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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Organization and Activities of the
Deputy Director (Research)
Development Projects Division
-
Special Projects Branch
As recommended, the Special Projects Branch of DPD plus the
necessary supporting units have been transferred to DD/R.
Technical Services Division
Further study did not commend implementation of the Working
Group's recommendation that all TSD research and development be
placed under DD/R. The DD/P made a substantial argument in favor
of leaving all of TSD under his control in order to insure close and
intimate relations with the operating units. Further, an argument of
almost overwhelming proportions indicated that the DD/R already had
some very major responsibilities without taking on the diverse and
generally unrelated responsibilities of TSD.
Other Research and Development
After considerable additional study it was decided to transfer all
ELINT to DD/R, except for the direct command of certain field units
which under all circumstances should be left under the station chiefs.
Research and development in support of NPIC would fall under DD/R
for those very advanced items, but not for current production require-
ments.
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n
Part II
Coordination
The staff of the Assistant for Coordination has continued to work
on the same basis as formerly and continues to be constituted of
assignees from other agencies. There appears to be progress in
achieving closer inter-agency coordination, but whether this is due
to the work of the Coordination Staff or to the DCI's personal interest
in this subject would be hard to determine.
Princeton Consultants to ONE.
This group has been continued.
National Photographic Interpretation Center
The Executive Director has personally kept under review the work-
load of NPIC. NPIC is recruiting in anticipation of an increased work-
load.
Caliber of Personnel
The new DD/I is cognizant of this problem and is taking steps to
improve the caliber of the personnel.
Merger of ONE and OCI
It has been decided not to merge these offices.
Preparation and Dissemination of Memoranda
Too many uncoordinated memoranda are still being circulated.
The practice of asking other departments to prepare memoranda has
not been adopted.
White House Relations
(This matter was handled orally by the Working Group and con-
Bequently the comments will be handled similarly.)
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74-1
Research on International Communism
The DD/I has established a special staff under an experienced
intelligence 
officer 
for this purpose, and this staff is getting gradually
organized.
Office of Scientific Intelligence
OSI is remaining under DD/I, but DD/R will eventually open his
career 
service to those 
who wish to join it.
DD/R's Operational Responsibilities
It has been firmly established that DD/R will operate those pro-
jects 
which he develops. 
We believe that DD/R has implemented some
of the principles in the 
special annex of the Working Group report.
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uffind
Organization and Activities of the
Intelligence Community
National Indications Center
-
Watch Committee
General Carter, the new Chairman of the Watch Committee, has
made 
a thorough review 
of its activities and NIC operations. Steps
have been taken to see 
that NIC is properly manned with the right
personnel, and the 
Department of State is being constantly reminded
of its obligations in 
this regard. We also believe that the methods of
operations of the 
Watch Committee have now been aligned in accord-
ance with the objectives 
of the Working Group.
CIA Relations with the Department of State
Since the issuance of the Working Group report, a special team
composed 
of a senior 
representative from the Agency and from the
Department of 
State have studied the entire problem of "cover." They
have reached an agree
agreed formula 
for this cover and for correcting some
of the problems that attracted the attention of the Working Group.This
includes the Foreign Service 
designation: A new agreement has been
reached on the handling of 
State communications. Since the production
of the Working Group 
report the level on which COMINT policy is
handled in CIA has been 
raised to that of Assistant Deputy Director.
State's Counter Communism Office
The proposal for the creation of such an office in the Department
of State 
appears to have 
come to naught.
State's Operational Center
The State Operational Center also appears to have come to naught.
State at White House Briefings
The Department of State does not attend the White House briefings.
Receipt of Top Classification Messages
The DCI has taken up with the White House the necessity for being
included 
in the dissemination 
of all top classification messages.
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2.
3.
SECRET
The organization of the DCI/DDCI's office is currently under study.
The Audit Staff is removed from the DD/S area and placed under
the Inspector General.
The Comptroller is removed from the DD/3 area, given greatly
expanded responsibilities, and will report directly to the DCI/
DDCI's office.
4. The General Counsel's office is removed from under the DD/S,
will resume responsibility for Congressional relations, and will
report directly to the DCI/DDCI's office.
5. The Office of Operations is disbanded. Contact Division to DD/P
as nucleus for Domestic Division. Foreign Documents Division
to be combined with OCR Library. Foreign Broadcast Information
Division to be independent unit reporting directly to DD/I.
6. Position of Assistant DD/P for Covert Action abolished.
7. Assistant DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations created.
8. Central Support Staff under DD/P created. This will draw together
such support as personnel, logistics and budget and will also take
over technical support from those operating units of TSD which
remain in the DD/P, e.g., secret writing, audio operations, etc.
The Central Support Staff will also absorb the present Operational
Services Staff and certain other activities.
9. A Special Task Force is created for such operations of a magnitude
that transcends the capabilities of one division.
10. The International Organizations Division and Covert Action Staff
are combined, putting together our largest activities in this field.
11. A Domestic Division is created. This will absorb as its nucleus
Contact Division of CO from the DD/I, the Commercial Staff, the
Air Proprietary Branch from DPD, ultimately the management of
CAT from the DD/S, and those aspects of cover which involve
contacts with the U.S. business community.
12.
A Deputy Director for Research is created. This organization will
take over the Office of Scientific Intelligence from the DD/I, Special
Projects m DPD, all research and development from TSD, and
other research and development activities currently located in various
units of the Agency such as the Office of Communications, NPIC, etc.
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March 29, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Notes on discussions between myself, Carter, Kirkpatrick
Coyne and Schuyler in review of report of the Kirkpatrick
Committee
Following recommendations call for further consideration and
possible modification.
1. Office of the DCI
1. Page 11
-
Comptroller
Terms of Reference of the Financial Policy and Budget
Committee under the Comptroller and the Executive Committee
as provided hereafter must be clarified to provide continuing
program review by a senior committee as part of an orderly
program and budget process.
2. Office of Coordination.
Differences between Kirkpatrick and Schuyler position
as outlined in the report and Coyne's position should be
considered and reconciled. Page 3, Item C. Responsibility for
SIGINT policies and resulting international arrangements as a
responsibility of this office should be further considered.
3. Public relations directive should be issued on policy of
speech making and public appearances by Agency employees,
including DCI and the Deputies.
