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ORIGINATOR:
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
CIA
C. TRACY BARNES
REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA
DATE:
PAGES:
06/25/1953
15
SUBJECTS:
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RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret
1A; IB
Redact
04/03/1998
Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio
Broadcasting by CIA.
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38
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25 June 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below)
SUBJECT
%
Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA
6
1. We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadcast-
ing in the cold war mission of CIA. The essential parts of the report
and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated
15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcast-
ing by CIA". (Operational information and other sensitive matter con-
tained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be sep-
arately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)
ao
20 The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved
by the Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:
Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, a
country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and
television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their
penetration, where feasible, or an explanation where it appears
not to be feasible.
b. Develop and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate
personnel and training offices, a plan for the recruitment and
training of officers qualified for covert broadcasting operations,
c. Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a
Joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency
and economy, material derived from escapee interrogations and other
intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to support all U.S.
propaganda efforts.
d. Develop and recommend, in collaboration with area divisions,
an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy
guidance to the field.
0 o Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland,
a project to produce broadcasting devices capable of electronic
intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques
for their use; and to continue research and development of other
unconventional methods of broadcasting suitable to our mission.
30
Chief of Op rations,
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3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of
the attached material with the request that you cooperate in the carrying
out of the DD/P's directive. Particular attention is called to item 2. a.
ahove
4. Mr. C. Lloyd Egner, assisted by Mr. Stanley P. Richardson, have
been assigned the responsibility for staff coordination of these matters
on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning
and sunnorting broadcasting onerations,
Attachment
As stated above
Distribution
DI/P - 1
ADCO .1
th
Chiefs, All Areas 1 ea.
Chiefs, Senior Staffs
5/17 - 1
PT/C/OPS
1
PF/CFY
1
PT/C/PAD
1
F/Mr. Egner
2
RI
:
1
1 ea.
/s/ C. Tracy Barnes
C. TRACY LARNIS
Chief
Political and Psychological
Warfare
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15 May 1953
MEMORANDUM FCR:
CHIIF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
:
SUBJECT
Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA
Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting as a cold
war weapon.' It is grouped into the following sections:
1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MEDIUM IN THE COLD LAB.
It shows in the main that the countries having the most to fear from
Communism are doing the lcast to counter its radio propaganda.
2. Section 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABILITIES. It embraces a.
discussion of the techniques available to CTA.
3. Section 3, Page 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our
current and planned activities against them.
4. Section 4, Page 4, deals with the principal PROFLEMS peculiar
to covertly directed broadcasting, and their solution."
5. Section 5, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of
principles to govern over-all CIA policy in its present and future
activities in this field.
(For a detailed statement of present CIA radio broadcasting
assets, reference is made to CPY to CPF memorandum of 25 February 1953,
entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS 86089.)
(The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting.
By CIA," from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953,
TS 88465.)
(The data on broadcasting hours by countries was obtained from
FBID and VOA, that on available receivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that
on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)
Attachment, as stated.
PP/CLE: ha
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/s/ C. Lloyd Egner
C. LLOYD EGNER
1
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15. May 1953
REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA
1. Radio As a Medium in the Cold War
&a The USSR and its satellites, including China, broadcast
to countries outside the Orbit 1,395 hours per week of aggressive psych-
ological warfare.
b. The free world responds with 1,015 hours per week.
Co
This gives the enemy a numerical advantage of approximately
seven to five. In reality, the Communist advantage is much greater
because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the
Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own peoples
for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures
reduce the effectiveness of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as much,
if not more than, 50 percent. An illustration is that the Communists
devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broad-
casts. There is no jamming of Orbit broadcasts to the Western world, nor
any restrictions on listening to them.
d. Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in
the over all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BBC and Canada together
broadcast 238 hours per week against the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries
combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North
America, the United Kingdom, and the Pacific area.
