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SEGMET-EVES OTHY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The ascessination
Overt knowledge of U.S. Government involvement
Recollections of CIA officials
The organization of the coup group
Why a coup failed to follow the assassination
International activity in opposition to Trujillo
The cast . .
The first Farland memorandum
Level of CIA activity prior to 1960
Approach to Trujillo by Ceneral Clark
Operation Lancet.
State asks Farland if he could engineer a coup
Farland replies that he could
Farland says the dissidents need guns
The U.S. is prepared to assist in overthrowing Trujillo
Rubotton asks that sniper rifles be supplied the dissidents
Acting DCI approves air drop of 12 Springfield rifles
Special Group approves all arms for dissidents
COS asks that one weapon ce sent in each pouch
Dearborn learns of plan to assassinate by intercepting auto
Wimpy Berry asks for submachine guns for plotters
Dearborn asks for three 36-caliber pistols for dissidents
The plot to kill Trujillo at his mistress' apartment
COS protests restriction on pouching weapons
Hqs guidance cable on policy and objectives
Station asks permission to pass three carbines to dissidents
Hqs approves passing carbines
The carbines are passed to the dissidents
Request for pouch waiver ref pouching submachine guns
Submachine guns pouched
Pleas from dissidents that submachine guns be passed to them
Hqs informs the station not repeat not to pass submachine guns
Post-Pay of Pigs standdown cable
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Station acknowledges receipt of submachine guns
Draft cable (not sent) approving release of submachine guns
State Department disapproves passing submachine guns
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The whereabouts of the three carbines
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Special Group confirms not passing submachine guns to dissidents
The dissidents' assassination plans are fir
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U.S. policy does not condone assassination
Dearoom and the COS protest
Critic No. 1 on the assassination
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Vice President Johnson asks about arms delivery
Discovery of U.S. involvement with assassination group
Recapitulation of arms passed or considered for passing
The motivations of the assassins
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i
Rafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was assassinated at
about ten p.n. on the night of 30 May 1951. It was Trujillo's
cars.
custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal
about once a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Chrysler
with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying
He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San
Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action:
after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a
khaki uniform; and set out for San Cristobal in an unescorted 1957
Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.
On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on
a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by eight
armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and
his body was removed from the scene by the assassins.
Trujillo's
chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins,
and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. Che was
never caught and was eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed
while resisting arrest. The others _ were arrested, confessed,
and were later executed before coming to trial. About eight or nine
others, who were in on or knew of the plot but did not participate.
in the actual assassination, were killed while in custody, While
resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.
(Note: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved
in this attempt to overthrow Trujillo. "Assassins" refers to the
Small group that actually did the killing.)
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There were reports in Ciudad Trujillo at the time that the
U.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters.
Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty,
many of the details care out. Norman Gall, a reporter with the
San Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in The New Republic
issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts follow:
The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L.
Trujillo was carried out with assistance from the US Central
Intelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the
69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highway near his
capital were smuggled by the CIA into the country at the
request of the assassins.
The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic in
late 1960, following a series of talks between US Consul Henry
Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Barfield of the US
Consulate, and Luis Amiama Tio. Also involved in the plot was
Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Plata province.
As Trujillo's political and financial problems deepened,
talks continued between Dearbon, Parfield and leaders of the
anti-Trujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact was
established between Amiama and a CIA agent who
named Plato Cox.
.
•
was
The key link between the assassins and the CIA in the arms
shipments was a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad
Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, other ise known as "Wimpy, who operated
a supermarket in a fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo also
lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the killing but
was later allowed to leave the country.
The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembled
later by the plotters, among the routine grocery shipments for
the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The
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gun. parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans,
which were later turned over to the conspirators.
The
Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during
the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being...
prepared. However, when the CIA-organized April 17, 1961,
invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was
focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a post-
ponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because
of the embarrassment another such failure might cause the
United States. But the order to
to 
hold up came too late.
needed weapons were already in the hands of the conspirators,
who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barfield to delay the
assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportunity.
This came on May 30, when Trujillo and his chauffeur drove out
Into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a
rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate, La Fundacion, with
Trujillo's 20-year-old mistress, Mona Sanchez.
It can be reported on excellent authority that close
associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within
a few days following the killing.
•
Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed
out of the Dominican Republic by US officials.
Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("Wimpy") has
returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket,
where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if
Trujillo had never lived...
We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then
Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations,
WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to
monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regine "but. not
pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the
"Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the
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furnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute
tangible evidence of U.S. support.
Bissell remembers the Agency
role as being somewhat more positive than that described by King.
WOW
and Esterline. He viewed the Agency's role as one of giving support
to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S.
interest. He described the affair as "a fairly normal operation
involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not
have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons
supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo.
Both Esterline and King believe they were not. Bissell, however,
has a vague impression that one of them was.
The Agency officers most immediately involved with the plotters
are now widely scattered. Lear Reed, who was chief of station
P
until October 1960, is now retired.
Robert Owen, who was chief
of station at the time of the assassination, is in Paris. Charles
"
Isabel
Cookson, the station's operations officer, is in Brazil.
Cintron, the station's administrative assistant who was used as a
communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1964
and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico. Ned Holman, the head-
quarters branch chief, is in Guatemala City. We elected not to call
back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able
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to furnish minor details that are missing from the written records,
we think it. unlikely that they would be able to add significantly.
'
to the quite complete record that appears in the EMCEED operational
files.
:
Agency activities aimed at replacing the Trujillo regime were
"
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assigned the cryptonym EMDZED. One segment of EMDEED was known as
EMSLEW, the cryptonym for the operation to remove Trujillo by
violent action. We have reviewed the voluminous EMDEED files. Most
of this account is drawn from them. Many of the more significant
documents were not put into the EMDEED files but were kept in a
private file by J. C. King. He made that file available to us.
We also have studied another particularly useful document.
Dominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) officer put in charge
investigation of the
The
of the Trujillo assassination was a navy lieutenant named Ortiz.
The Dominican Republic assigned him to its embassy in Ottawa in
November 1961 when the Trujillo family's attempt to regain power
failed. The New York field office of the FBI held extensive
interviews with him from 6 April through 10 May 1962. The result
„was a massively-detailed, 182-page report on the plot and on the
assassination as reconstructed by the SIM from its interrogations
of the persons it apprehended.
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(the EMDRED operational files)
From the records, we can trace the origins and the course of
We also can
U.S. policy with respect to the overthrow of Trujillo.
ascertain from the files the nature and the extent of U.S. support
of the plotters, including the passing to them of weapons out of the
U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujillc. What we cannot discover from the
files, despite quite massive documentation, is how the coup group
was organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly
accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in
the story is its failure to identify the individuals with whom the
U.S. Goverment was actually working. Excerpts follow:
The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of
conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved
too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it.
Each group
had its purpose and its separate personnel.
The function of the Action Group was to assassinate
Trujillo and immediately present proof of its succes, in
the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the
Political Group.
The latter would then launch a coup,
taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed
Forces.
The Action Group consisted of eight men. It appears to
have been organized originally by General Antonio Imbert
Barreras and Salvador Estrella.
They were joined
by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a member of the military.
corps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio
de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been
killed by the government because of his involvement in the
* Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a
Caribbean Dictator (New York: MacMillan Co., 1965)
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Galindez case; Huascar Tejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and Pedro
Livio Cedeno. The eighth member, Manuel Caceres Tunti, was in
Moca of the night of the 30th and saw none of the action.
it
The Political Group had a less distinct membership.
included Luis Amiaza Ts, Modesto Diaz, General Juan Tomus
Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the support
of General Roman Farmander, Secretary of State for the Armed
Forces, and his brother Bibin.
The over-all authority appears to have centered principally
in General Diaz, probably the only one who had sufficient
prestige to command authority.
The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When
information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going
to drive to Estancia Fundacion . . . Garcia Guerrero in the
Palace would inform the others by personal message.
