14-00000
104-10103-10112
DISPATCH
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
HIVULUUNTU
PRO.
POSED
ACTION
ACCOM
PLISHED
TO
MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.
FROM
Chief, Special Affairs Staff
ake
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
SUBJECT Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNK
Project AMTRUNK Operational Review
ACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCES
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM
PRIORITY
ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or
termination of Project AMTRUNK.
1. Attached herewith is an operațional review of and progress
report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March.
Station views on the operation are summarized below.
2..
The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-
MPREND
nesses:
.
A. The AMTRUNKer's admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working
"with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if
they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents
will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It
is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would
diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation,
since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational
successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no
hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major re-
fugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to
do so.
It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is
most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es-
cambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed
by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his
own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special
attention because of his ZRMETAL connections. and he will not hesi-
tate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1. and ODACID
or higher authority. if the operation or KUBARK handling of the
AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according
to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may
be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.
Distribution:
3 - C/SAS w/attchs.
SZULC
ed from Project AMTRUNK 19-6-8% 1
viri: 19-6-843
168-496/16
SH
MORE: VOLSKY
-6399-1
1 CROSS REFERENCE(Ted from s
DESENSITIZED
185 KSH 43-43
Cowngrading and
darlosalfication
ASSIFICATION
SECRET
4 6 8 STATE
DATE TYPED
15 April 1963
DATE DISPATCHED
APR
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
UFGA-8381
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER
• RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do 
Not Reproduce
14-00000
CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH
ASSIFICATIONE
DISPATCH SYMBOL, AND NUMBER
SHE
UFGA
-
8381
AMTRUNK/1 in turn may be expected to keep AMCAPE/1 fully informed.
There is no KUBARK control over AMTRUNK/1 or AMCAPE/1.
B. This operation has a very high "flap potential" if any AMTRUNK
agents are picked up by the opposition in Cuba. Not only will
KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the
operation, as may also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed,
and AMCAPE/1 and his newspaper
The latter could prove to be most
embarrassing and should be 
fully recognized as a possibility, if
not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into
Castro's hands.
TimeS
NEW YORK
C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects.
At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees
prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the agents.
AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactorily resolve the question of
their security during LCFLUTTER tests. It is believed that AMICE/2'
727
is withholding information of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con-
tacts.
An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between
AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on
29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14
the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban.
This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a
possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made
such an approach to AMTRUNK/3.
D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were
made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an
: area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily
develop.
10
E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within
five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently
patrolled by sea.
RABEZ Nunez
F This operation appears possibly competitive with AMLEO/3 opera-
tions aimed also at penetrating high military levels for the same
purposes Given the lack of control in the AMTRUNK operation, the
possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same
individual will be present.
3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK
group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. Three of the
four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a
number of fairly well placed contacts on the inside whom they ex-
pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have
been out of direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods
ranging up to two years, this is frequently the case in this type
of operation. The objective of the operation is worthwhile.
4.
.
Based on the attached operational review and the advantages and
disadvantages outlined above, it is the recommendation of JMWAVE
Station that this operation be terminated at the earliest possible
moment Since this operation originated at the Headquarters level
it is requested that Headquarters advise JMWAVE as to its decision
In the meantime, training and planning will continue. If Head-
quarters' decision is to continue with the operation at this time,
operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as
formulated.
END OF MESSAGE
See DIR 31748
FORM
5.60 53a
140'
CLASSIFICATION
USE PREVIOUS EDITION.
SECRET
CONTINUED
PAGE NO.
2.
14-00000
SAERCI BLE
31 March 1963
I.
· PROJECT ANTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW
STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.
The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2,
and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164
on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from
headquarters, was already at the training site when the team
was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS
and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite
until 16 March during which time he conducted training in
clandestine methods and techniques. This training included
security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica-
tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management,
and operational planning and reporting. The training included
group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate
operational situations, several problems, and daily physical
training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or
VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average
of two or three hours with the group in operational dis-
cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March,
both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group,
debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin
out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing
their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through
30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass
and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons
familiarization and firing. During the period under dis-
cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed
by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series
of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for
alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were
further processed on cover and finance problems. The re-
sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters
under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR
26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time.
Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS
report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as
attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the
AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the
training report for the week of 25 March.
II.
AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE
Removed from Project AMTRUNK
0168-496/16
7
Pold:
818-9-61
The project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the
existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among
high level military and civilian leaders of the government
culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and
DESENSITIZED
SECRE
per CSH 43-43
fly (
C
14-00000
3/8√
་་
III.
