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MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
ORGANIZED CRIME
CIA
ASSASSINATION, KENNEDY, JOHN
REPORT
Declassified
1B; 1C; 3
Redact
03/31/2000
COMMENTS: CCBOX 441
v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 1
AGENCY: SSCIA
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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TITLE :
DATE: 00/00/75
PAGES
690
SUBJECTS : ORGANIZED CRIME
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA
ASSASSINATION, KENNEDY, JOHN
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 2
[R] · ITEM IS RESTRICTED
SUNDAY NWS, AN 1975
My Pauly SUNDAY N
ETS OF THE CIAL
Americalt
erical Map Hari Who Duped Castro
Matic
spied on Fidel.
Its clandestine operations how undergoing c Sometimes painful official
echuting, the Central Intelligence Age, y maintains, as always, a tight lip. Dut.
from interviews with the egents whored out to do the CIA's clock-and-dagger.
rek, News reporter Paul Meskil tell here for the first time of the 
intrigue
that surfaced in the Cuban misalle cis, confrontation that pushed the U.S.)
to the brink of war with the Sy 1st Union, First of a series.
BY PAUL NICHIL
1
A BEAUTIFUL German-American
gir scored an intelligence coup for
the CIA by stealing scoret paperi
the Havana hotel suite the hi
hadh Fidd Control
the papers, the toll
Newcre mens showing the
geleteder Soviet missile ins
copionage ements, Caribbean conspira-
tors, and Cuban freedom fighters were
interviewed for this series. on CIA
operations the Caribbean and the
of their clandestine ac-1
ition and sold here for the first time,
same are being investigated by the
Intelli-
Committee on
pelice and Vice President Rockefeller's
on CIA Activities.
In Cuba.
to cre
wh is quictly in New York, was ti
En of the Caribbon cold
She was one of the most
member of a spring recruited
the Central Intelligence Apon
Frank ini, time triple
who later became known to the meris
can public as Watergate burgler Frank
Sturgis.
Ms. Lorenz, Sturgis, other formet
to sources, the CIA was,
or another; involved in:
assassinate foreign heads
of st ncluding Castro of Cuba,.
Papa Duvalier of Haiti 
and Rafael
Trajo of the Dominican Republic
Sing a Cartroite attempt to
invade Panama and sabotage the Pana-
thip
TG Canal.
The Explosion of a munition
Havana harbor.
• A fantastic scheme to scize a
Soviet ship and use it to obtain the
release of the captured American spy
ship Pueblo.
● Secret deals with American mob-l
sters who had lost their multimillion-
dollar Cuban gambling casinos.
• Armed raids on Cuba and many
shipments of guerrilla fighters, weap-
ons, explosives and other wer materi
als to the island before and after the
Day of Pigs ficuco.
16 Marie Lerons played a small but
important role in the labyrinth 
of
Caribbean comminatics.
Her Culan dentures begen on
1059, when
balmy evenin
Cuban revolution--
alanch
ary flag pulic elenmile the gleaming
white luxury 
Her Lerlin, anchored in
Havana harber on the next-to-last stop.
- of a Caribbean cruise.
In the launch were 20 or so heavily.
The
rumpled
fatigues.
armed Cubans, all weaking boards and
glive-green
Hner's accommodation ladder was
(Continent en pats 05).
50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 3
Box 441
Вах
Who Duped Castio
ሞ
(Continued from plae 2)
lowered And th4 bigbad (bearded
albard like pirates, kro-
males dejugling frein their belts and
Tincture guns swinging from their
shoulders
•
Women in evening gowns screamed
and ran for cover with their dinner-
jacketed husban a believing the ship
was being railed by Landit Eut other.
American trials recognized the leader
of the sinister-looking tarul as Fidel
Castro, the new pine minister of Cuba,
end they crowded around him for; auto-
grapha.
"Ta friend," he shouted obviously
nying the commotion he had caused.
"Ilike Americans."
1
The Berlin's shopper, former German
Nivy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz, nited
the barbudos to say for cocktaicy and
dinner, and he introduced Quatro his
vifarious 18-year-old daughter, Mari
"My father spoke Spanish anhe
got along well with Castro," Baric fold
this reporter. "He took Castro and his
nen on a tour of the ship. then ked
them to please leave their guns odde
dining room before they sat down
for dinner.
"Castro said they didn't feel safe
without guns, so my father allowed
Cm to keep their pistols, but he ade
Liem legve the machine guils, automat
ie rifles and grenades in the smoking
Tooth.
Caste sat at the captain's table,
bytween Lorenz and Marie. During the
meal, he smiled frequently at Marie,
nad she, was as impressed as any nur-
nul teebage girt would be by compli
ments from, the flamboyant hero of the
Caban revolution.'
She spoke German and English,
which she had learned from her Ameri-
can mother. Castro said he needed a
sacretary who could write letters in
these languages. Before the meal was
over, he offered the job to Marie.
Took Offer As Joke
"He asked me to stay in Havana
and work for him," she said. "My fa
ther and I both laughed. My father
said I was going back to Germany to
finish my education."
Castro promised to write to her, so
she gave him two addresses-her par-
ents home in Bremen, Germany, and
her brother's apartment in New York,
where she planned to stay, when the
Caribbean cruise ended. She never ex-
pected to see or hear from Fidel again.
About two weeks later, two Cuban
officers called on Marie in New York.
They carried a message from Castro,
saying he was in desperate need of an
English-German translator. He had sent
Cubana Airlines plane to bring her
back to Havana.
"I made a big mistake," Marie said.,
"I got on that plane."
During the flight to Havana, she
tried to imagine her life in Castroland.
She thought she wollt have a derk in
the premier's sccupatial pool and s
stall apartment of her own. She may
even have dreamed pf a romance with
Sangr
says SAC Garcia
"Source 
of Tarrabaci
V:
Mama
120
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page .4..
1
(the fall, chari palic dictator. Huther
airborne illusios were shattered moon
after the plane Linged.
1.
"I was ver idealistic then," she
said. "I was goig on an adventure and
to my first 4 I was going to help
the new govern piht. Instead, I me
Castro's playthi
"I was drin from the airpot to
the Havana on, where Fidel had
taken over the 4th floor. For the next
four onths, hardly ever got it of
the Hilton. Which I did get out, it was
nuder guard. I wanted to go dojin to
the pool or coffee shop, two buriedus
would go with me."
I Was His Prisoner'
Asked to define her relatio ship
with Castro during this period. Mario
said: "I was his prisoner. I was rap-
ped."
Were your over in love with
Fidel?"
"No; never. flow can you be in love
when you're afraid, when you're trated
like a piece of furniture, when pu're,
sleeping with a live bazooka, undef the
bed, when you're living in a room with
Kuns on every table and cigar butik all
over the floor ?"
"My way of thinking was Gerijan,"
she continued. "Everything, in my life
had been very orderly, very neat, and
clean. I never realized anyone, escial
ly a prime minister, could be so disor-
ganized. I thought he would have
several offices, with desks, chairs and
telephones. All he had, at this Foint,
was suite of rooms at the Hilton,
where he lived and worked. I was kent
in one of the roots. The door to the
hall was locked from the outside.
Barbudos and visitors were in the pext
rooln, but the door between the joms
was kept locked.
"All I could do was read Woks,
study Spanish, walk back and forth,
hsten to the radio or go on the balcony
and look out over Havana. was
miserable. My father tried to find out
what had happened to me. He contact-
ed the American Embassy in Havana
Marie was born un American citizen)
but nothing happened.
"The only clothes I had were what I
brought with me from New York. I
couldn't go out to buy anything. Fidel
had me measured for a uniform so
would look like a member of the 26th
of July Movement. An olive-green uni-
form with a lieutenant's star.
"That way, when I was allowed out
I under guard, he thought people would
think I was of his officers. But,
almost every llavana housewife heard
rumors that Castro was keeping a for-
eigner, an American girl, at the Hilton.
I was becoming a problem to him.
"One day two barbudos came to the
ronin while Fidel was out. They said
they were there to help me. They took
me on a 20-njinete
beautiful black
ne ride to the
uliowed me the
bouch there and
then drove me by jeep to this huge
prison complex. They showed me a cell
Discovery of missile
sites in Cuba provokod
a cold-war showdown
bolwoon than Prezident
John F. Kennedy and
thon Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev, a
confrontation that had
the world holding
iis breath.
A chance meeting in Havana harbor aboard a cruise ship captained by her
father brought Marie Lorenz and Fidel Castro logother. It began a
liaison destined to have international repercussions.
where dictator Fulgencio Batista had
imprisoned Fidel and Raul (Fidel's
brother) years before. I went into the
rell to look at a bronze plaque on the
wall. They shut the door and locked me
in the cell. Then they went away.
She Wasn't Pampered
same
"I spent a week there, eating the
other
food as the
prisoners
blacks beans, rice, stale bread and cof.
fee. As far as I know, I was the only
woman there.
"Every morning we would hear the
firing squads. As soon as it got light,
the birds would start singing. Then the
guns would go off. Then marching and
quiet. Then breakfast and cell checks.
The guards would check to see if you'd
hanged yourself during the night or if
you'd done something wrong in there
where there was hardly room to turn
around. It was horrible.
After seven days, I was taken out
and flown back to Havana."
Merin was never told why she was
jailed. She now believes Castro had her
locked up to make sure she didn't es
cape while he was out of the count v
visiting the United States and South
America.
One night she was with Castro, and
his bodyguards in the lobby of the
Riviera Hotel when a handsome, wavy-
haired mal aproached her. He wore
the olive-green rebel uniform and the
signia of a captain m the Cuban air
force.
☐ While Castro was conferring with
his sides on the other side of the
lobby, the captain mingled with the
barbudos around Marie and whispered
to her in English: "I know about you."
"Can you help me?" she responded.
"Can you get me out of here?"
"Yes. 1m with the American
Embassy. I'll get you out."
This was her introduction to Com-
mandante Frank Fiorini (later known
as Frank Sturgis), Castro confidant
and hired agent for the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency.
Agrees to Spy on Fide!
For the next few weeks Frank kept
in contact with her in
person and
through Castro officers who were
working for him. Marie agreed to spy
on Castro. She filched secret documenta
and reported Castro's conversations
with important visitors overheard
through the hotel, walls. By now, she
could read and speak Spanish fairly
well.
The suite was full of guns and
papers," she said. "Fidel had papers
strewn all over the tables. the floor,
the bed, the dresser. He had one filing
cabinet that was never locked. It was
full of money, papers, documents,
naps. I took papers out and slipped
then to Frank. Fidel never missed
them.
"Frank said, 'Get all the data you
cnn, and I did. I was a regular Mata.
llari."
Then Marie became sick, and Frank
arranged her escape. Two Cuban offi-
cers took her out of the hotel while
Castro was away and put her on
Cubana Airlines flight to New York.
About that finie, Frank also set up
the escapes of two top Cuban air force
officers, a project that forced him to
leave Cuba. He moved his lune of
operations to Miami, but he kept in
touch with his agents on the island and
his CIA contacts in Havana and Wash-
ington.
When she recovered from her ill-
ness, Marie jo,ned him in Florida and
volunteered foy mission that meant
certain death if she were caught.
Early in 1900, Castio wint
"
SUNDAY NEWS; JUNE 18, 1976
CIA Sent Bedmate
3
To Kill Castro in '60
By PAUL MESKIL.
Cavant New Y* Near to "Vir
The Central Intelligence Agency, sent a shapely Mata Hari to Cuba in
1960 to kill her former lover, Fidel Castro.
Details of this case were
Committee investigator who
learned that a mystery
woman had been involved
in an assassination plot
against the Cuban dictator.
It was the first of several
CIA-sponsored attempts to exe-
cate Castro.
The mystery woman has now
been identified by the committee
and The News as Marie Lorenz.
aun attractive German-American
brunette who shared Castro's
Havana hotel suite for soveral
months in 1959. When a commit
tee investigator confronted her
with evidence linking her to the
assassination plot, she admitted
that she had been recruited for
the attempted hit.
Exclusive Account
Then, last week, she gave this
reporter an exclusive account of
mission SO secret that she
never mentioned it to anyone for
16 years.
Ms. Lorenz, who now lives in
New York. is the daughter of
the late German Navy Capt.
Heinrich Lorenz and his Ameri
can wife. After World War II.
Lorenz became skipper of the
luxury liner Berlin. He took
Marie along 09:1 21 Caribbean
cruise in Polonary 1959. A
month after astro tuk over
the Cuban government.
Castro be the Berlin in
Havana harbor and dined with
the captain and his vivacious
teenage daughter. He later per-
shaded Maric to return to Hava-
na to work as his personal inter-
preter. When she arrived she
was installed in Castro's 24th-
flot suite at the Havana Hilton.
She Soon realized she was a
virtual prisoner.
Quizzed by FBI
Frank Fiorini. an American
who had became a Cuban Revo-
Lutionary Army officer and a
CIA agent, contacted her and
persuaded her to photograph
Castro's secret papers. He later
helped her escape.
She left Havana in January
DocId; 32423630 Page, 5.
uncovered by The News and a Senate Intelligence
The Memo That Started It
A
On Die: 11. 1959, Col. J. C. King, head of the CIA'S
Western Hemisphere. Division, wrote a memorand imita
Director Allen Dalles, according to a Senate committee
port. Noting that the far left" regime in Cab night on
courage other Latin American countries. take
against US interests he recommended that: "Them
consideration be given to the elimination of Fail C
None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Kan +
companion, Che Guevara, have the same mesme appeal to
the passes. Many informed people believe that the disappear
ance of Fidel would greatly accelerate a fall of the present
government."
:
Dulles and Deputy Director of Plans Ridled Bissell
approved the pectumeidation, and the CLA iaunched 20.
assassination campaign against Castro that lasted at least
five years. This is the exclusive story of the first try.
NW 50955
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 6
CIA Sent a Bedmate
To Kill Castro in '60
am page 3)
Fiorini gave her two capsules
full of poison powder. She was
told to sprinkle the powder in
Castro's coffee.
2
F
1
York and
Hospital for
Setels diness "I guess the company (CIA) v
questioned her supplied them. Frank said it was
dendan geen in Cuba ja company operation."
VaTIOUS Packing the olive-drab uni- a
with form that Castro had given her, w
Rorke. a designating her a lieutenant in
a tentang coworked the Revolutionary Army, Ms.
* and the FBI. Lorenz flew back to Havana on
Ju apa at these missions sho: Cubana Airlines. Believing she
might be searched at the airport,
Hana and stole s
she hid the capsules in a jar of na
cold cream in her purse. When
she arrived in Havana she ti
checked into " tourist hotel, ¦ e
and told her lead changed into her Fidelista uni-A
at 
sigeerd that would en
sele her
a tremendous
service for this country."
Heter to the FBI offices
"The lobby was full of report-L
1+1 60th St. for a conleers and other people trying to 11
with the two agents who see Castro, but he wasn't there. [
qde tined
previous-y. One of his aides recognized me de
and took me up to Fidel's suite. it.
had
apatan dements from
While he Was
tas late:,
al.
was a ked about my atti-
tade toward Cestre," she said,
and with 1. was willing
11
ste could get in and
Castors suite). I said,
Want Khidk
Thought It Was a Joke
**AN (saad, You could knock
word save everybody
troubled 1 thought he
hat they kept com.
and I realized
they were sp² jours.
"Alex sat. Why don't you kill
bbm? Daud, I don't know how,
with all those men around him.
and I don't know if it's in me to
kill hung
"Once
jealousy, 1
pointed ag a hand and Fidel
didn't even was. He said, u
can't kill said, I'm not
form and went to the Hilton.
Cold-Cream Caper
י{
m
Entering the two-room suite, a
she saw that nothing had chang-te
ed in her absence. The sitting
room was crowded with Castro's ti
bearded, pistol-packing retain-
ers. The bedroom was littered
with papers, cigar butts and
guns.
She waited nervously in Cas
tro's private room until he came
in a few hours later. As soon as
he smiled and hugged her, she
knew he didn't suspect she had
visited the suite a few months
previously and stolen his secrets.
And he certainly didn't suspect
she had come back to kill him."
Do Not Disturb
"He asked why I left him and
I said it was because I missed
my mother and my home. He
started talking about Cuba and
planning Ta just cleaning the problems, the lack of money,
the gun.
Ms. Len said there were
several more meetings, at which
var ons W
4 killing Castro
were discussed
"Finally they decided on pol-
son. They said it would be easy
to put poison in his food or
drink. I said, What are 801
trying to tell me? To go down
and kill him
"Alex said, "It would change
history. I said, "Well, I don't
want to de
"They didn't tell me to do it
or not to do it. They said if I
went I be protected, but who
could guarantee I'd get out?"
A Method Ready
Mrs. Lorenz said she finally
Miami with
to
go
the shortages. He talked a long
time. He said he was expecting
an important phone call, but he
took the receiver off the hook
and he shouted to the barbudos
(bearded ones) in the next
room: No me moleste (Don't
bother me)'
"Finally he ordered food and
coffee sent up. When it came, he
fell asleep on the bed, in his
fatigues and with a cigar in his
mouth. I had no confidence left.
but I knew this was the chance
to do it.
"I went into the bathroom and
opened the jar of cold cream. I
stuck my finger in it and the
whole thing came out like yuck.
couldn't find the capsules.
They had melted.
I
111 HEY absenced 1110 SILLIK
uld get in and!
room was crowded with Castro's ti
state). I said, bearded, pistol-packing retain
ers. The bedroom was littered
with papers, cigar butts and
guns.
Thought It Was a Joke
A saai, You could knock
soud save everybody
thought he
they kept com.
and I realized
Why don't you kill
him I said, I don't know how,
with all those men around blm,
and I don't know if it's in me to
Kilan.
"One
pointed a
dan't
cert kit
the
31':
Ms. A
of jealousy.
ath
and Frig
He said, u
I said, I'm not
just cleaning
She waited nervously. In Cas-
tro's private room until he came
in a few hours later. As soon as
he smiled and hugged her, she
knew he didn't suspect she had
visited the suite a few months
previously and stolen his secrets.
And he certainly didn't suspect
she had come back to kill him."
Do Not Disturb
"He asked why I left him and
I said it was because I missed
my mother and my honie. He
started talking about Cuba and
the problems, the lack of money,
the shortages. He talked a long
said there Were
time. He said he was expecting
meetings at which
an important phone call, but he
Kilang Castrtook the receiver off the hook
and he shouted to the barbudos
(bearded ones) in the next
room: No me moleste (Don't
bother me)'
Finally they decided on pol-
Ron. They said it would be easy
}: his food or
to put poison
drink. 1 said, What are y
trying to tell me? To go down
and kill him
"Alex said. It would change
history. I said. "Well, I don't
want to die
"They didn't tell me to do it
or not to do it. They said if I
went I'd be protected, but who
could guarantee I'd get out?"
A Method Ready
Mrs. Lorenz said she finally
arreni to tO to Miami with
for a meeting with Fiori-
m, who."said he had a way to do
She said she spent three
weeks in a CIA "safe house" in
Miami, seeing no one but Flori-
ni and Rorke. "They kept talk-
ing me into it. They said, 'You
can do it. You're the only one
who can do it.
"Finally he ordered food and
coffee sent up. When it came, he
fell asleep on the bed, in his
fatigues and with a cigar in his
mouth. I had no confidence, left,
but I knew this was the chance
to do it.
"I went into the bathroom and
opened the jar of cold cream. 1
stuck my finger in it and the
whole thing came out like yuck.
I couldn't find the capsules.
They had melted.
"It was like an omen.
"I couldn't just dump a glob
of cold cream in his coffee, so I
shut the jar and went back to
the bedroom and I watched him
sleeping. Finally I lay down on
the bed beside him.
Let history take its course.'
"I thought. To hell with it.
"Stupid, Stupid"
Frank and Alex met me when I
Asked if she now believes she
was brainwashed, she replied: "I
guess so." She said they appeal-flow
ed to her patriotism and told her
she "would Ket thousands,
nough to retire," if she Buc-
zecard.
When she finally agreed to ac-
cept the assignment, she said,
Aria Floors
Opera Singer
London, June 12 (UPI)
1n Giovanni reached for a
high note at the Royal Opera
House in London last night
and fell through the floor.
He stuck there, in the per-
son of singer Ruggero Rai-
nondi, trapped to his waist
and singing for dear life. Sir
Geraint Evans and his other
co-performers, still singing,
tagged and pulled. Eventual-
ly Raimondi climbed out, un-
hurt but shaken with his word
bent into a curve.
"They
magnificent,"
said critic Hilton Tims, who
was in the audience. "They
carried on without letting the
incident upset their vocal
equilibrium."
50955
were
to Miami next morning.
They asked me what happened
and I said the capsules melted.
Frank was very upset. He said,
'Stupid, stupid, stupid. Why did
you put them in the cold cream?'
I said. 'Where else? It was the
only place to think of where no
one would find them.""
Ms. Lorenz was not asked to
try again.
"
"Would you have killed him if
the capsules hadn't melted the
interviewer asked. "No," she
replied. "Probably not."
Alex Rorke later disappeared
on a mystery flight to Nicara-
gua. Frank Fiorini, now known
as Frank Sturgis, continued to
perform odd jobs for the CIA
until his arrest in 1972 as one of
the Watergate burglars.
Informed of Ms. Lorenz' ac-
count of the assassination at-
tempt, he verified her story.
Soon after her murder mission
failed, the CIA recruited Mafia
mobsters
including John
Roselli of Las Vegas, Sam Gian-
cana of Chicago and Santo Traf-
ficante of Tampa, Fla. - to kill
Castro. But they were no more
successful than the sexy. Mata
Hari.
DocId: 32423630 Page 7
DIERIENCE SEDITION
NYYS
WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER
SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975:
Daily 10c-Sunday 25c
71sh Year---Number 97
Гі
NW 50955.
CIA, Mobsters Linked
To Cuba Raid Plans
Newspaper Names 4Mafia Figures
when it became obvious that
that invasion of 1,400 exiles
was ta fallure, the mobster
boat returned to Florida.
SACRAMENTO (AP) The
Central telligere Agency
rehed on Your underworld
mobsters for Intelligence used
in planning the ill-fated 1981 Walsh identified the source
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, of his. information as a 
former
the Sacramento Bee said to employe of the CIA. He did
day.
not identify the employe in
the story, which carried a Las
Vegas, Nev., dateline. -
The CIA's underworld in
formants, all former Havana.
casino bosses, had buried
$750,000 in Cuba when they
fled Fidel Castro. Therefore.
they had a stake in encourag-
ing the United States, to un
dertake the invasion to over-
throw Castro, the Bee report
ed.
He quoted Lawrence R.
Houston, described as the CIA
1. official receiving the under-
"The Information they sup
plied to the CIA supposedly'
pinpointed troop and naval
vessel positions," Bee investi-
gative reporter Denny Walsh:
wrote in the Sunday edition.
"More 'unportantly, per-
haps, the mobsters also re-
ported that many of the peo
ple of Havana were unsym-
pathetic to Castro and would
almost certainly rise up in
support of a counter-revolu
tionary force once it hades-' **
tablished a beachhead,"
Walsh continued.
In exchange for their help,
the hoodlums had been prom
ised they would be allowed to
recover their buried cache un-¨
hindered, Walan s
He said the oddlums had
thefr own boat, with one CIA
man abourd, standing off the
Cuban shore when the Bay of
38
ود دهیم
world. Information, as declin-
ing to confirm or deny the
accounts.
thing like that. My gemity is -
probably not as
When you rellect on it
The Bee reported that Hous not an implausible: sițucties
is it?"
Related Story Page A5
ton, retired general counsel of
the CIA, said of the story:
"I do not recollect such a..
thing, but that doesn't mean it
didn't happen. I won't deny it,
but I don't remember any
The Bee sald two of the four
mobsters involved with tha
CIA in the Bay of Pigs are..
still alive.
It said one is Russell Bufail
no, 71, described as a sill-ac
Tive northeastian Pennsyl
(Please Turn To A2, Coll's)
୮
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
CA-Mafia Link
(Continued From Page A1).
1 Mafia boss who was con
victed just before his hookup)
With the CIA of conspiring to
obstruct fustico in lying about
the 1957 Mafia summit meet-
ing at Apalac in, N.Y..
The newspaper said the oth-
er living informant is George
Lavien, also known as George
Low
who was described as
no overseer and manager of
Mafia gambling Interests is
pre Castro Cuba. The Bee
sald he is reportedly, living in
Coral Gables, Fla.
The other two were James
Plumeri. Identified as a form
mer Mafia hijackor, labor
racketeer and garment dis-
trict strongman, and Salva-
tore Granello, Identified as a
Mulla extortionist and gani.
bler.
Plumeri and Granello were
✓ victims several years ago of
Huntelated gangland execu
Hons, Walsh wrote.
Here is the account of
CLA-Mafia Intrigue as de
scribed by Walsh from his
amidentified: former CIA
Gource:
*During the pre-1959 re-
gime of the former Cuban
Edictator, Fulgencio Butista,
alino gambling flourished in
the country under the direc
tion and control of the U.S.'
organized crime underworld.
1
The Castro revolution
✓ routed the mob along with
4 Balista, and the Cuban pre-
Amir's Communist govern
ment has never allowed the
resumption of mob: activities
tháng
The four former casino
bosses "made periodic re-
ports to the CIA until just
before the abortivo Bay of
Pigs invasion.
$45,000 and
"Between
$50,000 was paid by the four
gangsterata informants in
Cuba for the information
"The money came, at least
in part, from a $750,000 cach■
wrapped In oilcloth and bur-
ied in the ground by Granello
and Loving just before, their
hasty departure from Cuba
during the turbulent days of
the Castro takeover.
"It was the rest of this
money that Granello, Levine,
Bufalino and Plumeri were
assured they would be able to
recover unhindered if the Cas-
tro government was toppled..
"They managed to got word
"to hoodlumns inside Cuba who
knew the whereabouts of the
money to start buying stra-
tegic Information. Other Cu-
ban associates of the four
gangsters were dispatched to
the island from Florida on
intelligence-gathering sorties.”
Earüer published reports
bave said that in preparation
for the Bay of Pigs invasion,
CIA Director Allen Dulles re-
"lied heavily on reports which
stressed the unpopularity of
the Castro regime and the
expectation, never realized, of
massive rebellion at the time
of a strike.
Page 9
Marie Lorenz says she was told that maps she took from Castro's headquarters were factor in locating and
photographing missile sites (above). Under pressure from U.S., Khrushchev ordered missiles removed and shipped back
to Soviet 
Union (right).
Cienaga de Zapata, a vast swamp that
heeded to convert to rice fields. As
soon as he left Havana with his usual
entuarage, Marie received orders to re-
turn to the Cuban capital immediately.
She boarded a regular Cubana Airlines
flight, pasing an American tourist
and carrying her Castro uniform and a
loaded revolver in her overnight bag.
She arrived in Havana a few hours
after Castro left town. Americans were
still welcome there in those days, and
Chan stoms officers seldom searched
tourists' luggage.
"There was no trouble at the alr
port, Marie stod. "I checked into a
aleazy little hotel in downtown Havans,
changed into my lieutenant's uniform
and went direct to the Havana Hilton.
By this time, Castro had a home on
the outskirts of Havana, Casa Cojimar,
but it was more convenient for him to
keep his papere at the Hilton.
came
"He had Suite 2408 and the adjoin-
ing ute. had the key to 2408.
Nobusly recognized me when I
into the hotel. I had changed my hair
atvie and made my complexion darker
than it is naturally. And I wore dark
glasses. They (Castro's people) all
wore dark glasses, even at night.
A of people were litering in
the lobby, beradux and everything. I
just walked right through. Passing the
desk was the main thing that bothered
me because the desk dat know me. I
had n Stenozed 38 caliber Detective
Special elped to the inside of my
waistband. Nobundy seemed to
notice
me. I walked to the elevaturs and went
up to the 24th floor.
Saw Her Opportunity
"Nobody
When Fidel
was around
left, they all left with him; his body.
Kdards, his advisers, whatever. When I
had lived there. I was either all alone
And everything was dead quiet, or else
Fidel was there and there was a lot of
noise and cigar smoke.
"unlocked the dour to Suite 2108,
went inside and double locked the door
Behind me. I felt pretty confident le
Cause new Fidel was at Cinnaga de
Zapata.. Who he left the suite, no one
was to go in. These were the orders.
"As usual, the suite Was littered
with papers and the filing calanet w
open. I couldn't grab everything. I took
as much as I could and stuffed papers
and maps into my uniform pockets and
changed into a dress and caught the
next flight to Miami.
"Frank met me at the airport and I
gave him all the papers. I never knew
exactly what information they contain-
ed. I was told the stuff was good, it'
was fantastic, the United States gov.
ernment is very happy.' "
Anong the papers were topograph-
leal maps of Cuba on which several
sections of undeveloped land, miles
away from any population center, had
been marked with hand-drawn circles.
The maps also had handwritten nota-
tions that Marie, couldn't read because
"they were in a foreign languages
Czech, I think."
Her Find Was Valuable
Theo years later, another intelli-
gemo agent told her the maps were
"the original groundwork plans" for
Soviet missile sites. The circled areas
were the spots where Soviet missile
bases were built in 1962, setting off
the historic showdown between Presi
dent Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.
From information supplied by
agents inside Cuba and Cuban refugers,
and from aerial photos snapped from
U2 spy planes, the LA was able t
pinpoint at the missile bases on the
idand. But Marie believea her sul miss
sion to Castro's lair gave the CIA in
first inkling of what the Kusoans were
plotting. She also believes Castro san
pected sho was the burgl who saiped
his secrets. (The CIA has declined to
comment on Marie's involvement.)
In March 1960, soon after she had
completed this dangerous Sughment,
Marie received a mysterious telegram
from Havana. Delivered to her th
er's apartment at 311 W. 84th St, it
said. "CALL 28607 intro's private
number) LATE AT NIGHT. JUS
VERY IMPORTANT."
it was signed "Yanez," meaning
Capt. Jesus Yanez Pelletier, one of
Castro's closest aides. Marie's first
pulse was to ignore the message, but
curiosity overcame common sense.
Without mentioning the telegram to
her brother, she left the apartment
aroun midnight to place a collect all
to Havana from a phone be on the
corner.
As she stopped into the small vesti
bule between the outer and inner front
doors to the apartment house, two nort
grabbed her. One of them was Yanez
NW 50955 DobId 32423630 Pages" Marin recalled
Tril
WE THE the
other hotel,
"They were
Vo3178 14 1km
Cuba. Yanez said a plane was waiting
at Idlewild Airport. They hit me in the
face and tried to drag me out to a car.
"A person who lived in the building
opened the door and saw me seteameting
and fighting. This person ran down
toward Riverside Drive. The interrup
tion distracted the Cubans enough s
that broke loose and ran I heard one
of them yell, Shoot Shout! but he
didn't, an up to Broadway and
Bop there.
I
The Cubans took off. My face was
all bloody. Thank ad for But Be
took me to the
detectives ab
י,
shy of
true and fear. 1 nld them who Yabe
was and I gave the i
of "
West Sale hotel wre Castro people
stayed when the s were in New York.
The detectives Wit there and found
Danz, le they couldn't arrest hom
had diplomatic immunity.
an e
11. Fad a diplomatic pressport saying he
eas with the passer minister's office
The tedd lom o get on lus plane ani
Rosto Cuba."
When Yanez returned to Havana
without Mar, Castro dad what the
New York cops couldn't du. del sent
him on.
Discussed Killing Castro
..!
Asked if she and her membi
Frau's I'V tity: ad ever discus ed
Killing Castre, Marie replied: "Sure,
Wall did. 11.
were going to bomb
im during one of his speeches. We
were going to fly over and droji it
right on top of hit.
"We had the bomb, the plane. I was
Kong to go along Hd
run. 15
་་༄་། སྐ་ all set but 11 was called ett
Somebody topped
That's all I
know."
"
American
Tu
A
nate
Marie said two
Risterst
went Do Cuba
Castro
shortly before the Bay of Pigs inva
Min
"I met them at a little white ha
1821 ented In The Cuban colony 111
Meats I think i was on Flater
We would never stay in one place to
Ing. We'd rent a house and move en
is way, it was at ofte four meetings
thes talked real
heavy about
my in and killing him.
"The Americans went in, but
ey didn't get out. They grew heards,
essed like Castro saldiers. 1 heard
In kalbog
APTA, SHIV Ther
pines
41
28
Marie and she made
trips to Cub,,debvering rues, and supe
antitati erilis
Sisa
worked with rani h Atex Rocke
1th whom were content eumd zes
of the A, a caming they were L
listed on any federal payroll.
"There's really no contract, he x-
planed. "Nathing IN put down 6-16
paper. You just say you're doing this
for the good
Country 1. dub. t
handle the meta cend of at 117 WILA
given what we needed"
'Eduardo Supplied Cosh
+
When ch Wis needed. it
from A Pan she new only 14
Eduardo. He would meet Frank and
Alex from time to tian at "
house in Mil
"Eluard was farang on thing."
Mario said. "We we went to pick me
the money on the can
aw
him when I opened the door If this
little white house we used"
Years later, while reading about the
Watergate real n, Mane aw a news.
Paper photo et former IA man E.
Howard Hunt and immediately recog-
nized hun as the drive
She also rece, mized a picture of Star-
is, whom she had known
Fiorini.
"Eduardo"
Frank
tony was one of the ive burglars
caught in Democratie. Naonal Commut
tee heptates. at 1. Mascate
complex on June 12, Four of the
five Stugis, Bernard Barker, Eugenio
Rolando Martinez and
W.
James
McCord, then seemny chet for the
Nixon reelection campath commute...
were former CIA employes,
Stures Harker and Martone had
been active a preparation for
Rat
of Panditg
18.15 Hot, the
fiction writing mastremunt
The
And he fined
Watergate baglary.
to Sturgis, Barker A
court testimony
CLA contacts."
Martinez In
"Some of my old
Sturgis returned to Washington, thus
month, nearly three
acrest there, to testify a
Aeaals aller 1.N
secret staff
ses aons of the Rondstelle. Comme Sion
on CTA A. vatie ie wan't discr
testimony, but other stations sand be
was asked about CIA operations sal
ing from domestic spe to political
muders
(Tomorrow' ?
Frank
Fire Stargie,

NW 50955
ofthe
Hotreninvasion of the Canal Zone Was Foiled
BY PAULI NIESKIL
Third of a series
The Central Intelligence Agen
qa once investigated Fidel Castro,
Hallerina Margot Fontesh and ac
tors John Wayne and Errol Flynn
in connection with a bizarre inva-
sion of Panama,
↑ The colorful cast of this comic-opera
conspiracy includia Three American
adventureas, two of whom we working
for the A. William Morgah and Alex
Hurke, both former U.S. Army para-
Troopers, were on opposite sides of the
Pana plot And Frank Sturgis, a for-
mer Marine Raideri was in the middle
"
Storgi, born Frank Fiorini, wa
gun runner and troop-trainer for Caffro
Then he became security and intelligce
chief of the Cuban Air Force mean: In Panama, part of the invasion team is quickly quired.
sefying as a secret agent of the CIA.
Morgan was a freelance conspirator,
mdre interested in money than polities.
A native of Toledo, Ohio, e went to
Caba in 1958 and became second in-can troops occupied.
march on the Canal Zone and ri in
Panama City to keep Panamaman police
mand of an independent rebel arm in
the Escambray Mountains. This on-
Communist force helped Cast's guerril
las overthrow the Batista dictatorship
ar Caso made Morgan dajor, high-
est rank in the revolutionary Army,
The upset victory over Batista, and
the spoil that went with it, encouraged
Morgan consider extending the revolu-
tion to her Latin, latuds. A few weeks
alter the Castro takeover in Havana,
Morgan galled at Capt. Frank. Fiorini's
office in tuban Air Force headquarters.
Refused second spot
"Major Morgan spoke to me confiden.
tially," Sturgis told The News. "He said
he was preparing an invasion of Panama
and the Canal Zone. He wanted me to be
second-in command of the expedition. I
told him I was interested, but not in a
leadership position.
"I said, "Bill; you've got to be crazy."
The American government's got a mili
tary force there You're willing to g
against your own counlige and,
Well, the U.S. never did anything for
me.
But Frank's reports to the CIA pro-
Evided sufficient advance warning.
Castro left Cuba on April 14. Then
Arias and his wife flew to Panama and
vented the 12-foot motor launch Nola 'for
$75 a day, saying they were going tigh-
ing Five tough looking men accompa
them.)
Cache of arms
They reportedly saded directly to a
spot where a cache of arms. semi-
automatic rifles, revolvers, machine kģips,
renades and ammunition in waterpof
Scontainers had been dropped in the
Pacific Ocean. 15 miles outside the PAna-
Jia Canal entrance. The shrimp bost
(Elaine had been standing by for the
karma drop 11 retrieved the weapons
from the water and later transferred
them to the Nola.
i
1
The "fishermen" aboard the "Nola
came ashore on the Pacific coast, kar
Santa Clara, and buried the guns sond
ammo on the beach. Dame Margot and
her husband then resumed their cruis
On April 18, after receiving a CIA
report that an invasion ship had sailed
from the Cuban port of Batahane part
of Morgan's military district in Las
A Villas Provine, the Panamaman stov-
ernment ordered Anas' arrest. He heard
the news on the Nola's radio, returned to
the Santa Clara acea and went into hid-
ing of his family's ranch.
The American military strength in the
"anal Zace at that time in 1959 Lotaled
achout Luod non, compared to 65,000 in
World War. H. Morgan figured a sur
prise stack a few hundred Cultuurs,
artel by Panamanian lettists staging
and ther disorders, would be suf
filed to capture or at least sabotages
the vital canal
"The conspirators planned to over-
throw the Panamaman government andd
rab the Canal for propaganda and
extortion reasons," Sturpis said.
"They were going to send a ship.
loated with explosives, through the canal
locks. They were going to blow up and
sink the ship somewķere near the lock-
so that the gates docks would bet
damaged and ship traffic would be stop,
ped in both directions
"Mofan figured it would tie up the
canal for at least two months. He was all
set to go He had the men, guns, ships,
planes, everything.
Showed planes, named names
I contacted the American' Embassy
in Havana ant notified the (CIA) agent
in charge I took Col. Nichols (Erickson
Nichels, air attache at the embassy) to
the air fase and showed ham the camon
flaged planes that were to be used for
the invasion, and 1 named all the people
who were involved in the con-piracy."
Wise mate's eportedly included
Margot Fonteyn, superstar of London'
Roker Ballet and date commander of the
Order of the British Empar (The equiva
lent of achthouds, and her rich, an to
eratie hushut, Reierto Arias, former
Pananaman ambalor to Britain and
son of a former president of Panam
Daine Marges and her husband were
in bathe time No was Ruben Mine,
head of the Panangan evolutionary
movement They allegedly conferred with
Morgan at Chenfurge, where he wa
military commander.
According to antelligence reports, the
invasion was to take place while Castro
was visiting the United States and Cana
A pearhead force of Cabans and
Panamanians would land on the Carb
bean coast of Panaina A second force of
Patinanons would trike inland from
the Pacific coast. Then the main invasion.
Rimy would sad in from Cuba.
Police and National Gi: 1 posts were
to beastykel Rebel bands reto coate
Before dawn next day, the Nola slip-
pedunte the Panama Canal with only the
skiper and Dame Margot aboard. She
went to the home of her sister-in-law,
Senora Chela Arias. A few hours later,
she was arrested After 24 hours in jail,
the prima ballerina was boated back tn
hatain Meanwhile, Aras had taken ref.
uge in the Brazilian Embassy in Panama
City. He was later allowed to leave the
country.
National guardsmen found the arms
based in the beach at Santa Clara. A
econd arms cache was discovered net R
cottage owned by an American friend að
the Arias family.
Late Friday night, Aprd 24, .Cuban
drp landed at Puurta Coronolo ott
the Caribbean coast of Panama, about
finales northeast of the capital. In it'
were armed' mon, Cubans and Pana-
mans, and a woman mas
Spearhead blunted
Three of the men drowned in the surt
as they tried to beach the boat. The test
were quickly captized by Pamonie's Na-
ional Guard. Three moer Cuban ships
al left the Cuban ports of Cienfuegos.
a Batalan with the mon inviction
force of about at me, mostly Cubans
who had fight under Morgan. When
Kand the learned that the speathead
had failed to penetrate Panama he end!-
cl
the baton and ordered the three
Foll up lups back to taba.
Meanwhile, Panamanian officers dis
excred lae canvas bageleti beiund by
Pane Margot. Among the interesting
ind were a notebank containing
Est of arms to be perd in the two-prong-
ed invasinn, mapes of Panama, tide
table and several letters, which Pana
Beat authorities said proved Margat's in
volvement in the plot
There was al: » a letter from film
star John Wayne Signed "Duke," it
noted that Attas had eceived $5 DOG
From Wayne between Not 19.
HOT, and Apr 1969
Questioned
Amerbern
Waynexplained that he and Artat
hemeparting
DocId: 32423630 Page 11"
1 .. A
I don't ded me polities be
115.
Phota hy Ruselio Capare
he knew nothing about the Panama plot.
Errol Flynn also was asked about his
friendship with Arias. They had been
seen together in Cuba, where Flynn was
making a movie based on the Castro
revolution. The screen swashbuckler said
Arias wanted to hire Flynn's yacht, the
ocean-going Zaca, for a trip to Panama.
Suspecting what he had in mind, Flynn,
refused.
Some CIA agents believe Morgan
would not have attempted the Panams
invasion without Castan's rensent. But
Fidel insisted: "I had nothing to do with
it."
When the spearhead force splashed
ashore on a San Blas Indian reservation,
the CIA had a man at the scene. He was
Alexander Rorke Jr., a ferviance journal.
ist, photographer and intelligence agent.
Double doublecross
Son of a New York judge, Alex serv-
ed as a paratrooper and intelligence spes
cialist in World War II. In 1902, he
married actress Jacqueline Billingsley.
daughter of Stor, Club owner Sherman
Billingsley.
Frank Nelson, an American business.
man in Cuba, was involved with Sturgis,
Morgan and Rorke in various plots, in-
cluding a double doublecross. Nelson,
who new lives in New York and has just
finished writing a book, entitled "For s
Million Dollars," told The News;
"Extarted. The counter-revolution
against Castro in 1959 because he arrest-
ed a close friend of nune. I went to see
Frank Sturgis in Havana and asked if
there was anything he could do to get
my friend out of jail. He sent me to
Morgan who was very close to Castro,
but Morgan wasn't interested in way.
thing but money.
"I found out that Castro was going to
invade the Dominican Republic, so 1
went there and told Traill.. (Dominican
dictator Rafael Trujillo) about the inva
ston plans I said he should beat Casten
to the punch and invafe Cula, with
Morgan's help
"I told Trajillo, I think you enn bay
Morgan for a million dollai. Let him
take his army back to the mountains and
establish abuse. Then you come in with
your army and in a few days Castro is
finshed."
Trulle approved the million dollar
deal and put up the cash to get it start-
ed. Nelson said he paid Morgan $.00,000
down, plus $100,000 for expenses." The
remaining $100,000 was to be paid whet
the invasion of Cuba began.
Sturgis soon learned the detail of
this new plot and informed the CIA
When the agency pulled Sarges out of
Cuba in the samur of 1969, a Scuf
Rorke in to find out what was happete
Ink
Decoyed by Raul's wife
Nelson art need a meeting between
Roland Morgan Soon after Rocker
ved in Havana, be ploned Morgan's
home 1 Woman atowered, douted
Herself as "Mrs. Margi and told
When he jet
Rorke to come on over.
there, he was arrested. The woman wh
Answered the phone was Vilma Espi,
Raul Castro's wife.
By this time, Morgan had told Finel
about the invasion plot Without men
tions: the million dollars. The sand be
had pretended to go along with Trundle
in der to set a trap
In mud August, Moryan sent an un
gent de message to the chief of the
Duncan military intelligence the sand he
had seized Transind, on the south coast
an invasion beachhead
of tuba,
When a planeleed of Dominican solden
SEGRETS OF
TLE GIA
it was surrounded by 1,000 Cuban troops
led by File Castro himself.
The Dominicans were paraded before
TV cameras on their way to mil Castro
denounced Trujillo sud praised Morgan
as a hero. Less than two years later,
Morgan was executed by a Castro firing
squad for a much less profitable plot,
What became of the $600,000 is not
known. Neither Morgan's Cuban wife hor
his American family eve +248
at. Nor did Castro.
a cent of
As soon as the Trujillo invasion cel
lapsed, Alex Rotke was released from
jail and deported from Cuba, But he re
turned many times by mir and sea. For
these clandestine tripe, he used a twi
engine Beechcraft plane,
ber
and a 36-foot speedboat, the Vidyon HI.
Sturgis accompanied him on many ways
terious missions.
Assassins failed
On * accasion, Rorke reportedly
landed an execution squad that tend bost
failed to kill Castro. Early in 1963, the
Violynn I was detained in the Bahamas
when i stopped to refuel on a run be-
tween the U.S. and Cuba. British intelli
gence agents questioned Korke and the
17 Cuban raiders who wire with him.
Rorke told them the CIA had financed
many trips of the Violynn 1 and "the
United States government, through the
Central Intelligence Agency, had not.
vance knowledge of these tripes)
Former CIA agents told The Nexk
this statement was true.
On April 25, 1963, Ruake and there
other A contract archi Hew 10%. F
Havana in the Beecherait and tried to
homb two al refineries. The bombs miss.
ed their targets and consed little dame
age.
Five months later, Rorke went on his
last mission The 36-year-old contiter
and his partner, Geoffrey Sullivan, 28, of
Waterbury, Conn, took off from Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla., in a rented twin engine.
Beecheraft on Sept 21, 1963 Two tu
ban accompanied them.
Rorke and Sullivan filed a flight plan
indicating they were bound for Niescon
gua, where they planned to and an mir
freight service They made two fuel
stops -- at Cozumel island off Mexico's
Yucatan Peninsula and at Behe. British
Honduras. When they left Behze, the
plane disappeared
That night, Sturgis received a report
that the plane was overdue in Nicaragus.
Frank immediately cailed the command.
et of naval intelligence in Maan. An air.
sea search was launched by the Navy.
Coast Guard and Air Force A povate
search party was organized later by
Rocke's Memi lawyer at
fend, Elle Rulun But no trace of the
missing: Americans or their plane was
ever found.
Forced onto boat
personal
Some vesbrators helieve the plane
was sabotaged by Castro agents. Frank
Nelson has another theory
Alex
"When they stopped to refurt at Stay-
les Fold meat Bebze, Ve peto an
American contactcbo port, Floyd Park
Vamos Tex
sand they
Beaded for Palpa rapital of the
Republic of Homurach They took off in
the direction of "beguerealpa, out thes
never got there
"Several
late, Pat and
information from a couple of nine
that tw.. Ames
weswerin the fe
option of Rome and Sullivan
forced boatd tube boat
that had pulled into shore to Honduras
two weeks earlier with engine trouble
The trip beat left dat is after
"the twe Americans were put on bani
these men were moleed Kerke an
Sullivate, they Hver Benched Cal
Got
Investigaters an
The
free Cubans who isti Dad with Rake
Subash were til with them wheth
they mode the twe ta! taps. GBA
to reports received by both Nelson and
Stags, one at the men was harnote
Molina, tulen of these ha supposedly
turned agath-t. Un tro and fled to the
Emted States
"Molina was en in B
" "1"
months after he appeared van Rake
and Suliran nga Amer," Nel
He loves Molina may have
Topeed the American to land somewhe var
in Honduras, where they were delivered
Blaston Agents who kidnaped and killed
11.4131
NW 50 55
N.Y DAILY NEWS, MONDAY, APRIL 21, 1975
Our Havens Triple Spy Helped & Hart Castro
By PAUL MESKIL
Second of a series
"I was a spy," Frank Sturgis
admits.
"I was involved in assassina-
tion plots and conspiracies to over-
throw several foreign govern-
ments, including Cuba, Panama,
Guatemala, the Dominican Repub-
lic and Haiti.
"I smuggled arms and men into Cuba.
- for Castro and against Castro. I broke
into the intelligence files of the Cuban
Army and Air Force. I stole and photo-
graphed hundreds of secret documents.
"That's what spies do.
"I also broke into 'oreiga consulates
and business offices in Cuba, for the pur-
pose of obtaining information, and inte
import-export office in Caracas,
Venezuela, that was front for the
KGB (Soviet Secret Service)."
a
Sturgis was a hired operative of the
Central Intelligence Agency for at least
a 
decade. Maybe he still is, though his
cover was blown forever by the notoriety
he received as a Watergate burglar. He
constructed and controlled an espionage
network in Cuba that is still functioning.
despite frantic efforts by Castro security
forces and the KGB to destroy it.
the Watergate drama, Sturgis is a real-
life James Bond whose exploite val
those of any fictional spy. Interviewed at
the office of his Miami lawyer, Ellis
Rubin, and at other places in New York
and Florida, he candidly revealed many.
details of his colorful career as wat
hero, secrets-stealer, gun-runner, guer.
rilla fighter and professional plotter.
Changed the subject
Asked if he had also been an assas
air, he politely changed the subject.
Sonie things he will not talk about.
A stocky, iron-jawed man who looks
much younger than his 50 years, he was
born Frank Angelo Fiorini in Norfolk.
Va. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps at
the start of World War I and fought
through the Pacific with the famed First
Raider Battalion. After the war, he serv
edir. the Air Force, Army and Navy
Reserve.
a:fare
him to
ruinct
He had the perfect training for a se
cret agent. The Marine Corps tar ht him
judo, knife-fighting and jungle
techniques. The Air Force tang
plane and the Navy Reserv.
him to handle small, fast ships,
The Army completed, this
fl
f
Docta: 32423830 bpage in12 During hitch in Ceramay, he
tation.
SEGRETS OF
THE GIA
signed to a security unit that handled.
top-secret reports from Allied intelli-
gence agents all over Europe. This was
his introduction to the dark world of
espionage and intrigue.
In Berlin during the chilliest part of
the cold war, he met his first real spy.
She was a Leautiful actress who also was
an agent of Haganah, the secret army
formed to defend the new state of Israel.
When he returned to civilian life,
Frank became a laganah courier
per-
haps the only Roman Catholic in this
group. In the 1950s, he went to Miami to
visit an uncle who had married a Cuban
exile. Her family was close to Carlos
Prio, the Cuban president who was oust-
ed in 1952 by a military coup led by
Fulgencio Batista. Frank met Prio anil
other wealthy Cubans whose Miami man-
stons were hotbeds of anti-Batista in
trigue. Some of them supplied financial
support for a fiery young rebel, Fidel
Castro, who was then living in Mexico.
Ir. 1957, Prio asked Frank to "go to
Cuba, in Castro's army and let me
know what he's doing." Frank acceptek
(Continued on miso 961
C. I..
OUR TRIPLE-AGENT IN HAVANA
:
Frenk Sturgis in Cuba: "I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents."
(Continued from page 3)
the assignment. He flew to Havana and
with the help of Cuban priest, he
quickly located Castro's camp In the
Sietia Maestra Mountains and volun-
terred his services.
"Fidel remembered me," he said. "We
could understand each other. I spoke Ital-'
an, which is similar to Spanish, and he
spoke sune English. I offered to help
train his troops, but he said, 'Frank, what
I need is guns.' '
So Frank became a gun runner. With
money applied by the Castro under-
ground in Floris, he purchased thon-
sand of rifles and other weapons from
International Argnament Corp. (Inter-
arnico of Alexandria, Va., the world's
largest dealer insurplus arms. He then
set up an elaborate land-sra-air smug-
gling network to get the
ammunition into Cuba,
He Became Triple Agent
guns and
double
After several months
agent, working for Pho and Castro,
Frank became a triple agent. This time,
he was recruited for the game of intelli-
Kence by a mapa league scout, Park F.
Woolam, the State Department official
then in charge of the US. Consulate in
Santiago de Cuba,
"We at the Case Grande Hotel in
Santiago," Frank recalls. "Woodam knew
and was and what I was doing. He
Approached me or someone introduced
19. We had several other meetings and
The dressed as patriote in and so forth.
I agreed to work with him.
"Later, when he revolution was over,
I received order to go in Havana. We
lam told me who to contact in the Ameri
can Embassy there." is new contacts,
Frank sand, were CIA agents, one of
whom 
was the embo's military at
Inche
Castro mehately plant his most
tru.tl offieves an coumand of the
Can antiary services. Major Pedro
Diaz Lanz, a close friend of Frank's, be
came commander in chief of the Air
Force and his brother, Marcos Diaz
Lanz, became inspector general of that
BELVION
Frank helped the Piaz Lanz brothers
reorganize the Air Force and they made.
him their security and intelligence chief,
He also became the officer in charge of
inspecting and supervising all Cuban
gambling casinos, which were owned and
operated by American mobsters.
:
1
A bit player in the Watergate drama,
Sturgis was a real-life James Bond when
he did his big jobs for the CIA
presidential palace, in with Fidel. I re-
cruited everyone I could, Americans and
Cubans, to be undercover agents."
Max Gorman Gonzales, a Miami bust-
nessman who took part in clonk-and-dag-
ger operations against both Butista and
Castro, has known and worked with
Sturgis for many years. He says Sturgis
was a CIA employee from 1959 to 1968.
The CIA asked him to participate in
assassination pluts in Cube and else.
where. Sturgis introduced top Cuban
ailitary and political leaders to Ameri-
Can agents at the U.S. Embassy in Hava
na. During these visits, a conspiracy to
assassinate Castro and other Cuban lead-
ers developed.
"Two attempts against Castro's life.
were made in the early part of 1969.
Both failed. The assassins then waited
for a green light from Frank Finzini
Sturgis. A third attempt was made in
1960."
This reporter asked turgis when the
agency first began thinking about assas
sinating Castro
The fist discussion of assassination
with my (CIA) contacts was in Febru
ary 190," he replied. "I was making re-
purts on all the communist activity in
the military, suggested that this would
be a good time to assassinate Fulel. I
said would organize it and follow it
through.
"I would arrange an important con-
ference at Campo Labertad (Ca Laber
ty, the combined army air force base and
headquarters formerly known as Camp
Columbia). All the top commanders
would 
come to the base in their jeeps and
cark. I was going to station gunners an
the roofs, set up a 40 sire. I would
have 
wiped out Fidel, his brother Pil
al all the top (pro communist) muly
commanders 
in 30 seconds.
"I asked my contact in the Ens
ay to get a green light (official appong
alt 
on this. Whether this would hat. to
come from, the top level in Washin
(184 lower level, Edon't know"
Page
While they wartet forth
Frank said his CIA advisers "asked,
NW 509559a1:32423830", "Það
.
Sturgis and his CLA contacts devised two
alternate plots. One was to execute Cas-
tro in the second floor conference room
al Air Force headquarters. As he and the
other officers would not arrive at exactly
the same time, it might be more prach
cal to wait until they were all assembled
around the conference table.
"The whole idea was to kill all of
them at once. Unfortunately, if some of
the anti-Communist officers were in
there at the same time, they would have
to go too. The lives of some of the antl.
Communist commanders would have to be
sacrificed in order to get Castro and his
"
The third scheme involved planting a
borub in Castro's office. "I had access to
the prime minister's office, Sturgis
said. "I knew Fidel's private secretary,
Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with
the Embassy, 1 platened to go to Fidel's
office with A briefcase full of explo
sives which I would leave there. When
Fidel entered the office, signal would
be given and the bombs would be set off
by an electron device neross the street."
The plotters watted several months
for the green light from Washington,
but it never came "They couldn't make
up their minds," Frank said of the un-
seen, unknown des Pakels. "They
couldn't decide what to do."
Asked for Green Light
But, according to former intelligence.
agents, the CIA later approved and
bankrolled other plots to wipe out Cas
tre. American adventurers, Cuban exdes,
Mafia dons and high ranking Caban offi
cials played prominent parts in
these
conspiracies.
In June, 1959, Castro fired 25 top Air
Force officers suspected of dideyalty,
including the Diaz Lanz brothers. Pedro
Da Lanthum resigned from the Air
Porce Anil denounced tastry No
"
"
Almeida, ordered l'edro's arrest and the
Diaz Lanz brothers went und: rground.
At this point, Frank was pulled out
of Cuba. "I left Havana on June 30 and
came to Miami to arrange the escapes of
the Diaz Lans brothers and their fant-
lies. Pedro and his wife get out by sall-
boat; Marcos was picked up by a plane."
The brothers fled to Florida, told all
they knew about the Castro regime and
went to work for the CIA.
A few weeks after Frank's abrupt
departure from Havana, he received
word that Castro was sending an assas
amation team after him. Frank's Inform-
ant supplied full descriptions of the
three
Whe Mere Mexican
communists. The FBI posted a round-
the-clock guard on Frank's Miami home
and federal agents followed him wher
ever he went.
5988315,
Tailed to Florida
Customs and Immigration officers
were alerted. The Mexican gunmen were
spotted when they crossed the border
and were tailed to Florida, where they
were arrested. Their car was confiscated
and they were booted back to Mexico.
01. Oct. 25, 1950, an American B-25
1mber swooped over Havana and drop-
ped thousands of ante astro leaflets.
Cairo called this "bombing" aid "
. Cuban Pearl Harbor.
Pedro Daz Lane was the pilet,"
Sturgis told the News. "Is the us
pilot. Marcos Paz Laar and another
Cuban were with us. Cubati Air Force
fighters came after us but they missed
19
and almost shot their own plans
dewn. The big guns at the Navy station
and the Cabana fostres opened up but
the angle of the guns was such that they
were fing from the heights into the
ots. At least 26 people were killed and
wounded."
The leaflet babardment 18 MS the
first of many CIA onsored mysHIRS
Sturgis made to Cuba by an and sea "I
made at least 125 air operations nato
Cuba," he said, "with the green light and
without the green light (with and with-
ond official approval). And I made some
60 
boat misstens.
"I had fou beats They were financed
by the gene Une 1155 " converted
Const that after, 5 feet long, with
twin a horsepower engines. It hing a
maximum speed of 20 knuts Another
bat, the Cusa, was about the same size.
I also had two foot fiberglass boats
with radar and other sophisticated equip
ment They could carry 30 people and Jo
30 miles an he
A Mission to Cuba: Tale of the Doomed Raiders
By PAUL MESKIL 4/24/175
Fifth of a series
On March 17, 1960, President
Eisenhower authorized the CIA to
form a guerrilla urmy of Cuban
refugees and invade Cuba. Shortly
thereafter, the CIA dispatched
agent. Frank Sturgis to Guatemala
to confer with President Miguel
Ydfgoras about setting up training
bases in that country.
This "secret" mission was quickly
discovered and reported by the Guate
malan news media.
"I had planned to break into the
Cuban Eni bassy while 1 was in
Guatemala City," Sturgis told this re-
porter recently, "but the president sug-
gested I leave the country because of
all the publicity. The newspapers and
TV reported I was a CIA agent and
was trying to obtain bases for the
Cuban invasion."
Over the next year, the CIA trained
Cuban recruits in Guatemala, Panama,
Puerto Rico and the United States.
Sturgis, a marine combat veteran of
World War II. trained about 50 Cubans
in the Florida Everglades.
Sturgis was part of the agency's
super-secret Operation 40, an infiltra-
tion and intelligence-gathering group
DocId: 32423630
NW 50955
that was to go Into Caba before the
Bay of Pigs assault.
Some former CIA agents describe
Operation
8:1 assassination
sqbad." Sturgis won't go that far.
"It was a top CIA project," he says."
"Most of the men in it were Cubans:
who had been trained by the U.S.
Ariny. I am not saying that Operation'
30 had an assassination squad. There
are reports that there was one, but I'm
not saying 10.
To infiltrate
The prime purpose was infiltration,
not assassination. They (group mem
Lers) were to infiltrate Cuba and con-
tact anti-Castro military leaders, politi
cal leaders and underground people.
And they could kill--if they had to, if
It was really necessary."
Chief of Operation 40 was Jose Jon-
quin Sanjenis, a former Castro aile who
defected and came a CIA agent. Tw₁
of his cousins also worked for the agen
ry.
Early in 1961, the CIA learned that
a group of Cuban military officers was,
plotting to overthrow Castro. The lead
er of this plot was Major Humber
Sori Marin, a former Havana lawy
who drafted the Castro penal code
which made firing squad executions
legal
. Sori Marin had been adiutan
general of Castro's army, presiding
Judas
Page the 1959 "war crimes" trial
Tu Daily News
SEGRETS OF
THE GIA
that sent hundreds of Batista loyalats
to the firing squads, and Castro's first
minister of agriculture. But by 1961 he
had turned against the Castro regime.
His partners in the anti-Castro con-
spiracy included other Cuban army,
navy and air force commanders, the
chief of Castro's secret police, the depu
ty finance minister and the head of the
Cuban Sugar Institute. They planned a
military uprising during which Castro.
and his Communist advisers would be
killed.
As soon as the CIA learned what
they were up to. Operation 40 went into
action. Agents slipped into Cubs, con-
tacted the conspirators and asked he
to time the military revelt to relacide
with the Bay of Pigs invasion.
- A month before the dinate!
revolt-mvasion was to start, a rulitia,
patrol was sent to the Miram section'
of Havana to arrest a wor
shortages. As the milt a jeep pulled sp
been overheard complaining ab at ford
to 
her house, she ran out the fost ati
(Continued on page 65)
Air Ic by art. 10
Nelson: a vetoran conspirator.
TALE OF THE DOOMED RAIDERS
(Continued from pige 5)
led to the nearby home of x thaired
ngineer and his wife.
The mtamen charged after her,
entered, the engineer's house and burst
into room where ten leaders if the
anilitaly conspiracy were seated around
'n table littered with Havana street maps)
pinpointing the locations of key instal-
lation that were to be seized.
The militiamen were qutranked and!
Soutnumbered. Thay hesitated, not sure
what to do. Then informed sources said
Sori Marin pulled his pistol. A short
burst from Czech-made submachine
gun wounded him in the leg and per
suaded him and his co-conspirators t
surrender They were hauled off to la
Cabana Fortress for questioning.
Around this time, in March 1961, a
noisy party was held in a small white
bungalow in Miami's Cuban section. The
bungalow was a CIA "safe house" and
the party was a sendoff celebration for
an Operation 40 squad-five Cubans
and an American-that was about to
invade Cuba.
Contact underground
The squad's mission was to contact
the anti-Castro underground and create
a diversion on the north coast, to ninhậ
Castro think a guerrilla force was land:
ing there. The diversionary action wal
to begin shortly before the real invasion
on the south coast.
Most of the people at the Miam
jatty were Caban refugees. Among the
Americas there were Frank Nelson, a
former Havana businessman. and a
veteran Caribbean conspirator, and CIA
contractors Frank Sturgis and Alex
Kurke.
Neisen fell into conversation with
young Angus McNair, lone American
umber of the Cuba-bound squad.
Asked why he was going on such a
dangerous mission, McNair replied:
"Benastro lled an American sol-
der Bill Morgan.}
4 Morgan, a foguer U.S. Army para-
trooper who attained the rank of major
in Castro's nemys was executed by a
Castan firing squad on March 11, 1961).
Anat 20 people were at the
party."
Nation sealed recently. ***
a M Nair Aren't you afraid of n
lesk. wall these people nowing
short year mission" He said they were
fas and relatives of the Cubans
15 going with him. He trusted
Theme That was a fatal mistake."
The LA aiders set off the follow-
mph from the Florida Keys in the
42 foot torch Mercury, louded
ateities tommyguns, pig.
rehabes and bees of amtoo
Tren destination was an inlet of Caba
nas Bay to Pro dei Eso Price,
about ten Havana.
what
Reputed CIA ocent
44.19
55 dal Gables, Fl.
"" For Stores, Haders
were to prada Bevard Andersen, 1 a
rava! (aptop who owned a 264
Havana and command
e tatoos
Anderson
Werte lating
After ex
structed to
offices w
WEBS
a post there.
en in de touch
hitare afficers who
anti Castro emp.
atured, he was m
letene if other Cuban
în ex, the plot and if they
w wild attempt to cure it out. He was
to the CIA of the progress
tage action to to dumehed
by Operation 10 d. Pinar del Res
Shortly after sadright on March 19,
Mercany staped the garely bottom.
all, paim Frayed cove McNair
…
be at perfectly
In one CIA plot to kill Castro, the rifle failed to fire.
News photo
Super-secret Operation 40 was stymied
so many times by the alert Cubans that
it began to sound like Catch 22
Hearing one," they jumped into the
waist deep water and started to unload
the boat.
Searchlight:
were turned on, blund.
an the invadets. Armed me spilled
onto the beach and carrounded them.
More than 100 soldiers and malitiamen
had been waiting for het tot levd.
Someone, perhaps a. Castro mgent who
was a rest at the porn away priv
nad talked.
Anderson WHY
myht on his way
M. Nor The two
atresed the sume
with
Aluctuates the dat
dawn before a firing squard on Vril 19.
two days after the Bay of Pige
beygat
Seven Cubans were
theb, melding Gallerio Neta
of the ders of a ape head fo
tub to invade Fawara in
de test
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 15 timer tutto ante, în
with
4. une
t
No 1
19
the Panama farce and went to work
for the CTA.
Tabergen
Twelve
andi Castra plotters
were ever Hed next day. April 20, Seven
o i wete then the ballet pocke
mod of atalana Portrets. Ammik
them were Husberto Sori Marin, the
man who legabzed firing squads, and a
mysterious American citizen who called
himself Rafael Diaz Bencom and was
employol by CTA. He reportedly served
ontwert Son Mana's group
and the arenev
Although the Bay of Pips wolventure
worn duas her the CIA plots continurd
my invasten veterans contumed
to work the age Name of them
were at ned to the "speak ship” Rex,
For food converted to Navy rad
foot that mele hundreds of clandestine
Indiqu
AGAPPE
J. 17-3
the Nicmapman the, the Res
operated out of West Palm Beach and
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. It carried the
latest radar and sonat equipment, five
Cannons, several 30 caliber machine
guns and two 20-foot speedboats
Its skipper reportedly was Eugenio
Rolando Martinez, a Muumi real estate
salesman and CIA agent who made
more than 300 nocturnal russ to Cuba.
(He was taken off the official CIA
payroll in 1972, the day after he was
eught in the Watergate break in.)
On the might of July 21, 1963, one of
th Rex speedboxts deposited six airn un
* small island off Las Villes province
The invaders reportedly had been sent
to kill Castro at a. July 26 rally in
Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion, but
they never got there. They were picked
up by a military patrol soon after they
landed.
Men captured
On the night of Oct. 21, 1963, the
Rex sent its twin speedboats ashore at
the western tip of Cuba The landing
was observed by 8 militia patrol and
the six men in the first boat were cap-
tured as soon as they hit the bench. The
Second launch was sunk by a Cabin
gunboat as it reed back to the Rex.
Cannon fire from the Rex love off
the Cuban vessel The met the water
were hauled aboard the spy ship. Next
Shorting. # US Nusy submarine sur-
faced near the Rex off the ahamas,
Five Cubans four dead, one wounded
reportedly were transferred to the sub,
which then submerged and headed for
Florida,
Que nth after this incident, Presi
dent Kennedy wa assinated by fee
Harvey Oswald, who, had visited the
Cuban Embassy in Mexico City shortly
before the mider and had joined the
pro Castra Fair Play for Cube Coon-
putler President Jedunson later told an
nule, Lee Janos, that he thought the
Kennedy assa station nord have been
a retaliation" for the (A backed el.
torts to kill Castro.
These efforts continued after Ken
nedy's death
Leader of students
In the fall of 1961, CIA agents in
Paris made contact with an Army
Mason Rolando Cubelis, a hero of the
Castro revelion, and leader of the
Cuban student Add granitzativar. Inv
Cuban born CIA raptever Lais, Ent
Esque Tree and Carles Trepedino"
spoke with Cabelas and pit this in touch
with CLA apents wicking and of the
Americat: mbay in Paris The dien
few days later 111
Madend, where tubelas biet four
Aarent. Cubers had become disen-
raandest with the Castro perator and he
eventu div agreed to kill he former abol.
On in return to Havana, he was givent
a high now red sight,
contrivet
office W
Le
Other plotters rented an ancient
overlooking th invading where 114
Prime Jutrastor
located.
Cubetan regiortedly, drew a bed on tas.
Tro une day in 19 Heed up the
Cross has and peezed the trigger,
at the rifle fad to the Cap
cret poles later of win! of the as as-
station attend and arrested tubelas
astel set.
ploiter all of
were saved from the firing squad by i
lemene appeal from Cathe
The may have bas the last CTA-
ged attempt to madeate Chitro.
But other CTA straten Kept the Carsh
tran buat
Next The plot to free the Pach lo
}
NW 50955
How U.S. Made Unholy Alliance With the Mafia
BY PAUL MESKIL
Fourth of a series
14/23/75
When Fidel Castro threw the
American gangsters out of Cuba,
they vowed to return-over his
dead body.
Their determination to get rid of
Cart was shared by many high-placed
American officials and this
common
cause ed eventually to an unholy al-
liance between the CIA and the mob.
The strange story of CIA agents and
Mafia mobsters plotting together
against Castro was pieced together from
Interviews with police, federal agents,
ex-agents and underworld sources.
Meyer Lansky, the crime syndicate's
financial genius, and Santo Trafficante,
Mafia boss of West Florida and Hava-
n, got out of Cuba immediately after
the hasty exit of their benefactor, dieta.
tor Fulgencio Batista. The overseers of
their gambling casinos remained on the
island, nervously waiting for the axe to
fall.
knew he was preparing to shut the
down permanently, which he did. !
They were very, very mad, Tise
casinos were worth $ou aillion a year
to the American crine syndicate Ever
important mob Diss in the
States had points (percentages in the
Cuban casinos. Each point was anti
$30,000 to $100,000.
"Lansky and Trafficante were the
top men in Cuban gaming Jansky
had direct business dealings with Be
ta. Trafficante had several vasites, ins
cluding the Sans Souci."
Sans Souci partners
His Sans Souci partners Includi.
Norman Rothman of Miami Beach
the notorious Mannarino brothers.
Gabriel and Sam. Mafia chiefs in Pitt..
burgh. Rothman and the Mannarinos
tried to stop the Castro steamroler n
1958 by smuggling a planelead of arms
_ stolen from 
a National (and ar
ry in Ohio to anti-Castric fortes in
Cuba.
According to
police and foteral
sources, Rothman was high ep in the
Cuban crime syndicate and shar a his
rachets 
profits with Batista's there
in
-
law, Gen. Robert Fernandez
da.
"I was in touch with all the casino
owners and operators in Havana." said
Frank Sturgis, who was Castro's casino
Inspector during this
period. "Fidel
ordered me to close all the casinos for
To days, The owners got the hint. They
DocId: 32423630 Page 16
infan
min
Whis
1 more
Rothman returned, to Flori.
after the Castro coup and.
Cuban partners, bought the
Hotel in Mound Beach, the soun
N.U. Daily News
SEGRETS OF
THE GIA
The hotel's mest elegant suite, on the
: flour overlooking the cat, 14:15
ate ready for Batista, but he chose
the cooler climes of the Dominican
Republic, Portugal and Madeira.
Sturgis was on friendly terms with
several gaabling racketeers, including for
Hyman Levine, a Lansky mohater which
Jan 
Havana's Comedero casing. One
evening, during a casual conversation,
Levine observed that it uld be worth
a million" to the syndicate to get and of
Castro
. Sturgis didn't rise to this but
an! 
Levine changed the subject.
It popped up again a few weeks
later while Castro was in New York
during a whirlwind tour of North and
Sath An.erica.
Fidel and his entourage stayed at
the 
Statler
-Hilton, where Sturgis regis
tered 
under his real name and Cuban
military rank, Capt. Frank For..
Frank was in his root one evening
when he received a phone call from a
detective 
captain on duty in the lobby
as part 
of a heavy scenity detail. No
(Continued on page 421
St Th
AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE:
CIA AND THE MOB
I
Surrounded by his soldiers, Castro enters Havana in triumph after ousting the Batista government.
(Continued from page 5)
visitors were allowed on the Castro
flour without special permission.
"There's a guy here to see you," the
ported. "Ile вну he's
cop
uncle"
"Send him up." Frank replied.
your.
.1.
The short, pot bellied man who ar
rived a few unutes later looked more
hke a father than an uncle. Frank
recognized bin #ร่ 1 member of the
Havica gambling mph. Coming straight
to the mount, the hood offered Frank
$100,000 to kill Cast.
for hing" Frank said, end-
ing the conversation.]
When he returned to Havana a fewd
days er, he reported the offer to he
CIA contacts at the American Emba's-
ay.
Sturgis had no further contact with
the gangster win approached him in
New York, but someone in the intelli
yehee hierarchy decided that the CIA
and the syndicate should join forces
against fastro, The go-between picked
for this project reportedly was Norman
Rothman.
"Rothman was in touch with several
CFA pents," a former agent told The
News. They had many, meetings con-
vering assassination plots nginst Ca
tro."
Rothman, in turn, discussed the mal-
ter with his peers. Among those who
took part in these secret parleys, feli
alite
sad, 5 + + Santo
Trafficate of Tamga; Sam Mannaring
of Pittsburgh; Salvatore (Sally Barns)
Granello and Chayles Charle the
Blade Tourme, both of New York, and
John Don Giovann) Rusell of Las
Vegas.
Granello, a metaher of the Vito
Genovese emme famtis, had run casinos
in C and begged a map buschmack-
Any operation on Manhattan's East Sude.
Turine, an BSsrate of New Jersey
bob cheltains Ruggero (Richie the
Bool) Hairdo and Gerardo Gerry)
Catena, ain had operated Havana taxi.
Several songs were made for
Cashio's demise flue WH to send for
Gaspare Magniddin, a one man Marder
Ine who killed more than 50 people in
vations party of the world before he
was blown away by a shotgun blast in
Brookdy in 1970. A Sicilia Mafiosa,
radio ho lived in South America
Deprived of its Kavana casinos, U.S. mob
joined CIA in series of plots to kill Custro,
using everything from poison to dynamite
tro coup. He ktiew Havana well and was
perfect home for the assassination
assignment, but he either declined, or
wasn't offered the contract.
The mob and the CIA finally gave it
to Rosell, reputed Maia boss of Las
Vegas, federal sources said.
A dapper, gray-haired man who calls
himself a Hollywood movie producer
and benevolent pation of Vegas
showgirls, Rosell reportedly was intro
duced to IA agents in 1960 by a Howard
Hughes executive who formerly worked
for the FBI. Then, federal sources sind,
Roselli ayzeed to rent a death squad
to to a hunting Castro,
Money from CIA
The CLA With to Supply
Weapons. hd trate-portation.
.
Rosell flew to Miam in March, 1961,
and held separate conferings with CHA
agents and Trafficante on the Castro
project.
Rosell volunteered 1.. neompany
CIA financed Missaep c to Culm, the
federal sounces said. One of these expe
ditions reportedly landed an execution
squad that attempted hat failed to hit
Castro. On another occasion, the crew of
Roselli's bunch fought a running gun-
fight with a tuban patrol boat.
Columnist Jack Anderson reported
that A agents Lave Resell some poi
son capes which he passed along to R
Calan, who was related to Castro's chef.
The chef was to put the poison in Cas
Aro's food! The souces interviewed by
the News' confirmed that at least one
attempt was made to poison faslib.
An American who was mitive in the
anti-astri underground in Cuba at the
time sand "oh pon
to kill 1th
people" was dumped in a phets of malts
milk sent to Castro's suite in the Hav....
Hdton in 1961.
"Caltro ordered Chocolate
7.
every afternoon and the
me, Wata”, a
always bought it to : " he
When the waiter, came
in with
poned mall, he was hiking shi
NW 50955bbc1d32423630 Page 11 he almost dep
Tim prius the
"
you? The walter aand, 'I don't km;
maybe got a fever. Castro had him
arrested and had the drink analyzed
Chemists found the poison right away"
In early 1961.
Miserer claturate
assassination attempt was directed by a
well-financed American who arrived in
Havana soon after the Castro takeover
and lived there until security police ac
cused him of working for the CIA and
plotting to murder Castro,
Working with
Cuban
ant: Castro
military officers the American planted
several stick of dynamite
Karare floor of a 20 story
building Where 16 member
ades und Communist blar
lived with their families.
der the
apartment
"! Castra
diplomats
apartment
"Crestan cactus tu the
house every two weeks to see one of his
aduntants," one of the plottery said. “He
hlways hrrived in the afternoon, on the
same day of the week.
"He would drive in with his lody-
guards and jurk his car as the »pace
reserved for him. We timed b. visits It
always took at least five momates for
him to get into the xarage, md of the
car and into the freight elevator that
togk bini upstairs where he wanted to go
"We had a The four mien. Du
would Signal from a nearby roof when
Castro's car started into the garage,
The signal would be presed on Then a
couple of guys would hit the planger of
an electronic detonating deve The
detonator was in a hotel near the apart
ment house.
a
"W'0. would have
dust.
bjow to
"The night before it wa happen,
the guys (the Cuban plats bat i
final meeting to KU
the deta
Nobody outside our
111
Toap kese
The dynamite, but n Inetel at
62 (Castro's intelligence servague featul
out about the meeting atal reported it.
The Geme fookiny ter theme
They were
apachup of mes
Away from the place when the dynn
mite was The G
and every incly stated at
314
al'
UPI Photo
One of the plotters, a young military
affe named decos casas, shot I out
with the raiders and killed two of them
Ifore he 14,16
a.t.
motorcycle
cop. Three other conspirators, all rebel
offices whe had tough with hitro in
the Sierra Mastra. wire captured and
to G2 headquarters. They ea.
caped a few bars later, with the help
of friends the the inteligence Service,
and found refuge 19 the ruguayan
Embassy
"Castro never found out about the
who dir-
denamite," said the
closed the plot to The News "It's prol
Abl still there,” under the
garage
floor'
Intelligence sources told this report-
er that the CIA sent an execution squad
into Oriente Province in November 1962
to ambush Castro nest Santingo dl
Cuba as he drove to a memorial service
for his fallen guerrillas.
Snipers hid along road
service 58135
Snipers hid among trees and bushen
lining the road to the Voetery where
the
hell. On the
marting of the scheduled ceremoney. A
motorcade ve jeeps sopranched the
graveyard The first
soliners.
In the
bearded mahat
AP.
Ful
was wearing suhe as
was full of
tall,
ון … ,1
the driver. He
m his fatigue
ca was paced dess is to his eye.
Machineguns and rates orayed the
second jeep. with tole
Pu
ding the
duver and les passenger, who turned
to be astres
Capt Alfredo Ga
ANNUENSTAR
escaped. Se del Fibel, who had prudent-
taken anvt! or 1'e to th
tery
The A
in 100, during and h
tration
.
Al
Kenney read
Presider Jason, t
that "we're pune din
in the abbest.
P
.. we beyan
e da nis
Preuph the
In 1967, the Inte
rabats
...
cansany
Mander,
and Nata
delh
peedges agme Da Game Reset
1 hang forwa
to the coo
trevatix from it d
in 100) fict President
Nixon took off, & verument lawyers
apsed in court that Koveh shodd not
bond perched
ansjererified. "Nadable
"
" to the n.
formimity" Rocent witout deport
"
DAILY NEWS FRIDAY, APRIL 25, 1975
Frogmen' Blew Up & French Ship in Haten
By PAUL MESKIL
Last of series
At 3:10 p.m. on March 4, 1960,
a French munitions ship blew up
in Havana harbor, killing at least
75 people and injuring more than
200.
The vessel, Le Couvre, exploded dur
ing the unloading of 76 tons of ammu,
nition and grenades intended for Fidel
Castro's military and police forces. Cas-
tro suspected sabotage, but couldn't
prove it. The United States denied any
involvement in the incident.
A former CIA agent told The News
recently that Le Couvre was sabotaged
by "CIA frogmen." He said an under-
water demolition team slipped into the
water at night and attached a bomb ta
the ship's hull, under the wateriine. The
bomb, a detonator and a timing device
were in a waterproof container, he said.
The ex-agent added that the frog
men were Cubans working for the CIA.
"It was definitely CIA-connected
thing." he ad.
8
Another source said the bomb was
supposed to go off around 3 a.m., when
the waterfront was pleserted, but some
thing went wrongth the timer and
the blast cate 12 haurs later, when the
ewed with dock workers
and harbor
Still ther ree, formerly con
DocId: 32423630
M
NW 50955
neeted with the CIA and other falli
gence agencies in the Caribbean area,
blamed the big blast on Gen. ael
Trujillo, then dictator of the Doradcan
Republic.
Trujillo and his sinister intelligence
chief, Johnny Abbes, had many der
ence with CIA officials and Secret
agents. On une occasion in 11:00,
Trujillo offered CIA agents Frank Ftur.
gis and Pedro Diai Lanz, former chief
of Castro's Air Force, $1 million to irad
an invasion of Cuba from the mini-
can Republie. Diaz Lanz declined te!!-
ing his CIA hosses that he didn't want
to work for another dictater.
Plotting to kill Trujillo
While in the Dominican Repube to
confer with Trujillo in 1961, Sirgis
also 
contacted Dominican military offi
cers who were plotting to kill Tidjillo.
The 
CIA agreed to give the plotters
guns and 
anouration.
Cow
The guns .rived in boxes sent t
supermarket in Unudad Traji's (the Pas
mancan
capital.
called Santo
Domingo," said Frank Nelson, an
American who worked with Tray " in a
plot to 
overthrow Castro. "The Don.";
ea officers didn't reed the ruts Try
already 
had enough stuff for a v
They needed the moral support of the
US
gerechnett, and this was
sented by the arms pet:
The
office's
6 196
Trajon May
Page 18
SEGRETS OF
THE GIA
used the CIA guns has not been dis-
closed. But 
similar weapons figured in
subsiquent 
attempts to exterminate
Francois (Para 
Doc) Davalier, the vo0-
Joo Hitler of 
Haiti.
On the night of Aug. 28, 1963, a
ennverted 
B-
23 hember left Florida with
an arms 
shipment for Gen. Leon Can-
tava, a 
former Haitian Army command-
er who 
was planning to invade his
homeland 
from the Dominican Republic,
which 
shares the island of Hispaniola
with Haiti, 
The CIA plane swooped over
a flare-
lit field near the Dominican
military airport 
of Dajabon.
Wooden crates rained down en para-
chutes
. They 
contained mortars,
biczookas, M-1 
rifles, 20-caliber ma
chine guns, M-3 Tom.my guns, .45-caliber
pista, 
grenades and ammunition.
The weapons were distributed among
219 Haitian exties who comprised
stava's invasion army. They crussed
Massacre 
River, borderline between
Dan Republic and Haiti, on
of 
Sept. 22. Late the follow
Way, after a Moody battle with Hai
tips Cantava led the tent
(Cont need on suge 54)
PLOT TO RELEASE THE PUEBLO
NW 50955
(Continued from page 4)
!
and backcross the riter
Panatuary
A wick åpter, a sell group of ital.
the get we entered U.S. Army Spe
cial Forces App in high Carelina for t
ter injonit erfare Most of
the Haitians eve in Mir carly 20s and
Tad a
colige
1. United
Ses after Iscrepe in the US Army
6. Air Force. All at vm live on New
had been hand picked by the
CIA or what became one of the brav
est and most pititul javasion in the
history of Caribbean cagnage.
1.
1
Tsion forer tonsist of oily
13 men, eght of whom had been traged
Wine Given Beets they belonged to
anner crop call Jenne
Hi Young Had. Nearly All of the
13 were the ons Haitian
offers or officials who had |
Holy vale. thugs.;
M
Fades, Gusle Villedrouln, was a
Saman whose father, Hai- |
Col. Roger Villadrouin,
ched to death by Papa Doc's Toidon
Ma
as 1
(They chartered a boat in Florida and
Hart: on Aug. 5, 1964, entry-
In a variety of weapons supplied by
41A at Although the invasion as
deamed to failure before it began, the
1 Soane, New Yorkers managed to hold
off bindreds of Duvalier soldiers, ili-
tasies and Teton Macoute*.
Ti
kuled one by one; and
141.1 were left kept fighting. The
1st the invaders ran out of ammuni-
1 Det 24. then threw stones at
the there we gunned then down. The
Toads of t. 1ste cat off and sent to
He presidential palace in Port-au-
Par
Drops two gasoline drums
On Mar
Daa
1
B flew over
palace and dropped two a
Fred as one of which. Now a hole in
1+
trade the Haitian While
other did ret explete. The
phone was pulted to an American who
reedy had one contract jobs for
the CIA
Achimes imaginative, though no
1ste
at
CTA plot was simic-
burner at this time. Its
was the release of the USS Puch
To and have chew, captured by Commun
aat Nite kota in Jatany Hist
T
;:4
harlest 1 fe T'uble
Upton Sword. but these
Peter to as "the Mexi
1:ant from the plannin
becnating the
Cassati d
appeared in Fort Lamirdale hews
1439
advent ce" and "high
pif" the pabit applicants,
The
placed by Ray Sand-
etro, Fort Lauderde lawyer who al
add to the Va 14
Anhen abstered the ad,
to the to
Sty
434 37
GG
htt
an
a.i
easytage of the
pointed Max
worked with
security
Fount the letters
Frank eventu
litary serv.
and rovati
"There had
heep a War 11 others seTY
.1
Ka
Must were
yrobat, but onl
afe 10 and
oning prodora Hat he had
ample ch
Aut
nove
wagon some kind
of en accendof, as Frank, sed, 'Well, if
971 Pay sober w take you along."
1. on sire offered $10,000 for a
atment. Th.
were fold if
La command and to in
to free pritical prisoners from Castro's
concentrat caps"
AR";
a
To ritmos to this story, Stur
g displayed
phowing the
Treats of Cuban pissot nd prom
camps. He also, had a list of prismmers
who suppeally were to be freed.
None of the Juen, not even Gonges,
Doddr32423630,
1
Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, offered $1 million for a Cut-anjinvasion.
In the Caribbean, the CIA got involved
in dozens of schemes, including blowing up
a French ship and killing Trujillo
in vance." Starpis sad "The CIA
station in Musa was aware of St. So
were several other federal agencies, in
clubing the FII wd Customis,
The objective sa not to raid Cuba
but to rendezvous with another ship off
the coast of Mexico and, with the as
sistance of this, ship, seize a Russian
ves: el. We were to meet a Cuban Cessel.
1, some it was a Naval vessel, coDE-
mailed by Cuban Navy offices who
were desenchanted with Castro.
"The orders (for completing he
operations were aloud the Cuban ip.
The captain also had a sailing seli, dile
listing arrivals and departures of all
Soviet and Communist blue vessel
the Caribbean and the Gulf of M
Whoped to grab Suviel bong
Page, and ship.
on -
in
4.
stoped by the Cuban vessel. The skip
per of the Soviet ship probably would
not be suspicious of a boarding party
wearing Cuban Navy, uniformes. I
We would then capture the ship
We were to take it to a point off the
east of Venezuela. The orders were not
to go into any port but to stay off the
ebast. Certain officials in the Venezue
Lan government were aware of the plan.
They would participate in negotiations
for the release of the captive ship and
its crew. A statement would be issued
to the effect that we wanted to ex
change the ship and crew for certain
political prisonersin Cuba.
"But this was a ruse. Then we would
gh into the second phase of the opera
ในitt. In ducked with the horn Vormimal.
US S. Puele, its captain and crew, who
were still in confiament at this time'
"We were young to threaten to sink
the Communist ship and kill all the hos
Totes any ship of any country came.
close. It was supposed to look like a
pitate operation, manned by Ximenean
merremmes fasten tuins."
In preparation for the trip to Mexi
co, guns, camping equipment, medicine,
bandages, un: forms and other supplies
were hidden in door panels, seats and a
false trunk of a 1963 Falcon that wAS
outfitted by the mechanics of a Miamil
garage owned by two CIA employes.
The volunteers were to provide their
own transportation to Mexico and their
own weapons and camping gear.
"The men had to get to the meeting
place. Guadalajara, at their own +3-
pense," Gonzales said. "The contract
duln't go
into effect they KUR
there. How they get there и на their
business."
Running out of money
One of the recruits, Robert Curtis,
later testified in a court case resulting
from the operation: "When we got to
Guadalajara, the hotel we were Bup
posed to go to was torn down. We went
across the street to Les Americanes
(another hotel). We left the cat parked
out front where he (Sturgis could see
it. We waited three weeks, and we were
running out of money. So we went to
a kun shop and sold my Japanese
Nambu automatic pistel) for about
$30."
cang
Frank andl the rest of the
eventually arrived and proceeded to a
training camp Gonzales had set up in
the mountams near the toatemala bor-
der It rammed much of the time they
were there, and they called their base.
Camp Mand.
After two weeks there, they moved
to Camp Sand on the beach near the
Yucatan fishing village of Progresd.
They chattered the bing bost Amire.
muggled guns and the board, and
set off to meet the Cuban vesel. But
the charts they had obtained to guide.
them though the Gulf and Caribbean
364-201 10 years old and, therefore, not
compietely accurate.
Thes cursed south along the Yaca-
tata for four days, entered Cental
Aerican waters and then ran around
on a two miles of Rele, capital.
Hatch Honduras
"We threw 内
of gear over the
side, Gonzales and "We waited until
the tide came in. Then every body jump-
ed to the water to help get her off
the reef although there AUCEP shacks
around. We didn' at go flo
Belize, but the propeller and shaft wei's
hent, and there was A small leah. We
were tant
water and needed re
IPREE S
H
When the Vingre, limped ante port,
flying no Hag, poh. and oistanis of
cers boarded her Bitish Hoshian wit
thote at first thought at 3.14
invasion from Guatemala. Sturgis and
fus dirty dazen were questioned by Bist
ish intelligen.. agent
Tiver Stangas
spoke to the American cous, and, after
few phone calls to Mexico City nod
Washington, Bu consul told him not to
WORT. The Americians were released
and flown back to Miana.
"We was supposed to get $1,300 m
month plus $100,000 bonus to comple
twa of the mussion)," Cites said later.
"Well, all seen was
tit lacks to
get back home (from Mama."
"Whatever it was, it was dennitely
a CIA operation," said Max Gonzales, in
native New Yorker who is now in lukis
ness in Miami Frank State was
1A gent at the time sad till may be.
He was
171 contai with other A
agents in Guadalajara and Mexico City
Frank eser tell me what our anal m
་་་་
i th
IRCULATION-NOW MORE THAN 2 MILLION
U.S.News
& WORLD REPORT
$1.00
DECEMBER 6,1976
AS CARTER
"INVADES"
WASHINGTON
THE UNITED STATES NEWS
RLD REPORT
Cuban Extremists in U.S.
MIAMI
A-GROWING
TERROR
THREAT
CUBA
NW 50955 DocId: 32479
HOW NEW TAX LAW
HITS BUSINESSMEN

SPECIAL REPORT Cuban Extremists in U.S.
Miami
A GROWING TERROR THREAT
MEXICO
Λ
00
DOMINICAN
S PUERTO
RICO
BARBADOS
CUBA
HAITI REPUBLIC
JAMAICA
b bean
S
a
00
e
0
Out from Miami spreads a wave of vio-
lence. Terrorists' aim is to topple Castro, free
Cuba. Nearly all Cuban refugees share this
dream. But the acts of a few zealots create
trouble for fellow exiles and for the U.S.
Reported from
MIAMI and WASHINGTON
Terrorism by radical Cuban refugees has become a thorny
problem in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and, in the
view of some authorities, a potential threat to the lives of
American leaders.
The terrorists' goal is to wrest control of Cuba away from
its Communist dictator, Fidel Castro.
In pursuit of that goal, they have blazed a trail of violence
from Miami across the Caribbean Sea, not only to Cuba but
also to Mexico, Barbados, Jamaica and Panama-even across
the South Atlantic to Argentina.
They have engaged in a series of bombings in the U.S. and
abroad. They have carried out military-style attacks on
Communist ships. They are strongly suspected of several
killings.
A federal grand jury in Miami is investigating their activi-
ties and their leaders.
Now, as a new Administration prepares to take over in
Washington, it is feared that the Cuban terrorists will step up
their attacks in an effort to thwart any turn toward reconcili
ation with Castro..
Officials familiar with their operations warn that some of
the Cuban extremists will stop at nothing, not even at
assassinating members of the Carter Administration.
"The Cuban terrorists are the most highly trained assassins
in the world today," says one U.S. official.
Many of the terrorists were trained by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the days when this country was trying to
overthrow Castro, or kill him.
The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee recently held
hearings on the Cuban-terrorist threat. It heard this testimo-
ny from Lt. Thomas Lyons, head of a special antiterrorist
squad of the Dade County public-safety department in
US NEWS & WORLD REPORT Dec 6, 1976
NW 50955
cd: 2 4 30°°°Page 21
น
by:
Dr. Orlando Bosch, an anti-
Castro leader, is accused in
plane bombing fatal to 73.
VENEZUELA
Miami, where Cuban refugees
are concentrated:
"The overwhelming major-
ity of the Cubans in Miami are
strongly anti-Castro. That's
why they came to Miami in
the first place. They are also
law-abiding citizens who, with
minor exceptions, manifest
their opposition to Castro in
legal ways.
"However, there are a small
number of individuals whose
hatred of Cuban Prime Minis-
ter Fidel Castro and Commu-
nism has led them to engage
in extralegal actions and to
violate the laws of the country
which gave them sanctuary.
These individuals use Dade
against
County as a base for international terrorism
governments allied with Cuba, Cuban shipping, Commu-
nists, purported Communists and individuals who take a
stand against their terrorist-type attacks..
**Some Cuban groups purporting to be involved in terror-
ist-type attacks against the Cuban Government are no more
or no less than outright criminals, feeding upon the Cuban
population and diverting the collected funding for their own-
purposes."
Other investigators charge that the terrorists, to finance
their crusade, have dealt in cocaine and prostitution and in-
extortion from wealthy fellow refugees.
The number of hard-core terrorists is small; officially
estimated at fewer than 300. But their reach is wide. In this
year alone they have either bragged about or been accused
of such acts as:
• Machine-gun attacks on the high seas against vessels
from Cuba and other Commúnist nations.
Bombing a wide variety of targets in the United States,"
Latin America and Portugal.
• Planting-a bomb that caused the crash of a Cubana
Airlines plane near Barbados on October 6, with the loss of
73 lives.
• Possible involvement in the stiff unsolved bomb death of
29
EXILES vs.
CASTRO-
A Relentless
Pursuit
On Jan. 1, 1959, Fidel Castro took power and
the first wave of refugees fled Cuba. A small
number of the 600,000 exiles who settled in the
U.S. have become extremists.
Highlights of events in those 18 years, some
involving law-abiding exiles, others involving the
extremists-
1961: A 1,300-man Cuban Brigade, armed and
trained by the U.S. in Florida, Guatemala and Nica-
ragua, landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's south
shore. The invasion was a failure.
1962: Survivors of the Bay of Pigs were released
by Castro after payment of a 53-million-dollar ran-
som in drugs, food, medical equipment and other
supplies from "private contributions." President
John F. Kennedy, in Miami, pledged to the Cuban
exiles that the Brigade flag would one day fly over a
liberated 
Cuba.
U.S. launched its secret "Operation Mongoose"-
a plan to use Cuban exiles in paramilitary war
against Castro while U.S. maintained an economic
blockade to shake the island's economy. The attacks
generally failed.
1964: Cuban extremists in New York City fired a
mortar shell at United Nations as Cuba's Ché Gue-
vara addressed the General Assembly.
1967: Cuban exile specialists and U.S.-trained
Bolivian troops trapped and killed Guevara and
some of his Communist guerrillas in Bolivia.
1968-72: Cuban-exile extremists bombed ships
of nations considered to be friendly to Castro, ter-
rorized other exiles to keep them in line.
1972: Cuban exiles trained by Central Intelli-
gence Agency took part in Watergate break-in, later
testified that they thought it would help their anti-
Castro 
campaign.
1973: U.S. and Cuba signed agreement aimed at
controlling hijacking of aircraft and piracy of ships
at sea.
1974-76: Cuban extremists exploded more than
100 bombs in Miami area in two-year period, hitting
offices 
of the FBI, a State attorney and the Miami
police department.
Exile terrorists attacked airline offices and consul-
ates of governments that have diplomatic relations
with Castro. Bombings took place in Jamaica, Mexi-
co, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Panama, other countries.
Fishing boats based in Cuba and Soviet cargo
ships were attacked by high-speed motor launches
manned by exile extremists.
Terror reached its peak with the bomb sabotage
of 
a 
Cuban airliner and the death of 73 passengers
and crew last October 6-near Barbados. Police
seized Cuban exiles in Caracas, Venezuela, on suspi-
cion of involvement in the sabotage. Castro can-
celed 
U.S. Cuba hijacking agreement..
TW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 22
CUBAN EXTREMISTS
[continued from preceding page]
a former Chilean Ambassador in Washington, D.C., on Sep-
tember 21.
• Kidnaping two Cuban officials in Argentina.
• Attempting to kidnap a Cuban consul in Mexico.
Who are these terrorists? What motivates them? How do
they operate? And why are U.S. officials so concerned about
what they may do in the future?
To answer such questions, Orr Kelly and Carl J. Migdail of
the 
U.S. 
News & World Report staff dug deeply into the
records, 
interviewed Cuban refugees who share the hopes
though 
not the methods of the terrorists, and talked to law-
enforcement officials who are trying to stem the violence.
BREEDING GROUND FOR TERRORISM
After Fidel Castro took over Cuba in 1959 and it became
apparent that he intended to establish a Communist state,
800,000 
Cubans "voted with their feet" and fled their
homeland. Some 600,000 of them settled in the United
States. They and their children now total 750,000. Most of
them live 
in the Miami area.
The majority of these immigrants are law abiding. But
Miami's "Little Havana" provides a culture in which the
virus of violence 
can grow.
"In Miami," explains one refugee leader, "the Cubans
keep their national identity, their heritage, traditions,
hatreds 
and their hopes of going back to their homeland.
And they 
know they can't go back until Castro is gone. So
they 
dream of toppling Castro. What is clearly unrealistic in
other 
places in the United States seems very possible in the
atmosphere in Miami."
In the early 1960s, the overthrow of Castro seemed to the
Cubans in exile to be not only possible but almost inevitable.
It was 
U.S. policy to drive him from power. There was an
attempt 
to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 with an
army of Cuban exiles recruited and trained in secret by the
CIA. The 
invaders were not given the air cover necessary for
a successful 
attack, and the operation was a disaster. Only
180 of 
about 1,300 invaders escaped death or capture. The
Cubans felt 
betrayed.
Then came other American moves against Castro. There
was a secret "Operation Mongoose," which included efforts
to assassinate the Cuban leader. The United States backed an
economic blockade of Cuba in an attempt to prevent Castro
from obtaining 
sorely needed supplies and equipment from
abroad. 
Later, Cuban refugees were used to carry out secret
operations 
not only in the Caribbean but also in other parts
'
of Latin 
America-and even in Africa.
To many Cuban refugees, attacking Castro and Commu-
nism became a way of life.
Since then, however, American policy has failed to match
in intensity the fierce anti-Castro passion of the more mili-
tant refugees. In recent years, prominent members of the
U.S. Senate 
have visited Cuba. In 1973, Cuba made an
agreement with the United States to curb the airplane
hijackers 
who had been using Cuba as asylum. There were
moves 
on both sides toward normalization of relations bé.
tween Cuba and the U.S.
As their hopes of American action against Castro ebbed,
some Cuban refugees turned to violence on their own..The.
box 
on this page gives the chronology of developments.
TERRORIST LEADERS AND TACTICS
Though their numbers are small, the 300 or fewer active
terrorists have organized themselves into many groups.
Slogans 
of one group chalked on the walls in "Little Havana"
have barely begun to fade before they are replaced by the
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 6, 1976
'
slogans and initials of yet another group. Among groups
named in testimony before the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee are: Accion Cubana, or Cuban Action; Alpha
66, a name adopted when victory in 1966 seemed possible;
FLNC, standing for Frente de Liberacion Nacional de Cuba,
which means Cuban National Liberation Front, and Pragma-
tistas, which means what it sounds like-pragmatists.
A group calling itself Zero issued a "death list" of people
marked for killing and, according to officials, several persons
on the list soon died violent deaths.
Dade County's antiterrorist head, Lieutenant Lyons, says
he has stopped trying to keep track of the groups and instead
concentrates on trying to solve the crimes that they are.
suspected of having committed. He has no shortage of
business. Here is a sample of the violence attributed to
terrorists in the last two years:
⚫ Since February, 1975, there have been at least seven
assassination attempts directed against refugee leaders who
were viewed as opponents of the terrorists' tactics. Three
men were shot to death. One was killed by a bomb. Three
other attempted killings failed, but a prominent radio broad-
caster lost both legs below the knees when a bomb ripped his
car apart.
On Dec. 3-4, 1975, bombs blasted the Miami office of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, a Social Security office, a
State unemployment office, two post offices, a bank, a State
attorney's office and the Miami police-department headquar-
ters. A man accused of those bombings, and also the bombing
of the Miami International Airport two months earlier, was
acquitted recently in a federal court. He is to be tried again
in a State court.
• A number of bombs have been exploded in New York.
One blew out the window of the Venezuelan consulate on
Fifth Avenue, across the street from St. Patrick's Cathedral.
On Feb. 12, 1976, a Soviet freighter, the Dzhordano
Bruno, was sitting motionless 35 miles off Cuba's north coast
while its tanks were being cleaned. Suddenly a small boat
raced close to the freighter and raked it with heavy machine-
gun fire. No one was injured.
On April 6, 1976, two Cuban fishing boats were attacked
and a fisherman was killed.
On Sept. 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C., a bomb ex-
ploded in a car and killed Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean
Ambassador to the U.S. under the Marxist regime of the late
President Salvador Allende. Although the crime is officially
Insolved, there have been persistent reports that the bomb
was planted by Cuban terrorists as a "favor" to the secret
olice of the present anti-Cominunist Government in Chile.
NEW TERRORIST STRATEGY
Leaders of the terrorist bands are hard to identify. But one
an has emerged as an apparent leader: Dr. Orlando Bosch,
pediatrician. He was caught firing a bazooka at a Polish
p in Miami harbor in 1968 and was sentenced to 10 years
prison.
Dr. Bosch was released on parole after four years, but he
ortedly returned to the movement. He is now under
st in Venezuela, charged along with three other men-in
nection with the Cuban airliner bombing. Dr. Bosch is
ribed as the leader of the group calling itself Accion
ina.
=
June of this year, Dr. Bosch called a small group of his
activists together in the Dominican Republic. They
sharply divided on policy and strategy.
ie wanted to avoid the risks of further attacks in the
1 States and to concentrate their efforts against Castro
this country. Others held out for continuing
their
ies both here and-abroad.
a heated argument, a shaky agreement was reached
'
US & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 6, 1976
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
14.
Page 23
Automobile bombing that killed a Cuban refugee in Miami is one
of many unsolved crimes attributed to anti-Castro terrorists.
to focus their efforts outside the U.S. To direct the activities,
a new group was formed with the initials CORU, which stand
for Coordinacion de Organizaciones Revolucionaires Unidas
in Spanish or Co-ordinating Committee of United Revolu-
tionary Organizations in English.
American law-enforcement officials say that members of
CORU have the backing of powerful forces, perhaps even
the governments themselves, in some countries of Latin
America. The terrorists are described as "at home" in Haiti,
the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Chile. They are well
armed for terroristic acts, as shown in the box on page 32.
Since the June meeting, a new wave of terrorism has swept
across the Caribbean and beyond. Bombs have damaged
Cuban airline facilities in Barbados, Jamaica and Panama.
Two Cuban officials were kidnaped in Argentina.
On July 23, three men who had flown from Miami carrying
three coffee cans filled with plastic explosive attempted to
kidnap Cuban Consul Daniel Ferrer Fernandez in Mérida,
Mexico. He escaped, but a Cuban fisheries expert was killed.
The most serious act of terrorism came on October 6,
when a Cubana Airlines DC-8 exploded in flight shortly after
taking off from Barbados. The plane fell into the sea, killing
73 persons including members of the Cuban national fencing
team.
In messages to news media, both CORU and El Condor, a
group unheard of previously, claimed responsibility for the
crash of the plane.
Dr. Bosch, who has traveled freely on documents appar-
ently provided by officials of Governments friendly to the
anti-Castro movement, was picked up in Venezuela and on
November 2 was charged with homicide in connection with
the plane crash. Three other men are similarly charged.
The arrests of Dr. Bosch and his cohorts, instead of
reducing terrorist violence, may actually stimulate more
violence. El Condor, in a message to the United Press
International on November 19, said the four men held by the
Venezuelans are innocent and warned that, if they are
convicted, planes of the Venezuelan International Airways
will be attacked. On the same day, CORU sent a message
saying it would join with the Honduran Anti-Communist
Alliance in attacks on three airlines that plan excursion_
flights to Havana.
Roberto Carballo, a militant leader of veterans of the Bay
of Pigs invasion, denounced the threatened attacks. "It aids
Castro by making all Cuban exiles look like mad bombers,”
Carballo said.
CRACKDOWN BY LAW OFFICERS
Since last spring, there has been a sharp. reduction in
terroristic violence in the Miami area. That may be as much
due to a successful counterattack by law-enforcement agen-
cies as to the policy that was adopted by CORU last June.
Early this year, an antiterrorist task force was organizod
CUBAN EXTREMISTS
[continued from preceding page]
includes representatives from Dade County and Miami po-
lice, the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Although the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation is not formally a part of this task force,
its agents work closely with it.
With co-operation from Cuban refugees who are sick of
the terrorist violence, law officers have arrested a number of
suspects. Police also have learned enough about other sus-
pects so that their freedom to engage in new acts of violence
can be limited even though there is not enough evidence to
prosecute them.
A federal grand jury is interrogating witnesses who might
have some knowledge of terror operations.
Efforts of law-enforcement officials to deal with the terror-
ist groups face formidable handicaps, however. The terrorists
seem to know what police are doing. Lieutenant Lyons
relates that one suspect "identified one of my officers who
had never met him before, called him by name and told him
what section he worked in and what his duties were."
Terrorists are protected by a web of old loyalties. Most of
them worked at one time or another for the U.S. Govern-
ment. Many have had several roles: members of the U.S.
Army, CIA operatives and FBI informants. One refugee
leader suggests that law-enforcement officials have not found
the killers of Cubans "because they don't want to."
A further complication is the heavy infiltration of the
terrorist movement by members of Castro's intelligence
corps. They not only gather intelligence but sometimes act as
agents provocateurs, instigating terrorist acts designed to
discredit the refugees and influence American policy.
The Cuban Prime Minister has "surfaced" enough of such
agents to reveal their pattern of operation. Early this year,
for example, Manuel de Armas, a Cuban refugee who was
named in Senate committee testimony as having been in-
volved in terrorist activities in Miami, showed up in Havana.
In an April 22 broadcast by Radio Havana, De Armas said
that he had supplied the explosives used in the killing of a
man named Rolando Masferrer and that a CIA agent had
provided him with the explosives.
In a speech on October 15, Castro boasted of a double
agent who Castro claimed had passed on coded instructions
TERRORISTS' ARSENAL:
PLANES TO CANNONS
from the CIA. Said Castro: "From the very moment when he
was recruited by the CIA and over a period of 10 years, the
supposed agent has kept the Cuban Government fully in-
formed of all his contacts with [the CIA] and of the equip-
ment and instructions he has received."
Castro blamed the CIA for the airliner bombing and other
acts of violence. "Who else but the CIA. . . can carry out
these acts?" Castro asked.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has flatly denied U.S.
involvement in the airliner bombing. He said: "I can state
categorically that no official of the United States Govern-
ment, nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in
contact with the American Government has had anything to
do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this
totally reprehensible."
The CIA declines to discuss Cuban refugee terrorism.
Officials of other Government agencies say they seriously
doubt that the CIA, after all the criticism it has received for
some of its earlier activities, is still involved in operations
against the Castro regime. However, the agency is described
as providing very little help in combatting the terrorist
groups. "We have absolutely no contact with the CIA," says
Lieutenant Lyons. "I'd like to, but they don't talk to us." One
reason for that attitude may be that laws bar the CIA from
domestic law-enforcement activities.
Other laws, or the lack of them, also complicate the fight
against the terrorists. U.S. agencies cannot become involved
in investigations of terrorism outside the United States unless
the crime involves violations of neutrality laws making it
illegal to conspire in this country to commit crimes abroad or
to export arms without a license.
Although shocked by the October 6 airliner bombing, U.S.
officials reluctantly decided there was no authorization for
the FBI to enter that case.
With such handicaps as these, law-enforcement officials say
they can look forward to only limited success against the
terrorists. Any real solution to the problem must come from
within the Cuban refugee community-and investigators
state that the co-operation they get there does not extend to
cases of violence committed outside the U.S.
WHAT HAVE TERRORISTS GAINED?
As officials size up the effects of the terrorist campaign:
The only tangible accomplishment has been to push Castro
into renouncing the antihijacking
treaty, thus discouraging efforts to-
ward a diplomatic reconciliation be-
tween the United States and Cuba.
One measure of the military equipment A further measure comes from this tally
that is available to Cuban-terrorists is of extremists' weapons confiscated by Mi-
provided by this partial inventory-com-ami-law-enforcement officers so far in"
piled by authorities
10 or more high-speed motor launches
about 30 feet long, with special fuel.
_ tanks for extra range
A-number of small, spotter aircraft
Large-caliber recoilless riflès-
Missile-antitank weapons
Wide assortment of smaller weapons
Large quantities of C-4 explosives devel-
oped by the US Army
32
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page
1975-76:
■1 20-mm cannon, with 100 rounds of
explosive ammunition
498.submachine guns; 480 of them with.
silencers
82.explosive devices
3,265 pounds of dynamite and TNT
4 boxes of napalm
6 rifles
20 handguns
Thousands of rounds of ammunition.
Despite all the terrorist plots and
attacks, Castro remains firmly seat-
ed as head of a Communist regime
in Cuba. And it appears to the refu-
gees almost inevitable that the.
movement toward some kind of ac
commodation with Castro will be
resumed by American policy mak-
ers. Throughout "Little Havana,"
the fear is widespread that Jimmy
Carter, when he becomes Presi
dent, will give new impetus to this
movement, and that their homeland
will never be liberated from Com-
munist rule.
To both officials and Cuban-refu
gee leaders, it seems inevitable that.
the terrorists will continue their at
teinpts to keep the two countries
part by the only method they
know further acts of violence,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 6. 1976
1
MEMORANDUM
TO:
RECORD
Dar.
CA
Nelson Punk
fill as put of
Assasinature accordion
Эвий
there
FROM:
HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
gues
SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION OF JANUARY 19, 1977
I called Larry Callahan at 2:00 p.m. to advise him that
the Commiteee desired to interview Mr. Gene A. Boren, of
the IRS, at the earliest available opportunity and requested
his advice and assistance to accomplish this. Callahan was
nervous about the Committee's eagerness to proceed in response
to the memorandum for fear that we would be interfering with
an on-going criminal investigation.
He noted the FBI was looking
into this and he would have to check with the Bureau to
ascertain the feasibility of proceeding unilaterally. I told
Callahan we did not want to interfere with a criminal investi-
gation and that I did not feel that our interview of the IRS
employee would fall into that category.
Callahan referred to
a possible obstruction of justice on the part of that employee
in that the information had been withheld for approximately
five years.
At 2:30 p.m. I received a telephone call from Paul Daly
urging Committee restraint in unilaterally investigating
subject matter. Daly noted the Bureau had just received this
information and was intending to interview the IRS employee.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 25
-2-
Daly
and other individuals in question today or tomorrow.
noted that he was disturbed that Callahan had brought the
memo to the Committee's attention so promptly, as the Bureau
had intended to brief the Committee at the conclusion of their
investigation. Daly seemed most concerned that the IRS delay
in bringing the matter to the Bureau's attention and assured
us that the Bureau was desirous of cooperating fully. He
noted the information had been furnished by Justice absent
a specific inquiry from the Committee and that we were being
unreasonable if we desired to pursue the matter further at
this time. I asked Daly what information was available at the
Bureau on Brading and Hunt. He said there was a large quantity
of information available on both and that he felt he could pull
that material which related to the assassination quickly, but
would be reluctant to produce the information in its entirety.
I told him to ascertain this afternoon what information could
be produced immediately and he said that he would.
At 2:45 p.m. I talked again with Callahan who indicated
that Daly would be calling. Callahan said he thought the
Bureau was eager to redeem itself in this area and we should
give them that opportunity. I told Callahan that I was con-
mutilation
Coolin
cerned about the utilization of leaks, a position which Callahan
thinks is ridiculous. Callahan, however, did state that this
information was not as old as it looks at the Bureau, to-wit:
While the Justice received the IRS memo on December 30, 1976,
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 26
-3-
considerable time went by before Attorney General Levi could
address the issue of whether or not to entrust this matter to
the Bureau. Approximately one week ago, Justice went to Jim
Adams of the FBI with the request to look into the allegation
and was surprised to find that Adams was already apprised of
the situation and investigating, i.e., general indexes.
Apparently, Adams had been in receipt of similar information
in recent days.
Yesterday, in response to the Attorney General's request
for information, Paul Daly hand carried to Callahan the Bureau's
response (which is dated January 14) and today Callahan hand
carried the package to us over Assistant Attorney General
Uhlmann;s signature. Callahan advised that Daly was upset that
the Committee had been so promptly advised for fear that we
would interupt the Bureau's inquiry. Callahan apologized for
the lack of responsiveness on the part of Justice and the Bureau
but things are in disarray with Levi about to depart. I assured
Callahan we did not desire to interfere in the investigation
but desired to be promptly informed of any developments and
that we would stay in touch with Paul Daly in that regard .
Callahan promised to expedite any Committee requests as
made.
NW 50955. DocId: 32423630 Page 27
Paul Daly called at 3:10 p.m. to advise that "the powers
that be" at the Bureau were upset with the possibility that the
Committee was considering going to Dallas and interfering with
the investigation. He specifically that the Director be given
an opportunity to talk with Inouye prior to any such action.
I told Daly that it was merely the Committee's desire to go
to Texas; I had heard no discussion of going regardless of
the Bureau's position. Daly promised to pull together without
the need for a written request, all available information on
Brading for Committee review this afternoon, if at all possible.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 28
CRS MAIN FILE COPY
JUL 23 1975 0.33
HE NEW YORK TIMES,
Hunt Sons Charge
C.I.A. Used Agents
To Embezzle Funds
PE CT100 Hunt
late
DALLAS, July 22 (UPI)-Two
sons of H. L. Hunt, the
billionaire contending they
were discriminated against be-
cause of their conservative
views, charged today that the
Central Intelligence Agency in-
filtrated the family oil empire
and used secret agents to help
embezzle more than $50-mil-
lion from them.
The brothers, Nelson Bunker
Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt,
said new Federal charges that
they had tried to cover up
a family wiretapping scheme
were a further result of an
attempt by the C.I.A. to discred-
it the Hunt oil empire. They
said they held the C.I.A. re-
sponsible for earlier. Federal
charges that they had spied
on aides of their father,
They said their refusal to
allow the C.I.A. to use their
overseas Hunt Oil Company af-
filiate for espionge had led
to the Federal charges against
them. B
"After turning down the
C.I.A., a massive embezzlement
scheme, involving loses of over
[$50-million from the Hunt Oil
Company were uncovered," the
brothers said in a news release,
"An investigation disclosed
that some of the Hunt employes
involved in the scheme were
secret Government agents.".
A spokesman at C.I.A. head-
quarters outside Washington
said, "Since it appears such a
complicated matter, the agen-
cy's legal people would like
time to find out what it is all
about.".
A Federal grand jury yester
day charged the Hunt brothers,
Percy Foreman of Houston, a
criminal lawyer, three other
attorneys and a retired Texas
industrialist with obstruction
of justice for allegedly trying.
to thwart the wiretap investiga-
tion.
Dois
Who?
Cin ever
deny?
No 2 6 57 5
22
After the Hunts
1975
Found No
1975
S.Accused of Refusing to Investigate charged, one of their attorneys
50-Million Theft at H.L. Hunt Concerto require the Justice Depart-time UN Fo
-5-11
by MARTIN WALDRON
Spects to The New York Times:
Philip Hirschkop of Alexandria. Judge Woodward's
Vaked the Federal courts reports from the CIA, 60 lí
However, departmétirð We bad sold a pecan croment to investigate the thefts from the
Hunt said. The we were tol
to a company in El Paso," Mi from H.L.H
Warmed of De
In response to a statement
had not realized that pecarceral District Jud
were selling for so much an
had agreed to sell them
Romebody else for two cents
pound lem.”
Reports Commitment
Councy but
Natio
do Felbvance to the wireta
Hunta to me the documents.
Thomas Hung mid that the
clais have signed affidavita
none of the evidence being preby one of the thieves that h
* LUBBOCK, Tex Sept. 21 came from the C.LA,
sented in the wiretap trai
A member of the 
Hunt on fam Chacking Losses
By says that its widely adver
O. Woodward in 1973 that State Department also had
Sised H. L. H. food company The Hunts say that the wire
the some suncy dome Hunt to pay $45-milion still
be would dismiss case against come involved, urging Bunker
lost $50-million to $60-million tap charges grew out of effort
between 1980 and 1970 because by Herbert and Bunker Hun
not investigate," Hunt officials owed to the Libyss Govern-
of "stealing" by key company to find out why H.L.H. was los
"once again laid out the whole ment on the 1972 taxes. These
Semployes and that the Justice, ing so much money. Thomas same former employe negotiated other Justice Department off seized Mr. Hunt's all interests
Mr. Whitaker said that the situation to the FRI" and taxes were withheld after Libya
Department has refused for five Hunt said that H.L.H. losses the purchase of the pecan 
prociclala, Mr. Whitaker mid.
Sears to investigate. W in 1968 had reached $8-
million essing plant, committing H.LK,
Thomas M. Hunt, hephew a year, when a company projec- 
to paying $180,000 for it.
of 
H. L Hunt, the eccentric tion had 
shown they should be
late 
oil billionaire, who used making a profit.
the radio program "Life Line"
"
In that mation in 1973.
Two former empl
Mr. Hunt mid that this
HLH, John Curington and advice had been rejected.
"The plant had been shuf John H. Brown, were br
Tripoli Radio said in June,
down by the Food and Drug dicted and were convicted at 1973, that Bunicer Hunt's half-
Thomas Hunt's phone was Administration, it was all rusty your for using the main
to advertise his food and drug one 
of those tapped 
by three and has not been operated to HILDEL
products, said that the Justice private detectives hired by is 
this day," Mr. Whitaker said.
Department was under pressure cousins 
in November, 1969. The
and placed on prob
The previous owner of the third former employ
Hirachiom
the
to share in an estimated 10 billion.
afband barrels of oil in a desert field in
Libya had been seized because
Mr. Hunt was "an adventurer
hand broker seeking gains and
on-profits without carrying out
from any activity or bearing any
risk"
Food Products Division of Hunt
Thomas Hunt sald that HVH.
Ou Company had been reorth.
nized and was now showing a
From the Central Intelligence other phones were those of pecan plant gave a deposition o
Agency not to investigate the H. L. 
Hunt's private secretary, to Hunt G officials saying that of security for the
uleged thefts, and to prosecute, a Hunt oil company vise presi- he 
had paid cash kickbacks of pany, was given int
two members of the Huus fan-dent and three lesser company more 
than $80,000 to threecution by the Govern
ty for wiretapping.
officials.
Thomas Hunt is production
H.L.H. 
employes.
"He did not even have a
Losses of H.L.H. were get-
manager for H.L.H.'s parent ting so massive in 1968 and come at H.L.H. expense, he
But the biggest source of in 
testify at any trial.
positive attitude toward the
company, the Hunt Off Com 1989 that the Hunt 
Oil Com-said, was at least five dummy Hunt had given them permie Thomas Hunt said that the
The three men said that H. L. wishes of the people," the
pany, which is family owned. pany, which had been absorb food brokerage corporations sion to act as food 
brokers to
broadcast said.
Mr. Hunt 
is a cousin of Nelson ing the losses, "was getting 
that were set up by H.L.H. sell H. L. H. products, a state paving about. $100 million. In
Sunker Hust and W. Herbert into a cash bind." Thomas Hunt employes to receive
Hunt oil interests had been
Hunt, who are on trial in 
Fed- mid.
per cent mens denied by the 
lag billion-taxes to the Tibyen Government
eral District Court here on
commissions on all H.L.H. 
sales airbep. 2
wiretaping charges. Testimony in January. 1970, and three pri-lished the duplicity of H.L.H. Hunts were being
The wiretaps were discovered After auditors had estab
before Mr. Hunt was, ousted
In an enter to 
show that from the country.
in the case begins tousorrow. vate detectives were later con-executives in early 
1970, "the because they refused to obop
Bunker Hunt has said his revicted and sent to prison for whole 
scheme was laid out" tolerate with
fusal 
to allow the C.I.A. to use short terms. The detectives, aft- 
the F.B.I., Mr. Whitaker said.
his Middle-Eastern oil opera- or being 
released, told a grand
tions as a cover is the possible 
jury, under threats of contemot $442,873.19 was filed with the CLA formation they and
In July, 1970, & claim of Agency and the FBI, for 
any
reason behind the Government's citations, that the Hunt broth-
Fidelity and Casualty Company
Insistence on trying him and are hired them, and the Hunts 
of New York by Hunt Oll, de
his brother on six-year-old were indicted in February, 
1973. tailing allegations of thefts by
wiretapping charges.
Refused Request
Thomas Hunt said that be employes whose honesty had
☐ ford 1st resorted to hir been insured by Fidelity.
A C.LA. memorandum dated private duttiver, they had sought Eastland Ald
Dec. 
6, 1985, indicated that bec conced that the com
Bunker Hunt would be asked to pay officer who ordinarily After the private detectives
allow the agency to use his would have verhefts were ladicted in 1970, the Hunts
company as a cover in the Mid- thieves." An made efforts to have the pros
dle East. The Hunts had an oil independent audit later proved ecution dropped through politi
poncession in Libys. Bunker this such cal connections, asking Senator
Hunt said such a request was d
James O. Eastland, Democrat
made to him in 1968 by the
Every Operations of Mississippi and chairman of
ELA, but that be refused to
allow it because he did not frem como cortou, to intercede with the Jus
The thefts, he said, stretched the Senate Judiciary Commit
volved almost every speration tice Department.
Three Moms
The three of 13 (toms that the
C... would release, to Mr.
Hirschkop wiraphy of
Bunker Hunt, a copy of a mama.
randu that _recommended)
that Dunker Hunt be asked to,
be "operational" and copies of
attacks made on Bunker Hust
by Tripoli Radio.
Bunke: Hunt aid that in
1908, the CLA. asited him to
alloSapto 22 Labo
his
operatichs as a cover for C.LA.
Agents in the Middle East, but
that he refused.
want to alienate the Libyans.
The intelligence agency has of HCLH-purchases, sales and One Hunt attorney mid that
déciband to klow Use Hunts to operacions. Company payroll the Hunts had been led to be
of 13 frein were loaded with nonexistent love that if they would trop The December, 1908, mimo
for four on 
Bank 
Hunt, say employes and company off damage suits against former randam on Bunker Hunt said
log in a letter dated April 3 
cials got kickbacks on pur employes and settle the com- that the C.L.A. had had good
1979 that to flease 
thear chases and commissions on paay's claim against the bond cooperation on our routine
would per 
tel males through dummy food bro, ing company for $100.000, the its but have no way of
power 
sourcer 
äerage companies, he said. Case "would blow ever." The judging possible reaction to op
One of these items if 
revealed. Thomas Whitaker, a former suits were dropped and the set-erations requests. Our estimate
the 
CIA said, would constitute agent of the Federal 
Bureau of themment mode with the bonding is that we see no reap
a clearly unwarranted invasion Investigation who now is chief company.
not make a cautious ap
of the personal privacy of the security officer for the Ham
Individust vafuntqerine
Thomas Hunt, said that the
family belleved that this indithan $5
video ww
aployes
of the H.L.H
organized the
pany was strippet of
The Justice Departme
fused to comment on the
contentions
Washingted
I did
three detectives we
and sept
they testified before
rand jury in
mots were
stepping charge
hat year.
we
Fon Sedents Fe
On Ideas From Hanoi
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
Sept. 21 (Agence France
Presse)-The group of
high school stats to take
final exacions since the
Communits took over here
had a choice yesterday of
writing papers analyzing the
thoughts of either Ho Chi
Minh, the late North Vist
namese leader, or the current
Premier, Pham Van Dong.
The first choice was an ex-
cerpt from Ho Chi Minh's
"Call to the Nation" of July
17. 1908, when American
bombers started attacking
North Vietnam,
The other was a passage
from Mr. Dong's speech when
he presented his Government
to the intest exsion of the
North Vietnamese National
Asembly.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 30

usts down, deal with labor problems.'
amar's low-keyed personal style
Steadman says Lamar has never given
im a direct order in the 15 years of
heir association) tends to make some
eople think of him as a sort of a Mr.
'eepers with a yen to be a jock. "Ac
ually," says Maxfield, "he's Clark
Kent. He is a mild-mannered, meek,
veryday guy. But when money needs
o be committed, he goes into that little
hone booth and comes out with an 'S'
n his shirt."
lucky 11 trusts
The bedrock of Lamar's personal for-
une is the trust that his father set up
or him in 1935 as part of a tax
trategy planned with the aid of yet-
ran Hunt attorney J. B. McEntire. At
hat time, a trust was established for
ach of the Hunt children. In 1958, the
attern was repeated when the elder
[unt established trusts for each of the
econd Mrs. Hunt's children, calling
hem Loyal Trusts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Except
or Hunt Oil Co., which went entirely
Mrs. Hunt, H. L. Hunt left the bulk
f his personal holdings to the Loyal
rusts, whose beneficiaries are Ray
[unt, Ruth Jane Hunt, Mrs. Randall
. (Helen LaKelley) Kreiling, and Mrs.
Mark A. (Swanee Grace) Meeks.
Lo
The size of these trusts is
nknown, but one of the
roblems facing the Hunt
amily is how to commingle
1 separate fortunes (those
f the 10 children plus the
uth Ray Hunt Trust) to
aximum advantage. Dallas
riends of son-in-law
Randy" Kreiling say the
uestion is being debated
armly within the family.
Ithough Kreiling's role in
e Great Western United
keover was relatively mi-
or, it did demonstrate a
illingness between the two
bling groups to cooperate.
Lamar Hunt observes
at, since the bulk of H. L.
unt's estate was left to
Irs. Hunt, "it was a natural
ing for Ray to be the per-
on who looks after it." La-
ar adds: "It does not mean
at Ray will run the busi-
ess. He will be making an
rderly transition, a change
o whatever happens. He will
ave the responsibility of
naking decisions in relation-
hip to Dad's property, but
Dad's operation was much
impler.
There will be no move to
OUR WEDC February 17, 1975
tabunt Oil public, Lamar says. "Our
philosophy is not one of promotion of
stock and promotion to the public," he
says.
"Each of us has his own interests.
All of us operate in the oil business,
sometimes together, sometimes as an
independent oil operator. Hunt Oil,
which was my Dad's company, will be
run basically by employees of the com-
pany. We all will continue to operate
out of the Hunt Oil office."
Maxfield, who has been observing
the Hunts for nine years as Lamar's
partner, believes that Hunt Oil and
Placid Oil will carry on the monolithic
base of the family fortune. "It's like a
tree trunk, with each brother having
his own branch," he says. "Oil is not an
expression of the personality of the
sons as it was of the old man. The ex-
pression of the brothers will be in the
branches-Ray in real estate; Lamar
sports; Bunker horses, commodities,
and agriculture; Herbert in real estate,
residential development, and commodi-
ties." And while the brothers are
branching out, Maxfield believes, "they
will run the oil companies collectively
with a professional staff."
Stormy weather closes In
Meanwhile, a threatening cloud
looms on the family's horizon. Not only
(Ray Hunt (right) looks over his Dallas development.
is an oft-delayed trial ahead for
Bunker and Herbert Hunt on the wire-
tapping charges, but there is also the
threat of more indictments against
them by a federal grand jury that has
been sitting in Dallas for more than a
year. The Hunts claim their wiretap-1
ping activities were aimed at uncov-
ering suspected embezzlements from
their father's food concern. In their
only statement on the matter, over a
year ago, they cited "extensive, unex-
plained losses" suffered by the com-
pany, "We only sought to protect our
father and his property, as any others
would have done," they said.
But one of the wiretappers, Jon Jo-
seph Kelly, says that the tapping was
prompted by Bunker's and Herbert's
suspicions that someone was trying to
influence H. L. Hunt to leave the bulk
of his estate to the second Mrs. Hunt
and her children. Three of the wiretap
victims back up Kelly's version.
Just two weeks ago, in their syndi-
cated column, Jack Anderson and Les
Whitten aired a recurring Dallas ru-
mor that the grand jury is looking into
an alleged "$50,000 to $60,000 payoff"
from Bunker to the chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, James O.
Eastland of Mississippi, in return for
Eastland's assistance in getting a pa-
role for the other wiretapper, Houston
private eye Patrick W. McCann III.
Eastland wrote a letter on McCann's
behalf, but Bunker has denied that
there was any payoff.
The Dallas grand jury, is said to be.
mulling the Eastland connection, as
well as the circumstances surrounding
the three-year lapse between the wire-
tappers' arrest and the indictment of.
Herbert and Bunker on Feb. 28, 1973. A
Hunt family lawyer told Dallas Morn-
ing News investigative reporter Earl
Golz that Bunker managed to strike a
bargain with the Justice Dept. in which
"there would be no prosecution of the
Hunts if they performed certain ac-
tions; they performed the actions, but
there was an indictment anyway."
The actions, reportedly made after
1972 meetings with former President
Richard M. Nixon and former Attorney
General Richard Kleindienst, included
Bunker's providing Justice with a list
of Al Fatah agents in the U. S. He had
secured the list privately because he
feared he was on the Al Fatah death
list because of his Libyan holdings.
For the Hunts, the wiretapping epi-
sode has proved disastrous. Bunker and,
Herbert could receive prison sentences.;
And, more than anything else in the
family's history, it has torn the tightly
woven curtain of secrecy behind which
the family has lived and worked for
more than four decades.
5 & FACES
NW50955' DocId: 32423630
Page 31
1
NEW
a
G9609 MN
1975
No 203-75-
But are
Pipe
Film: Holmes Nostalgia better. For example,
22 623:1
Hound on Bill With
First-Rate Keaton
By RICHARD EDER
And then there are the
phrases. "Mr. Holmes, you're
the 
only man in all England
who in
The first bit in a program
of Sherlock Holmes nostalgia
at the D. W. Griffith Theater
to an old filmed interview
with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.
Stout, mustached and affable,
the 68-year-old author made
It clear what some people had
always suspected: it was
Watson who invented Holmes.
In any case, Sir Arthur was
mainly interested in talking
about psychic research
✓ People wanted to know
mortal tear Sir Henry's ure
will be snuffed out.""They
were the footprints of a
gigantic Hound." "Watson,
keep your eye on that han
"That's what I hate
about his moor, there's al-
ways something strange.".
And, of course: "Oh Watson,
the needie.
It's like the tunes-sing-
able with a life of their
own that pop out of Gilbert
and Sullivan.
☐ Some of the audiences
leaves after "The Hound,"
and the umber urges them
back to their seats. He's
program is a 45-minute
Buster Keaton classic.
what happened to the gener-right: the last picture in the
ation of young 
Englishmen
who died in World War II, be
said. "Are they dissipated into
nothing." he inquired, patting
his dog. "or are they still the
grand fellows we used to
know?"
☐ It wasn't Sir Arthur's
ghosts that made a success of
haunting it was his stories.
"Sherlock Holmes" is on.
Broadway, tourists still go on
forlorn searches up Baker.
Street, Gene Wilder is filming
Holmes's younger brother in
"Sherlock Junior" is not
really a Sherlock Holmes
picture. It is about a movie
projectionist (Keaton) who
wants to be a detectiva,
courts a girl, is thrown out
after a rival steals her fath-
or's watch and lays the blame
Casta
TWO MAKE VILLIERS.
London and Lord Olivier will am Boute;
tackle Monarty this fall
.
The centerpiece of the
Hotmes's film program is the
1939 Darryl F. Zanuck pro-
duction of "The Hound of the
Baskervilles." It isn't a great
picture. It lon't even a great
mediocre picture, but it is a
good mediocre picture, and
perhaps they made better
[mediocre pictures in those
days than they do now.
and buys. Burning:
Sharact
5 James
Berryence
John Sheets
Whard Care
by
even
he&
sweeps out the theater and
finds in the debris two or
three dollar bills that will al-
low 
him to buy candy for his
girl. The customers return
one by one to claim them.
comes up weeping. With
is an old women 
who
pony he yields up the dollar
bill to her. She takes and
yields her handburchief to
him.
03
& HUNTS INDICTED
Trial in
The Hunt
mummer for
1975
WITH 5 IN DALLAS ap case, and
Jul. 22 21:
Foreman Among 7 Charged on change of venue
is alated for Septem
bock, Tex., where it was mov
in Wiretap
The Indictments handid
today allege that the thunts
promised AP. Kelly, Mr. Mo
Cann and Mr. Everett amounts
mnging from $800 to $1,200 µ
"MONTH while in prison if they
did not testify befor
jug concerning the Hunts"
Sercial to The New York Times
DALLAS, July 21
Bunker Hunt and W. Mer
Hunt, sons of the late of bil
lionaire H. L. Hut, the Hous
ton lawyer Percy Foreman and
Two of the counts charge
four other men were indicted that Mr. Foreman accepted
by a Federal grand jury tonight $100,000 in two $30,000 pay.
on charges of obstructing jus-ments from Mr. Hudson to rep
tice and impeding an investige-resent Mr. Kelly and Mr. Ev.
tion into a wiretape case nereft and to guarantee that
volving the Hunts.
☐ neither man would testify be-
fore the Federal grand jury in
Dallas in 1972.
☐ An 18-member grand jury
handed up the nine-count in
dictment in the court of Fed- afr. Shank, the Hunt family
eral District Judge Robert W. attorney, was indicted on seven
Porter, ending an 18-month in-counts concerning the alleged
vestigation. No one named in bribes. Mr. Thesmer, wel
the indictment was present. known Dallas lawyer, was
Named 
along with the Hunts dicted on four counts,
and Mr. Foreman were Ralph lying to the grand jury in
Shank, the Hunt family's per ust. 1974, and October, 1974
sonal attorney: B. H. Timmins concerning the offer of a bribe
Jr., a former assistant United
States Attorney here who is
now in private practice, Ed
ward J. Hudson, a Houston of
field machinery company own
and close friend of the Hunts,
Mr. Kelly and whether or not
he had ever been employed as
a counsel for the Hunts. Mr.
Hudson was named in three
counts and Mr. Timmins in two
counts, all involving transmit
'Invasion of Island and Charles Tessings, a Dallas tal of the bribe offers.
Is Laid to France;
criminal lawyer.
Obstructies Chilled
All seven men were alle
She Denies Charge to have conspired to obstru
220-24 ☐ the investigation of the wire-
Lapping case and the Huntin
KAMPALA, Uganda, July 21 dictments. The investigation
Chery (AP
) - A 
spokesman for the subsequently resulted in the
Organization of 
African Unity indictment of the Hunt broth
aid today that 
French troops ers for violations of Fed
were invading 
the Indian Ocean wiretapping laws. The ind
island of Mayotte that 
the ment mid the group att
nation group recognizes as 
part to influence potential
of 
the 
newly independent Co-es in the earlier case throug
on him, falls asleep while
more Republic...
projecting a picture
☐ [la
and
dreams himself into the pic-spokermas found a domini.
ture. There he becomes Sher-ying, according to Reuters,
lock Holmes, frustrates the
that "there are no French
scoundrels and wins the girl.
and
- If it's not quite the master-
Paris, an official
Dartmoor. the funereal
setting for "The Hound," may
be partly painted backdrop
but they roll in enough studio
fog to do Wutheri
Heights twice. Basil Rath
bome and Nigel Bruce play
Holmes and Watson with
comic exaggeration. It is a
serious kind of comic
troop movements or eval
guration. It lets you watch R.
movements around Mayotte,
it dosen't spoof self:piece that "The General" or
which in any case is French."
dosen't wink at 
you and tell The Navigator is, it is still Peter One of Nigeria, who
you that it's really just as
first-rate Keaton. That is, it is is 
assistant secretary general
sophisticated as you are and both disciplined and wild of the African Unity group
nows it is making a fool of 
The major part of the picture, said at a news conference her
Half 
down there 
on thewhere in his dream he liter that French warships and
ally walks down the aisle, rounded the Comero inland
clambs in the screen and Mayoting where "trops
joins the pint as Holmes, is
full of marvelous chases, es-
capes and battles with ex-
ploding billiard balts
The bound is just a large
gly dag, but it manages to
be quite as frighteni as the
mechanical floor waxer in a
white shark it that plays
the lead in Jews", and a lot
bribes and veiled threm
physical harm and death
The Hunts were
all but two of the cour
Mr. Foreman was
three of the counts.
The wiretapping
the 1970 arre
Houst
Patrick McCain, in
a Delins subert, and
wiretapping
their car.
The Federal
tigation and
ment entered
& the Comere lead and T
declared the entire song
roup including Mayotte Everett,
adent of France on
a referendum last De- Mr
in which 95 per cent
2nd for an end to coloni
On Mayotir. howev
irds majority vote
aim to Fra
there appen
Howed to brem
other jolem
Judge Porter did not at any
trial date, nor did he set any
ball for any of the defendants.
20 Cambodia” Gone
From U.S. Navy Center
Jukeva k 3;1
(AP) - Twenty Cambodian
val officers, who received
political asylum in the United
States when their Gover
bent fell this spring have
left the naval training center
here to start new lives, ..
Most have found work in
Rhode Island even though the
state has a 16 per cent un-
Employment rale. Others
have left the state to stay
with relatives or try to return
to Cambodia.
The 20 officers graduated
in a private ceremony at Use
arval training center on May
19. several weeks after
Khmer Rouge Insurgents top-
pled the regime of President
Low Nol
PART TWO: JIM BRADEN
One of the most incredible bodies of recent information
concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research
done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top inves-
tigative reporter.
Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which
summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines
what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the
assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual
and is largely based on substantiated information such as
police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police
Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and
Texas police officials.
Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books)´
did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has
been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author
Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics..
It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings,
particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden,
have been factually substantiated and are solidly established
by official police records.
Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a
mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene
of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the
shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who
thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man who identified
himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released
shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas
Sheriff's Office.
Author Noves uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his
true identity during five years of investigative research.
And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune
of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for
"looking Suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now
believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking
tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate
fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 33
2.
i
For Jin Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading,
is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest
levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to
the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities
of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and
outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an
indispensable link or leader - of organized crime's
far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists
and professional hit men.
Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon
"enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast
and covers virtually every national crime syndicate juris-
diction. According to federal authorities working with the
Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and
according to other high government sources cited by author
Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for
Meyer Lansky.
The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up
under a false name across the street from the Texas Book
Depository just moments after the shots were fired on
November 22 1963 cannot be overemphasized.
Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders
in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or
brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom
were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at
that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter,
and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics
of the Warren Commission now attest to.
1
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 34
3.
Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22
Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police
officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository
following the assassination.
Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired,
Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the
Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting.
suspiciously.
Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before
taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation.
The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he
was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy
Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first
tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's
license, the common means of identification, the man pulled
out a gasoline credit card instead.
The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested
when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in
for further interrogation.
At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary
statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in
Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He
said he was staying at the Cabana Hotel, s short distance away
from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been
walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the
time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab.
Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy
Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository
during an attempt to make a telephone call following the
shooting.
Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's
office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made
of possible criminal records relating to him.
Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was
interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills.
The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing
and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by
the FBI and other authorities. In his FDI interview, Braden
gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on
the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on
Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no
information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey
Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 35
40
Jim Braden's True Identity Energes
In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter
whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim
Braden, began investigating the mysterious California
"oil man. 真案
Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a
former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney
Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination.
The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of
the assassination at the time of the shooting.
Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either
of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and
had left no forwarding addresses.
Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles
run a check on the license number that Braden had given to
the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the
assassination. Notor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's
license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego
county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new
business and home addresses, which interestingly were over
a hundred miles apart.
The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden
also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original
name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's
to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.
On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination,
Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had
legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a
new license under that name. The license was granted.
Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false
identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes
contacted the Intelligence Division of the California
Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the
mysterious Brading.
Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy.
He's got a long rap sheet and apparantly has Mafia connections."
Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's
(Jim Braden's) police records.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 36
5.
The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35
seperate entries covering virtually every phase of
criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement,
operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop
lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime
gas ration coupons on the black market.
Most of these arrests had been made under the name of
Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also
showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene
Bradley, Gone Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee,
and inevitably, Jim Braden.
"Jim Braden was the last entry shown on Brading's
records.
Incredibly investigator Noyes found that due to the fact
that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or
run a make on him, his truc identity of Eugene Brading was
never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the
time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren
Commission had only routinely included Braden's short state-
ment about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police
exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's
Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at
face value.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 37
G.
Jim Braden Eugene Brading) and The Mafia
Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of
Braden based upon all available police records and
documents.
What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement
by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia
leaders in the nation, a record of close association with
key figures in the national crime syndicate.
Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all
the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had
moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.
(BRADING AND PEREIRA)
In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor
Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of
several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved
in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement
of wealthy widows.
In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested
by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas.
The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from
a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before
flecing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon con-
victed of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years
in prison!
However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three
years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959
after having served just five years of his sentence.
(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)
During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the
convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still
another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to
Denver, Colorado.
In Denver Brading became very closely associated with.
two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde
and Gene Smaldone.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 38
7.
The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers
and Flip Flop, were the Mafia leaders in charge of the
syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from
the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show
that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the
entire Pueblo area of Colorado.
The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand
of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading
(Braden) became involved in many transactions with the
Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years
later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement
of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote
to him in prison, secking his advice on various financial
matters.
(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAIL)
Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills
in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came
under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department
Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.
In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on
his close association in Beverly Hills with two oil specu-
lators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark
and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police
records.
Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of
the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated
out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had
placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had
compiled extensive information on their friendship with
Brading.
In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD Captain
James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of
Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and
Brading.
Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost
experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission
(which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia)
to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of
Clark and Bauman.
Among those named was Eugene Brading.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 39
8.
Captain Hamilton's letter stated:
"This Department has under investigation Arthur
Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709250, and a Roger Bauman.
These men are representing themselves as officials
of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater
Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money
very lavishly."
"Clark has been arrested several times and has been
associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such
as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading,
Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Shaldone
brothers of Denver."
As investigator Peter Noves points out, the men listed
with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who"
of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.
(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)
Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps
the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known
as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the
Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.
In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of
the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of
LAPD Intelligence, stated that,
"We have long considered Fratianno to
be the executioner for the Mafia on
the West Coast."
Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence
Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia
executions.
Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination
of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949! Cohen had
survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of
his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insuf-
ficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been
at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the
shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles
Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of
the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 40'

