200000
104-10307-10006
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
EVES ONLY
SECRET
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP
14 APRIL THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962
EYES C237
SECRET
Task Force W
Foreign
Intelligence
Branch
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III. WHAT TARGETS WAS THE AGENCY ABLE TO COVER AND WITH WHAT
FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY?
The following remarks apply to agent coverage only, that is,
coverage by means of individuals on the island of Cuba, or elsewhere
in the world. Audio devices or telephone taps on Cuban installations
abroad or Cubans living abroad have produced intelligence which has
served operational ends, in other words, information which has pro-
vided critical data used in the spotting, assessment and recruit-
ment of agents. Due to the standard security measures taken in
most official installations, these technical operations have been
able to provide only a limited amount of positive intelligence. In
general, agents have produces information essentially in accordance
with their known access at the time of recruitment. Responsibility
for many of the agents dealt with during the present reporting period.
was simply assumed by TFW from past efforts against Cuba.
In many
instances, these agents had been recruited strictly on an "availa-
bility" basis, and indeed had no particular access. A major effort
was made at the inception of TFW to winnow out those persons who
could make no contribution and to redirect those who could. This
process of redirection, which was conducted via time consuming and
generally inefficient S/W channels, resulted in the conversion of
a number of heretofore unusable agents into sound, pertinent report-
ing sources. Though, in most instances, TFW operations officers
had never had personal contact with these agents, they succeeded
in inducing many of them to spot, develop and recruit sub-agents.
This technique succeeded, despite the obstacles involved in
vetting candidates and advising agents via S/W means. In regard
to the recruitment of new agent assets during the reporting period,
TFW was able to be guided by specific, priority needs. Accordingly,
the many new assets acquired were chosen because of specific access
to target personalities or institutions. The assigned targets and
extent of coverage are indicated below.
A. Military
During the reporting period, in the latter half, the Agency's
major effort to obtain intelligence from agent sources, centered
on Cuban military affairs. The reporting obtained covered matters
ranging from military policy to detailed OB. Almost every agent
contributed to this effort, with the consequence that the coverage
of military matters was wide-spread and continuous. Despite the
fact that 95% of this information was provided via S/W (much of it
from totally untrained sub-sources who had no military experience),
such was the detail and volume of the data, that our agents were
able to give us highly significant information on troop and materiel'
movements, location and nature of military sites, etc. The follow-
ing agents served as the major sources of military information
during the reporting period:
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1. Cuban (insurance) executive, who had a large and diversified
net, provided intelligence in late June 1962 which specifically
anticipated the massive Soviet military build-up which ultimately-
took place in Cuba. Throughout the build-up itself this agent
provided an almost continuous stream of OB intelligence on missile,
maritime and air phases of the build-up. He provided the initial
reporting on delivery of IL-28's to the island.
2.
A relative of a former Cuban president whose government
connections provided him on several occasions with information on
attitudes of various military factions toward Castro and the
Soviets. Agent also provided some detailed missile OB.
08
3. U.S. citizen) who established contact with a resistance
chief (in Pinar del Rio) during July 1962, provided, in the course
of several reports 30 an inventory of Soviet installations throughout
the province. The maintenance of communication with this agent was
extremely arduous in virtue of his most exposed position.
08
A Havana (surgeon) who took special horseback trips to cover
the Soviet installation at Torrens Reformatory.
4.
5. A former lawyer, resident of Santiago provided information
on Cuban armymmåne laying along roads in Santiago area, as well as
on Soviet troops and materiel movements.
6. A western diplomat who provided photographs of Soviet-
occupied hotels in Havana, Soviet troop and materiel movements in
the Havana area.
7. A Cubana official who provided comprehensive data on state
readiness of Cubana air materiel.
A merchant in Camaguey who had provided general observa-
tional reporting on military activities in his area.
8.
9. A former wife of a Cuba Airlines pilot who has contacts
among Cuban Airline pilots from whom she obtained some air OB.
A shipping clerk at Cardenas harbor reported sporadically
on activities at the port.
10.
A construction company employee at Guantanamo Naval Base
reported on Cuban OB in the environs of the base.
11.
.
12. A public accountant in Havana who is the leader of a
counter-revolutionary group, reported military information acquired
through his group contacts.
13.
A Havana bartender who reported considerable quantities
of OB data obtained from his large circle of varied acquaintances
in Havana area.
14.
A retired railroad official reported data on rail shipments.
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15.