The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace
came to the patient plotters at seven o'clock on the evening
of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at
this moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Maza
threatened to act by himself if the others lagged.…. In any
event, the plan went into execution.
Each of them
had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his own
saved-off shotgun and two M-1 semiautomatic rifles.
•
The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Never
very professionally contrived, the plot was hastened prematurely
to its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was
now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Imediately after
the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to
reach General Roman.
The Political Group of the conspiracy never took up its
planned role. The Action Group scattered, leaving a trail as
wide as a boulevard. Trujillo's body was left in the trunk of
de la Maza's car, parked in the garage of Ceneral Tomas Diaz,
where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators
were all hunted down very quickly, except for Aniama and
Imbert, who managed to conceal themselves for months until
the danger had passed.
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The FBI report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SEM investigator,
gives an excellent account of why the plot fell apart after the
=
assassination took place. One of the assassins, Fedro Livio Cedeno,
was seriously wounded (probably by fire from his own companions).
All of the assassins assembled at General Diaz' house after the
killing. One of them called a friend, Dr. Robert Reid Cabral, to
treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would
be required. Reid and two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital.
While in delirim he mumbled the names "de la Maza" and "Juan
.
"
Tomas. The police immediately picked up two brothers of Antonio
de la Maza.
Neither was personally involved in the plot, but both
knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General
Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieut. Garcia Guerrero were killed
resisting arrest. Amiama and Imbert went into hiding and survived.
The rest were caught and interrogated following torture. All
confessed.
The confessions led to identification of persons who were in
or on the fringes of the Political Group: General Roman and his
brother, Amiama Tio, General Garcia Urbaez, General Guarionex
Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Angel Baez Diaz.
Lorenzo Berry (Wimpy) was identified as a communications link between
the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. However, the SIM did not
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discover the identities of the political plotters with whom the
Consulate was actually working, because neither of the rea who might
have known the identities were available for interrogation.
escaped and General Diaz was killed.
The
Asiami Tio
Although the identities and the intention of the Action Group
were fairly widely known to persons not actually members of it, there
appears to have been excellent compartmentation between the Political
and the Action Groups--perhaps too much compartmentation.
assassination itself well planned. General Diaz was in over-
all charge of the operation, but de la Maza was the one who did all
of the work. He took three cars to a local garage and had the
engines rebuilt so that the cars could reach speeds of 120 mph.
He had possession of the weapons from the U.S. Consulate, plus
several of his own. He and the other participants took the cars
to the site selected for the killing and conducted dry runs each
Everything was ready and the assassins were lying in wait
for Trujillo on the night of 23 May. At the last minute he decided
not to go to San Cristobal because he wasn't feeling too well. The
assassins continued their dry runs each evening. After the assassina-
tion was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup
that was to follow failed--in part because of bad luck, in part because
of poor planning, and in part because of too much compartmentation.
night.
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General Roman, who was to take over the government after Trujillo's
death, was not told that the assassination was to be attempted on
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May 30th. After the slaying, General Diaz tried to telephone
General Roman but could not reach him. Diaz then took the car
with Trujillo's body still in its trunk and drove to Roman's house.
He saw so many soldiers in the vicinity that he gave up and returned
home, leaving the car in the driveway with the body still in the
trunk, where it was later found by the police.
What had happened was this: Former general and former head
of the SIM, Arturo Espaillat, happened to chance upon the scene
while the assassination was taking place. He was out for a drive
with his wife and was passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's.
He stopped at a drive-in restaurant and almost immediately beard.
shooting ahead, which he suspected involved Trujillo. He drove to
the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, and sped back
into town. He stopped at a military installation and gave the
alam and then drove to the home of General Roman to alert him.
He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination,
arriving simultaneously with the police. The police found Trujillo's
chauffeur, who was wounded but still alive. Roman and Espaillat
then went to the hospital to try to question the chauffeur. aus,
General Diaz could not reach General Roman to inform Roman that
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Trujillo had been killed and that it was time for Roman to make his
move to take over the government.
Roman knew only that there had been
a shooting involving Trujillo and that Trujillo was missing. . He did
` not know whether General Diaz' group was involved in it or not. He
was reluctant to move until he was sure that Trujillo was dead. By
the time Roman concluded that Trujillo must be dead, it was too late
for him to act; Hector Trujillo and Johnny Abbes had already taken
charge. Roman did make a couple of feeble tries at engineering a
take over, but it is apparent that he had no real advance plan nor
any appreciable chances of succeeding.
The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it took
place against a' background of international activity in opposition
to the Trujillo regime, with both the CAS and the U.S. taking clear-
cut stands. These are some of the highlights:
a. A briefing paper prepared in WH Division for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was planned
for December 1959 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed
pending receipt of arms from Verezuela. The plot was discovered
and was rolled up in January. Venezuela brought charges in the
QAS that the Dominican Republic was "in flagrant violation of
human rights, freedom, and democracy" following the mass arrests
in the Dominican Republic in January 1950. A committee of the
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QAS assigned to investigate the charges reported on 8 June 1950
that the Dominican government was guilty as charged.
b. A near-miss assassination attempt against President
Betancourt on 24 June 1960 killed in his entourage and
injured him and several others. The Venezuelan government
Under
announced after capture of most of the assassins that the
Dominican government was responsible for the attempt on Betan-
court's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the
QAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic.
Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture
Committee on 24 August in support of a request by President
Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota,
is reported as having said that it was hoped that economic
sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictator-
ship and its replacement by a moderate and free regime. The
United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican
Republic on 26 August 1960, although consular relations were
continued.
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As a further prelude to a chronological review of operation
EXCEED/EMSLEW, we think it would be useful to identify the people.
involved, especially since officers of the Department of State
played a very prominent role.
Washington
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Department of State
Roy R. Ribottom
Frank Devine
John C. Hill
Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs
Special Assistant to Rubotton
Special Assistant to Rubottom
Washington - CIA
J. C. King
Ned Holman
Ciudad Trujillo
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Joseph S. Farland
Chief, WH Division
Chief, Branch III, WH Division
Department of State
Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is
pertinent to note that King and Ester-
line attribute U.S. and CIA involvement
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Henry Dearborn
John D. Barfield
Ciudad Trujillo CIA
Lear Reed
Robert Owen
Charles Cookson
Isabel Cintron
with the plotters in the Dominican
Republic to Ancascador Farland. They
describe him as a former FBI employee
who considered himself quite a clandestine
operator. Esterline, who later served
under him in Panama, called him "a wild
man who bugged the Agency to support a
move to assassinate Trujillo." He had
direct dealings with a number of the key
plotters.
Counsellor of Embassy until 26 August
1960 and Consul General thereafter. He
used the code name DELTA in correspondence
with the plotters.
Second Secretary until 26 August 1960
and a consular officer thereafter.
CIA cryptonym:
EMDAZE-1
Chief of Station until October 1960
;
Chief of Station from 20 January until
4 June 1961. Code name used with the
plotters: GALGO
Operations Officer
Administrative Assistant
Key Dominican Plotters
Dr. Jordi Brossa
Juan Vicini
Luis Eaquero
Code names: SWORD and EL CHICO
Code Names: Mr. X, ABC, and YAGUATE
Code name: SOCRATES
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S. Thomas Stocker
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An American in the Dominican Republic
with when the station had had an earlier
unhappy experience. The consulate
preferred to have nothing to do with him,
but the Dominican plotters brought him in
as a cutout to the consulate. He took
delivery from Lorenzo Berry of three
carbines passed to Perry from the U.S.
Consulate for use by the plotters. Ee
held them for a few days and then gave
them back when Berry insisted they be
returned. Berry then passed them to
one of the assassins.
HECTOR and PLUTARCO
Dr. Severo Cabral
Code names:
Jose Francisco Tapia
Aulio Brea
Andres Freitas
Code name:
ANDY
Luis Amiama Tiq
Jose Rene Roman
Juan Tomas Diaz
Donald Reid Cabral
Lorenzo D. Berry
Flerida Berry
Code name:
CRISTOBAL
CIBAO
Code name:
"Wimpy"
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Berry is a U.S. citizen who
ored Wimpy's Supermarket in Ciudad
Trujillo. He was the main communica-
tions link between the plotters and
the U.S. Consulate. The weapons
furnished the plotters were actually
passed to Berry.
