AGENCY : PFIAB
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM:
IDENTIFICATION FORM.
AGENCY INFORMATION
Date : 09/24/98
Page : 1
RECORD NUMBER. : 206-10001-10016,
RECORDS SERIES: PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
:
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : NSC
FROM : A.R. ASH
ΤΟ : THE FILE
TITLE : BOARD PANEL ON COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS
DATE : 09/10/63
PAGES :
7
COVERT ACTION
SUBJECTS
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
CURRENT STATUS
: TOP SECRET.
: 1B, 1C
: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
:
:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW 08/06/98 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
: Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967. Duplicate
contained in 206-10001-10001.
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2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992
[R]
-
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
206-10001-10016
1
Box 10
Covert Operations.
1954-1967
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
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THE WHITE HOUSE
TOP SECRET
WASHINGTON
September 10, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action Operations
The Board Panel met in the Board's offices on September 6,
1963. Panel members present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman;
Mr. Gordon Gray; and Dr. William Langer. Messrs. Coyne and
Ash also attended the meeting.
1
During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed
by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants,
Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of CIA's head-
quarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings
were as follows:
British Guiana
MESSRS HELMS and MEYER
For 79-day period ending in July, the anti-Jagan Trades
Union Congress maintained a general strike which was directed
against the Jagan regime, and had wide support among agrarian
and industrial workers in protest against an oppressive Labor
Bill proposed by Communist-oriented Jagan. CIA worked out
with George Meany a program of CIA financial support ($435,000)
to the strike under the cover of "AFL-CIO contributions.
A CIA cover representative ran the strike program. The activity
was tricky because the United States and the British desired
to avoid violence; and the situation was complicated by the
fact that the British Governor-General opposed the strike.
CIA assesses the operation as a success because even though
Jagan was not unseated, the oppressive Labor Bill was withdrawn
and the TUC survived.
The strike activity took place against a background of
agreement between President Kennedy and MacMillan that the
British will not pull out of Guiana for an indefinite future
period, in the hope that a Communist government will not fill
the vacuum when the British do withdraw.
Cuban influence in the strike was in the form of a
$1 million advance from Cuba to the Guiana Import-Export
Corporation (an arm of Jagan's East Indian Peoples Progressive
Party) which in turn was borrowed by the Jagan regime.
Soviet help was indicated by a rumored transfer of over
$100,000 to Jagan's Party through banks.
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CIA at present is providing $5,000 to the PNC Party made
up of anti-Jagan Africans in Guiana, and CIA is sending a Negro
cover representative from New York to aid the African Party.
(CIA considers that Mrs. Jagan, a known Communist from
Chicago, is the brains and guts of the Jagan operation.)
Haiti
CIA has surveyed the intentions and capabilities of
various Haitian exile groups and has supplied them with token
amounts of money to test them out. Efforts of the groups to
form a united front have failed, and in the Dominican Republic
Juan Bosch has reversed his intention to help unseat Devalier
for the present. Ten days ago CIA dropped 100 rifles and
ammunition to one Haitian exile group which has been given
sanctuary by a Dominican Republic commander stationed on the
border.
Dominican Republic
In this country there is a lack of democratic institutions,
political party structure, labor unions, or cooperatives of an
effective nature. Juan Bosch spends more time debating charges
by political opponents than in performing the administrative
job of running the country.
Bosch is an extreme conservative, economically, and refuses
to spend moneys in excess of assured revenues. A twenty per cent
unemployment figure is a major problem. Bosch has strengthened
his Cabinet at the urging of the U. S. Ambassador, and has made
peace with church elements (with CIA's help).
Opposition to Bosch is from the right and from parts of
the Army. He has met individual Communist moves as they arise
(e.g., an attempted infiltration of the Planning Commission),
but he is not pursuing an over-all anti-Communist program or
crusade. Although Bosch is considered by CIA to be anti-Castro
and anti-Soviet, he has not clamped down on returning trainees
from Cuba.
