157-10005-10297
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NE94
4970
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
135/170
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Date: 10/05/93
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0965
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
C
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY: SSCIA
AGENCY INFORMATION
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10005-10297
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
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DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
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IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT (UPDATED OCT 16, 1975).
DATE: 09/01/75
PAGES: 678
SUBJECTS :
SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT (CLASSIFIED) TABS A-J
"AB A: PROLOGUE
TAB B: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
TAB C: COVERT ACTION
TAB D: CUBA
TAB E: CONGO
TAB F: EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY
TAB G: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
TAB H: CHILE
TAB I: SOUTH VIETNAM
TAB J: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
TAB K: RECOMMENDATIONS
TAB L: EPILOGUE
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
COMMITTEE'S DRAFT REPORT
(UPDATED OCTOBER 16, 1975)
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
Date: 10/05/93
Page:2
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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icjag
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TAB A:
Prologue
(update)
October 16, 1975
ASSASSINATION REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAB B:
Introduction and Summary
Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation
TAB
C:
TAB
.D:
Cuba
TAB E:
TAB
F:
TAB G:
1. Introduction
2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or
Known About Within the CIA
3. The Question of Authorization Outside the Central
Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Administration
4. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy
Administration, Pre-Bay of Pigs
5. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy
Administration, Post-Bay of Pigs
6. The Quastion of Connorization for the 1963 Assens Plot
7. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administration
Congo
Executive Action Capability
Dominican Republic
TAB H:
Chile
TAB I:
South Vietnam
TAB J:
Findings and Conclusions
TAB K:
Recommendations
TAB
L:
Epilogue
NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 3
16 ELA
(1)(A)
(1)(5)
(1)(c)
C
E
TOP SEORAN
taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a
contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).
The Inspector General's Report dates this
operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as
Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or
Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely
29
that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed
his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized
the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).
TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside
with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura
foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule
bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states
that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different
diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified
that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).
(e) AMLASH
(1) Origin of the Project
In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico
City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine
if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G.,
p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been
*Donovan was not aware of the plan.
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 4
39
(
TOP SECRE
A CIA cablemate
1965, stated
that B-1 had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMLASH-1 had
"small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965
the Madrid Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one
pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l's
secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that
"B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical
people and delivered to AMLASH-1 in Madrid"] (I.G.,
P. 103
In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact with
AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities
were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105).
YPU
"40
15.
B-1 is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination
of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know
B-1's location.
B-1 is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin
American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and
a junta is formed. This junta will be established even
though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive
and may still be in control of the part of the country.
This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able
to establish some control over one of the provinces so
that the junta can be formed in that location.
"6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel,
B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a
maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the
people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio
messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate
that the raid was possible thanks to the information
received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from
the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "p".
This will be AM/LASH-1's war name. "
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as
Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommitte
Editing and (2) Insertion of
Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony
TABLE OF CONTENTS
D. CONGO
1.
2.
3.
4.
Introduction
Dulles Cabled Leopoldville That "Removal"
of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High
Quarters"
CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"
Lumumba, Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger". Even
After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective
Custody
The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba
(a)
Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination"
of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to
Congo With a Highly Sensitive
Assignment
(b) [Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to
'Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi-
nation of Lumumba: September 1960 .
(c) Hedgman Testified That (Gottlieb Told
Him That President Eisenhower Had
Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba
(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination
Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes
Steps in Furtherance of It
(e)
f)
The Chief of Station Moves Forward
With Assassination Plot
(i) The Chief of Station Testified
That He Requested and Received
Confirmation of the Assassination
Plan from Headquarters
(ii)
The Chief of Station Took "Explora-
tory Steps" În Furtherance of the
Assassination Plot and Testified
That He Destroyed Cable Traffic
Related to the Plot
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Page
1
1
8
14
15
18
22
24
31
31
34
5.
(f)
-ii-
Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the
Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the
Assassination Plot .
Page
41
(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation
To Poison Lumumba
41
(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With
Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating
Lumumba and Ile Cabled Hedgman About Gaining
Access to Lumumba for the Purpose of
Assassination
44
(iii)
Bissell Testified That Ile Did Not Recall
Whether the Assassination Operation Had
Moved from Planning to Implementation
But it Was Not Against Agency Policy to
Send Poisons to the Congo
48
The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination
Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives
in the Congo
s) Operati
O'Donnell's ) Operations in the Congo
(a) (0.
(i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That
a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to
the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi-
nation Operation
(ii)
Bissell Discussed Assassination of
Lumumba With (O'Donnell) and Sent Him
to Congo: October-November 1960 .
(iii)
Bissell Testified That He Asked (①'Donnell)
to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination
Operation
(iv) (O'Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and
Learned That a Virus Was in the
Station Safe
(v) (O'Donnell) Planned to "Neutralize"
Lumumba by Turning Him Over to
Congolese Authorities and Requested
the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to
Leopoldville as His Alter Ego
52
53
53
54
59
60
65
(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-
December 1960
67
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DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975
Frederick D. Baron
TOP SECRET
For Internal Committee
Use Only
6
D. CONGO
1.
Introduction
The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA
plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to
the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically
intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands
of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency
of the CIA [Chief of Station
scientist.
Although these instruments of assassination were never
used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case
which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's
assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives
in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?
Second, how high in the United States government was the
source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally,
was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led
to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?
A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these
broad questions together with the documents and testimony re-
ceived by the Committee.
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E
Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned.
The central government of
the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody
of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its
own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese
authorities announced Lumumba's death.
There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing
of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the inci-
dent concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*
2.
Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba
is 
an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters'
Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence
from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new Chi
Chief of
The Chief of
1
S
Station to the Congo.
of Station said that the briefings
he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure
contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice
Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to head-
quarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late
July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassi-
nating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).
During August, great concern about Lumumba's political
strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers
of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured
* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN
Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October,
November, and December.
** See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing
anti
-Lumumba attitude in 
the United States government as shown by
minutes of the National 
Security Council and Special Group and the
testimony of high Administration 
officials.
NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 9
C
-4-
by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters
Chief of Station:
by the new
EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING
CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT.
MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST
PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR
INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE
FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER
OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING
COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-
WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND
THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION
TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable (IN 39706),
Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)
This cable also stated the Chief
Chief 
of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE
[OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60).
Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clan-
destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State
Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR
BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable'
Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell,
Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up
cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION"
(CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).
le (Out 59741),
Several days later, the (Chief of Station reported that a plan
to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by
Congolese leaders:
KASAVUBU
ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU
WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA
REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT
VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT
STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable (IN
Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.)
42762),
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C
The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to
the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of
"removing" Lumumba:
IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-
CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON-
TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE
RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST
PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE
CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF
THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY
WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN
URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING
CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH, PRIORITY OF
OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966),
Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)
Dulles cabled that the (Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER
AUTHORITY" along the lines of the previously authorized opera-
tion to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group "INCLUDING
EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable,
8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT
THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are
a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the
importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.
**As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified
that 
Allen 
Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to
refer to the 
President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48)..
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 11
-7-
Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TO
CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR-
TUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the
[Chief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT
COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
Chief of S
But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point
of assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to act
unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the
Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:
TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE
TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK. HIS CON-
CURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE
DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT
ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT
PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contem-
plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the
Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny"
United States involvement.
DDP Richard Bissell testified that he
was "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable
shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that
the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the
President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33..
64-65).*
* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell
on the question of authorization for the assassination effort
against Lumumba.
NW 50955
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-9-
to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might
assassinate Lumumba:
TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS
ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE
CONGOLESE POLITICIAN) INDICATED UNDERSTOOD
AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE
LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 49679.) Leopoldville
to Director, 
9/7/60.)
The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered
to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM"
and assured him that the United States would supply technicians
(CIA Cable, 9/7/60).
As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of
the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S.
apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the
Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official
position:
LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-
RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION
EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS
EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST
WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE.
(CIA Cable, (OUT 69233,) Director to Leopoldville,
9/13/60).
Estet
The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported
that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-
nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have
been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded
a safe base of operations:
NW 50955
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Pis
C
STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS
SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS
ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED
[TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK
WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-
NATE LUMUMBA, FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE
LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK.
ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST.
(CIA Cable, (IN 13374,) Leopoldville to Director,
9/15/60.)
On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met
with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator
requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some
Congolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerning
the meeting reported:
[CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE
SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP
... TROOPS
RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP [OLDVILLE] AREA ...
[THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE
ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT
ACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES
LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS
[ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE
PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION
LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228,) Leopoldville.
to Director, 9/17/60.λ
The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE
POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters
that they should
HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT
NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES]
DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-
SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).*
* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale
planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support
to anti-
Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and
Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of
Station 
was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-
sentatives or operational contacts:
(footnote continued on next page)
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-11-
Several days later, while warning a key Congolese
leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters,
the Chief of Station
URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL
OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,
(IN 15643.) Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).
Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were
leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
[IN] VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP -
MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING
FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS
PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION
IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN-
DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED
OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.
CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS,
SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-
LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.
(CIA Cable
10/6/60.)
Cable (OUT
04697, Director to Leopoldville,
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-14-
4.
(
The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba
In the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters
delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal bio-
The
[Chief
logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba.
The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving
confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the
scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps"
in furtherance of the assassination plot.
of Station
testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA
scientist, Sidney Gottlieb he was informed that President Eisenhower
had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba.
[Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by
general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA
headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Only" channel
including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.
Station.
[Chief of]
The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of
But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in
the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly
before the poisons were delivered to the [Chief of Station, there
is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi-
nated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence
of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events
which actually led to Lumumba's death.*
* See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about
the 
circumstances 
that led to Lumumba's death in Katanga.
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 16
-15-
(a)
Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba,
and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly
Sensitive Assignment
On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him-
self in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping
force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed
a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting
between the Chief of Station and "Sidney) Braun," who was traveling
e(Ch
to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:
WILL
IT
["SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT.
ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS '(SID) FROM PARIS".
URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ('(SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE
AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY
HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.
(CIA Cable, (OUT 71464,) Bissell/Tweedy to Chief
of Station, 9/19/60.)
The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator
that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the
"PROP"
www
Chief of the Africa Division. *
* In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review
Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to
denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick
A. O. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this
sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized
by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution
of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable
traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel
did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting
additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.
NW 50955
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The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the
Chief of Station
that
he was to continue to use this indicator for
The
ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU
INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.
(CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)
(Chief of Station referred to herein as "Hedgman"*
--
--
testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such
a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a
"most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11,
43). The cable advised, in his words, that;
someone who I would have recognized would
arrive with instructions for me.... I
believe the message was also marked for my
eyes only ... and contained instructions
that I was not to discuss the message with
anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)
Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-
tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any
way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12).
Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was
to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensi-
tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only"
basis (CIA Cable, (OUT 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).
* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the Chief
the
(Chief
of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testi-
fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75,
p. 4).
NW 50955
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1
6
Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be
required as an agent in the PROP operation:
IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES,
BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH
THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]
ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable,
9/22/60.)
Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station
was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A
THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT
FILL BILL" (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about
the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of
station and his "colleague" presumably the man identified as
who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP
operation to Hedgman were to be afforded considerable latitude
("Sid") wh
www.fxx
(Chief of
in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:
YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ
OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS
OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE
CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUT-
STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES
CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY
ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE
BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)
NW 50955
* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later
dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections
and
'
F
infra.
DocId: 32202487 Page 19
-18--
On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to
Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate"
Lumumba:
WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN
ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY
RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE
FAILS IN LEOP [OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF
IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,
OUT 73573), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)
Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the
presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating:
Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in
the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not
yet disposed of and remained a grave danger
as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC
Minutes, 9/21/60)
(b) Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the Chief of
Station in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba
The (Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson
Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville
with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable
(IN
IN 18989), Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same
week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba
and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that
existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of".
Hedgman testified about the identity of("SID"
of ("SID":") -
the messenger
referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:
Q: Who was the messenger who arrived?
Hedgman: Mr. ✓ Sidney Gottlieb
:
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 20

-
19
Q፡ And at that time, you knew who he was?
Hedgman, I recognized him as an officer of the
Agency.
I believe he referred to the
fact that I had received a message and that he
was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
PP. 15-16)
(Gottlieb,
The message carried by (Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to
DDP Richard Bissell.) was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:
Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or
my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.
By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?
•
my under-
Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was
standing of the primary means. I don't think it was
probably limited to that, if there was some other way
of doing it.
Q: Of doing what?
Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)
threat.
Hedgman said that he and (Gottlieb):
(Gottlieb) 
also may have discussed non-
lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but
he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 28).
however:
He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination,
Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb) indicate with regard to
the possibility of physically eliminating him?
Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was
probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)
And again:
Q: I take it that once you started discussing these
lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that
the kind of elimination he was there particularly to
discuss was killing Lumumba?
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 21
-20-
Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that
this was one of the way(s), and probably what
they thought was the only way that would work
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).
Hedgman explained (Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means
of assassination:
Չ
And what did he tell you with regard to
how that might be accomplished?
Hedgman: .. He brought some biological agents.
I assume that that's the correct word. But in
any case, poisonous agent with him, which he
passed to me....
Q: These were lethal biological substances?
Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding
as a non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)
Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a
syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him
in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that
this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:
Q፡
[W]hen he ([Gottlieb]) came to the Congo
to give you lethal biológical agents for
the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear
at that time that the means for administering
those biological agents was to inject them
into a substance that was to be ingested by
Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or
toothpaste or any other substance that was
to be ingested?
Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)
Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted
to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb:
This was not a sine qua non that I employ this.
If there were another method, another way, it
would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 22
E
C
-21-
. For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested"
shooting Lumumba (to Gottlieb) as an alternative to poisoning
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29).
There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassi-
nation should not be traceable to the United States:
The biological substance, or specimens, what
have you, I think it was up to my judgment,
and 
if there was a better way certainly.
[T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I
implemented these instructions, no way could
it be traced back to the United States. It
had to be a way which could not be traced
either to an American or the United
States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)
back
Hedgman said (Gottlieb) assured him that the poisons were pro-
duced to meet this requirement:
I believe I raised the point that poisons left
traces in the human body, which could be found
on autopsy
I believe that I was assured
that these lethal agents would (leave]
normal traces found in people that die of
certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)
Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great sur-
prise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb) was there to discuss
(Chief
an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the Chief of
Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not
carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he
told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46)
and left him with the following impression:
I think it would be a fair impression that he would
take away the thought that I was going to look into it
and try and figure if there was a way .. I believe I
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 23
-22-
C
NW 50955
stressed the difficulty of trying to carry
out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 47.)
The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his
initial contact with (Gottlieb) was clearly an affirmative response
to the assignment. The Chief of) Station said that he and (Gottlieb)
were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH.” (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to
Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that Mobutu's government
was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation
with Lumumba, and said:
[Mobutu's] go
HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT
WITH SECURITY INDICATED.
(CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)
(c) Hedgman Testified That (Gottlieb) Told Him That
President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination
of Lumumba
Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in
Leopoldville, (Dr. Gottlieb) informed him that President Eisenhower
had authorized the assassination of Lumumba :
9፡ Did you raise with him the question of authori-
zation of such instructions to you?
Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strong
recollection, that I did.
What do you recall in essence was what you
said to him?
pointed
Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have
out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,
and I may have probably said that I never heard of
it being done, which I had not, never in my training
or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any
references to such, in my recollection at least, such
methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose
authority these instructions were issued.
2፡
And what did Mr. (Gottlieb reply?
DocId: 32202487 Page 24
C
-24-
Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:
Hedgman:
Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot
be 100 per cent certain, but I have always, since
that date, had the impression in my mind that these
orders had come from the President. (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 34.) -
But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":
Q: You have a very firm recollection that he
(Gottlieb] represented to you that the President
of the United States directed the assassination of
Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?
Hedgman: That's my recollection.
8721775, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)
(d)
Yes. (Hedgman,
Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest
Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It
On the basis of his talks with ("Sid, ") Hedgman listed a
number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba.
the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent
be used in the following manner:
HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.
WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP
DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)
At
Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-
calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) lle in-
formed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED
ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60).
On September 30, the Chief of) Station urged that head-
quarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 25
C
-26-
in p
The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received
authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority
plan:
ов
YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS
WITH SCHOTROFFE) TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE
TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE.
APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO
PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, (OUT 75900, Fields to
Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)
In this cable, (Glenn Fields, Assistant Chief of the Africa Division,
expressed a "HOPE .. FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable
Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)
75900,
According to the report of the (Chief of Station, (Gottlieb)
left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of
the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171.) Leopold-
ville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of (Gottlieb's)
"materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances
would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of
the "expiration date" to (Gottlieb's) departure is unclear from the
cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances
had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indi-
cated that Gottli
(Gottlieb) left some biological substances that were still
lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination
operation:
((SID) LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING Use-
FULNESS. ([CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE
TRY 
IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171,
Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)
55 DocId: 32202487 Page 26
-27-
By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory con-
versation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining
access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Hedgman testified
that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a
means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 60):
I believe that I queried the agent who had
access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in
detail about just what that access, what
access he actually had, as opposed to speak-
ing to people. In other words, did he have
access to the bathroom, did he have access
to the kitchen, things of that sort.
I have a recollection of having queried him
on that without specifying why I wanted to
know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)
On October 7, the
on this meeting:
Chief of Station reported to headquarters
CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH
[AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES
[AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY
HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE
HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN
LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.
Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with
doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:
[C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild
scheme professionally. I did not think that
it ...
was practical professionally.
Certainly
to keep the U.S. out of it....
I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really
expected to carry it out.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)
*$ མཟ !
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 27
-28-
However, his cables indicate that he was planning to con-
tinue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do
it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate
operative for the assassination mission in the event that they
found his first choice unacceptable:
IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES]
BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES-
SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD
COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable (IN 24171,)
Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)
Tweedy cabled the
(Chief
of Station the same day that he "HAD
GOOD DISCUSSION. YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" presumably referring to
a de-briefing of Gottlieb/upon his return to the United States.
of (Gottlieb)u
(CIA Cable (OUT 78336), Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.)
indicated that he was
CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY
NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,
SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER
PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY
ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS.
(CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of
Station, 10/7/60.)
Tweedy
This expression of support for the operation was followed by
an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15,
1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's
Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as
Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA
channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to
:
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 28
C
-29-
appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States
embassy. This cable generally discussed the possibility of
covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and
military aid (CIA Cable (OUT 81476) Director to Leopoldville,
10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against
Lumumba that would be authorized:
ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND
IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING
[LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE
ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD
HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA Cable
(OUT 81476,) Director to Leopoldville,
10/15/60.)
On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second
cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally
by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for
Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable
Station, 10/15/60).
φυτ
81396 Tweedy to (Chief of
YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL
CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA [GRAPH]
ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-
CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC
[LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL
STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-
POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-
SIDERATION.
RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY
APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND
ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable OUT
81396) Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60).
Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi-
cating that communications about the assassination mission were
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 29
-30-
restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination
mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's
reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to
the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY
...
THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to
(Chief of) Station,
10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin O'Donnell who
testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to
undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.
In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional
officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason
that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly
under the Chief of Station:
of)
SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY
GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. (CIA
Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of Station,
10/15/60.)
Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba
activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels,
Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:
POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR
ABDUCTION (LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULT
ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE
PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS ANOTHER
BREAKOUT INTO TOWN REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.
(CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to (Chief of
Station, 10/15/60.)
*For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and
O'Donnell and O'Donnell's subsequent activities in the Congo, see
Section 5(a), infra.
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 30
}

-31-
i
This series of cables sent
during, and after
(Gottlieb)'s visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA
headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassi-
nation mission. The cables also show an intent to severely re-
strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in
CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the
Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other
covert activities.
(e)
The (Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination
Plot
The testimony of the (Chief of) Station, taken fifteen
years after the events in question and without benefit of review
of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture
derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted
assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from
the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he
claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an
affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.
(i)
The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested
and 
Received Confirmation of the Assassination
Plan from Headquarters
Hedgman testified that, after receiving (Gottlieb's
instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that
he was to carry out (Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified (Gottlieb) by
name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President
in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 31
-32-
Iledgman described the extraordinary security precautions he
took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination in-
structions :'
There was some special channel
because
it was handled differently than any other
normal message. For example, it was not put
on a regular cable form, which, you know,
you have several copies for your various files.
And it was my recollection that I personally
carried the message to the communicator to
encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk
way that even the communicator would not
necessarily know what it was about.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)
This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for
all cables relating to the assassination mission.
Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con-
firmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment,
he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:
I believe I received a reply which I interpreted
to mean yes, that he was the messenger and his
instructions were duly authorized.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)
Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con-
vinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)
Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from
ottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization
before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman ex-
pressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free
hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving
"final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 32
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-33-
Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his
second appearance:
made
I probably had authority to act on my own
but... it was possible that I had to go
back and get clearance for my action.
(Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75,
p. 39.)
Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been
www.www
that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of
eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).
I thought the policy decision had been made
in the White House, not in the Agency, and
that the Agency had been selected as the
Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out
a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)
Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally
selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under
the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so
and to proceed to take action:
Hedgman:
I doubt that I thought the
President had said, you use this system.
But my understanding is the President had
made a decision that an act should take
place, but then put that into the hands of
the Agency to carry out his decision.
Q: Whatever that act was to be, it was
clearly to be assassination or the death
of the foreign political leader?
Hedgman: Yes.
Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?
--
if Dr. Gottlieb's
Hedgman: Certainly if those
Iethal agents were employed, that would have been
the 
result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 33
-34-
Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out
these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not
he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without
seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked
with headquarters before taking action:
I think probably that I would have gone back
and advised that I intended to carry out and
sought final approval before carrying it out
had I been going to do it, had there been a
way to do it. I did not see it as
matter which could be accomplished practically,
certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)
a
He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval
would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the
specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 53).
(ii)
(Chief
The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in
Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified
That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot
Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's) vi
s visit, he locked
the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably"
sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was
the only other person with access to the safe and that she would
not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 3/21/73,
p. 49).
Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he pre-
served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 34
-36-
The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For
two months after (Gottlieb's s arrival in the Congo, a regular stream
of messages flowed between the Leopoldville (Chief of Station and
headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early
October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority
plan recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have
sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison
Lumumba. *
In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of) Station
that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and
he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-
tensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy
to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).**
These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on
October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission
.
* CIA, Cable (IN 18989, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60;
_CIA Cable 
(
IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable.
OUT 
75900, Fields to (Chief of Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable (IN 24171)
Chief 
of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section
supra, for
full treatment of these cables.
** See Section
cable.
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 35
"
supra, for more complete text of this
:
-37-
"
HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE.
THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS
INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable
(IN 28936) Chief of Station to Tweedy,
10/17/60.)
Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime
in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access
to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 61). The Ch
(
Chief of Station continued to communicate with head-
quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina-
tion operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so.
Hedgman confirmed Tweedy's view that although the assassination
operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with
responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate
on the progress of the assassination mission:
ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS
OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME,
VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable,
IN 28936, 10/17/60.)
Due to his workload, the Chief of) Station responded enthusiastically
to Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:
BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA
IF CASE
OFFICER AVAILABLE (CHIEF OF STATION] WOULD
DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING
AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable
(IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 36
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C
The (Chief of) Station concluded this cable with the following
cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he
may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to (Gottlieb as an alternative
to poisoning (ledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):
IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS
POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE
RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.
HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT.
HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,
WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING
OF HUNTING SEASON.
10/17/60.)
(CIA Cable (IN 28936,
The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers
to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The
rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the
possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON"
in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside
the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This
interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by
the Chief of) Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's "EYES
ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from
mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on
November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but
inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:
TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL
WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY
CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP.... CONGOLESE
TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S
ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS.
UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF
PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS
OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-
VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 37
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COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF
HOUSE BY CONGOLESE.... TARGET HAS DISMISSED
MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS
REMOTE. (CIA Cable IN 42478) (Chief of
Station to Tweedy.)
Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the
assassination question would have been sent with the same
extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably re-
ferring to the PROP channel which concerned (Gottlieb's) visit
and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:
The
I would have sent in a special channel
anything dealing with Lumumba, at least
that would touch upon his removal in one
way or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)
(Chief of) Station also testified that sometime before
leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to
the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's
best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy
those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never
before in his tenure as (Chief of Station in the Congo destroyed
cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91).
But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were
destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said
C
* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a
sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 38
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that eventually
--
I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because
the Congo was a highly sensitive area in
which at one period I recall we had all
of our files in the burn barrels. I mean,
when you wanted a file, you went over and
dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 91.)
plot, the (Chief of) St
At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination
Station was asked to give a general characteri-
zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times
in which it took place. His response indicated that although he
was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized
order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating
Lumumba :
I looked upon the Agency as an executive
arm of the Presidency.. Therefore, I
suppose I thought that it was an order
issued in due form from an authorized
authority.
On the other hand, I looked at it as a
kind of operation that I could do without,
that I thought that probably the Agency'
and the U.S. government could get along
without. I didn't regard Lumumba as the
kind of person who was going to bring on
World War III or something.
I might have had a somewhat different
attitude if I thought that one man could
bring on World War III and result in the
deaths of millions of people or something,
but I didn't see him in that light. I saw
him as a danger to the political position
of the United States in Africa, but
nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75.
pp. 110-111.)
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 39
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(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree
of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination
Plot
There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard
Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination
plot presented by the (Chief of) Station and the cable traffic from
the period.
While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that
the assassination effort was the "highest priority" at CIA head-
quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct
's mission to the Congo and Tweedy can
recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an
recollection of (Gottlieb's) mi
assassination attempt.
(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation
To Poison Lumumba
As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal
liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of) Station in Leopoldville
for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the
effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the
special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations
cabled to headquarters by the (Chief
of Station on the assassination
operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."
the
Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed
Chief of) Station that ("SID") would arrive in Leopoldville, with
an assignment (CIA Cable (OUT 71464), Bissell/Tweedy to
φυτ
(Chief of)
NW 50955
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Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he
had debriefed (Gottlieb) upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable
OUT 78336), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also
the "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on (Gottlieb's)
arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable (IN 18989) (Chief of) Station to
Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan
which emerged from the discussions between (Gottlieb) and Hedgman
as the top priority
--
infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's en-
tourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA
Cable
20857
(Chief of)
Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable,
7) Chief
(Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable (Chief of:) Station
to Tweedy, 10/17/60).
Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these
cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba:
Q. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger
from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo
to provide the Chief of) Station in the Congo
with instructions to carry out the assassination
of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him
with the tools to carry out such an assassination,
namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin-
istering them?