9.
Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in
the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the
mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las
Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the
robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by
bullets fired behind the ear, apparantly in true Mafia
fashion.
Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of
Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close
associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head.
Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of
another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli.
Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner
at Fratianno's home one night.
Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a business-
man in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy
gambler, had apparantly welched on a $80,000 gambling debt
that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite
charge hidden under the hood of his car.
Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for
extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure
involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor
Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that
Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that
the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over
$105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the
Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance"
of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans.
The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious
Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.
(BRADING AND MELTZER)
While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became
connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Heltzer.
The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become
aware of Brading's close relationship with Heltzer when
Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list.
Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia
leaders in the entire nation.
The U.S. Sonate Rackets Committee identified Brading's
friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union
racketeering and narcotics.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 41'.
10.
A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:
"Meltzer now is reported to operate a large
bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in
California. A major figure in the organized
underworld, he is known to all the important
narcotics traffickers throughout the United
States. He has also operated in Oklahoma
Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston,
and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong,
Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."
(BRADING AND THE SICAS)
Joe,
In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with
yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close
friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers.
Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly
brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics..
In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's
friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest
narcotics ring in the United States.
The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial.
On the night before the trial opened, the government's
star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously
shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was
never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for
lack of evidence.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 42
11.
Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby
The same inadequate investigative work which led the
Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid
Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible
for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of
Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the
Kennedy assassination.
As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very
substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly
involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.
But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates
that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia
figures operating in the same general areas, at the same
general times, there is another single piece of evidence
which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the
day before the assassination.
Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby
visited the Dallas offices of the N.L. Hunt Oil Company
on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four
hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any
link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place
at the same time on the day before the assassination does
of course raise further significant questions about a
possible relationship between the two men.
Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of
Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on
November 13, 1963, four days before the assassination.
Braden was required to report all of his travels to his
Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embez-
zlement conviction.
On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination,
Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in
Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole
Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he
planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while
here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous
right-wing oil billionaire.
☐
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 43
12.
Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of
Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time,
has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting
the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three
other men Rothermel has stated that the office log for
November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia
friend) and Horgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and f friend"
visited the Junt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states.
that Braden was definitely the "friend."
(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's
sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was
"suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassin-
ation. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel
found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel
filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's
sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for
several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has
produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers,
is still in the courts.)
Also on November 21, the day before the assassination,
according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack
Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Munt offices in Dallas.
The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman
friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same after-
noon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub
as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Dunt offices, apparantly
in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's
visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.
The Warren Commission investigated several other possible
links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still
unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside
one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the
Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate
that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.
Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before
the President's assassination does indeed arise.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 44
13.
Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferric
Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces
of information which indicate a possible connection between
Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.
David Ferric was the homosexual airline pilot and private
investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating
in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after
District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David
Ferric was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His
mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.
David Ferric has been a target of investigation by critics
of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In
fact the BI and Secret Service both investigated a possible
Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was
widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to
have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following
the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include
the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Forric in the
26 Volumes of Hearings, which were released after the Warren
Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally
release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following
Garrison's public accusations.
Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and
Davod Ferrie worked out of the floor of offices in a building
in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the
assassination.
This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that
time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private
investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top llafia kingpin. It
is widely believed by most federal authoritics that Carlos
Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of
the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national
and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the
Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls
most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United
part
States.
In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the
assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices
of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie,
who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his
boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the
Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans.
At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim
Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette
Building.
have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has
written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant
who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in
September of 1962.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 45
15.
According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top
lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby
sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The
informant stated that Marcello said that President
Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and
that his brother would then follow. The informant
further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut"
to do the killings.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 46
16.
Jim Braden: Author Peter Noves And Judge Byrne
Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered
most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading),
is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew
Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided
over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.
As is how well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case
against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White
House Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of
Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
A short time later, it became known that President Nixon
had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge
Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him
the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge
Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of
bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently
under investigation by the Soccial Prosecutor's Office.
It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest
in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg, may have
been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.
Author Hoves has written of his friend Judge Byrne's
involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after
Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding
the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his
friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern
California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne, and has said
that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence
which Noves had gathered. During one of these meetings with
Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend,
the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known
that Jim Braden
assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The
the man arrested at the scene of the
FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake
in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record.
The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on
Braden.
Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been
in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated
in early June of 1968.
Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating
any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his
friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the
Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 47
17.
The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, dis-
counted the information regarding the RFK assassination,
but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the
1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never
heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information
to the RFK investigators.
Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to
be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that
investigated student unrest several years ago. Following
his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne.
was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon,
the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 48
10.
Jim Braden: Where He Is Today
Immediately following the assassination of President
Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in
his personal finances.
Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from
an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He
reported the large increase in revenue from the well for
the month of November 1963.
"B
A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a
charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive)
La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that
year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend
Roger Bauman established the "B And B Cattle Company.'
The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably
named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two
men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during
this same period that Brading made a substantial investment
in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.
In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated..
He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club
which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his
parents in Santa Barbara.
And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious
trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.
The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one
of its 100 Charter members in January of 1961, is one of
the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.
The most powerful force behind. La Costa is Noc Dalitz, one
of Heyer Lansky's single closest associates. Hoe Dalitz had
been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland,
and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate,
one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.
Hoe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in
Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped
sot up the oward Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had
sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late
1960's.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 49
49
'
NW 50955
19.
The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction
of Moe Dalitz and lever Lansky, a key "watering hole" of
the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a
syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of
the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used
in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is
known in the Mafia as "open territory" meaning that no
single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.
troll
1
Intelligence authorities in southern California have long
regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some
officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."
The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in
La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to
soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members
were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.
Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became
frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles
away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration,
in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray
Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living
it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.
In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clem-
ente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and
John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa: to discuss
the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to
unravel.
"
John Dean have lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee
hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings.
These meetings
at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial
strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of
Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified
that the Costh meetings took place over a period of two
days, February 10 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions
were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by
Haldeman.
It has been during this same period of time, in the last
several years, that Eugene Brading (Jin Bradon) has become
one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa.
According to numerous intelligence reports, from California,
Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of
being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss
Meyer Lansky.
DocId: 32423630 Page 50

20.
The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation
into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for
"skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator
Noyes was told by several high government officials that
Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal
courier for Never Lansky. One official disclosed that
Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of
the country for the syndicate. Another official said
that was a "low estimate."
In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investi-
gation by California authorities following an incident at
La Costa.
A janitor a La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make
a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of
well over $100,000 in cash.
Author Nolles was informed by one official that the bundle
had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another Cal-
ifornia official put the amount at closer to $200,000.
During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated
that he had received the money from an oil transaction,
and that he had torporarily stored it in the locker. Later,
one of the officials working on that particular investigation
of Braden told Hoves that Braden had also been given the use
of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling
cash out of Nevada and the country.
At present Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still
operating out of La Costa.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 51'
Michael Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June; 1974
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
30 March 1976
Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 NW. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167
Dear Mr. Sturgis
We have received your request under the Freedom of Infor-
This is to advise
mation Act for information pertaining to you.
you that as of 27 September 1975 the Privacy Act of 1974 took
effect. This act and pertinent CIA regulations 
established
requirements and procedures for access by individuals to infor-
mation pertaining to them. CIA Regulations were published
in the Federal Register on 28 August 1975 and may be found in
Title 32 C.F.R. 1901.
Since the Privacy Act requires federal agencies to ensure
that improper disclosure of personally identifiable information
will not be made and further provides criminal penalties 
for
improper disclosure, CIA Privacy Regulations, section 1901.13,
sets forth the following requirements for identification 
of
individuals making requests.
NOL
An individual seeking access to or notification of
the existence of records about himself shall provide in the
letter of request his full name, address, date and place of
birth together with a notarized statement swearing 
to or
affirming his identity!... If such individual is an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, his or 
her
alien registration number must be also provided.
Before we may begin processing your request, we must receive
The statement
from you a notarized statement as explained above.
should verify that you are a U.S. citizen or 
an 
alien admitted for
It is also requested that you 
provide any
permanent residence.
additional information concerning yourself which might facilitate
our search of records. Unless you identify specific 
records you
may be looking for, we will conduct a search 
of all Agency 
records
that might contain information that pertains to you
.
Sincerely,
Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
REVOLUTION
AMERICAN
BICENTENNIAL
1776-1976
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 52
Mr. Gene Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
7 May 1976
Dear Mr. Wilson:
Re:
Pre-freedom of information request
notice of charges
Before exercising my right to a freedom of information request for copies
of any and all available ( in accordance with the declassification processes
stipulated in Executive Order 11652 and its amendment of January 1974 ) files
of records and documents, both computerized and manual apposite of me and my
activities under my present and former names and pseudonyms, I hereby request
the complete and final estimate of charges for search and duplication services.
As regards the charges for these services, two matters may be worthy of
consideration. The first of them is that, given the proper access codes, the
execution of a computer search is neither difficult nor costly. And the second
is that in light of the controversial nature of my past, a waiver or reduction
of charges may conduce to the furtherance of the public interest. I therefore
respectfully request that these factors be considered in the making of a decision
as to the cost of services.
In compliance with your request for identity verification ( pursuant to
provisions of the 1974 Privacy Act, section 552, subsections b and d ) I
hereby swear before a notary public as to my name and former names, my present
address, my date as well as place of birth, and my citizenship.
for your cooperation, I am
Yours truly,
Thanking you
Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
a.k.a.: Frank Angelo Fiorino
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A.Fiorini
Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE
Before me personally appeared
Frank Sturgis to me well known and
known to me to be the person de-
scribed in and who executed the fore-
going instrument for the purposes
'therein expressed.
Witness my hand and official seal
this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.
Notary: Public, State of Florida
at Large
Mycom
AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUAY 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS
Frank Bonnelli
Frank Campbell
code names:
Federini
Barbarossa
Samson
boon 9 December 1924
in Norfolk, Va.
United States of American citizen-
ship
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 53
CHRONOLOGICAL SETCH OF RESIDENCES AND EMPLOYMENTS OF:
1924, Dec. 9...
1930-1942.
1942-1945.
1945...
1945...
c.1945-1948.
c.1948..
c.1949.
c.1949-1950.
c. 1950-1952..
c. 1952.
c. 1952-1954..
c. 1956-1961.
also known as:
Frank Sturgis
present address:
2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A. Fiorini
Frank Fiorini
Frank Angelo Fiorino
..born in Norfolk,
Va.
.resided at 510 High Street Germantown,
Philadelphia, Pa.
.U.S.Marine Corps Reserve
"
(Paris Is., S.C.; Pacific theatre)
.honorable discharge -Klamouth Falls, Ore.
..Miami, Florida
.Norfolk, Va. adrs: Bank St., etc.
joined Norfolk Police Dept.
attended William and Mary College
also attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute
c.1946-employed as manager of the Virginia
Tavern on East Main Street
c.1949-employed as owner and manager of
The Whitehorse Tavern on East Main Street
.enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve
at the Norfolk Naval Air Station
.honorable discharge
.U.S. Merchant Marine travelling to and from
Europe
.U.S. Army stationed in Germany.
.honorable discharge
..owner-manager of Tophat Nightclub in
Virginia Beach, Va.
.Cuba(Sierra Maestra); Miami, Florida;
Mexico; Venezuela; Costa Rica; Guatemala;
Panama; Honduras; Bahama Is.
1958: contact with CIA at US Consulate-
Santiago, Cuba
1959: contact with CIA at US Embassy-
Havana, Cuba
1959: contact with FBI HQ
Washington, DC
1961-1970: Bay of Pigs
CIA control officer Sam Jenis
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 54
CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH!
cont'd
1963.
1963....
1968-1972.
June 17, 1972.
June-July 1972.
January 8, 1973.
January 15, 1973
c.May 1973..
January. 1974..
1974..
1974-1975..
1975....
1974-1975.
.contact with FBI and CIA
.travel and business (operation sword) Mexico and
Honduras
..mechanic and salesman for the Pan-American, Aluminum Corp.
185th St., Miami, Florida
..adventure: Watergate Office Building
.moved to Washington, D.C. jail
Watergate trial: U.Sov G. Gordon Liddy et al.
plea of guilty entered
....moved to Federal Prison Inst. in Danbury, Conn.
then moved to Eglin Air Force Base
Ehence moved to Dade County Jail
.released on appeal bond
.salesman for Heavy Equipment Company, Miami, Florida
. salesmanager for Dodge Is. Repairs, Miami, Florida.
.....salesmanager for Continental Egg Corp., Miami, Florida
salesmanager for Miami Book Ufg. Company'
4460 N.W.37th Avenue
Miami, Florida
Thank you,
Thank
Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE
Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known
and known to me to be the person described in and who executed
the foregoing instrument for the purposed therein expressed.
Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D.
1976.
_ _
Notary Public, State of Florida
at Large
My commission expires
NOTARY ENG STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMITION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENEREL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 55
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
26 MAY 1976
Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 N.W. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167
Dear Mr. Sturgis:
This acknowledges receipt of your letter, dated 7 May,
requesting access under the Privacy Act for information
pertaining to you. There is no charge for processing Privacy
Act requests.
P
We are therefore processing your request and will provide
you with the results under the Privacy Act as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
Австрів
Gene F. Wilson'
Information and Privacy Coordinator
REVOLUTION
AMERICAN
1776-1976
BICENTENNIAL
REVOLUTION
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
DEPA
*
*
T OF
BUREAU
JUSTICE
TIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
April 12, 1976
Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 Northwest 122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
Dear Mr. Sturgis:
This is to acknowledge receipt by the FBI on
March 23, 1976, of your Freedom of Information-Privacy
Acts (FOIPA) request dated March 13, 1976.
Based on the limited information you provided,
it is not possible to make an accurate search of our
records. To insure an accurate search of our records,
please furnish your complete name, date and place of
birth, prior addresses, employments and any specific data
that would permit us to locate the documents you seek.
An exceedingly heavy volume of FOIPA requests
has been received these past few months. Additionally,
court deadlines involving certain historical cases of
considerable scope have been imposed upon the FBI. Despite
successive expansions of our staff responsible for FOIPA
matters, substantial delays in processing requests continue.
Since January 1, 1975, the FBI has received
a total of 17,204 FOIPA requests. Of these, our present
backlog is 6,782. In an effort to deal fairly with any
request requiring the retrieval, processing and duplication
of documents, each request is being handled in chronological
order based on the date of receipt. Please be assured
that your request is being handled as equitably as possible
and that all documents which can be released will be made
available at the earliest possible date.
Mr. Frank Sturgis
Prior to the processing or release of any docu-
ments which may pertain to you, it will be necessary for
you to submit your notarized signature. This procedure
is designed to insure that information concerning 
an
individual is released only to that person.
Your patience and cooperation will be appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Cinkellen
Clarence M. Kelley
Director
2.
May 3., 1976.
FRANK STURGIS
2515 N.W. 122 STREET.
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33167
The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Office of the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.
RE:
Freedom of Information Request
Dear Mr. Kelley:
Thank you for your recent letter in which you requested more
specific information to help in the search, collection and
duplication of records indicated in my recent freedom of infor-
mation request. I am sending a chronological sketch of my
residences and employments prefaced by a list of names under which
I have been known. I hope this profile will aid the Bureau in its
search for my records. Notarization of this letter and the sketch
will attest to the verification of my identity.
Considering the voluminous quantity of material that may have
to be read and screened, I would be pleased in the interest of
fairness to afford the Justice Department whatever reasonable.
extension of time is needed to comply with my freedom of infor-
mation request.
Thank you for your kind cooperation.
STATE OF FLORIDA.
Very truly yours,
Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis :
Encl/
FS:s
COUNTY OF DADE
Before me personally appeared FRANK STURGIS
to me well known and known to me to be the
person described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument for the purposes there-
in expressed.
WITNESS my hand and official seal this
6th day of May, A.D., 1976.
line wilke)
Notary Public'
State of Florida at LangeARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22. 1978
My commission expires BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITER
MEMORANDUM
TO
FROM
October 29, 1976
Mike Madigan, Howard Liebengood, Mike Epstein
Rick Inderfurth
In case you missed the attached article on
Russell Bufalino:
Attachment

The Washington Post
October 28, 1976
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 61
Reputed Crime Chief
Accused of Extortion
In Collecting a Debt
Associated Prest
Russell Bufalino, a reputed organ-1
ized crime leader, has been indicted
on federal charges of conspiracy and
extortion for using threats of violence:
in trying to collect a debt, the Justice
Department announced yesterday.
Bufalino and three other men were
named defendants in a sealed indict-
ment returned by a federal grand jury
in New York City Tuesday and un-
sealed yesterday.
• Bufalino, 71; of Kingston, Pa., was
identified by federal officials in 1973
as the head of one of five Cosa Nostra:
families operating in Pennsylvania.
The Immigration' Service has at
tempted for nearly 20 years to deport
Bufalino to Sicily, saying he was born
there and brought to the United
States as an infant. He says he was
born in this country.
:
ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVE
RE: RAPHAEL GENER
October 26, 1976
IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO #R
5080
Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.
Dear Attorney General Levi:
As you know, the Intelligence Committee has taken
testimony 
with regard to John 
Rosselli and the assassi-
nation plots directed against 
Fidel Castro. As part of
the Committee's inquiry in this 
area, testimony has been
received regarding an individual 
by the name of Raphael
Gener. Committee staff have 
participated in a review of
this testimony with representatives 
of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. 
We are requesting that, upon
the completion of this review of 
testimony, the Committee
be provided access to all FBI materials 
relating to Mr.
Gener.
We are hopeful that Committee staff and your repre-
sentatives 
will be able to work out 
access to the appro-
priate files and materials in 
the same manner as we have
in the past. We continue to appreciate 
your assistance
in these matters.
Aloha,
MJM: mlh
Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Vice Chairman
1t
Veciana/FBI notes
12/20/76
Memo SAC
Sun to Director.
10/25/73
informant
advise SA.
terry Seelers
on 4 occassions betw. aug and Oct, 73.
AV severed Alpha 66.
rel.
several years earlier & was
member of
Pap
حمد
perered
Summer 1973.
because
cause locked "revoli
seal
Men SAC Miami
to Director
9/27/13 reference 3 infor
LHM of 9/27/73 re the DR (Directeria Revolucionario).
from Miami, Fla.
Veciana. IR planning troul activities
in Paris
name
of phony grout
Accion Cuba"
Jose Antonio Calatayud Rivera is Sec.. You. -DR.
Alds Serafin Cristobal Mayo, Eulalia Armente
resigned from De Sept 16,973
Primivite Rodriquez- Rodriquez said
attack on
of
Paris Embang initiated in office
Kesnik (Replica) + financed by Busch & AV..
балек
Alfred Solex Soler moving to very to
plan kedripping of Cuban offecies for R
in import export business.
LHM Aug 30, 1973
re Barres
·Banes advrier FB!
that orand
Serafin planned & executed Pare
hombing that killed tuan Felipe De La Cruz
Aug 2, 1973,
en
Luly, 73
AV. advised Baires that
he obtained 300 s
C.1 explosive
in Texas (having been unable to
Obtain (-4) and listed it in the Everglade
Av said he had
sent a man to
Spain, France Argentina & Perce to cance
explosion at Cuban Embassies
"S" type organizator
бул
newish Trans. fent
to madrid
5
create a Black
e (aug 30,73) "Moralitos"
lilla Antar |
Recaid Morales Navarette- asked by Bureaue
to Bosch. accused of death of
Cabanoin
U.S. Participated in terroust relocks Box
group has sentenced to dath
Micine SAC i serectos memo (8/2/73)
AV preserved 15 Bolivian
Venzeceber paspor Velongin
numerous
individuals
з
to (shini Ag.).
5
interent
7/16/73 SAC Miami to Director memo.
-Actnew ledger FBI
Miami
contact w/ Avin
+ three Legat in Caracas
La Paz FBI in
in PRP. vec.
c) delusions
be in
contact
vec. an
because
Opportunist
of grandeur. Wants to
limelight regardless.
7
cause
Correlation
Veciana Summary
3/15/73
Francisco Vincente Gonzalez Tueso says
he and Ay robbed the robbed the
For Financeris in
Banco Ferm
Caba in March, bl.
AV planned the
robbery. Av then sent message to
Zenaida (LNU) 1174 SW 12th St. Miami
requesting rifle grenades.
12/27/61 Conf. Source advised RBI that AV.
planned most recent attempt on
"Castros ligi.
1/7/63 Craig T. Sheldon raising
AV + Alpha lea
money for
Av heavily funded by tuled Lobs.
1/30/64 AV advised he had no
personel
Knowledge of John Robert
Klinner, who was investigated re
JFK assassination. Klinner is
James Edgar Wethington - with long
Criminal record. Claimed asoriation
W/ Caban Freedom Fighter. (See reports
# 62-109060 and #62-109060-
-3083
P.G, 655.)
1130/64 Veciania substantiated
report of Eusebic Ojeda, Chief of Personnel
SENE
Veciana in Dallas in May, 64 to wit
Dallas SENE Chapter
Vec. on
contact
w/ Somosa called
xomised him training bases in Nici
The CIA advised that James G. Cogswell,
who reportedly had high level contacts
Society and US Navy in April, 1966,
in
intro.
Auto CIA repr.
AV wanted
50,000 to organine group to assessinate
CASTRO - CIA declined.
Veciana treasures, administrator +
Spokesmen for me unity group of
alpha bele, SENE - BURP.
2/24/69
Au
Av signed doc. presented this date
to Duxon
to free Orlands
Bosch.
Veciaria lived at Savoy Hotel in Caracas,
qui Hevez Silva was detained questioned
and released sites baging to enter Soviet
Embany
hapaz. Silva had Avi
wifis name - dum in his bork.
in in
GRIMALDI
AV established liaison us Legation
Bolivia then the minerals allacke at
The US Embas. Al furnished info.
from Bolivian National Police files
S
Cyn 30, 68, im Augusto Pineda Gonzalez- Canida
info from
boat
-₩7
Pineda in June 68
Came
over
on
visited
and
asked
AV
Pinida to receive
3 57mm recoiless rifles in Fear.
somewhere
outride mami &
to
unspecified
in Miami, would
deliver
them
SENE people
NV disgusted
be used to attach Sonch Slieps.
az
Fred Penida to
us palecy V
organize
215 -
demonstrations and armed
attacks to any convinced
create probs.
415
protecting Castry.
AV would fund Pineda @
$3,0
to
$5,000 per me..
to call Sera wher
Pineda to
organized. She waved μoord
the $.
Co. Ordinator 7
Cuban Affairs of the
Dept of Sinto-
G. HARRY Stu Shuma
fuminted FBI info on vecini
based on his personal
contacts of heme of casone
te that Atus longer sloed
Active
Frisquet
on anti-Cass
+ Ray active in 1967 W, Vecien
1974-
Elvio Rivera Limonta
Enrique nunez Alvavez and
in FLNC terrous & octivites
activi
Both in
terroust activeles P. Rico.
MM 105 - 22094 at TAB Bufile
NISO
Chartulon, SC
111th M. I. Group, Miami
105-761797
receiving Dep.
лё
AV on 11/27/72 bad reportedly tied source that
The
the Costa R.
US Emban n
Lapaz helped him organize
Convention
MRS. Frances grant
Francis
Spec. invite on Rica
Tony Santiago
Convention
initiating Committee
Felipe Pazos- headed Benes Nacional
Cuba
under Rid.
NV
Israel Romero was Union City, NJ.
repr. of MIRR during pd. Bosch involved
in bombing activitess. Romers once close
to Bosch,
arturo Villar wealthy, San Juan, active
Rannon Font furnished explosive
for French expl. Aug 3, 73" Hitel Oasis
Gvrainville, Fe
Lesnick - longstanding Marxist.
attacked Batista
in radio
broadcast
Continiued Broadcasts after
For a #years in.
contact w
hoodlum
Castro- inventia
· Cuba-Si-Yanga
"
elements during Batista regime.
Took part in various assaults
Hovanna during Batista.
Left Havanna year or two after
Святка,
took power. Exile in Miamie
Despite fact-close friend of
college.
Fidel's
AV funded "Replica
LIEBENGOOD ROUTH NOTES FROM U. S. V. VECIANA, ET AL
DATE:
December 1, 1976
Veciana was represented by Barry L. Garber, 1040 City National
Bank Building, 25 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130
(305-377-4963)
Veciana became implicated as the result of a drug bust
of one Augustine Barres, a/k/a/ Emidigio Augustine Barres Fangul
("Gus Barres"). The bust resulted from an search warrant of
23 July 73 for Barres' attache case at the Taft Hotel in New
York. The police were acting on an informant tip to an under-
cover agent who arranged for a buy from Barres of seven kilograms
of Cocaine at the Taft. The police understood that Barres was to
be with a "female" courier. Barres advised DEA task force re-
presentative, Eugene W. Flynn, a detective sgt. with the NYPD,
that he purchased the seven kilos from Antonio Veciana in Miami
on July 21, 1973.
Barres owns a home in Puerto Rico and travels to New York
every two weeks on business.
A co-defendant of Veciana's in the case was Ariel Pomares
who is the President of Occidental Investment, a real estate
firm owned by Barres, located at 1186 J. T. Pinero Avenue,
Miami. Pomares is also involved with FRECA Imports in Puerto
Rico. This is also a Barres enterprise.
The DEA Miami regional office cables that Veciana is the
subject of INS File No. A12-490987 and that he claims to be a
public accountant.
According to the Miami Herald of July 25, 1973, Barres was
Assistant Secretary of Communications under Castro and later the
general manager of the Havana Health Department. He fled Cuba
in 1961 for asylum in Puerto Rico. He became a United States
citizen in 1970.
A cable from Ivan Wurms, the Chief Investigator of the DEA
Task Force to Durkin at DEA headquarters, Washington, states that
Veciana was arrested without incident on 7/24/73 and signed a
"consent to search" form. Miscellaneous papers and numerous
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 70

-2-
Liebengood Rough Nortes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al con't.
foreign passports belonging to several subjects were seized.
Swiss bank account deposit slips were seized and are to be
followed by IRS. Veciana claims to be an anti-Castro fund
raiser. FBI confirms this.
A July, 1973 TWIX from DEA in New York to DEA headquarters
Washington (attention: Daniel P. Casey, Acting Chief) referenced
as subject: G1-73-X093 (presumably Veciana) and states "during
debriefing of the defendant in New York on July 25, 1973, it was
learned that Antonio Carlos Veciana, 811 North Southwest 30th
Court, Miami is a member of an anti-Castro group which he has
stated intends to blow up a number of Cuban properties and/or
embassies in foreign nations, i.e., Spain, Mexico, Peru and France.
Bombings originally scheduled for July now delayed until August.'
Subpoena of August 14, 1973 exists for a telegram billed to
Veciana at 649-1226 and sent to Barcelona, Spain on 5/26/73.
"
Barres implicates a Paraguyan diplomat formerly assigned
to LaPaz, Bolivia and reassigned to Spain in the drug traffic.
DEA is discretely checking his identity. A follow-up cable
from DEA indicates that they have failed to identify the Paraguyan
diplomat sent to Spain but do indicate that a Pedro P. Medina,
a Paraguyan assigned to LaPaz, is believed to be involved in
Cocaine smuggling.
Barres admitted that he was responsible for bringing Pomares,
an employee of his, into illegal drug activity.
Veciana claimed to be without funds and destitute and was
not fined. The U. S. Attorney was concerned that he posted a
$100,000 bail immediately. However, after initial concern being
shown in the file by the U. S. Attorney, the U. S. Attorney later
writes the Judge that: $80,000 of the $100,000 bond was furnished
by Veciana's cousin, Dr. Pueblo Zalduendo, a phyčian from Detroit,
Michigan. The remainder of the bail money was furnished by Veciana's
uncle and other family members and friends who cashed insurance
policies, closed children's savings accounts, etc. U. S. Attorney
concluded that Veciana was possibly telling the truth when he advised
the Court that he was destitute.
Jose
One Hosea Lopez is a character reference for Barres on
appeal.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 71
-3-
Liebengood Rough Notes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al, con't.
Barres says he requested the government to give immunity to
Veciana in order to destroy the traffic of Cocaine from Bolivia.
Barres studied at Columbia Military Academy in Columbia,
Tennessee in 1951.
A taped transcript of Barres' debriefing by detectives
Flynn and Scamardella on July 25, 1973 reveals the following:
Barres got involved in drugs through his friend Veciana who was
an officer of the International Development Bank in the U.S.
Embassy in Bolivia. Some people think Veciana is with the CIA
but Barres does not know. Barres dealt with Veciana regarding
an attempt to kill Castro in Chile. He says Veciana did a good
job of transferring everything into Chile (1970-1971). Barres
gave Veciana $2,000 in support of this assassination effort.
About this time Veciana said that drugs could be smuggled out of
Bolivia through diplomatic pouch. Barres thought this was how
Veciana had sent weapons into Chile. Barres advised that the head
of Interpol in Bolivia gets a cut of drug money for protection on
the Bolivian end and that a Secret Service Agent and two Paraguyan
diplomats were also involved. They handled the transfer to
Veciana in Miami Beach of the drugs from Bolivia.
Barres thought that the individual he was selling the drugs
to in New York was a mafia type. It appears this is the indi-
vidual who informed the police. He is known only as Tony in the
transcript. The police were aware of his identity but did not
desire Barres to discuss it.
i
Pomares' counsel, Gustavo Del Toro, urged the DEA in San
Juan at the time of the arrest of Pomares to consider immunity
for Pomares because Pomares possessed valuable information re-
garding international narcotic trafficing, including the impli-
cation of diplomats in places such as Bolivia, Paraguay and
Nicaragua.
The file contains cancelled Veciana checks drawn on the
account of Antonio Sira Veciana at the Fidelity National Bank,
5880 Byrd Road, Miami, Florida, in May and June, 1972, for $1,000
each, payable to the Swiss Bank Corporation for account EF558230.
These checks were obtained through subpoena on Catherine Hune,
Vice President and Cashier of the Fidelity National Bank in Miami.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 72
-4-
Liebengood Rough Notes on U. S. v. Veciana, et al, con't.
In Veciana's appellate brief he references transfers of
He indicates that
drugs through the government's "APO System".
the first transaction he was involved in took place in April,
1972.
Also involved is someone known as "the midget".
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 73
MEMORANDUM TO: File
RE: Antonio Veciana
FROM: Tom Moore
DATE: Jan. 3, 1977
To Veciana
fele
Telephoned Veciana to ask if he recalled any attempts on
his life in late 1962 or 1963. He answered that there were
three attempts on his life, but none in 1962 or 1963. The
first attempt, he said; occurred in a stadium in Puerto
Rico in 1967 when a bomb exploded approximately 20 meters.
away. He said he believed Puerto Rican communists were
responsible for this attempt. The second attempt occurred
in Bolivia in approximately 1970 when some men with weapons
appeared at a home where he was supposed to be. He said a
woman who owned the home called him to warn him. He said
he thought this attempt was related to a revolution which
was taking place at that time. The third attempt, he said,
occurred in Caracas, Venezuela in 1971. He added that he had
received information within the past three months that Castro
wanted to kidnap him.
The only relevant incident in late 1962 or 1963 was that
an Isobel Zarate began making inquiries about him in Miami. He
said many people in the Cuban community informed the FBI she
was a Castro spy and that she subsequently escaped to Cuba via
Mexico.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 74
Mahen
Rosselli
CASTRO
KARAmessines
HARVEY
Helms
O'Connell
Hunt
Keuwerys
✓ ROWAN
HOOVER
waires
- parsiglice holes
nean convid
Near
Lines Inging
-What Castro dos
retaliatory been
What was Costas tellig
Capability.
стено
who repland
it in 
funding
wook Anti-CASTRO com
why
Addit Mafia relationships.
Lot Exiler
pressure on
Kean
a
7
n
CIA Evaluation of
McGovern Information
December
Conf Tom Mons
Ed GR.- MM. HC-RI (ME)
Need fuce picture on Hanst
Cuban-Bahamas switch be
mienic Sriperus
Sturgis
Get Hient, Sturgic, Barow, Marting mat
manic polsce.
Organizing our material
mistes materie - New Register
Centercom Related
• pte cepem formalize fles
Card Index-meme referenc
Wathgate material
-Hugher
omit sue but impt. References
танки
Rosseli
Harvey
Connell
CASTRO
KAKAMBESINES
HELMS
HUNT
KENNERY
Rowan
HOOVER
LBJ
Buny
ALL ADMAN OFFICIALS
KENNEDYN
HUNT
Marita
hatch Richhitless
Work
Mark Smeder
431 
- 
Kaynedy
4:00pm
offic
-represents
HANK
Mesick
Colement
Johnson City - Ramsey
February - Just Dipt list.
E-Tenn, State
BS Cr fastore
Masters Socidogy.
to weeks
Perez Jiminez
- Kill 
Kennedy.
Perez
Allen Altman. Lawyer
$2,600
wants/.
Gaz despise Frank
MARITA GAve To Mesick
Last person
Tekel Rosselli
ative.
150. BROADWAY
tinez.
Rolands Martin
Orlando
"The Cat"
"EL GATO - Code name
- Pretense buying nazi
book.
- Assassinated Castro's.
double.
old.
39.40 years
JMI/
Blonde 
German
Balding Fortune
Iold Zongi.
Shelly in bus.
Abend
wealthy
very
(collector
contiguid)
لله
4. He brought
Ei
State
mani
creatical agency cove
ww
son-4 wks
ago
after Fag. threat
no longer wants
- hospitalized
> Father - double Neczi for us (EBI).
7. Derry Davis
(Submarine)
= State Dept.
om
Dept. Justice
Gerstein bugged.
7. Sturgie - HKC theory
>- FBI down
-married Delaware.
nother
mant because
of publication of citation by meskill.
Soviets didn't react adversely to
plane
ficat
Germany
CIA Supers14
STAR
Sept 7, 1976.
Frock
Sturgis
2/sraeli's targeted
- - 1970
Unell
si
> Eduardo
|Lists
ми
A. Situational Report
سك
Survellance & Control
in Modern Democratic
Society
-
Robert Yaffee-
Univ. of Waterloo Student
June 16, 1972
anti-personnel radar.
Lyman Kirkpatrick
Mag
fled to
Canada,
accused f
being agent
Mike Ackerman-
CIA / Miami > Lecturing..
ске
Artine
Frank 1
Mex from EHH
Alex R.
white house
60-61- Miami
Frank angied to neveral.
klip
рв
ply Freak O'Brienquil / with Aly R
F. St.
Lundquis
when proposep
Castro
fill
N 36759
David W. Walters
Miami lawyer for
Peace Jiminez
Marita
Has the
$59,800.
To
50
JFK ash

Samais
Ca
12/3/76
Call
Marita
marita Lovenz.
Acty =
Hank Mesnik - winter
Allan Altman, Esq.
150 Broadway.
NYC, NYC.
Has materie
Tapis & documents
Pepe Alleman
trouble
hem,
everything
Wo
Louis Somosa
RGB
1
Bolle Boher
Hoffa
Saped
Jiminez
Trafficante
Killing
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 81
I. Carry-over from Church report
A. Relationship between agencies and Warren Commission
1. Warren Comm. staff has never been interviewed in
depth. Many have not been interviewed at all. The
Commission had particular staff assigned to (a) Cuba
and (b) organized crime. They, especially, should be
fully debriefed about everything that happened in their
contacts with the agencies, their frustrations, unful-
filled leads, inability to get access, questionmarks,
and what they knew, heard, or suspected about contacts
at high-level between Commission members and top agency
officials. This would include leads to additional
documents, memoranda and people, and is especially
important in the time-frame just before the Commission
issued its report, i.e. as final drafts being written,
when staff learned for the first time about Castro's
threat. (Willens, staff director, said there were staff
pushing hard to re-open this subject, but pressure of
getting the report out prevailed.)
2. Look for all other memoranda of contacts between
McCone and CIA re how to structure questions, etc.
3. We now know that Ruby was contacted svereal times
by FBI to inform on @кŋHNİZEĠXEXİµ¤×¤×§¤ÌÌaxxaxe=x
✗"criminal element" in Dallas area. All we've seen
is the cummary memo in which Warmen Commission was
so informed. Get each memorandum of contact between
FBI agents and Ruby, i.e. underlying materials which
"support" the summary memo.
B. The inter-agency committee which met to develop
continegncy plans in the wake of Castro's threat.
1. Numerous documents were sought from FBI, CIA,
Defense, State, etc., but never received by Church
Committee before our final report was issued.
follow-through, and then go deeper into it.
Must
2. What else was known besides Castro's retaliation
threat? What facts went into the assessment that
Castro might retaliate against U.S. leaders in Latin
America, but not U.S. leaders in the U.S.? Precisely
what accounted for the original inclusion of
a concern about retaliation in the U.S., but the sub-
sequent deletion of that prospect? Who was responsible
for the deletion, and what impact, if any, did that
have on the later of withholding of info from the
Warren Commission and on the agencies' failure to
investigate retaliation?
3. We must find out exactly who was on this Committee
at each meeting, get all back-up materials, and interview.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 82
|
C. FBI involvement in ¼ Bay of Pigs, Lansdale planning, etc.
1. As Church report was being completed, we were just
beginning to learn about how deeply the FBI was apparently
involved in U.S. anti-Castro action. Possibility
here that this could provide another clue in re
FBI's original reluctance to investigate retaliation
more fully. For instance we now know that FBI had
learned about CIA's interest in using organized
crime to kill Castro long before RFK toldxxx
Hoover about it (Hoover had professed surprise in
1963, but there's some indication he may have already
known). One FBI witness even told us that a high FBI
official a had even proposed the plot idea "in jest".
At a minimum, the paper record shows FBI was×яØRKAEŻEŃ
informed about idea of using
org. crime figures to provide Cuban intelligence and
that, according to the paper record, FBI recommended
against it. Trafficante has now claimed that FBI agents
came to him seeking Cuban intelligence. This must be
followed up, agents interviewed, and FBI memo's, etc.,
examined.
D. CIA files
I always had the impression that Jim Johnston felt
there were more CIA documents which he hadn't seen.
We must go over the itmes, one by one, with Johnston,
to find out just where we stand on the question of
whether or ø not we've seen everything. Do any of us
really fully understand the entire CIA filing system
so as to know whether we've been shown everything, or
indeed whether they have even as g-ne looking for
everything.? And how about the field office files,
i.e. JMWAVE files in Miami, New Orleans and Mexico.
Coty files, DC local CIA station files, and FBI field
office files?
II. Rosselli organized crime-Trafficante-Cuba
A. Organized crime files
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
This
1. A full assessment of all travel, contacts, relation-
ships, etc. of all major organized crime figures in
and around the time of the assassination of JFK.
would include a review (with appropriate pxiɛæXXXX
system for pritecting privacy interests) of all
microphone surveillance logs on organized crime figures
during key months in 1963, e.g. Fred Black. Trafficante,
Rosselli, Giancana, Las Vegas xxx casinos, etc.
(Rosselli was xxxx very defensive in his testimony
about some comment he says he made on the phone to
someone upon first learning that JFK had been killed;
he indicated that he had been "coming out of a deep
sleep and said someting about communists did it. of
c arse he now knows that that call may have been a tapped
and is trying to explain. No one had ever asked for
Page 83
"
L
that log.
2. A new analysis of all the long distance toll calls
of Jack Ruby in the days around Nov. 22. Warren Comm.
records show he made calls to Chicago 0.6. figure
Barney Baker, and Teamster heavy Dusty Miller, plus
others. Does the explanation for these calls really
wash (i.e. Ruby's union troubles in re his nightclub).
Has this whole subject been exhausted by Warren
Comm. or not. Is there more (interviews, etc.) that
should be done here?
3. Someone should literally live in Miami area for
a month, immerse in the community, get to know the
whole scorecard, (maybe hire a local Spanish-speaking
cop with good local contacts). Ø More fully debrief
Trafficante for his version of events and people.
Follow up with contacts with all the Cubans involved.
Has Miami pulled all the significant toll records
for period of time around Rosselli's death (Cubans,
O.C. figures, garage owner, etc.) and followed up.
4. A full tracking of what happened when Church reports
were released, reactions, contacts, concerns, who
were the key figures who actually got the reports and
who did they speak to about the ****EX contents.
Review our own mailing records, if exist, a showing who
asked for reports. Local ЯEяX news Meix media for leads
in re reactions of the community. Travel records of
0.C. and Cuban leaders in and around that time, as well
as in and around time of Rosselli's death.
Mawillie
J. M
Trafficante associate who invited
Ruby to Cuba in 1959. mawillie later manages
Las vegas casino's
Continues,
this subject.
x his contact with Ruby
Warren Comm. investigate inadequate on
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 84
MEMORANDUM
TO:
MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
FROM:
DATE:
BILL MILLER
HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
DECEMBER 27, 1976
SUBJECT: MARITA LORENZ
Marila file
5986
Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire
to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back
on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered
by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her
FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she
had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which
frightened her. She claims to want her information in
responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena
her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation
for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday,
January 3 at 212-534-2412. My personal opinion is that we
have little to lose if we have time to listen to her.
HSL/dr
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 85
I thich,
we should
Set me on intermen
time which
onflict
.
at a
Learn
pray
not be until latt
m
MEMORANDUM
TO:
MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER
HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
DECEMBER 27, 1976
FROM:
DATE :
SUBJECT:
MARITA LORENZ
5986
Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire
to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back
on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered
by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her
FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she
had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which
frightened her. She claims to want her information in
responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena
her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation
for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday,
January 3 at 212-534-2412. My personal opinion is that we
have little to lose if we have time to listen to her.
Howard: I have no objections to her coming down, but
would be personally hesitant to invest any more of my own time unless
she can provide at least a specific adjenda of new information she
will discuss.
One possible tactic is to tell her that we are extremely
pressed for time and cannot subpena her until late February unless she
give us specific areas that would allow us to show "our superiors"
that talking to her should be given a kám higher к priority
other committee business.
Tom Ton
over
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 86
MEMORANDUM
TO:
MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER
HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
DECEMBER 27, 1976
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
MARITA LORENZ
5986
Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire
to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back
on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered
by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her
FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she
had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which
frightened her. She claims to want her information in
responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena
her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation
for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday,
January 3 at 212-534-2412.
My personal opinion is that we
have little to lose if we have time to listen to her.
HSL/dr
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 87
MEMORANDUM
To: Mike Madigan
From: Ed Greissing
Date: Sept. 16, 1976
Subject: Review of CIA documents presented the SCI by Jack Anderson
The documents recently received by this Committee, from Jack
Anderson, had previously been reviewed by the Church Committee staff.
The documents appear to be a few of those requested for FOIA review
by David Belin. It is my understanding, after these documents were
declassified, David Belin furnished copies to both David Martin (AP)
and Jack Anderson.
The Church Committee was permitted to review the entire Oswald
201 file, the AMLASH file, Garrison files and selected Office of
Security files. The Committee primarily concerned itself with the
early period of the investigation (November 1963 - October 1964), as
it believed the information to be received from this time period
to be more relevant in evaluating the performance of the intelligence
agencies with respect to their investigation.
Dan Niescher, the Church Committee contact at the CIA, was the
individual responsible for the declassification of documents
relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. During this
declassification process, Dan Niescher consulted the Committee staff
to make sure that we were aware of certain documents. In addition,
Mr. Kaleras had given the staff unlimited access to all files we
believed necessary to conduct our investigation.
Yet, the possibility still remains that the staff was not
shown everything. The CIA has maintained throughout that the Oswald
201 file was a complete compilation of the material related to the
assassination of President Kennedy. However, information relating to
who Lee Harvey Oswald was, and what he was doing are not included. in
their files. The Oswald 201 does not attempt to question Oswald's
connection with both pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups or any of
the AMLASH information. The most notable subject missing was inform-
ation relating to CIA/U.S. Government attempts to assassinate Fidel
Castro.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 89
Doi
20
To Rossellifie
д. должны
Jonecon 
w/
навлеедие
12/22/76
No, I can't either confirm or deny it. We are prohibited
at staff level from discussing any Committee business.
I apologize for not being able to help you. You know the
ground rules and they haven't changed.
Right.
I can't say! I don't know. You indicated that you
Are you still working Rosselli? You getting anywhere?
You got a pretty good source on that? On the fact that
they were having dinner together on many occasions before
he was murdered?
I just can't help you because of the ground rules. I'd
like to have a copy of your piece, or two, for me and
Inderfurth here. Just drop a copy in the mail and I'll
appreciate it.
You mean people like
Trafficante?
Well, I think
people like
Well, I can't discuss whether or not such a meeting took
place. I can't tell you whether you're right or wrong.
Now when you talk about Trafficante you don't need to be
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 90
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 91
cautioned. You know them as well as I do.
Well, as far as our rules are concerned, it wouldn't
make any difference if Trafficante was here. It wouldn't
make any difference in our ability to confirm or deny that.
---

Miani
: Herald
Dec. 24
Trafficante Made Secret Appearance
At Senate Investigation, Sources Say
By RON LABRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer
Florida's reputed organized
crime boss, Santos Trafficante of
Tampa and Miami, made a secret,
four-hour October appearance be-
fore the Senate Intelligence Com:
mittee to answer questions about
his role in a CIA assassination plot,
investigation sources have dis-
closed.
Trafficante, 62, had not previ-
ously been questioned by the com-
mittee or its staff in the two-year-
old investigation of CIA activities.
Of the three Mafia figures in-
volved in the early 1960s plot to
kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro,
only Trafficante is still alive. Both
Sam Giancana and John Rosselli
'were murdered within the last 16
months.
The murders are unsolved.
INVESTIGATORS ALSO said
that Trafficante had dinner with
Rosselli at The Landings, a Fort
Lauderdale restaurant, in mid-July,
less than two weeks before Rossel-
li disappeared. Rosselli's body,
stuffed in an oil drum, floated to
the surface of Dumfoundling Bay
the first week of August.
Trafficante reportedly has told
police that the July dinner with
Rosselli as well as several other
meetings previously at the Cordoba
Restaurant in Miami. formerly
owned by the husband of Rosselli's
niece, according to police _ were
"friendly, social events with no
business."
44
Investigators in recent weeks'
have centered their efforts on trac-
ing the whereabouts of Traffi-
cante's associates at the time of
Rosselli's disappearance. a source
said.
Trafficante. who for about fave
John Rosselli
.. dined with Trafficante
years has maintained a home at
740 NE 155th St. in North Dade,
could not be reached for comment.
Trafficante was identified as the
head of a South Florida Mafia fam-
ily in testimony in 1963 before a
U.S. Senate subcommittee..
HIS ATTORNEY, Henry Gonza-
lez of Tampa, who accompanied
Trafficante when he went to
Washington, according to sources,
would not comment on either the
Senate appearance or Trafficante's
past activities. When first asked
about the Senate appearance, he
said, "You realize you're treading
on dangerous ground,"
sought to determine whether the
murders of the two men were con⚫
nected in any way, with their testi-
mony or potential testimony before,
the committee.
the CIA Castro plotting and the as-
sassination of John F. Kennedy.
Revelations of the Senate commit-
tee were a key factor in the cre-
ation of the new House of Repre-
sentative investigation, which is
taking a new look at the JFK mur-
der.
GIANCANA, WHO was a Mafia
boss in Chicago for many years,
was killed in June 1975. at the
same time Senate investigators Trafficante reportedly has told
were preparing to contact him. The investigators that he first met Ros-
gun used to kill Giancana, found selli about 1956. It was in the early
discarded on a roadside several 1950s that Florida law- enforce
miles from Giancana's house a ment officials estimated that a Bo-
month after the murder. was lita opertion run by Trafficante and
traced to a Miami gunshop, but the his brother netted $2 million annu
trail stopped there.
Investigators said the gun was
part of a shipment purchased in
1965 by the Tamiami Gun Shop,
but there are no records to indicate
where it went from there, accord-
ing to investigators and gunshop
owners.
Rosselli, whose most powerful
Mafia days were reportedly in the
1950s and early 1960s in Las Vegas
and Los Angeles, did appear before
the committee at least three times
in the 12 months before his death..
In Washington, the committee
has kept a tight clamp on comment
about the investigation, and only
one member, Robert T. Stafford
(R., Vt.), acknowledged the Traffi-
cante session, saying "I was not
present when the witness you
speak of was in front of the com-
mittee."
. Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii),
the committee chairman who,
along with Sen. Howard Baker (R.,
Tenn.) pressured for Justice De-
ques-partment and FBI involvement in
the Rosselli murder case, said "I
have never met Mr. Trafficante.
That's as far as I'll go."
A committee source said that
Trafficante had not been
tioned previously by the committee
because his role in the plot had
been considered "secondary."
Interest was renewed in the plot
after Rosselli's death. Investigators
A PRIME interest of the commit-
tee has been possible links between
ally.
Trafficante was a major gam
where he ran a casino. In 1959, it
bling figure in pre-Castro Havana,
was estimated that $1 million or $2
Mafia-run casinos in Havana. The
million was bet nightly in all the
took over in 1959.
gambling stopped when Castro
Rosselli was, the first of the
three Mafia figures to be recruited
by the CIA in 1960 in its plot to as-
sassinate Castro.
IN A CIA memo quoted in an in-
terim report of the committee a
year ago, it was said that Traffi-
cante's role was to "serve as a cou-
rier to Cuba and make arrange-
ments there."
Rosselli told his CIA liaison that
"Trafficante believed a
leading figure in the Cuban exile
certain
movement might be able to accom
plish the assassination." An inter-
nal CIA investigation in 1967 "sug-
gests that this Cuban may have
been receiving funds from Traffi
cante and other racketeers interest-
ed in securing 'gambling, prostitu
tion and dope monopolies' in Cuba
after the overthrow of Castro."
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page .92
(
Rossell's Body Found in Floating Drum
THE
dor the C
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serted as a liaison betw
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reportedly
Rosely
keep the
be found
NW 50955 Doeld 3242
year.
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8/9/26
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ber of the
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finberthen found the
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Bay Bebireen North Miami
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Fishermen, not publicly
tified, called them affect
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the holes chopped in the
Authorities said fli
Sent to La
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wolf's interents
inged under the
1
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan, 18, 1971
.1
B7
6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA
By Juck Anderson
Locked in the darkest re-
jtor before the motley invad- iate against President Ken- complete with secret trysts at
ers landed on the island. Their nedy.
glittering Miami Beach hotels
arrival was expected to touch To set up the Castro assassi- and midnight powerboat
cesses of the Central Intelll-off a general uprising, which nation, the CIA enlisted Rob dashes to secret landing spots
the Communist militia would ert Maheu, a former FBI on the Cuban coast. Once, No-
have had more trouble putting agent with shadowy contacts, selll's boat was shot out from.
cover assignments for the CIA For the first try, the CIA:
out of his Washington public furnished Roselli with special.
down without the charismatic
Castro to lead them.
who had handled other under-under him.
gence Agency is the story of
six assassination attempts
against Cuba's Fidel Castro.
For 10 years, only a few key
people have known the terri-
ble secret. They have sworn After the first attempt relations office. He later poison capsules to slip into
never to talk. Yet we have failed, five more assassination moved to Las Vegas to head Castro's food. The poison was
learned the details from
up billionaire Howard Hughes' supposed to take three days to
sources whose credentials are
Nevada operations.
act. By the time Castro died,
beyond question.
Maheu recruited John Ro- his system would throw off all
We spoke to John McCone, to a rooftop within shooting selli, a ruggedly handsome traces of the poison, so he
who headed the CIA at the distance of Castro before they gambler with contacts in both would appear to be the victim
time of the assassination at- were apprehended. This hap- the American and Cuban un- of a natural if mysterious ail-
tempts. He acknowledged the pened around the last of Feb-derworlds, to arrange the as- ment.
teams were sent to Cuba. The
last team reportedly made it
idea had been discussed inside ruary or first of March, 1963. sassination. The dapper, hawk- Rosell arranged with # :
the CIA but insisted it had Nine months later, Presi-faced Roselll, formerly mar- Cuban, related to one of Cas-
been "rejected Immedi-dent Kennedy was gunned ried to movie actress June tro's chefs, to plant the deadly
ately." He vigorously denied down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Lang. was a power in the pellets in the dictator's food.
that the CIA had ever partici- Oswald, a fanatic who pre- movie industry until his con- On March 13, 1961, Roselli de-
pated in any plot on Castro's viously had agitated for Cas-viction with racketeer Willie livered the capsules to his con-
| life. Asked whether the at-tro in New Orleans and had Bioff in a million-dollar Holly- tact at Miami Beach's glamor.
tempts could have been made made a mysterious trip to the wood labor shakedown. The ous Fontainebleau Hotel.
with his knowledge, he re- Cuban Embassy in Mexico CIA assigned two of its most A couple of weeks later, just
plied: "It could not have hap- City.
trusted operatives, William about the right time for the
pened."
Among those privy to the Harvey and James (Big Jim) plot to have been carried out
We have complete confl- CIA conspiracy, there is still a O'Connell, to the hush-hush a report out of Havana sal
dence, however, in our nagging suspicion-unsup- murder mission. Using phony Castro was 111. But he r
ported by the Warren Com- names, they accompanied Ro-covered before the Bay of Fif
The plot to knock off Castro mission's findings-that Casselli on trips to Miami to line invasion on April 17, 1981.
began as part of the Bay of tro, became aware of the U.S. up the assassination teams.
Pigs operation The Intent was plot upon his life anit some- The full story reads like the
to eliminate the Cuban dicta-how recruited Oswald to getal seript of a James Bond movie,
sources.
1
Four more attempts wie
made on Castro's life.
3187, Bell-McClure Syndicate fe
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 94
NW 50955
1975
Stick Anderson
Anderson
bem Release
Four and a half years ago, I broke a story that now is belatedly rocking
Washington. I reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had recruited two
Mafia figures, John Roselli and Sam Giancana, to assassinate Cuban Premier
Fidel Castro.
to say.
I tracked down Roselli and questioned him about the story. He had nothing
He promised me, however, that he would give me his exclusive story
if he should ever be free to talk.
Yesterday, John Roselli told his story
first, to the Senate Intelligence
Committee in secret session, then to me as he had promised four and a half
years ago.
14
Roselli is a dapper, hawk-faced man with a thatch of white hair. He has
been disciplined all his life to keep his mouth shut. His Mafia partner,
Sam Giancana, was slain before Senate investigators could serve him with
a subpoena.
So it was obviously painful for Roselli to talk. I promised I would make
clear that he revealed no names, except for the CIA contacts whose identities
the Senate already knew.
So here is Roselli's own account of a real-life "Mission Impossible"
the attempt to kill Castro. It is a story of cash payments, poison pellets,
|
high-powered rifles and powerboat dashes to Cuba.
when Dwight
The plot against Castro, Roselli said, began in 1960
Eisenhower was President, Richard Nixon was Vice President and Allen Dulles
was the CIA chief.
Roselli was recruited in Los Angeles, he said, by Robert Maheu, then an
+
aide to billionaire Howard Hughes. Previously, Maheu had operated a CIA
front in Washington.
DocId: 32423630 Page 96
Page 2.
According to Roselli, the murdered mobster, Sam Giancana, never became
involved in the assassination plot. He knew about it; he may even have suggested
a Cuban contact; nothing more.
1
Roselli identified the CIA project officer, in charge of the Castro
assassination, as "Big Jim" O'Connell.
Maheu put Roselli in contact with
O'Connell, as Roselli remembers it, in New York City on September 14, 1960.
Thereafter, Roselli flew to Miami and recruited the assassination squads.
At first, they plotted to poison Castro. Poison pellets were supplied by the CIA.
They were delivered to the plotters in a Miami hotel room, according to Roselli,
by Maheu. He dramatically opened his briefcase, revealing $10,000 in cash
and the fatal pellets.
The money was distributed tothe Cuban plotters. Roselli swore he never
took any money from the CIA, except for some incidental expenses. He paid the
big expenses, he said, out of his own pocket.
The poison pills were supposed to take three days to work. Supposedly,
this would give the poison time to work its way out of Castro's system before
he died, and his death would be attributed to natural causes.
Roselli never found out what happened to the plotters or the pellets. But
they tried again later with a stronger dose of poison. Not long afterward, reports
reached them that Castro was desperately ill. Roselli doesn't know whether the
illness was caused by the poison or a virus. But Castro survived, and the
plotters apparently did not.
Toselli said he also picked up intelligence, which he submitted to the CIA
both during the Bay of Pigs planning and the later Cuban missile crisis. After
the Bay of Pigs, Roselli said, Maheu was cut out of the plot.
Roselli reported to a CIA agent named William Harvey.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 97
Thereafter,
}
There were four more assassination attempts, the plotters were smuggled
into Cuba with high-powered rifles. The last assassination squad, Roselli heard,
made it to a Havana rooftop before they were caught.
This was around March 1, 1963. Then the project was abandoned. Roselli
saw Harvey for the last time in June, 1963. Five months later, Lee Harvey Oswa
gunned down President Kennedy in Dallas. Oswald had been active in the pro-
Castro movement. Shortly before that dreadful day in Dallas, Oswald had made
a mysterious trip to Mexico where he visited the Cuban embassy. The Warren
Commission found no evidence, however, that Oswald was in the hire of Havana.
Yesterday, Roselli made no apology for his CIA role. U.S. authorities
call him a mobster. He regards himself as a patriot.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 98
THE WASHINGTON POSTE
Sunday, September 12, 1976
1.1
Novelle
"
The Calculated Rise
And Abrupt Descent
Of Johnny Roselli
By Rudy Maxa
Until last month, Johnny Roselli
lived comfortably with his sister and
brother-in-law in a Miami suburb. A
friend estimated he earned about $25,-
000 annually from a gift shop he
owned in the lobby of Las Vegas' Fron-
tier Hotel.
"He shrugged last year, when his at-
torney suggested he hire a bodyguard,
after the murder of Chicago mobster
Sam Giancana, his partner in CIA plots
to kill Fidel Castro. If anybody wants
to kill me at my age, the 71-year-old Ro
selli said, what difference does it
make? So he played golf several times
a week, sipped white wine with din-
ner, and-until somebody decided
Johnny Roselli should wind up in an
oil barrel in Miami's Dumfoundling
Bay-considered employment in the
new gambling casinos beginning to
open in the oil-rich Middle East.
In the late 1920s Al Capone and his
friends chose Miami as the chic spot
for organized crime figures to buy
winter home. Just across a strip of
ocean was Cuba, a gambling and vice.
mecca. The mobsters from the north
were treated like visiting celebrities
by Florida press and society, while
some members of the local police force
began developing a taste for the finer.
things in life.
11
I lives in a sprawling white home that
at first glance, resembles every othe
house in the neighborhood.
But it is different: the carefully cur
tained windows, the extra lock on th
front door, and spotlights on all side
of the house give it the look of a subu
ban fortress. Inside, the furniture i
pale blue Mediterranean, the carpet i
thick white.
Roselli's killers did not ambush th
house; Roselli went to them. He lef
Plantation at 1 p.m. on July 28 wearin
a golf shirt, his golf clubs in his ca
trunk. He told his sister he would b
home for dinner. That afternoon o
evening he was killed, probably by su
focation, perhaps after being torture
- early reports said his legs were br
ken.. Heavily chained, Roselli wa
stuffed in a 55-gallon oildrum an
dumped into the ocean.
His brother-in-law found Roselli's si
ver-colored 1975 Chevrolet Impala se
eral days later, parked at the Miami li
ternational Airport.
Ten days after Roselli's disappea
ance something went wrong. The o
drum that was meant to keep his deat
☐ a secret floated to the surface of Dun
foundling Bay, buoyed by the gases (
Roselli's decaying body.
The holes in the side of the dru
and the placing of his Chevrolet at th
airport convinced investigators h.
corpse was meant never to be disco
ered; history was supposed to. recor
that dapper Johnny Roselli, facing d
portation proceedings that the gover
years, decided to disappear on an ai
plane flight to who-knows-where.
In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade
County (which includes most of the Mi-ment had threatened off and on fo
ami area) admitted to the Kefauver or-
ganized crime committee that; since
he had become sheriff on an annual
salary of $12,000 five years earlier, his
personal fortune had increased from
$2,500 to $70,000. One of the sheriff's
deputies said he collected $50,000 in
bribes in nine months spent as a bag-
man for Miami Beach gambling con-
cessions. In 1948 a bookmaker's opera-
tion in Miami grossed $26 million. It
was the kind of place that made a rack-
eteer feel at home.
"Cutting up and disposing of bodi
is not necessarily new to our depar
ment," says the man who is directir
the search for Roselli's killers. Lt. Ga
Minnium, head of the Dade Coun
homicide squad, is a well-muscled ma
with an aquiline nose that separates
pair of hard blue eyes. On the pa
green wall of his bare office is a sma
card that reads "DYNAMITE-DON
For the last two years, Johnny Ro-
selli felt at home in Plantation, a bed-SHAKE ME UP.”
Iroom suburb north of Miami that Ro- .
I selli made his retirement haven be
cause he had family there. His brother
in-law, a government missile expert,
He and another police officer
count the solving of some of Da
County's more brutal murders wi
See ROSELLI, L4, Col. 1
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 99
ROSELLI, From LI
the enthusiasm of two football players.
recalling their favorite bowl games.
The headless, handless body that
floated into a Miami canal last month
reminded Minnium of that other, simi-
larly mutilated body that turned up
last December. And who can forget
the man who got angry with his room-
mate, sliced him up and tossed the
parts along a highway?
As it turned out, Roselli's wasn't the
first body to float into the annals of Mi-
ami crime in a drum, Minnium says.
Ten years ago a lovers' quarrel re-
sulted in a man stuffing his girl friend
into a drum, filling it with cement and
Aqua Velva shave lotion. The drum
after a
work-a-day,
a velvety
junior jump! $58
A be-deviling shimmer-glimmer
you, set for champagne or a great
beat! One-piece cotton velveteen, ready
to layer black or brown, 5-13. Come in,
write or phone..
was found resting against a dike and
justice was eventually done.
Minnium is not pleased by such vio-
lent antics.
"We don't appreciate people com-
mitting murder and dumping a body
in our county, regardless of who the
people are, but especially if it's organ-
ized crime," Minnium says.
His department handled 168 homl-
cides last year and boasted an 85 per
cent clearance record." As of July,
1976, the percentage was even higher,
standing at about 92 per cent.
If Charles Zatrepalek and Julio
Ojeda have anything to say about it,
Roselli's killing is not going to dimin-'
ish those percentages. Both men are
28-year-old homicide detectives who
vow with a schoolboy's sincerity tha
they won't rest until Roselli's murder
is solved. In the last four weeks, with
the help of Washington agencies, Za
trepalek and Ojeda have reconstructed
Roselli's life in hopes of understanding
his death. For the third time in eight
years of marriage, Zatrepalek worked
out of town on his wedding anniversa-
ry; because of the "awesomeness" of
this case, Ojeda spent his Labor Day
holiday at work.
"Maybe 10 years from now," Ojeda
says, "I want someone to look at my
file and say, 'Hey, he talked to every-
body.' And maybe he'll hear some-
thing and BANG! that's the arrest!"
That Johnny Roselli was destined to
walk on the dark side of life never
seemed in doubt. As a teen-ager in Bos-
ton, when his name was Filippo Sacco,
Roselli was a runner for the numbers
racket. He helped his stepfather burn
down his home for the insurance mon-
ey. He was arrested at age 22 for steal-
ing about $25 from someone. Then he
changed his name and left for Chica-
go.
It would be 40 years until, in the late
1960s, Johnny Roselli would see his
mother again, though he sent money
to his family through an intermediary
in Chicago so his sisters could attend
college.
By the late 1920s Al Capone was well
established in Chicago. Newspaper-
men, politicians and cops were on the
Capone payroll and a young man with
Roselli's street savvy had little trouble
finding suitable employment; he hired
on as a rumrunner with the Capone
gang. At age 26 Roselli was arrested
for selling morphine to an undercover
agent. He was acquitted because, after
Roselli's arrest, no one could seem to
find the arresting officer or informant
in the case. They still haven't been
found.
In the mid-1930s Roselli, by now a
mature and charming man, lucky with
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 100
W
tortion, Bioff cut a deal with the gov
ernment and named Roselli as a Chi-
cago mobster who had helped him
shake down movie studios. Cohn testi-
"In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade County (which fied on Roselli's behalf, but in 1943 Ro-
includes most of the Miami area) admitted to the
Kefauver organized crime committee that, since
selli was sentenced to 10 years in pris-
on. When he got out he returned to
Hollywood to make pictures of prison
and gangster life. But publicity about a
secret appearance before the Kefau-
ver crime committee ruined his rela-
he had become sheriff on an annual salary of tionship with most studios. Even Cohn
$12,000 five years earlier, his personal fortune
had increased from $2,500 to $70,000."
women, friendly with men of money,
moved to Los Angeles. He wore hand-
tailored suits and, by all accounts, was
easygoing, mild-mannered. He was
married for a time to an actress, but
they had no children. He became a
close friend of Harry Cohn, the legend-
ary head of Columbia Pictures. The
two men sometimes vacationed to-
gether and Roselli always seemed to
know how to place a bet should Cohn
care to wager on a horse.
According to Bob Thomas' biogra-
phy of Cohn, "King Cohn," the movie
mogul once offered Roselli a job as a
producer. (In his book, Thomas dis-
guised Roselli's identity at Roselli's re-
quest.)
"What would you pay me?" Roselli
asked Cohn.
"Five hundred dollars a week,"
Cohn said.
"I get that much from waitresses
who take bets for me," Roselli is said to
have replied.
Besides being a handy man with the
placing of bets, Roselli purchased a 26
per cent interest in a Tijuana race-
track with $25,000 Cohn loaned him.
Roselli paid him back promptly and in-
;
cluded a check for 6 per cent interest;
Cohn magnanimously tore up the in-
terest check.
Roselli bought twin star rubies, had
them set in rings and gave one to
Cohn, who considered it a good luck
charm until his death. Once, when Chi-
cago mobster Willie Bioff moved to
Hollywood and began making life mi-
serable for movie studios by shaking
down executives in return for labor
peace, Roselli stepped in and saved
Cohn from a lengthy strike.
When Cohn refused to pay tribute to
Bioff and his union, Bioff tried to halt
production at Columbia by calling a
sudden strike. Desperate, Cohn called
Roselli who marched into Bioff's office
and confronted the hoodlum who sat
behind his desk wearing a hat and
coat, chomping on a cigar, a gun rest-
ing on the desk in front of him.
"Listen, Willie, I don't know what
you're trying to prove but it isn't going
to work," Roselli told him. "This is a
spite thing and you're not going to get
away with it. You meet with Cohn and
get it settled."
Bioff backed down and called off his
pickets. After he was sent to jail for ex-
re fused to hire him-"The stockhold.
ers would scalp me," Cohn told a bitter
Roselli.
It was during his years in the Los
Angeles and Las Vegas areas that Ro-
selli met the man who would make
him a household name later in life.
Robert Maheu, the ex-FBI agent who
parlayed a Washington private eye
business into a stormy career as How-
ard Hughes' man in Las Vegas, ap-
proached Roselli on behalf of the CIA
in 1960.
(Another person Roselli met in that
era who would later surface to talk of
Roselli, Giancana and John F. Ken-
nedy was a young party girl named Ju-
dith Campbell.)
Maheu and Roselli would later tell
Frank Church's Senate Intelligence
Committee the details of their plots to
kill Castro. Maheu told investigators he
had known Roselli since the late 1950s
and, while he didn't know of his un-
derworld connections, "it was cer-
tainly evident to me that (Roselli) was
able to accomplish things in Las Vegas
when nobody else seemed to get the
same kind of attention."
Over dinner at the Brown Derby in
Beverly Hills 16 years ago, Maheu ex-
plained to Roselli that his government
needed his services. Roselli, who was
born on July 4, 1905, was nothing if not
patriotic. (Sam Giancana once said,
"Just wave a flag and Johnny'll follow
you to any canal.") Maheu recalled that
See ROSELLI, L5, Col. 1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 101
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 103
5
Johnny Roselli
1975. upper riį
and. counterclo
wise from upper!
Fidel Castro in
Sam Giancana in
President John
Kennedy in
Dade County Po
Lt. Gary Minni
and the Flor
home where Ros
lived
before
death.
Photos by The Washington P
The Chicago Daily News. AP.-
pealed to Harvey for help and Harvey
recommended to the CIA that it try to
prevent prosecution, but Roselli was
convicted of violating interstate gam-
bling laws. He went to jail, returning
in 1974 to Plantation to do battle
against government efforts to deport
him.
In 1971 the CIA asked the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service to
"forestall public disclosure of Roselli's
past operational activity with the CIA"
that might occur if deportation pro-
ceedings were pursued. The INS
agreed to keep the CIA informed, but
at his death, Roselli and his lawyers
were still fighting deportation.
"
"Bob Maheu must be running scared.
-I thought about that just the other.
day: 'Jesus, what's Maheu thinking?"
said another of Roselli's brothers-in-
law, Peter Cardillo of New Jersey.
The public doesn't know what Ma-
heu is thinking, whether he worries if
pro-Castro Cubans are exacting retri-
bution for sins of 16 years ago. Maheu's
secretary in Las Vegas says she doesn't
know where her boss is or when he'll
be returning to his office. He report-
edly has some business interest in
Egypt, a part of the world that seems
to hold some fascination for the Castro
plotters; Giancana kept an apartment
in Beirut and, just before his death,
told a friend he had some sort of deal
brewing there. And Roselli longingly
eyed the opening of gambling casinos
in the land of the new oil millionaires.
In Tampa, Santos Trafficante, an-
other of the original Maheu group, also
refuses to talk with the press. But un
like the others, he did not testify be-
fore the Church committee so the pub-
lic has no inkling of his thoughts on
the Castro assassination attempts.
• Whether Roselli's killing was one of
retribution for a public or a private
matter, Johnny Roselli was a testa-
ment to an era that has passed. His life,
which would have remained largely
unnoticed save for the Senate's CIA
hearings, seemed straight from the
pages of a Mafia novel: allegedly
brought into the United States illegally
at the turn of the century, Roselli
clawed his way from the mean streets
of Boston and Chicago to the relative
glamor of Hollywood, Las Vegas and,
finally, Miami. Along the way, a simple
strain of patriotism-which impressed
the CIA enough to mention it to the
Church committee-put him in a rope-
dancer's position of sometimes receiv-
ing, sometimes taking advantage of his
knowledge of the darkest side of gov-
ernment.
☐ While some have speculated that he
was killed for talking too much to gov-
ernment investigators, Roselli was
hardly a loudmouth in the league of a
Joe Valachi, who sang for televised
Senate hearings on the Mafia in 1963.-
Fourteen years ago Roselli confided in
his lawyer, Washington attorney Ed-
ward Morgan, that he had been told by
Cuban sources in Miami that John
'Kennedy's killing was ordered and ar-
ranged by Castro, but he lived with his
secret.
The day after Roselli's body was
scooped from its crude coffin. his
brother-in-law in New Jersey, Peter
Cardillo, told me: "Down deep, in a
way, I probably hope it was connected
with (the Castro affair). At least then
Johnny, he would have died for a
cause.'
"

Roselli Probe
By RON LABRECQUE
Mr St
Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to
Miani Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to
underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence.
Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure
that federal agencies cooperate with local police.
"
The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Attorney.
General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee.
"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to
find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and
his testimony before the Committee."
HART SAID he also hoped to
meet with local officials of the FBI
and Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, a
Resell, 71, organized crime fig
ure who testified three times be-
fore the Sonale Intelligence. Com.,
mittee in the past year about his
recruitment by the CIA in a plot 10
kill Fidel Castro, was found dead
two weeks ago, stuffed in an
drum Heating in Dumfoundling
Hartade it ear that the Intel-
ligence Committee is concerned.
shout the possibility that Rosellis
death is connected to his testimo
by, although he did say there was
no evidente indicating Roselli
3 might have been killed to prevent
him for talking about other CIA,
- organized crime pacts.
know of no plans what
16 have him come back." Hart d
"but that's not to say we wouldn't
have called his back if some new
facts arose."
:
"But it would be reaching to say
we had one Itidication he had
(not yet sufied about) evidence
important to us" Her said.
487.
THE MURDER of Rosell, who,
last testified in April, renewed In
telligence Committee 
interest in the
dealb, of Chicago organized 
crime
,
Reader Sam (Momo) 
Giancans, GH
encana was shot to death 
in his
Thome in June of 1975, 
just a ta
time when Intelligence 
Committee
:
Investigators were tracking 
him
down
Accompanying Hart Friday was
Michael Madigan, a committee 
at-
'torney who, in June of 1975
, was
preparing to interview 
Giancaña
about his involvement 
with Roselli
In the Castro plot
Giantana and Tampa organized
crime figure Santo 
-Trafficsple
played "accompanying roles.in
the CIA-Inspired Castro 
assessina
...
tion plot, another committee 
aff
member traveling with Hart 
said
Friday
1. The commitice bad also."consid..
ered" subpening 
Trafficepte, the
staff invigator said, 
but Traffi
cente was never called 
because the
Copimittee considered Roselli's 
tes
timony the most important.
CHICAGO-AREA investigators
concluded that Glancana's draib-
was part of an internal 
gangland
1 struggle..
។
Nevertheless, Hart told The Her
ald Friday that with Roselli's
death, troubling questions" 
about 
·
Gincana's mulder linger. "The 
co-
incidentes begin to string them
-
7
selves together said the 
1972;
1 presidential campaign manager fors
George McGovern
=
"
Asked if he was satisfied with:
(the conclusions of investigators.
that Gianpans's death was noi con-
[nected to his potential testimony:
before the committee, Hart 
said:
there is the absence of any corro-
orating evidence which prevents
Tarn to Fage 28 Col. #
NW 50955 DocId: 3242363b Page 104
1.
:
Visits Local
Officials
ཝ་ན' ཐ
FROM PAGE IB
us from moving beyond specula
Madigan said the widespread re-
ports affer Giancans's death that
his appearance before the commit-
tee was minent were not true.
That further indicates, he agreed.
that Glaucane's death was not di
rectly related to his past CIA asso?
WE FINALLY go, Gancana's
home number (the day he was
Alle Madigan said Friday."We
had some difficulty tracking him
Yown in Houston (where Glandana
been in the hospital). It had
bees decided that I was going to
Interview him to see whether it
would be worth it to call him as a
witness. He had not been contacted
yet and he had not been suline.
ned," Madigan said.
Rotell, so bad bean subpe.
xed, did testify for the first time
Jour days after Giancora was shot.
1. That cofurnittee was headed by
Sea. Back Church and has since
I been replaced by a newly formed
committee headed by Sen. Daniel
Inouye (D. Hawall) and Sen. How-
and Raker (R, Tenn.): In its final:
Treport, that former committee.
strongly urged the new committee
to continue the investigation of co-
vert CIA activity as well as cons
pections between the Cestro assasi-
nation plot and the escassination of
John F. Kenny.
MART SAID FRIDAY there are
atillunsered questions about
Lee Harvey Oswaki's motiver par
ticularly relating to the so-called
"retaliatica pory" that Castro
for pro-Castro agents had JFK-
killed because of the CIA, attempts
on Castro's E
Hart interviewed Reselli twice
as member of the former com
mittee and he is also a member of.
the new Intelligence Committee.
"Rosell was very candid but beg
did not volunteer, information
14 Committed investigators sald Fri
day they have found no link be
tween Roselli and Eugene M. Car.
& Rockville Md., antique auto
deal with reported organized
crime connections who 
died under
circumstances mysteriously coind
deater to Rosell's death
Cerafe, 37, was reported miss
Jag by his wife on July 28, the
Tsame day Porell was hit seen by
his sister in Plantation with whom
**be had lived for those yea..
NW 50955. DocId: 32423630 Page 105
Caraffa's body floated to the sure
face of New York Harbor off Sta-
ten Island on Aug. 4. his body-
wrapped in a padlocked chain and
weighted by two. 15-pound bont
anchors. Follce spid he had been
strangled. Roselilhed been asphy's-
leted, possibly by strangling, ac-
cording to Investigators here.
New York. City detectives sald
that Caraffa knew Glancana" but
they have not been able to. pin.
down a motive in his death
The Washington Star, quoting an
unidentified FBI source, reported
that Caraffe had met with Roselll'
cia, Chicago about two month 30:
.
it
Roselli Probe
By RON LABRECQUE
Mer
Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to
Miami Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to
underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure
that federal agencies cooperate with local police.
The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Auornéy,
General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee.
"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to
'find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and
his testimony before the Committee.
HART SAID he also hoped to
meet with local officials of the FBI
and linmigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, an
Roselli, 71, organized crime fig-
ure who testified three times be-
fore the Senate Intelligence Com.)
mittee in the past year about his
recruitment by the CIA in a plot to
kill Fidel Castro, was found dead
two weeks ago, stuffed in a sil
6rum floating in Dumfoundling
Hart nade it ear that the Intel-
ligence Committee is concerned:
about the possibility that Rosells
death is connected to his testimo
ay, although he did say there was
no evidente indicating Roselli
7 might have been killed to prevent.
him from talking about other CIA,
- Organized crime pacts.
•
know of no plans whi
16 have im come back." Hart said
"but that's not to say we wouldn't
have called his back if some new
facts arose.
"But it would be reaching to my
we had some Iddication, he had
(not yet sufied about) evidence
important to us" He said,
482.
F THE MURDER of Roselll, who
last testified in April, renewed In-
telligence Committee 
interest in the
estb, of Chicago organized 
crime
,
leader Sam (Momo) 
Giancana, GH
ancama was shot to death 
in, his
Thome in June of 1975, just 
a ta
time when Intelligence 
Committee
:
Investigators were tracking him
Accompanying Hart Friday was
Michael Madigan, a committee 
at-
torney who, in June of 1975
, was
preparing to interview 
Giancaña
about his involvement with 
Rosell
In the Castro plon
: Giantana and Tampa organized;
crime figure Santo 
-Trafficante
played "accompanying roles 
in
the CIA-Inspired Castro 
assessina
...
tion plot, another committee 
dialf
member traveling with 
Hart said
Fiday.
1. The committee bad also."c
yered"ubpending Trafficente, the
staff jovestigator said, but Traffi
cente we never called 
because 
the
Committee considered Roselli's 
tes-
timony the most important.
CHICAGO-AREA investigators
concluded that Glancana's death-
I was part of an internal 
gangland
struggle
Nevertheless, Hart told The Her
eld Friday that with Roselli's.
death, troubling questions" about
:
Giancana's moulder linger. "The 
co-
Incidences begin to string 
them.
! selves together said the 1972;
1 presidential campaign manager 
for
George McGovern
-
Asked if he was satisfied with:
the conclusions of invenigators
that Giancans's death was not con-
nected to his potential testi:nony:
before the committee, Hart 
said.
there is the absence of any corros
"
orating evidence which prevenis
Turn to Fage 28 Col. §
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 106
Visits Local
Officials
FROM PAGE IB
us from moving beyond specula
Son
Madigan said the widespread res
ports affer Giancans's death that
his appearance before the commit-
tee was imminent were not true.
That further indicates, he agreed.
that Glaucane's death was not di.
rectly related to his past CIA asso
ication
WE FINALLY go: Gancana's
home number (the day he was
Alle Madigan said Friday." We
had some difficulty tracking him
Yown in Houston (where Gladana
1. had been in the hospital). It had
been decided that I was going to
Interview him to see whether it
would be worth it to call him as a
witness. He had not been contacted.
yet and he had to subs
'
mard, Madigan said.
: Rosell, who had been subpe
med, did testify for the first time
Jour days after Giancora was shot
That corunittes was beaded by
Sta. Back Gurch and has since
I been replaced by a newly formed
committee headed by Sen. Daniel
Inouye (Dawall) and Sen. How-
Card Baker (R, Tenn.). In its final.
report, that former committee
strongly urged the new committee
to continue the investigation of co-
vert CIA activity as well as coo
pections between the Cestro assas
nation plot and the assassination of
John F. Kennedy.
MAKT SAID FRIDAY there are
at uneswered questions about
Lee Harvey Oswald's motive, par
ticularly relating to the so-called
"retaliation Visory that Castro
for pro-Carro agents had JFK-
killed because of the CIA attempts,
on Castro's life
--
1 Hart Interviewed Reselli twice
as a member of the former come
mittee and he is also a member of.
the new Intelligence Committee.
"Rosell was very candid but be
did not volunteer, information,
Committed investators sald Fri
day they have found no link be
tween Roselli and Eugene M. Car..
& Rockville, Md., antique suto
dealer with reported organized'
crime connections who died 
under
circumstances mysteriously coind-
dental to Roselli's death.
Carraf, 37, was reported mis
og by his wife on July 28, the
same day Roselli was st seen by.
*his sister is Plantation with whom
be had lived for three years.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 107
Caraffa's body floated to the sur
face of New York Harbor off Sta-
ten Island on Aug. 4, hla body"
wrepped in a padlocked chain and
weighted by two. 15-pound boat
anchors. Felice spid he had been
strangled Romhed been asphyx-
inted, possibly by strangling, ac
cording to Investigators here.
New York. City detectives sold..
that Caraffa knew Glancana" but.
they have not been able to. pin
' down a motive in his death.
The Washington Star, quoting an
unidentified FBI source, reported:
that. Carella had met with Roselll'
Pin Chicago about two monthego:
Roselli Probe
By RON LABRECQUE
Mera Ster
;
Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to
Miami Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to
underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence.
Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure
that federal agencies cooperate with local police.
The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Attorney.
General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee..
"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to
find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and
his testimony before the Committee.
HART SAID he also hoped to:
meet with local officials of the FBI:
and Immigration and Naturaliza
tion Service, a
Reselli, 71, organized crime fig-
ure who testified three times be-
Tore the Senate Intelligence. Com.,
mittee in the past year about his
recruitment by the CIA in a plot to
kill Fidel Castro, was found dead.
two weeks ago, stuffed in an cil
orum flosting in Dumifoundling.
By:
Hart nade it fear that the Intel-
ligence Committee is coscered:
shout the possibility that Rosellis
death is connected to his testimo
by, slthough he did say there was,
no evidente indicating Roselli
might have been killed to prevent.
him from talking about other CIA,
Organized crime pacts.
"
"I know of no plans which
to have him come back," Hat d
"but that's not to say "we wouldn't
have called hira back if some new
facts arose."
:
"But it would be reaching to say
we had some indication he had,
(not yet testified about) evidence.
important to us" He said.
482.
THE MURDER of Rosell, who,
last testified in April, renewed 
In-
telligence Committee interest 
in the
death of Chicago 
organized crime
Reader Sam (Momo) 
Giancans, GH
ancana was shot to death 
in his
home a June of 1975, just 
a ta
* time when Intelligence Committees
Investigators were tracking 
him
down
Accompanying Hart Friday was
Michael Madigan, a committee 
at-
torney who, in June of 
1975, wes
preparing to interview 
Giancana
about his involvement 
with Resell
In the Castro plot
Giancana and Tampa organized
crime figure. Santo 
Trafficante
:
played "accompanying roles 
in
the CIA-Inspired Castro 
assessina
...
tion plot, another 
committee staff.
member traveling with Hart
, said,
Friday
1. The commitire bad also."consid..
yered" subpening 
Trafficente. the
staff Jotigator said, 
but Traffi
cente was never called 
because the
Gopimittee considered Roselli's 
tes-
timony the most important.
CHICAGO-AREA Investigators
concluded that Glancana's death-
was part of an internal 
gangland
1 struggle.
Nevertheless, Hart told The Her-
ald Friday that with Roselli's?
death, troubling questions" 
about:
Giancane's murder linger. "The co-
Incidences begin to 
string them-
selves together said the 
1972
:
1 presidential campaign manager 
fors
George McGovern
Asked if he was satisfied with:
the conclusions of investigators
that Giantans's death was not con-
infcted to his potential testimony:
before the committee, Hart 
said:
"there is the absence 
of any corro-
orating evidence which preVENTS.
WE
Turn to Fage 28 Col.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 108
Visits Local.
Officials
FROM PAGE IB
us from moving beyond specula
Ho
13.
Madigan said the widespread re-
ports affer Giancans's death that
his appearance before the commit-
tee was traininent were not true.
That further indicates, he agreed.
that Glaucane's death was not di
rectly related to his past CIA asso
Eclation
WE FINALLY got Gancana
home number the day they was
led Madigan said Friday."We
had some difficulty tracking him
own in Houston (where Glandana
had been in the hospital. It had
bees decided that I was going to
Interview him to see whether it
would be worth it to call him as a
witness, He had not been costscred
yet and be had not subpe-
ned," Madigan said.
Rosello had been subpe
ned, did testify for the first time
Jour days after Giancora was shot.
That "cominittes was beaded by
Sta. Back Gurch 2nd hes since
been replaced by a newly formed
committee headed by Sen. Daniel
incaye ( Hawail) and Sea. How-
ard Raker (R, Tenn.). In its final
report that former committee.
strongly urged the new comminge
to continue the investigation of co-
vart CIA activity as well as cops
actions between the Cestro assasš»
nation plot and the assassination of
John F. Kennedy.
MART SAID FRIDAY there are
ati unubeswered questions about
Lee Harvey Oswald's motive par
ticularly relating to the so-called
"retaliation Ugory" that Castro
For pro-Castro agents had JFK
killed because of the CIA attempts
on Castro's life
Hart interviewed Reselli twice
as a member of the former com
mittee and he is also a member of.
the new Intelligence Committee.
"Rosell was very candid but he
did not relunteer, information,
* Committed investigators sald Fri
day they have found no link be-
tween Rosell and Eugene M. Care.
Rockville, Md., antique auto
dealer with reported organized
(crime consections who died 
under
circumstances mysteriously coind-'
dental to Rosell's death.
Cafe 37, was reported mis-
ng by his wife on July 28, the
same day Roselli was hit seen by
"his sister in Plantation with 
whom
'
be had lived for three years....
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 109
1
Caraffa's body floated to the sur
face of New York Harbor off Sta-
ten Island on Aug. 4, ble body.
wrapped in & padlocked chain and
weighted by two. 15-pound boat
anchors. Police spid he had been
strangled. Roselli hed been haphy-
leted, possibly by strangling, ac
cording to Investigators here.
New York. City detectives sold
that Caraffa knew Glancana" but
they have not been able to. pin's
down & motive in his death.
The Washington Star, quoting an
unidentified FBI source, reported.
4 that Caraffa had met with Roselll'
Vin Chicago about two monthgo
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Michael Madigan
August 13, 1976
I recently discussed with Agent Richard Taylor of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation my recollections of pre-
testimony interviews with Mr. John Rosselli prior to Rosselli
testifying under oath in June of 1975. It is my recollection
that there were several meetings between myself, as counsel for
the Committee and Rosselli and his attorneys. Rosselli and hia
attorneys expressed on numerous occasions fear for the well-being
of Rossell1 They insisted and the Committee agreed that I
would conduct interviews prior to the sworn testimony at a
location away from the Senate so as to avoid any publicity
During these interviews Rosselli, on more than one occasion,
stated that he was taking a great risk in testifying. He was
worried about retaliation and particularly worried about his
relatives with whom he was living in Florida
cannot recall
Rosselli specifying exactly who he was most afraid of, but he
declined to testify about Giancana (until after Glancana's death)
refused to identify any of the Cubans who were involved in
assassination plots, and was reluctant to mention Santos
Trafficante by name In fact, I cannot recall Rosselli ever
mentioning Trafficante by name and only very vaguely responding
to questions if the questioner used the name Trafficante.
It is my recollection that on
least one occasion
the presence of Senator Howard H. Baker,
Rosselli told
the Senator that he, Rosselli, was concerned for his safety and
his life and that he was risking his well-being by testifying
before the Committee.
I am uncertain in my recollection as to
whether that conversation took place up in the Senate interview
room or elsewhere.
Throughout his testimony Rosselli declined
exact address in Florida for reasons of safety.
give his
is also my
recollection that Rosselli's demeanor was visibly affected
whenever testimony or interview focused or attempted to focus
on Santos Trafficante
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Michael Madigan
August 13, 1976
I recently discussed with Agent Richard Taylor of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation my recollections of pre-
testimony interviews with Mr. John Rosselli prior to Rosselli'
testifying under oath in June of 1975. It is my recollection
that there were several meetings between myself, as counsel for
the Committee, and Rosselli and his attorneys. Rosselli and his
attorneys expressed on numerous occasions fear for the well-being
of Rosselli. They insisted and the Committee agreed that I
would conduct interviews prior to the sworn testimony at a
location away from the Senate so as to avoid any publicity.
During these interviews Rosselli, on more than one occasion
stated that he was taking a great risk in testifying.
worried about retaliation and particularly worried about his
relatives with whom he was living in Florida. I cannot recall
Rosselli specifying exactly who he was most afraid of, but he
declined to testify about Giancana (until after Giancana
refused to identify any of the Cubans who were involved in
assassination plots, and was reluctant to mention Santos
Trafficante by name In fact, I cannot recall Rosselli ever
mentioning Trafficante by name and only very vaguely responding
to questions if the questioner used the name Trafficante.
Ꭲ;
He was
death)
It is my recollection that on at least one occasion,
the presence of Senator Howard H. Baker Jr Rosselli told
the Senator that he, Rosselli, was concerned for his safety and
his life and that he was risking his well-being by testifying
before the Committee.
I am uncertain in my recollection as to
whether that conversation took place up in the Senate interview
room or elsewhere.
Throughout his testimony Rosselli declined to give his
exact address in Florida for reasons of safety.
fa also my
recollection that Rosselli's demeanor was visibly affected
whenever testimony or interview focused or attempted to focus
on Santos Trafficante

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Michael Madigan
August 13, 1976
15
I recently discussed with Agent Richard Taylor of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation my recollections of pre-s
testimony interviews with Mr John Rosselli prior to Rosselli
testifying under oath in June of 1975. It is my recollection
that there were several meetings between myself as counsel for
the Committee, and Rosselli and his attorneys Rosselli and his
attorneys expressed on numerous occasions fear for the well-being
of Rosselli. They insisted and the Committee agreed that
would conduct interviews prior to the sworn testimony at
location away from the Senate so as to avoid any publicity.
During these interviews Rosselli on more than one occasion,
stated that he was taking great risk in testifying. He was
worried about retaliation and particularly worried about his
relatives with whom he was living in Florida cannot recall
Rosselli specifying exactly who he was most afraid of, but he
declined to testify about Giancana (until after Giancana a death)
refused to identify any of the Cubans who were involved in
assassination plots and was reluctant to mention Santos
Trafficante by name In fact, I cannot recall Rosselli ever
mentioning Trafficante by name and only very vaguely responding
to questions if the questioner used the name Trafficante.
It is my recollection that on at least one occasion,
the presence of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr
Rosselli told
the Senator that he, Rosselli, was concerned for his safety
his life and that he was risking his well-being by testifying
before the Committee. I am uncertain in my recollection as to
whether that conversation took place up in the Senate interview
room or elsewhere.
Throughout his testimony Rosselli declined to give his
exact address in Florida for reasons
safety. It is also my
recollection that Rosselli'a dembanor was visibly affected
whenever testimony or interview focused attempted to focus
on Santos Trafficante.
MEMORANDUM
To:
Rick Inderfurth
From:
Mike Madigan
Date:
August 13, 1976
Re:
Miami Interviews
I spoke with Senator Hart today about setting up interviews
in Miami for Friday, August 20, in the Rossell matter. He will
247°
be calling you about these arrangements
I will try to have a subpoena for Santos Trafficante signed
by Senator Baker before he leaves for the convention We, how-
er must obtain the approval of all or a majority of the
members of the Committee (under the Rules) to lasue the subpoena
Therefore, I have asked Martha to poll members on two questions:
(1) Authority to issue
Trafficance;
(2) Authority for Senator
subpoena for
to disclose
to the Miami police investigators in the Rossellf
case those portions of the classified Rasselli
related transcripts which he deems relevant to the
murder investigation
In case we miss connections, the relevant people involved are
Bill Lynch head of the Justice Organized
Crime Section, telephone number 739-3516 (he should
help us locate Trafficante and perhapa have a
suggestion as to how best to serve him
subpoena)
(2) Detectives Wolf and Zatrepallek
Dade
County Sheriff's Office, telephone number 305-547-7456
(they are the detectives investigating the Rosselli
murder for the locals) (I have been putting them
off about whether they can have access to the
transcripts
you need to talk to Bill Miller and
Gary about this)
(3) Paul Daly
you may have to go through
him if we need the FBI to locate Trafficanté.
By the time you return I will have taken preparatory steps
to set up interviews with the Miami police people as well as
begun an effort to locate Trafficante. After talking with Gary
you will need to follow up and confirm all these next week as
will be in Kansas City from Monday through Thursday. I will be
flying from Kansas City to Miami on Thursday night for the
interviews on Friday. You can reach me through the numbers
that either Bill Miller or Marie has. We need to talk at some
point next week to confirm all this.
**
A 14
WX POST
8/12/76
The Washington Post
AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER
THURSDAY,
A
W
Who Killed John Roselli?
E'RE GOING TO tell you a little story now.
Once there was a President who was murdered.
His brother was murdered too. A long time after they
died some very strange facts came to light. It turned
out that while they were running the government,
the government was trying to get two Mafia mobsters
to arrange the murder of someone else the head of
a small, hostile neighbor state. It also turned out that
one brother-the one who was President-appar-
ently had a girlfriend who was the girlfriend as well
of the mobsters. And one of the mobsters, whose
nickname was Momo, was prominent on the list of
criminals the President's brother was trying to put in
jail. The story may sound complicated, but life is com-
plicated, and the complications in this case got even
more so. For when a committee of the Congress
wanted the two mobsters to come and tell them some-
thing about all this, only one of them-the one
named Johnny- came. The other one, Momo, was
murdered in his house a week before they wanted
him to testify. Johnny, however, told his story to one
committee in the Congress and then came back-qui-
etly to tell some more things to another committee
which was in fact looking into the murder of the
President. Then Johnny went to Florida. Then no one.
could find him. Then some fishermen found him..
Dead. In an oil drum.
But we haven't told you the strangest part of all
yet, the part you're really not going to believe. It is
that when the great national political community of
solons, scribes, policemen, spies and managers of the
general wellbeing heard about poor Johnny, they
said: "Oh, my goodness." Some of them went farther,
of course. They said: "Fancy that!" But most of them
didn't say anything at all except: "Yawn."
Forgive us for lapsing into storybookese. We do it
for a reason which is that the simple unadorned facts
of the John and Robert Kennedy-Fidel Castro-CIA-
Mafia-Momo Giancana-Johnny Roselli-Judith Exner-
Church Committee-Schweiker Committee saga need
to be put forward in stark outline for their magni-
tude to be understood. Is it really, as the sophisticated
wisdom goes, "paranoid" on our part to brood about
the suggestive and possibly monstrous interconnec-
tions between all these facts and to wonder why they
are not the object of intense press and government
scrutiny? What accounts for the general indifference
in high places? What accounts for the eagerness with
which we all seem to accept that familiar tipoff that
we shall be hearing no more about the latest crime-
i.e., the pronouncement that Mr. Roselli's dispatch to
an oil drum and Beyond had "all the earmarks of a
gangland slaying." Those are the good old "ear-
marks" we only hear about when it is next to certain,
that we shall hear nothing more.
The supposition of course is that the Gang which
runs gangland has its reasons and its methods and
that, disagreeable as these may be, they really lie out-
side the proper realm of public concern because they
amount to a system of justice which 1) only affects
those dumb enough to get involved in it in the first
place and 2) tends only to punish those who have
committed what the rest of us would regard as hei-
nous crimes anyway. Not that these are things people
say-they're things people can be expected to as-
sume. But we think in this case the assumptions have
even less validity than they would have on a clear
day, which isn't much. And that is because if we
know anything, we know that the Mafia operations in
which Messers. Giancana and Roselli figured had be-
come intertwined with the operations of the United
States government. Never mind that the decisions of
the early 1960s which made this so may rank among
the most abominable decisions ever taken in the U.S.
government. The plain fact is that, given the provoca-
tive and suggestive history of the two men, it is not
possible for either Congress or the Executive Branch
to look the other way or to complaisantly accept the
earmarks-of-a-gangland-slaying bromide.
After Mr. Giancana was killed, the Church Commit-
tee inquired of the FBI whether its proposed meeting
with him had figured in his murder. The FBI re- .
ported that it had no evidence to this effect. The
then-director of the CIA, William Colby, felt obliged
to state that the CIA had had nothing to do with the
murder and Mr. Colby likewise pronounced the
other day that he was certain the CIA had not done in
Mr. Roselli. The mere fact that the questions, to
which these were meant to be the answers, had been
raised tells us, anyway, that much more in the way of
inquiry is wanted. The newly formed Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence has now asked the Justice
Department to make an investigation of Mr. Roselli's
death. We think the Department should comply and
that the investigation, despite FBI Director Clarence
Kelley's disclaimer of jurisdiction, should have the
Attorney General's personal attention. Such atten-
tion is needed because of the elaborate and not en-
tirely reassuring history of relationships between the
FBI and the CIA and the various participants in the
whole sorry saga. We are not suggesting that any
agency of government-or even any of those agen-
cy's fringe retainers were the murderers. We are
suggesting that there is an overlay of potentially em-
barrassing information sufficiently pervasive to keep
an awful lot of people from wanting to have this
thing aired. We also think that the Select Committee
should reserve the right to pursue the matter. Con-
gress, after all, can hardly be expected to sit idly by
while its witnesses are being done in. Nor do we see
how the public in general and the political establish-
ment in particular can turn their attention away un-
til we are all satisfied that a much greater effort has
been made by the government-which means both
the Executive Branch and the Congress-to discover
what elements were at play in this series of appalling
crimes and scandals.
The Data From M
DR. HAROLD KLEIN one of the scientists work.. and our best theories
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 118
ROSSELLI CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1955
1960
Meets Maheu at insurance friend's home.
Late July/early August. Maheu calls. Working for government. Recruit
Rosselli only. Meet Brown Derby, L.A., for lunch. Long talk about
project in Cuba. Rosselli wants verification.
2nd meeting, L.A., discuss further details, no discussion of specific
techniques. Plan to meet in N.Y. for verification.
Sept. 14, 1960. First meeting in N.Y. at old Plaza Hotel. Rosselli
introduced by Maheu to O'Connell. Rosselli "knew" O'Connell worked
for the CIA. Rosselli agrees to work on Cuban project.
Sept. 25, 1960. Maheu and Rosselli travel to Miami to begin making
contact with Cubans to be recruited for mission.
(Between Sept. 25 and the Bay of Pigs, a series of recruitments, meetings,
and arrangements were made. The following is an outline of events that
is not necessarily in chronological order.)
i
Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Trafficante.
where Maheu is introduced to Giancana.
Meeting
Giancana was, according
Rosselli states
to Rosselli, to only be a "back up man."
Giancana had nothing to do with the actual operation. Trafficant
was used, according to Rosselli, as a translator.
Meeting with O'Connell, Maheu, Rosselli, and two Admis
discuss the Cuban project.
Rosselli, in his contact with the Cubans, "invents" the cover
story that he represents some Wall Street business interests who
want to see Castro eliminated. Rosselli trusts Cubans he has
recruited because they are part of the Bay of Pigs operation.
1st attempt at assassination involved the use of pills. Maheu
and Rosselli met with Cuban #1 and #2 (?). Maheu opened up his
briefcase and gave the pills with instructions for their use to
Cuban #1. Maheu also had $10,000 he gave the Cubans for doing
the project. Rosselli did not know of the money. Rosselli states
he received no remuneration for his work on the project, in fact,
he paid out $800 for gas for a speed boat to deliver two or three
man parties for guerrilla raids into Cuba.
Prior to Bay of Pigs there was no discussion of using guns to
assassinate Castro.
Rosselli's cover name was "John Ralston."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 119
At different times, Cuban #1, #2, or #3 would propose different
projects. These would range from using plastic explosives to
booby trapping Castro's desk. Rosselli would relay these on
to Maheu, who, in turn, would contact the CIA. Most projects
were vetoed, but the CIA did supply a short wave radio to the
Cubans in Florida, to try and make contact with their people
in Havana.
Eventually, Rosselli felt the project had failed. There was no
specific point when it was announced. But, at sometime Rosselli
assumed the project, for whatever reason, had not succeeded.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 120
DATE
1959
October
1960
1961 Feb.
Early 1961
CHRONOLOGY
(ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS OF ANY
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATIONS)
EVENT OR ITEM
Richard Bissel becomes DDP
(head of Plans Directorate)
Tap on Dan Rowan phone in Las
Vegas (allegedly: (a) favor
to Giancana, and (b) done by
Rosselli)
Lumumba mysteriously killed
during Congolese strife.
News reports of CIA consideration
of Lumumba plot, but claim it
was done by others, e.g. Belgians?
Attempts to kill Castro before
Bay of Pigs landing by Rosselli
team
Bay of Pigs Landing
SOURCE ( Where Necessary)
Date and Rosselli role from
Government Opposition paper
to Rosselli motion for
reduction in sentence, 1971
Wash.Post & Star contempor-
aneous accounts
Wash. Post 2/6/75 story by
Lardener and Greider Tab A
Jack Anderson 1967, 1971
and 1975 columns;
Watergate Helms memcon
April 1961
May 31,
1961
Rest of 1961
and 1962
Sometime in
early 1960's
October 1962
Early 1963
Trujillo assassinated; charge
of U.S. involvement
Possibly ongoing efforts to
Kill Castro by Rosselli team
RFK quashes prosecution of
Giancana for Rowan Las Vegas tap
Cuban Missile Crisis -(date for
background reference)
Rosselli training a team in Miami
area
Jack Anderson column (1/19/
71) on Smathers coversation
with JFK. Agee book ( obvious
ly suspect in some respects)
last attempt by
Rosselli team in 1963, infra.
Watergate memcons on Keeney
and Wilson interviews
Wash. Post Greider/Lardener
story, supra., states Army
Ranger Capt Ayres saw him.
March 1963
Rosselli's last effort to
kill Castro
J. Anderson 1971 columns
Sometime in
1963
RFK stopped further efforts
J. Anderson 1971 columns
November
1963
Early 1964
Diem killed in Saigon coup
JFK told Smathers later
he thought CIA involved
Colby head of DDP Far East
Division at the time
Howard Hunt and others from
Bay of Pigs effort begin plot on
another Castro assassination
J. Anderson, 1/19/71 column
articles on Colby
reported by Tad Szulc in
book on Howard Hunt (1974)
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 121
>
Chronology
2
( more on Hunt Castro project)
May 1965
May 1965
(or later)
1966
1967
March 3
1967
1968
1968
Early 1969
1970
Assassination alleged to have
beenplanned as part of a smaller
invasion effortand preparations
were allegedly made in Costa Rica
Hunt Castro scheme "aborted when
Dominican Republic strife broke out
(scheme also allegedly involved
McCord, Barker and Sturgis)
As Katzenbach/Helms/LBJ meeting
on Domincan Republic ended, LBJ
asked Helms if CIA had ever
been involved in assassination
(of a leader) and Helms said "no".
CIA Poisoning plot ag| Haitian
Pres. Duvalier; bombing palace in "GF
Rosselli indicted for alien law
and interstate gambling crimes
(Friars Club card game rigging)
First Anderson column on Rosselli
In response to Anderson story,
RFK tells Walinsky and Edelman
he shut it off;
CIA bombing Haitian palace
Rosselli sentenced to 5 years
Asst. Atty Gen Wilson asks for
Justice Dept. Rosselli file
Rosselli goes before grand jury
under immunity re:Giancana
Szulc, supra
"
11
Katzenbach testimony
to Senate Select Committ
Anderson col., 4/7/75
Government Opposition
to sentence reduction,
supra.
We dont have, but Andersc
referred to in Hersh NY
Times story 3/10/75
Hersh story, supra
ANDERSON col., 4/7/75
Government Opposition,
Keeney Watergate memcon
Government Opposition, supi
1971 Jan.18
Jan.19
Jan. 27
Feb.l
First of three Anderson columns
Mahenu
✓ (scheduled to go before grand
jury on Las Vegas skimming) calls
AG John Mitchell
Same day: Haldeman asks Dean to inquire-
into Hughes/O'Brien/Maheu ties
Lenzner memo to SenErvin
on Rosselli ( and phone l
Maheu interviewed by Wilson and Peterson
on Rosselli matter
Caulfield to Dean memo that Maheu was
involved in covert activity for CIA in
early 1960's
Rosselli files motion for reduction
in sentence, citing Anderson stories
and presenting memorandum to Court
"
"
"
"
"
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 122
DATE
1959
October
1960
1961 Feb.
Early 1961
CHRONOLOGY
(ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS OF ANY
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATIONS)
EVENT OR ITEM
Richard Bissel becomes DDP
(head of Plans Directorate)
Tap on Dan Rowan phone in Las
Vegas ( allegedly: (a) favor
to Giancana, and (b) done by
Rosselli)
Lumumba mysteriously killed
during Congolese strife.
News reports of CIA consideration
of Lumumba plot, but claim it
was done by others, e.g. Belgians?
Attempts to kill Castro before
Bay of Pigs landing by Rosselli
team
Bay of Pigs Landing
SOURCE ( Where Necessary)
Date and Rosselli role from
Government Opposition paper
to Rosselli motion for
reduction in sentence, 1971
Wash.Post & Star contempor-
aneous accounts
Wash. Post 2/6/75 story by
Lardener and Greider Tab A
Jack Anderson 1967, 1971
and 1975 columns;
Watergate Helms memcon.
April 1961
May 31,
1961
Rest of 1961
and 1962
Sometime in
early 1960's
October 1962
Early 1963
March 1963
Trujillo assassinated; charge
of U.S. involvement
Possibly ongoing efforts to
Kill Castro by Rosselli team
RFK quashes prosecution of
Giancana for Rowan Las Vegas tap
Cuban Missile Crisis -(date for
background reference)
Rosselli training a team in Miami
area
Rosselli's last effort to
kill Castro
Jack Anderson column (1/19/
71) on Smathers coversation
with JFK. Agee book ( obvious
ly suspect in some respects)
last attempt by
Rosselli team in 1963, infra.
Watergate memcons on Keeney
and Wilson interviews
Wash. Post Greider/Lardener
story, supra., states Army
Ranger Capt Ayres saw him.
J. Anderson 1971 columns
Sometime in
1963
RFK stopped further efforts
J. Anderson 1971 columns
November
1963
Early 1964
Diem killed in Saigon coup
JFK told Smathers later
he thought CIA involved
Colby head of DDP Far East
Division at the time
Howard Hunt and others from
Bay of Pigs effort begin plot on
another Castro assassination
J. Anderson; 1/19/71-column_
articles on Colby
reported by Tad Szulc in
book on Howard Hunt (1974)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 123