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Wimpy's wife a Dominican citizen of
Syrian extraction. She appears to have
been even more active in the plot than
her husband. It was she who had the
contacts with the Dominicans involved.
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Most communications between the
Dominican plotters and the U.S.
Consulate were by means of written
notes. Mrs. Berry received the notes
from or passed them to either the
Consul General's secretary or the
CIA Station's administrative assistant.
Two documents provide a useful point of departure, from an
One is a semi-official letter from
historical point of view.
Ambassador Farland in the
Dominican Republic to Assistant
Secretary of State Rubottom. The other document is an internal
CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had
been played by CIA prior to 1960.
16 November 1959
Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal" memorandum
to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today
than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime." He described the
principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:
".
within this group there is growing militant anti-
American feeling based on the premise that the United States
should 
actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) for the
overthrow of the 
Trujillo regime. Discussions I have heard on
this subject 
show an appalling lack of understanding of the
position of the 
United States and its adopted doctrine of non-
intervention.
. This group is in possession of
clandestine broadcasting equipment which will go into operation
when the strike is made. 
CAS has been informed and joins with
me in 
suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King."
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15 February 1960
G
A CIA staff paper, addressed to Chief, WH Division, discusses
a plan for improving intelligence coverage of the Dominican Republic
in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives
stated in the paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event
Trujillo abdicated or was deposed and to prevent a takeover by
Castro-type forces. The following excerpt reveals the level of
CIA activity in the Dominican Republic prior to that time:
"The COS Ciudad Trujillo conducts no covert operations;
however
, his official 
contacts with Generalissimo Trujillo and
with the 
Chief of the Dominican Security Services has enabled
him 
on occasion to assess the attitudes and reactions of the
Trujillo government to 
internal oppoption activities and to
criticisms of 
and activities directed against the Dominican
government 
by exiles and other American governments unfriendly
to the Dominican 
regime.
10 March 1960
This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files
of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft
is not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President Eisenhower
from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years
of military service. The plan was for Clark to approach Trujillo,
with whom he had been on good terms in the past, and attempt to
persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was
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no cae who could succeed hip, and that to protect his family and
to preserve his image as El Benefactor, he should step down and
allow asylum to be arranged for him. His family would have the
wealth already outside the Dominican Republic, and the fortune
by
inside would be placed in trust, to be administered/internationally-
known personages for the benefit of the Dominican people.
This proposition received high-level attention in Washington,
including that of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter,
and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's approach to Trujillo,
the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative
of the State Department, rather than as a personal emissary of the
President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and
met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the meeting it
appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented
as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was done.
The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official
U.S. Government hand in the proposal. Of course, nothing came of the
meeting.
22 March 1960
L
> !F#cu£®q1#/2y
Ambassador Farland, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottom,
forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plotting Trujillo's overthrow
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bearing the code name "Operation Lancet." It was basically a
proposal for a course of political action reinforced by the threat
of being backed by muscle. The operation was to begin ith the
arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy"/would tell Trujillo
to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; he will
give him 12 or 18 hours to do it." It would be made clear that
if Trujillo refused, a border incident would be contrived, which
would be followed by "collective intervention." Assuming
Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatum, the plan then outlined steps
for transition to an operating representative government.
would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for
free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these
comments of his om to Rubottom:
The army
this segment of the dissidents is psychologically
conditioned to a point where it will take any step except the
ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they expect
United States assistance.
"Dick, I think the time has come for certain agencies of
our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement
a definite constructive program to influence the course of events
in the Dominican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary
and Allen Dulles emphasized the problems and the possibilities
of this type of approach.
30 March & 7 April 1960
21
The Special Group considered actions that might be taken in the
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ས་ ང་ ་ ་ ་ ་ གན་རས་ མ་ཤིན་ ་ག་་་་

igt ziv!
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event of a flare-up in the Dominican Republic. On 30 March, fearing
that Cuba might be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.S.
civilians from Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the
possibility of sealing off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic
from Haiti and of the problem of providing asylum for Trujillo.
On
7 April, there was further talk of sealing off the country if Trujillo
fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances of his leaving
willingly:
骂
it is evident that Trujillo will not consider
making any arrangements for orderly succession to himself, but
that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the
country on short notice, a la Eatista."
9 April 1950
State sent a cable to Farland through CIA channels, from which
the following is an extract:
"Could you, if so instructed, make appropriate arrangements
within next few weeks with appropriate civil and military
dissident elements to take over the GODR? You would be authorized
to indicate to them that as soon as they had seized power they
should immediately request United States recognition, and ask for
United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio
Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored
invastions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro
or pro-Communist elements within or outside Dominican Republic
"What, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements
prior to takeover
"
20
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"I wish to emphasize strongly that above is for contingency
planning 
purposes only and in no way 
intimates higher authority
at present contemplates such action
.
11 April 1960
Farland cabled his reply through CIA channels, in part as follows:
"Under instruction, it would be possible for me to make
arrangements 
with appropriate 
civilian dissidents whose leaders
are known to me including 
names their selectees for top
governmental positions, 
and with one military dissident, a
general, who is expecting an 
exchange of passwords for purpose
secret discussions.
"Regardless of
reething unrest which exists,
indications reflect Dominican dissidents, who are admittedly
poorly armed, loosely organized 
and lack working liaison with
military dissidents, will find 
it difficult to effect take-
over of GODR without existence 
one or more or combination of
following developments 
(which we summarize below):
(1) Clandestine arms shipments, with sabotage materiel.
(2) An investion to serve as a signal to the populace.
(3) Implementation of the dissidents' "Operation Lancet."
(4) Advance psychological conditioning by radio.
(5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo."
(6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding
the coup and for the period 
following it.
Farland stated a need for "minimum but key cooperation" from Dominican
military dissidents.
He added:
"One of the greatest contributions U.S. could make to
dissidents 
would be to let 
them know we are prepared to assist
-
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them; transmission of armament and sabotage material
fully substantiate this cooperation.
. . . could
9 May 1960
and signed by P.E.Oberst, Chief, WH/CA,
A zamorandum addressed to Chief, WH Dision,/reports steps
taken or recommended for improving CIA's capacilities in the
Dominican Republic. The paper refers to the need for covert action
assets, principally to obstruct infiltration of Communists or
Fidelistas. Among things recommended vere: placement of a junior
officer in the eribassy; assignment of a full-time officer to the
headquarters desk for the covert action program; authorization to use
Jose Figueres in third country operations; development of a
contingency PM plan in the event Trujillo fell and hostile forces
attempted to seize power, and establishment of a "U.S. Committee
for Democracy in the Dominican Republic."
A memorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads,
in part, as follows:
"The dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United
States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered
rifles with telescopic lenses. The Ambassador said that he saw
no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the
arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises
the question of whether the U.S. Goverment wants to engage in
this activity.
He
"Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision.
said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want
to support.
->
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(Comment: Farland was in Washington for consultations.
Although he is listed as having served as Ambassador until 28
June 1950, it appears that he did not actually return to duty
in Ciudad Trujillo. His successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated
:
13 June, but he never took the post.)
3 June 1960
Farland met with Nelson H. Smith, the Dominican desk officer
in WH Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if the
names CIA had were those with whom Farland had been dealing. Farland
said, "Those are the boys all right." Smith's memorandum of the
meeting includes this comment:
"Farland then told me that the underground opposition are
planning to assassinate Trujillo. He said that it is planted to
use a powerful bomb which could be planted along the route of
Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by a remote-
control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty
well along and could be executed at any time."