A lawyer in Havana reported on Rancho Boyeros Airport
in Havana where a certain airline) is one of his clients.
08
A(pineapple) firm manager in Pinar del Rio recruited
in July 1962 reported on military developments in his area.
16.
17.
A Cuban employee of a foreign embassy recruited in July
1962 in Havana reported some OB information which was obtained
through casual contacts.
10
18. A customs inspector at Jose Marti Airport) in Havana
was the source of good reporting on Sov/Bloc cargo shipments to
Havana, including military cargos.
19.
20.
Air OB.
A physician in Havana who reported on military movements.
A Cuban Airlines official, with limited access, reported
A foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana
reported military OB.
21.
22.
.
A second foreign intelligence service staff officer in
Havana reported military OB.
A number of maritime assets who have reported on Sov/Bloc
military cargo deliveries to Cuba.
23.
b. Political. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency was
able to produce Intelligence on Cuban political affairs at the
ministerial level and above. This intelligence was derived
essentially from sources who had but limited access to persons of
high rank or in key positions. This type of access placed a premium
on Agent elictation skills and the ability to distinguish between
rumor and fact, plus an aptitude for remaining afloat in dangerous
waters. The most significant political information was provided
by the following agents:
08
1. An official (in the Ministry of Economics) who, (in the 08
capacity of advisor to Ernesto GUEVARA) was able to glean informa-
tion on Cuban political affairs.
2. A relative of a former Cuban president who through this
connection and his own social position is able to maintain contact
with high-level officials in Cuba.
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3. A Cuban doctor (who gives medical treatment to Cuban
officials and) who is reporting limited intelligence, by direction,
until he is able to develop direct access to important high-level
officials.
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4. A cultural attache of a West European Embassy in Havana who
picks up information from other diplomats and from Cuban contacts on
political matters. A sub-agent of this asset has also been a source
of medium-level political information.
5. A West European Ambassador in Cuba who provides political
information he obtains from foreign and Cuban contacts.
08
6. A Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe) who has been reporting
with utmost detail and frequency on high-level political matters of
which he is aware.
7. The Ambassador to Cuba of a Latin American country who reports
political intelligence obtained through his Cuban and foreign contacts.
06
8. A former protege (of Raul CASTRO) who retains contacts with
government leaders and who is a new asset developing his reporting
capabilities on political matters.
10
9. The Ambassador in Cuba of North African) country who has
provided high-level political information.
08
10. A Cuban lawyer in Santiago whose brother-in-law, (a high-
ranking official) provided intelligence on GOC/Soviet relations.
24 11.
A staff officer of a foreign intelligence service assigned
(to a cover position) in a Havana Embassy who has produced some
political intelligence responsive to our requirements.
12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has
relatives in the PSP and in the government. To date, his reporting
has covered general political developments.
08
08
13. A librarian and teacher who is a relative of a (former justice)
of the Cuban Supreme Court) and who has high-level government contacts.
This agent has been reporting political personality data and some
political information.
'
08
14. A Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe) who has reported political
information to which he has access.
15.
In addition, there are a number of agent penetrations in
Cuban diplomatic establishments overseas who provide a variety of
miscellaneous political information concerning Cuban activities in the
areas concerned.
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c. Economic. The Agency was able to produce a continuous amount
of intelligence from Agent sources on the Cuban sugar, oil and trans-
portation industries, much of which was in the form-of statistical
summaries. In a number of instances, this intelligence was pro-
vided by agents who had direct access to this information by virtue
of their jobs. We also have been able to get continued reporting
on general economic conditions and foreign trade. Among the most
significant agents reporting economic information were:
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1. A Cuban (insurance) salesman, previously noted, who
through his extensive contacts and sub-agents has been able to
provide information on sugar production, insurance) affairs and
the Cuban banking system.
08
08
2. An official of the Ministry of Economy), (a close associate
of Che GUEVARA, who has provided useful economic intelligence.
3. A relative of a former Cuban president, previously noted,
who has provided detailed import-export figures; detailed documentary
reports on petroleum.
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4. (A high-level) official of Cubana Airlines who reportedly
provided high-level information on Cubana Airlines, particularly
financial and materiel affairs.
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5. A resident of Mexico and (director of an Italian-controlled
pharmaceutical firm who travels to Cuba where he has good contacts
in the Ministry of Industry, who has reported economic information.
6. A Dutch businessman who has access to Cuban economic
officials and who has provided useful economic information.
7. U.S. trained Cuban engineer who provided detailed reports.
on petroleum industry.
