200000
104-10302-10000
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
DO/PQ-
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
32
7/23/62
Executive Registry
62-5265
25 July 1962
SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
1. On 20 July 1962, the Director and the Deputy Director (Plans)
met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, William Langer, and
J. Patrick Coyne to discuss certain aspects of the Agency's Political
Action Programs. The Director sat with the Panel from 10:30 'til noon,
the Deputy Director (Plans) was present from 10:30 to 12:30 and from
2:00 to 3:30.
2. The Director opened the discussion with a historical description
of the Agency's covert financial support to political parties in the
fight against Communism. He described in detail the procedures now in
effect whereby Political Action Projects are originated, staffed out,
and cleared with appropriate elements of Government.
He pointed out
that each project must have his approval prior to its circulation to
the members of the Special Group. At this point, he digressed to inform
the Panel that reconnaissance overflights are now approved by the
Special Group and subsequently by the President. He said that this
same procedure applies to peripheral flights although to a lesser de-
gree.
He terminated this part of the discussion by stating that in
his opinion "all covert action programs are now handled in an orderly,
correct manner".
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998
13-Q0000
3. The Director then described in some detail Agency covert
financial support in the recent (Peru) elections, the last (Greek) elections,
8
and the Finmish election. He also described our activities in con-
nection with the Italian political parties. Following this, he covered
8
"
our plans for the upcoming (Brasilian elections. He touched on our
thoughts with regard to the political situation in British Guiana
4. At this juncture, the Director discussed Agency labor opera-
tions. He read to the group a short paper which outlined our support
"1
to anti-Communist labor unions in France] and [Italy] our work through
29.
8
the ICFTU)] and our relationships with (American] labor and the assistance
[United States unions] have given us.
24
5. Agency support to cultural organizations was raised by
Dr. Langer, and the Director covered in some detail the current status
of our support plus that of the Ford Foundation to the Congress for
Cultural Freedom and the International Commission of Jurists. He
touched on the Asia Foundation, and our desire to try to obtain the
services of Mr. Livingston Merchant to head it.
:
6. In the time remaining to him, the Director went over with the
Panel country by country an extended list of political parties and
leaders supported by the Agency throughout the world. What he did not
have an opportunity to cover in this list the Deputy Director (Plans)
finished during the remainder of the morning and during the afternoon
session.
10/mc
13-00000
3
7. Also in the afternoon, the Deputy Director (Plans) read to
the Panel a paper on Operation Mongoose which the Director had used
earlier in the day for briefing the President. This paper was used
on the instruction of the Director. The Panel asked questions about
Agency activity involving Cuba, all of which were answered with the
exception of one having to do with the role of the Attorney General.
This query was raised by Mr. Gray who recognized and gracefully ac-
cepted the fact that he was not answered directly.
8. Before the afternoon session adjourned, the Panel raised the
question of the total dollar amount of funds expended annually for
covert action. The Deputy Director (Plans) showed them a chart com-
piled by DDP-PG, dated 4 April 1962. This chart gives the precise
dollar amounts expended annually. These figures vary from the Congres-
sional ones since the support slice is not included.
Distribution:
Original - The Director
1 cc
-
• Exec. Director
C/CA-IO
1 00
1 cc - DD/P
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
ORET
13-00000
2.5767
111/9/62
F་ཀ་:བའུ
62-8090
2 November 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
1. On 1 November, the Deputy Director (Plans) met with
Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to present
a follow-up briefing on the Agency's political action programs since
the one held on 20 July 1962. The meeting lasted from 2:30 to 4:45.
2. There was little discussion on Cuba. In response to
Mr. Murphy's inquiry, I told him that a good intelligence job had
been done but that I thought it desirable to have this studied by
the Board on the basis of a paper which the Director was having pre-
pared and which Mr. Kirkpatrick had assured Mr. Coyne would be sub-
mitted to the Board after the Director had had an opportunity to re-
view it.
8
3. The Brazilian election program was covered in considerable
detail. Points covered were: (a) the reason for the program, (b) the
manner in which candidates were chosen, (c) the amount of money in-
volved, (d) the methods of funding, and (e) the coordination of State
and the Agency on the entire scenario. Following the presentation of
the factual elements, there was considerable discussion of the politi-
the factual elements,
cal situation in (Brazil) and the direction in which that Government
seemed to be tending.
2/mc
13-00000
· 2 ·
4. CIA-sponsored activities at the Helsinki Youth Festival was
the next item presented. A full report was given which followed care-
fully the post-mortem written by the CA Staff.
5. As for CA activities in the remainder of Latin America, the
following countries were covered: Dominican Republic, Chile, Peru]
and [Venezuela)]. [Haiti] and [British Guiana)] were then touched on, with
particular reference to the sensitivity of the US-UK] cooperation on
thets cooperat1on on
the latter.
2′
6. In Southeast Asia, an up-to-date report was presented on
operations in Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam. Problems in
connection with North Vietnamese operations were specifically identi-
fied.
24
7. On the [Sino-Indian] conflict, the Panel was made aware of
pending and current requests from the [Indian CTB] for assistance in
29
the training of guerrilla forces. The role of the Tibetans was also
identified.
In response to a query from Mr. Murphy, I said that I
did not see any requirement at this time for an increase of our perma-
"
nent establishment in [India] expressing the opinion that any trainers
and paramilitary experts which we might send could be covered for us
8
by the [Indians]
8. In Europe, CA programs in the following areas were up-
"
dated: Berlin, France and Italy, (Spain) (Finland) and/
and [Cyprus]
12/MC
13-00000
3.
Mr. Murphy seemed particularly interested in the level of activity
in Italy and our efforts to cut it back.
