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FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME:
CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH
NOSENKO (835 PAGE STUDY.
PAGES 85 TECU 348
VOL. IL
(PART I)
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85.
A.
NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER
Introduction
During his 11 or 12 years' service in the KGB Second Chief
Directorate, NOSENKO said, he rose from case officer to deputy
chief of a department and from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel
(or, as he has stated more recently, only to the rank of captain).
An English speaker, he had specialized in operations against
American targets in the USSR as he steadily advanced to higher
positions in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department
(from entry on duty with the KGB in 1952 or 1953 until 1955,
and from January 1960 to January 1962) and in the Tourist Depart-
ment (from June 1955 to January 1960, and from January 1962 until
the defection). His duties took him to England in 1957 and 1958,
Cuba in 1960, and Bulgaria in 1961 as well as to Switzerland in
1962 and 1964; also, NOSENKO made numerous trips within the USSR
in connection with operations, inspections, and conferences.
Commendations, twice accompanied by bonuses, were awarded to him
by the KGB Chairman in 1956, 1959, and 1961 and by the head of
the 
Second Chief Directorate in 1957 and 1958; he was one of
70 Second Chief Directorate officers awarded the Order of the
Red Star in 1962; and in the same year he received a medal for
completing ten years of "irreproachable service."*
Thus,
according to NOSENKO, his defection ended a promising career
marked by promotions, responsible positions, extensive travel,
and many honors.
NOSENKO has discussed a large number of KGB operations, in-
cluding some in which he had a personal role, either as a par-
ticipant or as a supervisor, and others conducted by other KGB
personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorate about which
he learned through his professional and personal contacts..
Those in which he played a personal role are covered in this
part of the paper. All are included in Part VI. The text of
the paper distinguishes the 
information from collateral sources
and investigations from the details which NOSENKO has provided
on 
the same topics.
NOSENKO has admitted recently, however, that he never got
any awards at all in the KGB.
TOP SECRET
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གT\t=qa
B.
Entry into the KGB
NOSENKO has provided a wide range of dates for his entry
on duty with the KGB and has offered disparate descriptions of
the circumstances and procedures involved in his becoming a
KGB staff officer. His statements on these two topics are
presented under separate headings below.
1. Date of Entry
.
A range of dates between early 1952 and 2 April 1953 has
been given by NOSENKO as the time when he entered on duty with
the KGB, but he has been most consistent in placing his entry
in the month of March 1953,✶ In summary, he has said the
beginning of 1952 (statement of 31 January 1964), May 1952 with
no day (statement of February 1964), 5 or 7 September 1952
(statement of 6 April 1964) March 1953 with no day (statements
of 9 June 1962, 24 April 1966 and 27 October 1966), 12 or 15 or
17 March 1953 (statement of 8 April 1964), 13 or 15 March 1953
(statement of 26 July 1965), and 2 April 1953 (statement of
17 April 1966). When last questioned about this subject, on
27 October 1966, NOSENKO acknowledged that he had lied when he
had earlier reported his entry as occurring in 1952. His state-
ments about the entry date are arranged in chronological order
below.
9 June 1962 (first CIA meeting with NOSENKO) : "In the
beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow [from duty with the GRU in
Primorsk/. This was 1953, in the beginning. in January. Well,
I came on leave to Moscow.
I was staying at my father's dacha
there... I was then in the Navy GRU. So I came to Moscow on
leave and, while I was home near Moscow at my father's dacha,
General Bogdan Zakharovich/ KOBULOV** dropped in on us. A con-
versation simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said:
'I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm work-
ing in the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How
do you like the work? I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I
don't like the work.' "Well,' he said, 'You better come to work
with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-
intelligence?'.. I did not want to go into intelligence.
I
E
Several of NOSENKO's remarks about his date of entry into
the KGB were made during CIA questioning about how and
when he first learned of the KGB agent "ANDREY"; the lead
to "ANDREY" was one of the two pieces of information which
NOSENKO offered to sell when he approached CIA in 1962
(see Part II.B.); the "ANDREY case is discussed at
greater length in Part VI.D.3.b.
** Other sources have reported that KOBULOV was expelled
from the State Security apparatus in 1946 and that he did
not return to a position of authority until a few days
after Lavrentiy BERIYA became MGB-MVD Minister on 9 or
10 March 1953. As of 1952, KOBULOV was working in East
Germany for both Wismut A.G., a uranium ore-mining con-
cern, and for the Soviet contingent to the Allied Control
Commission. KOBULOV was arrested at the same time as
BERIYA, along with others in the KGB. See Part V.B.2.
for further references to KOBULOV.
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'Well,' he
consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' ex-
perience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelli-
gence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence.
Then they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when
KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is
better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.
said, 'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.'
This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later
I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and
told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room, .
they told
me, 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa).
We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go
directly to the central entrance, A pass has already been
issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secre-
tariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV. Well, I went. KOBULOV
had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his
assistant received me. 'How_about working in the American De-
partment?' he (the assistant/ asked. "Well, good. Go there
right now, Well, I wert to the Second Directorate... His
KOBULOV's assistant sent me directly to the Second Directo-
rate, the American Department, the First Section, working with
American correspondents...in 153, in March, in March '53. STALIN
had just died.”*
.
*STALIN died on 5 March 1953.
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"
31 January 1964: Yuriy Ivanovich CUK was reassigned from
the KGB Second Chief Directorate "in something like 1952,
NOSENKO said, "exactly just about the time when I came from
the GRU to the KGB. He was already gone by that time."*
February 1964: After his defection on 4 February 1964,
NOSENKO prepared an official statement about his biography.
He said that he had entered the KGB in 1952, and he shifted
the dates of most of the events during the 1945-1955 period one
This was dis-
year backwards from the version given in 1962.
cussed with NOSENKO, and he repeated the new dates; he then
studied and approved an official statement on his biography
(for the Intelligence Community) which contained the new dates,
including his claim that he entered on duty with the KGB in
about May 1952.
