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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
TOP SECRET
1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study
Defector
-
entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier
for your review.
2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are
deleted since it contains information which bears on the
security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related
thereto.
3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A
when your review has been completed.
Attachment: As Stated Above
WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED
TOP SECRET
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
:
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Top Secret
Annex A
Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO
4 February 1964
NOSENKO defected in Geneva.
6 February 1964
The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified
the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that
NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as
4 February.
They speculated privately between themselves
that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an
mobile accident.
8 February 1964
auto-
An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva
reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert
temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four
days.
9 February 1964
Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports
attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO
had disappeared.
10 February 1964
The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources
as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.
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10 February 1964 (continued)
A U.S. Department of State press release was issued
identifying NOSENKO 3 s KGB officer and acknowledging his
request for political asylum in the United States.
According to a sensitive source,
Because of his
long tenure in the KGB, NOSLNKO would have a great deal of
important information which he could impart to intelligence
agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be
acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them.
He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number
of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American
and British nationals.
According to a sensitive source,
The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning
KGB activities, would revolve around the intelligence
operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities
working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly
familiar with all KCB personalities in Geneva and certainly
knew some KGB personalities in other countries.
Comment:
NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in
Geneva; he asserted that some others,..known
by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.
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(Annex A)
10 February 1964 (continued)
According to a sensitive source
NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for
approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an
employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His
father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the
Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry.
There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the.
Ukraine.
Comment:
NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until
1953, when he entered the KGB.
According to a sensitive source,
DESIGNERSKI several KGB
It appeared quite certain
officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KG3.
Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been.
a KGB lieutenant colonel.
According to a sensitive source,
from KCB officers UEZZAFIRA
The
photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of
NOSENKO. One worked with NOSENKO for several years
in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who
likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond
of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally
well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the
Second Chief Directorate.
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10 February 1964 (continued)
Comment:
The photograph accompanying American
and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection
was by error not that of NOSENKO but of
sensitive source Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom and NOSENKO both
identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the
Geneva Disarmament Conference.
L
Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB
officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, COLITSYN recalled that
NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working
against American citizens.
Comment:
Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962
(before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of
Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference.
NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not
at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.
11 February 1964
Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department
of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask
how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release,
and to demand an immediate interview with him.
12 February 1964
S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the
Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference
in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for
permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts
to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be
taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.,
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(Annex A)
12 February 1964 (continued)
At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the
Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted
the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappea-
rance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities
in locating NOSENKO.
The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered
to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to
Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the
means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.
The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in
order to obtain assurance that the defection had been
voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with
Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as
possible.
NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.
12-13 February 1964
14 February 1964
In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to
Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply
of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington
and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a
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14 February 1964 (continued)
'gross provocation by American Intelligence organs".
GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release
from American custody.
The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at
the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately after-
wards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and
Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington.
NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had
defected of his own free will after careful consideration
and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union.
response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced
his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.
18 February 1964
In
Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told
a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of Inter-
national Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV.
NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background,
was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious
for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".
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According to a sensitive source,
NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate
for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the
employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure
of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief
Directorate. A
NOSENKO. as Deputy to the Chief
of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone
directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees
in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments has officer
these phone books.
expressed the
opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and
CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he
knows so much about the methods of work of the First and
Second Directorates of the KGS and is familiar with so many
individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad.
a KGB officer
O said that PLNKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and
British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning
defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much
more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence
operations of the KGB."
Comment:
NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB
telephone book referred
ཨཧ ཝ ཏཾ ཨབྷཊཙིཏྟ'' ཙཙཙོ,
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According to a sensitive source,
whether NOSLO actually defected or whether
in @ response to a question
the defection might be a
KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter,
"
he was convinced that NOSEIKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.
22 February 1964
According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed. KOB
officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel
stationed at th. American Fribassy in Moscow, and with his
help agents were developed among these Americans. It is
assumed by the KGD that he is familiar with the number and
location of micropienes
the Embassy.
Comment:
Although NOSENKO knew that there were micro-
phones in three general locations in the
Embassy, his specific information regarding
the number and location of microphones was
limited to that contained in a written list
brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he
claimed no опе
in the KGB knew he had.
24 February 1964
Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO
visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time,
expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his
family and country and requesting a personal meeting with
him.
