200000
104-10332-10009
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
APPROVED FOR RELERSE 1993.
GIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
:
net
Box 11
SECRET Flor ll
OLC 78-1012/8
30 May 1978
Сорм
OGC 78-3595
5-31-78
Executive Registry
78-843217
JUN 5 10 04 AM 78 .
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
Director of Central Intelligence 2000
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
: S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Office of Legislative Counsel
: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"
1. Action Requested:
That you approve the recommendation at
paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee
on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized
version of the Hart Report.
2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey,
has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access
to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's
handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into
hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the view is
presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of
concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest.
is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest
has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period
that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately
below.
I
3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case,
addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These
matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's
bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed
and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his
letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on
the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and
internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and
his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.
#05948.
-SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted
in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's
bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also
been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding
studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been
interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and
retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been
revealed to the Committee.
5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB
agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed.
The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two
studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result,
the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart
report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period,
during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides
the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests
that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides
of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden
and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.
6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing
to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's
bona fides.
II
7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman
Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the
period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided
the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how
Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we
questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter,
HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct
of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which
includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms.
of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned
CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the
inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at
best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to consider that its
dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this
coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public
criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr.
Blakey as hostile to the Agency.
2
SECOCT
13-00000
SECRET
8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of
Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real
purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced
in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant
inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn.
it against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose of the
inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious, and reflects on its
face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be
so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant
to its charter, but the Agency should also assert a similar right to defend
itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.
9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made
available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be
taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained
in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.
III
10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on
foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is,
therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the
Report's being made available.
11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the
names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain
modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in
other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides a working basis
for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the
HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of
selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would
be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report
will remain classified.
12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be
on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have
access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide
research purposes.
13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the
paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff
representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such
release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the
material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)
3
ՏՐԻՐ:
13-00000
DEUTEL
hat if the paper is withheld, and a court test results, the Agency
must expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General
Counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the
paper available under the conditions set forth above.
14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited
Number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized version of
the Hart Report. Such access shall be conditioned on agreement to limit
se of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the
question of Nosenko's bona fides.
Attachments
CONCURRENCE:
SIGNED
General Counsel
APPROVAL:
Chief, SE Division
S. D. Breckinridge
31 MAY 1978
Date
Date
Chief, CI Staff
Date
1
JUN 1978
Director of Security
Date
// Frank C
Dip
Director of Central Intelligence
Date
ISAPPROVAL:
Director of Central Intelligence
Date
1
13-00000
SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report".
Distribution:
Orig Adse
1
1
-
-
DDCI
- ER
1 - OGC
1
1
1.
-
-
-
C/SE Div
C/CI Staff
SA/DO/O
1 - D/OS
1
1
OLC/Subj
OLC/Chrono
OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)
13-00000
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEAS IN FULL
2000
11 March 1993
بیوان
NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Peter Earnest
Chief, Media Relations
WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination
不
PL
curculation in
HAG, f
The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on
the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy
assassination.
With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George
Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview
former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee
Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet
Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and
location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for
Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview.
The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a
$250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday,
3 March, at the POST offices downtown. I did not remain for
it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which
was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very
pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of
our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko
who said he was satisfied with how the interview was
conducted and with the financial arrangements.
Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxed me a list of
the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves
to use in checking out Nosenko's information. They asked if
there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the
individuals named. I told them that developing information
in response to their questions would probably take a good
deal of research and that I doubted the Agency would be able
to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However,
said I would take it up with the appropriate offices.
I
Although told the POST that I do not believe anyone
would be willing to undertake research on their questions,
I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be
knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing
to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on
his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would
be grateful for making such a person available even if
13-00000
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request
all their questions aren't answered.
Considering that they
are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy
assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them
would be seen as a gesture of good will.
Attachment:
As stated
Peter Earnest
_Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background
about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is
available.
_No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the
Nosenko information.
13-00000
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
specialist in the Kennedy Assassination
DCI/PAI/Earnest: ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)
Distribution:
Original
Addressee
1
ADDO
1
SA/DDO
1
DO Registry
1
D/PAI
1
D/DO/CIC
1
1
C/DO/NROC
C/DO/CE
1
C/CSI
1
C/History Staff
13-00000
Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the
JFK assassination:
1. General Oleg M. Gribanov, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s
where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh
Department. Nosenko described himself as sort of favored by Gribanov and he said Gribanov in-
structed him, after the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right
away.
2. Anatoliy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at
time of JFK assassination. Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were
going over the all-important first volume--and finding KGB had nothing to do with Oswald--when
KGB officer from the First Department came in and picked it up on Gribanov's orders, to review it
and write a summary of it.
3. The officer who picked it up was Col. Matveey, deputy chief(I think) of First(or American) De-
partment, Second Chief Directorate. Unhave first name.
4. Chief of this First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyev or Fedoseev and presumably he
would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the "spravka" or summary.
'
5. Gribanov and more than 40 other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection,
according to Nosenko. That right? What happened?
6. Maj. Georgi Rastrusin. Was in 1959 a senior case officer in KGB responsible for Intourist mat-
ters. Nosenko says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in
Soviet Union. Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald "doesn't present interest" to KGB and Nosenko
checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell
Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.
7. Rastrusin returned next day and said we got a problem. Oswald tried to kill self, etc. KGB
washed hands of him, decided to let Intourist deal with him. Intourist then part of Ministry of For-
eign Trade. Nosenko said he believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that min-
istry and beyond, to Khruschev or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald
stay in Minsk. But not, Nosenko says, by KGB.
8. In the fall of 1963, a KGB colleague, M. I. Turalin, Service No. 2(counterintelligence in foreign
countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko orally that Mexico City station had just sent a cable
about a request by Oswald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done?
Nosenko said he said, 'wait a second. How come he's back in America?” At that point, Nosenko said
he hadn't know Oswald had gone back.
9. Nosenko said he said let's go to chief of department who he identified as a Col. Chelnekov or
Chelnenko but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may have been chief of
Nosenko's department at the time). In any case, Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, I remem-
ber this crazy nut. No. No. No. Tell them we don't have any interest.'
Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his
own country and apply for a visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc., etc.
10. Col. Gruzder, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners
there.
11. Oleg Nechiporenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly inter-
rogated or dealt with Oswald on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow area.
Other two Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: Valeriy Kostikov and Pavel Yatzkov.
द
13-00000
Memo to:
C/HRG
3 March 1994
Subject:
Mangold Litigation
that
Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/Kathy
the JFK collections contains a significant number of
documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the
Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold
Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years
old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, documents on
Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case. I
talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling
the litigation, however, she was not familiar with the
documents involved. She will consult with ly, the lawyer
on the case, and get back to me.
I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we
continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold
or other consideration to address, we can do so after the
HRG review is complete.
Barry
file

13-00000
9 marclay
Re: NOSENKO
Having Reviewed Buy 45
شه كان
note several Reports, not completely
identified
as & author.
(1) "Conclusions & Comments in the Case
Laid
OCT68)
of
рр.
Yuriy I. Nosenko" (b) (ie Salie Report) -264 pgs.
(This is in Box 45, FOIDER 8)
( It has been released in JFK)-JFK 62-F9
(concludes.
NOSENICO is good
"Case of Yury I nosenho " (835 page study)
dated Felmuay 1967.
(no indication chat I has been released)
-( Believe it was,
-prepared in SB. (perlups
by Bagley - or perhaps wilt w/STAFF)
(concludes
поценка
is BAD
(3). "Me Examination of de Bona Jades of.
Defecth
K6.B.
(447 pages)
-TS# 197124
a
dated FEBRUAry 1968
(This is found in ORIS BOX 62 JFK-FL9)
(was released except for ANNEX A
which is
found
a i Box 45 F. 23.
WIFS
Вопа...
fede)
(It concludes NOSENIO
мот
(Don't know author).
Su)
13-00000
INTERNAL USE ONLY
23 March 1994
Memorandum For: C/HRG
Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation
I received a call from Kathy Kelly, OGC, this morning
concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described
the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts
of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona
fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and
Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study). Since
Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination
story and the files are part of the sequestered collection,
HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination
Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some
of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and
wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.
Kathy Kelly said that the Mangold litigation should not be a
factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the
JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act.
When the review is complete, a list of the documents
released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the
same in the Mangold case.
She
I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some
background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were
the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available.
said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the
Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public
that ended. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how
he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a
couple years ago had not released some of the studies (she
mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the
case or if it was possible to continue to deny them. DO has
protected the information provided by Nosenko on other
Soviet sources and leads for possible recruitment. This
type of information should continue to be protected.
Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling
of the Nosenko files. We are considering all of the files
as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and
there was a large amount of information including parts of
the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard
copy collection. We have deleted information provided on
other sources and operations not related to the JFK story.
We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies.
Although they contain potentially embarrassing information
for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots),
there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK
Act.
13-00000
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich
NOSENKO
The following should be used as guidelines in
declassifying material files pertaining to the career and
"bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft.
Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of
American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence
service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the
Russian services continue to target Americans, this
information should continue to be protected.
2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract.
Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR)
remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities.
Russian intelligence services since the Second World War
have tried to track their defectors. There are indications
that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO
case.
The US
At the time of his arrest, Rick Ames had some
NOSENKO files (AESAWDUST) in his possession.
Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this
material was passed to the Russian service.
--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the
United States, both were questionned by the Russian
service about NOSENKO's activity and place and
residence.
5/94
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
Legal position
CI.
13-00000
SEP 16 '94 09:50AM
Mr.Robert Fringle
(2909 Rock Manor Court
(Herndon, Virginia 22071
Dear Bob,
P.3/4
It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12.
