File #:
66-MM-3346
Serial Scope:
1-17, 19-27, 30-32
NW-88608-Deeld:32989820-Page-1-
Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025
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Date
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Per nettles instructions &
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INDICES
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NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 3
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NW 88608- Docid:32989820 Page 4
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(Copies to Offices Checke
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TO: S:
☐ Albany
0000000
Houston
Albuquerque ☐ Indianapolis
Alexandria
Anchorage
Atlanta
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Rutte
Charlotte
Jackson
] Jacksonville
Kausas City
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Miami
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RE:
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TO LEGAT:
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house
Date 12/30/75
as Directors appearance before
subcommittee on appropriations fiscal
DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE" SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
DECEMBER 10, 1975
year 1977.
(2/76)
66-3242
Retention
For information 7 optional
For appropriate
action
Surep, by
conceal all
The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,
sources, paraphrase contents.
Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA
dated
Remorks:
ReButel to all SACS and Legats, 12/10/75.
Enclosed for each Office and Legat is
one copy of the transcript of questions which
were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance,
along with Mr. Kelley's answers to those questions.
Enc. (1)
SEARCHED
¡SERIALIZED.
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INDEXED
FILED
JAN 2 19/0
Bufile
Urfile
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 5
:
•Copy 5
Vol. 20
The United States Senate
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 6
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION
Wednesday, December 10, 1975
Washington, D. C.
tate
SEARCHED.
SERIALIZED.
INDEXED.
FILED.
JAN 2 1970
FBI-MIAI
WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
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STATEMENT OF:
CONTENT
כאן
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The Honorable Clarence M.
Kelley,
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Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve-
stigation
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INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION
Wednesday, December 10, 1975
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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10
o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,
the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)
presiding.
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Mathias.
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Also present:
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Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,
Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and
William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick
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A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority
Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick
Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles
Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob
Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,
Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.
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The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is
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the Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, the Director of the Federal
2 Bureau of Investigation.
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Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a
troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative
law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City
Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as
a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified
to lead the Bureau.
The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation
extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over
the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the
openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and
their willingness to consider the need for legislation to
clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.
It is important to remember from the outset that this
Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's
activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic
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admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative
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and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance
of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic
intelligence has raised many difficult questions.
The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather
than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light
in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director
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Kelley took charge.
The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director
Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous
policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The
FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-
gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.
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The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in
developing policies and standards for intelligence.
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are welcome developments.
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Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.
Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the
Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress
should take into account in thinking about the future of
FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-
lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons
likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be
outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain
types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;
whether foreign related intelligence activities should be
strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement
functions, and what should be done to the information already
in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in
the future.
The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange
of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney
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General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice
2 Department in the next months as the Committee considers
recommendations that will strengthen the American people's
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confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal
law and for the security of the nation against foreign
espionage.
Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if
you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off
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with, please proceed.
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כאן
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and
gentlemen.
I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in
the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-
gence and internal security fields.
I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my
35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-
tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs
of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with
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law.
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I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative
oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of
the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary
Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of
that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.
This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study
of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been
undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present
Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest
cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as
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requests.
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I believe we have lived up to those promises.
The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-
dented access to FBI information.
You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type
investigations and who are personally involved in every facet
of our day-to-day intelligence operations.
You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who
have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with
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all major areas of our activities and operations in the national
security and intelligence fields.
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In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these
matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the
Congress.
As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of
necessity, forcused largely on certain errors and abuses. I
credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the
hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's
record of performance.
It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus
on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the
organization.
The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the
lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted
an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.
A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year
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to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence
Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found
3 3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI
Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,
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less than three fourths, were approved.
I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were
being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era
when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative
matters per year.
Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed
regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate
and understandable.
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What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is
that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they
felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,
the Congress, and the people of the United States.
The question might well be asked what I had in mind when
I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it
did under the circumstances then existing would have been an
abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..
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Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and
buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige
to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and
killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such
acts of violence from New England to California.
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The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,
and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or
perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and
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agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their
rights.
There were many calls for action from Members of Congress
and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other
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law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient
demands, for immediate action.
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FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a
responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions
designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed
revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.
In the development and execution of these programs,
mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.
Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-
intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones,
should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.
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We must recognize that situations have occurred in the
past and will arise in the future where the Government may well
be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's
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agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet
an imminent threat to human life or property.
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In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried
out now,
can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating
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4 ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is
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a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to
human life.
Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,
the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such
preventive action should be available to the FBI.
These matters are currently being addressed by a task
force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,
and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can
be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress
to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible
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manner.
Probably the most important. question here today is what
assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose
under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?
First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-
stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's
methods of operations since I took the oath of office as
Director on July 9, 1973.
Today we place a high premium on openness, openness
both within and without the service.
I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion
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program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a
full and critical review of its propriėty.
Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.
I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and
Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of
position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts
and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or
reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.
The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take
full responsibility for them. 'My goal is to achieve maximum
critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner
weakening or undermining our basic command structure.
The results of this program have been most beneficial, to
me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to
the morale of our employees.
In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past
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were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside
the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's
guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his
own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests.
Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi
instructed that I immediately report to him any requests
or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,
considering the context of the request, I believed presented
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the appearances of impropriety.
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I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the
Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as
4 Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no
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one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,
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to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper
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purposes.
I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider
honoring any such request.
I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI
I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and
the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including
those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and
These are discussed openly and candidly in order
practices.
that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities
over the FBI.
I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today
is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity
can be assured only through institutional means..
Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the
character of the person who occupies the office of the
Director and every member of the FBI under him.
I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is
my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,
their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally
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demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the
nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct
at all times by the FBI.
The Congress and the members of this Committee in
particular have gained a great insight into the problems
confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,
problems which all too often we have left to resolve without
sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress
itself.
As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been
made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our
failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even
to the Executive Branch.
The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for
FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.
An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the
Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI
Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully
committed to maximum participation with the members of that
Subcommittee.
I laud their efforts.
However, those efforts are of very
recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.
One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee
has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex
problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that
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those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step,
a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative
charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence
jurisdiction for the FBI.
Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the
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security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it
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must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress
nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to
the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in
the past.
This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role
not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of
our performance.
I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the
courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that
have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role
of the courts into the early stages of the investigative
process and, thereby, would take over what historically have
been Executive Branch decisions.
I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would
seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast
them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our
Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con-
24 gressional oversight or Executive decision.
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The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination
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of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field,`á jurisdictional
statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both
the will and the needs of the American people.
Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a
career police officer. In my police experience, the must
frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing
law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is
when demands are made of them to perform their traditional
role as protector of life and property without clear and
understandable legal bases to do so.
I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative
charter will be a most precise and demanding task.
It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle
the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence
of crime and violence across the United States. That charter
must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;
yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and
so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive
challenges.
The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced
the formulation of operational guidelines governing our
intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need
for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-
diction resides with the Congress.
In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which
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acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.
As a practical matter, the line between intelligence
work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult
to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may
well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there
are some fundamental differences between these investigations
that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective
and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a
crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to
identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence
Since the investigation normally follows
for prosecution.
the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is
limited and fairly well defined.
By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of
information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be
not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the
Government has enough information to meet any future crisis
or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it
21 must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether
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the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the
means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability
of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on
our anticipation of those criminal acts.
Anticipation,
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in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-
gence.
Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.
4 Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need
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for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction
of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not
the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every
citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution
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of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful
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deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the
complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or
its successors in this important task.
In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as
Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit
of such legislation as the Congress may enact.
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That is the substance of my prepared statement.
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I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note
that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary
Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented
to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time
I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result
in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.
I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that
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time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of
I don't take
the FBI to discharge those responsibilities.
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them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I
have pledged myself to do what is good and proper.
I say this
not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might
4 place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek
sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the
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period these things occurred I was with the local police
Prior to that time,
department in Kansas City, Missouri.
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however, I was in the FBI.
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During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I
was with the police department, I continued throughout that
period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for
the FBI.
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I only want to point out that based on those years, based
on those observations, we have here a very fine and very
sensitive and a very capable organization.
is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without
I feel that there
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fault. I know that from those experiences I have had. We
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will not be completely without fault in the future. But I
assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any
mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at
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this is good and proper, and we do not intend I only want
to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a
matchless organization, one which I continue to say was
not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of
them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the
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best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney.
I am
only putting in your thinking my objective observations as
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It is too precious for us to have it in
a condition of jeopardy.
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The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.
I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able
to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one
question he would like to ask.
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Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.
Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be
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reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and
it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the
top of 11.
There you are indicating that you caution us about
extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations
suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplated
for the courts under the Constutution.
Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national
security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions
and concern has been on the possibility requiring court
approval for the use of informants, informants directed to
penetrate and report on some group.
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And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,
pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive
type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device.
It's
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really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy
than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He
can ask me questions to get information the government would
like to have.
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Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the
wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters
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of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate
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screen use of certain investigative techniques.. And the
3 informant is such a technique.
He functions sort of like a
4 general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval
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my feelings.
Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the
informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.
the concept of the informant,
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And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to
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It has of course been approved,
by numerous court decisions.
Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use
of the informant.
I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.
You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have
basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection
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You have within
the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary
circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and
seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none-
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I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,
we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our
job.
Now I'm not arguing with you, Senator, that it is not an
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I'm not even going to say that it is not
an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think
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We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that
are attendant. We take great care.
Now you say about the court having possibility taking
jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we
could present the matter to the court but what are they going
to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to
have to follow it all the way through?
Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts.
Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court
given for each contact?
of it.
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There are a great many problems insofar as administration
I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my
I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over
the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are
going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this
is going to happen no matter what you do.
Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your
reaction.
was not suggesting that there is consideration here to
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hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as
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you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a
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warranted by the particular circumstance.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
But I do understand
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.
(Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)
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The Chairman.
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Senator Baker, do you have questions?
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your
organization and I personally regret that the organization is
in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that
it is, along with other agencies and departments of the
government.
I think you probably would agree with me that even though
that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects
unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives
us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,
at least, to improve the level of competency and service of
the government itself.
With that hopeful note, would you be agreeable then to
volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve
the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or
indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,
to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and
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beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on
how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents,
the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its
essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to
see that these functions, these delicate functions are being
undertaken properly?
And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things
I am concerned about.
It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not
even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe
you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the
direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an
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United States. I think that is a movement in the right
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additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision
and scrutiny by us.
At the same time I rather doubt that we can become
involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney
General.
Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General
needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the
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I would appreciate any comments on that.
Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the
intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so
that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a
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look at these decisions and the process by which they were
made to decide that you are or you are not performing your
services diligently.
I don't think you can have oversight unless you have
access to records, and in many cases records don't exist
and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now
departed and in other cases you have conflicts.
How would you suggest then that you improve the quality
of service of your agency? How would you propose that you
increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the
11 United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving
the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that
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is required?
Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering
this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling
what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,
one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very
important is that the position of Director, the one to which
great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will
properly acquit himself.
I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going
over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most
necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means
of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency
25 toward consulting with other members of the official family,
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that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with
no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very
carefully.
I think further that he should be responsible for those
matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.
Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who
does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for
the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,
for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?`
Who does the executive of the FBI, the Director of the
FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?
Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,
but I think this is such an important field of influence that
it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the
judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the
Attorney General.
Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea
of the President of the United States calling the Director of
the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?
Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that
the relationship between the FBI Director and the President
is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited
through the Attorney General?
Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority
of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There
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has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if
2 the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he
3 may do so, call him directly.
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It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter
report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I
have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this
was revealed in full to them.
Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that
says the President has to go through the Attorney General,
although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.
But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary
for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the
Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least
some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of
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the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?
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Do you think that these things need to be handled in
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Mr. Kelley.
Personally, it would be my practice in
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the event I receive such an order, to request that it be
documented. This is a protection as well as a clarification
as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation.
I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-
tion.
I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it
can be worked very easily.
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Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I
2 believe, has already established some sort of agency or
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function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,
I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,
including the FBI.
Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has
taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of
Professional Responsibility.
Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.
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Senator Baker.
Do you have any comment on that? Will
as to whether you think that
you give us any observations
will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or
helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your
relationship to it in the future?
Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some
extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the
Attorney General.
Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it
completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely
subscribe.
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Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that
concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector
General who is involved with an oversight of all of the
agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally
protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care
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to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?
Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.
Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about
it and let us know what you think about it?
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Mr. Kelley. I will..
Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very
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The Chairman.
Senator Huddleston.
Senator Huddleston.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that
existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during
this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the
Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them
by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and
the people of the United States.
Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction
there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the
country because of certain circumstances rather than any
clear and specific direct instructions that might have been
received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,
is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,
to provide for that kind of specific instruction?
Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can
logically be incorporated and that
Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing
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danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the
attitudes may be at a specific time in this country because
Mr. Kelley.
Senator, I don't contemplate it might be
a continuing danger, but it certainly would be. a very acceptable
guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems
to arise, know what we can do.
Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which
Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can
provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the
court in determining what action might be proper and specific -
ally in protecting individual's rights, can't we also
provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various
techniques that might be used?
For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as
has already been done, that informants are necessary and
desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the
proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual
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Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must
be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure
that there is no infringement of rights.
Senator Huddleston. But this is an aware we've gotten
into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the
particular action was necessary, that there was a present
threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but
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in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been
necessary to have addressed the original threat.
How do we keep within the proper balance there?
Mr. Kelley.
Well, .actually, it's just about like any
other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's
right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.
There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.
This is one which I think might flow if he counsels
the informant.
Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,
I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is
still supervisory control over that agent and over that
informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing
basis.
Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point
as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be
17 very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone
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else.
If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do
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whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported
by the FBI.
Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to
our attention should either be handled by us or the proper
authority.
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past.
Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the
Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring
to but I would think your statement is proper.
Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence
of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that
have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to
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the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide
light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies:
The question that I'm really concerned about is as
we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give
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range of threats, how do we control what happens within each
of those actions to keep them from going beyond what
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Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.
Senator Huddleston.
Not only informants but the agents
3 themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever
intelligence gathering techniques.
The original thrust of my question was, even though we
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might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation
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Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's
germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed
out that the association to, the relationship between the
informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,
and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-
lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here
because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.
Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others
which may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of
violations of the law on the part of informants, and either
prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the
United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.
We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar
as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the
Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and
if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would
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pursue it to the point of prosecution.
Senator Huddleston.
But it could be helped by periodic
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Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the
activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection
Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well
as other matters.
Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed out the
difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in
gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.
Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to
attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the
departments, for instance, with not having a mixing of
gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques
definable and different?:
Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I
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see no objection to the way that they are now being handled
on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fatt, it is
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a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as
it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.
Now, another area, the FBI furnishes
Senator Huddleston.
information to numerous government agencies.
Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present
time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for
information, what kind of information they can ask for, and
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who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him
to do specific things?
Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether
or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such
project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?
Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must
come from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,
wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with
a letter so requesting.
This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as
has been placed very vividly in our minds, in
take care that you just don't follow the request of some
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I think it
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underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.
Just one more question about
Senator Huddleston.
techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad
projects undertaken.
Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional
oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department,
with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have
some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent
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with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent
with the very protections?
Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to the
oversight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now
see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of
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probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put
on the use of that information once it has been supplied by
the FBI?
+
Mr. Kelley.
I think so,
Senator.
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Senator Huddleston.
You think there are proper restrictions
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now?
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Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge
in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason
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for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a
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very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're
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that at least to us we are satisfied.
Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information
your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment
of the rights of any individuals.
Mr. Kelley.
Senator, I'm only confident in what I
do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.
Senator Huddleston.
I was wondering whether some
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inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to
who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed
on what the request, and what they can do with it after they
get it.
Mr. Kelley. Yes.
Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact
that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just
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bound to gather a great deal of information about some
individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-
gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarras-
sing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any
effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's
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file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific
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purpose unrelated to this information.
Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to
doing that?
Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the
guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which
is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-
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Senator Huddleston.
And how about the length of time
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that these files are kept in the agency?
too.
Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,
Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.
Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to
speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the
President of the United States from calling up the head of
the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement
problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction
to the agency.
But how about that? What about White House personnel
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informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our
present activities. I think this is the only way that we can
exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to
accomplish and what I want to accomplish.
Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect
of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad
direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects
that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such
things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence
is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this
type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap
again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction
and total permission to move in a certain direction and go
beyond what is intended or what was authorized.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.
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The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?
Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI
18 electronic surveillance of Dr. King, several tapes of
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specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were
produced.
Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?
Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.
Senator Goldwater.
Have they been reviewed by you?
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Mr. Kelley. No, sir.
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Senator Goldwater.
Have they been reviewed by any of your
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staff, to your knowledge?
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Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.
I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of
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There has been no review of them
since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.
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Senator Goldwater.
Would these tapes be available to
the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear
them?
Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is
of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to
be a discussion of this in an executive session.
The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the
Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and
decided that it would compound the original error for the
staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still
further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from
insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was
unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at
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the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,
and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to
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what we needed to know about the King case.
So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue
never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information
before the Senator.
Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of
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ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase
or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am
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not advocating it, I am merely asking a question. They would
be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and
decided on it.
Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-
diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the
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Senator Goldwater. I see.
Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance
routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a
target of inquiry?
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Attorney General.
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Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.
Senator Goldwater.
Mr. Kelley. Yes,
Ten years.
sir.
Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any,
to the Bureau of retaining such information?
Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a
destruction or erasure,we will abide by it. We will, on those
occasions where we think that matters might come up within
that period of time which may need the retention of them, we
will express our opinion at that time, but other than that
we would be guided by guidelines.
Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate
law enforcement needs should outweigh privacy considerations
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the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials
3 when the investigation purposes for which they were collected
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have been served?
Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close
look at the retention of material, and we would of course like
Thank you, Senator.
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to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.
8
Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank
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you very much.
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The Chairman.
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Senator Mondale?
Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the
most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the
invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,
limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can
and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,
and the question is, where should that line be drawn?
As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and
Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at
criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we
go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political
ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.
Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to
draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are
restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of
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crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather
than to leave this very difficult to define and control area
of political ideas?
Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last
statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that
I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue
in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory
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objective.
These are conclusions, of course, which are based
on statutes in the so-called security field, national or
foreign.
These are criminal violations. I feel that they should
be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this
atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have
more personnel working together, covering the same fields..
I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence
matters, because it is a concomitant.
It naturally flows
from the investigation of the security matters and the
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criminal.
Senator Mondale.
Mr. Kelley, what Mr. Stone said was
this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned
with political or other opinions of individuals. It is
concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws
of the United States. When the police system goes beyond
these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of
justice and human liberty.
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Do you object to that definition?
Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more
sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's
area of concern some matters which were probably not as important
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Senator Mondale.
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at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in
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touch with the security investigations and the gathering of
intelligence is something which has proved to be at times
troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable,
productive procedure.
I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely
of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today:
You see, I think you recognize, if
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that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that
at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in
fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't
see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in
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the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of
meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one
you've just defined.
If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate
ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's
security, particularly in the light of the record that we have
seen how that definition can be stretched to include practi-
cally everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders,
war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed
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that would provide any basis for oversight?
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How can you, from among other things, be protected from
criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't
do something that some politician tried to pressure you into
doing?
Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years
from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be
criticized for doing that which today is construed as very
acceptable.
Senator Mondale.
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for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.
Mr. Kelley. And the Director.
Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is
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why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines
as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured
to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20
hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say
well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-
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Don't you fear that?
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 50
ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by
the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me
that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's
possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to
be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what
you should have done.

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Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a
great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have
come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact
that I think that we have a different type of spirit today
in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,
that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they
are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact
that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the
organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we
had years ago.
I think there is a greater understanding in
the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.
We may not be able to project this on all occasions,
because we must equate this with the need and with our
experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're
going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a
flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those
guidelines.
Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think
there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified
law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I
think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,
from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of
enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you
are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you
get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the
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great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably
going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no
matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get
into trouble.
Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost
every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter
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of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate
from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is
less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working
with you we can at least make some achievements that will be
significant.
Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I
think we've made a good start.
Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August
9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure
16
of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.
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Which liberties did you have in mind?
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Mr. Kelley. Well, of course,
this speech has been mis-
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understood many, many times.
Senator Mondale.
Well, I want you to have a chance to
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clear it up.
Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement
of the approach which the courts historically have used in
resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its
recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute
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protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth
Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it
3 does not prohibit searches and seizures. I mention, it only
4 refers to those that are unreasonable.
I came from the police fiedḍ. What is more restrictive
to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be
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more chaotic is of you did not have traffic regulation.
We
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is os,
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in order to love in the complexities and
intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our
rights.
Some may construe this as an extravagant statement.
I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there
has to be a balance.
If it
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Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give
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up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you
--
let me ask. Let me scratch that and ask again, you
have to give up some tights. Which rights would you have us
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Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would
have the right for search and seizure.
Senator Mondale. "You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-
ment right.
Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.
Senator Mondale.
Mr.
What right do you have in mind?
Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.
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Senator Mondale.
There's no such right in the Consti-
tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,
under court warrant.
that?
Did you mean to go beyond that?
Mr. Kelley. That's right.
Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond
Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever
go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.
Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that
that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?
Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I
made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which
yes, it was inartful.
Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in
law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were
saying something different, that it was taken to mean something
different than I think you intended.
What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law
enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined
by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling
of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.
That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?
Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my
speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings.
I didn't
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understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.
I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.
Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that
in effect, the rights of the American people can be determined
not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the
5
law.
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You meant that.
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Mr. Kelley.
Indeed, yes, sir.
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Senator Mondale.
All right.
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07
end t. 3
Thank you.
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The Chairman.
Senator Hart.
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Senator of Colorado.
Mr.
Kelley, in response to
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a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about
laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was
we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the
Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably
hamper you from investigations of crime control in the
country.
But I think implicit in his question was also an area
that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind
of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau
from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political
figures, particularly in the White House?
And we've had indications that at least two of your
predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr.
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Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use
of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish
some plititcal end.
Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer
restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is
not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.
What kind of restrictions can we lay down to protect you
I'd be interested in that sign of the
from political pressures?
coin, if you would.
Mr.
Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would
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protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think
that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines
It might
as prepared to the present date by the Department.
be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any
consideration of such directives.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?
Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.
Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been
a problem for the people that preceded you?
Mr. Kelley. I think so..
Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the
Congress ought to address?
Mr. Kelley. I think so.
Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a
letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the
Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying
out the investigation or their efforts to review the investi-
gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther
King, Jr., in order to determine whether that investigation
should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked
for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all
material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates
to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-
ment asking this Committee for FBI files?
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Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.
2 I think they're asking for what tęstimony was given by
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witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.
Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all
material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates
to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."
I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department
asking this Committee for material provided to us by the
Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I
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Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.
Everything that was sent to you was sent through them.
they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy.
don't know why.
Did
Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you
provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?
Mr. Kelley.
That's right.
Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why
an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee
for your records?
Mr. Kelley.
No,
sir.
Senator Hart of Colorado.
You released a statement on
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program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO
activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:
"The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was
to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against
individuals, organizations and institutions both public
and private across the United States."
Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this
Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of
occasions he planned violent acts against black people in
groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the
FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.
How does his testimony square with your statement that
I have quoted?
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Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of
his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth.
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and that type of thing has been substantiated.
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Senator Hart of Colorado.
You're saying the testimony
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Mr. Kelley. Right.
Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,
and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did
not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI
25 was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against
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Now the Committee has received testimony that the New
Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher
authorities, the Attorney Gereral and Congress.
Do you have any information in this regard?
I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,
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but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record
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seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic
information flowing upward through the chain of command to
Director Hoover's superiors:
Mr. Kelley: May I ask that I be given the opportunity
to substantiate that with documentation?
Senator Hart of Colorado.
Mr. Kelley: Or respond to it.
Sure.
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Senator Hart of Colorado.
Dorector Kelley, just in
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passing, do you agree with the statement made by President
Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy
DI.
King should be brought to justice.
Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whose orders-
the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say
that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar
as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said
to do it and those who are responsible.
I took the responsibility for any such program and I
don't expect that those under me would be not acting in
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accordance with what they think is proper and may even have
2 some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that
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responsibility.
I think that it should rest on those who instructed that
that be done.
Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people
who give the orders should be brought to justice.
Mr. Kelley. I do.
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The Chairman.
Aren't they all dead?
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No.
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The Chairman. Not quite?
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Mr. Kelley. Not quite.
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Senator Hart of Colorado.
That's all, Mr. Chairman.
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The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the
COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the
FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three
basic questions.
Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee
is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for
the future, what I would think would be our constructive
legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what
we learned in that investigation.
And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of
the United States have from time to time ordered the FBI to
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obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the
2 necessary surveillance to obtain and to have a purely
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own personal purposes.
I think that you would agree that that is not a proper
function of the FBI, and you agree.
Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,
including the Director, to turn down a President of the United
States if he receives a direct order from the President.
It
is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,
I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man
serving in your position, particularly if the President puts
a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or
even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say,
you know, I am considering Senator White for an important
position in my administration, and I need to know more about
his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause
for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in
his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you
to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's
been doing lately.
It's difficult for you to say back to the President, Mr.
President, that's a very questionable activity for the FBI,
and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real
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to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and
you want to get something on him..
I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that
way, and I'm wondering what we could do in the way of protecting
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basic charter that we write.
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your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this
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Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one
or two of mine. I would like your response.
If we were to write into the law that any order given you
either by the President or by the Attorney General should be
transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective
and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain
those written orders and that furthermore they would be
available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the
joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee
would have access to such a file.
So that the committee itself would be satisfied that
orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or
unlawful.
What would you think of writing a provision of that kind
into a charter for the FBI?
Mr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order
issued by the President that is a request for action by the
Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my
opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in
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contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes
.'
or some that will say no, but I think we could define an
area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could
do that.
