14-00000
104-10232-10018
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
į
SECTET
20 October 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Peeting with Dr. Miro in New York City on
October 16, 1,61
The rooting with Dr. Miro on October 16 wa postmoned from 10:00
until such time as his audience ton inated with Cardinal Spellran. Ho
arrived at my room at about 10150. He declared that the Cardinal had
wept when he learned the details of the suffering of the Cubana at the
hants of Castro; declared that the Archbishop of Miami won't doing
enough for the Cuban refugees; that the U.S. wanan't doing enough for
them; that Castro rust be overthrown. Hiro told the Cardinal that in
all Latin America there vore going to to organized acts of syrpathy
for the Cuban sufferers. The Cardinal said he would say a Hass for
thes on October 17. He invited tiro to see him at any tire.
Miro anawered by query as to the Lacerda affairs by stating that
it was very successful; 2,800 people were inside the auditorium, and
another 1,000 peo·le outside; that Lacerda hnd received such applause.
The inter-American Press Association affairs also had given an
opportunity to present the Cuban tragedy. He said that he (Firo) had
told how Fidel had shot 31 people in September alone, and other detalls;
had described how Communist was gaining ground day by day; that in
Cube they have installed a powerful radio station broadcasting to Latin
America; that ton countries have broken with Cuba, but Argentina has
not; that everybody is confused.
He informed so that as for the documents relating to the Cuban
plots in Argentina, the Argentine rilitary ren came to talk to Varons,
and he gave them sune'documents that have no immortance. The officers
told Verona textually "We have no confidence in the Argentine Foreign
office," nevertheless, when they arrived there, they turned over the
documents to the Foreign Office. Put these documents had no importance;
they were merely to emonstrate that there had been an extradition of
documents, and that they were originals. The in rortant accurents are
held by Varona in Miami.
Miro said they also visualized another act involving Lacerda in
Miani, but that his "ack inistrative" budget really does not provide for
props arda activities (such as the Current STP and Laceria affairs). I
countered that it was considered that his budget was sufficient for his
to conduct sore propaganda activities; obviously nothing on a major
scale - but some things.
SECTET
14-00000
T
Miro declared that internal propaganda and clandestine action in
Cuba could not be delayed any longer. I agreed on the necessity, and
that it was believed that measures are recessary to forment in Cuba
the opposition to Castro. "The people are against himi" declared Miro.
"But increase it," I answered. Mire the stated "If this action doesn't
ster from the Consejo (CRC) - not as an independent agency, but in
close contact with you (the Agency), - what we forment is a complete
disorder in Cuba, and afterwards no govermant can succeed; secondly,
if we do not have a central plan, and carry it out well in a tore or
less limited period of time, there will rarely be more shooting of
people (prisoners) by Fidel."
What
"And this is my insistence. Now I am afraid to go to Miami.
am I to tell the people there? What do I :o? Converse? Meanwhile the
Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cute but disconnected from the
Council. I was told in my conversation with the President to amplify
In the
the renbership in the Consejo. I have endeavored to do that.
Council there are other great organizations dolegates from each of the
organizations that ask me for arms, cynamite, things, and I am here
powerless. Therefore I must work with you people in order to see how
ve xay hard over arms and a plan of action so they may see that this is
not merely an endloss series of sabotage actions." I replied, "hell, I
believe that a well-worked-out plan that ahova good chances of success
will te favorably considered.”
-
"How about arms for the Escambrey?" asked Miro. I replied that
it was 27 understanding that arms for the Escambray could only be
landed on the North Coast; how then would they get to the Escarbrey?
Miro said that the boat which had rand zany trips (working for YOU),
would have to establish communication and find out when they would pick
up the arra; what cannot be done is abandon Cavaldo Ramires in his
situation of anguish because he is the only real regional focus of
resistance that there is there, and he has been really left in a desperate
situation for three months.
I interposed that there seemed some question about the paper from
Ramirez asking for arms, whether it was the real thing. "Perfectly
identified" replied Miro. "he assured that it is perfectly identified and
requests have come to me through different channels asking for these arus.
I am still waiting now for a month and a half. All you have to do is tell
us the reans of delivery, the neople to contact and then deliver to our
Cutans the arms, dynatite, fuses. I am still waiting, and criticism (of
Cubans against insction) increases daily."
"All the delegations of revolutionary groups in the Council sak re
for arms and reans for fighting. But I cannot provide them anything.
Keammile the Agency is infiltrating people into Cuba without counting on
the Consejo for anything. This puts it into an absurd position - merely
a "coureil painted on the Wall." I have said, "Look for someone else if I
I have confidence
am not considered able to do the job but we rust work.
in the Agency, but I cannot work in this fashion."
STAT
14-00000
-
SCOCET
-30
-
"I've asked for money for the clandestine groups. What have they said
about that?" Miro asked. I replied that there is a problem of the means of
delivery, that the Italian & bassy at present appears undesirable. The
Ambassador isn't there. Well, we look for another reans; the Argentine
anything those people need money" he countered. I have to carry out con-
crete things," he declared. "I'r now like a person in a swimming pool
without water." "For three and a half months I've struggled to maintain a
revolutionary spirit. My rilitary neople are waiting till I arrived and
tell them, "this must be done, that must be done. Nothing yet! And without
any plan, I don't go anywhere; nowhere!