4. Page 6. Reduction of force consideration should be given
with continuing 3-man management review committes (such as
the Kirkpatrick Committee) exploring for the DCI and the DDCI
ways and means of eliminating duplication and consolidating
functions, eliminating unnecessary activities, with the objective
of developing better organization at lesser cost and with
fewer personnel.
5. 6. B. Terms of Reference for the Executive Director and
the selection of this man should be discussed between McCone
and Carter at an early date.
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II. Office of DD/P
1. Page 9: Important to move on an Assistant DD/P for
Paramilitary operations and air support. There is
continuing criticism of the Agency for lack of professionalism
in these 
activities, most particularly airborne.
2. Domestic Division.
Care must be exercised and the merger of Contact
Division 
with the 
balance of the Domestic Division and
also care must be exercised to be sure that the Domestic
Division "gathers up" all fragments of CIA's activities
dispersed throughout the United States with the exception
of Security Division.
3. Deputy Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth
Definition of this office must be worked out to avoid
confusion with respect to small British areas such as Hong
Kong, Singapore
, British Guiana, etc. The purpose of
this office 
probably to handle Commonwealth versus Colonial
Office affairs.
4. CIA/State Relations.
Review of salary allowances, expense accounts,
living 
conditions
, etc., of CIA agents under State cover
versus Foreign 
Service Officers comparable conditions
should be 
made and if criticism legitimate, corrective
measures should 
be taken without impairing ability Birtefs
of Station to 
handle special costly situations which might
be done by specific 
authorization Also audit and control
of 
personal expenses of COS must be developed immediately.
III. Office of DD/I
1. Carter and McCone should agree on selection of a DD/I,
Deputy 
DD/I and Chief 
of OCI as initial step in improving personnel
within this office.
2. Merger of O/NE and OCI should be delayed until new
DD/I 
is installed and 
makes his recommendations.
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3. National Board of Estimates should be reviewed and
improved where necessary and consideration given to formation
of a special group within O/NE to analyze on a continuing basis
objectives of Soviet/sino Bloc, international communism and
their pursuit of their cold war activities and in their efforts to
establish world domination. Note: This office previously
existed directly under DD/I but was abandoned a few months
ago.
4. Proper liaison with finance, State Department, and
agreed methods for DCI to brief NSC as provided by law
should be worked out.
5. National Photographic Interpretation Center, Page 19.
Note this requires immediate study, possibly by USIB.
Fear that the work load on the NPIC will overwhelm it and as a
result it will be unable to process vast amount of information
during months of May through September should be quickly studied
and arrangements made through USIB to disperse read-out to SAC
and Army St. Louis Center if doing so necessary to keep our
processing and read-out on a current basis. This matter
considered of greatest importance.
IV. Elements of DD/R
1. It should be recognized that Deputy Director for
Research is a cover and this office not necessarily confined
to research but should be tasked with operationed responsibi-
lities. Also most important project under DD/R is OXCART,
therefore DD/R must be restrained from taking on collateral
activities so fast that OXCART will suffer. The DD/R
responsibilities will cover all phases of Agency responsibility
and activity in NRO which may or may not include the actual
operation of CXCART. It will include intelligence input into
OXCART and CORONA and SAMOS planning, irrespective of
where operations rest.
2. Location of O5I should be resolved.
3. Interrelationship between DD/R and DD/P to provide
staff support and particularly the CI production should be
established by directive of Deputy DCI.
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4. With respect to page 23, certain operational responsibi-
lities should pass from DD/N to DD/P upon completion of
research and development; however a study should be made to
determine whether the many fully integrated operational activities
such as OX CART and some fully integrated ELINT operations
should not be permanently under DD/R who is to have both
operational and research and development responsibilities.
Considerations of OXCART
:
1. Responsibility for all phases of OXCART are to follow
the direct supervision of Sec/Def and DCI by agreement with the
OD, Charyk as AR/Sec. Def., will be executive head of NRO, DD/R
will be his Deputy and by assignment will be responsible for all
phases of OXCART.
2. Details of operations, as contrasted to R&D, will be
worked out at a later date.
3. NSC directive agreed OXCART tasks are responsibility
of Special Group and question of augmentation is a matter for Special
Group, not CIA, to decide.
4. DD/R should be charged with the responsibility of
mobilizing and utilizing all necessary resources of DD/I, DD/P and
DD/
S and General Counsel in performance of DD/R's assigned respon-
sibility as Deputy Director NRO and manager of OXCART project.
5. Question of use of Air Force officers versus civilians
must be decided by higher authority, likewise the question of operational
responsibility between that of CIA or DD/R or personnel secanded from
the Air Force versus direct Air Force operation must be decided by DCI
and Sec/Def. and the 
President after careful consideration of all issues
and problems relating to this matter.
6. Because of imminence of commencement of test
flights immediate careful attention should be given to all aspects of
the 
cover story as certain information concerning the plane will
become known when it is observed in FAA (that other) radar
V. National Indications Center Watch Committee
1. Appointment should be made next week for General
Carter and myself to visit the NIC and the DIA Centers and
observe the Watch Committee operations and make a judgment
as to 
whether this organization is properly set up and
efficiently operating, and to resolve differences between
Mr. Coyne and USB.
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mib
2. White House briefings should continue; a substitute
for Mr. Amory should be arranged until a more adequats
arrangement is provided: Daily briefings of Bundy, Clifton
and Taylor and an occasional briefing of the President by
DCI should suffice.
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JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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6 April 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
: Final Report of Working Group on Organization
and Activities
1. I have the honor to present herewith the final report of the
working group which you established in January to consult with you and
advise on the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and of its relationship with other agencies in the intelligence
community. This report reflects the views of the working group and is
divided into two parts. The first part deals primarily with the organiza-
tion of the Central Intelligence Agency and reflects the unanimous views
of the working group. The second part contains comments and recom-
mendations on areas dealing with the work of the Central Intelligence
Agency and activities of the intelligence community in which the working
group was either unable to agres or felt that considerably more study
was needed before action was taken.
