178-10004-10056
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11/14/1962
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CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
CUBA
CIA
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
MEMORANDUM
Top Secret
1B; 1C
Redact
08/04/1993
v9.1
39
☑
MONGOOSE
-
Parias S
178-10004-10056
CONTAINS
SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
SCI
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
_
Director of Central Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
19
14 November 1962
:
CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up
in Cuba, 1 July - 16 October 1962
A.
The Background
1.
The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military
base must have been made by the spring of 1962, and prepara-
tions within the USSR must have been under way from that
time on.
There also must have been planning activities in
Cuba, particularly reconnaissance and survey work. The
only indication of these operations which has so far been
found is a single intercepted personal message on 11 April
to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at the
Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not
judged solid or important enough to warrant inclusion by
itself in current intelligence publications.
2. Thus, until the first evidence of the deployment
began to come in late in July, Washington had no warning
of the USSR's intention. Intelligence officers dealing with
Cuba were focussing during July on the direction Soviet-
Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in
Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in
the "Escalante affair." This attitude was reflected in
reporting on the visit of Raul Castro to Moscow early in
the month. The President's Intelligence Checklist, which
will normally be used in this memorandum as the record of
CIA reporting to the President, Secretaries of State and
Defense, General Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy, reported on
4 July that Raul was "probably seeking more Soviet military
aid and, specifically, more advanced equipment such as the
MIG-21s and surface-to-air missiles which the USSR is
already providing to Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq.' The
Checklist of 19 July, however, noted that Raul had left
Moscow without the usual publicity and communiqué, and
surmised that this was "a pretty good sign that the visit
was unproductive." (The Central Intelligence Bulletin,
whenever coordination permitted, carried material generally
similar to the content of the Checklist.)
"
SCI
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
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Gerald R. Ford very
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PROPERTY Cr
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3. The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem
in this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62, The Situation
and Prospects in Cuba, passed by USIB on 1 August 1962, as
the intelligence foundation. for MONGOOSE. This estimate
stated that:
a.
"By force of circumstances, the USSR is
becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve
and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR,
however, has avoided any formal commitment to
protect and defend the regime in all contingencies."
b.
"We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will
provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major
independent military operations overseas. We also
believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in
Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least
for the period of this estimate."
C. "The Soviets...would almost certainly
never intend to hazard their own safety for Cuba's
sake," but "have sought to create the impression
that Cuba was under the protection of their missile
power...
"
d. "We believe that the Bloc will continue to
limit its military assistance to Cuba to defensive
weapons7. Such a policy would not preclude the
provision of more advanced jet fighters, surface-to-
air missiles, and modern radars, or even the pro-
vision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers..."
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B.
The Soviet Operation Begins
4.
During the last two weeks of July, Soviet ships
'carrying equipment and personnel for the build-up made
their first voyages to Cuban ports, the first arriving in
the period 26-29 July. Knowledge of some of these move-
ments reached CIA through routine intelligence coverage
No
of Soviet shipping before the ships reached Cuba.
particular significance is normally attached to such
voyages. However, evidence gradually accumulated that
the "behavior pattern" of these ships was similar to that
of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that
even greater security measures than usual were in effect,
that a number of the ships were coming from Baltic rather
than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger
ships, and finally that there was a general movement of
Bloc shipping toward Cuba: on an unprecedented scale.
use.
5.
Apparently, the first recognition of unusual
activity in any intelligence publication was a note in a
daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal
Commenting on an NSA report that certain Soviet
ships were en route to Cuba which had declared for other
destinations, this paper stated on 1 August that "at
lease some, if not all, of the ships involved probably
are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba."
This statement was in direct contradiction to NSA's com-
ment on the same information, ie, that it tended to
corroborate a report by the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana
(earlier intercepted by NSA) that Raul Castro had asked
the USSR to take back excess war materiel.
6.
CIA was also in disagreement with DIA over inter-
pretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to
Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting dif-
ficulties in coordination of the Central Intelligence
Bulletin held up publication from 3 August to 9 August
of the first item on the Cuban build-up in that publica-
tion. As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily
Intelligence Summary said that "The high volume of
shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade
between the USSR and Cuba..." There were further dif-
ficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the
interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-
loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CIA was
Photocopy
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irom
Gerald R. Ford Library
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a
long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photo-
graphy on deck cargoes and faster service in returning
these pictures to Washington.
7.
The Checklist reported the accumulating informa-
tion fully to the President. On 4 August, it stated
that "Eleven Soviet ships are on their way to Havana
and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such
a delivery would not be far short of the total amount
of arms delivered in the first half of 1962." On
9 August, it said "Soviet shipments to Cuba have been
arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July. Some
32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe
to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total
capacity of about 3,000 persons have already arrived.
Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians,
and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe
there are any combat troops among them."
8.
The DCI on 8 August briefed the Republican Policy
Committee, emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military
equipment and technicians. Two days later, at a MONGOOSE
meeting, he again stressed the importance of this intel-
ligence and raised questions as to what purpose was behind
the sudden movement of men and materiel. He said that
the United States must face the possibility of the USSR
locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could justify
because of US missile bases in places like Italy and
Turkey.
9. Soviet operations in August involved primarily
the establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast
defense missile positions. By the middle of August
CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee
reporting which, while understandably garbled and
fragmentary, enabled analysts to pinpoint areas of con-
struction and identify some of the equipment coming in.
On 18 August, the Checklist reported "There are grounds
for thinking that the large influx of Soviet military
equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be
connected with the beginning of construction of surface-
to-air missile sites. What we know so far is that
the shipments have included quantities of electronic,
transportation and construction equipment, some of it.
similar to Soviet equipment which showed up in Indonesia
for the building of SAM installations, and that many of the
arriving Soviets are construction personnel..." There were
further Checklist items along the same line on 23 and 28
August.