SELCERET
2
the Communists from power A secondary and subordinate
mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the
populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable
of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission
is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of
the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions,
the operation has been split into two initial phases, which
will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves
the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast
of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into
Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then
exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated.
Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of
black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast
of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into
Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black.
These two phases are discussed in detail in following para-
graphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations
designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to
make initial contacts among certain select high level military
figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these
phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed
operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de-
veloped.
PHASE I.
A.. AMTRUNK Personnel
08
1. AMTRUNK/2 is a (21) year old Cuban who is mature for his
years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine opera-
tions. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for
two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's
takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido
Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported
the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that
Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his
university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged
in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials.
Following the Playa Giron invasiona great many in the Havana
underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He
continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba
via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider
himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout
histraining. He is a pensive individual who displays good
judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to
be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is con-
scientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.
!.
SECRET
14-00000
6/PV
B.
3
08
His
2. AMTRUNK/3, a ②2) year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is
volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is
quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his
fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground
as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage.
underground work began while he was in secondary school
when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista..
In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and
began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack
down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection
and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally
when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for
Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily
in his training up to date, his performance falls far short
of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only
function as
n as 
support for this operation and should not inter-
fere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his
role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears
willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless,
direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future,
TASKS
1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira
(AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at
08 A/3's father's] farm in the Galera section ((AMS 3885 III,
Coords 993614).]08
08
Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2
to Guanaba or Havana.
2.
08
3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's
farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine
communications. Having completed this he would then be ex-
filtrated at Punta Jijira.
4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational
support through his contacts.
5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with
high level connections within the Rebel Army.
6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandes-
tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for
his exfiltration..
7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido
(AMS 3885 II).
EGORIE
14-00000
19/P√
C.
D.
INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
1..
The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at
Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make
their way to Ⓐ/3's father's farm one kilometer from the coast
and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go
to Guanabo 
or Havana.
2.
The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his
infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.
3. The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31
May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels
that 
Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for
exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be
necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged .
telegram signal would indicate his preference.
4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for
maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule
will allow 
for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2
considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his
contacts..
OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA
1.
Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the 24
two men will work their way to farm owned jointly by A/3's
father and Santos 
SUAREZ, located 1 kilometer from the point
of infiltration
. 06 They will make contact with the manager of
the farm named Pedro 
CRUZ. CRUZ) is 35 to 40 years of age,
is 
married and has an elementary school education. He has
no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon
06 
CRUZ) to make 
the following contacts in order to obtain
transportation to Guanabo or Havana:
06
(Roman HERNANDEZ) who lives a few kilometers away in
8 Sierra 
del Arzobispo._.__ 
HERNANDEZ owns a small farm and a
08 butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is
0837 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children.
He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-
revolutionary activities.
b.
06
_06
06
If (CRUZ) is unsuccessful in getting (HERNANDEZ) truck
he will contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next
08 
to A/3's father's 
farm. He is 45-50 Years old, married,
no 
children, wife's name is (Alicia) 06 He was the mayor of >
Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.
08
SECRET
19-6.811
;
14-00000
26/P√
%.
CRET
2.
c.
06
Another contact of A/3 is (Ramon CALZADILLE] age 21,
single, 8th grade education. He provided support in
the form of food and safehousing to underground workers
in the past. Hischome address is Corojo #1; Cotorro, 108
Havana. He owns ( butcher) shop in the Cotorro) section
of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs
to be safehoused in Havana.
The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after
arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order
listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and
vehicles for A/2.
a.
Elsa
06.08.
sa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana.
A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University
of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she
lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained cor-
respondence with her. She has helped previously in
providing safehousing for the underground. She also has
a car.
06, об
08
b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55) born in Havana.
He is a physician who lives and practices (medicine) in
Havana.06 IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activi-
ties previously. He has a brother, two daughters and
a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in'
New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months
ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano
an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine]
at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he re-
signed. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRIN] 06
об
C.. Sergio MENDEZ agegabout (50) born in Cienfuegos, a
former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the
08 Railroad system in Cuba.] Subject was originally a member
of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK con-
fidante during Castro's takeover. DC (MENDEZ]) has an apart-
ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under-
ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the C
government but is not sympathetic to the regime.
husband of this daughter, however, works for (Che Guevara.]
A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZ.)
06
об
00
об
The 0୪
d. Isabel MENOCOL), age about (35) born in Havana, single.
Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private
08 tutoring] school in (English) in Havana. She was A/2's
08 English teacher] and offered support to the underground.
06 MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a
close friend of A/2 and his wife.
