157-10014-10006
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Date:
7/7/2015
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER:
157-10014-10006
RECORD SERIES: HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 01-H-08
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SSCSGO
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TO:
TITLE:
Identification Form
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Document Information
ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTY
DATE:
PAGES:
01/22/1976
74
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
ANGLETON, JAMES
CIA, METHODOLOGY
MILER, SCOTTY
DEFECTORS
FBI
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
TRANSCRIPT
Top Secret
Consulted
Withhold
06/24/1997
COMMENTS:
Box 1
v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32423394 Page 1
1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : ‹SSESGO SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER :
157-10014-10006
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 01-H-08
Date: 07/31/95
Page: 1
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM
TO :
TITLE
ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTY
:
74
DATE: 01/22/76
PAGES:
SUBJECTS : ANGLETON,
JAMES
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
CIA, METHODOLOGY
FBI
MILER, SCOTTY
DEFECTORS
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS :
TRANSCRIPT
TOP SECRET
REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 1
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ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 50955 DocId: 32423394 Page 2
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ORIGINAL
Vol. 1 OF
Disclos
to Criminal Sanctions:
The United States Senäte
RMATION
ject
R2352
INVENTORIEDM
Report of Proceedings
ON
BY.
DN 2/15/77
BC
Hearing held before
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Thursday, January 22, 1976
Washington, D. C.
(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)
WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
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TESTIMONY OF:
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James Angleton
--accompanied by--
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Scotty Miler
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and
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CONTENTS
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FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
Thursday, January 22, 1976
United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock
p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, the Honorable Gary Hart
presiding.
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Schweiker.
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Also present:
Present: Senators Hart of Colorado (presiding), and
William G. Miller, Staff Director; and
16 Joseph diGenova, Charles Kirbow, Jim Johnston, Britt Snider,
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Loch Johnson, Elliot Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreath, Bob Kelley,
Michael Epstein, Rick Inderfurth, Charles Lombard, and Pat Sheaj
Professional Staff Members.
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you God?
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PRO
EEDINGS
Senator art of Colorado.
Gentlemen, let's go ahead and
be sworn and get under way if you don't mind.
Do you swear the testimony you're about to give will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
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Mr. Angleton. I do.
Mr. Miler. I do.
Senator Hart of Colorado.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Angleton at least has been before us before, and
routinely we remind all witnesses that they preserve all of
their constitutional rights, including the right to counsel,
the right to remain silent and so forth and so on, and to have
a member of the Committee present during all of the testimony.
It is my understanding we have no prepared statements to
start with, so I think I'll just open it up to staff questions
and interject some of my own, and I understand that the general
subject matter to be discussed here today and we are interested
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So, we'll just have the staff members start.
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in your expertise regarding the question of counterintelligence.
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^
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TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON
ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTTY MILER
Mr. Johnson. I wonder if we could begin by having both
4 of your gentlemen give us some information on your backgrounds,
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beginning with Mr. Angleton.
Mr. Angleton. I entered the OSS in 1943 from the Army,
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went into training in Washington and environs and then to
London, and then eventually to Italy, and I took over as
Chief, Counterintelligence in Italy, and eventually took over
as Chief, oss.
I returned in about '47, '48, and various jobs in both
espionage and counterintelligence.
At one time Chief of
Operations and eventually Chief of Counterintelligence, and
that was from about 1954 until 1974.
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Mr. Johnson. Mr. Miler?
Mr. Miler. I entered OSS in 1946. I was sent to China.
I was in China until 1949, transferred to Japan, became involved
in intelligence aspects of the Korean War. I served in Thailand.
the Philippines, as I said, China, Japan, Ethiopia. I traveled
extensively, was a station chief abroad, and for the last ten
years I have been in Counterintelligence, first in the
Special Investigations, and subsequently as Chief of Operations
for Mr. Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff.
And when I left the Agency in December of '74, that was
my position.
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if I may?
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Mr. Johnson. So both of you left the CIA in December, 1974.
Since that time we understand there have been some changes
in how counterintelligence is conducted at the CIA.
Could you give us some understanding of those changes?
Mr. Angleton. I would like to defer to Mr. Miler on this,
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Mr. Miler. Yes.
My understanding is there have been some rather fundamental
and substantive changes which are a continuation, actually,
of changes that were made first in 1973, in July of 1973
when many of the centralized counterintelligence functions were
decentralized and reallocated to different components of the
Directorate of Operations. Such things as agent approvals and
security, operational security reviews for intelligence
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collection and covert action operations; the oversight on
intelligence operations, and oversight on counterintelligence
operations in the field were decentralized. Research and
Analysis has been curtailed, and the emphasis on it has changed
There have been changes in the record procedures.
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Mr. Johnson.
Could you be more specific on these changes,
for example, in research?
Mr. Miler. In research, the research is now, as I under-
stand it, pretty much on a case by case basis, not in an
overall perception of worldwide or national counterintelligence
problems. There is no
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the application of historical cases,
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historical problems is not being applied, as I understand it,
to current operational efforts or investigative needs. There is
an entirely different philosophy being applied as to what may
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be required in terms of understanding the counterintelligence
threat to this nation. There is very little emphasis,
concern with such things as deception and disinformation. There
if any,
or
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is little application of analytical and assessment work to the
overall role of foreign intelligence and security services in
political action.
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There have been some fundamental changes in operational
philosophies stemming from an application of what is termed
management by objectives as it is being applied in the CIA to
operations, and there is a has been a distinct change in
--
some of the attention which has been previously placed on the
problem of penetration from foreign and particularly hostile
intelligence services into the American community.
And there has been a very, very substantive change in
the perception and the conduct of counterintelligence in that
there has been what is in my view a very serious erosion
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of security and compartmentation of operations, and leakage
of information which has not been to the best interests of
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a national counterintelligence effort.
Mr. Johnson. So, from going from a rather centralized
apparatus to a decentralized situation, the dangers of penetration
have increased.
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Mr. Miler. The dangers of penetration have increased
significantly, and this extends also to the methods by which
relations with foreign intelligence services are conducted.
Mr. Johnson. But how do you respond to the criticism that
during your tenure and Mr. Angleton's tenure, too tight a
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rein was kept on counterintelligence information, and individuals
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in the field at the station level failed to get the information|
they needed to conduct their counterintelligence operation?
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Mr. Miler. I would have to respond to that, Mr. Johnson,
and I could only respond to it in the context of specifics.
To my knowledge, and as practiced from my position as Chief of
Operations, whenever there was information which was judged
to be of significance, importance to a field station, that
field station was advised, unless there was some overriding
security source protection or other considerations, and the
decision then not to advise them was made at the Deputy
Director for Operations, as it is now called, or the Director
level.
There was, certainly, a very tight security, a very
tight compartmentation of counterintelligence information and
activities, which in my view was essential, and still is
essential, and will be even more essential in the future if
we are to regain a counterintelligence initiative and to do
our job in the future. And I think this is the fundamental
question that the management of the CIA and the Senate and the
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3 put our best minds to it.
Executive have to decide, is do we want a counterintelligence
effort, and if so, then we have to get to it, and we have to
Mr. Johnson.
Were there instances during your period in
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counterintelligence where the Counterintelligence Staff would
conduct its own counterespionage activities, without the knowledge
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of the various geographic division chiefs?
Mr. Miler. There were very few of them, with the chiefs.
Mr. Johnson. In those cases where there were such
operations, were they cleared with the DDO?.
Mr. Miler. Every single one of them was cleared with the
DDO and/or the Director and/or the Deputy Director.
Mr. Johnson. On important counterespionage operations,
could you tell us in more detail what the approval and clearance
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There may have been some.
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becomes involved.
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operations?
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process is?
We know that for covert action the 40 Committee frequently
What about for important counterespionage
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Mr. Miler. Well, Mr. Angleton might want to qualify my
response, because obviously he was involved more in this
than I was, but there would be the two primary considerations.
One was a strictly CIA, counterintelligence or counterespionage
activity. The derivation of the authority for this came from
the statutes which set up the CIA and from National Security
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Council directives 53, 55 and so forth. The authority rested
in there.
The approval would go to the then DDP, now Deputy
!.
Director for Operations, the Deputy Director and/or the
Director.
The authorities, if it were a significant counterintelligence
or counterespionage case, the authorities, as I understood it
then, might require the Director to go outside the Agency to
the White House or the Attorney General and so forth.
Alternatively, we in the CI Staff might be directed to
coordinate this with the FBI. We would go to the FBI, explain
the case and so forth. The FBI would then go to the Attorney
the Department of Justice and get authorities, whatever
authorities they would require in order to pursue the investi-
gations, conduct the case, and do it according to whatever
stipulations that the Department of Justice would put on it
in order to either neutralize the suspected spy or agent, and/or
conclude the case by prosecution.
And I am talking now of primarily in terms of a serious
counterespionage case involving an American citizen.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, do you know of any instances
where the CI Staff or higher
authority within the CIA went
outside the Agency for approval for important counterespionage
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operations?
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Mr. Angleton. I know of cases, yes.
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Mr. Johnson. And what would the approval system be?
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Mr. Angleton.
Well, it would be an ad hoc discussion
between the Director and the Secretary, and probably others,
3 the Attorney General.
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Mr. Johnson. Does this happen frequently? Is this a typical
procedure for a major counter operation?
Mr. Angleton. If it's a major matter, it's on the basis
of need to know.
You have another kind of case where a foreigner came to
me and stated his government had a defector from the Bloc, an
excellent agent, and they would be prepared to give us the agent
if we would take it over lock, stock and barrel, handle it
in such a fashion that there would be no exposure, because of
the political consequences to their government.