6 April 1964: Confronted with the above inconsistencies,
NOSENKO said that he returned to Moscow in August 1952 and during
the same month had a conversation with KGB personnel about getting
a job. The interview continued with the following dialogue:
Question:
NOSENKO:
You came (to Moscow) in January?
No, it wasn't January, it was the second part of
1952. Yes, before that I was in the GRU...
Maybe if I tell you 7 - 7 September maybe
it was 5, I don't know.
Question: ... What date did you enter on duty with KGB?
NOSENKO: I don't remember.
Question:
Early September 1952?
NOSENKO: Early September 1952, yes... I came and the
first few days was sitting in a room with
KUTYREV, RAKOVSKIY, and GROBOV, in Room 615.
Yes, it was 7 September when I had joined...
7 or 5... And so the first few weeks I had been
reading cases, studying forms; I worked like
that (during) December, January, February.
No, it was March, yes, after STALIN's death,
after the reorganization. And at the end of
March I was transferred to the attaches cases..
This would place the entry date some time at the beginning
of 1952, for the KGB defector GOLITSYN has reported that
GUK was transferred from the Second Chief Directorate in
January 1952.
NOSENKO later settled on June or July 1954 as the time of
this transfer. Part V.C. covers the period when, according
to NOSENKO, he was engaged in operations against the U.S.
military attaches in Moscow.
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8 April 1964: The interrogator pointed out to NOSENKO that
he had on different occasions dated his entry into the KGB as
January 1952, March 1953, and in September 1952.
continued:
Question: Which is the truth?
NOSENKO:
-
The questioning
Why
I
After the death of STALIN, in _March 1953.
did I say it the other dates]? You see, I
finished the Institute in 1949. Then I defended
my diploma, and then came the State exams.
"Foundations of
passed all the exams except one
Marxism-Leninism" the philosophy. And I had to
take all the examinations over again. All of
them. I took four, passed three, flunked one.
Just the same, all four had to be taken over
again. For that reason I graduated, or I received
the diploma from the Institute in 1950, although
This is an un-
officially I graduated in 1949.
pleasant thing and I did not want to mention it.
And right after that I was sent to the GRU.*
rest is just as I told you, word-for-word.
was the only thing. And then, after I said it,
I did not want to correct it. To twist around
again. And the mistake I made was about my work
in the KGB. It was not 1952, of course, but
1953... It was 12 or 17 or 15 March. KOBULOV
accepted me right away. STALIN was still not
dead and I was already accepted. March 1953,
about the 15th, about 15 March 1953.
The
This
26 July 1965: "At the end of 1952 I came to Moscow from
I had worked in the
Sovetsk in Primorskiy Kray, near Baltiysk.
Naval Intelligence Point (MRP) there. My aim in coming to
I couldn't
Moscow was to get out of this work in the MRP.
stand that work. I couldn't stand that work... I arrived in
Moscow at the end of 1952, December... I don't remember exactly
It
the date of the order appointing me an officer in the KGB.
was 13 or 15 March 1953."
"From August
17 April 1966 (letter to CIA case officer):
1952 until 1953 I worked at the Intelligence Point of the Naval
Intelligence of the 4th Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the
From 2 April
rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service.
1953 until 4 February 1964 I worked in the Second Chief Direc-
torate of the MGB-KGB."
"In
24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement):
the middle of March 19537 KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel
SAVITSKIY called me at home and told me to come to see KOBU-
LOV...
I worked in the First Section, First American/ Depart-
ment from the middle of March 1953 until July 1955.
27 October 1966: NOSENKO reaffirmed that he entered the
KGB in mid-March 1953. He said that he had lied when he earlier
said that he had joined the KGB in 1952, and that he knew he was
lying at the times he made these statements. Asked why he had
lied, he replied: "There was no sense." NOSENKO then went on
to explain that because he was only an average student and
because he was a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable
Since April 1966, NOSENKO has said he joined the GRU in
1951, a year later.
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by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950.
Therefore, NOSENKO continued, he had been trying to conceal
this fact from CIA by moving events back a year, for he thought
CIA would not have believed him if he reported that he was
first rejected by the KGB and was later accepted.
2.
Circumstances and Procedures of Entry
Although NOSENKO has consistently associated his entry into
the KGB with his discussions with General KOBULOV, * he has been
inconsistent concerning the content of their conversation, when
it occurred, its relationship in time to other events (see
Part IV.B.), and where it took place, at his father's dacha or
at KOBULOV's dacha. Also, whereas NOSENKO said in 1962 that
there were virtually no administrative formalities prerequisite
to his entry, he recalled in 1964 that he had had conversations
with various KGB personnel officers and (at home) had completed
a KGB questionnaire and a biographic form. NOSENKO was question-
ed at length on these points during 1964 and 1965. As a result,
he provided lengthy descriptions of his various interviews at
KGB Headquarters and of the questionnaire and other documents he
completed. In April 1966, however, NOSENKO reverted to his
original statement of 1962: There were no interviews with KGB
personnel officers, and he implied that he had filled out no
official forms. His various statements are presented in chrono-
logical order below.
9 June 1962: "KOBULOV was at our dacha. Well, he is a great
friend of my father. He was First Deputy to BERIYA, and my
father was Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry... A'conversa-
tion simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?' I said: 'I'm
working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working
on the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: 'How do
...
Then
you like the work?' I replied: 'Well, speaking honestly, I
don't like the work.' 'Well,' he said, 'You better come to work
with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-
intelligence?'. I did not want to go into intelligence. I
consider that only people who have seven, even ten years' ex-.
perience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelli-
gence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence.
they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when KOBULOV
asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: 'It is better, of
course, to go into counterintelligence.' Well,' he said,
'Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This
was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I
got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and
told me to stop by. I went. 'Come into this room,' (they told
me]. 'it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa).