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24 February 1961 (continued)
Comment:
NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife
and mother on the basis of physical descrip-
tions. On only one previous occasion have
members of a defector's family called on a
foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the
defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in
England in 1963, his wife appeared at the
British Fabassy to make inquiries about him.
According to a sensitive source,
KUROCHKIN (fnu),
a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington,
will not be sent us he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the
'course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often
visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a
result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".
Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor
referred to the name.
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February 1964
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Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in
the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's
defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval
preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in
1944-1946.
Comment:
ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of
the dates involved differs from those.claimád
by NOSENKO.
KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a
CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO,
whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his
wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV
later said on another occasion that he had friends who
knew NOSENKO well.)
Comment:
NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or
photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied
knowing him.
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February-March 1964
01353
Ton Beznet
was
According to a sensitive source:
A KGB conmission
in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused
by NOSENKO's defection} to the USSR. The commission was
very large, formed from different departments of the KGB.
The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that
NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear
matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many
details about life of the leaders of the country, in the
government...that he knew very much about internal relations
between the people working in the KGB, that he had many
close friends among them and [spent] days and nights
together with them. The whole history of his life was
studied step by step very carefully."
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According to a sensitive source,
officers f
conversations with various unnamed KGB
NOSENKO knows many
of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and
departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KCB Head-
quarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel
who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs
and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO
has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.
Comment:
NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms
until the January-March 1965 interrogations,
when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally
in the "chiefs' dining room".
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23 March 1964
The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of
NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in
Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required
some definite statement in writing from her husband so that
she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO
children.
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27 March 1964
According to a sensitive source
✓ certain
KGB
(from various unnamed KGB officers
There seems to be unanimous opinion among
chiefs W&HZ5SH
that NOSENKO...could do the KCB a tre-
mendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a de-
puty chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief
Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel
directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the iden-.
tities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Head-
quarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory
listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file
employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by
Some KGB 'chiefs"
that if NOSENKO
"
were merely able to make these two directories available
to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged
for the present and for several years to come.
Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB direc-
tories described.
31 March 1964
KGB officers 1.1. PETUKHOV nad P.P.. BORISOV in Canada
told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intel-
ligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating
materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets
with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could
be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked
whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recent-
ly publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it,
asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".
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31 March 1964 (continued)
Comment:
When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February
1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENNO had
in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he
had had sume connection with NOSENREO, and
NOSENKO may have known something of what the
KGB was doing in Canada.
NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name
was unknown to him, who apparently is--identical.
to SPRECHER.
March 1964
According to a sensitive source who
was
briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief
Directorate officer of the American Department; Personnel
of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until hie
defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not
mention it at all.
Comment:
a sensitive source
In this and other contexts
has stated
or implied that NOSENKO served in the American
Department in 1963-1964: NOSENKO asserts he
left the American Department in January 1962
and served in the Seventh Department until his
defection.
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April-May 1964
KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert, Lee
JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather
than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one
of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United
States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer
had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme
caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts
with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify
JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had
which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See
24 for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)
P
May 1964:
officers
According to a sensitive source
(from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB
Two commissions have
been established by the CPS for the purposes: (a) to :
determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN,
✓ and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt.
to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency
of the KGB.
3.
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20 May 1964
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According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only
40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually,
about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the
Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information
to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being
found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40
microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge
of the remaining ones.
12 June 1964.
Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American
Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom
he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate
with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow
to be someone they are wall rid of.
22 June 1964
According to a sensitive source
CRANE (from various unnamed KGB officers
Some
The consensus among KGB employees
T
is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the
effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence.
NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either
GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on
several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel
stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help
agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is.
assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to
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22 June 1964
(continued)
the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be
familiar with the number of microphones which had been
installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of
these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a depart-
ment, NOSENFO would normally have had access to a telephone
directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the
KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one
in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO
travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in
Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these
comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an
"important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in
the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO
had concerning the KGB.
29 June 1964
GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance):
NOSENKO, the son
of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer
who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh
Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while
on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two
or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953,
and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959.
When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO
replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department.
NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953
until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for
KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during
1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section
until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsi-
bilities or may have been working against other Embassy
personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the
American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or
1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and
was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not
work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate
American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited
the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early
1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been
in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief.
C.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the
Section during this period.
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NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in
1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department
until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy
Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not
identify COLITSYN's photograph and had denied
since defection that he has ever met or even
seen him.
June 1954
According to a sensitive source
"Just after" NOSENKO'a
defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the
CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the
Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarm-
ament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of
the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts.
