File #:
62-116395
Serial Scope:
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 1
552 THRU 567
Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 W
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
: Legal Counsel
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
joanlar
1
-
Mr. Mintz
-
Mr. Wannall
1
1
1
1
-
-~
-
1
"
Mr. Cregar
DATE: 8/1/75
Personnel File -
Fred J. Cassidy
Personnel File
Richard W. Held
Mr. Hotis
Mr. Daly
✓
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm..
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
pspection
fell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Loch Johnson, Staff Member, Senate Select Committee,
requested that SA Fred J. Cassidy be made available for an in-
terview concerning his knowledge of the "Houston Plan." Johnson
indicated that this would be a Staff interview. SA Cassidy is
currently on annual leave and Johnson was advised of this.
requested that he be notified when Cassidy would be available
for interview.
He
Avola
Staff Member Lester B. Seidel requested that Richard W
Held be made available for Staff interview. He indicated that
this particular interview would be with regards to COINTELPRO
against the Black Panther Party and the Bureau's investigation
of the Black Panther Party. Seidel is currently conducting in-
terviews on the West Coast and the details concerning the time
of the interview have not been established.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
EX-101
REC-56
62--11--512-5671
(1) That SAs Held and Cassidy be released from 27 1975
existing employment agreement for purposes of this Senate
Select Committee interview. Both IN INTCLL DIV-
Cassidy has
billy 
cutenreise
5.8
(2). That an Intelligence Division representative
be made available to accompany SAS Cassidy and Held for con-
sultation during interview when final details are arranged.
(The Intelligence Division Agent will not be present during
the interview but merely available for consultation.)
PVD:laded
(9.)
8406 28 1975
Buy
甜
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SPR AEM/EHL
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 BUS. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Page
whic
ARTME
DOMINA
JUSTITU
な
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
M.
TO: John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
18/20
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
SUBJECT: Three Specific Requests from SSC as They
Relate to Item 4 of the August 13, 1975,
Letter from Elliff
AUG 20 1975
8
Reference is made to a letter dated August 13, 1975, from
John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee to me, a copy of which
was sent to you earlier and attached to my memorandum dated
August 15, 1975.
On August 20, 1975, Mike Epstein of the SSC staff orally
requested delivery of three specific documents, access to which
were embraced generally by Item 4 of the August 13, letter. These
documents are:
Delivered to ((1) A June 7, 1961, memorandum from Courtney Evans to
SHAHEEN
8/21/75
"P. V. Daly (
By Ewf
REVOLUTION
Bureau Agent Belmont
(2) A routing or "buck slip" dated June 3, 1961, from .
the Attorney General to Evans bearing the notation
"pursue vigorously".
(3) A May 22, 1961, memorandum from Director Hoover to the
Attorney Genera-101
REC-56
62-116395-566
Please arrange for the delivery of these documents to
as
soon as possible. Indeed, I should appreciate their receipt by this
Office by tomorrow, August 21, 1975. If such information willery-1975
mit you to expedite compliance with this priority request, Bureau
Agent Cassidy knows of these documents and the SSC's special interest
in them.
MDB-16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
IS
DATE 10/19/003 SPA ALM/CHC
AUG 28. 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 3
Filc 62-116395
5-Eist
TO
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum TP
Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM S. S. Mignosassm
SUBJECT:
:
2-
SENSTUDY 75
SECRET
1
-
DATE:
1
1
1
-
-
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
8/18/75
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. S. S. Mignosa
Mr. T. J. McNiff
1
-
Mr. C. H. McCarthy
ALLINFORMATION CONTAINED
HAEIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT 
WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
infell the
Laboratory
Lega Coun
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Reference is made to memorandum dated 7/24/75,
captioned as above, which requested review, assessment and
recommendations pertaining to the contents of pages extracted
from a 693-page CIA document in order to fully identify the
subject matter and to assess whether FBI operations were
compromised.
Section CI-3 conducted the following review and
makes the assessment pertinent thereto:
RE:
Page 00026, "Siesta" and pages 00059-61, captioned
"Subject: General: Office of Security Survey.
-
Hole jok
This matter concerns Orlando Nunez-Toro
(Bufile 105-141367), a United States citizen of Cuban
extraction, who was suspected by CIA of attempting to
recruit for intelligence purposes CIA personnel, one
Miss Deborah Fitzgerald. By letter dated 8/4/70, the
first communication to the FBI by CIA relating to Toro-
Nunez and Fitzgerald, the FBI was requested to advise
whether it interposed any objections to CIA investigative
action CIA deemed necessary to explore questions raised
by the association of Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald with CIA
EX-101 REC-56
employees. (5)
报
(-2-11--3/5-865
In response to that inquiry, FBIHQ advised CIA
by letter dated 8/14/70, that the FBI interposed no objection
to CIA investigation for such a purpose. At the same time,
CIA was specifically requested to provide the FBI with any
information develoned relating to FBI internal security
responsibilities.
62-116395
CHM: clac
(6)
84 AUG 2.8 1975.
10/19/00, MDR 16
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM JEHL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25%
TOP SECRET
Classified by 6098 CHil
9 AUG 27 1975
CONTINUED
OVER
Exempt from COS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 4
5-7m
P
SECRET
'
Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
CIA communicated with FBIHQ by letters dated
7/6/71 and 2/24/72, concerning the Nunez-Toro and
Deborah Fitzgerald matter, requesting each time records
review of Bureau files of numerous individuals of interest
to CIA. On each occasion CIA was provided with the results
of such checks. However, by letter dated 3/2/72, FBIHQ
responded to CIA letter dated 2/24/72, by stating, "We have
made a study of our file concerning this matter (Nunez-Toro
and Fitzgerald) and a detailed review of the referenced
material. At the present time, it appears the paramount
concern is whether Nunez and Deborah Jane Fitzgerald are
obtaining intelligence information concerning your Agency,
and you have established a network of sources to cover that
aspect. As you indicate, there is no specific evidence
that Nunez or Fitzgerald has any connection with a hostile
intelligence service or a foreign government. We, therefore,
will defer to your Agency until completion of your investigation
or the development of information showing they are engaged
in subversive activities within our primary jurisdiction.
(s)
The FBI did not conduct an internal security-type
investigation regarding the relationship of Nunez-Toro and
Fitzgerald. The FBI did conduct an internal security-type
investigation of Nunez-Toro in 1965 as a result of his
reported disaffection for the United States while living
abroad. We reopened that investigation in 1969 when it was
reported that Nunez-Toro communicated with the Cuban Embassy,
Ottawa, Canada. That investigation was closed when it was
established his family desired to return to Cuba and his
contact was in that regard. ) (s)
revealed
A review of FBIHQ files contain no information
that any FBI employee was knowledgeable, before or after
the fact, of a surreptitious entry on the part of CIA
personnel, into the premises of Nunez-Toro and Deborah
Fitzgerald. That surreptitious entry by CIA personnel into
the premises of Nunez-Toro and Fitzgerald located in
Fairfax, Virginia, received considerable publicity recently,
when it was alleged that Fairfax police assisted the CIA
during the entry.
ASSESSMENT:
No compromise of an on-going FBI operation.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 5
TOP
SECRET
CONTINUED OVER
TOP
TOP SECRET
Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
RE: Page 00026, "Paragon."
[This matter pertains to an alleged plot in
1972-73 to assassinate former Vice President Spiro Agnew
and the Director of CIA by using two Latin American
revolutionaries. A CIA informant abroad reported that
one Elizabeth Boynton Millard, a New York City resident
known for her Communist associations and her involvement
with Latin-American revolutionaries, was scheduled "to
finger" top United States Officials for assassination.
The plot was allegedly conceived some time prior to 8/19/72,
in Chile and was to be carried out sometime between 10/25/72
through 11/7/72.] The FBI investigated this plot thoroughly (S)
and closed its investigation on 2/2/73, when it was
concluded that none of the individuals reportedly involved
had any connection with such activity.
ASSESSMENT:
RE:
No compromise of an on-going FBI operation.
Page 00282, "28 October 1970.”
During October, 1970, United States Government
officials, including Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who was then
assigned to The White House, received cryptograms indicating
bombings would occur in various cities of the United States
on 11/29/70. The Soviet Military Attache, Washington, D. C.,
received a similar cryptogram reporting United States
Chinese activities against Russia. The sender of the
cryptograms was identified and during our investigation
other government agencies, including CIA, were requested
to furnish the original cryptograms for fingerprint examination.
ASSESSMENT:
No compromise.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 6
TOP
SECRET
3
-
CONTINUED OVER
-
Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
SECRET
RE:
Pages 00290, 00292, 00295, 00310.
The contents of these pages concern the Daniel
Ellsberg matter, all of which is of a public nature.
ASSESSMENT:
RE:
No compromise.
Pages 00334, 00361-363, 00368, 00371, 00373, 00376–379,
00384, 00385, 00468-470 and 00615.
The contents of these pages concern the "Chilean
Project." On 4/16/71, CIA proposed technical penetration
of the Chilean Embassy, Washington, D. C., to collect foreign
intelligence data and to compromise classified encrypted
diplomatic traffic. CIA proposed that access be made
through one of their covert contacts. The FBI declined.
The Attorney General then requested FBI cooperation. On
5/13/71, a memorandum was sent to the Department of State
for approval of that operation and such approval was obtained
on 5/17/71. On 7/14/71, the Attorney General authorized
activation of the microphone installation at the Chilean
Embassy until 10/8/71. CIA requested continuation as the
expiration date approached and on 10/15/71, the Attorney
General authorized such continuation. The technical
surveillance was discontinued as noted in memorandum to
the Attorney General and CIA dated 2/7/72. The surveillance
was reactivated on 12/27/72, and was eventually discontinued
on 2/22/73.(S)
On 6/19/73, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force
requested FBI investigation of the alleged burglary of the
Chilean Embassy, Washington, D. C., on or about 5/13/72.
The Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D. C.,
conducted an investigation of that incident and submitted
a complete report to the Office of the United States Attorney.
That report was in the possession of the Watergate Special
Prosecution Force and on 10/30/73, that Force advised the
FBI that no additional investigation was desired. There
is no connection between the "Chilean Project" and the
alleged burglary of the Chilean Embassy on or about 5/13/72.
T/P
SECRET
4 -
-
CONTINUED OVER
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 7
TX P
TOP SECRET
Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
ASSESSMENT:
The above information refers to our special
coverage of the Chilean Embassy which was discontinued
in February, 1973, and has not been operational since that
time. Possession of such information by the Senate Committee
will not interfere with any on-going FBI investigation.
All activities engaged in by the FBI in connection with
this project were conducted on the instruction of Attorney
General Mitchell.
(5)
RE:
Page 00361, captioned "Memorandum for: Executive Secretary,
CIA Management Committee.
In addition to the "Chilean Project," the contents
of this page also refer to FBI technical coverage of diplomatic
establishments of Israel. It is pointed out that Watergate
Defendant James McCord telephoned the Embassy of Israel,
Washington, D. C., after his arrest, believing that his
conversation would be overheard and he would be able to
challenge tainted evidence. The date of his telephone call
to the Embassy of Israel is not known but it is pointed out
that our technical coverage of the Embassy of Israel was
discontinued on 10/16/72, at the specific request of Secretary
of State William Rogers. This matter is also public knowledge.
ASSESSMENT:
RE:
No compromise of FBI operations.
Pages 00457 and 00458, concerning Item Number 3.
According to CIA, this matter involved surreptitious
entries by CIA into a French diplomatic establishment,
Washington, D. C., during the early 1960's. As is evident
from reading Item number 3, there is no FBI involvement in
or knowledge of such activities by CIA.
(S)
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page
SECRET
- 5 -
CONTINUED OVER
-
✓✓
SECRET
Memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
It is pointed out that Philippe Thyraud De Vesjoli
(Bufile 64-33606) a former attache of the French Embassy,
Washington, D. C., and a former French Intelligence officer,
cooperated with CIA and provided CIA with information in
1963 that French intelligence planned to engage in intelligence
activities in the United States. This information was
thereafter transmitted to the FBI. It is believed that
De Vosjoli is identical with either Iden-122 or Iden-124
mentioned in Item number 3. (5)
ASSESSMENT:
RE:
There is no compromise of an on-going FBI operation.
Pages 00591-00593, captioned "MHCHAOS Program.
"1
This CIA program involved the clandestine
collection abroad of information relating to foreign
efforts to support and influence domestic United States
extremism. The foreign-oriented activity in the
United States was of two types%3 first, selected FBI
informants who traveled abroad in connection with their
extremist activity and their resultant debriefing by CIA
with the cooperation of the FBI. Second, FBI sources with
existing extremist credentials who were offered to CIA
for dispatching abroad to collect information responsive
to CIA requirements. (s
(s)
There has been no compromise of such FBI informants
and sources.
ASSESSMENT:
ACTION:
сним
No compromise of any on-going FBI operation.
For information and referral to Senstudy Group.
TJMK
TRP SECRET
- 6 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 9
RTME
USTICE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
FBI
for
COMINA
M.
TO:
FROM:
18/20.
John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
Senate Select Committee Request
SUBJECT: Senate
AUG 21 1975
Attached is a letter dated August 19, 1975, from the Senate
Select Committee requesting the names and addresses of various for-
mer and present Agents of the Bureau. Please arrange for compli-
ance with this request as soon as possible.
The Department has determined that SSC staff interviews with
these present and former agents would not interfere with any current
criminal investigation by the Department and will so advise the
Select Committee when the requested information is transmitted.
REC-56
EX-101'
D
62-116375-564
9
AUG 27 1975
1
'
ENCLOSURE
REVOLUTION
Cc Ad Hoc
84 AUG 2 8 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 10
MDR-16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERN
DATE 10/19/005 SP2 ALM/EHIC
Treat as
62-116395
Original
5-18

TO:
John Mintz, Assistant Director
Legal Counsel Division
AUG 21 1975
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FROM: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
SUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Request
Attached is a letter dated August 19, 1975; from the Senate
Select Committee requesting the names and addresses of various for-
mer and present Agents of the Bureau. Please arrange for compli-
ance with this request as soon as possible.
The Department has determined that SSC staff interviews with
these present and former agents would not interfere with any current
criminal investigation by the Department and will so advise the
Select Committee when the requested information is transmitted.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 11
MDR-16
10/19/00 SP2 ALM/CHIC
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN:
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, J'A.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
Vlnited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, BATH CONGRESS)"
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
August 19, 1975
Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Dear Mike:
MDR-16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATELO/19/00
BY SPR ALM/EHL
The Select Committee, as you know, is investi-
gating the FBI's relationship to mail opening activities.
The Committee staff desires to interview all present or
former Special Agents of the FBI who were responsible for
supervising the communications between the FBI and the CIA
with regard to this activity. Therefore, I am hereby
requesting the names and present assignment and/or where-
abouts of these Special Agents. Furthermore, please pro-
vide the current addresses and office assignments of all
Special Agents with the surname "McDougal" who were assign-
ed to the New York City area in 1971, and the names and
current addresses of all SACS and ASACs for years 1959 to
1966 in the following field offices: New York, Boston,
Washington, Detroit, Seattle, Los Angeles, Miami, and San
Francisco.
In addition, please advise me as to whether Com-
mittee staff interviews of these Special Agents would
interfere with the current criminal investigation into
these matters by the Justice Department. This request is
pursuant to the special procedure to which we have agreed.
121
13
RECEIVED
141
AUG 19 1975
151
Sincerely,
Jint. Elliff
John T. Elliff
Director
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
161\
181
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 12
62116-375-564
ENCLOSURE
NRØ 10 AT CODE
COMMUNICATIONS SUCTION
AUG 21 1975
TELETYPE
9:45 PM URGENT AUGUST 21, 1975 SSP
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
(62-116395)
FROM:
ATLANTA
(62-2854)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.- D-Inv..
Asst. I.
Admi.
Compt
Ext. Affairs
File "
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
SENSTUDY 75
COLFEF
RE BUTEL TO ATLANTA, AUGUST 14, 1975, AND ATLANTA TEL TO BUREAU,
AUGUST 15, 1975.
FORMER SA EDWARD F. GAMBER, MARIETTA, GEORGIA, ADVISED THIS DATE
HE HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY PAUL WALLACH, SSC STAFF MEMBER, WHO HAS
ARRANGED AN INTERVIEW WITH GAMBER IN THE ATLANTA AREA AT TEN A.M.,
SEPTEMBER 2, 1975. SA GAMBER INTENDS TO CONTACT THE OFFICE OF LEGAL
COUNSEL BY COLLECT CALL AUGUST 22, 1975.
END
SJP FBIHQ CLR
COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/Q
ALM/EHU
10/19/00 SYSPRAL
EX-101
REC-56
PARD
62-116395563-
9 AUG 27 1975
84-AUG 1975ml
3 1372
NW.88608 Docid:32989633 Page 13
cc-67-
(Edus.
Eclus. F.
Mancher
TO
5
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
* SA FPAR (41 CFR) 101–11.6
UNITED STATES GO ERNMENT
Memorandum
J. B. Adams
FROM
Legal Counsel
SUBJECT:
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 1975
+
MDR-16
111
-
Mr. Mintz
-
Enc.
-
1
-
1
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
DATE: 7/29/75
Mr. Hotis
Mr. Daly
ATE 10/19/80 BY SP2 ALMIGHS
14
-
-
-
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
EncAsst. Dir.:
Enc.
Enc.
Enc.
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Dattitude of
On 7/25/75 at the request of Special Couns Actio
for
Plan & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Holyoke
Intelligence Coordinator Michael Shaheen in the Department,
a meeting was held between representatives of the FBI (SAS
Paul B: Daly and John Thomas), representatives of the Senate
Select Committee (John T. Elliff, Task Force head of the Domestic
Task Force, Mark Gitenstein) and Michael Shaheen of the Department.
At this meeting Mr. Shaheen advised that the proposed procedures
concerning the handlings of requests for documents by the Senate
Select Committee had been approved by the Attorney General and in
the Senate Select Committee. (A copy is attached.)
Shaheen and Elliff indicated the purpose in meeting on
the 25th along with an anticipated meeting on Monday, 7/28/75, was
to assist the SSC in the planning of a superseding request in
accordance with the newly established procedures concerning
document requests. Both Shaheen and Elliff expressed concern at
this time that the schedules set forth in the new agreement was
such that in many instances the Bureau would not be able to
respond in time to meet the deadlines. Additionally, Shaheen
expressed concern that the provisions require that the Attorney
General adjudicate any question as to the necessity of furnishing
la document to the Committee and to make such a decision within 24,
hours would be very burdensome.
Messrs. Elliff and Shaheen were advised by SA Daly that,
this would be true, pointing out that in many instances files are
not readily available because of FOIA requests, needs of the
Bureau's ongoing investigations and law suits in which it was
necessary to view particular files. It was also pointed out that
many of the requests of the Senate Select Committee necessitate
the review of a number of files and/or numerous. volumes of a
particular file all of which are not necessarily available
immediately. Mr. Shaheen advised that it was the Attorney
General's desire that Senate Select Committee requests take
precedence over all other matters including the Freedom of In-
formation. It was pointed out to Mr. Shaheen that our responses
to Freedom of Information Act are under deadline by law and; if
Enclosure
PVD: 1ad 1975
NW 88608-1 Docld:32989633 Page 14
ST110
62-116395-5.62
REC 41
CONTINUED 25 10VER
11.
(F(8) Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams Memorandum
RE:
SENSTUDY 1975
(this were to be the Attorney General's feelings, he should
advise this Bureau in writing so that we would be in a
position to use this statement of policy should this
question arise during litigation. It was pointed out that
in many areas of possible abuse set forth by the Senate
Select Committee we have pending FOIA requests and/or
litigation which require the availability of those files
for responses.
Elliff indicated that it was the Committee's desire
in their forthcoming superseding request to request material
that had been previously furnished the Committee with the under-
standing that there would be less excisions made in compliance
with the new agreement. He inquired as to whether the Bureau
could advise him as to what material previously furnished was
readily retrievable and could be furnished in accordance with '
a new request. He was advised by SAs Daly and Thomas that it was
not possible at this time to give him a response, however, we would
endeavor to make an analysis of prior requests to obtain this in-
formation and have it available for the meeting Monday, 7/28/75.
Him
A general discussion was had concerning the new agree-
ment especially concerning the type of material which might
properly be excised and third agency problems. It was generally
agreed upon that not only the identity of informants be excised
but also information which might disclose the identity of infor-
mants might also be properly excised. Elliff indicated that the
Committee did not wish to see many items referred to the Attorney
General as is called for by the agreement for his decision and
would rather at least on a preliminary basis where it was a
question of the propriety of the excision that the discussion
be held with or one of his representatives before such a
referral was made. Shaheen also indicated a desire that the
referrals to the Attorney General be kept to a minimum.
ing the "Third Agency" problems which are not addressed in the
agreement there was no final decision arrived at. Elliff and
Shaheen were under the impression that the clauses referring
to foreign intelligence operations or foreign intelligence
sources would handle this problem. They were advised that
this was not the case. This was not true since even in
these instances Senators on the Committee are given access
after the Attorney General has made a determination that
material involved "pecularily sensitive foreign intelli-
gence sources or pecularily sensitive ongoing foreign
Regard-
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 15
CONTINUED
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OVER
RE:
Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams Memorandum
SENSTUDY 1975
"
intelligence operations.' It was pointed out that this
would require that many documents be referred to the
Attorney General for his determination which would be
contrary to Messrs. Elliff's and Shaheen's desires.
The meeting was held 7/28/75, Messrs. Gitenstein and
Elliff of the Committee, Michael Shaheen and Steven K.. Blackhurst
of the Department, and SAs Paul V. Daly, Seymor Phillips and Elmer
Larson were in attendance. Regarding the "Third Agency" rule
problem, we advised the Department and the Committee that we
would continue to abide by this rule. The Committee presented
a request dated July 28, 1975, captioned "Superseding Request
for FBI Materials." This document amounted to a recapitulation
of prior requests made by the Committee with a schedule for
delivery set forth in accordance with the established guidelines
for the production of documents An item-by-item analysis of the
request contained in the document was had and where necessary
modifications concerning scheduled responses was made. It was
obvious the intent of the Committee in making the superseding
request was to have more documents made available in the Commit-
tee offices and also to have less excisions made on documents.
previously furnished the Committee based on prior requests. We
were requested by Shaheen to prepare as soon as possible cor-
respondence to the Attorney General setting forth instances where
the deadlines set by the Committee could not be made. This prompted
the provisions in the guidelines for the production of documents
which require the Attorney General to notify the Committee Chair-
man and Vice Chairman within 24 hours of any expected delay beyond
96 hours of the request.
RECOMMENDATION:
Action. For information.
JBH R.
시
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 16
дна
Pan
тес
3-
扩
Request being
haveled septy
13
go
AVD
PROPOSED PROCEDURES
i
(1) The Domestic Task Force Leader will submit periodically a list
pertaining
of ggaexfix materials, xxxexx to the inquiry being conducted under
S.R. 21, to which the Committee staff wishes access or of which the
specificity,
Committee destres delivery. Any questions as to the scope for meaning
of any portion of such list shall be identified by the Special Counsel
and discussed at the time of acceptance of the list, between the DIFL
and the Special Counsel.
The first such list will be delivered to the Department of
Justice within 48 hours of the adoption of this procedure, and will
summarize and supersede all the presently outstanding requests; this
list will be in priority order, "as fixed by the Committee, with fixed
delivery/access dates specified. These materials for which the Car
mittee requests delivery or access shall be delivered to the Committee
or made accessible in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building not later than
within 4096 hours of the date specified. The Committee Chairman and
Vice Chairman shall be informed by the Attorney General, within 24 hours
each
of receipt of xe request, of cry delay beyond 48′ 96 hours, the expected
length of the delay, and the specific reasons for the delay. Pertial
access or delivery shall be proffered, by the Bureau of/to any materials
requested, while the balance of such materials are being prepared. A
partial proffer shall not extend the time of full response set forth
herein.
MDR-14
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/0D- BY SP2 AM/EHL
*Wherever used herein, the term Domestic Tack Force Leader (DTFL)
Staff Director,
is understood to include the Chief Counsel and the Minority Councel
of the Senate Select Committee
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 17
CLOSURE
62-116395
362
2
These procedures shall apply to all matters covered by para-
graph 1. In the event of a specific problem arising with the
applicability of these procedures to any matters in current litigation
or any matters in which criminal prosecution is pending, or any matter
which the Attomey General shall specifically designate as extraordinarily
sensitive, a special procedure shall be undertaken.* Such specific
problem areas shall be identified by the Attorney General to the Chairman
and Vice Chairman by letter upon consideration of the lists submitted
pursuant to this provision. The special procedure to be followed shall
be proposed, defined, adopted, and followed after consideration by the
SSC of the specific problem area and pertinent inquiry and discussion at
the staff level.
(2) The following procedures shall apply (a) where delivery of materials
requested might jeopardize FBI sensitive sources or ongoing operations,
or (b) where the Domestic Task Force Leader requests access to materials,
rather than delivery to the SSC.
(3) The Department will furnish access at the Hoover Building in Room
4171 to those materials requested:
(a) only to the members of the Committee, where it is determined
by the Attorney General that the materials involve peculiarly sensitive
foreign intelligence sources or reculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign
intelligence operations.
*No restriction of currently operational arrangements is intended under
this provision.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 18
2A
(b) In all other cases, to the appropriately cleared staff who
will have access to all of the materials.
(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made for the identities
of so-called "live" informants or potential informants as defined in the
FBI Manual of Instructions as to which no access will be furnished
unless the identity of the individual as an informant or potential
informant has already been made known to the Committee, jointly agree
on the limited disclosure of such identities to the Chairman and Vice
Chairman.
(d) As to other information which would identify persons, as
sources who have provided or continue to provide information to the
FBI, and as to whose identity the FBI has undertaken an obligation of
confidentiality, the Committee and its staff shall preserve the
confidentiality and shall make no use which would impair the confi-
dentiality of this class of information to which access has been
given, unless the identity of the individual as a source has already
been made known to the Committee, or unless such information appears
in materials which have been screened by the FBI as provided in
paragraph 6 below.
* Examples of prohibited use are:
(1) interviews of the source, as source
(2) interviews or inquiries that would disclose the fact that the
identity of a confidential source was made known to the staff.
(3) public disclosure.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 19
3
(4) Those materials to which the staff has access may be reviewed
and studied in Room 4171 of the Hoover Building and such notes may
be taken as deemed appropriate by the Staff.
(5) The Committee staff shall select from these materials to which
access is herein provided, those materials which it deems pertinent
to the Committee's inquiries and necessary for delivery to the
Committee's offices.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989633 Page 20
1

