2000AA
104-10306-10016
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
26 March 1963
ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE
PRESIDENT:
The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet
plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the
Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had
now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered
that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all
of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague.
McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certain
information such as the recent Brazilian intercept and report of Castro's
own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and
continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and
became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment
This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and
Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing
Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building
of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently
sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless
important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to
stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.
JAM/ji (taped)
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The President then suggested a meeting be held this
afternoon to determine a number of matters.
1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups
so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down
the operations.
2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.
3.
The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.
Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this
originated in the Bahamas.
.☑
5.
The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.
At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell,
Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon
for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigratio
idatex officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:
1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where
they are, and what can be done about them.
2.
Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami.
Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.
3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some
of this.
4. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we
intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives,
arms, etc.
5.
FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped
with DF-equipment to locate the stations.
6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from
Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown
before any attempt was made to guide the groups.
7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane
matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize
the plane.
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Excerpt from President's Press Conference --
April 3
THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is
that they did not come from the United States. We have already
indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a
useful purpose.
It seems to me in some ways they strengthen
the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba
and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might other-
wise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported
this and these men do not have a connection with the United States
Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate
the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and
who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases
the chances of freeing Cuba.
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John A. Mc Cone
CONFIDENTIAL Attachment
८
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
March 28, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE RIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTER:
Draft Letter to the President
from the Secretary regarding
the problem presented by
Cuban refuges groups
The President has called an NSC Executive Committes
Meeting for Friday, March 29 at 12:30 p.n, to discuss
the problem posed by Cuban refugee groups.
The Secretary has asked me to make available to
you the attached proposed letter from his to the Presi-
dent which will serve as a basis for discussion at
tomorrow's meeting. The letter has not yet been
signed by the Secretary but presumably will go to the
President in its present form. If any substantive
changes are made at the time of signature I shall so
inform you.
Attachment:
As stated.
William
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL Attachment
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CONFIDENTIAL
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Group I
Excluded from
automatic down-
grading and de-
classification
DRAFT LETTER
Washington
TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m.
Dear Mr. President:
I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles
may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our
national interest. Increased frequency of these forays
could raise a host of problems over which we would not
have control.
Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which
caused substantial damage to a Soviet vesse? may
complicate our relations with the USSR without net
advantage to us.
I therefore propose several measures which could
impede or deter further attacks of this nature.
First, the intelligence community could increase its
efforts in Miami to develop hard information about
projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs
authorities charged with investigation of violation of
arms control.
Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis
of this information can stop and search the vessels.
(They now do this, and picked un about 50 men and four
boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated,
and participants arraigned if a violation of law has
The President,
The White House.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
2 -
occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity
of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels
to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations
in the Miami area would be helpful.
Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami
could quietly inform suspects in the exile community
that the United States intends to intensify enforcement
of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.
Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal
radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in
connection with these raids.
Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our
plans to try to control these activities and express
our understanding that the British Government has
become increasingly concerned about the possibility
that British territory in the B-hamas may be used for
these raids and may be considering action to police
these areas more effectively.
These measures have not been discussed with any of
the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but
if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I
suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments
be called to discuss the problem.
Faithfully yours,
Dean Rusk
CONFIDENTIAL
March 28,
1963
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids
29 March 1963
1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66,
and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto
Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and
reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.
2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida
and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and
explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or
unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the
operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.
3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious
courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up
and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.
4. Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with
Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint,
are desirable. However, successful harrassment will create very
considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will
complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect
in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal
with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of
his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is
impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand
it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other
to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion
of their presence with the United States.
5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the
Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and
publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw
more public and press criticism in the United States than would result
from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government
from them through denial of both responsibility and control.
JOHN A. MCCONE
Director
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>
28
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#29
29 March 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting - 12:30 p.m. 29 March 1963
IN ATTENDANCE: All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and
others
The President raised the question of what should be our
policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my
views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary
Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized
raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they
would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships,
etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves
and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized
raids.
Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of
the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities,
etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by
utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested
we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should
disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General
outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership
of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them
from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and
Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane
that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance
thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks
on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The
Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting
them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt
the military should immediately study that which should be done to
stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized
raids.
ནནོ སཾ ཨདྡྷི
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29/23/98
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nated by DCI
#6
Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963
I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us
in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward
them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.
· The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S.
is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities.
We are
part of NATA, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not
a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.
Would like to say a word first about Cuba.
-
It was a
The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount
importance in reaching judgments both by the USSR and the US. Our big
problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war.
very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike.
In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crises
and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in
twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all
changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and
disadvantages of alternate cources of action. That is what we should do
in any other struggle with the Soviet Union
--
and I believe we will be
in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the
You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate
alternatives.
in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their
actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war.
It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should
continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.
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The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba.
Cuba might be our response in some future situation
--
--
although
the same way the
Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more
satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready
this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should
be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military,
in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba
in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible
speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had
Berlin to limit our actions.
the
98
In the matter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's
nuclear veto by French .... President Eisenhower
position.
reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by
the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement
the NATO nations
between the Three.