Mr. Tweedy.
No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)
* See Sections 4(a)
-
4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent
in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the (Chief of) Station in
Leopoldville..
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 41
-43-
When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received
by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by
(Gottlieb), who carried instructions that they were to be used in
the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:
There is nothing in my experience with the
Agency which would really bear on that
point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)
Tweedy added that if (Gottlieb) wen
went to the Congo as a courier,
"I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 35).
Tweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal bio-
logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't
recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).
In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable
from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to
the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be
"very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recoll-
ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).
Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of
the (Chief of) Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through
a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions
were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, pp.
32-33).
Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the
testimony of the (Chief of) Station, * the discrepancies in their
*
Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the
(Chief of) Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt
Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory
and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 42
-44-
testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:
I really am having trouble with this. I had to
be reminded of so many things. . . [T]he things
that I recall the most vividly about all my
African experiences were. the things I was
basically concerned with all the time, which was
putting this division together and the rest of
it.
When it comes to operational detail I start
fuzzy and you would have thought with something
like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms,
that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking
about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the
case.
(Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)
Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "(Gottlieb) would
have left instructions with the (Chief of) Station which would have
empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any
further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32,
36). Tweedy said:
In such a matter of this kind; headquarters would
have wanted to have a last word up to the last
minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)
(ii)
Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell
the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He
Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba
For the Purpose of Assassination
Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to
poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass-
ination attempt.
Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinat far
Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960
(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 14-15).
Tweedy stated that he did not know
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 43
-45-
whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about
exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy,
9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruc-
tion from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assump-
tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:
I would proceed with it on the basis that he
was authorized to give me instructions and it
was up to him to bloody well know what he was
empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)
Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass-
inating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28):
I think it came up in the sense that
Tweedy.
Dick would have said we probably better be
thinking about whether it might ever be necessary
or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case
we presumably should be in position to assess
whether we could do it or not successfully.
Q.
Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?
Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him
in any other sense but a planning exercise,
never were we instructed to do anything of this
kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a
thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of)
Station be thinking along those lines as well.
(Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)
Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con-
versation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers
sending to the (Chief of) Station asking him
to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever
have had to Lumumba. . . [in] the eventuality that
we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.
(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 44
5.
k
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Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for
the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24);
rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were
being explored:
Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this
be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?
Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might
have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)
Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the
feasibility of an assassination operation, did
poisons come up as one means that was being con-
sidered and which the Chief of Station should explore?
Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there
are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison
him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or
something like that. But basically you are talking
about a contingency plan which I assume has the best
possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S.
Government and if you want to do it in a manner which
would be as distant, if that is the right word, as
possible, I think poison would then stand high on
the list of possibilities.
Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the
of) Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious
answer.
(Chief
a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters"
(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27).
Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a
special channel concerning the "messenger" to the Congo or confirm-
ation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring
access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 45
-47-
sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the
normal CIA cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy
said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the
discretion of the (Chief of) Station and he did not know whether
Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22).
Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't" have a conver-
sation with (Sidney Gottlieb) about "anything in his inventory that
could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances
(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first
conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held
between Dick Bissell and (Sidney Gottlieb)," which Tweedy then would
have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).
Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the
means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning
interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was im-
minent that somebody would say 'go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):
Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the
time anything like this should occur there would
have been some kind of real focus on the problem
at probably a very considerable policy level with-
in the Agency.
and it never occurred to me that
I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come
down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we
ever in a position where he said that I would
merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got
that far.
Q. You didn't have any action plans for the
assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or
were aware of?
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 46
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NW 50955
-48-
Tweedy. No.
Planning, yes, but nothing that
ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)
It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's
testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authoriz-
ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorization
for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's
entourage is in accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiries
about gaining access to Lumumba.
However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the
(Chief of) Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable (IN
24171) Chief of St
Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile
with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never
imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week.
which told the (Chief of Station that Lumumba's
(Chief of) Station
DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE
CONSIDERATION.
THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE
AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable
(OUT 81396), Tweedy to Chief of) Station, 10/15/60)
(iii)
Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall
Whether The Assassination Operation Had
Moved From Planning To Implementation
But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to
Send Poisons to The Congo
Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing
the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it
seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place
(Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).
DocId: 32202487 Page 47
-49-
Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about
steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did
not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said that
exploring access to Lumumba "almost certainly" seeking information
from the (Chief of) Station about access for poisoning
www.www
would have
been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but
he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this
subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was
aware that the
(Chief Station had an agent thought to have direct
access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80).
Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables
that Tweedy sent to the (Chief of) Station seeking information about
gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell,
9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:
I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral author-
ization from me, would have had the authority to
send such a cable without my signing off on it.
(Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)
Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of (Gottlieb's trip
to the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was "cut out of
knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21).
Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to
(Justin O'Donnell with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that
*
*
Bissell's assignment to (O'Donnell) is discussed in Sections 5(a)
(i) and 5(a) (ii), infra.
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 48
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Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of f (Gottlieb')s
visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22).
Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a
messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were
to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . I
would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would
have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).
It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed
the assassination of Lumumba with (Sidney Gottlieb), who was then
his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a
number of occasions he discussed with (Gottlieb) "the availability
of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10,
p. 60).
Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed
that, if (Gottlieb)
(Gottlieb) 
went to the Congo, he had approved the mission,
(which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of
Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of
specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is
nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the
testimony of the (Chief of) Station that (Go
(
Gottlieb) carried poisons to
the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).
Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy
in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 49
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He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo.
in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49).
as still
Bissell acknowledged,
however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which
to administer them was an extraordinary event:
It would indeed have been rather unusual to send
such materials a specific kit. . of this
sort out to a relatively small station, unless
planning for their use were quite far along.
(Bissell, 9/10, p. 37).
Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he
had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to
move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10,
pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of
these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr.
(Gottlieb) took specific instructions 'to implement" (Gottlie:):)
would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by
Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed
into an implementation phase" and that "authorization was given"
(Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).
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☐
(
5.
The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination
Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives
In 
the Congo
(Justin O'Donnell), a senior CIA officer in the clandestine
operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he
had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry
out the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12).
(O'D
'
Donnell) said that he refused to participate in an assassination
operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba
away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in
the hands of Congolese authorities ( 0 Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).
Shortly after (O'Donnell 's arrival in the Congo he was
joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the
following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by
assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of
the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of
(①'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIA
Cable (IN 18739), Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).
Despite the fact that (O'Donnell) was initially approached
to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un-
likely that (O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation
of that plot by the (Chief of) Station.
Whether there is any connec-
tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives
QJWIN and WIROGUE
is less clear.
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 51
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C.
(a)
onnell's
Donnell's Operations in the Congo
(i) Tweedy and the (Chief of Station Agreed That a
Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo
to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation
In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the
specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior
case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of) Station with the
assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed
Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR
CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national
Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60).
operative (CIA Cable (OUT 78336), Tweedy to (Chief of)
On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the sugges-
tion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to
concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable (OUT 81396).
Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60).
of Station replied affirmatively:
of) S
Two days later, the Chief
BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable
IN 28936), (Chief of Station to Tweedy).
The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE
OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the
assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).
* See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 52
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C
(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With
O'Donnell)and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960
Probably shortly after the (Chief of Station's cable of
October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to
concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached
the subject with CIA officer (Justin O'Donnell).
At that time, (O'Donnell) was the Deputy Chief of a com-
ponent of the Directorate of Plans
O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 8).
--
the CIA's covert action arm
(Justin
Justin O'Donnell) testified that in October of 1960, he
was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi-
nating Patrice Lumumba (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12; 9/11/75,
pp. 19,
43):
'Donnell): lle called me in and he told me
he wanted to go down to the Belgian Congo,
the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate
Lumumba.
0:
What did you understand him to mean by
eliminate?
Donnell):
To kill him and thereby eliminate
his influence.
Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his
remarks, whatever his precise language, as
meaning that he was talking about assassination
rather than merely neutralizing him through
some other means?
O'Donnell): It was not neutralization
Clearly, the context of our talk was to kili
him. (②'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.).
O'Donnell reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:
I told him that I would absolutely not
have any part of killing Lumumba. He said,
I want you to go over and talk to Sidney
Gottlieb).
(①'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 12.)
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Ca
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(Gottlieb)
was a CIA scientist who was at that time the Science
Advisor to Bissell
Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).
'Donnell) said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct
such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles"
But the question of authorization
TⒶ::Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44).
(0
was never raised by Bissell:
I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles
in such an important issue, but it was not dis-
cussed, nor did he purport to have higher
authority to do it. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 15.)
onnell),
(O'Donnell) promptly met with (Gottlieb) and testified that he was
"sure that Mr. Bissell had called (Gottlieb) and told him I was coming
over" (O'Donnel), 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). (O'Donnell said
that (Gottlieb) told him "that there were four or five ... lethal
means of disposing of Lumumba" (6' Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 13). (O'Donnell
recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-
cluded poison" (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). (O'Donnell)
said that (Gottlieb)
(Gottlieb) 
"didn't even hint ... that he had been in the
Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo"
(O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 7-A).
After speaking with (Go
(
Gottlieb) (①'Donnell) said:
I then left his office, and I went back to
Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no
way would I have any part in the assassina-
tion of Lumumba
and reasserted in
absolute terms that I would not be involved
in a murder attempt. (O'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 43.)
NW 50955
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شا
-56-
(O'Donnell)
O'Donnell) said that in one of his two conversations with
Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy
to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be
in violation of federal law" (6' Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 14). He said
that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (②O' Donnell), 6/9/75,
P. 14).
Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, (O'Donnell)
agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize"
Lumumba "as a political factor" (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 43-44) :
I said I would go down and I would have no
compunction about operating to draw Lumumba
out [of UN custody], to run an operation to
neutralize his operations which were against
Western interests, against, I thought,
American interests. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13.)
(O'Donnell) added that his objective was
to
and his
neutralize Lumumba's influence
activities against (a Congolese leader],
whom at that time you might say was our close
instrument, he was the man we had put our
chips on. (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 20.)
Bissell also recalled that; after their discussions about assassi-
nation, O'Donnell went to the Congo "with the assignment
'Donnell)
of
looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75,
p. 53).
Although (O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he
reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 55
-57-
There was
(O'Donnell): I told Mr. Bissell that I
Mr.
would 
be 
willing to go down to neutralize
his activities and operations and try to bring
him out [of UN custody] and turn him over to
the Congolese authorities, that is correct.
Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that
his life might be taken by the Congolese
authorities?
Mr. (O'Donnell):
in the
It was, I think, considered
not to have him killed, but then
it would have been a Congolese being judged
by Congolese for Congolese crimes. Yes, I
think it was discussed. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75,
p. 38.)
a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would re-
ceive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities,
according to (O' Donnell (0'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 24).
But (O'Donnell)
"had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him
tried by a jury of his peers" (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 14).
Although (O'Donnell) had expressed his aversion to assassination
to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize"
Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still
interested in the assassination of Lumumba:
--
in leaving at the conclusion of our second
discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't
rule out that possibility meaning the
possibility of the elimination or the killing
of Lumumba 
I wouldn't rule it. In other
words, even though you have said this, don't
rule it out.... There is no question about
it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out,
meaning the elimination or the assassination
(O'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 45).
(O'Donnell) had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis-
cussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 56
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to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of
record (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):
[I]n the Agency, since you don't have
documents, you have to be awfully canny
and you have to get things on record, and
I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I
said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell
proposed to me, and I told him that I
would under no conditions do it, and Helms
said you're absolutely right.
6/9/75, pp. 15-16).
(O'Donnell).
Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a
conversation with (O'Donnell)
(O'Donnell) 
and he assumed that (①'Donnell 's version
of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).*
William Harvey testified that (O'Donnell) had informed him
about the conversations with Bissell:
Mr. (O'Donnell) came to me and said that he
had been approached by Richard Bissell
to undertake an operation in the Congo, one
of the objectives of which was the elimina-
tion of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me
that he had declined to undertake this
assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)
Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told
him that he had asked (O'Donnell) to undertake such an operation
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).
(0'Donnell) said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis-
cussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo: : COLL 'Donnell, 9/11/75
11 9/11/75
,
pp. 45-46).
* Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa-
tion in any way.
He did not recall why (O'Donnell had gone to the
Congo or what his mission was (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 57
بسیج
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(iii)
Bissell Testified That he Asked (O'Donnell) to Plan
and Prepare for an Assassination Operation
Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell)
discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell,
6/9/75, p. 75) and that (O'Donnell) reacted negatively (Bissell,
9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell. O'Donnell) said that he
"
thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that
the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways"
(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).
Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked
(O'Donnell) to see (Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).
Bissell differs with: C:CD:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:
s 
account on only one
important point the degree to which Bissell's initial assign-
(O'Donnell) contemplated the mounting of an operation as
opposed to contingency planning. (O'Donnell flatly testified that
ment to
('Donnell)
Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first
testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked
"to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell,
6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance,
however, Bissell stated that O'Donnell "had been asked to plan
and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,
p. 24).
6 onnell).
he
Bissell said that after his conversations with O'Donn
felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination
operation because, "given (0'Donnell)'s
is reaction, there was a risk
NW 50955
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E
C
that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell,
9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have de-
activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time,
Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/
(Gobblieb poison plot continued to move foward:
37 1
[T] his had been in my mind a very sensitive
assignment to him, limited with the
knowledge of it limited very narrowly even
within the Agency. And it is difficult to
separate recollection from inference on
occasion. But I seem to recollect that
after this conversation with him, I wanted
this put very much on the back burner and
inactivated for quite some time. Now that
doesn't rule out the possibility that some
action through completely different channels
might have gone forward. But the best of
my recollection is, I viewed this not only
as terminating the assignment for him, but
also as reason for at least postponing any-
thing further along that line. (Bissell,
9/10/75, pp. 25-26).