(6) The Bureau shall make copies of such materials as are specified
by the staff under the provisions of (5) above for transfer to the
Committee's offices
(a) before the copies of such materials are taken to the
Committee's offices, the Bureau shall, within 24 hours of the
selection, make appropriate excisions and paraphrases of infor-
mation which might, if inadvertently disclosed, endanger sensitive
or sensitive
FBI sources and/ongoing operations.
(b) If the Task Force Leader has any objections to the excisions
or paraphrases, the materials in issue will be forthwith conveyed by
the Bureau, with a written statement of its grounds for its position,
to the Special Counsel who shall resolve the matter by negotiation
within 24 hours.
(c) In the event the matter is not resolved within 24 hours, the
*Special Counsel shall submit the matter forthwith to the Attorney
General who shall notify the Chairman forthwith and arrange for an
appropriate disposition.
(7) The Committee staff may remove to the office of SSC for appropriate
use, any notes which they may make upon review of material screened by
the FBI, as provided in (6) above, without such notes being reviewed
by the Bureau. The Committee staff may remove notes on unscreened
materials only if such notes are reviewed and cleared by the Bureau
under the provisions of (6) (2) thru (c) above.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 21
- 5 .
(8) The staff and the members of the Committee may examine the
original materials to which the staff has been given access as
extensively as necessary, in the Hoover Building at Room 4171,
during normal FBI business hours; upon reasonable notice, special
arrangements may be made for access at other times.
(9) These procedures are adopted subject to satisfactory experience
in implementation. If after a fair trial the procedures herein do
not operate suitably in the view of either the SSC or the Attorney
General, the procedures may be unilaterally set aside by either the
SSC or the Attorney General and other appropriate and suitable
methods of procedure undertaken.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 22
$
::
:
"
TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. Joh
: Mr. Walsh
FROM : S. R. Burns
DATE:
July 24,
1975
Osen study
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
REVIEW OF PORTIONS OF
4-
BUREAN MANUAL OF RULES AND
REGULATIONS
·MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Intelligence Division has requested the Administrative Division to
review Sections 10 and 12 (copies attached) of the Manual of Rules and
Regulations for any possible excisions or problems in furnishing this
material to the committee and to furnish the results of the review to Legal
Counsel, attention Dennis R. Dickson.
Section 10, pertaining to Appeals and Grievances, and Section 12,
Transfers-Resignations, have been reviewed and no problems can be foreseen
and no excisions are necessary. In this regard, it is noted that Part I,
Section 10, Appeals and Grievances, needs to be revised to set forth the
current appeal rights of nonveterans. Attached is memorandum recommending
a Manual revision be approved pointing out that under current procedure,
final action in disciplinary matters involving cases of nonveterans up to and
including dismissal is taken by the Assistant Director, Administrative
Division, with the employee having the right to appeal this action to the
Director.
There was some question under Section 12 dealing with transfers to
foreign assignments wherein it is set out that Chief Clerks should be afforded
training in maintenance, consolidation, and destruction of files, whether this
information should be furnished. This was discussed with Deputy Assistant
Director, Homer R. Hauer, Files and Communications Division, who advised
there is nothing objectionable to this reference regarding destruction of files
and the reference of same need not be excised.
Under Section 12, dealing with foreign assignments, information is
set out regarding people being transferred to such assignments receiving
training on coding equipment, the AFSAM-7. This was questioned as to
whether it should be excised. Alvin C. Frank, Section Chief, Communications
Section, advised this information need not be excised as the mere reference
to AFSAM coding equipment is not objectionable. 2.116.15
3- Legal Counsel (Attention: Mr. Hampton)
TEA mba/tmc (5)
TET!
X
Intelligence D
F203
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 23-
REC
561
[ AGE 6 1975
(OVER)
☐
· AR
*Memorandum. Burns to Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee
It should also be noted that certain Manual changes are being
recommended in connection with Section 12, in relation to absences for
maternity purposes. In Section 12, page 10, we are recommending that
the phrase "absence for maternity reasons" be used in all instances where
we have previously used the phrase "maternity leave." These recommended
revisions have already been approved and are being processed. In
Section 12, page 8, we are recommending a revision indicating that
employees resigning for maternity purposes can utilize accrued sick leave
during their period of incapacitation and are not setting out specific time
elements as previously utilized. Memorandum is attached recommending
this change.
RECOMMENDATION:
That this memorandum be furnished to Intelligence Division,
with three copies to Legal Counsel Division, setting forth that the
Administrative Division has no objection to the material set out in
Sections 10 and 12, including proposed revisions, of the Manual of Rules
and Regulations being referred for review..
کسه
Woc
TJM
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 24
-2-
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 12 EDITION,
GSAGEN, REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _'
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
-
ΤΟ
:
Mr. Walsh
FROM
S. R. Burns
SRP
SUBJECT: NONVETÉRAN APPEAL RIGHTS
*
3
DATE:
July 22, 1975
MDR-16
AMENDMENT TO MANUAL OF RULESLL INFORMATION CONTAINED
AND REGULATIONS
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SP2 ALM.
Admin.
Comp. Syst,
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
-
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telophone Rm.
Director Sec'y
The purpose of this memorandum is to update Part I, Section 10,
Appeals and Grievances, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations to set forth
the current appeal rights of nonveterans.
Attached is the proposed change pointing out that final action in
disciplinary matters involving cases of nonveterans up to and including
dismissal is taken by the Assistant Director, Administrative Division.
The nonveteran employee may appeal the action taken by the Assistant
Director, Administrative Division, to the Director.
It is recommended that one copy of the attached be referred to
the Intelligence Division and three copies to Legal Counsel Division for
inclusion in Section 10 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations as this
material is being referred to the Senate Select Committee for review along
with other sections of the Manual. The Committee can be advised that the
Manuals are constantly being updated and the attached change is currently
effective and will appear in the next revision of the Manual.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the attached Manual revision be approved and made effec-
tive immediately and that the copies, attached, be disseminated to
Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel Division in view of material being
furnished to the Senate Select Committee.
low
Enc.
1 - Intelligence Division
15 Legal Counsel
NW 88608 Docid298963, Page/25 (4)
Sa
62-116395-
PROPOSED CHANGE IN
July 23, 1975
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Part I, Section 10, Appeals and Grievances
G. NONVETERANS' APPEAL RIGHTS
Recommendations for administrative action following inquiry by
a field office, headquarters division, and possibly including the
FBI Inspection Division staff, where serious charges may result,
are forwarded to the Personnel Section of the Administrative
Division. The matter is reviewed and a decision recommended.
The Assistant Director of the Administrative Division, following
his review of the matter, determines what final action is to be
taken up to and including dismissal. The employee may appeal
this final action to the Director.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 26
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00. BY SP2 ALM/EHL
UNIT
GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. Walsh
FROM
S. Ray Burns
SUBJECT:
DATE: July 23, 1975.
PROPOSED CHANGE. IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
R. G. Hunsinger memorandum to Mr. Walsh dated
April 3, 1975 authorized changes in "Maternity Leave
Policy.
"
Proposed changes in the Manual of Rules and
Regulations were handled under the date of May 23, 1975,
concerning changes in Maternity Leave Policy, in addition
to previous changes there is attached a revision for your
approval.
RECOMMENDATION
That the attached be sent and forwarded to the
Training Division for handling.
Ew
Asät. Dir.:
Admin
Comp. Syst.
¨Ext. Affairá
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Enclosure
HS: ced
(3)
1 - Mr. Woodworth
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY SPA ALD
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 27:
116-395-50%
PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL
OF RULES AND REGUALTIONS.
July 23, 1975
Part I, Section 12, Page 8, 4b(2) should read as follows:
(2) Employees resigning for maternity purposes
Generally, an employee resigning for maternity
purposes is paid for accrued sick leave for
period of incapacitation and resignation will
become effective upon expiration of accrued
sick leave. Note: In order for employee
to be paid for sick leave....
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 28
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/60. BY SP2.11M/EHL
1962 EDITION,
GEN. RIG.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
"Mr. Walsh
FROM. S. R. Burns
"SUBJECT: NONVETÉRAN APPEAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT TO MANUAL OF RULES
AND REGULATIONS
DATE: July 22, 1975
Asst: pir..
Admin:
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sac'y
.
The purpose of this memorandum is to update Part I, Section 10,
Appeals and Grievances, of the Manual of Rules and Regulations to set forth
the current appeal rights of nonveterans.
Attached is the proposed change pointing out that final action in
disciplinary matters involving cases of nonveterans up to and including
dismissal is taken by the Assistant Director, Administrative Division..
The nonveteran employee may appeal the action taken by the Assistant
Director, Administrative Division, to the Director.
It is recommended that one copy of the attached be referred to
the Intelligence Division and three copies to Legal Counsel Division for
inclusion in Section 10 of the Manual of Rules and Regulations as this
material is being referred to the Senate Select Committee for review along
with other sections of the Manual. The Committee can be advised that the
Manuals are constantly being updated and the attached change is currently
effective and will appear in the next revision of the Manual.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the attached Manual revision be approved and made effec-
tive immediately and that the copies, attached, be disseminated to
Intelligence Division and Legal Counsel Division in view of material being
furnished to the Senate Select Committee.
کسا
Enc.
1 - Intelligence Division
125 Legal Counsel
NW 88608 Doel 1 2989633_Paul 29
(4)
MOR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/00 BY S
NEHL
PROPOSED CHANGE IN
July 23, 1975
MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Part I, Section 10, Appeals and Grievances
G. NONVETERANS' APPEAL RIGHTS
Recommendations for administrative action following inquiry by
a field office, headquarters division, and possibly including the
FBI Inspection Division staff, where serious charges may result,
are forwarded to the Personnel Section of the Administrative
Division. The matter is reviewed and a decision recommended.
The Assistant Director of the Administrative Division, following
his review of the matter, determines what final action is to be
taken up to and including dismissal. The employee may appeal
this final action to the Director.
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 30
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/2/19/00 BY SPEHL

UNITED STATE,
GOVERNM
Memorandum
Mr. Walsh
Admin.
Comp.
DATE: July 23, 1975.
Ext. Af
File's
&
**FROM
S. Ray Burns
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
R. G. Hunsinger memorandum to Mr. Walsh dated
April 3, 1975 authorized changes in "Maternity Leave
Policy."
Proposed changes in the Manual of Rules and
Regulations were handled under the date of May 23, 1975,
concerning changes in Maternity Leave Policy, in addition
to previous changes there is attached a revision for your
approval.
RECOMMENDATION
That the attached be sent and forwarded to the
Training Division for handling.
Ew
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Enclosure
- HS: ced
(3)
1 - Mr. Woodworth.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page.31
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/02 
BY 
SPAL
PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL
OF RULES AND REGUALTIONS
July 23, 1975
Part I, Section 12, Page 8, 4b(2) should read as follows:
(2) Employees resigning for maternity purposes
Generally, an employee resigning for maternity
purposes is paid for accrued sick leave for
period of incapacitation and resignation will
become effective upon expiration of accrued
sick leave. Note: In order for employee
to be paid for sick leave....
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 32
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/19/17 BY EP2
A/E7IL
i
གོ་དོན།
NRØ02 SE CODE
4:21 PM MITEL 8/18/75 SLA
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
FROM SEATTLE (134-1177)
FEDERAL AU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUSSAMS
TELETYPE
JEFFREY PAUL DESMOND, AKA, INFORMATION CONCERNING.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm..
Dep. Agluv.
Asst. Dir
Admin.
Corp. Syst
Ext. Affairs
Files & Gem.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
✓✓
Inaction
5
00:
SEATTLE.
At
& Eval
RE SEATTLE AIRTEL TO BUREAU, JANUARY 21, 1972, AND SEATTLE
NITEL TO BUREAU, JULY 8, 1975, CAPTIONED 'SENSTUDY 1975"
"
S
1. Inz.
Teuing
Legal Can.
Tolophon R:n.
tor Sery
FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, DAILY
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, NEWSPAPER, ON INSTANT DATE CARRIED AN ARTICLE
OMB-CAS
ENTITLED "BOMB-CASE FIGURE 'ASSASSINATED' HERE”.
THIS ARTICLE
QUOTED SEATTLE POLICE CHIEF ROBERT HANSON AS SAYING THAT SUBJECT
WAS FOUND DEAD IN HIS APARTMENT WITH A SINGLE BULLET WOUND IN HIS
CHEST, AND THIS HAD AN APPEARANCE OF BEING A FLAT OUT ASSASSINATION.
THE SAME ARTICLE STATED THAT DESMOND IN PAST HAD CLAIMED HE
HAD BEEN RECRUITED BY THE FBI TO HELP THEM APPREHEND BOMBERS AND
THE FBI DENIED DESMOND'S STATEMENT.
SEATTLE HAS AGAIN ANSWERED PRESS QUERIES WITH THE SAME DENIAL
THAT DESMOND EVER WORKED AS AN INFORMANT FOR THE FBI.
END
COPY OF ARTICLE BEING SENT TO BUREAU UNDER SEPARATE COVER.
ww
ORIGINAL FILED IN
62-114665
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/2/28/8/ BY SP-1-esk/up
Records
"
Pls place
84 AUG 28 1975
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 33
CC into
сс
62-116395
62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 AUG MUG 1976 1975
5-WNP
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
Transmit the following in
Via
AIRTEL
FBI
Date:
8/7/75
(Type in plaintext or code)
AIRMAIL
(Priority)
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
SAC, LOS ANGELES (66-6243) (P)
U. S. SENATE „SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);
INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER
'Re Bureau teletype to Los Angeles dated. 7/31/75,
captioned SENSTUDY 75..
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are the original
and seven copies of a letterhead memorandum concerning the
interview.
above
Do Mar Diss B
Then LMM 
seperseded by
2/4063
offractions
malls. 
M 
Kenyon
LMM 8/15/25
EXCLA REC-56
front
2 - Los Angeles J-Destroved
- Bureau (Enc. 8) ENCLOSURE
wew/pml/jer
(4)
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTA
IS
8/15/25
P4 1975
2 AUG 14-1975
DATE 10/17/00. EY SPALM/EHL FIRE
84 AUGA1975
NV
age
Sent
-560
M Per
U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574
**
**
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
August 7, 1975
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC);
INTERVIEW OF SA WALLACE E. WARD
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER
On August 51275 Special Agent (SA) Wallace E.
Ward was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Lester Seidel at
Los Angeles Headquarters regarding Cointelpro/Black Panther
Party. The interview lasted from 9:12 a.m., to 9:22 a.m.
Seidel asked how long SA Ward has been a
Special Agent with the FBI, and SA Ward responded nine
years. He further requested previous offices SA Ward
had been assigned to, and SA Ward responded Cincinnati,
Ohio. Seidel advised the Bureau informed him that SA Ward
had been assigned Cointelpro/Black Panther Party in June,
1969. Seidel requested to know what work SA Ward had been
assigned before this, to which SA Ward responded he could
not remember, but believed general criminal work.
Seidel requested to know what specific instructions
were issued with regard to operating Cointelpro/Black
Panther Party. SA Ward advised that due to his employment
agreement, the sensitive nature of the Bureau work, and
the possible overlap of Bureau investigation, he did not
feel he could respond to any further questions.
interview was terminated at this point.
The official
SA Ward was advised by Mr. Seidel that the interview
was voluntary but SA Ward was not advised of his rights in this
matter.
AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
1776-1976
BICENTENNIAL
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed
outside your agency.
Do N. I Das
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 35
1*
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
BY SP
DATE 10/19/00 ALM/EHU
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-560
ΤΟ
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
:
W. O. Cregar 1000
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
3. Mr. J. A. Mintz
1
I
(1
(1
DATE:
-
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. P. V. Daly)
8/18/75
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 Mr. S. F. Phillips
MDR-16
-
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY 322 AM/EHL
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Vdent!
Inspection
WRVAL
Laboratory
Legal Coun
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv✓
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
At the request of the Senate Select Committee
(SSC), we recently furnished to it superseded material dated
back to 1960 and relating to various sections of the Manual
of Instructions, including Section 87. In furnishing this
material, we did not furnish the various cover sheets
relating to the many revisions since 1960.
We have received a telephonic request from
Miss Martha Talley of the SSC Staff for additional infor-
mation which would help her to better understand the various
revisions to Section 87. She also specifically desired a
copy of page 1 of that Section as it existed on 1/1/60.
We have secured the various cover sheets for the
many revisions, as well as a copy of page 1 which bears
the revision date of 8/13/56 and which, according to
Mrs. Alene T. Smith of the Training Division, was the page 1
in force as of 1/1/60.
In order to comply with the request of Miss Talley,
it is not believed necessary to obtain from the SSC a
formal, written request; neither is it believed necessary
to transmit the requested material by formal correspondence
to the SSC through the Attorney General.
EX 104 REC-56
преводу
62-116-37-559
ACTION: Attached to Supervisor P. V. Daly's copy of this
memorandum is the material which it is requested he furnish to
Miss Talley. Attached to this memorandum is a file copy of
the page alluded to above. Mrs. Smith has available in the
Training Division duplicate copies of the cover sheets referred
to above.
ENCLOSURE
Enclosure
62-116395
SFP: Lhblh (7)
N860020:32989633 Page 36
4 AUG 1975
в
AUG 25 1975
SECTION 87. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
87A
لا لا لسما السالمية
STATUTES
Title JE, USC, 88 953, 2383-2385, 2387-2390, (formerly §§ 4-11, 13, Title 18,
and 33-35, 37, Title 50, USC), effective 9-1-48. Violations occurring
prior to 9-1-48 should be considered under former code sections.
[Sections 2384 and 2385 were amended 7-24-56 to increase maximum penalties
(Public Law 766).
-
§ 2384. Seditious conspiracy · (A representative trial under this section
involved 28 members of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. The trials
were held in September 1954 and February 1955 in the U. S. District Court,
Southern District of New York, and resulted in 27 convictions. Sentences
imposed ranged from 1½ years to six years.)
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down,
or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy
war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force
to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States,
or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States
contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more
than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."]
-
$2385. Advocating overthrow of Government Smith Act of 1940
(Prosecutions under the Smith Act have been primarily instituted against
a number of Communist Party functionaries for conspiracy to violate the
provision of Title 18, USC, section 2385, set out below under the elements
as la, but there have been several individual functionaries indicted.
tried and convicted under provision lc, (4) and (5) below, which is commonly
known as the "Membership Provision" of the Smith Act of 1940.)
"Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises; or teaches the
duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying
the government of the United States or the government of any State,
Territory, District, or Possession thereof, or the government of any
political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination
of any officer of any such government; or
"Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such
government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes,
or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising,
or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing
or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence,
or attempts to do so; or
"Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is
a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group,
cr assembly of
persons, knowing the purposes thereof-
"Shall be fined not more than[$20,000] or imprisoned not more than[twenty]
years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States
or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction."
["If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section,
each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States
or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction."]
1. Elements of section 2385
There are three possible violations involved in section 2385.
2. Advocated, abetted, advised, or taught
MDR-16
The person, knowingly or willfully
Advocated, abetted, advised, or taught the duty, necessity,
desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the
Government of the U.S., or the government of any state,
territory, district or possession thereof, or the government
of any political subdivision thereof
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/60- BY SP
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 37
ADMAN 6 2-114395-559
8-1 USLOSURE
CODE
TO SAC BALTIMORE
TELETYPE
2 Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
AUGUST 20, 1975.
Mr. W. R. Wannall
PERSONAL ATTENTION "L
ヒー
1
-
FROM DÍRECTOR FBI (62-116395)
SENSTUDY 75
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
ITE 10/18/-6038.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm..
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
-
7
1 Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 Mr. S. F. Phillips
-
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975, FURNISHING BACKGROUND CONCERNING
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND BUREAU'S DESIRE TO COOPERATE
WITH IT; AND BUTEL MAY 28, 1975, CONCERNING CERTAIN FORMER
FBI EMPLOYEES WHO IT WAS BELIEVED MIGHT BE INTERVIEWED BY
SSC STAFF.
A RECENT REQUEST OF THE SSC INDICATES IT MAY INTERVIEW
FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE A. BERLEY, 4116 DUNNEL LANE,
KENSINGTON, MARYLAND 20795, AND JOSEPH M. ENGLISH, 18 EAST-
MOOR DRIVE, SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND 20901.
OF INTERVIEWS UNKNOWN.
SUBJECT MATTER
IMMEDIATELY HAVE BERLEY AND ENGLISH CONTACTED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE
MAY 28.
SUTEL IN ABOVE CAPTION RESULTS OF CONTACTS.
1
-
67-245562
1 67-295922
SHO
SFP: dmt
(9)
NOTE:
EX 104
REC-56
62-116315-557
(Personnel file Former SA George A. Berley)
FEDER INVESTIGATION
(Personnel file FoORMERNISATIONS SEIM. English)
BUGBO 1976
20
TELETYPE
19 AUG 22 1975"
All
The alerting of these retired Special Agents S
accordance with procedures we have been following.
information necessary to the Baltimore Office for the contacts
was incorporated in the referenced 5/28/75 teletype.
گرام
Director Secty
NVB88608 DocId?32989633 Page 38
MAILROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
шос
2437
JA
GPO 1975 O-569-
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALL, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
بكر
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., NN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
United States Senate JBI
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 14TH CONGRESS).
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
August 20, 1975
Senstudy - 75
Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Esq.
MDR-16
FB7
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/00 BY
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
Dear Mike:
:
Attached is an additional request for FBI mate-
rials in seven parts, requested for delivery or access by
August 26, 1975 (Part I), August 29, 1975 (Parts II and III),
September 4, 1975 (Parts IV and V), and under Special Pro-
cedures (Fuils VI and VII)
•
Please note that a few items are given earlier
deadlines than we discussed yesterday. These include
Part II, items 5 and 6, and Part IV, item 7. Please let
me know if alternate deadlines should be set for these
materials.
I also hope you will expedite the requests made
in my letters to you yesterday, especially the request for
names of agents in connection with mail openings. This
latter request should be considered a request for delivery
by August 25, 1975, although I hope we can have it by the
end of the week.
1112
RECEIVED
AUG 20 1975
9110
REC-56 62-116395-556
Thanks for your cooperation in this matter.
12-
121
ENCLOSURE
191/19
Sincerely,
Zelent. Ellipt
John T. Elliff
Director
9 AUG 22 1975
Domestic Intelligence Task Force
Treat as original
62-116395
NW 88608 Decld:32989633 Page 39
AUG 
26 1975
5-P
REQUEST FOR FBI MATERIALS
August 20, 1975
Part I
--
requested for delivery by August 26, 1975
1. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
implementation of SAC letter 70-48 dated September 15,
1970, which authorized development of Security Infor-
mants between the ages of 18 and 21.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Materials pertaining to a two-day conference held at
FBI headquarters on September 17-18, 1970, with racial
supervisors from 39 field offices plus two legal
attaches, including the initiation of the conference,
the subjects discussed, and any advice or instructions
to the field related thereto.
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
implementation of decision in 1970 to grant approvals
for Special Agents in Charge on their own initiative
to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a
Special Agent or proven source in covering public
appearances by black and New Left extremists except
where such appearances are at educational institutions.
Materials pertaining to the Attorney General's testi-
mony on February 27, 1975, regarding "types of abuse
for which the Bureau has been susceptible in the past."
(This material was previously made available for review
per III. D. of your letter of August 1, 1975. Delivery
is now requested.)
All SAC letters and SAC memoranda previously made avail-
able for access by SSC staff at FBIHQ. (Cf., Part IV,
item 3.)
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 40
31 MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
帶
DATE 10/18/00 BY SPALM/ETC
62-116395-556
ENCLOSURE
:

-
2
6.
7
=
8.
9.
Materials pertaining to the furnishing of information
to the White House in February 1970 and March 1970
regarding the role of Klan organizations in mailing
_letters to the President protesting school desegrega-
tion.
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
periodic review of the preparation and dissemination
by the Research Section of the Intelligence Division
of the following:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
CINAL, a periodic intelligence letter summarizing
significant items of interest in the security field;
"The 'Extremist Speaks", a monthly compilation which
shows the extremist views of right, left, and racial-
ly oriented groups and individuals;
"Special Report, Nationwide Civil Disturbances",
an extensive brief prepared at the request of Vice
President Agnew;
"Stop the Bombing Campaign: A Communist Cause", a
study prepared at the request of the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board;
A secret paper for the U. S. Intelligence Board
analyzing "Racism, Radicalism, and Nationalism in
the Caribbean";
"FBI Summary of Extremist Acitivities", a weekly
summary of racial extremist activities.
Materials pertaining to the origins, contents, and main-
tenance of additions to, and periodic review of, the
National Security File maintained by the FBI laboratory.
All materials pertaining to Project HUNTER, including,
but not limited to, all memoranda discussing the origins,
approval, implementation, and periodic review of the
requests by the FBI for the opening of mail by the CIA
in connection with this project and any other CIA mail
intercept activity; and all materials pertaining to the
origins, approval, and implementation of the requests
by the FBI for CIA mail intercepts directed at the
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 41
-
3
10.
11.
12.
following: SNCC, Institute for Policy Studies, Clergy
and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, and Jeremy Stone.
Copies of the 90-day status letters on COINTELPRO
activities submitted by the Chicago FBI field office
to the Bureau.
Last known address of former FBI clerical employee
Katherine Osborn Jensen.
Present office of assignment or last known address of
the following present or former Special Agents:
a.
John Kleinkauf;
b.
William Forsythe;
C.
James Bland;
d.
Paul Cox;
e.
Theodore P. Rosack;
£. Robert Denz;
g.
Fred Fox.
NW-88608 Docld:32989633. Page 42
°
-
4
-
Part II requested for access by August 29, 1975
1.
2.
"
3°
4.
Materials pertaining to the dispatch of an FBI infor-
mant to attend the World Conference on Vietnam in
Stockholm, Sweden, in November 1970, and the dispatch
of this informant to any other such conference(s) abroad.
5.
All materials included in the "Brief for Director's Use
in Connection with Attorney General's Staff Conference"
for the year 1970 and any other years for which such
briefs were prepared.
Materials pertaining to the origins in 1954 and the
expansion in 1955, 1959, 1962, 1963, and 1970 of the
program entitled "Intelligence Coverage of Friendly
Foreign Countries (Bufile 65-63113)", and any periodic
review thereof.
6°
Materials reflecting the information supplied by,
and Bureau supervision of the handling of, William
O'Neal, known to the SSC to have been an informant
within the Chicago Black Panther Party, including
the log of contacts with O'Neal kept by Special
Agent Roy Martin Mitchell.
All materials submitted by the FBI to the Department
of Justice in the course of the investigation leading
to the presentation of evidence in 1969 to the federal
grand jury regarding the shootings of Fred Hampton and
Mark Clark in Chicago on December 4, 1969.
Materials, including inspection, investigative, and
special inquiry reports and personnel records, pertain-
ing to former Special Agent (FNU) "Jack" Freedman, now
retired, who was at one time assigned to the New York
City field office of the FBI:
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 43
- 5
Part III
1.
requested for delivery by August 29, 1975
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, prepara-
_ tion, and dissemination by the Racial Reporting Unit
of the Intelligence Division in 1970-71 of the follow-
ing:
2.
3.
a.
b.
A special paper for the Vice President concerning
racial disturbances in Mississippi and Georgia;
A detailed account of advance information concern-
ing the potential for violence in support of the
Black Panther Party in New Haven, Connecticut.
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, prepara-
tion, and dissemination by the New Left Reporting Unit
in 1970 of a library of "hand out" material on the New
Left for dissemination on a high level to government
officials and responsible citizens.
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
implementation of the following airtels and letters to
field offices pertaining to the New Left movement:
a. Airtel dated 10/23/68 instructing the field to
expand its Key Activist programs; .
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
g.
Airtel dated 10/28/68 instituting a program to
obtain a comprehensive study of the whole New Left
movement;
Letter dated 11/5/68 instructing the field to con-
duct a detailed survey of "underground" newspapers;
Airtel dated 3/10/69 requesting information about
statements by Key Activists;
Airtel dated 3/16/70 instituting a survey of finan-
cial support given to New Left groups;
Airtel dated 3/19/70 instructing the field to
locate New Left communes and identify participants;
Teletype to all SACS dated 4/17/70 defining a com-
mune and instructing the field to develop informant
coverage of all communes;
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 44
to
-
- 6 -
4.
h.
Airtel dated 5/13/70 instructing each office to sub-
mit monthly reports on informant coverage used
against communes;
i. Airtel dated 5/15/70 forwarding copy of departmental
letter concerning campus disorders;
j.
k.
1.
m.
Airtel to select offices dated 8/20/70 instructing
them to submit handwriting specimens of each Key
Activist to be placed in the National Security File
maintained by the laboratory.
SAC letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70 instructing the
field to develop new informants to infiltrate com-
munes and the staffs of underground newspapers;
SAC letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70 discussing
briefings of local law enforcement officials regard-
ing New Left extremism;
Airtel dated 11/4/70 instructing the field to
investigate all members of SDS and to consider each
for the Security Index.
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
periodic review of the establishment of the Black
Nationalists Photographic Album on March 8, 1969, and
to the origins and approval of dissemination of the
Black Nationalists Photographic Album to other agencies.
5. Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
periodic review of the preparation of a monthly Racial
Calendar by the Racial Intelligence Section of the
Intelligence Division.
6.
7.
Materials pertaining to the FBI's receipt of and
response to directives of the Department in 1953 and
thereafter, including letter from the Department dated
July 28, 1966, requesting information of the Nation of
.Islam.
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
periodic review of the program entitled "Communist
Influence on Racial Groups (Bufile 100-442529)".
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 45
"
·8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
All memoranda and any other materials which pertain
to the establishment of a special unit to handle
Communist influence in racial matters in 1963 or 1964.
All memoranda and other materials which pertain to the
assignment of Special Agent Seymour Philips to head
the unit identified in item 7 above.
All memoranda and other material which pertain to the
assignment of Special Agents Theodore P. Rosack and
Richard Bates to the unit identified in item 7 above.
All memoranda and other materials relating to the re-
assignment of Special Agent Seymour Philips out of the
special unit identified in item 7 above.
All memoranda and other materials analyzing or report-
ing the Communist Party's participation in and/or
influence on the March on Washington.
All memoranda and other materials reflecting an analy-
sis of the Communist Party's influence in racial mat-
ters which were written subsequent to the March on
Washington.
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
periodic review of the "Key Black Extremist Program".
Materials pertaining to the proposal, consideration
by the Executive Conference on October 29, 1970, and
approval of a program to conduct a survey of black
student unions, including instructions sent to the
field on November 4, 1970, to implement this program.
Materials pertaining to the origins, approval, and
periodic review of the Ghetto Informant Program insti-
tuted October 11, 1967, and justified by memorandum
of G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan dated July 11, 1970.
Materials pertaining to requests by the Intelligence
Division for placing name stops in the Identification
Division and for placing names in the stop file of the
NCIC Unit, during or after 1970, where such requests
relate to persons other than fugitives.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 46
18.
Materials pertaining to the use by the FBI Intelligence
Division in 1970 of carefully controlled contacts with
the Commission on Campus Unrest to secure a copy of
—their report in advance in order to ensure that there
were no unfavorable comments concerning the FBI.
NW 88608 Docid:32989033-Page-47-
:
f
9
Part IV requested for access by September 4, 1975
1.
2.
Materials pertaining to all actions undertaken by
the FBI, in connection with COINTELPRO or other-
wise, to encourage tension between the Chicago Black
Panther Party and Chicago youth gangs.
All materials pertaining to the opening and maintenance
of a Bureau file, if any, on the following persons and
organizations, including material reflecting the deci-
sion to open the file, the information compiled in the
file, and any other Bureau activity related to the sub-
ject and recorded in the file:
a.
b.
Legion of Justice;
Thomas Sutton;
C. Thomas Stewart;
jj
d. Steve Sedlacko;
e.
Jerry Gaisor;
Orville Brettman;
f.
g.
Chicago Black Panther Party;
h.
Fred Hampton;
i.
Jesse Jackson;
j. Chicago Urban League;
k. Renault Robinson;
1. Father George Clements;
મેંĚ
n.
The Woodlawn Organization;
Black Strategy Center;
0. Black Peace Stone Rangers;
p.
Rev. Arthur Brazier;
q.
Archie Hargraves.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 48
:
-
10
3.
4.
The following materials pertaining to FBI activities
in Mississippi:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
All materials reflecting contacts and reports of
contacts (and the substance thereof) between and/or
among the FBI, the Meridian, Mississippi, or
Jackson, Mississippi, police, and A. I. Botnick,
from September 1, 1967, to March 31, 1970.
+
All materials reflecting contacts between the FBI
and Tom Hendricks, from May 1, 1968, to August 31,
1968.
All materials reflecting the information supplied
by, and. Bureau supervision of the handling of,
Alton Wayne Roberts, Raymond Roberts, and Gordon
Clark, known to the SSC to have been informants,
from May 1, 1968, to August 31, 1968.
All materials pertaining to FBI activities with
regard to Thomas A. Tarrants, including all com-
munications with other law enforcement agencies
and private individuals or groups relating there-
to, during April September 1968.,
-
All materials pertaining to the events in Meridian,
Mississippi, in June 1968 which resulted in the
shootings of Thomas A. Tarrants and Kathy Ainsworth.
All materials reflecting the information supplied by,
and Bureau supervision of the handling of, the follow-
ing persons known to the SSC to have been FBI infor-
mants:
a. Robert Hardy;
b.
Terry Norman;
C.
Douglas Durham;
d.
Larry Grantwohl;
e.
Mary Jo Cooke;
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 49
f.
Joseph Burton;*
g.
Thomas Tongyai;
11 -
h. Howard Berry Godfrey;
5.
6.
7.
* W. H.
Harry and Jill Schafer;
*
j. William DuValle;
k. Charles Grimm;
1. Boyd F. Douglas;
ml.
David Sannes.
All materials pertaining to the activities and deci-
sions of the FBI leading to the arrest by the FBI of
persons in 1971 in Camden, New Jersey, later prosecuted
in the case of United States v. Briggs.
All materials pertaining to FBI activity with regard
to the Secret Army Organization in the San Diego,
California, area.
All annual inspection reports for the Intelligence
Division beginning with the earliest available and
including the year 1972-1975.
:
*
Please also include all materials relating to travel by
any of these individuals outside the United States for, on
behalf of, or at the request of the FBI.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 50
:

