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104-10179-10025
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
1
Filcapy
AM Rung-
SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
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Ray
8 November 1960.
i
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Contact Report on Meeting with AMRUNG-1 201-290613
1. On 5 November at 1130 hours, AMRUNG-1 and BICKER were met
at the Washington Airport by undersigned. They were then taken by
taxi to the Mayflower Fotal, where a room had been reserved ... for
their use. After having lunch at the hotel, the party adjourned to
the room, where AMNG-1 was given a short briefing on Francisco 03
Castell, the /T operator who was scheduled to meet G-1 at
1400 hours.
.03.
2. At 1400 hours, the undersigned went to the lotty of the hotel
where Francisco was waiting with Bay Carcia, his escort officer.
5 Garcia was instructed to bring Francisco us to the room. It was
031
agreed in advance of this that all principals would with draw from
the room to give AYTUNG-1 an opportunity to talk with Francisco alone.
Fowever, it was suggested that Garcia Feturn a half hour before the
interview was terminated to clear up any points as to the nature of
Francisco's training, or any aspects that AMRUNG-1 might wish to
clarify. The interview with Francisco was terminated about 1510
hours, as AMEUNG-1 stated he would be pleased to have Francisco
assigned to him. All indications were that a happy rapport was esta-
blished between the principals and a complete understanding was
reached as to the future role of Francisco as the W/T operator for
the AMYUM group in Cuba,
03
3. At approximately 1535 hours. Andy Rogers put in his appearance
at the mom and was introduced to AMTENG-1 as Fr. Rodrick. Prior to
this meeting. GRUNG-1 was told that Mr. Rodrick was the coordinator
for operations and would like to discuss some of the more specific
aspects with hix, prior to his return to Cuba. Cecil Cartwright, who s
had escorted AMRUNG-1 to Washington, asked to sit in on this meeting
along with Peters and Rogers as he felt that MASH should be fully
informed on whatever operational matters were discussed with AMRUNG-1
for more effective future coordination between Headquarters and MASH.
03 [Rogers indicated no objections to this and stated he was glad to have
him sit in at this meeting.
03
4. In substance, Sopers covered most of the highlights dealing
with previous attempts to supply the ANTIH group with arms and ammo,
and air-maritine operations currently being planned. In this
connection, PNG-1 was highly pleased to learn that a 4,000 pound
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shipment had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence
and again urged that more such spitments should be stepped in the future.
0 Roters then briefly discussed the SINNE operation and asked ANRUNG-1 if he
didn't think this area for the Dwa. already "blown" due to the number of
people who already knew of his operation. (This includes 5 other people
besides AM-1 and AVBUNG-1.) AMRUNG-listated he was not sure, but would
investigate this upon his return. However, he felt that this was an excel-
lent DZ site and should be utilized for any subsequent airdrop scheduled in
the Pinar del Rio province () Rogers] informed AVRUNG-1 that his overlays on
various LZ's and C2's had been received and were being reviewed by the opera-
tions peo,lc. He complimented AMRUNG-1 on the excellent work of his carto-
grapher and expressed the view that these CZ areas would be put to good use.
Finally, he assured AMAUNG-1 that no stone is being left unturned to provide
his group with the necessary rateriel support which is critically needed and
that this sup.ort will be step ed up as our infiltration capabilities are in-
creased both by air and sna. In parting, he cautioned AVRUNG-1 not to take
any unnecessary chances when he resumed operational activities in Cuba, since
his leadership in the AMYUN group was vital to our overall interests. The
meeting was terminated about 1720 hours as Royers and Peters took their de-
parture.
03
5. Spre of the more significant highlights of the conversations which
took place between AVRUNG-1 and the undersigned prior to his meetings with the
W/T operator (Francisco) and (Regers are noted herewith:
8.
b.
03
Security: Castro has taken stringent actin in tightening up
his internal security a, ainst counter-revolutionary forces inside
Cuba. The ralitia are being used to search houses for concealed
Leapons (usually by a block system), and anyone failing to produce
proper identification is removed for questioning by the DIER.
Hence, AMSUNG-1 and his organization are largely confining their
activities to the daylight hours from 0700 to 2000 hours. He
considers night operations particularly on the streets of Havana
as highly dangerous inasmuch as the Diall (security organs) are
constantly on the alert to stop individuals on the street to check
their identification documents.
-
Documentation of A. ents in Cuba: AMRUNG-1 suggested using an
identification card issued by the Havana University for their
students. He had a sample copy in his possession, which he clairs
was readily accepted by Castro security forces as being valii.
Similarly, a driver's license properly authenicated along with a
health certificate were considered to be good "cover" documents
for m¿ents operating in the Havana area. A supply of blank identi
fication cards with be turned over to the Station by AVRUNG-1 for
transmittal to headquarters for any subsequent documentation of
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agents who can be passed off as students at the Havana University.