I would go to the Director and the Deputy Director, spell
out the matter, and come to a determination with them whether
we wanted to take the case on. This particular case involved
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not only a person who had been in the intelligence service of
the opposition a long time, but he had access to codes, and alsd
a great deal of deciphered material. So it was kicked back
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and forth, and there was a determination made that we would
take it over, the staff would take it over in its entirety.
And therefore, it meant that I called in Scotty and we
pulled together our team, we sent them abroad. We handled the
man in the field for a long time, and then eventually brought
him back here.
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name,
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In a case of that sort, the instruction was agreed upon
by all concerned, and the Director's instruction was that the
Division was not to be informed, the Division where this
individual came from, the Bloc area, should not be informed;
that the Bureau, only two or three people in the Bureau, by
should be informed, and that we would run the operation
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and
bury the individual at the end.
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Now, it went along
GOD COM
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Mr. Johnson.
Did you say "bury the individual"?
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Mr. Angleton.
I'm not using it in your Committee terms.
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Mr. Kirbow. You'd better clear that up for the record.
Mr. Miler. We would integrate him in to the American
society in such a way that he would be non-identifiable.
Mr. Angleton. He would be buried.
Mr. Miler. May I just add here also that the authorities,
16 the approval are very specific in terms of the agents' and the
17 CIA's responsibility to advise and get the approval of the
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Attorney General in bringing someone like this into the
United States.
The Director got this approval. It was a formal letter
There was a formal
to the Attorney General, a formal reply.
but very limited advice to the Immigration. All of the legal
requirements required by the Attorney General, Immigration,
all other agencies, were done. However, in this instance, they
were done on a very narrow, select basis, directly to Attorney
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General and so forth, rather than to go through the normal
bureaucratic chain of command out of the CIA and its various
components.
Mr. Angleton.
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With the added fact that we did not disclose
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all of the facts, nor identity.
Now,
this is important, because the individual was of
such prominence that the country concerned would be placed in
jeopardy diplomatically, the place where he was residing on
tour. There would be intensive investigations by his head-
quarters, and therefore we had to have covers. And so we
laid on in such a fashion that another service received infor-
mation regarding the target country that would induce them to
take certain observable actions, and then to spread the word
that the fellow had actually defected to another country, SO
that their entire investigative thrust would be directed toward
that country.
Senator Hart of Colorado. So far we've talked about
process, and I think we'll keep going on it, and return to
it, but I would like to quantify some of this if I can.
First of all, by terms of definition, is the phrase or
the term "counterintelligence" interchangeable with counter-
espionage?
Mr. Angleton. It can be. I think technically counter-
intelligence is regarded to be all forms of investigative
activity, travel control, your data files, your dossiers, all
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of the systems that go into counterintelligence as such.
Out of that emerges a product, and one of the products is
counterespionage.
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Senator Hart of Colorado.
I see.
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How big was the Counterintelligence Staff?
Mr. Angleton. When? Well, when it was in its prime it
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was around, it was 200 some odd people. After this decentraliza-
tion took place, when we lost international Communism, which in
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no service in the world has it ever been divorced from
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counterintelligence; we lost our police division where we
af
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train police from throughout the world; we lost operation
approval, which is approval of agents; we lost our controls
over the Technical Services Division; we lost the geographic
representation; we lost liaison, which was the liaison was with
the FBI and 26, other government agencies who do investigations.
Mr. Miler. They took counterintelligence and liaison
away from the counterintelligence component, if you can imagine
such a situation.
Mr. Angleton. So that reduced us to less than 80 people,
and this comes to, Senator, if I can just point to one of the
most important things in the legislation or in whatever the
Executive does, is that you cannot have in my view a Director
of the FBI and a Director of CIA who are independent of one
another. You have to have some higher authority to whom you
can make an appeal when decisions of this sort are made so that
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it is aired, and it is not done without the knowledge of anyone.
2 and then breaks, as it did, in the New York Times and what not.
3
Mr. Johnson.
Yesterday we had the Bureau representatives
4 telling us that there was really no problem or conflict when
5
it came to questions of this, and that there was no problem
6
with higher authority. in Apparently you wwduld you
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disagree with that.
Mr. Angleton. I disagree in total with that I'm saying the
decline in the Bureau over 20 years from when they had very high
10 grade counterintelligence until today when there has probably
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been
- -
well, it is least effective.
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Senator Hart of Colorado. Why is that?
Mr. Angleton.
Well, I think it has to do with the number
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of diversions it had in the days of the Vietnam war, when
15 internal security lost a tremendous number of men to other
'men
assignments and duties.
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Second, I don't think that counterintelligence or the
real thrust of Soviet Bloc intelligence has ever been brought
up to policy level, and, more important, anything, that involves
penetration has always been swept under the rug. In other
words, the question of penetration in this government or
penetration in any agency has never been brought to a responsible
level of finding out how it happened and what has gone wrong.
in this case he
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And let's take one defector who said
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spent 16 years in the Soviet Union in the KGB.
He gave us
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over 180 leads of penetration in France, and it occasioned my
drafting a letter for Mr. McCone to give to President Kennedy
le
3 to give to DeGaul. DeGaul secretly sent to this country one
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of his highest trusted military men.
He was here incognito.
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met with the defector for three days.
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The French original reaction to President Kennedy's letter
was, it was Soviet provocation, because this was at the stage
when France was making certain very sensitive agreements in the
atomic field and otherwise with the United States, and therefore
these allegations of penetration had a very direct bearing on
those negotiations. And so the General who came over was
totally prepared to believe this was provocation, but after
three days with the defector, in a meeting with Helms and
myself, he stated without any question that this man was 100
percent bona fide, because he could ask him those questions
right on the nerve of their secrets, and he got the responses.
Now, this defector also gave considerable data on the
status of penetration in the U.S. Government, documents which
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he had seen in Moscow, cryptonyms of operating agents, documents.
which could only have been prepared by our organization, and
many other cases going back into the early '50s, going almost
to Cabinet level. So all of this information was made available
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the pronouncement
--
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to the Bureau. But in due course Mr. Hoover regarded or made
and I won't say when he makes a pronounceme
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that it is one that has been recommended to him from higher
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GD GD
that the defector in question was probably a provoca-
tion, and the Bureau ceased contact with that individual, and
I would say they have not had any contact with him since 1965.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Why did Hoover make that
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decision?
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Mr. Angleton.
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Well, among other things, this defector
wanted to have access to ongoing and to past cases with the
view that he had a tremendous amount of data that he could not
relate to anything, but if he could see things that were going
on, then it would be meaningful to him in terms of what he had
to contribute. And I can take the example that, with another
allied service; immediately we brought them into it and he had
seen certain naval documents that dealt with infrastructure and
budget. This happened to be British.
In time they found the documents, and when they presented
them to him, he could identify those he had seen and those he
Vassal
had not seen. This led to the apprehension of Vassil, who
A
And this was the quality of his
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All through the west agents were apprehended on the basis
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of his information. But there is a tremendous bulk of it which
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was in the admiralty.
information.
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is made up of fragments, made up of documents he's seen where
we have not been able to identify the document; a great number
24 of cryptonyms of reporting sources. where we cannot find the
body to fit the cryptonym. So this is the reality. And he is
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being contacted perhaps by nine different intelligence services.
Now, there is no one who has supported the question of
3 his mala fides. In other words, everyone, to a man, has
stated that he is bona fide, that they have never been able to
disprove a statement of fact that he has given as a statement of
fact, although they do not necessarily agree with his hypotheses.
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That is the official statement.
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Mr. Miler. May I just add two things on this?
First, Mr. Johnson, it goes back to the business of
compartmentation and not advising stations.
In the case Mr.
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Angleton cited, the Paris station of the CIA was not told
anything about the information, and I think this is a very good
example of why you would not.
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The second point I would like to follow up on is with
respect to this defector's information, there were five leads
which were passed to the FBI about penetration which involved
17
the CIA, for action. And one case was solved, but it was
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solved only after the FBI officially sent us a letter saying
that they concluded that there was no substance to this
information.
They had to reopen the investigation
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Mr. Angleton.
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And they also said: send it to the Army.
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Mr. Miler. Yes, send it to the Army.
Now, they had to reopen the investigation when their
surveillance spotted a man coming out of the Soviet embassy, and
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it was subsequently proved that he was a Soviet spy.
Mr. Angleton. Now, that individual had performed four
separate missions for Soviet intelligence since about 1938 or
139.
One, he had been dropped in by the Soviets into Germany
on a mission with the WT set, to be captured in order to be
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played back and to penetrate the German intelligence.
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Second, he had moved from that into the penetration of
VLASOV
the Vassilov movement, which were the captured Russians in the
VLASOV
German: -- in the Vassilov Army.
Third, he had penetrated the anti-Soviet forces in Germany)
and then he was taken on by us in 1948 or '51 is when they
sent
to renew his inks.
12
So he was with us from '51 to around '60.
13
Well, when the defection occurred, it was
'62.
14
Mr. Johnson.
15
And Mr. Angleton, you used a term that is
unfamiliar to us:
his inks.
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Mr. Miler. Secret inks.
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Mr. Angleton. Secret inks. In other words, the Germans
had captured a Soviet agent who had the same kind of
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inks, and so therefore the inks were compromised, so they laid
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on a large operation in Berlin and trained him in highly
sophisticated inks. And he is now residing not too far
distant from us.
But I might add that it is very important to note that while
we maintained that he is a Soviet agent, and the Bureau disagreed
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and told us to send this off, we had a development occur which
it is not necessary for me to go into, it's still a relatively
live case, in which proof positive came that he was a Soviet
4 agent, and it was in the face of that proof positive that the
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Bureau moved in and interrogated him. And that is what prompted
him to go to the Soviet embassy.
