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104-10307-10024
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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04347
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TOP SECRET
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SENSITIVE
27 November 1962
Note:
Discussed 27 November
1962 by DD/P with DCI
and approved generally
in principle by DCI.
Fully concurred in
by DD/P.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH:
Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT:
1. Action:
Operational Plan for Continuing
Operations Against Cuba
This memorandum is for your information
and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are
contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum
is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we
believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable
future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even
intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for
the reorientation of the current effort into a long term
denied area type of operation of the highest priority.
I.
ASSUMPTIONS:
A. The United States Government will give public
assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are
present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does
not take action to threaten the peace and security of the
Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to
invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.
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B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA
action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since
unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-
ditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally
destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at
the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States
Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances
as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext
of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.
C.
CIA operations involving a high noise level and a
distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary,
guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable
as a matter of policy.
D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for
the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus
relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing
unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational
conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is
possible that recent and future developments including the
Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may
serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard
indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over
Cuba has been substantially weakened.
E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no
support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to
Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will
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severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans
both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly
difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already
recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other
efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.
F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably
will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort
against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate
objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.
This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very
long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe,
will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops
to support such an overthrow. The United States Government
in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not
express the above factors to them in the context or with the
bluntness stated here.
G.
In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two"
course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles
and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes
in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the
Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly
attractive at various levels in the United States Government.
H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and
economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive
sabotage against Cuba will be continued.
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I.
In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando
and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances
will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive
since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli-
gence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very
few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated.
Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for
action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority
will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence
coverage of Cuba.
J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of
facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States,
particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and
desirable.
II.
K.
Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.
is questionale)
(Validity of this assumption is
OBJECTIVES:
Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives
appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against
Cuba:
A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate
and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba
from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
Free World.
B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-
communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the
rest of the world.
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C.
Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando
and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and
political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only
for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the
additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on
Bloc resources used to support Cuba.
D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-
intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis
on:
1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.
2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other
security organs.
3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.
4.
State of potential resistance, including the
morale and temper of the populace.
5.
Militia and military order of battle and equip-
ment.
6. The loci of power and of possible stresses
and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.
7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,
the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World
and uncommitted nations.
The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban
8.
economy.
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E.
Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban
regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately
through clandestine means to the extent possible on any
significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime,
or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/
Bloc relationships.
OPERATIONAL PLAN:
III.
A.
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Espionage and Intelligence Collection All feasible
effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelli-
gence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli-
gence collection and related operational activity at the
present time and its development during the past six months
is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to
serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular
matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document
breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence
coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service.
Set out below are specifics of operational action it is
proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase in-
telligence coverage of Cuba.
1.
Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you
know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air
travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled
almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection
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with the contingency planning for supporting any possible
military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation
Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel
of the Center have been retained intact. In order to
re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees,
it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be
induced to reinstitute their regular flights from
Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as
possible after the settlement of the current negotiations
and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka
refugee interrogation center will be re-established
with the same personnel.
2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be
made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-
24
131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba.
tions with the
he (131) rece
To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort
will of course depend upon the stringency of future
Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible
as yet to accurately forecast.
3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-
cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba
will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort
will be made to increase this coverage, both through
the development of additional resident agents in Cuba
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and through the development of additional legal travellers.
We will continue to press
4. Liaison Operations:
the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort
against Cuba for additional coverage, including the
recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint
dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-
operating at this point in this connection are the
[British Dutch] (French Spanish] [Italian] [Greek]
T: Norwegian :D:D :D :Danish): (West Germany (Mexican) (Argentinian]
Uruguayan (Canadian) Chilean) (and Israeli) Direct
approaches to several of these services either by you
personally or in your name, as you prefer, are
being separately recommended. Personal representation
by you to the services underlined above would be useful.
In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services
with which we are in contact and reiterate to those
appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our
extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem.
In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will
endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make
greater use of their national assets, both inside and
outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to
possible utilization of the (Vatican)
5.
Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing
efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime
assets through liaison services, we will continue our
unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and
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particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the (twenty)
officers and crew members aboard(six) Cuban vessels we are
now running as controlled agents.
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6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At
24
the present time we are running (12) Čuban diplomats
stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable
24.
operations aimed at an additional (20) Cuban diplomats.
We propose to continue and intensify the current program
of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official
representative abroad to whom we can gain access and
concerning whom we have any reason to believe a
susceptibility to approach exists. These additional
penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral
operations and where appropriate in conjunction with
liaison services.
