176-10036-10179
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RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179
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TITLE: Status Report on Southeast Asia
DATE: 7/11/1962
PAGES: 10
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CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000
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COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 7/11/63. Box 1
SEE SANITIZED VERSION NUK-81-235
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upled was 2/3
STATUS REPORT
ON
SOUTHEAST
ASIA
JULY
11,
1962
PREPARED BY:
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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:
في
:
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VIET-NAM
Current Overall Evaluation
The general trend appears slightly favorable, with the GVN continuing
to improve its military, and to a limited extent, its political and econo-
mic position. Basic problems are being eroded but quick and decisive
action is rare. There were no major breakthroughs or important victories
and nore appear likely in the immediate future. The Viet Cong show no
weakening in strength or determination despite reportedly heavy losses,
On the military side, Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen continued
well. Viet Cong casualties were up and their activities down (there is
an unconfirmed news report that a major battle took place July 3, however,
in which the VC defeated a regular army battalion This may be due to
reorganization and weather rather than GVN successes. The GVN took several
good but minor steps to increase popular support for the war effort, and
several rural social and economic programs moved ahead significantly. On
the international front, there were some favorable responses to our efforts
to set up an aid coordinating group of donor nations. Economic conditions
improved somewhat, with stable prices, credit a little less tight, consu-
mer goods sales and tax collections up, and rice deliveries continued good.
Fearing that the prospective Lacs settlement will facilitate Viet Cong
activities and that it may presage a U. S. move to neutralize Viet-Nam it-
self, the GVN has made difficulties at Geneva over several issues and
threatens to boycott the conference. President Kennedy has sent Diem a
personal letter stressing the importance we attach to a Laos settlement
and our determination to continue to help Viet-Nam defend itself. There
is no response as yet.
1。 VC Activity
Progress on Action Program
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Viet Cong activity continued at a relatively low level, with armed
attacks falling to the lowest point over a year, 60, for the period 20-27
June and rising only slightly to 75 for the period June 27 July 4. The
lack of VC aggressiveness is likely due to the rainy season and their
efforts to regroup in order to counter the improved mobility and perfor-
mance of the GVN forces. Observing that this appears to be a period of
VC reorganization and assimilation of recent infiltrators, COMUSMACV rð-
ports indications that VC units which previously operated as separate
platoons and companies are now being formed into battalions. Infiltration
evidently continues, but good intelligence is scarce. MACV J-2 estimates
intiltration in May at 800-1,000 and 800 for the first three weeks of June,
but this information is unconfirmed and there are no reports of infiltra-
tion since.
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In spite of reduced VC activity, VC casualties were high and included
some main force personnel, For the period 20-27 June the VC suffered a
reported increase of casualties of almost 25 per cent over the previous
reporting period. Killed in action for the two week period were 865 VC
and 141 friendly forces.
Reports continue to indicate a critical VC shortage of medical supplies.
Unconfirmed reports raise the possibility that the VC are attaining an anti-
aircraft capability..
(Following items are keyed to the Viet-Nam draft action program of
July 3)
2. Strengthen popular support. The GVN took several steps to generate
more popular support in the last two weeks. These include the July 7 release
of 794 prisoners in connection with the celebration of the "double seven"
holiday (anniversary of Dien's coming to power), a stepped-up drive to root
out low-level corruption and abuse of power by GVN officials, and a Presiden-
tially proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting the questioning of
Cabinet Ministers both by Committees of the National Assembly and by the
National Assembly in plenary session. The prisoners released may include
leading oppositionist Phan Quang Dan, who has been in prison since his par-
ticipation in the attempted 1960 coup. We have urged the last item on Diem
in the past in an effort to increase the powers and prestige of the National
Assembly.
Another favorable development is increased emphasis on working with and
for the people in the current training program for strategic hamlet cadres.
Ngo dinh Nhu (President's brother in charge of the strategic hamlet program)
is concerned that the program win genuine popular support. He favors the
election of hamlet officials by secret ballot instead of by customary show
of hamis. This is now being done in soms hamlets.