08
The Agency has
d. Sociological and General Conditions.
provided a steady and relatively heavy flow of intelligence
covering such matters as the state of resistance activities, mood
of the populace, living conditions, etc., from agents in nearly
every Cuban province. A survey of agents reporting this type
of information has not been completed, because almost all of our
agents have reported on this low priority topic from time to time.
4. Within the Terms of the Agency's Mission, What Target
Was It Unable to Cover and Why?
a.
Paragraph 3 above sets forth in general the degree to
which the major Cuban targets were covered during the reporting
2.2-
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period. The key military, political and economic targets were
clearly defined and assiduously pursued by TFW. The immense
pressure of time must continuously be borne in mind if the attack
on the Cuban problem is to be granted its full perspective. Even
before TFW assumed responsibility for collection against Cuba,
it was clear that intelligence on Soviet, Satellite and Chinese
Communist Cuban policy and maneuvers would be formulated and
planned at the highest level in the respective governments.
Equally clear was the fact that the clandestine search for in-
sights into the Cuban policies of these governments would enjoy
only as much success as the clandestine search for any intelligence
regarding any policies of these governments. Time restrictions
alone ruled out the hope that adequate coverage of these key
denied area targets could be achieved. As a consequence, every
facet of the TFW collection program was geared to the search for
top priority Cuban intelligence; from sources in the free world'
and on the island every agent or agent candidate was evaluated in
terms of his access to such intelligence. Translated into
espionage terms, this meant that every agent or candidate was
examined sharply to determine whether and how he could help
penetrate the GOC, the Cuban armed forces or the managerial and
policy levels of the Cuban economy. Below is an account of the
success of this effort; it will be seen that most major target.
areas were under direct, specific assault.
b. Political.
8
1. Cuban Communist Party: In late May a close relative
and confidant of the Chief of the Cuban Communist Party) was
singled out and developed by a Cuban principle agent. The
candidate provided highly valuable information throughout the
summer of 1962. Though the information was obtained indirectly
by the agent it was but a portion of what he could produce. Thus
the ultimate aim of the operation was to effect the candidate's
direct recruitment. The drive toward this goal continues, and
though we are optimistic that the 6 months effort thus far in-
vested will result in the direct recruitment of a high-level
29 Communist Party) member, it would be inaccurate to say that as of
the close of the reporting period, the (Party) had been penetrated
at a significant level.
29
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2. GOC Ruling Circle.
(a) In May 1962 TFW spotted a Cuban legal
traveller whose brother-in-law has been a member of the GOCC
from its inception. The agent was recruited under specific
instructions to attempt to induce his relative to report on GOC
policy matters. Though TFW had only 12 hours with the agent
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before dispatching him to Cuba, he has attempted to carry out
his instructions. By October he had succeeded in eliciting
significant information from the target, and was confident his
One inhibiting
full recruitment was simply a matter of time.
feature affecting the pace of this operation is the fact that
the agent lives in Santiago while his relative, the target, is
a resident of Havana. Unquestionably the full recruitment of
the target could help fill an important gap in our reporting
on GOC activities.
(b) In June 1962 TFW obtained a lead to a
person very closely related to Fidel CASTRO. Throughout the
summer extensive but necessarily circumspent negotiations were
conducted to bring this person to Mexico where full recruitment,
training and briefing would be possible. The negotiations
culminated in success. The agent was met and trained by Agency
personnel in September and early October and dispatched to Cuba
on 15 October with the specific mission of reporting on the
thoughts, plans and activities of the CASTROS and other leading
GOC figures. Since the target, prior to recruitment did not
possess the kind of political awareness which would have led him
systematically to observe those GOC personalities to whom he
had matural access, the Agency was denied any prime political
intelligence from this source during the reporting period.
(c) Throughout the summer 1962, TFW
received various reports, the tenor of which were that Ernesto
'Che' GUEVARA would like to defect from Cuba. Each report proved,
upon closer inquiry, to be groundless, until we learned in late
September that a Mexican industrialist had claimed GUEVARA had
asked him in 1961 for assistance in leaving Cuba. Though many
of the facets of this disclosure tallied with other known data,
exploitation of this exceedingly important lead was hamstrung by
the inability to aline a qualified agency officer with the widely.
travelling Mexican. This lead illustrates well the frustrations.
involved in pursuing high-level targets within a rigid time
framework, and with a limited number of available personnel.
It also illustrated the need to persist, when the target is of
sufficient importance, in the follow up of "far-out" leads.