I am writing to confirm our recent conversation about the CIA's release
of documents about me to the National Archives. As I explained to you at
our meeting, I am very displeased that this was done without my knowled-
ge and especially since my photograph was officially released by the
Agency for the first time in thirty years.
As you know, it has come to my attention that the CIA released these
many hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling
me that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of
these reports totalling more than 700 pages. One is the October 1968
report supporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 re-
port by the CI Staff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report
contains a cory of my photo from the late 1960s. I consider this a breach
of my personal security.)
I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a
very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive
cases which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in
these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers
in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very
difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now
been seriously damaged.
This release particularly troubles me because for the past thirty years
I have remained very loyal to the Agency and considerate of its wishes.
For instance, despite many requests, I have only spoken to a few jourf
nalists, and only when the Agency advised me to go. I have never sought
13-00000
16 '94 09:51AM
Page 2
P.4/4
on my own to publish my story in an article or book. But now, the CIA
. has not returned this courtesy. Instead, it has released sensitive
information to the public without speaking to me first.
Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the
following:
1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Director James Woolsey,
and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and
Historical Review staff so that they are aware of what has happened.
--
2. I would like to receive, in writing, an explanation from these res-
ponsible. of why this release was done.
3. I would like to receive a list of the major reports about me which
have already been released. Aside from the twe reports that I already
have seen, I would like to receive copies of any other major studies
that have been released. (For instance, if there are reports released
by Peter Bagley, Newton Miler, James Angleton, the CI Staff and John
Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)
4. I would like to be given the Agency's written assurance that further
releases will not ecour without consulting me first.
Bob, you should know that before I wrote this letter I have spoken
about this matter with my good friend George Kalaris. He too was troub-
led by what I told him, and he advised me that I should ask the Agency
for an explanation.
Beb, I apologize for troubling you with this matter, but I have no one
else to turn to fer assistance.
Please let me know if there is any respense as soon as possible.
Respectfully yours,
13-00000
SEP 16 '94 09:50AM
Secret
5.≤14
Draft letter to Nosenko from the APROPECIAL COLLECTIONS
Dear
RELEASE IN FULL
2000
The Director has asked me to respond to your letter
expressing concern that US Government declassification of
material could compromise your privacy and security.
In regard to your question about the documents that have
already been released, rest assured that I have directed
officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care
in reviewing information concerning you in light of your
special circumstances. We will make full use of all
exempt possible exceptions to FOIA-mandated declassification in
order to protect your privacy.
As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination finvestigetic
Records Collection Act, which required all US Government
agencies to release any records related to the assassination
of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for operations, I
am of course committed to fully supporting the DCI in
meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern
about the files on you that are related to the
assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer
Historical in the DO to meet with the officials in the Agency's
Rovicw
Greut
historical staff who are involved in the declassification
program. This officer has had extensive discussions with
members of the start and has worked closely with them to
Identify those portions of the files that include personal
and operational information.
talien specià.
of the
to protect
As a result of this effort, we have (postponed release of any
Sensitive information touching on your private life or on operational
information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK
law, a Presidential Review Board will make the final
decision on the disposition of the material. This Agency
values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we
will present the Board with the strongest possible case for
protecting information that could affect your privacy and
security.
Secret
Best wishes,
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
17 April 1997
Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry
Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files
entitled:
1. "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"
2.
"DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"
found by Al Bonner) in the vault.
Received
City M. BRENeman
UNCLASSIFIED
17-APRIL-97
13-00000
Administra
HRG Internal Use Only
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000
30 April 1997
Note To:
ARRB Staff
Subject:
1.
CIC Soft files:
Warren Commission/Oswald´
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald
The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft
(or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren
Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date
from the Warren Commission period, or were created in
1975/76 (latest date of documents) in response to a request
or investigation.
Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection
(OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Norsenko
material pút aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the
Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is
not indexed document by document).
Зал
Administrative HRG Internal Use Only
13-00000
Administrative HRG Internal Use Only
-
30 April 1997
Note for the Record
Subject:
CIC Oswald/Nosenko related soft files:
1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2.
Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald
1. I advised Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, that most of the
documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in
the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other
documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald.
These documents are probably duplicated in the Nosenko
material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I
recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB
staff. She concurred.
2. Documents will be made available to Michelle Combs,
ARRB staff, on her next visit.
Barry
Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only
13-00000
ལ་
file
SECRET
TO:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
Eileen M. Wukitch
James W. Zirkle
08/01/97 09:54:03
Re: The Nosenko Papers
CL BY: 2034442
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82
Eileen: Let me introduce myself. I am CIC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you
concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are
aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the
Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such
information to the maximum extent possible. If I can be of help in that regard just let me know.
Jim
From the Desk of Dennis D. Lamb
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
(Ron L. Seckinger
Dennis D. Lamb
07/31/97 10:44:28
The Nosenko Papers
CL BY: 0790429
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82
At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, I received a call from Eileen Wukitch of the Agency's
External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing
the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)
on 5 August. Wukitch said Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko
material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is
taking. I said yes. Wukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to
this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns
in explaining our position to the ARRB.
1. Is Nosenko married? (No one in CIC/AG knows.)
2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but I can't see why she or the
ARRB needs to know.)
*
3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one
in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)
4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was
that Combs can find this out from open literature.)
SECRET

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SECRET
According to Wukitch, Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair:
the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted
or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible
would be done to prevent further release of his papers. I don't see any problem with this since the
papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.
Wukitch said she told Combs CIC would have Bob Pringle, former Chief of AG/FIOB currently
serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this
appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. Wukitch noted that Combs alluded to
the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.
CC:
CC:
John B. ENGBERT, Nancy T. BRUNONE, Edgar C. BAUML, Dennis D. Lamb, Curtis L.
MACKIAN, Jacqueline Frankfort @ DCI, Ron L. Seckinger
SECRET
13-00000
MEMORANDUM
August 5, 1997
To:
T. Jeremy Gunn
From:
Michelle Combs
Subject:
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
I have prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the
Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.
Summary and Recommendation
The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts,
memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public
as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy
assassination.
After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our
judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President
Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as "NBR." These NBR records
consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet
intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to
Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully
these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the
extent this is correct, we should process them as “NBRs.”
Background on Nosenko
KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in
Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the
United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His case became the single
most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency's history to date. Nosenko's
information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more
importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the
prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.
The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in
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2
December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would
dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence
agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described a
darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence
agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these
fake defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko's
bona fides would also be false. Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence
Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn's world view. Golitsyn argued that any
CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves.
Nosenko's first four meetings with the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an
intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley)
who met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his
debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey
Oswald's stay in the USSR which, he said, had come across his desk routinely as the
deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for
watching American visitors in the USSR.
With Golitsyn arguing against Nosenko's bona fides, plans were made in March 1964,
to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his
information. On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division
Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal
approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not
communicate with his supposed KGB controllers. On April 4, he was imprisoned in an
attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary
confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile
interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then in a
specially built cement house in Virginia. Despite over three years of severe treatment,
Nosenko's original story remained unchanged, no "confession" was forthcoming, and
no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed, a fake defector.
On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of
Security specialist. During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told
the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found
only positive responses to the questions. Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a
comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko's information, to
date, and concluded that he was what and who he had claimed to be all along. After a
review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA
custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA.
File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd
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In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no prima facie
evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent
defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector. He has identified many hundreds
of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on
the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special
studies on Soviet subjects. Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a
contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married, and living quietly in the
Sunbelt.
File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd
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6 October 1997
Note To:
DO
From:
Subject:
Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
Historical Review Group
Nosenko records in JFK Collection
The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's
designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK
sequestered collection as “not believed to be relevant"
(NBR). The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK
Board at the 14 October meeting. The Board requires a
description of all NBRs to be made available to the public.
Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff
member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public
release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if
possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with
the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions,
call me on 31825. Thanks.
Barry
Per phone call from Denis Lamb. 8 oct 97
1:30+ p. m
CIC has no
problem with
attached description of Nesenko
files.
BH
13-00000
Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK
Assassination
Reel 45, Folder 3
During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of
interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona
fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions
which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career and Komsomol experiences.
Reel 45, Folder 4
This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and
procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA.
Reel 45, Folder 5
This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and
procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.
Reel 45, Folder 6
All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR
document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division
(C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans
to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.
Reel 45, Folder 8A and B
Folder 8A contains the 263 page "Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security
Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be
believed. A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public. The
NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by
N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and
questions of Anatoliy Ġolitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on
inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for
further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.
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Reel 45, Folder 13
This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835
page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" by Peter Bagley. It records Peter
Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.
Reel 45, Folder 17
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB
buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the
transcript is also included.
Reel 45, Folder 19
This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet
intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent
under the control of the KGB.
Reel 45. Folder 20
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, and KGB buildings,
personalities, and procedures.
Reel 45, Folder 21
This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komosol and
Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.
Reel 45. Folder 24
This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study “The Case
of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB)
in 1967.
Reel 45, Folder 25
This folder contains pages 85-348, part V of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.
2
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3
Reel 46, Folder 2A
This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The
Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division
(DC/SB) in 1967.
Reel 46, Folder 2B
This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the
public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter
Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief, SR/CI on the
3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper
analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported
conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to
Chief, SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.
Reel 46, Folder 3
This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA
in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a
reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of
handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services'
handling of the Nosenko case. The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in
October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide
defector.
Reel 46, Folder 5
This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area
during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents have been released to the
public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework assignment"
prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum
on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.
Reel 62, Folder 2
This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.
Reel 62, Folder 3
This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its
impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB.
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4
Reel 62. Folder 5
This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions
by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation
targeted against an American tourist.
Reel 62, Folder 6
This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American
tourist.
Reel 62, Folder 7
This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB
operation targeted against an American tourist.
