20000A
104-10438-10237
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Page Count off-
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
INTERNAL
SE ONLY
CONDENTIAL
☐ SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O
2D0109
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
EXTENSION NO.
DATE
1542
8 April 1977
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/O
2.
3. Mr. William Wells
4.
5.
6.
7.
DDO
7E26 Hqs.
SA/DO/O
(Shepanek)
Stre
K
BIT: 4/8 Fl
8 APR 1977
MARCHETTI
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
8 April 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: All Divisions and Certain Staffs
FROM
:
Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/O
SUBJECT
DD/077.3194
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
1. Subject book was published in 1974 with 168
deleted items demanded by CIA and involved court
trial and decision. The lawyer for the authors has,
in effect, requested that a review be made of the
168 deleted items to determine which can now be
declassified and removed from the court's injunction,
particularly in view of the official disclosures
since the publication of the book. The Department of
Justice has advised that such a review is in order.
2. Since the courts decided the 168 deleted
items were properly classifiable and classified in
accordance with the appropriate Executive Order in
effect at the time of the initial classification,
including Executive Order 11652, the review at this
time must include two points:
(a). Is the item still classified under
Executive Order 11652,
(b) Has the item been placed in the public
domain by official disclosure by the United
States, such as by an official in the Executive
Branch authorized to declassify the item, or by
a report of a Congressional committee, or by
the courts.
3. Each addressee is requested to appoint a
focal point officer to review each component's
respective items which are held by this office.
This office also has the DDO documentation submitted
in support of deleting each item in 1973. These can
be reviewed by each focal point official as necessary.
13-00000
A review will also be needed of those items which
may have been cleared or released by CIA when
reviewing manuscripts submitted by other authors
since the publication of the Marchetti book. A
few items will need to be referred by some of the
components to other departments and agencies of
government for their review.
4. Please advise this office of the name of
your focal point officer by COB 11 April 1977.
Phil F. Fendig
O/SA/DO/O: SHalpern: (NAShepanekx1542)
Distribution
Orig & 1
DDO
1
C/EA
1
-
C/EUR
1 - C/LA
1 - C/FR.
-
C/NE
1
-
C/AF
1
1
1 - C/PCS
1 - C/CI
2
-
SA/DO/O
C/SE
C/DCD
C/SIA
info only
"
"
"
"
2
!
13-00000
For Sammy:
Testimony of
જ
Karry & Meyer
before the multi
National Subcommitte
in 1973 - Joan
Dick Ellist
re
Comms To Pow's
1973-today-
Radio.
-
13-00000
:
(CIA)
INS. A decking
open Testimony by INSA
Intel. before
State
DoD
FBI
with
Committe
Comino sites around
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Dick Elliot
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X76776
612!
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open Testimony
Specifics of can
pre
Fog & Meyer.
OLC and reshmory before
Math Nat Subcommitte
1973
13-00000
SUBJECT: Review of Deletions from Marchetti Book for Declassification
Request for Documents.
1. In order to review the deletions from the Marchetti book, The
Cult of Intelligence, Mr. Halpern must determine if any official of the
U.S. Government placed any of the classified material in the public
domain in open testimony before a Congressional Committee. The following
material or information is required:
a. Is there any index to public statements by senior government
officials on the subject of intelligence? Is there any index
to the Pike Committee or Church Committee testimony ?
b. Mr. Halpern would like to have copies of the open testimony
before a Congressional committee by senior officials of the
CIA,
NSA,
State Dept,
Dept of Defense,
FBI,
which deals with intelligence.
c. Any open testimony before Congressional committees by senior
U.S. officials dealing with the cutoff of AID during the
Cyprus disturbances.
d. Any testimony (open) concerning American POWS (MIA) in Vietnam
and CIA's method of communication with them.
13-00000
[ARTEL=
Hussein on
Following the disclosure that Jordan's
King Hussein had for years taken secret
payments from the CIA. NEWSWEEK'S
Arnaud de Borchgrave flew to Amman
last week for an exclusive interview with
the King. The result was what Hussein
called "my first and very last words" on
The Washington Post's revelation of the
payments and their possible impact on
chances for peace in the Middle East.
Some excerpts:
DE BORCHGRAVE: How much truth is
there in the story that appeared in The Wash-
ington Post?
!
HUSSEIN: The whole thing is ridicu-
lous and insulting. But I am prepared to
answer questions about it.
Q. Your government spokesman said the
story was a combination of "fabrication and
distortion." What has been fabricated and
what has been distorted?
A. What was fabricated in the story was
everything about funds handed over-per-
sonally for private benefit. When friend-
ly Arab countries extend aid, it has been
traditional for the checks to be made out
to the Head of State, which then are
deposited in the state budget account.
This is not an uncommon practice. All
assistance received by us is handled in
the same way. What is true is that for a
number of years, we have been offered
security and intelligence assistance,
which the government of Jordan accept-
ed gratefully.
As for the story that the CIA paid for.
the protection of my children at school-
in America, my request was made to the
State Department which kindly agreed
to ensure their security. Remember that
there have been many extremist plots
against me and my family and this was a
perfectly normal request. If Amy Carter
decided to come to school in Jordan,
we would, needless to say, be responsi-
ble for her security and would not be.
sending a bill to the U.S. Government
for an elementary courtesy and security
measure.
Q. How do you feel about President Carter
ordering the arrangement-code-named "No"
Beef" stopped?
A. We had, I promise you, never heard
anything about all this before. If the
reference is to the assistance we have
been receiving for security and intelli-
gence, then I have not been advised
about its suspension, either officially or
unofficially.
Q. The Intelligence Oversight Board set up
in February 1976 reported to President Ford a
few months later that they regarded the pay-
ments as improper and he did nothing about
it. What do you feel was improper about those
payments?
A. What is a proper way to support a
friend and ally is strictly your business,
Newsweek, March 7, 1977
His CIA Money
The subject never came up before and 1
was totally unaware that this assistance
to Jordan had come into question last
year. What is proper in some minds is
apparently improper in others. As far.
as I am concerned, anything I can get
for Jordan and my people is proper.
And five of your Presidents [Eisenhow-
er, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford]:
thought so, too.
Q. Since you say the assistance was proper
and just another form of U.S. aid; why, then,
the secrecy and method of payment?
A. If you mean the report that pay-
ments were made directly to the King:
and for his [personal] benefit and with
political conditions and obligations, this
eled against us. It was hardly coinciden-
tal that these attacks were made as the
peace offensive was picking up steam
and on the very day that Secretary
Vance arrived in Amman. It is obvious
to me that those who wish to sabotage
the
peace process-and help Israel stay
put in the occupied territories-are
even willing to engage in character
assassination of persons whose dearest
wish is for a just and durable peace.
Q. Who benefits?
A. Two quarters; One, in your own
country, that has been trying to under-
mine one of your key institutions, en-
gaged in a worldwide, struggle to try to
neutralize the actions of the KGB in its
efforts to promote Communism. The oth-
er is a powerful group that is not interest-
ed in a settlement and which also feels it
has a score to settle with Jordan. Don't
Alexandra de Borchgrave-Gamma-Liaison
Choice of targets: Jordan's King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range
is à complete fabrication. The assistance
was designed only to enhance our in-
telligence and security capabilities
period.
To us, the CIA is a part of the U.S.
Government. We have sought to acquire
know-how, equipment and new capabili
ties to defend ourselves in the face of a
worldwide battle, be it hot or cold, which
is still with us. And wherever there is an
identity of interests between our two
countries, I will continue to advocate
fruitful and mutual cooperation.
Q. What do you feel was the principal
motivation of those [sources] who contribut-
ed to the Washington Post story?
A. To undermine the credibility aud
integrity of those who are able and
willing to contribute to the forces of
peace: My people know me and I know
them and these attacks are futile in
terms of the Jordanian scene. We are.
stronger than anything that can be lev-
Newsweek, March 7, 1977
forget it was the Israeli lobby that
launched the campaign to block the
Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense sys-
tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby
failed.
Q. How much of a setback do you feel the
story has been to the peace-with-Israel
campaign?
A. I fervently hope, of course, that it
will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may
have a deleterious effect on our peace
efforts, but I plan to persevere regard-
less of attempts to sabotage a just and
durable peace.
Q. What, for example, do you feel the story
will do to your differences with the PLO and
attempts to form a joint delegation for the
Geneva talks? Is a joint delegation still a
realistic possibility?
A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this
week and the whole question of a joint
delegation is still very much in question.
The d
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13-00000
n
His CIA Money
The subject never came up before and I
was totally unaware that this assistance
to Jordan had come into question last
year. What is proper in soine minds is
apparently improper in others. As far
as I am concerned, anything I can get
for Jordan and my people is proper.
And five of your Presidents [Eisenhow-"
er, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford]:
thought so, too.
Q. Since you say the assistance was proper
and just another form of U.S. aid; why, then,
the secrecy and method of payment?
A. If you mean the report that pay-
ments were made directly to the King
and for his [personal] benefit and with
political conditions and obligations, this
eled against us. It was hardly coinciden-
tal that these attacks were made as the
peace offensive was picking up steam
and on the very day that Secretary
Vance arrived in Amman. It is obvious
to me that those who wish to sabotage
the peace process-and help Israel stay
put in the occupied territories---are
even willing to engage in character
assassination of persons whose dearest
wish is for a just and durable peace.
Q. Who benefits?
A. Two quarters: One, in your own
country, that has been trying to under-
mine one of your key institutions.en-
gaged in a worldwide struggle to try to
neutralize the actions of the KGB in its
efforts to promote Communism. The oth-
er is a powerful group that is not interest-
ed in a settlement and which also feels it
has a score to settle with Jordan. Don't
Alexandra de Borchgrave Gamma-Liaison
Choice of targets: Jordan's King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range
is à complete fabrication. The assistance
was designed, only to enhance our in-
telligence and security capabilities
period.
To us, the CIA is a part of the U.S.
Government. We have sought to acquire
know-how, equipment and new capabili-
ties to defend ourselves in the face of a
worldwide battle, be it hot or cold, which
is still with us. And wherever there is an
identity of interests between our two
countries, I will continue to advocate
fruitful and mutual cooperation.
Q. What do you feel was the principal
motivation of those [sources] who contribut-
ed to the Washington Post story?
A. To undermine the credibility an!
integrity of those who are able and
willing to contribute to the forces of
peace: My people know me and I knowe
them and these attacks are futile in
terms of the Jordanian scene. We are.
stronger than anything that can be lev-
Newsweek, March 7, 1977
forget it was the Israeli lobby that
launched the campaign to block the
Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense sys-
tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby
failed.
Q. How much of a setback do you feel the
story has been to the peace-with-Israel
campaign?
A. I fervently hope, of course, that it
will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may
have a deleterious effect on our peace
efforts, but I plan to persevere regard-
less of attempts to sabotage a just and
durable peace.
Q. What, for example, do you feel the story
will do to your differences with the PLO and
attempts to form a joint delegation for the
Geneva talks? Is a joint delegation still a
realistic possibility?
A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this
week and the whole question of a joint
delegation is still very much in question.
RREZAINO
The dialogue [interfued by the Jorda-
nian civil war'in 1970, when the PLO
was driven out of Amman] has barely
begun. To what degree political action
can be coordinated an ong us is some-
thing we will be expiosing over the next
few months. And, they hole Arab posi-
tion on this problem yet to crystallize.
i
Q. Is it your impression that the PLO is now
ready to amend its basic charter and agree to
coexist peacefully with Israel in a West Bank-
Gaza state?
A. This is the decision they must face.
But it is equally important to know what
the Israeli position will be. Why should
the PLO take such a step unilaterally?
There must be a degree of simultane-
ity Israel recognizes a West Bank-Gaza
Palestinian state and the Palestinian's
recognize Israel.
Q. Is it your intention to negotiate with the
PLO prior to Geneva a new organic link be-
tween a possible Palestinian state on the West
Bank and Jordan proper?
A. This has been suggested by many
leaders in the area as a possible con-
structive development and we certain-
ly plan to explore the possibilities.
But I must caution you against overopti-
mism. The resumption of the Geneva
conference by itself means nothing and
if it doesn't produce quick results
then there will be the danger of a
letdown, of the pendulum swinging
back and the extremists coming to the
fore again.
Q. How do you think the latest CIA story will
affect relations between Jordan and the Unit-
ed States?
A. Throughout all these years I have
been very proud of the growing strength
of the relationship with our American
friends. We identified with principles
your forefathers held dear. We built
our relations on the basis of mutual
respect, confidence and faith, and be-
yond that anything I did to cement
relations with the U.S. was based on a
deep conviction about our common ob-
jectives-stability, peace, and progress
in the Middle East..
My duty is to develop my country, its
human resources, armed forces and secu-
rity and intelligence services, to face the
tremendous threats that lie ahead. The
road is strewn with mines to sabotage the
peace process. One has just exploded in
Washington. There will be others. But
bear in mind that Jordan is not unique in
receiving such help. Israel falls into the
same category and is a far greater exam-
ple of all kinds of assistance. As far as I
, am concerned, these will be my first and
very last words ou that matter. My per-
sonal pride is a very touchy subject. And
my main concern is to preserve Jordan in
freedom.
Finally, regarding your media attacks
against a branch of your government, if ·
you choose to denude a vital arm that is
there to protect you, that is your affair,
not Jordan's.
9
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SECRET
21 April 1977
Executive Officer to the DDA
:
M. L. Latta'
Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff
SUBJECT
:
Fairways Corporation
1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys
for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168
items previously deleted by court order from the book,
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora-
tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in
this connection.
2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items
(107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respec-
tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on
all four items is that they are still classified, since they
describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an
operational support facility located in the U.S., and are
therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2)
of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive
Order 11652.
3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby
was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair-
ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there
are indications that Director Colby may have responded to
the question in a manner which could have been construed as
admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS
files contain other evidence that the matter was considered
to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when
Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair-
ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public
disclosure.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

13-00000
SECRET
4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its
response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further
on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may
have been placed in the public domain since the court
order (i.e., since February 1975).
For
5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O.
your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line
x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject
for the SA/DO/O.
2
SECRET
M. L. Latta
13-00000
• Shep reported that Tom Pack
could not do a review by country
lest reduced & 28 items
name
-
②Shep said Peck review of the 2 pritem
revealed only
one hit and that was re
Pankowsky Papers but no
released.
information was
б
21 April 77
,!
13-00000
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
✓
SECRET
ΤΟ
NAME AND ADDRESS
1 Tom Peck, FICA
2
འགའ་
3
4
сл
5
DATE
INITIALS
6
ACTION
APPROVAL
COMMENT
CONCURRENCE
Remarks:
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
FILE
PREPARE REPLY
RECOMMENDATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
INFORMATION
Request any
FIOA releases
to on
attached
any of the subjects
sheets!
This is in connection
with crash
deletions from Marchette
review of deletions
book, The Cult of Intelligence.
Info required SOONEST
(Consult with Shop or Sam Halpern, 9588,
-any questions or bits.")
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDIR
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
NA SHEPANEK ×1542
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
21ap+77
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
1-67
FORM NO. 237
Use previous editions
USGPO: 1976-202-953
(40)
13-00000
RTV
2. SHAH (IRAN)
3. HUSSEIN
4 INDIA
5 INDIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
6. NANDA DEVI
7 DALAI LAMA
8 CHIANG CHENG-KNO
.9. TAIWAN
10
CHIANG KAI-SHEK
SORBONNE
12 TIBET
13. TIBETANS
14
CAMP HALE, COLORADO
15 CAMBODIA
8
PDIAN
SIHANOUK
VIETNAMESE
INTELLfcence
"SERVICE
CONFEDERATION OF LABOR
16
17
18
19
TRAN NEOC
BUU
20
THIEV
21
22
PENKOVSKY PAPERS
OLEG PENKOVSKY
123 GEUREY. POKROVSKY
24 DAVID
MURPHY
25 NTS (NATIONAL ALLIANCE
OF SOLIDARISTS)
13-00000
•26 ISRAEL
27 ISRAEL
-2-
INTELLIGENCE, SERVICE
28 AFRICAN FORUM
29
AFRICA REPORT
30
KENYATTA
31. MOBUTU
32 RitoDESIA
33 Ritz DESIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
34 SOUTH AFRICA
35 SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE
36 WILLY BRANDT
SERVICE
37 CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, GERMANY.
!
38 SOCIAL: DEMOCRATS
39 SOCIALISTS, GERMANY
GERMANY.
FRANCE OF OUVRIERE
E
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, ITALY
40
LA
41
42 MAKARIOS
43
CYPRUS
44
GREECE
45
GREEK
INTELLIGENCE
46
NORWAY
47
SERVICE
NOR WEEFAN INTELLIGENCE
48 FRANCE
49
FRENCH
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
SERVICE.
50 WEST GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMA
13-00000
51 WEST
GERMAN
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
52 JAPAN
53
JAPANESE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
54. ITALY
55. ITALIAN
STELL
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
56
GREAT BRITAIN
57
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
58 CANADA
59
60.
CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE
AUSTRALIA
SERVICE
61
AUSTRALIAN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
62 NEW ZEALAND
6.3
NEW
ZEALAND
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
.64
FRANKFURT
65
ATHENS
66
MUNICH
67
BERLIN
68
HAMBURG
69
London
70
PARIS
71
72.
BrLIVIA
BOLIVIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
73 BRAZIL
74 BRAZILIAN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE
13-00000
75 KENYA
-4
76
KENYAN
INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE.
77 Jordan
78
JORDANIAN
IN TELLIGENCE
SERVICE
79
PANAMA
.80
81
PANAMANIAN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
FORBES BURNHAM
82
MEXICO
83
MEXICAN INTELLI
IGENCE SERVICE
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
FROM:
Acting Chief, Latin America
Division
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
SA/DO/O
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8..
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
DATE
21 April 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SA/DO/O
FROM
:
SUBJECT
22 APR 1977
:
George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
REFERENCE .
:
SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977
The following are the LA Division comments on the
review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.
Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR
Item 3a, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 3b, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
· Item 5, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 11, page 15, Chile
Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180
13-00000
..
SECRET
Item 29, page 49, Guyana
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3
Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 89, page 106, Cuba P.139.
Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177; Senate Select
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders
Item 201, page 222, Brazil
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2
Item 261, page 338, Panama
Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI
Item 292, page 420, Chile
Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 307, page 468, Cuba
8.139.
Declassified. Footnote 1,
Senate Select
(?)
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders
Item 317, page 468, Chile
Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2).
There
is no record that the intelligence report on which this
item was based has been declassified.
Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)
There has never been official acknowledgement by either
the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.
2
SECRET

13-00000
SECRET
Item 338, page 508, Chile
Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile
1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not
been officially acknowledged and is classified information.
Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's
book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.
Page 209 of The Night Watch concerns CIA in Bolivia.
3
SECRET
Я соці
Lowon
George V. Lauder
13-00000
SECRET
22 APR 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SA/DO/O
FROM
:
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
:
George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division
: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977
The following are the LA Division comments on the
review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book. .
Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR
Item 3a, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 3b, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Seleet Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 5, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 11, page 15, Chile
Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180
13-00000
SECRET
Item 29, page 49, Guyana
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3
Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 89, page 106, Cuba 8.13918
Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders
Item 201, page 222, Brazil
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2
Item 261, page 338, Panama
Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI
Item 292, page 420, Chile
Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 307, page 4, Cuba
Declassified. Footnote-
139 of 177, Senate Select
page
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders
Item 317, page 468, Chile.
Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There
is no record that the intelligence report on which this
item was based has been declassified.
Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)
There has never been official acknowledgement by either
the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.
2
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
Item 338, page 508, Chile
Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile
1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
'
Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not
been officially acknowledged and is classified information.
Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's
book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.
Page 209 of The Night Watch concerns CIA in Bolivia.
3
SECRET
/s/ George V. Lauder
George V. Lauder
13-00000
1
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
C/CCS
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
C/AF
3 B 21
Attn:
Hqs.
Ed Foy
2.
3.
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
✓ SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
EXTENSION NO.
GH-56
Hqs.
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED FORWARDED
C/EUR
4 B 4405 Hqs
Attn: Wm. Phelps
5.
C/LA
3 C 2019 Hqs.
6.
Attn: Wm. Sturbitts
7.
C/NE
6 D 3107 Hqs.
8.
Attn: George Walsh
9.
10.
C/CA
3 D 0004 Hqs.
Attn: Susan Watkins
11.
SA/DO/O
2 D 0109
Hqs.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
9164
5407
DATE
7
21 APR 1977.
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
HAND CARRY
22 22
кро
CALL
22
Arfow
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SA/DO/O
FROM
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
SECRET
21 APR 1977
: Erich W. Isenstead
:
Chief, Central Cover Staff
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject
1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its
files and effected coordination with interested components
on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
Results are described below.
2. It has been determined that the following items
continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt
from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
by paragraph citations in brackets:
a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-
ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B) (2), (B) (3)]
b. Item 48, page 71a -- BERLINER VEREIN.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division con-
firms the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.
