157-10008-10241
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Zind
7128178
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10008-10241
RECORDS SERIES :
Date: 10/07/93
Page:1
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
6/12/98
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: R602
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
DATE : 07/24/75
PAGES : 7
SUBJECTS :
INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE CHEEVER
ASSASSINATION INQUIRY
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
BOX 438-3
COMMENTS :
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ITEM IS RESTRICTED
438-3
ANTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
INTERVIEW WITH:
REGARDING:
Bruce Cheever
TOP
Assassination Inquiry
8602
DATE TIME-LOCATION:
PRESENT:
July 24, 1975
Paul WALLACH and Joe DiGenova
HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:
FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:
MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):
EXECUTIVE SESSION: _YES jilo
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page 1 of 6
TOP SECTE
This morning Joe DiGenova and I interviewed
Bruce Cheever at the Carroll Arms. We focused on
Cheever's tenure as deputy director of Task Force
W.
Background:
1938-43
1943-44
1944-46
1950-53
1953-56
1956-60
1960-3/62
3/62-65
1965-71
1971
3/64-2/65
Marine Corps
OSS Parachute School
Marine Corps
Office Police Coordination; headed
Plans Section for Western European
Division
14-3
Stations Sweden
Deputy Chief, European Division
Headquarters, U. S. European Command
(U. S. representative)
Deputy Director: Task Force W
(Chief of Stations South 12-12
Retired from Agency
Deputy Chief, Special Operations
Branch (developing paramilitary
capabilities for Agency)
Apparently selected for Task Force W because
of extensive paramilitary background. Not sure
whether slotted by Harvey or Helms.
Prior to his Task Force W assignment, Harvey
was known to Cheever by reputation only. He des-
cribed Harvey as one of the finest operatives the
Agency ever had, citing Harvey's Berlin tunnel.
Cheever understood that Task Force W was
Mongoose's instrument to get rid of the Castro
regime; that the Cuban operations had White House
backing; and that the Agency had been given an
operational carte blanche, with the caveat that
each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval
prior to getting off the drawing board.
Cheever told us: "You don't pull in fast-rising
men like [Ted] Schakley unless you have solid back-
ing." Cheever believes that Lansdale was RFK's
representative and that Task Force W would not
suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA with-
out Lansdale's approval.
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
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Cheever confirmed what we knew about Harvey.
Although Cheever worked closely with Harvey, he
told us that Harvey was a loner and most surely
would not inform him of operations unless he had
a "must need to know". In Cheever's opinion,
Harvey was one of the great believers in compart-
mentalization; Cheever "complained that Harvey
turned him into his staff man" (as compared to an
operational extension). Cheever also told us that
Harvey was a two martini man at lunch with thyroid
problems; this often "led to problems for Harvey
at early afternoon meetings".
Cheever believes he attended at least ten SGA
meetings. However he does not recall RFK, only
recalls briefing Bundy. (Maybe Cheever attended
other than SGA meetings
the minutes do not re-
flect his attendance.)
Cheever met weekly with designees of the SGA
principals in Lansdale's office (Messrs. Califano,
Haig, Hurwitch, Craig, and Johnson). Cheever would
brief these designees on proposed operational
plans; discussion of the details would ensue.
Subsequent to the staff meetings, the principals
would meet and decide whether or not the particular
plan would be approved. Cheever did state that the
Group often rejected proposals. In one instance,
Max Taylor vetoed the maritime infiltration of a
small team. Taylor felt that the chances of success
were small and attributability great. (Cheever
agreed with Taylor
brain childs.")
"but it was one of Lansdale's
Cheever told us that "around the Task Force W
shop it was known that the Kennedys wanted to get
rid of the Castro regime." In order to get this
done, "the Kennedys built a fire under the Agency's
tail and installed Lansdale as Chief of Operations".
According to Cheever, Lansdale and the SGA were
"geared to keeping the Kennedys informed as to what
was happening".
However, after the Cuban missile crisis, Cuban
operations were not pursued with the same sense of
urgency.
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