Now as to the availability to any oversight committee
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no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request
of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have
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put in writing such as some national or foreign security
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I would like to have such a consideration be given a
great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review
be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would
present a problem.
I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-
thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight
committee.
welcome that.
The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we
proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well,
I think.
Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the
Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question
If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs
to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since
Dr. King has long since been violently removed from the scene,
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why are they preserved?
Why aren't they simply destroyed?
Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable
the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information
that is has collected that it is no longer needed or may never
have connected the person with any criminal activity? And
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yet, all of that information just stays there in the files
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year after year.
What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's
not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down
there at the FBI?
Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, we do have the rule that
they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your
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question and why right now are they maintained?
Since we
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do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until
that's lifted, we can't destroy anything.
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I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines
or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be
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some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there
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might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation
himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.
I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but
it can be done and we are willing to be guided by those
rules.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting
thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees
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to Federal positions.
As a matter of fact, the only time I
ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his
badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.
so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.
And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that
as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that
is about the extent of it.
Then when this file is completed and the person involved
is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that
file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is
in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old
neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.
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and is developed in cases involving certain members of the
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Executive Branch of the government.
I see no reason why this would not be a proper area
for consideration of legislation.
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What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?
Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some
files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We
have some archival rules which govern the retention of mateial
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The Chairman.
Can you give me any idea of how much
do you have records that would tell us how much time and money
is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands
of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments
to Federal offices?
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Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not
have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost
for the investigation of Federal appointeės
The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other
information that would indicate to us what proportion of the
time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of
activity.
Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but
I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the
approximate expense.
The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is
a matter we need more information about. And when you supply
that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number
of such investigations each year?
You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,
but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example,
enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the
reach of these investigations may be.
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Mr. Kelley. Through '70?
The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.
The other matter that is connected to this same subject
that I would like your best judgment on is whether these
investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity.
That is to say where legitimate national security interest might
25 be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on
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past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.
I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate
routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive
in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI
checks.
And so when you respond to the series of questions, I
wish you would include the offices that are now covered by
such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the
Federal bureaucracy this extends.
Could you do that?
Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Fine.
Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at
the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional
questions for the record, and there may be other questions,
too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask
Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going
to be tied up on the floor with votes.
But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,
Mr. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the
way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of
its investigation during the past months.
Mr. Kelley.
Thank you.
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The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result
of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for
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the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll
encounter in the future.
Thank you.
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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.
On page 5 of your statement
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What?
Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third
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Mr. Kelley.
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full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then
to question about what you said. "We must recognize that
situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the
future where the Government may well be expected to depart from
its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative
and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps
which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or
property."
Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what
kind of situation?
And can you give some concrete examples under your general
principles statement?
Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to
that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an
employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's
going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you
have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and
so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent
threat to human life or property.
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principle.
Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the
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You are saying the extremist has said he is going

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to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and
he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.
Is that the presumption?
Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you
can extent it.
Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the
traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.
Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not
gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had
not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.
Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,
are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of
human life or property?
Mr.
Kelley.
I think so.
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Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act
to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there
is not by definition any threat to life or property.
Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business.
a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,
and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think
take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times
they have been acted upon.
I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to
kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's
not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to
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kill me, that just means one thing.
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Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.
Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying
4 on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible
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threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where
we don't lose the capability of doing something.
We don't
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say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to
the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that
we should act independently because maybe we don't have the
judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do
think that we should report it and thereafter see what can
be done.
Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of
our discussion the standard on page 5.
On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.
Mr. Kelley.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible
threat.
Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.
An imminent possible threat. All right.
Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than
arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to
prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other
than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have
in mind?
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Mr. Kelley.
Removing him from his position or whatever
is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as
impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.
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Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or
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Mr. Kelley.
I don't know what it would be.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Isolate him in some fashion.
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In some fashion perhaps.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Now, for such activity and for opening
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an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with
a standard which said you would have to have an immediate
threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal
crime involving violence?
Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out
so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.
Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit
you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from
what you think would be an acceptable standard.
Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might
be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to
do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for
you to, not with the presence or the possibility, not able
to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.
Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.
And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.
Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.
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Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening
of an investigation into a domestic group.
Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the
4 test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving
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To open a domestic security case.
Yes.
Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist
activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities
under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.
Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where
it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic
group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious
federal crime involving violence?
Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and
they have been well defined as to what is the possible
opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been
discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,
but there are other criteria that are used, yes.
Mr. Schwarz.
What would the other criteria be?
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Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations
over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the
most used of the basis, and then you have, of course,
intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of
short duration. If there is no showing of this into action
some
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Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the
intelligence investigation?
Mr. Kelley. By intelligence investigation, yes, you
are looking to prevent.
Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and
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Mr. Kelley. And the capability.
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And the capability.
All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and
I appreciate very much your time.
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Mr. Kelley.
Mr. Schwarz.
That's all right.
Assuming a legitimate investigation has
been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-
mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that
relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood
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of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to
collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning
let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the
political views of a person on the other?
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Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what
many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define
this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that
within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex
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some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the
government.
Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political
views?
Mr. Kelley. What?
Mr. Schwarz.
Would those be the only limits on political
views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence
or advocants of overthrow?
Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat
or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,
but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's
a member of some other organization.
Mr. Schwarz.
Is the standard you used on collection of
21
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sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything
might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of
balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's
justifiable to collect that kind of information on American
citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?
Insofar as doing it presently, it has been
Mr. Kelley.
23 included in some reports as a result of the requirement that
24 that is what is required by our rules, that when a person
25
reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint.
Insofar
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as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,
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I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether
3 or not this is something we should retain, and we would not
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object to anything reasonable in that regard.
Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.
Taking the current manual and trying to understand its
applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King
--
case, under Section 87 there is a permission is granted to
open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive
groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is
received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to
systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group
or organization, an investigation can be opened."
Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used
in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference in the 1960s, so that investigation could still be
open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.
Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of
clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch
as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-
trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered
organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the
benefit of the country.
Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that
under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be
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opened today?
Mr. Kelley. I think so.
Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.
Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only
5
of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a
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group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-
gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals
or people who come into contact with it?
Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely. If
you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we
then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the
infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation
of them without any basis for doing so other than that they
are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said
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Mr. Schwarz.
Thank you very much.
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Mr. Smothers.
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but
off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.
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inquiry, Mr. Kelley.
Just a couple of very brief lines of
I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was
raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you
talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between
intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions..
Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort,
indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects h (:
to distinguish some of this has been made.
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Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage
effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the
Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of
this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's
law enforcement position?
Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does
a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background
of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which
all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help-
ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also
enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding
of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that
spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type
of an operation.
I subscribe to the present system heartily.
Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission
if within the Bureau guidelines were established that
effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of
the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a
situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist
the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question
that there should be access to it.
Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that
intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing
of lines there with the information legitimately needed for
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law enforcement?
.
Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide
dissemination, because that just numerically increases the
possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything
of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile
6
to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to
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close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.
Mr. Smothers.
Let me just raise one final area with you.
We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about
the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department
regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the
King case in particular.
As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel
I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some
insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.
What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that
an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved
improperly?
Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it
routinely referred to the Justice Department?
Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of
procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for
Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the
great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative
Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual
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occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up,
2 perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is
3 handled internally at present.
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Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be
reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary
step?
I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,
I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the
Bureau police itself, and then secondly, is the Department of
Justice involved in the police determinations?
For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with
the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered
the action against King should be the subject of investigation
and maybe prosecution?
How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?
Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those
activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal.
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There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised
of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own
investigating, and this is something that we feel is a
decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we
have within our own organization sufficient capability to
handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled
24
independently of us.
Mr. Smothers.
25
Thank you.
!
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3
That is all I have.
Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.
(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed
4 subject to the call of the Chair.)
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NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 82
VZCZCH00041
PP MM
DE HO 0041 0520935
ZNP UUUUU
P 2114447 FEB 80
FM DIRECTO™ FBI
TO FBI MIAMI PRIOPITY
LEGAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY PRIORITY
BT
UNCLAS
0
066-3346* (175)
0
VISIT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) STAFF
TO MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND LEGAT MEXICO CITY REGARDING DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA).
THE SSCI IS CONDUCTING A STUDY OF THE DEA IN CONNECTION
WITH THE COMMITTER'S ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF
DEA BUDGET. PRIMARILY, THE COMMITTEE IS INTERESTED IN
DETERMINING THE POLE OF THE DEA IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
SSCI CHAI MAN BIRCH BAYH HAS PEQUESTED THE FBI TO ASSIST IN
THE COMMITTEE'S STUDY BY PROVIDING BRIFFINGS TO STAFF MEMBERS
REGARDING FBI/DEA RELATIONSHIPS. I HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST THE
COMMITTEE IN ITS STUDY. AS SUCH, YOU ARE TO PROVIDE BRIEFINGS
TO THE COMMITTEE STAFF REGARDING OUR PELATIONSHIPS WITH DEA.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 83
66-3346-30
ASAL
FREEMAN gy
COLLINS 
the
SEARCHED ANDEXED
SERIALIZED.
_FILED_
FEB 21 1980
FBI-MIAMI
Зас
C/2
1
PAGE TWO DE HO 0741 UNCLAS
THE COMMITTEE WOULD ALSO LIKE ITS STAFF MEMBERS TO BE
GENERALLY BRIEFED ON THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE FCI PROGRAM.
THEY ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE PRIORITIES AND FCI
THATS IN MIAMI. THE STAFF IS ALSO INTERESTED IN ACQUIPING
INFORMATION REGARDING THE POLE AND FUNCTIONS OF OUR
LFGAT IN MEXICO CITY. ACCORDINGLY, BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE
A BRIEFING ON THOSE MATTERS.
FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE STAFF MEMBERS WHO WILL BE
TRAVELING TO YOUR FACILITIES ARE DENNIS P. SHAPON AND
THOMAS CONNOLLY. APPANGEMENTS ALREADY HAVE BEEN MADE TO
HAVE THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE BRIEF MISSOS. SHAPON AND
CONNOLLY ON FEBRUARY 27, 1977, AT 2:30 P.M. THE COMMITTEE
HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT WILLIAM C. NETTLIS, ASAC MIAMI, WILL
CONDUCT THE PIEFING.
IT IS OUP UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS
CABLED THE U. S. 7MBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO ADVISE THEM OF
THE STAFF MEMBERS VISIT TO DEA AND FBI PERSONNEL. THE
COMMITTE INDICATED IT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT WITH OUR LEGAT
ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 23, OP SOMETIME ON 77BRUARY 25, 1980.
LFCAT MEXICO CITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR BRIEFINGS ON ONE
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 84
\ F
PAGE THREE DE HO 0041 UNCLAS
OF THOSE TWO ˜^TES. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT LEGAT MEXICO CITY
CONTACT WARD HEATH, REGIONAL DIPECTOR, DEA, MEXICO CITY,
WHO IS COORDINATING DEA'S MEETINGS WITH STAFF IN ORDER TO
ARRANGE A DATE AND TIME FOR BRIEFING. FBI HEADQUARTERS WILL
"OTIFY COMMITTEE THAT INFORMATION REGARDING FBI BRIEFING
SHOULD BE OBTAINED BY THEM THROUGH DEA.
FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, STAFF MEMBERS WILL BE
ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID MELOCIC, CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DFA. Mr. MELOCIC, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ATT EDI BRIEFINGS.
BOTH STAFF PERSONS ART CLEARED TO DECTIVE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION UP TO TOP SECRET. WHILE YOU SHOULD RESPOND
FULLY, YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF ONGOING
INVESTIGATIONS OF PROVIDE INFORMATIO" WHICH WILL COMPROMISE
INFORMANTS.D
SUTEL PESULTS OF SPIFFING TO PEACH FBI HEADQUARTERS DY
COB THE DAY AFTER SCHEDULED BRIFFING.
QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING THIS MATTER SHOULD BE
DIRECTED TO SA CHRISTOPHER MAZZELLA! LEGAL LIAISON/
CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS UNIT, FBI HEADQUARTERS, EXTENSION 4510.
ЭТ
༣༩/1
05220437mm-1
་་ ་་ ་་ ་་
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 85
PINK COPY
☐ WHITE COPY
GOLD CAPY
VZCZCK00041
·PP MM
DE HQ 8041 0522035
ZNR UUUUU
P 211444Z FEB 80
FM DIPECTOP FBI
TO FBI MIAMI PRIORITY.
LEGAL ATTACHE. MEXICO CITY PRIORITY
BT
UNCLAS
VISIT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SAI) STAFF
.TO MIAMI FIELD OFFICE AND LEGAT MEXICO CITY REGARDING DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA).
THE SSCI IS CONDUCTING A STUDY OF. THE DEA IN CONECTION
WITH THE COMMITTEE'S ROLE IN OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN PORTIONS OF
REA BUDGET. PRIMARILY, THE COMMITTEE IS INTERESTED I
DETERMINING · THE POLE OF THE DEA IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
SSCI CHAIRMAN BIRCH BAYH HAS PEQUESTED THE FRI TO ASSIST IN
THE COMMITTEE'S STUDY BY PROVIDING BRIEFINGS TO STAFT MEMBERS
"FGARDING FBI/DEA RELATIONSHIPS. I HAVE AGREED TO ASSIST THE.
COMMITTFE IN ITS STUDY. AS SUCH, YOU ARE TO PROVIDE 3RIEFINGS
TO THE COMMITTEE STAFF REGARDING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH DEA.
66-3346-30
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
LADZXED
FILED
FEB 21 1980
FBI-MIAMI
105
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 86
PAGE TWO DE HG 0041 UNCLAS
'
THE COMMITTEE WOULD ALSO LIKE ITS STAFF MEMBERS TO BE
GENEPALLY BRIEFED ON THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE FCI PROGRAM.
THEY ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN THE PRIORITIES AND TĊI
THREATS IN MIAMI, THE STAFF IS ALSO INTERESTED IN ACQUIPING
INFORMATION TEGARDING. THE POLT AND FUNCTIONS OF OUR
LEGAT IN MEXICO CITY. ACCORDINGLY, BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE
A BRIEFING ON THOSE MATTERS.
FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THE STAFF MEMBERS WHO WILL BE
TPAVELING TO YOUR FACILITIES ARE DENNIS P. SHARON AND
THOMAS CONNOLLY. ARRANGEMENTS ALPEADY HAVE BEEN MADE TO
HAVE THE MIAMI FIELD OFFICE BRIEF. MESSRS. SHARON AND
CONNOLLY ON FEBRUARY 27, 1980, AT 2:30'P.M. THE COMMITTEE
HAS BEEN APVISED THAT WILLIAM E. NETTLES, ASAC MIAMI, WILL `
CONDUCT THE BRIEFING.
IT IS QUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS
CABLED THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO ADVISE THEM OF
THE STAFF MEMBERS VISIT TO DEA AND FBI PERSONNEL. THE.
COMMITTEE INDICATED IT WOULD LIKE TO VISIT WITH OUR LEGAT
ON THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 23, OR SOMETIME ON FEBRUARY 25,
LEGAT MEXICO CITY SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR BRIEFINGS ON-ONE
1980.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 87
PAGE THREE DE NO 7041 UNCLAS
OF THOSE TWO DATES. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT LEGAT MEXICO CITY
CONTACT EDWAPD HEATH, PEGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEA, MEXICO CITY,
WHO IS COORDINATING DRA'S MEETINGS WITH STAFF IN ORDER TO
ARRANGE A DATE AND TIME FOR BRIEFING. FBI HEADQUARTERS WILL
NOTIFY COMMITTEE THAT INFORMATION REGARDING FBI BRIEFING
SHOULD BE OBTAINED BY THEM THROUGH DEA.
FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, STAFF MEMBERS WILL BE
ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID MELOCIC, CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEA. Mr. MELOCIC, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ATTEND FBI BRIEFINGS.
BOTH STAFF PERSONS ARE CLEAPED TO RECEIVE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION UP TO TOP SECRET. WHILE. YOU SHOULD RESPOND
FULLY, YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF ONGOING
INVESTIGATIONS OR PROVIDE INFORMATION WHICH WILL COMPROMISE
INFORMANTS.D
SUTEL RESULTS OF BRIEFING TO REACH FBI HEADQUARTERS BY
COP THE DAY AFTER SCHEDULED BRIEFING.
QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE REGAPPING THIS MATTER SHOULD BE
DIRECTED TO SA CHRISTOPHER MAZZELLA! LEGAL LIAISON/
CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS UNIT, FEI HEADQUARTERS, EXTENSION 4510.
BT
0941
0522043zmm-1
a A ሃ ለይ
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 88
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
20
FBI
Date: JANUARY 9, 1976
(Type in plaintext or code)
Transmit the following in
CODE
Via
TELETYPE
TO:
DIRECTOR (62–116395)
FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)
SENSTUDY 75.
RE MIAMI NITEL 1/8/76.
NITEL
(Priority)
-DLS
11
FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY WAS RECONTACTED 1/9/76
REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF HIS CALLING LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE.
QUIGLEY AGREED
TO CALL ME AND OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.
END
JLM:mjs
(1)
Approved
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 89
66-3346-76
Sent
4200
43
M
Per
WB
U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574
NR011 MM CODE
4:32PM NITEL JANUARY 9, 1976 JWB
TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM MIAMI (66-3346)
SENSTUDY 75.
RE MIAMI NITEL JANUARY 8, 1976.
FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY WAS RECONTACTED JANUARY 9, 1976
REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF HIS CALLING LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE.
QUIGLEY AGREED
TO CALL ME AND OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED.
END.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 90
66-3346-77

FD
Rev. 5-22-64)
2
FBI
Date: JANUARY 8,
1976
Transmit the following in
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)
6
Via
TELETYPE
NITEL
(Priority)
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)
SENSTUDY 75.
RE BUTEL CALL TO DALLAS, 1/6/76, AND DALLAS TELCALL TO
MIAMI, 1/7/76, RE FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY.
I CONTACTED QUIGLEY TELEPHINICALLY 1/8/76. HE STATED HE
HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO GRANT INTERVIEWS TO TV, AUTHORS,
PUBLISHERS, ETC., ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS REFUSED IN
EVERY INSTANCE. HE SAID HE WILL COOPERATE WITH THE SENATE
COMMITTEE AT LEAST TO THE INITIAL EXTENT OF DETERMINING WHAT
INFORMATION IS DESIRED OF HIM IN ORDER THAT HE CAN DECIDE
WHETHER HE WILL NEED PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL. QUIGLEY SAID HE
IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHATSOEVER IN THIS MATTER
AND SUGGESTED FBI OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL CONTACT HIM AS TO
ANY DIRECTION OR ADVICE CONSIDERED NECESSARY. HIS OVER-ALL
VIEW IS THAT THE SENATE COMMITTEE EFFORTS ARE DESTRUCTIVE AS
PERTAIN TO FBI AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE A PARTY TO THE
66-3346
JLM:mjsm
(1)
Approved:
66-3346-26
Sent
33 P
IB
M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 91
+7
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
Date:
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
Via
(Priority)
PAGE TWO
COMMITTEE'S APPARENT OBJECTIVES. HE SAID HE WILL RECEIVE ANY
COMMITTEE MEMBER WHO CONTACTS HIM, BUT HE WILL NOT TAKE ANY
INITIATIVE.
THE FOLLOWING IS QUIGLEY'S ADDRESS: JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY,
THE FOUNTAIN, APT. 107, 4120 TIVOLI COURT, LAKE WORTH, FLORIDA,
PHONE: (305) 967-7610.
ANY CONTACT BY PHONE SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN 8:30 AND 9:00
ANY MORNING IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.
END
Approved:
Sent
.M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 92
༡.༠ , ༧
h
NR006 MM CODE
3:30PM NITEL JANUARY 8, 1976 JWB
TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM MIAMI (66-3346) 2P
SENSTUDY 75.
RE BUTEL CALL TO DALLAS, JANUARY 6, 1976, AND DALLAS TELCALL TO
MIAMI, JANUARY 7, 1976, RE FORMER AGENT JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY.
I CONTACTED QUIGELY TELEPHONICALLY JANUARY 8, 1976. HE STATED HE
HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO GRANT INTERVIEWS TO TV, AUTHORS,
PUBLISHERS, ETC., ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS REFUSED IN.
HE SAID HE WILL COOPERATE WITH THE SENATE
EVERY INSTANCE.
COMMITTEE AT LEAST TO THE INITIAL EXTENT OF DETERMINING WHAT
INFORMATION IS DESIRED OF HIM IN ORDER THAT HE CAN DECIDE
WHETHER HE WILL NEED PRIVAT LEGAL COUNSEL. QUIGLEY SAID HE
IS RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHATSOEVER IN THIS MATTER
AND SUGGESTED FBI OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL CONTACT HIM AS TO
ANY DIRECTION OR ADVICE CONSIDERED NECESSARY. HIS OVER-ALL
VIEW IS THAT THE SENATE COMMITTEE EFFORTS ARE DESTRUCTIVE AS
PERTAIN TO FBI AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE A PARTY TO THE
COMMITTEE'S APPARENT OBJECTIVES. HE SAID HE WILL RECEIVE ANY
COMMITTEE MEMBER WHO CONTACTS HIM, BUT HE WILL NOT TAKE ANY
INITIATIVE.
END PAGE ONE
.
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 93
66-3346-26
"
PAGE TWO CMM 66-3346)
THE FOLLOWING IS QUIGLEY'S ADDRESS: JOHN LESTER QUIGLEY,
THE FOUNTAIN, APT. 107, 4120 TIVOLI COURT, LAKE WORTH, FLORIDA,
PHONE: (305) 967-7610.
ANY CONTACT BY PHONE SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN 8:30 AND 9:00
ANY MORNING IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS.
END.
CBL FBIHQ TU
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 94
Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 12- 8)
TO: SAC:
Albany
_760£ ¥45*P=
©**
(Copies to Offices Chocked)
Albuquerque
Alexandria
Anchorage
Atlanta
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Butte
Charlotte
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Jackson
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Kansas City
Knoxville
Las Vegas
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
(Oklahoma City
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TO LEGAT:
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Brasilia
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Springfield
Tampa
Washington Field
Quantico
Paris
Rome
Singapore
Tel Aviv
Tokyo
1/5/76
Date
RE: DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE
BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
$66-3346-25
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DECEMBER 10, 1975
SEARCHED.
SERIALIZED
6mys
INDEXED
жде
Retention
For information ☐ optional
For appropriate
action
JAN 7 1976
Surep, by
The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future_roßbï; MTempñceal all
sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.
Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA
dated
Remarks: By routing slip dated 12/30/75 and
captioned as above, all SACS and Legats were
furnished a copy of the transcript of Mr.
Kelley's 12/10/75 appearance before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities. Although the data contained in
the transcript may be made available to news
media representatives, used in answering
questions received from citizens, and other-
wise treated as being of a public-source nature,
the transcript itself should not be reproduced
for, or given to, anyone outside the FBI.
Enc.
Bufile
Urfile
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 95
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 96
NR5 WA PLAIN
C30PM NITEL 12/10/75 GHS
TO ALL SACS
OM DIRECTOR
FROM
DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975
À COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN
SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE. FOLLOWS A´
SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S.
QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES: 1
(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED
WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD' BE REQUIRED FOR FRI USE OF
INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE
WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMAŅIS
ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING
WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER
PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE
INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING
THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE
12/10/75
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4
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NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 97
66-3346-E
ARCHEL
SERIALL
LINDEXED
FILED
DEC 10 1975
'FBI-MIAMI
ASA
PAGE TWO
PROSÉCUTÉD
--
AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO
COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID 'FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE
TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2
THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI
DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S
TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).
(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER
'
. CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLIGED VIOLATIONS OF
LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED. BY THE FBI OR
OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS
CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT ;
THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST
F
BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE
THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL: PERSONNEL
INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,
OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT
REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL
AGENCY.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 98
Y
PAGE THREE
✓
(3) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF..
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. Í STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED
b
'
:
^
THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED
OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS
RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN
RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST
FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT
REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO
REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE .
ATTORNEY GENERAL.
:
(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD
BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE
RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED
THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I
FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.
(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY
OF CONTROLS ON REQUESTS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 99
:
PAGE FOUR
FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE.
OPALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD
WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES. THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD
PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE.
•
A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE
FURNISHED TO EACH, OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.
ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.
END
FBI MM SAK AACK OXX ACK FOR 1 TEL CLR AND TU
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 100
:
:

NRØ50 NA PLAIN´·
-
830PM NITEL 12/16/75 GHS
TO ALL SACS
FROM DIRECTOR
x
DIRECTOR'S APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, DECEMBER 10, 1975
A COPY OF THE STATEMENT I DELIVERED BEFORE THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES TODAY HAS BEEN
SENT ALL OFFICES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A
SYNOPSIZED ACCOUNT OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF THE COMMITTEE'S
QUESTIONS TO ME, TOGETHER WITH MY RESPONSES:
(1) REGARDING FBI INFORMANTS, QUESTIONS WERE ASKED
WHETHER COURT APPROVAL SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR FBI USE OF
INFORMANTS IN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS (MY RESPONSE
WAS THAT THE CONTROLS WHICH EXIST TODAY OVER USE OF INFORMANTS
ARE SATISFACTORY); HOW CAN FBI KEEP INFORMANTS OPERATING
WITHIN PROPER LIMITS SO THEY DO NOT INVADE RIGHTS OF OTHER
PERSONS (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT RELIANCE MUST BE PLACED ON THE
INDIVIDUAL AGENTS HANDLING INFORMANTS AND THOSE SUPERVISING
THE AGENTS' WORK, THAT INFORMANTS WHO VIOLATE THE LAW CAN BE
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 101
66-3346-
MAXEL
ILED
EQ1 1975
FL-Ar
1
SERIALIZE
(
PAGE TWO
PROSECUTED
AS CAN ANY AGENT WHO COUNSELS AN INFORMANT TO
COMMIT VIOLATIONS); AND DID FORMER KLAN INFORMANT GARY ROWE
TESTIFY ACCURATELY WHEN HE TOLD THE COMMITTEE ON DECEMBER 2
THAT HE INFORMED FBI OF PLANNED ACTS OF VIOLENCE BUT FBI
DID NOT ACT TO PREVENT THEM (MY RESPONSE WAS THAT ROWE'S
TESTIMONY WAS NOT ACCURATE).