C.
--
Item 48, page 71a AFRICAN FORUM.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms
the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.
--
d. Item 48, page 71a
Classified SECRET; describes
and methods as related to
tions. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
AFRICA REPORT.
intelligence sources
several magazine publica-
AF Division advises that
CA Staff
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089
13-00000
:
SECRET
the African American Institute, which published Africa
Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries
in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
pg. 263.
However, the Report gave as its source for
the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and
Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be con-
sidered official Government disclosure of Agency, sponsor-
ship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need
for continued classification and will comment separately.
e. Item 48, page 71a PREUVES. Classified SECRET%;B
describes intelligence sources and methods as related to
several magazine publications. [Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE:
CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification
and will comment separately.
fi
--
Item 48, page 71a
--
ENCOUNTER. Classified
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as
related to several magazine publications. [Section
5 (B) (2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con-
tinued classification and will comment separately.
--
g. Item 48, page 71a FORUM. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related
to several magazine publications. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
cation and will comment separately.
--
AXEL SPRINGER. Classified
h. Item 50, page 72
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of
operations based in Germany. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
NOTE:
EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-
tion and will comment separately.
--
i. Item 51, page 72 --
FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5 (B)
(2)]
j.
--
Item 55, page 80 RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]
k. Item 56, page 81
--
RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt.
[Section 5(B) (2)]
-2-
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
1.
Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,
133, and 403 respectively FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and
methods by identifying an operational support facility
located in the U.S. [Section 5 (B) (2)] According to
CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but
there are indications that the DCI may have responded
to the question in a manner which could have been con-
strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA
sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified
as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air
Advisor confirms the need for continued classification
and will comment separately.
m. Item 130, page 133 PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
(NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence
sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria.
[Section 5 (B) (2)]
n. Item 130, page 133 SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section
5 (B) (2)]
0. Item 226, page 257 GRACE SHIPPING LINES.
Classified SECRET%; describes intelligence sources and
methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-
mercial company. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
Item 278, page 400
SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC.
SCHOOLS
--
INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE
Referred to in the manuscript
as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency
diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)".
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods exposing an operation which provided cover.
[Section 5(B) (2)]
Item 280, page 404
--
RTV.
q.
Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]
-3-
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
...
3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET
because they described sources and methods in identifying a
support base located in the United States, but are now con-
sidered to have been placed in the public domain.
Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 -
INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation,
Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,
and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.
4. The following items fall into the questionable area
as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
authorized Government officials:
--
a. Item 49, page 71a ROME DAILY AMERICAN.
Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence
sources and methods as related to several newspaper
publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip
from the September and October 1974 edition of the
Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.
Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious
Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,
now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the
purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the
CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical'
of what the Agency was doing, a bad example"." It is
questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who
left the Agency long before that, can be considered
as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
information.
--
b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 FORUM
WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe
intelligence sources and methods and identification of
operations based in England. Forum World Features was
referred to but not by name in Book I of the Senate
Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:
"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout':
involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed
to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two
-4-
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
"
press services. It may be argued that although Forum
World Features continues to be protected to a degree
by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-
closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place
and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject
in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff
confirm the need for continued classification and will
comment separately.
CC:
C/AF
C/EUR
C/LA
C/NE
C/CA
CONCUR:
Book W..
Broch
ん
ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, AF Division
W s
Chief, EUR Division
Chief, LA
for
for a Walsh
- Chief, NE Division
Chief,
Staff
220677
Date
22 Apr77
Date
VVAPR. 77
Date
April 22, 1977
Date
22 Ju1117
Date
-5-
SECRET

13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
FROM
SUBJECT
:
REFERENCE
SECRET
21 APR 1977
:
Brich W.
Isenstead
Chief, Central Cover Staff
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.
By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
fr SA/DO/0, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject
1.
Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its
files and effected coordination with interested components
on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
Results are described below.
2. It has been determined that the following items
continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt
from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
by paragraph citations in brackets:
a. Item 24, page 47
--
RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-
ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B) (3)|
--
b. Item 48, page 71a BERLINER VEREIN.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5 (B) (2)] NOTE: BUR Division con-
firms the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.
-->
AFRICAN FORÙM.
C. Item 48, page 71a
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5 (B) (2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms
the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.
d. Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORT.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] AF-Division advises that
CAStaff
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
EZ IMPDET
CL BY 026089
13-00000
:
SECRET
The African American Institute, which published Africa
Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries
in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
pg. 263.
However, the Report gave as its source for
the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and
Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be con-
sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor-
ship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need
for continued classification and will comment separately.
Item 48, page 71a PREUVES. Classified SBCRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related to
several magazine publications. [Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE:
CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification
and will comment separately.
- -
-4
f. Item 48, page 71a ENCOUNTER. Classified
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as
related to several magazine publications. [Section
5(B) (2)]. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con-
tinued classification and will comment separately.
g. Item 48, page 71a FORUM. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related
tosseveral magazine publications. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
cation and will comment separately.
h. Item 50, page 72
NOTE:
AXEL SPRINGER. Classified
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of
operations based in Germany. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
BUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-
tion and will comment separately.
--
i. Item 51, page 72 FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
Classified SECRÉT; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(B)
(2)]
--
J. Item 55, page 80 RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]
k. Item 56, page 81 RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
-2-
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET!
1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,
133, and 403 respectively FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods by identifying an operational support facility
located in the U.S. [Section 5 (B) (2)] According to
CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but
there are indications that the DCI may have responded
to the question in a manner which could have been con-
strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA
sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified
as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air
Advisor confirms the need for continued classification
and will comment separately.
--
PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
m. Item 130, page 133
(NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence
sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria.
[Section $(B) (2)]
n. Item 130, page 133 SAPARI AIR SERVICE LTD.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section
5(B) (3)]
0. Item 226, page 257 GRACE SHIPPING LINES.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-
mercial company. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
--
p. Item 278, page 400 INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE
SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript
as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency
diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)".
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods exposing an operation which provided cover.
[Section 5(B) (2)]
Classified SECRET;
.. Item 280, page 404 RTV.
describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]
-3-
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET
because they described sources and methods in identifying a
support base located in the United States, but are now con-
sidered to have beenpplaced in the public domain.
--
Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129, and 130
INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation,
Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,
and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.
4. The following items fall into the questionable area
as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
authorized Government officials:
ROME DAILY AMERICAN.
a. Item 49, page 71a
Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence
sources and methods as related to several newspaper
publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip
from the September and October 1974 edition of the
Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.
Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious
Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,
now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the
purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the
CIA. [Bross recently called the arrangement 'atypical'
of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'.” It is
questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who
left the Agency long before that, can be considered as
as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
information.
--
--
--
b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 FORUM
WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe
intelligence sources and methods and identification of
operations based in England. Forum World Features was
referred to but not by name in Book I of the Senate
Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:
"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] "fallout'
involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
tained in Europe
the larger of the two was subscribed
to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two
-4-
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
press services." It may be argued that although Forum
World Features continues to be protected to a degree
by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-
closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place
and depending on how it was handled, praced the subject
in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff
confirm the need for continued classification and will
comment separately.
ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
CC:
C/AF
C/EUR
C/LA
C/NE
C/CA
CONCUR:
ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, AF Division
Date
Chief, EUR Division
Date
Chief, LA Division
Date
Chief, NE Division
Date
Chief, CA Staff
.5
SECRET
Date
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SA/DO/O
FROM
:
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
22 APR 1977
:
George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977
The following are the LA Division comments on the
review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.
Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR
Item 3a, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 3b, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 5, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
.
Item 11, page 15, Chile
Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180
13-00000
SECRET
Item 29, page 49, Guyana
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3
Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 89, page 106, Cuba
Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders
Item 201, page 222, Brazil
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2
Item 261, page 338, Panama
Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI
· Item 292, page 420, Chile
Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 307, page 468, Cuba
Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders
Item 317, page 468, Chile
Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There
is no record that the intelligence report on which this
item was based has been declassified.
Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)
There has never been official acknowledgement by either
the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.
2
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
Item 338, page 508, Chile
Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile
1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not
been officially acknowledged and is classified information.
Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's
book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.
Page 209 of The Night Watch concerns CIA in Bolivia.
3
SECRET
George V. Lauder
13-00000
SECRET
21 APR 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
SA/DO/O
: Erich W. Isenstead
:
Chief, Central Cover Staff
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject
1.
Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its
files and effected coordination with interested components
on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
Results are described below.
2. It has been determined that the following items
continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt
from the E.O. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
by paragraph citations in brackets:
a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-
ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B)(3)]·
b. Item 48, page 71a
--
BERLINER VEREIN.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B) (2)] NOTE: EUR Division con-
firms the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.
c. Item 48, page 71a
--
AFRICAN FORUM.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5 (B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms
the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.
d. Item 48, page 71a -- AFRICA REPORT.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B) (2)] AF Division advises that
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INGELEGENCE SOURCES
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089
13-00000
SECRET
ว
the African American Institute, which published Africa
Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries
in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for
the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and
Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be con-
sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor-
ship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need
for continued classification and will comment separately.
e. Item 48, page 71a PREUVES. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related to
several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:
CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification
and will comment separately.
--
--
f. Item 48, page 71a ENCOUNTER. Classified
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as
related to several magazine publications. [Section
5 (B) (2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con-
tinued classification and will comment separately.
--
g. Item 48, page 71a FORUM. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related
to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B) (2)]
NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
cation and will comment separately.
--
AXEL SPRINGER.
Classified
h. Item 50, page 72
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of
operations based in Germany. [Section 5 (B)(2)]
NOTE:
EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-
tion and will comment separately.
i. Item 51, page 72
--
FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
Classified SECRET%; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(B)
(2)]
--
j. Item 55, page 80 RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]
k. Item 56, page 81
--
RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]
-2-
SECRET

13-00000
:
:
SECRET
--
1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,
133, and 403 respectively FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and
methods by identifying an operational support facility
located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to
CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but
there are indications that the DCI may have responded
to the question in a manner which could have been con-
strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA
sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified
as recently as December 1976.
The DDA/Air
Advisor confirms the need for continued classification
and will comment separately.
--
NOTE:
PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
m. Item 130, page 133
(NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence
sources and methods of operations based in Nigeria.
[Section 5 (B) (2)]
n. Item 130, page 133
--
SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section
5(B) (2)]
0. Item 226, page 257 GRACE SHIPPING LINES.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-
mercial company. [Section 5 (B) (2)]
p. Item 278, page 400 INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE
SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript
as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency
diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)".
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods exposing an operation which provided cover.
[Section 5 (B) (2)]
--
RTV.
Classified SECRET;
զ. Item 280, page 404
describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]
-3-
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET
because they described sources and methods in identifying a
support base located in the United States, but are now con-
sidered to have been placed in the public domain.
Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130
INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation,
Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,
and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.
4. The following items fall into the questionable area
as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
authorized Government officials:
+
--
a. Item 49, page 71a ROME DAILY AMERICAN.
Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence
sources and methods as related to several newspaper
publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip
from the September and October 1974 edition of the
Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.
Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious
Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,
now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the
purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the
CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement 'atypical'
of what the Agency was doing, a bad example'.' It is
questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who
left the Agency long before that, can be considered
as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
information.
---
--
"
--
b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 FORUM
WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe
intelligence sources and methods and identification of
operations based in England. Forum World Features was
referred to - but not by name in Book I of the Senate
Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:
"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout'
involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed
to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two
-4-
SECRET,
13-00000
SECRET
press services." It may be argued that although Forum
World Features continues to be protected to a degree
by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-
closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place
and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject
in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff
confirm the need for continued classification and will
comment separately.
Kusch
2.
CC:
C/AF
C/EUR
C/LA
C/NE
C/CA
CONCUR:
ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
Chief, AF Division
Date
Chief, EUR Division
Date
Chief, LA Division
Date
Chief, NE Division
Date
Chief, CA Staff
-5-
SECRET
Date
13-00000
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SECRET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks
Alyson Ward
SIA/I
"alw
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
EXTENSION
NO.
6343
1602
DATE
FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
22 April 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
DATE
RECEIVED
1.
C/SIA/I
2.
22
арг
W
3.
C/SIA
22 APR 1977
s
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
SA/DDO/O
2D0109 Hqs.
FORM 610
3-62
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
22 April 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight
: Chief, Staff for International Activities
VIA
FROM
:
Robert D. Wiecha
Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
:
: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from
Mr. Fendig, same subject
1. This office has reviewed the five items concerning
Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has
determined that all items are still not releasable for the
following reasons:
a. Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon
Weimar, the CIA's liaison contact in the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified
"SECRET" under Executive Order (E.O.) 11652, Section
5(B)(2)(intelligence sources and methods).
b. Item 197, page 218: This item is still
classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5
(B) (1) (foreign liaison) and (2).
C. Item 198, page 219: This item is still
classified "TOP SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5
(B)(2).
d. Item 224, page 252: This item is still
classified "TOP SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5
(B)(2).
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059748
13-00000
e. Item 256, page 329: This item is still
classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5
(B) (1) and (2).
2.
Any questions regarding this memorandum should be
directed to Alyson Ward, SIA/I, extension 1602.
-2-
aurecha
Robert D. Wiecha
:
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRET
22 April 1977
Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight
: Chief, Staff for International Activities
VIA
FROM
:
Robert D. Wiecha
Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch
SUBJECT
:
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
REFERENCE
:
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from
Mr. Fendig, same subject
1. This office has reviewed the five items concerning
Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has
determined that all items are still not releasable for the
following reasons:
a.
Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon
Weimar, the CIA's liaison contact in the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified
"SECRET" under Executive Order (E.O.) 11652, Section
5(B) (2) (intelligence sources and methods).
b. Item 197, page 218: This item is still
classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5
(B) (1) (foreign liaison) and (2).
C. Item 198, page 219: This item is still
classified "TOP SECRET" under B.O. 11652, Section 5
(B) (2).
d. Item 224, page 252: This item is still
classified"TOP SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5
(B) (2).
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059748
13-00000
SECRET
Item 256, page 329: This item is still
classified "SECRET" under E.O. 11652, Section 5
(B) (1) and (2).
2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be
directed to Alyson Ward, SIA/I, extension 1602.
-2-
SECRET
Robert D. Wiecha
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Addendum to LA Division Memorandum dtd 22 April 1977
George V. Lauder
Acting Chief
Latin America Division
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
1039
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
SA/DO/O
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
610 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
26 APR 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SA/DO/O
FROM
:
George V. Lauder
SUBJECT
:
Acting Chief, Latin America Division
Addendum to LA Division Memorandum
Dated 22 April 1977
1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State,
INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and
item 337 page 509 are still classified.
2. Item 19 page 14, Chile
"
According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL
lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and
line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry' through line 29 continue
to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee"
through line 24 ending "the covert action programs. has been
declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170,
190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7
Covert Action.
3.
Item 10 page 15 Chile
Line 1 through "his nominal superior" and line 2
beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified
according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through
11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of
Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.
4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T.
Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour
Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.
...
Lauder
George V. Lauder
SECRET
πλ
E. IMPORT CL BY 12/80

13-00000
SECRET
26 APR 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
:
SUBJECT
:
SA/DO/O
. George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division
Addendum to LA Division Memorandum
Dated 22 April 1977
1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State,
INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and
item 337 page 509 are still classified.
.2.
Item 19 page 14, Chile
According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL
lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and
line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry" through line 29 continue
to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee"
through line 24 ending "the covert action programs. " has been
The substance can be found on pages 166-170,
190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7
Covert Action.
declassified.
3.
Item 10 page 15 Chile
Line 1 through "his nominal superior" and line 2
beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified
according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through
11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of
Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.
4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T.
Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour
Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.
/s/ George V. Lauder
George V. Lauder
SECRET
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Marchetti-Marks Manuscript
EXTENSION
NO.
FROM:
C/CAS
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
SA/DO/O
2.
Sam
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
DATE
25 April 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
FORM
3-62
610 EDITIONS
USE PREVIOUS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SA/DO/O
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
SECRET
85 APR 1977
Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Staff
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
Memo for All Divisions and Certain Staffs,
from SA/DO/0, 8 April 1977, same subject
Following are Covert Action Staff comments on items
24, 48, 54, 55, 56, 236, and 280, which are among the
passages containing classified information that were de-
leted before publication of the Marchetti-Marks manuscript:
a) Items 24 (p. 47), 55 (p. 80), 56 (p. 81),
and 280 (p. 404) are classified secret, and are
exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2) of
EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and
methods of operation. Specifically, these items
name RTV, Inc. and describe it as a CIA proprietary
that was used for clandestine operations in a variety
of countries. In addition, items 55 and 56 are
especially sensitive because they describe an opera-
tion in Jordan, exposure of which could be harmful to
United States relations in the Middle East (Section
5 b 3).
b)
Items 54 and 236 (on p. 80 and p. 262) are
classified secret, and are exempt from publication
under Section (5) (b) (2) of EO 11652, which protects
intelligence sources and methods of operation. These
items name Forum World Features, describe it as a CIA
proprietary that was used for clandestine propaganda
operations, specify that the clandestine operations
were directed especially at the Third World, and further
specify that the man who ran FWF was an experienced
CIA operator. It may be worth noting that the Senate
Select Committee declined to publish the name of this
clandestine proprietary when the Agency advised the
Committee that publication would damage the former
director of Forum World Features, who had entered into
a clandestine relationship with the U.S. Government in
good faith.
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
c) Item 48 (p. 71a) is classified secret, and
is exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2)
of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and
methods of operation. This item names African Forum,
Africa Report, Preuves, Encounter, and Forum as
magazines that received CIA subsidies. In the case
of Preuves, Encounter, and Forum, these magazines were
published by the former Congress for Cultural Freedom.
The Government has not acknowledged covertly subsidizing
CCF or its magazines, although Encounter magazine's
ties to CIA have been the subject of press speculation.
Preuves magazine has been the subject of little or no
press speculation, as far as we know, and it is our
understanding that French laws prohibit covert foreign
subsidies to French publications, which makes it
especially important to protect the former CIA tie to
that magazine. Exposure of the two Africa magazines
would be damaging to a number of prominent people and
organizations in this country and in Africa that have
worked for improved social conditions in Africa and for
good relations between this country and Africa, which
would be harmful to this country's relations with Africa.
(Section 5 b 3)
Donald
Purcel
SECRET
13-00000
☐ . UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Richard S. Sampson
Chief, European Division
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
SA/DO/O
05-7
2.
(DX-6)
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
DATE
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
EXTENSION NO.
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
May
DATE
25 APR 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
FROM:
External Oversight
Richard S. Sampson
Chief, European Division
SUBJECT:
Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:
Review of Deletions
1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed
the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the
original manuscript because of the Agency position they were
classified information. We can find only one instance in
which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has
placed any of these references in the public domain since
first publication of the book. The specific references are
listed below, together with the grounds for classification
and the components who have been consulted.
2. References which European Division believes are
still classified and should remain so are:
Name/Cite # /Page
E.O. 11652
Exemption Category
Coordination
Alex Springer (%2350, p 72)
5 (b) 2
EUR/G
Rome Daily American (#49,
p 71a)
:
5 (b) 2
CCS, EUR/Italy
Magazines: Preuves, Forum
(#2348, p 71a)
5 (b) 2
CA
:
Encounter (%2348%, p 71a)
See note
Forum World Features
(#54, #256, p 80, p 262)
5 (b) 2
CA, EUR/BC
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283
13-00000
SECRET
Name/Cite #/Page
LCPIPIT (#3334, 335, 336,
p 483-4)
E.O. 11652
Exemption Category Coordination
5 (b) 3
CA
Bases in Germany (%23234,
P 262)
5 (b) 3
EUR/G, CCS
Release of Satellite
photos to British (%2362,
p 86)
5 (b) 2
EUR/BC
Liaison relations
CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7,
p 215, 6, 8) (%23308, p 437)
5 (b) 2
EUR/BC
Liaison, others (%23196, 225,
333, p 217, 253, 483)
5 (b) 2
AF
MAKARIOS, Base rental
deal (#23296, 298, 300
p 425, 426)
5 (b) 1
EUR/CGT
Political subsidies: SPD, CDU,
Italy (#2321, 273, p 45, 380)
!
5 (b) 3
EUR/Italy
Willy Brandt (%2318 - 20, 28, 52,
p 42-45, 48, 77)
5 (b) 2
EUR/G
CA Staff
лывить
рада
says No.
NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds
were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural
Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.
R.S.Sup
Richard S. Sampson
-2-
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
FROM:
SUBJECT:
External Oversight
Richard S. Sampson
Chief, European Division
Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:
Review of Deletions
25 APR 1977
1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed
the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the
original manuscript because of the Agency position they were
classified information. We can find only one instance in
which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has
placed any of these references in the public domain since
first publication of the book. The specific references are
listed below, together with the grounds for classification
and the components who have been consulted.
