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TITLE:
RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
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ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
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NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 1
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NW 50955
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RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
A.
4/26/61
B.
5/2/61
Jä
C.
5/4/61
D.
5/5/61
E.
5/24/61
F.
6/10/61
G.
7/8/61
H.
9/1/61
I.
11/1/61
J.
11/2/61
K.
11/4/61
L.
11/22/61
M.
8/10/62
N.
8/13/62
0.
8/14/62
P.
5/27/75
NW 50955
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GOODWIN TESTIMONY NOTEBOOK
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary on Richard Goodwin by DiGenova.
Memo to Bundy re "Cuba Problem" from Goodwin.
Memo to Goodwin re "Possible Covert Activities against
Cuba," from Bissell.
I
Draft of NSC Action No. 2413.
Draft Record of Actions, 483rd NSC meeting (5/5/61)...
Memorandum of Conversation with Dick Bissell, Tracy
Barnes, by Goodwin.
Memorandum for the President re "CIA Reorganization,"
from Schlesinger.
Memorandum for Mr. Richard Goodwin re "Cuban Covert
Plan," from Schlesinger.
Memorandum to the President re Cuban Task Force
Meeting, 8/31, from Goodwin.
Memorandum to the President, 'Eyes Only for the
President," re concept of a "command operation" for
Cuba, from Goodwin.
Memorandum, Eyes Only for the President and the
Attorney General," re "operation should be organized
with five staff components," from Goodwin.
Memo, "Eyes Only," re recommendations that "the Cuban
Operation be organized in five components."
Memorandum to Sec. of State, Sec. of Defense, Director
of CIA, AG, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Lansdale, Richard Goodwin
re"... summary of the major decisions which have been
made in regard to the Cuba Operations" from Goodwin.
Memorandum for Record re "Minutes of Meeting of Special
Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August, 1962.
Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, Robert Hurwitch,
State, Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense, Don Wilson, USIA
re "Alternate Course B," from Lansdale.
Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans) re "Operation
MONGOOSE," from Harvey.
Summary of Goodwin Interview w. Aaron re "Intelligence
Activities in Latin America."
Table of Contents 2.
Q.
6/10/75
R.
7/17/75
S.
5/13/61
T.
5/29/61
Szulc Testimony before SSC, excerpt.
Summary of documents produced by Goodwin on 7/16/75,
by Dennin.
Memorandum to Goodwin re "CIA Covert Activities in
the Dominican Republic.'
"
Drafts and original of cable from State Dept. to
(date of cable) Dearborn.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 5
July 17, 1975 .
To:
F.A.O. Schwarz/Curtis Smothers
From:
Joseph E. DiGenova
Re:
Richard Goodwin Materials and Summary
Summary
☐
A.
Goodwin Interview of July 16, 1975
Mr. Goodwin was interviewed for a second time
on July 16, 1975. He indicated that he chaired the "Cuba
Task Force" after the Bay of Pigs. Paul Nitze had pre-
viously chaired the group. It was this Cuba Task Force
that suggested the establishment of the Lansdale project.
In this regard, Goodwin noted that Lansdale proved to be
very efficient. Goodwin indicated that he was present
during the conversation between President Kennedy and Tad
Szulc concerning the question of assassinating Castro.
(See Szulc's testimony infra.) He spoke with the President
after that conversation and remembers JFK saying about
assassination: "We can't get into that we'll all be
targets." He noted that Bissell never mentioned anything
to him, Goodwin, about assassination attempts.
With regard
to the August 10, 1962, meeting which he attended, Goodwin
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 6
D
2
noted that McCone never made any oration upon the immorality
of assassinating Castro. He remembered the August 10 meet-
ing and said that "assassination was not shot down". When
pressed for details at this point, and after being shown
the Lansdale (8/13/62) and Harvey (8/14/62) memoranda, he
said he wanted to think about the meeting before he made
any more statements about who said and did what. He noted,
however, that in 1966 while in Peru with Robert Kennedy that
Kennedy, in a fleeting retort to a series of questions
about U. S. assassination attempts against Castro, said
"Tell him (the interpreter) I saved his (Castro's) life."
At the conclusion of the interview he turned over
to the Committee various documents related to Cuba which he
had found in his personal papers. Those are appended to
this summary.
B. Goodwin Interview of May 27, 1975
During the course of this earlier interview,
Goodwin alluded to the Cuba Task Force. According to the
Committee notes of that interview, the discussion went as
follows:
In general, Goodwin had not heard much
specific talk of assassination, although
it would not have surprised him if it had
gone on. He mentioned one specific in-
stance in which he had heard talk of
NW 50955
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C.
assassinating Castro. After the Bay of
Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established,
first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by
Goodwin in his capacity as White House
Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task
Force, held at the State Department,
McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro",
someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell,
then asked if McNamara meant "Executive
Action". McNamara responded that he did
and stressed his interest in the idea.
However, Goodwin did not bring the topic
up later in the meeting after McNamara
left. (See interview infra.)
The Goodwin Documents
The documents which Mr. Goodwin has furnished
One docu-
the Committee are of no startling significance.
ment, the May 2, 1961, memorandum from Bissell to Goodwin,
is noteworthy because it does not advise him of the Roselli
connection or the efforts to assassinate Castro. Bissell
notes, "I have not attempted to provide you with much
detail." A May 24, 1961, Memorandum of Conversation with
Bissell by Goodwin does not mention any reference by Bissell
to actions against Castro on the assassination front. An
Arthur Schlesinger memorandum of June 30, 1961, to the
President discusses the need for revamping of the "intelli-
gence set-up" of the United States. In a footnote in that
memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not able to
control its operatives once they are in the field and of
(See page 6 of the memo.
the attendant dangers this poses.
.)
NW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 8
The other documents indicate the thinking that went on up
to the point where the Lansdale group was established as
the coordinated effort against Cuba.
Areas of Inquiry for Goodwin
What, if anything, does Goodwin remember of the August
10, 1962, meeting of the Special Group which he attended?
-- Is this meeting different than the meeting he refers to
in his initial interview where McNamara broached the sub-
ject of assassinating Castro? Or has he simply confused
them and are they one and the same?
How does he explain McCone's recollection of having given
an oration on the immorality of assassinating Castro when
it was brought up at the August 10 meeting?
Was McNamara the person who brought up the subject at
that meeting?
What discussion, if any, followed?
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 9
MEMORANDUM
McGeorge Bundy
To:
From:
Dick Goodwin
SECRET
Draft
4/26/61
Here are a few scattered thoughts on the "Cube" problem.
Cuba is a threat to the security of the United States in two basic ways:
1. As a direct military mcence in the Criblon, a monado which will
be intensified as communist arms shipments contimio.
However, oven this
increased danger will bo minimal. Our treaty obligations commit us to the
defense of any American nation which is attacked directly. Any military
met
moves by Castro could be immediately by our forces. Similarly we could
intervene in case of Castro military aid to guerilla operations in the Americas.
2. As an ciporter of revolution: There is no doubt that Cuba is being
used as a base for export of the communist-fidelista revolution. This is
done through the actual supply of funds and technical assistance to insurgent
elements, through widespread and reasonably effective propaganda apparatus
including a news service and radio network and through the use of Cuba as an
example of the alliance between fidclismo and necessary social reform
identification with co welfare of the people.
This throat is significant
especially in the Carribean area. However,
oven here, in the last six months there has been a significant decline in Cuban
effectiveness. This has come because of the growing isolation of communist--
fiedlista elements from the Democratic loft as Castro's pro-Soviet bent has
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 10

SECRET
become more apparent; and as Castro has become increasingly erratic in
His personal behavior.
There are signs, in fact, that, the communists are
looking for another, more stable, hero
perhaps Cardenas of Mexico.
3. While this means a declining influence of fidulismo over popular
movements; it does not necessarily lessen the importance of Cuban-Soviet-
Chinese material and technical ald to revolutionary movements. It is im-
portant to remember tligt even if Coptro were wiped out tomorrow we would
not have solved the problem of communist influence in the musicas. In fact,
most of the greatest danger spots (E.G. Northeast Brasil, Columbia back-
country, communist dominated student movements, etc.) do not owo either
their existence or strength to Castéo, but to local and independent leadership.
This danger has been steadily growing, and would contuire to pow if our only
anti-communist move were to Imock out Castro. These movements will
Emefit from material assistance, oven if they do not look to Cuba for leadership.
Currected Course of Action:
Action Aimed At Cuba Dirocity
1. Before acting directly against Castro, in any fashion, we need a
the degree of
complete reassessment of the vulnerability of his regime
popular support, the probably declining position of the Cuban economy and
its impact on the Cuban people, the efficiency of his police state, the possi-
bilities of underground organization, etc. Without such ch accessment it is.
SECRET
NW 50955
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SECRET
3 -
impossible to realistically determine what alternative courses of action are
open to us.
2. To meet the military threat we can work out defense agreements
with Central American nations along the linos suggested with Professor Borle.
3. We should approach the government of Chile to call an Inter-American
arms limitation conference. This conference should deal with methods of
stopping external arms shipments in the context of the over-all limitations
which are desparately needed in Latin America. We chould decide, before
this meeting, whether the risks in on QAS blockade of arms shipments to Cuba
are outweighed by the dangers involved in halting and searching international
shipping.
4. Immediately consult with heads of major nations in Latin America
to see how far they are willing to go in terms of collective action. This chould
be done via a personal emissary. Although we should have a reasonably clear
idea of what we want to do, this should be a genuine consultation among allies.
All the myriad proposals for OAS action, etc., depend on the reaction of other
Latin nations a reaction as yet undetermined.
5. Underlying all these proposals is the feeling that we should not move
quickly in direct action against Cuba. I do not believe that there is any course
of direct action which we can wisely take on the basis of current knowledge and
conditions.
NW 50955
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SECRET
SECRET
Attempts to ston/direct export of Centrciem
1. Wo should provide Carribean nations with the technical help
(e.g. radar to spot incoming planes) and navy patrol assistance to meet the
dangers of arms shipments from Cuba to insurgent elements in those nations.
2. There are two or three real danger spots (E.g. Dominican Republic
and Haiti) where we should now be developing domocratic alternatives to the
present regime
organizing replacement governments. If we do not do this
then the inevitable changes in government may be followed by Castro-type
regimes. When Democratic alternatives are organiced we should consider
means of precipitating the fall of Trujillo and Duvalier and possibly Somers.
In this way we can exert maximum control over the type of replacement govern-
the timing and initiative should be curs.
ment
3. Help provide counter-prop: guide assistance to Latin governments
e.g. radio transmitters. The more we can work through Democratic-
liberal forces in Latin America, rather than through USLA alone, the more.
effective will be our propaganda.
Coneral counter.
amannist operations
Our long-range strategy in the Americas should have two basic elements;
First, the organization of a strong political counter-force. We have
a ready instrument in the newly organized League of Democratic parties.
SECRET
NW 50955
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SECRET
We should assist these parties
fingucially and technically to develop
protgressive political movements (in some cases revolutionary movements,
especially in the less progressive countries) through helping them in tech-
niques of organization down to the village level, ideological warfare, etc.
U. S. government help should be covert.
Second, the Alianza para el progreso. This program with its emphasis
on social and economic advance is the real hope of preventing a communist
takeover. The Alianza is proceeding about as rapidly as possible given present
organization of effort, and the magnitude of available funds. Both of these
elements are unsatisfactory.
A. Funds: Present plans provide for the allocation of 250-350 million
dollars worth of economic assistance, to Latin America in fiscal 1962. This
is out of a total of 2.4. billion. (This aum does not include the social develop-
mont fund). Che hundred million of this willgtbo to Drazil to get them over
their current financial crisis. I am not clear that any substantial allocation
could be made given the enormous needs in Asia (especially in India and
although I believe there can be some increase. However, these
funds are probably not Sufficient to make a real and effective start in economic
development.
Pakistan)
D. Organization: If communist takeover comes in Latin America it
probably will not come through querilla warfare, but through the capture off
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 14.