12
Part V
--
requested for delivery by September 4, 1975
::
1. All materials pertaining to the referring of informa-
tion by the Los Angeles field office of the FBI in
1973 to the Los Angeles district office of the Internal
Revenue Service with regard to Bella Stumbo and Della
(LNU) and the allegation that Bella Stumbo had been
using the false name of Della (LNU) to conceal income.
2.
3°
Materials pertaining to a "no contact list", and any
other similar matters such as SAC letter 66-78 dated
December 15, 1966, reflecting that Courtney Evans is
a person not to be contacted.
A list of all "control files", "set-up files", and
"functional files" maintained by the FBI Intelligence
Division.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 51
:
13
Part VI
--
materials to be coordinated with response under
special procedures for electronic surveillance
and surreptitious entry
Materials pertaining to FBI electronic surveillance
policy, as listed below, and any other materials
logically related thereto (based on analysis of mate-
rials in "Black Notebook"):
a.
b.
C.
Memorandum of W. C. Sullivan dated September 25,
1964, which is referenced in the first sentence of
the September 30, 1964, memorandum from Mr. Sullivan
to Mr. Belmont captioned "Confidential Informant and
Similar Types of Coverage".
Follow-up memorandum which is referenced in the
"Action" section of the September 30, 1964, memo-
randum from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Belmont captioned
"Confidential Informant and Similar Types of
Coverage".
All memoranda and other materials which reflect
responses to or implementation of President*
Johnson's June 30, 1965, "Memorandum for the Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies" pertaining
to electronic surveillance.
d. All memoranda and other materials which reflect
consultations between FBI officials and the
Attorney General as required in the penultimate
paragraph of President Johnson's June 30, 1965,
"Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies" pertaining to electronic surveillance.
All memoranda and other materials reflecting a
March 30, 1965, conversation between Director Hoover
and Attorney General Katzenbach as referenced in the
last paragraph of the March 30, 1965, memorandum
from the Director to the Attorney General pertain-
ing to "proper controls over wiretapping and the
installation of microphones".
.e.
f.
All memoranda and other materials reflecting pro-
cedure which was "set up" as referred to in the
March 30, 1965,, memorandum from the Director to
the Attorney General pertaining to "proper controls
over wiretapping and the installation of micro-
phones".
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 52
·
•CO
14
g. All memoranda and other materials which reflect
the "various recent conversations" between the
Director and the Attorney General, as referenced in
the first sentence of the September 14, 1965, memo-
randum from the Director to the Attorney General
concerning "special investigative techniques".
˚h.
All memoranda and other materials which reflect
the following actions referred to in the September
14, 1965, memorandum from the Director to the
Attorney General concerning "special investigative
techniques":
(1) "the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
severely restricted and, in many instances,
eliminated the use of special investigative
techniques in carrying out our investigative
work."
(2) "we have discontinued completely the use of
microphones."
(3)
"I have further cut down on wäretaps.
$1
(4)
i.
j.
k.
"I have further refused to authorize any mail
covers, trash covers, or the use of the poly-
graph in our cases."
(5) "I have instructed that such (portable)
recorders not be used by the FBI."
Memorandum from the Director to the Attorney Gen-
eral dated September 23, 1964, which is referenced
in the first sentence of the September 27, 1964,
memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director
captioned "Special Investigative Techniques".
All memoranda and other materials reflecting reci-
sions, modification, or changes with respect to the
eliminations or restrictions reflected in the
September 14, 1965, memorandum described in para-
graph h above, and which recisions, modifications,,
or changes resulted from the September 27, 1964,
memorandum described in paragraph i above.
All internal FBI memoranda pertaining to the imple-
mentation of the June 16, 1967, "Memorandum to the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies" from
Attorney General Clark.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 53
!
- 15 -
1.
All internal FBI memoranda pertaining to the imple-
mentation of the October 16, 1972, "Memorandum to
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies"
from Attorney General Kleindienst.
11
m Any communications between the Justice Department
and the FBI regarding the "new standards and guide-
lines for use of electronic surveillance
referred to by Attorney General Richardson in his
September 12, 1973, letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright.
n.
.
All internal FBI memoranda pertaining to, the imple-
mentation of the standards and guidelines referred
to in item m above.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 54
16
Part VII -- materials covered by procedures for the
Martin Luther King case
1.
20
3.
4.
5.
6°
Contents of the OC file labeled Martin Luther King,
Jr. which was designated as File %23100 by the Inspec-
tion Division, including note dated December 10, 1965,
to Mr. Hoover; routing slip dated July 22, 1969, to
Miss Gandy; memorandum dated June 10, 1969, from the
Director to the Attorney General; and Serial Removal
Charge-Out dated December 13, 1973.
Serials 100-106670-253 and 100-106670-255.
Any FBI materials which would establish what was
originally attached to the December 10, 1965, note to
Mr. Hoover which appears on OC File #100.
Identification of the FBI personnel whose names appear
in the lower left-hand corner of the December 10,
1965, note to Mr. Hoover which appears in OC File #100,
together with their present offices of assignment or
last known address.
Identification of the FBI employee who entered the
name "Martin Luther King, Jr." on the December 10,
1965, note to Mr. Hoover which appears in OC File #100.
Identification of the FBI employee who entered the
names "Martin Luther King, Jr." and "Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach" on the July 22, 1969, note to Miss Gandy
which appears in OC File #100.
7. All materials which reflect the circumstances sur-
rounding the xeroxing of three copies of the December
10, 1965, memorandum to Mr. Hoover on June 30, 1966,
as reflected on the copy of the note which appears in
OC File #100.
8.
All memoranda and other materials prior to October 7,
1963, which pertain in any way to electronic surveil-
lance or proposals for electronic surveillance of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference and/or
Martin Luther King, Jr.
NW 88608-Deeld:32989633-Page-55
-
17
-
°
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
:
15.
All memoranda and any other materials reflecting cor-
respondence, communications and/or contacts between
FBI headquarters personnel and FBI field office per-
__sonnel with respect to feasibility, installation, ini-
tiation, continuation, authorization, re-authorization,
and termination of and disposition of tapes with
respect to each of the electronic surveillances iden-
tified in the FBI's July 24, 1975, memorandum attached
to your letter of August 11, 1975, which responded to
Item III. G. of my July 28, 1975, request.
All memoranda and any other materials reflecting
authorization or articulation of the procedure identi-
fied in the last paragraph of page 6 of the FBI memo-
randum referred to in item 9 above, to wit, "authori-
zation for utilizing a misur was made by the FBI
Director or his designees".
All memoranda and other materials which pertain to
photographic or covert optical surveillance of
Martin Luther King, Jr.
All memoranda and other materials which reflect infor-
mation received from the Central Intelligence Agency
concerning Dr. King.
All memoranda and other materials reflecting advance
information received by the FBI that Dr. King would
be meeting with Stanley Levison in any of the cities
and on any of the dates upon which any of the micro-
phone surveillances of Dr. King were operational.
All memoranda and other materials reflecting (as the
result of information obtained from physical surveil-
lance or live sources) that Dr. King did in fact meet
Mr. Levison in any of the cities and on any of the
dates upon which any of the microphone surveillances
of Dr. King were operational.
All memoranda and any other materials which pertain
to the transmittal of tape recordings of King sur-
veillances from the Intelligence Division, or any per-
sons therein, to the Laboratory Division, or persons
therein, or vice versa.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 56
$
-O
18
-
16.. All memoranda and any other materials* which related
to:
a.
b.
C.
d.
-
11
The preparation and/or dissemination of a
'composite" tape (or copies thereof) which con-
tained any or all parts of any tapes which re-
sulted from electronic surveillance of Dr. King.
The preparation of any transcripts of any or all
parts of any tapes which resulted from electronic
surveillance of Dr. King.
•
The mailing of any tapes which resulted from
electronic surveillance of Dr. King and/or any
other materials to Dr. King, Mrs. King, and/or
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
The playing of any tapes which resulted from
electronic surveillance of Dr. King, or offers
to play such tapes, or the displaying or dis-
semination of transcripts of such tapes, or
offers to display or disseminate such transcripts,
to persons not employed by the FBI.
.*
D
S
The Committee is not requesting tapes or transcripts.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 57
1
1
1
-
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
1
Mr. S. F. Phillips
August 15, 1975
The Attorney General
Director, REC 56
0211-395-555
EX 104
U. S. SEMATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Enclosed for your information is the original of a
memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of
captioned Committee of former FBI Special Agent Theodore A.
King. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding
to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.
Enclosures
62-116395
-
2.
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/
TE 10/17/00- DY
LES SP.2 ALM/EHL
1
hell
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admín.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
"Intell
Laboratory
I The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Michael E. Shaheen, Jr.
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
1
-
1
-
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
67-526234 (Personnel File Former SA Theodore A. King)
SFP:1hb hb
Training ------ ནི་ཁ ོ
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Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Sec
(10)
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2 ENCLOSURE
MAIL ROOM ☑
1975
النقد
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//
√10.0.
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 58
(~)
Awad
GPO 954-346
62-116395
1
fund fund
1
1
-
-
"
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 Mr. S. F. Phillips
August 15, 1975
Ques
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
U. S. SETATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SPECIAL
AGENT (SA) THEODORE A. KING BY
SSC STAFF MEMBER
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONT/
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00. BY SP-2. ALM/EHL
On August 11, 1975, Theodore A. Kih, Director
of Security, Southern Bell Telephone Company, Atlanta, Georgia,
voluntarily advised the Atlanta Field Office of the FBI that
he was interviewed by SSC Staff Member Michael Epstein in
the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, D. C., on
August 7, 1975, between 10:00 and 10:45 a.m. Theodore A. King
served in the FBI a. an SA from May 3, 1954, until March 18,
1960, when he resigned. It appears from the details of the
interview, as set out below, that Theodore A. King was
interviewed as an official of the Southern Bell Telephone
Company and not as a former FBI SA.
The following are the details of the interview as
furnished by Theodore A. King:
cyfat
At the beginning of the interview, which was not
under oath, King was furnished a form''warning" him of his rights,
which he signed. Epstein was the only other individual present
during the interview. Epstein stated the interview concerned
the activities of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) during the early 1960's.
Epstein asked the name of the employee in the telephone company
who was the contact with the FBI in the 1960's and King advised
it was Charles Eberhart. King explained he took over the
Security Division of the Southern Bell Telephone Company in
1961, and he handled the contacts with the FBI after that time.
King stated that Alden Miller was the contact man at the FBI
at the time.
ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG
100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
67-526234 (Personnel File Former SA Theodore SKINTE PAGE 3
TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE G
1
1
->
NW 88608 Docla
MAIL ROOM
BA
620-951-346
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC
King was asked if he provided assistance to the
FBI on national security information at any time and ho
stated he did not recall.
King was asked if the Southern Bell Telephone
Company provided any leased cable or leased line to the FBI
at any time and King stated he did not recall. King stated
he had several conversations with FBI individuals regarding
the procedure for obtaining leased lines and he advised them
to follow the normal channels through the company to make
application for leased lines the same as any other customer.
King was asked if any other Agent might have had
contact with the telephone company in connection with obtaining
leased lines and he stated it was entirely possible.
King was asked if he could recall any leased lines
being obtained under fictitious names and ho advised he knew
of none.
King was asked if he was ever given any names or
numbers to furnish information regarding, and he stated that
he did not recall. He was asked if he ever received any
request in writing regarding such and he stated he knew of
none.
King was asked if he assisted in any way in
furnishing information about the telephone services of
Martin Luther King, Jr., or the SCLC and he advised he could
not recall.
King was asked if he knew Martin Luther King, Jr.,
or the SCLC was under investigation at the time, and he stated
he did not know it for a fact.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 60
- 2

SE ATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE:
INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI SA BY SSC
King was asked if the Southern Bell Telephone
Company had any written policy about giving out information
at the time and he replied there was no written policy
until after 1968, which stated in substance that no
information would be given out without a subpoena.
NOTE:
Information reported herein taken from Atlanta
teletype, dated 8/11/75, captioned "Senstudy 75."
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 61
3.
E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
TO:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM:
FBI
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
2. DATE PROVIDED
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
8/15/75
4.
SSC
HSC
The Attorney General with a copy for forwarding to
the White House
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
5.
Memorandum reporting results of an interview by SSC
Staff Members of former Special Agent of the FBI Theodore
A. King
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
HA
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Surveillance, electronic
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
Former FBI investigation of Martin Luther King Jr.
62-116395
FMK: fmic
(4)
3791 (6-75)
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 62
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/008 SPA/07
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
TREAT AS YELLOW
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
5- Woc
ENCLOSURE 62-116315-555
INSTRUCTIONS
• Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
• "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 63
NRØY AT CODE'
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 11 1975
5:55 PM NITEL AUGUST 11, 1975 SSPELETYPE
TQ:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: AT LÁ NT A
ATTN:
(62⑉116395)
(62-2854)
LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND INTD, (W.O. CREGAR)
SENST UDY 75
ON AUGUST 11, 1975 THEODORE A. KING DIRECTOR OF SECURITY,
SQUT HER N BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, AND FORMER
FBI AGENT, ADVISED HE WAS INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF MEMBER
MICHAEL EPSTEIN IN THE EVERETT DIRKSEN OFFICE BUILDING IN
WASHINGTON, D.C., ON AUGUST 7, 1975, BETWEEN 10:00 AM AND 10:45
AM, AT WHICH TIME THE FOLLOWING TRANSPIRED:
Газ
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERVIEW, WHICH WAS NOT UNDER OATH,
KING WAS FURNISHED A FORM(WARNING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS, WHICH
HE SIGNED. EPSTEIN WAS THE ONLY OTHER INDIVIDUAL PRESENT DURING
THE INTERVIEW. EPSTEIN STATED THE INTERVIEW CONCERNED THE
ACTIVITIES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRIS-
TIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC) DURING THE EARLY 1960'S.
EPSTE IN ASKED THE NAME OF THE EMPLOYEE IN THE TELEPHONE COMPANY
WHO WAS THE CONTACT WITH THE FBI IN THE 1960'S AND KING ADVISED
IT WAS CHARLES EBERHART KING EXPLAINED HE TOOK OVER THE
.
SECURITY DIVISION OF THE SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY IN
REC-56
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
Inspection
Int 11.
La natry
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Fun.
Telephone Rm.
Direct Sea'y
62-116395-5
1961, AND HE HANDLED THE CONTACT-S WITH THE FBI AFTER THAT TIME.
KING STATED THAT ALDEN MILLER WAS THE CONTACT MAN AT THE FBI AT
AUG 22 1975
THE TIME.
MDR-16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIN
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/17/00 BY
1/17/80 BY 322ALM/EHL
let w/h: lil to NG I-DAG
SFriinb
5/3
NW 88608 |Jordb232984633 Page 64
必
A
PAGE TWO
AI-62-2854
KING WAS ASKED IF HE PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO THE FBI ON NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION AT ANY TIME AND HE STATED HE DID NOT RECALL.
KING WAS ASKED IF THE SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY PROVIDED
ANY LEASED CABLE OR LEASED LINE TO THE FBI AT ANY TIME AND KING
STATED HE DID NOT RECALL. KING STATED HE HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS
WITH FBI INDIVIDUALS REGARDING THE PROCEDURE FOR OBTAINING LEASED
LINES AND HE ADVISED THEM TO FOLLOW THE NORMAL CHANNELS THROUGH
THE COMPANY TO MAKE APPLICATION FOR LEASED LINES THE SAME AS ANY
OTHER CUSTOMER.
KING WAS ASKED IF ANY OTHER AGENT MIGHT HAVE HAD CONTACT WITH
THE TELEPHONE COMPANY IN CONNECTION WITH OBTAINING LEASED LINES
AND HE STATED IT WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE.
"
KING WAS ASKED IF HE COULD RECALL AND LEASED LINES BEING OBTAINED
UNDER FICT IT IOUS NAMES AND HE ADVISED HE KNEW OF NONE.
KING WAS ASKED IF HE WAS EVER GIVEN ANY NAMES OR NUMBERS TO
· FURNISH INFORMATION REGARDING, AND HE STATED THAT HE DID NOT RECALL.
HE WAS ASKED IF HE EVER RECEIVED ANY REQUEST IN WRITING REGARDING
SUCH AND HE STATED HE KNEW OF NONE.
KING WAS ASKED IF HE ASSISTED IN ANY
WAY
IN FURINSHING INFOR❤
MATION ABOUT THE TELEPHONE SERVICE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. OR
THE SCLC AND HE ADVISED HE COULD NOT RECALL.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 65
PAGE THREE
AT 62-285 4
KING WAS ASKED IF HE KNEW MART IN LUTHER KING, JR. OR THE SCLC
WAS UNDER INVESTIGATION AT THE TIME, AND HE STATED HE DID NOT
KNOW IT FOR A FACT.
KING WAS ASKED IF THE SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY HAD
ANY WRITTEN POLICY ABOUT GIVING OUT INFORMATION AT THE TIME AND
HE REPLIED THERE WAS NO WRITTEN POLICY UNTIL AFTER 1968, WHICH
STATED IN SUBSTANCE THAT NO INFORMATION WOULD BE GIVEN OUT WIT HOT
A SUBPOENA.
コ
END
SUP FBIHQ CLR
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 66
ΤΟ
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
: W.
0 Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
MOR-16
1
-
1
DATE:
1
1
-
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
8/15/75
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. T. J. McNiff
говорет
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inter
Laboratory
LesltCoun..
Plad. & Eval
.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
1 2ADM/CHIC
DATE 10/17/00 BY
Bureau letter to the Attorney General with enclosed
memorandum, both dated 8/7/75 and captioned "United States
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities," advised
that the Senate Select Committee (SSC) had requested the
current address of former Special Agent (SA) Thomas J. Smith
so that he may be interviewed with regard to his knowledge
concerning the "Huston Plan." Referenced LHM furnished the
SSC with the current address of SA Smith as 3410 Memphis Lane,
Bowie, Maryland 20715.
The note to referenced memorandum advised that an
attempt was made to telephonically contact SA Smith at the
above residence at which time it was ascertained that SA Smith
was out of town and not expected to return until sometime in
the future. A message was left for SA Smith to contact FBI
Headquarters upon his return.
On August 14, 1975, SA Smith telephonically contacted
SA Thomas J. McNiff at FBI Headquarters. SA Smith was advised
that the SSC had inquired as to his current address as they
desired to interview him with regard to his knowledge concerning
the "Huston Plan." He was advised that upon being contacted
by the SSC, he should immediately advise the Legal Counsel
Division in order to secure a release from his employment
agreement.
Bureau Agent would be available upon his request for counseling
purposes during the interview. It was also pointed out to
Mr. Smith that during the interview, there were certaiAUG 22 1975
privileged areas concerning which he would not be required to
62-116395
He was also advised that should-554
EX 104"
REC-56
ire
1 - 67-449472 (Personnel File Former SA Thomas J. Smith)
TJM:1hbhb
(6)
NW 86 AUG 28 1975
Docld:32989633 Page 67
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
answer questions, namely:
information which might divulge the
identities of FBI sources; information relating to sensitive
methods and techniques%; information which might adversely
affect ongoing FBI investigations and information which origi-
nated with other agencies, including foreign intelligence
agencies. Mr. Smith expressed his appreciation for the infor-
mation and concluded by saying that upon being contacted by the
SSC, he would advise this Bureau of the date of the anticipated
interview and his decision as to whether or not he would request
that a Bureau Agent be made available for consultation.
RECOMMENDATION:
None. Above for information.
TJ
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 68
тут
JBA
Pan
JA
затрудн
-
- 2 -
food
FROM
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
W. O. Gregar
C
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
MDR-14
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr. T. J. Jenkins
Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE:
8/12/75
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inte
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval. -
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
2
1
Mr. W. R. Wannall
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED Mr. W. O. Cregar
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/00 BY 522 ALM/EHL
Memorandum outlines problem area with respect to
confidentiality of FBI sources which we have encountered in
the Senate Select Committee (SSC) investigation.
In their investigation of COINTELPRO, SSC has been
given access to material from which we excised only informants
and potential informants as defined in Manual of Instructions.
When such material was requested for delivery, we have excised
identities of all individuals to whom we have incurred an
obligation to protect their identity and relationship with the
FBI. SSC has objected to these more extensive excisions in
delivered material, claiming the agreed-upon procedures do
not allow us such latitude. This was not our understanding
of the agreement.
As a result of this impasse, on morning of 8/8/75",
the Director and other FBI representatives met with the
Attorney General (AG) and the Deputy Attorney General (DAG)
in an attempt to resolve the question. The AG deferred a
decision at that time pending the receipt of certain requested
information concerning the general COINTELPRO operation. Later
that date, Mr. John Elliff, SSC, contacted SAs William O. Cregar
and Elmer W. Larson of the Senstudy Project, INTD, and stated
the DAG had suggested he attempt to get together with Bureau
representatives and reach some sort of compromise of
accommodation in this area.
REC-56
62-116395-55
During the after 100 ton of 8/8/75,
AUG 22 1975
Messrs Cregar,
Larson and Elliff conferred at length. Mr. Elliff indicated
The felt it was imperative that a certain number of individuals,
62-116396
EWL:1hb|hb
(8)
CONTINUED
"
OVER
3
5-Ext
84 AUG 26 1975
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 69
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
who had cooperated with the FBI in the COINTELPRO operations,
be interviewed by SSC Representatives so that a more accurate
picture could be obtained concerning possible harm to
COINTELPRO targets. He indicated there was a deadline set
for completion of COINTELPRO phase of SSC investigation and
Itime did not allow for extensive interviews; however, he
estimated that given no deadline a maximum of 36 such contacts
would be made and, in view of the deadline, 8 to 12 interviews
of the type indicated to be more realistic. Mr. Elliff isolated
three cases which he suggested might most easily lend themselves
to a compromise on this point and suggested they be considered
by the Bureau. If the Bureau saw fit to agree in these
instances, he suggested further deliberations be made to
select further cases in which the cooperative sources' identities
could be made available to the SSC.
SAs Cregar and Larson emphasized to Elliff that the
principle involved here was not whether or not the cooperative
source was of great and current value to the FBI but that the
issue was the FBI's obligation to the source to protect the
confidentiality of the relationship. While professing to
acknowledge the validity of the Bureau position in this regard,
Elliff, nonetheless, was adamant in his standing that the SSC
be allowed to contact these sources without the FBI first
contacting them to ascertain their amenability to such interview.
It was stressed to Elliff that prior contact of these sources
by the FBI would be mutually advantageous since it would
satisfy FBI obligation to the source and, if the source then
agreed to interview, would provide the SSC with a forth-coming
cooperative witness. Finally, after much discussion, Elliff
suggested that the three cases presented by him be approved and
following this he would be willing to consider negotiation
concerning further disclosures of identifies of sources based
on FBI proposal of prior contact. The three cases proposed by
Elliff are briefly set out below:
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 70
CONTINUED
-
OVER
2.