We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go
directly to the central entrance. A pass has already been
issued for you; the pass is already there. Go to the Secre-
tariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV
had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his
assistant received me. 'How about working in the American De-
partment?' he (the assistant asked. 'Well, good.. Go there.
right now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His
KOBULOV's assistant sent me directly to the Second Directo-
rate, the American Department, the First Section; working with
American correspondents."
See Part V.B.1. for further references to KOBULOV.
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"No.
I remember
KOLULOV was in.
It was
I was
In
They
8 April 1964: "It was February (1953]. KOBULCV was in
February in Moscow. He was our friend. He said: 'O.K.,
I'll help you if you want, with the KGB.'
George.
exactly. Yes. It was in February. I saw him at the cottage..
By this time I had been in Moscow six weeks...
February. He went to see my father at the Ministry.
the end of the day. It was late and my father invited him to
come along to the summer home. It happened to be a Saturday.
KOBULOV's wife stayed in Germany. He was just here for 
a 
short
TDY. *
My father invited him to spend. Saturday night and Sunday
at the dacha... On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV
asked me what I was doing. I told him 'nothing,' that I was 
at
I said: 'I
the disposal of the (GRU) Personnel Department.
don't want to go back to Baltiysk, to the Baltic Sea, because I
I 
get
don't like the work there. I'm not doing anything there.
He said:
no satisfaction from the work.'
'Well, you should be
utilized somehow... Do you want me to call the KGB Personnel
them look you over?' I told him: 'All right.' He called, and
he must have given our number to them, our home phone.
called subsequently by the Personnel Department of the KGB.
February. They told me to come see them at House No. 12.
had a pass for me... So I went. Picked up my pass and went...
[NOSENKO next gives a description of his route to the KGB build-
ing, his receipt of a pass, and his visit to the Central KGB
This man I 
don't 
know
Personnel Office.] They talked to me.
who or what he was - asked where I worked before and all that.
We will check
He said: 'O.K. We'll request your file from GRU.
you out and will let you know whether or not we will take you.'
That's all." NOSENKO was asked whether he completed any forms
Not there.
or questionnaires.
They gave me three copies
About my
of forms to take home. There were so many questions.
I filled all
parents, my education, my residences, addresses.
this out... Finally I completed all three copies and called
them. I was told that this time I would not need a pass, that
I should just go to the entrance, and the person (the personnel
I went,
officer] would come down and take the papers from me.
brought the papers, and he took them from me, and also three
Then I was called by
copies of my handwritten autobiography...
And at that time another
the personnel people once more.
officer talked to me, and this time I knew who was talking to
me, because I was told to go to talk to ROZHENKO (first name
unknown, later identified as a Section Chief in the Personnel
Department]. This was in March... Just as soon as STALIN died,
He must have 
been
KOBULOV came back from Germany immediately.
summoned by BERIYA or someone. And so, in just a few days
It was Bogdan
evidently he did not forget I got a call.
Zakharovich's assistant. He told me to go to the central
I remember it as if it
entrance, that I didn't need a pass.
just happened. I went in the uniform of a lieutenant, but with
a civilian overcoat. This was, maybe, the 10th of March...
sat down [in KOBULOV's office]. I thought it would be for five
minutes. I waited there almost two hours. The assistant came
out a few times and told me that Bogdan Zakharovich is very,
Some 
senior
very busy, but that he would give me an escort.
lieutenant came up to me and told me to follow him...
up to the sixth floor of the old building. I remember it as
though it just happened. I sat there about five or seven
I announced myself.
minutes. Then I was told to go in.
said: 'Yes, I know. Sit down. My name is SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor
Grigoryevich. He told me he was the Deputy Chief of 
the
Second Chief Directorate and that they had talked things over
and decided. He said that they wanted to offer me a position
in counterintelligence, in the First Department, the American
-
-
I
We went
He
NOSENKO had been told by his interrogator shortly before
that KOBULOV had been stationed in Germany and not in Moscow.
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Department... Then he asked (A. M.] GORBATENKO to come in.
He was filling in for the Chief of the First Department...
He took me to his office... Well, they decided to put me in
the First U. S. Embassy/ Section and called Yevgeniy KOZLOV,
the Chief of the Section. He came in and said: 'Well, hello,
Yuriy Ivanovich. I heard of you. Well, if you're finished
with him, I'll take him along with me and show him around.'
He took me and talked to me for a while and then told me to
report... Either the 12th or the 17th. I don't remember."
15 April 1964: NOSENKO again described the KGB question-
naire and autobiographic forms he had filled out at home and
recalled that he had also signed a secrecy agreement in the
personnel office. He also remembered that he had made several
additional phone calls to the KGB personnel office and described
his second visit there to talk to ROZHENKO: "At the end of
February I was told again to stop in the Pass Office and pick up
a pass and go to the same floor, but another room. They told me
I would have to talk to ROZHENKO today. He was a Chief of
Section, of the Personnel Section. So we had a talk. It was
the same thing again. He said: 'Tell me about yourself. But
he just wanted to look me over. And after that they said: 'All
right, we have not gotten all your documents yet from your
[military] district.
So wait.
26 April 1965: NOSENKO recounted his conversation with
KOBULOV, saying that it took place at KOBULOV's dacha in Usov,
where he and his parents were visiting in January 1953. NOSENKO
continued: "I was called at my family's dacha in February.
They said it was State Security calling and that I was to
report. I did this on the next day. Probably I then reported..
to House No. 12. As officer talked to me about my education,
service, and so on. Biographic questions. Then he gave me a
blank for my autobiography and a four to six-page anketa (bio-
graphic form). I filled these out at home. The next day I
called in and was told to come to the Eighth Entry. The officer
came down, and I gave him the forms and photographs of myself.
