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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
1 October 1968
CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
IN THE CASE OF
YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
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1 October 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
FROM
: Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff
SUBJECT
: NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich
1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusions
concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub-
conclusions are contained in the summary concerning several
major areas which were given primary consideration in the matter
of the bona fides of NOSENKO.
2. Included in this summary are comments concerning
conclusions in the previous summary and an annex containing re-
marks on three separate subjects related to the NOSENKO 
case,
3. In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO
is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in
the KGB during 1953 - January 1964, that NOSENKO was 
not dis- .
patched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations
are not actually of material significance at this time.
Attachment:
Summary
BLS:ko
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Bruce L. Solie
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"
SEGJET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
Introduction
Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since
30 October 1967
Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy
Ivanovich NOSENKO
A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims
to be?
B.
Is the Claimed KGB Career of NOSENKO Plausible?
C. Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of
His Motivation in Contacting CIA in 1962 and For
His Defection in 1964?
D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIA
Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and
Organization Reasonably Commensurate With His
Claimed KGB Career?
E.
Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be
Considered in Toto as Having Resulted in Material
Damage to the KGB and/or Has the Information
Furnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefit
to Western Intelligence?
F. Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away"
in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which Would
Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched
by the KGB?
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IV.
SE REY
G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type
Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO
by 
the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA
Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without
NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?
H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in
1962 
or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior
to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed
by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives
During These Contacts or After His Defection?
Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO
A.
NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU in Any of the
Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed
B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the.
Time He Claimed
C. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section
Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He Claimed
D. During the Period 1955
-
1960, He Was Neither a Senior
Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh
Department American-British Commonwealth Section
E. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy
Section 
nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section
During the Period 1961 - 1962 (sic)
F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section and Was
Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department,
Are Not 
Credible
G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB
Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between
1953 
and His Defection in 1964
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Annex
Annex A Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO
-
Annex B Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text
-
Annex C - The Cherepanov Papers
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I. INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION
The following summary and analysis is not intended to be
all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi-
zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished
by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious
and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the
formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of
primary concern.
This summary will not contain a detailed psychological
assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous
theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying
aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily
directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not
dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively
plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in
a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO
has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that
these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance
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but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational
or policy nature.
In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona.
fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily
on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge,
and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this
Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent
aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and
exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a
"bona fide" defector.
There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement
against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or
correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For
purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas
considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to
whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it
is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other
sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader
to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers
appropriate.
The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami-
nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector," has been considered in
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the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part
and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven
primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary,
Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omissions and
unsupported conclusions in the previous summary in regard to specific
cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this
summary will not include a point-by-połat comparison of all areas of
agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous
summary.
A positive decision in regard to NOSENKO based on all
available information should be made in the immediate futurs.
There
are no known sources currently available to provide new positive
information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognized
that there is always a possibility in the future a new source or sources
will be able to furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO.
However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there
is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion in
the NOSENKO matter.
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II.
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SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE
SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967
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SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE
SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967
Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to
NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.
Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have
A
been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career
:
of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been
covered during previous interview or interviews.
NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few
interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and
the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect
of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a
reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously
considered at a minimum extremely controversial.
This reluctance
was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the
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interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate
reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the
interviewer, totally disappeared.
During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months,
NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately
sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de-
fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB
organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example
of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included
i
remarks concerning approximately (875) KGB officers, (100) KGB agents,
35 GRU officers, and 400 other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpha-
betically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has
materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information
furnished by him during current interviews.
Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related
memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special
Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington
Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research
and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter-
viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning
whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.
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In addition, three professionals from the SB Division have
reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrieval of
previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current
information with previous information.
The latter is a tremendous
task because of the volume of material; the number of individual
cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB
personalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.
The SB Division also provided the services of an expert
translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO
by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three pro-
fessionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with
NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly
pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by
the Office of Security.
Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material
have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Com-
ments concerning the value of the information contained in the above
material are contained in another section of this summary. As of the
present time, & complete analysis is not possible since a considerable
portion of the material has not been fully processed. In the preparation
of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined.
Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work
has not been completad; but it is not considered that, based on all
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available information, the remaining work will materially affect
the conclusions drawn in this summary.
The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on
2 August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty
questions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph inter-
view. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview
and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is a
copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph
interview.
Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph
interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a review
of previous information and preparation of this summary.
There is
no doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information
of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will permit
a decision in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.
Attachment:
12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt
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: Chief, Security Research Staff
12 August 1968
FROM
:
Interrogation Research Division
SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
IRD # 67491
IDENTIFYING DATA
Subject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the
U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de-
briefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to
resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB.
He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources
1 in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.
PURPOSE
The primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:
1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;
Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie
any false information.
2.
PROCEDURE
Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at
a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was
conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the
ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for
purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative
in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to
be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information
on a topic.
The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:
Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.
Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.
Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your
intention to defect?
No.
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Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with
American Intelligence? No..
Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with
American Intelligence?
No.
Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an
Intelligence mission? No.
The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:
Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to
the USSR on the day of your 
defection? No.
Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV?
Yes.
Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for
CHEREPANOV?
Yes.
Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about
the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.
Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 80? Yes.
Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-617
Yes.
Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.
Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes.
The following relevant questions were asked on test three:
Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.
Was (SHUBIN in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.
'
To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh
Department at this time? Yes.
Did you telephone the GRU about SHUBIN at this time? Yes.
To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because
of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? 
Yes.
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To the best of your knowledge, was PENKOVSKIY exposed to the
KGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy?
Yes.
Was there any misleading information in the notes you-brought
out from the Soviet Union? No.
Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association with
GRIBANOV?
No.
Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.
Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicative
eception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraph
s were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to
the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin
stion.
Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The following
ant questions were asked on test four:
Di
bu join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.
ere you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.
ere you a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department?
Yes.
re you only a Captain at this time? Yes.
re you an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section from March
$3 to May 1955? Yes.
1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-
tish-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.
January 1960 to December 1961 were you the Deputy to the
f of the First Section of the First Department? Yes.
January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Section
he Seventh Department? Yes.
you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD,
time of the Stalingrad operation against Benson, Mule and
1? Yes.
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Page
The following relevant questions were asked on test five:
Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the
American Embassy besides ANDREY and HOWARD? No.
Did the KGB know about the notes you brought out? No.
Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career?
Yes.
Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in
cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? No.
Did you intentionally give us any false operational
information?
No.
Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the
First Department? Yes.
Was an order actually prépared promoting you to Deputy to the
Chief of the First Department?
Yes.
In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility
was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.
Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for
your defection?
No.
Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners
recruited by the KGB? No.
The following relevant questions were asked on test six:
Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN
KOBULOV? Yes.
Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section?
Yes.
Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section?
Yes.
Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB
knowledge? No.
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To your knowledge was there any misleading information in the
CHEREPANOV papers?
No.
Did you ever personally meet GOLITSYN? No.
Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARTEMEV
in the BELITSKIY case? Yes.
Did you personally make an approach to KEYSERS at the Moscow
Airport? Yes.
}
The following relevant questions were asked on test seven:
.
Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes.
Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or assignments?
No.
Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow?
No.
Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in
1960-61? Yes.
Are you withholding any information known to you concerning
KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S.
Embassy? No.
Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did
you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN
to PUSHKIN street? Yes.
Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV
in 1962 in Geneva? Yes.
Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document
to GORKIY only a mistake by KASHPEROV? Yes.
The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:
'While in the U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter
for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter to Edward Ellis
SMITH? Yes.
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Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his contact
with JENNER on a train from Helsinki to Moscow? Yes.
Are you intentionally withholding any information concerning
KGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No.
Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officer
to defect to the Americans? No.
Subject's polygraph test of 6 August likewise reflected no
indications of deception.
CONCLUSION
Based solely on the overall analysis of Subject's polygraph
tests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Subject has
been substantially truthful in answering the relevant questions.
asked.
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III.
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ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES
OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
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ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF
YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in
regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi-
trary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of
whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB
knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with represent-
atives of this Agency were known to the KGB.
It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects
would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exag-
gerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a
"bona fide defector."
The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which
are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section
containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H.
A.
B.
Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims
to be?
Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?
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C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of
D.
his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his
defection in 1964?
Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA
concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi-
zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB
career?
E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be con-
sidered in toto as having resulted in material damage
to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by
F.
G.
NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli-
gence?
Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in
information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant
a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?
Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective
which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB
with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his
knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given
a specific mission or missions?
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Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO
in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB
prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed
by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives
during these contacts or after his defection?
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A.
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IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON
WHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE?
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A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?
During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard
to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, assoc-
iates of his father and mother, and his own associates. The period
under consideration in this section is the period preceding his entry
into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, `in mid-
March 1953.
Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and
mother and his early life, together with other information such as a
comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father
and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with
Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he is Yuriy Ivanovich
NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship-
building in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisfactorily
supported by personal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concern-
ing other associates of his father and mother.
Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt
that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of
Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of
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little or no value in assessing the bona fides or non-bona fides of
NOSENKO. An expose of his youthful indiscretions, of which he has
admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NOSENKO
was or was not dispatched by the KGB. Obtaining any collateral first-
hand information in regard to NOSENKO before 1945 would be of
negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from
Nikolay ARTAMONOV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning
the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory
school in Leningrad.
NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad-
¨uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had
attended the Institute since 1945. He has explained that he should have
graduated in 1949 since it was a four-year course, but failed the final
examination in Marxism and therefore was required to attend the Institute
for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.
Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-
students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually
attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in
1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by
NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that
he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement
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by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO
on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he
"completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950. " .NOSENKO
has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to
1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in
1949. NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation
caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950
instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.
The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has
characterized as his "stupid blunders." The latter is a rather apt
characterizațion of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not
evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of
a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own
admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically
portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which
he had knowledge but did not personally participate.
The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during
March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been
seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of
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time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is
considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub-
stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951
to early 1953.
Attached is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum completed
by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement con-
cerning his life and KGB career. No effort has been made to correct
grammatical errors or spelling since to do so would be in conflict with
the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give
NOSENKO an opportunity to recount his life and activities to permit a re-
:
examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of
NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes
in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.
Interviews of and memoranda prepared by NOSENKO since
31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the
statements of NOSENKO in the attached memorandum. One change that
has been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the
First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh
Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather
than June
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July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement.
NOSENKO
also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"
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April
1955 rather than May June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel
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report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department,
neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature.
An effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between
errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by
NOSENKO.
Attachment:
31 Oct 67 Memo
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SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich
Operational Memo # N-2
The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum
furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on
30 October 1967:
I, NOSENKO, George, was born 30 October 1927 in the city
Nicolaev, Ukraine.
My family: the father
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NOSENKO, Ivan, b. 1902, was working
at the shipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which
he finished in 1928; the mother
-
NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI),
-
NOSENKO, Vladimir, b. 1944, a
b. 1908, a housewife; the brother
student.
In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 class) but
studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went
in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant,
"Sudsmech" from summer 1934. In Nicolaev I was living at the Street
Nicolski 7. All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.
In Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938:
summer 1935), St. Canal of Griboedov,
at the Street Stachek (1934
-
154 (1935-1938), St. M. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till
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1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living.
In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon I with the mother'
went to live in Moscow in the end of this year.
In Moscow we were living at the St. Serafimovich, 2. Here
I was continuing to study at the school 585 (St. B. Polianka). In 1941
I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi)
but soon began the war and we returned in Moscow.
In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in
Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I finished 7th class in spring 1942. In
Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, being there Í tried to run to
the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but we were caught and returned
home. In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother in city Gorki and in
July-August we returned in Moscow.
In August I entered in the Moscowite military-navy special
school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where I finished 8th class
in summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow. This
school must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I
did not want to go there. With the help of father I was accepted in the
Baku's military-navy preparatory school and in August went in Baku,
where I was studying at the second course (9th class). In this school
I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to the front but failed. Soon
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after that I run with a friend (RADCHENKO) home in Moscow (January
1944). In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished
9th class and was accepted again in the military-navy preparatory
school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in
Leningrad.
All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km.
from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two
months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand and was put
in the navy hospital. When I was in the hospital I decided not to return
in the school but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have
written a letter to my father asking his help and agreement with such
my decision. With the help of the father's friends I quited with the school
and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January
1945 and studied there till the end of May. The WWI finished and I
decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college
had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second
course and finished this course (though I was not passing exams). In
Leningrad I was living in the hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev).
In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents
(St. Granovski, 3).
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In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter-
national relations in Moscow and in July I entered in this institute.
:
In July my father went in Germany with the group of engineers
and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant,
documents and a uniform).
!
In 1945-1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 I acquainted!
with a girl - Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine institute. I
was in close relations with this girl, because of the pregnancy I married
her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and
we did not live together and we soon divorced. In the end of 1946 I was
acquainted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re-
ceived a flat in 1947 (St. Mira former 1st Uecyehckad, 162/174). In
November her father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married
her. The marriage was not successful. I foundout about her close
relations with the brother, and the child-girl was born with pathological
changes. I was not the father of this child. After that I broke with her
and we were living separately (end of 1948
-
-
beginning 1949).
In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working
the commission, which was dealing with future works of the students of
my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization
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and soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry
´ of State Security). But MGB did not accept me. After that with the
help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the
intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my future work.
Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a
group of fails I was passing state exams once more. In October 1950
I finished the institute and received a diploma.
!
I was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951
and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th
Fleet, as an interpreter of the information department). Before going.
to the Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.
At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow. Immediately
after returning in Moscow I had a blood cough out. In the middle of May
I went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow. In July I
finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health
I could not return back to the Far East and the personnel department of
the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of
the navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet
Kaliningrad's district).
-
in Sovietsk,
When I studied at the institute I as all the students received a
rank of junior lieutenant of administrative service after finishing the
5
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second course in 1947. In 1951 the ministry of navy had given me also
the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence.
In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenant.
In Sovietsk the work was not interested and for me it was nothing
to do. Besides this the climate was not good for my health and I decided
to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952
I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 I was with my parents
at the evening party at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom I
did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili - a
former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I
I was thinking about change of the job. KOBULOV was speaking with me
on this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing
more definite was said about my work. This month I reported to the
Thead of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN
about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.