S. B.CREAT
14-00000
!
3.
e.
06
6
об
(Gloria BAMCIALLA) age (23-24) born in Havana, single,
mother and father deceased. 8 She attended the University
of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960] She became
a close friend of A/2 during their student days in
Havana. She has no record of underground work. She
lives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt he
might attempt to contact her if she was living at
08 (Guanabo Beach) in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary
The following two operational assets will be contacted by
A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be
to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.
00
a. (Jorge VALS), age (Late 30s early 40s married.
Subject
holds the rank of Captain) in the Rebel Army but is not
presently on active duty.06 He was a friend of Castro's
during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains
some contact with Fidel. He also claims (CALS) has been
working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was
originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo
groups (VALS primary interest has been trying to or-
ganize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel.
A/2 feels VALS) is a very discreet individual who has
not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by 06.
the G-2. A/2 
claims to be a close friend of (VALS) and
trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked : CCC CMK KECEMACYCLES) is
09 1962] prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refuges.
06
Jose DUARTE Oropesa) age early (40s)) served in the
08 U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, 08
06 DUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military District)
by Camilio Cienfuegos JobFollowing the disappearance of
06 Cienfuegos] [DUARTE) was removed from the post and pre-
sently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties
from property confiscated by the government. He said
06 DUARTE started working against Castro within the MRP
under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the (military] 08
secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in
plotting against Fidel.06A/2 also stated that it was
rumored at the time that DUARTE was working for the
MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually
06 DUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according
to A/2 (DUARTE) was able to evade detection. Subject
has good connections within the Rebel Army and re-
volutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual
and has confidence in him as a potential operational
lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention
06 DUARTE as an opportunist.
SECER A
14-00000
CRE
E.
F.
C₁ A/2 may also attempt to contact the following
operational asset if he has an opportunity to make
contact.
06
(Lester RODRIGUEZ)
08
Gate
age 30s early 40s,] married,
former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He
fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area.
Following the Castro takeover he served as (head of 708
one of the military zones within Havana province.
Eventually he was given desser assignments and A/2
thinks he is now working in INRA) in Oriente Province.
He claims 
RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group
during 196T by supplying trucks for transporting
weapons and materials..
COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS
1. Cover
A/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee
of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be
issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana.
Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional
items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc.
The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.
2. Communications
Primary communications will be established through an SW
system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be
issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction
and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited
assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-
arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via
telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place
and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an
OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case
of an emergency.
OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION
1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which
has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The
area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile
site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are
known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals.
Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before
their first contact.
24
However, A/3 is leary of staying at his
father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his
24 father] to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the
farm will 
not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on
leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the
problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3
CRE
N
14-00000
10/PV
SECRET
to Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, may
jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and
patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-
He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under-
take a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3
step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2
ness.
has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi-
ness competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.
For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards
developing assets around his father's farm with maritime
reception capabilities.
24
0
In
There are
2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe
of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana.
However, 
he has not seen VALS) and (DUARTE for over a year.
addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army
.organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness
in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on EDUARTE con-
flict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no
evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been
a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an
opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. (A/2's
rebuttal to these remarks is that DUARTE has assisted him in
the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him
in his underground activities. This still leaves a question
mark next to the worth of: CHECKCUECAMARKTECHECKERED: :which unfortunately can only
be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2.
other security implications which should be discussed in this
evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-
curity conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a
contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case
officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking
contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip
was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters
not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres-
sion. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his
operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to
Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining
AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them
first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go
to his father's 
farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also
stated that a man named (DUARTE would be one of their con-
tacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that
KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candi-
date for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated
three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will
gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he
presents.
SERE LĪ

14-00000
SECR
- 2 -
3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security
weeknesses in this operation.. In contrast to these weaknesses
are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the
intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re-
cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime
operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results
which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter
for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential.
Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close
watching in terms of security and control for these factors
will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position
if not properly contained.
IV. PHASE II
A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL
1. AMICE/27 senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41
year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family.
His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law
and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself
graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising
lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos.
Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959,
A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities.
In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-
Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground
activities had come to the attention of the government and
he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy.
He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late
1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti-
vated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary
activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for
learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego,
and 
aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to
take offense, He is frank to state that he has a low opinion
of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply re-
sents any implication that he is working for KUBARK
આ એમએમની ક
He
states that he is working for the overthrow of the present
regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid
and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude
although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre-
sents a difficult handling problem.