"The other time I went with my eyes closed, through faith. We had a
failure and the failure fell upon¨re. I cannot proceed under such circum-
stances in no way. I've asked for $50,000 to send in to the underground.
The Russians are spending $400,000 in propaganda and have less than the
U.S. We shall not compromise the U.S. Tell me the way to send it in. The
Council is to aid them, not merely to conduct meetings."
"On that request they haven't replied anything?" he asked, I answered
that on this iter, I had made known Miro's desire, but that so far nothing
had been resolved.
"I'm not complaining," he stated, "but for three months I have been
asking for a conduct with the authority to resolve. Why? Because I'm
getting nowhere. When I return now I shall be asked, "How about it?" and
must answer, 'You will have to wait because I have nothing.' And meanwhile
the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba independent of the
Consejo. Let us go back. Without being in agreement, I cannot serve you.
I have no interest in presiding over a Council that is of no use."
I pointed out that the Council must continue to exist, with him as
its president, as the coordinating body of the resistance movement, but
that there are certain difficulties in putting the student or labor activi-
ties under the direction of the Council; that these groups are now functioning
efficiently and that I trusted that he could see the problems of completely
changing their control, direction, and coordination. I added that I
believed that he should know something of what they are doing and that I
believed that should be kept informed.
"I know absolutely nothing," he replied. "What comes to me is from
these same individuals. I am not in agreement with that, I'm becoming ridi-
culous. Under these circumstances I cannot continus. I have planted the
problem of the underground, the problem of the collateral organizations
(that he would like to have in Council by being their source of support
and coordination), of the magistrates, and now you have seen what ALABAU has
done (proclaiming GARCEHAN as president of exile government), tho is work-
ing with you people, and you have seen the reaction of the State Department.
How yesterday ALABAU is publishing political denunciations against the
Council. I have discussed the matter of the agistrates with the C.I.A., I
don't remember the name of the person. A month has passed and the other
magistrates (those with ALABAU) haven't been stopped (in their activities)
and they haven't had elections as I requested to select another leader."
SECTET
14-00000
-1
"The students are continuing their activities. I believe that I have
something in my head as a basis for the determination of what should be
discussed in the Council with re; and in agreement with you; but these
existing circumstances, without any connection, rake it so that I cannot
continue the clandestine aid. To the first problem, I presented your reply,
The shall se." To the second probler, the collateral organizations -
which continues the same as before; the third problem I presented, on arts
to send in, nothing. The fourth. problem, the propaganca operation "Grista"
that I showed you, nothing." I replied that on the latter I had discussed
the matter, that it was, I believer, a suggention given to him in the Depart-
rent. of State.
"If we don't make propaganda and send arra into Cuba now, it's useless,"
he declared. "And I cannot remain in silence." I replied that I believed
quite a bit of propaganda was being conducted. "Yes, but independent of the
Council. I CANNOT BE A PUPPETI" "They (the Agency) keep on dealing with the
MRP, with the Unidad Revolusiorario, and they haven't entered into the Council
signly because they are in direct contact with the Agency. Thus it appears
that none of the problems what I took up with you some twenty days ago have
been resolved, and I'll have to take another solution. I want to know the truth
if I'm not acceptable. I'll leave and without any scandle whatsoever. I have
swallowed all the criticism, in my own house, in silence, as though I were
responsible for everything. I curnot continue to do this and be doing nothing.
I cannot be a puppet! I have no arms to give."
He reiterated that nothing had been resolved on any of his requests and
procesals, and that he couldn't continue thus. That he could quit, go to
Puerto Rico as a professor. Be added he would want to work with us. He then
referred to the acts of Lacerda in New York, which had cost four thousand
dollars, plus passare, & ridiculous sur spend from the administrative Budget.
"We have paid the passage, his living costs here,” he said.
"Now I go to Piani where I have to face the organizations grouped into
the Council. "Arms for everytere?" "I haven't any. All the organizations free-
wheeling there which don't want to join together because they are working
directly with your people." I said this was unfortunate and asked whether
there could not be sore form of realizim. contacts with them without neces-
sarily channelizing their sport and direction through the Council, such
as by forming a committee along the lines I had suggested in Miami.
Miro then referred to the spreement reached in the White House meeting
with Fr. Goodwin, Mr. Woodward, with gentlemen of the C.I.A., and with Mr.
Hurvits. First, That he caly thing that is recognized is the Consejo (CRC);
Dr. Miro is the person of our confidence and will have an adrinistrative
budget which he will contral and will report later the expenses of coordina-
tion, and that any other expenses, propaganda er clandestine activity, will be
paid by the Agency; for the pretiers of the organizations in the Council there
will be a contact to assist in working out their solutions; that is to say,
that their problers of boats and arts." Another point was that in case there
are organizations that do not choose to join the Council, Dr. Miro will be
perfectly informed in actance of the ratters at hand and will give his
authorization. That is to say, it establishes a unifying control over the
14-00000
i
(CRC). I have seven, to work with you, with me, with the people who are
going to carry out the activities, with the people that I designate.