'
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
1. In 1969, an Assistant State Attorney General,
an established source of the Albuquerque Office, requested
public source information concerning an individual in
New Mexico who was a candidate for appointment to a pollution
commission. We were able to furnish such information reflecting
the subject's affiliation with the Students for a Democratic
Society. SSC indicated they desire to interview our source.
2. In 1966, we furnished information to a California
State Alcohol Beverage Control Commission agent that liquor
was to be sold at a political fund-raising party. SSC desires
to interview this source.
3. In 1968, the editor of a Tucson, Arizona,
newspaper contacted our resident agency in Tucson and requested
pertinent background data concerning some of the activists in
various anti-draft, anti-Vietnam and similar groups in the
Tucson area who had been receiving considerable publicity of
late. Authority was granted to furnish public source data to
the newspaper man. SSC now wishes to identify this contact
and interview him.
On 8/12/75; the Director was advised of the proposal
by Mr. Elliff. The Director indicated he desired to adhere to
the current policy of not divulging identity of sources with
whom the FBI has a confidential relationship; however, he
extended an invitation for Mr. Elliff to meet with him on
8/18/75 at 4:00 p.m., for further discussion of this issue.
During the morning of 8/12/75, the Director's position and
invitation was conveyed to Mr. Elliff by SA Cregar. Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Elliff called back to advise that he appreciated
the invitation but that in his view the meeting would merely
contribute to further delay and that he planned to contact
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 71
CONTINUED
-
OVER
-
- 3 -
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
Mr. Michael E. Shaheen of the DAG's staff and press for
him to advise the AG and ask him to resolve the issue as
soon as possible.
RECOMMENDATION:
Eus
None. For Information.
whe
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 72
- 4 -
Jampir
Pun
1
.
r.
I
R. Wannall
O. Cregar
C. Deegan
r. R. L. Shackelford
1. 17. R. Wannall
A. B. Fulton
COINTELPROS
MDR-16
8/11/75
1
Mr. A. B. Fulton
1
Mr. D. Kyan
1-. D. G Pottus
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/17/80 BY SPRALM/EHL
This is to identify C8 serials, copies of which were
furnished to John Elliff, staff member of the Senate Celect Committec
(SSC), on 8/5/75 for retention in SSC offices.
Barbara Banoff, a staff member of SSC, requested 47
of the copies on 8/1/75 and 19 on 8/4/75. The requests were submit-
ted by her based on copies which were previously reviewed by staff
members in room 4171, JFH. Subsequent to the request for delivery
of specific serials to CSC offices, they were re-excised to insure
information which would tend to identify sensitive sources was
deleted. Excisions in each serial, prior to being made available for
delivery, was approved by appropriate Section Chief. Elliff accepted
delivery from Section Chief Cregar and signed both attached lists
indicating receipt,
Attached are 20 copies of scrials requested on 8/1/75
which were delivered to Lllif on 8/5/75. Other coples which were
delivered are not attached since no additional excisions were made
other than those made in the initial project for review only. Ixcised
copies of those serials were previously designated for the Cointelpro
file. A second list is attached which contains ten copies of serials
requested on 8/4/75 and delivered to Elliff on 8/5/75. Nine copies
which were delivered are not attached since there was no additional
excising.
ACTION:
None. For information.
Enclosures
62-116009
1-02-110335 (Senstudy)
200
-
100-449098 (Now £cit)
100-3-104 (CPUSA)
1-100-448006 (Black Extremist)
DKP:Ifj
(12)
SEP 28
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 73
NO
170 SEP 2 1975
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
1
5010-106
ΤΟ
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM : W.
égar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
1
1
1
1
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. H. N. Bassett
Mr. W. V. Cleveland
Mr. R. J. Gallagher
DATE: 7/21/75
2
-
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
. Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. J. E. McHale
Mr. J. W. Hines
Mr. J. P. Thomas
This recommends representatives of Special and
General Investigative Divisions review material from
inspection reports which may be requested by the Senate
Select Committee (SSC) to determine whether any excisions
would be necessary before it is made available to the SSC.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspecti
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
By letter dated 5/14/75, the SSC, Appendix B,
Item I, Number 5, requested access to annual inspection
reports and related surveys for the past 10 years with
respect to the Intelligence Division and 10 field offices.
At a conference between members of the SSC Staff and
representatives of the Department of Justice and the FBIHQ
Senstudy staff, 5/30/75, it was agreed that in response to
the above request we would make available to the SSC Staff,
for review at FBIHQ, copies of the reports of the two
inspections conducted of the Domestic Intelligence Division in 1971
and the inspection of the San Francisco Office during
October, 1970.
EX 104
REC-56 62-116375-552
These reports have been reviewed by both the
Intelligence and Inspection Divisions and necessary excisions
agreed upon. The SSC Staff is being notified by LHM 7/22/75,
transmitted through the Attorney General by letter dated
7/22/75, that excised copies of the aforementioned three
reports are available for review in Room 4171 JEH. The LHM
alerts the Committee to the fact that all portions of the
San Francisco report which pertain solely to criminal matters,
without security ramifications, have been removed from that
✓ report but can be made available for review should the SSC-
62-116395 MDR-16
JPT: 1hblhb
(12)
8.4 AUG 26 1975
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 74
2 ALM/EHL
DATE 10/10/00 BY SP 2
J-The s
CONTINUED - OVER
SEE ADDENDUM OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
PAGE
5
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
L
determine that such material is pertinent to its mandate
by making a written request for access to it. The criminal
portions removed are attached to the tickler copies of this
memorandum designated for Messrs. Cleveland and Gallagher,
as they relate to matters within their Divisions' purview.
It has been our experience that the SSC generally does request
to see or obtain material not furnished during responses to
an initial request. Thereforé, it would be prudent for
representatives of the General and Special Investigative
Divisions to, at this time, review the material attached to
Messrs. Cleveland and Gallagher's ticklers and make a
determination as to whether any excisions must be made before
review by the SSC Staff, should same be requested. Generally,
under current ground rules, only material which would identify
sensitive sources, including cooperative foreign agencies,
or violate the Third Agency Rule, may be excised. Inquiries
regarding current ground rules may be made by the Sensṭudy
representatives of the General and Special Investigative
Divisions of Supervisor J. P. Thomas, Room 4063 JEH,
Extension 4636.
ACTION:
It is recommended that the material attached to
the ticklers of Messrs. Cleveland and Gallagher be reviewed
as indicated above and returned to Mr. Thomas with any
necessary excisions underlined in red by 7/24/75.
RJK
[NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 75
- 2 -
J
I
ADDENDUM SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION WPB:bam 7/24/75
ват
The attached portion of the October, 1970 Inspection
Report of the San Francisco Office has been received and in the event it
is furnished to the Senate Select Committee, it is felt that those
portions bracketed or underlined in red should be excised. The pages
containing material to be excised are as follows:
179, 181, 209, 211, 222,
давуу
232
Nie
me
ERS
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 76
- 3 -
Rev. 8/17/70
INSPECTOR
CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
for LARSON
During the inspection your
Criminal Informant Program
will be evaluated as to productivity and numerical progress as well as
from a program development standpoint.
GENERAL
1..
Identify supervisor and coordinator.
2.
identify.
MDR-16
4-H
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10 10/00 BY SPRALM
10/10/00
SPQ ALM/EHL
Are any Agents assigned exclusively to this program? If so,
3. Prepare a tabulation showing the number of CIs and Potential
Criminal Informants (PCIs) now as compared to last inspection. Tabula-
tion should also include number of CIs and PCIS in headquarters city and
each Resident Agency. Show numerical and percentage gain or loss.
; 4. Prepare tabulation showing Agent participation in program
using format set forth below:
a.
b.
Identify Agents spending 50% or more of time on
criminal-type investigative matters, who have
been so engaged for past year or longer, who
do not have currently assigned qualified CI per-
sonally developed by that Agent.
Length of time such Agent assigned to criminal-
type investigations.
If necessary to clarify, set forth nature of assign-
ments such as general criminal, accounting, or
other, together with percentage of time devoted.
SAN FRANCISCO
4-H
OCT 16 1970
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 77
INSPECTION
62-116395-552
Criminal Informants
- 2 -
d.
e.
Years on
Name
Those Agents identified in #a above, who have developed
qualified CIs in past five years but because of transfer,
reassignment, or discontinuance of informant do not
now have assigned a CI (furnish dates of development,
discontinuance or reassignment).
Number of PCIS currently assigned to Agents identified
in #a above.
Nature of
Assignment
and %
Criminal Work (If Needed)
Date Last
CI Devel-
oped
Date Disc.,
Reassigned,
etc.
No. PCIs
Now
Assigned
5. Show payments to informants and compare with last inspection.
Identify any informants to be contacted by only one Agent. Set
forth justification for this procedure.
6.
7.
What procedures and controls exist dealing with informant contacts
after hours?
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
'1. Briefly state overall objectives of your Criminal Informant Program.
To what extent do your criminal desk supervisors participate in this program?
(Do not include Criminal Intelligence Desks separate survey.)
--
2. Do you have standards or requirements by which you judge Agent's
participation in program? Include specific comments regarding first-office
Agents, Agents transferred in since last inspection, Agents assigned to your
Division for more than one year.
3.
a. List by supervisory desks handling criminal classifi-
cations, specific headquarters target areas (either
geographically or by classification) selected for inform-
ant development efforts. Identify several for each desk
and include examples for each criminal classification
handled. Identify Agents specifically assigned to
develop informants in each of above listed areas.
Identify by file number informants developed.
NW-88608 Docid:32989633 Page 78
Criminal Informants
- 3 -
4.
b. Same for each Resident Agency.
In order to maintain stability of your program and to insure CIs
and PCIS are not "turned over" for turnovers sake, do you require Agents
to submit a newly developed CI or PCI at time closing or discontinuing
memoranda are submitted on old ones?
5. What administrative procedures do you have to insure your sub-
stantive supervisors are aware of and participate in informant program?
Do they approve both opening and closing memoranda? Are they aware of
productivity of CIS and PCIs handled by Agents assigned to their squads?
How? Do you maintain a record of productivity by desk?
How often is Criminal Informant Program discussed by supervisors
at squad conferences?
6.
7. Do you keep statistics by Resident Agency (or road trip territory)
on productivity of informants? Do you feel your informant coverage in each
Resident Agency (road trip) is adequate? Where are the weaknesses? Handle
each individually.
8.
Do you feel your informant coverage in headquarters city is
adequate? Break down by squad giving consideration to types of classifi-
cations handled by each.
9. What administrative devices do you employ to follow Agents working
criminal cases in headquarters city and in Resident Agencies to be certain
each is making maximum contributions to the Criminal Informant Program?
10. What steps are taken to eliminate the carrying of PCIs in a pending
status for over one year, when during that time they have been unable to
produce sufficient information to qualify as criminal informants?
11.
Racial and ghetto informants have proven to be of valuable assistance
in solution of numerous criminal cases. What provisions have you made to
make these sources available to Agents working criminal work? How and to
whom do they submit their requests for contact with these informants?
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 79
Criminal Informants
4.
broken
12.
How much use is made of your Criminal Informant Index,
down geographically and by type of information for purpose of directing
certain inquiries to logical informants? Document.
Comments of SAC requested.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 80

SAC GEBHARDT:
(10/21/70)\
JTM: mer
- 5 -
☐
1.
ASAC JAMES T. MORELAND
SA STANLEY J. HENNESSY
2.
No
3.
OCATION
SYMBOL INFORMANTS
6769
10/70 Diff 옹
POTENTIAL INFORMANTS
6/69 10/70 Diff
TOTALS
%
6/69 10/70 Diff
eadquarters
erkeley
ureka
ayward
395
6
onterey
7077
70275
75 74 -1 -1.3
+2 +50
175
5 10 +5
176 +1 +.57
+100
250
250
-
9
16 +7
+77.8
-33.3
1
2
+1
+100
4
4
-
+1
+16.6
9
9
-
15
16
+1
+6.7
-0-
3
8
+5
+166.6
8
13
+5
+62.5
akland
22
21
alo Alto
2
ichmond
4
alinas
an Jose
an Mateo /
San Rafael
Santa Cruz
Santa Rosa'
alnut Creek
otals
343963mmo
2232245
1+
.1
-4.5
35
31
-4
-11.4
57
52
-5
-8.7
+1 +50
5.
8
+3
+60
7
11
+4
+57.1
-0-
7
7
11
11
-
-0-
+1
+50
7
4 -3
-42.8
9
7
-2 -22.2
-
-0-
20
27
+7
+35
29
36
+7 +24.1
+3
+100
4
15 +11
+275
7
21
+14 +200
+1 +50
7
5 -2
-28.6
9
8
-1
-11.1
+1 +50
3
6
+3
+100
5
9
+4
+80
-1
-25
4
4
-
8
7 -1
-12.5
6
+1
+20
3
5
+2
+66.7
8 11
+3
+37.5
י
148
155
+7
+4.73
288
317 +29 +10.07 436 472
+36 +8.3
4.
Years on
Criminal
Nature of
Developed
Name
MALOY
Work
Assignment
CI
Etc.
Date Last Date Disc.
Number
of PCIS
Assigned
Reassigned
2.1/2
Selective
None
None
4
Assigned
Service
San Francisco
Matters
6/16/69
WOLFARTH
10, Assigned
ITSP, Fraud
1969
R
-
7/69
San Francisco By Wire
7/14/69
MAVITY
2 1/2
88s
4/69
C - 8/69
.3
ProTop Ten Program
Relief Supv.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 81
- 6
Comparative Disbursements
6.
None
Month
8/1/68 through 5/69
6/1/69 through 9/70
June
1517.91
July
1787.00
August
845.00
1676.10
September
755.00
1520.00
October
1715.00
2233.00
November
1095.00
1670.00
December
1510.00
2623.60
January
1270.00
1138.00
February
1215.40
1510.00
March
1300.00
2397.00
April
2520.00
1460.00
May
2514.40
1303.00
June, 1970
1308.00
July, 1970
1703.00
August, 1970
1195.00
September, 1970
1248.00
$14,739.80
$26,289.61
7. Agents contacting informants outside of normal working
hours obtained supervisory approval for these contacts
prior to making them and make appropriate notations on
their #3 cards. Supervisors thereafter, during file
reviews with Agents, check with them regarding those
contacts and spot-check informant files to insure after-
hour contacts were made and appropriately recorded.
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT -
1.
The overall objectives of the criminal informant program
are to develop high quality informants who are in a
position to furnish valuable information on a continuing
basis.
Criminal desk supervisors participate in the program by
remaining alert to the necessity of having good informant
coverage in the criminal classifications which are covered
by their respective desks. The supervisor is also
required to approve any expenditure made to an informant
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 82
155
-
7
for information or services concerning any case
handled on his desk and in this way will be aware of the
progress of the program as it relates to their de jk.
The supervisors also follow the Agents' activities in
this regard on an individual basis to insure that they
are fully participating in the informant program.
2. The San Francisco Office does have standards which
requires all Agents assigned one year or more to this
division should conform to and that is they should have
a minimum of four PCIS or one CI and two PCIS or two
CIs assigned at any one time.
This, of course, is by
no means considered a maximum and many Agents
participate more fully in the program.
There are currently no first office agents assigned to
this division and when an Agent is transferred to this
division and assigned to criminal work he is expected
to show some progress by the end of sixty days and
within one year he is expected to be in compl liance
with the above standards.
3. A.
DESK 1
Accounting Matters
Supervisor H. ERNEST WOODBY
DESK Z
Applicant Matters
Supervisor ROBERT D. ROBY
These two desks are being handled as one unit
inasmuch as the only true criminal classification handled by
both desks are deserter fugitive cases, which are split
alphabetically between the desks.
SA HENRY L. GAIDIS is the only agent who spends
more than fifty per cent of his time on Squad 1 on deserter
matters and SA FRANCIS J. O'HARA is the only agent on
Squad 7 who spends more than fifty per cent of his time on
these matters.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 83
156.
8
i
CAS GAIDIS and O'HARA have been specifically.
assigned to develop informants who can give coverage in
fugitive deserter matters and they have concentrated their
: efforts in specific areas where deserters are most
likely to be found, as set forth below:
137-5670
137-5355
1
South of Market Street Area
North Beach Area
137-5094
137-5477
137-5738
Tenderloin and North Beach
Areas (homosexuals)
Tenderloin and North Beach
Areas (homosexuals)
Haight
-
Ashbury and the
Fillmore (Negro ghetto area)
DESK 2
Bank Robberies Major Case
Supervisor BRYON C. WHEELER
· Special Agents assigned to Squad 2 have been
instructed to continually be alert to develop top quality
informants in order to carry out the responsibilities in
their investigative fields. The work on the squad is broken
down into two major categories, the first of which includes
bank robberies and kidnappings. Agents specifically assigned
to develop informants in this field are SAS, MONTE A. HALL,
FRANCIS J. COLLOPPY, JR., THOMAS J. PADDEN, ARDEN F. KEITH,
ELDEN LOEFFELHOLZ, and WILLIAM R. tenBENSEL. The following
informants have been developed in this field:
137-5473
137-2686
137-2961
137-2864
137-4999
137-4290
137-5308
137-1934
157.
NW-88608 Docid:32989633 Page 84
137-4867
137-4680
137-5260
9
the 88
-
The second major category handled on this desk is
Fugitive cases and agents specifically assigned to
develop informants in this field are SAS RICHARD C. DU BRUILLE,
CLARENCE A. BROM and MICHAEL G. KEALEY. The following
informants have been developed in this regard:
137-5469
137-5426
137-4294
"
DESK 3
General Criminal Desk
Supervisor MORRIS M. DE JEAN
The main criminal classifications handled by this
desk are ITSMV, Theft or Destruction of Government Property,
Crime on Government Reservations, Crime on the High Seas,
Probation and Parole Violators, Bond Default Fugitives, and
Crime Aboard Aircraft and Air Piracy.
It is noted there are several major military
installations within Headquarters City, including the
Presidio and the U. S. Naval Shipyard at Hunters Point, as
well as numerous Government buildings.
In the ITSMV field SAS DANIEL J. BUCKLEY and
EDWARD C. SAUER have been assigned to develop informants and
in this regard the following have been developed:
137-470
137-3528
The fugitive classifications handled off this
desk are distributed among the various members of the squad
and in these classifications SAS BERLYN H. CLOW, JAMES E.
TARLETON, JR. and GARY D. MINYEN have been specifically
assigned to develop informants and the following are informants
developed in this regard:
137-5291
137-2164
137-5425
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 85
-
- 10·
H
Regarding the Government reservations, it is noted
that specific liaison assignments have been made in regard
to these but inasmuch as persons normally contacted on these
bases are Government employees contacted on an official
basis, they are not considered appropriate for development
as CIS and are bound to furnish information as part of
their duties. It is noted, however, that the Hunters Point
Naval Shipyard is in a predominantly Negro area and two
PRIS, 170-845 and 170-241, are under development at that
location by SAs assigned to this squad.
Regarding the air piracy and crime aboard aircraft
violations, it is noted all major airports are located within
Resident Agency territories and coverage at these locations
will be covered there.
DESK 5
TFIS and ITSP Matters
Supervisor GLENN A. HARTER
A major category on this desk is civil rights
matters but inasmuch as this classification does not lend
itself to the development of informants it will not be
covered in this write-up.
In TFIS matters the following agents have been
assigned these cases and have been instructed to develop
informants in this fielä: SAS F. STEPHEN OSBORN, DAVID C.
SUMMING, JAMES R. ECHOLS, RALPH V. FINK, STEPHEN L. JENKS,
and MARSHALL H. FELDMAN. In this regard the following
informants have been developed:
137-5202
137-5538
137-5358
137-4826
The following agents handle primarily ITSP
matters and have been instructed to develop informants in
this regard: SAS ELLSWORTH F. HEMINGWAY, FREDERICK A. GROS,
and EARL W. BAKER. In addition, a major source of informa-
tion in this field was developed by SA JOSEPH T. FOX, JR.,
who was recently transferred to the Hayward Resident Agency,
and is still contacted by SA FOX. The following are
informants developed in this field:
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 86
137-1966
137-5547
137-5168
137-4458
11
-
4 - H
DESK 6
Selective Service Matters
Supervisor RAY M. ANDRESS:
It is noted all agents assigned to this desk work
Selective Service matters and have been instructed to develop
informants that will be of assistance in this classification.
It is also pointed out that this desk has numerous
subjects that fall in the radical left and Black militant
category. Any time these subjects, when interviewed, appear
to be cooperative in any degree their names and addresses
are furnished to the appropriate desk for consideration as
development to an informant.
Members of this squad continually endeavor to
develop informants in Black neighborhoods, homosexual hang-
outs, and cheap hotel areas where most fugitive Selective
Service subjects are located.
The following informants have been developed in
this regard:
137-4948
137-4876
137-139
It is noted a number of agents on this squad are
recent transferees into this office and there is a total of
thirty PCIS currently under development by members of this
squad.
B.
BERKELEY RA
The Berkeley RA encompasses a large populous
metropolitan area and its primary investigative problems lie
in the security field. There are four agents assigned to the
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 87
-
12
1
4
-
- H
Berkeley RA handling primarily criminal matters and they are
SAS WILLIAM H. SHITH, JR., TUVAL V. FARQUHAR, ROBERT F.
PEVAHOUSE and LEON H. BLAKENEY.
Due to the varied nature of the criminal work
existing in the Berkeley RA and the relatively small area
covered by the Berkeley RA, no specific targets have been
designated for informant development, but all agents working
criminal matters are constantly alert to the necessity of
having good informant coverage. The following informants
have been developed:
137-4547
137-3910
137-4723
137-5238
137-109
EUREKA RA
The Eureka RA is a one-man RA handled by SA
RICHARD GUỶ MILLER and covers Humboldt and Del Norte County,
which are both rural in nature. All classifications in
this territory are handled by SA MILLER and in view of the
¨nature of the RA, no specific targets have been designated
for informant coverage. Two informants have been developed in
this territory and give general criminal coverage.
are as follows:
137-2613
137-3685
They
=
HAYWARD RA
The Hayward RA covers the southern half of
Alameda County and has been a rapidly expanding RA in popula-
tion and has developed into a large trucking area with a
population of approximately half a million people.
The major criminal problems in this RA have been
TFIS and ITSMV violations.
In this regard, SA SAMUEL A. MILLER has been
specifically directed to develop informants covering TFIS
violations and SĄ PAUL M. CARPER, JR. has been directed to
develop informants in the ITSMV field.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 88
-
13
-
The following informants have been developed in
this regard:
137-5402
137-5011
137-5175
The remaining informants in this RA furnish general
information regarding criminal and fugitive matters.
MONTEREY RA
The Monterey PA covers a territory that is rural
in nature and its main industry is tourism and agriculture.
There are four agents assigned to the Monterey RA which
handle primarily criminal classifications and they are SAs
FRANK W. MITCHELL, WARREN A. COOK, MAX H. FISCHER and LESLIE
L. VANNATTA. Two problems exist in the Monterey RA territory
and they are a large hippie-type population residing
within the RA territory and the town of Seaside, California,
is basically a Negro ghetto type area. The agents assigned
to criminal work have been instructed to establish as
much coverage as possible in these two areas and the following
two informants have been developed in this regard:
137-5255
137-5778
The major criminal classifications worked in this
RA are Selective Service matters, deserter matters, theft
and destruction of Government properties matters, crime on
Government reservations (it is noted Fort Ord, a major Army
camp, is located within the RA territory), with a sprinkling
of other criminal classifications. The following three
informants provide general criminal coverage for the entire
RA territory:
137-4008
137-3258
137-4601
162.
-NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 89
14
-
OAKLAND RA
H
The Oakland RA covers the northern half of Alameda
County and is the largest RA, personnel wise, within the
San Francisco Division. In this regard, its problems, as
related to criminal investigations, are very much the same
as Headquarters City.
The following is a list of agents working criminal
matters who have been assigned to develop informants in the
specific classifications they primarily are responsible for,
along with a list of informants developed for coverage in
these files:
The
Bank robberies and major case matters are handled
by SAS DONALD F. HALLAHAN and WILLIAM P. O'CONNELL.
following are informants developed in this regard:
137-2752
137-3121
137-213
In ITSMV, DGP, CGR, air piracy and aircraft hijacking
matters the agents handling them are SAS DAVID ROBERT EVANS,
THOMAS C. MC GEE and CHARLES SPYROPOULOS. The following is
a list of informants developed in this regard:
137-5470
T"
137-5161
137-5235
137-5326
137-5073
Handling TFIS and ITSP matters are SAS EWING H.
RAUCH, JR. and R. JAMES WILLIAMS. In this regard, they have
developed the following informants:
137-3515
137-4674
137-5480
137-4497
137-5088
NW 88608 Docid:32989633-Page-90-

-
15
Agents handling Selective Service matters and
deserter matters are SAS ROBERT M. LEONARD, DONALD E.
LOVEJOY, GEORGE W. SMITH and GEORGE P. WILLIAMS, JR. In
this regard, the following informants have been developed:
137-5342
137-1667
!
1
PALO ALTO RA
The Palo Alto RA is basically a metropolitan area
and its investigative problems are primarily in the security
field. The agents working the criminal classifications
in the Palo Alto RA are SAS TROY F. WILDER and JEAN G.
HUGHES. There have been no specific target areas assigned
in Palo Alto due to the general nature of the criminal
assignments given these two resident agents. The following
informants have been developed, giving general criminal
coverage to the territory covered by the Palo Alto RA:
137-1807
137-5031
137-5518
137-5815
137-975
RICHMOND RA
The Richmond RA covers northwestern Contra Costa
County with its basic population located in the City of
Richmond itself. As related to criminal investigations,
its one problem area in the Richmond RA is the Negro ghetto
area located in North Richmond. There are two agents
working criminal matters in this RA, GERARD JAMES NORTON and
RICHARD L. WEAVER. Inasmuch as the above-mentioned ghetto
area is their primary problem area, they have been
instructed to develop informants, giving as much coverage
as possible for this area. In this regard, the following
informants have been developed:
137-2818
137-5287
"
137-2575
1
137-5091
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 91
164.
- 16
-
SALINAS RA
4 - H
The Salinas RA is a two-man RA working primarily
criminal matters. The territory is rural in nature and its
primary industry is agriculture.
In view of the nature of the territory no specific
target areas have been designated and SAS THOMAS P. DOWD
and CARL A. GOSTING have developed the following informants
which provide general criminal coverage in their territory:
137-5452
137-5099
137-5594.
SAN JOSE RA
The San Jose RA territory covers a large
metropolitan area with a population in excess of 800.000
people. Eight of the ten SAS assigned to this RA handle
criminal case assignments at least fifty per cent of the
time..
There has been a high incidence of bank robberies
in the territory and specific efforts have been made to
´develop informants by SAS WILLIAM N. KIDWELL, JR. and FRANCIS
M. CONNOLLY which would provide information in this regard
and they have developed the following informants:
137-4215
137-5350
܂
The remainder of the criminal work in the RA is
general in nature and no specific assignments have been made
to develop informants and no agent has been specifically
assigned to the development of informants in the RA. In
addition to the above informants, there are five other
symbol informants furnishing general criminal information
and three informants furnishing information in the criminal
intelligence field.
165.
NW 88608Docid:32989633- Page 92
-.17
SAN MATEO RA
4
-
The San Mateo RA covers a large metropolitan
area, including the San Francisco International Airport.
There is a large volume of work at this airport and SAs
WAYNE J. MORRISON, JOHN F. BRESLIN and EDWARD C. SERNETT
have been instructed specifically to develop 'informants
providing coverage of criminal matters relating to it.
In this regard, the following two informants have been
developed:
137-5204
137-5501
There have been no other specific targets picked
for development of informants in the RA territory and in
addition to the above two informants, there are four other
informants furnishing general criminal information within
the territory.
'H
SAN RAFAEL RA
The San Rafael RA territory includes Marin and
Napa Counties. All criminal work in Marin is handled by
SA DAVID D. THOMAS and one problem has been the City of
Sausalito, which has a large hippie population, and
specific efforts have been made to develop an informant who
'could provide information concerning this element, and in
: this respect, SA THOMAS has the following informant:
137-5396
In addition to this informant SA THOMAS has an
informant providing general criminal information in Marin
City, California, which is a Negro ghetto area. This
informant is 137-3167.
It
SA ELWIN N. WEGNER handles all criminal work in
Napa County, which is basically rural in nature and no
specific target areas have been picked for this county.
is noted, however, SA WEGNER has developed an informant
providing general criminal coverage for the City of Napa and
this informant is 137-5421.
:
ENW 88608 Etoeld:32989633-Rage 93
166.
1
18
G
SANTA CRUZ RA
4
- H
The Santa Cruz RA is a three-man RA with two agents,
PATRICK J. HAGGERTY, JR. and JOSEPH A. DUSHEK, handling
the criminal work in this area. The territory covered by
this RA is basically rural in nature and no specific targets
have been picked for this territory. It is noted, however,
three CIS are currently being handled in this RA and in
addition, they have a symbol racial informant and a top
echelon criminal informant target. These informants are as
follows:
137-4132 .
137-5651
137-5280
137-5112
170-613
: SANTA ROSA RA
Criminal matters in the Santa Rosa RA are handled
by SAS WILLARD E. BASEMAN and DOUGLAS R. AHLSTROM.
The Santa Rosa RA covers three rural counties of
Sonoma, Mendocino and Lake, comprising some 7000 square
miles in area. The bulk of criminal activity is located in
and around the headquarter city of Santa Rosa, California
(Sonoma County). Informant coverage has been established
in the legalized cardrooms and night clubs in this area.
Coverage in the counties of Mendocino and Lake is
limited to the close personal relationship with deputy
sheriffs that cover the remote areas of these counties, which
principal industries are logging and ranching.
There are no principal targets for informant
development, such as shipping companies, railroads, airports,
or large industries. Coverage has been established in
gambling, 137-3976 and 137-4486. In night clubs, coverage
has been established with females, 137-5819 and 137-5818,
both of whom are furnishing quality information and will be
converted as CIs.
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 94
16%
19
H
In deserter and Selective Service matters, hippie
coverage is maintained in Guerneville, California (Sonoma
County) through 137-5462. This latter town is largely a
summer resort town for the area, but does have a hippie
population in the winter months as well. Also, in the
Indian and Mexican deserter fugitive matters, 137-1412
gives coverage to the skid row section of Santa Rosa,
California.
WALNUT CREEK RA
Criminal investigations in the Walnut Creek RA are
handled by SAS RUDOLPH H. MANCINI and FRANKLIN S. BURROUGHS.
This RA covers a territory which consists of
several large "bedroom" communities and a large section that
is rural in nature.
The only problem high crime rate area in the
territory is the City of Pittsburg, which is a Negro ghetto-
type area and specific efforts have been made to develop.
informant coverage in this area. The following informants
have been developed and furnish general criminal and racial
information for the Pittsburg area:
137-674
137-5079
In addition, the RA handles four other informants
and they are:
137-3135
137-5395
137-3529
137-4685
4.
5.
.
Yes, in line with the answer to question two above,
agents are expected to submit a replacement at the
earliest possible date.
Supervisors participate in the informant program in that
they must approve all expenditures to informants furnishing
information in classifications handled on their respective
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 95.
168
20
-
-
H
desks.
In this way they are aware of the productivity
of the informant program as it concerns them. ¡lso,
if there is any particular problem concerning the
handling of a particular informant, a supervisor is
expected to assist and give guidance to the agent
handling this particular informant. Supervisors are,
also regularly reminded of the importance of the
informant program at supervisors' conferences and follow
their individual agents to insure that they are fully
participating.
Supervisors in this office are not required to approve
either closing or opening memoranda on informant files.
No record is kept of productivity of informants by
desks, however, this information is readily available
through the monthly statistical letter submitted on
informant production inasmuch as each statistic is
reported by classification.
6. Agents are reminded of the criminal informant program
and their responsibility to participate in it at each
biweekly squad conference.
7.
8.
Informant statistics are not kept by RA or road trip
territory, however, this information would be available
if it were necessary to obtain it by review of the
particular informant files that are providing coverage
in these areas. Our informant coverage in each RA
area is considered adequate at this time and no particular
weaknesses are noted. However, efforts are made on a
continuing basis to try to improve coverage in all
areas.
It is felt that informant coverage at Headquarters City
is adequate at this time, but as indicated in number
seven above, a continuing effort is made to improve this
coverage.
Regarding the coverage provided by each criminal desk,
it is noted that as of October 12, 1970, the following
CIS and PCIS are being handled off the respective desks:
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 96
iLa
CIS
Desk 1
Desk 2
15
Desk 3
7
Desk 5
11
Desk 7
2
Desk 6
3
-
21
-
PCIS
3
2
1
14
17
27
3
30
9.
10.
•
The classifications handled by the above listed desks
are set forth in question three above.
=
Administrative devices used to make certain agents are
making maximum contributions to the criminal informant
program are that the agents are followed on an individual
basis through file reviews and supervisor conferences to
insure they are meeting the criteria as set forth in
question number two above. The criminal informant files
are also specifically reviewed on a semi-annually basis
at the time the semi-annual LHMs are submitted to the
Bureau. It is also noted files are checked at the time
they are posted on a continuing basis.
Informant files are reviewed at the end of the first
year they have been opened on an individual basis and
if they have been unproductive the agent is advised to
close the case and replace the PCI with anew one.
170.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 97
-
- 22
-
11.
:
12.
If the PCI has been productive the agent handling him
is advised to convert him to a criminal informant. If
it is a questionable matter it is discussed with the
agent handling the PCI on an individual basis andı a
decision is reached in this matter inasmuch as the
agent is in a better position to make the judgement as
to the potential of this particular PCI.
All agents in the San Francisco Division are aware of
the racial and ghetto informant program through
participation. If an agent has a case that he feels
warrants contacting of ghetto informants he will
dictate a memorandum setting forth specifically that
they should be contacted by the particular agents
handling them.
No actual record is kept of how much use is made of
the geographical criminal informant index. However, it
has proved to be a valuable tool in determining who
the logical informants are to contact in any given
situation. This has saved many investigative hours by
making easily available to each agent the particular
type of informant coverage he might need.
> -
NW 88608 Docid:32989633-Page-98-
1
4-H
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON
10/27/70
LSM/jb
#MORTG
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP-2 Acm/796
All criminal informant (CI) files and a representative
number of potential criminal informant (PCI) files were reviewed
during this inspection. Following review, a memorandum
disclosing the rating afforded in each file has been forwarded
to you for inclusion in the respective file.
Your office is currently operating 145 CIs as
compared to 141 CIs being operated at the time of the last
inspection. There is also an increase in the number of PCIS
under development at this time to 271 as opposed to 250 under
development during the last inspection. These figures do not
include Top Echelon informants or targets for development
which are commented on separately under the Criminal Intelligence
Program. This represents a slight increase in the number of
CIs and a more substantial increase in the number of PCIs
under development. However, there is a slight decrease in
two large metropolitan areas, namely, San Francisco and Oakland,
which though slight represents a static situation as to
increasing coverage in these areas. The Oakland Resident
Agency has also recorded a decrease in the number of PCIS
,under development. In analyzing the coverage in the resident
agencies, it was noted that Monterey, Richmond and San Jose
have the same coverage from CIs as during the last inspection
although Monterey and San Jose have shown a substantial
increase in the number of PCIs being handled. PCIS under.
development in Salinas and San Rafael are down somewhat,
although this too in part is off-set by the increase in the
number of CIs being operated. In view of the Bureau's
increased responsibilities, it is absolutely essential that
a strong criminal informant program be maintained and in
fact expanded if the Bureau is to meet these increased
responsibilities.
QUALITY
All of the CI files were reviewed during this
inspection and the following ratings were given to the CIs
presently being operated by this office:
17
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 99-
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Fair
Poor
Not Rated
Total
2.
14
36
78
12
3
2
145
The two files which were not rated are SF 3308-C,
SF file 137-5342 (Bufile 137-22463) and SF 2290-C, SF file
137-213 (Bufile 137-3071). Because SF 3308-C furnishes
information principally as a result of his employment in
the U.S. Army, Personnel Center, Oakland, California Army
Base, this informant should be discontinued as a CI and
converted to a Confidential Source. SF 2290-C was recently
reopened on the basis of having provided a service to
Department of Justice attorneys and the Bureau but has furnished
no criminal information for an extended period of time and
had been in a closed status since 3/10/69. This informant
should also be discontinued as a CI and considered as a
Confidential Source. You should appropriately advise the
Bureau that this action has been taken.
At
The following informants have been rated Fair and
they should be given specific assignments for a period of
90 days in an attempt to improve their productivity.
the end of that period of time you should advise the Bureau
of reasons for continuing them as informants or that they
are being discontinued.
Symbol
Number
San Francisco
File Number
=
Bufile
Number
SF 3258-C
137-4999
137-21270
SF 2712-C
137-3352
137-10786
SF 3320-C
137-5425
137-22726
SF 3119-C
137-4547
137-18815
SF 2966-C
137-4265
137-15784
SF 3313-C
.137-5168
137-22503
ŚF 3348-C
137-5594
137-23437
SF 2684-C
137-2613
137-10351
SF 3303-C
137-5161
137-22387
SF 3095-C
137-4080
137-18823
SF 3072-C
SF22793-C
137-4674
137-3135
137-17879
137-9744
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 100
173.

