2000AA
104-10332-10020
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief, Historical Review Group
FROM:
SUBJECT:
ESG 95-02
14 July 1995
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB
Position on Release of Information Pertaining to
Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination
Records
1. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be
addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation
in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources
and methods. The issues of greatest concern are those
surrounding the joint teltap operations run by the Agency and the
Mexican Services, official acknowledgment of which could have an
impact on liaison and foreign relations. We therefore, wish to
maintain protection of this information.
2% We are willing to release information which indicates
the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban
Embassies (as long as they appear unilateral and we can continue
(to protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican
Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the
existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window
which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to
the historical record. These steps will be useful to the
historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed
against these targets. We would want to continue protection of
the information which identifies coverage of other countries and
individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.
3.
We also agree to release of the following:
A.
Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees,
and file numbers.
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Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico
City Station and the JFK Assassination Records
4.
B.
C.
r
Cryptonyms, such as those in the LI series,
unless they appear in the context of liaison`
operational equities (such as LITENSOR and
LITEMPO).
We need to continue the protection of the cryptonym
LIENVOY.
This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the
collect to describe the joint activity from
different perspectives. Individual occurrences may
not seem to reveal anything significant but, when
looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire
collection it reveals the joint activity which we
are trying to protect.
Regarding the revelation of names of employees who
retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final
determination until the individuals have been contacted and
informed that their name is being considered for release. This
will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and
convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set
up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations.
We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational
involvement's. Office of Central Cover has prepared and is
coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both
inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.
Или
Worl
Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
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September 11, 1995
WORKING PAPER
Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995
ARRB Attendees: Marwell, Gunn, Mary + one
CIA Attendees : Barry, Ellie
Issue:
Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono item
#132 and ARRB document #31
Gunn proposed that the Agency release the information in
document 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico City
Chrono. Otherwise, the staff would have to take the
document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they
felt would undercut the credibility of the CIA and the
staff. The Board will not uphold a postponement in a
specific document if that information is released by mistake
in another copy of the same document.
Ellie's response - because the information deals with Mex.
liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher
level. [response needed by 16 September]
They also requested a “new” highlighted version of the
Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released
to NARA in the multiple copies of the Chrono and in the
documents referenced in the Chrono.
Issue:
The three documents of concern.
GIBSON Ellie reviewed the Gibson issues--the fact that he
had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA, etc. I
noted that since the document would not be included in the
determination list would the Board be willing to reconsider.
Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the
Board to reconsider, but he did not think it would have any
effect on their decision.
PROENZA
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Ellie explained that out goal here was to protect
the "asset" not the method and that the deletions could be
reduced to those words that could result in the
identification of the agent.
Marwell said that the Board may reconsider based on the need
to protect a source.
Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING?
Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some "AM"
source.
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Mary ask for more information on LIRING.
“PRIVATE LINE TAP”
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According the Marwell, the Board
considered the issue of the "private lines” but since the
paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to release. Mary said is
was hard to defend the individual released since she did not
have any information on the person.
We pointed out that the this release impacted on other
documents which dealt with private line taps plus the Board
had not limited its release to the paragraph that mentioned
Oswald but released the name in other calls which had
nothing to do with Oswald.
Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part
of looking at similar documents.
Mary
The issue of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up.
said the Board was inclined to release given the end of the
Cold War.
[Note: we will locate as many of the “private line tap”
documents we can for special review]
Issue:
Removing the Proenza and Private line tap
documents form the formal notification list
Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said they
would discuss). Has no problem with asking the Board to
reconsider or giving us the opportunity to presence
additional evidence since their next meeting was within the
30 days set by the law, but felt that the Board was not
inclined to keep tabling documents that they had reached a
decision on.
Marwell asked if the Agency plans to “appeal”; he would like
a heads-up.
Later, in private, Marwell said that he wanted to build into
the process a loop that would handle these types of
situations.
Issue:
Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting
It was agreed that "STATIONS” would be the focus of the
presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.
--
Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral
agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that
the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations.
Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico
City station window. There are documents from the 50s,
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references in summaries to the founding of the station and,
most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.
Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of
stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key
issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency
decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding
the Mexico City window into the 70s.
