File #:
62-116395
Serial Scope:
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 1
477 Thru 1ST NR 497
3RD NR 497 THRU 499
Released under the John F
1992 (44 USC 2107 Notel.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
Casett:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM : R. L. Shackelford
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
1
Mr. W. R. Wannall
1
1
1
-
R
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. R. L. Shackelford
DATE: 7/28/75
Mr. K. A. Mendenhall
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD inv.
Asdr. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y -
x/s
Reference is made to W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R.
Wannall memorandum dated 7/24/75, captioned as above. This
memorandum advised CIA had prepared a document citing instances
wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded
its legal mandate. Portions of this CIA document were
furnished this Bureau and referenced memorandum requested
documents pertaining to a particular Bureau division and/or
Intelligence Division section be reviewed to identify the
subject matter and make an assessment as to whether any
compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved. Those
portions of the CIA document pertaining to the IS-2 Section
of the Intelligence Division are pages 29, 30, 171, 190,
191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203, 330, and 482.
A review has been made of the material, supra, and
the following comments apply:
11
Pages 29, 30, under the heading "Merrimac, refer
to recruitment and handling of "several Agents" to covertly
monitor dissident groups in the Washington area and states
one was so successful the "Agent" was turned over to the FBI.
We have no idea who the "Agent" was and in absence of identi-
fying information no compromise exists to Bureau operations.
REC-102 62-116
Page 171 refers to CIA producing a document titled
"Restless Youth" in two versions. The version dealing with
radical students in America was sent only to the President
and two other high officials. Page 171, itself, in-no way.
compromises Bureau operations.
14 AUG 11 1975
Pages 190, 191, also deal with the "Restless Youth"
document, which disclose the document only went to mine
readers, "a copy may be in the Johnson Library, " and refers
to updating of the document. These pages, themselves, in no
way compromise Bureau operations.
62-116395
KAM: 1m
(5)™ Lin
1075
NW 8608611332989626 Page 2
CONTINUED
-
OVER
5-milf
499
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Senstudy 75
62-116395
Re:
Pages 193, 194, refer to CIA participation in prepara-
tion of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the
foreign connections of U. S. organizations and activists
involved in the anti-war movement. Reference is made to..
collecting information from their own sources "and through
liaison with the FBI." A reference is also made to primary
source of information being "sensitive intercepts produced
by NSA." While these pages do not directly compromise
Bureau operations, disclosure of NSA intercepts could well
indirectly adversely affect Bureau operations by disclosure
of sensitive techniques which. produce extremely valuable
information to the intelligence community, of which the FBI
is a part.
Pages 197, 198, refer to the response to an inquiry
as to involvement in domestic affairs by the Director, Central
Reference Service, CIA, and in no way compromises Bureau
operations.
Page 203 refers to a similar response by Director,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, CIA, and includes a
reference to their monitoring foreign broadcasts of Jane
Fonda and Ramsey Clark and furnishing transcripts at the
request of the FBI and Department of Justice for consideration
for possible trial use. There is no compromise of Bureau
operations involved as this was to be evidence in a public
trial and would have required CIA personnel to publicly
testify.
Page 330 again makes reference to "Restless Youth"
and use of FBI reports. It also refers to a 1967 CIA study
of "SDS and its foreign ties." The page, itself, does not
compromise Bureau operations.
Page 482 refers to a "project MPLODESTAR," which
involved manipulation of assets against targets in the
,"leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world."
Comments include "each case is cleared with the FBI..."
page itself does not compromise Bureau operations.
The
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 3
- 2 -
CONTINUED
-
OVER
7
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re:
Senstudy 75
62-116395
ACTION:
m
None. For information.
Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the
information contained therein should be closely
guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know
basis.
嘴啊
Per
wRw
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 4
1
3
* OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 62 EDITION
*GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
:
Mr Cochran
Cociya
FROM : T. F. Kelleher-
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ты
X
* SEGRET
DATE: 7/28/75
D.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an assessment
of the accuracy and possible damage that might be suffered by the Bureau
by the release of information to the Senate Select Committee CIA
as set forth in Cregar to Wannall memorandum dated 7/24/75 captioned
as above.
Attached are separate commentaries relating to items
appearing on corresponding page numbers in the CIA document.
It is to be noted that no written record or personal re-
collection could be located concerning item 7, page 00118 relating to
the purchase of cameras.
Attached are nine pages containing the results of the requested
assessment. Copies of these assessments have also been made for
each designated copy of this memorandum.
ACTION:
For information.
Enclosures
-ENCLOSURE
1 - Mr. Cochran
-
1 Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. McNiff
TFK:eb
(4)
84 AUG 13 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 5
Jn
REC-102
62-116395
New 498
Прем
ECRET
14 AUG 11 1975
Classified by 129
TK/TIM
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
Per 60324 UCBAW/SBS
Date 8-1-11
5-
RE: SENSTUDY
TOP SECRE
The following are comments prepared by the Radio
Engineering Section of the FBI Laboratory and relate to copies of
excerpted pages from a report written by the Central Intelligence
Agency. Comments are keyed to page numbers which appear in
the lower right-hand corner of each sheet.
1. Page 00112
Paragraph b. refers to FBI purchases of television
equipment and is accurate as to equipment obtained. According to
Bureau records, Purchase Order #21100 was issued to CIA on
4/11/73 and was amended 9/24/73. The items were 1 each WTC-20
@ $18,300 and 1 each WTC-23 @ $18,600. Purchase Order #21469
dated 5/1/73 was issued to CIA for 2 each lens systems totaling $11, 200.
No damage would be suffered by release of this information.
2. Page 00118
Item 9 lists 50 "Actuators, Recorders." This entry is
partially correct.
Bureau records show that Purchase Order #8989 was
issued to CIA on 11/17/71 for 30 each QTC-lls at $488.25, and 20 each
QTC-12As at $236. 25.
No damage would be suffered by release of this information.
Item 11 lists 1 "Camera, Video." This entry could refer to
that transaction detailed in Purchase Order #18301 issued to CIA on
11/27/72 for 1 each WTC-20 camera in the amount of $18,400. Tubes
installed in these cameras were of the type mentioned under Item 12
and 13 below.
Item 12 lists 1 "Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent
of WL 30691." This entry is accurate.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 6
· 1A -
62-11639-1
TOP SECRET
ENCLOSURE
5-498
TOP SECRET
Purchase Order #16555 was issued to CIA on 9/21/72 in the
amount of $4,639. The video tube was for use in a closed circuit
television camera.
Item 13 lists 2 "Tube, Image, WL 30691" as having been
furnished the FBI on 3/26/71 at a cost of $4,607 each. This entry
is probably a duplication of Item 4 on page 0019. Bureau records
show that Purchase Order #5450 dated 5/21/71 was issued to CIA
for this equipment for use in CCTV cameras. No purchase order
to support two such acquisitions (March and May) could be located.
Item 14 lists 2 "Cameras, Television" at a unit cost of
$18,300. This entry probably refers to that equipment acquired under
Purchase Order #21100 and is detailed in Paragraph b. page 00112, above.
No damage would be suffered by release of this information.
3. Page 00119
accurate.
Item 2 lists 25 "Actuators, Recorders." The entry is
Purchase Order #17204 was issued to CIA on 10/18/72 for 25
each QTC-11s @ $591.94. This equipment is identical to that obtained on
Purchase Order #8989 mentioned above.
Item 3 lists "Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance" etc., and is a
duplication of Item 12 on page 00118. Note identical dates.
Item 4 lists "Tube, Image, WL 30691" and is believed to refer
to the transaction carried as Item 13 on page 00118.
Items 5, 6, and 7 list "Transmitters, Module, Plug-In,
and Power Supply - UWP-39A." These entries are essentially accurate.
Purchase Order #4203 was issued to CIA on 4/6/71 for
2 each transmitters SRT-67 @ $1372. 35; 1 each transmitter QRT-10A
@3160. 33; 1 each module QWT-18 @ $1247.40; and, 1 each power
supply UWP-39A @ $538.65.
No damage would be suffered by release of this information.
TOP SECRET
-2-
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 7
CECRET]
'
4. Page 00221
Item (A) is believed to be accurate and in the absence of
additional detail no serious damage would be suffered by release of
this information.
Item (B) is accurate and as long as target is not specifically
identified no serious damage should be incurred. It should be recognized,
however, that although the concept of intercepting cryptographic
machine emanations would come as no surprise to those familiar with
intelligence work, confirmation of a functioning system could encourage
implementation of countermeasures which would deprive the U.S. of
invaluable information.
Item (C) is accurate except that the equipment has not been
operated for some time. Without specific identification no serious
damage would result from disclosure of this information.
Item (D) is inaccurate to the extent that it states that
"installation is not fully operational because the full complement
of personnel have not yet arrived." Aside from that, disclosure
of information could lead the knowledgeable foreign government to be
certain of Bureau's participation and take whatever diplomatic steps
they felt necessary. Decision to withhold is an operational/political
one rather than one which would affect technical capabilities and, therefore,
the Laboratory is making no recommendations in this regard.
5. Page 00222
Item (E) is accurate and entirely too revealing. If there
is any way this item can be deleted from material yet to be given to
anyone outside the intelligence community, it should be done. As
written, it suggests a concerted effort toward a penetration to be
attempted in the future. Disclosure of this information could easily
negate millions of dollars already spent and literally years of work
already performed the largest single project ever undertaken by
this Bureau. In view of our responsibilities in the counter-intelligence
field, the FBI, as well as the intelligence community, and perhaps the
free world as well, would suffer incalculable harm from release of this
information. It would also be appropriate for the Intelligence Division
to comment on this item.
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 8
3
TOP SECRE
TOP SECRET
Item (F) is accurate and, although its disclosure is
confirmatory no serious technical damage would result from its
disclosure. To our knowledge, there has been no diplomatic
protest, disclosure could precipitate such protest. Intelligence
Division may wish to comment regarding this possibility.
Item (G) asserts that in one case it is known that CIA
equipment was used against a "domestic target. " This is insufficient
information to identify this matter.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 9
TOP SECRET
- 4 -
ARABIC LINGUISTS
(Item 6, pgs. 182 & 202)
With regard to press allegations concerning the use
of polygraph, it was noted that during July 1971 the President
was alleged to be furious with unauthorized disclosure of
classified information relative to the SALT Talks as disclosed
in the New York Times. The President directed a sweeping
investigation to determine the source of the disclosure and
this was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and
others of the White House Staff.
A subsequent article in the Washington Post dated
September 3, 1971 stated that a State Department spokesman
had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department
employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT Talks
in July.
This statement is not accurate and the Director of
the FBI (J. Edgar Hoover) denied this allegation in a letter
to the Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations
had been conducted by another agency.
As noted in the CIA notes in fact, it was CIA that
conducted the polygraph examination in conjunction with the
State Department and the FBI was not involved in any way in
these polygraph examinations. It is recalled that FBI
officials had been called to a White House meeting headed
by Mr. Krogh in which it was indicated we might have to
conduct some polygraph examinations and were so alerted.
subsequent call from the White House to the FBI instructed
that the FBI polygraph examinations would not be required.
A
In view of above, it does not appear the FBI would
incur any damage to its reputation or recognized use of the
polygraph in carefully selected criminal and security matters
in which we have jurisdiction.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 10
-
- 5 -

POLYGRAPH
(Item 7, pgs 65-67)
X
SECRET
In regard to the CIA notes concerning the subject
of the lending of Arabic linguists to the FBI, the following
is noted:
The FBI's linguistic capacity is limited to those
foreign languages in which translators can be fully utilized
on a full-time basis. When we need translations of foreign
language material beyond our normal translation capacity,
we turn to the governmental linguistic community for
assistance.
Such help has been obtained in the past from
such agencies as the Library of Congress, Voice of America,
Foreign Service Institute, Defense Language Institute,
CIA, NSA, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U. S. Information
Agency and Smithsonian Institution. On occasions, we
have also turned to private citizens for help in very
unique situations involving exotic or rare languages.
The massacre of the Israeli athletes in Munich
at the 1972 Summer Olympics and other Arab terrorist
acts fomented a situation involving the national security
of the United States. The FBI needed immediate assistance
in the Arabic language field. A program was immediately
instituted to hire our own Arabic translators and, in the
interim period, CIA lent to our Washington Field Office the
necessary Arabic translators to fulfill our responsibilities.
The opening of the People's Republic of China
Liaison Office in Washington also created a need in the
Washington Field Office for Chinese translators with
special talents. Two such translators were borrowed from
CIA and one of them became an FBI employee for a short
time following his retirement from CIA.
All arrangements for the loan of Arabic and Chinese
linguists from CIA were effected by the Intelligence Division and
the Washington Field Office through their liaison with CIA, and
the FBI Laboratory was not directly involved.
In summary, the CIA notes are accurate. It is
not believed, however, that the FBI would incur any
embarrassment or damages as a result of this interagency
cooperation.
- 6 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 11
X
× SECRET
SECRET
DISCUSSIONS ON IMAGERY ENHANCEMENT TECHNIQUES
Item 8 (Pg. 00234)
Current personnel are unable to verify or
disclaim contact with CIA regarding this photographic technique.
In all likelihood, this contact was made in
conjunction with our continuing technical liaison with other Federal
agencies.
This consultation was entirely proper and made
to augment the Bureau's capabilities in this area. No deleterious
effect can be seen as a result of exposure of this information.
-7-
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 12
✓ SECRET
PURCHASE OF CAMERAS
(Item 7, Pg. 00118)
* SECRET
Based on the information furnished, no
written record or personal recollection of current employees
can attest to or disclaim the whether "20 camera sets" at
a unit cost of $656 were purchased from CIA.
✓ SECRET
- 8 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 13
O
PURCHASE OF CAMERAS
(Item 8, Pg. 00118)
The F. B.I., by purchase order #1793
SECRET
dated 1/20/72, contracted for the purchase of 10 Tessina
cameras on a transfer of funds basis arranged as a result
of our liaison with the Technical Services Division of CIA.
Cost of these cameras amounted to $7,000.
The Tessina camera is a small, sophisticated
camera which is employed in concealment devices needed
for photographic surveillances.
Although the exact nature of the concealment
devices we employ is not publicized, the disclosure of the
fact that we purchased cameras suitable for this use is not
considered inimical to our operations.
- 9 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 14
* SECRET
Read from sixate Select consmitte
Senstudy - 75
SECRET
August 4, 1975
REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS
Materials to which the SSC staff has been given access;
delivery requested by Friday, August 18, 1975:
A. The notebook or binder containing materials on
FBI legal authority and maintained in the Office
of the Special Counsel.
B.
Materials pertaining to FBI-CIA relations in 1970
previously made accessible at FBIHQ in excised
form; unexcised versions of the memoranda bearing
the item-number designations 8, 9, 30, 32, and 37.
C. "Foreign Operations Policy Manual," previously
made accessible at FBIHQ.
8-15-75) - D. The following materials maintained in the so-
called "Official and Confidential" files and
designated "non-derogatory," previously examined
by SSC staff:
1.
2.
3.
Agreement Between FBI and Secret Service;
-
Attorney General Submission of Memoranda by
FBI;
"Black Bag" Jobs;
4. Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence
Coverage;
5. Intelligence Coverage
Domestic and Foreign;
6. Directives (60);
FBI
7. Cook, Fred (52).
42-116395
-
"NOT RECORDER
9 AUG 6 1975
R. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by
Inspection Division for July 3 Inspection for the
individuals whose names are underscored on the
attached list (slightly expanded from previous
access request).
F. G. Inspection Reports on the Intelligence Division
and the San Francisco Field Office, as currently
sanitized.
Delips
84 AUG 6. 1975,
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 15
2
-
II.
Newly requested materials; delivery requested by
Friday, August/$, 1975:
A. All of Section 8 of the Manual of Instructions.
B.
C.
D.
Sections 1, 6, 7H, 7J, 8L, and 14 F of the Manual
of Rules and Reulations.
Superseding versions of Section 6 of the Manual
of Rules and Regulations.
The following materials referred to in
memoranda previously delivered to SSC regard-
ing FBI Legal Attaches:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Memoranda of W. C. Sullivan of June 7, 1971,
and June 16, 1971;
10.
Memoranda of Mr. Wannall of May 27, 1971, and
May 28, 1971;
11.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 16
Letter of Hoover to the President dated
September 21, 1970;
Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September
22, 1970;
Memorandum of Mr. Brennan dated September 21,
1970;
Memorandum of Mr. Child of May 23, 1969;
Recommendations of Dalby, Felt, and Beaver
upon the recommendation made in memorandum
of Sullivan of June 7, 1971;
Materials pertaining to conversations between
the President and Hoover regarding foreign
liaison operations in September 1970;
Materials pertaining to conversations between
Dr. Kissinger and Hoover in December 1970;
Materials pertaining to communications between
the FBI and the State Department regarding
foreign liaison operations in 1970;
Materials pertaining to a conference with the
President regarding foreign liaison operations
in June 1971;
“ག་ ༈་་་་་་——
19290376 47 J.
3
E.
F.
G.
H.
12.
Material pertaining to an inspection of all
FBI foreign liaison posts conducted in 1971
pursuant to instructions from Hoover to
Assistant Director Ponder in charge of
inspections.
Materials pertaining to the origin, operation, and
termination of the Mass Media Program implemented
by the former FBI Crime Records Division.
Materials pertaining to the establishment and
functions of the FBI External Affairs Division.
"Guide to Indexing" and "Rules Pertaining to
the General Index", cited at p. 14, Volume 1,
of the Classifying Instructor's Guide.
"The Standard Sub List".
I. The following materials pertaining to Projeci
INLET:
J.
1.
2.
Materials reflecting approval of the
Project on or about November 20, 1969.
Inspection Report referred to in SAC
Memorandum of December 26, 1972.
37– Any materials pertaining to recommendations
that the Project be terminated.
4.
Letter from FBI to Congressman Les Aspin
in 1973 regarding the Project.
Materials pertaining to the policies and procedures
of the FBI for the use of FBI agents for so-
called,"undercover" activity.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 17
'
4
III. Newly requested materials; access to screen for
delivery requested by August 12, 1975:
A. The following materials pertaining to Mrs.
Claire (Anna) Chennault and Spiro Agnew:
1.
20
3.
4.
5.
6.
All materials pertaining to the authorization
or re-authorization by the President or the
Attorney General of technical surveillance of
the South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington,
D.C. in 1968.
All materials pertaining to the initiation,
authorization, conduct, and termination of
technical or physical surveillance and "tele-
phone checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault
in November 1968.
All materials pertaining to the initiation,
authorization, conduct, and termination of
technical or physical surveillance and
"telephone checks" of Vice Presidential candidate
Spirto T. Agnew in November 1968.
All materials summarizing the results of tech-
nical or physical surveillance, including
incidental overhearings, and "telephone
checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault and
Spiro T. Agnew in November 1968.
All materials pertaining to White House
instructions to the FBI for the handling of
the summary letters described in item 4 above.
All materials pertaining to actions taken by
the White House as a result of information
contained in the summary letters described
in item 4 above.
7. The current addresses of the following former
Special Agents, who may have participated in the
technical or physical surveillance or "telephone
checks" of Mrs. Claire (Anna) Chennault or
Spiro T. Agnew:
a.
Phil Claridge
b. William Jackson
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 18
"
- 5 -
B.
The following materials pertaining to Yeoman
Charles E. Radford:
1. All materials, including memorializations
of oral communications, pertaining to the
authorization, initiation, conduct, and
termination of technical surveillances of
Yeoman Charles E. Radford from December
1971 to June 1972.
2.
C.
3.
4.
All materials, including memorializations of
oral communications, pertaining to the
authorization, initiation, conduct, and
termination of technical surveillance of
two close personal friends of Yeoman Radford
one retired from the Navy, the other a State
Department employee, from January to April
1972.
All materials, including memorializations of
oral communications, pertaining to the
authorization, initiation, conduct, and
termination of technical surveillance of
Yeoman Radford's step-father in Oregon from
February to April 1972.
All materials summarizing the results of the
technical surveillances described in items 1
through 3 above.
5. All materials pertaining to actions taken by
the White House as a result of information
contained in the summary described in item 4
above.
With respect to surreptitious entries carried out
by the FBI from January 1, 1960 to the present, all
materiáls pertaining to the following:
1.
2.
The date, place, target, and purpose of each
entry;
The request and authorization for each entry
including the identities of the agencies
and/or individuals who requested and/or
authorized the entry;
3. The procedures and methods used for the conduct
of each entry;
4.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 19
The results of each entry, including the
information obtained and the identities of
- 6
།
D.
E.
the agencies and/or individuals to whom
the information was disseminated.
Materials pertaining to any jurisdictional agree-
ments, agreements of coordination, or other agree-
` ments between the FBI and any other federal, state
or local agency with regard to the conduct of and
dissemination of information from surreptitious
entries.
The performance ratings (Form FD 185) of the
following current or former FBI employees;
1. George Berley
2.
Wilfred Bergeron
3.
William D. Campbell
4.
Richard Suter
5. William Tucker
6.
Terry O'Connor
F.
7. Joseph English
The current office assignment or last known address
of the individuals listed in E. above.
G. The following materials pertaining to NSA watch list
activity, reportedly in operation from late 1967
through 1973, which involved the monitoring of
international communications that were addressed
to, or from, or included the names of persons on a
changing "watch list: ☐ (5)
All materials pertaining to the proposing,
approving, putting names on, executing,
evaluating, or terminating the watch list
activity;
2. All materials (including correspondence) sent
by the FBI to the National Security Agency or
any other entity in the Department of Defense
listing names for the watch list or otherwise
commenting on the activity;
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 20

1
- 7 -
3.
4.
Any internal FBI materials produced as part of
the activity;
Any NSA or Department of Defense materials
(including correspondence and reports) regard-
ing the watch list activity sent to the FBI
H. Materials pertaining to the authorization for FEI
contacts with, dissemination of FBI information to,
receipt of information from, and requests by the
FBI for action by the Special Services Staff of the
I.
J.
K.
Internal Revenue Serviceecial Services) Staff
"The Handbook of Technical Equipment".
Materials pertaining to FBI activity with respect
to the National Environmental Teach-In (also known
as "Earth Day"), April 22, 1970.
Philadelphia FBI Field, Office file number 100-51132
(Women's Liberation). (1970-72)
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 21
NR014 PH CODE
940
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL TO 1975
سبت اسرا
TELETYPE
PM NITEL JULY 30, 1975 DCC
SECRET
12-19-88
Cisscified by SPI AG/GM
Daclassify on. QADR
# 
2/73
3030
Cock
Assoc. Dir
Dep.-A.D.-Adm._.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspections
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
TO:
DIRECTOR
FROM:
D
PHILADELPHIA (62-0-23222)
SENSTUDY
to Mr WannalC
RE PHILADELPHIA NITEL TO DIRECTOR, JULY 29, 1975, BUREAU
PHONE CALL TO PHILADELPHIA AND PHILADELPHIA PHONE CALL TO THE
BUREAU, JULY 30, 1975.
ON JULY 30, 1975, ROBERT THWEAT, U.S. NAVY COMMANDER,
RETIRED, ADVISED HE HAD NO PERSONAL OBJECTION TO HIS NAME BEING
DIVULGED. HOWEVER, THWEAT ADVISED THAT HIS SOURCE IS A RELATIVE
AND THAT ONCE THWEAT'S NAME IS DIVULGED IT WOULD IMMEDIATELY
IDENTIFY HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION.
THWEAT ADVISED HIS SOURCE HAD RELATED TO HIM THAT ONE
DANIEL O'FLAHERTY, WHO IS EMPLOYED WITH THE CHURCH COMMITTEE, HAD
REMOVED FROM HIS WORK AREA BY HIDING UNDERNEATH HIS SHIRT A CIA
MEMORANDUM CONTAINING DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON SENATOR HENRY
JACKSON.
O'FLAHERTY THEN XEROXED THE MEMORANDUM., THE DATE FOR
THIS OCCURRENCE IS NOT KNOWN TO THWEAT. O'FLAHERTY THEN PROVIDED
A COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM TO AN UNKNOWN PERSON FOR SUBSEQUENT
TRANSMITTAL TO SENATOR MORRIS UDALL. THWEAT ADVISED HIS SOURCE
FOT/PA # 293030
ATALA
CIVIL ACT..
B.O. $12356
DATE 12-19-88
84 AUG 13 1975
$1
INIYALS GA.
15 [CIA] (S)
NW-88608-Docld:32989626 Page 22
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS
EXCEPT
OTHERWISE
CLASSIFIED
6.2.116395-
NOT
170 AUG 12 1975
RO
ས མཱཛནྣཱམཱསུ དྷམྨཏྠཏྠོ
SECRET
کنند
ORIGINAL FILED DE, 65-75LC3
ཡོ€b6s»+ + * } 6##2"
PAGE TWO, PH 62-0-23222
SECRET
STATED THAT O'FLAHERTY HAD PERSONALLY RELATED THIS INFORMATION TO
THE SOURCE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT O'FLAHERTY HAD RELATED TO THE
SOURCE THAT HE, O'FLAHERTY, HAD ALSO TOLD A FORMER ASSOCIATE,
MR. KATZ, CURRENTLY A PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VANDERBILT,
NASHVILLE, TENN., OF HIS, O'FLAHERTY'S, ACTION. KATZ HAD VOICED
A DISPLEASURE AS TO O'FLAHERTY'S ACTION AND DID NOT APPROVE OF HIS
ACTION.
THE CAPTIONED MEMORANDUM DEALT WITH CIA POSSIBLE USE OF
DEROGATORY INFORMATION TO DETERMINE THE DIRECTION SENATOR JACKSON
WOULD TAKE IN FUTURE ACTIONS HE MIGHT ENCOUNTER WHICH WOULD INVOLVE
₤1) (S)
CIA ACTIVITY. THWEAT T DOES NOT KNOW IF HIS SOURCE HAS SEEN XEROXED
MEMORANDUM. THWEAT HIMSELF HAS NOT SEEN THE MEMORANDUM.
THWEAT ADVISED HE WILL RECONTACT HIS SOURCE AND ATTEMPT TO
INFLUENCE SOURCE TO COME FORWARD AND REVEAL HIS IDENTITY AND BE
COOPERATIVE IN ANY INVESTIGATION. THWEAT FEELS THIS WILL PROBABLY
BE THE RESULT OF HIS RECONTACT IN AS MUCH AS SOURCE HAS EXPRESSED
HIS DISAPPROVAL OF O'FLAHERTY'S ACTIONS.
END
PHILA DIV. WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THWEAT AND ADVISE BUREAU.
SJP FBIHQ CLR
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 23
SECRET
e-
ཨ ན ནི ནི ཏི ཏུ
*w
4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)
Date of Mail 6/14/75
Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.
Subject
JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATEL 23/2000 
BYSPO AV
Removed By
79 AUG 14 1975
MDR-16
File Number
62-116395-497
Permanent Serial Charge Out
DOJ/ FBI
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 24
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI.
Date: 7/24/75
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
AIRTEL
V-ra
(Priority)
10:
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
(ATTN: INTD, W. 0. CREGAR)
FROM SAC, ATLANTA (62-2854)
SENSTUDY 75
WRPN
REL
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT
SCOPY RETAINED IN
(LAS) SHHhlin
"
7127
741lts
10/20
Enclosed are the original and seven copies of
seven LHM's prepared at Atlanta and captioned "U. S. Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)," subcaptioned
and dated as follows:
1. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) W. John
Benton by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75;
KX
2. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) 0. Richard
Hamilton by SSC Staff Members" - 7/22/75;
3. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Robert W.
Thomson by SSC Staff Members" 7/22/75;
-
4. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Donald P.
Burgess by SSC Staff Members" · 7/23/75;
-
5. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Alden F.
Miller by SSC Staff Members"
REC-102
7/23/75;
P
2016 17
6. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Cha
Haynes by SSC Staff Members" - 7/23/75;
7. "Interview of FBI Special Agent (SA) Edward A.
Shea by SSC Staff Members"
-
7/24/75.
JUL 26 18
The FBI representative who was available in the
Atlanta FBI Office for consultation during the interviews
was Bureau Supervisor SEYMOR F. PHILLIPS.
(2-Bureau (Enc. 56) LUST
1-Atlanta
Approved:
CTH:rrl (3)
84 AUG 13 1975 Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 25
Lea
Sent
* 1975
U:S.Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574
Per
pag.
496
OF
JUSTIC
迎
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
July 22, 1975
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
#mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
AFREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-20-01 BY SP-2 ALM/JTE
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
The following information has been furnished by
SA W. John Benton concerning an interview of him by SSC
Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took
place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E.
Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.
The interview of SA W. John Benton began at 9:45
A. M. and terminated at 10:32 A. M., July 22, 1975. At the
outset of the interview no mention was made of SA Benton's
rights by SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo.
SA Benton was asked how long he had served with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). SA Benton advised
from December, 1956 to the present time.
to.
SA Benton was asked what offices he had been assigned
SA Benton advised the FBI Identification Division,
Washington, D. C.; the Atlanta Field Division, Atlanta, Georgia;
FBI Agents Training at Washington, D. C.; Oklahoma City Field
Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma;B Indianapolis Field
Division, Indianapolis, Indiana; and the Knoxville Field
Division, Knoxville, Tennessee, having current assignment
in the Chattanooga Resident Agency, Chattanooga, Tennessee.
SA Benton was asked how long he had been assigned
at Chattanooga, Tennessee. SA Benton advised from March 15,
1974 to the present date.
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed
outside your agency.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 26
XECLOSURE
62-116385--496
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Benton was asked the period of time he was
assigned to the Atlanta Field Division. SA Benton advised
from 1959 until August 22, 1966.
SA Benton was asked during what period of time
he was assigned to the King investigation. SA Benton
advised from his best recollection during the year 1964.
SA Benton was asked if he conducted any investigation
regarding the King case prior to his assignment during
1964 and SA Benton answered in the negative.
SA Benton was asked what his job responsibilities
were concerning the monitoring of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) headquarters and King telephones.
SA Benton advised his job responsibilities dealt with the
monitoring of incoming and outgoing telephone calls.
SA Benton was asked what did he do when receiving
or intercepting incoming or outgoing calls. SA Benton advised
a written log was maintained of incoming and outgoing calls
and only the pertinent facts of the calls were written on
the log. SA Benton further advised the incoming and out-
going calls were tape recorded. SA Benton was asked how
many telephones were monitored at the SCLC headquarters
and at the King residence. SA Benton advised he did not
recall the exact number of telephone lines monitored;
however, there were several lines.
SA Benton was asked the names of Agents assigned
with him to monitor telephone calls. SA Benton advised
his best recollection was that SA Hamilton, SA Burgess and
SA Thomson were assigned at the location during the period
SA Benton monitored the telephones.
SA
SA Benton was asked the location of the plant,
the floor and room number where the plant was located.
Benton advised the plant was located in an apartment building
directly across the street from the FBI Atlanta Field Division,
and he does not recall the floor or room number of the plant.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 27
- 2.
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Benton was asked who directed him to monitor
the telephones. SA Benton advised the Special Agent in
Charge, Mr. Joseph K. Ponder, directed him to his job
assignment on the King investigation.
SA Benton was asked what did he do with the logs
and tapes at the end of each day's work. SA Benton advised
the logs and tapes were handled by other Special Agents
of the FBI assigned to the case.
SA Benton was asked who the supervising or case
Agent was in the King investigation. SA Benton advised
SA Robert Nichols was the case Agent in charge of the King
investigation.
SA Benton was asked how many squads were located
in the Atlanta Division at the time the telephones were being
monitored. SA Benton advised there were four squads in the
Atlanta Division at that time. SA Benton was asked which
squad handled the investigation of the King matter and SA
Benton advised the Number 3 Squad handled the King investi-
gation.
SA Benton was asked who furnished supplies such
as tapes and logs to the plant where the monitoring took
place. SA Benton advised the supplies were brought to the
location by other Special Agents assigned to the case.
SA Benton was asked what happened to the tapes
and logs at the end of the day or when a day's work was
completed. SA Benton advised to his best knowledge the
tapes and logs were turned over to the supervising Agent
of the case.
SA Benton was asked whether he dictated any
daily summaries or memoranda regarding the monitoring of
the telephones. SA Benton advised that he did not dictate
any summaries or memoranda at any time regarding the
monitoring of the telephones.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 28
- 3
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
*
SA Benton was asked who handled the repairs of
the equipment if there was a malfunction of the equipment.
SA Benton advised the equipment and any repairs to the
equipment was handled by SA Miller who was assigned to the
Atlanta Field Division.
SA Benton was asked how many files were involved
in the King investigation. SA Benton advised to his best
recollection there was only one file involved. SA Benton
was asked if there were other files where investigation
was being conducted regarding SCLC and SCLC members other
than the King file. SA Benton advised he did not have
any knowledge of any other FBI investigations regarding
SCLC or SCLC members.
SA Benton was asked who were some of the named
individuals that he was told to listen for and the basis
for listening for these particular individuals. SA Benton
advised he was instructed to monitor incoming and outgoing
calls and that to the best of his knowledge several individuals
were of interest to the investigation. These individuals were
Stan Levison, Harry Wachtel, Ralph Helstein and Hunter Pitts
O'Dell. SA Benton was asked why these individuals or any
other named individuals might be of interest to the FBI.
SA
Benton advised the FBI had developed information that certain
individuals that had contact with Martin Luther King, Jr.
and SCLC headquarters were either sympathizers to the
Communist Party of the United States or possibly members of
the Communist Party of the United States.
SA Benton was asked if he received any mail at the
plant where the telephones were monitored and if there was
a mail box in the apartment complex where mail could be
received. SA Benton advised he did not receive any mail
at the apartment complex and did not have any knowledge
of any mail boxes.
SA Benton was asked if there was a telephone
located at the plant and if this telephone was assigned
an FBI telephone number. SA Benton advised there was one
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 29
4-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
telephone at the plant and he does not recall the telephone
number or in what name this telephone number was assigned.
SA Benton was asked what name the apartment was
rented in and who paid the apartment rent. SA Benton
advised he did not have any knowledge as to the name the
apartment was rented in and he did not know who paid the
rent on the apartment.
SA Benton was asked who cleaned up the apartment
since it was their understanding that this location was
manned by Agents 24 hours a day. SA Benton advised the
apartment complex was kept in a clean and orderly manner
by Agents assigned to the monitoring operations. SA Benton
was asked to give a description of the layout of the apart-
ment. SA Benton advised the apartment contained a kitchen,
a living room, a bedroom, and one bathroom.
SA Benton was asked which room the monitoring
took place in and SA Benton advised the equipment was located
in the bedroom of the apartment.
SA Benton was asked if he had knowledge of any
telephone calls intercepted of high elected Government
officials and the approximate date these calls might have
been intercepted. SA Benton advised to the best of his
recollection and while assigned to the monitoring operation
there was one telephone call intercepted of a high elected
Government official. SA Benton was asked the name of the
Government official and the parties involved in the telephone
conversation. SA Benton advised the intercepted telephone
call was between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin
Luther King, Jr. SA Benton was asked when this telephone
conversation took place and SA Benton advised it took place
sometime in 1964 to the best of his recollection.
(At no
time did SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo
ask the contents of the telephone conversation between
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Martin Luther King, Jr.)
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 30
- 5 -