3. Military
(a). In late July TFW recruited a Cuban
legal traveller expressly because of his close relationship with
a member of the Cuban General Staff 06 Once again only a few hours
was available in which to train the agent. Nevertheless, during
August, September and October the agent persisted in his efforts
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to develop the target and was able to provide significant OB
at the same time. Neither this, nor the other efforts to
penetrate the Cuban military at high-level, however, had met
with full success by the end of the reports period.
(b) The Cuban lawyer recruited in May 1962
(see paragraph 2a above) developed a second target in September,
a former member of the Cuban General Staff now awaiting reassign-
ment. The agent was instructed to recruit and train this
military Officer in S/W. At the end of the reporting period
it was not possible to determine the success of this potentially
excellent operational development.
(c) Included in this discussion is the
partially successful recruitment of a Cuban army engineer who
is stationed in Santiago. The agent cited in (2b above) has
been in contact with this target, a captain, since July 1962,
but has not succeeded in completing the full recruitment. He
has obtained OB from the captain, but we feel the operation
will not have reached its full potential until the captain has
been trained in S/W and is reporting directly to us.
(d)
Since mid-August the Agency has been
pursuing a lead to the G-3 of the Cuban Army. The basis of this
pursuit was fitted together from innumerable reports, and finally
centered, in early October, on a plan to try to effect the recruit-
ment using a letter from a former army and prison comrade. By
cut-off date, the developmental activity had reached the point
where the only remaining matter was to deliver the letter into
the hands of the Officer.
ཉ.
Economic. The Agency has striven to identify key
figures in the Cuban economy and to develop assess to them as
rapidly as possible, wherever the opportunity has arisen. Oil,
Nickle and Sugar Industries have been assigned to us having the
highest priority.
8.
(a) Petroleum:♥ TFW recruited and sent to
Cuba in January a yound U.S. trained engineer. In May) he reported
he had obtained a position in the (Institute of Petroleum) 29 Too
lowly himself to be of major value, we have steadily guided him 24
in an enterprise aimed at recruitment of the chief of the petroleum).
industry. The families of the two man had been close friends.
The effort involves many imponderables and must be carried out via
S/W. Still, the major aim is deemed worthy of the investment.
Meanwhile the agent has been able to provide intelligence of
increasing value.
2.
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(b) Nickle Industry: The seat of this
important industry unfortunately is in two small towns in Oriente
province. Lightly populated areas which are of strategic importance
always pose rugged operational obstacles. The nickle towns are
no exception. Numerous well-meaning persons in the U.S. have
attempted to help us obtain access to this critical target. Yet
not until late September was the Agency able to turn up (by.
virtue of a New Orleans recruitment) a source of viable leads
to key personnel. By cut-off date, however, we had not been able
to bring any lead to function. Most promising is a lead to the
technical supervisor of the Nickle complex.
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(c) Sugar: Two former high-level penetrations
of the Sugar Industry defected to the U.S. soon after the inception
of TFW. Throughout the summer it was not possible to identify
a suitable candidate to replace them. A New York source in early
October succeeded in placing us in touch with the chief sugar
technician in Cuba. This operation should be fully productive
by Christmas 1962.
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To illustrate the results of this operational data, we have
recently been preparing the recruitment in place or defection of
one of the principal officers of the Cuban Foreign Service in
Europe. We have been able to develop the proposals through an
already defected diplomat and the effectiveness of his approach
and a reading on the diplomats reactions can be provided to us
independently by three other agents in close contact with him as
well as through a technical surveillance operation.
G.
Liaison
10
The most fruitful liaison relative to the Cuban target has
been conducted with (European) and a few of the Latin American) 10
services. Specifically, the following services have been the most
cooperative and helpful: The British) "Dutch), (French), (Spanish),
Italian) Greek) (Norwegian," (Danish) (West German) (Mexican) (Argentinian)
Uruguayan, (Canadian), and (Chilean.)
11
"
Some of these services are working closely with the Task Force
both in Washington and Miami, cutting corners on procedure,
protocol and actually exceeding their own official instructions.
This has been particularly true after the announcement of the
President on 22 October 1962. The degree of this effort is
remarkable and runs all the way from full cooperation to an
outstanding exertion of personal commitment, resourcefulness, and
imagination to find ways to help our effort.