Chronology
2
( more on Hunt Castro project)
May 1965
May 1965
(or later)
1967
March 3
1967
1968
Early 1969
1970
Assassination alleged to have
beenplanned as part of a smaller
invasion effortand preparations
were allegedly made in Costa Rica
Hunt Castro scheme "aborted when
Dominican Republic strife broke out
(scheme also allegedly involved
McCord, Barker and Sturgis)
As Katzenbach/Helms/LBJ meeting
on Domincan Republic ended, LBJ
asked Helms if CIA had ever
been involved in assassination
(of a leader) and Helms said "no"
Rosselli indicted for alien law
and interstate gambling crimes.
(Friars Club card game rigging)
First Anderson column on Rosselli
In response to Anderson story,
RFK tells Walinsky and Edelman
he shut it off%;B
Rosselli sentenced to 5 years
Asst. Atty Gen Wilson asks for
Justice Dept. Rosselli file
Rosselli goes before grand jury
under immunity re:Giancana
Szulc, supra
"
Katzenbach testimony
to Senate Select Committ
Government Opposition
to sentence reduction,
supra.
We dont have, but Anderso
referred to in Hersh NY
Times story 3/10/75
Hersh story, supra
Government Opposition,
Keeney Watergate memcon
Government Opposition, supr
1971 Jan.18
Jan.19
Jan. 27
Eeb.l
First of three Anderson columns
Mayhu (scheduled to go before grand
jury on Las Vegas skimming) calls
AG John Mitchell
Same day: Haldeman asks Dean to inquire
into Hughes/O'Brien/Maheu ties
Lenzner memo to SenErvin
on Rosselli ( and phone lc
Maheu interviewed by Wilson and Peterson
on Rosselli matter
Caulfield to Dean memo that Maheu was
involved in covert activity for CIA in
early 1960's
Rosselli files motion for reduction
in sentence, citing Anderson stories
and presenting memorandum to Court
"P
"
"1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 124
1961
10
After the Bay of Pigs (April 1961)
Rosselli felt "sorry for the poor bastards left on the
beach." Rosselli felt indirectly responsible for their
deaths since he had encouraged many of them to partici-
pate in the invasion Two or three weeks after the
invasion, Rosselli was contacted in Los Angeles by
O'Connell, a meeting was arranged for at the airport
hotel in Miami. Rosselli went there and was introduced
to Harvey! O'Connell said Harvey was now in charge of
the Cuban project. Harvey told Rosselli he was to cease
all contact with Maheu and Giancana. Further, Harvey
stated that the government was still interested in using
Rosselli for intelligence-gathering operations. Rosselli
would report information from the Cubans to Harvey about
personalities and events in Cuba. Rosselli would also
relay on to his Cuban contacts requests for specific in-
formation from the CIA.
Sometime between the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban
missile crisis, Harvey gave Rosselli six poison capsules.
Rosselli, in turn, gave them to his Cuban contacts who
were to take them to Cuba, where another Cuban or Cubans
would use them to assassinate Castro. Rosselli never
learned the details of what happened, but the project ob-
viously failed. At one point, Rosselli remembers hearing
over the radio that Castro was very ill. A short time
later, he recovered.
Sometime before the missile crisis, Rosselli arranged,
pursuant to Cuban #1 request, for a van loaded with rifles
and ammunition to be delivered in Florida O'Connell and
Rosselli watched the Cuban contact pick up the van and
return it empty. Rosselli assumed that these guns were
going to be used by the two or three-man raiding parties
in Cuba to assassinate Castro and overthrow the government.
During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago.
He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indian-
apolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called
him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington,
D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for
the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times,
would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the
location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed
that this had been successful. After the Cuban missile
crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all
contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban
missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being
called off.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 125
Rowan Tap
Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had
asked Maheu for a tap on Dan Rowan. Maheu gave
Rosselli two stories. The first was that he was
doing Giancana a favor and the second was that there
was a real intelligence value in that Maheu was
afraid that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out
intelligence information that would be of value to
enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard
of the names Dubois or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He
admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him,
but both Harvey and Rosselli were mad that the opera-
tion had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the
tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for
the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail.
Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to
turn over the bail money. Finally, Rosselli arranged
to have a man with a green carnation in his lapel
meet and transfer the bail money. He never received
any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did
not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that
he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no
answers. Rosselli knew that Maheu had been questioned
by the FBI.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 126
MEMORANDUM,
To:
Gary
From:
Rick
Date:
Subject:
August 10, 1976
Roselli
Howard
So mi
First, some background information.
Yesterday,
August 9, Senators Inouye and Baker met with Directors
Kelley and Bush to discuss Roselli's death. The FBI
doesn't want to touch this with a ten-foot pole. At the
meeting, Jim Adams told Inouye and Baker that the FBI had
been told by Justice (Richard Thornburg) that it had no
jurisdiction in this case. Levi had, apparently, not been
consulted. Senators Baker and Inouye (especially Baker)
requested Kelley to take this up directly with Levi. Today,
a letter was sent to Levi, signed by Baker and Inouye, urg-
ing Justice to authorize FBI involvement.
letter is attached.
One other point about the meeting.
A copy of that
George Bush was
extremely upset about this case and the allegations that
the CIA was involved in Roselli's death. He said that he
would personally contact Levi to request that the Depart-
ment grant jurisdiction to the FBI to investigate.
For your information, Roselli appeared before the
Committee on four separate occasions to testify on three
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 127
-2-
matters. He appeared on June 25 to discuss the plots against
Castro; on September 20 and 22 to discuss the Campbell affair;
and on April 25 to discuss the retaliation theory.
Their numbers
Now for current events. First, the two detectives in
Miami handling the Roselli case are Detectives Zatrefralek
and Wolf. They are with Dade County Homicide.
are 305-547-7456 and 547-7923. Madigan has already talked
with Detective Wolf. Second, in light of the Inouye/Baker
letter to Levi I did not ask the FBI about the current
whereabouts of Santo Trafficante.
I did, however, ask CIA.
They have no information. Third, Baker and Liebengood are
putting together a packet of information on Roselli, which
will include CIA and Select Committee information and will
get this to you tomorrow.
I think you already know this, but Senator Baker does
want to launch an informal investigation into this matter.
Roselli told him, when he appeared before the Committee, that
he thought his life was in danger for testifying. Baker feels
a moral obligation, therefore, to look into this.
I have attached the most recent articles on the Roselli
death for you.
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 128
1
-3-
P.S. A couple of grizzly facts: Over the past few years
there have been quite a few anti-Castro deaths in the
Miami area. Car bombs and shootings have been the usual
means of death. Second, we received a report today that
another body was pulled up in the Hudson River. Another
gangland slaying, complete with cement and chains.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 129
!!
MEMORANDUM
TO:
TO THE FILES
FROM:
PATRICK SHEA AND MICHAEL MADIGAN
DATE:
JUNE 21, 1975
At the meeting
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY OF A MEEETING WITH MR. JOHN ROSSELLI
BEGAN AT 11:35 a.m., JUNE 21, 1975, IN ROOM 711 of the WATERGATE HOTEL
PRESENT AT THE SESSION: MR. MICHAEL MADIGAN, MR. PATRICK SHEA OF THE SELECT
COMMITTEE STAFF, MR. ROSSELLI, MR. THOMAS WADDEN, MR. JAMES CANTILLON, MR. LESLIE
SCHERR.
At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Madigan asked Mr. Rosselli if he felt
a need for any protection. He stated%3B emphatically, "No," that he was able to
take care of himself. Mr. Madigan made it clear that the Senate Select Committee
could provide US/ Marshalls for Mr. Rosselli during his stay in Washington.
This offer was rejected.
Mr. Rosselli stated that Giancanna had no involvement, to his knowledge,
with any of the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro. Maheu did deal with
higher authorities in government but stated that Rosselli was only the contact,
Giancana has a backup man. Rosselli was very concerned about the adverse
publicity in recent times, about the CIA and he thought it was unfortunate from
the Agency's point of view that the Giancana name had been linked to the Agency.
Rosselli was upset by the harassment he had been under by the FBI. He
pointed to the 1966 Frier Club incident as an example. He said in 1966 he had
been approached by the FBI to provide information on inside basis about organized
crime and when he had refused 18 months later he was indicted. Again, the first
week in June of 1970, the FBI had offered him cooperation but he refused.
Rosselli first met Maheu twenty years ago. He was introduced through a
life long friend who is dead now, named Spitzle, who was in the insurance business.
This first meeting happened in Los Angeles, in 1955. Maheu, at the time, was
running Maheu Associates in Washington, D.C. The meeting was only a social
gathering. There was nothing specifically discussed about activities of the CIA.
1960)
In July or August, Maheu called Rosselli and stated that he was working for
the government and had been specifically asked to recruit Rosselli. Maheu wax
stressed that it was to be Rosselli and no one else. They agreed to meet for lunch
at the Brown Derby in Los Angeles. Maheu described the project as an intelligence
operation involving Cuba. Maheu mentioned specifically Castro, Che Guevara, and
Raoul Castro. It was Rosselli's feeling that Maheu had recruited him because of
his known Cuban connections in Florida. These connections were unrelated to
gambling. There was no money mentioned by Maheu to Rosselli for payment for
services.
*་
The alleged support of Wall Street business men had not been mentioned and
was a cover invented by Roseelli.later. At the end of their first meeting, they
agreed to meet again at which time Maheu would verify to Rosselli that he was
working for the government. This verification would be by introducing a
government official of higher authority to Rosselli.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 130
Thou wous no
StPhone
-2-
Pre-Baye
igs &
The second meeting an occurred a week or ten days later. At this point,
Rosselli was instructed to proceed to New York for an introduction to the
manent Roy. tag Red for an
government official. He At both the first and second 
meetings
all went to NYC.
coinciding
hour or more and various aspects of the proposed of projects, were discussed
but nothing was mentioned of specific techniques.
Rosalli
Rosselli remembered his arrival in New York: Kiting with a visit N by
[Khrushchev] Eisenhower, Castro, Nasser, and perhaps Krushev. He said it was noteworthy
because New York was crawling with officials from all over the world. Rosselli
paid his own fare from Los Angeles to New York and stayed at the old Plaza Hotel
on Fifth Avenue and 57th Street. He was given the cover name, John Ralston.
??
.
?
The meeting in New York took place in a hotel room. In attendance.were
Maheu, Rosselli and "big" Jim O'Connell, and two or three other people who
did not explain why they were there. Jim O'Connell was introduced as a CIA
official. Rosselli was unclear as to whether this was stated explicitly or
whether through the whole context of discussions it became clear that he worked
for the CIA. At this point, Rosselli was satisfied that Maheu was working for
the government and, therefore, agreed to work the Cuban mission described at
their first meeting. Rosselli was not sure as to the length of his stay in New
York at this time. He did remember going to lunch with Maheu a number of times
and talking about the particular projects.
After his stay in New York, he traveled to either Washington, D. C. or
Florida. He was uncertain as to the exact location but he did remember there
were series of meetings between himself and Maheu to discuss further plans.
about the attempted assassination. There was only one further meeting with
O'Connell, involving these preliminary stages. At this point, he only discussed
techniques of assassination with Maheu. Rosselli remembered staying in Maheu's
Falls Church home ( it had a tennis court during his stays in Washington.
There still had been no discussion of the cover story (that Rosselli was a
private citizen representing a group of private businessmen from the New York.)
When Rosselli reached Florida, he made his contacts with the Cubans and
then arranged for the Cuban's to meet with Maheu. He trusted the Cubans he came
in contact with because they, according to themselves, were working on the Bay of
Pigs operation, which had not occurred as of yet. There were times when they would
stay at Arthur Godfrey's hotel the Kenilworth Hotel, in Florida. At times he
O registered under the name on. This was to allow him to maintain his cover
while Maheu, still working for Hughes, was able to register under his own name,
so that Hughes believed that he was doing his work. The operation went on in
terms of Rosselli arranging meetings with his Cuban contacts and then having
further discussions about specifics with Maheu. At times%3 O'Connell, from
the CIA, would visit with Maheu and Rosselli. One time, before the 1960 election,
O'Connell brought with him two Admirals, one of whom, Rosselli thinks, was retired.
with
At this point, Rosselli also was telling his Cuban contacts the cover story,
namely that he represented private business interests in New York who were interested
in seeing Castro done away with. The Cubans, at this point, had not met withJim
O'Connell, but had met with Maheu. Immediately after the Bay of Pigs, Maheu
left and Rosselli only met once more with O'Connell. Then he also left for the West
Coast.
The two attempts at assassination, both involved the use of pills. One attempt
was before the Bay of Pigs and the other was sometime after. The first means was to
use a capsule filled with a special poison that could be spilled into the food of
Castro and cause him to die of poisoning that was not traceable and made his death
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 131
-3-
#Cuban between Florida and Cuba.
look like a heart attack or by natural causes. Rosselli contacted a little
Cuban whose relative was a chef for Castro, At this time, Cubans could still
It was agreed that the CIA would manufacture
the poison capsule. It would be turned over to O'Connell, to Maheu, to Rosselli,
and from Rosselli to the Cubans. pp Maheu brought the capsule to Florida to the
Fontaineblen Hotel. The Cubans came up to the room, Maheu opened up his brief
case, with Rosselli and the Cubans present, and gave them capsule, plus $10,000
how MANY dollars. The money had come from the CIA and was considered partial payment
Pills
#2
Post-Bay
of Pigs
for the job of assassinating Castro. At this meeting, Maheu described the
method of using these capsules, making sure the Cubans understood the Cubans
understood they could not be put in food that was boiled, or other aspects
of using these pills here was no discussions with the Cubans, at this meeting,
about $250,000 dollars. That figure was used by Maheu after his first meeting
with the Cubans, described what the a CIA might put up to help the families
of men injured or killed in this attempted assassination Rosselli thinks that
the meeting with the money and capsules was after the election. P The number one
Cuban contact that Rosselli had would from time to time, make requests of Rosselli
to be relayed on to the CIA for equipment. The CIA did provide, for instance,
a short wave radio, which was supposed to be used by the Cubans in Florida to
contact Cubans in Cuba about the success or failure of the poison pill mission.
Rosselli was sure that the pills were sent to Cuba but he has received no
explanation as to what happened.
Another project was for the Cubans to receive plastic explosives from the
CIA and give them to frogmen on their side that in turn would place them on ships
in Havana harbor and blow them up. The CIA refused to do this because of the
ease with which plastic explosives could be traced back to the government agencies
such as the CIA. Maheu did EYEY discuss the use of cigars that would make
Castro's hair drop off. According to Rosselli lose his ability to govern the
country. Another proposal was that there be a booby trapped desk. Each of these
latter two projects were proposed by Cuban refugees who said they had people
in positions vis a vis Castro who could achieve the assassination.
✓ Prior t
Prior 
to the Bay of Pigs, there was no discuss fewer men than were involved
of guns. Rosselli claimed
to have a better idea than Maheu, namely that with far
in the Bay of Pigs, perhaps a hundred, they could land in Cuba and do the job
successfully Rosselli's Cuban contact at the time was traveling to New York and
New Orleans for meetings. Rosselli was not sure about what the meetings were
about but said that they were related to the overthrow of Castro. Another proposal
put forward was to purchase a speed boat and use some type exploding seashell.
宜
No
The night before the Bay of Pigs Rosselli went to his number one Cuban's
house and spoke with him. The Cuban contact said, "See you in Havana." Rosselli
expressed serious reservation about the possibility of success for the operation.
Rosselli eft Florida right after the Bay of Pigs. His total time on this
particular attempt at assassination in Florida was three or four months.
Rosselli felt sorry for"the poor bastards left on the beach." He felt
indirectly responsible for having encouraged the many of them to participate
in the operation. He went home and stayed in Las Vegas and Los Angeles for awhile.
A few weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Rosselli was contacted by Maheu or O'Connell,
he's not sure. He did meet with Jim O'Connell in Florida a few weeks later. They
had arranged to have rooms at the Airport Hotel. Rosselli was not sure as to what
his name, what name he registered under, but at this meeting in Florida he met a
new CIA man, named Harvey. The first time ne Maxxx met Harvey, Rosselli was told
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 132
Castro
re-in force
Ok w/
'67 Rept
but
20
2d Phone
Harvey wanted to know all that Rosselli knew about Cuba
Maheu
Man intelligence line.
Harvey told him at text this meeting to have no further contact with
and that he should not talk further with Giancana." He also said that he, Harvey,
was in charge of the operation and that Maheu should take!! or that Rosselli should
take his orders from Harvey. At this point the original||project, using pills,
was considered defunct.
with Herver
After this first meeting, Rosselli again contacted his Cuban people. He
made several trips, that is, Rosselli made several trips with Harvey in Florida,
some down in the Keys to see what type of operations were||continuing. One of
the projects Harvey had Rosselli doing was verifying CIA reports by using Rosselli's.
own people who were in frequent contact with Cuba. The intelligence reports dealt
both with personalities in the Cuban hierarchy, as well as differentongoing
operations. Rosselli paid his own bills wit before the Bay of Pigs but after, Harvey
would usually pick up the tab.
Harvey approached Rosselli with the proposed mission to try it for a second
time to assassinate Cuba[5] Harvey said that the new spills would really work
and were much stronger. Harvey gave Rosselli six pills, then Rosselli gave those
six pills to his Cuban contact. There were no special instructions on how'
to handle the pills and his Cuban contact said that they would be passed into Cuba
and used.
At this time, Rosselli had no ongoing contact with Maheu, but may have run
into him in Los Angeles. Maheu knew that Rosselli was still working on the Cuban
project and that he, Maheu, was out. Rosselli never got any report back on what
happened to the six pills but he assumed that they had been unsuccessful He did
hear a report over a radio or TV station, that Fidel Castro was deathly
111, but then, shortly thereafter, he recovered.
Rosselli arranged for the CIA to supply a panel truck loaded with carbines
for use by his Cuban contacts to make two or three-manned party raids into cuba,
hopefully assassinating Castro and overturning the government.
During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted
Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago.
Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C.,
Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile
crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the
location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been
successful! After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him
to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions.
Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off!
The only money that Rosselli ever put up was $800 to buy gas for the speed-
boat that would deliver the two or three-man teams to Cuba to do guerrilla operations.
He stressed throughout the interview that he had never received any money and that
besides this $800 he had never given any money for. His last contact with Harvey
was in June of 1963 or shortly there before, when Rosselli found out that Harvey
was being transfered to Rome and he made a special trip to Washington to say goodby
to him.
last
late of
?
April
?
1)
detail
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 133

-5-
before a
often 
the
tay
-detail
The Rowan tap; Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked
Maheu for a tap on Run Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first
was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the cond was that there was a real
intelligence value in that he was. Maheu was afraid, that||Giancana or Rowan
might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of
the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dubor Belotti or Fred
Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey
and Rosselli were pissed off xxxl that the operation had gone on. Giancana
obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the
two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli
could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Mr. Rosselli arranged
to have a man with green carnation in his lapel meet with Mr. Doakes" for a transfer
of the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims
that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been
questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers and he knew that Maheu had been
questioned by the FBI.
During his early contacts with Maheu in 1959 and '60, in setting up the
Cuban operation, Maheu was setting up a guard system for different Hughes'.
operations, such as Hughes Aircraft or other corporate interests.
Rosselli can't remember whether he ever introduced Giancana as Mr. Sam
Gold. He claims to have no business relationship with Giancana. Rosselli's
only business interests was the ice machines in Las Vegas! He ran those by himself
and had no contact with Giancana. When asked about Joe Santa
Trafficanto,
Rosselli stated that he used him only as an interpreter but not as a contact for
recruiting other Cubans for his mission.
11
Mr. Thomas Waddens stated that he was receiving no fees for his counsel,
for his representing Rosselli, now. The status of Mr. Cantillon or Mr. Scherr
was not clear. There was discussion as to the Committee paying the expenses
of Mr. Rosselli's transportation from Los Angeles and there was discussion as to
the limits, if any, to be placed on the Committee's inquiry of Mr. Rosselli's
contacts with the Cubans, how they had been developed, and what other operations
did go on.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 134
The Attorney General
The informant was told that his offer is outside
our juridiction, which he acknowledged. No commitments were
made to him. At this time, we do not plan to further pursue
the matter. Our relationship with him has been most carefully
guarded and we would feel obligated to handle any recontact
of him concerning this matter if such is desired.
1- The Deputy Attorney General
appy"
RECEIVE FROM
7 1976
DOJ
2
Book V, p. 12-13
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 136
The cast of characters surrounding
the seizure of anti-Castro
hardware as outlined on these pages
is particularly interesting.
The raw material cited in the
footnote is attached. Note
reference to Brinquer and Oswald.
Below that McLaney brothers and
Victor Espinosa and Frank Sturgis.
Not attached is a critical New
Orleans field office memo to
FBI headquarters linking Briniuer
to the McClaney/Sturgis operation.
New Orleans
tion a photo-
Orleans, La.,
given to a
record, given
lo the same,
Fidel Castro,
ht to invade
ates will do
right.
By friend to
d this after
that eonver-
n my friend
there and he
e Fair Play
horities, be-
nowledge of
front of Ed
. Council of
friend and
itler all the
hat Oswald
Oswald had
Ve gave all
11, somebody
lebate.
day of the
The time of
Bill Stuckey
indicate to
hake hands
at Stuckey
belleve that
to Oswald
to him as
t one Com-
ommunism,
hat I don't
I
;ic way.
+'ommunist,
hat if any
. something
me to me,
ve nothing
• answered
the wrong
it moment.
lebook for
vill happen
y him per-
sonally as a traitor if he doing something wrong in the debate. When he saw the
guidebook for Marines, he smiled to me, and he told me: "Well, listen, Carlos
don't try to do an invasion with that guidebook for Marines, because that is an
old one and that will be a failure." That was his joke in that moment.
E
After that we went to the debate, and I think that you have the whole history
of the debate, you have the transcription and everything, [so] that I don't have
to go inside that, because that is subjective, not objective. You have the ob
Jective, and that is the debate.
H
Mr. LIEBELER. That is right. We do have a transcript and we listened to it on
the tape last night over at the television station too.
P
Mr. BRINGUIER. And there is something that I want to show you too. I told
to you about the training camp that were across the Lake Pontchartrain.
Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.
Mr. BRINGUIER. [Producing newspaper.] At the beginning of August in the
Diario Las Americas from Miami for September 4-
C
Mr. LIEBELER. For September 4, 1963?
Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right. [Indicating photograph.) This is the spy
who was inside the training camp. The Christian Democratic Movement turned
him over to the FBI, and the FBI was questioning him in Miami. The Christian
Democratic Movement found a letter, according to this information, from this
guy directed to Carlos Lechuga, foriner Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and now
Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. In that letter the spy,
Fernando Fernandez, was warning Lechuga that they have to be alert from that
date to August 8, and the day that Oswald came trying to infiltrate my orga
nization was on August 5. This sounds for me strange in all this matter.
P
Fine
11!
[Indicating. Here is another interview from Fernandez here 3 days later.
Mr. LIEBELER. You are referring to a copy of the same newspaper but for the
date of September 6, 1963, on the front page of which-
THING
Mr. BRINQUIER. [Indicating.] Here. "Fernando Fernandez is in favor of
coexistence with the Communist regime of Castro." That is the title in
Spanish.
Mr. LIEBELER. Let me see if I can understand what you are saying. You say.
that Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga in Mexico.
Mr. LIERELER. Lechuga is a member of the Castro government?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.
Mr. LIEBELER. He is now Ambassador to the United Nations?
Mr. BRINGUIER. In New York; right.
Mr. LIEBELER. Fernandez is the person who was the Castro spy who had in-
filtrated the training camp in Louisiana?
THE
11:
Pro-
Mr. BRINGUIER. For the Christian Democratic Movement here in Louisiana.
Mr. LIEBELER. Now the Christian Democratic Movement is-what?
Castro?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Anti-Castro.
Mr. LIEBELER. It is an anti-Castro organization?
E
Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes; they were training Cubans over here to make a com-
mando action against Castro, but they find out that there was a Castro spy
inside the training camp, and they went back to Miami with the people and with
him, and they turn him over to the FBI. I think that after that the leader
for the Christian Democratic Movement-or that the FBI didn't found nothing,
because was not against the law to spy inside an anti-Castro organization. It
was against the law to spy inside the US. Government but not inside the anti-
Castro organization. And my feeling-and this is the question that I am asking
myself in New Orleans we are about 900 miles from Miami: In Miami is where
the headquarters of all the anti-Castro groups. I could not find any reason
for Oswald to come to me and offer me his service to train Cubans in guerrilla
warfare at the same moment when there was a secret anti-Castro training camp
in New Orleans and a Castro spy was inside that training camp. That for me.
is because, if he was willing to infiltrate one active organization, he will go
directly to Miami and he will offer his service over there in Miami, but not in
New Orleans where it is not publicly known tha here was something going on
at that moment. I believe that that was the only time here in New Orleans that
43
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 137
there was something like that, and it was a coincidence. And there is another
coincidence too for me, and that is that when Oswald left the city he went to
Mexico, and the letter from Fernandez that was intercepted here was to. Mexico
too, and Oswald visit the Cuban consulate in Mexico, and the Fernandez letter
was to the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. For me, that is a big doubt.
Mr. LIEBELER. Go ahead.
Mr. BRINQUIER. You see, after the debate, the same night of the debate, I
went to the radio station here in New Orleans and the local papers and the
United Press International office, and I gave a press release. If you want a
copy, I could give you a copy. I gave a copy to the Secret Service.
The most interesting thing is the four things that I asked to the Secret
Service of New Orleans. I think that this is the second one where I said,
"Write to your Congressman asking for a full investigation of Mr. Lee H.
Oswald, a confessed Marxist" [producing document]. And that was 3 months
before the assassination.
Mr. LIEBELER. Do you have another copy of this?
Mr. BRINGUIER. I have the original of that. You can have that.
11
1 THEIR L
Mr. LIEBELER. I have marked a copy of the press release distributed to the
various communications media here in New Orleans, on August 16, 1963-
Mr. BRINGUIER! No, August 21.
Mr. LIEBELER. August 21, 1963?
r
Mr. BRINGUIER. August 21, the night of the debate.
Mr. LIEBELER. I mark it as "Exhibit No. 3" to your deposition, and I have
Initialed it. Would you initial it?
[The witness complied.]
HER
Mr. LIEBELER. Let me go over some of this testimony that you have just
given to see if I understand. Mr. Fernandez wrote to Mr. Lechuga a letter
in which Fernandez said that we-meaning the Castro people?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes..
Mr. LIEBELER. Must be on guard up until August 8?
Mr. BRINGUIER. August 8, that is right.
Mr. LIEBELER. Of 1963?
Mr. BRINQUIER. That is right.
E
Mr. LIEBELER. You indicated that Oswald had come to your store or offices
on August 5, 1963?
Mr. BRINQUIER. That is right.
Mr. LIEBELER! Oswald came to you offering to assist in the military training
of Cubans?
Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.
Mr. LIEBELER. At that time, there was, in fact, a training camp near New
Orleans-
1
Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.
Mr. LIEBELER. For the training of people for military action against Castro?
Mr. BRINGUIER.Right.
T
Mr. LIEBELER. And that was not public knowledge at that time?
Mr. BRINQUIER. That is right.
Mr. LIEBELER! So you are tying this up in your mind by considering the pos-
sibility that Oswald was, in fact, a Castro agent?
Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.
Mr. LIEBELER. And did know about the existence of this training camp, be-
cause Mr. Fernandez had already himself infiltrated that training camp?
Mr. BRINQUIER. That is right.
T
Mr. LIEBELER. And that Fernandez had told Oswald about the existence of this
camp and had asked Oswald himself to try to infiltrate that camp for your
organization?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Excuse me.
Mr. LIEBELER. Is that correct?
Mr. BRINGUTER. Well, the only thing that I don't believe is that Fernandez
had told directly to Oswald. What I believe is that Fernandez had informed
some people outside the United States, and these people had informed Oswald and
had gave to Oswald the order to try to infiltrate the Cuban group here in New
Orleans.
44
Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernand
aware of approximately the time
fore, indicated to Lechuga that i
discovered as an attempted infiltr.
Mr. BRINQUIER. I beg pardon?
Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand
lates to the fact that Fernandez
will be in danger,"-up until abo
anything to do with Oswald?
Mr. BRINQUIER. Well, what I thi
on August 5 Oswald came to me
same period of time. Somethin
Orleans, that there was a secret
of the Fair Play for Cuba Comn.
New Orleans. Those are the fact
not sure about. I just want to s.
connection.
Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't see
handing out literature in the stre
to infiltrate the anti-Castro moven
Mr. BRINQUIER. Remember that
after I told him that I don't hav
that here there is nothing, and th
went openly to do that before t
he went openly to do that after he w
Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of.
In the pro-Castro movement and
Information to Oswald-conducted
Mr. BRINGUIEK. No.
Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have a
as a result of your anti-Castro ac
person as this, do you think you
Mr. BRINQUIER. Beg your pardon
Mr. LIEBELER. If there were suc
Castro movement who had been w
would have had access to that in
find out about it?
Even amoi
Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is
have a lot of persons. There ar
who are anti-Castro.
agents here in the city and you c
But there is something else: The
is located in 117 Decatur Street, j
the owner of the Havana Bar is
over there, gave the information
before that Oswald went to the
lemonade. He was with one Mexi
drinking the lemonade, he start to
to be a Cuban capitalistic, and tha
He was telling that that was too n
moment, Oswald feel bad at that
out to the sidewalk to vomit outsid
the Havana Bar told me that the g
the same one that one time the FBI
immediately because that was a pr
August 15 and August 30 was th
because I start to find out all these
before, because before I did not
nothing of this before to me. Bet
the owner of the Havana Bar cam
cause he already. saw one automol.
one of them the one who had bee
1
-
J
Face
15 Ho
Panier ter
* doubt.
of the debate, I
papers and the
If you want a
d to the Secret
e where I said,
of Mr. Lee H.
it was 3 months
istributed to the
ust 16, 1963-
tion, and I have
t you have just
Lechuga a letter
store or offices
Military training
camp near New
. against Castro?
sidering the pos-
aining camp, be-
ing camp?
· existence of this
t camp for your
that Fernandez
ez had informed
rmed Oswald and
roup here in New
Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernandez was, on this theory, aware of that and was
aware of approximately the time Oswald. would make this attempt, and, there
fore, indicated to Lechuga that there would be some danger of Oswald being
discovered as an attempted infiltrator?
Mr. BRINGUIER, I beg pardon? I don't understand the words.
Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand, part of the hypothesis here, the theory, re-
Intes to the fact that Fernandez said to Lechuga, "We must be careful, or we
will be in danger,"-up until about August 8. Now does that statement have
anything to do with Oswald?
:
Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I think is this: He send that letter to Lechuga, and
on August 5 Oswald came to me offering his service to train Cubans, all in the
same period of time. Something that never was happening here in New
Orleans that there was a secret anti-Castro training camp, and the chairman
of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee trying to join the Cuban group here in
New Orleans. Those are the facts. I don't want to tell something that I am
not sure about. I just want to show you that tremendous coincidence or that:
connection.
Mr. LIERELER. Now it doesn't seem likely, does it, that Oswald would go around
handing out literature in the streets like he did if he was actually attempting
to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement?
1
i
Mr. BRINQUIER. Remember that that was after I turned down his offer and
after I told him that I don't have nothing to do with military activities and
that here there is nothing, and that I turned down completely him. He didn't
went openly to do that before the attempt to infiltrate the training camp
he went openly to do that after he was turned down.
Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of any conceivable association between anybody
in the pro-Castro movement and Oswald that could have acted as a source of
information to Oswald-conducted the orders to him?
Mr. BRINGUIER. No.
Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have any way of obtaining information of that sort.
as a result of your anti-Castro activities and contacts? If there were such
person as this, do you think you would be likely to know about it?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon?
Mr. LIEBELER. If there were such a person, that is to say, some agent of the
Castro movement who had been working with Oswald, do you think that you
would have, had access to that information or you would have been likely to
find out about it?
RO
R
Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is a hard question, because here in the city you
have a lot of persons. There are some who are pro-Castro, there are many
who are anti-Castro. Even among the Cubans you could have some Castro,
agents here in the city and you could not have control of everybody.
But there is something else: The owner of the Havana Bar-the Havana Bar
is located in 117 Decatur Street, just two door or three door from my store
the owner of the Havana Bar is a Cuban; and he and one of the employees
over there, gave the information to me after Kennedy's assassination-not
before that Oswald went to the Havana Bar one time. He asked for some
lemonade. He was with one Mexican at that moment, and when Oswald was
drinking the lemonade, he start to say that, sure, the owner of that place had
to be a Cuban capitalistic, and that he argue about the price of the lemonade.
He was telling that that was too much for a lemonade, and he feel bad at that
moment, Oswald feel bad at that moment he had some vomits and he went
out to the sidewalk to vomit outside on the sidewalk. These persons here from
the Havana Bar told me that the guy, the Mexican, who was with Oswald, was
the same one that one time the FBI told them that if they will see him, call them
immediately because that was a pro-Communist. I remember that was between
August 15 and August 30 was that period of time. I could not locate that
because I start to find out all these things after the Kennedy assassination, not
before because before I did not found any connection. They did not told
nothing of this before to me. Between the 15th and the 30th the brother of
the owner of the Havana Bar came to my store asking me to call the FBI, be
cause he already saw one automobile passing by the street with two Mexicans,
one of them the one who had been with swald in the bar, and he told me
¦
GEM:
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 139
:e
e
11
.e
e
> -
11
Fair Play for Cuba Committee materials on one uneventful oc-
casion in Dallas sometime during the period April 6-24, 1963,316
Oswald's first public identification with that cause was in New Or-
leans. There, in late May and early June of 1963, under the name
Lee Osborne, he had printed a handbill headed in large letters "Hands
Off Cuba," an application form for, and a membership card in, the
New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.317 He
first distributed his handbills and other material uneventfully in the
vicinity of the U.S.S. Wasp, which was berthed at the Dumaine Street
wharf in New Orleans, on June 16, 1963.318 He distributed literature
in downtown New Orleans on August 9, 1963, and was arrested because
of a dispute with three anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and again on August
16, 1963.319 Following his arrest, he was interviewed by the police, and
at his own request, by an agent of the FBI.320 On August 17, 1963, he
appeared briefly on a radio program 321 and on August 21, 1963, he
debated over radio station WDSU, New Orleans, with Carlos Brin-
guier, one of the Cuban exiles who had been arrested with him on
August 9.322 Bringuier claimed that on August 5, 1963, Oswald had
attempted to infiltrate an anti-Castro organization with which he was
associated, 323
While Oswald publicly engaged in the activities described above,
his "organization" was a product of his imagination. 324 The imaginary
president of the nonexistent chapter was named A. J. Hidell,³25 the
name that Oswald used when he purchased the assassination weapon. 326
Marina Oswald said she signed that name, apparently chosen because
it rhymed with "Fidel," 327 to her husband's membership card in the
New Orleans chapter. She testified that he threatened to beat her if
she did not do so.328 The chapter had never been chartered by the
national FPCC organization.329 It appears to have been a solitary.
operation on Oswald's part in spite of his misstatements to the New
Orleans police that it had 35 members, 5 of which were usually present
at meetings
Oswald's
1
were held once a month 330 T
Play for Cuba activities may be viewed as a very
shrewd political operation in which one man single handedly created
publicity for his cause or for himself. It is also evidence of Oswald's
reluctance to describe events accurately and of his need to present
himself to others as well as to himself in a light more favorable than
was justified by reality. This is suggested by his misleading and some-
time untruthful statements in his letters to Mr. V. T. Lee, then
national director of FPCC. In one of those letters, dated August 1.
1963, Oswald wrote that an office which he had previously claimed to
have rented for FPCC activities had been promply closed 3 days
later for some obsure reasons by the renters, they said something
about remodeling ect!, I'm sure you understand." 331 He wrote that
"thousands of circulars were distrubed" 332 and that he continued to
receive inquiries through his post office box which he endeavored
"to keep ansewering to the best of my ability." In his letter to
V. T. Lee, he stated that he was then alone in his efforts on behalf
of FPCC, but he attributed his lack of support to an attack by Cuban
407
9 333
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 140
exiles in a street demonstration and being "officialy cautioned" by the
police, events which 
robbed me of what support I had leaving me
alone."334
335
338
1.11
In spite of those claims, the Commission has not been able to un-
cover 
any 
evidence that anyone ever attacked any street demonstration
in which 
Oswald was involved, except for the Bringuier incident men-
tioned above, 
which occurred, 8 days after Oswald wrote the above
letter 
to V. T. Lee. Bringuier, who seemed to be familiar with many
anti-Castro activities in 
New Orleans, was not aware of any such
incident.3
336 
Police reports also fail to reflect any activity on Oswald's
part prior 
to 
August 9, 1963, except for the uneventful distribution of
literature at the 
Dumaine Street wharf in June, 33
337 
Furthermore, the
general tenor of Oswald's next letter to V. T. Lee, in which he sup-
ported his 
report on the Bringuier incident with a copy of the charges
made against him 
and a newspaper clipping reporting the event, sug-
gests that his 
previous story of an attack by Cuban exiles was at least
greatly 
exaggerated. While the legend "FPCC 544 Camp St. NEW
ORLEANS, LA.
" was stamped on some literature that Oswald had
in his possession at the time of his arrest in New Orleans, extensive
investigation was not able to connect Oswald with that address, al-
though it did 
develop the fact that an anti-Castro organization had
maintained 
offices there for a period ending early in 1962.339 The
Commission has not 
been able to find any other indication that Oswald
had rented an office in New
New 
Orleans. In view of the limited amount
of public activity on Oswald's part before August 9, 1963, there also
seems to 
be no basis for his claim that he had distributed "thousands"
of circulars, especially since he had claimed to have printed only 2,000
and actually 
had only 11000 printed. In addition, there is no evidence
that he received 
any substantial amount of materials from the|na-
tional 
headquarters.340
In another letter to V. T. Lee, dated August 17, 1963, Oswald wrote
that 
he had 
appeared on Mr. William Stuckey's 15-minute television
program over WDSU-TV called "Latin American Focus" as a result
of which 
he was "flooded with callers and invitations to debate's ect.
as well as people interested in joining the F.P.C.C. New Orleans
branch."
"
341 WDSU has no program of any kind called "Latin Ameri-
can Focus." 342 Stuckey had a radio program called "Latin Listening
Post," on which 
Oswald was heard for less than 5 minutes on August
17, 
1963.313 It appears that Oswald had only one caller in response to
all of his FPCC 
activities, an agent of Bringuier's attempting to learn
more about 
the true nature of the alleged FPCC "organization" in
New Orleans.344
Oswald's statements suggest that he hoped to be flooded with callers
and invitations to debate. This would have made him a real center of
attention as he must have been when he first arrived in the Soviet Union
and as he was to some extent when he returned to the United States.
The limited 
notoriety that Oswald received as a result of the street
fracas 
and in the subsequent radio debate was apparently not enough
to satisfy him. He 
exaggerated in his letters to V. T. Lee in an appar
408
OSWALD DISTRIBUTING FAIR
ORLEANS, AUGUST 16, 1963 --
BILLS ON WHICH HE HAD ST.
COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2966 A
HANDS
OFF
CUBA!
Join the Fair Play for
*Cuba Committee
NEW ORLEANS CHARTER
MEMBER BRANCH
Free Literature, Lectures
LOCATION:
OSWALD
GOOT MALACING OF
RYONE WELCOME!
CUB
GARNER DE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 141
730-900 O-64-28
3.
10:
SIGNATURE
☐ APPROVAL
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐
ANSWER OR ACKNOWL-
EDGE ON OR DEFORE
PREPARE REPLY FOR
THE
REMARKS
☐ ☐ ☐☐
183.
COMMENT
NECESSARY ACTION
NOTE AND RETURN
CALL NE
PER CONVERSA
SATION
☐ AS REQUESTED
☐ NOTE AND FILE
YOUR INFORMATION
bilk
loose pop
35-3
Thank You
FROM
NAME
BUILDING, ROOM, EXT. DATE
Jon
BD Ben
REVEVILAFROM
MAY 1976
DOJ
330 Ne
MM 105-1742
10/3/63
Rulet J. Dever
Report
information concerning the Comandus Mambises or their
spokesman RAFAEL MARTINEZ PUPO, who 
made a statement 
in
Guatemala claiming credit for the 
August 17, 1963 attack
.
BOSCH stated that the MIRR will promote other
attacks in the future, as opportunities and 
availability
of equipment permit, without compromising 
the United
States
MISCELLANEOUS
C June 14, 1963, information was received that
a group of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery
in Cuba
On June 15, 1963, United States Cuasons Agents
seized a twin Beechcraft airplane on the 
outskirts of
a quantity 
of explosives.
Miami, Florida, along with
MIGUEL ALVAREZ, EVELIO ALPIZAR, RENE ESPINOSA,
VICTOR ESPINOSA and CARLOS HERNANDEZ, along 
with American
SAM BENTON are involved and detained
, but not arrested,
It 
was ascertained
by United States Customs Agents.
that MICHAEL MC LANEY supplied the money and explosivea
for this operation. MC LANEY is 
well known as a former
Cuba, and
gambling concession operator in 
Havana
presently resides at Miami Beach, Florida.
On July 19, 1963, ACELO PEDROSO advised there
was another plan to bomb Cuba, using bomb 
casings and
dynamite located on the outskirts 
of New Orleans,
On July 31, 1963, the Federal Bureau of
Louisiana.
Jstigation (EBI) at New Orleans, Louisiana, obtained a
RIED FROM
1976
DOJ
35.
NOV 1:1967
INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION
Pump Rate 143.
INDEXED

MM 105-1742
search warrape and seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and
20 bomb casings near Lacombe Louisiana. This material
was located on the property of WILLIAM J. MC LANEY,
brother of MICHAEL J. MC LANEY, a Miami Beach gambler and
former operator of a casino in the Nacional Hotel, Havana,
Cuba.
Investigation determined that this dynamite was
purchased at Collinsville, Illinois, by RICH LAUGHED for
VICTOR ESPINO who was involved in the June 14, 1963
ESPINOSA transported the dynamite to
Also involved in this
seizures at themi
New Orleans in a rented trailer
bomb plot ware CARLOS HERNANDEZ, MIGUEL ALVAREZ and SAM
BENTON, a Miami, Florida private detective.
MM 3, who is personally acquainted with SAM
BENTON and RICH LAUCHLI, advised that SAN BENTON
been involved in the past, with Cuban revolutionary
P
groups in plans to sink yachts to obtain insurance
arms deals and collection of funds for personal
use.
ook
GERALD
MT-3 advised on June 14, 1963, RICH ALBERT
LAUCHLI of Collinsville, Illinois recently arrived in
Miami, Florish in a Ford station wagon with a load of
arms for sale American adventurers and mercenaries,
JR., and FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS
PATRICK HENG
MAUCHLI around to meet the different Cuban exile leaders in.
Miami. LAUCHLI subsequently sold a .57 mm recoilless
rifle to the SNFE, a Japanese machine gun to American
mercenary BILL CARMAN, two automatic rifles and to French
guns to RAMON FONT of Comandos L, and miscellaneous
.9
other equipment to other organizations.
MMT-3 explained that when LAUCHLI arrived in
Miami in June of 1963, his station vagon contained .50 caliber
RECEIVED FROM
MAY 1976
DOJ
36.
MM 105-1742
LAUCHLI sold
machine guns, nine sub-machine guns, automatic rifles
and a number of foreign-made weapons.
nearly all of these arms, and at reasonable prices.
MT-3 explained that LAUCHLI is more interested
in arms sales as a gun dealer, and has no emotional feeling
about the Cuban exile cause of trying to overthrow the
present Covernment in Cuba.
1976
37.
Book V,
P. 5
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 146
There was no indication that the
Castro assassination plots were
brought to the Warren Commission's
attention in anyway. "The subordinate
officers at the FBI and the CIA who
acted as liaison with the Warren
Commission did not know of the CIA
assassination attempts
"
Book V, p. 5-6
The CIA investigation of the
assassination did not divulge
the AMLASH operation although
these investigators, in retro-
spect, think this knowledge
(vital. "There is also evidence
that CIA investigators requested
name traces which should have
made them aware of the AMLASH
operation, but for some reason,
they did not learn of that
operation.
"
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 147
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 148
Book V, p. 10
FBI informant during missile crisis
suggested that Castro could be
assassinated through underworld channels
inside Cuba and that the informant would
fund this if U.S. government would
assure such endeavor would not adversely
effect the national security. See
attached Hoover memo. We need to identify
and interview informant.
{;
$
The Attorney General
FROM : Director, FBI
SUBJECT: FIDEL CASTRO
INTERNAL SECURITY CUB
273
DATE: October 29, 1962
"OFFICE OF THE
RECEIVED
GO7291962
ATTORNEY GENER
We have an informant who furnishes data concerning
criminal matters and who is close to high officials of the
Teamsters Union. He has many contacts with hoodlum and
He is most
gambling elements throughout the United States.
concerned that his relationship with the FBI not be revealed
since he feels certain that, if his cooperation becomes
known, he will be killed immediately.
On October 22, 1962, the informant volunteered to
our Los Angeles, California, Office that he believes he could
arrange to have Fidel Castro assassinated. He explained
that some of his underworld acquaintances, such as Meyer Lansky,
in the past have had close connections/in Cuba whereby they
were able to "buy" practically any Cuban official or to
accomplish almost anything they wanted to do in Cuba.
believes some of these underworld figures still have channels
inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro could be
successfully arranged.
File
*
COULD IDENTITY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE
He
He said that, in the event the
United States Government is interested in having the attempt
made, he would raise the necessary money and would want nothing
from the Government except assurance that such an undertaking
would in no way adversely affect the national security. He
expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this mission
without any additional contact with Government representatives
and with a minimum of contacts with private indys.
RECEIVED FROM 71-4-12-13
109-539
50955
MAY 7 1976
DOJ.
DocId: 32423630 Page 149
11/10/03
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
22 JAN 2 1963
DAK
RECORDS BRANCH
ATTORNEY GENERAL -
D
Book V, p. 13
Intelligence files in mid-1963 documenting
series of meetings among major leaders
of anti-Castro movement. Such a report
is attached. Attention to the cast of
characters: i.e., Artime, Maceo, Somoza,
Carlos Prio.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 150
MM 105-1742
Intelligence
On August 23, 1963, ALFREDO BORJAS,
Chief of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR)
anti-CASTRO organization of MANUEL ARTINE, advised that the
MRR-Comandos of CARLOS BANDIN is a dissident group.
BORJAS
said the through his contacts in the latter organization,
he had ascertained that only about five members of BANDIN's
organisation lended in Cuba at the time of the June 20,
1963 invasion hoax.
BORJAS said the CRC press releases were a publicity
stunt which backfired and destroyed any credibility and
activity the CRC may have had up to that time. When the
press found out it was a hoax, ANTONIO HACEO and CARLOS BANDIN
resigned, blaming the CRC for the scandal which they both
helped to create.
II. THE SOMOZA PLAN
On July 16, 1963, MIGUEL CARCIA, in charge of
public relations for the CRC, announced that LUIS SOMOZA,
former President of Nicaragua, had recently been in
Washington, D. C.; reportedly conferred with United States
Government officials, and about ten days ago arrived in
Miami, Florida.
GARCIA said that SOMOZA conducted a series of
meetings, in which nearly all of the well-known Cuban
exile political and action group leaders attended. At
these meetings, SOMOZA claimed he had talked to all the
Presidents of the Central American Republics, and there
Presidents are willing to help Cuban exiles in the form
of training camps, military equipment, and bases of
operation from which to attack the present government of
SOMOZA indicated that his meetings with the
Cuba.
RECRE
5.
MM 105-1742
Presidents of the several Central American Republi̟, © s
and the leading figures among 
the Cuban exiles in Miam
New York and Washington, 
were known to have the sanction
On July 16, 1963,
of the United States 
Government.
SOMOZA left Miami and returned to Nicaragua.
On July 15, 1963, the "Miami News" contained
an article stating that there is 
growing speculation 
in
Miami that Attorney General 
ROBERT KENNEDY is quietly
backing certain Cuban 
exiles, such as MANUEL ARTIME 
BUESA
It is noted that MA NUEL
and the so-called SOMOZA 
Plan.
ARTIME BUESA is the head of the MRR, an anti-CASIRO
organization.
On July 15, 1963, MM T-3, who has been active
in Cuban revolutionary matters for 
the past five years,
advised that the below-listed 
persons are some of the
better-known Cuban exile 
leaders who met with SOMOZA 
during
his recent visit to the 
United States:
SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Comandos L
LAUREA NO BATISTA FALLA, Movimiento Democrata
Cristiano (MDC).
ANTONIO VECIANA, Alpha 66
SIXTO MESA, MRR
JOSE MORELL ROMERO, Cuban Committee of Liberation
CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba
6.
RECEIVED FRONI
MAY
* 1976
DOJ
MM 105-1742
MANUEL ARTIME, MRR
EUSEBIO MUJAL, labor leader
JOSE BOSCH, Cuban industrialist
On July 26, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ
advised he had talked with LUIS SOMOZA about four hours
while SOMOZA was in Miami during the middle 
of July, 
1963.
ALVAREZ said that it is his opinion SOMOZA 
was acting ea
an intermediary between the United 
States Covernment and
the Cuban exiles.
On August 20, 1963, ALVAREZ advised that nothing
has yet developed concerning the SOMOZA plan
; it is now
not clear what SOMOZA is offering
, or what the United 
States
Government's position or attitude is in 
this matter. ALVAREZ
said it is obvious SOMOZA cannot 
afford, either as a private
individual or a representative of the Nicaraguan 
Government,
to back such a military program by 
Cuban exiles, and will
have to have the backing and support 
of the United States
Government to go on with his plan.
On July 30, 1963, FERMIN FLEITES, member of the
Executive Committee of the MDC, advised that 
about a week
ago, a Nicaraguan Army officer visited the 
IDC Headquarters
,
and in the name of SOMOZA, offered 
camps, military equipment
This individual 
also offered to
and bases in Nicaragua.
pay the expenses of moving the MDC operations to Nicaragua.
FLEITES explained that the MDC had taken no
positive action concerning this matter, and had adopted a
"wait and see" policy to ascertain 
what attitude the
United States Government would take 
concerning this 
matter.
MAY 1978
DOJ
7.

MM 105-1742
Executive
On August 7, 1963, MARIO DEL CANAL,
Secretary of Rescate Democratico Revolucionario, advised
that when SONOZA was in the 
United States during July
of 1963, MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA
, head of the Rescate
Democratico Revolucionario (
RDR), conferred with SOMOZA
At 
the invitation of SOMOZA.
in Miami and New York.
VARONA left for Nicaragua on August 1, 1963, to again confer
with SOXOZA, and is expected 
to return to Miami in about a
week.
On September 10, 1963, CANAL advised that nothing
definite had been established as 
a result of VAROI's
visit to Nicaragua, and that the 
future of the proposed
SOMOZA Plan is uncertain.
On August 13, 1963, LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA,
military leader of the MDC, advised 
that he had 
recently
returned from Nicaragua, 
where he had conferred with
SOMOZA, who made no commitments 
or indicated any 
definite
SOMOZA showed 
great interest in the Cuban
plan existed.
problem, but offered no positive help or aid 
in the way 
of
arms or training camps.
BATISTA FALLA said that CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS,
former President of Cuba, was in Nicaragua 
at the same
time, conferred with SOMOZA, 
but did not receive any
BATISTA 
explained that PRIO
offers of positive aid.
had just previously returned from the Dominican Republic
(DR), and although PRIO and 
JUAN BOSCH, President of the
DR, had been friends for many 
years, PRIO was unable to
obtain any military bases in 
the DR.
On August 22, 1963, RUBEN DE LEON, former Cuban
Minister of Defense and Co-Ordinator 
of the anti-CASTRO
RECEIVED FROM
MAY 7 1976
DOJ
8.
MM 105-1742
organization Armed Forces of Cuba in Exile, stated that
about a month ago, LUIS SOMOZA told EMILIO 
NUNEZ 
PORTIUONDO,
former Cuban delegate to the United Nations 
(UN), that
he (SOMOZA) had talked to United States 
Attorney 
General (AG)
ROBERT KENNEDY.
AG KENNEDY reportedly said it was necessary for
SOMOZA to work out the Cuban problem and to unite Cuban
exiles. SOMOZA recommended that 
MANUEL ARTIME BUESA be
designated as the leader of the Cuban exiles
.
DE LEON advised that there was later a meeting in
Miami at the home of Nicaraguan Army Captain JOSE ALEGRETT
between SOMOZA and a number of Cuban 
exile leaders. At this
meeting, SOMOZA said there was a possibility of 
Nicaraguan
support for the Cuban exilé anti-CASTRO 
movement, but first
There
the exiles would have to accept ARTIME as 
their leader.
was considerable opposition to this suggestion 
by the 
exile
leaders attending the meeting.
On September 12, 1963, PAULINO SIERRA MARTINEZ,
advised
former attorney and textile mill operator in Cuba,
he had recently visited Nicaragua and conferred with LUIS
SOMOZA concerning help to Cuban exiles
.
SIERRA said there are no training camps in
Nicaragua or Central America for Cuban exiles, and all the
proposed aid and backing has progressed no 
further than 
the
talking stage. SIERRA said it seems 
to him that everyone
is waiting for the United States Government to 
give the
"green light".
RFC
On September 12, 1963, MM T-3 advised that nearly
all top political leaders among Cuban 
exiles have conferred
with SOMOZA and now agree that the SOMOZA 
Plan is too big 
for
MAY 7 1976
DOJ
9.
MM 105-1742
SOMOZA and the Central American Republics to put into
effect without United States military and political
support.
MM T-3 said that the different Cuban military
and political leaders now feel that SOMOZA has not yet
obtained a positive commitment from the United States
Government, because after two and a half months of
conferences, there are not any Cuban exile military
training camps in Central America, and the SONOZA Plan
has not progrossed beyond the talking stuge.
III.
ORGANIZATIONS
Comandos L
MM T-3 advised that Comandos L is one of the leading
It is headed by
anti-CASTRO organizations and action groups.
SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO CUESTA and RAMON FONT.
The organization maintains no office as such, but continúss
to use Post Office Box 66, Riverside Station, Miami, Florida,
to collect money donations.
On July 29, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ
advised the organization has had no military activity
since March of 1963. The leadership is now building the
organization to increase membership, establish different
sections, such as a Women's Section, a Publicity Section,
The organization recently
and committees to raise funds.
put out a thirty-page booklet, setting forth the aims and
purposes of the organization, along with information
concerning previous military operations of the organization.
ALVAREZ admitted his group has two boats in the
Miami River, which will be used in the future for military
RECEIVED FROM
MAY 7 1976
DOJ
10.
Book V, p. 25
Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton
to fully cooperate with the desk officer,
John Whitten, charged with investigating
the assassination. On November 24,
Mexico City cabled the names of known
contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico
City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela)
was included on that list. Nonetheless
neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom K or
Angleton advised the desk officer of
significance of this name.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 157
Book V, p. 25
P. 29
On November 23, 1963, the CIA
Headquarters asked the Mexico Station
to stop the planned arrest of Sylvia
Duran. Karamessinis speculated that this
was because CIA feared Cuba responsible
for assassination.
Headquarters equally concerned with
Duran on November 27 and warned
Mexico City station chief that U.S.
Ambassador pushing Cuban theory too
hard.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 158
Book V, p. 27
AMLASH's case officer omitted reference
to the poison pen in his November 25
contact report of his November 22 AMLASH
meeting on instruction from Fitzgerald.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 159
Book V,
P. 28
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 160
"D" tells his story in Mexico City on
November 25. On November 26, Mexico
City cables details of "D" interroga-
tion to CIA Headquarters. On December 1,
CIA Headquarters cables Mexico City that
the White House has been told that D's.
story is a fabrication.
Book V, p. 30
On December 1, 1963, CIA Headquarters
cabled Mexico City that a sensitive
source (
) has advised
that a Cubana airlines flight to Havana
was delayed in Mexico City on November 22
to pick up a passenger who rode in the
cockpit without going through customs.
This cable was found in Mexico City
file with no CIA headquarters record
of follow-up being found.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 161
Book V, p. 35
In December, 1963, Sullivan prepared a
memo for Hoover's aid in briefing the
President that stated that no evidence
had been developed which would indicate
Oswald's assassination was inspired or
directed by Pro Castro organizations
or by any foreign country.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 162
Book V, p. 40-41
FBI Legat in Mexico City cabled
FBI Headquarters on November 24
that U.S. Ambassador felt Cubans
participated in assassination
effort. "Bureau may desire to
give consideration to polling
all Cuban sources in US in
effort to confirm or refute this
theory." FBI Headquarter's
supervisor determined this was
not desirable and would only
promote rumors.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 163

Book V, P. 58
The CIA investigation reflected a
Soviet orientation, with exhaustive
studies of Oswald's activities in
re Soviet Union. There is no corres-
ponding CIA analysis of Oswald's con-
tacts with pro and anti Castro groups
in U.S.
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 164
Book V, p. 61- In December, 1963, the CIA learned that
63
a Cuban American had crossed the border
from Texas into Mexico, on November 23
and arrived in Mexico City on November 25.
He stayed in a hotel until the evening of
November 27, when he departed on a
regularly scheduled Cubana airlines flight
to Havana using a Cuban courtesy visa and
an expired U.S. passport. He was the only
passenger on the flight. In March, 1964
the Agency received a report from a
source which alleged that the same Cuban
American had received a permit to enter
Mexico City on November 20 in Tampa,
Florida. The same source said the Cuban
American was somehow involved in the
assassination.
The Agency did not follow up on this
report other than to ask a Cuban
defector about his knowledge of the
Cuban American's activities. The FBI
did investigate the reported unusual
travel but did not fully report the
results of their investigation to their
Warren Commission. Their investigation
showed that this individual had lived
in Tampa and Key West and was pro-Castro.
He had traveled to Cuba in May of 1962
and had a brother in the Cuban military
who was studying in the Soviet Union.
On November 17, 1963, the Cuban American
was at a get-together at the home of a
member of the Tampa chapter of the Fair
Play for Cuba Committee. This was the
same Fair Play for Cuba Committee that
Oswald had possibly contacted in May of
1963.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 165
Book V, p. 63-64
In March of 1964, the Warren
Commission requested from Director
Hoover information on certain pro-
Castro and anti-Castro organizations
which were active in the U.S.
including the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee, and Alpha 66, among
others. The Bureau furnished less
than a full and satisfactory
response and did not disclose the
fact that the CIA had operational
interests in certain of the entities
inquired about.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 166
Book V, p. 65
The FBI reports on Alpha 66 furnished
the Warren Commission noted the attack
on the Soviet vessel in March of 1963
but did not detail that group's
continued activity in planning and
carrying out their military operations
against Cuba. The FBI reports did not
show that Alpha 66 had been involved
with the New Orleans anti-Castro train-
ing camp.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 167
Book V,
p. 65
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 168
It is known that the CIA took an
interest in the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee with which Oswald was
associated. According to Bureau
documents, the Agency advised the
Bureau that they were considering
the use of disinformation that might
embarass the Committee in areas where
the Committee had support.
Book V, p. 72
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 169
In late July 1964, an FBI informant
reported that the CIA was meeting with
AMLASH for the purpose of assassinating
Castro. Informant also reported that
AMLASH was unhappy with the CIA's efforts
and that Attorney General Kennedy had
refused to support the plan but that the
plan had not been completely put to rest.
This information was not disseminated
outside the Bureau at the request of the
informant. But the Bureau notations
indicate that the Bureau was looking
into an underworld plot against Castro
that might be coincidental with the
AMLASH plan. The Bureau had first been
informed of AMLASH-CIA meetings in
October 1963. That information did not
indicate assassination involvement.
Book V, p. 74-75
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 170
The AMLASH operation was insecure
prior to the Fitzgerald meeting
with AMLASH, a meeting that
Fitzgerald was urged not to under-
take by several in the Agency.
Book V, pp. 77-78
AMLASI
Individuals outside the CIA had
been brought into the operation,
and the Agency learned that one
of these individuals was in
clandestine contact with Cuban
intelligence (Cable from
European station to CIA Head-
quarters, 3/18/65).
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 171
Book V, p. 78
Victor Espinosa, a Cuban exile, involved
in the transporting explosives to New
Orleans in 1963, contacted INS with
information about the AMLASH operation.
This information was turned over to the
FBI which informed the CIA. Both
agencies interrogated Espinosa in June
of 1965 and found that he knew that
AMLASH and others were planning a coup
which involved the assassination of
Castro and that the CIA had been
involved with AMLASH and others in the
planning.
Espinosa and AMLASH were life-long friends
but during the interrogation he gave no
indication that he was aware of the 1963
AMLASH-CIA meetings. Espinosa's
information noted in the 1967 IG Report
suggests a link between the AMLASH
operation and the CIA plots to assassinate
Castro using underworld contacts.
Therefore, Espinosa's information raised
the possibility that underworld figures
who were aware of the Harvey plots may
have been aware of the AMLASH operation.
CIA reaction to this interrogation was
to terminate the operation immediately.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 172
Book V, p. 79
CIA had FBI files on Espinosa detailing
his involvement with anti-Castro exiles
and underworld figures who were operating
the guerrilla training camps in New
Orleans in July 1963.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 173

Book V, p. 79
In mid-1965 the CIA interrogated Tepedino,
New York jeweler, who had been involved
with the AMLASH operation from the
beginning. The report concluded that
the subject was deceptive during the
interrogation and withheld pertinent
information in one or more relevant
areas. Tepedino lied in response to
questions dealing with AMLASH's and his
ties to Cuban intelligence. Tepedino
stated that AMLASH had no plan to over-
throw Castro. Tepedino stated AMLASH
had strong connections with Cuban
intelligence and was probably cooperating
with it in various ways. Although
AMLASH never mentioned these connections
to his CIA case officers; Teledino
stated that AMLASH had mentioned them
to him and almost everyone else he had
met.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 174
Book V, p. 79
The FBI made the connection between
Espinosa's 1963 activities and the
fact that in 1965 he was knowledgeable
of CIA involvement in plans to
assassinate Castro. However, there
is no evidence that either the CIA or
FBI investigated this connection
until 1967.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 175
Book V, p. 79
Although the CIA had received information
that AMLASH was a provocation there is
no evidence that the CIA investigated
the possibility of a connection between
its fall 1963 meetings with AMLASH and
the assassination of President Kennedy.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 176
Book V, P. 80 A client of Morgan's had informed him
that the United States had attempted
to assassinate Castro in the early
1960's and that Castro had decided to
retaliate. This information was passed
to Drew Pearson who in turn attempted
to have Chief Justice Warren look into
it but he declined.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 177
Book V, P. 81 Supervisory personnel assigned to the
assassination investigation have
uniformly testified they do not recall
ever discussing or reviewing memoranda
which touch upon Cuban involvement
in the assassination or of Cuban
retaliation for the CIA assassination
plots.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 178
Book V, p. 81 According to Secretary of State Rusk
in his testimony before the Warren
Commission, 6/10/64, he stated there
was "very considerable concern" in Cuba
immediately following the assassination
as to whether Cuba would be held
responsible for the assassination and
what effect the assassination might
have on Cuba's position and security.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 179
Book V, p. 84
On March 21, 1967, WFO send Headquarters
10 copies of a blind memorandum which
stated Castro employed assassination
teams for the purpose of removing
President Kennedy. Morgan's clients
were also aware of the identity of
individuals sent to the United States
for that purpose.
He understood that two
such individuals were now in the state
of New Jersey. The transmittal slip is
attached to this memorandum.
Neither the President nor the Attorney
General ordered a follow-up investigation
after receiving this memo.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 180
Book V, p. 92
In October, 1963, Soviet experts at FBI
Headquarters were informed that Oswald
had met with Vice Counsel Kostikov at
the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.
Kostikov was a member of the KGB and
believed to be with the KGB department
that carried out assassinations and
sabotage.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 181
I, Frank Sturgis, have today personally delivered
to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the
following materials:
1 Envelope - 2 cassettes
1
lg. Manila envelope - secret codes
Date:
9-3-76
RECEIVED:
Pamela Crupi
For the Committee
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 182
Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
°
INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 183

-2-
ML:
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Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco
and Fidel and several of his armed guards.
Okay now, what happened
Castanyava...
Castanyava
Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.
And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you
go into that?
Well he was very fond of everything German. He
said he read
and my father, you know, tried
to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship
because they were terrified. They thought they were
being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the
tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I
steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to
dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the
table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.
And he offered you a job, right?
Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back
up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged
gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along
very well.
My father is diplomatic and they
exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and
stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father
if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back,
return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was
getting German mail and he did not speak German and
he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an
office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had
friends in Cuba anyway.
How old were you then?
Nineteen, nineteen years old.
Did you get off the ship and stay there?
No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge,
asked me for my phone number and address in New York
and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't
believe it.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 184
-3-
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When did he call you?
The same day I arrived in New York.
Because my
father took off that night for Germany again and
the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the
morning. I guess the previous...
Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right?
Where did you go?
I was living with my brother in New York City.
My brother was a translator for the United Nations
and I was alone living in New York City going to
the Merchantson Banker School.
Well how did you get back to New York City from
Havana?
On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the
cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.
Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left
that night, left Havana that night...
Yeah.
went over to New York and then from New York went
back to Europe, right?
Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out
this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I
was young, I don't know. And I thought that...
He called, he called you, he knew just about what
time you were going to arrive in New York and when
you got there he called you, what, the same, the same
day you got there?
The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I
just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said
one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone,
on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I
heard "hello".
Did he speak Cuban or English to you?
He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess.
he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he
asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I
think about you very much and I call. I keep my word.
I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 185
-4-
ML:
(contd.)
FS:
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So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.
How long was it did you leave New York to go to
Havana?
Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel,
and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call
me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I
believe you I said because how else would you have
my number. He said "I want you come back. I think
about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you
come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the
Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell,
and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so
I would have enough for the return trip home because,
I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island
in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him
that he would send the plane.
Did he send the airplane?
Yes.
What kind of an airplane did he send?
A Cubana airliner with...
Four engines?
Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door.
I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on
the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party
and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was
reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro
and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus
and Pedro
and they showed me identification. One came in military
uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled,
one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said,
"We go now. Fidel want very much to see you.
"
FS:
ML:
(Laughter).
And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like.
in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they
were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane
would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I
haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 186
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ML:
(contd.)
FS:
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clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and
I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about
missing two days at school.
Yeah.
So I went...
what'd you
Well these are incidentals anyway, so,
do, you went to the airport? What airport did the
airplane, was the airplane at?
Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that
time named something else. Idlewild, right?
Idlewild, yeah.
And...
It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the
airplane, Cubana Airlines?
Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...
How many people where on the airplane?
Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two
guards.
Ha, ha, had
that's funny. Go ahead.
FS:
ML:
So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.
FS:
ML:
This is more or less a background so they know her
background.
Yeah that's, that's out anyway.
(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")
FS:
I mean don't drag it out so much because the details
of all this thing is...
Yeah.
ML:
FS:
Is yours, you know.
Go over it lightly. So you went
back to Havana, right?
ML:
Right.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 187
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-6-
Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where?
Cause we'll go over this lightly.
I was in the...
At the Hilton?
I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.
And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?
Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez
Raoul and some Americans.
He was having some argument with some Americans. Do
you know who the Americans were?
Yes.
Who were they?
One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...
Oh this was more business or something like that?
Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this
and that with Fidel.
FS:
Yes, well that's immaterial.
ML:
FS:
So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the
door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and
Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and
the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.
You'll write it don't worry.
Alright now. . .
Do you know approximately when you met me?
ML:
If I live.
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML
FS:
A couple months, or two months, or three months after
that.
No, That was very, I think you met me around what, April?
April, right.
April of 1959, right?
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 188
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Yeah.
And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the
lobby?
Yes.
That's where, when I saw...
That's what I said, a couple months...
Right.
right after that.
In April, right. And this is where we made contact
and so forth and then we saw each other a few times
after that...
In the coffee shop.
In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited
to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth
and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?
Yes.
He was
Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right.
the Colonel who was military attache with the American
Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?
Yes..
Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth
and so forth, alright?
Um hum.
We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth.
There were several meetings that Fidel had in the
Hilton with some of the people of the staff.
present at the meeting, right?
I was
ML:
Right.
FS:
ML:
And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the
staff concerned the gambling casinos and American
business interests in Cuba, right?
Right.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 189
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And it was stated that he was going to run all the
racketeers out of...
Out of Cuba.
Cuba. All the American businesses (were going to go.
ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the
Cuba for the Cubans.
Right.
And so forth. And then it was suggested about well
you know the American government may not like it.
You're gonna have all the American business interests
put pressure on the State Department which would put
pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and
they would have the agents, they would send new agents
into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close,
closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA
had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a
matter of fact that they were exchanging information
with Castro...
Uh hum.
which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups
so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power
struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So
Fidel, with the help of CIA...
Yes.
got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now..
I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his
guns from?
Well, you know...
To lead the revolution?
Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we
won't have to go into and so forth because we just
(unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there
came a period of time where Fidel in all his
popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you he
made approaches to you, right, and so forth?
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
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Hmm.
He told you he loved you and so forth.
Yes.
And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on
record.
Mm-Hmm.
You know, and you liked him and you actually in
liking him like a young girl thought for the future
that here's a man that I, you admired, that you
started to get an affection for him and so forth,
and really you thought of marriage, right?
Mm-hmm.
And in the process of being close with him, being as
the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did
force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced
you. You didn't want to but it happened.
Yes.
And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in
his Cuba, right?
I was in his Cuba alright.
Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate
Intelligence Committee has got is the things that
Fidel has stated against the United States government
if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so
forth when the new election time comes because at that
time the President of the United States was Eisenhower
and it looked like that the Democrats were going to
win the election and he felt that if a new government,
which was discussed among the top military people, if
the new government came in and if they decided that they.
didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what
he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale,
that if the United States government decided to go and
turn against him and put pressure on him he would do
likewise to the United States government. And he was
going to export his revolution in Latin America. These
are the things that you heard...
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Yeah.
A number of times I was present up there for the...
Mm-hmm.
in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba
when?
Sometime in September.
In September of 1959 you came to the United States,
right?
Yeah.
And when you came back to the United States you saw
me.
Yes.
And then arrangements were made for you to go back to
Cuba and so forth...
Yes, yes.
And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.
Right.
Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave
there the second time?
towards
When exactly / the end of 1959, 1960.
1959?
160
I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that.
I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went
out.
Well then was it the early part of '60?
Yeah.
It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back
to Miami, right?
Right.
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You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead
and do some work
With Alex.
With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then
when did you cease doing some work at that time?
Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.
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End of 1960.
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When did I tell you to make contact with
Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately
what time that was?
In 1960, 61.
The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that
then?
About the time of the Bay of Pigs.
Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it
had to be before the Bay of Pigs.
Before, before, yes it was.
Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..
Right.
Beach on the island there, right?
Yes.
Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his
home?
You.
You were told by me and you went there by yourself or
with someone else?
Should I name him?
ML:
FS:
Yeah. Alex?
ML:
Alex York.
FS:
Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez'
house, right. They had a gathering there with some
Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who
some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?
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President, ex-President Carlos Prios.
Big Cubans.
Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?
Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios
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I don't know, there were so many, God.
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Anyway.
Alright, well that's, that's good enough.
Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez,
alright.
Yes.
What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet
Petty Humanez?
Information gathering, to find out how he was
sponsoring the Cuban exiles.
Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other
goodies...
Oh,
yes.
to groups, where at?
In Miami and outside of Miami.
And down in Texas, right?
Yeah.
Training camps in Texas?
Yes.
Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...
Yeah.
Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro
government, right?
I would presume, yeah. I guess so.
Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them
this financial assistance?
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Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans.
him at the time.
I was with
Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't
that correct?
I would say so.
You would say so. As a matter of fact...
(unintelligible)
As a matter of fact a love affair developed...
Yes.
and so forth and so forth, alright.
Yeah.
We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and
jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?
Yes.
And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned
sometime when they, the United States State Department
sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to
prison, and you mentioned something about the family
wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I
could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that.
Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last
time we lost contact, when was that?
'64.
1964 or '63? 163 or '64 approximately, alright?
After '64.
It was around, approximately 1964.
(unintelligible)
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And you what, came to New York?
ML:
When the General went to jail.
FS:
Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back
to New York to live and so forth, right?
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Yeah.
Then you remarried, rather you got married here in
New York?.
Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but
then I got married, right.
Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go
ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...
ML:
Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.
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Alright, now one time you and him did what at what
building and the address?
We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.
You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover
agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?
Me as a double because I had...
You as a double agent. Now when did this start?
He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street
in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood
Management, called the Newberry. The work started
with the case agent in 1969.
1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal
agents, you already told me. You already told me and
they got it on record and this...
They told me not to say anything.
Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna
go ahead and send this down there because Senator
Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA
agent that you were in touch with.
You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau
and...
Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're
doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's
Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in
order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked
as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need
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protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go
ahead and tell them the name of these here people how
you gonna do it?
Mmm.
You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah,
you're looking for protection. So far the people
you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you
saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's
life whose working with the FBI. These people are
powerful people yet they have done nothing with the
problem that you have had right now with you, three
times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't
that correct? One time they almost threw you out of
an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-
whipped. You did all this crap for these people
here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the
present time, and this is on record in their own
files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give
you or your children any protection. This piece of
tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office,
it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to,
to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper
authorities which will be the Justice Department.
You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has
received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from
You can call him and find out, and also you
can call him at the same time and let him know if
a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of
fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his
office I will instruct his people in the office to
get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone
number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator
Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...
me.
Mm-hmm.
He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has
been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this
information over to the proper authorities. See. And
this information is not going to go to any newspaper
or anybody...
Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I
got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on
practically all my adult life.
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Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6
years. I don't want to know everything you did
because you can't...
They were like a family, they were like a family at
one time. Now when I need help they don't come
through and they say it costs too much. It cost me
a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian
stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear,
threats.
Alright so this is why...
(Unintelligible)
I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a
story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance,
you gonna go ahead...
No I'm not making anything up.
it.
I wouldn't lie about
No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go
ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment
building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work
well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI,
the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are
a liar.
for
No way am I going to be a liar.
I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna
protect this girl when she's lying to us because the
FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked
with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over
a six year period. God damn it that, that Justice
Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and
we want to see your files on this girl. And baby
they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't.
come up with it they're in trouble. They're in
trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they
are working for the same people who are their bosses,
who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in
a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says hey,
I want to see something here. Why haven't you given
this people protection if all this is true. But if
they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna
do anything?
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I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know,
you know.
Somebody has to know.
Now at the beginning you and
your husband, your husband was manager...
ML:
was the building manager of this building.
And he.
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Is he still building manager of that building?
Yes, but the way this
Well, honey forget about it right at the present time
because we're getting at the building and we're...
going...
ML:
Yes, yes.
FS:
He still manages the building.
Alright, now, how long
has he been manager of this building?
ML:
We raised this building, we
FS:
In other words when was the first years.. .
ML:
We were the very first tenants in this building.
moved in there before anybody moved in there.
were the first tenants. The first person to move in
was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.
We
We
FS:
What was his name?
ML:
Mr. Vittikoff.
FS:
And who was Mr. Vittikoff?
ML:
He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet
Ambassador to the United Nations.
FS:
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Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool
of spies which is the Soviet
(end of side 1)
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.where you and your husband worked where he was
manager, you were the first people to live in that
place?
250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood
Management, which are crooked, and that's on the
corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.
Okay, now, who started to move in there?
Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the
First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United
Nations. (unintelligible)
Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.
And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people,
but I never really...
Well how many people eventually moved in there besides
this man?
Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second
one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nick-
names...
Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The
second one who moved in there you called, you nick-
named the
The Stalker.
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The Stalker.
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What was his real name?
Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The
Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman,
Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by her-
self or did something out of the way she got pulled
back and she was under house arrest.
Alright, what was his name?
ML:
Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...
FS:
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Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?
I had nicknames for all of them.
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Yeah, but
Moonface, The Stalker...
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Yeah.
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The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering
until I memorized. We started out with the tenants'
list.
Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?
--
We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which
300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each
Soviet file read the same Permanent Mission of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I
got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock
in the morning, and my husband had been previously
working with Treasury and other agencies, including
this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.
His first name was what?
Albert, Albert Chestone.
What agency was he with?
The FBI.
Special Agent, FBI?
Yes, counterintelligence.
Sector of the FBI
Yes, political. And, my husband had known him
previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris
missile thing. This was before I met my husband or
married him. He did something with the Polaris
missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same
agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the
tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in
the building.
Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?
Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well,
why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few
burglaries (laughter)....
In other words this agent...
Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with
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them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint,
and my husband...
And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?
Well, I, yes.
Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of
you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by
yourself?
Well my husband had the master keys.
Right, alright.
And...
Well when you did these burglaries...
We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6,
7 cars.
One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission.
Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet
who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in
Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a
sudden in our building because they had surveillance
across the street. That's the first thing - they set
up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across
the street. That we were pointed out to. That
everybody who went in and out of the building was
photographed.
Including yourself and your husband?
Oh yeah, me especially in the morning taking my son to
school and everything. . .
Right.
But, and...
Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made
into the apartments. Once you found out that the
people were not in the apartments how did you find
out they weren't in the apartments?
Well, they would...
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Would you knock on the door or something?
No.
You saw them leave?
No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told
that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the
Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me
and I looked at him but it was still in the best
interests of the country, and this was a very, very top
KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah,
interested...
Do you know the man's name?
Yes.
he was
FS:
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This General?
ML:
Yes.
FS:
What was his name?
ML:
Oleg Likichev.
FS:
What's his name?
ML:
Oleg Likichev.
FS:
Likichev.
He's a top. . .
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KGB spy.
Alright, and he lived in the building?
Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.
Right.
On the 10th floor.
Alright, now you were advising them when they left
the building. Naturally they had surveillance out-
side, they would know when he left...
Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe
friendly...
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Friendly.
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Very friendly.
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We exchanged gifts and we went to
dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we
exchanged...
In other words you were being guided into doing
certain things...
No.
This one particular FBI agent.
This one particular agent told us daily what to do.
Alright now did he give you a code name or a code,
any particular code?
My name, Mariuch.
Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?
Mariuch.
Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.
Well he...
Maria.
He is Italian, too.
The agent?
Yes.
Alright, now, when,did you ever make an entry into
this top KGB agent's apartment?
This one particular, there were several. This wasn't
the only one.
Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.
Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed
it and I said, "Louis, you know,"
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It could be very dangerous.
Yeah, yeah, I said...
You could get caught, you could be killed.
I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct
on a local level that's breaking and entering, right?
And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it.
Now, Uncle Al as we started to call this...
FBI agent?
FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost
him and we found him and he's in the building and we
want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for
national security reasons, we want to enter that
apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know?
And my husband said, "Alright".
Did he said he had to discuss it with you?
They discussed it in front of me.
I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss
it with you about...
No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I
asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse
to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and
Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis
is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get
subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it.
I'll go along with it."
So
It was agreed that he would do it.
FS:
So it, it was agreed...
ML:
FS:
Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the
door for the agents?
Yes he did.
Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?
ML:
FS:
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Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?
Two agents.
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No he was not.
Do you know the name of the two agents that made the
entry?
No I do not.
Do not.
They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...
by Uncle Al that these two agents
You were
were coming?
Yes.
Alright, on a specific morning?
Yes.
Alright, and...
They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration
repairman.
.Right.
Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.
Alright, now you and your husband with these two
agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were
stationed where you were going to be the lookout?
In the...
Hallway?
Service entrance.
ML:
FS:
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In the service entrance.
keys?
Your husband had the pass
ML:
Yes.
FS:
He opened the door?
ML:
Yes.
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The two agents went in?
Yes.
Did your husband go in?
He stood at the door.
He stood at the door?
He stood at the door.
That is in case they'd come back he'd...
Right.
The fact that he is the manager of the building
standing there with two repairman.
But that he was assured, he was assured, right.
That these two men were repairmen?
That, that just in case something went wrong with the
5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio
that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this
moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way
up 2nd Avenue to his residence.
Right, and they....
You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...
Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.
Do, and get out.
Okay.
So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the
staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks
like a television repair case which had high power
cameras.
Right.
And they, my husband was always annoyed because they
were sloppy.
(Laughter)
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The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a
cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they
know immediately someone was in the apartment.
Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the
door with the pass key, did the agents look the door
over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes,
hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the
door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general,
this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is
a top KGB agent...
Yes.
wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would
leave something on the door.
Yes.
They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find
anything?
Right.
Right. So they opened the door. In other words, what-
ever they touched...
But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and
that...
Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on
this one particular thing.
Alright.
These people did go in, they did what they had to do
with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were
hidden...
Yeah.
cameras that they installed some place in there, right?
No, it was microfilm.
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Well there were cameras..
ML:
In the flour can...
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Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?
What the two agents brought in.
Yes.
Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the
general's...
Cameras.
They brought cameras...
Mm-hmm.
which were installed.
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Yeah.
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What else did they bring in?
I don't know. They...
Any listening devices, bugging devices?
I would say so. I think...
You don't know for sure, though?
I'm not sure, my husband...
No, but you do know about the cameras?
Yes.
Alright, but there is a possibility they brought
bugging devices because it's logical they would
bring bugging devices.
I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to
plant a bug.
Sure.
Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...
Well they install that through the walls and so forth.
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No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna
for the cable TV.
Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.
That way they thought they could tune in to them
transmitting. .
Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to
the General's apartment?
In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.
Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he
wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?
No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the
rug back the way he found it.
Right, in other, everything...
It was turned over...
had to be placed back the same way it was.
And he would watch them and they were rough.
Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not
interested in...
This worried my husband because this would...
Yeah, it would make...
They knew...
Make them know there was an entry.
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Right.
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No...
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Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the
agents ever go back into that apartment again?
No, one time.
Just one time and they never went back into that...
that particular apartment.
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they were satisfied.
They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out
alright. Even though...
Mm-hmm.
your husband was on edge about the way the agents
were...
Oh yeah.
Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how
about other entries. We'll get one at a time.
The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..
Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.
Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10
year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them
all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player"
because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis
every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try
to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same
time. He spoke English without an...
(unintelligible)
Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang
and everything else. His wife...
You got friendly with him also?
No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage
parlor and he was way out, too much way out.
FS:
In other words,
play with girls?
ML:
I had his, no,
I was, well he was one of those.
FS:
He liked to play?
ML:
Yeah.
FS:
He was a playboy.
ML:
He was a playboy.
That's, they use
FS:
Which is very, yeah,
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They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and
his apartment, they did his apartment, too.
What did they do?
They broke in, they
Well, now wait a minute.
used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't
on but...
Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..
Entry.
Right. In other words they used your husband and you
also as a stakeout again?
Yeah.
On that particular one.
Mm-hmm.
He opened the door again. What floor did he have his
apartment?
.I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.
Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't
worry about that. But they made entry into his
apartment.
Yes.
What did they do in his apartment?
I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway,
either way, whatever they did they did...
With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?
Cooperation of my husband...
And yourself.
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And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet,
the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the
23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was
working.
When you say PIU, what's PIU?
Prisoner Investigation Unit.
Prisoner or Police?
Prisoner Investigation Unit.
Was that a police unit?
That's the 23rd precinct.
Police.
Right, police...
Alright.
department. I was working up there.
Alright.
Now I answered the phones.
oh,
hm-mmm.
You understand?
Yeah.
And this tennis player called up and demanded a
detective. I was working up there and the detectives
'were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and
here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal
complaint of breaking and entering his apartment.
had him on the phone.
And he didn't know it was you.
I
And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept
on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't
disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I,
it was me. I took the complaint in other words.
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Right.
And I wrote up the 61.
Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.
The 61 complaint report.
Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were
working for this police department in this precinct.
What was your job with them?
Auxiliary volunteer.
cases, interrogation.
Photos, translations, rape
And at that time you were answering phone calls that
were coming in?
And typing, and doing other things but I don't really
want to get those guys involved because they...
No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were
doing in the police department.
I was an auxiliary sergeant.
Answering the phones. Okay.
Auxiliary is a volunteer police.
Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make
with them. That's two that you specified.
Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because
I was a little afraid so my...
Things were getting a little hot for you.
Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the
Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.
All living in that building?
All living in the same building. There was, it was
comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians,
the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese
went down the service entrance and to avoid the
Russians and the Al-, it was just, the Secret Service
in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics
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peddlers coming out of the laundry room.
It was,
it
was a merry-go-round.
FS:
In other words,
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We had, in one day about four different agencies
watching people.
In and out of the building.
And we didn't know if we were coming or going.
Yeah.
We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the
street and we would signal to the, across the street
surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd
see the cars pull up and the cars leave.
Alright, now...
My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.
FS:
He'd been doing most of the end of the...
ML:
FS:
I
Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught.
just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck
of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived
on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my
husband was opening the door to let those guys in my
husband would have been dead.
Alright, not only that I understand that you were
getting very familiar with many of the families of...
I was too friendly...
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these people.
ML:
with the families.
FS:
Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and
ML:
They trusted me alone in their apartments.
discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave
them medicine for one child who...
We had many
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At the same time you tried to get as much information
out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.
I was being on a very social...
Right.
natural basis.
Right.
And I became friendly with them.
How long, how long...
We even were paid money to throw a few parties.
You were paid money..
For the Soviets.
You were given money by the...
By the Justice Department.
Yeah.
To throw a few parties.
So the agents could make surveillance.
So they could make surveillance.
And contact?
And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen
up...
Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.
Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us.
But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters
and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't
go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell any-
thing like that. And I was very open with them.
leave from the countries and I would be the first to
know. They would bring back gifts.
children, I babysat their children.
They'd
They babysat my
We exchanged
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medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.
But your husband continued to work with the agency,
right?
Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for
cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.
You did a lot of surveillance work on these people
but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep
out of the...
Yeah.
operation as far as...
Break...
entering into the apartments, right?
Yes.
How long did this last? Over a period of how long?
1969 to 1976.
All these years?
Yes.
That's doing surveillance on these people.
Yeah. We were...
How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.
The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with
a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and
the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are.
The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their
own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the
apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their
children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We
convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their
mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was
on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the
apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And
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they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and
their mission was there. And we became very friendly
with them because of one incident, especially my
husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in
charge of the building. That same day they had a so-
called demonstration where the demonstrators had a
25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstra-
tion turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags
and everything and the Albanians came down. They all
are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the
rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only
my basic police training and my wits, really, and a
panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I,
the first thing I looked out the window when I heard
the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me
ΑΙ Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here.
I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't
know what to do. And there were about 500 people
throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate
glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian
flags because of something that happened in Albania.
Those that defected here started this demonstration.
So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was
hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian
Ambassador and five top officials agitated these
people from inside the lobby with fists. Very
unprofessional-like.
Yeah.
So I physically pulled them by their coats and told
them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself
back into the mission", because tenants were walking
through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by
flying glass and everything else. And I had no help.
The police were outside of the line...
Marita, what we're going into details is something
that is a story.
Oh, alright.
So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.
Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and
especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese
into the United Nations, which they did. It was that
speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador
Rocco Nocco sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco
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Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the
agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know,
case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what
time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was
the most valuable source of information for the
Bureau, and that was...
Garbage and trash.
Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you
know, and that was my job because I had the patience.
Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves,
flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because
I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which
was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors
down in other words when they threw their garbage
out that it would come out in brick form, block form,
brick crushed, which in fact was not true.
But they believed it?
They believed it. They trusted us.
the only ones allowed in the mission.
only ones.
Louis and I were
We were the
Now this mission is that building you were talking
about.
ML:
That's still there.
FS:
Still there.
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Very much there. That's the code that you have.
Right.
So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go
after midnight when they put their garbage out in the
hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service
entrance and take the bags at home, take em home.
And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and
gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart
and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would
turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would
past it together and give it to the Bureau and some
of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among
them was one code, now...
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I would assume that these letters that were in code.
they would be classified material. Otherwise it
wouldn't be in code.
Very valuable, yes. The...
And this was turned over to who?
To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on
a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when
the Red Chinese entered the United States, first
came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met
them first before anybody met them, Louis and I.
And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the
morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I
said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do
some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room."
So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough
around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the
21st floor.
3:30 in the morning?
3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them
closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut
the machine off and I got these, I got this code,
I caught it in other words, but it....
This is the code you turned over to me?
This is the first code, the very first code, at the
risk of having my hands chopped off because if I
didn't shut that machine off in time I could have
been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very
valuable. It was sent to Washington.
(End of tape - side 2).
these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned
off the machine you would have got your hand either
chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were
you saying about Al, Uncle Al?
Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I
got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything
out of the garbage and separated the letters and
every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything,
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I
put it all in a box, right down to every piece.
ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would
come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still
be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh
and ready for work and I had just come back from the
garbage room. And...
You stayed awake all night?
Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of
skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't
stick these letters togethers without skotch tape,
so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which"
was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him
and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever.
And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep. And he'd
say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so,
11
or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.
Who was Mr. Berzofsky?
Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republic.
What was his first name, do you know?
Mmmm, I forgot...
That's alright, it don't matter.
I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His
wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was,
she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and
she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to
have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first
met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her,
they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and
the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to
the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close
to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father
was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father
when their only child turns out to have liver cancer.
She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they
asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I
do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4,
which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to
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their daughter on
with the permission of
the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything
else. We were just one mother to another mother.
Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and
it was little things like that that I would get very
involved with. I don't know...
Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever
tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the
mission?
Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.
And who is he again?
He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they
thought he was still residing in Washington, the out-
side of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was
supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere
and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building,
as being in our building. They lost him and they were
furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to
him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we
spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,
In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask
(unintelligible)
Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it
was a game they were playing or if they were doubles
or what. They talked a lot about the State of
Washington, residing in the State of Washington.
They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me,
(unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"
What did he call you?
Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.
Oh, that's in Russian?
Yes.
And we always exchanged Russian words and I
know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden,
you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a
fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind
of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me
and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to
get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants
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diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to
him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you
mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash.
I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry
store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm
willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them.
I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said,
"Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's
a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what
can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis
said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said,
this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot
diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So
he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he
would buy them for cash.
How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?
Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next
morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for
you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot
diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because
I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since
he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds.' And I
said if you can put two and two together maybe this
guy will defect because he's talking about the State
of Washington. I said but you have to be careful,
I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you
the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready.
So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got
the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the
day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale
in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in
Washington, D. C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give
these diamonds back to the underworld or give them
the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow,
not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's
going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C.
Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is
in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes,
he is. Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick
because he was in my house with a hundred thousand
dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.
"
By himself?
By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from
Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on
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a Wednesday and the whole thing.
So what happened?
"
"
fell through. Al said he had to give them back to
the underworlds, to his source. So he took them
back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my
way out of it. 'It was just one of the flubs. But
anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for
me, kept coming directly to the apartment and say-
ing, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two
go, she left. I don't believe it. And my husband
said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems,
Oleg, you know, forget about it. And he said,
"No, it's not possible. You must stay together.
You must stay together.' Anyway, he kept coming,
about four times and asking my husband, until my
husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to
see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he
wants to see you. In other words if you're
finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My
husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street.
I talked to my husband and I said what did you do
that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street?
You know, because I know he wants to go out with
me.
11
Now
You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know?
So I call up, Uncle Al meantime is transferred to
Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a
case agent for the building and he works alone,
without me. The other agent is John Kotter.
With the FBI?
FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said,
"John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet
him. Drop things, start things, drop things,
different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said
look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out
with me.
And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is
a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said,
"Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated,
alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and
sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my
phone number on the bottom, something you know?
Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the
building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't
just call him up. You know that's going to be like
a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway,
he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what
have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you
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realize what a bomb this is? This top KGB spy wants
you?"
And I said, "Well", I say "he's not really my
type.", I said but again, the best interests of the
country, but how far do you want me to go? And he
said "all the way". I said what is all the way? He
said, "You start with a Christmas card." Well the
Christmas card was answered by Oleg going to Louis
and saying, "I got Ilonka's Christmas card. Where is
she living, Louis?" You know, so John talked me into
calling the mission. I call up the mission, across
from 19th precinct, and I said, "Oleg, this is Ilonka
Marischa. Hello darling", you know, and this, this
and this. And I said oh boy everything is wired and
everything from the mission anyway. But he's top dog
there. He is top dog in the mission. He has the.
say. He's a very important person in the Soviet
mission. Anyway, John okays a telephone coil pickup
that I have on my phone to a Soni tape recorder.
make a tape of this because John Kotter is sitting on
pins and needles waiting for me to replay that tape
on what Oleg tells me, you know? Oleg doubletalks
but we get a message that we want to meet, you know?
So they had some kind of a security council and we
I made a date and it was postponed. Oleg called up
and apologized which I also have on tape. And each
time the Bureau was very happy. We're gonna start a
blossoming relationship here, you know, and end up
with photographs and better something, which I don't
think I would have gone all the way. But that's what
their idea was so they can exchange at a later date.
Blackmail?
Well...
into
Blackmail him / giving them information
We
(unintelligible).
Say like they get one of our, one of our pilots, right?
And if we don't get our pilot back they expose Oleg,
right? Or make him...
Be a double agent.
Be a double...
Blackmail him...
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into being a double agent.
ML:
Right.
FS:
That's the idea.
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"
And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the
mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years
old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my
life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not
to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to
say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me
now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both
walked into the mission on the pretense that she had
to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She
needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the
mission everybody there I know because they reside in
the building.. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa
blah, blah, blah, blah. And I'm very friendly with
them all. They all love my daughter. But we're
there for other reasons. We're there to go to see
Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile
I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every
poster has a mirror or camera, you know?
But my
daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room
where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know
we're being watched. She knows it too and she
doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful,
beautiful. You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this
very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you
want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please.
I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he
is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait.
I refused a wire or anything like that, but...
"
What wire are you talking about?
A wire on me.
Oh.
Because..
That the agents (unintelligible)
Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me
he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian
way...
Yeah.
And he'll feel that and I'm dead.
Right.
Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.
Right.
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We
And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway,
we waited. We were allowed the run of the place.
knew everyone there and...
Like you say, eyes were watching you.
Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they
test you when you walk in there. And you just don't
get in there and have the run of the place, you're
not left alone. But I know you're being watched.
Sure.
Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate
excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations
because it was in the paper the next day, that it
was some security council meeting. And I said
"Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him
thank you very much for the material. And best
wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left.
Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us,
a uniformed police officer.
For what reason?
He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring,
nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the
police department because they're helping me now.
But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?
Yeah, he thought you were Russians.
He thought I was a Russian.
Or a Russian sympathizer.
Right, especially going in with a child and I looked
very...
Yeah.
American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was
waiting in front of my door. I remember it was
raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are
you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell
can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"
Yeah.
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I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you
tell me these things before that they're delayed at
a security council meeting, you know, instead of me
letting, letting me sit there. You know these are
all the little things that use to annoy me...
Yeah.
I
that they have to screen things first before, you
know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder
like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note.
said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy
and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John,
you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg.
I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room
upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and
take photographs. That's not my stick." I said
I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do
everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like
I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in
bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm
not getting anything for it right now. They allowed
me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it
back. Some of that mail is now missing, which
belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator,
perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I
asked the FBI to please help me with that.
Who's the perpetrator?
The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne,
aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole
this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations,
the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those
in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He
threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He
pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.
Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?
Yes.
He did what?
Yes, he tried to push me out the window.
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18 stories?
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Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if
anything happens to me there's letters with the
Justice Department naming everything I know about you,
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and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my
daughter in the back. He's threatening her right
now with disgrace because she is the daughter of
the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern
is the, these letters and the code and the tape and
possibly other things, are in the hands of this
Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and
he's probably right now at the building. He is
casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to
the same people that he has on the letters to tell
them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge,
for having him arrested on the assault charge with a
gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the
FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-
husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My
husband is calling me for help and I don't know what
to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the
code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have
any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in
Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I
worked for him and I don't know where to go because,
the only ones that are helping me now are the local
police in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid
to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the
kids. And they'll take the children home when I get
a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get
my back door shot at. I take my children and I put
them in the 23rd precinct.
They even, off duty...
The off-duty police, police officers take my children
home....
And they spend time at the house?
And they spend time at the house in their free time
when they should be home with their families.
Well you have saved the life of two people, right?
I would think so.
Well, you have.
Yes.
When, one of the, who are the two people you saved
their lives?
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A federal narcotics informant..
Undercover agent, right?
Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal
District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.
And you saved their lives because a contract was
being put out on them?
Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked
out.
And even though you have saved their lives...
I asked them please help me with this man, he has
Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my
children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked
them please help me because I gave you information
for nothing and they said they promised to do something
on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has
threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my
mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my
super.
He's an illegal immigrant?
He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.
What's his full name, his real name?
His arrest name, that he was arrested under was
Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David
Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also
known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a
day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler,
he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on
organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway,
Yonkers, and...
Any other agencies?
Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.
Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?
Yes I did.
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Who are the people you are in touch with?
Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was. . .
You know their full names?
Well I have a day number and a night number and
I did some work in the Newberry with my husband
with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection
in South America. I also worked with the organized
crime, gambling.
Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape
over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over
to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?
Yes.
You want me turn the...
Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just
in case something happens to me because I don't know
which way it's going to come.
And you need some protection, right now, right?
I need some type of help for my children, because of
this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with
the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up
in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up
until last month, last week and I've just, and I need
help. There is no help. I mean since last month and
I don't want my children hurt. They've already been
hurt.
Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over
to Senator Baker's committee, right?
Yes.
Who in turn will turn the information over to the
proper officials in Washington, D. C.
Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how
important it is but at this point I need help
desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they
don't deserve what they have to go through. The
whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and
my daughter of exposure.
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Did they every try to, to kidnap..
Yes.
the kids?
They threatened to kidnap my children. They were
once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of
it. On the last day of school and he, he will
hurt them. He will hurt them this man is sick.
He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable.
He's vengeful.
And his close association with top mobsters?
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Yes he has close associations...
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(End of tape)
Page 232
INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76
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Transcript of tapes provided the Select Committee on Intelligence
by Frank Sturgis on September 3, 1976
Marita Lorenze (ML)
Frank Sturgis (FS)
Interviewed by Frank Sturgis on 9/2/76
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Marita Lorenze
You an American citizen?
Yes.
Were you born here?
Born in Braemen, Germany on August 18, 1939 and my
mother registered me at birth with the Consulate
because she was stuck in the war over there, but I
am an American citizen, not naturalized or anything.
I was registered as an American citizen.
How old were you when you came to the United States?
I was about 12, came over on the U.S.S. Henry Gibbons,
American troop transport, because my mother worked for
the United States Army.
Okay, now we're going to go ahead and jump. You went
to Cuba what month and what year and on what ship?
I met, I went, I took several trips with my father
who was Commander of the oceanliner Berlin. I met
Fidel...
What was your father's full name?
Commander Heinrich Frederick Lorenz.
And how old was he?
Approximately 50-something, 55, when I first, I went
on several trips to Cuba before I met Fidel with,
but I was a little girl.
When's the first time you went to Cuba after Fidel
took over the government on January 1, 1959?
I met Fidel February 28, 1959, on one of my father's
cruises where Fidel came aboard with several of his
men. He said he saw the oceanliner from the Havana
Hilton balcony and he took a launch with his Chief
of the Navy, what's his name, I forgot, Castagna...
Forget it, forget about it, we can go ahead. Who
else was there besides the chief of the Cuban navy.
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Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco
and Fidel and several of his armed guards.
Okay now, what happened
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Castanyava...
Castanyava
Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.
And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you
go into that?
Well he was very fond of everything German. He
said he read
and my father, you know, tried.
to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship
because they were terrified. They thought they were
being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the
tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I
steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to
dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the
table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.
And he offered you a job, right?
Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back
up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged
gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along
very well.
My father is diplomatic and they
exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and
stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father
if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back,
return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was
getting German mail and he did not speak German and
he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an
office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had
friends in Cuba anyway.
How old were you then?
Nineteen, nineteen years old.
Did you get off the ship and stay there?
No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge,
asked me for my phone number and address in New York
and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't
believe it.
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When did he call you?
The same day I arrived in New York.
Because my
father took off that night for Germany again and
the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the
morning. I guess the previous...
Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right?
Where did you go?
I was living with my brother in New York City.
My brother was a translator for the United Nations
and I was alone living in New York City going to
the Merchantson Banker School.
Well how did you get back to New York City from
Havana?
On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the
cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.
Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left
that night, left Havana that night…..
Yeah.
went over to New York and then from New York went
back to Europe, right?
Yes.
Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out
this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I
was young, I don't know. And I thought that...
He called, he called you, he knew just about what
time you were going to arrive in New York and when
you got there he called you, what, the same, the same
day you got there?
The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I
just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said
one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone,
on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I
heard "hello".
Did he speak Cuban or English to you?
He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess
he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he
asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I
think about you very much and I call. I keep my word.
I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."
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So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.
How long was it did you leave New York to go to
Havana?
Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel,
and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call
me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I
believe you I said because how else would you have
my number. He said "I want you come back. I think
about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you
come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the
Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell,
and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so
I would have enough for the return trip home because,
I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island
in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him
that he would send the plane.
Did he send the airplane?
Yes.
What kind of an airplane did he send?
A Cubana airliner with...
Four engines?
Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door.
I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on
the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party
and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was
reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro
and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus
and Pedro
and they showed me identification: One came in military
uniform, the other in civilian clothes.. One smiled,
one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said,
"We go now. Fidel want very much to see
"
you.
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(Laughter).
And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like
in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they
were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane
would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I
haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My
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clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and
(contd.) I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about
missing two days at school.
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Yeah.
So I went...
Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you
'do, you went to the airport? What airport did the
airplane, was the airplane at?
Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that
time named something else. Idlewild, right?
Idlewild, yeah.
And...
It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the
airplane, Cubana Airlines?
Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...
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How many people where on the airplane? .
ML:
Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two
guards.
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Love Seve
Ha, ha, had that's funny.
Go ahead.
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So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.
This is more or less a background so they know her
background.
Yeah that's, that's out anyway.
(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")
FS:
I mean don't drag it out so much because the details
of all this thing is...
Yeah.
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Is yours, you know.
Go over it lightly. So you went
back to Havana, right?
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Right.
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Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where?
Cause we'll go over this lightly.
I was in the...
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At the Hilton?
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I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.
And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?
Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez
Raoul and some Americans.
He was having some argument with some Americans. Do
you know who the Americans were?
Yes.
Who were they?
One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...
Oh this was more business or something like that?
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Yes business.
Everybody was trying to promote this
and that with Fidel.
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Yes, well that's immaterial.
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So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the
door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and
Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and
the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.
You'll write it don't worry. Alright now....
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If I live.
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Do you know approximately when you met me?
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A couple months, or two months, or three months after
that.
No, That was very, I think you met me around what, April?
April, right.
April of 1959, right?
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_ Yeah. .....
And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the
lobby?
Yes.
That's where, when I saw.
That's what I said, a couple months...
Right.
right after that.
In April, right. And this is where we made contact
and so forth and then we saw each other a few times
after that...
In the coffee shop.
In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited
to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth
and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?
Yes.
He was
Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right.
the Colonel who was military attache with the American
Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?
Yes.
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Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth
and so forth, alright?
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Um hum.
We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth.
There were several meetings that Fidel had in the
Hilton with some of the people of the staff.
present at the meeting, right?
I was
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Right.
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And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the
staff concerned the gambling casinos and American
business interests in Cuba, right?
Right.
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And it was stated that he was going to run all the
racketeers out of...
Out of Cuba.
Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go
ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the
Cuba for the Cubans.
Right.
And so forth. And then it was suggested about well
you know the American government may not like it.
You're gonna have all the American business interests
put pressure on the State Department which would put
pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and
they would have the agents, they would send new agents.
into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close,
closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA
had contact with the 26th of July movement.
As a
matter of fact that they were exchanging information
with Castro...
Uh hum.
which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups
so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power
struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So
Fidel, with the help of CIA...
Yes.
got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...
I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his
guns from?
Well, you know...
To lead the revolution?
Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we
won't have to go into and so forth because we just
(unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there
came a period of time where Fidel in all his
popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he
made approaches to you, right, and so forth?
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Hmmm.
He told you he loved you and so forth.
Yes.
And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on
record.
Mm-Hmm.
You know, and you liked him and you actually in
liking him like a young girl thought for the future
that here's a man that I, you admired, that you
started to get an affection for him and so forth,
and really you thought of marriage, right?
Mm-hmm.
And in the process of being close with him, being as
the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did
force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced
you.
You didn't want to but it happened.
Yes.
And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in
his Cuba, right?
I was in his Cuba alright.
Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate
Intelligence Committee has got is the things that
Fidel has stated against the United States government
if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so
forth when the new election time comes because at that
time the President of the United States was Eisenhower
and it looked like that the Democrats were going to
win the election and he felt that if a new government,
which was discussed among the top military people, if
the new government came in and if they decided that they
didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what
he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale,
that if the United States government decided to go and
turn against him and put pressure on him he would do
likewise to the United States government. And he was
going to export his revolution in Latin America. These
are the things that you heard...
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Yeah.
A number of times I was present up there for the...
Mm-hmm.
in the Hilton with all the people.
when?
Sometime in September.
Now you left Cuba
In September of 1959 you came to the United States,
right?
Yeah.
And when you came back to the United States you saw
me.
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Yes.
And then arrangements were made for you to go back to
Cuba and so forth...
Yes, yes.
And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.
Right.
Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave
there the second time?
towards
When exactly / the end of 1959, 1960..
1959?
'60
-
I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that.
I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went
out.
Well then was it the early part of '60?
Yeah.
It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back
to Miami, right?
Right.
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You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead
and do some work
With Alex.
With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then
when did you cease doing some work at that time?
Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.
End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with
Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately
what time that was?
In 1960, 61.
The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that
then?
About the time of the Bay of Pigs.
Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it
had to be before the Bay of Pigs.
Before, before, yes it was.
Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..
Right.
Beach on the island there, right?
Yes...
Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his
home?
You.
You were told by me and you went there by yourself or
with someone else?
Should I name him?
Yeah. Alex?
FS:
ML:
Alex York.
FS:
Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez'
house, right. They had a gathering there with some
Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who
some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?
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Big Cubans.
Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?
Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios
President, ex-President Carlos Prios.
I don't know, there were so many, God.
Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway.
Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez,
alright.
Yes.
What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet
Petty Humanez?
Information gathering, to find out how he was
sponsoring the Cuban exiles.
Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other
goodies...
Oh,
yes.
to groups, where at?
In Miami and outside of Miami.
And down in Texas, right?
Yeah.
Training camps in Texas?
Yes.
Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...
Yeah.
Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro
government, right?
I would presume, yeah. I guess so.
Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them
this financial assistance?
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Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans.
him at the time.
I was with
Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't
that correct?
I would say so.
You would say so. As a matter of fact...
(unintelligible)
As a matter of fact a love affair developed...
Yes.
and so forth and so forth, alright.
Yeah.
We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and
jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?
Yes.
And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned
sometime when they, the United States State Department
sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to
prison, and you mentioned something about the family
wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I
could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that.
Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last
time we lost contact, when was that?
'64.
1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?
After '64.
It was around, approximately 1964.
(unintelligible)
And you what, came to New York?
When the General went to jail.
Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back
to New York to live and so forth, right?
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Yeah.
Then you remarried, rather you got married here in
New York?
Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but
then I got married, right.
Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go
ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...
Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.
Alright, now one time you and him did what at what
building and the address?
We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.
You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover
agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?
Me as a double because I had...
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You as a double agent. Now when did this start?
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He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street
in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood
Management, called the Newberry. The work started
with the case agent in 1969.
1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal
agents, you already told me. You already told me and
they got it on record and this...
They told me not to say anything.
Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna
go ahead and send this down there because Senator
Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA
agent that you were in touch with.
You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau
and...
Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're
doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's
Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in
order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked
as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need
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protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go
ahead and tell them the name of these here people how
you gonna do it?
Mmm.
You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah,
you're looking for protection. So far the people
you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you
saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's
life whose working with the FBI. These people are
powerful people yet they have done nothing with the
problem that you have had right now with you, three
times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't
that correct? One time they almost threw you out of
an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-
whipped. You did all this crap for these people
here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the
present time, and this is on record in their own
files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give
you or your children any protection. This piece of
tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office,
it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to,
to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper
authorities which will be the Justice Department.
You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has
received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from
me. You can call him and find out, and also you
can call him at the same time and let him know if
a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of
fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his
office I will instruct his people in the office to
get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone
number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator
Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...
Mm-hmm.
He's got the committee.
It's a new Committee that has
been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this
information over to the proper authorities.
See. And
this information is not going to go to any newspaper
or anybody...
Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I
got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on
practically all my adult life.
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Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6
years. I don't want to know everything you did
because you can't...
They were like a family, they were like a family at
one time. Now when I need help they don't come
through and they say it costs too much. It cost me.
a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian
stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear,
threats.
Alright so this is why...
(Unintelligible)·
I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a
story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance,
you gonna go ahead.. .
No I'm not making anything up.
it.
I wouldn't lie about
No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go
ahead and say, hey I broke into 33, in an apartment
building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work
for
well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI,
the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are
a liar.
No way am I going to be a liar.
I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna
protect this girl when she's lying to us because the
FBI says no.. But if you name names and say I worked
with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over
a six year period. God damn it that, that Justice
Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and
we want to see your files on this girl.
And baby
they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't
come up with it they're in trouble. They're in
trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they
are working for the same people who are their bosses,
who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in
a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says hey,
I want to see something here. Why haven't you given
this people protection if all this is true. But if
they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna
do anything?
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I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know,
you know.
Somebody has to know.
Now at the beginning you and
your husband, your husband was manager...
ML:
was the building manager of this building.
And he.
FS:
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Is he still building manager of that building?
Yes, but the way this
going...
Well, honey forget about it right at the present time
because we're getting at the building and we're...
Yes, yes..
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Alright, now, how long
He still manages the building.
has he been manager of this building?
ML:
We raised this building, we
FS:
In other words when was the first years..
ML:
We were the very first tenants in this building. We
moved in there before anybody moved in there. We
were the first tenants. The first person to move in
was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.
FS:
What was his name?
ML:
Mr. Vittikoff.
FS:
And who was Mr. Vittikoff?
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He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet
Ambassador to the United Nations.
Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool
of spies which is the Soviet
(end of side 1)
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.where you and your husband worked where he was
manager, you were the first people to live in that
place?
250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood
Management, which are crooked, and that's on the
corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.
Okay, now, who started to move in there?
Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the
First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United
Nations. (unintelligible)
Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.
And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people,
but I never really..
Well how many people eventually moved in there besides
this man?
Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second
one I named The Stalker, the third one I have nick-
names...
you nick-
Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The
second one who moved in there you called,
named the
The Stalker.
ML:
FS:
The Stalker.
ML:
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What was his real name?
The
Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians.
Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman,
Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by her-
self or did something out of the way she got pulled
back and she was under house arrest.
Alright, what was his name?
Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...
FS:
Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?
ML:
I had nicknames for all of them.
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Yeah, but
Moonface, The Stalker...
Yeah.
The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering
until I memorized. We started out with the tenants'
list.
Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?
We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which
300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each
Soviet file read the same Permanent Mission of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I
got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock
in the morning, and my husband had been previously
working with Treasury and other agencies, including
this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.
His first name was what?
Albert, Albert Chestone.
What agency was he with?
The FBI.
Special Agent, FBI?
Yes, counterintelligence.
Sector of the FBI
Yes, political. And, my husband had known him
previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris
missile thing. This was before I met my husband or
married him. He did something with the Polaris
missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same
agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the
tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in
the building.
Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?
Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well,
why not?
He said it doesn't consist of much, a few
burglaries (laughter)...
In other words this agent...
Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with
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them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint,
and my husband...
And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?
Well, I, yes.
Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of
you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by
yourself?
Well my husband had the master keys.
Right, alright.
And..
Well when you did these burglaries...
We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6,
7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission.
Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet
who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in
Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a
sudden in our building because they had surveillance
across the street. That's the first thing they set
up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across
the street. That we were pointed out to. That
everybody who went in and out of the building was
photographed.
Including yourself and your husband?
Oh yeah, me especially in the morning taking my son to
school and everything...
Right.
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But, and...
FS:
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Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made
into the apartments. Once you found out that the
people were not in the apartments
out they weren't in the apartments?
Well, they would...
how did you find
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Would you knock on the door or something?
No.
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No, no.
You saw them leave?
They were assigned, first of all we were told
that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the
Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me
and I looked at him but it was still in the best
interests of the country, and this was a very, very top
KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah,
he was
interested...
1
Do you know the man's name?
Yes.
FS:
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This General?
ML:
Yes.
FS:
What was his name?
ML:
Oleg Likichev.
FS:
What's his name?
ML:
Oleg Likichev.
FS:
Likichev.
He's a top...
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KGB spy.
Alright, and he lived in the building?
Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.
Right.
On the 10th floor.
Alright, now you were advising them when they left
the building. Naturally they had surveillance out-
side, they would know when he left...
Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe
friendly...
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Friendly.
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Very friendly.
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We exchanged gifts and we went to
dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we
exchanged. . .
In other words you were being guided into doing
certain things...
No.
This one particular FBI agent.
This one particular agent told us daily what to do..
Alright now did he give you a code name or a code,
any particular code?
My name, Mariuch.
Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?
Mariuch.
Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.
Well he...
Maria.
He is Italian, too.
The agent?
Yes.
Alright, now, when, did you ever make an entry into
this top KGB agent's apartment?
This one particular, there were several. This wasn't
the only one.
Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.
Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed
it and I said, "Louis, you know,"
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It could be very dangerous.
Yeah, yeah, I said...
You could get caught, you could be killed.
I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct
on a local level that's breaking and entering, right?
And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it.
Now, Uncle Al as we started to call this...
FS:
FBI agent?
ML:
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FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost
him and we found him and he's in the building and we
want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for
national security reasons, we want to enter that
apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?"
And my husband said, "Alright".
You know?
Did he said he had to discuss it with you?
They discussed it in front of me.
I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss
it with you about...
No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I
asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse
to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and
Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis
is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get
subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it.
I'll go along with it."
So
It was agreed that he would do it.
FS:
So it, it was agreed...
ML:
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Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the
door for the agents?
Yes he did.
Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?
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Two agents.
FS:
Two agents.
Was Uncle Al one of those agents?
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No he was not.
Do you know the name of the two agents that made the
entry?
No I do not.
Do not.
They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...
You were
were coming?
Yes.
by Uncle Al that these two agents
Alright, on a specific morning?
Yes.
Alright, and...
They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration
repairman.
Right.
Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.
Alright, now you and your husband with these two
agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were
stationed where you were going to be the lookout?
In the...
Hallway?
Service entrance.
ML:
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In the service entrance.
Your husband had the pass
keys?
ML:
Yes.
FS:
He opened the door?
ML:
Yes.
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The two agents went in?
Yes.
Did your husband go in?
He stood at the door.
He stood at the door?
He stood at the door.
That is in case they'd come back he'd...
Right.
The fact that he is the manager of the building
standing there with two repairman.
But that he was assured, he was assured, right.
That these two men were repairmen?
That, that just in case something went wrong with the
5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio
that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this
moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way
up 2nd Avenue to his residence.
Right, and they...
You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...
Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.
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Okay.
Do, and get out.
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So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the
staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks
like a television repair case which had high power
cameras.
Right.
And they, my husband was always annoyed because they
were sloppy.
(Laughter)
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The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a
cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they
know immediately someone was in the apartment.
Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the
door with the pass key, did the agents look the door
over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes,
hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the
door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general,
this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is
a top KGB agent...
Yes.
wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would
leave something on the door.
Yes.
They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find
anything?
Right.
Right. So they opened the door. In other words, what-
ever they touched...
But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and
that...
Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on
this one particular thing.
Alright.
These people did go in, they did what they had to do.
with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were
hidden....
Yeah.
cameras that they installed some place in there, right?
No, it was microfilm.
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In the flour can...
ML:
Well there were cameras.. .
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Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?
What the two agents brought in.
Yes.
Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the
general's...
Cameras.
They brought cameras...
Mm-hmm.
which were installed.
What else did they bring in?
I don't know. They.. .
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Yeah.
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Any listening devices, bugging devices?
I would say so. I think...
You don't know for sure, though?
I'm not sure, my husband...
No, but you do know about the cameras?
Yes.
Alright, but there is a possibility they brought
bugging devices because it's logical they would
bring bugging devices.
I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to
plant a bug.
Sure.
Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...
Well they install that through the walls and so forth.
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No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna
for the cable TV.
Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.
That way they thought they could tune in to them
transmitting.
Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to
the General's apartment?
In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.
Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he
wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?
No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the
rug back the way he found it.
Right, in other, everything...
It was turned over…..
had to be placed back the same way it was.
And he would watch them and they were rough.
Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not
interested in...
This worried my husband because this would...
Yeah, it would make...
They knew...
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Right.
FS:
Make them know there was an entry.
Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the
agents ever go back into that apartment again?
No, one time.
Just one time and they never went back into that...
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FS:
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No...
FS:
that particular apartment.
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they were satisfied.
They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out
alright. Even though...
Mm-hmm.
your husband was on edge about the way the agents
were...
Oh yeah.
Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how
about other entries. We'll get one at a time.
The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..
Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.
Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10
year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them
all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player"
because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis
every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try
to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same
time. He spoke English without an...
(unintelligible)
Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang
and everything else. His wife...
You got friendly with him also?
No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage
parlor and he was way out, too much way out.
FS:
In other words,
play with girls?
ML:
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I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.
He liked to play?
Yeah.
FS:
He was a playboy.
ML:
He was a playboy.
That's, they use
FS:
Which is very, yeah,
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They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and
his apartment, they did his apartment, too.
What did they do?
They broke in, they
Well, now wait a minute.
used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't
on but...
Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..
Entry.
Right. In other words they used your husband and you
also as a stakeout again?
Yeah.
On that particular one.
ML:
Mm-hmm.
FS:
He opened the door again.
apartment?
What floor did he have his
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I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.
Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't
worry about that. But they made entry into his
apartment.
Yes.
What did they do in his apartment?
I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway,
either way, whatever they did they did...
With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?
Cooperation of my husband...
And yourself.
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And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet,
the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the
23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was
working.
When you say PIU, what's PIU?
Prisoner Investigation Unit.
Prisoner or Police?
Prisoner Investigation Unit.
Was that a police unit?
That's the 23rd precinct.
Police.
Right, police...
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Alright.
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department.
I was working up there.
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Alright.
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Now I answered the phones.
Oh, hm-mmm.
You understand?
Yeah.
And this tennis player called up and demanded a
detective. I was working up there and the detectives
were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and
here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal
complaint of breaking and entering his apartment.
had him on the phone.
And he didn't know it was you.
I
And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept
on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't
disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I,
it was me. I took the complaint in other words.
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Right.
And I wrote up the 61.
Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.
The 61 complaint report.
Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were
working for this police department in this precinct.
What was your job with them?
Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape
cases, interrogation.
And at that time you were answering phone calls that
were coming in?
And typing, and doing other things but I don't really
want to get those guys involved because they. . .
No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were
doing in the police department.
I was an auxiliary sergeant.
Answering the phones. Okay.
Auxiliary is a volunteer police.
Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make
with them. That's two
wwww wwi
that you specified.
Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because
I was a little afraid so my..
Things were getting a little hot for you.
Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the
Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.
All living in that building?
All living in the same building. There was, it was
comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians,
the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese
went down the service entrance and to avoid the
Russians and the Al-, it was just, the Secret Service
in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics
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peddlers coming out of the laundry room.
was a merry-go-round.
In other words,
It was,
it
We had, in one day about four different agencies
watching people.
In and out of the building.
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And we didn't know if we were coming or going.
FS:
Yeah.
ML:
We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the
street and we would signal to the, across the street
surveillance apartment, apartment, you know.
see the cars pull up and the cars leave.
We'd
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Alright, now..
My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.
He'd been doing most of the end of the...
Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I
just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck
of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived
on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my
husband was opening the door to let those guys in my
husband would have been dead.
Alright, not only that I understand that you were
getting very familiar with many of the families of...
I was too friendly...
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these people.
ML:
with the families.
FS:
Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and
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They trusted me alone in their apartments.
discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave
them medicine for one child who...
We had many
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At the same time you tried to get as much information
out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.
I was being on a very social...
Right.
natural basis.
Right.
And I became friendly with them.
How long, how long...
We even were paid money to throw a few parties.
You were paid money..
For the Soviets.
You were given money by the...
By the Justice Department.
Yeah.
To throw a few parties.
So the agents could make surveillance.
So they could make surveillance.
And contact?
And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen
up. . .
Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.
Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us.
But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters
and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't
go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell any-
thing like that. And I was very open with them. They'd
leave from the countries and I would be the first to
know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my
children, I babysat their children. We exchanged
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medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.
But your husband continued to work with the agency,
right?
Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for
cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.
You did a lot of surveillance work on these people
but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep
out of the...
Yeah.
operation as far as...
Break...
entering into the apartments, right?
Yes.
How long did this last? Over a period of how long?
1969 to 1976.
All these years?
Yes.
That's doing surveillance on these people.
Yeah. We were...
How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.
The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with
a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and
the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are.
The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their
own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the
apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their
children to watch television. The Soviets don't.
We
convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their
mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was
on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the
apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And
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I..
they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and
their mission was there. And we became very friendly
with them because of one incident, especially my
husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in
charge of the building. That same day they had a so-
called demonstration where the demonstrators had a
25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstra-
tion turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags
and everything and the Albanians came down. They all
are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the
rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only
my basic police training and my wits, really, and a
panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone.
the first thing I looked out the window when I heard
the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me
Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here.
I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't
know what to do. And there were about 500 people
throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate
glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian
flags because of something that happened in Albania.
Those that defected here started this demonstration.
So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was
hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian
Ambassador and five top officials agitated these
people from inside the lobby with fists. Very
unprofessional-like.
Yeah.
So I physically pulled them by their coats and told
them," "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself
back into the mission", because tenants were walking
through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by
flying glass and everything else. And I had no help.
The police were outside of the line...
Marita, what we're going into details is something
that is a story.
Oh, alright.
So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.
Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and
especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese
into the United Nations, which they did. It was that
speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador
Rocco Nocco sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco
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Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the
agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know,
case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what
time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was
the most valuable source of information for the
Bureau, and that was...
Garbage and trash.
Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you
know, and that was my job because I had the patience.
Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves,
flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because
I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which
was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors
down in other words when they threw their garbage
out that it would come out in brick form, block form,
brick crushed, which in fact was not true.
FS:
But they believed it?
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They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were
the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the
only ones.
Now this mission is that building you were talking
about.
That's still there.
Still there.
Very much there. That's the code that you have.
Right.
So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go
after midnight when they put their garbage out in the
hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service
entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home.
And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and
gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart
and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would
turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would
past it together and give it to the Bureau and some
of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among
them was one code, now...
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I would assume that these letters that were in code
they would be classified material. Otherwise it
wouldn't be in code.
Very valuable, yes. The...
And this was turned over to who?
To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on
a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when
the Red Chinese entered the United States, first
came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met
them first before anybody met them, Louis and I.
And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the
morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I
said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do
some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room.
So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough
around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the
21st floor.
3:30 in the morning?
3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them
closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut
the machine off and I got these, I got this code,
I caught it in other words, but it...
This is the code you turned over to me?
This is the first code, the very first code, at the
risk of having my hands chopped off because if I
didn't shut that machine off in time I could have
been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very
valuable. It was sent to Washington.
I
(End of tape
side 2).
"
these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned
off the machine you would have got your hand either
chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were
you saying about Al, Uncle Al?
Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I
got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything
out of the garbage and separated the letters and
every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything,
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I
put it all in a box, right down to every piece.
ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would
come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still
be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh
and ready for work and I had just come back from the
garbage room. And...
You stayed awake all night?
Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of
skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't
stick these letters togethers without skotch tape,
so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which
was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him
and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever.
And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep.' And he'd
say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so,
"
or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.
Who was Mr. Berzofsky?
Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republic.
What was his first name, do you know?
Mmmm, I forgot...
That's alright, it don't matter.
His
I forgot really. But we were very close to him.
wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was,
she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and
she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to
have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first
met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her,
they took piano lessons together, exchanged books,
and
the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to
the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close
to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father
was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father
when their only child turns out to have liver cancer.
She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they
asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I
do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4,
which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to
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their daughter on
with the permission of
the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything
else. We were just one mother to another mother.
Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and
it was little things like that that I would get very
involved with. I don't know...
Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever
tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the
mission?
Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.
And who is he again?
He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they
thought he was still residing in Washington, the out-
side of Washington, D. C., in Virginia.
He was
supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere
and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building,
as being in our building. They lost him and they were
furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to
him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we
spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,
In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask
(unintelligible)
Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it
was a game they were playing or if they were doubles
or what. They talked a lot about the State of
Washington, residing in the State of Washington.
They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me,
(unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"
What did he call you?"
Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.
Oh, that's in Russian?
Yes.
And we always exchanged Russian words and I
know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden,
you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a
fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind
of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me
and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to
get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants
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diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to
him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you
mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash.
I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry
store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm
willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them.
I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said,
"Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's
a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what
can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?' And Louis
said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said,
this was at a dinner party up in their house.
diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds.
he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he
would buy them for cash.
Hot
So
How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?
1
Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next
morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for
you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot
diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because
I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since
he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I
said if you can put two and two together maybe this
guy will defect because he's talking about the State
of Washington. I said but you have to be careful,
I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you
the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready.
So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got
the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the
day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale
in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in
Washington, D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give
these diamonds back to the underworld or give them
the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow,
not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's
going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C.
Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is
in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes,
he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick
because he was in my house with a hundred thousand
dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.
By himself?
I
By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from
Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on
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a Wednesday and the whole thing..
So what happened?
"
fell through. Al said he had to give them back to
the underworlds, to his source. So he took them
back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my
way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But
anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for
me, kept coming directly to the apartment and say-
ing, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two
go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband
said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems,
Oleg, you know, forget about it.' And he said,
"No, it's not possible. You must stay together.
You must stay together.' Anyway, he kept coming,
about four times and asking my husband, until my
husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to
see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he
wants to see you. In other words if you're
finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My
husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now
I talked to my husband and said what did you do
that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street?
You know, because I know he wants to go out with
me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know?
So I call up, Uncle Al meantime is transferred to
Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a
case agent for the building and he works alone,
without me. The other agent is John Kotter.
With the FBI?
"
I said,
FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter.
"John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet
him. Drop things, start things, drop things,
different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said
look, Oleg is bothering Louis.. He wants to go out
with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is
a beautiful setup. Let's call him up.' I said,
"Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated,
alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and
sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know?
I'll put my
phone number on the bottom, something you know?
Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the
building, or I'll bump into him. I said you don't
just call him up. You know that's going to be like
a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway,
he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what
have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you
"
FS:
That's the idea.
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And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the
mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years
old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my
life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not
to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to
say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me
now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both
walked into the mission on the pretense that she had
to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She
needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the
mission everybody there I know because they reside in
the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa
blah, blah, blah, blah. And I'm very friendly with
them all. They all love my daughter.
"
But we're
But my
there for other reasons. We're there to go to see
Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile
I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every
poster has a mirror or camera, you know?
daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room
where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know
we're being watched. She knows it too and she
doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful,
beautiful. You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this
very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you
want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please.
I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he
is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait.
I refused a wire or anything like that, but...
"
What wire are you talking about?
A wire on me.
Oh.
Because..
That the agents (unintelligible)
Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me
he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian
way.
Yeah.
And he'll feel that and I'm dead.
Right.
Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.
FS:
Right.
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And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter.
So, anyway,
we waited. We were allowed the run of the place.
knew everyone there and...
Like you say, eyes were watching you.
We
Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they
test you when you walk in there. And you just don't
get in there and have the run of the place, you're
not left alone. But I know you're being watched.
Sure.
Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate
excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations
because it was in the paper the next day, that it
was some security council meeting. And I said
"Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him
thank you very much for the material. And best
wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left.
Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us,
a uniformed police officer.
For what reason?
He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring,
nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the
police department because they're helping me now.
But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?
Yeah, he thought you were. Russians.
He thought I was a Russian.
Or a Russian sympathizer.
Right, especially going in with a child and I looked
very..
Yeah.
American.
Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was
waiting in front of my door. I remember it was
raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are
you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell
can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"
Yeah.
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I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you
tell me these things before that they're delayed at
a security council meeting, you know, instead of me
letting, letting me sit there. You know these are
all the little things that use to annoy me...
Yeah.
"
I
that they have to screen things first before, you
know check things out, don't have to make a blunder
like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note.
said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy
and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John,
you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg.
I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room
upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and
take photographs. That's not my stick. I said
I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do
everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like
I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in
bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm
not getting anything for it right now. They allowed
me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it
back. Some of that mail is now missing, which
belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator,
perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I
asked the FBI to please help me with that.
Who's the perpetrator?
The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne,
aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole
this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations,
the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those
in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He
threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He
pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.
Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?
Yes.
He did what?
Yes, he tried to push me out the window.
ML:
FS:
18 stories?
ML:
Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if
anything happens to me there's letters with the
Justice Department naming everything I know about you,
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 278
-47-
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my
daughter in the back. He's threatening her right
now with disgrace because she is the daughter of
the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern
is the, these letters and the code and the tape and
possibly other things, are in the hands of this
Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and
he's probably right now at the building. He is
casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to
the same people that he has on the letters to tell
them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge,
for having him arrested on the assault charge with a
gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the
FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-
husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My
husband is calling me for help and I don't know what
to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the
code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have
any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in
Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I
worked for him and I don't know where to go because,
the only ones that are helping me now are the local
police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid
to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the
kids. And they'll take the children home when I get
a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get
my back door shot at. I take my children and I put
them in the 23rd precinct.
They even, off duty...
The off-duty police, police officers take my children
home...
And they spend time at the house?
And they spend time at the house in their free time
when they should be home with their families.
Well you have saved the life of two people, right?
Well, you have.
FS:
I would think so.
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
Yes.
When, one of the, who are the two people you saved
their lives?
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 279
-48-
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
A federal narcotics informant...
Undercover agent, right?
Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal
District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.
And you saved their lives because a contract was
being put out on them?
Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked
out.
And even though you have saved their lives...
I asked them please help me with this man, he has
Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my
children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked
them please help me because I gave you information
for nothing and they said they promised to do something
on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has
threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my
mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my
super.
He's an illegal immigrant?
He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.
What's his full name, his real name?
His arrest name, that he was arrested under was
Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David
Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also
known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a
day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler,
he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on
organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway,
Yonkers, and...
Any other agencies?
Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.
Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?
Yes I did.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 280
-49-
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
Who are the people you are in touch with?
Two agents, Murphy and Shannon.
You know their full names?
This was...
Well I have a day number and a night number and
I did some work in the Newberry with my husband
with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection
in South America. I also worked with the organized
crime, gambling.
Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape
over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over
to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?
Yes.
You want me turn the...
Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just
in case something happens to me because I don't know
which way it's going to come.
And you need some protection, right now, right?
I need some type of help for my children, because of
this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with
the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up
in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up
until last month, last week and I've just, and I need
help. There is no help. I mean since last month and
I don't want my children hurt. They've already been
hurt.
Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over
to Senator Baker's committee, right?
Yes.
Who in turn will turn the information over to the
proper officials in Washington, D. C.
Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how
important it is but at this point I need help
desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they
don't deserve what they have to go through. The
whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and
my daughter of exposure.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 281
-50-
FS:
ML:
FS:
ML:
Did they every try to, to kidnap...
. Yes.
the kids?
They threatened to kidnap my children. They were
once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of
it. On the last day of school and he, he will
hurt them. He will hurt them this man is sick.
He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable.
He's vengeful.
And his close association with top mobsters?
FS:
ML:
Yes he has close associations. . .
(End of tape)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 282
ienorable Bendel t, Incive
inted Sta
Mashington. ^.C. 29519
Enclosed you will ad & casy of a letter from this office
to Sonster 
Mansfield 
expressing our concern over the rush of
the Central 
Intelligence Agency to destroy large quantities of
secret government 
decusents. We believe the Select Committee
on Intelligence 
should review with CIA Director Bush what
specifically the Agency intends to destroy before doing so.
te is tikely that there 
areateOUS morante and other documents
which are of 
extreme importance to the committee, which are central
tottee's 
me the Sonated sandate of conorahons14a
and 
couplate overstant of 
axecutive intelliganee aaangles.
see that the Sanators serving on thw Intelltsance
Confernetako whatever steps necessary to ston the destruction
af materials by 
the Central Intellfzanca Anoney until such tton
ng the Coltiao can 
review the content and lsportance of that da
Sincerely.yours .
NW 50955 DocId:32423630
Page 283