That decision this Administration also supported.
However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the
French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would
make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches
and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which
France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western
World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult
to deal with. ]
98
De Gaulle did not question our support of Western Europe because we
have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not.
They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a
distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France
should assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance
on the U.S.
U.S.]
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3.
98
Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been
turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany. This is not so bad
1
as it has prevented Germany moving to the East. And, historically,
Germany's trade has been to the East. There is not much harm to us
in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this
would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time.
If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will
be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a
setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to
have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe
and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By
strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases
their dependence on us. This strengthens our invluence in Europe and
gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the
past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral
concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be
difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But
we should not be wholly distressed.
98
After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed
us in many places throughout the world in NATO, in the Congo and other
98
places
--
-
but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can do
so is to strengthen the mutilateral force and NATO.
C
Our negotiators on trade matters / Hill have to be very careful to protect
our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control.
If we get down to the $12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will
be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the
Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will
98
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4.
98
Now we
We will be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain
large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient
forces but instead concentrats on agricultural production for instance to
our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present we are paying
half of Norway's air and sea power for instance and supporting NATO, and
they are "living off the fat of the land" while we are paying for their
protection. In the coming months we must concentrate on how we can
protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous
policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries.
are running out and if the French and others get atomic capacity they
will be independent and we will be on the outside looking in. Do not
think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done
a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out
very strongly for the U.S. interests.. We must be sure our economic house
is in order and use our military, policital power to protect our own interests.
Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. There is criticism about
our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. the Pakistanis
are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If
they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistannis
are struggling against the Indians and the Afganistans. They will use or
attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent.
We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used India
lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While
doing this we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer
:
to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade 7
98
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the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance thir policy on India.
These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot
do much about it - we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to
keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call
themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp.
We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not
like the leaders themselves. )
--
With regard to AID (which is going forward under General Clay, we
hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United
States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will
serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not
a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance
though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we
must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out
of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a
communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress
may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the
safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do
on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want
to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to
suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of
We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it
will best serve our own interest.
aid.
:0
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6.
98
Turning to the domestic scene,
[we
we will have a deficit of about $12
of $12 billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and
Except for Defense and Space and
we have in the past three years.
Interest on the Debt we have no increased the National Budget but it
has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration.
With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had
many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped.
We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past
ten years.
This is serious, particularly with the great increase in pop-
ulation.
98
1.
If we get another recession
I think this Tax Bill is very important.
in this country it will be have a bad effect on the gold reserve.
It will have a bad psycological effect on the people of the U.S. And when
we see the strong position that Mr. Khruschev is taking with regard to
agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy and if we just
drift, we will look very bad to other nations.
-
Furthermore, the deficit is a reflection of the fight in the hot and
cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years.
If we
go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for
the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we
will be in much better shape. All of these matters the tax program,
AID, defense, etc. are all related.]
--
98ollure
98
The Military are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with
certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a
matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a
limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more
ore 7
:
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7.
98
This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been
appropriated for Stace and Defense
Face and Defe
and perhaps we should spend more.
98 [One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to
to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe
and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two
if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for
.9% or
or three days
-
ninety days and those around us can ohly fight for two or three days,
then we should take another look.
France carries their burden abroad,
If we
but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of
the United States as well as the interests of the Free World.
grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if
that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle
is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He
can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe
and he can bank on it.]
98
Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. We might be successful here
if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the
Chicoms develop an atomic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty
in protecting Asia. If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit
the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every
effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only
the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much. We should support
Foster all we can until we see where it is going.
treaty, we will gight it through if it will help us.
If we get a successful
(On the Hill ?)]
Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously.
Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this
Administration.
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File WE
23 March 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces
22 March, 1963
-
5:30 p.m.,
ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric,
Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant,
•
Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and several others
The purpose of the meeting was to receive Ambassador
Merchant's report on his visits to the Capitals. Merchant reported
qualified success, indicating reservations by the German,
Italians and British for various reasons, the two most prominent
ones being:
a.
Problem of control;
b. Use of surface ships versus submarines.
A long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there
was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance as to the
extent of the control of the United States versus control by
European countries since it seemed to mean that control should
shape up so that missiles could not be fired without United States
clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able
to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles. However, no
country or group of countries exclusive of the United States
should be likewise able to fire them.
There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant
on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether
Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign
Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Joint Committees at this time.
The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress
at this time. Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed
to the President's directive.
It was felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be
sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to
draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a
similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion
should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election.
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SEGRETECTES ONLY
With respect to submarine versus surface ships,
McNamara restated the opinion that surface ships were better
and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in
coastal waters where several thousand ships of all types would
be operating and therefore the missile ships could not be readily
identified and attacked.
The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral
forces idea was not going to go any place; as he wound up, he
seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without
its failure being used against the United States or his administration
to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who held stricly to the
"European control" idea.
No action was required on our part. I expressed no
viewpoint at this meeting.
JAM/mfb
JOHN A. MCCONE
Director