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104-10247-10097
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
7/
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris,
31 January to 3 February 1965
1.
Piwnip file
15 February 1965
AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965
and was met for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH
in order to arrange a meeting for the following day.
following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and
2 February 1965:
The
об
a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1
before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the
security implications involved in the infiltration and
possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA
Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964.
Orozco, according to his wre, went to Cuba to rescue (Jose
Vasquez Merey) and three others who were hiding in the
home of a woman named Gloria Cabrera, who lived at No. 72 08
27th Street) betweeN & O, Apartment 3, Vedado) Havana.
Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an
indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more
direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco
in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established
by AMICE-14 (Miguelito).
AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if
Upon his return to Cuba,
Orozco is under the control of the security service, will
decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and
AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate ANTRUNK-10.
AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to (UNSNAFU-9 to
indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is
still in hiding.
good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco
If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a
is not under the control of the security service.
letter talks abouth long, tiring trip, this will indicate
that Orozco has been arrested.
If the
AMLASH-1 was also requested
to send a report on the above and any complications which
have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.
b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles,"
which we have been using for the past three years, be
changed to "Gerardo."
MPV
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15-4
C. AHLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer
pills 
and 
carbon. He planned to take the S/W material
back with him 
to Havana.Ɔ AMLASH-1 again reviewed with
NSNAFU-9 and reminded (
UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his (Paris)
case officer all letters regardless of how received from
AMLASH-1 to either (
UNSNAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed
to his parents-in-
law. 
ΟΣ 
AHLASH-1 also agreed to send &/w
out in letters 
addressed to Juan Ventura (AMWHIP-1's
business partner) in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed
to inform Ventura 
that any letters he received from
AMLASH
-1 should be immediately air mailed to ANTHIP-1
_ 
in New York. 
Since AHLASH-1 will probably find it
necessary some time not to sign the letters to Ventura
in his true 
name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform
Ventura to forward to New York any letter received from
Cuba addressed 
to him and signed by a person unknown to
hi S/W letters 
to AMLASH-1 should continue to be
addressed 
to Ernestina Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8, 04.08
Esquina 
Calles 25 y H.) In an emergency a letter can also
be sent to AMLASH-1's mother.
-
d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had
been 
put 
down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he
had 
previously reported and attempted to answer most of
the 
questions in the HAVE cable. A cable on this subject
was sent from (Paris) to 
Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb.
AMLASH-1 was 
requested to send a message either through
his channel or 
through ANTRUNK-10's S/W chonnel reporting
how much of the 
radio equipment and other material had
been recovered 
from the cache.
e. AHLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in
Cuba 
whom he could 
recruit and who could be inserted into
the 
Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting
to get the 
DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela.
AMLASH-1 could 
think of only one possibility, an individual
known as (Gustavo 
Gonzalez, 06 AMLASH-1 has full confidence
0in 
(Gustavo) 
and (Gustavo) has previously been approached on
several occasions by 
Pinero to work for him.
06
return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if Gustavo
Upon his
can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be
sent 
on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1,
who also knows (Gustavo) % will 
provide the background infor-
mation upon his return 
to New York.)
f. AMLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections
on 10 February 1965. ANLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the
president of the Communist Youth, will become the new
hei
info.
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president and that his man, Lagaro Mora, would be one of
the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent
to Headquarters from (Paris.))
15-4
06
8. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Pizzolo).
regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage
of the locmotives being shipped from France to Cuba;
specifically, how carefully do they check the placement
of the seals, are they special seals or regular lead
seals, are there going to be any additional checks once
the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and
lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run
the locomotives under their own power or are they towed.
AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above
requirements and pacs the information to his contact in
154 the Paris Station AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find
out and pass to the Paris Station through (UN) SNAFU-9 the
names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.
15-4
02
h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with
whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or
through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela.
AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and
had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a
friend which was the only reason for writing to him.
1. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligenco
Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from
Paris to Headquarters.
15-4
154
J. A cable was sent from (Paris) to Headquarters
suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to AMTRUNK-10 stating:
"Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto.'
"
k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the fol-
lowing persons:
AMLASH-1
(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes.
reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and
is a good and brave man.
(2)
Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations
of the General Staff of the Occidental Army.
ANLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare
type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't
involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has
beard nothing bad about lusson.
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(3) Cadte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief of
Artillery of the Occidental Army.
(4)
Elpidio Baez Bigo.
Baez is a trusted Fidelman.
According to AMLASH-1,
(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned to
the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the security
people. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is young
and has for several years been with Pinero and the
Cuban IS.
(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a close
friend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regime
rises or falls as does that of Faustino.
(7) Sergio Tollon. Code clerk in the Embassy in
Paris. Tollon is staying in Paris at the request of
Ambassador Carrillo.
1. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary
conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems,
although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do
cause some problems. The purification of water has been
a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the
sickness in the country.
m.
AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invited
him to fly back to Havana with him in order to get him
AMLASH-1
back because of any serious security matter.
did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may not
return to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for his
trip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 does
not defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragones
does not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1
decides to stay out.
n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information on
the political developments in Cuba in mid-November and
December since he had been out of the country since early
November. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problems
between the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership and
explained the issues, the background and personalities
involved.
0. Soviet advise or influence in political and economic
matters creates resentment among the middle and higher level
Cuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.
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p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of
Raul is 
still
their influence in making national policy.
Next to Paul is Che Guevara.
the heir apparent to Fidel.
After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has
any great influence in the making of Cuban 
national 
policy.
President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is 
good since
he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrativo
ability and is able to work within the general 
outline 
laid
down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political 
influence
and control in Oriente where he has placed 
his men in
positions of influence, but only Fidel personally 
has 
any
Even within the
political influence in the rest of Cuba.
military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers.
Che Guevara is still strong in the 
economic field and
has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority
because of his earlier policy of industrialization.
Guevara restricts himself to the economic 
field and 
plays
He is serious
a very small role in the political field.
and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1,
who has worked seven days a week without leave 
since the
revolution. Emilio Aragones holds an important 
position
He is the
as the organizational secretary of the PURS.
official who was always at the office of the National
Directorate of the Party and has contact with 
all the
officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating
role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing 
former
13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but,
according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that
Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry 
he heads to DR
people. Because of this Chomon today controls 
to a 
large
Of all the 
ministries,
degree the Ministry of Transportation.
the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation.
Other DR people who continue to hold important 
positions
in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador 
Carrillo and
Jose Naranjo.
.. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any
specifics, but from their conversations with 
Ambassador
Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would 
prefer 
and
welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to 
the
Embassy in Madrid.
r. According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante
The 
job 
will
is being considered for a job outside Cuba.
probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a
decision had not been made as of November 
1964 as 
to
location.
:
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GIN:
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06
". AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando
Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in (
Bern) is
approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime.
AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique 
Rodriguez Loeches): 106
Cuban Ambassador in Rabat) is approachable 
if 
approached
and developed by the right 
person. (Marina Garcia 
Gonzalez.J06
assigned to the commercial section of 
the Cuban Embassy
in Rabato ANLASH-1 feels is also approachable 
and feels
Ambassador Carrillo
,
money can be used as an inducement.
AMLASH 1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could
probably be compromised with Fidel. He 
is a character
and could easily be entangled according 
to AMLASH-1 in
Ambassador 
Carrillo is a 
close
a compromising situation.
friend of Lucy Echevarria.
2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list
On many he was 
unable to 
pro-
of other requirements on Cuba.
vide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the
requirements on which he did provide 
information.
ce: WH/SA/EOB
File:
ANLASH-1 201
Internal Op
:
Nestor D. Sanchez
WH/EA/AMWORLD
:
1