157-10014-10100
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Date:
7/7/2015
AGENCY:
SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER:
157-10014-10100
RECORD SERIES:
Identification Form
Agency Information
MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
07-M-06
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
SSCIA
FROM:
SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
TO:
TITLE:
NOTES ON GORDON GRAY
DATE:
PAGES:
07/04/1975
72
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
ASSASSINATIONS
CIA
TRUJILLO
LUMUMBA, PATRICE
GRAY, GORDON
REPORT
Declassified
1B; 1C
Redact
05/05/2000
COMMENTS: CCBOX 450
v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 1
AGENCY: SSCIA
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
Date: 08/06/95
Page: 1
RECORD NUMBER :
157-10014-10100
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-06
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
FROM: SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
ΤΟ
:
TITLE: NOTES ON GORDON GRAY
DATE: 07/04/75
PAGES: 72
SUBJECTS: GRAY, GORDON
ASSASSINATIONS
TRUJILLO
DOCUMENT TYPE:
LUMUMBA, PATRICE
CIA
REPORT
REFERRED
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS: POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 450
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 2
50955
450-2
Box 450
GORDON GRAY
Tobnn Ruk Files
From: Frederick
Re: Notes on.
Date: 7/4/75°
1
GORDON GRAY
Page
2262
ALEX
维维edx
2268
2272
2273
2273
2274
2275
2276
2278-9
2281
2292
2293
ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY
Subject
Biographical background
Opinions on PFIAB generally
Never heard of Executive Action
"I know of no plan, plot, operational organization that
ever came to President Eisenhower with respect so any
assassinations, "HMN (2272-3)
In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, xaka:
sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda,
and the the training of Cuban refugees"
There was one H "well known individual" on PFIAB
who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you
considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in Nor
Vietnam". Thum&ñkmµк Gray says that "Agency policy
was against assassination on the ground that it didn't
accomplish anything".
"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational
capability that has ever been authorized at any high
level of government"
Runden At a meeting with Gray and a representative
of the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wante
the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all activities of this
government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the
people of some other nation.... President Eisenhower was
very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people
in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon
the wisdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those
kinds of operations.'
"
Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congress:
al goversight committee because of danger of leake
Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence office
(either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for In
E TRUJILLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's
report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. wan
high powered rifles with telescopic scopesx and subseque
received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Se
of State through the DCI.
Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eis
hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed
furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep.
--"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of
concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents,
and not assasssination, or that kind of activity.
"
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 4
Tobnя ☑■k Files
From: Frederick Bau L
Re: Notes on
Date: 7/4/75
GORDON GRAY
Page
2262
ARERX
addx
2268
2272
2273
2273
2274
2275
2276
2278-9
2281
2292
2293
ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY
Subject
Biographical background
Opinions on PFIAB generally
Never heard of Executive Action
"I know of no plan, plot, operational organization that
ever came to President 
Eisenhower with respect to any
assassinations, "
XXX (2272-3)
In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, xakot
sabotage, stepped up 
economic sanctions, propaganda,
and the *ke training 
of Cuban refugees"
There was one WE "well known individual" on PFIAB
who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you
considered 
trying to bump off some of the leaders in North
Vietnam". Th=m&*m* 
Gray says that "Agency policy
was against assassination on 
the ground that it didn't
accomplish 
anything".
"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational
capability 
that has ever been authorized at any high
level of government
"
REDEM At a meeting with Gray and a representative
of the CIA in 
1958, "the President told me that he wanted
the 54/12 gropp to 
pass upon all activities of this
government 
which impinged upon the sovereignty or the
people of some 
other nation.... President Eisenhower was
very sensitive 
to the necessity of having the top people
in government from 
the appropriate agencies pass upon
the wisdom, and 
in some cases, feasibility of those
kinds of 
operations. 
"
Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congression
al goversight committee 
because of danger of leake
Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer"
(either the DCI or 
a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)
& TRUJILLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's
report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. wanted
high powered rifles with 
telescopic scopesx and subsequentl
received authorization 
to provide them by the Assist. Secy
of State through 
the DCI.
Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen-
hower Admin. (11/
29/60%; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to
furnish arms to 
dissidents in the Dom. Rep..
- "I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of
concern, was with 
being of assistance to the dissidents,
and not assasssination
, or that kind of activity."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 5
1
Tob** Rиk Files
From: Frederick Bal 1
Re: Notes on
Date: 7/4/75
GORDON GRAY
Page
2262
REERX
Ex
2268
2272
2273
2273
2274
2275
2276
2278-9
2281
2292
2293
ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY
Subject
Biographical background
Opinions on PFIAB generally
Never heard of Executive Action
"I know of no plan, plot, operational organization that
ever came to President 
Eisenhower with respect to any
assassinations, "XX (2272-3
)
In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, sakot
sabotage, stepped up economic 
sanctions, propaganda,
and the *ke training of 
Cuban refugees"
There was one WE "well known individual" on PFIAB
who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you
considered trying to 
bump off some of the leaders in North
Vietnam". Thammкx 
Gray says that "Agency policy
was against assassination on 
the ground that it didn't
accomplish anything
".
"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational
capability that has ever 
been authorized at any high
level of government"
Presiden At a meeting with Gray and a
representative
of the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wanted
the 54/12 gropp to pass 
upon all activities of this
government which 
impinged upon the sovereignty or the
people of some other 
nation.... President Eisenhower was
very sensitive to 
the necessity of having the top people
in government from the 
appropriate agencies pass upon
the wisdom, and in some 
cases, feasibility of those
kinds of operations. "
Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congression
al goversight committee 
because of danger of leake
Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer"
(either the DCI or a 
Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)
* TRUJILь0: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's
report in May, 
1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. wanted
high powered rifles with 
telescopic scopesx and subsequentl
received authorization to 
provide them by the Assist. Secy
of State through the 
DCI.
Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at
hower Admin. 
(11/29/60%; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to
end of Eisen-
furnish arms to dissidents 
in the Dom. Rep.
-- "I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of
concern, was with being of 
assistance
and not 
assasssination,
to the dissidents,
or that kind of activity."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 6
These documents were pulled from a
Special Group file by John Bayly.
They should be replaced after we
xerox those minutes we intend to
use as exhibits for the Gray testimony.
Attached on top is
мето
copy
of a CIA Mems to be used
Das an exhibit.
☐
☐
NW 50955
DocId 32423488
Page 7
GORDON GRAY
Chronology and Issues
Biographical Background
1942-1947
1949-1950'
U.S. Army (Private to Captain)
Department of Army (ultimately Secretary
of the Army)
1950-1951
1951
1051-1955
1955
1958
1958-1961
1961-1975
Special Assistant to President TRUMAN
Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological
Strategy Board, which involved close
contact with intelligence community
President, University of North Carolina
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (ISA)
Director, Office of Defense Mobilization
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISENHOWER)
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)
Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelli-
gence Advisory Board) appointed by JFK
Chronology of Events
1959
BARAN
TOP SECRET
Issues and Questions
November 4
Special Group discusses Allen DULLES' "Cuba
Propaganda Project" for use of radio trans-
mitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project
would meet with high level approval" provided
it was acceptable to the President of Mexico.
100
GRAY represents President EISENHOWER
at Special Group meetings.
NW 50955
DocId 32423488
Page 8
July 8, 1975
1960 (Cont'd)
February 12
February 17
March 9
March 14
April 7
TOP SECRET
A "special" NSC meeting was held on this day.
The only record of this meeting in the NSC
minutes states: "On instructions from the
Executive Secretary no memorandum was written."
(NSC Minutes)
Special Group approves evaluation of agents
for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed
this matter with his associate" (Eisenhower)
and reported two tactical objections.
(SG Minutes)
GRAY tells Special Group that any covert action
like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken
only after overall consideration of "whether
and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO."
(SG Minutes)
At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES "reported that
a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being
worked on. Admiral BURKE suggested that any
plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be
a package deal, since many of the leaders around
CASTRO were even worse than CASTRO." (NSC Minutes)
At a Special Group meeting, after a paper
titled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba"
was read, there was "a general discussion as
to what would be the effect on the Cuban
scene if FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO and CHE GUEVARA
should disappear simultaneously." (SG Minutes)
"GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on what
happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO
can be kept out of the Dominican Republic.'
Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military inter-
vention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes)
Issues and Questions
Why were no minutes written?
Does context show that phrase "his
associate" refers to President
EISENHOWER?
Did such consideration involve
assassination plotting?
Was this "package deal" the simultaneous
triple assassination plot that was
mentioned on November 3, 1960?
Does this simultaneous disappearance
plan refer to assassination planning?
Is there a connection between this
Special Group discussion and the NSC
discussion on March 14, 1960, re a plan
to remove Cuban leaders?
Did U.S. support TRUJILLO'S opponents out
of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the
Dominican Republic?
NW 50955
DocId:32423488
Page 9
2
.