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Curs0
DUGA
TODAY TOM
.
חחח
9
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C.
The July Overflight Program
10. On 10 July, General Taylor, motivated primarily by
the extensive use of aerial reconnaissance in following Chi-
nese Communist military activities in Fukien, had asked the
DCI for a comprehensive review of aerial photography activi-
ties.
The end-product of this exercise was a series of mem-
oranda dated approximately 16 July from the DD/I to the DCI.
The one on Cuba recommended that U-2 flights over Cuba be
continued at their current level of two a month. It cited
inter alia in justification that earlier missions over Cuba
had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of
submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false, and
that "our most important need is for any evidence of the de-
ployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba." This
proposal was approved by the Special Group on 19 July and
later by the President.
11. The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized
for August was flown on 5 August, probably just too soon to
detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment enter-
ing the island at that time. The second mission was orig-
inally scheduled for 8 August but cancelled because of weather.
The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly
the second August mission "whenever the immediate situation
with regard to Soviet materiel justified it." COMOR reaffirmed
its requirement for the second mission on 13 August. The mis-
sion was again scheduled for the period beginning on the 19th,.
held up for 9 days by weather and eventually flown on 29 August.
(See Para 19)
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
Promulgation of NSAM 181 and the Response
D.
12.
THE WHITE
PROPER
On 21 August the DCI attended a meeting in Secretary
.Rusk's office at which were also present Secretary McNamara,
Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, Generals Taylor
and Lemnitzer, and McGeorge Bundy. He told this group that in-
formation available since 10 August indicated the extent of So-
viet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that
this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installa-
tions or missile sites, probably ground-to-air. The DCI again
raised the possibility that the Soviets would locate MRBMS in
Cuba, and there developed a discussion of possible US courses
⚫ of action in case they did so. It was agreed that the DCI would
fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that
Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would dis-
cuss the situation with the President on 23 August.
-
13. At the meeting of the 23rd, a number of actions were
decided upon to deal with what was agreed to be a critical
problem for the United States. These actions were formalized
in NSAM 181. (In addition, the President asked for a continu-
ing analysis of the number and types of Bloc personnel and
equipment in Cuba). Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the
highest levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet
military development in Cuba, including the probable establish-
ment of surface-to-air missile sites, and the danger of surface-
to-surface missiles. Furthermore the President had taken ac-
tion on the intelligence received. There was at this time no
evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being
installed--in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route
from the USSR--but the possibility had been discussed by the
President and his advisors.
14. The paragraphs of NSAM 181 applicable to CIA dealt
with: a) release of information, b) MONGOOSE, and c) "An anal-
ysis which should be prepared of the probable military, po-
litical and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba
of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles
which could reach the US." The first two subjects are outside
the scope of this memorandum; the third exists as a memorandum
dated 31 August prepared largely by McGeorge Bundy and the DD/I.
This paper, which had the benefit of preliminary results of the
29 August U-2 mission, concluded that the introduction of sur-
face-to-air missiles was the "most probable present Soviet mis-
sile activity," and that such missiles would be a serious
threat to aerial reconnaissance, but not to "determined US at-
tack." It stated that "surface-to-surface missiles with nu-
clear warheads would constitute a very significant military
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
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"
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
threat to the continental US. The memorandum concluded that
introduction of any missiles "will have a substanțial political
and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles
would create a condition of great alarm."
15. In a memorandum of 27 August, General Carter reported
to Mr. Bundy what actions CIA was taking in response to NSAM.
181. He named the officers responsible for the three items
mentioned above and listed the following additional measures:
a.
Task Force W was to look into the possibility of
removing restrictions on mounting clandestine operations out
of Guantanamo.
b.
The Board of National Estimates was to establish
a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and
types of Communist Bloc personnel entering Cuba, quantity and
types of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and all construc-
tion, particularly missile sites.
c.
The Board was also to assess the physical and
psychological dangers to the US and Latin America of missile
installations in Cuba. (The two Board actions, which were
later synthesized in the paper which eventually appeared on
19 September as SNIE 85-3, had already been set in motion by
the DD/I, in a memo to the AD/NE of 24 August).
d.
CIA was to begin immediately publishing a daily
paper on Cuba, including current intelligence, estimative as-
sessments and coverage of the press, to be distributed to the
President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Taylor,
and Robert Kennedy. (This paper, the Cuban Highlights memoran-
dum, was issued by CIA beginning 27 August, using a philosophy
and format similar to the Checklist. A few additional officials
were later added to its distribution. It was discontinued on
19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded
that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban re-
porting in regular intelligence publications).
e. CIA would arrange intelligence collection over-
flights "as frequently as the situation demands." (The results
of this action make up the central theme of this paper.)
f. Task Force W was to prepare a plan of operations
for MONGOOSE B Plus.
16.
The minutes of USIB show that at its next meeting,
29 August, Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military build-
up in Cuba, to be submitted to USIB at its next regular meeting.
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Photocopy
from
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SOPERTY OF
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTAITE HOUSE OFFICE
Presumably Mr. Hilsman was also acting in response to NSAM 181.
In any case, the paper he requested and the Board memorandum
already requested by the DD/I were combined. Successive drafts
of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, were quickly over-
taken by the photography which became available after 29 August.
At the USIB meeting of 7 September, further attempts to write
it were deferred until the new information could be digested.
This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19
September. Its substance will be discussed later. (See Paras.
26-29)
"
17. Also at the 29 August USIB meeting, two other perti-
nent subjects were discussed. First, General Carter and Mr.