Reel 62, Folder 8
This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB
control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko says that he has been
telling Deryabin the truth all along.
Reel 62, Folder 9
This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with
Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes
information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.
Reel 62, Folder 10
This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the
handling of Nosenko and is labeled “TS Material from Deryabin Safe.” This folder was
not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released
to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US
Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to day
handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a
report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for political
asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor,
and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his
handling.
13-00000
10/09/97 THU 15:00 FAA ZUZ 724 0457
АККВ
MEMORANDUM
October 9, 1997
To:
CC:
From:
Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director
Michelle Combs
же
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
Subject:
Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection
Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,
memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the
public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in
redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the
JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.
After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my
judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the
assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR
records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family.
and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,
and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career
in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by
the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie
Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the
JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were
reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the
Hart Report will also be processed for release.
The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed
carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of
the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,
which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and.
identified for processing and review.
4004

13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
DO JFK Board Focal Point
J. Barry Harrelson
16 October 1997
OFFICE:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
JFK Project Officer
CSI/HRG
Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997
The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:
1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting.
If
you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010,
please provide them to me by 23 October.
2. State cover
This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting. I recommend that you review the
material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if you want to provide additional "evidence". Are there other
components that should be consulted on this issue? Sue Burggraf was involved in discussions in April.
3. DRE Monthly Reports. This is a long standing request from the Board staff. Please provide a status of the request by October 21.
CC:
John Pereira @DC!
Eileen Wukitch@ DO
Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM
ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
13-00000
•FAX Rec'd TODAY
10/31/97 Re
NOSENKO
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEAX IN FULL
2000
28 October 1997
SUBJECT: Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
-NB
1. The Board intends to declassify and release for public
consumption, approximately 2400 pages of counterintelligence
staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona
fides studies on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. These studies contain
sensitive personal and operational material completely unrelated
and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President Kennedy. It has been officially stated and documented
that the remaining Nosenko records have been carefully reviewed
to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper
understanding of the assassination. Mr. Nosenko has adhered time
and time again to the stipulations of his Memorandum of
Understanding not to divulge his relationship with this Agency,
even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency
forced upon him during his early resettlement. Public disclosure
of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of his personal and professional privacy not to mention
the breech of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his
right of privacy and above all, his security. This trust was
reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDO, Ted Price,
in September 1994, stating that we would take special steps to
protect any sensitive information touching on Mr. Nosenko's
private life or on operational information pertaining to his
debriefings. The letter further states that this Agency valued
the sacrifices he made for our country, and every effort would be
made to protect information that could affect his privacy and
security. The question has been asked before. Should we not
show the same integrity that we expect from those who put their
lives on the line in defense of our national interests?
2. Furthermore, the recruitment of sources of high
intelligence value has always been this Agency's top priority.
Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage
to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might
be disposed to collaboration. Disclosure of cooperation with the
USG would cause any potential source to think twice before
placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot
protect his information. For those individuals such as Mr.
Nosenko, who placed their trust in this country in the past,
entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the
indiscriminate release of information, some of it very personal
SECRET
CL BY 0489514
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1
DRV DEF 2-82
13-00000
SUBJECT:
SECRET™
and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously
erodes this Agency's credibility and undermines our Resettlement
Program.
2
SECRET
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
John Pereira @DCI
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
FROM:
OFFICE:
SUBJECT:
SECRET
CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRY FRM: LOC 5-82
5 November 1997
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Linda Cipriant@DCI
J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
CSI/HRG
17 November JFK Board Meeting-- CIA issues (update)
REFERENCE:
1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:
(S) Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton, Va. as the location of the CIA Record Center.
In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the Agency has been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.
Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR (Not Believed Relevant) material from the 2017 per
the JFK Act to the year 2010.
The ARRB staff disagrees with the Board on this issue and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not
confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency
opposes the 2010 change in the date, I will need a memo from the DO explaining why. We could offer a compromise--accept the 2010
date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as 2017 to review and appeal the release of the records. I have ask OGC for a legal
opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be
Assassination Records (AR) will be re-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the coming year.
(S) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under integrated State cover”
We have provided written evidence (DO note coordinated with State and copy of MOA between CIA and State. According to the ARRB
staff, some Board members consider CIA use of state cover as an "open secret" and are inclined to release. We have been offered the
opportunity to brief the Board.
SECRET
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SECRET
Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.
ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR.
Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/IRO. If you have any comments or objections, please forward them
to me by COB Wednesday..
Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA
staffers. (FYI - no action required at this time)
The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers
them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.
(S)
2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Warrenton
and/or State Cover. Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the
material and prepare their presentations for the Board.
CC:
Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Becky Rant @ DA
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
John Pereira @ DCI
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Linda Cipriani @ DCI
CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRY FRM: COV 2-87
21 November 1997
FROM:
OFFICE:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
CSI/HRG
ARRB meeting 17 November - Results
1. Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton as CIA Records Center:
The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.
2. CIA use of State Cover:
The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.
This determination affects 16 documents ( 3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this
decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsideration/appeal review.
3. Release date of Nosenko NBR records:
The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.
4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:
The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records
for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of
financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.
5. Ramparts Damage Assessment Document:
The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
organization be processed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA Ramparts Memorandum be declared NBR. The
memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in Ramparts the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support
and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the Ramparts article. The
relevant organization is the International Rescue Committee; the IRC aided Oswald on his return to the US.
6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists:
The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain stations
that are releasable.
7. Document # 104-10072-10232:
The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt (LINLUCK). The document has been sent to the DO for
reconsideration/appeal review.
8. Other Documents:
The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents.
Reconsideration and Appeals:
If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has
requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around
Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register on that date. As mandated by the White House, the
Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.
CC:
Eileen Wukitch@DO
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Becky Dyer @ DA
Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM
SECRET
13-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
NOTE FOR:
J. Barry Harrelson
FROM:
OFFICE:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
10/10/97 12:10:24 PM
Nosenko Records
I have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While I see this as a success to have them support our
position and have some concern about the detail included within the descriptions. We had an occasion in the past to ask for a legal
opinion about a former employee's access rights to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act. Nosenko
has already personally expressed (in a letter to the Agency) his concern and objection about potential release of information about him. I
think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy
Act.
I trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and
classification but I just want to raise a mild concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder content. I will not object to
the these if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved as long as they are determined to not be in
violation of his privacy rights.
In future efforts to protect NBR information, I would like to see less detail in the description if at all possible.
CC:
Eileen M. Wukitch@DO, Lee E. Carle Y- @ DO
Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10:24 PM
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
13-00000
***
Classification of Material Transmitted
HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
Phone # 703-613-1806
PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY
SUBJECT:
Piosenko
CLASSIFIED FAX
FROM: J. Bany Harrelson
SENDING FAX NO. 703-613-3060
DELIVER TO:
ло
RECEIVING FAX NO. 893-4346
**********
DATE TRANSMITTED:
10/10
PAGES TRANSMITTED: 7
TRANSMITTED BY:
1. Melang
(including cover sheet)
********
MESSAGE:
Classification of Material Transmitted
13-00000 20/09/87 THU 15:00 FAX 202 724 0457
АККВ
MEMORANDUM
October 9, 1997
To:
CC:
Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director
From:
Michelle Combs
же
Subject:
Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection
Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,
memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the
public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in
redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the
JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.
After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my
judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the
assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR
records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family
and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,
and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career
in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by
the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie
Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the
JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were
reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the
Hart Report will also be processed for release.
The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed
carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of
the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,
which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and
identified for processing and review.

13-00099/09/97
THU 15:00 FAX 202 724 0457
AKKB
NBR Folder Summaries
Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet. At least one member of the HSCA
reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.
Reel 45, Folder 3
During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of
interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona
fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation
sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career, and Komsomol
experiences.
Reel 45, Folder 4
This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol
personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then
current) incarceration by the CIA.
Reel 45, Folder 5
This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities
and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.
Reel 45, Folder 6
All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR
document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division
(C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on
plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.
Reel 45, Folder 8B
This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott
Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and
questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on
inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for
further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.
2
44333
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3
Reel 45, Folder 13
This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835
page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" written by Peter Bagley of the
Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967. The document records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on
Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.
Reel 45, Folder 17
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB
buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to the abbreviations in the
transcript is also included in this folder.
Reel 45, Folder 19
This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's
biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The
conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the
KGB.
Reel 45, Folder 20
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer and KGB buildings,
personalities, and procedures.
Reel 45, Folder 21
This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and
Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.
Reel 45, Folder 24
This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study "The Case
of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.
006
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ARRB
Reel 45, Folder 25 ·
This folder contains pages 85-348, part V, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.
Reel 46, Folder 2A
This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The
Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.
Reel 46, Folder 2B
This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have already been released
to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogation sessions with
Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965; an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief SR/CI
on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965
paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported
conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to
SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.
Reel 46, Folder 3
This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the
CIA in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a
reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of
handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the handling of the
Nosenko case by the Clandestine Service. The Hart Report endorses the conclusions
reached in October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a
bona fide defector.
Reel 46, Folder 5
This folder contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area
during Lee Harvey Oswald's residence there. Some documents in this folder have been
released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 "homework
assignment” prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces and a four page
memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.
Reel 62, Folder 2
This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko's background, marriage, and divorce.
4
1307
13-000000/09/97
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АККВ
5
Reel 62, Folder 3
This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which detail Nosenko's career progress and a disciplinary problem and its
resulting impact on his promotion schedule.
Reel 62, Folder 5
This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions
by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation
targeted against an American tourist.
Reel 62, Folder 6
This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Perter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American
tourist.
Reel 62, Folder 7
This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's education, Navy career, and a particular KGB
operation targeted against an American tourist.
Reel 62, Folder 8
This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by
Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent
under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko responds
that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.
Reel 62, Folder 9
The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with
Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes
information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.