2.
References which European Division believes are
still classified and should remain so are:
Name/Cite # /Page
E.O. 11652
Exemption Category
Coordination
Alex Springer (%2350, p 72)
5 (b) 2
EUR/G
Rome Daily American (#2349,
p 71a)
5 (b) 2-
CCS, EUR/Italy
Magazines: Preuves, Forum
(#2348, p 71a)
5 (b) 2
CA
See note
Encounter (%2348, p 71a)
Forum World Features
(#54, #256, p 80, p 262)
5 (b) 2
CA, EUR/BC
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283
13-00000
OLVALI
Name/Cite # /Page
LCPIPIT (%334, 335, 336,
p 483-4)
E.O. 11652
Exemption Category Coordination
5 (b) 3
CA
Bases in Germany (#23234,
p 262)
5 (b) 3
EUR/G, CCS
Release of Satellite
photos to British (%2362,
p 86)
5 (b) 2
EUR/BC
Liaison relations
CANUKUS (%194, 5, 7,
p 215, 6, 8) (%23308, p 437) ·
5 (b) 2
EUR/BC
Liaison, others (%23196, 225,
333, p 217, 253, 483)
5 (b) 2
AF
MAKARIOS, Base rental
deal (%23296, 298, 300
p 425, 426)
5 (b) 1
EUR/CGT
Political subsidies: SPD, CDU,
Italy (#21, 273, p 45, 380)
5 (b) 3
EUR/Italy
Willy Brandt (%2318 - 20, 28, 52,
p 42-45, 48, 77)
˚5 (b) 2
EUR/G
JApril 77
CAStaff
NOTE:
CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds
mem were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural
Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.
Rays
NO.
DDO/EUR/FP/FC:William Phelps:kdh
Distribution:
Orig & 1 Addressee
R.S.Soup
Richard S. Sampson
(25 April 77) (x1872)
1
-
C/EUR
1 - E/FP/FC
-2-
SECRET
13-00000
:
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
SE/OSG
5B4806
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
SA/DO/O
2D0109
2.
"Mr. Halpern
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
CONFIDENTIAL
☐ SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
RECEIVED
DATE
FORWARDED
EXTENSION
NO.
1705
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
тол
DATE
26 April 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Sani
This takes care
of
of SE. Onl
ONE to go.
Only
Slep
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000
SECRET
26 APR 1977
2
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight
FROM
:
George T. Kalaris
Chief, Soviet/East European Division
SUBJECT
:
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
REFERENCE
: Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
dated 8 April 1977
1. We have reviewed the seven items relating to
SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974
from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence, againt official disclosures and have
determined that with one exception, the items are still
properly classified under Executive Order 11652:
A.
Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains
classified SECRET. It describes intelligence
sources and methods of operations directed
against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from
the General Declassification Schedule of
Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).
B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating to
the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET.
They describe intelligence sources and methods
of an operation directed against the Soviet Union.
They are exempt from the General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption
category 5B(3).
C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the
AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They
describe intelligence sources and methods of an
operation based in Tokyo directed against the
Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under
cover.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014652
13-00000
!
SECRET
Item No. 57. This item
Marchetti and Marks wrote
2. The one item excepted is
relates to the Penkovskiy Papers.
in their manuscript: "One of the CIA's most famous venture
(sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic).
This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin
appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal
of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky." The Penkovskiy
Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Book I, page 194, dated 26 April 1976, as follows:
"Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was
published in the United States in 1965 'for
operational reasons', but actually became commer-
cially viable. The book was prepared and written
by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case
materials. Publication rights to the manuscript
were sold to a publisher through a trust fund
which was established for the purpose. The publisher
was unaware of any U.S. Government interest.
"
3. In view of this published statement by the Senate
Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public
domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can
no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.
малала
George T. Kalaris
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
20 APR 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
:
Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight
George T. Kalaris
Chief, Soviet/East European Division
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
dated 8 April 1977
1.
We have reviewed the seven items relating to
SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974
from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence, againt official disclosures and have
determined that with one exception, the items are still
properly classified under Executive Order 11652:
A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains
classified SECRET. It describes intelligence
sources and methods of operations directed
against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from
the General Declassification Schedule of
Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).
B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating to
the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET.
They describe intelligence sources and methods
of an operation directed against the Soviet Union.
They are exempt from the General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption
category 5B(3).
C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the
AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They
describe intelligence sources and methods of an
operation based in Tokyo directed against the
Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under
cover.
WARNING NOTICE
-
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED
SECRET
E2 IMPDET .
CL BY 014652
13-00000
SECRET
2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57. This item
relates to the Penkovskiy Papers. Marchetti and Marks wrote
in their manuscript: "One of the CIA's most famous venture
(sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic)..
This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin
appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal
of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky.' The Penkovskiy
Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Book I, page 194, dated 26 April 1976, as follows:
1
"
"Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was
published in the United States in 1965 for
operational reasons', but actually became commer-
cially viable. The book was prepared and written
by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case
materials. Publication rights to the manuscript
were sold to a publisher through a trust fund
which was established for the purpose. The publisher
was unaware of any U.S. Government interest.
3.
In view of this published statement by the Senate
Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public
domain by official disclosure by the United States.
It can
no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.
George T. Kalaris
DDO/SE: JDKenney (x1705 26 April 1977) clh
Distribution:
Orig & 1
Addressee
1
-
SE/RAO
1
SE/CI
2
-
SE/OSG
SECRET
13-00000
I...
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Memorandum
CONFIDENTIAL
☑
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
FROM:
EXTENSION NO.
NE/COPS
-
Samuel H. Rickard
R-1188
DATE 27
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED FORWARDED
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
SA/DO/O
Attn: Mr. P. Fendig
Room: 2D 01.09
FORM
3-62
610
Tube: DX-6
April 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS ☑ SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ATTENTION
FROM
SA/DO/O
SECRET
:
Mr. Philip F. Fendig
:
Samuel H. Rickard
27 APR 1977
not.
public
domain
me there
SUBJECT
:
Chief of Operations, NE Division
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by
Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
1. The following deleted items in subject book have been
placed in the public domain as cited below:
a.
Item 72, page 97: This item, which was placed in
has been the public domain in Harry Rositzke's book, The CIA's Secret
no official Operations,
public
8.5521s
a reprint
of a
articleby
Braden
Tomi
and mange
on pages 173 and 174, is a problem area. The author
of this book is a former senior CIA officer who allowed the
Agency to review his manuscript prior to publication. However,
CIA did not approve the manuscript for publication and, there-
fore, in our view Item 72 remains classified under Executive
Order 11652 under Exemption 5B (2).
b. Item 152, page 165 and Item 28, page 48: These
two items also fall in a problem area. The following references
to CIA's special relationship with the Shah of Iran imply, but
do not specifically state, that such a relationship exists. See
Book 1 of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, page 552, and Ray S.
Cline's book entitled, Secrets, Spies and Scholars; Blueprint
of the Essential CIA, pages 131 and 132. Additionally, though
Mr. Cline, a former senior CIA officer, allowed the Agency to
Therefore, in our view Items
*152 and 28 remain classified under Executive Order 11652 under
Exemption 5B (2).
the official review his manuscript prior to publication, CIA did not approve
ngint
Commutter
бу
the manuscript for publication."
2. The following items remain classified under Executive
Order 11652:
SENSITIVE
AND
Item
Manuscript Page
55
80
24
47
56
81
280
404
152
165
NOTICE
SOURCES
SECRET
Exemption
5B (2)
5B (2)
5B (2)
5B (2)
5B (2)
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056382
13-00000
SPORET
Item
23
22
227
M23
Manuscript Page
46
46
Exemption
5B (2)
5B (2) (3)
5B (2)
73
97
172
189
5B (2)
74
98
331
482
332
482
160
182
224
252
159
181
160
182
.5B (2)
5B (2) (3)
5B (2) (3)
5B (2)
5B (2)
5B (2) (3)
5B (2)
161
183
5B (2)
162
184
5B (2)
2
Samuel H. Rickard
SECRET
13-00000
22 April 77-
Talked to Foy rememo:
a) conection of para 3: item 41 page 65 not pby
(b)
رندی
Church
item 339, page 509: review mention of Congo
in item 339; Congo revealed
Connte " Alleged Assassination Plot"
c) para y
: to check with States NSC
2
in
дат
comment at
Monday to get no objection
least, of pomble get full covidination
27 April 77
Congo item 339.
a) Received AF comment on
incorporated into drepty report
may)
cm
para y
+
b) Ed Foy has USC coordination
will get statis on Monday after stats officer
Stater
returns from TDY.
13-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Marchetti/Marks Book
FROM:
EXTENSION NO.
Chief, Africa/Plans
1326
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
SA/DO/O
Attn:
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Mr. Shepanek
RECEIVED
DATE
FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
my
27 APR 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
FORM
3-62
6.10
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SA/DO/O
: Mr. Norbert Shepanek
ATTENTION
FROM
:
Edward J. Foy, Jr.
27 APR 1977
SUBJECT
:
Chief, Africa/Plans
Marchetti/Marks Book
1. Mr. Sam Halperin has questioned our request
that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground
that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an
official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the
reference to the Congo.
2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo
is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It
may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.
We believe the item should remain classified and that
exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
D
Edward J. Foy
Jr.
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ATTENTION
FROM
SUBJECT
SECRET
SA/DO/O
: Mr. Norbert Shepanek
: Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa/Plans
:
Marchetti/Marks Book
27 APR 1977
1. Mr. Sam Halperin has questioned our request
that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground
that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an
official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the
reference to the Congo.
2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo
is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.
It
may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.
We believe the item should remain classified and that
exemption 5(b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo.
WARNING NOTICE
ISENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JR.
· Edward J. Foy, Jr.
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
C/AF/PLS
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
SA/DDO/O
2.
Attn: Mr. Shepanek
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
1326
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
21 April 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight
21 APR 1977
ATTENTION
:
Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek
FROM
:
Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans
SUBJECT
: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
REFERENCE
SA/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject
1. The information which pertains to Africa and which
was deleted by court order from subject book remains
classifiable and classified. The information is national
security information, bears directly on the conduct of our
foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized
disclosure. None of the items of information ordered
deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified
by any United States Government official authorized to
declassify national security information.
2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items
are as follows:
Item 29, Page 49
Item 79, Page 100
Items 283 and 284,
Page 413
Items 286 and 287,
Page 414
Item, 287a, Page 415
Item 288, Page 416
Items 290 and 291,
Page 417
Exemptions 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemptions 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (3)
Exemptions 5 (B) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (3)
Exemption 5 (B) (1) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B)(1) (2) (3)
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904
:
:
13-00000
SECRET
3. The following items, all of which relate to matters
of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified:
Item 41, Page 6/5
Item 42, Page 65a
Item 47, Page 71
Item 48, Page 71a
Item 55, Page 80
Item 130, Page 133
Item 170, Page 189
Item 197, Page 218
Item 198, Page 219
Item 301, Page 427.
Item 339, Page 509.
Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5 (B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (2)
Exemption 5(B) (2)
Exemption 5(B)(2)(3)
Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B)(1) (2) (3)
4. Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291
pertain to National Security Council proceedings.
Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security
Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date
that CIA will refuse the request of the attorney of
Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.
2
Edward J. Foy,
SECRET.
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ATTENTION
:
FROM
Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight
· Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek
:
Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans
21 APR 1977
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
: SA/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject
1. The information which pertains to Africa and which
was deleted by court order from subject book remains
classifiable and classified. The information is national
security information, bears directly on the conduct of our
foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized
disclosure. None of the items of information ordered
deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified
by any United States Government official authorized to
declassify national security information.
2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items
are as follows:
Item 29, Page 49
Item 79, Page 100
Items 283 and 284,
Page 413
Items 286 and 287,
Page 414.
Item, 287a, Page 415
Item 288, Page 416
Items 290 and 291,
Page 417.
Exemptions 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemptions 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (3)
Exemptions 5(B) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (3)
Exemption 5(B)(1) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904
13-00000
SECRET
3. The following items, all of which relate to matters
of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified:
Item 41, Page 6/5
Item 42, Page 65a
Item 47, Page 71
Item 48, Page 71a
Item 55, Page 80
Item 130, Page 133
Item 170, Page 189
Item 197, Page 218
Item 198, Page 219
Item 301, Page 427
Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5 (B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B) (2)
Exemption 5(B) (2)
Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3)
Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Item 339, Page 509
Exemption 5(B)(1) (2) (3)
4. Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291
pertain to National Security Council proceedings.
Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security
Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date
that CIA will refuse the request of the attorney of
Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.
/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JR.
Edward J. Foy, Jr.
2
SECRET
13-00000
answer to the Combodian item on
Here's you toda
artentus in
Job Bolden
13-00000
1
THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA EMERGENCY, 1975
Part IV Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of
Ambassador John Gunther Dean
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MAY 5, 1976
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
75-094
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFfice
WASHINGTON: 1976
13-00000
672
made on behalf of Cambodia. To insure that the program was tailored to real
requirements, to insure that equipment was received by personnel trained in
their use and to insure that material provided under MAP had reasonable
expectancy of maintenance support, items such as force structure, military orga-
nization, technical assistance and logistics became matters that came under th
purview of the MEDTC. To have closed our eyes to these aspects in my view.
would have ignored congressional concerns regarding efficient management. I
did not consider these functions a violation of the congressional intent in
banning advisors and these functions continued during my tenure. In my belief
the ban would have been violated had personnel been assigned to military units
or activities on an around-the-clock basis and involved themselves in most of the
matters affecting their units or activity. In prescribing the limits of our assist.
ance, the views of the GAO report were useful in guiding our judgment.
Question 10. During your tenure as Ambassador, did any U.S. Military Attachés
serve with Khmer military units in the field?
-What regulations did the U.S. Embassy have to govern the activities of
U.S. Military Attaches and the Military Equipment Delivery Team?
-Were any changes in the regulations made after the incident at Kampot
involving Major Lawrence Ondecker in March 1974?
Answer. No U.S. military served with Khmer military units in the field. U.S.
personnel from both the Defense Attache Office and the Office of the Chief
Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia routinely visited and reported
the military status of Cambodian military units as part of their duties; however.
U.S. personnel did not remain with units in the manner which U.S. advisors did
in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel were extensively briefed upon arrival regard--
ing the Congressional restrictions against advisers to the Cambodian military.
The Kampot incident occurred prior to my arrival in Cambodia. Shortly after
my arrival in Phnom Penh. I received the instructions in effect and determined
that they were adequate. I did. however. personally impress upon my military
staff, on several occasions, the need to abide scrupulously by these instructions
and to avoid situations which might be interpreted as infringements of their
prescribed duties.
Question 11. In November 1974, the Washington Post reported and the De-
fense Department acknowledged that data on potential bombing targets in
Cambodia was gathered by American reconnaissance fights from Thailand and
passed on to Cambodian military authorities.
- When did this practice begin?
-Did you know about it, and did you have a role in it?
-Do you consider it a violation of the Congressional ban on American
advisors with Khmer Republic forces?
Answer. It would be inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed in
Cambodia that military information which we had would be deliberately withheld
or denied to a country to which we were providing enormous military and
economic assistance. The information we had concerning enemy activities in
Cambodia was a by-product of our own intelligence collecting effort on com-
munist forces throughout Indochina. This information was provided to Cam-
bodian military authorities but the decision on what action, if any, would be
taken was one which the Cambodians made for themselves. The provisions of
information preceded my arrival and I am not aware exactly when the practice
may have begun. I was aware of the practice although I did not play a pivotal
part in the process and did not consider this procedure as violating congressional
restrictions on American advisors.
Question 12. Did CIA personnel in Cambodia ever act as advisers to Khmer
Republic forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos (even if on a
smaller scale)?
- Could you tell us what role China Airlines played in Cambodia and if it
was in any way associated with CIA activities?
- What was the U.S. role in organizing and applying the Khmer "Middle
Range Reconnaissance Patrols" (MERPS)?
Answer. Having served both in Laos and Cambodia, and knowing the CIA
operations in both countries, I can honestly say that the CIA did not act as
advisers to the Khmer Republic forces in a fashion similar to their activities
in Laos. China Airlines, under contract to Air America, transported supplies, not
including weapons and ammunition, for U.S. agencies in Cambodia. The Middle
Range Reconnaissance Patrols received U.S. Inilitary equipment as part of the
Khmer Armed Forces and also received some intelligence collection training..
13-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
☑ SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: (Optional)
☐
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
vigter
FROM: Robert L. Skidmore
CEA/CA
5D3102, Hqs
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
EXTENSION NO.
DATE
building)
1.
ACEA/OPS
2.
3.
4.
DCEA
1383
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
15 April 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
DATE
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
15/4 GA
5.
CEA
8
6.
7.
SA/DO/O
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
610 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
☑ SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Call Kathy (1383)
farhand Carry
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000
E
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
:
REFERENCE
:
SECRET
16 APR 1977
Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight
William J. Graver
Chief, East Asia Division
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977,
Same Subject
East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted
subject book items per Reference request and conclude they
are:
1) still classified under Executive Order
11652,
2) still not in the public domain through
official disclosure; and
3) still not contained in material cleared
by the Publications Review Board.
J.
Attachment
-
William J. Graver
Detail Listing
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 022438
13-00000
I
Item
26
SECRET
Attachment
E. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in
The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence
Manuscript Page No.
P. 47
Exemption
5 B (1) (2)
27
p. 48
5 B (1) (2)
28
p. 48
5 B (1)
.
31
p. 54
5 B (2)
38
P. 63
41
p. 65
5 B (2) (3)
5 B (2) (3)
42
p. 65 a
5 B. (2) (3)
43
p. 65 a
46
47
67
P. 92
p. 70
P. 71
5 B (2) (3)
5 B (2)
5 B (2) (3)
5 B (3)
152
p. 165
5 B (1)
197
P. 218
5 B (1)
319
p. 470
5 B (2)
320
P. 471
5 B (2)
321
P. 471
5 B (2)
SECRET
13-00000
16 APR 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
:
Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight
William J. Graver
Chief, East Asia Division
SUBJECT
:
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
REFERENCE
:
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977,
Same Subject
East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted
subject book items per Reference request and conclude they
are:
1) still classified under Executive Order
11652,
2) still not in the public domain through
official disclosure; and
3) still not contained in material cleared
by the Publications Review Board.
J.
William J. Graver
Attachment
-
Detail Listing
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 022438
SECRET
13-00000
Attachment
E. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in
The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence
Item
26
P. 47
27
P. 48
28
p. 48
31
P. 54
38
p. 63
Manuscript Page No.
Exemption
5 B (1) (2)
5 B (1) (2)
5 B (1)
5 B (2)
5 B (2) (3)
41
p. 65
5 B (2) (3)
42
p. 65 a
43
p. 65 a
46
p. 70
.
47
P. 71
67
p. 92
5 B. (2) (3)
5 B (2) (3)
5 B (2)
5 B (2) (3)
5 B (3)
152
p. 165
5 B (1)
197
P. 218
5 B (1)
319
p. 470
5 B (2)
320
P. 471
5 B (2)
321
P. 471
5 B (2)
SECRET
13-00000
....
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. John Greaney
L
DD/O.??.3850
28 APR 1977
FROM
SUBJECT
Office of General Counsel
: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
Review of the 168 Deleted Items in
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
In reply to your oral request, attached is
the report of the review of the deleted items which
are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate
components of the DDO reviewed their respective
items for classification and their findings are
contained in the attached report. Specific classi-
fication and exemption authority for each item
which is still classified is available, if needed,
in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O.
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - OGC
2 - DDO
2 - SA/DO/0
William W. Wells
William W. Wells
SECRET
E2
IMPDET
CL BY 018630
13-00000
SEC ET
27 April 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy Director for Operations
VIA
:
Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh
Special Assistant to the DDO
for External Oversight
: Samuel Halpern
DD/077-38501
FROM
SUBJECT
:
Review of 168 Deleted Items in
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
(U) 1. This is the report of the review done by
the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items
which are the basic responsibility of the DDO.
The
remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi-
bility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those
Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC.
Responsible components did the necessary inter- and
intraagency coordinations.
(U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted
concerning the completeness of the review, especially
as regards those items declassified by "official
public disclosure" as defined by the courts. While I
am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done
by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely
complete search is impossible for the following reasons:
(U) a. There is no index of any kind,
let alone having the material in machine form
such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published
hearings and reports of the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church
Committee), the six published hearings and
proceedings of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume
Report to the President by the Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States
(Rockefeller Commission);
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018630
13-00000
(U) b. There is no comprehensive readily
available record of precisely what information
has been declassified and released in accordance
with the Freedom of Information Act and the
Privacy Act; there are separate collections
with a limited capability to retrieve some such
information;
(U) c. There is no available record of
the information that officials of the Executive
Branch of government, with authority to
declassify information, have said or written
in public either before Congressional
committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows,
college symposiums, the general lecture
circuit, other public forums, etc.
