124-10273-10070
1
9/29/60
INFO
sec
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
2244
Office Mem
IO : MR. BOARDMAN
i
FROM
: AH BELMONT
tum
SECRET
UNGERERS
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION
ACTION
GOVERNMENT ›
DATE: January 22, 1958
POST Hunter - Policy \
CHURTEN PRINC
بیمر
INFY
JUNE
200 POLICY
-TA
SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.
S.S. 
R.)
off
Tolson
Nicholst
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Roser
Tamm
On January 10, 1958, Harry Stone) of MI-5), Laison Representa-astrowd.
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy
tive with the Bureau, confidentially advised that his service had
determined that Soviet illegal agents all over the world, when they want a
meet with their principal, are under instructions to send a proper communication
to "K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.P." Mr. Stone stated (S)
that the aforementioned information was being made available to the Bureau and
the RCMP only.
165-65007
Brat Izan
On the basis of this information, we immediately instructed the
Washington Field and New York Offices to institute confidential inquiries with
appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing
correspondence from the U.S. to the (U.S.S.R.), looking toward picking up a
communication dispatched to the aforementioned address.
On January 21, 1958, SAC Powers of the New York Office called
advising that his preliminary inquiries at first disclosed that such coverage
could possibly be effected at LaGuardia Airfield. Powers stated that he subsequently
received a car from the Chief Post Office Inspector who told him that he would not
be able to make such arrangements and explained that something had happened in
Washington on a similar matter and that Bureau Headquarters should take up the
matter with Post Office Headquarters here in Washington. The Post Office
Inspector said that it did not involve our agency and because of what was going
on in Washington at the present time, he just couldn't do it on his own.
Almost simultaneous with this advice, Mr. James Angleton of CIA
approached our Liaison Agent, (Sam Papich on a personal basis. He indicated
that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the
Bureau, he would lose his job. Mr. Angleton stated it had come to the attention
of CIA, through the Post Office, that we were making inquiries concerning the
coverage of mail to the (U.S.S.R), and as a result CIA was expecting to receive
an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this
coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by
CIA. He stated the coverage is actually made through the Post Office in New York
43029.
WAB:hmm
(5)
cc:
Boardman
1- Belmont
1 - Branigan
MCT-22
SEC
cough
ructed
SLUING FEB 20 1959
B20,SS
+6038
273-10070
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY 202 ALM/
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
MDR-16
+
MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
SEGNET
THE (U.S. S. R.)
.S.R.)
RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.
and in view of the volume of material being sent from the U.S., their coverage
is an extensive and expensive operation. He indicated that they had to set up an
elaborate array of IBM machines to tally and tabulate the results. In addition
a complicated indexing procedure was involved, as well as complex scientific
examinations of the material. He said two or three hundred CIA employees are
exclusively engaged on various facets of the coverage. Angleton also indicated
that the cost of the operation was well over a million dollars a year. He further
indicated that the coverage has been in existence in excess of a year and he
stated that the sole purpose for the coverage was to identify persons behind the
Iron Curtain who might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached
¡in their countries as contacts and sources for CIA. Angleton indicated that CIA
had successfully developed several sources through this means. He stressed
the confidential nature of his information and stated that while other officials of
CIA more directly concerned with the coverage were expecting a visit from the
FBL he was passing this along for our guidance.
It would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in
New York have flushed out a most secret operation of CIA. The question
immediately arises as to whether CIA in effecting this coverage in New York
has invaded our jurisdiction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a
legitimate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set up, namely,
the development of contacts and sources of information behind the Iron Curtain,
and according to Angleton they have had some success: in this regard. At the
same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of
our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identification of
illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. While recognizing
this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage
because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity,
size and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by
pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible
to share their coverage with us. Of course, we are not interested in the
identities of the numerous persons in this country legitimately corresponding
abroad. The Post Office has indicated there are approximately four thousand
items of correspondence to the U.S.S. R each day. Angleton said they have not
come up with a microdot or secret message communication as yet.
ACTION:
"..
SECRET
1. On the basis of our inquiries conducted in New York, we are in
a position and should, through Liaison, approach CIA, informing them that it
has been indicated that their Agency has coverage of mail going to the U.S.S.R
We should get from them the details of their coverage and explain our interest in
being furnished with the results of the coverage as it might effect internal security
matters
Stent!
MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMAN
RE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.
THE (U.S.S.R.)
2. It is believed that we can and should furnish CIA with the name
and Moscow address furnished us by the British, telling CIA that we want to (S)
be advised of any communications going to that address. We will not explain
to them our interest in the particular address and, therefore, we will not be
violating the confidence of the British.
3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of this coverage, we will
have to work out arrangements so that knowledge of it is strictly confined
within the Bureau. We will handle this the same as Aandle communications
intelligence data.
་
-
ск
の
-3-
SECRET
STANDARD FORM NO. 64
Office MemorandumECRET
✓ TO
:
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
72
12.2
MR. L. V. BOARDMAN WHERE SHOWN OTHYbruary 6, 1958
FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT
JUNE
CLASSIFIED BY SPALMle
10/26/00
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_
SUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)
HE (
U.S.S.R.)
HB
Telson
Boardman
Belmont
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy
Reference my memo of 1-27-58 advising of the briefing given our
Liaison Agent by CIA representatives on 1-24-58 as to the nature and extent of
CIA coverage of mail going to and coming from Russia Our Liaison Agent
determined that CIA began this coverage approximately a year and a half ago through
confidential arrangements made with postal authorities. Initially, this coverage
involved photographing of envelopes; these envelopes were not to be opened. The
envelopes were microfilmed and the names and addresses appearing thereon were
indexed with IBM equipment. Several months ago CIA began opening some of this mail,
microfilming the contents and indexing pertinent data therein. Approximately 250,000
names have been indexed by CIA. Examination of certain of this mail for microdots and
secret writing has been made to a limited extent because the volume of mail has been too
humerous for the establishment of a practical system without delaying movement of the
mail. CIA has advised that to date it has not discovered any microdots or secret writing
or information revealing evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States.
CIA has also advised that this program has not reached its full potential, but that its
system of opening mail is rapidly increasing. CIA has expressed a willingness to
furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we feel would be of
interest to us.
Brawny
An analysis has been made of CIA capabilities as revealed to the Liaison Agent
and it is believed we should request that CIA furnish us information of the following
types, both that which has been received in the past and that which they will obtain ins;
the future
Proc
1)' All correspondence of a suspicious nature, such as that containing double
talk, et cetera.
2) All correspondence indicating that the Soviets may be utilizing a hostage
situation, i.e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on Soviet citizens who
have close relatives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U.S.
3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or
dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet, presently in the United States so that the Bureau
might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals for defection or
double agent purposes,
&
(05-93089-4)
4) Any information appearing in correspondence Indicating Soviet control or
direction of the Cp, USA.
APL.DEM:mn (9)
CC -
Messrs Boardman
MOT: 20
Belmont
Litrento
TO KEB 2018
SECRET.
EX-135
Baumgardner JDDonohue REC-94.
Branigan
55R 2710Rapich
Turner
Belmont to Boardman (2-6-58)
SECRET
re: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)
With regard to the above coverage, it is believed desirable that Liaison make
arrangements for us to review at CIA any material of this nature and we will then
select that which appears to warrant investigation and then make appropriate checks.
This procedure will eliminate. having CIA sending us a bunch of worthless material with
the possible expectation that we will be running out leads for them. It is believed this
arrangement can be worked out with CIA in a proper fashion.
In addition to the above it is believed the following arrangements can be
effected with CIA:
1)
Place stops against names and addresses of individuals possibly presently,
engaged in Soviet espionage to determine if they are in correspondence with (U.S.S.R..
This would include a check of the back traffic on these individuals also. We would, of
course, make these stops on a highly selective basis.
2) Request CIA to place stops against addresses in Soviet Russia believed by the
Bureau to be mail drops or suspected mail drops. (It should be noted that we already
have placed a stop with CIA against the name and address of K. S. Smirnov, Central
Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R., which, according to information received from Mi-5,
is a drop utilized by (Soviet illegal agents all over the world arranging emergency meet-
We will, of course, continue to analyze this coverage by CIA to see that we
•
obtain maximum benefits.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1) That information received from this source be hereinafter designated as
Bureau Informant 2001 Records Section has advised that this informant symbol has
not been previously used.
ings.
'
2)
That this matter and any mail relating thereto be labeled "June" and then
filed and maintained in the Sovme Unit, Room 1734 (the regular repository of "June"
mail) to afford maximum security to this source.
-
.
3)
That our Liaison Agent orally advise CIA of the type of data set forth above
that would be of interest to us and make arrangements with CIA so that we can review
this type of information in order to select that which we feel will warrant further
investigation. Liaison should also perfect the arrangement with CIA so that on a
continuing basis we can place appropriate stops with them.