In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium,
where I was in 1952. In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to
Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There
I have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said
that he would settle my question concerning my job. After several days
in the middle of March I have received a telephone call from MVD to
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come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the re-
ception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant
SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory
SHUB NIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was
accepted in the 1 department of 2 chief directory as a case officer..
SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO
(who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the
department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department
of extraordinarily affairs (investigation) ). SHUBNIAKOV and
GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1 section of
the department. Then I with GORBATENKO went to the 1 department,
was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV
told me that I will be working against the American correspondents,
showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were
working in this room; KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV.
The last officer must give files on the correspondents and agents. I
was said to come next day and began to work.
When I was resting in the tuberculous sanatoriim I acquainted
with KOJEVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University,
and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents
at St. Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at
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St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents). In 1955 I received a flat.
at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family.
In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice
of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors.
asked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an
operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had given
me a treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once
more, but I did not come. They wanted to see once more and sent a
letter to the place of work, which was written in the passport. The
!
plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV,
was speaking with me. I had written my explanation, and punished by the
chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV 15 days of arrest. The komsomol's
organization also punished me. I received a strict reprimand and was
freed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director.
-
I was a member of komsomol's organization from October 1943.
In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol
organization of KGB took off this strict reprimand.
In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written
characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that
I did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June-
July I was appointed to the 7 department 2 chief directory as a case
0001038
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officer of 2 section. This section was new created (the work against
tourists). The chief of 7 department - PERFILIEV, the chief of the
2 section - GUSKOV.
In 1956 I was accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party,
soon received a rank of a senior lieutenant and got a promotion
senior case officer.
In 1957 I was accepted in the Party as a member.
In August 1956 my father died.
a
In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In
7th department I was working till 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to
work as a deputy chief of the 1 section in the 1 department 2 chief
directory (chief of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Vlad., chief of the
1 section
-
KOVSHUK).
My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana,
born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958. Oksana was ill (bronchial
asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in
hospitals. In 1960 Iwas thinking about change (temporary) place of
living and there was a possibility to go to work in 2 departments KGB
in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow'
I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the chief of the section of
2 department, PIATROVSKI, proposed to me to go to work in Ethiopia
0001039
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(counter-intelligence work among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia). The
chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided
but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree.
i
The reasons were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for
"cover) and a checking in the place of my living (some of agents report
that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife).
I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962.
I was appointed again in the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section
(work against tourists from the USA and Canada).
In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain.
When I began to work in the 7 department I knew that soon I
must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free
a place the deputy chief of department BALDIN was preparing to go
to work in eastern Germany.
In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy chief of 7 department
(the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here I was working
till January 18, 1964.
During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school,
only in 1953-1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-
KGB at St. Kiselni.
10
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Five times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a
sport delegation; in 1958 was again in England with a sport delegation;
in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry;
in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department 2
directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland
armament.
the conference of dis-
Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In
1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954
I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage.
In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia.
In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at
the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife
rested in Sochi. In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in
Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in
Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi.
In July 1963
I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.
11
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B.
IS THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE?
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B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In the
past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer
in the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern-
ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been so
extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.
It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed
Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed
positions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO has
not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his
original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 as
date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given
in 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature,
as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day
of transfer from one Department to another and not considered critical
or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false
information in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning
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his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary
version he gave in June 1962.
Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB
career of NOSENKO:
Mid-March 1953 late May 1955, First Section,
First Department, SCD
Late May 1955
-
December 1959 (1958)
-
December
1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh
Department, SCD
January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of
Section, First Section, First Department,
!
SCD
January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section,
Seventh Department, SCD
July 1962 January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh
Department, SCD
(NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this
summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief."
The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance,
including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used
2
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in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example,
a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad
may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of
First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief
of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the
Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of
Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the
most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only.
over designated sections or organizational components.)
During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO
has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates
his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are
contained in separate sections of this summary.
It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO
was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department,
SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until
circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section,
First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information
with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department
in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart-
ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available
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at this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO
would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First
Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of
GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960
-
1961 and of his conferences
with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.
NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD
or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom
he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN.
A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has
stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware
of certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I.
GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir
A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.
The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of
GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict
with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and
talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description
of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls
rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any
reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such
an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this
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issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took
place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is.
no reason to attach significance to this lapse of memory.
The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed
position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, during 1960
1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements
relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in
detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy
over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB,
entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge
whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960
-
1961
on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First
Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief
in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.
Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD,
KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy
Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in
the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB
may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure
of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment
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as to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis
of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent
in a somewhat similar position in CIA.
One of the most important differences between United States
agencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure
of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the
salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank and
on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity
and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a
!
monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the
difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty.
rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and
a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military
rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant
Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major
who holds the position of Chief of Section.
During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain
from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various
claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold
the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual
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supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a
considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO.
Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the
questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.
7
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HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OF
HIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962
AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?
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C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his
motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of
:
the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration
in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably
the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual
support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although
motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation
problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or
is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in
1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late
date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature
which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision.
Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit
unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.
On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a
handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of
which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct,
is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memo-
randum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.
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NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society
throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor
of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at
best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized
and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying
degrees.
NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father
in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy
parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains
!
employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of
the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy
by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The
influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an
important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being
permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is
particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was
the primary reason.
The above should not be construed as any reflection on the
actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how
NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His
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performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that
he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been
the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.
If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the
disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages
following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may
have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO
is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in
the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time
after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and
the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through
influence.
A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation
in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money
and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he
wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally
ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a
contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could
no longer retreat.
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NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the
best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not
rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some
information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the
Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted
to give information," he would not have been believed and would have
been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding
how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally
decided to do it through (David MARK whom the KGB considered was with
American Intelligence.
record.
almost
The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the
NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information,
immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for
money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was
ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current
interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive
amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO
has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his
expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the
Americans.
4
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ULVIILI
NOSENKO has stated that the night before his departure from
Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not
emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his return to the
Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made his final
decision to defect at the first opportunity, realizing that it meant
leaving his wife, children, and other members of his family in the
USSR.
Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and
will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact detailed
chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or if even
certain obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both
impossible at this time and probably at any time in the future. What
is important at this time is a decision as to whether the motivation of
NOSENKO was based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB
dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning
his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except
the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in 1962
or his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other information of a
collateral nature. (See Section III, H.)
Attachment:
Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO
5
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SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich
Operational Memo # N-4°
The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum
furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on
31 October 1967:
What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to
the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an
understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of
the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign
and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the right-
ness of the free world.
It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted
in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I
think that the beginning was in the studentship.
Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's
and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers
and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in
the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of
Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the
people of the Soviet Russia.
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When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found
out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime,
about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings,
about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and
still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was
(and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.
វ
At the same time when I was several times abroad I have
seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in
reality how is living people.
!
Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying
at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping
me -- my family.
In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the
Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real
show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In
that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay
abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even
when I was returning home in Vienna.
In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could
not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done
all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.
2
6001057
14-00000
OLONE
It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult
to leave the family for ever.
And now in spite of everything I do not regret.
SECRET
·0001058
14-00000
14-00000
SECRET
D.
IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIA
CONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES,
AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATE
WITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?
SECRET
Excluded
downgrading and
0001059
14-00000
SECRET
D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning
KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen-
surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor-
mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities,
and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimed
career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February
1964.
In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given
to his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in each
department. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory with
consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception
or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logically
be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, no
accurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive deter-
mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is
actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events
or could be attributed to willful deception.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatici
downgrading and
declassification
6001060
14-00000
SEONER
An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular
patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall
specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas
have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory
as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely
from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance
on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has
known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest.
NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB
officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career.
He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently
added certain details which he recalled at a later date.
Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to
the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This in-
formation is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO
was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD,
during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Con-
sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in
evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his
indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during
2
0001061
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not
occupy the position which he claimed to have held.
It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports
-
his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially
confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed
positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an
applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual
holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It
is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of
junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 – 1957.
As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section,
Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO
held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal
judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in
as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in
regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.
NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices
he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four pri-
mary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962
1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers
3
SECRET
0001062
14-00000
SECHEL
and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams
of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 -
1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO
could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not
immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source
or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams
and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite
astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily
This type of information is
prepared the material in such detail.
peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another
defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive con-
clusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.
-
NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB
operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 -
1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is
less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude
until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given
consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so
that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently
substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly
deserved a low rating.
4
SECRET
0001063

14-00000
SECRET
The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations,
and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department
and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The
scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto
is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of
increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments
of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a
further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions.
during this period of time.
5
SECRET
0001064
14-00000
E
14-00000
E.
SECRET
CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BE
CONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTED
IN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HAS
THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OF
SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
0001065
14-00000
SECRET
E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered
in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has
the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to
Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above
questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss
to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly
of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.
NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished voluminous
information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total
of specific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only
an interesting figure, the actual significance of which would be marginal.
Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, reveals
information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected that this
This should
production can continue for a considerable period of time.
not be construed as an indication that NOSENKO is intentionally with-
holding information, but rather that stimulation of his memory through
normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be
productive.
SECRE
0001066
14-00000
NOSENKO has furnished information concerning perhaps (2,000)
KGB officers and (300) KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms
agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals),
mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations.
However, he has identified approximately 250 former or current First
Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of
officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers
of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with
delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions
such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the
number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside
the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the
future.
There has been very little attempted exploitation of information
furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore,
the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence
cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be esti-
mated.
Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would
be a necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to the
West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a
2
0001067
SECRET
14-00000
JOPER
limited period of time or for the placing of the individual in a defector
status. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western
Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the ex-
posure of the identities of approximately (2,000) KGB officers and (several)
(hundred) KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance.
Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or
KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a consider-
able amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even
acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type
of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than
it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed
doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identifi-
cation of 2,000) CIA employees and (several hundred) agent assets to
the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable
information.
Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the
organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The
information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed
and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States
Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysts
3
0001068
14-00000
SECRET
can differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this
type of information.
"
NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB,
recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering
the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a
statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all
SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period. His infor-
mation based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First
Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information
concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some
FCD cases, but this information was in general acquired indirectly
from social or business conversations with other KGB officers.
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of
་་
cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While
the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional
details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be
dismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the
information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore,
inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information
already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his
having provided such information.
SPORET
0001069
14-00000
!
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of
recruitments by the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by
Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with
Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB
agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of
considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to
have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admittedly, the potential
to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than
that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist"
or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent. "
NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in
which there was some previous but limited information. In a number
of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has per-
mitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an
"Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information from
NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since
the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not
have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest.
This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage
to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.
5
SECRET
0001070
14-00000
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of
individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited
by the KGB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant
information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by
NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never
have actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be
for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geo-
graphical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time
of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of
interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least
until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to
make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even
though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that
it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.
NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of
cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has
been unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this
time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be
possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identi-
fication is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Intelli-
gence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value
0001071
SECRET
14-00000
cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has
furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent,
probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove
the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the KGB for
photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the
agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting
the security of the United States cannot be gauged.
In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases
where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant infor-
mation must be considered on balance as having resulted in material
damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.
Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is
not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether
the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his
claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO
has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of
this paper.
A few examples from the above cited categories of information
furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as
illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.
7
SECRET
0001072

14-00000
The case of Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case of
James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous
summary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a result
of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.
Another American case is that of Herbert HOWARD, a USIA)
employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962 - 1963.
NOSENKO identified Herbert HOWARD as having been recruited by.
the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive
that HOWARD furnished valuable information to the KGB. When
interviewed in 1964, (HOWARD did not admit he had been recruited,
but suspicion of HOWARD was great enough so that his contract with
USIA was not renewed.
:
If indeed HOWARD was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible
to determine how much information would have been compromised by
HOWARD while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United
States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if HOWARD was
recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of a
potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to
establish contact using HOWARD) as intermediary.
NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHARI"
(apparently a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a true
8
SECRET
0001073
14-00000
name). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk
who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made
based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI"
was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fouzi Mitri HINDALY, a former
NSA employee who defected to the USSR in 1962, and the information
from NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated.
Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets
in the fall of 1967,
information concerning KGB knowledge
of American code clerks was being investigated; and John DiscOR
SMITH was a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the
Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was
identical to "ZHARI.” Investigation disclosed that no definite informa-
tion could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH
after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate
investigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identi-
fication of John Discos SMITH as "ZHARI." However, such identifi-
cation would have been of considerable interest to the Department of
State and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which
would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise
sanouncement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.
NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which
William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOLITSYN, in late
1960
"
early 1961, had furnished information concerning a Soviet pene-
tration of the British Government on the basis of which the British
of which
g
SECRET
14-00000
Services had compiled a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL.
Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects
would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL was
the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the
information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termi-
nation by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent.
Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the micro-
phones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned.
GOLITSYN, following his defection in December 1961, furnished
certain information in regard to microphones in the United States
Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones were connected
to central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led
to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appro-
priate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have
:
been aware that no action was taken prior to June 1962 when NOSENKO
first contacted CIA.
U NOSENKO is a dispatched KGB agent, it is not clear why the
KGB would attract specific attention to a system of microphones which
must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may
be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of
1962, an advanced system of monitering devices which rendered the
abova microphone system obsoleta. However, no concrete evidence
of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it
10
SECRET
0001075
14-00000
SECRET
was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken to
locate and remove the microphone system to which GOLITSYN had.
given a lead in late December 1961 early January 1962.
-
most
Current
A few general comments in regard to the CI information fur-
nished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section.
As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO to American cases,
of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary.
interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeen
new American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The inter-
views have also resulted in more specific information in regard to a
number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting
additional development of these cases by the FBI.
NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB
agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including
nationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United
Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan,
Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.
Included in the more important of these agent or other leads
are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks,
to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal
0001076
11
SECRET
14-00000
SEC
support assets.
Also included are foreign correspondents, repre-
sentatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.
A summary of the foreign leads arbitrarily defined as of major
significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly
placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving
definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also
shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions
in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western
Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).
NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign
:
national agents, his information on several being derived during his
three months in Geneva in 1962.
It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance
of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of signi-
ficant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly
subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there
are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited
at this time.
As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary
is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive
12
SECRET
0001076/a
14-00000
JEUNEI
intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination
of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that
it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed
in many areas of positive intelligence interest.
13
SECRET
0001077
14-00000
14-00000
F.
IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY"
IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICH
WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKO.
WAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB
SECRET
CROUP 1
Excluded from automatic)
1
0001078
14-00000
SECRET
F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in
information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion
that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this
summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB. In
reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has
been both a necessary and integral part.
It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by
NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration
in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by
the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have
surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB
in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO
was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB
purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be
unknown.
An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first
contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is
particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would
have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications
of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.
SECRET
CROCP 1
fremantomatic)
m
0001079
14-00000
SECRET
NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two
pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to
be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact
with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the
time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-
intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly
would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his
first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information"
and began to talk quite freely on other matters.
If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962
contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks
or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any
suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead. a current
review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962
indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite
likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO
and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO
that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in
Geneva.
2
SECRET
0001080

14-00000
SECRET
NOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many
statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation
of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO.
The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO
made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.
(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with
#
Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the
recruitment pitch to James STORSBERG. (This was
a lie and an interview with STORSBERG with display
of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO
did not participate.)
(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment
approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and
LANGELLE was available for interview.)
(c) NOSENKO said he recruited (LUNT (Horace
(LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met
LUNT.)
3
SECRET
0001081
14-00000
(
SECRET
(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with Edmund)
STEVENS who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited
by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met
(STEVENS and only had seen
en 
(STEVENS) once at a distance.)
(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY"
in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished
information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to
Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time
that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to
Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in
Moscow 1952-1954.
(f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer
met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did
not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign
typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH
operation.)
(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the
first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that," in
reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits
4
SECRET
0001082
14-00000
he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If
NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he
and the KGB should have known that these indicated
exaggerations would eventually lead to a question
concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. )
In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between
information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been
furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were
quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO because
he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered
already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN.
Certain
of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of
NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of
the similarities noted.
(a) Both furnished information in regard to
Johan PREISFREUND)
(b) Both furnished information in regard to a
military code clerk case (James STORSBERG).
(c) Both furnished information in regard to a
trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name,
to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was
connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in
5
0001283
14-00000
Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly
with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO
related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the
assumed name which KOVSHUK used.)
(d) Both furnished information in regard to
microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.
(e) Both furnished information in regard to
Edmund STEVENS and Isaac Henry SHAPIRO,
The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actual
differences in the amount of information furnished on any particular
topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this
summary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest
is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases,
or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate
question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.
The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and
it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information
on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or
greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence
6
SECRET
6001084
14-00000
SECRET
that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during
current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost
every instance. In a few instances he has said he did not recall
how he learned of a particular piece of information but these
apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are
considered to be in no way suspicious.
The general area in which there was a similarity between
information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early.1962 and
information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have
been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States
Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering
around or in the First Department, SCD.
It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an
officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955
and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961. Therefore,
the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases
or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN
furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not
unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN
7
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knew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and
GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities
of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his association with
certain officers in the First Department, SCD.
It is recognized that there are certain conflicts in information
furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not
-
possible to satisfactorily correlate certain information from GOLITSYN
with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 163 of the previous
summary refer to information from GOLITSYN which is characterized
as "Information about KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in
1960 - 1961." The references are to information from GOLITSYN based
on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich
KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an
officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD.
NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First
Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 - 1961, that his primary.
responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy
in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in
the same work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN
SECRET
6001086
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that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has
been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.
GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he re-
ceived from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD.
In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could
not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was
previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part
of, NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility
that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain
instances, more apparent than real.
In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate frag-
:
mentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO,
making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be
construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples
cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible
correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this
time, (d):
(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he
received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV
that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an
0001087
9
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14-00000
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American female employee of the American Embassy
in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the
attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information
that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of
the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return
to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to
effect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the
secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German)
sounding" name.
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a
recruitment attempt against Collette SCHWARZENBACH,
who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary"
referred to by GOLITSYN. However, SCHWARZENBACH
was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but)
had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador)
BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958-1959 was employed)
(as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow.) The
recruitment attempt against SCHWARZENBACH) according to
NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First
Section, First Department, SCD.
0001088
10
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(
(
SECRET
(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains infor-
mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in
the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operation
against an American Embassy military code clerk in which the
KGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited.
This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case of
James STORSBERG) who was actually the subject of a recruit-
ment approach in 1961.
There is considered to be a good possibility that
!
GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from
GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow
rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was
preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This
theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous
summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January
1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section)
that Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in the
successful recruitment of an American employee of the
Embassy. Johan PREISFREUND was used in the STORSBERG
operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also
0001089
11
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14-00000
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aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about
PREISFREUND) since GOLITSYN wanted to use PREISFREUND
in Helsinki. NOSENKO has stated he was not present during
the above conversation. It is very possible that KOVSHUK
exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the
matter of why GOLITSYN could not use PREISFREUND as an
agent.
NOSENKÓ has furnished extensive information in regard
to the James STORSBERG case and with due consideration to
+
the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not
appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of
NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report-
ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV
concerning what is considered to have been the James)
STORSBERG case and detailed information furnished by
NOSENKO concerning the James STORSBERG case. The
exact date of the recruitment attempt against STORSBERG)
has not been positively established, but it is considered to
have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the
March-April 1961 period. The statement by James
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14-00000
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STORSBERG that it occurred in October 1961 is com-
pletely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other
statements by STORSBERG himself.
(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains
information from GOLITSYN which he had received from
GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American
employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited
or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual
compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960.
The previous summary also states that according to
GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in
various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just
become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing
ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN
did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB
would hold in reserve.
NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the
homosexual compromise of Robert BARRETT, who was a
guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and
with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual
0001091
13
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SEVNER
agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work against
the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of
the Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departments
were participating under the direction of the Ninth
Department.
One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in
involving BARRETT in homosexual activities which were
photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO,
although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB
was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of a
general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment
of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned
visit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.
NOSENKO also stated that the compromising material
and information on BARRETT was later given to the First
Department and that BARRETT was recruited by the Second
Section, First Department when he returned with another
Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in
the recruitment operation. BARRETT, following his return
14
0001092
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to the United States in January 1962, confessed to the
FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of
compromising photographs which had been taken
during his 1959 trip to Moscow.
Although it cannot be established at this
time, it is possible that the information furnished
by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV
actually refers to the Robert BARRETT case. It should
be noted that Robert BARRETT) could not actually be
characterized as an "American employee of the Embassy
in Moscow.".
(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor-
mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he
visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned
from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy
code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki.
GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had
already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was
15
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considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if
the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITS YN
might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.
NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be
correlated in any way with the above information from
GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN
resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation
which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is
considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer
to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in
Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previous
remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who
i
might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks
in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information
obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.
The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in
November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information
from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is
16
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also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career
of NOSENKO.
GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki
to accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to
Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance
with the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.
The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was
undoubtedly John GARLAND) and the train manifest lists John GARLAND
and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the
same train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of the
identity of John GARLAND but claims no knowledge of the above trip
of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.
NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specifically
charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the
November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack of
knowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities.
such as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it cannot be
interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if
he had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of
KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the
KGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.
17
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A theory which has previously been given consideration and
warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched,
his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence
and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN.
In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during
current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way
· be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does
not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently,
when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO,
his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD, "
or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that."
In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of
NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by
the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain
events should be noted.
GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961.
NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland,
where he remained until 15 June 1962.
It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not
impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or
potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITS YN,
18
0001096
14-00000
SECRET
select NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter-
act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to
his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO
was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this would
have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN
aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original
plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched,
it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to
Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.
The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have
been dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thus
to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United
States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should
and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually
substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information
that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.
Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should
be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from
NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts
19
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A
(
SECRET
of American counter-intelligence to determine the identity of and
take appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United
States Government.
The only answer to this question seems to be
that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelli-
gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.
The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-
sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow.
In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that there
were no recruitments of American personnel in the, United States Embassy
in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY"
(Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD. The basis for this
expressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary
and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred
of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements
are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time
there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the
expressed opinion of NOSENKO.
NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any
particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim
:
to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD.
As an
20
0001098
i
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SECRET
example, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activities
against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students,
and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization or
a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best
mainly of a collateral nature.
NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of
activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD,
nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh
Department was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certain
notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number
of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code
name. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an
opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department
and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.
21
SECRET
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G

14-00000
SECRET
G. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANY
OTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCH
OF NOSENKO BY THE KGB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAK
+
FREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB
AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFIC
MISSION OR MISSIONS?
SECRET
CROUP 1
Excludes from automatic]
downgrading and
declassification
0001100
14-00000
SECRET
G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective
which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission
to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without
NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? The above possi-
bility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications
are practically incalculable.
The conclusion is that as regards NOSENKO,
with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a
political or other type objective which could be considered of sufficient
importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with
the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being
given a specific mission or missions by the KGB.
•
It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable
of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection
to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no
limitations on the KGB intelligence information he might reveal providing .
that such act would, in the estimate of the leadership, result in a net
political gain for the USSR. For such a possibility to be seriously
entertained by the Soviets, however, it would have to involve an issue of
major importance to the Soviet leadership and presumably would have to
0001101
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14-00000
be considered by them as the only or at least the best means of
achieving the desired end and of having a very high probability
of success.
The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which
might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President
Kennedy: the involvement of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination
and his association with the Soviet Union. Given (a) speculation
obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the
assassination, (b) the premise that in fact there was no Soviet
involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply
concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to
irreversable actions, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership might
have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States
authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passage
to the United States Government of the allegedly complete Soviet consular
file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act.)
The NOSENKO case warrants examination in the above regard in
light of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was
"inside" KGB information on OSWALD: information which purportedly
0001102
2
14-00000
f
SEGNET
revealed the substance of the content of the KGB files on OSWALD.
This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship
with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD,
and that as a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with a
continuing series of problems.
Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the
requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free
KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable:
a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible
problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CIA
in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.
b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is
interesting and pertinent, it is not, in nature, scope, and content,
sufficiently convincing for United States authorities to reasonably be
expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof of Soviet
non-involvement.
C. It is implausible not to assume that the Soviets would
assume that United States authorities, in any examination of the
possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume
0001103
14-00000
extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation a
compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB
officer other than very senior persons and an individual of group of
action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature.
The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious
consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the
above very limited category.
It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically
motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily
eliminated.
The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might
have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer,
with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or
cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would
be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could
only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence
community would involve a major portion of its personnel and efforts
in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current
or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be
arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. It is not believed that
SECT
0001104
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SECREL
NOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission
or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an
overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full
exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB.
Consideration of the above possibility must also include an
.
evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments
by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by
information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect
on others of the conviction and sentencing of persons who have committed
a crime or: crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of why persons
who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.
The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of
William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKEN-
BAUGH should not be underestimated.
The KGB also could not have
known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the
trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning
whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.
G001105
14-00000
H
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H. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS OF
NOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THE
KGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKO
WAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOR
OR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS OR
:
AFTER HIS DEFECTION?
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic)
downgrading and
declassification
0001106
14-00000
SECRET
H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962
or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or
that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior
or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The
conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO
in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his
defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.
The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in
previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest
since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.
It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as
the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning
whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be
based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO,
collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the
individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of
each item of available information.
The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962
and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is
SECRETL
GROUP 1
Excidio automatic
downgrading and
dati
0001107
14-00000
SECRET
necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his
activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion
that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction¨
or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent
behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion
was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB
control at that time.
Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962
contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to
the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was con-
cluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant
serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate
conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor in
KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free
to defect.
Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO,
during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his
personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be
kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the
2
SECRET
0001108

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U
United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CIA and
that he did not wish to be contacted and would not recognize any attempted
contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnished information as
to the reason for his concern that no information regarding his contact
with CIA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the
dangers to NOSENKO in any contact or attempted contact with NOSENKO
in the USSR.
It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO
about his personal security is not substantial evidence that NOSENKO
was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was
not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the
USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of the KGB if NOSENKO
was under KGB control.
The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been
carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KGB
participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection
of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable
type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could have furnished
all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB
ever at a later date becoming aware that the material was actually missing.
The latter statement even includes the travel document which authorized
the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.
0001109
3
14-00000
The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to
participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to
NOSENKO, this particular document was not accountable in that it was.
only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel
expenses. NOSENKO stated that he had not claimed the rather small
amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he
really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank
of Lieutenant Colonel.
NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the
rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even as a Deputy Chief of Depart-
ment he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to
receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that
giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was
the error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and.
that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
The above explanation by NOSENKO may well be considered by
readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO
was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been pro-.
vided with something a little more substantial to document his claim of
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition, it would seem that the KGB
SECRET
0001110
14-00000
SECKET.
could have provided NOSENKO with some type of document which
would support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, KGB.
Even the Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim of
NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First
Department, SCD, in 1960 - 1961, nor do they even support the claim
of NOSENKO that there was such à position in the First Section in
1960 - 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.
5
0001111
14-00000
IV
14-00000
SECRET
IV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS
IN REGARD TO NOSENKO
0001112
SECRET
678071
Excluded from wamalis)
14-00000
SECRET
COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS
IN REGARD TO NOSENKO
Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357
-
360 of the "Examina-
tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G)
primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence)
and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are
independently treated in separate attachments.
!
With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are
in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that
NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was
a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964,
and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953
February 1964 period.
* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the
Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations
unless otherwise indicated.
Attachment:
Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination
of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded tran automatic)
downgrading and
daclassification
6001113
14-00000
SECRET
PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO
AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF
"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"
The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy
Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation
of A
-
G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)
"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"
"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
successively senior positions of authority from which he derived
extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB
operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period
1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive
array of information about KGB personnel, organization and opera-
tions which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive
evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including
intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's
claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a
senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who
0001114
14-00000
SECRET
enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal short-
comings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered
a
by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of KGB
· Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assas-
sinate him."