Reel 62, Folder 10
This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the
handling of Nosenko and is labeled "TS Material from Deryabin Safe." This folder was
not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released
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ARRB
6
to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various
US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko's day to
day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko,
a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko's request for
political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent
contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case
and his handling.
Combs e:\nosenko4.wpd
File 4.20.5, 4.0.2, and 2.4
14 009
13-00000
DEC 12 92 09:47PM
P.2
MEMORANDUM
September 22, 1998
To:
From:
Subject:
Laura Denk
Executive Director
Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader
Michelle Combs Mille Comb
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
Associate Director for Research and Review
Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Containing Information Not
Believed Relevant to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
Previously, the Review Board voted to declare NBR approximately 2400 pages of
material on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA sequestered collection
microfilm unrelated to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
The Review Board staff has since examined an additional two boxes of working files on
Nosenko produced as a result of the search for records related to the Kennedy
assassination. This material either duplicates or is the original copy of the sequestered
collection microfilm material previously declared NBR. For example, many of the
original tapes from which transcripts were produced are found in the working files.
The Board previously declared the transcripts, which are found in the sequestered
collection microfilm, to be NBR. The files contain no new material which would add to
the understanding of the Nosenko story.
I recommend that the Board declare the contents of the two boxes of working files on
Nosenko to be NBR.
e\combs\nbr\nosenko.wpd
File 2.4, 4.0.2, and 4.20.5
13-00000
SECRET
CI-277-94
31 August 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Discussions with Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko
1. On 3 August I had a series of discussions with the
staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) at
the Center's office in the Ames Building. Our discussion
centered on the disposition of more than 3,200 pages
relating to the career of former KGB officer--and current
CIA independent contractor--Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. The
documents are being reviewed for declassification and
release as required by the JFK law.
2.
The Declassification Problem: CSI's de-
classification staff has carefully reviewed the Nosenko
material. Ellie Neiman--a career Directorate of Operations
officer--is representing the DO in the review process.
Ms. Neiman noted that the material can be divided into two
parts:
•
•
Approximately 800 pages that deal with Nosenko's infor-
mation about Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union
and his relationship with the KGB.
A body of counterintelligence staff studies, inter-
rogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on
Nosenko totaling some 2,400 pages. These studies contain
sensitive personal and operational material. For
example:
--
Information on how CIA conducted operations in
Moscow ("sticks and bricks"), material on how
bona fides analysis is conducted, and details on
how we evaluated the KGB's operations.
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Discussions with the Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko
Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB
assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases)
and on Americans Moscow Station used as assets.
One US citizen the KGB developed is now a
senior professor of history in California.
3. Nosenko's Sensitivities: I discussed with
Ms. Neiman Nosenko's concern about the impact of the release
of information on his personal life. I informed her of
Nosenko's recent letter to the DCI complaining about the
release of material related to his association with CIA, and
of his concern that future releases would endanger his
privacy and security. The bona fides studies dwell in great
detail on Nosenko's personal life, including his problems
with venereal disease and his relationships with women.
Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses of
Nosenko's life, their release would reveal modus operandi of
sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man
who has served as a CIA employee for more than three
decades.
4.
Following my discussions with Ms. Neiman, I met
with John Pereira, Acting Director of CSI, and Barry
Harrelson, a member of his staff. I recommended that CIA
move to release the material dealing with Oswald, but--
citing the operational costs, embarrassment to prominent
American citizens, and threat to Nosenko's privacy--strongly
suggested that the other material be held back. Mr. Pereira
agreed to take these points into consideration, noting that
the law did allow CIA to withhold certain information to
protect national security or for reasons of privacy. He
told me in closing that later this year the Agency would
have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board
the reasons for withholding. I promised that I would raise
the issue with the Chief of the Counterintelligence Center
and said I believed we could provide the justification.
$ 2
SECRET
Robert Pringle
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Discussions with Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko
CONCUR:
John Pereira (AD/CSI)
2 Sept 94
Date
15/CSI
Barry Harrelson (CSI)
2 Sept 94
Date
Ellie Neiman
SECRET
6 Sept 94
Date
13-00000
SUBJECT:
SECRET
Discussions with Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko
DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246
(31 Aug 94).
Distribution:
Orig John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman
for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG
-
AD/CSI
CSI (Harrelson)
Neiman
1
1
C/CIC Chrono
1
CIC/AG Chrono
1 CIC/AG Defector File
SECRET

13-00000
530
> of the factors I had to consider in connection wi
ted it, and I will continue to 
accept it until somen
vidence, not opinion.
gs that Nosenko states is that the KGB never
They didn't interview 
Oswald when Oswald state
ey didn't interview Oswald when 
they decided
d sent him 
to Minsk.
your knowledge of Nosenko, based on your know
d on your knowledge of KGB 
procedures and tech
> 
credible when he says they 
never interviewent
what is meant by interview, a formal interview
KGB headquarters, if that is 
what is meant
ring to is a KGB officer 
speaking face to face with
g himself as a KGB officer, but 
speaking to him
chooses, Nosenko says that 
never happened. My
his credible?
best of his knowledge, I will have to-I will
ccept that?
.ppen.
the KGB didn't have a large book on him.
er done to check out the 
feasibility of statements
king to see what the experiences 
of other defectors
debriefed by KGB officers
? Was that ever done,
individual had been interviewed for some other
the Oswald case because the 
Oswald investigation
some who were in Russia in a proximate period
ed
, it is very possible. You would 
almost have to
period of time because 
the international situation
ne comparison should be 
within the approximate
how many lie detector tests, to your knowledge?
y or all of these tests to have been valid?
test to be a 
completely valid test; that is, the
ou be in actual discussion 
concerning the poly-
se from our office because I 
am not an operator.
and I will only confine 
myself to questions relat-
lie detector information 
into your report.
consider them to be valid
, is that correct?
nly to not be valid, 
to be completely invalid.
ay that Lee Harvey 
Oswald was a minor aspect
bona fides?
acterize the Oswald aspect?
art to be considered.
: it received the full consideration and the
Lee Harvey Oswald 
aspect?.
us amount of investigation done in 1964.
en that Nosenko was not truthful in his rela-
arvey Oswald, would 
that be significant as to
is bona fide?
I would have to consider.
sible that he could be lying about Oswald and
e was lying about Oswald.
he was lying about Oswald, do you think that
whether he was bona 
fide?
531
Y. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BE-
FORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSAS-
SINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978
INTRODUCTION
Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who
believed him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official
who had overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko dur-
ing the years 1964-67, when Nosenko was kept in solitary confine-
ment,
was among other things, he was asked about the 
reason Nosenko
solitary confinement, about why he questioned No
senko's credibility, and about Nosenko's charge that his statements
to the Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the
Agency. Portions of that transcript follow.
EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978
Mr. KLEIN. When Nosenko defected in 1964, when he came to the United States,
I was he in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?
Mr. MURPHY. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe so. I am not exactly
sure of the legal-I mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts,
he was in the custody of the IO.
Mr. KLEIN. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had pri-
mary responsibility for Nosenko?
Mr. MURPHY. The Soviet Russian Division.
Mr. KLEIN. Of which you were the Chief?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir..
Mr. KLEIN. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?
Mr. MURPHY. Beginning in 1968.
Mr. KLEIN. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have
primary responsibility for Nosenko?
Mr. MURPHY. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the
spring of 1967.
Mr. KLEIN. The investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that
time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet
Russia Division to another division?
Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer
of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which
Solie was a member.
Mr. KLEIN. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary
responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where
he was kept, what he was asked?
Mr. MURPHY. I was responsible for the case.
Mr. KLEIN. OK.
Mr. MURPHY. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the
Division.
Mr. KLEIN. But they would report to you?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes.
*
Mr. KLEIN. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe, when the treatment
received by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogations began, is that
correct?
Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, elaborate.
Mr. MURPHY. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under
consideration changed and Nosenko was not permitted to evade questions or to
decide when he would or would not want to respond.
Mr. KLEIN. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as
conditions and how it was changed?
13-00000
532
Mr. MURPHY. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting
Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we
wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was
not to sit still for a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time,
which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important
aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsisten-
cies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.
Mr. KLEIN. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?
Mr. MURPHY, Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to
depart.
Mr. KLEIN. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interroga-
tion sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?
Mr. MURPHY. I don't think so, not that early. I don't remember that.
"
•
•
Mr. KLEIN. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated
by people from the Soviet Russia Division?
Mr. MURPHY. That is right.
Mr. KLEIN. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated
chosen?
Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is
a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people
thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that.
In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By
that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the truth
or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this.
And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to pos-
session of information in the hands of the interrogators which then offered the
best opportunity to get through and get the truth.
One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other break-
throughs. The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially a fac-
tor of the tactics of the debriefing.
Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were
determined by desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire
to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence
agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.
Mr. MURPHY. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by
the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that
parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, made
no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were
not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as
valid any data he might provide unless you could be sure that that data was in
fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the moti-
vation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the
information was not considered acceptable.
*
*
*
•
•
Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about
Oswald?
Mr. MURPHY. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February
or March.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall now the substance of it?
3. Mr. MURPHY. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much
back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was
never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed
by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the
affair. There is more detail, but I can't really pin it down.
Mr. KLEIN. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?
Mr. MURPHY. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the
Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959
in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an
active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think,
that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it
seemed to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.
I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on
or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of
13-00000
532
Defore was one of pretty much permitting
words, we wanted his cooperation and we
reasonable manner, but his preference was
ng, to want to go out socially all the time,
o continue to work. And the most important
e decision to confront him with inconsisten-
id and passing it on.
day living conditions, were they changed?
rmitted to leave. He was not permitted to
-to-day treatment, not the actual interroga-
recreation, was that changed at that time?
that early. I don't remember that.
is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated
ision
?
ular subareas on which he was interrogated
know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is
n was made based on what the CIA people
to get an admission and to break on that.
on points that they had collateral on. By
aid what this man is saying is not the truth
and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this,
were tactical considerations relating to pos-
of the interrogators which then offered the
et the truth.