G C
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20505
22 June 1976
Jun 23 11 26 AH '76
Honorable Daniel Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am sending you a copy of my letters to
Senators Mansfield and Scott extending the moratorium
on the destruction of certain records until 10 December
1976. I do hope that this action and the procedures
outlined in my letters are fully responsive to the
interests of your Committee.
Sincerely,
C.B
George Bush
Director
orig > LGM for Chain & return to fills
✓y >MJM & return to Research
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423630. Page 284
NW 50955
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
22 JUN 1976
Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Mansfield:
In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have
extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain
records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975
in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on
10 December 1976.
In addition, before any such records are destroyed, we
shall transmit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence copies
of the record schedules which are submitted to the National Archives
and Record Service for their approval prior to the destruction of any
records. The same will be done with respect to those routine
administrative records which, although not involved under S. Res. 21,
were withheld from routine destruction during the life of that Resolution.
I am confident that suitable arrangements can be made for review of
documents before they are destroyed if this is the desire of the Select
Committee.
It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to
the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's
letter of 8 June to you.
cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye
Sincerely,
Cuyo
George Bush
Director
DocId: 32423630 Page 285
REVOI
AMERICAN
1776
UTION
-1976
BICENTENNIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505.
Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Scott:
22 JUN 1976
In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have
extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain
records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975
in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on
10 December 1976.
In addition, before any such records are destroyed, we
shall transmit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence copies
of the record schedules which are submitted to the National Archives
and Record Service for their approval prior to the destruction of any
records. The same will be done with respect to those routine
administrative records which, although not involved under S. Res. 21,
were withheld from routine destruction during the life of that Resolution.
I am confident that suitable arrangements can be made for review of
documents before they are destroyed if this is the desire of the Select
Committee.
It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to
the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's
letter of 8 June to you.
Sincerely,
George Bush
Director
CC:
Chairman Daniel Inouye
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 286
REVOI
AMERICAN
UITION
BICENTENNIAL
1776-1976
June 7, 1976
Honorable Michael J. Mansfield
United States Senate
133 Russell Bldg.
Washington, DC
20510
Dear Senator Mansfield:
##
George Bush's letter to Senator Hugh Scott, with a copy te
you, of the 2nd of June is disturbingly ambiguous. In stating
that the CIA now believes itself relieved of the reappasibility
of maintaining data "which were subjest to investigation by the
Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee, the Agency
failed to make any effort to identify whet materiale ware targeted
for destruction and which weren't. Further, the next to last
sentence of Mr. Bush's Letter, "I trust you (Semater Scott) agres
that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would
appreciate your confirmation of this understanding," has led
same observers in the Senate to concluda no destruction will
take place until such donfirmation to a been given. This does
not appear to be trus. Neither the press office nor the legia-
lative confulthat would confirm that destruction of date has not
already occurred, er would not occur without acquisence from the
Senate leadership. To the contrary, the legislative counsel's
office informed this group that the "process" of destruction has
already begun,
The action of the Central Intelligence Agency is wrong.
The new Seleet Committee en Intelligence should have be
consulted prior to the destruction of any materials which might
be vital to the proper functioning of that committee and which
in any case are within the legislative and oversight damain of
that committm Chairman Inouye and Vice-Chairman Baker, along
with the membership of the Intelligence Committee should have
the opportunity to review the data selected for destruction and
to determine, in eamjunction with the CIA, theppropriety of
destroying or maintaining such date.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 287
Hon. Michael Mansfield
Page Two
June 7, 1976
.. We urge you, Senator Mansfeld, to take whatever staps
necessary to immediately halt the unilateral aet undertaken by
the CIA of destroying possibly critical and irreplaceable
government documents.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 288
Sincerely yours,
Janas Humphreys
MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTAN
•
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510
June 7, 1976
Copy for Senator Baker
1
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
We have received a letter from the Honorable George Bush,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, relative to the destruc-
tion of papers and material which he has held for sometime relative
to our request. Our action was taken to facilitate the inquiry being
undertaken by your predecessor committee under the chairmanship of
Senator Frank Church.
In view of the fact, as we assume, that all of Senator
Church's committee records have been turned over to your permanent
Select Committee, we would appreciate your advising us as to whether
or not you want our original letter to stand and the papers and other
materials to still be held. Could you give us the judgment of you
and your Committee on this matter?
With best wishes, we are
Hu
HUGH SCOTT
REPUBLICAN LEADER
Miche Manaffull
MIKE MANSFIELD
MAJORITY LEADER
CMI GAV
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 289
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C.
Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
20505
2 June 1976
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Mansfield:
On 27 January 1975, following adoption of S. Res. 21 creating the
Select Committee on Intelligence, you and Senator Hugh Scott 
requested
that the Central Intelligence Agency "not destroy, 
remove from [its] 
pos-
session or control, or otherwise dispose or permit 
the disposal of any
records or documents which might have a bearing 
on the subjects 
under
investigation, including but not limited to all records 
or documents per-
taining in any way to the matters set 
out in section 2 of S. Res. 21."
In response to this request, the Agency placed in effect a complete
moratorium on the destruction of records, including 
normal administrative
records scheduled for routine destruction.
The purpose of this letter is to advise you that it is our intention to
proceed with destruction of records, now that the 
Select Committee has
completed its investigation and issued its final 
report. We have so 
advised
Senator Church.
Along with the backlog of routine administrative records, the Agency
will destroy records which were collected and maintained 
by the Agency
and which were subject to investigation by the 
Rockefeller Commission
and the Select Committee. The Agency is 
required to destroy much of
this latter material by the Privacy Act of 1974 (
P. L. 93-579) and by
Executive Order 11905. Of course, all 
records destruction will be 
fully
consistent with other applicable laws, Presidential 
directives, and the
requirements of pending litigation and 
Justice Department investigations
.
I trust you agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate,
and I would appreciate your confirmation of this 
understanding.
I am sending a duplicate of this letter to Senator Hugh Scott.
Sincerely,
Cy
Biul
George Bush
Director
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 290
AN REVOLUTION
AMERICAN
1776-1976
BICENTENNIAL
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. V
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO 5. RES. 21, 54TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
February 11, 1976
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Pfeiffer:
Senator Mansfield has informed me that you did not
receive my letter to you of December 19, concerning the
work of the Select Committee. I am therefore enclosing
a copy for your information.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 291
Sincerely,
William G. Miller
Staff Director
MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA
Pfeiffer
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510
1975 DEC 18 AM 11: 25
SELENT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
December 15, 1975
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Pfeiffer:
This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.
I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to
respond to your request.
Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
CC William G. Miller
Longmillerx
Bluan
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 292
i
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211
Senator Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
M
January 8, 1976
Dear Senator Mansfield:
Thank you for your letter of December 15th in which you state that you
would contact Ar. Miller and ask him to respond to my request. I am sorry
to bother you again but I have had no word from Mr. Miller. As you know,
I feel that the matter is of sufficient importance that it deserves a reply
or at least an acknowledgement of a receipt of my letter from Mr. Miller.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 293
Sincerely yours,
Sua
E. W. Pfeiffer

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
December 19, 1975
Page Two
I regret that we simply do not have the time or re-
sources to investigate the matter which understandably con-
cerns you.
This does not deny its importance. I hope one
of the other committees may better be able to help you.
DB: hom
NW
DocId: 32423630 Page 294
Sincerely,
William G. Miller
Staff Director
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
December 19, 1975
Page Two
I regret that we simply do not have the time or re-
sources to investigate the matter which understandably con-
cerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one
of the other committees may better be able to help you.
Sincerely,
32423630 Page 295
William G. Miller
Staff Director
NW-9095
SEL COMM
File:
December 19, 1975
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801'
Dear Professor Pfeiffer:
* Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries.
The press of business on the Select 
Committee has been ex-
cessive.
The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems
concerning the role of U.S. intelligence 
agencies in Indochina
.
For example, there was an executive 
session on CIA paramilitary-
Staff members have also investigated sev-
operations in Laos.
eral cases related to Vietnam.
Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some
limits to its inquiry. There are a 
vast number of important
To 
do
issues in the activities of the 
intelligence agencies.
an effective job of presenting 
recommendations for 
legislation
concerning the agencies, within 
the time allotted to the Com-
mittee, we have had to 
concentrate our attention on certain
The Committee has concluded that
issues rather than others.
the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its
investigation.
A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence
agencies may be established to 
follow the Select Committee.
In this case there would be new 
opportunities to pursue many
The problem
of the lingering, unresolved issues 
which remain.
of use of herbicides in Indochina 
might also be 
considered with-
in the jurisdictions of the Committees 
on Foreign Relations or
Armed Services.
*32423630
Page 296
DM
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211
December 2, 1975
Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Mansfield:
You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a
meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could
present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activ-
ities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in
the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia,
one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when,
formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal
government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for
about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you.
He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activ-
ities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his
committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the
committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since
August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet re-
ceived no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read
in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at
Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina.
I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert opera-
tions of ".S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate
your views as to what should do to get an investigation of the massive clan-
destine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in
technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most inter-
ested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the
Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence
community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to
ask these questions.
I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I
regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you
understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that
the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.
Sincerely yours,
E. W. Pfeiffer'
Equal Opportunity in Education and Employment
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 297
SEL COMM
File:
December 19, 1975
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Pfeiffer:
* Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries..
The press of business on the Select 
Committee has been ex-
cessive.
The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems
concerning the role of U.S. intelligence 
agencies in Indochina
.
For example, there was an executive 
session on CIA paramilitary
Staff members 
have also investigated sev-¨
operations in Laos.
eral cases related to Vietnam.
Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some
limits to its inquiry. There are a vast 
number of important
To 
do
issues in the activities of the intelligence 
agencies.
an effective job of presenting recommendations 
for 
legislation
concerning the agencies, within the 
time allotted to the Com-
mittee, we have had to concentrate 
our attention on certain
The 
Committee has concluded that
issues rather than others.
the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its
investigation.
A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence
agencies may be established to follow 
the Select Committee.
In this case there would be new 
opportunities to pursue many
The problem
of the lingering, unresolved issues which 
remain.
of use of herbicides in Indochina 
might also be 
considered with-
in the jurisdictions of the Committees 
on Foreign Relations or
Armed Services.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 298
DIME
COPY
February 11, 1976,
Professor E. W. Preiffer
University of Montans
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Pfeiffer
Semtor Mansfield has informed me that you did not
receive my letter to you of December 19, concerning the
work of the Select Committee. I am therefore enclosing
a copy for your information.
Sincerely,
be:
WM:mun
Senator Mike Mansfield
William G. Miller
Staff Director
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 299
cheape
check as Ted
Ralston
4. (
JMM) Met with Senator Frank Church regarding
a letter he had written to Professor E. W. Pfeiffer of the University of
Montana, stating that Senator Church had reliable 
information that Air
America was responsible for defoliation operations in 
Cambodia. A
copy of Senator Church's letter had been sent to the 
Director for 
comment
I
by Professor Arthur H. Westing, Windham College in 
Vermont.
explained to the Senator we were much concerned over 
this 
allegation and
the Director authorized me to deny it categorically. I added 
that while we
were not prying into the identity of the Senator's source, we were 
curious
as to whether this source's allegations were based on honest 
mistake or
malice. If the former, I suggested the Senator might wish 
to straighten
him out. Senator Church said he couldn't remember off 
hand where he
learned this information but would check his files. He said 
he fully 
accepted
our denial.
"
#
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 300
PART
RTM
UNITED
INTELE
биз
сут
Cy
In
NO 50955, DocId 32423630 Page 301
298
3476
Long
th
(400) 13
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 302
Jin
SEL COMM
File:
December 19, 1975
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Pfeiffer:
Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries..
到
The press of business on the Select Committee has been ex-
cessive.
The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems
concerning the role of U.S. intelligence 
agencies in Indochina
.
For example, there was an executive 
session on CIA paramilitary
Staff 
members have also investigated sev-
operations in Laos.
eral cases related to Vietnam.
Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some
There 
are a vast number of important
limits to its inquiry.
issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do
an effective job of presenting 
recommendations for legislation
concerning the agencies, within 
the time allotted to the Com-
mittee, we have had to 
concentrate our attention on certain
The 
Committee has concluded that
issues rather than others.
the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its
investigation.
A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence
agencies may be established to 
follow the Select Committee.
In this case there would be new 
opportunities to pursue many
The problem
of the lingering, unresolved 
issues which remain.
of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered with-
in the jurisdictions of the Committees 
on Foreign Relations or
Armed Services.
NW
DocId 32423630 Page 303

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
December 19, 1975
Page Two
I regret that we simply do not have the time or re-
sources to investigate the matter which understandably con-
cerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one
of the other committees may better be able to help you.
Sincerely!
NW 50955
32423630
DocId2
Page 304
William G. Miller
Staff Director
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Review Staff: 76-0229/2
27 February 1976
Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
'
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Miller:
Attn: Mr. Ralston
In response to requests about Agency involvement!
in Cambodia, the attached statement is forwarded for
your information.
Attachment:
Sincerely,
Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff
Denial of CIA involvement in the
resistance and dissident activities
which occurred in Cambodia since the
fall of that country to Communists
RECEIVED
FEB 27 1976
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 age 305
CIA
UN CLASSIFIED
The Central Intelligence Agency has not been involved
in any way in the resistance and dissident activities which
have occurred in Cambodia since the fall of that country to
the Communists!
UN CLASSIFIED
age 306
RECE
FEB 27 1976
CIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Review Staff: 76-0229/1
23 February 1976
Mr. William G. Miller.
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Miller:
Attn: Mr. Ralston
In response to your recent request about allegations
of Agency involvement in Cambodia, please be advised that
Mr. Ralston was given a copy of a 1971 letter from
Senator Church to Professor Pfeiffer and a copy of a
memorandum for the record reflecting a conversation
between Senator Church and our Legislative Counsel about
the specific allegation concerning the use of herbicides
in Cambodia in 1969.
These memoranda were furnished Professor Pfeiffer
in response to his FOIA request.
Sincerely,
Wast Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff
RECEIVED FROM
FEB 24 1976
CIA
W
SEL COMM
File:
December 19, 1975
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Pfeiffer:
*Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries.
The press of business on the Select Committee has 
been ex-
cessive.
The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems
concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina.
For example, there was an executive session on CIA 
paramilitary
operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated 
sev-
eral cases related to Vietnam.
Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some
limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important
issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do
an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation
concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to 
the Com-
mittee, we have had to concentrate our 
attention on certain
issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that
the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of 
its
investigation.
A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence.
agencies may be established to follow the Select 
Committee.
In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many
The problem
of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain.
of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered with-
in the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign 
Relations or
Armed Services.
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
December 19, 1975
Page Two
I regret that we simply do not have the time of re-
sources to investigate the matter which understandably con-
cerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one
of the other committees may better be able to help you.
Sincerely,
DB:bcm
32423630 Page 309
William G. Miller
Staff Director
MIKE MANSFIELD
. MONTANA
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Lender
Washington, DC. 20510
1973 DEC 18 11:25
SEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
December 15, 1975
Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Pfeiffer:
This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.
I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to
respond to your request.
Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am
Sincerely yours,
CC William G. Miller
orig mulla
Bro.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 310
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211
December 2, 1975
Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Mansfield:
You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a
meeting between myself and Ir. William Hiller, of the staff of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could
present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activ-
ities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in
the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia,
one year prior to the U... incursions into that country and during a time when,
formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal
government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for
about one-half hour, with fir. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you.
Ile made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activ-
ities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his
committee Sometime ago, I wrote fr. Hiller to find out when he expected the
committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since.
August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet re-
ceived no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read
in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at
Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina.
I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal coltert opera-
tions of . intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate
your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clan-
destine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in
technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most inter-
ested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the
Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence
community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to to
ask these questions.
I
I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington.
regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you
understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that
the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.
Sincerely your
E. W. Pfeiffer
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Equal Opportunity in Education and Employment
Page
United States Senate
Washington, D. C., December 15
19 75
Respectfully referred to
Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
U. S. Senate
Correspondence from Professor E. W.
Pfeiffer
I would appreciate your replying to
Professor Pfeiffer directly..
Form No. 3
M. M.
Mike Mansfield
16-45102-3
U. S. S.
GPO
32423630 Page 312
MI
00001000
L
THE MISSOULIAN
P. O. BOX 1535
500 N. HIGGINS AVE.
MISSOULA, MONTANA 59801
TEL. (406) 542-0311
Oct. 23, 1975
Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 607, Capitol Hill Hotel
Washington,..D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Miller:
Recently I discussed with Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, University of Montana
zoologist, an incident in which he has had an abiding concern: the
herbicide attack that occurred in eastern Cambodia in the spring of
1969..
As I understand it, from my talks with Dr. Pfeiffer and from my
review of the correspondence he has received from various agencies,
there is no doubt that the attack actually occurred, that it was
large and significant, and that the nature of the chemicals and
aircraft involved indicate that the U.S. had a direct role in
carrying it out.
Yet it seems the State and Defense departments, the CIA and the
"private" CIA-affiliate Air America have all denied in one way or
another that they conducted the attack.
The obvious question is who did make the attack? Who ordered it,
why was it ordered and under what authority? Dr. Pfeiffer has
indicated your committee is looking into this matter and that the
affair may ultimately be discussed in the course of Select Committee
hearings at some point.
Would
Is it possible for you to tell me the status of your inquiry?
it be appropriate at this time for our newspaper to interview Dr.
Pfeiffer and write a news story on the documents he has received,
for would such a study benefit from new information your committee
efforts may resurrect within the near future?
Thanks in advance for your interest. We have followed with great
interest the Select Committee efforts to date.
orig = For TE
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Sincerely,
хлад
xref Pfeffer on mingen
Don Schwennesen
Environmental Writer
Western Montana's Leading Newspaper
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 313
100% Recycled
Paper

:
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211
Oct. 27, 1975
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
1975 OCT 30 PM 2:22
Mr. William Miller
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Rm G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Miller:
Through the good offices of Senator Mansfield, we met some
weeks ago to discuss certain problems related to possible CIA
activity in Cambodia. As you know, I am particularly interested
in why the CIA cannot or will not find out who carried out the
massive herbicide attack against Cambodia in the spring of 1969.
The CIA has under the Freedom of Information Act provided me
with some documents from my file which bear directly upon this
strange episode and Senator Church's efforts to find out information
for me. When we met you indicated that CIA activities in Indochina
were to be investigated by the Select Committee. I would greatly
appreciate knowing about when you think this subject will come
up. I would also very much like to submit some of the documents
I have received from the CIA and my personal testimony to the
Committee. I believe that Professor A. Westing and myself were
the last official guests of the Sihanouk regime before it was
temporarily deposed.
I look forward to hearing from you on these matters.
Sincerely yours,
E.W.Pfeiffer
Professor
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University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211
Aug. 6, 1975
Mr. Paul Wallach
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Room G 308 Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Wallach:
As decided in our phone conversation today, I am
writing to you about a conversation I had last week in
Paris with an official of the Royal Government of Cambodia.
He informed me that CIA-directed activities hostile to his
government are presently occurring in his country, and that
these activities are being launched from bases in Thailand.
I would greatly appreciate your assistance in finding out for
me whether any agency of the U.S. Government is presently
carrying out activities against the Royal Government of
Cambodia.
I greatly appreciated the opportunity to talk with
you in person recently, and thank you for your interest
and help.
orig - Wallach
نا
Leg Blue chron
Sincerely yours,
Sulfell
E.W.Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 315
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THA
LONG:LE
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COMMITTAR ON
MORAMO INCULAR APMAIES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310
July 26, 1971.
E. W. Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
Dear Professor Pfeiffer:
Please forgive my delay in replying to your
last letter of March 29, 1971. Although the De-
partment of State has offered to make the Seventh
Air Force Study available to me at the Department,
I frankly have not had the chance to get down and
study it.
I have been told, however, that Air America
My
was responsible for the Cambodion defoliation.
source was not the State Department, but rather an
individual who is in s position to know the facts
in this matter.
It would be most useful to have a full study
of the extent and the effects of our defoliation
program in Southeast Asia. Perhaps you and Arthur
Hesting and others could get together to make a pro-
posal for a study of this nature.
With best wishes,
Leerely,
Sincerely
Church
Frank Church
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 316
Memorandum
мм
To: Terry Lenzner
From: Jim Moore
Subject: Robert Maheu John Roselli
2/14/74
Hereis a summary of what I have done on the Roselli-Maheu
connection.
him.
Yesterday I spoke with David Nissen, who prosecuted Roselli in
1968 for being an unregistered alien and for being involved with hidden
owners in the Friar's Clubi case. Nissen never met Maheu or spoke with
However, he did remember that stories about Maheu and Roselli
being involved in anti-Castro plots did come to his attention when he was
investigating and prosecuting Roselli. He couldn't remember the source
of those stories, saying that his information came from many people,
including Justice Department lawyers in Washington and the FBI. One
story he heard was that Maheu tried to intervene in Washington, either
through direct contacts in the FBI or at Justice or through Edward P..
Morgan, to kill the Roselli prosecution on the basis that Roselli had helped
the United States in Cuba. Maheu was reportedly an old CIA agent,. Nissen
remembers hearing at some point that Roselli had gone to Cuba in an attempt
to assasinate Castro
Nissen said that there are extensive files on Roselli maintained by
?'
the FBI or the Department. Nissen had a vague recollection that the files
contained a story about Maheu somehow being involved in a wiretap on Sam
Giancona, for whom Roselli worked. Nissen also remembered information
about a meeting between Maheu and Giancona regarding Cuba, but he couldn't
remember any of the specifics.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 317
When Roselli came up for sentencing, he was represented by Tom
Wadden, who had been associated in some capacity with Edward Bennett
Williams. Wadden filed a motion to reduce sentence and included with it
two columns by Jack Anderson that recounted the story of Roselli and Maheu
trying to assasinate Castro. Nissen thought the motion might also have
included an affidavit from Edward P. Morgan. The government successfully
resisted the motion on the grounds of fraud, since Wadden produced no
witnesses or documentation to support his claim. I called the Federal Court
in Los Angeles, and they have sent the motion for reduction of sentence and
attached papers to us. The Clerk there told me that in addition to the Anderson
columns, the motion included affidavits from Anderson and Les Whitten
vouching for the unnamed source of the columns.
Roselli is now in Florida so he can be reached, but, according to
Nissen, Giancona is in exile somewhere in Mexico.
FRONTIER CASE
Nissen never heard about Maheu being questioned in Washington in
Frontier
lieu of the Grand Jury appearance. Nissen did not try the/case, because he
had been promoted to supervisory capacity. However, he seemed surprised
that he had never heard of such a meeting. He. ✓ gave me the names of
three lawyers who handled the case after he gave up direct responsibility.
for it. My phone interview with the first of them, Jerry Ullman, is written
up as a separate interview. The second Lawyer, John Hornbeck, has not
yet returned my phone call. The third, Tom Kotoski, actually tried the case.
He is now an assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles and about to
become head of the San Francisco Strike Force. He will be in Washington
Thursday and Friday, February 14 and 15, and I have asked him to call me
as soon as possible.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 318
that
file
One final note Nissen said/the Roselli/in the Justice Department
contains many references to Maheu. He never, however, saw or heard about
a file kept on Maheu himself.
Richard Crane, head of the Organized Crime office in Los Angeles,
Jen
is also in town until the end of this week. He may know something about
well as about Dalitz coming back to the
Maheu and Roselli, as
Desert Inn. He should call me this evening or tomorrow morning.
Mike DeFeo, head of the Kansas City Strike Force,
Also,
will be in town tomorrow
and Friday. He, according to Crane, might know something about the Dunes.
In addition, Will Wilson mentioned the strike force man from Kansas City
as the one who set up the Maheu interview at the Justice Department. I
spoke with DeFeo today, and he will call me tomorrow to arrange a meeting
time before he leaves town.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 319
144
NAME
ALIASES
: Sam GIANCANA
: Sam Mooney, Sam Malone
DESCRIPTION: Born 7-16-08, Chicago,
LOCALITIES
FREQUENTED
FAMILY
BACKGROUND.
CRIMINAL
ASSOCIATES
CRIMINAL
HISTORY
BUSINESS
MODUS
OPERANDI
Ill.;
5'9", 175 lbs., hazel eyes,
dark chestnut hair, fair
complexion and medium build.
: Resides at 1147 Wenonah Ave.
Oak Park, Ill. Frequents
the Army Lounge, Norwood
House, Villa Venice, all of
Chicago, Illinois.
: Wife, Angeline DeTolve, died in 1954. Has three
daughters, Annette, Bonita Lou and Francine.
Mother deceased, father is Tony Giancana, and
sisters are Mary, Josephine and Victoria. Sam's
consort is Ladana Collins, 20 E. Delaware, Chicago,
Illinois.
: Tony Accardo, Paul Ricco, Willie Baddone, Nicholas
D'Amico, Sam Battaglia and Leonard Gianola, all of
Chicago, Illinois.
: FBI #58437, Chicago PD #E-27465. Subject has re-
cord of 13 arrests dating from Sept. 1925, on such
charges as murder, grand larceny, auto theft,
burglary and liquor law violations with two felony
convictions.
: Owns the Forest Lounge, the R & S Liquor Co., the
Lohmar Dist. Co., Chicago, Ill., and has gambling
interests and an interest in the shrimp business
in Cuba.
: A top ranking member of the Mafia in the State of
Ill. and a director of the organization's activi-
ties in Chicago and vicinite
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 320
56
NAME
ALIASES
: Giovanni ROSELLI
: John Roselli, John Russelli,
John Kasselle, John Passelli
DESCRIPTION: Born 7-4-04 Chicago, Ill,
5'8", 171 lbs, brown-grey
hair, blue eyes.
FREQUENTED
LOCALITIES : Resides 1251 No. Crescent
Hts., Hollywood, Cal. Fre-
quents gambling casinos at
Las Vegas where he has room
at Tropicana Hotel. Travels
frequently all parts U.S.
FAMILY
BACKGROUND
CRIMINAL
ASSOCIATES
CRIMINAL
HISTORY
BUSINESS
MODUS
OPERANDI
: Divorced from movie actress June Lang; father:
Vincenzo; mother: Maria Russo (both deceased);
cousin: Joseph Evangelista.
: Dragna family, Philip Kastal, Harold Meltzer,
Francisco Costiglia, Charles Fischetti, Louis
Piscopo.
: FBI #3339986. L.A. Sheriff's Office #51247.
Record dating from 1926 includes arrests for
suspicion of robbery, vagrancy, interfering with
trade, mail fraud & violation of parole.
: Vice-President Monte Prosser Productions and
varied other interests.
: A top Mafia figure at Los Angeles and Las Vegas.
Active in labor racketeering and control of gamb-
ling.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 321
SAM J. ERVIN, JR, ME, CHAIRMAN
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN, VICE CHAIRMAN
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, GA,
DANIEL K, INOUTE, HAWAII
EDWARD J. GURNEY, PLA
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, M. MIX
SAMUEL DASH
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
FRED D. THOMPSON
MINORITY COUNSEL
RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
DEPUTY COUNSEL
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 68, 3D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
MEMORANDUM
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.
To:
Senator Ervin
From: Terry Lenzner and Marc Lackritz
Subject: Relevance to S. Res. 60 of John Rosselli's
testimony about his CIA activities
Summary:
John Rosselli and his attorney, Tom Wadden, object to
testifying about Rosselli's involvement with Robert Maheu in a⠀⠀⠀
CIA-
financed plot to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960's.
The objection is 
based upon national security grounds as well as
an assertion 
by Mr. Wadden that the material is not relevant to
our inquiry under S. Res. 60.
Testimony of Mr. Rosselli about this matter is relevant
and necessary to our investigation for a variety of reasons.
Facts:
al Wilson
During the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the
CIA apparently financed and organized a plot to assassinate Fidel
Castro. Among 
the participants in this plot were Robert Maheu and
John Rosselli. 
Maheu had a public relations business at the time,
and 
Rosselli was associated with some alleged organized crime
figures (e.g. 
Sam Giancana) who had lost substantial gambling
investments when Castro came to power. Apparently, the plot
continued 
into the early 1960's even after the abortive Bay of Pigs
invasion, but it 
failed in attaining its objective of killing Castro.
Only a few officials in the government knew of the exis-
tence of the plot at that time.
Justice Department officials stumbled across this infor-
mation about the plot as a result of their investigation into an
illegal wiretap by Sam Giancana in the early 1960's.
Manch InшKY
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630gedly handsome gambler with contacts
A-
Jealousy an
Roselli, Harvey said he had a high -B
1.
-2-
The sensitive information was brought to the attention of
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and either he or then-Attorney General
Robert Kennedy ordered the prosecution of Giancana dropped in order
not to compromise national security considerations.
End.
:
The Information about the alleged assassination plot then
lay dormant in a secret file in the Department of Justice until early
1969, when Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson requested the
file from the Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime Section. The file
was returned to Central Files shortly after it was taken out.
wishes
out the
Assistant Attorney General Wilson next requested the secret
Justice file in early 1971 in connection with his interview of Robert
Maheu on January 27, 1971 (see attached chronology). This interview
at the Department of Justice, in lieu of a grand jury appearance, was
arranged by a telephone call to Attorney General Mitchell on January 19,
1971, only one day after Jack Anderson published his first column linking
both Maheu and Rosselli to the CIA plot to kill Castro. (see attached)
However, the significance of Anderson's column on January 18,
1971, was that on the same day, Haldeman requested Dean to find out
what he could about the Hughes - Maheu O'Brien relationship...
In the follow-up memos from Caulfield to Dean on the Maheu-
O'Brien link, Caulfield notes Maheu's prior "covert activities" for the
CIA and advises Dean that a check into CIA, FBI, and IRS files on Robert
Maheu is advisable to avoid a "counter-scandal."
In addition, Assistant Attorney General Wilson showed the
sensitive "Castro file" to Attorney General Mitchell, in January, 1971,
and discussed with him the political implications of the information.
Following the on-the-record interview of Maheu on January 27, 1971,
by Lynch, Wilson and Petersen, Maheu was interviewed privately by
Wilson concerning his prior CIA activities with John Rosselli. Maheu
was not forthcoming with information about the plot at that time.
Attorney General Mitchell discussed the contents of the sensitive file
with President Nixon, according to Wilson, who had advised him to do
so.
Conclusion:
Therefore, the obsession of the Administration in keeping tabs
on Larry O'Brien in 1971 and 1972 was in part motivated by a fear that
Maheu would impart some of this sensitive information about the plot
yea ag, 28
NW $0955 DocId: 32423630 Pagedly handsome gambler with contacts Roselli, Harvey said he had a high
A
--
_E

-3-
to O'Brien. Alternatively the objective was to discover if there was
any information about the plot that might be damaging to the Democrats
that O'Brien might possess from Maheu. And these concerns could
have been a possible motivation for the break-in to the offices of the
DNC and Larry O'Brien by four Cuban-Americans on June 17, 1972,
especially since their directions were to photograph any documents
relating to Cuban contributions or Cuban involvement in the 1972
Democratic campaign.
It is for these reasons that we wish to question John Rosselli #for:
about the nature and scope of his activities with Robert Maheu in the
early 1960's.
NW 50955 DocId:3242 630
Mantuitivity as sug
gedly handsome gambler with contacts
in both the American and Cubon
onship
Mako.
བ བཀག 1:|: :ཉིན ཀྱི ་ ཚ ར ར ད ལྟ ི ཀྱི ས
to
fot
- years ago, as
Roselli, Harvey said he had a high
-B
NW 50955
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Thanksgiving, 1970
December 4, 1970
January 18, 1971
January 18, 1971
:
January 19, 1971
January 19, 1971
January 25, 1971
January 25, 1971
January 26, 1971
January 27, 1971
NOVE
January 27, 1971
February 1, 1971
February 12, 1971
er find a M
Hughes leaves Las Vegas.
Maheu is fired..
Jack Anderson column published linking Mal
and Rosselli to plot to kill Castro.
Haldeman sends memo to Dean requesting in
mation on O'Brien-Maheu-Hughes relations}
1
Jack Anderson column appears with more det
on Maheu's involvement in plot to assassina
Castro.
F
Attorney General John Mitchell called Robert
Maheu in Las Vegas at 5:12 p.m. and talked
Caulfield to Dean memo discussing Danner
relationship with Maheu, O'Brien relationshi
with Maheu, and request for investigation in
CIA, FBI, IRS files for information to avoid a
"counter-scandal..
$9
John Rosselli enters prison.
Dean to Haldeman memo on Maheu-O'Brien-
Hughes relationship
· Maheu interviewed at Department of Justice 1
A.A.G. Will Wilson, Henry Petersen and Bill
Lynch, in lieu of an appearance before the
Grand Jury. Interview is about "skimming" in
Las Vegas
A.A.G. Wilson and Petersen meet with Mahe
privately to discuss Maheu's prior CIA activi
Caulfield to Dean_memo noting that Maheu wa
involved in "covert activities" for the CIA in
early 1960's.
Rosselli's attorney files a Motion to Reduce
Sentence based on Rosselli's prior CIA activi
15 hand t
Ne
Maneu recruited John Roselli, a rug-
gedly handsome gambler with contacts
1 with a Cat
ica e
years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about equality;
Roselli, Harvey said he had a high
DocId: 32423630 ingboth the American and Cuban un-regard for him.
-B
of "inci
NW 50955
1
(VERIFICATION - 446, 2015.5 C. C. P.)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2
COUNTY OF
--
8.5.
3
I am the_
4
5
in the above entitled action; I have read the foregoing
10
6
2
00
9
10
and know the contents thereof; and I certify that the same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which
are therein stated upon my information or belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true.
11
I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.
12
Executed on
(date)
California
(place)
13
14
Signature
15
16
(PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL --
1013a, 2015.5 C. C. P.)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
17
COUNTY OF Los Angeles
18
19
20
I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and not
a party to the within entitled action; my business address is:
9601 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 400, Beverly Hills, California 90210
2 2 2
21
On
June 25
22
1971
I served the within Notice of Motion For Reduction
of Sentence (Rule 35 FRCP); Points and Authorities; Affidavits in
Support Thereof
23
on the
24
222
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Plaintiff
in said action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the
Beverly Hills, California
United States mail at.
adaressed as follows:
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U.S. Courthouse
312 North Spring St.
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012
Beverly Hills
California
(place)
I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on June 25, 1971
(date)
at
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
25th day of June, 1971.
0
KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL
NOTARY PUBLIC CALIFORNIA
Both the verification and, proof,ol service by mail forms, being signed under penalty af perjury, do not require notarization.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Commission Expires August 29, 1972
Scheital
✓ Signature
Myrna J. Weinstein
OFFICIAL SEAL
KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL
DocId: 32423630 Page 326
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
National Archives and Records Service
To all to om these presents shall come, Greeting:
By vu of the authority vested in me by the Administrator of General Services, I
certify or his behalf, under the seal of the United States General Services Administration,
that the achreproduction(s) is a true and correct copy of documents in his custody.
GSA
68.13478
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 327
SIGNATURE
NAME
Leen
GILBERT DORAME
TITLE
Center Manager
Ө
FEB 12 1974
NAME AND ADDRESS OF DEPOSITORY
General Services Administration (9NC-L)
Federal Records Center, NARS
4747 Eastern Avenue
Bell, CA 90201
R9 Overprint 33 (4-72)
FORM
GSA
APR 68 6791E
3
ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U. S. Courthouse Building
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Tel: 688-2406
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
FLED
FEB 17 4 46 PH 71,
ROT COURT/
NTAL IS OF CALIF.
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United States of America.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
No. 1175-PH-CD
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Plaintiff,
GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO
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V.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
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FILIPPO SACCO, also known
as JOHN ROSSELLI,
REDUCE SENTENCE
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Defendant.
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Plaintiff, United States of America, strongly opposes
defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence based upon the files and
records in the case and the attached Memorandum.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney
Dand R. Dissin
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.
DRN:jt
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MEMORANDUM
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John Rosselli is actually Filippo Sacco, born July 4, 1905,
in Italy of parents Vincenzo and Maria Sacco. Vincenzo Sacco
came to the United States after the birth of Filippo, his oldest
child, and in 1911, Mrs. Sacco and Filippo joined Vincenzo in
the United States where they resided as aliens in East Boston.
Filippo Sacco completed the sixth grade in the public
schools of East Boston and was discharged from school in 1917.
By this time Filippo had two younger brothers and two younger
sisters. In 1918, Vincenzo Sacco died. His wife Maria and the
five children moved into the residence of Liberato Cianciulli
and a daughter was born in 1920. In 1922, Maria and Cianciulli
were married.
In 1922, Filippo had a job driving a horse-drawn milk
wagon and was nicknamed "Milky". However, in addition to his
legitimate occupation, Filippo had made connections with the
criminal element in East Boston and was engaged in narcotic
traffic with his headquarters in and around Maverick Square.
On September 14, 1922, Filippo sold morphine to a government
informant named Fisher while under surveillance by a narcotic
agent. On September 19, 1922, Filippo arranged for a large
sale from his "source" and was present and under agent sur-
veillance when the morphine was delivered. On September 29,
1922, Filippo Sacco and his "source" were arrested by Federal
narcotics agents. On October 18, 1922, the Federal Grand Jury
in Boston indicted Sacco for the sale of narcotic drugs and
two days later he was released on bail. While awaiting trial
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was released on bail on July 2, 1923.
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-2-
.
in the narcotics case, in Federal Court, Sacco was arrested and
indicted in Massachusetts State Court for grand larceny and
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In 1923, while he was on bail awaiting trial in the
narcotics and larceny cases, Filippo Sacco jumped bail in both
cases and disappeared from East Boston. The Government narcotics
informant, Fisher, disappeared about the same time and Government
sources believe that he may have been killed to prevent him from
testifying. Because of his fugitive status, both indictments
against Sacco were dropped.
After Sacco's flight from his home in 1923, he spent some
time in New York and Chicago, and finally made his appearance in
Los Angeles in 1924 under the fictitious name "John Roselli.”"
Sources indicate that Sacco engaged in bootlegging and hijacking
during this period and police records show he was frequently
arrested on such charges as carrying concealed weapons,
picion of robbery.
and sus-
After 1930, Sacco became associated with the Al Capone
gang in Chicago and was also closely associated with organized
crime in Los Angeles. Reliable sources relate that he was an
executioner for the criminal organizations in both cities. In
19 1936, by demands and threats, Sacco forced his way into part
ownership of "Nationwide News Service," a horseracing information
service used by bookmakers across the country.
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After prohibition was repealed, Sacco left the bootlegging
business and associated himself with Columbia Picture Studios.
As a close friend of Los Angeles underworld leader Jack Dragna,
Sacco soon became known as a labor muscleman and racketeer for
the movie studios. In 1943, Sacco was indicted on a charge of
conspiracy to extort millions of dollars from movie producers
and a labor union. Also indicted were union officials Browne
and Bioff, and the following ranking members of the Chicago La
Cosa Nostra family: Frank Nitto (aka Nitti), Louis Campagna,
Paul DeLucia (aka Paul "the waiter" Ricia), Phil D'Andrea,
Francis Manitote (aka Frank Diamond), and Charles "Cherry Nose"
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Gioe. In 1944, Sacco and the Chicago defendants were convicted
and all were sentenced to ten years in prison.
In 1947, Sacco and all his co-defendants were paroled
There were
immediately upon their becoming eligible therefor.
5 indications that their release had been secured by bribery but
admissible evidence sufficient for prosecution was not
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obtained.
Shortly
In July 1948, Sacco's parole was revoked because of his con-
tinued association with known criminals and he was imprisoned
until November 1948, when his parole was reinstated.
after Sacco's parole terminated in March 1954, William Bioff, a
key Government witness at the extortion trial was murdered by
the bombing of his vehicle. (The trial judge reportedly had
warned the defendants that if anything happened to Bioff while
they were on parole he would hold them responsible.)
co-defendants of Sacco have also been victims of gang slayings.
Upon his release from prison, Sacco returned to Los Angeles
and again associated himself with a movie studio. Reliable
sources report that this was a front and in fact, through his
close association with Sam Giancana of Chicago, Sacco received
Two other
the responsibility of overseeing the concealed interests in
Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld.
became a powerful figure in Las Vegas.
Sacco immediately
He travels back and
forth between Las Vegas and Los Angeles extensively and asso-
ciates with the known Cosa Nostra members and major gamblers.
Rosselli appeared before the Kefauver Committee investi-
gating organized crime and falsely testified concerning his
association with underworld figures and even his own personal
background.
During the period 1956-1958, Sacco was very active in
the construction and pre-opening operation of the Tropicana Hotel,
and Sacco received the lease to operate the gift shop. The
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Nevada Gaming Control Board refused to allow the Tropicana to
open as long as Sacco was associated with its operation, where-
upon the hotel owners were forced to buy back the gift shop lease
at a cost of $180,000, reportedly about thirty times the amount
paid for the lease.
During the above period, Sacco also involved himself in the
production of shows for the Tropicana, but again the Gaming
Control Board refused to allow him to participate in any capacity
and he sold his interest. Following his ouster from the
Tropicana, Sacco sold ice machines to most of the Las Vegas hotels
at prices far in excess of prices on the open market.
Sacco has
also received numerous "finders fees" from various Las Vegas
hotels and casinos for which few if any services were performed.
In October 1960, Sacco and T. W. Richardson were involved
in placing a wire tap on the telephone of comedian Dan Rowan in
Las Vegas at the request of Chicago gangster Sam Giancana.
In May 1968, Sacco was convicted of failing to register as
an alien and report his address annually. In the course of that
trial, it was shown that birth records in Chicago, Illinois, had
been forged in an effort to make it appear that Sacco had been
born there as John Rosselli. Sacco has long been a close friend
of Edward J. Barrett, County Clerk, Cook County, Illinois, in
whose office the birth records for Chicago were kept.
Among Sacco's underworld associates are the following:
Al Capone head of the Chicago underworld gang;
Charles F. Fischetti a Capone lieutenant;
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Micky Cohen
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gambler and racketeer;
Jack Dragna - leader of the Cosa Nostra, Los Angeles,
now deceased;
:
Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel member of Murder, Inc.
murdered June 20, 1947;
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 332
Allen Smiley
gambler, bookmaker, racketeer;
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Tony Accardo
Momo Adams
ranking Cosa Nostra figure;
ranking Cosa Nostra figure; and
Frank Costello ranking Cosa Nostra figure.
Numerous prospective witnesses in the course of investiga-
tions concerning Sacco's criminal activities have expressed or
displayed fear at the prospect of being called to testify
against him, and a number of witnesses have refused to testify.
In the Friars Club trial, it was apparent that a number of
witnesses deliberately perjured themselves in order to exonerate
Sacco, including Friedman, Vinnie Donato, Lee Deer, and Nat Ross.
Defendant Sacco was convicted in the Friars Club case in
December 1968 of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering
enterprise and interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained
securities. He was also convicted of making a false statement in
his income tax return. Sacco has had a long practice of concealing.
the source and nature of his income. He was sentenced to five years
in prison.
In view of Sacco's extensive criminal record extending back
more than 40 years, as well as his membership and participation
in the organized criminal syndicate known as Cosa Nostra, we
strongly urge that defendant Sacco's sentence not be reduced for
any reason whatsoever. He is a genuine menace to society and,
in particular, to those witnesses who have testified against him.
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I,
(
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
JUNE S. TOKUYAMA
declare:
That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or em-
ployed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address is
Office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North
Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age
of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action%;B
That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Cen-
tral District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose
direction the service by mail described in this Certificate was made;
I deposited in the United
that on
February 17, 1971
,
States mails in the United States Courthouse at 312 North Spring St.,
Los Angeles, California, in the above-entitled action, in an envelope
bearing the requisite postage, a copy of
addressed to
GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION.
TO REDUCE SENTENCE
Adrian Marshall, Esq.
Attorney at Law
9601 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210
at his
last known address, at which place there is a delivery ser-
vice by United States mail.
This Certificate is executed on
February 17, 1971
at Los Angeles, California.
I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.
USA-12c-240"
(Rev. 10/19/67)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 334
bene S. Arkivy
JUNE S. TOKUYAMA“
NW 509
To
Terry Lenzner
منتات دست
From : Bob Muse
Subject:
Interview of John Roselli
On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob
Muse interviewed John Roselli at the office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden,
888 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were
Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin and Leslie Scherr.
Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had
discussed with Roselli the Maheu Cuban matter with which we were concerned; and
found that it presented a great problem of national security. Accordingly he had
tried to reach Senator Ervin, an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the
Senator from allowing this interview to go forward. He did not get in touch with
Ervin directly but talked to a staff member in Ervin's office, whom he would not
identify. He further noted that Roselli was insistent upon not giving any information
about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be compelled to testify
about the matter.. Thus the interview was not productive insofar as Roselli's
involvement with Maheu in 1960 was concerned. However Wadden did allow us to inter-
view Roselli about his background and we reserved the right to have an executive:
session before a Senator where John Roselli might be compelled to testify about his
involvement with Maheu in Cuba. (It should be noted that Wadden would not identify
his privilege claim other than saying it related to national security.);
than saying it related to na
A
3.6
John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr.
and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His
telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with
them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he
had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the
Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman,
Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involve-
ment either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)
With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's
in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel.
When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was,
Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of
national security.
Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for
Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He
said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for
Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted 
to 
give
Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence 
in Los Angeles
and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who 
owned 13% of
the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two 
of the penthouses
at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for
Kolod 
acquiesced and told
seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas.
Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate,
When the New Years date
but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years.
was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and
Roselli then 
convinced Kolod to allow them
I were suppose to leave their premises.
to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels and avoid
any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression 
that Hughes didn't
I
want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want
to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of
trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to
sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would
receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and-asked Maheu if he wanted to
purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to
Roselli also
his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end.
instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did
not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which
represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.
He said
Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he
did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod.
that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters
concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.
With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that
He noted that
time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests.
Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense (but did arrange for Jim
He said that he had no
Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter).
trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted
Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent
by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal
from the Friar's Club.
Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns.
His involvement there started
his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel.
in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out
and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrange-
ment with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him
against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked
out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from
the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly
He
treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier.
recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the
gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan
was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.
-
Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall
the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had
terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while
his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper.
Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other
than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for
Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.
He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went
to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever
Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no subsequent substantiv
discussions with Peter Maheu.
He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack
Cleveland. Similarly, he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and
knows of the person only through newspaper articles.
With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in
NW 509.55
DocId: 32423630 Page 336
NW 509
Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney
He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and
that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971.
He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment
about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement
with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and
mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated state-
ment discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very
inaccurate.
Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen.
Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the
possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files..
Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel
grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter
appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should
make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury-
minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall
He said he
having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury.
had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden
that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about
it.
He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an
application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.
With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions
with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over
$10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making
any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no
knowledge of ferry Thomas making any contribution.
Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of
Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does
not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have
had with Thomas or Greenspun.
He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.
With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he
knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.
He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at
Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate
of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to
look at the Paradise Island set-up.
Nor does he
Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield.
recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail.
He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once vis-
Similarly,
ited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him.
while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's
fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat
to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not 
recall what the discussion
about Maheu concerned. He noted that no one has ever asked him 
about Danner
,
Rebozo or any members of the Administration.)
'
With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's.
The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly
after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions
were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with
Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.
He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the
He said however that
Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in.
he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a
prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he
has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own.
that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.
He also noted
The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli
and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 338
NW 5090
To
From
Subject:
: Terry Lenzner
Bob Muse
Interview of John Roselli
On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob
Muse interviewed John Roselli at the office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden,
888 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were
Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin and Leslie Scherr.
Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had
discussed with Roselli the Maheu Cuban matter with which we were concerned; and
found that it presented a great problem of national security. Accordingly he had"
tried to reach Senator Ervin, an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the
Senator from allowing this interview to go forward. He did not get in touch with
Ervin directly but talked to a staff member in Ervin's office, whom he would not
identify. He further noted that Roselli was insistent upon not giving any information
about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be compelled to testify
about the matter. Thus the interview was not productive insofar as Roselli's
involvement with Maheu in 1960 was concerned. However Wadden did allow us to inter-
view Roselli about his background and we reserved the right to have an executive
session before a Senator where John Roselli might be compelled to testify about his
involvement with Maheu in Cuba. (It should be noted that Wadden would not identify
his privilege claim other than saying it related to national security.)
3.
John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr.
and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His
telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with
them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he
had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the
Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman,
Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involve-
ment either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)
With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's
in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel.
When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was,
Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of
national security.
He
Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for
Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966.
said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for
Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted to give
Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles
and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of
the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses
at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for
seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas. Kolod acquiesced and told
Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate,
When the New Years date
but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years.
was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and
were suppose to leave their premises. Roselli then convinced Kolod 
to allow them
to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels 
and 
avoid
any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression that Hughes 
didn't
want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want
to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of
trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to
sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would
receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and asked Maheu if he wanted to
purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to
his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end. Roselli also
instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did
not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which .
represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.
He said
Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he
did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod.
that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters
concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.
Since that
With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's.
He noted that
time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests.
Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense (but did arrange for Jim
Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no
trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted
Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent
by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal
from the Friar's Club.
Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns.
his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started
in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out
and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrange-
ment with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him
against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked
out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from
the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly
treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier.
recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the
gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan
was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.
.-
He
Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall
the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had
terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while
his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper.
Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other'
than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for
Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.
He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went
to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever
Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no subsequent substantiv
discussions with Peter Maheu.
1
He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack
Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and
knows of the person only through newspaper articles.
With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in
NW 50955
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NW 50
Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney
He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and
that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971.
He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment
about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement
with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and
mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated state-
ment discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very
inaccurate.
Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen.
Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the
possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files.
i
Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel
grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter
appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should
make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury
minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall
He said he
having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury.
had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden
that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about
it.
He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an
application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence..
With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions
with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over
$10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making
any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no
knowledge of Terry Thomas making any contribution.
Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of
Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does
not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have
had with Thomas or Greenspun.
He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.
by use of stolen stocks
.
With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he
knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.
He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at
Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate
of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to
look at the Paradise Island set-up.
Nor does he
Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield.
recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail.
He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once vis-
Similarly,
ited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him.
while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's
fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat
to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not 
recall what the discussion
about Maheu concerned.. He noted that no one has ever asked him about 
Danner
,
Rebozo or any members of the Administration.)
With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's.
The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly
after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions
were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with
Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.
1
He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the
Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that
he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a
prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he
has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted
that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.
The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli
and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.
1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 342
7
6
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2
This is cover page of a
use of.
in 
Beverly
25 count indictment
arising 
from as
The FRIARS Club
Hills for illegal gambling
activities.
00
8
9
BY
FILED
DEC 21 1967
CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DEPUTY
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11
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
1432
NO.
12
Plaintiff,
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V.
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MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN;
MANUEL JACOBS (aka RICKY JACOBS);
VICTOR G. LANDS;
T. WARNER RICHARDSON,
FILIPPO SACCO (aka JOHN ROSSELLI);
BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM,
Defendants.
INDICTMENT
[18 U.S.C. $371: Conspiracy;
18 U.S.C. §1952: Interstate
Transportation in Aid of
Racketeering; 18 U.S.C. §2314:
Interstate Transportation of
Funds Obtained by Fraud;
47 U.S.C. $502: Operating Un-
certified Communication Device;
26 U.S.C. $7206 (1) Subscribing
False Tax Return.]
19
The Grand Jury charges:
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22222222223
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27
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31
?
COUNT ONE
[18 USC §371]
Commencing prior to June 15, 1962, and continuing to the
date of the return of this indictment, defendants MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN,
MANUEL JACOBS (also known as RICKY JACOBS), VICTOR G. LANDS,
T. WARNER RICHARDSON, FILIPPO SACCO (also known as JOHN ROSSELLI),
BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM, and their unindicted co-conspirators Ernest S.
Allen, Vernall Furlong (also known as William G. Douglas), Edwin
Nathaniel Gebhard (also known as Pete Kelly, Pete Peterson, and
George McFarland), Alfred Mathes, George E. Seach, and Albert Snyder
agreed, confederated and conspired together to commit offenses
against the United States as follows:
DRN:mlm:mt
(a) To travel in interstate commerce and use facilities
NW 50955
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DocId: 32423630 Page 343

WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Blvd.
Suite 400
1
ADRIAN MARSHALL
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3
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5
10
7
Beverly Hills, California 90210
272-9211
Attorneys for Defendant
Filippo Sacco, also known as
John Rosselli
FILED
JUN 28 9 31 AN '71
CLERK U.S.TISTRICT COURT
CENTRALIST OF CALIF.
00
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9
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12
Plaintiff,
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VS.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FILIPPO SACCO, also known as
JOHN ROSSELLI, et al,
7-671
NO. 1432 Criminal (WP6)
NOTICE OF MOTION FOR
REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
(RULE 35 FRCP); POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES; AFFIDAVITS
IN SUPPORT THEREOF
Defendants
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case.
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TO DAVID R. NISSEN, Chief, Criminal Division, United States Attorneys
Office, Los Angeles, California:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that. On July 6, 1971, at 2:00 o'clock P.M.,
or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, at the Courtroom of the
Honorable William P. Gray, defendant, Filippo Sacco, also known as
John Rosselli, will move the Court for a reduction of sentence entered in this
Said motion will be based upon the grounds stated herein, the
affidavits attached hereto, additional affidavits defendant proposes to file
before the date of the hearing, oral testimony to be presented at the hearing,
and all of the files, records, pleadings and other documents in this case.
Defendant was convicted of one count of violation of 18 U.S.C.
§371, one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952, three counts of violation of
18 U.S.C. §2314 and one count of violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1).
Defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a fine
of $10,000.00 on Count One, two years to run consecutively to Count One and
1.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 344
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a fine of $10,000.00 for Count Six, and two years imprisonment to run
concurrently with Count Six and a fine of $10,000.00 for each of Counts
Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen of the Indictment, and one year imprisonment
to run concurrently with Count One and a fine of $5,000.00 for Count
Twenty-Two. The total imprisonment was five years and the total fine was
$55,000.00.
On January 18th and 19th, 1971, there appeared in newspapers
throughout the country nationally syndicated articles by columnist
Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence
Agency of the United States Government as set forth in said articles.
The affidavits of Jack Anderson and his assistant, Les Whitten, are
attached hereto and included therewith are copies of the columns, set forth
as Exhibits A and B. Exhibits A and B were published on the 18th and 19th
of January, 1971. Attached as Exhibit C is a follow-up column which
appeared on February 24, 1971, and Exhibits D and E which are copies
of the office records of columnist Jack Anderson, which were released
and published on April 18th and April 27th, 1971.
The undersigned is informed that at no time prior to the
sentencing of defendant were the matters set forth in Exhibits A and B
of the attached affidavits brought to the Court's attention. It is the belief
of the undersigned that had these matters been brought to the Court's
attention they would have materially affected the sentence handed down
by the Court in this case.
Defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in
support of this written motion and to present the testimony of at least one
witness at the hearing on July 6, 1971. The additional affidavits and/or
testimony to be produced at the hearing may relate to the financial ability
of defendant to pay the fine of $55,000.00 as well as the condition of
defendant's health.
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31 ///
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///
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 345
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
United States v. Ellenbogen (2nd Cir.) 390 F. 2d 537.
DATED: June 25, 1971.
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Respectfully submitted,
ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
By Adrian Marshall
ADRIAN MARSHALL
Attorneys for Defendant,
Filippo Sacco, also known
as John Rosselli
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NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 346
3.
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
) ss.
CITY OF WASHINGTON
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )
following:
JACK ANDERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says the
under my own by-line.
1. I am a nationally syndicated columnist writing
For many years prior to the death of Mr.
Drew Pearson, he and I wrote a column known as the "Washington
Merry-Go-Round".
2. I wrote the articles attached hereto as Exhibits
A and B pertaining to certain activities performed by John
Rosselli, the Defendant herein, on behalf of the United States
Government.
3.
The information contained in said articles was
made available to me by persons employed by the United States
Government who, in the past, have supplied me with accurate and
truthful information as pertains to other subjects.
4. After receiving said basic information, my staff
and I conducted an impartial and independent investigation
regarding John Rosselli's activities as described in Exhibit A,
which were performed at the behest of Agents of the United
States Government.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 347
5. The aforementioned investigation satisfied me that
the facts set forth in Exhibit A are a truthful account of Mr.
Rosselli's activities as described therein.
JACK ANDERSON
Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.
My
Яйш Р. Джа
NOTARY PUBLIC
Commission experies March 31, 1975
NW 50955
Docid:32423630 Page 348
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
CITY OF WASHINGTON
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )
) ss.
following:
LESLIE WHITTEN, being duly sworn, deposes and says the
1. I am employed as principal associate of nationally-
syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, writer of "Washington Merry-
Go-Round".
2.
I worked on certain articles relating to John
Rosselli, and services performed by him on behalf of the Central
Intelligence Agency, an organ of the United States Federal Gov-
ernment.
3. As part of my investigation, I twice called William
K. Harvey, a retired Central Intelligence Agency official, now of
Indianapolis.
4. On my first call, in January, I asked Harvey if it
were not true that he had personally intervened with the Justice
Department in order to mitigate the government's prosecution of
Rosselli on the basis that Rosselli had done a formidable service
for his country. Harvey said "this is a long story
think it ought to be printed." I asked him whether it was not
true that he had a high regard for Rosselli. "I still do," he
earnestly replied.
5.
•
.
I don't
In pursuing the story further, I called Harvey
again in Indianapolis in February and asked him whether he could
comment on our story about Rosselli which by now has been pub-
lished widely in the United States. He declined to comment.
But
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 349
he twice reaffirmed his "high regard" for Rosselli. I advised
•
him I was making an affidavit on Rosselli's behalf and he ex-
pressed concern for Rosselli, asked his present status and said
he would "follow up" on Rosselli's behalf from his end.
6.
Based on my part of the investigation, I am satis-
fied that the facts set down in Exhibit A, appended to the Affi-
davit of Jack Anderson, are a truthful account of Rosselli's
activities on behalf of the United States.
Salli Whitton
LESLIE WHITTEN
Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 350
My
Jane P. Jones
NOTARY PUBLIC
Commission experie March 31, 1975
"STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
being by me first duly sworn, deposes and mxys:
in the above entitled action; that he Ads
and knows the contents thereof; and that the same is true
knowledge, except at t
matters which are
therein stated spen
information or belief, and as to those mais
day of
.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this...
Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)
Notice of Motion, Motion for Reduction
Received copy of the within of Sentence and Request for Evidentiary 12th
Received copy of the within.
Hearing, Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support thereof.
RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT
th
THIS 12 DAY OF
February
1971
Plaintiff
Attorney.
1971
19
U. S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
BY E. Gomay
Attorney.
(AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL
1013a, C. C. PJ.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
being first duly sworn says: That afiant is a citizen of the
United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; that effient is over the age of eighteen years and is not a party to the
business
within above entitled action; that affiant's residence address is:_
that on the
the within
afiant served
on the
Lin mid action, by placing a true anqy thereof in an envelope
addressed to the attorney _ of record for and...
residence
at the
office address of said attorney _ as follows:
and by then scaling said envelope and depositing the same, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at the
rity where is Incated the office of the attorney for the person by and for whom amid service as alle.
That there is a delivery service by United States mail at the place so addressed or ** there is a regular communication by
mail between the place of mailing and the place so addressed.
"
Subscribed and worn to before me this
day ol
Notary Public in and for said County and State of California:
(SEAL)
"Here quote from envelope name and address of adre
**Phen the letter is addressed to a post office other than where mail
where maled from, strike out "et.".
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 351
and to the same cin
1
02
מא
3
4
ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210
272 9211
Attorneys for Defendant
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
VS.
Plaintiff,
NO. 1175 PH
MOTION FOR REDUCTION.
OF SENTENCE AND
REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY
HEARING
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FILIPPO SACCO, also known
as JOHN ROSSELLI,
Defendant.
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Defendant FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, by his attorneys,
ADRIAN MARSHALL and WADDEN, WALL & RUDY, requests this Court
to grant a hearing for the presentation of oral testimony and other evidence
in support of defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence entered in this
case. As grounds therefor defendant alleges:
22
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1.
24
Defendant was convicted of six counts of violation of Title 8
U.S.C. Sections 1302 and 1306 (a) and Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1305 and
1306 (b) and sentenced to six months on Count 1 and thirty days on Counts
2 through 6, all to run concurrently.
25
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2.
1228 22
29
On January 18, 1971, the mandate was spread and defendant was
ordered to surrender to the United States Marshal at noon on January 25, 1971,
for direct delivery of defendant to Terminal Island for service of his sentence.
30 3.
On January 18 and 19, 1971, there appeared in newspapers through
out the country nationally syndicated articles of columnist Jack Anderson
alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency in an
13
31
32
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 352
-1-
2.
1
M
assassination attempt against Fidel Castro. Attached hereto as Exhibits A
2 and B are Xerox copies of said publications.
מא
H
LO
5
6
7
4.
At no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the
matters referred to in Exhibits A and B brought to the Court's attention.
5.
At an evidentiary hearing, defendant will present oral testimony
and other evidence in support of this motion related to the matters set forth
in Jack Anderson's column which defendant feels will materially affect the
8 Court's reconsideration of the sentence entered in this case.
0
6.
On or before February 19, 1971, defendant proposes to file
10 and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion.
11
12
Dated:
February 12, 1971
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2 2 3 3 21.
Respectfully submitted,
ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
By Adrian Mashed
ADRIAN MARSHALL
Attorneys for Defendant..
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 353
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 354
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p. 7-8
p. 10-11
R4297
June 24, 1976 Testimony of John Rosselli before Committee
Senator \Church presiding
Los Angeles
Rosselli first met Maheu in approximately July, 1960,
pursuant to a telephone call from Maheu. At their first
meeting, Maheu told Rosselli that a high government official
had requested that Maheu recruit Rosselli to "fight Communism
90 miles away from Florida" to recruit Cubans to assassinate
Castro.
New York
Rosselli had second meeting with Maheu and went to New York
in September under the alias of John Rawlston [Castro was
in New York at this time]. Rosselli met Jim O'Connell of
CIA, plus "three others.'
"
Florida
p. 12-15
O'Connell, Maheu and Rosselli met in Florida hotel approxi-
mately one week after New York. Rosselli introduced Giancana
to Maheu. Also introduced X (Trafficante) to Maheu. Obtained
permission from Maheu to bring Giancanainto project.
Rosselli recruits Cuban #1, Rosselli's cover was as Wall Street
businessman. Rosselli and Maheu agree on a $250,000 price tag
P. 17
for the job.
P. 20
p. 26
P. 27
P. 35
P. 44
O'Connell never met Cubans. Trafficante, Cubans and Maheu met.
Maheu brought $10,000 and poison capsules.
Rosselli told Giancana about CIA involvement to keep his mouth
shut. Rosselli only had one discussion with Giancana.
O'Connell called Rosselli after Bay of Pigs. Met in Florida
not long after Bay of Pigs with William Harvey, O'Connell and
Rosselli. Harvey told Rosselli that he wanted Rosselli to
have nothing to do with Maheu and not to use Giancana connections.
Rosselli indicates that pro-Castro people in Florida probably
had inkling of assassination attempts.
During Missle Crisis, Harvey asked Rosselli to see if "they"
had any intelligence on us, on the missiles.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 355
TOP ST
p. 68-70
p. 71-75
p. 76-78
p. 79-80
p. 81
P. 82
P. 84
p. 85-87
P. 88
p. 89
p. 90
FBI agents Hill and Dodge met with Rosselli and his lawyer,
Cantillon. At this time Dodge informed Rosselli that the
FBI was
aware that he was not a U.S. citizen. Dodge indicated
something about Nevada and some other secret organizations.
Rosselli met with Sheffield Edwards in 1966 for some drinks
and discussed his problems with the FBI.
Rosselli received a telephone call from an FBI agent, Jack
Barron in June of 1970. The agent informed Rosselli that his
appeals can be reversed. He was told that his lawyers and
friends can't do anything for him in Washington.
Rosselli talked with Bill Harvey prior to his testimony before
the Select Committee to see if Harvey had objections and
Harvey only suggested that Rosselli protect those people whose
lives and whose families might be jeopardized by his testimony.
Rosselli stated he did not know the five so-called Watergate
burglars Hunt, McCord, Barker, Martinez or Sturgis.
Roselli had no doubt that the Cuban operation was on behalf
of the CIA and not Mr. Hughes.
Rosselli stated that his Cuban contacts were never informed
that this was a CIA project, but that he represented a Wall
Street business:
In the period 1967-1968, Rosselli failed to register as
alien and faced criminal charges.
Rosselli describes how he is brought into the operation
Maheu's contact and O'Connell's satisfying him that they
were government representatives.
an
Rosselli stated that Sheffield Edwards was not overly concerned
with the FBI's contacting Rosselli.
Rossell's reason for not informing his sources that it was
a CIA operation was because he believed he would be more
successful doing what he was doing by representing big
business.
When the FBI contacted Rosselli in both 1966 and 1970
they hinted that they wanted Rosselli to provide information
about United States gambling interests.
NW 50955
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TOP
親
P. 44
p. 45-46
P. 47
p. 47
p. 52
P. 52
p. 54-55
p. 58
P. 59
☐ p. 61
p. 62
P. 64
p. 66
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the whole operation came
to a halt and Rosselli said he was never in contact with
the Cubans again.
Rosselli met Harvey at Dulles Airport in Washington after
the Missile Crisis, in June 1963, and had dinner with him
in Washington that night.
Rosselli mentions FBI had him under surveillance for several
years.
Maheu
Roselli has two stories re Rowan wiretap from Maheu.
told him he wanted Rosselli to get some bail money for two
guys in Las Vegas who were in trouble and he had placed some
taps in Rowan's room because 1) Maheu was doing Giancana a
favor, and 2) Maheu had the authority to see if Giancana was
leaking to his girlfriend.
Rosselli arranged bail money for the two men who were caught
tapping Rowan's room.
Giancana laughed when Rosselli discussed tapping incident with
him, but gave no clues to the reason for the tap.
Rosselli met in New York with O'Connell and Harvey in April
1962.
Rosselli states to the Committee that he felt the CIA came
to him because he has contacts in Cuba.
Rosselli states he took on "project" because it was the
government; he was patriotic.
Rosselli knew Trafficante before "operation" started.
Rosselli maintained some contact with Maheu after Harvey took
over.
Rosselli still is social friends with Harvey.
In April or May of 1966, Rosselli was stopped in the street
by two FBI agents with note saying to meet him later.
referred them to his attorney, Mr. Cantillon
Rosselli
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 357
TOP
OFT
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20510
Howard--
In re your "battle plan" memo to Hart
and Garn, I think you should consider possible
wis com of our Committee making some kind 
of
very low-key anouncement that we're doing
something. Purpose would be two
-fold--to
prevent getting wholly co-opted by new
House Committee (and agencies making 
a
claim that since House is doing it, they can
ignore us---also to put House on notice there
is specific area we have carved and 
will
continue to carve out for ourselves). Most
important, we must do something affirmative to
insure that the sources out there come 
to us.
If we say nothing, potentials which just go
to House under assumption that that's the only
thing going on.
Attached is the type of low-key someone
could say in response to an inquiry (which
I assume Spencer gets lots of).
Mike
DocId:32423630 Page 359
Assassination.
study
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a
limited inquiry into certain leads which the Church Committee
did not have time to finish checking out. The Committee is
also continuing to explore the question of
e whether or Mr. Roselli's murder
appearances
church
was related in any way to his reskin before the Committee.
^
Dreams Interest Re Reviews 9 R4.881 documents
ned unsan
By Logistics
a cepy May 74 memo
why did Houston
Hear only homself, Edi, aso Augen & R
dilail
maller
SECRET
SECRET
respon
to never
identifying
CIA offici
Vegas
Sur,
in
July 1974
file
Cable 24 Luly 74
while not directly involved
r
admittedly unAWARE
facts - ramifications ref
a exposure
Atiants base of opinion
1
termination at this
stage, even if only temporary expedient, will have aduceuse
ештенец
ippece on his LogHety to clot. He might recent
талпинальоти ей сльо
for something he not respon
for
March 76 05 memos LG on mahout Hughes
Jeme-1974
Security Officer Special Staff Properished Os to chuck
Nerds in James R. Phelan & Wallow Jurned, both.
липсы
z
interest in
connection wy a sensitive SPS activity.
Os record show Phelan to a A wilni in Clay Show
treal. Deccan write several oil remakers deformation
suit w, Augives a thought to be cource.
2
Зискит лишал
receiving call from RAM in Dec 1970 complaining
That CIA embarked
thru hein.
new Hughes project + had gone
(manen - Hugh fight reason for fermin
Стати
Non Offic. Doc's in mehrige as Fite
IFeb 71
Memo
work ouch
from
Eric I to DOP
الله
RAMA
Discusses efforts to
a satis. plan to terminate mm from RAMA.
cover
cover 
i
a
RAMA offrons
nat voices the need for a meeting wi
• Non 015 Docer) in RAM'S file
27 tiene 66
нет
and Ram
DECRET
Houston to DDC/ re Long Subcommittee
Soun Leon testified before
Long Subcom on Onassis
case & subcom. staff undoubtedly.
knord makea used audio device.
yle Miller memo For Record 14 March 1974
ролів
Notes contact wi
Houston said
L. Houston ne maker/Diaconna
The only Agency officials "aware
of details were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Riccal
and himself.
Lyle miller MFR
10 Oct 73
he meeting W/ Scott Armst. re his interview
Jam
في
10/3/73+
assoc. w/ CIA.
interest in
"New Years Eve Party" Wilkinson report
critical . C.
ст.
8 page PELTIER mund 11/18/68 re "Observations,
on Cover
Cover Com
Personnel
ралу
* activities
(RAMA).
4. взе
4 poze jaar 71
MFR of
O'Connell
7
(CCS/CPGLOBE) meeting wi Ed Mullen (Intertel)
RAMA/MM/CIA. Juran Duran arias] $1000r
withdrand
Rodakint of
DECKET
-Mullin/Interler
14 MAY 62 TOP SECRET.
Edwards MFR - Re Barteli.
mem prepared for RFK following are brifing
"
Ji
Rosselli and makes spent consed.
time in minion talking with the
correr. Geavanini ars fresent.
Geacanne put them in touch w/ a
сочений
went
Edi.
рых
qoutes
Who
Ежелый
ваша речтин Набашин,
said op feasible
기
Jon 71-M CIA
contact w/ RAM cut
wi
лат сит
77
because Hughes buille & unfav. publ..
However - Osh. note Mist Helms had
directed termin. 8 Maken relation
early as 1966.
Малин
"flors" ignored
O'connell MFR 1/5/71 - re: RAM
On 17 Nov. 70-
O'Coprece
Mahen called
to say that Rossellis lawyer advisia
that
unler. Someone interceded on.
his
chal re deportation - Ros. was going
to make complete expose of
Wil
his activatin
- maken advised or that his
& Jan 7,
past affiliat. Wi
Hughes power
had no bearing on
CIA hod.
мо
Struggle situation.

KET
④
M STAFF File Ex Properly.
2/15/72 Osb memo to Colby re Russelli
Des ignored Rosselli exposure threat, taking
calcul risk as to expose [Sanitizes
ein fficers name for untinown reason]
June 75
Subm. to Schwart
from knacke - Elder for
Type writter- fragmetar resume - Cubick
__
JECKET
Bill Angeloni used for dirty work. Sunveil by mahen
"
mahen fill "Gaps"
Vol. I
Nov 63 - Dec. 73
3 time 71
CCS
12419
Eric I
13 ap 71
re
to SAM Halpern.
81
The attached 2 memoranda
Contain
the latest development
in the Rovert A. Mahen associats
(RAMA) "thriller. "...
The second
memorandum is self explanatory
sherud кной тол
Except
you
Mulley
Rovers
Assor
'
Longtime
Cooperator in the cover field, and Howard
سمه همیار
Hunt is nord one
(No Attach.)
of its Vice Presidents.
MER
by
meeterġ
کی
(CCS / LPGLOBE).
wondering
nows his name come
сер ет
Hughes Tool.
enverleg.of.
RAMA.....
Heinonen meeting w, Mullin
of Interter to det. this
ESSIONAL RECORD
KON TER
HON DAWSON MATHIS
TIVES
HON
Allegations
Cast
Char
тов
CA
EBI
Cuban Exiles & Soldier of Fortine
Hughes
Clure Plots
#T
#2
1
AMCASA
urob
Ruby
By Connection
>
Connection
Oswald
саловодие
Library
1 Inventory - Review - Jom/Ed.
2. Digesting
3. Timings Nature & Public Statement
4. House areas
1
7
Interest
leads
hot beads
ustart interviews
Someone to work
fell 
seption
Oct 12 meg
__
DeLoach to Mohr 12-12-63
Re Assassination of the President
I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his
viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that
Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI
investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip
and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to
pil the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that
although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.
Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately
one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some
"startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a
source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an
unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely
tended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination of
the President. This shows
how
ms Gimes. N
I told Ford that apparently McCohe had failed to follow up on this matter.
I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a
igment of his innamation, However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source,
he source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we
re still checking some angies of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either
e or somewhat of a psychopathic liar., Ford stated he could certainly see this.
inst
We will
Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of
The Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he
hought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and
traighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all
means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain
confidential.
We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years.
le has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism"
and has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.
CTION:
RL
Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford. Preve
تلمنك
Wall his study
FLu
FBT
* SEE MEM
12
213.63
Jes: HET.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 368
2 -
L
ΤΟ
WIRGIN IS
93 77
~ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mohr
Mr. Mohr
FROM
:
C. D. DeLoach Pidat
DATE:
December 12, 1963
Collab in
Conti
Lonch
Vins
Tuv
Trotter
Tele. HoomE
Holmes
Canily
L
SUBJECT:
Com 197)
ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT
I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. (Gerry) Ford
(R. - Michigan) in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. 
Upon arriving he
told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was 
agreed to.
- Ford told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which
Chief Justice Warren was carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission.
He explained that the first mistake that Warren made was 
his attempt to establish a
"one man commission" by appointing a Chief Counsel, Warren 
Olney, that was his 
own]
protege. Ford stated that after the mention of Olney's 
name by the Chief Justice, at
their first meeting, Allen Dulles, former Director of 
CIA, protested quite violently.
Because of Dulles' protest, the other members told Warren 
that they would like to 
know
more about Olney prior to giving their consent.
W
On the occasion of their second meeting, Ford and Hale Boggs joined
Dulles, Hale Boggs told Warren flatly that Olney would not be acceptable 
and 
that
(he (Poggs) would not work on the Commission with Olney. 
Warren put up a stiff
argument but a compromise was made when 
the name of Lee Rankin was mentioned
.
Warren stated he knew Rankin and could work 
with him.
de 1
Chức
i to
Ford told me that he was currently having problems inasmuch as the
majority of the members of the Commission desired to go along with the recommendation
made in Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's letter to 
the Commission dated 12-9-63
In this letter, Katzenbach recommended that the 
Commission make an immemuate
press release pointing out that the FBI report clearly 
showed there was no 
international
conspiracy or collusion and that Oswald was a 
loner. Ford stated he was a minority of
one that did not want to give out any press release 
until the Commission had had a
thorough opportunity to review and discuss the 
FBI report. (I noted that the report 
was,
on his desk at the time of our meeting.)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 Mr. R-sen
1 - Mr. Evans
my wring pointer.
This in my
1 - Mr. Sullivan This document is prepared in response to your request and is vote for dissemi-
1
Mr. Jones
CPD:saj
Its use is limited to official proce 1
your Coppie and the content may 
not be disclosed to unauthorized persone
nation adside your Committee.
nt without the express approval of thONTINUED NEXT PAGE
FEDT 19
XFOX
JOJAN 3 1964
DEC 30 193
REC 55
12.108.9021 d
22 DEC 27,1903
5
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 369
DeLoach to Mohr
12-12-63
Re Assassination of the President
I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his
viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that
¡Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI
investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip
and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to
il the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that
Although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point. '
Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately
one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some
"startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a
source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an
unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely
tended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination <f
the President. This now
ms Omnes. N
مساله
ти
I told Ford that apparently McCone had failed to follow up on this matter.
I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a
igment of his imagmation, However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source,
he source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we
re still checking some angles of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either
e or somewhat of a psychopathic liar., Ford stated he could certainly see this.
When will in
ins
Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of
he Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he
hought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and
traighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all
means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain
confidential.
We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years.
He has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism"
Ind has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.
CTION:
RE
Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford.
HL Well handled
Flu
FBT
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 370
2 -
* SEE MEMY
121-13.63
Jes: HET.
J1
My Turn
Donald E. Schulz
Kennedy and the Cuban Connection
Conspiracy theories are fashionable,
sometimes even fruitful, as in the
case of Watergate. So it is not surprising
that recent revelations of the Senate In-
telligence Committee have resurrected
an old question: what connection, if any,
did the Castro government have with the
assassination of John F. Kennedy?
Current speculation is that the Cuban
dictator, having learned of CIA plots
against his life, decided to strike back,
returning violence for violence, with
consequences that are now history. In-
deed, the recent report of the Schweiker-
Hart task force, while finding no hard
evidence to support this theory, did un-
cover some interesting new leads. More
than that, it established that a CIA-FBI
"cover-up" had deprived the Warren
commission of vital information that pre-
vented it from seriously exploring the
possibility of Castro's involvement and
that consequentry there is no longer any
reason to have faith in its picture of the
Kennedy assassination."
And so we may well have a reopening
of the investigation. At last.
Given all this, it seems appropriate to
examine the record of the period. A small
but interesting body of published testi-
mony and reminiscences describes and
amply documents a little-known cam-
paign of accommodation launched by
Washington and Havana in the weeks
preceding that fateful day in November
1963. Actually, the origins of this tenta-
tive and ultimately ill-fated rapproche-
ment may be traced to the previous
spring, when. Castro, increasingly de-
pendent on his Soviet sponsors, found
himself obliged to embrace the banner of
"peaceful coexistence" in order to obtain
economic and military agreements need-
ed to assure the continued development
of his revolution. In practical terms, this
meant the normalization of relations
with the United States.
A MESSAGE FOR CASTRO
It was not until September 1963, how
ever, that this campaign began to show
results. At that time, William Attwood, an
adviser to the U.S. delegation to the
United Nations, told his superiors he had
word that Castro wanted an accommoda-
tion. John Kennedy got the message and
approved a "discreet contact" with the
Cuban U.N. representative, Carlos Le-
chuga. Subsequently, communications
were established and meetings held
to discuss the prospect of negotiations.
By early November, Kennedy had de-
cided to push toward an opening with
Cuba in hopes of taking Castro out of the
Soviet fold and erasing the memory of
the Bay of Pigs. The Americans sought a
meeting to draw up an agenda for later
discussions. On Nov. 18, this message
was transmitted to Havana. Shortly
thereafter, Lechuga was instructed to set
forth such a plan for U.S. consideration.
Even as these developments were un-
folding, a second dialogue was taking
place through an unofficial envoy-the
French journalist Jean Daniel. On Oct.
24, Kennedy had received Daniel in the
White House. The President, it seems,
had learned of the Frenchman's forth-
coming visit to Cuba and had decided to
seize the occasion to send Castro a mes-
sage. The essence of this communication
was a strong hint that the United States
I would be willing to normalize relations
providing certain conditions were met.
What were those conditions? One, clear-
ly, was an end to Castroite subversion.
The U.S. had a special responsibility to
contain Communist expansionism. As
long as Havana continued to export revo-
lution, the economic "blockade" of the
island would remain in effect.
ACCOMMODATIONS
Beyond this, not much was definite.
The American negotiating position had
not yet been worked out. Even so, hints
of possible Cuban participation in the
Alliance for Progress and of the desire of
the United States to see a decline in
Soviet influence on the island suggested
further avenues for discussion.
Bearing this message and an invitation
to revisit the White House upon his re-
turn, Daniel set off for Cuba. There he
found a remarkably receptive Fidel Cas-
tro. Indeed, during the course of a six-
hour interview the lider máximo found
occasion to praise the American Presi-
dent for his sincerity, realism and "good
ideas": Kennedy might yet understand
that there could be "coexistence be-
tween capitalists and socialists, even in
the Americas. Castro was convinced
that normal relations could be restored
"on the basis of mutual respect for sover-
eignty." His country needed peace in
order to concentrate on the socio-eco-
nomic tasks of the revolution. The issue
of subversion would not be an obstacle.
Cubans would naturally "feel solidarity"
with their revolu-
tionary brethren in
other lands. But ul-
timately, each na-
tion would have to
determine its own
destiny, and "if they
choose regimes oth-
er than ours, this is not our business."
This was two days prior to President
Kennedy's death.
I mention these developments be-
cause they provide an important-and
perhaps crucial-frame of reference for
Congressional investigators and the pub-
lic alike. They are not, of course, proof of
innocence. But they are suggestive:
would Castro have been so intent on
coming to terms with a man he was
conspiring to kill? One may seriously
doubt it. In point of fact, the assassina-
tion would bring a quick end to Washing-
ton's interest in accommodation.
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
Still, this is not to rule out the possibil-
ity of a "Cuban connection." Govern-
ments often behave in inconsistent and
self-defeating ways. Indeed, even as the
Kennedy Administration was taking
these first covert steps toward rap-
prochement, the CIA was engaged in an
attempt on Castro's life. If, due to a lack
of political control and a prevailing at-
mosphere of cold-war hostility, U.S
agents could be conducting such activi-
ties in direct conflict with Presidential
policy, it is not difficult to imagine simi-
lar distortions on the Cuban side. Only a
few weeks earlier, Castro had publicly
denounced U.S.-sponsored assassina-
tions and even threatened retaliation.
Might not some overzealous security of-
ficials have taken this for tacit authority
to set up a "program of elimination"?
But all this remains speculation. It is.
possible to envision any number of sce-
narios that might have led to the fatal
events of Nov. 22. In lieu of hard evi-
dence, however, it seems only fair to give
Castro the same benefit of the doubt that
Kennedy has been accorded-namely,
that he be considered innocent until
proved guilty. It is hoped that the inves-
tigations to come will proceed on the
basis of that assumption.
Schulz, a Ph.D. candidate in political.
science at Ohio State University, is writ-
ing a book on the Cuban revolution.
September 6, 1976
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 371
9
Fonzi Mty. Notes
9/20/76
Manalo
Ray:
photos
Al Farab mem
Ruby-Casted.
GAGE 101
305-861-765
Ztr.
LFBI got guest,
Tuley 62/63 Havens to see antigues dick
✓
Someone
cuchtipped o
Cubelt
DEA
Fungis/hury B
involved
case 
a
Bernsten
Alleman/Traficante -
CUSA -Conservatisin
Black bordered ado
Larry Craford lived Carousel
too.
(Reg
Operation
Myers lends & to
"How 
Hollywood
Bailey
makes nover
Called McCune
get people
go
out of
Hent in Stargy early. Shortly
after she got here
Bernstein
Farkll
Monta Lorenz
Лить
DEA
Gibso
Traffic
✓
Hunt as Eduardo
Pru Meskill - Ny Daily News
Sturgis Lorenz
new
movie
1975-Series of
pieces
Sylvia Odio sure it was Oswald in DAlAs late Sept.
The Dian-Asset.
imposter
Norman Rothman -Rule
Ozwned
Ferrie Lowvence.
Stougis
shan Myers
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When
Supposed to
be
тыр
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Strawman
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Vol 19 477
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Lorenz-
Sam Benton - Speed Cro
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Juming house. Alex Roark/Sturgis /
Shamma
mining
Naval Intell
Artime
org. G.
Source
grafficante
Norady Quality Foods
Gadot - Cocaine
mee Kessler Al
Gill Foods
Lee Triannon feualy
Eduard Baton
Trice Co. Realtor
(Rebogo]
,
Eduardo Buttavi
Artine.
McQuilley
Workings
For Rothm.
when
Ruley in
Contact
to
汰
Carlos Martin
Cuban
for
DR. Modesto Mora - best p
Traffeg
Sam Mannarino
(Norm Rothman J
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Jack Whitten
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1965- Hunt straighting
out Cabula componice.
in Spain.
3”
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4. Nosenko
Sanchez transcupt.
Amish file
5.-Alvarrado.
> 6. sensitive / reliable source
NW 50955 Docid:32423630 Page 57H
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 375
CONFIDENTIAL
To Assassination
فقع
PART TWO: JIM. BRADEN
One of the most incredible bodies of recent information
concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research
done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top inves-
tigative reporter.
Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which
summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines
what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the
assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual
and is largely based on substantiated information such as
police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police
Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and
Texas police officials.
Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books)
did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has
been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author
Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.
It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings,
particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden,
have been factually substantiated and are solidly established
by official police records.
Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a
mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene
of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the
shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who
thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified
himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released
shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas
Sheriff's Office.
Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his
true identity during five years of investigative research.
And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune
of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for
"looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now
believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking
tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate
_ fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 376
1
2.
For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading,
is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest
levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to
the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities
of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and
outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an
indispensable link or leader of organized crime's
far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists
and professional hit men.
Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon
"enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast
and covers virtually every national crime syndicate juris-
diction. According to federal authorities working with the
Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and
according to other high government sources cited by author
Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for
Meyer Lansky.
The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up
under a false name across the street from the Texas Book
Depository just moments after the shots were fired on
November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.
Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders
in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or
brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom
were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at
that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter,
and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics
of the Warren Commission now attest to.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 377
3.
Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22
Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police
officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository
following the assassination.
Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired,
Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the
Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting
suspiciously."
Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before
taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation.
The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he
was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy
Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first
tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's
license, the common means of identification, the man pulled
out a gasoline credit card instead.
The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested
when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in
for further interrogation.
At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary
statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in
Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He
said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away
from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been
walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the
time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab.
Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy
Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository
during an attempt to make a telephone call following the
shooting.
Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's
office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made
of possible criminal records relating to him.
Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was
interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills.
The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing
and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by
the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden
gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on
the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on
Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no
information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey
Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 378
4.
1
Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges
In early 1969, Peter Noves, the investigative reporter.
whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim
Braden, began investigating the mysterious California
"oil man."
Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a
former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney
Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination.
The FBI man told Noves of Braden's presence at the scene of
the assassination at the time of the shooting.
Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either
of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and
had left no forwarding addresses.
Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles
run a check on the license number that Braden had given to
the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the
assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's
license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego
county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new
business and home addresses, which interestingly were over
a hundred miles apart.
The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden
also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original
name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's
to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.
On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination,
Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had
legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a
new license under that name. The license was granted.
Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false
identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noves
contacted the Intelligence Division of the California
Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the
mysterious Brading.
Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy.
He's got a long rap sheet and apparantly has Mafia connections."
Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's
(Jim Braden's) police records.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 379
5..
The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35
seperate entries covering virtually every phase of
criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement,
operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop
lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime
gas ration coupons on the black market.
Host of these arrests had been made under the name of
Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also
showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene
Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee,
and inevitably, Jim Braden.
"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's
records.
Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact
that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or
run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was
never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the
time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren
Commission had only routinely included Braden's short state-
ment about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police
exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's
Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at
face value.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 380
6.
Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) and The Mafia
Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of
Braden based upon all available police records and
documents.
What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement
by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia
leaders in the nation, a record of close association with
key figures in the national crime syndicate.
Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all
the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had
moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.
(BRADING AND PEREIRA)
In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor
Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of
several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved
in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement
of wealthy widows.
In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested
by the FDI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas.
The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from
a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before
fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon con-
victed of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years
in prison.
However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three
years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959
after having served just five years of his sentence.
(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES).
During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the
convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still
another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to
Denver, Colorado.
In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with
two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde
and Gene Smaldone.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 381
7.
The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers
and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the
syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from
the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show
that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the
entire Pueblo area of Colorado.
The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand
of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading
(Draden) became involved in many transactions with the
Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years
later, after Brading finally wont to jail for the embezzlement
of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote
to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial
matters.
(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAII)
Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills
in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came
under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department
Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.
In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on
his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil specu-
lators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark
and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police
records.
Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of
the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated
out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had
placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had
compiled extensive information on their friendship with
Brading.
In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain
James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of
Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman,
and
Brading.
Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost
experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission
(which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia)
to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of
Clark and Bauman.
Among those named was Eugene Bṛading.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 382
8.
Captain Hamilton's letter stated:
"This Department has under investigation Arthur
Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman.
These men are representing themselves as officials
of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater
Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money
very lavishly.'
"
"Clark has been arrested several times and has been
associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such
as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading,
Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone
brothers of Denver."
As investigator Peter Noves points out, the men listed
with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who"
of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.
(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)
Of these top lafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps
the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known
as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the
Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.
In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of
the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of
LAPD Intelligence, stated that,
"We have long considered Fratianno to
be the executioner for the Mafia on
the West Coast."
Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committed that his Intelligence
Division had linked Jimmie Frationno to at least sixteen Mafia
executions.
Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination
of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had
survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of
his lieutenants. Fratianno, was later released due to insuf-
ficient evidence. Pratianno used the alibi that he had been
at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the
shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles
Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of
the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 383

9.
Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in
the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the
mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las
Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the
robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by
bullets fired behind the ear, apparantly in true Mafia
fashion.
Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of
Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close
associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head.
Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of
another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli.
Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner
at Fratianno's home one night.
Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a business-
man in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy
gambler, had apparantly welched on a $80,000 gambling debt
that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite
charge hidden under the hood of his car.
Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for
extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure
involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor
Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that
Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that
the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over
$105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the
Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance"
of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans.
The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious
Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.
(BRADING AND MELTZER)
While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became
connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Heltzer.
The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become
aware of Brading's close relationship with Heltzer when
Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list.
Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia
leaders in the entire nation.
The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's
friend Heltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union
racketeering and narcotics.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 384
10.
A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:
"Meltzer now is reported to operate a large
bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in
California. A major figure in the organized
underworld, he is known to all the important
narcotics traffickers throughout the United
States. He has also operated in Oklahoma,
Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston,
and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong,
Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."
(BRADING AND THE SICAS)
In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with
yet another top Nafia operation. Brading became a close
friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers
Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly
brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.
Joe,
In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's
friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest
narcotics ring in the United States.
The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial.
On the night before the trial opened, the government's
star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously
shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was
never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for
lack of evidence.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 385
11.
Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby
The same inadequate investigative work which led the
Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid
Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible
for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of
Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the
Kennedy assassination.
As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very
substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly
involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.
But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates
that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia
figures operating in the same general areas, at the same
general times, there is another single piece of evidence
which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the
day before the assassination.
Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby
visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company
on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four
hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any
link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place
at the same time on the day before the assassination does
of course raise further significant questions about a
possible relationship between the two men.
Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of
Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on
November 13, 1963, four days before the assassination.
Braden was required to report all of his travels to his
Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embez-
zlement conviction.
On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination,
Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in
Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole
Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he
planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while
here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous
right-wing oil billionaire.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 386
12.
Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of
Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time,
has' recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting
the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three
other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for
November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia
friend) and Horgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend"
visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states
that Braden was definitely the "friend."
(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's
sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was
"suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassin-
ation. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel
found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel
filed suit against Lámar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's
sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for
several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has
produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers,
is still in the courts.)
Also on November 21, the day before the assassination,
according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack
Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Munt offices in Dallas.
The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman
friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same after-
noon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub
as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the lunt offices, apparantly
in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's
visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.
The Warren Commission investigated several other possible.
links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still
unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside
one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the
Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate
that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.
Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before
the President's assassination does indeed arise.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 387
NW 50955
13.
Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie
Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces.
of information which indicate a possible connection between
Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.
David Ferric was the homosexual airline pilot and private
investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating
in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after
District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David
Ferric was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His
mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.
David Ferric has been a target of investigation by critics
of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In
fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible
Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was
widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to
have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following
the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include
the official Secret Service, and FBI reports on Ferric in the
26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren
Leport was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally
release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following
Garrison's public accusations.
same
Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and
Davod Ferrie worked out of the floor of offices in a building
in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the
assassination.
This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that
time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private
investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top llafia kingpin. It
is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos
Marcello ranks with his close friend Heyer Lansky as one of
the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national
and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the
Mafia cmpire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls
most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United
States.
In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the
assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices
of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie,
who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his
boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the
Porc Marquette Building in New Orleans.
At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim
Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette
Building.
DocId: 32423630 Page 388
Braden was then commuting between New Orleans and
Beverly Hills, with the approval of his Parole Board.
Braden was working as a representative of his Mafia
friend Roger Bauman, the oil speculator. Braden worked
out of Room 1701, which was the office of his associate,
Victor Main, Jr., an oil geologist. This was just a short
way down the hall from David Ferrie in Room 1707.
Interestingly, in one visit to his Parole Office, Braden
"mistakenly" told his Parole Officer that he was working
out of Room 1706 which would have been the room next
door to Ferric instead of Room 1701.
Thus a possible Braden-Ferrie connection in the weeks
just before the assassination does indeed arise in addition
to the possible Braden-Ruby connection. Both connections
definitely do seem to fall outside of or beyond the area
which could reasonably be attributed to coincidence, chance,
or circumstance.
Beyond several sets of information which tend to indicate
that David Ferric had some contact with Lee Oswald at
various times; the critics of the Warren Commission have
particularly focused on Ferric's ties to Carlos Marcello
and the Marcello Mafia empire.
In fact, in his interviews with the FBI and Secret Service
after the assassination, Ferrie claimed that he was with
Marcello at the very time of the assassination. Ferrie
stated that he was in court with Marcello on the afternoon
of November 22, which does appear to be true.
Carlos Marcello, along with Meyer Lansky, had become the
central targets of the Justice Department's Organized
Crime Division in the early 1960's, under the vigorous
direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy.
Marcello, known as "The Little Man," became one of Attorney
General Kennedy's most fierce enemies during that period.
Marcello once claimed that he had been kidnapped under orders
of Robert Kennedy and the Justice Department.
Ed Reid, author of The Greenfelt Jungle and widely recognized
as one of the most respected experts on the Mafia in the
nation, has written that Carlos Marcello once threatened to
have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has
written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant
who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in
September of 1962.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 389
15.
According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top
lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby
sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The
informant stated that Marcello said that President
Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and
that his brother would then follow. The informant
further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut"
to do the killings.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 390
10.
Jim Braden: Author Peter Noves And Judge Byrne
Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered
most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading),
is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew
Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided
over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.
As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case
against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White
House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of
Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
A short time later, it became known that President Nixon
had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge
Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him
the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge
Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of
bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently
under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.
It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest
in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsbere may have
been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.
Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's
involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after
Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding.
the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his
friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern
California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said
that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence
which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with
Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend,
the FBI man told Noyes that the PBI had never before known
that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the
assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The
FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistako
in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record.
The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on
Braden.
Hoyos meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been
in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated
in early June of 1968.
Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating
any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his
friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the
Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 391
The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, dis-
counted the information regarding the RFK assassination,
but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the
1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never
heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information
to the RFK investigators.
Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to
be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that
investigated student unrest several years ago. Following
his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne
was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon,
the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 392
Jim Braden: Where He Is Today
Immediately following the assassination of President
Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in
his personal finances.
Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from
an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He
reported the large increase in revenue from the well for
the month of November 1963.
A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a
charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive)
La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that
year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend
Roger Bauman established the "D And B'Cattle Company."
The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably
named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two
men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during
this same period that Brading made a substantial investment
in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.
In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated.
He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club
which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his
parents in Santa Barbara.
And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious
trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.
The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one
of its 100 Charter members in January of 1964, is one of
the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.
The most powerful force behind La Costa is Noc Dalitz, one
of Heyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had
been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland,
and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate,
one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.
Hoe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in
Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped
set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had
sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late
1960's.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 393

19.
The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction
of Moe Dalitz and lieyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of
the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a
syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of
the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used
in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is
known in the Mafia as "open territory" meaning that no
single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.
Intelligence authorities in southern California have long
regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some
officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."
The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in
La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to
soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members
were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.
Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became
frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles
away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration,
in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray
Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living
it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.
In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clem-
ente, H.R., Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Koore, and
John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss
the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to
unravel.
John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee
hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings
at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial
strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of
Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified
that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two
days, February 10 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions
were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by
Haldeman.
It has been during this same period of time, in the last
several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become
one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa.
According to numerous intelligence reports, from California,
Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of
being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss
Meyer Lansky.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 394
20.
The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation
into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for
"skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator
Noyes was told by several high government officials that
Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal
courier for Never Lonsky. One official disclosed that
Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of
the country for the syndicate. Another official said
that was a "low estimate."
In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investi-
gation by California authorities following an incident at
La Costa.
A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make
a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of
well over $100,000 in cash.
Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle
had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another Cal-
ifornia official put the amount at closer to $200,000.
During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated
that he had received the money from an oil transaction,
and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later,
one of the officials working on that particular investigation
of Braden, told Hoves that Braden had also been given the use
of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling
cash out of Nevada and the country.
At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still
operating out of La Costa.
(Braden is now
living in Atlanta.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 395
- Mike Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974
RICHARD L. THORNBURGH
RE: JKF ASSASSINATION
January 21, 1977
IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO RV 6250-
Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh
Acting Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.
Dear General Thornburgh:
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would
most appreciate prompt access to Federal Bureau of
Investigation material relating to Mr. Nelson Bunker
Hunt and Mr. Eugene Brading, a/k/a Jim Braden.
Your assistance and cooperation with the Select
Committee is most appreciated.
Aloha,
HSL/dr
cc: I
author file
1.
subject matter file
1
William G. Miller
1 Michael J. Madigan
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 396
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Chairman
DONALD F. MASSEY
RE:
December 8, 1976
LEE HARVEY OWWALD
IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R#5785
Mr. Donald F. Massey
Assistant Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
Dear Don:
As I mentioned briefly this afternoon, the Select
Committee has expressed an interest in recent press accounts
suggesting the existence of transcripts of Lee Harvey
Owwald conversations in Mexico City. I would be pleased
if you would advise as to the existence of such transcripts
and their availability for review by the Senate Select
Committee.
Thank you in advance for your attention to this
request.
Sincerely,
HSL:dr
cc: 1
Author File
1
1
Subject File
Minority Counsel
1
Staff Director
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 397
HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
Minority Staff Director
Schulz
AM
rudeau
HA!
AT
ITLE
MP!
Curtis
LE
Jack Anderson and Les Whitten
CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe
After President John F. Kennedy
was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the
Central Intelligence Agency received
evidence suggesting that Cuban Pre-
mier Fidel Castro arranged the assassi-
nation in retaliation for attempts on
his life.
Yet sources privy to the secret dis-
cussions at the highest levels of the
CIA during those hectic days now tell
us that the CIA deliberately withheld
the evidence from the Warren Com-
mission investigating Kennedy's death.
Our sources cite two reasons for
holding back this evidence. One was a
resolve to cover up the secret that the
CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill
Castro.
There also was a legitimate concern
that the Castro revelations might in-
flame the American people, whose
grief could have turned into a terrible
wrath that might have precipitated
.some rash action.
.:
Only a few key people knew about
the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One
was Attorney General Robert F. Ken-
nedy, who was his brother's personal
watchdog over the CIA. It has now
been established that Robert Kennedy
was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the
attempt to use underworld killers to
knock off Castro.
Two days later, Robert Kennedy cau-
tioned the CIA not to go ahead with
the assassination without consulting
him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd
on the CIA, it must be assumed that he
was kept advised of subsequent assassi-
nation attempts. However, there is no.
documentary evidence of this.
Records now available show that
Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J.
Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10,
· DROPOUTS
1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover
later divulged this important informa-
tion to the Warren Commission.
Of course, various CIA officials also
knew about the assassination scheme.
Not the least of them was the late CIA
chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved
the original plan. He later served on
the Warren Commmission, yet he sat
silently throughout the investigation
without mentioning the Cuban angle...
Within hours of President Kenne
dy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled in-
formation from Mexico City suggest-
ing that the Cubans may have been be-.
hind the assassination. Our sources say
that the CIA developed similar infor-
mation in Washington.
The first person to reach Robert
Kennedy's side after the shooting was
CIA Director John A. McCone, who re-
mained alone with the Attorney Gen-
eral at his McLean, Va., home for
nearly three hours.
McCone swore to us that Castro's
name was never mentioned during the
three hours. But CIA records show
that the next day McCone not only
mentioned Castro to the new Presi-
dent, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed
him on the information from Mexico
City.
Yet no one brought the Cuban
connection to the attention of the War-
ren Commission. We were the first to
get word of the anti-Castro plot to
Chief Justice Earl Warren, the com-
mission chairman, four years later.
We are now free to reveal our role
in the drama. Two of our confidential
sources, CIA agent William Harvey
and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A
third source, attorney Edward P. Mor-
YOU SAY YOU HAVE
RECURRING FANTASIES.
OF SPACE FLIGHT...
-DO YOU DESIRE TO
EXPERIENCE INTERPLANETARY
TRAVEL?
NOT
PARTICULARLY...
gan, has waived the confidentiality we
had promised him.
Morgan told us in January, 1967,
about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot
against Castro. He raised the possibil
ity that the plot could have backfired
against President Kennedy. There
were suspicious circumstances, he
may have learned of the attempts on
pointed out, indicating 
that Castro
against Kennedy.
his life 
and may have retaliated
Morgan refused to identify his
sources because it would have violated
the attorney-client privilege. But he
was an attorney of such stature that
we didn't doubt his word. He had been
chief inspector of the FBI. He had di
rected the historic congressional inves
tigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing.
Later, he ran the investigation into the
excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCar-
thy.
We got Morgan's permission, to
write a cautious story. We confirmed
the general outlines from a CIA
source. Then on March 3, 1967, we
wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have
approved an assassination plot, which
then possibly backfired against his late. :)
brother."
The next day, according to records
now available, Kennedy's secretary.
called 
for a copy of the May 7, 1962,
memo, which summarized the briefing
he had received on the assassination
plot.
On March 7, 1967, we reported more
details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to
assassinate 
Cuba's Fidel Castro," we
wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a
counterplot by Castro to assassinate
President Kennedy."
JUST THE
WEIGHTLESSNESS.
By Howard Post
GASOLINE ALLEY
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 398
1
The Washington Post
August 22, 1976
Slain Mobster Claimed
Cuban Link to JFK Death
1
By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers
Long before his recent murder,
John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld
recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Cas-
tro, had been privately claiming that
agents of the Cuban premier, in retali
ation, were involved in the assassina.
tion of President John F. Kennedy.
Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connec-
tion to the Kennedy assassination was
expressed through his attorney, Ed-
ward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long
ago as March, 1967, and also in private.
conversations with a longtime associ-
ate of Rosselli who participated in
meetings between Rosselli and the
CIA.
An FBI "blind memorandum" on
an interview with Morgan dated
March 21, 1967, was included, without
identification of the interviewee, in
last June's Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee's report on the role of the in-
telligence community in the Kennedy
assassination investigation.
Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli
and another Morgan client had in-
formed him that Castro became aware
of CIA assassination conspiracies
against him and "thereafter employed
teams of individuals who were dis-
patched to the United States for the
purpose of assassinating Mr. Ken-
nedy."
Because neither Morgan nor Ros-
selli was identified in the Senate re-
port, the significance of that portion
of the 106-page document was dis-
counted at the time it was published
in June, before Rosselli's disappear-
ance and the subsequent discovery of
his body in an oil drum in Florida
waters. The Washington Post, however,
has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli
. were the sources of the testimony that
suggested a Cuban role in the Ken-
nedy murder.
Morgan's account, according to a
summary of the FBI interview, was
that Rosselli had reached his conclu-
sion about à Cuban connection to the
Kennedy
from
"feedback" furnished by sources close
to Castro who were involved in the CIA
plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.
assassination
:
"His (Morgan's) clients were aware
of the identity of some of the individ-
uals who came to the United States
for this purpose and he understood
that two such individuals were now in
the state of New Jersey," the FBI in-
terview summary stated.
A long-time associate of Rosselli
who was interviewed separately by
The Washington Post, said there was
no question in the slain mobster's
mind that President Kennedy was
killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal
for the CIA schemes against the Cu-
ban leader.
"He was positive; he was sure," said
the associate, who knew Rosselli well
and was in contact with him before
Rosselli disappeared from his Florida
home on July 28. The associate, who
does not want to be identified pub-
licly, is scheduled to be interviewed
this week by Dade County, Fla., homi-
cide detectives. He was a party to Ros-
selli's contacts in the early 1960s with
CIA case officers overseeing the at-
tempts to assassinate Castro.
Despite occasional speculation, the
collective conclusion of all official
U.S. government investigations into
the Kennedy assassination-including
the Warren Commission, the FBI and
the CIA has been that there was no
evidence that implicated the Castro
government or any of its agents.
However, the CIA's involvement in
the schemes to assassinate Castro
was not divulged to the Warren Com-
mission, and knowledge of them was
confined until 1967 to a small, elite
circle of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity. President Johnson apparently
first learned about the schemes only
after a March 7, 1967, column by the
late Drew Person, which prompted
Johnson to order a CIA investigation
of the highly sensitive episode.
Full details of the CIA-underworld
collusion in the plots to kill Castro
did not surface publicly until the pub-
lication last year of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee's assassination re:
port and the ensuing report last June
on the possible role of the intelligence
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 399
2
1
1
1
J
1
་
agencies in the Kennedy assassination
and investigation.
The body of Rosselli, who lived
flamboyantly in a world of mobsters.
politicians and playgirls, was found
two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum.
weighted with chains but buoyed by
the
gases from decomposition on
ocean's surface off the coast of Miami.
The specific cause of death was deter-
mined by an autopsy to be asphyxia-
tion.
Last year, an underworld colleague
of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana,
who also had been recruited by the
CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was
found shot to death in his Chicago
home in what police described as a
highly professional job by assailants
who penetrated the mobster's per-
sonal security screen. Giancana was
due to testify before the Senate Intel-
ligence Committee shortly after his
*demise.
1
Neither murder has been solved.
The possibility that Rosselli's mur-
der might have been related to his
Senate testimony on the CIA schemes
to kill Castro has brought the FBI
into the investigation at the request
of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.
The involvement of Rosselli, Gian-
cana and other underworld figures-
principally Santos Trafficante of
Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana
gambling enterprises fell hostage in
1959 to the Cuban revolution-in plots
against Castro had been a closely held
secret within the top echelons of the
CIA and FBI until recently.
The tangled chronology of suppres-
sion and eventual disclosure, although
detailed in the June report, has re-
ceived little public attention. Rossel-
li's murder adds significance to those
events.
Here is the sequence, pieced to-
gether from the testimony given to
Senate intelligence investigators:
Columnist Drew Pearson went to
the late Chief Justice of the United
States Earl Warren late in January,
1967, and told him that a Washington.
lawyer had confided to him that one
of his clients said the United States
"had attempted to assassinate Fidel
Castro in the early 1960s and Castro
had decided to retaliate."
Warren declined Pearson's sugges-
tion that he see the lawyer, who was
Edward Morgan. Warren referred the
matter to then Secret Service Direc-
tor James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13,
1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Ho.
over, informing him of the allegations.
⚫ Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six
senior bureau officials on an "eyes-
only" basis. There is no record of FBI
meetings or discussions of those alle-
gations. At that point the sensitive let-
ter bounced back and forth in the
higher reaches of the FBI bureauc
racy.
The job of responding to Rowley's
letter was assigned to the supervisor
of the FBI's General Investigative Di-
vision who was given responsillity for
the overall assassination investigation
in March 1964.
This official's job was complicated
by the fact that he had never been in-
formed of what Hoover and his closest
circle of confidants in the FBI learned
early in 1962-that the CIA was
deeply
involved in assassination
attempts against Castro, and promi-
nent American underworld figures, in-
cluding Rosselli and Giancana, had
been recruited for the attempts..
So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official
prepared a draft reply to the Rowley
letter for his superiors saying "our in-
vestigation uncovered no evidence in-
dicating Fidel Castro officials of the
Cuban Government were involved
with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assas-
sination of President Kennedy. This
'bureau is not conducting, any investi-
gation regarding this matter." The
TBI official added in later testimony
that "everyone in the higher echelons
read this
Drew Pearson went ahead and pub-
lished a column on March 7, 1967, ref-
erring to reports that CIA schemes
against Castro's life in 1963 "may
have resulted in a counterplot by Cas-
tro to assassinate President Kenne-
dy."
Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one
of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies,
called FBI assistant director Cartha
DeLoach with the message that "the
President had instructed that the FBI.
interview (Morgan) concerning any
knowledge he might have regarding
the assassination of President Ken-
nedy."
DeLoach told Watson that it ap-
peared Morgan "did not want to be in-
terviewed, and even if he was inter-
viewed he would probably not divulge.
the identity of his sources
son persisted, however.
Wat-
De-
"Under the circumstances,"
Loach concluded in a memo for the.
files, "it appears that we have no al-
ternative but to interview (Morgan)'
and then furnish the results to Wat..
son in blind memorandum form."-
The interview was assigned to two
agents from the FBI's General Investi-
gative Division, which the Senate
committee concluded was "puzzling"
because it was the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division which had been as-
signed responsibility for investigating
possible foreign involvement in the
assassination.
Neither agent was privy to the
knowledge, confined to Hoover and
his top aides, of the CIA's assassina-
tion plots against Castro. Both agents
testified eight years later that they
were "surprised" when Morgan al-
luded during the interview to U.S. at-
tempts to assassinate Castro.
"These agents stated that they
could not evaluate the lawyer's
(Morgan's) allegations or question him
in detail on them, since they had not
been briefed on the CIA assassination
efforts," the Senate committee ob-
served.
On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Wash-
ington Field Office sent headquarters
ten copies of a blind memorandum
summarizing the interview with Mor-
gan..
In a Senate Intelligence Committee
summary of the FBI interview, Mor-
gan was reported to have acknowl-.
edged that his clients were "on the
fringe of the underworld" and that
they faced "possible prosecution in a
crime not related to the assassination
"9
Morgan said his clients "were called
upon by a governmental agency to as-
sist in a project which was said to
have the highest governmental ap-
proval. The project had as its purpose
the assassination of Fidel Castro.
Elaborate plans were made, including
the infiltration of the Cuban Govern-
ment and the placing of informants
within key posts in Cuba."
Morgan also told the FBI, according
to the summary, that Castro had em-
ployed "teams of individuals who
were dispatched to the United States.
for the purpose of assassinating Presi
'dent Kennedy."
It was not clear then-nor is it to
day-why Morgan came forward at
that time to bring Rosselli's story to
the ears of the nation's highest law
enforcement authorities.
It may be relevant that Rosselli had
'serious legal problems at the time.
In May, 1966, the FBI. threatened to
deport him for living in the United
States under an assumed name unless
he cooperated in an investigation of
the Mafia (his true name was Filippo
Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA
contact from the anti-Castro conspir-
acy days, CIA security director Col.
Sheffield Edwards, who informed the
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 400
FBI that Rosselli wanted' to "keep
square with the bureau” but was
afraid that the mob might kill him for
talking.
In 1967, after he was arrested for
gambling fraud at the Friars Club: in
Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his
former CIA case officer, William Har-
vey, who sought unsuccessfully fo in-
tercede in the prosecution.
It was against this background that
Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson,
and then the FBI, with Rosselli's son-
sational allegations of CIA plotting
against Castro and the Cuban counter-
espionage directed against President
Kennedy.
Last April Rosselli told the Senate
Intelligence Committee he had no rec-
collection of either receiving informa-
tion that Castro retaliated against
President Kennedy or of having dis-
cussed it with Morgan. This meant ei-
ther that Rosselli suffered a dramatic
memory loss or that Morgan's state-
ment to FBI agents nine years earlier
was a pure invention, a serious risk
for an established Washington lawyer.
No committee source could explain
the discrepancy, and Morgan declined
to confirm that Rosselli was the client
in question or to discuss either his
állegations against the Cuban govern-
ment or his recent testimony.
The internal FBI memo on the 1967
interview with Morgan was sent to
headquarters with a transmittal slip
saying: "No further investigation is
being conducted by the Washington
field office unless it is advised to the
contrary by the Bureau."
The Senate intelligence committee,
in commenting on this position, said
that "had the interviewing agents
known of the CIA-underworld plots
against Castro, they would have been
aware that the lawyer had clients who.
had been active in the assassination
plots."
On March 21, FBI headquarters for-
warded the Washington field office
memo to the White House, the attor-
ney general and the Secret Service. It
did not recommend any further in-
vestigation of Morgan's allegations.
On the evening of the following
day, President Johnson called CIA Di-
rector Richard M. Helms to the White
House. The next morning; March 23,
Helms ordered the CIA inspector gen-
eral to prepare a report on the CIA
involvement in the assassination plots
-Operation Mongoose-of which
Helms had full knowledge at the time
they were executed. }་
By May 22, Helms briefed President;
Johnson on the results. There is, how-
ever, no evidence that Helm's briefed:
the President on the November, 1963,
plot-one of eight major schemes on
3
Castro's life from 1960 to 1965-to as-
sassinate the Cuban leader through
the employment of an agent with the
cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity
was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a
1961 CIA "recruit" with close access
to Castro.
CIA, operatives turned over assassi
nation! equipment to Cubela during a
· Paris meeting on November 22, 1963-
the day President Kennedy was killed
in Dallas. There has been subsequent
speculation that the mercurial and
talkative Cubela was either a double
agent or being monitored by Cuban
intelligence.
During the later days of his presi
dency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically
of a "Caribbean Murder Incorpo-
rated" targeted against Fidel Castro.
The inspiration for that statement un-.
I doubtedly was the CIA inspector gen-
eral's report he ordered Helms to have
prepared.
Within the past year, Rosselli and
two of his co-conspirators in the Cas-
tro assassination schemes have died,
Giancana at the hands of a profes-
sional hit man and Harvey as the re-
sult of a "massive heart attack" last
June.
Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of
the deceased CIA official, said she
suspected no foul play in her hus-
band's death. She did, however, tell.
The Washington Post that she re-
ceived a call after Rosselli's disappear.
ance in late July warning her that Cu-
bans appeared to be attempting to
wipe out all those who participated in
the anti-Castro plots.
The call, she said, came from an old
friend who was acquainted with Ros-
selli's sister, whose name is Edith Dai-
gle. Mrs, Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle
told the mutual acquaintance that the
Rosselli family had received a tele.
phone threat from unidentified Cu-
bans prior to Rosselli's disappearance.
She also said that Rosselli had gone to
meet the Cubans in an effort to pro-
tect his family.
Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by
The Washington Post. But another sis-
ter of Rosselli said she had heard of
no such threats or warnings.
Harvey, who died at age 60 and
whose exploits as a clandestine opera-
tor are both legendary and controver-
sial within the agency, testified to the
Senate Intelligence Committee. He
had become Rosselli's case officer in
Operation Mongoose and supplied the
mobster with poison pills, explosives,
detonators, rifles, handguns, radios
and boat radar for transmission to!
anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and,
Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to
the Senate committee, "developed a
close friendship.".
Another CIA official who worked
with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was
asked if he knew whether the agency
transmitted information to the mob-
ster on possible Cuban involvement in
the Kennedy assassination. He replied
that he was out of the country at the
time Kennedy was killed, and had no
further comment..
i
Two months before the Kennedy as-
sassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who
was identified by the Warren Commis-
sion as Kennedy's murderer, had trav-
eled to Mexico City in an attempt to
gain entry to Cuba. According to the
Warren Commission, Oswald repre-
sented himself as the head of the New
Orleans branch of the Fair Play for
Cuba organization and a friend of the
Cuban Revolution.
Some three months before Kennedy
was killed, Castro told Associated
Press reporter Daniel Harker that
U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to
eliminate Cuban leaders would them-
selves not be safe.
A U.S. government committee coor-
dinating policy toward Cuba at the
time agreed there is a strong liklihood
that Castro would retaliate in some
fashion. However, it concluded Castro
would not risk a major confrontation
with the U.S. by attacking U.S. lead-
ers.
On the same day Kennedy was as-
sassinated, a CIA officer met with a
high-ranking Cuban official, who had
said he would kill Castro, to tell him
the U.S. would provide him with ex-
plosives and a poison pen device.
While the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee said it found no evidence suffi-
cient to justify a conclusion that the
Kennedy assassination was part of a
conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies
did not properly investigate the assas-
sination or tell the Warren Commis-
sion about the CIA plots on Castro's
life.
"There is no indication that the FBI
or the CIA directed the interviewing
of Cuban sources or sources within
the Cuban exile community," the Sen-
ate committee said.
According to a former FBI official
in charge of key aspects of the FBI's
probe of the Kennedy murder, the
FBI never satisfactorily determined
what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or
what he had done in Russia.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 401
Howard A
THE WASHINGTON POST
September 12, 1976
Allon Frye
The JFK Assassination: Curiosity in Havana
An inquisitive American learns many things on a
visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high
officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the
investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be re-
opened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban
factor in the murder.
Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban.
government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos.
Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed
closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence
Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commis-
sion investigation. The Cubans are well aware that the
doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to
inform the Warren Commission of the several plots
mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge
of these plots appears to have been withheld even
from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible
for investigating the President's murder and for sup-
porting the work of the Warren Commission. As a re-
sult, there was no special effort to explore the possi-
ble involvement of either the Cuban government or.
Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed
by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plau-
sible and a new inquiry imperative.
The situation is murkier and more perplexing than
ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories
and who have been prepared-even, eager to be-
lieve that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no
longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an
"The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on For
eign Relations.
adequate prop for their predilections. The commis-,
sion did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the
very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the
Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a rank-
ing Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and re
cently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the mur
der of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba, a French_re-
porter, Jean Daniel, was spending the day with Cas-
tro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed
by President Kennedy in a brief interview at the
White House on Oct. 21, persuading Castro that Ken-
nedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations.
Thus, at the moment the President was killed, U.S.
policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only
on two tracks but in opposite directions, and move
ment on either track could have provoked violent re-
sponse by one or another Cuban faction.
Perceptions inside the Cuban government re-
sponded to both tendencies in U.S. policy. There is
good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation
involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept.
one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA even-
Stually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "inse-
cure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries.
within two days of the assassination it was known (but
not to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had
been in contact with Soviet personnel in Mexico City,
where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit
hoth the Cuban and Soviet consulates. Whether these
facts are significant or merely coincidental, one can-
not tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with.
some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit
Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted.
the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at
Havana.
Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AM-
LASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7,
1963, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cu-
ban conspirator for the first time since the preceding
year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called
in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an un-
expected interview. Only three Western reporters.
were based in Havana at the time and their contact
with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban
leader had a message he wished to get on the record
through Harker. He charged that the United States
was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S..
leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to elimi-
nate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."
This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory
and more understandable now that we know what
Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United
States was in fact stepping up its covert operations
against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet
it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban pol-.
icy as it was then evolving.
For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro
had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are
signs that he was interested in an opening to Wash-
ington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks
with the Americans at the United Nations, and Ken-
nedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early Sep-
tember the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos
Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport,
spent two weeks in Cuba. Although key U.S. officials
have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that
occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and com-
ments as hinting of American interest in a possible ac
commodation, much as they were later to interpret
the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.
Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Ken-
nedy has been a compound of political antipathy and
personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role
in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and
his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate re-
gard for the President's courage and realism. They.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 402
1
!
2
profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to
more hopeful relations between the two countries.
The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment.,
the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a
more mature, poised and forward-looking leader withi
whom they could have done business.
With this frame of reference, Cuban officials specu-
late that the real origin of the assassination lies in an-
ti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch.
They emphasize that assassination is incompatible
with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they
never contemplated it even against Batista, the pre-
vious Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion
that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny
Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the
CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with
Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.
Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "count-
er-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination,
but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further
investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from:
seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American rela-
tions, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry.
Their curiosity seems greater than their complicity.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 403