4)
SECRET
(1) CIA ADVISED BE TYPE OF DAYS OF INTERBAT
TO (2) ARRANGEMENTS MADE TO FRVIEW IN
(2) ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR STOPS/17
In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, a confirmatory memorandum
will not ko furnished to CITA
A
"
2/13/38
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
ALL FEE INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE/0 2600 BY SIN
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
'
Rafely
6 February 1958,
-
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich
SUBJECT:
* HUNTER
ER Report #1
Fil 18-1
Sitfenty
June
P.
1. The intercept project that has been explained orally to
(Mr. Papich) will be referred to as Project HUNTER in correspondence
between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency.
:
2. This explanatory memorandum constitutes HUNTER Report
#1. Future disseminations will be numbered consecutively.
3. In submitting possible traces on individuals of interest to
´you, reports will be submitted in the following form:
a. If the individual named in the intercept appears to be
identical with the individual of interest to you, you will be furnished
a reproduction of the exterior, and of the contents if the item has been
opened.
ɓ. If the individual named in the intercept is only possibly
identical with the individual of interest to you, only machine run
listing of the items will be submitted. In such cases a reproduction
of the exterior and of the contents, if the item has been opened, will
be available upon request.
4. In order to facilitate your reading of machine run entries,
there follows an explanation of the various types of replies which you
will receive in connection with requests. A hypothetical request for
any addressee in the U.S. of mail from P. KROVAN, whose location
is believed to be: C:/: : Moscow,) might result in the following reply:
S ENCLOSURE
G₁t
REC-94
EX-135 (105-95089)
SECRET
FEB 20 1958
5-Do
.Date
Name In
SECRET
I
Ref Loc
Name Out
Ref Loc Ban Firms
-
A 57.CO5C3325 (KROVAN, Paraskoviya (*) ABB EVOSWA, Wasyl ( )
()(*)
This reply has the following meaning:
KM
"A" has no present meaning. All numbers are now preceeded by
"A" only to allow for future additional classifications. None are
presently contemplated.
"57CO5'is the date of intercept, namely: "57" is the year. "C"
indicates the month. The code key for months is set out as Enclosure 1.
"05" is the day of the month. Thus, "57C05" is 5 March 1957.
The group "C3325" is our own internal filing number. .
The "Name In" entry identifies the correspondent inside the USSR.
The asterisk in "Ref" column indicates that:
at KROVAN) sent the letter:
The entry in "Loc"(ation) column indicates the area or city inside
the Soviet Union from which the letter was mailed. In this case it was
mailed from the western section of (Ukrainian SSR. The code key
used for this column is set out in Enclosure 2. This code key is to
be used for all items prior to 1 January 1958, on which date a 4-place
code was instituted in order to designate more precisely the localities
within the USSR. A copy of this new code is enclosed as Enclosure 3.
The "Name Out" entry identifies the correspondent outside the
(USSR) In both the "Name In" and "Name Out" columns, the last or
family name is listed first.
The absence of an asterisk in the "Ref" column after EVOSWA
indicates that she is the recipient of the letter.
The entry in the second "Loc" (ation) column indicates the state of
the U.S. (in this case, New Jersey) to which the letter was addressed.
The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 4. You
will note that some 3-digit entries indicate large cities within a state,
thus KO indicates New York State and KOA indicates New York City.
For your convenience an alphabetical list of the states with their code
indicator is set out in Enclosure 5.
2
SECRET
Date
The absence of an "X" in the "Ban" column means that the letter
‘was not opened and that only the exterior is recorded in our files.
5. Since the hypothetical request was for mail from (P. KROVAN,
who is believed to be located in Moscow) only the listing as set out
above would be furnished, since it would not appear that Paraskoviya
KROVAN, located in the western section of the Ukrainian SSR) is
identical. If in connection with future investigation or information
otherwise available, you may believe that (KKROVAN) may be identical
with the individual of interest to you, you need reference only the
HUNTER report number and request the exterior photographs of
item No. A57C05C3325, which will be reproduced from the original
film and made available to you.
6. If the hypothetical request is for any mail from the
the 
(Soviet
Union to Rose ESTERSON,) who resides in Chicago, the reply might
be as follows:
A57D23U 57D18
Name In
Ref Loc
Name Out
(ESTERSON, Rose)
RUNINA, Vera) (*) AAA (ESTERS
AVRUN
(AVRU
Ref Loc
Ban Firms
KKB X
The difference in this listing from that previously illustrated is as follows:
"U' is our internal identifying designator. The first date is the date
of the intercept. The second date is the date of the communication
inside the letter. The "X" under the "Ban" column indicates the letter
was opened. Again this indicator would indicate only a possible identi-
fication since KKB under "Loc" indicates California. In this instance
upon request, identifying the HUNTER report number and referencing
both A57D23U and 57D18 mumbers, the outer envelopes and their con-
tents will be reproduced and furnished to you.
7. Normal service of either of the above requests will be 24 hours.
In an emergency we could service the request in a few minutes.
8. If your first request had been for KROVAN, or P. KROVAN,
for Paraskoviya KROVAN located in the western section of the
Ukrainian SSR) you would have initially received the photograph of
`the envelope. Likewise, in the second instance, if your request had
3
SECRET
SECRET
been for ESTERSON, or R. ESTERSON, or Rose ESTERSON) located
in Chicago, or Illinois, you would initially have received photographed
copies of the envelope and its contents.
-9. In order to insure most efficient servicing of your request,
it is suggested that you submit trace requests as follows: List the
last name first with any known first and given names or initials, and
address including state, city and street, if known. If an exact address
is not known, a probable state or section will be helpful but is not
required. The same would apply to the (USSR) The above should be
listed on duplicate 3 x 5 cards. If only a phonetic name is known,
various combinations of spellings would be appreciated, together
with any other data such as probable address or area. Where an
address is known and there are individuals, other than the subject,
at this address to whom the questioned communication might be.
addressed, their names should also be given. For record purposes
and in order to facilitate our answers to your request, would you in
turn number each card as HUNTER Request No.
10. On each request will you also indicate whether the request
is for a one-time check or whether the name should be put on the
Watch List. If the latter, please indicate the duration of the Watch
List, i. e. 30, 60, 90 days, or "until cancelleḍ". If a Watch List is
* requested, you should also indicate the treatment desired when a
possible" hit is made, i. e. photograph outside only; photograph
outside and contents; photograph outside, contents, and examine for
S/W or microdots. Specifically indicate any Watch List item which
should not be opened. In this connection you may also desire to give!
us a white list of correspondents of interest to you whoare not Watch
List subjects but whose mail should not be opened in the course of
our normal openings for spot-checking for operational or intelligence
information. In some instances you may desire to indicate that you
are to be informed immediately when a hit is made and prior to the
receipt of the letter by the addressee.
11. It is possible to make a special machine run of the names
of all correspondents either addressor, addressee, or both, from
any specific area in the (USSR) to the United States or to any specific
state or city in the U.S., or vice versa. There are various other
combinations that could be run, such as all letters mailed in Florida
either on a specific date or for any given period. If the above-listed
·
CERRET
E

SECRET
or any other type of exploratory processing is desired, a presentation
of the problem will enable us to tell you immediately what we can do,
how long it will take, and the amount of work that is involved. While
this type of service is possible, it does involve a great deal of work
and should be requested in connection with very important cases only.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:
کے
ton]
JFICER
J. Aufleton
James Angleton
Enclosures (5)
*
SECRET
°
STANDARD FORM NO. 64
Office Memorandum
TO : A. H. Belmont.
FROM : W. A. Branigan
SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
:
0
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ·
1 - Belmont
1
I
DATE: 4-21-58
-
•
Branigan
Litrento.
Schweppe
- Polic. YALL!!
NUME
CALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
BY
DATE 10/26/00
Bureau Informant 200) is the symbol number designated
Tolon
Nichols
Boardman
Belmond
Mason
.Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Wease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
for information furnished by CIA to the Bureau from its coverage Holloman
of mail going to and from the (USSR) This designation was approved and
in your memorandum to Mr. Boardman' dated 2-6-58. That memo pointed out
the willingness of CIA to furnish us any information obtained from this
coverage which we felt would be of interest to us. That memo recommended
that Liaison effect arrangements with CIA so that we could review
information obtained from that coverage. .'
ل
CIA is furnishing us with certain of the results of the SFICO
coverage of Soviet mail under the caption "Project Hunter." Each report
received is labeled with a report number, for example, Hunter Report|
# 19
The reports received are reviewed in the (Soume) Unit.
When
the information fails to indicate which Section or Unit would have a
logical interest in the report, the names involved will be searched
for identifiable information. Then we can locate no such information,
a case will be opened if deemed warranted. The objectives of those,
investigations will be the identification of persons of pro-Soviet 1
sympathies whose dealings with the Russians) are of a security or
intelligence interest, the identification of those individuals who
might present logical "hostage" possibilities, which could be exploited
by the Soviets and the identification of any (Soviet) individual in the
U.S. who has indicated weakness or dissatisfaction, a situation which
the Bureau might exploit for defection or double agent purposes.