1960 (cont'd)
TOP SECRET
Issues and Questions
3
April 14
:
April 14
June 30
July 1
July 5.
At an NSC meeting presided over by Vice President
NIXON, Allen DULLES reported "TRUJILLO'S position
continued to weaken and was now quite precarious.
[he] thought further attempts will be made to kill
or oust TRUJILLO. Under Secretary of State
DILLON said "if TRUJILLO could be removed from
power in the Dominican Republic while pro-CASTRO
elements were prevented from seizing power
in that country, our anti-CASTRO campaign
throughout Latin America would receive a
great boost. The Vice President agreed that
getting rid of TRUJILLO would be a favorable
development for us. (NSC Minutes)
"1
Allen DULLES predicted at an NSC meeting, that
one possible outcome with respect to CASTRO
was an assassination that would make CASTRO
a martyr. (NSC Minutes)
GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about
all that it can afford to take from the
CASTRO government." (SG Minutes)
Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemis-
phere Division to the Acting DCI recommending
delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic
scopes to the opponents of TRUJILLO.
The
memo said: "approval for delivery of these
arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE ROY RUBOTTOM."
President EISENHOWER met with Secretary of
State HERTER and others to discuss the
Dominican Republic. "The President thought
we should knock out of any documents on file
any reference to starting a revolution."
(Conference Memorandum)
Were these U.S. attempts to kill TRUJILLO?
DILLON'S comment indicates that the U.S.
had an active interest in removing TRUJILLO
What did NIXON mean by "getting TRUJILLO"? .*
Does this show that assassination was not
a favored alternative because it would
produce martyrdom?
General atmosphere of vehement opposition
to CASTRO.
Was the Special Group aware of this action
Was the President aware of the plan?
Purpose of weapons?
Page 10
NW 50955
DocId 32423488

1960 (cont'd)
TOP SECRET
Issues and Questions
July 7
July 21
Allen DULLES reported to the NSC that the
Venezuelan government wants, the United States
to lead the way in breaking relations with
TRUJILLO. DULLES stated: The Venezuelan
government was engaged in an all-out effort,
through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate,
condemn and cause the downfall of TRUJILLO.
[Because] they have convincing evidence that
TRUJILLO was responsible for the assassination
attempt on BETANCOURT [President of Venezuela]
BETANCOURT believes another attempt will
be made momentarily and therefore it [his
government] wants a showdown without delay.".
(NSC Minutes)
"Mr. DULLES stated that he believes, and the
intelligence community agrees, that the
problem of TRUJILLO must be settled before the
problem of CASTRO can be dealt with, even
though CASTRO is the greater threat."
(NSC Minutes)
The NSC Minutes further state that BETANCOURT
was told that the U.S. cannot act without
The U.S.
ascertaining TRUJILLO'S successor.
will work with BETANCOURT and FIGUERES of
Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor to
TRUJILLO. President EISENHOWER suggested that
a government in exile should be ready to go
into the Dominican Republic in the event of
TRUJILLO'S downfall. (NSC Minutes)
GRAY said "his associates" would favor the
development of sabotage operations in CUBA.
(SG Minutes)
The U.S. was under pressure to move
against TRUJILLO.
Did TRUJILLO'S attempt against BETANCOURT
make him "fair game" for assassination in
the eyes of OAS nations including the U.S.
Did the U.S. determine a successor?
Did the U.S. "act"?.
"Associate" is the euphemism for Eisen-
hower.
Does sabotage imply the further steps
of assassination?
NW 50955
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Page 11
1960 (cont'd)
July 28
August 12
August 16
August 25
August
(approx)
TOP SECRET
11
President EISENHOWER stated at an NSC meeting:
"Until TRUJILLO is eliminated, we cannot get
our Latin American friends to reach a proper
level of indignation in dealing with CASTRO.
In this regard, "the President said if we
attempted to take any action with respect to
Cuba before settling the TRUJILLO situation,
we would be the loser." (NSC Minutes)
BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget
for Cuban operations which was to be laid
before "higher authorities" for decision.
(SG Minutes)
Dr. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical
Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to
be treated with lethal poison for use against
CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21).
After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA
operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented,
however, that his associates had expressed
extremely strong feelings on the necessity for
very straightforward action in this situation,
and he wondered whether the plans as outlined
would be sufficient to accomplish this
It
was finally agreed that planning for the Congo
would not necessarily rule out 'consideration'
of any particular kind of activity which
might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA.
(SG Minutes; emphasis added)
At the NSC meeting, Mr. STANS suggested that
the U.S. might "throw out LUMUMBA by peaceful
means. (NSC Minutes)
"
BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts
with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation
5
Issues and Questions
Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?
Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or DCI DULLES
aware of this?
Is this circumlocutious order for
An
assassination from the President?
indication that at the least, assassina-
tion was within the range of acceptable
means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"?
Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES
Was it authorized by
aware of this?
NW 50955
DocId 32423488
Page 12
1960 (cont'd
TOP SECRET
Issues and Questions
September 8
September 21
October 24
November 3
During brief discussion of CONGO developments,
"GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in
the field are fully aware of the top-level
feeling in Washington that vigorous action would
not be amiss. (SG Minutes; emphasis added)
"
Allen DULLES stated at an NSC meeting that
"LUMUMBA was not disposed of and remained a
great danger as long as he was not disposed
of."
(NSC Minutes)
At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES reported
that "five Congolese soldiers had attempted
to assassinate MOBUTO on the 15th of
October.
The U.S. had prior information
of this attempt and had warned MOBUTO
(NSC Minutes)
At a Special Group meeting, Mr. MERCHANT
"asked whether any real planning has been done
in taking direct positive action against FIDEL,
RAUL and CHE GUEVARA. He said that without
these three the Cuban government would be
leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded
that it would be necessary to act against all
three simultaneously."
The minutes further state: "General CABELL
pointed out that action of this kind is
uncertain of results and highly dangerous
in conception and execution, because the
instruments must be Cuban. He felt that
particularly because of the necessity of
simultaneous action, it would have to be
concluded that Mr. MERCHANT'S suggestion is
beyond our capabilities." (SG Minutes)
Against LUMUMBA personally?
Did the NSC contemplate "disposing of"
LUMUMBA by assassination?
Did this information prompt the U.S.
to plot the assassination of LUMUMBA
in retaliation or to protect MOBUTO?
Was MERCHANT referring to an assassina-
tion of Cuban leaders?
Shortly before this, CIA had made the
assassination contract with the Mafia.
Was General CABELL unaware of this CIA
contract? Was General CABELL expressing
a traditional CIA objection to assassina-
tion proposals? If so, on what other
occasion did Mr. GRAY hear the CIA
objection?
NW 50955
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Page 13
6
1960 (cont'd)
TOP SECRET
Issues and Questions
December 29
At a Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave
the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan
for proceeding with certain limited covent
activities directed against the TRUJILLO
regime, but "he also emphasized that the
proposed actions would not of themselves
bring about the desired result in the near
future, lacking some decisive stroke against
TRUJILLO himself." (SG Minutes) (Source:
Minutes, December 29, 1960, by T. Parrott,
of Special Group Meeting, December 29, 1960,
02752)
TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30,
1961.
Did Mr. BISSELL or the Special Group.
propose to approve aiding Dominicans
who might assassinate TRUJILLO to
effect such a "decisive stroke"?
1961.
January 12
Late Jan.-
Early Feb.
Special Group approves the State Department
proposal explained by MERCHANT "that limited
supplies of small arms and other material
should be made available for dissidents inside
the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." (SG Minutes;
emphasis added)
DDP BISSELL asks William HARVEY to establish
an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project
ZRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying
that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by
the White House" to establish such a
capability, including the capability to assassina-
ate political leaders.
Were these assassination-type weapons?
If not, was this Special Group action
used as implicit authority for sub-
sequent provision of weapons for the.
assassination of TRUJILLO?
Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated
or authorized during the EISENHOWER Adminis
tration?
NW 50955
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Page 14
GORDON GRAY: Short Summary
Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs from 1958-1961. During this period Gray represented President
EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects
were discussed: "any particular kind of activity which might contribute
to getting rid of LUMUMBA"; provision of small arms to opponents to
TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the
U. S. wishes to move against CASTRO"..
Gray's testimony should involve the following questions (see attached
list of exhibits):
CASTRO
1. What was Admiral Burke referring to at the March 14, 1960, NSC meet-
ing when he spoke of "a plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should
be a package deal"? (Exhibit at Tab E)
2.
3.
4.
5.
Is there a connection between the plan referred to by Admiral Burke
at the March 14 NSC meeting and the discussion at the March 14
Special Group meeting on the "effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and
Raoul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously"?