The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA,
a KCB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty
Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from
their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair.
V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet
Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely
exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to
Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known a
to Source
had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended
NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the
chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed,
would also lose his job.
Comment:
by a sensitive source
MEDVEDEV, & KGB officer formerly stationed in
New York City, was said by to be one
of those from the CPSU Central Committee who
conducted interviews with KGB personnel going
abroad.
identified MEDVEDEV
Another sensitive source.
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(Continued)
As a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the
United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer
and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that
MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he
worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified ag с
KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.
29 July 1964
According to a sensitive source,
(from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers M
An investigating commission of the
CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances
surrounding NOSINKO's defection has thus far been responsible
for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate
employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled
from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant
general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like
an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken
since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed
on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief
of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection,
GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or.
less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps
to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt
that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to
defect. Three of GRIBANOV' s deputies were also expelled
from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK
[BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees
expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of
NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO
details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV.
a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for
Moscow because the investigating commission had determined
that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told
NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal
Residency. COLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB
:
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29 July 1964 (continued)
Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO
and GOLUBLV were given different assignments within the KGB
and thereafter did not associate with one another in the
course of their daily activities.
Corrent:
NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claies
that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his
advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identi-
fied by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he
had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO
said he had never worked with him at KGB Head-
quarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the
First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the
USSR on 28 August 1964.
:
July-August 1964
to a sensitive source:
The first
about
JE ZG GS MP
information
NOSENKO was from KGB Headquarters which reported
the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed
to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The
letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very
great and some new forms of work should be created to be
efficient in the future". The Legal Residency hád not
before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's
escape".
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November 1964
Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian
people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet
mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American
acquaintance that they had not been told officially but
they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in
Moscow. It was
in this way,, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he
learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance.
According to the "grapevine", the defection was very
damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the.
Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities
of all Soviet agents in the United States.
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ཆབ་ཤm-:ས་ཞུ།-༧--[ q མཎྜཏཏོ
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November 1964 (continued)
Comment:
GAMKRFLIDZE is suspected of having connections
with Soviet Intelligence because of his
statements, actions, and unusual freedom of
solitary movement while on visits to the United
States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment
attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed
the opportunity to meet with an American
Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet
Intelligence officers he had met with their
American counterparts'. During that 1964
meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject
of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a
traitor to his country".
December 1964
a SHOP BRONN source
Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the
time of his defection, told
CONES that he had been
interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection,
and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which
NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK
source reported to the dismissal of large numbers of
KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what
RESHETNYAK said, CO thought the KGB might go so far
source
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December 1964 (continued)
89 to send someone to the United States to locate and kill
later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB
NOSENKO.
officer.)
Comment:
Source
NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the
staff of the Disarmament Delegation.
29 January 1965
According to a sensitive source
(from conversations with unrecalled KGE officers
It is common knowledge among
HGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and
CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a
result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being
considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary.
statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief
Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained
considerable. "compromising information", concerning NOSENKO;
if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from
consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary
material, ran a line through all of it, and, added the nota-
tion: "Send him to Geneva. The general feeling is that
GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's
deficiencies because of CRIBANQV's long-time friendship
with NOSENKO's father.
Comment:
NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV
was responsible for sending him to Geneva in
1964, but after retracting his claim that
GRIBANOV had played any special role in his
·assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved
the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father
and GRIBANOV were acquainted.
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8 February 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
the KGB officer
1
Prior to NOSENKO's
defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the
Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh
(Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, won three
separate occasions participated in conferences between
"important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the
Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these.
Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank
of captain in the KGB. attributed this (the the KGB officer
disparity between job and rank) to the influence which
GRIBANOV exerted
the behalf of NOSENKO.
the KGB officer
Comment:
NOSENKO
NOSENKO has never identified
always claimed that he had been a lieutenant
colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he
retracted that claim and asserted that he had
been only a captain.
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
GRIBANOV has been dismissed from
the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on
a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after
NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other
people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of
GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second
Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief
Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief
Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment
has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the
CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.).
SHCHERBAK.
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8 February 1965 (continued)
Corment:
GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact
with a senior Western diplomat until late
autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO'&
defection), when he turned over that contact
to another KGB officer.
9 February. 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
The amount of damage caused
by NOSEN O's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew
few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad,
but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by
virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved
for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.
