement
to you of its substance, it would suggest to you that AMLASH
was known by given diplomatic personnel in Paris to be putting
down the Castro revolution.
AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on who. In other words,
who did he say this to because he did have friends in the
different embassies.
Mr. Johnston. The Cuban embassy?
24
25
AMLASH Case Officer.
He stayed at the Cuban embassy.
He
was a Cuban official at that time. So he had friends who were
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of like mind that he was They wer not happy with the way the
"
revolution was moving.
Mr. Johnston. So that fact would have been more broadly
known say in the Cuban embassy?
AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes. This was fairly well
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Mr. Johnston. The cable seems to indicate that the source
of the information was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating
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or she had a tape recorder to record what AMLASH and another
person were saying, suggesting it is not a friendly source to
AMLASH
AMLASH Case Officer. Well, that suggests and again, I
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can't give you any definitive explanation for it
suggests is that she overheard AMLASH talking with somebody
else of like mind, and she didn't like what she heard, I guess.
--
what that
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Mr. Johnston. Let's go now to again what you talked about,
any link in your mind or in Fitzgerald's mind in November and
December 1963 between what you had been doing with AMLASH and
the assassination of President Kennedy?
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AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever, none. whatsoever,
and no discussion, and again, again, I go back and take you
back in time, if you can place yourself back in 1963 and not
1976, after all of this has taken place, after we have had
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all the public theories expressed of the connections, all built
on circumstantial evidence of what and who were involved in
the Kennedy Assassination. I take you back and try to place
yourself back within the context of this operation in 1963
when this happened.
First of all, I have to preface what I have to say by
25 saying that this was not an assassination plot, so there would
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be no reason why we would be connecting Kennedy's assassination
with this assassination plot. This was not an assassination
plot, it was not conceived as an assassination plot.
As a coup
against Fidel Castro, yes. The fact that the U.S. Government
was not happy and was supporting people who were opposed to
Castro, this was well known. This was in the aftermath, '63, of
the Bay of Pigs. So there was really in the context of the
time the fact that this was not an assassination plot conceived
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as an assassination plot, there was really no reason to
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connect this one particular operation with the tragedy of
President Kennedy.
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Mr. Johnston.
Okay.
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We do know that on the 29th of October Fitzgerald told
AMLASH that Robert Kennedy was behind the plot or behind
AMLASH's proposal, is that correct?
AMLASH Case Officer. What we told him was that the U.S.
Government was prepared to support a coup against Fidel
Castro.
Mr. Johnston. And AMLASH had previously told you that
at least one of his plans for a coup would require the assassi-
nation of the Castro Brothers.
AMLASH Case Officer. He had not exactly put it in those
terms, but he certainly felt that the first move would have
to be against the leadership, yes. In other words, we never
talked to him in terms of assassination, and I want this
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perfectly clear.
Mr. Johnston. And he told you before the 29th meeting that
the first step would probably have to be the assassination of
the Castros?
AMLASH Case Officer. He never told me assassination because
he didn't even like to use the word "assassination."
Mr. Johnston. What word did he like to use?
AMLASH Case Officer. The neutralization, the elimination
if you will, of the leadership.
The first move in any coup attempt, in order for the
other officers to fall in line, would have to be the removal,
the removal of Fidel Castro, because of the loyalties that he
still had personally with some of the officers.
Mr. Johnston. And after he told you that on October
29th, you gave him an assurance that Robert Kennedy backed his
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes, the U.S. Government and
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Fitzgerald as the representative of Robert Kennedy, supported
a coup against Castro.
Mr. Johnston. On the very day of the assassination, you
referenced the speech of President Kennedy's talking about
an ouster of the current regime in Cuba.
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's right.
Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the September 7th
statement of Fidel Castro's, threatening the lives of U.S.
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leaders, and let me
ave a poor Xerox copy, but especially
a portion of that statement by Fidel Castro on September 7th
3 at a party at the Brazilian embassy in Havana, he talked to a
reporter, Daniel Harker of AP and said, among other things,
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"we are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. The United
States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist
plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be
safe."
I would think from your description of the AMLASH operation
that AMLASH had a plan to eliminate Cuban leaders, and that
it is very possible
1-
AMLASH Case Officer. So did everybody else. So did every
other Cuban exile who was plotting against Castro.
Mr. Johnston. But this is in the Brazilian Embassy on
September 7th, and you started
meeting with AMLASH on
September 5th in Brazil, and it may be coincidence, but Castro
does give a warning about United States leaders aiding terrorist
plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, and you were doing that very
thing.