(Exhibit at Tab F)
Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that on August 16, 1960,
the CIA Office of Medical Services received a box of Cuban cigars to
be treated with poison for use against Castro? (Exhibit at Tab O)
Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that in August 1960
Bissell asked Edwards to find underworld contacts with Cuba for an
assassination mission? (Exhibit at Tab R)
At the November 3, 1960, Special Group meeting, was Mr. Merchant
referring to planning for assassination when he asked whether plan-
ning had been done "in taking direct positive action against Fidel,
Raoul, and Che Guevara"? How does General Cabell's response (that
Merchant's suggestion "is beyond our capabilities") square with the
fact that shortly before November 1960 the CIA had made contact with
the Mafia for a Castro assassination effort? (Exhibit at Tab V)
TRUJILLO
1. Was Vice President Nixon referring to assassination at the April 14,
1960, NSC meeting when he said "getting rid of Trujillo would be a
favorable development"? (Exhibit at Tab H)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 15
- 2 -
2.
Was the Special Group, Mr. Gray, or President Eisenhower aware that
Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom was reported, on July 1, 1960,
by the CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief to have approved delivery
of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to Trujillo opponents?
(Exhibit at Tab YZ)
3. When President Eisenhower was reported at the July 28, 1960, NSC meet-
ing to have said that "until Trujillo is eliminated
referring to an assassination? (Exhibit at Tab M)
4.
was he
On January 12, 1961, the Special Group approved making available
."small arms" to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. Were these
assassination-type weapons such as the rifles with telescopic sights
'referred to in Exhibit at Tab YZ? (Exhibit at Tab X re January 12
meeting)
5. Did the attempts by Trujillo to assassinate President Betancourt of
Venezuela prompt the Special Group to favor supplying arms to Dominican
dissidents who might try to assassinate Trujillo? (Exhibit at Tab K)
LUMUMBA
1. When Mr. Gray commented at the August 25, 1960, Special Group meeting
that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the
necessity for very straight-forward action", was he referring to
assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was
objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P)
2. When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960,
that "he hoped that agency people in the field are fully aware of the
top level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be
amiss", was he referring to assassination of Lumumba?
Tab S)
COMMAND and CONTROL
(Exhibit at
What was the command and control system for covert action operations
in the Eisenhower Administration?
Pertinent Relationships
President Eisenhower
DCI Allen Dulles
DDP Richard Bissell
Gray was the President's liaison to the
intelligence community and the National
Security Council (including the Special
Group).
Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated
the CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate
Castro and the Executive Action capability.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 16
FB/RKK
7/8/75
1
TO:
FROM:
Fritz Schwarz and Curt Smothers
Frederick Baron
DATE: July 6, 1975
SECRET
GORDON GRAY: SHORT SUMMARY
Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for Natonal Security
Affairs from 1958-61. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER
at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed:
"any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of
LUMUMBA;" provision of small arms to opponents of TRUJILLO in the Dominican
Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO"
Gray's testimony should involve the following questions:
www
Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or
explicitly contemplate or plan assassination attempts
against LUMUMBA, TRUJILLO, or CASTRO?
To what extent were CIA plans against these leaders
authorized by or made known to President EISENHOWER,
Gordon GRAY, DCI Allen DULLES, or the Special Group as a whole?
What were the general command & control practices?
Questioning of Gray should focus upon the following documents:
Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.
Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.
Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division to the Acting DCI.
Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.
PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPS
President Eisenhower
DCI Allen Dulles
DDP Richard Bissell
President Truman
Livingston Merchant
Gray was the President's liaison to the
intelligence community and the National
Security Council (including the Special Group).
Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the
CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate CASTRO
and the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability.
Gray was Secretary of the Army and
Special Assistant to the President
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
representing the State Department at Special
Group meetings.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 17
Castro*
EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY
Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.
Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.
Lumumba
Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.
Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.
Trujillo
Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.
Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.
Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488
Page 18
E
3 November 1960
E-5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,
Gen. Lansdale
*
1. Cuba
Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for
problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant 
said he
would check into the progress of the State Department 
group 
which
has been charged with developing recommendations on this 
matter
.
The
From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of
Mr. Douglas,
the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro.
supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that
perhaps things have now progressed to a point 
where covert activities
of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake 
will not be 
effective.
Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of 
the militia, Mr. Gray
cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, 
and Mr. Merchant dwelt
on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control 
the
population in ways which the Communists have developed 
so well.
latter said that he and others in the State Department 
had 
originally
thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba 
and that
this could be augmented by the comparatively 
small-scale efforts 
of
exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are 
beginning to 
feel
more and more that despite the numerous defections 
and the economic
deprivations being experienced by the middle and 
upper classes, time
Mr. 
Merchant said that he
is actually working on Castro's side.
foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert
intervention would not do the job.
CS
Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to
"clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. 
military 
force.
He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed 
exiles to mount 
a
simulated attack on Guantanamo in order 
to offer an excuse for overt
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE FICT
SECRET - EXTES CONLY
THIS DOCH
A SOUNCH RE
IS
IN CO HITRICAL
PATEN 10.230
- DO HOT NO.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 19
1 WIT
intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion
of which was that such action on our part 
would not be desirable, but
that should Castro be foolish enough 
actually to attack Guantanamo
this would almost certainly mean 
war.
the subject 
of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in
Mr. Gray said that he had 
had
order to be able to arrive at a top-level 
decision on this very point.
He thought it essential that the policy 
of the U.S. should be completely
understood by responsible officials, so 
that any overt Cuban act would
be met with a previously-agreed-
on response.
Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,
he thought 
that some of the previous 
argumentation in today's meeting
was faulty, in that we could not have 
it both ways. By this he meant
that it is not logical to conclude that 
an indigenous uprising is impossible
and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to 
go in overtly and "clean up
the mess. "He pointed out that if 
Castro's support were such that an
uprising was out of the question then an open 
invasion by the U.S. would
be met by a hostile population and we 
would be plunged into a situation
like Algeria.
Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell
outlined 
the general proposal to establish 
bases in the U.S., with the
reasons for coming to this conclusion
.
possibility of U. N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope
He cited specifically the
of the program, which has been brought 
about by the increased strength
of the Castro regime. All members 
of the Group expressed serious
doubts as to whether such activity 
could be kept at all secure.
Merchant said at one point, 
that although this does not represent a
final conclusion on his part, he is 
inclined to think that the proposal
embodies the worst aspect of both 
worlds; that is, the choice should
rest between continuing our 
operations entirely on foreign soil or
preparing to make the best 
possible case for overt intervention.
Mr.
Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his
associates 
at the same time Tibet 
is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed
that this is where it should end up, 
but asserted that he is not prepared
to move in that direction until a survey 
has been made of the possibilities
of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.
to
In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using
a refugee 
organization either an 
existing one or a contrived one
backstop the operations.
08704
SECRET - EVES COLY
PROPERTY O
THE WHITE HOUSE O
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 20

NW 50955
Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have
the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific
locations that would be suitable.
Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been
done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.
He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be
leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be
necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed
out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous
in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.
He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous
action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion
is bevond our canahilities.
"
DocId: 32423488 Page 21
SEGNET - EYES ONLY
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
W
ل الدنيا
M4. Supply Drops - Cuba
Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had
not taken place because of the absence of specified communication
from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because
of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed
that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.
✓5. U-2, Cuba
Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first
He continued
flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover.
that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that
some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to
make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.
Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with
him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of
this kind before the middle of next week. " The other members appeared
to have the same reaction.
✓. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles
Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken
to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and
Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA
representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if
He had stated, however,
necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him.
that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take;
that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups
other than those under the direction of CIA..
The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would
be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and
discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make
arrangements for this.
7.
Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis
Cape Canaveral
Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum
02186
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488
Page 22
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SEPPET - FUER CHA
Withl
on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group
on 20 October 1960.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488
Page 23
Ya Parratter
THOMAS A. PARROTT
5.
SECRET - EVES ONLY
✓
ון
SECRET
EYES ONLY
15 Aug 60.
12 August 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting II August 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell
SUCKET - EXES ONLY
% 2.
2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr. Bissell summarized the
budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the
Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year.
The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million
dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an
estimated value of 1.6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency
inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have
been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance
required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles
stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since
there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs
will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major
sub-headings as follows:
Political Action
Propaganda
Paramilitary
Intelligence Collection
Counter Intelligence
$>
Communications Support
Support
960,000.00
2,152,120,00
8,055,753.00
833,200.00
325,400.00
229,420.00
731,718.00
$ 13,287,611.00
Total
PROPLET
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 24
EYES ONLY
SECRET
THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURC
IN CEE
PAPLN 230.
SECRET
EYES ONLY
-2-
It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that
the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and
scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not
state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the
estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was
agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher
authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the
next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions
involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but
because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial
expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance
that the operation was to go forward.