And after some hours there he came out, he was asked why
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did you go to the Soviet embassy, and he said I went there to
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get my personal history and particulars regarding my family
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other words, instead of
since those are the questions you have been asking me.
in this case the man had a wife
In
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person here
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who was having an affair off and on with a Japanese military
instead of recruiting the Japanese and the wife
to work in to him, because what we wanted was a confession,
because the point I want to stress here is in a case of this
sort, a penetration there, he is not there as a solo person.
He is there as a spotter. He is a person used for entrapment
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abroad. He is a person who can originate an operation,
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induce you to go into the operation and bring in a weak
element, and put them in a position for further recruitment.
And I can stretch this on and on.
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And the classic example is the Philby case.
would have been Chief of British Intelligence.
identified positively in the end by this defector.
defector first knew about it, it was called the Ring of Five
Philby
He was also
When the
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in the Soviet intelligence, five people, Philby being one.
But from the time he knew about it, in actual fact it
was a ring that went into the twenties, because the purpose
of the penetration is simply not to be a passive figure; it is
to be an aggressive figure who creates situations for recruit-
6
ment. And that case has never been prosecuted. The man has
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never confessed.
He's never been broken.
And yet it was in
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Mr. Angleton.
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the heart of our SB, Soviet Division activities.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Could you give us, back to the
quantification, could you give us some figures for numbers of
counterintelligence cases handled per year?
Scotty, you can.
Senator Hart of Colorado.
Just so we can have an idea
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of the magnitude of volume.
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Mr. Miler. Well, for example, one, program that we had
going was an attempt to record penetration recruitment attempts
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of U.S., American officials abroad, strictly abroad.
And overi
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a ten year period the number of attempts to recruit and
penetrate hit close to 1200. So we were running around 250 or
so a year, just in that one small area of counterintelligence
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concern.
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The number of cases that we had would vary, but I would
from Soviet
say that from defectors in the last ten year,
and Soviet Bloc defectors, we averaged around 150 cases a
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year. At one time
I do know that at one time we had over
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500 active cases which required investigation.
We were concerned with approximately 140 to 160 double
agent operations a year. We had investigations which would
probably have a range, 25 to 30, significant investigations
that were going on, in addition to which we would have a
number of investigations, leads and operations with cooperative |
foreign intelligence and security services which would probably,
hit an average of about 50, if you would.
There were other operations which were generated from other
investigations and so forth, leads from the FBI, leads from
the military services, which would perhaps hit 30 or 40
a year.
Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the number of cases
involving penetration, successful or otherwise, of the Agency
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itself?
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Mr. Angleton. Well, the basic responsibility would be
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the Office of Security.
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In other words, we would work with
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them, but it tends to be a one way street, as it should be,
namely, they are responsible for personnel and for installations.
But from the one defector alone, I would say there were five
hard leads.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Over what period of time?
Mr. Angleton. Of this one defector who came out in
December of '61.
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But his leads were going back to '51, 1951.
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Mr. diGenova.
Is this the same defector with whom the
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FBI has had no contact since 1965?
Mr. Angleton. That's correct.
Mr. diGenova.
since 1965?
Has the Agency had any contact with him
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Mr. Angleton.
Yes, we've had it, but we've had our
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ups and downs.
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Mr. diGenova.
And what have those ups and downs been
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attributable to?
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are
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fact, we
Mr. Angleton. Well, they are basic well, first, there
two different attitudes in the American intelligence
community regarding defectors.
One of them is to give them
the harsh treatment and to treat them as second class citizens,
and we actually have taken on more salvage cases in the
Counterintelligence Staff and rehabilitated these people. In
า
came into that case basically because the fellow had
16
gone sour.
And
--
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Mr. Kirbow. Meaning he had failed to continue cooperating
or was not giving you the right information?
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Mr. Angleton. That's right.
Well, no, it was simply that
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he refused to cooperate any further, because one didn't appre-
ciate the ideological reasons for his defection.
we would
So these ups and downs would go on -- I mean,
have to change case officers because they would simply have a
breakdown in communication.
Mr. diGenova. Did the failure of the FBI to utilize this
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from utilizing it?
Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because so much of the infor-
mation that we wanted to take up with him was also related to
FBI information.
Mr. diGenova. In other words, you needed access to
information the FBI had, and you couldn't get it?
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Mr. Angleton.
We could get it but they wouldn't give
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permission that their information would be submitted to him.
Mr. diGenova. In other words, you had a third agency
rule blocking you?
Mr. Angleton. A third agency, also in the attitude.
For instance, in one session in which I participated, the
Bureau asked him to give the name of a source.
He refused to
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give it on the grounds that the man was in the KGB, was a
friend of his, and he didn't. want that man's name ever to
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get back to the KGB because it would mean the man's life.
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And therefore he had a direct confrontation, refusing to give
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it, very understandable.
Mr. diGenova. Was this lack of cooperation directly
attributable to Mr. Hoover, to your knowledge?
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Mr. Angleton.
no.
Mr. diGenova.
end
begin 03
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Was this problem ever brought to the
attention of the President of the United States at any time?
but he raised it with the Attorney
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Mr. Angleton.
No,
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General Mr. Kennedy, he had a direct meeting with him.
Mr. diGenova.
And what, if anything, happened?
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Mr. Angleton.
Only encouragement.
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Mr. diGenova.
Could you amplify on that?
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Well, the Attorney General handled him
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Mr. Angleton.
very well indeed, but nothing further came out of it.
Mr. diGenova. But there was no commitment on the part of
the Attorney General to see if he could budge: Mr. Hoover to
assist the Agency?
Mr. Angleton. Well, the issue didn't come up in that
fashion, just the general, the general agreement that he was
prepared to work for the United States at the highest level,
because the intelligence he had went far beyond simply KGB.
It went into Soviet policy. It went into Soviet reorientation.
It went into Soviet Bloc. It went into Soviet defense matters.
It went into some of the major secrets. And therefore it wasn
It had to do with policy or
simply counterintelligence.
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political action.
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He knew, for example, the identity of a Prime Minister
20
who was a Soviet agent, who at that time was trying to get us
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to go into several political arrangements, and he knew
exactly how he was recruited and how he was being used as
agent of influence.
an
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scope.
So these were matters that went beyond simply intelligence
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Mr. Kirbow. How long is a man like that good for, Mr.
Angleton? I mean, by this time, or a decade from now, a lot
3 of that information is of no longer any value to you.
q
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Mr. Angleton. No, that's not so. It is a fact that the
man has a computer mind. In other words, if you took all of
his interrogation reports, they ran to some 20 filing cabinets.
You try to have anyone retain in their mind, to apply that
8 same data against a new problem that comes up, it requires an
individual who lived that to be able to look at a case that
9
10 has arisen, and he knows the case officer on the Soviet side,
and he can give an analysis that this fellow was on the Scandi-
navian desk and that he was promoted to this, and that his
background is ciphers. He had not told you that he was ciphers
before because it wasn't relevant. So it's a new, added
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factor.
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And then you find that •. someone is known
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as a code clerk, and therefore the pieces begin to fit
together, that the man who was sent to the field by the Soviets
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to handle some unknown American is a cipher expert, and therefore
you look among who are the code clerks.
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Mr. diGenova. I'd like to
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Mr. Miller. Could I interrupt just a moment?
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You spoke in this instance of 20 file cabinets from the
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interrogation of one defector.
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Mr. Angleton.
Yes.
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Mr. Miller. What kind of volume did you put together in
your years in this activity?
If this is the product of one
interrogation, what kind of volume did you put together to
make a workable capability?
Mr. Angleton. Well, the first thing was to computerize
everything, and the second was to break it out case by case,
British cases, Australian cases, New Zealand cases, Dutch
cases, Finnish cases, French cases, Italian cases, all the
way on across the board; American cases; and then to take all
of the data, all of the voluminous stuff that was pertinent
to each of the leads, including the unknowns, in other words,
Unknown 1, Unknown 2, Unknown 3, etc.
So you had the ability to pick out a file on X subject or
X individual, and there would be the direct quotation from the
interrogation, and then whatever traces there were of follow-ups,
action taken, dissemination, etc.
Mr.
Miller. Just to press that
ww
yes.
Mr. Miler. I think your question is the total volume of
19 the files that were available to the Counterintelligence?
Mr. Miller.
Yes.
I was impressed by the fact that one
interrogation yielded 20 file cabinets, and was wondering the
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total volume.
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Mr. Miler.
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once,
What were the figures on the cases to read?
Mr. Angleton.
Well, I think I've already presented that
but when we were dealing with the new management and it
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was all this business of objectives and management by objectives,
and the idea of changing Counterintelligence personnel every
two years and new faces and open it all up and the rest of it,
we ran a basic job on how many, if you took 20 cases that were
imperative for a Counterintelligence officer to read, what the
statistical side would be. Those 20 cases would run into enough
linear footage, which according to the mathematicians in the
Agency would take 22 man years to read, or if they were 100
9
percent incorrect, 11 years to read.
Those would be the 20
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basic counterintelligence cases.
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And the purpose of it was simply to show that it was
profession, and that there had to be longevity to build up
Counterintelligence officers.
a
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Mr. Johnson. Generally speaking, within the counterintelli-
gence organizations, it seems to you perform four activities:
liaison, research, operations and security.
Could you give us an idea of your own priorities in
terms of distributing manpower across those four activities?
Can you break it out that way?
Mr. Angleton. Well, it is difficult to break out, but
the primary thing of all is the question of penetration in the
U.S. Government, and then in allied governments.
That would be
my priority. In other words, when we had a defector from the
Cuban service who had information of an agreement made between
the KGB and the DGI in Cuba to work against the U.S. and how
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KGB was oversurveilled, the DGI would take over the surveillance
of our personnel and so on.