4. Seek International Support
(*) Cambodian Relations. The GVN replied mildly to the Cambodian
note concerning the ARVN border incursions of June 16, but did not apologize
or offer indemnities. The note insists that all precautions were taken to
avoid crossing the poorly marked frontier, admits that in spite of these pre-
cautions the frontier may have been violated, points out that any such inad-
vertent crossing was not motivated by hostility toward Cambodia, denies the
arrest of or harm to Cambodian inhabitants, and proposes a mixed border con-
tral committee to study frontier incidents and provide for future border
cooperation.
Another source of GVN-RKG friction, disputed constal islands.
was the subject of an exchange of notes which threatened to stir up further
trouble between Cambodia and Viet-Nam.
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(b) Third Country Aid. The United States has suggested a
Saigon, and possibly a later Washington meeting of donor country repre-
sentatives to coordinate aid to Viet-Nam. The intention is to stimulate
more third country aid if possible, and to make sure that current third
country contributions are being effectively applied. To date, Australia
and New Zealand have indicated willingness to participate in such meetings,
Germany will take part in informal Saigon meetings but would not attend
any formal Washington gathering, and the Japanese are "proceeding with
caution" because of the expressed fear that too close identification
with the U.S. will open up Japanese technicians in Viet-Nam to Viet Cong
reprisals. Canada has declined to participate because of its membership
on the ICC. The Belgians. French, Italians and the UK have not yet
responded.
Negotiations for the integration of Australian trainers into
our MAAG appear near completion. The GVN has indicated its willingness to
receive a New Zealand medical team at any time and the details are being
worked out with Wellington and Saigon.
10. Military Civic Action
The 31st Engineer Battalion assisted the local population at
Cheo Reo in Pleiku Province in the construction of a Buddhist temple.
In addition to the 150,000 copies of a news sheet distributed weekly by
soldiers to the local civilian population, 35,000 copies of the sheet
were also air dropped.
12. Develop and Implement Mutually Agreed Plans
Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen. Saigon reports both clear-
and-hold operations continuing to make progress without serious VC reaction.
Increased contact with the VC is reported in the Hai Yen area, however, as
the military move into VC territory.
Hamlet Councils have been elected in the Hai Yen area, but the
Embassy notes a serious problem in the fact that a hamlet Council member
receives only 300 piasters (about $4.00) per month for what is theoreti-
cally a full time job. In Operation Binh Minh, an effort will be made to
induce the people to move voluntarily into the fourth village to be set
up there.
The plan calls for extensive propaganda and explanations in
advance of the move establishment of military control over the area so
that the people will be free to move voluntarily, and up to 15 days to
accomplish the move itself (previous regrouping actions allowed only a
very short period for the physical move).
Montagnards. Latest information developed as a result of joint
surveys indicates the Montagnard situation is more a long term problem
than an emergency. There has in fact been a movement of some 17,000 Mon-
tagnard as a reaction to VC pressures, and this movement will probably
continue, particularly if the GVN provides adequate food and security.
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Almost all Montagnard refugees are at least temporarily resettled and re-
ceiving minimum food, shelter and security.
The Embassy comments that while this information somewhat reduces
the urgency of the problem, it does not change the problem's magnitude or
importance. Difficulties stemming from the absence of a well directed,
national Montagnard relief program, limited relief resources, and the Viet-
namese prejudice against the Montagnard continue. But the principal and
most, encouraging aspect is the fact that the Montagnard have fled the VC
pressures and more may do so.
Strategic Hamlet Program. The second ten day training course for
490 strategic hamlet cadres was inaugurated by Ngo dinh Nhu in Saigon July 2.
Future Plans. According to CAS, General Dinh's plan for the paci-
fication of Binh Dinh province has been approved by Diem and will soon be
presented to the Embassy. The First Corps Commander is also reportedly de-
veloping plans for two provinces in his area; these plans are said to stem
from the U.S. interest and support for Hai Yen.