(2) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING IMPROPER
CONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES, I STATED THAT ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF
LAW BY FBI PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED BY THE FBI OR
OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY; THAT THE INSPECTION DIVISION HAS
CONDUCTED INQUIRIES REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT;
THAT AN OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HAS JUST
BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AND WE WILL ADVISE
THAT OFFICE OF OUR MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENTAL PERSONNEL,
INCLUDING FBI EMPLOYEES, FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF LAW, REGULATIONS,
OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT; THAT I WOULD RESERVE COMMENT
REGARDING POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NATIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
TO CONSIDER MATTERS OF MISCONDUCT BY EMPLOYEES OF ANY FEDERAL
AGENCY.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 102
___
1
PAGE THREE
(3)
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING HARASSMENT OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I STATED THAT THE PERSONS WHO ISSUED
THE ORDERS WHICH RESULTED IN SUCH HARASSMENT SHOULD FACE THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT, RATHER THAN THOSE UNDER THEM WHO CARRIED
OUT SUCH ORDERS IN GOOD FAITH; THAT THE FBI STILL HAS RECORDINGS
RESULTING FROM ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES OF KING; THAT WE RETAIN
RECORDINGS FOR TEN YEARS BUT WE ALSO HAVE AGREED TO A REQUEST
FROM THE SENATE NOT TO DESTROY INFORMATION IN OUR FILES WHILE
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE BEING CONDUCTED; THAT I HAVE NOT
REVIEWED THE KING TAPES; THAT IF THE COMMITTEE REQUESTED TO
REVIEW THE KING TAPES, THE REQUEST WOULD BE REFERRED TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL.
(4) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS REGARDING WHETHER IT WOULD
BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SEPARATE THE FBI CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE
RESPONSIBILITIES AND OUR INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, I STATED
THAT WE HAVE FOUND THE TWO AREAS TO BE COMPATIBLE, AND I
FEEL THE FBI IS DOING A SPLENDID JOB IN BOTH AREAS.
(5) IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ADEQUACY
OF CONTROLS ON REQUESIS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND FROM OTHER
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR FBI INVESTIGATIONS OR FOR INFORMATION
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 103
PAGE FOUR
FROM OUR FILES, I STATED THAT WHEN SUCH REQUESTS ARE MADE
ORALLY, THEY SHOULD BE CONFIRMED IN WRITING; THAT WE WOULD
WELCOME ANY LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THE CONGRESS FEELS WOULD
PROTECT THE FBI FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTISAN MISUSE,
A FULL TRANSCRIPT OF THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WILL BE
FURNISHED TO EACH OFFICE AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE.
ALL LEGATS ADVISED SEPARATELY.
END
FBI MM SAK AACK OXX ACK FOR 1 TEL CLR AND IU
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 104
Routing Slip
0-7 (Rov 12-17-73)
TO: SAC:
Albany
Albuquerque
Alexandria
Anchorage
Atlanta
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Butte
Charlotte
(Copies to C
es Checked)
Houston
Indianapolis
Jackson
Jacksonville
Kansas City
Knoxville
Las Vegas
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Mobile
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbia
Dallas
Newark
Denver
New Haven
Detroit.
El Paso
Honolulu
New York City
Norfolk
New Orleans
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
Richmond
Sacramento
St. Louis
TO LEGAT:
Beirut
Bem
Bonn
Prasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Hong Kong
London
Madrid
Salt Lake City
Manila
San Antonio
Mexico City
San Diego
Ottawa
Paris
Rome
Singapore
San Francisco
San Juan
Savannah
Seattle
Springfield
Tampa
Washington Field
Quantico
Tel Aviv
Tokyo
11/21/75
Date
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(3/75) 66-3346
Retention For appropriate
For information optional ☐ action
☐ Surep, by
The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all
sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.
Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA
dated
Remarks:
Enclosed for your information is a copy of
an article by Mr. William Safire entitled "Mr.
Church's Cover-Up" that appeared in the
November 20/1975, issue of "The New York Times.
یخی
66-3346-
#9
#10
Enc.
Bufil
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#6
R
NOV 1375
ASAC
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 105
Mr. Church's Cover-Up
By William Safire
WASHINGON, Nov. 19-On Oct. 10,
1963, the then-Attorney General of the
United States put his personal signa-
ture on a document that launched and
legitimatized one of the most horren-
dous abuses of Federal police power in
this century.
In Senator Frank Church's subcom-
mittee hearing room this week, the
authorized wiretapping and subse-
quent unauthorized bugging and at-
tempted blackmailing of Martin Luther
King Jr. is being gingerly examined,
with the "investigation" conducted in
such a way as not to unduly em-
barrass officials of the Kennedy or
Johnson Administrations.
With great care, the committee has
focused on the F.B.I. Yesterday, when
the committee counsel first set forth
the result of shuffling through press
clips, it seemed as if no Justice De-
partment had existed in 1962; today,
an F.B.I. witness pointed out that it
was Robert Kennedy who authorized
the wiretap of Dr. King, and that "the
President of the United States and the
Attorney General specifically discussed
their concern of Communist influence
with Dr. King."
But the Church committee showed
no zest for getting further to the Ken-
nedy root of this precedent to Water-
gate eavesdropping. If Senator Church
were willing to let the chips fall where
they may, he would call some knowl-
edgeable witnesses into the glare of
the camera lights and ask them some
questions that have gone unasked for
thirteen years.
For example, he could call Nicholas
Katzenbach, Attorney General Ken-
redy's deputy and successor, and ask
what he knows of the Kennedy de-
cision to wiretap Dr. King. Who at
Justice concurred in the recommenda-
tion? How does the F.B.I. know the
President was consulted or informed?
After Mr. Katzenbach assumed of-
fice, and the wiretapping continued,
he was told by angry newsmen that
the F.B.I. was leaking scurrilous in-
formation about Dr. King. Why did he
wait for four months, and for a thou-
sand telephonic interceptions. to dis-
continue the officially approved rap?
Of course, this sort of testimony
would erode Senator Church's political
base. That is why we do not sec for-
mer Assistant F.B.I. director Cartha
(Deke) Deloach, Lyndon Johnson's
personal contact with the F.B.I. in the
witness chair. What did President
Johnson know about the character-
assassination plot and when did he
know it? What conversations took
place Botween Mr. Deloach and Presi-
dent Johnson on the tapping of Dr.
King, or about the use of the F.B.I. in
ather intrusions into the lives of
widical figures?
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page
1
The committee is not asking embar-
rassing questions even when answers
are readily available. A couple of
weeks ago, at an open *hearing, an
F.B.I. man inadvertently started to
blurt out an episode about newsmen
who were weritapping in 1962 with
the apparent knowledge of Attorney!
General Kennedy. The too-willing wit
ness was promptly shooshed into sit
lence, and told that such information
would be developed only in executive
session. Nobody raised an eyebrow.
That pattern of containment by the
Church committee vividly shown by
the handling of the buggings at the
1964 Republican and Democratic con-
ESSAY
-
ventions which were ordered by Lyn-
don Johnson. Such invasions of politi-
cal headquarters were worse than the
crime committed at Watergate, since
they involved the use of the F.B.I.,
but the Church investigators seem to
be determined not to probe too deeply.
If F.B.I. documents say that reports
were made to specific Johnson aides,
why are those men not given the
same opportunity to publicly tell their
story so avidly given the next Presi-
dent's men? If Lyndon Johnson com-
mitted this impeachable high crime of
using the F.B.I. to spy on political.
opponents, who can be brought for-
ward to tell us all about it?
But that would cause embarrass-
ment to Democrats, and Senator
Church wants to embarrass profes-
sional employees of investigatory
agencies only. A new sense of Con-
gressional decorum exists, far from
the sense of outrage expressed in the
Senate Watergate committee's hear-
ing room. When it is revealed that the
management of NBC News gave press
credentials to L.B.J.'s spies at the 1964
convention, everybody blushes demure-
ly--and nobody demands to know
which network executive made what!
decision under what pressure.
I have been haranguing patient
readers for years about the double
standard applied to Democratic and
Republican political crimes, and had
hoped the day would come when the
hardball precedents set by the Ken-
nedy and Johnson nien would be laid
before the public in damning detail.
Obviously, Democrat Frank Church
is not the man to do it. His. jowl-
shaking indignation is all too selec.
tive; the trail of high-level responsi-
bility for the crimes committed against
Dr. King and others is evidently going
to be allowed to cool.
Pity. You'd think that after all the
nation has been through in the past
few years, our political leaders would
have learned that on thing that
brings you down is the act of cover
Ang up.
106
66-3346-22
тор
107 1975
жде
THE NEW YORK TIMES
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20th, 1975
PAGE C-41
Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 7-11-71
TC: SAC:
(Copies to Offices Checke
Albany
], ¡louston
Albuquerque
Alexandria
Anchorage
Atlanta
Baltimore
Binningham
Boston
Buffalo
Butte
Charlotte
Indianapolis
Jackson
Jacksonville
Kansas City
Knoxville
Las Vegas
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Mobile
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
Richmond
Sacramento
St. Louis
TO LEGAT:
Bern
Bonn
Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Hong Kong
London
Madrid
Salt Lake City
Manila
San Antonio
Mexico City
San Diego
Ottawa
San Francisco
San Juan
Savannah
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbia
Dallas
Newark
Seattle
Denver
New Haven
Springfield
Detroit
New Orleans
Тапіра
El Paso
Honolulu
New York City
Norfolk
Paris
Rome
Tel Aviv.
Tokyo
Washington Field
Quantico
Date
December 5 1975
'
RE: TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
12/2/75
Retention For appropriate
For information ☐ optional
action
Surep, by
_
conceal ali
The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,
sources, paraphrase contents.
Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA
dated
Remarks:
Re Bureau R/S of 12/4/75 which provided
excerpts of Mr. Adams' testimony.
Attached for your information and
assistance, is the complete transcript of
above-referenced testimony
66-3346-22
UNEDITED TRANSCRIPTS
13PARCHED_
¡SERIALIZED.
INDEXID_
Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile
DEC 8 1975
FBI-MIAMI
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 107
Vol. 15
The United States Senate
Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations.
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION
Tuesday, December 2, 1975
Washington, D. C.
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 108
WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
(202) 544-6000
66-3346-211
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
DEC S 1975
FBI-MIAMI
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 109
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
WARD & PAUL
11
13
14
15
16
17
Senator Tower. The next witnesses to appear before the
12. Committee are Mr. James Adams, Assistant to the Director-
Deputy Associate Director, Investigation, responsible for all
investigative operations; Mr. W. Raymond Wannall, Assistant
Director, Intelligence Division, responsible for internal
security and foreign counterintelligence investigations; Mr.
John A. Mintz, Assistant Director, Legal Counsel Division;
Joseph G. Deegan, Section Chief, extremist investigations;
Mr. Robert L. Schackelford, Section Chief, subversive
investigations; Mr. Homer A. Newman, Jr., Assistant to Section
Chief, supervises extremist informants; Mr. Edward P. Grigalu-
Unit Chief, supervises subversive informants; Joseph G. Kelley,
Assistant Section Chief, Civil Rights Section, General In
gative Division.
18
19
20
21
NNN
22
23
24
25
Gentlemen, will you all rise and be sworn.
เค
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
↑
smn 16°
1901
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22
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give
before this Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
3 but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Adams. I do.
Mr. Wannall. I do.
4
5
6
Mr. Mintz. I do.
7
Mr. Deegan.
I do.
8
I do.
10
11
12
13
14
Mr. Schackelford.
Mr. Newman. I do.
Mr. Grigalus. I do.
Mr. Kelley. I do.
Senator Tower. It is intended that. Mr. Wannall will be
the principal witness, and we will call on others as questioning
might require, and I would direct each of you when you do
15 respond, to identify yourselves, please, for the record.
16
17
18
19
20
20
21
22
23
I think that we will spend just a few more minutes to allow
the members of the Committee to return from the floor.
(A brief recess was taken.)
Senator Tower. The Committee will come to order.
Mr. Wannall, according to data, informants provide 83
percent of your intelligence information.
Now, will you provide the Committee with some information
on the criteria for the selection of informants?
24
25
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 110

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
1)
•
C
WARD & PAUL
>
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
1
1
TESTIMONY OF W. RAYMOND WANNALL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
2
10
3
4
5
00
6
r
'8
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ·
ACCOMPANIED BY: JAMES B. ADAMS, ASSISTANT TO THE
DIRECTOR-DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (INVESTIGATION);
JOHN A. MINTZ, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, LEGAL COUNSEL
DIVISION; JOSEPH G. DEEGAN, SECTION CHIEF; ROBERT L.
SCHACKELFORD, SECTION CHIEF; HOMER A. NEWMAN, JR.,
ASSISTANT TO SECTION CHIEF; EDWARD P. GRIGALUS, UNIT
CHIEF; AND JOSEPH G. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECTION CHIEF,
CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION, GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
Mr. Wannall. Mr. Chairman, that is not FBI data that you
have quoted. That was prepared by the General Accounting
9
10
11
12
13
Office.
14
Senator Tower.
15
Mr. Wannall.
16
Senator Tower.
17
figure.
18
Mr. Wannall.
That is GAO.
Based on a sampling of about 93 cases.
Would that appear to be a fairly accurate
19
I have not seen any survey which the FBI
itself has conducted that would confirm that, but I think that
20 we do get the principal portion of our information from live
21
2 2 2 2 2 2 1
sources.
22
Senator Tower.
It would be a relatively high percenter
23
then?
24
Mr. Wannall. I would say yes.
And your quest
25
criteria?
NW-88608-Docld;32989820-Page-111-
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Senator Tower. What criteria do you use in the selection
of informants?
Mr. Wannall. Well, the criteria vary with the needs. In
our cases relating to extremist matters, surely in order to get
an informant who can meld into a group which is engaged in a
criminal type activity, you're going to have a different set
of criteria.
If you're talking about our internal security
matters, I think we set rather high standards. We do require
that a preliminary inquiry be conducted which would consist
principally of checks of our headquarters indices, our field
office indices, checks with other informants who are operating
and in various established sources such as
in the same area,
local police departments.
Following this, if it appears that the person is the type
who has credibility, can be depended upon to be reliable, we
would interview the individual in order to make a determination
as to whether or not he will be willing to assist the FBI
in discharging its responsibilities in that field.
Following that, assuming that the answer is positive, we
would conduct a rather in depth investigation for the purpose
of. further attempting to establish credibility and. reliability.
Senator. Tower. . How does the. Bureau. distinguish between
the use of informants for law enforcement as opposed to
intelligence. collection?
Is the guidance different, or is it the same,
or what?
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 112
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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smn 19
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Mr. Wannall. Well, Mr. Adams can probably best address
the use of informants on criminal matters since he is over
the operational division on that.
Mr. Adams. You do have somewhat of a difference in the fact
that a criminal informant in a law enforcement function, you
are trying to develop evidence which will be admissible in
court for prosecution, whereas with intelligence, the informant
alone, your purpose could either be prosecution or it could be
just for purposes of pure intelligence.
The difficulty in both is retaining the confidentiality
of the individual and protecting the individual, and trying to,
through use of the informant, obtain evidence which could be
used independently of the testimony of the informant so that
he can continue operating as a criminal informant.
Senator Tower. Are these informants ever authorized to
function as provocateurs?
Mr. Adams. No, sir, they're not. We have strict regula-
tions against using informants as provocateurs.
This gets
into that delicate area of entrapment which has been addressed
by the courts on many occasions and has been concluded by the
courts that providing an individual has a willingness to engage
in an activity, the government has the right to provide him the
opportunity. This does not mean, of course, that mistakes don't
occur in this area, but we take whatever steps we can to
avoid this. Even the law has recognized that informants can
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1 engage in criminal activity, and the courts have held that,
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especially the Supreme Court in the Newark County Case, that
3 the very difficulty of penetrating an ongoing operation, that
an informant himself can engage in criminal activity, but
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law, we stay away from that. Our regulations fall short of that.
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If we have a situation where we felt that an informant
has to become involved in some activity in order to protect
or conceal his use as an informant, we go right to the United
States Attorney or to the Attorney General to try to make sure
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we are not stepping out of bounds insofar as the use of our
informants.
Senator Tower. But you do use these informants and do
instruct them to spread dissension among certain groups that
they are informing on, do you not?
Mr. Adams. We did when we had the COINTELPRO programs,
which were discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably
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one of the best examples of a situation where the law was
We heard the term States Rights used
much more then than we hear it today. We saw in the Little
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Rock situation the President of the United States, in sending
in the troops, pointing out the necessity to use local law
We must have local law enforcement, to use the
troops only as a last resort.
And then you have a situation like this where you do try
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to preserve the respective roles in law enforcement.
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You have
historical problems with the Klan coming along. We had
situations where the FBI and the Federal Government was almost
powerless to act. We had local law enforcement officers in
some areas participating in Klan violence.
The instances mentioned by Mr. Rowe, every one of those,
he saw them from the lowest level of the informant. He didn't
see what action was taken with that information, as he pointed
out in his testimony. Our files show that this information was
10 reported to the police departments in every instance. We
also knew that in certain instances the information, upon being
received, was not being acted upon. We also disseminated
simultaneously through letterhead memoranda to the Department
of Justice the problem, and here, here we were, the FBI, in a
position where we had no authority in the absence of instruction
from the Department of Justice, to make an arrest.
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Sections 241 and 242 don't cover it because you don't have
evidence of a conspiracy, and it ultimately resulted in
a situation where the Department called in United States
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officials.
So, historically, in those days, we were just as frus-
trated as anyone else was, and when we got information from
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and it was passed on to those who had the responsibility to
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indicated.
Senator Tower. None of these cases, then, there was
4 adequate evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to
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act?
Mr. Adams. The Departmental rules at that time, and still
require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.
Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together. You
can have a mob scene, and you can have blacks and whites
belting each other, but unless you can show that those that
initiated the action acted in concert in a conspiracy, you have.
no violation.
Congress recognized this, and it wasn't until 1968
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that they came along and added Section 245 to the civil rights
statúte, which added punitive measures against an individual
But this was a problem
that the whole country was grappling with: the President of
the United States, Attorney General. We were in a situation
where we had rank lawlessness taking place, as you know from
a memorandum we sent you that we sent to the Attorney General.
The accomplishments we were able to obtain in preventing
violence, and in neutralizing the Klan and that was one.
of the reasons.
Senator Tower. What was the Bureau's purpose in con-
tinuing or urging the continued surveillance of the Vietnam
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Veterans Against the War?
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Was there a legitimate law enforcement purpose, or was the
intent to halter political expression?
Mr. Adams. We had information on the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War that indicated that there were subversive
They were going to North Vietnam and meeting
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with the Communist forces. They were going to Paris, attending
meetings paid for and sponsored by the Communist Party, the
International Communist Party. We feel that we had a very valid
basis to direct our attention to the VVAW.
It started out, of course, with Gus Hall in 1967, who was
head of the Communist Party, USA, and the comments he made,
and what it finally boiled down to was a situation where it
split off into the Revolutionary Union, which was a Maost
group, and the hard-line Communist group, and at that point
factionalism developed in many of the chapters, and they closed
those chapters because there was no longer any intent to follow
the national organization.
But we had a valid basis for investigating it, and we
investigated chapters to determine if there was affiliation
and subservience to the national office.
Senator Tower. Mr. Hart?
But in the process of chasing
Senator Hart of Michigan.
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after the Veterans Against the War, you got a lot of information
that clearly has no relationship to any Federal criminal
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statute.
Mr. Adams. I agree, Senator.
Senator Hart of Michigan. Why don't you try to shut that
stuff off by simply telling the agent, or your informant?
Mr. Adams. Here is the problem that you have with that.
When you're looking at an organization, do you report only the
violent statements made by the group or do you also show that
you may have one or two violent individuals, but you have
some of these church groups that were mentioned, and others,
that the whole intent of the group is not in violation of the
statutes. You have to report the good, the favorable along
with the unfavorable, and this is a problem. We wind up with
information in our files. We are accused of being vacuum
cleaners, and you are a vacuum cleaner. If you want to know the
real purpose of an organization, do you only report the
violent statements made and the fact that it is by a small
minority, or do you also show the broad base of the organization
and what it really is?
And within that is where we have to have the guidelines
we have talked about before. We have to narrow down, because
we recognize that we do wind up with too much information in
our files.
Senator Hart of Michigan. But in that vacuuming process,
you are feeding into Departmental files the names of people
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Mr. Adams. It hangs me up. But in the same files I
imagine every one of you has been interviewed by the FBI, either
asking you about the qualifications of some other Senator
being considered for a Presidential appointment, being inter-
viewed concerning some friend who is applying for a job.
FBI?
Were you embarrassed to have that in the files of the
Now, someone can say, as reported at our last session, that
this is an indication, the mere fact that we have a name in our
files has an onerous impression, a chilling effect.
I agree.
It can have, if someone wants to distort what we have in our
files, but if they recognize that we interviewed you because
of considering a man for the Supreme Court of the United
States, and that isn't distorted or improperly used, I don't
· see. where any harm is served by having that in our files.
Senator Hart. of Michigan.
But if. I am. Reverend. Smith
and, the vacuum cleaner. picked up the fact that. I. was helping
the veterans, Vietnam Veterans Against. the War, and two years
later a name check is asked. on Reverend Smith and all your
file shows is that he was associated two years ago. with a group
that was sufficient enough, held sufficient doubtful. patriotism
to justify turning loose a lot of your energy in pursuit on
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Mr. Adams. This is a problem.
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Senator Hart of Michigan.
This is what should require
us to rethink this whole business.
Mr. Adams.
Absolutely.
And this is what I hope the guidelines committees as well
as the Congressional input are going to address themselves to.
Senator Hart of Michigan. We've talked about a wide range
of groups which the Bureau can and has had informant penetration
and report on. Your manual, the Bureau manual's definition
of when an extremist or security investigation may be under-
taken refers to groups whose activity either involves violation
of certain specified laws, or which may result in the violation
of such law, and when such an investigation is opened, then
informants may be used.
Another guideline says that domestic intelligence
investigations now must be predicated on criminal violations.
The agent need only cite a statute suggesting an investigation
relevant to a potential violation. Even now, with an improved,
upgraded effort to avoid some of these problems, we are back
again in a world of possible violations or activities which
may result in illegal acts.
Now, any constitutionally protected exercise of the
22 right to demonstrate, to assemble, to protest, to petition,
conceivably may result in violence or disruption of a local
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town meeting, when a controversial social issue might result
in disruption. It might be by hecklers rather than those holding
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the meeting.
Does this mean that the Bureau should investigate all
groups organizing or participating in such a meeting because
thềy may result in violence, disruption? :
Mr. Adams. No, sir.
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Senator Hart of Michigan.
Isn't that how you justify
spying on almost every aspect of the peace movement?
Mr. Adams.
NO, sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we
monitor demonstrations where we have an indication that the
demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have an
investigative interest in, a valid investigative interest in,
or where members of one of these groups are participating where
there is a potential that they might change the peaceful
nature of the demonstration.
But this is our closest question of trying to draw
guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing on the
First Amendment rights of people, yet at the same time being
aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers in the
past than we do at the present time, But we have had periods
where the demonstrations have been rather severe, and the
courts have said that the FBI has a right, and indeed a duty,
to keep itself informed with respect to the possible commission
of crime. It is not obliged to wear blinders until it may be
too late for prevention.
And that's a good statement if applied in a clearcut
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case. Our problem is where we have à demonstration and we have
to make a judgment call as to whether it is one that clearly
fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor the activities, and
that's where I think most of our disagreements fall.
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Senator Hart of Michigan.
Let's assume that the rule
for opening an investigation on a group is narrowly drawn. The
Bureau manual states that informants investigating a subversive
organization should not only report on what that group is
doing but should look at and report on activities in which
the group is participating.
There is a Section 87B3 dealing with reporting on
connections with other groups. That section says that the
field office shall "determine and report on any significant
connection or cooperation with non-subversive groups. Any
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groups.
it
Now let's look at this in practice. In the spring of
1969 there was a rather heated national debate over the
installation of the anti-ballistic missile system. Some of us
remember that. An FBI informant and two FBI confidential
sources reported on the plan's participants and activities
of the Washington Area Citizens Coalition Against the ABM,
particularly in open public debate in a high school auditorium,
20 which included speakers from the Defense Department for the
ABM and a scientist and defense analyst against the ABM.
The informants reported on the planning for the meeting,
the distribution of materials to churches and schools,
participation by local clergy, plans to seek resolution on
ABM from nearby town councils. There was also informat¨
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plans for a subsequent town meeting in Washington with the
names of local political leaders who would attend.
Now the information, the informant information came as
part of an investigation of an allegedly subversive group
participating in that coalition. Yet the information dealt
with all aspects and all participants. The reports on the
plans for the meeting and on the meeting itself were disseminated
to the State Department, to military intelligence, and to the
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How do we get into all of that?
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Mr. Adams. Well
Senator art of Michigan. Or if you were to rerun it,
would you do it again?
Mr. Adams. Well, not in 1975, compared to what 1969
was. The problem we had at the time was where we had an
informant who had reported that this group, this meeting was
going to take place and it was going to be the Daily World,
which was the east coast communist newspaper that made comments
about it. They formed an organizational meeting. We took
a quick look at it. The case apparently was opened in May 28,
1969 and closed June 5 saying there was no problem with this
organization.
