1104-10306-10020
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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SECRET
30 October 1962
URGENT
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter
At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President
directed as follows:
1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or
emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or
without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami
station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize
every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made.
This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.
2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the
next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no
contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt
through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down
operations during the next several days.
3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped
during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for
sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be
temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be
reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.
NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG
discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships
or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26)
and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these
operations should be suspended for the next several days.
NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey
phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.
4. The President requested that all the principals who are
attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments
who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and
decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days.
Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a
representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and
these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan.
(This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)
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30 October 1962
URGENT
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter
At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President
directed as follows:
1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or
emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or
without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami
station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercise
every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made.
This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.
2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the
next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no
contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt
through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down
operations during the next several days.
3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped
during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for
sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be
temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be
reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.
NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG
discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships
or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26)
and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these
operations should be suspended for the next several days.
NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey
phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.
4. The President requested that all the principals who are
attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments
who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and
decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days.
Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a
representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and
these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan.
(This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.) _
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The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This
memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa -
tion by you.
isl
JOHN A. McCONE
Director
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Orig & 3ce to addressee
Icc DCI chrono
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lec - DCI #5 file
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The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This
memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa-
tion by you.
Live Curve Cave
JOHN A. McCONE
Director
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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI
November 14, 1962
Attached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining
policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction.
In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Messrs.
Helms, Houston, Miskovsky and McManus, and upon receiving
final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was
instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions.
It is exceedingly important that great care be exercised
to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest
on the part of the United States Government in securing the release
of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are
anxious that the explanations given the Cuban Families Committee
be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme
caution be taken to avoid attribution or CLA implication in this matter.
SIGNED:
John A. McCone
Director
Attachment
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DCI Memoranda
Memo for the Record
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193 CILY
14 November 1962
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN
PRISONERS.
The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney
General at 10:30 a. m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI's
request.
McCone explained that he had had dinner the evening before
with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury,
legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).
Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations
for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million
dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with
members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past
few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked
out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at
length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on
November 16th.
Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding
of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban
developments of the last three weeks.
After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction
I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing
in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a
topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.
In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave
concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA had 20 million
dollars on covert deposit in the Bank of Canada and that two Letters
of Credit had been issued by the Bark, one in the amount of 10 million
dollars to Pfizer, and one for even million dollars to [Merck.] As
long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there
was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug
industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government
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connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the
Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press
stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying
Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of
17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs.
I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members
of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would
come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were
outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.
Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed
totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if
an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction,
the American public and a great many others would be confused and
disenchanted.
For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity
undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange
for the bank to withdraw the Letters of Credit, and for the withdrawal
of a substantial part of the money from the [Bank of Canada] Also
advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better
climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that
action be commenced today.
The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an
exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of
action.
We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families
Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way
abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but
were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the
negotiation aside pending further developments on other important
problems involving our Cuban relationship.
McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally
approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher
authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone
at 1:45 p.m.
Copy to General Carter w/
covering memo
SECRET-EYES ONLY
JOHN A. MCCONE
Director
Vanc
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline, DD (I)
SUBJECT: Castro as a Threat to the Americas.
November 6, 1962
I think that in analyzing Castro's potential in the Western
Hemisphere as covered by paragraphs 9 through and including 21,
we should consider his posture and potential under various alternatives
of possible United States decisions and probable Soviet policies.
Let us assume for the moment that the United States meets
the exact letter of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange and no more.
This would mean the withdrawal of IL 28s, the halting of the establish-
ment of a submarine base, and some acceptable form of inspection
verifying the removal and assuring against the reintroduction of
offensive devices, U.S. commits not to invade. At this point U.S.
commitment on propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla activities and other
actions designed to overthrow Castro is not very clear, but I think
that we can assume that such activities if attempted would be no
more successful in the future than they have been in the past, which is
about zero.
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Having reached this point, the Soviets have at least three
alternatives:
One, they can abandon Castro, reduce military and economic
aid, cut their losses, and in such event Castro would soon collapse.
Current intelligence does not support such a probable Soviet course
of action, otherwise they would not be disposed to leave such quantities
of extremely valuable modern military hardware, including the SAM
sites, communications equipment, and extensive Naval and ground
equipment and a large number of technicians.
Second, they could maintain about the same level of economic
and military support as in the past, although I would feel this could not
be a very reasonable assumption from the standpoint of military support
as the presence of large amounts of additional military equipment, in-
cluding those mentioned above, would necessitate a higher level of
military support than before in order to provide operational readiness,
training, maintenance, spare parts, replacements, etc. This does not
mean more economic supportalthough I think Castro could insist upon
it on the grounds that Soviet equipment is a burden to him and of course
Dorticos alluded to this in statements in New York.