To cite only a few of the current||FI operations developed
through liaison services, the Spanish service has given us
us 
(424
resident agents (including 2 diplomats) 24 The (French) service has
provided us with one (resident diplomat) who communicates directly
with us by W/T) 24 The (Danish) and (Dutch) services, have given us
control of maritime assets calling at Cuban ports), and they have
also participated in joint operations using legal travellers) 24
In addition to mounting operations against Cuba, several (European) (0
services have provided secure diplomatic courier) services for the
transmittal of our own agents' communications) and for the (infil- 24.
tration of S/W and W/T and other materials to our agents Inside
Cuba.
Services in Belgium) and (Holland) have been particularly
helpufl in the development of an operation to deny Cuba (access) 24
to an urgently needed solvent for petroleum products). To date
it appears that efforts to make this product unobtainable) to
24
the Cubans has been successful.
10
In general, the (West European) services have been cooperative
in assisting us to mount operations against Cuba and against
installations in their own territory. Latin American) services,
have been most helpful in developing operations against Cuban
targets in their own countries, apparently because of the Latino
Americans') increasing concern with the threat of Cuban subversion
on their territory.
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V. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN
THE AGENCY'S COVERAGE CAPABILITY, WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE
PERIOD.
The initial, significant change effected by the Agency to
increase and improve its Cuban intelligence coverage capability
was to establish a Cuban Task Force at Headquarters and to
staff it with experienced intelligence officers. These officers
were selected from other operating Divisions within the Agency.
Many of them spoke Spanish and all of them have had extensive
experience in various intelligence assignments both at Headquarters
and in the Field. This newly created Task Force was charged with
the responsibility to direct, advise, support, and/or coordinate
all phases of the Agency's intelligence operations directed
against Cuba.
At the same time, the Task Force Field Station in Miami was
strengthened considerably with increased numbers of experienced
staff officers and facilities for mounting intelligence operations
against the Cuban target. This concentration of experienced
personnel into the Cuban Task Force, both at Headquarters and at
the Miami Field Station, was a positive and significant effort to
increase the Agency's intelligence coverage capability in order
to satisfactorily fulfill the priority requirements and tasks
which had been levied on the Agency as a result of the Communist.
takeover in Cuba.
To further improve our coverage capability, the Agency communica-
tions office set up a special facility in Miami to (intercept
* electronically internal communications) within Cuba. These (inter-24
cepted communications) are processed in Miami and then forwarded
directly to Headquarters, Miami Field Station, (and to NSA for ection 24
and/or further dissemination) The (NSA) disseminates to the other
members of the intelligence community the information that has been
intercepted and processed by this special Agency communication
facility. This facility cooperates and coordinates its operations
closely with [NSA) and is used by NSA) to assist in the (interception) 24
of internal communications) in Cuba. 29
24
In addition to setting up within the Agency an organization
whose primary mission is concerned with all phases of intelligence
operations directed against Cuba, all other operating Divisions
within the Agency were directed to give top priority attention to
the development of intelligence operations against Cuba. This has
resulted in the diversion of certain assets who had the requisite
access to Cuban targets as well as the experience or capability.
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The response of the various Agency components, both by Head-
quarters Desks and by the Field Stations, has been most satis-
factory and has aided the Task Force considerably in the perform-
ance of its assigned mission. Within the Task Force, selected
officers have been designated to assist, advise, and coordinate
on all phases of Cuban intelligence operations with the various
geographic division desks. This arrangement has provided for a
continued, increased coverage capability of the Cuban target by
insuring a regular review of current, developmental, and planned
intelligence operations of all available Agency intelligence
assets which could be directed against Cuba.
The above points are ones that reflect significant changes
which have taken place during this period. In addition, it
should be pointed out that there has been an intensification
and concentration of all operational techniques applicable to
the particular type and character of the Cuban target. There
has been a substantial increase in the recruitment and training
of agent assets. There has been an extensive increase in the
establishment and use of clandestine communications methods and
channels. The use of SW, one way voice radio, and WT as methods
of communicating with agents inside Cuba has been greatly expanded.
And since certain (Western Nations still maintain Embassies in
Havana (courier) channels for the delivery of letters and packages) 24
by the (diplomatic pouch have been developed and are being used
extensively. 24 The above points are discussed elsewhere in this
paper but they are mentioned here briefly in the context of being
closely related to significant changes in the Agency's intelligence
capability.
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VI. WHAT SUPPORT FOR COLLECTION FACILITIES-WAS REQUIRED
FROM OTHER AGENCIES? HOW WAS IT SECURED FROM THEM? WAS IT TIMELY
AND EFFECTIVE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WAS LACKING?