Cline raised the question of more rapid delivery from Turkey
and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships (see
para. 6). Second, General Carter informed the Board that he
had two days earlier asked General Lemnitzer about the possi-
bility of low-level photography using RF-101 or F8U aircraft
and that Lemnitzer had replied that something "could be dug up.
The conversation with Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction
telephoned from out of town by the DCI, who was concerned over
the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather. (The DCI
departed Washington on leave on 23 August, went first to the
West Coast, left the country on 30 August for the Riviera, and
returned to Washington on 23 September.) On 30 August Lemnitzer
told the Special Group of this discussion with General Carter.
The Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and reopen it
"when specific targets and information needs could be identified."
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}
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.
E.
Hard Intelligence on the Build-Up (Defensive Phase)
18. During the last week in August, CIA continued to
follow the progress of the Soviet build-up, using shipping
information, communications intelligence, and agent and
refugee sources. The Checklist of 29 August reported that:
"There is no sign of a let-up in the movement
of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba.
"By latest count, there have during the
past six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban
ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships
under Communist charter.
"We note that deliveries of industrial
equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary
items are being made largely on chartered
Western ships, probably because so many
Soviet ships are involved in hauling military
gear."
19. The first hard evidence on what the Soviets were
up to in Cuba was provided by photography of the 29 August
mission. The President was told, in the Checklist of
31 August that:
August
"Preliminary information from the 30 /sic
U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the
western half of the island. Manning of this many
sites would require some 1500-2000. Bloc troops. We
are able to report on the basis of what is known so
far that construction of the sites appears to be
fairly advanced and that there are canvas-covered
missiles in the vicinity of some sites. The existence
of additional sites can probably be assumed.
"The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet
missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined
number of Soviet tanks. The Cubans have had Soviet
tanks for some time, but this is our first indica-
tion that they now have boats of this type. They
appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting
two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated
range of 35 nautical miles."
After further analysis this information appeared in the
Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September. On the 4th
and 5th, General Carter briefed a number of congressional
leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed
Services Committees. In a White House statement, also of
4 September, the President publicly confirmed the presence
of SA-2s and KOMAR-class boats.
-9-
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Photocopy
from
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST.
.
20.
The 29 August mission had confirmed the establish-
ment of a missile defense of Western Cuba. The first mission
for September (of the two which had been authorized as a
routine matter by the Special Group on 19 July; see para 10)
was flown on schedule on 5 September and revealed similar
defenses in Las Villas Province. In retrospect, it can be
seen that the two groups of SA-2 sites surrounded the areas
in which MRBM and IRBM site construction was planned. .
Photography of these areas in the 29 August and 5 September
missions, however, gave no recognizable evidence that any
such construction was then under way (although re-examination
showed a few vehicles and some construction material at
Guanajay Site 1 on 29 August). In fact, there was probably
no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at the time (see
discussion in paras. 36-39).
21.
More detailed readout of the 29 August mission had,
by about 6 September, led CIA analysts to suspect the presence
of another kind of missile site--possibly surface-to-surface--
General Carter so
at Banes, on the northeastern coast.
informed the President and the Secretaries of State and
Defense on 6 September. No equivalent of such a weapon had
been identified in the USSR in earlier U-2 photography.
Lacking such background, further information and study were
necessary to determine the characteristics and range of the
missiles. Programs for both were set in motion.
22. COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State,
on 9 September reviewed the vehicles available for reconnais-
sance of Banes. The next day, General Carter in a memorandum
to the Secretary of Defense requested "necessary actions,
(including Special Group approval) to provide for the employ-
ment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type
reconnaissance" against the cruise-missile site at Banes.
At the Special Group meeting of 14 September, a JCS repre-
sentative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of
certain targets in Cuba; however, the Secretary of Defense
was recorded as not wanting the operation considered further
until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets
were available, i.e., General Carter's proposal had been
overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10
September (see paras 24-25). Meanwhile, further analysis
of the 5 September photography had resulted in a CIA study
dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the
Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense
missile. A fully checked-out item appeared in the Central
Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September.
-10-
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Photocopy
from
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23.
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFE
This
One additional item was picked up by the 5 September
mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara
airfield, along with several others still in crates.
was not reported by CIA in the Checklist, but was reported in
the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 8 September. Actually,
these MIG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs)
had arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship
which had been photographed en route, but the photographs were
not received in Washington for several weeks.
Upon the
arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying
MIG-21 crates, an item was published in the Central Intelli-
gence Bulletin of 27 September--with DIA withholding con-
currence (see para. 6) --that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had
been delivered to Cuba. This information was also reported
in the Checklist of 27 September.
-11-
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Photocopy
from
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
F.
The New Overflight Program
PROPERTY OF
This took
Among those pre-
24. The results of the 29 August and 5 September mis-
sions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites, led to
a full review of the overflight program for Cuba.
place in the White House on 10 September.
sent were Mr. Rusk, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
The decisions of this
General Carter, and General Lansdale.
meeting are crucial to the record, and some discussion of
the atmosphere in which they were taken is required.
were three major factors:
a.
There
On 30 August, a SAC U-2 had overflown Sakhalin
Island.
The USSR had protested on 4 September, the US had
acknowledged the overflight, and the incident has received
This had been followed 
on 
8
major play in the world press.
over Communist
As a result,
September by the loss of Mission GRC-127
China, accompanied by even greater publicity.
most of the participants were--to varying degrees--reluctant
to chance another U-2 incident at this time.
that they were naturally hesitant to authorize any flights
over areas where SA-2s might be operational.