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
W. JOHN BENTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Benton was asked if he had any knowledge of any
telephone calls intercepted between Martin Luther King, Jr.
and the Attorney General of the United States during the
period of time he monitored the telephone. SA Benton
advised he did not have any knowledge of any calls intercepted
between Martin Luther King and the Attorney General of the
Ünited States.
SA Benton was asked if he had any knowledge of any
telephone calls to the Democratic Convention in 1964 by
Martin Luther King, Jr. that were intercepted during the
monitoring operation. SA Benton advised he did not have any
knowledge of any intercepted calls made by Martin Luther
King to the Democratic Convention during 1964.
SA Benton was asked at the time he was assigned
to the monitoring of the King telephones by the Special Agent
in Charge of the Atlanta Field Division did he question his
assignment. SA Benton advised absolutely not.
SA Benton was asked that during the period he
monitored the King telephones did he ask to be relieved of
his assignment. SA Benton answered absolutely not.
SA Benton was asked at this time does he question
his assignment to the monitoring of the King telephones
and SA Benton answered absolutely not.
The interview was terminated at 10:32 A. M. this
date, July 22, 1975.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 31
- 6*
☆
*
OF JUSTIC
*
画
UREAU
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
July 22, 1975
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-20-01 BY SP-2-ALMITE
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
The following information has been furnished by
SA O. Richard Hamilton concerning an interview of him by
SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which
took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator
Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.
The above-mentioned interview commenced at
10:38 a.m. and concluded at 11:54 a.m. SA Hamilton was
not advised of his rights by the SSC Staff Members. The
following information is not necessarily in chronological
order.
Regarding the period of time of SA Hamilton's
FBI employment and period of assignment in Atlanta,
Georgia, SA Hamilton advised he became a Special Agent
in September, 1951, and has been assigned to the Atlanta
Office since February, 1961. SA Hamilton was questioned
regarding the period of time he was assigned to the
Security Squad in Atlanta. SA Hamilton advised that
according to his best recollection, he was assigned to
the Security Squad shortly after his arrival in Atlanta
in 1961, and continued that assignment until approximately
sometime in 1962. At that time he was assigned to a road
This document contains neither recommendations nor con-
clusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and
is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to
be distributed outside your agency.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 32
62-116395-496
GLOSUR
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
trip involving investigations of any FBI matter occurring
within that road trip and such assignments were not neces-
sarily connected with the Security Squad. SA Hamilton
advised he was reassigned to the Security Squad in Atlanta
during the Spring or early Summer of 1964 or 1965, and he
believed that, according to his best recollection, this
was in 1964.
The SSC Staff Members questioned SA Hamilton as
to what, if any, assignment he had regarding the inves-
tigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., or with the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). SA
Hamilton advised that upon his reassignment to the Security
Squad, he was assigned to monitor a wiretap on SCLC and
on the residence of King. The Staff Members inquired as
to the number of lines monitored and as to the location
of the technical installation. SA Hamilton recalled
that lines on the SCLC switchboard and SCLC Wide Area
Telephone Service (WATS) as well as the residence tele-
phone of King were monitored. The Staff Members inquired
whether tapes of conversations were made from the techni-
cal installation and SA Hamilton replied that occasionally
when it was necessary to record more than one telephone
conversation occurring at the same time, that he occa-
sionally would tape one conversation while preparing a
handwritten log of another, that thereafter the conver-
sation recorded on tape was reduced to a handwritten log
when time permitted. The Staff Members asked what was
done with the recorded tapes following the completion of
the recording and Hamilton advised that when the conver-
sation had been reduced to writing on a log and the tape
was used up, that as best as he could recall, the tape
was erased and then reused. The Staff Members asked
whether such tapes were reviewed by other FBI personnel
and SA Hamilton stated he could not recall any situation
where this occurred. The Staff Members inquired as to
whether such tapes were further maintained or placed
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 33
2
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
somewhere else and SA Hamilton replied he was not aware
of any instance where this was done. The Staff Members
asked to whom the case on King was assigned and who was
the supervisor of the squad at the time that SA Hamilton
was assigned to the monitoring of the installation. They
were advised the agent assigned to the case was former
SA Robert Nichols and the supervisor was Charles Harding.
At that point the Staff Members inquired as to who was
the supervisor of the Security Squad when SA Hamilton
was first assigned to Atlanta and who were the succeeding
supervisors on that squad. They were advised that Mr.
Henry Rowse was the supervisor when Hamilton was first
assigned to Atlanta and that upon Rowse's transfer to
FBI Headquarters, Harding became the supervisor. There-
after, in approximately 1968, Charles Haynes replaced
Harding as supervisor of the Security Squad in Atlanta.
The Staff Members inquired as to the reason for the
replacement of Harding by Haynes. Hamilton advised
that was an administrative decision made by FBI Headquarters
and since that did not relate to the investigation per-
taining to Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., he would respect-
fully decline to discuss that matter. The Staff Members
subsequently asked if SA Nichols was subsequently assigned
to the Valdosta, Georgia, Resident Agency of the Atlanta
Office and, then transferred to another field office.
SA Hamilton advised that was correct. The Staff Members
inquired as to the reason for SA Nichols' transfer to
another field office, to which SA Hamilton replied he
felt that question did not relate to the investigation
of King and involved an administrative decision by FBI
Headquarters; and, therefore, declined to answer.
The Staff Members, after being advised by SA
Hamilton that he was assigned to monitoring the technical
installation for a period of approximately four months,
inquired as to whether he was ever subsequently assigned
to any investigation relating to King or SCLC. Hamilton
advised the case concerning SCLC was assigned to him
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 34
3 -
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
upon the retirement of former SA Alan Sentinella in
approximately 1970. The Staff Members inquired as to the
period of time thereafter that SCLC remained under inves-
tigation and what basis if any there was for closing
the case. SA Hamilton pointed out that since the re-
assignment of the case to him occurred after the death
of King, he felt that question did not directly relate
to the investigation of King and that prior to fur-
nishing an answer to that question, he felt he should
confer with a FBI Headquarters representative who was
then present in the Atlanta Office of the FBI. The
Staff Members advised they did desire an answer to that
question and approved of a consultation between SA
Hamilton and the FBI Headquarters representative. SA
Hamilton conferred with the FBI Headquarters represen-
tative then in the Atlanta Office of the FBI and it
was agreed the question regarding the closing of SCLC
and the assignment of that case to SA Hamilton was outside
the parameter of the authority given to SA Hamilton by
FBI Headquarters regarding discussion of Doctor Martin
Luther King, Jr. However, in the spirit of cooperation,
it was agreed that SA Hamilton would answer the question
of the Staff Members in this regard. Thereafter, SA
Hamilton advised the FBI investigation regarding SCLC
was closed about 1972 or 1973 since a review of the
case file failed to reflect any influence by individuals
or organizations having affiliations with communist
background. In view of that, it was felt the SCLC case
should be closed.
The Staff Members inquired as to who made the
decision regarding closing of SCLC and whether the matter
was first discussed with FBI Headquarters or other indi-
viduals within the Atlanta Office of the FBI or if it
was a decision made by SA Hamilton alone. Hamilton
advised that as he recalled, he reviewed the SCLC case
file from that time to a substantial period in the past
and that he recommended to the supervisor of the Security
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 35
-4-
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
Squad that the case be closed since there had been no known
communist influence upon the activities of the SCLC
organization for a long period of time. In response
to the mechanics of closing the case they were advised
that SA Hamilton dictated a letter to FBI Headquarters
from the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta Office,
advising that a review of the file reflected no communist
influence upon the activities of SCLC and that unless
advised to the contrary by FBI Headquarters, the case
was being closed. The Staff Members asked if a form
letter was used whereby blanks were filled in and they
were advised this was not the case. The Staff Members
inquired if FBI Headquarters agreed with the closing and
SA Hamilton advised that to his knowledge, no communica-
tion was thereafter received from Headquarters which
would disagree with the closing of that case. The Staff
Members inquired as to whether SA Hamilton or anyone in
Atlanta conferred with any persons in the New York Office
of the FBI prior to closing the case and SA Hamilton
advised that to his knowledge this did not occur. The
Staff Members then inquired as to the basis for closing
the case on SCLC as compared with the basis for opening
the case originally. Hamilton advised he did not speci-
fically recall the wording of any communications upon
which the case was originally opened, however, a review
of the case at the time it was closed did not indicate
that SCLC might be involved in any activities which
could constitute a violation of the Internal Security
Statutes. The Staff Members inquired as to whether the
investigation was based upon the Smith Act and SA Hamilton
stated he did not recall specifically seeing the words
"Smith Act", however, FBI investigations regarding communisṭ
influence was based upon the communist goal of forceable
overthrow of the U.S. Government.
The Staff Members asked if, after the death of
King, whether Stanley Levison was in contact with Reverend
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 36
5-
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
Ralph Abernathy, President of SCLC. They were advised by
Hamilton that that question was not related to the FBI's
investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., and he
would decline to discuss that matter without further con-
sultation with FBI Headquarters representative in the
Atlanta Office. The Staff Members did not ask that
Hamilton then discuss that point with the Headquarters
representative.
The Staff Members inquired as to the identities of
other FBI personnel assigned to the monitoring of the tech-
nical installation and SA Hamilton advised he recalled that
at that time SA Robert Thomson and SA John Benton were assigned
to monitoring, however, SA Hamilton could not recall the
identities of other agents assigned during the period of
time he was assigned to the monitoring of the installation.
Staff Members inquired as to the reason for SA Hamilton being
removed from the assignment of monitoring the installation
and Hamilton replied that he requested he be removed for the
purpose of being reassigned to security investigative matters.
Hamilton stated that shortly after discussing this desire with
Supervisor Harding, he was taken off the assignment and was
given other investigative assignments. They inquired as to
whether Hamilton questioned the propriety of the technical
installation regarding King and SCLC and Hamilton replied
that he did not question such propriety. The Staff Members
inquired as to the names Hamilton was instructed to listen
for on the installation and Hamilton replied he recalls being
instructed to listen for conversations of individuals by
the names of Stanley Levison and Harry Wachtel. They asked
if he was instructed to listen for conversations of indivi-
duals by the names of Helstein and O'Dell. Hamilton advised
the name Helstein was familiar although he could not recall
specific instructions regarding him but recalled that he was
instructed and did listen for conversations of Hunter Pitts
O'Dell.
Staff Members asked whether the Atlanta FBI Office
maintained subfiles regarding Doctor Martin Luther
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 37
6-
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
O. RICHARD HAMILTON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
King, Jr., or SCLC or whether the Atlanta Office or FBI
Headquarters maintained a JUNE file regarding King. SA
Hamilton advised he could not recall the maintaining of
subfiles and could not recall a JUNE file relating to
King. They asked if the FBI maintained a case regarding
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., and SA Hamilton advised he
could not recall at this time whether such a file was
maintained on Mrs. King.
During the interview the Staff Members asked
who handled the arrangements for renting the apartment
where the technical installation was located and where
it was located. Hamilton advised the installation was
located in an apartment at 300 West Peachtree Street,
but he could not recall in which apartment it was located.
They inquired as to the identities of the individuals
who handled the rental and who made the rent payments and
SA Hamilton advised he did not know that information.
They asked whether or not FBI inspectors ever inspected
the installation or if during the course of an inspec-
tion of the FBI Office in Atlanta whether they visited
the installation. Hamilton advised he was not aware
of any inspection of the installation or visit of it
by inspectors.
The Staff Members asked if Hamilton could recall
any contact with King by any political personalities,
public officials, or officeholders, to which Hamilton
replied he could not at that time recall any such
contacts.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 38
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7*
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**
ог
UREAU
眞
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
July 22, 1975
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
#70816
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-20-01 BY SP-2 ALT #16
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
The following information has been furnished by
SA Robert W. Thomson concerning an interview of him by
SSC Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which
took place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator
Herman E. Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.
No mention was made at the outset of this inter-
view by either Michael Epstein or Mary DeOreo as to any
Constitutional rights of SA Thomson.
The interview commenced at approximately 3:15
P. M. and was terminated at approximately 3:32 P. M. Set
forth as follows are the results of this interview which
are not necessarily in chronological order:
SA Thomson was requested to furnish the approximate
date of his assignment to Atlanta as well as his assignment
to other divisions. SA Thomson advised that he entered on
duty with the FBI in July, 1947, and was assigned to FBI
Headquarters, New York City and Albany, New York as both a
clerical employee and as a special employee. SA Thomson
was appointed an Agent in 1962 and was assigned to the Little
Rock Office until approximately the middle of May, 1964,
when he was assigned to the Atlanta Office.
SA Thomson was asked if he worked security matters
in Little Rock, which was answered no and he was then asked
if his assignment upon reporting to Atlanta was in the security
62-111-395-496
-
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed
outside your agency.
CLOSUR
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 39
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
field. SA Thomson advised that he was assigned to the
security squad and upon questioning stated that the nature
of this security assignment was to monitor the telephones
of Martin Luther King, Jr., both at his residence and his
office. SA Thomson advised that he continued in this
assignment until approximately August, 1964, when he was
transferred to the Columbus, Georgia, Resident Agency.
SA Thomson was asked the reason for his transfer.
from Little Rock to Atlanta and thereafter to the Columbus,
Georgia, Resident Agency, at which time SA Thomson replied
that both transfers were routine transfers, the transfer
to Columbus due to the fact an opening had been created in
the Resident Agency.
SA Thomson further advised that in 1969 he was
transferred from the Columbus, Georgia, Resident Agency back
to Atlanta, Georgia and that for a short period of time in
1971 was assigned to security work in the Atlanta Office.
SA Thomson was asked that upon his return to Atlanta
and engaged in security work in 1971, if he was aware of any
pending investigation concerning SCLC and SA Thomson advised
he could not recall any investigation of SCLC but could state
that he was not involved in any if there was such an investi-
gation.
SA Thomson was asked if he had any knowledge as to
when this telephone monitoring of Martin Luther King was
instituted or when it was discontinued. SA Thomson replied
that he had no such knowledge.
SA Thomson was further questioned as to what pertinent
instructions were furnished him in regard to his monitoring of
Marting Luther King's telephones and who gave these instructions.
SA Thomson advised that the supervisor at that time was Special
Agent Charles S. Harding and that SA Thomson was advised that the
monitoring of these telephones was being done because of national
security and information was to be obtained concerning King's
contacts and associates, and the reason for such contacts.
SA Thomson was questioned if he ever questioned
himself at any time as to the morality or justification for
this monitoring. SA Thomson replied that after having only
worked on such monitoring for two months he had no question in
his mind as to the reason for this telephone monitoring.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 40
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2 -

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Thomson was asked how many telephone lines
were monitored or if he knew the exact location of the
telephones being monitored at which time SA Thomson stated
he could not recall exactly how many telephones were being
monitored but that they were at the residence of Martin
Luther King and SCLC, and that he could not furnish the
addresses of either of these locations. In addition, SA
Thomson was asked if he typed logs or handwrote them. SA
Thomson replied that he utilized both methods.
SA Thomson was asked if he was furnished any list
of names of certain individuals to be on the lookout for in
contacts by Martin Luther King. SA Thomson stated he could
not recall any such list. In addition, when asked where the
physical location of this telephone monitoring was accomplished,
SA Thomson advised that it was at the Peachtree Towers
Apartments but that he could not furnish the exact room or
floor utilized.
SA Thomson was asked if he ever highlighted or
placed additional emphasis on any of the telephone calls
that he monitored. SA Thomson replied that no such emphasis
was placed on any such call, and when asked if SA Thomson
prepared any other forms or memoranda or communications
regarding any of the telephone calls, he monitored, SA Thomson
replied in the negative.
SA Thomson was asked if he could recall Martin
Luther King or any of the other persons monitored being in
any telephone contact with any public officials. SA Thomson
replied that he could not specifically recall any such
telephone conversations, however, during the time SA Thomson
was assigned these monitoring duties Martin Luther King was
traveling to other cities and it is entirely possible that
Martin Luther King could have been in contact with some
officials.
SA Thomson was asked for the identities of other
persons also assigned monitoring duties during the time he
was so engaged. SA Thomson stated that he recalled that
SAs John Benton, O. Richard Hamilton, Don Burgess and Brian
O'Shea also were engaged in monitoring of the telephones.
NW 88608 Doçid:32989626 Page 41
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3
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ROBERT W. THOMSON BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Thomson was asked if any stenographic person-
nel were utilized at the monitoring site. SA Thomson replied
in the negative.
SA Thomson was asked for the procedure utilized
in handling the logs and tapes used to record the telephone
conversations. SA Thomson stated that to the best of his
recollection the logs were delivered by the Agent on duty
each morning to the office and that the tapes were utilized
over and over again for recording telephone calls.
At this point both Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo
stated that they had no further questions of SA Thomson and
the interview was concluded.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 42
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4*
画
REAU
In Reply, Please Refer to ´.
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENt of justice
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
July 23, 1975
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
#MORIE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-20-01 BY SP-2 ALM #76
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
7
The following information has been furnished by
SA Donald P. Burgess concerning an interview of him by SSC
Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took
place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E.
Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.
The interview of SA Donald P. Burgess commenced
at approximately 3:45 P.M. and terminated at approximately
4:45 P.M. At no time during the interview was any mention
made to SA Burgess regarding his rights by SSC Staff Members
Michael Epstein and Mary DeŬreo.
The results of this interview will not necessarily
be in chronological order, but will be to the best recollection
of SA Burgess.
At the outset of the interview, SA Burgess was
asked when he was assigned to the Atlanta Office of the FBI
and SA Burgess replied to the best of his recollection it
was at the end of July or the first part of August, 1964.
SA Burgess was also asked how long he had been in the FBI,
to which he replied since January, 1951.
SA Burgess was asked what his duties were and to
what squad he was assigned when he first arrived in the
Atlanta Division of the FBI. SA Burgess advised he had been
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed
outside your agency.
62-111395-496
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 43
t
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
immediately assigned to the Security Squad. In reply to a
question as to what type of investigations he handled,
SA Burgess replied that he was mainly involved in civil rights
type investigations.
Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess when he was assigned
to monitoring the telephone tap of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr.
SA Burgess replied to the best of his recollection he was
assigned to these duties from the end of November, 1965, until
sometime in June, 1966. SA Burgess was asked if he could pin
down exactly the date of his assignment to this monitoring
duty and SA Burgess replied that he recalled the general time
period quite well as he had recently undergone surgery before
this assignment and after extensive sick leave, went almost
immediately on the monitoring duty.
Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess what his understanding
was as to why this telephone tap on Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr.
was being used. SA Burgess replied that it was his understanding
and recollection that three or four individuals who had heavy
and extensive Communist Party or Marxist affiliations and
connections had an inordinate influence and control over
Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. insofar as policies, objectives
and activities of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC). SA Burgess replied it was his understanding that
these three or four aforementioned individuals' influence over
King extended so far as preparing his speeches and public
statements and that it was also his understanding that the
Attorney General at the time the telephone tap was instituted,
Robert Kennedy, had approved of and insisted upon this
investigative technique.
SA Burgess was then asked if he thought the telephone
tap on Doctor King was justified and SA Burgess replied that
he thought it was fully justified in light of the time and
circumstances and the position of Doctor King.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 44
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2
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U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Burgess was then asked about the personal type
information regarding personal misconduct, whether or not
he felt the collecting of this type of information was
justified. SA Burgess replied that information regarding
personal misconduct or immoral activities on the part of
King was not the prime purpose or interest of the telephone
monitoring, but that he did feel that evidence of gross
personal misconduct and completely amoral activities was
significant in this particular case, bearing in mind the
original justification for the telephone monitor and the
fact that Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. was a moral leader
of world stature and a religious personality. SA Burgess
said that he therefore felt a complete double standard of
personal conduct as opposed to public image was significant
inasmuch as such behavior would make Doctor King subject
to pressure or blackmail by the worst criminal or subversive
elements in our society.
SA Burgess was asked if the type of information
regarding Doctor King's personal misconduct was disseminated
to other agencies or the press and SA Burgess replied that
he did not know. SA Burgess was asked if he ever disseminated
any information regarding the personal misconduct on the
part of Doctor King to the press or others, and SA Burgess
replied he had not.
Mr. Epstein said that he assumed that SA Burgess
was aware of some of the allegations that had appeared in
the press regarding FBI dissemination of this type of
information, and SA Burgess replied that he was aware of some
of these allegations but he had no specific knowledge regarding
these matters.
SA Burgess was asked if he ever reviewed the
communications regarding Doctor King based upon information
monitored, and SA Burgess replied that he merely recorded
the results of the interception of telephone conversations.
NW 88608 Doclḍ:32989626 Page 45
-
3
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Burgess was then asked for the physical location
from which the telephones were monitored and if this physical
location was an apartment in the Peachtree Towers. SA Burgess
replied in the affirmative, but said he could not recall the
exact apartment number or the floor on which it was located.
SA Burgess was asked if the apartment from which
the telephones were monitored was a one or two bedroom
apartment and if he knew any of the neighbors or if he
recalled maid service to the apartment. SA Burgess replied
that he believed it was a one bedroom apartment, did not
recall any of the neighbors and insofar as he recalled,
there was no maid or janitorial service.
In response to a question as to where the monitoring
equipment was located, SA Burgess replied to his recollection
it was in the bedroom of the apartment.
SA Burgess was asked if inspectors were at the
apartment and if odd-hour shifts were maintained. SA Burgess
advised that he recalled that odd-hour shifts were maintained,
but he did not recall any inspection of the apartment.
Mr. Epstein asked SA Burgess if he recalled what
his duties were prior to the time that he was assigned to the
aforementioned monitoring and SA Burgess replied, general
security work and particularly civil rights cases which
included the observation of civil rights demonstrations in
various locations.
Mr. Epstein then asked about general policy regarding
observation of demonstrations, whether it came from Washington.
or originated in the field, and whether the instructions to
observe demonstrations came by SAC letter to the field.
SA Burgess replied that insofar as he knew it was the general
policy of the Bureau for a number of years to observe at any
type of demonstration involving civil rights type matters
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 46
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4
O
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
where the possibility of violence existed so that firsthand
observation of any possible violation of Federal statutes
could be had by impartial observers, and that any
subsequent investigation would not be dependent upon the
sometimes impassioned observations of persons on either side
of a controversial issue.
At this point in the conversation, Mr. Epstein
was reminded by SA Burgess that the purpose of the interview
was the investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr., and
Mr. Epstein replied that he was interested in observations
of civil rights matters insofar as Doctor King was involved.
SA Burgess replied that the only specific demonstration
or civil rights activity he recalled in which he acted as an
observer where Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. or SCLC was
involved was in Americus, Georgia, in 1965, and he could recall
very little regarding this matter.
SA Burgess was asked at one point during the interview
if, during the time he served as a monitor on the telephone tap
of Doctor King, there was a tap on SNCC. SA Burgess replied
that he had no recollection of a telephone tap on SNCC, (Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee).
Mr. Epstein asked why SA Burgess was removed from
monitoring telephones mentioned above. SA Burgess said that it
was at his request as he had completely recovered from a
debilitating illness and was very frankly quite bored with an
inactive assignment.
Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess remained on the
Security Squad in the Atlanta Office and what type of cases
he handled after that period. SA Burgess replied that he
did remain on the Security Squad until December, 1966 or
January, 1967, and that he had handled general security matters,
but not the investigation of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr.
Mr. Epstein asked why SA Burgess was reassigned and
was advised it was a routine administrative reassignment.
- 5 -
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 47
1
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
Mr. Epstein then asked SA Burgess if he was quite
certain of his period of assignment to monitoring the
telephones of Doctor King and SA Burgess replied that he was
virtually certain that assignment to these duties was from
within ten days before or after Thanksgiving, 1965, until
sometime during June, 1966, because of the aforementioned
surgery approximately six weeks prior to his assignment
on these duties.
Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess could ascertain
the date of his surgery from his doctor or hospital records.
SA Burgess replied that surgery had taken place at St.
Joseph's Infirmary immediately adjacent to the FBI office.
and he would attempt to ascertain the date. Mr. Epstein
asked if SA Burgess would be willing to telephone the
hospital at that time in an attempt to verify this date.
SA Burgess replied that old hospital records are sometimes
difficult to locate and from experience, it would probably
take two or three days.
In response to a question as to whether anyone
else immediately available could recall the date of this
surgery, SA Burgess replied that his wife might recall.
Mr. Epstein then asked SA Burgess if he would be willing
to telephone his wife in an attempt to determine the date of
his surgery. At that point in the interview, SA Burgess
did telephone his wife who informed SA Burgess that she
thought SA Burgess had undergone surgery during mid-September,
1965. This was communicated to Mr. Epstein.
Mr. Epstein also asked SA Burgess whether or not any
record in the Atlanta Office would pin down the exact dates
of his assignment to monitor the King telephones. SA Burgess
replied that he knew of no such record.
Mr. Epstein asked if an annual fitness or performance
report would show his assignment at that time, and SA Burgess
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 48
6 -
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
DONALD P.. BURGESS BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
replied that he believed these performance reports merely.
stated general assignments, such as general security, etc.,
and the location of these reports were unknown to him.
Mr. Epstein asked if SA Burgess had seen his annual
performance reports and SA Burgess replied that he had.
At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Epstein
asked if he might have SA Burgess' home telephone number
and if he might call him at a later date to obtain from
SA Burgess the date of the aforementioned surgery, if SA
Burgess was able to ascertain this date. SA Burgess did
furnish Mr. Epstein his home telephone number and advised
he would attempt to determine the date of this surgery.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 49
- 7* -
*
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
July 23, 1975
7
ALM76
#moc16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
ASFEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DITE 7-20-0) BYSP-2 ALM
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
The following information has been furnished by
SA Alden F. Miller concerning an interview of him by SSC
Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took
place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E.
Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.
The interview of SA Alden F. Miller commenced at
4:50 P. M. and was terminated at 5:29 P. M., July 22, 1975,
with the statement that consideration would be given over-
night as to whether additional questions would be directed
on the following morning to SA Miller. At the outset Staff
Member Michael Epstein advised SA Miller of his rights,
stating he did not have to answer any questions, that he
had the right to legal counsel, and further, that anything
he said might be used in a criminal proceeding against him.
The following questions and the responses of SA
Miller to these questions are set forth hereinafter in
narrative form to the best of his recollection, utilizing
verbiage nearly as possible synonymous with statements made.
The context of this question and answer interrogation is
not necessarily in chronological order. All questions were
directed to SA Miller by Staff Member Michael Epstein.
SA Miller was asked concerning his employment
and assignment to the ederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Atlanta Office. SA Miller replied that he first was assigned
to the Atlanta Office in 1947, was transferred to New York
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed
outside your agency.
62-114395-496
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 50
CLOSUNK