2. For the record I would note that the working group held its
first session on January 3 and met on 35 different days between that date
and its final session with you on March 28. During its work the group
had approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the
organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also
included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several
briefings on State Department activities and its relations with CIA; approxi-
mately one-half day spent in the Pentagon in addition to other briefings
by the Defense Intelligence Agency; and a full week spent visiting SAC,
NORAD and other activities in the United States. We were briefed by
the head of every major component in the CIA with the exception of three
DD/P area divisions whose briefings had to be excluded because of the
pressure of time. However, we feel that having heard from four other
area division³ the working group had a knowledge of the activities and
problems of these units. In addition to the 100 briefings, the working
group had more than ten executive sessions in which it discussed and
debated at great length its findings and conclusions. Finally, there were
R... Ken
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some 20 meetings with yourself, and with senior Agency officials to
discuss our 
findings and conclusions. These included at least two
sessions with 
each of the Deputy Directors and with the Assistant
Director for 
National Estimates and the Assistant Director for Cur-
rent Intelligence
.
3. The attached report does not purport to be complete or ex-
haustive 
in any respect, but 
rather it is an aide memoir to recall to
mind our oral discussions 
and to record some of the reasons and
philosophy behind our recommendations.
cc: DDC1
Attachment
Report was read by:
pl
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
DD/R
DD/S
DD/I (and also
Knight McMahan)
AD/SI
DD/P
cy 7-destroyed
су
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PARTI
This section deals primarily with the organization
of the Central Intelligence Agency and represents
the view of the entire Working Group.
SECRET
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OFFICE OF THE DCI
Organization of DC's Office
We recommend that the organization of the DCI's office be
changed in order to provide more effective support to the DCI, a
systematized control of messages both oral and written, and a
clear delineation of the responsibilities of the assistants to the
DCI. In this connection we would urge that a secretariat be
created, · that the head of this secretariat assign individual re-
sponsibilities to each of the personal assistants to the DCI, that
.
daily staff meetings be held for a full exchange on the activities
of the staff, and that all personnel in the Agency be advised as
to how to keep the DCI's staff informed properly of the activities
of the Agency.
ExD
:
Comptroller
We recommend that the Comptroller's office be brought
out from under the DD/S, report directly to the DCI's office and
receive full authority for fotal fiscal control of the Agency.
We recommend that the Comptroller be designated Chair-
man of a Financial Policy and Budget Committee composed of
the appropriate senior officers of the Agency. We believe that
SECRET
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such a committee should be kept fully and currently informed of
all Agency activities, and in order to be effective should meet
regularly and submit its reports to the DDCI and DCI,
Inspector General
We recommend that the Audit Staff be combined with the
staff of the Inspector General and that the merged staff report to
the DCI's office.
We believe that the size of the Inspector General Staff
should be increased with qualified professional personnel assigned
from their respective components in order to perform more
frequent inspections of Agency units. We urge'inspections at
least annually of major operations and of field stations.
New
to
IG+
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печен
General Counsel
We recommend that the General Counsel's staff be
removed from the organization of the Deputy Director (Support)
and report directly to the office of the DCI. In such a position
the General Counsel should resume the responsibility for the
direction and guidance of the work of the Legislative Counsel;
which is currently the responsibility of the Inspector General,
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Cable Secretariat
We have examined the Cable Secretariat which is currently
located in the office of the DCI and reports to the Executive Officer.
We believe it should continue to be in the office of the Director under
the careful supervision of the Executive Director. We are con-
cerned that as it now operates requirements for cables have not
been adequately coordinated, and cables have been disseminated
too often on the judgment of junior officers. We believe this needs
careful study.
D
Contracts
We believe that the Agency is vulnerable on sole-source
contracts for such activities as TSD and DPD, and that those
contracts currently in existence should be reviewed and that all
such future contracts should be passed on by the DCI's office
prior to approval.
Personnel Assignments
We believe that the DDCI and DCI should be the final
approving authority for all assignments to positions of Chief
or Deputy Chief of Offices (DD/P Divisions and Staffs) or of
field stations and bases, both foreign and domestic.
DOCI
shoed
review
S
3
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We believe the DCI's office should also review all assign-
ments in the middle management echelon with particular reference
to insuring the proper language qualifications, operational training
and suitability.
harkleo
7
Public Relations
We recommend that the present system of public relations
by the Agency be changed. While we see the necessity for the
DCI to have an assistant in his office handling relations with the
public media, we believe that every effort should be made to
minimize the amount of publicity that CIA receives.
We strongly recommend that the present practice of
giving background briefings to newspapermen cease and that
CIA give information to the press only where CIA has something
which for operational reasons should be released on an unattri-
butable basis. We urge that no public speeches be given by
Agency officials.
under
ExD
agree
Reduction in Force
We recommend that the DCI and DDCI insure that the
present reduction in force in the Agency include senior officers,
particularly supergrades who are no longer as effective as they
should be in their assignments.
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Handling of Communications Other Than Cables
We note that under present arrangements communications
other than cables are handled by the Records Integration Division
of DD/P, which is not always fully cognizant of the interests of
non-DD/P parts of the Agency. We recommend that the entire
system of handling incoming and outgoing communications be
subjected to further study with a view to insuring adequate dis-
semination of all communications, particularly in DD/I, DD/R
and DD/S, which may have need for prompt receipt of such
material.
I
to
Executive Director
We have not tried to spell out the responsibilities of the
Executive Director, inasmuch as we believe this to be primarily
a matter that should be tailored to the personal preferences of
the DCI and DDCI and how they wish to operate their office and
the Agency. We urge, however, that special attention be directed
to the avoidance of a straight vertical line of command; i. e.,
problems should not have to pass through each of the three officers.
all
agree
Executive Committee
We recommend the creation of an Executive Committee
to be chaired by the DDCI and consist of the four Deputies, the
-
5
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Comptroller, and the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and
Intelligence Community Guidance. This Committee, from a
policy standpoint, would review proposed major projects and
maintain a continuous review of all major activities and make
appropriate recommendations thereon to the DCI. This Com-
mittee would replace the present Project Review Committee.
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Include
ExD
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}
Delite
G-C
AsshforCoord.)
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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
Get
to th
Office of the DD/P
We commend the decision of the DD/P to abolish the position
of the A/DDP/A, and believe that the restoration of the previous
organization with just the DD/P and COP in the line of command
in the front office will result in a clear delineation of responsibili-
ties and more efficient operations.
The Staffs
We studied at some length the staffs in the DD/P. We con-
sidered a possible merger of the FL, CI and CA staffs. We also
studied proposals for divesting the staffs of all operational responsi-
-
bilities. We believe that while both are desirable objectives, neither
are practicable under present circumstances. We therefore urge
that the FI, CI and CA staff functions be drawn closer together
under the Chief of Operations and that these organizations insofar
as practical act in the classical sense as staffs for the DD/P. We
further believe that the Operational Services Staff, the Central Staff,
and the residual of the Cover and Commercial Staff, after the changes
recommended below are completed, be transferred to the Central
Support Staff which is proposed.