In Tweedy's mind, (O'Donnell)'s eventual mission to the Congo was
linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba
rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody
(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).
(iv)
O'Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and Learned That
a Virus Was in the Station Safe
On October 29, the (Chief of Station was informed through
the PROP channel that (Justin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in Leo-
poldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798) Fields)
φυτ
(Chief of) Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, (O'Donnell) arrived
to
=
E
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 59
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(
in Leopoldville (CIA Cable (IN 38052), Leopoldville to Director,
11/4/60). (Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been
made aware by cable that (O'Donnell) was coming to the Congo
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible"
that as a new (Chief of) Station he took the dispatch to the Congo
of a senior officer like (O'Donnell as a signal that CIA headquarters
was "dissatisfied with my handling" of (Gottlieb)'s instructions
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42).
Hedgman had a general picture of (O'Donnell)'s mission:
dre dub
I understood it to be that similar to
mine, that is, the removal or neutrali-
zation of Lumumba ... I have no clear
recollection of his discussing the assassi-
nation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)
'
Hedgman said that he had no recollection of (O'Donnell) indicating
one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as
a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55).
Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that
he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Gen-
erally, however, Hedgman perceived (O'Donnell as being unenthusiastic
about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89).
When (O'Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he met with the (Chief of)
Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe"
(O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). (O'Donnell said he
assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O' Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 37), although
Hedgman was not explicit:
(10'
I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio
shot up to date. ( 'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 16.)
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He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,
"it would have been in the custody of the State Department"
personnel, not the CIA station (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 36).
O'Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned
(O'Donnell)
the source of the virus (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 8).* But 0
assumed that it had come from (Sidney Gottlieb)'s office:
It would have had to have come from Washington,
in my estimation, and I would think, since it
had been discussed with (Gottlieb that it
probably would have emanated from his office.
((O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.)
Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo
with (①'Donnell), but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
pp. 60-61).
O'Donnell was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he
did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that
such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because
he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the
Congo (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 17).
O'Donnell) stated that he knew of no other instance where a
lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station
(②'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was
assassination:
When O'Donnell was informed about Hedgman's testimony on
the visit of (Gottlieb) to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba,
he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell,
9/11/75, p. 53). (O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knew
them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that
testimony. (O'Donnell) regarded Hedgman as
"F 'an honest and a decent
man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) "a totally truthful man"
(O'Donnell), 9/11/75
DocId: 32202487 Page 61
p. 56).
-63-
C
My feeling definitely is that it was for a
specific purpose, and was just not an all-
purpose capability there begin held for tar-
gets of opportunity, unspecified targets.
(O'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 49.)
At several points, (O'Donnell) stated that he did not think that
Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell),
6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:
I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very
possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connec-
tion with other people. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75,
p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)
His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific
purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell),
9/11/75, p. 50).
(O'Donnell)
'Donnell) said that the (Chief of) Station never indicated that
(O'Donnell was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In
fact, 'Donnell) testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi-
nation effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (6' Donnell),
9/11/75, p. 54.)
While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his
assassination operation with (O'Donnell), he "assumed" that he had
at least discussed with (O'Donnell) the problem of gaining access to
Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
pp. 55, 60). (O'Donnell) testified, however, that because he was
"morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have
C
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 62
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explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would
he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess-
ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone
else ((O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 26).
(O'Donnell) was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman
about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination
of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no
recollection of learning this from O'Donnell) (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
(O'Donnell)
p. 56).
'Donnell)
Beyond this, 'Donnell said that his discussions of assassi-
nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with.
"the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):
From my point of view I told him I had
moral objections to it, not just qualms,
but objections. I didn't think it was
the right thing to do. (O'Donnell,
9/11/75, p. 9).
When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination
based on those discussions, (O'Donnell) said:
I will answer your question just as fairly
and as scrupulously as I can. I have a
great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if
he said something, I would believe him to
be speaking the truth as he knew it without
shading it.... The best I could say, I.
think, would be this, that he would not have
been opposed in principle to assassination in .
the interests of national security.... I
know that he is a man of great moral per-
ception and decency and honor, and so forth.
And that it would disturb him to be engaged in
something like that. But I think I would
have to say that in our conversations, my
memory of those, at no time would he rule it
out as being a possibility. (O'Donnell)
9/11/75, p. 18.)
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(v)
C
O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning
Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the
Assignment of Agent OJWIN to Leopoldville as His
Alter Ego
After (Justin O'Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he formu-
lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from
the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:
O'Donnell:
[W]hat I wanted to do was to
get him out, to trick him out, if I could,
and then turn him over
to the legal
authorities and let him stand trial. Be-
cause he had atrocity attributed to him for
which he could very well stand trial.
2:
And for which he could very well have
received capital punishment?
O'Donnell: Yes. And I am not opposed to
capital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,
pp. 20-21.)*
To implement his plan, (6' Donnell made arrangements to rent "an ob-
servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"
* According to an earlier report from the (Chief of Station, it
was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General
of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST
A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop
(Chief
of Station to Director, 10/11/60). The Chief of Station proceeded
to 
recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:
STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS
ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE
THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM
SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).
C
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 64
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(O'Donnell),
ell), 
6/9/75, p. 20).* (O'Donnell) also "spotted" a member
of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an
attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O' Donnell),
6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21).
(O'Donnell)
'Donnell said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to
CIA headquarters (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 26). He also said that
he informed the Chief of Station about his plan (O'Donnell), 9/11/75,
p. 56).
In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN cus-
tody. (0
O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was
QJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him
p. 19):
What I wanted to use him for was
counter-espionage[.]...
(①'Donnell), 9/11/75,
I had to screen
the U.S. participation in this ... by
using a foreign national whom we knew,
trusted, and had worked with
the
idea was for me to use him as an alter
ego. ('Donnell) Tr., pp. 19-20.)
41261),
In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA head-
quarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261),
Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:
LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE
IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO
LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable (IN 41556),
Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)
* A cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November
reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese
troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC
RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE"
(CIA Cable (IN 42478), (Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60).
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 65
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C
The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about
the "operational circumstances."
(b)
Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December
1960
QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background,
recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re:
Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer (Arnold,
Silver In November 1960, at ②①'Donnell's
Is 
request (O'Donnell), 6/9/75,
p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by (Silver) to under-
take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk."
(CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*
A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip
to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to
his mission:
In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob-
jective for which we want him to perform his
task, he was not told precisely what we want
him to do.... Instead, he was told ... that
we 
would like to have him spot, assess, and
recommend some dependable, quick-witted
persons for our use.... It was thought best
to withhold our true, specific requirements
pending the final decision to use [him].
(CIA Dispatch, (AUD) 147, 11/2/60.)
22
* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to
send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci-
fied mission
. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained
in the 
cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta-
tions that 
dealt with him.
There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN com-
pleted this mission. (O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any
mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (O'Donnell)
9/11/75, pp. 32-33).
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0955
i
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This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained
at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic
necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading."
रटे
Dispatch, ADDW-147, 11/2/60.)
(CIA
QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable
(IN 49486) 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960
(CIA Cable (OUT 54710), Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).
The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN
о
had been recruited earlier by Arnold Silver
for use in a special operation in the Congo
[the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be
run by Justin O'Donnell.
onnell). (I.G. Report, p. 38.)
However, both (①'Donnell) and Bissell testified that (O'Donnell)
re-
fused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead,
(O'Donnell) said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba
from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in
the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 13-14,
37.)
According to (O'Donnell),
QJWIN was a man who was capable of
undertaking an assassination mission:
(O'Donnell):
I would say that he would not
be a man of many scruples.
Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything?
(O'Donnell).
I would think so, yes.
3: And that would include assassination?
O'Donnell): I would think so.
(O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)
* See Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii) above.
DocId: 32202487 Page 67
NW 50955
-69-
But
(O'Donnell) had no knowledge that QJWIH was ever used for an
assassination mission (②'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).
(O'Donnell) said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA
officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did
not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 28).
When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent
of that he was performing for O'Donnell), he said:
(o'
O'Donnell): Yes, that is possible
1- or
it could have been that somebody contacted
him after he got down there, that they
wanted him to do something along the lines
of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell
9/11/75, p. 29.)
onnell),
But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it
would be a departure from standard CIA practice
wwww www
placing an agent
in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising
officer (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).
Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJWIN had an independent line
of responsibility to the (Chief of) Station, a cable of November 29
shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities. ·
In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP
channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to
"PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence
and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable (IN 49486), (Chief
of) Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). (O'Donnell) said that he had directed
QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force
whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody
DocId: 32202487 Page 68
-70-
Do
'Donnell, 9/11/75,
p. 21).
But Lumumba had left UN custody at
this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville.
did not deter QJWIN:
VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN
ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED
DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT
USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).
This
It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassina-
tion as well as abduction. An affirmative reply from headquarters
came through the PROP channel the next day which was also suscep-
tible of interpretation as an assassination order:
CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE..
WE ARE
PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJWIN
BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY
FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE (UNITED
STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314),
Chief of Africa Division to (Chief of Station,
11/30/60.)
(O'Donnell) said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-
extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I
did."
Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands
(6' Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 19.) (O'Donnell) said he left the
of Congolese authorities. (6' Donnell), p. 20.)
QJWIN left in
December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.
In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities
in the Congo, William K. Harvey under whom (O'Donnell) had worked
--
before being detached for assignment to the Congo noted the
success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 69
17
-71-
C
specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been
completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey,
1/11/61). (O'Donnell) explained Harvey's reference to the fact that
QJWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba
was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for
the mounting of the project had become moot" (O'Donnell),
9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for
Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, (O'Donnell
"Absolutely not" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not
recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that O'Donnell's
said:
return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QJWIN's
mission (llarvey, affidavit, p. ).
Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that
QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission
and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November,
there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any
assassination plan or attempt.
The CIA officers who were involved
in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave
no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.
The Chief of) Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN
was in the Congo working for (Justin O'Donnell).
(Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 95.)
But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of
Hedgman's.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson
Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo
NW 50955
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(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).
William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for
his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities
in the Congo:
I was kept informed of the arrangements for
QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently,
of his presence in the Congo. I do not know
specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I
do not think that I ever had such knowledge..
If 
QJWIN were to be used on an assassination
mission, it would have been cleared with me.
I was never informed that he was to be used
for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. )
03
He stated that Crnold Silver) probably wrote the memoranda con-
cerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (llarvey
affidavit, p. ).
(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE
After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by
CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE,
a project which included research into a capability to assassinate
foreign leaders.*
QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT"
figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents
by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation
of Project ZRRIFLE:
* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section
infra
; on the "
Executive Action Capability."
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 71
-73-
Arnold Silver had not previously used
JWIN as an assassination capability or
even viewed him as such. (Harvey affi-
davit, p. >
tlieb) in connec-
Although Harvey also had discussions with (Sidney Gottlieb)
tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that (Gottlieb) never mentioned
to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or (Go
(Gottlieb)'s
own
trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit,
P. ). Harvey had con-
sulted with Arnold Silver about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).
The (Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he had
never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project
to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was
"quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities
or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.)
Hedgman testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter-
intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss
the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.)
An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIA
and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employs
hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to Arnold Silver
in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial
in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested:
IF
INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASII
CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW, SALVAGE QJWIN FOR
OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable (OUT 73943), 4/18/62.)
N
15 DocId: 32202487
Page 72
-74-
(d)
Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE
to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960
The one incident where there is an explicit reference to
assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with
WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.
WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" (European) who was
11
a forger and former bank robber"
(and
had fought with the French
Foreign Legion) (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.)
He was
sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee
by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling
through the Congo. (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was
assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT
ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable (OUT 86554)
OUT 36554)
Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).
The (Chief of) Station described WIROGE as "a man with a
rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least."
(Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility
agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, develop-
ing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.)
Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly and did not put WIROGUE in
touch with (Justi
Justin O'Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)
A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector
General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he
received:
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 73
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-75-
On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa
Division met with him to discuss "an opera-
tional assignment in Africa Division."
In
connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1
was to be trained in demolitions, small arms
and medical immunization.... In October 1960
a cable to Leopoldville stated that ...
Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as
utility agent in order to "(a) organize and
conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept
packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute
other assignments requiring positive action.
His utilization is not to be restricted to
Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)
WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on
(IN 18739), 12/17/60).
December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 18739,
He was given two
instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;'
and (2) to "spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence
assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA
Cable (IN 18739), 12/17/60.)
91
Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached
QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is
described by Leopoldville (Chief of) Station Hedgman in a cable to
CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):
QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED
LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH A
AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE QJWIN
SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS.
STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN
REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS
PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER
"EXECUTION SQUAD." WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED,
WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS.
UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK-
INF FOR [AMERICAN] SERVICE.
IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED
QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM.
THEN [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE
HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS.
(CHIEF OF) STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT
WISH 
REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION [CIA]. (CIA Cable,
DocId: 322024@ppoldvikle to Director, 12/17, 60.)
-76-
The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's
actions:
LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING
AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD-
ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT
ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING
KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE
DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST
SOLUTION.