Nothing of that is being done. Then what they want is to work alone.'
-
-
"I will not continus. I will not continue from the time I return to
Miami. I have gone on for five months, struggling. I cannot accept this
situation
. I have tried to pull together these groups as asked in the
White House. I haven't succeeded in grouning any rore, because I want to
speak clearly in order to remain good friends always because you have
prevented it. The students haven't joined, not because of no political
reason, but merely because you support them directly. Presumably the idea
is that in this way the security of this nation is better safeguarded.
A Consejo was desired to serve as the coordinating group and to provide a
means by which the United States would not appear to be intervening in Cuba.
If there is to be a Consejo, it must have all the dignity of a Council."
-
"When I try to form a Council, grouping all elements together, they
don't join because they are talking directly with your people - and there
is an office for that purpose in Miami which deals with all the ren who
want to work, who want to do things. This is all indecendent of the Council.
And some work for a destruction of the Council. I cannot tolerate this. I
have a son who is a prisoner; either I know the plans, and I knew the maneuver
and the problems that they are going to carry out, or I, when I arrive in
Miami, will say, "No," and send word to Washington. Let them do without me.
There will be someone who will submit to these things, but not I."
"And of the four items that
medy promised me to resolve, there
-have not been resolved any, and I find myself in the dark. And I as very
sorry. I am not going to compromise the security of this Nation, but
neither an I going to compromise the situation of these boys. When they
disappeared, lost their lives, etc., I was confronted with "And you are the
president of the Council." I cannot remaine in this way.."
"I haven't been able to group together anything. I was promised that
the magistrates would all incorrorate together (into the Council), but
that rascal ALABAU is working against the Council and I have reason to
believe that he is doing it with Agency support, otherwise how would he pay
for his political denunciations." I responded, that I believed this could
not be true. He shouted, "I have expressed my position to you, and I want
you to get an answer when you can. If these problems that I have set forth
do not have an immediate solution, I & not to know and to dispose of
relative actions to be taken, then how, in view of my situation, must I do.".
He asked about the plan for clandestine sabotage action by commando
raid, that he had given us, and what had core of it. I replied that he must
realize that the study of such a plan necessarily was alow and must be
considered by rany. He said he was convinced that there was no intention of
accepting such plans, and that while now we discuss such plans, we lose out.
"I cannot accept this situation, nor would you."
14-00000
1
:
He then said that he could go ahead and dissolve the Council, and let
auch organization go ahead and do as it pleased; that he couldn't proside
over a reaningless council; that this was not a threat, but he would step
out. I reassured him that he was highly esteered in Washington and It was
necessary that he continue as head of the Council. He replied, "But they
disregard re."
" i
He reiterated that he had lanted four problems, none of which had
been resolved; reiterated that is had planted the pronaranca problem a
long time ago, but that propaganda continues indeponient of the Connoil
and people are not out like those to the Con-ress of stucents in Sao
Paulo, Miere they repeat tinga like parrots which don't go with Latin
Averican audiences.
"I have asked for arms; either give us massive aid, one, two, three
million - whatever is necessary, because this is to destroy Communia,
and we'll take our plans. And we'll furnish the dead, for wo can do no
rore. We must work in agreement, because new ouch time that I speak,
it's "we shall see, we are going to study," - and nothing happens. No,
no, I shall not preside over another Council existin; under these circum
stances. I have often spent 24 hours without sleeping, trying to pull
together the groups,
and meantime, problems arise on all sides. Why?
Because so long as other grouse pet sunport, they won't enter the Council.
The MRP is in contact with you and getting amma; now the Unidad Revolu-
cionario. I retain the ridiculous one. Alroady I've suffered a lot and
have a son who is a prisoner. And I've talked a lot during these days,
and I keen on being a puppet, but worse than a punnet, because a puppet
is noved, but I'm not even roved."
"Therefore, I say to you that the groups that want to work with us;
you, the chief of that group, and I, we ought to resolve all these questions;
for example, with the chief of the military group, because he has pulled
together the professional army and the rebel army (elements) and the army
of liberation, such us Varela, Botus, Nino and the boys, who have core
from the brigade." He declared that SOTHS is a fighter, is willing to
return to Cuba, and that he had great confidence in SOTUS.
I assured him that the legalization of SOTUS' residence would be
arranged, and that Pr. Burwitz informed me that he believed something
could be done for the other three returnees whose nares Dr. Miro had
given se.
Dr. Miro reiterated that he rust speak clearly, that he could not
continue thus as a travelling presicent without having anything to give to
his ceccle- nothing to the underground through Council action; nor could
he be ignorant of plans which he opposed where Cubans go out to die, and
then having their relatives come to hip as responsible. He declared, "I
don't want to live on a budget, preside over an adrinistrative office,
receive people, tell ther lies, saying, "We shall see." The ren who are
SEPERT
14-00000
:
here (in Council) representing organizations must know something of what
they are going to do and if they ask for 40 rifles, I must be able to say,
"Here they are" - not to give arms directly into their hands - but through
a contact for this. Otherwise you people make your plans, and I'll retire
from everything. And be assured that never, never will I say a single word
against the Agency or the United States, nover; nor explain reasons which
shouldn't be explained.