(He suggested preparing one for his w/T operator (Francisco).
c. Operational Expenditures: Que:ied on this aspect, VENTNG-1 stated
his organizati n would need a minimum of 50 to 60,000 pesos a
month to cover their overall operational expenses. These funds are
being used for safehouse maintenance, travel expenses, purchase of
vehicles and gasoline, allocation of funds to varicus sub-
divisions of the AMYUM organization located in various provinces of
Cuba, and purchase of food and support of various agents whose
families may be in dire need of food and medical supplies.
d. W/T o.erators: To date, both AMPANIC-14 and ANGLEX=1 have not
met the requirements for effective communication with us on ANTUM
operations. However, AMRUNG-1 feels that AMPANIC_14 has not been
compromised or turned by the DIEx and once he rets over his nervous
state, it is possible he can still be used. Similarly, although
ANGLEN-1 is considered to be a ɛo d w/T cperator, AUNG-1 feels
his usefulness to hir has been considerably negated by the nature
of his assignment at the Naval base and his recent restrictions
to this base by orders of the Castro regire. In stort, AKUNG-1
feels communication is the weakest link in his current operations
and that direct com-unications with the Embassy is growing in
creasingly hazardous, due to the fact that Embassy personnel are
under close surveillance by the Castro security forces. For this
reason he feels that Francisco will fill a serious veld in this
respect, once he is infiltrated into the AMYUK organisation in
Cuba.
e. Support for other anti-Castro props in Cuba: AMRUNG stated that
all materiel support should be funneled directly to his organiza-
tion for distribution to other anti-Castro grope in Juba. In
his view this would serve as a control factor in unifying the over-
all effort of the various splinter groups seeking such support in
Cuba and ould also enhance the prestige of the MRR as the spears
head for the FRENTE. He then went on to add that he was fully
aware of our efforts to support other groups in Cuba, which he
assumed we were operating with on a unilateral basis, (i.e., he
sited Nino Dias in Oriente). AMUNG-1 felt this was a serious
mistake, as this unilateral support would affect the leadership and
direction now being provided by the MKR throughout Cuta. The
undersigned told AMMUNG-1 that he agreed on the desirability of
a coordinate d effort on the part of all counter-revolutionary
groups seeking to overthrow Castro using the FRENTE as the rally.
ing center. However, the question of support being ted
through one channel namely: his organization in Cuba, was neither
feasible nor practical. The fact that Castro had tightened up
security throughout the various provinces of Cuba, would make it
difficult or impossible for the A!YLM group to ship arms and other
equipment from Havana to the eastern rost provinces (1.0., Las
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Villas, Caraguay or Oriente) without jeopardizing both shipments
and person el. Hence, the need for unilateral action on our
part to supply these fighting groups in these provinces. This
explanation appeared to satisfy ANHUNG-1, however he still insisted
that his organization should at least be appraised of any materiel
He was assured that we
support provided other groups in Cuba.
would take his request under consideration.
He
f. ANDIDRY-1: AMRUNO_1 feels that no useful purpose would be served
in sending his associate to join forces with him in Havana.
feels that AFBIDDY-1 should continue to represent the ANYUM
faction in the FRD and when the counter-revolutionary forces aro
fully prepared to overthrow the Castro regire, AMRIDCY-1 will be
brought into the Pinar del Rio to direct the forces in this
province.
:
6.
Manolo Ray: AMRUNG-1 considers RAY as a highly dangerous individual
because of his great ambition to play a prominent role in any
subsequent Cuban government following the overthrow of the Castro
regine. In his opinion, RAY poses a seriqua threat to VARCNA's
leadership and the FRD inside Cuba. He is attempting to draw
various dissident groups to his banners and appears to have support
from the riddle class represented by business interests, politicians.
and the professional class. Should RAY be persuaded to join
forces with the FRD, AMAUNG-1 thinks he will continue to operate
on a unilateral basis while seeking to supercede the FRD with
his own crganization in Cuba.
h. Tony Varona and the FRD: Although AMRUNG-1 recognizes the need
to support the FRD as political front for rallying counter-
revolutionary groups against the Castro regine, he nonetheless
feels that the FRENTE and Tony VERONA have lost considerable face
in Cuba by inaction and political maneuvering. He further pointed
out that he is aware that thousands of dollars had been poured into
the FRENTE, but dissident groups in Cuba have seen no evidence of
any of this money to sup ort their efforts to overthrow Castro.
Hence, confidence in the F!D is at a relatively low ebb among the
people in Cuba and a new shot in the arm in the form of materiel
and financial support is needed to restore this confidence.- Ac-
cording to MRUNG-1 this cup, ort must be forthcoming soon because
such peo;16 as Manolo RAY are taking the initiative and will soon
control the entire counter-revolutionary movement in Cuba.
John D. Peters
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