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Merger of Covert Action Staff and International Organizations Division
The DD/P has advised us of his desire to merge the Covert
Action Staff with the International Organizations Division. While
this is contrary to the trend of divesting staffs of operational duties,
we nevertheless do not observe any major reasons against such a
merger and believe that it should be tried out in accordance with
the DD/P's wishes.`
Central Support Staff
We recommend that the DD/P draw together into a Central
Support Staff control of personnel and other support matters cur-
rently decentralized to the divisions and staffs in order to locate
these functions directly under him.
Special Task Force Operations
•
We recommend the creation of an organizational entity to
be known as "Special Task Force Operations" reporting directly
to the DD/P, which shall be activated and deactivated upon need,
and which shall be the command inechanism for handling such
projects as the Cuban operation which demands the creation of an
organization from Agency-wide assets.
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Assistant to DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations
We recommend the creation of an office in the DD/P to be
i
known as Paramilitary and Air Support Operations, under the
direction of an Assistant DD/P, to develop the capability for covert
paramilitary and air support operations. We suggest that the bulk
of this new organization be located at [10] where it will have
facilities for organization and training. Such a move will also relieve
the burden on the headquarters building. We recommend that the
individual to head this organization be drawn from military service
and be a senior Colonel or a Brigadier General with wartime para-
military experience. Having in mind the total disestablishment of
the DPD in its present form, we recommend that the Air Support
Branch of DPD be transferred to the new Paramilitary Office of DD/P.
Domestic Division
We endorse the proposal to create a Domestic Division. We
strongly urge that the new Domestic Division utilize the Contact
Division of OO, which is to be transferred from the DD/I to the DD/P,
as the nucleus for field work in the United States. We also believe
that this Domestic Division should take over those functions of the
Cover and Commercial Staff presently carried out by the Commercial
Group, plus all those activities of the Cover Division which involve
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contacts with domestic organizations in the United States such as
:
business and foundations. This would involve the transfer to this
Domestic Division of the Air Proprietaries Branch of DPD, and of
the responsibility for the management of CAT from the DD/S, and
of managing Fairways Corporation. In consolidating CAT and Fair-
ways into the Air Proprietaries Branch we wish to draw attention
to the necessity of having the right man to head this branch.
We would also urge that a complete review be made of the
Agency's present and future requirements for air proprietaries and
that a statement of the requirements be provided the Air Proprietaries
Branch indicating exactly what may be needed in all parts of the world.
With the creation of the Domestic Division we urge that the DD/P
examine the requirements levied by DD/P components on the Office
of Security for operational support and if possible reassign these
requirements to the Domestic Division in order to relieve the Office
of Security for its more important responsibilities in regard to the
security of CIA.
Operational Aids Unit
The DD/P should have a new unit charged with the following
functions:
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a.
Residual TSD activities not transferred to DD/R.
b. Preparation of "operational characteristics" for new
or improved equipment desired to be developed by DD/R.
c.
Close contact with DD/R activities involving develop-
ment of items for DD/P.
d. The conduct of rigorous field tests of these itema
before they are released to divisions for operational use.
We recommend that all of the research and development responsi-
bilities currently in TSD be transferred to DD/R. Remaining units
in TSD should be transferred to the new DD/P division recommended
above; e.g., Audio Support less Research and Development, Photo -
graphic Support less R & D, Special Assistance, Intelligence,
Personnel, Authentication, and Graphic Arts Reproduction. We
note, however, that DD/P himself would prefer to retain under his
own responsibility the R & D function as it pertains to specific items
to be used by individual agents (audio devices, incendiary items, etc.).
Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs, Western European
Division
We recommend the creation in the Western European
Division of a second Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs.
We suggest that this Deputy Chief have as his line responsibilities
11
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all matters involving -
24
7. Further, this officer should
have full control authority over.
[
24
].
and all other components of the Agency, including the DD/I, should
keep this officer advised on a daily basis L
24
5
20.
].
War Plans
Because of the vital importance of war plans to the Agency's
relations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recommend that the War
Plans Group receive direct support from the DDCI, even though it
should remain organizationally as a part of the Central Support Staff
of the DD/P.
Police Programs
We are convinced that United States Government support to
the police in friendly nations can provide great benefits to the
United States and that some of these benefits will assist CIA in its
work. The President has recently indicated to AID that he wishes
this program to receive strong support. We believe that CIA should
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give it greater support than it has previously received. We recom-
mend that the police group in the CI Staff receive such augmentation
as is necessary, and that Project [
24
] be transferred from the NE Division to the CI Staff.
Liaison with Department of State
We urge that the DD/P centralize liaison with the Department
of State and maintain careful records of all discussions between the
Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every
area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in the
Department but that under the present system there is no organized
method for keeping the central management of the DD/P informed
of what takes place at these meetings.
Advice to State on Black Propaganda
We recommend that the DD/P develop procedures which will
insure that other appropriate agencies of the government (Department
of State, Defense, White House and USIA} are kept appropriately
informed of black propaganda activities which otherwise might be
misunderstood and believed to be legitimately the views of a foreign
power. We have in mind our discussions with the Department which
heard expressed concern that the Department was unaware of certain
black propaganda activities relating to Communist China and conse-
quently was led astray.
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CIA Personnel Under State Cover
:
We recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of
State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We believe
in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the
○ DD/P, after proper study, that CIA allowances for rents, servants
and entertainment are in line with comparable State Department
allowances.
"Legitimate" [
08
Cover
We recommend that the Agency more and more place people
under L
08 3 cover by the "legitimate" method of recruiting
individuals, having them L
and be [
08
08
コ
1 ; and follow through a
:
normal [ 08 ] career. CIA should obviously keep [
૦ ૬ ] advised concerning these individuals, work with [
08 ]
☐ 
on their assignments which will be mutually beneficial,
and covertly train them. By this method such individuals will be
under true [
08
1.
cover and will not only be unknown to
other intelligence services, but also to their colleagues in [
08 ].
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Latin American Operations
We urge that the Agency give high priority to supporting
the expansion of activities of Latin America, and insure that the
proper level of competence is assigned to these important posts.