The moment this defector arrived in the United States, I
sent Scotty to the airport immediately to see him because that's
6
the number one priority. Here was an individual whose job
7
was to work on Americans and who allegedly had seen information
from one of our embassies. Now, that is the highest priority,
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and particularly because information of a counterintelligence
nature is perishable. Some is and some isn't.
The moment there is a defector, the opposition runs a
damage report. So you know certain information will be known
to them immediately that is compromised, and they will take
action to correct it. But there are certain secrets that the
man knows that their damage report will not turn up. Those
you put on the back burner. But the ones you reach for first
are those that are perishable, and this is the priority is
established by the fact that here is a live, highly valuable
force, and we only have so much time to extract the cream off
of him and determine those things that would disappear.
Mr. Miler. But the whole thrust of all of our operations,
research, analysis, everything, was toward that goal. And much
of the reason for the security of the compartmentation for
the CI activity was to protect that concern.
Mr. Lombard. I wonder if I could ask a question concerning
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the Bureau.
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• Would it help today if there was a separate Bureau under
the Attorney General for counterintelligence, separate from the
FBI?
Mr. Angleton. You are posing the same problem that the
RCMP in Canada had. In other words, they set up, I might add
7
because of us, because we brought them into counterintelligence
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in a way they had never been brought into it, we brought them
down when this first defector, this major defector came out,
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RCMP.
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and the cases that were revealed to them, cryptonyms, telegrams
that were taken from them, an ambassador who was recruited,
one of their ambassadors and all this, led in time to the
Canadian Prime Minister desiring to set up a special counter-
And so they had this problem of how you take
intelligence.
a law enforcement force and what do you do about it. And
their ultimate decision was that you had to keep it within the
You created the separate office, and you created sort
of a director general of it, but the cadre, your people came
from the regular force, even though they are separated from
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the rest of the RCMP, and they are independent of the Commissioner
of the RCMP.
I mean, they are there for rations and quarters.
I guess what I had in mind was more the
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Mr. Lombard.
British model of the Yard having
Mr. Angleton. Well, the British model is the most
overexaggerated model in the world. I think I can quite
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honestly state that since World War II the British have never
caught an agent where the lead didn't come from us or somebody
else. It was never self-generated.
Now, in the last year or so maybe they caught an agent,
but up until that time they have never caught an agent.
Mr. Lombard. So your answer, in effect, would be that
the counterintelligence function should stay within the Bureau.
That is correct. I mean, not that it's
Mr. Angleton.
ideal, but in terms of the realities, in terms of the realities.
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it should be kept within the Bureau. It should, be greatly
enlarged, and the head of that should be, in my view, a Deputy
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Director of the Bureau.
Mr. Lombard. All right.
Now, let me ask you this. In your experience were there
problems where the law enforcement impded the running of
counterintelligence or counterespionage operations domestically?
In other words, were there times when you would have liked to
have run an agent domestically for a longer period of time
in order to get the rest of the guys, but they said no, we've
got to take this fellow to court now?
Mr. Angleton. That used to be prevalent back in the '50s.
Today I don't think they've got many cases. I mean, I don't
think that the job is being done, not in the last ten years.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, when I asked you earlier
what your priorities were, you mentioned making sure that
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we were not penetrated in conducting investigations to see if
in fact we were, which seems to give the impression that we
3 are defensively oriented, and that was your main priority.
Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that how could you have it
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any other way?
If you've got a cryptonym of telegrams disappearing and
are in possession of the opposition
Mr. Johnson. But isn't the aggressive dimension even
more important and trying to penetrate the hostile service?
Mr. Angleton. Those are all kind of theoretical arguments
to my way of thinking.
Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're penetrating first
I mean, this idea of running operations is
Mr. Angleton.
not really understood.
To run a double agent operation requires a tremendous
It is a commitment that very few people
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amount of manpower.
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understand.
If you are going to run a double, I mean,
to start;
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from the beginning, you've got to be able to keep a diary.
Now, one is the real life is the real life of the agent and
the other is his double life, because you can have a question
21
from his headquarters that says, that agent
you had three
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You've got to
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to answer that question.
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NOW,
this takes manpower.
You've got to have meetings.
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You've got to be able to satisfy the questionnaites, and you
2 can go all the way on down the line. This ties up thousands of
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man-hours.
Mr. Johnson. Could you explain that "satisfy the
questionnaires?"
What does that phrase mean, "satisfy the questionnaires?"
Mr. Angleton. The opposition wants to know, find out
from your sources the following questions.
Mr. Miler. In other words, the requirements they put
on the agent.
Mr. Angleton. Now, that agent is allegedly in the CIA
and there is a penetration, then you are just going through
games, and they will play such an operation. They could have
a very senior penetration into the Agency and play along on
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a double in order to lead you to believe that they do not have
a penetration. And they can tie up your manpower and put
doubles underneath him and another agent, and they can give
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him a radio set, and with the radio set they can give him
crystals, and he needs other crystals, and it involves more
and more of your own personnel and manpower.
And you can
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tie up NSA: monitoring
all the links.
And so this idea that has all of a sudden been novel and
newly discovered in the Agency that Counterintelligence must
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be aggressive is in my view a joke.
It's a joke.
25
Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're dealing with.
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You have to understand the enemy intelligence service before
2 you're going to penetrate it, and you have to be secure from
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penetration yourself, and you then have to run that penetration
very securely and on a very compartmented basis.
Mr. Angleton.
And there is one added proviso, then, that
you can only run a first rate double agent if you have a
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source superior to him that he is unaware of. In the war,
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double agents because we could read their messages back to
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their headquarters, re-enciphered, and the headquarters messages
back to the control, back to our double. So questions of
danger signals, questions of alerting him that he was under
control and so on was taken care of because of communications
intelligence.
When you don't have communications intelligence, then
the only other source that is superior is penetration, that is,
somebody who can read back from their headquarters how they are
in fact, absorbing the thrust of that double agent. And those
conditions do not exist for the Bureau or for ourselves.
Mr. Miler.
of double agents.
Or for the military services, to run a lot
Mr. Angleton. I mean, they do not have the superior
source of control over double agents.
Senator art of Colorado. Why is that?
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Mr. Angleton.
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Because they are one, not breaking codes, of
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they don't have the penetrations in the opposition against whom
you run the double.
Senator Hart of Colorado.
Does that mean we can't do that or we aren't, or what?
But what is the prescription?
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Mr. Angleton.
Well, we haven't succeeded.
I mean, we
6
have had Popov and Penkosky, and both of them are dead.
They
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were shot.
Mr. Johnson. It must be easier to penetrate the so-called
Third World than it is the so-called Soviet Bloc.
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Mr. Angleton.
Absolutely.
Mr. Miler.
But that's not getting you exactly what you
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want or need either.
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sake. It will look good in: statistics.
And you can divert an awful lot of time,
effort and manpower to running what in essence would eventually
boil down in a year or two years to operations for operations'
It will justify your
16
budget request to the OMB.
It will justify your counterintelli
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gence effort in terms of management objectives, because you've
increased from 22 double agent operations to 46 last year,
but
what is the net result, and how much time, effort and so forth
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are you actually using, and where are you losing focus on
what the real problems are facing the country in terms of
penetration and in terms of knowledge and in counterintelligence:
The picture which both you and Mr. Angleton:
paint this new face of counterintelligence from your point of
view is a rather gloomy one because your comments seem to
Mr. diGenova.
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the end product.
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indicate that you believe that this decentralization, lack of
compartmentation and in general, spreading the counterintelligence
function around is eventually going to lead to a breakdown in
We're not going to be getting what we should
be getting. You may be getting bigger statistics, and on the
face it may look like we're getting more, but in fact we're
7
not.
8
Mr. Miler. You're not going to get substance.
9
Mr. diGenova. Why was that decision made?
That seems to
10
be so fundamentally apparent by the way you explain it?
Surely
11
the Director must have made that decision for a reason?
12
Do you know why?
13
Mr. Angleton.
Mr. Miler has known him more than
longer;
14
than I have.
Would you?
15
Mr. Miler. Yes, I'll offer my opinion on it.
Mr. diGenova.
We would like to have it.
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Mr. Miler.
The basic reason is that neither the current
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worked in counterintelligence.
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director nor the incumbent DDO understand or perceive of what
counterintelligence actually is and what function it has, and
what the CIA's responsibility is for counterintelligence to
the nation. That is my personal opinion. They do not
have not had experience in counterintelligence. They've never
And quite frankly, they do not
understand the problems involved in counterintelligence.
Counterintelligence, as articulated previously by the
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current DDO, was station security and liaison.
Mr. Kirbow. Can you see this getting any better with
your new selectee who is coming from the outside world?
Probably knows the term counterintelligence, but knows nothing
about the intelligence community basically?
Mr. Miler.
I don't
--
quite frankly, I couldn't comment
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on Mr. Bush at all, but if Mr. Bush is going to have to rely
on the current management and the current management of counter.
intelligence in the CIA, it is my view that he will get
completely erroneous information and not have the advantage
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of understanding counterintelligence, and would be forced to
make decisions which ultimately will be tragic to this
country as far as counterintelligence is concerned,
from
C.
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ignorance.
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Senator Hart of Colorado.
What kind of erroneous
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information?
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Mr. Miler. What counterintelligence is, how it should
be organized, what the threat to the nation is that can be
hopefully countered by an effective counterintelligence organi-
zation which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI, the
military services, the Department of State, and all other
agencies concerned.
You are going to have to have a perception of the real
problems and what is involved in counterintelligence in order
to organize or reorganize the CIA's counterintelligence efforts,
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to promote the best kind of a national program.