Kiel and M. Bell
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)
r
EYES ONLY
SECRET
PROPERTY
THE WHITE HOUSE OPFIET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488
Page 25
DRP C.3173
SECRET
C-X-3
ERGO.SAY
1 July 1960
MCMORANDUM POR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:
SUBJECT
Deputy Director (Plans)
Clandestine Delivery of Arms to Opposition Leadership
in the Dominican Republic.
1. This memorandus recommands action by the Acting Director of
Central Intelligence. Such recɔumendation is contained in para 5.
2. While Ambassador Farland was in the Dominican Republic, a prin
alpal leader of the opposition requested that a limited mmbar of arms be
mada available which could be used to precipitate the overthrow of the
regine of General Raftel Leonidas Trujills. These arms presumably would
be used aguinat key members of the Trujillo regime.
Within recent months, the Thuills regime the become increasingly
unstable due to growing opposition within the professional and middle
clacson to the exccases of the dictatorship. Political oppression of
those groups has brought about severely strained relations betweon the
Catholic Church and the Trujillo regize. Host knowledgeable sources have
been prodiating that the fall of the regime is imminent. :
Since the fall of the Trujillo regime uppoare inevitable, is to the
interest of the U.. that our relations with the opposition be as close
an possible. Providing the arms as requested would contribute signifi-
cently toward this and.
3. It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition
forces in the Dominican Republic twelve (12) sterile U.. rifles, Model
1903 (Springfield), with telescopio sights, together with five hundred
(500) rounds of communition for sane. Arms and amnition are immediately
available at depot; approximate cost is 12700. It is placed to
deliver thoro vaspana by air through DPD facilities provided arrangements
can be varked out with the opposition for thoir reception. If they cannot
be delivered by air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for
delivery by sea.
4. Approval for delivery of these arms has boon given by Assistent
Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requents that the arms be placed in
the hands of the opposition at the carliest possible moment.
11
02269
PROPERTY OF
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SECRET
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488 Page 26
SECRET
Page Two
5. It is recommended that the opposition in the Dominican Republic
be provided the arms as requested.
001 DDCI
CONCURI
Deputy Director
(Plana)
Date
SIGNED
Chiof
Western Hemisphere Division
The recommandation contained in
paragraph 5 is approveds
SIGHED
Director of Central Intelligence
2 JUL 1850
Date
DDP/WH
sklb (1 July 60)
Distributions
Qig & 1
Addressee
1
DDCI
1
DDP
1
Wee
1
COPS
C/WHD
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488 Page 27
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SECRET
02280
:
29 December 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 December 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell
3. Air Drops Cuba
Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in
the next three days.
f
5. Dominican Republic
Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for
proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the
Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given
to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a para-
military force as such, since this would be impractical in view of
requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions
would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future,
lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it
should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that
Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic
should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The
consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent.
However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time
no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.
6. Cuba
Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with
Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points:
(a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of
individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if
possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with
other countries, some time before January 20th.
2
SECRET-EVES ONLY
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE C
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 28
ULUNLI
12 January 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 12 January 1961
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles
Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front
Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General
Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned
group reportedly will 
visit Washington on Saturday.
11
✓5.
5. Contingency Planning for Cuba.
Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force
consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff
to draw up contingency plans covering the possible eventual use of
overt U.S. forces.
All members agreed that such planning is an essential step.
Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report of the task force be available
for the meeting of January 19th.
7. Capture of Supplies in Cuba
In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban
government's capture of materiel from two airdrops plus one cache.
PROPERTY DE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NO ONLY
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488
Page 29
THIS DOGUMENT IS
A SOURCE NETTO
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 220
nv
Dominican Republic
Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State
that limited supplies of small arms and other materiel should be made
available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott
said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that
the plan would call for final transportation into the country being
provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.
✓ 11. U-2 Flights - Vietnam
Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the
three successful IJ-2 flights. over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not
been covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission
to cover that area as soon as the weather permits.
January 20th.
The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after
They also requested a brief memo summarizing results,
for the meeting of the 19th.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 30
SECRET - EYES ONLY
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

3 November 1960
E-5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,
Gen. Lansdale
X
1. Cuba
Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for
problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. 
Merchant said he
would check into the progress of the State Department 
group 
which
has been charged with developing recommendations 
on this matter.
The
From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of
Mr. Douglas,
the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro.
supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that
perhaps things have now progressed to a point 
where covert activities
of the type originally envisaged for CLA to 
undertake will not be effective
.
Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of 
the militia, Mr. Gray
cited the matter of arms from the Soviet 
bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt
on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to 
control the
population in ways which the Communists have 
developed so well.
latter said that he and others in the State 
Department had originally
thought that a popular rebellion would develop within 
Cuba and that
this could be augmented by the comparatively 
small-scale efforts 
of
exiles under CIA control. Now the same people 
are beginning to feel
more and more that despite the numerous defections 
and the economic
deprivations being experienced by the middle and 
upper classes, time
Mr. 
Merchant said that he
is actually working on Castro's side.
foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert
intervention would not do the job.
Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to
"clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. 
military force
.
He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed 
exiles to mount 
a
simulated attack on Guantanamo in order 
to offer an excuse for overt
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SECRET - ENES ONLY
THIS DOCUNT IS
A SOUN
IN CO HILICAL
PAPER NO. 230
_ DO NOT -
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488 Page 31
intervention.
This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion
of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but
that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo
this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had
the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in
order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point.
He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely
understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would
be met with a previously-agreed-on response.
Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,
he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting
was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant
that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible
and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up
the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an
uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would
be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation
like Algeria.
Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell
outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the
He cited specifically the
reasons for coming to this conclusion.
possibility of U. N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope
of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength
of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious
doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure.
Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a
final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal
embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should
rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or
preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.
Mr.
Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his
Mr. Merchant agreed
associates at the same time Tibet is discussed.
that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared
to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities
of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.
www
to
In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using
a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one
backstop the operations.
02204
SECRET - ENES COILY
PROPERTY
THE WHITE HOUSE O
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488 Page 32
NW 50955
Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have.
the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific
locations that would be suitable.
Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been
done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.
He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be
leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be
necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed
out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous
in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.
He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous
action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion
is bevond our canahilities.
DocId: 32423488 Page 33
02:85
SERNET-ETES ONLY
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OF DE
beth-27 ULY
14. Supply Drops - Cuba
Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had
not taken place because of the absence of specified communication
from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because
of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed
that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.
✓5. U-2, Cuba
Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first
He continued
flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover.
that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that
some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to
make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.
Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with
him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of
The other members appeared
this kind before the middle of next week. "
to have the same reaction.
✓. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles
Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken
to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and
Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA
representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if
He had stated, however,
necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him.
that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take;
that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups
other than those under the direction of CIA.
The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would
be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and
discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make
arrangements for this.
7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis
Cape Canaveral
Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 34
SERRET - EXES CHY
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE CITIE
LI20 W
on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group
on 20 October 1960.
NW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 35
Ya Perrettes
THOMAS A. PARROTT
5
SECRET - EVES ONLY
ZU
ARE WINC
SECRET
EYES ONLY
i 15 aug co
12 August 1960 ·
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - II August 1960
:
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell
SARKET - EXES ONLY
11
2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr. Bissell summarized the
budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the
Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year.
The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million
dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an
estimated value of 1.6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency
inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have
been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance
required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles
stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since
there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs
will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major
sub-headings as follows:
Political Action
Propaganda
06300$
960,000.00
2,152,120.00
Paramilitary
Counter Intelligence
Support
8,055,753.00
Intelligence Collection
833,200.00
325,400.00
Communications Support
229,420.00
731,718.00
$ 13,287,611.00
PROPERTY D
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 36
EYES ONLY
SECRET
Total
THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SQUEC
IN CEH.
WINGE
PAPLN 230.
SECRET
EVES ONLY
-2-
It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that
the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and
scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not
state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the
estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was
agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher
authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the
next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions
involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but
because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial
expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance
that the operation was to go forward.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 37
Mil and Mr. Riell
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)
PROPERTY
EYES ONLY
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE OF
SERET - EYES ONLY
25 August 1960
E-3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles
1. Congo
Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later
described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in
mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included:
operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions;
the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of
no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged
leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the
latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing
the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.
The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much
in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had
expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very
straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether
the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles
replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had
every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits
or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a
position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of
necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the
Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular
kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.
Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have
given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic
Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In
this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been
made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope
assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not
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outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously
well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other
individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church
hierarchy who could be useful.
Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black
Mr. Dulles concurred in this,
Africa is not a very substantial force.
but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.
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√4. Cuba
• The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing
contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection
he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which
had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities
(after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).
In answer
2. He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of
approximately 500 people ready to operate by November.
to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating
the tactical combat phase.
Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray
that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as
a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that
he would like Gray to look into.