In the rest of the world, the balance is drastically in
favor of the Communists. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to all
other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a
mere 264 hours broadcast to all Orbit countries by non-English speaking
nations of the free world,
f. Of the total of 1,015 broadcast hours beamed by all the free
world to the Orbit, CIA, through TPTCNIC and other quasi-clandestine
stations, breadcasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles
from Communist dominated areas.
g. The greatest disparity in effort is most noticeable in
Western Europe. France, which receives 89 hours of broadcasts per week
from the Orbit as a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy
receives 97 hours from the Orbit but broadcasts only 44 to it, Spain 94
to 12, Grecce 89 to 9, Turkey 34 to 7. Even relatively aggressive
Yugoslavia receives 194 broadcast hours from the Orbit against its output
to the Orbit of only 89 hours.
ho The one-sided
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h. The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison
of the broadcast output of the USSR alone, without the satellites,
against Europe. It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for
instance, to 140 hours of broadcasts per week. The combined broadcasts
of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per
week. France and Turkey who, together, receive 64 hours per week from
the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR.
i. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the
international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows
that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western
Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it should in the radio
propaganda battle with the Orbit.
2. Capabilities
Several techniques, are available to CIA for the use of radio
broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.
Qo Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under
cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique normally
would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and
the use of multiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly
and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition
and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.
*******
bo
Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or
#captive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing
a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents
more manageable security and control problems, delivers a signal in spite
of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on
listeners and presents special problems in avoiding interference with
broadcasts of friendly countries.
Co
*******
Subsidization of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Communist,
religious broadcasts.
***
d. Through covert penetration and/or support, the manipulation
of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) streng-
thening their anti-Communist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (2) influenc-
ing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-Western attitudes in their
domestic services.
This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine
operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no
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problems concerning bases and management, and requires relatively
small investments and expense. It would be advantageous beyond the
immediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist
infiltration, spot forthcoming political changes by observing changes
in government propaganda directives, recruit agents with reliable
cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for
denial of the facilities to an enemy in the event of hostilities.
We believe it should be the agency's established policy
to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can
be created.. A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the
immensity of this field of potentialities, both as concerns the
countries on the peripheries of the USSR and Communist China in
Europe, the Near East and Far East; and in Latin America as well.
We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Aree
Divisions, on a country-by-country survey of possibilities in this
area and that action be taken to achieve penetration wherever this
study indicates it may be feasible.
****
Use of purchased or free time through covert channels
on existing radio systems in friendly countries. ***
Example--
f. Electronic penetration of enemy broadcasts.
the "Ghost" Voice operations of World War II. This technique is
discussed in para 5.c.(6) below.
80 To exploit the amateur han broadcasters, large
numbers of whom exist in Russia. *** A project is being drafted
to explore the possibilities of this technique,
h. Broadcasting from airplanes. This has been carried out
experimentally in two areas with disappointing results due primarily
to operational and equipment limitations which make for limited aud
ience coverage at best. It is, moreover, very costly and also pre-
cents special security problems. It is not recommended, except for
possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used
on occasion to simulate messages from agents inside the USSR or sat-
ellites. This is a deception technique rather than broadcasting but
should, we believe, be explored.
3. Targets in order of importance, with estimate of Adequacy
of present Projects
USSR. Radio is the only consistent medium for pierc-
ing the Soviet iron curtain. It is estimated that there are approxi-
mately 4,000,000 receiving sets in the USSR, of which 75 to 80 per
cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of
receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of them readily
receive long and medium wave signals. Not all of these receivers are
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in the hands of private individuals, however; and the number of those
having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly
decreasing due to Soviet efforts to increase group listening by means
of wired networks. Nevertheless, it would appear that there will be a
sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three
ware bands, for some time to come. One indication of this is the
fact that at present the USSR is broadcasting approximately 900 hours
per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own people.
Many of these transmissions are to areas and over frequencies which lie
within our transmitting capabilities.