"If I cannot have the responsibility that I should have, I shall not
land myself to what may result in a tragedy. None of the problems I have
planted have been resolved; not that of the rexistrates nor that of the
Escambray, nor the money to the underground, has been resolved, not the
plan of propagamla that I gave you. I cannot continue to sit in an office,
While you continue operating, as you wish, with my silent consent. You may
choose someone else like Mr. Godoy, who is asking for arms. Choose and
see whether his mate will save Cuba. You are going to create another Fidel,
who is nothing.
I reminded him that I had my talks with him only ten days before, not
twenty, and that I could talk to no one in Washington until a week ago and
had to have rany conversations with many people, and that his proposals
could not be resolved in such a short time. He returned to the arecront
that "plans of action be discussed jointly; that if there were objections,
that the objections be discussed. He said there had been no objections so
far to discuss; nor objections to propaganda plans. He was to have contact
with a representative of C.I.A. to meet with representatives of organiza-
tions that want to collaborate, and with Dr. Miro - nothing developed on
thati He declared that he should have knowledge of the activities of
those that don't want to collaborates and said each day there will be more,
because they want to gain the power for themselves; to act on their own
account. Ho said he knows there is a "Jim" and a "Robert" and others that
are doing things.
I assured hir he rust realize that there were any problems involved
in his proposals and that time was essential to work them out. I rerinded
hir of his conversation with Mr. Goodwin and the latters' state: ent to the
effect that there could be no thought in the foreseeable future of a mili-
tary operation against or invasion of Cuba. Miro countered by referring to
his conversation with the President on 18 July and his (Miro's) complaint
of inactivity. He said the President proposed the recruiting of Cubans in
different units of the Army for training so as to utilize them at the
opportune time, and that the officers would be invited to our military
schools. Miro said he had gathered some of the military together and in-
formed them of this offer, and the next week he was called to discuss the
recruiting, which he approved. Then General Hershey went to see him at
his house, telling him that Cubans wouldn't be sent to Berlin or any such
place but kept in the U.3. available for use later. Miro said, "If there
is to be no invasion, then let's utilize the underground, which needs arms
and roney."
STORET
:
14-00000
He again repeated, "There must be massive propaganda; secondly art.as
we shall furnish the dead, but I need to know "llow are we going to die."
He commented that he was going to ask that his photograph not be put on
the cover of a certain magazino because he didn't know whether he was
going to continue; that in the present circumstances he didn't see how be
could continue. Again I urged that he rust do so, and that I felt certain
that we could resolve sure of his proposals, probably not to the extent
that he desired, but at least in part, but that time was necessary to
accomplish this.
He repeated that the Council neods to have some ction taken in Cubs,
but the Agency keens on undertaking actiona without any connection with
the Council. Further, that he must have the reans for conduction propa-
ganda, such as outlined in the "Operation Grieta." He asked, no when could
I give him sore answers. I replied that during the current week I expected
to have reetings in which these matters would to discussed - the Department
of State, with Mr. Goodwin, with representatives of the Agency, and that I
hoped that surething would be resolved, but that ho must realize that rany
people are involved in such matters and solutions are not reached quickly.
He reiterated that he had to keep telling his organisations "wait a little
longur" and that this was becoming embarrassing.
Then he brought up his preposal of having him and the Council go to
Cuba, saying "perhaps it would be advantageous that I die in Cuba; that
the Council ask recognition from. Cuban soil and the military aid of the
United States all to take place within 42 hours, He added, "I have
told you of the reaction of Cardinal Brellran, "We have done very badly
in the Cuban affair."
-
I reminded hir that despite the urgency that we all recognized in the
Cuban situation and its threat to the United States and all the Azericas,
there are rany other world problems - Laos, rerlin, atc., which also
occupy the attention of our government cecole.
-
Then I said I wished to take advantage of our meeting to ask him for
information relative to his current budget; first, did he believe that
there were any people receiving a salary fra the Council who might also
be getting financial aid from H.E.. He unid, "No, I would never parrit
that." Then he declared that he had two ways of operating when he absorbed
either to cut off
the personnel of the various organizations into the CRC:
their salaries suddenly, or to put ther to work for their way; that the
"norina" (cayroll) Frew a little bit because he had to take in certain
people, and that he considered his absorbing them was sccording to the
policy of C.I.A. Then he declared that the raxinu benefit received by
refugees from. H.F,W. was $100 per family per month, and that no where here
could family live on a hundred a month. Hence, he did not feel that he
could cut off the pebule on the staffs of the CHC organizations, and send
them to the H.E.W. Therefore, they were assigned to the different
SECUT
14-00000
SEGRET
-800
"The money for the underground is much and contact is doubtful, an
The problem of Cuba costs a lot of money! The people of the
-
excuse.
Escambray it's difficult to deliver arms to them? But we are going to
run that risk. The arts are going to be lost? Well, risks must be taken."
Pirc again referred to the groups that didn't want to collaborate with the
Council but would collaborate directly with the Agency stating that he
had opposed it and still opposed it; that he received a very affectionate
letter asking him to try work out all the problers between us and accept
a solution, and that a representative would be designated to work with him;
that I had appeared and he had spent two very pleasant days with me; that
I wan vory understanding; that twenty days had peased of great anxiety.