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
in 1948, and returned to the Atlanta Office in 1951. SA
Miller was further asked when he was assigned to the Security
Squad in the Atlanta FBI Office, to which he replied June of
1951. Inquiry was further made as to whether still assigned
to the Security Squad and SA Miller replied that as of March,
1975, he was no longer assigned security matters and that he
was presently assigned to work in conjunction with the General
Accounting Office review of matters in the Atlanta Office.
SA Miller was asked when a technical installation
or telephone tap was placed on the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference (SCLC) and Martin Luther King. SA Miller
replied that it was impossible for him at this date to recall
specifically when such an installation was made, but by citing
civil rights activities with particular emphasis in Albany,
Georgia, in 1962, was reasonably sure that the technical
installation was made sometime subsequent to that date. When
asked how long the technical installation remained in effect,
SA Miller replied that he could not recall the exact duration
of the telephone tap, however, was of the opinion it was in
effect for several years, possibly three. When asked what
telephone facilities were covered, SA Miller replied that
telephone service to the offices of SCLC and to the residence
of Martin Luther King were covered in this telephone tap.
SA Miller was asked what was the justification or
purpose of this technical installation, to which he replied
that it was to determine the degree of subversive influence,
if any, over the activities of the SCLC sponsored civil
rights demonstrations and programs.
Inquiry was made as to who instructed the installation
of such technical coverage and SA Miller replied that he un-
doubtedly received these instructions from his immediate
supervisor and/or the Special Agent in Charge of the Atlanta
Office at that time. When asked whether these instructions
were written or verbal, SA Miller replied that he could not
specifically recall, but was reasonably sure that if written
they would have also been discussed verbally, both with his
supervisor and the Special Agent in Charge.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 51
2
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
I
SA Miller was asked whether a feasibility study
was made prior to the actual installation or a survey
conducted. SA Miller replied that he did not recall at
this late date whether such a feasibility study was made
prior to the installation. SA Miller was asked whether
if such a study or survey was made whether it was reviewed
by high officials prior to ordering such an installation.
SA Miller replied that he did not specifically recall
whether such a review as that was made on a feasibility
or survey, as if this were done, it would have been done
in Washington, and SA Miller would not have been in a
position to know of such a review.
SA Miller was asked in making the telephone tap
did the Atlanta Office have sufficient equipment here and
if not, where did we get such equipment to make this
installation. SA Miller replied that the Atlanta Office
did not have equipment available for such an installation
and at this date it is unknown where the equipment came
from, however, a request for such equipment would have
been made of FBI Headquarters in Washington, D. C. SA
Miller was asked whether he dealt with the phone company
in conjunction with this installation and he replied that
he undoubtedly had requested line information which relates
to pair and cable data for phones to be covered in this
technical installation. Inquiry was made of SA Miller
as to the identity of the person at the Southern Bell
Telephone Company who provided such information and it
was stated that at this late date it was impossible to
say definitely who furnished this data as the phone
company during this era was in the process of setting up
a security office who would normally provide such infor-
mation under the proper circumstances and that if such an
office were then in existence Mr. Theodore King would have
provided the line information desired.
SA Miller was asked whether leased lines were
obtained from the phone company in conjunction with this
installation, to which he replied he did not specifically
recall whether leased lines were utilized or whether other
telephone service was ordered with subsequent adaptation
enabling the use of this service for the technical installation.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 52
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3 -
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Miller was asked whether charges were incurred for such
service, to which he replied payments were made for all
services rendered by the Southern Bell Telephone Company,
whether it be leased lines or other telephone-type service.
SA Miller was asked whether he had issued the orders for
leased lines or other service and if so, what name was
utilized in issuing such orders, to which SA Miller replied
that if leased lines or other service was ordered through
the Security Office of Southern Bell Telephone Company, that
he had ordered same, however, he could not recall at this
time the name utilized for such service.
SA Miller was asked further did he issue the order
for having a private working number installed in the monitoring
plant, to which he replied he could not recall whether such an
order was issued or given by him and if it was, whether it was
done through the Security Office or done in a routine fashion
like any person requesting normal telephone service.
SA Miller was asked if he recalled where the
technical installations were made, to which he replied he
did recall and could point out the locations, however, could
not recall the addresses of these locations. SA Miller was
asked the location of the monitoring point, to which he
replied an apartment in an apartment building located
diagonally across the street from the Federal Building
housing the offices of the FBI.
SA Miller was asked whether he was responsible for
renting the apartment which was used for monitoring this
technical installation, to which he replied he did not think
that he was, but was of the opinion that the case Agent
rented the apartment. SA Miller was asked where in the
apartment building was the apartment located, to which he
replied he could only recall it was in the upper portion
of the building, probably above the tenth or twelfth floor
and that it was located immediately adjacent to a wire closet.
SA Miller was asked the cover name used in renting this
apartment, to which he replied at this late date he could
not recall the exact name utilized, but was of the opinion
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 53
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4
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
it was some sort of engineering company, but at any rate,
it would have been the same name utilized in requesting
telephone service. SA Miller was asked further whether
the owners of this building and top management were
cognizant of the real identity of the renters of this
apartment, to which he replied he had no way of knowing
but was of the opinion for security reasons no one knew
or was aware that this apartment was being utilized by the
FBI.
SA Miller was asked further whether he had anything
to do with the installation of utilities and furnishing of
this apartment used in the monitoring operation, to which
he replied he had nothing to do with this other than the
installation of certain wooden shelves utilized for
equipment necessary to such monitoring and neither did
he have anything to do as it related to the utilities.
SA Miller was asked whether he ever actually
monitored this installation, to which he replied that on
several occasions when regular monitors were ill and there
were other technical needs at the facility, he would serve
as a monitor. SA Miller was asked whether he had ever
furnished supplies to this facility, to which he replied
the only kind of supplies he would have taken to the
facility were those necessary to insure a trouble free
technical monitoring. SA Miller was specifically asked
whether he ever replenished the supplies or tapes for
recording purposes, to which he replied he did not recall
such, other than at the initial inception when a sufficient
supply of tapes were made available and these tapes were
used over and over.
SA Miller was asked specifically whether he ever
made any technical installation on phone service at the
Ebenezer Baptist Church, the church where Martin Luther King
was on the staff, to which he replied that no such installation
to his knowledge was ever made. SA Miller further informed
that he did not know whether city police authorities or
state authorities had made such an installation and further,
he was not in a position to be aware of any such activities
on the part of these law enforcement agencies.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 54
-
5 -
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
· SA Miller was asked whether he had ever discussed
Martin Luther King with Eugene Patterson, Editor of the
Atlanta Constitution, to which he replied that to the best
of his knowledge he had never discussed this matter with Mr.
Patterson. SA Miller did point out that he was acquainted
with Mr. Patterson professionally and socially as previous
investigations had brought him in contact with Mr. Patterson
and that they were both members of the same church and served
jointly on various committees and boards for several years.
SA Miller replied further that during this era Mr. Patterson
may have directed questions to him regarding Martin Luther
King, as it was a timely subject and one receiving considerable
newspaper publicity; however, all such inquiries were parried
or handled in a non-committal and non-revealing manner. SA
Miller further replied that numerous civil rights cases were
being conducted by the Atlanta Office of the FBI, which was
public knowledge and subject of news coverage by the newspaper
of which Mr. Patterson served as Editor, however, to the best
of SA Miller's knowledge no revelation was made indicating
the FBI had an unusual interest in the activities of Martin
Luther King. SA Miller further advised that even though
socially acquainted with Mr. Patterson, he did not agree
with Mr. Patterson's publicly espoused political position
on many and varied interests of the times.
SA Miller was specifically asked that while the
Staff Member did not desire to place SA Miller in a bind,
did a superior of his at any time ever instruct him to
contact Eugene Patterson regarding Martin Luther King, to
which SA Miller replied that at no time had any superior
of his, or for that matter, any other FBI employee, ever
ask that Eugene Patterson be contacted in regard to Martin
Luther King.
The interview was terminated at 5:29 P. M. with
Mr. Epstein stating that he would like to think overnight
regarding the questions and answers as set forth above and
would on the following morning advise as to whether he
desired to ask additional questions.
-6;
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 55
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
ALDEN F. MILLER BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
On the morning of July 23, 1975, Mr. Epstein
communicated to SA Miller that no further questioning of
SA Miller was necessary.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 56
- 7* -
{
☆
OF JUSTIC
BUREAU
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
#Moris
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BYSPZALM1276
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
July 23, 1975
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
The following information has been furnished by
SA Charles T. Haynes concerning an interview of him by SSC
Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took
place on July 22, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E.
Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.
The interview of SA Haynes started at 11:57 A. M.,
was discontinued for lunch from 1:32 P. M. until 2:34 P. M.,
and was terminated at 3:10 P. M. Epstein asked all of the
questions during the interview. Haynes was not advised of
his rights or of the purpose of the interview. Early in the
interview, Haynes informed Epstein he was under the impression
the purpose of the interview was to obtain information re-
garding Martin Luther King, Jr., and Epstein confirmed this
explaining King, the SCLC* and the marches were so closely
related it was necessary to go into some of these things.
Epstein asked Haynes his title and was informed
Haynes is a Special Agent Supervisor in the Atlanta Office
of the FBI, supervising the Number 3 Squad which is generally
known as the security squad. He asked when Haynes became a
supervisor and was informed he was appointed in August, 1968.
Epstein asked who served as supervisor of the squad prior to
Haynes and was advised SA Charles S. Harding, now retired,
* Southern Christian headership Conference
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed
outside your agency.
1. 11135-496
い
CLOSUAR
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 57
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
preceded Haynes as supervisor. He asked why Harding was
replaced and Haynes stated it was a decision made by the
Bureau which was an administrative matter and not pertinent
to the inquiry regarding Martin Luther King, Jr. Epstein
did not pursue this question any further.
Epstein asked when the investigation regarding King
started and if there was a file open prior to the time the
investigation was authorized. Haynes replied he did not know
when the file was opened or when the investigation was
authorized. Haynes was asked when the technical coverage
regarding King was instituted and when it was discontinued,
and he replied to the best of his knowledge it was instituted
during about November, 1963, and Haynes monitored it until
about January 4, 1964, when Haynes became ill from a kidney
stone attack, thereafter entering the hospital in Atlanta on
January 8, 1964. Epstein asked Haynes if he returned to
monitoring the surveillance later and Haynes replied that he
did not return to the assignment on a full-time basis, but
probably relieved other individuals monitoring several times
during a period which may have continued as long as a year.
Epstein asked when the King case was closed and
Haynes replied he did not know, but felt sure it was some-
time prior to April, 1968. Haynes was asked who made the
decision to close the file, and he stated he did not know.
Epstein asked when the SCLC case was closed and Haynes
stated he did not recall, but did remember that SCLC activity
"wound down" considerably prior to King's death, and even
more so after King's death to the point that the information
did not warrant maintaining the file in a pending status.
When asked who gave instructions to close the file, Haynes
stated that he did not recall but that it was possible that
the Atlanta Office took the action closing the file, and it
was even possible that Haynes may have approved such action
administratively; however, he does not recall.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 58
- 2 -
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT((SA)
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
It
Epstein asked if it would be customary for New
York to send Atlanta any information they received regarding
Stanley Levison and if so what file it would be put in.
was explained to Epstein it would be necessary to know the
nature of such information before answering such a question,
however, since Atlanta did not have any pending investigation
regarding Levison or SCLC there would be no reason for New
York to send any information regarding Levison to Atlanta
unless they had some reason to request information concerning
some pending investigation. Epstein pressed the question of
whether New York would continue to send Atlanta information
concerning Levison and he was informed, based on information
available at Atlanta, there was no reason for New York to
send the information to Atlanta regarding Levison, without
requesting investigation%3B however, it was possible that they
may have some reason for having sent information to Atlanta
for informational purposes.
Epstein asked where the monitoring of the King
technical surveillance was conducted and he was advised by
Haynes it was conducted in the Peachtree Towers Building.
He asked the room number and Haynes replied he did not
recall the room number but did recall it was on one of the
upper floors of the building. He asked who made the in-
stallation and handled the contact with the telephone company,
and Haynes replied he did not know, that the equipment was
in the apartment when Haynes was instructed to report there
for the monitoring assignment. Epstein asked who else was
present in the apartment at the time and was advised that
SA Alden F. Miller was present, connected the equipment
and instructed Haynes in the operation of the equipment.
response to the question of other Agents monitoring the
technical surveillance at the time, Haynes stated to the best
of his knowledge he was probably the first Agent to monitor
the surveillance, with the technical assistance of SA Miller.
In
Epstein asked the name of the person who rented
the apartment at the Peachtree Towers and Haynes replied
he did not know. He asked if such information was available
in the files of the Atlanta Office and Haynes replied he
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 59
- 3
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
did not know, explaining that such information may have been
made a matter of record, and yet may not have been made a
matter of record. Epstein stated that at this point he would
stop the questioning in order for Haynes to go upstairs to the
FBI Office and review the files to determine whether or not
such information was in the files. Haynes explained that such
a project would probably entail extensive file review in order
to state whether such information was, or was not, in the file.
Epstein asked if Haynes could have someone else conduct the
necessary file review regarding this matter, at which time
Haynes replied he would request a break at this point to con-
sult with an FBIHQ representative in the FBI Office. After
consulting with the FBIHQ representative for approximately
five minutes, Haynes returned to Senator Talmadge's office
and informed Epstein that the clearance for the interview was
based on what Haynes could remember regarding King and not
on information from the files. Epstein was advised that any
request by him for information from the files should be submitted
in writing in the usual manner. Epstein did not pursue this
matter any further.
Epstein asked if Haynes knew Bill Sullivan and if
he recalled him coming to Atlanta. Haynes replied that he
did know Sullivan and recalled him coming to Atlanta in the
1960's at least on one occasion and possibly twice. Haynes
explained he recalled Sullivan coming to Atlanta in the early
or middle 1960's in connection with a regional type FBI
conference regarding developing and handling of informants
in Klan organizations, and possibly a second visit at a later
time, but no other details were recalled.
Epstein asked Haynes if he knew of any instance where
an Agent in Atlanta furnished any information regarding King
or the SCLC to the news media and Haynes replied he did not.
Epstein asked if Atlanta had a COINTELPRO file re-
garding King or the SCLC and Haynes advised it did not. Haynes
was asked if he knew of any COINTELPRO information regarding
King or the SCLC and Haynes stated he did not. When asked
where such material would be filed, Haynes stated that since
he knew of none he did not know where it would be filed. When
asked if such information could be in the case file, Haynes
advised it was possible.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 60
· 4 -

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
CHARLES T. HAYNES BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
Epstein asked if the Atlanta Office participated
in the COINTELPRO retrieval project and was advised by
Haynes he thought so%; however, Haynes was not familiar enough
with the particular project he had in mind to be sure. Haynes
explained he had in mind a project around the first of 1975,
which had to do with declassifying certain previously identified
COINTELPRO correspondence and subsequently classifying some
material also connected with COINTELPRO. Epstein wanted to
know if any COINTELPRO information regarding King or SCLC was
included in this information and he was informed Haynes had
no knowledge of such, but the details of the project were
handled by another Agent under Haynes' supervision. Haynes
was requested to identify the Agent and replied he would have
to have a few minutes to consult with an FBIHQ representative
in the FBI Office prior to answering this question. Epstein
contacted the FBIHQ representative in the Atlanta Office
telephonically, requesting him to come down to Senator
Talmadge's office and conferred with him for approximately
five minutes, during which time Haynes was not present.
the conclusion of this conference, upon advice of the FBIHQ
representative Haynes informed Epstein the Agent who handled
the above-mentioned project was SA Edward A. Shea.
Epstein terminated the interview at 3:10 P. M.
At
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 61
-
5* -
"
BUREAU
*
JUST
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
July 24, 1975
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HANS UNCLASSIFIED Dette
1.
DATE
ما
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
The following information has been furnished by
SA Edward A. Shea concerning an interview of him by SSC
Staff Members Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo, which took
place on July 23, 1975, in the office of Senator Herman E.
Talmadge in Atlanta, Georgia.
The interview of SA Edward A. Shea by the two
SSC Staff Members commenced at 9:35 A. M. and ended at
10:37 A. M.
At the beginning of the interview no mention was
made of SA Edward A. Shea's rights by SSC Staff Members
Michael Epstein and Mary DeOreo.
The following information was furnished to these
two SSC Staff Members and it is not necessarily in chronological
order:
At the outset of the interview, SA Shea was questioned
about his service in the Bureau, type work he did, etc., and
SA Shea indicated that he had been in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) as a Special Agent for almost 25 years,
having entered the Bureau in March, 1951; after an initial
assignment at Richmond, Virginia, SA Shea was transferred to
Cleveland, Ohio, where he was assigned to the security squad.
SA Shea remained in Cleveland for 20 years doing security
work for practically the entire time. In May, 1972, SA Shea
was transferred to the Atlanta Division and once again was
assigned to security work, which assignment has continued to
the present time.
(2-111313-4976
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed
outside your agency.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 62
ENCLOSUR
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA Shea was then asked by Mr. Epstein about a re-
view project he had handled earlier in the year pertaining
to the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) in the
Atlanta Division and what it involved.
SA Shea mentioned that in approximately the latter
part of December, 1974, or early January, 1975, he had been
assigned to handle a project dealing with COINTELPRO in the
Atlanta Office.
FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) had sent out communications
to various field offices around the latter part of December,
1974, or early January, 1975, relative to the COINTELPRO-Hate
Groups, Black Nationalist Hate Groups, New Left, and Communist
Party, U. S. of America (CP, USA). In these communications
FBIHQ had indicated it was in receipt of a request under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for documents relating to
the COINTELPRO. As a result, FBIHQ had reviewed its files
on COINTELPRO and classified various documents. FBIHQ listed
these documents in work papers which were sent out to the
various field offices, including Atlanta, as enclosures to
the FBIHQ communications. These work papers listed documents
that were to be classified in each office and recipients
were instructed to review the work papers to make sure all
copies of these documents classified by FBIHQ were so classi-
fied in the field office files on COINTELPRO. These work
papers showed the classification assigned to the particular
document, the identifying number of the classifying officer,
the exemption category and the date it was classified by
FBIHQ.
In addition, these FBIHQ communications instructed
the recipient field offices to review its various COINTELPRO
files, such as the ones on the Hate Groups, Black Nationalist
Hate Groups, etc. to insure that all other documents in these
files which were classifiable were so classified. These
were to include memoranda and letters to other offices, etc.
The office that originated the communication had the re-
sponsibility of notifying other recipients of these
communications so their copies could also be classified.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 63
-
2
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
Based on these FBIHQ communications, SA Shea,
who handled this project by himself, located all the documents
listed in the FBIHQ work papers and classified them according
to the information set out in the work papers.
In addition, SA Shea also reviewed each of the
Atlanta COINTELPRO files on the categories previously mentioned,
for any further documents that should be classified.
SA Shea recalled that in this part of the review he
did locate various documents in these files which he felt re-
quired classification.
SA Shea could not recall any specific documents
that he so classified but did remember classifying a number
of documents in the COINTELPRO-Hate Group file and COINTELPRO-
CP, USA file. These documents selected by SA Shea were then
classified, and copies designated for any other Atlanta files
were then located and classified; in addition, FBIHQ and other
field offices that had been furnished copies of these documents
were then notified by Atlanta to locate their copies of these
documents and classify them according to information furnished
by Atlanta.
SA Shea pointed out to the SSC Staff Members that
he recalled that subsequently FBIHQ had sent back communi-
cations to Atlanta relative to documents SA Shea had classified
in both the COINTELPRO-Hate Group and COINTELPRO-CP, USA files.
FBIHQ instructed that all those classified by SA Shea in the
COINTELPRO-Hate Group file be declassified as they did not
warrant classification and also a number in the COINTELPRO-
CP, USA file also were to be declassified, which was done by
SA Shea.
The SSC Staff Members then inquired if during this
review of the COINTELPRO files, whether SA Shea had noted any
COINTELPRO actions, any recommended actions, or any COINTELPRO
suggestions which were directed against Reverend Martin Luther
King, Jr., Coretta King or the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC). SA Shea indicated that in carrying out
this project, his purpose was first to locate the COINTELPRO
documents listed by FBIHQ in their work papers and classify
them; next he was also to review the Atlanta COINTELPRO files
to see if any other COINTELPRO documents prepared by Atlanta
required classification.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 64
-
3
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
SA
In handling this project, SA Shea was primarily
interested in classifying the documents in these COINTELPRO
files and little notice was made of any specific COINTELPRO
actions actually being recommended in these documents.
Shea pointed out that in his review he did not recall any
COINTELPRO action that had been directed or recommended
against Reverend King, his wife, Coretta, or SCLC.
SA Shea was then questioned as to whether he could
recall in his review, having to classify any Atlanta COINTELPRO
document in which a copy may have been designated for the case
file on SCLC, and SA Shea indicated that he could not recall
or remember anything specific on this.
Mr. Epstein then inquired if the Atlanta Office
had any COINTELPRO files which only pertained to organizations,
in which all information relative to a particular organization
like the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), or the Socialist
Workers Party (SWP) would be located. SA Shea indicated there
was no such specific breakdown in the Atlanta COINTELPRO files
as they were set up under broad group categories, such as Hate
Groups, Black Hate Groups, New Left, etc.
Mr. Epstein then asked if SA Shea had ever been
involved in handling any COINTELPRO matters when he was
assigned to the Cleveland Office or whether the Cleveland
Office ever had any COINTELPRO actions against Reverend King
or SCLC. SA Shea indicated that he understood that the
questioning of him would be limited to his review of the
Atlanta COINTELPRO files earlier in the year, for the classi-
fication purposes; SA Shea suggested that this should be
discussed with the FBIHQ representative, who was in the Atlanta
Office at the time, to resolve this%; however, Mr. Epstein did
not pursue this.
Mr. Epstein then inquired, that prior to the FBI
instituting the COINTELPRO, and prior to the various field
offices setting up COINTELPRO files, if some Agent made a
suggestion about a counterintelligence action, would such a
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 65
4
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
suggestion, say in the form of a memorandum or letter, be
placed in the case file of the organization or the individual
against whom the action was being directed. SA Shea indicated
he had no knowledge of any such suggestions ever being made
in the form of memoranda, letters, etc., suggesting a counter-
intelligence action being directed against anyone or any
organization prior to the institution of the actual COINTELPRO
by FBIHQ.
Mr. Epstein then asked, if when FBIHQ instituted
the COINTELPRO and the various field offices set up COINTELPRO
files, was there any retrieval of any documents made from any
files dating back prior to the commencement of COINTELPRO,
that were then placed in any of Atlanta's COINTELPRO files.
SA Shea indicated that in his review of the various COINTELPRO
files earlier in the year, he had not noted any such indi-
cation of this.
Mr. Epstein then asked if SA Shea was aware of any
review program dealing with COINTELPRO in which any documents
were removed from COINTELPRO files. SA Shea stated emphatically
that there was no program to ever remove any documents dealing
with COINTELPRO from Atlanta's COINTELPRO files or from any
Atlanta files.
On several occasions during the interview of SA
Shea, Mr. Epstein would come back to his line of questioning
about SA Shea's review of the COINTELPRO files earlier in the
year and whether SA Shea could recall any COINTELPRO action
or COINTELPRO suggested action against Reverend King, Mrs.
King or SCLC. SA Shea on each occasion pointed out that he
could not recall seeing any documents in any of the COINTELPRO
files which related to any such action directed against the
Kings or SCLC.
Mr. Epstein on one occasion asked SA Shea if, during
the time he had been assigned to the Atlanta Office, he had
ever hear of any COINTELPRO action, or any suggested action,
directed against Reverend King, his wife, or SCLC, and SA
Shea replied that he had not.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 66
5
-
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
INTERVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT (SA)
EDWARD A. SHEA BY SSC STAFF MEMBERS
Mr. Epstein also asked if SA Shea was aware of
any COINTELPRO action or recommended action being made
after FBIHQ has discontinued the COINTELPRO, and SA Shea
indicated he knew of no actions or recommendations being
made.
During the interview, Mr. Epstein did most of the
questioning and Mrs. DeOreo took extensive notes%3B both SSC
Staff Members were pleasant and cordial during the entire
interview, which ended at approximately 10:37 A. M.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 67
-
6*
-
:
ΤΟ
:
OPTIONAL FORK NO. 10
MAY 262 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
NITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM :
Legal Counsel.
SUBJECT:
INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS RECEIVED
FROM FORMER ASSOCIATE DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES A.
WILDEROTTER, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
· DATE:
7/8/75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gan. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory,
Legb1 f
Plan. & Evol.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Justice D= parti
At 3:05 p.m. on July 8, 1975, I met with Deputy Attorney General
Tyler and advised him of the fact that Mr. Wilderotter had furnished
certain materials to the Bureau at the time of his transfer to the White House
I told him that Mr. Wilderotter requested an inventory be prepared of the
materials in order to assure their appropriate disposition and that such aņ
inventory was prepared. I told him that the Attorney General was advised by
memorandum dated June 26, 1975, with a copy designated for the Deputy,
each of which enclosed a copy of the inventory. I explained that I took a copy
of the inventory to Mr. Wilderotter and requested him to mark thereon his
suggestions as to the disposition of each item.
on
--
“ORIGINAL FILED IN
I suggested that some of the items appearing the inventory
could be material pertinent to the current inquiries by the Senate Select
Committee and to conversations recently had with the Deputy Attorney General
concerning official and confidential files maintained by Mr. Hoover.
I told the Deputy that my purpose in bringing this matter to his personal attentio
was to emphasize my concern that the Department would be aware of the
existence and location of the material listed in the inventory and of our
interest in having materials returned to the Department or otherwise
disposed of at the earliest possible date.
REC-107
62-55047-2169
2314 4 1975
.1
Mr. Wannall
1 Mr. McDermott (Attn: Mr. Farrington)
-
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd
(4)
62-116395
NOT RECORDED
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
46 MAR 3 
1976CONTINUED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 101/2000 
BY SPO
MOR-16.
-
OVER
LEGAL
NW 88600-Docld:32989626 Rage 685. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Inventory of Documents Received
from Former Associate DAG Wilderotter, etc.
The Deputy requested a copy of the inventory marked by
Mr. Wilderotter and I furnished a Xerox copy of the original. He said
that he would discuss this matter with K. William O'Connor and that he
would contact me to discuss further disposition of the materials presently
being held by the Bureau.
RECOMMENDATION:
For information.
Q
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 69
· 2 ·
да
gri
Hey
"
I
1
1
-
-
-
Mr. J. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
MAILED Z
AUG 4 1975
~-FCI
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
US. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
1
-
1 Mr. S. F. Phillips
-
August 4, 1975
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UN
2.20.81 Spyjormun
6076
Enclosed are two copies each of seven memoranda,
each reporting the results of an interview of an FBI Special Agent
(SA) by Staff Members of the SSC. One set of these memoranda
is for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel
to the President.
All the interviews took place at Atlanta, Georgia,
and all the SAs, except W. John Benton, are assigned to the
Atlanta Field Office (FO) of the FBI. Benton is assigned to
the Knoxville FO and traveled to Atlanta for the interview at
the request of the SSC.
Except for the interview of SA Edward A. Shea, all the
interviews were arranged on advance notice of the SSC given to
the FBI on July 17, 1975. The SSC request for interview of
Shea was made on July 22, 1975. REC-102
62-1163.10
Prior to all these interviews, these SAs were informed
by an FBI representative that they were being released from any
applicable employment agreement for purpose of the SSC interview
concerning the former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr.
It was explained to all that they had the right to counsel;
however, the FBI was unable to provide private counsel. They
Assoc. Dir. were all told that there were certain privileged areas concerning
Dep. AD Inv. which they would not be required to answer questions. These
areas concerned information which might divulge the identities
Comp. Syst. of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive methodus and
Ext. Afcs techniques; information which might adversely affect ongoing
ENCLOSURE
Dep. AD Adm. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin,
Affairs
Gen. Inv.
Ident. 62-116395
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Sec'y
-
-
100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
SFP:1hb lhb
(10)
MAIL ROOM
慨
100
UNREC CORDARD
ON OF ENEL FILED IN
ABE
SEE NOTE PAGE 2
TELETYPE UNIT
/006
(
GPO 954-546
NW 1860 1969 Page 70

The Attorney General
FBI investigations; and information which originated with
other agencies, including foreign intelligence agencies. They
were all also informed that an FBI representative would be
available in the Atlanta FO for consultation purposes should
such a need arise. This procedure, as explained to these SAs,
provides that if a question arose during the interview in one
of the areas set out above, the SA had the privilege, before
replying, of consulting with the FBI representative.
representative did not accompany these Agents to the interviews
but was available in the Atlanta FO located in the same building
where the interviews took place. Instances of the use of this
representative for consultation purposes are indicated in the
appropriate menoranda being furnished.
Enclosures (14)
1
-
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
The
NOTE:
The FBI representative referred to above was
Supervisor S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project who, on
prior approval, traveled to Atlanta for the dual function of
giving the SAS on-the-scene advice on behalf of the Legal Counsel
Division and to be available for consultation purposes as
indicated. It should be noted that it was necessary during
the course of some of the interviews for the SA to consult with
Phillips as to whether certain information was to be furnished
the interviewers and, notably in respect to SA Charles T. Haynes,
consultation resulted in our refusal to at this time acquiesce
to a request for information from Atlanta FO files. Also, the
interview of Haynes late afternoon 7/22/75 resulted in a request
for interview of Shea which was arranged on the scene and took
place morning of 7/23/75--details of clearance for this covered
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 71
2
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3
The Attorney General
NOTE CONTINUED:
in 7/24/75 memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall captioned
"Senstudy 75." LHMs were prepared by the seven SAS at Atlanta
on instructions of Phillips and submitted to Headquarters by
Atlanta airtel 7/24/75 under "Senstudy 75" caption. Copies of
airtel and LHMs will be placed in personnel files of respective
SAS.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 72
3
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
OTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
FROM:
TO:
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
2. DATE PROVIDED
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
8/4/75
SSC
HSC
The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding
to the White House
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
5.
Memorandum reporting results of on interviews by SSC Staff
Members of incumbent FBI Special Agents W. John Fenton, 0.
Richard Hamilton, Robert W. Thomson, Ronald P. Burgess, Alden
te espesa formal quest, other-
Shea.
IN RESPONSE TO is
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc:)
6. CLASSIFICATION. OF
INFORMATION (enter.
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
HA
U
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Surveillance, electronic
Intelligence collection
Organization and staffing
Intelligence ectivities, domestic
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
Former FBI investigations of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Southem Christian Leadership Conference, COINTELITO,
Stenley Levison
62-116395
FMK: Fmk
(4)
#M0R16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 SY SP.2 ALM
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
3791 (6-75)
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 73
TREAT AS YELLOW
62-11639; --495
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
ENCLOSURE
INSTRUCTIONS
•
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 74
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
OSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
fl Memorandum
TO
· Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
:
Legal Counsel
A..
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
1
-
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
1
-
Mr. Mintz.
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
DATE:
8/1/75
Personnel File
Seymor Phillips
Mr. Hotis
Mr. Daly
Holis
Mal
"
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD I
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laborato
Legal Coun
Plan.&Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y.
Michael Epstein, Staff Member, Senate Select Com-
mittee, requested that Staff interview be arranged with
Seymor Phillips concerning the Bureau's investigation of
Martin Luther King. He requested the interview be held at
10 a.m. 8/1/75. He was advised that this was not possible
and that sometime next week would be more acceptable.
It was
agreed that the interview would be conducted at 10 a.m. on
Monday, 8/4/75.
In view of the ongoing discussions between the
Department, representatives of the King family, and the Senate
Select Committee concerning Committee access to information con-
cerning Martin Luther King, Michael Shaheen was contacted con-
cerning this interview.
It was pointed out to Mr. Shaheen that Mr. Phillips
had a great deal of knowledge concerning the King investigation
and it could be assumed that information would be disclosed
during interview which might contravene an agreement with the
King family should such an agreement become perfected. Since
the Department was to meet with representatives of the King
family and Senate Select Committee members on 7/31/75, it was
suggested that any decision concerning Mr. Phillips interview
be held in abeyance pending a resolution of this problem.
'Shaheen agreed.
1.
D
Shaheen subsequently advised SA Daly that the meeting
with the King family representatives, Senate Select Committee'
representatives and the Department had not resulted in an agree-
ment. He said he had discussed the pending interview of
Mr. Phillips with the Committee Staff representatives and they
said they would furnish guidelines concerning the topics to be
covered during the interview. Shaheen indicated these guidelines
would be consistent with the King family's concerns regarding the
production of information from Bureau files concerning King.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERES UNCLASSIFIED
JBH/PVDATE10/17/2000 BY Spa Alm
MDR-16
(8)
8411 1975
REC-102
Alm/nf
62+116395
CONTINUED
-
OVER
NW 88608419cid:32989626 Buy 15.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
AUG 6 1975
VE
794
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
RE: SENSTUDY 75
Steven Blackhurst, Deputy Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination, later advised Inspector Hotis that
SA Phillips could discuss any aspect of the investigation other
than information developed through wiretaps or microphone
surveillance. Mr. Epstein assured him that he was not interested
in the substance of any conversation that might have been overheard,
but would inquire into such procedural matters as the number of
wiretaps installed and the identity of persons who authorized them.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That SA Phillips be released from existing employ-
ment agreement for purposes of this interview, consistent with
the above limitations.
(2) That an Intelligence Division representative
be available but not present during the interview of SA
Phillips in the event that questions arise concerning the
proper scope of the interview.
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NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 76
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 77
#тоель
NA INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS
15 UNCLASSIFIED
ENVELOPE
DATE 7/20/61 BY SP-2 ALATE
ENCLOSURE
116395-
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Louisville, Kentucky
March 20, 1973
:
Pages 1-5 of LчM, dated 3/20/73, at Louisville.
Serial 7
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DA
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 78
BY
MDR-16
Alm
:
A
Page 2 of AT dated 3/20/73, from SAC, Louisville, to
Acting Director, PBJ.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 79
Robert Chilton;
Luther C. Fonner, Jr.;
Jack Ferguson;
Reed McWhorter;
Fred McWhorter;
Walter "Dee" Huddleston
.
Mr. Edward M. Steutermann, 1211 Commonwealth
Building, Louisville, Kentucky, was interviewed by a
representative of the FBI on February 6, 1973. In this
interview, Mr. Steutermann stated the information that he
provided to United States Attorney Long concerning this
matter had been furnished to him originally, in part, by
former Kentucky Governor and then candidate for the office
of United States Senator, Louie B. Nunn. Mr. Steutermann
recalled that Mr. Nunn at the time was running against
Walter "Dee" Huddleston, now incumbent United States Senator,
for a seat in the United States Senate.
Mr. Steutermann further advicod
+144
in
T
|--
Page 2 of LHM, dated 2/7/73 at Louisville.
Serial 5
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 80