AMLASH Case Officer. There is probably a coincidence
there. I don't recall that I knew of this at that time. I've
certainly heard of it since, but I don't see the point that you
are trying to make, because if Castro is behind or was behind
AMLASH to involve him in the assassination of an American
leader, then are you proposing that he would also publicly
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in the Brazilian embassy state that this was going to take
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had?
In other words, was he telegraphing this plan that he
Mr. Johnston. I don't know: I assume not...
AMLASH Case Officer. I would find it highly unusual that
if he was serious about being involved in something like this,
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that he would publicly announce his plan, but I may be wrong.
That's just my opinion.
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Mr. Johnston. So we have this Castro speech of September
7th, whatever that means, and we have the AMLASH operations
we talked about in November and October, and then almost
at the very moment of the Kennedy assassination we have your
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the assurances of technical equipment that he had requested at
the October 29th meeting.
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You knew on November 24th, certainly November 25th, that
the alleged assassin of President Kennedy was pro-Castro, Lee
Harvey Oswald was pro-Castro.
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't even know that at this
time.
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Mr. Johnston. You don't know that at this time?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, where did you get that?
Mr. Johnston. You don't know?
AMLASH Case Officer. That he was pro-Castro?
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Mr. Baron. Wasn't that a logical deduction from the fact
that he was part of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?
AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been, but I haven't
Mr. Greissing.
He had come out publicly in interviews
stating that he was for Castro and would defend Castro if the
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U.S. took action.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Well, probably so, but I never had
Mr. Johnston. And in fact, Oswald had visited Mexico City, and
on November 25th, the very day you wrote your contact report,
the Mexico City chief of station cabled headquarters and reminded
them about the Castro speech threat, and I assume that our informa-
tion is that Mr. King was handling the activity in Mexico
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City.
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AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.
Mr. Johnston. So on November 25th he was aware of the
threat, reminded of the threat.
I think it is fair to say that Mr. King knew that Oswald
had visited the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. He knew that on
November 25th.
Another CIA document indicates that Chief of Station Wynn
in Mexico City,
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Scott --
I don't know whether you knew him
--
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on November 25th read a message to the President of Mexico
in which he said, Mr. Scott's memo says there are still some
25 important questions concerning Oswald and his visit to Mexico
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city.
Was the assassination of President Kennedy planned by
Fidel Castro, and were the final details worked out inside the
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Cuban embassy in Mexico?
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That's again on November 25th.
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There's no reason for you to have seen the document.
AMLASH Case Office. I don't know that, but again, I'll
just question, this was just a question that was asked. I
wouldn't report it as fact.
Mr. Johnston. No, on November 25th that is a question
being raised.
Knowing now, looking back at Mr. King, we have the Western
Hemisphere Division on November 25th is informed that Castro
has made a threat against U.S. leaders, that the chief of
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station in Mexico City is telling the President of Mexico
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that there is a possibility that Castro was behind it,
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Oswald was known to be pro-Castro, and on November 22nd, you
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Mr. Johnston.
in turn were meeting in Paris, giving a high level Cuban
assurances that his coup plot that might include assassination
of Castro was backed by the U.S. and that yet you made no
connection between those, all those events, and there was no
discussion of any connection.
AMLASH Case Officer. No, there was no discussion between
the connection between the assassination of President
Kennedy and the AMLASH operation.
Was there an investigation?
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AMLASH Case Officer. Not to my knowledge. I left the
operation right after that, so I wouldn't know if there was
3 or wasn't. But the coincidence that you are talking about,
if you are connecting or trying now to imply that there was a
connection between AMLASH and the fact that it was on the 22nd
of November, the same date as President Kennedy's assassination,
they must have had a very terrific system of communication.
Mr. Johnston. Although you had set up the meeting on the
20th of November, is that right?
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but he didn't know specifically
what we were going to say. In fact, the answer that we could
have given him could have been reversed.
Mr. Johnston. Well, you said he requested it.
AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he requested it before he left,
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but the assurances, you can go back before that. You can go back
to the October meeting when the assurances of support were given
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So I can't -- I find it very difficult to follow what you
are trying to imply or to relate AMLASH directly to the
assassination on 22 November. This is what I find difficult to
understand.
Mr. Johnston. Let me show you a copy of a cable, no
indication that the cable went to SAS. The cable is Mexico
City, 7045, dated 24 November '63 and by way of background,
tell you that immediately upon the assassination, the personnel
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in Mexico City then started putting the entire Soviet apparatus
in Mexico City under surveillance and pulling the records, and I
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don't want to read this into the record because it uses a
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true name.
Let's go off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Johnston. Let me read it, except for the true name.
It says "Provided below sufficiently definitive summary
of local contacts of Ivan Gavrilovich Alferiev." It gives his
"
contacts, it says "23 December 1961 with the Third Secretary of
11 Cuban Cultural Attache, naming her, and arranging a press
conference for AMLASH. It's a very tangential relationship
with the AMLASH operation, but again, on November 24th, 1963,
Mexico City is reporting KGB or Alferiev's contacts, and
it includes a contact in '61 with AMLASH.
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So I have difficulty believing that they are, in hindsight,
not related, and that on November 24th or November 25th no
one at CIA related the two events.
AMLASH Case Officer. What I'm telling you is
-- I'm not
telling you that no one at CIA relates the two events. You
asked me the specific question, did you and Fitzgerald discuss
any relationship. My answer to you was that Fitzgerald and I
did not specifically discuss that.
Mr. Johnston. Do you know of anyone who discussed it?
AMLASH Case Officer. No.
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Johnston Do you know of any investigation that was
conducted?
AMLASH Case Officer. No.
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(A brief recess was taken.):
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Mr. Johnston. Let me now talk 10
and again the groundwork
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is that you were unaware of any investigation of a connection
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between the two, and you were unaware of any discussion about
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a connection between AMLASH and Kennedy's assassination.
Is that a correct summary?
AMLASH Case Officer.
That's correct.
Mr. Johnston. I will show you a document.
For the record,
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this is a document appearing in Volume IV of the AMLASH
13
file, and the first page of it has AMLASH's name on it, but
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I call your attention to the red handwriting in the upper right
hand corner of that, on that cover sheet, and it says, "not to
leave this office, per" blank's "orders."
Is that correct?
This document has handwriting in the upper writing hand
corner that it is not to leave this office, whatever that is.
AMLASH Case Officer. Without specific clearance, without
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orders.
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Mr. Johnston.
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Do you have any recollection of such orders
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes,
what we have talked about before,
that Mr. Fitzgerald gave orders to minimize the knowledge ability
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of this particular operation because of its sensitivity.
Mr. Johnston. And that is the reason that this instruction
was given about the file, this particular file or this
particular document?
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I can't see at this time that
anything else would have been thought of at that time.
Mr. Johnston. What suddenly required that order to be
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AMLASH Case Officer.
Well, nothing specific except that
by December of 163, the man with whom we were dealing, AMLASH I,
was going back, or was probably back by that time already in
Cuba. It was primarily probably I would say as much to protect
his security as anything else.
--
did this have the
Mr. Johnston. So that nobody else
effect of blocking knowledge of the AMLASH operation from other
people within the Agency?
AMLASH Case Officer. Probably from my office down.
Certainly
20
not Fitzgerald, not the Director or not anybody else who needed
to know about the operation, absolutely not.
circulation within other components of SAS.
This was just
That would not
21 in other words, a note of this type would only mean that I
would be, or whoever would clear the order would be asked
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24 anybody.
Mr. Johnston. And I don't want to indicate
--
my question
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does not imply intent or anyone's purpose, but would this
notation have blocked anyone but Mr. Helms or Mr. Fitzgerald
3 from getting access to this file?
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AMLASH Case Officer. No.
This is too informal.
If you
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want to block a file like this, there is a much more formal
procedure to go by, to block the file for, say, the Director's
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use only, or even at that time, the Chief of SAS. A note
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like this is strictly, can only be interpreted to restrict the
circulation of this file for the other people in SAS below my
office, not restricting it for anybody else.
Mr. Johnston. Upwards.
What about laterally? What about to the other divisions?
AMLASH Case Officer. Laterally also. In other words, they
14 would have to be checked out. It would have to be. We would
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have to know who got the file.
It is a matter of control.
This
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is what it amounts to, really.
It is to know who the file
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is.
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Mr. Johnston. But you do that anyway, right?
That's routine procedure. This seems to be something more
than that, of saying don't let this leave without my approval.
AMLASH Case Officer. No, it isn't anything more than that
and I think that you're really much more into it than what it
I don't even recall giving
telling the secretary this
25 particular thing. It probably came about' from the miminized
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circulation order that Fitzgerald had given way before in
October, as I recall.
Mr. Johnston. Did you expect this instruction to be carried
out, that the file would not leave the office until you had
given your personal approval or Fitzgerald had approved it?
AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I would have thought that my
secretary would not have permitted this file to leave unless
cleared.
Mr. Johnston. We previously discussed whether Mr. King
knew about the operation.
Did he specifically know, to your knowledge, about the
AMLASH operation in the fall of 1963?
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I never briefed him
personally.