The Miami Herald
September 19, 1976
Could Rosselli Have Linked:
Castro Plot to JFK Death?
By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer
In 1960, when the CIA was try-
ing to set up a delicate attempt on
the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to
a man once described as "the big-
gest flag-waving SOB in the coun-
try" West Coast underworld
figure Johnny Rosselli.
Rosselli - a seemingly improba-
ble conspirator in a government
plot got the "flag-waving" label
.from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana,
then Chicago's top crime boss and
a man Rosselli brought into that
same plot.
Now both are dead, murdered in
the past year, and investigators are
wondering whether their plotting
led to their deaths and whether the
CIA plots against Castro only
recently made public and even kept
from the Warren Commission
are vital clues to the John F. Ken-
nedy assassination.
The deaths of Giancana, in June
of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer,
have aroused a renewed concern in
Washington, where on Friday the
House of Representives voted to re-
open the investigation of the Ken-
nedy murder.
REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D.,
Va.), who will be chairman of the
panel, said he is "convinced" a con-
spiracy was involved in Kennedy's:
death.
Now, in the aftermath of the vi-,
olent deaths of Giancana and Ros-
selli, the question arises of what
role, if any, the Kennedy White
House played in the early 1960s
"deal" the CIA made with the two
underworld figures to have Castro.
murdered.
Whether the Kennedy "White"
House knew about about the CIA's
plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found
out after the contacts were ended),
the CIA's use of the underworld
seems ironic in retrospect.
✓ Robert Kennedy's passionate ef-
forts to disable organized crime are
well documented.
IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy
wrote about what he had learned
of organized crime in America
from his years as chief counsel to
the Senate Rackets Committee, he
too quoted Giancana to make a
point.
He told about Giancana's inter-
view at his local draft board at the
outbreak of World War II, when
he was asked what he did for a liv-
ing.
"I steal," Giancana is said to
have replied.
So Sam Giancana didn't go to
war and years later would boast to
Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that
he stayed out of the Army la-
beled unfit by telling the truth.
"What's wrong with the syndi-
cate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana.
"Two or three of us get together
on a business deal and everybody
says it's a bad thing. Businessmen
do it all the time and nobody
squawks!"
A Senate committee began stu-:
dying the Kennedy questions more
than a year ago as it looked at co-
Evert CIA activities.
IN AN addendum to the Senate
Intelligence Committee's interim
report last November, Sen. Howard
Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my
personal view that on balance the
likelihood that presidents (the re-
port dealt with Dwight Eisenhower
and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro)
assassination plots is greater than
the likelihood that they did not."
Just to trace Rosselli's history
with the CIA is mind-boggling for
the investigators. Yet, it is just one
aspect of the search for his killer.
Johnny Rosselli born on the
fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and
71 when he died - was not first
and foremost a CIA operative.
-
* His greater role as evidenced by.
two convictions, his associations
and to some extent his own.com-
ments, was as an influential, if
publicly lesser known, organized
crime figure.
HIS ASSOCIATION with other
identified underworld members
was monitored by law enforcement
agencies as recently as several.
weeks before his July 28 disap-
pearance.
By all accounts, Rosselli was a
charming man, dressing in expen-
sive clothes, married for only two
fyears in the early 1940s and
known most of his life as one who
easily attracted women.
He was an immigrant who told
in a short autobiography written
about 1967 that his "life of crime" a
began as a teenager in Boston, at-
tempting arson for his stepfather
and stealing $50 on his own. As he
traveled west, finally to settle in
California, his attention turned to
(bootlegging, gambling and dab-
bling in the movie business.
IT IS said that Rosselli guarded
the West Coast gambling interests.
for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.
Why Rosselli was chosen by the
CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is un-
clear, although CIA officials have
since testified that they wanted the
kind of contacts in Cuba which or-
ganized crime had made during the
pre-Castro days when Havana was
a gamblers' haven.
2
Giancana was enlisted by Rossel-
li because he had influence with
Florida's Santo Trafficante, consid-
ered the key underworld gambling
figure in Havana.
The unraveling of CIA and un-
derworld conspiracies, an awesome ..
web spanning decades, is left to a
team of nine in the Metro Homicide
Division. It is a team now clearly
consumed by the task which has
been a full-time operation since
Rosselli's body was pulled from
Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 404
- 2 -
THAT THE Metro team is even
Involved is happenstance. Rosselli
lived in Plantation, Broward Coun-
ty, with his sister and brother-in-
law. It's just that his killers chose
to dump his body in Dade.
While several detectives say
their instincts lead them to con-
clude that the Rosselli murder was
an internal underworld affair, all
on the team are aware of the pres-
sure on them to search each clue
that leads back to the CIA-Castro
affair.
With Rosselli's death this sum-
mer, the newly appointed Senate
committee saw its list of knowl-
edgeable witnesses further trim-
med. Some of those witnesses have
died violently and some from natu-
ral causes.
When Giancana was murdered in
June of 1975, before he could even
be questioned by the committee
staff, authorities attributed it to an
internal gangland struggle
though. the murderer is still un-
known.
even
The death of Rosselli, who had
appeared before the committee
three times in the past year with-
out immunity, caused greater con-
cern on Capitol Hill..
THE SAME night Rosselli's body
was identified the legs hacked
off and stuffed along with the body
into an oil drum Baker, vice
chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, called for the FBI to
get involved in the case. (Several
days later, Attorney General Ed-
ward Levi ordered FBI involve-
ment.)
It wasn't until several weeks
later, however, that what was
known to Baker became public
knowledge.
A section of the former commit-
tee's April report told of a Wash-
ington attorney who in 1967 went.
to Supreme Court Chief Justice
Earl Warren (chairman of the
then-disbanded Warren Commis-
sion) to say that two of his clients
believed they knew about Cuban
agents in the United States who
conspired in the assassination of
John F. Kennedy.
THE INFORMATION: eventually
reached the FBI, but as the Senate
committee concluded this year, the
1967 FBI probe was slipshod and
incomplete.
One of the clients referred to in
the report has since been identified
as Rosselli. And it has since been
learned that Rosselli was con-
vinced he held a vital clue to the
JFK murder.
"There was never the slightest
doubt in John's mind that Castro
was responsible for the assassina-.
tion of Kennedy," said Edward P.
Morgan, the attorney referred to in
the report.
Morgan is an attorney of no
mean stature in Washington. He
✓ served as chief counsel to the joint
congressional committee which
studied the Pearl Harbor attack,
counsel to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and for seven
years was chief inspector of the
FBI.
ROSSELLI told Morgan about
the CIA plot in 1967, when the De-
partment of Justice was vigorously
attempting to deport Rosselli for
being an illegal alien.
Rosselli, Morgan said, "was cer-
tain that the people he (Rosselli).
put around Castro in the CIA plot
turned right around and killed Ken-
nedy. The people he still knew (in
1967) did it.'
Rosselli, according to Morgan,
decided to talk about his CIA activ-:
ity in hopes of decreasing the pres-
sure from the FBI and Department
of Naturalization and Immigration,.
both Justice Department agencies.
Several friends of Rosselli, in-
cluding Morgan, say they are con-
vinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli
to become an organized crime in-
formant by threatening to have:
him deported if he didn't coopera-
te.
IN 1961, through a bungled_
wiretap effort, the FBI became
aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.
. While Giancana and Rosselli:
were in Florida planning the opera-
tion, Giancana wanted to return to
Las Vegas to check on his girl
friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he
suspected of dating comedian Dan
Rowan. To keep Giancana in Flori-
da, it was agreed that a bug would
be placed in her hotel room and her
conversations monitored.
But the private detective they
hired, with CIA money it has since
been learned, was discovered and
arrested. Eventually the police in-
vestigation led back to the Castro.
plotters.
Prosecution was avoided when
the CIA intervened and said the
"national interest" would be dam-
aged if the plot information be-
came public.
'
WHEN THE wiretap case was
again to be investigated in 1966,
this time by a Senate committee
headed by the late Sen. Edward
Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again step-
ped in to stop it.
Morgan was told about the pend-
ing investigation by Rosselli and
Robert Mahue, a former FBI
agent-turned Howard Hughes aide
who was the CIA's. initial link to
Rosselli.
Mahue told Morgan that both he
and Rosselli had been subpenaed to
appear before the committee. Mor-
gan said he called Lawrence Hous-
ton, the CIA general counsel. Hous-
ton went to Long and the investi-
gation was dropped.
MORGAN SAID he knew, as the
Senate committee recently empha-.
sized as well, that all information.
about the CIA plots which could
have been the incentive for pro-
Castro forces to kill Kennedy
had been kept from the Warren
Commission.
"
"I was an admirer of Earl War--
ren,' Morgan said. "(His) report
said that .. Oswald alone killed
Kennedy. It kept bugging me after
so gruesome a detail from Rosselli.
that the Chief Justice could put his
name on a report which didn't as-
sess the most significant piece of
evidence bearing on the killing of
Kennedy."
The information Morgan had
was passed to Warren via colum-
nist Drew Pearson, a mutual
friend. Eventually, it reached the
FBI, but, remarkably, even after di-
rect orders from President Lyndon
Johnson in the spring of 1967, in-
vestigation was not vigorously pur
sued.
THE SENATE Intelligence Com-
mittee compared that apparent in-
action with a statement former FBI
director J. Edgar Hoover made to
the Warren Commission on May 5,
1964. Hoover said, "well, I can as-
sure. you so far as the FBI is con- .
cerned the case will be continued:
in an open classification for all-
time. That is, any information com-
ing to us or any report coming to:
us from any source will be thor-s
oughly investigated, so that we
will be able to prove or disprove
the allegation."
A Senate Committee staff mem
ber commented recently. "what is
really happening is that the investi-
gation which the FBI should have
done in 1967 and no one can
come close to explaining why it
wasn't. is actually being done
now."
HART, AS have local investiga-
tors, has established three possible
scenario's for Rosselli's death: his
recent organized crime activity, re-
taliation for his Castro assassina-
tion efforts or the information he
held concerning the JFK assassina-
tion.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 405
3
"Maybe Rosselli's - information
was the vital nerve of the Kennedy
assassination," a Senate source told
The Herald.
High officials in the Cuban gov-
ernment also reportedly feel there
was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK
death, but they see it as a result of
exile politics, according to a recent
article by Alton Frye, a senior fel-.
low of the Council Foreign Rela-
tions in Washington.
_ Frye wrote that he visited Ha-
vana recently and met with Cuban.
officials including Deputy Prime
Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.
44
they volunteer the suspicion
that the recent murders of Sam Gi-
ancana and Johnny Rosselli
surely have some connection with
} Cuban exile politics and the 'Kenne-
dy murder," Frye wrote.
THERE HAVE been theories re-
cently propounded to show why
both pro and anti-Castro forces
could have wanted to get JFK out
of power in 1963.
On the one hand, there is the re-
port of French journalist Jean Dan-
iel, who was the bearer to Castro
1 of an offer from JFK for calmer re-
lations. Castro was reportedly
agreeable. The report stated that
Daniel later was lunching with
Castro when word came that Ken-
nedy had been shot. Daniel de-
scribed the Cuban leader as genu-
inely shocked by the news.
'
It has since been learned that
probably in the very hour JFK was
shot, a one-time Castro supporter
was receiving a poison pen device
from a CIA agent in what was a
long-running anti-Castro effort.
That Cuban agent was code-named
AM/LASH, and he has since been
identified as Rolando Cuebala, now
imprisoned in Cuba for his assassi
nation plotting.
WHETHER JFK had knowledge
of, or perhaps even approved, any
of the assassination plots will prob
ably never be known.
His closest advisers, who testi-
fied before the Senate Committee.
all said he had no knowledge of
such plots and would never have
approved of them.
The same month Rosselli was.
passing poison pills to his Cuban
contact at a meeting at the Fon-
tainebleau, March of 1961, former
Florida Sen. George Smathers, a
friend of Kennedy, said he and
Kennedy discussed the ramifica-
tions of a Castro assassination.
Smathers has since said Kennedy
rejected the idea and that the dis-
cussion was more of a "brain-pick-
ing" session.
AT LEAST one high-level CIA
official did testify he believed the
White House was being briefed on
the plots but according to Richard
Bissell, one of the officials who
originally decided to use Rosselli, it
was through the method of "plau-
sible deniability."
That, according to the recent
Senate report, "can also lead to the
use of euphemism and circumlocu-
tion, which are designed to allow
the President and other senior offi-
cials to deny knowledge of an op-
eration should it be disclosed."
Another alleged link between'
the White House and the under-
world plotters, first made public by
the Senate Committee, has also
been denied by virtually everyone
involved. Judith Campbell Exner,
the woman who claims to have
been friend and lover to both Gian-
cana and JFK, introduced to both
by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in
the Castro plotting, those close to
both Giancana and Kennedy have
said.
A MAN with access to Kenne-
dy's closest advisers told The Her-
ald recently. "The Giancana-Ros-
selli thing is unrelated to the Exner
thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew
her, but he was naive about those
kinds of things."
There is documentation to show
that on March 22, 1962, Hoover.
lunched privately with Kennedy
and presumably gave him his first
information linking Exner with the
gangsters. The final recorded
phone call between the White
House and Exner was made only a
few hours later.
Another possible link discussed
in the Senate report shows that the
same unidentified Cuban to whom
Rosselli passed the poison pills
prior to the Bay of Pigs operation
in April of 1961, was among a
group of Cuban exile leaders who
met with JFK following the inva-.
sion fiasco.
IT IS known that several of the
Cubans with whom Rosselli
worked have been identified, but
investigators say that not all are
known.
As a condition to his appear-.
ances before the Senate Committee.
in the past year, it was agreed that
Rosselli "would not state
the
names or confirm the existence of
those agents whom he knew
about,' Rosselli's attorney Leslie
Scheer said.
"
The friends and acquaintances of
Rosselli who could be contacted by
The Herald all said they never
heard the names of the Cuban
; agents.
But a committee source cau--
tioned, "they (Cuban agents) read
the committee's report, they know
who's being referred to."
ANOTHER .Rosselli
attorney,
Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward
Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I'
think he had more knowledge"
than he testified to.
Searching Rosselli's more recent
past for enemies also presents
problems, investigators say.
The decline of John Rosselli ap-
pears to begin in the late 1960s. In
1967, he was convicted in a card-
cheating scandal at the posh, celeb-
rity-filled Friar's Club in Los An-
geles where the influence of Sina-
tra had made him a member ac-
cording to investigators.
Deportation pressures were also
mounting at this time.
ROSSELLI entered prison on the
conviction in 1970 where he would
serve three years of a five-year.
sentence.
In 1971, he was brought to a.
federal grand jury in Los Angeles
which was probing whether some
indentified Detroit organized crime
leaders conspired with the Emprise:
Corp. a giant firm with nation-
wide race track and sporting event
concessions - to hide financial in-
terests in the Frontier Hotel in Las
Vegas.
Rosselli, too, had, an interest in
the Frontier, which opened in 1967.
He owned the gift shop concession
along with a partner named Joe.
Breen. How Rosselli obtained the
concession is unclear, but Breen.
said it gave Rosselli an income of
about $60,000.
ROSSELLI at one time had been
a major influence in Las Vegas.
Several sources said that when the
owners of the Desert Inn wanted
Howard Hughes to move out of the
penthouse because his special
needs were costly and putting
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 406
4
some "high rollers" in would be
more profitable it was Rosselli
who patched things up.
Hughes eventually bought the
Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.
What Rosselli told the federal
grand jury about the Frontier, in
1971 is unknown.. Rosselli didn't
testify later at the trial at which:
Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Pol-
izzi and the Emprise Corp., among.
others, were convicted.
"
ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in
jail. In 1973, the House of Repre-
sentatives Select Committee on
Crime probed the influence of or-
ganized crime in sports _ and one
area they looked at was Emprise
and the Frontier Hotel case.
At the time of the conviction, the
federal prosecutor asked that Poliz-
zi and Terilli be jailed immediately,
because monitored, wiretapped
conversations showed that the two
had talked about "murder, the kill-
ing of certain individuals.
An intimate associate of Rosselli.
however, discounts the possibility
that Rosselli's grand jury appear-
ance could have led to his death.
"They know Johnny didn't talk to
the grand jury," the associate said.
JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't
been to Las Vegas for nine years,
that "he's never even seen the gift
shop."
Since his prison release and
move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't
trying to regain power; according
to his friends. "He had no muscle,"
said an associate."I can't believe
Rosselli was getting back into mob
stuff."
But at the same time, 'many of
the associates were surpised to
learn about Rosselli's recent visits
with alleged organized crime fig-
ures on the West Coast.
Several associates speculate that
Rosselli wanted to get involved in
casino gambling, preferably in the
Middle East, and was looking for
someone with money to back him..
"MY IMPRESSION was that he
was broke." Morgan said. "He told
me last year, 'I'm in bad financial,
straits.'
"
Scheer said Rosselli's income in-
cluded about $60,000 from the gift
shop and about $3,500 in social se-
curity, most of which went for
back fees to attorneys and for gov-
_ernment fines.
One friend said that just before
Giancana's death, Rosselli had ac-
cepted Giancana's offer of money.
The friend was to act as the inter-
mediary. "Let me figure out what
my next (attorney's) tab will be,":
the friend quoted Rosselli as say-
ing.
Rosselli is described as a man
with a sense of humor who did lit-
tle offending.
A California woman who had
known Rosselli for about 40 years
told The Herald, "If you were.
around him for 30 minutes you'd
like him because he would regard
you as a human being."
"If you had a headache he would
either get you an aspirin or send
someone to get one. I said some-
thing significant there - he would
get it or he would send someone
he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a
tough guy either."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 407
anged.
Oswald 201- 57 file fredus- chron arrang
Ballen for access.
Ck... CIA files on Jelen Wilson - Hudson
Cita Case officer allegedly compromised
Peace
by the Cuban quil - Williamson (
Stave thunt.
1967 16 Repor
not in Secure report which Loca
required in 1967 when hou requested the
Esperisso file in lof Juris investig
fume - Swenson to Spain.
1961 - sack Stewart - (1967 It report first recreated
AMLASH Mayores City.
IG
FRIP Dailey, says the FBI.
informant wh
tres them of AMLASH plot was not
Tepedia Bran refuses to say who
6, 1965
ther source
informant.
مر
Cin
sigo the
Tepidins,
Espinoso tied into dynamite
New Orlean/miami.
Amens datompromised
fait
te knowl. of ets.
Sturgis
+ note of tnterce
questions To Be Answered From Reading 1967 It Report
what does he do?
who is OJWIN? wheat are names of other fre
sub-ments requered for 2 Rifle activities?
"Dr. Edward "Manny
Bunn'
"
involved
Tech
Operatio
planning, lasked to theepers wy lethal material
Jake Esterline
was head of
Cuba task force in pre Bay y Pag
days....
Cornelius Loosevelt- Chief, TSD), dicing early plots.
Seancanna nixed gsugland slaying becaus
use of weapons rendered cape and
survival regligible.
The disaffected Coben official
touch wp was
Orta
had acc
Castr
Sprint Asst to DD
Si battle involved.
少?
time frame.
Arta lost position in
Culian
Coon
refuge in Venzulean
goot
letan. 1961
embassy on 11, 1961
and became the responsibility of the Mexican
Embassy when Ving. broke relations w/ Cuba
Mov. 1961. Castro refused
uncil
Conduct
Р
Oct. 1964 cuden allowed him to go te mexico city
Orla arrived in Miami in Feb, 1965 (Concl. face from
favor r/t card feet killed.
first gangster attempt.)
Orla
suggested a successor
insucessful attempt
Who was successor
- who made several
1.35
Trafficanti - supisted Lony Varona (high in excle
movement)
3) Where
head of Democratic Revolutionary Front arou
Vasora not satisfied w/ degree of CIA
2 e 60 - JRI gave CIA a memo.
by CIA a
as
ball I laugh
on rocketers effects.
to finance Anti-cantes activities.
18 Jon 61
Varona associated w/ slove schemer His
Edw. Moss, D.C. public relations was fund
raiser and public relatious advisor. Moss's mishin
Julia Cellini, whose brothers owned 2 large Habana.
Jampling counts, mon had been quin Covert Security -
FBI report.
are
the
4.) Edward R. Moss file
orig.
Clearance by CA.
Esterline supposedly took "ineffective steps"
to thwart Varona's involv. in mobster plan
As he was
one
of five key figures in the
Revalien tionary Front & heavily involved in
The approaching sopp plan.
3.) Who were other & leaders?
"take? Why in effecture?
What slips Lake
Pilt delive Rossilli-
O'Connell → Varona ?
6) Who is Varona's son-in-Ind-chal, involved when
during relevent time frame ?"
2 R Rifle was covered as an FI/D operation (tencility
to develop capability for entering sepic and for
kidnapping covers
7) Names of those
in FL/D) inclved in Rifle
Gun teminated by Luxembourg station-aps. 1964
46
48
50-
Munn delivered poison pills to Handey
Harvey says Russells in touch w Varona we
arrived.
Flo. O'Connell does not remember when Verona was re-activated for
phase 2 efforts.
Giancana and Trafficance apparently.
not involved
phase 2. Rosselli dealing is a Culian www spoke Italian non
MACED who went by her name Garcia- Gomez & Goday / Varonal
+ Varona's son-
Shackley was never told who pill deliv. to or why. Only fred surveilla
in support of a HQ p
Harvey and
Shackley deliv. arms.
equip.
for Varona
52
Jan 63-
Feb 63. Harvey
Harvey
for MACED
it looked like
effort was over Roselli mi w Harvey in LA and
agreed to close opn off "but that it would be unwise to
altempt to precipitate a freak beturin Rissuli & Varona"
with Rossech Agree
freque
content
53.
June 63- Rosecl, visited Harvey on DC.
went out to dinner-
While dining Pupich called Harver
ed if he knew who
ples
his dinner quest was. Rosell; under intensive Surveilance
Papich said have to tell
Edlids
Hoover
Why did Agency tell RFK that- opas ceased
مهند انبا
when
underway W
in fact they still
mol at that
10. FBI. Interviewed Ed Morgan.
72
once
Wi
Vixon
malin mit at hast
to aid marchos vis-a-vis Onassis
73 maken wild someone di do tech suit on Onassis
73
Sen. Case w/ Maker's counsel, Ed Morgan, persuaded
Sen. Long not to 
call him.
73 Som Halpen was in on the contaminated diving seet.
Scheme after Des Fitzgerald look over Cuban Task Force from
Harvey in Jan. 63. Gothich of courscales involved.
TMS A
no CI fils reviewed by 16 in
стравь
by 16 in preparing report
messies
city.
78 March 61 Lock Steward met up Cubelt Stew assigned
to mess. city knew Cubis commly from Havanna days. Tepedins
(Amwhip-1), long time ficend Cubela arranged meeting to soun
Call out on his views on cuban situatio
Though inconclusive led to AmuASH.
This ing
80
· March 6t
81
82
ase reported that Cub
Luan Ort (gangsters man in C) wanted to defect.
CIA found 3 name links betw. Cubels and persons
involved in gombling syndicate episodes - All neulous
Seeq. 61. Culla sent message to repedics: this cubela mante
to talk with friend of Stewarts in Paris if possible and thru Cuvel
geil friend airline hosten. Pasis given ok to approach
he was ever contacted.
- no indic.
June 62 - Tepeden told FBI of Culas desire to
defect pureaue said would refer
Cubela tv. CHA in Parys if he
contaded Bureau's legal attache
دی در
84
Jepidin's contacted FBI because he upset wy way CIA handled
"defection
attempt in in 1961
Cubelas
"
Ally 62 wamuight from HQ met w/ Tep. went to A
meetings by Cubels where defection 
plan turned
in place
Aug62
S
for series
• recruiting Canelo
Cubela met w/ Spanish speaking case fpeces in Paris in
after mueled in Stockholm on Aug 7-9.
Fold 4 Ju
his meeting in Helsinki.
In Paris it was learned that Cubel
14-23 Aug 62 - Earle Williamson, Spanish speaking case offici
from modsid, mut in Paris in Career, Tep., & Wainwright, on 18 Aug.
"HG. strongly agreed Cubel not to be given physical elevation
miven.
Дере из Sanchez from HQ pains wainwright Jep:
высота Симёвый сам дий
Cuchel in Broil
.16 Sept 63.
зость з
Cuba (Paris) writes Tep. (NY) don't intend to
your frund
- Sachez again
Sancher arrives Paris Anyway, Learned that French
n
Keeping Cubela under surveillance.
11 Oct 63
Sancher cables.
Client on
Si us official
2900363
pref. RFK for assurances.
Destaring James Clark alias
mut
Cubiela
Poris
home
Rid. Stenti
Sanchez interp.:
Fitz
said U.S. wanted.
part in
sitempt on
Castros
"Ife.
14 Nov 63 Wainwright meets Sipeding in NY - Says Cullela pleased w
Dis meiling from palicy standpoint but very unhappy at
being given tech. assistance.
по дни
19 Nov 63
Des approved telling Cubeln
he would
be furnished cache insides
091.92
Сква
Dock)
record in AMCASH
fitted has gap here

re
Sam Halpern Sanchis anded bunn for at g
sssssivation khas waned Allow cubelescope
Дина
20 Now. Helps Sanchez asked to rig paison pen for Jauchy nyt day.
Done
-22 Nov. Saviley as Paris
+ mets Culla late PM.
accepte sin but doesn't think much
2
device.
Fite called Sanchez after JFK ass, saying everything off.
The
cable not in
file.
30 Aug 64 - artum rec. infe three modd
Why
1964
that dissidents
Castic regene
wanted direct Artime conbet
* on 7 Oct 64 an artime assoc. went
Serve as intermediara
to France to
wi disside group.
r
agency conspiring to put CubelA - Ostume
Ergether
w/o lach other
Knowing it
Wants
Weapon
wants inside
man uba
64- arturi-mects Cubela in Madred
Feb 65-
Cubila gets silenced weapon from artimes
Secty in Madra
March 65 - Madrid cable that lawyer Garcia - Bang
arrived in Madrid walls
Cubila,long a close friend.
defending SANTOS TrafficANTE.
that he was
G.B. was jailed in 1962 for
in contact wi
and of
full
Mad/65
mus 
Espanoss reported knowledge of Cubeln plans
SA
CIA complicity.
June 23
65
106
No sent cable
young
all stations directing terms
7
contact
W, Cabela
Marble Cubela iriste
involving CIA.
P108-
Contact
group.
for counterreval. activ.
Cubela Treal brought out
wi James Noel in add
-PHS - July/Aug 1964 - CIA memos refer to
P127
a gangland effort to pay
150,000 to
кие
Carter &
refer to FBI inters of partic
O'Connell met ur maken post Drew P. article.
He reported:
Rosselli stured to Morgan (separately
from Makeu) by Greenspan.
Jim Ganon, Morgen & Roselli
+ perhaps Greenspun intouch
w each other in Las Veg, in March
Plry Re to a Puerto Rican in Phillipine custory
who says in participated in Castre
inspered assos play in Dall
expected to wring him
varona
diy
became very embittered by
128 Brod on
Buy Pfaillere. Among most critical. Agency failure
to support his
exile group led to loss of locome
Last
on
part time auto Salesman.
be living hand is mouth as
130
"Makea has good reason for not wanting
the story aired further. Unfavorable
publicity might cause on to love his
lucrative clt., Howd. Hughes.
7 Mar 66- Cable to Ruck
Lies about ass. Involv
ΤΟ
:
Mind..
GSA COM
#G. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT..
Memorandum
Mr. Belmont
FROM
:
A. Rosenm
SUBJECT:
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT KENNEDY
DATE:
12-10-64
1-Mr. Sullivan
(O.H. Bartlett)
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Malley
1-Mr. Shroder
1-Mr. Rogge
KA
Bimont
Mohr
DeLoache
Casper
Callahan
Coprad
✓ Nons
Cile
- Roken.
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
PURPOSE:
BAROUIT
Likids
To advise you that an Agent of the Secret Service, when
testifying before the President's Commission, denied making certain
statements to FBI Agents which were subsequently reported to the
Commission.
DETAILS:
In Volume II of the hearings before the President's
Commission commencing on page 61 there appears the testimony
of Roy H. Kellerman, Assistant Special Agent, White House Detail,
U. S. Secret Service on 3-9-64.
*In Charge
Under questioning by a Commission member, Kellerman
was asked about certain statements reportedly made by him on
11-22-63, to SA's Francis X. O Neill, Jr. and James W. Sibert,
of our Baltimore Office, which appear in the 12-10-63 Dallas
report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling (page 3, paragraph
4). SA's O'Neill and Sibert were under orders to be observers
during the autopsy of President Kennedy at the National Naval
Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, which commenced on the
evening of 11-22-63, to be of assistance to the Secret Service;
and to look after the Bureau's interests.
Our Agents, in conversation with Kellerman, sometime
during the evening of 11-22-63, learned of certain information
portions of which were reported as follows: an insane
"He advised he heard a shot and immediately
turned around, looking past Governor Connally,
who was seated directly in back of him, to the
President. He observed the President slumped
forward and heard him say, 'Get me to a hospital."
Mr. Kellerman then heard Mrs. Kennedy say,
'Oh, no!', as the President leaned towards her.
780.40 1976 He immediately advised the driver to take the
FBI
RDR: tmt
(8)
President to the nearest hospital."
CONTINUED OVER
PERO BECOME
H
ندازی
REC
"
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 417
•
A. Rosen to Mr. Belmont Memo
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
RE:
The Commission in questioning Kellerman made specific
'reference to the underscored portions of the above paragraph
as it contradicts some of Kellerman's testimony. Kellerman
claims he did not hear the President nor Mrs. Kennedy say
these things and had never told our Agents that he had. In
part of Kellerman's denial he stated "I don't know where they
got those quotes.
OBSERVATIONS:
"
Kellerman is claiming our Agents furnished inaccurate
accounts of a conversation with him. It is to be remembered
that at the time this conversation with our Agents reportedly
took place 11-22-63, Kellerman had been a security guard in
the President's car and more than likely was upset and feeling
remorse over the days episode. In his testimony before the
Commission he endeavored to give the impression that he acted.
calmly and immediately took command, issuing logical instructions
after the President was hit. The conversation reported by.
our Agents made it appear Kellerman reacted normally to the
tragedy and not dramatically as indicated in his testimony,
as he didn't order the driver to the hospital until after the
President had so directed.
It is felt our Agents reported accurately what
Kellerman told them on 11-22-63, and that Kellerman's testimony
3 months later is the result of considered deliberation, on
his part, to paint the most favorable picture possible, under
the circumstances, for the Secret Service.
Consideration has been given to discussing this matter
with Chief Rowley of Secret Service, however, since it is the
word of our Agents against Kellerman's, it is not felt any good
purpose would be served by this course of action.
RECOMMENDATION:
Affidavits are being obtained from our Agents Sibert
and O'Neill attesting to the accuracy of their report and
refuting Kellerman so that we will be in a position to show
any future inquirer that we recognized this contradiction and
did something about it.
flo 2913
FBI
✓
-2-
О
གསན་
Autility
A.12.11.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 418.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
100
Research
Review Staff:
11 March 1976
76-0298/1
Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Miller:
Attn: Mr. Johnston
In response to a request dated 9 March 1976 about
the Oswald file held by the Agency, the attached is
forwarded for your information.
Sincerely,
Wast Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff
Attachment:
As stated
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 419
MAC
REVOLUTION
AMERICAN
776-1976
Wdcore.
*
L
SECR
AA
Attachment to:
Review Staff:
76-0070/1
☐ 1
BAXT
1. The following CIA Staff Employees, all of whom
are now retired, participated in the preparation of DIR
86054 on 30 November 1963:
Originator: Mr. Louis Armstrong
Coordinators:
Authenticator:
Mr. John M. Whitten, Mr. William
B. Tyng, Ms. Sue L. Darling
Mr. William B. Tyng ("for"
Desmond FitzGerald)
Releasor: Mr. John M. Whitten ("for" J. C. King)
2. We believe that the Italian diplomat on the Cubana
flight No. 465 on 22 November 1963 from Mexico City to Havana,
Cuba, was Mario MAURI who was accompanied by his wife, Maria
Antonieta MAURI. We have been unable to determine who trans-
mitted the information contained in DIR 86054 to CIA and we
have not been able to locate any documents relating to this
matter in Latin America Division files or the Oswald files.
3. We have been unable to locate any documents which
would indicate that there was a response to DIR 86054 from
Mexico City.
4. Assuming there was no response to DIR 86054, the
originating Headquarters component should have 
initiated
follow-up action if a response was not received.
5. We have been unable to find any further information
relating to DIR 86054 in Latin America Division files.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 420
SECRET/SHDITIVE
RECEIVE FROM
FEB 5 1976
CIA
1
SECRET/SENSITIVA
-2-
6. We do not have a copy of the Ćubana manifest for
the 22 November 1963 flight from Mexico City to Havana, but
we have determined that the following persons were on that
flight:
NAME
OCCUPATION
NATIONALITY
Jakob ETT
Swiss
Diplomat
Hector LEMIEUX.
Canadian
Unknown
Joseph POULIOT
Canadian
Unknown
Donald George CAMERON
Canadian
Unknown
William POULIS
Canadian
Unknown
Thomas Clark OSULD
Canadian
Unknown
Dungan MCPHERSON
Canadian
Unknown
Leo John DEST
Canadian
Unknown
Thomas MURPHY
Canadian
Unknown
Arthur EDMONDS
British
Unknown
James DISINOP
British
Unknown
Venancio OLIVAREZ Villaverde
Spanish
Unknown
Jose Luis CACHO y Barcha
Spanish
Unknown
David FLOR Lechago
Spanish
Unknown
Maria Antonieta MAURI
Italian
Unknown
Mario MAURI
Maarten Van DERPLAAT
Italian
Dutch
Diplomat
Diplomat
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 421
SECRET/SENSITIVE
RECE
ROM
PEM 5 1976
CIA
1
L
ttachment F
AGE
SUBJECT: REARREST OF SILVIA IUNAN
ADI
8. ALFICES JENSON
27 Ar63
85476
DSEDIARZ
THIS AGENCY'S STATICH INC
WAS AWISED (3 27 BOVERBEN TEAR
MKICA AUTHORITIES RAD PIZARRESTED SILVIA DURAN, MEXICAN HATICHAL EMPLOYEZ
OF THE CORAN REASSY IN MEXICO, VRO HAD TALKED TO LES CHALD AT THE CURAN
IRBASSY IN LAGE SEPTEMBER 1963. THE REASOCH FOR THE HEARREST WAS THAT BILVIA
TURAN HAS TRYING TO LEAVE MEXICO FOR CHEA..
BASISO CE
Document Number
134-595
for FOIA Review on
APR 1976
RICHARD H
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 422
RD OF LES
اميرة
San follow dosent
mulper.
on this
اضة
12-528
for HOA Review on
APR 1976
I don't know what
FBI did in low by hit
Lova bien
this
talking about sois for
a
long
We
said to be extremely bright.
1. LA Memo said they checked
info]
and found it
asked me to
unsubstantiated.
2.1
send this cable.
3. We will try to confirm
or refute
info and follow up. als
She 
is als Hous
Oponices Communists not mentioned the pass's Reports
LE WARKAN COMMISSION
investiga hry
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 423
RECORD COPY

Octabor 5, 1964
Mexican Comunists who and contact with Oswald,
as has not appeared in Warren Commission write-ups in press
sot around recalling detail:
'of their having been in a group with Oswald here last fall.
during the days that he was in Mexico.- The write
-ups of the
Warren Commission report in the newspapers 
sparked this ...
discussion, and they apparently had never really 
sit 
around
determind to piece it all together, although 
all three were
deeply affected by Kennedy's assassination, 
seemed literally
to adore the Kennedy family image, still follow 
Robert Kenned
career with great interest and admiration
.
The main points:
Horacio is the husband of
SYLVIA DURAN, the Mexican girl who was arrested for quastioni
about Oswold because she had been in touch 
with him at the Cu
embassy when he went there looking) for a visa. (She 
is or 
w
also a ringleader at the Cuban-Mexican Institute on 
Tokic, I
remember).
While Osweld was here last fall the Duran cousins invited the
to a "twist party" at 
the
SOURCE 1.
home of Ruben Duran mid-week. A few Communists they knew
and a number of people who struck th
as very peculiar at the time, were there. AND OSWALD WASTHERL
WITH THO OTHERS BEATNIK LOOKING BOYS
, ONE OF EZZ WHOM WAS
VERY TALL AND ALL THREE OF HOM THEY REMEMBER 
QUITE WELL.
When they began asking questions about the Americons
, who
were standing together all evening and 
didn't duncu at all
,¨
. they were shifted to another room.1
they were intrigued because I
Source I
SOURCE
However
said he didn't know
who they were, except that Sylvia Durin had brought them, and
none of the other guests made any attempt 
to approach them.
so insistent about meeting them,
Also, when the l
the Durans replied that the boys were leaving town v
The next day, well along in 
the day,
early the next morning.
saw all thro
boys together on Insurgentes. In other words, they had not l
toim. At the time, they remarked about 
fix it.
As soon as Cold's picture was printed in the newspapers
clearly rememb red 
him. And of course the arrest 
of
Sylvia Duren almost immediately afterward, 
underlined their
cortainty.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 424
They wore so sickoned/
) that they broho
• SOURCE
off their relations with the Durons. |
says that Lynn Duran and one of the Duran
boys, have made trips to Texas. And that most 
conspicuously
Always poor before
,
they have all prospered 
this last year.
they now have an 
expensive car each.
HOT
Horacio Duran works at El Dia newspaper..
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 425
7
His
employment,
finally.
13 NOVEMBER 1
FRON
DIRECTOR
CONFI
INFO
XXX
ΤΟ
FLASH
INFO
CS.COPY
3
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
132
CITE DIR
8 49 16
ARREST OF SILIVA DURAN IS EXTREMELY SERICUS NATTER WEICH COULD PREJUDICE
U.S. FREEDCH OF ACTION ON ENTIRE QUESTION OF CUBAN RESPONSIBILITY.
WITH FULL
REGARD FOR NEXICAN INTERESTS, REQUEST YOU EHISURE THAT HER ARREST IS KEPT ABSOLUTELY.
SECRET, THAT NO INFORMATION FROM HER IS PUBLISHED CR. LEAKED, THAT AL L SUCI INFO IS
CABLED TO US, AND THAT FACT CF HER ARREST AND HER STATERENTS ARE HOT SPREAD TO
LEFTIST OR DISLOYAL CIRCLES IN THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT.
1
WE ARE TRYING TO GET MORE INFO ON OSWALD FROM FBI
CR THROUGH FBI MEXICO
AND WILL ADVISE DIRECT
END OF MESSAGE
THOMAS KARAMESSINES
ADDP
RELEASING OFFICER'
Document Number
37
-529
for FOIA Review or APR 1975
CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS
23 Nov 63
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
AVIMENTICATING
OFFICER
Copy No.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 426
☐ NO
27_1963_
PA
☐☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
FROM:
DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:
TO
FLASH
路
51
6
27 Nov 63 20 12z
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
FLASH
CITE DIR
85318
RE:
2.
(IN-69048)
THIS INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH\
AND
MEXICAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD INTERROGATE SILVIA DURAN TO EXTENT
NECESSARY CLARIFY OUTSTANDING POINTS WHICH BEEN RAISED YOUR CABLES LAST 48
HOURS. YOU MAY PROVIDE QUESTIONS TO MEXICAN INTERROGATORS BUT WE DO NOT
REPEAT NOT WANT ANY AMERICANS TO CONFRONT SILVIA DURAN OR BE IN CONTACT WITH
HER.
Document Number 158-610
3. ADVISE ASAP RESULTS INTERROGATION.
for FOIA Review on
(END OF MESSAGE)
APR 1976
Comment: Silvia Duran rearrested because she was attempting
to leave Mexico for Cuba.
RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER
CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS.
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 427
✓ AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
Copy No.
CONF:
INFO:
DIRECTOR
☐ NO INDEX
1963
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
ΤΟ
PRIORITY
INFO
5
b
127 Nov 65 21
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
CITE DIR 8537
FURTHER TO DIR-85318.] TO BE CERTAIN THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING
NEITHER (NOR CUBANJ
BETWEEN US, WE WANT TO INSURE THAT SILVIA DURAN GET IMPRESSION THAT
A
0
AMERICANS BEHIND HER REARREST. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WANT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES
TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHOLE AFFAIR.
(END OF MESSAGE)
Comment: *Mexican authorities should interrogate Silvia Duran to
extent necessary to clarify outstanding points which have been raised.
MEXI may provide questions to Mexican interrogators, but Hqs. does
not want any Americans to confront Duran or be in contact with her´
Document Number
177-618
for FOIA Review on APR 1976
LichardWilm
RELEICHARD, HELMS.
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 428
59z
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
Copy No.
7- APR 1954
SAMAN, . . Ice Mak
Actions of Silvia R3 after her
finerti passed to
the WaRRON Commission
1. Berence is mele to the attachments to ny
pozeranda datori 31 January 1904 and 21 Fanary 1504,
both of which sport information un Miris DR,
a Fexican etti sloped as the Cuban Coastīsie
in Mexico City. Diici ca the actions of
Silvia Ron ber to the Chan
Consulate on 23 Svember 1963, fallowing ber first
internosatica by the Mexicon authorisica, is attached
to this
This item cay be useful to the
Comission in the evaluatica of Mrs. KEAN's story.
2. The inferation contained in this attachm
It thereiya
Tas oltaisetive sources.
beara an appropriate sensitivity indienter.
Attedment
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 429
RECORD COPY
Richard Feins
Deputy Direcice for plans
Document Number
643-273
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976
7 Apr 64
Subject: Actions of sil-A DURAJ, Ddies Employed
by the Gian Consulate, following Ear First
Interratic by the Nerious Amborities
L A ralishla usi semibire source, well infamed on
political personalities and events in the Dabbesy und
Commalate in do City, had stated that on her return to
the Caibia, Gian 2) Rovember 155), iris told
haz callengte asemidally the sae story about her official
comminisces à La (SWALD thai sas mblished in
the Mades City press. Dis nach seams to
Tak Deen surreptiously given to the pream by cariain
Undsen ausberities, indiated that according to DUBAI,
OSWALD had risited the Cabea and Soviet Camilates to
obtain vis in defer to visis these countries, and othe
had badled his case as the Chien Conqulate.
3.
The only prites to the account that Gilvia KURAN
gave her collages was ber elais that the Motion police
And thened to edit bar to the United States for a
confrontation vità ca. According to the source, Silvia
SUSAH, an intelligart and quite viteed some, did not four
sach a emprestation.
3. It should to noted that SIA doua not too the
precise origin of the mggested confrontation.
origimiel, in all probability, with the Mexican autobrities
involved in the interrogation of DIEA].
4. According to the pace source, immediately ester
and since the ascessimiion the personnel of the Dutxa
Tubasay maa shocked and paasled – no atgressions of
picasare at the agasalation were beard, nori there ERB
little discussion of it. The goods and official conversations
in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate tend to confim the
in that (EXULD visited the Embassy only to get a
visa to visit or to transit the comtry.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 430
Original & -3
Addressee
DDP
7 April 1964
Based on DIR 85670 dated 29 November 1963
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 431
Attachment D
SECTION
SECTION 111: To be completed in all cases.
☐☐ SENSITIVE
| NON-SENSITIVE
NAVE
(Lost)
OSWELD
(Last)
201 NO
(First)
letters.
ACTION
ANLAN
CLOSE
if applicable) must be listed. If the iden-
Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable
luding maiden nome,
cate
1.
must be used.
SECTION
1.
SOURCE DOCUMENT
(Middle)
LEE
(First)
HENRY
NAME VARIANT
(Hiddle
(Title)
(Ti:10)
SEX
YES
PHOTO
NB: HARVEY
8.
BIRTH DATE
COUNTRY OF BIRTH
6.
CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH
☑
40
-18-10.39
USA
DCCUPATION/POSITION
New Orleans, La.
3-0/1/75
7.
OTHER IDENTIFICATION
3.
Ralar operator, U.S. Marie Eps 1960
CRYPTONYM
SECTION 11
PSEUDONYM
D
AGY2
OCC/POS. CODZ
COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
USSR
cit; ?
COMMENTS:
SECTION 111
10.
ACTION DES*
2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.
3RD COUNTRY INTEREST
124.
Document Number 1-18
• Defected to the USSR in October 1959
for FOIA Review APR 1
PERMANENT. CHARGE
TES
☑
TORY 8318
C - 57
201
MO
та
RESTRICTED FE
Copy
SIGNATURE.
YES
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 432
RECORD COPY
(38)
OSWALD, LEE HENRY ·
SEX M DOB 18 OCT 39
NEW ORLEANS, LA., USA
CIT ?
REF:
A USSR
201
RADAR OPERATOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS, AS OF 60.
DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT. 59.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 433
Document Number
for FOIA Review on
APR 1976
2524

L
10 Oct 1963
TO
SEE BALOW
FROM: JOK
CONF
NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
COPY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFO
XX
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD
of
2
3
5
16
0 OCT 63 29
R.
ROUTINE
CITE DIR
748
1.. ON 1 OCTOBER 1953
MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE,
IDENTIFIED
AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN
MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY. HAD RECEIVED
ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO
ASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY
35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL
WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.
2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE
HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN
OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER HADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED
STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH
HIS RUSSIAN-PORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA. AND THEIR.
(CONTINUED)
RELEASING OFFICER
30
COORDINATING OFFICERS
195.
USAZOVA,
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
TE
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
Copy Na
INHAM'S
SPYAVG
QWALD
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 434
E
LA
TO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CON
INFO
TO
CHILD.
INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
5
3
6
PAGE TWO
INFO
CITE DIR
DEFERRED
ROUTINE =
3.
THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATE:
ANY FURTHER INFORMATIC
TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY.
RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATIC
IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE.
END OF MESSAGE
INFO BASED ON
(IN 36017) |
RELEASING OFFICER
REPAUCTIO
_:.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 435
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
OFFIC
PROHIB
Copy
Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFIC
:
ROM:
DIRECTOR
CONFE
INFO
REF:
[
NO INDEX
1963
☐ FILE IN CS FILE
OS BOPY.
INF
(IN 36017)*·
2
ها:
100cr 53-22
11
ROUTINE
CITE DIR
7483
Who CONTACTED SOVIET EMBASSY
LEK OSWALD
LEE HENEY OSWALD
1. OCT. PROBABLY IDENTICAL
BORN 18 OCT 1933, NEW ORLEANS,
LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES.
WHO DEFECTED TO USS IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET
INCHES, ONE. HUNDRSU SIXTY FIVE FOUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAYY HA
BLUE EYES.
CON 310 1959 ER ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED
TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW,
STATES CITIZENS
INDICATING HR HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. LON 13 FEB
THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD
POSTMARKED HINSK ON FIVE. FEB 1961 IN WHICH SUBI INDICATED
HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA
IF WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING
'OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ፅም. ON 8 JULY ON HIS OWN
INITIATIVS HE APPEARED AT THE EMB. WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE AROUT
HIS RETURN TO STATES; SUBJ STATED THAT. HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER
APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
ར།:
10 t
(CONTINUED)
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
Copy No
Document Number.
for FOIA Review on
APR
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 436
CS COPY,
FROM:
DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:
TO
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NON
PAGE TWO
INFO
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
CITE DIR
7483
THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR. AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION
OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS
APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO. SOVIET
CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE
13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY, IN MINSK
WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP, OSFALD WAS.
MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA &
DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO EIDOS TRACES
HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE
COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA. INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT.
WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTES
OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING
EFFECT ON OSWALD.
3. LATEST EDQS INFO WAS |
STATE
SAYING
REPORT DATED MAY 1962
HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND
BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE
HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD
TO USA.
(CONTINUED)
COORDINATING OFFICERS
ELEASING OFFICER
1
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
REPRODUCTION
OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE) PROHIBITED.
Copy No.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 437
10
[POM:
CONF:
INFO :
DIRECTOR
□ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NON
5
61
PAGE THREE
INFO
DEFERRED/
ROUTINE
CITE DIR 748
SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE
LOCALLY. INFO PARAS
TRO AND THEKE ORIGINATES WITH
AND POSSIBLE. IDENTIFICATION EEING DISSEMINATED
PLS KEEP
HOQS. ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
CP OSWALD
END OF MESSAGE
REF ON
CIT
according tol
spoke with Consul.
to Washington.
1 Oct, an American male/
Dane Lee Oswald.
stated he at Sov Rab on 28 Sept cher
He discussed sending a telegram.
No local Dissemination had been made.
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
:
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 438
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
Copy No.
LENORAMAM FOR
:
= The Ambassador
16 October 1953
FREZ
SUBJECT
• Ambassador Notifica
Les QWALD/Content with the Soviet Exles57
1. The following inamin was received/
On 1 Cctober 1963, an Aerican mile contacted
the Souls Fancy and Himself as Lor COMALD. Tale wife l
terndred th bad bean at the Soviet Shiner on 25 S 1963 and
had talked with Valeriy Raibiirock ECSHERY, &r of the Consular.
Section, in air to lem if the Sovie's Embassy had received a rmly im
oncerning his quest We are no clarifying infomation with
regard to this reques
2. Our Headpurtas la informed no that the CD above is probabiy
(antical with Lez-Izzy (OSTALD, kun ca 10 triober 1959 to Her Orleans,
Loristar, a former roler operator in the U. S. Marine Corps the defected
to the Scristi in Catober 1959..
3. This office will arise you if additional indo
is received.
this matte
30
C
00
9-5
Document Numbar
for FOIA Review of
APR 1976
The Asher582
The Huisies
Canal 20 Political
Regional Security Officer
Leslerine
Naval Attache
IS
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 439
RECORD COPY
ONE
IFO
XX
" 1
OCT 1963
TE NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
DEPARTMENT OF THE MAY?
66 BOPY.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
5
OCT 63 19:10z
240463
DEA
ROUTINE
SUBJECT:
Cate clence - 230ct on
INFO
HENRY OSWALD
While 24☺A
CITE DIR
77973
REFERENC. IS MADE TO CIA OUT TELEPTO 50. 74873, DATED 10.
OCTOBER 1983, REGARDING POSSIBLE PRISTICS OF SUBJECT IN
IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FORJARD TO THIS OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
TWO COPIES OF THE MOST RECENT PHOTOGRAPH YOU HAVE OF SUBJEC
ILL FORWARD THEN TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE-IN-MEXICO, WHO WILL ATTRIP)
TO DETERMINE IF TEK
SAME INDIVIDUAL.
CSWALD IN MEXICO CITY AND SUBJECT AR3
END OF ESSAGE.
RASED ON: ☐
(17 40357)
Opcument Number 10-6
for EOIA Review on APR 1976
CS COPY
turin
COORDINATING OFFICERS
24-04-63
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 440
Copy No.:
6 Copies of photo of Oswald
Reproduced for use of legal
Attachs with Maxican police.
Document Number
for FOIA Review on
11-64
APR 5576
Me
He made fifty (50)
ices of each of these
(which in god from
Legal Attache for fer.
Attach to use with
Mexica Police
ہو
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 441
RECORD COPY
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 442
Lee Harvey Oswali
Race White
Sex Male'
DOB là October 1939
POB New Orleans, Louisiana'
Height 5'.9"
Weight 140 Pounds
Hair Medium Brown
Eyes Blue Gray
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 443

1
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON ±5. D. C.
June 9, 1964
BY COURIER SERVICE
Honorable J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
The President's Commission
200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast
Washington, D. C. 20002
Dear Mr. Rankin:
Your letter of June 1, 1964, requesting summaries
of FBI reports with regard to ten named persons and certain
information regarding the contact by Special Agent Charles W.
Flynn with Jack L. Ruby on March 11, 1959, is berewith
acknowledged.
1993,
As you were advised by my letter of February 27,
1954, Jack Ruby was contacted by Special Agent Charles 7.
Flynn of the Dallas Office on March 11, 1359, in view 
of 
his
position as 2 night club operator who might have knowledge of
the criminal element in Dallas. The purpose of 
this contact
was to determine whether or not Ruby did have such 
knowledge
,
and if so, if he would be willing to furnish information 
to
this Bureau. Ruby was advised of the FSI's 
jurisdiction in
criminal matters, and be expressed a willingness to 
furnish
information. A personal description of Ruby was obtained by
Special Agent Flynn on the occasion of this 
contact on
March 11, 1959, but no information or other 
results 
were
obtained. Between March 11, 1959, and October 
2, 1959, 
Ruby
vas contacted on eight other occasions, but be furnished 
no
information whatever and further contacts with 
him were
discontinued.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 444
Honorable 5. Lee Rankin
The personal description of Ruby as obtained by
Special Agent Flynn on March 11, 1959, did not in itself contain
the rebark "known Dallas criminal." This remark was added to
the description by Special Agent Louis H. Halley at the time
when he was assisting in the preparation of the report of Special
Agent Nanning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963.
Enclosed herewith is the affidavit of Special Agent Louis M.
Kelley at Little Rock, Arkansas, dated June 4, 1964, setting
forth his basis for adding the remark "known Dallas area
criminal" to the description of Ruby as it appears in the report
of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30,
1963, and in the enclosure to my letter to you of April 7, 1964.
The summaries concerning the ten named individuals in
your letter of June 1, 1964, are currently being prepared and
will be forwarded to you promptly upon completion.
Enclosure
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 445
Sincerely yours,
Hoover
Little Rock,
Arkansas
June 4, 1654
I, Louis M. Kelley, Special Agent, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, after being duly sworn, depose as follows:
1963, to
I arrived at Dallas, Texas, November 23,
assist in the investigation of the assassination of President
On or 
about
John Fitzgerald Kennedy and related matters.
November 24, 1963, I was assigned to review all previously
existing files and current information as to Jack L. 
Ruby 
and
to prepare an insert based on such file review for 
inclusion
This insert was to include 
such
in an investigative report.
physical description and biographical data as were available'
from the file review and from information developed 
on
November 24, 1963. I had before me at the time I dictated
the insert information which had been obtained on November
24, 1963, by other Special Agents of the FBI and from the
Identification Division files of the Dallas Police Department.
The Dallas Police Department records, under Dallas 
Police
Department No. 22255, included information concerning arrests
of Ruby dating from February 4, 1949, to March 14, 
1963.
f
In dictating the physical description and biographical
data concerning Ruby, I possibly included under the heading
"Remarks," 'Known Dallas area criminal," based 
on the fact 
I
had before me Ruby's identification record from 
the Dallas
Police Department, which listed several arrests 
in the 
Dallas
area. This would have been the only thing 
on which such an
observation could have been based.
Sworn and subscribed to before me
•
this
day of June 1964.
به پاکستان آزاد
SELLS
Notary Public
12º emmission Expires Jan. 22, 1965
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 446
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
FBI Withheld Data on JFK Slaying
By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten
WEST 10/27
The FBI withheld from the
Warren Commission hundreds
of documents about the
assassination of President.
Kennedy.
These are raw FBI files,
which the commission
requested but never received.
They contain no startling
information that will overturn
the commission's verdict, but
they reveal intimately how the
FBI handled its most im-
portant case.
In the margins of some
suppressed memos, the late
FBI chief, J. Edgar Hoover,
scribbled caustic comments in
blue ink. He was critical of
almost everyone involved in
the investigation, from Dallas
police chief Jesse Curry to
President Lyndon Johnson.
Confidential notes kept by
one top FBI official, for
example, quote Hoover as
warning: "Johnson may
become very dictatorial. We
*must keep our guard up."
:
Sources familiar with the
suppressed documents say the
contents were summarized
and submitted to the Warren
Commission. But there were
some subtle, perhaps
deliberate, omissions.
The documents show that
Hoover brought pressure on
his subordinates to rush out a
preliminary report on the FBI
investigation before the
murdered President's
brother, Robert F. Kennedy,
returned to his desk as
Attorney General.
The confidential notes quote
Hoover
as instructing his
subordinates to get the report
out of the Justice Department
"before Bobby gets back."
Apparently, the FBI chief
also feared Deputy Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Kat-
zenbach might tamper with
the report before forwarding it
to the Warren Commission.
Hoover told his aides to alert
President Johnson's major-
domo, Walter Jenkins.
"Let Jenkins know after
report is out of our hands.'
Hoover directed. "Let Jenkins
know what Katzenbach is
doing. Might cause long delay.
Must not consider
any
alteration."
Thirteen days after
President Kennedy
gunned down in Dallas,
Hoover delivered a detailed
report to Katzenbach naming
Lee Harvey Oswald as the
assassin. Katzenbach kept it
four days before submitting it
to the commission.
was
The crusty old G-man was
furious at the Dallas police
chief, meanwhile, for leaking
the story that the FBI had
investigated. Oswald but had
failed to alert the Secret
Service.
"This is the lowest level in
history of Bureau since I have
been director," Hoover
lamented, according to the
confidential notes.
He contended that Oswald
had never been seen with
firearms, had written no hate
letters against U.S. leaders.
As a former defector, he also
knew he was a marked man
whom the FBI was watching.
"With that background,"
grumbled Hoover, "how could
he be security risk? No in-
dication of violence so far as
our records show.
could have hollered false
arrest if we had arrested
him."
Oswald
The FBI chief commented
that Chief Justice Earl
Warren, who headed the
commission, "would have
been first one to holler" about
Oswald's rights. Citing the
criticism of the FBI, Hoover
commented: "This is one of
the rough ones."
He felt, therefore, that
President Johnson should
have endorsed the FBI report.
"President should
have
backed up report," com-
plained over, "based on
evidezze gathered by the
FBI."
In private remarks that
were never intended to be
repeated outside his inner
circle, he made deprecating
remarks not only about
President Johnson but about
Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-
Ariz.), who
was then
preparing to run against LBJ
for the presidency.
"Goldwater has no sound
advisers around him," Hoover
noted. But his comment on
Johnson was more deadly:
"LBJ's speeches are dull."
The Warren Commission
adopted a resolution,
meanwhile, calling for "the
raw materials upon which any
reports given to the com-
mission are based, together
"
with all raw materials and
reports relating to the work of
the commission since the date
of any and all earlier reports."
J. Lee Rankin, the general
counsel, followed up with a
"Dear Edgar" letter to the
FBI chief requesting the full
files 'as promptly as
possible." But they were
never delivered.
64
A commission lawyer,
remembering those days;
more than a decade ago,
told us: "Nobody ever got the
FBI's own files." In 1963-64.
another staff member pointed
out, the FBI "could do no
wrong," so no one pressed too
hard for their internal
records.
Now 12 years after the
Kennedy assassination, a
fascinating story is still locked
in FBI files awaiting a public-
reopening. We will tell part of
the story in future columns.
Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-
Pa.), chairman of the Senate
intelligence subcommittee
investigating the
assassination, is seeking the
full story from the FBI.
Footnote: FBI spokesmen
stoutly defended the FBI's
findings and the thoroughness :
of the investigation. They
conceded that "informative"
and "deliberative" memos
were not given to the com-
mission. But "everything they
needed was given them. They
had all they wanted to make
their
findings."
(1975.United Feature Syndicate, Inc.)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 447
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
Oswald-Agent Contact Covered Up
W Post 10/288
By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten
The late J. Edgar Hoover, in
his zeal to protect his beloved
FBI, engineered a cover-up 12
years ago to keep the Warren
Commission from learning
about the ties between FBI
agent James Hosty and
assassin Lee Harvey Oswald.
The formidable Hoover,
whose bulldog visage had
become a national symbol of
law and order, intervened.
personally when the Warren
Commission began to zero in
on Hosty.
Now, 12 years later, Hosty
has admitted destroying a
'threatening note, which
Oswald delivered to the FBI
office in Dallas a few days
(before shooting President
F.
Kennedy
in
1
Been handling the Oswald
case. Shanklin telephoned the
Dallas police and asked
whether Hosty could par
ticipate in the interrogation.
Hosty later questioned
Oswald at police headquar-
ters. Oswald, who had been
outwardly calm, suddenly
became agitated. "I know
you!" he shouted. "I know
you! You're the one who ac
costed my wife twice!"
The incident
passed,
however, without any mention
of the threatening letter.
Hosty also confided to a friend.
on the Dallas police force, Lt.
Jack Revill, that the FBI had
a file on Oswald. Revill
repeated the conversation to a
superior who ordered him to
put it in writing.
summary of Oswald's
notebook. The summary
conveniently omitted the fact
that Hosty's name, telephone
and license tag had been in the
notebook.
The commission found out
about the omission and
demanded an explanation. On
Jan. 27, 1964, Hoover
acknowledged that Hosty's
had been in the
name
notebook.
The G-man also gave what
purported to be a full account
of the FBI's contacts with
Oswald. The last contact, he
reported, had been on Aug. 10,
1963. "We did not interview
Oswald in Dallas, Texas, or in
Irving, Texas, prior to the
assassination of President:
Kennedy," Hoover added.
"Special Agent Hosty
Interestingly, he used the
related to this officer...
word "our" to describe the
Revill wrote,
last contact with the FBI. But
"that the
Bureau
1. on Feb. 6, in a sworn affidavit,
of
Investigation was aware of the
Hoover changed the wording
they had information that this
subject (Oswald) and that
in a curious way. He swore
that Oswald had no contact
committing the assassination
subject was
with FBI "agents" after Aug.
capable of
10, 1963.
of President Kennedy:"
John
November, 1963. The note
threatened to blow up the FBI
office and Dallas police... Federal
headquarters if Hosty didn't
stop bothering his wife..
The FBI should have
notified the Secret Service
that Oswald, a misfit who had
threatened violence, was in
the Dallas area. The Secret
Service routinely would have
checked his whereabouts
during the presidential visit.
This might have saved
President Kennedy's life.
When the FBI learned that a
suspect named Lee Harvey
Oswald had been picked up,.
Hosty reminded his boss,
Gordon Shanklin, that he had
Hoover was furious when he
learned of Hosty's loose talk.
According to confidential
notes taken at the time, the
grizzled FBI chief complained
that Hosty had "diarrhea of
words." But the old man,
nevertheless, sought to cover
up the FBI's embarrassment.
On Dec. 23, 1963, the FBI
gave the Warren Commission a
*
It is now known, of course,
that Oswald appeared at the
FBI office in Dallas a few days
before the assassination. At
that time, just as Hoover said,
he did not speak with any FBI
"agents." But he spoke with
ah FBI receptionist, who
passed on his threatening note
to the agents.
It is imposisible to know
whether the late FBI chief
subtly switched the word
"our" to "agents" in order to
hide his knowledge of
Oswald's violent threat.
!
But in a later letter to the
Warren Commission, dated
categorically: "I wish to
April 6, 1964, Hoover stated
emphasize that the facts
available to the FBI con-
cerning Lee Harvey Oswald'
prior to the assassination did
not indicate in any way that he
President Kennedy.'
was or would be a threat to
The truth is, of course, that
the FBI had received
dramatic evidence less than a
week before the assassination
that Oswald was violence-
prone.
On April 24, the Dallas
Morning News reported Hosty
had told the Dallas police
1 lieutenant, Jack Revill, that
the FBI knew Oswald was
"capable" of assassinating
the President.
"
Hoover immediately sent
word to the Warren Com-
mission that the story was
• "false" and followed up three
days later with a personal
letter delivered by courier.
"Special Agent Hosty
unequivocally denies ever
having made the statement as
quoted in this article...'
declared the FBI director.
"Special Agent Hosty points
that prior to
John Fitzgerald Kennedy, he
the
assassination of President
never had any information
indicating potential violence
Oswald.'
on the part of Lee Harvey
out
.
There's more to Hoover's
great cover-up, which we'll.
report in a future column.
C United Feature Syndicate, Iné.
NW: 50955-DocId: 32423630
Page 448
WASHINGTON President
is sitting
сп
- an Chic
olitical H-bomb
firmed report that Sen. Robert
Kennedy, D-N.Y, may have
approved an assassination plot
which then possibly backfired
His late brother.
Tup officials, queried by this
tumn, agreed that a plot to
sassinate Cuban dictator
Hel Castro was considered
the highest levels of the
Intelligence Agency at
Ume Bobby was riding
сп the agency. The
cials disagreed, however,
or whether the plan was
proved and implemented.
version claims that
faworld figures actually
re recruited to carry out
plat. Another rumor has it
: three bited
i.
assassins
Havona where
is stil
sed to be languishing in
on. These stories bave
westigated and dis-
by the FBI
the rumor persists,
spered by people in a
tion to know, that Castro
become aware of an
trian plat upon his life.
decided to retallate
nst President Kennedy,
is report may have start-
New Orleans's Rariboyant
Attorney Jim Garri
in bis investigation of the
dy assassination, but!
us belleve be is following
wrong transit
For weeks after the trad
This column was told, lobby
was morose and refused to sce
people. Could he have been
plagued by the terrible
thought that he had helped put
into 
mation forces that indi
rectly may have brought
abent 
his brother's martyr-
dom? 
Some insiders think so.
Blow for Blow
Note: Those who
may be
shocked that the CIA would
onsider stooping to a political
assassination 
should be re-
minded of the ugly nature of
that Secretary of State Dean
Bisk has called "the back-
ey struggle."
He has described it as "a
trigh struggle going on in the
back 
alleys all over the
world... a never ending
var...to quarter asked and
erry-Go-Round
none given.
By Dreto Pearson
It's unpleasant,
and no one likes it, but that is
not a field which can be left
entirely to the other side.
The blunt truth is that the
subterranean world of capio-
nage is harsh almost beyond
belief. 
There have been times
that the CIA has been forced
to resort to the most extreme
measures to protect the na
tional 
security.
Some of the CLA's best
operatives also have suddenly
and mysteriously disappeared.
No 
word will be heard of them
for months, then a few grim
details will leak out.
people have been subjected to
"We will learn that these
the most skillful, most fiendish
tortures that man can possibly
devise 
and that they have
been reduced to animals or
vegetables." Clark Clifford,
head of 
the President's For-
eign Intelligence Committee,
told this coluinn. "When they
no longer can really be called
information has
ed from them, the
disposed of. It is t
picture, but that
the game is played"
an
We also play rouge. The
New York Times, in
quoted "one
exhaustive report on the CIA,
informed men in Washington
of the best-
"When we catch one of them
on 
this subject" as 
saying
:
(a Soviet or other age), it
everything out
"e
do it wi
1 barred."
82200
th
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 449
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
This much can be verified
1. President Kempertz wat
disillusioned with the f
after the Bay of Pict L
that he swore to f
would like to splinter
In a thousand
Escaller it to the wo
ordered a thap
thin
tion by a great
Gen. Maywill last
'President's real wat
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up call the t
CIA.
2. During a penet 647
CIA ta gotint
་ ་་ ་ རྒྱུ
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Hugotonie bie 1° 1.96 reach
an !!!
(the)
Insides, wand teseg fram
ip seh the prostas kintate
urne antiate stat
Hobby, eager to avente the
Bay of Pigs fusen, played
They rele 15 110
199
Whether the assassinatura pist
K'J5 ever actually put into
effect is disputed.
Castro Reachs
3. Sorna insiders are con.
¡vinced Castro learned enough
at least to believe the CIA was
secking to kill him. With
characteristic fury, he is.
reported to have cooked up a
counterplot against President;
Kennedy.
4. Shortly after Kennedy
I was gunned down, the FBI
- handed President Johnson n
memo reporting that Cuban
leaders had hoped for Kenne- :
dy's death. The President
showed it to Kennedy's top
nide, Ted Sorensen, who
thought tho. details were so.
anibiguous that he called the
memo "meaningless."
5. It is also known, ol
Course, a ale
assassin, was active in the
pro-Castro movement and
traveled to Mexico seeking a
1 Cuban visa 7 few weeks
before the dreadful day in
Dallas.
Some sources consider Rob-
ert Kennedy's behavior after
the assassination to be signifi-
cant. He seemed to bc.
tormented, they say, by more i
than the natural grief over the
murder of his brother.
Author William Manchester,
who got his information chief-
ly fron Kennedy-controlled
I sources, portrays Bobby as a
character of granite during
thoso tragic days." But others.
had a 
different impression.
McGeorge Bundy, ten
Top White House eit
Page 450
A
00779
Jack Anderson
W Post 7/27
Did the Castro Plot Backfire?
The late Robert Kennedy was tor-
mented by the terrible thought, ac:
cording to intimates, that he may have
helped trigger the assassination of his
brother.
We raised this possibility in January
1971, when we first revealed that the
⚫ CIA had plotted to assassinate Cuban
Premier Fidel Castro. It has taken us
4 years to get the rest of the story.
"Not only was he fully aware of the CIA'S
attempts to kill Castro, but after President
Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert
Kennedy was devastated by the possibility that
Loyal associates of Robert Kennedy, the CIA plot may have backfired against his
rushing to defend his memory, have
sworn that he knew nothing about the
assassination attempts and, contradic-
torily, that he put a stop to them. Both
accounts are incorrect, according to
sources with an intimate knowledge of
the events.
Not only was he fully aware of the
CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after
President Kennedy was gunned down
in Dallas, Robert was devastated by
the possibility that the CIA plot may
have backfired against his brother.
The preparations to knock off Castro
began during the last months of the
Eisenhower administration as part of
the Bay of Pigs planning. President
Kennedy, who inherited the fiasco,
swore to friends afterward that he
would like to splinter the CIA in a
thousand pieces and scatter it to the
winds."..
Instead, he appointed his brother,
Robert, to oversee the CIA, with in-
structions to shake it up. Characteristi
cally, Robert began investigating the
undercover operations from top to bot-
tom. His purpose was to prevent an-
other Bay of Pigs.
our
He became fascinated, say
sources, with the CIA's covert activi-
ties. Eagerly, he pursued the details
down through the lower-levels. As one
source put it, "He was like a wide-eyed
schoolboy."
In the process, he learned about the
continuing effort to eliminate Castro,
an operation known inside the CIA as
the "executive action plan." In fact,
Robert took a special interest in the
brother.”
activities against Castro. One insider,
former 
Deputy Defense Secretary Ros-
well Gilpatric, told us the focus "on
the 
Cuban situation" was intensified in
1961 at Robert Kennedy's "insistence."
The President eventually put Robert
in charge of a counter-insurgency com-
mittee, called
the Special Group,
which concentrated upon harassing
Castro. One member, former CIA chief
John McCone, acknowledged that the
group had "directed mischievous
things against Castro like infiltrating
saboteurs, blowing up bridges and car-
rying on general confusion."
McCone insisted, however, that "the
group at no time gave any considera.
tion to any assassination plot." We
have 
established that the "executive
action plan" was directed by William
Harvey, the CIA operative whom we
linked 
to the assassination plot in our
original 1971 story. We have also
learned that he reported to the late
Desmond Fitzgerald in CIA headquar
ters
. 
We have been unable, however, to
identify the next link in the chain of
command.
Nevertheless, wholly reliable sources
insist that Robert Kennedy knew
about the plot against Castro and did
nothing to stop it. The intended tar-
get, Fidel Castro, also knew about it.
One assassination squad reportedly..
was apprehended on a Havana roof top
within range of Castro's movements,
about March 1, 1963.
The Cuban premier, in an interview
with Associated Press correspondent
Daniel Harker the following Septem-
ber, warned that U.S. leaders would
find themselves in danger if they at-
tempted to do away with Cuban lead-
ers.
"United States leaders should think
that if they are aiding terrorist plans
to eliminate Cuban leaders, they them
selves will not be safe," Castro told,
Harker.
Two months later, President Ken-
nedy was shot down in the streets of
Dallas. The accused assassin, Lee Har-
vey Oswald, had been active in the
pro-Castro movement and had traveled
to Mexico to visit the Cuban embassy.
a few weeks earlier.
The first person to reach Robert
Kennedy's side after the shooting was
CIA director John McCone, who re-
mained alone with Robert at his Mc-
Lean, Va., home for nearly three
hours. All others, including Robert's
priest, were turned away. But McCone
swore to us that Castro's name was
never mentioned during the agonizing
three hours.
Other sources say that Robert,
clusion for the next few days. Al-
deeply despondent, went into semi-se-
though he bottled up his feelings, they
knew him and understood the circum
stances well enough, to realize he
blamed himself for his brother's death.
There was little doubt, they say, that
he believed the CIA's attempts against
Castro put into motion the forces that
brought about his brother's martyr-
dom.
On January 18, 1971, we reported:
"Among those privy to the CIA con-
spiracy, there is still a nagging suspi-
cion-unsupported by the Warren Com
mission's findings-that Castro became
aware of the U.S. plot upon his life
and somehow recruited Oswald to re-
taliate against President Kennedy."
It has now been disclosed that the
Warren Commission was told nothing
about the CIA's plot to kill Castro
even though the late Allen Dulles, the
CIA chief who initiated the plot, sat on
the commission.
According to the final report, the
commission investigated "literally doz
ens of allegations of a conspiratorial
contact between Oswald and the Cuban
government" but found no substance
to any of them..
The Cuban premier himself, in an in-
terview with Frank, Mankiewicz and
Kirby Jones, emphatically denied hav-
ing anything to do with the Kennedy-
assassination.
"It is . . .
very interesting that this
man Oswald, who was involved in the
assassination, traveled to Mexico a few
months prior to the assassination and
applied for a permit at the Cuban em-
bassy to travel to Cuba, and he was
not given the permit," said Castro.
"But I ask myself why would a man)
who commits such an act try to come:
here. Sometimes we ask ourselves if
someone did not wish to involve Cuba
in this, because I am under the impres
sion that Kennedy's assassination was
organized by reactionaries in the
• United States and that it was all a re-
sult of a conspiracy.
... We have never
believed in carrying out this type
activity of assassination
adversaries."
of
1975. United Feature, Inc.
of
i
JUI 5095
Jack Anderson and Les Whitten
The data Pink, 9/9/76
CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe
After President John F. Kennedy
was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the
Central Intelligence Agency received
evidence suggesting that Cuban Pre-
mier Fidel Castro arranged the assassi-
nation in retaliation for attempts on
his life.
Yet sources privy to the secret dis-
cussions at the highest levels of the
CIA during those hectic days now tell,
us that the CIA deliberately withheld
the evidence from the Warren Com-
mission investigating Kennedy's death.
Our sources cite two reasons for
holding back this evidence. One was a
resolve to cover up the secret that the
CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill
Castro.
There also was a legitimate concern
that the Castro revelations might in-
flame the American people, whose
grief could have turned into a terrible
wrath that might have precipitated
some rash action.
Only a few key people knew about
the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One
was Attorney General Robert F. Ken-
nedy, who was his brother's personal
watchdog over the CIA. It has now
been established that Robert Kennedy
was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the
attempt to use underworld killers to
knock off Castro.
Two days later, Robert Kennedy cau-
tioned the CIA not to go ahead with
the assassination without consulting
him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd
on the CIA, it must be assumed that he
was kept advised of subsequent assassi-
nation attempts. However, there is no
documentary evidence of this.
Records now available show that
Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J.
Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10,
DROPOUTS
1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover
later divulged this important informa-
tion to the Warren Commission.
Of course, various CIA officials also
knew about the assassination scheme.
Not the least of them was the late CIA
chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved
the original plan. He later served on
the Warren Commmission, yet he sat
silently throughout the investigation
without mentioning the Cuban angle.
Within hours of President Kenne-
dy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled in-
formation from Mexico City suggest-
ing that the Cubans may have been be
hind the assassination. Our sources say
that the CIA developed similar infor-
mation in Washington.
The first person to reach Robert
Kennedy's side after the shooting was
CIA Director John A. McCone, who re-
mained alone with the Attorney Gen-
eral at his McLean, Va., home for
nearly three hours.
McCone swore to us that Castro's
name was never mentioned during the
three hours. But CIA records show
that the next day. McCone not only
mentioned Castro to the new Presi-
dent, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed
him on the information from Mexico
City.
Yet no one brought the Cuban
connection to the attention of the War-
ren Commission. We were the first to
get word of the anti-Castro plot to
Chief Justice Earl Warren, the com-
mission chairman, four years later.
We are now free to reveal our role
in the drama. Two of our confidential
sources, CIA agent William Harvey
and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A
third source, attorney Edward P. Mor-
gan, has waived the confidentiality we
had promised him.
Morgan told us in January, 1967,
about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot
against Castro. He raised the possibil-
ity that the plot could have backfired,
against President Kennedy. There
were suspicious circumstances, he
pointed out, indicating that Castro
may have learned of the attempts on
his life and may have retaliated
against Kennedy.
Morgan refused to identify his
sources because it would have violated
the attorney-client privilege. But he
was an attorney of such stature that
we didn't doubt his word. He had been
chief inspector of the FBL He had di-
rected the historic congressional inves-
tigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing.
Later, he ran the investigation into the
excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCar-
thy.
We got Morgan's permission. to
write a cautious story. We confirmed
the general outlines from a CIA
source. Then on March 3, 1967, we'
wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have
approved an assassination plot, which
then possibly backfired against his late
brother."
The next day, according to records
now available, Kennedy's secretary,
called for a copy of the May 7, 1962,
memo, which summarized the briefing
he had received on the assassination
plot.
On March 7, 1967, we reported more
details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to
assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we
wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a
counterplot by Castro to assassinate
President Kennedy."
By Howard Post
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 452
Tuesday, September 7, 1976
THE WASHINGTON POST
C19
Jack Anderson and Les Whitten
Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder
Mafia mobster John Roselli may
have taken the secret of the John F.
Kennedy assassination with him to his
death. He was brutally murdered a
few weeks ago, his backed-up body
stuffed into an oil drum and dumped
into Miami's Biscayne Bay.
Before he died, Roselli hinted to as-
sociates that he knew who had ar-
ranged President Kennedy's murder.
It was the same conspirators, he sug-
gested, whom he had recruited earlier
to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.
By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro
learned the identity of the underworld
contacts in Havana who had been
trying to knock him off. He believed,
not altogether without basis, that Pres-
ident Kennedy was behind the plot.
The Cuban leader, as the supreme
irony, decided to turn the tables and
use the same crowd to arrange Ken-
nedy's assassination, according to
Roselli's scenario. To save their skins,
the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Os
wald to pull the trigger.
Roselli could never be pinned down
on names or details. It was also diffi-
cult to assess whether he knew what
he was talking about or whether he
merely described what he thought
might have happened. Certainly there
is no real evidence to support Roselli's
story. But there are enough curious
circumstances to justify telling it. Here
⚫ are the fascinating highlights.
The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a
flamboyant mobster with underworld
contacts in Havana, was recruited by
the Central Intelligence Agency in
1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no
authority, however, over the under-
world elements in Havana.
DROPOUTS.
I SEE YOU'RE EN-
LARGING YOUR HUT,
CHIEF... EXPANDING
FAMILY."
They were under the loose control
of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos
Trafficante. His gambling enterprises
in Havana had been closed down by
Castro after the 1959 revolution. In
fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a
period in a Cuban jail, an indignity
that didn't endear Castro to him.
After Trafficante made it back to his
Florida haunts, he left part of his or-
ganization behind in Havana. Some of
his 
henchmen even managed to de-
velop contacts in Castro's inner circle.
These were the people Roselli wanted
to use to knock off Castro.
But Roselli didn't have the stature
inside the Mafia to make the necessary
arrangements with Trafficante. So
Roselli called in his patron, the Chi-
cago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana,
to deal with Trafficante.
As Roselli's associates tell it, he per-
suaded Giancana that it would be to
their advantage to win the good will of
the CIA. Convinced. Giancana flew
down to Florida to make the prelimi-
nary arrangements.
Once Giancana and Trafficante set it
up, Roselli used the Havana under-
world to plot Castro's demise. At first,
they tried to plant poison pills, sup-
plied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The
pills would have made it appear that
he died of natural causes. When this
failed, snipers were dispatched to a
Havana rooftop. They were caught.
The word reached Roselli that some
of the plotters had been tortured and
that Castro had learned about the
whole operation.
The CIA called off the Roselli opera-
tion in March, 1963, but recruited a
Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to:
murder Castro.
NO,
ALF...
-Aun's rese
alure Syng cate. inc
In an impromptu, three-hour inter-
view with Associated Press reporter
Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that
he knew about the attempts on his life-
and 
warned that U.S. leaders also
might not be safe. That was Sept.
1963.
According to Roselli, Castro enlisted
the same underworld elements whom
They supposedly were Cubans from
he had caught plotting against him
.
the old 
Trafficante organization.
allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharp-
Working with Cuban intelligence, they
shooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had
been active in the pro-Castro move-
ment.
According to Roselli's version,
Oswald may have shot Kennedy or
may have acted as a decoy while oth-
ers 
ambushed him from closer range.
When Oswald was picked up. Roselli
suggested, the underworld conspira-
tors 
feared he would crack and dis-
them. This almost certainly would
close information that might lead to
have brought a massive U.S. crack-
down on the Mafia.
So Jack Ruby was ordered to elim-
inate Oswald, making it appear as an
act of reprisal against the President's
killer. At least this is how Roselli ex-
plained the tragedy in Dallas.
Several key CIA officials believed
that Castro was behind the Kennedy
assassination.
It has also been established that Jack
Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and
had connections in the Havana under-
world. One CIA cable, dated Nov. 28,
1963, reported that "an American
gangster type named Ruby" had vis-
ited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.
- EXPANDING
WAISTLINES.
By Howard Post
GASOLINE ALLEY
Where's
the truck
the boss
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 453
The man got
it started, Sarge!
4.7
Good! That saves
me a trip to the
city
I brought your
iced tea, Mr. Turnip!
Porn
By Moores
Thank
you so
muchi

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, August 27, 1976
!
1
Jack Anderson and Les Whitten
+༥ ༢༠
Smudge Only Clue in Rosselli Case
It was a grisly end for John Rosselli,
the dapper, debonair mobster about
town, who had been a familiar figure
in the glittering night spots of Holly.
wood, Las Vegas and Havana.
His killers shot or stabbed him in the
stomach. The autopsy indicates they
may have shot him and then dug out
the bullet with a knife. Then they bru-
tally hacked off his legs. It is possible
that he was still alive when they
stuffed his body into a 55-gallon drum.
They wrapped chains around the
drum to weight it down and tossed it
into Biscayne Bay. The autopsy sug-
gests he may have died of asphyxiation
inside the drum before it hit the wa-
ter. The gases from the decomposing
body floated the heavy container to
the surface. It was discovered, with its
nightmarish contents, 10 days after
Rosselli had disappeared from his sit
er's home in Plantation, Fla.
The police withheld the gruesome
details of his death while they
searched for his killers. We began our
own investigation, meanwhile, after an
appeal from his associates.
We first encountered Johnny Ros-
selli more than five years ago. We
were investigating his role in the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency's plot to assas-
sinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.
The CIA case officer, William Harv.
ey, told us that Rosselli had been the
hero of the abortive adventure.
Harvey broke his oath of secrecy be
cause he thought it might help Rossel-
li, who was in trouble with the law.
The CIA agent had nothing but praise
for Rosselli's daring.
In the strictest of confidence, Ros-
selli himself confirmed that he had di-
rected six assassination attempts
against Castro. We protected his con-
'
fidence, so he came to trust us. We
were the only reporters he would talk
to.
So when he vanished last month his
associates came to us for help. We
were suspicious, of course, that his dis-
appearance was linked to the Castro
caper. But our investigation has now
produced evidence to the contrary.
We have learned, for example, that
Rosselli was not the amiable, retired.
old duffer he pretended to be. He be-
gan in the big time as a bookkeeper for
Chicago's notorious Al Capone and be
came a specialist in white-collar
crimes. It's a profession, apparently,
that he never gave up.
Competent sources say that, be
tween rounds on the Florida golf
courses, Rosselli was involved in stolen
securities and financial swindles. His
operations reportedly were resented
by Santo Trafficante, who has been
identified in Senate testimony as the
Mafia chief in Florida.
Rossell came to Florida from Las
Vegas, where he allegedly represented
the Chicago mob. Our sources say that
he handled millions in illegal gambling
money, which he forwarded to the
Chicago underworld. There are re-
ports that Chicago crime lord Tony Ac-
cardo felt he had been short-changed
by Rosselli.
Still earlier, Rosselli spent time in
the slammer, first, for extortion and,
later, for a card swindle. Those who.
know him say he had developed a taste
for the good life. He dressed in the lat-
est styles, dined at the best restaurants
and dated beautiful women. The
thought of going back to prison,
friends say, horrified him.
To avoid prison, he began to talk to
the government as early as 1970. He
A
1
gave information, according to our
sources, which resulted in a grand jury
confrontation for Tony Accardo. The
surly mobster took the fifth. But Ac-
cardo grumbled to associates that he.
would pay back Rosselli some day.
Rosselli was also blamed for passing
information to the government, which
led to the conviction of Detroit mob ;
ster Anthony Zerilli. He is now serving
a four-year sentence at Sandstone fed-
eral penitentiary for racketeering.
Perhaps the last straw was Rosselli's
testimony in the Castro case. He identi-
fied two mobsters, the late Sam Gian-
cana and Santo Trafficante, as being
involved in the assassination attempts.
It's no secret in the underworld that
Trafficante detests publicity.
Our sources believe that the Mafia
bosses finally became fed up with Ros-
selli. His execution would have re-.
quired the approval of the top leaders,
our sources say, because it was almost.
certain to bring the federal govern-
ment into the case.
Who were the vicious killers? The
only clue is a smudge spot on the win-
dow of Rosselli's car. One of his assail-
ants probably had used a greasy hair
pomade.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 454
LRS - MAIN FILE COPY
the Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST
Tuesday, Feb. 23, 1971
Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA
Jack Anderson.
B11.
job by Robert Maheu, a for sell with deadly poison is still on the CIA payroll.
The mystery man whom the
mer FBI agent, who admitted capsules which be
Central Intelligence Agency dercover assignments for the chef to plant in the dictator's Harvey said he had a "high re-
to us that he 
had handled un- through a relative of Castro's ship with Roselli but refused
tried Both 
admitted to us a friend.
recruited to assassinate Cuba's CIA. He refused, however, to food. Later, marksmen armed gard" 
for Roselli and called
to discuss their CIA activities.
Fidel Castro has been laid up discuss the details. This is the 
with high-powered Belgian rithe Friar's 
Club case a "bum
in the sick ward 
of the Los same Maheu, incidentally, who 
fles attempted to infiltrate 
rap." Said
Angeles County jail.
He is 
handsome, hawk-faced tle 
over phantom billionaire down
is now involved in a 
legal bat- close enough to 
gun Castro Friar's Club Indictment is
John 
Roselli, once a dashing Howard Hughes
' Nevada 
oper- All bold, six assassination at do with that than I had."
Harvey: "The
figure around Hollywood and ations,
phony. Roselli had no 
more to
Las Vegas, now a gray, 66-
year-old 
inmate with a respira- being asked to perform a se-out this period, Roselli worked their client, citing our stories,
Roselli was so 
flattered over the spring of 1963. Through trying to get clemency for
tempts were made; the last in 
Roselll's lawyers are now
tory ailment.
Confidential FBI files iden- ernment that he paid all his 
of two secret CIA agents, Wil-
cret mission for the U.S. gov- under the direct supervision about his 
secret CIA service.
tify him as "a top 
Mafia fig- expenses
ure
" who watched over 
"the pocket and risked his neck to Jim) O'Connell.
out of his own llam 
Harvey 
and James (Big
concealed interests in Las land the assassination 
teams
Vegas casinos 
of the Chicago on 
the Cuban coast.
underworld."
Roselli
has
name
admitted
to
Roselli's Reward
Firearms Fiasco
Under pressure from the
In James Bond fashion, he
firearms lobby, the Treasury
friends that he was a rum run- Miami Beach hotels with Cu- tried to pump. Roselli for in- 1968 federal firearms act.
held whispered meetings in the assassination plot, has force a vital section 
of the
The FBI which got wind of Department has falled 
to en-
ner during the Roaring Twen- bans willing to make an at- formation. But he was sworn
ties. Operating along the East tempt on Castro's life. Once, to 
silence 
by the CIA, and up
Coast, he learned how to 
evade 
he called on Chicago racket to this 
moment, he hasn't bro- the murders of Sen. Robert :
Coast Guard cutters and po-
boss Sam Giancana to line up ken it.
The law was passed after
lice patrols.
His
a contact. The confidential
later became files report that Glancana had partment, as part of its crack- Treasury Secretary to require
Kennedy and 
Dr. Martin Lu.
linked with the 
biggest names "gambling interest and an in- down on organized 'crime, full 
reports of all firearms and
` Meanwhile, the Justice Dether King. It authorizes the
in the Chicago 
and Los Ange- terest in the shrimp business 
tried to nail Rosel FBI ammunition 
sales.
les underworlds
. He 
also de- in Cuba." However, the Chi- 
discovered that his 
Chicago
veloped contacts 
in the Cuban cago 
gangster took no direct birth 
records had been forged, law has been in force, the
underworld before Castro took 
part in the assassination plot.
For the two years that the
over the Havana gambling ca-
sinos.
Roselli made
that his name was really Fl. Treasury 
Department has ig.
midnight 
lippo Sacco and that he had 
nored this key provision. The
He had the right back-assassins in twin powerboats. Italy as a child. He was con- it would be a bookkeeping
dashes to Cuba with 
his hired come to this country 
from gun industry has complained
.
ground for a hush-hush mis- Once a Cuban patrol ship victed for failing to register as 
nightmare.
sion 
that the CIA was plan- turned its guns on his 
dark- an alien.
ning in 1961. As part of the ened boat, tore a hole in the He was also convicted for which would have to compiles
Bay of Pigs Invasion, the CIA bottom and sank the boat. Ro- conspiracy to rig card games all 
the sales data, has also
The federal government,
hoped to knock off Castro and sell was fished out 
of the at Los Angeles' exclusive been 
reluctant to spend the
I water by the other boat, 
which Friar's Club.
escaped into the shadows
.
leave Cuba leaderless.
Risks Neck
Roselli was recruited for the [ported how the CIA furnished
In earlier columns, we re-
$100 million it would cost for
to Indianapolis and O'Connell |
clates, Harvey has now retired tain the firearms files.
Of Roselli's two CIA asso- 
computers and staff 
to main+
1971. Bell-McClure Syndicate. Inse
1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 455
PN USB
(The Washington Merry-Go-Round
LRS - MAIN FILE COPY
THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 19, 1971 D15
Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions
By Jack (Anderson
The plot to kill Cuban dic-
tator Fidel Castro, hidden for
10 years from the public, raises
some ugly questions that high
behind the Trujillo and Diemment and had traveled to sion, there was a wide spec.
assassinations.
Mexico to visit the Cuban trum of plans ranging from
3. Did the late Robert Ken- Embassy a few weeks before one extreme to another,”
nedy know about the assassina- the dreadful day in Dallas. McCone admitted. "Whenever
tion attempts? After the Bay Could Bob Kennedy have this subject (assassinating Cas-
of Pigs fiasco, President Ken- been plagued by the terrible tro) was brought up-and it
to friends he thought that the CIA plot, was - it was rejected imme
buried deep inside the Central would like "to splinter the CIA condoned, put into motion diately on two grounds. First,
In a thousand pieces and scat forces that may have brought it would not be condoned by
1. Has the CIA tried to as-ter it to the winds." He put about his brother's martyr anybody. Second, it wouldn't
sassinate any other leaders? his brother, Robert, in charge dom?
have achieved anything."
There was also talk in high
officials would rather keep
Intelligence Agency.
nedy
swore
which he must at least have
John McCone, who headed the of the CIA with instructions The last surviving brother,
CIA during the six attempts to shake it up. The CIA made Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass),
to knock off Castro, denied five attempts on Castro's life could give us no insight. His places, McCone acknowledged,
emphatically that the CIA has after the Bay of Pigs while brothers had never spoken to of supporting a coup to oust
tried to kill anyone. But ex- Robert Kennedy was riding him about any assassination Diem. The former CIA dl.
Sen. George Smathers, one of herd on the agency.
attempts against Castro, he rector said he had argued
John F. Kennedy's closest 4. Could the plot against said. He was aware, he volun- against this at a secret session
friends, told us the late Presi- Castro have backfired against teered, only that Sen. Smath- with both Kennedy brothers.
dent suspected that the CIA President Kennedy? The late ers had talked to the late He had contended that there
had arranged the shootings of President was murdered nine President about eliminating was no one strong enough to
the Dominican Republic's Ra- months after the last assassi- Castro.
take Diem's place and that a
fael Trujillo in 1961 and South nation team was caught on a Smathers told us that Presi-coup, therefore, would bring
Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in Havana rooftop with high-dent Kennedy seemed "horri- "political upheaval."
"I told the President and
powered rifles. Presumably, fied" at the idea of political
1963.
'
2. Did President Kennedy they were subjected to flend- assassinations remember Bobby together," recalled Mc-
personally sanction the plot ish tortures until they told all him saying," recalled Smath- Cone, "that if I were running
against Castro? The prepara- they knew. None of the assas-ers, "that the CIA frequently a baseball team and had only
rations to assassinate the Cu-sination teams, however, had did things he didn't know one pitcher, I wouldn't take
ban dictator began during the direct knowledge of the CIA about, and he was unhappy him out of the game."
The November, 
1963, coup
last months of the Eisenhower involvement. The CIA insti- about it. He complained that
administration as part of the gators had represented them- the CIA was almost autono- caught the United States com-
pletely by surprise, he said.
Bay of Pigs scheme. All six selves as oilmen seeking re- mous.
attempts, however, were made venge against Castro for his "He told me he believed the While the plotters were mov-
during 1961-63 when M.. Ken- seizure of oil holdings. CTA had arranged 
to have ing on the palace, he said,
Diem and Trujillo bumped 
off. then-Ambassador Henry Cabot
was visiting 
Diem
.
He was pretty well shocked Lodge
Former associates recall about that. He thought it was
Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our
once spoke to the late Pres- that Robert Kennedy, deep- a stupid thing to do, and he Pacific commander, had also
dent about assassinating Cas- ly despondent, went into semi- wanted to get control of what been present, but had left
tro. Mr. Kennedy merely seclusion after his brother's the CIA was doing."
rolled back his eyes
, recalled assassination. Could he have But McCone, disagreeing
Smathers, as if to indicate the been tormented by more than vigorously, told us that "no Diem escaped through a tun-
idea was too wild to discuss. natural grief? He certainly plot was authorized or imple- nel but was caught in nearby
Subsequently, Mr.
Kennedy learned that the assassin, Lee mented" to assassinate Castro, Cholon and "shot in a station
told Smathers of his suspicion Harvey Oswald, had been ac- Trujillo, Diem or anyone else. wagon."
that the CIA may have beenitive in the pro-Castro move- "During those days of ten-| 1971. Bell-McClure Syndicate, Ine.
nedy occupied the White
House. Smathers told us he
PLOT BACKFIRE?
early to go to the airport.
McCone said President
"
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 456
PN 4 S.B
Washington Merry-Go-Rouad THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 15, 1971
B7
G'Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA
By Jack Anderson ¡tor before the motley invad- late against President Ken-complete with secret trysts at
ers landed on the island. Their nedy.
Locked in the darkest re-
glittering Miami Beach hotels
arrival was expected to touch
cesses of the Central Intelli-
To set up the Castro assassi- and midnight powerboat
off a general uprising, which nation, the CIA enlisted Rob- dashes to secret landing spots
gence Agency is the story of
the Communist militia 
would ert Maheu, a former FBI on the Cuban coast. Once, Ro-
six assassination attempts
against Cuba's Fidel Castro.
agent with shadowy contacts, selli's 
boat was shot out from
have had more trouble 
putting
For 10 years, only a few key down without the charismatic cover assignments for the CIA
I 
who had handled other 
under- 
under him.
people 
have known the terri- 
Castro 
to 
lead them.
For the first try, the CIA
out of his Washington public furnished Roselli with special
ble secret. They have sworn After the first attempt 
relations office. He
never to talk. Yet we have falled, five more assassination moved to Las Vegas to head Castro's food. The poison was
later poison capsules to slip into
learned the details from
sources whose credentials are
teams were sent to 
Cuba. The up billionaire Howard Hughes' supposed to take three days to
Nevada 
operations.
beyond question.
last team reportedly made it
act. By the time Castro died,
Maheu recruited John Ro- his system would throw off all
We spoke to John McCone, to a rooftop within shooting selli
, a 
ruggedly handsome traces of the poison, so he
who 
headed the CIA at the distance of Castro before they gambler 
with contacts in both would appear to be the victim
time of the assassination at- were apprehended. This hap- the American 
and Cuban un-of a natural if mysterious ail-
tempts. He acknowledged the pened around the last of Feb. derworlds, 
to arrange the as-ment.
idea had been discussed inside ruary or 
first of March, 1963. sassination. The dapper, hawk-
the CIA but insisted it had 
Nine months later, Presl faced Roselli, formerly mar- Cuban, related to one of Cas-
Roselli arranged with a
been "rejected immedi-dent Kennedy was gunned ried 
to movie actress June tro's chefs, to plant the deadly
ately." He vigorously denled down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Lang. was a power in 
the pellets in the dictator's food.
that the CIA had ever partici- Oswald, a fanatic who pre-movie Industry until his con- On March 13, 1961, Roselli de.
pated in any plot on Castro's viously had agitated for 
Cas
-
viction with racketeer Willie livered the capsules to his con-
life. Asked whether the at-tro in New Orleans and had Bloff in a million
-dollar Holly-tact at Miami Beach's glamor-
tempts could have been made made a mysterious trip to the wood labor 
shakedown. The!
with his knowledge, he re- Cuban Embassy in Mexico CIA assigned two of its most;
ous Fontainebleau Hotel.
plied
: 
"It could not have hap- City.
trusted operatives, William about the right time for the
A couple of weeks later. Just
pened."
Among those privy to the 
Harvey 
and James (Big Jim) plot to have been carried out,
We have complete confi- CIA 
conspiracy, there is still a O'Connell, to 
the hush-hush a report out of Havana said
dence, however, in our nagging suspicion-unsup: 
murder mission. Using phony Castro
sources.
ported 
by the Warren Com-names, they accompanied Ro-covered before the Bay of Pigs
was ill. But he re-
The plot to knock off Castro 
mission's findings-that 
Casselli on trips to Miami to line invasion on April 17, 1961.
began as part of the Bay of tro became aware of the U.S. up the assassination 
teams.
Pigs operation. The intent was plot upon his life and some- The full story reads like the
to eliminate the Cuban dicta- 
how recruited Oswald to retal-script of a James Bond movie,
Four more attempts were
made on Castro's life,
1971. Beli-McClure Syndicate. Ine.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 457
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 458
3/10/75
"
BY JACK ANDERSON.
with Les Whitten
WASHINGTON-Press account have
identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target
of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.
The headlines couldn't have comp at a
worse time for Secretary of State Henry Kis-
singer. He is in the thick of "most delicate
negotiations," according to our White House
sources, to restore some
kind of diplomatic rela-
tionship with Cuba.
Actually, we reported
as far back as Jan. 18,
1971, that the CIA had ar
ranged six assassination
attempts against Castro
in the early 1960s. Now
that the story has been
revived, it might be use
ful to recount the details.
The plot began as part Anderson
of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation.
The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban
leader before the CIA invasion force landed.
on the island.
:
To carry out the assassination, the CIA
selected an underworld figure who could be
disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli,
identified in confidential FBI files as "a top
Mafia figure" who watched over "the con-
cealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the
Chicago underworld.'
Roselli represented himself as an oil man
seeking revenge against Castro for his sei-
Eure of oil holdings.
For the first try, the CIA furnished Ro-
selli with special poison capsules to slip
into Castro's food. The poison was supposed
to take three days to act. By the time Cas-
tro died, his system would throw off all
traces of the poison, so he would appear to
be the victim of a natural if mysterious ail-
ment.
Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to
one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly,
pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13,
1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his
contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fon-
tainebleau Hotel..
A couple weeks later, just about the right
time for the plot to have been carried out, a
report out of Havana said Castro was ill.
But he recovered in time to rout the Bay of
Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961..
Although both the murder plot and the in-
vasion failed, the CIA continued trying to
get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had
sneaked the poison into Havana was never
seen again.
Roselli arranged for triple-strength cap-.
sules to be slipped into Castro's food several
weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again,
the plot failed and the conspirators disap-
peared.
.4
Four more attempts were made on Cas...
tro's life thereafter, using assassination
teams equipped with high-powered rifles,
explosives and two-way radios. Roselli per-
sonally made midnight powerboat dashes to
deliver the teams at secret landing spots on
the Cuban coast.
The assassination teams never got a shot
at Castro, although the CIA learned that the
last group reached a rooftop within range.
This occurred around the last of February
or first of March, 1963.
Nine months later, President Kennedy'
was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey
Oswald, a fanatic who had been active in the
pro-Castro movement and had paid a myste-
rious call upon the Cuban embassy in Mex-
ico City a few weeks before the dreadful day
in Dallas.
Sources familiar with the CIA conspiracy
can't shake a nagging suspicion-unsup
ported by the Warren Commission's findings
- that Castro may have become aware of
the U.S. plot upon his life and, therefore,
may have recruited Oswald to retaliate
against President Kennedy.
CKS TRAIN THE COPY
|The Washington Morry-Go-Rowd
THE WASHINGTON POST
Monday, March 10, 1975
CIA Plots Against Castro Recounte
By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten
Press accounts have identi-world."
fied Cuba's Fidel Castro as the
The
:
Nine months later, Presi
Kennedy was gunned dow
Dallas by Lee Harvey Os
a fanatic who had been acti
who watched over "the con- lets in the dictator's food. On ing spots on the Cuban
cealed interests in Las Vegas March 
13, 1961. Roselli deliv.)
casinos of the Chicago 
under-ered the capsules to his contact never got a shot at Castr
assassination
at Miami Beach's 
Fontaine- though the CIA learned th.
Roselli's CIA contacts were 
bleau Hotel.
target of an unsuccessful CIA William Harvey and James
assassination 
plot.
O'Connell, who accompanied about the right time for the plot around the last of Februa
A 
couple of weeks later, just within range. This occt
last group reached a 
ro
The headlines couldn't have 
him on hush-hush trips to Miami to have been carried 
out, a re-first of March, 1963.
come at a worse time for Secreto line up the assassination port out of Havana 
said Castro
tary 
of State Henry 
A. Kissinger. teams. No one 
else was told, was ill. But he recovered in time
He is in the thick of "most deli-however, of the CIA's 
role in the to rout the Bay of Pigs invasion
cate negotiations," according to murder mission.
our White House sources, to re-
on April 17, 1961.
Roselli represented himself)
store some kind of diplomatic as an oilman seeking revenge plot and the invasion failed, the the pro-Castro movement
Although both the murder
relationship with Cuba. against Castro for his seizure of CIA 
continued trying to get rid had paid a mysterious call i
Actually, we reported as far oil holdings. The assassination of Castro. 
The Cuban who had the Cuban Embassy in Me
back 
as Jan. 18, 1971, that the weapons were also carefully se- 
sneaked the poison into Havana City a few weeks before
CIA had arranged six assassina-lected from foreign makes
, was never seen again. There-
tion attempts against Castro in mostly Belgian, to 
prevent any fore, the CIA, unsure whether
dreadful day in Dallas
the early 1960s. Now that the link to the United States
. .
Sources familiar with the
story 
has been revived, it might
the plotters had failed or the conspiracy can't shake a
Each attempt to kill Castro poison hadn't been
be useful to recount the details, was meticulously planned, like enough, decided to try again the Warren Commission's f
strong ging suspicion-unsupporte
The plot began as part of the an episode from the TV drama with a more 
powerful dose.
discredited Bay of Pigs opera- "Mission 
Impossible." For the
ings-that Castro may have
tion. 
The strategy was to elimi-[first try, the CIA furnished Ro- strength capsules to be slipped upon his life and, theref
Roselli arranged for triple-come aware of the US.
nate the Cuban leader before selli with special poison cap-into Castro's food 
several weeks may have recruited Oswal.
the CIA 
invasion force landed sules to slip into Castro's food.
on the island. 
Without the char
after the Bay of Pigs. But once retaliate against President h
The poison was supposed to again, the plot failed and the nedy.
ismatic Castro, it was thought, take 
three days to 
act. By the conspirators disappeared.
the defenders would become time Castro died, 
his system
Footnote: Sources fami
demoralized and 
disorganized. would throw off all traces of the made on Castro's life, thereafter CIA'S activities have now
Four more attempts were with the secret review of
To carry out the assassination, poison, so he would appear to using 
assassination teams knowledged that Castro, as
the CIA 
selected an underworld be the victim of a natural if mys-equipped 
with high-powered reported four years ago.
figure 
who 
could be disowned. terious ailment.
He was hawk-faced 
John Ro
rifles, explosives 
and two-way marked for assassination by
Roselli arranged with a Cu-
radios. 
Roselli personally made CIA. A CIA spokesman refu:
selli, identified in confidential ban
;, related to one of Castro's midnight 
powerboat dashes to to comment.
FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" chefs, to plant the deadly pel-
deliver the teams at secret land-
1975, United Feature Syndicate, Inc
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 459
NW 50955
>
Only a Ho-Hum Murder
By Russell Baker
The gangsters Sam Giancana and.
John Roselli who were associated with
the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch
Fidel Castro have now both been mur
dered after discussing their C.I.A. en-
terprise with the United States Senate,
and the police have pronounced the
incidents "gangland-style killings."
The phrase "gangland-style killing"
has the cozy resonance of "home-style.
cooking," perhaps because both sug-
gest the intimacy of hearth and fire
with nobody but us family gathered
round and nobody else welcome, Jack.
These family affairs are, of course,
meddled into by the constabulary, but
rarely with much enthusiasm.
This may be because police success
at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-
style killings" has never been such as
to get them into the world series of
detection, with the result that inces-
sant failure may have dulled their
appetite for the hunt.
Or, it may be because policemen
believe the subjects of "gangland-style
killings" aren't worth working over-
time for. I don't know, and I certainly
don't mean to impute either languor,
timidity or indifference to America's
homicide squads. I simply point out
that once a murder has been called
"gangland-style," apprehension of the
perpetrator almost invariably fails to
occur.
This raises the question whether
"gangland-style" murders might pos-
sibly be catching among people who
don't come from gangland. Consider
the Roselli case. The body is found in
the customary barrel, with the cus-
tomary weights, in the customary
water. It bears the customary bullet
holes. Roselli's publicized standing in
gangland seems to leave an open-and-
shut case, which the police will quietly.
shut as soon as possible...
If you and I know this, reader, does
it not follow that it is also known by,
let us say, some hot-tempered waiter
whom Roselli has been consistently
undertipping for years?
If that waiter wanted to take his
revenge and get away with it, is it
not logical that he would do it "gang-
land-style," so the police could forget
it, rather than by scalding Roselli to
death in public with a tureen of lobster
bisque?
This is not to suggest that the police
ought to be giving Roselli's waiters
the third degree, but merely to point
out that gangland can have no monop-
oly on "gangland-style killing." Any-
body with a barrel, some concrete and
a capacious expanse of water can.
engage in it, just as readily as your
'
.
corner greasy spoon can engage in
"home-style cooking."
The one special requirement is a
victim who is a bona fide citizen of
gangland. Obviously, a. philandering
husband cannot do in a loyal wife of
40 years "gangland-style" and expect
the police not to lift an eyebrow. Un-
less the subject is the real gangland
thing, it won't work.
gangland people are peculiarly vulner-
The corollary of this fact is that
able to "gangland-style" murder by
right to get away with it.
devious non-ganglanders, who have no
This must be infuriating to them.
Imagine that you are an eminent.
statesman of gangland, and the vexa-
tion becomes manifest. You are en-
tirely prepared to be sent off "gang-
land-style" by your colleagues. Those
are the rules of the land.
Moreover, if they complete the job,
you wouldn't dream of telling the po- :
lice who did it, even if you could. That
would violate the rules of the sports-
land, good sports don't tell.
manship governing gangland. In gang-
But to have some alien from the
outer world some straight-Jake cous-
in who wants his share of your will.
OBSERVER
prematurely, some barber who hates
your sideburns to have somebody like
this do the job on you and get away
with it because it's done "gangland-
style" Ah, my friend, that must seem
a cruel injustice.
Such a bad egg as that you would
surely betray to the cops. How infuri-
ating it would be if they looked at the
barrel, the concrete, the water, the
bullet holes and closed the case with
a quietly murmured, "Just another
gangland-style killing."
You will have been the victim, not
only of murder, but also of discrimina-
tion, for it is only your membership
your persecutor to justice.
in gangland that prevents the police
from extending themselves to bring
☐ I do not know how policemert feel
about nonmembers of gangland killing
gangland members "gangland-style,"
but my hunch is that they take a
sterner view of it than they do of
The average cop probably thinks it is
gangland men bumping off each other.
ought to be doing.
not the kind of thing decent people
I know very well that gangland folks
don't approve of it, and to make sure
that there is no misunderstanding, I
want to assure them that I haven't
the heart to swat a fly, myself, and,
what's more, I've never been any good
with concrete.
.
8/24/26
Ngành
Tuis
DocId: 32423630 Page 460
Only a Ho-Hum Murder
By Russell Baker:
The gangsters Sam Giancana and
John Roselli who were associated with
the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch
Fidel Castro have now both been mur.
dered after discussing their C.I.A. en-
terprise with the United States Senate,"
and the police have pronounced the
incidents "gangland-style killings."
The phrase "gangland-style killing"
has the cozy resonance of "home-style
cooking," perhaps because both sug-
gest the intimacy of hearth and fire
with nobody but us family gathered
round and nobody else welcome, Jack.
These family affairs are, of course,
meddled into by the constabulary, but
rarely with much enthusiasm.
This may be because police success
at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-
style killings" has never been such as
to get them into the world series of
detection, with the result that inces-
sant failure may have dulled their
appetite for the hunt.
Or, it may be because policemen
believe the subjects of "gangland-style
killings" aren't worth working over-
time for. I don't know, and I certainly
don't mean to impute either languor,
timidity or indifference to America's
homicide squads. I simply point out
that once a murder has been called
"gangland-style," apprehension of the
perpetrator almost invariably fails to
occur.
This raises the question whether
"gangland-style" murders might pos-
sibly be catching among people who
don't come from gangland. Consider
the Roselli case. The body is found in
the customary barrel, with the cus-
tomary weights, in the customary
water. It bears the customary bullet
holes. Roselli's publicized standing in
gangland seems to leave an open-and-
shut case, which the police will quietly
shut as soon as possible...
If you and I know this, reader, does
it not follow that it is also known by,
let us say, some hot-tempered waiter
whom Roselli has been consistently
undertipping for years?
If that waiter wanted to take his
revenge and get away with it, is it
not logical that he would do it "gang-
land-style," so the police could forget
it, rather than by scalding Roselli to
death in public with a tureen of lobster
bisque?
This is not to suggest that the police
ought to be giving Roselli's waiters
the third degree, but merely to point
out that gangland can have no monop-
oly on "gangland-style killing." Any-
body with a barrel, some concrete and
a capacious expanse of water can.
engage in it, just as readily as your
corner greasy spoon can engage in
"home-style cooking.”
The one special requirement is a
victim who is a bona fide citizen of
gangland. Obviously, a. philandering
husband cannot do in a loyal wife of
40 years "gangland-style" and expect
the police not to lift an eyebrow. Un-
less the subject is the real gangland
thing, it won't work.
The corollary of this fact is that
gangland people are peculiarly vulner-
able to "gangland-style" murder by
devious non-ganglanders, who have no
right to get away with it.
This must be infuriating to them.
Imagine that you are an eminent.
statesman of gangland, and the vexa-
tion becomes manifest. You are en-
tirely prepared to be sent off "gang-
land-style" by your colleagues. Those
are the rules of the land.
Moreover, if they complete the job,
you wouldn't dream of telling the po-
lice who did it, even if you could. That
would violate the rules of the sports-
manship governing gangland. In gang-
land, good sports don't tell.
But to have some alien from the
outer world some straight-Jake cous-
in who wants his share of your will
OBSERVER.
prematurely, some barber who hates
your sideburns-to have somebody like
this do the job on you and get away
Iwith it because it's done "gangland-
style" Ah, my friend, that must seem
a cruel injustice.
- Such a bad egg as that you would
surely betray to the cops. How infurt-
ating it would be if they looked at the
barrel, the concrete, the water, the
bullet holes and closed the case with
gangland-style killing."
a quietly murmured, "Just another
You will have been the victim, not
only of murder, but also of discrimina-
tion, for it is only your membership
in gangland that prevents the police
from extending themselves to bring
your persecutor to justice.
I do not know how policement feel
about nonmembers of gangland killing
gangland members "gangland-style,"
but my hunch is that they take a
sterner view of it than they do of
The average cop probably thinks it is
gangland men bumping off each other.
ought to be doing.
not the kind of thing decent people
don't approve of it, and to make sure
I know very well that gangland folks
that there is no misunderstanding, I
want to assure them that I haven't
☐ the heart to swat a fly, myself, and,
what's more, I've never been any good
with concrete.
8/24/20
Tunes
i
1
(
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 461
)
New York Time,
8/23/76'
Terrorist Activities
Charged to Cubans
By Police in Miami
WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI)|
-Militant pro-Castro and anti-1
Castro groups in the Miami
area are engaged in terrorist
activities both in and outside t
the United States, according to e
testimony given before a Šen-
ate subcommittee and released R
today.
น
The testimony came last May r
before a Judiciary subcommit-w
tee on internal security headed g
by Senator James O. Eastland, ar
Democrat of Mississippi. It said ri
that as many as 50 Cuban
groups of various shadings had th
been operating in Miami at any a
one time, many of them en-T
gaged in violent plots involving re
local actions and activities in m
Mexico, Central and South W
America and Cuba itself.
S
Lieut. Thomas Lyons, who D
has been with the Dade County o
Public. Safety Department forth
more than nine years, and Raul c
J. Diaz, of the department's or-d
ganized crime, terrorist and se-
curity unit, told of efforts to C
track down terrorist elements p
in the greater Miami area.
a
Lieutenant Lyons said most e
Cubans in the area were hard-c
working and industrious; but y
some individuals "use Dade e
County as a base for interna-
tional terrorism against allied
governments of Cuba, Cuban c
shipping, Communists, purporty
ed Communists and individuals]
who take a stand against their
terroristic-type tactics."
During the last two years,
Lieutenant Lyons said, there
have been four homicides "with,
strong indicators on each that
the motivations were political
in nature and terroristic, by de-
sign.".
Mr. Diaz said that some. Cas-
tro groups had infiltrated exile
organizations and that there
were plans to assassinate Latin-1.
American diplomats and for-t
eign ministers.
Lieutenant Lyons said his
unit received Information from
a confidential source early this
year that there would
attempt on the life of Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger
during his February visit to
Costa Rica.
The Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation and the Secret Service
were notified, he said. A well-
known fugitive exile, Orlando
Bosch, was jailed after illegally
entering Costa Rica. There no
incidents during the Kissinger)
visit.
He did not mention the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency's ef-
forts to use Cuban exiles in)
Florida and American gangsters
to kill 
Prime Minister Fidel Cas
tro.
Two weeks ago, the body of
an underworld figure, John)
Roselli was found stuffed in a
chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum
floating in a bay near Miami.
Mr. 
Roselli had testified last
year before the Senate Select
Committee on Intellegence Ac-
tivities 
that he and a Chicago
gangster, Sam Giancana, were
hired 
by the C.I.A. to recruit
Cubans 
to kill Mr. Castro. Mr.,
Giancana was shot and killed
by unknown persons last year)
just before 
he was testify be-
fore the 
Washington panel.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 462
The Boston Globe Monday, August 23, 1976
JACK ANDERSON
Plot to kill
Kissinger
blocked
WASHINGTON
19 *
retary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica six months
A reported plot to assassinate Sec-
ago was blocked by US and Costa Rican authorities four
days before it was supposed to be carried out.
We have pieced together the story from secret testimo-
ny before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and
from interviews with Cuban exiles and US intelligence
sources.
A Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch Avila was re-
ported to be gunning for Kissinger. The attempt on the
Secretary's life was expected, according to underground
reports, during his visit to Costa Rica last February.
Shortly before Kissinger's arrival, Bosch slipped into
Costa Rica on a false passport. But the FBI and Secret Ser-
vice had been alerted. They traced Bosch's movements and
notified the Costa Rican authorities. The suspected assas-
sin was arrested and clapped into a tiny jail cell four days
before Kissinger got to town.
The plot to kill Kissinger apparently grew out of his
overtures to improve relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro
back in 1972. This reportedly upset an anti-Castro terrorist
band, known as Cuban Action, which Bosch headed.
We reported part of the story two years later after a
lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and
Nov. 12, 1974, we warned that anti-Castro terrorists
planned an "assassination
men and businessmen who supported a... thaw." We noted.
against American congress-
that Kissinger had been in touch with Castro.
The first hint that Kissinger, himself, was one of the
targets came later from Carlos Rivero Collado, son of the
man elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1958. Rivero was
active in the anti-Castro underground in Miami's little.
Havana. But he later re-defected to Cuba where he gave a
fascinating interview.
"I have known privately since 1972," he said, "(about)
the plan to assassinate the US Secretary of State." He said
the plot had taken "certain form" by 1973 and had been
"actualized" by 1974.
Then, in a reference to our 1974 columns, he added:
"This fact which, I repeat, I've known privately, has been
corroborated by the US journalist Jack Anderson."
,
1
0
Rivero named Bosch as one of the 18 anti-Castro l
ers who had conspired to kill US and other leaders pron
ing a Cuban-American detente. Bosch already had b₁
convicted in 1968 of shelling a Polish freighter with a
zooka while it was moored in Miami. He jumped Fede.
parole and fled to Venezuela ir 1974.
Months later, he was reported to be in Curacao, pr
tected by Chilean gunmen. He bragged, according to th
reports, of his "money, friends and protection."
Florida's Dade County Public Safety Department, be
cause of the huge Cuban population in Miami, has excellen
ties throughout Latin America. In early 1976, the county':
terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, picked up some electri-
fying news.
He told the Senate Subcommittee about it in secret tes-
timony. "We received information from confidential sourc-
es," he swore, "that there was going to be an attempt on the
life of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger... We passed the
information on to the FBI, and they had also received the
information, and we notified the Secret Service, as they.
have the protective duty for the Secretary of State."
The plot was linked to Kissinger's two-day stay in Cos-
ta Rica, and Bosch was picked up and questioned. He was
held on a false passport charge until Kissinger was safely
out of the country.
Bosch later insisted: "My only crime was entering the
country with a false passport." Certainly, it was never.
proved in court that he hoped to knock off Kissinger. He is
now at large somewhere in Latin America.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 463