7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations
Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or
telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations
in (Chile) (Italy), (Mexico), (The Netherlands) (England)
(Uruguay), (Greece) (Spain), (France), and Canada) No
major expansion of this coverage is presently
contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional
targets of opportunity and wherever possible install
coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-
gence from this type of source over and above what we
are now receiving would appear to make such installation
worthwhile.
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8.
Communications Intelligence:
We will continue
our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA
station in Miami at the same level and will continue
to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communica-
tions. As the current situation "normalizes" it should
be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even
increase their (seaborne) intercept coverage of Cuban
communications.
9.
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Communist Party Operations: A complete survey
has been made world-wide of all Communist Party
penetration operations and wherever any such penetration
can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the
agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban
targets, this will be done, except in those cases where
such action would result in unaccepta
unacceptable prejudice to
the operations in the area where the agent is now based.
It is believed that the most lucrative field for the
redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will
be Latin America where there are (65) ) ) (enetrations of
various communist parties.
24
Of this (65), the survey
24
we have conducted indicates that (23) have some direct
pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these (23) w111
be directed against these targets unless in any case
there are overriding reasons to the contrary.
The
remaining cases in the total of (65) 21- bein individually
examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.
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10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two
successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID)
which have produced substantial intelligence will be
continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed
primarily at continued intelligence collection and at
the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of
other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba
in the areas where the teams are operating: (②Pintar del 24
Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully
selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional
agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba
in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA
and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as
possible, train additional agents legally resident in
Cuba.
11.
Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potential
recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for
training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,
They will then be re-infiltrated into
and motivation.
Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,
this will be done through legal travel channels, but
where this is not possible, it will be done wherever
feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration
facilities, primarily our maritime assets.
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SPLITTING THE REGIME
B. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily
directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress
or strain within the regime and between the regime and other
nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will
be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity
to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible
fashion.
This is basically a long term effort. A great deal
of work already has gone into this and the current
status of this program and the proposed further expldtation
of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in
the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of
a separate compilation.
actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of
course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United
States Government to support them and it is entirely possible
that any such effort might fail unless supported with military
forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I
above would appear unlikely.
The effectiveness of assets aimed at
C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out
above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other
acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little
purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare
instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable
risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed
to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but
no active or wide scale program is contemplated.
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D.
Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:
Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale
program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we
propose to maintain in being our present facilities and
the capability of undertaking such operations in order to
fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban con-
ditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.
E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and
intensify the program already undertaken to deny through
clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban
economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly
some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied
firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic
materials to Cuba.
F.
Counterintelligence:
The current counterintelligence
and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and
related services will be continued and as possible intensified.
This program has developed substantially and it should be
possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness
considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelli-
gence operations mounted against United States interests
from Cuba.
G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:
In this field the following tasks will be continued and where
appropriate intensified:
1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.
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to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American
attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow
of the Castro-communist regime.
2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro
concepts, leaders, and political groups.
3.
Stimulate, support and guide covertly the
propaganda and political action activities of the CRC
and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as
appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
Cuba.
4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the
Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum
use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during
the missile crisis.
5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime
in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis
on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated con-
clusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of
Soviet imperialism.
6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-
sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.
7.
Launch propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established and policy authority is
granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.
8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material
into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,
with special emphasis on selective black operations.
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.
H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue
the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for i̇ntelligence
collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions.
As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as
possible from areas outside the continental United States, and
particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides
on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which
contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed
action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed
that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible
of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence
type operation into the political field, which is the province
of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed
it would be advisable to press for the creation within the
Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to
handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile
groups.
IV.
ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES :
Maximum Implementation of the above plan which provides
for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,
the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the
maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity
as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes
in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit
and make advisable the following:
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A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures
and personnel of Task Force W.
B.
Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W
within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component
of the WH Division under different direction.
C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.
D. The removal of the past framework which required
detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of
even minor operational details and decision by committee on
points which it is believed are completely within the purview
of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.
RECOMMENDED ACTION:
V.
A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan
is recommended.
B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with
the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.
C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special
Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan
American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami
and Havana at the appropriate time.
D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept
is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of
State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled
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subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.
ㄖ
It is recommended that the Mongoose operational
mechanism be abolished.
F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations
will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force
W within the DD/P.
WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W
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