SDORDT
indigenous revolutionary movements! We cannot meet such a threat
effectively
well-organised as it is when our overseas operations are
no fiffuse and uncoordinated as they are today. The aid program, the
political burcans of State, the USIA, educational crichunge, CIA activities
their
all go, to too great an critent, 
their 
own way under separate howls and often
in pursuit of separate goals. I believe that resulting diffusion of effort,
results in great waste of resources and intelligence. We must organize our
non-military overseas operation to reflect our basic objective in Latin
America the strengthening of dehocratic Western-oriented nations and
governments so that they have the
ty to resist communist attack in all
its forms. Those who are charged with the responsiblity for achieving this
objective must have control over the instruments which our government
provides. Juct no we have seen
used for some centralization of command
in fighting hot ware --
it in hooded for clipetively waging a cold war.
This
does not necessally mean a
"
Mef of Hemisphere Operatione'; but at the
very least it means that, within each key country there must be a central op-
erational capacity and authority dith direct lines to the levels of action in
Washington.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505
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SECRET
EYES CULY
2 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin
SUBJECT:
Assistant Special Counsel to the
President
Possible Covert Activities against Cuba
Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations
against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject
and our conversations over the past few days, I have not
attempted to provide you with much detail.
Attachment: Paper as stated above
NW 509
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EVES CULM
Thickand Mr. Bissell
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director
(Plans)
2 May 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin
SUBJECT:
Assistant Special Counsel to the
President
Possible Covert Activities against Cuba
Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations
against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject
and our conversations over the past few days, I have not
attempted to provide you with much detail.
Attachment: Paper as stated above
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 17
(Sispod) Calend !. Blanell, Jr.
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director
(Blans)
STATE
2 May 1961
As indicated by the combined INR/ONE estimate, anti-Castro
activity within Cuba will probably be muted at least for the next
several months. Most individuals whose loyalty is in any way
suspect have been arrested. A recent report from the Swiss
Ambassador indicated that political prisoners now number 100,000.
All internal services will continue to work on a theory of repression
plus undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties. Consequently, it will be
very difficult to carry on any clandestine operations and it is doubtful
that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening
the Castro regime.
In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition
to the regime among individuals still at large and that such opposition
is prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover,
there are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces
and communications can still be had either directly or indirectly with
individuals. At the very least these agents can and will continue
to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency. In addition,
certain of these individuals, plus some additional ones who might be
infiltrated, could attempt to carry out some sabotage. Individual
acts of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small
amounts of material. Successive acts of sabotage or extensive
thes
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 18
SECONT
NWSP
SEQUIT
52317
sabotage operations are more difficult and inevitably more costly in
terms of loss of men.
Nevertheless, it would be possible, starting
in the near future, to attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining
its feasibility and with the hope that gradually an increased program
might be developed.
A capability also exists for types of maritime operations including
infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, landing and caching of arms,
under-water sabotage of shipping and small raider operations. Under
present circumstances it would seem wrong to attempt these except on
a very limited scale and, in all likelihood, raider operations should not
be attempted until more information regarding feasibility has been
obtained.
The Agency also has a small air arm including some transport
aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack bomber aircraft (B-26).
Although it is not absolutely certain, there is reason to suppose that
Cuban crews also are available for operational flights. At the moment,
air operations should be substantially eliminated with the possible
exception of supply flights to support opposition elements unable to
survive without such support. Even with respect to such operations,
however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful
night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great
to justify the risk. B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against
chosen targets (e.g. refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if
SECUEL
EVEG SILLY
successful, might have the effect of extensive sabotage. In view
of the risks involved, however, and the poor deniability of U.S.
support where aircraft are involved, it is recommended that such
operations be avoided at least for the present.
Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted an independent MRP
capability to conduct infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage
and defection operations into Cuba. He recognizes a need for U.S.
support but is very firm in his desire to operate as independently
as possible of any official U.S. connection. His initial request
1
is for five boats, some materiel and some money. He admits,
however, that, looking ahead, additional support such as real
estate, some help with training and communications will be required.
He offers to share his information with the U.S. Government, seek
U.S. advice and, at least for a period of time, be willing to operate
with the Revolutionary Council. The Council's views are being
canvassed and Ray has been asked to prepare a prospectus giving
in some detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future
and the step-up required over a period of time should his efforts
prove successful.
The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support
within reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the
Council and with the U.S. are satisfactory.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 20
SECTET
#

NW
SEOPET
DO
In addition to the activities described above, propaganda
activities such as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines
and newspapers can be continued independently by the Agency or
in support of Ray or the Revolutionary Council. Moreover, limited
political action operations are possible. As to both propaganda
and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type
of activity undertaken will depend to a large extent on the decisions
with respect to the operations described above. Consequently,
these will be noted here as mere possibilities.
324245b5 \Fage
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
3. V. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Mamo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)
a. Agreed that the political objective of U. 8. policy to-
O you wouldn't do
•
vard Cuba is to bring about the downfall of the Cestro
regime.
b. Agreed that the United States should not undertako mil-
itary intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing
that would foreclose the possibility of military inter-
vention in the future.
i
C. Agreed that the Cuban situation should be kept under
constant review, in the light of the possibility that
actions by Castro would prompt a reconsideration of
the decision not to intervene..
d. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval
or air blockade against Cuba at this time.
Noted the importance the President attaches to obtain-
ing timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban mili-
tary capabilities, especially the enhancement of such
capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance,
taking into account the possibility of U. S. inter-
vention at a future E date.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 22
TOP SECRET
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
1. Noted the importance the President attaches to publian-
tion in the Free World press of the terroristic actions
of the Castro regime.
3.7.1120
92
D
2. Noted the President's direction that the Task Forca on
Cuba make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in
Cuba today.
Noted that a Special Committes, under the direction of
the Director of Central Intelligence, would prepare a
lan of special covert operations with respect to Cuba,`
for the consideration of the President.
plan
1. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be
organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals
4
would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces
and trained in special units countsting of-Spanish-
speaking nacionais, under a plan to be presented by
the Secretary of Defense in connection with his review
of U. S. conventional forces..
NW 5095
23505 'Page 23
TOP SECRET
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
Al'
del
Agreed that Cuban nationals now in the United States
will be given refugee status and assisted, under a
program te be developed and directed by the Secretary
burgers of Health, Education & Welfare, in carrying on their
Sfor
former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be
mylatometry,ble for encouraged to locate in other areas.
ati
Cuban nationals
entering the United States will be given refugee status.
k. Agreed not to impose a complete trade embargo on Cuba
for the present, but if later actions by Castro resulted
in a decision to do so, all trade with Cuba would be.
stopped. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the
President an analysis of how a U. S. embargo on
trade with Cuba would affect our trade relations with
other countries under the Battle Act,
Noted that the President would discuss with Canada the
position of Canadian subsidiaries of U. S. corporations
in the event of U. S. impositions in trade embargoes
on Cuba.
Agreed that the United States should at once initiate
nagotiation to enlarge the willingness of other Ameri-
can states to join in bilateral, multilateral and GAS
arrangemente to quarantine Castro, such as (1) breaking
diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling
NW
DocId: 32423505 Page 24
2
TOP SECRET
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
Г
subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing
arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic rela-
tions with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security
force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuben
invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) dẹ-
nunciation of Castro as an agent of international com-
muniem by MAXIMH all nations of this hemisphere.
n. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be
strengthened by such measurós as (1) rapid implemente-
tion of selected social development projects; (2) ac-
celeration of the implementation of other Latin Amer-
ican aid; and (3) provision of additional resources
for Latin American economic and social development,
including consideration of a supplemental appropria-
tion for development loans.
2. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would M
expand its existing program in Latin America rather
than initiate electronic warfare against the Castro
regime.
R. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under genedal
guidance to be prepared by the Department of State,
would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America
with Latin American officers.
NW 50955
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TOP SECR
無
DRAFT
1. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare
report on a possible new juridical basis for effec-
tive anti-communist action.
4. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI
Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly
both emergency and long-range plans for anti-comunist
intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the
Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that
the United States should not initiate the overthrow of
Trujillo before wa knew what goverment would succeed
him, and that any action against Trujille should be.
multilateral..
Bring Dearborn back for aches cituro
Barbil Gorana
TOP SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 26
TOP SECRET
NW
DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS
483rd NSC Meeting
(5/5/61)
1.
U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN
2.
3.
TOP SECRET
COPY NO.
50
Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate
a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on
May 19.
U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA
Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate
a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on
May 19.
U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)
a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall
of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not
!
likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at
intervals with a view to further action.
b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military in-
tervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would fore-
close the possibility of military intervention in the future.
505 Page
TOP SECRET
DRAFT
3.
Ur-S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)
TOP SECRET
c. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade
or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither
course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
d. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely
and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, e-
pecially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet bloc
military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible in-
tervention may be maintained at an adequate level.
e, Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the
Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regine,
and to possible political action to end the current terror.
f. Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence
Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of
possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which
exert control in Cuba today.
g. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be
improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized
as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar
as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.
"
h. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized
in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged
to enlist in the U. S. armed forces under plans to be developed
by the Secretary of Defense.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 28
TOP SECRET
☐
DRAFT
3.
U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)
TOP SECRET
1. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visitors' visas
will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to
be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees
now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban
nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status.
All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and
it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizen-
ship.
1. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba.
The
Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis
of the effects of a U. S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation
to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is im-
posed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain excep-
tions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs.
k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation
to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in
bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro,
such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) control-
ling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms
shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba;
(5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval
patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Carib-
bean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international
communism by all nations of this hemisphere.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 29
3
TOP SECRET
1
DRAFT
TOP SECRET
3. U, S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)
1. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by
such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social de-
velopment projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of
other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional re-
sources for Latin American economic and social development, in-
cluding consideration of a supplemental appropriation for devel-
opment loans of the order of $200-$400 million.
m. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would expand its exisṭ-
ing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare
against the Castro regime%3B means of propaganda should be made
available to non-U. S. groups.
n. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to
be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro
threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.
Q. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a
possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.
2. Agreed that pending appointment of an Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should
be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assis-
tant to the Special Counsel to the President.
H
NW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 30
L
TOP SECRET

DRAFT
4.
U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI
TOP SECRET
Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emer-
gency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the
event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the
President's view that the United States should not initiate the
overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed
him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.
5. U, S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA
6.
Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would consider what can be done
in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over
in that country.
U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA
a.
b.
C.
Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit and Diem
that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.
Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told that we are
considering inclusion of U. S. troops in SEATO forces to be sta-
tioned in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments
during or after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference.
Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending
recommendations to the President promptly on the number of U. S.
training troops to be stationed in Thailand.
NW-50955 DId>32423505“, Háyë
TOP SECRET
May 24, 1961
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH:
Dick Bissell
Tracy Barnes
Mr. Bissell agreed that no major decisions concerning covert activities
in Cuba should be made before the President returns from his European
trip. However there are a few things he thought should be done immediately:
1. That he revise the internal CIA organization in preparation for possible
covert activities. This means changes bothehere and in Miami.
2. That a small group (30 to 40) Cuban pilots be continued as pilots under
commercial cover in Central America and perhaps one or two American
companies. No commitment should be made to them that they would be
used in future activities. They would be trained as individuals and not
´as any group or "movement." This is primarily to keep their skills
alive and to keep them available.
3. He wishes to clean up the Nicaraguan situation. We have left a lot of
Military hardware there as a residue of the Cuban operation. He would
like to pull this equipment out of there, turning some of the B 26's over
to Somoza and allowing some of the Cuban pilots to remain there to train
Nicaraguans in flying these planes. This would be at Somoza's request
and would only be done if he insisted upon it as a re-payment for services
rendered. I stressed that no Americans should be involved in the train-
ing of Nicaraguan pilots.
4. He would like to train a few Cubans as radio operators. They would be
trained as individuals and would not know each other or that any others
were being trained. This amounts to training some individual agents for
possible future use. No commitments would be made to any of the men
trained. It is felt that this much activity is necessary in the next few weeks.
5. In addition, the Agency would like to survey the various potential insur-
rectionary groups which now exist. There are several of these groups,
three or four of which claim to have an underground in Cuba. We should
speak to them. We should tell them we could make absolutely no commit-
ment as to any future activities. However, he would like from them an
assesment of what they thought they could do in the future and .
if they
were to be active what help they would require from the United States.
Gib ti
NW 50955
DocId: 32423505 Page 32
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
2
This would enable us to make a judgment as to whether we should en-
gage in covert activity based partly upon this information informa-
tion which would tell us what help in specific terms would be required
and what we could expect from these groups. This has already been
done in the case of Mirona Ray. The groups contacted would include
the Council, the MRP, UNIDAD and MRR.