15. Provide Increased Technical Assistance.
Village Radios.
As of July 4, 817 of the planned 2500 village.
radios were installed and operating. Tests of radios for use on trains
were started.
Defoliation. The Embassy has proposed a test of the effectiveness
of defoliants against VC food patches in the mountainous area of Operation
Hai Yen. Governor Harriman opposes the use of defoliants on food crops be-
cause of the effect on Asian opinion. Decision and action will be delayed
until the Governor's return from Geneva.
20. Integrate Economic Measures with Counterinsurgency Effort.
Agricultural Extension. A pilot training program for agricultural
efforts associated with counterinsurgency plans opened July 3 in Qui Nhon.
One hundred farmers will study farming and stock raising methods for one
month, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides.
Provincial Hospitals. Construction of four of the 25 planned
hospital surgical suites began on schedule.
Anti-Rat Program. The USOM-supported rat destruction campaign was
carried out in ten northern provinces June 12-22, resulting in the destruction
of an estimated 15-20 million rats or 20,000 per village.
25. Publicize the War Within Viet-Nam and Internationally.
Viet-Nam Photo Service. USIS Saigon is sending out a weekly packet
of photos designed to enlist third country interest and support for the GVN
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war effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, indicating
no difficulty in placing the photos in leading newspapers.
28. Establish Network of USIS Sub-posts.
The GVN has agreed to the establishment of virtually any number
of USIS sub-posts throughout the country. Negotiations on locations and
physical arrangements are underway.
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THAILAND
Current Situation Evaluation
The RTG has accepted the International Court decision awarding the
disputed Phra Viharn Temple to Cambodia. Thai delegates attended the
Geneva Conference on Laos, which reconvened on July 2, but the RTG has
not yet announced its intention to attend the next meeting of the SEATO
Council of Representatives in mid-July.
On July 2 the US began the redeployment of 1,000 Marines from the
Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Udorn. Possible Thai concern over
this move was lessened by our informing them at the same time of a US-
financed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand (see below).
On June 29 police arrested one suspected Communist in Chiengrai and
one in Lampang, both in the North of Thailand. The Thai press reports
that subversive documents were confiscated at both locations. According
to unconfirmed reports these documents originated from a Communist pro-
paganda ring operating out of Northeastern Burma.
Progress on Action Pregram
1. Improved Logistic Facilities
We have outlined to the RTG our proposed program to improve
logistic facilities in Thailand. The program would consist mainly of
a POL pipeline to Korat in the northeast, rolling stock, airfield im-
provement, storage areas, and prepositioning of heavy military engineer-
ingequipment. The Thai have agreed to the proposal in principle although
Sarit reserved his decision on our request that the RTG provide the right-
of-way for the pipeline and in-country transportation.
2. Internal Security Plan
We have instructed Embassy Bangkok to cable summaries of those
portions of the plan which will not have been pouched in time to reach
the Department by July 11. This will permit consideration of the basic
components of the entire plan during Secretary McNamara's forthcoming
trip to Honolulu.
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LAOS
Current Situation Evaluation
The principal remaining issues before the Geneva Conference, including
SEATO, having been resolved. it is anticipated that the new Accords may be
signed next week. There is nevertheless one serious stumbling block, which
endangers the satisfactory conclusion of the Conference, i.e., the possible
refusal of the GVN to sign. The GVN's position stems from its belief that
so many concessions have been made to the Communists that the security of
SVN is gravely threatened. We are, however, hopeful that Diem will still
be persuaded that we have achieved the best obtainable compromise for Lacs
and that we stand firm on our commitments to SVN.
Progress on Action Program
There has been little progress on our action program. We are con-
centrating at present on the following problems:
1. Economic Assistance. Elaboration of our future aid to Laos awaits
the visit of Souvanna Phouma to Washington, tentatively scheduled for
July 25-27. In the meantime, we seek to spread the burden of providing
Souvanna with the material assistance he requires by enlisting contribu-
tions from other Free World nations.