"The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known
facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the
test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are
internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether
he actually gained the information he has from occupying the
KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he
says he is, according to his own accounts?"
"This examination had led to the following findings, arrived
at independently:
A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU
in any of the capacities or at the places and times he
claimed.
B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the
manner or at the time he claimed.
C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American
Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as
0001115
he claimed.
14-00000
D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neither
a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh
Department American-British Commonwealth Section.
E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the
American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or
supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)'
F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was
thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are
not credible.
G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty
that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel
between 1953 and his defection in 1964.
These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability
or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence
in each instance."
"The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence
of NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts
of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims
as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently
0001116
SECRET
14-00000
cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and
fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually
any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability,·
or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is
not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector."
"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide
defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives
for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information
he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely
consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal
conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. : The
character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that
some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials,
and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all
require that at least a provisional judgment be made."
"Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's
misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing
as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he
suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has
greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for
simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB
agent.
11
0001117

14-00000
SECRET
"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That
NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal
advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from
:
the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations
which he has provided and which could only derive from within the
KGB itself."
"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and
psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the'
possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product
of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."
"It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB
officer who served in at least some of the components for some
or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exag-
gerated his positions, rank and access to information, and
invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with
American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to
accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted
that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also,
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's
patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a
product of his own invention, since these were the subject of
"
6001118
comment by other sources.
"
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with
the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are
left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the
KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies,
none of them renders it untenable."
"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or
other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the
evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched
by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be
regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor-
mation should be assessed accordingly."
CECRET
:
6001119
14-00000
14-00000
SECRET
A. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RU
IN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES AND
TIMES HE CLAIMED
i
SECRET
CSGVP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
0001120
14-00000
SECRET
A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities
or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)
The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard
to NOSENKO.
The current conclusion is that the claimed service of
NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early
1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated
and should be accepted.
The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated
by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of
International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to
admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class.
However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962
statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted
significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.
It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his
"stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal
matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassificatha
0001121
14-00000
SEGNER
1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully
acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all
of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval
RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will,
for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.
The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole
Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief,
Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic
or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify,
by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service,
but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits
to Geneva.":
Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily
prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number
of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was
not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval
RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by
NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by
NOSENKO regarding approximately (875) KGB officers, (100) KGB agents,
35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.
2
SECRET
0001122
14-00000
It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names
of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early
:
1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews
and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelli-
gence personnel whom he knew in the 1951
-
early 1953 period.
Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question
whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence
and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a
copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by
NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy
Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was
completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of
his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.
NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic
area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled
that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's
village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENK O
for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had
caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-
existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the
place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and
that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.
3
SECRET
5001123
14-00000
SECRET
The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed
active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of
Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It
should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being
a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet
Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee
of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States
Navy.
Attachments:
List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO
Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO
4
SECRET
6001124
14-00000
sekrenev Leonid
(on agents,
intelligencel
- till 1952 or 1953 a deputy of chief of no
then a chief of nary intelligence, later he was a
if GRU (Sezov Ivan and Ira shutin). I heard he was a navy
A Baltalentso
·navy.
deputy of dif
attache in the USA.
2. Bespalor - a major, code - clerk of the navy intelligence of 7 fleet
in Soviet Harbour's region in 1957-1952.
3. Bogdanovskiy
- departy of chief of the navy intelligence of I
Fleet (on agents) in 1951-1952.
4. Bulakh
-
an officer of the navy intelligence print of intelligenc
of the 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1852.
a
5. Chikin
-
in 1950 ±
a colonel, worked in the departments of foreign
irs of the brinistry of defence.
6. Churil'skiy
- R
colruel, in 1950 - worked in the department of
foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.
7. Demchenko fit an office of ancy intelligence point of intelligence of 4 F Bet
in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district.
1
-
8. Denisenko in 1962-1964 a military attache of sovict embassy in Bern.
9. Bol'shakov Yuri.
officer of Ghill (colonel) was in the USA,
- All
" works under cover of press - agency.
News"
10. bulgenin Lev K., in 18502 worked in GRU.
11. Joliger
Irliyer
-
Au
officer of fill in essos. (or Iyerler).
12. Kaloshin - a colonel, in 1950-1962 a chief of personnel department
The
navy intelligence:
0001125
13. Cononyuk - in 1950 finished the institute of international relations
in 1001 takon in the have intellicouse and cent to work in Rank:
14-00000
14. Kapalkin - a general, in 1540+ was a deputy of chief the Military.
diplomatic academy. He his two sons: Kapalkin Sergey - finished this academy
in 1950, works in JRU, worked in Italy and in Freuse, his wifen daughter of
Marshal Timoshenko - Olya [ finished the institute of foreign trade); Kapalkin Vic-
tor - in 1940s studed as a student in the US, also works in gru.
is. Kabalinov Vladimir - a major, a senior officer of the navy intelligense
of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.
16. Khaberov – in 1950-52 a deputy of chief of navy radio detachment
of the navy intelligence of 7 Fécet.
17. Khaytor S.S.
S. a
ge of I Fleet in 1950-52.
☐
deputy of chief (on information) of nexy intelli-
18. Kon'kor - a deperty of chief of nocy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52.
15. Rozlovskig - in 1950 - an officer of department of foreign affairs of the
ministry of defouse.
20. . Molchanor - an officer of ghill [ in 1850 - )
21.
i-
Ozekhoo Jennadi - in 1451-52 an administrative officer of the navy in
telligence of I Fleet.
22. Pogodin Boris - a chief of the secretariate of many intelligence of 7 Fleet
in 1950-1952, knows a japanoze language.
23. Rezantsev - a commander of navy intelligence point of the intelligence
4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.
....
. 24. Skalin - a general, in biyo — was a chief of the Military diploncatio.v2n-
diny, later was a chief of hl.
25. Shaneshniker durci
cz
-
CC01126
a neural works in Thill: his bather was a marshaluss:

14-00000
:
Lease
as. Mel'nikov Sergey - a chip of neoy intelligence of 4 that in 1950-52.
7 Flet
27. Namgaladze - a genul, a chief of navy intellignce at black sex; 1950-52
28. Sergeyer
btcolonel, a senior officer of the nady
- an engineer - 
bit colized,
intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1907-52 (earlier he worked in Turkey).
27. Suslovich - in 1950-52 a comumuder of racy radio dotachment of the
navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.
30. Srishchunov - all
din from where was recalled.
31. Tishkin
(02-cv)
officer of ight, worked in the USA, last years indu-
- a rear -admiral, in 1550-52 a deputy chief of the navy
lligeave of the ministry of military navy.
32. Vasilevskiy Yuri - works in Jhill, son of a marshal of Ussk.
-.u.u
Lite-
33. Voronker Albert
officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Flect in 1982.
34. Vorontser Michael - a vice admiral, a former chief of navy intelligence (1950 52
in Youcher dustryf a doctor of Ladeflect, works in port designed,
are archives agout of types.
35. Yershow - an officer of personnel of the navy intelligence of F Fleet
in 1850-52, knows a chinize language.
SECRET
0001127
14-00000
SECRET
The 12 of March, 1451 was signed
an order about my up-
pointment as a interprator of the navy intelligence of I Fest
in Soviet herbour, Primorskiy district., where I have gone.
by a train and arrived in the place of my appointment in the
end of March." (I went from Moscow to Khabarovsk where
train to Komsomolsk on Amur, then crossed the
zwver and from station Pioun went to Soviet harbour (station
Pyati sotka).
changed
вку баніны
Pay Postovaya
cut Zhilderbart.
sity Soviet
island Salihalin
herben
The intelligence of 7 Fleet was loanted in bay Postrouga, here
were also Political directory of I Flict, submarine's and obstuyer's bases.
This headquarters of 7 Fleet was located in settlement Thilderbet
The commander-in-chief of 7 Fleet was admizal Baykor Irand.,
chief of staff - vice admiral Pajatined.
6001128
The chief of navy intelligence of I Fleet was captain of I real
Melnikov Sergey K. dis deputies - castuin of 2 rank boydancoski)
14-00000
wontis deportment), ception of trout Khaytor- Somen S. (information
diportment), captain of trakk Kowsker (navy intelligence), colonial
Burchenko (a commissär).
1048
working in the information department. Efficers Kabalines,
Efimor were working in this dipertucent. Other officers of the intelligent.
were lieutenant-colonel Sergeyes, bieutement Veroukhov Albert, mejor
Eishor, captains Ozekhor, Rodieuer, Pegodin, bespalov and 3-4 more.
officers. There were also seargents and privates.
In the end of April, 1952 I flew in Moscow (stopping for 1-2
days in Khabaronsk) for a leave.
chief directory:
In June - July 1852 a personal department of the navy intelle
juse (a chif -colonel kaloshin) was desiding a question about-
my
tin ferouse because of illness. And I was appointed in the navy
intelligence point of ravy intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk (lo-
cated before a peninsula to biltiysk - fornier Pillau)., where I
arrived in August, 1952. (Kaliningrad's district-formce Fressia).
Soviet is a little sity-village, a former german village of fish
it seems had a name. Fishhausen.
craien,
Sovietsk
Baltiysk
☑
Sovietsk - a demolished little town, here there
there a navy intelligiuse piisit and 1-2
others military detachments (building
battalion):
Baltiysk was a bese and headquarters of 4 Fleet.
-6001129
14-00000
The commander-in-chief of 4 Fleet was admiral golovko H. G.
The chief of my ravy intellizouse print was captain of 2 rank Ryssantico.
there were officers : Vinogradov, bulakh, Demchenko and others with sexagent:
and privates.
before my arrival (2 days) this nacy intelligence point was transfe-
sed from east Germany in Sorist. If in Germany the work of the
poent was sonnested with agent's work, now there was another
tesh - a preperation of agent-observation post in a case of new un
(3-4 persons each post). absolutly monkey bussness
-
또하
In the end of Desenulis I took a leave reasoning it with my illness,
having in mind a transference in another place.
In mid of March, 1853 I began to work in 2 chief directory of kyt
(formie Mod).
6001130
14-00000
14-00000
SECRET
B. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THE
MANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMED
SECRET
Excluded
downgrading and
declassification
6001131
14-00000
SECRET
B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time
claimed. (Previous conclusion)
to NOSENKO.
The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard
The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered
the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his
entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General
Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.
Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of
entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary
and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews
that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con-
sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.
The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that
NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed
was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when
he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in
1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic)
downgrading and
declassification
0001132
14-00000
SECRET
In 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into
the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the
Institute of International Relations in 1949.
The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements
of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what
are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not
given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding,
and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or
reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through
the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then
the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures
should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence
organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official.
General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA,
the Minister of the then MVD.
The previous summary raises several points concerning the
eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67
that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU,
he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at
the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not contro-
vertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO
2
0001133
SECRET
14-00000
SECEED
was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953
with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy
to BERIYA.
The previous summary also states that according to KGB
defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate
was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.
This is a flat statement
which it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fully
substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is
medically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is accepted
that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium
rest
place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGB
after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly
have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously
had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who
had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.
The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks
and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and
therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning
these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at
this time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB
(MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that
0001134
3
SECRET
14-00000
OLORET
NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his
processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was
a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate.
This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General
KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval
RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).
The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would
have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD
would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry
of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also
had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN
era.
The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the
necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not
speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would
seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the
elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal
procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he com-
pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).
Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not
know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly
6001135
SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While
NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the
time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second
Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the
First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal of
designations occurred in March 1953.
STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the
:
MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA
as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June
1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for less
than a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning the
date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and places
it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated that
the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the
MVD in April 1953.' In the light of our inability to fix the effective date
of the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it is
unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation
of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).
There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to who
was responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD.
NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is
5
SECRET
0001136
14-00000
SEOPER
in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and
GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for
the changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversal
of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However,
the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of
upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in
this issue.
NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing
the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the
!
KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no
contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason
to disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased to
exist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KI
continued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care
should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain
position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their own
memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at
any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations
were organized or ceased to exist.
6
SECRET
000113
14-00000
SECR
The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO
in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered
difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the
brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in
early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he
encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection
was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an
official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO
would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted
that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only
. met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated
that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no
way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.
7
SECRET
0.1138
14-00000
14-00000
SECRET
C. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
SECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 - 1955 PERIOD
AS HE CLAIMED
SECRET
!
6001139
14-00000
SECRET
C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section
throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)
The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The
conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First
Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March
1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department,
SCD.
This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO
during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an
officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that
both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he
was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to
admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during
this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal be-
havior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the
Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic)
dawngrading and
declassification
0001140
14-00000
to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether
he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.
The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since
his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the
KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of
SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the
Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.
The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain
in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and
was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This
is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was
the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.
NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that
following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was respon-
sible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not
claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news-
paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers.
NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer,
indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced
officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period
of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his
2
SECRET
0001141
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information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight
to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor-
respondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.
From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Depart-
ment in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an
officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the
Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It
is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache
personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that
NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late
May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members
of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work
undoubtedly left much to be desired.
In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the
Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least
certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the
First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances,
NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not
undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during
this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of
3
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the Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was an
officer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as related
by him.
NOSENKO has stated that the work against the Military
Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment
possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches
on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive
sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB
would appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted as
exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Walter
MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches
to Soviets in the United States in that period.
NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the
details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he
should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against
the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submitted
that this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his
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assigned functions, but makes to allowance for the uncertain personal
status of NOSENKO whose actual future in the KGB was in jeopardy
after mid-1954.
March
-
NOJENKO has previously indicated and still indicates a definite
lack of knowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately
May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an un-
satisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a
decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in which he
went on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days
under hospital care because of the possibility of recurrence of his previous
tuberculosis.
Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest that NOSENKO
had not furnished sufficient details about his alleged agent network for
use against the Military Attaches. It is considered that NOSENKO in
current interviews has furnished adequate acceptable details, and as
an example furnished specific information concerning "VOLODINA
alad "RAKETA" (pase 85). It would appear that there was no intent by
NOSENKO to withhold information concerning these individuals, but
non veg the he was never alked to amplify his previous camual reference
these individual
5
11)
0001144

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DECKED
The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his
assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March
1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the
bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer
in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information
furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews
is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer
in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.