Our assets for exploiting this potential audience,
including projects still in the planning stage, are far from adequate.
b. Communist China.--Like the USSR, the Communist government
of China relies heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with
the people. It utilizes more than 50 national and regional stations
for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and long wave but to
some extent, also, on shortwave. *
*
"
Co European Satellites. The preponderance of CIA broad-
casting efforts are centered on this area. * * *
do The Free World. Many countries afford opportunities
for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration of
indigenous broadcasting systems and use of free or purchased time. * * *
(See Para. 2.d.)
40
Problems of Covert Broadcasting
இச
Cover
(1) a radio transmitter that can be heard cannot be
hidden. Put another way, there are no known methods for concealing
from technical monitors the geographical source of broadcasts, although
the non-technical listening public can he and often is deceived.
Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable.
problem. Autonomous emigre organizations, which offer the most
credible cover, generate factionalism as well as control, security
and management problems. These difficulties could, however, be
minimized by positive agency control through a compartmentalization
which separates the cover organization from program and transmitting
operations and lays down strict requirements on security, budget
control, and high professional standards. See Chart, Annex II.
(2)
Religious broadcasting presents few cover head-
aches, but is of doubtful propaganda value.
(3) The best cover
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(3) The best cover is afforded by covert penetration
of friendly systems, (a Western European nation talking back to USSR,
etc., as discussed in 2.d. above).
(4) Commercial broadcasting cover presents some possi-
bilities in the free world but none for broadcasting to the Soviet
Orbito
Bases
(1) Because governments object to providing bases for
aggressive psychological warfare which they do not influence or control,
it is difficult to find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the
Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to
plan, build, and staff and long tenure is therefore important. How
ever, the political climate of a country can change abruptly, with
resulting uncertainty as to length of tenure. Munich, for instance,
which once furnished an excellent base for a variety of broadcasts
targeted to the Orbit, appears to be becoming less and less satisfactory,
Cover and control problems are closely related to
this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be
less difficult to obtain than for a loosely organized one.
(2) Seaborne transmitters offer much in mobility but,
antenna limitations restrict their effective power. As in the case
of the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are required for
maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problem becomes the same
as for land transmitter bases, and costs in investment and maintenance
are considerably higher than land based operations. Moreover, the
difficulties of providing credible cover for a covert seaborne operation
are manifest. While this office will continue to study VOA experience
in this field, it sees no prospect of any agency use for it.
:
(3) The VOA presently controls numerous broadcasting
bases and are developing additional bases, in areas of the world
suitable for our purposes. The necessary agreements with host
countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transporta-
tion and other logistics have been provided. The present manage=¨
ment of VOA are sympathetic to sharing these bases with CIA,
In addition to the saving in cost, this would furnish us secure
areas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems.
If the difficult but not insurmountable problem of cover can be
resolved, such locations would be ideal for our purposes.
Co
Information Support
(1) To supplement available normal news sources,
broadcasting to Orbit countries is dependent for program material
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upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees
and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flow of intercepts
from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, inter-
esting, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast potential resources
and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is
far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, VCA,
and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the
same or similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the
same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained
in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only
for all radio but all other PW activities better and faster. A cleared
consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, pro-
duced on abundance of excellent support information and evaluation
data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated,
could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt FW effort
targeted to the same area.
This complex problem needs a high level decision
by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers
experienced in both PW and interrogation work with power to devise
an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resources.
do To Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard
(1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts raises
serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that
can be heard above the jamming. To be sure, some of our broadcasts
get through because they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts
in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast trans-
mission at all hours.
seem clear:
on the increase.
For future plarming purposes, however, these factors
(a) Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and
(b) The degree of their jamming seems to be re-
lated to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on
their interests. Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda
are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.
(c) We have no present capabilities to monitor
their jamming if they use-as they probably do in congested areas
low-powered local jammers.
(2) Prudent planning would, therefore, require that
any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting
transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure
our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.