Now the problem we get into is if we take a quick look
and get out, fine. We've had cases, though, where we have
stayed in too long. When you're dealing with security it as like
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1 Soviet espionage where they can put one person in this country
2 and they supported him with total resources of the Soviet
3. Union, false identification, all the money he needs, communi-
cations networks, satellite assistance, and everything, and
5 you're working with a paucity of information.
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The same problem exists to a certain extent in domestic
You don't have a lot of black and white situations.
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So someone reports something to you which you feel; you take
a quick look at and there's nothing to it, and I think that's
what they did.
Senator Hart of Michigan. You said that was '69. Let
me bring you up to date, closer to current, a current place
on the calendar.
This one is the fall of last year, 1975. President
Ford announced his new program with respect to amnesty, as
he described it, for draft resistors. Following that there .
17 were several national conferences involving all the groups
18 and individuals interested in unconditional amnesty.
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Now parenthetically, while unconditional amnesty is
not against
while unconditional amnesty is not yet the law,
we agreed that advocating it is not against the law either.
Mr. Adams. That's right.
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Sonator llart of Michigan.
Some of the sponsors worn
24 umbrella organizations involving about 50 diverse groups
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the country. FBI informants provided advance i).
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plans for the meeting and apparently attended and reported on
the conference. The Bureau's own reports described the
participants as having represented diverse' perspectives on
the issue of amnesty, including civil liberties and human
rights groups, G.I. rights spokesmen, parents of men killed
in Vietnam, wives of ex-patriates in Canada, experts on draft
counselling, religious groups interested in peace issues,
delegates from student organizations, and aides of House and
Senate members, drafting legislation on amnesty.
The informant apparently was attending in his role as
a member of a group under investigation as allegedly subversive
and it described the topics of the workshop.
Ironically, the Bureau office report before them noted
that in view of the location of the conference at a theological
seminary, the FBI would use restraint and limit its coverage..
to informant reports.
Now this isn't five or ten years ago. This is last
fall. And this is a conference of people who have the point
of view that I share, that the sooner we have unconditional
amnesty, the better for the soul of the country.
Now what reason is it for a vacuum cleaner approach on
a thing like that? Don't these instances illustrate how broad
informant intelligence really is, that would cause these groups
in that setting having contact with other groups, all and
everybody is drawn into the vacuum and many names go into the
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Bureau files.
Is this what we want?
Mr. Adams. I'll let Mr. Wannall address himself to this.
He is particular knowledgeable as to this operation.
Mr. Wannall.. Senator Hart, that was a case that was
opened on November 14 and closed November 20, and the information
which caused us to be interested in it were really two particular
items. One was that a member of the steering committee therel
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was a three man steering committee, and one of those members
of the national conference was in fact a national officer
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of the VVAW in whom we had suggested before we did. have a
legitimate investigative interest.
Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I would almost say so what
at that point.
Mr. Wannall. The second report we had was that the
VVAW would actively participate in an attempt to pack the
conference to take it over. And the third report we had
Senator Hart of Michigan.
-F
And incidentally, all of the
information that your Buffalo informant had given you with
respect to the goals and aims of the VVAW gave you a list of
goals which were completely within Constitutionally protected
There wasn't a single item out of that VVAW that
jeopardizes the security of this country at all.
objectives.
:
Mr. Wannall. Well, of course, we did not rély entirely
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on the Buffalo informant, but even there we did.
recei
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from that informant information which I considered to be
significant.
The Buffalo chapter of the VVAW was the regional office.
4° covering New York and northern New Jersey: It was one of the
5
five most active VVAW chapters in the country and at a
6 national conference, or at the regional conference, this
informant reported information back to us that an attendee
2
at the conference announced that he had run guns into Cuba
prior to the Castro take-over. He himself said that he during
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the Cuban crisis had been under 24 hour suveillance.
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was also discussion at the conference of subjugating the
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VVAW to the revolutionary union. There were some individuaļs
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in the chapter or the regional conference who were not in
agreement with us, but Mr. Adams has addressed himself to the
interest of the revolutionary union.
So all of the information that we had on the VVAW did
not come from that source but even that particular source did
give us information which we considered to be of some
significance in our appraisal of the need for continuing the
investigation of that particular chapter of the VVAW.
Senator Hart of Michigan. But does it give you the
right or does it create the need to go to a conference, even
if it is a conference that might be taken over by the VVAW
when the subject matter is how and by what means shall we
seek to achieve unconditional amnesty? What threat?
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Mr. Wannall. Our interest, of course, was the VVAW
influence on a particular meeting, if you ever happened to be
3 holding a meeting, or whatever subject it was.
Senator Hart of Michigan. What if it was a meeting to
seek to make more effective the food stamp system in this
country?
Mr Wannall. Well, of course there had been some
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Senator art of Michigan.
Would the same logic follow?
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Mr. Wannail. I think that if we found that if the
Communist Party USA was going to take over the meeting and
use it as a front for its own purposes, there would be a logic
in doing that. You have a whole scope here and it's a matter.
of where you do and where you don't, and hopefully, as we've
said before, we will have some guidance, not only from this
committee but from the guidelines that are being developed.
But within the rationale of what we're doing today, I was
explaining to you our interest not in going to this thing and
not gathering everything there was about it.
In fact, only one individual attended and reported to us,
and that was the person who had, who was not developed for
this reason; an informant who had been reporting on other
matters for some period of time.
And as soon as we got the report of the outrete of the
meeting and the fact that in the period of some dive ve
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Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, my time has expired
but even this brief exchange, I think, indicates that if we
really want to control the dangers to our society of using
informants to gather domestic political intelligence, we have
to restrict sharply domestic intelligence investigations. And
that gets us into what I would like to raise with you when
my turn comes around again, and that's the use of warrants,
obliging the Bureau to obtain a warrant before a full-fledged
informant can be directed by the Bureau against a group or
individuals.
I know you have objections to that and I would like to
13 review that with you.
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Senator Mondale. pursue that question.
Senator Hart of Michigan. I am talking now about an
obligation to obtain a warrant before you turn Loose a full-
fledged informant. I'm not talking about tipsters that run
into you or you run into, or who walk in as information sources
Committee.
The Bureau has raised some objections in this memorandum to the
The Bureau argues that such a warrant requirement
might be unconstitutional because it would violate the First
Amendment rights of FBI informants to communicate with their
government.
Now that's a concern for First Amendment rights that
ought to
hearten all the civil libertarians.
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But why would that vary, why would a warrant requirement
raise a serious constitutional question?
Mr. Adams. Well, for one thing it's the practicability
of it or the impacticability of getting a warrant which:
ordinarily involves probable cause to show that a crime has
been or is about to be committed.
In the intelligence field we are not dealing necessarily.
with an imminent criminal action. We're dealing with activities
such as with the Socialist Workers Party, which we have
discussed before, where they say publicly we're not. to engage
in any violent activity today, but we guarantee you we still
subscribe to the tenets of communism and that when the time
is ripe, we're going to rise up and help overthrow the United
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Well, now, you can't show probable cause if they're about
to do it because they're telling you they're not going to do it
and you know they're not going to do it at this particular
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It's just the mixture somewhat of trying to mix in a
20 criminal procedure with an intelligence gathering function, and
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we can't find any practical way of doing it. We have a particular
organization. We may have an informant that not only belongs
to the Communist Party, but belongs to several other organization:
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and as part of his function he may be sent out by the Communist
25 Party to try to infiltrate one of these clean organizations.
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We don't have probable cause for him to target against
that organization, but yet we should be able to receive informa-
tion from him that he as a Communist Party member, even
:
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though in an informant status, is going to that organization
:
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and don't worry about it. We're making no headway on it.
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It's just from our standpoint the possibility of informants,
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the Supreme Court has held that informants per se do not
8 violate the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments.
9
They have
recognized the necessity that the government has to have
10 individuals who will assist them in carrying out their
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governmental duties.
Senator Hart of Michigan.
I'm not sure I've heard anything
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yet in response to the constitutional question, the very
practical question that you addressed.
Quickly, you are right that the court has said that the
use of the informant per se is not a violation of constitutional
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rights of the subject under investigation.
But Congress
18 can prescribe some safeguards, some rules and some standards,
19 just as we have with respect to your use of electronic
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` surveillance, and could do it with respect to informants.
That's quite different from saying that the warrant
procedure itself would be unconstitutional.
But with respect to the fact that you couldn't show
24 probable cause, and therefore; you couldn't get a warrant,
25 therefore you oppose the proposal to require you to get a
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warrant. It seems to beg the question.
Assuming that you say that since we use informants and
groups which may only engage in lawful activities
investigate
but which might engage in activities that can result in
violence or illegal acts, and you can't use the warrant, but
Congress could say that the use of informants is subject to
such abuse and poses such a threat to legitimate activity,
including the willingness of people to assemble and discuss
the anti-ballistic missile system, and we don't want you to
use them unless you have indication of criminal activity or
unless you present your request to a magistrate in the same.
fashion as you are required to do with respect to, in most
cases, to wiretap.
This is an option available to Congress.
Senator Tower. Senator Schweiker.
Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wannall, what's the difference between a potential
security informant and a security informant?
Mr. Wannall. I mentioned earlier, Senator Schweiker,
that in developing an informant we do a preliminary check on
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him before talking with him and then we do a further in-depth
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background check.
A potential security informant is someone who is under
consideration before he is approved by headquarters for use as
i
an informant. He is someone who is under current consideration.
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On some occasions that person will have been developed to a
point where he is in fact furnishing information and we are
3' engaged in checking upon his reliability.
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In some instances he may be paid for information furnished,
but it has not gotten to the point yet where we have satisfied
ourselves that he meets all of our criteria. When he does,
the field must submit its recommendations to headquarters, and
headquarters will pass upon whether that individual is an
approved FBI informant.
Senator Schweiker. So it's really the first step of
being an informant, I guess,
Mr. Wannall.. It is a preliminary step, one of the
preliminary steps.
Senator Schweiker. In the Rowe case, in the Rowe
testimony that we just heard, what was the rationale again
for not intervening when violence was known?
I know we asked you several times but I'm still having
18 trouble understanding what the rationale, Mr. Wannall, was
19
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Mr. Wannall.
Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address
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answer that.
Senator Schweiker. All right.
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Mr. Adams. The problem we had at the time, and it's the
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problem today, we are an investigative agency. We do not
have police powers like the United States marshalls do.
About 1795, I guess, or some period like that, marshalls have
had the authority that almost borders on what a sheriff, has.
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We are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice
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and during these times the Department of Justice had us maintain
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the role of an investigative agency. We were to report on
activities to furnish the information to the local police,
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who had an obligation to act. We furnished it to the Department
of Justice.
In those areas where the local police did not act, it
resulted finally in the Attorney General sending 500 United
States marshalls down to guarantee the safety of people who
were trying to march in protest of their civil rights.
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This was an extraordinary measure because it came at a
time of civil righs versus federal rights, and yet there was
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a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the country.
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This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement agencies
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in itself at the time either because many of them did act
upon the information that was furnished to them.
have no authority to make an arrest on the spot because we
would not have had evidence that there was a conspiracy
available. We can do absolutely nothing in that regard.
·
In Little Rock, the decision was made, for instance, that
if any arrests need to be made, the Army should make them and
But we
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nẹxt to the Army, the United States marshalls should make them,
not the FBI, even though we developed the violations.
And over the years, as you know, at the time there were many
questions raised." Why doesn't the FBI stop this? Why don't
you do something about it? .
Well, we took the other route and effectively destroyed
the Klan as far as committing acts of violence, and of course
we exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.
Senator Schweiker. What would be wrong, just following
up your point there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program
since it's obvious to me that a lot of informers are going to
have pre-knowledge of violence of using U.S. marshalls on some
kind of a long-range basis to prevent violence?
Mr. Adams. We do. We have them in Boston in connection
with the busing incident. We are investigating the violations
under the Civil Rights Act. But the marshalls are in Boston,
they are in Louisville, I believe at the same time, and this
is the approach, that the Federal government finally recognized
was the solution to the problem where you had to have added
Federal import.
Senator Schweiker. But instead of waiting until it
gets to a Boston state, which is obviously a pretty advanced
confrontation, shouldn't we have some here a coordinated program
that when you go up the ladder of co¨rand in the FBI, that
on an immediate'and fairly contemporary basis, that kind of
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help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting until it
gets to a Boston state?
I realize it's a departture from the past. I'm not
saying it isn't. But it seems to me we need a better remedy
than we have.
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Mr. Adams.
Well, fortunately, we're at a time where
conditions have subsided in the country, even from the '60s
and the '70s and periods or '50s and '60s. We report to the
Department of Justice on potential troublespots around the
country as we learn of them so that the Department will be
aware of them. The planning for Boston, for instance, took
place a year in advance with state officials, city officials,
the Department of Justice and the FBI sitting down together
14 saying, how are we going to protect the situation in Boston?
I think we've learned a lot from the days back in the
early '60s. But the government had no mechanics which protected
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people at that time.
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Senator Schweiker.
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I'd like to go, if I may, to the
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Robert Hardy case. I know he is not a witness but he
was a witness before the House. But since this affects my
state, I'd like to ask Mr. Wannall. Mr. Hardy, of course, was
the FBI informer who ultimately led and planned and organized
a raid on the Camden draft board. An according to Mr. Hardy's
testimony before our Committee, he said that in advance of the
25 raid someone in the Department had even acknowledged the fact
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that they had all the information they needed to clamp down
on the conspiracy and could arrest people at that point in time,
and yet no arrests were made.
Why, Mr. Wannall, was this true?
Mr. Wannall. Well, I can answer that based only on the
material that I have reviewed, Senator Schweiker. It was not
a case handled in my division but I think I can answer your
question.
There was, in fact, a representative of the Department
of Justice on the spot counselling and advising continuously
as that case progressed as to what point the arrest should be
made and we were being guided by those to our mentors, the
ones who are responsible for making decisions of that sort..
So I think that Mr. Hardy's statement to the effect that
there was someone in the Department there is perfectly true.
That responsibility rests with who
Senator Schweiker.
under your procedures?
Mr.
Wannall. We investigate decisions on making arrests,
when they should be made, and decisions with regard to
prosecutions are made either by the United States attorneys
or by Federals in the Department.
Mr. Adams. At this time that particular case did have
a departmental attorney on the scene ause there are questions
of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a tough violation to prove and
sometimes a question of do you have the added value of catching
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evidence to prove the violation.
Well, in this case, though, they
even had a dry run. They could have arrested them on the
dry rụn.
me.
That's getting pretty close to conspiracy, it seems to
They had a dry run and they could have arrested them on
1
someone in the commission of the crime as further proof,
2
rather than relying on one informant and some circumstantial
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Senator Schweiker.
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Senator Schweiker.
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the dry run.
run.
I'd like to know why they didn't arrest them on the dry
Who was this Department of Justice official who made
that decision?
Mr. Adams. Guy Goodwin was the Department official.
Next I'd like to ask back in 1965,
during the height of the effort to destroy the Klan, as you
put it a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released
figures that we had something like 2,000 informers of some
kind or another infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000
estimated membership.
I believe these are either FBI figures or estimates.
That would mean that one out of every five members of the Klan
at that point was an informant paid by the government.
And I believe the figure goes on to indicate that 70
percent of the new members of the Kla. that year were FBI
informants.
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Isn't this an awfully overwhelming quantity of people.
2 to put in an effort such as that? I'm not criticizing that
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you shouldn't have informants in the Klan and know what's
going on for violence, but it seems to me that this is the
tail wagging the dog.
For example, today we supposedly have only 1594 total
informants for both domestic informants and potential informants
and that here we had 2,000 just in the Klan alone.
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Mr. Adams. Well, this number 2,000 did include all
racial matters, informants at that particular time, and I
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think the figures we tried to reconstruct as to the actual
number of Klan informants in relation to Klan members was around
6 percent, I think, after we had read some of the testimony.
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Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan had a
group called the Action Group. This was the group that you
remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony, that he was left
af-
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ter the meeting. He attended the open meetings and heard
all of the hurrahs and this type of thing from information,
but he never knew what was going on because each one had an
action group that went out and considered themselves in the
missionary field.
Theirs was the violence.
In order to penetrate those, it takes, you have to direct
as many informants as you possibly can against it.
Bear in
mind that I think the newspapers, the President and Congress and
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everyone is concerned about the murder of the civil rights
workers, the Linio Kent case, the Viola Liuzzo case, the
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bombings of the church in Birmingham.
We were faced with one
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tremendous problem at that time.
Senator Schweiker. I acknowledge that.
Mr. Adams. Our only approach was through informants
and through the use of informants we solved these cases, the
ones that were solved. Some of the bombing cases we have
never solved. They are extremely difficult.
These informants, as we told the Attorney General, and
as we told the President, that we had moved informants like
Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the bodyguard to the
head man. He was in a position where he could forewarn us
of violence, could help us on cases that had transpired, and
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yet we knew and conceived that this could continue forever
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unless we can create enough disruption that these members will
realize that if I go out and murder three civil rights workers,
even though the sheriff and other law enforcement officers are
the case!
in on it, if that were the case and with some of them it was
that I would be caught. And that's what we did and
that's why violence stopped, was because the Klan was insecure
and just like you say, 20 percent, they thought 50 percent of
their members ultimately were Klan members and they didn't
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| couldn't control the conspiracy any longer.
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Senator Schweiker. My time is expired. I just have
one quick question..
Is it correct that in 1971 we're using around 6500
informers for black ghetto situations?
Mr. Adams. I'm not sure if that's the year. We did
´have one year where we had a number like that which probably
had been around 6000, and that was the time when the cities
were being burned, Detroit, Washington, areas like this. We
were given a mandate to know what the situation is, where is
violence going to break out, what next?
They weren't informants like an individual penetrating
They were listening posts in the community
that would help tell us that we have a group here that's getting
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an organization.
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Senators remaining for questioning.
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ready to start another fire-fight or something.
Senator Tower. At this point, there are three more
If we can try to get
everything in in the first round, we will not have a second
round and I think we can finish around 1:00, and we can. go
on and terminate the proceedings.
However, If anyone feels that they have another question
21 that they want to return to, we can come back here by 2:00.
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Senator Mondale?
Senator Mondale. Mr. Adams, it seems to me that the
:
record is now fairly clear that when the FBI operates in the
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organization of its kind in the world. And when the FBI acts
in the field of political ideas, it has bungled its job, it
3. has interfered with the civil liberties, and finally, in the
4 last month or two, through its public disclosures, heaped
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shame upon itself and really led toward an undermining of
the crucial public confidence in an essential law enforcement
agency of this country..
In a real sense, history has repeated itself because it
was precisely that problem that led to the creation of the FBI
in 1924.
In World War I, the Bureau of Investigation strayed from
its law enforcement functions and became an arbiter and
protector of political ideas. And through the interference
of civil liberties and Palmer Raids and the rest, the public
became so offended that later through Mr. Justice Stone and ·
Mr. Hoover, the FBI was created. And the first statement
by Mr. Stone was that never again will this Justice Department
get involved in political ideas.
And yet here we are again looking at a record where with
Martin Luther King, with anti-war resistors, with we even
had testimony this morning of meetings with the Council of
Churches. Secretly we are investigating this vague, ill-defined,
impossible to define idea of investigating dangerous ideas.
It seems to be the basis of the strategy that people
can't protect themselves, that you somehow need to use the
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tools of law enforcement to protect people from subversive
or dangerous: ideas, which I find strange and quite profoundly
at odds with the philosophy of American government.
I started in politics years ago and the first thing we
had to do was to get the communists out of our parts and out.
6
of the union. We did a very fine job. As far as I know, and
7
I'm beginning to wonder, but as far as I know, we had no help
8
from the FBI or the CIA. We just rammed them out of the meetings
9
on the grounds that they weren't Democrats and they weren't
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good union leaders when we didn't want anything to do with them.
And yet, we see time and time again that we're going to
protect the blacks from Martin Luther King because he's
dangerous, that we've going to protect veterans from whatever
it is, and we're going to protect the Council of Churches
from the veterans, and so on, and it just gets so gummy and
confused and ill-defined and dangerous, that don't you agree
with me that we have to control this, to restrain it, so that
precisely what is expected of the FBI is known by you, by the
public, and that you can justify your actions when we ask
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you?
Mr. Adams. I agree with that, Senator, and I would like
to point out that when the Attorney General made his statement
Mr. Hoover subscribes to it, we followed that policy for about
24 ten years until the President of the Mited States said that
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we should investigate the Nazi Party.
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I for one feel that we should investigate the Nazi Party.
I feel that our investigation of the Nazi Party resulted in
the fact that in World War II, as contrasted with World War I,
there wasn't one single incident of foreign directed sabotage
which took place in the United States.
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Senator Mondale. And under the criminal law you could
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have investigated these issues of sabotage.
Isn't sabotage a crime? ·
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Mr. Adams. Sabotage is a crime.
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Senator Mondale.
Could you have investigated that?
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Mr. Adams. After it happened.
Senator Mondale. You see, every time we get involved
in political ideas, you defend yourself on the basis of
crimes that could have been committed. It's very interesting.
In my opinion, you have to stand here if you're going to
you'
continue what you're now doing and as I understand it, you
still insist that you did the right thing with the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War, and investigating the Council of
Churches, and this can still go on. This can still go on under
your interpretation of your present powers, what you try to
justify on the grounds of your law enforcement activitios
in terms of criminal matters.
Mr. Adams.
The law does not say we have to wait until
we have been murdered before we can
--
Senator Mondale. Absolutely, but that's the field of
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law again. You're trying to defend apples with oranges. That's
the law. You can do that.
Mr. Adams. That's right, but how do you find out which
of the 20,000 Bund members might have been a saboteur. You
don't have probable cause to investigate anyone, but you can
direct an intelligence operation against the German-American
Bund, the same thing we did after Congress said
Senator Mondale. Couldn't you get a warrant for that?
Why did you object to going to court for authority for that?
Mr. Adams. Because we don't have probable cause to
go against an individual and the law doesn't provide for
probable cause to investigate an organization.
There were activities which did take place, like one time
they outlined the Communist Party
Senator Mondale. What I don't understand is why it
wouldn't be better for the FBI for us to define authority
that you could use in the kind of Bonn situation where under
court authority you can investigate where there is probable
cause or reasonable cause to suspect sabotage and the rest.
Wouldn't that make a lot more sense than just making these
decisions on your own?
Mr. Adams. We have expressed complete concurrence in
that. We feel that we're going to beat to death in the
next 100 years, you're damned if you ', and damned if you
don't if we don't have a delineation of our responsibility
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in this area. But I won't
agree with you, Senator, that we
2
have bungled the intelligence operations in the United States.
3
I agree with you that we have made some mistakes.
Mr. Kelley.
4 has set a pattern of being as forthright as any Director of the
5
FBI in acknowledging mistakes that. had been made, but I think
6
that as you said, and I believe Senator Tower said, and
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Senator Church, that we have to watch these hearings because
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of the necessity that we must concentrate on these areas of
.abuse. We must not lose sight of the
overall law enforcement and intelligence community, and I
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still feel that this is the freest country in the world.
I've travelled much, as I'm sure you have, and I know we have
made some mistakes, but I feel that the people in the United
States are less chilled by the mistakes we have made than they
are by the fact that there are 20,000 murders a year in the
United States and they can't walk out of their houses at night
and feel safe.
.
Senator Mondale. That's correct, and isn't that an
argument then, Mr. Adams, for strengthening our powers to go
after those who commit crimes rather than strengthening or
21 continuing a policy which we now see undermines the public
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confidence you need to do your job.
Mr. Adams.
Absolutely.
The mistakes we have made are
:
what have brought on this embarrassment to us
•
I'm not blaming the Committee. I'm saying we made some
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mistakes and in doing so this is what has hurt the FBI. But
at the same time I don't feel that a balanced picture comes
3 out, as you have said yourselves, because of the necessity
of zeroing in on abuses.
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I think that we have done one tremendous job. I think
the accomplishments in the Klan was the finest hour of the
7
End Tape 78
.some mistakes.
FBI and yet, I'm sure in dealing with the Klan that we made
But I just don't agree with bungling.
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Senator Mondale. I don't want to argue over terms, but
I think I sense an agreement that the FBI has gotten into trouble
over it in the political idea trouble, and that that's where we
need to have new legal standards.
Mr. Adams. Yes, I agree with that.
Senator Tower. Senator Huddleston.
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Senator Huddleston.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Adams, these two instances we have studied at some
In
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length seems to have been an
inclination
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the Bureau to establish a notion about an individual or a group
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which seems to be very hard to ever change or dislodge.
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the case of Dr. King, where the supposition was that he was
being influenced by Communist individuals, extensive investi-
gation was made, surveillance, reports came back indicating that
this in fact was untrue, and directions continued to go out
There never seemed to be a
to intensify the investigation.
willingness on the part of the Bureau to accept its own facts.
Ms. Cook testified this morning that something similar
that
to that happened with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War,
every piece of information that she supplied to the Bureau
seemed to indicate that the Bureau was not correct in its
assumption that this organization planned to commit violence,
or that it was being manipulated, and yet you seemed to insist
that this investigation go on, and this information was used
against the individuals.
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Now, are there instances where the Bureau has admitted that
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course?
Mr. Adams We have admitted that. We have also shown
from one of the cases that Senator Hart brought up, that after
five days we closed the case. We were told something by an
individual that there was a concern of an adverse influence
1
in it, and we looked into it. On the Martin Luther King
situation there was no testimony to the effect that we just
10 dragged on and on, or admitted that we dragged on and on and
11
on, ad infinitum.
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The wiretaps on Martin Luther King were
all approved by the Attorney General. Microphones on Martin
13 Luther King were approved by another Attorney General. This
wasn't the FBI, and the reason they were approved was that
there was a basis to continue the investigation up to a point.
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What I testified to was that we were improper in discreditir
Dr. King, but it's just like
Senator Huddleston. The Committee has before it memoranda
written by high officials of the Bureau indicating that the
information they were receiving from the field, from these
surveillance methods, did not confirm what their supposition
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was.