6. In addition, he was informed that Swan radio could not be used by the
USIA. They are unable to assimilate it into their system. I suggested
that we might try to find a good Latin American group, e. g., The League
of Democratic Parties or the Institute of Political Education run by Jose
Figures, to use it. I said that for the Council to operate the station did
not seem to me to be desirable.
7. I discussed the general situation in Miami and the various newspaper
reports. I pointed out that the KIA agents now in Miami were known to
everyone, including the press, and were the same people who were
identified with pre-invasion activities. Their presence I felt only in-
tensified the rivalry among Cuban groups and served as a focal point of
discontent. I requested that this group be broken up and that to the ex-
tent agents were necessary new people -- people not identified with the
pre-invasion activities should be sent to Miami.
_ 8. It was agreed that no future covert activities should be conducted in
the Miami area and that the groups with whom we dealt should be scattered
in other cities throughout the Southeastern part of the country. I said that
working in Miami was like trying to carry on covert activities in the city
room of a newspaper.
9. We also agreed that Dr. Miro could be informed that we were making
a survey of other Cuban groups but that he should be told nothing more
specific than that.
10. I also referred to the newspaper stories which reported that Batistianos
were being used supported by U.S.-CIA funds. They said this was not
accurate. They said that this would be very carefully looked into and that
the most specific instructions would be given that absolutely no Batistianos
should be supported directly or indirectly by the U.S. government.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423505 Page 33
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
11. I am strongly of the opinion that we must clear up the Miami area
as soon as possible. Therefore, I will get Ribicoff to expedite the
Refugee program, probably through the use of Mutual Security funds
in order to get these people into jobs, schools, etc. in other parts of
the country. Unless we do this we are going to have continually in-
creasing problems in the Miami area.
NW 55
32423505
Richard N. Goodwin
TOP SECRET
NW 50955
Jxas 30, 1961
QD FR THE EASIDENT
LA Reorganization
نستا
7 subwoft the following views ae ana whe worked in C69 forlog tha
vay and served as a periodis CLA convulsant in the years sincs.
balonch, CIA's record the protably been very good. In the
nature of clandestine operation, the triumphs of an intelligenca
agency are wolnospt; all the public bear a about (or alould bear
shost) are ita orpora. Bus, again in the nature of the case,
agency dedicated to clandestine activity can affowl damned few
visible arr»26, The importar thing to recogalse soday, in way
judgment, to that the CIA, he at procent cured and appetitured has
about ad up ite gusta. No margin for future armor is practically
-xitoni. One more CIA dabacie will chake faith constancably
in Uf polley, we home as well as abroad. And, well CIA i vidiy
roorganisad, it will (an in (be Algerisa instance) be vádaly Memed for
dovalopyzante at which is to wholly inuocarf,
The ergwnand of this smskandum in that CLA's tremble can be tread
to the autonomy with which the agendy Line boon parmilad to operatej
And that the autonomy ta fhd to three main causSODI (1) a quate
diccirizw of clandeating operationor (2) sa inastequziv senaption
the relatic/bip botman eprations on policy; (3) so inadequate
*OT should be -- BSA CIA Cing how been the
occasional restinees to sugeb to the tempertoar ad favorable
publicity. The Gegzamaiah od irian sporttonu more simp
alified by the food of acquinty baby water fullon
tham la.g., the articles by Richend and Opbye bavNS
Máy stay koton: Laloga of 116.
13, 1984).
SECRET
2.
conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence.
The memorcadum also suggests waye in which some of these prob-
lems can perhaps be alleviated.
L
CIA Autonomy.
1
CIA conducta three main forms of secret work; clandestine intelli-
gence collection covert political operations; and paramilitary
activities. It carries on those functions with relative autonorny.
The reasons for the autonom are historical.
When CIA bøgan, the State Depertinent, stili thinking too much in
torms of ite traditional missione in foreign affairs, looked on this
new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize
firm control of CIA operatione. It did not, for example, try to
establish any affective system of clearance for CIA activities; and
some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA waa up to
in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and
the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed
CIA's independance from supervision by State Department desks.
ABOK TENTHED
During the fifties it
In the meantime, CIA grew in sise and power.
began in some areas to ceistrip the State Department in the quality al
ito personnal. Partly because CIA paid higher onlaries and even
more perhaps because Allen Dullen gave his people courageous pro-
tection against McCarthyits attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold
a large number of able and independent-minded men, The more it
Réded brilliant activists to its staff, the mose momentum its operations
developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of pelicy.
By the time that fitoba had begun to be fully aware of the problemis
crested by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed
the chance to establish its own ultimate authority, While Stato re-
tained a nominal expervision over covert political aperations, this was,
to some degres offset by CLA's tendency to present a proposed operation
almost as a fait accroll; State never had title to cortsal overt
clandestine intelligens collection; and it held loss ground in such
#8036 25 overt pulitical ropciting and even la the roadrdenence of
cvast diplomatic contacts.
NW
DocId:32423505
Page
1
band
SECRET
For its part, CIA had developed a whole ceries of functions paral-
loling already existing functions of the State Department, and of
the Defense Department as well. Today it bas its own political
decks and billitary staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service;
it has (or haa had) its own combst forces; it even has its own air
force. Ra annual budget is about times that of the State Depart-
ment. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristico
of a state within a state.
II. Doctrina
Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has beau
able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct is
clandestine operations, The problem of doctrine for CIA is the exdent
to which its various clandestino missions are compatible with a free
and open society.
Yet
It is idlo to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-ruch,
we are free to do it teo. Communiera is a cread nurtured in con-
epiracy and the whole point of Communist social and political organi-
zation is to make cosepiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means
contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americase in order
to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that.
I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limila
which the maintenance of an open society places ca necret activity.
Unill this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and under-
stood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret
activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?
We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States
will continue to be a nation in which politicians vill ack questions and
make speeches, zsportese will dig out stories, newspapera will pub-
lish editoriala, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will
blurt out things harmful to the state, and so os We do not wish to
change these things and could unt do so without violating the essONCS
of our socioty. These thiago make up the framework in which CIA
In short, they constitute the problem; and, 23
Ceneral Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the
problem.
must operats.
D
NW 50955
DocId: 32423505 Page 37
CHEF
There follows from thie, I would think, the conclusion that secret
activitiae arz permissible wolleag so they do not corrupt the
principles and practices of our society, and that they csaɔs to bo
perwiscible when their effect is to corrupt these priaciulas and
practices.
Each form of secret activity presents its own problam. Clandestinie
intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national
elate. Its rules and usagen are fairly well established. In the
main, sepionege. If conductail with discretion, should present no
great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook
and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the
limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for
cumple, the question of the Centrelled American Scorce (CAS) and
whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activitioa
of the government
Occagiena.
Covert political operations prosent a trickler proħlom,
arise when it is necessary to scheidlee nowoptpore, politicians ard
organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life
of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I
wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it.
Paramilitary activition create on oven more difficult problem, if
only because the problems of concealinant are so much more difficult.
•
In general, I would euggest that any secret oparation whese #access is
dependent on the exppression of news, on lying to Cangrecemen and
journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken
only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really ssom to
cutweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the pre-
posed eporation way to of crucial importance. Small operations can
be done with a minimum of accompanying corruptioa,
The grasier
the visibility of the operation, the more its succose depends on
thwarting the impalees and denying the valuse of an open society,
the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming
caso be made for its nesusity.
In short, when confronted with a proposed eperation, we must not only
ank whether the operation is technically fonsible in its own tarme; 5829
must ask whether to outeuse' requires our open cociety to be in any
serious way false to its own principles.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 38
Г
SECHET
5.
117. Sperations and Policy
Clandestine activities should be accessed not only in the comfort
of their relationship to an open society but 
alon in the context of 
their
rolationebip to United States foreign policy.
CIA operations have not been bold effectively exbordinats to U. 8.
foreign policy.
1. Cloudcating intelligence collection in, by charter, from from
This fact exposes 
American foreign policy
State Department control.
to a multitude of embarrassinents when CIA le discovered recruiting
The rece::$
egonte or developing sources in a friendly 
country.
Singapore.co, hon CIA, without 
notice to the 
Consul General,
tried to subvert a member of the Spacial 
Branch of the Singapore
After complications of
Police provides an instructiva example.
Iudicrous conglosity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to
a lie-detector test, it turned out that 
the recruit kad long since
Informed bis superiore of the CIA approach 
and mes leading CIA
imo a trep which, whith spring, produced 
considerakle embarrass-
most to relaflens between the US 
and the Gingapore government.
There have been treaties of a comparable 
sert in Pakietsa and 
in
Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals 
were erniggled into 
Sasobo
to work in a CIA-NOA operation).
49 44
CLA bas snid that, in such cress, neither the Emhogay nor the Depart
ment in Washington is mozzally informed of this 
type of operation.
In short, no and knows how many potential 
problems for US foreign
policy and how mach potential friction 
with friendly states -- are
being created at this moment by 
CIA clandestina intelligence opereiis
.
Surely there is on argument for permitting 
State to dreide whether the
advantage to be goined by the operation 
(s. g., the information degiva“
from en agent wilbly the Special 
Branch of the Singapore Policz) out-
weighs the rick (6.5), ameperating the 
local government and choking
Clandestins
ite confidence both in our purpoese 
and in our sense).
intelligonės operatións nhmuuld plainly 
be clenzed toth 
with the Dapori
mort of State and (cave for exceptiocal 
instances and ou agrosment o
the Becretary of State) with the local 
U.S. Airbassador,
NW 50955 DocId:32423505…., Page 39
SECRET
6.
wwww..
1
2. Covert political operations tochnically reqsire Fists
Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often boon
able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's rels almost
to that of a rubber stamp.
This has been partly the conosquanca of the superior drive sad
activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence
of State Departmeus personnel. For example, when men come to CLA
with the assignment of developing covert political campaigne or
organizing coupa or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men
naturally fall to work with ingenuity and seal; they probably feal that,
they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize es maáy
coupa ce posutble. The concept of 'contingency pløsning' has
legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably
in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency
planning,' when carried to the clage of recruitment and training of
personael, creates a vorted inforest which often trancforms contin-
gencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a groep le assembled
and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the
project through (it to argued) will invite the disappointment and
alienation of the group; to the preocure increases to follow through
on what had started to a pure speculation. This van a central factor,
of course, in the Cuban Casioica the fact that distardant of the
Cuban forco in Guatemala just ocomed to caento too many problems and
ombarressmante. Having catered inte relatice with personalities in
foreign lands, CLA hee pometimes seemal to feel that we must there-
after do pretty much what they want or else they will blow security
This approach bas made us on
or even go over to the Communists.
occaalen the prisoners of car own agents. *
The Caban
*We become prisoners of our agents in another sense too.
spicode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control ite
own low-larel opozalivad. While the CIA people in Washington are man
of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are soEMO -
times tough asd even viclocs prople motivated by dives of their can
and not necessarily in political or oven moral øyrapethy with the purposes
of the operation. Sach actions as locking up the Revolutionary Counæál,
such enterprises es Operation 40 in Miand where CIA egents reportedly
trained Cobane in methode of tortura, euch episodes as the detention and
third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodulfa Nodal Tarcía aoi
16 other democratic Cabane this February all thics suggest that things
go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only Mrody
acquainted.
-
NW 50
32423505 Page 40

SECRET
7.
1
A
It has meant too that the State Department, aftes appriced of an
operation only in ita later stagon, is under great prenœure to
'endorse the oporation as already mounted because of the alleged
evil consequences of Oxorcislug e voto. I wall remember Tom
Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba:
"I would never have favored initiating this operation: but, since it
kas gone as far as it bee, I do not think we can rich cailing it off. "
Moreover, ni a time when there is increasing premium on activism,
Siste, when it questions CLA oparations or initiatives, caste toalf in
a priesy, siaey, cogative rele. The advocate of clandestine activities
seema 'tough' and realistice) the appeasat has to invoke ruth istangibles
ca the reputation of the United States, world publie episton, "What
do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and opsme hopelessly
iúsalietis, legalistic and 'scất.
The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has boon
to crasto situations which have forced policy on the Stobe Department.
This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote
in hie 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Cosnmities,
"The Cantral Entelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy.