6
SECRET
0001145
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0001146
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SECRET
D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955
-
1960, HE WAS NEITHER A
SENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF
THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH SECTION
SECRET
CROUP 1
Excluded from automatic)
downgrading and
dessication
:
0001147
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SECRET
D. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a
senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department,
American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)
The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The
.
current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh
Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh
Department from 1958 to December 1959.
During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive
information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department
during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject.
of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally in-
volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959.
These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI.
in June 1956, contact with Sir Allen LANE and Arthur BIRSE in the
summer of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS) in 1958, the re-
cruitment of George DREW) in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of
SECRET
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Excluded from automatic]
Gowngrading and
tobusation
14-00000
SECRET
William Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR
-
in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of Gerard MERTENS in July
August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959. The
foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims
personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged
participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who
was the KGB target.
Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY) and
David TAYLOR were British citizens and the other above-named indi-
viduals were United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate
the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an
officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common-
wealth tourists in the USSR.
In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about
an operation against Martin MALIA) an American tourist who was in
the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955.
MALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this
time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement
or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the
individual involved.
2
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NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain
United States Government officials, including Congressional represent-
atives to the USSR in 1955-1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice
William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously
mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in the
Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth
tourists during the late May 1955 · December 1959 period.
NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh
Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent
network was not available for operations against American and British
tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the
USSR was just in a formative stage.
NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he de-
veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel
and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code
names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by
interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com-
promise operations.
150
The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101
in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of
0001150
NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty
3
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pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is
considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there
would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO
was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department
during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it con-
ceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various
areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any
evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there
are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the
previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which
are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.
!
On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO
was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-
intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents
among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation
of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the
MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous
known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit-
ment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart-
ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-
speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB offe
4
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:
considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on
Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of
a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.
Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations which
were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included
in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations
were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE,
Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (fnu) KARLOV, Norman FISK,
Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William
+
TARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases
was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other
than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details
as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Depart-
ment in 1962 following his return from the First Department.
The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another
section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review
of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his
statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes
are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished
by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi-
mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.
0001152
5
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"(
During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific
information on certain of the above eleven cases, including William)
TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE,
It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR
NOSENKO has, in
and William TARASKA were cases in which the tourist was visiting
relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory
explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case.
discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British 'Common-
wealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended
to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was assigned to a
group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of
Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.
NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the
individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV,"
two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO
has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of
identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they
had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual
activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt
action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual
0001153
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was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information
was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual
returned to the USSR.
NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the Patrick
PRESSMAN and Gerald SEVERN cases; and, the listing of the (Sofia)
SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955
-
1959 period is in com-
plete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information
from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews
the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in
detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material
which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.
The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement
of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the
Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual.
An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation
was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is
logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English
language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents
were used in two of the four cited cases.
The summary also noted that there was a question concerning
whether Gisella HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case.
7
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SECRET
:
This question seems quite superfluous since HARRIS was in the USSR
on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh
Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an indi-
vidual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual
is traveling; i. e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation,
as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat
stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow,
as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending
a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors
which affect the determination of which Department or organizational
component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case.
factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign
intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman.
In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the
responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the
FCD.
These
On pages 148
-
149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at
least some of the substance of the information furnished by George
BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents
in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO
made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information
6001155
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although he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the
source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such infor-
mation were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was
not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had
actually seen excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE.
According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only
partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come
from an agent.
-
The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA
acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists
by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the
Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his de-
fection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained
references to certain 1958 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-
intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO
claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth
Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified
no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later
is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection
of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.
6001156
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NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against
American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958 - 1959. Many
of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in
the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Common-
wealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was
quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 1959 were
acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view.
!
NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the
Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort
to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists
had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in
the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not
review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and follow-
ing advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the
document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN
has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained
additional information not in the document which he was aware had
been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.
NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with
a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by
GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptionNOSENKO
10
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concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the SCD for
various categories of foreign visitors to the USSR provides a logical
explanation for his unfamiliarity. Previous problems in this regard
appear to have stemmed from a misconception of the meaning of the
term "tourist" as used by the KGB. This general term has a specific
meaning in the Second Chief Directorate; namely, a "tourist" is a
foreigner travelling to the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a person
was the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Depart-
ment. A large number of travelers to the USSR, including business-
men, persons travelling on invitation of a Soviet organization, students
attending a university, etc., are not tourists in the KGB concept and
would not be the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh
Department.
The only unresolved problem considered of any significance
in regard to the 1955 - 1959 period is the account by NOSENKO of the
presence of American citizen John SHUBIN) in the USSR as a tourist
in the late 1950's. The previous summary pointed out that, since
(John SHUBIN) did not have a valid United States passport between 1940
and June 1961, it was impossible for him to have been a tourist under
true name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventh Depart-
ment, as NOSENKO claims. Although several avenues of possibly
fruitful investigation have not yet been fully explored, there is no
0001158
11
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i
assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All that
justifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the story
of NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why such
inaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch,
or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department
in 1958
-
· 1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimed
service in 1962 - 1963 in the Seventh Department.
12
G001159
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SECRET
E. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN
!
EMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER OR
SUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THE
PERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic)
rading and
0001160
14-00000
SECRET
E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American
Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section
during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)
It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the
position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section},
SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.
!
The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960
- 1961 has been the most difficult claimed position of NOSENKO to
satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of
his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in
a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career
is valid. It is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh
Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication
that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of
Section during 1960 - 1961.
Position in the SCD, KGB, and throughout the KGB is important
from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. If
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0001161
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NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer in
1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant
loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to
have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1960 - 1961 would raise con-
siderable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960,
as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963.
It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all
aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 -
1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal
responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews,
an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NCS ENKO
actually were in 1960 - 1961 and whether his statements in this area
were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have
been Deputy Chief, First Section.
According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only
approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and
in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section.
In addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed
by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was
not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First
Section, First Department.
2
0001162
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SEULE
According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a
Deputy Chief of Section and the duties of the particular Deputy Chief
were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section
decided would be his assigned duties.
The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict
between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he
entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequent
claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKAVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First
Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various
other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain
matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later
stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The
previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these
contradictions.
In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a
Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV
and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not
contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with
whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chief of
Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he was respon-
sible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other
0001163
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hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned
to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code
clerks). There could of course have been no specific predecessor for
Therefore, in one sense BAKHVALOV was
a substantively new area.
the predecessor of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The
interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as
being in conflict appears to be the result of confusion on this point by
all concerned.
According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First
Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for
a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be.
KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NCSENKO to
supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy.
NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended
to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy
for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on
trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.
After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by
GRIBANOV that he, NCSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the
work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United
States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being of the greatest
6001164
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importance, and the recruitment of code clerks as a priority aim of
the KGB. KLY PIN, who was Chief of the First Department, later re-
peated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy I.
GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO
responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV
Iwere not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers
although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO.
NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely
scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.
NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their
work,
According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work
against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section
and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than
work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his respon-
sibilities as follows:
(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John
ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy.
(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of re-
ports from OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take" from
microphones in the United States Embassy.
5
0001165
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☐
SECTET
(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical
security file on the United States Embassy.
(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief,
First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.
As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO,
by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished
by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a
Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst can either accept
or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the
responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst
accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.
Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments
:
and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service.
of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Department, 1960.
1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy
Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that
section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief
and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The
matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks
will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the respon-
sibilities listed in (a)
-
(d) above.
ó
0001166
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Pages 205
-
222 of the previous summary contain a detailed
basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case
officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the
responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against
ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of
a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is
whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB'
for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that
the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.
According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the
direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another
POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against
ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO
appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his
description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only
within that framework.
Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount
of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand
if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the
KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV,"
it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had
G001167
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little material value for the SCD. The FCD had advised the SCD prior
to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was considered to
be "American Intelligence," and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the
Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGELLE,
who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD
was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence"
or not.
The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite
specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB
operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous.
This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion that
NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.
NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 he
prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation
of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his
maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement
is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH
did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN
has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results.
invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICH could not have
treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961.
C001168
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ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March
1960 with the intention that he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approxi-
mately three months later his close association began with Myra
KEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continued
until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH
as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH
became the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall
of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had
uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit
entry for cleaning purposes.
ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet
Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there
is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three
When
mailed?
operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all
showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO in
June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal
letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.
ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hour
surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance
brigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the
responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the
0001169
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First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case
officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give
any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but
under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillance
activities of the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had sur-
veillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses of
ABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personal
weaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern
of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV"
remained unchanged.
Pages 210
212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO
was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the
USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find
out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO
stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "operational
action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." The
surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD
to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would
certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO
contends that the results which might reasonably be expected would be
of little or no practical value to the SCD.
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Pages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary
on the matter of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN
visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review
of the 1964 - 1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates
they were unable to clarify the matter and did much to confuse the issue.
Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved
the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of
conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First
Section, First Department, for any material period of time after
!
30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance
report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or
was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he
read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event.
There is no reason to question his assertion that he read the report
since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions
in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent
inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relate it to
his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually
read the report.
NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street
deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post
11
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near the site which was maintained for three months and that he was
informed on a daily basis of the results of this stake out (always
negative). To take this statement literally would raise a further problem
since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the
Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO went to
Geneva in mid-March 1962.
It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept
advised of developments or nondevelopments following the visit of
ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief
of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to
NOSENKO since 1953, or Vladislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV,
Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Depart-
ment. Even so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matter
in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of
the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mail-
ings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would appear clearly to have been
derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring-
summer of 1961.
It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO
was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding
any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond
12
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this, NOSENKO himself has stated that it did not occur to him to tell
us because the stake out had long since been dropped, it had revealed
nothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and therefore
he had regarded it as insignificanṭ.
This is not implausible. Another possible explanation, however,
derived from the already noted inability of NOSENKO to pin down a date
for the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if not
of the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should be
noted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIY
case in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Street deaddrop undoubtedly became
the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.
!
That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visit
of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clear
from the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has con-
sciously exaggerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermath,
it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of the
affair derive from honest confusion.
Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inter-
views leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN
to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits by
ABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational
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letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished
drawings which substantiate, that visits of ABIDIAN to a commission
shop, a next-door art shop, and a local post office in the area were
known to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrance to the
art shop, according to NOSENKO, was so situated as to be an ideal.
place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, and a mobile surveillance
was placed on the art shop for a period of time following the visit of
ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time
and to the buildings described by NOSENKO.
Pages 216
220 of the previous summary contain no reference
to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the
visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It is also clear
from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that
no differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB
coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area.
circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the
Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site
(30 December 1961).
It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing
of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would
have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but
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there is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to
--
the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event,
one thing is clear since he may well have transferred out of the First
Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and most certainly had
transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied
confused information regarding the Pushkin Street affair cannot be used
to impugn his claim to having been case officer for ABIDIAN from early
1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact that NOSENKO is not able to
properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative
of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the
date right.
In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary re-
view of reports from OTU (Technical Unit of KGB) of "take" from micro-
phones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his
claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not
sustained.
It is not felt that the previous conclusion made sufficient allow-
ance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually
entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy,
according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone inter-
cepts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate
case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even
within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in his
0001175
absence to the Chief and then were distributed to the individual responsible
15
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SEVCET
case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the
rank of Deputy Chief was aware of the total microphone "take" from
the United States Embassy as received by the section.
As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO
this was considered the most important by the KGB and OTU, NOSENKO
:
had no responsibility for review or ultimate dissemination of the infor-
mation to the Chief, SCD, the Chairman, KGB, or the Central Committee
since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD.
NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the
working microphones was "dying" and that OTU in addition to having
reception difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining a sufficient
number of qualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to
NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from
most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which
OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all
conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been
of interest to responsible officers of the First Section, OTU, according
to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide
more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more
"
personnel. According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at
OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of to
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First Section could listen to a particular tape but he had to go to OTU
to do so and as a result this was done very infrequently.
It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or
transcribed all conversations even in the thirteen areas listed by
NOSENKO as having active microphones is not reasonable or even
realistic. It is also unrealistic to presume that any conversation con-
ducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not
compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in
any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption
that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because some-
!
one had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active.
microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from
microphones in the United States Embassy.
It is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors
to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up
by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions
of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and
even if he did, whether he would consider it of sufficient importance or
interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.
In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible
for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy,
17
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it is not considered that there is an adequate basis for questioning
this claim.
The previous summary contained a conclusion that the claim
of NOSENKO that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was
an invention. The basis for this conclusion was not then adequate and
current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim
on this point should be accepted.
In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in place
of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent,
it is considered that this claim is acceptable providing it is not con-
verted into a presumption that therefore NOSENKO knew everything
that KOVSHUK knew.
NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct
supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First
Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and
would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an
example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of
the work against diplomatic personnel in the United States Embassy.
He has stated he is sure he would have known of anything "important"
such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim
to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First
18
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SECRET
Section. His recognition of the names of individuals at the United
States Embassy in 1960 - 1961 and even their assignments seems
adequate.
The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the names
of most agents or operative contacts who were part of the KGB network
among the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did not
recognize their photographs, and did not give sufficient details con-
cerning their specific activities is considered to be an unwarranted
criticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agents
in the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers.
It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain
a single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that respon-
sibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agent
had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case officer other
than the handler of the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particular
interest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though he was the case
officer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV and
GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent
network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for report-
ing on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally
19
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not an adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agent and it
appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established
handler-agent relationship has considerable merit.
NOSENKO, as previously indicated, has stated that he had the
responsibility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy
during 1960 - 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims respon-
sibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in early.
1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of
the work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir
DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY.
GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks
and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN
and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handled indigenous agents in American
House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO only in those cases
where these agents were directed against code clerks.
It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the
code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according
to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was much
greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees
at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.
0001180
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The following comments are concerned with several specific
cases in which, according to NOSENKO, there was an approach by the
KGB, interesting information was developed, or in which at least a
considerable amount of specific work was carried out by NOSENKO,
KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.