They said they would call me. I did nothing from January to
March. January was leave. In February and March I was at GRU
Personnel's disposal." After STALIN's funeral NOSENKO was
summoned to KOBULOV's office. His assistant, SAVITSKIY, told
NOSENKO to wait. After more than an hour had passed, SAVITSKIY
sent him to SHUBNYAKOV's office. There he learned that he would
be assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section and was introduced to
the Chief of the American Department, GORBATENKO. The official
order appointing NOSENKO was issued the same day, the 13th or
15th of March 1953.
24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement: Again
NOSENKO said that he had spoken with KOBULOV at the KOBULOV
dacha and set the date at 1 January 1953. The document con-
tinued as follows: "I saw KOBULOV for the second and last time
on the day of STALIN's funeral in my father's office in the
Ministry of Shipbuilding in March 1953. I had come from the
sanitorium to Moscow and dropped in to see my father at work.
In his office I ran into KOBULOV as they were gathering to go
to the Dom Soyuzov for the funeral. KOBULOV said he would
concern himself with the question of my entry into the KGB.
The same day I returned to the sanitorium, and several days
later, having completed my treatment, I returned to Moscow.
In the middle of March, KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY,
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KOBULOV.
didn't see me and SAVITSKIY directed me to the Deputy Chief
of the Second Chief Directorate, Colonel SHUENYAKOV....
called me at home and told me to come see KOBULOV.
* SHUBNYAKOV told me that an order had been signed appointing
me a case officer in the First Section of the First Depart-
ment, Second Chief Directorate. SHUBNYAKOV called the Chief
i of the First Department, Lieutenant Colonel GORBATENKO, and
introduced me. Then I went to the First Department and was
introduced to the Deputy Chief of the First Department and the
Chief of the First Section, KOZLOV. KOZLOV said I would take
over the cases of Senior Case Officer, Captain / Anatoliy]
TORMOZOV and suggested that I begin work the same day.
accepted for work in the MVD in precisely this way.
necessary to note that none of the workers of the MVD Personnel
Administration spoke to me, either before or after the signing
of the order assigning me to the Second Chief Directorate of
the MVD."
I was
It is

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93.
C.
1.
To June 1955 (American Department)
Introduction
Depending upon which date he has given for entering the KGB,
NOSENKO's first assignment in the U.S. Embassy Section of the
American Department, working on American correspondents living
in Moscow, lasted for about six to eighteen months. From that
job, he said, he moved in 1954 to operations against U.S. Mili-
tary Attaches assigned to the Moscow Embassy, remaining in the
same section until being transferred in June 1955. His activi-
ties, as NOSENKO described them, and pertinent collateral infor-
mation on his targets while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section
are reviewed below.
2.
Operations Against Correspondents
On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO was
taken directly to the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section.
There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO
that he would take over the work of the departing case officer,
Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American cor-
respondents in Moscow.
a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY
When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, accord-
ing to statements made on 8 April 1964, he found a desk in Room
615.
"There were three other guys sitting there. At first I
was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files
on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I
didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on
Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as one on GILMORE's wife
SEREBRYAKOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY
and Thomas WHITNEY.*
$1
During the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO identified
SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours. He said that WHITNEY "worked
for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he
refused to work for us when he left the country and would not
contact us in the United States." GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an
active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not
know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the
status of SALISBURY as of 1953.
NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during
the early period of his KGB service were developmental files
(delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents.
The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you
would never be able to figure out whether he (the subject of
the file] is an agent or not." NOSENKO explained that, once a
person becomes an agent, another file is set up, and these agent
NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsi-
ble for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself
was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with
SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's wife. I also know that KOZLOV was
For
working with WHITNEY and with [Andrew J.] STEIGER...
each of these persons there was an operational file which I
did not see.". According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved
with STEIGER and Edmund STEVENS, both of whom were American
correspondents recruited as agents by the KGB..
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NOSENKO
files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV.
stated that he read the files on these seven persons "slowly
and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things
as notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remem-
ber."
He was also given the files on the agents surrounding
these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.
b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents
NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who
were reporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY and the GILMORES
and met with them regularly to learn whether "anything was new,
who did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior,
what might be suspicious in his behavior, who he is contacting,
etc.
He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare â
written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to
describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied: "Let us take the same
case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a month
or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what
was new in SHAPIRC's behavior since our last meeting, whether
SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meet-
ings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was
SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met. And then the man
[agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything
suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next
morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I
would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if
there was something interesting he should call immediately.
It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to
the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings,
either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.) KOVSHUK
(also of the U.S. Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents,
he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV or as soon as conveni-
ent to both. If the meetings were taking place late in the day
and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written
materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then re-
port the next morning."
KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various
agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teach-
ing me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting
would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop
but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case
officer."
NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and
clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their
families. Asked to describe them, he said on 15 April 1964:
"My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at
GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later.
Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one. My second agent was
a chauffeur whose codename, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he
was driving WHITNEY. Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a
funny little fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs,
this was my agentura [agent network]." Although NOSENKO was
able to give a breakdown of this network in terms of the number
and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he
had forgotten their true names and could not provide detailed
personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't
remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were
turned over often. NOSENKO did recall that it was he who
selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office
as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of
Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.
14,00000*
He first identified GILMORE's cook, "AGLODİNA,” as Yelena
S. KOSIENKO in the fall of 1965, while reviewing a list of Sov-
iets employed by Americans in Moscow. He told CIA at that time
that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TOPMOZOV upon entering the
U.S. Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked
for and reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard KASISCHKE.
NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting in-
formation."
NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling 10
to 12 agents in operations against the correspondents. This,
he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case offi-
cers might have as many as 15. In April 1964 NOSENKO broke his
agentura down as follows:
Target
Eddie GILMORE
Thomas WHITNEY
Henry SHAPIRO
Harrison SALISBURY
"
Agents
Two agents, the cook and the driver;
one operational contact; a part-time
cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of
GILMORE's sister-in-law, who reported
on the sister-in-law and GILMORE's
wife.