("Hot twenty but ten," I internoued.) His auid he figured that probably ha
right have arms and help for the underground and know about plans of action
and had felt strengthened. "Eut" he said, "now I feal knocked down. Kone
of the plans or propaganda proposals have been accepted, none. The firing.
wall in Cuba continues functioning, 31 dead in 30 days. by resignation has
been written long ago, and I am ready to submit it as soon as I return to
Mlari."
I declared that he must not do that, that he must have patience., that
it takes time to resolve these things; He replied that he has been waiting
since April and mentioned all the suffering he had gone through, attacks
by everyonn, rothers of prisoners and dead, the American Press, Fortune,
Time, Life, New York Times, etc., all against him alone; with ALABAU Trelles,
and othora; and that he had supported all of this in silence. He had been
asked it it were true that there was no air sunport and had not answered.
"The other time I kept my lips closed with absolute faith, the next time I
shall have my eyes open and have many questions. I don't understand how
you people can doal with some of these unknown Cubans.
He said, "I've given many proofs of loyalty to you, what they attribute"
to me the other day in Miari that "there would be an invasion in a few
days", that is not true. I have a tape recording of what I said which was
"very soon (without mentioning any date) in Cuba there would be unveiled
the great Pascuna (resurrection) of the Fatherland. And the press has mis-
interpreted Puscuús as the Pascuas de Navidad (Christans).
"Thus the prend comes out with staterents attributed to Dr. Miro that
the invasion will take place by Christras, completely a lie and nothing
like what I said." I conceded to Dr. 1iro that he had suffered a tremendous
number of attacks in silence and that the press had over a period of time
core out with critical remarks. I asked him if he planned to pass through
Washington before returning to Miami and he said he didn't have money for
such expenses; that his wife was terribly worried about their son, but
that he would have to remain in New York until Wednesday to attend the
luncheon for all the editors of the Latin Aerican press, who want to con-
verse with him, to help with propaganda but without costing the U.S. a
cent.
เ
SEPERT
14-00000
-10-
commissions within the CRC: finance, propaganda, clandestine, military,
organisation, etc. The ones who are no good or don't want to work, he
said, he would cut off, but that he couldn't just fire screone suddenly,
He then said saluries were mall 6 $200, $225 per month as an average
except for particular individuals, such as his assistant Aragon, a very
capable person, and the chiefs of the various organizations who work "Full
tine" and receive $400 each; further that he planned to give each organiza-
tion approximately $700 per month for their operating expenses, somo less, .
some a little more - (MRR, Rescate, 30 de Nov, 20 de Maye, AAA Independ-
ientes, Montecristi).
Won I questioned whether the Monteoristi organization was still in
the CRC, he said it was, that only Justo Carillo had dropped out of the
CHC but the group remained in and had a new head. He added that he had
Just had a request from Carillo to provide him (Carillo) with a thousand
dollars; that Carillo had photographic copies of some checks that he had
paid to Waldo Frank for propaganda activities against Cuba and that
Carillowas asking reimbursement but Miro said he didn't consider he had
to give it to Carille:
Returning to the budget, Miro Said, "There are the various employees;
there is the item of trips; there are the military people grouped under
the military commission - I cannot let the suffer misery. There are no
students on the payroll because they are being supported by you (the
Agency). And right there a difference is established between those in
the Council and those who receive money from the Agency directly, which
is more than that received by ry people. See how you (the Agency) with-
out intending to, and for reasons of insecurity, are going to destroy
the Council." He then stated that ho had placed Alvarez Dias, who had
been Minister of Finance, in charge of finance matters because he (Miro)
could not be everywhere, and to make certain that no expenses were paid
on which they were not in agreeront, and which Paula would carry out.
i
I quarried whather Paula would continuo as accountant, and Miro said,
"certainly, as accountant." He said that everyone has been coring to him
(Mire) with all kirds of pleas for money and therefore it was necessary
to have Alvares Diaz in there so that he and Paula night resolve the finance
matters. Miro added words of praise for Paula, "It's like I want to have
for each section of the Council, like I wanted Conte Aguero to handle
propaganda, but since he is receiving money from you (the Agency) he
doesn't want to. I have to have someone to take this load off of me; first
as in Naval affairs, someone to lock for boats, arms, etc."
I asked about Festre for propaganda and Miro replied that restre is
no good, never was of value; that he had been put in charge of the propa-
ganda commission previously and given $48,000 monthly, but had done nothing.
Then he launched into a critician of the Swan propaganda; that it was a
shame, handled by Batistianos: Fernandes VARELA, à Catholic; Suares
Hernandes, a senator in the epoch of Batista. He named another (sounded
SECRET

14-00000
"
SECTIT
-11-
like Chau Miller) a bad person and n Batistero. Firo said he had asked
that Svan to stopied but, since they work directly, these people are
defended. He added vryly that he wished they (the Ager.cy) would defend
him (Piro) that way.