Yet, in the yeare since, CIA has, in effect, 'anda' policy in maay
parte of the world. A number of governments still in power know
that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at Gverthrow -- nuss
a state of mind celculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the
United States. Indonsela, of cœaree, is a prime example.
This experience suggests that the pressat system by which CLA notifies
State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US
interests, There must be some means by which Skate can be informed
of such operations at an early enough etaga to affect the conception
and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will coa
tinue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on
foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reason-
able control.
$. The Controlled American Source (CAS) repréesnio a particulas
espect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making fanctieco. CIA today
has nearly as many people under efficial cq75s evassege do State
3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are nadov Stato Department cover
"
NW
Do
SLOD
NW
Dould:
SECHE
8.
(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other nen-États
official cover), Originally the use of Suto Department cover för
CIA personnal was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary.
The Walles-Corren-Jackeen report stated in 1948, "The CIA should
cot use Glate Department cover as a simple answer to all its problamo,
but should proceed to develop ite own outside cuver and eventually in
this way and through increased efficiency of its overcess personnel,
None-
find a way to temper ita demanda upon the Sints Department.
theless CIA haa szendly increased its requlaittene for official cover.
There are several reasons why CLA has abandoned its original intention
of developing cystems of private cover. it is easier to arrange COVAT
through Stete; it is less apsive; it is quickory it facilitates tha
security of operations sa well as of communications; it insures a
pleasanter Me for the CIA poople. But the affect is to further the
CIA encroachmant on the traditional functions of State.
In some missions, I understand, CAS pereanuel outnumbers regular
State Department personnel. La the American Exubassy in Vienna,
out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List es
being in the Political Section, 16 are GAS personnals of the 31 officers
of the
listed on engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS,
13 officere listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile,
11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent
of the political officers serving in United States Embassies ware CA&
Sometimes the CIA iriselon chief has been ta the country longer, has
inoro tuossy at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than
the Ambassador. Often be has direct access to the local Prime
Minister. Sometimes (es during a critical period in Laos) he puratsa
a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he la gonoraily
wall known lecally as the CIĘ representative.
CIA in Paris
In the Paris Ambassy today, there are 128 CLA people.
has long since begun to move isto areas of political reporting norsally
occupied by State. The CIA mon doing overt internal political reporting
CLA hao
cutnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2.
eren sought to menopelito contact with certain French political personali-
CMA occupies
tles, among them the President of the National Assembly.
the top floor of the Paris Ecņbassy, a fact well known locally; and ca
GECRET
9.
I
1
the night of the Generals' roknit in Algeria, posseon-by noted
with amusement that the top floor was ablase with lights. (I am
informed that Ambassador Garia was able to escura entrance that
night to the CIA offices only with diffle ulty. )
CLA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAB approach as a
pormement solution for ite problema. B la pressing to have CLA
people given the rank of Counselor. Before State lesse centred of
more and more of its prazumed oversees porsonnel, and beface CAS
boecavas permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would
zoom importaes (a) to secure ovary ambassador the firm centrel
over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directivo
cí Jantaxy 19, 1961, and (L) to review the current CAS altustion with
sa oye to a steady reduction ef CAS personnel.
4.
Faramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quartere
2ª a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and there-
fore a proper function of the Department of Defense, Tot there la
almost no CIA (unction mees peculiarly dependant ca the political
costext then paramiličnzy warfare.
0.3.
There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary
operation is in its nature a large and sitzibutstle operettan and thoseby,
ao suggested abova, clashes with the presuppositions of our epon
society. (Thera cossiderokens nood not apply, hemoves, to the
training of, say, the Bruth Vistoneste in guarrilla tection or is the
support of already ezisting guerrilla activities,} For surther, tho
moral and political price of direct paremilitery failure is acuto for
Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, azá
doing what the world expects from them: when we do 11 wo appear
to betray our own professed principles and therefave conect afford to
compound delinquency by defectu Moreover, &s the regent Algariza
opieoda chomail, onde wa convince the world that we cre ornmitted to a
paramilitary endaever, we will be blamed før ell sorts of thinga. Axe
na the recent tractors-for-gizonare episode shared, when we do sand
man to possible death, we cant lightly write thera off and cluzo the
books. The Communiste, on the other hand, have pe ecroplso about
liquidating e losing ahem
NW 509
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SECRET
10.
:
crever, fill fare is fought, much more than military
men ordineally realise, in en kirological context The guerrilla
succoode when his program oplists gracerects apparts and it is
very difficult indsed to best him when the countryside is with bin.
Van Mook told Central Marshall in 1946 oct to worry about tho
Avorrillas in Indonesia; "we are scading 50,000 men out there
FI Marshall,
and will clean the effication up in the three monthe.
who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines,
replied, “It won't be so e21F. You will fled that they will bleed
you to death. "
Cyprus and Algeria illustrato the difficulty of ever-
corning guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military fores.
E
In
The otruggle
Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times cinca
the end of the Second World Wars in Greece, because Tito's defection
closed the northern Horder; in the Philippines) and in Malaya.
the last two cases the guerrzüla resistance ended tocause of the
combination of political and military countermoreuze8.
in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for
the minds and hearts of the peoples it therefore involved not only
paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, erganisation
of trade unions, political reform sad en offer of national independence.
If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer
lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guarrilis to roase
the countrycide. "Without a political goal," wzała láno Tes-tung,
“guerrilla warfare misst fail, as it must if its political ebjectives do
not coincide with the capirations of the reelo and if their sympathy,
ceoperetion aлd ancistsoco conect be gained, lle sáded, "Do wa
want the support of the masaço? Il va do, wa meni go among tho
ma9900; Brouss them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal
and woo."
+4
For those reasons, paremilitary warfare cannot be considered as
primazlly a military wesDOR It to primarily a political wanpon end
rust therefore be subjected to close and eareful political oversight.
I probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than
transferred to Defence.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 44
6400
11.
1
1
5. How to Establish Policy Cantrell
British experience might not be of valco.
Here I wonder whether the
The actable feature of the
British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestino
activity undar otrist Foreign Office contral, This contrel is achieved
in a number of ways:
1
a) Secret inteiligence Service (MI-6) itself opornies under
the direction of the Joint ketelligence Committes, which has à
Foreign Office chairman (rotil recently Sir Putrich Dean, who
is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes
the Service Intelligence directoro end representatives of the
Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well
as the Chief of SIS.
b) basle political warfare directives are originated, net
by SMS, but by the Information Research Department in the
Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdeperimental
Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under
the ultimate central of the Superintending Undar-Secretary di
the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign
Cifice.
c) 315 covert political action campaigns must not only coa-
form to Foreign Office directives but must ba cleared with the
appropriate Foreign Office geographical desku.
d) working groups under IRD chairmanship goreza opera-
tione la spacial arces, sich es, for example, Sino-Bøvist rola-
tions or the World Youth Festival.
e) a Foreign Offles Staff Lisleen Officer site nuir to the 818
Chief, and Fereign Office officiale sorve tase of dziy la 313
secticas,
All these devices might to adapted for use by the Stato Dogartraceda
Organizationally, this would moto that the intelligenes egonay would
retain operational antaneary but that its openttians would be at nil
points subject to Bioła Depastiant clearance -- a elsarsace to ke
LA.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 45
NW 50955
SECRET
120
enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of
working groupe, and by the kafiltration of Stato Department
personnel into the Intelligence agaacy.
Obviously this ost-up would pot succeed, however, talcea the
State Department Maolf woze prepared to overcome its labrod
habits of diffusion, negustviem and delay and to take a firm and
purposeful grip on the sikurtion.
IV. Operations and Intelligence
The relationship between eparations and intelligence raises particu-
larly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two segarable
activities: clandestion cellsction; and research, analysis and
串
ovaluation. The first deals with that small portion of row intelli-
gence procured by szeret means (Mr. Dalles estimated in 1947 that
"a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by
. overt
nermal, and zbovobozrd means would supply us with over 60 percent,
I should estimasis, of the information required for the gildance of our
national policy"); the second involves the cellation and interpretation
of all forme of Intelligence, however obtained and the production of
estimates.
Under the British cystem, clandestine collection is entrusted to the
Sacrat Intelligence Esprica. The research, enslysts and estimating
function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.
i
Under the American systom, CIA has responsfbility for both
clandestine collection and ressarch and acalpoin. The State Depart-
ment's Daresu of Intelligence and Reesarch el69 has rescazeh vad
analysis responsibilities; but, in practico, CIA has eciahlichod
control over the machinery for producing nailamel estimétis in such
a way as to reduco State's contribution to arbmitting te views to CIA
for acceptance or rejection, in other words, where in Great Britain
the Foreign Office playa the coordinating rede in the latelligence field,
in the United States that sale has been assumed by CIA,
SECHE
13.
i
די
The argument against incorporating the research and estimate
function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper
judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that
information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to
weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without
having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable.
and even propor prejudices of the men whose daty it is to determine
policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to
be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be
faulty.
11
Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against
the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA
1. c., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then
those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the
intelligence which validates the operation.
Obviously both argumente conclude to a case for the establishment of
a fairly independent research and estimate group, But, if the A&E
group is too independert, one runs into the opposite danger; that is,
that neither policy nor cperations will be subjected to adequate
Intelligence checks.
The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that
intelligence and operations were combined, but precisaly that the
The in
Cuban operation evadad systematic intelligence judgment.
telligence branch (DD) of CIA was never informed of the existence
of the Ceban operation, The Office of National Estimates cas never
asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent
had reached the point in Cuba whare a onccessful landing operation
would provoke uprisinge behind the lines and defestions from the
Militia La December and February, the Office of National Estimates
produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were
wholly independent of the Cuban operation, I gather that, if its
opinion had been invited, DDI would bavo given quite a differont
estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the opera-
tloo was bagad. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation
NW 50955
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:
SECRET
14.
that knowledge of the Cuban uporation, flaunted in Miami bars
by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA,
was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State
know even less about the Cuban operation.
The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent
of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case
for veeted idese and intereste yet sufficiently close to be able to
subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and
searching scrutiny.
Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to became.
subordinate to Stato, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the K&E
function might be vested in a ceardinate subagency, somewhat inde-
pendant cí both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-
to-day operations. The R&E oubagency would receive intelligence
from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course,
from public sources. It would represent, in effest, a fusion of CLA/DDI
and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain
of the service functions now confided to CIA photographic interpre-
色號
tation, biographical dinin, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt callee.
tică, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board.
with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a
State Department or White House chairman.
V. Conclusion.
The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrange-
mant of ear present intelligence aet-up, It also implies the capacity
of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do
no in an effective and pärposeful way. If the State Department se at
present staffed in not capable of assuming effective command, this is
not, in my judgment, an argument against a reŝional reorganization of
intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State
Department.
NW 509
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Page 48
SEGUIDO
15.
The structure which would not the criter
memorandum would be ne falloons 1
ggested in this
This
1) The Gate Department would be granted genoral
cloeronce outhority over all clandestian activity.
might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment
of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who
would act for the Secretory in these mettere and who might
sorve as chairman of a Joint Imelligence Beard.
2) The Joint Intelligence Board zoulil include repre-
sentatives from all elements in the intelligence community
and also from the White House.
3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be
reconstituted under some Mameloes title (the National kaforms-
tion Servica). This new agency would be charged with recpossi-
bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations
and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance.
In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relations
ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA
presently do.
4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again
bearing a blameless title (the Foreign lleoearch Agency), coordi-
nate with the operations zgency. This agency would be charged
with responsibility for cellation and interpretation. It would
Include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Regnarch in
State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA
(photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast
monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc, },
It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean,
cct
The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 49
SEET
Arthur Schlesinger, jr.
SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 8, 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD GOODWIN
SUBJECT:
Cuban Covert Plan
Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) "an island-wide
resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal
assets under close Agency control and direction"; (b) "support and
guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a
potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations
bases" in the US. In short, what is intended is a CIA underground
formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban
underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient
to overthrow Castro.
Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CLA
specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept
CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups
most eager to control their own operations. I. e., the plan discrimi-
nates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates
against men of independence and principle. Thus these criteria elimi-
nate the Manuel Ray group; yet I can find nowhere in the documents
any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people.
Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical
effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating
broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the key prob-
lem: i. e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against
the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled
and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable
types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes.
My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and
demand that it be recast to make political sense. The key is the
NW50955 BocId:32423505 Page 50
SECRET

SECRET
2.
