AGENCY : PFIAB
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
Date: 09/24/98
Page :
1
RECORD NUMBER. : 206-10001-10014
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY, BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM : A.R. ASH
ΤΟ :
TITLE :
THE FILE
COVERT ACTION PANEL MEETING 6/5/64 (DISCUSSION WITH
SECRETARY, SPECIAL GROUP, ET AL.)
DATE : 06/05/64
PAGES :
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION
6
COVERT ACTION
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS
:
RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/08/98 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
:
: Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967.
2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 88132
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206-10001-10014
Вох
Box
10
Covert Operations.
1954-1967
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Covert Action Panel Meeting 6/5/64
(Discussion With Secretary, Special Group, et al.)
TOP SECRET
June 5, 1964
On 6/5/64, at the Board's offices, Mr. Murphy held a meeting of the
Board's Covert Action Panel (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Langer) also attended
by General Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne; and A. R. Ash.
1
At the invitation of Chairman Murphy the meeting was joined by Mr. Peter
Jessup who since January 20, 1964, has been serving as Secretary of the Special
NSC 5412/2 Group.
In answer to questions asked by Panel members, Mr. Jessup provided a
description of the Special Group and its activities, as follows:
The Special Group is chaired by Mr. McGeorge Bundy; Mr. Alexis Johnson
represents the State Department; Mr. Cyrus Vance represents the Secretary of
Defense; and Mr. McCone the CIA. These Group members are back-stopped by
small staffs in their respective agencies.
Meetings of the Special Group are held once each week. They are "action"
meetings not talk-fests, and the members have done their homework beforehand.
The Chairman of the JCS attends when the agenda includes subjects of particular
JCS interest (since January he has attended two meetings for discussion of Cuba
matters).
Most of the covert actions considered by the Special Group are CIA pro-
posals, although other members suggest actions (for example, State Department
brought up for discussion the matter of supplying arms in Tangayika). The State
Department is considered to serve as the "conscience" of the Special Group in its
consideration of proposed covert actions. During the current year some 23 of
39 proposals were favorably considered by the Group.
About 50 per cent of the covert actions coming before the Special Group
are carried out by the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) of the JCS, in the
aerial reconnaissance field. Since January 1, the Group has approved actions
with respect to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Panama, Chile, Congo, Angola,
Tibet, Zanzibar, and China, among others. For example, the April 29, 1964,
meeting included discussions of the Chilean elections; Cuba; a JRC forecast of
peripheral missions; and reconnaissance coverage from India of a Chinese Communist
test range.
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Minutes of Special Group meetings are provided only to the members.
_ (In answer to a specific question from Mr. Murphy, Mr. Jessup said that to
his knowledge there has been no systematic review by the Special Group con-
cerning the results of actions taken pursuant to previous Group approvals.)
The Group follows the policy of referring to the President those pro-
posed actions as to which Group members have differences of opinion regarding
the probability and acceptability of "noise levels" which would result from the
actions. Since January, the subject of Cuba has been taken up with the President
with a view to obtaining guidance on the level of covert action activity desired
during this election year.
Mr. Jessup concluded his visit with the Board Panel and departed the
meeting at this point.
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Next, the Board Panel meeting was joined by Messrs. Dick Helms and
Cord Meyer of CIA.
Mr. Helms said that with regard to Cuba there has been an effective stand-
down in externally-mounted sabotage operations since February. Policy approvals
have been given only to oddments of "passive sabotage", such as supplying agents
with incendiary pencils, etc.; a mattress factory and a plastic works were burned
down; but CIA does not consider that such operations are enough and they are not
the whole program that CIA wants to conduct. The "Track II" paper in the State
Department calls for CIA support of Cuban exile group activity, but no CIA
diréction and control; and few results are possible from such an approach, with
Artime burning down a sugar mill, but Manolo Ray getting arrested by the British.
There have been acts of sabotage performed on tractors carried by vessels en route
to Cuba. On the economic front, after Castro had put out false rumors of an
expected short sugar crop, in order to run up the world market price, the CIA
countered by assembling correct information which when published brought the
price down again.
With regard to Soviet personnel in Cuba, Mr. Helms estimated that there are
from 15,000 to 18,000 on the Island, although U. S. intelligence community
estimators place the figure at from 4,000 to 5,000.
Concerning Chile, Mr. Helms said that the coming Presidential elections.
there on September 13 are viewed with serious concern. The Socialists there are
more radical than the Communists, and candidate Allende (backed by the FRAP
party) may have a strong chance of winning. Moreover, the constitutional-minded
Chileans would accept a regularly-elected Communist as President and would not take
coup action to put him out of office. Allende is being supported by the USSR at
the rate of about one-quarter million dollars a month, and his success at the polls
is important to the Soviets who can then point to the election as an example of a
"peaceful" Communist victory.
CIA support of Chilean Christian Democrat candidate Frei included $750,000
in March; and on May 14, another $1.25 million was added following the urgings of
major business elements in Chile and the U. S. Some support is also being given
to anti-Communist candidate Edwards; to Protestants; and to poll-taking groups.
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Referring to Panama, Mr. Helms observed that CIA appeared for the moment to
have backed the right candidate Rables.
--
-
With reference to Brazil, Mr. Helms said that the coup was Brazil
inspired and spontaneous, not a U. S. operation. He added that Brazil had
come close to being lost to the Communists through subversion from the top
(Goulart).