One agent, his driver.
Three agents, SHAPIRO's secretary
and his cahuffeur, plus an old woman
who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife
and lived with the SHAPIROS in Mos-
COW. (The secretary and chauffeur
later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and
reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY
temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in
Moscow.)
Two agents, SALISBURY's driver, "SER-
GEY" and a part-time cleaning girl.
NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral," in
that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The
first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language
training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was
"RAKETA," but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The sec-
ond, "VOLODINK, was a female teacher in this same program who
instructed some of the correspondents, including BRODNEY, and
Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true
name of "VOLODINK. When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsi-
bility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his
agents to other case officers in the U.S. Embassy Section with
the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINK," whom he continued to
handle in his work with military attaches.
c. Information from Other Sources
SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent, by GOLITSYN in 1961,
before the lead was received from NOSENKO, and he had previously
been suspected as such on the basis of his long stay in Moscow,
his unusually good access to Soviet information sources, and his
marriage to a Soviet national. SHAPIRO was mentioned as a KGB
14-00000
agent by a cryptonym (known to NOSENKO and confirmed by GOLITSYN)
appearing in the CHEREPANOV papers.
"
The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKLOV had earlier identified the
Polish-born wife of WHITNEY as a KGB agent, an allegation which.
she denied, and it had been long assumed that WHITNEY too had
reached some sort of accommodation with the KGB because of this
fact and because of the long duration of his tour as a correspond-
ent in Moscow.
GILMORE also had been suspected by CIA before NOSENKO's in-
formation was received. He served in Moscow for 12 years, from
1941 to 1953, and is married to a Soviet national.
SALISBURY served two short tours, of about one year each,
in Moscow during the 1950's. During the second of these, he
became enamored with the Pole who was to become WHITNEY's wife
(see above) and was during this period a subject of criticism by
other American correspondents in Moscow for his pro-Soviet arti-
cles. When WHITNEY married the Pole shortly after STALIN's
death, SALISBURY returned to the United States and his articles
took on an anti-Soviet tone.
NOSENKO claimed no involvement with the other two American
correspondents whom he identified as KGB agents, STEVENS and
STEIGER, both the subjects of a considerable amount of derogatory
information in CIA files. They are discussed in Part VI.D.2.
under the heading of NOSENKO's American leads.
3.
Operations Against Military Attache Personnel
Some time in the first half of 1954 NOSENKO was relieved of
his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then
until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB
Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer person-
nel of the U.S. Military Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of
the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of
the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.
-
8 April 1964: "I took over the Military Attache cases
from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned
the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."
-
10 April 1964: "I made a mistake... I said I accepted
the cases from KHRENOV when I was taking on the Military Attache
work. This is not right. KHRENOV was not working in the First
(U.S. Embassy) Section; he was working in the First. (American)
Department. I took over the cases from--let's see, there was
ZHUKOV and Vladimir Aleksandrovich CHURANOV, and here was my
table (desk), and I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich
PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."
-
:
15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned
over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returneda.
to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when
the PETROV's defected in Australia; he explained that he was
See Part V.D.7.c. for a detailed discussion of the CHEREPANOV
Papers.
14-00000
97.
not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another
officer. "If KISLITSYN came (back from Australia) in 1953, then
it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else.
#
- 18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the First Section in
1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYL-
DIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the
BUDYLDIN left
Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV.
later that year and turned those files over to me... Yuriy
LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files
on the Army Attache and his assistants."
NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed
responsibilities for the attaches. As noted above, he said on
10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of
1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents
"only about six months." If the date of March 1953, which he
most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct this would
place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he
has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases
and began work against the attaches in January 1954, on still
others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO
said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.
14-00000
. 98.
a. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches
Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network
(agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Mili-
tary Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NO-
SENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers*...
about ten persons, plus the agent SERVIZNIY' and the one
with the code name 'DMITRIYEV' These additional two
agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one ex-
ception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO trans-
ferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955.
each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who
were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the
street. According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a
supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the
main source of information on the Military Attaches being the
microphones in their offices.**
He met
Newly added to the network while NOSLNKO held this
position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl
Her
L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS.
name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-
speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of
English in order to overhear conversations or read letters
without taking them outside."
"
Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was
and she
his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code name "SHVEDOVA,
was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira
RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin
Toman, from whom he never obtained anything of interest.
They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.
21
of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identi-
fied Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various of the at-
taches. "He reported where they went, what they said,
whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had
unusual packages with them, and so on.
"
He
When viewing photographs in September 1964, NOSENKO
identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent "SERVIZNIY.
had been working in the Embassy since its establishment,
starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time,
performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connec-
tion with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself
did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in
1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to
NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the
Embassy, issued monthly.
"DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV:
NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but
was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who
worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and eleva-
tor, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and
The Military Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random,
NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior
attache, none were targetted against individual members of the
attache office.
** See Part V.E.3.g. on electronic operations against the U.S.
Embassy.
14-00000
ནགས
other wires he had observed in the Embassy as well as on the
security measures on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRI-
YEV" had no direct connection with the Military Attaches.
In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 bio-
graphic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Em-
bassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the per-
son involved and short biographic notes, including his name
and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these
cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NO-
SENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV
but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that
he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the biographic
information on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them
as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American De-
partment and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously.
In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information,
which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the Military Attache,"
He.
NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent."
later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.
b.
NOSENKO's Targets.
As the Second Chief Directorate case officer responsible
for operations against American Military (Army) Attaches sta-
tioned in Moscow,* his main task was not to recruit them but
rather was to prevent the attaches from collecting intelligence.
He has used this statement about his main task (identical with
that of other U.S. Embassy Section officers working against
the Army and Navy Attaches) to support his claim that no U.S.