As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had
already agreed to the release of those documents.
Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a
good opportunity to address the Private Line and other Tel
Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.
After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation.
He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico
relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence
(bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories did not go
over well and neither did Bill McNair. He emphasized the
importance of using the language of the law.
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September 12, 1995
WORKING PAPER
Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995
Issue:
Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting
It was agreed that "STATIONS” would be the focus of the
presentation 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.
--
Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral
agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that
the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations,
particularly those in Europe.
Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico
City station window. There are documents from the 50s,
references in summaries to the founding of the station and,
most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.
Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of
stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key
issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency
decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding
the Mexico City window into the 70s,
As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had
already agreed to the release of those documents.
Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a
good opportunity to address the Private Line and other Tel
Taps issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.
After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation.
He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico
relationship); when possible provide specific/hard evidence
(bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories do not go
over well. He emphasized the importance of using the
language of the law especially when citing harm. He
specifically mentioned Sec. 6. (B) {copy attached} which sets
a standard of “interfere with the conduct of intelligence
activities”.
[Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn, he stressed similar
themes including avoiding what he called “chicken little”
arguments. He also raised the question on sensitivity of
acknowledging we had a station in Moscow during the ::::_:_:_:_:_:_
"It would have been logical to have one during the Cold
War." ]
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
FEB 02 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Coordination,
Intelligence and Research, Department of State
SUBJECT:
Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)
The JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently
released documents revealing the existence of CIA stations in
(Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague, a joint tel-tap operation
with (Mexican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral
penetration of a liaison service. It is the CIA's assessment
that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations
as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United
States. CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by
the Board and requests the support of the Department of State
should these appeals be brought before the President. (S)
Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of
stations in Rome, Madrid; Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, and
Stockholm, and in March-April, it will be reviewing a document
that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965. It is
anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases
and requests State Department's assessment as to the damage to
foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly
acknowledged. (S)
It remains essential that the U.S. Government stand by
assurances to persons and foreign governments that information
they provide and activities they undertake based upon expected
confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary. These
releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA
to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make
those assurances in the future. (C)
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Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK
Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)
We have a critically short deadline in which to address
issues concerning the release of Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The
Hague stations, the identity of the asset, and Mexican liaison
The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be
resolved over the next two weeks. We request your comments and
expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on
the foreign relations of the United States, and hope to cite
State Department's support as we finalize our appeal. (S)
CIR-316/ 00293-96
David N. Edger
David N. Edger
Acting Deputy Director for Operations
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C/IMS/ESG/F.Wickham/tdn/x44448/2Feb96
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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
J. Barry Harrelson
Linda CaCipriani
03/18/96 06:24:14 PM
JFK Meeting today
After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting today, Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the
Board's understandings (or misunderstandings) of CIA's position. Bob Caudle and I discussed what happened at the JFK meeting and
the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically Edger did not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed
his willingness to cooperate with the Board:
1.
Jerusalem Station Edger was more willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release. CIA wants to present more
information. Edger was not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come prepared to present new
information on it. CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity.
2.
Open Period for Stations (Edger agreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period. He had
no problem with the Sept 63-64 period and opening it up to 61 in the Oswald file. He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to
the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this.
3.
Substitutions for Nordic stations Although Edger suggested "Scandanavia Station" as a substitution, he clearly prefered
something less revealing like (Northern European station 1, 2, etc.)". Using the former term has far less plausible deniability. The latter
option basically gives up what we want to protect.
Once HRG hears from Edger as to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday
morning before the Board leaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken impression about the above, they will
leave assuming we have come to an agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date.
Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this. FYI, I will be in meetings at 10AM and 2pm (Win Scott settlement
discussions!!!) tomorrow.
CC:
John F. Pereira
Eleanor Neiman @ DO
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

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Fredrick Wickham @ DO
Johnny Goins @DO
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
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From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
Linda C. Cipriani
03/29/96 11:52:57 AM
JFK release of Tokyo station(S)
I just spoke with EA legal and informed her about the latest release by the JFK Board of Tokyo station and the fact that we have a letter
from the Ambassador objecting to the release. She indicated that Art Brown would be a good candidate to go down to speak with the
Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?) to request that they reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange
for a State Department person (Japan desk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador's letter. (S)
I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then
brief the appropriate people in the DO and State Department as soon as possible. (S)
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J. Barry Harrelson
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21 March 1997
JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER
SUBJECT:
Policy Guidance--"Atsugi” and “U-2”
1. References to “CIA base/Station/representatives at
Atsugi, Japan" in the U-2 context is releasable.
2.
Information relating to the station, other bases,
and Agency representatives elsewhere in Japan will continue
to be protected.
3. The issue was coordinated with the DS&T (Teresa
(Wilcox), DO (Lee Carle), the Air Force (Captain Thomas D.
Rock) and the Department of State (Nina Noring); all of whom
had no objection to the declassification and/or release of
“CIA Base at Atsugi, Japan” and “U-2” project / effort /
activities.
File: G:\HRG\JAPOL. DOC
SA
J. Barry Harrelson
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DD10 95-3059
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
-7 NOV 1995
Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board
David Cohen.
Deputy Director for Operations
Release of JFK Documents
1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the
release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the
public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of
our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station
name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice
Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations
during a specific window of time if they are substantively
relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the
documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent
presence of the station? (S).
2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment
of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host
government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and
liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably
would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to
be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and
determined the damage to national security which would follow
such release. (S)
Our
3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information
regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now
Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in
Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located.
current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown
liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain
individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close
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!
relationships with the Zaireans because of our need for their
cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program
and will need to improve our relationship over the next several
months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We
also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have
liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing
with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances
where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's
ability to keep its relationships clandestina. То ехровe our
station there would further hamper developmental relationships
and eventual recruitments. (8)
4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the
following comments:
Brussels
-
Public acknowledgment would force the
government and liaison service to pay closer attention to
Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing
sensitive operations. (S)
Helsinki A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison;
thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison
relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to
ongoing sensitive operations. (8)
Paris
-
No additional damage. (8)
Bonn
-
Berlin
No specific damage. (s)
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No specific damage. (8)
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Luxembourg Public acknowledgment would embarrass the
government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering
ongoing operations. (S)
The Hague
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Public acknowledgment would draw questions
from the press and create political problems for the
government and liaison. This would endanger the
continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)
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Oslo
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Public acknowledgment would draw questions from
the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive
ongoing joint operations. (S)
Madrid
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Public acknowledgment would draw prass
attention and embarrassing questions for the government and
liaison service. This would further damage an already
delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for
counterterrorism operations. (8)
Stockholm
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A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
would be politically embarrassing for the government and
liaison services. This would likely endanger any
continuation of joint operations. (S)
Geneva
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A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
would create political problems for the government and
liaison service and force greater attention to our
operations. This would create an intensive
counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to
cause a decrease in our operations. (8)
London
Ottawa
-
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No specific damage. (S)
No specific damage. (8)
5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when
we consider public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from
operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During
the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin
the establishment of good working relations with the host
government and internal/external services. As a result, the
station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level
bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will
of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an
atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general,
and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That
distrust lingers in the public's mind even today.
our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational
activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions
about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further
Exposure of
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inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our
relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could
withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague
Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time
without serious damage to national security. (S)
6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua,
San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires,
Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our
operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any
release of information about a clandestine service breeds
distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at
risk. (S)
1.
We receive significant national collection systems
support from Australia which affects national system collection
efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would
jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the
public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing
disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the
current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two
incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present
year. Any further disclosure' would exacerbate the tension and
create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and
personnel. (8)
.
8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a
problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign
relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very
sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and
public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to
the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be
closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized,
it would affect a large number of important intelligence
collection operations. (8)
9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be
a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and
Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must
act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The
Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively.
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to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well
engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to
show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that
our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a
capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and
Islamic extremism.
(8)
10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a
problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist
population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority
Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem,
and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.8. in
general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a
station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist
population to react negatively and demand that our station be
closed. If the station were closed, the U.8. Government would
lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African
stability and Islamic extremism. (S)
11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to
operational capability and national security, I would feel
compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public
acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or
additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I
must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any
disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities
are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability
to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure
to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)
Daniel
所
David Cohen
Equ
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