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Third, the Soviets having accomplished one of their objectives,
that of securing a U.S. guarantee against invasion, will increase their
military and economic aid so that all military materiel will be work-
able at all times and the Castro economy will be reasonably well off.
Under each of these alternatives, Castro's posture and his
effect on the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries
will differ vastly and I would suggest that your paper be oriented so
that it will project for the benefit of policy makers the consequences,
favorable or unfavorable, under these several alternatives.
It is my personal opinion that Mikoyan will return to New York
in a few days and will announce an agreement for some perfunctory
Red Cross ground inspection of the missile sites and nothing else,
will deny any intention of a submarine base, will dismiss the IL 28
issue as wholly beyond the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, will
indicate that all Soviets are leaving Cuba except economic and
agricultural advisers, and will state most persuasively that the
Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement has been fulfilled to the letter and
demand our non-invasion commitment.
He will then build Castro up and indicate Soviet intention for
supporting in every way and to go right down the line with him.
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Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be
manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more
aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing
Western Hemisphere countries.
This is the situation I fear, and I think our policy makers
whose negotiations are trending toward the establishment of a set
of conditions and commitments which will make the third case
mentioned above a probability, should have the benefit of our
thinking as to the consequences. In doing this, equal attention
should be given to the first two alternatives.
In further reference to the paper, the historical background
is excellent, the country by country annex useful, although if time
permitted we might get the chiefs of station to give the current view
of their contacts as Win Scott did. The inventory of equipment is
useful but I propose that it be broken down into three columns, a
pre-July 1st, 1962, added since July 1962, and the total as of now.
John A. McCone
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: CIA activities in South Viet Nam
26 September 1963
1. Prior to January 1962 the CIA maintained a modest station
in South Viet Nam, the purpose of which was to support the Ambassador
and Headquarters with reports on the internal situation in South Viet
Nam, the activities of the Viet Cong and the Communists and their
threat to the government, and to assist the government in its internal
security problems. Among other things we trained and equipped
Special Forces whose mission was to conduct a variety of unconventional
activities such as the infiltration of V.C. centers, interdiction of
supply routes, interfering with V.C. communications, sabotaging
V.C. efforts, harrassment, etc.
The CIA station created about dosen training centers
throughout South Viet Nam in which selected nearby villagers would
be trained in community defense and civic action. It issued arms and
thus provided the actual defense of the strategic hamlets created
in the areas. These activities were carried on with the support of
the U.S. Special Forces. As the activities expanded, a determination
was made to shift prime responsibility to the military, with CIA
in support, and the switch has been accomplished successfully.
About 75,000 South Viet Namese have been trained.
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CIA created a South Viet Namese intelligence organisation,
established a civilian intelligence system and trained the personnel,
In addition the Agency assisted in the development of intelligence
apparatus within the SVN military.
In addition a variety of activities were supported designed to
assist the basic objective of winning the war.
Without exception all CIA programs in South Viet Nam were
coordinated with the Ambassador and also in Washington. CIA took
no unilateral actions nor involved itself in designing policy. CIA has
been represented at all policy meetings in Washington, including NSC
and Executive Committee meetings and all of the McNamara-Pearl
Harbor meetings held to review progress, The activities of the
station were examined by all inspection teams such as General
Wheeler's mission, General Krulak's several missions,
Mr. Forrestal's missions, etc. At no time prior to recent surge
of critical publicity have CIA's activities in Saigon been reported
other than cooperative and an integral part of an accepted and agreed
policy.
2. CIA Reporting.
In June 1962 I traveled extensively in South Viet Nam.
I reported upon my return that repressive measures of the Diem/Nhu
regime were causing considerable criticism and that there was
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danger of a coup. This situation was watched carefully by our CIA
station and at frequent intervals we reported that the image of the
regime was tarnishing and hence its effectiveness was questionable.
A number of estimates and a great number of reports and appraisals
were issued, each one warning that the deterioration of the regime's
popularity gave rise to serious question concerning the future trend
of the war and CIA warned that unless corrective measures were
taken by the regime to improve its image, it was quite possible
the war would be lost or that a popular uprising would cause the
removal of the regime. For 18 months at frequent intervals rumors
of coups were received by our station and were reported to the
Ambassador and to Washington. Throughout this period our Chief
of Station at the direction of the Ambassador met once every two
weeks with Ngo Dính Nhu, explored all problems relating to the
situations in which we had a common interest, and reported to the
Ambassador. Contacta were also maintained with many groups in
South Viet Nam, with military leaders and with knowledgeable
citizens.