(
14
Slain Mobster Claimed
3/27/76
Cuban Link to JFK Death
By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers
Long before his recent murder,
John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld
recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Cas-
tro, had been privately claiming that
agents of the Cuban premier, in retall-
ation, were involved in the assassina-
tion of President John F. Kennedy.
Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connec-
tion to the Kennedy assassination was
expressed through his attorney, Ed-
ward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long
ago as March, 1967, and also in private
conversations with a longtime' associ
ate of Rosselli who participated in
meetings between Rosselli and the
CIA.
An FBI "blind memorandum" on
an interview with Morgan dated
March 21, 1967, was included, without
ROSSELLI, From Al
ance and the subsequent discovery of
his body in 
an oil drum in Florida
waters. The 
Washington Post, however,
has confirmed 
that Morgan and Rosselli
were the 
sources of the testimony that
suggested a 
Cuban role in the Ken-
nedy murder
.
Morgan's account, according to a.
summary of 
the FBI interview, was
that Rosselli 
had reached his conclu-
ision about a 
Cuban connection to the
Kennedy
"feedback" furnished by sources close
from
Sto Castro who 
were involved in the CIA
* plots to 
assassinate the Cuban leader.'
2
assassination
"His (Morgan's) clients were aware
of 
the identity of 
some of the individ
tuals who 
came to the United States
for this 
purpose and he understood
*
that two such 
individuals were now in:
the state of New 
Jersey," the FBI in-
terview 
summary stated.`
A long-time associate of Rosselli
"who was interviewed separately by
The Washington 
Post, said there was
no question 
in the slain mobster's
mind that 
Président Kennedy was
killed on Castro's 
behalf in reprisal
for the CIA 
schemes against the Cu
ban leader.
"He was positive; he was sure." said
the 
associate
, who knew Rosselli well.
and was 
in contact with him before
Rosselli 
disappeared from his Florida
home on July 
28. The associate, who
does not 
want to be identified pub-
licly, is 
scheduled to be interviewed
this week by 
Dade County, Fla., homi-.
'
cide 
detectives. He was a party to Ros-
selli's contacts 
in the early 1960s with
CIA case 
officers overseeing the at-
tempts to 
assassinate Castro.
Despite occasional speculation, the
collective conclusion of all official
U.S. 
government investigations into
the Kennedy 
assassination-including
the Warren 
Commission, the FBI and
the CIA 
has been that there was no
evidence 
that implicated the Castro
'
government 
or any of its agente
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 464
identification of the interviewee. in
last June's Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee's report on the role of the in-
telligence community in the Kennedy
assassination investigation.
Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli
and another Morgan client had in-
formed him that Castro became aware
of CIA assassination conspiracies
against him and "thereafter employed
teams of individuals who were dis.
patched to the United States for the
purpose of assassinating Mr. Ken-
nedy."
Because neither Morgan nor Ros-
selli was identified in the Senate re-
port, the significance of that portion
of the 106-page document was dis
counted at the time it was published
in 
June, before Rosselli's disappear-
See ROSSELLI, A8, Col. 1
However, the CIA's involvement in
the schemes to assassinate Castro
was not divulged to the Warren Com-
mission, and knowledge of them was
confined until 1967 to a small, elite
circle of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity. President Johnson apparently.
first 
learned about the schemes only
after a March 7, 1967, column by the
late Drew Person, which prompted.
Johnson to order a CIA investigation
of the highly sensitive episode..
Full details of the CIA-underworld
collusion in the plots to kill Castro
did not surface publicly until the pub-
lication last year of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee's assassination re-
port and the ensuing report last June
on the possible role of the intelligence
agencies in the Kennedy assassination
and investigation.
"
The body of Rosselli, who lived
lamboyantly in a world of mobsters,
politicians and playgirls, was found
two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum
Weighted with chains but buoyed by
gases from decomposition on the
ocean's surface off the coast of Miami..
The specific cause of death was deter-
mined by an autopsy to be asphyxia-
tion.
Last year, an underworld colleague
of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana,
ho also had been recruited by the
CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was
found shot to death in his Chicago!
home in what police described as a
Highly professional job by assailants
who penetrated the mobster's per-
sonal security screen. Giancana was
due to testify before the Senate Intel-
Egence Committee shortly after his
demise.
Neither murder has been solved.
The possibility that Rosselli's mur-
der might have been related to his
Senate testimony on the CIA schemes
o kill Castro has brought the FBI
into the investigation at the request
of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.
Washington
103
+
Donespally Santos Traileante
Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana
gambling enterprises fell hostage in
1959 to the Cuban revolution-in plots
against Castro had been a closely held
secret within the top echelons of the
CLA and FBI until recently.
The tangled chronology of suppres
gion and eventual disclosure, although
detailed in the June report, has re-
erived little public attention. Rossel-
ti's murder, adds significance to those
Events.
ין
Here is the sequence, pieced to-
gether from the testimony given to
Senate intelligence investigators:
Columnist Drew Pearson went to
the late Chief Justice of the United
States Earl Warren late in January,
1967, and told him that a Washington
lawyer had confided to him that 
one
of his clients said the United 
States
"had attempted to assassinate 
Fidel
Castro in the early 1960s and 
Castro
had decided to retaliate."
Warren declined Pearson's sugges-
tion that he see the lawyer, who was
Edward Morgan. Warren referred 
the
matter to then Secret Service 
Direc
tor James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13,
1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar 
Ho-
over, informing him of the allegations..
Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six
senior bureau officials on an "eyes-
only" basis. There is no record of FBI
meetings or discussions of those alle-
gations. At that point the sensitive 
let-
ter bounced back and forth 
in the
higher reaches of the FBI bureauc-
racy.
The job of responding to Rowley's
letter was assigned to the supervisor
of the FBI's General Investigative 
Di-
vision who was given responsillity for
the overall assassination investigation
in March 1964.
was
☐
This official's job was complicated
by the fact that he had never been in-
'formed of what Hoover and his closest
circle of confidants in the FBI learned:
early in 1962-that the CIA
involved in assassination
deeply
attempts against Castro, and promi-
nent American underworld figures, 
in-
cluding Rosselli and Giancana, had
been recruited for the attempts.
So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official
prepared a draft reply to the Rowley
letter for his superiors saying "our 
in-
vestigation uncovered, no evidence 
in-
dicating Fidel Castro officials 
of the
Cuban Government were involved.
with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assas
sination of President Kennedy. This
bureau is not conducting any investi-
gation regarding this matter." 
The
FBI official added in later testimony
that "everyone in the higher echelons
read this "
Drew Pearson went ahead and pub-
lished a column on March 7, 1967
, ref
..
erring to reports that CIA schemes
against Castro's life in 1963 "
may
have resulted in a counterplot by Cas-
tro to assassinate President 
Kenne-
dy."
elab Brector Cartha
DeLoach with
message that "the
President had intructed that the FBI
interview (Mo) concerning any
knowledge he ht have regarding
the assassination of President Ken-
nedy.
DeLoach toli Vatson that it ap
peared Morgand not want to be in-
terviewed, and en if he was inter-
viewed he would probably not divulge
the identity of his sources . . .
." Wat.
son persisted, however.
"Under the circumstances," De-
Loach concluded in a memo for the
files, "it appears that we have no
al
ternative but to interview (Morgan)
and then furnish the results to Wat-
son in blind memorandum form."
The interview was assigned to two
agents from the FBI's General Investi-
gative Division, which the Senate
committee concluded was "puzzling"
because it was the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division which had been as-
signed responsibility for investigating
possible foreign involvement in the
assassination.
Neither agent was privy to the
knowledge, confined to Hoover and
his top aides, of the CIA's assassina-
tion plots against Castro. Both agents
testified eight years later that they.
were "surprised" when 
Morgan al-
luded during the interview 
to U.S. at-
tempts to assassinate 
Castro.
they
"These agents stated that
the lawyer's
evaluate
could not
(Morgan's) allegations or question him,
in detail on 
them, since they had not
been briefed on the CIA 
assassination
efforts," the Senate 
committee ob-
served.
On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Wash-
ington Field Office sent 
headquarters
ten copies of a blind 
memorandum
summarizing the interview 
with Mor-
gan.
In a Senate Intelligence Committee
summary of the FBI 
interview, Mor-
gan was reported to 
have acknowl-
edged that his clients 
were "on the
,
fringe of the underworld
" and that
they faced "possible 
prosecution in a
crime not related to the assassination
"
Morgan said his clients "were called
upon by a governmental 
agency to as-
sist in a project which 
was said to.
have the highest 
governmental ap
proval. The project had as its 
purpose
the assassination of 
Fidel Castro.
Elaborate plans were made, 
including
the infiltration of the 
Cuban Govern-
ment and the placing of 
informants
within key posts in Cuba.
"
Morgan also told the FBI. according
to the summary, that 
Castro had em-
ployed "teams of 
individuals who
were dispatched to 
the United States
for the purpose of assassinating 
Presi-
dent Kennedy."
8/23/76 Washin
Püst
70/3
It was not clear then-nor is it to-
day why Morgan came forward at:
that time to bring Rosselli's story to
the ears of the nation's highest law
enforcement authorities.
.
It may be relevant that Rosselli had
serious legal problems at the time.
In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to
deport him for living in the United
✓ States under an assumed name unless
he cooperated in an investigation of
the Mafia (his true name was Filippo
✓ Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA
contact from the anti-Castro conspir
acy days, CIA security director Col.
Sheffield Edwards, who informed the
FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep
was
square with the bureau" but
afraid that the mob might kill him for.
talking.
. 1
In 1967, after he was arrested for
gambling fraud at the Friars Club in
Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his
former CIA case officer, William Har.
vey, who sought unsuccessfully to in-
tercede in the prosecution.
It was against this background that
Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson,
and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sen-
sational allegations of CIA plotting
against Castro and the Cuban counter-
espionage directed against President
Kennedy.
Last April Rosselli told the Senate
Intelligence Committee he had no rec-
ollection of either receiving informa-
tion that Castro retaliated against
President Kennedy or of having dis-;
cussed it with Morgan. This meant ei-
ther that Rosselli suffered a dramatic
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 465
a pure invention, a serious risk
established Washington lawyer.
Isa ommittee source could explain
fle discrepancy, and Morgan declined
confirm that Rosselli was the client
in question or to discuss either his
allegations against the Cuban govern-
monthis recent testimony.
The internal FBI memo on the 1967
interview with Morgan was sent to
headquarters with a transmittal slip
saying: "No further investigation is
being conducted by the Washington
field office unless it is advised to the
contrary by the Bureau."
The Senate intelligence committee,
in commenting on this position, said
that "had the interviewing agents
known of the CIA-underworld plots
against Castro, they would have been
aware that the lawyer had clients who
had been active in the assassination
plots."
On March 21, FBI headquarters for-
warded the Washington field office
memo to the White House, the attor-
ney general and the Secret Service. It
did not recommend any further in-
vestigation of Morgan's allegations.
On the evening of the following
day. President Johnson called CIA Di-
rector Richard M. Helms to the White
House. The next morning, March 23,
Helms ordered the CIA inspector gen-
eral to prepare a report on the CIA
involvement in the assassination plots
-Operation Mongoose-of 'which
Helms had full knowledge at the time
they were executed.
By May 22, Helms briefed President
Johnson on the results. There is, how-
ever. no evidence that Helms briefed
the President on the November, 1963,
plot one of eight major schemes on
Castro's life from 1960 to 1965-to as-
sassinate the Cuban leader through
the employment of an agent with the
cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity
was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a
* 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access
to Castro.
CIA operatives turned over assassi-
nation equipment to Cubela during a
Paris meeting on November 22, 1963-:
the day President Kennedy was killed
in Dallas. There has been subsequent
speculation that the mercurial and
talkative Cubela was either a double
agent or being monitored by Cuban
intelligence.
During the later days of his presi-
dency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically
of a "Caribbean Murder Incorpo
rated" targeted against Fidel Castro.
The inspiration for that statement un-
doubtedly was the CIA inspector gen-
eral's report he ordered Helms to have
prepared.
8/22/76
Washington Post
30f3
The Washington Post that she re-
ceived a call after Rosselli's disappear.
ance in late July warning her that Cu-
bans appeared to be attempting to
wipe out all those who participated in
the anti-Castro plots.
The call, she said, came from an old
friend who was acquainted with Ros-
selli's sister, whose name is Edith Dai-
gle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle
told the mutual acquaintance that the
Rosselli family had received a tele-
phone threat from unidentified Cu-
bans prior to Rosselli's disappearance.
She also 
said that Rosselli had gone to
meet the Cubans in an effort to pro-
tect his family.
Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by
The Washington Post. But another sis-
ter of Rosselli said she had heard of
no such threats or warnings.
Harvey, who died at age 60 and
whose exploits as a clandestine opera-
tor are both legendary and controver-
'
sial 
within the agency, testified to the
Senate Intelligence Committee. He
had become Rosselli's case officer in
Operation Mongoose and supplied the
mobster with poison pills, explosives,
detonators, rifles, handguns, radios
and boat radar for transmission to
Within the past year, Rosselli and
two of his co-conspirators in the Cas-
tro assassination schemes have died,
Giancana at the hands of a profes-
sional hit man and Harvey as the re-
sult of a "massive heart attack" last anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and
June.
Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of
the deceased CIA official, said she
suspected no foul play in her hus
band's death. She did, however, tell
4 1
"
Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to
the Senate committee, "developed a
close 
friendship."
Another CIA official who worked
with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was
asked 
if he knew whether the agency
transmitted information to the mob-
ster on possible Cuban involvement in
the Kennedy assassination. He replied
that he 
was out of the country at the
time Kennedy was killed, and had no
further comment..
"
Two months before the Kennedy as-
sassination; Lee Harvey Oswald, who
was identified by the Warren Commis-
sion as Kennedy's murderer, had trav-
eled to Mexico City in an attempt to
gain entry to Cuba. According to the
Warren Commission, Oswald repre-
'
sented 
himself as the head of the New
Orleans branch of the Fair Play for
Cuba organization and a friend of the
Cuban Revolution.
Some three months before Kennedy
was killed, Castro told Associated
Press reporter Daniel Harker that
U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to
eliminate 
Cuban leaders would them.
• selves not be safe.
A U.S. government committee coor-
dinating policy, toward Cuba at the
time 
agreed, there is a strong liklihood
that 
Castro would retaliate in some.
fashion
. However, it concluded Castro
would not risk a major confrontation
with 
the U.S. by attacking U.S. lead-
ers.
On the same day Kennedy was as-
sassinated, a CIA officer met with a
high-ranking Cuban official, who had
said he would kill Castro, to tell him
the 
U.S. would provide him with ex-
plosives and a poison pen device.
While the Senate Intelligence Com
mittee said it found no evidence suffi.
cient to justify a conclusion that the
Kennedy assassination was part of a
conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies
did not properly investigate the assas-
sination or tell the Warren Commis-
sion about the CIA plots on Castro's
life.
"There is no indication that the FBI
or the CIA directed the interviewing
of Cuban sources or sources within
the Cuban exile community," the Sen-
ate 
committee said.
According to a former FBI official
in charge of key aspects of the FBI's
probe of the Kennedy murder, the
what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or
FBI never satisfactorily determined
what he had done in Russia.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 466
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
DEPA
*
*
*
JUST
BURRAU OF
62-116395
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
February 24, 1976
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
Reference is made to SSC letter to the U. S.
Department of Justice dated January 14, 1976,
requesting access to certain material and delivery of
other material maintained by the FBI.
Pursuant to request item numbered 17, we
currently have one abstract covering the areas of
inquiry available for review at FBI Headquarters by
approved personnel of the Committee.
零零
Pursuant to request item numbered 18, we were
not able to locate a copy of a cable dated on or about
November 28, 1963, from Director, FBI, to Director,
CIA, regarding interrogation of witnesses concerning
Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City.
We are,
however, furnishing a copy of an FBI to CIA teletype
dated November 27, 1963, captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald,'
which advises that the interrogation of Oswald between
his arrest and murder had not extended to his travel to
Mexico or his contacts with Soviet establishments.
The
teletype, classified "Secret," also contains details
from an Oswald letter to the Soviet Embassy,
Washington, D. C., which were obtained from a highly
sensitive source.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 467
SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)
We are also furnishing 3 Bureau memoranda in
response to the latter part of request item 18 asking
for all memoranda prepared between November 22, 1963,
and December 30, 1963, which relate to the interrogation
of witnesses concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City,
including his visits to the Soviet Embassy and Cuban
Consulate.
0
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 468
DEPARTM
NT
DOSONA
OF JUS
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
FEB 26 1976
Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Church:
Transmitted herewith is a memorandum with SECRET
enclosures prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
in response to the request in Items 17 and 18 of a letter
dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your
Committee staff.
Sincerely,
Michel
MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Vorig tates → Admin
Ly
Cy
→ Wallach
Blic
MERICAN REVO
WY 1776-1976"
REVOLUTION
ON BICENT
Tissue
-
Chimn
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 469
☐
1976 TER 27 A 11:41
LEE ON
ACHINES
:
3122 PT. TO PANCH
130
SECRET
2
TO
DIRECTOR
FROH
MEXICO CITY.
31.
ROUDING
141
اتا
اد
ACTION, WH B. (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1535 25 NOV CJ)
INFO
* DOP, CI, Ci/CPS, FI, SR 7, SAS 8, va
MICROFILMED
FEB 31964
692. MICRO: SER.
2367682
SECRET 251954Z
IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7050
REDCAP
REF MEXI 6868
CIN
iP
000 092
60046) *
ACCORDING LIFIRE DIP COURIERS REF LEFT MEXI FOR CUBA 12 NOV VIA
CUBANA 465, RETURNED MEXI 18 NOV VIA CUBANA. ACCORDING LIENVOY,
THEY PROBABLY LEFT FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOV VIA AERONAVES FLT
451. ANANYEV (PHONETIC) OF SOV CONSULATE NEW YORK PHONED. SOVEMB
23 NOV ASKING FOR INFO ON WHICH FLIGHT COURIERS TAKING, COMMENT;
THIS ONLY INFREQUENTLY OCCURS. ASST CONSUL KOSTIKOV HANDLED THE
CALL FROM NEW YORK.
SECRET
c/s COMMENT: * ALEKSEY PAPKOV AND VALENTIN PONOMAREV, SCN.DIP COURIERS ARRIVED
MEXI 10 NOV.
D-201-291579 (cefiled.)
9
ROUTING INITIAL
RID/AN
RID/MIS
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RID/PS
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la
CROSS FILE COPY FOR
RID/FI
201- 287248
201-223333
DO NOT DESTROY
SECRET
C-171
1389
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REPRODUCTION
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of
: 3.
BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
Copy No.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 470
ONS
IDEN 4
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EXT
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DATE :25 NO7 63
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
DY SECRET
LE IN CS FILE NO. 200-3-5
3
TO
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONF: WH 8
INFO: DOP, CI, CI/OPS, SR 7, SAS 8, VR
2.1D
12-62
ROUTING
5
6
20 by 63 15 232
ROUTINE
TO
FBI
INFO
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS
CITE DIR 85676
1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR TELETYPE OF 2 NOVEMBER 1963
CONCERNING THE TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS VALENTI
GERMANOVICH PONOMAREV AND ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH POPKOV.
2. ACCORDING TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY, PONOMAREV
AND POPKOV LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CUBA ON 12 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA 465
AND RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY ON 18 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA.
3. A. USUALLY RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THEY
PROBABLY LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOVEMBER VIA AERONAVES
FLT 451. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT ONE "ANANYEV" (PHONETIC) OF
THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN NEW YORK CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXI
CITY ON 23 NOVEMBER AND REQUESTED INFORMATION ON WHICH FLIGHT THE
COURIERS WERE TAKING. ASSISTANT CONSUL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKO
PROVIDED THE INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CI
RECEIVED FROM
JAN 23 1976
CIA
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
Cowngrading and
declassification
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
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UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :
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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.
TO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO :
TO
12-62
POUTING
1
4
2
5
3
PAGE 2
See Sanitized File
Inumber
For sterile copy of this document.
INFO
DEFERRED.
ROUTINE
CITE DIR
05076
4.
"ANANYEV" IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEORGIY ANANYEVICH
ANANYET OF THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
END OF MESSAGE
BASED ON:
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CI/LIAN 23 1376
SING FACER
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REPRODUCTION
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IDEN 58
SR/CI/K
C/WH/3
IDEN4
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
IDEN 14
C/WH/R
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
OTHER THAN THE ISSUING. OFFICE.
downgrading
declassification
PROHIBITED.
AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER
Copy No.
-
SECRET EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 9, 1964
Сиси
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro
Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the
Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine con-
tinuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish
to review.
(1)
The three operations involved are:
a commando sabotage operation against a coastal
warehouse and pier;
(2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in
a harbor; and
(3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding
in coastal waters.,
All of these operations would have been approved three months ago,
and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted
because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise
level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the
small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December
which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation
approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it
seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review
of the Cuban problem).
The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small
sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we
call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thus
have an opportunity to choose.
I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.
I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle
I know that Rusk has never liked it
of covert sabotage against Cuba.
and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA
are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the
Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,
SECRET. - EYES ONLY
Copy
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 473
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

SECRET EYES ONLY
-2-
Jan. 9, 1964
but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position
I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal,
ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish
to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.
McG. B.
SECRET - EYES ONLY
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 474
MEMORANDUM
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJ:
Background
SÉCRET
TAB H
Senator Hart (Colorado) and Senator Schweiker
Jim Johnston
Dan Dwyer
Ed Greissing
January 27, 1976
Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation
of JFK Assassination
The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the
Amlash operation might have had some effect on CIA's response to
the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. On January
9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and
after a delay which was not explained, the staff was permitted to
review the file on January 23 and 26.
Summary of Amlash File
Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with
case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruc-
tion in secret writing and explosives. Interest in Amlash continued
after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA
agents until mid-1963. Why there was a year lapse in contact with Am-
lash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962
undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.
*
In any event, DIR 48198" to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that
Amwhip, a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of
an "activation effort to reluctant dragon.' Presumably, Amlash was
"reluctant dragon" and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA.
"
In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban
officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil. He cabled Amwhip
about his arrival on August 29. This cable apparently was the signal
that he was prepared to meet Amwhip in Porto Alegre.
Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre
between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to
the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of
meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session.
CIA messages tell a different story. Porto Alegre 0704 to DIR of 7
September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he felt there were only two
ways of getting rid of Castro. The first was an invasion by U.S.
forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was
an "inside job." Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action.
He referred to the explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier
as "too cumbersome" for his purposes.
* DIRs are messages sent from Langley.
SLUINCH
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At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters
cabled on 9 September that, based on what little feel Headquarters
had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should
be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own co-
horts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist
him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage
and more serious matters on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Porto
Alegre, JMWAVE and Rio.)
On 11 September, Porto Alegre 0708 to DIR summarized the intel-
ligence information Amlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying
all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left
Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe.
A document in the file dated 16 September and marked OFPA 72775
appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means.
There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but
it probably is in the Cuban Embassy in Paris.
"Mary:
· Moreno:
Betty:
I don't want to imagine things but
this thing of Amlash.
It is either a tremendous secret or a
top secret matter (unreadable) then the
word "treason" or "reason").
I believe it is a top secret matter."
By letters of September 14 and September 16, Amlash stayed in
contact with Amwhip. Paris station apparently was picking up responsi-
bility for Amlash at this time, since Paris 0706 to DIR dated 19
September asks for some background material on Amlash.
On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of
an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group
as well as a communist group. The message also notes that Fidel is
allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them
in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba.
Nevertheless, Amwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash
and is assigned to accompany him around Europe. According to Paris
0934 to DIR dated 7 October, Amlash met with case officer 0* on 5
October. Case officer ○ sat and listened permitting Amlash to get
everything off his chest. Amlash seemed to be complaining about the
low level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September
meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role. Case officer
O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and
that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)"'"
"With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash con-
* The files do not accurately identify these case officers.
and
however, were the principal case officers.
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لا كارتات
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siderably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating
his desire 
return Cuba to undertake the big job:'
On October 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer O met with
Amlash and Amwhip on 13 October. Although the case officer had been
forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's
request for a high level meeting. "Amlash convinced that if such meet
does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out
again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite
decision. Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many
Cubans would refuse to see a major" such as Amlash. The message notes
the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest
target level which believe we cannot afford overlook."
This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's
role. DIR 75683 to London on 15 October directed case officer 0 to
return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case.
The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case
officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative
of RFK. He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that
the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-
communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban
leadership and which assumed significant control to invite the U.S.
to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S. support could come only
after a 
successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel,
the military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would
disintegrate. He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussion
but desired to know what technical support he could get.
Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was
asked about Amlash's reaction to the meeting.. His reactions are
summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 Novem-
ber. Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.S.
government. While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not
at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical
assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not under-
stand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised
a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave
much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions
against Cuban coastal targets. Amlash had accepted the fact he had to
work with the CIA, but CIA might lose him if it continued to procrastin->
ate. "Amlash talked about going to the French terrorist organization,
the OAS, but realized that was not feasible. The memorandum ends with
what apparently is the author's conclusion: "It is hoped that he does
realize that Havana must first be taken.
or failing that, a
truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which
could be true rallying point."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 477
SECRET
SECRET
In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized
the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash. Amlash was to
be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup.
He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18
and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters
had approved giving Amlash scopes and rifles and other equipment. The
memo ended by stating that "C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash
operation be kept to a minimum.
11
Pari 1564 to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called
on the night of November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return to
Cuba in order to see case officer 0 "if it something interesting.'
" The
CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but that it was
to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to
give Amlash the "technical support" he felt he had not been promised in
the 29 October meeting.)
Case officer O flew from the U.S. so as to arrive in Paris on the morn-
ing of November 22 for this meeting.
Pari 1607 to DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November
is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting
had taken place. It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to
Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that
day.
The file contains no outgoing cable to Paris on November 23 or
any other time telling Paris to break contact with Amlash.**
On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason
to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages
and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash. The first two pages
have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon.
The type on the third page is much lighter as though prepared on a
typewriter with an old ribbon. It made no mention of the passing
of a poison pen to Amlash.
On November 27, Pari 1669 to DIR reports information obtained
in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices. A source com-
plained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they
denigrate the revolution. The source said she wished she had a con-
cealed tape recorder to record these conversations. She named Amlash
as one of these visitors.
* Desmond Fitzgerald
** In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent
but could not be found.
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SECRET
-5-
"
On 3 December, Headquarters furnished JMWAVE some details on the
Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S.
support if he is successful in a real coup against the Castro regime.'
He was also promised arms which will have to be furnished through
JMWAVE's operations.
A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE
on December 6, 7, and 8. Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE
authority to drop a cache of arms in Cuba. Then Headquarters called
off the operation. In DIR 87615 of 7 December, it is noted "major
top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which
should provide basis for decision."
JMWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8
December. JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message
indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher author-
ity but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be de-
layed and not run in December.
☐
Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure
was to present infiltration operation plans to "higher authority"
even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed
or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation. "This procedure
will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirma-
tion needed when previously relaxed operation finally mounted." Head-
quarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating
objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others. "Believe by
January, CIA should be in position better evaluate status of internal
assets.
"
By Pari 1914 of 13 December, Paris reported that Amlash left
Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case
officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio
on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December.
The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December
1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information
relevant to the October-November activities. Nevertheless, in red pen
on the cover page appears: "Dec 1963 Not to leave this office on Nestor's
(Sanchez) orders." followed by initials that appear to be "GM."
One later document in the Amlash file contains more information
about the November 22, 1963 meeting. That document, a rough draft of
a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found)
appears to have been prepared in 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest
for a later plot against Castro. It states: "22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald
and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him every-
thing he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted).
The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meet-
ing to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because
of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this
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SECRE
CORET
Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader
(including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt. This
included the following. "We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope
nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift
a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro."
The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash
in November 1964 by Mr. Sanchez.
Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash
through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966.
Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to the September-
November 1963 Amlash operation. Several such documents report informa-
tion received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of
Amlash's plots against him. For example, Amlash's one time Cuban
mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her
brother was known to be with Cuban intelligence. Pari 8242 to DIR
in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too
many Cubans. And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known
double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's
Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intel-
ligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban
%
exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important opera-
tions. Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any
detailed analysis of these possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash
operation, although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one re-
port rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro.
One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers
gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given
a poison pen for self-protection. That document reports that Amlash,
and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for
self-protection throughout their travel in Europe.
Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA
files to determine what other operations Castro might have been re=
ferring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates
that some coastal landings of supplies in August were the only other
CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period.
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SECRET
Scenario for B-9
This doctrine is based on the proposition that
the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live
with a Castro/communist regime in Cuba which continues
its present course of subversion and aggression in Latin
America and that we are determined to take appropriate
action to put an end to these acts.
1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before
the OAS hold out for a "blank check" resolution. Settle
for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian,
or Chilean support.
2. If, despite 1. above, OAS waters down resolu-
tion, vote against the watered-down version.
3°
If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed
to 5. below.
4. If watered-down resolution passed over our
protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents
an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the
United States must unilaterally declare (see 5. below).
5. Declare publicly that further aggression and
subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable
to the United States and, in the event of a new act on the
part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 481
arms cache, the U.S. will take such measures against
the Castro/communist regime in Cuba as it deems appro-
priate in the circumstances.
6. Explain carefully through diplomatic
channels to the Soviet Union that the United States
finds the present behavior of the Castro/communist
regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in
Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts
of violence of comparable danger or potential danger
on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no
longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion or
other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in
order to reduce tensions in the Caribbean and permit
the U.S. to live peacefully with the Castro/communist
regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained
from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain
to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort
by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures.
Point out to the Soviet Union the physical vulnerability
of Cuba as well as the effect a failure to resolve the
Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which
the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the
Soviets' European satellites. Make it plain that the U.S.
desires peace in the Caribbean and expects the Soviet
Union to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro.
Copy
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 482
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
3
7. Decide upon the type of action on the part
of Castro which would trigger action on the part of the
U.S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would
represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the
stability of a Latin American state. By this criterion
20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced
into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger,
whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central American
country might. The judgment can be unilateral and
subjective on the part of the U.S.
8. Formulate a program for a post-Castro Cuba
giving full weight to the real changes which have taken
place there during the past five years and full recog-
nition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished
revolution into constructive lines.
The above scenario should not be commenced unless
it is recognized that, although these actions are
primarily designed to deter Castro from his present course,
he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such
circumstances the U.S., having publicly embarked on the
doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences.
Copy
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 483
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

3.
Advantages
Probably feasible
within OAS.
a.
b.
Surveillance com-
pletely legal and
low noise level.
b.
Disadvantages
Does not attack prin-
cipal problem of
Castro's subversion
in Latin America.
Castro may return to
policy of non-shipment
C.
of arms.
Probably will not result
in apprehending arms
carriers.
d. Expensive.
6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above,
engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting
π
"autonomous exile groups and continue to encourage
internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and
leaflet campaigns.
Advantages
a. Some economic advan-
tages and limited
encouragement to
anti-Castro senti-
bi
ment.
Deniability by U.S.
as U.S. soil and
personnel not used.
a.
Disadvantages
Results commensurate
with limited skills of
exile groups.
b. Though fact of U.S.
support carefully
guarded, Castro will
blame U.S. anyway.
C..
Some noise level.
7. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5. and 6. above,
engage in soft sabotage operations employing CIA-controlled
Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced
intervals.
Advantages
a More professional
operations that are
targetted and con-
trolled.
8.
Disadvantages
Constant danger of proof
of U.S. involvement.
NW 50955
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Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
b.
Improvement of morale
b.
among internal anti-
Castro elements.
Continued exacerbation
of Castro without chance
of delivering a mortal
blow.
Better domestic poli-
tical position as
result of increased
noise level.
8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7.
above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban
exile maritime raids and air strikes against Cuba from
U.S. territory.
Advantages
Disadvantages
Improvement of exile
a.
morale and internal
General ineffectiveness
against targets.
resistance spirit.
b.
Obvious employment of
U.S. soil.
Air strikes however
ineffective begin to
arouse Soviet response.
B.
Can't Live with Castro
(It is assumed that maximum intelligence collection
will be continued.)
1. Engage in CIA-controlled as well as "autonomous"
covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact
but higher risk targets such as Santiago refinery,
Matanzas power plant, etc., employing Cuban personnel
only.
a
b.
Advantages
This essentially minimum
plan evolved June 1963,
but never permitted to
develop, having some
chance to overthrow
Castro.
Measurable economic impact
and strong encouragement.
to anti-Castro elements.
Disadvantages
a
High risk of capture
and exposure,
High noise level.
C.
SECRET
Possibility of some
Soviet response.
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 485
1
DECRET
6
2.
Institute an economic denial program based upon
the establishment of a "Proclaimed List" under the Trading
with the Enemy Act together with all other feasible actions,
overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its
economy.
Advantages
Considerable increase
in Cuba's difficulty in
procuring key imports.
b. U.S. obviously "doing
something about Castro."
a.
Disadvantages
c.
Multiplication of U.S.
problems with major allies
including possible loss of
allies' support of U.S.
dollar.
Loss of trade.
Will not assure overthrow
of Castro.
3. Engage in sabotage operations as in B.l. above
using not only Cuban but other nationalities including
U.S. soldier of fortune teams.
Advantages
Improved operations and
greater economic damage.
a.
b.
Disadvantages
Technical deniability
only and very high
noise level.
Will not assure over-
throw of Castro..
4. Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable
sabotage activities, using U.S. service personnel where
necessary, such as mining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban
shipping on the high seas and in the harbors using drone
surface craft, sneak air attacks on key installations, etc.
Advantages
Disadvantages
Much more effective opora-
tions and real economic
damage.
a.
No deniability.
b.
Very high noise level.
If does not result
NW 50955
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rapidly in fall of
Castro, will result in
Bay of Pigs type of
criticism,
DECRET
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
i
SECRET
7
5. U.S. unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban
shipping
, ostensibly for the 
purpose of preventing
export of arms to Latin America 
with the aim of humi-
liating and degrading Castro
.
Advantages
Proof of U.S. intention
to stop Castro.
a.
.
Disadvantages
Will probably not catch
contraband.
If vigorously pursued
against all Cuban
shipping, may provoke
Soviet response.
Very expensive without
assuring fall of Castro.
6. Cutoff of all communications (except radio) into
and 
out of Cuba including a 
clandestine cutting of the
Jamaica cable.
Advantages
Will at least for a
period disrupt Cuba's
diplomatic and economic
offensive and hinder
subversive efforts.
•
b.
Disadvantages.
Considerable outcry
from Europe and Latin
America.
Not fatal to Fidel.
7. A Presidential public declaration making clear
that 
the U.S. considers the 
continued presence of the
Castro regime as intolerable, 
barring any rapprochement
with it and encouraging anti-Castro
/communist dissident
elements within the Cuban armed 
forces to carry out a coup.
Advantages
Very effective inside Cuba
and encouraging to Latin
America.
Disadvantages
Must be followed by some
form 
of effective action.
Copy
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 487
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
SEGRET
8. An official declaration that should Castro
engage in certain specified proscribed actions the
U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation
inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine")..
b.
Advantages
May force Castro to
stop his subversive
actions.
Whether retaliation by
the U.S. is required
or not, it will have
profound effect on
anti-Castro morale.
Disadvantages
May provoke Soviet
response either before
or after retaliatory
action taken.
Difficulty in pinning
b.
down clear-cut viola-
tions by Castro.
C.
Difficulty in avoiding
civilian casualties.
9.
Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union
through high level diplomatic channels that further sub-
version by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and
that if Castro persists in his present course the United
States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions
against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as
it deems appropriate.
See Annex A.
Advantages
Disadvantages
3.
Proper basis for
a.
future actions.
Difficulty of clear
proof.
b.
Possible deterrence
b.
Possible Soviet
reactions.
of Castro.
c.
Best method of mini-
mizing Soviet reaction.
10.
After having established the appropriate basis
for such action, impose a total blockade of Cuba.
Advantages
The most effective method
of bringing down Castro.
Disadvantages
Possible Soviet reactions.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 488
SECRET
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
SEGRET
9
11.
After having established the appropriate basis
for such action, invade Cuba.
Advantages
Will bring down Castro.
NW 50955
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Disadvantages
Possible Soviet
reaction.
b.
Probable heavy
C.
SECRET
casualties on both
gides.
Increased difficulties
in post-Castro Cuba.
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
/
PLAY FOR
FAIR PLAY
CUBA
COMMITTEE
799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y.
Oregon 4-8295
to a mimeo machine to prepare public material if you are going to operate. A
good typewriter is essential and above all people that will carry out the million
and one mechanical functions necessary to make it a going operation.
(
Note: when you contact people by mail we recommend that only first class be
used and that no full name go on the return address on the outside of the envelope.,
You will notice how we work our's here on the national level. Many people will re-
spond better with this type of protection against nutty neighbors and over curious
postment These may sound like small things to you, but I can assure you that we
gone through thi a thousand and more time the length and breadth of the country ax
have learned a great deal over the last three years through some bitter experience.
Naturally, I would like to communicate with you a great deal more concerning
yourself so that we can get to know you and possibly be of some assistence to you
as we get more information.
We hope to hear from you very soon in this regard and are looking forward to
a good working relationship for the future. Please fell free to discuss this mat
quite thoroughly with me.
*ཏྭཱ
F ྃ་▪
sin
Uta
t
516
NW 3093T
Doclu.32923030 Fage 490
Fraternally,
V.T.
V. T. Lee,
National Director.
V. T. Lee Exhibit 3
LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3-Continued
i
4
21 February 1964
SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA
Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement
that there is no point in discussing courses of action
with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is
made as to whether or not it is possible for the United
States to live with Castro, the following possible
courses of action are listed under the headings "Can
Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither
of these headings is absolute; the courses of action
listed under each are indicative of degrees of accepta-
bility of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency
to overthrow it.
COURSES OF ACTION
A.
Can Live with Castro
1.
Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards
full recognition of his regime and unlimited trade
between the United States and Cuba. The negotiator of
the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro com-
mitments not to engage in subversive activities in
Latin America and not to engage in polemics against
the United States. He would also endeavor to reduce
or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet
presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine
to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful
Latin American island republic.
No covert activities would be undertaken and
intelligence operations would be of a nature compat-
ible with our relations with a neutral power.
Copy
NW 50955
Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
DocId: 32423630 Page 491
2
Advantages
If the plan works, this
would represent a satis-
factory solution of the
Cuban problem, especially
if the Soviet presence
could thereby be eliminated.
8.
b.
Disadvantages
As plan almost sure not
to work, it would have grave
consequences throughout
Latin America as well as
serious domestic political
repercussions.
Even if plan ultimately
successful there would
be short term domestic.
political losses and
short term weakening
U.S. position in Latin
America.
2. Do nothing. No specific efforts will be made
to arrange a rapprochement with Fidel but we would
remain receptive to any advances made by him. No
covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence
operations would not include black maritime operations
into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing
the good faith and good will of the new Administration,
would make his own advances leading towards a satis
factory detente.
Advantages
As in 1. above.
a.
Disadvantages
As in 1. above but less
short term domestic and
Latin American losses.
Even less chance of
success.
3. The present level of intelligence operations,
including U-2 overflights would be continued. Black
maritime infiltrations and exfiltrations of agents and
caches of intelligence gear would continue but no action
operations would be conducted. We would be "keeping an
eye on" Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making
no effort to hinder his internal development.
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 492
3
Maximum effort would be made to increase the
countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign
target countries.
Advantages
We would be maintaining
a clean hands attitude
towards Castro and our
policy would be more
compatible with that of
our major allies.
a.
b.
Disadvantages
Evidence of American
inaction would be
domestically assailable,
would be quickly sensed
by Latin American coun-
tries and would further
demoralize the exile
community.
We would be in effect
helping Castro to con-
solidate his position
at home and establish
his image abroad.
4. In addition to intelligence collection as in
3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial
program employing diplomatic efforts and the coopera-
tion of U.S. corporations. Covert subtle sabotage
against selected Cuban imports (e.g. contamination of
lubricant additives).
Advantages
A carefully targetted
denial program with effec-
tive subtle sabotage is capa-'
ble of at least disrupting
the timing of Castro's
economic efforts. It may
have a measurable effect
on Cuba's one domestic
source of economic strength
sugar.
Disadvantages
We will remain at odds with
our allies on Cuba trade.
We may delay but not prevent
Castro's progress.
5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above,
engage`in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft
carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral
agreements with individual countries in Latin America,
such surveillance to be accomplished without the use of
force in international waters and the use of force in
national waters.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 493
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

10. Cawald
AIR PLAY FOR
799 BROADWAY
CUBA COMMITTER
Exhibit No. 3 To
degosition of VITILL
4/17/6y as wewe.
M.Y, (Sucrinted
for cary on 5/14/45
NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8293
May 29, 1963
Hom
take
Je f
1997 L/C Magazine Street
New Orleans, Louisiana
Dear Friend:
Thank you for your prompt reply. Enclosed are your card and receipt, along
.
with our thanks and welcome.
Your interest in helping to form an FPCC Chapter in New Orleans is gratefully
received. I shall try to give you some basic information now so that you may have
a botter picture of what this entails.
For one thing, I. an enclosing a copy of our Constitution and By-Laws for all
Chapters and Student Councils. You will note that there is considerable autonomy
for an organization our size. We try and let all Chapters operate according to the
local requirements. Naturally, there a minimul regulations which must be mot.
All Chapters can receive literature in bulk at a discounted rate and resell at
the retail price and use the proceeds for further Chapter activities.) Credit is
extended and payment is not required with the order. We do expect payment within a
reasonable period so that we may continue our end of the operation.
It would be hard to concieve of a chapter with as few members as seem to exist
in the New Orleans area. I have just gone through our files and find that Lousiana
scems somewhat restricted for Fair Play activities. However, with what is there
perhaps you could build a larger group if a few people would undertake the disciplined
responsibility of concrete organizational work.
We certainly are not at all adverse to a very small Chapter but certainly would
expect that there would be at least twice the amount needed to conduct a legal executive
board for the Chapter.
contac
I ori
T
experie
those
Yo
to do FF
which i
teen for
are in
ses our
overed t
Fax for a
ganizat
Could move
oceedure
pporters.
easily i
commend
erate in
We will
Should this be reasonable. we could readily issue a charter for
the loca
V.T. Lee Exhibit 3
LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3
514
NW 5095 Docla:32423630 Page 494
NO. 3. 70
of VITILI
Par New...
(SuesTinted
684 on
5/14/64)
FAIR PLAY
FOR
CUBA
COMMITTEE
799 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 3, N. Y.
Oregon 4-8295:
29, 1963
receipt, along
Pleans is gratefully
that you may have
Men And By-Laws for all
considerable autonomy
operate according to the
Lon which must be met.
iscounted rate and resell at
er activities.) Credit is
et payment within a
operaon.
few members as seem to exist
files and find that Lousiana
wever, with what is there
would undertake the disciplined
1 Chapter but certainly would
eded to conduct a legal executive
ild readily issue a charter for
г No. 3
28
a "ew rleans Chapter of FPCC. In fact, we would be very, very pleased to see this
take place and would like to do everything possible to assist in bringing it about.
We feel that the south-east is a very difficult area to work because of our lack of
contacts. Our only southeastern Chapter right now is that in Tampa, Florida which
I originally organized before coming up to work in the National Office.
I for one am convinced of the possibility of such an enterprise but know from
experience that it is quite a problem and requires some sacrifice on the part of
those involved.
You must realize that you will come under tremendous pressures with any attempt
to do FPCC work in that area and that you will not be able to operate in the manner
which is conventional here in the north-east. Even most of our big city Chapters have
been forced to abandon the idea of operating an office in public. The national office
here in New York is the only one in the country today and the New York City Chapter
uses our office too so it is the only Chapter with an office. Most Chapters have dis-
covered that it is easier to operate semi-privately out of a home and maintain a P.O.
ut.))
Box for all mailings and public notices. ((A P.O. Box is a must for any Chapter in the
organization to guarnatee the continued contact with the national even if an individuual
should move or drop out.. We do have a serious and often violent opposition and this
proceedure helps prevent many unnecessary incidents which frighten away prospective
supporters. I definitely would not recommend an office, at least not one that will
be easily identifyable to the lunatic fringe in your community. Certainly, I would not
recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can
operate in the community through several public experiences.
It is up
We will be able to give you some assistence from here, but not much.
to the local Chapters to handle their om affairs. You shaould have at least access
V.T. Lee Exhibit 3
LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3-Continued'
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 495
515
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1
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Deputy Director (Plans)
Cost of Cuban Operations
Fiscal Years 1960
1964
Fiscal Year
Supporta/
Covertb/
Collection
PA/Propd/
Covert Action /
Paramilitary/Brigade Support
Post-Invasion E/
Total
1960
1961
1962
$319,534
$131,063
$1,677,161
$318,409
$2,446,167
6,293,580
457,633
5,168,584
30,164,698
$1,627,824
3,599,274
793,8248/
43,712,319
6,444,098
2,975,635
4,176,000
1963
17,988,831
5,343,973
1,738,977£!
5,786,797
5,038,880
3,899,830
1964 (est.)
21,808,457
5,030,000
1,767,500
3,520,000
9,317,500/
565,000
20,200,000
Total
20,586,361
4,888,997
22,596,640
47,815,122
10,268,654
106,155,774
AZE/Y! I say uj
Copy
administrative
administrative
a Support: Includes staff salaries, purchase of/equipment and supplies, rental of properties and
bl
d/
el
facilities, etc..
Covert Collection: Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence
operations involving the use of classic agent 
operations, audio and other technical devices, use
of third-country intelligence and security 
services, refugee debriefings, etc.
Covert Action: Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities
encompassed by NSC 5412.
PA/Prop: Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers,
magazines, other publications, radio, television, 
etc.
Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the
formation, development, and dispatch of groups 
in paramilitary operations.
f/ Brigade Support: Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in
action, medical and rehabilitation costs of 
released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade
members, etc.
g Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Center at
Opa Locka, Florida: $95,000 for fiscal 
year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year 1963.
h/ Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in
June 1963.
66707
15 December 1963
TAB
C
ROUP 1
from automatio
'g and
_cation
This document Com 13 O
No. 7 of 2 Copies, Sories
3.
About 1/25/64.
REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF
See page
11712
COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA
In
The Current Situation in Cuba
During 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily worsened. The
economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt
the downward curve. Hurricana Flora intensified Cuba's economic
problems. Disillusionment and apathy among the great majority
of the population continued to grow, and enthusiasm was increasingly
restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and
terror were employed more and more to maintain the regime's control.
Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype
caused increasing disillusionment among his original followers.
His stature in the eyes of many Cubans and Latin Americans suffered
with the realization, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis,
that Cuba had been a pawn and Castro a cupe of Soviet policy.
Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to
stop acta of defiance against his regine. Guerrilla activity,
although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous
acts of sabotage are common throughout the island,
At great
risk refugees still elude his security forces and sca patrols
to escape from Cuba. In this atmosphere, externally mounted
raids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of
frustration and helped sustain hope among the many Cubans dis-
illusioned with his regime.
During 1963 Cuba's international situation seemed almost as
bad as the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the
U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba was
holding up fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly were under
strain. Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provida a
much needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate
Castro-type armed uprisings throughout Latin America failed to
disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially
embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to.
Venezuela. These internal and international trends and develop-
ments brought Cuba to a low point during 1963.
Within the past few weeks, hozaver, five developments have
given the Castro regime an important political-psychological
NW 50955
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SITIVE
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Lyndon B. Johnson Library
lift
JEURI SENDITAVS
lift. They ere:
1. The realization in the Cuban Government that the
continuing high sugar prices in the world market
have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible
currency reserves from about $20 million to
almost $100 million during the year.
2. The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed
on January 11, and the Khrushchevassurances of
January 22, demonstrated a Soviet willingness to
maintain its aid and trade program at a very
substantial level and to support Cuban suger
prices. Tha protocol calls for Cuban-Sovict trade
to increase by 22 per ceat over 1963. Sovict
exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on
credit, will increase by at least 10 per cent.
3. The distinct possibility that the United States
policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba
may not be able to stand in the face of increasing
pressures from Western countries to expand trade
with Cuba, extending credit if necessary. The
British bus deal, with payment spread over a
five-year period, is an important political and
psychological trimph for Castro. Its erosive
effects on potential Cuban suppliers are already
clear,
5,
The recent rioting and violence in Panama, in which
Castro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary
fervor into Castroite activities. In addition,
Panama and its aftermath will take the play away
from the incident of the Venezuela arms cache.
The revolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro also had a
hand, is bound to impress Latin America as well as
other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's
arm and the potency of his doctrine.
SENSITIVE
Capy
These
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 498
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3 -
These recent developments have provided the upward
political and psychological thrust Castro's regine badly.
needed. He now has a firmer base for his repeated claims
that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a major Cnited States
effort to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to in-
press many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition,.
Castro now has the possibility of producing some tangible evidence
that his regime can restore forward momentum in the economy.
Consequently, the general position of the Castro regime ta
much improved over that of three or four months ago.
II Current U. S. Policy and Program
The ultimate U.S. objective is the replacement of the
present goverment in Cuba by one fully compatible with the
goals of the United States..
To attain this objective, we are trying, by exerting
mazim pressure through all means short of the use of mili-
tary force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty
and discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose clements in
the military and other power centers of the regime to bring
about the overthrow of the Castro/Commmist group and the
elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; (b) weaken the
base for subversion in the Hemisphere; and (e) assist in
convincing the Soviets that they are backing a losing and
expensive horse.
In order to create the optiam situation just described,
se bave been carrying out a program of integrated, mutually
reinforcing and mutually dependent courses of action. These
comprise:
The economic, nolitical and psychological isolation
of Cuba from the free world
Denial of free-world markets and sources of
suonly to Cuba: We have undertaken a variety
of overt and covert activities designed to
reduce free-world trade with Cuba and, especially,
to deny Cuba access to commodities critical to
BEERST SENSITY
its
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 499
economy. Proposala for expanding and intensi-
fying these activities are now being presented.
The execution of these additional measures dependa
basically on a decision to incur the considerable
political costs and risks that are entailed.
The reduction of free-world shinping in the Cuba
trade: We have maintained diplomatic pressure
on free-world nations to reduce and eventually
eliminate their ships in the Cuba trade. We have
denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to
ships in the Cuba trade (NSAM 220, as amended).
To the same general end, we have employed existing
legislation, and the threat of additional legis-
lation, restricting economic and military assist-
ange to countries with ships in the Cuba trade,
3. The reduction of free world, and the containment
of Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba: We have
maintained diplomatic pressures on free-world
countries having, or wishing to establish, air
service to Cuba. We are invoking recent legis-
lation denying assistance to countries whose
ships and aircraft carry commodities to and from
Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic
pressures on free-world countries to deny their
facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines
serving or trying to serve Cuba, or harass such
airlines.
4. The limitation of free-world diplomatic relations
with Cuba: As opportunity has offered, we have
exerted pressure to persuade free-world countries
to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to
prevent the establishment of such relations with
Cuba.
5.
Efforts to undermine the Castro imbre abroad and
to fristrate Cuban attempts to enhance that in we;
By nema of diplomatic, propaganda and covert
measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the
weakness, failures and betrayals of the Castro
regimo.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 500
SENSITIVE
匪
Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
SECRET
5-
B. Defense against Castro-Communist Subversion
1. Within Cuba: As indicated above, all our efforts
to bring about disorganization, uncertainty and
discontent in Cuba ore intended to weaken the
Cuban base for Castro/Communist subversion.
2. Cutside Cuba:
a. Multilateral: We have sought, through the CAS,
to obtain general Latin American recognition
of the seriousness of the subversive threat
and approval of recommendations of measures
to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the
transfer of funds and propaganda. At the
present time, we intend to expand and intensify
this effort through actions to be taken by the
OAS on the basis of the Venezuelan complaint
against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the OAS,
we have made special efforts with the Central
American countries and Pinama to have then
tighten controls on the activities and movement.
of subversives, to develop inland and inshore
surveillance capabilities, to create effective
intelligence organizations and to establish a
system of intelligence exchange.
b. Bilateral: Through training, material assist-
once and exchange of intelligence, we have
worked to improve the internal security
capabilities of individual countries.
Unilateral: In addition to miltilateral and
bilateral measures, we have continued to
maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity
of Cuba, to improve our own comunications
systems and to develop our own intelligence
capabilities against subversive activities.
BECAST SKSITIVE.
Copy
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 501
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
The reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviar
military presence in Cuba
We bave maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets
to continue troop:withdrawals and we have warned the
Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet
forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprising.
The collection of intelligence
We have maintained and improved our overt and covert
collection of intelligence to meet not only U.S.
strategic requirements but also operational require,
ments connected with our covert activities within Cuba,
We have maintained periodic high-level overflights
supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights.
We have warned the Soviets and Cubans against inter-
ference with these flights.
Covert operations to weaken and undermine the Castro
Reaine
A detailed discussion of the covert elements of our
program appears in Section III.
As stated above, all these courses of action interact and
are interdependent. For example, our covert sconcaic denial
operations are designed to reinforce and be reinforced by our
overt masures of economic pressure. Both types of activities
directed against the econcary are intended to aggravate existing
ecomic difficulties and thus to increase the level of dia-
affection not only in the popular mass but particularly in
the power centers of the regize. This disaffection enhances
ability to establish meaningful contact with figures in
the military and other power centers and to develop intelli-
gence sources. This disaffection is in turn intensified by
the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided
by the success of covert sabotage and harassment activities.
By
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SECRET SENSITIVE
F Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library
SECRET SENSITIVE
By the same token, the failure or elimination of one of these
mutually supporting courses of action jeopardizes the othera
and thus comprcaises the entire program,
Through 1963, these courses of action were having a mezzurs
able positive impact. ka are now confronted, however, by a
series of developments, described in Section I, which threaten
to arrest or even reverse our forward movement. The situation
is particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of our
economic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert
operations particularly timely and important.
III. Concept of the Covert Action Proszma
The CIA covert action program aims at maintaining all
feasible pressures on Cuba and at creating and exploiting
situations in Cuba calculated to stimulate dissident elements
within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry
out a coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove
the Castro/Commmmists from the regime and to eliminate the
entire Soviet presence from Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S.
is engaged in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet
ally to obstruct the consolidation of Castro's region at boms
and to prevent bis; from achieving his ambitions in Latin
Americe, we set the time frame for this program at about
eighteen months from June 1963.
As originally conceived and approved in June 1963, the
covert action program was based on the assumption that U.S.
policy precludes a military invasion or a full blockade of
Cuba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union,
In addition, the covert action program was and is predicated
on the thesis that its chance of success would depend heavily
on a sustained and intensive effort in other sectors, parti-
cularly the overt economic denial and political isolation
programs, by all elements of the United States Government.
Thus, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against
Cuba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if there
is to be any bope of accomplishing the overall mission.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 503
SECRET SENSITIVE
Copy
CIA's
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

SECRET
NSITIVE
CIA's integrated covert action program consists of the
following interdependent courses of action:
1. Covert collection of intelligence to meet U.S.
national security requirements and to support.
current and placed covert operations. It should
be noted that clandestine maritime operations are
an integral part of intelligence collection.
2. Propagands actions to stimulate low-risk simple
sabotage and other forms of active and passive
resistance against the regime.
3. Economic denial actions in support of government.
wide overt official U.S. economic isolation
measures.
Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in
the Cuban armed forces and other per cuntere of
the resine to encourage these elements to carry out
a coup against the Castro/Communist factions. CIA
is identifying, contacting and attempting to es-
tablish channels of communication with these indi-
viduals,
5. General gatotege and harassment as an economie weapon
and as a stimulus to internal resistance. As an
economic weapon, it is designed to supplement and
support the overall economic denial program by
damaging economically important installations and to
add to Castro's expacaic problems by forcing him to
divert money, manpower and resources from economic
to internal security activities. As a stimalus to
resistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations
provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existence
and capability of organized resistance against the
regimes To the extent that these operations are
successful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban
population and elite groups the vulnerability of the
regime to militant action. It is recognized that no
single act of envotage by itself can materially affect
the economy or stimulate resistance, but we believe
that the
{
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that the cumulative psychological and political
impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operationa
is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our
mission.
6. Support of extonomous unti-Castro Cuben exile
Bo
These operations are intended to provide
a deniable activity, a means of supplementing and
expanding our covert capability and a mans of taking
advantage of untapped political and resistance rescurcas
of the exila community. The program now includes two
autonomous groups whose credibility as to autonomy is
strengthened by the facts that:
They are led by men whose prominence and status
in the Cuban exile commity rakes plausible their
access to funds, equipment and manpower quite in
dependent of the U.S.;
Both are based in the Caribbean area outside of
U.S. territory;
Both have natural, willing allies in power in
several Latin American countries;
Both are Cuben and employ Cuban nationals
exclusively;
Every item of financial and logistic support has
been handled in a mammer as to provide mazimm
protection against proof of CIA or U.S. parti-
cipation..
The initial aim of these operations is to strengthen
the will to resist by increasing the tempo of sub-
version and sabotage largely maintained until now
by CIA; the eventual sin is to take the fight
from the coastline to the interior of Cuba,
The disadventage of our autonomous operations is
that it is necessary to accept a lower order of
efficiency and control than would be considered.
acceptable in CIA-run operations.
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電話
Of the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, items
(1) and (2) are in train and no policy problema regarding them
are expected. Item (3) is the cubject of another paper which
is being proscated for concurrent consideration. Item (4)
is the essence of our program and is dependent for its success
on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action.
Item (5) has been the subject of continual review since the
Inception of the program and is the primary subject of this
paper. Consideration of Item (6) (autonomous operations) should
take place with a discussion of sabotage and harassment (Item 5).
These latter two itens are discussed in more detail in Section V.
below:.
IV. The Sabotage Prog in Retrospect
We know of at least 80 acts of internal sabotage and 60
arred clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents
since 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not
part of a coordinated program; they are acts of individual
or small group defiance. They are stimulated by many factors,
and no one factor can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage
incidents, which include a high proportion of sugar cane
burnings, have a tendency to be seasonal, a fact which further
obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that from
a low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963
there was a heavy increase during the fall (following the
conincement of our raiding activity), we believe that clezzer
light is shed on the effects of our barassment program by the
statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba
and by the acts of the Cuban regime itself,
31ace_1 August 1963, five sabotage raids have been
attempted I All were successful. There was substantial
damage to the target; all participants were safely recovered
and the plausible deniability of the operations was not
compromised.
The lack
1. Annex I contains a brief review of these operations..
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The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent
Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed,
almost every act of defiance against his regine has been
credited to the Agency.
Castro's emotional reactions to real or rumored security
threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance
and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure
frou external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand,
has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and
blaster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction,
aside from the expected propaganda, followed a scries of air
raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile
groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had
no responsibility. They did no real damage, tpt they did
demonstrate that the Cuban air defense syston could be
breached, and they added substantially to the psychological
impact of our first two raids.
The Agency sabotage raids produced some very specific
results. For example, in the political and psychological
realm, Canadian Ambassador Kidd reported in late âugust
that the incidents that month, including the Santa Lucia
and Casilda operations "disturbed the feeling of consoli-
dation and tranquility which the Castro regime had succeeded
in creating in recent months." He reported that the Cubans
were uncertain and apprehensive over the possibility of a
U.S. campaign of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba's
vulnerability to such a campaign due to the "low cbb" of
enthusiasm for the Castro regize among the people. He also
stated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed
to the regime" and that "dispirited opposition had received
fillip to its morale.”
"In a September report, Ambassador Kidd stated that
the "host immediate effect of such attacks is the psycho
logical blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime.
with consequent boost in opposition," Low morale and
dejection in the counterrevolutionary ranks of some months
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ago, be said, "has given way to a wave of optimism that the
Maximum Leader is no longer necessarily a permanent fixture.”
Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guevarra had indicated
concern that the ralda would divert much needed manpower
and resources from the economic to the military sector.
On 4 September a reliable clandestine source in Cuba
reported that the reaction of the average man on the street in
Havana to the news of the attacks on Casilda and Santa Lucia
was "astounding." Prior to the Cuban government's announce-
ment of the raids, the average nan on the street seemed
apathetic, depressed and in a low state of morale. Following
the announcement their mood changed to one of pleasure, joy,
and hope,. The observations of this source were reinforced
by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived in the U.S.
shortly after the Cuban amouncement of the raida.
A former Major in the Cubah Rebel Azuy who broke with
Castro reported after his exfiltration from Cuba in January
1964 that the 23 December Siguanes raid which destroyed a
P-6 patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected
Cubane.
A Cuban Lawyer with extensive connections among Cubm
government officials and in the Western community in Bavana
has just reported that the "horale effects of the recent
sabotage operations are good among anti-regima segments of
the population. Such acts, to them, indicate that the cutside
world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight con❤
tizzes and suggests a possible prelude to some military action
against Castro. Opposite morale effects are noted among the
pro-regime segments who have tended to remain notably quiet
about the regime after successful sabotage operations.
A Cuban coumications technician employed by the Cuban
government reported on 1 January that the "act of sabotage
against the torpedo beat on the Isle of Pines was very success
ful in the opinion of the people and, for sare, public opinion
needed something to stimulate it, What happened at La Siguanea
had such an effect. Although at times failures are suffered
which depress the people, they are anxious for something to
happen,"
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料
The raids also had an impact on the Cuban military and
security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed on
special alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive
positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently
launched or intensified; and defensive positions in industrial
or agricultural complexes are manned to meet the real or
imagined threats. The raids interfere not only with routine
military training but also with work on construction and
agricultural projects which use military personnel. Raul
Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incident.
In addition, Castro expanded his coast watching network
from 46:observation posts at the end of June to 103 at the.
end of October. Those posts have radio communications and are
manned by 10 to 25 full-time personnel. In a further effort
to scal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations
have been established since June, and we have evidence tenta-
tively identifying 7 more.⠀
Castro's fear of rising dissidence and insurgency La
reflected in his initiation of a wide variety of repressive
measures. Many are bound to have adverse political, psycho-
logical or economic repercussions insido Cuba. Ee has con-
ducted almost constant anti-insurgent operations involving
mits of up to 2,500 men. Air, naval and ground force
elements have been put on special alert, either on a local
or island-wide basis, on at least 35 occasions during 1963
as a result of inmored or actual maritime operations. Resi-
denta in areas of querrilla activity have been forcibly
relocated, and restrictions have been placed on transportation
in suspect creas, In August 1963 a new internal accurity
force, the Lucha Centra Fixatas, was formed to attempt to
cope with off-obora raiding parties. In September new training
Courses were initiated for command cadrea of "popular defense
unica." The purpose of these units is to organize the people
to defend themselves against enemy attack and to protect
industrial centers and installations from sabotage..
Despite these measures to increase Cuba's defensive
capability against raids, we have continued to improve our
Town infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate
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Cuba's defenses with good regularity. Raiding operations of
this sort, however, always present risk and we mist assume
that captured Cuban agents will reveal U.S. involvement as they
have dona in the past giving Castro the opportunity to make
vociferous propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition,
although Ehrushchev has not made Agency harassing raids the
subject of special protest (as he did in the case of the
exile air raids in August and September), a major step-up
in the frequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on
a major economic target such as Matanzas or Santiago, might
bring about a Soviet protest. The chance of a physical
retaliation by Castro as, for instance, an attack upon
0.3. installation in the Caribbean, although unlikely,
cannot be entirely discounted.
If Castro is to be brought down without overt military
action the main effort will have to come from inside Cuba,
We believe that there is sufficient evidence to show that
sabotage raids, despite the risk involved, are a necessary
stimulus to internal action which will need to be continued for
a considerable period to permit the tempo of internal acts to
reach a point where it can become self-sustained.
"Impact of Cessation of Sabotage Operations
Because of the visible and dramatic nature of sabotage
operations, their cessation would soon be noted by all
interested parties to and observers of U.R/Cuban relations.
The cessation of these raids, bouever, disclaimable by the
U.S. the raids themselves may be, would probably be intes-
preted in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba as a switch
of U.S. policy from one of discreet encouragement and support
of aggressive action against the Castro regime to one of
"coexistence" and eventual accommodation with a Castro/Commist
Cuba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive action
against Cuba, a weakening process would be set in ration
which could well load the countries of Latin America to draw
their own conclusions from these indicators and embark on
accommodation policies of their own. Those governments in
Latin Americs already threatened by Castroites in their own
'cogntries arellikely to be subjected to even stronger domestia
presstics.
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As this belief spreads, Western European and other free
world countries eager to trade with Cuba will come to feel
that they may safely ignore and evade, to an even greater
extent than they do now, U.S. appeals for the econsaic and
political isolation of Cuba. An important additional economia
affect would be the release into normal economie activity of
manpower and funds now tied up in defense against raids.
Finally, and most important, this development in time
is bound to have a severe demoralizing effect on the internal
resistance against Castro. The Cuban exile community and
particularly its militant and articulate elements would be
acutely sensitive to a cessation of raids and can be expected
to react vociferously. Judging from past experience, we
an expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on
the part of the numerous Cuban exiles who have political
comections within the U.S.
In the event that it is decided to terminate CIA-
controlled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be
assumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater
deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the
mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro
and inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks
necessary to set a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are
As yet untested in their capability to conduct successful
sabotage and harassment operations on a sustained basis.
It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups
will develop the ability to match CIA-controlled operations,
either in quantity or quality.
If sabotage and harassment operations were to be termicated
for the autonomous groups as well as for the Agency, its
support to the autonomous groups must also be terminated
completely as otherwise we would not be in a position to
insure that they would discontinue raids and sabotage.
Such termination would compound the effects of the cessation
of our own raids, particularly in those areas in the Caribbean
where the autonomous groups have been mast active.
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故律
VI. The Residual ProsTAI
In the event it is decided to abandon the core of the
covert program, we will be obliged to fall back on essentially
overt courses of action which are already operating but which
'can be refined and intensified, provided the political risks
and costs are judged acceptable and we receive adequate
cooperation from our allies.
Action against free-world ecozonic ties with Cuba
Because of the recent erosion of our efforts in this
sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to
expand Cuban economic relations with the free world, a series
of recommendations to intensify this course of action has been
I made and is now being presented. The basic issue in the
recommendations is our ability and willingness to incur the
political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure
would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted
completely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts
to curtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful.
On the other hand, if the actions and commitments included
in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty
that; under present circumstances, our economic pressures will
be reduced to ineffectiveness. In any case, it must be clearly
recognized that no amount of economic pressure can by itself.
bring on the Castro government, at least as long as the
Soviets are prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy. The
curtailment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the
free world can only contribute, and then only over time, to
the creation of the optimum situation we are trying to develop.
The effectiveness of this contribution would be at least
sharply impaired by the relaxation of the pressure created
by covert operations. Beyond these considerations, we can
never have assurance that a foreign goverment cooperating
in the economic program will not pull out and virtually
collapse the program. Entire or even important reliance.
on economic pressure as a substitute for the covert program
would be to deliver the fate of cur policy into the uncertain
bands of governments which do not share our convictions and
sense of priority with respect to Cuba,“
B. CAS ACTION
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B. CAS Action
As a result of the Venezuelan charges against Cuba arising
from the arms cache discovery, we have been considering a scries
of measures which we would seek in the CAS. It should be noted
that the atmosphere for 013 adoption of strong measures bas
deteriorated as a result of the Panamanian crisis.
The measures which we have been studying include:
14. A break in diplomatic relations
The principal effects of this measure, which would
mean action by five countries, including Brazil,
Chile and Mexico, would be to provide rather dramatis
evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cuban
regina subversive facilities offered by its remaining
missions in Latin America. The measure would meet
heavy resistance from Maxico, Chile and particularly
Brazil,,
2 A break in economic relations
Although this would have little practical effect
economically, it would have some utility as a means
of moral pressure on other free-world countries
trading with Cuba.
A break in air and surface communications
Over time this would lead to a reduction in the
Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin
America. It would be useful as a means of moral
pressure on other free-world countries baving, or
wishing to establish, air services with Cuba. On
the negative side it would mean the temporary loss
of Latelligence facilities and would have an adverse
effect on Cuban exile morale by closing on existing
escape route for persons inside Cuba,
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Anaroval for cooperative surveillance measures
against movement of arms and en
The single most damaging OAS action to Castro would be
an authorization for the use of force in connection
with the movement of arms and nen. The chances of
getting a politically acceptable majority for such
una vas estimated to be less than even before the
events in Panama and the prospects have diminished
since then. Such OAS action would almost certainly
dramatize the Cuban issue domestically and inter-
nationally. At the present time, it appears that the
surveillance system which might be authorized by the
CAS would involve the use of force only in the
territorial waters of the countries for which the
offending shipments are destined. Thus the question
of OAS authorization for the use of force on the
high seas will not arise.
3. Condemnation of the Castro regine
This would be a pro forma action, with only limited
psychological force.
Reaffirmation of previous CAS measures on controlling
Cuban-based and supported subversion
This would be of valus as a means of reinforcing a
general effort in this sector (see C balow). It ia,
however, a purely defensive measure,
In sum, this series of OAS measures would certainly be
helpful and would constitute important multilateral progress,
The actions, however, are primarily psychological and
defensiva.
Increased efforts against subversion
We can probably increase and expand our multilateral,
bilateral and unilateral efforts to increase the ability of
Latin America to resist subversion. Such efforts are purely
defensive and external to Coba. Fo certain results can be
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guaranteed, In say case, if the Cuban base were to be
strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by
the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting
#gainst increasing odds.
D. Increased psychological and procaranda efforti
We can intensify our measures in this sector, including
major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other
senior officers of the Government. The efficacy of such
efforta is entirely dependent, however, upon the substance.
behind them. A propaganda offensive would be productive
only if there were credible evidence that our words were
being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.
VII. Conclusion
The residual program set out above la substantially
weaker than the present program. Accordingly, the prospects
for attaining our ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/
Commmist regime, which have been by no means certain even
under the present program, would be very measurably diminished
under the residual program. The elimination of the core of
the present covert program, especially if accompanied by a
rejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of econcale
pressure, would zaise in sharp terms the question of the need
to eine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or
accommodation.
VIII. Recommendation
That the covert program be continued in at least its
present form and scope.
EDIN
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Annex 1
The five sabotage raids run by CIAS
1. On 18 August the POL storage tanks at Casilda, Las
Villas Province vera attacked using 4.2 mortara,
One tank car waa destroyed and one storage tank
broachad, causing considerable fire damage,
2. On 19 August the culphuric acid plant at Santa
Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province was attacked.
There was considerable fire damage and fuel
lines were broken. We have reports that asid
found its way into the turbines as a result
of the raid causing additional damage.
On 30 September a lumbermill at Bahia da
Maravi, Orienta Province, a minor installation
of local economic importance, was 70 per cant
destroyed by a raiding party.
4. Oa 21 October an underwater demolition team
attacked a dredge in the harbor at La Isabelāj,
Las Villas Province. The vessel was suck.
On 23 December an underwater demolition team
attacked a Cuban naval P-6 patrol boat in the
Siguanea, Isle of Pines, naval base. The
patrol boat was seriously damaged and may have
sunk. Thres Cuban naval personnel were killed
and 13 others injured in the explosion.
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tive." Second question: What does the American gov-
ernment expect to gain from the blockade? Is the
economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political
maneuver?
Kennedy's reply: "Are you suggesting that the polit-
ical effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]?
You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not.
In any case, we can't let Communist subversion win in
the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are
needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on
the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on
the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles
are equally difficult." (Silerice.) Then, a last comment:
"The continuation of the blockade depends on the con-
tinuation of subversive activities."
The interview was over. I did not really wish to sug-
gest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and,
on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of
the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing
to their isolated economic situation. But I could see
plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking
a way out.
That same evening I recounted this conversation in
detail to an American colleague - an intimate friend of
President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this
interview and to the editor of The New Republic.
Both my confidants, who knew the President a thou-
sand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy
had never before expressed him so specifically and
with such feeling on his understanding of the first.
phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw
any political conclusions from his remarks. However,
they were not surprised at Kennedy's invitation to.
come and see him again when I returned from Cuba.
In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic charac-
teristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming
degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a
particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events,' and
only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with
a problem was sufficient to make him come to a deci-
sion, and because of this, his decisions were unpredic-
table. At that point he had a consuming need for
information, and this need had increased a great deal
since experience had taught him not to rely solely on
official channels.
After this, I went to Havana.
Night Session
TAB M
In the "Pearl of the Antilles rum-perfumed and
steeped in triumphant sensuality," as Čuba is described
in those American tourist folders still lying about in
the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and
intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would
never get to meet with Fidel Castro: I talked with farm-
ers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revo-
lutionaries, ministers and ambassadors - but Fidel re-
mained inaccessible. I had been warned: he was snowed
under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the
Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole
planning program; and then, above all, he no longer
had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all
Western newsmen. I had practically given up hope
when, on the evening of what I thought was to be my
departure date (the capricious plane which links
Havana with Mexico happily did not leave the next day
after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my
interview with the President. We went up to my
room at to in the evening and did not leave until 4 in
the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that
part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John
F. Kennedy's remarks.
Fidel listened with devouring and passionate inter-
est: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist's
beret down over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all
the while making me the target of a thousand malicious,
sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point
I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner
with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do
battle; as though I myself were in a small way that
intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev
described to Fidel as someone with whom "it is pos-
sible to talk." Three times he had me repeat certain re-
marks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed
his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Ken-
nedy showed his impatience with the comments attrib-
uted to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which
Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war
fatal to all humanity.
When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion.
Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the
end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humor-
ous, always thoughtful exposition. I don't know wheth-
er Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons cari-
caturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the
Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality.
I only know that at no time during the two complete
days I spent with him (and during which a great deal
happened), did Castro abandon his composure and
poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself,
reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judg-
ments on these two political leaders based on my own
experiences in Cuba.'
"I believe Kennedy is sincere," Fidel declared. "I
also believe that today the expression of this sincerity
could have political significance. I'll explain what
mean. I haven't forgotten that Kennedy centered his
electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of
firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Ma-
chiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at
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THE NEW REPUBLIC
invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organiza'ın
of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above ev ry-
thing, all the retaliatory measures which were imposed
before, long before there was the pretext and alibi of
Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult
situation; I don't think a President of the United States
is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present.
feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe
he now understands the extent to which he has been
misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at
the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also
think he is a realist; he is now registering that it is im-
possible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the
explosive situation throughout Latin America, to dis-
appear.
Why the Missiles Were Installed
"There is one point on which I want to give you new
information. right away. I have refrained from doing
this until now; but today an attempt is being made to
frighten all mankind by propagating the idea that
Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war,
so I feel the world should know the true story of the
missile emplacement.
"Six months before these missiles were installed in
Cuba, we had received an accumulation of information
warning us that a new invasion of the island was being
prepared under sponsorship of the Central Intelligence
Agency, whose administrators were humiliated by the
Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being
ridiculed in the eyes of the world and herated in US
government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon
was vesting, the CIA preparations with the mantle of
its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of
the President. There were those among our informants
who even thought it would suffice to alert the President
and give him cause for concern in order to arrest these
preparations. Then one day Khrushchev's son-in-law,
Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to
Washington at the invitation of Kennedy's associates.
Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei
had been received by the American Chief Executive,
and their talk centered particularly on Cuba: A week
after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of
Adzhubei's report to Khrushchev. It was this report
which triggered the whole situation.
"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to
this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that
the new situation in Cuba was intolerable for the Unit-
ed States, that the American government had decided
it would not tolerate it any longer; he had said that
peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the
fact that 'Soviet influences' in Cuba altered the balance
of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed
18
upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his state-
ment by pronouncing each syable separately] Ken-
nedy reminded the Russians that the United States
had not intervened in Hungary, which was obviously
a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the
event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word
‘invasion' was not mentioned and Adzhubei at the
time, lacking any background information, sould not
draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we
communicated to Khrushchev all our previous informa--
tion, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy-
Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to
the source of our information. By the end of a month,
the Russian and Cuban governments had reached the
definite conviction that an invasion might take place
from one moment to the next. This is the truth.
"What was to be done? How could we prevent the
invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned
about the same things that were worrying us. He asked
us what we wanted. We replied: do whatever is needed
to convince the United States that any attack on Cuba
is the same as an attack on the Soviet Union. And how
to realize this objective? All our thinking and discus-
sions revolved around this point. We thought of a
proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid.
The Russians explained to us that their concern was
twofold: first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolu-
tion (in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes
of the world), and at the same time they wished to
avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conven-
tional military aid was the extent of their assistance,
the United States might not hesitate to instigate an
invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this
would inevitably touch off a world war."
At this point I interrupted to ask how Cuba could
have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention..
After all, I said, Stalin certainly "let down" Markos,
the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because
such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones
of influence.
"I know," Castro replied, "but the two situations
cannot be compared." Then he continued:
"Russia was much too deeply committed to us. More-
over, since then we have had every proof of the im-
mense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders.
You can see for yourself how clearly this solidarity is
manifest here. Then there is. something else, specifi-
cally apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and
others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev
for taking a more conciliatory standhan Stalin toward
the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several ex-
amples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the
prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me -
and I believe him that Stalin would never have em-
placed missiles in Cuba.
-
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page. 518
: DECEMBER 1, 1963
"It is true that it was said then by other factions
that the real reason for installing the missiles was
because certain internal problems were driving the Rus-
sians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here
to tell you that the Russians didn't want and do not
today want war. One only need visit them on their
home territory, watch them at work, share their eco-
nomic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the
workers' standard of living, to understand right away
that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation
or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted
by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (be-
cause of their commitments and their position in the
socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked:
or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to
retreat before the missiles, would not give up the at-
tempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity
and the risk of war.
"Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans
have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It
was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don't
you agree? Don't you believe that honor plays a role
in politics? You think we are romantics, don't you?
Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are
militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplace-
ment of the missiles. And I might add here that for us
Cubans it didn't really make so much difference
whether we died by conventional bombing or a hydro-
gen bomb. Nevertheless, we were gambling with
the peace of the world. The United States was the one
to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat
of war to stifle revolutions.
"And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che
Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means
of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in
three weeks. The United States was able to find out
that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it
took them two months to discover that these weapons
were guided missiles. Two months. . . in other words,
longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, we
were seeking intimidation, not aggression."
Alliance for Progress
The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Prog-
ress. "In a way," Castro said, "it was a good idea, it
marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it
was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the
moment, under constraint... despite all that I am will-
ing to agree that the idea instituted an effort
to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in
Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in
he papers this morning - did you see the news? That
Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argen-
tine government! Do you realize what that means? This
.
will cause more commotion on the New York stock
exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military.
conservatives of Argentina, the factions most closely
linked with American interests! There is talk of na-
tionalization of industries there, of agrarian reform
there... well and good! If the Alliance for Progress
provokes these developments, then it's not doing so
badly; all these things are consonant with the aspira-
tions of the people. I can look back to the days of
Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furore
which broke out when the United States and Cuba to-
gether decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply,
mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000
hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts
was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin
American countries, because the Communist banner is
used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American
trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose strawmen,
so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties.
"This is why Kennedy's good ideas aren't going to
vicld any results. It is very easy to understand and at
this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told
you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy
- not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon
– has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the
prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class
which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of
Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who
tries to support the interests of another class (which
has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the
various Latin American countries the impression that
the United Sates no longer stands behind the dictators,
and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revo-
lutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their
interests are being a little compromised (just barely,
. but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strate-
gic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all
the Latin American countries alert their American
friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short,
Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or
allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instru-
ments of the new policy are swept out of office, like
Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed.
Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he
has become one.
"In view of all these things, how can the American
government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is
at the root of explosions taking place all over the
South American continent? In Venezuela, for example,
are you familiar with the situation there? Do you think
the Venezuelans need us to understand what's going
on in their country? Do you think we don't have
enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only
one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country's
economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to
19
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educate our young compañeros. This doesn't mean we
do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling
and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up
to those nations to decide what they want, and if they
choose other regimes than ours, this isn't our business."
"We Have Always Lived with Danger"
. I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will
the situation develop? Even if the United States uses
against you what you call the alibi of Communism, it
still remains true that you have chosen Communism,
that your economy and your security depend on the
Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior mo-
tives in this, association, still the United States considers
that you are part of an international strategy, that you
constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends
on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of in-
fluence.
"I don't want to discuss our ties with the Soviet
Union," Fidel Castro cut me short. "I find this indecent.
We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound,
total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are
making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts
which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own
policies which are perhaps not always the same (we
have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to
dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am
not a pawn on the Soviet chess is something like
asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square
that she is not a prostitute.
"If the United States, sees the problem as you have
posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But
who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried
everything against us, everything, absolutely every-
thing, and we are still alive and getting better day by
day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to celc-
brate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1,
1964, the fifth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution!
The United States' policy of isolating us economically
is less effective with each passing day; we are increas-
ing our trade with the rest of the world. Even' with '
Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 500,000 tons
of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us,
the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmos-
phere we need to stiffen the country's backbone. Are we
in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say
nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many
friends one discovers in the world when one is perse-
cuted by the United State New truly, for all these
reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll
tell you something else: since the rupture and the
blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel
neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply
don't think about the US. When I think of the problems
which diplomatic relations with the United States
would pose! The Swiss Ambassador representing the
US at present. I prefer to do business with him than
with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely
some spies would be spotted.
"I have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary.
But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and
from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too
important a country not to have an influence on world
peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader
will come to the fore in North America (why not Ken-
nedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing
to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth
and, most important, let the various nations act as
they see fit. I ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assist-
ance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men --
nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We
are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation,
the Latin American countries will choose what they
want. All the same, at a time when the United States
is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with
China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be
impossible to make the Americans understand that _
socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to co-
existence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because
the Russians have never done us any injury such as
the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained
of in the past, and because the Americans have never
given us any of the benefits for which these two nations
congratulate themselves today.
"As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in
Latin America through Cuba's subversive activitie:..
this is just attributing to others one's own desire to
dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago tha:
the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involve-
ment. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speak-
ing from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force
nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, it
seems to me that å man like Kennedy is capable of
seeing that it is not in the United States' interest to
pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So
far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to
normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sover-
eignty."
In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: "Since you
are going to see Kennedy again, be an emissary of
peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear:
I don't want anything, I don't expect anything, and
as a revolutionary the present situation does not dis-
please me. But as a man and as a statesmen, it is my
duty to indicate what the bases for understanding
could be."
All this was said two days before President Ken-
nedy's death.
QUSA: The New Republic and Jean Daniel
20
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1
a á
MEMO to Boonstra, od to COS from LEGAT; Subject: OSWALD It is to be noted that the White
House was in receipt of a paper entitled "Possible Psychological Motivations in the Assassina-
tion of Pres. Kennedy" written by Jose I. LASAGA of Miami, Fla. This speculative paper attempted
to establish that the motivation of OSWALD in the assassination of Pres Kwas Fidel CASTRO
or a CASTRO agent and that OSWALD was motivated during his trip to Mexi between 27 Salt and
2. Oct 63. The paper alleged that OSWALD held an extended interview with the Cuban Amb in
Mexi whom he met in a restaurant on the outskirts of Mexi from which restaurant they both
later left in the Amb's car for a talk without being overheard./ Source of this latter info
was alleged to be Salvador DIAZ Verson. This individual was interviewed at Miami, He stated
that while in Mexi 29-29 Nov 63 attending the Congress of the International Federation of
Professional Newspaper Organizations, he was at the offices of the newspaper Excelsior on
the night of 25 Nov 63. There he learned through the Mexi press that the Maxi gov had arrested
one Silvia DURAN; that DURAN allegedly had OSWALD as a guest in her house during his visit
to Mexi; and that DURAN placed OSWALD in contact with officials of the Cub in HAL. /
DIAZ Verson went on to claim that he was à told by Dr. BORRELL Navarrod, pn exiled Juban
newspaperman employed by Excelsior, that OSWALD and DURAN on the day following CSWALD's arrival
in Mexi went to a restaurant called the Caballo Blanco or possibly the Caballo Bayc where they
met an official of the Cub. Emb, DIAZ Verson claimed that he knows nothing about OSWALD and
the Cub official leaving the restaurant together in a car. / It was uncertained that Dr.
Eduardo BORRELL Navarro, a former Cuban Cabinet Minister who on occasion writes feature
articles for the Mexi City Excelsior, currently resides at 1303 Homero St., Apart 301, Mexi,
BORRELL Navarro was. interviewed on 11 Jan at which time he furnished the following info;
Salvador DIAZ Verson was in Mexi as claimed and discussed OSWALD with BORNELL and other Cuban
exiles. DIAZ Verson also visited BORRELL in BORRELL's home. / BORRELL did not tell the story
credited to him/ by DIAZ Verson concerning the visit to a Mexi City restaurant by OSWALD
Silvia DURAN. BORRELL had never heard this story or any similar story before. /
knew
of no meeting between OSWALD and Cub Emb officials other than the meetings which occurred
at the time OSWALD visited the Cub Con in Mexi. / BORRELL knew nothing concerning any visit
by OSWALD to the home of DURAN. / It is to be noted that DURAN was questioned by Neal authorities
on 23 Nov 63. At that time she confirmed that OSWALD visited: the Cub Amb in Maxi during the C/A
time he was in Mexi from 27 Sept to 2 Oct. She alleged that the purpose of his visits to the
Cuban Emb was to obtain a Cuban visa. She stated she had given him a telephone number to use
in calling her concerning the visa, but denied that he had ever visited in her home. / On
17 Jan 64 & source.... advised that he had been unable to locate a Caballo Blano restaurant
in Mexi, but stated there is a Caballo Bayo restaurant located on outskirts, of Mexi.
Source went to restaurant, showed photos of former Cub Con Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, who was in
charge of Cub Con at the time of OSWALD's visit there, of Cub: Amb HERNANDEZ Armas, of Silvia
DURAN and of OSWALD to employees of restaurant and conducted extensive interviews of these
employees H
He was unable to find anyone among the employees, who could recall any of the
persons as having been at restaurant.
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prepared chronology
From CIA
SECRET - SENSITIVE
- 12
BOX 4:
MISCELLANEOUS
From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely
to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this
box were not examined.
NW 50955
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IBWBD
SENSITIVE
PROPERTY OF
01520
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SECRET
wwwwww
SENSITIVE
MC CONE PAPERS
NOVEMBER 24, 1961 DECEMBER 31, 1964
REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS,
WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS
BOX 2:
MEMORANDA FOR RECORD
File:
_
November 29, 1961 April 5, 1962
December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy -
"Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12.
December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy
"Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5.
January 22, 1962, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy
Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412
Committee plus Robert Kennedy.
April 5, 1962, Memos on Special Group/Mongoose Project
General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.
File: April 7, 1962
August 21, 1962
(40) April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that
Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling
people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney
General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day.
(61) July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General.
included a short discussion of "Reuther plan" for labor
operations apparently in Italy.
(86) August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis
Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence,
General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy a general discussion
of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's
are discovered in Cuba:
"McNamara expressed strong feelings
that we should take every possible aggressive
action in the fields of intelligence, sabo-
tage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans
and do such other things as might be indi-
cated to divide the Castro regime.
(emphasis added)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
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PROPERTY OF
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SECRET
2
SENSITIVE
File: August 24, 1962
December 31, 1962
(97) October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy:
McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba Bundy was
more conservative. (No specifics)
(118) December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on
Cuba [MISSING]
[Apparently not a meeting or phone call]
(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)
(119) December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba
[MISSING]
(120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba
[MISSING]
File: June 1, 1963 February 9, 1963
(12) January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and
Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba. (No mention of
assassination.)
File:
February 9, 1963 April 9, 1963
(36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney
General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]
[According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]
(38) March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney
General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission].
[DESTROYED]
(52)
wwwwwwww
- March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and
Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]
File: April 15, 1963 June 4, 1963
(68) Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts
developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem
and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by
representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during
his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains
the following:
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SENSITIVE
3
"I agree with the ONE estimate that
Castro's political position will im-
prove within the next year (barring
assassination).
"
The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not
proposing this.
(77) DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this
statement: "Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassi-
nation, will survive the efforts of internal opposition
elements... Context indicates DCI was not proposing or
considering assassination.
ff
(61) April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney
General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/
Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED]
☑
(62) April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about:
"Helms/Angleton Project.
[DESTROYED]
File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963
Nothing Relevant
File: July 23, 1963 November 26, 1963
(133) August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan,
Tom Ross of Chicago Sun Times [MISSING]
(138) September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group"
[MISSING]
(138)
Dow
September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]
(138) September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at
Justice Department [MISSING]
(158.5) October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at
Kennedy's house [MISSING]
(168) November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about
Kennedy assassination [MISSING]
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SENSITIVE
ww
(168) November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said
that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked
if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI
said no.
File: November 27, 1963
December 31, 1963
[Entire contents of file missing.].
From titles, nothing here appears relevant.
File: January 1, 1964 February 11, 1964
Nothing relevant.
File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964
[Entire contents of file missing.]
(25.5)
Meeting
February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald:
Situation Room Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]
"White House
(36.1)
[DESTROYED]
March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms
(46) April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: "EYES ONLY
NO DISTRIBUTION FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan;
Republican Platform of 1960."
[DESTROYED]
File:
H
April 6, 1964 July 8, 1964.
(49) April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren,
Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject:
DCI's Office"
[MISSING]
"Met in
(58) May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms Subject: "Warren
Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission
transcript and returned it to the commission." "No MR
expected" [MISSING]
(69) June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos
used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME" NO DISTRIBUTION
nothing on assassinations.
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5
File: July 8, 1964
August 12, 1964
(No file under these dates.)
File: August 12, 1964 September 10, 1964
Nothing relevant.
File: September 11, 1964 October 31, 1964
(138). October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich "NO DISTRIBUTION
discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter. [DESTROYED]
"
"In
(143) October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy:
Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY
NO DISTRIBUTION". [DESTROYED]
JAM
File:
November 1, 1964 December 31, 1964
Nothing relevant.
BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT
File:
October 25, 1961
July 31, 1962
(B)
December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President
and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were
possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassi-
nation attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela,
which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.
(6) February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President,
Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one
Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life
magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently, the
article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.
(12) ∙May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and
Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail.
No mention of assassinations.
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File: July 31, 1962 November 29, 1962 [actually covering
through Dec. 18, 1962]
(28) July 20, 1962:
At a meeting with the President,
Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed.
mention of assassination.
No
(52) October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive
Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.
(55) October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential
Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups;
estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press."
[MISSING]
(70) November 29, 1962: At a meeting of the NSC
Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed
Mongoose. No mention of assassination.
File: January 1, 1963 March 31, 1963
(7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President,
DCI, and Helms. No memo present. Listing does not indicate
whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally
indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note
of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file"
(8) January 23, 1963 (4:45 p.m.):
and President
(28)
WALLE
Meeting between DCI
missing memo; same situation as #23 (7) above.
March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI
"reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance
intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within
the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk'
with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.
File: April 1, 1963
July 1, 1963
(33) April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI
discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working
on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to
remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of
Castro by means which could be developed after the removal
of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination.
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>
SECRET:
SENSITIVE
7
(43) May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and
others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were
discussed. No mention of assassination.
(50) - June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and
others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against
Cuba, including "external sabotage." Vague memo of record
by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.
File: July 1, 1963
November 12, 1963
(74) November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI,
and others, "McCone emphasized that to a very considerable
extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and
forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect
some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking."
(This was in a general discussion of covert actions against
Cuba; no mention of assassination.)
File: November 23, 1963.
December 31, 1963
(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told
Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City.
DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City:
"...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by
Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."
(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In
meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed
"contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent inves-
tigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the
DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.
(4) November 29, 1963:
".
In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B.
Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest
developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list
of "late developments" is in file, to be used for this purpose.
(Obtain copy.)
File: January 1, 1964 ⠀ April 2, 1964
Nothing relevant.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 529
SECRET SENSITIVE
01515
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SECRET
8
SENSITIVE
File: April 3, 1964
May 20, 1964
(19) April 7, 1964:
re Cuba Covert Action.
Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective
set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective
of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the
military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the
eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the
elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba. (emphasis added)
[OBTAIN COPY]
Meeting of DCI, President, and others
File: May 21, 1964 October 5, 1964
September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to
discuss "Warren Commission Report (to set up Presidential
Committee)" No memo indicated to have been prepared.
File: October 6, 1964 December 28, 1964
Nothing Relevant.
BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP,
CHRONO (1962)
File: 303 January
December, 1963
Several sets of minutes have the following notations after
paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special
minutes for additional items." No such "special minutes"
appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same nota-
tion appeared in connection with other subjects.
This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem.
Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of
Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.
Nothing else relevant.
File: January December, 1964
Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to
"explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in
the immediate future." (May 12, 1964)
*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 530
SECRET SENSITIVE
01516
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SECRET
SENSITIVE
9
The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964)
contained the following: [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)
"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve
the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders.
Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and
stated that he would like to go into the matter further.
Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was
being put on notice and should do everything in its power to
ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then under-
take prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the
matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law
enforcement.
静
Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this
meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same
information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA
memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate
leading Cuban government leaders." This memo apparently had
been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General.
[OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following:
"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we
should take to establish the credibility of the report; also
communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should
call the Attorney General personally."
The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee
meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report)
contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba.
Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had
only the following reference to Cuba:
"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for
August were approved and the July operations were noted."
File:
Counterinsurgency
January June, 1962
Nothing relevant.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 531
SECRET
www
SENSITIVE
01517
PROPERTY OF
THE HOUSE OFFICE
BOX 7 MISCELLANEOUS
SECRET
SENSITIVE
10
Envelope "Cuba Loose Ends"
Much information on Mongoose.
No mention of assassination.
Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled
"Communism and the Negro Movement
A Current Analysis"
contains comments on Dr. King's personal life. Relayed by
J. Edgar Hoover to McCone.
File: "Cuba Background Material"
This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile
crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations.
File: "White House"
This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence
to, from, and of interest to the White House.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 532
SECRET
SENSITIVE
01518
PROPERTY OF
FUG-WANTE HOUSE C
SECRET
ww
SENSITIVE
11
wwww
BOX 5:
MISCELLANEOUS
The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this
box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which
purports to list the files in the box.
File: Cuba 1962
Nothing relevant to assassinations.
File: Cuba 1964
February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central
Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs
Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect
to Cuba." This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible.
courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with
respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as
an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It,
however, contains no mention or reference to possible assassi-
nation of Castro.
BOX 6:
MISCELLANEOUS
File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964
Nothing relevant to assassination.
File: "M" File
Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.
File: "D" File
This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen
Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement.
There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.
File: "W" File
Nothing relevant.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 533
SECRET
SENSITIVE
PROPERTY OF
01519 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

When Castro Heard the News
Havans
It was around 1:72 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We
were having lunch in the living room of the modest
summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magni-
ficent Varadero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havana.
For at least the tenth time, I was questioning the Cuban
leader on details of the negotiations with Russia before
the missile installations last year. The telephone rang,
a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dor-
ticos, President of the Cuban Republic, had an urgent
communication for the Prime Minister. Fidel picked up
the phone and I heard him say: "Como? Un atentado?”
("What's that? An attempted assassination?") He then
turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck
down in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone
and exclaimed in a loud voice "Herido? Muy grave-
mente ("Wounded? Very seriously?")
He came back, sat down, and repeated three times
The words: "Es una mala noticia." ("This is bad news.")
He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call
with further news. He remarked while we waited that
there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in Amer-
can society and that this deed could equally well have
D! he work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a
Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The
second call came through: it was hoped they would be
able to announce that the United States President was
still alive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel
Castro's immediate reaction was: "If they can, he is
ready re-elected." He pronounced these words with
satisfaction.
This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had
held on a previous evening and which had turned into
an all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 10 in
the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of
the talk revolved about the impressions recounted
to him of an interview which President Kennedy
granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel
Castro's reactions to these impressions. During this
nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself lof
a relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the
recent past Washington had had ample opportunity
to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead
it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping
and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me
that he wasn't in the least fearful of his life, since.
danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become
a victim of the United States this would simply en-
ha.
his radius of influence in Latin America as well
as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he
said, from the viewpot of the interests of peace in
TABN
both the American contingets achieve this goat, a
leader would have to arise in the United States capable
of understanding the explosive realities of Latin Amer-
ica and of meeting them halfway. Then, suddenly, he
had taken a less hostile tack: "Kennedy could still be
this man. He still has the possibility of becoming,
in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the
United States, the leader who may at last understand
that there can be coexistence between capitalists and
socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be
an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for
example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you
can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all
my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have
assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await
his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible
for everything, but I will say this: he has come to
understand many things over the past few months;
and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that
anyone else would be worse." Then Fidel had added
with a broad and boyish grin: "If you see him again,
you can tell him that I'lling to declare Goldwater
my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!"
This conversation was held on November 19.
Now it was nearly 2 o'clock and we got up from
the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio.
Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and
intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts
from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came
in, Vallero would translate it for Fidel: Kennedy
wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder
of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: Presi-
dent Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to
me: "Everything is changed. Everything is going to
change. The United States occupies such a position in
world affairs that the death of a President of that
country affects millions of people in every corner of
the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin
America, Cuba, the Negro question... all will have to
be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy
was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed.
This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter."
After the quarter-hour of silence observed by all
the American radio stations, we once more tuned in
on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a re-
broadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange
indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn
ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a
circle of worried faces. "Now," Fidel said, "they will
have to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly,
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 534
otherwise, you
watch and see, I know them, they with
try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell m
how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four
This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has been
assassinated. You know, when we were hiding out in
the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in an-
other) who wanted to kill Batista. They thought they
could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have
always been violently opposed to such methods. First
of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, be-
cause so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been
killed he would have been replaced by some military
figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists
pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also
opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is
repellent to me."
The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter
felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy
was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings.
Fidel exploded: "What sort of a mind is this!" He re-
peated the remark several times: "What sort of a
mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations
after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin
Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it
mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes de-
cency, dignity, respect. There are even street urchins
who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally,
this reminds me of something else: if you
those things I told you yerday against Kennedy's
policy, don't use his name now; speak instead of the
policy of the United States government.
write all
Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since
there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we
must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He
wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a
granja de pueblo (state farm), where he had been en-
gaging in some experiments. His present obsession is
agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies
and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, ·
and the possibilities which will give Cuba, enough
sugar cane by 1970 to achieve economic independence.
"Didn't I Tell You"
We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas
police were now hot on the trail of the assassin. He
is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five
minutes later, correction: he is a spy married to a
Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't tell you; it'll be
_my turn next." But you. The next word was: the
assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came
through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man
who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Com-
mittee," that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel
declared: "If they had had proof, they would have said
ALIUBLIC
he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In
saying simply that he is an admiss, this is just to try
and make an association in people's minds between the
name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the
assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda
device. It's terrible. But you know, I'm sure this will.
all soon blow over. There are too many competing
policies in the United States for any single one to be
able to impose itself universally for very long."
We arrived at the granja de pueblo, where the farm-
ers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker
announced over the radio that it was now known that
the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." One commen-
tator followed another; the remarks became increas-
ingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then
excused himself: "We shall have to give up the visit
to the farm." We went on toward Matanzas from where
he could telephone President Dorticos. On the way he
had questions: "Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his
reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy?
With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of
the attempted invasion of Cuba?" Finally and most
important of all: "What authority does he exercise
over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch,
saw that it would be half an hour before we reached
Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to
sleep.
After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state
of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting
the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before,
he said to me that it was an irony of history for the
Cubans, in the situation to which they had been re-
duced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of
a President of the United States. "After all," he added,
"there are perhaps some people in the world to whom
this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese
guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine,
Madame Nhu!
I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the
sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army
with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming
captions HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA IS NOT ALONE. ...
I thought of all those who had been led to associate
their deprivations with the policies of President John
F. Kennedy.
At dinner I was able to take up all my questions.
What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of
the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent
was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to
envisage relations between Cuba and the United States
along the same lines as those between Finland and the
Russians? How was the transition made from the
'humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism
of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an
explanation for everything. Then he questioned me
8
NW 50955 Docid:32423630 Page 535
“
2
DECEBER 7, 1963
once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized the
intellectual qualities of the assassinated President, !
awakened the keenest interest in him.
The Cubans have lived with the United States in
that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized
with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy.
In that very sective city of Havana to which we re-
turned in the evening, where the luminous signboards
with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and
toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Soviet exhibits
and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emo-
tion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of re-
sentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of
everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rap-
prochement. After all, this American President was able
to reach accord with our Russian friends during his
lifetime, said a young Cuban ellectual to me as I was
taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apolo-
gizing for not rejoicing at the assassination.
JEAN DANIEL
ROMANS
"Robert Frost wrote 50 years ago, 'nothing is true except as a man or men
adhere to it - to live for it, to spend themselves on it, to die for it.' We
need this spirit even more than money or institutions or agreements."
- JOHN F. KENNEDY, November 18, 1965
By Saturday night, even the television seemed worn
out by attempt and failure and ceased to comment and
gave over to a succession of photographs of the col-
imns and the windows and the corners of the White
House and of the shadows of the great Lincoln head
in Springfield and to a voice reciting "Oh, Captain,
My Captain." It is to be, then, the grand style. But the
ship has not weathered every storm; Mr. Kennedy is
not Abraham Lincoln; not because he is more or less,
but because he is a remembered physical presence and
Mr. Lincoln an image of the plastic arts. One's own
time is personal, not historical. Just how long will it be
before many of us will want to read a book about the
day Mr. Kennedy was shot?
The news of the President's assassination was given
by a taxi driver to three gentlemen as they left a hotel
on Arlington Street in Boston. They turned right
around and hurried back inside to attend to their in-
vestments. Packed with students and businessmen a.
shuttle plane from Boston to Washington waited for
permission to take off when the captain came on the
intercom: "Folks, up here on the flight deck we've been
listening to the news and the President is dead." There
was only time to hear one woman say, "How dread-
ful" before three men went back to discussing plan
specifications. A college student reading Agamemnon
pa to visible attention. One of his notes read, "love-
ine." The plane took off, the stewardess collected
the money and started to serve drinks. Then the cap-
tain was back again. They had been listening to morė
news, that is trying to listen to news because their
real job was to hear flight control. There had been a
gun battle in Dallas; a patrolman was killed; the police
had taken a man in vie theater. Vice President
Johnson was now the President. The talk of business
went on through this, and stopped only when the
tain again interrupted to say that the new President had
been sworn in aboard an aircraft. A few laughed.
cap-
They ask too much of us when they ask us to act up
to the grand style. We are not an emotionally affluent
people. And yet some of us always complained that
Mr. Kennedy did not seem quite emotionally commit-
ted enough. But now someone remembered with special
affection a moment late in the 1960 campaign. Mr.
Kennedy was in a motorcade and the Democratic gov-
ernor who was with him said how wonderful it was to
feel the love with which these crowds pressed forward
to feel the touch of their candidate. "Oh, dry up," Mr..
Kennedy said. It seemed now somehow a special grace
in him that he used only the real in emotion and ab-
stained from fabricating the expected. He had too much
respect for the grand style to counterfeit it; how much
truer to him might we have been if we had come down
in scale and if the many of us who must have remem-
bered the lines from Cymbeline had thought them
proper to speak
"Fear no more the heat of the sun/Nor the furious
winter's rages.
Thou thy worldly task hast done/Home. art thou
NW 50955 DocId:32423630
Page 536
1
火
Flash from Dallas
:
Just as Secret Service men reacted instinctively, rushing to protect the
presidential party, reporters reacted instinctively to get the news-sketchy
as it was at first-to the world. United Press International's Merriman
Smith, dean of the White House correspondents, describes on pages 32-33
his frantic rush to call the Dallas UPI bureau. Reproduced here is the result
of Smith's first efforts-the actual Teletype copy that almost immediately
clacked out of hundreds of UPI machines in newsrooms, radio and
television stations, pressrooms, and business offices all over the world.
DETECTIVES WERE THERE AND THEY ASKED HIM TO LOOK IN THERE (THE BRIEF-
CASE) FOR SOMETHING.".
THE CASE WAS OPENED AND AN ENVELOPE WAS FOUND CONTAINING 44 $100
BILLS, THE WITNESS SAID. THE STATE HAD SAID IT WOULD PRODUCE 
THAT
PIECE OF EVIDENCE BUT IT HAD NOT LISTED IT 
AS ONE "OF THE SEVEN
LINKS. THE DEFENSE HAS IMPLIED IT WILL TAKE THE LINE 
THAT 
CAROL'S
DEATH AFTER A SAVAGE BLUDGEONING AND STABBING IN HER 
HOME WAS THE
MOREDA 1234 PCS
RESULT OF AN ATTEMPTED
At 12:34 the Teletype was
supplying copy on a
Minneapolis murder trial.
UPI A7N DA
PRECEDE KENNEDY
DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
MOTORCADE TODAY IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
JT1234PCS..
UPI AЯN HX
2ND ADD 2ND LEAD THOMPSON MINNEAPOLIST
BUOS HO
UPHOLD
DA IT YRS NX
UPI A8N AJ
DAY
CORRECTE
BUOS UPHOLD--NX
The Dallas bureau, alerted by
Smith over radiotelephone from
the press car as it careered
toward the hospital, sends out
the first sparse news.
Minneapolis starts to add more
details on the murder trial. The
New York bureau, knowing
that ace reporter Smith is covering
the President's trip, tells all
bureaus to "uphold"-get off the
wire. "Dallas, it's yours."
Atlanta tries to interrupt, but is
quickly squelched by the
New York bureau.
UPI AЯN DA
URGENT
1ST ADD SHOTS, DALLAS (A7N) XXX DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.
THE INCIDENT OCCURRED NEAR THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON MAIN
STREET, JUST EAST OF AN UNDERPASS LEADING TOWARD THE TRADE MART WHERE
THE PRESIDENT WAS TO MA
The Dallas operator begins
sending the rest of Smith's account
from the press car.
FLASH
FLASH
KENNEDY SERIOUSLY WOUNDED
PERHAPS SERIOUSLY
PERHAPS FATALLY BY ASSASSINS BULLET
JT1239 PCS
22
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 537
At the hospital, Smith sees the
President's limp body in the ca
and races to a telephone. At
12:39, nine minutes after the
shooting, the grave news flashes
over the wire.
UPI 9N
BULLETIN
1ST LEAD SHOOTING
DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GOV. JOHN B. CONNALLY
OF TEXAS WERE CUTDOWN BY AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS AS THEY 
TOURED
DOWNTOWN DALLAS IN AN OPEN AUTOMOBILE TODAY.
Now reporter Smith is dictating a
story ready for printing.
MORE JT1241 PCS
UPI AION DA
1ST ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING DALLAS (9N DALLAS XX TODAY.
THE PRESIDENT, HIS LIMP BODY CRADLED IN THE ARMS OF HIS WIFE, WAS
THE GOVERNOR ALSO WAS 
TAKEN TO PARKLAND
.
RUSHED TO PARKLAND HOSPITAL.
CLINT HILL, A SECRET SERVICE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MRS. KENNEDY, SAID
HE'S DEAD, AS THE PRESIDENT WAS LIFTED FROM THE REAR 
OF A WHITE 
HOUSE
.OURING CAR, THE FAMOUS "BUBBLETOP" FROM WASHINGTON. 
HE WAS RUSHED
TO AN EMERGENCY ROOM IN THE HOSPITAL.
OTHER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WERE IN DOUBT AS THE CORRIDORS OF THE
HOSPITAL ERUPTED IN PANDEMONIUM.
THE INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST EAST OF THE TRIPLE UNDERPASS FACING A
PARK IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
HEAR
MORE 144PES
Smith rolls on, swiftly and
fluently, adding fresh details as
"pandemonium" breaks out
in the corridor outside his
telephone niche.
UPI A11N DA
2ND ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING (9N DALLAS) XXX DALLAS.
REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
HEARD WHAT WOUNDED LIKE THREE BURST OF GUNFIRE.
SECRET SERVICE AGENTS IN A FOLLOW-UP CAR QUICKLY. UNLIMBERED THE IR
AUTOMATIC RIFLES.
THE BUBBLE TOP OF THE PRESIDENT'S CAR WAS DOWN.
THEY DREW THEIR PISTOLS, BUT THE DAMAGE WAS DONE.
THE PRESIDENT WAS SLUMPED OVER IN THE BACKSEAT OF THE CAR FACE
DOWN. CONNALLY LAY ON THE FLOOR OF THE REAR SEAT.
IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT
MORE 145 PES
Searching his mind for
impressions of the shooting,
Smith adds all he can remember
to the story. The shaken wire
operator stumbles in the
second line.
UPI A12N DA
IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT ONCE WHERE KENNEDY WAS HIT, BUT BULLET
WOUNDS IN CONNALLY'S CHEST WERE PLAINLY VISIBLE, INDICATING THE GUNFIRE
MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE COME FROM AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON.
THERE WERE THREE LOUD BURSTS.
DALLAS MOTORCYCLE OFFICERS ESCORTING THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY LEAPED
FROM THEIR BIKES AND RACED UP A GRASSY HILL.
MORE 146PES
As yet nothing is known of the
sniper, what kind of weapon
he used, or where the
shots came from.
UPIA13N DA
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 538
23
:
Ambalbtor Hymande: Armas apologizes
late in calling him, but because of an interni,
until now. He adds that "I spoke with this yo
to what I have treaty informed and which I
the concrete point which you asked me about,
Dorticos:
Decidus
ving beca
the line, he has not done so
Hii not add anything important
Abully.
with respect to
Mab there was no offer of any kind".
"ah, I had
"no...I wasn't asking about an offer" ndez Armas:
ortions: "no, I was referring
as to
understood that with the confusion of the..."
"ah,
"NO,
Whether they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate.
had in given money to the man...that American...understand?" Hernandes Armas:
no, no, no, not at any moment". Dorticos: "nothing of that?" Hernandez Armas:
no, that nothing absolutely was given to her...rather they (enderezar
"then we can go along version of your
the interrogation...." Dorticos:
information?" Hernandez Armas: "yes, Sr. Presidente, of course".
ll yes,
1
r the
а
z
straightened cut?)
Dorticos:
"then
nothing more of importance?" Hernandez Armas: "No, nothing important...xx anyway,
am going to submit soon a draft of all the details, because there are other details
of minor importance, and others of none at all, but contained in the statement...
and.
and I have asked her to make me a du draft as prolific as possible to submit it
at the first opportunity"
Amy calline
Par to Clark
Birald
NW 5095 DocId: 32423630
Page 539
رجاع شده ام
• COPIES OF SPANISH LANGUAGE
TranscriptS AND SOME ENGLISH:
TRANSLATIONS OF TELEPHONE
IN
CONVERSATIONS AS CONTAINED
THE MEXICO CITY STATION FILES
11/26/63
1839
foyda
Hans by
This document is prepared to respons to your request and is :
nation outside your Commitice. Its is limited to officiul
your Commite and the con ent may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
eltthout the express approat of the. KR.
Memorandum
к.к.
Mr. Belmont
10
DATE: November 27, 1963
FROM :
C. A. Evans
GN
Rosen
Sullivan_
avel
Trotte
John F
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
SUBJECT:
ASSASSINATION
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
Вла
Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach telephoned at 10:50 a. m.
He said he had 
just 
completed talking on the telephone with Alexis Johnson,
Deputy Under Secretary 
of State. Johnson told Katzenbach that insofar as
the investigation 
of this matter in Mexico is concerned, the State Department
felt this should be coordinated 
and directed by the FBI. State took the
position that the 
President's directive to the FBI extended to any activity
outside of the United 
States, as well as within the country. Insofar as the
Ambassador in Mexico is 
concerned, Johnson believed he should be kept
informed of any pertinent 
developments but that the Ambassador should not
be running the 
investigation.
As to current developments, Katzenbach said that the last thing
he would want 
would be for 
the FBI to take Agents away from their investiga-
tive duties to prepare 
reports. He requested, however, that if there were
any pertinent developments 
he be orally briefed.
I have will contine E. K
With further reference to his conversation with Alexis Johnson,
Katzenbach 
said 
he had been asked whether the State Department should make
a formal inquiry of the Soviet 
Government for information concerning Oswald
and his wife, 
particularly as to their activities in Russia. He asked that this:]
question be 
considered by the Director, as Katzenbach felt his views most
important.
In thinking about the matter himself, Katzenbach noted if we
did not ask the Soviets for information there would be no answer should the
question of Oswald's stay in Russia be raised, other than to admit we had
made 
no inquiry. On the other hand, he observed that we could not place
any reliance on anything the Soviets said.
RECOMMENDED ACTION:
1
REC-118
ORRECORD
62-109060-1493
After conferring with Messrs. Belmont and Sullivan, the
1 - Mr. Mohr
1
Mr. DeLoach
1
Mr. Rosen
RETED FROM
25 DEC
1963
1 - Mr. Sullivan
CAE:vap (8)
DEC 10 1963
XEROX
FEB 27 KIG
FBI
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 540
Memorandum to Mr. Belmont!
following recommendations are submitted with reference to the points
raised by Mr. Katzenbach:
1. Insofar as making a formal approach to the Soviet Government,
we believe 
this undesirable. Such a formal 
request from the United States
will enable the Russians to put out 
an official statement entirely favorable
to them. The United States will have 
to accept this, since it is in response
to our formal request, and we won't be 
in a position to disprove it. The
State Department has responsibility 
here and we should not dictate the
position they are to take, but our 
views should be stated.
2. In connection with the investigation in Mexico, it is
recommended 
Katzenbach be 
informed that the State Department and
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
have jurisdiction in dealing with foreign
governments and in getting investigative 
results and intelligence coverage
abroad; that while we are cooperating 
fully with State and CIA in Mexico,
the responsibility in this matter should 
rest with State and CIA.
If approved, Katzenbach will be so advised.
V.
Donez
2.25pm
5 11/27/63
Ok. The ambassador
E
Sinc
in
Tike
a
aa
Sha
acting.
lady?
indicated in the wives
received this m
め
ты
ming
NW 50955 DecId: 32423630
Page 541
RUM
FEB 27 1916
2
Li
NW
SECRET
Project ZRRIFLE
HARVEY EX! R371
6/25/75
друг
☑
1. Identification: The purpose of Project 2RRIFLE is.
to spot, develop, and use facin agent assets for Divisie D..
pox operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas,
michiding the United States, but it poses for operational
security resious will probably not be used in their
countries of residence. Present developmental activity is
bening conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it
is unticipated that this will be extended to other division
areas. The project will be operated against third-country.
istallations and personnel.
Objectives: The objective of this propet is the procurement
and information concering such materials,
of of code and cipher materials, in accordance with
requirements levied on the Clandective services, premerely by.
the National Security Agency: fince these requirements
subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would
be valid for the duration of the project. Specific
operations will be mounted on the basis of need and
opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division
I with assistance from area divisions and stations as
3
RECER
needed.
JUN 24 1975
CIA
3. Background: re response to the increasing requirements.
for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher
material, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of
agent arcets as a
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Crimigal Sanctions.
Docid:32423630 Page 542
developmental activity. During the same
FIGHT
Classified by 007789
Exempt from general
declassification, scheduto of E.O. 11852
exemption schedulo 53 (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Puto Impossible to Determine
SECRET
2
[N]
-period requirements from NSA became more refined and in
many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are
not equipped to conduct this tippe of operation and because
of the desirability of completely centralized control over this
∙entine effort, it was determined that Division ), which is
in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could
best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity
has now advanced for enough to justify removing from
the OSA category.
4. a perstional assets:
(1) Personnel: OFWIN is under writter
-contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of
spotting agent candidates. Of fine was first contacted in
1958 through the chief of the Luxembourg I. S. by
the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with
an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For
a period of a year and a half babe was contructed in to
sporadically by COS, Licembourg, in behalf of the
Burlan of Narcotics Hiles of this Bureau reflect
October
an excellent performance by Of Jivin. On septime 1960,
RECEIVED NOT
KIN 24 1975
SECUES
NW 5955
DocId: 32423630 Page 5431
CIA

SECRET
3
& Juvin annual selovy:
Travel+ ops expenses for
$7,200
Qui & other agents & agent candidated : 2,000
Nees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates :
Travel of staff employees
engaged in Zrrible activity:
Hire of safehouses, automobiles.
and other operational expenses:
2,000
2,500
1,000
$14,700
Pay for agents on
_completion of jobs ?
SECREE
NW 60955 DocId: 32423630 Page 544
RECELE
JUN 24-1915
CIA
SECRET
4
11). Legal, ethical morale, operational problimes; political: non-attribute-
bility.
Mw
2) our experience (Bangkok). (+ effect on DDP) and experimices.
_w/ KGB (Croesup, Bandera grans, holls) require negat
- proficusial, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable,.
CE-experienced opc officers (few available), able to conduct pateict
search of refute to mill back if mistrict or knowledge tells hime
Offrown high regard for operation security.
he should, & Assessments are all-important.
3) Maximum security:
a. Kubark only (e.g.; what does firaques now
know?); no approach to othes Saut. agencies.
b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control.
search, tracing, case officering, etc - DDParthority
in this focal point mandatory. Dci officially cloriced?
c. Max. security cable commco for inocuous
travel; possibidats
caldes only; no restrictions on
of one-ma
man quercess
(Europe) control base with
t.
owener (non-station) commor word of mouth +
no backfulness ne triis
(except for search)
d. No PA's or mitermediaries; rigid case - officering,
from start to finish.
e. No approach to officials of foreign-
gauts-
RECEIVE
f-no use
WIN 24 1975
CTA
e of amphis any agent who
exier morked for a HA. Gott agency Tracing.
hy opposition would reved--
g. Use of already tested auto (e.g.,
Manhel) in the search.
h. Stand-by list of Rubashers who can
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 545
SEGREI
SECRET
IS
1471
5
-pass as foreigners.
i. Pretect: utilic/D search; this tallerledes., Rimes),
to discussions 
in stations. h. No "team" mitit
Blackmacte
ready to go if stalls
4. Blackmail
a. No American citizens or residents or
people who ever obtained vis, visa
b. No chain of connections: strictly person to
person; singleton ops.
c. No matting any candidate in home tantory..
1.g., Sicilians
l. Exclude organizations criminals, those
afrecord of smects, those of metability of purpose
as eximinals
e. #taffers muiolved - selections.
5. Cover: planning should include provision for
Planing Husor Gecks in case of blo
6. Testing of
security this at nominees essentist: vre following lineatione,
7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.
8. The nobody who has never dealt if criminals; otherwise
will pust be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such
as follow to trand, wanted lists, etc.
$9.
9. Should have phony 201 in to backstop this, all
documents therein forged & backdated. Should lookblic
a CE file.
10. Possible use of staffers for the action.
n. Silverthorne.
Keeping of files,
RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24. 1975-
CIA
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 546
"
SECRET
freek to travel b
Legal; operational + ethica> merele problems. [Khokhlo
7
sig life not recure enough
6
1) Maximum security + within Hubark only (e.g., how much
does firaques now know?). Thimitation on number isdi
cerks for enciphering & deciphering thrise of Levice objective.
=) t'me focal point for resoch, control, tracing, exce-officer + FA
selection. Complete DDP outhority in this focal point mandatory
Overvas one-man control base with own
own 
(non-station) comment
3) Every operation to fie nigibly case-officered; no silk-start
_PA's.
non-attritictability:
4) No Americane antigone or Pucovician residents for direct action;
possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal.
who taiited by use by another American
agency.
agency. Use of
Jesse officers who can pass as foreigners - and limited.
official reference
5) No chair of poremections permitting blackmail.
6) Don't meet any selected in have territory.
7) Avoid discussion in foreign officials mitil all possibility,
of search through private citizens (e-g. Ofen hos
billy examined.
RECEIVED FROM
24 1975
8) Plamming should include prouicon for blaming
Soviets (or becks) me esse
CIA
of blow is 4 above essential.
9) Exclude organization Ovenimals, those with record of
arrests, those who have engaged in severd type of crime
NW 50955 D: 32423630
Page 547
SECRET
(10) Corsicans recquemended. Sinision could dead to
Mafia.
(11) Former recistance peresund offer possibilities, (ass
archies S
12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each
selestee.
all
13) Kubark personel involved should have some CE
experience.
14) Silverthoric & stable in Paris.
15) What are limits on teams or individuals
.selected? No "team" until ready to go.
16) 750 Danger of stardlys,
{
RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 548
CEODET
sed of -25%
Exec cation
Estionn
(_ "The magic button
Parcotics Bino
"for a living
"
(8
RIS 201 Cover
Cautions - Bankruptcy - no Star
A.
eiges- Jim h
not a TSD f
3 apply brakes
Contrackstruct
From U-2
Last resort beyond lost resad a
a confer
El Benefactor
waknees.
assumptions
Example or 3 "wrong"
Framework of Sid's job for
Et
R&D - memo
Translating machines"
177
عساف
bosic sounds project.
phensons - fruunth CB)
Com-year
Gusthesia
AS- Fanfor_200/- matter-
26/1
no fil Bernew-
RECEIVE
JUN 24 1975
CIA
mew never mentors
word ass
1. Select proper opern to rin-
2. Place & cover
3. Security Rules
4. Mine levies
5 Last Resort - Brakes.
max 2
B-WIN-AS-
3
sid - Reserv.
Sustler-li
alexx
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 549
SECRET
6. no oth
SECRET
одель
ぐ
7. no projects or popers
except for coves.
ท
8. Principal Orgent - (Mankel)?-
AF- Proper cheft ICH-
tested 1500 - from NB-
mash spat roma
den Plicke
project.
G. Disposed
10.
Targets who wher
must know befa
we can spat
храх
11. case officering
12. cover file
create & prou
nonser
}
RIS or abi
13. had dangers of RIS counter
actions & monitor if they
are blamed
ZdJlest.
Remember
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 2423630 Page 550
RECEIVE
FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA
January 28, 1976
The Honorable Otis Fike; Chairman
House Select Committee on Intelligence,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Congressman Pike:
Congratulations on your Committee's great servico to the American elec
torate in removing some of the mask of secrecy from the domestic covert
operations and funding of the CIA. Secrecy protected counterproductive
and indefensible covert operations for twenty-seven years, The light
of exposure 
and cleansing is now enhancing our countie's security. The
publishing of your excellent report over CIA and White House objections
is an act of courage the electorate will soon appreciate.
Reliance, however, by any Congressional committee on tandouts from the
CIA itself, is like an investigative reporter compiling his story from
government press releases. Neither is doing the job the employer paid:
it to do.
Finding the hidden CIA budgets for three or four times the billions of
dollars admitted to the electorate is a commendable achievement. But
what would your investigators have achieved if a law was already in
force imposing criminal penalties upon CIA employees who leaked infor-
mation to you? The CIA proposed secrecy law is a blackmail weapon.
Intelligence, money and secrecy combine to constitute autocratic power
in our society. The Congress enjoys no intelligence service of its
Own. It enjoys no offective control over spending of funds hidden in
the budgets of non-CIA departments and agencico. If surrenders to
the doctrine of secrecy it is powerless indeed. To strengthen Congress'
power I offer you my own counterintelligence service in place. The
sources have been carefully tested and accumulated since 1949.
The problem is not leaking intelligence out of Committe; it is leaking
independent intelligence into it. Starting exactly one year ago today
I launched penetration offorts with a 19 page report aldressed to
"Chairman and Members, Select Committees on Intelligene Operations.
I hand delivered this report to every committee member's office. My
wife Nancy recorded the date, hour and person deliveret to.
On June 25, 1975 Edward Roeder III of your staff receipted for 103
pages of counterintelligence on CIA. This represented a distillation
of a quarter century of intelligence gathering. CIA control of the
Watergate breakin and coverup and CIA's investigation ɗ my penetration
of their secrets is covered. The application to the U.S. Attorney and
three U. S. Special Prosecutors requesting investigatia and prosecution
of murder of American citizens within the U.S.A. is inyour files.
Nevertheless, none of this intelligence leaked to recognition or inves-
tigation within the executive departments or your Committee.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 551
(2)
On July 30, 1975 Emily Shoketoff of your staff receipted for a one page
notification distributed to chairmen and members that Anne P. Commandu-
ras, an employes of CIA's domestic assassination office, had been mur-
dered in her apartment house swimming pool by CIA assassin Eugene Hale
Brading.
I now enjoy the additional intelligence that Commanduras was executed
with a CIA dart gun such as that displayed to news comeras by a member
of the Senate Intelligence Committes. The intelligence weapon fires a
sliver coated with shellfish toxin that kills within seconds, dissolves
and leaves no mark. The CIA preserved their shellfish toxin supply in
direct contravention of an order of the President. Your Committee filed
this report without action along with over 200 additional counterintel-
ligence. Is this secrecy that protects national security?
Congressman Pike, you have exposed $10 billion of CIA funding mostly
hidden in another budget. Will you go for more? Then examine the
State Department, Treasury Department, Justice Department, White House
and Congress appropriations. All of these support personnel accepting
orders for covert domestic operations from CIA.
You have uncovered CIA operations in the media. Investigate police
departments throughout the nation funded by LEAA that are responsive to
CIA ordor3. In the Fairfax County, Virginia, police department alono
a CIA assassin has twice employed the badge of the department as cover
to gain entrance to domiciles to perform executions.
I again commend your Committee for resisting the pressure for secrecy
in publishing your report. I deplore your resistance to the leaking
of intelligence into your Committoo. The latter confines your Com-
mittee's intelligence to official and unofficial leaking channels of
the CIA. Please concede that there are other citizens as concerned
for the security of America as you are.
I respectfully request opportunity to confer with you, Congressman Pike,
or with your capable, diligent and honest staff chief, A. Searle Field.
I want to assist your Committee in recommending remedial legislation
based upon 27 years of defining the problem,
Respectfully submitted,
Encl: Letters to Senator
Abrahan Ribicoff and to
Senator Frank Church.
Amos E, Heacock
Amos E. Heacock
4410 Cglethorpe, Apt. 700,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 552
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.
ACRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN., CHAIRMAN
JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE
LEE METCALF, MONT.
JAMES B. ALLEN, ALA.
LAWTON CHILES, FLA.
SAM NUNN, GA.
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
BILL BROCK, TENN.
RICHARD A. WEGMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
Mr. Amos E. Heacock
REQUEST TO TESTIFY ON DOMESTIC INTELLI
GENCE DIVISION, CIA
• PENETRATION OF
NON-
INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES OF GOP'T AND COUNTER-PENETRATION
BY SOVIET KGB.
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708
Hyattsville, Maryland
Dear Mr. Heacock:
نے تر ہے
United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
March 8, 1976
2334-HIlRL.
20781 Falls Church, L'a, 22043
TEL. (70) 534-397.5
Thank you for writing to me regarding your knowledge of
I understand
the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
that you have discussed these questions at length with members
of the Committee staff.
On March 1 the Committee reported S. Res. 400 creating
The legislation
a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities.
which was before us concerned only the establishment of a new
congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that would
significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA it-
self. The Committee has not been authorized to hire 
additional
staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Further-
more, we were under instructions from the Senate to report out a.
formal recommendation in the form of legislation by March 1.
I am, however, deeply concerned with the charges you
have made because, if true, they represent grave examples of
corruption and criminality. It is my hope and intent that the
new committee created by the legislation we are considering
,
once it is established, will have the jurisdiction and the re-
sources to explore the kind of issues which you raise.
I assure you that the entirety of the information you
have submitted to my committee will be made available to the
new Congressional oversight committee.
I am sure you understand the constraints on the Govern-
ment Operations Committee which prevent us from undertaking the
investigations you suggest, but I shall forward 
the material
you submitted to the new committee as soon as it is established...
For your information, I am enclosing a copy of S. Res.
400 and a copy of the committee's report on this measure.
Sincerely,
Che Rikiw
Abe Ribicoff
Enclosures (2)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 553