He said they (the Agency) had posed the proble: five months ago in
Miari relative to Joaquin, Jagerio, a Cuban who was working with the
Council and has worked regnificently, but then he accepted work with the
C.I.A. and continues doing this (and do a whatever he leasen) _ intel-
11,ence, arms, recruiting, etc. - and will have nothing to do with the
Council.
Again Miro declared that he had the highest regard for Paulo and
couldn't desponse with hir; had even proposed his nare to be the agistrate
of the Tribunal of Accounts in the future government of Cuba. I added
By understanding that Paulo had done an excellent job, particularly
sentioning his handling of paying dependenta, a meticulous and arduous
task, Hiro exciaired that he had never considered replacing Paula but
merely needed Alvarez Diaz to handle details with Paula. He noid every-
one in Miami knows it is Pula who has the money to make payments by
check, and that he thought it would be better for the people to get pay-
vents in cash and sign a receipt; that sometimes score Light rob Paula
and then people will auk "from where does this money core," since the
Cubana have no roney,"
Then Dr. Miro said he would like to clarify any doubtful questions. I
asked whether he had received any other communication from the Escambray
group. He replied that he had not, but that the one had cor a through the
Montecristi groun and they continued to ask him for this arms aid. I
asked whether any changes or additions had been made in the Council at the
October 10th meeting. He replied that the MRP had not answered his in-
vitation because they were working with the Agency, and that the new
group, the Union Revolucionario, had replied that they did not, because
they have a delegate in Washington who is seeking direct contact with
U.S. Government Agencies.
Miro then declared that in order to call a Council meeting, he had to
have a press conference or a press release (about calling a CHC resting)
but Prio, ALABAM, and everybody were against all t is, and were doubtful.
whether to come or not to core. "I talked with Conte Aguero and with Ar-
reliano many hours. Arreliano is a fuehrer; if things aren't done as he
wants, he won't go along. Moreover, he has a strong anti-American
sentiment, I talked to them, but they said, "No." "There were two
proble at their lack of confidence in the Government, and my contradictory
view that we want to be with them (with U.S.). I would like to have had
to call a Council meeting almost by force. Therefore I decided to have
no mesting and no press conference, and to come here (to Eew York City).
There was no session
SEGRET
14-00000
SEORET
-12-
"The fastistianos are very well organized and also the Frio followers,
waiting for re to do something, and I cannot do anything. I'm like St.
Lawrence, roasted on one side and fried on the other."
I asked whether the Council was looked upon too ruch as a political
entity rather than a unifying medium. Miro replied, "Those people (Prio,
Alabau, etc.) want to obstruct the ones who are fighting Castro through
the medium of the Council. They are divided into two groups: (1)
Politicians; Prio, Alonso Pujol; those that wart to to the directors;
(2) The groups that want to act within Cubu who don't want to join CRC
but rather to deal directly with you people in order to have the power
tomorrow in Cuba; people only of action, but not of cormon sense and who
cannot mean much to the future of Cuba; they would cause another era
like that of Fidel, who is rothing but a student. That is extremely
dangerous. You give these people the means and if one of them over-
throws Fidel he is the one who assumes power. He may be a good man of
action but only 24 or 25 years old and not one who can orient Cuba in
the way of democracy. After reaching 40, people think differently.
Fighters are capable of currying out the action you give them to do, but
not to govern, //
Dr. Miro continued to dwell on his concern as to the future if these
young fighters are given a free hand to do as they please; that care must
be taken as to who is sunported, that these people are the ones who don't
want to work with us; that the FRP hopes that it will be the one who will
land tomorrow in Cuba; that oaos of the future will be sorething to which
you the U.S. has contributed by supporting such elements.
Dr. Miro cormented in further detail his views and again hærored on
the manner of using funds to avoid being like the ostrich. "Everyone
knows where the money is coming from and to have to be careful of the
form. Everyone does not know of you, but of where the help is coming
from"
"We are the puliticos of the war against Castre," affirmed Ir. Miro,
Let a military ran function as chief of staff as long as the military action
against Castro continues, but then the civil action rust be carried out
by non-military ren."
He added that during the softening-un action against Castro, Le
rust take good care of the ranner in which the notion is taken to avoid
exposing the ".S. suport; and that he considered that the collateral,
independent groups were not safeguarding it; so we are losing the now
as you (U.J. Agencies) deal with each of those grours. Arce Eust not
lose, we must vin.
SEGRET
14-00000
SEJ
-13-
I told Lr. Miro that I was anxious to work out some manner of linking
these groups with ir. Miro and the Council, without having to channel
direction and funds through Dr. Miro, since these groups are now function-
ing well under existing arrangerents.
Dr.
Dr. Miro s-id he would be pleased to meet with them outside of the
Council, and they say continue to function as collateral organizations
independently; but that they realize that they have one direction.
Miro added that like the independent magistrates with their attitude -
they are injuring the Council.
1
Dr. Miro Camented that he wanted the magistrates to have an election
and select their leader according to the results of a vote. He reiterated
that all the collateral organizations rust operate within the orbit of the.
Council; and that he would be glad to discuss with them their opinions
just as he as a professor had done with students--often times resulting
in excellent, ideas and viewpoints.
Then I mentioned that I had read in one of our magazines a laudatory
item describing his demonstrated capabilities as a mediator between
political groups and individuals.