The first case, (James STORSBERG, is covered on pages 166 -
177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considered
necessary on this case since there does not appear to be any adequate
reason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGB
effort against STORSBERG.
It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1962
exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placing
himself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment pitch was made
to STORSBERG. NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, but
there is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a year
in the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessful approach
to STORSBERG.
An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach
to STORSBERG since STCRSBERG) dated this as October 1961, NOSENKO
has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, based
on remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the
21
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approach occurred at the "end of 1960."
NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable
account of the STORSBERG) case. He has stated that he cannot precisely
date the approach to STORSBERG, but that it occurred before the
approach at the Moscow airport to James KEYSERS) (June 16, 1961)
because otherwise no action would have been taken against KEYSERS)
When recently reinterviewed, (STORSBERG) continued to maintain
that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the internal evidence in
his description of collateral events makes it clear that the approach had
to have taken place considerably earlier.
Joseph MORONE) another code clerk at the United States Embassy,
who will be the subject of further discussion below, has been interviewed
on the basis of statements by STORSBERG that MORONE was present in
American House the night of the approach. Analysis of the statements
of MORONE clearly indicates that the events (STORSBERG describes
could not have taken place later than the period February to early May
1961.
The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to
STORSBERG) occurred in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible
with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the face
of this approximation of the date of the approach to (STORSBERG) it is
0001182
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believed reasonable to assume that the remarks of KOVSHUK to
GOLITSYN in January 1961, as related by GOLITSYN concerning
a successful operation against a military code clerk in Moscow at the
end of 1960, referred to STORSBERG, and that KOVSHUK either was
referring to a compromise phase of the operation rather than the actual
approach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success.
Pages 178 - 181 of the previous summary contain information
in regard to the attempted defection operation against James KEYSERS!
As of this time, it is considered that there are no discrepancies between
record information and information from NOSENKO which in any way
reflect against NOSENKO. KEYSERS did not recognize a photograph
of NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the air-
port, but this does not provide a valid reason to disbelieve the statement
of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to KEYSERS)
There are certain statements relative to the KEYSERS case as
set forth in the previous summary which require specific comment.
(a) The statement is made that no KGB officer
directly connected with the case could regard KEYSERS)
as the replacement for STORSBERG) In fact, (KEYSERS
actually was being trained by STORSBERG as a substitute,
not a replacement, even though his primary assignment
0001183
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(
was not that of a code clerk.
NOSENKO has during
current interviews related how he received the impression
from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the
microphone in the Military code room at the United States
Embassy that KEYSERS) either was not a code clerk or
had been away from code work for a considerable period
of time. In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was
that STORSBERG was having a difficult time explaining.
the particular work to (KEYSERS. The observations of
NOSENKO are of interest since KEYSERS actually had
not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained
by STORSBERG so that he could act as a substitute. Under
the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the
KGB would assume at the time that KEYSERS was to be the
eventual replacement of STORSBERG.
(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his
departure from Moscow, (KEYSERS acknowledged to his
supervisors Colonel URBAN/ his homosexual tendencies
and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents,
all at the American House" (page 179).
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Contrary to this assertion, a review of the
official memorandum, dated 16 June 1961, of (Colonel
(URBAN) reflects that KEYSERS was not informed by
URBAN of the "allegations of homosexuality in order
not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him
while within the Soviet Union. 11.
•
(c) On page 236 of the previous summary, the
statement is made that, "In the single case in which he
/NOSENKO asserted that he relied on information pro-
cured from microphones (KEYSERS) failure to report
receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error.
"
While the official record shows that (KEYSERS)
did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to (Colonel
(URBAN) in the office of Colonel URBAN, it should be noted
that this occurred less than one hour before (KEYSERS) left
the Embassy for the airport.
NOSENKO has stated that in
the absence of information to the contrary from microphone
and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that KEYSERS)
had not reported receipt of the defection letter and there-
fore had decided to approach KEYSERS at the airport. In
view of the short time between (KEYSERS report of receipt
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of the letter and his departure from Moscow, it would
have been remarkable if the KGB had learned this in-
formation in time to call off the airport approach. The
account of NOSENKO in the (KEYSERS matter therefore
is considered completely credible.
Pages 181
-
184 of the previous summary contain information
in regard to Matthew ZUJUS, who succeeded James STORSBERG)
having arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the
responsible case officer for (ZUJUS) according to NOSENKO.
The previous summary states (page 183) that ZUJUS), during a
routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of
1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN," who.
visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic.
"LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she
claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech.
Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport had been issued to
"LILLIAN, " and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN"
replied that she had forgotten it, then left, and did not return.
The previous summary stated that the above incident had been
described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph
[MORONE in 1960, not (ZUJUS) in 1962.
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(
Page 194 of the previous summary relates information from
NOSENKO that GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin in early 1960 to obtain
two German women who could be used against the residents of American
House. During current interviews, this matter has been again covered
with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for
these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow
under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an
Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent,
"HANNA," as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed
"HANNA" had met MORONE at American House. In a recent interview,
MORONE confirmed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl
at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of
MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO.
Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO re-
ported that she was queried about her passport at American House and
as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further
attempts to use her at American House. NOSENKO places this incident
in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i. e., 1960 - 1961. He
has never suggested any connection with (ZUJUS), nor is there reason
to assume that he could be referring to the experience of (ZUJUS since
this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the
American Embassy Section.
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It was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO
did not know enough about (ZUJUS or his background to have exercised
any supervision in the development of (ZUJUS. Granted that NOSENKO
did not know many details regarding (ZUJUS) the fact is that NOSENKO
left the First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at which
time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated. (ZUJUS) who
did not arrive in Moscow until September 1961, remained in Moscow
until January 1963. NOSENKO could hardly be held responsible for
knowing anything about (ZUJUS after 1 January 1962.
Pages 185
-
189 of the previous summary contain a synopsis of
previous information from NOSENKO in regard to Paul JENNER)
Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that
Paul JENNER, who was thought to be a code clerk, was coming to
Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV
to Helsinki to travel on the same train as JENNER to Moscow. A female
agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the
train entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted
with JENNER as a part of a future operation against JENNER) in Moscow,
and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with (JENNER).
NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both
KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquaintance of (JENNER,
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and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on
the trip from Helsinki to Moscow.
JENNER, after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was
approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy
and a girl, probably university students," who struck up a conversation.
According to JENNER, they both said that they might see (JENNER) in
Moscow. About three months later JENNER) reported being approached
again by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he had
gone on courier business. There was a short conversation and she gave
JENNER a phone number, insisting that he call her. The woman also
advised JENNER not to mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO
has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance,
the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter JENNER at
the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet
couriers.
Insofar as is known, JENNER has never been shown a photograph
of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of
age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in
appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a
university student.
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During current interviews, NOSENKO has repeated the same
general story as regards (Paul JENNER. He still insists that KOSOLAPOV
was on the same train with JENNER from Helsinki. Collateral infor-
mation raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests
indicate that JENNER was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the
(31) March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor
KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by
KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow.
:
The above obvious discrepancy has not been and cannot be clari-
fied with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either
on the same train as JENNER or he was not. Train manifests indicate
that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy and girl, probably
university students" who, according to JENNER) struck up a conver-
sation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the
operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the
later approach of this same girl to JENNER at the airport. There is
no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV.
In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by
NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "boy student" was: whether
this somehow was KOSOLAPOV, or whether it may have been some
other person entirely.
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It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible
evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as
(JENNER). Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error.
There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy
between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that
KOSOLAPOV and JENNER/ were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV
did not travel with JENNER, this does not establish anything more than
that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something
he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV, should have known according to
his own statements.
Pages 190 – 192 contain a summary of previous information in
regard to the John GARLAND case. (GARLAND) was identified by
NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom
no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically
no details in regard to GARLAND other than to identify him as a code
clerk.
GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered
relates to the trip of GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November
1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB
Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American
code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that
0001191
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the responsible SCD case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki
under alias to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which the
SCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV
in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV
a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki
to Moscow.
The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised that
later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy
Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had helped
!
KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to discuss
the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must
have resulted in a successful recruitment.
It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the
FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the
Embassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Department.
GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alias
of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a first name and
patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (fnu) ZENKIN as
being from the American Department, SCD.
It is considered that there is no doubt that the (inu) ZENKIN
referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name
32
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concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information. NOSENKO
has identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall but
possibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Depart-
ment, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section
both before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games"
against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this
group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection
with activities of the Second Section, but that he had no specific 'knowledge
regarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has fur-
nished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard to
ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together with
his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOS ENKO
may prove quite useful.
As regards the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND matter and the opinion
expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the
case (GARLAND) that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment,
there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. According
to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this
point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in
1960 - 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case
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Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and
the work against GARLAND was the responsibility of the First Section,
it does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have known of any
developments in the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND) matter.
The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki
to Moscow train lists John GARLAND and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of
KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. GARLAND, when interviewed in 1962
following the lead from GOLITSYN, denied having met any Soviet with
the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow
trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later
interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he
had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted
by any foreign intelligence agent.
It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki
in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he
was on the same train as GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow. It is
also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip
to Helsinki in November 1960.
Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries
requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not
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matter that the individual has previously traveled on a similar mission,
each trip must have specific high-level approval. The red tape which
thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip
further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about
the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND trip.
The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts
the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip,
but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about
it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study
of GARLAND, he would have been aware of it.
NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code
clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in
1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba
from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility
exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the
trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November
1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as
a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV
trip.
As with the JENNER-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at
this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the GARLAND
KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge,
35
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this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance,
as in the JENNER case, of his not knowing something he, by his own
statements, should have known.
Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of
operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the
JENNER case nor those in the GARLAND case, singly or combined,
in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not super-
visor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk
operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not
substantiated in the previous summary.
!
Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of
KGB activity against code clerk Joseph MORONE from various sources,
including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.
According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work
against MORONE was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that MORONE
and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of BEGGS) were
planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the
UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to
Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as (MORONE)
and BEGGS. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or sub-
sequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise MORONE sexually. She
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successfully accomplished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UB
liaison relations, it was not possible for the KGB to exploit this directly.
The previous summary stated that with respect to the female
UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor
KOSOLAPOV played the roles in the MORONE case described by
NOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and
of KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as the (MORONE
trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO and
KOSOLAPOV being involved personally in this part of the (MORONE)
+
case.
NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female
agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw.
MORONE and BEGGS departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not
known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the
16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow.
NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. The
activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible within the
known time frame.
It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role
in the MORONE) case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO,
placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that
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:
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KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent.
NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train
from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the
train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking
to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician
after he returned from Cuba.
The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter
are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not con-
sidered that the retractions NCS ENKO has made from his original
statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially
discredit him.
Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that
MORONE, when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana
IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO
had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw
or heard concerning MORONE (page 194). The summary, however,
cited a number of reports that MORONE had been intimate with IVANOVA
and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American
House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware
of the sexual involvement of MORONE with "IVANOVA's friends."
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NOSENKO, during current interviews, has indicated awareness
of at least some involvement of IVANOVA with MORONE. He has fur-
nished information on a developing operation against Marine guard
GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA) based on the involvement of GARCIA)
with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was considered
of using IVANOVA against MORONE to obtain compromising photographs.
This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from the
militiaman/ KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA,
her girl friend, (MORONE) and a Marine guard, possibly (GARCIA) had
been "in the city," then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marines
where the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliability
of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.
According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pietro
CECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV,
reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothing
specific that CECCHI had reported about (MORONE. The summary also
states that MORONE was said by other American Embassy employees
to be a close friend of CECCHI and that MORONE had admitted black
market money exchanges with CECCHI.
During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHI
furnished "pieces" of information concerning MORONE, but he, NOSENKO,
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knew of no black market involvement of MORONE with CECCHI.
NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected,
and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not
fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course
was aware that CECCHI was involved in the black market. However,
whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is
open to question; viz., the Maurice ZWANG case below.
The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO
was unaware that MORONE/met some Soviet females in the spring of
1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB
agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans,
and was intimate with one in this apartment.
A review of official records indicates that MORONE did report
having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is
no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he
was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary
in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since
there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place
in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is con-
sidered completely acceptable.
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A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the
previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there
concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank
DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not
specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of
NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was
not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The follow-
ing observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper
perspective:
-
(a) Maurice ZWANG ZWANG was identified by
NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on"
during 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested
that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity
against ZWANG was inadequate. First, reporting of
NOSENKO on ZWANG contained no reference to the
relationship of ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO
in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although
ZWANG) denied sexual relations with his maid, he did
admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment.
During polygraph examination ZWANG reacted when he
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responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual.
relations with his maid. The failure of NOSENKO to re-
port on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance,
but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on
his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details
of this relationship to the KGB.
Second, NOSENKO had not reported that ZWANG)
was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI.
(A fact that previous summary implied he should have
known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, how-
ever, it appears that the dealings of ZWANG were not
directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy
employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either
unaware of the involvement of ZWANG or, as NOSENKO
himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all
details of his currency operations to his KGB handler.
(b) John TAYLOR NOSENKO identified (TAYLOR
as (a State Department code clerk) and target of KOSOLAPOV.
The KGB was aware of the involvement of (TAYLOR with
his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit (TAYLOR
before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might
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endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to James
STORSBERG, who had been under development for almost
a year and was considered more valuable.
The implication of the previous summary that
the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question
failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG
was not approached until after the departure of TAYLOR,
the operation against STORSBERG was underway before
TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, it is
apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR
since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR
on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.
(c) Frank DAY - NOSENKO identified Frank DAY) as
a State Department code clerk) who was the target of either
KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO,
nothing "interesting" was learned about (DAY) and no oper-
ational measures were taken against (DAY. The previous
summary noted that in July 1961, (DAY) traveled to the
Caucasus with his friend and (former overt CIA employee,
Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN. It was also
stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons
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SECREZ
at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman"
in their hotel room when they unexpectedly returned, and
that on another occasion an "attractive and available Soviet
female" was believed to have been planted in their train
compartment.