Armed Forces Attaches were recruited by the KGB from 1953 un-
til his defection in 1964. He has also said that this is one
reason he knows relatively little about the personal back-
grounds of his various targets during this period--the empha-
sis was on surveillance instead of development for recruitment-
purposes. Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache per-
sonnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and
"MICKELSON, MEARNS,
1955, NOSENKO gave the following names:
His
RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."**
knowledge of the activities of these targets and of KGB action
against them, coupled with information from other sources,
discussed in the following paragraphs.
is
* Naval Attaches were handled by ZHUKOV during this period, NO-
SENKO said, while Air Attaches were initially handled by CHURA-
NOV. When CHURANOV left the section in early 1954, he turned
over the Air Attache files to PANKRATOV, who turned them over
later in the year to KHRENOV.
**This is the order given by NOSENKO. The list comprises two
generations of Army Attaches in Moscow and is neither in al-
phabetical order nor in terms of date of service in Moscow.
It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKEL-
SON through Captain MULE to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA
.
Questioned about these officers in a different context, NOSENKO
indicated knowledge of their ranks. Not mentioned by NOSENKO
was George VAN LAETHEM, Assistant Army Attache in Moscow from
August 1951 to August 1953 (prior to the time when NOSENKO said
he was responsible for work against the military attache 
office
).
VAN LAETHEM returned to Moscow in 1955, however, and was at-
tached to the Army Attache staff again from 19 March to 19 May
1955, during which time NOSENKO claimed he was still responsible
for this group.
=
14-00000.
100.
(1) MICKELSON
NOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel
and the Military Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955.
PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKEL-
SON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954.
When asked about agents who might have been working against.
MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB
operational contact whose name he did not recall, and
MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA;
the cook and NOVIKOVA went to work for MICKELSON after NO-
SENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section. In addition to
these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was
his chauffeur, whose name. NOŠENKO also did not remember.
NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about
MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or
surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruit-
ment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or
derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.
According to information in CIA files, MICKELSON was
involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union
which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested
in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a
bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges.
In August 1954 MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal
photographs south of KHARKOV; on this occasion he was held
for two hours before being released.
(ii)
MEARNS
NOSENKO identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON's
replacement and said that he was the responsible case of-
ficer. There were two agents and one operational contact
working against EARNS. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the
name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on
MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to overhear MICKEL-
SON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his
clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she
never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB.
NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects were searched
by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the
United States, and that all his service records had been
discovered and photographed. * NOSENKO described MEARNS
as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and
said that information from concealed microphones showed
him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest con-
cerning him was received from these microphones or from tele-
phone taps.
CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant informa-
tion on MEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.
(iii) RICHARDS
NOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant
colonel who served as the Assistant Army Attache in Moscow.
NOSENKO said that he was the case officer working against
*NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.
14-00000
101.
RICHARDS. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO
could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym
"SHVEDOVA," but she had never provided any worthwhile in-
formation about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers
reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from
them.
According to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow
from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the
office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with
MEARNS. RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his
maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart
attack during the period she was employed by him. (This
incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.) For about four
months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language
lessons from Ludmila. GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During
these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and
wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her
record her speech on his tape recorder.
GROMAKOVA was preg-
nant and unmarried at the time. (NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA
as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her
contacts with RICHARDS.) * RICHARDS identified one "Volodya"
About
(i.e., first name Vladimir) as his principal driver.
62 years old in 1954, Volodya was the son of a rich jeweler
in Moscow during the Revolution. Volodya himself was well
educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Mos-
cow, he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS about the Revolu-
tion, propaganda, and news media. (NOSENKO did not know of
Volodya.) Further details from RICHARDS are given in the
following section on FELCHLIN.
(iv) FELCHLIN
NOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant
colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and
stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer. FELCHLIN was in
the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being
declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the
name of any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN,
although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid and she
would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said,
the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and
drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the
precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to
some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States
for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind.
NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCH-
LIN, but said the action was based on information which had
been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents.
For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs
and a report had been written; along with other similar
indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents
in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away for pos-
sible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCH-
He said then
LIN during the February 1965 interrogations.
that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata,
and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO
See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN,
to whom she also taught Russian.
14-00000
102.
explained his having but few details concerning this action
by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had trans-
ferred from the American Department to the Tourist Depart-
ment in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN's
background.
Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the
USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before
arriving in July 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the
latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was
asked to leave the country. (He had previously served in
Austria and West Germany and had been in official, contact
with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the
United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was
the subject of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his
arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant
Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches
took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted
American attaches in many years. Six months later, on
25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article
saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of
their "spy documents" on the train. FELCHLIN said this
charge was false. On another occasion, while travelling
with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his
train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in
his bunk. (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.)
In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J.
YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in
Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military
target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when
told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO
said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was
the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after
some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia
They
station where they were ordered to sign a confession.
were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American
FELCHLIN was
ambassador to deliver a strong protest note.
told on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the
Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major
Walter A. MCKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN'S
travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were
allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same
time. *
Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN
immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the
general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military
Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his
first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the
Ambassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial
Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the
USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In February 1965
NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances
under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, in-
asmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at
the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954,
NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.
- 2.

14-00000
103.
attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy"
(Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the
Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with
the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHYRYEV drove primarily
for the Military Attache himself, but sometimes drove for
the Assistant Military Attaches, and he remembered that
SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had
continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV
had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of
any.)
FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOPOVA (not specifically
named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. When she spoke with
FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month,
which seemed excessive, so PELCHLIN offered 80. FEDOROVA
refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted.
She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back
door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with her, and sus-
pecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCILIN
teased her about it. FEDOROVA's previous employer at the
Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with
a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local
"boss" of the Embassy network. PEARSON printed the allega-
tion. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN,
the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, waved it in
his face, and accused him of being PEARSON's source.