This meant
b. Second, there is no record that the MRBM
problem was discussed. The hard intelligence gathered
so far on the Soviet build-up (the Banes problem was
still up in the air), was not such as to produce a sense
of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required.
The establishment of SA-2s and other advanced defensive
systems had been foreseen in the NIE of 1. August and
1. their probable arrival had been fully reported during the
intervening period. Hence confirmation came not as a shock,
(It may
but as a problem to be dealt with deliberately.
even have served to relax the sense of urgency generated by
the President's decisions of 23 August, the known usually
The participants
being less alarming than the unknown.)
therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic
coverage of the rest of Cuba, from which the full story of
what the USSR had put into the island could be developed
..
They felt no immediate need for re-coverage of the areas
covered by the two previous missions.
C. Finally, the participants were operating in
The Cubans had been claiming
The Soviet diplomatic
the atmosphere of the time.
that U.S. invasion was imminent.
and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention
-12-
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Photocopy
from
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☑
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
on Berlin and hinting at a confrontation late in the year,
thus creating the impression that a Berlin crisis would not
come until after the US election. In fact, the USSR in its
statement of the following day (11 September) on Cuba stated
• this explicitly. There were vague hints of Khrushchev's in-
tent to attend the UNGA in New York. Khrushchev appears now
to have been throwing up a diplomatic smoke-screen behind
which to carry out the deployment of strategic forces into
Cuba, but those present at the meeting of 10 September did
not have the benefit of this hindsight. Furthermore, they
must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially
the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Admin-
istration in the election campaign then beginning.
25. At the meeting, the Secretary of State objected to
the CIA proposal for two extended overflights covering the
remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5
September missions. He insisted, instead, that coverage of
the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights
over international waters would not be combined with over-
flights of Cuban territory. To meet his wishes, the program
was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peri-
pheral. One overflight was to be over the Isle of Pines and
the other over the part of Cuba east of 77° West to cover.
Guantanamo and Banes. One peripheral flight was to cover
the north coast of eastern Cuba, the other the south coast.
The overflights would be quick "in-and-out" operations, while
all four were to be designed for maximum safety. (There
is apparently no written record that a decision was made not
to fly over known SA-2 sites, but in obtaining approval for
the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that they
did not do so.) Later the DCI negotiated with the Depart-
ment of State permission to extend the Isle of Pines mis-
sion over the Bay of Pigs area of Cuba proper. The Presi-
dent approved this program, authorizing three flights in
September in addition to the one remaining of the normal
September allocation (Special Group action of 19 July).
Thus, the record shows that the President authorized every-
thing the Special Group requested.
-13-
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Lyrary
'
G.
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST,
SNIE 85-3-62
PROPERT
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
26.
The lack of urgency expressed in these decisions was
also reflected in the deliberations over and the content of
SNIE 85-3-62, The Military Build-up in Cuba, passed by USIB
on 19 September. This estimate, which was generated by the
issuance of NSAM 181, must be viewed as a symptom of the state
of mind in the Intelligence Community and in Washington gen-
erally during the first half of September. There were no dis-
sents and no major disagreements in preparation of the final
draft. Its key findings are as follows:
a. "We believe that the USSR values its position in
Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from
it and consequently that the main purpose of the military build-
up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against
what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that
the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it.
The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhanc-
ing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet
military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recog-
nize that the development of an offensive military base in
Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat
their present purpose.
"
b. "The Soviets themselves are probably still uncer-
tain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed
they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions
as they go along.
"
c. "As the build-up continues, the USSR may be tempted
to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive
in purpose but of a more 'offensive' character: e.g., light bomb-
ers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-
surface missiles....
2.
"
"However, they are well aware that the question of
offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a
major political issue.
"
e. "The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear
striking forces which would be used against the US would be in-
It
compatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.
would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level
of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus
far... However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly
considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility
and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. There-
fore, this contingency must be examined carefully, even though
it would run counter to current Soviet policy."
f. "Soviet planners might see some utility in deploy-
ing MRBMS and IRBMS to Cuba in order to supplement the limited
number of ICBMS now believed to be operational in the USSR and
to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles.”
g. "The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant
strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp de-
parture from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far
not been installed even in Satellite territory... The Soviets
might think that the political effect of defying the US by sta-
tioning Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position
How-
would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it.
ever, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not¨
be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction.
h.. "Although the Soviets may see some military advan-
tages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be
great and the political implications would run counter to the
kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America.
They do not propose to win the region for communism by military
conquest. They count instead on a process of political action..
were
27. In commenting on these statements it must first be rec-
ognized that the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR
was willing to accept was gravely in error. It should also be
recognized that the community was virtually unanimous in support
of this judgment%;B deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons outside the USSR was without precedent. Further, while
the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba in
the period 7-15 September, (see para. 37) the first reports from
ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington
by 19 September; there was no evidence available that MRBMS
on the way. What the estimate failed to do, however, was to give
adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were mov-
ing and to the great probability that the new installations were
manned by Soviet personnel. The community was still thinking in
terms of the rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid pro-
grams for the UAR, Iraq, and Indonesia (and indeed for Cuba in
the 1960-62 period) when there was already good evidence that
the Cuban program had departed from this pattern.
: 28.
Moreover, the Indonesian program too had broken the
pattern only a month before, when the USSR showed itself will-
ing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk for the .