According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other
local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy
who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local
KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the
local organization was trying to do a thorough job on [DAY
and BROWN, but it apparently was nonproductive. It does
not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have
recalled a trip which produced no results.
(d) Robert DWELLY
NOSENKO has related in con-
siderable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and
KOSOLAPOV to involve Robert DWELLY, a code clerk in
Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual com-
promise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual
agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion DWELLY was a
homosexual.
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There is no reason to doubt the statement of
NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when
and where DWELLY was going "into the city" (Moscow)
so that a homosexual compromise situation could be
arranged. There were no specific developments from
their efforts, according to NOSENKO.
(DWELLY has categorically denied being a homo-
sexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the
homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed DWELLY as
&
a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason
to consider the statements of NOSENKO about DWELLY
as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.
(e) Joseph GAFFEY
-
NOSENKO has identified
Joseph GAFFEY as a code clerk. The previous summary
noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure
GAFFEY into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA,
an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.
By way of comment, the previous summary stated
that GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and
that Fred KADERA had reported that GAFFEY had told him
he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the Amer205
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House. It was further noted that GAFFEY was recalled :
from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunken-
ness and during interview had admitted being intimate
with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apart-
ment and that she had claimed pregnancy.
As to whether the above information raises a
question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors
should be considered:
!
(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the
latter part of December 1961 he was part time
in the First Department and part time in the
Seventh Department, and that he reported full
time to the Seventh Department after New
Years Day 1962.
(2) In addition to the information previously
mentioned as furnished by GAFFEY during inter-
view, GAFFEY also stated that he was first
intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December
1961 and was also intimate with her later on three
occasions at her apartment. According to GAFFEY)
IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about i May
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1962, which is approximately four months after
NOSENKO has stated he transferred to the Seventh
Department.
The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from micro-
phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been
mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary
contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter
of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and
damage estimates prepared by the Americans.
The previous conclusion
was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy
:
Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB
microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this
summary in regard to this previous conclusion.
A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding
of the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO in
1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side hand-
written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active micro-
phones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy.
This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be
repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character -
ized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO
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has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his
retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.
During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been
covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been
done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to
his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession
at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the
judgment of the previous summary.
NOSENKO has stated that in 1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV,
Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points"
for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point"
not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit
which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and
translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." The
targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there
was a transcription-translation problem.
According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were
assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States
Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN,
held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Vladislav
KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which
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(
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was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certain
Embassy "points" controlled by the First Section, and permitting
PETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.
According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a list
of names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical cover-
age. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paper
(
which PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in the
United States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended,
NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.
Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the following
names in Russian: (LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, and Sipe BURTIN.
The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of (LUBIN)
and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of
(SMITH. NOSENKO has explained that LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN,
and Sipe BURTIN were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOV
and CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.
NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Soviet
names except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated that
he could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that it
occurred while KLY PIN was Chief of the First Department. (According
to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as
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Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard
to the four non-Soviet names leaves no doubt that (LUBIN is George)
LUBIN; and that Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTIN) are correct names,
with Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN) All three are American
citizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. (SMITH) at this time,
has still not been identified.
In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date
of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.
According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above
was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages
of a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy. " This,
according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebook
issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all their
notes, destroying any other notes.
According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not
completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put
loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file
rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO
has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes
with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted
concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEV
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when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared for
lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did
not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones;
it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh
Department.
In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should
be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing
of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he obviously had also prepared while
in the First Section; e. g., his notes for a lecture to the Seventh
Directorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the American
Embassy.
By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of
NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy
communications, the previous summary implies that there is some
reason to question his information on this subject.
NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in
reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however,
he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible for
communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some
United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what
extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known
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ار باشد
to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the
scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there
is no reason to question his statement.
In the previous summary (pages 240 248), the failures or
successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With
the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the
responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According
to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL
was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK
knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was
CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that
NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of
KOVSHUK.
As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks
are appropriate.
(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledge
Paul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely
known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to
Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD
at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was
"American Intelligence. " GARBLER, however, did not
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arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month
before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh
Department.
(b) The previous summary stated that according
to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that Eugene
MAHONEY was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer.
It was also stated that MAHONEY reported the presence
of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow from
October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB
surveillance" is based on statements of (MAHONEY and
may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern
over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.
(c) Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by
NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and
identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer
or cooptee.
(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according
to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.
George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that
KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI
officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate
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JEVACI
that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of
BOWDEN with suspicion.
It is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify
CIA officera are of particular significance in establishing that he was
or was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many un-
known factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assump-
tions as to what the KGB knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not
know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b) the information known
to the KGB was not available at the First Section, First Department,
level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or
to a specific case officer was of no official concern to NOSENKO and
was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities is
suggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known
whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a
propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of his own
knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case.
Pages 252
-
!
258 of the previous summary contain a report of
the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With
regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel as
described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt
his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in
54
0001214
SLEE
14-00000
the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960
damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy
code clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is to
say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a trip
abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for which
there is no supporting evidence.
As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for which
there is no collateral information, the previous summary concluded
that his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip to
Bulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation
against STORSBERG was reaching a climax and his subordinates were
"apparently planning to exploit KEYSERS' newly-discovered vulnerability, "
it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dis-
pensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did not
travel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why his
account of the purpose of the trip was untrue.
As to the STORSBERG case, while it cannot at present be proved
that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria,
it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from MORONE, that it had to
have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria.
Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the pre
55
SEADET
14-00000
of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear
that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this
phase of the STORSBERG) operation had been completed.
As to the KEYSERS case, there is no apparent problem since
it is clear that the approach to KEYSERS took place after NOSENKO
returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did
not become aware that KEYSERS was a homosexual, and therefore
potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.
In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by
NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true,
or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having
been supervisor of code clerk operations..
0001216
56
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SECRET
F. NOSENKO'S CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEF
OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND
WAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH
DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE
SECRET
6001217
14-00000
SECRET
F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous
conclusion)
The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from
:
January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department thereafter.
NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the position
of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. GRIBANOV,
Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the
Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.
According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich
FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO
as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK,
then Chief of the First Section, to the position.
FEDOSEYEV was
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic?
downgrading and
declassification
C001218
14-00000
SECRET
willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section.
However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO
considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to
return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to
FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUK as a Deputy.
Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the
position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the
· reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would
become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN.
above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indi-
cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to
GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.
The
This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career
of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section,
and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-
ment. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to
June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de-
tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January -
July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks.
in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of
March
-
June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases
2
SECRET
0001219
14-00000
SEGHER
are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett
JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst)
BRAUNS. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and
information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals
were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the
previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial
evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the
First Section, Seventh Department, during January July 1962. That
there were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and)
BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four
individuals.
-
A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are
warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial
discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual
stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari-
fication.
In the Wallace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously noted
that JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB
operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary sug-
gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend-
encies of JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary
to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current
3
SECRET
's
14-00000
has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON
"SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY, " two
"by chance" soon after his arrival.
homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room
at the Metropol Hotel where (JOHNSON stayed. They met JOHNSON there
and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.
•
"In regard to the William Carroll JONES case, NOSENKO during
current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation
against JONES, including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited
as an agent to work against JONES and was used in another case. The other
details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the JONES case are compatible
with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.
In regard to the Natalie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did not claim
to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough
specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when
she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details con-
cerning the BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have been
Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.
In regard to the Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summary
the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited
the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS
met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that
0001221
SECRET
14-00000
the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting
relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, accord-
ing to the previous summary, was aware that BRAUNS was a former
Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives
was information available to the KGB through his visa application.
In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not
concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet
expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from
NOSENKO.* Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the respon-
sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of
another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were
involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher
authority to another department or component, it was and remained the
responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that BRAUNS was a
former Soviet citizen could very well have made BRAUNS of interest to
the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of
the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher
authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Depart-
ment since BRAUNS was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The
previous summary also indicated that BRAUNS listed on his visa appli-
cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS had a
* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the
022
Seventh Department. The situation was not the same 201
in 1959.
SCADET

"
14-00000
relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by
the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concern-
ing his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no
specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose
in visiting the USSR.
Pages 282
M
286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by
NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role
in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in
the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of
the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated
his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance
to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva
in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.
The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in
what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and infor-
mation from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differ-
ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved,
an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differ-
ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there
is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.
NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom
American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the
0001223
6
SECRET
14-00000
KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence
into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated
that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started
(Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British
involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrange-
ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern
of activity in Moscow or Geneva.
NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness
that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use
BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruit-
ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the
primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in
contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered
completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in
Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to
BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY
had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.
There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the
BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis-
crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY
case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO 001224
7
SECRET
14-00000
the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has
furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the
.KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relation-
ship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the
KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London
and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB
his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium.
As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in
1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some
at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused
BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result
he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these
:
events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.
The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB
actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London
in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the
developments in his case prior to 1961:
(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which
time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also´
reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information
received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to
0001225
8
SECRET
:
14-00000
SECMENT
George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would
ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which
may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could
have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was
employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under
suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)
(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went
to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA
rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known
whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and
that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American
Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the
KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of
the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY
had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to
initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB
anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then
gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961,
BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail-
ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had
a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore
0001226
9.
SECRET
14-00000
would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact
with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well
could have told the KGB he had seen a particular woman
whom he had previously known, he was sure she worked
for American Intelligence and it was through this woman
American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in
Geneva.)
(c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva agreed to meet
within the USSR an individual representing CIA. However,
his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions,
the most interesting of which was that the individual must
be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of
BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to
.
BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must
make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY
with CIA.
The above conditions are quite explainable if
BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1958
and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of
the 1961 events in London.
10
6001227
14-00000
SECRET
As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient
number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrep-
ancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the
BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against
NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not
know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.
The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA
was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also
noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB
that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous
summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB
agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY,"
There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement: by
NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY
against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actually
happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva.
The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially
told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by
the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence
while previously in Paris, France.
11
SECRET
0001228
14-00000
ค
It was determined there was no collateral information which
would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis
and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf
of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by
American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to
BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and
report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.
Pages 282 286 of the previous summary, in connection with
-
the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV.
It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American
tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly
familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV
with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this
was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart-
ment. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV
was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO
was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO
has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section,
First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi-
mately 1957.
12
SECRET
0001229
;
14-00000
(
(
A closer examination of the cases described in the previous
summary as "CIA American tourist agents," reveals there is no con-
flict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement
by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Depart-
ment. As an example, one of the cases is the case of Edward McGOWAN.
NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was
originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter
by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the
First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only
became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.
Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with a CIA
officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland)
and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under
no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of
the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was
even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual
was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief
Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally
request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely un-
likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance
in a case involving an American diplomat.
13
SECRET
0001230
14-00000
-
Pages 332 333 of the previous summary contain the basis
for the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was a
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January
1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is
not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate
information. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished
details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position
which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.
An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu-
sion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the written
notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.
The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is
inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,
an cffort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explan-
ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.
During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa-
tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his
claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes
collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section,
First Department, in 1960 - 1961.
0001231
14
SECRET
14-00000
SCORE
follows:
Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as
(a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the
First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh
Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962
-
1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and
that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who
supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all
recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to
NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the
files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of
other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives.
NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of
the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also ex-
panded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not
excluding previous cases or cases which had already been
given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand-
written reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section
on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to
agent and even including some human errors.
Many of the above cases had previously been trans-
ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about their 001232
15
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14-00000
inclusion support his statement that he had expanded
the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have
some "pieces of information to give CIA."
(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned
of during the 1962 - 1963 period. Certain of the notes were
made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh
Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two
occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were
sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later
date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before
his defection.
(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate
prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and
the Seventh Department, 1962 - 1963.
(d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First
Department, in the latter part of 1961.
(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre-
pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs,
including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the
Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium
of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh
0001233
16
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14-00000
SECRET
Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared
report was never typed as a formal document.
The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in
carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination
of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in
.
collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the
possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought
out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con-
siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with
little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his depart-
ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None
of the material was registered and all could have previously been des-
troyed by NOSENKO.
The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB
documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered
or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:
(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium
which has been mentioned previously.
(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually
a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of
submitting in handwriting as the others did.
:
1.
:
17
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0001234
14-00000
(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent.
NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file
kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one.
Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered
document and did not contain the usual information as to
number of copies typed.
18
SECRET
6001235
:
14-00000
SECRET
G. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THAT
THE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSY
PERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic)
dowerrading and
daclassification
0001236
14-00000
SEONET
G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB
recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his
defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)
The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the
opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy
personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception
of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and (Herbert HOWARD, who actually
was a USIA employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.
The
The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of
NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion
can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB
recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time.
only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be
accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that
a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any
This should in no way be interpreted as a
way of the recruitment.
suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased
observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to
accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.
The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be
0001237
examined and can be cited as follows.
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic.
downgrading and
declassification
14-00000
(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO
was a case officer in the First Section, First Department,
SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known
the details concerning any recruitments (other than
"ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been
he would have heard "something."
"
(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO
was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department,
but continued to have contact with certain officers in the
First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the
opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United
States Embassy during this period he would have heard
"something" even though he would probably have learned
few details.
(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period
NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First
Department, and he has made the categorical statement
that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United
States Embassy personnel during this period of time.
He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments
during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during
1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of the 01238
case or cases. There is merit to this contention by
2
14-00000
!
NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav
KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart-
ment since 1953, actually working in the First Section
except for the periods of time that he was in the United
States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a
period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First
Department.
(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the
Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain
contact with certain officers of the First Section, First
Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV,
who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First.
Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter
part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.
According to NOSENKO his relationship with
GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that
he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO
some information in regard to any successful recruitments
of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed
out that he learned of the existence of the Herbert HOWARD
case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until
1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually
:
0001239
3
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SECRET
learned of the name when the First Section, First
Department, needed the services of the Seventh
Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room in a
certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of HOWARD.
In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion
of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARD were the only
successful KGB recruitments during 1953
-
December 1963. It should
be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during
this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of
NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinion
of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an
honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it is
absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred.
NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since
NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 – 1961
his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitment
-
in 1955 – 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallible.
