157-10002-10056
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Date: 09/30/93
Page:1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10002-10056
RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR JR
TO THE PRESIDENT
TITLE :
CIA REORGANIZATION
CIA
DATE: 06/10/61
PAGES: 15
SUBJECTS :
COVERT ACTION
PARAMILITARY WARFARE
CUBA
POLICY CONTROL
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/30/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
Box 244
Folder 7
COMMENTS :
Exhibit 5 to R. Goodwin testimony on 7/18/75
NW 50955 DocId: 32281896 Page 1
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
SECHET
5.
(1)(B)
(1)
(
c)
4 NOV 93
31-2
* DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Rass'n ☐ Change/classify to
☐ With concurrence of
☐ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
A 12356, See. 1.3 (a) ( (1162
FPC/HDR by
10. Sperations and Policy
Clandestine activities should be accessed not only in the context
of their relaticeship to an open society but 
ales in the context of 
their
relationabip to United States foreign policy.
CIA operations have not been bald effectively subordinate to U. 8.
foreign policy.
ས་ཝཱ་-བ་
1. Clandestine intelligence collection in, by charter, from from
This fact exposes 
American foreign 
policy
State Department control.
to a multitude of embarrausinents when CIA la diecovered recruiting
The recent
agente or developing sources in a friendly 
country.
Singapore cose, who CIA, without notice 
to the 
Consul General,
tried to subvert a member of the Special 
Branch of the Singaporn
After complications of
Police provides an instructive example.
ludicrous conglozity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to
a lie-detector text, it turned out that the 
recruit knd long since
Informed bie superiore of the CIA approach 
and mes leading CIA
imo a trep which, when spring, produced 
considerable embarrass-
most to relations between the US 
and the fingapore government.
There have been troubles of a comparable 
sert La Poiana and 
l
Cusco 
Nationals vero erniggled
ation
JO OD
- REE
CLA bas said that, in such cases, Deither the Embooey nor the Depart.
ment in Washington is normally informed of 
this type of operation.
In short, no ena knows how many potential 
problems for US foreign
policy and how much potential friction 
with friendly stateOS
being created at this moment by CIA 
clandestine intelligence 
operetion
Surely there is on argument for permitting 
State to decide whether the
Edvantage to be joined by the operation 
(3. g., the information derivati
fram en agent within the Special 
Drench of the Singapore Policz) eui-
weighn the rick (6.5., areperating the local 
government and choking
Clendeating
ite confidance both in our purpoese 
rod in our sensa).
intelligence operations should plainly be 
clanzed both 
with the Deport.
ment of State and (cave for exceptiocal 
instances and ou agreement of
the Secretory of State) with the local U.S. 
Airbassador.
NW 50955
DocId: 32281896 Page 2
%་*
SECRET
7.
де
(1) (8)
4 NOV 93
14
It has meant too that the State Department, oftenu appriced of an
operation only in ite later stages, is under great proscure to
endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged
evil consequences of oxorcislug a reic. I well remember Tom
Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba:
"I would never have favered initiating this operation; but, olace it
kas gone as far as it bee, I do not think we can rich calling it off.
Moreover, ni a time when there is increasing premium en activism,
State, when it questions CLA oparations or initiatives, casts tosif in
a prisøy, sisey, cogatira role. The advocate of clandestine activitieø
seema 'tough' and realistic) the expensat has to invoke reth intangibles
sa the reputation of the United States, world public episton, "What
do we say in the United Nations 7", etc., and ossme hopelessly
lúsalietis, legalistic and 'acít.'
The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been
to crasto situations which have forced policy on the State Department.
This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wres
in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Aruxed Services Committee,
"The Central Entelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy.
Yot, in the ycare since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' pelley in many
parte of the world. A number of governments still in power know
that they have even been targets of CIA attempts nå overthror
a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the
United States. Indossels, of course, is a prime example.
This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies
State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US
Interoute. There must be some means by which Skate can be informed
of such operations at an early enough etaga to affect the conception
and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will com
tinue to confrom State with propositions having potential impact on
foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reason-
able control.
The Controlled American Source (CAS) repréesnis a particuing
entrenchmerd on policy-making fanctions. CIA today
under official 007ss
39758 
Gra8860e en Stads
Šase are cador State Department covor
bas nearly as many o
$300 to 3700. About 1500
H
NW 50955
DocId: 32281896 Page 3
Docketer all
See 3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☐ With concurrence of
LO Peclassify ☐ In part and excise as
JEK ACT EQ 12355, Sec 13 fet (1)
FPC HDR by.