Dr. Miro again returned to his belief that funds of all organizations
should funnel through the Council because every Cuban has a sense of well
that inclines him to go where he knows the money is dispensed; that this is
sad but true; and that those who are still outside and hope to get direct
support, they now that the money was here (in his hands), would come
running without urging. He then said that he had seven hundred dollars,
more or less, for each organization's operating expenses. He concluded
by saying that be didn't wish to operate without us (Agency) or without
any of the Arency people, but merely desired to pull together the diverse
groups and other activities.
-
He then referred to his conversations with Mr. Berle and General
Taylor, and his view expressed to them that in the April affair he felt
that the Agency had functioned more or less effectively Soretires
their people had been "rough", or "tough", but that he had no complaint;
that the lack of air cover no doubt caused defeat. When he had been
querried by resorters and other on specific questions designed to pry
secreta out of his, he had replied, "I didn't see them," or similiar
evasions, and thus had endeavored to be loyal to us.
He said his son had been certain that his father would be with the
expeditionary force, and, in route to the Bay of Pigs from Guatemala
the son had searched for him on the boats, and was disillussioned because
his father wasn't there.
SEQUET
14-00000
-14-
Again he emphasised his view that the students sent to Latin American
countries on propaganda missions should be indoctrinated by people in the
Council to prepare them for the cross examining that they would undergo,
and thereby prepare them against trans and foolish statertnts; and to
insure that no Batista supporters were sent out. He orphazised that one
of the first questions asked of these propaganda emissaries would be
"with what roney do you come here?" "What Yankee organization is behind
you." He added, "The people have to be well prepared to answer; just as
I had to undergo a succession of penetrating questions when I first went
into exile in Argentina and could answer them without hesitation because
of a clean record. "
-
Again he came back to his argurent that the collateral organizations
should function through the Council not "forgotting the Agency, but not
being forgotten by the Agency." I told Dr. Miro that I hoped during the
course of the week to have a serios of conversations in the course of
which certain decisions and solutions would be reached that would enable
me to sit down with him the following week and work out some details on
propaganda and other ratters.
-
Fr. Miro then asked, "How best can the security of this nation be
insured the Agency dealing directly with these people or working with
the through Miro?" And he emphasized that he was concerned both with
the security of Cuba and of the United States, and that these people
(Cubans with whom the Agency is dealing directly) at any moment when
they felt they were losing out or were not sufficiently paid - would
ask for more, and, being Cubans, might be very indiscrete; but that if
they had to deal with Miro they would be obligated to go to hip with
their complaints. He said that just as a bee seeking sweets will go to
any source, but if there is only one source it will go to that one; and
that thus all grouns must look to the Council.
Again Dr. Miro returned to his thosis that sooner or later there rust
be war to overthrow Castro, and that Cubans and Americans must realise
this; that as a preliminary the Cubans must carry out sabotage, etc.,
but just as blockades didn't overthrow France or Mussolini, neither would
they cause the fall of Castro; further that if suborage was conducted with-
out being a part of an overall plan of missions, the people inside Cuba
would come to react adversely to the sabotage and align themselves with
Castro.
He then expressed his view that time is being sadly wasted in trying
to bring the Latin American countries into agreement with the U.S. against
Castro, because, unfortunately, many are ruled by dictators and they fear
concerted action against themselves, but if the U.S. attacks and destroys
Castro they will applaud. Arain he repeated that the Punta del Esto
agreerent might well cause rany countries to say, "Thank you Fidel, and
not, thank you Mr. Kennedy."
Dr. Miro emphasized that he wanted to collaborate with us fully. Then
the conversation turned to the dissolution of the FRD by Varona, and Dr.
Miro declared that this step was difficult for Varona, to take because be
Cro
7
1
:
14-00000
SUPPET
-15-
hai teen its cheef and in a high nosition and had thus submitted to the
Council. He declared his esteer for Varona, a very brusquo han but very
hobeat. He said Varona had declared with respect to the Argentine
documents that, "They are in Miami. I don't fool like sending them to
Argentina because they don't belong to Argentina. They belong to the
thief; that is Castro. Argentina has diplomatic relations with Cuba and
if it feels like it, will send the documents to Cuba." Varona declared
in the SIP that the Argentin military ren had deceived him because,
having stated that they didn't trust the Argentine Foreign Office, they
nevertheless took to inventine the three documents that wero Fiven to
then and upon arrival turned them over to the Foreign Office. Firo
added that Varona stated is clearly in the SIP meeting where two
Argentine delegates wore present. They said, ", ithout rentioning nares,
Doctor, do you declare this before the SIP?" "Yes, I declare it," to
replied, "unt they shut up.
Kiro added that Varons had declared last night, "Let then give us
arms to finish off with Castro, but give them to un! Whoever has them,
give them to us! Dr. Miro then declared, "Were willing to disembark,
but here we are just playing hide and seek."