12/17/60.)
(CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,
WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is
explained by ledgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as
an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.
(Chief of)
The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed
WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:
I would like to stress that I don't know what
WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution
squad,'
" and I am sure he was never tasked to
go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 100.)
Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an
execution squad:
His idea of what an intelligence operative
should do, I think, had been gathered by
reading a few novels or something of the
sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)
(Justin O'Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone
stin
connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 75
-77-
C
tion of WIROGUE
о
'Donnell
9/11/75; pp: 39-42). (O'Donne
'Donnell men-
tioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm
squad," but said that this was for purposes more general than
assassinations:
surveillance teams where you have to go
into crime areas
where you need a
fellow that if he gets in a box can fight
his way out of it.
p. 36).
(O'Donnell, 9/11/75,
Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to
QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that
WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo
(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would
"absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against
Lumumba because "he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt
with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people
in the Africa Division Tweedy himself and his deputy:D:D:D Glenn
Fields
--
who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba
was being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65)..
The (Chief of) Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was
connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted
a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which
this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was
sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much
wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received
assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
concerning the (Gottlieb)
p. 102.)
In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 76
-78-
speak in a derogatory manner of an asset.'
p. 101)
WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do
when you
(Hedgman, 8/21/75,
"B
The Chief
of Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition
to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to
WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:
I had difficulty controlling him in that he
was not a professional intelligence officer
as such. He seemed to act on his own without
seeking guidance or authority ... I found
he was rather an unguided missile
the
kind of man that could get you in trouble be-
fore you knew you were in trouble....
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).
But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:
[I]f you give a man an order and he carries it
out and causes a problem for the Station, why
then as (Chief of Station, well, you accept
responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)
In sum, the Ch
(Chief of Station testified that despite the fact
that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during
this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad"
was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassi-
nation plan.
Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medical
immunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility
that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Luniumba by means
of lethal biological substances.
The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 77
-79-
by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The
report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of
his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved
in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But,
when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office,
the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one
of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in
assassination attempts: "ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be dis-
carded out of hand as 'exceeding instructions.'" (I.G. Memorandum,
3/14/75)
6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing
About Lumumba's Death in Katanga
There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring-
ing about Lumumba's death in Katanga, The CIA officers most closely
connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that
they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death.
(a)
Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by
Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville:
November 27-December 3, 1960
The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved
in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure
from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from
the
(Chief of) Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478,
(Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman re-
ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's
POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT
HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO
THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.
(CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 78
(
-80-
The Chief of) Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge
of)
of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that
eventuality:
DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE
SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY
[AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE.... STATION
HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENT
OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF
ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)
There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually
gained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville.
In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's
escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum-
stances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable (IN 48484), Leopoldville
to Director, 11/28/60).
But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether
the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese
troops:
[STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT]
TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED ·
[BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable,
11/28/60.)
A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates
against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese
forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable IN 10643,
Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).
(IN 10643),
The (Chief
Station testified that he was "quite certain that
there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 79
-81-
from UN custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's
plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted
with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might
take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track-
ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (ledgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).
Despite the fact that (O'Donnell) had planned to draw Lumumba
out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he
insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked
by the CIA 'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 22).
(b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed:
January 17, 1960
The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was
kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of
1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba
a serious political threat.
CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.
But there is no direct evidence of
* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the
testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, (O'Donnell,) and Helms
(investigative report) should be inserted.
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 80

Group
-83-
agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily
rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac-
tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.
(Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)
The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special
Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of) Station in Leopold-
ville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable (OUT 62966),
Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON
YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE.
Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassina-
tion, Richard Bissell the CIA official under whose aegis the as-
sassination effort against Lumumba took place testified that, in
his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group
meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assas-
sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-
34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the
primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba,
testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure,
including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to re-
move Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).
On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the (Chief of)
Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters.
Two days later,
in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security
NW 50955
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2
-84-
(
Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave
danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th
NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien-
tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the (Chief of) Station
with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate
Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this
operation.
Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that
it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza-
tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba.
First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-
sponsible to the President for national security affairs testified
that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an
assassination plot.
Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National
Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit
Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary
of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac-
tual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism
for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19).
NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong pos-
sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order
would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe-
mism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 82
NW 50955
-94-
7/21/60).
Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these
early meetings was vehement:
Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a
person who was a Castro or worse
Mr. Dulles went
on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he de-
scribed as "harrowing"
It is safe to go on the
assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun-
ists; this also, however, fits with his own orienta-
tion. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)
The President presided over the other two NSC meetings.
After look-
ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter-
mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the
President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).
However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the
Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's. testi-
mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.
The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series
of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-
ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The Septem-
ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.
* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-
tail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows:
The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group
was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the
necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to
consider "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to
getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this
meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments
referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vig-
orously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60;
see Section 7(a)(iii), infra). The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes
Only" cable under his personal signature to the Chief of Station in
DocId: 32202487 Page 83
-95-
The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before
the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu
which 
Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard
the 
President's 
statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson
could have 
heard the statement by the President was held on Septem-
ber 7, 
two days after this event.
Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960,
indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced
* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR-
TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT 
AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
AND THAT .
THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY 
OF OUR COVERT ACTION"
(CIA 
Cable OUT 
62966, Dulles to (Chief of 
Station, 8/26/60).
les cable added:
The Dul-
INCLUDING EVEN MORE
YOU CAN
WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY
AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT .
ACT ON YOUR OWN 
AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-
FERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 
8/26/60) (See Section 2,
for more complete 
treatment of this cable.)
supra,
On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters
to 
the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive 
assignment (CIA Cable
OUT 
71464, 
Bissell/Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 
9/19/60; see Section
4(a), 
supra). On September 21, in the presence 
of the President at
an NSC 
meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a 
grave
danger as long as he was 
not disposed of" (
NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see
Section 
7(a)(iv), infra).
tist 
arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal
Finally, on 
September 26, the CIA scien-
biological substances, instructed him to 
assassinate Lumumba, and in-
formed him 
that the President had ordered the 
DCI to undertake an as-
sassination 
effort (see Sections 4(a)-4(c), 
supra).
Station 
stated that he received 
confirmation from CIA headquarters
The (Chief of)
that he was to follow the instructions he 
had been given (see Section
4(e)(i
), supra).
"
** In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two
position in the State Department,
changed 
to Deputy Secretary of State.
the name of 
which subsequently
In 
this position, he frequently
(Continued)
NW 50955
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-107-
E:
on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of
Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba
had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN
custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially
in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between
Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:
Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the
Congo for the monent but 
Lumumba was not yet
disposed of and 
remained a grave danger as long
as he was not disposed 
of.
9/21/60.)
(NSC Minutes,
Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a
personal cable to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville which
included the following message:
WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING
LUMUMBA FROM ANY 
POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL
POSITION OR IF HE 
FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING
HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR 
ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,
OUT 73573), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)
On September 26, (Sidney Gottlieb), under assignment from
CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable (IN 18989).
Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the (Chief of)
Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba,
and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for
this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), supra).
Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote
the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not
interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination:
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Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active
in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of
Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs Livingston Merchant, and Deputy Secretary of Defense
James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion
about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2;
Merchant atfidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).
(c)
Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of
a Specific Recollection, He "Strongly Inferred"
That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was
Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles
Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level
authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-
lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection
of receiving such authorization and that all of his testimony
on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell,
9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject
by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed
Justin O'Donnell to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell,
6/11/75, pp. 54-55).
Donnell)
Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based
on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating
to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an
assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels.
of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62,
65).
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 86
:
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As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes
of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the
NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was con-
templated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means
of "getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii),
supra).
There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the
he(Chi
hief f) Station
cable from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville
on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized
Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a
direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had
attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell
was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles
cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12).
Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of
the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated
within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):
It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted
by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of
the Special Group as authorizing implementation
[of an assassination] if favorable circumstances
presented themselves, if it could be done covertly.
(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)
Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi-
dential authorization for him to order action to assassinate
Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 87
-116-
2: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower
wanted Lumumba killed?
Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't.
Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously
through this kind of 
cable?
Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect.
(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)
As for discussions with Dulles about the source of autho-
rization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell
stated:
I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles
would have said either 
the President or President
Eisenhower even 
to me. I think he would have said,
this is authorized in the 
highest quarters, and I
would have known what he 
meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75,
p. 48.)
When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the
consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa-
tion of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had [such]
authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).
of Station's testimony
When informed about the ::Chief
about the instructions he received from Go
(
Gottlieb),
Bissell said
that despite his absence of a specific recollection:
I would strongly infer in this case that such an
authorization did 
pass through me, as it were,
if (Sid Gottlieb gave that 
firm instruction to the
Station Chief. 
(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)
Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this
authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40).
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 88
(
G
-117-
Bissell did not recall being informed by (Gottlieb)
that
(Gottlieb) had represented to the Chief of Station that there
(Chie
was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba
(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he
had 
instructed 
(Gottlieb) to
had instructed (Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there
Gottlieb
was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruc-
tion without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75,
P. 47).
Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell (Gottlieb
that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower
(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion
that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about
Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then
s actions were
(Gottlieb)'s
fully authorized:
(
Gottlieb's
Q:
In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency
and 
the policy at the Agency 
at the time, Mr.
(
Gottlieb)'s representation 
to the Chief of Station
that the President had 
instructed the DCI to
carry out this 
mission would not have been beyond
the pale of Mr. 
Gottlieb's authority at that
point?
Bissell:
p. 65).
No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75,
Bissell further stated:
Knowing Mr. Gottlieb), it is literally inconceivable
to me that he would have 
acted beyond his instruc-
tions. (Bissell, 9/10/75
, p. 41.)
With respect to his assignment to (Justin O'Donnell) to "plan
and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,
p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give
NW 50955
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C
-118-
O'Donnell
sonnell
this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50).
But he
said that this specific assignment was made in the context
that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho-
rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50;
also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).
see
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 90

-4-
14.
that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any
urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later
appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of
the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and
not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and
gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he
never heard of the project.
William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain"
that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials Sidney
Gottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and
(Arnold Silver a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility
of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action"
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those
meetings, *
Harvey testified that they took place after his initial
* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-
tations 
25/1-Sid C) and "26/1 indicate 
that he spoke to Sidney
Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed 
to 1962.
fied 
as follows:
Harvey testi-
Q:
And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and
is 
about the subject of Executive 
Action?
Harvey:
Q:
Yes, it is.
And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that
you 
have recounted?
Harvey:
[W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thought
this, well, this 
has got to be '62, 
but I am almost certain
now that it is not. If this is true
, this might place the
first discussion that I had with 
Dick Bissell in early
January and this is difficult 
to pinpoint because there were
several such discussions in varying 
degrees of detail during
the period in the spring, and very 
early in '61 to the fall
of '61 period, but I did find out 
fairly early on that Silver
0955 DocId: 32202487 Page 91
-5-
discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,
might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p.
52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey
about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,
p. 10).
Stat
had
or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassi-
nation 
with Arnold Silver and this 
discussion, at the very
least, had to take place after
discussed 
the matter with Silver
know 
Bissell already had
Garvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).
Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-
structions to establish an executive action 
capability:
the first thing I did
was discuss in theoretical
terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly
the whole subject of assassination, 
our possible assets,
our posture, going back, if you 
will, even
mental questions 
of A, is assassination a proper weapon
to the funda-
of an American intelligence service
, and B, even if you
assume that it is, is it within 
our capability within
the framework of this government 
to do it effectively
and properly, securely and 
discreetly.
pp. 37-A, 38).
(Harvey, 6/25/75,
The Inspector General's Report connected (Silver) and Gottlieb to
early stages of the executive action 
project as follows:
to the
Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain
aspects of the problem with 
Arnold Silver and with Sidney S
Gottlieb Since Silver was 
already cut in, Harvey used
him in developing the Executive 
Action Capability..
Harvey's mention of him (
Gottlieb ]] in this connection
may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn 
that Harvey instructed
Gunn to discuss techniques with 
Gottlieb without associa-
ting the discussion with the Castro 
operation.
Report, pp. 37-38).
(I.G.
It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turn-
over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 
1961 was discussed
as part of 
ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). 
Thus, their initial
discussion 
of executive action can, at the 
least, be dated before
November 
1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" 
notations would have to
refer 
to January 1961.
NO
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bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell,
Harvey did not recall any mention of the
6/11/75, pp. 19-20).
White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November
meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).
Although Richard Helms was briefed and given
administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three
months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated
a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55).
Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were
related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), "Helms testified:
as
"In my
However,
mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52).
Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the
syndicate which had Castro as its target
ZR/RIFLE project .
p. 47).
"capability
folded into the
and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,
When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action
for assassination" was "used against Castro",
Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75,
p. 47).
The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15;
1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assas-
ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.
(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa
QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-
ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive
programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 93
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ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent
of 
Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.
potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.
However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was
03
assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent
QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his
supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the
Chief 
of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver worked,
had 
ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch (ADW) 147,
11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission
afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey,
1/11/61
). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail
in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section
[Gottlieb] we
supra.]
There are two factors which may raise a question as
to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop
an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated.
First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,
QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matter
and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of
ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of
an assassination capability had already been discussed with Silver
and 
Gottlieb] before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75
p. 52; 
I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).
Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm
evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate
Lumumba
.
NW 30555 DocId: 32202487 Page 94
تا
-4-
Documents indicate that consideration was given within
the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.