"
statement that our covert activity "should be viewed only as the
covert contribution to any national program designed to bring
about the eventual replacement of the Castro government. This
is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity
should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba
most likely to rally support for Castro's overthrow (which means, for
example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity
should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban
Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper.
It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out
in a political vacuum.
NW 5095. DocId: 32423505 Page 51
SECRET
A. S. ^.
Arthur Schlesinger, jr.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
September 1, 1961
The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31.
Present were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two
members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself.
The following decisions were made:
1. We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Carribean govern-
ments the possibility of organizing a Carribean Security Force. This could
be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework
of existing treaty arrangements, as a series of new bilateral treaties, or a
formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization
would depend on the judgment of other Carribean countries as to how they
could accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running
serious internal political risks. The United States, for its part, would pre-
fer the formal multi-lateral arrangement. Such a Carribean Security Force
would have at least four major aspects:
(1) Advance committment to come to the aid of other signatories
threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation.
of specific units for participation in necessary multi-lateral
actions.
(2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information con-
cerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of
such information.
(3) The establishment of a Carribean air and sea patrol to watch
for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents.
A training program in combatting subversive tactics, police
organization and procedure, etc.
It was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if
necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seek a more
formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political
considerations in the United States.
NW 60955 DocId:32423505 Page 52-
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NW
"
2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as
possible trying to ignore Castro and his island.
3. Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of
targets important to the economy, e.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equip-
ment, etc. This would be done within the general framework of covert opera-
tions which is based on the principle that para-military activities ought to
be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for
establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within
that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose des-
truction will have the maximum economic impact.
4. We will intensify our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and
especially U. S. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal
mathods to attempt tendivert this trade depriving Cuba of markets and
sources of supply. I understand that we have already had a few successes in
this effort.
5. We will establish next week
warfare group.
This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged
with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietiza-
tion of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc.
much of which has been hitherto classified -- putting this information into
readable, popularized form, and developing methods of disseminating it through
Latin America. Such dissemination would be primarily through USIA channels
but would include feeding it to Latin papers for "exclusive" stories, helping to
prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list
of intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group, etc.
The basic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin American communica-
tion, instead of treating it as official U. S. Propaganda. We have selected
someone to head this effort Jim O'Donnell of George Ball's office who was
a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the Saturday Evening Post)
for many years and who Ball highly recommends.
in the State Department -- a psychological
Go an
6. The CIA was asked to come up within the week with a precise, covert
procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government.
The object of this dialogue. to explore the possibility of a split within the
governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split. was fully de-
tailed in my last memorandum to you. This is an effort to find an operational
technique.
Richard N. Goodwin
SECRET
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
November 1, 1961
I believe that the concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, asdiscussed
with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-
out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably dis-
posed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and
uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.
The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot
lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at lease we will
emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer
idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us.
The question then is who should head this operation. I know of no one current-
ly in Cuban affairs at the State Department who can do it. Nor is it a very
good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activi-
ties. I do not think it should be centered in the CIA. Even if the CIA can find
someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to
revamp CIA operations and thinking and this will be very hard to do from
the inside.
I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of
such an operation. Either I or someone else should be assigned to him as
Deputy for this activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time
to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with
what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of success are very
speculative. There are a few answers to this:
ment
smp st
(1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs -- in and out of govern-
is aware that the United States is already helping the underground.
The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common
knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we
have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads it.
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
NW 50955
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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
(2) His role should be told to only a few people at the very top
with most of the contact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his
deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct
of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed
except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came
through those channels. There are probably three or four people who could
fulfill this criterion.
This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as
the fellow in charge. This danger must be weighed against the increased
effectiveness of an operation under his command.
Richard N. Goodwin
EYES ONLY FRR THE PRESIDENT
TOP SECRET
NW 50955
DocId: 32423505 Page 55
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
2 November 1961
MEMORANDUM
I believe that the operation should be organized with five staff components:
1. Intelligence collection and evaluation
2. Guerilla and underground
3. Propaganda
4. Economic warfare (exclusive of covert activities within Cuba)
5. Diplomatic relations
Each of these divisions would be headed by someone directly responsible to
In addition you would have a deputy who would do the actual contact work
you.
between this operation and the various government agencies involved. He
would be the one identified as the source of orders and directives when direct
Mefoot be would pendar
contact with the agencies was needed.
He should be from CIA for reasons discussed below. I
would act as Staff Assistant to you. My primary job would be to see that
current questions for decision were presented to you at your morning staff
meetings with the alternatives fully discussed. I would have no direct opera-
tional duties; thus keeping in the back ground.
I have talked to MacNamara and he has promised to supply a topflight guerilla
and underground man, as well as whatever additional personnel we need. I
think this is the best way to handle it. However, it will be necessary to use
the CIA apparatus and agents for this. That is why it will be valuable to assign
In this way we can probably
a CIA man to you as deputy in order to keep them happy and the
deeply involved at the command level.
avoid an internal struggle between the CIA field operatives and the Defense
command.
will discuss
Both the diplomatic relations and economic warfare people can come from
if you give the signal
State. I have some ideas on this and
it with George Ball.
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 56
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
2
One of Bob Amory's brightest young men should be assigned to intelligence
collection and evaluation.
As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence
although we should check with Ed
from the Times and work on this one
Murrow and Dick Bissell.
These people should have a headquarters. It should probably be at the Pentagon
because (a) we might get better security; (b) MacNamara will be easier to work
with in terms of getting whatever staff services, secretarial personnel, etc;
(c) It is a relatively neutral place between State and CIA; (d) you could re-
arrange your schedule to stop in on the way to Justice every morning
pėrhaps for a breakfast or post-breakfast meeting.
This operation should not be discussed at tomorrow's meeting. Initially only
George Ball (and Rusk, of course), MacNamara, McCone and Bissell should
know of your participation. When they are named, the five section heads
the the initial organizing work and contact work should
will have to know
be done through your Deputy and myself. If this subject is discussed tomorrow
then already too many people will know about it.
The first steps are (a) name the section chiefs (b) review with them all current
operations in their field, establish their authority over operations, get nec-
essary staff assistance (on as small as possible basis), and start them to
work; (c) establish the physical headquarters; (d) arrange for financing
presumably coming largely from CIA.
If this meets with your approval I will begin work on the above items with all
final decisions on personnel and other matters subject, of course, to your
approval.
Richard N. Goodwin
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 57.
TOP SECRET
NW
EYES ONLY
созад
November 4, 1961
The following are some tentative recommendations meant to serve as a
basis of discussion:
I would recommend that the Cuban operation be organized in
five componente:
a. Intelligence collection and evaluation
b. Underground and guerilla
c. Propaganda
d. Economic warfare (other than covert activities
inithin Cuba)
e. Diplomatic relations
Although these sections will make use of available agency capabilities the
operational authority for each of these aspects of the operation will be in
the hands of the section leader who is responsible to the chairman of the
group. All of these activities will be compartmentalized as much as possible,
L.e., only the chairman will be kept completely formed on all aspects of
the operation,
The operation should have its physical headquarters in the Department of
Defense, both for maximum security and to detach it as much as possible
from identification as a CIA activity.
The first steps are:
1. Designation of section chiefs;
2. A complete survey by each section chief of current
operations in his field;
3. The establishment of control over operations by the
section chief;
4. The expansion of operations where feasible.
Bob Amory should be asked to designate one of his best men to centralize
the intelligence collection and evaluation.
The Defense Department should designate the section chief for underground
and guerilla activities.
2423503 Paye
EYES ONLY
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
-2-
Г
Г
Г
We should discuss expansion of propaganda operations with Ed Murrow
not relating it 
to stepped up operations
and appropriate CIA officers
QUID
in other fields. With these people we should select a single person to be
the propaganda chief, coordinating CLA and USIA 
operations. I have
if he can be persuaded 
to take a leave of 
ab-
suggested that Tad Ssulc
sence -- would be a useful person to advise on this aspect of the operation.
C&
Both economic warfare and diplomatic relations should be handled by a
designee of the State Department. It is 
important to keep the diplomatic
relations aspect of this operation under some sort 
of control so that we
con't involve ourselves in potentially embarrassing 
situations in the OAS
,
e. g. voting to send an investigating committee 
to Cuba when our operations
are at a height and Fidel has evidence to 
present of U.S. participation.
The Deputy should be from CIA.
The President should not talk to the press. It may be that some contacts
in the most general way. But 
if
with a few key newsmen should be made
the President approaches them personally and the operation does not succeed
it is inevitable that he will become the 
focus of another Cuban failure. There
are two types of newsmen involved here. There is a 
rather large group which
will hear rumors and stories of various 
kind. There is nothing to be done
about them. There are a few newsmen whose 
contacts in the Cuban 
community
are no extensive that they might be able to put 
together a coherent story. If
any approaches are to be made it should be restricted 
to these; although they
should never be told we are going to 
wage an all-out operation. In addition,
as much contact and operational work as possible 
should be done outside the
Miami area..
Our next step should be to design te section chiefs, establish their authority
and have them make a complete survey of 
present operations. This would 
in-
clude a survey of current covert operations 
and capacities here and in Miami
(and anywhere else they are going on), as 
the first task of the Defense Depart-
ment designce with CIA assistance. The 
physical headquarters should be
established.
Although the Attorney General should maintain a general operational super-
vision, it is probably unwise for him to be 
the formal chairman of the group
because the risk of identification is fairly 
high.
TOP SECRET
HW 50955 Do
EYES ONLY
50935
1505 Page
EYES ONLY
-3-
If such identification is made, and the operation is not successful, an-
other Cuban failure may be directly traceable to the President. I regard
this as fairly remote in this type of operation but the danger can be de-
creased if the operation is formally headed by someone who is not so
clearly acting at the direct behest of the President. The Attorney General
can give assistance and maintain general supervision on behalf of the President,
working with the Chairman alone -- rather than extending his confacts to in-
clude all the operation chiefs.
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
☐

November 22, 1963
Bob
If you approve this (it is based on a brief memo from
General Lansdale) I will send it on its way. In addition
you should have a meeting as soon as possible
with Lansdale and the senior representatives of State,
Defense and CIA. If you want to call me on this after
you have read the memo I will suggest a procedure for
getting them together.
NW 50955 DocId: 3242330 Page 61
Richard N. Goodwin
TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY
November 22, 1961
MEMORANDUM TOI
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of CIA
The Attorney General
General Tayler
General I.enadale
Richard Goodwin
The following is a summary of the major decisions which have been made in
regard to the Caba Operation.
1. We will go ahead with the discussed project to help Cubs overthrow the coin-
munist regime and establish a free Cuba. All available aveots will be directed
to this end as a matter of urgent national priority,
2. The program will be conducted under the geoural guidance of the Attorney
General, with General Lanedale se his chief of operations,
3. The program will be reviewed in two weeks in order to determine whether
General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations,
4. The NSC 5412 group will be kept infairmed of activities,
5. The Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency will appoint sealer officers of their department as persoval ropre-
sentatives to assist the chief of operations as required. These senior officers
should be able to exercise -- either theṁsalves or through the Secretaries nad
Director -- effective operational control over all aspects of their Department'e
operations dealing with Cuba.
6. Knowledge of the existence of this operation should be restricted to the recipients
of this memorandum, members of the 5412 group, and the representatives appointed
by the Secretaries and the Director. Any further discomination of this knowledge
will be only with the authority of the Secretarios of State or Defense, the Attorney
General, or the Chief of Operations.
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TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
HARVEY #5
13
jaise ₤4. 18
7-5-75
MONGOOSE
10 August 1962
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on
Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962
PRESENT:
State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin,
Mr. Hurwitch
White House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy
Defense/JCS:
Mr. McNamara Mr. Gilpatric, General
Lemnitzer, General Lansdale
CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey
USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson
This thought
Later in the meeting,
1. Mr. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of
National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro
regime fail because of its own inherent weaknesses.
had not been contained as such in the NIE.
Mr. McCone said that he believes we must face the fact that Cuba
will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his per-
sonal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MRBM
base in Cuba.
concurred in by the Board of National Estimates or by the USIB.
He noted that these two points are not necessarily
. 2.
At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief.
explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent
papers. He then summarized progress to date by saying that during
Phase I, now completed, an intensivé intelligence look has been
taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not
yet have a
true assessment of resistance potential.