Undated Working Paper (filed between papers dated 25 May and 13 June)
"To
The author is not identified nor is there any indication that
the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus:
precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 August or as
soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S. become a
prime motive force against the Trujillo regime. "In the event Trujillo
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refused to abdicate, consideration should be given to other covert or
over actions designed to effect his removal from the scene." A
deadline of 1 July was proposed for completing arrangements.
17 June 1960
Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence,
queried State through CIA channels, asking for confirmation on
certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident leader,
Dr. Jordi Brossa. He stated his understanding of the U.S. position
as follows:
a.
The U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against
the Trujillo government while it is in full control.
b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition clandestinely
to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overthrow.
C. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly
until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional
government which controls a substantial section of the
Dominican Republic.
20 June 1960
Dearborn, again through CIA channels, asked Rubottom and Farland
if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy in a
meeting with Juan Vicini, another dissident leader.
Farland replied
in the affirmative.
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26 June 1950
Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting with Juan
Vicini. He said that Vicini felt that the time to concentrate on,
for planning purposes, was the period extending through the
"incapacitation' of Trujillo; too much planning for what would
follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.
Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is
a summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C.
King that the Government of the United States was prepared to
participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following
extent: "to provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices
for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene.
"
Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this
time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the
undergound to accomplish a revolt.
29 June 1960
Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa. He
said that Brossa had recommended a temporary standdown on "action
toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's
reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt.
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C
Dearborn reported that the dissidents had a capability for picking
in
up arms at sea and for caching/nearby caves. He also described an
airdrop site.
1 July 1950
A nemorandum addressed to the Acting DCI recommended approval
for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.
"It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground
opposition forces in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile U.S.
rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together
with five hundred rounds of ammunition for same.
It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD
facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the
opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by
air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for
delivery by sea.
"Approval for delivery of these ams has been given by
Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that
the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the
earliest possible moment.
The memorandum was signed by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; was
concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by
C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.
Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to airdrop twelve
30.03 Springfields, with ammunition, and with sights "fixed and
sighted." The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop
site and for a four-man reception team with flashlights.
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:C
added that, "If air drop delivery not possible, Rgs now studying
means of effecting delivery by sea if deemed more practicable."
8 July 1960
Headquarters cabled Dearborn, in part:
11
imperative learn from [Juan Vicini] and/or
Dr. Jordi Brossa] what plans and capabilities are to be
employed simultaneously with action to incapacitate Trujillo
and what is needed in way of material support for implementation
of plan of action. Of particular importance is info re extent
of military participation in preparations. In spite of Vicini]
apparent lack of knowledge of opposition organization, most
logical that he is actively collaborating with a group that
must have some plan and capability for action which will assure
stable interim government after removal of Trujillo.
In your opinion are [Vicini] and [Brossa] members of same group
or if not could the two groups be merged?
8 September 1960
"
The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department
of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 5 September)
proposing that he step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom
of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal
approach. The Group concluded that a personal approach would be
best and discussed William Pawley as a candidate for the job.
18 October 1960
Chief, WH Division, prepared a memorandum summarizing approvals
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obtained for action in support of the Dominican internal opposition.
The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your
vertal request on 13 October 1960
п This is the remorandum
to which reference is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960.
29 December 1960
The minutes of the Special Group meeting of this date read,
in part:
"Bissel gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan
for proceeding with certain limited covert activities (irected
against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although
support would be given to the Figueres group there is no
intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such.
He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of them-
selves bring about the desired result in the near future,
lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
18
It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that
overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be
mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operations.
it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time
no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention
may be.
"
(Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with
such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific
plan of about this date.)
12 January 1961
The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the
- 28
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$
Special Group on this date:
"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of
State that limited supplies of small arms and other material
should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican
Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed
securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final trans-
portation into the group being provided by the dissidents
themselves. The Group approved the project."
19 January 1951
Cable from headquarters:
"For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable,
authority has been given Has for delivery to internal front
of limited supply of small arms and other material on condition
that introduction of material into DomRep be effected by Doms.
Above coordinated with State."
24 January 1961
Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEED by
members of the CA Staff and of WH Division:
"It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the
Special Group now has approved that a 'limited supply' of
small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to
the 
Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been
dealing. This was additional to the Special Group's approval
on 29 December 1950 of our Operational Proposal."
(Comment: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we know
none of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.)
Y
29
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31 January 1961
SCARET-EVES COILY
"Official-Informal" letter from Dearborn to Devine in State
Department:
"With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, by
friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been
made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too
long the question of actual delivery since they are eager
and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only
lead them to question our sincerity.'
6 February 1961
Cable from headquarters:
"1. Realize details not now available but Has would
appreciate dissidents / reaction to offer of armed assistance
to include. [dissidents: current plan
"2. Also request [Robert Owen's] initial assessment
[dissidents'] capability carry out plan of action once limited
armed assistance provided.
10 February 1961
"
The station cabled its reply:
"No solid reaction except joy as of 9 Feb.
"Initial assessment is Brossa and Vicini] could not
carry out plan. But with access Dr. Severo Cabral he now
approaching point when will better be able evaluate group'
potential for action. We some weeks away from being able
make solid preliminary assessment.
"Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one small
-
30.
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*
NON
MODITIES ON
size high fire power weapon so at least gesture in right
direction can be made if 
we all thrown out. Arzo could
come later."
14 February 1961
At the Special Group meeting of this date, Mr. Bundy:
"
asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher
authority on 
the 
subject of what plans can be made for a
successor government 
to Trujillo.'
(Comment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandum
in CLA files.)
15 February 1951
Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, met with Juan
Vicini and Donald Reid Cabral in New York City. Excerpts from his
memorandum record of the meeting follow:
Vicini played down somewhat the necessity for
delivery of arms, 
although he did 
say that it is desireable
and should be a part 
of the planning. He said that members of
the opposition could, if 
they wanted to, obtain small quantities
of arms fron Army contacts . 
. .
would have to be used very quickly before their loss is
but that any arms so 
obtained
discovered. For this 
reason, he said it would be desireable to
have arms delivered by us 
that could be stored for use at any
moment desired.
"Vicini said that the object of obtaining this kind of help
anyway 
is the elimination of 
Trujillo and instead of using arms
or grenades he began to speak 
of more exotic materiels and methods
a powerful bomb that 
could be planted along the route of
Trujillo's 
evening walk 
and could be detonated from a nearby
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electronic device . . . (or)
the possibility of poisoning
the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles
of certain 
medicines that the distator is known to take
regularly.
"A less exotic and more practical plan that they put fortard
was one 
that 
they said had already been planned at one time
before. 
They said that when the dictator leaves his office for
his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the
dictator 
himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in
the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally
is for several 
trucks to block the progress of these cars at a
given 
intersection at which time young men who belong to the
action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and
grenades to finish off the dictator."
4 March 1961
Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of Holman's memorandum
of his meeting, with Vicini and Reid. On 4 March, the chief of station
cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage
and kill him with guns and grenades:
!
Kat
"Vicini idea . . almost certain fail if applied.
type 
attack 
is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified
cope with.
Their 
defense pattern and displacement vehicles
plus police practice detour traffic blocks away from entourage
make Vicini 
idea fatally childish in Owen's view.'
"
(Comment: The assassination was actually carried out
through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and
took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's movements
in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled highways.)
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The station cabled headquarters on 4 March:
•
if opportunity support pro-US group not to be lost,
believe
imperative nake sure arms with amo ready for
immediate entry DomRep
if necessary at air drop sites
5 March 1961
•
•
As a follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication
from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands chance to speedup
events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be
assured as much as human fallibility permits.
7 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the field, in part:
"Existing authorization precludes introduction arms into
Dom Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans
for possible alternate delivery method, request station
determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned
Request type and quantity arms desired.
•
87
8 March 1961
Cable from the station:
"Brossa told Dearborn on 7 March that Dr. Severo Cabral and
group plan try kill Trujillo by [intercepting his car at point
near Wimpy's Supermarket]. Date not set and obviously depends
on Trujillo travel.