Mr. Adams. That memorandum was rot on Dr. King. That
was on another individual that I this somehow got mixed up.
in the discussion, one where the isous was can we make people
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prove they aren't a Communist before we will agree not to
investigate them.
But the young lady appearing this morning making the
4 comment that she never knew of anything she told us that
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she considers herself a true member of the VVAW-WSO inasmuch
as she feels in general agreement of the principles of it, and
agreed to cooperate with the FBI in providing information regard-
ing the organization to aid in preventing violent individuals
from associating themselves with the VVAW-WSO. She is most
concerned about efforts by the Revolutionary Union to take over
the VVAW-WSO, and she is working actively to prevent this..
I think that we have a basis for investigating the VVAW-
WSO in certain areas today. In other areas we have stopped
the investigation. They don't agree with these principles
laid down by the
Senator Huddleston. That report was the basis of your
continuing to pay informants and continuing to utilize that
information against members who certainly had not been involved
in violence, and apparently to get them fired from their job
or whatever?
Mr. Adams. It all gets back to the fact that even in the
criminal law field, you have to detect crime, and you have to
prevent crime, and you can't wait until something happens. The
Attorney General has clearly spoken i that area, and even our
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statutory jurisdiction. provides that we don't
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Senator Huddleston. Well, of course we've had considerable
evidence this morning where no attempt was made to prevent
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Mr. Adams. We disseminated every single item which he
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But I'm sure there are instances where you have.¨
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To a police department which you
reported to us.
Senator Huddleston.
knew was an accomplice to the crime.
Mr. Adams. Not necessarily.
Senator Huddleston. Your informant had told you that,
hadn't he?
Mr. Adams. Well, the informant is on one level. We have
other informants, and we have other information.
Senator Huddleston.
Yes, but you were aware that he
had worked with certain members of the Birmingham police in
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order to
--
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Mr. Adams. Yes.
He furnished many other instances also.
Senator Huddleston. So you weren't really doing a whole
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lot to prevent that incident by telling the people who were
already part of it.
Mr. Adams. We were doing everything we could lawfully
do at the time, and finally the situation was corrected, so that
when the Department, agreeing that we had no further. juris-
diction, could sent the United States Marshal down to perform
certain law enforcement functions.
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Senator Huddleston.
Now, the Committee has received
documents which indicated that in one situation the FBI assisted
an informant who had been established in a white hate group
4 to establish a rival white hate group, and that the Bureau paid
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his expenses in setting up this rival organization.
Now, does this not put the Bureau in a position of being
responsible for what actions the rival white hate group might
have undertaken?
Mr. Adams. I'd like to see if one of the other gentlemen
knows that specific case, because I don't think we set up a
specific group.
This is Joe Deegan.
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Mr. Deegan.
Senator, it's my understanding that the
13
informant we're talking about decided to break off from the
14
group he was with. He was with the
15
Macon Klan group of
the United Klans of America, and he decided to break off.
This
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was in compliance with our regulations.
His breaking off,
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we did not pay him to set up the organization.
He did it
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on his own. We paid him for the information he furnished
us concerning the operation.
We did not sponsor the organiza-
tion.
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Senator Huddleston.
Concerning the new organization that
he set up, he continued to advise you of the activities of that
organization?
Mr. Deegan. He continued to advise us of that organization
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activities.
Senator Huddleston.
He would advise us of planned
The new organization that he formed,
did it operate in a very similar manner to the previous one?
Mr. Deegan. No, it did not, and it did not last that
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long..
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Senator Huddleston.
There's also evidence of an FBI
8
informant in the Black Panther Party who had a position of
responsibility within the party with the knowledge of his
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them in how to use those weapons.
9
FBI contact of supplying members with weapons and instructing
Presumably this was in the
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knowledge of the Bureau, and he later became
came in contact
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with the group that was contracting for murder, and he partici-
pated in this group with the knowledge of the FBI agent, and
this group did in fact stalk a victim who was later killed with
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the weapon supplied by this individual, presumably all in the
knowledge of the FBI.
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How does this square with your enforcement and crime
prevention responsibilities.
case.
Mr. Deegan.. Senator, I'm not familiar with that particular
It does not square with our policy in all respects, and
I would have to look at that particular case you're talking
about to give you an answer.
Senator Huddleston.
I don't have the documentation on that
particular case, but it brings up the point as to what kind of
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control you exercised over this kind of informant in this kind
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of an organization and to what extent an effort is made to
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Mr. Adams. A good example of this was Mr. Rowe, who became
active in an action group, and we told him to get out or
we would no longer use him as an informant, in spite of the
information he had furnished in the past.
We have had cases, Senator, where we have had
Senator Huddleston. But you also told him to participatė
in violent activities.
Mr. Adams. We did not tell him to participate in violent
activities.
Senator Huddleston.
That's what he said..
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Mr. Adams. I know that's what he said. But that's what
lawsuits are all about, is that there are two sides to the
issue, and our agents. handling. this have advised. us, and I
believe have advised. your staff, that at no time did they
advise him to engage in violence..
Senator. Huddleston. Just to do what was necessary to
get the information, I believe maybe might have been his
instructions.
Mr. Adams. I don't think they made any such statement
to him along that line, and we have informants, we have
informants who have gotten involved in the violation of the law,
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to the subject, and have prosecuted I would say, offhand, I
can think of around 20 informants that we have prosecuted for
violating the laws, once it came to our attention, and even
to show you our policy of disseminating information on violence
in this case, during the review of the matter, the agents told
me that they found one case where their agent had been working
24 hours a day, and he was a little late in disseminating the
information to the police department.
No violence occurred,.
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but it showed up in a file review, and he was censured for
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his delay in properly notifying local authorities.
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So we not only have a policy, I feel that we do follow
reasonable safeguards in order to carry it out, including periodic
review of all informant. files. .
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Senator Huddleston.
Well, Mr. Rowe's statement is
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substantiated to some extent with the acknowledgement by the
agent in charge that if you're going to be a Klansman and you
happen to be with someone and they decide to do something, that
These were the words of the agent,.
he couldn't be an angel.
.
and be a good informant.
implication is that he would have to go along and would have
to be involved if he was going to maintain his credibility.
Mr. Adams. There's no question but that an informant at
times will have to be present. during demonstrations, riots,
fistfights that take place, but I believe his statement was
. He wouldn't take the lead; but the
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and I was sitting in the back of the
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room and I don't recall it exactly, but some of them were
beat with chains, and I didn't hear whether he said he beat
someone with a chain or not, but I rather doubt that he did
because it's one thing being present, and it's another thing
taking an active part in criminal actions.
Senator Huddleston. He was close enough to get his
throat cut.
How does the gathering of information
Senator Tower. Senator Mathias is here, and I think that
we probably should recess a few minutes.
Could we have Senator Mathias' questions and then should
we convene this afternoon?
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question.
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Senator Tower. Go ahead.
Senator Huddleston. I wanted to ask how the selection of
information about an individual's personal life, social, sex
life and becoming involved in that sex life or social life
is a requirement for law enforcement or crime prevention.
Mr. Adams. Our agent handlers have advised us on Mr.
Rowe, that they gave him no such instruction, they had no
such knowledge concerning it, and I can't see where it would
be of any value whatsoever.
Senator Huddleston. You aren't aware of any case where
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these instructions were given to an agent or an informant?
Mr. Adams. To get involved in sexual activity? No, sir.
Senator Huddleston."
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tower. Senator Mathias.
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Senator Mathias.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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I would like to come back very briefly to the Fourth
Amendment considerations in connection with the use of informants
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and in posing these questions we're not thinking of the one
time volunteer who walks in to an FBI office and says I have
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a story I want to tell you and that's the only time that you
may see him.
I'm thinking of the kind of situations in which
there is a more extended relationship which could be of varying
degrees. It might be in one case that the same individual
will have some usefulness in a number of situations. But when
the FBI orders a regular agent to engage in a search, the first
test is a judicial warrant, and what I would like to explore
with you is the difference between a one time search which
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when you make that
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search, and a continuous search which uses an informant, or
the case of a continuous search which uses a regular undercover
agent, someone who is totally under your control, and is in a
slightly different category than an informant.
Mr. Adams.
Well, we get there into the fact that the
Supreme Court has still held that the use of informants does
not invade any of these constitutionally protected areas, and
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if a person wants to tell an informant something that isn't
protected by the Supreme Court.
An actual search for legal evidence, that is a protected
4 item, but information and the use of informants have been
consistently held as not posing any constitutional problems.
Senator Mathias. I would agree, if you're talking about
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the fellow who walks in off the street, as I said earlier,
but is it true that under existing procedures informants are
given background checks?
Mr. Adams. Yes, sir.
Senator Mathias. And they are subject to a testing period.
Mr. Adams. That's right, to verify and make sure they
are providing to us reliable information.
Senator Mathias. And during the period that the relation-
ship continues, they are rather closely controlled by the
handling agents.
Mr. Adams. That's true.
Senator Mathias.
So in effect they can come in a very
practical way agents themselves to the FBI.
Mr. Adams. They can do nothing
Senator Mathias.
Certainly agents in the common law use
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Mr. Adams.
That's right, they can do nothing, and we
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instruct our agents that an informant can do nothing that the
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an organization in an undercover capacity, he can sit there and
glean all the information that he wants, and that is not in the
Constitution as a protected area. But we do have this problem.
Senator Mathias. But if a regular agent who is a member
of the FBI attempted to enter these premises, he would require
a warrant?
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Mr. Adams. No, sir, if a regular
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purpose for which he is entering.
it depends on the
If a regular agent by
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Communist Party, he can attend Communist Party meetings, and he
can enter the premises, he can enter the building, and there's
no constitutionally invaded area there.
Senator Mathias. And so you feel that anyone who has
a less formal relationship with the Bureau than a regular
agent, who can undertake a continuous surveillance operation
as an undercover agent. or as an informant.
--
Mr. Adams. As long as he commits no illegal acts.
Senator Mathias. Let me ask you why you feel that it is
impractical to require a warrant since, as I understand it,
headquarters must approve the use of an informant.
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Mr. Adams. The main difficulty is the particularity
which has to be shown in obtaining a search warrant.
You
have to go after particular evidence. You have to specify
what you're going after, and an informant operates in an
area that you just cannot specify. He doesn't know what's
going to be discussed at that meeting. It may be a plot to
blow up the Capitol again or it may be a plot to blow up the
State Department building. .
Senator Mathias. If it were a criminal investigation,
you would have little difficulty with probable cause, wouldn't
you?
Mr. Adams. We would have difficulty in a warrant to
use someone as an informant in that area because the same
difficulty of particularity exists. We can't specify.
Senator Mathias. I understand the problem because it's
very similar to one that we discussed earlier in connection
say wiretaps on a national security problem.
Mr. Adams. That's it, and there we face the problem of
where the Soviet, an individual identified as a Soviet spy
in a friendly country and they tell us he's been a Soviet spy
there and now he's coming to the United States, and if we can't
show under a probable cause warrant, if we couldn't show that
he was actually engaging in espionage in the United States,
we couldn't get a wiretap under the probable cause requirements
which have been discussed. If the good fairy didn't drop the
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espionage, we again would fall short of this, and that's
3 why we're still groping with it.
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Senator Mathias. When you say fall short, you really,
you would be falling short of the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
Mr. Adams. That's right, except for the fact that the
President, under this Constitutional powers, to protect this
nation and make sure that it survives first, first of all
national survival, and these are the areas that not only the
་
President but the Attorney General are concerned in and we're
all hoping that somehow we can reach a legislative middle
ground in here.
Senator Mathias. Which we discussed in the other national
security area as to curtailling a warrant to that particular
need.
in an
Mr. Adams. And if you could get away from probable
cause and get some degree of reasonable cause and get some
· method of sealing indefinitely your interest, say,
ongoing espionage case and can work out those difficulties,
we may get their yet.
Senator Mathias. And you don't despair of finding that
middle ground?
Mr. Adams. I don't because I think that today there's
more of an open mind between Congress and the Executive Branch
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and the FBI and everyone concerning the need to get these
areas resolved.
Senator Mathias. And you believe that the Department,
if we could come together, would support, would agree to that
kind of a warrant requirement if we could agree on the language?
Mr. Adams. If we can work out problems and the Attorney
General is personally interested in that also.
Senator Mathias. Do you think that this agreement might
extend to some of those other areas, that we talked about?
Mr. Adams. I think that that would be a much greater
difficulty in an area of domestic intelligence informant who
reports on many different operations and different types of
activities that might come up rather than say in a Soviet
espionage or a foreign espionage case where you do have a little
more degree of specificity to deal with.
Senator Mathias. I suggest that we arrange to get
together and try out some drafts with each other, but in the
meantime, of course, there's another alternative and that
would be the use of wiretap procedure by which the Attorney
General must approve a wiretap before it is placed, and the
same general process could be used for informants, since
you come to headquarters any way.
Mr.
Adams. That could be an alte tive. I think it
would be a very burdensome alternative
And I think at some
25 point after we attack the major abuses, or what are considered
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major abuses of Congress and get over this hurdle, I think
we're still going to have to recognize that heads of agencies
3 have to accept the responsibility for managing that agency
and we can't just keep pushing every operational problem up
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to the top because there just aren't enough hours in the day.
Senator Mathias. But the reason that parallel suggests
itself is of course the fact that the wiretap deals generally
with one level of information in one sense of gathering
information.
also.
You hear what you hear from the tap.
Mr. Adams. But you're dealing in a much smaller number
Senator Mathias.
Smaller number, but that's all the
more reason. When an informant goes in, he has all of his
senses. He's gathering all of the information a human being
can acquire from a situation and has access to more information
than the average wiretap.
And it would seem to me that for that reason a parallel
process might be useful and in order.
Mr. Adams. Mr. Mintz pointed out one other main
distinction to me which I had overlooked from our prior
discussions, which is the fact that with an informant he is
22. more in the position of being a concentral monitor in that one
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of the two parties to the conversation agrees, such as like
concentral monitoring of telephones and microphones and
25 anything else versus the wiretap itself where the individual
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and neither of the two parties talking had agreed that their
conversation could be monitored.
Senator Mathias. I find that one difficult to accept.
If I'm the third party overhearing a conversation that is taking
place in a room where I am, and my true character isn't perceived
7
by the two people who are talking, in effect they haven't
consented to my overhearing my conversation.
Then they consent
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if they believe that I am their friend or their, a partisan
of theirs.
But if they knew in fact that I was an informant for
someone else, they wouldn't be consenting.
Mr. Adams. Well, that's like I believe Senator, llart
raised earlier, that the courts thus far have made this
distinction with no difficulty, but that doesn't mean that
there may not be some legislative compromise which might be
addressed.
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Senator Mathias.
Well, I particularly appreciate your
attitude in being willing to work on these problems because
I think that's the most important thing that can evolve from
these hearings, so that we can actually look at the Fourth
Amendment as the standard that we have to achieve. But the
23 way we get there is obviously going to a lot easier if we
can work toward them together.
24
25
I just have one final question, Mr. Chairman, and that
.. NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 165
gsh 6
°1957
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
"
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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?
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deals with whether we shouldn't impose a standard of probable
cause that a crime has been committed as a means of controlling
the use of informants and the kind of information that they
collect.
Do you feel that this would be too restrictive?
Mr. Adams. Yes, sir, I do.
When look at informants and I see that each year
informants provide us, locate 5000 dangerous fugitives, they
provide subjects in 2000 more cases, they recover $86 million
in stolen property and contraband, and that's irrespective
of what we give the local law enforcement and other Federal
agencies, which is almost a comparable figure, we have almost
reached a point in the criminal law where we don't have much
left. And in the intelligence field we still, I think when
we carve all of the problems away, we still have to make sure
that we have the means to gather information which will permit
us to be aware of the identity of individuals and organizations
that are acting to overthrow the government of the United
States. And I think we still have some areas to look hard
at as we have discussed, but I think informants are here to
stay. They are absolutely essential to law enforcement.
Everyone uses informants. The press has informants, Congress
has informants, you have individuals in your community that
you rely on, not for ulterior purposes, but to let you know
what's the feel of the people, am I serving them properly,
NW 88608 Docid 32989820 Page 166
:
:
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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
WARD & PAUL
gsh 7
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
1958
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am I carrying out this?
It's here to say. It's been here throughout history
and there will always be informants. And the thing we want to
4 avoid is abuses. like provocateurs, criminal activities, and
5
to ensure that we have safeguards that will prevent that.
6
But we do need informants.
7
Senator Tower.
Senator Hart, do you have any further
8
questions?
Senator Hart of Michigan.
Yes.
I ask unanimous request
10
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perhaps with a view to giving balance to the record, the
groups that we have discussed this morning into which the
Bureau has put informants, in popular language, our liberal
groups I would ask unanimous consent that be printed in
the record, the summary of the opening of the headquarters
file by the Bureau of Dr. Carl McIntyre when he announced
that he was organizing a group to counter the American Civil
Liberties Union and other "liberal and communist groups,"
is not a left only pre-occupation.
Senator Tower. Without objection, so ordered.
(The material referred to follows:)
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NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 167
|
410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
C
WARD & PAUL
gsh 8
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
7
1959
1
Senator Tower. Any more questions?
2
Then the Committee will have an Executive Session this.
3
afternoon in Room 3110 in the Dirksen Building at 3:00,
and
I hope everyone will be in attendance.
5
Tomorrow morning we will hear from Courtney Evans,
6
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Cartha DeLoach. Tomorrow afternoon, former Attorneys General
Ramsey Clark and Edward Katzenbach.
The Committee, the hearings are recessed until 10:00
a.m. tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 1:10 'o'clock p.m., the hearing in the
above mentioned matter was concluded, to reconvene on Wednesday
December 3rd, 1975, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.)
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NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 168
Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 7-11-75)
TO: SAC:
Albany
Albuquerque
Alexandria
Anchorage
Atlanta
Baltimore
Bimingham
Boston
Buffalo
Butte
Charlotte
(Copies offices Checked)
Houston
Indianapolis
Jackson
Jacksonville
Kansas City
Knoxville
Las Vegas
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
☐ Oklahoma City
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
Richmond
Sacramento
St. Louis
TO LEGAT:
Bern
Ronu
Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Hong Kong
London
Madrid
Salt Lake City
Manila
San Antonio
Mexico City
San Diego
Oltawa
San Francisco
Paris
Rome
Tel Aviv
Tokyo
San Juan
Savannah
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbia
Mobile
Dallas
Newark
Scattle
Denver
New Haven
Springfield
Detroit
New Orleans
Tampa
El Paso
Honolulu
New York City
Norfolk
Washington Field
Quantico
RE:
Date December 4, 1975
-
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE
For information
Retention
optional
For appropriate
action
Surep, by
conceal all
The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,
sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.
Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA
dated
Remarks:
For your assistance in responding to
local press inquiries, attached is a copy of
unedited excerpted remarks by Assistant to the
Director--Deputy Associate Director James B.
Adams while testifying before the Senate Select
Committee on 12/2/75, concerning anti-FBI
allegations made by Gary Rowe, former FBI
informant.
66-3346-20
Enc. (1)
Bufile
Urfile
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 169
1975
TU-MAMI
EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE BY
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR JAMES B. ADAMS
TESTIFYING BEFORE THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
PERTAINING TO THE KU KLUX KLAN,
GARY ROWE, FORMER FBI INFORMANT, AND
PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS OF THE FBI
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 170
TO PREVENT VIOLENCE
DECEMBER 2, 1975
66-3346-19
PRARCHED
CECKLA
INDEXED
DEC 8 1975
TDI-MIAMI

QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
....You do use informants and do instruct them to
spread dissention among certain groups that they are
informing on, do you not?
We did when we had the COINTEL programs which were
discontinued in 1971, and I think the Klan is probably one
of the best examples of a situation where the law was
ineffective at the time. We heard the term, State's Rights
used much more than we hear today. We saw with the
Little Rock situation the President of the United States
sending in the troops pointing out the necessity to use
local law enforcement.
We must have local law enforcement
use the troops only as a last resort. When you have a
situation like this where you do try to preserve the
respective roles in law enforcement, you have historical
problems.
With the Klan coming along, we had situations where
the FBI and the Federal Government was almost powerless
to act. We had local law enforcement officers in some
areas participating in Klan violence. The incidents
mentioned by Mr. Rowe--everyone of those he saw them from the
lowest level--the informant. He didn't see what action
was taken with that information as he pointed out during
his testimony. Our files show that this information was
reported to the police departments in every instance.
We also know that in certain instances the infor-
mation upon being received was not being acted upon. We
also disseminated simultaneously through letterhead
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 171
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
memorandum to the Department of Justice the problem.
And here we were--the FBI--in a position where we had no
authority in the absence of an instruction from the
Department of Justice to make an arrest.
Section 241
and 242 don't cover it because you don't have evidence
of a conspiracy.
It ultimately resulted in a situation
where the Department called in U. S. Marshals who do have
authority similar to local law enforcement officials.
So historically, in those days, we were just as
frustrated as anyone else was, that when we got information
from someone like Mr. Rowe--good information, reliable
information--and it was passed on to those who had the
responsibility to do something about it, it was not always
acted upon as he indicated.
In none of these cases, then, there was adequate
evidence of conspiracy to give you jurisdiction to act.
The Departmental rules at that time, and still do,
require Departmental approval where you have a conspiracy.
Under 241, it takes two or more persons acting together.
You can have a mob scene and you can have blacks and whites
belting each other, but unless you can show that those that
initiated the action acted in concert, in a conspiracy, you
have no violation.
Congress recognized this and it wasn't until 1968
that they came along and added Section 245 to the Civil
Rights Statute which added punitive measures against an
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 172
-
2.
-
QUESTION:
MR ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
individual.
There didn't have to be a conspiracy. This
was a problem that the whole country was grappling with--
the President of the United States, Attorneys General--we
were in a situation where we had rank lawlessness taking
place. As you know from the memorandum we sent you that
we sent to the Attorney General the accomplishments we were
able to obtain in preventing violence and in neutralizing
the Klan and that was one of the reasons.
..A local town meeting on a controversial social
issue might result in disruption. It might be by hecklers
rather than by those holding the meeting. Does this
mean that the Bureau should investigate all groups
organizing or participating in such meetings because
they may result in violent government disruption?
No sir, and we don't....
Isn't that how you justify spying on almost every
aspect of the peace movement?
No sir. When we monitor demonstrations, we monitor
demonstrations where we have an indication that the
demonstration itself is sponsored by a group that we have
an investigative interest in, a valid investigative
interest in, or where members of one of these groups are
participating where there is a potential that they might
change the peaceful nature of the demonstration.
This is our closest question of trying to draw
guidelines to avoid getting into an area of infringing
on the 1st Amendment right, yet at the same time, being
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 173
-3-
QUESTION:
MR. WANNALL:
MR. ADAMS:
aware of groups such as we have had in greater numbers
in the past than we do at the present time. We have had
periods where the demonstrations have been rather severe
and the courts have said that the FBI has the right,
and indeed the duty, to keep itself informed with respect
to the possible commission of crime. It is not obliged
to wear blinders until it may be too late for prevention.
Now that's a good statement if applied in a clear-cut
case.
Our problem is where we have a demonstration and
we have to make a judgment call as to whether it is one
that clearly fits the criteria of enabling us to monitor
the activities. That's where I think most of our disagree-
ments fall.
In the Rowe Case, in the Rowe testimony that we just
heard, what was the rationale again for not intervening when
violence was known about. I know we have asked this several
times--I'm still having trouble understanding what the
rationale, Mr. Wannall, was in not intervening in the Rowe
situation when violence was known.
Senator Schweiker, Mr. Adams did address himself to
that and if you have no objections, I'll ask that he be
the one to answer the question.
The problem we had at the time, and it is the problem
today, we are an investigative agency; we do not have
police powers even like the U. S. Marshals do. The Marshals
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 174
-4-
since about 1795 I guess, or some period like that, had
authorities that almost border on what a sheriff has. We
are the investigative agency of the Department of Justice,
and during these times the Department of Justice had us
maintain the role of an investigative agency.
We were to report on activities.
We furnished the
information to the local police who had an obligation to
act.
We furnished it to the Department of Justice in those
areas where the local police did not act. It resulted
finally in the Attorney General sending 500 U. S. Marshals
down to guarantee the safety of people who were trying to
march in protest of their civil rights.
This was an extraordinary measure because it came at
a time of Civil Rights versus Federal Rights and yet there
was a breakdown in law enforcement in certain areas of the
country. This doesn't mean to indict all law enforcement
agencies in the South at the time either, because many of
them did act upon the information that was furnished to
them. But we have no authority to make an arrest on the
spot because we would not have had evidence that was a
conspiracy available. We could do absolutely nothing in
that regard. In Little Rock the decision was made, for
instance, that if any arrests need to be made, the Army
should make them. And next to the Army, the U. S. Marshals
should make them--not the FBI, even though we developed
the violations. We have over the years as you know at the
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 175
5
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR ADAMS:
Time there were many questions raised. Why doesn't the
FBI stop this? Why don't you do something about it?
Well,
we took the other route and effectively destroyed the Klan
as far as committing acts of violence and, of course, we
exceeded statutory guidelines in that area.
What would be wrong, just following up on your point
there, Mr. Adams, with setting up a program since it is
obvious to me that a lot of our informers are going to
have preknowledge of violence of using U. S. Marshals on
some kind of long-range basis to prevent violence?
We do. We have them in Boston in connection with
the busing incident. We are investigating the violations
under the Civil Rights Act, but the Marshals are in
Boston. They are in Louisville, I believe, at the same
time and this is the approach that the Federal Government
finally recognized.
On an immediate and fairly contemporary basis that
kind of help can be sought instantly as opposed to waiting
till it gets to a Boston state. I realize a departure from
the past and not saying it isn't, but it seems to me we need
a better remedy than we have.
Well, fortunately we are at a time where conditions have
subsided in the country even from the 60's and the 70's, or
50's and 60's. We report to the Department of Justice on
potential trouble spots around the country as we learn of them
so that the Department will be aware of them. The planning
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 176
-6-
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
for Boston, for instance, took place a year in advance, with
state officials, city officials, the Department of Justice
and the FBI sitting down together saying "How are we going to
protect the situation in Boston"? I think we have learned a
lot from the days back in the early 60's. But, the Government
had no mechanics which protected people at that time.