• etc.
3.
blockade of Berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward
Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a
Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping,
He suggested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency plans should
be closely meshed.
that he did not believe limited retaliation of this kind would con-
Mr. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying
stitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-vide
harrassment of Soviet facilities would be a different matter.
PROPERTY OF
+
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THE WHITE HOUSE OF
4. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to
create 
a split between Castro 
and old-line Communists.
out that such 
a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.S.
lle 
pointed
interests no matter 
which way the balance of power swung. In this
general connection, it was 
hard for him to visualize a valid pretext
for U.S. military intervention 
in Cuba under any circumstances
currently foreseen. 
However, should reasonably viable resistance
develop to the extent for 
example that some provinces might oppose
the Havana Government, then 
the U.S. might desire to give support
to such provincial officials.
In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at
the moment 
the previously
-cited frictions between Castro and the
old-line Communists have 
been resolved in Castro's favor, and no
issue currently exists
. There has additionally been at least a
temporary rapprochement 
between Fidel and Moscow.
this 
of course may be temporary.
lle indicated that
He said that there has been some
success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work for the U.S.,
and that there have been some 
defections.
5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the
MONGOOSE 
program
. 
Mr. 
McNamara questioned whether we cannot séparate
the building up of agent assets within Cuba from 
actions that would
hurt the U.S. in the eyes 
of world opinion. This led to the sug-
gestion by General Taylor 
that we should consider changing the
over-all objective from 
one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one
of causing its visible failure.
In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate
plan (called 
hereafter 
the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B
described by General Lansdale
, which he said had been prepared as a
result of the conclusion 
that stepped-up B would not in fact result
in the overthrow of Castro. 
He emphasized that the stepped-up plan
should not be undertaken unless 
the U.S. is prepared to accept
attributability for the 
necessary actions, including the eventual
use of U.S. military force
. Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up B will
risk inviting an uprising, which 
might result in a Hungary-type blood
bath if unsupported. Not only 
would the U.S. be blamed, but there
would also be a high noise 
level in the press and eventually a situation
would be created which would require 
intervention.
On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in
Mr. McCone's 
view, avoid all of 
these dangers because it would not
invite an uprising. 
Again he repeated his view that the U.S. might,
however, face a stronger Cuba 
in the future.
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PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
i
6.
The principal members of the Special Group felt, after
some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further
for consideration at next. Thursday's meeting of the Special Group.
Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize
measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split.
It was
emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as
to avoid major attribution to the U.S.
7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not
wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as
suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given
an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the
Navy, as he himself docs. The view is that this base is too important
to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance
of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with
this view.
8. Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the
possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly
"disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert
financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they
could generate on their own.
9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be
placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.
10. Action to be taken:
CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in
accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be
ready by Wesnesday, August 15th.
CC:
General Lansdale
dustry 4 4/9/63. mn.
Attachment
Agenda for Meeting
Thomas A.. Parrott
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PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
Tab D
AKLEY
DEPAR
DEFENS
STATES OF
UNITED BU
UNITED
MESK
TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
LONGCOS:
D
13 August 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE
DON WILSON, USIA
From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale
Subject: Alternate Course B
J
In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the
10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce
an outline of an alternate Course B for submission.
The CIA paper
"Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting
basis.
Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy
guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only
a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities.
The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence,
Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.
(
We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in
my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the
outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of
completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of
us to work from a full set of drafts.
Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:
Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,
7), Economic (sabotage, limited
deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion
in other sections of the paper.
Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and
Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections
of the paper.
EXCLUDED FROM GBS
TGP SECRET-NOFORN-
#3_
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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
ده اند
This document contains
Copy No.
03075
2.
TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING
Gen. Harris:
Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary
(limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for
Inclusion in other sections of the paper.
Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any
suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 67
TOP SECRETUMORO
SPECIAL
SPRET
SENSITIVE
EVES
(MY
14 August 1962'
6/15/75
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT
:
Operation MONGOOSE
:
1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.
: 2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962,
concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale,
Attached is a copy
of this memorandum, excised from which are
four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on
page 1.
These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."
3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro,
was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the
Special Group (Auginented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August.
It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a
comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which
has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on
the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group
(Augmented) is not expecting any written cominents or study on
this point.
4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called
Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand
the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in
writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far
as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to
this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it.
I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise
the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, in-
cluding those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly
thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that
he agreed and that he had done so.
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SEET EYES ONLY
SENSITIVE
5.
EYES SILY
For your information also, in your absence and since
the attached memorandum already had been 
distributed and in
view of the possibility that this might come 
to the Director's
attention, I informally briefed Walt 
Elder on the above.
bukl
WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W
Attachment
Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62.
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EYES ONLY
Exceed
COORST
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN.
Date: May 27, 1975
Place:
Page 1
SENSITIVE
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW
FILE:
of 6
Participants: Sel. Com.
wwwww
David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton
Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America
Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton
After the
During
During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign
policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America.
election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America.
that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter
on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of
1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After
working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White
House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama
1
crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America,
instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late
in 1965.
1. Assassinations:
In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as-
sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone
on.
He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of
assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was
established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his
capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force,
held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro,
someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 70
6

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page
of 6
"Executive Action."
McNamara responded that he did and stressed his
interest in the idea.
However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later
in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reason
able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that
Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced
with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later,
Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the
President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an
article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba
Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States
let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only but-
tress his position in Latin America.
During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every
week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division
of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor
did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin
worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967.
Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in-
volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life.
During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed
diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominican
Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be as-
sassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern-
ment was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul
in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-
Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some
1
weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces.
Goodwin suspected that
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 71
FILE:
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page
of 6
the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said
that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have
come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even
would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that
sort might have been passed by the Special Group.
Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact,
he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea
because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field
might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in
supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone
might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that
the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g.
by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In
general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in
all Washington agencies including the CIA.
FILE:
2. CIA Activities in Brazil:
Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United
States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the
period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart
factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the
Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections
for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congres-
sional elections. On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome
to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further
Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 72
لا
i
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
3. CIA Activities in Chile:
Page 4 of 6
tive Alessandri.
The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic
forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist
influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was
applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conserva-
Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only
rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he
remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were general
statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or
conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democratic
political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the
Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know
how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem
inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, however, the assertion that
the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washing-
ton since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the
White House it did not seem so.
4.
Changes during the Johnson Administration:
Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy--
Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert
actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American
policy, although the President did become active in the two crises--
Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change
in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and
conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 73
?
FILE:
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page 5 of 6
for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled
by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated"
in the Caribbean.
The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was
Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from
the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he
became President.
5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:
When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during
the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis
was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no
reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American
objectives could be secured through it.
Counterinsurgency was some-
thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police through
AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American
militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity.
At that point,
the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to
power and that the threat was subversion.
Paramilitary operations
Latin
were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency).
American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin
America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia.
Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little
difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not
in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America
without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla
movements that began had little indigenous support.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 74
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
Page 6 of 6
In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that
these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good-
$
win often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on
occasion, specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like.
Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin
America.
6. Goodwin Suggestions:
Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of
intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-
day operations.
What is required is an active Congressional committee,
on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active
staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major
operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to
tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do%; institutional
checks are required.
With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned
that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub-
director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto
Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Țad Szulc. In response to a
question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay
of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of
that.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 75
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C
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
aint
TOP SECRET
25
1 the United States.
2
ة
4
5
Several months later, I presume because
of that trip and several other contacts I maintain with
representatives of the Cuban government at the United Nations
and the Organization of American States, because of my personal
friendship with a number of people at the White House and
6
Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Donnegan and others, in a conversation with
7
Mr. Goodwin it was suggested that I come and see the Attorney
>
WARD & PAUL
C
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
8
General. I was invited to lunch with Mr. Kennedy at the Justice
Department.
We discussed in considerable length the situation
in Cuba following the invasion, the pros and cons of some
different possible actions by the United States government in
that context.
At the end of this conversation, the Attorney General
asked me whether I would have objections to meeting with his
brother the President. I said I would of course be pleased
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
did.
20
21
22
23
24
25
to do so.
The following day I received a call from the White House
received
indicating that the President would like for me to come in at
1
11:00 o'clock in the morning on that day in November, which I
And I was received by the President in the company of
Mr. Goodwin in the Oval Office for a conversation which lasted,
if memory serves, in excess of an hour and a half, in which the
President discussed a number of his views on Cuba in the wake
of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning
my conversations with Premier Castro, a general review of the
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amt
TOP SECRET
26
1 situation in Cuba, you know, what the United States should do,
2
3
4
5
6
7
could do, might do in terms of either in a hostile way or in
establishing some kind of a dialogue, most relevant of which
I suppose was that at one point the President rather unexpectedly
turned to me and said what would you say, what would you think,
if. I decided to authorize the assssination of Premier Castro?
Let me add for the record that the precise wording appears
I am
00
9
in the Esquire article from the notes taken at the time.
now paraphrasing from memory. This was a rather
11
12
rocking chair and hurled a question at me:
10
Mr. Aaron. Let me read this into the record. "We chatted
for a while about Cuba, and then Kennedy ‘leaned forward in his
'What would you think
•
13
if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?'"
Mr. Szulc.
I was taken aback and so indicated to the Preside
14
:
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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.25
To the best of my recollection, I said in the first instance as a
practical matter I thought this would not make all that much
difference even if he were because I thought that by then the
Cuban structure had been established to a sufficient degree
where the murder and disappearance of Fidel Castro would not
necessarily mean the collapse of the governing system, if this
were the purpose of the United States government.
In the second place, it was more important to me, I said
to the President, that my personal feeling was that the United
States government should not be party to murders and political
assassinations at which point the President leaned back and
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TOP SECRET
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1 smiled and said, well I was testing you. I agree with you
2
10
3
completely.
And then he went on for a few minutes to make the point
how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United States
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
4
5
for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having
recourse to assassination in foreign policy. Again, the
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
precise quotes and the precise paraphrase I placed in the article
and again I'm paraphrasing from memory now.
And the President added in this context that the reason I
have raised it with you, or words to this effect, is because
I am under very, very strong or powerful pressure from certain
people, whom he did not identify, to authorize an operation
resulting in the assassination of Premier Castro. And I think
we talked about this for a few more minutes, and I think I
repeated the points I made originally and the President said
14
15
16
he felt very strongly that same way and the fact he was testing
me or trying to see what my response as a reporter or as a
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
23
24
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25
citizen would be.
I might add that several days ago Mr. Goodwin and I had
the opportunity to discuss this and compare our respective
recollections of it, and Mr. Goodwin's recollection is exactly
the same as mine. We discussed this at some length, this
being last week, and the subject being relevant to the current
flow of news and Mr. Goodwin made the point to me, obviously if
President Kennedy were planning to authorize the assassination
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of Castro, he would not likely be discussing it with you in
2 the full knowledge of a reporter and if Castro were killed
3 or an attempt to kill him would surface you would have the
4
5
6
7
9
professional duty to rush to your typewriter and report on this
conversation, even though it was on a personal basis. And
Mr. Goodwin's judgment, and in which I concur, was that
presumably the President would not have floated this issue
with me, and this is really responsive to my own effort to
re-evaluate after the passage of time the President's sincerity
in disclaiming any desire to do so.
My impression at the time and today fourteen years later
is that the President was sincere and serious in affirming his
revulsion to such an idea of assassination.
Mr. Aaron. Let me ask you, when was your conversation
with Mr. Goodwin?
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Mr. Aaron.
Yes, the one you just mentioned.
18
19
20
Mr. Szulc. The most recent one?
21
22
23
23
24
25
Mr. Szulc. Last Friday which would have been the 6th of
June of this year.
Mr. Aaron. May I read into the record 'the following
paragraph from your article.
"Kennedy leaned back in his chair
smiled, and said that he had been testing me because he was
under great pressure from advisers in the Intelligence
community (whom he did not name) to have Castro killed, but
that he himself violently opposed it on the grounds that for
TOP SECRET
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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GOODWIN (TRUJILLO)
The papers produced by Mr. Goodwin on 7/16/75
contained some Trujillo-related material. Certain
documents were selected from this material and are pro-
duced herein under Tabs S and T. All of the attached
Trujillo-related documents have been produced before the
Committee, and Mr. Goodwin has been questioned concern-
ing them. They are attached again herein for possible
use in connection with questions concerning handwritten
notations appearing on the documents.