Investigations in the field would include a check of office
indices and logical sources and informants in order to establish the
subject's background, activities, sympathies and the strategic
character of his employment. This could culminate in recommendations
for interview to clarify certain points not established by investigation
and to determine whether the present activities of the subject are
inimical to the best interests of the U.S., provided available infor
mation does not dictate against such interview and provided the
interview can be conducted without compromising (Bureau Informant 200
Information from Bureau Informant 200) would be forwarded to
the field, personal attention SAC, utilizing the following or similar
phraseology: "Information has been received from Bureau Informant 200)
105-67845
MAY 8 1958
HITS: cug
PRAVISORS SEREC 11 (105-930.
BRANIGAN
All 
Superv
24/58
SRALI
17
Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200'
105-67845
"
H
that
JFR
42
a most sensitive and reliable source, indicating that John Doe has been
in direct contact with..
The contents of the Hunter Report should
then be summarized as necessary and paraphrased. Following the
reporting of information found in Bufiles on the subject, and
instructions regarding the investigation to be conducted a paragraph
as follows should also be added: "You are being cautioned that infor-
mation obtained from Bureau Informant 200 is not to be disseminated
outside the Bureau and should not be set forth in any investigative
reports. Information from this informant should be utilized for lead
purposes. only. You must avoid any statement concerning the scope of
the coverage in effect in this instance and under no circumstances
is the subject or any unauthorized person to become aware that we have-
knowledge of his contact with a person in (Russia)"
•
In those instances where an opened or closed case file an af FK
person mentioned in a Hunter Report is located at the Bureau, the
Hunter Report will be forwarded to the appropirate Section Chief or
Supervisor for his information and any action he deems necessary. Said
Supervisor might desire to advise the field in the manner described
above or place a brief, paraphrased version of the Hunter Report into
the subject's main file for information purposes.
RECOMMENDATION:
In view of the extreme sensitivity of this source, the
knowledge of the same is to be confined to a need-to-know basis.
Therefore, within the Domestic Intelligence Division the Section
Chiefs of the Nationalities and Intelligence Section, the Internal
Security Section, and the Subversive Control, Section will be advised .
of the above procedure for their personal information. All supervisors
in the Espionage Section will also be informed of this procedure.
WAS
70.
OPTIONAL FORM NO. TO
UNITED STATES GOVE MENT
Memorandum
15:30.1.
ΤΟ
:
MR. A. H. BELMONT.
FROM
MR. D. E. MOORE
SUBJECT:
JFK
HUNTER P
ESPIONAGE
-
R
سده
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
10/26/00 BY SA
DATE: March 10, 1961
Loach±
Ένστο
Malone
Resen
Tovel.
Trotter
W Sullivan
Tele. Hoom
Ingram
Gandy
cc Mr. Parsons
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Belmont
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan
Mr. W. D. Stewart
Hunter is CIA's sensitive project involving the re-
view of mail going to the Soviet Union) CIA makes available
to us results of their analysis relative to this project.
100:
T
.
On 3-9-61 during a conference on (Soviet illegal. es-
pionage activities between Special Agents (Papich, Litrento,
Duckett and me and Messrs. Angleton, Horton and Hunt of CIA, we
1 were advised that C IA has now established a laboratory in
New York in connection with this project which can examine cor-
respondence for secret writing, micro dots and possibly codes.
He said the laboratory is fully equipped and they would be glad
to make its facilities available to us if at any time we desire
an examination of this nature to be made in NYC and time was of
the essence and would not permit the material to be brought to
our Laboratory in Washington, D.C. We expressed our appreciation
for the offer and said that in the event we desired to utilize
their laboratory, we would contact them.
ACTION: For information.
DEM: td. (7).
JD.
(Absen)
SA 5. J. Papich
advised 
4/19/61
• Hunter 
material
-The increase about
20% since NY Lab
now 
establish 
d
ylow.
99
WDS 4/21/61
63 MAR 28 1961
another road!
JFK
(C)
EX-114
REC-22
TERE
3/13
(105-93089-2
7. MAR 23
B
JFK
%
30
,
0-14f (Rev. 10-16-70)
SECRET
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Federal Bureau of Investigation
March 10, 1972
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
ATTENTION: Deputy Director for Plans
RE
Dear
HUNTER PROJECT
BY GIA COURIER'
GAMES
JAMES ANGLETON
JFK
1. For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be
of interest to you.'
☐ 2. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted
as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results.
3. No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter.
狗
REC-50 [55.993021-46]
☐ 4. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection
with this inquiry.
☐ 5. Please note change in caption of this case.
TO MAR 10 1972
Incomplete
☐ 6. Status of case:
☐ Completed
Very truly yours,
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatio
downgrading and
declassification
John Edgar Hoover
Director.
Enc.
ко
CLOSURE
SECRET
IBXXXXXNBKAZAKUXHXXÃÆLAXXXX
TXOMISTUD RENT COX KRYCIA IMEI MI
Reference is made to your special notation on
Hunter Report No. 27,226, Item 
72A13AM.
Attached is a list of types of traffic we
would like to receive.
MAR 1, 1972.
97
ROUTE IN
SECRET
ELOPE
1
RE: PROJECT HUNTER
-
M. . Triplett
W. O. Cregar
Horch 10, 1972
We are in the process of reviewing the Watch List
and will advise you of additions and deletions. The following
types of traffic have been of assistance and continue to be of
interest to us:
1.
1
Current and, former Soulet exchange students, visitors,
researchers and scientists.
2. Current and former Soviet official visitors.
3.
Current and former Soulet] nonofficial visitors whose U.S.
contacts are subversive, would be of interest to the Soviets
because of their access to classified data or are in a post-
tion to be of assistance to the [Soulets.
•
U.S. exchange students, researchers and persons who have
been in the USSR with American exhibitions and delegations.
5. Current and former U.S. students and researchers in the
USS who do not come under official East-West Exchange Program.
This does not include the short-term student tours but does
include individuals who are in the USSR for some time. We
would, of course, like to receive any traffic on individuals
who are there for a short time if they have been sponsored by
subversive organizations and subversive individuals or have
received special invitations or special treatment from the
Soutets
60 We have no interest in the hundreds of legitimate travelers
who visit the [USSR] on regular tours or go to see relatives. We
do have an interest in travel and contacts involving persons on
the Watch List; known communists, New Left activists, extremists
and other subversives; suspected and known espionage agents;
individuals known to be of interest to the Soviets because of
their specialized knowledge or work on classified matters;
individuals who appear to have been compromised; and persons
who meet with Soviets connected with organizations known to
specialize in propaganda or in obtaining information regarding
the U.S.
7 Communist Party and front organizations (such as American
Russian Institute, National Council of [American-Soviet Friendship]
and Ukrainian News, entremist and few Left organisations.
105-93089 miD]
M.E.Triplettime
(4)
(10)-93
Joy
Original to CIA, Att'n James Angleton
CIA courier 3-10-72. SECRET RE
96
GROUP 180055
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
TE
SECRET
8. Protest and peace organizations, such as People's Coalition
for Peace and Justice, National Peace Action Committes and
Women's Strike for Peace.
9.
Communista, Trotskyites and members of other Harrist-
Leninist, subversive and extremist groups, such as the Black
Panthers, Thite Panthers, Black Nationalist and Liberation
groups, Venceremos Brigade, Venceremos Organization, Weathermen,
Progressive-Labor Party, Worker's Student Alliance, Students
for a Democratic Society, Resist, Revolutionary Union and other
New Left groups. This would include persons sympathetic to the
(Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam and Red China. Far East
10. (Cubans and pro-Castro) individuals in the U.S.
Traffic to and from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands)
showing anti-U.S. or subvèrsive sympathies.
12. Contacts with the (Soviet Red Cross), particularly those
„made or received by Individuals,
13. (Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots
Abroad (contacts with emigres and emigre organizations in U.S.).
14. Traffic between U.S. nationals and altens in the U.S.
with individuals attending such institutions as the Central
Komsomol School and Friendship) University. This would include
the (USSR)
any allens in the U.S. who have previously been in the
as students.
NOTE:
3
Above sent in answer to special notation on Hunter Report.
27,226, Item 72A13AM ((105-67845-38542)) reading as follows: "Your
30 October 
1962 statement of HUNTER Project requirements does not
cover contacts such as the one reflected in attached item. Please
advise whether you wish to see traffic from U.S. nationals or aliens
temporarily residing in the U.S. (e.g., foreign students) to rela-
tives or friends studying at Friendship University or similar
institutions. You may wish to take this opportunity to review, and
possibly revise, your above-cited requirements statement.
Subsequent to 10-30-62 memo, there have been several oral requests
for other types (Items 1,2,3,12 and 14) and "Hunter" asked us if
we desired information on New Left and Black Nationalist fields on
1-15-69 and we advised them that we did. They had made a similar
inquiry regarding P.O. Boxes utilized by the Soviets by Soviet
Committee for Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad) ( Hunter
Report 27,226 was dated January 25, 1972, and transmittal Tetter
was signed by James Angleton,
JFK
SEPRET
* Tlakt meth
FROM
"OPTIONAL FORM NO.10
MAY 1963 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO.