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IRTY OF
sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet
interests. The original contracts for Indonesia had been
roughly similar to those for the UAR and Iraq. They included
14 SA-2 sites, 12 KOMARS, 26 TU-16s (12 equipped with air-to-
surface missiles) and 12 submarines, all to be manned by In-
donesians and to be delivered at a pace consonant with the re-
quired training of personnel. However, as the crisis over
West New Guinea approached its climax of. August, Soviet eager-
ness to embroil the Indonesians in open warfare with the Dutch
led them to accelerate delivery schedules and to permit the
use of Soviet personnel to operate some of the weapons being
provided. Six submarines manned by Soviet crews actually con-
ducted war patrols under nominal Indonesian command. Thus by
mid-August the USSR had shown itself willing to take some risk
of military engagement with an ally of the United States, al-
beit the degree of risk involved was far less than in the Cu-
ban venture.
܂
29.
For the record, there is no evidence that the ex-
istence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting influence on later de-
cisions. It was not, for instance, cited to support an argu-
ment against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current
intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the
estimative process and provides a check on the continuing val-
idity of standing estimates.
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H.
Views of the DCI
30.
The only available record of dissent from the
judgments made in Washington during the first half of
September, both estimative and operational, is that of the
DCI himself, who, although vacationing on the Riviera, was
kept informed by CIA cable. On 7 September, he cabled
General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions
and stating that "my hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet
short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in
Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast US
and possibly Caribbean areas. On 10 September, the DCİ
again cabled "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive
costly defenses being established in Cuba...appears to me
quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of
ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMS
to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and
country secured from overflights. Suggest Board of National
Estimates study motives.... (The Board's response is in
effect contained in SNIE 85-3.)
"
-"
"
31. On 13 September and again on 16 September the DCI
repeated these premonitions. In the latter cable he added
"Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe
CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger
of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps
possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system
operative.' Finally, on 20 September, the DCI expressed
reservations on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3, which had
been cabled to him, saying "as an alternative I can see that
an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with
most important and effective trading position in connection
with all other critical areas and hence they might take
unexpected risks in order to establish such a position."
These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of
National Estimates.
32.
As a result of the DCI's pressure there was a
renewed examination of other methods of reconnaissance of
Cuba. (It should be noted here that this discussion was
in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment
of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible,
with the implicit thought that only at this point would the
Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMs.)
On 19 September, at USIB, General Carter stated his desire
to use RF-101s over Cuba. He also said he thought use of
the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special
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:
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OF
Group, adding that "we cannot put a stop to collection in
Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the
point of decision was reached." The Special Group at its
next meeting approved consideration of the use of FIREFLY
. and COMOR forwarded to USIB on 27 September a program for
its use.
(No FIREFLY missions have yet been attempted.)
33.
Another attempt during this period to get addi-
tional coverage was the programming of KEYHOLE Mission
The
9045 (29 September 2 October) to photograph Cuba.
results were unsatisfactory, largely because of cloud cover
-
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF. IDEALIST
.
I.
CIA Reporting during September
34. The progressive uncovering of the Soviet program in
Cuba was reported in detail by CIA current intelligence.
Pertinent samples from the Checklist are:
a. "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at
12, but the likelihood that others are under con-
struction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to
the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations.".
(14 September)
b. "A message intercepted yesterday on a net
serving Soviet forces in Germany called for 'volunteers
for the protection of Cuba.' We are not sure of the
weight to be placed on this and another intercept
referring to the isolation of 'volunteers.' If valid,
they would suggest that the influx of Soviet military
personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating
further." (15 September)
C. "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger
vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise
our estimate of technicians on the scene to about
4,200. We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence
foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey
Province." (18 September)
d. "The interception on 15 September of a signal
from a missile-associated radar, probably coming from
the surface-to-air missile site at Mariel, suggests
that the site is or soon will be operational.
"The message asking for volunteers for service
in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped
up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that
a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on.
There is no indication yet of the numbers involved."
(19 September).
e.
"Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's
canvass of its military forces for volunteers to serve
in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen
anything like it before.
to
"The move may be purely administrative:
replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with
others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand,
it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel
in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely
to be engaged in combat. We are trying to get a better
answer." (21 September)
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f. "Our running account of the number of Soviet
dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-
July is now over 100. About 85 of these probably were
carrying military hardware.
"The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered
Western correspondents to put in for new credentials by
today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's
city limits is out of bounds except by special per-
mission." (27 September)
35. During this period General Carter, at the President's
instructions, briefed General Eisenhower on the Cuban situa-
tion on 10 September. On 12 September he briefed the House
Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees. Although cut
of time sequence, it should also be noted here, because the
information presented was essentially more of the same,
the DCI again briefed General Eisenhower on 3 October and
Congressman Cannon on 9 October.
that
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
J.
The Soviet Offensive Deployment
36. At this point, it is necessary to retrace a few
steps in time and discuss what was actually going on in Cuba.
Examination of information now available makes it possible
to outline with a fair degree of confidence a time-table of
the Soviet program which is generally consistent from site
to site. This begins with the construction of SAM defenses,
first in the west around San Cristobal and Guanajay, then in
central Cuba around Sagua la Grande and Remedios, finally in
the rest of the island. Next, in each case, comes the eviction
of local inhabitants at each site, road improvement, and the
establishment of restricted construction areas. Finally
comes the arrival of equipment at each site according to what
appears a carefully prepared schedule. Apparently, no recog-
nizable missile equipment was moved to the MRBM sites and no
major construction was begun at the IRBM sites until at least
two weeks after the last U-2 overflight of the area and until
the US had publicly acknowledged the presence of SA-2 sites
in Cuba.
37.
The first large pieces of equipment for the MRBM
sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR
on the ship Omsk, which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September.
A second shipment followed on the Poltava which arrived on
15 September. This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by
truck at night, with the first convoys probably arriving at
the sites about 17 September. That is, 17 September is the
earliest date at which photography might have detected the
first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal.
38.