Turning to the subject of Southeast Asia, Mr. Helms said that there have
been many lengthy discussions about South Vietnam and about getting the Viet
Cong out of that country. This objective has been talked to death, and all
possibilities considered; but no one seems to be preoccupied with finding a way
to replace the political fabric that was lost in South Vietnam when the Diem regime
was overthrown. The present government is all a military show. Mr. Helms added
that the Bhuddists are a political group but not cohesive. As for prospects of
effecting intelligence infiltration of North Vietnam, Mr. Helms said that CIA
had been trying, but the target country is small and there is not much intelli-
gence to obtain there. At present MACV is in charge of sabotage efforts against
/ North Vietnam. In Mr. Helms' opinion there is a clear need to create a new
political structure in South Vietnam or else there will be little use in
"striking against the North".
In Laos, Mr. Helms said, the Pathet Lao can take over at will. He noted
that the Meo's are still intact (only one battalion) and are being supplied
by CIA air drops (from Thailand) of weapons, food and medicines.
Mr. Cord Meyer referred to the crisis of the Adoula government in the
Congo. There are 200 men in Brazzaville, with Chicom support, ready to
assassinate cabinet officers. When the UN forces leave on June 30 the 30,000-man
Congolese National Army will have a big job to do. Mobutu and officers of the
Army are wary of providing much training down to the platoon level, because they
distrust these troops in arms. Meanwhile, CIA has supplied the Army with 6
airplanes and pilots, and authority has now been received by CIA to double this
support.
Regarding Cyprus, Mr. Helms said that the Turks are threatening to go
onto the island with troops within 24 hours.
Messrs. Helms and Meyer left the Panel meeting at this point.
The Board Panel meeting was next joined by Mr. Alexis Johnson of the
State Department. He filled the Panel members in on the latest Cyprus development.
including the President's message to the head of the Turkish government; and
General Lemnitzer's trip to Turkey to point out the hazard to Turkey's NATO
relationships if Turkey moved into Cyprus with troops.
Panel Chairman Murphy asked Mr. Johnson for any comments he might have
regarding State Department relationships with the Special Group, and with
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
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Mr. Johnson said that as State Department representative on the
Special Group he tries to do the difficult job of viewing the risks against
the gains involved in proposed covert actions. Issues rarely arise in the
Special Group because problems are first staffed in the member agencies.
In State Mr. Johnson is staffed by Mr. Scott of INR who maintains contacts
with FBI and CIA the relation with FBI having been recently regularized
as had been done earlier in the case of CIA. Mr. Scott consults Mr. Johnson
on all covert operations and any issues, and also focuses on NRO matters
for Mr. Johnson. In all, Mr. Johnson feels that the Special Group system is satis
factory. He acknowledged, however, that the Special Group does not have a pro-
cedure for systematic look-back at the results of programs previously approved.
From State's point of view, he could see the need for such a procedure, for he
never hears about projects once they are approved -- unless something goes
wrong. Mr. Johnson said that within State a quarterly review is made of
political action programs, and he sees a need for monitoring of programs in
the Special Group.
As for State's relations with the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, Mr. Johnson recalled that one problem arose with the Board's
November 22 report on the Dunlap case, which caused him considerable concern
particularly the discussion language supporting the Board's recommendations on
subjects involving State, CIA and FBI. Mr. Johnson thought that he should
have been given an opportunity to comment to the Board concerning the FBI and
CIA complaints which were reflected in the recommendations.
Mr. Coyne then gave Mr. Johnson some of the background of one of the
Board's recommendations which involved State-CIA-FBI and which pertained to a
development of such sensitivity as to closely restrict the Board's disclosure
of it. (Mr. Coyne took the initiative, after the Panel meeting, to suggest to
FBI that Mr. Johnson be briefed on this sensitive item, in order that State
Department might be in a position to assist, and not unwittingly hinder,
related operations of FBI and CIA interest abroad. FBI did this soon afterward, and
Mr. Johnson expressed to Mr. Coyne his satisfaction at this handling of the
matter.)
Mr. Murphy next brought up the subject of the recently discovered audio
penetration of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow. Mr. Murphy noted that the preliminary
USIB damage assessment contained State Department comments to the effect that
the compromise was not too serious, and he wondered if this accurately re-
flected the State Department view of the matter. Mr. Johnson said that during
the audio penetration period the State Department sent many messages to our
Ambassador in Moscow, telling him to make certain representations to the Soviets;
and in turn the Ambassador sent messages to Washington reporting on what he had
said to the Soviets and what they said to him; so, Mr. Johnson felt that no
damaging breach had occurred in this regard. except for perhaps any Department
or Embassy analyses that might have appeared in messages intercepted by the
Soviets. Mr. Johnson added that our people at posts behind the Iron Curtain
assume that they are "bugged" and they behave accordingly; and Mr. Johnson
related to the Panel his own experience while serving at Prague where "he
dug out 35 mikes".
--
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--
Mr. Murphy raised with Mr. Johnson the question as to whether subordinates
should be allowed to make decisions such as the cutting of the co-axial cables
discovered leading out of the Embassy in Moscow Mr. Murphy pointing out that
such action appeared premature and prevented the technicians from making technical
examinations of value and importance. Mr. Murphy also noted that subordinates
in State and CIA had assumed responsibility for the decision that no attempt
would be made to exploit the devices found in Moscow. Mr. Johnson was unaware
of policy direction regarding such matters, and Mr. Coyne made known to him
the provisions of NSC 5618 covering the subject.
(
With reference to North Vietnam, Mr. Johnson noted that the situation
is most discouraging insofar as covert infiltration actions are concerned.
He said that CIA had tried hard, and the activity has now been transferred to
MACV in Saigon.
کم
Mr. Johnson concluded his visit with the Board Panel and departed the
meeting.
In executive session, Panel Chairman Murphy asked that the Board Staff's,
review of the Special Group minutes include summaries of items pertaining to
Vietnam and Cuba, for later study by the Panel.
The Panel Meeting adjourned at 12:15 p.m.
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A. R. Ash
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