157-10008-10150
19
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
AGENCY:
SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER :
157-10008-10150
RECORD SERIES : MEMORANDUM
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Agency Information
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
SSCIA
FROM:
JOHNSON, LOCH
TO:
SENIOR STAFF
TITLE:
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS RETRIEVED FROM LBJ LIBRARY
DATE:
PAGES:
07/21/1975
14
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
CASTRO
COVERT ACTION AGAINST CU BA
LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTS
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Unclassified
Redact
05/11/1994
COMMENTS:
Box 393-1
NW 47129 DocId: 32203658 Page 1
21
Date:
2/23/201
2 -
-
5.
Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 December 1963.
Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will
present several options for discussion including unleashing of Cuban.
exiles and the intensification of the covert program.
6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1963.
This memo is mainly important because it reveals who in the Admin-
istration was dealing with Cuban policy. The list of people to attend
the meeting on Cuba held this day included: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk,
Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or les Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy,
and Chase.
7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 December 1963.
"
For a press conference, Bundy recommends the following language re-
garding Cuba: ...say...that you expect to take every available means
to stop and turn back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere."
8.
CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15
December 1963.
This table reveals that the CIA spent $106,155,774] on Cuban Opera-
tions, almost 50 percent of which was spent on paramilitary action
☐ $47,815,122). The total covert action budget (psychological and para-
military warfare) was approximately $81,000,000 in this four-year period.
9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963.
NSC
defers to
PCIA
The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new Presi-
dent on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which in-
cluded a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans,
and attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would
dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding two exile groups in particular:
one led by Manuel Artime, the other by Manolo Ray. _Bundy recommends
that byndon B. Johnson ake "a more vigorous line / toward Cuba/ than
we have in the past."
10.
Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 9 January 1964.
"
Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of
covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not
support the program of sabotage, while 'McCone and the CIA are for it,
and so are most of the middle-level officers dealings with the Castro
problem.' Bundy concludes: "...in your position, I would stop sabotage
attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging
to our broader policy."
NW
Docīd:32203698 Page 2
NW
-5-
action up to or including invasion."
18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964.
Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charge of contingency planning for a coup
in Cuba.
19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964..
This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was
"to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections.
Thus, the continued exile raids were viewed negatively since they increased
the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming
completely beyond U.S. control despite CL\ financial support to the groups.
20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964.
Chase notes that Castro has executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed
two others as CIA agents. CIA admits having a connection with the executed
Cubans "but that it is completely deniable."
21. Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1961. Subject: "Plans of Cuban
Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Gove nment Leaders"
The CIA was made aware of certain plans to kill Castro. The Agency told
the sources, according to Helms, that "the United States Government would not,
under any circumstances, condone the planned actions." Apparently on 2 March
1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate
Castro for $150,000. The wealthy exile turned down the offer. Similar offers
were make to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading figure in the
negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shipping;-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale.
An agreement was finally made to pay the Cameron group $100,000 for killing
Castro, plus $2,500 for expenses. Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban
exile in New York was to pay much of the Money, and did pay the $2,500 on
25 April Though Cameres group remained anonymous, it was clear the Mafia
was involved. Cameront aled that his contact was a police officer in the
St. Louis (Mo.) Vice Squ
22. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. Subject: "Assassination of Castro."
Referring to the above memo from DDP 10 DCI, Chase notes that John
Crimmins feels the matter should be discussed at a Special Group meeting.
DocId:32203658 Page
--
"
"John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit
any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing, notes Chase,
"and should go all out to stop the plot." In marginal notations, Bundy
agrees with John and with the need to forward the matter to the Special
Group.
23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, with attachment (Des FitzGerald's
"A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations")
FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and
Chase disapprove of the operations, though for different reasons.
24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964.
Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more
likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Caribbean crisis than the overthrow
of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noice levels
and the November election. This memo is very much like his 14 May memo
(see Item 19).
25. Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964.
In a reference to Helm's memo on assassination (see Item 21), it was
pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in
effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take
preventive action could be construed as condonation. " The AG said Justice
would look into the matter.
26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964 .
McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against
Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 Jame (See Item 21). The Bureau
interviewed many people allegedly involved, most of whom denied the existence
of such a plan (The Bureau did not interview Cameron, since he was out of
the country). The most teresting finding was that Lobo had in fact
IA.
discussed the matter
27. Memo, Chase to Bunny, 10 November 1961.
The election past, Chase et al. agreed that "we can usefully do some
NW
bocid:322
58 Page:
-7-
basic review work on Cuba." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CIA-
directed covert program.
28. Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 November 1964, with JCS attachment
dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE DANCE.
A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army to use germ warfare against
Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Bundy agree that the White House should
"remain aloof from formal consideration of 'Square Dance' at this stage."
I believe this plan for covert action is even more shocking and unacceptable
than plans for assassination.
NW
Id: 32203658
-8-
29.
Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently
a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964).
The Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options "short of
war to get rid of the Castro regime," including the possible contamination
of sensitive Cuban imports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a
Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating
elements into Cuba.
I
i
30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964.
The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA
(as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfere
with him at this stage.
31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965.
Chase reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Artime plot
to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be
"neutralized." D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed
"
.
at an upcoming Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Artime's
water. Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation
of the Artime/Cubela plot."
32.
Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA
document.
Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against
ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should
be authorized to reduce its commitment in the paramilitary field.
33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1955.
This memo indicates that not even Actime had his group in control. The
memo also discusses CIA covert activities in British Guiana, such as pene-
trating the PPP and proping up the democratic trade unionism.
34. Memo, Murat Will
23 February 1965.
(INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff,
Recommends immediate termination of Artime support.
35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965
Discussion of who is for maintaining a covert capability against Cuba
(presently on the shelf) and who is oppo ³ed. Chase guessed that CIA would
be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitude
toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out
the Vietnam problem.
Id: 32203658
NW 47129 DocId:32203658 Page 6
36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965.
Chase recommends phasing out support to Artimė. The CIA is consider-
ing diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; this is similar to the kinds of tactics
mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and are a manifestation of the moral
bankruptcy of U.S. palicy. Also some talk here of backing a new exile
group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently.
Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilitary capability, while DoD and State
want the capability maintained.
37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Burdy, 18 June 1965.
This is a summary of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The ultimate objective
is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary
program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really
started."
|
38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965.
Adm. Raborn recommends reactivation of a paramilitary effort against
Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNamara, and Cy Vance are against this
chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us, "Bundy
writes, "do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba."
recommendations said nothing about assassination.
39.
Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966.
Raborn's
Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into
ambush and the agents were captured. The President could expect "the noise
level of Castro's charges of 'threatened Yankee aggression' may go up."
40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967.
This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans
who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile
talking to them about their activities.
41.
Memo, W.G. Bowd
-Rostow, 18 December 1967.
The new CIA empha is on developing contacts within Castro's inner
circle. Dave Phillips was to be in charge of the new CIA Cuba program.
Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for
accommodation or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand
if they move to dump him.'
"
NW 47129 DooId:32203658 Bager 7