ROUT IN ENVELOPI
SECRET
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
GOVERN
Memorandum
ΤΟ
:
Mr. E. S. Miller
W. A. Branigan
SUBJECT:
BUREAU INFORMANT 200 - Policy
1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. J. P. Lee
1-Miss M. E. Triplett
⚫ DATE:.
February 15, 1973
1-Mr. Branigan
100
CLASSIFIED BYSZALI
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
[Bureau Informant 200] is the symbol number
Mr. Felt.
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt.
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.§.I
Mr. Purvis
Mr. Soyars _
Mr. Walters _
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs.
designated for information furnished on a highly confi-
dential basis by CIA and referred to by them as "PROJECT HUNTER.
Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy Director
2:00 PM of CIA, has an appointment to meet with Acting Director Gray
20-78 on February 16, 1973. In this connection, at 5:50 p.m., on
✓
1. Filin (105-9.
February 15, 1973, Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence
Staff, CIA, advised that the reason for General Walters' visit
is to discuss PROJECT HUNTER. Specifically, General Walters
will raise the question of the Bureau taking the PROJECT over.
Angleton stated that Dr. Schlesinger, Director of CIA, had
instructed Walters to meet with Mr. Gray prior to his,
Schlesinger's, return from overseas planned for February 19, 1973.
Commencing in January, 1958, and continuing to the
present time, the Central Intelligence Agency has furnished this
Bureau with the product of its highly confidential review of mail
going to and coming from the USSR. Arrangements for this review
were obviously worked out between the Agency and Post Office
officials and we are not privy to the details,
ર
It is obvious that both incoming and outgoing mail
is opened and photographed. At one time in March of 1961,
we were advised that CIA had established a laboratory in
New York where they could examine correspondence for secret
writing, microdots, and possibly codes. At that time CIA
offered to make these facilities available if we needed them.
During the same approximate time, CIA advised that about
500,000 items per month passed to and from the [USSR and about
200,000 of these items are screened. Approximately 1,200 items
per month received "close scrutiny.".
RCC-49(
1-47
HACLES SEK
On February 15, 1973, Mr. James Angleton advise B
that at the present time, he has 9 of his people in Washington.
working on PROJECT HUNTER, and there are 2 additional "personnel
working in New York, for a total of 11, Presumably, all or most
of these people have
WAB:hke
(5)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAsian language ability. Angleton further
FREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE 
SHOWN OTHERWISE.
1073
EX-103
CONTINUED OVER
SECRET LANE 5. WaR
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
JFC,
JEK
SECRET
Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: [BUREAU INFORMANT 200`
advised that the U. S. Postal Service had raised a question as
to CIA's necessity to continue PROJECT HUNTER in view of possible
security problems within the Postal Service.
لمد بالانكل
JFK
The Bureau has always handled PROJECT HUNTER material
on a strict need-to-know basis. The material received is handled
on one desk in the Domestic Intelligence Division where it is
screened for items of possible investigative use and retention.
Material of no interest is destroyed. HUNTER material can be
only transmitted to our field divisions in paraphrased form
and can only be used for investigative purposes. The material
can never be incorporated in any communication which is intended
for dissemination outside of the Bureau. HUNTER material that
is retained is kept in a Special File Room in the Records Branch
at the Identification Division Building. Periodically CIA has
been furnished with general guidelines as to the material which
would be of special interest to our needs. CF For example, we are
currently interested in material concerning current and former
Soviet] exchange students, visitors, researchers, and scientists.] ((s)
We are likewise interested in Americans who are in the [USSR] for
an appreciable period of time. We are interested in American
communists and other extremists who may be corresponding with
persons in the USSR
We have always considered the product from PROJECT HUNTER
as valuable to our investigative interests. In this connection,
it has provided us with the identities of Americans in contact
with [Soviet] exchange students in the United States who offer some
potential as informants regarding the Soviet] students' activities.
We know from highly confidential sources thất a proportion of
these students have already been recruited by one or the other
of the major Soviet Intelligence Services. We know also that
many of the exchange students will subsequently be posted to the
United States in some official capacity. ](s)
PROJECT HUNTER has identified numerous individuals
from the United States and from other areas of the world in
วล
JER
Wo
attendance at the Central Komsomol School and Friendship] University. (s)
CIA has 'permitted us to furnish them the names of
specific individuals in whom we have an investigative interest,
and this has been valuable in covering their activities. ✓ The
product from HUNTER has also been valuable in identifying Soviets
who plan to and later visit the United States ](s)
2
-
SECRET
-
JFK
CONTINUED
-
OVER
;
SEGNET
Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
હ
The Soviet Union is currently building up the number
of trade-representatives who will be assigned in various areas
of the United States where we normally would not have coverage.
We anticipate that PROJECT HUNTER would be valuable in providing
leads for any necessary coverage of these people. (S)
With the relaxation of tensions between the U. S. and
the USSR the volume of correspondence has obviously increased.
We do not currently know what that volume is. To the best of
our knowledge, CIA has maintained this PROJECT smoothly and
without hitch. It would be necessary to now examine what
security problems the U. S. Postal Service is experiencing.
ACTION:
The above is submitted for possible use by the
Acting Director for the visit of General Walters.
EM
CONFIRMED WITH GEH.
WUALTERS FOR 2:00 PM.
TUESDAY, 2-20-23
SEGRET
ODK/DMA3
p
I

ΤΟ
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO: 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
་
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
“UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.
Papi
FROM
:
S. J. Papich(
SUBJECT:
105-93089
реп
Fiel
DATE: January 16, 1969
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/20/00 BY SA
BUREAU INFORMANT 200)- Policy
UTILIZATION OF SOURCE IN THE
NEW LEFT AND BLACK NATIONALIST FIELDS
Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad -
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
C.D.Baus
JFK. G. th
On January 15, 1969) Richard Ober Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), suggested to the Liaison Agent
that the Bureau should not overlook the utilization of the
Agency's Hunter project for the development of leads in the
New Left and Black Nationalist fields: Ober admitted the
traffic involving individuals in these areas might be light
but that the Bureau might wish to give consideration to placing
stops on certain key personalities.
The Hunter project for which we have given the
designation of Bureau Informant 200) essentially consists
specialized coverage of mail between the United States and
Russia If we have some reason to believe that one of our
.
subject's is communicating with anybody in the (Soviet Uniop)
it might be worthwhile to place a stop.
+
"We should bear in mind that this coverage is
extremely sensitive and the handling of any matters involving
(Bureau Informant 200 should conform with the ground rules
(See (Mary Triplett, extension
which have been established.
631, Soviet Section.)
ACTION:
REC 102
105-730-7
The above information is being directed to the
attention of the Internal Security Section and the Racial
Intelligence Section.
-
1
-
C. D. Brennan
1
G. C. Moore
1
8
--
M. E. Triplett
Liaison
S. J. Papich.
SJP:clb
(6)
GREB 1190
Stops
18 FEB 5 1969
not warrdated Dow
on black extremists
at 
this time
J2D 1/31/69
STANT
5
JEL
(118
TO
FROM
OPTIONAL NEM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: W. A. Braniganl
: M. E. Triplett
SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 2001
ST
یان
remo W.il. Inanga o pow. c. full 8/24/68
"APLidal
-
W. A. Branigan
-
r
Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
A. P. Litrente Conrad.
DATE: August 24, 1966
S. Papich
M. E. Triplett
[=
Project
200 enter rojan J Policy
Felt
Galo
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
From 8-14-65 through 8-13-66, 3028 Hunter Reports JFC
transmitting 6077 items were received from Bureau Informant
200) This is a slight increase (almost 3%) in number of
items over the previous year.
ক
Although items were received on a continuous basis,
the number dropped during the period of August, 1965, through
January, 1966. This is believed to be due to the reorganization,
transfer of personnel and change in supervision over the Hunter FC
Project at CIA which was taking place during this time.
'
From February, 1966, to the present, there has been
a marked increase in number of items received. The average
for the past four months has been 627 per month, whereas the
average for the same period last year was 421. There has been
no significant change in the type of material except that more
items are being received regarding subjects on whom the source
has not furnished information previously, necessitating more
research. The value of this material is shown by the fact that
there was an increase of 53% in number of new cases opened on
the basis of information furnished by the source.
•
This
Approximately 580 letters were written on information
furnished by Bureau Informant 200) during the past year.
is an increase of approximately 9% over those written the
previous year. More than 260 new cases were opened and 96 cases
were reopened. The majority of new cases were opened on the
basis of travel to the USSR) and contacts of U.S. citizens Latin
Americans and (Cubans) in the U.S. with individuals in the USSR)
Information was sent to the field to assist in pending investiga-
tions and for information. In some cases, data was extracted
from several items, summarized and sent to the field in one com-
munication under more than one caption to show relationships
between various subjects.