2. RLG Diplomatic Relations. The RLG's decision to recognize 5 bloc
countries and accept an exchange of Ambassadors poses a major problem with
respect to the GVN. GRC, Federal Republic of Germany and the ROK. Further
action by the RLG is deferred until Souvanna's return to Laos. In the in-
terim we are attempting to assist the pro-Western countries involved in
establishing or maintaining satisfactory representation in Laos.
3. ICC. We have asked our Geneva delegation to request the ICC to
prepare a detailed budget and list of equipment needs so that we will be
prepared to meet quickly our share of the requirements. With regard to
the essential heavy equipment helicopters and light aircraft
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taking steps to make it immediately available to the ICC.
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we are
4. MAAG Withdrawal. With the signing of the Accords, we will seek
Canadian cooperation in utilizing to the full the 75-day period for the
withdrawal of foreign military personnel. This will give us the maximum
possible opportunity to determine whether the DRV is abiding by its
commitments and whether the Soviets as Co-Chairman are carrying out
their undertaking.
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BURMA
Current Situation Evaluation
The internal situation remains unstable. This fact was highlighted
by incidents on July 7 and 8 when student demonstrations led by pro-
Communist organizations were ruthlessly repressed by the police and army.
These incidents could well lead to increased public disaffection with the
Ne Win regime and to a rift between the regime and the opportunistic
leftist groups who have, heretofore, been its only outspoken civilian
political supporters.
Internal security conditions are apparently continuing to deteriorate,
though not dramatically. A special Government amnesty offer expired June 30
without producing significant response from the insurgents.
Progress on Action Program
1. Political
It has been confirmed that Brigadier Tin Pe of the Union Revolutionary
Council will come to Washington for medical treatment as planned probably
in late July, although precise dates have not been determined.
2. Economic (AID)
No new developments.
3. Military
a. The Burmese are ready formally to accept the FY 1962 military
"sales" program.
State and DOD have agreed to accelerate deliveries of M2
carbines as requested by the Burmese, to the extent production facilities
permit, in order to contribute to planned post-monsoon counter-insurgency
operations. This action will also, hopefully, earn some political credit
for the United States.
117
b. Embassy Rangoon has confirmed that United States training
for Burmese officers will be continued under the FY 1962 program.
prospective students have been processed for the coming year.
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CAMBODIA
Current Situation Evaluation
Cambodia's differences with neighboring Thailand and South Viet-Nam
continue, but they have so far not significantly affected the presently
generally satisfactory relations between the United States and Cambodia.
Thai moves concerning Preah Vihear temple are being watched closely, and
it appears likely that if the announced decision to respect the World
Court's award is not implemented by September the matter may be brought
by Cambodia to the attention of the UNGA. The dispute between Cambodia
and Viet-Nam over the ownership of islands off the Cambodian shore has come
to the fore again, with the GVN rejecting a Cambodian protest against Vietna-
mese naval movements near them on the grounds that they belong to Viet-Nam.
Organization of a new Cabinet has been postponed pending religious rites
celebrating the World Court decision. New evidence of anti-Sihanouk plotting
in Bangkok has developed.
Progress on Action Program
1. RKG-GVN Border Commission (Pol. 8). The GVN reply to the RKG's pro-
test against the June 16 border violations is not entirely satisfactory, but
Phnom Penh believes it may allow progress on the border commission proposal
and has raised this possibility with the Foreign Ministry.
2. Force Increase (Mil. 1). The initial reaction of the RKG to approval
of the request for a force increase of 3,184, for MAP support only, is one of
disappointment that military budget support was not included.
3. New Aircraft (Mil. 5). Four T-28 aircraft, first increment of six-
teen, have arrived in Cambodia. Formal turnover awaits the arrival of
Ambassador Sprouse.
4. Highway Repairs (Econ. 9). Invitations to bid have been sent out,
and the repair contract is scheduled to be awarded by August 15. Contractors
would be scheduled to commence work November 1, under the proposed contract.
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