SPECIAL .NVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
March 22 1973
-
At the specific direction of the
Department, limited investigation has been
conducted of an allegation of Interstate
Transportation in Aid of Racketeering
Bribery involving the application for a
state bank charter in Albany, Kentucky.
The U. S. Attorney informed that Walter
"Doc" Huddleston, U. S. Senator, was ap-
proached in rebruary, 1972, by certain
individuals seeking a charter for a bank
+212 that cutnl
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11:34 int
--/---.
Note from Special Investigative Division, dated 3/22/73,
stapled to top of Airtel 
from SAC, Louisville to Acting
Director.
2/07/73.
NW 88608 Docld;32989626 Page 81.
Robert Chilton;
Tather C. Fonner, Jr.;
1
Page 3 of LAM dated 2/7/73, at Louisville.
Serial 5
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 82
ROBERT CHILTON;
LUTHER C. CONNER,
JR.;
JACK FERGUSON;
REED MC WHORTER;
ET AL
capacity to function for the Commissioner of Banking and
Securities. Mr. Mc Neely stated the Bank of Clinton County,
Inc., Albany, Kentucky, was granted a state bank charter on
March 21, 1973.
1-2 week
information developed during
the interview of Willis G. Moremen and a review of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes pertaining to banks and trust
companies set forth in Appendix A that the authority to
approve a state bank charter is held only by the Commissioner
or the Deputy Commissioner of the State Department of Banking
and Securities.
Page 4 of LHM, dated 4/27/73, at Louisville.
Serial 9
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 83
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
SECRET
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
1
1
ΤΟ
: Mr. W. k. Wannall
who fp
FROM : W. O.
cresduов
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
-
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. J. P. Thomas
DATE:
8/6/75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Iny.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y -
This is to record identities of Staff Members of
the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities
(SSC) who have had access to FBI materials pursuant to SSC
requests.
On 7/28/75, SSC delivered a "superceding request"
for various materials. In partial compliance with that request,
SSC Staff has been given access for review to the following:
Item
Date
t
Subject
Staff Member
III B & C
O & C Files
Mark Gitenstein
III D
Abuse areas
"
"
III E
IV C
SAC lets & memos
Foreign Operations
11
11
7/31-8/1/75
8/6/75
8/4/75
D
Policy Manual
John Elliff
8/4/75
IV D
5-yr. INTD Budget
Projection
"
"
IV G
INLET material
11
11
8/5/75
8/4-5/75
IV H
Insp. Div. material
re O & C files
Mark Gitenstein
7/31/75 -
IV F
8/5/75
Chilean Embassy
_ REC-102
62-116395
.1975.
Surreptitious Entry(5) John Elliff
Regarding the 5/14/75 SSC request, Appendi US,
Mark Gitenstein on 7/30/75 reviewed inspection reports of
Domestic Intelligence Division, January and September, 1971,
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
62-116395
JPT: 1hblhb
(4)
1.1975
SECRET
CLASSIFIED BYSPALM JUME
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_
NW 88608 Bocid:32989626 Page 84
MOR-14
WHERESY
WISE.
CONTINUED
-
OVER
gem-s
SECRET
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
and of San Francisco Division, October, 1970, and Dan Dwyer
reviewed Records Section Classifying Unit Guides (9 volumes)
on 7/31/75 and 8/1/75.
Jim Dick reviewed materials regarding Photo and
Physical Surveillance on 7/25/75.
ACTION:
JPT
None. For record purposes.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 85
- 2 -
SECRET
TO
TIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOY RNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. McDermott
FROM
:
J. C. Fa
con
SUBJECT:
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Eiles & Com.
DATE:August 1, 1975 on. Inv..
REQUEST BY U. S. SENATOR WALTER D. HUDDLESTON
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MEMBER TO REVIEW
HIS FBI FILES
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory _
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval:
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
On July 21, 1975, the Attorney General determined
there should be a disclosure of material in the files,
with certain exceptions (for details see J. B. Adams to
Callahan memorandum dated July 24, 1975, captioned "Request
by various Senators on Senate Select Committee to Review
their FBI files").
On August 1, 1975, Senator Huddleston and
Departmental Attorney, Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special
Counselor for Intelligence Coordination, were with James
B. Adams, Assistant to the Director, Deputy Associate
Director in his office from approximately 10:30 a.m.
to 11:05 a.m. During this time Senator Huddleston
reviewed the following FBI material pertaining to himself.
94-1-676-300
94-67291
166-5980
-
1 Mr. Adams
1
-
INITI
12 ON CRISTES
Mr. McDermott
AUG 6 1975
1
-
Mr. Farrington
1
-
Mr. Wannall
Attention:
Mr
Cregar
1-ENGLOSURS
Enclosures (6)
ENCLOSURE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED)
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BYSPRAUM | Umf
NW
66 1975
MDR-16
FIVE J
62-116395.
NOT RECORDED
46 AUG 6 1975
BUS. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Docid:32989626 Page 86
4-776
ORIGINAL FILED IN
J. C. Farrington to Mr. McDermott Memo
REQUEST BY U. S. SENATOR WALTER D. HUDDLESTON
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MEMBER
TO REVIEW HIS FBI FILES
!
Portions of file 166-5980 were masked out.
As these masks will be removed, a Xerox of the pertinent
portion of the respective documents have been made for
record purposes and attached to this memorandum. The sender
did not wish the masking whithin.
Senator Huddleston inquired if Boggs or Karem,
former employees who had been fired, had anything to do with
bribery allegation (166-5980) against him. File 166-5980
was reviewed on 8/1/75, and there was no mention of Boggs
or Karem in file.
Scurlly setti
ACTION:
/
For information concerning request of
Senator Huddleston.
New
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 87
жеде
-2-
Pr
PLM
для
Mr. J. A. Mintz
2
(1
1
-
1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep AD Adm. _
AD inv.
De
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
July 30,
1975
1
GRO
Mr. R. D. Hampton
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
This is in response to SSC letter dated July 3,
1975, requesting copies of all communications from the
FBI Director and/or other Headquarters personnel to more
than one FBI field office and/or to all Agents in those
offices regarding the activities of the SSC.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to
the Committee is the original of a memorandum with enclosures
which constitutes our response to this request.
A copy
of the memorandun and the enclosures is being provided for
your records.
P
Sensitive information pertaining to electronic
surveillance contained in FBIHQ teletype of June 13, 1975,
(attached) was not excised pursuant to advice received from
Mr. K. William O'Connor of your Department during consultation
with a representative of this Bureau on July 24, 1975. The
June 18, 1975, FBIIQ teletype (attached) has been sanitized
only to the extent that the terms "mail surveillance" and
"source" were substituted for wording which could, tend to
identify specific sensitive sources.
Enclosures (19)
62-116395
1
--
could tend to 192
62-265
REC-102
good
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
/ ENCLOSURE
1
Intelligence Coordination
Files & Com. _RDH: mjg /\\, ÁLL INFORMATION CONTAINED
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
(9).
gen
MAIL ROOM
1075
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO 7000 BY SP
NW 48608bcl:2989626 Page 88
MDR-16
TELETYPE UNIT
9 AUG 8 1975
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
Pem
WOC
हा
the 7-11-75703
to Sta
GPO 1975 O-569-920
NEGAR
406 3 8 7
*The Attorney Ceneral
NOTE:
The enclosures constitute all of the communications
that have been sent by FIIIIQ to all SACs or more than one
office regarding the SSC.
Supervisor J. P. Thomas, CI-2, INTO, consulted with
K. William O'Connor, regarding possible excisions to 6/13 and 18/75
teletypes, to protect electronic surveillance and mail
surveillance operations. O'Connor advised that the material
should be given to the SSC. He was informed that this would be
noted in our memorandum to the Attorney General and he assented
to this. Subsequently, Mr. Adams instructed that the code
names of the mail surveillances should be deleted.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 89
- 2 -
02-110300
C
ลง
2
1
pod pod pol
1
-
-
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. R. D. Hampton
July 30, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COFIITTEE
TO STUDY COVERICIENTAL OPERATIONS
VIŢII RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE:
COMETUNICATIONS FROI FBI
HEADQUARTERS TO FBI FIELD OFFICES
AID AGENTS CONCERNING THE CSC
Reference is made to the letter fron the captioned
Committee dated July 3, 1975, which contained their request
fox copies of all communications fron the FBI Director
and/or other FBI Headquarters personnel to more than one
FBI field office and/or to all Agents in those offices
regarding the activities of the SSC.
Pursuant to your request, coples of the following
communications are enclosed for you:
1) Teletype dated January 20, 1075, from Director,
FBI, to all Special Agents in Charge (ACS) and all Legal
Attaches (Legats).
2) Teletype dated March 24, 1075, fron Director,
FDI, to all SACS.
3) Teletype dated May 2, 1975, from Director, FDI,
to all SACS.
4) Teletype dated by 2, 1975, Iron Director, FDI,
to SACS, Alexandria, Faltinore, New Haven, Newark and Omaha.
5) Teletype dated May 28, 1975, from Director, FDI,
to SACs, Alexandric, Atlanta, Baltimore, Charlotte, Chicago,
Dep. AD Adm. Kansas City, Little Rock, Newark, Omaha, Philadelphia,
Portland, Phoenix, Tamps and Washington Field.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
—
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y —
6) Teletype dated May 20, 1975, Iron Director,
FDI, to all SACS.
ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL
RDH:mjg
(8)
ज्ञ
MAIL ROOM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO 17/2006 BY SP2 num
MDR-1662
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 90
WAY
نية
1113375-492
ENCLOSURE
Tum
GPO 1975 O - 569-920

United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC)
Res
Communications from FBI-
Headquarters to FBI Field Offices
and Agents Concerning the SSC
7) Teletype dated June 13, 1975, Efrom Director, FBI,
to SACS, Detroit, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Sacramento
and Washington Field.
8) Teletype dated June 18, 1975, from Director, FBI
to SACS, New York, Boston, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami.
San Francisco, Seattle and Washington Field.
Memorandum To All Employees dated May 28, 1975,
from Director, FBI, regarding interviews of FBI employees.
Enclosures (9)
The Attorney General
NW 88608 Docld:32989626. Page 91-
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Addressee:
☐ LTR
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Senate Select Committee
☑ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated
7/281757/30/75
U.S. Senate Select Committee Re: Communica-
Caption of Document: tions from FBI Headquarters to FBI
Field Offices and Agents Concerning the SSC.
Originating Office:
Delivered by: Richard T. aylor).
Received by:
FBI
310
am
J.
Date:
8/5/75
See
Title: Екее вес
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
1/2000 BYSPJALM
DATE 16/17/5
MOR-16
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 92
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
TO:
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT:
FROM:
FBI
Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
SSC
7/30/75
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum and enclosures
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter 7/0/75
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
U
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Information handling
8.
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
Forwarding to the Committee all communications from
the FBI Director and/or other FBI Readquarters
personnel to more than one FBI field office and/or
to all Agents in those offices regarding the activities
of the SSC
62-116395
FMK: fmk
(4)
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELD 17/2006 BY SPO Dum
10/17/
MDR-16
TREAT AS YELLOW
Wo
3791(6-75)
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 93
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
INSTRUCTIONS
•
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 94
CODE
‘TELÈTYPE
IMMEDIATE
1-29-75
TO ALL SACS AND ALL LEGATS
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
DESTRUCTION OF FIELD FILES AND RECORDS.
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPOSED INVESTIGATION AND
STUDY OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAVE REQUESTED
THE BUREAU NOT TO DESTROY, REMOVE FROM OUR POSSESSION
OR CONTROL, OR OTHERWISE DISPOSE OR PERMIT DISPOSAL OF
ANY RECORDS OR DOCUMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE A BEAKING ON
SUBJECTS UNDER INVESTIGATION. ACCORDINGLY, UPON RECEIPT
OF THIS COMMUNICATION, RECIPIENTS ARE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD
½ IN ABEYANCE ANY RECORDS DESTRUCTION PROGRAM PREVIOUSLY
: APPROVED BY STATUTE OR REGULATIONS. FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
IN THIS MATTER WILL BE ISSUED UPON RECEIPT.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626- Page 95
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN
DATE 101/2000
MOR-16
[CODE
TELETYPE
NITEL
3-24-75
TO ALL SACS
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ·
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMA-
TION FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN
OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD
SUTEL TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION,
SETTING FORTH SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS
AND AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT
ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES, SHOULD BE USED IF APPRO-
PRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY CATEGORIES. THIS
INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY BETWEEN INTERNAL
2
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO 
17/2000 BYSD2A
MOR-16
$m
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 96
· TELETYPE TO ALL SACS
RE: SENATE SELECT.COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
}
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. YOUR RESPONS, SHOULD
BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 97
CODE
TO SACS ALL OFFICES
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
C
SENSTUDY 75
TELETYPE
NITEL
5/2/75
PERSONAL ATTENTION
CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS
FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN
CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK
ΤΟ
INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.
RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS
INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED
THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.
THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE
AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDER-
TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE
DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO 17/2000 BY SP2 ALM
TEL/17/200
MDR-16
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 98
TELETYPE TO ALL OF
RE: SENSTUDY 75
}
PROTECTED.
SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND
HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFOR-
MATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD
BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL.
YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH
OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER.
PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.
THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES
OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD
BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.
m
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 99
CODE
о
TELETYPE
URGENT
5/2/75
TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
NEW HAVEN
NEWARK
OMAHA
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
SENSTUDY 75
PERSONAL ATTENTION
CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS
FROM SEHATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
T
CONECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES,
JLAKE
קינה.
MAV
1231 R
1424
INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES. THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS ALREADY INTERVIEWED SOME FORMER
EMPLOYEES. NEWARK TELETYPE APRIL 30 LAST "ADMINISTRATIVE
INQUIRY; 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATING CONVENTION,
ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY," REPORTED ADVICE FROM FORMER
SPECIAL AGENI JOHN P. DEVLIN THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED BY
:
MICHAEL T. EPSTEIN,
SSC STAFF MEMBER, CONCERNING DEVLIN'S PART
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
:
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SP2 Am / haf
MDR-16
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
hel without the express approval of the FBI.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989626_Page_100

TELETYPE TO SACS, A KANDRIA ET AL
RE: SIISTUDY 75
IN FBI'S ACTIVITIES AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY,
AUGUST 22-28, 1964.
SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMEER
BUREAU AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL SQUAD AT ATLANTIC CITY,
AUGUST, 1964. EACH OF THESE FORMER AGENTS IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY
CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT THEY MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC
STAFF. THEY ARE NOT, REPEAT HOT, TO BE ADVISED OF THE AREA WHICH
MAY BE COVERED IN AITY INTERVIEW OF THEM BY THE SSC. THEY SHOULD,
HOWEVER, BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING
THE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE
BUREAU OPERATIONS, THEY CAN REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT.
CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER AGENTS TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY
SĄC OR ASAC. IN THE EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE,
BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.“
то
IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAU
BY. TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER AGENT NO LONGER IN
YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICE
IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.
NEWARK SHOULD INCLUDE RECONTACT WITH DEVLIN FOR PURPOSE
INDICATED ABOVE AND ALSO FURNISH BUREAU ANY INFORMATION DEVLIN
MAY HAVE FURNISHED YOUR OFFICE IN ADDITION TO THAT IN YOUR TELETYPE.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 101
2
-
TELLTYPE TO SACS, ALEXANDRIA ET AL
RE: SEXSTUDY 75
ALEXANDRIA: HAROLD F. LEINBAUGH, 1643 NORTH A
WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 8338 MAGON WHEEL ROAD,
ALEXANDRIA.
BALTIMORE:
LEXANDRIA
LOWALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD SINEET, CHEVY CHASE
OXFORD
NEW HAVEN HOBSON H. &COCK, 65 GLANBROOK ROAD, SINIFORD,
CONNECTICUI.
NEWARK: LEO THOMAS CLARK, 1421 ATLANTIC AVENUE,
ATLANTIC CITY. JOHN PAIRICK LEVLIH, 39 BENNINGT IN ROAD,
LIVINGSTON, NEZ JERSEY.
*
SHORT HILLS, BEW JERSEY.
HOWARD J. WILSON, 30 CAPPBELL ROAD,
OMENA: JOHN J. QUINN, IORA LAW ENFORCEMENT AGADDY,
JOLLISTON, 1074
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 102
CODE
TO SACS ALEXANDRIA
ATLAITTA
BALTIMORE
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
TELETYPE
NEWARK
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PORTLAND
PHOENIX
KANSAS CITY
TAMPA
LITTLE ROCK
WFO
FROM DIRECTOR FBI'
SENSTUDY 75
NITEL
5/28/75
☑
PERSONAL ATTENTION
"
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975..
INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
CONCERNING A NUMBER OF PRESENT AND FORMER FRY EMPLOYERS,
717
CLUDING THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS, SUGGESTS THEY MAY BE INTER-
VIEWED BY SSC STAFF, EXACT SUBJECT MATTERS FOR INTERVIEWS UN-
KNOWN. SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF
FORMER BUREAU EMPLOYEES AND OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCUMBENTS,
REC-100
ALL OF WHOM SSC HAS INQUIRED ABOUT.
EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY CON-
TACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE (SHE) MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO 1/2000.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989626 Page 103
MDR-16
TELETYPE TO SACS ALEXANDRIA ET AL
RE:
ŞENSTUDY 75
AS A
SSC STAFF, SUBJECT MATTER UNKNOWN. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT
IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURING THE COURSE OF SAME,
THE
QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS
(SOURCES, METHODS, TECHNIQUES, THIRD AGENCY RULE, AND ONGOING
INVESTIGATIONS), THEY MAY REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT.
BUREAU WILL PROVIDE AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE.
PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING
CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM. INCLUDING
OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS
FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE
IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSÈ WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE
GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION. CONTACTS
WITH
WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR
ASAC.
IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED
BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.
INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES TO BE ADVISED THAT IF CONTACTED BY SSC
STAFF FOR INTERVIEW, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION TO BE IMMEDIATELY
NOTIFIED THROUGH SAC.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 104
- 2
TELETYPE TO SACS ALEXANDRIA ET AL
RE:
SELSTUDY 75
IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED
BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER
RMER 
EMPLOYEE NO
LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO
OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS,
ALEXANDRIA: COURTLAND J. JONES, 6607 N. 29TH STREET,
ARLINGTON, VA.; ROBERT G. KUNKEL, SAC; BERNARD A. WELLS,
5311 MONTGOMERY STREET, SPRINGFIELD, VA.
ATLANTA: ALDEN F. MILLER
BALTIMORE: ERNEST H. BELTER, 616 EDNOR ROAD, SILVER SPRING,
MARYLAND; STERLING B. DONAHOE, 2813 SPIRAL LANE, BOWIE, MARYLAND;
ROBERT H. HAYNES, 205 NORTHMOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND
JOSEPH A.`SIZOO, 84A PINE CRESCENT, WHISPERING PE
CHARLOTTE:
NORTH CAROLINA
CHICAGO: OLGA CIESA, 10409 S. INDIANA AVENUE, CHICAGO,
ILLINOIS
KANSAS CITY: BILL D. WILLIAMS, SAC
LITTLE ROCK: JOHN J. CREAMER, JR., ASAC
NEWARK: JOHN J. CONNOLLY; RITA AGNES AMBROSIO,
1604 JOHN STREET, FORT LEE, NEW JERSEY; RALPH W. BACHMAN,
610 NORWOOD DRIVE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY; KARL L. BROUSE,
PINES
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 105
-
3
TELLTYPE TO SACS ALEXANDRIA ET AL
RE: STSTUDY 75
5 BURRINGTON GORGE, WESTFIELD, NEW JERSEY.
OMAHA:
ROBERT L. TAGG
PHILADELPHIA:
JOHN B. MEADE
PORTLAND: LEO B. APP, JR.; EDGAR O. INGALLS
PHOENIX:
ARIZONA
MILDRED E. RISK, 11830 113TH DRIVE, YOUNGTOWN,
TAMPA: MICHAEL J. ROZAMUS, 6509 GULF DRIVE, HOLMES BEACH,
FLORIDA
WFO: JAMES J. GAFFNEY; ELMER L. TODD
ROME: THOMAS J. BIAMONTE; JOSEPH C. MICHE LA; HELEN C. SPEAR
COPY TO ROME, WITH ITS EMPLOYEES NAMED, BY MAIL.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989626_Page_106
CODE
TO ALL SACS
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
SENSTUDY
-
75.
TELETYPE
NITEL
20
MAY 19, 1975
PERSONAL ATTENTION
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR
INFORMATION.
IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC
IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1970.
IN HANDLING SUCH INQUIRIES INSURE ESTABLISHING BONA FIDES
OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR,
IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.
UNLESS INFORMATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE
CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FBIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY
FBIHQ MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL
INFORMATION FURNISHED.
INFORMATION.
This document is prepared in response your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use i. I'mited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATEL/17/2000 BY
'MDR-16
NW-88608-Docld:32989626-Page-107-
CODE
O
TO SACS DETROIT
HONOLULU
LOS ANGELES
MILWAUKEE
SACRAMENTO
WFO
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
SENSTUDY 75
URGENT
TELETYPE
JUNE 13, 1975
IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST,
FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY RETURN TELETYPE ATTENTION INTD´ ·
W. O. CREGAR.
-
2
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AT FBIHQ DO NOT INDICATE
OVERHEARS ON KNOWN TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MARTIN LUTHIER
KING, JR. FOR FOLLOWING DATES AND LOCATIONS:
WIRETAPS
APRIL 24
-
26, 1964
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
JULY 7 - 9, 1964
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL
LOS ANGELES
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SPOALM/unf
MDR-14
The document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
ma on outside your Committee. Its use limited to officia
ommittee and the content may not be disclosed to
me out the express appeal of the FBI .
oceedings by
orized person-
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 108
1
"
.
PAGE TWO
MICROPHONES
JANUARY 5
8,
1964
WILLARD HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 27, 1964
SHROEDER HOTEL
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN
FEBRUARY 18
-
20, 1964
HILTON HAWAIIAN VILLAGE.
HONOLULU, HAWAII
FEBRUARY 20
-
21, 1964
AMBASSADOR HOTEL
LOS ANGELES
FEBRUARY 22
-
249
1964
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL
LOS ANGELES
MARCH 19
-
20, 1964
STATLER HOTEL
DETROIT, MICHIGAN
APRIL 23
-
24, 1964
SENATOR HOTEL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
JULY 7
9,
1964
HYATT HOUSE MOTEL
LOS ANGELES
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 109-
1
:
PAGE THREE
OFFICES REVIEW ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AND
FURNISH FBIHQ FIRST DATE THAT KING WAS OVERHEARD ON ABOVE
TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS. IF HE WAS NOT HEARD, SO ADVISE.
NW-88608 Docid:32989626 Page 110

COLE
TELETYPE
TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
MIANI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO
IMMEDIATE
JUNE 18, 1975
SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED:
JUNE 24, 1975.
THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ
FROM THE SENATE SELECT COISHITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:
"
THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO
AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL'
AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY,
....
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS,
✓ OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES: (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL
OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU
"OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE
STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS
CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE
OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO/17/2006 BXSP2 sum umf
MOR-16
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee.
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI,
Its use is limited to official proceedings by
1
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 111
PAGE TWO TOP SECRET
1
AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT (2) FOR ALL
INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI
1
EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE
EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE
THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES
OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF
MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE
ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO
THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF: AND
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND
COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE.
EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL
INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON,
DETROIT, LOS ANGELES. SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFOR-
MAIL SURVEILLANCE
MATION CONCERNING
NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN
MAIL SURVEILLANCE.
FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING
of
MAIL SURVEILLANCE.
NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING
MAIL SURVEILLANCE.
SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 112
· PAGE THREE
SECRET
· MAIL SURVEILLANCE
AND
SOURCE
FROM
1
MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED
1
RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO
APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED.
RESULTS SHOULD BE
SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD
REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 113
Unexcised copy
K
CODE
TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
N
TELETYPE
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
LOS ANGELES
WFO
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
IMMEDIATE
JUNE 18, 1975
SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.
THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ
FROM THE SENATE SELECT COFIITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:
"
THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO
AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL'
AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY,
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS,
: OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL
OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU
"OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE
STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS
CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE
OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE!0/17/2000 BYSP2Dim At
MDR-16
NW-88608-Docid:32989626-Page-1-15-
PAGE TWO TOP SECRET
AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL
INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI
EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE
EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE
THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES
´OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF
MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE
ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO
THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF: AND
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND
COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."
EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL
INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE.
NEW YORK, BOSTON,
DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFOR-
MATION CONCERNING
NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN
FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING
NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING
SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 116
F
PAGE THREE TOP SECRET
AND
MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED
INFORMATION
RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO
FROM
APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED.
RESULTS SHOULD BE
SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. Ò. CREGAR, AND SHOULD
REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.
F
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 117
AMERICAN
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
1-75
BICENTE
*
*
U. TED STATES DEPARTMENT C. JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
May 28, 1975
MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES
RE: INTERVIEWS OF FBI EMPLOYEES
All employees are advised that Congress is conducting
an inquiry into activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Congressional staff members are conducting interviews of former
and current FBI employees. This Bureau has pledged its cooperation
with the Congress.
You are reminded of the FBI Employment Agreement
(copy attached) with which you agreed to comply during your employment
in the FBI and following termination of such employment.
Also, you are reminded of Title 28, Code of Federal
Regulations, Section 16.22 (copy attached), which reads as follows:
"No employee or former employee of the Department of
Justice shall, in response to a demand of a court or other authority,
produce any material contained in the files of the Department or disclose
any information relating to material contained in the files of the Department,
or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as part of
the performance of his official duties or because of his official status
without prior approval of the appropriate Department official or the
Attorney General in accordance with Section 16. 24.
"
Also, you are reminded of Department of Justice Order
Number 116-56, dated May 15, 1956, (copy attached) which, among
other things, requires an employee upon the completion of his testimony
to prepare a memorandum outlining his testimony.
Our cooperative efforts, of course, must be consistent
with the above cited authority. Therefore, if you are contacted for
purpose of interview or testimony you are to request approval as
required by the Employment Agreement and await authorization before
furnishing information, testimony, or record material.
Enclosures (3)
Contelley
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE ) 0 /17/2006 BYSPQAm/
MDR-16
Clarence M. Kelley
Director
REVOLUTION
1776-1916
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 118
Г
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
As consideration for employment in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United
States Department of Justice, and as a condition for continued employment, I hereby declare
that I intend to be governed by and I will comply with the following provisions:
(1) That I am hereby advised and I understand that Federal law such as
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793, 794, and 798; Order of the
President of the United States (Executive Order 11652); and regulations
issued by the Attorney General of the United States (28 Code of Federal
Regulations. Sections 16.21 through 16.26) prohibit loss, misuse, or un-
authorized disclosure or production of national security information, other
classified information and other nonclassified information in the files of
the FBI;
(2) I understand that unauthorized disclosure of information in the files
of the FBI or information I may acquire as an employee of the FBI could
result in impairment. of national security, place human life in jeopardy, or
result in the denial of due process to a person or persons who are subjects
of an FBI investigation, or prevent the FBI from effectively discharging its
responsibilities. I understand the need for this secrecy agreement; there-
fore, as consideration for employment I agree that I will never divulge,
publish, or reveal either by word or conduct, or by other means disclose to
any unauthorized recipient without official written authorization by the
Director of the FBI or his delegate, any information from the investigatory
files of the FBI or any information relating to material contained in the files,
or disclose any information or produce any material acquired as a part of the
performance of my official duties or because of my official status. The burden
is on me to determine, prior to disclosure, whether information may be disclosed
and in this regard I agree to request approval of the Director of the FBI in each
such instance by presenting the full text of my proposed disclosure in writing to
the Director of the FBI at least thirty (30) days prior to disclosure. I understand
that this agreement is not intended to apply to information which has been placed
in the public domain or to prevent me from writing or speaking about the FBI but
it is intended to prevent disclosure of information where disclosure would be
contrary to law, regulation or public policy. I agree the Director of the FBI is
in a better position than I to make that determination;
(3) I agree that all information acquired by me in connection with my official
duties with the FBI and all official material to which I have access remains
the property of the United States of America, and I will surrender upon demand
by the Director of the FBI or his delegate, or upon separation from the FBI, any
material relating to such information or property in my possession;
(4) That I understand unauthorized disclosure may be a violation of Federal
law and prosecuted as a criminal offense and in addition to this agreement may
be enforced by means of an injunction or other civil remedy.
I accept the above provisions as conditions for my employment and continued employment
in the FBI. I agree to comply with these provisions both during my employment in the FBI and
following termination of such employment.
(Signature)
(Type or print name)
Witnessed and accepted in behalf of the Director, FBI, on
19
by
'
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 119
(Signature)
[
Atrof K. Jen in { >= "all are the retreated mutand la misma Juntas Fath
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530
January 18, 1973
ORDER NO.501-73
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Title 28-JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
Chapter -Department of Justice
[Order 501-73]
PART 16-PRODUCTION OR DISCLO-
SURE OF MATERIAL OR INFORMA-
TION
Subpart B-Production or Disclosure
in Response to Subpenas or De-
mands of Courts or Other Authori-
ties
This order delegates to certain De-
partment of Justice officials the author-
ity to approve the production or dis-
closure of material or information con-
tained in Department files, or informa-
tion or material acquired by a person
while employed by the Department. It
applies where a subpena, order or other
demand of a court or other authority,
such as an administrative agency, is is-
sued for the production or disclosure of
such information.
By virtue of the authority vested in me
by 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, and 5 U.S.C. 301,
Subpart B of Part 16 of Chapter I of
Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, is
revised, and its provisions renumbered,
to read as follows:
Subpart B-Production or Disclosure in Response
to Subpenas or Demands of Courts or Other
Authorities
Sec.
16.21
16.22
16.23
Purpose and scope.
Production or disclosure prohibited
unless approved by appropriate De-
partment official.
Procedure in the event of a demand
for production or disclosure.
16.24 Final action by the appropriate De-
partment official or the Attorney
Goneral.
.6.25 Procedure where a Department decl-
sion concerning a demand is not
made prior to the time a response
to the demand is required.
6.26 Procedure in the event of an adverse
ruling.
AUTHORITY: 28 U.S.C. 509, 510 and 5 U.S.C.
:01.
Subpart B-Production or Disclosure
in Response to Subpenas or De-
monds of Courts or Other Authori-
ties
16.21
Purpose and scope.
(a) This subpart sets forth the pro-
cedures to be followed when a subpena,
order, or other demand (hereinafter re-
ferred to as a "demand") of a court or
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 120
other authority is issued for the produc-
tion or disclosure of (1) any material
contained in the files of the Department,
(2) any information relating to material
contained in the files of the Department,
or (3) any information or material
acquired by any person while such per-
son was an employee of the Department
as a part of the performance of his of-
ficial duties or because of his official
status.
(b) For purposes of this subpart, the
term “employee of the Department” in-
cludes all officers and employees of the
United States appointed by, or subject
to the supervision, jurisdiction, or control
of, the Attorney General of the United
States, including U.S. attorneys, U.S.
marshals, and members of the staffs of
those oficials.
§ 16.22 Production or disclosure prohih-
ited unless approved by appropriate
Department official.
No employee or former employee of the
Department of Justice shall, in response
to a demand of a court or other au-
thority, produce any material contained
in the files of the Department or disclose
any information relating to material con-
tained in the files of the Department, or
disclose any information or produce any
material acquired as part of the per-
formance of his official duties or because
of his official status without prior ap-
proval of the appropriate Department of-
ficial or the Attorney General in accord-
ance with $ 16.24.
§ 16.23
Procedure in the event of a de-
mand for production or disclosure.
(a) Whenever a demand is made upon
an employee or former employee of the
Department for the production of ma-
terial or the disclosure of information
described in § 16.21(a), he shall im-
mediately notify the U.S. attorney for
the district where the issuing authority
is located. The U.S. attorney shall im-
mediately request instructions from the
appropriate Department official, as desig-
nated in paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) The Department officials author-
ized to approve production or disclosure
under this subpart are:
(1) In the event that the case or other
matter which gave rise to the demanded
material or information is or, if closed,
was within the cognizance of a division
of the Department, the Assistant At-
torney General in charge of that divi-
sion. This authority may be redelegated
to Deputy Assistant Attorneys General.
(2) In instances of demands that are
not covered by paragraph (b) (1) of this
section:
ORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 10/17/2000 BYSPOraum/unf
MDR-16