An analysis of information received from the source
the past year is attached.
dur
ENCLECTION:
Enclosure
EX-110
REC 5
(05-93087-
78
None. This is for your informati§n SEP 12 1986
ऐশ
نتشارات
AFKP
RE: PROJECT HUNTER.
10-30-62
After an extensive review of 2500) Hunter Reports since our
last memo captioned as above and dated 8/21/62, we have made the
following observations in the interest of economy in regard to Project
Hunter as it related to our Bureau and your Agency to insure time will
not be unnecessarily expended by our Bureau processing unwanted
material and to save your Agency the expense involved in the preparation
of such material.
I Traffic Which Holds No Interest:
.
1. (Soviet-bloc) immigrants desiring to repatriate to (USSR) These
people are interviewed by INS and INS refers anything of interest to us.
2. Americans traveling to the (USSR) as such travel is permissible and
several hundred people a year visit the (USSR) while on tour abroad as
well as Soviets returning to visit relatives. We, of course, have an
interest in such travel involving people on the CIA Watch List, known
Communist Party members, and suspected intelligence agents.
3. U. S. professors in Academic Research corresponding with each other.
It is not likely if U. S. professor is passing any data he would identify
himself at the same time.
II Traffic of Specific Interest:
1. All data re Cuba) This serves to identify profCastro followers in
the U. S.
2. All data re U. S. (Cubans). in contact with (Cubans) attending (Friendship
University in Moscow.
3. All material emanating from (Querto Rico) of an Anti-U. S. nature
and prof Soviet
4. Data re U. S. peace groups going to ( Russia).
and while in (Russia)
5. Data indicating death of any U. S. Communist abroad.
6. Data re
Any data on. Alite
.
RE:
PROJECT HUNTER
(Moscow) or
to U. S. persons
8. Any traffic from or, to U. S. Students in Mos
who were former students in (Moscow)
9. Any traffic between U. S. persons who are with a current
exposition or a previous exposition in the CRCRCRC.:)
.8
:
i
ONAL FORM NO. 10
UNPIED STATES GOVER INT
Memorandum
ΤΟ : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
FROM : Mr. W. A.
CH....
Bran
anigan
11%
westy
SUBJECT: (BUREAU INFORMANT 200) POLICY
DATE: 6/9/61
1
-
W. C. Sullivan
-
W. A. Branigan
---
W. D. Stewart
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
I
Callahan
Conrad _
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy
Аксові Верзија
The purpose of this memo is to bring to your attention, as a
matter of interest, the increase in the volume of Hunter Reports)
received from CIA, the additional administrative bontrols instituted
to cope with increased volume, and lastly the desirable type of infor-
mation (Bureau Informant 200) has been continually furnishing..
(Bureau Informant 200) is the symbol number designated for infor-
mation furnished on a highly confidential basis by CIA and referred to
by CIA as "Project Hunter" and the reports emanating from this project.
as Hunter Reports. This informant originated in 1/58 and furnished
its first Hunter Report in 2/58. As of 6/6/61, we have received
Hunter Report number 5005: many reports transmit : as many as twelve
items, and some reports transmitting up to twenty items. My memo to
Mr. A. H. Belmont dated 12/5/60 revealed as of that date 3425 Hunter.
Reports had been received. You may be interested to learn that in the
last seven months we have received 1680 Hunter Reports pr almost 50%
of the number received from 2/58 until 12/60. On 3/9/61 CII advised
representatives of this Bureau that it had recently established a
laboratory in New York City in connection with this project.
Laboratory is able process Hunter material for secret writing, microdots
and possibly codes. Our liaison representative advised the laboratory
would probably increase the Hunter Report volume to us by 20%; however,
from the above figures it appears this increase in volume is far greater
than 20%..
·
This
A memo W. D. Stewart to W. A. Branigan 2/21/61 re captioned
matter recommended and received approval for the utilization of a stamped
notation on the front of the Hunter Report permitting the interested
supervisor to destroy contents of a Hunter Report if found to be of no
value after checking the appropriate block on the stamp indicating his
Reason for destroying same. Approval to destroy these Hunter Reports
was received from CIA.which ban, if necessary, at a later date repro-
duce any Hunter Report. A memo from Mr. Belmont 3/3/61 to All Super-
visors of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Internal Security
and Subversive Control Sections instructed all recipients re use of
above-mentioned stamp. In addition, above memo 2/21/61 received approval
for a proceedure whereby Hunter Reports would be screened for destruction
by substantative desk handling captioned matter prior to sending these
reports to Records Section for handling to preclude any indexing or
handling which would later be deemed necessary report is destroyed.
RJUN 14 1961
REC-8
(705-93089)
slj
(WDS: $13)
QX 101
27
P.A).
the
.
Memo Branigan to Sullivan.
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
205-93089
°7
POLICY
A great deal of material furnished by the informant relates
directly to contacts and activities of individuals who are of current
interest to us such as top level communists as William Z. Foster and
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and such espionage subjects as the Maurice Hyman
Halperins, who were identified by Elizabeth Bentley, who stated Maurice
Halperin was 'a source of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster. The Halperins
are now in Russia) Pertinent information relating to individuals of
current interest is passed to the field for its. intelligence interest.
In addition, material is received which reveals the (Soviet) sympathies
of some U.S. citizens and also indicates certain arrangements with the
Soviets which may be considered against the best interests of the
U.S. Government. The larger amount of data received tends to confirm
information already moun and it does not require in itself that the
field be advised of same.
The informant furnished two specific Hunter Reports reflecting
that two different individuals were (sending post cards to USSR with
another post card deliberately and carefully sealed to the first post
card. In a case opened entitled "V. Podgoretsky, IS - R". (105-98499),
the informant advised that both of the post cards forwarded by
Podgoretsky contained a clandestine message on the inner side of the
back post card. Investigations concerning James D. Cawthon, the
former individual mentioned, and Podgoretsky are still in progress.
below:
are
are 
set out
Typical data furnished by (Bureau Informant 200) at
Information concerning travel plans abroad of several SM-
subjects; one namely, Martin Field (101-1019) Contacts in this
country of Security Index (SI) subjects vacationing and studying
abroad; namely, Cary Lou Patterson (100-136466) Data relating
to a contact by Bernon Ferguson Mitchell) with his mother in (California)
As you recall, Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin were employed at
NSA a short time ago before they defected to Russia Data that one
D. C. Mac Donger. of Brighton, Massachusetts requested publishers
of the Soviet "Pravday to forward to him old issues of that paper so
he could distribute same to Americans in various cities here to improve
their language skill and to acquaint them with the (USSR)
cerning numerous individuals who sent New Years greetings to Nikita
Khrushchev and expressed their sympathies toward Soviet way of life;
namely, Donald A. Sawtelle (105-15570), a New York SI subject. Data
revealing a contact by John Peter Grothe (62-105833) with the Minister
of Culture in Moscow requesting this individual to promise the (Moiseyou)
dancers would perform in U.S. and also indicating to him he expected to
visit USSR again in the near future. (Grothe) advised him that last year.
-
2
Memo Branigan to Sullivan
Re:
BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089.
he worked for Senator Hubert Humphrey) as a foreign relations advisor
and did a lot of work in field of disarmament. He further indicated
he was doing graduate work at Stanford but still served as a consultant
to Senator (Humphrey) Bufiles reveal one Victoria Ivanova Sandor
(105-58070), a Russian born alien and her husband (John Sandor) who is
presently employed as an attorney in the Office of the Attorney General,
State of Minnesota, are close friends of Orville Freeman, former
Governor of Minnesota and present Secretary of Agriculture, Washington,
D. C. The informant advised recently in regard to Victoria Sandor
that she advised her mother in (USSR) she expected to move to Washington
where her husband will work for Secretary of Agriculture, Freeman; that
she and her husband will be friends of Freeman and President Kennedy;
and that she hopes through these connections she will be able to obtain
a necessary permit for her mother to come to the U.S. She indicated
she will go to the President, to his wife, or to whomever it will be
necessary to achieve this goal.
Information received from Bureau Informant 200) cannot be
disseminated directly as it might tend to reveal this highly confidential
sounce; however, the information is used to great advantage by the
Bureau for its own intelligence at the Bureau and in the field.
gations are opened on data furnished as above and if we can ascertain
confirmation of same data from our sources in the field we can then
appropriately disseminate pertinent information.
ACTION:
None, above data are furnished solely for your information.
WAB
(WAS)
M
Greel
Investi-
&
.3
CATIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERN NT
Memorandum
SECRET
DATE:
8/21/61
10/26/10.
CLASSIFIED BY 507 ALM/ely
DECLASSIFY ON: 
25XL
TO
:
MR. W. C. SULLIVAN
W. A. BRANIGAN
FROM :
SUBJECT:
*BUREAU
INFORMANT 200.
POLICY
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Collahan
Conrad
DeLoach.