TAB S.
in the
May 13, 1961 Memorandum to Goodwin
re CIA Covert Activities
Dominican Republic
Page 2 of this document contains, on the
original ribbon copy, a pencilled-in circle.
Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that this circle
was placed on the original copy of the
memorandum by him and indicates that the
encircled material (a report of the passage
of revolvers and carbines) struck Goodwin
as both significant and new to him. Further,
the word "neutralize" is underscored in
pencil on the original copy of the memorandum.
Goodwin might be questioned concerning the
significance of this underscore.
TAB T.
Various drafts, together with the
original of the 5/29/61 cable from the State
Department to Dearborn are attached herein.
Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that the handwriting
on pages numbered 237, 238, 239, and 240 is
his handwriting. The handwriting on pages
233, 234, and 235, a subsequent draft of the
same proposed cable is not Goodwin's.
Goodwin suggested this handwriting may be that
of President Kennedy.
NW. 50955
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MEMORANDUM:
SUBJECT
CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic
13 May 1961
Attached is the special briefing paper on CIA covert activities directed
against the Dominican Republic which was requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin of
the White House.
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NW
SECK
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PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
I.
II.
BACKGROUND
A. On 29 December 1960 the Special Group approved a plan of covert
action to support the internal and exiled Dominican dissidents which
involved provision for increased propaganda directed against Trujillo,
and the financial support of selected exiled groups. Additionally this
authority included authorization for CIA to make available to selected
exile groups communications and equipment support necessary for them to
develop a capability to undertake the infiltration of personnel and
Since none of the exiled groups
equipment into the Dominican Republic.
had an existing underground organization within the area, it was the
Special Group's concept that this delivery capability could be eventually
used to support the plans and activities of the internal opposition with
whom the Agency and the Consulate are currently in contact.
B. On 12 January 1961 the Special Group authorized CIA to make
available to Dominican dissidents a limited supply of small arms and
other materials on the condition that the internal opposition develop
the capability to receive these materials and that the materials be in-
troduced into the Dominican Republic by Dominicans themselves.
"
CURRENT COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS
A. In late January 1961, CIA advised selected internal opposition
leaders that we were prepared to make available to them limited supplies
of arms,
communications, equipment, and sabotage materials which they
had repeatedly requested provided they developed a capability to receive
32423585,
EYES ONLY
SECRET
44
SECRA)
EYES ONLY
2
it via air drops or sea infiltration. To date the internal opposition has
not been able to develop this capability, nor have they been able to
nominate training candidates for code radio operators or saboteurs.
This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of
'Trujillo's security services, the understandable fear that prevails
throughout the Republic of being caught or suspected of anti-Trujillo
activities, and the fact that the organized internal opposition apparently
consists of only a few individuals with no real underground structure.
CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo a
limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent
very
requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense
weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO,
three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying
ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The
recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support.
B.
i
CIA has established working relationships with selected exile
groups. These relationships have taken into account that President
Betancourt of Venezuela has in effect designated former Costa Rican
President Jose Figueres as his emissary and representative to work with
Dominican exile groups. Through Figueres and with the knowledge of
1
President Betancourt, CIA is providing financial support and technical
guidance to the following activities:
(1) The development of a Dominican exile council in San Jose,
Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations,
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 83
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SECRET
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.3'
The
a representative designated by Betancourt, and chaired by Figueres.
council had its first organizational meeting in San Jose on 12 May 1961.
Subject to CIA's review of the council's proposed program and with the
concurrence of President Betancourt, CIA has indicated to Betancourt
and Figueres that it is prepared to support the council's program in
It is Figueres' initial concept that the
the amount of $15,000 a month.
council will undertake propaganda activities directed against Trujillo,
and train selected Dominicans in democratic process,
administrative skills,
and public administration so as to equip them to assume positions of res-
ponsibility in any successor government. Figueres has also proposed
that an exile paramilitary force be trained, but CIA has discouraged this
activity to date since neither Betancourt nor Figueres have indicated a
It is CIA's judgment that the exile
clear plan for its eventual use.
groups represented on Figueres' council have little if any popular sup-
However one of the chief advantages
port among the internal dissidents.
that can and is being gained by support of the council is the number of
credits that this gives to the United States Government in its dealings
with Betancourt and Figueres in utilizing them in other operations.
Betancourt has been adamant that no action be taken against Castro until
This support has served to neutralize his
Trujillo is disposed of.
attitude on that point since it amounts to a guarantee to Betancourt of
the United States's basic attitude toward Trujillo.
1
Likewise it serves
to solidify the attitudes of dissident exiled Dominicans so that they are
not anti-U.S. and will make them more approachable and amenable to
U.S. Government objectives once Trujillo is overthrown.
EVES ONLY
SECRET
(2) The conduct
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 84
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-
41
of radio propaganda from Ponce, Puerto Rico, which is under the direction
of Horacio ORNES, Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Domini-
cana (VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as
the voice of the ORNES organization.
(3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht belonging to ORNES so as
to give it the capability to deliver small quantities of arms or personnel
into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-military boat capability.
has not been utilized to date. It is contemplated that both the ORNES
propaganda program and this limited boat capability will be absorbed by
the exile council now being formed by Figueres.
C. With the knowledge of President Betancourt, and using his govern-
ment as the ostensible source of funds, CIA has provided limited financial
support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing a para-military
capability in Venezuela.
D. CIA has recently re-located Dr. Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon from
Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Jimenez, a physician and university
professor, is a highly respected Dominican exile and enjoys the confidence
of the internal opposition. He is currently working with the Puerto
Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of
the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program is to pro-
vide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes
and selected administrative skills. Through Jimenez and a small group
of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition,
CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the in-
ternal opposition which will supplement those currently in being through
EVES ONLY
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505
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our Station in Ciudad Trujillo.
5
E. CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets through-
out the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo.
A.
i
III. COVERT ACTIVITIES CIA IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED
Train selected members of the internal opposition as code radio
operators. CIA has the appropriate radio equipment "on-the-shelf" at
our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. However, this program has not been ini-
tiated due to the internal opposition's failure to provide individuals
who are able to undergo the required training outside of the Dominican
Republic and willing to run the risk of having the radio equipment in.
their possession.
IV.
B.
Train selected members of the opposition in sabotage and under-
ground resistance techniques. Here again the internal opposition has
provided no training candidates or developed a capability to receive
explosive materials through clandestine channels.
POSSIBLE COVERT ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION
A.
CIA has a supply of four (4) calibre 45 sub-machine guns and a
small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of
our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. A secure means of passing these weapons
to the internal opposition for their use in personal defense attendant
1
to their projected efforts to remove Trujillo can be developed by the
Station.
B. CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic,
in response to past requests from the internal opposition for leaflets
exploiting the excesses of the Trujillo regime.
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C. While to date the internal opposition has developed no capability
to receive arms or sabotage materials by either air or sea delivery, CIA
could initiate operations to cache such supplies off the coast of the
Dominican Republic for later retrival by the opposition when they develop
such a capability.
D. Initiate the training of para-military cadres. CIA has been
reluctant to recommend the initiation of such training since current
information indicates that any invasion of the Republic unless massively
supported by overt action would be impractical.
NW. 50955 Docid:32421505 Page 87
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SECRET
1
sand
Not we fir
THE WHITE JUSE OFFICE
FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT
SECRET
I'm
were total by Miste
his message.
mThis document consists of 2 pages
of 9 copies; Series
Copy No.
(Draftil 3/24/61)
1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subsequen:
your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest.
uncertainties reflected ref
clarification will be welcomed.
2.
Hope this will resolve
but your comments and requests for any necessary
:
Would hope
Department appreciates valuable work performed by Amb. Farland and your-
self and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements.
this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from
If price tagy for friendship of dissidents,
standpoint US national interest.
whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown quanti
places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which US stands
involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted,
you will agree we should stand firm.
Iccl sui
3. While fully congrizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republi
which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerns
by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from
normal cover and cut-out safeguards with xezuţix result ISG too openly identifi.
with what should be clandestine activities.
4.
Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objez
(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive cr
among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican
Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505
occur.
Page 88
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228
CC 1
در
SECRET
2
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily:
override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted
opposition leaders at this x time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver
copy to them.
5.
In May 19 meeting here with. Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sough
disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be
At same time assured them this government
party to any political assassination.
continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve represent
tive government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens.
6.
In response your comment recovert activities program you should be
aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made conté:
upon deepening of cover arrangements so
I.
as effectively to disassociate USG.
In light foregoing suggest you withhold further action and to xx extent
feasible substantave conversations with dissidents pending receipt documents now
to be pouched.
ARA: FJDevine: jer f/24/201
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 89
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END OF MESSAGE
22.9
SECRET
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
May 26, 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at
yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a
draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our
Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he
will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans.
The text of this draft telegram has been shown to the Agency and
agreed to by them. I am also forwarding copies of the exchange
with Dearborn leading up to the present draft telegram to him.
I know it will be difficult for the President to find time
before he leaves to have a look at this but, in view of the situ-
ation in the Dominican Republic, I feel that he should approve it
personally so as to be sure that it is consistent with his views
as stated in the NSC Record of Actions for May 5.
AB
Chester Bowles
Attachments:
Tab A
Tab B
waves
Proposed outgoing
telegram
Previous exchange
of telegrams
SECRET

SECRET
PROPOSED TELEGRAM
to US Consul General in
Ciudad Trujillo
FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT
1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subse-
quent your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope this will
resolve uncertainties reflected your telegram of May 21 but your comments and
requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.
2. Department appreciates valuable work performed by Amb. Farland and your-
self and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. Would hope
this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from
standpoint US national interest. If price tag for friendship of dissidents,·
whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown
quantity, places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which
US stands or involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted,
feel sure you will agree we should stand firm.
3. While fully cognizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republic
which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerned
by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from
normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result USG too openly identified with
what should be clandestine activities.
4. Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objectives:
(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive
credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican
Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.
NW 50955
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SECRET
SECRET
2
In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily
override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted op-
position leaders at this time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver
copy to them. If you believe conditions specified in second and third paras
Department's telegram of May 17 fulfilled, you may advise trusted opposition
leaders that you assume any friendly group seeking to establish authority after
overthrow of Trujillo would promptly declare itself provisional government and
request armed assistance from OAS, US, Venezuela and perhaps other governments.
If reply affirmative, you may advise them orally lines you think such request
should take.
5. In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sought
disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be
party to any political assassination. At same time assured them this government's
continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve represen-
tative government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens.
6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be
aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made con-
tingent upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG.
7. In light foregoing suggest further action and to extent feasible substan-
tive conversations with dissidents be withheld pending receipt documents now to
be pouched.
NW
SECRET
END OF MESSAGE
☐
>>
))
>>
TOP SEC ET
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
FOR DEARBORN FROM STATE
1. President has now approved contingency plans dis-
cussed during your stay here with one major exception: You are not-
to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident
groups.
2.
We consider it essential that you continue to work to
strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissident groups.
Your
work along this line has been invaluable.
However, we must
S
not run risk of U.S. association with political assasination, a
U.S. cofound 
play can't sle
This last principle is 
overriding and must 
prevail in doubtful
situation.
However, there is much you can do to protect U.C.
interests within this framework of policy; including most of
the measures in which you are now engaged. Specific instruc-
tions follow.
3. Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support
In case of innoverthrow of
for thir position.
Trujillo--whether or not initiated by pro-U.S. group--the
pro-U.S. group should promptly make every effort to constitute
itself as reasonable and plausible provisional government.
It should inmediately declare itself such and request assistance
from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and OAS.
If advance discussions.
NW 50955
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233
TOP SECRET
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
show that dissidents are favorable to this procedure discuss
the specific content of such a request and procedures for
All possible preparations should be made short
handling it.
of actual formulation in writing of age request in advance
of the event. Underlying this procedure is the policy that,
under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist
type takeover in the Dominican Republic even if we must intervene
This last possibility should not be discussed
without a request.
with the dissidents.
4.
Reference to multilateral action in record of actions
means only that further open sanctions will be multilateral;
and that in the case of direct intervention it would be pre-
No broader interpretation
ferable for forces to be multilateral.
is justified. All other U.S. äctions--whether propaganda or
covert activities--will be continued on a bilateral basis.