(i) The Director of the Federal Bu- § 16.26 Procedure in the event of an ad-
reau of Investigation, if the demand is
one made on an employee or former em-
ployee of that Bureau for information
or if the demand calls for the production
of material from the files of that Bu-
reau, and
(ii) The Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, if the demand is one made on
an employee or former employee of that
Bureau for information or if the de-
mand calls for the production of ma-
terial from the files of that Bureau.
(3) In instances of demands that are
not covered by paragraph (b) (1) or (2)
of this section, the Deputy Attorney
General.
(c) If oral testimony is sought by the
demand, an affidavit, or, if that is not
feasible, a statement by the party seek-
ing the testimony or his attorney, setting
forth & summary of the testimony de-
sired, must be furnished for submission
by the U.S. attorney to the appropriate
Department official.
16.24 Final action by the appropriate
Department official or the Attorney
General.
(a) If the appropriate Department of- ↳
ficial, as designated in § 16.23 (b), ap-
proves a demand for the production of
material or disclosure of information,
he shall so notify the U.S. attorney and
such other persons as circumstances may
warrant.
(b) If the appropriate Department
official, as designated in § 16.23(b),
decides not to approve a demand for the
production of material or disclosure of
information, he shall immediately refer
the demand to the Attorney General for
decision. Upon such referral, the Attor-
ney General shall make the final decision
and give notice thereof to the U.S. attor-
ney and such other persons as circum-
stances may warrant.
§ 16.25
Procedure where a Department
decision concerning a demand is not
made prior to the time a response to
the demand is required.
If response to the demand is required
before the instructions from the appro-
priate Department official or the Attor-
ney General are received, the U.S. attor-
ney or other Department attorney des-
ignated for the purpose shall appear with
the employee or former employee of the
Department upon whom the demand has
been made, and shall furnish the court
or other authority with a copy of the
regulations contained in this subpart and
inform the court or other authority that
the demand has been, or is being, as
the case may be, referred for the
prompt consideration of the appropriate
Department official and shall respect-
fully request the court or authority to
stay the demand pending receipt of the
requested instructions.
verse ruling.
If the court or other authority declines
to stay the effect of the demand in re-
sponse to a request made in accordance
with § 16.25 pending receipt of instruc-
tions, or if the court or other authority
rules that the demand must be com-
plied with irrespective of instructions
not to produce the material or disclose
the information sought, in accordance
with § 16.24, the employee or former em-
ployee upon whom the demand has been.
made shall respectfully decline to comply
with the demand. “United States ex rei
Touhy v. Ragen," 340 U.S. 462.
Dated: January 11, 1973.
RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc.78-1071 Filed 1-17-78;8:45 am]
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 121
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
May 15, 1956.
ORDER NO. 116-56
It is the policy of the Department of Justice to extend the fullest
possible cooperation to congressional committees requesting information from
departmental files, interviews with department employees, testimony of depart-
ment personnel, or testimony of Federal prisoners. The following procedures
are prescribed in order to effectuate this policy on a basis which will be
mutually satisfactory to the congressional committees and to the Department.
(This order supersedes the Deputy Attorney General's Memorandum No. 5, dated
March 23, 1953, and his Memorandum No. 97, dated August 5, 1954. It formal-
izes the Attorney General's press release of November 5, 1953, establishing
procedures to permit committees of the Congress and their authorized repre-
sentatives to interview and to take sworn testimony from Federal prisoners,
It supplements Order No. 3229 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953, and Order
No. 3464, Supplement No. 4 (Revised) dated January 13, 1953 (with Memorandum
of "Authorization Under Order No. 3464 Supplement No. 4 (Revised)" dated
January 13, 1953), insofar as said orders have reference to procedures to be
followed in the Department's relations with congressional committees.
support of this order, reference should be had to the President's letter
dated May 17, 1954, addressed to the Secretary of Defense, and to the Attorney
General's Memorandum which accompanied it.]
A. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM DEPARTMENT FILES
In
1. Congressional committee requests for the examination of files
or other confidential information should be reduced to writing, signed by
the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney General,
who is responsible for the coordination of our liaison with Congress and
congressional'committees. The request shall state the specific information
sought as well as the specific objective for which it is sought. The Deputy
Attorney General will forward the request to the appropriate division where a
reply will be prepared and returned for the Deputy Attorney General's signa-
ture and dispatch to the chairman of the committee.
2. If the request concerns a closed case, i. e., one in which
there is no litigation or administrative action pending or contemplated,
the file may be made available for review in the Department, in the presence
of the official or employee having custody thereof, The following procedure
shall be followed in such cases:
a.
The reply letter will advise the committee that the
file is available for examination and set forth the
name, telephone extension number, and room number of
the person who will have custody of the file to be
reviewed;
FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATEL 11/2000 BYSP2 ALM
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6/17/8
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 122
T
2
b. Before making the file available to the committee
representative all reports and memoranda from the FBI
as well as investigative reports from any other agency,
will be removed from the file and not be made available
for examination; provided however that if the committee
representative states that it is essential that information
from the FBI reports and memoranda be made available,
he will be advised that the request will be considered
by the Department. Thereafter a summary of the contents
of the FBI reports and memoranda involved will be
prepared which will not disclose investigative tech-
niques, the identity of confidential informants, or
other matters which might jeopardize the investigative
operations of the FBI. This summary will be forwarded
by the division to the FBI with a request for advice as
to whether the FBI has any objection to examination of
such summary by the committee representative. The file
will not be physically relinquished from the custody of
the Department. If the committee representative desires
to examine investigative reports from other government
agencies, contained in the files of the Department, he
will be advised to direct his request to the agency whose
reports are concerned.
3. If the request concerns an open case, i. e., one which liti-
gation or administrative action is pending or contemplated, the file may
not be made available for examination by the committee's representative.
The following procedure shall be followed:
The reply letter should advise the committee that
its request concerns a case in which litigation or
administrative action is pending or contemplated, and
state that the file cannot be made available until the
case is completed; and
b.
Should briefly set forth the status of the case in
as much detail as is practicable and prudent without
jeopardizing the pending contemplated litigation or
administrative action.
B. REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEWS WITH DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL
1.
Requests for interviews with departmental personnel regarding
any official matters within the Department should be reduced to writing,
signed by the chairman of the committee, and addressed to the Deputy Attorney
General. When the approval of the Deputy Attorney General is given, the
employee is expected to discuss such matters freely and cooperatively with
the representative, subject to the limitations prescribed in A respecting
open cases and data in investigative reports;
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 123
"
3
2. Upon the completion of the interview with the committee repre-
sentative the employee will prepare a summary of it for the file, with a
copy routed to his division head and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney
General.
C. EMPLOYEES TESTIFYING BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
1. When an employee is requested to testify before a congressional
committee regarding official matters within the Department the Deputy Attorney
General shall be promptly informed. When the Deputy Attorney General's approv-
al is given the employee is expected to testify freely subject to limitations
prescribed in A respecting open cases and data in investigative reports;
2. An employee subpoenaed to testify before a congressional committee
on official matters within the Department shall promptly notify the Deputy
Attorney General. In general he shall be guided in testifying by Order 3229
(Revised) and the President's letter of May 17, 1954, cited at the beginning
of this Order.
3. Upon the completion of his testimony the employee will prepare
a memorandum outlining his testimony with a copy routed to his division head
and a copy routed to the Deputy Attorney General.
D.
REQUESTS OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES FOR THE TESTIMONY OF FEDERAL PRISONERS
Because of the custodial hazards involved and the extent to which
their public testimony may affect the discipline and well-being of the institu-
tion, it is the policy of the Department not to deliver Federal prisoners out-
side the penal institution in which they are incarcerated for the purpose of
being interviewed or examined under oath by congressional committees. However,
when it appears that no pending investigation or legal proceeding will be
adversely affected thereby and that the public interest will not be otherwise
adversely affected, Federal prisoners may be interviewed or examined under oath
by congressional committees in the institution in which they are incarcerated
under the following procedures, and with the specific advance approval of the
Deputy Attorney General.
1. Arrangements for interviewing and taking of sworn testimony
from a Federal prisoner by a committee of the Congress or the authorized
representatives of such a committee shall be made in the form of a written
request by the chairman of the committee to the Deputy Attorney General.
2. Such written request shall be made at least ten (10) days
prior to the requested date for the interview and the taking of testimony
and shall be accompanied by written evidence that authorization for the
interview or the taking of sworn testimony was approved by vote of the com-
mittee. Such request shall contain a statement of the purpose and the sub-
jects upon which the prisoner will be interrogated as well as the names of
all persons other than the representatives of the Department of Justice who
will be present.
30.
A member of the interested committee of the Congress shall be
present during the entire time of the interrogation.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 124
*4
4. The warden of the penal institution in which the Federal
prisoner is incarcerated shall, at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to the
time at which the interview takes place, advise the Federal prisoner concerned
of the proposed interview or taking of sworn testimony; and shall further
advise that he is under the same, but no greater obligation to answer than any
other witness who is not a prisoner.
5. The warden of the penal institution shall have complete
authority in conformity with the requirements of security and the mainte-
nance of discipline to limit the number of persons who will be present at
the interview and taking of testimony,-
6. The warden or his authorized representative shall be present
at the interview and at the taking of testimony and the Department of Justice
shall have the right to have one of its representatives present throughout
the interview and taking of testimony.
7. The committee shall arrange to have a stenographic transcript
made of the entire proceedings at committee expense and shall furnish a copy
of the transcript to the Department of Justice.
E. OBSERVERS IN ATTENDANCE AT COMMITTEE HEARINGS
In order that the Department may be kept currently advised in
matters within its responsibility, and in order that the Deputy Attorney
General may properly coordinate the Department's liaison with Congress and
its committees, each division that has an observer in attendance at a
congrssional hearing, will have the observer prepare a written summary of
the proceeding which should be sent to the division head and a copy routed
to the Deputy Attorney General.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 125
/s/ Herbert Brownell,
Attorney General
Jr.
r
ť
The Attorney Ceneral
Director, FEI
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITICE
OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
1 - Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 Mr. Mintz
-
July 25, 1075
1 - Mr. Crégar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
Reference is made to a letter from John F. Elliïí,
dated July 23, 1975, requesting that a list of knowledgeable individuals,
who were contacted by the Inspection Division of this Baroma during its
inquiry into the "official and confidential" Wiles be forwarded to the
Senate Select Committee.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum, with enclosure, which
is in response to the aforementioned request.
A copy of this memorandum, with enclosure
furnished for your recorda.
is being
Enclosures (4)
62-116505
REC- 102
12-116385
9 AUG 8 1978
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: I, William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Assoc. D. + ENCLOSK
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Intelligence Coordination
PVD:dkg (11)
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608432989275Page 126
ра
SEE NOTE - PAGE 2
gid
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINDI
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATSID 17/2000 BYSPON
#MDR-14
7/30/75
:: Phese Zemmar tutalk RT
to O'Connors office 7/29/75 AUD
دسرور
GPO 1975 O-569-920
1
The Attorney General
NOTE: By letterhead memorandum dated 7-16-75 we made available to
the Committee a summary of the Inspection Division inquiry into the
"official and confidential" files, along with making available in
Bureau space a list of people knowledgeable concerning the "official
and confidential" files who were contacted during the Inspection Division
inquiry. We have now been requested to forward this list to the Committee's
offices. It would appear to resist this request would not be in the best in-
terests of the Bureau. Especially in view of the Department's prior reluctance
to resist requests of this Committee.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 127
- 2 -
اليمن
1
-
Mr. Bassett
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 Mr. Hotis
July 25, 1975
1 - Mr. Daly
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY COVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE: "OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL" FILES
Reference is made to a letter from John T. Elliff,
dated July 23, 1975, requesting that a list of knowledgeable individuals,
who were contacted by the Inspection Division of this Bureau during its
inquiry into the "official and confidential" files be forwarded to the
Senate Select Committee.
In response to the aforementioned request, we are
attaching a copy of the list of knowledgeable individuals who were
contacted during the Inspection Division inquiry concerning the
"official and confidential" files.
Enclosure
1 - The Attorney General
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. lav.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
PVD: dkg (12)
MAIL ROOM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10 
12 door
DATE/
6/12/2008 Byson
/ Jon
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 128
MDR-16
всм
H3H
GPO 1975 O-569-920
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
HNG. TONER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALVER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART COLD.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 23, 1975
K. William O'Connor, Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Dear Mr. O'Connor:
Reference is made to your letter of July 21,
1975, providing a copy of the report of the Inspection
Division inquiry dated July 3, 1975, and offering access
to a list of knowledgeable individuals on the matter of
the disposition of the so-called "official and confiden-
tial" files. Please provide the Committee for use in
its offices the list of knowledgeable individuals now
available for review by Committee staff in the FBI
building.
Sincerely,
Давай
4. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
ALLI
INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATEL 0/17/2006 BYSP 2bum/in/
#MDR-16
NW 88608 Doçid:32989626 Page 129
62-11639
-491
Name
Adams, A.. D., Jr.
Baker, Betty, Mrs.
Battle, Joseph E., SA
Bear, Gloria L.
Bracksieck, Louis, E., SA
Brandt, Earl T.
Brennan, Daniel J.
Brown, Louis, Jr.
1. Campbell, Wason G.
Canday, Tommie R.
Carey, Charles L..
Carey, Clyde C.
x
Assignment
May, 1972
Director's Office
Washington Field
Director's Office
(Clerk)
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Director's Office
Security Patrol
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Director's Office
(Clerk)
Mechanical Section
Cassidy, Edward,Jr.
Cheshier, Jerry Wayne
"Corbin, Donald F.
Codi, Anthony A.
Cox, Fred
Mechanical Section
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 130
Current
Assignment
Out of Service
-
Messenger Courier
Unit Supervisor
Washington Field
Supply Supervisor
Chicago
Out of Service
Out of Service
Mechanical Section
Out of Service
Security Patrol
Mechanical Section
Out of Service
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Special Clerk
(Washington Field)
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Address
(Former Employees)
3280th Student Squadron, Lackla
Air Force Base, Texas
E
-491
1109 Logan Avenue, Tyrone
Pennsylvania
501 Brooklyn Boulevard, Sea Gir
New Jersey
ENGOSIE
206 East Broad Street, Greenfie
Tennessee
4254 East Capitol Street, Apt. 2
Washington, D. C.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS, UNCLASSIFIED
117/20
DATELO 17
BYS
#MDR-16

Crawford, James E. 1
Crookston, James
Cundy, Wanda M., Mrs.
Dembnicki, Paul E., SA
Dowling, Joseph E., SA
Downing, Phyllis, Miss
Dudney, Thomas Barden
Dunphy, John P.
"
Durrer, Virginia, Miss
Felt, W. Mark
Fields, Annie
Chauffeur
Messenger Unit
Secretary
. Director's Office
(Clerk)
Special Agent
(Washington Field)
Secretary
Washington Field..
(Chief Clerk)
Exhibits Section
File Locate Unit
Out of Service
Service Unit
Out of Service
Boston
Washington Field
Director's Office
Chief Clerk
(Washington Field)
Exhibits Section
(Section Chief)
General Index Unit
Director's Office
Out of Service
Gandy, Helen W., Miss
Gerrity, Edward J., SA
Gregory, Darwin M.
Housekeeper
Director's Office
Out of Service
Out of Service
"Gunsser, Albert P.
Haisten, James A.
Hereford, Douglas
Director's Office
(Clerk)
Mechanical Section
(Section Chief)
Boston
Out of Service
Out of Service
Holmes, Edna M., Miss
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 131
Director's Office
(Clerk)
Security Patrol
Clerk
Out of Service
Director's Office
Out of Service
9727 Mt. Piscah, Apt. 604
Silver Spring, Maryland
3051 Brinkley Road, Apt. 101
Temple Hills, Maryland
3216 Wynford Drive, Fairfax, Virgin
4936 30th Place, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
4801 Connecticut Ave., N. W., Apt.
Washington, D. C.
5714 Belfast Lane, Springfield, Virgi
401 Sligo Avenue, Silver Spring,
Maryland
6201 Cheryl Drive, Falls Church,
.
Virginia
2600 North Fillmore Street,
Arlington, Virginia
Hughes, Brent H.
[sner, James D.
Jones, Robert B..
Koerner, Julian A.
Kuhn, Daniel F.
Kunkel, Robert G., SAC
Lockhart, Lois W.
Lovelace, James
Lovelace, Melvian
Lyles, Everett A.
Marsden, Robert B.
McCord, Ruth, Miss
McMichael, G. Speights
Metcalf, Erma, Mrs.
Mohr, John P.
Mooney, Nancy A., Miss
Moten, Thomas E., SA
Ness, Ronald H.
NW.88608 Resid 329896261 Page 132
Exhibits Section
Messenger Unit
Director's Office
(Clerk)
Security Patrol Clerk.
SAC
(Washington Field)
Supply Supervisor
Security Patrol Clerk
Exhibits Section
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
(Supervisor)
Director's Office
Procurement Section
Director's Office
Director's Office
Director's Office
Chauffeur
File Delivery Unit
Filing Unit
Exhibits Section
Correlation Unit
Director's Office
(Clerk)
New York
(Special Agent)
Supervisor
SAC
(Alexandria)
Contract Specialist
Philadelphia
(Special Agent)
Exhibits Section
Out of Service
Mechanical Section
(Supervisor)
Director's Office
Procurement Section
Director's Office
Out of Service
Director's Office
Chauffeur
Out of Service
Mail Room
4561 North Capitol Street, N. W
Washington, D. C.
3427 North Edison, Arlington,
Virginia
3410 Manis Road, Clinton,
Maryland
Peffer, Kenneth Lee
Exhibits Section
Peterson, Jesse T., Jr.
Mechanical Section
ton, F. Thomas
Exhibits Section
Pickering, Michael Wilmer Mechanical Section
Powell, Excell
Randolph, George W.
Security Patrol
Riddles, Richard E.
Security Patrol
Ruegsegger, Hugh D.
Security Patrol
Ryan, Edward F.
Exhibits Section
Security Patrol
Schaeffer, Raymond H.
Exhibits Section
Shaffer, Kenneth
Shields, Carolyn
O'Haver, Robert R.
Page, Thomas L., SA
bol, Robert J.
Exhibits Section
Clerk
Washington Field
(Clerk)
Messenger Unit
Exhibits Section
Indianapolis
(Special Agent)
Exhibits Section
Mechanical Section
Exhibits Section
Security Patrol
Philadelphia
(Special Agent)
Quantico
(Special Agent).
Exhibits Section
Indianapolis
(Special Agent)
Exhibits Section
Washington Field
(Clerk)
Records Unit
Rt. 1, Box 85, Clatskanie, Oregon
1454 Montana Ave., N.E.
Washington, D. C.
Out of Service
Out of Service
Shoaff, Clark S., SA
Singleton, Robert.
File Unit
Skillman, Dorothy S., Mrs. Director's Office
Quantico
(Special Agent)
File Unit
Out of Service
NW:88608 Dold 32989626 Page 133
Mechanical Section
429 N. Street, S. W., Apt S700
Washington, D. C..
Mechanical Section-Quantico
Smith, Thomas J.
Research Section
Out of Service
Smith, Ursula, Miss
Director's Office
Out of Service
Soyars, William B.
Assistant Director
Out of Service
Stewart, Alfred LaFornia Mechanical Section
Out of Service
Suan, Cornelius G.
Thompson, Ronald E.
Thrun, Robert W.
Tice, Alvin L.
Tietgen, Gladys M.
Tschudy, Carol, Miss
Underwood, Thomas E.
V, Helen, Miss
Walp, Shirley, Miss
Washington, William H.
Windear, Ralph A.
Winters, Lawrence E.
Banwarth, Robert F.
"Director's Office
(Clerk)
Security Patrol
Mechanical Section
Director's Office
Mechanical Section
Director's Office
Messenger Unit
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Director's Office
(Clerk)
ASAC
(Washington Field)
Director's Office
(Clerk)
Quantico
(Special Agent)
Méchanical Section
Director's Office
Administrative
Assistant
Out of Service
Administrative
Assistant
Teletype Unit
Mechanical Section
Mechanical Section
Director's Office
(Clerk)
Exhibits Section
3410 Memphis Lane, Bowie, Maryland
11 North Garfield, Arlington, Virginia
12 Green Winged Teal Road, Amelia
Island Plantation, Ame lia, Florida
Rt. 2, Box 164, Statesboro, Georgia
12019 Center Hill Street, Wheaton,
Mayland
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 134
:
Benedict, James P.
Booch, James D.
Brady, Lawrence W.
Dalton, Terry A.
Exhibits Section
oxzen; Mildred, Mrs.
Filing Unit
Exhibits Section
Filing Unit
Exhibits Section
Filing Unit
"
Fox, Wayne M.
Exhibits Section
Exhibits Section
Greene, Edgar G.
Exhibits Section.
Exhibits Section
3 Hewett, Bernice R.
Exhibits Section
Exhibits Section
Larson, Fredrick A.
Exhibits Section
Exhibits Section
Massie, Laurence M.
Exhibits Section
Exhibits Section
Nash, William H.
Exhibits Section
88608 Docld:32989626 Page 135
-
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Addressee:
☐ LTR
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
US Senate Select CommiHEE
LHM
Caption of Document:
Originating Office:
Memo
Report dated
July 25, 1975
"Official and Confidential Files"
FBI
-
Delivered by: Richard saylor, J.
Received by:
Title:
The
Cisst Clesk
er
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
2:30
Date: 7/30/75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE JO17
/2000 BYSPAN
#MDR-16
62-114395-491
ANGLOSU
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 136
TO:
N
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
FROM:
FBI
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
1.
✗
SSC
7/25/75
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum and enclosure
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC letter 7/23/75
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
U
7.
KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
8.
Operating Procedures
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
List of knowledgeable individuals who were contacted during the
Inspection Division inquiry concerning the "Official and
Confidential" files.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BYSP2Am limf
#MDR-16
TREAT AS YELLOW
5.
nock
62-116395
FMK:1hb
(4)
3791 (6-75)
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN
CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 137
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
4:2116355-490
INSTRUCTIONS
Type or print clearly in ink.
•
i
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO 11/2000 BYSparram/KAL
#MDR-16
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 138
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
fr Memorandum
ΤΟ
FROM :
· J. B. Adams
gentar
Legal Counsel
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
1.
1
1.
We
1.
-
1
1
1
.-
-
-
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
Personnel File
Richard D. Cotter
DATE **7/29/75
· Personnel File -
Thomas J. Smith
Mr. Hotis
Mr. Daly
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On 7/28/75, Loch Johnson requested that former employees
Richard D. Cotter and Thomas J. Smith be made available for in-
terview and/or their current address be made available to the
Committee so they may arrange interviews. The topic of the
interview is to be their knowledge concerning the Houston Plan.
Both Cotter and Smith were formerly employed in the Intelligence
Division.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) That Cotter and Smith be released from employment. ·
agreement for purposes of an interview by the Senate Select Com-
mittee concerning the Houston Plan.
Jan/gio
(2) That the Intelligence Division arrange to have
Cotter and Smith contacted to advise them of the Senate Select
Committee's interest in interviewing them and of the fact thất
should an interview take place, the Bureau will, if requested,
make available an Agent for consultation during interview, and
insure they are advised that the Bureau Agent will not be
actually present during the interview.
REC- 102
62-116395-490
(3) Prepare the necessary communication so that the
Senate Select Committee is advised of the location of former
SAs Cotter and Smith.
AUG 8 197.
sex ist <tn í gG4sse
8/7/75 458/dot
·
PVD: ladlad
(8)
для
PLM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2006 BY SPanum
"#
MDR-16
NW 88608.docid:32989626 BUS Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
84 11 1975
Buy
Page 139
рот
与一心
'
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
for Memorandum
13
-
DATE:
ΤΟ
: W. R. Wannall
FROM : W. O. Cregar
Wo
10/655
1
-
1
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY -757
1
-
J. B.
Adams
J. A. Mintz
(1
-
(1
-
J. B. Hotis)
P. V. Daly)
7/29/75
W. R. Wannall
W. O. Cregar
V. V. Kolombatovic
L. A. Crescioli
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Com.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
This is to advise that Special Agent-Liaison Officer
L. A. Crescioli has been requested to appear for informal staff
interview by the Senate Select Committee (SSC) 7/30/75.
On 7/28/75 Mr. James Dick, Staff member, SSC,
requested that Liaison Officer Crescioli appear on 7/30/75 for
informal staff interview to be conducted by Mr. Dick and
Mr. Paul Wallach, both SSC Staff members. According to
Mr. Dick, the interview will concern the general liaison
responsibilities of Liaison Officer Crescioli with the Head-
quarters Office of the Inspection Service, U. S. Postal Service
(USPS).
Upon learning on the above occasion that Crescioli
assumed the USPS Headquarters liaison post in November, 1974,
Mr. Dick inquired as to Crescioli's predecessor and was
provided the name of Mr. Francis X. O'Neill (currently assigned
as ASAC, New Haven Office). Mr. Dick was aware of the fact that
at an earlier period SA L. F. Schwartz handled liaison with
USPS.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
D
1. That Liaison Officer Crescioli be released from
his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.
REC-102
62-116395-489
2. Inasmuch as Mr. Dick has advised that this is to be
a "non-abuse" type interview, it is recommended that a repre-
sentative of the Intelligence Division be designated AUG
present during SA Crescioli's interview.
1
-
WRW/THE
Personnel file of SA Louis A. Crescioli
LAC: pld
(10)
NW860:12389626 Page 140
LAC
Mus
1976
JGA
PLM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BYSP2 Dumlu
#MOR
-16
тат