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trottor
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy
✓
"/""H
Reference is made to memorandum Stewart to Branigan
8/8/61 re same subject wherein it was requested a conference be
arranged between Special Agents (Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart and
an interested CIA representative to explain to CIA specific type
of "Project Hunter" material we desire
JFK
On 8/17/61 Special Agents (Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart)
and CIA representatives, (James Hunt, John. Mertz and Thomas Chalmers
conferred at CIA concerning the "Project Hunter." The observation
set out on pages 2, 3, and 4 of the referenced memorandum were
individually discussed with the CIA representatives. They appeared
very pleased with our analysis of the Hunter material received and
were also pleased with the attention afforded it. Mr. Hunt, at the
conclusion of the conference, requested we furnish a set of guides,
similar to our of ore-mentioned observations discussed, for his
people. Attached is a blind memo for CIA setting forth material in
which we have no interest and a specific interest.
In order to better understand the coverage of (Bureau
Informant 200 the writer specifically asked the following questions
and received the following answers:
traffic?
1. Is the informant covering all traffic or selected
Answer: Approximately 500,000 items pass to and from
each month. Approximately 200,000 items are screened. The other
300,000 escape screening because they pass through at hours when
no one is on duty. Of the 200,000 items screened, approximately
1,200 items receive "close" scrutiny.
getting?
INCLOSURE
2. What portion of the informant's coverage are we
Answer: Of the 1,200 items closely scrutinized,
receiving approximately 250 to 300 monthly
(NDS: ct (✓)
Enclosure
(105-93089)
31
61 SEP 1 1961
REC-52
5 AUG 29.1961
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED 
EXCEPT
WHERE 
SHOWN 
OTHERWISE.
SECRET
5...
5+
SECRET
I
Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
105-93089
POLICY
3. Why are we getting specific type traffic, i.e.,
Exchange Students, Vladimir Kazakevich) material (Kazakevich) is
a prolific letter writer now in (USSR) who was formerly a pro-
(Soviet) economist-living in the U.S.), and (Intourist) traffic
(general data re arrangements for Americans traveling to (Russia) :? (5)
Answer: Exchange Student traffic ("Mother writes to
son who is a (Soviet-bloc exchange student in U.S. and sends family
love" and vice versa. Letters are synopsized and are of no interest
as such) has been sent because CIA is surveying a certain area of
traffic. Mr. Hunt) advised they derived no.intelligence benefit
from their survey and was interested to learn of our similar results.
In regard to Kazakevich CIA develops a great deal of foreign
intelligence data from material he transmits and receives. (Mr. Hunt)
felt material would be of interest to us. He was advised we have
derived nothing to date from this material as we are solely interested
in the individuals involved and in order to protect this highly
sensitive informant we do not route the informant's material around for
general intelligence interest. (Mr. Hunt) was advised all of the
informant's material is handled on a strictly need-to-know basis
and the material retained is under strict control. (fr. Hunt) was
pleased in regard to our secure precautions as only a very few
CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter. In regard. to
Intourist) traffic, (fr. Hunt) advised we were furnished same because
one of the individuals associated with an Intourist agency was
suspected of being a Soviet) intelligence contact. (Mr. Hunt) agreed
with our observation that all Americans traveling abroad
had to obtain a passport from State Department, such travel to
the (USSR) being permissible, we could obtain any necessary data
re an individual from State. (s)
In regard to item number three above, it was agreed
We would not receive any more Hunter material re Exchange Students,
Vladimir Kazakevich) (who alone provided 300 items in 1960) and
Intourist traffic. In addition "holiday greeting" type traffic
will not be furnished. Specific exceptions to the above-mentioned
traffic we will not receive are' set out in our blind memorandum to
CIA and were set out in the referenced memorandum on pages 2 and 3.
3. (s)
-2-
SECVET
Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200 POLICY
105-93089
SEORET
The matter of receipt of illegible material was
also discussed and it was pointed out to Mr. Hunt no matter how
important the contents may be if the name and address of the U.S.
addressee or addressor is illegible the material is of no value.
It was specifically requested more legible material be furnished
and, if it was obvious reproduction would be poor, we would
appreciate it if U.S. person's name and address could be printed
or written out. (MACY.CY: Hunt advised they were aware of reproduction
problem and stated Xerox équipment was to be installed in the
near future. This, he believed, would help the problem.
In regard to the CIA Watch List, approximately 535
names now appear on this list which is supplemented each Monday
morning. Mr. Hunt requested we specifically place on this list
the individuals on whom we want coverage even though we are
presently receiving items re these persons. If their names
appear on the Watch List, we will possibly get closer coverage.
Attached with the blind memorandum for CIA is a list of individuals
| presently on the Watch List which (Mr. Hunt requested. Interested
supervisors will be advised and additional names of Communist Party
members now in (Soviet-bloc) countries will be furnished CIA via our
Liaison Agent.
In regard to CIA's sampling of certain types of traffic
and furnishing same to us, (Mr. Hunt) was requested to advise our
Liaison Agent what it was doing and after a period of six months
we would furnish the results of our observations which would dictate
whether we would continue to receive this new type material.
•
(fr. Hunt) desired that in regard to any correspondence
with CIA wherein a reference is made to a Hunter Report or the
Project Hunter in any way that the letter be sent via Liaison as ·
only a few. CIA people have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and
CIA does not want such letters in regular mail channels.
JFK
01681
As pointed out in the referenced memorandum, the
need for this conference was to insure the Bureau Informant 200)
Program will continue to operate under maximum economy and
efficiency to the mutual interests of CIA and the Bureau.
believed as a result of the above conference that the Hunter material
now received will be reduced approximately 50%.
It is
-3-
SECKE!

།
·SECKE I
Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan
Re: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
105-93089
POLICY.
At the conclusion of the conference, (Mr. Hunt)
and his aides who were obviously pleased with our observations
requested a similar conference in approximately six months.
SA Stewart) will prepare an appropriate tickler in this regard
and set same for 2/18/62, at which time a suitable memo will be
prepared indicating observations which might be discussed and requesting
permission to attend such a conference.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the three copies of the attached blind memorandum
be furnished to CTA by our Liaison Agent as a guide to the REDCHunter
traffic in which we have an interest.
(Wire) WARD
deleverd
CIA
to
8/23/61
чить
SECRE
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
'Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
TRATAM
SECRET
1 Stewart
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED 
EXCEPT '
WHERE 
SHOWN 
OTHERWISE
...
RE:
[PR
PROJECT HUNTER
August 21, 1961
10/26/00
CLASSIFIED BY SAL
DECLASSIFY 
ON: 25X
After an extensive review of 5600 Hunter Reports
transmitting innumerable items, we have made the following
observations in the interest of economy in regard to
Project Hunter as it relates to our Bureau and your Agency
to insure time will not be unnecessarily expended by our
Bureau processing unwanted material and to save your Agency
the expense of furnishing our Bureau this unwanted material.
I TRAFFIC WHICH HOLDS NO INTEREST:
1
FBI
1 - (Intourist) traffic (general data concerning arrangements
for Americans traveling to Russia). Such travel is
permissible and arrangements have been previously made
through State Department for a passport. (5)
2
.3
-
Personal type letters, which have been translated into
English, between the United States relatives, sweethearts,
stamp collectors, and their (Russian) counterparts.
- Letters to and from Exchange Students, which again
are synopsized in English and reveal that "Mother
writes to son who is an Exchange Student in the
United States and sends family's love," and vice versa.
4 No "holiday greeting" type traffic desired.
In regard to the above four categories, your
Agency's laboratory processes all Hunter material for secret
writing, microdots and possible codes and presently furnishes
us its observations concerning any (one of these appearing in
the traffic.
II EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE FOUR CATEGORIES:
,
A. Any traffic in the above-mentioned nondesired categories
wherein the translator feels there is some intelligence
significance. Numerous letters have the translator's
LWDS: ct/
SECRET
-B-
A
ni
SECRET
I
Project Hunter'
comments indicating your Agency's Watch List shows
the person is a suspected intelligence agent or that
the text of the letter indicates some type of code,,
et cetera.
B. Any traffic wherein it is revealed United States
addressee or addressor is a United States Government
employee or is employed in a sensitive industry, i.e.,
missile field.
C. Any traffic wherein we have an obvious intelligence
interest such as an open offer by an individual
to assist Soviets, an indication an individual is
going to Russia and wants to become a citizen or wherein
any individual professes pro-Soviet or procommunist
· sympathies.
III WE ARE. SPECIFICALLY INTERESTED IN:
IV
1
•
3
All traffic relating to top communists traveling
abroad which we have been getting regularly and from
which we have been extracting a great deal of
intelligence data such as Mary Lou Patterson, the
Pittmans, William Z. Foster, Claude Lightfoot;.
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, et cetera.
Flynn,
All traffic on specific individuals we place on
the Watch List.
All traffic on special individuals such as NSA
defectors William Hamilton Martin and Bernon Ferguson
Mitchell.
Mitch
All traffic of a clandestine type such as that
in the V. Podgoretsky) case.