3
The following informants were rated Poor and
should be closed immediately:
Symbol
Number
SF 3226-C
SF 3166-C
SF 3257-C
San Francisco
File Number
137-4427
137-5091
137-4888
Bufile
Number
1
137-20833
137-19341
137-21264
A representative number of PCIs were reviewed
and were rated as follows:
Excellent
Very Good
Good
Poor
Insufficiant Data
to Rate
4
10.
31
37
83
The following PCIS have been under development for
a period in excess of one year and should be closely followed
and directed for a period of 90 days in an attempt to
· qualify them as CIS. If at the end of that time they have
not furnished sufficient information to qualify as CIS they
should be closed.
137-5486
137-5483
137-5474.
File 137-5485: has also been open for a period
in excess of a year. This PCI has furnished no information
since September 1969. This file should be closed. This
PCI was rated "Poor.
11
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 101
AGENT PARTICIPATION
You have indicated Special Agents JAMES P. MALOY,
CARLTON H. WOLFARTH and GARY N. MAVITY have spent 50% or
more of their time on criminal type investigative matters
during thepast year but do not currently have assigned a
qualified CI personally developed by them. Further comment
is being set forth later in this addendum concerning these
Agents.
PAYMENTS
A review of payments indicates that your office
paid an average of $1,473.98 a month to informants during
the period immediately preceding the last inspection. For
the period immediately preceding this inspection, an average
of $1,643.10 was paid to informants each month. A spot
check of payments made to CIS and PCIS indicated value was
being received for the money paid. You should insure that
your personnel are alert to the use of monetary payments to
enlist the further cooperation of informants by compensating
them for expenses incurred in pursuit of information for
this Bureau and as compensation for their effort on the
Bureau's behalf. You should continue to closely evaluate
informant payments to insure that value is received for money
paid.
· ACCOMPLISHMENTS
10
According to Bureau records your office shows
increases in 4 of the 8 statistical accomplishments
attributable to informants and it is noted that these
increases have occurred in matters concerned directly with FBI
investigations.
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
You have indicated a rather extensive involvement
of supervisory personnel in directing informant development to
those areas of responsibility coming within the scope of
their respective desks. Referring to Government reservations
and military installations, you indicated you do not
consider Government employees appropriate for development as
CIs as they are bound to furnish information as part of
their duties. Your attention is specifically directed to
175.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633-Page-102-
5
In
Section 108, I-12, Volume 4, Manual of Instructions, which
states informants should be developed on Government
reservations and military installations when warranted.
view of the large installations located within your territory,
it is suggested you identify particular areas of these
installations wherein informant coverage would be logical
and productive and give consideration to pinpointing such areas
for development.
i
You have also indicated that Supervisors approve
payments to informants and in this way are also aware of the
productivity of the informant program. However, it is noted
that approval of payments provides a rather limited
assessment of the productivity of informants and points out
the need for a continuing evaluation of respective coverage.
Supervisors must constantly be alert to identify specific
areas in which informant coverage would be logical and
. productive.
OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
You should give consideration to the development
of informants on Government reservations and military
installations as suggested by the Manual of Instructions.
In a number of instances, it was noted there was
no follow-up on incomplete information furnished by informants.
In such instances, the informant was not recontacted any
sooner than required by the 30 day contact rule, which would
indicate a lack of direction of the informant to further
develop information of interest. The need to give informants
direction to develop information to the point it can be
considered useful and valuable should be brought to the
attention of all appropriate investigative personnel.
There were few instances noted during review of
the CI files wherein FD-302's had been utilized in recording
informant information. It is recognized that much information
regarding fugitives and possible suspects does not require
17%
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 103
i
6
such recording but in view of the recent passage of Senate
Bill 30 which will greatly expand the opportunity to utilize
informant information, you should make certain all personnel
are aware of those instances in which informant information
should be recorded on an FD-302 and the proper method for so
recording it.
-
Numerous areas have been identified in your
territory as being the habitat of ethnic, ghetto and hippie
elements, many with a high incidence of crime. To provide
a better over-all view of the coverage in San Francisco and
the heavily populated East Bay area and to facilitate a more
convenient, ready reference for the agents of your office to
this information, you should consider preparing a large wall
map of the San Francisco East Bay area and placing it in a
central secure position in the office. In addition to criminal
informants, you should include the location in which racial
and ghetto informants will logically be able to furnish
information and you should identify the location of all these
informants on the map with an appropriate locator reference
to an index showing the agent to whom the informant is
assigned and the coverage which informant can be expected to
provide.
EXPLANATIONS REQUESTED
Explanations are requested from SA's JAMES P. MALOY,
CARLTON H. WOLFARTH and GARY Ñ. MAVITY as to why they have
not developed a qualified criminal informant during the past
year.
requested.
'SA STANLEY
Comments of SAC, ASAC and SA STANLEY J. HENNESSY
HENNESSY, ASAC JAMES T. MORELAND
AND SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT:
The Inspector's analysis of
the Criminal Informant Program
has been reviewed by each of us. It has been the goal of
this office to develop quality informants that can furnish
information concerning violations within the jurisdiction of
the Bureau. As noted by the Inspector, we have increased our
:
NW-88608 Docid:32989633 Page 104
177
7
+
number of CI'S since the last inspection and have increased
the number of PCI'S since the last inspection. We have also
increased our payments to informants and no instances have
been found where we did not get value received from these
payments to informants. We have achieved excellent statistics
from them as indicated by the fact that at the close of the
last fiscal year we were ahead in all eight categories of
informant accomplishments. This is our continuing goal and
we will make every effort to surpass these accomplishments
in the coming months. The observations, instructions and
suggestions of the Inspector will be immediately complied
with and this program will continue to receive close super-
vision in order to get maximum results in connection with
our work.
178.
38608 Docid:32989633-Page-105
ས་:
1
SA JAMES P. MALOY: Since my assignment to the San Francisco
10/28/70
Office, I have developed 4 PCI's. I am
presently handling 4 PCI's.
One' PCI,
STEVE VINSON (137-5565) can be qualified as a CI as soon as
additional background information is obtained. I will
immediately develop this background information and he will
be qualified as a CI. In SF 25-75571 PCI Steve Vinson] (137-
5565) furnished information on which investigating Agents
located and interviewed subject (Mosely). In 25-7475 PCI
Steve Vinson (137-5565) furnished information on which
investigating Agents located the subject (Malagone). PCI
Vinson is in a position to furnish information on Deserters,
SSA fugitives, hippies and narcotics. In 25-73123 PCI
Jay Wilson (137-5790) furnished information re fugitive
Jonathan Pitts. In 25-72710 PCI Dewey A. Parker) (137-5566)
furnished information which resulted in the location of
subject Arsens Joseph St. Amand. Jr. I recognize the
importance of the Bureau's informant program and will make
every effort to develop other CI's.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 106
179.
30
SA GARY MAVITY:
10/28/705
GNM: jl
In the period of time I have jeen
assigned to criminal work I have
handled a number of PCIs with a view
to the qualification of them as
approved Criminal Informants. In the past year since I
last had an approved Criminal Informant I have handled
several PCIs including one who previously was the prime
factor in the apprehension of a Bureau fugitive wanted
for the murder of a police officer. This PCI has since
furnished information of value which was relayed to the
local police in a burglary case. He has been given the
assignment to develop further information concerning local
suspects in the handling of stolen merchandise from this
and other burglaries.
In the past year I have been unable
to devote a great deal of time to the development of this
and other PCIs due to having been utilized as Relief
Supervisor in the absence of the regular supervisor and
because of the time necessary to prepare and present lectures
at police schools on legal matters.
I am aware of the importance of the
Criminal Informant Program and will continue efforts to
develop a qualified Criminal Informant and expect to
qualify the above-mentioned PCI in the very near future.
180.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989633_Page_107
SA CARLTON H. WOLFARTH: I am extremely aware of the need to
10/28/70
CHW:ekk
develop CIs and have had a total of
nine PCIs in San Francisco during the
time I have been in San Francisco.
I arrived in the San Francisco Division,
7/13/69, on transfer from the Chicago Division. It is to be noted
that I developed CG 72150 in 1967. This informant had either
worked for or was close to the top men of organized crime in Chicago,
Miami and New Orleans. At one time, through a court order, this
informant was wired with a microphone and tape recorder so
information could be obtained in an Obstruction of Justice case.
I had at least one other informant while I was handling the
above informant, and handled both until leaving Chicago.
The potential of the four PCIs which I
opened on 8/24/70 and the one which I opened 10/19/70 appears
promising and it is anticipated that at least one will develop
into a CI in the near future.
My assignments in San Francisco have
been mainly ITSP FBW investigations which are complicated and
involve reviewing records and interviews with banks, brokerage
house and other business officials. I had one excellent
opportunity to develop a good CI when LOUIS MARDER, Las Vegas
furnished me on 2/27/70 and 3/2/70 the original information which
led to the recovery of $650,000 worth of Avco Thrift Certificates
at Las Vegas. [MARDER as recently as 10/27/70, furnished me
valuable information. He cannot be developed into a CI because
he lives in Las Vegas and is under Federal indictment in Miami.
I am sorry that this delinquency on
my part happened. It is regretted and I will not let it happen
again.
181.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 108
Rev. 8/24/70
INSPECTOR
Fin De 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/20/01 BY SP-2 ALM/776
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
AND INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
Occ LARSON
applicable, so indicate.
PART A.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
GENERAL
4-M-3
Please furnish data requested
below. If a question is not
}
Brief summary of commercial or continuing types of
lucrative crime in your territory such as organized
illegal gambling, loan sharking (shylocking), labor
racketeering, planned bankruptcy fraud, et cetera.
A brief analysis any corruption in law enforcement or
among political officials who tend to control law
enforcement.
Assess level of your informant and other coverage relied
upon in making responses to paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
What progress have you made in penetration of racketeering
operations since last inspection? To what extent has your
Criminal Intelligence Program been expanded since last
inspection?
Set forth total Agent days spent on Organized Crime and
Gambling Programs in last six months and if less than
previous six months explain. How many Agents are assigned
full time to these programs? Describe allocation of man-
power (headquarters and resident agencies) and outline your
plans for allocation of manpower in future (headquarters and
resident agencies). Outline supervisory responsibility and
functions in these programs.
SAN FRANCISCO
4-M-3
OCT 16 1970
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 109
INSPECTION
203.
:
Criminal Intelligence Program
2.
6.
7.
8.
9.
PART B.
"
.1.
.2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
•
Tabulate by months since last inspection the number of
origin cases opened in classifications 92, 143, 144, 162,
165, 166, 168, 172, and 179.
Set forth accomplishments including convictions since last
inspection as a result of Criminal Intelligence and Inter-
State Gambling Programs in your territory. Separately
set forth cases pending prosecutive action.
While prosecution of underworld leaders and associates is
a prime objective, a continuing flow of basic intelligence
on organized criminal activities and general crime picture
in your area is necessary to future success of your pro-
gram. Briefly describe examples of intelligence accom-
plishments which enable you to stay abreast of these conditions.
Cite examples of dissemination to other agencies, Federal,
state or local, which have resulted in disruption of organized
.crime.
GAMBLING MATTERS
Identify leading gambling operators in your division.
Indicate types of gambling prevalent in your division
and whether under hoodlum control.
What is extent of gambling in your division? Furnish data
available with respect to monthly or annual handle.
Advise how sports line is received or formed in your
division as well as how gambling operators are receiving
early race results.
What progress have you made in penetration of illegal
gambling operations since your last inspection?
By letter to SAC, Albany, 1/27/70, captioned "Gambling
Investigations Under Proposed S 30, Organized Crime
Control Act, 1970, IGA Activities," the Bureau issued
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 110
204

Criminal Intelligence Program
PART C.
1.
2.
PART D.
1.
2.
- 3 -
instructions regarding the investigation of gambling
matters. How have you complied with those instruc-
tions? Be as brief as possible; however, be specific.
TOP-ECHELON INFORMANT MATTERS
In providing information called for below, bear in mind
that a top-echelon informant can be qualified on the
basis of regularly providing productive information on
local gambling matters even if not tied into La Cosa
Nostra.
Show number and location of top-echelon informants at
time of last inspection and now. If decrease, explain.
Identify by symbol number top-echelon informants
developed since last inspection. List targets for develop-
ment in TECIP and show location. What are your plans
for increasing coverage?
Identify Agents working full time or almost full time in
Organized Crime and Gambling Programs who have not
thus far developed a top-echelon informant and explain
why not..
(Provide response only if applicable to your territory, i.e.
presence of La Cosa Nostra or major hoodlum activity.)
Identify organized criminal groups (e.g. La Cosa Nostra)
present in your division. Explain briefly manner in which
such group or groups, control any or all of operations
outlined in Part A, paragraph 1. Identify leadership
element. Break down your response by headquarters city
and resident agency territories.
What is estimated La Cosa Nostra membership in your
territory and how many have been identified. Of the
La Cosa Nostra members within your division, how many
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 111
205.
Criminal Intelligence Program
:
1
3.
PART E.
1.
2.
3.
- 4 -
have been identified by sources of your office? What
are your plans for effecting identification of other La
Cosa Nostra members residing in your territory? Has
your intelligence developed any indication of a change
in leadership or operations of La Cosa Nostra in your
division? If so, advise of your contemplated action
with respect to this situation.
* Identify by symbol number any top-echelon criminal
informants who are members of La Cosa Nostra or other
organized criminal groups in your territory. Outline
your prospects for development of additional informants
of this type.
TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
STREETS ACT OF 1968
Are Agents handling Criminal Intelligence Program inves-
tigations thoroughly familiar with all aspects of Title III ?
Have any Title III requests been initiated since last
inspection? Identify files.
Identify files wherein investigative efforts are being made
to justify Title III requests.
Comments of SAC requested.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 112
SAC R. G. GEBHARDT
10/22/70
"[
-
7
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
PART A. GENERAL
1.
The commercial or lucrative type of criminal
activity in the San Francisco Division continues to be
predominantly confined to the areas as noted below.
Exhaustive and probative investigation and close liaison
with local state and Federal agencies to date has revealed no
evidence of an organized criminal group controlling these
activities inngan Francisco or Resident Agency territories.
Investigation contacts with informants and other sources of
information have failed to reveal the existence of any
organized illegal gambling, loan sharking (Shylocking),
labor racketeering or planned bankruptcy frauds.
2.
A. Local bookmaking involving horse and
B.
sport bets conducted by numerous local
independent bookmakers, some of whom
have established "lay-off" arrangements
among themselves.
Prostitution activity primarily in the
"Tenderloin" section of San Francisco
involving out-of-town businessmen,
tourists, and servicemen with prostitutes,
most of whom are working for unorganized
negro "pimps".
C. Narcotic activity and related crimes
usually involving thefts and frauds near
universities, military installations, and
"hippie" or Bohemian sections of cities
within the division.
This office continues to enjoy an excellent rela-
tionship with the San Francisco Police Department and its
official personnel. Cooperation and excellent relationships
SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/22/70
CNH/crv
NW 88608 Docid:32989633-Page-113-
20%
2 -
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70.
are known to exist between all Resident Agencies and the
local law enforcement agencies in their territories. No
evidence or information has been made available to this
office to indicate that there is any corruption in law
enforcement in this division.
As the Bureau is well aware, Mayor JOSEPH LAWRENCE
ALIOTO was the Subject of anti-racketeering investigation
by this office several years ago, however, this matter has
been closed. ALIOTO prior to assuming the position of Mayor
of the City of San Francisco was a prominent and well known
attorney, particularly in the field of anti-trust matters.
He is known to have been the attorney for TONY LIMA, a former
"Boss" of the LCN in San Francisco. He also represented a
number of other LCN figures and their associates.
Prior investigation revealed that the cousin of
ALIOTO's father, JOHN ALIOTO, was the former "Boss" of the
Milwaukee LCN Family. JOHN ALIOTO attended the inauguration
of Mayor ALIOTO at San Francisco in January 1968.
As a result of an article published in "Look"
magazine, September 23, 1969, linking ALIOTO with many LCN
figures, ALIOTO filed a $12.5 million libel suit against
"Look" magazine and the authors of this article, RICHARD
CARLSON and LANCE BRISSON.
:
On May 15, 1970, Federal Judge BRUCE THOMPSON
declared a mistrial in San Francisco on this suit in that
the jury was unable to agree on the key issue of whether
the article linking ALIOTO with the "Mafia" was published
with "malice and reckless disregard for the facts." The
jurors told newsmen that the article was defamatory to
ALIOTO and that at least 50 per cent of the 27 points were
indeed untrue. There was no agreement as to whether the
falsehoods and the article's general claim that ALIOTO was
"enmeshed in a web of alliances" with the "Mafia" represented
"malice and reckless disregard for the facts." U.S. Supreme
Court has ruled that such a finding is essential to a libel
judgment sought by a public official.
208
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 114
37
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70
-
3
On August 5, 1970, RUDOLPH RAPALÈ, brother-in-law
of Mayor ALIOTO, filed a $2 million libel suit against
"Look" magazine and CARLSON and BRISSON. This article re-
ferred to a trip by PAPALE to Mexico during which PAPALE met
with FRANK BOMPENSIERO, "CAPO", of the Los Angeles Family of
the LCN residing in San Diego to discuss a lard selling
permit in Mexico for a company of which PAPALE was former
president.
On September 5, 1970, it was reported that retrial
of the ALIOTO $12.5 million libel suit against "Look" was
tentatively reset for May 3, 1971.
3.
San Francisco top level informants currently being
handled consist of four members of the LCN and six” TE
informants in the gambling and related criminal fields,
LCN TE informants and ten PC target informants report on LCN
activities of the San Francisco and San Jose Families as
well as LCN activities in other divisions. Our other TE
informants and our 36 PC target informants regularly report
on matters involving bookmaking, prostitution, pornography
and other criminal matters. [As an indication of the level
of our informant coverage since last inspection, SF 2689-C-TE
assumed the position of "Boss" of the San Francisco DCN
Family. These informants due to their positions and locations
have made it possible to obtain top level information necessary
to provide coverage for Items 1 and 2.
4.
Since last inspection extensive investigation as
well as informant coverage led to the first ITAR conviction
prosecutions ever in the San Francisco Division (see Item 7
below).
r
Investigation in the case CARL EZEKIAL ECKSTIN,
ITWI, case developed a "shakedown" by ECKSTIN against local
bookmaker VICTOR ROMOLO. This matter arose out of the failure
of ROMOLO to pay a bookmaking debt owed ECKSTIN. SALVATORE
VINCENT "BILL" BONANNO, JOSEPH BONANNO, JR., MAURICE PATRICK
HARTIGAN and MARTIN CHEIPETZ CARSON acting as agents for
ECKSTIN attempted to collect the $1,600 gambling debt and
during contacts with ROMOLO threatened him with physical harm
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 115
209
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70
if he failed to pay the debt. This case is currently
under investigation with the matter being presented to
the Federal Grand Jury at San Francisco for violation
of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 894, Extortionate Credit
Transaction Statute.
It should be pointed out that "BILL" BONANNO
and JOSEPH BONANNO, JR. are the sons of JOSEPH BONANNO,
a "Commission" member of the LCN in the United States.
SR.,
The aforementioned Subjects are also involved in
a separate ECT case involving the shakedown and threats to
do bodily harm to. WILLIAM JOSEPH ELLIS. This matter is
presently under investigation and will be presented to the
Federal Grand Jury, San Francisco immediately upon completion
of Grand Jury action in the ECKSTIN ECT case.
Since last inspection investigation has continued
in regard to GUISEPPI CONFORTE, the reported Vice Lord,
State of Nevada, who for years has headed up a major pros-
titution operation. Through extensive investigation and
the placement of SF 3239-C-TE and SF 3369-C, this organization
has been completely penetrated identifying his lieutenants
´ and scope of operation. As a result of the above, it has been
determined that CONFORTE's operation has spread to the State
of Hawaii being controlled there by one of his top lieutenants,
TOMMY SEALE. San Francisco has under. preparation an affidavit
for a request of a Title 3 electronic surveillance on the
phones utilized by this organization in Honolulu. This Title 3
affidavit has been prepared with the assistance of Departmental
Attorney at San Francisco and who has discussed same with the
Organized Crime Section, Department of Justice, who has advised
that upon completion of current investigation in Honolulu the
affidavit should be immediately submitted for approval.
As another example of the progress made in the
penetration of the racketeering operation since the last
inspection information was received that HARRY JOHN JOHNSON
and ALAN "SUITCASE" FIDLER,: two. Boston "hit men" received a
contract, reportedly by a printer, to travel to San Francisco
and "straighten somebody out over a union matter." JOHNSON,
a former resident of San Francisco, is known as a former
associate of JACK GOLDBERGER, top local Teamster official
e a
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 116
210.
- 5 -
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70
and reportedly JIMMY HOFFA's special West Coast representative.
JOHNSON and FIDLER travelled to San Francisco from Boston in
January, 1970 and through surveillance and subsequent intensive
investigation it was determined that they met with one GEORGE
R. DUNCAN, International Representative, International
Typographers Union (ITU). It was determined that shortly
prior to the travel of JOHNSON and FIDLER to the San Francisco
area a strike situation existed at the San Rafael "Independent
Journal" newspaper involving the ITU. Through cooperation and
liaison with local law enforcement, JOHNSON and FIDLER were
arrested near San Rafael, California and found to be in
possession of handguns and mace. Shortly after the return
of JOHNSON and FIDLER to the Boston area, an individual who
had knowledge that they had been given this contract was
found murdered in Boston and on his body were found the names
and telephone numbers of JOHNSON and PYDLER. Through these
efforts the attempt by JOHNSON and FIDLER to perform the
conditions of the contract were thwarted. In addition, this
matter is being considered by Departmental Attorney for
possible Federal Grand Jury presentation.
Another example of progress made in the penetration
in the field of intelligence and organized crime in this area
resulted when through information furnished by top echelon
informants revealing the presence of ALATADENO JAMES FRATIANNO
residing in the San Francisco territory. Through investigation
and surveillances conducted FRATIANNO was subsequently contacted
and was developed as a top echelon target of this division.
Frequent contacts were conducted with FRATIANNO and extensive
cooperation was obtained from him concerning organized crime
FRATIANNO was identified as a member of the Los Angeles Family
of the LCN and during August, 1970 was indicted by Federal
Grand Jury convening in San Francisco for two counts of
violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 894, ECT.
presently incarcerated FRATIANNO is being contacted periodically
as a target in an effort to continue development of his
cooperation.
Although
Increase in penetration of racketeering operations
since last inspection is evidenced by the above examples as
well as the statistical accomplishments reported. hereinafter.
:
211.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 117
40
6
:
5.
Total Agent days spent on organized crime (an
gambling program in last six months was 2,370 days, 31 burs.
The total for the prior six months was 2,356 days, 4 hours.
1
1
There are 19 Agents working full time on the CIP,
14 in Headquarters City and 5 in RA's.
The following Special Agents are assigned full
time to the CIP Squad:
Supervisor
CHARLES N. HINER
Squad Assignments
TECIP
IGA
ITAR
-
-
. LOWELL S. LAWRENCE, Coordinator
CHARLES E. GALVIN
BERNARD A. FEENEY, Coordinator
JAMES F. BLANTON
THOMAS J. A. HENRY
GEORGE B. JARVIS, JR.
JOHN G. REDMOND
PROSTITUTION COSBY J. MORGAN,
-
EDWIN K. TANAKA
Coordinator
PETER K. STACKHOUSE
CIP-AR
-
FRANK UNDERWOOD, III, Coordinator
JOHN CONNOLLY, JR.
J. TIMOTHY LANN
DAVID J. SARGENT
Berkeley RA
-
GEORGE R. ZEIGLER
Oakland RA
-
RUSSELL J. HUCKABY
San Jose RA
-
JOHN M. PAGE
JOSEPH CHIARAMONTE
Walnut Creek RA
-
RUDOLPH H. MANCINI
Manpower for the program is constantly being re-
evaluated for maximum effectiveness and efficiency both in
212.
NW 88608-Docid:32989633 Page 118
7
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70
Headquarters City and Resident Agencies. Manpower will
be allocated in the future according to the demands of
the investigative matters to be conducted.
Tabulation by months since last inspection, ofcothe
number of origin cases opened in the following classifica-
tions:
6.
92
143
144
162
165
166
168 172
179
1969
July
10
0
0
1
15
22
0
0
0
August
4
0
0
11
8
0
0
0
September 27
0
0
0
19
34
1
October
12
1
0
0
23
30
0
0
November 28
0
0
0
54
26
0
1
December
14
0
0
8
1970
January
February 23
22
15
4
1
30
1
.0
2
30
March
17
1
22
5
2.232
33
29
0
0
29
0
0
31
1
30
0
0
April
14
0.
0
4
26
0
May
16
11
3
33
June
17
0.
0
15
17
41
0°
0
July
8
0
4
10
47
0
August:
4
0
6
16
30
1
September 16
0
0
2 13
58
0
0
TOTALS
225
7
0
65
258
474
.2
-NW 88608_Docld:32989633 Page 119
213:
3
8
SAC R. E.
10/22/70 .
7.
GEBHARDT
Since the last inspection seven convictions have
been reported as a result of Criminal Intelligence and
Interstate Gambling Programs as indicated below:
Caption
HULLEN HOWARD WATKINS, aka;
GAIL KRISTINE WATKINS
ET AL
ITAR
-
-
VICTIMS
PROSTITUTION; WSTA
THOMAS HENRY SZYMANSKI, aka;
DONNA MARIE STEVENSON
ET AL
on
ITAR
-
VICTIMS
PROSTITUTION; WSTA
EDWARD ADOLPH BARDYSZEWSKI,
TFIS; AR
CHARLES PRITCHETT, aka;
IVAR ARNOLD KVALNES, aka
ITAR
-
- CGR
-
GAMBLING;
GAMBLING
T
JACK GLENN KNOPFER;
EUGENE DE POLO
ITGD
cases:
Bufile
SF File
Convictions
166-3994
166-846
2
166-3664 166-615
1
aka
92-11801 92-1180
1
166-4217 166-949
2
:
143-1138
143-54
l
Prosecutive action is pending in the below listed
Caption
:
ALADENA T. FRATIANNO, aka
AR; ECT
Potential
Bufile
SF File Convictions
-
92-3899 92-271
1
JACK GLENN KNOPFER;
EUGENE DE POLO
ITGD
143-1138 143-54
MILTON GOLDMAN, aka
ITSP; AR
92-10419 92-715
1
-NW-88608-Docld:32989633 Page 120
214.