SECRET
0001240
14-00000

14-00000
SECRET
V.
ANNEX
SECRET
CACY 1
Excluded from automatic
dawa raring and
decissifica Isa
:
:
0001241
14-00000
DECRET
ANNEX
The previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex
"B" covering pages 316
-
435. Limited comments concerning Annex
"A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B,
Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition,
$
there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "The
Cherepanov Papers.
"
Attachments:
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excled cutomatic
owngrading and
festaseification
0001242
14-00000
14-00000
SECRET
ANNEX B SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT
EXAMINED IN TEXT
SECRET
Excludi
dog and
forbification
0001243
14-00000
%
ANNEX B
SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXT
Pages 399
-
435 of the previous summary contain summaries
on the cases of 49 Americans who, according to information from
NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or
were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases
did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular
times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining
his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored
in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now
possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and
certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.
It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of 49 cases,
as well as all other cases concerning which NOSENKO has furnished
information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance
or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO
claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements con-
cerning each identified case are supported by collateral information.
These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of infor-
mation from NOSENKO as well as being supporting eva24his
claimed positions in the KGB.
ORDER 1
Excluded from somatic
14-00000
(
To comment specifically on each of the (49) cases would require
a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent
additional information from NOSENKO in approximately 40 of the 49
cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has
logically sourced his information in all except perhaps (four cases.
The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all 49 of
the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having
knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions
in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to
source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes
no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall some-
thing which was insignificant at the time it occurred.
Without citing in detail any of the (49) cases, the ways in which
NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important
since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB
during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief,
First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section,
Seventh Department, January
-
July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh
Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above
are as follows:
0001245
SECRET
14-00000
(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventh
Department cases which had occurred in 1960 - 1961, as
well as several 1958 - 1959 cases from notes prepared by
the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second
Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were pre-
pared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief,
Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of
these three sections; and the request was actually an ex-
pansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief
of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh
Department. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes
prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section,
Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many
of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly
1960 - 1961, was limited to information contained in the
notes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his re-
port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable
to the request.
(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of
the First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I.
GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief,
0001246
3
SECRET
14-00000
.ட்.
First Section, First Department. This information was
furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship
with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations.
However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or
was furnished additional details as a result of a request
from the Seventh Department to the First Section, First
Department, for assistance or vice versa.
Certain of the 49 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Depart-
ment prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh
Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section,
First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960 - 1961. The
knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not
materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and
Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the
Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962 - 1963, and his claimed
assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961.
It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these 49 cases
since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they
constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of
the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First
Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approxi-
mately five and one-half years. It should be noted, how that the
14-00000
explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the (49) cases
is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the
First Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964.
10
5
1:|:ཀ
0001248
14-00000

14-00000
ANNEX C
-
SECRET
THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS
SECRET
Excluded in
D
destina
0001249
14-00000
SECRET
ANNEX C
THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS
-
Pages 309 316 of the previous summary contain a description
of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV
passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early.
November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of
NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to
the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department,
in late 1963.
The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona
fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consid-
eration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the
papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception
information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious
question.
NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was,
according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department,
SECRET
Exclude
automatic
0001250
14-00000
during 1960 mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from the
KGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have
been Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to have
had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except
in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKO
also claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV in
¨ December 1963.
This theory
Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the
Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through
CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO.
seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no information
which would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in the
First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The papers also contain
no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of
the First Section during 1958 – 1960.
-
Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was
not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed
he had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because he
was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by
CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.
There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of
the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is
SECRET
0001251
14-00000
nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides
a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form
and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by
NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First
Department.
During current interviews, the CHEREPANOV case has been
covered in detail with NOSENKO. The Cherepanov Papers, which
were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, have
also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. Although
NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item
prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings,
types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO
was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Depart-
ment, and with First Department procedures.
Certain additional research has been conducted in regard to the
papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared at a later date. It
should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment has
been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Papers
since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material.
However, based on information developed thus far, and there is no
reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is
not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KGB
control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive informatigen"
3
14-00000
or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a
disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated,
the removal of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to
CHEREPANOV.
The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine
if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive infor-
mation" either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas
have been noted and given full considerati
(a) There is no specific info
were any recruitments by the KGB
sonnel in the United States Embas
nor is there any information sugge
American source or American age
during that period of time.
(b) Petr S. POPOV, a GRU
1253
Coded 08. Atauld
be
Protect
Janet OK
an extremely valuable CIA source from 1953 on, was,
according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January
1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne
WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CIA employee under
Department of State cover assigned to the Embassy in
Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained
by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct
result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.
6001253
14-00000
In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather minute part of
-
the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 – 1960.
The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly
indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the
Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958 -
1960 period is only a matter for consideration. It is not conclusive
proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source
did not exist. The papers do not contain a positive statement on
either matter..
:
In regard to (b), the quite specific information in the papers
that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a result of KGB
surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to
POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as
possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation
can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to
Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY.
The circumstances under which he was recalled and collateral infor-
mation have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November
1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western
Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had
been cooperating with United States Intelligence.
It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to
POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more specifically
0001254
14-00000
CIA, had a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or
source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that
a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead to a
penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully
protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course exists that
a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure
of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established that it did nor is there
any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent
or agents who furnished information to the KGB pertinent to develop-
ment of the case against POPOV.
The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov
Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information
from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or
identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information
in the papers and could only lead to the conclusion that the papers contain
"deceptive information."
The conclusion in regard to the above is that the fact the papers
attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS
when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible
with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained infor-
mation from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in
regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.
ó
SECRET
0001255
14-00000
If information was received from an important FCD agent
such as George BLAKE or through another valuable FCD agent which
led to KGB suspicion of POPOV prior to his return to Moscow in
November 1958, it is highly unlikely such information would receive
wide distribution within the KGB, either in the FCD or the SCD. It
is also possible the limited group within the KGB who would be aware
that the KGB had received information leading to suspicion of POPOV
from a valuable agent would be very interested in attributing the
exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV
by WINTERS. The possibility should be considered that prior to the
retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep
suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case
:
against POPOV.
Consideration has been given to the possibility that CHEREPANOV
was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American
tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the hope of involving CIA
in a KGB-controlled operation within the USSR. In that event, the
papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since
this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would become
a successful operation.
The above theory has been rejected since there are a number
of factors which militate against it. These factors include the fact that
7
SECRET
0001256
14-00000
SEGRE
the latest information in the papers was at least three years old,
which would indicate CHEREPANOV had no current access and there
was no indication CHEREPANOV was interested in a future contact.
0001257
8

14-00000
SECRET
:
INDEX
ABIDIAN, John
-
IV, E, 5, 7-15,19,20,52
"ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) - IV, G,Ì-4
ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - III, A, 2
ARTEMOV, Vladimir Lvovich - IV, F, 6, 12, 13
BAKHVALOV, Mikhail IV, E, 3, 4
BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F, 2
ALDIN
BARRETT, Robert) - III, F, 14, 15
BEGGS, Frank) - IV, E, 36,37
BELITSKIY, Boris IV, F, 6-12
BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich
-
BIENSTOCK, Natalie - IV, F, 3, 4
BIRSE, Arthur - IV, D, 1, 2
BLAKE, George
-
IV, B, 2, 3, 5-7
IV, D, 9; IV, F, 9; V, C, 6,7
BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich - IV, F, 15,16; V, B, 3
BOHLEN, Ambassador
-
III, F, 10
BOWDEN, Lewis
-
IV, E, 53, 54
BRAUNS, Horst) - IV, F, 3-6
BROWN, G. Stanley - IV, E, 43
SECRET
:
CROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
daierreding sad
destancification
0001258
14-00000
BUGAYEVA, Ludmila
-
IV, F, 4
BURGI, Richard - IV,D,1
BURTIN, Sipe IV, E, 49,50
-
BURTIN, Will – IV, E, 49, 50
CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40, 42
CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F, 2,16
CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - III, H, 4; V, C,1-4, 6-8
CHERNETSEV, Y. E.
-
IV, E, 49
-
III, B, 4
CHURANOV, Vladimir A.
-
DAY, Frank – IV, E, 41, 43
DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E, 20, 45
DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV,B,5,6
DOUGLAS, William O. - IV,D,3
DREW, George IV,D,1
DWELLY, Robert - IV, E, 41, 44, 45
FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A.
FEDOROVICH, Tatyana
FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M.
-
- V,A,1
IV, E, 8,9
-
IV, E, 49-51; IV, F,1
FISK, Norman - IV, D, 5
FRIPPEL, Arsene - IV, D, 2
GAFFEY, Joseph) - IV, E, 41, 45, 46
2
0001259
14-00000
SECRET
GARBLER, Paul - IV, E, 52
(GARCIA, Anthony A. - IV, E, 39
GARLAND, John - III, F, 17; IV, E, 31, 33-36
(GINSBURG, Michael - IV, D, 5,6
GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich
-
HI, B, 3, 4; III, E, 9-11;
IV, B, 5, 6; IV, D, 9, 10;
V, A, 1
III, F, 5-13, 15-19;
IV, E, 21, 23, 31-34;
GRIBANOV, Oleg M. III, F, 3,4; IV, 6; IV, 6; IV, E, 4, 5, 21; IV, F, 1,2
"GRIGORIY"
-
III, F, 13; IV, D, 3,6; IV, F,4
GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - III, B, 4; IV, E, 20
GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I.
III, B, 4; III, F, 8-13, 15; IV, E, 5, 12, 19-21, 26-28,
30,43-45; IV, G, 3; V,B, 3,4
GUK, Yuriy I.
-
III, B, 4
HAMILTON, Victor Norris
(aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri)
"HANNA" IV, E, 27
-
III, E, 9
HARRIS, Gisella - IV, D, 1, 7, 8
HORBALY, William · IV, E, 53
HOWARD, Herbert) - III, E, 8; III, F, 20; IV, G, 1, 3,
IVANOVA, Svetlana
-
· IV, E, 38,39,45,46
JENNER, Paul - IV, E, 28-31, 35-36
JOHNSON, Robert Lee
-
III, E, 8; III, G, 5
(JOHNSON, Wallace Everett - IV, F, 3,4
(JONES, William Carroll - IV, F, 3, 4
4
0001280
3
SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
KADERA, Fred - IV, E, 45
KANTOR, Marvin - IV, D, 5, 6
(KARLOV, fnu - IV, D, 5
KASHPEROV, Mikhail - III, H, 4
KEMMER, Myra - IV, E, 9
KEYSERS, James - IV, E, 22-26, 55, 56.
KLY PIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich - IV, E, 5, 48-51
KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - IV, B, 1-4,7
KOLOSSOV, Viktor
-
· IV, E, 30, 34
(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)
KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V.
-
III,B,4; III,F, 8, 16, 17; IV, E, 5,19-21,28-32,
34-39, 42-44
-
III, A,
1
-
III, B, 4; III, F, 5, 11, 12; IV, E, 3, 4, 6, 12, 18, 21,
23,49,52,53; IV, F, 1,2; IV, G, 3; V, C, 2
KOSYGINA, Madame
SYGINA
KOVSHUK, Vladislav M.
KOZLOV, Veniamin IV, E, 12
KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich
LANE, Allen) – IV, D, 1, 2
IV, B, 5
LANGELLE, Russell
-
III, F, 3; IV, E,
8
"LILLIAN" IV, E, 26
LUBIN, George IV, E, 49,50
-
LUNT, Horace - III, F,
,3
MAHONEY, Eugene - IV, E, 53
MALIA, Martin) – IV, D, 2
<+
SECRET
0001261
14-00000
MARK, David - III, C, 4
MATLAW, Ralph - IV, D, 5
MERTENS, Gerard - IV, D, 2
MIKHAYLOV, A. A. - IV, E, 49
SECRET
MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen
III, E, 8; III, G, 5
MORELL, William N.
-
IV, E, 52
MORONE, Joseph - IV, E, 22, 27,36,37,39,40,55
-
MULE, Walter (Capt.) – IV, C, 4
MC GOWAN, Edward - IV, F, 13
PECHTER, Bernard - IV, D, 5,6
-
PENKOVSKIY, Oleg Vasilyevich IV, E, 13
PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich
-
III, B, 4; IV, E, 48, 49
POPOV, Petr S.
-
IV, E, 7, 10; V, C/4-7
PREISFREUND, Johan) - III, F, 5, 11, 12
PRESSMAN, Patrick - IV, D, 5, 7
"RAKETA" - IV, C, 5
RASTVOROV, Yuriy
-
IV, B, 5, 6
RHODES, Roy - III, F, 4
RUFE, John - IV, D, 5,
,6
SCHWARZENBACH, Collette
-
III, F,10
5
SECRET
0001262
14-00000
SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU
-
IV, E, 32, 33
(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also
identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV
and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)
(SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry - III, F, 6
SHATTAUER, Sofia) - IV, D, 5,7
SHAZLY, Sarwat el
-
IV, E, 40
SHELEPIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich - III, F,13
"SHMELEV" - III, F, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 4
SHUBIN, John - IV, D, 11
SHULGINA, Nataliya IV, F, 11, 12
SMITH, Dayle Wallis
-
III, F, 4, 20; IV, G,1
SMITH, Edward Ellis
III, F, 4
SMITH, John Discoe - III, E, 9; IV, E, 49, 50 ·
STALIN - IV,B,5
(STEVENS, Edmund - III, F, 4, 6
STORSBERG, James
-
III, F, 3, 5, 11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55,56
TARASKA, William - IV, D, 5,6
-
TAYLOR, David – IV, D, 2
TAYLOR, John - IV, E, 42, 43
UMANETS, Ella - IV, E, 38
6
SECRET
0001263
:
14-00000
URBAN, (Colonel)-IV, E, 24, 25
SECRET
VASSALL, William - III, E, 9; III, G, 5; IV, D, 9
WASHENKO, Steve - IV, E, 53
WILBY, William Stanley - IV,D,2
WINTERS, George Payne, Jr.
ZENKIN, FNU
-
IV,E,32-34
-
IV,E,53; V, C, 4-7
(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also
identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV
and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)
ZUJUS, Matthew) - IV, E, 26-28
ZWANG, Maurice - IV, E, 40-42
1
7
SECRET
0001294