One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his
discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest
withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any
effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had
answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and
Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)
The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not
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know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,
particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration
of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had
pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken
with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)
In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first
point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with
Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail
all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to
understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA
is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer
to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -
and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view
was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just
why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the
steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and
to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the
point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V
for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the
participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the
country.
On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good
deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and
cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion
of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente bad
issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly
as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as
to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this
was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance
of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans'
point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do
so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future
and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as
appropriate.
Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political
ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be
clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He
added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these
politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement
of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD
together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical
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to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group
views.
Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related
point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that
Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given
adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a
concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise
of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn
of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the
necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact
directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.
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While agreeing that the Government could not take an official
stand, Mr. Merchant expressed his personal opinion that if the
companies should suspend operations, this would give the Soviets a
great opportunity, given the fact that the Cuban economy is so dependent
on oil. He pointed out that no alternative leader to Castro has yet
emerged, and that the United States would be held liable for any
economic crisis that might be precipitated in this way…
Mr. Gray related the consideration of this sort of action to the
sugar project discussed three weeks ago by the Group. He emphasized
that in his opinion these are isolated actions and that any moves of
this kind should be made only after an over-all consideration of
whether and how the United States wishes to move against Castro.
Mr. Irwin took some exception to this, indicating that he thought it
wa's possible and perhaps desirable to take such actions as those
contemplated in the sugar proposal, apart from any concerted across-
the-board program. Mr. Dulles emphasized that in any case we will
have to decide before long whether covert action should be taken in
Cuba.
It was then agreed that a special meeting of the Group should be
held on Monday, March 14th, to consider what might and should be
done in Cuba. It was agreed that in addition to the regular members,
Mr. Rubottom, Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. King and perhaps
Colonel Lansdale should attend.
There was then a brief discussion of Admiral Burke's letter to
Mr. Merchant. It developed that the attachment to this letter has now
been given the status of a JCS document but that it has not been forwarded
to the NSC as the JCS had desired. (Mr. Irwin said that he had held
up this action because of the informal nature of the letter.) Mr. Merchant
said the Department is preparing comments and that he hoped the JCS
paper would not be considered apart from State's comments.
Mr. Dulles said that we would require a policy decision on
whether a black radio could be established on U.S. territory, probably
in the Florida Keys. It was agreed that this proposal should be staffed
through the Scott office.
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PRESENT: Mr. Merchant, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gray, Gen. Cabell
کوک
Dominican Republic
Mr. Gray asked the Acting DCI whether he had anything to add
on the situation in the Dominican Republic to 
what had been covered
by himself and the Secretary of State that morning 
at the NSC meeting
.
General Cabell replied that he would only 
like to add the comment
that it appears evident that Trujillo will not 
consider making any
arrangements for an orderly succession to 
himself, but that he 
will
either hang on to the bitter end or flee 
the country on short notice,
à la Batista.
Mr. Gray asked the Group's views on what happens after Trujillo,
specifically how Castro can be kept out of the 
Dominican Republic.
General Cabell commented that so far no 
worthwhile opposition to 
the
Benefactor has been identified, and that in his 
opinion it might well
become necessary to dispatch U.S. forces, 
openly identified as 
such,
to the country in the immediate aftermath 
of the demise or flight of
Trujillo. Mr. Merchant said that his 
preliminary thoughts were 
that
there would probably be a good chance to get 
OAS support for a move
of this kind to forestall Castro; on the other 
hand, we might expect
some internal revulsion at the arrival of U.S. 
forces because of the
memory of the Marine occupation.
Mr. Merchant added that Mr. Rubottom was thinking seriously.
of a plan to seal off the land approaches to the Dominican 
Republic
via Haiti, thereby requiring any sizeable 
Castro effort to be an
amphibious one. He said that this plan has 
not yet been formally
4. Cuba
Mr. Gray expressed satisfaction with the organizational
arrangements for interagency groups 
considering the continuing
In this connection he 
expressed
development of the Cuban situation
.
some concern that USIA and CIA might be working on parallel or
conflicting lines with respect to radio
. General Cabell assured 
him
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that the top people in USLA are aware 
of CIA plans and there should
be no crossing of wires.
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28 April 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 April 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Hare, Gray, Dulles
Mr. Joseph Scott of the Department of State sat in as an
observer.
✓ 8. Cuba
Mr. Gray said that he had discussed with his associates the
organizational entities within the U.S. Government 
which have 
been
established to deal with the Cuban situation
. He noted that a number
of different groups and committees, with varying 
interests and
objectives; are concerning themselves 
with this situation and 
that
there seemed to him to be no "chief 
of staff" to whom all could 
look
as a central point,
He said that the opinion had been expressed to him that Mr.
Dillon should assume this function, but that 
in Dillon's absence,
Mr. Hare should take on the responsibility and 
should inform 
himself
of the general outlines of what has been 
going on in the Government.
Mr. Gray said that it had been felt essential 
to have such an official
available over the coming weekend, because 
of the expected May Day
troubles, and that since this official 
should be of such a stature as
to permit access to the highest levels, Mr. 
Hare had been decided
upon, pending Mr. Dillon's availability
.
In this connection it was agreed that Mr. Dillon should be brought
up to date at an appropriate time on the status 
of covert operations
with respect to Cuba.
02062
Mr.
Inter alia, Mr. Gray expressed concern and some surprise at
statements and actions by UAR officials with 
regard to Cuba.
Hare explained at some length his conviction 
that Deputy 
Foreign
Minister Sabri (older brother of Ali 
Sabri) is largely responsible 
for
this kind of thing, and that it does not represent 
the feelings of
Nasser or Ali Sabri. He traced the brother's 
background and 
described
PROPERTY
him as a "twisted personality."
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19 November 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 19 November 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas and Gen. Lansdale;
Gray; Dulles and Bissell
12. Cuba
Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting
more burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than
that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann
believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S.,
but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly
if an increase in numbers is contemplated: Therefore, the only solution
would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries;
this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists
with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point
with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take
another look at Cuba and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains
This
unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture.
would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a govern-
ment in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some
training in the U.S.
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Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training
anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we
could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that
he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of
our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before
the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than
in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embar-
rassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments
it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of
Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry
out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied
that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would.
be acceptable, particularly in the U. N.
Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with
Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have
developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investi-
gation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He
said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established
in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into
the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same
way as Guatemala.
Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for
constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate
future and some over a period of longer range. They include:
This story
a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly
designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles.
could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long
or how effectively.
This
b. A guarded military facility in the U.S.
could be handled more securely, but the existence of
an area where peculiar things are going on could not
be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be
private property such as the King Ranch, but this would
take longer to arrange than a military base.
c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly
remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already
trying to get the U.S. Marines out.
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d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure
but would require a large amount of airlift.
At this
e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone.
location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost
certainly know where they were.
Mr. Douglas said that a military base could be made available,
He said that
such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas.
the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation
with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also
that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be
effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has
been contemplated to date. Gen. Lansdale said that he and Gen. Bonesteel
were of the same opinion.
Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the
current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was
different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable
amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray
wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be. Mr. Dulles
acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if
the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt
that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps
within the militia itself.
Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to
seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a
one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not turn
in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small
groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a
decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general
connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if it is finally decided that overt
U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained
Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued
in any case.
Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting
the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined
urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS
investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites
to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Randolph.
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The latter location should absorb no more than 200.
Mr. Douglas
cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time
be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or
stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a
kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined.
✓ 3. Advice to Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested advice to Mr. Yeagley
in connection with Cuban exiles. Mr. Douglas felt that it was not
desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper. He suggested that
Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method
of procedure might be to prosecute one test case; e. g. Masferrer,
but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer to a question,
Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would
satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who
had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley,
who anneared satisfied with the oral ouidance.)
✓ 5. U-2 for Cuba
Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over
Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties
to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to
Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.)
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23 November 1960
PROPERTY OF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 23, November 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Gen. Lansdale, Dulles and
Bissell
12. Cuba
Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the
meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan
would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees.
He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that
it is believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation
plus two roundtrips by C-124s. These we would request the Department
of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small
commando-type units about 50 men to Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell
also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be
significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else.
The DCI agreed in general with this preliminary thinking. He
urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne
constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once.
Gen. Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras
be informed.
Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until
receipt of Defense's report on facilities available in the U.S.
Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by
Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines. He explained that we
have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much
support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt
will take piace in the reported time schedule, or indeed at all, but
emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others,
so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on
very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible
major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition,
he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for
combat, with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might
be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the
immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines.
Mr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.
Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage
Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic Billy Graham) to carry
out activities in Cuba.
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CEERT-ETS CO
30 November 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 November 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas; Gray;
Dulles and Bissell
% 2.