2. AMICE/14 is 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a
Iaw graduate of the University of Havana. He has been in-
volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities.
Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME.He
is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has
a very highly developed security consciousness, developed
from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January
to July 1961 he made four black infiltration/exfiltration
trips to and from Cuba and PBPRIME and has an excellent
knowledge of the northew Tanzas area. He is easy to work
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10 L
with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-
KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27
8/278
3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a 49 year old fisherman from the
08 
Cardenas area 
who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963.
He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will
be used as a maritime guide.
B. TASKS
C.
.
1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small
boat 
onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact
individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil
operations.
2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline
into 
the mainland, including making arrangements for trans-
portation into Havana.
!
3.. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana
and 
obtain safehousing and operational support.
4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-
tration 
and future infiltrations.
5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts
among important 
military figures.
6. Establish internal and external communications.
7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.
INFIL-EXFIL PLANS
In A tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14,
It is
Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about
23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor
into the 
Keys area and remain in the area for approximately
three 
days, during which time they will remain black, keep
the 
boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals
known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements
with contacts 
at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14
on the 
mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747)
and 
contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas.
worked out at this time with these contacts for a second in-
Plans will be
filtration 
in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27
and AMICE/14 will 
again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be
passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will
exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met
by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz
del 
Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).
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D.
OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA
1.
81706,08
Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of
charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti-
Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used previously
for infils and exfils. One is "Tango" (Garcia Lezcano.] 26
Tango is a brother of Eustiquiano Garcia Lezcano (201-307338)
whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who
was already being utilized elsewhere) The other contact is
the owner of the Salina (salt drying beds)] A/14 has not yet
been able to recall this individual's name.
лоб
2. Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco
Leguas on the mainland. Key contacts here are Antonio 06
Garcia) (not related to Tango, above) and (Pablo Lopez) both
of whom have small farms in the area.
3.
06
Town of Marti. Contact here is "Perico" LNU. Subject is
about 50 years old, is employed by INRA and has a jeep which
was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.
06
City of Cardenas. Contact is (Pedro Barbil owner of the
08 Bate Marino restaurant. Subject is a close friend of A/14
who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime
receptions.06ⒷBarbi would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to
Havana.
Owns a car.
5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here named (Carlos]) 06
Pedraza] who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in
1961. Subject is (60) C: Dyears old, married, and is a forman
08 of public works) in the city. Subject has a son (Carlos ou now.
in New York City : Pedraza will be contacted for transpor-
tation to Havana. Owns a car.
6.
06
Varadero. "Fifo" Pineiro) owns a car and was formerly a
close friend of A/14. Subject was formerly active in the
underground and might be used by A/14 in the event he could
_ not use Barbi) or (Pedraza for obtaining transportation. 06,08
ɗ Pineiro is the brother of the communist (Manolo Pineiro, aka
"Barba Roja", but is reported to be anti-communist himself.
7. Havana
06
a. Adolfina (Suarez) More. Subject is single and lives
with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mis-
tress) and can be used as safehouse keeper. Subject is
08
sister of (Rafael (Suarez) More a Commandante inthe Navy ]
who, according to A/27, was at one time (chief of naval
08 operations.] His present assignment or location is
unknown.
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06
d. b. Manuel (Garcia) Sanchez, Is a close friend of A/14
and is uncle of (A/14's wife] 08 Can be used for operational
support, a car, and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt.
in Oriente under Calixto Garcia 2 but no longer in army.
A/14 believes he is now an adminstrator of some type of
industry in Havana.
06
c. Maria Josefa (Isalgue)) Subject is aunt of A/14
and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives
alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was
formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.
06
d. Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre.) Subject is a relative of
A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing.
Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his
sixties.
e
об
(Bebo (Orozco)
06
To be recruited by "A/14 as his prin-
cipal agent in Havana. Subject and A/14 previously worked
together in the underground.06 (@rozco) was in the Sierra
with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from
the army in February 1959, although he has maintained many
contacts within the army. Was one time active in the
Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of Capt.
Bernardo Corrales who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio.
Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain
arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into
Cuba without his absence having been known to the authori-
ties. Was responsible for safehousekeeping (Vargas Gomez] 06
for nearly one month when authorities were searching for
him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on
defectable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but
not well. A/14 was last in touch with Orozco) by letter
about two months ago.
06
f. Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27
as principal agent. Would be used for operational in-
telligence and spotting among disaffected army officers..
Would be kept entirely compartmented from Orozco) % Guin
is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm
complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14,
both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is
anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos
officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an
overthrow of the government.