At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Hollman of the CIA
Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly
suggested possible sites for the drops.
(CIA memo, 6/21/60)
Documents also indicate that a meeting was held
around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and
Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.
Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view
regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate
in the overthrow of Trujillo."
raised by King, among them:
A number of questions were
"C.
Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles
or 
other devices 
for the removal of key Trujillo people
from the scene?"
King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to
that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)
*
On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting
Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's
signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy,
Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, p. 26).
2)]
The memorandum stated that
a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked
Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate
Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arms
* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does
either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles.
(Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.);
'
5
DocId: 32202487 Page 95
1
Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved
Trujillo's assassination.
He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and
the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom
that the dissidents were
.. in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary
activity in the foreseeable future 
except the
assassination of their 
principal enemy.'
(Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)
Th
It is uncertain what portion of the information provided
by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary
level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,
his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant (Frank Devine,
were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,
aware of Dearborn's current projects."
letter, 8/15/60)
*
(Devine]
to Dearborn
By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom
as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank
[Devine]
Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While
serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, [Devine]
reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State
activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that
Devine maintained almost daily communication with fed Holman
and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division
(Devine, P.7)
*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960
raised concern with the Department 
and he was advised that certain
specific information should more 
appropriately come through "tne
other channel" (presumably, 
CIA communications). Dearborn was
advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19
different recipient 
offices. (Id.)
55 DocId: 32202487 Page 96
C
i
have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly
more, 
and we are not prepared to make them
available
. Last week we were asked to furnish
three 
or four pineapples for a party in the
near future
, but I could remember nothing in my in-
structions that would 
have allowed me to contri-
bute 
this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't
tempted. 
I have rather specific guidelines
to the effect 
that salad ingredients will be
delivered 
outside the picnic grounds and will
be brought 
to the area by another club.
(
Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)
After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests
in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con-
cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the
"pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation
grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients
outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to
refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group
order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic.
(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)
2. The Passage of Pistols
a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic
In a March 15, 1961 cable, [Chief of Station (Owen reported
that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue
to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret
no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against
shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor-
dinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61)
Station [Chief then
The
then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary
authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had
received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,
NW 38955
DocId: 32202487
Page
i
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therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable,
3/21/61)
Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols
and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station
Chief was
was instructed not to advise Dearborn.
cable, 3/24/61)*
(Hqs. to Station
b.
Reason for the CIA Instruction
Not to Tell Dearborn
Owen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dear-
born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that
the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not
something to be unnecessarily discussed.
03
Owen pp. 78,79)
Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew
03
Owen had no other means of receiving weapons.
7/29, p. 33)
(Dearborn,
C. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?
Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol
for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con-
sideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been
approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area
and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event
of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed
* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with
a review of these events, 
concludes that:
"There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files
that the pistols 
were actually pouched. The request
for pistols appears to have 
been overtaken by a sub-
sequent request 
for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)
This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March
24, 1961, Headquarters 
to Station cable, which provides:
"C.
Pouching, revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462
(in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted)
24patenġabsbeing 
pouched. Explanation follows.'
"
NW
DocId:
- 18
the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a
pistol.
*
E
Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these
pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA
memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source,
to
states that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen]
Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry a United States citizen who was in direct
contact with the action element of the dissident group. It
should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-
ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether
one or more of these 38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols
eventually came into the hands of the assassins
and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the
assassination, remain open questions.
Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols
as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never
considered them in any way connected with the then-current
assassination plans.
i
03
(Dearborn 7/29, p.70: Owen
PP.38,73)
However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the
.03.
purpose for which the handguns were sought and :D:D:D:Owen's cable
stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.
(Station to HOS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,
03
*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked Owen to
request only one 
pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) (Owen), 03
on the other hand, testified 
that if his cables requested three
pistols for Dearborn then 
Dearborn must have asked for three
pistols.03 Owen) p.72)
The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package
(
HQS to Station cables, 3/27/61 
and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-
fied that, what he believed 
to be the one gun, came
up" and that he 
passed it.
wrapped
(Dearborn, --7/29,p.30)
NY 0-05 DocId: 32202487 Page 99
"
Tor
TOY 
BELLI
cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the
very cable which was sent in response to a request by the
dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination
effort which had been previously described to Headquarters.
As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little,
if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these
weapons to would-be assassins.
3. Passing of the Carbines
a. Request by (Owen) and Dearborn and Approval by CIA
In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked
for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber Ml
carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by
Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations
in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred
in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents.
(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters
cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to
Station cable, 3/31/61)
1961.
b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?
The carbines were passed to the action group contact) Wimpy Berry on April 7,
(Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found
their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio
de la Maza.
pp. 46, 49)
(Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report
Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the
carbines were at all times viewed as strictly a token show
$5
DocId: 32202487 Page 100

RASULACI
of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts
to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)
C. Failure to Disclose to State Department
Officials in 
Washington
There is no indication that the request or the passage
of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in
Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on
April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn
not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines
and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable
was sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that
upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain
the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-
mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence
with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station
to HQS cable, 4/6/61)
Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the
time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State De-
partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the
passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)
15 DocId: 32202487 Page 101
C
3.
Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns
a.
The Station
103
Ower Requests Machine Guns (for Use
in Assassination
(Chief:) suggested that Headquarters consider
pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64;
Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again
in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled
a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns
specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic
pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that
delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their
(Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)
resources.
The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly
identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connec-
tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to
kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according
03
to Owen
cable:
"14. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-
guns. and 1500 
rounds ammo for personal defense in
event fire fight. 
Will use quiet weapons for basic
job." (Id.)
103
In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an
assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or
uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist,
Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create
more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position
that:
.we should attempt to avoid precipitous action
by 
the internal 
dissidents until opposition group
and HQS are better 
prepared to support /assassination/*,
effect a change in the regime
, and cope with the after-
math. (HQS to Station cable
, 3/24/61)
"
* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.
$55
DocId: 32202487 Page 102
-22-
The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared
to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when
they developed a capability to received them, but that security
considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*
Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington
for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in
the Dominican Republic and
"especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident]
leaders that they be provided 
with a limited number
of small arms for their 
own protection (specifi-
cally, five M3 caliber 
.45 SMG's)."
for the record, 4/11/61)
b.
(CIA memo
Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved
by Bissell
Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver
Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to
pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a
priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used
for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)
The request,
submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western
Hemisphere Division, further provided:
"B. A determination has been made that the issuance
of this 
equipment to the action group is desirable
if for no other 
reason than to assure this important
group's continued 
cooperation with and confidence in
this Agency's 
determination to live up to its earlier
commitments to the 
group. These commitments took
* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised
that the revolvers and 
ammunition were being pouched.
55 DocId: 32202487 Page
31 -
in cables from Dearborn and wen
(Station to HQS cables
C
4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, (Owen advised Headquarters that
Wimpy Berry, had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was
going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.
Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three
carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with
whatever else was available. (Id.)
In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated
that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the
03
dissidents and requested owen to advise the dissidents that the
United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with
the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments,
Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27,
1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with
the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S. government not now
prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from
attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)
Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that
an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and
testified that
unsuccessful.
efforts to carry out the instructions were
In effect, the dissidents informed him that
this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit
the convenience of the U.S. government.
(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)
NW
DocId: 32202487 Page 104
33-
E
additional support, coupled with fact ref.
C items [the 
carbines] already made available
to them for 
personal defense; station authori-
zed pass ref. 
A items (the machine guns] to
opposition 
member for their additional pro-
tection on their 
proposed endeavor." (Draft of HQS
to Station cable, 5/2/61).
The cable was never sent.
In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-
zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns
as:
….. having made already a considerable
investment in this dissident group and its
plans that we 
might as well make the addi--
tional investment
." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)
rt,
The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert, Deputy Chief
of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted
as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning
covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph
Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force
on Latin America.
A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that [_HK_Herbert]
informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republic
wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose.
The memorandum continued:
"On cross examination it developed that the
real plan was to 
assassinate Trujillo and they
wanted guns for 
that purpose. [Herbert] wanted
to know what the 
policy should be.
But
"I told him I could not care less for Trujillo
and that this was 
the general sentiment.
we did not 
wish to have any thing to do with any
assassination plots 
anywhere, any time. Herbert
said he felt the same 
way.
Conversation, 5/3/61)
(Berle, Memo of
NW 50955
DocId: 32202487 Page 105
34
-
1
Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;
the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
and to Special Assistant [Frank Devine].
Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily
contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised
of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact,
Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed
cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.
C.
Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 16, 1961
On the day following the Berle-
rle
-Herbert]:
meeting, the
Special Group met and, according to the minutes:
"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new
anti-
Trujillo 
plot. He said we never know if
one of these 
is going to work or not, and asked
what is the 
status of contingency planning should
the plot come off. 
Mr. Bundy said that this point
is covered in the 
Cuba paper which will be discussed
ať a high level in the 
very near future." (Special
Group Minutes, 5/4/61)
Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes
makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed
speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail
Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo
plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was
Dearborn's April 30 cable disclosing an imminent assassination
attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.
On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the
situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the
NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 106
NW 50955
36.
to continue to take the same line until he received contrary
instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in
advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was
approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)
[Ray Herbert) referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a
memorandum he sent to [Devine] on the same date and asked to be
advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of
the machine guns. [Herbert] noted that when this request was
last taken to the Department; Berle made the decision that the
weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)
[Herbert's] me
Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day,
advising [Herbert] that the Department's policy continued to be
negative on the matter of passing the machine guns. *
[Herbert's]
attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group
limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the
Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert_
[Herbert]
was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,
to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.
(Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)
E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation
Drafting 
of Contingency Plans
At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,
the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was
considered and it was:
"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would
prepare 
promptly both emergency and long-
range plans 
for anti-communist intervention
in the 
event of crises in Haiti or the
By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising
the
the State Department that
roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the
fact 
that it must make do with what it 
had. (Dearborn to State
32267/6 107
NW 50935
45-
fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would
serve 
very little purpose and expose the United
States to 
great danger of association with
assassination 
attempt."
The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President
Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept.
to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)
VII.
May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:
A. Trujillo Assassinated
Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed
and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The
assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the
action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic
and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and
the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The
assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to
whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy
information as is available indicates that one or more of the
carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when
Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicato
however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by
handguns and shotguns.
(I.G. Report, p.61)
B. Cables to Washington
After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul
General Dearborn and Station [Chief CKCHED sent replies. According
to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable
as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations.
(Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).
DocId: 32202487 Page 108
-46
He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:
" ...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate
Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want
anything to pin this on us, because we aren't
doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing
it." 
(Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)
Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had
always been his personal belief; that the U.S. should not be
involved in an assassination and that if an assassination
occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn
7/29, pp. 100, 101)
05
In contrast the CIA Station [Chief:CE:D:D:D:Ke
[Chief::
CHECKCHECK: did regard
the
cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on
the question of supplying arms. Owen p. 120) He believed the
May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter
and consequently felt that the government had retreated from
its prior position, of offering material support to the dissi-
dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such support.
Owen responsive cable to Headquarters stated:
"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already
associated 
with assassination. If we are to at least
cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in
assassination 
preparation must be withdrawn."
(
Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)
5555
DocId: 32202487
Page 109
:
=
SCHNEIDER REPORT
Page
I.
Summary
1
II.
The President's Initial General Instruction
and Background
6
A.
September 15 White House Meeting
9
B.
8
Background: Tracks I and II
C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project
III. CIA's Implementation of Track II
15
17
A.
Evolution of CIA Strategy
17
1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach
17
2.
Military Solution
18
B.
The Chile Task Force
19
C.
The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency
Relations
20
D.
The False Flag Base
(False Flag: Ba
Chief of Station
IV.
E.
CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup
A.
The Chilean Conspirators
B. Contacts Prior to October 15
22222 ±
29
30
26
27
29
C. October 15 Decision
34
D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15
36
E.
The Killing of General Schneider
وفی
F.
Post October 22 Events
41
V.
CIA/White House Communication During Track II
43
A. September
45
B.
October
.46
C.
December
54
D.
Did Track II End?
54
180

-17-
1
C
III.
A.
CIA's Implementation of Track II
Evolution of CIA Strategy
The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent
Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S.
Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction
to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup
d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military
circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place
› without active U.S. encouragement and support.
There was much talk among Chilean officers about
the 
possibility of some kind of coup.. .but this
was not the 
kind of talk that was being backed by,
you know, 
serious organizational planning.
(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)
1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach
Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende
victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its
activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.
On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:
Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-
tion of 
power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been
discarded. Military 
solution is objective.
(Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)
The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting
a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency
decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a
successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)
Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the
Congress, and proclaim a new election. private U.S. citizen who had
been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him
-18-
(with
with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)
Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:
So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a
sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully
non-violent military coup....This was abandoned
when the military were reluctant to push Frei
publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant
to leave on his own in the absence of pressure
from the military....There was left as the only
chance of success a straight military coup.
(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)
At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:
Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor
Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario
in which either has to play an active role now
appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower
echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course
be made. This involves promoting Army split.
(Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)
2. Military Solution
President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party
convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended
all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency.
memo,
(November 18
Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October,
it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be
found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-
ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, consti-
tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439,
September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly
unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented
by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence
of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested
in a coup.
A three-fold program was set into motion:
T
☐
|
stet:
13.
David
--20-
✓ Chief
[in
David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned
back to Washington to head the operation.