.
normally the case, gives you other break-
ts to be interrogated was essentially a fac-
that after April 4 the subject areas were
him
, to break him, as opposed to a desire
use to you in your role as an intelligence
the operation.
impression. The answer is yes because by
at the man was not telling the truth, that
wn to be untrue and that, therefore, made
for his behavior and his statements were
id not appear to make sense to accept as
Is you could be sure that that data was in
doubts about this, leaving aside the moti-
e way in which he presented it, that the
able.
•
bstance of what Nosenko had to say about
tean, when he first said it back in February
stance of it?
ning I said would be polluted by so much
st of the message was that Oswald was
ence Services, that he was never debriefed
ecause I was personally involved in the
eally pin it down.
ent by Nosenko?
believe that it would be possible for the
mained indifferent to the arrival in 1959
operator who had served at what was an
at to be strange. It was only later, I think,
er ramifications began to emerge that it
me even more unusual.
eems to me almost to have been tacked on
dn't seem to be part of the real body of
533
the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand
that Nosenko was much of what he said was true.
Mr. KLEIN. You are talking about other areas?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much
relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one 
coincidence
but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have 
been there and all that sort
of thing. That is what I mean.
•
•
*
Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept
in Nosenko's statements about Oswald?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, that they just-this is part of the first one-no contact was
ever made, that he went up to Minsk and lived happily and well 
with no contact.
The Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that. I mean, 
he is the only person
.
Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman, what happened to
Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of 
him on the layout of
the American Embassy. It didn't seem to be possible.
Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't constitute any breakthrough.
It seemed to me to be strange.
Mr. KLEIN. Would you distinguish between first the fact that nobody debriefed
Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried 
to find out what he
knew as a marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that 
once they
decided to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find 
out if he was some
kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, they would be two different points. The first point clearly
involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this 
background
and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence 
technical point of
view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in 
at 90,000 feet what did the
blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar 
operators handling
operational traffic involving U-2's.
Mr. KLEIN. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although
the KGB knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to 
question him
,
and because of that, never knew that he was a radar 
operator or that he
worked at the base from which the U-2's took off and 
landed?
Mr. MURPHY. I think it would be strange.
My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of
your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing
. There is no
indication here that the GRU was advised, which in 
the case of a defector,
there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the out-
fit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a 
marine
about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn't require 
that he be known to
have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a-they would
talk to him about his military affiliation just as we would.
I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think
the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don't believe they are. I think they are very,
very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Ameri-
cans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same 
elemental competence
that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will 
talk to 
a
private in the East German Border Guards, period. The GRU would be 
interested
in talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who 
had stated
to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets
, Soviet locals
and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the
Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted 
to tell all.
I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many
other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere
of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally
important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it.
Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to
believe.
•
•
Mr. KLEIN. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over
almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko's statements
about Oswald?
Mr. MURPHY. And other things.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't
questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald was?
13-00000
534
Mr. MURPHY. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone
that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this
case, were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence
officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter
who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.
Mr. KLEIN. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would
it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which
you have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area
for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?
Mr. MURPHY. Probaby not.
Mr. KLEIN. Why would that have been?
Mr. MURPHY. Because there were many other areas which posed equally inter-
esting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred
abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us
to obtain in the Soviet Union.
Mr. KLEIN. Who in the Soviet Russia division made the decision as to who
would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?
Mr. MURPHY. [OIA employee], chief of the group.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you know of any criteria that he used to pick his inter-
rogators?
Mr. MURPHY. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko's English was not good,
the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA
interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the
first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go
back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don't want to
expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot
of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth,
know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had available
and there were a variety of criteria.
Mr. KLEIN. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is
our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald
matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything
about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason
that such a person would be used that you can tell us?
Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had,
he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations.
I wasn't sure of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very
many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.
Mr. KLEIN. Two points-
Mr. MURPHY. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was level-
headed, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the
long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his
career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.
Mr. KLEIN. But wouldn't—
Mr. MURPHY. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't what you are saying,
he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I
don't know.
Mr. KLEIN. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I
told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other
than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that
they would not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at
least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA
knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that?
Mr. MURPHY. I would certainly think so.
Mr. KLEIN. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you
a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the
particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that,
it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say
might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that
he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would
that be-
Mr. MURPHY. That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people,
relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of
interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debrief-
ings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,
13-00000
one, or I am not aware of anyone
those officers concerned with this
of any former Soviet intelligence
om they spoke about this matter
omeone did, I never heard of it.
>d, beginning in April 1964, would
to Oswald and the problems which
Oswald constituted a major area
er areas which posed equally inter-
ich more and which had occurred
which obviously is not easy for us
sion made the decision as to who
4?
oup.
ria that he used to pick his inter-
us Nosenko's English was not good,
t is one of the aspects of the CIA
eople because you then lose. In the
ly hostile guy who is liable to go
her side, and so you don't want to
t a good idea to simply bring a lot
died the case and became in depth,
he officers that they had available
nversations about a week ago, it is
ogated Nosenko about the Oswald
Oswald, he didn't know anything
Oswald at all. Is there any reason:
can tell us?
thought the point was that he had,
e CI debriefings or interrogations.
bout Oswald. I am not sure very
an was available at the time.
3 chosen was because he was level-
oing to be with the case for the
That is why he was used. And his
of many, he is a very good officer.
at he wasn't what you are saying,
find that difficult to believe. But I
a hypothetical situation, where I
knew nothing about Oswald other
you think that was unusual that
lready who knew about Oswald, at
a A to Z, everything that the CIA
unusual, that they didn't do that?
was the other point I made to you
, let me be frank, we spoke to the
r knowledge is gained from that,
ped up deposition that what I say
8, but my recollection of it is that
perience, and my question is would
cause there were very few people,
leed elsewhere who had a lot of
of very many hostile CIA debrief-
probably otherwise, either abroad,
535
might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn't
squads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking 
CI experienced
interrogators.
Mr. KLEIN. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a
number of tapes, and all of the ones I have listened to were 
totally in English,
there was no Russian.
Mr. MURPHY. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major
operation in the Bureau in 1964?
Mr. MURPHY. It was an important operation, an important case.
Mr. KLEIN. And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who
could be used to interrogate him?.
}
Mr. MURPHY. I am sure some of the people had interrogation experience. I
mean [CIA employee] himself had a lot of background 
in this field. I can't explain
why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald 
did not have prior briefing on Oswald
except what I mentioned to you the other day, because 
it was not a thing that
we thought we were going to get through 
on, because we were weak in that
area at that time.
Mr. KLEIN, Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?
Mr MURPHY. Not to my knowledge..
Mr. KLEIN. Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about
whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell 
the truth?
Mr. MURPHY. There were many, many conversations all the time about various
things that could be done, all the techniques 
that are known, to get him to talk,
but as far as I know and in discussions 
with the medical officer who handled
the case, there was never any decision made 
or any attempt made to use these,
because none of them appeared to be likely 
to produce results and they all would
be very harmful and, therefore, not produce 
results.
Mr. KLEIN. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control over the case, in
those years, it is your statement that if any drugs were 
given to him, to get him
to tell the truth, you would have known 
about it, and no such thing happened?
Mr. MURPHY. That is correct.
*
•
•
*
Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964,
in April?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?
Mr. MURPHY. It indicated he was lying on several key points.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?
Mr. MURPHY. No.
1
Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector test in
1966?
Mr. MURPHY. Yes.
Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?
Mr. MURPHY. Same thing.
Mr. KLEIN. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?
Mr. MURPHY. No; I believe the operator 
who gave him the test in 1966 was the
same operator who gave him the test 
in 1964.
Mr. KLEIN. That is correct.
V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS
AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
ASSASSINA-
TIONS
INTRODUCTION
In a further effort to clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko's claims
that his statements to the CIA should 
not be used to impeach his pres-
ent testimony, the committee took depositions 
from FBI and CIA
agents who were present during the 1964 
interviews. These agents were
13-00000
HI
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 842.9
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
41-872 0
SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978
VOLUME III
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations
....
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
i
13-00000
748
TO STABIEITAGO
I have read the foregoing
one through sixty-six, inclusive,
top
which contain a correct transcript
of the answers made by me to
questions therein recorded, signature
is subject to corrections.
749
On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee
the following letter supplementing his testimo
testimony
.
as deB. Kat
Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504
momitest ym gas
of TM ban appro
September 25, 1978
Notary Public in and for the
rchigiani
do hereby certify that I am notarizing
re for the deposition of Mr. Nicholas
th day of February 1979 •
/S/Flora A. Marchigiani”
Notary Public in and for the
County of Westchester
State of New York:
The Honorable Louis Stokes
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman;
In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September
21, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr.
Helms with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms
said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964.
On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes
of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr.
Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the
calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a
meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and there-
fore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the
calendar itself.
It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I
doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by
me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such
notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now
a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some
recollection of the meeting.
3
I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the
period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren
Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investi-
gation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While
13-00000
this calendar does not
change
CC:
Committee
my
testimony,
it
and Mr. Helms
Mr. Gary Cornwell
Hon.
Edward
Richard
refresh
did seem
C. Helms
750
my recollection
to
me that
and therefore would not
in fairness to both the
I should make it available to you.
Respectfully yours,
Bennett Williams, Esq.
Nacht das Ketel
L
13-00000
751
750
ests M 211 orimetre? no
h my recollection and therefore would
seem to me that in fairness to both the
ould make it available to you.
Respectfully yours,
Nickles has chertel
Thursday, April 2, 1964
Harold Keis
Sol Lindenbaum
Joseph Dolan.