Senator Hart of Colorado.
Assume something about, Mr.
Angleton mentioned earlier, about the tendency to sweep
penetrations under the rug in this country.
Has there been a pattern in the past that still prevails
of reluctance on the part of professional intelligence
officials as well as administration officials to admit that
we are susceptible to that?
Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there is no question that
there has been a tremendous dishonesty in facing up to hard
11
facts an intelligence.
12
I'll take the Yom Kippur war as an example.
As you know,
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it was a complete failure in terms of prediction.
tained in my testimony, if you cannot make a proper estimate
in a primitive area, then God help you when you come into the
Bloc area, and I still hold by that conviction.
As I main-
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But in that case, a few days prior to the Yom Kippur war,
the FBI disseminated a report to the President, the Secretary
'
of State, Defense and the Director of CIA which purported to
and a very senior source
be a discussion between Gromyko
to the effect that they had given up on the Arabs, that they
would no longer support the Arabs, they would no longer give
them arms, that they were going to recognize Israel, and in
fact they had the draft notes ready for the recognition of
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Israel.
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Now, I have never seen the post mortem of the whole project
on the estimation, but I would assume that any estimator who
received information by letter or memorandum, hand-carried,
4 quoting Gromyko, would tend to discount the fact that the Arabs
5
were about to attack Israel where they would have to depend on
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Soviet arms, and therefore the question of the Yom Kippur war
would be out of the question. In other words, that one report
I give it as an example.
1
Now, independently a study group of the Joint Chiefs came
up with the whole question of Soviet disinformation, strategic
disinformation to put us off balance on our estimating process.
Now, in our own Agency we were heavily frowned upon for
raising these questions, that there was a strong element of
Soviet deception and disinformation that had been injected into.
the intelligence collecting program.
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Mr. Miler. Prior to the Yom Kippur war.
Mr. Angleton. Prior to that. But the important thing
is that that source who provided the Bureau with that infor-
mation has been providing information over a number of years,
but no one has made a study of information in hindsight in
order to evaluate that source.
And I could go into many more sensitive cases of where
again intention has come through a highly questionable source,
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and yet there has been no re-examination.
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There has been no
Each
25 grouping or forum in which there can be any disputation.
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Senator art of Colorado.
It seems to me that you're
2
suggesting at the very least a naivete
on the part of our
10
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government and at the worst, I don't know what.
A
Mr. Angleton.
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Well, I do suggest that there is a naivete.
There's no one who ever
5 There is no counter-disinformation group.
10
-- most of the information today that goes into much
The human part of it is small.
6
studies.
7
of
it's mainly scientific.
Now most of it is from overt sources.
Mr. Johnson. What about the Inner-agency Committee on
Defectors?
Doesn't that review?
Mr. Angleton. It has nothing to do with it.
Mr. Johnson.
What does that do?
12
Mr. Angleton.
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Mr. diGenova.
16
That only allocates or handles the mechani
of who talks to the defector and what are the priorities and
questionnaires and whatnot.
The order of interrogation.
Mr. Miler. It is a clearing house to get the information
17
disseminated.
18
Mr. diGenova.
Mr. Angleton, I'm interested in going
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back to one part of your most recent response about the fact
of your or the CI staff's concerns about the Israeli problem
22 which you alluded to was frowned upon within the Agency.
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What form did that take?
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Hr. Angleton.
I'd be interested to know that.
Well, it took this form, that a person
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working with Scotty who takes his military duty over there,
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two weeks every year and whatnot, and who is very high on S&T
intelligence, arranged for these Joint Chiefs and this group
to come over and to address an audience of hand-picked people.
So this covered both the overt side of the House
By wyp
Mr. Miler. The three directorates, intelligence,
6 operations, and S&T.
Mr. Angleton. And they laid out their entire thesis,
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and we added to that to the FBI report to which I referred.
Afterwards I was severely criticized for having wasted everybody's
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time on that matter and told that if they realized it was
going to be that type of thing, we would never. have permitted
it to have taken place, et cetera, et cetera.
Mr. Kirbow.
Was this by the three directorates?
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Mr. Miler.
No, that was from the directorate of
operations. The directorate of S&T, Scientific. and Technical
was impressed by the presentation and subsequently said that
there was very great need for thought in this. And I think
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also, Jim, that concurrently in the operations I had an officer
who was working on discernible or apparent deception as reflected
20°
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in CIA reporting from the field of Soviet disinformation
concerning the situation in the Middle East.
And we did a tremendous study on this and which was
completely discounted and thrown out and it wasn't even
considered.
Mr. Miller. Well, in the Yom Kippur War, if I'm not
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mistaken, there was a SIGINT: alert. The NSA collection systems
were of such nature their analysts said it looks like there's
going to be a war within 24 hours.
They predicted the time.
They sent it over. It was immediately said, go back to bed.
5 Is that correct?
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Mr. Angleton. All I know about it is the alleged part
of that. I remember the Pike Report that caused a great deal
8
of comment. I thought that the four magic words were that
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NSA was not able to make a contribution because the Egyptians
had gone into a high SIGINT alert.
In other words, that through SIGINT they couldn't learn
the intention. I don't know this fact that you are tabelling.
Mr. Miller. I think Mr. Miler is
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deception and disinformation.
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Mr. Miler. The point that we're trying to make in this
connection is part and parcel of Soviet espionage, Soviet
intelligence service activity and Soviet bloc intelligence
It involves
service activity is in the political field.
A properly coordinated and run
counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical
work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment
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of the situation, which should be of value to policy-makers
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in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CIA,
to the Director of the CIA, and that what has happened in the
CIA since mid-1973 is that there has been erosion of this
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facility which cannot be divorced from counter-intelligence
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because as you focus and even as you focus on what the current
2 popular term, aggressive counter-intelligence operations, you
ان
have to have some knowledge of this in order to be able to
4
equate, assess and evaluate your so-called penetration of
5
a Soviet or Soviet bloc intelligence service to see if it is
1
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real. You have to have a litmus paper to judge your penetration.
And without that litmus, you are completely at the mercy of
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a system which is orchestrated and which is essentially
directed and controlled.
i
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as
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Mr. Miller. So what you're saying is from mid-1973 on
the country, or at least the CIA has lost a valuable asset.
What happened in '73? What was the decision?
Mr. Angleton. That's the decentralization, when all
of these components were taken away from us, including the
liaison and whatnot, including international communist parties.
So this completely viscerated the counter-intelligence
we have built it up since 1954.
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We were, I would say
world, we gave the leadership.
without question in the Western
We created all of the inter-
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governmental committees.
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We brought services from tiny
fragmented units up into major components of their government,
the five major countries, which meant we reoriented their
services along priorities that mot our requirements, and I
don't think there was any question that we were the acknowled
leaders in the Western world.
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By the same token, it induced people to bring their cases
to us for analysis.
They came to see us many times to see
the defectors, the stable of defectors that we had for
interrogation.
So that alone was a tremendous acquisition of counter-
intelligence data which would not have otherwise have been
available to this country.
Mr. Kirbow. And it's not available today because of this
spreading of the
9
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Mr. Angleton.
Well, that's what they say.
I mean I've
11
had one or more chief of intelligence who have surreptitiously
12
seen me since my departure.
And they will naturally work
13
as far as they can with the agency.
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Mr. Miller. When you say us, who do you mean?
Mr. Angleton. How did I use it?
Mr. Miller. You were referring to your capability prior
to 1973.
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Mr. Miler. The CI staff.
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Mr. Angleton. The CI staff.
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Mr. Miller. The CI staff.
Well, what were the numbers.
21
what was the capability that you had translated into people,
22
into files?
23
Mr. Angleton.
Well, at the highest point we had a littl
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over 200 people.
That was clerical and officers.
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Mr. Miller.
That seems a fairly small group.
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Mr. Angleton.
were understaffed.
Well, they were a hardworking group. We
There were many things we could have
taken on and I'll give you one example because it is still
pending, and it gets down to the question of penetration.
But when Philby was stationed in Washington, he was
given communications intelligence clearance so if NSA broke
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into the Bulgarian traffic, he could go to his Soviet control
8
and tell them that we were reading Bulgarian traffic. A secret
9
of that sort permits them to make use of the Bulgarian
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traffic as a deception channel the moment they know you are
reading it. That becomes a powerful instrument in their
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hands to deceive.
Now my point is this: No one has made an analysis from
the day that he was briefed on that particular traffic of why
the traffic continued for two more years and then gradually
petered out of what was put into that traffic which, if you
took that and identified an item of deception that came from
the opposition, you then look at your own agent reports and
find what agents at the same time were fortifying that lie
or that piece of deception. And it would point a finger on
21. agents who, in fact, were under control.
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How this is just one small exercise. HSA has preserved
every single piece of paper. In other words, there's literally
hundreds of thousands of pages of available material for such
an analysis, and I worked very closely with Lou Tordella.
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In fact, one of our effort or common efforts was I brought him
I brought him in with all these
2
into counter-intelligence.
3 foreign chiefs and whatnot in order to enlarge the scope of
4
NSA, since they can study and frame these patterns, they
5
can get into illegal traffics and get into many facets.
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ཌ་ ནག་
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It's one of the best outfits, as far as I know, in the
1
U.S. government, but they had always been denied these facts
that I just stated, such as Philby's access, the clearances,
the various espionage cases that have happened in the west,
the people that have had communications intelligence clearance.
Could we have a Philby level
Senator Hart of Colorado.
penetration of our intelligence community?
Mr. Angleton. I'm not stating that there is one, but I
have probably done more recruitment of higher level people in
my youth in the business and I have never been any respector
of rank. I've dealt with prime ministers, and I've dealt with
them at all levels.