L
If possible, it would be appreciated if an effort
could be made to furnish as legible a copy of Hunter material
SECREY
SECRET
Project Hunter
as possible. In particular, if it is evident paper from
which copy is to be made is not type to give a good
reproduction, it would be appreciated if a notation
concerning name and address of United States recipient
br sender could be made from original. Frequently,
information of interest is received but United States
person's name en reproduction is indistinguishable and
information becomes of no value.
V LIST OF PERSON DESIRED ON THE WATCH LIST AS OF AUGUST 18, 1961
NAME
-
BERLAND, MARK V.
FOSTER, WILLIAM Z.
HASKELL, ROY
KAHN, ALBERT EUGENE
KOVOLENKO, V. P.`.
PECHTER, BERNARD DAVID
ROBERTS, HOLLAND DEWITTE
SUCHOBECK, ALEX (NMI)
ADDRESS
Flat 15 Lasvinskaya St. 11
Perm 24, USSR
Apartment 6B, 1040 Nelson
Avenue, Bronx, New York
12 Crown Street
Brooklyn, New York
1302 Henno Way,
Glen Ellen, California
General P. 0.,
Kiev I, USSR
2161 Shattuck Avenue
Berkeley, California
383 Hadonia, Palo Alto,
California. During Week
Days - 787 Castro Street,
San Francisco, California
1315 Lincoln Avenue,
Pacific Grove, California
SECRET
SEGRET
Project Hunter
TRILUPAITIENĖ, ALDONA
TRILUPAITIS, LEONAS
(also card on
Leonas Algeda)
131/14-1, Antakaenio Street
Vilnius, Lithuania
Apartment 1B, 104 Irvington
Street, S.W.,.
Washington, D.C.
:
SECRET
O FORM NO. 10
:: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callchan
Conrad
ΤΟ
W. C.
Sullivan &
DATE:
FROM
M. A. Branigan
Branigan
SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200
200] -
POLICY
11/2/62
DeLoach
Evan's
Malone
Rosen _
Sullivan
Tavel
Trottor
Tele. Room
Holmes
-
1
1
-
Sullivan
Branigan
Stewart
Gandy
This is to advise you that on 10/31/62 representatives of
this Bureau conferred with CIA representatives James Hunt, John Mertz
and Thomas Chalmers) at. CIA concerning "Project Hunter." At this
conference our observations concerning Hunter material furnished since
our last conference on 2/13/62 were given CIA. In addition, we advised
CIA specifically of certain Hunter items which were of no interest
to us and of certain Hunter items which were of interest to us. These
items were set forth in memorandum form and furnished to CIA; a copy
of same is attached.
CIA advised that its (Hunter-Don') coverage was being
operated seven days a week until November 15. This concentrater
coverage is for the purpose of determining if there is any illegal
agent traffic. After November 15 all Hunter coverage can be expected
| to be reduced until after the Christmas mail rush has subsided.
.
.\
The CIA representatives were very pleased with our analysis
of the Hunter material received and with the attention afforded its
by us. They are very cooperative in that they are willing to focus
their attention on any particular phase of coverage we suggest for
our own benefit. For CIA's interest we furnished them a copy of the
attached memorandum of our analysis of typical information furnished
by (Bureau Informant 200) of interest to us.
ACTION:
None. Above data furnished for your information.
WDS
لام
(
WDS:jes
(4)
(105-93089
Enclosure'
Fix.b.
ENCESSURE
65 NOV 1962
REC-35
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
12/246/02 BY
(105-930-19
EX-118
7 NOV 5 1962
OPTIMAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERN ENT
Memorandum
l
L-Branigan...
Land Bland
1 Baumgardner
Donahoe'
Le Stewart.
Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad .
DeLoach
Evans _
Malone
Rosen _
Sullivan
Tavel
TO
W. C. Sullivan
DATE: 8-25-61
FROM
-W. A. Branigan (
SUBJECT:
BUREAU INFORMANT 200-POLICY
I
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy_
On 8-17-61,. a conference took place between Special
Agents Sam J. Papich, W. D. Stewart and representatives of CIA in
regard to Bureau Informant 200 As a result, CIA was recently
furnished a guide as to Bureau Informant material we desire.
This guide was prepared after discussion with several members
of the Espionage, Nationalities Intelligence, Subversive Control,
and Internal Security Sections. In addition, CIA was furnished
a current list of names previously placed on the CIA Watch List
by us. In this regard, the CIA representative advised that,
although we are getting coverage on certain individuals, to insure
we get complete coverage on each individual we desire it on,
they should be specifically added to the Watch List. This watch
Lest is revised each Monday; therefore, any person not included
on this list at present can be included by forwarding a routing
slip anytime to W. D. Stewart, Room 644 RB, bearing the individual's
name, his address in U.S., and indicating the period coverage is
desired. A list will be compiled by Mr. Stewart weekly and furnished
to CIA via liaison. The CIA representative further advised that
very few people there have any knowledge of "Project Hunter" and that
any communication referring to this project or a "Hunter Report"
should be forwarded to CIA via liaison and appropriately flagged
for our Liaison agent's attention to avoid the comminication getting |
into CIA's regular mail channel.
་་༼
-
The CIA representative further advised, if any security
subject travels to the (USSR) and his name is added to the Watch
List, CIA will promptly afford him coverage while he is abroad..
RECOMMENDATION:
DATIO
:
EX 107
REC 47 (089-32)
That the above information be discussed at the next
conference held by the Espionage, Nation&ties Intelligence,
Subversive Control, and the Internal Security Sections and that
all agents in the above-mentioned sections be reminded to furnish
Mr. Stewart a copy of any letter prepared from Bureau Informant 200
material to assist him in continually evaluating the program.
WDS: ekg
(?)
eng ikan (mas) with
(105-93089)
99
yone at fiction Chiefs Cont
9/1/61. home will.
Rubmitted Thrus
10/30/62
RE: /BUREAU INFORMANT 200
Typical data furnished by Bureau Informant 200
Information indicating travel plans to the (USSR) of numerous
Communist Party subjects; data indicating pro-Soviet sympathies of
U. S. individuals; data indicating a U. S. person may be serving as a
(Soviet) courier; data indicating the existence of particular (Russian)
social and art clubs in the U. S.; data indicating a desire of U. S.
students to study in (USSR) data indicating profCastro sympathies of
U. S. persons; data revealing present activity, feelings, and former
associates of Bernon Ferguson Mitchell and William Hamilton Martin,
recent National Security Agency (NSA) defectors; data revealing U. S.
military personnel are in contact with official establishments and/or
individuals in (USSR) data revealing activities of the Maurice Hyman
Halperins, now residing in (Cuba) and of their son David Carlos Halperin,
a medical student at the University of Chicago) and data indicating
current whereabouts of Carl and Alice Jerome Communist Party subjects;
and data relating to the current whereabouts of (James M. McMillin, Jr.,
a former U. S. soldier attached to U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Russia, who
previously defected and married a Soviet)
Soviet
Data of Special-Interest:
During the present (Cuban) crisis, we have identified several
pro Castro) sympathizers in U. S. through their contacts with (Cubans
at Friendship University, Moscow, and have been alerted to their activity.
We have learned that (Russian) school authorities are greatly displeased
with Huldah S. Clark, daughter of Negro Communist Party subject
William Clark of Newark) because of her behavior.
She too evidenced
discontentment there. Her educational trip to (USSR) served as CP
propaganda. We were alerted to Maurice Halperins intended return to
U. S. We have been advised of Cillie Mae Teslich's intended visit to
(USSR). Her daughter in (Moscow) is suspected as being the propaganda-radio
announcer (Moscow Molly." We are developing U. S. contacts of
Helen Kagen-Pozner, UN employee discharged in 1950's for failure to
answer questions re possible espionage involvement, through
correspondence of her with relatives in (Russia)
&
(195-93089-54)
such as (Valeriy Tereshchenko
enkop One of (Tereshchenko's) contacts is
believed to be a target for contact by (KGB) and another is the
son-in-law of the woman in whose apartment (Viktor Kravchenko had
been visiting. (Kravchenko) is a (Soviet defector who recently
committed suicide. The informant has advised of the activities
and contacts of (Vladislaw Krasnow, Soviet defector to Sweden in
1962. The Bureau was not aware previously that (Krasnow) was
in the U.S.
• Although ‘much material regarding communists and the
Communist Party (CP) is also received from other sources,
the
informant continues to furnish additional details and new infor-
mation regarding changes of employment and residence, travel,
contacts and activities. Data regarding attempts of the DuBois
Clubs to expand nationally and internationally was furnished in
items on Paula Garb) International Secretary, who went to the
USSR) to marry Sobiet) if he can obtain a divorce. Items
pertaining to Mary Lou Camacho) (daughter of CP leader) told of
the birth of her daughter, reconciliation with her (Cuban) husband
plans to go to Cuba to live and that one of her friends, a
Security Indes subject, was in Ghana when she was believed to
be in the U.S.