(NO-
SENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall
hearing or reading of this incident.)
(v) BENSON
NOSENKO identified his target John S. BENSON as a
major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not
recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but
said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in
Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGE
with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared per-
sona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information
on BENSON from any other source.
(vi)
STROUD
NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an
Assistant. Army Attache. The only agents working against him
were the Military Attaches' drivers. From concealed micro-
phones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before
STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of
electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE
in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with
them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB
knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any
source.
CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE,
the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment
in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on 7 May
1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Mos-
cow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an Ameri-
can defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE
was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; SISCOE was,
in fact, a CIA cooptee.)
14-00000
WETHIS SOK # you be?
104.
(vii) MULE
NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army
Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible
for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE,
in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there
had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the
United States on the basis of money and the promise of a
new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to
try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only
a captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and because
material from concealed microphones indicated that he was
often disparaged by the other attaches. When MULE received
letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the
maids turned these over to the KGB; from this mail it was
understood that MULE did not have a house in the United
States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father
of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Ger-
meny for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed
too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the
KGB appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American De-
partment, to attempt to defect MULE. Together with BORODIN,
KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's
special technical section) NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad
for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a
concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel
room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return.
When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of
BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK
closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape.
BORODIN reviewed for MULE the Facts the KGB had accumulated
about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his
fellow attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered
him a job as a "consultant." BORODIN had either $5,000 or
$10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. Ac-
cording to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN
to get out, that he would not talk to him, and that he was
a captain in the American Army.
CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He
said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to
a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack
SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range
basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required
to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to
MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal
life that could have been obtained only from listening de-
vices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about
20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident.
MULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.
(viii) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD
After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Tourist De-
partment in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets
of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being
*Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the re-
cruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO.
(See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)
14-00000
105.
declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the following
account of this incident: For some time the Second Chief
Directorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenient
piece of electronic equipment which American Intelligence
officers were known to be using during their travels inside
the Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the
American Department had been given authorization from the
Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this
equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of
such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the
Tourist Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to
develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an
abortive attempt to steal the equipment from an attache at
a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE,
and STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's trans-
fer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them,
and the KCB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad.
To carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. FEDOTOV,
then Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and A.M.
GORBATENKO, Chief of the American Department, flew with
other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad.
The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched
constantly from a visual observation post, and it was noted
that they never ato in the hotel restaurant but always in
their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was
placed under a pillow before they began to eat.
were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB
officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment.
In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it
was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and
STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the
persona non grata action.
While they
According to information from other sources, the equip-
ment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955,
and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a
month before NOSENKO ciained to have transferred to the
Tourist Department).* When the 7 May date was given to
NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied
that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he
did not directly participate in it, but that he had been
involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment.
It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was in
the Tourist Department at the time of this operation, and
that he had consistently said that he transferred from the
American to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO
shrugged, but offered no comment.
*The source Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the United
States as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA
in 1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in
the early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. Mili-
tary Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed that
he might have contributed information leading to the three
Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being de-
clared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's
targets were BENSON, MULE, and STROUD.
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106.
(ix)
:
CARDELLA
NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an admini-
strative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA.
The KGB had no interesting or unusual information concerning
CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO could say nothing more
about him.
CIA files show that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served
in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. Other than the
fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA's Moscow Em-
bassy office in 1964, no significant collateral information
concerning him is available.
(✗) VAN LAETHEM
NOSENKO identified George VAN LASTHEM as an Assistant Air
Attache at the U.S. Embassy against whom an operation was at-
tempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that during this period a
Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going
from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquain-
tance with VAN LAETHEM which could be followed up in Moscow.
She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and tele-
phone number. Although she was certain that she would hear from
him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had
heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer handling
LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case officer respon-
sible for VAN LAETHEM, as he was for all members of the Air At-
tache's office at that time. NOSENKO knew of no other interest
or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.
CIA records show that VAN LAETHEM was not an Assistant Air
Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from
March 1951 to March 1953.* As cryptographic security officer
and officer in charge of the Embassy code room, he had super-
visory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics,
including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms
with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Mos-
cow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM's duties also carried respon-
sibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.**
He was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time
when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S.
Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to be
only a TDY, it was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant
Army Attache assignment because of the extremely sensitive na-
ture of his business there. He was project officer for the en-
tire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to
review the operations including the planned use of the new
electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE,
STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above).
:
and
Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in
March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he entered the KGB
he was succeeded in his post by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO
has claimed full responsibility. Thus, the fact of his posi-
tion as Assistant Army Attache and MULE's predecessor would
presumably be available to NOSENKO.
Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of
"ANDREY" in the June 1962 meetings, he related it to Roy RHODES.
Each reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that
it was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of
RHODES had no
special electronic equipment in the U.S. Embassy.
access to such information.
14-00000
107.
D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)
1.
Introduction
By his account" NOSENKO served in the American-Canadian-
British Section of the Tourist Department, * KGB Second Chief
Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly after the department
was created to operate with and against foreign travellers.
in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in
that directorate in January 1960. He was a case officer
until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958.
In statements made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to
have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year
period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or
September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he
said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.
NOSENKO has described his personal and direct partici-
pation in the section's activities as consisting of:.
-Recruitment of two Soviet nationals as homosexual
agents, ** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until
they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.
-Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents tar-
getted against American tourists; their number varied from
eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist.
-Operations involving 14 foreigners who visited the
USSR for various lengths of time.
-Recruitment and handling of the American Express Com-
pany representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to
meet following his reassignment in January 1960.
-Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was
of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent par-
ticipation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD's activities
in the USSR.
Each of these categories is discussed separately below.