American Friends of the Middle East
We recommend that the project for support of the organization
known as the American Friends of the Middle East, which is cur-
rently being run by the NE Division, be transferred to the IO Division
inasmuch as it now transcends NE Division area responsibilities and
has activities in Africa, or, if it is determined that AFME activities
are not worth the Agency's support, that the project be abolished.
15 -
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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
Office of the DD/I
DDI
news
We have carefully reviewed the organization and activities
of the DD/I's immediate office and believe that with the addition
of a full time deputy he will be able to assert the degree of
influence on the management of the units under him required for
sound operations. At present his three office assistants provide
good staff work in this review, but we did observe that a con-
siderable amount of the intelligence produced in the DD/I area
is reviewed at no higher a level than office chief, if that.
We recommend that the DD/I establish in his office a
focal point through which all intelligence, processed or unevaluated,
going to the White House must flow. If for reasons of urgency a
report is sent to the White House prior to evaluation, we recom-
mend that a special notice to the effect that it is unevaluated be
attached to the report and that an evaluation follow the report at
the earliest possible moment.
>
Board of National Estimates
The Office of National Estimates should be strengthened by
the addition of one top-level foreign affairs expert to the Board of
Estimates, and if obtainable a top-level scientist and a top-level
We also believe that the Board would benefit by the
economist.
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addition of an individual experienced in business in the international
field, provided one of sufficient caliber could be found who would
be willing to spend two or three years on the Board of Estimates.
Control of Estimates
We urge that the DCI utilize the USIB to control the
scheduling and to limit the number of National Estimates.
Office of Operations
We recommend that the Office of Operations be abolished,
that the Contact Division be transferred to DD/P to be the nucleus
of the Domestic Division.
The DD/I has advised us that with the transfer of Contact
Division, Office of Operations, to the DD/P, he is considering
closer integration of the Foreign Documents Division and the
Foreign Broadcast Information Division. These units have a lot
in common: both process unclassified information, both have
considerable language capability. We believe such an integration
should be considered. On the other hand, the Assistant Director
for Central Reference believes very strongly that the Foreign
Documents Division should be assigned to OCR. He advances as
reasons: that the procurement of foreign documents are arranged
by OCR; that the dissemination of the FDD product is handled by
OCR; that OCR through its relations with the Library of Congress
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OLULI
and other agencies is in a good position to assist in coordinating
:
the exploitation of foreign documents. We urge that the DD/I
integrate FDD and FBID into the most compatible area of the
DD/I organization.
Support of Cenis
Support for the Center for International Studies (CENIS)
at MIT is currently being handled by the DD/P. If such support
is worth continuing, and we question this, we recommend that
it be transferred to the DD/I's office.
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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)
Security Office
We recommend that the burden on the Security Office for
support of the DD/P be reviewed (see DD/P section). In the
meantime, we believe that a careful look at the Security Office
is necessary to insure that the volume of work it is carrying
is not in any way jeopardizing its primary responsibility of
insuring that every`possible measure is taken to keep the Agency
Becure.
While we
We recommend that all security clearances be centralized
under the Office of Security; e. g., clearances that are issued
by DPD, OCI, NPIC, and other Agency components.
would leave the policy of granting clearances with the appropriate
officials, we believe that the Office of Security should maintain
a centralized index for special clearances and do all of the
processing of these clearances.
Audit Staff
We recommend that the Inspection and Audit Staff check
regularly on activities in the Lockheed plant which are of vital
concern to the Agency.
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DPD Support
We recommend that the DD/S be given the responsibility for
· support to all projects under the control of DD/R, providing of
course the necessary security safeguards, and that in the future
no parallel support mechanism be developed in the Agency.
Automatic Data Processing
We believe the Automatic Data Processing Staff can
properly remain under the DD/S inasmuch as this is a support
mechanism, although we strongly recommend that the DD/S
in consultation with other deputies concerned direct this staff
to aggressively pursue the objective of automation in the Agency
in such a way as to insure the ultimate compatability of auto-
matic data processing systems throughout the intelligence
community..
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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
The Office of the Deputy Director (Research) having already
been created, we now make the following recommendations as to
those units which should be included under this Deputy.
Development Projects Division
-
Special Projects Branch
We recommend that the Special Projects Branch of DPD
plus the necessary supporting elements, including those projects
supporting the Department of Defense in advance reconnaissance
programs, be placed under DD/R.
Technical Services Division
We recommend that all TSD research and development
be placed under DD/R.
Other Research and Development
We recommend that the extent to which research and
development for SIGINT collection equipment, including agents'
SIGINT equipment, air-borne collection, etc., should be transferred
to DD/R, be left as a matter for negotiation and agreement between
DD/I and the Director of Communications.
We recommend all research and development in support of
NPIC be transferred to DD/R.
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༠,, 1
PART II
This section contains comments and recommendations on areas
of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and activities of the
intelligence community in which the working group was either unable
to agree, or felt that considerably more study was needed before
action is taken. These views are presented herewith so that they
may assist and guide those who may be asked to pursue these matters
further.
-
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Coordination
We note your intention to abolish the present office of the
Assistant for Coordination and to create in its stead an Assistant
to DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.
With the exception of Mr. Coyne, we are fully in accord. We set
forth below our concept of the principal functions of this Assistant.
a. He should be the DCI's principal advisor on coordina-
tion matters within the community and his personal representative
in dealing on such matters with top officials of the community.
b. When so directed he should represent the DCI in
negotiations and discussions on intelligence matters with appropriate
officials of foreign governments.
C. He should be responsible for development of Comint
and Elint policy insofar as this is an Agency function.
d. He should keep continually under review the general
extent and direction of the intelligence efforts of the community to
insure that such efforts fully and effectively support national policy,
submitting reports and recommendations to DCI as appropriate.
e. He should correspondingly maintain a continuing
review of activities and efforts of the Agency to insure that they
remain fully and effectively coordinated with the activities and
efforts of other members of the community.
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We do not consider it practicable at this time to suggest the
number or qualifications of supporting staff officers for this
Assistant. We feel, however, that he will need a group of such
officers and that they should be of particularly high caliber and
broad experience. The functions we visualize for this office are
highly important for the community and for CIA. They have not
been adequately handled in the past. The Assistant should be given
whatever staff the full development of his role may later require.