And therefore, my point is it is conceivable, it's
conceivable if you've got enough information, spotting informa
tion, and you can put a person into a certain kind of situation
regardless of his rank, you will find that he is recruitable.
It is a process of a fingernail, finger, hand, arm and body.
Senator art of Colorado. But all of the grills that
new people of the Agency have to go through, lie detector and
so on, you're saying that they can get through that.
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Mr. Angleton.
I don't think anyone regards the lis
46
detector to be anything more than just another investigative
instrument. It does help in the sense that there are certain
people susceptible. They will in turn reveal something of their
past which they should have revealed, which, if you had
discovered independently, would have given you grounds to believe
they were penetration, but once the machine begins to find that
they're goggling on something, then they come out and then
"
say, well there's a story I haven't told you when I was in
Turkey, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and wipes the slate
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12
So it serves a useful purpose. But it's not
I
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wouldn't give it 20 percent credibility.
Now the Office of
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Security probably gives it 70 or maybe higher.
Mr. diGenova. Mr. Angleton, the point you made of the
lack of study of traffic which followed the deception in the
cable traffic, as I understand it, you're saying that there's
been no analysis that you're aware of since that time done of
of everything since then.
Mr. Angleton.
There's never been any analysis ever.
Mr. diGenova. Is the current research set-up which CI
staff now has which is oriented toward instant studies, quote
unquote, to provide data for ongoing operations inconsistent
with wanting to achieve that sort of goal, like analyzing that
data?
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Mr. Angleton.
Well, I don't know what that really means,
...
instant analysis. I mean we've always done instant analysis.
Mr. diGenova. I know that but it's our understanding,
we've learned from the Agency that there has been a movement
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away from in-depth historical research toward more current
sort of analyses.
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What you're suggesting to me by saying that there's
been no analysis done of those cables is that we've lost a
valuable CI tool since that study hasn't been done, and I'd
like to know if your assessment of the current trend toward
research is a bad one?
Mr. Angleton. I think it makes no sense whatsoever.
Mr. Miler. It's disastrous. It will lead to complete
chaos within a very short time because you're trying to analyse
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other cases to that case.
Mr.
diGenova. There's no integration in other words.
Mr. Miler. That's right and you cannot operate in a
vacuum.
Mr. Angleton. We have learned from one defector, the
one of December '61 a complete new understanding of what
happened from the days of Lenin.
That is not in the public record. A complete new
picture of the growth of the OGPU and of the Cheka. And in
the reorientation of KGB part of the deStalinization in May
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of 1959, it was a return to the modus operandi of the Cheka.
And this is from an individual, fully, who had seen all of the
documents, fully versed in it so that this plunged us back into
it and we began then to find leads. And I give one example.
General Orlov, who died not long ago in the United
States, was the most senior NKVD KGB officer ever to defect,
The Bureau had interrogated him in
6
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and he died last year.
8
1953 after the death of Stalin with little or no success.
lle
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knew the code name of Philby.
10
The Agency tried to contact him
in '58 and had a very unhappy handling problem.
We went back
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into it shortly thereafter and we were able to go through his
book with him and he gave us the true identities of 34 agents
13
in France.
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His uncle had been one of the senior men under Lenin,
a
head of NKVD in the Ukrain but with tremendous operations.
He himself was a senior NKVD man in Spain during the civil war. So
we spent up until his death, Mr. Rocco, who was my deputy,
would travel to the Midwest and spend several weekends with him
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of dredging out and recreating the operations and penetrations
in British intelligence and the British navy and whatnot,
eventually getting down, by recreating and reconstructing,
down to the identity.
Now this is research, and these are
cases where the Soviets had every reason to believe that those
agents were safe and secure because nothing had happened.
And when you make that type of identification unbeknownst
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to them, then it gives you tremendous leverage of how you want
to play it, whether you move in to take him on as a double
or whether you move in to arrest him.
And that isn't being done today.
Well, they can't do it because they don't have
Mr. diGenova.
Mr. Angleton.
6
Mr. Rocco and they have fired most of the personnel.
One of
"
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the best men we had was from the Library of Congress and
knowing where to find every piece of information. inthet govern-
ment has just been transferred to, or he's been released or
hired back on contract, and when they are putting him in the
Freedom of Information section as a contract agent.
And he has handled Ukrains, he's run agents, he speaks
Could you
Mr. Johnson. We are going down with a represent
of military intelligence later on this afternoon.
tell us about the coordination between military CI and CIA
CI especially in the area of double agentry.
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Mr. Angleton.
Then I will just say one thing and then
Scotty will speak authoritatively to it.
We all came out of the war and therefore we are very
strongly in favor of a very strong military counter-intelligence.
And therefore, we've always given them highest priority of our
time. We've done the original training of the OSI people.
We trained teachers who went out, who in turn trained
other people. That was a three months course, if I recall.
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1 We rean a seminar using the highest talent that we had and
revealing as much information as we could conceivably reveal.
2
3
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And so our whole mental attitude was that counter-intelli
gence, one of its highest priorities is the defense of its
5
6
own forces. And I'm not going to justify the mail program at
this time, but some day I'll justify it in print or otherwise
.7
because it represents only .001 percent of Americans
Qi G a
8
small coterie of Americans who wrote to the Soviets when we
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had troops in the field on two occasions, and our primary
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duty was the support of those troops.
So that background Scotty can tell you but the relationships
we've had with the military.
Mr. Miler. Well, the relationships with the counter-
intelligence with the military have varied. I would say that
for the most part it has been reasonably good, it has been
perhaps better in Washington than it has been in the field.
With few exceptions CIA field representatives have not been
terribly concerned with conducting counter-intelligence.
They
have not cooperated to the extent that the military commanders.
in the field have wanted.
Some of this has to do with priorities that are imposed
24
25
on the CIA representatives from Washington. Some of it has
to do with lack of manpower. Some of it has to do with the
fact that in the opinion of many of the CIA operatives, the
Ariny
in particular, to a lesser extent the other services,
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have not undertaken counter-intelligence activities which are
of a high enough level to justify the time and attention,
particularly of senior CIA representatives abroad.
It is, I think, also a bit of a problem because the
priorities of military counter-intelligence in many instances
do not parallel or support CIA's priorities. They have the
responsibility for the protection of their installations and
there have also been imposed on the military the requirement
to build assets, what we term double agents which the military
term controlled foreign assets, as a contingency for possible
deception use.
1
Traditionally, also, the CIA, and in recent years thin
has been quite true, the CIA field operatives have wanted to
exploit military counter-intelligence assets for what is
termod aggressive positive intelligence or recruitment attempts
of the enemy agent or officer who was controlling the double
agent of the controlled foreign asset.
There has been traditionally a problem of coordination
between the military services, the CIA, and the FBI on double
agent operations.
I think overall this has worked reasonably well, given
the fact that in particular, for example, the system of
chain of command in the Army is a very confused one and is not
easy to put your finger on. There are various echelons and
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reporting procedures and so forth.
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From the counter-intelligence staff standpoint, in
particular what I was concerned with was an attempt to make
sure that there was a full integration.
You see, under the
operating procedures and the responsibilities, the military
5 services are required to advise the CIA of its activities,
counter-intelligence and so forth abroad. In turn, they
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advise the FBI of their counter-intelligence activities and
so forth here in the United States.
So you have, when an activity here in the United States,
the individual involved, the double agant, the controlled
foreign asset transfers abroad, then there is a transfer of
coordination and vice versa.
Mr. Angleton. I'd like to inject this. There is
concurrent jurisdiction since the double is usually an American
citizen. So regardless of where he is, we would always persuade
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the Army or whoever it is, to notify the Bureau through their
own channel because you're dealing with Americans, so
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geography is not really the important element.
(
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Mr.
Miler.
From a counter-intelligence standpoint,
it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that
20
in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad.
There is
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a means of working together with the military services and
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the agencies of the potential for deception
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so forth in terms of notifying each of the services, each of
feeding and
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Mr. Johnson.
Does the CIA have veto powers over military
proposed double-agents?
Mr. Miler. No, not the veto power.
Mr. Angleton. Well, it never really comes up to a veto.
But if we took a stand against it and supplied reasoning that
made sense, they would go along the way that we wanted. We've
never had a head-on collision.
Mr. Miler. There would oftentimes be differences in the
field, that would be presented through the proper channels,
from our field station
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say from the Army back to the ACST
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to headquarters.
And then there would be a discussion and a
12
resolution at the Washington level.
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feelings and misunderstandings and so forth. But I think that
Now obviously, in any kind of a situation like that,
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there have been instances where, you know, there was bad
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overall, at least in my experience in the way we try to
conduct the business was that it was mutually beneficial.
Now the military services have complained to me because
I represented and a couple of my people represented the
Agency on double agents to the military services and so forth,
not as forthcoming in providing them information
about our possible assets and so forth as they were.
that we were
Their system was different. They had a clearinghouse
system where this was available and so forth. Our position
on it was that if we had a requirement, we would perhaps find
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a source or an asset in which to fulfill the requirement.
2 But for security and compartmentation reasons, not exclusively
15
3
due to the counter-intelligence concerns but also to the
4 general security and operations procedures of the Agency as
50
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a whole, there was a reluctance to put this information forward
except when and as needed.
-
Mr. Angleton. And there's another point that has to be
raised here. That is when you get into the field of deception
9
you are bound by certain charters. Those charters have not
10
been approved at the highest policy level. So there's been
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a great deal of tactical military cover and deception.
Our interest is more on the strategic deception, and
that paper has been resting with Dr. Kissinger for some 2 1/2
years or more for approval.
Mr. Miler.
Three.