Construction equipment and material for the
Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about
mid-August, minor activity of an indefinite type was noted
there in the 29 August photography, and major construction
had probably begun by 15 September. (The fact that ship-
ments to Guanajay started before those to San Cristobal
reflects the longer lead-time required for construction of
a fixed site). It is not possible to say how soon after
15 September the activity might have been recognizable from
the air as an IRBM site.
39.. The sites in Las Villas Province were established
Equipment
on a slightly later, but similar, time scale.
for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites was probably landed
at Casilda, on the south coast. The most likely ship to
have carried the large items is the Kimovsk, which docked
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there on 22 September. This equipment must have moved to
the site during the last week of September, and was probably
detectable from photography after 1 October. The Remedios
IRBM site construction was parallel to the Guanajay schedule,
_ but also about two weeks behind. Photography of 5 September
was negative, but road improvement began shortly thereafter,
and a flow of construction material from the port of Isabela,
on the north coast, began. The estimated date for the be-
ginning of major construction is about 1 October. Again
the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photo-
graphic signature is not determinable.
1
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
The Targeting of San Cristobal
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFOF
a.
40. Although the sites themselves were closed to ground
observation, the movement of equipment to them from the ports
was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a number of individuals
_ who later fled to the US. The agents reported this informa-
tion as soon as they were able, but in most cases had to de-
pend on secret writing for communication. Hence, there was
lag of several days at least before their information became
available. Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer
for other, and uncontrollable, reasons--the time of the in-
dividual's decision to leave Cuba, his discovery of means for
doing so, and his delivery to an interrogation center. Many
of the reports so received dealt with unidentifiable construc-
tion activity. Many of them, because of the time-lags noted
above, did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October,
and some are still coming in.
41. Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the San Cristobal
area had been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic
confirmation had been requested. This represents a consider-
able technical achievement... To understand why, it is again
necessary to back-track in time. Since the moment of Castro's
triumphal march into Havana, the Intelligence Community had
been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and mis-
sile installations in Cuba. There were several hundred such
reports, claiming the presence of everything from small arms
to ICBMs, before August 1960, i.e., before the USSR had sup-
plied Cuba with any weapons at all. More specifically, CIA's.
files contain 211 intelligence reports (this does not include
press items) on missile and missile-associated activity in
Cuba before 1 Jan 1962. All of these were either totally
false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of
activity. CIA analysts had naturally come to view all such
reports with a high degree of suspicion.
42. On 15 February 1962 an interagency interrogation center
was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cu-
ban refugees and improve the quality of intelligence collected
from them. It was manned by trained bilingual interrogators
from the armed services and CIA. The establishment of Opa Locka
coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity re-
ceived in Washington. When the defensive phase of the Soviet
buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very
rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equip-
ment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the se-
curity precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation.
(Such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited in
para 9).
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
43. For the better part of two years, CIA had been check-
ing information obtained from refugee, defector, and agent
sources with NPIC whenever it was apparent that the informa-
tion was of a kind that could be verified or negated by aerial
· reconnaissance. In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of
formal listings (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba)
in which these reports were evaluated in the light of photogra-
phic coverage. In the 7 issues of this publication between 31
May and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it
for comment. Of this total, only three cited missile activity
which could not be linked directly to the SA-2 and cruise mis-
sile deployments. NPIC's evidence negated those three.
44.
When the first indications of build-up began to come
in in August, these procedures were further tightened. CIA
current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's office
on about 14 August not to publish any information on the con-
struction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked
out with NPIC. (This instruction was in the field of intelli-
gence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to
later restrictions; (see para 50). Between 14 August and mid-
October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check
on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought
to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. À
great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally
by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary
coverage or made a negative finding.
45. On 20 August, the COMOR Targeting Working Group
(chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first compre-
hensive card file system for Cuban targets. An example of its
procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande
area. Based on refugee reporting, the COMOR Targeting Working
Group on 27 August pinpointed four farms in this area as sus-
pect missile sites. Readout of the 29 August coverage showed
an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis
for the reported activity there, and the target card was changed
to show a confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that know-
ledge that this site was in the area could have led analysts to
misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of
the SAM development, but in fact no such reports were received.
46. By September, the volume of agent and refugee report-
ing had become very large indeed. During the month 882 re-
ports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclu-
sive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine col-
lectors report that their output represented only the small pub-
A substantial
lishable fraction of the raw material collected.)
-24-
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PROPERTY OF
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST¨
however
proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive mis-
siles and related activities. Knowledge on the part 
of the
analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on
, plus 
the
normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in tell-
·ing an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw
a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment
when it finally began. The CIA analytic apparatus, ::
recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM
equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action
upon them.
It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another.
location where alleged missile activity should be negated by
photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site.
47. This process took about three weeks, from the date
when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to
The two reports from Opa
the preparation of the target card.
Locka which triggered it were:
a.
An observation in Havana on 12 September of a
convoy carrying long canvas-covered objects which the source
This re-
identified under interrogation as resembling SS-4s.
contained.
port, which was disseminated by CIA on 21 September,
sufficient accurate detail to alert intelligence analysts.
b.
An observation on 17 September of a convoy mov-
This information, received
ing toward the San Cristobal area.
on 27 September, dovetailed in many respects with the earlier
report.
;
48.
The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts
to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact
seen the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the
SS-4 identification being genuine. A day or so 
earlier; a
target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the 
basis
of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket 
base." Now
this card was removed and, with the two reports cited 
above
and other less specific information on activity in this area
which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared
between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority require-
This card was used in 
the
ment for photographic coverage.