David Tilvaroff.
John Douglas
Jack Rosenthal
Burke Marshall
David Filvaroff,
William Foley-
William Orrick
Marshal McShane
David Filvaroff
William Geoghegan
9:35 2.m
SAW
_) Civil
9:35 a.m.
SAM
) Rights
9:35 a
a.m.
SAN
briefing 9:35 a.m.
SAW
9:35 a.m.
SAN
9:35 a.m.
SAW
9:35
a.m.
SAW!
11:55 a.m.
SAW
12:27 p.m.
SAW
1:50 p.m.
SAW
2:37 p.
SAVE
3:10 p.m.
SAW
3:25 p.m.
SAW
Esq.
Edgar Cahn, 0.L.C.
Burke Marshall
3:30 P.
SAW
3:32 p.m.
SA
Burke Marshall
4:07 p..
SAW
[Lawrence mston, CIA
4:08 p.m.
SA
[Richard ilelms, CIA
4:08 p.m.
SAL
[David Murphy, CIA
14:08 p.m.
ᏚᎪᎸ
[J. Walter Yeagley
[William Foley, Crim
[Defector Case]
4:08 p.m
SAL
4:08 p.m.
SAW
John Douglas
William Orrick
David Filvaroff
Joseph Dolan
Addressed Brandeis Univ.
4:40 p.m.
SAH
Students (40)
in AG's office
Sol Lindenbaum
6:45 p.m.
SAW
6:56 p.m.
SAW
7:06 p.m.
SAN
7:12 p.m.
SAN
7:15 p.m.
SAW
Friday, April 3, 1964
John Durfner (white Motor)
Sol Lindenbaum-
9:15 a.m.
SAN
9:30 a.m.
SAW
Harold Reis
> Civil
9:30 a.m.
SAW
David Filværoff > Rights
9:30 a.m.
SAW
Burke Marshall
briefing
9:30 a.m
SAW
Jack Rosenthal
9:30 a.m.
SAW
Joseph Dolan
9:30 a m.
SAW
Nde BK to Puerto Rico
10:15 a.m.
13-00000
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
A
HIC
E
842.
-453
vol.4.
کے روم ہے
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
41-378 O
SEPTEMBER 22, 25, AND 26, 1978
VOLUME IV
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock Number 052-070-04906-5

13-00000
20
have a say in what happens with respect
ertainly was involved with decisions on
to end, but I was not the controlling
re were three major agency reports that
> the Nosenko case; specifically there was
by the Soviet Russia Division, another
I the Office of Security report, and then a
red to as the Hart report.
ether you are familiar with all three of
ll any longer whether I read the first two
riefed on their contents. The Hart report
the agency in early February 1973 and I
onnections with it since.
ing his defection in 1964 and upon his
tes was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of
I missed the question.
asking precisely during his defection in
in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko
1. That was an accepted procedure under
eragency Defector Committee that defec-
Intry were handled by the CIA, through
esettling period, whatever had to be done
hat the legal authority under which he
k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you
like to answer that question a little bit
dulge me.
nly.
go, on September 20, 1978, I received a
· before this committee in executive ses-
reviewing that transcript I noted that,
er, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko's
between 1964 and 1969 in a number of
is an area of obvious interest to the
> take this opportunity to describe my
It greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen-
entral Intelligence Agency was.
a lawyer nor a judge, so I was not
conclusions about Mr. Nosenko's tenure
ce Agency. I'm sorry, I am not prepared.
Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re-
ed to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko's
npanied by a claim that he could give a
ee Harvey Oswald's contacts in connec-
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be-
e the significance that Yuri Nosenko's
vestigation of President Kennedy's as-
turned out to be a bona fide defector, if
21
information were to be believed, then we could conclude that
the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey
Oswald in 1963 and therefore had nothing to do with President
Kennedy's murder.
If, on the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in
advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if
Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's con-
tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise
that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November
1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent
when he shot President Kennedy.
If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent
when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United
States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been
staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to
this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko.
Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end
of March it was clear to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosen-
ko's credibility would not be easy.
On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along with
David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence
R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicho
las Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General of the United
States; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Divi-
sion of the Justice Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who was
then Mr. Yeagley's First Assistant in the Internal Security Divi-
sion; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in
the Justice Department.
The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach's office in the Justice
Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen-
ko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind
of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency's
ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko.
* The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the
record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting
on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the
substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day,
April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the
Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part
of the record of these proceedings.
* During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice
was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status with the Agency and
the Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the
Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.
As Mr. Houston's memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko's technical
status in the United States was one of "exclusion and parole,"
which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had
technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had
also temporarily "paroled him" to the custody of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that
Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it
was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or
whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.
13-00000
24
statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Direc-
tor to come here and present the story because he was supposed to be the most
familiar with it since he had reviewed it for the CIA.
He stated in substance, Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by
the CIA after defection or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a
diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material. The guards
were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours
☐ at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere
else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then
built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there
under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be
specific, at which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put
him on their payroll and let him go.
And then they gave as their-I questioned on the authority to do a thing like
that. Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr.
Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal.
And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why-and I don't
imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that
you would not rather clearly remember the incident if it had occurred.
Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman,
had ever been made known to me, I would recollect it, I am certain; and I would
hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed.
Mr. SAYWER. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Having heard Mr. Katzenbach's testimony of yesterday, can you
reconcile his testimony to this committee with your statement just
read to this committee?
Mr. HELMS. I can only say, Mr. Stokes, that it is very hard to
reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the
meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the
meeting is something he was not responsible for as far as I am
aware.
Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr.
Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April
3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for
the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.
It reads:
Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter
Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined
the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opin-
ion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I
pointed out that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole-or more
technically, deferment and parole.
Paragraph 2:
After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representa-
tives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr.
Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later
confirmed this position by telephone.
☐ I in turn, after the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an
interpretation thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto.
Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston,
General Counsel.
The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is
signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memoran-
dum for the director of security. That would be the officer who was
the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence
Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:
On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status
of aliens whose inspection by INS-
13-00000
LEVEL 1
-
20 OF 80 STORIES
Copyright 1993 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
All rights reserved
ABC NEWS:
SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)
August 27, 1993
Transcript # 1337
PAGE
6
TYPE: Show; Show
SECTION: News; Domestic
LENGTH: 8240 words
HEADLINE: Case Closed
GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attorney; GERALD POSNER, Author, "Case Closed"; Dr.
PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas; URI NÓSENKO, Former KGB Agent;
ROBERT OSWALD, Brother
HIGHLIGHT:
Lynn Sherr reports on a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews
author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove LeeHarvey Oswald
acted alone, and was not a Mafia or KGB agent.
BODY:
BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I'm Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is
on vacation. This is 20/20.
ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the stories that
touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters this is 20/20.
Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, will a powerful new book end
the controversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he
has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to
come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - 'Case Closed.'
And-
SELMA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: [sp?] Who is equipped to think of dying
in your 20's or 30's?
ANNOUNCER: -if you think it only happens to older women, you're wrong.
KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to
have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.
ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are,
the harder it is to detect.
Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography can have an error rate
of up to 40 percent in young women versus a rate of less than 15 percent in
older women.
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ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some
shocking news 'It Could Happen to You.'
Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms
homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Today, he's happy with his wife.
JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part of your marriage.
'
RICHARD COHEN Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what
you're asking.
ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them-
'ALEX,' Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30 years of
my life, I feel alive.
ANNOUNCER: -but in the gay community, backlash.
GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure.
ANNOUNCER: John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they 'Born
or Bred?' Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.
[Commercial break]
Case Closed
BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this
week when more than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were
finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current
population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event
continues to haunt us all.
The fact is a majority of Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do
believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book
claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act
alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it?
[voice-over] Whatever side you're on in this still-raging controversy, you'll
want to see Lynn Sherr's report now.
LYNN SHERR, ABC News: [voice-over] No period in an American presidency has been
as controversial, as thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated
about as the final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's life.
1st NEWSCASTER: [?] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it
passed out of the downtown area of Dallas.
SHERR: [voice-over] No detail about the final moments of the President's life
has been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph,
medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted
or dismissed, then woven into countless theories. For three decades, an already
skeptical American public has been left wondering if we would ever learn the
truth about what happened in Dealey [sp?] Plaza on November 22,
1963.
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MAN: [?] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead.
Let us pray.
SHERR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor
corner window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of
which ended the life of America's 35th president. But that's too simple an
explanation for a great many Americans, and for conspiracy theorists, far too
convenient that one man alone did it. Doubters insist that the shot or shots
that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or
from a railroad overpass just beyond.
MARK LANE, Author/Attorney: Shots came from at least two directions. A bullet
hit the President in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat. It came from the
front. A bullet hit him in the head. It came from the front. That was three
shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connolly [sp?l, One bullet missed,
struck the curb.
SHERR: [voice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the most persistent and
prolific of conspiracy theorists, has long insisted that the Warren Commission
was wrong, and covered up critical evidence that might make it possible to
identify the President's assassins.
-
Mr. LANE: Today, with hundreds of thousands of documents in the vaults of the
CIA, the DI [?], and the FBI and the National Archives which we can't see
the cover-up is continuing.
SHERR: [voice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says
evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led him
directly to the only person who could possibly have shot the President.
GERALD POSNER, Author, 'Case Closed': Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy,
acting alone.
SHERR: [voice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culmination of a
three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the Kennedy assassination, concedes that
in identifying a familiar culprit, he's not likely to win over many conspiracy
buffs. But he says the evidence didn't allow for any other suspects.
Mr. POSNER: Most people who have written conspiracy books started with their
conclusion already done. They knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and they
went around to prove that case.