The Honorable Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman
Committee on Government Operations,
United States Sonate
Dirksen Sonate Office Building
Washington, D. C.
20510
Dear Senator Ribicoff:
January 28, 1976
Destiny has chosen you the second time in seven years to chair a com-
mittee with capability of establishing legislative remedies to prevent
domestic and foreign assassinations, huge corruption within military
supply streams, multi billion dollar currency manipulation and massive
intervention of the CIA in domestic covert operations.
On or about March 6, 1969 you were the acting chairman of the Permanent
Investigations Subcommittee that heard Cornelius Hawkridge, my witness,
describe a multi billion dollar currency manipulation racket in South
Vietnam. Carmine Bellino, staff investigator, prevented Hawkridge from
also testifying about truck convoys of stolen military arms and supplies
that he observed heading toward the Cambodia border, the "fence" for
these stolen arms was the fabulous Soviet KGB agent Jarques Yong, dos-
cribal by staff in your hearings to be a more Vistamoso commissary
clork. The organized crime vendors of the stolen goods reached into
your Committee in Carvino Bellino to protect their lucrative racket.
Hawkridge later wrote you a latter covering this deficiency in testi-
mony. He pointed out the sale of aras generated funds used in cur-
rency manipulation.
I aided the crippled Hawkridge aboard his flight at Seattle. Your Com-
mittos provided an ambulance to meet him for it was less than two
months since he survived an assassination attempt that killed his wife.
The Soviet KGB let a contract with organized crime's CA assassination
facilities to kill them. The KGB considered Hawkridge a defector.
William S. Wood, alias Willian Poxley, CIA alias Willice Harvey and
double agent for KGB fingered Hawkridge and his wife Angola, a "baby
sitter agent for West German and CIA intelligence. In the contrived
truck-car "accident" Hawkridge was crippled for life.
I met with CIA's Harvey as Boxley in November, 1968, in New Orleans
pursuant to my counterintelligence investigations. Harvey, witnass
before the Sonate Intelligence Committee, has admitted his role as
organizer of the ZR/RIFLE Executive Action assassination capability
and his contacts with John Rosselli and Sam Giancana of organized crino
to implement that capability. Harvey incorrectly jumped to the conclu-
sion for the KGB that Hawkridge was a cooperative soume of much of my
accurate counterintelligence on KGB.
Hawkridge had precipitated your investigation by appealing to a Treasury
official. The official prevailed upon Senator John McClellan, then
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 554
(2)
Chairman of your Committee, to conduct it. He first exposed the famous
"Prysumeen" account in a New York bank. It was used to convert South
Vietnamese piasters to dollars, most of which ended up in three banks
in the shiekdom of Dubai on the Persian Gulf.
My further investigation beyond the Committee probe, sabotaged by Bel-
lino, established the dollars were used to requisition gold ingots
from the U. S. Treasury at $35 per ounce, These were remelted to con-
venient "taels" or wafors of gold for black market trading for Indo-
china currencies again at huge discounts. The conspirators enjoyed
government facilities for converting piasters to dollars at fantasti-
cally unrealistic official exchange rates. The exchange provided huge
profits to conspirators and huge losses to the Treasury.
This inflation machine is still at work, though at a reduced rate since
the end of the war in Southeast Asia. The entrepreneurs seek greener
pastures where new wars destabilize currencies. Perhaps Angola?
Hawkridge's real name is Cornel Solyon. His intolligence activities
for a decade were traced in a 64 page report in the possession of the
Senate and House Intelligence Committees and your Committee.
Senator Ribicoff, had the activities of CIA-Crime double agent Carmine
Bellino and Hawkridge's testimony been exposed in the public record in
1969, the trauma for you, for your Committee, for the Congress and for
Bollino
the American electorate would have been mercifully softened.
went on to become Chief Investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee.
He covered up the sources of $1,050,000 of so-called political donor
funds I have traced. He went on to instruct CIA agent Alexander But-
terfield in the White House to reveal the existence of the President's
tapes, thereby insuring his downfall.
A file of my letters to Senator Henry Jackson in 1969 were sont by him
to your Committee. The intelligence was suppressed by Bellino. Although
your Committee published eight volumes of hearings in this investigation,
Hawkridge's vital testimony was deleted. My intelligence was disregarded,
The legislative remedies now being proposed to counter corruption of our
intelligence services can only be made adequate by exposing to public
view the depth of the problem of secrecy. I an alarmed at demands for
secrecy to support CIA covert operations such as those that led our
country into the most counterproductive covert operation in our nation's
history the war in Vietnam. Did the secrecy imposed by Bellino with-
Or did it
in your Committee advance the security of the United States?
insure the greatest humiliation of our foreign policy and our armed
forces since the birth of our republic 200 years ago?
I am alarmmed that criminal penalties are being proposed for public ser-
vants whose conscience impels them to notify Congress and the public of
irresponsible actions of men infected with the arrogance of power.
I
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 555
The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senato,
Russell Office Building,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator Church:
20510
January 28, 1976
Ref: My lettor 11/20/71
& encl. to Son. Welkor.
forwarded & acknowledged
your letter 1/7/75; your
acknowledgement data
5/5/75; my letter 7/11/75.
I commend the diligent efforts of you, the members and the staff in produc-
ing and especially in publishing the Committee's report on "Alleged Assa63-
ination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders."
Nevertheless, I must advise you that over 200 pages of counterintelligence
on domestic and foreign assassinations of the CIA I have provided or made
available to staff and members has been disregarded or deliberately with-
held from members.
Consequently, as members are preparing to sign a final report, it is timely
to list some of the disastrous errors of the interim report. The errors
are the result of intentional misrepresentation and deceit of the Congress
and the American electorate by the CIA, its directors and employees.
(1) The ZR/RIFLE Executive Action program begun in 1960, headed by Wil-
liam Harvey, was designed as a domestic assassination capability.
(2) Under the direct planning and implementation of Harvey, a number of
domestic and foreign assassinations were executed.
(3) Harvey's real name is William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, alias
W. J. Wod. His assassinations in USA I have already reported.
(4) Among foreign assassinations with participation by Wood's domestic
tean members on foreign duty are those of Lumumba and Trujillo.
(5) Orders passed by CIA for execution, rather than exiling or kidnapping,
caused the deaths of Ngo Diem, Ngo Nhu and Rene Schneider.
(6) CIA gave the code name WJ/WIN to the organized crime assassination
consultant employed to insure the killing of Patrice Lumumba. His
real name is Michael Genovese, alias Victor Resignio, son of Vito
Genovese, boss of bosses of the Mafia in Atlanta federal prison
until he died. Genovese enjoyed assassination authority independent
of CIA directors delegated by Meyer Lansky, boss of the American
international crime syndicate then. Neither President Eisenhower nor
President Kennedy conferred assassination authority upon CIA.
(7) Genovese, as Victor Resignio, directed an arms and supplies diversion
and currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam in 1966-67 that cost
the Treasury $51.8 billion, Executive Departments' total, not mine.
(8) Wood's crime team member that aided Genovese to assure Lumumba's death
was code named WI/ROGUE. He is Frank Sturgis, Watergate burglar.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page .556
(2)
(9) Sheffield Edwards, witness produced by CIA as its Director of Secur-
ity, was a spurious substitution to deceive the Committes and the
American electorate. Recruited from organized crime, CIA coached
him to appear as the Edwards or Colonel Edwards who directed the
carly alleged attempts to assassinato Fidel Castro.
The real Edwards who collaborated with organized crime's hit man John
Rosselli, his boss Sam diancana and Robert Mabeu, agent of Howard
Hughes, oil tool billionaire, was E. Howard Mat, Watergate burglar.
Edwards was Hunt's CIA name. The CIA poisoned Sheffield Edwards
after his appearance to prevent his recall and possible exposure as
a fraud.
(10) John Rosselli accepted assassination orders from nob leader Giancana
who accepted orders in turn from Meyer Lansky.
(11) Committed witness Rosselli was the hit man who shot Giancana with a
special assassination weapon developed by CIA. Ib: led the kidnapping
and execution of Janes Hoffa, one time Teamsters' president
as your hearings progressed.
- even
(12) Witness Robert Mahue executed the orders of Howard Hughes in contact-
ing Rosselli to implement a domestic assassination capability through
organized crime. Hughes issued orders to assassinate Fromier Ngo
Diem through Richard G. Danner, alias Cil Danner.
Danner precipitated the Hughes order to bug Laurence O'Brien's tolo-
phone in the Watergate complex by being caught forwarding a $100,000
payment on President Nixon's San Clemente and Key Biscayne homes for
Hughes to the President's friend, Bebe Rebozo. Hughes suspected a
plot by defector Mahou and O'Brien to blow the elction for Nixon.
"Gil" Danner was manager of the International Club in Saigon, owned
by the U. S. Embassy. He represented Hughes' interest in the $51.8
billion racket managed by Michael Genovese.
(13) CIA in 1949 established a Domestic Intelligence Division for covert
action within the White House, the Executive Departments, Congress,
political parties and the media.
(14) The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 was und as authorization
for CIA to implement domestic covert actions throgh funding and
personnel of domestic agencies of government. The Intelligence Direc-
torate of CIA is cover for domestic covert actions in the agency itself.
I am sure you will agree that had your staff investigated and confirmed my
counterintelligence during the year it has been available to you, the legis-
lative romedias recommended by your proliminary report wald have been found
unacceptably weak by Committee, Congress and the American electorate. Please
permit me to meat and serve you with counterintelligence input.
Encl: Letters to Son.
Ribicoff & Rep. Pike
Respectfully submitted, amor E. Heauch
Amos E. Heacock, 4410 Cglehorpe, Hyattsville,
20781, telephone 864-5353.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 557
(3)
am alarmed that no witness had pointed a finger of blame at the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 19491 It is the Magna Charta of CIA's Dom-
estic Intelligence Division. This act specifically provided cover for
CIA. It effectively repealed CIA's restriction to foreign operations
intended by Congress to prevent a police state.
The 1949 act authorized CIA to conceal huge portions of its budget and
personnel within the budgets and personnel roster of domestic agencies
of government. These especially include employees on Capitol Hill,
in the White House, in the Department of Justice, in the Federal Aviation
Administration and in the Civil Aeronautics Board. Until the act is
repealed Congress will remain part of the problem, not part of the
solution.
When Cornelius and Angela Hawkridge were hit by the CIA's domestic
assassins on January 10, 1969 my anger overrode my caution. I wrote
all fifteen members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February
23, 1969. I demanded that Hawkridge be heard by the Senate. Although
I received no replies, this forced Carmine Bellino's hand and Hawk-
ridge was subpoenaed. The recipients referred some letters to your
Committee.
Six months earlier my letter of August 14, 1968 to the Foreign Relations
Committed enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the
Industrial State." It concluded with the startling premise I am now
prepared to prove to the Senate:
"It is my firm prediction that when the Foreign Relations.
Committees get to the bottom of the CIA's conspiracy to
usurp Congress' foreign policy authority they will also
have solved the conspiracies behind the continuing
assassinations of the industrial state.".
I rely upon your fairness for opportunity to refute the claims of
William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to testify and to aid
your Committee to draft legislation that will effectively prevent
abuses of power by the government's intelligence agencies.
As an Air Force officer before, during and after World War II, I am
concerned, as I know you are, that our country's security will be pro-
tected. I will testify for more effective legitimate intelligence and
counterintelligence services. Perhaps the most effective testimony I
can give is that which will establish that the CIA has been thoroughly
infiltrated and corrupted by double agents who owe their primary
loyalty to the Soviet KGB.
Encl: Letters to
Senator Frank Church.
and Congressman
Otis Pike.
Respectfully submitted,
Amox E. Hearch
Amos E. Heacock
W110 Oglethorps, Apt. 703,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 558
2/4/14
(3
Memi
K₁
for Ambank to Sanchey : Requirements
Latin Americans in querilla training
in Cuba?
Number of training schools in Cuba?
③ are they training africans,
)
whhere ?/
and
④ Training for officers in charge?
fter of the
the training
Dessin
Dunction
⑥Do they instruct foreigners and
an the foreigners doing 
the
traming
( under whose auspices do they
operate?
how
are they selected?
What funds are used for
thi
operations and boow are they developed?
Staff Note's
☑
"
NW 50955
COPY
(Original copy cannot be reproduced)
ECRE
FIELD INFORMATION REPORT.
46:
COUNTRY:
Cuba:
REPORT NO.
HKH-1385
SUBJECT:
Assassination of Lt. Col. Antonio.
BLANCO Rico Solved
DATE OF INFO: 28-29 November 1956
Q
•PLACE ACQUIRED:Habana
DATE ACQUIRED: 29 November 1956
DATE OF REPORT: 30 November 1956
SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Cuban government official (8)
Appraisal of Content:3
1. Agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM, Cuban Military Intelligence
Service) are reported to have identified definitely the assassins of Lt. Col.
Antonio BLANCO Rico, former chief of SIM killed on 28 October 1956 at the Mont-
martre nightclub. On 29 November 1955 SIM agents interrogated Dr. Armando CARDENAS
Aranguren, instructor of pathology at the University of Habana, and succeeded
in obtaining an admission from CARDENAS that Juan Pedro CARBO Servia and Rolando
CUBELAS Secades 2 had sought refuge at his house after the assassination of BLANCO
Rico and had remained there approximately three or four days. CARDENAS stated
during interrogation that CARBO had arrived at his house carrying a sub-rechine
gun. On the basis of CARDENAS' admissions, SIM officials are convinced that
. CARBO and CUBELAS were the ones who killed BLANCO Rico.
2. Implication of CARDENAS and CUBELAS resulted from the interception of a cable
by SIM sent from Miami, Florida, by a friend of CUBELAS to Virginia SECADES,³
mother of CUBELAS, in Habana. On 27 November 1956 Virginia SECADES was arrested
by SIM and taken to SIM headquarters for questioning concerning her son's parti-
cipation in the assassination of BLANCO Rico. SIM agents were unable to obtain
any information from SECADES concerning her son's role in the killing but suc-
ceeded in learning that CARDENAS was a close friend of her son. On 29 November
1956 SIM agents picked up CARDENAS, who, under pressure, admitted that he was
a homosexual, that CUBELAS was his intimate friend, and that he had hidden
CUBELAS and CARBO in his home for about four days. These admissions were made
at SIM headquarters in the presence of Colonel Irenaldo GARCIA Baez, deputy
chief of SIM, Lt. Col. Marcelo TASERNILLA, who was wounded during the shooting.
of BLANCO Rico, and other high SIM officials.
3. Interrogation of CARDENAS failed to reveal the destination of CARBO and CUBELAS
after they left the home of CARDENAS. On the basis of the intercepted cable,
dated 23 November 1956, however, SIM officials believe that CARGO and CUBELAS
fled toes by ship, since both possessed visas to the United
States which
at the present time.
AUG 15 1875
CIA
valid. CARBO and CUBELAS are believed to be in Miami
SECRET
COPY
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 560
COPI
(Original copy cannot be reproduced)
SECRET
4.
AUG'
REPORT NO: HKH-1385, Page 2
DATE
30 November 1956
SIM has transmitted the results of interrogation of SECADES and CARDENAS to
President Fulgencio BATISTA, but the latter's reaction to these new develop-
ments is not known. Further action by the Cuban-authorities is complicated
by the fact that the Government's main witness, CARDENAS, is of dubious re-
liability, because of his homosexuality. CARDENAS is also reported to be
the doctor of the family of Santiago VERDEJA Neyra, Minister of Defense, who
vouched for him when he was arrested by SIM.
Field Comments:
1. Office files contain no previous record of CARDENAS in connection with
anti-BATISTA activities. A Dr. Armando CARDENAS was listed in Hov (defunct
newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party), issue of 22 April 1949, as one
of the persons who sent greetings to the World Congress of Peace Partisans,
scheduled to begin in Paris on 20 April 1949.
2. Both CARBO and CUBELAS have been the subjects in the past of denunciations
and arrests by the Cuban authorities as a result of their anti-BATISTA
activities. They were accused in August 1955 by Colonel Orlando PIEDRA,
chief of the Department of Investigations, of having fled from the police
from the site of an arms cache. In February 1956 CUBELAS was arrested and
tried on charges of participating in student disorders, according to articles
which appeared in local newspapers on 15 March 1955 and 1 April 1956. CARBO
was denounced by the Cuban police as one of BLANCO Rico's killers immediately
after the shooting incident at the Montmartre nightclub.
3. Office files contain no previous record of Virginia SECADES, Habana news-
papers of 29 November 1956 carried an item in which the University of Habana
Student Federation protested against the detention of Virginia SECADES by
SIM.
4.
5.
Files of the Consular Section, United States Embassy, Habana, revealed
that CARBO was issued a tourist visa on 3 June 1954 and that CUBELAS re-
ceived a similar visa on 15 October 1954. The files do not indicate
whether these visas were valid for a single entry or multiple entries, but
they could still be valid, on the basis of the dates of issue.
FROM
1975
CIA
Police officials announced immediately after the assassination of BLANCO
_ Rico that they had information as to the identity of the two assassins,
haming CARBO but not his accomplice, and that they were on the trail of
the latter. The police have failed to find the killers, however, and re-
portedly, under pressure from President BATISTA and General Francisco
TABERNILLA, Chief of Staff, Cuban Armed Forces, SIM: and the police have
It is
been making desperate efforts to solve the BLANCO Rico killing.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 561
COPY
(Original copy cannot be reproduced)
SEGRET
REPORT NO:
HKH-1385, Page 3
DATE
30 November 1956
possible that CARDENAS may have been forced by SIM interrogators to make
statements implicating CARBO and CUBELAS which were not altogether true.
6. The local press and radio reported on 29 and 30 November 1956 that United
States authorities were looking in New Orleans for two Cubans who were sus-
pected of being the killers of BLANCO Rico. They were identified by name as
Rolando CUBELAS Secades and Guillermo GARCIA Riestra. The latter, while a
student at the University of Habana, was accused of having participated in
an attempt against the life of Rolando MASFERRER in September 1949, accord-
ing to office files.
7. Avance, Habana-afternoon newspaper, published the official SIM version of
CARDENAS' arrest on 30 November 1956; other newspapers carried it subse-
quently. It contained substantially the same information as reported
above, but it also implicated among others, former president Carlos PRIO Socarras
in the assassination of BLANCO Rico, alleging that PRIO had helped CARBO
and CUBELAS to escape from Cuba.
RECEIVED FROM
AUG 15 1975
CIA
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 562
ER
- COPY -
TVAT
MEMORANDUM:
SUBJECT:
PEARE
JEURET
18 March 1965
Proposal to Exploit
L-I
Jose Rebellon in
AN
and
Operation
t-
It is proposed that at the next meeting with
wo pass a messago as follows:
"A big comandants or capitan who used
to bo a leader of the university students
opened a numbered (secret) account in
Switzerland through, Colombian Suarez (7
successor). He was traveling in Europe at
that time, roughly December, 1964-January 1965.
The deposit was in the amount of $10,000."
The message is purposely so phrased that it could apply to
both. L-d and Jose, Pabellon Both Ana' past presideuts
of the FEU (Federation of University Students), one is a
comandante and the other a captain, and both were traveling
in Europe in December 1964-January 1965.
2.
Subject proposal has taken the following information
into consideration.
L-I
Wher
His
The record: The file shows that since .
L-I
April 1959 and repeatedly since then !
has threatened to eliminato CASTRO, but has
not done so. He also was reportedly on the
vorge several times of defecting but never did.
There are numerous reports of varying credibility
that be has been and is _Castro agent.
character is such that he has been described.
in a report as "a probable thief, a possibla
user of narcotics, a homosexual or a friend of
homosexuals," but also "an exceedingly brave
man. Various reports indicate that he is a
heavy drinker and a party lover. Thus a person
with such traits could resonably be bolioved
to be involved in irregular financial transactions.
read 28 Aug 65
SECRET Sun
NW 509 DocId: 32423630 Page 563
།

b. Favorable factors (from
standpoint):
gave
for
}
WW-1
اسا
OPS
In the summer of 1962. 4-1
$500 in Helsinki to be deposited
in a European bank "for a rainy
day.' In March 1961. . 2-1 showed great
sensitivity on the subject of bank accounts
in Europe by Cuban officials, indicating that
he night shoot any official so involved.
C.
Conclusion: While it cannot be
discounted that .
may be a Castro_
L-I
agent, itay bo that he has been sincoro
In his dealings with
doubts through an folyGRAPH
been impossible since
CIA
Resolution of
interview has
bit the
L-I
ceiling when the matter was first mentioned.
L-I
Presumably CIA'S interest in
L-/ is to see him carry out bis mission
to oliminate CASTRO The above proposal
may actually stimulate the desired action.
If
is questioned by the regime in
connection with this charge, and should the
investigation involve a certain amount of
harassment and unpleasantness, he might well
reach the conclusion that the time to take
matters into his own hands (which he has
threatened to do for several years) has at
last arrived.
If
L-L
is a Castro agent and
Castro should be aware of _ L-1 's relation-
ship with CIR Castro might conclude that
L-I
received the money from
banked it without reporting it, and was in
fact working with CIA against Castro.
(At the recent meetings in Paris.
asked us for $10,000 We did not give him
this sum, though W-I gave him $7,000.)
CIA
L-1
-
cand how
he
going to get
cut 
of Jisil
to 
do so
?
which we
had.
himp
once told
he
could have
If for any reason the regime should
do away with
- his alleged sympathizers
in the Armed Forces might feel they must react.
at once to save their own skins. Given the
tense political situation in Cuba today, this
is not out of the question and certainly this
proposal could split the regime more.
FROM
GIA
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 564
L-1
I himself fill
B-1
the last tim
his french
Any of
World
do would
be to help her
ON TH
CON MAY
3
1
Jose Robellon
RECE
SECRET
Rebellon is a non-controversial good
OPS play for
target for inclusion in this
the following reasons:
2-1
b.
Bo is close to Castro, as well as to
and has a Communist background.
He is familiar with the $80,000
Account opened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador.
Carrillo in the fall of 1964. Rebellon has
been authorized by Castro to draw on that
fund for purchases related to Castro's pot
projects. Castro night think that Rebellon
had raided Castro's own official fund.
As with
انتا
any action by the
regime against Rebellon might widen splits in
Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness
and tensions in interpersonal relationships that
we desire.
NW 505
DocId
23630 Page 565
ECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff
ATTENTION:
VIA:
Mr. Walter Elder
SA/DDO
SUBJECT:
SSC Request
REFERENCE:
RS 76-0083/A (14 January 1976)
10 February 1976
RECE
ROM
FEB 11 1976
CIA
Attachment "A" contains
1. Re question number 1 of reference:
the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City, Mexico, during
the period 1 September 1963 through 31 December 1963 and who are still
on duty. Attachment "B" contains the names of Agency personnel who
were in Mexico City during this same period but are now retired or no
longer on duty. It is understood that these attachments will be
retained in the Headquarters building for use by the Committee Staff.
2. Re question number 3(a) of reference: For your background,
the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) was a Cuban student
exile entity founded in September 1960 as an anti-Communist revolutionary
organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Castro regime! The parent
organization of the DRE was the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a revolu-
tionary organization of Cuban students opposed to the Batista regime
which actively joined the Castro forces by organizing a guerrilla move-
ment which contributed greatly to the collapse of the Batista regime.
The Castro government, themselves of student origin, recognized the DR
power and by-passed them politically by forming the new regime without
their participation. The original DR became Communist controlled and
directed. While the Agency had no role in the founding, the DRE was an
entity used by the CIA as a unilateral asset in pursuing U.S. policy
objectives. CIA support to the DRE ceased on 30 September 1966 and formally
terminated on 1 January 1967. At that time DRE files were reviewed and
material dealing with CIA support and operations were either destroyed
or turned over the JMWAVE Station. The DRE was expected to continue as
an organizational entity and continue its activities independent of CIA.
3. The DRE files of both Station JMWAVE and Headquarters that are
available have been reviewed and Lee Harvey Oswald's name does not appear
in these files. WAVE cable 8049 (in 66782) of 22 November 1963, states
in the third sentence, "according AMSPELL files, Oswald", undoubtedly
refers to the DRE files maintained in the DRE office in Miami, Florida.
CRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009560
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 566
T
These entity files were independent of the JMWAVE Station files. Had
Station JMWAVE referred to its files in WAVE 8049 the cable would have
been worded, "according AlSPELL Station files." The file of AMHINT-53,
a former executive of the DRE, has also been reviewed and no reference
to Oswald was found. The file number which appears on WAVE 8049 is no
longer in use and the contents of this former file were transferred
into Oswald's and other 201 files by the CI Staff. A tape of the radio
debate cited in WAVE 8049 is included in the Oswald 201 held by the CI
Staff.
4. Re question number 3 (b) of reference: We have been unable to
determine if Station JMWAVE was instructed to review its files for
information on Oswald. For many years the CI Staff has been the focal
point for the collation of any and all information concerning Oswald
and if the JMWAVE files on any Cuban groups contained information on
Oswald such information should be reflected in Oswald 201 file.
Attachments:
A & B as stated
NW
DocId: 32423630
age 567
SE
Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division
FROM
REGI
FEB 11 1976
CIA
Hernandez Armas:
26/11/6 =
05:
آئے
"Listen, I have your confidential (report) 125, about the Sm.
Duran case and i want to ask you for some declarations on this! you can tell un
no
10".
in detail". He adds "Listen...that's true...of blackmail, what you say here in the
confidential (report), the Federals of that country wanted Sra. Silvia Duran to say
something, that they had some interest in, and had offered some money to the
American? (Oswald). Hernandez Armas replied that "no, no, nothing about money,
Dorticos continued speaking, "and they tried to detain her, to oblige her to make
a statement". Hernandez says that "she was detained, and was questioned with respect
to this visit and the request for a visa, and then she said that she had requested
the visa, had filed out the documents and the reply of our government had been
Dorticos asked if "you spoke with her". Hernandez
Regative, not granting the visa".
said that yes, "I could talk to her yesterday and I immediately sent the report".
Dorticos: "understand? if all this is true, better that it be known; if she is being
_ DETAINED.
:::::::: by those people, better too."
Hernandez: I was saying that she was
detained Saturday afternoon, and freed in the early morning, and yesterday was when
-I-found her and could talk with her, she referred me (? me refirió) and I took
advantage of the fact that a plane was about to leave with our mail. Dorticos: yes,"
yes, you sent that, I already know what you sent...do you know what happened? that
the paper that I have here, and don't tell me that that is what happened?
Hernandez: What I have just told you besides the interrogation. Dorticos:
it that they asked you? Hernandez: They asked her concretly about whether she knew.
what wes
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 568
1
this individual; if she had gone to the Consulate; if she had personal relations, and
even if she had intimate relations with him...she denied all that, only..
.Dorticos:
intimate relations with him?-- Hernandez: Yes; she denied all that and said that
it was a case like any other, of the many of the hundreds of cases that come to
request visas at the Consulate, and if she remembered in detail of this case it was
because this man had an incident with our Consul...he had an incident witheranodonsnèn
in which our Consul AZCUS, rebuked him and practially threw him out of the Consulate.
BRUISES
Dorticos: and why does she have) (hematomas) (ESR),
h, 
did they
treat her badly? Hernandez: well, yes, yes. Dorticos: what did they do to her?
CRUISES
• Hernandez:
She has a few
arms during the interrogation.
was done.
to the c
Hernandez:
on the arms, because she says they squeezed her
Dorticos: what was it...as she told you about what
In this way, Presidente: they want to her house and took her
ice of Federal Police and interrogated her to the extreme
REGENFROM°
JAN 23 1976
CIA
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 569
2.
ї
I was telling you about. Dorticos: and the maltreatment, how was it?
her.
Hemmander:
At the time of interrogation, trying to impress her so that she would tell all she
had to say, that she knew, and then was when they took her by the arms and shook
Dorticos: listen, Joaquin and did they aske her some other question about maney?
no, no, absolutely, it seems... .Dorticos: did they try to get a statement
Hernandez: no, no, absolutely from what she told me, they limited themselves
principally to try to find out what relations she had had and her husband with
this individual. Dorticos:
Hernandez:
from her?
and they spoke of money? Hernandez: no, no, she has not
told me anything about money, they did not talk to her about that, that is, she has
SAID
not told me that they spoke to her about that. Dorticos: Mirabal p
to a friend.
something about that. Hernandez: eeh? well, I asked her if there had been some
interest, if they had questioned her abmx on other points, if there had been something
else, and she did not speak about that. Dorticos: At any rate, question her some
more, investigate more and x call me here.
you immediately.
Hernandez: Good, Presidente, I will call
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 570
UpS1 LUDIQ Oct
FIDEL CASTRO SAYS HE
KNEW OF
OSWALD THREAT
TO KILL JFK
By COMER CLARK
"Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's
possible that I could have saved him.
"I might have been able to
be put into effect."
but I didn't. I never believed the plan would
These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel
Castro in Havana on July 15.
he wanted to work for us.
"Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro
went on. "The first time I was told
"He was asked to explain, but he
wouldn't.
"He wouldn't go into details.
"The second time he said he wanted
to 'free Cuba from American imperial-
ism.'
"Then he said something like: 'Some-
ΟΙ ught to shoot that President Ken-
nedy.'
"Then Oswald said and this was
exactly how it was reported to me
'Maybe I'll try to do it.'
"This was less than 2 months before the
U.S. President was assassinated.
"The two visits occurred close together,"
Prime Minister Castro told me. "I didn't take
them seriously."
My hard-won interview took place in the
middle of a cheering, jostling mob on the
sidewalk of La Rampa, the main "show
street" of Cuba's capital, Havana.
Although millions of words
have been written claiming
that Fidel Castro was behind
the Kennedy assassination, no
newsman has been able to se-
cure a personal interview with
the Cuban prime minister for
his views on the slaying of the
U.S. President.
To shed more light on the most
dramatic event of the 20th
Century, The ENQUIRER sent
Comer Clark to Havana for
a face-to-face meeting with
Castro.
And here, for readers of The
ENQUIRER, is the exclusive
story of the dramatic interview
with Castro.
PRIME MINISTER of Cuba, Fidel Castro, was
addressing admiring crowd when ENQUIRER
reporter drew surprising statements from him
in unexpected rapid-fire interview.
meeting of the Organization of Latin American Soli-
darity.
"The Prime Minister is bound to be very busy.
You will have to be patient.'
While waiting for permission to interview the
prime minister, I was taken on official visits to
Cienfuegos Bay to watch the construction of a
Castro had arrived unexpectedly to in-
spect progress on the building of a Cuban
pavilion, erected with those of other Com-
munist countries to mark the July 26 cele-
bration of Castro's rebellion against the Ba- ago Diaz, of the Cuban consulate in London, massive sugar processing and storage plant. And
tista regime.
And also to mark the meeting in Havana that permission to visit Cuba had been "cleared" in Cuba.
who deals with entry inquiries. Diaz told me then I went 
to Trinidad, one of the oldest towns
of 
Castro's rebel Organization of Latin 
Amer- (though I was unable to learn what specific . I noticed that the windows of many Trinidad
ican Solidarity (OLAS) confer-
ence, due to open on July 31.
I had applied to the Cuban em-
bassy in London during April-
May for permission to go to Cuba
to interview the island's prime
minister.
Although a British subject does
not need a visa to enter Cuba,
approval by the Cubans for the
entr
necessary.
Otherwise, the incoming visi-
for risks being turned away at
Havana airport. The approval
came at the end of June and
was telephoned to me by Santi-
Page 4
NATIONAL
ENQUIRER
REPORTER: Comer Clark's
questions netted new facts.
Oct. 15,1967
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 571
checks on my eligibility had been
made).
There are only three legal ways
to enter Cuba by air. From Mexico
City, from Prague, Czechoslovakia,
shops were barren of goods.
For example, in the former Woolworth store on
the main street, the entire window facing the street
was empty.
windows were pictures and photographs of Fidel
The only things that filled many otherwise empty
or from Madrid, Spain. So I flew to Castro and propaganda posters. Many shops are
Madrid and entered Cuba by 
air- simply shut, because of a shortage of consumer.
liner on July 9.
goods.
In Havana, I immediately applied Soviet help in construction schemes was obvious
to 
the Ministry 
of External Rela-- particularly at Cienfuegos Bay. Some old Ameri-
tions for an 
appointment to see can machines were still in use, but much of the
Prime Minister 
Castro.
new construction equipment was either Russian or
Japanese.
In London, I'd been assured an
interview would not be too difficult
to obtain. But Senor Laurencio Cor-
doso, who dealt with foreign press
queries was not quite as optimistic
Inspection tours, however, weren't what I had
come for. I kept asking about the Castro interview
and kept being told I'd have to be patient.
Many early-bird delegates to the OLAS confer
ence started to arrive now. Waiters, public servants
"You know, there are the annual and others began pinning on OLAS buttons. With all
celebrations of the rising against this activity, I began to feel my waiting and hoping
Batista," he said. "And 
then the
as that.
(Continued on next page)
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restaurant on La Rampa, and was there
☐ the evening of July 
15 when there
sudden sound 
of cheers in the street.
Ny people hurried from the restaurant, and I
d in the general 
direction of the crowd.
ere were 
shouts of "Fidel! Fidel!"
rohad, indeed
, arrived.
That I Could
May of Castro's public appearances are made with-
for warning. Partly, 
this 
seems 
to be for security
.
ness. But, 
also
, 
because it is regarded as "in accord-
.th 
the spirit of the rebellion." Sudden, dramatic
sspurning protocol.
pushed into the cheering crowd as
in his familiar "fatigue" uniform of
green and a sweat-cap, 
acknowledged
Cheers and looked 
admiringly at the
A pavilion.
Fespoke several times rapidly in Spanish.
shed through the mob 
toward him,
gripped me.
and my Press card in my hand and
it. saying (in English) that 
I'd like to
prime minister when he could spare
see me. I hoped some nearby 
offi-
ld be able to translate my request
Vatro
_ apparently Castro himself heard my
voice above 
the background of
te zub noise.
- turn-
bearded prime minister
and understands English well
und flamboyantly and; raising his
called to me in a friendly way:
here do you come from, senor? Don't you
A we're having a great celebration?"
I called out that I was a British news.
man and had been trying to get an ap-
ment to see him. Again, I waved my
Picard.
What's wrong with right now?" he asked
ous good humor and plainly happy to
wing on a show for the crowd.
Have Saved
Him, Says Fidel
OF THE
ENT OF THE F
UN
HIT CUBA HARD: President John F. Kennedy is
shown in November 1962 as he told newsmen that
Russia had agreed to remove weapons from Cuba.
Prime Minister," I said, "it's been sug-
several times that there was some
involvement or link with the assas.
of American President Kennedy.
Could you tell me if there is any truth at all
"
Castro looked straight at me, thought for a
few
s and then made the dramatic statement,
ted at the start of
article, that he'd
eports of Lee Os-
5 visits to Cuba's
City embassy
dn't believed the
serious.
did you form
ew?" I asked.
farro replied: "Well,
were two calls in
veeks. I later learn-
stayed at the em-
about 15 minutes.
me. He gave the
Lee Oswald each
LTA
The calls were re-
to Havana, as a
of course, un-
the authority of our
LEE OSWALD
NOW LINKED TO CUBA
assador in Mexico, Senor Joaquim Hernandez."
I asked: "Did the ambassador himself see Os-
.......
✓ afro replied: "No, he was seen by an aide.
an aide."
went on: "Let me be clear. I just didn't be-
at he (Oswald) meant this. I thought that he
✓ have been some sort of wild man. Or maybe
...
ter money.
seemed that to kill the head of a state
pid. Just pointless. As far as Cuba was con-
the policy of the American government
go on, anyway."
I acked Castro, frankly: "Did you have any
Eft of warning the American government
Oswald?"
ro replied, spreading his hands: "We don't -
in't have any relations with the American
ment, anyway..
I'd taken it seriously, I might have informed
ted Nations or some other official agency
at. But who would have believed me? People
have said Oswald was just mad. Or that I'd
mad."
Suddenly asked: "What is your name, any-
I told him.
"Well. Mr. Clark," said the Prime Minister,
Page 5
NW 50955
NATIONAL
ENQUIRER
DocId: 32423630 Page 572
|
"I thought the visits might be something to do with
the American CIA whether anything eventually
happened or not.".
DIDN'T HELP: Castro admitted he had heard
of the assassination threat but gave vague rea-
sons for not reporting it to the United Nations.
view under odd and difficult circumstances. If he
could be taken at his word, Castro had shed new
light on the Kennedy assassination mystery. I hoped
to learn even more at the formal interview, which
was still pending.
On July 17 I was telephoned at my hotel by Senor
Cordoso, who had tried to arrange the formal in-
terview.
Cordoso said: "I am glad you had the chance
of meeting the Prime Minister. You were very
fortunate.'
I agreed and asked when my longer interview
would be granted.
But Cordoso explained he'd been told by the
Prime Minister's office that Castro would be heavily
Cries from the crowd began to divert Castro's engaged with the anniversary celebrations and meet-
attention from me. I desperately asked if by "any-ings with OLAS visitors.
thing happened" he meant an assassination of Pres-
ident Kennedy.
"Well, it crossed my mind. But I didn't give
much thought to it," he said.
"Then, too, after such a plot had been found out,
we would be blamed - for something we had noth-
ing to do with.
"It could have been used as an excuse for an-
other invasion try. In any case, people would have
tried to put it at my door."
Castro started to make his way to the edge of the
sidewalk.
As he did so, he added: "I was not responsible
for Kennedy's death. I will tell you that.
"He has a lot of pressing engagements - those
and other things," Cordoso said. "I can't see any
chance of another personal interview at all in the
near future."
This was the final decision, and I decided to make
arrangements to leave Cuba. I flew to Mexico City,
where I called at the high-walled Cuban embassy
to see if I could learn more about Oswald's two
visits there.
The grilled double gates were opened by a gate-
keeper to allow in some official-looking diplomatic
car.
I quickly showed him my Press credentials, and
asked if I could see anyone of authority inside the
"I think he was killed by U.S. Fascists - right embassy.
wing elements who disagreed with him."
Then he started speaking again in Spanish with
those immediately around him, turned and said
But the gatekeeper replied in halting English:
"No, no Press. It is impossible."
goodbye to the crowd, climbed into his car and Oswald situation, except for that one revealing
was driven away.
The wall of silence had been lowered on the
moment with Castro himself on the sidewalk in
It had been an unexpected and shocking inter-|Havana.
160
INTRIGUE: Cuban Embassy in Mexico City was visited twice by Oswald before assassination.
RUBAN
""
mbassy of the USSR
S. A. Washington
Section 3
• Reznichenko
wald M. N.
nce and, therefore, by this
of replies (sic) to my appeals
> the USSR and residence in
the expediting of this matter
fully,
BOX 611
-Continued
Wiven
NW 50935 Docid:32423630 Page 573
sation Pa
and
COMMISSION EXHIBIT 15
33

TOP SLODET
R2125
R
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Jim Johnston Paul Wallach
FROM:
Dan Dwyer
DATE:
SUBJ:
January 21, 1976
CIA Briefing with Raymond Rocca Regarding Oswald
Early in our investigation of CIA's handling of the Oswald case,
Raymond Rocca briefed Wallach, Dwyer and Greissing on November 11 and
13, 1975. Some of Rocco's comments merit consideration in light of
our present knowledge of the case.
1.
Opening of 201
Rocca explained that Oswald's 201 was opened by Betty Egerter::
from a list of American defectors 1958-1960 from the State Department.
2.
Status of 201, 11/22/63
7.
Rocca explained that on November 22, 1963 all documents in the
Oswald 201 were originated by other agencies; Mexico City cable
traffic was not included in the 201 because it was routed through
a compartmentalized channel and therefore would not be circulated
via the 201.
3.
Oswald's Defection to USSR
With regard to Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, Rocca
said Oswald would have been of interest to the military and the FBI
and that CIA was only interested in the "information" aspect of the
case. Rocca could not cite any, example of a U.S. citizen defecting
on behalf of any interest of the U.S. government.
With regard to the "Hoover" memorandum of June 3, 1960 raising
the possibility that an imposter could be using Oswald's birth certifi-
cate, Rocca believed Hoover would not have generated it.
Rocca sug-
gested someone at the Bureau who was familiar with Soviet technique
of using birth certificates for illegals Larry McWilliams, Brannigan
or Cregar would have authored the memo. (Rocca could never establish
if, in fact, Oswald took his birth certificate with him to the Soviet
Union.) Rocca commented that the Bureau memo, sent to State and ONI,
should have been forwarded to CIA by State, but never was.
In Rocca's determination, Oswald was the only American defector
who was allowed to stay in Russia following a suicide attempt. Rocca
said that Oswald would have been subjected to one or two assessments
by the KGB.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 574
المراة
Rocca referred to an SB study, directed by Lee Wigren and con-
ducted by Virginia Valpi which compared the Oswald case to other U.S.
defectors and their wives. SB concluded Oswald was not given special
handling by the KGB. Rocca maintains Oswald was given special treat-
ment. He believes Oswald's relationship with the "Red Cross" (from
which Oswald received financial assistance) and the Red Cross' relation-
ship with the KGB should be clarified.
Rocca also finds it peculiar that Marina married Oswald since
Marina's uncle was KGB. Rocca said that Oswald was the only defector
who married someone with a KGB connection of that kind. Rocca said that
the CIA developed this information after the assassination.
Rocca described Minsk as "not an unsensitive section" of Russia
and added that Oswald was the only American defector in Minsk, a white
Russian area.
Rocca commented on Oswald's surprise visit to the American Em-
bassy in Moscow by saying that "people don't do that kind of thing
in Russia'
Rocca believes Oswald's Soviet diary is bona fide. Rocca ad-
mitted that although there are perceptible changes in the quality
of Oswald's written material, Oswalds' mentality seemed conducive
to periods of attention to thoroughness and detail.
4.
Alleged Debriefing of Oswald
Rocca did not have any knowledge of an alleged debriefing of
Oswald in New York City by the DCD. Rocca said that if a debriefing
report existed, it would have been distributed in 00 series (overt
operations) of the DDI (now DDO). Rocca also noted that a debriefing
report would not have been filed in the Oswald 201. Rocca noted that
a Dr. Froyn (phonetic) supervised DDI records. Rocca also said that
Traveler's Aid was a legitimate charitable organization which had no
ties with the CIA.
5.
Oswald and Mexico City.
Rocca said that Chief, WH could clarify aspects of technical
operations on Cuban and Soviet Embassies. Rocca said that David
Phillips organized the technical surveillance..
✓
Although the Cuban Embassy was officially closed on September
28, Rocca found nothing unusual about Oswald's visit there and meeting
Silvi Duran, Cuban consulate employee.
Rocca emphasized that Oswald's activities in Mexico City were
the responsibility of the FBI.
༢༽༼༽
TOP
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 575
6.
TOP SECRET
Possible Oswald-Cuban Connections
Rocca described document gaps in the materials that the Russian
and Cuban governments forwarded to the WC via diplomatic channels.
He described these areas. as "open and relevant.
"
Rocca drew attention to Oswald's Marine duty in California in
1958. Basing most of his analysis on testimony of DelGado, Oswald's
sergeant in California, Rocca maintained that Oswald had made contact
with the Cubans at the Cuban Embassy in Los Angeles. Rocca said that
DelGado had to release Oswald from guard duty because someone from Los
Angeles reinitiated contact while Oswald was on duty.
11
"
Rocca placed specific emphasis on Castro's "impromptu comments
to Harker at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana on September 7, 1963.
Rocca viewed Castro's comments as a "message" to American leaders
and said it was a "very important signpost,
Rocca added that the
Mexico City Station brought Castro's comments to Headquarter's atten-
tion on 11/25/63. Rocca also viewed Castro's comments in terms of
Oswald's possible perception of them, since New Orleans Times Picayune
ran the Harker article on September 9, 1963. (This is the line Slawson
adopted: could Oswald have read the piece?).
In regard to the Castro comments (unfortunately my notes are
sketchy here) Rocca refers to a 10/24/63 cable, memo, or letter from
"Des to Paris.". He then refers to an 11/5/63 memo for the record and
said "man never heard from again. Rocca should be asked to clarify
these references.
"
"
Rocca briefly outlined Cuban-Russian relations in the early 1960s.
he described 1961 as the "seed time" between Cuba and the USSR. Rocca
said that following the missile crisis, the KGB and DGI began a "pre-
liminary relationship.' Rocca mentioned Srotoff (phonetic) and
Alexiev (sic) as being KGB principals involved. Rocca said that when
Castro visited Moscow in June-July 1963, Alexiev and Leonoff served
as liaison between Kruschev and Castro. Rocca referred to an escalation
of Alpha-66 activity (sporadic revolutionary attacks on Cuban ports,
vessels, etc.) in July-August 1963. Rocca places Castro's "warning"
of September 7, 1963 in the context of these activities.
Rocca said that Oswald's activities for the FPCC in New Orleans
were apparently self-motivated. Rocca added, however, that V. T. Lee,
national chairman of the FPCC, visited Cuba in 1964. Rocca noted that
(fnu) Hernandez handled Lee's case and that Hernandez' office was next
to Azcue's, who, according to Duran, argued with Oswald at the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico City. According to Rocca, Hernandez was mentioned
in penetration reports from Guatemala where Hernandez was running two
DGI agents.
Rocca outlined these relationships briefly to demonstrate
DGI FPCC connections. Rocca concluded that the Warren Commission should
have paid more attention to the DGI. Rocca also mentioned that the
CIA picked up a DGI defector named Mugg in April or May of 1964, who
was handled by WH Division.
TOP CODET
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 576
7.
Oswald, New Orleans, Garrison Case
Rocca said that the CI/R and A stayed on top of the Garrison case
and "summarized overt developments." Rocca identified the analyst
for the Garrison material as Donald Pratt. Rocca said that by NSA
intercepts and associated relationships, the CIA believed Garrison
was operating (unwittingly) under KGB manipulation. (Rocca briefly
described Soviet technique of misinformation. He recalled an inter-
view that Drew Pearson had with Kruschev in Cairo in 1964 or 1965.
Kruschev told Pearson that his "gut feeling" was that American right-
wing extremists and capitalists were responsible for the President's
assassination. Rocca said this typified KGB disinformation.)
Rocca characterized Oreste Pena's allegations as "absolute
fabrication.' Rocca said CIA files revealed that Clay Shaw was a
contact of the DCD until 1956..
"
Rocca said that he was never informed in 1962. or 1963 about
a revolutionary training camp around Lake Pontchartrain. He believes
that the GIA did not know of its existence. Rocca said there is evi-
dence that messages from the Lake Pontchartrain camp were going to a
drop in Mexico City.
8.
GP FLOOR Period
GP FLOOR was the crypt used to describe the investigation con-
ducted by CIA following the President's assassination (11/23-1/12-15/63.)
The Mexico City aspect of GP FLOOR was controlled by WH: J. C. King,
Chief; Jack Whiten, Desk Chief, and Win Scott, COS, Mexico City. Rocca
said that Whiten would report Mexico City developments to Helms who
would then inform McCone.
9.
End of GP FLOOR: Warren Commission
With the formation of the Warren Commission, the GPFLOOR period
ended. Rocca explained that Helms served as the major liaison between
the CIA and WC. Rocca served as chief of research for matters of in-
terest to the WC. mostly concerning Oswald's defection to Russia.
Rocca's staff included: Thomas Hall, Arthur Dooley and Paul Hartman.
Hall conducted research on Soviet service in DDO. Dooley followed all
Bureau developments forwarded to CIA. Hartman was responsible for ex-
ploration of overt references and Soviet service." Additionally, Hartman
researched DeMohrenschildt's relationship to the Oswalds.
Rocca reported his research staff's findings to Angleton; Rocca
had no contact with Helms. Rocca explained that he had some liaison
with Slawson of the WC staff. Rocca said that any negotiation between
the CIA and WC was conducted by Helms, Dulles, and Rankin. Rocca said
he had no knowledge of any CIA assassination attempts against Castro.
Rocca emphasized that the FBI was the investigative arm for the
Warren Commission. Rocca said that Sam Papich, Dick O'Niell (sic) and
Jim Hunt were the Bureau personnel involved with the WC.
TOP SECRE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 577
Rocca said that additional research in CI was conducted by
David Murphy and Bagley, Chief and Deputy Chief of CI/SB. Rocca
said that Lee Wigren and Virginia Valpi were also involved in
Soviet R&A.
10.
Rockefeller Commission Inquiry
Rocca served as CIA liaison to the Rockefeller Commission
in regard to Warren Commission allegations. Belin and Robert Olsen
were involved in the investigation. Belin wanted Rocca to review
documentation regarding the photo of the unidentified individual
in Mexico City. Belin told Rocca that the Warren Commission was not
clued in on Cuban emigreeissues and Operation MONGOOSE. Rocca de-
veloped the impression that the Rockefeller Commission was looking
into CIA's operations aimed at Castro. Belin asked Rocca for the
Castro comments of September 7, 1963. Belin was not aware of the
statements during the Warren Commission. (Slawson, however, was but
only at the conclusion of the WC.).
Rocca also said that Belin is writing another book on Oswald
and the President's assassination.
TOP SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 578
MEN
O DOMIN
JUS
CE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
FEB 24 1976
Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C.. 20510
Dear Senator Church:
Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response
to the request in Item 15 of a letter dated January 14,
1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.
Sincerely,
Michel & Shahm
MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Voug + att admin
y = wallach
із
REVOLUTION
BICENT
1775-1976
су
cy -
Police
Tissue
Chim
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 579
VL-C-
5-031
1976 FED 27 AM 11:41
TITLE CN
ILUSASE ACTIVITIES
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
DEPAR
*
R
#
OF JUSTIC
*
**
BUREAU
62-116395
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
February 19, 1976
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 14,
1976, requesting access to various materials contained in FBI
files.
Item 15 of referenced letter requested access to
materials pertaining to FBI contacts or interviews of
Loran Eugene Hall from January, 1963, through December, 1975.
Material responsive to Item 15 has been assembled and is
available for review by SSC Staff members in Room 4171,
J. Edgar Hoover Building.
SSC Staff member Paul Wallach advised on
February 10, 1976, that the portion of referenced request
concerning Item 14 is withdrawn.
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 Page 580
TOP SECRET
1
2
that
3
I then got a call from Bundy on October 2nd, and he said
Chase, I think his name was. Peter Chase, one of his
assistants is the person to be in touch with, and to keep
him apprised of all developments.
I later again got a word from Jean Daniel; the French
5
6
7
ripe for a conversation.
8
correspondent who had come back from Havanna saying Cuba seemed
So this also came from another source,
a Greek town planner named Doxiati;, who said that Castro was
9
10
very much interested in some kind of normalization relation,
but that Che Guevera and Raul were opposed.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
+1
October 21st, I got a call again from Bundy's office asking
me what was new. I said, well the ball is now in the Cuban's
court.
On the 28th, I saw Lochuga again at the UN who said that
Havanna didn't see exactly how a talk would be useful now, but
he would be glad to maintain continuous contact with me anyway.
The 4th of November I briefed Stevenson on these develop-
ments and meanwhile, Miss Howard had been on the phone with
18
Rene Valao who was Fidel Castro's aide at that point, and who
19
was one of the so-called pro-Americans in the group and who
20
21
suggested that I get in touch with him by telephone.
the 5th of November
22
I then briefed Bundy on this: on
Bundy told me that the President was more in favor of pushing
23
24
towards an opening toward Cuba than was the State Department,
the idea being
well, getting them out of the Soviet fold and
25
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 581
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
1
2
3
perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into
normal.
Chase then said. Bundy wanted a chronological memo about
the entire thing. I might say have forgotten one point. When
5
I first told Adlai Stevenson about this demarche or approach
:
6
by the Cubans he said he liked it, but, and I quote, he said
8.
the CIA, unfortunately, is still in charge of Cuba. But he
said he still offered to take it up with the White House.
Anyway, we're now on November 12th, and I went to Miss
10 Howard's apartment where she said he had set up a phone call to
Havanna with Valao. We never could get through the bad
connections, but she had spoken to him before I arrived and
11
12
13
14
15
16
he had suggested that come to Marianao from Key West and
talk directly with Fidel Castro, because they wanted to avoid
going through Havanna.
Bundy called me the same day to say that the White House
favored preliminary talks with Valao at the UN but not down in
I finally reached Valao
on the telephone on November the 14th and delivered a message
17
18
Cuba and told me to tell Valao this.
19
20
about his coming here. He said
and that we wanted to discuss
21
agenda.
22
He said he would send instructions to LaChuga and that he
23
would
or rather Castro, through him, to LaChuga, that they
24
should discuss an agenda with me.
He was very cordial on the
25
telephone.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 582 TOD SECRET
Atwood
1
7/10/75
TOP SECRET
TAB K
6
1
2
we referred to our talk in '59. and he said another talk might
be possible and useful at this time, and that was the first real
4
indication.
citizen but a government official and we agreed that the
At this point, I said I'm no longer a private
5
current situation was different, at the same time, things were
6
a bit abnormal and he said the Cubans were very much annoyed at
7
8
0
9
10
the exile rate, the CIA rate on Cuba, as well as the freezing
of their assets.
The next step was my visit to Washington on September 24th
when I came down to see Robert Kennedy who was then Attorney
General. His position was I showed him the memoranda, which
11
12
I had prepared on what had happened up to that point.
He said
13
that a trip to Cuba which is what LaChuga had suggested would
be rather risky, said it was bound to leak and said it might
14
result in some kind of Congressional investigation or something.
15
Anyway, it might be a problem.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
But he did think the matter was
worth pursuing through UN channels, and he would be talking to
Averell Harriman and Bundy about it.
At that point, LaChuga said he would be making a very
violently anti-American speech on November 7th and not to worry
too much about it, so Stevenson asked me to help prepare a speech
On the 27th of September, I saw Lochuga again, told him
in reply.
I could not accept any invitation to come to Cuba, but I would
be glad to keep in touch with him and he could talk with
anyone who wanted to come up and he said he would notify Havanna.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 583
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
I reported this to Bundy on the 19th of November
by the
way, my call to Valao was the 18th he said that after their
agenda had been received, the President wanted to see me at the
White House and decide what to say and whether to go or what
we should do next. That was the 19th of November, three days
before the assassination.
On the 29th of November, LaChuga had seen: Miss Howard
and he wondered where things stood now. I passed the word to
him that I didn't know, but that until we were told differently
that we would continue our conversation.
On the 2nd of December he confirmed. getting a letter from
Valao and he wanted to know if things had changed again. He
12
13
said he was authorized to talk to me in general terms.
14
I called the White House, Chase in this case,
to say that
15
16
17
18
19
20
20
21
22
23
24
25
the ball was now in our court.
On December 4th, LaChuga again looked me up at the UN,"
said he now had a letter directly from Castro approving the
detailed talks and an agenda. Again, I informed Chase.
He said the decision would take some time now because all
our policies were under review.
This went on. I kept seeing LaChuga and LaChuga would say
he was waiting for an answer, and I kept saying well the door
isn't closed, I just don't know.
On the 17th of December the President, this time President
Johnson, came to the Waldorf to meet with the delegation at
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 584
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
10
1
2
Stevenson's apartment and told me that he had read my Cuban
memo recapitulating the events or the discussions in the fall
3
with interest and that was that. And I then was in Washington.
Averell Harriman asked me about the Cuban project. I said I
4
5
6
7
didn't know, that it was lying down in Chase's office in the
White House and that he told me he'd get back to me after the
holidays.
Well, that ended my diary in 163. I then went to Kenya
8
9
as Ambassador in February of 164.
However I do recall that
10
some time in January I again called Chase and I said, well,
if
this thing is going to be continued I would suggest either
John Case or someone on that mission. He said, well, it doesn't
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
look as though it's going to be continued now because it's an
election year, or whatever the reason was, and anyway we'll keep
it in mind but that it was a dead issue.
The interesting thing, I think in terms of your investiga-
tion is that whatever was going on in terms of assassination
plots, certainly there seemed to be two tracks, because it seems
hard for me to believe that the Executive would be approving this
type of negotiation while other covert operations were happening,
although it could conceivably have happened.
The Chairman. If it did happen, what we are in search of
is an explanation.
21
22
23
I think your testimony is helpful.
Certain inferences
24
can at least be drawn.
But it is very helpful.
25
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 585
TOP SECRET
AMERICAN
17761
REVOLUTION
ON BICENT
BICENTENN
1976
ENNIAL BIB!.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
Research.
MAR
8 1976
Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Senator Church:'
Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an attach-
ment which is responsive to a letter dated February 12,
1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.
Sincerely,
Steven Blackhurst
STEVEN BLACKHURST
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
RECEIVED FROM
MAR 9 1976
EBL
MAX
☐
.CE OF THE DIRECTOR
DEPARTMEN
21
BUREAU
13
JUP
62-116395
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
February 27,
1976
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
REVOLUTION
AME
1776-1918
BICENTENNIAL
Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 12,
1976, which requests delivery of Mr. Hoover's memorandum
dated November 29, 1963, which memorandum is contained in
the "Official and Confidential Files" (O & C) and which was
made available for access on February 12, 1976, to an SSC
Staff Member.
A copy of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29,
1963, is attached in compliance with the above request.
excision has been made by reason of privacy.
One
Instant memorandum also serves to confirm a conversation
on February 20, 1976, between Mr. Paul Wallach, SSC Staff Counsel,
and Mr. Steven Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, a pertinent
portion of which conversation was relayed by Mr. Blackhurst
to Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff. Mr. Blackhurst reported
that during the above conversation Mr. Wallach gave assurances
that should the SSC decide to use the attached memorandum or
any portions thereof, the material used will not be identified
as having been maintained in Mr. Hoover's O & C files.
In addition to the above, referenced SSC letter of
February 12, 1976, also requested delivery of all material in
the O & C files pertaining to a number of specifically identified
items relating to the Warren Commission and to this 
Bureau's
investigations of both the Oswald matter and the assassination
of President Kennedy. A thorough review of the special indices
relating to material contained in the O & C files failed 
to
indicate that any documents contained in these O & C files,
other than the attached memorandum, would be responsive to the
items listed in referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976.
Enclosure
MAK
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings bu
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI.
$475
Original
Page one
Document Routing Sheet
Date Received
Received From
Classification
R #
3/12/76/CIA
Confidential 2762
Description: 3/11/76 etc. to miller (attn:
Johnston) for Eldar w/attach. Ipg.
re: Oswald file
Copies to:
Date
Date
Original to:
Date
Research 3/2
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 588
Filed:
VI-C
Research
Page three
Date Received
Received From
Classification
R #
3/11/76 CIA Confid 12762
Description:
3/11/76 th to mill
of
Cat Deo for Elder
w/ ps attach, re: Oswald
file
Copies to:
Date
Date
Original to:
Date
Filed:
Research
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 589
ΤΟ
FROM
:
SUBJECT:
OPTIONAL POPH NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 37
UNITED STATES
3010-100
IMENT
Memorandum
Mr.
Belmon
A. Rosen
JACK RUBY;
LER HARVEY OSWALD VICTIM
CIVIL RIGHTS
G
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Gullahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
DATE:
November 25, 1963
"
At 9:20 A.M. this date an individual
identifying himself only as Mr. Miller,
1125 14th Street, Northwest, contacted the Bureau
and advised that he was a close friend of Ruby.
In addition he identified Cling Murchison and
Tommy Webb as being friends of Ruby. Miller
declined to furnish additional information but
agreed to interview. Washington Field Office
was immediately advised and an Agent dispatched
in order to get full details concerning the above.
1
Mr.
DeLoach
IIAS: cfs
(7)
- 1978
TUM
rigorously. I
Dia
would furmise
Clinton,
Dr.
EX-114
火
REC-25
Ry
2844-24016-11
522 NOV 291963
HUN .23
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
Its use is limited to official proceedings by
Lation outside your. 
Committee.
FB This
DECA-106
your Comme and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
no without the express approval 
of the FBI .
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 590
:
MEMORANDUM
TOP SECRET
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500
May 21, 1975
To:
File
From:
Mason Cargill
MC
Subject:
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING
TO PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO
(-x1-23
On May 20, 1975, I reviewed one file of documents
in the office of the Assistant Attorney General/Criminal
Division. The file was about one-half inch thick, was marked
"#82-46-5 - TOP SECRET. It contained documents relating to
the October 31, 1960, wiretapping incident in Las Vegas.
"
The documents in this file indicated the following
items of interest:
1.
2.
3.
4.
The IRS investigated Rosselli from December 1, 1962, to
March 1, 1963.
IRS report attached to March 19, 1963, memo to Herbert J.
Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
indicates Maheu told FBI that Rowan tap had been placed
to determine whether McGuire had leaked any classified
information she had obtained from Giancana.
Letter from Miller (Assistant Attorney General) to U.S.
Attorney in Las Vegas of January 17, 1963, instructed
that prosecution of Balletti should be dropped.
wwww
Memo for the Record, dated May 14, 1962, Subject: Arthur
James Balletti et al Unauthorized Publication or Use of
Communications, by Sheffield Edwards of CIA The file
contained original of this memo outlining the full briefing
which had been given Robert F. Kennedy on May 7, 1962.
(We have a copy of this from CIA.)
RMC:clb
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 591
PROPERTY OF
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
02312
TOP SECRET
2
5.
6.
Memo to Attorney General, from Herbert J. Miller, of
April 24, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti Wiretap
Sam Giancana This memo recommends prosecution in
this case would be against national interest. It contains
no mention of assassination.
Case
The file contained several memos to and from FBI Director
and Miller of January, February, and March, 1962, re
Las Vegas case. They did not mention assassination.
7. Other Department of Justice documents of December 1961,
relating to possible prosecution were filed. They basically
outlined facts of the Balletti matter.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
FBI reports on Las Vegas incident, dated September 12,
1961, August 18, 1961, and July 28, 1961. The last one
indicated Maheu installed bug to determine whether
Giancana had leaked classified information to McGuire.
There follow several FBI reports on interview during 1961
of participants in the Las Vegas incident.
Memo from Director of FBI to Attorney General, of May 22,
1961, transmits the memo dated May 22, 1961, of an inter-
view with Shef Edwards of May 3, 1961. [We have copy of
the memo on this interview, dated May 22, 1961, Subject:
"Arthur James Balletti, et al."]
FBI report (April 20, 1961) of interview with Maheu.
It indicates Maheu said he ordered bug to determine if
Giancana or McGuire were leaking information.
There follow many FBI documents in 1961 on investigation
of details of preparation, etc., for Las Vegas affair.
Memo, dated November 22, 1960, to Assistant Attorney
General (Criminal Division), from Director of FBI,
Subject: Arthur James Balletti, Unauthorized Publication
or Use of Communications transmitted a report of an FBI
agent at Salt Lake City dated November 10, 1960. The
agent's report stated that Balletti was arrested on
October 31, 1960, at the Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas. This
report contains the details of the arrest.
(This document is the last entry in this Criminal Division
file on the Las Vegas Incident.)
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 592
TOP SECRET
102373
1. TOP SECRET
3
14.
Documents from late 1960's and early 1961 indicate Maheu
did not implicate CIA initially but instead said he had
been asked by a Los Angeles attorney to arrange investi-
gative work in Las Vegas. Maheu declined to name the
attorney.
Maheu first mentioned CIA connection in an FBI interview
on April 18, 1961 [after the Bay of Pigs] (detailed in an
agent report of April 20, 1961, transmitted by a memo to
Assistant Attorney General on April 25, 1961). He said
he was working with CIA and the Las Vegas bug was ordered
to determine if Sam Giancana was leaking information.
(Maheu did not tell FBI about nature of activities he
undertook for CIA.)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 593
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PROPERTY OF
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02272

1 to eliminate a break for big investors.
'still
val
inal pected to improve the meas-
tre's image in the eyes of
House, liberals, who have been
fearful that the committee
might report out a "rich man's
ved
by
its
int
vi-
er-
dit
int
1.
to
43 95126
er
be
il-
g-
1S
st
bill."
FOCO
The crucial vote in the hair.
breadth decision was under-
stood to have been cast by Rep.
Martha W. Griffiths (D-Mich.),
who was absent when the com-
mittee deadlocked 12 to 12.
THE
☑
Youngsters stand in front of the newly completed Jaines W. Johnson School at 1420 S. .1
ch as the last of 20
Alba..
y mobile cas is moved away. Portable
schmalenoms were oved to Delano School, 3937 W. Wilcox, where they'll be used until a
new wing is completed there. In an interview Thursday Schools Supt. Benjamin C. Willis
defended the flexibility of the mobile units, saying they are being requested in some areas
in spite of protests directed against their use at 73d and Lowe. Stories and other pictures on
Page 3. (Sun-Times Photo by Howard Lyon)
chic Sun-Times
Helen #1
CIA Sought Giancana
Help For
By Sandy Smith
Sun-Times Correspondent
Cuba Spying
WASHINGTON-A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving
Castro forces kidnap 19 refugees in the Bahamas while
U.S. fliers watch helplessly, Page 2.
Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelli-cau of Investigation of Gian- was embittered because the
gence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Timės.
EXCLUSIVE
cana's crime
had
dollars.
syndicate in Commission, in traditional gang
Chicago led directly to the ex- bipartisanship,
Giancana never did any spying ("our cause") brotherhood and Cuban revolt:
posure of the La Cosa Nostra backing both sides in the
at all for the CIA.
the Commission.
Giancana, according to these With his connections
The Commission was said
to
It was a weird gangland spy
case in which, government of-
ficials said, CIA agents con-
tacted Giancana in an effort to
1 obtain Cuban intelligence after 1959 and carly 1960, Giancana, sources, merely pretended to Cuba, Giancana declared he Castro-only to have him shut
in have given financial backing to
the Fidel Castro regime came a big shot on gangland's "Com- go along with the CIA in the would be able to sneak intel- down the gambling casinos.
into power in 1959.
mission" and in its La Cosa hope that the Justice Depart-ligence out of the island for
What the CIA accomplished Nostra murder-and-terror so-ment's drive to put him behind the CIA.
-if anything-by negotiating ciety, became what his fellow bars might be slowed-or at.
with the 53-year-old Chicago gangsters abhor and would act least affected-by his ruse of gave The Sun-Times this ac- lions he received from Com-
A high government source portedly fled Cuba with mil-
rackets chief is one of many swiftly to exterminate-an co-operation with another gov- count of how Giancana stepped mission hoodlums.
unexplained mysteries of the
matter.
agent for the U.S. government. ernment agency.
The CIA wasn't talking about If this was Giancana's mo-
One thing, however, is cer- the case here on Thursday. tive. his scheme was a failure.
tain:
But Justice Department | For a probe by the Justice De-
r several months in late sources expressed belief that partment and Federal Bur-
into the role of a government
agent:
The CIA made its first con-
tact with Giancana in 1959.
The Chicago gang boss then
And the former Cuban dic-
tator, Fulgencio Batista, re-
In his dickering with the
cd that he had contact with
CIA, Giancana reputedly boast-
Turn to age 2
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
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PROPERTY OF
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Reveal CIA Sought Giancana's Aid
Continued from Page 1
anti-Castro factions and was
ready to use his contacts for
the CIA.
Justice Department officials
say now that Giancana was just
talking. He might have had
some "contacts," but he never
produced anything of value for
the CIA, the officials said.
The CIA was said to have
dumped Giancana as a possible
source of Cuban intelligence
some time in 1960, long before
Sign First Trade Pact
the abortive rebel invasion at he was on the payroll of a pri- told investigators to get investigator's mission in the Las
the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961. vate detective agency in Flor- touch with the CIA.
Vegas suite of the entertainer
An equally bizarre episode ida.
The inquiry then shifted was another riddle of Gianca-
months later gave the Justice Florida authorities sought an from Florida to Washington na's caper with the CIA. Neith-
Department its first clue to explanation of the incident and revealed Giancana's nego-er the CIA nor the Florida
Giancana's negotiations with from the operator of the detec- tiations with CIA, it was dis- detective agency ever has of
the CIA.
tive agency. At first, the oper- closed.
The figures in this incident ator refused to discuss the
fered an explanation of what
were a male night-club enter- matter. Finally, however, he Thursday that the private in- the hotel suite, the sources said.
Government sources reported the investigator was doing in
tainer and Giancana's girl
friend, Phyllis McGuire, one of
the singing McGuire sisters.
At the time, in Giancana's
opinion, the entertainer was
overly attentive to Miss Mc-
Guire.
Fifth Buddhist Burns Self i
HUE, South Viet Nam (AP) | courtyard of the Tu Dam pa- | to herself in the market place
-A 71-year-old Buddhist monk goda brought immediate mar- of Ninh Hoa, a coastal vil
burned himself to death in his tial law to Hue, which lies 40 lage 200 miles northeast of
ceremonial robes inside Hue's miles north of Saigon and is Saigon. She was the first wom-
biggest pagoda carly Friday, the ancient capital of Viet Nam. an fire-suicide.
He was the fifth to burn to
death in the mounting Buddhist week.
At Las Vegas, Nev., in 1961,
DAR ES SALAAM, Tangan- sheriff's police seized a prowler
yika (AP) Tanganyika and in the entertainer's hotel suite.
the Soviet Union have signed For hours, the intruder refused
their first trade agreement. The to identify himself or say he
African nation will exchange was rifling the entertainer's
He was the third to burn this Informants at Ninh Hoa said
sisal, cotton, hides, skins, to- rooms.
A 17-year-old novice government authorities had tak-
campaign against the South monk committed suicide Tues- en the nun's body in a move
bacco and coffee for Soviet
Persistent questioning by Vietnamese government of day and a middle-age nun took aimed at preventing a
metal, tools, vehicles, road sheriff's deputies, according to President Ngo Dinh Diem, a her life in Ninh Hoa Thursday. demonstration at her funeral.
equipment, cameras, fishing federal authorities, led to an Roman Catholic.
Reliable informants said
They followed the same tac-
boats, planes and other things.
mass
admission by the prowler that His self-immolation in the the nun, Dieu Hien, set fire tie with the body of a novice
Tar-Feathers "Torture' Bared As Hoax
LOS ANGELES (UPI) — A
woman tarred and feathered
* and apparently left to die in a
flaming house told a bizarre
story Thursday that her "tor-
fure" actually was part of a
Dax to stir up a racial inci-
dent.
owner of the house which was
Mrs. Smith, a baby-sitter, ad-
monk who immolated himself
early Tuesday near the central
Vietnamese religious center, of
Hue.
It had an opposite effect,
set afire, Henry Lewis, attempt- mitted setting fire to the house,
ed to inspire a racial incident authorities said. She and the
that would pressure his neigh- Lewis couple faced charges of Milburn Akers
bors in a right-of-way dispute. arson and conspiracy, detectives Astro-Guide
INDEX TO
Office
and the
said Mrs. Harwell said.
wises were arrested
According to Mrs. Harwell,
Business News 54-58
CHA
Colum
John Dre
Editoria's
NW 50955 Võõrα:32129638 Page 595.
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFF
# 6. of
10
iscellaneous John McCone Papers
hai Pilots
7/
Selected
ateral used at NSC Exec. Committee Meeting 29 March 63
arge envelop of miscellaneous papers
riefing Memoranda-1962
resident Briefing 22 Dec 1964
"File
"File
1
✓ ile
1962
1962
1962
ar East Trip 2-14 June 1962
Purcell Panel
1963 & 64
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 596
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE:
02298
JOB
See
(-XI-1
)
4 of 10
see
No
Notes for DCI and Weekend Reading June-Dec 1963
Briefing Memoranda
1962
State Cables for DCI Raborn
1966
JOB #
Task Force Report on Free Europe Committee and Radio Liberty Committee. 12 Mar 65
Vol. I, II, III & IV of Annexes to Report to the PFIAB on Intelligence Community
Activities relating to Cuban Arms Build-up. 14 April-14 Oct 1962.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 597
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
02239
i
72-0-431
ок
870-150
- #9+40
B.
Disposition of CIA Long-Range Plan.
2-8-72
ppy #1
retained in Executive Registry.
PPy #2
Retained in O/IG. - PuttER 11-15-72
opy #3 thru #7
Records Center
Opy #8
DDP retained,
ppy #9
PPB Retained.
ppy #10
D/DCI/NIPE retained.
Ppy #11
Records Center
ppy #12
DDS&T retained.
py #13 thru #16
Records Center.
·P:
17
PPB retained.
Records Center.
ppy #18 thru#26
all, Executive Registry retired 19 copies of the Long-Range Plan.
so three bound books of Working Papers and one bound book of Working Plan Committee
eeting minutes.
r. Bye destroyed all loose working papers.
David Be
David L. Bye
Chief, Executive Registry
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 598
02390
JX
#23 8 of 10
ок
Job #
8-12/1 Meetings with the President-25 Oct 61-31 July 62
8-12/1 Meetings with the President 31 July 62-29 Nov 62
Meetings with the President 1 Jan 63-31 March 63
Memoranda on Meetings with the President 1 Apr 63-1 July 63
Meetings with the President 1 July 63.
12 Nov. 63
23 Nov 63 31 Dec 63
Meetings with President Johnson'
Meetings with the President 1 Jan-2 April 1964
Meetings with the President 1964 3 April-20 May
Meetings with the President 21 May 64-5 Oct 64
Meetings with the President 6 Oct 64
'eetings with the President Jan-28 April 65
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 599
#1
#2
#1
#2
#3.
#1
#2
#3
#4
#1
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
02301
==
1 of 1
13 Committee
January-December 1963
4
3 Committee
January-December 1963.
unter-Insurgency
July-December 1962
unter-Insurgency January-June 1962
ecial Group CI-1965
ecial Grup CI – 1964
rono
1962
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 600
ок
JOB #23 72-13-431
Ail
Checked generally-
nothing relating
to Cuba
Spol checked.
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
02202
અન
7
"2 of 10
Memoranda for Record:
1 March-28 April 65
January-28 Feb 1965
November-31 Dec 64
11 Sept-31 Oct 64
6 April 64-8 July 64
9 July-11 Aug 64
iz Aug
10 Sept 64
1 Jan-11 Feb 64
27 Nov-31 Dec. 63
23 July 63-26 Nov 63
5 June 63-20 July 63
15 April - 4 June 63
1. Jan 63-9 Feb 63
› Sept - 31 Dec 62
7 April 62-21 Aug 62
29 Nov 61-5 April 62
1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 601
Complete
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
02303
Job #
ок
м
אל
# 3 of
10
_nam
Vietnam
Vietnam
August 1963
September 1963
October 1963
November 1963
ок
Wietnam
December 1963
January
January 1964
Vietnam
Vietnam
Vietnam
Vietnam
Vietnam
nama (2
Vietnam
Vietnam
Vietnam.
Vietnam
Vietnam
Vietnam
Vietnam
February 1964
March 1964
April 1964
May 1964
June 1964
July 1964
August 1964
September 1964
November 1964
January 1965
February 1965
March 1965
LA-DCI Notes 1-2 June
DE. SA Trip
NODIS---LOR----McCone Eyes Only
DEFOLIATION
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 602
شله
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
02204
JOB #
м
0x # 7 OE 10
Selected
See
JOB #
OK
NRO
1963 thru 1965 (also includes one 6 Sept 61 ltr to DCI frm Defense re
Management of NRO)
:
CYPRUS 1964 material on Cyprus & the DCI trip in Sept 1964
Binder containing excerpts frm the National Security Act of 1947; the Organization_
of USIE; Summary of NSCID's & charts & regs on Organizaton of CIA.
Summary Reports Chiefs of Station, WH Division, presented at Conference-
Panama (29 Jan-1 Feb 1962)
White House-1962 & 1963 (containes correspondence to, from and of interest to
the White House. )Also included autographed picture of the CIB wich appeared in
the newspaper & compromised the code words. Autographed to McCone frm McGeo Bundy.
Duropean Trip-10 thru 17 February 1963 (John McCone/DCI)
Memoranda of Record on DCI Trip to Europe-17 thru 29 Sept 1964
“moranda on DCI's European trip-January 1964
Panama Conference-29 Jan-2 Feb 1962.
Memos for the Reocrd
EA/DCI for 1964 & 65.
DCI's 1962 Far Eastern Trip
Caribbean Survey Group (1961 and 1962-mainly on Cuba)
DCI Letters of appreciation for hospitality extended him on his Far East Trip-1962
DCI's Disucssions with Government Officials during his European trip in 1964
also containes some background papers on trip.
Envelop containing FBI report on Dr. Martin Luther King. 18 Oct 1963-
DCI Speech File (1962, 63 & 64)
Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba-1964
CURA-Background Material-1962
02305
to DCI from DDCI-September 1962 on Cuba Situation
☑1
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 603

Dx #5 of 10
ican Republic-1965
Tuba Package
Executive Registry File "John McCone
Committee of Principals
aos 1962
ub
1964
>
book-Bay of Pigs
Nuclear Papers
IcCone Speeches 7 June 63
25 May 64.
1cCone Speeches 8 June 64
11 March 65
\ 1962 >
ut Prisoner Exchange #1- Aug 62
tate Eyes only Cables
Executive Registry DCI File 1963
epartment of Defense 1954 - 1964
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 604
Selected
1962
02306
See
Job #
..
MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500
May 21, 1975
C-X1-22
To:
File
Mason Cargill
MC
From:
Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS
On the afternoon of May 20, 1975, I briefly
examined the Justice Department files on the Kennedy assassi-
nation, ranging from February 18, 1969, to January 28, 1971.
According to Mr. Keeney and his secretary who has reviewed
these files in detail, they contain no memo from any State
Department employee who was in Mexico in 1963. Basically these
files consist of letters from citizens, some referred from
congressmen, and press clippings relating to the assassination.
Mr. Keeney's secretary referred me to several
entries in these files respecting allegations by people who
claimed to have been involved in the Kennedy assassination.
One claimed to have been a CIA agent. There are also many
letters from assassination "nuts." Other documents relate
to court proceedings to force FBI agents to testify in the
Clay Shaw trial in Louisiana.
One document is an FBI report, dated February 2,
1972, stating that one Richard von Kleist had contacted the
FBI claiming he had information on the John F. Kennedy
assassination. Kleist claimed certain people conspired in
the Hotel Luna, Mexico City, in July, 1963. Kleist was not
a State Department employee. He appeared to be a free-lance
magazine writer.
MC:clb
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 605
02266
eLoach to Mohr
12-6-63
Re: Assassination of the President
that before looking at the FBI as to possible "leaks," he should carefully examine his
own house. I told him I was quite thoroughly familiar with the way Guthman and
.Rosenthal dealt with the press and that as he well knew the wire service people stayed
'constantly in Guthman's private office. I told him it was quite obvious to me how the
AP had learned that the report had been sent over to the Department.
Katzenbach reiterated that he had no complaints against the FBI. He
stated again that the purpose of his call was to tell me about Senator Russell's feelings.
He added that he had another reason for calling and that was to determine
if we could give him any ideas as to how Warren Olney could be dropped as Chief
Counsel of the Presidential Commission. I told Katzenbach of our feelings concerning
Olney. He stated that he was presently working through Congressman Hale Boggs and
he thought he was going to be successful in getting Olney's name removed from
consideration. He told me that Boggs was very sympathetic.
Katzenbach mentioned that Waggoner Carr, the Texas State Attorney
General, would like very much to see the Director on Friday, 12-6-63. I asked him
what for. He stated that Carr had no particular motive in mind other than to indicate
to the press later on that he had discussed matters with the Director. I told him I could
see no percentage in the Director's seeing Carr, that we were the investigative
agency and that Carr's dealings should be with the Department and the Presidential
Commission. Katzenbach indicated that the White House might think otherwise. He
stated that the President was most anxious for Carr to be given attention in Washington
inasmuch as Carr was running for office next year. I told Katzenbach I knew this,
however, I still felt that the Director should not be injected into this matter.
Katzenbach stated he would attempt to disuade Carr from seeing the Director, however,
Carr was quite persistent.
ACTION:
In view of the close friendship which Carr obviously has with the
President, the Director may desire to just shake hands with Carr without sitting down
and discussing facts concerning our report.
of the all mil
see him.
RECENTES FROM K
FEB 13 1976)
སི་--
FR
- 2 -
NW 50955
Doeld:3
Page 606
NW
and 794, the
trange
CT
CENTRAL
SELLIGENTE AGENCY
National Colors of the Unit5 States A The
gagging' teď 601679 be 0.0 0.'ed
g th
Toma.07.09 of Mich
S-5-C-P-E-T/NOPORT/LIMITED
CUPA
CLASSIFICATION/DIVINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
1. ATTESTS OF FIDEL CASTRO TO COUNTERACT
CCHINIST PLANS TO CONTROL-CURLS.
COVERNMENT.
2. MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO OVERTHION CASTRO.
=
MARCH 1952
5. UNITED STATES (7) APRIL 1952)
AL 3
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS
g
of to Ledionage Love Title 18, U.S.C. Loca
by Lov
REPORT NO. TOCS3-3/550,097
DATE DISTR 2 MAI 1952
PRECEDENCE
REFERENCES
BOUTING
אן
siá
23109
FIELD REPORT NO.
DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE
1. FIDEL CASTRO CALLED ON A GROUP OF ANY CONCHANDERS ABOUT TWO WEEKS EXFORE
II OUSTER OF ANAL ESCALANTE ON 25 MARCH 1952 AND TOLD THEM THAT THE COMPETESTS
ARE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE COVERNMENT IN CUBA. THE ARMY OFFICERS CONTACTED SY
2.
у
CIRA
TRO WERE POLANDO QUERIA JOSE MARIA DE LA AGUILERA, FELIPE GUERRA NATOS, JUAN
SIRL, JORGE SERVIRA FEVERI, NIDRO MIAI PERETO. CASTED ASKED THEM TO HACK HIM UF,
3 HE DITENDED TO REGAIN FULL CONTROL OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, AND THEY AGREE.
AT THE TIME OF ESCALANTE'S OUSTER CASTRO ALCO GEDEFED THE TRANSFER CF A
DIGTUNIST LEADER DI MATANZAS PROVINCE TO AN AGRICULTURAL CO-CRERATIVE IN ORIENTE
ROVINCE. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT RETIREER THE NAME OF THE LEADER TRANSFERRED).
3. CASTRO ALSO ORDERED A COMPLETE DIVESTIGATION OF FELIX MERES COMUNIST LEADER
LAS VILLAS FROVIICE, CASTRO TOLD THE AFLY COMUNDURS WITH WHOM HE TALKED THAT
-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
ARMY/ACSI
NAVY AIR
JCS
SCCDEF NSA
NIC
USIA OCI ONE 002 ORR со
AD FROM
UG 15 103
CIA
INFORMATION REPORTI
SECRET
DocId: 32423630 Page 607
201-25223Ų
_
SEGNET
CLASSIFICATION-D AINATION CONTROLS
S-E-C-R-E-TOPORN/LIMITED
IN 28103
TDCSD2-3/650,097
РАСБ
2
IF NECESSARY I WILL HAVE TORRES SHOT IN THE CENTRAL PARK OF SANTA CLARA".
4. CASTRO MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS ARMY CONFIDANTS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT
DEVIATING BROM THE SOVIET UNION OR THE COMUNIST PARTY LEVE, HE WOULD ARRANGE IT SO
THAT LAZARO PENA, BLAS, FOCA, AND OTHER COMUNISTS WOULD NOT ES OCCUPYING FOSITIONS OF
LEADERSHIP.
:
5. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ARMY LEADERS AGREED TO EACK UP CASTRO, THEY HAVE
IN MIND A PLAN WHICH WILL INVOLVE THE ASSASSINATION OF SIDEL, RAUL CASTED, AND CHE
VARA AT SONG FIOPITIOUS MOMENT AND THE TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THEMSELVES.
THEUS MEN ARE OF THE OPINION THAT SUCH A PLAN WILL SUCCEED, AS THEY ARE IN CHARGE OF THE
REGULAR ARMY AND MILITIA TROOPS IN CUBA. THE ARTY LEADERS SAY THAT THEY ARE NOT
RISTS, AND THEY REALIZE THAT NOT ONLY THE CIVILIAN FOFULATION, BUT ALSO A LARGE
MAJORITY OF THE ARNED FORCES OF CUBA, ARE FED UP WITH CASTED AND THE COMMUNISTS.
6. (SOURCE COMMENT:
Source
SAID THAT THE SABOTAGE
CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE CITY AND PROVINCE OF HABANA CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO
THIS GROUP OF ANY LEADERS. HE BASED HIS OPINION IN PART ON THE FACT THAT DE LA
تنا
ERA IS A LEADER OF THE BANK WORKERS' UNION, AND THE NEW CUBAN NATIONAL BANK
EJILING IN HABANA WAS THE RECENT OBJECT OF SABOTAGE BY BURNING.)
7. FIELD DISSEN: CINCLENT, CINCARIB.
END OF MESSAGE
°
SEGRET
FROM
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTACLS
---TFORM/LIMITED
CIA
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 608
5010-106
Mr. Belmo
Mr. Rose
Mohr
1
De Loach'
2
IMENT
Mr. Mall
Mr. Rogge
Mr. McGowA
Mr. Ilines
Mob: -
Casper
Callahan
Cantad
Deloach
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM 1:2. 10
MAY 152 (DITIN
SA GEN. BEG NO
27
'UNITED STATE
Memoranaum
A. H. Belmont
༠༠༠༢།
FROM :
A. Rosen
SUBJECT:
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION.
DATE: February 26, 1964
Trytter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT
Ва
Brigan
While at the offices of the President's Commission on other
matters, J. Lee Rankin requested Malley to stop by his office. 
Mr. 
Rankin
advised that he desired to make it 
known that the Bureau had been of tremen-
dous help to the President's Commission, that an extremely large 
volume of
work had been produced by the Bureau 
and that the Bureau had been most
cooperative in handling all requests which 
had been made by the 
President's
Commission.
He commented that recently there had been quite an increase in the w
number of requests and there was a possibility that there 
would be many more
additional requests. Mr. Rankin stated this 
was not intended as a criticism
of the Bureau's work but instead was 
the following through of the Commis-
sion's desire to complete the Commission's 
record and leave no unanswered
questions.
al
In this regard, Mr. Rankin went on to say that the Bureau, in
conducting its investigation, had an extremely difficult and 
enormous 
task
to perform and that he as well 
as other members of the Commission staff had
been amazed at the amount of detailed information 
which had been developed
by the Bureau in its investigation. He commented 
that the Commission in
performing its tasks was of necessity 
making a most minute study of the
Bureau's work as well as that of other Government 
agencies with the idea 
of
picking the investigation to pieces to the 
extreme degree so that wherever
it was possible to clarify any item, 
this could be handled while the
Commission was in existence.
Mr. Rankin advised that in connection with the letter which had
just recently been transmitted to the Bureau requesting an 
explanation 
con-
cerning information relative to Special Agent 
James P. Hosty's name being
omitted from a report prepared in the Dallas 
Office (report of Special 
Agent
Robert P. Gemberling dated 12/23/63), 
he wanted the Bureau to know the
following:
Enclosure 2-27-64
1
'Mr. Sullivan
1
qplif
Mr. Branigan
1
1
Mr. Conrad:
Mr. Lenihan
(14) 1954
ра
VEROX
1 62-109060
105-82555
1
1 44-24016
REC-53
offi
62-109090
11
This diament is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. It's use 
is limited to official proceeds b
our Committee and the content may not be 
closed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI a
SIX
UNP
NW 50955. DocId: 32423630
Page 609
L
1
Memorandum A. Rosen to A. H. Belmont
Re:
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION |
The Commission, had noted in reviewing the notebook in question
that Agent Hosty's name appeared in the book along with the office telephone
number and a license number. It had been noted that this information did
not appear in the Dallas investigative report and members of the Commission
wondered why this item did not appear. Mr. Rankin stated that prior to any
question being raised concerning this item, the Bureau in one of its letters
to the Commission (dated 1/27/64) set forth full information for the
Commission's information explaining the appearance of Agent Hosty's name
in the Oswald notebook. As a result of this information being furnished by
the Bureau. the members of the Commission were fully aware that there had
been no effort on the part of the Bureau not to make this information
available. Mr. Rankin stated that after some discussion concerning this
item, the members of the Commission directed Mr. Rankin to request the
Bureau for an explanation so that the record of the Commission would show
the exact circumstances by which this item was omitted from the Dallas
report of 12/23/63 by Special Agent Gemberling.
ACTION:
Attached is a letter to J. Lee Rankin setting forth the reasons
why Agent Hosty's name was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63. We
are enclosing for the Commission affidavits from Special Agent Robert P.
Gemberling and John T. Kesler wherein they set forth their explanations in
handling the Mosty entry in Oswald's address book. Both affidavits are
excellent and should satisfy the Commission that our handling of the Hosty
entry was sound.
RECE
Rel
FEB 16
FBI
Wes.
Lif there had been profen
the anestpondence
clarification
would have been vojded
Notwithstanding Romain's
statements
is me some.
C is the th
Low
H
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 610
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Review Staff: 76-0412
13 May 1976.
Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510.
Dear Mr. Miller:
Attention: Mr. E. Greissing
As requested by Mr. Greissing, transmitted herewith
is a copy of a 1 May 1967 memorandum numbered 502 and
captioned "Claimed Agency Affiliation by Conspiracy Case
Figures". This document was recently released by the
Agency in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.
Sincerely,
Attachment:
. As Stated.
RECEIVED 1900
STAY 14 1976
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 611
Seymour R. Bolten
Chief, Review Staff
• AMERICAN REVOLU
1776-1976
BICENTENNIAL
COS
ST.:
:STR
COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)
DEFERRED
CLASIFIED JESS
SECRET
CLASSIFICANON
DATE:
23 NOVEMBER 1963
FILE: P-3593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod
NUMBIA
INITIALS
Dre.
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL
INITIALS
ROUTINE XX IMMEDIATE
TO
IMMEDIATE DIR
KAPOK
A.
INFO.
7020
CITE
MEXI NUMBER
REF: DIR 84888
3. MEXI- 7025
1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV
AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE
OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.
2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS
ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.
3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO
MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD
ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY
ON 26 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO
UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER.
(See Reg F).
4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO
HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
END OF MSG
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 612
COORDINATING OFFICERS
-SEGRET
CLASSIFICATION
OUTGOING
W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER
COS
ST.:
:STR
COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)
DEFERRED
CLASSIFIED JESS
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
DATE:
23 NOVEMBER 1963
FILE: P-3593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod
NUMBIA
INITIALS
Dre.
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL
INITIALS
ROUTINE XX IMMEDIATE
TO
IMMEDIATE DIR
KAPOK
A.
INFO.
7020
CITE
MEXI NUMBER
REF: DIR 84888
3. MEXI- 7025
1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV
AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE
OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.
2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS
ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.
3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO
MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD
ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY
ON 26 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO
UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER.
(See Reg F).
4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO
HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
END OF MSG
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 613
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
OUTGOING
W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

COS
ST.:
:STR
COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)
DEFERRED
CLASIFIED JESS
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
DATE:
23 NOVEMBER 1963
FILE: P-3593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod
NUMBIA
INITIALS
Dre.
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL
INITIALS
ROUTINE XX IMMEDIATE
TO
IMMEDIATE DIR
KAPOK
A.
INFO.
7020
CITE
MEXI NUMBER
REF: DIR 84888
3. MEXI- 7025
1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV
AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE
OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.
2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS
ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.
3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO
MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD
ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY
ON 26 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO
UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER.
(See Reg F).
4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO
HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
END OF MSG
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 614
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
OUTGOING
W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER
COS
ST.:
:STR
COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)
DEFERRED
CLASIFIED JESS
DATE:
23 NOVEMBER 1963
SECRET
FILE:
CLASSIFICANON
INITIALS
Dre.
PRIORITY
OPERATIONAL
INITIALS
ROUTINE XX IMMEDIATE
TO
IMMEDIATE DIR
KAPOK
A.
INFO.
P-3593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod
NUMBIA
7020
CITE
MEXI NUMBER
REF: DIR 84888
3. MEXI- 7025
1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV
AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE
OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.
2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS
ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.
3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO
MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD
ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY
ON 26 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO
UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER.
(See Reg F).
4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO
HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
END OF MSG
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 615
COORDINATING OFFICERS
SECRET-
CLASSIFICATION
OUTGOING
W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER
2-
his friend commented that a Mexican had allga
that
hal Tat
that the last be had
bhabi vita (hittel (tbaben bad. Catron Stei Sent 1/1 st við
that it was all a Joy Thallium Th
the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it:
heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that
But they already
this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA:
know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they
already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed..
HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's
say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minite, asks him
to go.ca. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been
one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then
there was, lot's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the
United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the
country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resalu
tion in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was trus, who
imows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will lappen.
Who know3.
1
.
:
5:
LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laught).
HP: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's.
LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says
"so that after they can say that we are observing the death of NEEDY, then wa
spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it
will not coincide with the burial (the laughs)".
:
-
That has to be taken into
account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense,
RECEIVED FROM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Ja92361876
2-
his friend commented that a Mexican had allga
that
hal Tat
bhabi vita (hittel (tbaben bad. Catron Stei Sent 1/1 st við
that it was all a Joy Thallium Th
that the last be had
the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it:
heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that
But they already
this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA:
know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they
already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed..
HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's
say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minite, asks him
to go.ca. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been
one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then
there was, lot's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the
United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the
country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resalu
tion in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was trus, who
imows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will lappen.
Who know3.
1
.
:
5:
LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laught).
HP: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's.
LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says
"so that after they can say that we are observing the death of NEEDY, then wa
spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it
will not coincide with the burial (the laughs)".
:
-
That has to be taken into
account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense,
RECEIVED FROM
NW 50955 DocId:32423630 JAN92361976
BF:
"
Chay; he asks where she is going to stay now, and LUISA comments that now
asks if they
she plans to move tonight to the house of the doctor (female).
know everything now, and LUISA says yes, but doesn't know how the thing is, or if
they will have to stay in the embassy, however believes that today it will not be
possible, because everyone has gone to the airport and the embassy has no car,
however, possibly tomorrow morning instead of going to the study circle, she will
Gove. HF: Then he will call her tomorrow.. LUISA: To try the embassy or at the
1
house, since if they will not stay at the embassy, she will go home where she will
be at about 10. HF accepts.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 618
Soviet Embassy.- 15-60-55.-
27 Sept 63.-
134-M8.-T128-
0900-2114 hrs.
395-
(1605) IN.
7 IN: OV. - From the Cuban Consulate- Says that there is an
i
American here who has requested a transit visa for Cuba because
he is going to the USSR. OV. - Wants to know with whom he (American)
spoke at the Soviet Embassy becuase she (OV) had sent him over to
them thinking that if the Soviets approved the visa then the Cubans.
would give him one without anymore processing only advising the
Emmigration of Cuba. OV - wants to know with whom he (American)
spoke since he himself doen't know either and he was told that there
were no problems. IV. - asks that OV. wait a minute. 404- 410
OV is SILVIA DURAN of the Cuban Consulate and explains the same to
the other IV. This one tells her to leave her name and number so
She can call her. SILVIA gives it to him along with the tel, num.
11-28-47.- Silvia says as a personal thing that she has moved and
that she has not advised about her changes of address and will not
receive the Bulletin and she can advise them now. IV. asks that she
call KOUKHARENKO in order to change the address, and then asks for
the name of the Cultural Attache. SILVIA says it is TERESA PROENZA.
whose number is 14-13-26. IV. thanks her.-- 435--
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 619
395-
MBAJADA RA
27 septiembre
Entrada.
10-357-
15 HA
del Cha
Lado de Cuba, dico que esta allí
whe
un ciudadado (Americano,
to Nite a solicitar una visa para C
on Transito porque va para 12 DRSS y entoncos quiero sabor co
quien habia hablado porque la lo mandó con ollos do la Emba
da rusa diciendole que si ellos lo hacian o aceptaban la visa
que ontonces ollos los cubos tambien se la daban sin mas
tramitos nadamas avisando 1 Emigración on Cuba, y quiore sabe
con quien habló porque el dico que no sabe tampoco con que
persona y que le dijoron que si quo no tonia problema. HD le
pide ospore un momento. 40-- 410-- NT os SILVIA DURAN del
Consulado do Cuba y explica lo mismo a otro HD. Esto le dice
quo lo dojo su telefono y nombro para que despues le llame;
SILVIA so lo proporciona and como el telefono 11-28-47.- Y` que
aprovecha como dowa personal de que ella so cambio do domicili
y no ha podido avisar para que le envion el boletin y que ahor
la
puede dar. im lo pido que llamo a KOUKLARENKO para que
de su cambio, pide le de el nombre de la Consejero o Agregac
Cultual.. SILVIA dice que
TIRESA PROENZA y lo llaman
30
al 14-13-26. IID que gración.-- 435--
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 620
Attachment b:
A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at
1605 hours on 27 September 1963 by Silvia CURAN
of the Cuban Embassy saying there was an America
citizen at the Cuban Embassy requesting a Cuban
visa in transit to the USSR. She was asked to
lead her telephone number (11-28-47).
27 Sept
288-
..3.-135-M22.-.
IV
inside voice.
OV
outside voice.
I
Out to 14-13-26. (1625 hrs.)- (Cuban Embassy) IV. - asks the
number of the Cuban Consul. OV. It's --11-28-47.-- 294-
295-
Out to 11-28-47.-(1626 hrs)- IV asks SILVIA if the American
has been there. SILIVA: says yes, he is here now.
IV.- According
to the letters that he showed from the Consulate in Washington he
wants to go to Russia to stay for a long time with his wife who is
Russian. Eut we have not received the answer from Washington con-
cerning his problem and considering the processing it will take 4
to 5 months. Without that permission of the USSR they have to request.
and better still the visa can't be given here without asking Washington
But according to this man, he belongs to an organization in favor of
Cuba and he has said that the Cubans can't give him a visa without the
Russian visa 
and I don't know what to do with him. I have to wait for
the answer from Washington. SILVIA We have to wait also because his
problem is that he knows no one in Cuba and it's dificult to obtain a
visa in these conditions. He expected to process the visa. He knew it
would take long to process the Russian visa and would wait for it in
Cuba and leave from there for the USSR. IV. The thing is that if his
wife is now in Washington she will receive the visa for returing to
Russia
. She will receive the visa in Washington and having the visa
she can sent it to any place for example here or any other place but
right now she doesn't have it. SILVIA - Naturally, and we can't give
him a 
letter of recommendation because we don't know if his visa will
be approved. IV. - We will only give the visa according to indications
(intructions) 
SILVIA. Then that is what I will put in my plans.
AUD
IV. We can't give him a letter of recommendation either becuase we
don't 
know 
him. Please pardon the bother. SILVIA No bother and
thank you very much.--
--331-
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 621
2950
1626hing
27 sephied
it
si ha ido alla enc
:
oricam
gito
Si, qua alli
doi conmilado en -
lo
ID que según las chetas que
pura estar allá mucho tiempo
Washington el quiere de a în
se ha recibido la
con su osposa que es rusa, puro todavia
2 
su problema, pero eso
contestación de Washington a spravo
auto o cinco meses poro sin
según los trámites noupan uni
tener oso permiso de la URSS deben de preguntar y mas bien no
so lo puedo depacinis aquí el visado sin 
preguntarlo a Washingto
pero según este seller le most ma 
carta on que es un miembro
do una organización en favor de Cuba y ha 
dicho que ollos los
Laado oin 
ol visado ruso y ahora
, .
Cubanos no puoden darlo, ol
la contes-
IID no sabe que hacer con el, porque deben de esperar
tación de Washington. SILVIA que ellos tambion
, 
porque el pro-
blema do. el, as que ol no conoce a nadio, en 
Cuba y entonces al
os asi os muy dificil que le don la visa, 
porque el pensaba ..
tramitar su visa, porque como ol ya sabia que 
se iba a tardar
en Cuba y 
ya de allá irse a
mucho on esperar ol visado xudo
la URSS. IID que la cosa este su esposa ostá ahorita on
Washington va a recibir ahorita el visado a 
al permiso de 
la
URSS para regresar a la patria, olla va a 
recibir su visado 
en
Washington pero teniendo es visado ella 
podrian comunicarle
a cualquier lugar ese permiso por ejemplo aqui 
o en cualquier
otra parte lo puede recibir, pero ahorita no 
las tienon. SILVI
que claro y que tampoco so le puodo dar 
una carta porque no
saben si su visa será aprovada. IDD que ellos 
solo daran el 
vis:
do según las indicaciones. SILVIA que entonces 
eso pondrá en
planilla.. IID que tampoco se le puedo dar 
ninguna carta de
so lo conoco y que 
perdone por la
recomendación porque no
molestia. SILVIA que no hay cuidado y que muchas gracias.-
331--
S
13
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 622
Attachment c:
A telone call to the Cuban Embassy made at
1626 hrs on 27 September 1963 by an unidentified
208-
28 Sept 1963
IN - OV. from the Cuban Consulate says that there is
an American there in the Consulate who had been at the Soviet
Embassy. IV. Wait a minute. 213- OV. Is SILVIA DURAN and
speaks English with someone outside--and comments in Spanish
that they installed a telephone for APARICIO and takes down the
number as 14-12-99--- 230-- SILVIA informs (them) of the American
and says she will call.- 232-235- OV.- speaks in Russian. IV.-
speaks in English.-- EOTH CONTINUE IN ENGLISH.-244 -1151 hrs.-
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 623

208-
Lienvoy
2 SET. 1953
15 60 55
208.
MO:
.MI:
MO:
MI:
MO:
MI:
MO:
Datrada.- IQ daljconsuique de quien dice que alia
an su consulado esta norteamericano que estuvo alli
ar la bajada Rusa. que espere un momento. 213-es -
SILVIN DURAN 7 habla IGLES con alguna persona ura y come
en español que le pusieron telefono a APARICIO y lo apunta qu
es el 14-12-99- 23F
SILVIA le dice sobre el cilladadane
norteamericano y que les va a hablar.-- 232-235-15
HP habla
RUSO. HD le habla en INGLES. SIGUEN LOS DOS EN FYLCS.--244
_ 1151 hrs.p
Please see the Spanish transcription/. Wo while waiting:
speaks in English/to someone in the background: He said wait
..Do you speak Russian? Yas. Why don't you talk to him?
I don't know.. /MO takes the phone and says in broken Russie
I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minu
MI takes the phone and asks MO in English what does he want
/in Russian/ Please speak Russian.
What else do you want?
I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address
I know that.
speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not
know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for
my address, because they have it..
Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it
not far from the Cuban Embassy.
-
Well, I'll be there right away.
RECEIVED FROM
JAN 23 1976.
CIA
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 624
bb :
50-8-10-
เ
dion gite alli
ening alli
8 SET. (200
.5 60 55
208.
?
NO:
MI
MO:
MI:
MO:
MI:
MO:
es el 14-1-90
nontaammicano p
RUGO. HD do in
1151 m
Flence tha
nich
sponks in tinto soite
1.Do you spoke
I don't know..
bokos
I w in you
bassy and
MI takes the phand
Zora-- y comont:
7 10 apita quo
tea sobre el cinânduiana
232-- 255-- HP habla
LÒG DOK UN JUGLUS.--244-
ation/. No whilo weiting
in thd background: He sold wait
Why don't you talk to him?.
prone and says in broken Russion/
spoke to your consul. Just a minute
:
In English what doos he wont?
/in Russian/ Phraco spock Husalan.
What clso do you want?
I was just now at your beady and they took my address
I know that.
/spooks terrible, hardly femizable Russion/ I did not.
know it then. I went to the Cuban Embossy to ask them for
my address, because they have 16..
Why don't you como again and leave your address with us, it.
not for from the Cuban Embassy..
Woll, I'll be there right away.
Attachment da
A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at
1151 hours on 8 September 1963 by Silvia DURAN
of the Cuban Embassy who puts on an unidentified
norteamerican man who tells the Soviet that he
was just as their Embassy and wants to give thema
his address. The Soviet tells him to return to
th the address.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 625
11.
7
RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-69-57.
1 October 63.
L26-M26-T129
1031 - 2002
45°
MO:
MI:
MO:
MI:
outside
Man outside
man
hims
>
in broken Russian.
In at 1051 MC talks to (MI)
Hellow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to
your consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Wa-
shington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?
I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.
Please:'
Please write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.
i
MO;
Thank you.
MI:
Please.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 696
RUSSIAN EMBASSY.
1 Octobor 65
45.
MO:
MI:
MO:
In at 1051. MO talks to a brokon Russian.
Hollow. I was your place as Saturday and I talked to
your consul. They said that they'd send a tolegram to Wa-
shington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?
I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.
Please.
Please write it down; 15-60-55, and ask for a consul.
Thank you.
MI:
MO;
MI:
Please.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 627
Attachment :
about a
A telephone call to the Soviet Military Attache
at 1031 hours on 1 October 1965 by an unidentified
man speaking broken Russian who asked
telegram which they were to send to Washington.
Unidentified ran said he was at the Soviet Embassy.
"last Saturday". Soviet told him to call 15-60-55.
128.
\135.
140.
151.
Phis
249.
OBY:
Out to 15-12-64 at 0955. OBYEDKOV talks to OBRUBOV.
VOLODYA, come here as fast as you can.
OBR
Alright.
:MO:
OBY:
LEE:
OBYS
LEE:
(previously transcribed)
(previously transcribed)
Man outside..
In at 162 (?) MO/ the same person who phoned a day or so
ago and spoke in broken Russian/ speaks to OBYEDKOV.
Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaking. I was at your plac
last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that
they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find
'
out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the nam
or that consul.'
KOSTIKOV. He is dark hair or skin?/.
Yes. My name is OSWALD.
Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't
received anything yet.
Have they done anything?
OBY:
Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothir
has been received as yet.
LEE:
And what...? /OBY hangs up/.
(previously transcribed)
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 628
INTEGY, 15-00-55
1 October 65
In at 1035 hours 110/the same person who
Broken Russian/speaks to ODVEDROV.
NO:
03Y:
Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaki
Saturday and spoke to a consul, and
ay or no ako and spoke in
who at your place last
that they'd send a
telegran to Washington, so I wanted fino if you have thing
new? But I don't remember the name
that consul.
KOSTIKOV.
He is dark hair or skin:/.
LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.
OBX:
LEE:
Just a minute I'll find out. They may that they haven't received anything yet.
Have they done anything?
OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been
received as yet.
LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 629
Attachment f:
A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy at
1035 hours on 1 October 1963 by the same
man who called previously (28 September 63)
and spoke broken Russian. He said his name
was Lee OSWALD and wanted to know if they
bad heard anything. Soviet said no.
TAB
J
An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15
(AP) Nov. 18 The following is a text of President Kennedy's address
tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:
*
*
ot
"The genuine Cuban revolution because it was against the tyran-
ny and corruption of the past had the support of many whose aims and
concepts were noble.
"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.
"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.
"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country
and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band
of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and hand-
ed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces
beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperial-
ism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dic-
tated by external powers to subvert the other American republics.
This,
and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible.
Without it everything is possible.
Ready and Anxious
"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work
with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few
short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people
throughout the entire hemisphere.
"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken prom-
ises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere.
For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of
friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic insti-
tutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people.
"
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 630
*
Unofficial Envoy
TABL
An Historic Report from Two Capitals
by Jean Daniel
A recent trip to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it
possible for me to establish a "dialogue" between the late President Kennedy and
Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is
being written, I have been asked whether the impressions I derived from these
interviews could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on
future relations between Lyndon B. Johnson and Castro.
Last week in these pages I answered the first question by describing the re-
actions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to John Ken-
nedy's death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the
Kennedy-Castro dialogue from the viewpoint of one who was a witness to it.
THE AUTHOR
President Kennedy received me at the White House
on Thursday, October 24. My appointment had been
scheduled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference.
Toom, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual
custom, came to look for me himself so that he could
escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay,
not so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to ex-
plain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be
very strictly organized. As we passed through the small
room where his secretary was working, we caught a
glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window
on her way to the private garden of the White House.
The President called her back to introduce me.
It was still Indian summer in Washington. The
weather was very warm, and both the President and
Mrs Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhanc-
ing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity
which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity
of entering these august chambers. The President
(athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with
quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at
times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, al-
most, I would say, completely expressionless) invited
me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in
the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair op-
posite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25
minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief tele-
phone call.
The President immediately asked me how the French
situation was developing. After my reply, he spoke
about General de Galle. He talked in a relaxed fashion,
like someone who has at last found solace in indiffer-
ence after having long been exasperated and fascinated.
John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart
of a matter quickly, make decisions even more
rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de
Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khru-
shchev. One day, impatient at not understanding the
General's reasoning and intent upon convincing him,
Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Odd-
ly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle's.
foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington
Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned
about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had
made ир his mind not to worry about them any more.
According to him, it was a waste of time.
"Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we
"And
didn't agree on anything," the President told me.
we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly cal-
culated to create a flourishing friendship between two
great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that
General de Gaulle's strategy, which is rather incom-
prehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension
with the United States. It would seem that only through
this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire
to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence
on American dollar aid and political guidance!”
President Kennedy went on to sum up, with con-
ciseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between
the United States and France. On the subject of Ger-
many, nuclear policy, Europe, the lea of "indepen-
ence," he told me what has since become public
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 631
15
THE w Repust
knowledge. He added, however, that France had a
strange way of manifesting its independence, part--
ularly, for example, on the subject of Vietnam and
Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the
French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling
him how the United States should proceed, without
assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was
more appreciative than he of advice, information, and
even criticism; but that these were all the more valued
if the friends proffering them were themselves com-
mitted to a program of action.
I then asked Mr. Kennedy what could be expected
from General de Gaulle's proposed visit to the United
States next February. He replied: "Absolutely nothing."
But he followed this up immediately and with a broad
grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of
the impending meeting: "It will be exciting, just the
same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is de-
cidely the strangest great man of our time."
Relations with Cuba
Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the
subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists
were not the only ones in France who deplored certain
mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time
I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he
was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech
on the subject of Algeria. Te the ideas set forth in
that speech been faithfully applied in Saigon and
Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall
let the late President speak through them:
"We haven't enough time to talk about Vietnam,
but I'd like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our
conversation will be much more interesting when you
return, because Ben Bradlee [of Newsweek] tells me
you are on your way to Cuba now.
"Every now and then I read articles in the European
press pointing out that we Americans were blind to
what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just
learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Com-
munism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and
temporary form of a will to independence from the
United States. Of course it is very easy to understand
this will to independence' around President de Gaulle."
John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force.
He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechan-
ical gesture which had become famous:
"I tell you this: we know perfectly what happened
in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning
I personally followed the development of these events
with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which
I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclu-
sions go much further than the European analyses. Here
is what I believe.
16
"I believe that there is no country in the world, in-
cluding all the African regions, including any and all
the countries under colonial domination, where eco-
nomic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were.
worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country's
policies during the Batista regime. I believe that we
created, built and manufactured the Castro movement
out of whole cloth and without realizing it. I believe
that the accumulation of these mistakes has jeopardized
all of Latin America. The great aim of the Alliance for
Progress is to reverse this unfortunate policy. This is
one of the most, if not the most, important problems in
American foreign policy. I can assure you that I have
understood the Cubans. I approved the proclamation
which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when
he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to
rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: to some
extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a
number of sins on the part of the United States. Now
we shall have to pay for those sins. In the matter of the
Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban
revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear."
After a silence during which he was able to note my
surprise and my interest, the President continued: "But
it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a
Cuban one, and has become international - that is, it
has become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the
United States and not a sociologist; I am the President
of a free nation which has certain responsibilities in the
Free World. I know that Castro betrayed the promises
made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to
be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that through
his fault either his 'will to independence', his mad-
ness or Communism - the world was on the verge of
nuclear war in October, 1962. The Russians understood
this very well, at least after our reaction; but so far as
Fidel Castro is concerned, I must say I don't know
whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it."
A smile, then: "You can tell me whether he does when:
you come back. In any case, the nations of Latin Amer-
ica are not going to attain justice and progress that
way, mean through Communist subversion. They
won't get there by going from economic oppression to
a Marxist dictatorship which Castro himself denounced
a few years ago. The United States now has the pos-
sibility of doing as much good in Latin America as it
has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we
alone have this power
- on the essential condition that
Communism does not take over there."
I
Mr. Kennedy then rose to indicate at the interview
was over. I apologized for keeping him to ask two
quick questions. The first: Could the United States.
tolerate economic collectivism? He answered What
about Sekou Touré? And Tito? I received Marshal Tito
three days ago, and our discussions were most posi-
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 632
January 29, 1976
Mike Madigan
Chron File
The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Dear Mr. Attorney General ::
As you may recall, in June of last year alleged organized
crime leader Sam Gfancana was killed. At that time, this Committee
had taken steps to contact Mr. Giancana for the purpose of obtaining
his testimony on our assassinations inquiry than under way. However,
we had not yet succeeded in contacting Mr. Giancana or anyone on his
behalf.
Shortly after Mr. Giancana's death, Mr. Michael T. Epstein of
our staff met with Mr. William Lynch, Chief, Organized Crime Section,
Department of Justice, and members of Mr. Lynch's staff to inform
them of the Committee's actions taken to contact Mr. Glancina, and
Its interest with respect to determining whether there was any relation-
ship between the Committee's desire to examine tr. Glancana and his
murder. Mr. Lynch informed Mr. Epstein at that time that there was
no indication of any such relationship and assured him that in the
event any such indication was discovered, the Committee would be
immediately informed.
The Committee has received no further information from the
Department about this matter since last June. For the purposes of
completing our record on this subject, I would appreciate it if you
would inform the Committee whether the Department has received any
additional information about this subject since the above-described
meeting.
MM do
NW 50955 DocId: 3242
Sincerely yours,
Frank Church
Chairman

MEMORANDUM
To:
Files
From:
Mike Madigan
Date:
June 30, 1975.
три
Subj
Committee Contact with Sam Giancana
To my knowledge the Committee's first contact with Sam
Giancana occurred on June 9, 1974, when Patrick Shea of the
Committee staff received a telephone communication from
Robert Bennett, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, Texas.
It is my information from talking to Mr. Shea that Mr. Bennett
called the Committee to advise that Sam Giancana was admitted
to the Methodist Hospital, which was located at 6515 Bertner
Street in Houston, Texas. Mr. Bennett's information was that
Giancana was admitted to Room 402 of the Hospital under the
care of a Dr. Debakey.
Mr.
Mr. 
Bennett also advised that Giancana
was there for a gall bladder removal operation. I believe, al-
though I am not positive, that Bennett also advised that
Giancana was then under surveillance. My recollection at this
time is not clear as to whether Bennett advised as to which
agency or organization had Giancana under surveillance, but my
impression is that it was not the F.B.I.
At about the time of this communication from Bennett, I, as
Committee Counsel, had been attempting to locate Mr. Giancana.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 634
I had discussed his possible testimony before the Committee
with Chief Counsel, Fritz Schwarz, and Staff Director, William
Miller. It is my recollection that we agreed that I should
attempt to contact Giancana for the purposes of interview-
ing him in order to determine whether he would have suffi-
cient information to warrant an appearance before the Commit-
tee as a whole. It is my memory that we did decide that
he was of sufficient importance to be interviewed by the
Staff, i.e., for me to interview him.
During this same period of time, I discussed with
Messrs. Schwarz and Miller whether we should consider
issuing a subpoena for Mr. Giancana while he was in the
hospital. I made this suggestion because of an impression
I had that Giancana was difficult to locate. I should add
that I see absolutely nothing prejudicial or improper or
discourteous in the issuing of a subpoena, but rather
regard a subpoena as a valid method of obtaining testimony
before a Congressional Committee. In any event, my dis-
cussion with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller resulted in a
decision to have me contact Mr. Giancana over the telephone
and offer him an opportunity to appear before the Committee
voluntarily and to have me interview him if he so agreed.
If he did not agree, we would then take it before the Com-
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 635
3-
mittee as to whether a subpoena should be issued for Mr.
Because of the events that followed we never
Giancana.
My telephone
reached the point of bringing before the Committee the ques-
tion of whether Giancana should be subpoenaed to testify.
After the initial phone call from Bennett to Shea, I
telephoned Bennett on two different occasions.
contact with Bennett was for the purpose of our locating
Giancana and a telephone number at which I could reach him.
Bennett initially indicated to me, as described earlier
this memorandum, that Giancana was in the hospital. My recol-
lection is that on my second telephone call with Bennett, he
informed me that Giancana was now out of the hospital and
staying at the Warwick Hotel. Finally, I recall calling the
in
Methodist Hospital in Houston and asking to speak to Mr.
Giancana. I recall that the hospital authorities indicated
that they had no such person by that name in the hospital.
I do not recall the precise date of this telephone communication
to the hospital. It is my recollection that the name used by
Giancana was Doc Brown. I am uncertain whether Bennett told me
Giancana was using "Doc Brown" at both the hospital and the
hotel, but I believe he said that the alias was used at the
hospital. Bennett advised that Giancana had been visited by
several relatives and gave me the names of a couple of persons
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 636
-4-
who he thought were Giancana's sons-in-law. The only name
I remember is that of Tisci.
In either the second or possibly a third conversation
with Bennett, he told me that Giancana had now checked out
of the hotel and was either on his way back to his home in
Oak Park, Illinois, or with his daughter in California. He
provided me with the telephone number of the daughter in
California and suggested I obtain Giancana's home number from
the information directory in Illinois.
The telephone conversations with Bennett occurred, to
the best of my recollection, during the week of June 16, 1975.
It is possible, however, that the first conversation occurred
later in the week of June 9. It is my recollection that my
second telephone conversation with Bennett occurred on Thurs-
day June 19. In any event, I am certain that I attempted to
contact Giancana by telephone on Thursday, June 19. I was
unable to get anyone to answer the telephone in California
and did not have an opportunity to attempt to obtain the
Illinois number. I learned Friday, June 20 that Giancana had
been shot and killed in his home in Oak Park, Illinois on
the evening of June 19.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 637
:
The Washington Post
August 22, 1976
Slain Mobster Claimed
Cuban Link to JFK Death
By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers
:
Long before his recent murder,
John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld
recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Cas
tro, had been privately claiming that
agents of the Cuban premier, in retali-
ation, were involved in the assassina-
tion of President John F. Kennedy.
Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connec-
tion to the Kennedy assassination was
expressed through his attorney, Ed-
ward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long.
ago as March, 1967, and also in private.
*conversations with a longtime 'associ-
ate of Rosselli who participated in
meetings between Rosselli and the
CIA.
An FBI “blind memorandum" on
an interview with Morgan dated
March 21, 1967, was included, without
identification of the interviewee. in.
last June's Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee's report on the role of the in-
telligence community in the Kennedy
assassination investigation.
Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli
and another Morgan client had in-
formed him that Castro became aware
of CIA assassination conspiracies
against him and "thereafter employed
teams of individuals who were dis
patched to the United States for the
purpose of assassinating Mr. Ken-
nedy."
Because neither. Morgan nor Ros-
selli was identified in the Senate re-
port, the significance of that portion
of the 106-page document was dis-
counted at the time it was published
in June, before. Rosselli's disappear-
ance and the subsequent discovery of
his body in an oil drum in Florida
waters. The Washington Post, however,
has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli
. were the sources of the testimony that
suggested a Cuban role in the Ken-
nedy murder.
Morgan's account, according to a
summary of the FBI interview, was
that Rosselli had reached his conclu-
sion about a Cuban connection to the
Kennedy
from
"feedback" furnished by sources close
to Castro who were involved in the CIA
plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.
assassination:
"His (Morgan's) clients were aware
of the identity of some of the individ-
uals who came to the United States
for this purpose and he understood
that two such individuals were now in
the state of New Jersey," the FBI in-
terview summary stated. .
A long-time associate of Rosselli
who was interviewed separately by
The Washington Post, said there was
no question in the slain mobster's
mind that President Kennedy was
killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal
for the CIA schemes against the Cu-
ban leader..
"He was positive; he was sure." said
the associate, who knew Rosselli well
and was in contact with him before
Rosselli disappeared from his Florida
home on July 28. The associate, who
does not want to be identified pub-
licly, is scheduled to be interviewed
this week by Dade County, Fla., homi-
cide detectives. He was a party to Ros-
selli's contacts in the early 1960s with
. CIA case officers overseeing the at-
tempts to assassinate Castro.
་
Despite occasional speculation, the
collective conclusion of all official
U.S. government investigations into
the Kennedy assassination-including
the Warren Commission, the FBI and
the CIA-has been that there was no
evidence that implicated the Castro
government or any of its agents.
However, the CIA's involvement in
the schemes to assassinate Castro
was not divulged to the Warren Com-
mission, and knowledge of them was
confined until 1967 to a small, elite
circle of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity. President Johnson apparently
first learned about the schemes only
after a March 7, 1967, column by the
late Drew Person, which prompted
Johnson to order a CIA investigation
of the highly sensitive episode.
Full details of the CIA-underworld
collusion in the plots to kill Castro
did not surface publicly until the pub-
lication last year of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee's assassination re-
port and the ensuing report last June
on the possible role of the intelligence
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 638
2
agencies in the Kennedy assassination
and investigation.
The body of Rosselli, who lived
flamboyantly in a world of mobsters,
politicians and playgirls, was found
two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum
weighted with chains but buoyed by:
gases from decomposition on the
ocean's surface off the coast of Miami,
The specific cause of death was deter-
mined by an autopsy to be asphyxia-
tion. ;
Last year, an underworld colleague
of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana,
who also had been recruited by the
CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was
found shot to death in his Chicago
home in what police described as a
highly professional job by assailants
who penetrated the mobster's per-
'sonal security screen. Giancana was
due to testify before the Senate Intel-
ligence Committee shortly after his
¡demise.
1
Neither murder has been solved.
The possibility that Rosselli's mur-
der might have been related to his
Senate testimony on the CIA schemes
to kill Castro has brought the FBI
into the investigation at the request
of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.
The involvement of Rosselli, Gian-
cana and other underworld figures-
principally Santos Trafficante of
Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana
gambling enterprises fell hostage in
1959 to the Cuban revolution-in plots
against Castro had been a closely held
secret within the top echelons of the
CIA and FBI until recently.
The tangled chronology of suppres
sion and eventual disclosure, although
detailed in the June report, has re-
ceived little public attention. Rossel-
li's murder adds significance to those
events.
Here is the sequence, pieced to-
gether from the testimony given to
Senate intelligence investigators:
Columnist Drew Pearson went to
the late Chief Justice of the United
States Earl Warren late in.: January.
1967, and told him that a Washington.
lawyer had confided to him that one
of his clients said the United States
"had attempted to assassinate Fidel
Castro in the early 1960s and Castro.
had decided to retaliate."
Warren declined Pearson's sugges-
tion that he see the lawyer, who was
Edward Morgan. Warren referred the
matter to then Secret Service Direc-
tor James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13,
1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Ho-
over, informing him of the allegations.
Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six
senior bureau officials on an "eyes-
only" basis. There is no record of FBI
meetings or discussions of those alle-
gations. At that point the sensitive let-
ter bounced back and forth in the
higher reaches of the FBI bureauc-
racy.
The job of responding to Rowley's
letter was assigned to the supervisor
of the FBI's General Investigative Di-
vision who was given respons¡ility for
the overall assassination investigation
in March 1964.
This official's job was complicated
by the fact that he had never been in-
formed of what Hoover and his closest
circle of confidants in the FBI learned
early in 1962-that the CIA was
deeply
involved in assassination
attempts against Castro, and promi-
nent American underworld figures, in-
cluding Rosselli and Giancana, had
been recruited for the attempts..
So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official
prepared a draft reply to the Rowley
letter for his superiors saying "our in-
vestigation uncovered no evidence in-
dicating Fidel Castro officials of the
Cuban Government were involved
with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assas-
sination of President Kennedy. This
bureau is not conducting, any investi-
gation regarding this matter." The
FBI official added in later testimony.
that "everyone in the higher echelons
read this..
Drew Pearson went ahead and pub-
lished a column on March 7, 1967, ref-
erring to reports that CIA schemes
against Castro's life in 1963 "may
have resulted in a counterplot by Cas-
tro to assassinate President Kenne-
dy."
Ten days later, Marvin Watson. one
of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies,
called FBI assistant director Cartha
DeLoach with the message that "the
President had instructed that the FBI'
interview (Morgan) concerning any
knowledge he might have regarding.
the assassination of President Ken-
nedy."
DeLoach told Watson, that it ap-
peared Morgan "did not want to be in-
terviewed, and even if he was inter-
viewed he would probably not divulge
the identity of his sources
"Wat
son persisted, however.
De-
circumstances,"
"Under the
Loach concluded in a memo for the..
files. "it appears that we have no al-
ternative but to interview (Morgan)'
and then furnish the results to Wat-.
son in blind memorandum form."
The interview was assigned to two
agents from the FBI's General Investi-
gative Division, which the Senate
'
committee concluded was "puzzling"
because it was the Domestic Intelli-
gence Division which had been as-
signed responsibility for investigating
possible foreign involvement in the
assassination.
Neither agent was privy to the
knowledge, confined to Hoover and
his top aides, of the CIA's assassina-
tion plots against Castro. Both agents
testified eight years later that they
were "surprised" when Morgan al-
luded during the interview 'to U.S. at-
tempts to assassinate Castro.
"These agents stated that they
could not evaluate the lawyer's
(Morgan's) allegations or question him
in detail on them, since they had not
been briefed on the CIA assassination
efforts," the Senate committee ob-
served.
On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Wash.
ington Field Office sent headquarters
ten copies of a blind memorandum
summarizing the interview with Mor-
gan..
In a Senate Intelligence Committee
summary of the FBI interview, Mor-
gan was reported to have acknowl-
edged that his clients were "on the
fringe of the underworld" and that
they faced "possible prosecution in a
crime not related to the assassination
Morgan said his clients "were called
upon by a governmental agency to as-
sist in a project which was said to .
have the highest governmental ap-
proval. The project had as its purpose
the assassination of Fidel Castro.
Elaborate plans were made, including
the infiltration of the Cuban Govern-
ment and the placing of informants
within key posts in Cuba."
Morgan also told the FBI, according
to the summary, that Castro had em-
ployed "teams of individuals who
were dispatched to the United States.,
for the purpose of assassinating Presi
Ident Kennedy."
It was not "clear then-nor is it to:
day why Morgan came forward at
that time to bring Rosselli's story to
the ears of the nation's highest law.
enforcement authorities.
It may be relevant that Rosselli had
'serious legal problems at the time.
In May, 1966, the FBI. threatened to
deport him for living in the United
States under an assumed name unless
he cooperated in an investigation of
the Mafia (his true name was Filippo
Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA
contact from the anti-Castro conspir-
acy days, CIA security director Col.
Sheffield Edwards, who informed the
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 639
t
i
FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep
square with the bureau" but
was
afraid that the mob might kill him for
talking.
In 1967, after he was arrested for
gambling fraud at the Friars Club in
Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his
former CIA case officer, William Har:
vey, who sought unsuccessfully to in-
tercede in the prosecution.
It was against this background that
Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson,
and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sen-
sational allegations of CIA plotting.
against Castro and the Cuban counter-
espionage directed against President
Kennedy.
Last April Rosselli told the Senate
Intelligence Committee he had no rec.
collection of either receiving informa-
tion that Castro retaliated against
President Kennedy or of having dis-
cussed it with Morgan. This meant ei-
ther that Rosselli suffered a dramatic
memory loss or that Morgan's state-
ment to FBI agents nine years earlier
was a pure invention, a serious risk
for an established Washington lawyer.
No committee source could explain
the discrepancy, and Morgan declined
to confirm that Rosselli was the client
in question or to discuss either his
allegations against the Cuban govern-
ment or his recent testimony.
The internal FBI memo on the 1967
interview with Morgan was sent, to
headquarters with a transmittal slip
saying: "No further investigation is
being conducted by the Washington
field office unless it is advised to the
contrary by the Bureau."
The Senate intelligence committee,
in commenting on this position, said
that "had the interviewing agents
known of the CIA-underworld plots
against Castro, they would have been.
aware that the lawyer had clients who
had been active in the assassination
plots."
On March 21, FBI headquarters for-
warded the Washington field office
memo to the White House, the attor
ney general and the Secret Service. It
did not recommend any further in-
vestigation of Morgan's allegations.
On the evening of the following.
day, President Johnson called CIA Di-
rector Richard M. Helms to the White
House. The next morning, March 23,
Helms ordered the CIA inspector gen-
eral to prepare a report on the CIA
involvement in the assassination plots.
-Operation Mongoose-of
Helms had full knowledge at the time
they were executed.
which
By May 22, Helms briefed President
Johnson on the results. There is, how-
ever, no evidence that Helm's briefed
the President on the November, 1963,
plot one of eight major schemes on
3
Castro's life from 1960 to 1965-to as-
sassinate the Cuban leader through-
the employment of an agent with the
cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity
was revealed as Rolando Cubela. a
1961 CIA "recruit" with close access.
to Castro.
CIA operatives turned over assassi-
nation equipment to Cubela during a
Paris meeting on November 22, 1963-
the day President Kennedy was killed.
in Dallas. There has been subsequent
speculation that the mercurial and
talkative Cubela was either a double
agent or being monitored by Cuban
intelligence.
During the later days of his presi
dency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically
of a "Caribbean Murder Incorpo
rated" targeted against Fidel Castro.
The inspiration for that statement un-
doubtedly was the CIA inspector gen-.
eral's report he ordered Helms to have
prepared..
Within the past year, Rosselli and
two of his co-conspirators in the Cas-
tro assassination schemes have died,
Giancana al the hands of a profes-
sional hit man and Harvey as the re.
sult of a "massive heart attack" last
June.
Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of
the deceased CIA official, said she
suspected no foul play in her hus
band's death. She did, however, tell
The Washington Post that she re-
ceived a call after Rosselli's disappear-
ance in late July warning her that Cu-
bans appeared to be attempting to
wipe out all those who participated in
the anti-Castro plots.
The call, she said, came from an old
friend who was acquainted with Ros-
selli's sister, whose name is Edith Dai-
gle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle
told the mutual acquaintance that the
Rosselli family had received a tele-
phone threat from unidentified Cu-
bans prior to Rosselli's disappearance.
She also said that Rosselli had gone to
meet the Cubans in an effort to pro-
tect his family.
Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by
The Washington Post. But another sis-
ter of Rosselli said she had heard of.
no such threats or warnings.
Harvey, who died at age 60 and
whose exploits as a clandestine opera-
tor are both legendary and controver-
sial within the agency, testified to the
Senate Intelligence Committee. He
had become Rosselli's case officer in .
Operation Mongoose and supplied the
mobster with poison pills, explosives,
detonators, rifles, handguns, radios.
and boat radar for transmission to
anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and
Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to
the Senate committee, "developed a
close friendship.".
Another CIA official who worked
with Rosselli, James R. O'Connell, was
asked if he knew whether the agency
transmitted information to the mob-
ster on possible Cuban Involvement in
the Kennedy assassination. He replied
that he was out of the country at the
time Kennedy was killed, and had no
further comment.
Two months before the Kennedy as-
sassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who
was identified by the Warren Commis-
sion as Kennedy's murderer, had trav-
eled to Mexico City in an attempt to
gain entry to Cuba. According to the
Warren Commission, Oswald repre-
sented himself as the head of the New
Orleans branch of the Fair Play for
Cuba organization and a friend of the
Cuban Revolution.
Some three months before Kennedy
was killed, Castro told Associated
Press reporter Daniel Harker that
U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to
eliminate Cuban leaders would them-
selves not be safe..
A U.Ş. government committee coor-
dinating policy toward Cuba at the
-, time agreed there is a strong liklihood.
that Castro would retaliate in some
fashion. However, it concluded Castro
would not risk a major confrontation
with the U.S. by attacking U.S. lead-
ers.
On the same day Kennedy was as-
sassinated, a CIA officer met with a
high-ranking Cuban official, who had
said he would kill Castro, to tell him.
the U.S. would provide him with ex-
plosives and a poison pen device.
While the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee said it found no evidence suffi-
cient to justify a conclusion that the
Kennedy assassination was part of a
conspiracy, it also said U.S. 'agencies
did not properly investigate the assas-
sination or tell the Warren Commis-
sion about the CIA plots on Castro's
life.
"There is no indication that the FBI:
or the CIA directed the interviewing
of Cuban sources or sources within
the Cuban exile community," the Sen-
ate committee said.
According to a former FBI official
in charge of key aspects of the FBI's
probe of the Kennedy murder, the
FBI never satisfactorily determined
what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or
what he had done in Russia. .
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 640
1
'NY'S
WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER
SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975-
Гі
NW 50955
FEDITION
Daily 10c-Sunday 25c. 71st Year--Number 97
CIA, Mobsters Linked
To Cuba Raid Plans
Newspaper Names 4Mafia Figures
SACRAMENTO (AP) - The
Central Belligcheo Agency
relied on Your underworld
mobsters for intelligence used
In planning the ill-fated 1981
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba,
the Sacramento Bee said to
day.
The CIA's underworld in
formants, all former Havana
casino besses, had buried
$750,000 in Cuba when they
fled Fidel Castro. Therefore,
they had a stake in encourag-¨
ing the United States to un
dertake the invasion to over-
throw Castro, the Bee report-
ed.
"The Information they sup-
plied to the CIA supposedly"
pinpointed troop and naval
'vessel positions," Bee investi-
gative reporter Denny Walsh
wrote in the Sunday edition.
"More 'unportantly," per-
haps, the mobsters also re-
ported that many of the peo-
ple of Havana were unsym-
pathetic to Castro and would
almost certainly rise up in
support of a counter-revolue
tionary force once it hades-
tablished a beachhead,"
Walsh continued.
when it became obvious that
the invasion of 1,400 exiles
was a failure, the mobster
boat returned to Florida.
"Walsh identified the source
of his information as a former
employe of the CIA. He did
not identify the employe in
the story, which carried a Las
Vegas, Nev., dateline.
He quoted Lawrence R.
Houston, described as the CIA
oficial receiving the under-
In exchange for their help,
the hoodlum had been prom
ised they would be allowed to
recover their buried cache un
hindered, Walan said. –
He said the oddlums had
their own boat, with one CIA
man aboard, standing off the
Cuban short when the Bay of
Did I starter: Dud
DocId: 32423630 Page 641
مد تقيم
world information; as declin-
ing to confirm or deny the
accounts.
thing like that. My piersity is -
probably not na good es cone
When you reflect on it,
The Bee reported that House not an implausible: situctices
is it?”
Related Story Page A5
ton, retired general counsel of
the CIA, said of the story:
"I do not recollect such a
thing, but that doesn't mean it
didn't happen. I won't deny it,
but I don't remember any,
#
The Bee said two of the four.
mobsters involved with tha
CIA in the Bay of Pigs are
still alive.
It said one is Russell Bufal
no, 71, describe as s
live northeastian Pennsylva
(Please Tun To AZ, CòL'5)
I
୮
CIA Mafia Link
"
Continued From Page A1)
la Mafia boss who was con
victed just before his hookup)
with the CIA of conspiring to
obstruct fustico in lying about
the 1957 Mafia summit moot-
ing at Apalac in, N.Y.
The newspaper said the oth-
ér living informant is Georie
Lavlen also known as Congo
Lawia who was described as
"to overseer and manager of
Mafia gambling Interests i
pre-Castro" Cuba. The Bce
said he is reportedly living in
Coral Gables, Fla.
The other two were James
Plumeri. Identified as a for-
mer Mafia hijackor, labor
racketeer and garment dis-
trict strongman, and Salva-
fore Granello, Identified as a
Milla extortionist and game
bler.
..
Plumeri and Granello were
victims several years ago of
"Hantelated gangland execu
tons, Walsh wrote.
Here is the account of
CIA-Mafia Intrigue as de-
cribed by Walsh from his
unidentified former CIA
Gource:
"During the pro-1959 re-
gime of the former Cuban
Edictator, Fulgencio Batista,
talino gambling flourished in
the country under the direç
lon and control of the U.S.
organized crime underworld.
The Castro revolution
routed the mob along with
Balista, and the Cuban pre-
Amir's Communist govern
inent has never allowed the
resumption of mob, activities
there
The four former casino
bosses "made periodic re-
ports to the CIA until just
before the abortive, Bay of
Pigs invasion.
"Between $45,000 and
$50,000 was paid by the four
gangsters to informants rin
Cuba for the information
"The money came, at least
in part, from a $750,000 cache
wrapped in oilcloth and bur
ind in the ground by Granollo->
and Loving just before, their
hasty departure from Cuba:
during the turbulent days of
the Castro takeover.
"It was the rest of this
money that Granello, Levine,
Bufalino and Plumeri were
assured they would be able to
recover unhindered if the Cas-
tro government was toppled...
"
"They managed to get word.
"to hoodlumns inside Cuba who
knew the whereabouts of the
money to start buying stra-
tegic information. Other Cu-
ban associates of the four
gangsters were dispatched to
the island from Florida on
Intelligence-gathering sorties."
Earüer published. reports
have said that in preparation
for the Bay of Pigs invasion,
CIA Director Allen Dulles ro-
(lied heavily on reports which
stressed the unpopularity of
the Castro regime and the
expectation, never realized, of
massive rebellion at the time
of a strike.
Г
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 642
MEMORANDUM
TO:
FRITZ AND BILL
FROM:
MIKE EPSTEIN
DATE:
JUNE 20, 1975
SUBJECT:
GIANCANA
I expect that no one will write off the alleged Giancana murder as a
$8
"third-rate homicide, and that it will grow and grow and grow. It is clearly
the most volatile media issue of the season.
Given the barest outlines of what allegedly happened, and taking them
at face value, we have a responsibility to take action under 18 U.S. Code,
Section 1505:
Whoever
witness
endeavors to
by force
impede any
in connection with any inquiry or investigation
being had by ... any committee of either House
Whoever
endeavors to
by
or
force
obstructs, or impedes or
obstruct, or impede
the due and proper
any committee of
exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry
or investigation is being had by
either House
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
1
In short, if Giancana was a "witness" (which status he might have
achieved by mere location contacts made by staff) and he was killed to
prevent his appearance; or indeed even if he wasn't yet a "witness" but
this was a "message" to all witnesses to keep quiet (e.g. Roselli and Maheu),
there is a violation of law which we might have the responsibility to investigate.
Beyond what our responsibility is, it seems clear to me that most extreme
possibilities of what might actually have happened dictate that we come up
with a well-reasoned position and plan after careful, deliberate, intensive
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 643