In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee
that those items which are still classified by the
DDO components have not been deliberately or
inadvertently declassified in whole or in part as
"official public disclosure.
"
(U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A
lists those items of the DDO deleted items which have
been declassified by "official public disclosure."
These thirteen complete and parts of four other items
can therefore be released from the court injunction.
(S) 4. Attachment B (seven parts) contains
eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still
classified but about which there may be some possible
question. These are highlighted here so that
cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with
due regard for all legal and policy aspects.
(U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining
items which the DDO components advise are still
classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and
cannot be released from the court injunction.
Fammud
Samuel Halpern
SECRET
13-00000
MSS
Item No.
p. no.
.3
.11
4.
5
12
12
9 (line 17 thru ninth
word on line 24)
14
10 (last four words of
line 1 and first 11
15
words of line 2%;
and lines 5-11)
11
15
46 (line 20 thru first
70
three words of line.
24)
57
84
89
106
129
124
126
130
127
130
SEGRET
ATTACHMENT A
Official Public Disclosure
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190 -
Church Committee.
Vol. 7, p. 168
Church Committee
Vol. 7, p. 190
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 160, 170, 172
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171
Church Committee
Book I, p. 194
Church Committee,
Alleged Assassination Plots
pp. 139 ff.
Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218
Church Committee
Book I, pp. 208-209
Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218
Church Committee
Book I, pp. 208-209
Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218
Church Committee
Book I, pp. 208-209
13-00000
ATTACHMENT A cont'd
MSS
Item No.
p. no.
292
4:20
Official Public Disclosure
Church Committee
Vol. 7, p. 205
307
317
338
435
468
508
339 (line 1, third,
509
fourth, eighth,
ninth words; and
line 2, first
three words)
SECRET
· Church Committee,
Alleged Assassination Plots
pp. 139 ff.
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 144-209
CIA presence has been
officially disclosed in
the following only:
a.
Congo Church Committee
report on Alleged Assassina-
tion Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders, pp. 13-70.
b. Cambodia
-
Amb. John
Gunther Dean testimony before
the Special Subcommittee on
Investigations of the
Committee on International
Relations, House of Representa-
tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672
c.
Laos Director Colby,
-
13 September 1974, in an
address to the Fund for Peace
Conference on CIA and Covert
Actions and in Church
Committee Book I, pp. 120 and
155; Book IV, p. 68.
d. Vietnam
-
Church Committee
report on Alleged Assassination
pp. 217-224%;B Book I, pp. 23
and 120.
-
e. Philippines Church
Committee, Book I, p. 23.
13-00000
1.
ATTACHMENT B (1)
Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172
MSS pp. no. 46, 48, 165, 189
(U)
NE Division has highlighted these items.
(S) Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such
a 'special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup
d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was
understandably grateful..." Item 28 lists the Shah among
other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special
relationships" as does Item 152 and a similar statement is
made in Item 179.
(U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and
Scholars," pp. 131-132, states:
"... a covert operation so successful that it
became widely known all over the world was carried
out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been
driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier,
Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the
local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet
Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful
clandestine services officer who flew to Iran,
hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate
those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian
military men loyal to the Shah how to take over
the local radio station, and paved the way for the
Shah's triumphal return."
(U) The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly
mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran"
as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert
operations."
(S) There is a vast difference between the classified
deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship"
with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a
statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The
former is still properly classifiable and classified.
SECRET

13-00000
ATTACHMENT B (2).
Item No. 49
MSS p. no. 71a.
(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily
American is still classified SECRET because it describes
intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper
publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the
September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia
Journalism Review which states; "Landon K. Thorne, Jr.,
the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute,
then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm
of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the
fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American
in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange-
ment 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad
example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by
Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute,
who left the Agency long before that, can be considered
as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
information.
SECRET
13-00000
ATTACHMENT B (3)
Item No. 54, 236
MSS p. no. 80, 262
(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World
Features is still classified SECRET because both items
describe intelligence sources and methods and identifies
operations based in England. Forum World Features was
referred to - but not by name in Book I of the Church
Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another
example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two
proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in
Europe... The larger of the two was subscribed to by
over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these
two press services." While Forum World Features was not
named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be
protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper
editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."
:
SECRET
13-00000
:
ATTACHMENT B (4)
Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25)
MSS p. no. 92.
(S) Under injunction as classified information is
"For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the
Agency constructed extensive support facilities in
Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas
to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training."
Underlining (line 25, ninth thru twenty-third word).
indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS
page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly
brought to the United States for special paramilitary
training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado."
This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and
appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book.
SECRET
13-00000
ATTACHMENT B (5).
Item No. 72
MSS p. 97
(U) NE Division has highlighted this item.
(S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact
with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.
Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was...
"
(U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret'
Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was
winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents
into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could be
done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the
offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched
by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving
him a channel of communication with the West.
"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to
avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was
accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator
who was able to keep Washington posted on his often
hazardous progress.
"
(S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA
"close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being
"financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different
from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators
being with the Dalai Lama. These are two different
comments with the first being properly classifiable and
classified.
SECRET
13-00000
Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279
ATTACHMENT B (6)
MSS pp. 123, 132, 133, 403
(S) CCS states that all four items which refer to
Fairways Corporation as a CIA-owned proprietary company
are still classified since they describe intelligence
sources and methods by identifying an operational support
facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from
declassification under Section 5 (B) (2) of the General
Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.
(S) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director
Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship
of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV
documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear
on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby
may have responded to the question in a manner which
could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of
Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence
that the matter was considered to be still classified as
recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the.
subject be withheld from public disclosure.
SECRET
13-00000
ATTACHMENT B (7)
Item No. 339
MSS p. no. 509
(S) CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been
officially acknowledged and is still classified because
it involves sources and methods.
David Phillips in his book The Night Watch,
chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970-
1972" describes his presence as Chief of Station of CIA
in Brazil and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia.
(S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence
in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509),
Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence
in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.
It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We
believe the item should remain classified and that
exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo."
What
It is not a question of whether to agree or not
to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church
Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made
"official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the
subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A
shows, four other countries of the Third World are also
mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone.
adverse effect could be expected now by another public
reference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original
1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is
difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has
not changed since the 1975 release of the information by
the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse
effects there might be have already occurred.
SECRET
13-00000
ATTACHMENT C
ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
Item No.
MSS p. no.
1
11
9 (lines 14-16;
14
line 24, last
two words
Item No.
MSS p. no.
63
86
.67
677)
723
72
92
97
73
97
thru line 29)
74
98
79
100
10 (line 1,
15
107
123
first 7 words;
128
132
line 2, last 2
129
133
words thru
130
133
line 4)
148
155
149
156
868
1122222
18
42
152
165
19
.43
159
181
20
44
160
182
21
45
161
183
22
46
162
184
23
46
182
196
24
47
194
215
26
47
195
216
222MMM44.
27
48
196
217.
28
48
197
218
29
49.
.198
219
31
54
201
222.
34.
59
224
252
.38
63
225
253
41
6'5
226
257
42
65a
234
262
43
65a
236
262
46 (line 24,
70
256
329
fourth word
261
334
thru line 31)
273
380
48
4445SSSSSSSS
890123456822
47
71
278
400
71a
.279
403
49.
71a
280
404.
50
72
283
413
51
72
284
413
52
77
286
414
53
78
287
414
54
80
287a
415
55
80
288
416
56
81
290
417
58
84
291
417
59
85
296
425
62
86
298
426
SECRET
13-00000
፡፡
Item No.
MSS p. no.
300
426
308
437
318
469
319
470
320
471
321
471
322
473
323
474
331
482
332
482
333
483
334
483
335
483
336
484
337
507
339 (line 1, first 509
two words and
fifth, sixth
and seventh words)
SEGAT
SECRET
2
13-00000
28 Aguil 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
Mr. John Greaney
Office of General Counsel
: William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
Review of the 168 Deleted Items in
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
In reply to your oral request, attached is
the report of the review of the deleted items which
are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate
components of the DDO reviewed their respective
items for classification and their findings are
contained in the attached report. Specific classi-
fication and exemption authority for each item
which is still classified is available, if needed,
in each component's response filed with SA/DO/0.
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - OGC
2 - DDO
2
· SA/DO/O
William W. Wells
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018630
13-00000
SEC ET
27 April 1977.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
VIA
:
Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh
Special Assistant to the DDO
for External Oversight
FROM
:
Samuel Halpern
SUBJECT
:
Review of 168 Deleted Items in
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
(U) · 1. This is the report of the review done by
the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items
which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The
remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi-
bility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those
Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC.
Responsible components did the necessary inter- and
intraagency coordinations.
(U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted
concerning the completeness of the review, especially
as regards those items declassified by "official
public disclosure" as defined by the courts. While I
am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done
by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely
complete search is impossible for the following reasons:
(U) a. There is no index of any kind,
let alone having the material in machine form
such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published
hearings and reports of the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church
Committee), the six published hearings and
proceedings of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume
Report to the President by the Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States
(Rockefeller Commission)%;
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 018630

13-00000
(U) b. There is no comprehensive readily
available record of precisely what information
has been declassified and released in accordance
with the Freedom of Information Act and the
Privacy Act; there are separate collections
with a limited capability to retrieve some such
information%;B
(U) c. There is no available record of
the information that officials of the Executive
Branch of government, with authority to
declassify information, have said or written
in public either before Congressional
committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows,
college symposiums, the general lecture
circuit, other public forums, etc.
In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee
that those items which are still classified by the
DDO components have not been deliberately or
inadvertently declassified in whole or in part as
"official public disclosure."
(U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A
lists those items of the DDO deleted items which have
been declassified by "official public disclosure."
These thirteen complete and parts of four other items
can therefore be released from the court injunction.
(S) 4. Attachment B (seven parts) contains
eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still
classified but about which there may be some possible
question. These are highlighted here so that
cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with
due regard for all legal and policy aspects.
(U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining
items which the DDO components advise are still
classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and
cannot be released from the court injunction.
Farm & Ha
Samuel Halpern
SECRET
13-00000
MSS
Item No..
p. no.
3
11
5.
12
12
9 (line 17 thru ninth
word on line 24)
14
10 (last four words of
line 1 and first 11
.15
words of line 2;
and lines 5-11)
11.
15
46 (line 20 thru first
three words of line
24)
70
57
84
89
106
124
129
126
130
127
130
SEGRET
ATTACHMENT· A
Official Public Disclosure
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190
Church Committee
Vol. 7, p. 168
Church Committee
Vol. 7, p. 190
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 160, 170, 172
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171
Church Committee
Book I, p. 194.
Church Committee,
Alleged Assassination Plots
pp. 139 ff.
Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218
Church Committee
Book I, pp. 208-209
Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218
Church Committee
Book I, pp. 208-209
Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218
Church Committee
Book I, pp. 208-209
****
13-00000
MSS
Item No.
p. no.
292
420
307
317
338
ATTACHMENT A cont'd
435
4.68
508
Official Public Disclosure
Church Committee
Vol. 7, p. 205
Church Committee,
Alleged Assassination Plots
pp. 139 ff.
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205
Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 144-209
CIA presence has been
officially disclosed in
the following only:
339 (line 1, third,
509
fourth, eighth,
ninth words; and
line 2, first
three words)
SECAST
a. Congo
-
Church Committee
report on Alleged Assassina-
tion Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders, pp. 13-70.
b. Cambodia Amb. John
Gunther Dean testimony before
the Special Subcommittee on
Investigations of the
Committee on International
Relations, House of Representa-
tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672
C.
Laos Director Colby,
-
13 September 1974, in an
address to the Fund for Peace
Conference on CIA and Covert
Actions and in Church
Committee Book I, pp. 120 and
155; Book IV, p. 68.
d. Vietnam Church Committee
report on Alleged Assassination
pp. 217-224; Book I, pp. 23
and 120.
e. Philippines Church
Committee, Book I, p. 23.
13-00000
ATTACHMENT B (1)
Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172
MSS pp. no. 46, 48, 165, 189
(U)
NE Division has highlighted these items.
(S) Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such
a 'special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup
d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was
understandably grateful..." Item 28 lists the Shah among
other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special
relationships" as does Item 152 and a similar statement is
made in Item 179.
(U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and
Scholars," pp. 131-132, states:
"
a covert operation so successful that it
became widely known all over the world was carried
out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been
driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier,
Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the
local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet
Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful
clandestine services officer who flew to Iran,
hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate
those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian
military men loyal to the Shah how to take over
the local radio station, and paved the way for the
Shah's triumphal return."
(U) The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly
mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran"
as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert
operations."
(S) There is a vast difference between the classified
deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship"
with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a
statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The
former is still properly classifiable and classified.
SECRET
13-00000
B
SECRET
ATTACHMENT B (2)
Item No. 49
MSS p. no. 71a
(S).
Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily
American is still classified SECRET because it describes
intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper
publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the
September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia
Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr.,
the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute,
then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm
of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the
fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American
in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange-
ment 'atypical' of what the Agency was doing, a bad
example'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by
Mr. Bross, who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute,
who left the Agency long before that, can be considered
as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
information.
SECRET
13-00000
SEBEET
ATTACHMENT B (3)
Item No. 54, 236
-
MSS p. no. 80, 262
(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World
Features is still classified SECRET because both items
describe intelligence sources and methods and identifies
operations based in England. Forum World Features was
referred to I but not by name in Book I of the Church
Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another
example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two
proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in
Europe... The larger of the two was subscribed to by
over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these
two press services." While Forum World Features was not
named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be
protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper
editors may be considered as "official public disclosure.'
"
SECRET
13-00000
ATTACHMENT B (4)
Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25).
MSS p. no. 92
(S) Under injunction as classified information is
"For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the
Agency constructed extensive support facilities in
Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas
to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training."
Underlining (line 25, ninth thru twenty-third word)
indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS
page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly
brought to the United States for special paramilitary
training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado."
This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and
appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book.
SECRET
13-00000
Item No. 72
MSS p. 97
ATTACHMENT B (5)
(U) NE Division has highlighted this item.
(S)
The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact
with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.
Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was..."
(U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret ..
Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was
winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents
into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could be.
done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the
offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched
by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving
him a channel of communication with the West.
"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to
avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was
accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator
who was able to keep Washington posted on his often
hazardous progress. "
(S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA
"close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being
"financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different
from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators
being with the Dalai Lama. These are two different
comments with the first being properly classifiable and
classified.
SECRET
13-00000
E
Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279
ATTACHMENT B (6)
MSS pp. 123, 132, 133, 403
(S) CCS states that all four items which refer to
Fairways Corporation as a CIA-owned proprietary company
are still classified since they describe intelligence
sources and methods by identifying an operational support
facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from
declassification under Section 5 (B) (2) of the General
Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.
(S) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director
Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship
of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV
documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear
on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby
may have responded to the question in a manner which
could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of
Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence
that the matter was considered to be still classified as
recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the
subject be withheld from public disclosure.
SECRET
13-00000
ATTACHMENT B (7)
Item No. 339
MSS p. no. 509
(S) CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been
officially acknowledged and is still classified because
it involves sources and methods.
David Phillips in his book The Night Watch,
chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970-
1972" describes his presence as Chief of Station of CIA
in Brazil and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia.
(S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence
in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509),
Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence
in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.
It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We
believe the item should remain classified and that
exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo."
It is not a question of whether to agree or not
to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church
Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made
"official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the
subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A
shows, four other countries of the Third World are also
mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone.
adverse effect could be expected now by another public
reference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original
1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is
difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has
not changed since the 1975 release of the information by
the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse
effects there might be have already occurred.
What
SECRET

13-00000
ATTACHMENT C
ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
Item No.
MSS p. no.
Item No.
MSS p. no.
1
9 (lines 14-16;
11
63
86
14.
.67
92
line 24, last
72
97
two words
73
97
thru line 29)
74
98
79
100
10 (line 1,
15
107
123
first 7 words;
128
132
line 2, last 2
129
133'
words thru
130
133
line 4)
148
155
149
156
18
4.2
152
165
19
43
159
181
20
44
160
182
222
22
23
24
1234
21.
.45
161
183
46
162
184
46
182
196
47
194
215
26
47
195
216
27
48
196
217
28
48
197
218
29
49
198
219
31
54
201
222
34
59
224
252
38
63
225
253
41.
65
226
257
42
65a
234
262
43
65a
236
262
46
(line 24,
70
256
329
fourth word
261
334
thru line 31)
273
380
47
71
48
1961
SSS
49
50
72
51
72
52
77
53
78
H227∞
278
400
71a
279
403
71a
280
404
283
413
284
413
286
414
287
414
54
80
287a
415
55
80'
288
416
56
81
290
417
58
84
291
417
59
85
296
425
62
86
298
426
SECRET
13-00000
Item No.
MSS p. no.
300
426
308.
437
318
469
319
470
320
471
321
471
322
473
323
474
331
482
332
482
333
483
334
483
335
483
336
484
337
507
339 (line 1, first 509
two words and
fifth, sixth
and seventh words)
3101
SECRET
2
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
:
REFERENCE
SECRET
Mr. John K. Greaney
Associate General Counsel
Deputy Director for Operations
DDO Coordination on DDS&T's Review of
Deletions from The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks
· DDS&T-5193-76/1 dated 27 May 1977
1. Appropriate Components of the DDO have reviewed
the following items (deletions) listed at Tab C of referent
for coordination with the DDO and concur with the DDS&T
that they are all properly classified in accordance with
E.O. 11652 and should so remain:
Item
Manuscript Page
25
47
159
.181
160
182
161
183
162
184
163
184
164
185
205
234
208
235
209
'236
295
424
297
425
299
301
426
427
2.
In Tab D of referent, the DDS&T deferred to DDO
or OS the decision on the classification of Item 190, manu-
script page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make
intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered
in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow. The
appropriate DDO Component finds that this item must remain
classified SECRET since it relates to cryptography and is
exempt. from the General Declassification Schedule of
SENS
SECRET
E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
13-00000
SECRET
E.O. 11652, exemption category 5B(2).
3. Specific classification and exemption authority for
each item, if needed, is available from SA/DO/O.
William W. Wells
0/SA/DO/O: NAShepanek: kaw (1542)
Distribution
Original & 1
-
Addressee
2 - DDO
1 -
1
2
2
-
ADDO
Ex Reg
DDS&T
SA/DO/O
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
DDS&T-5193-76/1
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel.
ATTENTION
SUBJECT
:
John Greaney
22 MAY 1977.
Review of Deletions from The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks
1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this
directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject
book per your request. The review was made to determine whether
each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the
information in each deletion has been officially released by the
U.S. Government.
.
2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed
by this directorate. Tab B is a list of those items of primary
interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi-
fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C
is a list of those items which we determined are still classified
under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be
released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be
coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of
items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and
should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list
of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can
now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified
and should not be released.
.3.
Since many of the deleted items involved the National
Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina-
tions through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any
coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General
Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other ele-
ments was attempted.
4. This memorandum completes the DDS&T action on the
court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.
Home J. Rebben
ERNEST J. ZELLMER
Associate Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
Attachments:
As Stated
SECRET
-2 IMPORT CL BY 005166
13-00000
DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T
TAB A
Item
Page
Item
Page
25
47
190
214
86
104
191
214.
87
104
192
215
88
.105
204
233
91
106
205
234
92
1.07
208
235
135
134
209
236
136
135
245
268
155
177
248
269
157
179
254
327
158
180
258
331
159
181
259
3.31
160
182
260
331
161
183
267
337
163
184
268
337
164
185
269
337
165
185
275
394
166
185
295
424
167
185
297
425
170
189
299
426
171
189
301
427
172
189
302
427
173
190
304
430
174
191
306
431
175
191
312
442
176
19.2
313
450
177
193
324
474
178
194
325
474
187
200
3,27
475
188
201
328
476
189
202.
329
480
13-00000
Tab B
ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T
AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED
Item
Manuscript Page
91
106
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
92
107
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
*135
134
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
136
135
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
155
177
158
180
163
184
165
185
166
185
167
185
SECRET, 5B (3)
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
SECRET, 5B (3)
CONFIDENTIAL, 5B (2)
CONFIDENTIAL, 5B (2)
188
201
TOP SECRET, 5B (2)
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
:
13-00000
'
labu
ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN
CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS
Manuscript Page
Item
* 25
47
DDO
* 87
104
88
105
DOD (DIA)
DOD (DIA)
157
179
OS
159
181
DDO, OC, ERDA
160
182
DDO, OC, ERDA
161
183
DDO, OC, ERDA
!