The twenty per cent unemployment situation provides the
basis for a coup in the months ahead. Meanwhile the Army
strong-man Embert (one of Trujillo's assassins) waits in the
wings.
Vietnam
CIA's role in Vietnam during the past two years has been.
two-fold:
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(1) Total support of the war against the Viet Cong, in-
cluding the training of some 43,000 irregulars (now turned over
to U. S. Special Forces); support to the mountain people in
operations against the Viet Cong; and CIA training of U. S.
Special Forces in South Vietnam.
(2) CIA support of infiltration operations in North
Vietnam. (Not a great success. High losses of teams.)
a
--
"
In response to/question based on recent U. S. press allega-
tions that CIA is attempting to overthrow the Diem government:
"CIA has never engaged in any such operations whatsoever
no instigation of the Buddhists nothing. CIA considers
that anti-CIA expressions of this kind originate with Madame
Nhu. The Viet Cong has been working on the Buddhists, but the
Buddhist leader who took sanctuary in the U. S. Embassy has
indicated that the Buddhist activity is motivated by a desire
to unify what is a loosely-joined, individual-Pagoda-type religious
movement.
11
--
August 20 saw the temple raids, martial law, and then the
arrests of students. One U. S. reaction was an August 24 cable-
gram from the State Department (presumably hastily prepared)
which, in nice diplomatic language to State Department representa-
tives in Saigon, gave the word to "unload the Nhus' i.e.,
¾ indicate to the anti-Diem plotters among the Generals that
they should get moving. However, the Generals proved to be lack-
ing in any intention to pursue their previously-professed anti-Diem
sentiments. CIA considers that the August 24 State Department
cablegram was the result of a miscalculation of the General's
true capabilities and intentions. CIA understands that subsequently
the Executive Committee of the NSC has met frequently on the sub-
ject, and more recent State Department cables have reflected
a revision of the earlier "unload the Nhus" message.
As yet the political situation in South Vietnam has not
had an adverse effect on the military effort, nor any increased
Viet Cong moves to capitalize on the situation. (Mr. Helms
departed at this point.)
Italy
With approval by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the Christian
Democratic Party was supported by CIA to the tune of $1 million
in the campaign leading to the June elections (plus $600,000
to other political elements in Italy). CIA's rationale for the
loss of CDP strength in the elections is that (1) there was a
loss of votes among the workers from the south who were given
the Communist treatment when they moved to the northern cities;
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(2) Fanfani, and (3) the Papal audience given to Khrushchev's
son-in-law had an effect on anti-Communist religious Italians,
including wives of the workers who had previously been able to
persuade their husbands to vote against the Communist candidates.
Meanwhile the Special Group has authorized CIA to spend $125,000
to support the CDP in current developments looking toward the
establishment of a center-left government coalition.
Bolivia
The Special Group has authorized a unique effort by CIA
in support of Paz Estancero's program to "rationalize" the
tin mines -- i.e., a project calling for the firing of surplus
tin miners and resettling them in new jobs. This will take
some time, but may result in breaking the leftist influence among
the Bolivian miners.
Brazil
Goulart is engaged in coordinated efforts to (1) discredit
the legislature, (2) obtain backing of the Army, and (3) make
a demagogic appeal to the Brazilizn people as the only leader
who can serve their interests.
CIA is carrying out covert action in the labor movement
and CIA believes that Communist control can be weakened.
In student groups, a number of CIA operations are going and
assets are in place (e.g. in the top executive committee of
the Students' Federation). However, there is no large-scale
CIA political operation in Brazil now.
MR. FITZGERALD
(On the subject of Cuba)
In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for
a package of covert actions against Cuba. The covert program
assumes that means short of military action are to be attempted
on the premise that at the present rate of progress, the Castro
regime will be even more firmly entrenched because the passage
of time runs in Castro's favor.
Mr. Fitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved CIA
covert actions, remarking that if they seemed familiar proposals
which were previously under consideration, it should be kept in
mind that they have now been approved as "interdependent" actions.