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
f/ Memorandum
TO
: Mr. Gallagh
FROM
SUBJECT:
: L. E. Rhyne
گے
SENSTUDY 75
DATE: 7/28/75
1
1
-
-
1
-
1
-
Mr. Gallagher
Mr. Rhyne
Mr. Rosenquist
Mr. Wannall
(ATTN: T. J.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
McNiff, Rm 4063 JEHþlephone Rm..
Director Sec'y
возроб
Reference is made to memorandum of Mr. Cregar
to Mr. Wannall dated 7/24/75, relating to certain pages
of a CIA document. Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, 155, 156,
158-161, 178, 180, 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354 of this
document were reviewed and disclosure of this information to
the Senate Select Committee will not compromise or otherwise
damage an ongoing investigation presently being conducted by
the FBI.
Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the
information contained therein should be closely guarded and
disclosed only on a need-to-know basis.
GR
enp
درو؟
LEP
GDR/brb
(5)
CREATION CONTAINED
UNCLASSIFIED
brb
4MDR-45
10/17/2000 SP2 L/10
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REC-102
79 AUG 14 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 141
سال
ЈЕ
62-116395-
9 AUG 8 1975
488
5-Amel
Frosis: - PLANTEXT
To: Cry
☐ Ay
✓ temper capire
Photogra
☐ W
Special heating instructives: ("HAND CARAY TO DIRECTOR.)
ASST DIR. MINTZ Recommaugs BiftCTOR personpally cast
AMDR#E¥ Gowered.
C
Senstudy
:
Asso
Dep. AD Ad
Dep. AÐ Am
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. I
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Count
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-75
D
REC-102
K
62--116-375-487
18 AUG 7 1975
INCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE
84 AUG 11 1975
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/2000 BY SP2 Aim Tomt
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 142
#MDR-16
Up
Fild
11.
!
FRI:
I: Missing the Point
many disclosures have surfaced to rapidly that
Sa pubile may have became inured to still more
revelations about improper activities of govern.
ent intelligence agencies. Yet the admissions and
Promments Monday by FBI Director Clarence N.
Kelley should not be permitted to pass unnoticed:
-The FBI for many years engaged in "national
Sanity" barglaries, and presumably, foreign em
es in Washington were among the targets.
criminal investigation. His explanation was nothing
less than astonishing. He said such information.
which includes and drinking habits, Waght
very well to helpful to us in laki mretigations.”
Of course it might, but that terzis is the very te
sence of a police state.
The bindau, Kelley said, is drawing guidelines, in
cooperation with the Justice Department, to scontol
the collection of personal behavior information
N-T FBI al comples personal chavia res helated to criminal investigations.. No goldsting I did not
formation on government offieis, incheding mom,
bers of Congress and prominent private citizmas.
In defering the bugs Kelley : 1
convinced that in these maliers where there might
te some criticion there is an underlying intent to
do that which is good for the nation. I
dome across any activities which I would estrue
as being legal or being directed toward personal
gain or to enhance the personal reputation of any-
R
This analysis, even if scorate-which is doubtful
betrays à misunderstanding of the responsibilities
of an agency like the FBI in a democratic society.
A warning some 20 years ago by Same Chart
Justice Frits Frankfurter gode to the hand us` `
frobeat Frankfurter said. The scorsion of dan
gerous power res not come in a day, It does come
however sky, from the generative force of un-
thecked diangard of the restrictions that fence in.
even the most disinterested assertion of authority."
Of social picance was Kelley's revelation
(hat the FBI continues to collect personal informa-
tion on congressmen and others who are hot under
is
I said receive
are pecezazry, base no Anzrican citizen should
be the target of such an investigation.
Say
this
is their con
"I have not reviewed files to find out about resclusion
congressmen or other public figures," Talley
but here again be was wide of the mark. The
or lack of it, or the good intention of an
rector or lack of it, does not mex the issue.
Aktifice should not exist.
After the Senate Selpot Committee on Intelligence
Agencies complits its investigation, Congress must
the roles of the FIL, the CIA and other
elements of the intelligree cornizimily, which in
this thousands of employes and which spots
to M billion a your. Their santi opazations.
and the manpower and billoys they commend, give
the vet posar. That power must be bought un-
for firm conuol.
Size mechanism must be devised that is more of.
feelive than the present oversight cmmunitiess of
Congress, which, kam their record, could be
og sccurately dubbed the "overlook committe
of Cos
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO
E 10/17/2000 BYslam/inf
#MDR-16
ENCLOSURE
rv for
Volunteered
See
info.
4/12--11637
-487
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 143
I
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
NEWS CONFERENCE OF CLARENCE M. KELLEY
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JULY 14, 1975
Good morning. I have very few statements to make as
an opening. I just want to say that this is a further
attempt on my part to be a little more available.
Frankly, it is something which I hope we can continue
and I have not in the past been premeditatively evasive
nor reluctant to appear before you. But, frankly, I've
been pretty busy with a number of other things. I want to
let you know that we're continuing our efforts to try to
improve the rapport between us. We will continue to do
some things and hopefully, in the future we can get together
more frequently on the basis of some of our past meetings
which I think have been very fruitful. So now I'll throw
it open for questions and these lights are a little bit
strong but I'll try to be able to identify you. Do you
have any questions?
Do you have any evidence, sir, or any information leading
you to suspect any CIA Agents have been planted in any man-
ner or form in any executive agencies for the purpose of
transmitting evidence back to the CIA about that agency?
I have no evidence whatsoever brought to my attention
and I certainly know of none.
Sir, do you have ongoing programs trying to check out
that sort of thing? Do you look for it?
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN, IS UNCLASSIFIED
62-111.3815
--487
DATE10/17/2006 BYSPO infl
#MDR-16
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 144
ENCLOSURE
የ
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
We have no ongoing programs whatsoever and have had no
reports that it has occurred and this is something new
to us.
Sir, there have been complaints repeatedly in recent days
from Congressmen and Senators on the Hill who are charged
with investigating the FBI and its domestic surveillance
in past years that they are not getting the information
that they need. We heard fṛom Senator Church maybe yester-
day. Can you respond to that?
The allegation has been made to the effect that the FBI
is dragging its feet, so to speak, and slow to respond
to the requests of the Church committee for information
relative to past abuses by the FBI in the intelligence field
and it's even been said from time to time that this reluc-
tance is reflective of an effort to preserve the image of
Mr. Hoover. First, I want you to know that in giving
instructions in this matter, it has been consistently
my policy to say that we should be completely candid
and forthright. And we should respond in whatever manner
we can consistent, of course, with some restrictions--those
being a matter of confidentiality and right to privacy.
Insofar as dragging our feet, the letter which was sent to
us was dated May 14, 1975. We immediately embarked on a
program to try to respond. In May, 1975, I remember it was
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 145
· 2.-
•
น
the last half of May, we devoted 323 man days to try to re-
spond and to date have added another over 400 hours and it's
a total dedication of personnel--of 102 of our people.
We have 102 people who are responding to this request.
The reason why it has taken this much time and this great
amount of manpower is that we must go. through all of
this material very carefully to preserve, of course;
the privacy of those who may be mentioned and also to
assure that matters of grave import are no so
disclosed. We are trying at best we can to resolve
in favor of making them available.
I think this number
102 is very significant inasmuch as in the work of the
Freedom of Information, there are also over 102, about
105 people, dedicated to fulfilling our obligations there.
So, we have almost 210 people engaged in these two
enterprises and this has a great impact upon our capabili-
ties. Does that answer your question?
Can you tell us why Senator Church would be complaining?
Why he what?
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
No sir, I don't know.
Why he would be complaining?
Some of these things, of course,
may be thought to be too slow and it's thought perhaps
that all you have to do is to remove the material from
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 146
3
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
the file and send it on up. We have already submitted .
a great deal of it and intend within the next 10 days to
complete the entire matter.
Is in any of that material now in the Justice Department
awaiting approval of the Attorney General?
Yes, some of it is in the hands of the Department ready
to be transmitted. That's our first step--after we make.
our survey, to ship it over to them, they review it and then
send it on through.
Well, has it been there for a while?
I can't tell you exactly what length of time but I can say
that within about 10 days, we'll have ours completed and
you can gage thereafter what type of delay is experienced
through the Department.
Mr. Kelley, Senator Church says that you won't allow him
and his staff to interview FBI Agents and that's one of
the complaints he makes about the lack of cooperation.
Is that true that you will not allow the Senate staff to
interview FBI Agents?
We have gone through a procedure whereby ex-FBI Agents
may have available to them our people in order to consult
with them as to any matter which might be thought to
violative of some of the confidentiality provisions; and
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we have not, to my knowledge, denied the right of anyone
presently employed to be interviewed with, of course again,
the requirements that if they want to consult with us
they may do so.
Well, in other words, you're saying that FBI Agents can
be interviewed by the Senate staff. Is that correct?
Let me just check that. Mr. Mintz, is that correct? Have
we denied any?
We have not denied any.
We've not indicated to anyone
we would not let them be interviewed.
What was that Mr. Kelley, about ex--I didn't understand,
about ex-FBI Agents?
Ex-FBI Agents, when called, and we're advised, are informed
that one of our people can be present outside the inter-
view room for consultation by that interviewee with our
people to determine whether or not a certain question is
beyond the purview of his capability, and we do not say to
him that he cannot answer but we do say here are the rules,
the regulations, the law and you can be guided in accordance
But we make available to him a con-
with your own dictates.
sultant, so to speak.
Is that a requirement or..?
That's an agreement between us.
In other words, when an ex-Agent goes up, he has to have
somebody?
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No sir, he does not have to have but we inform him that
he may have if he so desires.
During your confirmation hearings two years ago,
you advocated or said that you would like to see
more Congressional oversight of the FBI. You think now
that there's too much, just about right, or not enough
oversight?
It is true that I said during my confirmation that I do
not object to FBI Congressional oversight. One has been
established and I have met with them on several occasions
to set an oversight committee. There is also a House
so-called oversight committee--it's the House Judiciary
Committee--there are others who may by virtue of their
jurisdiction feel that they, too, have oversight.
We do
no oppose House oversight. Frankly, I would like to have
a joint committee of oversight so that we can know
precisely to whom we should report and they, in turn, know
precisely to whom any oversight problems can be referred.
Basically, in other words, I do not object to oversight--
I do think that it would be much better if we could have
it well-structured so that it will be clearly understood
by all parties concerned as to what they are going to do
and how they are to do it.
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Mr. Kelley, do you feel the oversight being conducted now
between the Senate and House is probing too deeply into the
FBI--do you feel that any of the operations of the FBI have
been hurt by the investigations going on now?
I do not construe the activities of the oversight groups
as having delved too deeply into the work of the FBI. We do
on occasion feel that perhaps some matters need protection,
particularly those involving national security, but I have
no objection in the exchange in oversight groups of any
matter in which we are engaged. I think, as a matter of
fact, that this is a proper balance insofar as keeping us
in line and I also welcome it inasmuch as it gives us an
opportunity to explain just what and how we do things. I
do not object to the exchange, in other words.
Mr. Kelley, you said that you're not attempting to preserve
the image of J. Edgar Hoover and, apparently, you know
what will be in the information that is to go out of your
office in 10 days. Can you tell us, when that information
gets up to the Hill and assuming it's made public, are there
going to be some more bomb shells about the FBI that we
haven't heard about or is this all information which has
generally been made public?
I don't know of any bomb shells, so to speak. In the news
media, there have been many things discussed, many reports
made, and in those matters I think that just about every-
thing that we know about has been already, at least to
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some extent, discussed and, to some extent, publicized.
I am convinced that in these matters where there might be
some criticism, there is an underlying intent to do that
which is good for the Nation. I have not come across any
activities which I would construe as being illegal, being
directed toward personal gain or to enhance the reputation
of anyone. I see nothing untoward in these activities, in
other words, as they will be reviewed by the various groups.
Now, Mr. Kelley, Mr. Sullivan said about a week ago, that
he assumed there had been some national security break-ins ·
over the years and I'm just wondering if there have been
national security break-ins, say in the last five years,
roughly what number are we talking about and why aren't
they illegal? What's the legal authority?
There have been statements made about surreptitious
entries and the latest was that statement made
by Mr. Sullivan who just retired as the Assistant
Director in Charge of the Los Angeles Office; and there
have been, of course, reports in the media that the
Department of Justice has been inquiring into allegations
that our people have engaged in surreptitious entries or,
as they are sometimes termed, burglaries. Yes, the FBI
has conducted surreptitious entries in securing information
relative to the security of the Nation. However, in 1966,
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all such activity was terminated with the exception of
a small amount of actions which were conducted in connection
with foreign counterintelligence investigations which we
felt had a grave impact upon the security of the Nation.
And again, as I just said, I feel that the FBI personnel
participating in or approving such activities acted in
I'm
good faith with the belief that national security interests
were paramount and their actions were reasonable.
always mindful of a story I heard many years ago about two
neighbors who started some arguments which, obviously,
were going to terminate into difficulties. One of the
neighbors started a campaign to build himself up with
shadowboxing, punching the bag and so forth, and it appeared
very likely that he was going to be in pretty good shape
in order to beat up his neighbor and so the neighbor,
thereafter, concerned as to what would happen to him,
started to defend himself. You don't wait until the
climax which could be the putsch--you start preparing
yourself and so I think that the FBI and its officials
construed this as paramount again in the protection of
the country.
You said that in 1966, there were a small amount of
I'm just wondering how small is small and
burglaries.
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who gave the OK. Did this come from President Johnson
or President Nixon or was this a decision made by Attorney
General...
This matter will be discussed in subsequent hearings
and in reports, and further than what I have stated, I
cannot comment.
Mr. Kelley, were these directed against Americans or
foreign persons?
I would prefer not at this point to make any comments
further and particularly not in particularity as to who
may have been the ones against whom they were directed.
Well, were they all conducted in this country or were
some conducted overseas?
I know of none overseas.
Sir, going back to prior to 1966, why was the procedure
changed in 1966?
By virtue of the feeling of Mr. Hoover that, under the
then-prevailing philosophy and the feeling that possibly
in the context of the times, this was not a viable
procedure--they were stopped. It was Mr. Hoover's
decision.
Sir, can we infer that there were quite a number, a
large number, of burglaries prior to 1966, but fewer
since then?
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You cannot infer anything because I have not told you
of any number. I can only say that they were stopped
in 1966. As to the number, I cannot actually tell you how
many nor can I say that it's quite a number or very few.
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Why can't you tell us the number?
Because we're going to make reports to our Congres-
sional groups and to the Department of Justice and,
frankly, I can't tell you the number myself. We
don't have any..
They did not entirely stop in 1966? There were
some that did get, you say, a small number after
1966?
There may have been some after 1966 which were,
of course, in the field of foreign counterintelli-
gence, and such that it would make a grave impact
on our....
Before that, they were not with the field of foreign
counterintelligence?
Oh, yes, there were some in that field also.
There were others that were not in the field of
foreign counterintelligence before 1966?
You recall that I said in the context of the time,
it may well have been that prior to that time national
security or counterintelligence or whatever terminology
you might want to use could have included other areas.
But, then you began to compartmentize various types
of activities and then it became evident that the
area of foreign counterintelligence national security
certainly should be differentiated from domestic
security.
But, Mr. Kelley, what policy have you followed in
the time that you have been Director? Is this type
of activity, has it been permitted? Is it policy
now to conduct this kind of activity?
I have not had a single request to conduct such
activity since I have been made Director.
If ever
anything of this type comes up, and I can't foresee
this need, but, if it ever did come up and it became
a matter of grave concern, a matter which is to be
solved only through such activity, I would present
it to the Attorney General and would be guided by
his opinion as to such activity. Frankly, I have
not had any such request since I have come aboard.
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Is that in the foreign field, Mr. Kelley. Is that
limited to the foreign field when you say such
activity?
Yes, sir.
Foreign intelligence, counterintelli-
gence, national security, whatever terminology
you want to use.
Back prior to 1966, were any of those in say
organized crime investigations?
I know of none.
Would you characterize, Mr. Kelley, what areas they
were in, please. What areas the pre-1966 burglaries
took place? Characterize the kinds of investiga-
tions they concern?
I can not at this point characterize them because I
just don't know how they were to be characterized.
But, it could be that, I would guess, that the
great majority of them are what we now term counter-
foreign, counterintelligence, or national security.
I would say that in all probability the geat majority
of them were in that area. That's where the grave
concern is.
Have you reviewed them from a legal point of view
to determine whether any of them at all were con-
ducted without proper legal authority?
We have discussed them with the Department, and will
place them in their hands and they will make such
a review.
I wanted to ask you if this goes back to World War
II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Cold War
or all of them?
They will go back to World War II, I'm confident.
Is it possible to get court authorization by warrant
or whatever means for surreptitious entry as dis-
tinguished from an ordinary search warrant?
Inherent in the request for a microphone installation
there is a matter of surreptitious entry. So, therein
you have a natural concomitant. You do have that
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permission. There is some dictum to indicate, at
present, that this may be brought up later.
But,
I
know of no authorization which can be obtained per se
for a surreptitious entry. And, at this point, of
course, the feeling is that these confined as they
are to foreign counterintelligence it flows from
presidential authority as it applies also to the
warrantless wiretaps.
Weren't the civil rights groups, Mr. Kelley, among
some of the organizations who were burglarized?
I'm not going to say anything about where they were,
or against which organizations they were directed,
only to say that they were, Mr. Nelson, and I hope
that will satisfy you, and I hope that if there is
any revelation to be made later that they can be as
complete as possible because, again, we feel that
the intent was a very good one and there was no
illegality concerned. And the impact of it was to
protect the country.
Sir, how can you say that there was no illegality
concerned if the Constitution says that you have to
have a search warrant to make an entry and without,
as I understand it, even checking this with the
Attorney General, these Agents burglarized private
premises?
The resolution of the problem which you now present
is up to the Department and the courts, and I, of
course, will not engage in anything except to say
that in the defense of the men who authorized and
participated, that they had this intent and within
every criminal violation there is a necessity that
there be the ingredient of intent and there was none
here as far as I can determine.
Mr. Kelley, would you say, sir, that most of these
requests for surreptitious entry flowed from presi-
dential authority? Is that what you said, sir?
No, I did not say that. I did not give a complete
outline as to what the authorization was. And, this
again will be a matter which will be discussed in
the reviews of the Department and the various Congres-
sional committees.
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Sir, would you say that the Cubans who burglarized
Daniel Elzberg's psychiatrist's office should not
have been convicted then since they thought that
they were on a national security mission? They
didn't intend to violate any laws. That was their
testimony.
I have no judgment insofar as that because my
province is in presenting the facts and for the
review and determination by the courts and if such
an inference was made it was not intended by me
to give them any sanctuary. I'm trying to keep in
the area of our facts and that particular thing as
to whether or not they had any intent or whether or
not it is a viable defense is up to the courts.
Mr. Kelley, did you twice mention that you expect
some resolution to this question in the courts?
How is it going to get into the courts?
I don't know. It possibly will be some sort of a
defense, rather some sort of a presentation to the
courts by the Attorney General. He has indicated
that perhaps this being a Constitutional question--
it being a matter of the executive privilege of the
presidential power--that it might well be necessary
to have such a review to determine.
Were all of these break-ins conducted with the
permission of either the Attorney General or the
President at the time? Or were there any that were
conducted without such approval?
I cannot, at this point, give you any particulars
about the program. I just say, as I did before,
and this...
Because you don't know or because you're withholding
comment?
I'm withholding comment.
Mr. Kelley, I'm still unclear about distinction
between break-ins before 1966 and afterward. Is the
reduction in number the only change that was made or
was there change in the limitations on the targets
that were used?
There was a change insofar as the targets just being
in the subsequent area confined to those matters which
were concerned in foreign counterintelligence.
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You imply then that the others concern domestic
security or did it go beyond that?
This implication is yours, Mr. Rogers, but....
I'm trying to recall what you said initially.
I said that..., the question was asked me whether
I included domestic intelligence, and I said I
was confident that the great majority was in the
area of foreign intelligence or foreign counter-
intelligence, whatever you want to call it. And
there may have been. I don't know.
Mr. Kelley, you said that you have not received a
request for any type of activities such as this
since you have been in office. When did the last
one take place?
I do not know. I do not know.
Will the material you turn over to the Church
Committee include full details of everyone of the
break-ins?
It will be a matter which will be completely
presented to the Attorney General, and, insofar as
full disclosure by him, that's a question which
only he can answer. We will report those about
which we know.
Mr. Kelley, you said it was also for the good of
the country that Agents send letters to school
boards and principals and others to damage the
reputation of people working who have had connec-
tions with groups the FBI had infiltrated. Was
that also for the good of the country?
Your statement, was that also for the good of the
country to do that, to damage the reputation, was
not the issue. As you pose your question, you
answered substantially my response that would be
made. Yes, I think that the purpose here was to
do something that would ultimately end to the
benefit of the Nation. In other words, I think
in the so-called COINTEL Program, which you men-
tioned, that the intent there was one which had
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adequate basis.
As to the programs, now, indi-
11
I
vidually activities within those programs may be
suspect. I have said and repeated that some of
those activities I would not feel are proper today.
wasn't there during the time that all of these programs
were developed, nor certainly the approval of the
various activities within those programs. Were I to
have been there, there is some that perhaps I might
have said, "No I don't think this is proper. I have
the benefit of hindsight. I have the benefit of exper-
ience in local law enforcement which, I think, prepares
me to better understand perhaps the impact of some of
these types of things. They are not at all unknown in
the field of law enforcement. In some degree or another
almost all the law enforcement has engaged in some
similar types of activities. Not perhaps to the sophisti-
cation as the COINTEL Program, but the context of the
time is felt necessary in the present day. We realize
that different standards should be applied and they are
and we do not engage in those activities now. Since
April, 1971, we cut them off.
(NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS AND EDITORS: The preced-
ing comment by Mr. Kelley concerning local police
use of efforts similar to COINTELPRO may be open
to misinterpretation. At his direction the FBI
later issued his clarifying statement: "I had in
mind that law enforcement agencies have used
methods designed to create disunity among the
criminal element, particularly in organized crime
and hoodlum gangs. Probably most common was
labeling a crime figure as a police informant
to discredit and destroy his criminal influence.
These activities to pit one crime figure against
another have achieved success in neutralizing
the criminal element.")
You said that you disagreed with some of the activities,
that they were not proper programs. Alright, does that
mean that there are variations of COINTEL Programs
still going on?
In the first place, we deliniate certain programs.
That's the overall structure of the full system.
Within each of these programs there were some activ-
ities, individual activities. I feel that the setup
of the programs certainly was directed properly, that
is, with the intent to preserve the Nation. Insofar
as some individual activities, yes, I feel that some
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were, in today's context particularly, imprudent and
that they were not, again in the present context, the
type of thing that certainly I would approve. Be that
as it may, we stopped them in 1971 and we have no
intention to continue them.
Mr. Kelley?
Yes, sir, Joe?
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When you were an Agent did you engage in any
break-ins or were you aware of any break-ins?
Insofar as the matter which you are now discus-
sing, I think that we can give substantially the
same answer to this. This is a matter which is
being investigated by the Department and is being
investigated by the various committees, particu-
larly the Select Committee of Congress and, I'm
not saying that Clarence Kelley engaged in such
activites, or did not engage in these activities.
I'm merely saying that these have been presented
for review and they will, thereafter, be discussed
at some length and any publicity that might be
given them will be that which will be given by
those more knowledgeable than I.
Mr. Kelley, to your knowledge have any members of
the FBI been involved in the planning or execution
of assassinations?
No, sir. I know of none.
Mr. Kelley, how about the break-in of embassies
here in Washington. Have any members of the FBI
gained surreptitious entry into any embassies in
Washington?
Without naming or designating victims or insti-
tutions, I can only say that there were a few
concerned with counterintelligence--foreign in
nature--subsequent to 1966. Further then that
I cannot say.
A few is 10, 20, 100? When you say few, I'm sure
that I'm lost as to how few is a few.
Not many.
Was a lot of this done in Washington as opposed
to other cities in the country?
And,
There were not a lot, I'm confident of that.
frankly, I don't think that all of the few were
confined to Washington, D. C., but I can't tell
you absolutely that that is true.
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Mr. Kelley, were any of these done in conjunction
with the CIA? With their knowledge?
I know of none. Now, subsequently, perhaps there
may have been information which did go to them
but, not insofar as the origin of the information,
I'm confident of that. We were not in partner-
ship with CIA.
How about the NSA? Were there any of these break-
ins done to help benefit the NSA in its code-
breaking programs?
That is a matter which will be developed and will
be presented and, it's better for them to comment
then I.
In
Mr. Kelley, the Rockefeller Commission report
said that, in discussing the CIA's mail cover
operations, said the FBI only learned about this
about five years after it was in the works.
1958, I believe. Mr. Colby's report to the
President said the FBI knew about it from its
conception. Which is correct?
It is my understanding it was 1968.
1958?
1968. Wait a minute, 1958, 1958. That's right,
1958.
Mr. Kelley, in the last 50 years, as I understand
it from FBI officials, there has never been an
FBI Agent prosecuted for any kind of corruption
or crime in connection with his official duties.
Is there any agreement with the Justice Department
either in writing or any other kind of agreement
not to prosecute people who may stray from or
commit crimes but, rather to handle it with
internal discipline?
Mr. Kelly, spelled K-E-L-L-Y, there is no such
agreement. I would not abide by such an agreement.
I vehemently oppose any such arrangement and would
not operate under such arrangement. No, there is
none. Yes, anyone that, within the FBI, will be
prosecuted if there is evidence leading to that
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conclusion. I can assure you absolutely that
this is my policy, is the policy of the Bureau,
and that we will pursue them as vigorously as
we possibly can. There's nothing worse in my
estimation than the betrayal of trust and that's
what we have when one of your own people defects
and gives sanctuary and assistance to the
crminal world.
How do you account than for the fact that there
has been no one who has strayed across the line
in all these years? It's almost unhuman.
Well, I appreciate your compliment, Mr. Kelly,
which I agree with, there has been none. There
have been, of course, some allegations made
from time to time, all of which have been pursued
and found to be groundless. I think that it's
inherent in an organization which is closely
scrutinized, an organization which has a strong
inspection system but, more than anything else,
is the choice of people who are not susceptible
to this type of thing. Unquestionably, in such
a screening process some might get through.
But, than, within the FBI is a built-in system
which further prevents this possibility and that
is a tremendous pride in this very matter. That
is, that there has been no corruption. And, I
am confident that Agents working with one another,
although, will, of course, on occasion be sym-
pathetic to an Agent who possibly may be drinking
too much or may possibly, for other reasons in
the area the morals might digress to some extent,
they absolutely will not countenance corruption
or defection to the criminal element or otherwise
contaminate that splendid reputation of the Bureau.
It's a unique situation. It's difficult for some
to understand. But, it's a built-in barrier to
an extension of this type of activity and, some-
thing of which we will have tremendous pride and I
personally would not hesitate one second to pursue
any allegations such as this, feeling that although
it may get wide publicity, although it may, to some
extent, harm the credibility of the FBI, it must
be done. And, I assure you, will be done. Unusual
perhaps, but nonetheless, it is present and we will
persist with this type of activity. We don't ask
our Agents to squeel on one another, we point out
the splendid reputation that is inherent within
our tradition and is one of the finest traditions
you can possibly build.
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Mr. Kelley, earlier you spoke of the advantages and limitations
of hindsight. After having examined the records of the break-ins
and other surreptitious activity, you observed that you thought it
was well intentioned, I believe, in most cases. Did you also
observe that there was any gross misuse of authority in the
process of that?
I do not note in these activities any gross misuse of authority.
I see a consistent thread of well-intentioned activities. Perhaps
now in the present society, and in the context of now and in those
times, I do not feel that it was a corruption of the trust that
has been placed in us. As now we have determined a valuation
that perhaps could be wrong, but in those days there was no
intention to engage in activities which were prohibited, illegal,
or otherwise wrong.
Mr. Kelley, why wouldn't an act like the bugging of Martin Luther
King's hotel room have been a betrayal of trust? These Agents
took an oath under the Constitution and that was prohibited by
Federal law at that time.
There have been a number of articles written about this situation.
In reviewing this situation, I feel that the authority stemmed from
the proper source. It was a matter which was construed in those
times as of considerable concern to the country, and the FBI acted
in accordance with the request which was made that it be installed.
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You say that it was a matter which was then a violation of the
law. Within the warrantless wiretaps under ordinary circum-
stances they could conceivably be construed as a violation, but
under the umbrella of the protection of the country they have
been authorized, so I don't subscribe to the feeling that they
knowingly, in such an installation, vilated the law with the
intent to violate the law.
Mr. Kelley, do you still--does the FBI still--compile personal
information on the personal behavior of Members of Congress,
members of the press, and other people?
The FBI receives a great deal of information from time to time.
We are charged when we have a complaint to write up that
complaint. We feel that not only are we following the archival
rules that such must be recorded, but also we feel in discharge
of our duties we should record it because such information might
well dovetail with some investigation that we are conducting.
'People come to us to tell about these things for reasons--not
just to spill out gossip and rumor and to possibly put someone
on the spot. We inform them, for example, at the time they
submit this information a record will be made of this but if it is
outside the jurisdiction of the FBI we so state. They know before
they leave, for example, that nothing will be done about it other
than to record it.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 166
- 22 -
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
But it is put in the files?
Yes, it is put in the files. Yes sir.
Whether it has to do with sex activities, or drinking too much,
or what have you?
The allegations within the complaint are put into the complaint
and are put into the file no matter what they might be. Yes.
Government officials, Members of Congress and the press,
and what have you?
Yes sir. The Department of Justice and the Bureau are now
engaged in a mutual venture to set up guidelines as to our
activity in this regard. We will abide by those guidelines.
We do want it known, however, that some of this information
might very well be helpful to us in later investigations. The
abuse is the publication of this information, and I know of no
abuse, Jack, which we can point to.
Has it been used at times to try to get a person's job?
I know of none.
You know of none?
Now you say to try to get a person's job? Now I don't know of
all of the activities that we're involved in--and I say to you, Jack,
that yes there have been some accounts as to this effect. I feel
that actually were there any such activity it was on the basis of a
- 23 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 167
feeling that these things were true and that they were of such
importance that they should be passed on. Some of these, of
course, are in the COINTEL Program. I was not privy to some
of these allegations. I assure you that this will not continue to
the present time. I have been asked what about your own feeling
about such information. Since I have arrived I have not had a bit
of gossip or a bit of rumor sent to me and this is over two years.
I have not reviewed files to find out about reporters, Congress-
men or other public figures. I do not subscribe to that type of
thing. I have a file on me. It is a quite lengthy file. It includes
the investigation conducted about me at the time I was being
considered. I understand it is quite voluminous. I assure you
that I have not read that file. I do not know who made
complimentary statements about me. I don't know who made
derogatory statements. Perhaps, maybe, some of you may
have made such statements. I don't want to be colored in my
opinion about you by some statements which you may have made
in good faith, and I think this substantially is what it is all about.
The confidentiality and the privacy of individuals. If you, Joe
Lastelic, want to make a statement about me, you should. I
think you should be given that right, and I think that the proper
forum is in one of confidentiality. I have not read those so-called
gossip, rumor, or other objectionable types of materials. I am
24-
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 168
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
not going to read them, and I certainly do not sponsor any move
to revive anything such as may have once existed.
Those files will remain? Rumors, gossips--gossip, whatever
is in it?
Yes sir.
You said that you don't question the motives of people who come in
to give you information. Do you ever check out the information
that was given to you about the people?
If it is within our jurisdiction and makes allegations which may
mount into a violation, yes, we check them out. But a mere
allegation that so and so is a sex deviate or that he is going
around conducting himself other than in a gentlemanly manner
and so forth, no, we do not just on the bare gossip stage check
that out.
But, nevertheless, that remains in file. You don't check that
out, that remains in the person's file unevaluated and raw.
Is that correct?
That's right. Now the implication is that you should possibly
clear the man. In so doing you would, of course, be violating
your charter which is that you do not investigate matters of this
type. You might also by virture of this give it some degree of
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 169
- 25 -
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
statute by investigating it. But more than anything else if we
have no business in it we shouldn't be checking it out and we
do not.
If you have no business in it, why are you in it at all?
We did not enter into it.
Is this a file that is a part of the FBI records?
Yes sir.
You won't always be the FBI Director?
That's right. I am confident of that. I am with you a thousand
percent.
Mr. Kelley, can you tell us when you first learned of the files that
Mr. Hoover kept that were called his confidential or OC files and
whether or not anyone within the Bureau knew about those files
and failed to tell you about them?
Jack, that's a long answer, but I will try to brief it. I first learned
of the possibility that these files existed in January, 1974. I then
was presented a list of some of the files and called in one of the
Assistant Directors and said what is this all about. Should they
be integrated into the general file system, and I mean by that that
we have a general file system. We have a section of our files which
are kept in a separate room because we don't want everyone to
have the capability of going into them. The man who was charged
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 170
- 26 -