162
184
DDO, OC, ERDA
163
184
DDO
164
185
DDO
172
189
NSA
187
200
DOD (Navy)
189
202
DOD (Navy)
204
233
NSA and DDO
205
234
DDO
208
235
DDO
209
236
DDO
245
268
DOD (SAFSS)
248
269
DOD (SAFSS)
254
3.27
DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
258
331
DOD (SAFSS)
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000
Tab C
Continued
Item
Manuscript Page
259
331
DOD (SAFSS)
260
331
DOD (SAFSS)
267
337
DOD (Navy)
268.
337
DOD (Navy)
269
337
DOD (Navy).
*275
394
OL
295
424
DDO
297
425
DDO
299
426
DDO, NSA
301
427
DDO, OC, NSA
302
427
NSA
304
430
NSA
306
431
DOD (Navy)
312
442
NSA
313
450
NSA
329
480
NSC Staff
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
2-
13-00000
Tab D
ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS
Manuscript Page
Item
8.6
104
O/DCI
170
189
NSA
171.
189
NSA
173
190
NSA
174
191
NSA
175
191
NSA
176
192
NSA
177
193
NSA
178
194
NSA
190
214
DDO or OS
191
214
192
215
324
474
State Department
State Department
DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
325
474
DOD
327
475
DDI and DOD
328
476
DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

13-00000
SECRET
Tab E
ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE
Item 135, Manuscript page 134
1967
"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in
when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research laboratory!
in the Boston area."
Item 25, Manuscript page 47
הכ
"Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the
[Nationalists] first to run guerrilla attacks against mainland
China and then in more recent years to use Taiwan as a base
for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots
trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of
the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda
and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revol-
ution."
Item 87, Manuscript page 107
"The Agency also had a project to determine where American
prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to
[Communicate with them Scale models of the prisons were
constructed from aerial and satellite photography and from
other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which
prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate.
* Some of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their
infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending
coded messages relating where they were being held.
Thus,
the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the
families to send answers back Meanwhile, the Technical
Services Division of the"
Item 275, Manuscript page 394
new optics for satellite cameras and improvements in 'over
the horizon' radars These technical contracts were almost
always drawn up under the cover of being between the scholar
(or the university) and some government agency other than the
CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were
the most"
SECRET
13-00000
Tab C
ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN
CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS
Manuscript Page
Item.
EA - China
* 25
47
DDO
* 87
104
DOD (DIA)
88
105
DOD (DIA)
157
179
OS
China/India
159
181
DDO, OC, ERDA
"
160
182
DDO, OC, ERDA
"
161④
183
DDO, OC, ERDA
"
162
184
DDO, OC, ERDA
163
184
DDO
164
185
DDO
172
.189
NSA
187
200
DOD (Navy)
189
202.
DOD (Navy)
204
233
NSA and DDO
205
234
DDO
208
235
DDO
LA
LA
209⑰
236
DDO
245
268
DOD (SAFSS)
248
269
DOD (SAFSS)
254
327
258
331
DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
DOD (SAFSS)
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000
Tab C
Continued
Item
Manuscript Page
259
331
DOD (SAFSS)
260
331
DOD (SAFSS)
267
337
DOD (Navy)
268
337
DOD (Navy)
269
33.7
DOD (Navy)
* 275
394
OL
EA China
295
4.24
DDO
12
EA. China / Eve Cyprus. 297
425
DDO
2.99
426
DDO, NSA
EalEUR
14
301
.427:
DDO, OC, NSA
AF
302
.427
NSA.
304
430
NSA
306
431
. DOD (Navy)
312
442
NSA
313
450
NSA
329
480
NSC Staff
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
2='
13-00000
1
Tab D
ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS
Manuscript Page
Item
86
104
O/DCI
170
189
NSA
171
189
NSA
.173
190
NSA
174
191
NSA
175
191
NSA
176
192
NSA
177
193
NSA
178
194
NSA
it.
H
SE
-
190
214
DDO or OS
191
214
192
215
324
474
State Department
State Department
DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
325.
474
DOD
327
475
328
476
DDI and DOD
DDI, DOD and NSC Staff
13-00000
4
Page 45
Hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the
strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a
desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was
not (new),
so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. A CIA
owned, New York based proprietary company, named RTV, provided the technical
expertise and management skills to put the station in operation. ]
Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special
relationship is Nationalist China. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is
not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent,
Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the
State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something
of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all-
night drinking bouts with the younger Chiang.
bouts with
241
Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first (25
to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent
years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist
pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland
and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at
China during the Cultural Revolution. ]
In South Vietaam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally
conducting all important meetings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was
of station
accompanied by the CIA chief when there was Agency business to be discussed.
But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for
many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President.
According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has
served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal
meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea.
personally with
Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu personnaly with millions of
(laundered money)
dollars in untraceable, "black bag" funds, in additi to the hundradaso:
A
26
4
5
6
8
"
1
"
i
l
2
2
2
2
2
2
7.
2
13-00000
C
Page-257
the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the analysts in making
*
a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content.
Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive
large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from
actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance
(which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was said) with agent
reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services
confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose
function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make
decisions based on that intelligence analysis.
[In_
(159)
In the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and
the experts of the Scientific and Technical Directorate combineddfdoces to
carry out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful)
intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level
U.S. government officials were disturbed by reports that Communist China was on
the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.
They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's would play an important part
in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest
priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtze, the
Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.
The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-
powered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from
the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information
to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain
peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the
Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to
the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA
laboratories. the Clandestine Services took on the responsibility for the most
2
13-00000
difficult phase of the operation
--
installing the machine on the mountain top. (160),
The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the
Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the
CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not
only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project.
Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry
the device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it
into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered
Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb.
Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experienced
CIA case officer.
That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian
climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret
CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn
how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi.
Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international
mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an
ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the
technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the
CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements
with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was
clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport
plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were
brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from
where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda
Devi.
Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the
Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking
too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the
_ In
- λ
2
2
NM.
3
5
3
6
1
8
13-00000
[
C
اجار
would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base
camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by
a small party of climbers accompanied by a few porters. Soon after the
group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to
tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the
staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes.
The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in
an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now well off
schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition
because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency
operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its
target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures
well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into
operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news
of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging area.
But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been
sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over
the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the
device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government
was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi
that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headgaters of the sacred
Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about
religious pollution, not ecological.
The CIA reacted by planning another climbe of the mountain for the following
year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring
system this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team,
led by Bishop, was gathered together again and this time it reached the
top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was
set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year
13-00000
Page-260-
before was not found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor device 1621
stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical
malfunction.
At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the
Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved
satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were
thanked and compensated for their cooperation. The American climbers were
presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA.
[The
And
The fertile imaginations of the ☑S&T experts during the following
years produced many more unique coblrction schemes aimed at solving the
mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be
unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential.
The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man
airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In
concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into
the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would
assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border.
Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with
this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards.
A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could 163
be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall
slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three
feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, and aerial rising from
its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still
later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most
likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a
foreign and hostile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional
similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine
raised serious questions as to the system's utility and worth. The S&T
ユ
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13-00000
Luge 201
specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however (1641
oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile
installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear
to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear
attack. Development of the Coatly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The
technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device
in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself
several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation
that the device failed to self-activate and function properly. 7
A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, (165)
such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which
could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well
over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble
on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once
over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras
would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either
to its launch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated
Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the
CIA in research on this "baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in
to be
the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if
Λ
and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an
Agency-sponsored spying mission.
The technical difficulties involved in the air-drop] system and the model
[ airplane device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully
developed by their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite
surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement
for these questionable and potentially provocative collection systems before
they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices
more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value were also being
fand
-- a few
1166
167
2
1

13-00000
restore the Shah to power. Over the years, the Shah had shown his gratitude by
allowing the Agency to use Iran as a base for electronic and radar surveillance
of the Soviet Union. The CIA station chief in Iran usually maintained much
closer contact with the Shah than the American ambassador. (With the 1973
appointment of former CIA Director Helms to the past of American ambassador in
Trap, any Agency-State conflicts then presumably disappeared.)
No P> The issue amagery had developed a new type of over-the-horizan radar
24
205
for surveillance of the Soviet Unio
which it wished to install near the Soviet border in Iran, As was normally
the case, CIA representatives carried out most of the negotiations with the
Iranis. However, when Ambassador Armin Meyer was informed of the details of
the proposed agreement, he raised some questions with the CIA station chief that
blossomed into an inter-agency dispute. At this point Meyer cabled the State
Department for instructions and advice.
--
In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications
clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies overseas
and Washington for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate
code room for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a
senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative
part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA's communicators who work
under State cover. In theory, CIA code clerks are not supposed to read the
messages they send for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful
career quickly realized that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he is
well advised to show the CIA station chief copies of all important State
messages. The State Department long ago implicitly recognized that its most
secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special
communications channels which sppposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA.
[Thea, in 1968, Ambassador Meyer ran into troubles with the CIA station chief
channel (Roger),
"secure"
Λ
Dept, Has
in Teḥeran, Meyer switched his communications with State in Washington to one of
these "secure" channels, called "Roger." He needed to be able to discuss the
3
4
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10
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
NNNN
13-00000
Page 370
( situation in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were
i
one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept
his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each
State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy
of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of
each intercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be
kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.
Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information, ]
Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield
to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at
CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor,
they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were .
unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so
aggravated by this continued resistance that he personally telephoned Secretary
of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing
completely to the CIA position.
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5
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Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D 208
worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain
South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of
allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent
by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercept
the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements
were normal procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw
nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which
cooperated in good faith.
FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period
of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over
unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship.
However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could
be restored.7
"
"
2
13-00000
Page 311
2
H
Sometime later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite 2091
that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the
international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive
operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other
CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and 5
wether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to ८
be a matter concerning CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn
from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American
country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel (which
CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme wen
with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.
Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the
country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that
country's secret messages.
Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the
Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who
probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in
a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies
within the U.S. government not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues
perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into
liaison agreements with FI/D.
--
Bob X is one of these bodinary looking people who mow their lawn, love
their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.
Two
Fow other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes
similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and E. Howard Hunt. Both had long,
relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-
middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security
officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt
was an onerator who plaved a leading role in the Bay of Pigs and who took part
7
8
9
10
11
12
15
14
15
16
17
18
14
Z6
21
22
23
24
2:
21
N N N N N N
13-00000
Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced
it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its
operation against Cuba. The Presi·ent may have set the original
policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply
by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agency
paramilitary activities against Guatamala.
CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on Amer-
ican foreign policy. They can subject the country to blackmail
if something goes wrong. For instance, after th CIA pilot was
shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within five days
the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000
tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in
small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that
moment, the CIA was actively backing an armed revolution against
the Sukarno regime hese would have been strange actions indeed
for the US government to take if it were not extremely concerned
about saving the captured pilot.
A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960
after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city.
to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy.
When the Agency technician plugged in his polygraph machine in
a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building.* The
1
*This was not the only time that the CIA blew major “pos wer- 295
During the mid-1960s, the Agency added to its numero" T
facilities on Taiwan by building a juge electronic f
8928.
13-00000
lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were
soon all under arrest. The Singapore government and the British,
who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence,
were both quite disturbed by the indident.
Negotiations then
ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the US government offered $3.3 mil-
lion to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten times as
much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIA
officials were subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretary
of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to the
Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech
as an example of the type of activities engaged in by the CIA.
The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by
the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee's
charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk's letter of d-
pology, and State was forced to retract its original statement,
although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered.
As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlines
around the world, the incident caused the State Department to
revamp its internal system for making announcements about in-
telligence matters.
E
Blackmail was agin the theme in the mid-1960s when the
President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the
296
_installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the
device was turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large (297)
part of the island's power. In this case, the local government
ཀ་
reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore's.
13-00000
13
US goverment that he might oust certain intelligence instal-
lations from his island. The CIA had a major interest in the
matter, siit operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice FBIS! listening post there, and the Pentagon was also con-
www
:!
cerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveil-
lance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was
that Makarios had to be mollified at practically all costs.
Finally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the
w ily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about
$10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA
put up half of the money, using the Director's Contingency Fund
for this unforseen expense.
298,
299
In general, the presence of American intelligence facili-
ties in a foreign country can have an important effect on Amer-
ican policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World.
Closely aligned countries, such as England, Jermany, Japan,
and Australia, have usually allowed the United States to set
up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of
cooperation between allies. But to the less developed countries,
the presence of an American installation is both a threat and
an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition for-
ces who look on the base as an example of "neo-colonialism"
and use it as a weapon against those in power. The opportunity
arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly
for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment--and to
keep it in place, as Archbishop Makarios discovered.
300
13-00000
Byp
The only American military bases in Africa are in fact pri- 301
marily intelligence facilities. These are Kagnew in Ethiopia
and Kenitra in Morocco.
..7 BC
Both host governments have been severely
criticized by internal forces and neighboring countries for
giving the United States a foothold in their nations, but both
have been handsomely rewarded in terms of receiving American
military and economic assistance which had added up over the
years into the hundreds of millions of dollars,
tively modest amounts of aid would have probably been supplied,
even if there had been no bases, the large size of the programs
represented, in effect, a direct payment for the intelligence
facilities.
While compara-
S
Similarly, from 1956 until the end of 1969, the US Air Force
operated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan, which was pri-
marily an intelligence facility. For several years before Francis
Gary Powers' abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960,
CIA U-2 planes used Peshawar as a principal take-off point for
reconnaissance flights over and along the edges of the Soviet
Uniion.
LOND
2377
In addition, military intelligence set up a vast array (302)
of electronic listening devices there to monitor activities
within the Soviet Union.] From the early days of the Eisenhower
administration, the United States had allied itself more closely
with Pakistan than with India in those two countries' traditional
struggle. Yet, at least some experts on the region believe
that an important factor in the American "tilt" toward Pakistan,
at least until the late 1960s, was the desire to hold on to the
E
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13-00000
penetration, while clearly fortuitous, are not unique in clandestine operations. /
3
4
In 1964, it was learned that the American embassy in Moscow had been thoroughly 2
bugged by the KGB. Scores of Soviet audio devices were found throughout the
building. Counterespionage and security specialists determined that the
equipment had been installed in 1952 when the embassy had been renovated, and
that the bugs had been operational for roughly twelve years. The damage report
asserted that during this entire pariod at the height of the cold war
--
--
Soviet intelligence had probably intercepted every diplomatic cable between
5
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7
8
Washington and the embassy. This assessment was based on the discovery of electr
audio devices in the code room which would he allowed the Soviets to hear
distinctly the sounds being maded by the typewriters and cryptographic equipment.
It was a reasonably easy technological feat well within Soviet capabilities
--
to translate such sounds into their true alphabetical meaning.
--
American suspicions about the Soviet eavesdropping were apparently aroused
early in 1964 when Soviet leader Khrushchev made a remark to Ambassador Fay-Foy
Kohler about Kübler's role in blocking the shipment to the Soviet Union of
steel for an important popeline. Taken in context, Khrushchev's remark indicated
to Kohler that there was a leak somewhere in American security. Kohler started
a massive investigation, and within a month or two, forty-odd bugs were found
embedded in walls throughout the embassy. Although Kohler would later claim
there was no connection between the discovery of the bugs and the investigation
he ordered after his conversation with Khrushchev, the timing would seem to
indicate otherwise.
191
☑In any case, the official damage report concluded that for those twelve
crucial years at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets almost certainly knew
every diplomatic secret which was communicated between the American embassy in
Moscow and Washington. The damage report noted, however, that this Soviet
knowledge may well have worked to the advantage of the United States at least
in one instance in 1953 when the Korean War armistice was being negotiated. At
the time, U.S. bargaining position with the North Koreans was that if a particular
14
}
N
2
2
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Halpern
FROM:
H. G. Bean
SUBJECT:
SECRET
DDA 77-2412
28 APR 1977
Acting Executive Officer/DDA
Fairways Corporation
REFERENCE:
Attached memorandum from Central Cover Staff
1. With reference to paragraph 4 in the attached memorandum
from Mr. Latta, to the very best of our knowledge the CIA sponsorship
of the Fairways Corporation has not been officially placed in the
public domain. There has been at least one newspaper article relating
to Fairways and, in addition, at least one short television news
item on the same subject. However, official confirmation of the
allegations of a relationship which was made in these media presentations
has been carefully avoided.
2. There has been official acknowledgement of the fact that
CIA's Office of Training runs a proprietary to provide executive
transportation. Such a statement appeared in the report of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. However, here
again there has been no acknowledgement that such an entity was
identical with or related to the Fairways Corporation.
3. The DDA concurs with the position of CCS as expressed in
paragraph 2 of Mr. Latta's memorandum.
6%
будет
H. G. Bean
Attachment
CC:
CCS
SECRET
CLASSIFIED BY 058779.
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
:
SECRET
077-2340
21 April 1977
Executive Officer to the DDA
M. L. Latta
Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff
SUBJECT
:
Fairways Corporation
1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys
for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168
items previously deleted by court order from the book,
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora-
tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in
this connection.
2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items
(107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respec-
tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on
all four items is that they are still classified, since they
describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an
operational support facility located in the U.S., and are
therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2)
of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive
Order 11652.
3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby
was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair-
ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there
are indications that Director Colby may have responded to
the question in a manner which could have been construed as
admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS
files contain other evidence that the matter was considered
to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when
Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair-
ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public
disclosure.
WARNING NOTICE.
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

13-00000
SECRET
4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its
response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further
on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may
have been placed in the public domain since the court
order (i.e., since February 1975).
For
5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O.
your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line
x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject
for the SA/DO/O.
2
SECRET
M. L. Latta
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Record
attached are DDO Division
DDS&T
responses coordinating
response to John Greeny, JGC,
of
on
deletions from The Cult of
Intelligence by Marks- marchatte
On the basis of the attached
of
DDC position 
was
prepared and sent to Mr. Gravy
over the 
DDO's signature.
FORM
a memo of DDO
5.75 101 USE
action Completed me shepanek
June 1977
PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
13-00000
SECRET
14 June '1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM
Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O
i-
SUBJECT
DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on
Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti¯
-
Marks
1.
In conjunction with the current review of the dele-
tions in subject book for possible declassification, the
DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should
remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached
(see page 3).
2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive
purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have
been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the
details.
.3. The following items should be reviewed by the
components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by
23 June 1977:
Manuscript Page
Review Responsibility
EA Division
Item
25
47
.159
181
EA Division and NE Div.
160
182
"
"
11.
161
183
"
"
"
162
184
"
"
11
163
184
"
12:11
"
"
164
185
.f
"
205
234
NE Division
208
235
LA Division
209
236
LA Division
295
424
.EA Division
297
425
299
426
301
427
☐ 190
214
SECRET
EA Division and EUR Div.
EA Division and EUR Div.
AF Division
SE Division (Office of
Security may be appropriate
action office for this item)
E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
13-00000
SECRET
4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single
coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
please contact the writer on x1542.
Attachments
As Noted Above
O/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek: kaw
Distribution
Original
1
N. A. Shepanek
(1542)
-
-
-
-
C/EA/CA/June
E/FP/FC
NE/COPS
C/AF/Plans
C/SE/OSG
LA/FOIA
SA/DO/O
1
1
1
-
1
2
SECRET
1
1:
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
DDS&T-5193-76/1
27 MAY 1977
ATTENTION
SUBJECT
:
John Greaney
: Review of Deletions from The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks
1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this
directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject
book per your request. The review was made to determine whether
each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the
information in each deletion has been officially released by the
U.S. Government.
2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed
by this directorate. Tab B is a list of those items of primary
interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi-
fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C
is a list of those items which we determined are still classified
under EO 11652%; however, some portions of three items can be
released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be.
coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of
items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and
should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list
of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can
now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified
and should not be released.
3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National
Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina-
tions through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any
coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General
Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other ele-
ments was attempted.
This memorandum completes the DDS&T action on the
court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.
4.
Maroc J. Zellemen
ERNEST J. ZELLMER
Associate Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
-2 IMPORT CL BY 005166
Attachments:
As Stated
SECRET
13-00000
DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T
TAB A
Item
Page
Item
Page
28
25
47
190
214
86
104
191
214
87
104
192
215
88
105
204
233
91
106
205
234
192
107
208
235
135
134
209
236
136
135
245
268
155
177
248
269
157
.179
254
327
158
180
258
331
159
181
259
331
160
182
260
331
161
.183
267
337
163
184
268
337
164
185
269
337
165
185
275
394
166
185
295
424
167
185
297
425
170
189
299
426
171
189
301
427
172
189
302
427
173
190
304
430
174
191
306
431
175
191
312
442
176
192
313
450
177
193
324
474
178
194
325
474
187
200
327
475
188
201
328
476
189
202
329
480
13-00000
Tab B
ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T
AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED
Item
Manuscript Page
91
106
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
92
107
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
*135
134
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
136
135
155
177
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
SECRET, 5B (3)
158
180
163
184
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
SECRET, 5B (2) and (3)
165
185
166
185
167
185
188
201
SECRET, 5B (3)
CONFIDENTIAL, 5B (2)
CONFIDENTIAL, 5B (2)
TOP SECRET, 5B (2)
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000
Tab C
ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN
CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS
Manuscript Page
Item
* 25
47
DDO
* 87
104
DOD (DIA)
88
105
DOD (DIA)..