12-16-193
4 NOV 93%
(1)(8)
(1) 
(c)
4 NOV 93
8.
(the other 2200 are premambly ander military or other ren-State:
- (icial cover).] Originally the use of State Department cover for
A personnal was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary.
The
Halles-Correa-Jeckeon report stated in 1948, "The CIA should
fat ussitate Department cover as a simple answer to all its problamie
but should proceed to develop its own outside cuver and eventually in
this way and rough increased efficiency of its overdees personnri,
find a way to tomper its demands upon the State Department. Nong.
eless CIA haa endily increased its requisitions for official cover.
#
There are several regeous why CLA has alagdoned its original intenti:
of developing cystems private cover. in casier to arrange cov)
through Slate; it is ledenive; it is quicker; it facilitates tha
Security of operations sal na of corpinunicatious; It insures a
leasanter a for the CIA ople. But the affect is to further the
IA encroachment on the trstitional functions of State.
1 some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular
State Department personnel. Lie Amagican Embassy in Vienna.
ors & 20 pozaons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Eatvico Liet zo
belag in the Foliticni Sections 16 ore GAS portomols of the 31 cfflecr
Listed en engaging in seperting activities, over half are CAS, the
13 Qificaro Voted in the Politieel Soction in our Ambagey in
11 aro CA On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 67 poscont
Uret the petitionfatticars serving in United States Embassies ware CAS
Sometimes the CIAAnission chief has been in the country longer, has
nore mosey at his disposal, wields more influance (and is abler) that
The Ambassador Often be has direct access to the local Prime
Minister. Sometimes (es during a critical periodum &aea) he pursuas
different paftey from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally
well known fecully as the CIA representative.
123 CLA poole.
In the Paris Embassy today, there are
has long since begun to mora isto areas of political reporting horical
occupied by State. The CIA mon doing overt internal political reporting
cutnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10.2] CIA hap
egán sought to manageliza contact with certain french political peracyjali-
CIA Occussies
fles, among them the President of the National Assembly.
the top floor of the Parla Lanbassy, a fact well known locally; and (ad
NW 50955
DocId: 32281896 Page 4
3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify
With concurrence of
Declassify ☐ In part and excise- as shown
SEO 19345, Subhastal
заснет.
FPC/HDR by
7
12+6-193
4 NOV 23
SECRE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
elite Sec ✓ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
With eoncurrence of
ཉ
Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
JFkact
EO 12356, Sec.
Fre/HDR by
12716
(I am
the night of the Generala' revolt im Algusta peenesa-y-hot-d3
mith@gmusement that the top flear was ablese with lights.
informed that Ambassador Carly was oble to escura entrance that
night to the Citoffices only with diffleculty.)
CLA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAB approsch an a
Formament solution for £oblems. E le pressing to have CLA
people given the rank of Counselsz Before State lesse contral
more and more of its protumed overesse personnel, and before CAS
boccavas permaneolly integrated lose the Foreign Earvice, it would
gam important (a) to secure ovary ambassador the firın esntrel
over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NCC Directive)
of Bancary 19, 1961, and (b) to review the currens CAS abastian with
majoye to a steady reduction ei CAS personaal.
4. Faramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quartore
as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and there-
fore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yot there la
almost no CIA function mere peculiarly dependant on the political
context then paramilitszy wazforo.
D.A.
There are anveral rouzono for this. For can thing, a paramilitary
speratlan le lu its nature a large end sitzibetale sporelian and thoreby,
no suggested abora, clashes with the presuppositions of our epon
society. (These considerations need not apply, howover, to the
training of, say, the South Vistonesco in guarrilla tactics er to the
expport of already ezisting querrilla activitice.} For angiher, the
moral and political price of direct paremilitary failure is acute for
Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, azo
dokg what the world expects from them; when we do 16 wa appear
to betray our own professed principles and therefore cancct afford to
compound delinquency by defeat, Moreover, es the regent Algerica
opieods chowall, once we convince the world that we are committed to a
paramilitary andsever, we will be blamed for all sorts of thinga,
Asae
na the recent tractor9-for-prizonezo episode bad, when we do sand
man to possible death, we connet lightly write them off and cloze tho
booka. The Communiste, on the other hand, have be screplao about
liquideting e lasing them
NW 50955
DocId: 32281896 Page 5