SHERR: [voice-over] One of the major assassination controversies Posner seeks to
resolve is the number of shots fired, where they came from, and which ones
struck the President. Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home
movie taken by Abraham Zapruder, Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was
able to count the shots, for which he says Oswald had more time than the Warren
Commission believed.
-
Mr. POSNER: Oswald's first shot, which missed, was fired much earlier than
anyone realized just after the car turned the corner. Evidence of this is
overlooked by most experts. It's in the film. In the upper righthand corner of
your screen, you'll see a little girl. She's heard that shot and turned. In the
car, the President and Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor also heard the shot and
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turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had over eight seconds, not five, for the
next two.
The second shot is fired. This bullet hits both Kennedy and Connolly, After
passing through Kennedy, you see it go through the Governor, as his suit lapel
flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that crucial detail just last
year.
SHERR: [voice-over] This is the so-called 'magic bullet' that seemed to zigzag
through the two men.
Mr. POSNER: This computer animation illustrates that the second bullet needed no
magic. Because of the way the two men were lined up, this bullet passed directly
through them. It turned only after it slowed down and shattered Connolly's wrist
no zigs, no zags.
SHERR: How could that bullet have emerged so clean, with no flaws on it, really,
whatsoever?
Mr. POSNER: I was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing
that stops many people from believing Oswald did it alone. It emerged so clean
because that it went through Kennedy, it slowed up. When it went through
Connolly's chest, it slowed up. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist,
which everybody thinks would damage it, it was traveling at half or a third of
its speed fast enough to crush the bone, but not fast enough to deform the
bullet.
-
SHERR: [voice-over] The sudden backward motion of the President's head as the
third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his skull, has led many to
believe that the shot came from the front, but Posner says normal neurological
reflexes make the body stiffen when struck, causing it to move back.
And Dr. Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the President at
Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace President
Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain.
Dr. PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the metal coming
up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace
bandage.
SHERR: In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures we've seen- well, how do you
describe what the body is doing, having seen the brace?
Dr. JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn't fall forward. I think you'd have
to fall backwards or aside.
SHERR: Because?
Dr. JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.
2nd NEWSCASTER: [?] At approximately one o'clock, the President is dead. The
doctors were working too frantically to revive him to notice the exact moment.
SHERR: [voice-over] Dr. Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs. Kennedy
sometime standing next to him.
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Dr. JENKINS: She had such a drawn look. I really feel like she was in shock, and
she was just holding her hands, one above the other. And one of the times, she
nudged me with her elbow and handed me something in her hand, which is part of
his brain that obviously was in her lap- with his head in her lap as the car
came to Parkland. Bad moment.
SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer animation of the presidential
limousine and its passengers, Posner sought to show where in Dealey Plaza, the
shots came from.
Mr. POSNER: Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer animation, and working
back from their wounds, the computer determines the only possible location for
the assassin, as indicated by the yellow shading. Notice that Oswald's
sixth-floor window is right in the center of it.
Mr. LANE: Posner believes the magic-bullet theory. Next, I guess, we're going to
hear about the Tooth Fairy. It's just mathematically impossible. No one has ever
been able to recreate what it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did.
SHERR: Well, they've done it- he's done it now with a computer enhancement-
Mr. LANE: I know that.
SHERR: -and he claims the computer shows that it's absolutely the way it
happened.
Mr. LANE: Well, he's entitled to his computer. The American people were there,
and they testified, and two-thirds of them said they know shots came from the
wooden fence.
SHERR: [voice-over] What about that reported fourth shot fired from the grassy
knoll? When the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1978 that
there was a 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were
heartened, but the committee's finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles
[sp?], was based on a static-filled Dictabelt recording of a Dallas police
motorcycle radio stuck in the on position. The sheriff says the motorcycle
wasn't even in Dealey Plaza, but the committee heard four shots. We couldn't
hear any.
[interviewing] You have a copy of that tape, right?
Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas: I certainly do.
SHERR: Why don't you play it, and let's take a listen. Is that a shot?
Sheriff BOWLES: No, that's the motorcycle slowing down, see?
SHERR: I didn't hear any shots.
Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else. They listened to the same belts we
listened to, and they claimed to hear four shots.
SHERR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select
Committee's tape?
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Sheriff BOWLES: You have to ask them.
Mr. POSNER: They clearly went down the wrong path. The National Academy of
Sciences reviewed their work later, and pointed out all the flaws in it. They
just made an error on that Dictabelt. There is no fourth shot. There's no shot
at all, even, to hear.
SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey
Plaza, and agreed that it tended to support the Warren Commission's findings,
that would not end the speculation. Surveys show that most Americans doubt that
Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, believing instead that he was either part of or
himself became a victim of a conspiracy.
LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody, no, sir.
3rd NEWSCASTER: [?] Oswald has been shot!
SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-organized crime connection? Clearly,
there was a connection there.
Mr. POSNER: No question. As a matter of fact, I think the Warren Commission
underplayed Jack Ruby's organized crime connections.
SHERR: Isn't there some evidence, then, that he might have been acting on their
behalf to wipe out Oswald?
Mr. POSNER: Right. No. If he had a contract from organized crime, why didn't he
shoot Oswald when he saw him for the first time two days earlier? On the day.
Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed. He
was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own
motivation, this desire, as he thought, to be a hero in Dallas, that he would
erase the stain and the stigma attached to the city that had been done by the
President's murder.
SHERR: You're saying Jack Ruby acted all by himself,.a lone-gunman theory once
again?
Mr. POSNER: Without any doubt.
SHERR: [voice-over] Posner also explained his views on the many conspiracy
theories about the assassination.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY: Did you say, 'That 5.0.B., I'll break his back'?
JIMMY HOFFA: Who?
Mr. KENNEDY: You.
Mr. HOFFA: Who's the 'who'?
SHERR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of
Bobby Kennedy, who was going after organized crime.
Mr. POSNER: I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or '63, sat at a
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table with some of its key henchman, and discussed killing President Kennedy.
They did hate him. They might have even had a conspiracy afoot. There is no tie
between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime. There's not opportunity for him
to have been their assassin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy.
SHERR: How about, as in the Oliver Stone movie, JFK, the military industrial
complex?
Mr. POSNER: The movie, JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink. If you can't
just have one of them, let's have everybody in the plot, because they all have
some reason to knock off Kennedy.
JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassination of the President solved,
and there is no question about it.
SHERR: What about the Garrison investigation?
Mr. POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination. I think it's a
disgrace. It was a travesty of justice, a miscarriage of justice. Garrison knew
it. I discovered files of his investigation - documents, affidavits, memos from
his investigators - which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled on the
American public. Here was a man who knew better. I think his behavior actually
crossed the line to being criminal.
SHERR: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all that Lee Harvey Oswald was
working on behalf of the CIA to kill the President?
Mr. POSNER: No. I don't believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the
President, but they had no connection to Oswald at all. And the reason that I
can say that so confidently to you is actually an unusual source. It's the KGB
files. The KGB files, which had surveillance on Oswald for day in and day out
for nearly two years in Russia, came to the conclusion that he was not a sleeper
agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.
SHERR: [voice-over] So if Oswald wasn't working for the CIA, how about the KGB?
After all, he spoke Russian, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, married, a
Russian, and lived in Minsk for two years.
Mr. POSNER: A popular early theory, popular that we now see in the documents
just released this past week in Washington. The KGB was high on the CIA'S
possible list of targets. The KGB did not want Oswald from day one. They
realized Oswald had problems, psychological problems.
URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent: [sp?] I do not think that Oswald will be trusted
by any intelligence.
SHERR: [voice-over] Uri Nosenko is someone who might know. Before defecting to
the United States in 1963, Nosenko was Oswald's KGB handler, and had access to
his file. He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB. Still concerned about his
own safety, Nosenko asked 20/20 not to show his face.
Mr. NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was mentally unstable.
SHERR: [voice-over] But unlike Posner, Nosenko says he doesn't believe Oswald
could have shot the President for a very simple reason.
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Mr. NOSENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. Would you believe
it? He never shoot a single rabbit. And here we see person shooting rifle on a
long distance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds.
Mr. POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that's used as evidence that
he couldn't kill the President? But talk to those who actually knew what Oswald
was like with a gun, his brother who used to go out with him.
ROBERT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits with .22's on the run,
okay? We've shot squirrels in the trees with .22's.
SHERR: [voice-over] Robert Oswald says his younger brother was always interested
in guns. He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when he was 16.
Mr. OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun or a .22 was he
usually got his game.
SHERR: [voice-over] And Lee Harvey Oswald used the same rifle that killed the
President only weeks earlier in a failed attempt to murder to retired Army
general Edwin Walker. In other words, according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald,
a loser in life, wanted to accomplish something.
MAN: [?] Lee Harvey Oswald, 0, S, W, A, L, D.
REPORTER: Did you fire that rifle?
LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That's the facts that you people have been getting, but I
emphatically deny these charges.
SHERR: [voice-over] If, as you say, Lee Harvey Oswald was not working with the
mob or with the CIA or with the KGB or with the military industrial complex, why
did he kill the President?
Mr. POSNER: I think that Oswald killed the President, because this was to be
almost his fulfillment, his moment in the sun. Three days before Kennedy arrives
in Dallas, he's given a gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy's going to pass
in front of the Depository. It's not ideology, it's not because he's Communist,
but it's because he has that opportunity to place himself in history. Here we
are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was successful. He got his wish.
WALTERS: Well, there's a lot of proof. Is the case closed?
SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes so, but out experience is that
people on the other side are so dug in, it's unlikely anything is going to
change their mind. You know, even at Dealey Plaza, there are people just walking
around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, Dealey
Plaza-
WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.
SHERR: -which is where it took place-
WALTERS: Yeah.
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SHERR: It's so much smaller in real life-
WALTERS: Really?
SHERR: -than it appears-
WALTERS: I think of it as a huge-
SHERR: Right.