The conduct of intelligence collection operations often
has depended on timely and effective support from other U.S. govern-
ment agencies. Several government agencies provided support to
intelligence operations directed against the Cuban target on both a
regular and a standby basis. In fact, each and every request for
policy approved support was granted and carried out rapidly and
effectively. For example, the Department of State has expedited the
issuance of visas on selected cases at our request as well as granting
visa waivers to individuals of operational interest to the Agency.
In addition, Foreign Service personnel interview, debrief, and attempt
' to establish the bona-fides of potential intelligence assets who
voluntarily contact a U.S. Embassy or Consulate. This is often done
alone and some times in collaboration with an agency officer prior
to introducing the agency officer for further development and ex-
ploitation as the case may require. These types of support are
provided regularly by the Department of State and contribute consid-
erably to the effectiveness of many complex intelligence operations.
Another U.S. government agency which has given invaluable
support to the Agency's intelligence collection operations is the FBI.
The FBI has provided biographic data, investigative reports, and
operational leads to individuals of known or potential operational
interest. This support has been maintained on a regular and continuing
basis. Close liaison relations between the FBI and this agency are
maintained at Headquarters and at various Field Stations. This close
liaison has resulted in a better understanding of the needs and
requirements of each Agency in the successful accomplishments of
their separate responsibilities as well as providing a rapid channel
for providing support and assistance when requested.
The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has facil-
itated the entry into the U.S. of persons of operational interest
to the Agency; and has provided guidance and support for cases which
involve unusual alien residence and/or naturalization proceedings.
Liaison with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service is
particularly close and harmonious at the Miami Field installation
where the bulk of the cases involving persons of operational interest
to us originates.
Reports provided on a regular basis by the National Security
Agency have been a source of operational leads which have been followed
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.29.
up for the development of collection assets. The disseminations by
the (N.S.A) also serve as an effective means of checking selected
information and activity that has been provided by other sources of
information. The (NSA) also collaborates in the dissemination of
certain information with the CIA (communication facility) in Miami,
Agency unit engaged in the (electronic interception) and processing of
Cuban (Internal Communications.
24
24
an
Liaison with the aforementioned U.S. government agencies
is maintained on a continuing and regular basis both at the Headquarters
level in Washington, D.C. and at appropriate field installations by
designated Agency components. It has been our pleasurable experience
that these agencies, in addition to others such as the Department of
Agriculture where specific operations required guidance in their par-
ticular fields of competence, have provided timely, effective, and
professional support and guidance, in support of policy approved
intelligence collection operations as required in the national interest.
Without such support, the task of intelligence collection would have
been in many instances much more difficult and, in many cases, impossible
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VII. AGENT SUMMARIES
The scope and nature of the Agency's Foreign Intelli-
gence operations is most clearly seen in the character, personal
ambition and caprice of the human material present, namely the
agents involved. The following sketches of the individual agents
engaged in these operations have been compiled in recognition of
the vital ingredient which these human beings bring to an apprecia-
tion of the Agency's FI operations. It will be noted that a
majority of the agents work, or have been worked, out of Miami,
the city which has been the center of anti-Castro Cubans, the
major pool of potential agents, since 1959.
Other geographical areas are represented in mathematical
sequence, in fact according to the number of Cuban exiles in
residence at a given place. This same mathematical order applies
with reference to the jobs these agents hold. Thus, if a Cuban
has a function, the performance of which is important in sustain-
ing the island, hence important to the Cuban Regime, the Agency
has sought the services of this man as its agent. 24 For this reason,
several agents are in the employ of the (airlines) and of (merchant 24
marine shipping businesses. So too, with diplomacy.
Every foreign
diplomat now accredited to the Regime in Havana has been examined
by the Agency as a prospective agent. Forty percent of these diplo-
mats were approached. Of this number about one half took our bait
and have accepted assignments which range from marginal involvement
in "intelligence" (e.g., using their diplomatic immunity to carry
our materials), to active participation in our operations.
Finally, one type of Cuban who played an influential,
though limited, role during the past six months was the defector
(who is not mentioned elsewhere in this paper). The defector is
the official who for one reason or another cannot remain in or be
persuaded to remain in place and report on his job. Owing to the
nature of this particular person, it is difficult to draw hard
lines between those who genuinely reject their Government and those
who merely quit in self-interest, but during the past six months,
the Agency tapped in on the defections of about ten Cubans of
consequence, profiting from their information in all cases and
from their psychological exploitation when circumstance would permit..
2/10
ATOREY
32