2. Cuba
06708
Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a
consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result
The following points were
of the high-level meeting of the day before.
agreed:
a. Mr. Gray's associates stand ready to deny U.S.
activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become
blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to
make it possible to deny plausibly).
b. If the program is enlarged, additional facilities
may be obtained, but at this stage not in the U.S. No
training of Cubans will be conducted in the U.S. under
present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of
the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala.)
C. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness.
(Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's
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notice before any OAS committee actually visited
Guatemala and that it might be possible even then to
avoid actual investigation on the spot. Mr. Bissell
said that if we do have a week, evacuation could be
carried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed is
required DOD assistance might be necessary.
Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell
concurring, felt that the possibility of emergency
evacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinary
refugees should be kept in mind.)
Mr. Dulles suggested that questions on Cuba might be asked at
the next Presidential press conference and that we should be prepared
with a statement along the lines that we do not entirely discourage
revolutionary activity. Mr. Merchant said he would arrange to have
a draft prepared along these lines. In this connection, Mr. Parrott
reported the request from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for
guidance as to possible action against an alleged collaborator of
General Pedraza. (Note: Mr. Yeagley was later told that we have no
operational interest and no objection to the Department of Justice's
pursuing the case. Mr. Yeagley said that they would proceed with
investigation, but that it is by no means certain the case will ever
come to trial.).
Mr. Gray then outlined his understanding of his friends' desires
He said that the
with respect to organization of the anti-Castro effort.
principal need foreseen was for an individual to serve as a focal point
for diverse interests in this situation, and to be available to meet with
Mr. Gray's friends at any time. In addition, someone should be
available to deal with the FRD and to talk to other Latin American
governments.
After a considerable amount of discussion, the consensus of the
Group was as follows: Probably two men will be required, one to handle
the overt and the other the covert aspects. They would work together
on a daily basis and both would have the entire picture in mind, but
responsibility for the execution of covert operations would have to rest
with CIA. The overt man should ideally be a government official,
preferably someone senior in the Foreign Service or the Department
of State. There should be a sort of "board of directors" to oversee
all aspects of the operation. This should be the Special Group plus
Secretary Anderson when matters of major policy are considered.
(Mr. Gray was not entirely sure that his friends would accept the two-
man concept but Mr. Dulles and Mr. Merchant emphasized that whether
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there were one man or two, CIA would have to maintain its own
organizational integrity.)
There then ensued a lengthy examination of qualifications and
availability of a number of individuals. It was finally decided that,
taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick
availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice.
On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes.
It was recog-
nized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's
associates.
Mr. Mann suggested that Mr. Willauer might also do the FRD
job, but the DCI pointed out that this requires a covert approach and
must be done by the Agency.
As to Mr. Pawley, it was decided that it would be unwise to have
him embark on a grand tour or to endow him with official government
status. Mr. Merchant said he would not object, however, to Mr. Pawley's
talking to President Frondizi..
Mr. Gray then mentioned the report which had reached his
friends about a representative of the FRD who had apparently just
returned from a trip around Latin America. It was noted that the
individual referred to was probably Sardinius, and Mr. Dulles said
he would obtain a written report of the trip, for passage to Mr. Gray's
associates.
Mr. Bissell reminded Mr. Douglas of the outstanding request
to the DOD for thirty-eight NCOs and officers for service outside the
U.S.
Laparrott
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17 February 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 17 February 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Gray, Irwin, Dulles
Mr. Joseph Scott of the State Department sat in as an observer.
/1.
Cuba
-
The project providing for covert spotting and assessment of
potential agents for eventual sabotage 
of sugar mills was discussed
that is, that no action
at some length. Within the limits 
outlined
would be initiated under the terms 
of any 
approval reached at this
meeting, but rather that approval would 
cover only the identification
the 
Group expressed general approval.
and evaluation of assets
Mr. Dulles reiterated that he was not asking for approval actually
to proceed with operations. Mr. Irwin 
stated that he and Secretary
Douglas were enthusiastic about the 
project. It was agreed that it
should be presented to the Secretary 
of State and that Mr. Gray 
would
discuss it further.
(Later Mr. Gray reported that he had discussed this matter
The latter had made 
two points:
with his associate.
a. He doubted the efficacy of the proposed action,
feeling that if it were successful in denying 
money to
the Castro regime which could 
otherwise be used for
subversive activities, the Cuban 
government could
obtain offsetting funds from other sources
.
b. He would not agree to identifying assets for this
particular sabotage operation. He 
would agree that the
Agency could proceed to spot and 
assess potential agents
He said that once this
for a variety of possible tasks.
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was done and a comprehensive program of suggested
action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the
Special Group, and if the Group recommended approval
it should probably then be discussed with him. It was
stipulated that in any case no action should take place
until his return from the trip on which he is about 
to
embark.
Cavilh
11 Stat
Mr. Scott also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly
the same point as outlined in b. above.)
✓. Dominican Republic
There was a brief discussion of the situation in the Dominican
Republic. Mr. Irwin commented that the Defense Department is most
interested in determining whether or not a sort of Third 
Force can be
identified.
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28 December 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 December 1960
PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray and Dulles
Special Meeting on Cuba
Mr. Gray said that it is desired to set up a special meeting on
His associates wanted particularly
Cuba for 9:00 AM Monday, 2 January.
to make certain that everyone concerned "clearly sees the sequence of
events." He also said that Mr. Pawley had had a recent 
conference in
the White House.
Mr. Gray asked that Mr. Merchant and Mr. Douglas determine
whether their respective Secretaries wish to attend. He said 
that
Mr. Willauer would also be on hand. Finally, he asked 
that the 
Army
colonel (Lt. Col. Egan) who had given such an enlightening 
description
of the qualities of the Cuban volunteers be on hand for 
the meeting.
It was noted that Col. Egan is currently out of the country, 
but the
DCI agreed to have him brought to Washington for the meeting
.
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
PERCAY
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488
Page 56
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 230
- DO NOT DESTROY-
· SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
CONCLUDING REMARKS
You will, I hope, permit me some personal, but I think
not unimportant observations. I hope that you will complete your
work as expeditiously as possible as I feel very strongly the need
for a viable Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within
its charter. I believe that the present furor about C.I.A. is
impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it is
able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our
country will be served. I believe that we will continue to need
effective, intelligent collection and analysis for our policy makers
and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be
undertaken in the interests of our National security.
improper
Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that
there is tremendous concern now and I don't suggest that it is
with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,
while at the same time people seem not to be equally concerned
about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, especially
through its very many KGB agents here. I would hope that a
Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigate
this most serious matter.
NW 50955 DocId 32423488 Page 57
:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, DOUGLAS
DILLON, GENERAL GOODPASTER
Land Under
State
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
July 5, 1960
TRUJILLO
OCCURRENCE: On July 5, 1960 President Eisenhower met with Secretary of State
Herter, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon. Also present were Gen. Goodpaster and
General Persons. The memorandum of the conference stated: "With regard to the
Dominican Republic, Mr. Herter said there are various things being done which
could result in a provisional government being set up. The President said if such
a government were set up we should recognize it quickly. We could then move in with
troops on their request if need should arise. In so far as the question is one of
internal intervention, we must use the CIA in order to avoid attribution. The
President--though we should knock out of any documents on file any reference to
starting a revolution."
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (DDE DIARY SERIES) - Abi Leve
FILE:
STAFF:
DATE:
Kelley
July 6, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. GRAY,
DOUGLAS DILLON
March 14, 1960 CASTRO
MONGOOSE
OCCURRENCE:
At a National Security Council meeting on March 14, 1960 Mr. Dillon
said: "Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba...there is
no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears.
Indeed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover."
"Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being
worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders
should be package deal, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse
than Castro."
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series) 436th NSC meeting,
March 10, 1960 - Abilene
FILE:
STAFF:
Kelley
DATE July 6, 1975
CATEGORIES:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS
DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY
DATES:
April 14, 1960 TRUJILLO
OCCURRENCE: AT a National Security Council meeting on April 14, 1960, Vice
President Nixon presiding, ": "Mr. Dulles reported..Trujillo's position continued
to weaken and was now quite precarious... (he) thought further attempts will be made
to kill or oust Trujillo."
"Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect...if Trujillo could-be removed
from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-Castro-elements-were-prevented from-
seizing power in that country, our anti-Castro-campaign throughout Latin America
would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of Trujillo
"would be a favorable development for us."
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
( Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 441st meeting, April 14,
1960) Abilene
FILE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488
Page 58
STAFF:
Kelley
DATE July 6, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS
DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY
DATES:
April 14, 1960 TRUJILLO
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
On April 14, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. Dulles
reported that 
a SR. Betancourt / no 
relation to Venezuelan leader/ had defected
from Cuba and predicted 
three outcomes with respect to Castro:
that would 
make Castro a martyr, (2) Castro's suicide as a result of the failure
(1) an assassinatie
of the Cuban experiment and (3) 
a trend to a socialist dictatorship and a Batista
terror regime.