。,。as
With the exception of the
Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head
ery) and
of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the
task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had respon-
sibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to
Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II.
(November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo,
page 3) Most of the
significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and
Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.
It should be noted that all those involved with the task force des-
cribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines
has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the
heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was plac-
ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished."
messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the
]
(Kara-
Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was
"as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme.
"
Flannery]
Flannery\ testi-
mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone
through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just
constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the
constant,
White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)
the/Army]
C. The Use of the Army/Attache and Interagency Relations
The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the
/the
Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army At-
tache in Santiago
Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military
་་
stet.
stet
very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal
i
contacts among the Chilean officers.
TOP
Following a proposal by the Chief
of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in-
ertin
telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a
channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support
for a coup.
Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:
We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,
the senior military which 
we had not maintained and did not
have, but which we felt 
confident that our military represen-
tative in Chile had....
And we got the approval of the DIA to
enlist the cooperation of 
Colonel Wimert in our effort to pro-
cure intelligence.
(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)
To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested mes-
sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago
through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General
Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy
Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,
1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of
the
[Army) Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized
[Army] Attache:
transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:
...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,
his deputy, 
in contacting and advising the principal mili-
tary figures who might 
play a decisive role in any move which
might, eventually, 
deny the presidency to Allende.
Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-
tache of 
this message, or give them any indication of its
portent. In the 
course of your routine activities, act in
accordance with the 
Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously,
I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion
with the CAS chief.
*
General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October
10, 1970.
General Philpott 
was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.
☐|7
&
C
NW
-22-
This message is for your eyes only, and should not be dis-
cussed with any 
person other than those CAS officers who will
be knowledgeable. 
CAS will identify them.
to 
Santiago)
(Headquarters 380
(Amy) Att
For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache,
the secret CIA communications channel was used.
Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-
tially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" in-
telligence on Chilean military officers.*
p. 6)
(Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines,
the Army]
The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did
in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to
the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the
Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages
ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to
take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army
Attache to these Generals.
[ⒶArmy)
General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II
and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did
he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army] Attache.
General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything
connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman
on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)
U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970
was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,
* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about
this letter, General 
Philpott testified that he recalled signing
an authorization 
such as that contained in the first paragraph of
Headquarters 380 but that 
he did not recall the authorizations and
instructions 
in paragraphs two and three.
TUT
1
+
23
testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on
"a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be
helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."
(Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such,
the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message
of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.
Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities
connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting
on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean
generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military
coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.
The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to
Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to
that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:
to Co1.
Wimert
FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has
been rescinded. 
This action does not repeat not imply
change in our 
estimate of situation. On the contrary,
it is intended to 
place us in a posture in which we can
formally cut off 
assistance if Allende elected and situa-
tion 
develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa-
tion. (Santiago 
446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters
934, 21 October 1970)
Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he
followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on
Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that
☐
I
1
T
* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this
message and also pressed 
him on several occasions to seek a re-
sponse from 
Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert].
Vol. II, 
p. )
(Roth,
TOP SECRET
C
23a
? F
'any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility
of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,
p. 8)*
Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described
by Roth were routine DIA activities.
However, Colonel Roth testified:
I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is
that I was informed that there 
was concern at the highest
U.S. Governmental level 
over the possible election of Allende,
that DIA then had a priority 
responsibility of coming up with
the identities of key Chilean 
personalities that would be help-
ful, and so forth. I have 
nothing specific as to the nature of
the instructions or the 
channels through which they came.
.Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a
project that if it had not 
been initiated by, at least had
the attention of or 
concern of, the highest level?
*
Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe
be queried on two or three 
occasions regarding a report from [Wimert]
and that Philpott instructed that only 
he (Philpott) would communi-
cate with Cushman if the need arose. 
(Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi-
fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would
be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)
-241
☐
Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.
Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department
that the highest 
level of government usually indicated the
President of the United 
States?
Colonel Roth. I would assume that.
The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify
Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among
these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's
(Undated message, ca. 14 October 1970) General
purported signature.
Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that
it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it.
p.
(Philpott,
) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762)
and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General
Bennett to the [Army Attache.
authorize these messages:
General Bennett testified he did not
It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military
assistance area. 
It goes beyond the responsibility which I
had in terms that I 
would have to get the authority or the
approval of the 
Secretary through the Chairman for covert
action of this 
magnitude. This message would not have been
signed by me. (
Bennett testimony, p. 21)
According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to
issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi-
mony, p. 84)
The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear-
ing on the issue of Wimert)}'s
's 
Track II instructions or responses. A
DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham, the
present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents
for the September-October 1970 period.
testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on
his activities are missing from the files.
(Graham, p. 6) However, Roth
(Roth, Vol. II, p. )
به
CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting
messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a
message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly
forceful in this regard:
.I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central
Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an
individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what-
ever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly
and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his
duly authorized representative.
(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the
water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or
among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.
(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been
the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at
all before we would have been found out, a single instance
of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken
place would have put us out of business.
(Karamessines testimony, p. 80)
[Army)
(Army) Attache.
Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's
role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache.
(Kissinger testimony, p. 22)
The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the
statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials.
There are
four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals
Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their
[ⒶArmy
general instructions to the Army Attache.
contrary to their sworn testimony.
This possibility would be
Second, General Bennett was not aware
of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to
the Army Attache.
Attac 
This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony
but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to
keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own.
after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered
and,
ا
Pik
bal
NW
-26-
the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department
Army
of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to
the sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines,
the sworn testimony of ②David Phillips,]
and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized
the CIA to convey orders to the
Army]
Attache on the basis of high or
highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff
directed that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be in-
formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr.
Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.
D. The False Flag Base
In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident
Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a
("False Flag Base,"
to send four staff officers to Chile posing as
") ..
nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts
with Chilean military officers.
Given the limitations of the Station's
resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of
("False
'False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a
"
chance. One of these officers posed as a Brazilian
a Brazilian 
intelli
"
so that "any flap would be a Braziliansione.
ian intelligence officer
(Headquarters 363,
September 27, 1970)
*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips,
"an unusual practice," either by the CIA or foreign intelligence
services.
(Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)

-27-
The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported
separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer] in Santiago
who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the
Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and
not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975,
E. Chief of Station
p. 27)
Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of
Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and
the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers..
The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:
I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues
and superiors that I did not consider any kind of
intervention in those constitutional processes
desirable.... And one of the reasons certainly for my
last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot
act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very
intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at
that time that the Agency was not too interested in
continuously being told by me that certain proposals
which had been made could not be executed, or would
be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix)
testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)
The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.
The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report
should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on
action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters
wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.
TOP
191
-29-
IV.
CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup
A. The Chilean Conspirators
Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key
individuals.
*
One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General
who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. Following the
"Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the
support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being
the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA
Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July
15, 1975)
Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo
Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was
06.08
دمان
обб
in league with several other (active duty) officers, (including (Admiral
Hugo Trado, Navy Commander in Chief General Vicente Huerta, Director,
06.06
06.08
General of the Carabinero (police) Corps: General Canalles, Director of
the Military Academy and General Joaquín García, second in command,
Air Force (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18,
1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception (of Canales
were in contact with Viaux as well.
**
NW
*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-
tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as
an abortive coup.
**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers
is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with Generato
Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12
Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One
cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member
of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators 06 (Station 545, 16 October 1970).
At the very least, Limado was in contact with Viaux.
06
1
Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups,
as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the
principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty
military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The
record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three
Schneider kidnap attempts.
f
.
NW
-30-
There was considerable communication among the various plotting
elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:
B.
..I might add here that it seemed that a good
dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers
were privy to what was going on (in addition to
President Frei and they were all talking to one
another exchanging views and trying to see how
best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted
to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)
Contacts Prior to October 15
Constitution."
The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within
the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-
Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),
but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the
Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider,
Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-
ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,
constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, P. 2)
Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General
Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the
idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the
second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S.
Government would support a coup both before and after it took place."
(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in
earnest on October 5 when (Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General
("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup
*
*
*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be
prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra-
cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main-
tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)
Difesessen
-31-
U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)*
06.08
Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander
of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solu-
tion and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright
military intervention."
(Task Force Log, 9 October)
26
General Hterta
informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean
Army high command.
(Task Force Log, 10 October)
On October 7, Colonel
Wimert approached members of the War Academy
This was
in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons.
06
Colonel
Colonel 
Wimert's first contact with the Army fit. Colonel to whom he
**
would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22. At this
meeting, the Lt. Colonal told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues
were
trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate
Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send
him out of the country. They had even stud-
ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the
main barrier to all plans for the military
to take over the government to prevent an
Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)
اين
1
ચૂંટવી
*
According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5
and October 20, the CIA Station and the (Army) Attache--for the most part
the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials.
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970).
**
el Wimert)
In his testimony, (Colonel
indicated that the LC. Colonely was
affiliated with General (Canales? (Wimert testimony, p. 52) a cable
sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the LE. Colonel request
for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that (Wimert)
believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain were in
league with Admiral Pirados (Station 562, October 18) At another point
in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy
Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force General over here.
(Wimert) testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine
the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel 6 However, as previously
stated, both General (Canales) nd Admiral Tirado) were affiliated with
General Valenzuela and Admiral Brado was in contact with General Viaux.
"
NW 5095
-32-
C
-06-
The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response
Headquarters took note of Schneider's
to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting.
resistance to coup plans and stated:
This would make it more important than
ever to remove him and to bring this new
state of events... anything we or Station
can do to effect removal of Schneider?
know this rhetorical question, but wish
inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
(Hqs. 628, 8 October)
We
During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success
looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:
President Frei and the highest levels of the
armed forces unable to pull themselves together
to block Allende. The Chilean mflitary's tradi-
tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to
tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's
firm constitutional stand, and most importantly,
the lack of leadership within the government and
military are working against a military takeover.
(Task Force Log, 8 October)
The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid (ly) waning
chances for success. 33
(Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not
dispelled by their simultaneous judgment:
"Station has arrived at Viaux
solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three
days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention
on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing
to block Allende."
(Task Force Log, 13 October)
If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak
indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him
and va enzuela
as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the
first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for.
carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.
NW
F
-33-
_
Although (Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with
Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he
[an vigentime military
served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argent
Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several
Argent-ing
hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago
476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that
a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux
should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner
to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if
it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)
The primary purpose of theCRECY CERCHECKCallse Flag Rase was to contact Viaux,
the Argentine Attache) of that
and it very rapidly relieved (Wimert and the
for arms,
task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the
"False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand
but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency
was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and
refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions."
(Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-
quarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000
in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of
U.S. support. (Headquarters. 729, 13 October)
On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider
by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early
hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join
(Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that
same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within
the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,
Viaux?"
NW
C
NW
-34-
A
October) This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-
tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela.'
"
(Station 529, 13 October)
At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its
other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was
to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:
C.
Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing
coup activity from other military quarters,
specifically an Army General (name deleted),
Admiral Tirado the forces in Concepcion and
Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and 6
(Task Force Log, 14 October)
October 15 Decision
To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-
tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with
the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen-
06
erals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*
On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander
Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile.
According
to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a run-
oh
down on Viaux, the Camales meeting with Blade, and, in some detail,
the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."
(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October
1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,
at least temporarily:"
* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable
from Santiago to Headquarters:
We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at-
tempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other re-
porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this
weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)
There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental
in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:
Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met
with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-
tempt a coup. (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)
Sig
:.
-35-
It was decided by those present that the Agency
must get a message to Viaux warning him against
any precipitate action. In essence the message
should state: "We have reviewed your plans and
based on your information and ours, we come to
the conclusion that your plans for a coup at
this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may re-
duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve
your assets. We will stay in touch. The time
will come when you with all your other friends
can do something. You will continue to have
our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conver-
sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)
The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.
Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure
on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,
after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching
orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.
The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
House meeting to the Station in Santiago:
2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to
generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz-
ing every appropriate resource.
3.
After the most careful consideration it was
determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out
by him alone with the forces now at his disposal
would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive
to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that
CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against
precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo-
ber)
The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him
(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other
coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded:
ос
**
"There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Pirado
0
Ganales Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)
*
Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not
in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)
that was sent 
the following day to the Station in Santiago. This mat-
ter will be discussed 
in Part V of this report.
-36-
D.
Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15
The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's
08
father-in-law on October 17. The draw responded that it did not
matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case.
(Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False
Flagger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was in-
formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc-
tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."
(Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication
with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,
18 November 1970, page 21)
*
As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter
for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.
As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:
do
Coup possibilities afforded by the active
duty military group led by General Valenzuela
and Admiral Elmad had always seemed more
promising than the capabilities of the Viaux
group. These military officers had the abil-
ity and resources to act providing they de-
cided to move and organized themselves ac-
cordingly.
(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from
the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)
By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in
this direction.
On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army
Colonel and the Navy (Captain They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,
06
*Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and (Carin, made one last attempt to
persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15.
The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco.
Schneider refused to listen to General (Canales (eloquent presentation of
Communist action in Chile... and adament in maintaining his non-involvement
stance. (Santiago 548, 16 October)
32 |
-37-
'three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition.
The Navy
Captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified
by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to
use them."
(Santiago 562, 18 October) (Colonel Wimert) and the Chief
of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns
for self-protection.
The question, of course, is whether the arms were
intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.
об
The fact that the weapons were provided the LC. Colonel and the Navy
Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing
suggests that the guns were not involved.