15
Mr. Angleton.
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Three years.
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So that is bogged down a great deal of the whole overall
deception program.
Mr. Maxwell. The paper that is in front of Dr. Kissinger
now makes what deceptions?
Mr. Angleton. It was a paper that was pulled together
by the Joint Chiefs, ourselves, and the FBI.
Mr. Maxwell. And it proposes what?
Mr. Angleton. It outlines procedures for strategic
deceptions, political deception and other deception.
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Mr. Johnson. Could you give a brief example of the CIA
role in strategic deception, a specific example?
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Mr. Angleton.
No,
I can't. I mean I could get into
4
cases but it's too vague.
It's always been something that
5
has been arrived at ad hoc and it served the
purpose,
but I
6
wouldn't call it strategic.
7
Mr. Miler. No program, in other words.
8
Mr. Angleton.
In other words, the proper strategic decep-
9
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tion would be the President calls in the Directorvand says, no
one knows that in three months I'm going on the following trip.
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I will have meetings with the following people. I'm not
going to announce it until a week before I leave.
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So it gives you a time span of two months to use all of
your sources to put across disinformation or information, a
letter in the mailbox to the proper addressee that, you know,
favor his role or favor his mission and helps him out. And
that's what we are trying to seek and have been trying to seek
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for a long time. But there has to be a way of knowing what
are some of the intentions of the government in order to
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advance it through disinformation or deception.
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:lr.
Miler. With respect to the military, if I may
return to that, I think that one of the probably the greatest
difference and failure with respect to CIA counter-intelligence
relationships with the military was with respect to the
situation in Vietnam because CIA did not perform a counter-
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intelligence function of any responsibility or significance
in Vietnam. That was a tragic failure on the part of CIA
and it goes back to the basic problem of the present management,
to answer your earlier question, the present management because
the present management of the CIA was involved in the decisions
which prohibited a good counter-intelligence effort in Vietnam.
8
Mr. Shea. In that paper that is before Dr. Kissinger,
are there any proposed control mechanisms that would act as
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a filter so that the misinformation in a sense could not flow
back into the policy circles within the United States?
Mr. Angleton. Well, there wouldn't be. The kind of
channels used, there wouldn't be any of that happening.
would be information given to an agent who was reporting,
say to the KGB back, say it would never hit the light of day.
Mr. Shea. So the process of misinformation as it
normally relates to the intelligence field is totally separate
in terms of the active process of misinformation as it goes
on in counter-intelligence?
This
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Mr. Angleton. We are not dealing in overt.
There may
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be some overt things put out that support a document that was
given to a double who would pass it to KGB.
But if the man
is regarded to be an agent of the KGB, the KGB is not going to
publicize that document without having blown the alleged agent.
Mr. Shea. But they could work on it in their process
of disinformation to come back, and you would be caught.
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Mr. Miler. No.
'
a means of monitoring.
To be successful you would have to have
You would have to have your penetration
3 of, you would have to have your own litmus to see where it
4 is played back or what reflections or what requirements are
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put on other double agents on the basis of the information from
this agent.
That requires a centralized screening and control of
double agents.
Mr. Angleton. If you sent the information through. Agent N
to KGB headquarters in Moscow, part of your testing would be to see
whether your other double agents received questionnaires
which you knew related to that document.
Mr. Shea. But it seems like in order to make strategic
misinformation functional, you would have to have the same
requirements that you had when you were talking about having
namely, somebody in a superior point of
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a double agent:
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information penetrated into that organization to make sure
that they are getting that information you're sending out
is misinformation.
Mr. Miler. Not necessarily.
Mr. Angleton.
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It's not quite the same.
Mr. Miler. It's not quite that simple because you could
see reflections of it perhaps in other areas in political
actions, in failure to act.
Mr. Angleton.
There are other ways of doing it.
You
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1 can go to a diplomat who has a weak cipher system and you
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yourself can tell that diplomat in great confidence a whole
You know the Soviets are going to break the
series of things.
code and read that message.
That would be one way of doing it. There are other ways
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of having, telling a friendly foreign service. whom
you
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know
is penetrated.
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task,
I mean it's all case by case. But once you are given the
that's when you begin to look at all of your assets and
you begin to do the creative side of running a double, or how
are you going to put this across. And there are many ways of
doing it without bringing many people in.
Mr. diGenova. I'd like to change the subject matter just
briefly.
Part of the responsibility of the CI research personnel
is to produce reports on various subjects which include current
analyses on proprietary companies used by foreign intelligence
services.
I would like to know whether or not either of you could
shed any light on the question of whether or not we have any
evidence that foreign intelligence services have established
and used proprietary companies in the United States?
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Mr. Angleton. Well, there's one case that comes to mind.
I can't remember the details but I think that as a result of
it, one of our deputy directors had a big project with this
company and they dropped it because the Foreign Intelligence
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Service had quite a penetration into it.
Mr.
diGenova. Would that be the only instance of which
you are familiar that there was in fact knowledge of an operating
proprietary company run by a foreign intelligence service
within the continental United States?
Mr. Angleton. Offhand I can't say because the Office of
Security would be working with the Bureau, usually.
I mean to
8
say that S&T are the most likely people to have contracts with
9
a number of contractors and companies. It would be Office
10
of Security's job.
11
Mr. diGenova.
Maybe I'm not making my point clear. I
12
just thought that maybe in the course of your counter-intelligence
13 function you may have discovered by whatever means that there
14
was in fact such a company operating in the United States
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which was being used, not to contract with the Agency but to
contract or just do anything, whether it was a bookkeeping
firm or a law firm or anything, and was in fact engaged in
espionage.
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Mr. Miler. Well, we've had a number in the past. We've
had a number of leads which were to the effect that Soviet
intelligence money was in such and such a company, or something
such as that. That was turned over to the FBI. And whether
or not we ever heard anything hack or did anything further on
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which we could pursue abroad or something, I'm a little bit
confused by the question because it's outside the investigation
of such a thing is outside the purview of the CIA unless it is
abroad, unless it would be funded through Switzerland or Luxem-
bourg or unless there was a Messagerie Maritime connection where
Soviet money was being put in and they had representation here.
Mr. diGenova. Well, the staff has been given information
that these analyses are done by CI research personnel or
proprietary companies of foreign intelligence services, and
either that information is wrong or we just do not understand
each other.
Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean it's true that there have
been analyses done. But the one that comes to mind is the
one I mentioned, was the one where in this case it was French,
15 had a heavy penetration of a company and that company was
contracting with our STT people and therefore, our question
was rather a project for large sums of money of using this
company would proceed, and the decision based on
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intelligence analyses was to drop the project.
our counter-
Hr. iGenova. I'd like to ask the question.
We've been told that one of the benefits which occurs
to U.S. counter-intelligence when it focuses on bloc
countrie
is the fact that these totalitarian regimes have a habit of
acquiring great amounts of information about their citizenry
and storing it, and that this is, on occasion, accessible to s
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and makes them somewhat vulnerable as a result of that.
Turning the coin around a little bit and looking at our-
selves, are the computerized systems which we now have in our
country which put in a central location large amounts of
information about individual citizens and large groups of
citizens, making us vulnerable to penetration in terms of
information, more vulnerable in terms of penetration by
foreign counter-intelligence services?
Mr. Angleton. Vulnerable in what sense?
Mr. diGenova. Getting information about us, period,
which I understand is one of the key goals of counter-intelligence,
finding out what the other side is doing.
Mr. Angleton. You mean surreptitiously getting it from
us or officially getting it from us?
Mr. diGenova. Both. The fact of the matter is the
information exists and it's vulnerable for them to have it,
is it vulnerable for us to have it?
Mr. Angleton. Well, I wouldn't put it down as vulnerable
19 because when anyone makes a request on you for information,
the first question is why. So the burden is on them to justify
that they have a counter-espionage reason for asking for that
And in the bulk of the cases you'll find that the
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information.
are doing your work for you.
In other words, they've come across a telephone tap of
some American who's arrived, he's made a call to the Bulgarian
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embassy and it looks as though: there's a meeting being set up,
so immediately you get a flash. And they ask that service for
traces on the individual and you come back with the why, i
and they tell you about the entire Bulgarian business.
And
so we start an investigation as to Bulgarian antecedents or
anything dealing with Bulgaria, et cetera. And if it's
justified, we give them the information.
Mr. diGenova. Well, I don't think, Mr. Angleton, that's
not what I'm getting at.
We as a country are amassing properly, quote, unquote,
large amounts of information about ourselves through the use
of computer systems.
Mr. Angleton.
That's right.
Mr. diGenova. The CIA tells us that that is one of the
things they like so much about foreign countries, because the
totalitarian regimes have the tendency to amass large amounts
of information about their citizenry and when we penetrate
and get that information, that helps us.
My question is when we do that, when we centralize the
information by using our own computer systems, no matter where
it is, do we help them?
And in this regard I would note that in 1970 the Inspector
23 General's report on the question of cover noted that the fact
that credit bureaus in this country were amassing so much
information about people, including CIA personnel, that it
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posed a major threat to maintain cover, both in the United
States and abroad for CIA agents.
Now the question I raise is are we cutting off our nose
to spite our face by using computers to really marshall together
large amounts of evidence which can be made accessible to
foreign powers either by surreptitiously or by simply openly
7
getting it?
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Mr. Miler. Yes, the answer is yes.
9
Mr. diGenova.
10
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Good.
Mr. Miler. Because it's very easy to get this information.
11 And, for example, the Soviets have had, you can confirm this
12 from the Bureau, have had a systematic system of purchasing
from the State of Maryland, the District of Columbia, the
State of Virginia, the business directories, residence
directories, license directories for less than $350 apiece.