"
Data is received regarding travel and contacts of Mary
Rakoczy) (widow of suspected espionage agent), who attended the
(Higher Party School of the Ukraine in Kiev, USSR) Informațion
continues. to be received regarding her son, (Andrew Rakoczy,) who
was allegedly studying ballet but actually attended the above
school for almost two years. This has included his contacts,
change of employment and residence and racial, poverty and
Progressive Labor Party activities in Chicago. One of his con-
tacts now at this school has been identified as Teddie Kardash
son of Canadian communists. The source has also advised that
(Irene Rakoczy) and three unidentified individuals plan to study
dancing in Kiev) this summer (possibly at the above-mentioned school
which maintains a special section to combine lessons in dancing
and indoctrination) and that (Bernard Francis Taylor) (son of CP
official), who went to the USSR with a musical and dancing group,
remained in Kiev) to attend school. Don Zurilko), son of the alien
wife of a U.S. citizen residing in State of Washington, is
attending school in Kiev. He is believed to be from the U.S, or
Canada.
Additional information is received regarding persons
involved in the peace movements, anti-Vietnam demonstrations,
women's organizations, "teach-ins" (one has been in contact with
a (GRU) officer), *racial matters, Progressive Labor Party, Students
for a Democratic Society, DuBois Clubs, Students Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee and other organizations. Items reveal
names of U.S. contacts with members of such (Soviet) propaganda
organizations as the Soviet Peace Committee, Soviet Women's
Committee, Committee For Return to the Homeland) and others.
-
- 3 -
&
хак
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
“UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ : W. C. Sullivan
FROM
می
: W. R. Wannall w/rec
1
DATE:
March 27, 1963
1
1
1
1
SUBJECT: BUREAU INFORMANT 200)-
POLICY
1
*.
-
-
-
-
-
-
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Branigan
. Mr. Stewart
Liaison
1 Mr. Harrell M
->
Tolson
Belmont
Mohf
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Eyans
Gale
Rogen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy
G
For approximately one month beginning in February, 1963,
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had coverage of mail destined to
(Cuba) which was funneled through New York City from approximately
one-half of the United States. The results of this highly confidential
project were furnished us under the code ("Hunter-Vince") through
special arrangements made with CIA. The project has been temporarily
discontinued so CIA can analyze the results and decision will be made
as to its reinstitution based on the results achieved.
Pafferty
While no
During the period the coverage was in effect, we received
94 items and opened 15 new cases based on the material.
specific data was developed indicating clandestine messages were
being transmitted, we know that one of the illegal (Cuban) agent networks
has plans for mail drops in the New York City area, and this coverage
could conceivably lead us to these drops in the future. We have
previously furnished CIA summaries concerning positive results
achieved through its coverage of (Soviet mail for its assistance in
evaluating whether that program should be continued.
we should do so in this instance.
ACTION:
It is believed
If you approve, the attached memorandum containing a
Summary of the action taken by us as a result of the Hunter-Vince
Scoverage will be furnished CIA by liaison for assistance of CIA in
evaluating whether the program should be continued.
Enclosure
989)
105-93089
RAM:djw.
(8)
| 1::CLOSURE
FO
67 APR 4-1963
Am
for
6EX-102
APR 4 1963
REC-52)
Kerme
93087-616)
17 APR
IDED OF FILED
multies
trusted to Y/29/3
Hunt) C/A
#5-11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERFIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
129/1/11
CLASSIFIED BY SprArulely
DECLASSIFY ON: 25XL
MDR-16
200)
INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM (BUREAU INFORMANT 200
Data received regarding the following current and
former double agents, and sources has been utilized to evaluate
their reliability: (Luke Chia Liu Yuan; [Pedro Celestino Jimenez
Moreno Gordon Philip Polley; Hugo Rodriguez-Ramirez; Julius (S)
Shell; NH 445-53. Phyllis Oja; Samuel Jaffe; [NI 2911-S; NY 3556-S;
CG 6562-S Mr. and Mrs. George R. Atkins; and Boris I. Oblesow, (s)
The field has been advised of individuals in close contact with
(Soviets) with the request to consider for development as sources..
Information regarding (Soviet) exchange students (eight
(KGB) agents) includes names of associates, activities, travel,
types of material requested to obtain and individuals with whom
they continue to maintain contact after they leave the U.S.
Similar information is furnished regarding other (Soviets) in the
.U.S. as a result of the exchange program. Material is also
furnished regarding U.S. citizens who travel to the USSR) as part
of the exchange.
.
are
Data regarding current and former U.S. exchange students
shows (Soviet and U.S. contacts before and after return, romantic
involvements, sympathies and difficulties encountered in Russia
A former exchange student has been in contact with a suspected
espionage agent regarding (Ralph Matlaw) (according to (Nosenko), the
KGB) was to attempt recruitment of (Matlaw). The source has revealed
former exchange student (Michael Cole's) travel plans and continued
contacts with (Soviets) (one is son of an espionage agent) and (Henry
Huttenbach's) attempts to obtain a divorce in order to marry a (Soviet)
girl. Similar information is furnished regarding U.S. citizens
who are, or have been, in(Russia) but are not under the exchange
program. These include Sally Harris, Natasha Kent, Kathy Boudin
and Alexander Nikolauk! Two of the four U.S. citizens who have
applied for entrance to Soviet universities have stated that they
desire to become (Soviet) citizens. (Milagros Ruiz Aponte, Puerto
Rican nationalist in the USSR is using an alias in her corres-
pondence. Another (Puerto Rican went to (Cuba) before he left for
the (USSR
Material has been received regarding three employees
of USIA, two U.S. citizens employed by the UN, a Federal employee
who intends to marry a (Soviet girl, three individuals involved
with (Soviet) women and two U.S. contacts of (Gelina Smirnova (an
Intourist guide) who has compromised Americans in the past).
Contacts of foreign exchange students and aliens in the
U.S. from (Canada, Peru, Cuba, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Brazil,
Uruguay, Colombia, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile, Haiti,
Italy, France, Iraq and Africa) with their friends in the USSR who
are studying at (Friendship) University or other schools show that
SEGRET
a
1
1-(105-730-81-78)
SECRET
they may be communists. Two foreign students and an exile from
(Haiti) have been acting as intermediaries. Several have applied
for admittance to Friendship) University and other schools in the
(USSR) because of finances or ideology. A(Nicaraguan) Marxist in
the U.S. is acting as an intermediary for an individual at
(Friendship University by forwarding mail to (Bolivia Data is
furnished regarding foreign students who attended school in the
(USSR) and are now in the U.S. One of these appears to have been
compromised before he left (Russia) and another brought his (Soviet)
wife to the U.S.
Items are received regarding (Soviets) who have entered
the U.S. as wives of Americans: Victoria Sandor (now a Federal
employee); Ala Anderson; Ludmila Olsen) who has advised that she
was approached by (Soviet) Intelligence when in the USSR in 1965;
Iriņa Horwitz; Nataliya Konigsford; and Rosita Brayton) wife of
an (Alaskan) politician and newspapermán, who has become involved
with a (Russian-born U.S. Army Captain. The source advised of
contacts, travel and study in the USSR of Mrs. Kemp Tolley, Soviet)
wife of former U.S. Naval Attache, who has admitted furnishing
information regarding Americans to the Soviets) in the 1940's.
Much material has been furnished regarding U.S. citizens'
travel plans, including those of known subversives, their (Soviet)
relatives and contacts and difficulties encountered by two tourists
with Soviet authorities. Data has been received regarding Soviets
and former U.S. citizens who have traveled, or intend to travel,
ito the U.S., their contacts, activities and relatives. Several
had renounced their U.S. citizenship and had been engaged in
questionable activities in the past. (Mary Mackler), who recently
returned to the U.S., has had numerous contacts with known subuer-
sives, at least two of whom were connected with espionage, in the
past. Material is received on U.S. defectors now in the (USSR)
Additional information received includes: plans of
seven individuals to repatriate to the USSR U.S. contacts with
current and former known and suspected (Soviet agents now in the
USSR (Vladimir Sossinskiy, Vladimir Pozner, Eugenia Olkhina,
Leonids Rimjans, Vladimir Paramonov, Igor Melekh and others);
activities and contacts of current and former known and suspected
espionage agents new in the U.S. (Aaron Pressman, Josef Zarovich,
Victor Perlo, Helen Pozner Wilga and others); the death of Georgi
Lieb) (suspected of working, as black market currency operator for
KGB) and continuation of his contacts by his wife; activities of
Kirill Alereeus (suspect in (Umbel case) family; (Soviet contacts of
(Gerard Piel) who has been in contact with a (KGB) officer; (Soviet)
contacts and travel of (D. G. Brennan, who, according to redere
was to be approached by KGB contacts of (Olga Yourkevitch) (widow
of ship designer) with KGB) agent, travel to (USSR) as a guest of
organization to receive her husband's archives and her illness
JEUNG the (USSR) contact of Major Abdel Okeil of United Arab Republic)
the thes attending the FBI National Academy) with individual
the (USSR U.S. contacts of several defectors and (Soviet repatriates,