Mr. Coyne does not concur in this recommendation. He dis-
agrees with (a) the proposed organizational placement and title of
the recommended office, because this would perpetuate the present
ineffective arrangement of the Coordination Office now in existence
and would not provide the recommended office with the stature required
to assist the DCI in fulfilling his heavy responsibilities throughout
•
the Intelligence Community; (b) the limitations in the functional
concepts of the office, as outlined above. Further, he does not con-
cur in this recommendation because it does not distinguish sufficiently
the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI from the community-
wide functions which the recommended office must perform if the
DCI is to execute effectively his principal mission as assigned in
the President's Directive of January 16, 1962. Mr. Coyne believes
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that if the office is established along the lines recommended above,
it will be incapable of effectively assisting the DCI in performing
his principal Presidentially-assigned responsibilities of (a)
coordinating and effectively guiding the total U. S. foreign intelli-
gence effort; (b) establishing necessary policies and procedures to
assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all
levels; (c) maintaining a continuing review, with the heads of the
Departments and Agencies concerned, of the programs and activities
of all U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities; and
(d) assuring efficiency and effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable
duplication in the total foreign intelligence effort. Mr. Coyne will
submit his recommendations on this subject at a later date.
.
Princeton Consultants to ONE
Mr. Coyne recommends that this group be disbanded based on
advice from principal concerned officers of the Agency that the group
makes no contribution to the intelligence estimating effort. The other
members feel that on balance the group should be continued.
National Photographic Interpretation Center
We are concerned about the capability of NPIC to handle what
may be a greatly increased volume of work in coming months. We
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recommend that as a matter of priority the USIB have this matter
reviewed and insure that any increased flow of raw material does
not result in slowing down the prompt and complete processing so
urgently required.
Caliber of Personnel
We believe that the DD/I should devote some considerable
effort to improving the caliber of personnel in his offices. Although
we did not make a study in depth, we believe that there is a serious
problem in this regard in OCI and that steps should be taken under
the new management of OCI to improve the caliber of supervisory
personnel and thus improve the morale of that office.
Merger of ONE and OCI
We studied at some length the feasibility of merging the Office
of National Estimates with the Office of Current Intelligence. We
found the Office of Current Intelligence eager for a merger, the
Office of National Estimates strongly opposed. The DD/I was inclined
to favor it, but foresees certain personnel difficulties. We do not
believe that such a merger would be wise unless it was well esta-
blished that the result would be the creation of better national estimates
and current intelligence dailies and weeklies. The DD/I feels that
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he should be given at least sixty days to explore this proposal and
to prepare his recommendations.
We concur.
Mr. Coyne does not agree with the above paragraph and in lieu
thereof recommends that the ONE and OCI be merged now. He
believes that such merger will result in improved intelligence
products to support the national policy makers.
Preparation and Dissemination of Memoranda
We have noted considerable unhappiness in the Department of
State because ONE and OCI have established the practice of distri-
buting throughout the community, and to the White House, uncoordinated
memoranda on intelligence matters. These memoranda are prepared
as "think pieces", but the Department of State feels that they often
seem to influence policy at high levels. We think the Department
of State has a point, and we urge that such memoranda be carefully
restricted to circulation within the Agency unless or until they have
been coordinated across-the-board.
We also urge that the DCI adopt the practice of asking other
agencies to prepare such memoranda if the subjects fall within the
purview of their responsibilities; e.g., the Department of State on
strictly political matters. We believe that, at a minimum, when
CIA is asked for a memorandum that inquiries should be made of
-
· 27 ·
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other departments to determine whether such a memorandum hasn't
already been prepared or might be in the process of preparation.
White House Relations
We are concerned about Agency relationships with the White
House insofar as handling of intelligence matters is concerned. We
would like the opportunity to discuss this with you orally before
framing recommendations.
Research on International Communism
We are concerned about the reported inadequacy of research
done on International Communism. At the present time some is
done in the DD/I area in both OCI and ONE, some is done in the DD/P
area in the International Communism Division of the Counter Intelli-
gence Staff, and some is done in the State Department in the Special
Studies Group of INR. The DD/I expressed himself as believing
this was sufficiently covered. The Chief, CI Staff believes it is
insufficiently covered. Representatives of the Department of State
urged that greater expertise be brought to bear on the subject.
Inasmuch as it will fall squarely on the shoulders of the DCI if not
enough is being done, we urge that the matter be reviewed by the DCI
at an early date to satisfy himself that all necessary research in this
field is being accomplished.
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Office of Scientific Intelligence
On the new chart we have shown OSI as a division under DD/R
since we understand this to be your desire. We feel, however, that
OSI in its major activities is more closely linked to DD/I than to
DD/R and therefore more properly belongs under DD/I. DD/I himself
strongly supports this view and urges that he retain OSI. We believe
that if this is approved, scientists in OSI should be members of DD/R's
career service, subject to transfer between OSI and units of DD/R as
might be agreed between the deputy directors concerned.
DD/R's Operational Responsibilities
We have some concern relative to your intention to have DD/R
carry into the operational phase his responsibility for certain major
projects involving complex and coordinated operations which are
highly sensitive and where a mis-step could have serious national
or international repercussions. DD/R's key people will be mostly
scientists, technological experts or leaders in specialized develop-
ment fields. Such individuals on the average have no professional
intelligence operating experience and little background or interest
in detailed operational problems requiring thorough inter-agency
coordination, painstaking and tedious follow-up actions and careful
attention to security details. DD/P, on the other hand, has a number
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of top-flight people who for some years have dealt almost exclusively
with just such problems.
We recognize all the difficulty, in the course of a project of this
type, of shifting responsibility from one deputy to the other; and we
realize that development must also lap over into the operational
phase. We suggest having as a general rule (but granting that excep-
tions will arise) that when operation begins the responsibility for the
operations should be the DD/P's, but that DD/R should retain his
responsibility for seeing that the equipment he has developed continues
to function properly. There is here attached a specially classified
annex.
30
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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
:
National Indications Center Watch Committee
-
We have examined quite carefully the National Indications
Center, its organization, its capacity to support fully the Watch
Committee, and its relations with other departments and agencies.
We note that opinions within the community concerning NIC and its
functions vary widely from the feeling that it should be abolished,
--
or combined with DIA indications center -- to the belief that it is
entirely satisfactory in its present situation. We do not fully sub-
scribe to either of these views.