Severo Cabral not aware Brossa has told
us but interesting that Charge' Papal Munciatura also aware plot
exists but possibly not of personnel involved."
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8 March 1961
SEGNET-EVES SOILY
Hedquarters cabled the station:
"Hqs deeply interested plan
and request urgently.
additional details in order make plans timely assistance.
Uncertainty of plans, timing and chances of success precludes
Hqs seeking commitment for such speicific assistance as that
requested
13 March 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
....
"Following elicited from EMOTH-8 (Andres Freitas):
Freitas speaks for Aniam The group which includes military
members . . . in six brigade Egs and which have capability,
at appropriate time, of taking over military garrisons with
arms already at hand, and appointing military/civilian junta
in control provisional govt.
Reqist following station
action with respect Amiama Tio group: A. Identify military
membership; B. Assess capabilities as claimed; C. Indicate
if assets can be coordinated with overall effort. Eqs places
special emphasis on identifying military membership Asiama Tio
group. This important for vetting as well as enable assess
realistically chances successful takeover."
15 March 1961
Cable from the station:
"Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry asked (a consulate employed for
small supply fragmentation grezades 'for use in next week or so.'
By note, the chief of station checked back with Wimpy and
learned the dissident group must do EMSLE (Hill Trujillo] this
month or drop it as number of fringe persons with loose mouths
are apparently aware renewal plan
Wimpy asked for five
45 mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or similar, 1,500 rounds ammo for
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•
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care,
rockets.
50 fragmentation grenades,
"
16 March 1961
سوعة
ten 64mm tank
Headquarters cabled its reply:
"Hqs exploring possibilities for ams delivery and will
advise ASAP. Meanwhile, request you clarify soonest: Is
Berry making request on own initiative or is he speaking for
Dr. Severo Cabral? .
"
17 March 1951
Cable from the station:
"For issue to several [of the dissident group] Consul
General Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and Wesson
Special pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges.
If sending ammo complicates problem, advise and we will try
get from Marines.
"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion [to send in each
pouch one small size high fire power weapon] as Dearborn
increasingly concerned lest momentum which group has now for
[assassination] decline result lack tangible or too slow action
on arms by the U.S. Government. Also security these people
increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day
more involved in the operation ]. Loss of one of key people
thru capture could lead revelation details ODYCKE/EMLEED
activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend
themselves against SD."
18 March 1951
.:
4
Chief of Station Robert Owen met for the first time with Dr.
Severo Cabral. He cabled the results:
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"His group [ascassination] plan now this: Group knows
identity Trujillo's mistress in capital. He visits her once
week or once in two weeks. Goes her apartment acognito and
lightly guarded. Group apprently has someone in building who
can alert them to visit. Dressed as army officers, small group
will go to entrance, distract guard with pretext, dispatch him
or them in silence, enter apartment and try do [ussassination],
possibly including mistress, in silence.
"To do they need five M-3 or comparable machine guns and
1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event firefight.
Will
use quiet weapons for basic job.
Severo Cabral's final
position was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch.
or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by
other means would compromise entire project. Obvious he can
count on only one group both receive arms and do [assassination].
"Dr. Severo Cabral expects and willing_risk chaos for period
of undetermined length after [Assassination mainly because for
security reasons his group cannot approach military and hope to
get decisive agreement support before [assassination].
20 March 1951
Headquarters cabled the station:
...
"Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations
against shipment of arms
Will deliver to the group's
representatives outside the Dominican Republic if this feasible.
Coordinated with State Department."
22 March 1961
The station replied, in part:
"
•
we realize permission does not now exist but
Chief of Station knows that he at last two posts received pistols
via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can be done. Judging from
ref, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so then
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please continue try get authorization for air drop of
arma
or import arms by [other] means. Completely negative plea
for arms, whatever delivery method, will end_cooperation Severo
Cabral and probably by Timpy and Mrs. Berry].*.
25 March 1951
The above excerpt is the most significant point in the cable,
but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the
cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P
(Bissell) undertook to set Owen straight. The cable gives a fairly
complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and of Owen's
responsibilities. It is summarized here. We support a program to
replace the Trujillo regire; we wish to avoid precipitate action if
planning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine
guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the
dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters
is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action by
the dissidents that might result in the forming of a new government.
"If above clarifies.Hqs position, Owen should proceed accordingly.
In event major points remain unclear, State Department preparing
orders permit return for consultations.'
"
(Comment: We do not know whether Oen replied to this cable
or not. We do not find a reply in the files. Oven did go to
headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot
283
-
37.
-
* It is apparent from the EMDEED operational files that no arms were
ever air-dropped or delivered by sea.
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establish that the trip was a direct result of this cable.
There
is some evidence that suggests that the trip may have been in
connection with a request from the dissidents for submachine
guns.)
26 March 1961
: Cable from the station:
"For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-
automatic M-1 carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which available
consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need from Hqs
nine 30 cartridge magazines for vespons. Request prompted by
Severo Cabral note 25 March which says he cannot hold group
together beyond April 15 without arms delivery.
•
(Comment: It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology
at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were
actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of
Antonio de la Maza, who worked out the details of the assassination
and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly
were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have
no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shooting.
The little evidence we have suggests that they were not actually
used. These three carbines are the weapons referred to by various
sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no
evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)
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27 March 1951.
SECRET-EVES ONLY
Headquarters cabled the station:
"FYI, ref hardware [the three pistols the station asked be
(pouched] makes fairly sizeable package if lumped single shipment..
Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one package;
or whether split shipment preferable."
(Comment: We find no indication in the files that these
revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not,
because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.)
29 March 1961
Ecadquarters cabled the station:
S
...
Hqs inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref
carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installation
inventory, thus requiring paper work which may blow CIA's
ultimate use? How does station propose to pass weapons in secure
manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees becoming
witting they being made available to Dominicans? Require
Consul General Dearborn's concurrence. Advise...
Pouching
•
⋅
nine magazines
31 March 1961
The station replied:
"No inventory problem. No paper work to show CIA in act
in anyway. Pian file off serial numbers. Will handle packaging
after hours. Only consulate person who knows disposition is
Dearborn. Delivery to Wimpy Perry by the station's female
administrative assistant or other CIA officer depending on what
steps seems best here. Dearborn concurred in request and in this
message. We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of
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:
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good will to Severo Cabral now.
These items are not what he
asked for but they are an investment in operational continuity.
The security risk in his having these items is no greater than
his having similar items delivery which done by more complicated
and less secure cache or drop."
Headquarters cable to the station:
"[Passing the three carbines] approved. Advise Egs when
passing of this equipment completed.
:
(Comment: This cable was released by the DD/P (Bissell).)
7 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"The pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbines]
contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines
as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbine
magazines."
9 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"[The station's female administrative assistant] passed
[the three carbines] to [Wimpy Berry] April 7. No complications."
(Comment:. The files do not contain an account of how the
carbines were actually passed. As we will later see, headquarters
subsequently pouched submachine guns for passing to the dissidents.
Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the
submachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Propose
use essentially same technique as that for the three carbines].
40.
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The station's female administrative assistant] driving own car
will go to local supermarket Dimpy Berry's] for usual Saturday
morning purchases. Then to consulate to get mail. Will get assisté
from Chief of Station in loading package or packages into car
trunk with groceries: Station operations officer] will then
accompany to administrative: assistant's apartment, help take
groceries in. If no danger signal given by operations officer,
[Wimpy Berry] will arrive in personal car, pick up items from
operations officer at partially concealed entrance to admini-
strative assistant's apartment and promptly leave. Cover for
his visit will be commercial delivery.")
7 April 1961
Chief, WH Division, submitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting
waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons.
"The above request
is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo has
requested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240
rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action
group to be used for self protection."
(Comment: The entry for 18-March 1961 refers to a request
for submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station.
This pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station as
41
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at headquarters for consultations.
It is probable that he made the
plea in person. As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so-
17
called 'grease 5:3" of World War II) were pouched but approval was
never given the station to pass them to the plotters.) .