WALTERS: -kind of highway.
SHERR: It's quite small, and Posner points out that if all the eyewitnesses who
have come forward were in fact there that day, it would have been elbow to
elbow. In fact, it was not very crowded that day.
WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 more
to come. Is that going to settle anything?
-
SHERR: Unlikely. That, however, is the one area where both sides agree
unclassify all those documents. Otherwise- and even so, this is going to be
argued for generations to come.
WALTERS: Probably. Probably. Thank you, Lynn.
Next, most people feel that breast cancer only attacks women over the age of 50.
[voice-over] But Dr. Tim Johnson reports that more and more young women are
discovering they have a special battle to fight. What should you know? After
this.
[Commercial break]
It Could Happen to You
-
BARBARA WALTERS: The American Cancer Society's meetings on breast cancer are
taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference come reports of a
disturbing new trend · younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing
rate. Though diagnostic tests have improved over the years, breast cancer in
younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problems.
[voice-over] And as Dr. Tim Johnson reports, if you are under 40, much of what
you previous learned about the disease may not apply to you.
TERESA ROBERSON, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had lumps before, they were all- they
turned out to be cysts. But I knew this was different.
GAYLE RUSSELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in
my family, so I was very surprised.
KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to
have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.
Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: [voice-over] A disease they
thought they were too young to get, but more and more, the woman on the
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October 3, 1993 Sunday, FINAL EDITION
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HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY;
GERALD POSNER, ACTING ALONE, HAS WOUNDED THE JFK COVER-UP INDUSTRY
BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.
BODY:
The rendezvous was arranged for a weeknight last fall at a Türkish restaurant
near CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The proprietor would be expecting him.
When author Gerald Posner said he was there to meet George and his wife, as
he had been instructed to do, the proprietor led Posner and his wife, Trisha, to
à private table in the back room.
George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected to the
U.S. in 1964 and now lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the
country. Posner was researching a book about the assassination of John F.
Kennedy, and Nosenko had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively about
the Soviet intelligence agency's surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his
stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962. Nosenko had suggested
that he and Posner bring their wives, Posner said, because the sight of two
couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.
"Yuri supervised the Oswald file in Moscow and was familiar with the KGB
files on Oswald's time in Minsk, which I had seen," Posner said. "I knew he
could be extremely helpful in reconstructing that period of Oswald's life."
A chapter in Posner's new book, "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the
Assassination of JFK," is devoted to Nosenko and his assessments of Oswald.
As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald to be Kennedy's assassin, acting
alone, just as the Warren Commission said. Further, he was not a CIA agent, not
a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a sociopath and loser who had grandiose
notions of making a mark in history.
Posner is as surprised at the book's conclusion as the conspiracy buffs are
riled.
"I'm getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people.
If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here is the
final answer, here is who did it," Posner said during a visit to Chicago.
Posner's intention was to write a primer of sorts about the assassination
after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and
what wasn't.
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Poking in the garbage
"When you read all the conspiracy books, it's apparent they can't all be
right because they flatly contradict each other," he said. "I knew there was
garbage on the record. I didn't know how much."
After he debunked as many inaccuracies and false leads as he could, he
assumed there would be some issues that would require further investigation,
perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or possible Mafia involvement.
Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bob Loomis, his editor at
Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn.
"I was convinced the Warren Commission had gotten it right. The evidence was
overwhelming," he said.
Posner also was aware, of course, that a large majority of the populace
thinks the Warren Commission had gotten it wrong, maybe on purpose.
He got a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive
editor of Random House, took his own poll at the next meeting of the publishing
house's top editors, who periodically gather to report on works in progress.
"Bob told them about what I'd found and asked how many believed the Warren
Commission was right," Posner said. "Remember, these are some of the brightest,
best-informed, best-educated people in New York City, and no one raised a hand
except Bob Loomis."
Posner was not dismayed. "When people cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90
percent of the public as believing the assassination was the result of a
conspiracy, I say I'm surprised it's not 100 percent when you consider that
people have essentially heard only one side for three decades."
'JFK' an 'abomination'
A 1978 congressional investigation estimated that 2,000 books, including
those that are self-published, had been written on the subject. All but a
handful present a variety of sometimes-elaborate scenarios about plotters,
motives, killers and cover-ups, and as a rule, the conspiracy books make
bestseller lists, while the others don't.
"Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy,"
Posner said. "A recent one was a five-hour British film for Arts & Entertainment
called 'The Men Who Killed Kennedy.'
And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver Stone's $50 million movie,
"JFK," released in late 1991.
"Half of our country's present population weren't born (as of) November 1963.
Stone's movie is a historical abomination that's filled with demonstrable
falsehoods, but to young people, it's a documentary.
"Even if they read articles criticizing it, they say, 'Well, Stone may have
exaggerated, but there's got to be something there.' Believe it or not, there's
not."
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What's especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the
investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his
prosecution of businessman Clay Shaw as an alleged conspirator.
"Garrison's prosecution of Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been
thoroughly discredited. There was coercion of witnesses and changing of
testimony," Posner said. "The jury took only 45 minutes to find Shaw not guilty,
and one of the jurors said it would have been 20 minutes but that several jurors
had to go to the bathroom."
Stone has said "JFK" was a "counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren
Commission.
The no-longer magic bullet
Among the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by "JFK," Posner
noted, is that the so-called magic bullet found on Texas Gov. John Connally's
stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn't have struck Kennedy
and Connally, as the Warren Commission said it did, without zigzagging in
midair, and was probably planted.
"If ballistics tests didn't prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy, and
Connally, which they do, use your common sense, " Posner said. "At the time the
bullet was found, the conspirators wouldn't know if the bullets fired at
Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered.
"
"If they wanted to shield the conspiracy, there can only be three shots.
More than that, and the single assassin doesn't have time to shoot. So why risk
exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn't match
ballistically with remnants of the other rounds?"
And what about Jack Ruby, the Chicago native who moved to Dallas to run strip
clubs? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov. 24 and shoot Oswald on the
spur of the moment?
"Ruby's murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting
the truth out than anything else," Posner said. "First, it prevents the trial of
Oswald, where the evidence would have convicted him. It also gives us a second
assassin, with ties to organized crime. It's hard for people to believe this was
a coincidence, so you're off and running with a conspiracy."
Posner's account of Ruby's life and his actions during the assassination week
demolishes any notion he was a conspirator.
According to the trade journal Publishers Weekly, six books by major
publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the
assassination, with "Case Closed" standing alone in its anti-conspiracy stance.
Posner has been heartened by promising sales and positive reviews. "Many
readers are put off by conspiracy books that select only material that's
favorable to their position, whether it checks out or not. I think these people
are buying the book."
Thumbs up from the critics
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Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national
best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune's list of Chicago's best sellers.
U.S. News & World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed," writes:
"Posner achieves the unprecedented. He sweeps away decades of polemical smoke,
layer by layer, and builds an unshakable case against JFK's killer . . . Lee
Harvey Oswald." It quotes Stephen Ambrose, biographer of Dwight Eisenhower and
Richard Nixon: "The chapter on the (magic) bullet is a tour de force, absolutely
brilliant, absolutely convincing."
New York Times book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "Posner
effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up to conspiracy
theories."`
In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is
"utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems, in light of all that has
transpired over the past 30 years, almost revolutionary."
Posner, 39, didn't set out to be a writer, instead complying with the wishes
of his father, a union official in San Francisco. "My father dealt with a lot of
lawyers. He said, 'Son, these fellows charge fees you can't believe.'
"
So Posner attended law school at the University of California at Berkeley,
where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious Wall Street law firm,
leaving two years later to form his own firm.
In 1981 he represented Jewish victims of Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious
Nazi war criminal who escaped from Germany after World War II and died in hiding
in South America.
"It was a pro bono case, and I sued the Mengele family and the German
government," Posner said. "Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 25,000
documents about Mengele, so I thought I'd write a book."
"Mengele: The Complete Story," which he co-wrote with John Ware, was
published in 1986, prompting Posner to leave the law and write full time.
"Case Closed" is his fifth book. "A weakness of mine is that I tend to
underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake. This was true with
this book, but as I kept going I kept finding answers to things I didn't think I
could get answers to."
The real cover-ups
Posner agrees with critics of the Warren Commission who say its investigation
was flawed.
"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren't attempting to
conceal their involvement in the murder of the president but rather their own
inefficiency and bungling," Posner said. "I go into detail in exposing these
cover-ups, but they can't be interpreted as evidence of conspiracy."
The Warren Commission's work also was tarnished by a dubious finding of the
1978 investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Posner said.
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"The committee's acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radio
traffic on Dallas police channels and said they were 95 percent certain there
had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and a conspiracy."
A retest by the National Academy of Sciences discredited the committee's
experts, concluding that the recording was made a minute after the shooting,
Posner said.
Half of "Case Closed" is a meticulous examination of Oswald's entire life,
culminating in an almost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two
months before the assassination. "Many conspiracy books almost ignore Oswald.
But he's the key, and it's amazing how much is known about him," Posner said.
"It's certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spy or a
patsy.
"My technique was to go to original sources. Too many books quote secondary
sources, some of which are passing on misinformation, which means the garbage is
disseminated again and again, becoming fact.
“Here's an example. 'JFK' opens with Rose Cheramie, a prostitute, warning her
doctors that the Kennedy assassination is going to take place in Dallas and
naming Ruby as involved. I found her doctor, who said she was psychotic and
didn't mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until
the day after he killed Oswald."
Posner paused. "I can go on."
GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHIC
PHOTO (color): Gerald Posner, debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Smyth
School on West 13th Street, which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles
Cherney.
GRAPHIC: The three shots. From: "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the
Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 1, 1993.)
See microfilm for complete graphic.
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
LOAD-DATE-MDC: December 7, 1993
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