•
with the responsibility of looking into this then within a few
months retired. The next stimulation of this situation arose
after a statement appeared in the paper mentioning these files
and we immediately talked about this. Still I did not look at the
files. I then instructed that our Inspection Division go over them and
make a listing of them, categorizing them. Some of them, of
course, were purely administrative, some included information
as outlined by Mr. Levi. Such a listing was made and was turned
over to the Department. Thereafter Mr. Silberman looked them
over and thereafter Mr Levi looked them over and I made a
rather cursory check of them myself. Why did I not look these
files over in the first place? I did not construe them as being with-
in the realm of the so-called dossiers that had been mentioned
before and during, certainly, my confirmation. I said I did not
subscribe to the preparation or retention of dossiers on Congress-
men nor members of the Senate. I still persist in that and we have
not. My references were about those which were declared
improper during Mr. Gray's administration and they were at that
time stopped. These were dossiers that were prepared on candidates
for Members of Congress and those who failed in their venture
were destroyed. Those which were successful were put into the
general files. We no longer do that and frankly, in my opinion,
this is what was referred to. I feel that these files should be
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 171
-
- 27 -
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
maintained confidential. I still have not given them a close
review. I have not done so for the very reason as I mentioned
about my own file. I don't think it will benefit me to go over
them. Under archival rules they must be preserved. In the
guidelines which are to be established, I will welcome any
reasonable guideline which says we either do or do not preserve
them. I am anxious for us to do our work the way it should be
done. More than that, I cannot say.
Mr. Kelley, there have been suggestions that your absences
from Washington for family reasons have prevented you from
getting the kind of control of the Bureau that you would have if
you were here all the time. I am wondering how you respond
to that kind of suggestion?
My response is that I feel that I have been able to maintain
control. I am certainly in constant touch. I have telephone
calls that are relayed to me when I have made such trips. I am
confident that the executive staff of this Bureau is solidly behind
me. I say this inasmuch as I have somewhat a feeling such aș
may be implied in your question. I must as a result of
conditions that you know about make these trips. If I feel that in
so doing it will endanger my administrative control and my
capability of doing that which I think should be done, I will leave.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 172
-
28 -
QUESTION:
MR. KELLEY:
There is no question whatsoever because that which I say applies
to others should also apply to me. But, I do feel that I have
control of the organization. I have known of no disruptive tactics that
might have been launched to unseat me and again were there any.
evidence of that and found, in my opinion, to be one which is well
grounded, I would immediately leave.
Mr. Kelley, if I can return for the moment to the subject of
break-ins. You said that conditions of national security and
foreign intelligence--there may have been other areas. I wonder
if you can be a little clearer on whether there were any break-ins
that were not related to foreign intelligence or national security?
I know of none.
Thank you Mr. Kelley.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 173
- 29 -
ONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EPON
SA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. O. Cregar
ش اشیا کی کا
Thi
FROM
:
A. B. Fulton
SUBJECT: 1
SENSTUDY 75
DATE:
7/28/75
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr.
Fulton
1-Mr. McCaffrey
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Kinspection Lau
Infell.
Laboratory
Blah. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Re Senstudy 75 memorandum dated 7/24/75.
Pages 521-522, Item 5 and Item 6, of a CIA
memorandum entitled, "Items For Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI," contain references to CIA participation in FBI
training and FBI participation in CIA training. Comments
appear below in regard to each item.
Item 5.
It is true that since late 1972 CIA has
participated in numerous foreign counterintelligence (CI)
in-services put on by Intelligence Division (INTD). CIA
has participated in all seven of our basic CI schools held
to date.
고
It should be noted that CIA's input into these
programs has been highly valuable and productive and is
designed to give FBI Agents a better insight into the Soviet,
Satellite and Chicom target based on CIA's overseas experience,
against these targets. Two of the lectures usually given at
these courses include the structure, function and role of CIA,
and the structure, function and role of the Domestic Collection
Division and the Foreign Resources Division.
These lectures have been beneficial in teaching our
Special Agents about the mutually complimentary roles of CIA
overseas and the FBI in the United States in working against
hostile intelligence targets.
CIA officers who lecture to our classes have been
careful to emphasize CIA's experience against these hostiles
from an overseas perspective and their overseas experiences.
REC-102 2-perie
6
486
CIA's presentations can in no way be interpreted as
being an attempt on their part to teach us how to work UT 1ñ**
the United States, nor does CIA attempt to persuade our Special
Agents to adopt CIA overseas methods or tactics to Uted States
conditions.
JWM:jvl
(4)
84 AUG 13 1975
ཡཱསམྨནྟིཙ
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 174
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. O. Cregar
Re: Senstudy 75
Item 6. Three Special Agents, Neil Rice, Larry
McWilliams, and John McCaffrey, attended this Soviet Operations
course at CIA Headquarters. The course ran from May 14 to
May 25, 1973. Special Agent McCaffrey only attended one week
while Rice and McWilliams attended for two weeks.
The primary reason for FBI inclusion in this course
was because, at that time, the three Special Agents were
members of the new Training Unit, INTD, and we were seeking
educational guidance and ideas for our basic CI courses then
under development. We benefited from this course because we
borrowed a few educational ideas and techniques from CIA's
method of handling its course.
RECOMMENDATION:
None. For information.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 175
the
Грем
шки
1
2
CPTIONAL
NO 10
MAY 2 TON
3SA 12 REG NC 27
5010-100
À UNITED STATES GOERNMEN I
Memorandum
1
2
-
10
Mr. W. R. Wannally
FROM W. O. Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
DATE:
1
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
7/30/75
Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 Mr. W. O. Cregar
-
Assoc, "i
10 Adm.
A lav.
Asst. .:
"
315".
Ext. Affans
& Co.
Inspection
Lusoratory
Legal Coun.
& Eval.
5. Inv.
Training
Telefone Rm.
Director Sec'y
"
Attached is a "Superceding Request For FBI Materials,
dated 7/28/75, which was received from Mr. John Elliff, SSC
Staff Representative, on the afternoon of 7/28/75.
This request is in the form of six categories
(Roman numerals I through VI), the first four requested by
Friday, 8/1/75, and the latter two by Friday, 8/8/75.
Set forth is à brief description of the separate
categories with comments under each, where applicable:
I. Materials to which the Committee Staff has been
given prior access and now requests delivery.
II.
Outstanding previously requested materials for
delivery to the Committee.
i
REC-88
Item E. pertaining to mail surveillances is
being deferred pending receipt of guidelines
from the Department of Justice since there is
a problem with possible future litigation in
the areas of mail opening and intercept,--The
Department, by letter from the Director 7/29/75,
was advised of our position in this matters
Item H. refers to materials pertaining to
COINTELPRO. During discussions on 7/28/75,
the Committee Staff decided to defer the
deadline for this material for 8/8/75.
Enclosure
62-116395
EWL: 1hb
(6)
34 AUG 6 1975
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
CLASSIFIED
DATE] 0/1/2000 #YSPRAUM U
MDR-16
CONTINUED OVER
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 176
=
ཡ
7.5.5
1 X 2
4
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
Outstanding previously requested materials to
be made available for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.
Items G., H., and I. in this category pertain
to information developed through investigation
of Martin Luther King, Jr. SSC Staff
Representatives on 7/28/75 advised that an
agreement is pending but not yet finalized
between the Committee and attorneys repre-
senting Mrs. King which would govern the type
of information to be furnished the Committee
in these categories. We are deferring
processing of the requested materials until
an agreement is reached so that guidelines
may be furnished us. The Attorney General
has been advised of our position in a letter
of 7/29/75.
Newly requested materials for access by SSC Staff
IV.
at JEH Building.
Items A. and B. in this category were deferred
until 8/8/75 by Committee Staff in conference
on 7/28/75.
V.
Outstanding previously requested materials for
delivery to the Committee.
In this category Item B. is being handled by
the Department of Justice. Items A., C., Dr,
D., E., and F., have been substantially
complied with and Item G. is in preparation.
VI.
Outstanding previously requested materials for
access at JEH Building.
SEA
น
XCL
2
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 177
CONTINUED OVER
- 2 -
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
A conference was held on the morning of 7/29/75
by Senstudy Project personnel with all Intelligence Division
personnel involved in the Senstudy effort. Appropriate
assignments were made or confirmed. A conference is scheduled
for the afternoon of 7/30/75 to check progress and identify
any special problems. It appears at this time that we will
be able to meet the deadline of 8/1/75 for designated materials
in categories I. through IV., as well as the deadline of 8/8/75 ·
for designated materials in categories V. and VI.
ACTION:
None. For information.
NW-88608 Docid:32989626 Page 178
3 -
230
R
Phillips
SECRET
July 28, 1976
SUPERCEDING REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS
~ I.
Materials to which the Committee staff has been given-
access; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:
A. FBI file #100-00
:
B.
FBI Inspection Guidelines
3. Huffith ado. Vrato furwohly 1/70.
C.
D.
Index to all SAC Memoranda and SAC letters
Petersen Committee Report on COINTELPRO, including
all appendices and case summaries (names of authors
of analytical appendices may be deleted)
E. All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual
of Rules and Regulations previously made accessible
at FBIHQ (including Manual of Instructions Sections
105, 107, and 130)
F.
All superceding sections of the FBI Manual of
Instructions previously made accessible at FBIHQ.
-G.
Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents. - 3/19/-z
Ita - TPC
H.
FBI Forms previously made accessible at FBIHQ.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN 
OTHERWISE.
CLASSIFIED BY Spa Aim lumf
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
MDR-16
10/13/2000
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 179
ENCLOSURE
SECRET
2
F
2.
-
2
-
-SECRET
II. 'Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery
requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:'
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
Immediate and continuous delivery/access to underlying
materials pertaining to specific COINTELPRO operations,
as listed previously and subsequently by SSC staff.
Underlying materials pertaining to mail covers,
proffered by Special Counsel in letter of“July 15,
1975.
Materials pertaining to the "Huston Plan" requested
on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, items 2-3, 5, 7, 9-12.
Materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966
of the investigative techniques referred to in
President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973, requested
on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 1 (with specific
reference to surreptitious entry and mail surveillance).
Materials pertaining to mail surveillance, including
mail covers, mail opening, and mail intercept,
requested in letter of June 13, 1975.
Sections 8A, 8B, 8P, and 80 of the Manual of
Instructions, and Sections 10 and 12 of the Manual
of Rules and Regulations, requested in letter of
July 8, 1975.
Communications regarding the activities of SSC which
have been addressed from the FBI Director and/or
other FBIHQ personnel to more than one field office
and/or to all agents in those field offices, requested
in letter of July 8, 1975.
Materials pertaining to COINTELPRO operations
directed against the Black Panther Party in the
late 1960s and early 1970s in San Francisco-Oakland
Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, requested
in letter of June 30, 1975 (list of persons contacted
not to include persons in their capacity as sources).
SECRET
2
NW-88608-Docid:32989626_Page_180
:

1.39
III.
socat
3. SECRET
Outstanding previously requested materials; access to
screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975.
A.
B.
C.
D.
Ready to E.
revice
"ming
...55C
F.
(G.
H.
I.
of columnist Kraft
Materials pertaining to the reported investigation finis/Deciz
"logs" of any surveillance. w/ Dalybe crane re sexth cuspecto
Materials contained in the so-called "Official and
Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory (Hilton)
information about individuals, requested in part on
May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 22.
Access via agreed procedure to certain information
regarding materials contained in the so-called
"Official and Confidential" files which do contain
derogatory information about individuals.
Materials, including inspection reports or related
surveys, which pertain to the Attorney General's
Mali (Helgesor)
testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding eral' Sypes Mutt (1/
of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in
the past,
item 23.
requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C,
SAC letters and SAC memoranda, requested in memo
of June 17, 1975.
Çiatiyar
Materials pertaining to surveillance at the Democratic
National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1964,
requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 7a, 7b,
8, 16.
Materials pertaining to electronic surveillance of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested on May 14, 1975,
Appendix D, items 5, 6a, 6b, 6c.
Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of
July 8, 1975.
Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter
of July 14, 1975.
رام
Shen
Shid
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 181
·SECRET
4
-
SECRET
KE
Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery
requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:
A.
B.
C.
D.
F.
G.
H.
I.
Abstracts of Executive Conference memoranda from
January 1, 1960, to the present
Burns
The so-called "Papich Committee Report" on FBI-CIA
coordination prepared in 1966.
The Manual of Instructions and/or Rules and
Regulations for the Legal Attaches (pictions
Morz
(from
Ezzinly
The annual five-year budget projections of the
FBI Intelligence Division from 1970 to the present.
The annual FBI Intelligence Division budget requests
from 1970 to the present
Materials pertaining to any surreptitious entries
considered, proposed, or conducted by the FBI at
the Chilean Embassy from January 1, 1970, untir
the present.
✓ (5)
All project INLET letters prepared for and disseminated.
to the President, the Attorney General, or any other
recipient during the period 1969 through 1973.
Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspectioff
Division for July 3 Inspection for the following
individuals: (See O.C. Witness list)
Control file for the year 1971 for the Mass Media
Program.
Johnson (Ryan)"
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 182
SECRET
•
OC WITNESS LIST
SECRET
S.A. Battle
James Crawford
Joseph Dowling
Thomas Dudney
John Dunphy
Mark Felt
Annie Fields
Helen Gandy
Albert Gunser
Robert Kunkel
Irma Metcalf
John Mohr
Tom Payton
Kenneth Peffer
Jessie Peterson
S.A. Clark Shoaff
Kenneth Shoffer
Dorothy Skillman
Raymond Smith
Carol Tschudy
. Ralph Windear
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 183
SECRET
:
V. F
LIKE
KL
་
V.
the
b
- 5-
SECRET
Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery
requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Materials relating to the establishment, maintenance,
and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic
surveillance index, requested in part on May 14,
1975, Appendix D, item 2.
has gone for very sic
Materials and/or information pertaining to warrantless
electronic surveillance for national security purposes
requested in letter from Senstor Church to the Attorney
General, dated July 7, 1975.
"Depy is leakey
Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions,
policies, and procedures with regard to surreptitious
entry, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5,
Appendix B, item 4.
دودا سانان
jone to Depor. procesing to sic
Larse
migrating braiſing
Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions,
policies, and procedures with regard to [incommunicado
interrogation, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A,
item 5, Appendix B, item 4.)(s) has
Jone to bejut.
Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions,
policies, and procedures with regard to obtaining
bank, credit, or other personal information, requested
on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B,
item 4.
3 Daley
Dept fully SSC
Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions,
policies, and procedures with regard to the use of
informants, including possible entrapment, provocation,
interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other
problems, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item
5, Appendix B, item 4.
Jone to Dejot for eventos Sc
Materials pertaining to Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose
Sell, Maude Adams White Wilkerson, and Martha L.
Shockey, requested in letter of July 1, 1975 (list
of persons contacted not to include persons in their
capacity as sources).
NW-88608-Docld:32989626-Page-184-
SECRET
IA,!
MARE
VI
•Dept
6.
-
SECRET
Outstanding previously requested materials; access to
screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:
A. A list of all warrantless electronic surveillances
identified by subject and target which were instituted
or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request_
of the FBI from January 1, 1960, until the present,
requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 3.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
All written justifications for the specific authori-
zations by the Attorney General for warrantless
electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until
the present, requested in notification letter of
June 27, 1975.
Prins,
Deixem
Sums Valley
All materials reflecting the denial by the Attorney
General of specific requests for warrantless electronic
surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present,
requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975.
L
Materials pertaining. to the use of warrantless
electronic surveillance and other controversial intelli-
gence techniques against plaintiffs in certain pending
civil suits, listed in letter of June 23, 1975.
Materials pertaining to ("SCOPE" and Operation ORKID
requested in letter of July 14, 1975]te Dipt for Risse.
Materials pertaining to "notional" organizations
and to the general subject of fictitious and cover.
organizations (political, commercial, or other),
requested in letter of July 14, 1975.
Materials pertaining to FBI activities with respect
( suffere- lempiin.)
Gan
to the Ku Klux Klan, requested in letter of respect, Shen
1965.
Materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of
the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic of
1965, as requested on May. 14, 1975, Appendix C,
item 28.
at White House
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 185
SECRET
་ ན་ ་ ། Y" }
RE
'
i
P
The Attorney General
Director, FBI.
U. S. SETATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
2
1
1
-
-
Mr. JA. Mintz
(1
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
July 29, 1975
7-51-75174)
Reference is made to a request for FBI materials
dated July 28, 1975, received from SSC Staff Representatives
John Elliff and Mark Gitenstein during the afternoon of
July 28, 1975. This request is categorized under six sections,
Roman numerals I through VI. The first four categories require
delivery/access by August 1, 1975, and the latter two categories
by August 8, 1975.
We have completed our initial review of this overall
request and anticipate we will be able to comply with the
designated deadlines with the following exceptions:
}
II. E. With respect to the request pertaining to
mail surveillance, including mail covers, mail opening and mail
intercept, we are deferring action pending receipt of guidelines
from the Department of Justice, and it is suggested that the
deadline for this request be deferred to some future date
consistent with the Department's decision in this matter.
III. G. H. and I. These requests deal with information
developed through investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
It is our understanding that an agreement is pending but not
yet finalized by the SSC and attorneys representing Mrs. King
Dep. AD Adm which would delineate type of information to be furnished in
Dep. AD Inv. these categories. Upon receipt of guidelines, we are prepared to
process this material on an expedite basis and furnish to the
Comp. Syst. Committee within one week of such notification.
Assoc. Dir.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. __
Gent, Inv. 162-116396
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. -
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
EWL: 1hb
(8)
The AUG 1 1 1975
Director Sec'y
-
X-105
REC-34, 62-110315-
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/200BYSPapum
MAIL ROOM ☑
MDR-16
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docía:32989626-Page 18623 JEH
485
W
1/ 17 AUG 5 1975
PL
Selbred to Alators thic
GPO 954-545
The Attorney General
It should be emphasized that the above exceptions
are the result of a preliminary review of the request. It is
possible that unforeseen problems might arise during our
continuing research in the various areas of the request which
will make it necessary to extend the deadlines; however, we do
not anticipate such problems at this time and should they arise,
you will be immediately advised. Also, we are mindful of the
request by the SSC Staff for a partial proffer of materials
and will attempt to comply whenever circumstances allow.
-
1 The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
KW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 187
2
CODE
TO SACS LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
SENSTUDY 75
1 -
TELETYPE
Mr. J. B. Adams
NITEL
3- Mr. J. A. Mintz
find food front
-
a
(1
-
GNO
Gits
JULY 31, 1975
Mr. Hotis)
Mr. Daly)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. S. F. Phillips
(62-116395)
1
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
REBUTEL JULY 30, 1975.
FOR INCUMBENTS:
REPORTING PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW RELATIVE TO SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF INTERVIEWS OF PRESENT AND FORMER SAS:
IMMEDIATELY AFTER INTERVIEW PREPARE LHM
REPORTING AS DETAILED AS POSSIBLE QUESTIONS ASKED AND REPLIES
GIVEN. INCLUDE WHETHER OR NOT INTERVIEWEE'S RIGHTS WERE
EXPLAINED TO HIM; DURATION OF INTERVIEW; AND IF IT WAS NECESSARY(
FOR INTERVIEWEE TO CONSULT WITH BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE, SO STATE.
ALSO INCLUDE ADVICE GIVEN TO INTERVIEWEE BY BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE
AS TO RIGHT TO COUNSEL, PRIVILEGED AREAS, CONSULTATION PRIVILEGES,
AND PARAMETERS OF INTERVIEW, ALL AS DISCUSSED IN REFERENCED
TELETYPE. LHM SHOULD BEAR DUAL CAPTION: "U.S. SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)"; "INTERVIEW OF SA
(INSERT NAME) BY SSC STAFF MEMBER." SUBMIT ORIGINAL AND SEVEN
COPIES OF EACH LIM TO BUREAU BY COVER AIRTEL, ÁTTENTION INTO
W.O. CREGAR.
SFP: jg
(9)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 31 1975
REC-88
62-116375-4484
9
AUG 6 1975
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
W
753 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
TERETS UNCLASSICTED
TOLETYPE
DA
TELETYPE UNIT ✓✓
Laboratory _
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
1075
NW8860Lbd:32989626 Page 188
MDR-16
4063 foxx
GPO 1975 O-569-920
PAGE TWO
62-116395
FOR FORMER SAS: ANY FORMER SA WHO HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED AND
VOLUNTEERS TO FURNISH RESULTS (NOTE THAT SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD
NOT BE SOLICITED BY FBI BUT MERELY ACCEPTED WHEN OFFERED) SHOULD
BE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER INTERVIEW AND
LHM PREPARED AND SUBMITTED IN LINE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR
INCUMBENTS.
SECOND HEADING OF LHM SHOULD USE TERM "FORMER
"
NOTE:
_
Referenced Bureau teletype alerted appropriate offices
to tentative schedule of SSC Staff Member for interviews re
Cointelpro/BPP. The teletype advised of Director's waiver from
employment agreements and issued other necessary instructions for
briefing of personnel in advance. Instant teletype necessary
for reporting instructions and is in line with procedure we have
been following for other similar interviews, reporting of which
has been mainly by HQ personnel.
SA.'
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 189
I
2
1
"
ΤΟ
:
-
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
12
1
-
2
DATE:
1
1
-
-
FROM
:
W. O. Crega
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Mr. J. B. Hotis) Comp. Syst.
7/30/75
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
week
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y —
Attached is a "Superceding Request For FBI Materials,"
dated 7/28/75, which was received from Mr. John Elliff, SSC
Staff Representative, on the afternoon of 7/28/75.
This request is in the form of six categories
(Roman numerals I through VI), the first four requested by
Friday, 8/1/75, and the latter two by Friday, 8/8/75.
Set forth is a brief description of the separate
categories with comments under each, where applicable:
I. Materials to which the Committee Staff has been
given prior access and now requests delivery.
II. Outstanding previously requested materials for
delivery to the Committee.
REC-88
62-11-375483
Item E. pertaining to mail surveillances is
being deferred pending receipt of guidelines
from the Department of Justice since there is
a problem with possible future litigation in
the areas of mail opening and intercept The
Department, by letter from the Director 7/29/75,
was advised of our position in this matte AUG 6 1975
Item H. refers to materials pertaining to
COINTELPRO. During discussions on 7/28/75,
the Committee Staff decided to defer the
ENCLOSURE, deadline for this material for 8/8/75.
Enclosure
62-116395 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/11/2000 Bid Am
MOR-16
EWL:1hb lhb
ак
CONTINUED
-
OVER
(6)
AUG 6 1975
NW 88808 DocId:32989626 Page 190

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
III.
Outstanding previously requested materials to
be made available for access by SSC Staff at JEH Building.
Items G., H., and I. in this category pertain
to information developed through investigation
of Martin Luther King, Jr. SSC Staff
Representatives on 7/28/75 advised that an
agreement is pending but not yet finalized
between the Committee and attorneys repre-
senting Mrs. King which would govern the type
of information to be furnished the Committee
in these categories. We are deferring
processing of the requested materials until
an agreement is reached so that guidelines
may be furnished us. The Attorney General
has been advised of our position in a letter
of 7/29/75.
Newly requested materials for access by SSC Staff
IV.
at JEH Building.
Items A. and B. in this category were deferred
until 8/8/75 by Committee Staff in conference
on 7/28/75.
V.
Outstanding previously requested materials for
delivery to the Committee.
In this category Item B. is being handled by
the Department of Justice. Items A., C., D
D., E., and F., have been substantially
complied with and Item G. is in preparation.
VI.
Outstanding previously requested materials for
access at JEH Building..
CONTINUED
-
OVER
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 191
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
A conference was held on the morning of 7/29/75
by Senstudy Project personnel with all Intelligence Division
personnel involved in the Senstudy effort. Appropriate
assignments were made or confirmed. A conference is scheduled
for the afternoon of 7/30/75 to check progress and identify
any special problems. It appears at this time that we will
be able to meet the deadline of 8/1/75 for designated materials
in categories I. through IV., as well as the deadline of 8/8/75
for designated materials in categories V. and VI.
ACTION:
None.
For information.
Euf
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 192
لله
- 3 ·
-
PLM
дж
дам
PH
SECRET
Philly's
July 28, 1975
Aw
SUPERCEDING REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS
I.
Materials to which the Committee staff has been given
access; delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
✓ G.
H.
FBI file #100-00-
FBI Inspection Guidelines -
3. Kriffith ado. Horto furishly 1/20
Index to all SAC Memoranda and SAC letters
'including
Petersen Committee Report on COINTELPRO,
all appendices and case summaries (names of authors
of analytical appendices may be deleted)
All sections of FBI Manual of Instructions and Manual
of Rules and Regulations previously made accessible
at FBIHQ (including Manual of Instructions Sections
105, 107, and 130)
All superceding sections of the FBI Manual of
Instructions previously made accessible at FBIHQ.
:
Titles and number of FBI Field Office Agents. - 3/19/75 Request
FBI Forms previously made accessible at FBIHQ.
ItemI-PC
CLASSIFIED BY SP2 Humlum f
DECLASSIFY ON: 
25X 6.
MOR-16
10/13/2000
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 193
SECRET
ENCLOSURE 62-116395-483
II.
SECRET
Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery
requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:
A.
5/8/15
B.
Immediate and continuous delivery/access to underlying
materials pertaining to specific COINTELPRO operations,
as listed previously and subsequently by SSC staff.
Underlying materials pertaining to mail covers,
proffered by Special Counsel in letter of July 15,
1975.
c. Materials pertaining to the "Huston Plan" requested
on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, items 2-3, 5, 7, 9-12.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
Materials pertaining to the FBI's termination in 1966
of the investigative techniques referred to in
President Nixon's statement of May 22, 1973, requested
on May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 1 (with specific
reference to surreptitious entry and mail surveillance).
Materials pertaining to mail surveillance, including
mail covers, mail opening, and mail intercept,
requested in letter of June 13, 1975.
Sections 8A, 8B, 8P, and 80 of the Manual of
Instructions, and Sections 10 and 12 of the Manual
of Rules and Regulations, requested in letter of
July 8, 1975.
Communications regarding the activities of SSC which
have been addressed from the FBI Director and/or
other FBIHQ personnel to more than one field office
and/or to all agents in those field offices, requested
in letter of July 8, 1975.
Materials pertaining to COINTELPRO operations
directed against the Black Panther Party in the
late 1960s and early 1970s in San Francisco-Oakland
Los Angeles, and San Diego, California, requested
in letter of June 30, 1975 (list of persons contacted
not to include persons in their capacity as sources).
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 194
SECRET
XII.
to assest
3
SECRET
Outstanding previously requested materials; access to
screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 1, 1975.
A.
B.
C.
D.
Ready to E..
deferring
zineding
receipt of
from SSC
F.
G.
II.
I.
Materials pertaining to the reported investigation Mallit/Dalsig
of columnist Joseph Kraft in
"logs" of any surveillance. (w/ Dalyre clevance re seated.aspects
Materials contained in the so-called "Official and
Confidential" files which do not contain derogatory March (Helgeson)
information about individuals, requested in part on
May 14, 1975, Appendix C, item 22.
Access via agreed procedure to certain information
regarding materials contained in the so-called
"Official and Confidential" files which do contain
derogatory information about individuals.
Materials, including inspection reports or related
surveys, which pertain to the Attorney General's
testimony on February 27, 1975, regarding the "types
of abuse for which the Bureau has been susceptible in
the past," requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C,
item 23.
SAC letters and SAC memoranda, requested in memo
of June 17, 1975.
Malleti (Helgeson)
Materials pertaining to surveillance at the Democratic
National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 1964,
requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, items 7a, 7b,
8, 16.
Mallett (Dab/
Materials pertaining to electronic surveillance of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested on May 14, 1975,
Appendix D, items 5, 6a, 6b, 6c.
Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter of
July 8, 1975.
Materials pertaining to FBI activity regarding
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., requested in letter
of July 14, 1975.
plichinger
Share
Shea
Shea
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 195
SECRET
EV.
SECRET
Newly requested materials; access to screen for delivery
requested by Friday, August 1, 1975:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E
F.
G.
Abstracts of Executive Conference memoranda from
January 1, 1960, to the present
The so-called "Papich Committee Report" on FBI-CIA
coordination prepared in 1966.
Burns
Nolan
The Manual of Instructions and/or Rules and Moore
Regulations for the Legal Attaches (Foreign options
Manual
Oplications
t. Nicore (from Dirk
The annual five-year budget projections of the
FBI Intelligence Division from 1970 to the present.
The annual FBI Intelligence Division budget requests
from 1970 to the present
Materials pertaining to any surreptitious entries
considered, proposed, or conducted by the FBI [at
the Chilean Embassy from January 1, 1970, until
the present. (5)
Одливу
All project INLET letters prepared for and disseminated
to the President, the Attorney General, or any other
recipient during the period 1969 through 1973.
H. Summaries or notes on interviews conducted by Inspection
H
Division for July 3 Inspection for the following
individuals: (See O.C. Witness list)
Control file for the year 1971 for the Mass Media
Program.
Halogen
Johnson (Ryan).
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 196
SECTET
OC WITNESS LIST
SECRET.
S.A. Battle
James Crawford
Joseph Dowling
Thomas Dudney
John Dunphy
Mark Felt
Annie Fields
Helen Gandy
Albert Gunser
Robert Kunkel
Irma Metcalf
John Mohr
Tom Payton
Kenneth Peffer
Jessie Peterson
S.A. Clark Shoaff
Kenneth Shoffer
Dorothy Skillman
Raymond Smith
Carol Tschudy
Ralph Windear
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 197
SECRET
SECRET
Komas.
5
Outstanding previously requested materials; delivery
requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:
A.
B.
R. Ross
Materials relating to the establishment, maintenance,
and operation of the so-called "ELSUR" electronic
surveillance index, requested in part on May 14,
1975, Appendix D, item 2.
has gone for delivery to SSC
Materials and/or information pertaining to warrantless
electronic surveillance for national security purposes
requested in letter from Senator Church to the Attorney
General, dated July 7, 1975.,
"Dept's leaking
C. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions,
policies, and procedures with regard to surreptitious
entry,‚requested on May 14, 1975,
Appendix B, item 4.
Appendix A, item 5,
gone to Dept. fridliving to SSC
D. Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions,
policies, and procedures with regard to (incommunicado Larson
interrogation, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A,
E.
F.
G.
item 5, Appendix B, item 4. J(s) has gone to Deput. Ai
• suggesting briefing
Daly
Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions,
policies, and procedures with regard to obtaining
bank, credit, or other personal information, requested
on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item 5, Appendix B,
item 4.
gone to Dept for delivery to SSC
Materials pertaining to legal authority, decisions,
policies, and procedures with regard to the use of
informants, including possible entrapment, provocation,
interference with lawyer-client relationship, or other
problems, requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix A, item
5, Appendix B, item 4.
Jone & Depot. For delivery to SSC
=
Renderhalf
Materials pertaining to Morris Starsky, Evelyn Rose
Sell, Maude Adams White Wilkerson, and Martha L.
Shockey, requested in letter of July 1, 1975 (list
of persons contacted not to include persons in their
capacity as sources).
NW-88608 Docld:32989626 Page 198
SECRET
1
- 6 -
SECRET
Outstanding previously requested materials; access to
screen for delivery requested by Friday, August 8, 1975:
A. A list of all warrantless electronic surveillances
identified by subject and target which were instituted
or operated by, for, on behalf of, or at the request,
of the FBI from January 1, 1960, until the present, ins,
requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix D, item 3.
B. All written justifications for the specific authori-
zations by the Attorney General for warrantless
electronic surveillance from January 1, 1960, until
the present, requested in notification letter of
June 27, 1975.
C.
Dept.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
Burus Palsy
All materials reflecting the denial by the Attorney
General of specific requests for warrantless electronić
surveillance from January 1, 1960, until the present,
requested in notification letter of June 27, 1975.
Beins,
Materials pertaining to the use of warrantless
electronic surveillance and other controversial intelli-·
gence techniques against plaintiffs in certain pending
civil suits, listed in letter of June 23, 1975.
Materials pertaining to [SCOPE" and Operation ORKID
requested in letter of July 14, 1975. The Dept for liv. diss
J/s)
Hampton
ver Ryan
Materials pertaining to "notional" organizations
and to the general subject of fictitious and cover)
organizations (political, commercial, or other),
requested in letter of July 14, 1975.
Materials pertaining to FBI activities with respect
to the Ku Klux Klan, requested in letter of Juspect, then
1965.
Materials pertaining to the origins and conduct of
the FBI investigation in the Dominican Republic of
1965, as requested on May 14, 1975, Appendix C,
item 28.
at White House
terugstor
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 199
PECRET
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
: Mr. Walsh
FROM S. R. Burns
:
дре
DATE: July 29, 1975
SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
LIND
COPY
RETAINED
PERSONNEL RECORDS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone R
Director Sec'y —
The Department of Justice (DOJ) received a letter dated July 24,
1975, directed to K. William O'Conner, Esq., Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
requesting that the DOJ provide the Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities with a list
of all Special Agents assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's
who had the surname "Kehoe". The unit to which they were assigned and their
current addresses were also requested. The letter, which has been forwarded
to us for our response, was signed by John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic
Intelligence Task Force.
The purpose of this memo is to recommend that the attached
memorandum from the Director enclosing a memorandum for the SSC be
approved and forwarded to the Attorney General. The memo for the SSC
advises (1) that there were two Special Agents, Francis Joseph Kehoe and
James Patrick Kehoe, assigned to the New York City area in the mid-1960's
who have the surname "Kehoe" (2) that both were assigned to the investigation
of Soviet espionage matters and (3) that both are currently employed as Special
Agents of the FBI with business address as follows:
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DA
'MOR-16
Enc..
WWDCT:pms (7)
2 Mr. Mintz
1
1
-
-
(1 Mr. Hotis)
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Walsh
1 Mr. Midkiff
-
1075.
NW88087:32980026 Page 200
Francis Joseph Keho REC-88
62-116345-1
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Gateway I, Market Street
Newark, New Jersey 07101
James Patrick Kehoe
Federal Bureau of Investigation
201 East 69th Street
New York, New York 10021
felespe
ec's to lose 
men
AUG 6 17
Phily
(OVER)