Co-defendant
in CUBELA tral - IN presen
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g. Target personalities who are suspected of being dis-
affected and on whom A
/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather
information in Havana are 
as follows:
Comandante "Macho" Parra
Cdte. Oscar Guerra
Jose Pinares
Capt. FNU Lawton
1.
2.
3.
"
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
"
Capt.
" Manuel Avila
Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
Pedro Miret
Juan Nuiry
9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More
10.
11.
Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville
Capt. FNU Guerra Matos
12.
13.
"
Capt. Sandy Olivares
Jose Fernandez Alvarez
These names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and
in most cases also 
with AMLEO/3. In a majority of cases
there appears 
to be some evidence to indicate the subjects
may be disaffected. 
In the case of Jose Pinares however,
it would appear 
that he is completely loyal to the regime.
This information was 
passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files
were negative on Avila and Lawton.
E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS
AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay
in Cuba. They will be 
equipped with alias documentation and
with disguises. Both of 
them have previously lived in the
Havana area and know the 
city well.
Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and
They will be trained 
in
`
possible three agents 
in Havana in SW, prior to their own
\exfiltration. 
In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and
A/14 in OWVL. At the 
time of infiltration, exfiltration plans
will have been laid on 
with the agents.
change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary,
In the event that a
an OWVL message could be 
sent to the agents.
immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents
Any urgent 
and
during their short stay 
in Havana would be on a prearranged
open code system by 
commercial telegram. Such a system will
In-
be worked out to cover several possible contingencies.
ternal communications 
of whatever net is organized by A/27
and A/14 will be 
arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead
drops.
F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION
1. The LCFLUTTER examinations on both AMICE/27 and AMICE/14
were inconclusive 
Although it is the opinion of both the
_case officers and 
the training personnel who have been in
close contact with these 
individuals that both agents are
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14
highly motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point will
remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that
A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER examination if asked.
information
It is believed that A/27 was withholding
the LCFLUTTER and subsequently. The nature, seriousness, and
possible consequences of this are as yet not clear.
2.
A/27 has told at least two people something about this
operation. Although he says that he did not give any details
of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in
very general terms with two individuals whom he named at
the time of the LCFLUTTER .test. One of these is a friend
of Gutierrez Menovo and one a friend of Vargas Gomez,
THERE some suspicion he was G-2 agent.
V.
VI.
3. AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the
past two years. Although it is difficult to assess how well
he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks,
it is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts
might be considered really close. AMICE/14 has been out of
direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961.
4.
The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent
upon having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase
II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.
5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking.
Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of
withholding support to the operation. Control however will
remain tenuous at best and A/27. will continue to be a dif-
ficult handling problem.
6. On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre of the
agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly
motivated. Both agents have experience in clandestine opera-
tions, particularly A/14 who has made a number of previous
clandestine entries and exits and has many operational con-
tacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in
training.
FUTURE PLANS
During the week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive
maritime instruction. During the week 8 through 13 April,
they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, dis-
guise training, and further operational planning sessions.
·COMMITMENTS
1. According to AMICE/27. the following principle, which he
feels is a commitment from ODYOKE was enunciated during his
initial trip to ZRMETAL : "ODYOKE will recognize a new Cuban
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Meareste
Tinay
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Hotte
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"presuntal"
Rof
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SECREA
government which is anti-Communist and which operates on
democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a
government of its own choice upon Cuba". A/27 has made a
big point of discussing this "commitment". It is apparent
that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his
followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links
Batista and. KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batis-
tianos in a post-Castro government.
2. All AMTRUNK group members think that they received a
commitment while in ZRMETAL that ODYOKE would support their
operational plan, with funds. training logistical support,
and technical assistance, but would leave control of the
operation entirely in their hands In other words. they
are not working for ODYOKE or KUBARK in any sense, On this
point they are very sensitive.
3.
Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed
in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition"
to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful
coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that these individual
will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime.
This means recognition of an individual's participation in
the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific
government formed by the conspirators themselves.
4. Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed
several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these
commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the com-
mitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL.
has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back
to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as
commitments.
PEGGINS
5. The only commitment made by JMWAVE through PEGGINS has
been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured
while on the mission 1, their families in PBPRIME would be
assisted for a "reasonable amount of time financially.
PEGGINS declined to state what that time would be or how much
financial assistance would be involved.
"
6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between
PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no com-
mitment will be made at this time to support any internal
group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives
and that this extends specifically to no promise to support
active sabotage with demolitions.
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