157
179
OS
159
181
DDO, OC, ERDA
160
182
DDO, OC, ERDA
161
183
DDO, OC, ERDA
162
184
DDO, OC, ERDA
163
184
DDO
164
185
DDO
172
189
NSA
187
200
DOD (Navy)
189
202
DOD (Navy)
204
233
NSA and DDO
205
234
DDO
208
235
DDO.
209
236
DDO
245
268
DOD (SAFSS)
248
269
DOD (SAFSS)
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327
258
331
DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
DOD (SAFSS)
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000
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.Continued
Item
Manuscript Page
259
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DOD (SAFSS)
260
331
DOD (SAFSS)
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DOD (Navy)
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DOD (Navy)
269
337
DOD (Navy)
*275
394
OL
295
424
DDO
297
425
DDO
299
426
DDO,
NSA
301
427
DDO, OC, NSA
302
427
NSA
304
430
NSA
L
306
431
DOD (Navy)
312
442
NSA
313
450
NSA
329
480
NSC Staff
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
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Tab Ꭰ .
ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS
Item
Manuscript Page
86
104
O/DCI
170
189
NSA
171
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190
NSA
174
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NSA
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NSA
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192
NSA
177
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NSA
178
194
NSA
190
214
DDO or OS
191
214
192
215
324
474
325
474
327
475
State Department
State Department
DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
DOD
DDI and DOD
328
476
DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

13-00000
:
SECRET
Tab E
E
.ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE
Item 135, Manuscript page 134
"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in [1967]
when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research laboratory]
in the Boston area.
"
Item 25, Manuscript page 47
"Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the
Nationalists first to run guerrilla attacks against mainland
China and then in more recent years to use Taiwan as a base
for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots
trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of
the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda
and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revol-
ution.'
Item 87, Manuscript page 107
"The Agency also had a project to determine where American
prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to
[communicate with them Scale models of the prisons were
constructed from aerial and satellite photography and from
other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which
prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate.
Some of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their
infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending
coded messages relating where they were being held.
Thus,
the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the
families to send answers back Meanwhile, the Technical
Services Division of the"
Item 275, Manuscript page 394
'new optics for satellite cameras and improvements in 'over
the horizon' radars These technical contracts were almost
always drawn up under the cover of being between the scholar
(or the university) and some government agency other than the
ČIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were
the most"
SECRET
13-00000
Tab C
ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN
CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS
Manuscript Page
Item.
* 25
47
DDO
* 87
104
DOD (DIA)
88
105
DOD (DIA)
157
179
OS
159
181
DDO, OC, ERDA
160
182
DDO, OC, ERDA
161
183
DDO, OC, ERDA
162
184
DDO, OC, ERDA
163
184
DDO
164
185
DDO
172
189
NSA
187
200
DOD (Navy)
189
202
DOD (Navy).
204
233
NSA and DDO
205
234
DDO
208
235
DDO
209
236
DDO
245
268
DOD (SAFSS)
248
269
DOD (SAFSS)
254
327
DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff
258
331
DOD (SAFSS)
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
13-00000
Tab C
Continued
Item
Manuscript Page
259
331
DOD (SAFSS)
260
331
DOD (SAFSS)
267
337
DOD (Navy)
268
337
DOD (Navy)
269
337
DOD (Navy)
* 275
394
OL
295
424
DDO
297
425
DDO
299
426
DDO, NSA
301
427
DDO, OC, NSA
302
427
NSA
304
430
NSA
306
431
DOD (Navy).
312
442
NSA
313
450
NSA
329
480
NSC Staff
*Can be sanitized and portions released.
-2-
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Tab D
ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS
Item
Manuscript Page
.86
: 104
O/DCI
170
189.
NSA
171
189
NSA
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190
NSA.
174
191
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175
191
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176
192
NSA
177
193
NSA
178
194
NSA
190
214
DDO or OS
191
214
192
215
324
474
State Department
State Department
DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff
325
474
DOD
327
475
DDI and DOD
328
476
DDI, DOD and NSC Staff
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
CONFIDENTIAL
☑ SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
FROM:
Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O
2D0109
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
2.
Ralph J. Katrosh.
SA/DO/O
3. Mr. Robert Skidmore
C/EA/CA
5D3102 Hqs.
4.
RECEIVED
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
FORWARDED
June
DATE
1542
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
نثار
14 June 1977
COMMENTS. (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
15 JUN 1977
1/6 JUN 1977
RLS The EA ITEMS cited
Should remain classified
as They reveal somers
Methods and 
have 
not
fren
placed in the
public demain by The
USF.
R.c. Skidmies
5.
ACEA
16
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
SA/00/0
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY.
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
See Distribution
FROM
:
Norbert A. Shepanek
SUBJECT
:
14 June 1977
O/SA/DO/O
DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on
Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks
1.
In conjunction with the current review of the dele-
tions in subject book for possible declassification, the
DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should
remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached.
(see page 3).
2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive
purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have
been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the
details.
3. The following items should be reviewed by the
components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by
23 June 1977:
Manuscript Page
Review Responsibility
EA Division
Item
25
47
159
181
EA Division and NE Div.
160
182
"
"
"
"
161
183
"
"
"
"
162
184
"
"
"
"
163
184
"
"
"
"
164
185
"
"
"1
"
205
234
NE Division
208
235
LA Division
209
236
LA Division
295
424
EA Division
297
425
299
426
301
427
190
214
SECRET
EA Division and EUR Div.
EA Division and EUR Div.
AF Division
SE Division (Office of
Security may be appropriate
action office for this item)
E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
13-00000
SECRET
4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single
coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
please contact the writer on x1542.
Attachments
As Noted Above
0/SA/DO/O: NAShepanek: kaw
Distribution
Original
-
C/EA/CA
1
-
E/FP/FC
1
1
1
2
-
-
-
NE/COPS
C/AF/Plans
C/SE/OSG
LA/FOIA
SA/DO/O
N. A. Shepanek
(1542)
SECRET
13-00000
•Hage
47.
SECRET
4
Hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the
strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a
desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was
not (new),
so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. A CIA
owned, New York based proprietary company, named RTV, provided the technical
expertise and management skills to put the station in operation.]
Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special
relationship is Nationalist China. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is
not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent,
Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the
State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something
of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all-
night drinking bouts with the younger Chiang.
(24)
Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first
to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent
years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist
pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland
and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at
China during the Cultural Revolution. ]
In South Vietnam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally
conducting all important meetings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was
of station
accompanied by the CIA chief when there was Agency business to be discussed.
But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for
many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President.
According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has
served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal
meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea.
personally with
Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu personáljjyith millions of
Haundered money)
dollars in untraceable, "black bag" funds, in addition to the hundreds of
6
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Page-257
181
SECRETS
the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the analysts in making
*
a confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content.
Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive
large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from
actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance
(which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was said) with agent
"
reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services
confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose
function it is to analyze foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make
decisions based on that intelligence analysis.
159
In the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and
the experts of the Scientific and Technical Directorate combineddforces to
carry out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful)
intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level
U.S. government officials were disturbed by reports that Communist China was on
the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system.
They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's would play an important part
in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest
priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtze, the
Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.
The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-
ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from
the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information
to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain
peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the
Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to
the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA
Taboratories. the Clandestine Services took on the responsibility for the mos
SECRET
1
13-00000
)
182. SECRET
[ difficult plase of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top. (140) 1
The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the
Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the
CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not
only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project.
Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry
the device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it.
into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered
Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb.
Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experienced
CIA case officer.
That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian
climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret
CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn
how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi.
Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international
mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an
ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the
technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the
CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements
with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was
clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport
plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were
brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from
where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda
Devi.
Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the
Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking
too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the
A
- A
^_
N M
3
4
S
८
1
SECRET

13-00000
183.
SECRET
(161)
would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base
camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by
a small party of climbers accompanied by a few porters. Soon after the
group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to
tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the
staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes.
The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in
an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now well off
schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition
because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency
operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its
target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures
well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into
operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news
of the successful installation was cadioed back to the staging area.
But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been
sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over
the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the
device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government
was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi
that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headgaters of the sacred
Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about
religious pollution, not ecological.
The CIA reacted by planning another climbe of the mountain for the following
year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring
system
--
this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team,
led by Bishop, was gathered together again and this time it reached the
top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was
set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year
7
13-00000
Bago 260-
184
SECRET
before was not found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor device 162,
stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical
malfunction.
At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the
Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved
satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were
thanked and compensated for their cooperation. The American climbers were
presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA.
And
[ The fertile imaginations of the S&T experts during the following
years produced many more unique coblrction schemes aimed at solving the
mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be
unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential.
The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man
airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In
concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into
the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would
assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border.
Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with
this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards.
A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could 16=
be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall
slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three
feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, and aerial rising from
andaerial
its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still
later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most
likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a
foreign and hostile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional
similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine
raised serious questions as to the system's utility and worth. The S&T
Z
k
13-00000
Page 201
185
SECRET
( specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however 1641)
oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile
installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear
to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear.
attack. Development of the Costly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The
technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device
in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself
several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation
that the device failed to self-activate and function properly.]
A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, (165)
such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which
could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well
over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble
on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once
over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras
would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either
to its launch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated
Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the
CIA in research on this "baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in
to be
the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was of course, that if
and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an
Agency-sponsored spying mission.
The technical difficulties involved in the air-drop/system and the mode 1]
✓ airplane device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully
developed by their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite
surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement
for these questionable and potentially provocative collection systems before
they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices
more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value were also being
bløtand
--
a few
166
167
2
3
4
13-00000
424.
SECRET
xt
Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced
it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its
operation against Cuba. The President may have set the original
policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply
by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agency
paramilitary activities against Guatamala.
CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on Amer-
ican foreign policy: They can subject the country to blackmail
if something goes wrong. For instance, after th CIA pilot was
shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within rive days
the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000
tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in
small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that
moment, the CIA was actively backing an armed revolution against
the Sukarno regime hese would have been strange actions indeed
for the US government to take if it were not extremely concerned
about saving the captured pilot.
-
A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960
after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city
to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy.
When the Agency technician plugged in his polygraph machine in
a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building. The
8928.
*This was not the only time that the CIA blow major sos var-
During the mid-1960s, the Agency added to its nutəmir
facilities on Taiwan by building a juge electronic
SECRET
L
295
SECRET
13-00000
425 SECRET
E
lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were
soon all under arrest. The Singapore government and the British,
who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence,
were both quite disturbed by the indident. Negotiations then
ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the US government offered $3.3 mil-
lion to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten times as
much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIA
officials were subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretary
of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to the
Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech
as an example of the type of activities engaged in by the CIA.
The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by
the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee's
charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk's letter of d-
pology, and State was forced to retract its original statement,
although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered.
As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlines.
around the world, the incident caused the State Department to
revamp its internal system for making announcements about in-
telligence matters.
1.5.
Blackmail was agin the theme in the mid-1960s when the
President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the
296
✓ installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the
device was turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large 297
14
part of the island's power. In this case, the local government
reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore's.
SECRET
13-00000
物
13
426
SECRET
US government that he might oust certain intelligence instal-
lations from his island. The CIA had a major interest in the
matter, sit operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
vice FBIS) listening post there, and the Pentagon was also con-
cerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveil-
lance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was
that Makarios had to be mollified at practically all costs.
Finally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the
wily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about
$10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA
put up half of the money, using the Director's Contingency Fund
for this unforseen expense
298
299
In general, the presence of American intelligence facili-
ties in a foreign country can have an important effect on Amer-
ican policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World.
Closely aligned countries, such as England, Jermany, Japan,
and Australia, have usually allowed the United States to set
up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of
cooperation between allies. But to the less developed countries,
the presence of an American installation is both a threat and
an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition for-
ces who look on the base as an example of "neo-colonialism”
and use it as a weapon against those in power. The opportunity
arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly
for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment--and to
keep it in place, as Archbishop Makarios discovered.
SECRET
(300
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O
2D0109
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
2.
Ralph J. Katrosh
SA/DO/O
3. Crocky Hogg
LA/FOIA
3C34 Has
4.
5. Norbert Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O
:6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
200109
DATE
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
14
June
16'
June.
EXTENSION
NO.
1542 DATE
9564
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
14 June 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column. after each comment.)
To 5:
To the best of our
knowledge, items 208 and
209 have not been made
public.
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED_
13-00000
SECRET
14 June 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM
SUBJECT
Norbert A. Shepanek
O/SA/DO/O
DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on
Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks
1.
In conjunction with the current review of the dele-
tions in subject book for possible declassification, the
DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should
remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached
(see page 3).
2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive
purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have
been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the
details.
3. The following items should be reviewed by the
components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by
23 June 1977:
Item.
Manuscript Page
Review Responsibility
EA Division
25
159
160
161
162
163
164
47
181
EA Division and NE Div.
182
"
"
"
"
183
"
"
"
"
184
"
"
"1
184
"
"
"
"
.11
"
"
185
IT
205
208
209
295
297
299
301
234
NE Division
LA Division
235
236
LA Division
.424
425
426
190
427
214
SECRET
EA Division
EA Division and EUR Div.
EA Division and EUR Div.
AF Division
SE Division (Office of
Security may be appropriate
action office for this item)
E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
13-00000
SECRET
4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single
coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
please contact the writer on x1542.
Attachments
As Noted Above
0/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek: kaw
Distribution
Original
1
1
1
1
1
2
=
C/EA/CA
E/FP/FC
-
-
-
.-
. -
NE/COPS
C/AF/Plans
C/SE/OSG
LA/FOIA
SA/DO/O
(signed) Norbert A. Shepanek
N. A. Shepanek
(1542)
SECRET
C
13-00000
Page 370
235
SECRET
(situation. in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were
one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept
his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each
State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy
of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of
each intercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be
kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.
Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information, ]
Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield
to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at
CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor,
they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were
unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so
aggravated by this continued resistance that he personally telephoned Secretary
of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing
completely to the CIA position.
[Bob
- NM +
3
4
5
6
7
ૐ
G
1
"
12
208)
OUT
Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D
worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain
South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of
allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent
by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercppt
the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements
were normal procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw
nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which
cooperated in good faith.
FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period
of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over
unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship.
However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could
be restored.7
2
2
SECRET

13-00000
Page 311
236
SECRET
OUT
2
3
H
Sometime later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite 2091
that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the
international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive
operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other
CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and 5
wether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to 6
be a matter concerning CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn
from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American
country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel (which
CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme ven
with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.
Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the
country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that
country's secret messages.
Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the
Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who
probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in
a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies
within the U.S. government not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues
perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into
liaison agreements with FI/D.
--
Bob X is one of these bodinary looking people who mow their lawn, love
their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.
Two
Fow other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes
similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and E. Howard Hunt. Both had long,
relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-
middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security
officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt
was an onerator who plaved a leading role in the Bay of Pigs and who took part
7
9
10
12
13.
14
15
16
17
18
"
26
21
22
23
2<
نه ته که نه
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
E/FP/FC
4 B 4406
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
O/SA/DO/O
Mr.
Shepanek
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ས
7.
8.
9.
10.
11..
12.
13.
14.
15.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
RECEIVED
DATE
FORWARDED
EXTENSIONS
1872
NO959 AM $71
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
23 June 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
S-E-C-R-E-T
23 June 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
O/SA/DO/O
FROM
:
SUBJECT
:
REFERENCE
William W. Phelps
EUR/FP/FC
Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti
Book
: SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977
European Division concurs that the two items involving
EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain
classified.
William W Phelps
William W. Phelps'
S-E-C-R-E-T
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY 003283
---་་་་
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
FROM
SUBJECT
:
REFERENCE
S-E-C-R ET
:
William W. Phelps
23 June 1977
EUR/FP/FC
Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti
Book
SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977
European Division concurs that the two items involving
EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain
classified.
William W. Phelps
S-E-C-R-E-T
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
NE/COPS
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1. O/SA/DO/O
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
B.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
Attn:
Mr. Shepanek
TUBE: DX-6
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
EXTENSION NO.
9165
DATE
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
23 June 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ATTENTION
FROM
77
JUN 23 1 12 PM, 1977
June
O/SA/DO/O
: Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek
:
Joyce R. Herrmann
Chief of Operations, NE Division
DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on
Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks
SUBJECT
:
NE Division has researched the seven DDS&T items cited
in reference and to our knowledge none of the items cited
have been legally placed in the public domain. Therefore,
the items remain classified under Executive Order 11652 as
listed below:
Manuscript
Page
Item
Exemption
159
181
5B (2) (3)
160
182
5B. (2) (3)
161
183
5B (2) (3)
162
184
5B (2) (3)
163
184
5B (2) (3)
164
185
5B (2) (3)
205
234
5B (2) (3)
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIDENCE SOURCES
AND MENS
DAVED
SECRET
JenueR. Human
Joyce R. Herrmann
сели
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979
13-00000
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
AC/SE
5B4803
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
O/SA/DO/O
2D0109
2.
3.
4.
Shop
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
3-62
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
RECEIVED
DATE
FORWARDED
124
EXTENU 24 NO. 10 26 AM '77
9045
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
>>
DATE
23 June 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
SECRET
23 JUN 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO for
ATTENTION
:
FROM
:
SUBJECT
:
REFERENCE
:
External Oversight
Norbert A. Shepanek
Katharine C. Hart
Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division
Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence
by Marchetti Marks
-
Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS&T Request
for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions
in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti -
Marks, dated 14 June 1977
1.
We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division
interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.
This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book,
The Cult of Intelligence. Checking against official disclosures
we have determined the item is still properly classified under
Executive Order 11652.
2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet
capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio
devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in
Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to
cryptography and is exempt from the General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(2).
Katham C. Hart
Katharine C. Hart
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014652
13-00000
SECRET
23 JUN 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ATTENTION
FROM
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
Special Assistant to the DDO for
External Oversight
:
: Norbert A. Shepanek
Katharine C. Hart
Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division
Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence
by Marchetti Marks
Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS&T Request.
for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions
in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti
Marks, dated 14 June 1977
:
1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division
interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.
This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book,
The Cult of Intelligence. Cheating against official disclosures
we have determined the item is still properly classified under
Executive Order 11652.
2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet
capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio
devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in
Moscow, remains classified SHORET. This item relates to
cryptography and is exempt the General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(2).
Katharine C. Hart
Katharine C. Hart
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014652
$
13-00000
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination
Deletions in the Cult of Int 1:11
FROM:
Chief, Africa Plans
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
RECEIVED
Ø
EXTENSION NO.
1326
DATE
Certain
SECRET
by Marchetti-Marks
FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
6 JUL 1977
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
DATE
1.
2.
3.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
O/SA/DO/O
Attn: Mr. Shepanek
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
may
Fale
-
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000
SECRET
6 JUL 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
SUBJECT
:
0/SA/DO/O
Attn: Mr. Shepanek
Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans
DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination
on Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks
We concur in the DDS&T's conclusion that Item 301,
page 247 remain
classified.
Java B
Edward J. Foy, Jr.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM
O/SA/DO/O
Attn:
Mr. Shepanek
: Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans
6 JUL 1977
SUBJECT
:
DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination
on Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks
We concur in the DDS&T's conclusion that Item 301,
page 247 remain
classified.
/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JR.
Edward J. Foy, Jr.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904
SECRET
:
13-00000
LEFT
5192
Pagel
тор
373120
22
24 FEB1977
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Transcript of the President's News Con
Following is a transcript of Presi-
dent Carter's news conference in
Washington yesterday afternoon, as
recorded by The New York Times
through the facilities of ABC News:
Opening Statement i
Good afternoon everybody. I'd like
to make a very brief statement as a
progress report to the American people
of some items that are important to
¡ us.
i
We have submitted and the Congress
is now considering legislation to give
me the authority to reorganize the
executive branch of Government. The
Senate Committee under Senator Ribic-
off has now completed their hearings
and they'll be marking up the bill
beginning tomorrow.
The House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations under Congressman
Jack Brooks has scheduled hearings to
begin on March 1.
So because of the interest of the
American people and the Congress and
myself in completing this very crucial
project I think the Congress is moving
with great expedition to give me that
authority.
We've also initiated with directions.
to the members of the Cabinet and
other agency heads a new program to
cut down on the extremely great over-
load of paper work with a requirement
that those who prepare Government
regulations be responsible for the
preparation assigned them. I've asked
my Cabinet officers to read the regula-
tions that are forthcoming from their
departments each week until they see
the volume and the complexity of them,
and we hope to eliminate unnecessary
regulations, abbreviate those that are
necessary and express them in a lan-
guage so that we can all understand
them.