18 forvored alternative
The assert wou of a
Does This indicate that ass
at MSC level 1
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 441 st meeting, April 14
1960)
FILE: -Abi Lene
STAFF:
DATE. Kelley
July 6, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESI-
DENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN
DULLES
DATES:
July 7, 1960
CATEGORIES:
TRUJILLO
CASTRO
MONGOOSE
OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on July 7, 1960 Mr. Dulles
stated: "The Venezuelan 
government was engaged in an all-out effort, through
the OAS and otherwise, to 
isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of Trujillo.
An important reason for the 
vigor of the Venezuelan efforts was the fact they
have convincing 
evidence that Trujillo was responsible for the assassination
attempt on Betancourt /President 
of Venezuela/ *** "Betancourt believes another
attempt will be made 
momentarily and therefore it wants a showdown without
delay."
Mr. Dulles further explained that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wants
the United 
States to lead 
the way in breaking relations with Trujillo and that
Betancourt wants a 
meeting of the OAS nations to deal with the Trujillo problem.
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Risenhower
(Whitman Filo) (NSC) mooting serios, 450th NSC meetinjt,
Phulk:7, 1960)
Ahilove
STAFF:
Kelley
DATEduly 6, 1075
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE
July 7, 1960
TRUJILLO
PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON,
ALLEN DULLES
CASTRO
MONGOOSE
OCCURRENCE:
On July 7, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting "Mr. Dulles
stated that he believes, and the intelligence community agrees, that the problem
of Trujillo mist be 
settled before the problem of Castro can be dealt with, even-
though Castro is 
the greater threat."
The NSC minutes further state that the United States told Betancourt of
Venezuela that the United States can't act without knowing who the successor to
Trujillo would be. The 
U.S. will work with Betancourt and Figueres of Costa
Rica on 
suggestions for a successor for Trujillo. President Eisenhower suggested
a government in 
exile be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event
of Trujillo's 
downfall.
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting,
July:7, 1960).
STAFF:
Kelley
DATE July 6, 1975
Abilene
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488 Page 59
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
MR. GRAY, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
July 28, 1960
CASTRO
TRUJILLO
MONGOOSE
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: On July 28, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting President
Eisenhower said: "Until Trujillo is eliminated, we cannot get out Latin American-
friends to reach a proper level of Indignation in dealing with Castro. It was
noted that Venezuela was trying to separate the Cuban and Domincan Republic prob-
lems 
in OAS forms. On this matter, "The President said if we attempted to take
any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would
be the loser."
Does "elimination
"
assivation."
?
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of July 28, 1960
FILE:
Abilene
STAFF:
DATE Kelley
July 6, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAURICE
Aug. 25, 1960 LUMUMBA
STANS, MR. GRAY
OCCURRENCE: On August 25, 1960 the minutes of the National Security Council
meeting that day state: "The President suggested the United Nations might re-
cognize Katanga: Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe
and Kasavubu and throw out Lumumba by peaceful means.'
"
(page 15)
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of August
F25 E1960
Abilene
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY, Sept. 21, 1960 LUMUMBA
OCCURRENCE:
STAFF:
Kelley
DATE July 6, 1975
CATEGORIES:
On September 21, 1960, at a National Security meeting, Mr. Dulles
said: "A-recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. ***Mobutu appeared
to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not
disposed of and remained a great danger as long as he was not disposed of."
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of Sept. 21, 1960)
FILE:
2
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488
Id: 32 60
Page
STAFF:
Kelley
DATE July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY Oct. 24, 1960 LUMUMBA
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
On October 24, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr.
Dulles reported:
"An intercepted UAR /Egypt/ message indicated that five Congolese soldiers
had attempted to assassinate Mobutu on the 15th of October. The U.S. had prior
cinformation of this attempt and had warned Mobutu, most he had not been warned, x
it was probable that he would have been caught." (page 16)
SOURCE:
Abilene
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, minutes of meeting,
October 24, 1960)
STAFF:
Kelley
DATE
July 6, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GORDON GRAY, MARION W. BOGGS
DATES:
Feb. 12, 1960
CATEGORIES:
LUMUMBA
CASTRO
TRUJILLO
OCCURRENCE: On Febraury 12, 1960 a "special" National Security Council meeting
was held, and Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, attended as Acting
Executive Secretary. The only record of this meeting appearing in the NSC meeting
series of minutes is a one-page notation which states: "On instructions from
the Executive Secretary no memorandum was written?"
What was
discussed is Not indicated
IN doccement..
SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, special NSC meeting,
Feb. 12, 1960.
FILE:
Abilene
STAFF:
Kelley
DATE :July 6, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
SOURCE:
FILE:
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 61
DATES:
า
CATEGORIES:
STAFF:
DATE:
MOTE ON GRAY TESTIMONY FOR FAOS:
short summary
If we don't re-write the Gray ghxnxningy, you
should note to the senators that since we w
drafted it we have received a new batch of
key documents from the Eisenhower library
which are reflected (quoted) in the
Gray Chronology.
Add NNON to short fummary
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488
Page 62
To:
Files
From: Frederick Baron
Re:
DELETION IN SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 3, 1960
Date: July 7, 1975
In a phone conversation with Jim Wilderotter of the White House,
Wilderotter assured me af that after the line "beyond our к capabil-
ities" on page 3, there was a double space followed by
Item 2, which deals with the African continent (not Congo),
followed by a double space, then Item 3, which deals
with Southeast Asia.
Wilderotter assured me that neither item related to
our inquiry. He said that there was nothing deleted on
page 3 that related to Cuba.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488
Page 63
EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY
Castro*
Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.
Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.
Lumumba
Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.
Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.
Trujillo
Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division to the Acting DCI.
Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.
Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.
* The Special Group Minutes of February 17, 1960 could be used for
two purposes: (1) To establish the general atmosphere in the
Special Group of planning, sabotage, operations in Cuba; and (2)
The fact that, at least in this case, Gray's "associate" was
President Eisenhower.
NW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 64
MEMORANDUM
TO:
Files
FROM:
Frederick Baron
DATE:
July 5, 1975
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH GORDON GRAY
TOP SECRET
GENERAL BACKGROUND
1. Staff Responsibilities Under Eisenhower:
Allen Dulles
Gray said that the structural chain of command ran directly from the
DCI to the President during the Eisenhower administration.
was able to approach Eisenhower directly, rather than through Gray.
Andrew Goodpaster staffed President Eisenhower on many of the same
subjects that Gray worked on. Gray was responsible for long-range planning;
Goodpaster was responsible for spot work. Gray said that Goodpaster and he
kept each other "intimately informed". However, Gray said that any covert
action program would go through him and not Goodpaster. "Although I would
tell Goodpaster about anything I discussed with the President." Some covert
action programs were extremely tightly held, for example, on the U-2 incident
only the following people were knowledgeable: Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and John
Eisenhower.
"I didn't live with Eisenhower 24 hours a day. I don't know everything
that he did. But I do think I knew every major decision, approval, or action
of Eisenhower's."
2. Special Group Function
At the 54/12 committee, Gray said, "I represented the President's interest,
that was my role."
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488 Page 65
Gray said that shortly after the BERLIN TUNNEL, Eisenhower said,
"I want the 54/12 committee to consider any action that impinges upon
the sovereignty of another country."
TOP SECRET
Gray said that in almost every case, a proposed covert action would
have been discussed with the State Department and would have been staffed
out before Special Group meeting. "Most of the rest of us did not have a chance
to reflect before the meeting."
Gray said that during his tenure, there was no chairman of the 54/12
(Special Group). But perhaps Merchant conducted the meetings.
Gray said that during the transition to the Kennedy administration, he
asked McGeorge Bundy to promise him that the Special Group would not be
washed out. Gray explained that the Special Group was necessary for the
protection of the President. The Special Group discussions allow the President
the chance to know in advance about actions which are potentially embarrassing
to him. The President's representative to the Group (Gray, then Bundy) has the
The President
right to object to an action and take it up with the President.
has a chance to know about everything that goes on in the Special Group, and
through his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President would
have a chance to say "no" to a proposed action. Gray said that the presence
of the Special Group would protect a President from operations such as assass-
inations.
3. "His Associate":
Initially, Gray did not recognize the phrase used by Parrott in the
Special Group minutes 'Mr. Gray's associate" or "his associates". Gray's
first reaction was that "his associates" would probably refer to members
of his NSC staff.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 66
-3-
But after seeing the minutes of the Special Group mecting of
February 17, 1960, Gray said that it was clear that in those minutes
"his associate" referred to President Eisenhower.
be
Gray said that he never used the phrase "associate", that was
Parrott's phrase. Gray was not aware the phrase was used at the time
in those minutes and couldn't, without reconstructing each minute,
He said that when he
sure it referred to the President in each case.
attended the meetings, he would refer to "the President" directly.
(Note: Since the phrase "the President" is never used in Parrott's
minutes, it is fair to assume that at least some of the references to
"Mr. Gray's associate" are euphemisms for President Eisenhower.)