Memo Burns to Walsh
Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations
With Respect To Intelligence Activities (SSC)
Review of our in-service and out-of-service records failed to
indicate any other current or former FBI Agents with the surname "Kehoe"
who were assigned to the New York Office in the 1960's. Francis Joseph
Kehoe, EOD 12-10-51, GS-13, $26,905, married with six children, was
assigned to New York City from 1952 until 10-15-74 when he was trans-
ferred to Newark where he is currently assigned. During all of the 1960's
he was assigned to the investigation of Soviet espionage matters.
James Patrick Kehoe, EOD 3-26-51, GS-13, $27,632, married with one
child, has been assigned to New York City since 1953. Prior to the 1960's
through the present he has been assigned to the investigation of Soviet
espionage matters.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the attached memo from the Director to the Attorney General
enclosing the attached memo to the SSC be approved and forwarded to the
Attorney General.
woc
TSM
125
G
NF
-2-
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 201
EW/RGH
Рем
F
ΤΟ
:
I
OPTIONAL FOR NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
1
1
1
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
-
Mr. J. G.
Deegan
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
1
-
FROM
:
J. G. Deegan TCP
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
DATE: 7/29/75
Mr. J.. T. Aldhizer.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
་
To advise review of pages 188, 189, 283 and 330
of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document which Senate
Select Committee has had access to and which reportedly
makes reference to extremely sensitive Bureau operations
determined such pages do not compromise or damage FBI
operations or sources which relate to IS-1 Section.
CIA document is fully identified in memorandum from
Mr. W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall dated 7/24/75 under
instant caption.
Re page 188
The
This page reveals CIA began to follow Caribbean
black radicalism in earnest in 1968 and as a result CIA's
Directorate of Intelligence published studies on 8/6/69
and 6/12/70. This page revealed in each of these studies
there was a single paragraph devoted to ties with U. S. black
power movement and primarily concerned visits of Stokely
Carmichael and other U. S. black power activists to the
Caribbean. The second study was to pay special attention to
links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates
of black power in U. S. This page reveals these studies
did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between
militant blacks in the U. S. and the Caribbean.
REC-88
42 116-375--481
These CIA studies were furnished FBI, see serials
157-8415-247 and 190-12-324-257. The 8/6/69 study revealed
the Jamaican Government had officially banned the travel
to Jamaica by Stokely Carmichael, H. "Rap" Brown and James
Forman. These individuals were not further identified and
no additional information was set forth in that study
concerning their possible travel to Jamaica.
WHA: adnadn
(5)
19 AUG 6 1975
CONTINUED OVER
耐能
5-mm
84
6 1975
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
NW 88608-'Docld:32989626 Page 202
2
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
"
The study on page 13 reports "Unlike its fairly frequent
contacts with Black Panthers and other radicals in the U. S.,
the Castro Regime seems to have refrained from more than
occasional communications and expressions of moral support
for the Caribbean groups. No specific data is set forth
regarding contacts between Black Panthers and other radicals
in the U. S. and the Castro Regime. Paragraph number 33 on
page 13 of this study notes that the extent of relations
between black power groups in the Caribbean and similar
organizations in the U. S. is vague. Activities of "the
more activist Negro leaders in the U. S. such as Stokely
Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad have been followed closely
in Jamaica and other places. There have been visits by
Carmichael and other U. S. black power exponents to some
of the Caribbean Islands. The study notes these visits have
been limited in the past two or three years because of a ban
on the travel of certain U. S. Negro spokesmen by the
Governments of Jamaica, Antigua and Trinidad-Tobago. The
study notes the latter government had refused to permit
Carmichael to enter the country despite the fact that he is
a native of Trinidad.
"
The 6/12/70 study on page seven noted that available
evidence suggested that contact between Caribbean groups and
the black power movement in the U. S. is infrequent. It
reported there was a two-way flow of visitors including
occasional speaking tours by Carmichael and one or two other
radicals. It was presumed that exchanges of views and
sharing of information occurred but the study noted there
was no firm evidence of funding or direction by U. S. groups.
There is no data on page 188 or published in the
two CIA studies which would compromise or damage FBI operations
or sources.
Re page 189
This page indicates that for several months in the
first half of 1968 the Caribbean branch (apparently of the
Director of Current Intelligence, CIA) wrote periodic typescript
memoranda on Carmichael's travel abroad during a period when he
had dropped out of public view. This page indicates that it was
felt these memoranda were for internal CIA use only although
a copy of one such memorandum was inadvertently sent to the FBI.
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 203
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
SENSTUDY 75
Re:
Bureau file 100-446080 contains numerous communications
from CIA concerning Stokely Carmichael's activities and travel
during late 1967 and early 1968. These memoranda included
data concerning Cuban Intelligence Service contacts with
Carmichael and his travel, including trips to North Vietnam
and Algeria.
It is probable these memoranda were furnished FBI
due to our interest in establishing the degree of foreign
influence or funding in relation to Carmichael's activities
in the U. S.
Data on page 189 and in the memoranda furnished by CIA
concerning Carmichael's whereabouts during this period does
not compromise or damage FBI operations or informants.
Re page 283
This page noted under date of 12/10/70 that "DDI"
noted press accounts of Director Hoover's 11/19/70 statement
reported that the Black Panthers are supported by terrorist
organizations. This page reveals that someone: with CIA had
examined FBI's related files and also those of CIA and could
locate no indication of any relationship between FEDAYEEN and
the Black Panthers. This page revealed a CIA employee provided
"Director," probably the CIA Director, with a memorandum on
this topic.
FBI Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1970 released
10/30/70 revealed the Black Panther Party (BPP) ideology showed
an increasing emphasis on the teachings and writings of the
Premier of North Korea; that BPP spokesmen repeatedly
confirmed their belief in Marxism-Leninism%3B that the inter-
national influence of BPP grew with support groups being organized
in foreign countries; and a BPP international staff was
operating in Algeria. The Annual Report revealed the head of the
BPP International Staff had established a relationship with
Al Fatah, the Arab guerrilla organization, which relationship
had manifested an outpouring of anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist
propaganda in the BPP newspaper.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 204
-
3 -
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
Re page 330
Since the reference to Mr. Hoover's statement
concerning support being received by the BPP has been made
public, the data on page 283 would not damage or compromise
FBI operations or sources.
ACTION:
WHA
The three paragraphs under the caption "Black
Radicalism" on this page briefly summarized the data reported
by CIA on page 188. Data on this page does not compromise
or damage FBI operations or sources.
Woe
Ewf
For information.
Дм
Вси
wwew
#66
джа
дно
шви
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 205
-
. 4.
1
2
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
i
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
1
1
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
-
-
July 21, 1975-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Reference is made to letter from the Committee
to the Attorney General dated May 14, 1975, which contains
request for certain information from the FBI.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a "Secret" memorandum, which
responds to a request from the Committee. A copy of this
memorandum is being furnished for your records.
Enclosures
62-116395
-
-
2
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention:
K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
REC-88
62-10-375-480
9 AUG 6 1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Evol. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
EWL: 1hb hu
(9)
BUCLOCHE
MAIL ROOM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
D. 10/16/2020 BY SP2 Dum/1mG
MDR-16
TELETYPE UNIT
✓wode
888608401:31935626 Page 206
भ
W16
EWL/8
GREE MATERIAL ATTACHED
Jo 4063
4063 да
GPO 1975 O-569-920
62-116395
SECRET Mr. J. B. Adams
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
-
1
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
July 21, 1975
U. S. SEMATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE
INCOMMUNICADO INTERROGATION
1
}
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Pla
Spec.
Training
Reference is made to your request to the Attorney
General by letter dated May 14, 1975, with specific
reference to Appendix A, Request Number 5, B., as well as
Appendix B, Request Humber 4, a and b. In general, these
tvo requests refer to information concerning the use of
certain techniques by the FBI in performance of its investi-
gative responsibilities. The purpose of this memorandum is
to respond to information requested concerning the technique
referred to as "Incommunicado Interrogation."(5)
For your information, this technique has been used
by the FBI on extremely rare occasions during the period of
approximately 1959 to 1963. In each instance when this
technique was used, the subjects were known, prior to
interviews, to be illegally in the United States and to have
been associated with the Soviet Intelligence Services as
illegal officers/agents. (5)
In view of the extremely sensitive nature, it is
requested that any further details concerning the limited
use of this technique be given in an oral briefing before
properly cleared members of the Committee's Staff who are
assigned to this matter. At that time, they will be given
access to necessary documentation.(s)
The Attorney General
EWL: 1hb Inb
(8)
DECLASSIFY
CLASSIFIED
BY Spa Am/unf
MDR-16
ON: 25X 12
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
SECRET
Classified by 6283
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
INFORMATION CONTAINED Exempt froD GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Tate of Declassification Indefinite
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
CLASSIFIED EXC
DTE
MAIL ROOM
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 207
GEDETYPE UNENCLOSURE. & 1240 6. Str 13.
1
6-110.
Wral
सह
0 954-545
---4/880
JECRET
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL
Addressee:
☐ LTR
AU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHTON, D. C. 20535
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
21
7/17/75
☑ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated
U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Caption of Document: Activities. Re: Incommunicado
Interrogation. (Appendix A, Req No. 5, g.,
Appendix B, Reg No. 4, a & b.)
Originating Office:
Delivered by:
Received by:
Title:
FBI
Di Miller Date: Aug 1, 1975.
Ber
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 208
7
SECRET
а
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-48
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM:
SECRET
FBI:
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
2. DATE PROVIDED
7/21/75
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
☑SSC
HSC
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
6.
CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
287 (5)
S
SSG letter 5/14/75, Appendix A, #5,g and
Appendix B, #4, a and b.
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
[Intelligence Collection](s)
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
[Due to extremely sensitive nature referred to as
"Incommunicado Interrogation", it is requested that any further
details concerning the limited use of this technique be given
in an oral briefing before properly cleared members of the SSC (s)
62-116395
FMK: fmk
(4)
CLASSIFIED BYSP2 Dum limf
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
MOR-16
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY
INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
3791 (6-75)
OTHERWISE.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 209
STANT
TREAT AS YELLOW
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
5- WorkB
ENCLOSURE, 62-116395--480
INSTRUCTIONS
mid
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 210
O

|
2
(1
1
J. A. Mintz
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
1
Mr. W. O. Cregar
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
REC-88
1
62-116375-479
ÚNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
-
July 18, 1975
Mr. J. W. Dalseg
Mr. J. P. Lee
By letters dated May 14, 1975, with attached
appendices, and June 13, 1975, the SSC requested certain
information and documents from the FBI.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to
the Committee is the original of a memorandum containing
responses to some of the requests. A copy of this
memorandum is being furnished for your records.
Enclosures (2)
62-116395
-
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
Z
1
7.1°
JPL cm]
(10)
ENCLOS
24-1-3
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Directon Seo'
ALL, INFORMATION CONTAINED
IS, CLASSISED
3/0/11/2000 BYSPALm/unf
gen
MADD ROOM
MOR-16
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 211
TELETYPE UNIT
W.
Pan
NAM
Woc/6
7270i
SEKAR
4063954
J
GPO 1975 O-569-920
62-116395
23
1
1
1
1
-
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. J. W. Dalseg
-
Mr
J. P. Lee
July 18,
1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE COMMITTEE'S
PRIOR REQUESTS
FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE FBI
AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (POLICIES AND PROCEDURES)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _
Reference is made to SSC letters dated May 14,
1975, with attached appendices, and June 13, 1975.
The letter of June 13, 1975, amplified a
request made by letter dated May 14, 1975, with
reference to Item 5b in Appendix A and Item 4 in
Appendix B concerning the FBI's legal authority
regarding the technique referred to as all forms of mail
surveillance including-mail_covers_and_opening mail.
In view of the statement on page 3, of the
letter dated July 15, 1975, from Mr. K. William O'Connor,
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of
the Deputy Attorney General, to Mr. John T. Elliff,
Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force of the SSC,
we are withholding documentation relating to the opening
of mail.
With regard to mail covers, they are placed in
accordance with the guidelines set forth in Section 861
of the U. S. Postal Service Manual.
1
-
The Attorney General
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE10/11/2000 BISPOAL/ME ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO ATTORNEY GENERAL
JPL:cm1 MDR-16
(9)
ENCLOSURE
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
2-11637449
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI .
MAIL ROOM ☐
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 212
week
340
GPO 1975 O-569-920
Documents pertaining to the Committee's
prior request
Further documents pertaining to the FBI
and Department of Justice (policies and procedures)
NOTE:
The letter referred to from K. William O'Connor
to John T. Elliff pointed out on page 3 as follows:
"documentation relating to the opening of mail will be
withheld at present due to ongoing investigations.”
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 213
- 2
-NE
OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
PARTME
DOMINA
SEQUIT
USTICE
June 16, 1975
TO:
Paul Daly
FROME Mike Shaheen
The attached is for your attention,
action and response.
Please keep me advised as to the
currency of the Bureau's contemplated
response. Discuss problems as soon as
possible.
Thanks.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO/1/2008
5/11/2000 
SP2 Aum
MDR-16
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 214
BANK GRURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
LOHN.G. TOVER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIA. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN,
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
Wintley Blates Senate
SELECT COMMITEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 34TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
June 13, 1975
རྒྱུས
56/31/6 11117.7053
Mr. K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
fit to AG 10/LHM
7/18/25
ご
JPL/eml
2 ANG
Dear Mr. O'Connor:
Seattug
j
I
In amplification of Item 4, Appendix B of the Committee's
document request to the Attorney General dated May 14, 1975,
am making the following requests pertaining to the technique
referred to as "mail surveillance, including mail covers and
opening mail" and the utilization of this technique "in internal
security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence
matters, operations, or activities:"
REC-88 62-11 395
(1) For all incidents of mail opening or mail intercept by on
on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from January 1,
1960, until the present, please state the physical logation where75
the opening or intercept was conducted, the names of the indivi-
duals who participated in the opening or intercept, the type
mail opened or intercepted, and the purpose of the opening or
intercept.
(2) For all incidents of mail covers that were physically
conducted by FBI employees, whether alone or in cooperation with
Postal Service employees, from January 1, 1960, until the present,
please state the physical location where the cover was conducted,
the names of the individuals who participated in the cover, the
type of mail covered, and the purpose of the cover.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO 11/2000 BYSPOS Aum/mor
to Paus Mary
88608 Docld:32989626 Page 215
MDR-16
To MIG S. folia
By Hand
The OC
528
PA
*
Mr. K. William O'Connor
Page -2-
June 13, 1975
(3) Please provide all documents and memoranda which discuss,
refer, or relate to the origins, authorizations, conduct and
termination of, and policies and procedures for, the mail
openings, intercepts, and covers identified above.
I would appreciate it if you would treat the requests
delineated above with the highest priority.
JTE:bcm
Sincerely,
Joh
L.T. Elüiff
John T. Elliff
Director,
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 216
i
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Addressee:
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Senate Select Committee
LTR ☐ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7/18/75
U.S. Senate 
Select Committee Re: Further
Cap ion of Document:
Documents Pertaining to the FBI
* and Department of Justice (Policies and
Appendix A, Item 5b and
Procedures)
Appendix B, Item 4.
Originating Office:
Delivered by:
Received by:
3
FBI
Date Aug 1, 1975
Title:
e
unge
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO/1/2000 Bxsporum/unf
MDR-16
62-116395-479
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 217
ENCLOSURE
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
TO:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
Intelligence. Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM:
FBI
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
SSC
7/18/75
HSC
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
SSG letter 5/14/75 and 6/13/75
Appendix A, item 5b, Appendix B, item 4
U
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Intelligence collection
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
Mall covers placed in accordance with guidelines set forth
in Section 861 of the U.S. Postal Service Manual. He are
withholding documentation relating to the opening of mail
62-116395
FMK: fak
(4)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DA15/0/11/2000
MDR-16
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMINITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
3791
(6.75)
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 218
5. Woc
TREAT AS YELLOW
62-116395-479
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
ENCLOSURE
INSTRUCTIONS
Type or print clearly in ink.
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
2
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 219
4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)
Date of Mail
7/18/75
J
Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.
*bject
JUNE MAIL
SENSTUDY
ALL XEFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/20 BX SP2 ALM//mf-
MOR-16
79 AUG 7 1975
Removed By
File Number
62-116395-478
Permanent Serial Charge Out
DOJ/FBI
NMW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 220

2
Mr J. A. Mintz
(1 J. B. Hotis)
1
1
-
-
1
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. T. E. Burns, Jr.
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
July 18, 1975
By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached
appendices the SSC requested certain documents and
other information from the FBI.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum containing
a response to one of the Committee's requests.
A copy of this memorandum is being furnished
for your records.
Enclosures (2)
62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
REC-28
Intelligence Coordination
1165757497
12975
TEB: lek lek
( (9)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD AdmENCLOSURE
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
"ENCLOSURE IN BULKY BOOM"
6 MA197 COM +
TELETYPE UNIT
KM 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 221
W.O
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/0/10/2006 BYSP Dim
PADR-16.
13
GPO 1975 O-569-920
4238
62-116395
2
Mr.
(1
1
-
1
1
-
-
J. A. Mintz
J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. T. E. Burns, Jr.
July 18, 1975
UNITED STATUS SINATE SELECT COMMITTE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE
FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
(Appendix B, Part I, Item 1.a.)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training-
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y —
Reference is made to letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents
and other information from the FBI; to our memorandım
captioned as above dated June 4, 1975; and to the
undated note from SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein to
William O. Cregar of this Bureau attaching a list of
Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Memoranda and Letters
selected for review at FBI Headquarters by the SSC Staff.
Pursuant to the request to review selected SAC
Letters and Memoranda identified in the attachment to the
above referenced note, we currently have such material
available for review at FBI Headquarters by appropriately
cleared personnel of the Committee.
1
The Attorney General
\TEB:lekick.
(8)
MAIL ROOM
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/10/2000 BY SP2 am/imf
MAR-16
ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
62-11639-7577
TELETYPE UNIT
ENCLOSURE
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 222
ртут
GPO 1975 O-569-920
Re:
Further Documents Pertaining to the
FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
(Appendix B, Part I, Item 1.a.)
NOTE:
-
-
-
-
The material to be reviewed consists of clean
Xerox copies of the approximately 335 selected SAC
Letters and Memoranda. Each of the SAC Letters and
Menoranda was reviewed by the following Divisional
representatives who cleared such material for review
by the SSC Staff with respect to their Division's
interests: Identification J. T. Stewart, Training
J. E. Reilly, Administrative F. Woodworth, Files and
Communications H. R. Hauer, General Investigative
J. W. Hines, Laboratory R. F. Petty, External Affairs
D. L. Divan, Special Investigative - J. E. McHale,
Inspection - F. B. Griffith, Legal Counsel - P. V. Daly,
Computer Systems - C. D. Neudorfer. INID reviewers who
cleared the above material with respect to INTD interests
for reviewing by the SSC Staff were: J. W. Johnson
(1971 - 1972), H. W. Dare (1962 1966), R. D. Hampton
(1968 - 1973 - 1974 - 1975), R. L. Moore (1964 1965
1967), K. A. Mendenhall (1960 - 1969), and T. E. Burns, Jr.
(1961 - 1963 1970). Excisions were made in the material
-
-
-
-
-
by the above INTD personnel with regard to protection of
sources, third agency considerations and with respect to
sensitive methods and techniques. Since the material is
to be reviewed at FBI Headquarters and in order to expedite
the process of making the material available and avoid
unnecessary extensive effort, the various SAC Letters and
Memoranda have not been classified nor have they been
excised with regard to privacy considerations in all instances.
The SSC Staff representative(s) will be orally advised of the
above at the time of their review at FBI Headquarters. Should
the SSC Staff seek certain specific copies of the SAC Letters
or Memoranda, those items selected will then be appraised
with regard to classification and privacy considerations,
prior to furnishing any copies to the SSC Staff for
their off-premises perusal. None reviewed pertained to OPE
responsibilities.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 223
2
-
SAC LETTERS AND MEMOS
Dir let and LHM to AG 7/18/75
477
5/14/75 request, Appendix B, Part I, 'Item la
Re SAC memos and lets selected for review
at FBIHQS
1
's
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 14TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C.
20510
To:
Bill Cregar
From:
Mark Gitenstein
Bill, attached you will find
the list of SAC memos and
letters which we have selected
for review at FBI headquarters.
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 225
ALVE
SAC MEDS & LETTERS
1960
60-A
1/15
60-30
6/21
60-41
8/23
60-B
1/22
60-G
7/1
60-44
19/29
60-C
1/25
60-32
6/28
60-45
9/27
60/9
2/9
60-33
7/5
60-J
10/20
$60-10
2/16
60-34
7/12
60-51
11/1
60-D
2/29
60-H
8/1
60-54
11/22
60-11. 2/19 .
60-36
7/19
60-k
1/13
60-12
2/23
60-38
8/2
60-56- 12/6
°
60-14
3/8
60-I
8/17
60-59
12/20
60-16
3/22
60-43
9/13
60-E
4/21
60-F
5/10
1961
61-A
1/23
61-28
5/23
61-D
7/24
61-42
518
61-5
1/24
61/29
5/29.
61-47
9/5.
61-8
2/21
61-31
6/6
61-55
9/26
61-10
.3/1
61-C
6/19
61-56.
not dated
61-12
3/7
61-33
6/20
61-62
10/24
61-13
3/14
61-34
6/21
61-E.
*10/26
- 61-18
4/4
61-37
7/11
61-F
11/7
61-19
4/5
61-38
7/18
61-G
11/29
61-24
4/27
61/39
7/25
61-71
12/19
ALL'I
FR FORMATION CONTAINED
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 226
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 16/10/2000 BY SP2rum/umt
MDR-16
в
5.8.
SAC Monos & Letter
-Page 2
1962.
62-A
1/8
62-22
4/17
62-47
9/7
62-12
2/14
62-E
4/26
62-55
10/3
62-11
2/13
62-27
5/8
62-58
10/16
62-B
62-F
5/9
[62-11-J-I-K
62-C
2/19
62-32
6/5
62-61
62-16
3/8.
62-6
7/27
62-66
10/26
62-20
4/3
62-33
6/12
62-70
12/11 .
62-21
4/10
62-34
6/19
62-72
12/26
→
:.1963
6༢-4
1/23
63-14
3/19
63-39
8/6
63-Â
1/30
63-E
3/27
63-44
9/4
63-6
1/29
63-F & G
63-47
9/19
63-B
2/27
63-27
6/11
63-50
10/1
63-C.
3/6
63-26
5/28
63-I
10/23
63-30
6/25
63-59
12/10
63-D
• 3/25
63-35
7/19
63-61
63-13
3/12
63-H
7/27
Ї
1964
64-4 & 5
64-B
4/1
64-39
7/3
64-3
7
1/14
64-23
4/28
64-43
8/25
-
1
64-A
1/24
64-24
5/5
64-48
9/29
64-13
2/27
64-C
5/20
64-F
10/26
i
64-20
4/7
64-D
6/22
64-52
10/27
64-21
4/14.
64-E
7/6
64-G
11/25
NW 88608 Docid:32989626-Page-227-
SAC Mos & Letter
Page 3
}
1965
65-8
65-41
65-50
65-10
65-40
65-54
5/4
65-A
65-D
65-53
5/11
65-B
65-C
65-58
65-31
65-44.
65-68
65-36.
65-E
65-63
65-37
65-47
1966
66-4
1/13
66-41
7/5
66-68
11/1
66-8
2/1
66-A
7/22
66-72
11/15
66+10
2/15
66-44
7/18
66-73
11/22
66-19
3/29
66-45
7/19
66-77
12/13
66-27
5/3
66-50
8/9
66-76
12/7
66-34
6/7
66-56
9/9
66-78
65-35
6/14
66-61
10/4
66-79
12/15
I.
66-33
6/31
66-63
10/11
66-80
12/20
66-30
6/21
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 228
s & Letter
A...
C
Page. 4
о
1967
67-3
1/10
67-23
4/25
67-50
8/21
67-5
1/19
67-24
5/2
67-52
8/29
67-6
1/24
67-25
5/9
67-56
9/12
;
67-8
1/31
67-27
67-62
10/17
67-10
2/1
67-29
5/24
67-63
10/24
67-11
217
67-38
6/27
67-65
10/31
67-12
2/14
67-40
7/11
67-66
11/7
67-13
2/21
67-42
7/25
67-70
11/28
67-14
2/28
67-43
8/1
67-71
12/5
67-17
3/21
67-A
8/8
67-74
12/19
67-20
4/7
67-47
8/4
1968
68-4
1/9
68-25
4/30
63-40
7/16
68-5
1/16
68-26
5/1
68-41
7/23
68-9
1/31
68-30
5/21
68-51
9/3
68-14
2/20
68-32
6/4
68-52
9/10
68-16
3/12
68-34
6/11
68-54
9/20
68-18
3/19
68-36
6/21
68-55
9/20.
68-20
3/26
68-38
7/2
68-63
11/5
68-21
4/2
68-39
7/9
68-63
11/26
i
68-22
4/9
NW 88608-Docid:32989626-Page-229--
SAC Pos & Letter
Page S
1969
69-4
1/14
.69-30
5/27
69-51
9/15
69-5
1/21
69-31
6/3
69-55
9/26
69-7
1/28
69-34
6/24
69-58
10/7
69-14
2/25
69-36
7/1
69-63
10/22
69-15
3/4
69-37
7/3
69-67
11/10
69-16
3/11
69-43
8/13
69-69
11/18
69-22
• G
69-44
8/19
69-73
12/9
69-29
5/6.
69-45
8/26
69-76
12/23
69-28
5/13
69-46
9/5
1970
70-4
1/27
70-21
4/2
70-43.
8/17
70-6
2/3
70-26
5/12
70-45
8/27
70-9
2/17
70-29
5/26
70-46
9/1
70-11
3/3
70-30.
6/2
70-48
9/15
70-13
3/17
70-33
6/16
70-61
11/3
70-15
3/24
70-36
7/14
70-64
11/10
70-17
3/31
70-38
7/28
70-72
12/29
70-18
4/7
70-40
8/4
NW-88608-Docld:32989626-Page-230-

ACICHOS (ICCIO
age f
1971
71-3
1/19
71-20
5/11
71-37
8/10
1
71-4
1/26
71-21
5/18
71-39
8/17
71-A
2/18
71-24
6/8
71-41
8/24
71-10
. 3/9
71-28
6/22
71-46
9/21
71-11
3/16
71-30
37/6
71-51
10/19
71-17
4/27
71-34
7/20
71-B
11/8
1
71-19
5/4
71-36
8/3
71-61
12/28
1972
72-17 1/4
72-21
4/18
14-72
8/1
77-5
1/11
memo 1-72
5/23
15-72
3/8
72-6
1/26
momo 5/72
6/13
21-72
9/12
72-10
2/22
memo 11/72
7/11
22-72
9/19
72-17
3/21
13/72
7/25
25-72
10/10
1973
10-73
3/6
18-73
4/24
31-73
7/31
12-73
3/13
25-73
6/5
53-75
11/23
1974
5-74
1/29
32-74
6/25
50-74
10/17
.
8-74
12/19
35-74
7/16
52-74
11/5
1
13-74
3/12
39-74
8/13
56-74
11/26
22-74
4/30
49-74
10/15
55/74
12/10
5-75
1/28
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 231
1975
18-75
4/22
F
21-75
5/13
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
Addressee:
☐ LTR
☑ LHM ☐ Memo
Report dated
7/16/75
UIS. Senate Select Committee to study Govt
Caption of Document:
Operations. Re%; Further Documents
Pertaining to the FBI and Dept. of Justice;
Policies and Procedures. (5/14/75 request, App.R,
oating Offen
Delivered by:
Received by:
Title:
SAC memos and
Willer
டியே
Office
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
Date:
Aug 1, 1975
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/0/10/2000 BY SPO ALm/umf
MDR-16
NW 88608 Docld:32989626 Page 232
TE:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
FROM:
FBI
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
2. DATE PROVIDED
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
FOR
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
SSC
7/18/75
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
6.
SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Part I, Item la
CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
17.
U
KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Operating procedures
8.
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
Hade available for SSC review at FBIHQ selected SAC
Letters and Memoranda
3791(6-75)
62-116395
FMK: Fmk
(4)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE IN
2000 BYSPA/Lmf
MDR-14
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 233
TREAT AS YELLOW
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
5-шое,
INSTRUCTIONS
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docid:32989626 Page 234