The functions of the Watch Committee, and NIC, with their
terms of reference, were developed prior to the time when DIA was
created. Now DIA has developed a strong capability to provide both
early warning and indications of approaching crises to the community.
Its capacity in this regard will develop even further in the months
ahead.
We are aware that USIB is now considering the Fitch Committee
Report. But we doubt that few if any members of that Committee
were intimately aware of the full capacity of DIA and of its future
plans. We note that General Carroll was reluctant to be drawn into
the Committee's deliberations.
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We recommend, therefore, that except as noted below, NIC
operations be allowed to continue as they are for the next three or
four months. At that time we recommend a thorough review of the
Watch Committee and NIC operations, particularly in the light of
DIA's capabilities and activities, with a view to redefining the
responsibilities and functions of NIC as may then appear desirable.
Mr. Coyne disagrees and recommends that the NIC be abolished
now, and that the DIA be assigned the national strategic warning
function and that its personnel complement be enlarged to include
representation from appropriate members of USIB. Mr. Coyne
points to reasons outlined in his memorandum to the DCI dated
February 5, 1962.
We do believe that the National Indications Center should be
properly manned and should receive both the high caliber of per-
sonnel at the proper grade and the number of personnel to perform
its function promptly and efficiently. In this connection the Depart-
ment of State has no representatives at NIC at present and the DCI
should ask the Secretary to remedy this situation immediately.
We would suggest a change in the present method of preparing
the Watch Committee report. If NIC is adequately manned, we see
no reason why it should not draft, 24 hours in advance, the weekly
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SEGHET
Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera-
tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it
could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated.
Related to the Watch Committee
--
but also an important aspect
of all coordinated intelligence community reports
--
we believe that
substantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelled
:
out in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNIEs rather than
being suppressed or covered by watered down language as is some-
times the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus of
views of the intelligence community. If there are differing minority
views on the part of one or more agencies, including CIA, these
should be spelled out in appropriate footnotes.
CIA Relations with the Department of State
We examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State.
Several matters of concern in this area are mentioned in the section
on the DD/P. We would note that "covering" for the Agency poses
certain problems for the Department in its relations with the Congress.
These include such items that attract Congressional interest as:
the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the political
section; the designation of CIA officers as [24]; the CIA role in
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handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend
close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and
that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro-
priate Congressional committees on these matters.
We are particularly concerned that the [
tions of CIA personnel [ 24
24 2 designa-
], particularly [-2, are so
revealing. We recommend that the Agency arrange with State to
[ 24
☐ designations.
The Department of State indicated concern about the level in
CIA on which Comint policy matters are handled, and also noted that
on occasions there appears to be lack of coordination within CIA on
Comint policy matters. This factor is one of the reasons why we
recommend raising the level of Sigint policy matters to the Assistant
:
to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.
State's Counter Communism Office
We reviewed with some interest the proposed creation in the
office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the
Department of State of a strategy group for combatting communisın.
While the full scope of its function is as yet unclear, we believe that
CIA should follow the developments in this office closely as its
activities will have considerable bearing on the work of the Agency.
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State's Operational Center
We reviewed with some interest the embryonic operational
center which the Department of State is developing. We found that
this is an interesting development and would obviously have bearing
on the intelligence community.
State at White House Briefings
We recommend that in accordance with the present practice of
a représentative of the Defense Intelligence Agency attending the
briefings of the White House staff by CIA, that a representative of
the Department of State also be invited to attend these meetings.
Receipt of Top Classification Messages
We recommend that the DCI take up directly with the President
the problem of receiving all pertinent messages dealing with foreign
affairs which might have any bearing on intelligence estimates or
reports, or on covert operations. We have particularly in mind
such communications as between the President and Khrushchev, etc.
We believe that it is important for the DCI to see such messages in
order to give proper guidance to the intelligence and operational
activities of the Agency.
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=
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 3, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency
In the course of our discussions as members of Mr. McCone's
Working Group on Intelligence and in our March 28 meeting with
Messrs. McCone and Carter, I indicated that I did not concur
in the "Coordination" section of the draft report which we
discussed with the DCI and the DDCI.
In line with the foregoing, it would be appreciated if
you would:
1) Amend the second sentence of the section to read:
"With the exception of Mr. Coyne, we are fully in accord."
2) Add at the end of the section a new paragraph
reading as follows:
"Mr. Coyne does not concur in this recommenda-
tion. He disagrees with (a) the proposed
organizational placement and title of the recommended
Office, because this would perpetuate the present
ineffective arrangement of the Coordination Office
now in existence and would not provide the recommended
Office with the stature required to assist the DCI
in fulfilling his heavy responsibilities throughout
the Intelligence Community; (b) the limitations in
the functional concepts of the Office, as outlined
above. Further, he does not concur in this recommenda-
tion because it does not distinguish sufficiently
the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI
from the community-wide functions which the recommended
Office must perform if the DCI is to execute
effectively his principal mission as assigned in
the President's Directive of January 16, 1962.
Mr. Coyne believes that if the Office is established
along the lines recommended above, it will be in-
capable of effectively assisting the DCI in performing
his principal Presidentially-assigned responsibilities
of (a) coordinating and effectively guiding the total
U. S. foreign intelligence effort%3B (b) establishing
necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate
coordination of foreign intelligence activities at
all levels; (c) maintaining a continuing review,
14-00000
:
"with the heads of the Departments and Agencies
concerned, 
of the programs and activities of all
U. S. 
agencies engaged in foreign intelligence
activities; 
and (d) assuring efficiency and
effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable duplication
in the total foreign 
intelligence effort.
Coyne will submit his recommendations on this
subject 
at a later date."
Mr.
I would appreciate receiving a copy of the revised report
of the 
Working Group at your 
earliest convenience.
₤. Patrical Coyne
J. Patrick Coyne
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
"f.
23 October 1962
Good
i
10/25/62
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
After Action Report on the Findings
of the Working Group
This is with reference to the memorandum of 6 April
1962 which presented you with the final report of the Working
Group which you established in January to consult and advise
on the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency. This report indicates the action which has been
taken on the findings of the Working Group, and if no action
has been taken the reasons therefor. The comments here
are in the same order as they appeared in the report of the
Working Group.