1
r
-9-
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70.
The following additional convictions were reported
'by CIP Squad:
Caption
JOSEPH ALEX RUDY, aka;
DONALD NASON
EXTORTION
-
-
Bufile SF File Convictions
VICTIM
CONTEMPT OF COURT
9-50141 9-2315
1
TERRY LEE GREENFIELD;
UNITED AIRLINES,
SFIA.
-
VICTIM
EXTORTION
MYRTLE ALICE HALL, aka
LMRDA
-
IM
JOHN REED COX, aka;
9-51445 9-2375
1
159-3071 159-267
FLOREDIA ALLEAN SAVAGE
EXTORTION
-
VICTIM
9-49946 9-2303
,cases:
1
Prosecutive action is pending in the below listed
Caption
FRED JOE THORNTON, aka;
Bufile SF File
Potential
Convictions
ERMA SCOTT, aka
->
VICTIM
EXTORTION
9-51238 9-2363
1
SUZANNE HONEY STOUGHTON, aka-Fug.
LMRDA
-
IM
159-3044 159-264
1
TED CECIL SURRIDGE
LMRDA
GO
IM
ROBERT WILLIAM WARD;
SHIRLEY OWDEN
-
EXTORTION
159-2972 159-259
1
VICTIM
9-51212 9-2362
1
215.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 121
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70
10
Subsequent to the submission of last inspection
report, through information by top echelon, informants this
office, information has been developed that SF 2689-C-TE
has assumed the position of "Boss" of the San Francisco
LCN Family.
SF 2656-PC has reported to the return to the San
Jose area of STEFANO ZOCCOLI, Consiglieri of the San Jose LCN
Family from Los Angeles where he had been residing for the
past year.
During November 1969, SF 2656-PC reported that
GEORGE ADRAGNA, a member of Western Pennsylvania Family of
the LCN was coming to the San Jose area to live. Subsequently,
SF 2656-PC and SF 2689-C-TE reported that ADRAGNA´s membership
had been transferred to the San Jose LCN Family and he is
currently residing in the San Jose area.
Subsequent to the submission of last inspection
report SF 2689-C-TE reported that JAMES FRATIANNO, a member
of the Los Angeles LCN Family had moved into the San Francisco
·area where he remained until August when he commenced serving
a prison sentence executed by the state of California.
During October, 1969, information was received
indicating that JERRY LISNER, major bookmaker, Los Angeles,
California was in contact with. JOHN CASTELLI, bookmaker,
Oakland, California. The purpose of this contact was for
LISNER to establish a base of operation, particularly book-
making, for his criminal activities in the San Francisco
area. Investigation subsequently established that LISNER
and others commenced a bookmaking operation in Alameda and
Contra Costa Counties, East Bay Area, using as its front
A-1 TV Service, Oakland, which is owned by JOHN CASTELLI.
Following extensive investigation in cooperation with the
Oakland Police Department, no evidence was developed to
indicate any violation of Federal statutes. On November 22,
1969, the Oakland and Berkeley, California Police Departments
simultaneously arrested SALVATORE J. BERNICE, JOHN TRAPPS and
two other associates who were engaged in LISNER's bookmaking
-NW-88608-Docld:32989633_Page_122
21%
11
-
1
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70.
operation.
These arrests resulted in a breakup in the
entire bookmaking operation and subsequently during
February, 1970 LISNER returned to the Los Angeles,
California area.
In July, 1970, information was made available
6 the San Mateo Police Department which led to the arrest
of WALTER DALY, PAULA DALY and SABRINA DUNN. These indi-
viduals were arrested for prostitution, conspiracy,
maintaining a disorderly house and being an inmate in a
disorderly house. These arrests were a direct result of
informant information and investigation conducted by the
San Francisco Office which revealed no Federal violation
and therefore was referred to local authorities. This
operation was determined to be a $90,000 a year "high class"
call girl service and from this five other call girl services
were uncovered, all local in nature in San Francisco.
Intelligence information concerning these operations has
been furnished the San Francisco Police Department and are
being followed closely by the San Francisco Office.
9°
Results of dissemination of information resulting
. in disruption of organized crime since the last inspection
are illustrated by the following statistical accomplishments:
Raids
Individuals Arrested
Convictions
12
39
38
Amount of money seized $5,829.00
Total "handle"
bookmaking
$895,000.00
Prior to the last inspection, these accomplishments
were as follows:
Raids
Individuals Arrested
Convictions
10
24
10
Amount of money seized $5,198.00
Total "handle"
bookmaking
-
$575,500.00
✓ NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 123
21
SAC R. E. GEBHARDT
10/22/70
12
In addition to the foregoing, as a result of
information furnished by SF 2956-C-TE and SF 3036-PC,
CHARLES FRANCIS LEAHY, JR., Major San Francisco bookmaker,
was arrested on August 4, 1970, by the San Francisco Police
Department on charges of bookmaking and ex-convict in
possession of firearm. Trial date was initially set for
September 22, 1970 in Municipal Court, San Francisco,
however, has been set over until October 28, 1970.
218.
NW-88608-Docld:32989633-Page-124-
47
i
PART B: GAMBLING MATTERS
-
13
1. In the San Francisco Division there appears
to be two gambling operators that lead all others in terms
of handle, volume, coverage, number of accounts, and
number of employees. These operators are CARL EZEKIAL
ECKSTEIN and CHARLES FRANCIS LEAHY, JR., both of whom are
based in San Francisco. While they both handle substantial
individual accounts, ECKSTEIN and LEAHY are primarily
associated with and rely on lessor local bookmakers for
"action."
CARL EZEKIAL ECKSTEIN, age 40 years, has been
engaged in gambling activities most of his adult life.
ECKSTEIN was formerly associated with TONY RUIZ and other
San Francisco bookmakers, but in the last year ECKSTEIN
has set up his own independent operation. ECKSTEIN has been
arrested on several occasions on charges of bookmaking but
has never been convicted of this violation. In 1965 ECKSTEIN
was convicted for failure to pay Federal wagering tax, which
conviction was subsequently overturned. Details regarding
his current operation are set forth below in Paragraph 3.
CHARLES FRANCIS LEAHY, JR., a native San Franciscan,
in his middle 40's, has been engaged in bookmaking activities
throughout his adult life. He was convicted in United
States District Court, San Francisco, in 1961 for arrest
on 9/28/60 for violation of Title 26, Section 7203, U.S.
Code, failure to report and pay wagering tax, and was
sentenced to six months in jail and five years probation.
Subsequent to his incarceration, LEAHY moved to Medford,
Oregon. He returned to the San Francisco area in the Spring
of 1969 and resumed his bookmaking activities. During his
absence from San Francisco, his ex-brother-in-law, KENNETH
JOSEPH ZAHND, reportedly handled his, LEAHY's, bookmaking
operation. LEAHY was recently arrested by the San Francisco
Police Department on local bookmaking charges and is
currently awaiting trial.
222
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 125
-
14
-
2. The types of gambling prevalent in the San
Francisco Division are primarily wagering on horse races
and sporting events. In addition, small numbers betting
with a weekly drawing take place usually in the Spanish-
speaking communities. There are also legal and illegal
card games operating usually in low-income commercial
neighborhoods. Gambling in the division is conducted by
individual operators who are independent of each other,
except for layoff purposes with respect to bookmaking and
there are no indications of hoodlum control over any of
these activities.
3. Concerning the extent of gambling in this
division, bookmakers ECKSTEIN and LEAHY, named in Paragraph
1 above, operate in the following manner. Both are in
daily contact with their accounts located in the Bay area
which include other bookmakers for layoff purposes, split
bookmakers, and numerous individual bettors.
Bets are placed with these operations generally
at locations to which the general public has access, such
as bars, restaurants, coffee shops, and other small shops.
The "action" received at these business locations are in
turn called in to a phone spot operated by a bookmaker who
has a gambling relationship with the operator of the
business.
ECKSTEIN normally operates with six employees,
including two phone men, a bookkeeper, a pay & collect man,
and two runners. In addition, he utilizes several split
bookmakers as employees. The principal bookmakers and
split bookmakers-involved in the ECKSTEIN bookmaking
operations are THEODORE CHALMIS, ALBERT DiGERONIMO, ELBERT
HEDRICK, MANNY PRONGOS, and ALBERT CARLSON. ECKSTEIN's
monthly handle based on informant data, evidence seized by
the San Francisco Police Department during recent bookmaking
raids, and interviews of bettors is estimated to be approxi-
mately $50,000 for horse bets. His sports "action" varies
with the season of the year and bettor interests in particu-
lar sporting events; however, ECKSTEIN's handle for sports
action is estimated to be $40,000 per month.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 126
བ་མ་བ་
15
t
i
LEAHY's operation normally consists of a separate
phone man for horse racing action and sports bets, at least
two pay & collect men, and several runners operating in the
vicinity of three San Francisco bars in which LEAHY
reportedly has a hidden interest. The persons believed
to be associated with LEAHY as bookmakers and/or split
bookmakers are ROBERT MAGIDSON, ATTILIO SPAGNUOLA, VICTOR
FORNER, KENNETH ZAHND, MORRIS COOPER, and ALBERT CARLSON.
With respect to LEAHY's handle it is to be noted
that a review of records seized at the time of his arrest
on 8/4/70 discloses a daily handle for horse action in the
approximate amount of $2,000 or approximately $50,000 per
month. Data regarding LEAHY's sports handle is incomplete
but it is estimated that this handle is comparable to that
of ECKSTEIN.
Based on a review of available gambling records
seized by local authorities on lessor local bookmakers,
it is estimated that they have a monthly handle of approxi-
mately $25,000 each. Investigation, including contacts
with informants and local authorities, indicates there are
`approximately 20-30 lessor bookmakers operating in the
San Francisco Division on any given day. Accordingly, it
would appear that the monthly handle for the San Francisco
Division is in the approximate amount of one million dollars.
4. Sports line is formed by local bookmakers who
receive an early opinion line from sports services located
in Los Angeles, California, operated either by GERALD
KILLGORE, DOMINICK "SONNY" DeFALCO, or FRANK MILANO.
Upon receipt of this line information, the local bookmaker
will make his own adjustments, if necessary, to suit his
particular situation. In addition, the local major news-
papers in this division publish line information on a daily
basis prior to a particular sporting event.
Early race results are currently being furnished
to local bookmakers by JERI GORDON MATZA who openly operates
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 127
· 16
-
a sports service at 225 Kearny Street, San Francisco.
Investigation has determined that MATZA receives race
results by calling either California Turf, Los Angeles,
a horse race results business operated by FRANK MILANO,
or J & K Sports Journal, North Hollywood, California,
operated by GERALD KILLGORE.
835. Since the last inspection, the San Francisco
Office has developed SF 2661-C-TE, who is a key operator
within the ECKSTEIN bookmaking organization. SF 3036-PC,
who was targeted at time of last inspection, has been
developed to the point where he furnishes detailed
information on a weekly basis regarding the LEAHY bookmak-
ing organization. This target is a split bookmaker handling
sports "action" for the LEAHY organization. As a result
of information furnished by SF 3036-PC and SF 3237-C-TE,
LEAHY was arrested by the San Francisco Police Department
on 8/4/70 on charges of bookmaking and convict in possession
of a weapon.
SF 3090-PC was targeted at the time of the last
inspection; however, during the past several months, he
has furnished extensive information regarding several
large bookmaking operations.
SF 3387-C was developed since the last inspection
and was responsible for the initial information and identifi-
cation of a major bookmaking operation in the East Bay area,
including Oakland, California, and Naval Air Station,
Alameda, California. The informant's information led to
the arrest and subsequent conviction of the two major
operators within, the organization in United States District
Court, San Francisco. In addition, based on informant's
information and investigation by this office, there were
two arrests and convictions effected by local authorities,
Oakland.
NW-88608-Docld:32989633-Page-128-
222.
51
-ON
17
-
i
As a result of extensive investigation in the
ECKSTEIN ITWI case, a "shakedown" on the part of ECKSTEIN
against a local bookmaker was developed. This investigation
has resulted in two major ECT cases involving non-payment
of bookmaking debts which are currently under investigation
and before the Federal Grand Jury at San Francisco. Το
date, eight local bookmakers have appeared before the
Federal Grand Jury and others will be called. This has had
a disruptive effect among bookmakers and has created an
atmosphere of distrust.
6.
Pursuant to instructions set forth in Bureau
letter to SAC Albany 1/27/70 regarding gambling investiga-
tions under proposed SB30, a review of gambling cases was
undertaken. It should be pointed out that during the past
three years, it has been the policy of the San Francisco
Office to closely follow the activities of local gambling
organizations and/or subjects in an attempt to develop any
indication of a Federal gambling violation. Per instructions
additional 162 and 165 cases have been opened and investigated.
Specifically since 2/1/70, sixty-three 162 cases and ninety-
eight 165 cases have been opened.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 129-
༡༢
11
-
18
PART C. TOP-ECHELON INFORMANT MATTERS
1.
At the time of the last inspection, San Francisco had 7
top-echelon (TE) criminal informants. Of those 7, 4 were
LCN members:
SF-2550-C-TE, San Jose "family"
SF-2745-C-TE, San Jose "family"
SF-2689-C-TE, San Francisco "family"
SF-3208-C-TE, New York "family"
SF-2956-C-TE, San Francisco
SF-3058-C-TE, San Francisco
SF-3237-C-TE, San Francisco
Since the last inspection, this office has developed
three additional TE informants:
SF-2661-C-TE, San Francisco
SF-3300-C-TE, San Francisco
SF-3239-C-TE, San Francisco
At the time of the last inspection, San Francisco had
under development a total of 39 PC informant targets.
。
Targets currently under development are as follows:
LCN Members
-
10
SF-2501-PC, San Francisco
SF-2874-PC, San Mateo
SF-3013-PC, Monterey
SF-2545-PC, San Francisco
SF-2582-PC, San Jose
SF-2630-PC, San Francisco
SF-2886-PC, San Jose
SF-3132-PC, San Francisco
SF-3141-PC, San Francisco.
SF-3242-PC, San Jose
NW-88608-Docld:32989633-Page-130-

มง
Associates of LCN Members 5
-
SF-2656-PC, San Jose
SF-3123-PC, Oakland
SF-3241-PC, San Jose
SF-3385-PC, San Francisco
SF-3288-PC,
11
11
Gambling and General Criminal Field 31
SF-2500-PC, San Francisco
-
SF-2845-PC,
"
11
$
11
SF-2927-PC,
**SF-3036-PC, Oakland
SF-3061-PC, San Francisco
SF-3090-PC,
"
SF-3112-PC, "
SF-3135-PC, Oakland
It
SF-3144-PC, San Francisco
SF-3178-PC,
11
SF-3235-PC, !!
SF-3243-PC, 12
SF-3245-PC, "
SF-3251-PC, "
SF-3132-PC,
SF-3290-PC, "
"
1
SF-3291-PC,
SF-3310-PC, It
SF-3318-PC,
SF-3338-PC,
"
"
"
ft
11
"1
"1
it
SF-3324-PC,
"
"
SF-3333-PC,
SF-3336-PC, 11
SF-3347-PC, 11
SF-3351-PC, "t
SF-3350-PC, It
SF-3355-PC, $3
SF-3385-PC,
SF-3349-PC,
SF-3234-PC, "
SF-3356-PC,
"
11
12
"t
12
Santa Cruz
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 131-
225.
20
The San Francisco Division has under development a
total of 46 PC targets in San Francisco and RA territories.
The TECIP continues to be intensified for development of ad-
ditional targets and information received regarding subjects
of AR, ITAR and gambling investigations, as well as informa-
tion received by our informants, is carefully evaluated for
possible selection of potential targets under this program.
2.
Agents
JAMES F. BLANTON
JOSEPH CHIARAMONTE
THOMAS J. A. HENRY
RUSSELL J. HUCKABY
J. TIMOTHY LANN
JOHN M. PAGE
JOHN G. REDMOND
DAVID J. SARGENT
FRANK UNDERWOOD, III
GEORGE R. ZEIGLER
Targets Assigned
2 1
2243NIAH22
1
It should be noted that SA's LANN and SARGENT were as-
signed to Squad #34 handling CIP matters subsequent to the last
inspection. All agents on this squad are well aware and con-
stantly apprised of the importance of the TECIP and efforts
will continue to insure that each agent will develop a TE
informant.
NW 88608. Docid:32989633 Page 132
226.
ار دیگه میشه ره
r
21
PART D.
1.
The La Cosa Nostra (LCN) continues to exist in the Northern
California area and includes a San Francisco "family"
and a San Jose "family. There are currently 8 members of the
San Francisco "family" residing in this division and 19 members
of the San Jose "family" residing in this division. In addition,
there are two members of the San Francisco "family" residing in
the Sacramento Division, one member in the Los Angeles Division,
one in the Chicago Division and two members presently residing
in Italy. There are currently 3 members of the San Jose "family"
residing in the Sacramento Division and one in the Las Vegas
Division. All of these members have been identified as members
of the San Francisco or San Jose "families by TE informants
of the San Francisco Division.
Four top echelon informants of this division who are
members of LCN "families" have failed to indicate that the LCN
"tamilies" of this division register any control over gambling,
narcotics, prostitution or any other organized illegal activity
within this division.
The present leadership of the San Francisco "family"
has recently been assumed by ANTHONY LIMA, who took over this
position when the previous "boss", JAMES JOSEPH LANZA, stepped
down in his favor. The "underboss" of the San Francisco "family"
is GASPARE "BILL" SCIORTINO and this "family" has one Capo de
Decina, VINCENZO INFUSINO, who resides in Modesto, California,
in the Sacramento Division.
The leadership of the San Jose "family" remains the same
as at the time of the last inspection report with JOSEPH CERRITO,
the "boss," PHILIPPO OCTAVIO MORICI and STEFANO ZOCCOLI,
Consiglieris, and one Capo de Decina, EMANUEL FIGLIA.
No ap-
pointment has been made to the position of "underboss" since
the death of the previous "underboss," CHARLES CARBONE, in 1967.
2.
There are presently 8 members of the San Francisco "family"
and 19 members of the San Jose "family" residing in this
territory. All of these members have been identified by TE
criminal informants of this division.
TE informants of this office who are members of the LCN
or associates of members of the LCN have been alerted to con-
tinue to furnish information and identities of any individuals
227
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 133
56
222
who are associated with the LCN in this territory. SF-2689-C-TE
has indicated that the recruits are the "second army" of the
LCN and to be aware of and on top of activities of the LCN,
it is necessary to identify these recruits. Since the last
inspection, TE informants have identified an additional 11
recruits of the San Francisco and San Jose "families" residing
in this territory or in the Sacramento territory.
As has been reported above, TE informant of this office
reported the change in leadership of the "boss" of the San
Francisco "family" when JAMES LAÑZA stepped down in favor of
ANTHONY LIMA.
In addition, informants of this office reported the
return to the San Jose area of Consiglieri STEFANO ZOCCOLI, who
has been residing in the Los Angeles territory.
3.
The following TE criminal informants are members of the
LCN in the San Francisco territory:
SF-2550-C-TE
SF-2689-C-TE
SF-2745-C-TE
SF-3208-C-TE
Agents of the San Francisco Division currently involved
in the development of TE criminal informants and in AR investiga-
tions are contacting the following PC targets who are members
of the LCN in this territory in an effort to develop their
cooperation:
SF-2545-PC
SF-2501-PC
SF-2630-PC
SF-2874-PC
SF-3013-PC
SF-2582-PC
SF-2886-PC
SF-3132-PC
SF-3141-PC
SF-3242-PC
Of the above LCN member targets, SF-2501-PC, SF-2874-PC and
SF-3141-PC, in contacts to date, have furnished some cooperation
and it is felt that with continued contacts, these targets offer
excellent potential. In addition, from contacts to date, SF-2630
and SF-3013-PC have also expressed some cooperation and it is fel
offer good potential as targets under the TECIP.
228.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 134
PART E.
23
TITLE III OF THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
STREETS ACT OF 1968
1
1.
2.
3.
All agents assigned to Squad #234, handling CIP matters,
are thoroughly familiar with all aspects of Title III.
Yes. See 3. below..
Since the last inspection, extensive investigation, as
previously reported herein, has been conducted in the
GIUSEPPE CONFORTE; ETAL case. During recent weeks, an affidavit
for a Title III electronics surveillance has been prepared with
the assistance of the Departmental attorney at San Francisco.
This case, as well as the affidavit, has been discussed with the
Organized Crime Section, Department of Justice, by the
Departmental attorney and it is agreed that upon completion of
investigation currently being conducted by the Honolulu Office,
these results should be added to the affidavit and immediately
submitted to the Bureau and the Department for approval.
:
229.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 135
1 ADDENDUM
1
24/
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON:
10/27/70
COFL: dp
with appropriate personnel:
LA COSA NOSTRA (LCN)
The following comments
are based on a review of
information of pending
files and interviews
Investigation by your office revealed the existence
of two LCN "families" within your territory. Membership
within these "families" total 64 individuals. Your
investigation revealed neither "family" is considered to be
very strong and has little or no illegal operations being
conducted on a day to day basis.
One "family" is centered in the San Francisco area
and has for the past few years buen headed by James Lanza,
an attendee at the Apalachin meeting in 1957. Lanza has
recently stepped down as boss of the San Francisco "family"
and has been replaced by Toni Lima. Your investigation
reveals that Lima's leadership has not been approved by
the "commission." You should follow this matter closely
so you will be in a position to know all activities relating
to this change in position.
The second "family" is centered in the San Jose area
• and is headed by boss Joe Cerrito. This "family" exhibits
little enthusiasm for illegal operations. You should closely
follow the activities of members of this "family" to insure
that any illegal operations are immediately known to your
office.
Organized Crime
تر
Although prostitution, gambling and narcotic activities
exist within your division, there is no indication from your
investigations that these operations are controlled by either
the LCN or other organized groups. Your investigations
should be continually pursued with vigor in order that your
office will be aware of any illegal operations within your
division. This is particularly true in regard to gambling
activities in view of the recent passage of Senate Bill 30.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 136
230.
25
As you are aware provisions of Senate Bill 30 made it al
Federal crime in certain gambling operations and it will
not be necessary to prove interstate aspects of the
gambling activity.
1
Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program (TECIP)
The following is an analysis of your Top Echelon
Informant Program at this time as compared with the last
inspection:
:
Rating
Excellent
Last Inspection
Very Good
Good
Fair
Poor
Insufficient Data to Rate
4220001
Totals
7
Present Inspection
Mmmhool
3
3
3
10
It is noted your office has penetrated the LCN
"families" in both San Jose and San Francisco through the
development of member informants. This is very noteworthy
and you are encouraged to make certain that your member
informants are utilized to the best advantage of the Bureau.
Also, it is noteworthy that you have increased your TE
coverage from 7 to 10 since the last inspection.
SF 3058-C-TE (San Francisco file 137-4670; Bureau
file 137-17455) was rated fair because of a lack of productivity.
You should follow instructions issued in Bureau letter dated
July 14, 1970 and if this informant is unproductive for four
months subsequent to the receipt of that letter the informant
should be closed.
Although SF 2745-C-TE (San Francisco file 137-3456;
Bureau file 137-11174) was rated good, his progress should
be closely followed. Although he is noted to be a member
informant the file indicates he is very sick with varicose
veins and is very old. The majority of information furnishėd
by this source has been of a nature of past activities and
little present information is being furnished by him.
should endeavor to have him furnish more productive recent
informant or give consideration to concentrate on a more
productive source.
You
231
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 137
S
•
26
A review of your file 137-5207, Bureau file 137-20313
concerning SF 3208-C-TE indicates the source was last contacted
on June 26, 1970. The file indicates this source sold his
business and left for Los Angeles and this information was
learned by your office on August 13, 1970. The file also
indicates this TE left the New York area because of being
a victim of a shylock loan. In view of this information
you should closely follow this informant's activities and
be circumspect in dealing with the informant to prevent
any possible embarrassing situation from arising.
The following is a rating of the PCs and a comparison
with the ratings at the time of the last inspection:
Last Inspection
Present Inspection
Rating
Excellent
Very Good
Good
11
Fair
Poor
Insufficient Data to Rate
0627701
.1
Totals
39
l
7
24
3
1
10
46
It is very encouraging to note that you have increased
your targets from 39 from the time of the last inspection to
46 at the time of this inspection. You are encouraged to
continue this most desirable trend.
SF 2123-PC (San Francisco file 137-4945; Bureau file
137-11841) was rated fair. This target was opened on April
8, 1968 and was last contacted on October 10, 1969. You
advised that contact is being held in abeyance pending a
surveillance which was conducted by the Oakland Police
Department in early 1970. In view of the length of time
since this case was opened and the length of time since this
target was contacted he was rated fair.
SF 2630-PC (San Francisco file 137-2967; Bureau file
137-9023) was rated fair. By letter dated December 10, 1968
the Bureau advised that this target was over two years old
and that you should consider deleting within four months if
he was unproductive. This informant was also rated fair
during the last inspection because of lack of productivity.
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 138-
232
27
ک کی کر
The only reason this informant is being classified fair,
instead of poor is because information contained in your
letter to the Bureau dated September 18, 1970 wherein your
informant reported information was furnished by a TE to
the effect that the present "boss" of the San Francisco
LCN "family" had been discussing leadership of the San
Francisco LCN with the target. You are instructed that
in the event he does not furnish valuable positive information
within 90 days he should be closed and a more suitable target
developed.
SF 3061-PC (San Francisco file 137-4768; Bureau file
137-17558) was also rated fair. This target along with the
other two targets rated fair should be closely followed for
90 days and be given specific assignments during that period
of time. In the event they are unproductive they should be
closed.
SF 2582-PC (San Francisco file 137-2696; Bureau file
137-8249) was rated poor and should be closed.
In regard to your PCs, the following specific
instructions are being furnished you:
SF 2656-PC (San Francisco file 137-3086; Bureau file
137-9425) was rated good because of his being close to San
Jose LCN member Dominick Anzalone and Pittsburgh LCN member
George Adragna who recently moved to San Jose. He is also
close to LCN "recruit" Vito Adragna. It is noted that this
target has been opened for a period of more than one year
and has been furnishing general rather than any specific
information. You should encourage this informant to furnish
some specific information concerning these people who he
is close to in order that he may be retained as a target of
your office.
SF 3318-PC
SF 3318-PC (San Francisco file 137-5545; Bureau file
137-22526) has been a target of your office since December
26, 1969. Unless your office is in possession of some
specific information to the contrary he should be immediately
interviewed to determine whether he will be cooperative
with your office.
NW-88608-Docld:32989633-Page-139-
233,
62
28
i
SF 3135-PC (San Francisco file 137-5010; Bu eau file
137-19079) was opened on May 17, 1968. During the wo
inspections since he was opened this PC was rated Unsufficient
Data to Rate. On November 20, 1969 you advised that an
interview of this PC was being held in abeyance pending an
investigation by the Oakland, California Police Department.
The file indicates that that investigation was completed on
August 6, 1970 with your target paying a $125 fine. On
August 19, 1970 you advised that interview of the target
was being delayed pending further investigation. You are
instructed that this interview should be immediately conducted
in order to determine if this target will be cooperative with
your offiœ.
SF 3297-PC (San Francisco file 137-5457; Bureau file
137-22106) was opened on October 17, 1969. The file indicates
that this target has never been interviewed and you indicate
that contact with the target is being delayed until a more
logical area of vulnerability is developed. Inasmuch as
this target is over one year old it is felt that sufficient
information should be developed so that your office might
approach this target to determine if he will be cooperative
with your office.
'
SF 3192-PC (San Francisco file 137-5016; Bureau file
137-10982) was opened on May 21, 1968. SF 3110-PC (San
Francisco file 137-2182; Bureau file 137-22452) has been
opened since December 8, 1969. It would appear that
sufficient time has elapsed in order for your office to
develop background information so that an interview of
these targets can be conducted. You should without further
delay interview these targets to determine if they will be
cooperative and if not you should consider closing and finding
more suitable targets for development.
Information you furnished indicates there are ten
SAs who are working either exclusively or virtually exclusively
'on the CIP and IGA program who have not developed TEs.
Although all ten Agents have PCs their progress should be
closely followed to insure their participation in the
development of TEs. In this regard you may desire to
reiterate provisions of the Manual of Instructions to the
Agents on the program concerning the qualifications of TE
informants.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 140
234.