-2-
consideration of all avenues of approach, pitfalls, suspected motives, etc.
Most important of all, it seems to me, is our acceptance of the fact that
maybe we don't even have anyone on our staff with sufficient experience,
sophistication, background, and investigative maturity to deal with this
situation.
As a first step, I urge your decision to convene a planning session to
decide what the second step will be.
I can't emphasize enough the need for well-thought-out planning here.
Who knows where this will lead? And at a minimum, some months from now,
Senator Church may be asked, "What did you do the day after you learned
that Giancana had been killed?".
My stream of consciousness on kinds of things to consider would
include: What our public statement on this should or should not be,
security for other witnesses, immediate contact with other key witnesses
(to reassure them), secrecy of witness lists and immunity applications,
secrecy of place, time and even fact of interview, meetings with Justice
organized crime section, Chicago strike force, local law enforcement people
in Oak Park and Illinois, obtaining all FBI investigative reports (they're
in it per tonight's Star), getting background on all law enforcement officials
in Illinois who will be involved (whom do you trust?), is this a diversion
which we're being sucked into, how do we avoid that (hire someone just for
this), how do we show we care so other witnesses (known or unknown) won't
dry up, etc. etc. etc.
NOTE: Mike can be reached after 6:45 tonight at (802) 863-2652.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 644
MEMORANDUM:
TO: Mike Madigan
FROM: Ed Greissing
DATE: August 13, 1976
SUBJECT: Mention of Carlos Marcello in the 4/23/76 transcript of
John Rosselli.
On April 23, 1976 during Mr. Rosselli's appearance before the
Schweiker-Hart Subcommittee, we took the opportunity to question
him about any information he might possess regarding the New Orleans
Mafia Chieftan, Carlos Marcello..
!
Our interest in Marcello developed from 1) the allegation that
Marcello was tangentially involved with both Clay Shaw and David
Ferrie; the fact that Marcello was deported by Attorney General Robert
Kennedy and that the assassination of President Kennedy was a possible
retaliation,
In my telephone conversation with Jim Johnston, 8/13/76, he could
think of no other reasons why we questioned Rosselli about Marcello.
If you would like to talk to Jim about this matter, his telephone
number is 780-6203.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 645
MEMORANDUM
To:
Files
From:
Mike Madigan
Date:
June 23, 1975
Subj:
Ref to Troff.
or
ar X
Х
Additional Roselli Questions
Harvey
how long
Boy/Pizz
ак
but
Inquire when in the discussions between Roselli and the CIA
did any suggestion appear with regard to both Che Guevera and
Rauol Castro, in addition to the discussions involving Fidel only.
note
Query whether Roselli has heard the term "ZRRIFLE"
Helms to Harvey memorandum of 12 February 1962, giving approval for
use of unvouchered funds.
1961.
I.G. Report references first delivery of the pills in early.
Second delivery of the pills in early 1962
Roselli's date recollection.
- -
inquire re:
Jake Esterline had possession of the cigars already treated
with poison in March through August 1960 in Florida. Esterline
apparently destroyed them before he left in June of 1961
knowledge of Esterline or the cigars?
Roselli's knowledge of thalliu salts operation to put in
Castro's shoes when left outside hotel room on trip?
outside
I.G. Report indicates First Phase from August 1960 through
Roselli's
no April 1961 and Second Phase from April 1962 through February 1963.
Break
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 646
-2-
R
-H.
to R-
9 
to 11
Inspector General's Report states that Maheu was instructed
to tell Roselli that Maheu represented businesses (Wall Street)
who had interests in Cuba and who wanted to eliminate Castro and
were willing to pay $150,000.
Roselli Trafficante's gambling interests in Cuba interest
in killing Castro?
I.G. Report indicates "first meeting" to be 14 September 1960
in New York City, with Maheu, Roselli and O'Connell present.
I.G. Report indicates that Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana
and that Giancana was to arrange contacts with syndicate elements
in Cuba meeting for Roselli/Maheu/Giancana meeting in Fountain-
bleu Hotel in Florida week of 25 September 1960. I. G. Report
indicates that Giancana told Maheu that he had a man (Trafficante)
to serve as a courier going back and forth between Miami and Cuba.
I.G. Report indicates conversation in Roselli's presence wherein
Giancana tells Maheu that Giancana is opposed to the use of guns
no chance of escape?
R
R
Roselli named inside man in Cuba as Juan Orta
then in
Prime Minister's office in Havana.
I.G. Report indicates Dr. Gunn's notation of delivery of
the first batch of pills to be 10 February 1961?
Roselli timing?
R
I us
us before Bay ffige?
how for
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 647
-3-
sect
R.
indicates
I.G. Report indicates that Roselli's man, Orta, had "easy
access" to Castro, and that he was involved in a "rake-off on
gambling profits."
I.G. Report has Roselli giving the pills to Trafficante,
rather than directly to the Cuban?
NO
NO
Did Harvey actually tell Roselli to cut off the project
slowly so as to avoid creating hard feelings on the part of the
:
Cubans in the latter part of 1962?
I.G. Report in
"Second Phase" indicates Roselli telling
O'Connell that Trafficante knew a man high up in the Cuban exile
movement who could take over the job from Orta. Report indicates
this man's name is Varona, and that Trafficante probably knew
Varona in his efforts to take over gambling once Castro was out.
Does Roselli know Edward Moss and the Cellini's offer of money
to Varona to be used against Castro?
:
I.G. Report indicates that Trafficante told Varona that he
(Trafficante) had clients who would pay big money to get rid of
Castro' Roselli's knowledge of this time frame March/April
1961 figures mentioned from various witnesses are (1) $50,000
(2) $25,000 (3) $10,00 plus $1,000 worth of communications
equipment. NOTE: O'Connell's testimony of $50,000 being taken
to Florida and put in a safe deposit box to be paid C.O.D. upon
accomplishment of Castro mission.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630
Page 648
-4-
R
well
after
intro;
3d
MAN.
I.G. Report has Harvey taking over in February 1961 but only
of the "executive action capability."
The Report indicates
15 November 1961 as date Harvey says Bissell told him to include
Cuba in ZRRIFLE program, and to take over syndicate connection
Roselli's knowledge of either of these dates? NOTE: Are ZRRIFLE
and Castro assassination plans synonymous?
cast
I.G. Report gives 8 and 9 April 1962 in New York City as the
meeting place for the first introduction of Harvey, O'Connell and
Roselli. NOTE: O'Connell feels that Harvey met Roselli prior
to this meeting meeting took place at Savoy Plaza/Savoy Hilton
Hotel where Roselli stayed dinner at the Elk Room
drinks at
the Copacabana table across from Phyllis MacGuire with Dorothy
Kilgallen and Liberace performing
would not be seen by MacGuire
seats changed so that Roselli
Roselli's recollection?
June of 1963 Harvey left for Rome.
43 am
April 18, 1962 Dr. Treichler's records showing delivery of
four pills to "OC."
September 1961, last casino in Havana closed.
I.G. Report references Roselli's having a man known as "Maceo"
or "Garcia - Gomez" and "Goday".
Cuban who spoke Italian
The report describes him as a
Roselli's recollection?
time frame?
! NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 649.
پوسته اند
Wier
The I.G. Report has April 1962 as the time period for
the delivery of the rental truck with the rifles, etc.
recollection of what was inside?
Roselli's
Rifles with telescopic sites
for assassination purposes? Communications equipment what type?
NOTE: Roselli's recollection regarding joint surveillance by Harvey
and Shackley in one car and O'Connell and Roselli in another car?.
May 1962 I.G. Report indicates that Roselli reports to Harvey
that the pills are in Cuba- references to all calls to Roselli
- -
going to the Friars Club and Roselli's calls going to Harvey's home
number
Roselli's recollection?
June 1962 I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that
Varona had sent a three-man team into Cuba and that the pills were
"inside."
September 1962 I.G. Report references Roselli meeting Harvey
in Miami on 7 and 11 September. Roselli tells Harvey that a second
--
three-man team was sent in by Varona a team of militia to infil-
trate Castro's bodyguard
7
and safe?
Лепис
that the first team is already inside
Roselli's recollection of facts?
January 1963. I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey
that "militia team" prepared for take-off and that they never did?
Roselli's recollection?
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 650
-6-
June 1963. I.G. Report reference last meeting between Roselli
Roselli met by Harvey at Dulles Airport Roselli
and Harvey
stayed at home of friend of Harvey's
Harvey's home closed up
per overseas trip Harvey called by FBI having seen Roselli/Harvey
at restaurant
--
FBI had Roselli under surveillance
Roselli's
recollection of facts? - Time period?
I.G. Report indicates that Maheu put in contact with Giancana
for tap through Roselli Roselli's advance knowledge?
O'Connell's Testimony
O'Connell's recollection is that Orta's man would not go through
with it and that the pills were returned to O'Connell by Roselli.
O'Connell's recollection then is that the second plan was a call
from Roselli and Maheu indicating the use of a chef. The pills
were sent down and again returned when this plot failed.
O'Connell is unclear which of the aforementioned schemes took
place before the Bay of Pigs. He indicates, however, the use of
Varona to be after the Bay of Pigs.
O'Connell has the first introduction of Roselli and Harvey as
being in the Miami airport.
O'Connell's testimony is that he received a call from Maheu
who said that Giancana was upset about Phyllis MacGuire seeing
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 651
-7-
Dan Rowan. Maheu said that he had been requested to place a tap
for Giancana and that Giancana might "stop helping" on the assassina-
tion plot if this tap was not placed. O'Connell checked with
Edwards and received the go-ahead.
O'Connell indicates that
Maheu was authorized to pay for DuBois out of the month given him
on the assassination plan.
O'Connell states that he recalls November 1960 as the time
period of the delivery of the pills for Roselli through Trafficante?
O'Connell recollection that "chef" incident after Bay of Pigs.
O'Connell states that Varona's price was $50,000
worth of communications equipment in addition.
$10,000
O'Connell introduced by Roselli to Varona as "Mr. Olds."
*
Harvey Testimony
Harvey places the fall of 1961 as the time period in which
ZRRIFLE was to be applied to Cuba.
Harvey reference to pressure from the Kennedys to topple the
Castro regime clandestinely and not by means of any attack.
Roselli's hearsay knowledge of this?
Harvey states that he recalls firearms in the truck, possibly
"sniper-scope rifles."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 652
8-
Harvey states that as soon as the missile crisis was over,
i.e., late 1962, he indicated to Roselli that he wanted the
project cut off, although gradually so as not to create hard
feelings.
Roselli's knowledge of Greenspun's safe break-in in 1971
1967 meeting between Greenspun, Garrison, Roselli, etc.?
I.G. Report reference to "air contamination" in early 1960
Roselli hearsay knowledge?
efforts
E. B. Williams' knowledge re Maheux Roselli/Greenspun meetings
in 1967?
Roselli knowledge re Angell Luis Castillo (U.S. in 1968)
and Jerry Henning (training of Cuban teams)?
Roselli knowledge of explosives along with guns valued at
surveillance by Chief JMWAVE?
$5,000
U-Haul truck delivery
Late 1962-Early 1963 Roselli knowledge of skin-diving suit
implemented with poisons?
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 653
##

Dear Mr. Attorney General:
I am writing you today on behalf of the Select
Committee about the recent death of Samuel Giancana.
As
7
you are no doubt aware, his name has been raised in the
context of allegations concerning the Central Intelligence
Agency's possible involvement in so-called political
assassinations.
Based on information available to the Committee,
it was obvious that he might be knowledgeable about the
political assassination matter. Although Mr. Giancana
had not actually been subpoenaed to testify by this Com-
mittee, he had been approached by members of the staff
for a possible interview. Since this might involve viola-
tion of federal statutes pertaining to obstruction of a
Congressional Committee investigation, the Select Committee
is requesting that you instruct the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to keep it fully informed of all information
coming to the Bureau's attention pertaining to Mr. Giancana's
death. In making this request, the Committee is not conced-
ing its right to conduct its own investigation of this
matter. However, it is acting in the spirit of cooperation
on a question of mutual concern to the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches of government.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 654
i
The Committee is also concerned about the
safety of several other possible witnesses.
Therefore,
we request 24-hour-a-day protection by the United States
Marshall Service for the following witnesses which the
Committee has subpoenaed, intends to subpoena, has inter-
viewed, or intends to interview:
(Alternative paragraph:
The Committee is also concerned about the
safety of several other possible witnesses. We would
like to discuss with members of your staff the necessity
for special arrangements by the United States Marshall
Service to ensure the safety of witnesses who have or
might have to contact with the Committee pertaining to
these matters.)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 655
¡COSTA LONGO
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1459
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2,18
NEW YORK
VINCENZO MANGANO.
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JOSEPH PROFACI
(DECEASED 1962)
THE MAFIA ORGANIZATIO
TAMPA, FLORIDA AREA
ALFONSO DIECIDUE
(DECEASED)
1947
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SANTO TRAFFICANTE,SR.
(DECEASED 1954)
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C COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
D CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
IA CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR MARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
18 AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
1C PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
1D SUSPECTED OF TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS
2 GAMBLING
GAMBLING
SHYLOCKING
LABOR RACKETEERING
COIN MACHINE RACKETEERING
6 EXTORTION, MAYHEM AND MURDERS
COUNTERFEITING
8 RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
RECEIVING
BOOTLEGGING
10 BRIBERY
11 BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND LARCENY
12 TAX EVASION
13 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
14 VICE (PROSTITUTION)
15 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
16 HIJACKING
17 CONTEMPT
18 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
00 CHART REFERENCE NUMBER
STEFANO SCAGLIONE
STEVE'
FBI *285845 C
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 657
20
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JAMES GUIDA BRUNO
@"JIMMY"
FBI *2924250
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B CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS
C COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
O CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
IA CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
1B AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
1C PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
10 SUSPECTED OF TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS
2 GAMBLING
3 SHYLOCKING
4 LABOR RACKETEERING
MACHINE RACKETEERING
5 COIN M
6 EXTORTION, MAYHEM AND MURDERS
7 COUNTERFEITING
RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
8
9
BOOTLEGGING
10 BRIBERY
11 BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND LARCENY
12 TAX EVASION
13 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
14 VICE (PROSTITUTION)
15 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
16 HIJACKING
17 CONTEMPT
18 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
00 CHART REFERENCE NUMBER
13
HENRY TRAFFICANTE
FB: * 625515 B
A 1,5, 21
81 9
C
0 2,10
20
ALFONSO SCAGLIONE
"AL"
FBI *4091276
12
12
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SALVATORE JOE LORENZO
SINGING SAM"
FBI * 5136882
7,8,9
13,1
JAMES GUIDA BRUNO
@"JIMMY"
FBI *2924250
C
2,17,11,12,18
B5
02
EMPLOYEES
21
ASS SOCIATES
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 658
CENTRAL & EAST FLORIDA
COSTAL AREA
SAMUEL CACCIATORE
• "SAM"
@
A 1,5,13
16
02
Rudy Mach
Don Mach
Dan Fussel
Buddy Parron
Glen Brechen
Tommy Berry
Clifford Bell
HARLAN BLACKBURN
Clyde P. Lee
Jesse Joyner
Vasco Joyner
Mathew Smith
Macon Tribue
Julia Ciphon
Hoy Anderson
Kat Bradshaw
Joe Wheeler
Max Reid
Mary Cardan
Phil Riffe
Cecil Merril
Clayton Thomas
"Sonny" Brown
George Solomon
Ralph Strawder
Benny White
Wm. Harrell
Elvin Carroli
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC
IN NARCOTICS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THR
PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY
H CONGRESS
ST SESSION
PURSUANT TO SENATE RESOLUTION (1788TH
PART 2
OCTOBER 10, 1
AND 16, 1963
Printed for the use of the Committee,
ment Operations
W 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 659
520
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. And then Sergeant de la Llana, will
you identify yourself, please, sir?
Mr. DE LA LLANA. Jack de la Llana, Tampa Police Department. I
have been with the police department for 9 years, and attached to the
homicide division for 4 years before starting the criminal intelligence
unit of the Tampa Police Department.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you had previous police service?
Mr. DE LA LLANA. My first experience was 9 years ago, when I
started 
first with 
the force.
The CHAIRMAN. Chief Brown, do you have a statement, a prepared
statement?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, I do, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. I have a copy of it before me, and I see it has several
pages. Do wish to read all of it?
you
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would like to read it to the committee.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well, then, you may proceed.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am
Neil G. Brown, chief of the Police Department of the city of Tampa,
Fla.
I have been a member of the Tampa Police Department for the past
16 years, and I have been chief of the department for the past 4 years.
Prior to my appointment as chief, I served as inspector of detectives.
I am a graduate of the National Police Academy of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and a member of the Tampa Bay Area Chiefs
of Police Association and of the International Association of Chiefs
of Police.
With me here today is Sgt. Jack de la Llana who, at my direction,
formed our department's first criminal intelligence unit in February
of 1962, and has been its director since that time. Sergeant de la
Llana also holds the important post of chairman of the Florida In-
telligence Unit, a statewide agency which coordinates information
amongst intelligence units in cities throughout the State of Florida.
In addition to Sergeant de la Llana, whose diligent work and knowl
edge of criminal operations has provided much of the foundation for
my statement to you, I feel fortunate in being accompanied also by
Sgt. William Branch of the intelligence division of the Orlando Police
Department. Sergeant Branch is presently attending the National
Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has been a
member of the Orlando Police Department since 1951, and a detective
sergeant since 1956. He is particularly familiar with organized gam-
bling operations in the central Florida area, and I believe his presents-
tion of that situation will be of material value to this inquiry.
I feel privileged to be able to testify before you today. I believe.
that the facts I can present here about organized crime operations in
Tampa will help you and the American public realize the seriousness
of this problem, and our Nation's emergent need for further Federal
legislation to combat an evil that has clearly expanded beyond the
powers of municipal law enforcement to contain, suppress and elimi
nate it.
Tampa has a large and respected Italian population, who are con
sidered in all respects to be an asset to our community. Unfor
tunately, a small percentage of this group of citizens have achieved
ORGA
a notoriety
continuous
people of ou
"the Mafia."
Our grow.
1956 when:
Tampa to in
the Mafia wa
grand jury's 1
* there a
exists and oper
The 
evidence p
nesses interview
element whose 1
Mafia as we unde
The CHAIRM
before the grai
you the law en
Mr. BROWN.
The CHAIRM
existed in your c
Mr. 
BROWN. (
been there.
The CHAIRMA
were unable to b
Mr. BROWN. T
The CHAIRMAN
able to get it out i
Mr. BROWN. T
The CHAIRMAN
Mr. BROWN (re:
our records i
from underworld act
The CHAIRMAN.
day from the Ch
murders, gangland
years, and only 2 o
court determination
Mr. BROWN. Tha
The CHAIRMAN.
give us some idea ab
Mr. BROWN. I w
like Chicago.
The CHAIRMAN. S
16 Mr. BROWN. Yes,
The 
CHAIRMAN.
developments of inf
just 
couldn't believe
in the first-degree fa
ropolitan Chicago ov
be solved
. It thorou
the danger of organi:
You 
say: "Well, t
That may be true, but
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 660
C IN NARCOTICS
geant de la Llana, will
Police Department. I
ars, and attached to the
the criminal intelligence
lice service?
as 9 years ago, when I
(a statement, a prepared
e, and I see it has several
I it to the committee.
roceed.
the subcommittee, I am
nt of the city of Tampa,
Department for the past
ent for the past 4 years.
s inspector of detectives.
Academy of the Federal
Tampa Bay Area Chiefs
al Association of Chiefs
na who, at my direction,
ligence unit in February
at time. Sergeant de la
Irman of the Florida In-
coordinates information
at the State of Florida.
diligent work and knowl-
ich of the foundation for
ing accompanied also by
ion of the Orlando Police
attending the National
igation. He has been a
ince 1951, and a detective
iliar with organized gam-
ind I believe his presenta-
se to this inquiry.
ore you today. I believe
nized crime operations in
lic realize the seriousness
need for further Federal
rly expanded beyond the
ntain, suppress and elimi
population, who are con-
our community. Unfor-
of citizens have achieved
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
521
a notoriety greatly disproportionate to their numbers, because of their
continuous activity in criminal and racketeering enterprises. The
people of our city refer to this group as "the Sicilian underworld" or
"the Mafia."
Our growing concern with this criminal group was crystallized in
1956 when a Hillsborough County grand jury was empaneled in
Tampa to investigate and determine the truth of allegations that
the Mafia was then operating in Tampa. The pertinent part of that
grand jury's report stated:
there are some individuals who believe that a Mafia or Black Hand
exists and operates in this community, but they are in the minority. 串串
The evidence presented, the volume of written material examined, and wit-
nesses interviews point to the existence in this community of an organized crime
element whose methods of operation are similar to the pattern of the Sicilian
Mafia as we understand it. ***
The CHAIRMAN. Chief, let me ask you, prior to this development
before the grand jury, before the grand jury made this finding, were
you the law enforcement officials or in the police department?
Mr. BROWN. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Were you suspicious that such an organization
existed in your city?
Mr. Brown. Oh, yes; law enforcement has been aware that this has
been there.
The CHAIRMAN. There was something, you felt confident, but you
were unable to bring it out in concrete proof; is that correct?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. So you had been trying to combat it without being
able to get it out in the open?
Mr. BROWN. That is exactly right.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.
Mr. BROWN (reading):
* * * our records indicate that the vast majority of our unsolved crimes stem
from underworld activity involving persons of Sicilian or Italian ancestry * **
The CHAIRMAN. We had some startling information here the other
day from the Chicago chief of police with respect to some 976
murders, gangland style, that had been committed over a period of
years, and only 2 of them had been solved. That is, officially solved by
court determination or court action.
Mr. BROWN. That is typical.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the ratio in your community, if you can
give us some idea about it?
Mr. BROWN. I will bring that out in my statement, but it is just
like Chicago.
The CHAIRMAN. Something along that line?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That struck me as one of the most frightening
developments of information that I have heard regarding crime.
just couldn't believe that 976 murders, and apparently just murder
in the first-degree fashion, could be committed in an area like Met-
ropolitan Chicago over a period of years, and only 2 of them could
be solved. It thoroughly demonstrates to me the great menace and
the danger of organized mobs committing crime.
You say: "Well, they probably killed each other pretty much."
That may be true, but they kill each other because of the extortionate
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 661
522 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
operations that they are engaged in, to the detriment of the public
at large, and to the detriment of innocent people who can't help
themselves. It focuses and emphasizes how serious this menace is.
Very well, you may proceed.
Mr. BROWN. Notwithstanding these findings, the grand jury con-
cluded that there was no national or local Mafia in Tampa. I would
like to submit as exhibit 1 a certified copy of the report of the grand
jury dated March 30, 1956.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well, this report of the grand jury will be
received and it may be made exhibit No. 44, and exhibit 1 to this
witness' testimony.
I may later direct it be printed, but as of now we will just let it be
filed as an exhibit for reference.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44" for refer-
ence, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
Mr. BROWN. It seems likely to me that the grand jury failed to
acknowledge without qualification the présence of the Mafia in Tampa
because it sought a pattern of Mafia operations similar to the historical
Sicilian tradition of primitive and direct extortion, rather than the
sophisticated and polished control of rackets that now characterize
that organization.
The CHAIRMAN. I take it from that last statement that you feel
that they have considerably improved their technique.
Mr. BROWN. Very much so.
The CHAIRMAN. Of crime operations.
Mr. BROWN. Very much.
Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question, Chief, there?
As I understand what you have just testified relative to the grand
jury's report, they acknowledged that there was some evidence of the
existence of Sicilian Mafia in the community, but apparently felt
that evidence was not conclusive; is that a correct summary?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct; yes, Senator. The Tampa Police De-
partment, however, has long been aware that many criminals in our
area have local reputations as Mafiosi. My staff and I have made 
a
careful evaluation of those reputations, based upon personal knowl-
edge, criminal records, surveillance reports, personal histories, familial
relationships, statistical analyses, reports from confidential inform-
ants, information from Federal and local law-enforcement agencies,
and other customary police intelligence sources.
It is our considered conclusion that the Mafia exists in Tampa, that
it controls most illegal gambling in Tampa and central Florida, and
that its members have interstate and international ties to other 
Mafia
groups.
The organization of the Mafia in the Tampa area is best understood
from a chart we have formulated which I submit to this subcommittee"
as our exhibit No. 2.
Senator MUSKIE. Before we get to that, Chief, may I ask another
question? The grand jury to which you referred sat in 1956, am I
correct?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct, sir.
Senator MUSKIE. That is 7 years ago. Do you think you have
accumulated additional evidence as to the existence of the Mafia in
Tampa which would justify a new reference to the grand jury?
Mr. BROWN. Yes; I believe so.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 662
on
W
mas
own
mon
der
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Senator MUSKIE. Are you planning that?
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
523
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. This chart may be received as exhibit
No. 
45 and we will 
direct it be printed in the record if it can be, as
far as it can be. The 
title of it is "The Mafia Organization in the
Tampa, Fla., 
Area
."
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45" for refer-
ence 
and faces 
this page.)
The CHAIRMAN. Would you say the operations of this organized
group 
are 
not confined just to the city limits of Tampa, but they are
in the area?
Mr. BROWN. By all means; the entire area.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. This chart is now a part of the record
and
, if you wish to 
comment about it, we will proceed with
ment.
your state-
Mr. BROWN. The chart is keyed to show only the criminal, business,
and 
familial 
interrelationships and activities of the persons named,
although other 
criteria figured in our categorization of these persons.
Of course, this chart cannot 
be considered as a definitive "table of
organization" of the Tampa Mafia, because it is but a simplified repre-
sentation of an organization 
that is in a constant state of flux, and about
which we know 
we still have many things to learn.
However, I believe it is completely accurate in showing that Santo
Traficante is the 
boss of this criminal group. Indeed, it is to Santo
Traficante that 
Tampa owes the dubious distinction of having been
represented at the 
notorious crime convention at Apalachin, N.Y.,
in November 1957.
The CHAIRMAN. I notice you designate or refer to this group as the
Mafia
. Would you say that 
it is the same group that has been referred
to by the famous witness, Joe 
Valachi?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; it is.
The CHAIRMAN. Whether he calls it Cosa Nostra or the Mafia makes
no 
difference
. This is the organized crime group to which you re-
ferred?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct, Senator; this is the;
Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question there?
group.
Under this group, there is another group which you describe as
nonmember associates and 
employees. Is that intended to suggest
that the people who 
are so described know nothing about the identity
of their employers 
and the organization of which they are a part?
Mr. BROWN. Senator, that is a part of the insulation of the group.
They 
have many 
employees, and as we go into the statement, to show
how in this 
gambling operation the seller is non-Sicilian in most
cases, and he 
reports to another member up the ladder, and so on up.
Many of these people are 
nonmembers of the Mafia as it is.
Senator MUSKIE. Do they know they are engaged in criminal ac-
tivities?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
Senator MUSKIE. They know they are a part of a criminal orga-
nization?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
Senator MUSKIE. But they are not members?
Mr. 
BROWN. That is correct.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 663

524
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Senator MUSKIE. What do they need to do to become members in
the Tampa area?
Mr. BROWN. Well, I think I can clarify that later on in the state-
ment, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. All right; you may proceed.
Mr. BROWN. Santo Traficante, Jr., was born in Tampa on November
14, 1914. He was one of five brothers. He maintains residence today
m Tampa and in Miami. He previously lived in Havana, Cuba,
where he owned and operated gambling casinos under the Battista
regime. When Fidel Castro took over, Traficante's gambling opera-
tions were stopped. He was expelled from Cuba and returned to
the United States. He inherited the control of the numbers racket
in central Florida which his father, Santo Trafficante, Sr., who died
in 1954, and he continues to head this operation.
Testimony in the 1958 hearings of the Senate Select Committee
on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field identified
Santo Traficante, Jr., in the operation of the Sans Souci gambling
casino in Havana. That testimony stated that Trafficante took over
the Sans Souci from the Mannarino brothers in Pittsburgh, Pa.
Gabriel Mannarino was a fellow delegate with Santo Trafficante, Jr.,
to the Apalachin crime convention in 1957.
Additional testimony named Trafficante, Jr., as the key figure in
the Mafia in Tampa, stating, as the Tampa police had long known,
that he succeeded his father as the major racketeer in the city.
Other information substantiated by our files reveals that Trafficante
is an associate of such notorious criminals as Meyer Lansky, Joseph
Bonanno, Sam Giancana, Aniello Dellacroce, Joseph Stassi, Sam Man-
narino, Joseph Arcuri, and of Joseph Riccobono, also known as Staten
Island Joe, who had been closely allied with the elder Traficante,
and was also discovered at the Apalachin meeting.
When Joseph Profaci's daughter Carmella married Anthony Tocco,
son of Detroit mobster William "Black Bill" Tocco, in Brooklyn on
June 4, 1955, one of the guests at the reception in the Hotel "Com-
modore in New York was Santo Traficante, Jr. Among those who
also attended were 13 other persons who later attended the Apalachin
conference, as well as other notorious Mafia figures, such as Frank
Livorsi, Thomas and John Dioguardi, Tony and Albert Anastasia,
and Thomas "Three Finger Brown" Lucchese.
There have been at least two known attempts on the life of Santo
Traficante: On January 2, 1953, he was shotgunned in a car on the
streets of Tampa, receiving wounds in the arm. Later, in Cuba, four
American mobsters who intended to kill Trafficante were told by
Cuban police that they would have to do it on American soil.
Traficante has been arrested in Tampa several times for investiga-
tion, because of our knowledge that he was deeply involved in gam-
bling, even though we have not yet been able to obtain the quantum of
proof necessary to a successful prosecution. He has also been picked
up by the police for questioning about the gangland slayings of Rene
Nunez, Angelo Giglio, and Joe Antinori.
Traficante was a suspect in the Albert Anastasia murder on Oc-
tober 25, 1957, in New York because he had appeared in New York
just before the murder. He was considered a likely suspect because
there had been reports that Anastasia was then attempting to move
ORGAN
in on Traffi
the alias "B
on the night
after Anasta
The Depa
organization
fication of th
Apalachin co
of Tampa, Fl
Furthermo
out-of-town I
of the Tampa
ficante is asso
Louis Coticel
quently seen
boarding a pla
Other know
Traficante ga
colo, and Antl
Mr. O'DON
nuity, so that
a statement w
the interest of
like to have it i
Do you
Mr. DE LA LL.
Mr. O'DONN
Mr. DE LA LL.
The CHAIRM.
have
Mr. DE LA LL
Brady, and his
to our attention
record. I have
The CHAIRM.
No. 46 for refere
(Document re
may be found in
The CHAIRMA
that you have ma
Mr. DE LA LLA:
The CHAIRMA
record, either at
statement of the
(The statemen
One of the clear t
is reflected by the c
as a courier for the
first came to the at
served him, in Tami
Diecidue, two of the
tacts made by Cotic.
tion about him whic
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 664
ARCOTICS
ne members in
on in the state-
a on November
residence today
Havana, Cuba,
r the Battista
ambling opera-
nd returned to
numbers racket.
', Sr., who died
lect Committee
Field identified
Souci gambling
cante took over
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Trafficante, Jr.,
e key figure in
ad long known,
e city.
that Traficante
Lansky, Joseph
tassi, Sam Man-
known as Staten
Idler Trafficante,
Anthony Tocco,
in Brooklyn on
the Hotel Com-
mong those who
the Apalachin
. such as Frank
bert Anastasia,
The life of Santo
"1",
in a car on the
in Cuba. four
te were told by
ican soil.
es for investiga-
nvolved in gam
the quantuin of
also been picked
slayings of Rene
murder on Oc-
ed in New York
✓ suspect because
mpting to move
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 525
in on Traficante's gambling operations in Cuba. Trafficante, using
the alias "B. IIill," stayed with Anastasia in the latter's hotel suite,
on the night of October 24, 1957, and moved out approximately 1 hour
after Anastasia's murder in a nearby barber shop.
The Department's evaluation of Traficante as the boss of the Mafia
organization in Tampa was confirmed, of course, by the positive identi-
fication of the "Louis Santos of Havana, Cuba," apprehended at the
Apalachin conference in November of 1957, as Santo Traficante, Jr.,
of Tampa, Fla.
Furthermore, we have witnessed and documented many visits of
out-of-town racketeers with Santo Trafficante and his fellow hoodlums
of the Tampa area. These visitors give further indications that Traf-
ficante is associated with Mafia members in other cities. For example,
Louis Coticchia of Chicago, also known as Lou Brady, has been fre-
quently seen visiting Traficante and on one occasion they were seen
boarding a plane together, heading for Miami.
Other known outside racketeers who have visited in Tampa with
Traficante gang members are John Joseph Vitale, Salvatore Lopic-
colo, and Anthony Giardano, all known racketeers from St. Louis, Mo.
Mr. O'DONNELL. I think at the present time, in interest of conti-
nuity, so that the record will read properly, Sergeant de la Llana has
a statement with regard to a courier operation within the Mafia. In
the interest of time, I am not going to ask him to read it, but I would
like to have it introduced in the record.
Do you have that?
Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, I do.
Mr. O'DONNELL. How many pages does it consist of?
Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is five pages.
The CHAIRMAN. Give a better description of it and tell us what it is.
Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is with reference to Louis Coticchia, alias Lou
Brady, and his visits to Tampa on various occasions, which first came
to our attention on April 13, 1962. This subject has a long criminal
record. I have an FBI record which I will also submit into evidence.
The CHAIRMAN. Let the FBI record be received and made exhibit
No. 46 for reference.
(Document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 46" for reference and
may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
The CHAIRMAN. Now, your statement, is that a summary statement
that you have made and prepared for the record?
Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it may be received and printed in the
record, either at this point or immediately following the prepared
statement of the witness now testifying.
(The statement referred to follows:)
STATEMENT OF SGT. JACK DE LA LLANA
One of the clear ties of the Trafficante organization with other criminal groups
is reflected by the contacts with Trafficante made by a man who appears to act
as a courier for the Mafia. Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, FBI No. 1427493,
first came to the attention of our Department on April 13, 1962, when we ob-
served him, in Tampa, in the company of Augustine Primo Lazzara and Frank
Diecidue, two of the men on our Mafia chart. Because of this and other con-
tacts made by Coticchia, our intelligent unit developed the following informa-
tion about him which I think is of interest to this committee in giving a profile
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 665
ORGA
526
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
of a hoodlum who is entrusted by the Mafla to act as a courier for them between
the various groups.
Coticchia was born on February 25, 1920, in Cincinnati, Ohio. When he was
arrested a couple of years ago, he gave as his occupation "industrial financier."
He is presently reported to be interested in the operation of a company offering
wired music in the Chicago area known as Symphonaire Sound Systems, Inc.
His criminal record shows that he was first arrested in 1936 in Ohio for
robbery. In 1937 he was arrested in Miami, Fla., for investigation of a "shake-
He was arrested
down." He was held for 4 days and released without charges.
again in Hot Springs, Ark., in 1938 for investigation and released with the under-
standing that he would leave the city.
In 1938, in Cleveland, Coticchia was arrested and charged with assault with
intent to commit rape. He was convicted and received 1 to 15 years, of which
he served 4 years, being released in 1941. He was arrested in 1942 in Los Angeles,
Calif., on a warrant issued in Baltimore for grand theft. He was tried in Balti-
more for receiving stolen goods and received 5 years in prison.
Coticchia was again arrested in Dallas, Tex., in 1961, by the U.S. marshals
for violation of and for conspiring to violate the Federal Securities and Exchange
Act of 1933, which case is still pending in the Southern District Court of New
York. His last arrest known to us was on January 4, 1963, when he was ar-
rested in Tampa for investigation of grand larceny. He was released due to
insufficient evidence.
Coticchia worked as a "pit boss" in gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nev., and
Havana, Cuba. He was involved in a scandal in 1960 in which mobsters at-
tempted to take over a nationwide bail bond business.
On
Coticchia has been in and out of Tampa since our first observation of him and
on every occasion he is in direct contact with Trafficante and Diecidue.
December 31, 1962, he purchased a new automobile in Tampa, paying the dealer
$3,625.95 in cash. He then registered the car under the name of Jane Campbell.
He remained in Tampa several days and was in constant contact with Trafficante
and Diecidue.
On January 4, 1963. Coticchia was arrested in Tampa on suspicion of grand
larceny and at the time of his arrest he had $1.775 in cash on his person. He
had papers on him that showed he had resided previously at the Aloha Motel in
Miami under the name Luiz Paulino Bailey from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He
also had a paper with a list of gambling equipment and the name "Empress
Lines, Ltd., Nassau-via Wappen Von Hamburg-German boat loading pier
No. 3."
An investigation revealed this equipment had been shipped airfreight from
Las Vegas to Nassan and placed in a German vessel, the Wappen Von Hamburg,
which sails between Nassau and Miami. This equipment included 50 one-arm
bandits, or slot machines, and was valued in excess of $65,000. The information
received was that this vessel was to travel between Miami and Nassau as a
floating gambling casino.
After Coticchia's arrest in Tampa, the telephone calls were checked at the
motel. It showed that he had made several calls to Trafficante, Diecidue, and
other associates of Trafficante. He had also made a long-distance call to Sonny's
Restaurant in Miami Beach, which is owned by Thomas Altamura, FBI No.
511563, a Mafia member and another associate of Santo Trafficante, Jr.
I would like to submit for the record Coticchia's FBI record, and a photograph
of him taken by my department when he was arrested in Tampa on January
4, 1963.
Another example of the Trafficante group's connections with Mafia figures in
other parts of the Nation is: John Joseph Vitale, FBI No. 793259, of St. Louis.
Mo. Vitale is well known to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and
is reputed to be the Mafia leader in that area. He has a record of 13 arrests
and a conviction for violating the Harrison Narcotics Act for which he received
a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment. He has been arrested as a fence and is
believed to deal in anything in which there is a large percentage of profit.
Police authorities consider him among the most dangerous of Mafia principals
in the St. Louis area, and he is known to have underworld connections through-
out the country. He appeared twice before the Senate Rackets Committee
(August 19, 1958, and February 11, 1959) and each time refused to answer any
questions, invoking the fifth amendment.
On April 17, 1963, Vitale flew from St. Louis to Tampa, using the name "Jack
Howard." He visited the Diecidues for 4 hours and then flew back to St. Louis
using the sam
there, he was
traveled to T.
Mo., to the Die
To me it d
trouble of flyi
between two I
significantly,
doubts that he
These two
connections of
the Mafia grou
Mr. O'Do:
Mr. Brow
gave sworn
1953 concern
long been en
to testify or
been granted
those who te
Nick Scaglio
Mr. O'Don
you have intr
Mr. BROWN
Mr. O'DON
Mr. BROWN
cal Mafia tech
prises by the
This incident
deeply involv
major interest
The case wa
officer, Detect
the operation
racket of consi
based upon inf
lottery.
An attempt
operation of th
suits of clothi
with the full
had immediate
As a result
were arrested.
The CHAIRM.
Mr. BROWN.
The CHAIRM
he is the boss?
Mr. BROWN.
Each received
viction was late
term and was
indicted by the
We know of
by Santo Traffic
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 666
_
N NARCOTICS
urier for them between
i, Ohio. When he was
"Industrial financier."
of a company offering
Sound Systems, Inc.
in 1936 in Ohio for
vestigation of a "shake-
Arges. He was arrested
"eleased with the under-
rged with assault with
1 to 15 years, of which
d in 1942 in Los Angeles,
He was tried in Balti-
prison.
, by the U.S. marshals
Securities and Exchange
District Court of New
1963, when he was ar-
Ile was released due to
in Las Vegas, Nev., and
30 in which mobsters at-
t observation of him and
ante and Diecidue. On
Tampa, paying the dealer
name of Jane Campbell.
it contact with Trafficante
pa on suspicion of grand
He
cash on his person.
sly at the Aloha Motel in
de Janeiro, Brazil. He
and the name "Empress
erman boat loading pier
shipped airfreight from
he Wappen Von Hamburg,
ment included 50 one-arm
$65,000. The information
• Miami and Nassau as a
calls were checked at the
Traficante, Diecidue, and
ng-distance call to Sonny's
omas Altamura, FBI No.
Trafficante, Jr.
record, and a photograph
ted in Tampa on January
tions with Mafia figures in
BI No. 793259, of St. Louis,
tan Police Department, and
has a record of 13 arrests
s Act for which he received
arrested as a fence and is.
percentage of profit.
angerous of Mafia principals
world connections through-
Senate Rackets Committee
time refused to answer any
ampa, using the name "Jack
then flew back to St. Louis
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 527
using the same alias. We alerted the St. Louis police and upon Vitale's arrival
there, he was interviewed by detectives of that city. He declared that he had
traveled to Tampa to settle a debt of the Lombardo Produce Co., of St. Louis,
Mo.. to the Diecidue Bros. of Tampa.
To me it does not seem probable that Vitale would go to the expense and
trouble of flying to Tampa and returning the same day in order to settle a debt
between two produce companies with which he has no known connections. More
significantly, his use of an alias to run this errand, too, points out his own
doubts that he was engaged in a legitimate errand.
These two examples, Coticchia's and Vitale's, indicate to us the interstate
connections of the Trafficante organization, and point up the need for attacking
the Mafia group on a national-basis.
Mr. O'DONNELL. All right, we will continue.
Mr. BROWN. Some of Traficante's men shown here on our chart
gave sworn testimony before the Hillsborough County solicitor in
1953 concerning gambling in Tampa. They admitted that they had
long been engaged in illegal gambling activities. They were forced
to testify or face jail terms for contempt of court, because they had
been granted immunity from prosecution for such crimes. Among
those who testified were Frank Diecidue, Augustine Primo Lazzara,
Nick Scaglione, Henry Traficante, and James C. Longo.
Mr. O'DONNELL. Are any of these individuals on the chart that
you have introduced as exhibit 2?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, they are all on the chart.
Mr. O'DONNELL. Thank you.
Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante has himself been caught up in a typi-
cal Mafia technique of seeking to preserve and protect its illegal enter-
prises by the corruption of law enforcement and other public officials.
This incident substantiated our intelligence that Traficante was
deeply involved in gambling operations, and it showed that he had
major interests in gambling outside the city of Tampa.
The case was initiated in 1954 by a veteran St. Petersburg police
officer, Detective Sgt. Harry Dietrich, who had obtained evidence of
the operation of the Traficante bolita ring. Bolita is a numbers
racket of considerable importance in Florida, involving weekly payoffs
based upon information taken from radio reports of the weekly Cuban
lottery.
An attempt was made to bribe Sergeant Dietrich to ignore the
operation of the ring. He was given a new car, a television set, some
suits of clothing, and cash. Sergeant Dietrich accepted the bribes
with the full knowledge and orders of his superiors, to whom he
had immediately reported the initial bribery attempt.
As a result of his work, Santo Trafficante and his brother Henry
were arrested. Both were charged with bribery and were convicted.
The CHAIRMAN. When did this occur?
Mr. BROWN. This was in 1954.
The CHAIRMAN. This is the same man that is now operating, and
he is the boss?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
Each received a prison sentence of 5 years. Santo Trafficante's con-
viction was later reversed in a higher court. His brother served his
term and was recently released. Both brothers were subsequently
indicted by the Federal Government for tax law violations.
We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned or controlled
by Santo Trafficante. He owns no real estate, nor any other property,
cumined
__
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 667
528
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
real or personal. His house, automobile, and all his other possessions
are held in the names of of hers. However, we do not believe him to be
destitute, for his control of gambling in the central Florida area alone
must net him huge amounts of money. His operations there show,
also, a characteristic Mafia method of utilizing non-Sicilian associates
where it serves its criminal objectives.
Sergeant Branch, who has for the past 7 years been investigating
gambling and other organized criminal activities in the Orlando area,
will describe the Mafia's control, through the Harlan Blackburn
"organization, of lottery operations in central Florida. We know of
no legitimate businesses that are owned.
The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant Branch is here with you?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
On the lower right-hand side of our chart we have depicted that
group
of Traficante associates.
Sergeant Branch will here testify about the Blackburn group.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are
about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. BRANCH. I do.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM BRANCH
The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify yourself for the record?
Mr. BRANCH. I am a sergeant with the Orlando Police Department
attached to the intelligence division, and I have been with them since
1951. I have been working in this type of work since 1956, with the
cooperation of the Federal and State agencies in our area.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir, I do.
The CHAIRMAN. It appears to be four or five
to read it?
Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.
Do
pages.
you
wish
In the central Florida area the main gambling activity is known as
bolita or Cuba. Bolita is a numbers lottery where the winning num-
ber is drawn daily. Cuba is a numbers lottery where the winning
number is drawn weekly.. Bettors can place bets on any number from
1 to 100 and receive a 60-to-1 return if they win. The Cuba winning
number is the last two digits from the Cuban national lottery number
which is five digits and is broadcast over a Havana radio station each
Saturday shortly after 2 p.m.
The public is contacted by "peddlers" or "sellers," who receive a com-
mission of 15 percent of their sales. "Pickup" men, who take the bets
from the sellers to the "checkup houses," receive 20 percent of what
they collect. Employees such as checkup men, adding machine opera-
tors, and supervisors above this position usually receive salaries for
their duties.
Lottery operations in central Florida prior to 1948 were dominated
first by Charlie Wall of Tampa and then by Sam Warren, an Orlando
native. In that year Harlan Blackburn, FBI No. 1026922, a con-
victed felon, came into Orlando and began taking over bolita and
Cuba gambling.
This man is on the chart also.
ORGANIZED
Blackburn was
he was convicted
served 42 years
the Florida State
March 1956 for o
a 5-year prison sei
Senator MUSKII
Mr. BRANCH. Y
Senator MUSKIE
Mr. BRANCH. N
Senator MuSKI
Mr. BRANCH. H
yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN.
Mr. BRANCH. N
He was then inc
conviction of cons
was most recently
Federal wagering
trial.
Blackburn supe
Florida gambling.
F. Lee, Cecil Merri
Don Mach, Dan Fu
and Clifford Bell;.
Riffe; Clyde F. Le
Macon Tribue, Jul
shaw Cecil Merrit
Solomon; and Ral
and Elvin Carroll.
With the excepti
all of these persons
other crimes.
I have here copies
committee's record.
The CHAIRMAN.
reference only.
(The documents 1
erence and may be fo
Mr. BRANCII. The
operation for a numl
of gross and net col
have secured from <
from witnesses tha
gambling.
Senator MESKIE.
Mr. BRANCH. I ha
The lottery operat
County into all of
Georgia.
From 1948 until th
that Santo Trafficant
visiting Orlando and
ducting the lottery.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 668
RAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
and all his other possessions
we do not believe him to be
The central Florida area alone
His operations there show,
lizing non-Sicilian associates
7 years been investigating
tivities in the Orlando area,
gh the Harlan Blackburn
ntral Florida. We know of
re with you?
chart we have depicted that
ut the Blackburn group.
ar that the testimony you are
will be the truth, the whole
you God?
IAM BRANCH
urself for the record?
The Orlando Police Department
d. I have been with them since
e of work since 1956, with the
encies in our area.
red statement?
ar or five pages.
Do you
wish
gambling activity is known as
ottery where the winning num-
ers lottery where the winning
place bets on any number from
they win. The Cuba winning
Cuban national lottery number
ver a Havana radio station each
or "sellers," who receive a com-
Pickup" men, who take the bets
es," receive 20 percent of what
Aup men, adding machine opera.
tion usually receive salaries 
for
la prior to 1948 were dominated
hen by Sam Warren, an Orlando
burn, FBI No. 1026922, a con
I began taking over bolita and
ORGANIZED CRIME, AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 529
Blackburn was born in Sand Lake, Fla., on April 13, 1919. In 1935,
he 
was convicted of forging a U.S. Government 
check, for which he
served 4½ years in prison. In 1943, he 
was sentenced to 2 years in
the Florida State prison for cattle theft. 
He was again arrested in
March 1956 for operating a lottery in 
Polk County, Fla., and received
a 5-year prison sentence, but was released in 1959.
Senator MUSKIE. Did you say Mr. Blackburn was on the chart?
Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir. He is listed in the lower right-hand corner.
Senator MUSKIE. It is not on this chart?
Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; not on that one.
Senator MUSKIE. Blackburn is not a member of the Mafia, as such?
Mr. BRANCH. He is a subordinate that 
works under their direction;
yes
, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is he the same as Sam Warren?
Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; he is not. Sam Warren is dead.
He was then incarcerated for 60 days in Polk County for an earlier
conviction of conspiracy to violate the 
lottery laws of Florida. He
was most recently arrested on November 
5, 1962, for failure to buy a
Federal wagering tax stamp. He is 
presently out on bail awaiting
trial.
Blackburn supervises the five lottery bankers who control central
Florida gambling. These bankers are Rudy 
Mach. Joe Wheeler, Clyde
F. Lee, Cecil Merritt, and Ralph Strawder. 
Mach has in his operation
Don Mach, Dan Fussell, Buddy Parron, 
Glen Brechen, Tommy Berry,
and Clifford Bell; Joe Wheeler has Max 
Reid, Mary Carden, and Phil
Riffe; Clyde F. Lee has Jesse Joyner, 
Vasco Joyner, Mathew Smith,
Macon Tribue, Julia Ciphon, Hoy Anderson
, and Katherine Brad-
shaw; Cecil Merritt has Clayton 
Thomas, Sonny Brown, and George
Solomon; and Ralph Strawder has Benny White
, William Harrell,
and Elvin Carroll.
With the exception of Carden, Riffe, Harrell, White, and Ciphon,
all 
of these persons have criminal records 
and arrests for gambling and
other crimes.
I have here copies of their FBI records and submit them for the sub-
committee's record.
The CHAIRMAN. They may be received in bulk as exhibit No. 47 for
reference only.
(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 47" for ref-
erence and may be found in the files 
of the subcommittee.)
of
Mr. BRANCII. These five exceptions have been connected with this
operation for a number of years, 
however, and their names and amounts
gross and net collections appear in much 
of the evidence that we
have 
secured from checkup houses. 
We have also sworn testimony
from witnesses that these persons have 
been engaged in illegal
gambling.
Senator MUSKIE. What is the size of their take?
Mr. BRANCH. I have that further along in my statement, sir.
The lottery operation of the 
Blackburn group extends from Orange
County into all of central Florida and into 
the southern State of
Georgia.
From 1948 until the latter part of 1953, our department established
that 
Santo Trafficante, Jr., and his brother
, Henry, personally were
siting Orlando and supervising the 
checkup houses that were con-
acting the lottery.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 669
530
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
It has also been obvious to us that the Trafficante organization has
controlled the Blackburn operation for at least the 
last 10 years.
From our examination of seized records, and 
from the fact that in
all raids on the checkup houses we have arrested persons 
having
close family ties with the Trafficante organization 
who were acting
as auditors for his interests. In addition, there 
has been heavy tele-
phone toll traffic between the Trafficantes in Tampa and the 
Blackburn
group in Orlando.
When Blackburn was arrested in 1953, a memorandum was found
containing telephone numbers of Augustine Primo 
Lazzara, Salva-
tore J. Lorenzo, J. M. Cacciatore
-uncle of Santo Trafficante, Jr.—and
Santo Traficante, Jr., and of the Nebraska and Flamingo 
Bars, both
owned by the Trafficante family.
In 1957 a search of a gambling house in Orange County by a State
officer, with the assistance of the Orlando Police, 
resulted in the
arrest of several persons. One of these was Lorenzo 
and another per-
son by the name of Leto, from Tampa. They both 
gave sworn state-
ments at that time to the county solicitor that 
they were working for
Santo Trafficante, Jr.
In November 1961, another raid was conducted by agents of the
Internal Revenue Service in conjunction with the Orlando 
Police
Department on a house in Orange County. There 
were six persons
arrested, and among those were Armando Rios 
and Sam Cacciatore
.
These two were cousins of Santo Traficante, Jr.
In July 1963, a raid on a gambling house in Sanford, Fla., by the
IRS agents, with the assistance of the Orlando 
Police Department,
established that it was another operation of Harlan 
Blackburn's,
supervised by Clyde Lee. In the records seized there was the 
phone
number of Traficante's cousin, John Favata 
Cacciatore, and the
phone number of the printing establishment employing Stefano
Scaglione, who is also on the chart.
During the past 12 years that we know of at least three murders
that have been due to lights for control of lottery operations 
in the
Orlando area.
The fantastic amount of money taken in by these lottery operations
has been repeatedly established by our raids of these gambling 
houses.
For example, the raid in 1957 in Orange County, where 
Frank Ferreri
and Sam Lorenzo were arrested, disclosed that the 
house was doing
week.
a gross business of $100,000 per
Senator MUSKIE. What were they paying out?
Mr. BRANCHI. The profit on this operation runs about 50 percent.
The November 1961 raid in Orange County where Armando Rios
and Sam Cacciatore, cousins of Santo Traflicante, were arrested re-
vealed that operation was doing a conservatively estimated gross of
$160,000 per week.
The CHAIRMAN. With the same ratio of half applying there?
Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.
Senator MUSKIE. When you say "net profit," this means after
deductions of the commission which totaled 35 percent?
Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.
Senator MUSKIE. And the prizes.
Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.
The commission and also the prizes and what other operating ex-
penses they may have such as automobiles, rent, telephone bills.
ORGA:
The latest
$250,000 per
From thos
The Cuan
Mr. BRAN
Orlando. T
and auditors
From thes
heavily into
revenues are
nized crime.
Any addit
further restr
stantial blow
Senator M
was it dishon
Mr. BRANC
They don't
They stop at
The CHAIR:
Mr. BRANCI
The CHAIR
cannot get his
Mr. BRANCI
Thank you,
The CHAIRM
be afraid to p
All right, C
Stand by, S
Mr. BRANCH
TH
Mr. BROWN.
it is necessary
dates from the
1937 and 1945,
in on all illegal
city was referre
Senator Mus
papers?
Mr. BROWN.
During the 1
rackets to any g
M. Wall, starte
the illegal gam
Florida. He st
admitted to a H
ing from illegal
by entering inte
The elder Tra
in 1904 and beca
of the missing
Tampa. He die
arrest for Santo
In 1952, Wall
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 670
,
N NARCOTICS
te organization has
the last 10 years.
in the fact that in
ed
persons having
n who were acting
as been heavy tele-
and the Blackburn
randum was found
o Lazzara, Salva-
Trafficante, Jr.-and
lamingo Bars, both
County by a State
ice, resulted in the
zo and another per-
h
gave sworn state-
y were working for
by agents of the
the Orlando Police
re were six. persons
and Sam Cacciatore.
anford, Fla., by the
Police Department,
Harlan Blackburn's,
there was the phone
Cacciatore, and the
employing Stefano
least three murders
ry operations in the
se lottery operations
ese gambling houses.
where Frank Ferreri
the house was doing
ms about 50 percent.
where Armando Rios
te, were arrested re-
y estimated gross of
applying there?
," this means after
ercent?
at other operating ex-
telephone bills.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 531
The latest raid, in July of this year, indicated a gross revenue of
$250,000 
per week.
From those figures-
The CHAIRMAN. Where was that raid?
Mr. BRANCH. That was in Sanford, Fla., just 17 miles north of
Orlando
. These 
figures are established by the Internal Revenue agents
and auditors.
From these figures, it is easy to see why the Mafia has moved so
heavily into lottery gambling in central Florida and why gambling
revenues are 
universally acknowledged to be the "lifeblood" of orga-
nized crime.
Any additional legislation that this subcommittee can promote to
further 
restrict 
and inhibit gambling will, in our opinion, be a sub-
stantial blow to 
organized crime.
Senator MUSKIE. Did they actually pay off on those lotteries or
was 
it dishonest 
in that respect, too?
Mr. BRANCH. Usually they pay off.
They don't pay off when we pull a raid on them or arrest them.
They 
stop 
at that. But they are in operation the next week.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean they do not pay off for that day?
Mr. 
BRANCH. No, sir; they don't.
The CHAIRMAN. It is unfortunate for the fellow that won, who
cannot get his winnings.
Mr. BRANCII. Yes, sir.
Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. If the law enforcement is pretty vigilant, I would
be 
afraid to 
place a bet under those circumstances.
All right, Chief, if you will, you may proceed.
Stand by, Sergeant, as we may want to ask you some questions..
Mr. BRANCH. 
Yes, sir.
TESTIMONY OF NEIL G. BROWN-Resumed
Mr. BROWN. To understand the crime network Trafficante operates
it is necessary to examine the modern era of crime in Tampa, which
dates 
from the early 1920's. Its most violent episodes were between
1937 and 1945, when 
the Sicilian underworld was attempting to move
in on all illegal gambling in Tampa. This period in the history of our
city was referred to as 
"the era of blood."
Senator MUSKIE. Who coined that phrase, the gang or the news-
papers
?
Mr. BROWN. I think it was the newspapers, Senator.
During the 1920's, before the Sicilian underworld moved into the
rackets to any great extent, one of our most notorious residents, Charles
M. Wall, started 
his rise to become the acknowledged boss of most of
the illegal gambling in the Tampa and central area of the State of
Florida. He styled himself "dean of the underworld," and in 1953 he
admitted to a 
Hillsborough County solicitor that he had made his liv-
ing from illegal gambling. During 1915, Wall forfeited his leadership
by entering into a partnership with Santo Trafficante, Sr.
The elder Trafficante was born in Sicily in 1886. He came to Tampa
in 
1904 and became a 
naturalized citizen in 1925. In 1950, he was one
of the missing 
witnesses in the Kefauver crime hearings held in
Tampa
. He died on August 11, 1954. Police records do not show any
arrest for 
Santo Trafficante, Sr.
In 1952, Wall declared that he was retiring, although he did not
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 671
_ _ ___
532
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
state what he was retiring from. In April 1955, Wall's body was
found in his home. He had been brutally beaten and 
his throat had
been slashed. We have never discovered who the murderers were
, 
nor
have we determined their motive. Perhaps Wall was murdered be-
cause the killers learned he had admitted 
that he was Trafficante's
partner in illegal gambling, and that he disclosed confidential 
facts
about the Mafia.
In 1960, Sergeant de la Llana obtained-from a confidential source
of known reliability-an astounding report about the Mafia 
and its op-
eration in Tampa. The report had been obtained from 
Charles Wall
in 1945, approximately 6 months after Trafficante, 
Senior, had made
himself a partner in Walls' gambling enterprises.
Wall declared that from 1920 through 1945 he controlled gambling
in Tampa and in the Florida counties of Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco,
Hernando, Polk, and Orange. His rival for control of the gambling
rackets was the local Mafia organization. This was 
headed, he said,
by Santo Traficante, Sr., the Diecidue brothers, James Lumia, Ignacio
Antinori and Salvatore Italiano. Antinori was murdered 
on October
22, 1940; Lumia was murdered on June 5, 1950; and Italiano fled to
Mexico in 1951.
Wall admitted that he had good reasons for going along with Traffi-
cante, Senior, in 1945; previously the Mafia group had made three at-
tempts on his life; the first was in 1937 as Wall 
was leaving a bank on
the main street in Tampa; the second try occurred as Wall was leaving
the garage behind his house; the third, in 1940, happened a few 
blocks
from his house. In the third attempt, a truck passed the automobile 
in
which Wall was riding and then stopped abruptly in front of the car.
James DeSimone and Nicola Impostato, FBI No. 2716692, each armed
with a shotgun, stepped from the truck and fired at Wall and 
his
chauffeur. Both escaped with slight injuries. DeSimone 
and Impo-
stato were known Mafia killers from Kansas City, Mo. They were
staying with the Antinori family at the time.
The CHAIRMAN. Is Wall still living?
Mr. BROWN. No, sir; he was killed.
The CHAIRMAN. Later killed?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. These three attempts failed but later he was killed?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
Wall declared that the Mafia tried to make the public believe that
the organization no longer existed in this country and that Mafia mem-
bers pointed to the end of terrorism
Italian
among
groups as 
evidence
Wall believed,
that the Mafia was gone from the underworld scene.
however, that the organization had merely changed its type of opera-
tion. He said that other. racketeers had once used the Mafia 
to
monopolize rackets in major American cities. They had educated the
Mafia so well in the process that the Sicilians had taken over the 
rackets
themselves. Wall stated that the Mafia learned to consider 
extortion
from Italian businessmen a "nickel-and-dime" business. They had
discovered that public officials could be corrupted by bribery and that
they could organize to take over the major rackets in the United States
.
Wall declared that the Mafia was not dying out, but "was bigger
and better than ever." He said that his partner, the elder Trafficante,
had told him that there were some 10,000 active Mafia members in
the United States. Wall stated that the Mafia leader in Tampa was
ORGANIZ
Santo Traffical
of the organiza
tries of the wo
in the United >
a sizable Sicili
by Joseph Prot
of the major l
Frank Costello
members of th
Luciano were f
According to
tinct groups, an
was that only
while American
Wall was told
"outer" to "inn
even though he
were not due to
can birth, but b
of the proceeds
to keep the me
Senator Mus
inner circle, Chie
Mr. BROWN.
circle.
Below that-
Senator MUSK
Mr. BROWN. I
be in the inner ci
The CHAIRMA:
the Tampa area is
Mr. BROWN. T
The CHAIRMA:
Mr. BROWN. N
The CHAIRMA:
organization is se
Mr. BROWN. T
The CHAIRMAN
it, but who was W
Mr. BROWN. T
The CHAIRMAN.
(At this point S
Mr. BROWN. W
from 1930 throug
ano, James Lum
Thomas, and Fra
leadership of Trai
Wall that Vincen
Diecidues but that
had Joseph Profac
Senator MUSKIE
Mr. BROWN. Yes
Senator MuSKIE
any point in this h
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 672
IN NARCOTICS
955, Wall's body was
en and his throat had
he murderers were, nor
all was murdered be-
t'he was Trafficante's
osed confidential facts
a confidential source
at the Mafia and its op-
ned from Charles Wall
nte, Senior, had made
PS.
he controlled gambling
rough, Pinellas, Pasco,
ontrol of the gambling
is was headed, he said,
James Lumia, Ignacio
as murdered on October
50; and Italiano fled to
going along with Traſſi-
oup had made three 
at-
was leaving a bank on
red as Wall was leaving
1. happened a few blocks
passed the automobile in
ptly in front of the car.
No. 2716692, each armed
fired at Wall and his
DeSimone and Impo-
City, Mo. They were
d but later he was killed?
se the public believe that
atry and that Mafia mem-
talian groups as evidence
Id scene. Wall believed,
Hanged its type of opera-
once used the Mafia to
They had educated the
had taken over the rackets
rned to consider extortion
me" business. They had
upted by bribery and that
kets in the United 
States.
ying out, but "was bigger
iner, the elder Trafficante,
· active Mafia members in
Tafia leader in Tampa was
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 533
Santo Traficante, Sr., and that he was well informed on the activities
of the 
organization in the United States, in Sicily, and in other coun-
tries of the world. 
Traficante had told him, Wall said, that the Mafia
in the 
United States was directed by a local board in every city having
a 
sizable Sicilian 
population. There was a national board, headed
by 
Joseph Profaci in New York City, which was composed of the heads
of the major 
local boards. Traflicante is reported to have said that
Frank 
Costello, Vincent Mangano, and Joe Massie were influential
members 
of the national board, and that Frank Nitti and Lucky
Luciano were former 
members.
According to Wall's account, the Mafia was composed of two dis-
tinct groups, an "inner circle" and an "outer circle." The general rule
was 
that only natives of Sicily were admitted to the "inner circle,"
while American
-born Italians were recruited into the "outer circle."
Wall was told it was possible for a member to be transferred from
"outer" 
to "inner" status when he performed an act of special merit,
even though he had 
been born in the United States. The restrictions
were not due to lack of trust by native Italians toward those of Ameri-
can 
birth, but because the "inner circle" usually took the major part
of the 
proceeds of the Mafia's illegal activities and, therefore, preferred
to keep 
the membership of the "inner circle" as small as possible.
Senator MUSKIE
. Would you say that this chart represents the
inner 
circle, Chief?
Mr. BROWN. At the very top portion, Senator, would be the inner
circle
.
Below that-
Senator MUSKIE. By the "top portion," do you mean-
Mr. BROWN. I would include in that that the three top men would
be 
in the inner 
circle and those below that would be in the outer circle.
The CHAIRMAN. Those would only be in the inner circle so far as
the Tampa area is concerned?
Mr. BROWN. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Not in the inner circle overall?
Mr. BROWN. No, sir; this is just in the inner circle in the Tampa area.
The 
CHAIRMAN. But that gives an indication of how the overall
organization is set up.
Mr. BROWN. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. You may have it in here, but I may have missed
it, 
but who 
was Wall talking to when he gave all this information?
Mr. BROWN. That 
was a confidential informant.
The CHAIRMAN. I see. Very well.
(At this point Senator Javits entered the hearing room.)
Mr. BROWN. Wall believed the influential Mafia members in Tampa
from 
1930 through 
1945 were: Santo Trafficante, Sr., Salvatore Itali-
ano, James 
Lumia, and the Diecidue family-Alfonso, Antonio,
Thomas, 
and Frank. The Diecidues and their in-laws opposed the
leadership of 
Trafficante in the Tampa organization. Trafficante told
Wall that Vincent 
Mangano, of the national board, supported the
Diecidues but that 
he, Trafficante, was able to stay in power because he
had Joseph Profaci's 
friendship.
Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question here?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
Senator MUSKIE. You refer to the national board. I do not recall
any point in this hearing where there was this kind of a direct refer-
1.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 673

534
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
ence to a national organization in the Mafia. Was it referred to as
such?
Mr. BROWN. This is the information as Wall has reported that it
consisted of a national board.
Senator MUSKIE. Do you know who he identified as members of the
national board?
Mr. Brown. Well, Joe Profaci and Vincent Mangano were two of
the members of the national board.
The CHAIRMAN. They are shown to be leaders of families, both of
them.
Senator MUSKIE. But those same people are leaders of families in
New York as testified by Valachi.
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. So it is your impression that the heads of the New
York families made up a national board that had jurisdiction over
Tampa, among other places?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct; yes, sir.
Wall declared that there were approximately 40 members of the
Mafia living in the Tampa area and he believed that Traficante's
share of proceeds of their gambling operation was being divided with
other members of the Mafia.
Information in our files from another confidential source confirms
Wall's statement. In addition it reveals that Antonio Diecidue made
annual trips to Miami for the purpose of renting a house for Vincent
Mangano, who came down froin New York every year to spend 2 or 3
months in Miami. This source stated that many important members
of the Mafia visited Mangano in Florida, but that Trafficante never.
appeared.
Senator MUSKIE. May I ask another question on the national board!
Was it your impression that the national board members shared in
the proceeds of the criminal activities in Tampa?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; they had a percentage.
Senator MUSKIE. Have you any idea what that percentage was?
Mr. BROWN. No, sir; I have no idea.
The gray shadings on our chart depict the influence of each of
these men. To me, it appears to be no small coincidence that in
Tampa the Diecidue family lost stature from at least the early 1950's
when Vincent Mangano disappeared; nor that Traficante, Jr., the
Profaci man, was in the immediate vicinity, when Albert Anastasia
was murdered in 1957.
Sergeant de la Llana's intelligence unit has prepared summaries of
the men in Trafficante's organization, along with a commentary of
relevant facts about each of them. So that our information may be
available not only to the subcommittee, but to all police units to whom
your reports are so valuable, I wish to submit these summaries and
commentary for the record, as our exhibit 3a through t; and exhibit 4.
The CHAIRMAN. The summary to which you have referred may be
received as exhibit 48-
Mr. O'DONNELL. Chief, as I understand it, these are summations,
very brief summations, of the 19 individuals that are on the chart
insofar as their criminal activity, their mode of business, their crim-
inal history, et cetera; is that correct?
Mr. BROWN. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be received as exhibit No. 48.
ORGANI
(The docun
and may be f
The CHAIR:
is it?
Mr. O'DON:
little detail as
4, which will b
The CHAIRM
The summar
That is what
Mr. BROWN.
The CHAIRM
exhibit 4, your
Mr. BROWN.
The CHAIRMA
Mr. BROWN.
The CHAIRMA
Exhibit 48 ist
Mr. BROWN.
The CHAIRMA
on the chart?
Mr. BROWN.
The CHAIRMA
Mr. BROWN.)
The CHAIRMA:
(The documen
and may be foun
The CHAIRMAN
You may proce
Mr. 
BROWN. (
task to obtain ev
members, because
ways been reluct
their fear of Mafi
that the Mafia dc
the relative infre
successfully prose
We have categ
1928 to the prese
circumstances of
uses murder to dis
lators of its code a
activities and goal
solved. A ratio
ticular murder wa
argument, althoug
the argument. It
though the killer a
In startling cont
an examination of
1962 shows that we
unsolved, a solutio
through 1962, all 8:
24-366-63-pt. 2
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 674
N NARCOTICS
as it referred to as
has reported that it
al as members of the
ngano were two of
of families, both of
aders of families in
he heads of the New
ad jurisdiction over
40 members of the
ed that Traficante's
being divided with
tial source confirms
tonio Diecidue made
a house for Vincent
year to spend 2 or 3
important members
at Trafficante never
?
the national board?
members shared in
percentage was?
influence of each of
coincidence that in
least the early 1950's
Traficante, Jr., the
en Albert Anastasia
pared summaries of
h a commentary of
information may be
police units to whom
these summaries and
ugh t; and exhibit 4.
ave referred may be
hese are summations,
hat are on the chart
business, their crim-
No. 48.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 535
(The documents referred to marked "Exhibit No. 48" for reference,
and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
The CHAIRMAN. You make reference to another exhibit. What
is it?
Mr. O'DONNELL. Will you explain the other exhibit? Go into a
little detail as to the various murders that you have on your exhibit
4, which will be a different exhibit in our hearings.
The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair get this straight first.
The summary that he referred to has been inade exhibit 48.
That is what you referred to as "our exhibit 3a"?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Then you say "through t; and exhibit 4." What is
exhibit 4, your exhibit 4?
Mr. BROWN. Exhibit 4 is a brief summation on each of the subjects.
The CHAIRMAN. What is your exhibit 3?
Mr. BROWN. They are arrest records of each of the individuals.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Exhibit 48 is the arrest records.
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Your exhibit 4 is a brief summary of each person
on the chart?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It is of his records and activities?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be received as exhibit No. 49 for reference.
(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 49" for reference,
and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
The CHAIRMAN. Now the record is straight.
You may proceed.
Mr. BROWN. Our department has always found it a most difficult
task to obtain evidence sufficient for successful prosecution of Mafia
members, because the witnesses who might offer such evidence have al-
ways been reluctant to do so. The paramount reason, of course, is
their fear of Mafia reprisals, since it is common knowledge in Tampa
that the Mafia does not hesitate to use murder for such reprisals and
the relative infrequency with which such professional murders are
successfully prosecuted.
We have categorized certain homicides in the Tampa area, from
1928 to the present, as "gangland slayings." An examination of the
circumstances of some of these murders emphasizes how the Mafia
uses murder to discipline its membership, to revenge itself against vio-
lators of its code and to otherwise eliminate opposition to its criminal
activities and goals. Of the 23 homicides on the list, only 1 has been
solved. A ratio of less than 5 percent of solution-and that par-
ticular murder was cleared up because it apparently resulted from an
argument, although it is possible that the slayer deliberately provoked
the argument. It was not, therefore, a typical gangland slaying, al-
though the killer and the victim were both underworld figures.
In startling contrast to the number of unsolved gangland slayings,
an examination of all other Tampa homicides from 1958 through
1962 shows that we have had 145 murders and that only 4 are presently
unsolved, a solution ratio of better than 97 percent. From 1960
through 1962, all 83 homicides in our city were solved.
24-366-63-pt. 2-10
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 675
536
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
The CHAIRMAN. What period is covered by the 23 gangland slayings
that you make reference to?
Mr. BROWN. From 1928 through the present day.
The CHAIRMAN. In a period of about 30,
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
years.
The CHAIRMAN. And you identify them as gangland slayings as
distinguished from the usual homicide cases that you have?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. On those, according to your testimony, it has been
impossible or you have been unsuccessful, at least, in solving any
of them except the one that appeared so obvious, and it would not
possibly come within the category of "gangland slayings"?
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. But you have included it as being the only one
that was solved.
Mr. BROWN. That is correct.
Senator MUSKIE. What are the characteristics of the gangland slay-
ings that makes it so difficult to solve them as contrasted with your
excellent record in other homicides?
Mr. BROWN. Of course, primarily it is because of witnesses who are
reluctant to give the law enforcement any information whatsoever.
In some of our killings-I recall one where we had nine witnesses in
the room and nobody actually saw the murder or knew anything
was going on.
Senator MUSKIE. So this fact has a direct bearing upon the question
of immunity statutes, for example.
Mr. BROWN. That is right. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. This, in other words, emphasizes the rigid disci-
pline, the code of underworld law, that cannot be violated without
suffering the penalty of death.
Mr. BROWN. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the nine who were in the room when
the murder was committed, possibly every one of them knew what
happened.
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would think so.
The CHAIRMAN. I would doubt that somebody did not know it.
But, anyway, they know that the penalty for them talking would be
death.
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Even if they were inclined to, and I do not mean
to say they were inclined to, even if one of them were inclined to
talk, he knows what the penalty would be. And that makes it
difficult. That is why you have the trouble in the gangland slayings,
the silence, the threat, the intimidation of a death sentence, of their
being executed by their underworld government if they talk.
Mr. BROWN. That is true.
Senator MUSKIE. Then, Chief, just to nail that point down, they
seem to be more than concerned and clearly are more concerned for
themselves and for their allies than they are about immunity against
prosecution.
Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; that is true. They are afraid for their lives.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.
OR(
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 676
IN NARCOTICS
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1.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 537
Mr. BROWN. I have had these gangland slayings listed, with a few
pertinent comments about each, and submit to the subcommittee this
list as our exhibit 5.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be received and be made exhibit No. 50.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 50" for ref-
erence and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)
(At this point Senator Javits withdrew from the hearing room.)
The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.
Mr. BROWN. With few exceptions, those murders well reflect Joseph
Valachi's testimony that Mafia members do live by violence and die
by violence.
At least two of the unsolved murders on our list-that of Gus Perez
in 1936 and of Joe "Pelusa" Diaz in 1958-were, in my opinion, di-
rectly attributable to the Mafia's knowledge or belief that the victims
had given to legal authorities evidence incriminating Mafia members.
A third murder of Carl Carramusa, in 1945-taking place in Chi-
cago, involved some Tampa Mafiosi, and is of particular interest in
illustrating the Mafia zeal for vengeance against a member who vio-
lates its rules. It is of further significance, too, in demonstrating the
difliculty of protecting witnesses against the Mafia-and is under-
lining Attorney General Kennedy's request for additional funds for
that purpose, which request I strongly endorse.
The Carramusa case developed in Kansas City, Mo., with certain
aspects related to the Mafia organization in Tampa. The principal
figure in the case was Carl Carramusa, known as a minor member of
the Mafia and a front man for the Mafia's narcotics traffic operation
in Kansas City.
Carramusa was indicted in 1942 for conspiring to violate the Fed-
eral narcotic laws. His codefendants were Joseph DeLuca, Nicola
Impastato, Paul Antinori, Joe Antinori, Charles Gerrgimina, Louis
Ventola, Patsy Ventola, Charles Tiabi, Samuel Pernice, and Fellipo
Fernice. Tampa's Mafia organization was one of the sources of sup-
ply for the Kansas City group, and at that time the narcotics trade
in Tampa was headed by Paul Antinori and Joseph Antinori, who
had inherited the narcotics leadership from their father, Ignazio An-
tinori. The elder Antinori had been murdered a few years before in
a narcotics deal. All of the defendants in the Kansas City case were
prosecuted successfully, primarily because Carramusa violated the
cardinal Mafia code of l'omerta, or silence, testifying openly against
them at their trial. After the trial, Carramusa went into hiding in
Chicago with his wife and family, changing his name and beginning
a new life under new circumstances.
Three years later, in June of 1945, while he was seated in his auto-
mobile, Carramusa's head was blown off by a shotgun blast. James
Lumia, an associate of the Antinoris, was a suspect in this killing,
but was himself murdered at Tampa in June of 1950. A prime suspect
was the same Nicola Impastato, who had some years before attempted
to kill Charles Wall.
In Tampa we have suffered also the frustration I know that many
of my police colleagues in other cities have experienced-the deliberate
recanting at trial of the original statements of complaining or key
witnesses, because of their fear of Mafia reprisal. A clear instance
of this frustration of law enforcement effort involved three of the
ranking members of the Tampa Mafia.
50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 677
538
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
One day in 1953, one Joe Castellano went to the Italian Club in
Tampa to play cards with a group of friends. During the course
of the evening, he talked to Salvatore Scaglione privately. Scaglione
asked Castellano if he wanted to make a profit on a "hot load" of
whisky. Castellano said he was interested, and they agreed to meet
later that night.
At the meeting, Scaglione was accompanied by Joe Mistretta and
Angelo LoScalzo. Castellano got into the front seat of a car provided
by the others, and the four men drove to a thickly wooded area outside
of Tampa city limits. Castellano was then attacked with a hammer,
being hit repeatedly on the head. He managed to get out of the car,
although he was badly hurt. He broke loose from his elderly assail-
ants and ran away. He stumbled into a nearby house and asked to
be taken to the constable's house, where he gave a statement about
the incident, naming the three as his assailants. He swore to the
county solicitor that he had no idea why he was beaten. Scaglione,
Mistretta, and LoScalzo were arrested and charged with assault with
intent to murder.
Joe Castellano disappeared for a period of time. After he was
found, the case went to trial. Castellano changed his story completely
and testified that he had injured himself while hunting on the night
of the attack. The predictable result, of course, was a verdict for the
defendants of "not guilty."
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO FIGHT
ORGANIZED CRIME
I believe firmly that it is almost impossible for the Police Depart-
ment of the City of Tampa, or any other municipality, to cope ef-
fectively with the activities of a national or international crime
syndicate such as these hearings show exists in the United States.
One of the main problems is that the most dedicated, well-trained,
and well-staffed police force is almost always limited legally and
financially to the territorial boundaries of its municipality. For
example, the Tampa Police Department is obviously interested in
and informed about the activities of Santo Traficante. However, in
the past the department was unable to do anything about Trafficante's
operations in pre-Castro Cuba; it has no jurisdiction or control of
his illegal affairs in Miami and elsewhere in central Florida. The
department could only record that he attended the Apalachin meeting
in November of 1957, but it could do nothing about this obvious evi-
dence that he was a high-ranking member of a national crime
syndicate.
In the light of our experience with the Mafia in our own city's
underworld, I submit for this subcommittee's consideration some sug-
gestions for Federal legislation which I believe would certainly help
focal law enforcement agencies to fight organized crime more
effectively.
1. More ample funds must be obtained by local agencies to recruit
high caliber police personnel and to retain superior personnel having
the experience and capabilities to understand, investigate, and prose-
cute organized criminal conspiracies. Because of the demonstrated
interstate nature of organized crime, Federal legislation similar to
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NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Page 678
The Miami Herald
September 19, 1976
Could Rosselli Have Linked
Castro Plot to JFK Death?
By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer
In 1960, when the CIA was try-
ing to set up a delicate attempt on
the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to
a man once described as "the big-
gest flag-waving SOB in the coun-
·try”
West Coast underworld
•
figure Johnny Rosselli.
пориви
Rosselli a seemingly improba-
ible conspirator in a government
plot got the "flag-waving" label
from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana,
then Chicago's top crime boss and
a man Rosselli brought into that
same plot..
Now both are dead, murdered in
the past year, and investigators are
wondering whether their plotting
led to their deaths and whether the
CIA plots against Castro only
recently made public and even kept
from the Warren Commission'
are vital clues to the John F. Ken-
nedy assassination.
The deaths of Giancana, in June
of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer,
have aroused a renewed concern in
Washington, where on Friday the
House of Representives voted to re-
open the investigation of the Ken-
nedy murder.
REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D.,
Va.), who will be chairman of the
panel, said he is "convinced" a con-
spiracy was involved in Kennedy's
death.
Now, in the aftermath of the vi-
olent deaths of Giancana and Ros-'
selli, the question arises of what
role, if any, the Kennedy White
House played in the early 1960s.
"deal" the CIA made with the two
underworld figures to have Castro
murdered.
Whether the Kennedy "White"
House knew about about the CIA's
plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found
out after the contacts were ended),
the CIA's use of the underworld
seems ironic in retrospect.
Robert Kennedy's passionate ef-
forts to disable organized crime are
well documented.
IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy
wrote about what he had learned
of organized crime in America
from his years as chief counsel to
the Senate Rackets Committee, he
too quoted Giancana to make a
point.
He told about Giancana's inter-
view at his local draft board at the
outbreak of World War II, when
he was asked what he did for a liv-
ing.
"I steal," Giancana is said to
have replied.
So Sam Giancana didn't go to
war and years later would boast to
Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that
he stayed out of the Army la-
beled unfit - by telling the truth.
"What's wrong with the syndi-
cate?" Kennedy, quoted Giancana.
"Two or three of us get together
on a business deal and everybody
says it's a bad thing. Businessmen
do it all the time and nobody
squawks."
A Senate committee began stu-
dying the Kennedy questions more
than a year ago as it looked at co-
Evert CIA activities.
IN AN addendum to the Senate
Intelligence Committee's interim
report last November, Sen. Howard
Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my
personal view that on balance the
likelihood that presidents (the re-
port dealt with Dwight Eisenhower
and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro)
assassination plots is greater than
the likelihood that they did not."
Just to trace Rosselli's history
with the CIA is mind-boggling for
the investigators. Yet, it is just one
aspect of the search for his killer.
Johnny Rosselli born on the
fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and
71 when he died was not first
and foremost a CIA operative.
* His greater role as evidenced by
two convictions, his associations
and to some extent his own.com-
ments, was as an influential, if
publicly lesser known, organized
crime figure.
kp:
HIS ASSOCIATION with other
identified underworld members
was monitored by law enforcement
agencies as recently as several
weeks before his July 28 disap-
pearance.
* By all accounts, Rosselli was a
_charming man, dressing in expen-
sive clothes, married for only two
years in the early 1940s and
known most of his life as one who
easily attracted women.
He was an immigrant who told
in a short autobiography written
about 1967 that his "life of crime"
began as a teenager in Boston, at-
tempting arson for his stepfather
and stealing $50 on his own. As he
traveled west, finally to settle in.
California, his attention turned to
(bootlegging, gambling and dab-
bling in the movie business.
IT IS said that Rosselli guarded
the West Coast gambling interests
for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.
Why Rosselli was chosen by the
CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is un-
clear, although CIA officials have
since testified that they wanted the
kind of contacts in Cuba which or-
ganized crime had made during the
pre-Castro days when Havana was
a gamblers' haven.
Giancana was enlisted by Rossel-
li because he had influence with .
Florida's Santo Trafficante, consid-
ered the key underworld gambling
figure in Havana.
The unraveling of CIA and un-
derworld conspiracies, an awesome
web spanning decades, is left to a
team of nine in the Metro Homicide
Division. It is a team now clearly
consumed by the task which has
been a full-time operation since
Rosselli's body was pulled from
Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 679
- 2 -
THAT THE Metro team is even
Involved is happenstance. Rosselli
lived in Plantation, Broward Coun-
ty, with his sister and brother-in-
law. It's just that his killers chose
to dump his body in Dade.
While several detectives
say
their instincts lead them to con-
clude that the Rosselli murder was
an internal underworld affair, all:
on the team are aware of the pres-.
sure on them to search each clue
that leads back to the CIA-Castro
affair.
With Rosselli's death this sum-
mer, the newly appointed Senate
committee saw its list of knowl-
edgeable witnesses further trim-
med. Some of those witnesses have
died violently and some from natu-
ral causes.
„
When Giancana was murdered in
June of 1975, before he could even
be questioned by the committee
staff, authorities attributed it to an
internal gangland struggle - even
though. the murderer is still un-
known.
The death of Rosselli, who had
appeared before the committee
three times in the past year with-
out immunity, caused greater con-
cern on Capitol Hill.
THE SAME night Rosselli's body
was identified the legs hacked
off and stuffed along with the body
into an oil drum Baker, vice
chairman of the Senate Intelligence]
Committee, called for the FBI to
get involved in the case. (Several
days later, Attorney General Ed-
ward Levi ordered FBI involve-
ment.)
It wasn't until several weeks
later, however, that what was
known to Baker became public
knowledge.
A section of the former commit-
tee's April report told of a Wash-
ington attorney who in 1967. went.
to Supreme Court Chief Justice
Earl Warren (chairman of the
then-disbanded Warren Commis-.
sion) to say that two of his clients
believed they knew about Cuban:
agents in the United States who.
conspired in the assassination of
John F. Kennedy,
THE INFORMATION: eventually
reached the FBI, but as the Senate
committee concluded this year, the
1967 FBI probe was slipshod and
incomplete.
One of the clients referred to in.
the report has since been identified
as Rosselli. And it has since been
learned that Rosselli was con-
vinced he held a vital clue to the
JFK murder.
:
"There was never the slightest.
doubt in John's mind that Castro
was responsible for the assassina-
tion of Kennedy," said Edward P.
Morgan, the attorney referred to in
the report.
Morgan is an attorney of no
mean stature in Washington. He
served as chief counsel to the joint
congressional committee which
studied the Pearl Harbor attack,
counsel to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and for seven
years was chief inspector of the
FBI.
ROSSELLI told Morgan about
the CIA plot in 1967, when the De-
partment of Justice was vigorously
attempting to deport Rosselli for
being an illegal alien.
Rosselli, Morgan said, "was cer-
tain that the people he (Rosselli)
put around Castro in the CIA plot
turned right around and killed Ken-
nedy. The people he still knew (in
1967) did it."
Rosselli, according to Morgan,
decided to talk about his CIA active-
ity in hopes of decreasing the pres-
sure from the FBI and Department.
of Naturalization and Immigration,.
both Justice Department agencies.
Several friends of Rosselli, in-
cluding Morgan, say they are con-
vinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli
to become an organized crime in-
formant by threatening to have
him deported if he didn't coopera-
te.
IN 1961, through a bungled_
wiretap effort, the FBI became.
aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.
While Giancana and Rosselli
were in Florida planning the opera-
tion, Giancana wanted to return to
Las Vegas to check on his girl
friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he
suspected of dating comedian Dan
Rowan. To keep Giancana in Flori-
da, it was agreed that a bug would
be placed in her hotel room and her.
conversations monitored.
But the private detective they
hired, with CIA money. it has since
been learned, was discovered and
arrested. Eventually the police in-
vestigation led back to the Castro
plotters.
Prosecution was avoided when
the CIA intervened and said the
"national interest" would be dam-
aged if the plot information be-
came public.
WHEN THE wiretap case was
again to be investigated in 1966,
this time by a Senate committee
headed by the late Sen. Edward
Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again step--
ped in to stop it.
Morgan was told about the pend-
ing investigation by Rosselli and
Robert Mahue, a former FBI
agent-turned Howard Hughes aide
who was the CIA's initial link to,
Rosselli.
Mahue told Morgan that both he
and Rosselli had been subpenaed to
appear before the committee. Mor-
gan said he called Lawrence Hous-
ton, the CIA general counsel. Hous-
ton went to Long and the investi-
gation was dropped.
MORGAN SAID he knew, as the
Senate committee recently empha-
sized as well; that all information:
about the CIA plots - which could
have been the incentive for pro-
Castro forces to kill Kennedy
had been kept from the Warren
Commission.
59
"I was an admirer of Earl War-.
ren,' Morgan said. "(His) report:
said that ..
Oswald alone killed
Kennedy. It kept bugging me after
so gruesome a detail from Rosselli
that the Chief Justice could put his
name on a report which didn't as-
sess the most significant piece of
evidence bearing on the killing of
Kennedy."
The information Morgan had
was passed to Warren via colum-
nist
Drew Pearson, a mutual
friend. Eventually, it reached the
FBI, but, remarkably, even after di-*
rect orders from President Lyndon
Johnson in the spring of 1967, in-
vestigation was not vigorously pur-*
sued.
THE SENATE Intelligence Com-
mittee compared that apparent. in-:
action with a statement former FBI
: director J. Edgar Hoover made to
the Warren Commission on May 5,.
1964. Hoover said, "well, I can as-
I sure. you so far as the FBI is con-
cerned. the case will be continued
in an open classification for all
time. That is, any information com-
ing to us or any report coming to:
us from any source will be thor-
oughly investigated, so that we
will be able to prove or disprove
the allegation."
A Senate Committee staff mem
ber commented recently, "what is
really happening is that the investi-
gation which the FBI should have
done in 1967 and no one can
I come close to explaining why it
wasn't is actually being done
now.
19
HART, AS have local investiga-
tors, has established three possible
scenario's for Rosselli's death: his
recent organized crime activity, re-
taliation for his Castro assassina-
tion efforts or the information he
held concerning the JFK assassina-
tion.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 680
- 3
"Maybe Rosselli's Information
was the vital nerve of the Kennedy
assassination," a Senate source told
The Herald:
High officials in the Cuban gov-
ernment also reportedly feel there.
I was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK
death, but they see it as a result of.
exile politics, according to a recent
article by Alton Frye, a senior fel-
low of the Council Foreign Rela
tions in Washington.
Frye wrote that he visited Ha-
vana recently and met with Cuban
officials including, Deputy Prime:
Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.
64
they volunteer the suspicion
that the recent murders of Sam Gi-
ancana and Johnny Rosselli
surely have some connection with
Cuban exile politics and the 'Kenne-
dy murder," Frye wrote.
THERE HAVE been theories re-
cently propounded to show why
both pro and anti-Castro forces
could have wanted to get JFK out
of power in 1963.
On the one hand, there is the re-
port of French journalist Jean Dan-
iel, who was the bearer to Castro
of an offer from JFK for calmer re-
lations. Castro was reportedly
agreeable. The report stated that
Daniel later was lunching with.
Castro when word came that Ken-.
nedy had been shot. Daniel de-
scribed the Cuban leader as genu-
inely shocked by the news.
It has since been learned that
probably in the very hour JFK was
shot, a one-time Castro supporter
was receiving a poison pen device
from a CIA agent in what was a
long-running anti-Castro effort...
That Cuban agent was code-named:
AM/LASH, and he has since been
identified as Rolando Cuebala, now
imprisoned in Cuba for his assassi-
nation plotting.
WHETHER JFK had knowledge
of, or perhaps even approved, any
of the assassination plots will prob
ably never be known
His closest advisers, who testi
fied before the Senate Committee.
all said he had no knowledge of
• such plots and would never have
approved of them.
The same month Rosselli was
passing poison pills to his Cuban
contact at a meeting at the Fon-
tainebleau, March of 1961, former
Florida Sen. George Smathers, a
friend of Kennedy, said he and
Kennedy discussed the ramifica-"
tions of a Castro assassination.
Smathers has since said Kennedy
rejected the idea and that the dis-
cussion was more of a "brain-pick-
ing" session.
AT LEAST one high-level CIA
official did testify he believed the
White House was being briefed on
the plots but according to Richard
Bissell, one of the officials who
originally decided to use Rosselli, it
was through the method of "plau-
sible deniability."
That, according to the recent
Senate report, "can also lead to the
use of euphemism and circumlocu-*
tion, which are designed to allow
the President and other senior offi-
cials to deny knowledge of an op-
eration should it be disclosed."
Another alleged link between'
the White House and the under-
world plotters, first made public by
the Senate Committee, has also
been denied by virtually everyone
involved. Judith Campbell Exner,
the woman who claims to have
been friend and lover to both Gian-
cana and JFK, introduced to both
by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in
the Castro plotting, those close to
both Giancana and Kennedy have
said.
,
A MAN with access to Kenne-
dy's closest advisers told The Her-
ald recently, "The Giancana-Ros-
selli thing is unrelated to the Exner
thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew
her, but he was naive about those
kinds of things."
There is documentation to show
that on March 22, 1962, Hoover.
lunched privately with Kennedy
and presumably gave him his first
information linking Exner with the
gangsters. The final recorded.
phone call between the White
House and Exner was made only
few hours later.
Another possible link discussed
in the Senate report shows that the
same unidentified Cuban to whom
Rosselli passed the poison pills
prior to the Bay of Pigs operation
in April of 1961, was among al
group of Cuban exile leaders who
met with JFK following the inva
sion fiasco.
IT IS known that several of the
Cubans with whom Rosselli
worked have been identified, but.
investigators say that not all are
known.
As a condition to his appear--
ances before the Senate Committee,
in the past year, it was agreed that
Rosselli "would not state the
names or confirm the existence of,
those agents whom he knew
àbout," Rosselli's attorney Leslie:)
Scheer said.
The friends and acquaintances of
Rosselli who could be contacted by
The Herald all said they never
heard the names of the Cuban
agents.
But a committee source cau-
tioned, "they (Cuban agents) read
the committee's report, they knows
who's being referred to."
ANOTHER Rosselli. attorney,
Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward
Bennett Williams; said, "Yes,'
think he had more knowledge”.
than he testified to.
Searching Rosselli's more recent.
past for enemies also presents'
problems, investigators say.
The decline of John Rosselli ap-:
pears to begin in the late 1960s. In
1967, he was convicted in a card-
cheating scandal at the posh, celeb
rity-filled Friar's Club in Los An-
geles where the influence of Sina-
tra had made him a member ac->
cording to investigators.
Deportation pressures were also
mounting at this time.
ROSSELLI entered prison on the
conviction in 1970 where he would;
serve three years of a five-year.
sentence.
In 1971, he was brought to a
federal grand jury in Los Angeles
which was probing whether some
indentified Detroit organized crime
leaders conspired with the Emprise
Corp. - a giant firm with nation-
wide race track and sporting event
concessions to hide financial in-
terests in the Frontier Hotel in Las
Vegas.
Rosselli, too, had, an interest in
the Frontier, which opened in 1967.
He owned the gift shop concession
along, with a partner named Joe.
Breen. How Rosselli obtained the
concession is unclear, but Breen
said it gave Rosselli an income of
about $60,000.
ROSSELLI at one time had been
a major influence in Las Vegas.
Several sources said that when the
owners of the Desert Inn wanted
Howard Hughes to move out of the
penthouse because his special
needs were costly and putting
www.y.com
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 681
4
some "high rollers" in would be
more profitable it was Rosselli
who patched things up.
Hughes eventually bought the
Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.
What Rosselli told the federal
grand jury about the Frontier, in
1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't
testify later at the trial at which
Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Pol-
izzi and the Emprise Corp., among
others, were convicted.
on
ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in
jail. In 1973, the House of Repre-
sentatives Select Committee
Crime probed the influence of or-
ganized crime in sports and one
area they looked at was Emprise.
and the Frontier Hotel case.
At the time of the conviction, the
federal prosecutor asked that Poliz-
zi and Terilli be jailed immediately
because monitored, wiretapped'
conversations showed that the two
had talked about "murder, the kill-
ing of certain individuals."
. An intimate associate of Rosselli,
however, discounts the possibility
that Rosselli's grand jury appear-
ance could have led to his death.
"They know Johnny didn't talk to
the grand jury," the associate said.
JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't
been to Las Vegas for nine years,
that "he's never even seen the gift
shop."
Since his prison release and
move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't
trying to regain power; according
to his friends. "He had no muscle.
said an associate."I can't believel
Rosselli was getting back into mob
stuff."
But at the same time, 'many of
the associates were surpised to
learn about Rosselli's recent visits
with alleged organized crime fig-
ures on the West Coast.
Several associates speculate that
Rosselli wanted to get involved in
casino gambling, preferably in the
Middle East, and was looking for
someone with money to back him..
"MY IMPRESSION was that he
was broke," Morgan said. "He told
me last year, 'I'm in bad financial,
straits.'
Scheer said Rosselli's income in-
cluded about $60,000 from the gift
shop and about $3,500 in social se-
curity, most of which went for
back fees to attorneys and for gov-
ernment fines.
a
€
One friend said that just before
Giancana's death, Rosselli had ac-
cepted Giancana's offer of money.
The friend was to act as the inter-
mediary. "Let me figure out what
my next (attorney's) tab, will be,'
the friend quoted Rosselli as say-.
ing.
Rosselli is described as a man
with a sense of humor who did lit-
tle offending.
A California woman who had
known Rosselli for about 40 years:
told The Herald, "If you were.
around him for 30 minutes you'd
like him because he would regard
you as a human being."
"If you had a headache he would
either get you an aspirin or send
someone to get one. I said some-
thing significant there he would
get it or he would send someone
he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a
tough guy either."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630
Page 682
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SECRET
delivered to
10000
O'C Fla
отс
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AKA / Mechand Scalzetti)
casinor
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Mel
wed are under
"contant denne"
Since '63
GrAwana drives?
Jun 159 fall of gembly
SECRET

1st Meet
I sumpered of be appre
by CIA
Cuba
home intererty
Eve
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 684
تمرا
wh
6
SECRET (
REfile
Meyla Lesky's
Triffinte
-gaming came under Batista
father died in 54 - sented racket
initiate of Carlo Marello
an
I introduced in cica Sept so
"foe"
1st attempt I delivered
fo
pain pills to "agent who had acce
= failure
to Castro
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I suggested other condilite
- ated Jun Orta -
Cub receing kiba
gambling interent still had
aken to Castro
T
I que pills to
Cuba exile de
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Tcall to made
ravels etc
Rati
disc. - Hold
fint
follow
about? - concen overpot Fla?
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Tick-(TAManis - Bil
Lynd
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who are willed after I got he
call it
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Name I LA guy
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NW 50955 DocId:
Page 686
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 687
18 § 1510
Note 13
CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
perjury involving alleged contribution to
political organization in return for 
im-
and Exchange
pairment of Securities
Commission investigation and judicial
proceedings were not entitled 
to continu-
ance or change of venue on ground 
that,
though pretrial publicity was nationwide,
exposure varied in 
certain sections of the
country. U. S. v. Mitchell, 
D.C.N.Y.1973
,
372 F.Supp. 1239, appeal 
dismissed 485
F.2d 1290.
§ 1511. Obstruction of State or local law enforcement
(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to ob-
struct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a 
State or political subdi-
vision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an 
illegal gambling business
(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object
of such a conspiracy;
(2) one or more of such persons is an official or employee, elected,
appointed, or otherwise, of such State or political 
subdivision; and
(3) one or more of such persons 
conducts, finances, manages
,
supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal 
gambling busi-
ness.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) "Illegal gambling business"
which-
means a gambling business
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivi-
sion in which it is conducted;
(i) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance,
manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part 
of such business;
and
(ii) has been or remains in substantially continuous opera-
tion for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross 
revenue
of $2,000 in any single day.
(2) "gambling" includes but is not limited to pool-selling, book-
making, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels
, or dice tables, 
=
and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers 
games, or selling
chances therein.
(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, and any territory
or possession of the United States.
(c) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similar
game of chance conducted by an organization 
exempt from tax under para-
.
graph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 
of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, as amended, if no part of the 
gross receipts derived from such
activity inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder, member, or em-
ployee of such organization, except as compensation 
for actual expenses
incurred by him in the conduct of such 
activity.
(d) Whoever violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not
more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more 
than five years, or both.
Added Pub. L. 91-452, Title VIII, § 802 (a)
, Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 936.
References in Text. Paragraph (3) of
subsection (c) of section 501 
of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954, 
referred to in
subsec. (c), is classified to section 
501(c)
(3) of Title 20, Internal Revenue 
Code of
1954.
Congressional Statement of Findings.
Section 801 of Pub. L. 91-452 
provided
that: "The Congress finds that 
illegal
gambling involves widespread use 
of, and
has an effect upon, 
interstate commerce
and the facilities thereof."
Priority of State Laws. Section 811 of
Pub.I. 91-452 provided that: 
"No provi-
sion of this title [enacting 
this section
and section 1955 of this title
, amending
section 2516 of this title and 
enacting ma-
terial set out as notes under 
this section
and section 1955 of this title
] indicates an
intent on the part of the Congress 
to oc-
cupy the field in which such 
provision op-
erates to the exclusion 
of the law of a
State or possession, or a political 
subdivi-
slon of a State or possession, on the same
subject matter, or to relieve any 
person of
any obligation imposed by any 
law of any
State or possession, or 
political subdivi-
sion of a State or possession
."
Legislative History. For legislative his-
tory and purpose of 
Pub. L. 91-452, see
1970 U.S.Code Cong. 
and Adm.News, p.
4007.
Index to Notes
Admissibility of evidence 8
Constitutionality 12
Prejudice 6
Relevance of .
4
Sentence
11
Severance
Sufficiency o:
1. Constitu
This sectio
S. v. Crocket
Section 19:
tion were
though they
ed by char
tions. U. E
477 F.2d 62.
1403, certior:
1064, 39 L.E
This sect
persons to
ment of cri
cal subdivis
cilitate ille:
specified ci
powers gran
clause, U.S
infringe on
U.S.C.A.Con
process or
tally vague
S. v. Garr
1112.
1. Definiti
Definitio
ness" in th
ness which
who condu
is not
ground th
duces an i
guity яя
cluded in
Riehl, C.A
1a. Indiet
Sheriff
fendant,
was prop
charging
of
an illegal
acy to co
1955 and
ett,, C.A.G
Indictm
to obstru
of Louisi
making i
spire to
laws
thereof.
gambling
cumstanc
of this
grounds
state off.
v. Garris
Indicti
with cor
of crimi:
of this
persons
ment of
subdivis
tate ille
ified cir
to time
section.
of conti
dictmen
applicat
Use, i
spiracy
Construction with other laws
Definitions 1
8/
nal law
section
Discovery and inspection le
Elements of offense 3
Evidence 2
Indictment la
Participants in business 3
200
conspir
inal lu
thereof,
gambli
cunsta
Conspi:
Law E
5
18 § 1505
CRIMES
Ch. 73
Ch. 73
I'ub.L. 87-061 sub-
Historical and Revision Notes
1362 Amendment.
stituted the catchline "Obstruction of
proceedings before departments, agen-
cies, and committees" for "Influencing or
Roviser's Note. Based on Title 18, U.
S.C., 1910 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321,
§135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, c. 1, 54 Stat.
13 June 8, 1945, c. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).
Word "agency" was substituted for
the words "independent establishunent,
board, commission" in two instances to
eliminate any possible ambiguity as to
scope of section. (Sec definitive section 6
of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phrase-
ology. 80th Congress House Report No.
30%.
References in Text. The Antitrust
Civil Process Act, referred to in the text.
is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15,
Commerce and Trade.
Evidence 6
Generally 2
Constitutionality 1
Indictment or information
Proceedings within section 3
Questions for jury 7
5
4
Witness within section
Library references.
injuring witness before agencies and
committees" and punished the willful re-
moval, concealment, destruction, mutila-
tion, alteration or falsification of docu-
ments which were the subject of a de-.
mand under the Antitrust Civil Process
Act if done with the intent to prevent
compliance with a civil investigative de-
mand.
Legislative History: For legislative his-
tory and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, sea
1962 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p.
2507.
Notes of Decisions
Obstructing Justice C7, 21.
C.J.S. Obstructing Justice $$ 5, 22.
1. Constitutionality
Former section 241a of this title [now
this section providing that whoever "cor-
ruptly" endeavors to influence, intimidate
or impede any witness in proceeding, etc.
was not unconstitutional for failure to set
up an ascertainable standard of guilt
contrary to U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5 and
6. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 83 F.
Supp. GOG.
2. Generally
This section covers any activity which
would influence or intimidate witness who
might be called to testify and is not
limited to witness who has been called to
testify with defendant's knowledge. U. S.
v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 220 F.Supp. 492,
certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912,
13 L.Ed.2d 790, rehearing denied $5 S.Ct.
1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d CSS.
3. Proceedings within section
The submission to the Naturalization
Service of an application to file a peti-
tion for naturalization cannot, in a legal
sense, have pendency throughout the en-
tire United States within meaning of this.
section creating a 'criminal offense
against one who corruptly attempts to
obstruct or impede the due and proper
administration of law, under which such
a proceeding is had before a department
or agency of the United States. Taran
v. U. S., C.A.Minn.1959, 200 F.2d 561.
In prosecution for corruptly endeavor.
ing to influence and impede due and
proper administration of law in relation
to a naturalization proceeding allegedly
pending. before Immigration Service.
based
on a false statement allegedly
made in defendant's application for par
don regarding other arrests and convie
tions against him, naturalization pro-
ceeding was not pending in 1951 before
the
Service when the defendant made
the application for pardon, nor when
pardon was obtained by him, so as to
authorize conviction, where at the time
of charged offense the Service had no ap-
plication in its hands, in that it regard.
ed the naturalization application as not
having been entitled to be submitted and
returned it to defendant, and defendant
subsequently submitted
a new applica
tion in 1955 having no relation to what
was done in 1951. Id.
"Proceeding" within this section in-
cludes any investigation which is directed
by formal order of Securities and Ex-
change Commission and at which desig
nated officer takes testimony under oath.
U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1961, 226 F.Supp.
492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 29)
U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied
85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 6
596
4. Witn
One wh
able wit
and who
ness" the
defendant
when and
prosecuti
and corru
false and
ate Comm
S., C.A.C:
denied 85
2d 795.
5. Indicti
Indictmuc
lawfully,
corruptly
and corru]
struct and
cise of po
cific acts,
and partial
from Senat
ion Invoic
sonable rel
quiry of
concealing
memorandu
which bore
matter of i
ficiently el
section dea
juring with
mittees. U.
187 F.Supp.
Indictmen
lawfully, wi
ruptly influ
corruptly e
and impede
power of inc
particularly
tially destro
Senate Select
voice or reco
lation to sub.
ate Select Co
withholding
containing 1
reasonable r
inquiry, and
dismissed, or
judicata app
ment chargi
refusal to ar
Select Commi
Indictment
lawfully, will
ruptly influer
corruptly ent
and impede.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423630 Page 688
ision Notes
Ch. 73
Ch.73
+.
22 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 sub-
ted the catchline "Obstruction of
Selings before departments, area.
and committees" for "Influencing
ing witness before agencies and
ittees and punished the willful re
11. concealment, destruction, mutita
alteration or falsification of doc..
s which were the subject of a des
under the Antitrust Civil Process
if done with the intent to prevent
Hance with a civil investigative de
a.
gislative History: For legislative his-
and purpose of Pub.L. ST-664. Bee
US.Code Cong. and Adm.News, pe
sions
e. have pendency throughout the en-
United States within meaning of this
un creating a criminal offense
inst one who corruptly attempts to
ruct or impede the due and proper
inistration of law, under which such
joceeding is had before a department
igency of the United States. Taria.
į. S., C.A.Minn.1959, 266 F.2d 561.
prosecution for corruptly endeavor
to influence and impede due and
er administration of law in relatioa.
1 naturalization proceeding allegedly
ling before Immigration Service.
on a false statement allegedly
je in defendant's application for par
regarding other arrests and convic
against him, naturalization pro-
ing was not pending in 1951 before.
Service when the defendant made
application for pardon, nor when.
on was obtained by him, so as to
rize conviction, where at the time:
Barged offense the Service had no ap-
ation in its hands, in that it regard
the naturalization application as 20.
Jag been entitled to be submitted and.
red it to defendant, and defendant;
Sequently submitted a new applica⚫
in 1955 having no relation to what
done in 1951. Id.
rocceding" within this section in
les any investigation which is directed:
formal order of Securities and Ex..
ge Commission and at which desig
d officer takes testimony under oath.
3. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1904, 226 F.Supp.
certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898. 20
912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied
S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Witness within section
The whom defendant knew was prob-
witness before Senate Committee
who intended to testify was a "wit-
though not under subpoena when
dant gave him false story to tell
and if he testified, for purposes of
tions for subornation of perjury
corruptly influencing witness to give
and perjurious information to Sen-
Committee investigators. Stein v. U.
C.A.Cal.1964. 337 F.2d 14, certiorari
S5 S.Ct. SS9, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed.
21795.
3. Indictment or information
Indictment charging that defendant un-
afully, wilfully, and knowingly did
rruptly influence, obstruct and impede
corruptly endeavor to influence, ob-
struct and impede due and proper exer-
of power of inquiry by certain spe-
He acts. particularly altering, defacing
and partially destroying and withholding
Senate Select Committee certain un-
invoice or record, which bore rea-
able relation to subject matter of in-
airy of Senate Select Committee, and
dealing and withholding envelope and
morandum containing union's records,
which bore reasonable relation to subject
Matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, suf-
iently charged an offense under this
section dealing with influencing or in-
Juring witness before agencies and com-
tees. U. S. v. Presser, D.C.Ohio 1900,
17 F.Supp. Gå.
Indictment charging that defendant un-
Tawfully, wilfully and knowingly did cor-
uptly influence, obstruct and impede and
rruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct
impede due and proper exercise of
power of inquiry by certain specific acts,
particularly altering, defacing and par-
tally destroying and withholding from
Sante Select Committee certain union in-
ice or record, which bore reasonable re-
ion to subject matter of inquiry of Sen-
ate Select Committee, and concealing and
withholding envelope and memorandum
containing union's records, which bore
asonable relation to subject matter of
Inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be
dismissed, on ground that doctrine of res
licata applied because of prior indict-
ment charging defendant with unlawful
refusal to answer question before Senate
Select Committee. Id.
18 § 1505
power of inquiry by certain specific acts,
particularly altering. defacing and par-
tially destroying and withholding from
Senate Select Committee certain union
invoice or record, which bore reasonable
relation to subject matter of inquiry of
Senate Select Committee, and concealing
and withholding envelope and memoran-
dum containing union's records, which
bore reasonable relation to subject mat-
ter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would
not be dismissed, on ground of double
jeopardy, because of prior indictment
charging defendant with unlawful refusal
to answer question before Senate Select
Committee, since same facts would not
prove each case. Id.
An indictment for conspiracy to vio-
late erminal code by subornation of per-
jury in proceeding before the Federal
Petroleum Board was not subject to crit-
icism that it was too vague, contradic-
tory, duplicitous, uncertain and indefnite.
U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F.
Supp. 696.
C. Evidence
The "two witness rule" was not appli
cable in showing that defendant violated
this section proscribing obstruction of
justice by influencing witness to give
false testimony and information to Sen-
ate Committee and its investigators, and
testimony of one person alone was suff-
cient to convict. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal.
1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct.
SS9. 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed.2d 795.
Testimony of one person alone is suffi-
cient to convict defendant for obstructing
justice in influencing witness to give
false testimony to Senate Committee and
to give false and perjurious information
to committee investigators. Id.
Evidence sustained convictions under
counts charging corruptly inducing wit-
ness to testify falsely and corruptly in-
fluencing him to give false and perjurious
information to investigators of Senate
Committee. Id.
7. Questions for jury
Whether defendant charged with ob
struction of justice in Securities and Ex-
change Commission's investigation by in-
ducing person to testify falsely that he
had purchased certain securities through
firm of which defendant was head and
had resold securities to that firm knew
that witness would be asked to testify
U. S. v.
under oath was jury question.
Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, cer-
tiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912,
13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct.
1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d CSS.
597
Indictment charging that defendant un-
lawfully, wilfully and knowingly did cor-
uptly influence, obstruct and impede and
corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct
And Impede due and proper exercise of
NW 50955
DocId: 32423630 Pagé 689
.56
§ 1504
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AMENDMENTS
1968 Pub. L. 90-578 substituted "United States magis-
trate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner"
and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201
et seq. of this title.
Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see
section 401 of this title.
Wire or oral communications, authorization for inter-
ception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section,
see section 2516 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516
of this title.
§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.
Whoever attempts to influence the action or de-
cision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the
United States upon any issue or matter pending
before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a
member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or
sending to him any written communication, in rela-
tion to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months.
or both.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit the communication of a request to appear
before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 770.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed.,
243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).
Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that
a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be
construed as a technical violation of this section.
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201
of this title.
Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as
excluding offenses punishable under this section, see
section 3401 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.
§1505. Obstruction of proceedings before depart-
ments, agencies, and committees.
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, endeavors to
influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any
proceeding pending before any department or agency
of the United States, or in connection with any in-
quiry or investigation being had by either House, or
any committee of either House, or any joint commit-
tee of the Congress; or
Whoever injures any party or witness in his per-
son or property on account of his attending or having
attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation.
or on account of his testifying or having testified to
any matter pending therein; or
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or
obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any
civil investigative demand duly and properly made
under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968
of this title willfully removes from any place, con-
ceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means
falsifies any documentary material which is the
subject of such demand; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or communication influences,
Page 4312
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, ob-
struct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under which such proceeding is being had
before such department or agency of the United
States, or the due and proper exercise of the power
of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation
is being had by either House, or any committee of
either House or any joint committee of the Con-
gress-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664,
§ 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452,
title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed.,
241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13,
1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59
Stat. 234).
Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independ-
ent establishment, board, commission" in two instances
to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of sec-
tion. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
REFERENCES IN TEXT
The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text,
is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
AMENDMENTS
1970-Pub. L. 91-452 added reference to section 1968
of this title.
1962 Pub. L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Ob-
struction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and
committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before
agencies and committees" and punished the willful re-
moval, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or
falsification of documents which were the subject of a
demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with
the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative
demand.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201
of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 203 of this title;
title 12 section 1457.
§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false
bail.
Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, fal-
sifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process,
or other proceeding, in any court of the United
States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made
void, or does not take effect; or
Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowl-
edged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or
judgment, in the name of any other person not
privy or consenting to the same-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233
(Mar. 4, 1909. ch. 321, § 127. 35 Stat. 1111).
The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5
years, to conform the punishment with like ones for
similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
CROSS REFERENCES
Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see
section 2071 of this title.
Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section
641 of this title.
§ 1504
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AMENDMENTS
1968 Pub. L. 90-578 substituted "United States magis-
trate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner"
and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201
et seq. of this title.
Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see
section 401 of this title.
Wire or oral communications, authorization for inter-
ception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section,
see section 2516 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516
of this title.
§1504. Influencing juror by writing.
Whoever attempts to influence the action or de-
cision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the
United States upon any issue or matter pending
before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a
member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or
sending to him any written communication, in rela-
tion to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months.
or both.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit the communication of a request to appear
before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645.
62 Stat. 770.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed.,
$243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).
Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that
a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be
construed as a technical violation of this section.
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201
of this title.
Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as
excluding offenses punishable under this section, see
section 3401 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.
§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before depart-
ments, agencies, and committees.
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, endeavors to
influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any
proceeding pending before any department or agency_
of the United States, or in connection with any in-
quiry or investigation being had by either House, or
any committee of either House, or any joint commit-
tee of the Congress; or
Whoever injures any party or witness in his per-
son or property on account of his attending or having
attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation,
or on account of his testifying or having testified to
any matter pending therein; or
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or
obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any
civil investigative demand duly and properly made
under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968
of this title willfully removes from any place, con-
ceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means
falsifies any documentary material which is the
subject of such demand; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or communication influences,
Page 4312
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, ob-
struct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under which such proceeding is being had
before such department or agency of the United
States, or the due and proper exercise of the power
of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation
is being had by either House, or any committee of
either House or any joint committee of the Con-
gress-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-664,
§ 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452,
title IX, 903, 84 Stat. 947.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed.,
§ 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13,
1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178. § 2, 59
Stat. 234).
Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independ-
ent establishment, board, commission" in two instances
to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of sec-
(See definitive section 6 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
tion.
REFERENCES IN TEXT
The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text,
is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
AMENDMENTS
1970-Pub. L. 91-452 added reference to section 1968
of this title.
1962 Pub. L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Ob-
struction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and
committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before
agencies and committees" and punished the willful re-
moval, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or
falsification of documents which were the subject of a
demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with
the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative
demand.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201
of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 203 of this title:
title 12 section 1457.
§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false
bail.
Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, fal-
sifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process,
or other proceeding, in any court of the United
States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made
void, or does not take effect; or
Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowl-
edged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or
judgment, in the name of any other person not
privy or consenting to the same-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233
(Mar. 4. 1909, ch. 321, § 127. 35 Stat. 1111).
The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5
years, to conform the punishment with like ones for
similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
CROSS REFERENCES
Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see
section 2071 of this title.
Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section
641 of this title.
1
§ 1504
TITLE 18.-CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AMENDMENTS
1968-Pub. L. 90-578 substituted "United States magis-
trate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner"
and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201
et seq. of this title.
Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see
section 401 of this title.
Wire or oral communications, authorization for inter-
ception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section,
see section 2516 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516
of this title.
§1504. Influencing juror by writing.
Whoever attempts to influence the action or de-
cision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the
United States upon any issue or matter pending
before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a
member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or
sending to him any written communication, in rela-
tion to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months.
or both.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit the communication of a request to appear
before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 770.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed..
$243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).
Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that
a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be
construed as a technical violation of this section.
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201
of this title.
Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as
excluding offenses punishable under this section, see
section 3401 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.
§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before depart-
ments, agencies, and committees.
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, endeavors to
influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any
proceeding pending before any department or agency
of the United States, or in connection with any in-
✓ quiry or investigation being had by either House, or
any committee of either House, or any joint commit-
tee of the Congress; or
Whoever injures any party or witness in his per-
son or property on account of his attending or having
attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation,
or on account of his testifying or having testified to
any matter pending therein; or
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or
obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any
civil investigative demand duly and properly made
under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968
of this title willfully removes from any place, con-
ceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means
falsifies any documentary material which is the
subject of such demand; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or communication influences,
Page 4312
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, ob-
struct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under which such proceeding is being had
before such department or agency of the United
States, or the due and proper exercise of the power
of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation
is being had by either House, or any committee of
either House or any joint committee of the Con-
gress-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-664,
§ 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452,
title IX, 903, 84 Stat. 947.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed.,
§ 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13,
1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178. % 2, 69
Stat. 234).
Word "agency" was substituted for the words "Independ-
ent establishment, board, commission" in two instances
to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of sec-
(See definitive section 6 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
tion.
REFERENCES IN TEXT
The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text,
is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
AMENDMENTS
1970-Pub. L. 91-452 added reference to section 1968
of this title.
1962 Pub. L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Ob-
struction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and
committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before
agencies and committees" and punished the willful re-
moval, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or
falsification of documents which were the subject of a
demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with
the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative
demand.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201
of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 203 of this title:
title 12 section 1457.
§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false
bail.
Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, fal-
sifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process,
or other proceeding, in any court of the United
States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made
void, or does not take effect; or
Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowl-
edged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or
judgment. in the name of any other person not
privy or consenting to the same-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948.
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233
(Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).
The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5
years, to conform the punishment with like ones for
similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
CROSS REFERENCES
Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see
section 2071 of this title.
Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section
641 of this title.
$ 1504
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AMENDMENTS
1968-Pub. L. 90-578 substituted "United States magis-
trate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner"
and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201
et seq. of this title.
Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see
section 401 of this title.
Wire or oral communications, authorization for inter-
ception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section.
see section 2516 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516
of this title.
§1504. Influencing juror by writing.
Whoever attempts to influence the action or de-
cision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the
United States upon any issue or matter pending
before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a
member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or
sending to him any written communication, in rela-
tion to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months.
or both.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit the communication of a request to appear
before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645.
62 Stat. 770.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed.,
243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).
Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that
a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be
construed as a technical violation of this section.
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201
of this title.
Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as
excluding offenses punishable under this section, see
section 3401 of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.
§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before depart-
ments, agencies, and committees.
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, endeavors to
influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any
proceeding pending before any department or agency
of the United States, or in connection with any in-
quiry or investigation being had by either House, or
any committee of either House, or any joint commit-
tee of the Congress; or
Whoever injures any party or witness in his per-
son or property on account of his attending or having
attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation,
or on account of his testifying or having testified to
any matter pending therein; or
Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or
obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any
civil investigative demand duly and properly made
under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968
of this title willfully removes from any place, con-
ceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means
falsifies any documentary material which is the
subject of such demand; or
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or communication influences,
Page 4312
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, ob-
struct, or impede the due and proper administration
of the law under which such proceeding is being had
before such department or agency of the United
States, or the due and proper exercise of the power
of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation
is being had by either House, or any committee of
either House or any joint committee of the Con-
gress-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-664,
§ 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452,
title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed.,
241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13,
1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59
Stat. 234).
Word "agency" was substituted for the words "Independ-
ent establishment, board, commission" in two instances
to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of sec-
(See definitive section 6 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
tion.
REFERENCES IN TEXT
The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text,
is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.
AMENDMENTS
1970 Pub. L. 91-452 added reference to section 1968
of this title.
1962 Pub. L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Ob-
struction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and
committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before
agencies and committees" and punished the willful re-
moval, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or
falsification of documents which were the subject of a
demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with
the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative
demand.
CROSS REFERENCES
Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201
of this title.
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in section 203 of this title;
title 12 section 1457.
§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false
bail.
Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, fal-
sifiles, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process,
or other proceeding, in any court of the United
States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made
void, or does not take effect; or
Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowl-
edged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or
judgment, in the name of any other person not
privy or consenting to the same-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reviser's Note.-Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233
(Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 127, 35 Stat. 1111).
The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5
years, to conform the punishment with like ones for
similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
CROSS REFERENCES
Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see
section 2071 of this title.
Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section
841 of this title.