The actions call for (1) covert collection of intelligence,
(2) propaganda action to stimulate "low-key sabotage", (3) stimulate
disaffection among the Cuban military, (4) an economic denial
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program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for
industrial machinery, and other products needed by Cuba,
(5) a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6) support
of anti-Castro autonomous groups, by giving them money and
the means to act, but under an arrangement which insures against
attribution to the United States, and which precludes operations
from U. S. or British soil. (The CIA philosophy is to back only
the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups,
the military is felt to be the best bet.)
and
The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to
internal sabotage actions. CIA mounts about 10 "black"
operations a month, and Castro security forces have taken their
toll among the CIA teams. Three operations were conducted on
August 17 and 18, and among other things the objective is to
give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military
officers who see no professional future under Castro who is
unloading military elements which aided him in his initial
seizure of the government. (The Special Group, Mr. Bundy and
other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIA's
sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted.
CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressures for
these operations to be increased beyond the present effective
capacity which CIA has at this time.)
Again, referring to the Cuban economy, it is hurting badly.
The United States has a monopoly on the spare parts for industrial
machinery needed by Cuba, and the USSR cannot supply them.
The Cuban electrical industry is particularly hard hit in this
respect. Castro's re-emphasis on an agricultural step-up means
increased efforts to produce sugar, a crop which presents a good
sabotage target. Finally, the Soviet aid at a rate of $1 million
a day (military and economic) is not enough to keep the Cuban
economy going. Cubans are not starving but they do not eat
" 'comfortably' even in the larger cities. CIA finds that a major
problem for their "black" teams is food re-supply in areas where
the Cubans are hard put to feed themselves.
CIA assets being used against Cuba:
Staff: 384 (Washington and Miami)
U. S. contractor personnel: 83
Foreign nationals: 525 (mostly Cubans)
Personnel at overseas posts: 45
DD/I staff: 12
NPIC: a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba.
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CIA considers that of all nationalities, the Cubans are
the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best informa-
tion comes from non-Cuban agents.
There are 108 agents in Cuba, including friendly diplomatic
personnel. There are two illegal teams working, one of which
has 200 sub-agents. There are 44 legal travelers working;
60 agents in Cuban shipping; and there are 31 penetrations of
Cuban installations abroad.
As to Soviet shipping into Cuba, CIA has an agent in
every port, but observers cannot say what is in the crates
they see being off-loaded.
Since January CIA has disseminated 150 photographs taken
by agents on-the-ground in Cuba. Also CIA has furnished its
agents in Cuba more and better radio equipment.
CIA's estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba: 12,000 Soviet
troops; 150 Chinese (mostly diplomatic personnel); an unknown
number of Soviet civilian technicians; and "a lot" of Czech and
other bloc technicians working with the Cuban military forces.
CIA considers that in the past 9 months progress has
been made in (1) intelligence collection with respect to Cuba,
and (2) effectiveness of the economic denial program. CIA
feels that the "X" factor is the volatility of the Cuban people
whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change over-
night if they see evidence of successful sabotage operations
against the Cuban government.
CIA penetration of the Cuban military got under way in
April. An agent brought out a Cuban Army major and he is being
sent back into Cuba next week. The major says that there is
a medium level acceptance among the military of the idea of
overthrowing Castro, but although this view is held by
individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating
it to others within Cuba. The wife of the chief of training of
the Cuban Army is a CIA source. Defectors are naming military
personnel to be contacted. There is, however, a fear of the
Castro security system.
The subject of specific kinds and amounts of Soviet military
equipment in Cuba is an area of the worst exaggeration and reporting
by nonprofessional observers. However, there is no evidence of
offensive missiles. There are 47 MIG-21's operated by Cuban pilots.
Cubans are at the SA-2 sites and are being trained to operate them.
We don't know what is in the caves, exactly. Neither CIA agents
nor Cubans (nor even Castro) has access to the Soviet armored camps.
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