The machine guns and ammunition were sent from Washington by diplo-
matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was
puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them
but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops
with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will
try send them whether you can provide explanation or not. (Headquarters
854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army L
Colonely and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con-
sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*
* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in
Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.-
rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to
provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army (Captain) the tear gas grenades
originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of
this action:
00
Station plans give six tear gas grenades to
(Colonel Wimert) for delivery to Armed Forces
officers (deletion) instead of having (False
Flag Officer) deliver them to Viaux group.
Our reasoning is that (Wimert) dealing with
active duty officers. Also False Flagger)
leaving evening 18 October, and will not be
replaced but(Wimert) will stay here. Hence
important that (Wimert credibility with Armed
Forces officers be strengthened.
NW: 509
2202487
(Santiago 562, 18 October)
22.1

-38-
That same day, General Valenzuela informed/Colonel Wimert that he,
General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General, were prepared
to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18
November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General
Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military
dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown
ral [Tirado)] would
to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would
head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the
kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:
General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation
but not directly involved. He has been sent to
Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be
seen in public places during 19 and 20 October
to demonstrate fact that above operation not his
doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at
end of week. Military will not admit involve-
ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be
blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)
The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider
left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard
failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that an-
other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)
Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price
agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."
* The "False Flag Officer") who was in contact with Viaux at the time
the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert) apparently understood
that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:
Q. Were you told any of the details of how
the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?
Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be
at some sort of a banquet which the General
(Schneider) would be attending.
(Sarno testimony, p. 37)
-39-
(
but Wimert/insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the
money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela
assured (Colonel Wimert) that the military was now prepared to move. (Task
Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also
failed and the Task Force concluded
E.
Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having
considerable difficulty executing even the first
step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup
succeeding or even occurring before 24 October
now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)
The Killing of General Schneider
In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am),
Colonel Wimert
delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt.
Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago. *
*
Although (Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not 08
clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel
was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the
weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel to the Valenzuela group:
...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela
to set the plan of October 197 into motion
through Schneider's abduction was several sub-
machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades
and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus
$50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon
demand.
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
18 November 1970, p. 22)
...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas
cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen-
zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason
why they still wanted the weapons was because
there were two days remaining before the Congress
decided the Presidential election and the Valen-
zuela group maintained some hope they could still
carry out their plans.
(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the
President on Chile, p. 7, July 15, 1975)
↑
NW
7. PC
-
A
1.
-40-
At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General
Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the
findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider
killing, neither the Army (Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there.
Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his
way to work, by the abductors and he was mortally wounded when he drew
his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand
gurs had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found
that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.
*
The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said
"Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on
way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease
guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously
been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station
was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered
об
several hours earlier to the Army (to Colonel.
Santiago then informed
Headquarters "Station has instructed (Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000
if Gen. Valenzuela requests 90
(Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating
that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-
zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:
* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the
shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led
conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated
in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.
In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot
culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year
prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re-
sulted in serious injury to the victim,' and a five-year exile for con-
spiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge
They received sentences of three
(were) Generals Valenzuela (and ado
years in exile.
50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 133
11
-41-
Station unaware if assassination was pre-
meditated or whether it constituted bungled
abduction attempt. In any case, it important
to bear in mind that move against Schneider
was conceived by and executed at behest of
senior Armed Forces officers. We know that
General Valenzuela was involved. We also
near certain that Admiral Eirado
Army he
Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved.
We have reason for believeing that General
Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in,
but cannot prove or disprove that execution
or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to
elements linked with Viaux. Important factor
to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not
retired officers or extreme rightests, set
Schneider up for execution or abduction...
All we can say is that attempt against Schneider
is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity
to prevent Allende's election if they are willing
to follow Valenzuela's scenario..
(Santiago 598, 22 October)
P.
Post October 22 Events
The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declara-
tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider
as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief
of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile '
Task Force to make the following initial judgment:
With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional
runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile.... The attack
on General Schneider has produced developments which
closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequently the
plotters' positions have been enhanced.
(Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)
On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II:
It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved,
and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a
successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a
point where a military solution is at least open to
(Task Force Log,-24 October)
them.
1.
C
نها
A. September
September 18
VAD SECRET
Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House.
As
Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a
plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA
records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the
conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in
the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)
The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con-
cern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was
viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit.".
September 21
The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation
that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar
confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair-
man, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review
his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings
of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the
meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet
privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances
save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no
evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting
actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa-
tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none
for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no
other such private meetings occurred.
September 22
Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Litt
meeting called to discuss Track I.
The two
discussed Track II actions,
especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei According to
།༢
✓
TOP SECKEJ
Kissinger told Karamessines that "our
handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect
and he added we were doing fine and keep it up.". (Memorandum for
the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)
B. October
October 5
✓✓ Prats.)
A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a
report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals
Valenzuela (and Huerta-named in a cable of September 30.
(Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was
needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556,
5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place,
although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony,
His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40
pp. 69-70)
Committee meeting on Chile.
chaired the 40 Committee.
October 6
(Karamessines calendar)
Kissinger
The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe
evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October.
1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one
"with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more seri-
ous action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered
(Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)
action at this time."
Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan,
supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of
an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below)
makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kişsinger testimony, p. 24)
wwwww.w
47a
TOP SOURET
October 10
Haig.
It seems to me, although the records don't re-
flect it
, that there was a meeting in September,
a very brief 
one, in which I must have been
told that there was a specific program going
underway
. That probably would have been by
Henry (
Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines
there. I am 
not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)
Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General
He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number
of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly
very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all."
.02
(Memorandum/LUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)
Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.
His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.
I do know, and I know that from looking at the
record 
this morning, that Karamessines made a
telephone call to me in which he gave a progress
report. I recall 
that. It was in effect a nega-
tive progress 
report, that they were just not com-
ing up with it. 
(Haig testimony, p. 12)
TOP SECRET
』ger: ",
། མས་
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Haig indicated to the Committee that he would have passed along the
substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his
role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:
I am quite confident that, given my own concep-
tion of my role at 
that time, that I would have
conveyed 
that information to Henry,...
(Haig testimony, p. 13)
***
Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr.
Kissinger
, and talked to you, what degree of
latitude did 
you have concerning what you would
pass on to Dr. 
Kissinger?
General Haig. At that time I would consider I
had no degree 
of latitude, other than to convey
to him what had 
been given to me.
(Ibid., p. 15)
C
October 14
A cable to Santiago for (Colonel Wimert) ostensibly from General
Bennett, authorized Wir
Wimert)
Colonel
to select two Chilean general officers and
convey to them the following message:
"High authority in Washington
has authorized you to offer material support short of armed interven-
tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to
prevent the election of Allende on October 24...."
Station cable 762, October 14, 1970)
1
1.
(Headquarters to
Karamessines testified that in
:
this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President,
for no one else could have given (Wimert such broad authorization.
Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at
least cleared with, the White House.
(Karamessines testimony, p. 91)
However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14th
cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told on
the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the
49a
October 15
cuss Track II.
Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-
According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines
gave a run-down on Viaux, Canal
and Tirado and "the general situation in
Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."
It was concluded that Viaux
did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a
successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions
from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:
5. It was decided by those present that the
Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him
against any precipitate action. In essence our
message was to state: "We have reviewed your
plans, and based on your information and ours,
we come to the conclusion that your plans for a
coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,
they may reduce your capabilities for the future.
Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch.
The time will come when you with all your other
friends can do something. You will continue to
have our support."
6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup
plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-
ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in
Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main-
tain the capability for Agency operations against
Allende in the future.
8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note
that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-
sure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now,
after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and
into the future until such time as new marching
orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that
the Agency would comply.
(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.
Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15
October 1970)
TOP SECRET
15710
412
meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the
October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any
such discussion.
October 14
(Kissinger testimony, p. 53)
The Senior Review Group met to discuss Chile.
(Karamessines calendar)
October 15
Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-
cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines
06
06
gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Firado and "the general situation in
Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux
did not have more than one chance in twenty-perhaps less--to launch a
successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions
from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:
5. It was decided by those present that the
Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him
against any precipitate action. In essence our
message 
was to state: "We have reviewed your
plans, 
and based on your information and ours,
we come to 
the conclusion that your plans for a
coup at 
this time cannot succeed. Failing,
they may reduce your capabilities for the future.
Preserve 
your assets. We will stay in touch.
The time 
will come when you with all your other
friends can do 
something. You will continue to
have our 
support."
6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup
plot, 
at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-
ted Mr. Karamessines 
to preserve Agency assets in
Chile, working 
clandestinely and securely to main-
tain the 
capability for Agency operations against
Allende in the 
future.
8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note
that the 
Agency should continue keeping the pres-
sure on every 
Allende weak spot in sight--now,
after the 
24th of October, after 5 November, and
into the 
future until such time as new marching
orders 
are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that
the Agency 
would comply.
(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.
Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15
October 
1970)
17/700
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Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA
memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat
more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p.
He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your
assets.'
11
52)
Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as
recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA
issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the
October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the
meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maxi-
mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order
indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous
day, and stated:
:.|
2.
It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by a coup. It would be much prefer-
able to have this transpire prior to 24 October
but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously
beyond this date....
06
4. There is great and continuing interest in the
activities of (Birado, Canales Valenzuela et al
and we wish them optimum good fortune.
(Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)
Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off
the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them.
testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.
"
(Kissinger
The conclusions of that meeting were that we had
better not do anything rather than something that
was not going to succeed.... My 'general feeling
was,
I left that meeting with the impression that
there was nothing authorized."
(Haig testimony, p. 13)
Loage further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in
the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends"
(Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).
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In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson)
reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True-
heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They
accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and
would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G.,
C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his
brother from his position in the government.
Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America
in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids
and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation
that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South
Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, P. 212).* Later on that
same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers
77
Speraw
Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,
respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243,
but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial
action of assuming power of state.
win or lose" (SAIG 0304. 8/26/63).
Entirely their own action,
A message from the White House on August 29 authorized
Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United
States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,
but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho-
rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272,
8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:
*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast
had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating
"the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise.'
Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in
the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends"
(Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).
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"
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against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be
identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly
approved by the President.
(Pentagon Papers, pp.215-] 16)
On October 3 Conein contacted Minlı. Minh explained that a
coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American
support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of
action, one of which was the assassination of Dien's brothers,
Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).
The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, Devia R. Smith
°3
cabled on
October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set
ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the
other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a
protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).
*
A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:
"(w) e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,
approving, 
or supporting assassination, but on the other
hand, we 
are in no way responsible for stopping every
such threat 
of which we might receive even partial know-
ledge. We 
certainly would not favor assassination of Diem.
We believe 
engaging ourselves by taking position on this
matter opens 
door too easily for probes of our position
re others
, re support of regime, et cetera.
believe best approach is hands off.
Consequently
interested in intelligence on any such plan.
However, we naturally
**
* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon
by 
various military 
units and direct confrontation between military
units involved in the 
coup and loyalist units.
**Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted
this 
cable for McCone
. Colby testified:
"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director
personally 
opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assas-
sination?
"Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)
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C
McCone testified that he met privately with the President and
the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was
to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was
going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but
to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the
United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone,
p. 62). McCone testified:
"I felt that the President agreed with my position, des-
pite the fact that he had 
great reservations concerning
Diem and his conduct. I urged 
him to try to bring all
the pressure we could on 
Diem to change his ways, to
encourage more support 
throughout the country.
words to the 
President, and I remember them very clearly,
My precise
was that Mr. President, if I was 
manager of a baseball
team, I had one pitcher
, I'd keep him in the box whether
he was a good pitcher or 
not. By that I was saying that,
if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we
would have a succession 
of coups and political disorder
in Vietnam and it might 
last several years and indeed
it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63
.)
McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with
the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go
or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing.
that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation
(McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:
"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to
ambassador 
(concerning assassination plan) under McCone
instructions
, as we cannot be in position actively con-
doning such course 
of action and thereby engaging our
responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).
In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:
In addition, since DCM
"Action taken as directed.
Trueheart was also present when original recommendation
was made
, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's
Instruction was 
also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador
Lodge 
commented that he shares McCone's opinion."
to 
CIA, SAIC 1463, 10/7/63)
(Saigon
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None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or
indirect involvement of the United States.*
* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge
notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders
for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation
(Saigon Station Cable [No. 2036], 10/30/63). Conein was charged
with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the
morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an
aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting
Chief of] Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not
be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours,
since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified
that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country
that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in
any other country. There were no aircraft immediately avail-
able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country
of asylum (Conein, p. 54).
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United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone
assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded;
the United States would support the plotters.
d. Lumumba
The chain of events revealed by the documents and
testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference
that the assassination plot was authorized by the President.
It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.
The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of"
Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC
and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo,
Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority",
and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support
an inference that the President and the Special Group urged
the assassination of Lumumba.
Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President
to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does,
as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization
which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record
of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of
others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's
national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of
Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was
Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba
is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because
Gottlieb we
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this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings
with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb ]nor the Chief of
Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements
about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed
that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,
but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when
this occurred.
The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and
DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate
Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that
President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination
effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty
in the evidence.
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First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a
matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles
went privately to the two Presidents- - - a course of action
which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than
Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of
plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing.
Third,
it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand
from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was
being discussed.
The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the
Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not
able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent
with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit"
approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary
to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men
closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.
* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order
to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against
Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the
Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would
imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such
matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba
example indicates that the President would discuss such matters
openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be
approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's
testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had
told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have
told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the
Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential autho-
rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he
was told by Dulles.
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