It read as
targeting of the 14 October flight (see para 63).
follows: "Collateral reports indicate the existence of a re-
stricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected 
of
including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4
Shyster. The area is bounded by a line connecting the follow-
ing four town: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244W); San 
Diego
del Los Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (8301N/2243W); 
and
Las Pozos (8317N/2250W). Requirement: Search the area 
deli-
neated for possible surface missile construction, with
cular attention to SS-4 Shyster."
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49.
Another report, too general to be used in the process
described above, is nevertheless of interest as the first good
information distributed on the Soviet offensive build-up. On
20 September, CIA disseminated an agent report that Castro's
personal pilot, Claudio Morinas, had said on 9 September "We
have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface
and surface-to-air, and we have a radar system which covers,;
sector by sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as
far as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for inter-
mediate range rockets"
TY OF
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST.
L. Limitations on Publications
50.
At some point, probably just after 27 September, an
item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might
´have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It
could not be written because there was an injunction not to do
so. By the time that hard information began to come in early
in September, the USIB principals had become acutely conscious
of the distinction publicly made by the President between of-
fensive and defensive weapons in Cuba. Aware that they 
were
dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that
"leakage" of intelligence on offensive weapons, true or false,
would seriously limit the President's freedom of action 
in 
deal-
ing with what might become a major international crisis, they
had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such infor-
mation. Analysis would continue and senior policy officials
would be briefed, but no material would 
appear in formal 
intel-
ligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals.
These instructions were first issued orally
, and later (on 11
October) formalized by USIB in the "PSALM" system (X-Ray Funnel
for SIGINT). The key passages in USIB's order were
:
information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each
USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals 
on 
an
EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities 
as ad-
visers to the President have a need to know," and "
There is no
intent hereby, however, to inhibit the essential analytic 
pro-
cess.
"
"Such
51. It should also be noted that the order not to publish
anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration (Para 44)
The effect this would 
have had on 
re-
had never been rescinded.
porting in late September and October if the other ban had not
been in effect is difficult to determine.
52.
These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist,
but the Checklist writers drew for their Cuban information
largely on the Cuban Daily Summary, a compendium of reporting
on Cuba published by CIA. Since the Summary was 
affected by
the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the 
sheer volume
of raw material coming in on Cuba; had the effect of 
cutting
the Checklist off from information on offensive 
weapons.
53.
Moreover, neither the Checklist group, nor any other
current intelligence officers, knew that the possibility that a
Soviet strategic missile base might be established 
in Cuba had
been raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by 
the President
and his advisors more than a month earlier (See 
Para 13). . In
other words the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered 
down 
by
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PHO
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISHE WHITE HOUSE CTFIVE
time and bureaucratic process that it reached the working level
only in the form of SNIE 85-3, which held that establishment of
such a base was most improbable. (See, however, para 29)
54.
It is difficult to say whether information from ground
' sources would have been published had there not been a blanket
injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the
potential political impact of the reports they were receiving;
this would not have influenced them against publication, but
would have made them want to be doubly sure, especially on a
subject with a history reaching back to Our Man in Havana. In
addition, rigid compartmentation was maintained between the
COMOR Special Grow organization responsible for collection and
the intelligence components responsible for analysis. Few, if
'any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem even had IDEALIST
clearances. As a result, they did not know that no overflights
of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September
They had
program, or that this program was seriously delayed.
no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had
requested would not be soon forthcoming, and they might well have
delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it..
55. Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunc-
tion against publication had not existed there would have been
some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary,
which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite pos-
sible--but by no means certain--that they would then have been
picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they
would have survived the coordination process for the Central In-
telligence Bulletin. Thus, at the most the President might have
learned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal
slightly more than a week before he apparently did.
56.
In sum the CIA analysts believed they had done their
duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic cover-
age, but no word of their concern over activity in this area
It appears highly
had appeared in an intelligence publication.
probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at
its meeting on 9 October, when (see para. 63) it ordered a U-2
mission which covered the area.
57.
The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correla-
tion of reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be
attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative
This machinery was de-
structure supporting the Special Group.
signed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper
work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back
They
into the early history of U-2 operations over the USSR.
were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnais-
sance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as
In fact,
that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical.
after readout of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned.
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
:
..
M.
Progress of the September Overflight Program
PROPERTY
VINTE HOUSE OFFICE
58. While the MRBM and IRBM deployment continued and
the first good ground reports began to filter out of Cuba,
the four-flight reconnaissance program approved on 10 Septem-
ber was being pushed forward. Unfortunately, this program
Not until 26 September
was seriously delayed by bad weather.
could the first successful mission be flown, over Banes and
Guantanamo.. (A mission was flown on 17 September but its
On 27 and 28 Septem-
targets were completely cloud-covered)
ber the weather was bad again, but on the 29th the Isle of
The
Pines Bay of Pigs mission was successfully flown.
weather again turned bad until 5 October, when the south
The next day,
coast peripheral mission was accomplished.
the north coast peripheral mission aborted, but was success-
fully completed on 7 October.
-
59. Thus, completion of the September program took 26
days, from 12 September--the earliest date on which missions
approved on the 10th could have been flown--through 7 October.
On 20 of these days weather was bad over the areas not yet
overflown (the criterion for launch was a forecast of less.
than 25 percent cloud cover). On four days successful mis-
sions were flown. On one day a mission was launched but
aborted, and one day was used to alert a mission which was
launched the following day. Availability of aircraft was
not a limiting factor.
-60. These missions accomplished their purpose, i.e.,
they established almost completely the location of SA-2
sites on the island. They did not--and, since they were
designed to avoid SAM-defended areas, could not--detect the
The combined
ballistic missile deployments then under way..
effect of the Special Group decision of 10 September and
the weather conditions of the period following was to delay
consideration of what reconnaissance activities should next
be undertaken over Cuba until early October.