12 April 1961 |
Headquarters cabled the station:
"Equipment for Severo Cabral [submachine guns] which subject
of Chief 
of 
Station conversations Eqs being pouched
14
April. Prior to passing equipment, advise Hos what scheme of
delivery 
proposed.'
(Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in commment on
the 9 April entry.)
13 April 1961
•
An extract from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn from
Juan Vicini:
"The three Leica cameras, model M-1 [the three carbines],
with 
their accessories
, should be in the proper hands in a day
or tro. 
...
With the small amount of equipment which they
are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places
and therefore the 
probabilities are considerably reduced and
the 
time factor, considerably extended accordingly. With the
rest of the 
equipment (four Leicas, model M-3) the submachine
guns] the 
possible places of action are multiplied and the lost
time greatly 
reduced."
14 April 1961
Extract from a note from SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA
. 42 -
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PERFT-5923 CILV
[Consul General Dearborn]:
"The three Leica cameras and accessories are in the hands
of the ones that will take the pictures. They need more cameras
in order 
to do a better and faster job. We hope that the memo
we sent two days ago might help in Wash. in this regard."
17 April 1951
Note from YAGUATE [Juan Vicini] and SOCRATES [Luis Eaquero] to
DELTA [Dearborn]:
"The last word, up to the minute in the matter of cameras:
CRISTOBAL 
General 
Juan Tomes Diaz] says that with the 3 Leica
cameras 
already delivered it is impossible to do the photographic
job
. 
He needs 
to have the rest of the equipment (the 4 M-3
Leicas) before he 
undertakes the job. The ones already delivered
he sees them as good complementary equipment (defensive) but he
needs the others for the aggressive part of the job.
belief that the ones already delivered have served a psychological
purpose also:
the men involved have always been in doubt the
good faith of your people in Wash. Their feeling was that in
several 
months all they have obtained were promises.
Now they
It is my
see that you actually mean business. So, now, all they are doing
is waiting for the heavy cameras.'
17 April 1961
"
Headquarters cabled the station:
repeat not
most important [the submachine guns] not/be
passed to Severo Cabral without additional Hqs approval. Please
advise when equipment 
received and proposed scheme and timing of
delivery
.
"
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20 April 1961
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Headquarters cabled the station:
"Submachine guns should be held in station custody till
further notice and not repeat not be passed to [Wimpy Berry].
This Hqs decision based on judgment that filling vacuum created
by: [assassination] now bigger question than ever view unsettled
conditions in Caribbean area.
"Request station provide foll info soonest: (a) Eave
[the three carbines] been delivered to Severo Cabral? (b)
Details on an alternate plan to deliver [Submachine guns]
which would involve ground caching."
(Commert: It might be noted that this cable was sent
just three days after the failure of the Liding at the Bay of
Pigs.)
20. April 1961
Note to DELTA [Dearbor] from YAGUATE and SOCRATES:
"The officers that were to do the photographic job are not
only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery
of the other Leicas. They have decided to give up the plan and
disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing.
20 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"
"[Submachine guns] here 19 April with no entry problems
whatsoever. Excellent basic wrapping means station's plan can
be simplified even more. The administrative assistant, the
operations officer, and the chief of station can share delivery
direct to drop. Request Hqs advise when we may begin.”
44
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(Comment: The presise nature of this "excellent basic
wrapping" is not further clarified in the file.Norman Gall,
writing in The New Republic, said that the weapons were shipped
to Wimpy Berry in food cans. This sounds to us.as if the sub-
machine guns were packed in food containers for pouching. If co,
we wonder how Gall learned of this. We can state with fair
confidence that these submachine guns were never passed out of
Them.
:
the consulate. As late as the very day of the assassination, Bob
Owen sent a cable protesting the policy that forbade his passing
This sounds as if there must have been a leak from the
consulate--from one of the very few who knew of the submachine
guns. We cannot confirm that the submachine guns were actually
packaged in food containers for pouching. TSD has no record of
having done so. Jake Esterline has a faint recollection of food.
containers, but not in connection with pouching.)
21 April 1961
•
Cable from headquarters to the station:
"[Submachine guns should be held in station custody till
further notice and not repeat not be passed to Wimpy Berry].
22 April 1961
The station replied to headquarters' query of 20 April
regarding disposition of the three carbines:
[Wimpy Berry] has given [the three carbines]
to intermediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up
45
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(Comment: This "intermediary" appears to have been Thomas
Stocker. The significance of this and the security problem it
posed will become apparent from one of the later entries for
31 May.)
25 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"Foll from Dearborn: "I believe political consequence of not
delivering Submachine guns] so serius I plan go Washington within
next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqs!"
26 April 1961
M
Cable from the station:
•
"[Wimpy Berry] told Chief of Station . . Antonio de la
Maza plans try assassination between 29 April and 2 May.
Severo Cabral possibly not yet aware plan. No solid info other
members assassination effort but General Juan-Tomas Diaz protably
will aid. Will use the three carbines plus whatever else can
get.
De la Maza asks Berry add the submachine guns if possible
30 April 1961
Cable from the station:
"Following from Dearbor: April 28 Lorenzo Berry as emissary
Juan Vicini and Severo Cabral called on me with foll info:
main mission Berry was plead with me release submachine guns they
believe in Dom Rep and under my control. Action group has 3
carbines, 4 to 6 12-lage shotguns with 120 rounds and sore small
Action entails roadside ambush near San Cristobal
arms...
•
46
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and few additional weapons could be important.
I replied
I had no submachine guns under my control and that any U.S.
controlled items which might be in Dom Rep could only be released
on specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that
✓ since the three carbines were made available Cuban incident had i
occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study
and assessment.
"
2 May 1961
Cable from the station:
"
suggest qs review: decision not pass submachine
guns. Determination of group to go ahead with possibly inadequate
means could spell end best pro-US force now working toward the
overthrow of the Trujillo regine."
2 May 1951
Draft cable prepared at headquarters:
"
. Since it appears that E group has committed
itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with
fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal
defense; station authorized pass submachine guns to Berry for
their additional protection on their proposed endeavor.
(Coment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated
by Ray Herbert for J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordinated on
it. It was forwarded to the DECI for release. General Cabell
attached a handwritten buck-slip: " Return to: Chief, W.H. Div.,
unacted upon.")
47.
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4 May 1951
The Director, at a meeting of the Special Group, reported a
2.
new anti-Trujillo plot, saying that we never knew if one of these
would work or not.
5 May 1951
Headquarters cabled the station:
"Regret delay but release [of the submachine guns] awaits
high level State Department decision.
"
8 May 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
"State Department has disapproved passing [submachine guns].
16 May 1961
Cable from the station:
." For Achilles and Coerr from Dearborn: Thomas Stocker called
on me night May 15. Stated he emissary from action group which
plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. Stocker's
mission was urgently request me to furnish group with few machine
guns which it understood US agents have in Dom Rep
•
(Comment: There is an unsigned and almost incomprehensible
memorandum in the EMDEED files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and concerns
a meeting with Mrs. Flerida Berry. The transmittal dispatch makes.
48
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C
it clear that the author was Isabel Cintron, the station's
administrative assistant.
This is our interpretation of what
Miss Cintron was trying to say: Sometime during the second...
week of May," Wimpy Berry asked Thomas Stocker to return the three
carbines Eerry had given Stocker for the plotters.
Stocker at
first refused but finally agreed. Presumably Berry then passed
them to Antonio de la Maza.] On 15 May, Stocker again saw Berry.
at the supermarket, said he had the carbines back in his possession,
and his group planned to carry out the assassination the following
night. The group that was to do the job was not the group that
Berry had been working with on behalf of the consulate. SOCRATES
(Luis Baquero) arrived at the supermarket while Stocker was still
with Wimpy. After Stocker left, Mrs. Berry asked Baquero if he
had given the Carbines back to Stocker. Baquero said he was
certain not, although he and the man who had the carbines and was...
to do the job did not know each other's identities.