NSC DOCUMENTS
Gray recalls that the President called him, and perhaps Allen Dulles,
into his office shortly after Gray's appointment and said that "no
minutes, notes, or memos of Special Group meetings are to be kept, except
by the DCI and they are to be kept in the DCI's files." Gray said that
Dulles was not present at this meeting. He knows that he would have told
Dulles shortly afterwards.
Gray did not keep personal notes of the Special Group meetings.
Although he did defy the Presidential directive in one specific instance,
by deciding to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating
to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the Presidential
Library in Abilene, Kansas.
Gray said that he never reviewed Thomas Parrott's minutes of the
Special Group. But the NSC minutes were passed to the principals at the
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 67
-4-
meeting for their review. Gray prepared the "records of action" for
the NSC, along with Jimmy Lay, Gray's assistant.
LUMUMBA
Gray said that he did not remember the August 25, 1960 meeting at
which it was reported that Gray commented that "his associates had expressed
extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action"
in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not remember
LUMUMBA's position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talking
with Eisenhower about LUMUMBA.
However, Gray does remember that "we were anti-LUMUMBA and wanted to
see him removed from his position of responsibility.".
In reference to the August 25 meeting, after he had seen the minutes
of the meeting, Gray said that "when I said 'straightforward action', certainly
assassination would be one possibility." Gray continued to say that Allen
DULLES was consistently in opposition to assassination and "he was probably
saying to me that assassination was one of the things we shouldn't do."
With reference to testimony received by the Select Committee from Robert
JOHNSON, a State Department official who was a member of the Policy Planning
Council, he said that he had no recollection of a meeting in the summer of
1960, at which President EISENHOWER ordered the assassination of LUMUMBA or
said words to that effect.
Gray said that he knows Bronson TWEEDY, but he never discussed LUMUMBA
with TWEEDY.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 68
TOP SECRET
-5-
TRUJILLO
"I am sure there was no discussion with EISENHOWER about the
assassination of TRUJILLO."
"I don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have
approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group. The
DCI should have taken a suggested course of action to the Special Group
after checking with State."
Gray said: "A high-powered weapon with a telescopic site would
connote to me that it would be used for the purpose of assassinating an
individual.'
"
CUBA
Gray said that President EISENHOWER would frequently remark at
meetings on Cuba that an operation should be planned so that it would be
carried through successfully, otherwise it should not be planned at all.
Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17,
1960, Gray said that at some point during that period of time, Allen
DULLES brought his sugar mill sabotage plan to President EISENHOWER, who
listened attentively. Afterward, the President said, "I don't think
sabotage of sugar mills will do something significant. Bring me a complete
plan." Subsequently, DULLES brought the President a four-point program:
propaganda; economic sanction%; sabotage; and the training of Cuban exiles.
GRAY said the President approved this memo.. (Note that Gray also said that he
made a memo of this meeting and subsequent meetings on Cuba.)
لا خالامان خان کالا
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 69
-6-
After the BAY OF PIGS, Gray called President EISENHOWER and
offered to show him all of the memos that Gray had prepared on Presidential
meetings on Cuba. Gray said that JOHN EISENHOWER obtained the memos and
brought them to Gettysburg. Gray and President EISENHOWER reviewed the
memos. Gray said that the President objected to the word "planning" in
reference to a Cuban invasion, on the basis that there was no actual military
planning. EISENHOWER suggested that the page should be retyped to change
the word "planning". Gray said they did retype the page.
Gray said that although in his mind and EISENHOWER's, there was no
military "planning", definitely EISENHOWER knew that Cuban exiles were being
trained for an amphibious landing in Cuba.
President EISENHOWER went so far in contingency planning, said Gray, as to
advocate to Allen DULLES the formation of a government in exile among the
Cuban community. But, Gray said, the Cubans could never settle among them-
selves who would constitute the leadership of such a government.
Referring to the minutes of Special Group meeting of August 12, 1960,
Gray remembers the presentation by Richard BISSELL of a budget for Cuban
operations over. 13 million dollars, with a heavy emphasis on paramilitary
operations. Gray said that the reference at the end of the memo to laying.
this budget before "higher authorities" for approval clearly referred to
President EISENHOWER.
Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of November 3, 1960,
at which MERCHANT asked a question about whether there had been planning "for
taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVARA," Gray said
TOP SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 70

-7-
that he did not remember the meeting. Gray acknowledged, however, that
the phrase "direct positive action" in this context "could have included
assassination." Gray said that the reaction by General CABELL that such
action would be beyond CIA capabilities, was the "usual DCI reaction".
Referring to the Special Group minutes of December 28, 1960, Gray said
that "the special meeting" mentioned therein is clearly a meeting with the President.
Gray though that this must have been the last meeting on Cuba with the
President, the purpose of which would have been to clean up the Cuba project
for the new administration. Gray said that there must have been dozens of
meetings on Cuba (all of which will be reflected in the Gray memos in Abilene).
CASTRO/GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION, PHASE I
Gray said that he was completely unaware of any conversation between
Richard BISSELL and Sheffield EDWARDS about establishing underworld contacts
for the purpose of an assassination attempt on CASTRO. Gray also said that
he was unaware of any development, within the Technical Services Division of
the CIA, of assassination devices to be used against CASTRO such as lethal cigars.
Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the
disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO.
Gray said that he knew BISSELL well, but not EDWARDS.
Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have
known about them. Gray said that if the DCI knew about such operations, "he
would have raised it at the Special Group or with me. He didn't. I think I
would have known if Allen DULLES had discussed such subjects with the President."
Gray said that it was possible that BISSELL was acting unilaterally on this
TOP SECRET
NW 50955
DocId: 32423488 Page 71
-8-
matter. Gray said that he'd talked to Andrew GOODPASTER about the recent
news stories which indicate that there was assassination planning against
CASTRO during this period of time, and GOODPASTER said that he'd never
heard about such things.
EXECUTIVE ACTION
me."
"I never heard of EXECUTIVE ACTION until David BELIN mentioned it to
ASSASSINATIONS GENERALLY
(1) When
Gray said that he remembered two mentions of assassination:
NASSAR was riding high, someone at the planning board said "we ought to bump
him off". But Gray said this was not a serious discussion. Assassination was
not an option that went to the President.
member consistently would ask the CIA "about bumping off the leadership in
Hanoi". Gray did not think this was a serious suggestion. Gray said the
member who suggested this is "well-known" and he was reluctant to provide the
name to us.
(2) At the PFIAB meetings, one
"I followed closely any covert operations I was interested in." Gray said
that "if I had known of any assassination attempt, I probably would have called"
the responsible official to stay abreast. He said he didn't know of any such
attempts.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 72
TOP SECRET
Interview Questions For Gordon Gray
TRUJILLO
1. MEMO of July 1, 1960 from J.C. King, (Chief, WHD) to Acting
DCI Rabatt recommending the delivery of arms (high-powered rifles
with telescopic scopes) to the opposition of TRUJILLO. The Memo
says that "APPROVAL FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ARMS HAS BEEN GIVEN
BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM".
-Inumthem Were there any proceedings of the Special Group at
this time which authorized delivery of arms? (We don't have
record of any authorization until January 12, 1961 S.G. Minutes)
-If not, did the DCI and Assistant Secretary of State exceed
their authority?
-Generally, what was the procedure in the Eisenhower administratior
for handling the approval of such a project?
-Could the DCI approve it under his own authority?
-Did the Assistant Secretary of State exceed his authority
gand
by not requesting a receiving approval foom the Secy of Stat
- Shouldn't the Special Group have been consulted?
2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES of 12 JANUARY 1962. GRAY was present.
The Group approves shipment of arms to "dissidents inside
the Dominican Republic".
- Do you кMEM remember this event? Are the minutes accurate?
-What was the policy behind the approval?
-Weren't the weapons intended for use in assassination?
NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 73
4
To;
Files
From: FDB
Re: NOTES ON TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON (6/18/75)
Date: 7/5/75
Biographical Background
1951-62
National Security Council staff member
1962-67
State Department, member of Policy Planning Council
Chronology of Events
Summer, 1960 Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss
developments in the CONGO. "At some time during that
discussion, President EISENHOWER said something
that came
I can no longer remember his words
across to me as an order for the assassination
of LUMUMBA... There was no discussion; the meeting
simply moved on.
"
--Johnson said he might have omitted the statement
from his de-briefing memo due to its sensitivity.
- J. said probably Allen DULLES and Gordon GRAY
were present at the meeting (in the Cabinet Room).
--The formal record of decision by the NSC is
unlikely to contain information on this subject,
he said.
--The memos which Johnson did on the meetings would
be with President Eisenhower's papers. (10)
"I was surprised *...that I would ever hear a President
say anything like this in my presence or the presence
of a group of people. I was startled."
NW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 74