A review of the reporting over 18 months and resulting
estimates bear out that the Agency consistently warned of the
deteriorating situation and the possible consequences.
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During this period we also analyzed the progress of the
war and the thrust of our reporting was to the effect that as the
American advisers were able to exercise their influence on the
South Viet Namese military, and our Embassy and General Harkins
were able to persuade Diem to recrient and redeploy his forces,
gradual but consistent favorable progress was made.
3. Attitude of the Station and OtherS
!
In any difficult situation involving guerrilla warfare where
progress can not be measured in territory won or lost, and in
casualties and prisoners, differences of opinion among observera
arise. Likewise Americans required to work with a stubborn
and authoritarian regime often become exasperated by the
difficulties involved. Furthermore Americamaccustomed to our
civil liberties, freedoms, and the rights of the individual are
shocked by the conduct of a government which deprives the individual
of these privileges. Finally an American community living among
natives, many of whom age visiously critical of the government (and
this is the ease in Saigon and Hus), are bound to be influenced
by, and to a degree espouse, these criticisms.
For these reasons there have been serious differences within
the American community.
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Within the CIA station there are differences of opinion.
Some feel the cause is hopaless with the Diem regime in power.
Others feel it best to go along with the regime until a better one
appears. The reporting has been, however, consistent and has
coincided with the views of Ambassador Nolting.
Within AID and USIA there have been strong differences
of opinion and the same is true of the Embassy staff. On the
other hand, the military which is devoted to the single task of
defeating the Viet Cong, had turned its back on political problems
and concentrated on military problems and have been steadfast
in refusing to be deterred by internal political issues.
Many people have become highly emotional, have talked
too much and have given the impression of very deep splits.
onig weed by ses
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Situation in the last several weeks.
The Hue incident on May 8th was a serious setback for the
Diem Government. The agreement with the Buddhists on June 16th was
designed to improve the situation. The agreement was never carried
out. Increasing agitation by the Buddhists culminated in the raids on the
pagodas on August 21. This was carried out apparently at the direction
of Nhu by the Special Forces, some of whom are in the Saigon - Hya
area and by the military. In this connection it is to be noted that neither
MACV nor CIA maintained absolute control over the deployment of the
Special Forces and it is to be noted that substantial units of them were
deployed to the north and engaged in their regular assignments.
The action on August 21 broke the camel's back as far as those
in the United States Government who felt that the cause would be lost if
the Diem regime remained. Therefore, a cable was sent to the Ambassador
instructing him to insist on effective reforms including reducing the influence
and authority of the Nhus and if this could not be accomplished by persuasiba
to take such action as would accomplish this objective even though it meant
removing the regime.
The fault in this instruction was that there existed at the time no
firm estimate as to the possibility of successfully reforming the regime
and no plan for a successor regime.
At this point CIA was asked by the Ambassador and General
Harkins to query certain military leaders and to determine whether the
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resentment had created a body of opinion among the military, the Security
Forces and the public that would carry off a coup and establish a new
government. CIA reported this condition did not exist. During the week of
August 26 and without taking a position as to whether the regime should or
should not be removed, the Agency urged care and deliberation. It pointed
out that to act precipitously and without assurance of succuss a civil war
would inevitably result, the war against the Viet Cong would be lost and
the Communists would take over.
This position was highly exasperating to those who wished to
move precipitously. It is for this reason that the advocates of action to
move precipitously without coordination and without intelligence support
are now carrying on a campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Station.
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#5 file
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter
2 September 1964
--
You will note from the very brief memorandum of my
discussion with Secretary Rusk that he made two requests
the first, a study of the reasons for lack of action of the
Communists in Southeast Asia. This is a matter I discussed
at this morning's meeting and I hope that we can have an OCI
memorandum on my return.
The second question was concerning clandestine channels
to Castro, the Chinese Communists and Hanoi. This should be
given serious thought by DDP. Each situation differs. I am sure
we could, if we desired, open up a channel to Castro. The
Peiping and Hanoi situations are more difficult. In one respect
there is a channel open to Peiping through Warsaw, but it is not
effective. Perhaps the Taipei Station) would have some thoughts.
on this. Also, there is a channel to Hanoi through the [Canadian
representative on the ICC; however this obviously is an "official"
channel and is not very productive. I think it would be well to
go over this matter with Dick Helms when he returns.
Secretary Rusk expects comments on both these points
next week.
Attached:
Laus
JOHN A. MCCONE
Director
Copy of MR on Discussion with Secretary Rusk
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