Berry was talking with Baquero, the man to whom Berry had last
given the weapons [presumably Antonio de la Maza] arrived at the
supermarket. Mrs. Berry asked him if he had returned the carbines
to Stocker. He replied that he had not that that, if she wanted
confirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he
always carried then.)
While Mrs.
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18 May 1951
There was discussion at a Special Group meeting of planning with
respect to the Dominican Republic. Chester Bowles said he thought
that an internal State planning paper outlining an ambitious
paramilitary plan (and alleging Special Group approval) exceeded
the Special Group's action. Mr. Parrott's notes supported that
impression. The following is an excerpt from the minutes:
"General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were
pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in
U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. Se inquired whether the
feeling of the Group remained that these arms. should not be
passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary
position at this time. " *
25 May 1961
The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed
discussion of "further guidance to Dearborn re contacts with
"
dissidents. The minutes of the meeting, however, make no mention
of the subject.
27 May 1961
The station cabled:
"Department from Dearborn:
Andreas Freitas.
'May 26 I had long talk with
Freitas made no request for arms which
indicates group has accepted fact it must do with what it has.
50
* The small arms to which General Cabell referred were the submachine
guns, which were pouched to the station but were never passed to the
dissidents.
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His caly statement on this subject was that group has arms but is
somewhat concerned whether enough.
" He stated action group planning overthrow Trujillo for
past 3 weeks and representing anti-communist pro-democratic
elements of which he member remains on brink final performance
and determined as ever. Said he could give me no date because
action depends when Trujillo follows awaited pattern which
not known in advance. Group has arrangement for being informed
sufficiently in advance to get into assigned positions once
signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-
United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow
Trujillo.
..
"I replied
speed with which assistance could be
given would be increased considerably if we could have prior
info on such subjects as timing, plans for action, personalities
involved and identity of proposed junta.
He replied
participants were not prepared give their names until afterward
and could not give time for reasons stated earlier.
•
"Re timing Freitas stressed event could happen any day and
could in fact have happened 3 times in last 2 weeks except that
necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize.'
29 May 1961
Headquarters cabled the station:
•
Thi
"For Dearborn from State
We must not run risk.
of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S..
as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination.
-last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful
situation.
You must request and receive further
specific instruction for any specific covert activity. At the
present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents.
.....
(Comment: Both Dearborn and the chief of station sent
cables commenting on this guidance cable. Their cables were filed.
51
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:
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in Ciudad Trujillo on 30 May but were not received in Washington
until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours
after the assassination took place. Excerpts follow.)
31 May 1961
Cable from the station:
•
"State from Dearborn
If attempt is made by U.S.
friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against
us and best we can do is see there is no proof. Greatest danger
point is Thomas Stocker. He was given small number arms by
. dissident agent to hold several days and has told several persons
dissidents obtained these items from consulate. Stocker told me
same and I have informed him this cannot be true or I would know
and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents
I told him this impossible.
"
Cable from chief of station:
"Assume the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn] is
final word on present policy on which CIA work here must be based.
This for practical purposes retreat from previous policy.
However Aqs aware extent to which U.S. Government already
associated with assassination. If we are to at least try 'cover
up tracks.' CIA personnel directly involved in assassination
preparation must be withdrawn now.
If assassination
tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of
station, the operations officer, and the administrative
assistant mandatory.
"
52
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31 May 1951
Received in Headquarters Signal Center at 0341 hours,
Washington time:
FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO TUMBER 1. APER 2.
SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH DISSIDENT ACTION GROUP (C).
SOURCE AT 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIME 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL
WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO KITLED BY ASSASSINATION SAME NIGHT. AMERICAN
CONSULATE PERSONNEL ENCOUNTERED ROADBLOCKS ON CIUDAD TRUJILLO RIO
i
HADA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 ECURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY.
INDIVIDUALS FORMING BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY
FEW OF WHOM ARMED WITH FIREARMS OTHERS WITH MACHETES. NO
CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED 06002.
[0200 Washington time]
(Comment: The station's follow-up operational cable
identified the source of Critic No. 1 as Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry,
who gave the information in person to Consul General Dearborn
and Chief of Station Owen at the consulate. At about 0100 hours,
Dominican time, Andres Freitas telephoned Dearborn "to ask
cryptically whether we had the news." Freitas said he would add
details when he had them.)
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3 June 1961
Memorandum for the record signed by J. D. Esterline, in part:
"
"The evening of 2 June, it was decided to immediately
move out of the Dominican Republic the Station Chief Cren, and
Case Officer Cookson. It was also decided that Administrative
Assistant Isabel Cintron should not return to Trujillo. Accord-
ingly, an operational immediate cable was sent to the station
the afternoon of 2. June issuing appropriate instructions."
9 June 1961
:
Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject:
"High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part:
"The meeting was held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room
7514 of the Department of State. Among those present were Vice
President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer,
Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary Alexis Johnson,
Mr. Ed Murrow, Chief, USIA, Hr. Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Richard
Goodwin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Win Coerr, Mr. Morales Carrion
and Mr. Jameson.
"Vice President Lyndon Johnson referred to another message
from Consul General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to
the possibility of implicating the United States in the delivery of
arms to the dissidents. The Vice President then asked what.
was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms.'
(Comment: The message to which Vice President Johnson-
referred is not in the EMDEED operational files. We did not
find a copy in a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake
Esterline, who appears to have ridden heri on post-assassination
planning, does not recall having heard of Vice President Johnson's
54
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query. The record suggests that he knew of it but does not now
remember..
There is an unsigned memorandum in the EMDEED file
dated 6 June 1961 (the day after the meeting at State), subject:..
2
"CDACID Views on Passage of Arms to Dominican Dissidents.
:
The memorandum summarizes State Department-Consulate involvement
in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. The routing and
record sheet attached to the remorandum shows it was originated
by John Poulter, WH3/DRAH, and was forwarded to C/OPS/WH
(Esterline). Esterline initialed the routing and record. sheet
and returned the memorandum to Poulter. This suggests to us
י.
that J. C. King, upon returning from the meeting at State, asked.
Esterline to have a summary pulled together.
•
J. C. King remembers the meeting at which the Vice President
asked about the delivery of arms. He does not now recall the
specific query. Re-reading his memorandum record of the meeting
leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was
directed to one of the State representatives.
He feels that,
--
if it had been directed to CIA, he would have made mention of
that fact in his record of the meeting.
A remorandum for the record prepared by J. C. King of a White
House meeting on the Dominican crisis on 7 June 1961 makes no mention
of U.S. involvement in passing weapons to the assassins. The reeting
was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.
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The preceding, quite detailed, and almost wholly documentary
account of U.S. Government involvement with persons plotting.
the overthrow of Trujillo carries through the actual assassination.
Early in the report we explained why the coup that was to follow
the assassination never took place. Another essential part of the
story is the roll-up of the assassination group and the discovery
The consulate cabled through CIA
of U.S. involvement with them.
channels on 9 December 1961 that the 7 December issues of the
Dominican newspaper La Nacion carried a story
based on Huascar Tejeda Pimentel's statement
to Judge of Instruction that Wimpy (Lorenzo A. Berry)
provided the caliber 30 M-1 Garand automatic carbines used
to kill Trujillo.”
Wimpy's involvement with the plotters, including passing weaponS
from the U.S. consulate to them, became known to the Dominican
Military Intelligence Service (SIM) as early as 3 June from its
The following summary
interrogations of the captured assassins.
is drawn from the FBI's report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SIM
officer who headed the investigation of the assassination.
Immediately after the slaying, all of the assassins assembled
Dr. Robert Reid Cabral
at the house of General Juan Tomas Diaz.
was called to treat the most seriously wounded assassin.
Dr. Reid
was the cousin of Donald Reid Cabral, one of the key political plotters,
but appears not to have been in on the plot himself.