(signed). Li non B. Kirbynirick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
Attachment
CC: DDCI
LBK:jrc: Retyped gmk (23 Oct. 62)
Distribution:
Orig Addressee w/att
-
1 - DDCI w/att
1
-
Exec. Dir. w/att
4 - Extra
414
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SELECT
x
Operational Aids Unit
This recommendation was rendered inapplicable in view of the
decision not to transfer TSD to DD/R.
Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs, Western European
Division
As recommended, this position has been created and is now
occupied by Mr. John Caswell. A review will shortly be made to
determine the degree of control that this unit has over liaison.
War Plans
As recommended, the DDCI is giving full support to the War
Plans Group, and is assisted in this effort by the Executive Director.
Police Programs
As recommended, CIA is giving the police program greater
support. An Agency Officer heads the police program in AID, and
he has been provided an Executive Officer by the Agency. Project
ENDOMORPH 
will be transferred to the CI Staff..
Liaison with the Department of State
.
The DD/P has centralized the control of liaison with the Depart-
ment of 
State and 
careful records are now maintained of all discussions.
Advice to State on Black Propaganda
The Chief, CA Staff, is now charged with advising State, and
other departments where appropriate, of any black propaganda activi-
ties that 
might be misinterpreted by the U.S. Government if they were
presumed 
to be legitimately the statement of another government. .
CIA Personnel Under State Cover
The DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed
toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various
allowances with their State Department colleagues.
1.
ཨཱབ་
4.
Lag
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Assistant to DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations
We recommend the creation of an office in the DD/P to be
known as Paramilitary and Air Support Operations, under the
direction of an Assistant DD/P, to develop the capability for covert
paramilitary and air support operations. We suggest that the bulk
of this new organization be located at Isolation where it will have
facilities for organization and training. Such a move will also relieve
the burden on the headquarters building. We recommend that the
individual to head this organization be drawn from military service
and be a senior Colonel or a Brigadier General with wartime para-
military experience. Having in mind the total disestablishment of
the DPD in its present form, we recommend that the Air Support
Branch of DPD be transferred to the new Paramilitary Office of DD/P.
Domestic Division
We endorse the proposal to create a Domestic Division. We
strongly urge that the new Domestic Division utilize the Contact
Division of OO, which is to be transferred from the DD/I to the DD/P,
as the nucleus for field work in the United States. We also believe
that this Domestic Division should take over those functions of the
Cover and Commercial Staff presently carried out by the Commercial:
Group, plus all those activities of the Cover Division which involve
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all matters involving liaison with the British or with Canadian,
Australian and New Zealand intelligence services except matters
concerned with Sigint and Comsec. Further, this officer should
have full control authority over liaison exchange of information
with the British and the above mentioned Commonwealth services,
and all other components of the Agency, including the DD/I, should
keep this officer advised on a daily basis of liaison relations with
the British services.
War Plans
-
Because of the vital importance of war plans to the Agency's
relations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recommend that the War
Plans Group receive direct support from the DDCI, even though it
should remain organizationally as a part of the Central Support Staff
of the DD/P.
Police Programs
We are convinced that United States Government support to
the police in friendly nations can provide great benefits to the
United States and that some of these benefits will assist CIA in its
work. The President has recently indicated to AID that he wishes
this program to receive strong support. We believe that CIA should
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F
give it greater support than it has previously received. We recom-
mend that the police group in the CI Staff receive such augmentation
as is necessary, and that Project ENDOMORPH (police training
school) be transferred from the NE Division to the CI Staff.
Liaison with Department of State
-
We urge that the DD/P centralize liaison with the Department
of State and maintain careful records of all discussions between the
Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every
area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in the
Department but that under the present system there is no organized
method for keeping the central management of the DD/P informed
of what takes place at these meetings.
Advice to State on Black Propaganda
We recommend that the DD/P develop procedures which will
insure that other appropriate agencies of the government (Department
of State, Defense, White House and USIA) are kept appropriately
informed of black propaganda activities which otherwise might be
misunderstood and believed to be legitimately the views of a foreign
power. We have in mind our discussions with the Department which
heard expressed concern that the Department was unaware of certain
black propaganda activities relating to Communist China and conse-
quently was led astray.
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CIA Personnel Under State Cover
-
We recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of
State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We believe
in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the
DD/P, after proper study, that CIA allowances for rents, servants
and entertainment are in line with comparable State Department
allowances.
"Legitimate" Foreign Service Cover
We recommend that the Agency more and more place people
under Foreign Service cover by the "legitimate" method of recruiting
individuals, having them take and pass the Foreign Service exams
and be commissioned in the Foreign Service and follow through a
normal Foreign Service c career.
CIA should obviously keep the
Department advised concerning these individuals, work with the
Department on their assignments which will be mutually beneficial,
and covertly train them. By this method such individuals will be
under true Foreign Service cover and will not only be unknown to
other intelligence services, but also to their colleagues in the
Foreign Service.
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Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera-
tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it
could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated.
Related to the Watch Committee but also an important aspect
--
of all coordinated intelligence community reports -- we believe that
substantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelled
out in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNIEs rather than
being suppressed or covered by watered down language as is some-
times the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus of
views of the intelligence community. If there are differing minority
views on the part of one or more agencies, including CIA, these
should be spelled out in appropriate footnotes.
CIA Relations with the Department of State
We examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State.
Several matters of concern in this area are mentioned in the section
on the DD/P. We would note that "covering" for the Agency poses
certain problems for the Department in its relations with the Congress.
These include such items that attract Congressional interest as:
the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the political
section; the designation of CIA officers as FSRs; the CIA role in
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handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend
close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and
that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro-
priate Congressional committees on these matters.
We are particularly concerned that the Foreign Service designa-
tions of CIA personnel under State cover, particularly FSR, are so
revealing. We recommend that the Agency arrange with State to
cover CIA personnel equally with FSS and FSO designations.
The Department of State indicated concern about the level in
CIA on which Comint policy matters are handled, and also noted that
on occasions there appears to be lack of coordination within CIA on
Comint policy matters. This factor is one of the reasons why we
recommend raising the level of Sigint policy matters to the Assistant
:
to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.
State's Counter Communism Office
We reviewed with some interest the proposed creation in the
office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the
Department of State of a strategy group for combatting communisın.
While the full scope of its function is as yet unclear, we believe that
CIA should follow the developments in this office closely as its
activities will have considerable bearing on the work of the Agency.
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SEPPEY
: