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NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 1
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88608 Date: 03-18-2025
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NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 2
TOP SECRET.
The Eva Bains
For most employees of the Federal government, work
continues unchanged when a new man moves into the White House.
Employees of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Labor-Management Services
Administration, or the Commodity Exchange Authority
フ
all go about their jobs in their accustomed ways, Ex though changes of
Even
administration policy can ultimately have an effect. The pattern of
most intelligence work--collection and the production of finished intelligence
undisturbed.
for a considerable number of officials--remains fixed
;
له
But for
those who are turning out intelligence specifically for the President,
everything is apt to change
himself
Al allo
as
Dovr
takes over.
immediate
new Chief Executive signals the fenest
How wide-ranging will the new President's
be
will large.
foreign countries and in international relations?
interest in fix How much intelligence? will he swant great
be in
order
appetite will he have for
requires
and frequent servings, or modest portions only as absolutely handed?
merely
Will he want facts, or facts plus interpretation and analysis?
TS
NW-88608-Docld:32401332 Page-3
:
2
Separated or homogenized? Is he willing to read a regular intelligence
document, or does he prefer to be briefed?
In each of the previous administrations, OCI had established
a satisfactory channel directly to the President. However, the system ☑
had never carried over from one incumbent to the next. Eisenhower did not
want the personal weekly briefing from the Director that Truman had
the General
received; /preferred to be briefed in the setting of weekly meetings
not
of the National Security Council. Kennedy did/like to use the NSC
with any regularity. Instead he found just what he wanted in the
Checklist
personal, daily intelligence RERE devised for him five months after
he entered office.
The Checklist system worked so well with Kennedy that
OCI and the Director naturally hoped to continue it with Lyndon Johnson,
especially as it became apparent that Johnson, like his predecessor,
was not going to have regular NSC meetings. Eventually OCI succeeded;
This
is was
but only after many months of frustration. It was only when
NW-88608 Docld:32401332 Page 4
'
3
he had a firm hold of his administration and when certain
foreign situations forced themselves upon his attention that President
Johnson discovered the usefulness of a daily current intelligence
document.
President
at 8:30x a.m.
personally
For a few days after the assassination of Kennedy,
ARKXERXXX
R. J. Smith took the Checklist to M McCone at East Building
The Director then held a staff meeting, after which R.J.
Smith/took the Checklist to Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton in the White
The briefing of President Johnson from the Checklist, however,
House. Funabout three weeks after
capt chenge administratiena,
was done by McCone, who saw the President daily for about three weeks
McCome me daily-wis
donewolfisomy partly with¥the purpose of briefing
after the assassination.
1/
Checklists.
Although OCI had provided more detail and background
information in than usual in its first intelligence books for President
on 24 November
within two days
there should be
Johnson, McCone/passed the word through DDI Cline that he would like to
see more but shorter items. (Two weeks later Brumley Smith was
and return to a normal checklist.)
arging that oci leave but the background” da
-
McCone said the President
expected that topics appearing in the Checklist would be followed up
in later issues; therefore, OCI should make even negative reports.
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 5
1
4
Cline, presumably reflecting the Director's wishes, said that the
Checklist that day should cover military activity in South Vietnam,
the fighting in Laos, Soviet ICBM developments, and problems in the Berlin
air corridors and * Venezuela.
Around the middle of December, MEN members
take over ther
White
House
Musing the Checklist, tried to parka intelligence
when McCone stopped seeing the President daily, the White House staff
the President
They
tried to get him to read the Checklist, but were largely unsuccessful,
xxx
although McGeorge Bundy was able to do some oral briefing, Checklist in
Ocl's
hand. On 16 December, Gen. Clifton told Checklister John Heidemann, kkak
"If we can't penetrate this sort of wall today or tomorrow, we'll just
have to try something else." In this cloudy atmosphere, the sun came out
occasionally. On the 18th, Clifton said that the staff had finally managed,
to get the President to read th "the books"--probably two or three issues.
At Christmastime, the President went to his Texas xxxk
ranch and shortly after Christmas had Chancellor Erhard as a visitor for
several days. The PICL was cabled to the ranch each day. The report
NW-88608 Docid:32401332 Page 6
;
:
}
5
was limited to notes covering important developments and any information
that might be useful in the talks with Erhard. The President returned
to Washington on 5 January, and the next day Gen. Clifton, who had been
at the ranch, i told Heidemann that he had been able to get the
Checklist to the President with some regularity once Erhard had gone.
On 8 January, however, Clifton was having difficulties
not
again--the President had/read the intelligence document since leaving Texas.
little
Clifton thought there would be a let-up in the press of business after
What was evidently happening was that the President found time for
that day's State of the Untion speech. He
the Checklist only when there wasn't a press of other business. Uliften
asked Philip Kennedy for a special report, briefly treating important
and still-current
problems that were covered in the books the President
hadn't
&pton
read. xx
th on the problem of the President-
in fact, that
not setting his reading dons. Clifton thought, it would be good to try
the system of giving the President a summary of significant intelligence
twice a week.
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 7
6
OCI quickly put together an experimental President's
covering the period 4-9 January. This was taken by
Intelligence Review, Richard Lehman, the Assistant for Special
Projects, to Gen. Clifton on 9 January. Clifton thought the
Review was the best solution to the problem of the President's intelligencer
were
reading. He and Bundy agreed that the President would not accept a
daily intelligence briefing. The President had instructed Clifton that
the DCI was to see him whenever he wished but that otherwise the President
relied on Bundy and Clifton to stay on top of the intelligence. Because
with no warning
word,
the President was likely to ask them/for the latest intelligence, the daily
Checklist had to continue. Clifton seemed receptive to
prepncal to
sia
gend the Checklist to
x additions
suggested that
the Checklist periodically include a special blue-xx or green-bordered page
containing an operational report. 21
The next morning Gen. Clifton called Lehman to report that
and
ir
which he wanted continued.
the White House was very pleased with the Review,/It had been tried on
the President at breakfast and it had "worked like a charm." 3/
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 8-
7.
Because the President was not reading the Checklist every day,
a
few
it sent
its ountants known tonere
more
Than
DCI McCone wanted in /high-level officials be know bizat
often-sensitive
/contents beyond the small circle of readers in Kennedy's time--the
Secretaries of State and Defense, McGeorge Bundy at the White House, and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Therefore he obtained permission in
additional
February to extend the dissemination to four more top officials in the
plus
State Department, two more in Defense, one on the Joint Chiefs staff, and the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General. 4/
rekly
Besides doing the semi-
Thingsmment along on
-weekly
Review
the PICL, OCI was
from the
By the basis of tuxk anh 001's production of the new
writing memoranda
White House staff and
the
h
to
requests
response
esident's accusional reading
DCI McCone. was
and briefings
the President from time to
time by Mas
The Checklist writers still took the publication to
Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton each morning and received their comments,
plus occasional playback from the President. When xxx unusually
in the PICL
interesting items/caught his eye, Clifton would make a point of bringing
them to the President's attention. On 21 January, for example, he
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 9
8
reacted immediately to the "quotable Khrushchev" item and said he would
get right to the President with this. A few days later he instructed
OCI to keep the White House "up to the minute" on Cyprus developments.
"Hours will make the difference," he said.
Insert *
Gen. Clifton told James Hanrahan on 28 January that
he had talked with the President about the Presidents Intelligence
was
found
Review and Mr. Johnson had said it is just fine. He finds it a very
ed
valuable supplement to his occasional briefings from the DCI and he wants
it continued without change.
from nakt nage
Early in 1964, the President drew his aides Bill Moyers and
Jack Valenti into the intelligence picture. He wanted one of them present
when he read the Review at breakfast and he was reported occasionally as
discussing Checklist items with them. Although the PICL writers
continued to meet and talk with Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton, it began to
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 10

9
look as though Moyers and Velenti were xxxxlly taking the documents to
Insect
7.8
on
the President.
in Texas
plans to spend a weekend
On 25 March the President's LIENSKÝMKX
comment
stækkuxxanek prompted Gen. Clifton to xxx that Mr. Johnoon read his
jup and
was
intelligence while ✓e at the ranch; he is often
8:15 a.m.
was
by
(asking for it. But it is hard to catch him in Washington.
The next day Clifton said that it was not necessary for the OCI representa-
tives to meet him at 9:30 a.m.
book did not move upstairs that fast.
He asked that the meetings take place at 10 in the future.
DDI
James C. Graham, Acting AD/CCI, took up with/Ray Cline
the possibility
This inviting. Moyers to CIA headquarters for lunch
first
and a briefing. Cline wanted to discuss the White House problem
asked Graham for
with McCone, but first wanted a little memorandum on how things were going. 5
OCI then drew up a statement for Cline making the principal points that
it was
meeting
had no way of knowing whether we were mixing the President's
it
needs because we had no feedback from him, in contrast to the situation
under Kennedy. The reason for this was that list
contacts at the White House
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 11
10
What
McCord's
position?
us come
Died in Ayers
did
☑1.ot deal directly with the President on intelligence matters.
OCI wondered how it could establish close links to the President's
immediate staff. 61
love for
sed borders
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 12
11
& confused
Things remained in an unpredictable state for the
only
next few months, with/occasional indications that OCI's presidential
Commented
publications had hit the mark. Clifton remarked in May that the Review
The said
was the best means of reaching the President, although the PICL registered
at times when Valenti was interested in an it
item. One day when the
PICL was heavy on the side of bad news, Clifton said, "It's no wonder the
President doesn't want to read this stuff--it annoys you." There were
days when the President read and initialed both the Review and the PICL.
Campaign
-
From mid-year on, tuk Mr. Johnson made frequent political trips around
the country. Clifton, who was usually with him, said he had more luck
getting the President to read his intelligence on the return flights than
on the way out, when Mr. Johnson was reviewing his speeches.
As the election neared, Secretary of State Rusk
expressed some concern to McCone about the security of the Checklist
and seemed to prefer that dissemination be limited to the President,
Me Come passed the word down
Secretary of Defense McNamara and himself. The DDI was asked to follow up
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 13
:
and
also conveyed his
He
on the
Ceram was informed
Feeling
12
of
the same
time
at McCone
felt that the President should read the Checklist daily, or have it read to
him, and should not depend on the semi-weekly Review. 7/
¶ AD/C/ R. J. Smith responded in a memorandum of 5 November 1964.
believed
Smith He felt that the Agency would have a graceful
readers
way of dropping some of tx the Checklist and if the publication
were to undergo a transformation in which it would acquire
a new name,
8
new cover,
and a new format. It would become President Johnson's publication,
specifically designed to meet his needs. To increase the xxix chances
of its being read by the Chief Executive, it would be a produced
and would be
to conform to the President's working habits by being delivered in
for late afternoon delivery that it could be part his evening reading,
Smith noted that the Review, which Mr. Johnson "usually reads," was
timed
produced medida condambox for his evening perusal. Smith also noted
the importance of finding a way to establish direct contact with the
and thus avoid
ing
• that it would not write in
President so that OCI could get feedback
a vacuum. 8/
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 14
Lick this
13
The PDB Apenis
Smith's proposal for a new publication was accepted
and was rapidly put into effect. The last Checklist was dated 30
1964
November, and the next day the first issue of the President's Daily Brief (PDB)
was delivered to the White House. In substance it resembled the PICL,
but it had a fresh appearance, and it max came out late in the afternoon
in the
instead of the early morning.
A
Jack Valenti sent this first issue back
to McGeorge Bundy saying that the President read it, liked it, and wanted
it continued.
Dissemination was cut back, so that the only persons
the
receiving the PDB outside the White House were/Secretary A and Under
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and
:~
one Assistant Secretary, the Treasury Secretary, and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and Gen. Carroll.
Week was baghy
In place of t semi Heekly Review the Highlights-of-
The semi-weekly Review was dropped, but by 16 December
06/'s
a
the DCI ordered that the summary x of the Current Intelligence
with
Weekly Review be included in each Friday's PDB. The summary, titled
Laving
-
Highlights of the Week, lasted only until 26 February 1965, Bromley
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 15
14
failed to arouse presidential interest.
In the ensuing weeks and months, OCI was naturally
watching for indications of the success or failure of the restyled
PDB writer
daily for the President. On 13 January,/Thomas Patton xxxxxxx
Corner
on.
noted that Bromley Smith wrote "The President" in the upper right of
Copy No. 1. Patton asked whether Smith would like OCI to type the his
Nexxik No, said Smith, Putting it on in long-hand gave it a human
touch..
desibibe
On 19 January, the format of the Brief was changed as a
result of discussions between McGeorge Bundy and Ray Cline. Bromley Smith
said he xx liked the new format and he thought the South Vietnam item
was "exactly right." The President was not interested in the names of
generals and ministers and didn't follow such details.
page size
Further experiments in format followed a talk McCone had
of them,
but nothing
Crome
with the President. There was even a sample Brief that the President could
put in his pocket, though the thought of having sensitive material handled
this way made Bromley Smith groan.
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 16
25
In mid-February, Bromley Smith said that the
Vietnam Situation Report, which OCI had begun sending to the White House
daily at 8 a.m., was proving to be very useful; it was going up to the
- It should not be imagined clif
President every morning.
5 PDS writers always transacted their business
with Bromley Smith in tranquillity. I
(Occasionally there was a certain amount of commotion in
when the PDB CTS Were there
around Brokey Smith's office/because of people coming and going to
different meetings in the White House. One day Smith closed his door,
explaining that IFNKEX
problems
Bundy might be able to work this way with all the
Indians charging in all the time, but I can't, espec-
ially since I was here till after 11 last night
waiting for the President to leave.
one day
Bxxxxximmy Smith unburdened himself/about about
1 for himself and the Agency. One of them was the occasional flow of raw
clandestine information directly to the President, who "eats, up informa-
Smith, recognized the need to
And yet time was of the osséncer
"portant,
profelligence
to th
505
as
possible,
ar
but though
tion" and has a "very short reaction fuse."//Smith felt there should be a
flow should be controlled by/a
timely
"city editor" somewhere who could make a/package of all the many types of
information, including the operational.
!
to PDBer Joseph O. Matthews
At another time, he reiterated/how
short the reaction * times had become at the White House. He also
2 Dom
Leve
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 17.
16
}
The Impact of Santo Domingo.
On 24 April 1965 events took place that resulted in
an improvement in the standing of OCI publications in the White House.
On that day an uprising max began against the provisional government of the
Dominican Republic. The US fear that Communists might seize control of the
country led to the prompt dispatch of Marines to Santo Domingo.
xbombomdodir
*President,
--28 April--
By coincidence, that the day they landed/was also the day
Johan wanted a steady flow of intelligence
that Admiral William Raborn was sworn in as DCI, sicceeding John McCone.
Dominican
President Hohnsont could hardly get enough intelligence on the Remix
situation, and Admiral Raborn was determined to provide the best service
the establishment of x
possible. The day after he took office, the Admiral ordered/a CIA task force
on the Dominican Republic under E. Drexel Godfrey, chief of OCI's Western Area.
•
As directed, it provided "complete and around-the-clock CIA intelligence support
Its first task each day was to brief Raborn to
•
' him
to the White House." / Ix put xin readiness to deal with calls from the
White House.I
round-up
Periodically throughout the day and night it issued /
/situation reports, and when necessary, spot reports of particular developments.
All these reports were teletyped to the White House, and they were read by the
Mr. Johnson, who was described by Bromley Smith as a FEEX President "who eats
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 18
17
up information. " ⱭOI, of course, continued to put out its regulan
Dominican
publications. It was during the crisis that word, was received that
the President's Daily Brief had taken firm root in the White House. H
on 21 May that
Bill Moyers said/the President read it "avidly." 9/
The increased tempo of intelligence service to the
route
Chief
MEXX Executive prompted further consideration of the proper to him.
the No. 1 retipient. 'BD]
land ODI Ray Cline
Cline and DDCI Richard Helms agreed that
a "greased channel" through Monsonge. Bundy should be established for the PDB
and any other reports the DCI wants to be sure the President sees. 10/
on 20 May
-
AD/CI Jack Smith commented/that a "greased channel" already appeared to exist
for the PDB. 11/
the NSC Staff (Me feorge Bundy, Bromley Smith, and the
Hefeorge Bundy, as the President's Assistant for National Secubity Affairs,—
White House Situation Room)
The President
should be the place of entry for intelligence for Mr. Johnson, although informa-
Helms and Cline said han
copies could be sent to Moyers and Valenti. onak
-NW-88608 Docid:32401332 Page 19
18
}
hectic
The Muxlix atmosphere in the spring of 1965, with the
Dominican situation coming on top of growing difficulties in Vietnam,
caused the men in the White House to ask more of intelligence and to
tended to 
prednom sharper reactions in the White House to interrigence and to-
react to it more sharply. Bromley Smith said the President has a "very short
first from official sources and not from the press
reaction fuse." He wants to hear/about major developments, xxxx so rapid
Was
Smith
dissemination is essential. He also warned that OCI would soon be asked to report
on every coup and to cover all present and potential trouble spots with high
precision. He said that in the for future, OCI's reports would not say that
the Valencia regime is shaky, but that "Valencia is going to be overthrown
by a coup on the umpteenth July by X in Toonerville." Since this would be asking
the impossible in most cases, Richard Lehman, OCI's Assistant for Special
Projects, went to see Bill Moyers. He explained that it was possibierfor OCI
Could
write 50 pages of intelligence warnings a day, thereby taking out insurance
against any possible contingency, but that the office did not believe that this
would really serve the President. Lehman said OCI tried to be highly selective
in warning of xxx coups and the like. Moyers expressed understanding of ExK
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 20

19
~
OCI's difficulties, and the fire died down. 12/
This episode had
an amusing sequel about eight months later when Bromley Smith pondered
the series of army coups in the republics of West Africa. He said he didn't
think the President wanted or needed to be informed in advance of every
threatened coup. "Otherwise," he said, "you could fill the book with that
sart of thing."
INSERT from page
below
Insert
the system now seemed to be working satisfactorily. OCI
was fairly confident that the PDB was being read regularly by the President,
writers on the
the PDB team wit
and reactions,
and/is received useful suggestions, and criticisms, usually from Bromley Smith,
they
when I delivered the publication each day. Gone
first paragraph of the
the
One day in June 1965 k
Alead item in the PDB said "Accumulating information suggests that Hanoi is
bringing North Vietnam to a state of semi-mobilization, " The second paragraph
explained
>aid that Hanoi's action was far short of classic mobilization for offensive
operations; NEKE OCI xax considered the move defensive and was therefore
Σ
British expert
inclined to discount the view of one Briten who thought a large-scale attack
and Gen. Clifton
would soon be made acress the 17th parallel. President Johnson/at the time
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 21
}
Insert
0.19
Johnson
The system for supplying current intelligence to hur
President/was now working better than previously.xuderdomder behrDORU
OCIT
To be sure,
under
confident that the President was reading the PDB regularly,
from the Presidential
OCI did not benefit from the steady playback/it
usually
had enjoyed from John Kennedy. It did not, in fact, (receive the direct
reactions of the men Meyers and Valenti who were closest to Mr. Johnson,
On the other hand, toexx OCI was fairly confident that the President
was reading the PDB regularly, and the writers on the PDB team received
useful Juggestions, criticisms, and reactions--usually from Bromley Smith--
when they delivered the publication each day.
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 22
120
were at the LBJ ranch. Late in the afternoon, the PDB received a phone call
from Bromley Smith, who said that Gen. Clifton had called from the ranch.
He had been shaken by
the
Annal
first sentence of the Vietnamese item had shaken Alifton, who
item had shaken filifton, who 
was also
was concerned about the whole piece. The President was out on the lake a
and was not expected back for several hours. Clifton at first felt he should
summon the President to shore.
m
Smith discussed the matter with the PDB writer,
Thomas Patton, and there was further conversation with Clifton, who decided
kattk simply to add the word "but" after the first sentence and continue with
was
case
a vivid
the xxm somewhat reassuring second sentence. The case illustrated
of the potentiality of the PDB for causing excitement in the White House familyr
Cammy?
entourage.
Foreign developments often provoked alarmabone
spirited reactions from Bromley Smith, but it was not often that
nature of the
he expressed surprise mexbation at the kind of intelligence he was reading,
substance apart. One such occasion, however, came when the PDB ran an item
#
about dissension between Rumania and the Soviet Union. An intercept revealed
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 23
mont
21
that Ceausescu and Maurer had complained to Shelepin that the USSR acts on
the international scene without consulting its allies, just as in Stalin's time.
The Rumanians cited the 1962 missile adventure in Cuba and Soviet positions
on disarmament. Shelepin agreed that more coordination was needed.
Smith was
particularly interested in this item and remarked that
bxxx
to PDB writer Archer C. Bush that it was "fantastic" that we could get this
kind of information.
Bromley Smith now and then modified or rewrote items when
he felt that they might confuse or unduly alarm the President. In December
1965, for example, President Johnson ordered a halt in the bombing of N
Vietnam in the hope of getting negotiations started. A PDB item reported
that Hanoi had þroadcast a tough restatement of its position, making no reference
this would be
}
to the pause in air strikes. Smith, xxxaftax afraid that ex
taken
NEKÄ as a rebuff to the President's efforts, reworked the text to
a
fully
avoid this interpretation since the
Emphasizexkkkkebroadcast did not constitute an official government statement.
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 24
☑
22
22
It was clear at various times that there
Quite clearly, the White House staff cringed at bad news
from Vietnam. When the PDB reported in April 1966 that "the political situation
averred
appears to be rapidly worsening" in South Vietnamy and Ext that Ky
might soon have to take drastic measures to restore authority or make major
concessions to the Buddhists, Smith remarked that the article was pessimistic,
and that
Max he had later information. It was, of course, one of the perils of the
PDB operation that the White House sometimes had later fresher reports from the
field. Smith handed John Heidemann cables reporting that Ky was going to
as
formulate a new constitution and that the State Department looked upon this
hopeful. Heidemann agreed that OCI had written in ignorance of this information,
but added that offhand he would not be optimistic.
A few days later Smith read that "There was no real improve-
ment in the situation today.. ," and said "You're going to break the President's
...
whole
heart; he thinks things are much better today." When he finished the/dis
heartening
KEHİRENİKA, report, he toosed the book in the air, whistled, and said, "We'll
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 25
23
have fun tonight. But that's no reason for not writing it as you see it."
&
Smith had cause for unhappiness again when the PDB had
to report that/Pakistan official felt that his country was sexiatui
_ temporarily, drifting apart from the US and would probably establish closer
PDB writer
relationships with the Soviet Union. Smith told/Allen Valpey that this article
was a "shacker" and that Walt Rostow would be disturbed by it. (Rostow
had replaced McGeorge Bundy xx in April 1966.)
White House
Although
John McCone had not taken up a/suggestion
}
ent
^
_in Kermedy is time-
that the President's daily give occasional coverage to CIA activities,
Admiral Raborn as DCI did adopt this practice. Bromley Smith reacted
negatively to these reports, however, apparently believing that President Johnson
did not like them. He particularly objected in 1966 to a PDB Annex explaining
:. astically
how CIA used a portable ultra-violet light device in Vietnam to detect
guerrillas who MEX■ had recently handled weapons before mingling immcocently-
with innoſent villagers.
"advertise in the
informed of
Smith did not want the Agency to.
PD13.
Some
He believed that if
The President should be
CIA activities, the Del should
emorandum.
Send hom
a
me
'
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 26
this time Rid. Smith
2524
was
DDI, E. Drexel Godfrey
Chak
Richard Lehman
was
DD/OC/. Bromley Smith
was
0/061
met
with
them and.
th
PDB writers
Late in July 1966 Bromley Smith said that he had some ideas
about the PDB and would like to get together with all the writers.) He met wi
leadership
them and the 001/in the Langley building on 3 August.
kkongkdax
He prefaced his
remarks by sodaoduri expressing his satisfaction with the way
He explained, however,
the President was being served; He had no criticisms. xxxxXXEXKERERKERx
anon
y that while the President "tolerates" Mymous documents, he
is much more × responsive to a personalized document. He wondered whether the
now DCI.
Brief could be signed by Mr. Helms, Then it would become a personal link
between the President and the Director. In regard to content, Smith said the
_PDB did not have to alert the President to impending crises over which he would
have no control. Rather, Smith thought it the PDB could be most useful
rondering
by carrying items that give pithy judgmentson situations with which the
President is or will be faced. Ha Smith said these judgments would be accepted;
OCI did not have to support them with argumentation or evidence. Smith
emphasized that the Brief writers had to be fully up on US policies and should
adequately
read presidential speeches. He felt the President is kept/informed of
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 27
25
1
Vietnamese military developments by other means; the PDB should carry more
Vietnamese political and economic items. Smith urged that the Brief
have more coverage of
SEXKXKKKOGETEXTEFEK Europe and said that Panama was another subject
high on the priority list. 13/
OCI promptly set about adopting Smith's suggestions as to
Soon
content, and Smith commented that he noticed the change. 14/
A
( what about Helms signature?)
Back to Morning Delivery
alteration
A major change in the PDB system occurred at the end
of February 1967. Seemingly all that was involved was that President Johms on
decided that he would rather get the Brief in the morning than in the evening.
time
However, this change in delivery/forced other changes. The President wanted
the Brief at 6:30 a.m., just before he began reading the newspapers. This meant
that OCI's closing time on the book was 5 a.m. Nonetheless, the PDB had to
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 28
26
be written in full knowledge of what was in the morning press.
As/E. Drexel Godfrey* commented, the schedule *put "the highest premium
on making the publication up to the minute."
Brict
15/
-
Because the DDD now had to be delivered to the White House
Situation Room by 6 a.m., the PDB writers Extn no longer had a member of
the President's staff up and available to receive the book and comment on it.
'
having
make
This meant that there was no point in/the writers making the trip to the
White House. From this time on, the PDB was delivered by couriers.
up for the loss of the morning conversations with Bromley Smith,
To make
an OCT
staff member would visit him occasionally to check on how things were going,
and there was also communication by phone.
for the PDB
Shortly after the changeover to the new schedule,
commenting on the President's reaction,
Bromley Smith,
said emphatically
that "we are much more certain now that he's reading it."
He also made a
point he was to make several times subsequently, which was that he disapproved
of annexes to the Brief. He was afraåd that if the Brief were burdened with
an Annex, the President would put it aside for later reading--and then not
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 29
+
27
Smith thought it
was
ፉ
Brist
to
Shanmarize
excellent idea
the
for the
conclusions of
"important" natonal estimates. 161
get back to it. In Brexiextxxxix Smith's view, the PDB should be of a
It would be
length which the President could whip through quickly.
be better if annex-type reports were sent down separately.