Dr. Viro then referred to his view that Diario de las American
should receive a call subsidy; that sometimes it published articles
unfavorable to the 11.8. but that usually, and it subsidized, would eliminate
advorce iters,
Then I returned to the subject of the bulget and concern that sore on
the Council nayroll night also be on H.E.W. payroll. He replied that for
October he would have thot swear that they were receiving no other Loney
and remarked that rary are on the payroll. He enumerated the different
sections delegations in Latin American countries, each person (two or
three at rost in each country; received only enough to live crit without
operating funda. He said each chief of organization in the Council received
$400, "which is very little."
-
He added that during the past outh with funds left over, he had sent
to Mexico 83,500 because so: 240 people had arrived there in need and
hungry. He said C.I.A. aided with 15,000 and he had sent $3,000 because
they were Cutans. Further, that re had provided each organization with $700
for its expenses of railing, offic B, car, etc., but that ta' wasn't a
He added that whatever wes left over he wanted to send to Cuba
It those who re fighting there.
fixed st.
.
'
He declared "As for they car reduce the budget to the vininum
provided that they send funds to Cuba; but ry roblers rust be resolved.
This payroll was -rorised to re when I was race president of the Council,
and I didn't create it."
i
14-00000
-16-
I quarried about the emenses of his recruitment suction, and he said
be had told Paula to eliminate that iter since recruiting is now done else-
atere, but the rilitary personnel in recruiting should be groused in the
rilitary so that sore form of intelligence agency could be maintained to
provide information.
No affirmed that his rilitery start really consisted of three officers
(Varels, Domaigre, Pontoagulo) but that they had exenon of office,
transportation, td secretarial help. As for his Social kolfure section,
be said this had been established by and was necessary for dispens
Ingrediainoa, etc., for Outan refugees bere.
Ra declared that he hadn't touched any of the exmensen (inherited
from FRD) except operating expenser, in one to give him a rargin of
Aunds to uset foreseen urgent expenses,
He said, "I told Paula to eliminate all that could be eliminated;
naturally he would have to consult with you." (Agency) :
Relative to the Naval section he said be planned to eliminate their
expense alloverce bit not the section itself, bersure he doe: » it essential
for vattera such as sending arms to Cuba, since they cannot be sent by
air; and that an office is necessary for them but their expensos must be
cut off slowly.
said
As for the Fedical Section which had beer created before,
only two "rutilados" (casualties) réraired and that the section was to be
eliminated. He reiterated that these sections had been created by us
(Agency) und that they could only by eliminated gradually,
He affirmed that there is left for his use only sora eleven or
the thousand dollars for ratters sur is attenterice at the SIP and
Macera affairs, and such inor propagar affairs, but that he felt
be should have restored to his the funds for propaganda (that had been
ine through lestre).
I assured his that it was certainly tended that the Propapanda
rmission now function under him as the rosagania section of the Council
and that if lestre was not co: sidered to be its ender, that he should
designate more else. He declared that estre as in New York, had
talked to Virons yesterday, and asked larve what he should do, to which
Varen renilo, "Resign."
Niro the said he would like to put corte Auero in as head of
prosunda but that Conte would not agres less e told him to. Miro
mentioned that the staff which Pestre d as very good but that lestre
was no good because he wanted to spend the anele day at a swiming pool.
He
E mentioned Argel del Cerro, Fermin Fena, sules arlo Rur baud.
mid Angel del Cerro wouli to a good chief of ropaga da, but that for
this he would also like a good adviser suen as Conte, who really is no
god excent to talk, but would like to be president. Miro said
SHOTET
14-00000
SECRET
-17-
Humberto Medrano, a reporter, also would to good to direct propaganda
offerts. He added that restre, chief of tropaganon for the it, which no
longer exists, is the one who continues receivin, the propaganda funds
from Paula, lie declared that he (Miro) didn't control these funds; that
he didn't have anything except a bureaucracy,
I told him that I considered this problem of propaganda section and
its operators should be corrected right away. He added that he felt that
Radio Swan should be it unvier the cropignada section of the Council;
further, that the propaganda section had to quit Bunding printed ratter
to the Latin Arerican countries and instead send a format to much country
so that they could be printed there with the terms used in each country;
in Argentins, in Argentine style; in Brazil, in Portuguone; in
Panara, in the ranner of peaking in Panurat that such propaganda rust
te aid for. He affirmed that llumberto Endrano was a great reporter and
hard worker and could harsile this well; that Fermin Peinado was a fine
worker who now is having a struggle to live, but works well at propaganda
Eatters.
Again said that the propaganda funds should pass through his
control, and that I
take this up union ry return to hashington.
Again he declared that he felt plans rust te rade for him and the Council to
return to Cuba. I said this was a matter for the future.
We terminated our meeting with my staterent that it would probably
not be till the following week when I would return to Miami, after
getting ratters resolved in Washington. He said that he would probably
te returning to Miami on Wednesday after the Fress luncheon...
returninb
I added that if it seered desirable for him to come to ka si;ington
on route to Miami, I would call him; that otherwise I would look forward
to seeing him in Miami. I said I felt we had covered a lot of ground,
and thanked him for giving me so much of cin time to our meeting.
.
Again he reiterated that he desired responsibility for all groupa
and that if he wasn't considered to be the right one, that he was ready
and willing to resign. hon this, we finished and I excorted him to the
elevator of the hotel.
DECRET