55
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Since Dr. Reid
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in being called as a physician learned the identities of the assassins,
General Diaz said he could not allow Dr. Reid to go free. General
Dia: forced Dr. Reid to furnish refuge in Reid's house for four
of the assassins (General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, Salvador
Estrella, and Roberto Pastoriza). The other assassins went their
separate ways.
Within hours after entering Dr. Reid's house, General Diaz
and his three companions began to panic. (It might be noted here
that the assassins were so sure that the coup would follow and they
would all be national heroes that they had made absolutely know
plans for hiding or escape.) De la Maza called for Mrs. Reid and
ordered Dr. Reid out of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs.
Reid in the presence of his companions.
Pastoriza and Estrella were
highly incensed over the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after
a near-fight and a drawn-weapons confrontation.
Estrella left after
a few hours. Diaz and de la Maza left later and were killed in a
gunfight while resisting arrest.
captured, tortured, and confessed.
:
Both Pastoriza and Estrella were
The following are excerpts from
the FBI's report of its interviews with Ortiz, the SIM investigator.
"
after Pastoriza left General Juan Tomas Diaz composed
a telegram addressed 
to 
President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela,
which said, "We who have 
killed Trujillo urgently need your help
in order to flee the 
country. Signed General Juan Tomas Diaz.'
56.
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Diaz requested Dr. Peid to take this telegram to 'Wimpy, an
American who owned a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo, and to
tell Win' to take the telegram immediately to the American
Consul and to ask the Consul to code the telegram and send it
through the proper channels to Betancourt.
"Reid refused to take the telegram on the basis that he
had already implicated himself greately in the plot through
no fault of his own and stated that he thought Diaz was trying
to have him killed by asking him to take this telegram to
"Wimpy.' With that de la Maza became so incensed that he
punched Reid and pushed him around and even went so far as to
hold his revolver against the head of Reid's young son. Reid
then said that the plotters could kill the entire Reid family
if they wished but that he would not deliver the telegram to
'Wimpy.'
"Estrella was asked to furnish what he knew concerning
'Wimpy's' alleged connection with the conspiracy. Estrella
related that 'Wispy' is the one who facilitated the obtaining
of the shotgun and the automatic rifle for de la Maza and
General Diaz. He was asked if "Wimpy' key the purpose for
which these weapons were secured and Estrella replied that 'Wimpy'
was aware of the purpose. Estrella further related that 'Wimpy'
works for the FBI, the State Department, or some other agency
of the U.S. Government.
"Estrella was asked to explain how he knew 'Wimpy' was
connected with the Americans and he replied that he had heard
from the other conspirators that 'Wimpy' was the intermediary
between the American Consulate and the conspirators. Estrella
stated that "dimpy' was a friend of General Diaz, Antonio de la
Maza and Luis Amiana Tio, and that 'Wimpy' had been the inter-
mediary through the American Consulate when these three discussed
their proposed coup with American authorities.
the source mentioned that during the interrogation
of the conspirators who mentioned that United States officials
were involved, they were all asked to identify the United States
officials, but none of the conspirators were able to identify
these officials by name and mentioned only that they were high
functionaries of the United States Department of State. The
only name of any American official which was disclosed during
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these interrogations was the name of American Consul Hill in
connection with the telegram that General Disc wanted to send to
Betancourt.
the source noted that the telegras never reached
Consul Hill because Diaz tore it up after the incident in Dr.
Reid's house.
"(.
the source commented that the interrogators
themselves did not believe at this time that the U.S. Department
of State was in any way involved with the plot. They thought
the disclosures concerning the alleged involvement
simply a method by which Amiama induced General Roman to give his
approval to the plot.
it was the interrogators opinion
was
at that time that if the North Americans had been involved in
this plot, the plot would have been much better organized and
the coup would have succeeded.)
"
..
by the latter part 2 June 1961, the investigation
had pretty well established the identities of all the individuals
involved in the plot, many of whom had been arrested and
interrogated. The only ones not accounted for were Luis Amiama
Tio and Antonio Imbert Barreras. As previously related, General
Juan Tomas Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieutenant Amado
Garcia Guerrero were killed when resisting arrest. (At this
point the source related that if General Diaz, Lieut. Garcia,
de la Maza, Amiama, and Inbert had been captured, and made to
talk, it is certain that many many more prisoners would have
been taken.)
"As far as the source is aware, the only individuals who
were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who
were brought before the courts were Tavares and General Roman.
As far as the source is aware, no other individual arrested in
connection with this plot was brought before any Dominican
court. 'Wimpy,' the North American, was to have been brought
before a court to be deported; however, Ramfis ordered that he
was not to be molested in any way and as far as the source is
aware, no action was taken against 'Wimpy.
- 58
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(
"Wimpy" Berry, his wife, and their children were allowed to
leave the Dominican Republic. They went to Florida and subsequently
visited Washington. While in Washington, Berry was given $2,000
for "expenses" by CIA. After amnesty was granted the plotters in
December 1961, the Berrys returned to Santo Domingo and resumed
operating their supermarket.
They, especially Mrs. Berry, continued
to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch .
supporters of the conservative Antonio Imbert/Wessin y Wessin faction
and were involved in the actions that led to the overthrows of the
goverments headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabral.
To recap:
a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King
on 28 June 1960 that the U.S. Government was prepared to partici-
pate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of
providing a small number of sniper rifles for the removal of
key Trujillo people from the scene. General Cabell, as Acting
DCI, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Springfield rifles to
•
the Dominican dissidents by air drop or by sea. The rifles
were never delivered.
b. On 10 February 1961 the chief of station cabled" a
suggestion that one small-size, high-fire-power weapon be
forwarded in each pouch.
This suggestion was not acted upon.
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C.
On 17 March 1961, the chief of station cabled a request
of Consul General Dearbon for the pouching of three 38 caliber
Smith and Wesson Special pistols for delivery to key members
of the dissident group. Headquarters was preparing to pouch
the pistols but apparently did not do so. There is no indication
in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually
"
pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken
by
a subsquent request for submachine guns.
d.
On 26 March 1961 the station cabled a request for
permission to pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines plus
ammunition to Dr. Severo Cabral. The carbines and ammunition
the magazines.
were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel.
The station requested that headquarters pouch magazines. Head-
quarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition and pouched
The cable authorizing passing the carbines was
released by the DD/P (Bissell). The station said it would file
off the carbines' serial numbers. The station cabled that the
carbines were passed to "Wimpy" Berry by the station's female
administrative assistant on 7 April 1961., Berry, at the request
of the dissidents, gave the carbines to S. Thomas Stocker for
temporary safekeeping. Berry later recovered the carbines from
Stocker and gave them to Antonio de la Maza, who reportedly kept
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them in the trunk of his automobile.
It is probable that at least
one of the carbines was taken to the scene of the assassination
by de la Maza, but we have no evidence that it was actually used
in the shooting. Ortiz, the STM investigator, told the FBI that
the assassins who were apprehended and interrogated spoke only
of the firing of a sawed-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols.
e. While at headquarters for consultations in early April
1961, Chief of Station Robert Chen evidently prevailed upon
headquarters, to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition
to the station. The submachine guns were pouched and arrived
at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station
on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to
the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. Despite
repeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from the Consul
General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass
them. We think it is safe to conclude that the submachine guns
(were never passed to the dissidents.
A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not know the
motivations of men such as: Jordi Brossa, Juan Vicini, Severo Cabral,.
Amiama Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM interrogations of the plotters
it captured revealed that they were not greatly motivated by a desire
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to live in a free and democratic republic. Most of them were seeking
vengeance or personal gain. General Roman, who was to have taken over.
..
and form an interim government, admitted that he had had no intention
of pemitting free elections. He had planned to establish himself
as the new Dominican "strong man". replacing Trujillo. General Juan
Tomas Diaz was bitter over having been publicly disgraced by Trujillo
Antonio de la Maza also had a
and then cashiered from the army.
personal grudge. His bromer, Octavio, had been killed by the
Trujillos to conceal his and their participation in the slaying
Most of the others also
of Gerald Murphy in the Galindez case.
0 had personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead.
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