9. At one point in the briefing, I spoke of the change in
status of the African-American Institute and told of our negotiations
with the Ford Foundation on the Congress for Cultural Freedom. I
mentioned the Department of State veto on passing funds to Holden
Roberto] There was some discussion of the Yemen and associated
6
problems. Here, I simply gave an intelligence briefing on the Yemen
and the effects of the revolution there on Saudi Arabia and the
British position in the Aden Protectorate.
Distribution:
Original
1 cc
-
-
-
Director, CIA
Exec. Director
Chief, CA
1 co
1 cc
-
DD/P
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
/mc
CONFIDENTIAL
☐ SECRET
13-00000
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
"SE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
NO.
Office of the DD/P
Rm. 3-C-34 Hdqrs.
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED FORWARDED
Executive
DDCI
Director 200
11/5/62
Ex. DIR. for feles
LBK
7/9/62
1305/11/62
5.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
ORM
DEC 56
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
DATE
2
NOV 1962
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom Draw a line across column after each comment.)
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
GPO 1961 0-593644
13-00000
DD/P 3-1911
Executive Registry
17 April 1963
603-3249
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
1. On 15 April, at DDP's request, I met with Messrs. Robert
Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to brief them on major
covert action developments since their previous briefing on
2 November 1962. The meeting lasted from 10:00 to 12:15.
☐
2. At Mr. Murphy's request, I began with a description of our
electoral operations as approved by the Special Group in Chile, the
Dominican Republic, (Brazil) and Guatemala. Mr. Murphy was
particularly concerned with the situation in(Brazil) and both he and
Mr. Gray found it difficult to understand why the State Department 6
continued to provide large-scale economic assistance when [Goulart]
had to date refused to clean house of the Communists and fellow
travelers both within the government and the labor movement. They
were interested in knowing that we were in touch with some of the
military leaders who are opposed to Goulart] and they seemed to feel
that a military coup at some point might be preferable to allowing a
country [as large and powerful as Brazil to drift into the hands of the
opposition. Both gentlemen wished to know the amounts that we had
expended in these electoral operations and our own estimate of the
results. They did not question either the need for intervention or
the size of our effort; although in the Chilean case Mr. Murphy wanted
to be sure that we had evidence that the funds passed through[Italian] 8
hands actually reached the Chilean Christian Democrats.
४
3. Mr. Murphy then raised the Argentine problem and said
that he had been informed in New York that the State Department was
putting considerable pressure on the Argentine regime to persuade it
to hold the elections scheduled for June 1963. He questioned the
wisdom of this pressure, pointing out that there was a real danger
of the Peronistas returning to power if the elections were held. He
asked our opinion and I said that, despite the pressure, there was still
considerable doubt whether the elections would actually take place.
10/MC
13-00000
8
I added that the more responsible military were trying to work out with
the Guido government and the non-Peronist/political parties a formula
which would prevent the Peronistas] from making large gains on the
national level.
8
11
4. On the subject of Haiti Mr. Murphy felt that in so small a
country action should be possible to remove [Duvalier] and wondered
why it had not been done. I pointed out that we had as yet no policy
approval for such action but that we were active in identifying and
making contact with opposition elements both within Haiti and in exile.
I described some of the difficulties, such as Duvalier's control of
the arms in the palace and his widespread penetration of opposition
_plotting that had just resulted in the rolling up of a coup attempt by
[Haitian army officers.
5. Mr. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report
of our recent decision to allow Radio Liberty to broadcast in Russian
to the Soviet troops in Cuba. He was heartily in favor of such action
but wondered how we were able to obtain approval of it when the
Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear
to be provocative to the Soviets. I informed him that there had, in fact,
been some delay in obtaining the approval.
6. Both the gentlemen asked for detailed information on the
structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC)
and asked whether we felt this committee in any way hampered or
interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that
both Chief, WH and myself were well pleased with the way the LAPC
operates and believed it to be highly useful.
7. I then briefed them on actions which were taken in Southeast
Asia, particularly the measure to strengthen the border police in the
10 [north of India. I told them that [Nehru] was aware of these actions and
they wanted to be certain Mr. Bowles] was clearly instructed prior to
his departure as ambassador.
8
6
8. Both men objected to press reports that certain Administration
officials believed the Soviets to be exerting a helpful and restraining
influence in Laos. I had to agree with them that it was hard to maintain
such a view in the face of the increasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao,
and I described the existing policy limits on our relations with [Phoumi] 6
and/Kong Le] I then described the present state of the Soviet-Chinese
andKong
b
N
1379/MC
13-00000
split and some of our efforts to exploit and exacerbate these tensions.
Mr. Murphy asked for specific information on the extent of trade, if
any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the out-
standing Chinese debt to the Soviets. I agreed to provide this via
Mr. Coyne. Mr. Gray asked about the depth and extent of our
Intelligence from Peking and the China mainland, and was critical of
the information supplied to us by the Chinese Nationalists. I said
that intelligence operations in China were not my field but that I would
make sure that a report on this did get to them.
9. I went on to describe the cultural ferment within Russia and
recent action Khrushchev had taken to discipline the dissident writers
and artists. They were very much interested in the actions we had
taken to exploit this situation and particularly interested in the current
issue of Encounter and in the account therein of the Khrushchev tirade
at the recent art exhibition.
10. On Cuba I explained that I was not in a position to brief
them in depth and any questions in this field would be handled by the
Director or DDP. I did, however, brief them on the Krulak Committee
and the recent meetings in Managua regarding measures that could be
taken to limit the export of subversion from Cuba. (I have sent to
them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandum on the present scope of the
Cuban subversive training effort.)
8
11. I described the covert support to the Italian political parties
for the forthcoming parliamentary election as approved by the Special
Group. Mr. Murphy had not previously known of the decision to lend
some selective support to the [Nenni autonomists] and described this
decision with some surprise "as quite a awitch. 8
"
8
12. Finally, gwhen informed of the policy limitations on Our
relations with the Angolan Nationalists] and[Holden Roberto Mr. Murphy
expressed himself as being in agreement with those limitations and
seemed to feel that the best course to follow was to assist the Portuguese]
Government in its attempts to control the situation. He said that he had
met recently for the first time with Roberto Holden]in New York last
week and was not impressed by the man.
b
3
6/mc

13-00000
13. The meeting was throughout a cordial one and I detected
no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency's covert
action program,
Distribution:
Orig.
-
Director, CIA
1 - Exec. Director
1 - DDP
1 - C/CA
CORD MEYER, JR.
Chief
Covert Action Staff
Vb 12 10 OT VW .83
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
PE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
C/CA
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
Exec. Director
2.
PFLAB
3.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
1 DEC 56
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEE,
RECEIVED
DATE
FORWARDED
NO.
DATE:
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
LBK
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
GPO 1961 0-593644
13-00000
23 April 1963
C
13-00000
(CLASSIFICATION)
Handle Via Indicated Controls
99
[BYEMAN]
DCI
Copy!
23
[BYE 4242-6
8/19/98
Assassination
Record
Michle
Gov
of
y 2
this
document to
chos. Enright
on 7ang 1964
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the mean.
ing of the espionage lows U: S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmis.
sion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any
manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign govern.
ment to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoc.
trinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be
maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.
This document contains information referring to Projects:
99
CORONA.
(CLASSIFICATION)
[TACKLE]
13-00000
TOP SECRET
24 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
1015, Tuesday, 23 April 1963
Present: Dr. Killian, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Clifford, Mr. Pace,
Gen. Doolittle, Mr. Gray, Dr. Langer, Dr. Land;
Staff members Messrs. Coyne and Ash;
From CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. FitzGerald,
Mr. Bruce Clarke, Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick
1.
When Mr. McCone entered the room the group had been discussing
the release of the American prisoners in Cuba, and it had been explained to
the Board that the three CIA men who had been imprisoned had been released.
Mr. Murphy had asked what their cover story had been and had been told
that they represented themselves as conducting audio surveillance for com-
mercial interests, and that their fictitious names had apparently held up
during interrogation.
Mr. Murphy asked Mr. McCone the conditions of the release of the
22 and the DCI explained that at Castro's request we were trying to obscure
the fact that there had been a quid pro quo in releasing the four Cubans in
exchange for the 22 Americans. The Attorney General had arranged the
release of the three Cubans who had been accused of, but not convicted of
sabotage, and Mr. McCone had personally arranged the release of Molina
with Governor Rockefeller, who had granted him executive clemency with
deportation. Mr. McCone noted that the release of the three CIA persons
was very important to the Agency, and that nothing in the agreement for the
release involved any other commitments.
Mr. Murphy asked what the DCI thought was behind Castro's making
these releases. Mr. McCone replied that it was probably domestic foibles,
and that Donovan was the only thread open to the United States. Mr. Clifford
asked if we had everyone out that we wanted. The DCI replied that he knew
of no one else there that we wanted. He reported that Donovan had to make
a statement that he would not return to Cuba, advised that he had no intention
of returning at this time, and he would have to use another cover if he did
return. Dr. Land asked why Castro did all this, and the DCI said we didn't
really know, but one possibility offered by Donovan was that Castro
apparently is interested in trying to reach some rapprochement with
TOP SHEET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
Gestoasification
13-00000
TOP SECRET
the United States, that Donovan says he is not a Communist, and that Fidel
didn't know how to go about making any accommodation with the U.S.
because he was so closely surrounded by advisers who were watching every-
thing he did. Mr. McCone said that Castro had specifically requested that
the President, the Attorney General and the DCI be advised of his attitude.
Mr. Clifford asked why Castro wanted the DCI to know, and Mr. McCone
said he had no idea, because at no time during the Donovan negotiations was
any indication given that CIA was being consulted or advised. Dr. Killian
then suggested that the Board turn to the briefing on Cuba. Mr. McCone
said there were several things he wished to discuss before going on to that
briefing.
2. Mr. McCone reported that on coordination the NRO agreement was
in effect and working pretty well. An agreement had been reached on the
complete and comprehensive use of the NPIC facilities by DIA, and NPIC
was developing well. The Special Group has expanded its review of counter-
insurgency activities to include those of the DOD, and they are now cognizant
of DOD activities in this field. In the field of current intelligence reporting,
we are now attempting to correct the DIA and CIA bulletins and to establish
one bulletin with increased DIA input and with DIA issuing addendum.
Mr. McCone said this was supported at the DOD stage by the Secretaries.
He noted that he was attempting to get all issues with the DOD settled by the
15th of May so that they can be fully implemented before Mr. Gilpatric leaves
in June. He said that in the clandestine collection field the work of Defense
was being fully and carefully coordinated on a regular basis. Mr. McCone
said that reasonable progress was being made on the five areas of coordina-
tion. He said that he and Mr. McNamara had postponed the reorganization
of USIB. It was going along all right as it was and they didn't see any point
of creating problems on the Hill by a reorganization at this time.
16
✓ 3. Mr. McCone reported that recent CORONA and TACKLE flights over
China produced the best photography we have ever had, and that he had not
set up a formal briefing for the Board because of their busy schedule. He
advised that there was one point concerning ICBM complexes in the Soviet
Union which he wished to call to the attention of the Board. The last CORONA
flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these
installations in 18 separate places. He noted that these complexes ranged
from four pads to possibly as many as 18. This might well indicate that
18 launching pads were standard, and if the support facilities are proportioned
similar to the one with 18 pads, there might well be as many as 18 times 18
launching pads, or a total of about 450. Mr. McCone advised that at this time
we were analyzing each one to determine the level of support facilities.
- 2 -
TOP SECRET
1/mc
13-00000
TOP SECRET
The photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction
time. He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to 150
launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate.
Dr. Langer asked how many sites there were with 18 pads and Mr. McCone
replied, "Only one.
"1
i
4. Dr. Land stated that CORONA was getting better and better, and
he hoped that all of those in the pursuit of a better vehicle would not forget
that CORONA is doing the job. Mr. McCone replied that this was true, and
said that he had the schedule for satellite launchings which he would leave
with the Board. This called for CORONA-M once a month to July, with an
extra one in May, and CORONA-J once a month from May 1963 to July 1964,
with two in September. If trouble develops with the "J" configuration, "M"
can be continued once a month until March. The next [LANYARD) shot is
_scheduled for early next month and will be followed by three more. The first
99 [GAMBIT] shot is scheduled in June, and will then be launched once a month
through all of 1964. Mr. McCone noted that if there were future failures,
there should be no hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between
shots.
5. Mr. McCone reported that the OXCART vehicle would have one more
flight at Mach [2.5] and then would be pushed up to its full speed and altitude.
General Doolittle noted that the next (6)] increase presented very serious
engineering problems. Mr. McCone said that this was thoroughly understood
but he wanted the Board to be apprised of the status.
6. Mr. McCone reported that he was establishing a panel to make a
judgment as to what additional steps should be taken to bring satisfactory
photography in the area of resolution. He noted that he felt we were dealing
too much in optimistic hope at the present time, and that he wanted the best
possible judgment as to the resolution that could be achieved from satellite
photography in order to be weighed with the political decision of overflying
the Soviet Union. He stated that he had gone to Cambridge to see
Dr. Edward Purcell in an effort to persuade him to chair a panel which
would be composed of the best brains from both inside and outside the Govern-
ment. He reported that he felt he must be able to tell the President when
satellite photography would reach the desired resolution. Mr. McCone
advised that he had a memorandum establishing the terms of reference of
this committee which he would submit to the President's Board. He noted
that there were many studies oriented toward the most exotic types of
reconnaissance, including the best read-out, but that he wanted this com-
mittee to be completely impartial and objective and therefore was establishing
it under his personal direction. He noted that he had the enthusiastic support
- 3 -
TO DECKET
4/mc
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TOP SECRET
of DOD in doing this. He said he would like the support of the President's
Board and their thoughts on the terms of reference and the membership,
including whether they thought some members of the Board might sit on the
committee or whether this would present a conflict of interest, as the Board
had apparently felt in a previous matter. ]
Dr. Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future poten-
tiality of satellite photography, and Mr. McCone then read to the Board the
terms of reference in his memorandum. He noted that he thought this panel
should be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in the
U.S. Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR. Mr. Clifford
asked if the panel would deal with politics, and Mr. McCone replied, "No."
Dr. Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO and
Mr. McCone replied that NRO would support the panel. Gen. Doolittle noted
that the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability, and
Mr. McCone said that he knew this, but felt that that committee was not full
out and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted.
Gen. Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and he
thought they were giving the problem very serious consideration. Mr. McCone
said he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he was
concerned because all of the views were not being pulled together. He noted
that what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to what
resolution was required down to the nearest inch in order to determine the
engineering of missiles..
B.
Mr. Land asked what Dr. Purcell had said, and commented that he
thought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or five
who knew what they were talking about. Mr. McCone replied that he was
not sure he had been able to get Purcell, and that he might have to ask
Dr. Land to persuade Purcell; Dr. Land replied that he might be able to do it.
C
98
24
7. [Mr. Pace asked whether there had been one or two U-2 flights over
China. Mr. McCone replied that there had been two, and that they had
produced some interesting results. These included progress on a possible
gaseous diffusion plant. He noted that the preparations are just half those
of the Soviet plant, of which it may be a duplicate. He said that this was
not understood, and noted that, as presently constituted, the plant could not
produce cascades to develop the quality of the top product. He noted that it
could possibly be another process, metallurgical or textile, but on another
area there were a large number of cooling towers. Mr. McCone advised
that he had set up a special group under Dr. Roddis to study the Chinese
nuclear energy program. This group has made a report in which they pointed
out the paucity of the information available. However, they had put together
-
4
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TOP SECRET
98 24
a whole lot of intelligence information and had come to the conclusion that
the Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field
and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device. He reported
that the Board of Estimates was making a new estimate on the subject at
this moment and that the program was being supplemented by intensive over-
flights. Dr. Land asked whether the DCI saw any problems in using the A-12
over China, and Mr. McCone said that he didn't and, furthermore, that he
personally didn't see any problem in using it over the USSR.
8. Mr. McCone advised that he had taken some additional steps to
pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets. He had established
a Research and Development Review Board. He said that it didn't seem wise
at this time to relocate OSI and TSD. The Office of Scientific Intelligence
analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence, and its
removal from DD/I would take away an essential link in the process of that
area. He said further that TSD was directly linked to the operational aspects
of DD/P, and he didn't feel it should be removed from that area. He noted
that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General
Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He
said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board
and read to the Board the membership.
- 5 -
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1/mi
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TOP SECRET
9. Mr. McCone then turned to a discussion of Cuba and stated that
he was giving the Special Group this afternoon a study showing the results
of 51 days' reconnaissance over Cuba and that this was disturbing when the
four principal targets were analyzed. There were 59 occasions when
weather precluded any readout of what was going on in these four Soviet
military camps. Some of the camps were not seen for five or six days in
a row and in one instance for as long as 12 successive days. Mr. McCone
then read from the memorandum on reconnaissance over Cuba dated 23 April
1963 and said he would provide the Board with a copy.
The DCI then reported that James Donovan during a nighttime drive
to Veradero had passed a convoy of 25 very large trucks, the type generally
carried on railroad flatcars. Mr. McCone stated that an examination of the
photography for that day and the following day provided absolutely no trace
of the convoy.
Dr. Land stated that the DCI's previous statement may have
provided the answer as to where this convoy might be. The DCI said he
planned to recommend low-level flights in order to provide more information.
10. At this point Mr. FitzGerald was asked to give his presentation on
operations in Cuba. He commenced by displaying the chart which indicated
the number of resident agents, illegal teams, legal teams, shipboard agents
and penetrations of Cuban installations. He noted that the number of illegal
teams had risen to three as a result of a successful operation on Sunday,
and one of these teams had as many as 100 subagents with extensive coverage
in the province of Pinar del Rio. Dr. Langer asked what the subagents were
looking for, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that their coverage was mostly
military. Mr. Murphy asked if these agents were all strictly collecting
intelligence, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was their primary purpose
at the moment, but the illegals could create a resistance net if this was
desired. He pointed out that the policy at the present time precluded attempt-
ing to develop a large scale dangerous activity.
Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the penetration of Cuban installations
were mainly diplomatic installations and that some [14 Cuban diplomats] were
our agents. Mr. Clifford asked how the information was gotten out of Cuba,
and Mr. FitzGerald replied that it was mostly by secret writing transmitted
10 to ✓ Mexico City] by mail and then forwarded to Washington. He said there
were four radios in Cuba and that we now had a greatly improved medium 24
speed transmitter that was quite small, the size of about two cigarette cartons
and it could get a message off in just 60 seconds. He said that there was a
smaller and better transmitter currently in the process of development.
-6-
TOP STALT
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13-00000
TOP SEGRET
Dr. Land asked if the loss of this transmitter would compromise others.
Mr. FitzGerald replied that it would not compromise any other agents
except the one apprehended, and the DCI noted that it would simply com-
promise the instrument.
Mr. Murphy asked concerning the quality of substantive reporting,
and Mr. FitzGerald noted that the 1,040 reports looked impressive, but it
was quite true that this was not a true indication. He said that some of the
reporting was very good, and there were two (Cuban ambassadors on the
payroll who provided some first-rate reports and were closest to the bone
in what Castro was thinking. Mr. Murphy asked if we had Castro's
immediate entourage penetrated, and Mr. FitzGerald said his sister worked
for us but that she didn't always have inside information. He pointed out
that the 665 reports from resident agents were primarily on military targets,
and the intelligence community felt they were really worthwhile as a supple-
ment to overhead reconnaissance. General Doolittle asked if an illegal
724
team was (two men and Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes". Mr. Murphy asked
whether these agents provided information on Soviet troop strength and
equipment, and Mr. FitzGerald replied in the affirmative. Mr. Clifford
noted that with just two illegal agent teams in Cuba at this time we were
back to where we started from in 1962. Mr. FitzGerald commented that the
casualty rates were very high and referred to the charts "Legal Resident
Agents in Cuba" and "Illegal Agent Development".
in.)
(At this point Mr. McCone left the meeting and Mr. Cottrell came
Mr. Gray asked if the modest number of agents was a result of
policy or operations. Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was primarily a
result of operations and noted that it was not the result of lack of effort, but
because of the high attrition rate and the dangers involved. He went over
the lists of what had happened to the agents that were put in. He noted that
it was presently planned to carry out approximately five operations a month.
Mr. Murphy asked if there was evidence of organized resistance in Cuba.
Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes", but they were now small bands scattered
throughout the island. He noted that Castro had broken up the large country-
wide resistance networks last summer. He then produced the chart entitled
"Illegal Infiltration
Exfiltration Operations" and commented on this.
--
Mr. Murphy asked if the groups on the island committed sabotage, and
Mr. FitzGerald said the policy presently precluded major sabotage operations
and limited it to "subtle sabotage". Mr. Murphy asked what constituted
"subtle sabotage", and Mr. FitzGerald described it as tying a rock to a wire
and throwing it across high tension lines.
- 7 -
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TOP SECRET
11. The Board then turned to Mr. Cottrell and asked him to describe
the work of his group. Mr. Cottrell said the President had become con-
cerned there were so many government agencies dealing with so many
Cuban groups, and he had set up the group under Mr. Cottrell to coordinate
all of this activity. He said that his immediate group consisted of a repre-
sentative of Defense and CIA, and there were additional committees or
groups reporting to them. He outlined the general policy guidance under
which they were operating and under questioning from Mr. Murphy stoutly
denied that the policy was basically defensive in nature, and it was
directed toward getting rid of communism and Castro in Cuba. It was
further explained that CIA's activities were coordinated through this group.
12. Dr. Killian then asked Bruce Clarke to give a brief report on the
situation in Cuba, and with the aid of photographs Clarke analyzed the
present Soviet troop strength on the island and explained how these figures
were arrived at. At 12:00 this session was recessed to permit the presenta-
tion by DIA.
LBK: drm:
Distribution
cy'
су
1 Dei
#2 -
.
# 3-
tho -
DDCI
Ex DiR
ER
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
8
13-00000
Subjects covered in briefing 23 April 1963:
1. Discussion of the release of the three American prisoners in Cuba.
2. Coordination on NRO agreement
-
"'in effect and working well".
99
10
3. Report on photographic results of Corona and Tackle lights: Ever
China] mentioned there would be one more Ox flight at Mach
and then be pushed to full speed and altitude.
4. Reported on establishment of Purcell Panel.
5.
10
Discussion of U-2 flights over China] and results.
Mach 2.5724
6. Establishment of R&D board to pull together the Agency's scientific
and technical assets.
7. Discussion of Cuba; DCI said plans to recommend low-level flights
to provide more information.
8. FitzGerald gave presentation on operations in Cuba.
9. Cottrell described the work of his group.
10.
Bruce Blark gave report on the situation in Cuba.
TOP SEGRET
99
[BYEMAN]
σο
13-00000
SECRET
As advised 1012a.m.
22 april 1963.
Lore
20 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick
LBK
DCI does not want to meet the Board with Cottrell
and requests that you advise the Board that Cottrell is not privy
to many operational matters. Your suggestions seemed agree-
able to Mr. McCone.
SECRET
Welder
W. Elder
".
13-00000
SEGRET
22 April 1963
SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 10:15 A. M., 23 APRIL
to
11:15 A. M.
I
Coordination.
a. NRO Agreement--currently in effect.
b. NPIC--agreement with DIA is fairly well solidified
with not too many differences in opinion.
c.
Counterinsurgency--new system whereby DOD goes
to the Special Group now in effect.
d. Current Intelligence Reporting--now in negotiation
stage with DIA.
e. Clandestine Intelligence Collection--close coordination
between CIA and DIA now in effect.
в мотв
II
III
99
Recent CORONA Coverage plus Recent TACKLE Flights
Schedule of flights for 1963-19
Re
Progress on OXCART. Cube.
a. Establishment of the Purcell Panel.
IV
Scientific and Technical Intelligence in CLA.
Report of the Roddis Panel on Chinese nuclear energy
capabilities.
a.
b. The CIA Research and Development Review Board.
U/ Policy
L will
ли
Cable
Rex. our be
SEGRET
13-00000
Handle via BYEMAN
Control System
ika
SECRET
17 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, Tuesday, 23 April 1963
1. The President's Board has asked that you meet with them on
the 23rd from 10:15 to 11:15. They have suggested that the later half
of this period be devoted to a review of both operations and intelligence
on Cuba and have suggested that Mr. Cottrell attend for that period.
2. Assuming that the question of the Board's charter and proce-
dures will have been settled prior to the 23rd, I would suggest that you
may wish to give them a quick review of outstanding matters including
their recommendations and perhaps a briefing on the latest C_
and 1.799
flights.
cc:. DDCI
99
Handle via ②YEMAN]
Control System
L
Kinkatul
Kyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
SELF
Exclud
declastito
23
ⒷYE 4241-63
Labe
M
13-00000
:
· །
DA
63-2540/
28 March 1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
LBK
Reference the attached memorandum from the Director,
I will of course be pleased to meet with the President's Board
on Tuesday, 23 April, and would appreciate very much your
informing Pat Coyne accordingly. I hope that you will be able
to be present also in accordance with your normal procedures.
If not, I would appreciate your appointing an appropriate repre-
sentative. If you can find out in advance from Mr. Coyne just
what the Board may want, it would be most helpful. In the
meantime, please ask the staff to prepare appropriate briefing
memoranda on whatever will be appropriate at that time!!!
る。
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
Attachment:
Memo to DDCI from DCI dated 28 March 1963 (ER 63-2540)
MSC:blp
Distribution:
Original
-
Addressee w/att
1
-
DDCI w/cy att
-
1 ER w/cy att
13-00000
28 March 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter
In discussions with Dr. Killian, he mentioned
that his Board were meeting for one day. He had
been advised that I would be in Europe at that time.
The meeting date is April 23rd. Dr. Killian specifi-
cally requested that you be available for an hour or
so on that date, and I said I would convey this request
to you.
John A. McCone
Director
Executive Registry
-2540
13-00000
(CLASSIFICATION)
BHE 3759
Cyp#1
Handle Via Indicated Controls
99
[BYEMAN]
8/19/98
Assassination
Record.
Michelle
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the mean.
ing of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmis-
sion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any
manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign govern-
ment to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoc.
trinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be
maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.
This document contains information referring to Projects:
(CLASSIFICATION)
13-00000
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI
UNCLASSIFIED
ATION TOP AND BOTTOM
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
1 DCI
2
EVEC
Dir
3
4
5
10
16
ACTION
APPROVAL
COMMENT
CONCURRENCE
Remarks:
DATE
INITIALS
DCI
Noted
Approved with
3 гирках changer
noted.
Welder
as
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
FILE
INFORMATION
PREPARE REPLY
RECOMMENDATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
Distribution to other than DDCI and
yourself awaits your approval.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
Executive Director
DATE
31 Dec 62
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
2-61
FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
(40)
* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 0-587282

13-00000
28 December 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI with the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, Friday, December 28, 0930 a. m.
Specific
Subject : Discussion of Cuba
1. At 0930 Dr. Killian opened the meeting with a statement to the
Director that the Board had read the report and appreciated the great
amount of work that had been put into it. He commented particularly
on the lucidity of the report and said the Board had also looked at the
changes which had been sent to them this morning. The Director
commented on page 90, the final conclusions, and said that he still did
not feel sufficient attention had been paid to important indicators.
Mr. McCone then said that there were one or two other subjects that
he wanted to mention to the Board before getting into the Cuban report.
These are covered in separate memoranda.
2. After coverage of the other subjects, Dr. Killian then asked
Mr. McCone whether he had any further comments to make on the report.
The Director, referring to conversation the previous evening, said he had
no further comments and that he thought it was understandable why his
personal position had not been included in the report. He noted that the se
were covered in his October 31 memorandum for the record which the
Board had. Dr. Killian asked if the Board did have this and Mr. Coyne
Евче
[BYE ₤359-62]
cy#1
Уже
13-00000
2.
noted that Dr. Killian had seen it at the previous meeting. Mr. McCone
went on to say that the Board should realize that the people in receipt
of his cables had been receiving intelligence on an hour to hour basis.
Mr. Clifford noted that the Director's messages would be of tremendous
interest in any Congressional investigation and thought that the Board should
have copies of them. Mr. McCone replied that he realized this and would
supply copies.
3. Mr. Gray asked if they could then turn to question 16. Dr. Killian
asked the question, which was whether the existence of the Special Group
had complicated the intelligence program and he noted particularly the
detailed decisions made by the Special Group in relation to Mongoose.
Mr. McCone replied no, in fact the Special Group had assisted. He noted
the way it operated and said that the Augmented Special Group, with the
Attorney General, served as authority to stimulate intelligence gathering
through increased use of agents, refugee interrogations and third country
activities. He noted that prior to Mongoose there had been a hiatus and
that everything apparently had stopped after the Bay of Pigs. In December
of last year there had been no interrogation of refugees, no agents and no
Miami set up. At the instigation of the President, the Attorney General
and himself, all of this had been built up. Mr. Murphy asked why opera-
tions against Cuba had stopped and whether this was for psychological
reasons. The Director said it was psychological. There had been
investigations and there was general discouragement. Dr. Killian said
TGP 870257
13-00000
wasn't there a similar danger now and that there seemed to be a general
euphoria and a feeling of success. Mr. McCone said there was a great
danger inherent in Cuba. The SAM sites were still there as well as many
other things. He said a week ago Monday he had brought this up forcefully
in the Executive Committee and the President had issued instructions that
word be gotten to the Soviets that any interference with our reconnaissance
over Cuba would bring an instant reply with action from the United States.
This word was communicated by Stevenson to Kuznetsov and by Thompson
to Dobrynin. He said that the present understanding is that we will fly
two or more high level flights a day, or if weather or other reasons fore-
stall these flights, there will be a request made to the President for low
level flights. He noted that low level flights could escalate a critical
situation.
4. Mr. Pace asked if there were any prohibitions on intelligence
collection on Cuba today. Mr. McCone replied yes. We would like a
more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration. He said he thought it was
important that in the next three or four months there be extensive intelli-
gence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba. He said
he thought the Soviets might move completely out of Cuba, and certainly
this was one impression they were trying to convey; or second, that they
would recognize they had a good piece of real estate which they would
want to maintain for subversion through Latin America, and a base of
This would involve a control of Castro and while they
operations.
might not re-install offensive missiles, they will always have the
3.
TOO SEORET
13-00000
capability to do so. Mr. McCone said he was inclined to believe that the
second alternative would be followed, and obviously the intelligence effort
should be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions.
5. Mr. Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort
The DCI said yes, that every effort
to penetrate the Cuban government.
should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure
and that more and more agents should be put it. He noted that only this
week a team had been infiltrated and another team exfiltrated. Mr. Murphy
-24
asked how many there were in a team and the Director replied [three to five]
6. Mr. McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts
to utilize third countries in the Cuban intelligence effort and mentioned
8
8
the [British] [Canadians, French Germans] and
one or two Latin countries.
He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced
by discussions with Donovan and Noland. We already know that Castro
had a fight with Che Guevarta.
Guevarta.
24
Castro also spent three hours with the
captain of the African Pilot) and the captain had indicated that he wanted
to talk to intelligence immediately on landing in Florida. Mr. McCone
said that he intended to get the Special Group, immediately after the
first of the year, to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities.
He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time
to stimulate an uprising and that all of our resources should be concen-
trated on intelligence collection.
TOP SEBRET
4.
6/MC
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5.
7. Mr. Pace asked whether this plan would include using Guantanamo.
The Director replied that he did not recommend the use of Guantanamo.
He noted that if it was used as a base for intelligence operations, and we'
got caught, Castro could mobilize world opinion against us. Dr. Killian
said that Castro assumed that we used it in this way whether we do or
not.
8. General Doolittle asked how frequently we are overflying Cuba
now. The Director replied that there were two flights a day at present,
but if the weather is bad and our program slips, there is authority to
fly additional daily flights. General Doolittle asked how frequently this
gave complete coverage of the island and Mr. McCone said that it worked
out to about once a week. He noted that some areas such as harbors were
covered more frequently, and that COMOR had worked out a system of
priorities for aerial reconnaissance.
9. Mr. Pace then asked if we had studied the possibilities for the
use of Guantanamo and what could be achieved in using it as a base for
operations. The Director replied that we had made no such study.
10. Mr. Pace then inquired about restrictions on U-2 flights during
NO
September and said that apparently effort was made to penetrate critical
areas by agents and therefore he thought we should have explored using
Guantanamo. Mr. McCone pointed out that the operators had proposed a
from Guantanam
series of agent infilitrations in August, but that this was not approved.
Nobody at the policy level, including the JCS, would approve these
operations.
TOP SPORET
13-00000
6.
11. Mr. Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different
than it did in August, would there be accelerated operations. The
Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case.
Mr. Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his
opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless
24
of policy inhibitions. Dr. Killian asked if [Guantanamo
no was used for
SIGINT)] purposes. Mr. McCone said that he was sure it was and
Che
29
referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick who read from the NSA memorandum/on
their expanding activities in June, noting the additional positions
were
24
activated in June and the fact that/there some [floating positions] established
near Santiago de Cuba.
12. Mr. Murphy then asked what was the difference between
Mongoose and Mongoose B-plus. Mr. McCone replied that the first
phase of the Mongoose operation was to determine the intelligence
potential in Cuba. This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties.
He mentioned that there were 100,000 informers organized on a block and
community basis throughout the island and that these people controlled
ration cards and travel, thereby making all movement difficult. He said
the second phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four
different levels of activity. "A" was the most violent, directed toward
precipitating a revolution. "B" involved extensive sabotage. "B plus"
was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more
activity, such as mining harbors. Mr. McCone said that his big problem
TOP SECRET
3/mc
13-00000
7.
is the question of United States policy. He did not wish to put CLA in the
position of stimulating an uprising unless he was certain that U. S. policy
would commit troops to back the uprising. He noted that on August 10,
when he forecast MRBMs in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense, he had
discussed the ramifications of an uprising in Cuba extensively. Dr. Killian
asked who chaired the Special Group on Mongoose. Mr. McCone said he
wasn't sure whether it was Bundy or the Attorney General and turned to
Mr. Kirkpatrick, who didn't know.
13. Mr. Pace asked whether an assessment had been made of the
accuracy of NPIC interpretations on Soviet missiles. He said he wondered
whether there were flaws which might change some of our estimates.
Mr. McCone replied that, quite to the contrary, there was no instance
where NPIC failed. He said that, for example, the September photography
of San Cristobol showed some construction equipment. In retrospect we
know it was for developing missilesites, but the photography could be
interpreted as being only a few trucks for agricultural purposes.
14. Dr. Killian said that he was very concerned about the clear
implication that the Soviet Union would soon be developing better
camouflage techniques. This, plus the lack of resolution in the photography,
might pose considerable difficulties. Mr. McCone said that this was a
different story. He noted that he was concerned about the adequacy of
coverage of the Soviet Union. He noted that the targets for coverage were
reviewed repeatedly, but at the present time of year the light was poor
and the coverage was bad. He noted that there was a certain margin
TCT GARRET
13-00000
allowed in the estimates to take into account missile sites that might
not have been seen. The DCI said that NIE 11-8 had just been reviewed
and that an amending memorandum would be issued shortly. He said
obviously it was impossible to say precisely what was going on in the
Soviet Union.
15. Dr. Killian said that he was terribly concerned about the fact
that the public now seems to feel that we have swung all the way from
a missile gap to a great superiority over the Soviet Union, and that
this was obviously the wrong way. Mr. McCone said he agreed that this
was definitely wrong. Mr. Murphy asked whether the government was
putting out this information. Mr. McCone said he didn't know and that
he felt it was wrong and dangerous and would develop complacency and
might even result in an economy minded Congress cutting the Defense
budget drastically. Mr. Murphy noted that it was implicit that we should
have precise knowledge on what was going on inside Russia. Mr. McCone
said that in his presentations to Congress he specifically made the
reservation each time that there were obviously things we didn't know.
Dr. Killian noted that even photography can be wrong and can give an
erroneous impression; e. g., that nothing is there. Mr. McCone
acknowledged that this was a danger. Dr. Killian asked whether
Congress, the President and the Secretary of Defense understood this
danger. Mr. McCone replied that he always stressed it, and he also
stressed that intelligence was commencing to have almost absolute
dependence on photography.
TOP SPORET
8.
13-00000
9.
16. Mr. Pace commented that since November there had been
72 overflights of Cuba, and yet for a much greater length of time there
had been no U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which was a much more
important target. He said that obviously there must be great gaps in
our knowledge on the USSR. General Doolittle said it was even worse
than that. He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence
on Cuba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so
that low level reconnaissance was needed. The Director said this
wasn't accurate, that the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed
to convince the OAS and our other allies. The low level flights were
needed for backstopping possible military operations. Mr. Pace asked
if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on
Cuba and Mr. McCone said that this was true. General Doolittle noted
the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had
moved faster and gotten the camouflage up, we might never have dis-
covered the missiles.
17. Dr. Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said
that the Board would make a strong recommendation on an intensive
24
non sensors to break through camouflage]
research program
18. Mr. Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in
the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence. He
noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban
TOP SEGRET
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9/22/58
OK daß
bot,
Substitute language
"technical details"
ж

13-00000
crisis. Mr. McCone said yes, he thought there had been a change in the
State attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2
and other intelligence activities. He said that he was having a recapitu-
lation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which might
interest the Board. He cited the fact that we had been prevented from
11
thowever,
recently
covering: [China] North Vietnam and North Korea. He said that a second
10
n
U-2 had been sent to Formosa and that the wraps had been taken off
10
[Far Eastern reconnaissance. On the other hand, every time there was
an overflight State got very nervous and had made several telephone
calls.
10.
يرمان
19. Dr. Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation for the
report and for Mr. McCone's taking the time to be with them. Mr. McCone
replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had
concerning the report, except that he felt the conclusions should stand as
presented. If, however, there were any additional substantive matters,
there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn.
20.
This session was completed at 10:40.
LBK:rm
Orig - DCI
cy 2 - DDCI
cy 3 - DD/P
cy 4 - DD/R
cy 5
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-
DD/I
6 - IG
ey 7
Exec
CPFIAB Rile
(PFIAB fill
Syma
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
deato jo Jan 13
(PFIAB files) deate
Dir (P
3/MC