Mr. Johnson. If we're going to keep on our schedule,
we've got a witness who's supposed to be here at 3:30, so
is there a final question?
19
Mr. Kirbow. I have two questions.
Because of the
20
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vast years of experience, Mr. Chairman, that we should ask
them to comment on, and either one of you all should answer.
22
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What do you all consider today to be the major threats
to this country? And the second question is, what has been
the major foreign covert action program directed against this
25
country in your lifetime and experience in the Agency?
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Mr. Angleton. Well, I think, no question, it's the
2 Soviet bloc services that represent the major threat because
3 they are really a small, they are directly subordinated to the
4 central committee and to the basic objectives, as I've seen them
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all my life to the change and balance of military power.
Further, that practically all intelligence operations more
and more have political objectives, and I think it is the fact
that since '59 they have elevated the Cuban intelligence and
all of the other bloc services to a very high degree of
efficiency, that they are coordinated and they work as equals.
And I think that is the major threat, that is the
inability of the FBI by lack of personnel and manpower to be
able to cover these people. There isn't the minimal coverage.
The people they cover are people who have been "identified,"
and I defy anyone to have a list of identified agents in this
country.
Now that is the legal side of it. Now the larger part
18 of it is the illegal, where there's been little or no success.
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The only one that has really come out is the Abel case, which
Hayharpn
we handled through Hahannan. And then there was one or two
minor ones.
But that is a whole program of bloc activity, and
23 according to one of the best sources we had, his view was that
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the illegals would be placed primarily in airports, docks,
factories, and they give a whole listing. And these are the
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areas where you have sabotage, you have explosions you can't
identify, et cetera.
Now the illegal directorate represents a very major part
of Soviet intelligence and bloc intelligence and we just
there are not successes. It's just happenstance.
Mr. Epstein. It's disruption of our defense effort?
Is that what you're speaking of now? Their goal being
disruption of this country's defense effort?
Mr. Angleton. Well, they have many assignments.
But
the point is they have also the sabotage-assassination part,
which is totally apart from the body politic of the KGB, and
it raises questions in everybody's mind when there is sabotage
and all other kinds of activities and you cannot find the
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culprits.
One defector stated that he believed that the computer
fire they had in the Pentagon several years ago was KGB. He
But he stated in effect that he thought that was
one of their operations.
Scotty?
Mr. Miler. The major threat to the U.S., I think, is
based on the fact, as we referred to earlier, as this should
affect counter-intelligence, the national counter-intelligence
effort, is to have your national counter-intelligence focusal
on the fact that the Soviets and the Soviet blocs, since May
of 1959 have rededicated themselves to the principles of
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Leninism.
20
They have rededicated themselves to the shift in
the military balance of power. They have reinstituted, in
3 effect, what was the policy of the NEP period, the New Economic
4
5
6
Policy, the attraction of Western business, the attraction of
Western capital into the Soviet Union to bolster the Soviet
Union, the disruption of the economies of other nations, which
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would have an adverse effect on the economy of this nation
all of this centrally controlled and directed, used through
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such countries as Romania, where we have for several years now
deluded ourselves that Romania is independent, through Bulgaria,|
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through Hungary, through Poland, all the rest of it.
This is the major threat to the United States.
intelligence is probably, in my view, at least, one of the
major ways that you're going to be able to counter this and
at least get the information brought to the attention of the
people who are making the decisions and making the policy
for this country.
Mr. Epstein. Has our penetration effort been good enough
to establish whether or not the Soviet Union has been involved
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in direct covert action against the United States, such as
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to undermine our economy, not using other countries but
directly?
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Mr. Angleton.
There's been a tremendous amount of
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information on this. I mean, for example today the second
head of the Chamber of Commerce in Moscow is General Pitovranov.
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Prior, he was Deputy Chief of the NKVD. He was the resident.
KGB resident in Peking. He's the one who with Mao set up the
underground that took over China. He was the head of Karlshorst,
4 the largest KGB in Germany. He operated people like George
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Blake. le organized the kidnapping of Otto John, the head
of Security, West Germany.
Ile has now been placed as the Deputy Chief, or Deputy
Chairman, of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce, the same role that
DZHERDHINSIY
Lenin had Derjensky in the NEP. That is the role to he
able to deal with Western capitalists with the view of abroad
recruitments and with the view of using them as agents of
influence.
Now there's a tremendous amount of data. Now this is
what I'm trying to say, that counter-intelligence has always
been kept at a very low level as far as its ability to submit
such studies or whatnot to the National Security Council or to
a forum where they are debated. But they happen to be the
only hard intelligence because they are coming from men who
were 16 years in this one case, a part of that mechanism and
who read all the files.
Mr. Epstein. What happens to all that?
Mr. Angleton. Well, that's been used by directors in
briefings but there's never yet been a forum where you can
24 actually have a confrontation with people who hold contrary
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Mr. Miler. In other words, how significant is the fact
2 then, how significant would it be if our Congress, our Executive,
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and our business people knew that as of 1974 the last figures
4 I have of 187 Soviets identified with the USSR all union
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chamber of commerce, the people that are doing all of the
business with our businessmen who are coming here to the United
States, work them and so forth, when 47 of those were appointed
to that from the KGB.
I mean, what significance does this have to the United
Senator Schweiker. 47 out of how many?
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States?
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པ་
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Miler. About 182.
Mr. Angleton. Let's go to the scientific side on this.
The scientific side, in May of 1969 the central committee
15 ordered that there be added 2,000 staff officers to KGB from
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the Academy of Sciences in order to exploit the opening to the
West and the scientific levels.
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Mr. Epstein.
And how would that exploitation be
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Mr. Angleton.
For recruitment and exploitation of
contacts in the West in the scientific exchanges.
Mr. Epstein. The goal being espionage or something else?
Mr. Angleton. Espionage.
Mr. Miler. Espionage and influence. How many KGB
25 officers?
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Mr. Angleton.
2 together.
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In 1961, 1000 of those had been pulled
There was a briefing given by the general staff to
high KGB people regarding the field of military electronics,
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and during that briefing it was pointed out that they were 14
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years behind us, but they would overcome and surpass us through:
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three means:
Number one was the Central Committee adding the
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2,000 staff officers for espionage;
Second would be disinfor-
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mation leading our scientific efforts in the wrong directions;
And third was to enter into those kind of treaties which would
bind our own scientific progress in military fields.
When I left the Agency, I read a report by a man who
12 knew nothing of this lecture, and this was a group of American
electronic experts who had made a very sensitive, Top Secret
study which stated that in this field the Soviets were four
years behind us.
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This was in 1974.
Mr. Epstein. A final question. In the last 10 or 15
years have you experienced any situations where any hostile
powers were involved in covert action against the election
20 process in this country?
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Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there's no question that
22 influence has been brought to hear.
Ilow?
Mr. Epstein. Meaning what?
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Mr. Inderfurth.
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Mr. Angleton.
Propaganda, among other things.
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For example, one of the most famous of the disinformation
agents, I mean they had established contact at political levels
in this country.
Mr. Epstein. Now about campaign financing?
Mr. Angleton. I don't think it figures unless it would
be the CP.
But just to add one last point to this question of the
threat, it is my view, seeing Angola and seeing the unwilling-
ness of this country to resist or to define its purpose, or
to deal fairly with its allies, that within a period of four
years there will be a form of confrontation on an unpopular
issue between the Soviet bloc and the United States in which
we will back down. We will then go into our supreme isolation,
because in December of '61, when this Soviet defected and he
had read the political action programs, he spelled out in
detail that one of the primary purposes of the reorientations
was that all intelligence operations or political objectives,
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States as the main enemy, to achieve its isolation and to achieve
political hegemony over most of Africa and Latin America.
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He pointed out that the two largest and newest divisions
created in KGB were Africa and Latin America.
Now this was not speculative. This was reading actual
documents of a Top Secret nature in which you had to have a
communications intelligence clearance to even have access
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them, and I think what he has spelled out, and I might add that
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when I took him to many: countries we talked on higher levels
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than we could talk in the United States. And I took him to
some countries that we could talk to Prime Ministers. I have
seen Prime Ministers and have been able to expose this. But
the machinery here is not of such a nature that you can get
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into these matters.
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Mr. Epstein. Are they disseminated?
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Mr. Angleton. We're not going to disseminate. These
are matters that should go to the Secretary of State.
They
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shouldn't he going up, through people because many of the
secrets are within that.
Mr. Epstein. Do they go to the Secretary of State?
Mr. Angleton. No.
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Mr. Epstein. Why not?
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Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Secretary of State has
ever been much interested in asking for opinions. On Romania
we sent something to the President prior to our trip.
Mr. Epstein. But the documents you're talking about,
the Top Secret documents
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Mr. Angleton. We don't have the document.
I'm stating
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he read those documents in Moscow.
Mr. Epstein. But the report that he read, Was that
disseminated?
Mr. Angleton. I don't know. It went to the Director and
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it went to many other people.
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But whether it actually got to
the Secretary of State, I do not know.
Mr. Miler. I think one important point here that I
would like to make is that what has happened, in my opinion
what has happened in counter-intelligence in the Agency and
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the so-called aggressive operations, the increase in double
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agent operations and so forth and the dispersal of the centralized
counter-intelligence is not going to produce a counter-
intelligence program within the CIA which is going to focus
on attempting to provide the government, policy-makers and
so forth, with the kind of information and analytical product
that is necessary if we're going to have a successful counter-
intelligence.
Mr. Johnson. I would like to thank the witnesses, and
unless Senator Schweiker has any questions, we will adjourn
for five minutes.
Is that acceptable?
Thank you very much.
Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 4:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the
21 above-mentioned matter was concluded.)
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