Mr: Johnston.
Did you have any reason to know that he
did know about AMLASH operation?
AMLASH Case Officer. No.
Mr. Johnston. Our notes indicate that on February 4th,
1964, Mr. King sent a memo to you, requirements for AMLASH, and
I'll show you our notes. They basically detail questions,
intelligence information to be gathered from AMLASH.
AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically remember receiving
this, but if we have -- certainly the fact that we have an
asset who can surface any intelligence requirements from the
community or anybody else in the Agency, it would be perfectly
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normal for anybody to send these requirements.
Mr. Johnston. Would you agree, at least from that summary
of the document, that really he's asking you to get intelligence
type information from AMLASH?
Is that correct?
AMLASH Case Officer.
Yes.
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Mr. Johnston. And given the October 5th, 1963 meeting when
AMLASH sort of indicated he didn't want anything to do with
that, this would be very inconsistent for someone who was
knowledable about AMLASH.
AMLASH Case Officer. What are the dates?
Mr. Johnston. October 5th, 1963, is when AMLASH complained
13
about the low level espionage requirements.
AMLASH Case Officer. He did not want
--
he did not say
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that he would not surface intelligence requirements.
not want to exclusively be that type of an asset.
He did
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So therefore it would be perfectly normal, regardless of
what he thought himself to be, or what even we may have thought
for him to be, that if he had access to information, we were
going to levy the requirements on him.
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Mr. Johnston. My direct question is, then, having read
the summary apparently prepared by Mr. King, and sent on
February 2nd, 1964, do you think that Mr. King knew about the
AMLASH operation, the events of October and November?
AMLASH Case Officer. If he sent us a memo giving us
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requirements for AMLASH,"
minimum he had to know that we had
an agent with this particular access. But he knew about the
operation?" Not necessarily so.
Mr. Johnston. Do you find this consistent with the
nature of the operation as of November 22nd, 1963?
AMLASH Case Officer. Explain that. I don't understand.
7
What are you
8
--
what is your question?
Mr. Johnston. As of November 22nd, 1963, you were now
involved in coup plotting with AMLASH, and were delivering or
planned to deliver the equipment, rifles, sights, explosives,
to assist him in that coup. It seems inconsistent, suddenly in
February, to go back to trying to get espionage information
from him.
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AMLASH Case Officer.
First of all, I have to address
that question from this point. Receiving a memo from King at
that time doesn't necessarily mean that we are going to levy
the requirements on AMLASH.
Mr. Johnston. Oh, I agree with that.
AMLASH Case Officer. So, to clarify the other part of your
question, that if we needed intelligence after the October
'63 meeting in which he said I'm not going to be strictly a
source for intelligence, I want to do something more for my
country, it would not be in any way out of the orderinary to
ask him to send information that we felt was required on the
outside.
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Mr. Johnston. So you are saying you would not infer from
this document & monclusion one way or the other about whether
3 Mr. King knew the details of the AMLASH coup plotting.
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AMLASH Case Officer. No.
Mr. Johnston. As a final matter from my point, as we did
in your past meetings, could you briefly summarize, were you
contacted prior to today's session at the Agency, and did you
discuss your testimony or the ramifications of your testimony
with anyone at the Agency?
AMLASH Case Officer. I was called yesterday morning,
February 10th, by Mr. Walter Elder, and informed that I was
to come here at 10:00 o'clock to discuss the AMLASH operation,
and that you would be over yesterday afternoon to mark those
portions of the file that you wished to discuss.
I picked up the files from the review staff last night and
came here this morning.
Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss the substance or proposed
substance of your testimony with anyone?
AMLASH Case Officer. No. I read the file and informed
myself as to those points that you wanted to talk about.
Mr. Johnston. That's all the questions we have.
I want to thank you very much for spending the time with
us today.
Is there any other comment you would like to make?
AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all.
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You're quite welcome.
(Whereupon, at 1:15. o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-
3 entitled matter was concluded.)
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Exh
An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15
--
(AP) Nov. 18 The following is a text of President Kennedy's address
tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:
*
*
*
"The genuine Cuban revolution
ny and corruption of the past
concepts were noble.
--
because it was against the tyran-
had the support of many whose aims and
"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.
"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.
"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country
and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band'
of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and hand-
ed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces
beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperial-
ism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dic-
This,
tated by external powers to subvert the other American republics.
and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible.
Without it everything is possible.
Ready and Anxious
"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work
with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few
short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people
throughout the entire hemisphere.
"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken prom-
ises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere.
For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of
friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic insti-
tutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people.'
"
62801100092
NW88608 Fod
*
* *