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(3) What techniques

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(3) What techniques are available to meet this require-
1
(a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be
heard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a
low-powered and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering
unintelligible a signal of substantially higher power from a distant
point. The greater the power of our transmitter the more complicated
the installation and the more expensive the investment. And the more
difficult becomes the cover and security problems as well as the
political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the
enemy is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would
therefore be fighting a losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out"
on a power basis only.
(b) Jamming evasion through the device of vary-
ing the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of lay-
ing down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamming. This
method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must
assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient
to overcome the annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination
with appropriate programming techniques and the use of two or more
frequencies simultaneously this has so far proven to be the most
effective means of jamming avoidance a
Such frequency shiftings cannot be accomplished
within the legal rules laid down for international broadcasting.
These must therefore, be "black" broadcasts in the sense that they
can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the government
of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies
produces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to
whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while
fully justified in the case of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies,
must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friends.
Our broadcasts using this technique have so
far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very low
power. This limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit
target and that only on the periphery. The same techniques can be
used with higher power and at greater distances from the target.
To avoid interference with friendly nations' broadcasts the base
must be located in an area which, with the proper antenna adjust
ments, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly
countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting
bass in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts to the USSR, the facility would
have to be engineered so that its signal would not interfere with
local broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in
between.
(c) The development of unconventional broadcasting
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techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting
services might well enable us to overcome the handicaps imposed by
the jamming of our conventional broadcasts to the Soviet orbit and
seize the cold war initiative in the radio sphere. It is a field
which has been neglected thus far.
Some possibilities in this area are described
in the "Project Troy" report of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (Vol. IV, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.
Among them is the "intrusion," or "side-band
injection," technique which was used successfully by the Russians
against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude
our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on
enemy home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the
Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences over enemy facilities
or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort
to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda
broadcasts to Western Europe to the advantage of our friends. The Troy
report observes as to the technique itself:
"This would be an effective and annoying
technique which would be extremely difficult to counter."
Utilization of this technique appears to be
within our capabilities at the moment. It has been field tested
and is ready for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations
can be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved
in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being
explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.
Another unconventional technique being devel-
oped by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing
is the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that
we can transmit an interfering signal into an orbit domestic radio
service which will cause the listening audience to shift to our
nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference on his
own home program.
Other unconventional means of carrying the
cold war to the Orbit by means of clandestine radio might be cap-
able of invention and development, and the scientific and practical
potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.
This office is convinced that emphasis must
be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting tech-
niques if the cold war of the air waves is not to become more one-
sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly devel-
oped and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the pro-
cess of perfection and those which might be invented might even be
the means of
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the means of shifting the whole radio propaganda war balance in our
favor. They would be indispensable in the event of hot war. We,
therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capaci-
ties in this direction to the utmost and proceeding immediately with
the covert procurement of bases and equipment needed for the task.
To recapitulate, it would seem desirable for
CIA to limit its present and future conventional radio broadcasting
acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any new undertakings
should provide:
1 A maximum transmitter power of
100,000 watts capable of accommodating:
2 Built in Jamming evasion capabili-
ties; and
capabilities.
3 Built in unconventional broadcasting
Bases in secure and protected areas
which permit the use of the jamming evasion technique without inter
ference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is
now being made by this office.
Lead Time
(1) (a) Radio broadcasting facilities cannot be created
over night. From the time that plans are finally approved, it takes
12 to 18 months to design, construct and install a transmitter.
Prior to such approval time is required for the planning cycle, negotia-
tion for bases, the staffing problem, etc.
(b) Deep cover penetration of existing radio sta-
tions or systems likewise require time for development .
(2)
1
All in all, it would be prudent to estimate that
upwards of two years are required from the conception of a project
for broadcasting and its implementation. Hence, the planning must
be long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabil-
ities for targets of opportunity, such as Stalin's death.
f. Control and Management
(1) Control by CIA of the substance of broadcast and
the management of broadcasting operations should be absolute and through
officers directly responsible to agency control.