Smith continued to admonish OCI writers now and then
bangnagaxkex about the words and phrases they employed in the PDB. He admitted
that that it was hard to know where to draw the line, but he caution
Axator the staff should be careful about did not like "hopping mad,"
nor
As a rule of thumb, he said the writers should avoid seeming frivolous or light-
hearted.
on another occasion, did he care for a description of India as an "unwilling bride."
At the President's request, OCI on 7 September 1967 begah
dealt
to attach to the Brief a Special Report on North Vietnam that mainly
with the effects of the war. The only copy to go outside of the Agency was
addressed: "For Bromley Smith
-
Eyes Only for the President."
Beginning with
the issue of 6 October, this Special Report carried a new section
on North
Vietnamese treatment of political attitudes toward the war, expressed in state-
ments and demonstrations.
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 30

28
In November DOI Helms talked with Drexel Godfrey and
Richard Lehman about the PDB. Matx The Director expressed great satisfaction
the
with both the Brief and/Special Report. He said the latter ix was "really
-
hitting the mark." He urged that OCI try harder to FxEXExx come up with items
Helms said,
on the personalities of men familiar to the President, who thinks in terms
of personalities. Helms also asked that the PDB give more attention to
coming visits of world■ VIPs to Washington and to each other.
No major changes in the PDB were made during President
Report
m
Johnson's time after the introduction of the Special North Vietnames
Heport. To all appearances, the Brief had evolved into a document satisfactory
to the President, and it kept serving its purpose throughout the rest of the
administration.
All OCI analysts who have worked on the PDB are familiar
in the White House
holding
with a photograph of President Johnson sitting/with Lady Bird and/his first
grandson. In his hand is an issue of the President's Daily Brief, whilesha
appears to be reading mmoc This homey picture epitomized the position
Occupied
*** OCI hoped the Brief had in the White House. And perhaps it did.
NW 88608 Docld:32401332 Page 31
Ribhead
29
The importance to a President of a steady flow of
first-class intelligence is self-evident. Whatever scope and depth of in-
formation he can obtain from the public media, he still needs the intelli-
gence that comes from the utilization of sensitive technogical means and
clandestine operations. He is entitled to objective appraisals based on all
the
sources, public and governmental. In planning American positions and actions,
Should have
seeks
probable development
hex the most soundly based estimates of how foreign situations, are likely
pois.
ble. and
of
CIA and its predecessor, the CIG, have met these presidential
intelligence needs. What they have furnished the Presidents has been determined
by he interplay between the intelligence organization and the White House.
learn what each
The Agency has been premi eager to hot President wanted
and
and
it has tried
in terms of subject matter, timing, format,/style, For the most part, it
to
moet
these
requirements.
has tried to give each President just what he wanted, and not bother him with
may
The Agency has fulfilled its obligation
anything olss. At the same time, CIA, having the intelligence in its possession
-HPT)
before the President, has been obligated to see that the receives
intelligence
reports
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 32
30
to bring to the President's attention thays he dient
but which CIA recognized
-
K...
Drside.
he wanted
- meest
have.
rool the
it has not been-foresson and requested.
he must have, oven if it does not fall within any category of requested-
information.-
There has probably never been complete agreement between
CIA and the White House on what the President really needs to know, but
a degree
a of mutual toleration usually prevailsx so that a President will
accept
some things he isn't particularly interested in and CIA will
carry on certain lanes of reporting simply out of regard for a President's
supply President with oertain reporting
idiosyncracies.
In serving Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Was
able to
-
Johnson, CIA's Office of Current Intelligence found oireet line to the
Chief Executive
its
directly
to the
Message
Chief Executive,
-
although the method was adjusted to accord with each President's preferences.
NW 88608 Docid:32401332 Page 33/