5.
Covert activities are, as you know, very small due to
inability of dissidents to develop a method of receiving supplies
which will effectively disassociate U.S., and failure to provide
candidates for training as radio operators or saboteurs.
offer to help along these lines--provided they develop capacity
Our
and effective cover--remains open.
However, you must request
NW 50955
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TOP SECRET
234
། ་ཥ་
TOI SECRET
PROPERTY OF
-3-
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
· and receive further specific instructions for any specific
covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer
Tell them that this is because of our
arms to dissidents.
suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe.
In actual
fact we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little
purpose and expose the United States to great danger of ultimage
assxucation with
disclosure of participation in] assassination attempt.
The basic
while
policy is to continue to hold open offer of covert help,
carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested.
This is feasible because, in actual fact, the covert help is
very slight except for verbal encouragement and exchange of
information.
6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo propaganda campaign
and other external pressures.
7. FYI, in event overthrow of Trujillo military forces will
On receipt
be dispatched immediately to pre-invision) positions.
of request from provisional government, and your concurrence,
وسلم انهزه ما انس ویشته یا الله
we will
in
If no request is received and there appears to
be any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made
in Washington whether to intervene regardless.
This makes it
imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible.
End FY
NW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page-95-
TOP SECRET
235
TOP SECRET
PARERED Oi
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
-4-
8.
Begin conversations immediately with dissidents in-
forming them of U.S. position and the necessity for an immediate
request. If they are favorable to this procedure take all
possible measures to prepare for the immediate transmittal
of such a request short of the actual preparation of a written
document for advance transfer to you.
TOP SECRET
IL
236
Y OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
L
TOP SECRET
тор
For from State
1. President has now approved contingency plans discussed during y-ur
stay here with one or major exception: You are not to request a pre-signed re-
quest for help from Dominican dissident groups,
2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S.
sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line had been intime,
11.h
་ཉིད་གང་ཡི་ཐང་
m
However, we shes must not permit danger of disclosing/U.S. association
with political assaination or intervention in-the-Dominican-Republic. This last
principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. However, there is
much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this framework of policy; including
most of the measures in which you are now engaged. Specific instructions follow:
3. Dalam Comitune to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their
position. In case of assassination or overthrow of Trujillo--whether or not
initiated by pro-U.S. group--the group should boyitato make an irmediate
request for assistance from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and the 0.A..This request
will be responded to favorably by the Unifed States. They should Sheldre til
told
sslyes the provisional government and request help whether or not they actually
are able to assume power.
If
are favorable to this procedure radiali
L
NW
23:7
DocId: 32423505 Page 97
TOP SECRET
THE SLAPY OF
Fordello prim state
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
1. President has now approved contingency plans discussed during
stay here with one E major exception: You are not to request a pre-signed.
quest for help from Dominican dissident groups.
2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen
sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line had been
However, we als must not permit danger of disclosing..
with political assaination or intervention in the Dominican-Republic. This i
principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. However,
much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this framework of note,
most of the measures in which you are new
3.
ase of assination or overthrow of Trujillo=whether or not
tiated by pro U.S. group
--the pro U.S. group should promptly
It should immediately in declare 
itself
ke every effort to constitute 
itself as reasonable 
and 
plausible
rovisional government.
uch and request assistance from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and OAS.
_avorable to this procedure all
EL
NW 50955
23.8
DocId: 32423505 Page 98
PROPENE
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
discuss the specific content of such a request and procedures for handling it.
:
All possible preparations should be made short of actual prepation in writing of
a signed request in advm ce of the event. Underlying this procedure is the
policy that, under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist
Friend
A
type takeover in the Diminican Republic even if we must
rozin without a request.
This last possiblity should not be discussed with the dissidents.
4. Mutilateral Reference to multilateral action in record of actions ricans
open
only that further sanctions will be multilateral, and that in the case of direct
intervention it would be preferable for for forces to be multilateral. No
kader broader interpretation is justified. All other U.S. actions--whether
propganda or covert activities--will be continued on a bilateral basis.
5. Corent activities are, as you know, very small due to inability of
dissidents to develop a method of receiving supplies which will effectively
dissacoitate U.S.Jani failure to provide candidates for training as radio
operated or saboteurs. Our offer to help along these lines--provided they
develop capacity and effective cover--remains open. However, you must T
furtiliy
have specific instructions for any specific covert activity. At the present
time we are unable to transfer one arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is
because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be unpaian. In
actual fact we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose
NW 50955 Dovid: 32423505 Page 99
23.9
?
L
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
L.
and expose the United States to great danger of
attempt. The The basic policy is to
ultimate disclosure of assassinati
continue to hold open offer
of covert help, whule carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested.
This is feasible becuase, in actual fact, the covert help is very slight except
exchend it
for verhal ancouragement and Anformations.
6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo proaganda campaign and other external
pressures.
i .
of
7. In event overthrow/Trujillo militery forces will be dispatched immediately
to pre-invation positions. On recept of request from enter provisional goverment
in. If no request is received and these aprears to
and your concurrence, we will is
he shox any danger of communist; takeover then decision will be made in
Washington whether to interven regardless. This makes it imperative that a
request be obtained if at all possible,
8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents informing them of U.S.
position and the six necessity for an immediate request. Tawubugradiz
If they are favorable to this procedure take all pissible measures to
prepare for the inmeditate transmittal of such a rest short of the actual
preparation of a written document by the issients for advance transfer to you.
Sta
Goodwin
2.40
50955
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Our WHP3/DR&H
Xi'
ATE 29 MAY 1961
TOP SECRET
2
1580
3
0
CIUDAE TRUJILLO (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)
ROM: DIRECTOR
CONFI C/WH 1-5
FODCI 6, D/DCI 7, DDP 8, COP 9 ADOP/A... 10,C/CA 11, S/C 11-12
ว
TRUJ (OPL) TOP SECRET
INFO
REF: TRUJ 0609 (IN 13990) =
. EMIDEED
Officer
. FOR CIA/
FROM STATE
ROUTING
S
6
2920 27z
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE,
TOP SECRET OUT ECE
42443
42443
1780694
CITE DIR
1. PRESIDENT HAS NOW APPROVED CONTINGENCY PLANS DISCUSSED DURING YOUR
STAY HERE WITH ONE MAJOR NICEPTION: YOUR ARE NOT TO INQUEST A PRE-SIGNED
REQUEST FOR HELP FROM COINICAN DISSIDENT GROUPS.
THAT
j
2. WE CONSIDER IT STIAL THAT YOU CONTINUE TO WORK TO STRENGTHEN
PRO-U.S. SENTIENT AGONG SIDINT GROUPS. YOUR WORK ALONG THIS LINE HAS BEEN
INVALUABLE. HOWEVER, WE NET HOT RUN KRISK OF U.S. ASSOCIATION WITH POLITICAL
ASSASSINATION, SINCE U.S. AL MATTER OF GUERRAL POLICY CANNOT CONDONE ASSASSINATION.
THIS LAST PRINCIPLE IS OVARIDING AND MUST PREVAIL IN DOUBTFUL SITUATION. HOWEVER,
THERE IS MUCH YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF
POLICY, INCLUDING MOST OF THE TEASURES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW ENGAGED. SPECIFIC
INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW.
3. CONTINUE TO INFORM DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF ... SUPPORT FOR THEIR
POSITION. IN CASE OF OVERTHROW OF TRUJILLO--UNNER OR NOT INITIATED EI PRO-
U.S. GROUP--THE PEC-U.S. GROUP SHOULD PROMILY NA VLY OFFORT TO CONSTITUTE
ITSELF AS REASONABLE AND PLAUSIBLE PROVISIONAL GOVT SHOULD IMEDIATELY
DECLARE ITSELF SUCH AND REQUEST ASSISTANCE FRON
EEN ST, COLORETA AND CAS.
(CONTINUED)
ELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERs
TOP SECRET
,
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
Copy No.
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423505 Page 101
ATE :
48
DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOP SECRET
TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET
INFO
PAGE TWO
ROUTING
1
4
2
S
3
6
DEFERRED
ROUTINE
OUT 60694
CITE DIR
42443
L
IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT DISSIDENTS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE,
DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF SUCH A REQUEST AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING IT.
ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE SHORT OF ACTUAL FORMULATION IN WRITING
OF A REQUEST IN ADVANCE OF THE EVENT. UNDERLYING THIS PROCEDURE IS THE POLICY
THAT, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN WE TAKE THE CHANCE OF A COMMUNIST TYPE TAKEOVER
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC EVEN IF WE MUST INTERVENE WITHOUT A REQUEST. THIS
LAST POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT EE DISCUSSED WITH THE DISSIDENTS.
4. REFERENCE TO MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RECORD OF ACTIONS MEANS ONLY THAT
FURTHER OPEN SANCTIONS WILL BE MULTILATERAL: AND T. AT IN THE CASE OF DIRECT
INTERVENTION IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR FORCES TO BE MULTILATERAL.
INTERPRETATION IS JUSTIFIED. ALL OTHER U.S. ACTIONS--WHETHER PROPAGANDA OR
1. COVERT ACTIVITIES-WILL BE CONTINUED ON A BILATERAL EASIS.
NO BROADER.
5. COVERT ACTIVITIES ARE, AS YOU KNOW, VERY SHALL DUE TO INABILITY OF
DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOP A METHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES WILCH WILL EFFECTIVELY DIS-
ASSOCIATE U.S., AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS
OR SAPOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES--PROVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITY
AND EFFECT COVER--REMAINS OPEN. HOWEVER, YOU MUST ALQQUEST AND RECEIVE FURTHER **
· SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANY SPECIFIC COVERT ACTIVITY. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE
ARE UNABLE TO TRANSFER ARE TO DISSIDENTS. TELL TH. THAT THIS IS BECAUSE OF
COORDINATING OFFICERS
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OUR SUSPICION THAT METHOD OF TRANSFER MAY BE UNSAFE. IN ACTUAL FACT WE FEEL THAT
THE TRANSFER OF ARME WOULD SERVE VARY LITTLE PURPOSE AND EXPOSE THE UNITED STATES
TO GREAT DANGER OF ASSOCIATION WITH ASSASSINATION ATT:APT. THE BASIC POLICY
IS TO CONTINUE TO HOLD OPEN OFFER OF COVERT HELP, WHILE CAREFULLY EXAMINING
AND CLEARING THE SPECIFIC HELP REQUESTED. THIS IS FEA: IELE FECAUSE, IN ACTUAL
FACT, THE COVERT HELP IS VERY SLIGHT EXCEPT FOR V-REAL ENCOURAGEMENT AND EXCHANGE
OF INFORMATION.
6. WE INTEND TO KEEP UP ANTI-AR JILLO PROPAGANDA CANTAIGN AND OTHER.
EXTERNAL PRESSURES.
7. FYI, IN EVENT OVERTHROW OF TELJILLO ILITARY FORCES WILL BE DISPATCHED
IMMEDIATELY TO STAND-BY POSITIONS. ON RECEIPT OF REQUENT FROM PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT, AND YOUR CONCURRENCE, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO IN CEDIATELY. IF
NO REQUEST IS RECEIVED AND THERE APPEARS TO LE ANY DANGER OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER
THEN DECISION WILL SE MADE IN WASHINGTON WHETHER TO INTERVENE REGARDLESS. THIS
HAKES IT PERATIVE THAT A REQUEST BE OBTAINED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. END FYI.
8. BEGIN CONVERSATION NEEDIATELY WITH DISSIDENTS INFORMING THE OF U.S.
POSITION AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN IDIATE IF THEY ARE FAVORAILS TO
THIS PROCEDURE TAKE ALL POI SIPLE RAPUNTS TO ARE FOR THE INMEDIATE THANS ITTAL
OF SUCH A REQUEST SHORT OF THE ACTUAL PENPARATION OF A RATTEN DOCURANT FOR ADVANCE
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officer
to State in which he asked what
guidance and encouragenent he could give dissidents, if he could
provide dissidents with draft document request 
../OAS assistance
in event The JILLO overthrown, and asked 
clarification of
President's statement that any action against TRUJILLO should be
multilateral.
WH/Comment: Ref was message from CIA/
'S COMMENT: *** DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED.
ORGANIZATION.
C/WHD
TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT.
COORDINATING OFFICERS
TOUCH T
it
C/..H/3
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