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Photocopy
from
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
N.
The Special Group Decision of 9 October
PROFERTA U
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
61. By late September the delays in accomplishing the
four-flight program, coupled with a mass 
of evidence that 
the
Soviet build-up was continuing, had 
generated a greatly
It should 
again
increased sense of urgency in Washington
.
be noted, however, that high-level consideration of the
possibility that MRBMs might be 
deployed to Cuba had 
always
been in terms of Soviet action 
after the SA-2 defense was
There is no documentary 
evidence of 
action
fully operational.
directed toward the overflight of SAM-defended areas until 
the
At this
Special Group (Augmented) meeting of 
4 October.
meeting the DCI pointed out that 
U-2 flights 
were now (before
the last two missions of the 10 
September program) restricted
by the presence of SAM sites to the 
southeastern quadrant of
Cuba. According to the minutes 
of this meeting "it was
questioned by the DC17 whether 
this was a reasonable 
restric-
tion at this time, particularly 
since the SAMs were almost
The 
Group then ordered the 
NRO
certainly not operational."
to prepare an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba for
presentation at the Group's meeting 
of 9 October.
Para
62. On 6 October, COMOR provided to the NRO a memo-
randum entitled "Intelligence Justification 
and 
Requirements
for Overflight of Cuba" for use in 
this presentation.
Al. of this paper stated that "there 
is now a pressing 
and
continuing need for up-to-date 
intelligence on the progress
The very highest levels
of the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba
.
of the government are dependent upon this intelligence to
assist in making policy decisions 
of immediate and vital 
con-
Para A2.
, commenting on the absence of
cern to the nation."
coverage of western Cuba since 29 August, included the state-
ment that "Ground observers 
have, in several recent instances
,
reported sightings of what they 
believe to be Soviet MRBMS in
Cuba. These reports must be 
confirmed or denied by photo
" Attached to the 
memorandum were a number of 
target
coverage.
lists, on which the area previously targeted around 
San
Cristobal appears, together with 
recommendations for 
attack
of particular targets by satellite
, U-2, oblique, FIREFLY,
(USIB, considering this 
paper
or F8U-1P/RF-101 photography.
on 6 October, recommended to the Special Group full coverage
of two of these lists which did not 
specifically include San
Cristobal, but which by its nature 
would have covered that
area and the other ballistic missile 
sites as well.)
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
Photocopy
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⋅
63.
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
"
PROPERTY
ANNE KORDT GETICE
At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's
first recommendation was "A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM
site as soon as weather permits. This referred to the area
targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal (see Para 48). The
operation, which was to be supported by ELINT collection
aircraft off the coast, also was designed to pass over one
of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most nearly opera-
tional. Thus the secondary objective was to determine the
status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved
in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as
possible. NRO's second recommendation was therefore condi-
tional: "If there is no SA-2 reaction to the initial U-2
sortie, maximum coverage of the western end of the island
by multiple U-2s simultaneously, as soon as weather permits."
(There were also certain other recommendations for low level,
oblique, and FIREFLY missions.)..
64.
The Group gave first priority to the San Cristobal
mission and recommended to the President that he approve it.
The President gave his approval--presumably learning of the.
San Cristobal reports at this time--and the mission was
immediately mounted. It was delayed by weather, however, from
10 through 12 October. On that date operational control was
transferred to SAC. There is no reason to believe that the
transfer in any way delayed launching the mission, which SAC
flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the prescribed
track, but took a course at an angle to it. Fortunately the
planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal, and the
primary mission was accomplished.
.65. After this mission had been approved, but before it
had been flown, CIA received on 10 October Navy photographs
taken two weeks earlier of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.
These photographs showed clearly identifiable IL-28 crates,
which later showed up in U-2 photography of 17 October--along.
with a number of others which must have come in on unphoto-
graphed ships--at San Julian airfield in the western tip of
the island. The information appeared in the Checklist of
11 October.
66. During this interim period, the DCI briefed the
CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations on 10 October on
the build-up, including the IL-28s. He also commented on
MRBMs essentially along the lines of his cables from Nice
(para 30), adding that there were many experts who did not
believe the Soviets would make such a move, but that he
differed with them. He told the Subcommittee that he had
authority for an overflight in the next day or so.
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General
Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
Carter said much the same thing to Senator Saltonstall the
following day (11 October). In reply to Saltonstall's
question about Senator Keating's charges of known MRBM sites
in Cuba, General Carter said that there were refugee reports
' but no hard evidence, and that CIA hoped to photograph the
areas in the next day or so. General Carter also briefed
Senator Stennis on 15 October (before the photography of
the previous day was available), again along the same lines.
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Photocopy
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
0.
Notification of the President
67.
By this time, photography from the 14 October
mission had arrived in Washington and readout had begun.
The Director, NPIC, contacted the DD/I in the early evening
of the 15th to inform him that a possible MRBM site had been
The DD/I notified
identified in the San Cristobal area.
General Carter (the DCI being out of town). : General Carter
told him he would notify General Taylor and General Carroll
of DIA at dinner, and McGeorge Bundy if he was present.
As the readout progressed during the evening the information
became firmer and the DD/I decided not to wait until morning
About
to notify White House and State Department officials.
2200 he passed the information to Mr. Bundy and Mr. Hilsman,
The following morning
who notified the Secretary of State.
(16 October) General Carter and the DD/I briefed Bundy in
detail and General Carter at 1100 briefed the President.
TH
THE WHI
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Photocopy
from
Geran R. Ford Library