Next I would like to ask, back in 1965, I guess during
the height of the effort to destroy the Klans as you put it
a few moments ago, I believe the FBI has released figures that
we had something like 2,000 informers of some kind or another
infiltrating the Klan out of roughly 10,000 estimated member-
ship.
That's right.
That would
Isn't that an
I believe these are FBI figures or estimates.
mean that 1 out of every 5 members of the Klan at that point
was an informant paid by the Government and I believe the
figure goes on to indicate that 70 percent of the new members
in the Klan that year were FBI informants.
awful overwhelming quantity of people to put in an effort such
as that? I'm not criticizing that we shouldn't have informants
in the Klan and know what is going on to revert violence but it
just seems to me that the tail is sort of wagging the dog. For
example today we supposedly have only 1594 total informants,
both domestic informants and potential informants. Yet, here
we have 2,000 in just the Klan alone.
Well, this number of 2,000 did include all racial matters
and informants at that particular time and I think the figures
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 177
-7-
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
we tried to reconstruct as to the actual number of Klan
informants in relaton to Klan members was around 6 percent, I
think after we had read some of the testimony on it. Isn't that
right, Bill? Now the problem we had on the Klan is the Klan
had a group called the Action Group. This was the group if you
remember from Mr. Rowe's testimony that he was left out of in
the beginning. He attended the open meetings and heard all the
hoorahs and this type of information but he never knew what was
going on because each one had an Action Group that went out and
considered themselves in the missionary field. Theirs was the
violence. In order to penetrate those you have to direct as
many informants as you possibly can against it. Bear in mind
that I think the newspapers, the President, Congress, everyone,
was concerned about the murder of the three civil rights
workers, the Lemul Penn case, the Violet Liuzzo case, the
bombings of the church in Birmingham.
tremendous problem at that time.
I acknowledge that.
We were faced with one
Our only approach was through informants.
Through the
use of informants we solved these cases. The ones that were
solved. There were some of the bombing cases we never solved.
They're extremely difficult, but, these informants as we told
the Attorney General and as we told the President, we moved
informants like Mr. Rowe up to the top leadership. He was the
bodyguard to the head man. He was in a position where he
could see that this could continue forever unless we could
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 178
-8-
QUESTION:
MR ADAMS:
QUESTION:
create enough disruption that these members will realize that
if I go out and murder three civil rights, even though the
Sheriff and other law enforcement officers are in on it, if
that were the case, and in some of that was the case, that I
will be caught, and that's what we did, and that's why violence
stopped because the Klan was insecure and just like you say
20 percent, they thought 50 percent of their members ultimately
were Klan members, and they didn't dare engage in these acts of
violence because they knew they couldn't control the conspiracy
any longer.
I just have one quick question. Is it correct that in
1971 we were using around 6500 informers for a black ghetto
situation?
I'm not sure if that's the year. We did have a year
where we had a number like that of around 6000 and that was
the time when the cities were being burned. Detroit, Washington,
areas like this, we were given a mandate to know what the
situation is, where is violence going to break out next. They
weren't informants like an individual that is penetrating an
organization. They were listening posts in the community that
would help tell us that we have another group here that is
getting ready to start another fire fight or something.
...
Without going into that subject further of course we
have had considerable evidence this morning where no attempt
was made to prevent crime when you had information that it
was going to occur. I am sure there were instances where
you have.
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 179
-9-
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
We disseminated every single item which he reported to us.
To a police department which you knew was an accomplice to
the crime.
Not necessarily knew.
Your informant told you that, hadn't he?
The informant is on one level. We have other informants
and we have other information.
You were aware that he had worked with certain members of
the Birmingham Police in order...
That's right. He furnished many other instances also.
So you really weren't doing a whole lot to prevent that
incident by telling the people who were already a part of it.
We were doing everything we could lawfully do at the
time and finally the situation was corrected when the Department
agreeing that we had no further jurisdiction, sent the U.S.
Marshals down to perform certain law enforcement functions.
...This brings up the point as to what kind of control
you can exercise over this kind of informant and to this
kind of organization and to what extent an effort is made to
prevent these informants from engaging in the kind of thing
that you were supposedly trying to prevent.
A good example of this was Mr. Rowe who became active in
an Action Group and we told him to get out or we were no longer
using him as an informant in spite of the information he had
furnished in the past. We have cases, Senator where we have had
But you also told him to participate in violent activities
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 180
-10-

MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
We did not tell him to participate in violent activities.
That's what he said.
I know that's what he says, but that's what lawsuits
are all about is that there are two sides to issues and our
Agent handlers have advised us, and I believe have advised your
staff members, that at no time did they advise him to engage
in violence.
Just to do what was necessary to get the information.
I do not think they made any such statement to him
along that line either and we have informants who have gotten
involved in the violation of a law and we have immediately
converted their status from an informant to the subject and
have prosecuted I would say off hand, I can think of around
20 informants that we have prosecuted for violating the laws
once it came to our attention and even to show you our policy
of disseminating information on violence in this case during
the review of the matter the Agents have told me that they
found one case where an Agent had been working 24 hours a
day and he was a little late in disseminating the information
to the police department. No violence occurred but it showed
up in a file review and he was censured for his delay in
properly notifying local authorities. So we not only
have a policy, I feel that we do follow reasonable safeguards
in order to carry it out, including periodic review of all
informant files.
Mr. Rowe's statement is substantiated to some extent with
an acknowledgment by the Agent in Charge that if he were going
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 181
-11-
MR. ADAMS:
QUESTION:
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
to be a Klansman and he happened to be with someone and they
decided to do something, he couldn't be an angel.
words of the Agent. And be a good informant.
These are
He wouldn't
take the lead but the implication is that he would have
to go along or would have to be involved if he was going
to maintain his liability as a
There is no question that an informant at times will
have to be present during demonstrations, riots, fistfights
that take place but I believe his statement was to the
effect that, and I was sitting in the back of the room and I do
not recall it exactly, but that some of them were beat with
chains and I did not hear whether he said he beat someone with
a chain or not but I rather doubt that he did, because it is
one thing being present, it is another thing taking an
active part in a criminal action.
It's true. He was close enought to get his throat cut
apparently.
How does the collection of information about an
individual's personal life, social, sex life and becoming
involved in that sex life or social life is a requirement for
law enforcement or crime prevention.
Our Agent handlers have advised us on Mr. Rowe that
they gave him no such instruction, they had no such knowledge
concerning it and I can't see where it would be of any
value whatsoever.
-12-
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 182
QUESTION:
MR. ADAMS:
You don't know of any such case where these instructions
were given to an Agent or an informant?
To get involved in sexual activity? No Sir.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 183
-13-
FD-36 (Rev 5-22-64)
4
37
FBI
Date:
SEPTEMBER 12, 1975
18
(Type in plaintext or code)
Transmit the following in
CODE
TELETYPE
Via
NITEL
(Priority)
TO:
DIRECTOR (62–116395) MEB
FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)
SENSTUDY 75
REMYTEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975.
THOMAS MCANDREWS ADVISED THE MIAMI OFFICE HE IS DEPARTING
THIS DATE FOR WASHINGTON, D. C., AS HE HAS BEEN CALLED TO
FURNISHED FOR INFO.
TESTIFY.
END
JLM:mjs
(1)
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 184
mys
Filed.
Sent
66-3346-17
90 Per sah
хая
90%M
U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574
NR018 MM CODE
9:02 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 12, 1975 MRW
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
FROM MIAMI
SENSTUDY 75
(62-116395)
(66-3346)
ONE PAGE
REMYTEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975.
THOMAS MCANDREWS ADVISED THE MIAMI OFFICE HE IS DEPARTING
THIS DATE FOR WASHINGTON, D.C., AS HE HAS BEEN CALLED TO
TESTIFY. FURNISHED FOR INFO.
END
TMA ACK FOR ONE AND FBHQ CLR
TH.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 185
Fie
что
66-3346-17
ev. 5-22-64)
Transmit the following in
CODE
Via
TELETYPE
FBI
Date: SEPTEMBER 10, 1975
(Type in plaintext or code)
NITEL
(Priority)
4
TO:
DIRECTOR (62-116395)
-
LSG
IP
FROM: SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.
THOMAS MC ANDREWS AND FREDERICK F. FOX WERE CONTACTED BY
SAC SEPTEMBER 9, 1975.
ARE CORRECT.
ADDRESSES SET FORTH IN RETEL FOR EACH
MC ANDREWS STATED HIS KNOWLEDGE IS INDIRECT AND DIMMED
BY APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN YEARS. THE AGENT HANDLING Z COVERAGE
AT WFO WHILE MC ANDREWS WAS SAC IS NOW DEAD. MC ANDREWS
PROTESTED THAT BUREAU FILES SHOULD BE BY FAR MORE ACCURATE
AND COMPLETE THAN HIS KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY.
FOX STATED HE WOULD NOTIFY FBI, MIAMI, SHOULD HE BE
CONTACTED.
END
JLM:mjs
(1)
Approved:
4th &
2
Sent
Special Agent in Charge
fodaxed.
Filed-
J
66-3346-16
вер и роден
U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 186
NR 004 MM CODE
6:01 PM NITEL SEPTEMBER 10, 1975 MRW
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM MIAMI (66-3346)
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTEL SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.
THOMAS MC ANDREWS AND FREDERICK F. FOX WERE CONTACTED BY
SAC SEPTEMBER 9, 1975. ADDRESSES SET FORTH IN RETEL FOR EACH
ARE CORRECT.
MC ANDREWS STATED HIS KNOWLEDGE IS INDIRECT AND DIMMED
BY APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN YEARS. THE AGENT HANDLING Z COVERAGE
AT WFO WHILE MC ANDREWS WAS SAC IS NOW DEAD. MC ANDREWS
PROTESTED THAT BUREAU FILES SHOULD BE BY FAR MORE ACCURATE
AND COMPLETE THAN HIS KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY.
FOX STATED HE WOULD NOTIFY FBI, MIAMI, SHOULD HE BE
CONTACTED.
END
PLS ACK FOR 4
LSG FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR AND HOLD FOR TWO
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 187
Indexed
Filed
my
66-3346-15
NR 030 WA CODE
5:53PM NITEL 9/5/75 PMJ
TO ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
DALLAS
EL PASO
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MEMPHIS
NEW YORK
PHILADELPHIA
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
OKLAHOMA CITY
PHOENIX
LOUISVILLE
MIAMI
OMAHA
ST. LOUIS
SAVANNAH
FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)
PERSONAL ATTENTION
PERSONAL
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS
OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE
INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE
TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN
ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.
HW
42
-66-3346-15
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED
SEP 5 1975
FBI-MIAM
ASAC
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 188
C
PAGE TWO
INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA'S
-
LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR
SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING
MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES. ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER
SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 1966 IN ONE OR MORE
OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIAMI,
NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD.
PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.
THEY
EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY
CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC
STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING
CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING
OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS
FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF
ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE
AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU
INFORMATION.
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 189
*
PAGE THREE
CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED
PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE
FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.
IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED
BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION
OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO
LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO
OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.
ALEXANDRIA:
W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON,
VIRGINIA.
JAMES H. GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
THOMAS E BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA
BALTIMORE:
ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND
PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND
DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS,
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE
VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY,
MAR YLA ND
DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 190

PAGE FOUR
BIRMINGHAM:
JOHN DAVID POPE, JR. 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA
BOSTON:
,
LEO L. LAUGHLIN 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE
J.F. DESMOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
CHICAGO:
MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE
MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS
CINCINNATI:
PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO
HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO
DALLAS:
PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS
KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS
EL PASO:
KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS
INDIANAPOLIS:
DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS,
INDIANA
ALLAN GILLIES 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
JACKSON:
WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON,
MISSISSIPPI
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 191
PAGE FIVE
JACKSONVILLE:
DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE,
FLORIDA
WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE,
FLORIDA
LOUISVILLE:
BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE,
KENTUCKY
LOS ANGELES:
WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO,
CALIFORNIA
WEŚLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS,
CALIFORNIA
ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE,
CALIFORNIA
JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA,
VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE,
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA
MEMPHIS:
E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENnessee
MIAMI:
(813) 2612996
THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA
FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI,
FLORIDA 893-7743
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 192
PAGE SIX
NEW YORK:
JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 656 HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK
HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY:
JAMES T. MORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA
LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.W. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY,
OKLAHOMA
OMAHA :
JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY,
CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA
PHILADELPHIA:
RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE,
PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA
PHOENIX:
PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX,
ARIZONA
ST. LOUIS:
THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD NR. 105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS,
MISSOURI
WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD,
MISSOURI
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 193
PAGE SEVEN
SAN DIEGO:
FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO:
CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO,
CALIFORNIA
HAROLD E. WELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA,
CALIFORNIA
SAVANNAH:
TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH,
GEORGIA
JOSEPH D. PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA
SEATTLE:
LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268, SEQUIM, WASHINGTON
RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P.O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE,
JAMES E. MILNES, 4317·
WASHINGTON
PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 ·
WASHINGTON
-
38TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE,
END
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 194
NR 030 WA CODE
5:53PM NITEL 9/5/75 PMJ
TO ALEXANDRIA
BALTIMORE
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
CHICAGO
CINCINNATI
DALLAS
EL PASO
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
JACKSONVILLE
LOUISVILLE
LOS ANGELES
MEMPHIS
NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
MIAMI
OMANA
ST. LOUIS
SAVANNAH
FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)
PERSONAL ATTENTION
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTELS MAY 2, 1975, AND SEPTEMBER 4, 1975.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED WHEREABOUTS
OF A NUMBER OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES INDICATING THEY MAY BE
INTERVIEWED BY THE SSC STAFF. LISTED BELOW, BY FIELD OFFICE
TERRITORY, ARE THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES AND THEIR LAST KNOWN
ADDRESSES AS CONTAINED IN BUREAU FILES.
66-3346-15
XTE
SLUJALIZED
sagt
INDEXED
FILED.
SEP 5 1975
FBI-MIAMI
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 195
PAGE TWO
INFORMATION FROM SSC INDICATES NAMES OF FORMER SA'S
'
LITRENTO AND STEWART DEVELOPED AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR
SUPERVISING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA CONCERNING
MAIL OPENING ACTIVITIES, ALL OTHERS IN LIST BELOW WERE EITHER
SAC, ASAC, OR BOTH, DURING PERIOD 1959 - 1966 IN ONE OR MORE
OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES: BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, MIANI,
NEW YORK, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, AND WASHINGTON FIELD.
PRESUMABLY ARE ALSO KNOWLEDGEABLE CONCERNING MAIL OPENINGS.
THEY
EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY
CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE Ssc
STAFF FOR INTERVIEW. THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING
CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF, CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
BY COLLECT CALL FOR FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM INCLUDING
OBLIGATIONS AS TO CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS
FBI EMPLOYEE. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF
ASSISTANCE IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK, BUT IS DONE
AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU
INFORMATION.
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 196
1
1
PAGE THREE
CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED
PERSONALLY BY SAC OR ASAC. IN EVENT THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE
FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.
IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED
BUREAU BY NITEL IN ABOVE CAPTION, BRIEFLY INCLUDING REACTION
OF FORMER EMPLOYEES CONTACTED. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO
LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO
OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.
ALEXANDRIA:
W. DONALD STEWART, CRYSTAL HOUSE I, APARTMENT 202, ARLINGTON,
VIRGINIA.
JAMES H, GALE, 3307 ROCKY MOUNT ROAD, FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
THOMAS E BISHOP, 8820 STARK ROAD, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA
BALTIMORE
ANTHONY P. LITRENTO, 2810 STONYBROOK DRIVE, BOWIE, MARYLAND
PAUL O'CONNELL, JR., 2417 STRATTON DRIVE, POTOMAC, MARYLAND
DONALD E. RONEY, 131 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE, WINDSOR HILLS,
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE
VICTOR TURYN, 2645 TURF VALLEY ROAD, ELLICOTT CITY,
MARYLAND
DONALD W. MORLEY, BOX 222, NEW MARKET, MARYLAND
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 197
PAGE FOUR
BIRMINGHAM:
JOHN DAVID POPE, JR., 221 REMINGTON ROAD, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA
BOSTONS
LEO L, LAUGHLIN, 9 EVERETT AVENUE, WINCHESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
EDWARD J. POWERS, 10 COLONIAL DRIVE, BEDFORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE
J.F. DESKOND, 185 FRANKLIN STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
CHICAGO:
MARLIN W. JOHNSON, CANTEEN CORPORATION, THE MERCHANDISE
MART, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
HARVEY G. FOSTER, 1012 SOUTH HAMLIN, PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS
CINCINNATI:
PAUL FIELDS, 2677 CYCLORAMA DRIVE, CINCINNATI, OHIO
HARRY J. MORGAN, 5314 ELMCREST LANE, CINCINNATI, OHIO
DALLAS:
PAUL H. STODDARD, 3014 CHATTERTON DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS
KENNETH E. COMMONS, 2458 DOUGLAS DRIVE, SAN ANGELO, TEXAS
EL PASO:
KARL W. DISSLY, POST OFFICE BOX 9762, EL PASO, TEXAS
INDIANAPOLIS:
DILLARD W. HOWELL, 6413 CARDINAL LANE, INDIANAPOLIS,
INDIANA
ALLAN GILLIES 8228 HOOVER LANE, INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
JACKSON:
WILLIAMS W. BURKE, JR., 1847 AZTEC DRIVE, JACKSON,
MISSISSIPPI
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 198
PAGE FIVE
JACKSONVILLE:
DONALD K. BROWN, 826 BROOKMONT AVENUE, EAST JACKSONVILLE,
FLORIDA
WILLIAM M. ALEXANDER, 4857 WATER OAK LANE, JACKSONVILLE,
FLORIDA
LOUISVILLE:
BERNARD C. BROWN, 2301 NEWMARKET DRIVE, N.E., LOUISVILLE,
KENTUCKY
LOS ANGELES:
WILLIAM G. SIMON, 2075 LOMBARDY ROAD, SAN MARINO,
CALIFORNIA
WESLEY G. GRAPP, 4240 BON HOMME ROAD, WOODLAND HILLS,
CALIFORNIA
ARNOLD C. LARSON, 4232 ABBINGTON COURT, WESTLAKE VILLAGE,
CALIFORNIA
JOSEPH K. PONDER, 3719 CARRIAGE HOUSE COURT, ALEXANDRIA,
VIRGINIA. BUSINESS ADDRESS: 3030 SOUTH RED HILL AVENUE,
SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA
MEMPHIS:
E. HUGO WINTERROWD, 1550 NORTH PARKWAY, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE
MIAMI:
THOMAS MC ANDREWS, 324 NEAPOLITAN WAY, NAPLES, FLORIDA
FREDERICK F. FOX, 11450 W. BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI,
FLORIDA
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 199
PAGE SIX
NEW YORK#
JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, 65G HUNT LANE, MANHASSET, NEW YORK
HENRY A. FITZGIBBON, 76 EASTON ROAD, BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK
OKLAHOMA CITY:
JAMES T. KORELAND, 108 FERN DRIVE, POTEAU, OKLAHOMA
LEE O. TEAGUE, 2501 N.V. 121ST STREET, OKLAHOMA CITY,
OKLAHOMA
ONAHA :
JOHN F. CALLAGHAN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY,
CAMP DODGE, POST OFFICE BOX 130, JOHNSTON, IOWA
PHILADELPHIA:
RICHARD J. BAKER, 219 JEFFREY LANE, NEWTON SQUARE,
PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN F. MALONE, 25 GARFIELD AVENUE, CARBONDALE, PENNSYLVANIA
PHOENIX:
PALMER M. BAKEN, JR., 3832 EAST YUCCA STREET, PHOENIX,
ARIZONA
ST. LOUIS:
THOMAS J. GEARTY, 6630 CLAYTON ROAD NR. 105, RICHMOND HEIGHTS,
MISSOURI
WESLEY T. WHALEY, 286 GREEN TRAILS DRIVE, CHESTERFIELD,
WISSOURI
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 200

PAGE SEVEN
SAN DIEGO#
FRANK L. PRICE, 2705 TOKALON STREET, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO:
CURTIS O. LYNUM, 644 EAST HILLSDALE BOULEVARD, SAN MATEO,
CALIFORNIA
HAROLD E, VELBORN, 13067 LA VISTA COURT, SARATOGA,
CALIFORNIA
SAVANNAH:
TROY COLEMAN, 36 CROMWELL ROAD, WILMINGTON PARK, SAVANNAH,
GEORGIA
JOSEPH D❤ PURVIS, 721 DANCY AVENUE, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA
SEATTLE:
LELAND V. BOARDMAN, ROUTE 3, BOX 268, SEQUIN, WASHINGTON
RICHARD D. AUERBACH, P.O. BOX 1768, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
JAMES E. MILNES, 4317 - 50TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON
PAUL R. BIBLER, 15134 * 36TH AVENUE, N.E., SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON
END
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 201
1
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
Transmit the following in
TELETYPE
Via
FBI
Date:
9/8/75
20
CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)
URGENT
(Priority)
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395) -VLN
ATTENTION: INTD, W.O. CREGAR
MIAMI (66-3346) (RUC) 2P
SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975
RE BUREAU TELETYPE SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.
ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975, SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL AND SA
RAYMOND L. O'KELLY MET WITH WALTER J. LAUGHEED, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, AND ROBERT WENNERHOLM, LEGAL COUNSEL, DADE COUNTY,
FLORIDA PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT (DCPSD), AT THE DCPSD.
THESE TWO OFFICIALS WERE ADVISED OF THE REQUEST TO THE
FBI BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), FOR ACCESS TO
ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL
AGENCIES.
INFORMATION IN MIAMI AIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, CAPTIONED
"MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER C" WAS ORALLY
-
66-3346
RED
Pod
Approved:
146/723
339
Sent
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 202
66-3346-14
.M
Per
* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRIN
"A
OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
Date:
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
Via
(Priority)
PAGE TWO
FURNISHED AND THEY WERE ASKED WHETHER THE DCPSD HAS ANY
OBJECTION TO THE FBI RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL EMANATING
FROM DCPSD AND CONTAINED IN THIS AIRTEL WHICH WOULD DISCLOSE
THE BCPSD USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE
OF KING.
گھر
LAUGHEED ADVISED THE DCPSD HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FBI
RELEASING THIS INFORMATION TO THE SSC. HE SAID THEY WOULD
HAVE TO SEARCH THEIR RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHAT INFORMATION
THEY HAVE ON KING AND THAT ANY REQUEST FOR THIS INFORMATION
BY SSC WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE FORM OF A SUBPOENA.
E. WILSON PURDY, DIRECTOR, DCPSD, WHO IS ON VACATION,
WAS INITIALLY CONTACTED IN THIS MATTER BY SAC JULIUS L.
MATTSON AND MADE AWARE OF THE REQUEST BY SSC.
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 203
Sent
.M
Per
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
,,་
NRØ11 MM CODE
3:39PM URGENT SEPTEMBER 8, 1975 JGS
TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM MIAMI (66-3346) (RUC)
ATTN: INTD, W.O. CREGAR
SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975
RE BUREAU TELETYPE SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.
ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975, SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL AND SA
RAYMOO'KELLY MET WITH WALTER J. LAUGHEED, ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, AND ROBERT WENNERHOLM, LEGAL COUNSEL, DADE COUNTY,
FLORIDA PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT (DCPSD), AT THE DCPSD.
THESE TWO OFFICIALS WERE ADVISED OF THE REQUEST TO THE
FBI BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC), FOR ACCESS TO
ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES.
INFORMATION IN MIAMI AIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, CAPTIONED
"MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER-C" WAS ORALLY
FURNISTED AND THEY WERE ASKED WTETHER TTE DCPSD HAS ANY
OBJECTION TO THE FBI RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL EMANATING
FROO DCPSD AND CONTAINED IN THIS AIRTEL WHICH WOULD DISCLOSĘ
THE DCPSD USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR COVERAGE
OF KING.
END PAGE ONE
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 204
Flic
MJ
66-3346-14
PAGE TWO MM.66-3346
LAUGHEED ADVISED THE DCPSD HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO THE FBI
RELEASING THIS INFORMATION TO THE SSC. HE SAID THEY WOULD
HAVE TO SEARCH THEIR RECORDS TO DETERMINE WHAT INFORMATION
THEY HAVE ON KING AND THAT ANY REQUEST FOR THIS INFORMATION
BY SSC WOULD HAVE TO BE IN THE FORM OF A SUBPOENA.
E. WILSON PURDY, DIRECTOR, DCPSD, WHO IS ON VACATION,
WAS INITIALLY CONTACTED IN THIS MATTER BY SAC JULIUS L.
MATTSON AND MADE AWARE OF THE REQUEST BY SSC.
END
FBI
WA VLN
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 205
NRØ12 WA CODE
258PM URGENT 9-5-75 VLN
TO MIAMI -
NEW YORK
FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)
66-3346-116395)
SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.
1
REMMAIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, NYAIRTELS MAY 18, 1965, MAY 28,
"
1965, AND NYLET JULY 29, 1965, ALL CAPTIONED MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER
NEW YORK FILE 100-136585.
-
C," MIAMI FILE 100-15079,
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED ACCESS TO
ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL
AGENCIES OR GOVERNMENTS.
REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS INDICATE THAT THE DADE COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND THE THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR
COVERAGE OF DR. KING.
IN ORDER FOR FBIHQ TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE SSC REQUEST
IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK TO CONTACT APPRO-
i
Камини биринг
X4646
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
66-3346-13
INDEXED
FILED
Damg
SEP 5 1975
FBI-MIAMI
11/05
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 206
}
PAGE TWO
PRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ADVISE THEM OF THE SSC
REQUEST.