'
29
All Agents are to be reminded that in dealing with
I informants, they are to be particularly alert and not
leave themselves open for criticism or false accusations.
The importance of having an alternate contacting Agent ·
or another Agent along during the course of certain,
interviews is advisable in case any compromising situation
is attempted.
"
1
With the recent enactment of Senate Bill 30 you
should concentrate on increasing your informant coverage in
the areas covered by this legislation. Also in regard to
the passage of Senate Bill 30 dealing with gambling, which
you are aware does not now require interstate activity, you
should not overlook the utilization of your racial informants
to furnish information to your office concerning gambling
activities. Other divisions of the Bureau have been
particularly successful in coordinating the information
from racial informants in to the CIP and IGA programs.
Statistical Accomplishments
During the fiscal year (fy) you recorded two convictions
in the CIP-IGA category. During the fy 1970 your office had
three convictions. During the first three months of fy 1971
you have recorded one conviction in this category.
According to the information furnished by your office
: you have four cases pending prosecution, two of which are
in the 159 (LMRDA-IM) category and two are in the 92
(Anti-Racketeering) category. Only one of these cases is
in the CIP-IGA program. A review of your files indicates
that in file 179-24 in a case captioned JAMES FRATIANNO,
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTION (ECT), the subject was
indicted under Title 18, Section 894 of the U.S. Code.
Your office was working the case under Anti-Racketeering
classification and the file was opened after the ECT
indictment.
:
In regard to the possible statistical accomplishments,
from the above file it would appear the local office of the
United States Attorney will seek indictments under the ECT
statute. A review of your cases in this category reveal only
three Office of Origin cases. The files also indicate instances
wherein there are shylocking activities among the gamblers
where there are large debts outstanding. A review of your
235.
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 141
ง
$30
!
`file 165-100 on Kenneth Joseph Zahnd, aka; Morris Cooper,
ITWI, indicates the local office of the United States Attorney
appears to be in no rush to seek Grand Jury indictments on
gambling matters. If the local office of the United States
Attorney will entertain prosecution under ECT and is in
! no rush to seek indictments under the gambling statute,
you should review at squad conferences with Agents assigned
to the program provisions of SAC letter 68-46 dated August
20, 1968 wherein provisions of the ECT statute are set forth.
>
'
In relation to statistical accomplishments, prior
experience has shown a direct relationship between Office
of Origin cases in a particular classification and statistical
accomplishments. As of September 30, 1970 your monthly
administrative report reflects the following Office of Origin
cases in the categories enumerated:
Classification
92
143
144
162
165
166
168
172
Office of Origin Cases
02
0
22
50
128
0
1
2
179
A review of the monthly administrative reports since
the last inspection indicates your office of origin cases
has remained fairly constant since the last inspection.
With the increase of manpower on this program and the
addition of informant development since the last inspection
it is anticipated that your office should be in position at
this point to begin to show results in regard to the
statistical accomplishment phase of this program.
Supervision And Manpower
The CIP and IGA program is supervised by Supervisor
Charles N. Hiner, Discussions with Supervisor Hiner and
personnel assigned to the program indicate a very enthusiastic
approach to the problems involved in this program.
:
NW-88608-Docld:32989633_Page_142
236.
31
Immediately prior to the last inspection, by letter
May 29, 1970 captioned "CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM,
ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL MANPOWER, you advised the Bureau
of the addition of ten Agents to be assigned exclusively;
to this program. Your success since that time has been
noted by the addition of one conviction in 1970 vs. 1969.
Also you have added three TEs to the program and seven
additional PCs. This is to your credit and you are encouraged
to continue this favorable trend. However, the collection
of intelligence information, though very important, is only
one phase of this program. The other phase of the program
which must receive close supervision and personal attention
is the obtaining of convictions to fulfill the Bureau's
responsibility toward statistical accomplishments.
In regard to statistical accomplishments, other
divisions of the Bureau have been very successful in
the utilization of Title 3. The utilization of Title 3
requires extensive use of manpower and if the Title 3 you
are presently awaiting approval is approved you should
judiciously use manpower in the operation of the Title 3
installation.
In regard to the utilization of manpower, it is
imperative that all Agents assigned to this program show
the necessary zeal to accomplish the desired results of
. intelligence information and statistical accomplishments.
In the event any Agents assigned to the program fail to
show the necessary enthusiasm consideration should be given
to the reassignment of those Agents to other squads.
Administration And Files
Several instances were noted wherein the "pink sheet"
were not completed although the informant files have been
opened for a considerable period of time. The following
are instances of this:
137-2341
137-5457
137-5545
137-3813
137-5651
137-3241
137-5688
137-5293
137-5650
137-5423
137-5597
137-5323
237,
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 143
32
:
There were four instances wherein you were instructed
during the last inspection to complete the pink sheet and
although 14 months have passed since last inspection these
pink sheets have not been completed. While failure to
complete the pink sheet when instructed does not necessarily
indicate an Agent's enthusiasm in working this program, it
does not show the desired attitude. These four instances
are as follows:
137-4768
137-5015
137-4945
137-5016
This
A review of your 162 files indicates several instances
wherein Bureau instructions were not followed. These Bureau
instructions were set forth in Bureau airtel dated April 2,
1969, captioned "INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITY MATTERS."
is found in your file 162-00-21. Briefly, these instructions
stated that the 162 classification should be reserved for
"intelligence-type" inquiries and that substantive cases
should be opened under the proper classification. These
files which were opened on individual gamblers were as
follows:
162-897
162-896
162-893
162-885
162-883
162-902
162-903
162-892
162-899
162-733
162-900
A review of your 166 files indicates cases which
appear to be of dubious prosecutive potential and
you should closely follow these cases to insure that when
it is determined they are of no intelligence or prosecutive
value these cases should be immediately closed. Instances
are as follows:
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 144
238.
33
166-1628
166-1623
166-1652
166-1614
166-1510
166-1624
166-1650
166-1615
166-1491
166-1625
166-1635
166-1616
166-1550
166-1627
166-1634
166-1571
166-1551
166-1630
166-1646
166-1572
166-1633
166-1607
166-1648
166-1567
166-1632
166-1610
166-1649
166-1575
166-1631
166-1653
166-1667
166-1576
Dissemination
:
"
Your office has been very successful in obtaining
favorable results in dissemination of information to local
law enforcement agencies concerning local violations
developed during the investigation. You are encouraged
to continue this favorable trend; however, you should
bear in mind that violations that were strictly local in
nature previously may now be covered by the recent enactment
of Senate Bill 30. Those which are determined to be Federal
violations, of course, should be prosecuted in Federal
court.
New Legislation
A review of your files indicates you have complied
with Bureau letter dated January 27, 1970, concerning the
then proposed Senate Bill 30. You should closely follow
guidelines formulated by the Bureau in regard to this
new legislation in order that your office will be abreast
of the latest information so that the Bureau's responsibilities
in the organized crime field can be fulfilled.
Observations and Instructions
· (1) Provisions of Title 3, the Extortionate Credit
Transaction statute and of the Manual of Instructions
concerning the qualification of TEs should be reiterated
to all Agents on the program at squad conferences.
(2) You should stress to all Agents on the program
the necessity of developing quality TEs.
NW-88608-Docid:32989633_Page_145
239.
68
34
(3) You should stress the necessity of proper
utilization of Title 3 installations as other field divisions
have been very successful in this regard in obtaining a
backlog of potential statistical accomplishments.
(4) You should concentrate on quality cases which
have prosecutive potential which will obtain the desired
statistical accomplishments.
(5) You should keep abreast of policy in regard to
new Senate Bill 30 so that the Bureau's responsibility in
this regard can be fulfilled.
Comments of Supervisor HINER and SAC requested.
A
SUPERVISOR CHARLES MINER AND.
SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT
Inspector's in-depth
analysis and favorable
comments regarding positive results achieved in the Criminal
Intelligence Program are appreciated. You are assured the
observation and comments will be closely followed and
implemented.
240.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 146
SELECTIVE SERVICE MATTERS
4-M-5
1.
INSPECTOR
ARE: AC.
LARSON:
}
The following comments,
observations, recommendations
and instructions are being made after an in-depth review of
a representative number of your Selective Service Act matter
cases and administrative files along with conversations with
supervisory and Agent personnel and review of the answers to
questions in a separate yellow (4-M-5):
The San Francisco area is a
haven to draft dodgers and this undesirable situation will.
not be reversed until we make this area unattractive for
"bums,""hippies," and members of white and black extremist
groups who come to San Francisco in order to avoid the draft.
Several obstacles must be surmounted in order to reverse this
undesirable situation. The indifferent attitude that the
judges have displayed to date must be reversed towards a
tough handling of Selective Service Act violators. Supervisory
and Agent personnel must maintain an aggressive attitude and
continue to be a leader in streamlining processing procedures
by the United States Attorney's Office and various Selective
Service Boards to insure that these violators are promptly
prosecuted in the courts. Every technique available to the
Bureau should be used to get the judges, United States
Attorney and public riled up about this ridiculous situation.
Aggravated violators should be put in jail.
There are 2,983 "hippie-type"
communes in the San Francisco Division comprising in excess
of 20,000 population. 1,050 of these communes are located in
the Berkeley and Oakland areas comprising in excess of 10,000
population and 43 communes are known to be violently oriented.
Your office has eight subjects who have committed Selective
Service Act violations that are members of white and black
extremist groups. Every effort should be made to take these
individuals out of circulation by placing them in jail.
Information concerning their activities with extremist groups
should be furnished to the probation officers so that they
can so inform the judges in their presentencing report. All
Agents handling Racial Matters and Selective Service Act
matters should be periodically reminded to be on the alert
SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
4-M-5
10/28/70
OLD:lcj/dp
O/R
An
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 147
24.1
}
to identify members of the Black Panther -Party, Students
for a Democratic Society, and other members of extremist:
groups who are in violation of Selective Service Act
matters. These should be promptly discussed with the
United States Attorney for expeditious handling.
United
There are several reasons
why the draft dodgers come to this area to beat the draft,
however, the six most important reasons are as follows:
howeve
3113
1.
Nation-wide publicity during the last
three years concerning San Francisco
being a haven for draft dodgers.
The apathetic attitude of the United
Stătes District Judges. Sentences have
been very light and many decisions were
adverse due to technical grounds which
made prosecution of additional cases
difficult.
3. Large panel of attorneys, most, if not
all, of them of civil liberties inelina-
tion, was formed a few years ago in San
Francisco under the auspices of the U, S.
District Court for the purpose of defending
Selective Service Act violators. The
4.
Sei
dere
attorneys are appointed from this panel, by
the court, when a man cannot afford his own
attorney. The expenses for the violators'
defense are paid out of the U. S. Legal
Assistance or Public Defender Fund in San
Francisco. Many of these attorneys have
not only defended inductees who refused to
step forward for induction, but have fur-
nished legal advice and assistance to
various
Resistance movements in the area...
not
The Resistance, a loose organization in
various colleges throughout the United
States, has counsellors who assist regis-
trants in deciding what their rights: and
possibilities are under the Act.. The
Resistance has several offices in various:
parts of Berkeley, Oakland and San Francisco:
where men can go for advice.
Vitet e
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 148
24-2-
-
3
5.
6.
Investigations have developed strong
indications that there is a loosely
organized I movement by registrants,
to deliberately crowd the court calendars
in San Francisco to make the reaching
of any one man as slow as possible.
This will also give the violator the
opportunity of getting the indictment
against him dismissed alleging that
the defendent cannot receive a speedy
trial.
The former United States Attorney had
on his staff an assistant handling 25
cases who had never served in the Armed
Forces and was outwardly sympathetic
towards the Selective Service Act
violators. The new United States Attorney
has a good attitude towards the prosecu-
tion of these violators, however, he has
not completely replaced the staff of the
old United States Attorney.
A major portion of the Selective
Service Act violations in the San Francisco Division pertains
to the inductees failing to step forward to be sworn into
the Armed Forces, thereby refusing induction. The Armed
Forces Examining and Entrance Station located in Oakland,
"California handles all inductions for Northern California
and part of Nevada and handles approximately five per cent
of all inductions in the United States.
Approximately 38 per cent of
all refusals for induction into the Armed Forces arise at
Oakland, according to the Department of the Army statistics..
Many registrants from all over the United States come to the
'San Francisco area for the specific purpose of having their
local draft board changed to this area, and after meeting
all other requirements for induction, refuse to step forward
to be inducted knowing that they will have two years or longer
of freedom due to the slow handling of these cases by the
Selective Service Board, United States Attorney's Office
and the courts. San Francisco has several cases where the
violations are over two years old in which no prosecutive
action has been taken.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 149
دارد
4.
4-M-5
1
It is evident from the
backlog of cases awaiting trial (414), backlog of cases'
awaiting prosecutive action by the Federal Grand Jury
(749) and the fact that these violations are being re-
ceived by your office at the average rate of 175 cases
per month, that something must be done to get these
cases before the courts. The most aggravated cases should
be singled out and tried first, particularly those indi-
viduals who are members of extremist groups. Experience
has shown that after several subjects have received rigid
sentences, and a widely publicized trial, that many subjects
enter guilty pleas hoping for lesser sentences by avoiding
the Government the expense of a trial.
It is recognized the San
Francisco Division has been most forcefully making every
effort to expedite the handling of these cases, particularly
through the judiciary. Indications are that the relatively
newly appointed United States Attorney is sympathetic and
receptive to the problem and is making an effort to diminish
the backlog of cases awaiting Grand Jury presentations, but
it is recognized once an indictment is returned, it is then
up to the judiciary to proceed through the final step, to
which they have not been particularly receptive. They have
not responded enthusiastically to handling these matters in
Federal Court.
It is obvious the Federal
Judges in Northern California (San Francisco Division) have
resisted any and all pressures brought to bear upon them
concerning this problem. In my analysis of this situation,
I have determined that the United States Attorney's Office,
personnel of the FBI, and Selective Service personnel have
all attempted to influence the Judges in handling these
matters more expeditiously to no avail. Furthermore, within
recent months there has been wide-spread nation-wide publicity
relative to their coddling and minimizing this particular
problem.. This apparently has had no effect upon them. It
would, therefore, appear that the various Federal Judges
will not react to this problem unless some superior influential
individual or group can forcefully bring this matter to their
attention, particularly if such individual or group is one
which the Federal Judges would respect. The obvious answer
is the Administrator of the Courts for the Federal Judicial
System in Washington, D.C. and/or Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, WARREN BURGER.
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 150

- 5 ·
4-M-5
You are, therefore, instructed
to suggest to the Bureau that the contents of the letterhead
memorandum setting forth this overall problem be brought to
the attention of the Attorney General with the further sug-
gestion that the Attorney General bring this matter to the
attention of the Administrator of the Courts of the Federal
Judicial System and/or Chief Justice BURGER for his analysis
and information, and the further suggestion he may desire to
communicate with the Chief Federal Judge in San Francisco
relative to these matters.
SAC, ASAC, Supervisory and
Agent personnel should take advantage of every opportunity
to personally discuss this aggravated situation with the
United States Attorney, Selective Service Board officials,
SAC contacts and other prominent individuals to get them
riled up about this ridiculous situation. Insure that
continuous close liaison is maintained by supervisory and
Agent personnel with United States Attorney's Office and
various local draft board officials to insure that these
cases are promptly processed and prosecuted.
Your office in April, 1969
suggested to the former United States Attorney that arresting
several inductees on the spot might have a favorable effect
upon lowering the rate of refusals at the Oakland Induction
Center. The only objection given by the former United States
Attorney was that the case of the registrant must be presented
to the Federal Grand Jury within two weeks after arrest. Due
'to your effective liaison, most of the "bottlenecks" have been
worked out between the Selective Service Board and United
States Attorney's Office in which these arrests can now be
effected. You should be alert to members of extremist groups
who will fail to step forward at the time of their induction
and appropriately arrange with the United States Attorney for
authority to arrest these individuals on the spot. You should
insure that such arrests are given adequate press coverage..
Such plans should be brought to the attention of the Bureau
for their consideration in making a national press release,
if warranted.
You must closely coordinate
Selective Service Act cases with Agents handling extremist
groups such as the Black Panther Party, Weatherman, SDS, etc.
These files should be cross-referenced by appropriate
memoranda.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 151
245.
'
6
-M-5.
5.
Statistical Accomplishments and Administrative Handling of Cases
As of 9/30/70, you had 1,873 origin Selective
Service matters (1,799 active and 74 inactive). Between
March and September 1970 you received 1,186 Selective Service
Act matters for investigation, an average of 169 (1,186 - 7)
per month.
As of 10/23/70, 1,163 of the origin cases were
completed. 749 cases are awaiting the United States
Attorney's (USA) prosecutive decision, and 414 cases involve
indictments of subjects and are awaiting trial. The case
load is split about in half between Headquarters City and
Resident Agents. 17 Agents are assigned to Squad 6 who
handle only Selective Service Act (SSA) matters and their
informants. One Agent has been on extended sick leave.
Approximately 18 Resident Agents spend between 60 to 100%
of their time on Selective Service Act matters. During
the fiscal year 1970, ending 6/30/70, you recorded 74
convictions and for the first four months of fiscal year 1971,
ending 9/30/70, you have recorded 9 convictions.
The procedures followed by your office concerning
the immediate handling of subjects who refuse to step forward
at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, Oakland,
California, appear to save Agent time and Government expense
and should be continued. It is noted, however, that several
months elapse between the time the Subject is interviewed and
the time the United States Attorney makes his prosecutive
decision since he insists that the Selective Service file be
processed and forwarded to his office by the State Director of
the Selective Service Board. You should have Headquarters
city Agents continue close liaison with Selective Service
Boards and the United States Attorney's Office to insure that
these cases receive expeditious processing and are presented to
the Federal Grand Jury at an early date.
?
Current administrative procedures being followed in
these refusal type cases are as follows:
The Induction Officer at the Armed Forces Examining
and Entrance Station, Oakland, California, calls an Oakland
Agent when there is going to be one or more inductees who will
refuse to submit to induction. Inductions are handled on
a Wednesday of each week. The Special Agent witnesses the
refusal, conducts a short interview of the Subject, and in
almost every instance secures an admission from the Subject
that he knew he was violating the law and that he had thought
NW-88608-Doeld-32989633-Rage-152
246.
7
about this matter carefully before refusing to step
forward. The Agent during this interview obtains the Subject's
current address which is generally different from the one he
furnished the Selective Service Board. The Agent places
the Subject on notice as to what probably will occur as to an
indictment, summons, etc. The Subject is cautioned to remain
in touch with his Local Draft Board in order to avoid being
a Bureau fugitive.
A case is immediately opened and assigned to the
Oakland Agent who prepares a report. Information copies of
the report are furnished to the local USA, San Francisco and
the field office and the USA covering the Subject's draft
board when located in another division. It is the USA's
opinion (San Francisco) that the refusal to step forward takes
precedence over any prior delinquencies and will be handled
by the USA, San Francisco. Instructions are given in leads
to Headquarters city Agents and/or auxiliary offices to
closely follow the Local Boarḍ to insure that all pertinent
information regarding the Subject is promptly furnished
to the USA, San Francisco.
In order to streamline the administrative handling
of these matters as well as keeping the Bureau fully
informed of the activity you are taking in these matters to
insure prompt prosecutive handling, the following instructions
should be followed:
All refusal cases and all other cases in which
the investigation is completed should be reassigned to three or
four Headquarters city Agents. These Agents will have
the responsibility of getting these cases to the Federal
Grand Jury and on the trial calendar. Those cases in which
the subject becomes a fugitive should be reassigned to another
case Agent.
T
፡፡
At the present time there are 1163 cases pending
prosecutive action. In order to eliminate status letters and
reports to the Bureau in these type cases, the following
procedures should be followed.
Memos to the SAC should be placed in individual
files to keep them from becoming delinquent. When the
Subject is indicted the Bureau should be immediately advised
in each individual case. Beginning 10/30/70 and continuing
on the 15th and 30th of each subsequent month, you are to
advise the Bureau, by letter, entitled "SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
MATTERS, SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION" of the activity conducted,
247
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 153
8
4-M
which would include the total number of cases present('d
to the Federal Grand Jury during the prior two week period,
identifying each case by San Francisco file number; Bureau
file number and title; the number of cases completed and
awaiting Federal Grand Jury action; number of new cases
received for investigation and general comments concerning
the attitude of the USA's Office and U.S. District Courts
concerning these matters. Also you should comment on any
favorable publicity being given these matters by the local
press media.
In the refusal cases the Bureau should be specifically
advised of the status of a case within five months after (es
violation. The USA should be requested to advise of the
prosecutive action he intends to take in each case and this
information reported in the individual file.
It is felt that better liaison can be maintained
with the USA's Office when only two or three Special Agent!
present these cases in a group thereby eliminating 30 to 79
different Agents presenting their cases separately. The
Bureau will be kept advised on a semi-monthly basis of
the activities of your office in getting these SSA matters
through the courts. The above procedures will eliminate
the dictation and typing of approximately 750 pages each
month.
There are a sufficient number of SSA cases in
Berkeley, Oakland, San Jose and San Francisco for your
consideration of having a Special Clerk handle the
review of Selective Service Board records. You should
closely review these situations in these particular areas
and if warranted recommendations for hiring Special Clerka,
i
Comments of SAC requested.
BHARDY
SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT
(10/29/70)
Supervisor
M. ANDRESS
The inspector's instructions will be followed.
248.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 154
1
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM
Administrative Handling of Theft
From Interstate Shipment Cases in
the San Francisco Division
INSPEC
SPRE FOR
A
ARNOLD C. LARSON:
During the course of the
inspection of the San Francisco
Office a review was made of 140 Theft From Interstate Shipment
cases. Instances were noted wherein Bureau Regulations
'concerning the handling of these cases were not followed.
forth below are instances noted during this review:
Set
In the following cases, it was noted the amount
involved appeared to be a minor amount and there appeared to
be no aggravating circumstances concerning these violations.
In some instances concerning the cases which originated at the
San Francisco Airport, it was noted the file indicated there
was a possibility of an individual at the airport being involved
in the theft. However, it is felt it is not necessary to keep
open all the minor cases in order to determine which, if any,
employees at the airport may be involved. These cases where
minor amounts are involved are as follows:
15-11816
-11977
-11987
-11988
-11989
-11990
-11991
-11993
-11995
-11814
-11946
-11945
-11944
-11947
-11927
-11941
=11926
-11940
-11824
-11992
-11902
SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/28/70
✓
10FL:st
-NW-88608-Docld:32989633_Page_155
249
-11996
-11994
-11953
-11925
- 2 -
-11923
The FBI Handbook, Part III, Chapter 73, Paragraph
F, Page 192, states as follows:
“If complaint is received involving a
minor Theft From Interstate Shipment where there
are no known aggravating or unusual circumstances,
immediately present facts to USA for prosecutive
opinion. If USA will not consider Federal prose-
cution, conduct no investigation, advise complainant,
and, where appropriate, refer matter to law enforce-
ment agency having jurisdiction. Confirm to USA and
complainant in writing opinion and action taken."
None of the aforementioned cases reviewed indicate
you are referring minor violations to the U. S. Attorney to
determine if he would prosecute in the event a subject was
identified.
There were numerous incidents wherein information
had been received and the file contained no FD-302s and no
indication that the FD-302s had been dictated.
The following is a list of these files which includes
only those files wherein the case is at least 15 calendar days
old. These files are identified as follows:
15-11918
-11980
-NW-88608-Docld:32989633_Page_156
-11816
-12010
--12011
-12013
-12017
-11814
-11947
-11837
-11831
-11983
-11902
༢༦༠.
-11939
-12006
-11973
-11933
-11969
-12003
-12000
-11999
-11998
-11954
-11925
- 3
-11923
The Manual of Rules and Regulations, Section 4,
Paragraph C2b and c, provide as follows:
(b) "Information not in a signed statement receiveā
from a witness and concerning which the witness may testify"
should be reported on the Form FD-302.
(c) "Information which may be the subject matter
of testimony of a Bureau Agent" should be reported on the
Form FD-302.
Four instances were noted wherein serial numbers
have been obtained and, although sufficient time had lapsed,
the serial numbers had not been entered into NCIC. These cases
are as follows:
15-12006
-11994
-11965
-11877
The Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section
3, Paragraph F, Page 31 and following pages lists the procedures
for entering serial numbers of stolen items into NCIC.
1
In your file 15-11918 a case was opened wherein the
opening memo states there is no Federal violation involved.
The alleged purpose of opening this case is because the person
who is responsible for this theft may have been involved in a
theft wherein FBI jurisdiction was apparent.
Explanations Requested
Supervisor GLENN A. HARTER is requested to explain
the following:
NW 88608_Doeld:32989633 Page 1572
251.
4 -
1) Why, in his supervision of these matters, he
failed to insure that cases involving minor thefts were
immediately presented to the U. S. Attorney for prosecutive
opinion in accordance with existing Bureau instructions.
2) Why, in his overall supervision, he failed to
detect that FD-302s were not prepared in the aforementioned
cases.
3) Why he failed to detect that serial numbers in
the aforementioned cases were not entered into NCIC.
4) Why a case was opened on 15-11918 when the
opening serial indicated no Federal law had been violated.
Comments of SAC requested.
]
NW-88608 Docld:32989633 Page 158
252.
-5-
✓ SUPERVISOR GLENN A. HARTER:
10/28/70
1) This office received a
letter from the U.S. Attorney
dated 6/24/69 wherein the
U.S. Attorney advised that they would not undertake prosecution
of minor theft cases. The letter set the guide as those
cases of value of less than $100. This office has been
following the interpretation of minor thefts as those having
a value of less than $100. It was the judgment of this
office that bout all of the airport thefts involved amounts
in excess of $100. It appears that an average loss at the
airport would average an estimated $250, it being noted that
the airline companies currently are paying up to $500 per
bag. Therefore, these cases were not judged to be minor
cases and had not been discussed with the U.S. Attorney as
their value exceeded $300. In following this policy San
Francisco believed that they were in compliance with Section 94
of the Manual regarding presentation of minor cases to the
US. Attorney. In the future this office will immediately
present cases of the type cited by the Inspector to the
U.S. Attorney before any investigation is conducted and
will consider suitcase type thefts as minor cases.
2) Submission of FD 302s. Regarding
the fact that I had not detected that FD 302s were not
included in the 25 files listed by the Inspector, I would
like to explain that 13 of these files were opened after
September 22 and I had not reviewed any of these files
as yet on tickler and thereby would not have had an
opportunity to detect the fact that the FD 302 was not
listed. The remaining files have not all been available
for review at this time but it is obvious that some of
these files did not have FD 302s prepared :- promptly.
3) NCIC Entries. Three of the
four files listed where NCIC entries had not been made
had not as yet been reviewed on ticklers since they had been
received in this office. One of the four files, 15-11994, re-
flects a suitcase claim check number which is not suitable
for entry into the NCIC.
4) File 15-11981 was recommended
to be opened by the case Agent as he felt that this
shipment involved personnel and circumstances which
would be logically worked in connection with other existing
TFIS cases and that it might be a lever for possible.
informant development. The Agent hoped to work this case
even though it was not a Federal violation and obtain an
253,
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 159
82
1
-6-
ม
informant and utilizing the Subject's complicity in the
case as a possible lever. It was believed that he
could obtain a criminal informant.
I regret very much that it was
necessary for the Inspector to call to my attention the
matters referred to in this administrative write-up. I
will take the necessary action to insure that minor cases
are immediately presented to the U.S. Attorney, that FD 302s
are immediately prepared, that NCIC numbers be immediately
entered where pertinent so that it will not be necessary
for these matters to be called to my attention again.
NW 88608 Dold32989633- Page 11
254.

7
SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT:
The USA advised this office by
letter dated 7/16/69 that the
FBI should no longer present minor theft cases to the USA's
office and that these cases should be deferred to local
courts. The office has followed the policy set down by the
USA and has utilized his guideline of $100 as a minor case.
In view of his policy, the office has not been receiving minor
theft cases, as the local business community has been made
aware of the policy of the USA and has not been referring
minor cases to the office.
Occasionally some minor case is received from
someone not aware of the policy of the USA's office in not
prosecuting cases having a value of less than $100. In the
future when a complaint is received regarding a minor theft,
the case will be immediately presented to the USA and after
his declination, the office will advise the complainant and
the USA's office in writing and where appropriate, refer the
complaint to the local law enforcement agency having jurisdiction
over the violation. This procedure will be in line with the
requirements in the Manual of Inspection, Section 94.
NW-88608 Docid:32989633 Page 161
255.
i
ADDENDUM
- 8
1
INSPECTOR
بان
C. LARSON: In regard to your answer to this
write-up, the following is
pointed out to you:
1.
In
Your answer implies the inspector indicated that
´all suitcase-type thefts are minor thefts. This is completely
inaccurate as each case, whether it be a suitcase or otherwise,
has to be judged on the merits of the individual case.
the review of 140 cases there was not one single instance
wherein the United States Attorney had been consulted to
determine if the case was a minor amount and he would not
entertain prosecution even if the subject were identified.
2.
Concerning the submissions of FD-302's to the
file, the following is a tabulation of cases over two months
old in which no FD-302 is in the file:
FILE NUMBER
15-11918
15-11816
15-11814
15-11947
15-11818
15-11902
15-11939
DATE OPENED
8/14/70
7/6/70
7/2/70
8/26/70
7/10/70
8/25/70
8/28/70
15-11933
8/21/70
Although the remainder of the 25 files pointed out to
you did not contain FD-302's and the files had not come
up on ticklers for your review, it is apparent with this
number of files without FD-302's the Agents are not receiving
adequate instructions in conferences concerning proper
preparing of FD-302's in TFIS cases.
256.
NW-88608-Docid:32989633-Page-162-
9
3. Although it was pointed out to you wherein;
NCIC entries on serial numbers had not come up for adminis-
trative review, it is apparent that several Agents on your
squad have not been properly instructed in the necessity
of immediately entering serial numbers into NCIC. It should
not be necessary for you to have to remind Agents on your
squad on a periodic file review of the necessity of entering
serial numbers into NCIC. They should not wait an extended
period of time to enter these numbers in NCIC, but the serial
numbers should be entered immediately after they are obtained.
4. File 15-11981 was of a purely local nature and
should have been worked out of the related Federal violation
case rather than open a separate TFIS case wherein no
Federal jurisdiction was indicated in the opening serial.
Supervisor HARTER and SAC noj
NW-88608-Doeld:32989633-Page-163-
257,
I
1
:
CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP
-
JEREMIAH JOSEPH SULLIVAN, Jr.
SSN 4-30-46-219
SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
SF file 25-66962
Bufile 25-555242
00: San Francisco
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON:
,
1
This is a pending case, opened
on 3/16/67, assigned to SA
GERARD JAMES NORTON of the Richmond, California, Resident
Agency. It is supervised by SA RAY M. ANDRESS.
A review of this file reveals the Subject was de-
clared delinquent by Local Board #330, Richmond, California,
on 3/9/67, for failure to report for inquction on 8/17/66.
The whereabouts of the Subject have been unknown since 3/16/67,
and considerable investigation has been conducted to locate
him. Information was developed in March, 1970, that Subject
was possibly in Canada and a friend of Subject's mother advised
in September, 1970, that the Subject is in Canada, but that his
mother does not have an address for him. The Subject is re-
ported to telephone his mother on occasions. Other neighbors
and police have reported Subject to be in Canada at the present
time.
In view of the above, the following action should be
promptly initiated in an effort to ascertain the location of
the Subject:
1. Prepare a letterhead memorandum, in accordance
with instructions set forth in the Manual of Rules and Regu-
lations, Part II, Section 4, page 14 (2) (a) I and SAC letter
#70-27, dated 5/19/70, in order that information regarding
the Subject may be furnished to the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police.
SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/20/70
ALA:lcj
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 164
294.
n
2
-
2. Place stop notices with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service.
3.
1
Place stop, under Subject's name, with the
FBI Identification Division.
4. Place stop notices with the appropriate FBI
Border Offices.
parents.
5. Check toll telephone calls on Subject's
If the objective of this case is obtained,
either directly or indirectly as a result of this suggestion
memorandum, advise the Bureau by routing slip, attention:
The Inspection Division.
Comments of SA GERARD JAMES NORTON, Supervisor
RAY M. ANDRESS, and SAC requested.
SA GERARD JAMES NORTON:
10/22/70
Inspector's comments are appreciated
and recommendations will be done
immediately.
.¨ SUPERVISOR RAY M. ANDRESS:
are carried out.
SAC GEBHARDT:
This will be followed closely to
insure that Inspector's suggestions
Inspector's comments appreciated. This will be
done.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 165
295.
1
:
ARNOLD C
CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP
RAND N. DODD
SSAN 548 62 8438 A
ASN 28 189 434
FUGITIVE DESERTER
SF 42-44226
BU 42-284756
00: SAN FRANCISCO
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON:
This is a pending case in the
San Francisco Office which was
opened in July 1969 and is presently assigned to SA JEAN G.
HUGHES. It is supervised by SA H. ERNEST WOODBY.
Extended investigation has been conducted since
inception of this case in the neighborhood of Subject's parents,
1132 South Sage Court, Sunnyvale, California. When case was
initiated, it was determined Subject's family had moved from
870 El Camino, Mountain View, California, the address shown on
Subject's DD 553 in 12/68 which was prior to Subject's
reported absence from the military in 4/69. Subject's
parents have appeared to be cooperative and although present
neighbors of Subject's parents are not well acquainted with
the Subject, they are cooperative and a neighborhood source
has been established.
Subject entered military service in 9/66 at San Jose,
California, at which time he was approximately 20 years of
age. Since initiation of this investigation, additional past
residences have been developed for Subject's parents at 278.
Lassen Avenue, Mountain View, California in 9/63; 620 East
Mauded Avenue, Sunnyvale, California in 7/68 and 1390 Latham
Street, Mountain View, in 7/68. A neighbor has indicated
Subject may have a brother but could furnish no specific
information concerning his identity. Attempts to establish
residence at the Latham Street address have been negative.
Mail returned to the U.S. Army addressed to the Latham Street
address indicated a possible residence of Apartment 101, 1617
Pine Street, San Francisco, California. Investigation has
also indicated past employment for the Subject at Channing
House, Palo Alto, California, for a period not stated.
In view of the fact Subject had already entered
military service before his parents moved to their current
address, it is suggested investigation be concentrated in
San Francisco Inspection
10/22/70
LSM/jb
NW-88608-Diacld:32989633 Page 166
2
the following areas to develop background and associates of
Subject which may be of assistance in determining his present
whereabouts and causing his apprehension:
1.
1
Re-interview parents specifically concerning
the identity of any possible brothers or sisters
or other close relatives Subject might logically
contact.
2. Conduct in depth investigation in areas of
family's former residences, correlating this
inquiry with results of re-interview of parents,
to develop former employments or associates of
Subject who may be able to furnish information
concerning his present whereabouts.
3. Conduct inquiry at Pine Street address in
San Francisco to develop background information
of possible assistance in this investigation.
4. Check records at Channing House, Palo Alto,
to determine if Subject formerly employed there
and for possible leads to associates of Subject,
such as listed references or indicated residences.
5. Conduct appropriate credit and criminal
checks at Palo Alto and San Francisco.
6. Inasmuch as Subject has been absent for a
period in excess of one year, consideration
should be given to contacting Baltimore Source
4 should the above leads be unproductive.
If the objective of this case is achieved, either
directly or indirectly as a result of this suggestion memorandum,
advise the Bureau immediately by routing slip, attention
Inspection Division.
:
:
Comments of SA JEAN G. HUGHES, Supervisor H. ERNEST
WOODBY and SAC requested.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 167
:
3
་
SA JEAN G..HUGHES: The above points have been noted and the
(10/23/702
investigation will be conducted.
SUPERVISOR H. ERNEST WOODBY:
(10/23/70)
SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT
(10/23/70)
The suggestions of the Inspector
are appreciated and immediate
steps will be taken to carry them out.
I concur with the Inspector's comments.
:
298.
NW-88608-Deeld:32989633-Page-168
CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP
LEE EDWARD BECKHUSEN
SSAN 565-86-4805A
ASN US 56843058
FUGITIVE DESERTER
SF File 42-44534
Bufile 42-279118
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON:
This is a pending case, San
Francisco origin, which was
The case had been assigned to SA STEVEN R.
BROWN since 3/27/70, and is supervised on the desk of SA
H. ERNEST WOODBY.
opened 8/4/69.
Subject declared deserter by U.S. Army 2/9/69.
On 9/18/69, his mother, MARY BECKHUSEN, advised that the
Subject lived with her until June, 1969, and since that
time, had stayed with different friends in the Oakland-
Berkeley area. Mrs. BECKHUSEN provided a list of other
relatives of the Subject. She stated that she had seen
the Subject approximately three weeks prior to that date.
On 11/18/69, Mrs. BECKHUSEN advised that she had
not seen her son for several months and that he had called
her from Death Valley, California, approximately one month
prior to that date.
It is suggested that the following investigation
be considered at this time:
1. Conduct thorough neighborhood investigation
in vicinity of Subject's residence, 949 Madison Street,
Albany, California.
20
Attempt to establish reliable neighborhood
source who will report the Subject's presence in the event
he is staying at or returns to his home address.
3.
Interview Subject's brother, LYNN BECKHUSEN,
and attempt to determine identity of friends in Oakland-
Berkeley area.
San Francisco Inspection
10/23/70
BDW/lla
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 169-
299.
2
j
4. Interview Subject's brother, LAWRIN
BECKHUSEN, „who resides on Fairview Street, Oakland.
5.
Consider contacting Baltimore CS-4 for
information regarding the Subject's employment.
These leads should not be considered all
inclusive and case agent should conduct a thorough file
review to insure that all logical investigation is being
conducted in an effort to locate the Subject.
If the objective of the case is attained, either
directly or indirectly as a result of this suggestion
memorandum, advise the Bureau immediately by routing slip,
attention: Inspection Division.
Comments of SA STEVEN R. BROWN, Supervisor H.
ERNEST WOODBY and SAC requested.
SRB
SA STEVEN R. BROWN:
10/24/70
✓
The above points have been noted and
this, as well as other logical
investigation will be conducted.
Supervisor H. ERNEST WOODBY:
10/24/70
SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDT:
10/24/70
The suggestions of the
Inspector are appreciated
and immediate steps will be
taken to carry them out.
I concur with the Inspector's
comments.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 170
300.

thirst and courth
:
INSPECTO
ISPECTIO
ANOLD
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
BOND DEFAULT MATTERS
ARNOLD C. LARSON: As of 10/1/70, the San Francisco
Office had 48 bond default
This volume of cases presents
convictions under the Bond
matters under investigation.
a fertile field for increased
Default classification.
An in depth survey conducted by the Inspection
Division disclosed that there has been a significant
increase in cases received by the FBI for investigation
subsequent to the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966.
This Act liberalized bail and bond procedures in Federal
cases whereby subjects were to be considered for release
on their own personal recognizance or unsecured appearance
bond in contrast to previous procedures which required a
specific bond, creating an excellent opportunity for us
to achieve statistical accomplishments. The ratio of
convictions to the number of cases investigated in bond
default matters is one of the highest of any violation
handled by the Bureau.
One of our offices, namely San Diego, has been
responsible for the most significant portion of the Bureau's
convictions in bond default matters as a result of effective
liaison with the U. S. Attorney, who felt that an indictment
obtained under bond default was more easily proven than
the substantive offense. When a subject is apprehended,
the sentence is, in part, influenced by the U. S. Attorney,
who informs the court the length of time the subject's
apprehension has been sought by the Bureau. A number of
these cases have arisen through charges of narcotics and
smuggling of merchandise and aliens across the border.
Subjects were brought before a magistrate, and rather than
pleading guilty, subjects obtained a court appointed
attorney and entered a not guilty plea. They were released
then on either personal recognizance or a minimum bond until
their scheduled appearance. When the subject failed to
appear in court, a bench warrant was issued, San Diego opened
a case, and. usually within 30 days an indictment was secured
under bond default.
SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/23/70
WAK: kah
NW 88608 Docid:32989833 Page 171
· 2 -
Although San Francisco is not a border office,
it is a great port of entry, both by sea and air, and many
of the same type cases utilized by San Diego for obtaining
a bond default indictment should be available to San,
Francisco.
As you are aware, convictions are becoming more
difficult to obtain because of the court's interpretation
of the law in many classifications. Bond default matters
present an excellent opportunity to increase your conviction
rate, therefore, it is suggested that through your liaison
with the U. S. Attorney, point out to him the possibilities
for an increase in convictions under the Bond Default
Statute.
The necessity to establish effective liaison with
the U. S. Attorney in bond default matters was set out in
SAC Letter 70-13 dated 3/17/70..
;
If an increase in cases and convictions is obtained
as a result of this Suggestion Memorandum, advise the
Bureau by routing slip, attention Inspection Division.
Comments of Supervisor DE JEAN and SAC GEBHARDT
requested.
1
SUPERVISOR MORRIS M. DE JEAN: Close liaison will continue to
10/26/70
be maintained with the United States
Attorney's office and all avenues
of potential convictions will be
vigorously pursued to increase the statistical accomplishments
in the San Francisco Division.
SAC GEBHARDT
10/26/70
This matter will be followed and the
Inspection Division will be advised if
an increase in cases and convictions is
obtained.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 172
=
302.
SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP
ROGER WILLIAM EPPERLEY
SSN 4-4-49-18
SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT
00:
San Francisco
San Francisco File 25-77034
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON:
ARNOLD
This is a closed case which was
opened in the San Francisco
Office 4/21/70, and closed 6/15/70. At that time, case was
assigned to SA ROBERT M. LEONARD and supervised by SA RAY M.
ANDRESS. The case was reopened 8/26/70, and assigned to
SA RICHARD G. MILLER and supervised by Relief Supervisor
RICHARD E. LUEBBEN on the desk of SA ANDRESS. Case was again`
closed 9/3/70.
The case was initially opened on the basis of a
copy of a letter directed to Local Board 4, Eureka,
California; from the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance
Station, Oakland. The letter indicated that the Subject
reported for induction 4/14/70, was found qualified, but left
the building prior to induction. Case was closed 6/15/70,
on basis of a memorandum from SA ROBERT M. LEONARD wherein
it was pointed out that the violation was not such as to be
reported to the U. S. Attorney by the Selective Service
System.
Case was reopened 8/26/70, on receipt of a request
for investigation from the U. S. Attorney, San Francisco,
and assigned to SA RICHARD G. MILLER. Review of the file
indicates that Subject was interviewed by SA MILLER 9/1/70,
at which time he indicated he would agree to induction.
$
U. S. Attorney declined prosecution and a closing
report was submitted 9/3/70, with copy to U. S. Attorney and
San Francisco Office. This report was signed by SA RICHARD
E. LUEBBEN. This report contains FD 302 (interview report
form) wherein interview of Subject was recorded. The FD 302
fails to indicate that the Subject was advised of the
identity of SA MILLER or the nature of the inquiry.
SAN FRANCISCO INSPECTION
10/26/70
BDW:sad »
308.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 173
94
-
2
-
Agents' handbook, Part II, Page 12 and 12B,
instructs that at the beginning of an interview with any
known Subject of a Bureau case the Subject be advised of the
name and official identify of the interviewing agent and the
nature of the inquiry. The fact that the Subject was, so
advised is to be recorded in the opening paragraph of the
FD 302.
EXPLANATIONS REQUESTED:
SA MILLER is requested to explain his failure to
advise the Subject of his name and official identity and the
nature of the inquiry and to record on FD 302 that this was
done.
Relief Supervisor LUEBBEN is requested to explain
his failure to detect this delinquency at the time he
approved the report on 9/3/70.
Comments of SA ANDRESS and SAC requested.
SA RICHARD GUY MILLER:
10/27/70 m
At the beginning of the interview at the
Humboldt County Jail, Eureka, California,
I exhibited my FBI credentials to the
subject and advised him of the nature of the inquiry. I
´apparently inadvertently failed to record this in the opening
paragraph of the FD 302 and on review of this FD 302 I
inadvertently failed to note this had been omitted from the
FD 302. Care will be exercised in the future to insure this
does not reoccur.
SA RICHARD E. LUEBBEN:
10/27/70 REL
I was Relief Supervisor on Desk #6 in the
absence of the regular supervisor and due
to the exceptionally high volume of mail
handled by this desk I inadvertently failed to note the above
omission from FD 302 of SA MILLER dated 9/1/70 when the report
was signed out by me. Every effort will be made in the future
to avoid a repitition of this delinquency.
Ac
SA RAYMOND ME ANDRESS:
10/27/70
In reference to the report of SA RICHARD GUT
MILLER signed out by SA LUEBBEN on 9/3/70,
SA LUEBBEN was one of the Relief Supervisors
during my extended sick leave during this period. SA LUEBBEN is an
experienced Relief Supervisor and supervises the desk in a very
efficient and commendable manner. Due to the exceptionally heavy
volume of mail during this time, he inadvertently overlooked the
omission in the FD 302 of SA MILLER. The importance of advising
Bureau subjects the identity of Agents and nature of interview will
be discussed with the Relief Supervisors periodically and will be
followed closely to insure this does not reoccur.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 174°
1
3
SAC GEBHARDT: Above delinquencies noted and will be followed
10/27/70
closely to insure this does not occur, again.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 175
310.
1
INSPECTOR ARNOLD C. LARSON: There is no Seat of Government
culpability in this matter as
this error or delinquency could only be detected through
a review of the field office file.
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 176
:
ت عادة مشوش
;
SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP
WILLIAM JOSEPH LAPUZZA, AKA.
NSN B 61 78 34
FUDE
00: OMAHA
OM
SF
42-8670
42-44333'
BU 42-285245
INSPECTOR ARNOLD.
LARSON:
This is a pending case in the
San Francisco Office opened
on 7/24/69, assigned to SA JEAN G. HUGHES and reassigned
on 12/8/69, to SA KENNETH W. SHEETS. Case is supervised
by SA ROBERT D. ROBY.
Review of the file indicates the Subject together
with two other Navy deserters had lived in a hippie commune
in the San Jose area during August of 1969, Investigation has
determined that he has used narcotics and has associated with
hippie-type individuals until the present time.
During 8/70, investigation was conducted in San
Jose and investigation determined that one JOAN BAUER was
also residing in a hippie fashion and was acquainted with the
Subject of this investigation as well as the other two Navy
deserters.
On 8/13/70, JOAN C. BAUER was interviewed at which
time she stated she is employed at National Aeronautics
Space Agency (NASA), Ames Research Center, as a secretary
at Moffett Field, a Navy installation. During the course
of this interview, she stated she was living with a male
individual in a common-law relationship. She had formerly
considered herself a member of a "family" of hippies
including the Subject and another Navy deserter. At the
time of interview she advised that the members of this
hippie "family" received mail at her address and the reason
for maintaining the address is to receive food stamps for
this hippie "family" living in a commune style. She stated
she occasionally picks up their mail at her home and admitted
on occasion taking the mail to them when she visits the
"family". This interview was conducted at Moffett Field.
The information concerning BAUER was orally disseminated
to the Security Officer, NASA, Ames Research Center, on
8/13/70.
San Francisco Inspection
10/23/70
JHO/lla
NW-88608 Docid:32989633 Page 177
The Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part 2,
· Section 5, Page 7, indicates that Bureau policy under
Executive Order 10450 is to furnish the Civil Service
Commission all pertinent identifiable, derogatory non-
subversive information relative to employees of the Executive
Branch of the government. This is normally accomplished by
including such information in letterhead memorandum form
and transmitting same to the Bureau for appropriate dissemination.
INSTRUCTIONS
Immediately handle this matter in accordance with
Bureau instructions cited above.
EXPLANATIONS REQUESTED
1. SA KENNETH W. SHEETS is requested to explain
why he neglected to forward to the Bureau in letterhead
memorandum form the information developed concerning JOAN C.
BAUER, as required by existing Bureau instructions.
2. Supervisor ROBERT D. ROBY is requested to
explain why, in his over-all supervision of this case, hè did
not detect this error as set out above.
Comments of SAC requested.
SA SHEETS:
JOAN C. BAUER advised at the outset
of the interview on 8/13/70 that she
could consider herself a member of the communal "family",
however, this became a matter of interpretation during the
_ course of interview and eventually she denied she was a member
of the "family" or commune. She admitted visiting people
connected with the commune and associating with them, even to
the extent of allowing some of these individuals to use her
address for the purpose of receiving mail and food stamps.
.
This matter was discussed at length
with Security Officer RALPH MAINES and JOHN VAN ETTEN, Head of
Security at NASA, Moffett Field, California. They made no
· statement as to what action they intended to take.
I realize now that I should have
also prepared a letterhead memorandum for dissemination to NASA
Headquarters in Washington, D.C. I regret not having done so and
in the future will insure that such matters are promptly
disseminated.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 178
312.
3
А
SUPERVISOR/
ROKART
RT D. ROBY:
On 9/30/70 I approved a
communication prepared by
SA SHEETS to office of origin incorporating interview of
JOAN C. BAUER, referred to above. At the time, mv primary
attention was directed toward information furnished in the
´substantive fugitive investigation and I failed to consider
the nature of BAUER's emplovment. I agree that the infor-
mation pointed out by the Inspector should have been furnished
to the Bureau in letterhead memorandum form for dissemination
at the Seat of Government. Letterhead memorandum has now been
prepared and forwarded to the Bureau. I regret my oversight
in this instance and will be alert for similar situations in
the future to insure that all data which should be disseminated
by letterhead memorandum is promptly submitted.
SAC GEBHARDIN
Letterhead memorandum
should have been prepared
I
at the time of the initial interview with JOAN C. BAUER.
will continue to emphasize the necessity of prompt dissemination
of information obtained during our investigations which may
be of interest to other governmental agencies.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 179
102
K
f.
FOR KOLD
INSPECTOR
ARHOLD C. LARSON: There is no Seat of Government
culpability in this matter as
this error or delinquency could only be detected through
a review of the field office file.
{
NW 88608 Docid:32989633 Page 180
1

· SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP
JIMMY LA VERNE BUSHBAUM,
ALSO KNOWN AS
JAMES L. BUSHBAUM
UFAC
-
MURDER
00: LOS ANGELES
SF
LA
88-9478
88-11640
-
FUGITIVE
INSPECTOR
CARNOLD
BU 88-35799
C. LARSON: This case was opened in 9/65
with San Francisco as Office
of Origin. Bureau changed Office of Origin to Los Angeles
7/19/66. Case has been opened periodically in San Francisco
Division to cover leads. Case reopened 5/4/70 and assigned
to SA DOUGLAS R. AHLSTROM. Case is supervised by SA BRYON
C. WHEELER. Case was closed (RUC) on 10/15/70.
Subject escaped from custody at San Quentin Prison
9/16/55. Authorized complaint filed 10/21/65 before U.S.
Commissioner, San Francisco, California. Bureau changed
Office of Origin to Los Angeles because Subject's relatives
and friends live in the Los Angeles area and all logical
leads had been covered in the San Francisco Division.
K
Los Angeles by letter dated 4/24/70 requested the
San Francisco Office to identify the holders of two telephone
numbers concerning long-distance telephone calls from home
telephone of Mrs. MARLYS CONNOLLY, Rialto, California. San
Francisco by letter dated 6/30/70 identified one telephone
number registered to the Subject's sister, Mrs. MELVIN GLAZE
of Point Arena and subsequent contact with Mrs. GLAZE failed
to develop any information concerning the Subject. No investigatic:
was conducted to identify holder of telephone number 933-8871
at Walnut Creek, California between 5/4/70 (date case reopened)
and 10/15/70 (date case RUCed).
INSTRUCTION:
Immediately reopen this case and conduct logical
investigation requested in Los Angeles letter dated 4/24/70.
San Francisco Inspection
10/26/70
WAK/jb
NW-88608 Docid:32989633 Page 181
318.
-
2
1
EXPLANATIONS REQUESTED:
SA DOUGLAS R. AHLSTROM is requested to explain
why he failed to detect the lead at Walnut Creek had not
been covered before the case was closed on 10/15/70.
Field Supervisor BRYON C. WHEELER is requested
to explain why he failed to assign a lead to a Walnut Creek
Resident Agent to conduct an investigation to identify
the holder of the telephone number and why he failed to
insure that this investigation had been conducted before he
approved the closing of this case (San Francisco letter to
Los Angeles dated 10/15/70).
Comments of SAC requested.
Abin
SA DOUGLAS R. AHLSTE
The writer was of the
impression that the lead at Walnut Creek to identify a
telephone subscriber had been covered and reported at
the time the case was RUC'd on 10/15/70. The writer did
not have the file available as the RUC communication was
submitted from the Santa Rosa Residence Agency and was
therefore unable to make a thorough review of the file.
Steps will be taken to make certain this does not recur
in the future.
"
SUPERVISOR BRYON C. WHEELAR: The lead to check
out a telephone number at Walnut Creek was inadvertently
overlooked at the time the case was reopened and assigned
to SA AHLSTROM. Upon receipt of the RUC communication closing
the case on 10/15/70, the fact that the Walnut Creek lead
had not been covered was overlooked.
Efforts will be made
to make certain this does not recur in the future. Case reopened.
SAC ROBERT E. GEBHARDA
The above write-up and
explanations have been noted. It will be stressed among
Special Agent and Supervisory personnel in this office
the importance of guarding against a situation of this
kind happening in the future.
NW 88608 Docld:32989633 Page 182
}
L
OF CARNOLD
INSPECTOR
OLD C. LARSON: There is no Seat of Government
culpability in this matter as
this error or delinquency could only be detected through
a review of the field office file.
NW-88608-Docld:32989633-Page-183-
106