Early June 1965
According to a sensitive source
CHELER (from conversations with NGS officers KAZANEAZ
95: Major General BANNIKOV is currently
temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having
replaced CRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he
supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a
small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an
unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".
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a sen
sitive
source
15 Jul 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting
of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KCB Headquarters
was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the
circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second
(British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A.
TARABRIN, about three and a half caths earlier. I.A. BELOV
and other officers also attended the meeting. According to
official statements made at the meeting, after the defection
of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to
determine which employees knew his and the nature of their
relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said
he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited
contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, how-
that TARABRI attended several parties at which NOSENKO
Was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there.
described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was
afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing
vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB
and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.
ever,
Comment:
NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met
GRIBANOV socially only three times during his
KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was
present. NOSENKO said be twice provided girls
for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or
November 1963 in circumstances similar to those
referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was
Chief of the British Department from 1958 to
1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service
No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence
Department of the First Chief Directorate.
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Top Secret
Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source
* 66ners
These
: ha a result of NOSENKO's defection, many
sused, expelled from the Party, and
luded Chairman SEROT, and Second
GRIBANOV had been expelled from the
GRIBANOV had been especially
had given him many privileges, and
night buddies".
Chief Directorate Chief
Party and from the KGh.
friendly with NOSENKO,
they were "buddies and
Comment: SEMICHASTNYY,
not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in
1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.
Winter 1965-1966
Source, a
self-professed former KGB Second
said
Source
Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a
colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science
and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962.
that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations
against the American Embassy in Moscow):
NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother
was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering".
NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected
somehow with the KGB, When NOSENKO defected, everyone said
he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the
microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.
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Source
Top Secret
(Annex A)
Winter 1965-1966 (continued).
Comment:
Source's
☐ allegation is the single report
source describing NOSENKO as other than
a KGB officer.
from any
March 1966
According to a sensitive source,
who was
Source
¾ (from unidentified sources in Moscow) : NOSENKO,
not personally known to J,
was an important
boss in the KGB When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in
the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU
Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps
for a year.
NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person
while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been
discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very
influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was
able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion
of persons to whom
talked that NOSENKO had given
very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection
and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information
which included all means of KGB coverage of people in
Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on
NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the
microphones.
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March 16 (continued)
Comment:
Top Secret
Source
NOSENO has claimed that he rejected an offer
to attend the Military Diplomatic Academ.
(which he, like called the GRU
Military Academy), by choice accepting assign-
the GRU in
ment to the Far East on entry to
1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic
Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO
did attend the school, he could not have
serve! age claimed in the GRU.
is
Source
the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged
NOSENKO served in the GRU.
A
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Mid-1966
Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited
Paris and spoke with representatives of the Freach magazine
Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve
as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he
begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet
secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and
English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the
matter at that time.
Comment:
KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV
who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for
the United Press International Moscow corres-
pondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and
GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB
Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled
previously to Brussels as a correspondent for
the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan
and the United States as & correspondent for
Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer. by
an official Soviet press representative of
information on a "Soviet secret agent", which
turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without
precedent.
October 1956
Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with
an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to
provide a story on the life of the family of a 'Soviet secret
agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their
.396
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October 1966 (continued)
life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background
statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated:
"NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police
organization, defected to the USA without his family about
two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.:
it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of
the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important
positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and
also was clonely acquainted with the country's leading
families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife,
35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother.
The family in not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about
the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply
to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and
compensation. It is possible that this case will be given.
much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he
defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA."
KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and
family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and
indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family
could be obtained and that interviews with them and with
others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match
correspondent.
Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union,
who is legally considered to be an enemy of the
ntate, is granted automatically upon the wife's
request.
28 January 1951
According to a sensitive source
(from personal knowledge):
knowledge of ECB organization,
his explanation, he would call
knew these matters better than
at KGB Headquarters longer.
Source
Referring to his own
said if NOSENKO heard
a child, since NOSENKO
because he had served
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February 1967
According to a sensitive source
(from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow):
NOSENKO worked only in KU Information Department of the GRU,
and only for about five or six months, after which he went
to the KCB.
May 1967
According to a sensitive source
The KCB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole
system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew
all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew
all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all
the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.
According to a sensitive source
When
NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked
only the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly
there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of
which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went
to the KCB.
5 June 1967
According to a sensitive source
: There had been some
* KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in
Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts
which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to
investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of
SHAKHOV.
Comment:
:
NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962
to investigate SHAKHOV.
398
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