SECURE THEIR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO: WHETHER
THEY HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO OUR RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL
FROM THEM CONTAINED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH WOULD
DISCLOSE THAT THEY USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR
COVERAGE OF KING. THEY SHOULD BE APPRISED OF THE FACT
EVEN IF FBIHQ DOES NOT VOLUNTARILY SUPPLY REQUESTED
INFORMATION, SSC MAY SUBPOENA FBI RECORDS.
EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY TELETYPE. IN THE ABOVE CAPTION,
ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR, BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 8,
1975.
END
FBI
mm
MM 
CLR
MRW
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 207
NR012 WA CODE
258PM URGENT 9-5-75 VLN
TO MIAMI
NEW YORK
FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)
SENSTUDY 75, BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975,
"
REMMAIRTEL MAY 23, 1966, NYAIRTELS MAY 18, 1965, MAY 28,
1965, AND NYLET JULY 29, 1965, ALL CAPTIONED MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER C," MIAMI FILE 100-15079,
NEW YORK FILE 100-136585.
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) HAS REQUESTED ACCESS TO
ALL MEMORANDA AND OTHER MATERIALS WHICH RELATE TO ELECTRONIC
SUR VEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING BY STATE AND LOCAL
AGENCIES OR GOVERNMENTS.
REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS INDICATE THAT THE DADE COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE, MIAMI, FLORIDA, AND THE THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN THEIR
COVERAGE OF DR. KING.
IN ORDER FOR FBING TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO THE SSC REQUEST
IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR MIAMI AND NEW YORK TO CONTACT APPRO-
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 208
66-3346-13
SERIALIZED M
INDEXED
D MY FILED my
SEP 5 1975
FBI-MIAMI
جب
PAGE TWO
FRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE DADE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND ADVISE THEM OF THE SSC
REQUEST.
WHETHER
SECURE THEIR COMMENTS RELATIVE TO:
THEY HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO OUR RELEASING TO SSC THE MATERIAL
FROM THEM CONTAINED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH WOULD
DISCLOSE THAT THEY USED ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES IN THEIR
COVERAGE OF KING. THEY SHOULD BE APPRISED OF THE FACT
EVEN IF FBING DOES NOT VOLUNTARILY SUPPLY REQUESTED
INFORMATION, SSC MAY SUBPOENA FBI RECORDS,
EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY TELETYPE IN THE ABOVE CAPTION,
ATTENTION INTD, W. O. CREGAR, BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS SEPTEMBER 8,
1975.
END
FBI mm CUR
MRO
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 209
i
NR 033 WA CODE
4:47PM 9/4/75 NITEL AJN
TO ALL SACS
FROM DIRECTOR
PERSONAL ATTENE
SE NSTUDY 15
(62-116395)
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO (1) REITERATE THAT
FBI HẠS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY
INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI;
AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF
INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBỊ EMPLOYEES.
FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY
'HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED
BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR
OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR
INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE
FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO
POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR
L
2
ク
3 byt
вн
40
& f
و
928
5
the
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 210
10 MA
66-3346-12
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
פרין
FILED
my my
SEP 4 197
19750
FBI-MIAMI

F
''
PAGE TWO
INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY
IN THE USUAL CASE,
COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION.
"
AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD (i)
THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU
CANNOT PROVIDĖ SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED
PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN
WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION.
THESE AREAS ·
ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU
SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL
IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY
AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.
HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWEES CONSULTATION
PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE
NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEWEE
MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS
OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT
AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 211
PAGE THREE
ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST
EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES
SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE
DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF
INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. W. R.
WANNALL, OR, IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. CREGAR.
THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS
LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND
FORMER EMPLOYEES.
FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE
DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION,
WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT
EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIS REGARD.
END
FBI MM CLR MRW
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 212
NR033 WA CODE
4:47PM 9/4/75 NITEL AJN
TO ALL SACS
FROM DIRECTOR
(62-116395)
PERSONAL ATTENTION
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
PURPOSES OF INSTANT TELETYPE ARE TO (1) REITERATE THAT
FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE (SSC) AND WISHES TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY
INVESTIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SSC WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI;
AND (2) SET FORTH NEW PROCEDURE RELATING TO SSC STAFF
INTERVIEWS OF CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.
FOR INFORMATION OF THOSE OFFICES WHICH HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY
HAD CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEES IN ITS TERRITOY INTERVIEWED
BY THE SSC, THE BUREAU FREQUENTLY LEARNS FROM THE SSC OR
OTHERWISE THAT FORMER EMPLOYEES ARE BEING CONSIDERED FOR
INTERVIEW BY THE SSC STAFF. INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR THE
FIELD OFFICE TO CONTACT THE FORMER EMPLOYEE TO ALERT HIM AS TO
POSSIBLE INTERVIEW, REMIND HIM OF HIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
WITH THE BUREAU AND SUGGEST THAT IF HE IS CONTACTED FOR
66-3346-12
SEARCHED.
SERIALIZED
_INDEXED
FILED
SEP 4 1975
FBI-MIAMI
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 213
K
PAGE TWO
INTERVIEW, HE MAY CONTACT THE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY
COLLECT CALL FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. IN THE USUAL CASE,
AS CIRCUMSTANCES UNFOLD, THE FORMER EMPLOYEE IS TOLD (1)
THAT HE HAS A RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL, BUT THAT THE BUREAU
CANNOT PROVIDE SAME; (2) THAT THE BUREAU HAS WAIVED THE
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERVIEW WITHIN SPECIFIED
PARAMETERS; AND (3) THAT THERE ARE FOUR PRIVILEGED AREAS IN
WHICH HE IS NOT REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTION.
THESE AREAS
ARE RELATING TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY (A) IDENTIFY BUREAU
SOURCES; (B) REVEAL SENSITIVE METHODS/TECHNIQUES; (C) REVEAL
IDENTITIES OF THIRD AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES, OR INFORMATION FROM SUCH AGENCIES; AND (D) ADVERSELY
AFFECT ONGOING BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS.
HERETOFORE, BUREAU HAS OFFERED INTERVIEWEES CONSULTATION
PRIVILEGES WHEREBY A BUREAU SUPERVISOR WOULD BE AVAILABLE
NEARBY, ALTHOUGH NOT ACTUALLY AT INTERVIEW, SO INTERVIEWEE
MIGHT CONSULT WITH HIM SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE AS TO PARAMETERS
OF INTERVIEW OR PRIVILEGED AREAS. THE CONSULTANT DID NOT ACT
AS A LEGAL ADVISOR.
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, BUREAU WILL NO LONGER PROVIDE
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 214
k
PAGE THREE
ON-THE-SCENE PERSONNEL FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES TO ASSIST
EITHER CURRENT OF FORMER EMPLOYEES. PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES
SHOULD BE TOLD THAT, IF THEY DESIRE ASSISTANCE OF THIS NATURE
DURING AN INTERVIEW, THEY MAY CONTACT EITHER PERSONALLY (IF
INTERVIEW IS IN WASHINGTON, D. C.) OR BY COLLECT CALL, THE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, MR. V. R.
IN HIS ABSENCE, SECTION CHIEF W. O. GREGAR .
WANNALL,
OR,
THIS CHANGE IN PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS
LESSENING THE ASSISTANCE WE ARE FURNISHING TO CURRENT AND
FORMER EMPLOYEES.
FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, I AM WORKING WITH THE
DEPARTMENT IN EXPLORING AVENUES TO ARRANGE LEGAL REPRESENTATION,
WHEN NECESSARY, FOR CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES WITHOUT
EXPENSE TO THEM. YOU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIS REGARD
END
FBI MM CLR MRW
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 215
FD-36 (Rex. 5-22-64)
Transmit the following in
Via
TELETYPE
010
AUGUST 28, 1975
FBI
Date:
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)
IMMEDIATE
(Priority)
TO:
DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM: SAC, MIAMI
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTEL 8-26-75.
FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED 8-27-75
PER INSTRUCTION.
FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU
RECORDS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.
END
JLM:mjs
(1)
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 216
Fied
M
66-3346-11
Sent
101 PM
Per
U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972-455-574
NR 501 MM CODE
16:13PM IMMEDIATE AUGUST 23, 1975 JWB
TO DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM MIAMI
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTEL AUGUST 26, 1975.
FORMER MIAMI ASAC FREDERICK F. FOX CONTACTED AUGUST 27, 1975
PER INSTRUCTION.
FOX'S RESIDENCE ADDRESS SHOULD BE CORRECTED IN BUREAU
RECORDS TO 11450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD, MIAMI 33161.
END.
3161.
VN FBIHO CLR
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 217
Aaafid
✓ Filee.
10 no
66-3346-11
NR 569 WA CODE
3:30PM NITEL S-26-75 LXS
TO ALEANY
BALTIMORE
MIAMI
PHILADELPHIA
TAMPA
FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)
PERSONAL ATTENTION
(346* (5/75)
• blox 3346*
SENSTUDY
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
"
INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY
PE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS
NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO
THESE ORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY
AND/OR SUBVERSIVE. CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE
FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS.
SIT OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU
.
1
NW 88608 Docid:32989820' Page 218
66:3346-10
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
LINDEXED
FILED.
AUG. 26 1975
FBI-MIANI
PAGE TWO
· EMPLOYEES.
EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY
CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC
STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE
INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED.
WHICH RELATE TO, SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS
AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE,
INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY
MAY REQUEST, AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL 'PROVIDE
AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEWEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW
THE FORMER IMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC. STAFF,
CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR
'
%
,
IT
FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE.
IS IMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT
INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE
AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.
THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR
CONTACTS WITH'
1. ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE
HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 219
PAGE THREE
IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED
:
BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO
LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO
OTHER. OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.
ALPANY: JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY
NEW YORK 12369; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY,
UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12388.
BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA,.
MARYLAND 20014.
MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD,
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.
'PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLEEN LOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E.'
LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE. -
TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A.T.O., P. O. BOX 141%,
SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.
SEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING.COX'S WHEREABOUTS
IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER
THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO
BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU
· DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 220
1

▪ PAGE FOUR
SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE
•
INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOKE MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION
TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR.
SOONER. TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS
FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.
END
F31 MM JWB CLR
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 221
NR 009 WA CODE
3:30PM NITEL 8-26-75 LXS
TO ALBANY
BALTIMORE
MIAMI
PHILADELPHIA
TAMPA
FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)
PERSONAL ATTENTION
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
INQUIRIES MADE OF BUREAU BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
CONCERNING BELOW-LISTED FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES SUGGESTS THEY MAY
BE INTERVIEWED BY SSC STAFF. WHILE SUBJECT OF INTERVIEWS HAS
NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY SSC, INTERVIEWS WILL LIKELY PERTAIN TO
THE SE ORMER EMPLOYEES' DUTIES WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY
AND/OR SUBVERSIVE CONTROL SECTIONS AND MAY ALSO RELATE TO THE
FORMER BUREAU'S INVESTIGATIONS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
COMMUNIST INFLUENCES IN RACIAL MATTERS AND RELATED MATTERS.
SET OUT BELOW ARE LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF THESE FORMER BUREAU
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 222
66-3346-10
AUG 26 1975
FBI-MIAMI
PAGE TWO
EMPLOYEES.
EACH OF THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES IS TO BE IMMEDIATELY
CONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT HE MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSC
STAFF. THEY SHOULD BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE
INTERVIEWED AND DURING COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED
WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVE BUREAU OPERATIONS (SOURCES, METHODS
AND TECHNIQUES, ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS, AND THIRD AGENCY RULE,
INCLUDING IDENTITIES OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES), THEY
MAY REQUEST AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT. BUREAU WILL PROVIDE
AGENT ON REQUEST OF INTERVIEVEE. AS A PRELUDE TO INTERVIEW,
THE FORMER EMPLOYEE MAY, AFTER BEING CONTACTED BY SSC STAFF,
CONTACT BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION BY COLLECT CALL FOR
FULL INFORMATION TO ASSIST HIM, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS AS TO
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION ACQUIRED AS FBI EMPLOYEE.
IS EMPHASIZED THAT BUREAU'S OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IS NOT
INTENDED TO IMPEDE SSC WORK BUT IS DONE AS COOPERATIVE GESTURE
AND TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE BUREAU INFORMATION.
IT
CONTACTS WITH
THESE FORMER EMPLOYEES TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BY SAC OR
ASAC. IN EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TO BE
HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.
ན
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 223
PAGE THREE
IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED
BUREAU BY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A FORMER EMPLOYEE NO
LONGER IN YOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO
OTHER OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBI HEADQUARTERS.
.
ALBANY:
JOHN H. KLEINKAUF, 1153 CULLEN AVENUE, SCHENECTADY,
NEW YORK 12369; EMPLOYED AS DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AND SAFETY,
UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK 12308,
BALTIMORE: JAMES F. BLAND, 4310 ROSEDALE AVENUE, BETHESDA,
MARYLAND 20014.
MIAMI: FREDERICK F. FOX, 1450 WEST BISCAYNE CANAL ROAD
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33161.
PHILADELPHIA: MRS. KATHLEEN LOGAN, SPOUSE OF SA RICHARD E.
LOGAN, ASSIGNED PHILADELPHIA OFFICE.
TAMPA: PAUL L. COX, U.S.N.A.T.O., P. O. BOX 1418,
SARASOTA, FLORIDA 33578.
BEST INFORMATION BUREAU HAS CONCERNING COX'S WHEREABOUTS
IS THAT HE IS CURRENTLY ON A LENGTHLY TRIP WITH A MOTOR TRAILER
THROUGH CANADA AND THE MID-WEST. INDICATED ADDRESS BELIEVED TO
BE A TRAILER COURT CONTACT POINT FOR MAILING PURPOSES. BUREAU
DOES NOT DESIRE EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE COX AND
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 224
PAGE FOUR
SUGGESTS FEASIBILITY OF LEAVING SOME MESSAGE THROUGH THE
INDICATED ADDRESS OR SOME MEANS OF FORWARDING A COMMUNICATION
TO COX SO HE MIGHT CONTACT YOUR OFFICE ON RETURN TO AREA OR
SOONER.
TAMPA'S REPLY TO BUREAU SHOULD SET OUT WHAT ARRANGEMENTS
FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT HAVE BEEN PERFECTED.
END
FBI MM JWB CLR
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 225
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
CODED
Transmit the following in
TELETYPE
Via
FBI
Date:
245
P
6/24/75
10
(Type in plaintext or code)
URGENT
(Priority)
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: SA W.O. CREGAR
FROM:
SAC, MIAMI (66-3346)
TOP SECRET
SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED JUNE 24, 1975
DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
Per CGSLUSTBJ2
Date
RE BUREAU TELETYPE JUNE 18, 1975, AS ABOVE.
6/2/2016
THE FILES OF THE MIAMI OFFICE CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION ON "MAIL SURVEILLANCE" BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE
FBI FROM JANUARY 1, 1960 TO THE PRESENT TIME.
(1) MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT.
ON JANUARY 2, 1963, MIAMI BEGAN SCREENING AIRMAIL TO
CUBA EMANATING FROM PUERTO RICO IN CONNECTION WITH THE
CASE CAPTIONED, "PENETRATE, ESPIONAGE CUBA," BUFILE 65-
67842, OFFICE OF ORIGIN SAN JUAN 65-398, MIAMI 65-2940/
Selavuus
Lod
1-66-3346
RLO/kr
(1)kr
Approved:
m/ges
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 226
Sent
PMJ-48
Me5-
✰ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
66-3346-9
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
Date:
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
Via
(Priority)
PAGE TWO
TOP SECRET
ON FEBRUARY 11, 1963, MIAMI BEGAN SCREENING SUCH MAIL
EMANATING FROM MIAMI IN CONNECTION WITH THE CASE CAPTIONED,
"FOXTROT, ESPIONAGE
" BUFILE 65-67951, OFFICE OF
ORIGIN MIAMI 65-2945.
CUBA,
IN ORDER TO FACILITATE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
ON THE SCREENING OF THIS MAIL, MIAMI OPENED A SEPARATE FILE
CAPTIONED, "JOE SURVEY, ESPIONAGE
CUBA,
"
MIAMI 65-2959, AND
THIS SOURCE WAS ASSIGNED SYMBOL NUMBER CSMM 921-S.
THE PURPOSE OF THE JOE SURVEY WAS TO LOCATE CLANDESTINE
COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH THE USE OF CERTAIN INDICATORS AND
DROP ADDRESSES ON MAIL TO CUBA, AND TO IDENTIFY THE
COMMUNICATION AS BEING ONE DIRECTED BY AN ILLEGAL AGENT
THROUGH ITS CONTENTS AND WRITING CHRACTERISTICS.
THIS MAIL WAS INTERCEPTED IN A ROOM FORMERLY OCCUPIED
BY THE POSTAL INSPECTORS AT THE BISCAYNE ANNEX POST OFFICE,
MIAMI.
POSTAL EMPLOYEES WOULD BRING THE APPROPRIATE MAIL
BAGS TO THIS ROOM, WHERE MIAMI AGENTS WOULD REVIEW IT,
LOOKING FOR SOME 50 DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA, REBIND THE MA IL
IN BUNDLES, AND PLACE IT BACK IN THE MAIL BAGS.
Approved:
Sent
.M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 227
✰ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
Transmit the following in
Via
FB 1
Date:
(Type in plaintext or code)
(Priority)
3
PAGE THREE
TOP
TOP SECRET
THIS MAIL CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF LETTERS CONTA INING
PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SOME 12,000 TO 20,000 LETTERS
BEING REVIEWED DAILY.
THE JOE SURVEY ENDED ON JULY 21, 1966. THE NUMBER
OF AGENTS UTILIZED RANGED FROM FOUR TO TWENTY DEPENDING ON
THE AMOUNT OF MAIL AND WHETHER A SPECIAL SEARCH WAS NEEDED
BASED ON INFORMATION FROM BUREAU SOURCE SIX.
SPENT WAS APPROXIMATELY 60 MAN HOURS A WEEK.
AGENT TIME
AGENTS REVIEWING THIS MAIL WERE FROM THE SECURITY
SQUAD AND THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL AGENTS INTERCEPTED MAIL
AT BISCAYNE ANNEX AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE PERIOD OF
THE SURVEY:
JOHN BARRON; EDWARD J. DAHL; GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR.,;
WILLIAM E. DOWLING; JAMES H. DOWNING; WILLIAM MAYO DREW,
JR.; ARNOLD C. DUQUETTE; ROBERT JAMES DWYER; CHARLES W.
EDMISTON; THOMAS ERRION; MAURICE F. FARABEE; LAWRENCE
FELDHAUS; CLARENCE P. GRAHAM; ERNEST HARRISON; JAMES D.
Approved:
Sent
.M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 228
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
$
FBI
Date:
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
Via
•
(Priority)
24
PAGE FOUR
PAGE
TOP SECRET
HAYES; JAMES C. HOLMES; MELVIN C. JENSEN; SAMUEL W. JONES;
JOSEPH P. MC CANN; JOHN E. MC HUGH; JOHN J. MATTIMORE;
JOHN C. MENTON; PETER J. NERO; JAMES J. O'CONNOR; RAYMOND L.
·O'KELLY; EUGENE L. PAYNE; LEON PRIOR; LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.;
WILLIAM W. STEVENS; ROBERT G. STRONG; EDWIN L. SWEET.
WHEN A DROP ADDRESS WAS NOTED ON AN ENVELOPE, THIS
PIECE OF MAIL WAS HAND CARRIED AND LATER SENT BY MA IL,
PURSUANT TO BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, TO THE FBI LABORATORY FOR
EXAMINATION FOR SECRET WRITING AND MICRODOTS. IN EACH CASE,
AFTER THE LETTER WAS EXAMINED, IT WAS THEN PLACED BACK IN
THE NORMAL FLOW OF MAIL AT BISCAYNE ANNEX DESTINED FOR
CUBA.
AUTHORITY TO HAND DELIVER LETTERS TO THE LABORATORY
CAME FROM BUREAU SUPERVISORS WILLIAM A. BRANNIGAN, OTHO EZELL,
AND INSPECTOR DON MOORE.
DURING THE PERIOD THE JOE SURVEY WAS IN EFFECT,
APPROXIMATELY 4,00 LETTERS WERE OPENED EITHER BY THE
FBI LABORATORY OR THE MIAMI OFFICE, RELATING TO CUBAN
Approved:
Sent
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 229
M Per
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FB 1
Date:
Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)
Via
(Priority)
PAGE FIVE
T
TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
OF THIS AMOUNT, THERE WERE 50 LETTERS
IN 1963 AND 10 LETTERS IN 1964, WHICH WERE DETERMINED TO
CONTAIN SECRET INK MESSAGES, EITHER ON THE LETTER OR ON THE
ENVELOPE.
THE MAIL INTERCEPTED AT BISCAYNE ANNEX WHICH WAS
OPENED AT THE MIAMI OFFICE WAS OPENED IN A SPECIAL CHAMFERING
ROOM BY THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL AGENTS:
JAMES D. HAYES, WILLIAM E. DOWLING, WILLIAM W. STEVENS,
GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR., WILLIAM G. FRIEDEMANN.
THOSE LETTERS OPENED AT THE MIAMI OFFICE WHICH WERE IN
THE SPANISH LANGUAGE WERE TRANSLATED BY MRS. SOPHIA Y.
SALIBA AND MISS ELEANORE M. SCHOENBERGER.
(2) MA IL COVERS PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES.
THERE WERE NO KNOWN INSTANCES WHERE MIAMI FBI EMPLOYEES
PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED A MAIL COVER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION
WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES OTHER THAN AS INCIDENTAL TO
THE REVIEW OF MAIL IN THE JOE SURVEY.
Approved:
Sent
.M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 230
✰ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
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PAGE SIX
TOP SECRET
(3)
DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA ON MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS
AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE.
PENETRATE, ESPIONAGE CUBA:
-
PENETRATE WAS THE BUREAU
CODE NAME FOR A CUBAN INTELLIGENCE AGENT IN PUERTO RICO.
ALL OF THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS WERE DISSEMINATED UNDER
THE ABOVE CAPTION:
BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, OCTOBER 29, 1962, REQUESTING
SAN JUAN CONSIDER FEASIBILITY OF CHECKING. MAIL COMING
FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.
BUREAU.AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 3, 1962, CONCERNING
BUREAU DECISION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE CHECKING OF THIS
MA IL.
SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 2, 1962, CONCERNING
A WATCH LIST OF SUSPECTED MAIL GOING TO CUBA.
BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 7, 1962, REQUESTING
MIAMI TO CONTACT POST OFFICE ON FEASIBILITY OF CHECKING MAIL
8128
FROM PUERTO TO CUBA VIA MIAMI.
Approved:
Sent
M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 231
✰U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
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PAGE SEVEN
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SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 10, 1962,
REQUESTING MIAMI TO DETERMINE FROM POST OFFICE THE NUMBER
OF MAIL DISPATCHES FROM MIAMI TO CUBA.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI NOVEMBER 8, 1962, ON DESIRABILITY
OF AGENTS RATHER THAN POSTAL EMPLOYEES CHECKING THIS MAIL.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 13, 1962, REQUESTING
BUREAU TO CONTACT CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR, WASHINGTON,
ها
D.C., ON CHECKING MAIL AT MIAMI.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, NOVEMBER 21, 1962, ADVISING
FBI LABORATORY SHOULD PROCESS ANY LETTERS SENT BY PENETRATE
FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.
SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU, NOVEMBER 23, 1962,
TRANSPORTING SUSPECTED MAIL VIA THE AIRLINES.
ON
BUAIRTEL TO SAN JUAN DECEMBER 4, 1962, ON BUREAU CONTACT
WITH CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR H.B. MONTAGUE.
BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI DECEMBER 10, 1962, ON
MIAMI AGENTS PERSONALLY HANDLING SCREENING OF MAIL.
Approved:
Sent
M Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 232
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
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MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU, DECEMBER 13, 1962, ON CONTACT
WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL ON METHOD OF SCREENING
THIS MAIL.
NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 12, 1962, ON SIGNIFICANT
CLANDESTINE INDICATORS WHEN REVIEWING THIS MAIL.
SAN JUAN AIRTEL TO MIAMI DECEMBER 13, 1962, ON METHOD
PENETRATE USED TO SIGNIFY INVISIBLE WRITING IN A LETTER.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI DECEMBER 21, 1962, AUTHORIZING
MIAMI TO SCREEN MAIL FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA. ALSO AUTHORIZ-
ING SPECIAL AGENTS GEORGE E. DAVIS, JR., AND WILLIAM G. FRIEDE-
MANN TO HANDLE INITIAL INSPECTION OF COMMUNICATIONS BEFORE
SENT TO FBI LABORATORY AND SETS OUT METHOD OF TRANSMITTAL
TO LABORATORY.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 28, 1962, ON MIAMI
ARRANGEMENTS WITH LOCAL POSTAL AUTHORITIES TO IMPLEMENT
SCREENING SURVEY.
Sent
M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
✰ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
Approved:
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 233
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
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PAGE NINE
PAGE
TO SECRET
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI, JANUARY 3, 1963, REQUESTING
NAMES OF MIAMI AGENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED SPECIALIZED TRAINING
IN PROCESSING MAIL.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 7, 1963, ON MIAMI
AGENTS WHO HAVE RECEIVED CHAMFERING TRAINING.
SAN JUAN TELETYPE TO BUREAU JANUARY 10, 1963, WITH NEW
DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA FOR MIAMI MAIL PROCESSING.
BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN JANUARY 24, 1963, ON FBI
LABORATORY PROCESSING SUSPECTED LETTER RECEIVED FROM
MIAMI MAIL SURVEY.
SAN JUAN RADIOGRAM TO MIAMI JANUARY 25, 1963, ON NEW LETTER
DROP OF PENETRATE IN CUBA.
BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN JANUARY 30, 1963,
AUTHORIZING 30 DAY MA IL COVER ON RIOS MORALES, HIMENEZ VEGA,
AND MUJICA.
NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 30, 1963, SETTING
OUT INDICATORS ON ENVELOPES TO ASSIST MIAMI IN IDENTIFYING
MAIL FROM ILLEGAL AGENTS.
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 234
Sent
.M
Per
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
Transmit the following in
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43
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PAGE TEN
TOP SECRET
BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO SAN JUAN FEBRUARY 14, 1963,
CONTAINING NEW CUBAN DROP ADDRESSES OF PENETRATE.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO SAN JUAN, FEBRUARY 28, 1963, ON
FEASIBILITY OF OBTAINING ACCESS TO CUBAN COURIERS BAGGAGE
OR DIPLOMATIC POUCHES TO DETERMINE CUBAN MAIL DROP IN NEW
YORK CITY.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MARCH 28, 1963, ADVISING NO
SECRET WRITING OR MICRODOTS ON SUSPECTED LETTER SENT TO
LABORATORY.
MIAMI-AIRTEL TO BUREAU MAY 17, 1963, ADVISING THAT MIAMI
IS NOT SCREENING ANY MAIL COMING FROM CUBA.
SAN JUAN LETTER TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 23, 1965, REQUESTING
MIAMI TO EXTEND JOE SURVEY TO COVER INCOMING MAIL FROM CUBA
TO PUERTO RICO AND OUTGOING MAIL PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 2, 1965, ADVISING THAT
MIAMI POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL BELIEVES THAT SCREENING
INCOMING MAIL FROM CUBA FOR PUERTO RICO WOULD PRESENT
SECURITY PROBLEM AND ADD APPROXIMATELY 17,000 PIECES OF
MAIL TO THE SCREENING DAILY.
Approved:
Sent
.M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 235
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
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9
PAGE ELEVEN
TOP SECRET
BUREAU LETTER TO SAN JUAN APRIL 19, 1965, CONCURRNING
WITH MIAMI RECOMMENDATION THAT JOE SURVEY COVERAGE CANNOT
BE SECURELY EXPANDED AT THIS TIME AND INSTRUCTING SAN JUAN
TO SUPPLY MIAMI WITH LIST OF DROP ADDRESSES IN CUBA.
SAN JUAN LETTER TO MIAMI MAY 17, 1965, ADVISING WATCH
LIST OF DROP NAMES AND ADDRESSES IN CUBA NOT BEING FURNISHED
DUE TO LARGE NUMBER OF WATCH LIST.
FOXTROT, ESPIONAGE
CUBA:
FOXTROT WAS THE BUREAU CODE NAME FOR A CUBAN INTELLIGENCE
AGENT IN MIAMI. · INVESTIGATION WAS INITIATED ON THE BASIS
OF INFORMATION FROM BUREAU SOURCE 6. ALL OF THE FOLLOWING
DOCUMENTS WERE DISSEMINATED UNDER THE ABOVE CAPTION:
BUREAU AIRTEL TO NEW YORK DECEMBER 12, 1962, ON NEW
NAMES AND ADDRESSES IN CUBA IN THE EVENT MIAMI INSTRUCTED
TO INSTITUTE COVERAGE OF MAIL FROM PUERTO RICO TO CUBA.
Approved:
Sent
_M Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 236
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
•
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PAGE TWELVE
TOP SECRET
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 15, 1963, ADVISING INFORMA-
TION IN BUREAU LET DECEMBER 12, 1962, INCLUDED IN MIAMI MAIL
COVERAGE IN PENETRATE CASE.
MIAMI TELETYPES TO BUREAU JANUARY 25 AND JANUARY 31,
1963, REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO SCREEN MIAMI TO CUBA MAIL,
AND ADVISING THAT MIAMI POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL ADVISED
ADDITIONAL COVERAGE WOULD CAUSE NO BURDEN OR INTERRUPT POST
OFFICE OPERATIONS.
BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI FEBRUARY 4, 1963, ADVISING
CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR H.B. MONTAGUE, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
AVE APPROVAL TO COVERAGE OF MAIL GOING FROM MIAMI TO CUBA.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 11, 1963, ADVISING
JOE SURVEY COVERAGE BEGAN FEBRUARY 11, 1963.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 12, 1963, ESTIMATING
12,000 PIECES OF MAIL BEING REVIEWED DAILY IN FOXTROT AND
PENETRATE CASES.
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 237
Sent
M Per
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
|
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
ప
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|
PAGE THIRTEEN
SECRET
BUREAU RADIOGRAM TO MIAMI MARCH 12, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY
OF JOE SURVEY SCREENING MAIL ARRIVING IN MIAMI FROM NEW
YORK CITY FOR A LIMITED PERIOD IN EFFORT TO OBTAIN LETTER
CONTANING PHOTOGRAPH AND MONEY TO BE SENT FOXTROT FROM CUBA,
IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY FOXTROT.
MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 13, 1963, ADVISING LOCAL
POSTAL INSPECTOR APPROVED AND REQUESTING CHIEF POSTAL
INSPECTOR MONTAGUE BE CONTACTED FOR OFFICIAL APPROVAL IN
SCREENING NEW YORK MAIL.
BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI MARCH 14, 1963, ADVISING
CLEARANCE OBTAINED FROM MONTAGUE FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD TO
SCREEN THE NEW YORK MAIL.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO NEW YORK, MARCH 13, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY
-OF SCREENING MAIL FROM CUBAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY FOXTROT.
MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 17, 1963, ADVISING THAT
SLIGHTLY OVER ONE MILLION PIECES OF MAIL FROM NEW YORK
AREA BEING REVIEWED DAILY.
Approved:
Sent
M Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 238
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
Date:
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PAGE FOURTEEN
SECRET
MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU MARCH 15, 1963, ADVISING MAIL
COVER TO BE PLACED ON FOXTROT, UACB; POSTAL INSPECTORS WILL
PROVIDE THE RETURN ADDRESSES ON THIS MAIL.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MARCH 28, 1963, ADVISING SECRET
WRITING FOUND ON A LETTER SUBMITTED FROM JOE SURVEY.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU MARCH 25, 1963, INDICATING MAIL
COVER PLACED ON SON OF FOXTROT, POSTAL INSPECTORS WILL
FURNISH RETURN ADDRESSES.
BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI MARCH 29, 1963, INDICATING
THAT A LETTER CONTAINING SECRET WRITING FROM FOXTROT MAY
HAVE BEEN PROCESSED PRIOR TO ITS RECEIPT BY LABORATORY.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 1, 1963, INDICATING
MAIL COVERS ON FOXTROT AND SON OF FOXTROT WERE UNPRODUCTIVE.
MIAMI TELETYPE TO BUREAU APRIL 3, 1963, ADVISING
LETTERS OF FOXTROT WERE NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO ANY OTHER
PERSON OR AGENCY ACCORDING TO POSTAL INSPECTORS.
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 239
Sent
M
Per
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
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PAGE FIFTEEN
SECRET
BUREAU TELETÝPES APRIL 12 AND APRIL 23, 1963, ADVISING
SECRET WRITING CONTAINED IN A LETTER AND TWO RELIGIOUS
PAMPHLETS SENT BY FOXTROT.
12
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU APRIL 29, 1963, CONTAINING THE
FIRST OF A SERIES OF WEEKLY SUMMARIES ON THE FOXTROT
INVESTIGATION.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI, MAY 2, 1963, ASKING FEASIBILITY
OF USING MAILS RATHER THAN AGENT PERSONNEL IN SUBMITTING
LETTERS OF FOXTROT TO LABORATORY.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU MAY 6, 1963, ON ARRANGEMENTS
MADE WITH POST OFFICE IN SCREENING MAIL AND RECOMMENDING
AGENT PERSONNEL BE USED IN TRANSMITTING THURSDAY INTERCEPTIONS.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI MAY 16, 1963, ADVISING MIAMI TO
USE THE MAIL IN FORWARDING LETTERS OF FOXTROT TO FBI LABORATORY,
EXCEPT FOR THURSDAY INTERCEPTIONS.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI JUNE 24, 1963, AUTHORIZING 30
DAY MAIL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH, A SUSPECTED MAIL DROP
OF FOXTROT.
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 240
Sent
M
Per
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
"
FBI
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(Priority)
PAGE SIXTEEN
TOP SECRET
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI JUNE 27, 1963, ADVISING THAT
SECRET WRITING WAS FOUND ON THE ENVELOPE CONTAINING A LETTER
OF FOXTROT.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JULY 1, 1963, ADVISING MAIL
COVER PLACED ON SUSPECTED MAIL DROP OF FOXTROT IN MIAMI.
BUREAU LETTER TO MIAMI JULY 12, 1963, ADVISING IT WAS
NOT NECESSARY FOR MIAMI TO INFORM BUREAU WHEN INTERCEPTED
LETTERS HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO NORMAL MAIL FLOW AT MIAMI.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI AUGUST 15, 1963, SETTING OUT
GUIDELINES IN DUSCUSSING FOXTROT CASE WITH MIAMI CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
-
MIAMI LETTER TO BUREAU SEPTEMBER 9, 1963, REPORTING
RESULTS OF MAIL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH, WHICH WAS PROVIDED
BY POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.
BURÉAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 19, 1963, ON FEASIBILITY
OF CHECKING POST OFFICE BOXES FOR MAIL DROP OF FOXTROT IN
MIAMI.
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 241
Sent
_M
Per
✰ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
Date:
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PAGE SEVENTEEN
SECRET
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 26, 1963, GIVING
AUTHORITY FOR SIX MONTHS MA IL COVER ON FRANCISCO GUASCH.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI OCTOBER 3, 1963, POINTED OUT
THAT SECRET WRITING WAS FOUND ON TWO SHEETS OF PAPER SUBMITTED
WITH A BLANK LETTER OF FOXTROT.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 10, 1963, ADVISING THAT
THROUGH ARRANGEMENTS WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR R.G. WOLF, A
LETTER FROM FOXTROT IN A POST OFFICE BOX USED AS A DROP, WAS
OBTAINED AND FORWARDED TO LABORATORY.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 14, 1963, ADVISING
POSTAL INSPECTOR MADE AVAILABLE ANOTHER LETTER OF FOXTROT
FROM A MAIL' DROP IN MIAMI.
14
MIAMI LÉTTER TO BUREAU OCTOBER 21, 1963, WITH RESULTS
OF MAIL COVER ON A SUSPECTED INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHICH WERE
PROVIDED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR SAL DRAGO.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI NOVEMBER 13, 1963, ON ADMINISTRATIVE
HANDLING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL SENT TO FBI LABORATORY.
Approved:
Sent
M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 242
* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
>
+
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PAGE EIGHTEEN
T
SECRET
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 5, 1963, RECOMMEND ING
SCREENING OF MAIL FROM MIAMI TO MEXICO, APPROXIMATELY
5,000 LETTERS A DAY WOULD BE INVOLVED.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU-NOVEMBER 21, 1963, ADVISING A
MANILA ENVELOPE MAILED FROM NEW YORK CITY INTERCEPTED AND
BELIEVED TO CONTA IN A BOOK AND MONEY FOR FOXTROT.
NEW YORK AIRTEL TO BUREAU NOVEMBER 26, 1963, INDICATING
THAT A PORTION OF THE MONEY FURNISHED TO FOXTROT FOUND IN
AFOREMENTIONED BOOK ORIGINATED FROM SOVIET FUNDS USED IN
THEIR CLANDESTINE OPERATION.
MEMORANDUM OF SA WILLIAM E. DOWLING DATED DECEMBER 2,
1963, CONTAINING COMPILATION OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON FOXTROT
CASE.
BUREAU LETTER TO MIAMI DECEMBER 5, 1963, REQUESTING
APPROPRIATE COVERAGE BY. MIAMI OF A POST OFFICE BOX USED AS
A MAIL DROP BY FOXTROT.
Approved:
Sent
M
Per
Special Agent in Charge
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 243
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
X
FBI
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PAGE NINETEEN
TOP SECRET
„MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 14, 1963, ADVISING OF A
15
LETTER WHICH FOXTROT MAILED AT A MAIL BOX AND WHICH WAS
FURNISHED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR E.M. CAMPBELL.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU DECEMBER 18, 1963, ADVISING
THREE LETTERS WHICH FOXTROT MAILED AT MAIN POST OFFICE
FURNISHED BY POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 27, 1964, RECOMMEND ING
THAT CIA AT MEXICO CITY, MEXICO CONTINUE SCREENING MAIL FOR
MEXICO AS SOME OF THIS MAIL MAY BYPASS JOE SURVEY.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU FEBRUARY 3, 1964, ADVISING OF
ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL TO REVIEW
MAIL GOING TO A SUSPECTED DROP ADDRESS OF FOXTROT IN
MIAMI AREA.
MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED JUNE 2, 1964, SUMMARIZING
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT THROUGH 1963, INCLUDING
SECRET INK MESSAGES LOCATED IN HIS LETTERS.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JUNE 10, 1964, REINSTITUTING
TEMPORARY SCREENING OF ALL MAIL FROM NEW YORK, NEW YORK AREA
TO CUBA.
Approved:
Sent
.M Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 244
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
k
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(Priority)
PAGE TWENTY
TOP SECRET
MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 1964, SUMMARIZING
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT IN 1964.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU JANUARY 13, 1965, FORWARDING
A LETTER OF FOXTROT MAILED AT A MAIL BOX AND PROVIDED BY
POSTAL INSPECTOR CAMPBELL.
BUREAU AIRTEL TO MIAMI SEPTEMBER 3, 1965, REQUESTING
INTERVIEW OF FOXTROT BE CONSIDERED IN VIEW OF LACK OF
INFORMATION INDICATING HE IS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITY AND HOW INFORMATION FROM JOE SURVEY CAN BE USED
DURING INTERVIEW.
MIAMI MEMORANDUM DATED SEPTEMBER 15, 1965, SUMMARIZING
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF FOXTROT IN 1965.
MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER 14, 1966, REFLECTING
JOE SURVEY WAS DISCONTINUED ON JULY 21, 1966 AT THE DIRECTION
OF THE BUREAU.
(4) BUREAU ASKED IF MM 890-S RESULTED FROM INTERCEPTION
OF MAIL.
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 245
Sent
M
Per
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
Date:
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PAGE TWENTY-ONE
TOP SECRET
MM 890-S WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE INTERCEPT OF MAIL.
ASTERISK
THE BUREAU MAY HAVE REFERENCE TO CSMM 809-SA MIAMI FILE
134-769, A BUREAU AUTHORIZED ACTIVITY WHICH BEGAN ON MARCH 15,
1962, AND ENDED AUGUST 1, 1966. THIS OPERATION PHOTOGRAPHED
MATERIAL FROM DIPLOMATIC POUCHES, HAVANA, CUBA TO NEW YORK,
AND HAVANA TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY, OTTAWA, CANADA, WHICH PASSED
THROUGH MIAMI VIA PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS.
ASTERISK
INFORMATION FROM CSMM 809-SA WAS DISSEMINATED UNDER
THE CAPTION, “FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
"
-
CUBA, BUFILE
109-12-210, MIAMI FILE 105–1747.
ASTERISK
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CSMM 809-SA IS NOT BEING
SUBMITTED AS IT DOES NOT INVOLVE MAIL EMANATING IN THE
U.S. OR PUERTO RICO.
TOP SECRET, CLASSIFIED BY 7129, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.
Approved:
Sent
M Per
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 246
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
NRØ48 WA CODE
4:38PM IMMEDIATE 6/18/75 GHS
TO NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
FROM DIRECTOR
T
SECRET
DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET
C38W57BƏZ
6512016
MIAMI
Per
Date
SAN FRANCISCO
¨ SEATTLE
WFO
SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED:
JUNE 24, 1975.
THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED
:
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ
FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES:
"
THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO
AS MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL'
AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE' IN INTERNAL SECURITY,
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS,
OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:'. (1). FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL
OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE
·
Maintain file.
on #9 rotor
O 66-3346-8
4/18/75
:
дово
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Didy
JUN 18 1975
FPROMIAMI
olly REO
Contact SA se handle
PAGE TWO T
SECRE`T
i
STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR, INTERCEPT. WAS
CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE
OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,
AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL
INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI
EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE
EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE
THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES
OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF..
MAIL COVERED, AND 'THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE
ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO
THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND
COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."
>
EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL
INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON,
DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFQ SHOULD FURNISH INFOR-.
MATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN
FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING GUS SUR VẸ Y.
NEW YORK AND WFỎ SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE.
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 248
:
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SECRET
SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP
AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED
FROM MM 89Ø-S RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO
APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED.
RESULTS SHOULD BE
SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD
REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975:
CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.
END
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 249
NEN:36 NA CODE
5:35 PM NITEL 5-26-75 PAU
TO ALL SACS
FROM DIRECTOR
PERSONAL ATTS
SENSTUDY.
75.
116395)
RÉBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
IN CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTIES, ITS REPRESENTATIVES MAY CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR
INFORMATION.
IN ONE RECENT INSTANCE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE TELEPHONICALLY INQUIRED AS TO IDENTITY OF SAC
IN A PARTICULAR OFFICE DURING 1973.
IN HANDLING SUCH INQUITIES INSURE ESTABLISHING EOVA FIDES
OF REPRESENTATIVE BY SHOW OF CREDENTIALS ON PERSONAL CONTACT OR,
IF TELEPHONIC CONTACT, BY TELEPHONING BACK TO COMMITTEE.
UNLESS INFOR ATION IS OF A PUBLIC NATURE, AS IN THE INSTANCE
CITED ABOVE, OBTAIN FDIHQ CLEARANCE PRIOR TO SUPPLYING ANY
INFORMATION. FLIH MUST BE EXPEDITIOUSLY ADVISED OF ALL
INFORMATION FURNISHED.
END
JLE FBI XX
AN CLR TKS
66-3346-7
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MAY 21 1975
FB: MIAMI,
"D
Aer sup
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 250
ASAé

'
FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)
(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
Senate Committee Rejects Request
By CIA, FBI to Monitor Inquiry
SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - The Select
Senate Committee on Intelligence
Activities rejected Friday a rather
'unusual request by the CIA and FBI
to monitor the committee's investi-
gation into the spying operations of
those agencies.
At the same time, committee
chairman Frank Church (D., Idaho)
announced that "the tempo of our
investigation will now be stepped
up" and that staff investigators will
begin questioning witnesses, within
a few days, about the CIA's "co-
vert" operations here and abroad.
The committee was created by
the Senate in January following
charges and reports that govern-
ment, intelligence units and other
agencies were illegally spying on
American citizens. But the commit-
tee has been slow in getting off the
ground.
FRIDAY, AT a closed meeting,
Committee members cleared away
some obstacles to an investigation,
Church reported, and it was decid-
ed the serious investigative work
should go forward."
Among the problems were re-
quests, relayed to the committee by:
the White House and the. Justice
Department, that the CIA and the
FBI be permitted to have monitors
present when one of their agents or
emplopes is questioned.
Church said the agencies suggest-
ed that "the monitors be called ob-
servers."
The committee has already
agreed with CIA-FBI requests to
take such unusual secrecy measures
that committee and staff members]
will be required to withhold infor
mation from each other as well as
from the public.
The committee balked at the lat-
est request, however, because it
would have opened the probe to the
agencies under investigation and al-
fowed them to possibly intimidate
employes who may wish to give in
formation about their superiors..
CHURCH SAID the committee
hrad unanimously rejected the CIA-
FBI proposal "believing there
should be no inhibition" among
those questioned by senators or
staff personnel.
In another important procedural
àction, the committee gave Church
the power to issue subpenas if the
administration or the agencies are
slow in volunteering documents and.
witnesses.
The first phase of the investiga-
tion. Church said, would go into the
CIA's "covert intelligence opera-
tions" including reported plans and
attempts to assassinate foreign
leaders.
The committee investigators,
with at least one senator present
will question witnesses informally
or. in sworn depositions in execu
tive session; Church said.
(Indicate page, name of
newspaper, city and state.)
14-A
MIAMI HERALD
MIAMI,
FLA.
Date: 5/10/75
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title: SENATE COMMITTEE
REJECTS REQUEST BY
FBI, CIA
Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.
Being Investigated
66-3346
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MAY 13 1975
FBI-MIAMI
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 251-
FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)
*.
(Mount Clipping in Space Below)
Senate unit
bars CIA, FBI
from probe
Associated Press
WASHINGTON The Senate
Intelligence Committee has rejected
ás "unacceptable" a Ford adminis-
tration proposal that CIA and FBI
monitors be allowed to observe the
questioning of witnesses.
Chairman Frank Church (D-
Idaho) said the committee voted
unanimously to enter the active
phase of the probe and to authorize
him to issue subpoenas if they!
prove necessary.
"We 'decided that the serious in-
vestigative work should now go
forward," Church said. "The tempo
of the investigation will now be
stepped up."
He told a news conference the
committee will begin a wide-ranging
review of past and present covert
intelligence activities, including "is
sues raised as to assassinations.<
Church said the request for moni
tors to sit, in on executive interro
gation sessions was made by the
White House, but he thought it had
been initiated by the CIA
+
"The committee voted unani-
'mously to reject the proposal be
cause we thought there should be
no inhibition or possible inhibition"
of witnesses Church said.
The initial phase of the investiga-
tion interviews, the taking of
sworn depositions and formal hear-
ings will be closed to the public,
Church said.
"The committee will decide later
what phases of its investigation
will go public," he added:
(Indicate page, name of
newspaper, city and state.)
2-A
MIAMI NEWS
MIAMI, FLA.
Date: 5-10-75
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title:
SENATE UNITEBARS
CIA, FBI FROM PROBE.
Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.
☐ Being Investigated
66-3346
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FBI-MIAMI,
5
NW-88608-Docid:32989820 Page 252
F
i
NRØ74 WA CODE
930 PM NITEL 5-2-75 MSE
TO ALL SACS
FROM DIRECTOR (62-116395)
PERSONAL ATTENTION
SENSTUDY 75
CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS
FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN CONNEC
TION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK
TO INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.
RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS
INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED
THAT MANY BORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.
THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE
AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS UNDER-
TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE
DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY
3
4 M
7
W
&
D
1/7/ 5/2/75
5m
L
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 253
سوم
بسنا
я дев
め
66-3346-4
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MAY - 2 1975
FBI-MIAMI
ASA C
i
PAGE TWO .
PROTECTED.
SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND
HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFOR-
MATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD
BE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL.
YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH
OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER
PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.
THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES
OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD
BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.
END
HOLD
FBI MM JGS
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 254
FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)
FBI
27
Date: MARCH 20,
Transmit the following in
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)
Via
TELETYPE
URGENT
(Priority)
1975
9.
10
A
2
TO DIRECTOR
FROM MIAMI (66-ADM)
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES
OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS AND INTERNAL
SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:
SACS 0; ASACS
-
0.
SUPERVISORS CI MATTERS:
ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE
ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE
ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.
SPECIAL AGENTS CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO
ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5
PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED
75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT;
ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.
JCB/al
(1)
Approved:
Special Agent in Charge
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 255
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923 8.
M
Per
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 O-346-090 (11)
66-3346-3
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
SAC, MIAMI
TO
DATE: 3/26/75
FROM :
SUPERVISOR JOSEPH C. BALL
SUBJECT:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Re Miami teletype to Bureau, 3/26/75.
For your information, Supervisor CLYDE GROOVER,
Budget and Accounting Section, Administrative Division,
FBIHQ, advised that for purposes of response to Bureau
teletype of 3/24/75, the following categories should be
included under Internal Security:
3, 14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176
The following categories should included under
Counterintelligence:
2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 113, 134, 185
In arriving at the statistics set forth in referenced
teletype, the following Agents were included:
Supervisors
CI Matters: SA BALL Assigned 90%
SA WILSON
-
Assigned 5%
IS Matters: SA EDDY
SA BALL
-
Assigned 50%
Assigned 5%
Special Agents CI Matters: Assigned full time
SA BURGINS
CERVANTES
COCHRANE
DAWSON
DWYER
FARABEE
5010-110
JCB/al
(1)
ae
GIBBONS
JONES
66-3346-2
KISZYNSKI
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INDEXED
MARSZALEK
MILLS
11975
FB-MIAMI
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
NW 88608 Docid:32989820 Page 256
ROSS
STEVENS
STICKNEY
WARGER
i
SAs
T
CI Matters (cont.)
Assigned 50%
Assigned 40%
Assigned 5%
FORRESTER and WALZER
O'KELLY
SITHER
IS Matters
Assigned full time
-
HOMER MILLER
PETERSON
NW 88608 Docld:32989820 Page 257
Assigned 75%
Assigned 60%
Assigned 50%
Assigned 30%
Assigned 10%
2.
WINDLAND
MENTON
HEANEY
O'KELLY
CANNON
-
DOWLING
-
DOOHER
VAN RHEIN
GUTIERREZ
DREW
KELLOGG
NRØ46 WA CODE
8:30 PM NITEL 3-24-75 DEB
TO ALL SACS
OM DIRECTOR
FROM
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS MADE AN INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
FROM THE FBI. AMONG THE ITEMS REQUESTED IS A BREAKDOWN OF
FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
ACCORDINGLY, WITHIN FOUR EIGHT HOURS EACH SAC SHOULD SUTEL
TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION, SETTING FORTH
SEPARATELY THE NUMBER OF SACS, ASACS, SUPERVISORS AND AGENTS ASSIGNED
TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGES
OF AN AGENT'S TIME, WHEN NOT ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE ACTIVITIES,
SHOULD BE USED IF APPROPRIATE, PARTICULARLY IN THE SUPERVISORY
CATEGORIES. THIS INFORMATION SHOULD BE BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY
BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
BE LIMITED TO AGENT PERSONNEL ONLY.
END
FBI MM JRS CLR AND TKU
ACK FOR (1)
THANKS
YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD
46-13346-
8. D
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MAR 24 1975
FBI-MIAMI
BALL
Faxy
WE