I've also asked major elements of
our own society, the university profes-
sors and the state officials in this last
week to give me their suggestions on
how the regulations might be improved.
We have done the same thing with
reports required by the Federal Govern-
nient. I hope to reduce drastically the
number of reports and the frequency
of those reports and the complexity..
of them.
We will complete the proposed legis-
lation on creating a new Department
of Energy this week. The proposed
legislation is now on my desk. It will
be submitted to the Congress for action
the first of next week. And we've con-
sulted very closely with the key leaders
in the Congress and I believe there's
going to be a rapid creation of this
new department and a heavy emphasis
on the importance of energy questions
to our people.
We will also present to the American
people. probably at a joint session of
the Congress a speech by me about
April 20, a comprehensive energy poli-
cy which would involve all the com-
plexities of the energy question. It's
something that's long overdue and it's
going to be quite profound in its impact
on the American consciousness and our
society, and I hope it will be compre-.
1.
President Carter walking past reporters
I'm not going to leave of not comment-
ing directly on any specific C.I.A. ac-
tivity. But I can tell you that I have
begun a complete analysis which will
be completed within the next week of
all activities by the C.I.A. I've received
substantial reports already.
I've reviewed the more controversial
revelations that have been publicized
in the last few days, some quite errone-
ous, some with some degree of accura-
cy. These same operations have been
reviewed by the Intelligence Oversight
Board, an independent board, and also
by my predecessory, President Ford.
I have not found anything illegal or
improper.
If in future assessments, which will.
come quite early, I discover such an
impropriety or an illegality I will not
only take immediate action to correct
it but also will let the American people
know about it.
I might say this. This is a very serious
problem of how in a democracy to have
adequate intelligence gathered, as-
sessed and used to guarantee the se-
curity of our country. It's not part of.
the American nature to do things in
secret. Obviously, historically and still
at this modern time there is a necessity
to protect sources of information from
other nations. Sometimes other Gov-
ernments cooperate with us fully;
sometimes they don't.
But I'll try to be sure, and so will
Stan. Turner, who will be the next
director of the intelligence community.
He will try to be sure that every thing
we do is not only proper and legal,
but also compatible with the attitudes
of the American people.
One other point I'd like to make is
this. It can be extremely damaging to
our relationship with other nations, to
the potential security of our country
.....
after news conference at the E:
with labor and management. Bu
whether I'll be successful, I don't know
I'm just going to have to do my best.
6. Human Rights Abroad
Q. In your letter to Mr. Sakharov
you said that the United States would
use its good offices to seek the release
of prisoners of conscience. And you
said that you wanted to continue to
shape a world responsible to human
aspirations. As you know there are
human rights problems in many other
countries. And some of them like Iran
or the Philippines we support with
arms, or we support with American aid.
These are countries where many people
believe we have more leverage than
we might have in the Soviet Union.
What if anything do you plan to try
to do to help victims of political repres
sion in these countries?
on
A. I think without my trying to take
credit for it there has been a substan-
tial move toward concern about human
rights throughout the world. I think
this has taken place in probably a
dozen or more different couries,
There's an arousing interest in the posi-
tion that our own Government here in
our free country does take. Obviously
there are deprivations of human rights
even more brutal than the ones
which we've commented up to now.
In Uganda the actions there have dis-
gusted the entire civilized world and,
as you know, we have no diplomatic
relationships with Uganda. But he e is
an instance where both Ambassador
Andrew Young and I have expressed
great concern about what is there. The
British are now considering asking the
United Nations to go into Uganda to
assess the horrible murders that appar-
ently are taking place in that country-
13-00000
PAGE 3
MIDDLE
LEFT
Side
412
allu
LONGIC
going to be a rapid creation of this
new department and a heavy emphasis
on the importance of energy questions
to our people..
We will also present to the American
people. probably at a joint session of
the Congress a speech by me about
April 20, a comprehensive energy poli-
cy which would involve all the com-
plexities of the energy question. It's
something that's long overdue and it's
going to be quite profound in its impact
on the American consciousness and our
society, and I hope it will be compre..
hensive enough so that it can be well-
balanced and fair to all.
1
We are quite concerned about the
pressures of ination. The advisers to
me on economics are trying to assess
all Government programs and private
actions that contribute to inflationary
pressures. When this analysis is done
I will use every means that I have
available to me to express these con-
cerns and possibly corrective actions.
to the American people as well.
And the last point is that we will
have 2. complete analysis underway
Now on deregulation. And the first
question is the deregulation of the air
lines. Legislation is in the Congress
now. We'll be submitting a message
to Congress very shortly on that sub-
ject. We will not submit administration
legislation because the Congress has
already moved substantially forward in
dealing with this important issue.
And now I'd like to answer questions.
Mr. Frank Cormier.
Questions and Answers
1. Defense Budget
Mr. President, you told the Demo-
cratic Platform. Committee that you
thought present defense expenditures
could be reduced by five to seven bil-
dion dollars. Now I think you may have
modified your position somewhat since
then. Obviously in your short time in
office you didn't find the opportunity
to make cuts like that in your precedes-
sor's budget. But isn't it also likely
that next year's budget for the defense
will exceed this year's.
A. Well because of inflationary pres-
sures and because of an impossibility
of assessing the potential threat to our
country from other nations, it's hard
to predict exactly what the level of
defense spending will be. In the short
time that we had available to work
on the previous Administration's budg-
et-about three weeks of hard work-
we were able to reduce the suggested
expenditures by almost $3 billion. I
think about $2.75 billion.
This was done-and I think Senator
Stennis in his recent public statements
has confirmed that it has been done
without weakening our own defense
capability. And the substantial savings
in defense spending that will still leave
us muscle will be in such things as
the standardization of weapons, long-
range planning, a more businesslike al-
location of defense contracting, an as-
sessment of the defense contracts for
construction or repair already out-
standing.
A reassessment of priorities of the
evolution of new weapons which in the
future can become enormously expen-
sive; a longer assignment of military
personnel to a base before they are
transferred; some emphasis on the cor-
rection of inequities and unfairnesses
in the retirement system.
These things obviously can't be done
in three weeks, but they will be an
ongoing effort on my part. And I think
the 1979 budget, which will be my Ad-
ministration's first hudent
11
+
other nations. Sometimes other Göv¯¯
ernntents cooperate with
us fully;
sometimes they don't.
But I'll try to be sure, and so will
Stan. Turner, who will be the next
director of the intelligence community.
He will try to be sure that every thing
we do is not only proper and legal,
but also compatible with the attitudes
of the American people.
One other point I'd like to make is
this. It can be extremely damaging to
our relationship with other nations, to
the potential security of our country
even in peacetime, for these kinds of
operations which are legitimate and
proper to be revealed. It makes it hard
for us to lay a ground work on which
we might predicate a successful meet-
ing of a threat to us in time of war
if we don't have some degree of secre-
cy.
I'm quite concerned about the num-.
ber of people now who have access
to this kind of information. And I've
been working very closely with the
Congressional leaders, yesterday and
today, to try to reduce the overall num-
ber of people who have access to the
sources of information that within the
bounds that I've described propriety
and legality and American attitudes to-
ward secre-I'll do the best I can
not ever to make a mistake. And I'm
also assuming on a continuing basis
a direct personal reponsibility for the
operation of all the ingelligence agen-
cies in our Government to make sure
that they are meeting these standards.
3. Correcting Errors on C.I.A.
Q. If there has been erroneous infor-
mation, wouldn't it behoove you to cor-
rect the record?
A. In some ways we are correcting
the record, but if I began to either dis-
pute or confirm every individual story
that's written whether correct or er-
the C.I.A., then these matters which
roneous on every matter relating to
are necessarily secret would no longer
be secret, so I'm not going to comment
on individual items that relate to intel-
ligence.
4. Difference With Meany
Q. Mr. President, George Meany says
he won't go along with your idea for
pre-notification on wage and price in-
creases. And my question really is, how
hard, are you going to press Mr. Meany
to go along and do you have anything
else in mind that you could use in the
way of Government involving itself to
try to control inflation?
A. I announced earlier my firm com
mitment not to have mandatory. wage
and price laws or authority, not to have
standby wage and price authority. I've
not made any proposal to Mr. Meany
or any other labor leader nor to any
representative of industry or manufac-
turing. But I will retain the option in
the future of assessing what we need
to do to control inflation.
I've emphasized always the word
"voluntary." And to the extent that
I can arrive at a common understand-
ing with industry and labor leaders that
a certain amount of cooperation and
information can be exchanged before
a major proposal is made. I think that's
a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can't
force it. It's got to be voluntary. And
that's as far as I can go with my an-
swer.
5. Wage-Price Guidelines
Q. You mean just directly about wage
"
there are deprivations of human rights
even more brutal than the ones on
which we've commented up to now.
In Uganda the actions there have dis-
gusted the entire civilized world and,
as you know, we have no diplomatic
relationships with Uganda. But he e is
an instance where both Ambassador
Andrew Young and I have expressed
great concern about what is there. The
British are now considering asking the
United Nations to go into Uganda to
assess the horrible murders that appar-
ently are taking place in that country-
the persecution of those who have
aroused the arc of Mr. Amin.
1770
chach
--in
th
I've expres my concern ab
prisoned ped rers in
Korea, in Cuba, in many countris
several countries, rather, in
America and I'll continue to do so. I
have never had an inclination to single
out the Soviet Union as the only place
where human rights are being abridged.
We have, I think, a responsibility and
a legal right to express our disapproval
of violations of human rights. The Hel
sinki Agretment,
allad
Rocket:
Three Provision, insures that some of
these human rights shall be preserved.
We are a signatory of the Helsinki
agreement. We are ourselves culpable
in some ways for not giving people
adequate rights to move around our
country or restricting unnecessarily, in
my opinion, visitation to this country
by those who disagree with us political-
ly.
So I think that we all ought to take
a position in our own country and
among our friends and allies, among
our potential adversaries, that human
rights is something on which we should
bear a major responsibility for leader.
ship. And I have made it clear to the
Soviet Union and to others in the East-
ern European community that I'm not
trying to launch a unilateral criticism
of them, that I'm trying to set a stand-
ard in our own country and make my
expressed throughout the
world, not singled out against any par-
ticular country.
concerns
Q. Mr. President, the other day. get-
ting back to this C.I.A. thing, when
that story broke your Press Secretary,
when he issued what amounted to a
"no comment" by the White House.
someone asked him if this story had
broken back during the campaign when
you were running for Presiden, would
you have given a similar response? And
he said "well I don't know." So can
I ask you, what would have been your
response? Would it have been the
same? A. I don't know.
7. Review of C.I.A. Activities
Q. Mr. President, on that same sub-
ject, you said earlier that you review.
of C.I.A. activities had found nothing
illegal or improper and you later said
that these activities are legitimate and
proper. Isn't that a value judgment that
the American public might like to
share? But how can they if you refuse
to' give them any idea of what you
have discovered during this review
about payments, including ones made
in secret?
A. That is a value judgment. It's made
by the independent Intelligence Over-
sight Board, which was established and
appointed by President Ford. This
board has made itself available to the
Inspector General and to any employee
within the C.I.A. or within the defense
intelligence agencies or any other to.
receive even rumors of impropriety.
13-000ssures of nation. The advisers to
Left
3015
me on economics are trying to assess
all Government programs and private
actions that contribute to inflationary
pressures. When this analysis is done
I will use every means that I have
available to me to express these con-
cerns and possibly corrective actions.
to the American people as well.
hove
د
3
And the last point is that we will.
complate: analysis underway
Now on deregulation. And the first
question is the deregulation of the air
lines. Legislation is in the Congress
now. We'll be submitting a 
message
to Congress very shortly on that sub-
ject. We will not submit administration
legislation because the Congress has
already moved substantially forward in
dealing with this important issue..
And now I'd like to answer questions.
Mr. Frank Cormier.
Questions and Answers
1. Defense Budget
Mr. President, you told the Demo-
cratic Platform Committee that you
thought present defense expenditures
could be reduced by five to seven bil-
dion dollars. Now I think you may have
modified your position somewhat since
then. Obviously in your short time in
office you didn't find the opportunity
to make cuts like that in your precedes-
sor's budget. But isn't it also likely
that next year's budget for the defense
will exceed this year's.
A. Well because of inflationary pres-
sures and because of an impossibility
of assessing the potential threat to our
country from other nations, it's hard
to predict exactly what the level of
idefense spending will be. In the short
time that we had available to work
on the previous Administration's budg-
et about three weeks of hard work-
we were able to reduce the suggested
expenditures by almost $3 billion. I
think about $2.75 billion.
This was done-and I think Senator
Stennis in his recent public statements
has confirmed that it has been done
without weakening our own defense
capability. And the substantial savings
in defense spending that will still leave
us muscle will be in such things as
the standardization of weapons, long-
range planning, a more businesslike al-
location of defense contracting, an as-
sessment of the defense contracts for
construction or repair already out-
standing.
A reassessment of priorities of the
evolution of new weapons which in the
future can become enormously expen-
sive; a longer assignment of military
personnel to a base before they are
transferred; some emphasis on the cor-
rection of inequities and unfairnesses
in the retirement system.
These things obviously can't be done
in three weeks, but they will be an
ongoing effort on my part. And I think
the 1979 budget, which will be my Ad-
ministration's first budget, will show
these improvements to a substantial de-
gree.
Q. Will next year's defense budget
actually be lower then than the one
that you just revised. A. I can't say
▾ct.
:
2. C.I.A. Accountability
Q. Do you think it was proper for
the C.I.A. to pay off King Hussein and
other foreign leaders? And what steps
are you taking to make yourself more
knowledgeable and more accountable
for what the C.I.A. does?
A. Well, I've adopted a policy which
TUT
us 10 may grounu soLK DIE WHICHE
we might predicate a successful meet-
ing of a threat to us in time of war
if we don't have some degree of secre-
cy.
I'm quite concerned about the num-.
ber of people now who have access
to this kind of information. And I've
been working very, closely with the
Congressional leaders, yesterday and
today, to try to reduce the overall num-
ber of people who have access to the
sources of information that within the
bounds that I've described propriety
and legality and American attitudes to-
ward secrecy-I'll do the best I can
not ever to make a mistake. And I'm
also assuming on a continuing basis
a direct personal reponsibility for the
operation of all the ingelligence agen-
cies in our Government to make sure
that they are meeting these standards.
3. Correcting Errors on C.I.A.
Q. If there has been erroneous infor-
mation, wouldn't it behoove you to cor-
rect the record?
"
A. In some ways we are correcting
the record, but if I began to either dis-
pute or confirm every individual story:
that's written whether correct or er-
roneous on every matter relating to
the C.I.A., then these matters which
are necessarily secret would no longer
be secret, so I'm not going to comment
on individual items that relate to intel-
ligence.
4. Difference With Meany
Q. Mr. President, George Meany says
he won't go along with your idea for
pre-notification on wage and price in-
creases. And my question really is, how
hard, are you going to press Mr. Meany
to go along and do you have anything
else in mind that you could use in the
way of Government involving itself to
try to control inflation?
A. I announced earlier my firm com
mitment not to have mandatory wage
and price laws or authority, not to have
standby wage and price authority. I've
not made any proposal to Mr. Meany
or any other labor leader nor to any
representative of industry or manufac-
turing. But I will retain the option in
the future of assessing what we need
to do to control inflation.
I've emphasized always the word
"voluntary." And to the extent that
I can arrive at a common understand-
ing with industry and labor leaders that
a certain amount of cooperation and
information can be exchanged before
a major proposal is made. I think that's
a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can't
force it. It's got to be voluntary. And
that's as far as I can go with my an-
swer.
5. Wage-Price Guidelines
Q. You mean just directly about wage
and price "guidelines" which might be
voluntary. How is that for an idea?
A. Well I think rigid guidelines are
a mistake. If we said, for instance, that
no price increase or no wage increase
could exceed 6 percent this would be
too restrictive. It would be contrary
to my own philosophy of Government
and I think that because of the diversi-
ty of our society and the fact that it
is a free enterprise system, you've got
to have some flexibility.
But I'd prefer to deal with these
problems that arise on increasing
prices on an individual bases and I also
prefer, of course, to work harmoniously
prisoned po pribers in th
Korea, in Cuba, in many countri --in
several countries, rather, in th
America and I'll continue to do so. I
have never had an inclination to single
out the Soviet Union as the only place
where human rights are being abridged.
~3
We have, I think, a responsibility and
a legal right to express our disapproval
of violations of human rights. The Hel
Rocket
sinki Agreement,
Three Provision, insures that some of
these human rights shall be preserved.
We are a signatory of the Helsinki
agreement. We are ourselves culpable-
in some ways for not giving people
adequate rights to move around our
country or restricting unnecessarily, in
my opinion, visitation to this country
by those who disagree with us political-
ly.
So I think that we all ought to take
a position in our own country and
among our friends and allies, among
our potential adversaries, that human
rights is something on which we should
bear a major responsibility for leader-
ship. And I have made it clear to the
Soviet Union and to others in the East-
ern European community that I'm not
trying to launch a unilateral criticism
of them, that I'm trying to set a stand-
ard in our own country and make my
expressed throughout the
world, not singled out against any par-
ticular country.
concerns
Q. Mr. President, the other day. get-
ting back to this C.I.A. thing, when
that story broke your Press Secretary,
when he issued what amounted to a
"no comment" by the White House,
someone asked him if this story had
broken back during the campaign when
you were running for Presiden, would
you have given a similar response? And
he said "well I don't know." So can
I ask you, what would have beer: your
response? Would it have been the
same? A. I don't know.
7. Review of C.I.A. Activities
Q. Mr. President, on that same sub-
ject, you said earlier that your review:
of C.I.A. activities had found nothing
illegal or improper and you later said
that these activities are legitimate and
proper. Isn't that a value judgment that
the American public might like to
share? But how can they if you refuse
to' give them any idea of what you
have discovered during this review
about payments, including ones made
in secret?
A. That is a value judgment. It's made
by the independent Intelligence Over-
sight Board, which was established and
appointed by President Ford. This
board has made itself available to the
Inspector General and to any employee
within the C.I.A. or within the defense
intelligence agencies or any other to
receive even rumors of impropriety.
They have assessed these operations.
They made their inquiries in the past,
which is in accordance with an execu-
tive order issued by President Ford to
the Attorney General of the United
States and also to the President.
I have read that correspondcare. It's
quite voluminous and think that it's
accurate to say that Senator Inouye's
committee in the Senate and the appro-
priate committees in the House have
also received this information in the
past.
I have talked to Senator Inouye and
he confirms what I've just told you.
And I think he would also conurm that
:
PAGE3
Воттом
13-00000
раде
тор
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1977
Right SIDE
DARTICLES
ference on Foreign and Domestic Matters
The New York Times/Teresa Zabala
cutive Office Buiding in Washington
the impropriety or the illegality does
not exist on any ongoing C.I.A. opera-
tion.
8. Problems With Congress
Q. Mr. President, Charles Kirbo, your
friend Charles Kirbo seems to feel that
you're going to be having a continuing
problem with the Congress and that
you'll have to go over Congress's head.
to the people in order to get results.
Is this true?
A. I think if you read the whole
statement that Mr. Kirbo made, which
is just a private citizen's opinion, he
would say that every President has had
arguments and debates and disagree-
ments with the Congress. And I think
that's inevitable in our system of Gov-
ernment. That's part of the checks and
balances that's very precious to us all.
I have found up to now a growing.
sense of cooperation with the Congress.
I think last week when I was asked
roughly the same question that the
troubles were perhaps underestimated
by the news media. I think now per-
haps the troubles with the Congress
are overestimated. I have frequent
meetings with the Congressional lead-
ers both Democratic. and Republican.
And I think that the progress of the
legislation that we consider to be cru-
'cial which seemed to be moving very
slowly in the past is now speeding up.
So I don't believe that we'll have
nearly the problems with the Congress
that has been the case in recent years.
And I have to say in summary that
I am very pleased with my relationship
with the Congress now.
9. The Election Process
Q. Mr. President, in view of your
assignment to Vice President Mondale
regarding the election laws, could you
give us your view, sir, on the direct
1.1.
But I will work with Congress on
the deregulation of natural gas as a
part of an overall energy policy. By
April 20 I think we'll be prepared to
present to you, the news media, and
the people and the Congress more
specific proposals involving direct
legislation proposals that will answer
your question more fully.
13. Energy Program Sacrifices.
Q. Mr. President, we've been told that
the central thrust of your new energy
program will involve sacrifice and
voluntary conservation, yet the public's.
always reading stories in the paper of
how the major oil companies are with-
holding natural gas. So I'd like to ask
how are you going to expect the public
to make sacrifices when there's such
widespread public suspicion about the
role of the oil companies in the energy
crisis.