(2) The doctrine of compartmentalization should be
strictly enforced. No one, excepting the handful of technicians required
090
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to operate a transmitter, should be allowed near the transmitter
site. The delivery of tapes, etc., should be through a cutout. Like-
wise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the
operation of the transmitter as well as from any other activities of
the cover organization. If two or more language groups use the same
facilities they should be compartmented from each other.****
(See Para. 4.a.(1))`
g. Evaluation
(1)
In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting
(25 February 1953-TS 86889) attention was called to the need for a
continuing evaluation of all radio broadcasting operations with partic-
ular reference to coverage and impact, and sources for the essential
information were outlined.
(2) PP/OPS, in collaboration with this office, has
initiated this much-needed undertaking.
h. Personnel
(1) There is a shortage of professional and technical
personnel qualified for covert radio broadcasting. A program of
selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any
plans for new radio projects.
.
(2) A training program in covert broadcasting techniques
should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe
houses by detail of qualified instructors from covert training for basic
indoctrination; to be supplemented by area instruction by the area desks
and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office.
5. Recommendations
Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the
cold war we have made certain assumptions as to the criteria which
should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting.
Our thesis is that CIA should use radio broadcasting in
covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:
a. That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other
overt media.
b. That any contemplated operation follow strict con-
cepts for clandestine operations, including
(1) Positive and direct agency control of both
management and policy.
(2) Strict security requirements including com-
partmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.
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(3) Maintenance of
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(3) Maintenance of sufficient cover to permit
credible denial of official connection by U.S. or host country govern-
ment.
That no direct broadcast operation be undertaken by
CIA until every possibility has been exhausted to have the task under-
taken by another country (or countries) through penetration, manipula-
tion and/or contral of, or covert purchase of time on, indigenous radio
facilities.
Our foremost objective should be to exploit the
broadcasting; systems of friendly and neutral countries. This generally
is possible in two ways:
(1) To stimulate; our friends to greater aggressive
effort in their international broadcasts to the Soviet orbit; and
(2) To influence the output of the domestic ser-
vices of friendly and neutral states in the interests of the Western
cause.
recomendations:
Within this frame of reference we made the following
(1) Proceed to exploit the many possibilities to
us indigenous radio systems in friendly and neutral nations with the
objectives of (a) increasing the amount and effectiveness of their
propaganda efforts against USSR and the satellites, (b) exposing and
ihibiting Communist fifth column activities and (c) the maintenance
(f pro-U.S. and pro-Western attitudes.
These missions should be undertaken in closest
collaboration with the USIS missions to the end that all that can be
accomplished overtly.
(2) Undertake a recruitment and training program to
make available highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers
preferably with natural cover to undertake and to support such missions.
(3) In coopera ion with State, develop a positive
program for information support of all propaganda activities through
maximum use of intelligence and defector sources.
(4) Strengthen and streamline the machinery for
policy guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for broad
policy only and the field missions to be given the widest possible
latitude in the application of those policies to local requirements
and the exploitation. of targets opportunity. A mature staff officer
experienced in P.W. should be available in the mission to (a) feed
propaganda lines, (p) expedite P..W. support (c) coordinate with USIS
and (d) generally
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Security Information
and (d) generally backstop the operation.
(5) Establish machinery for evaluating the substance,
coverage, impact and management of radio operations.
(6) Proceed with the development of capabilities to
electronically incrude upon and otherwise exploit the Communist radio
broadcasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important to
have those facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible
use in the cold war-Not to have them available at the outbreak of
hot war would be a tragic mistake.
# # * # # *
Note: Recommendations with respect to specific
targets have been transmitted to the appropriate
divisions
(10) A small staff element should be created to
supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting.
This staff should be instructed to expedite the implementation of
the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CIA
Policy and Program for the use of this Media.
15 May 1953
NW 50955 DocId: 32424022 Page 16
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S-EC-R-E-T
/s/ C. Lloyd Egner
C. LLOYD EGNER