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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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- 7 NOV 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board
FROM:
David Cohen
SUBJECT:
Deputy Director for Operations
Release of JFK Documents
1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the
release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the
public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of
our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station
name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice
Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations
during a specific window of time if they are substantively
relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the
documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent
presence of the station (S)
2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment
of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host
government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and
liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably
would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to
be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and
determined the damage to national security which would follow
such release. (S)
3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information
regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now
Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in
Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located.
current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown
liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain
individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close
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relationships with the Zaireans because of our need for their
cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program
and will need to improve our relationship over the next several
months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We
also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have
liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing
with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances
where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's
ability to keep its relationships clandestine. То ехрове our
station there would further hamper developmental relationships
and eventual recruitments. (8)
4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the
following comments:
Brussels
-
Public acknowledgment would force the
government and liaison service to pay closer attention to
Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing
sensitive operations. (S)
Helsinki
-
A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison;
thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison
relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to
ongoing sensitive operations. (S)
Paris
-
No additional damage. (8)
Bonn
-
No specific damage. (S)
Berlin
-
No specific damage. (8)
Luxembourg
-
Public acknowledgment would embarrass the
government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering
ongoing operations. (S)
The Hague
-
Public acknowledgment would draw questions
from the press and create political problems for the
government and liaison. This would endanger the
continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)
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Oslo
-
Public acknowledgment would draw questions from
the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive
ongoing joint operations. (S)
Madrid
-
Public acknowledgment would draw press
attention and embarrassing questions for the government and
liaison service. This would further damage an already
dalicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for
counterterrorism operations. (8)
Stockholm
-
A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
would be politically embarrassing for the government and
liaison services. This would likely endanger any
continuation of joint operations. (S)
Geneva
-
A neutral country. Public acknowledgment
would create political problems for the government and
liaison service and force greater attention to our
operations. This would create an intensive
counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to
cause a decrease in our operations. (S)
London
Ottawa
-
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No specific damage. (S)
No specific damage. (8)
5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when
we consider public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from
operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During
the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin
the establishment of good working relations with the host
government and internal/external services. As a result, the
station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level
bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will
of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an
atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general,
and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That
distrust lingers in the public's mind even today.
our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational
activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions
about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further
Exposure of
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inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our
relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could
withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague
Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time
without serious damage to national security. (S)
6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua,
San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires,
Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our
operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any
release of information about a clandestine service breeds
distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at
risk. (S)
7. We receive significant national collection systems
support from Australia which affects national system collection
efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would
jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the
public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing
disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the
current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two
incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present
year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and
create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and
personnel. (8)
8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a
problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign
relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very
sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and
public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to
the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be
closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized,
it would affect a large number of important intelligence
collection operations. (8)
9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be
a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and
Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must
act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The
Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively
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to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well
engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to
show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that
our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a
capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and
Islamic extremism.
10.
(8)
Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a
problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist
population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority
Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem,
and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.8. in
general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a
station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist
population to react negatively and demand that our station be
closed. If the station were closed, the U.8. Government would
lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African
stability and Islamic extremism. (s)
11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to
operational capability and national security, I would feel
compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public
acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or
additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I
must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any
disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities
are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability
to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure
to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)
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David Cohen
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