A. I think the comprehensive nature
of the proposal that takes in all these
very disparate and sometimes conflict-
ing elements at one time and a long-
range projection of our needs and a
tangible demonstration to the Ameri
can people, to the extent that I'm able
to put it forward, that there will be
direct ultimate benefits to them will
be the elements that will cause them
to make those sacrifices. At the same
time, I want to increase the surety that
we have that the reserve supply data
given to us by the oil companies and
others are accurate.
We are now conducting some admit-
tedly superficial studies by Secretacy
Cecil Andrus in Interior and also they'll
be followed up by more detailed studies
under Dr. Schlesinger, to see whether
or not the reserve supplies are ade-
quate and whether or not the oil com-
panies are giving us accurate data. I
think it's obvious to all of us that there
are some instances where natural gas
is withheld from the market. That's
understandable. If I was running an
oil company I would reserve the right
to release or to reserve some supplies
of natural gas.
With the emergency' legislation that
the Congress did pass, I think in about
a week of assessment during the frigid
part of the winter-it's still very cold-
we were given some authority to buy.
extra gas at a very high price. This
is obviously a transcient circumstance.
But I believe the American people
will be willing to make the sacrifices
required, if they are convinced that fu-
ture reports will be accurate, that sup-
plies will not be withheld from the mar-
ket and if we can let the oil companies
know in a predictable way what our
policy will be two months or two years
or 20 years in the future-within the
bounds of human reason-then I think
they'll be much less likely to withhold
supplies of oil and natural. gas from
the market just hoping that they'll get
some bonanza increased price in the
future if the policies do change.
14. Rise in Gasoline Tax
Q. Another question, sir, on the sacri-
fices that you say your upcoming ener-
gy program is going to demand. Is it
likely that one of those sacrifices is
going to come in the form of a largely
increased Federal gasoline tax?
A. I don't know how to answer your
was a waste. You also promised to cut:
the waste out of the defense budget.
When would you expect to stop
production of the B-1 as opposed to
research and development on the B-1?
A. I think I cut out about more than
$200 million from the B-1 program in
the budget just submitted to the Con
gress. I have serious questions about
whether or not the B-1 ought to be
in the future the center of our airborne.
defense capability.
have several more months before.
I have to make a decision on that mate:
ter and the National Security Council,,
which combines, as you know, State,:
Treasury, Defense and other elements.
of the Government, working very close-
ly with me, is now making a complete
reassessment of the need for the B-L
bomber.
"
I don't know whether we will decide.
to go on with it or not. And I don't
know whether we'll expedite produce
tion of it or not, at this time.
Part of the factor to be assessed is.
the attitude of the Soviet Union. If we
can have a general lessening of tension,
a demonstrated commitment on their
part toward disarmament, it would cer
tainly make it less likely that we would
go ahead with the B-1.
But I can't answer that question unti
I complete my own study, and I think
that would have to be terminated by
the end of May.
18. Campaign Financing Law..
Q. Mr. President, I was a little unclear.
about what you're going to propose
in the campaign finance law. Are you
saying that you will propose to have
alf Congressional elections publicly fi
nanced? A. That's my preference, yes.
Q. Is that what you will propose to
Congress? A. The Vice President is now
doing a study on a complete election
law package. And I'd like to reserve
my own judgment until I see what his
report is to me. But that's my own
inclination. It's a position that I took
during the campaign and so far. I have
no reason to change my mind.
19. Foreign Policy Turntable
ta.
Q. You gave us a kind of a timetable"
for your domestic program in your pre-
liminary statement. I wonder if you
have a similar timetable of what you
hope to achieve in foreign policy be-
tween now and the end of the year,
such as Middle East peace, Cyprus, the
treaty with Panama.
A. Of course I can't answer that
question specifically because I don't
know what cooperation we will get
from other nations and I don't know.
what the inclination of those nations.
in disputed regions of the world want
to do toward one another.
Secretary Cyrus Vance has just re-
turned from what I consider to be a
very successful trip to the Middle East.,
He not only probed with the heads of
those Governments and their Cabinet.
members their own positions, both pube
lic and private on the controversial,
issues that have so far prevented a
peace in the Middle East. He also had
a chance to compare their positions.
on issues which ones they found to
be in harmony, which ones there was
13-00000
радег
MIDDLE
And I have to say in summary that
I am very pleased with my relationship
with the Congress now.
9. The Election Process
Q. Mr. President, in view of your
assignment to Vice President Mondale
regarding the election laws, could you
give us your view, sir, on the direct
election of a President versus the Elec-
toral College. And also do you think
that the public financing should be ex-
tended to Congress as well as the Presi-
dency?
A. There are three basic questions
that come up. In the first place, I do
favor at least an automatic vote by
Presidential electors once the general
election is completed. I think the Elec-
toral College, for instance, should be
eliminated. Whether the ratio among
states of votes ought to be changed
I'm not prepared to comment on now.
the mancing of Congres
sional elections by public funds-it has
proved to be successful, I believe, in
the Presidential election. I strongly'
favor that, yes. And the other element
of the overall package would be a sim-
ple way for American people who are
citizens and 18 years old to register
to vote. And I am committed to that
proposition and the Vice President has
graciously consented to take on this
overall election process responsibility.
Those three will be basic elements of
the proposals.
10. Relations With Cuba
Q. Mr. President, are you prepared
to lift the tradé embargo 'against Cuba
as one step toward normalizing rela-
tions?
A, I think any substantial move in
our relationship with Cuba would have
to await further discussions with them
indirectly, and also some tangible evi-
dence on our part that they are willing.
to restore basic human rights in Cuba,
involving the number of prisoners who
are being held, their attitude toward
overseas adventures such as the one
In Angola, and other matters. So I can't
say what might come in the future.
I'm willing, though, to discuss these
matters with the Cuban leaders. At this
time we have no direct relationships
with them, political. But through inter-
mediaries comments are being ex-
changed back and forth. Most of my.
tomments are in public statements like
this, but we do have messages coming
back from people who visit Cuba.
11. Defense Savings Goal
Q. In answer to an earlier question,
Mr. President, you said that you could-
n't say whether next year's defense
budget will be lower or higher than
this year's. But as I understood your
earlier postion, you did want to achieve
a five to seven billion dollar savings
regardless of the overall level of spend-
ing. Do you still hold with that figure?
is that still your goal and a commit-
nent?
A. Yes. The analyses that I've made
of the defense budget so far-which
is you know has been limited to about
month's study just part-time-indi-
ate that that's a goal that will be
feached.
12. Natural Gas Deregulation
Q. Mr. President, in letters to the
governors of Oklahoma, Texas and
Louisiana last October, you said uncon-
ditionally that you would work with
Congress to deregulate new natural
tas. And I wondered if you planned
to keep that promise, and if so how
whout it
"
Apts 40 changer
14. Rise in Gasoline Tax
Q. Another question, sir, on the sacri-
fices that you say your upcoming ener-
gy program is going to demand. Is it
likely that one of those sacrifices is
going to come in the form of a largely
increased Federal gasoline tax?
A. I don't know how to answer your
questions about specifics of the propos-
al. I want to make this clear. The pur-
pose of the energy policy evolution
is not to cause sacrifice or hardship
among the American people.Unless I
can demonstrate that in balance the
temporary sacrifices in a certain area
are far overcome by immediate and ul-
timate benefits then nobody's going to
buy it.
And I believe that we've now got
such a horrible conglomeration of con-
fusion in the energy field that nobody
knows what's going to happen next.
So I think that the sacrifices will be
far overcome by the benefits that the
American people will be easily able to
discern for themsels.
15. U.S. Roon Canada
Q. You said that in spite of the fact
that the Canadian eople would have
to determine their future for them-
selves, particularly in regard to the
separatism issue in Quebec that you
had confidence that the issue would
be straightened out relatively peaceful-
ly. Do you really think that there is
little concern in this country about the
future of a unified Canada and is there
anything really that we can do about
it?
A. There's a great deal of concern
in this country about the future of
Canada and I have complete confi-
dence, as I said in an interview with
the Canadian news media in the sound
judgment of the Canadian people.
I'm familiar and even more familiar
today than I was two days ago after
Prime Minister Trudeau's visit-with
the problems in Quebec and the inclina-
tion of some of the French Canadians
to have an independent status from the
rest of Canadian Provinces.
I don't know what's going to be the
ultimate outcome. But I believe that
we are so closely tied together with
Canada on a mutually beneficial basis,
sharing problems, sharing opportuni-
ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur-
ing companies that have joint owner-
ship, our exchange of energy sources,
our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-.
way, the Great Lakes as far as water
pollution is concerned, the bringing of
Alaskan oil and natural gas down to
us that we have got to have a continu-
ing relationship with Canada.
My own personal preference would
be that the commonwealth stay as it
is and that there not be a separate
very successful trip to the Miquie Basty
He not only probed with the heads of
those Governments and their Cabinet
members their own positions, both puber
lic and private on the controversial,
issues that have so far prevented a
peace in the Middle East. He also had
a chance to compare their positions
on issues which ones they found to.
be in harmony, which, ones there was
still a dispute.
We also invited the leaders of all
those nations to meet with me. They
have all accepted and I will be meeting
with the heads of the nations in dispute.
in the Middle East, all of them, before
the end of May. The first visit of one
of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin.I
believe, March 12. And he will be fol.
lowed by the leaders from Egypt, from
Jordan and from Syria, from Saudia
Arabia and I look forward to meeting
with them.
At that point I hope I will have a
very clear picture: of: what to the
American Government ought to play.
The same thing applies to the situa
tion that exists between ourselves..and
Turkey, ourselves and Greece, -our-
selves and Cyprus
"
We can't impose our will on other
people. But if they honestly want to
seek a solution, we are perfectly will-
ing to offer our good offices as a coun- !
try with influence and interest to help
them resolve their own differences. But
it's got to be done primarily by those
countries involved.
We have begun again, and within
the last week, our discussions on the
Panama Canal Treaty. We have two
extremely good negotiators and I hope
that we will have success there. There's
no way that I can say at this point
what degree of progress we have made.
It's just beginning.
So throughout the areas of high dis-
pute, including South Africa and others
that I don't have time to mention we're.
probing as best we can to discern some
possibility of resolution of those ten-
sion areas.
We are meeting today, in fact all
this week with the British, to try to
get a renewed proposal to make con-
cerning the question surrounding Rho-
desia. And then, of course, we'll still
have left Nambia and ultimately ma
jority rule question in South Africa..
But I've only been in office a month.
I don't claim to know all the easy an
swers. And these questions that have
are not going to be easy to solve. But
we're going to do the best we can open
ly and forcefully offering our good
services, not trying to impose our will
on other people.
Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
..
Carter Errs on Rabin
Quebec province. But that's a decision And U.S.-Uganda Ties
for the Canadians to make and I would
certainly make no private or public
move to try to determine the outcome
of that great debate.
16. Keeping Campaign Promises
Q. Mr. President, you've had a month
now to enjoy the view from the Oval
Office. Do you think you'll be able to
keep fully all the campaign promises
you made?
A. As you know, we have issued what
I believe is the complete book of my
campaign promises, which is, I pre-
sume, being made available to all of
you. My determination is to keep all
those promises.
Obviously if circumstances should
change I would have to reserve the
1.11. Annainn anal
WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (AP)—Presi-
dent Carter made two errors in his
conference today, which the
White House staff later corrected.
news
Mr. Carter used a wrong date. for
the forthcoming visit to the United
States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
of Israel. The President said that he
thought the visit would take place
March 12.
The White House later corrected that
to say "the proposed visit is tentatively
planned for March 7 and 8."
The White House also corrected the
President's statement that the United
States does not have diplomatic rela
tions with Uganda.
"This is not strictly accurate," the
!
13,000.ongress as well as the risi
ency?
A. There are three basic questions
hat come up. In the first place, I do
Ivor at least an automatic vote by
residential electors once the general
ection is completed. I think the Elec-
oral College, for instance, should be
iminated. Whether the ratio among
cates of votes ought to be changed
Im not prepared to comment on now.
hancing of Congres-
onal elections by public funds-it has
roved to be successful, I believe, in
e Presidential election. I strongly
avor that, yes. And the other element
the overall package would be a sim-
le way for American people who are
tizens and 18 years old to register
> vote. And I am committed to that
roposition and the Vice President has
raciously consented to take on this
verall election process responsibility.
hose three will be basic elements of
e proposals.
10. Relations With Cuba
Q. Mr. President, are you prepared
lift the trade embargo 'against Cuba
; one step toward normalizing rela-
ons?
A, I think any substantial move in
ar relationship with Cuba would have
▸ await further discussions with them.
directly, and also some tangible evi-
ence on our part that they are willing
▸ restore basic human rights in Cuba,
volving the number of prisoners who
e being held, their attitude toward
verseas adventures such as the one
Angola, and other matters. So I can't
y what might come in the future.
I'm willing, though, to discuss these
atters with the Cuban leaders. At this
me we have no direct relationships
ith them, political. But through inter-
ediarics comments are being ex-
anged back and forth. Most of my
omments are in public statements like
is, but we do have messages coming
ick from people who visit Ouba.
11. Defense Savings Goal
Q. In answer to an earlier question,
r. President, you said that you could-
t say whether next year's defense
idget will be lower or higher than
is year's. But as I understood your
arlier postion, you did want to achieve
five to seven billion dollar savings
gardless of the overall level of spend-
g. Do you still hold with that figure?
that still your goal and a commit-
ent?
A. Yes. The analyses that I've made
the defense budget so far-which
you know has been limited to about
month's study just part-time-indi-
ate that that's a goal that will be
ached.
12. Natural Gas Deregulation
Q. Mr. President, in letters to the
overnors of Oklahoma, Texas and
ouisiana last October, you said uncon-
tionally that you would work with
ongress to deregulate new natural
as. And I wondered if you planned
• keep that promise, and if so how
ou will go about it?
A. I don't know how I'll go about
. I do try to keep my promises. The
osition that I have taken, and the
osition that the governors of Oklaho-
a and Texas took at governors con-
rences to which I was referring, was
e deregulation of natural gas for a
mited period of time, four to five
ears, to see how it works out, leaving
xisting contracts in effect.
·
is not to cause sacrifice or hardship
among the American people.Unless I
can demonstrate that in balance the
temporary sacrifices in a certain area
are far overcome by immediate and ul-
timate benefits then nobody's going to
buy it.
_ And I believe that we've now got
such a horrible conglomeration of con-
fusion in the energy field that nobody
knows what's going to happen next..
So I think that the sacrifices will be
far overcome by the benefits that the
_American people will be easily able to
discern for themselves.
15. U.S. Roon Canada
Q. You said that in spite of the fact
that the Canadian people would have
to determine their future for them-
selves, particularly in regard to the
separatism issue in Quebec that you
had confidence that the issue would
be straightened out relatively peaceful-
ly. Do you really think that there is
little concern in this country about the
future of a unified Canada and is there
anything really that we can do about
it?
A. There's a great deal of concern
in this country about the future of
Canada and I have complete confi-
dence, as I said in an interview with
the Canadian news media in the sound
judgment of the Canadian people.
I'm familiar and even more familiar
today than I was two days ago after
Prime Minister Trudeau's visit-with
the problems in Quebec and the inclina-
tion of some of the French Canadians
to have an independent status from the
rest of Canadian Provinces.
I don't know what's going to be the
ultimate outcome. But I believe that
we are so closely tied together with
Canada on a mutually beneficial basis,
sharing problems, sharing opportuni-
ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur-
ing companies that have joint owner-
ship, our exchange of energy sources,
our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-
way, the Great Lakes as far as water
pollution is concerned, the bringing of
Alaskan oil and natural gas down to
us that we have got to have a continu-
ing relationship with Canada.
My own personal preference would
have all accepted and I will be meeting
with the heads of the nations in dispute.
in the Middle East, all of them, before
the end of May. The first visit of one
of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin,L
believe, March 12. And he will be fol
lowed by the leaders from Egypt, from
Jordan and from Syria, from Saudia
Arabia and I look forward to meeting
with them.
At that point I hope I will have a
very clear picture of what rule the
American Government ought to play.
The same thing applies to the situa
tion that exists between ourselves and
Turkey, ourselves and Greece, our-
selves and Cyprus.
We can't impose our will an other
people. But if they honestly want to
seek a solution, we are perfectly will
ing to offer our good offices as a coun
try with influence and interest to help
them resolve their own differences. But
it's got to be done primarily by those
countries involved.
We have begun again, and within
the last week, our discussions on the
Panama Canal Treaty. We have two!
extremely good negotiators and I hope
that we will have success there. There's.
no way that I can say at this point i
what degree of progress we have made.
It's just beginning.
So throughout the areas of high dis-
pute, including South Africa and others
that I don't have time to mention we're
probing as best we can to discern some
possibility of resolution of those ten-
sion areas.
We are meeting today, in fact all
this week with the British, to try to
get a renewed proposal to make con-
cerning the question surrounding Rho-
desia. And then, of course, we'll still
have left Nambia and ultimately ma
jority rule question in South Africa..
But I've only been in office a month.
I don't claim to know all the easy an
swers. And these questions that have
are not going to be easy to solve. But
we're going to do the best we can open.
ly and forcefully offering our good
services, not trying to impose our will
on other people.
Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
be that the commonwealth stay as it Carter Errs on Rabin
is and that there not be a separate
Quebec province. But that's a decision
for the Canadians to make and I would
certainly make no private or public
move to try to determine the outcome
of that great debate.
16. Keeping Campaign Promises
Q. Mr. President, you've had a month
now to enjoy the view from the Oval
Office. Do you think you'll be able to
keep fully all the campaign promises
you made?
A. As you know, we have issued what
I believe is the complete book of my
campaign promises, which is, I pre-
sume, being made available to all of
you. My determination is to keep all
those promises.
Obviously if circumstances should
change I would have to reserve the
right to go back to the American people
and say "now that circumstances have
changed this a better approach to that
particular problem." But I will do my
utmost to keep all the campaign prom-
ises that I made to the American peo-
ple.
17. Production of B-1
Q. Mr. President, you said at various
times during the campaign that the B-1
And U.S.-Uganda Ties
WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (AP)—Preși-
dent Carter made two errors in his
conference today, which the
White House staff later corrected.
news
Mr. Carter used a wrong date. for
the forthcoming visit to the United.,
States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
of Israel. The President said that he
thought the visit would take place
March 12.
The White House later corrected that
to say "the proposed visit is tentatively
planned for March 7 and 8."
The White House also corrected the
President's statement that the United.
States does not have diplomatic rela-:
tions with Uganda.
"This is not strictly accurate," the
correction said, explaining:
1
"While the United States has with-
drawn its mission from Uganda and..
has no direct diplomatic representation
there, United States affairs in the
Republic of Uganda are carried out.
through the West German embassy and
the Republic of Uganda has an operat
ing embassy and charge d'affaires in
Washington."
Right-side
Page
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Воттом
13-00000
A7
WASHINGTON POST
CIA Admits
Working to
Raise Sub
By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Central Intelligence Agency
has finally acknowledged publicly
that it was "involved" in the Glomar
Explorer's attempts to raise a sunken
Russian submarine from the Pacific
Ocean floor.
The terse acknowledgement came in
a court document filed in the U.S.
Court of Appeals by the Justice De-
partment two weeks ago. The docu-
ment asked that a suit against the
CIA by a private group concerning
the Glomar's financing be sent back
to a lower court for further hearings.
The filing marks an abrupt change
from the previous position taken by
the Justice Department in the 18-
month-old case that the mere acknowl-
edgement of the CIA's involvement in
the project would be harmful to na-
tional security. Although the CIA's
operation of the project has been re-
ported in numerous publications, the
agency has been adamant in its re-
fusal to say publicly whether those re-
ports were true.
The case brought by the nonprofit
Military Audit Project, which moni-
tors spending by the defense and in-
telligence establishments, has in-
volved an unprecedented amount of
secret court proceedings as the CIA
attempted to prove the need for sec-
recy to U.S. District Court Judge Ger-
hard A. Gesell. The suit seeks the fi-
nancial details of the Glomar project.
)
Board
There's the
Bull game
•File Marchett
W
For example, Gesell was forced to
issue a secret opinion in the case last!
October that even the attorneys in-
volved still have not been able to
read. The opinion was issued in that
secret fashion upon direct orders of
the U.S. Court of Appeals, which in-
structed Gesell to accept secret affi-
davits from high-level government of-
ficials concerning the case.
Public affidavits filed at the time by
former President Ford's top national
security adviser, Lt. Gen. Brent Scow-
croft, said disclosures of the CIA in-
volvement or other details about the
project might prompt other nations
offended by the project to retaliate
against the United States.
Scowcroft said that retaliation
might take the form of "strong meas-
ures" that might "endanger U.S mili
tary and diplomatic personnel and
businessmen overseas."
The federal government had previ
ously acknowledged only that the ship
was part of a 1969 classified U.S.gov.
ernment project "to accomplish cer
tain secret tasks in furtherance of na-
tional security objectives."