2. Soviet Homosexual Agents
Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a
public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded
that A. I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some
operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation
which verified this possibility in 1987: A homosexual agent
of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked
VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had
previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated,
was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interro-
gated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to
*These components are also known as the First Section and
Seventh Department, respectively.
**This term refers to agents whose homosexuality is ex-
ploited by the KGB against certain male targets.
mef***fir; M*t?
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I
NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB among homosexuals.
VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a homo-
sexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled).
YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team
against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition
to specific targets, they had the general assignment of
associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the pur-
pose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described
on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: "Although I am
a chief of section there I have all sorts of agents.
have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls,
beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like--anything you
want. I have homosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular, I
have one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both
you and the British. I permitted this pair to work in
general (without specific assignments. I send them out to
look on their own. I give them money and tell them to go
out. 'Stroll about. Here are theater tickets. Look around,
but only Americans. Look for American pederasts.' They are
& couple, that is, they love each other. They are able to
do anything desired, either active or passive, anything.
They call me at night: Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister
so-and-so here. He wants to go to bed with us. I say:
Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow. So the next
day they go to a special hotel room. Wo make photographs.
Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it?
Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--
depending on his position, what he can give, what he can
tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well, let's have
a go igrat']. After this, I speak to these boys: 'Well,
go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish.
Do whatever is wanted.' All this is seen (observed by the
KGB]. The [hotel] administrator enters. 'What are you
doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is
drawn up. 'Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our
business. We don't know what to do with you. · Then the
Chief arrives: 'What's up. Aha, I sce. Well, then a con-
versation begins: 'Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is
punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of
recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your
friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they
help but find out?..."
.
1
י,
When NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the
Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January
1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They were
'never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy, but, NOSENKO
said, the Tourist Department "used to call me on homosexual
prospects." VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB
agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they
could not be used further since they had become too well
known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB
archives in 1962 or 1963.. The last operation in which these
two agents participated was during January 1962.
7.
NOSENKO has been
During interrogation on these agents,
unable to tell where they lived in Moscow, their family
situation, or other such details. He said that he never
met either in a safehouse (always on the street) and never
met either of them alone, without the other being present..
14-00000
*
109.
NOSENKO has described eleven KGB approaches to Americans
based on compromising evidence obtained with the assistance
of VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in which
Americans were suspected of being homosexuals on the basis
of the evaluation of these two. Additionally, CIA records
indicate that at least six Americans, not reported on by
NOSENKO, have had contacts with one or both of these agents
in Moscow. Of these six, three were CIA agents, one a U.S.
graduate student, another a psychiatrist visiting Soviet
institutions, and the last. Charles W. THAYER, the well-known
diplomat and author. With one or possibly two exceptions, all
the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported by NOSENKO or
other sources took place during the period from April to
November 1959. The known exception was the KGB approach to
W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962; * the possible exception was
the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place
in 1959 or early 1960 but cannot be dated precisely. Finally,
NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV; YEFREMOV,
and the American Robert BARRETT in the summer of 1959 but
does not know of their contacts in the summer of 1961,
shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of com-
promising information obtained in 1959. **
3. Other Soviet Agents
The Tourist Department, just established when NOSENKO
was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for
operations against American and British tourists. Conse-
quently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers had
to "start from the beginning."
As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow
officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist; these
were not agents, he explained, but "just persons known to
the KGB so that a KGB man could approach one of them with
questions about somebody or something." NOSENKO began to
collect information on these individuals and others with the
aim of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955,
he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all
of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four
years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied:
Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another,
some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing
all the time, back and forth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had
about ten agents, in 1957 there were about 12, in 1958 about
eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return
to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14.
NOSENKO has provided information on five of these agents,
all of whom he says he recruited from within Inturist during
1955. These were:
- Larissa SOBOROVA: An Inturist interpreter and one of
the first Inturist agents recruited by NOSENKO. SOBOROVA
was NOSENKO's agent until 1959 (when she married and retired)
and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as
an interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation
*See Part V.F.4
**See Part V.D.4.m.
14-00000
against
in the summer of 1957.*
NOSENKO reported specifically on her possible sexual involve-
ment with two other tourists, one American and the other British.
during 1957-1959. NOSENKO mentioned at one point that he "even
told Larissa about his last name.
"
Vladimir MUROMTSEV: KGB cryptonym "LESEDEV, recruited
in 1955. (NOSENKO has also said that MUROMTSEY had been a
MUROMTSEV was
Second Chief Directorate agent "since 1958.")
called into the Army in about 1959 and was sent to some Soviet
Air Force academy in Central Asia, where he worked as an inter-
preter for Syrian students studying there. During this period,
Later 
he
his file was held by the local KGP in Central Asia.
returned to Moscow and was reactivated by the Second Chief
Directorate.
Nikolay ROGOV: KGB cryptonym "Ozero," recruited in 1955.
ROGOV had formerly been a "confidential contact" of the KGB.
He worked in the central office of Inturist which assigned
interpreters to British and American citizens visiting the
Soviet Union.
"
Natalya SHULGINA: Recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, ar.
Inturist interpreter. Shown SHULGINA's photograph on 6 February
1964, NOSENKO failed to recognize it; when he was given her name,
however, he said that this was a Second Chief Directorate agent.
on whom Boris BELITSKIY had reported to CIA, NOSENKO's only
other statement on SHULGINA was made on 17 April 1964, when
He said:
discussing the agents he acquired in 1955.
"So, for
example, I had this SOBOROVA. then I had MUROMISEV. I recruited
him. Who else? Natalya SHULGINA, KUNGAROVA, Well, anyway,
during this short period. during 1955 until the end of '55, I
had about eight people, all of them translators from Inturist.'
NOSENKO therefore said he handled SHULGINA and implied that be
recruited her, (Information from other sources indicates that
SHULGINA worked for two years as secretary/interpreter for the
NBC correspondent in Moscow, Irving R. LEVINE. who arrived in
the Soviet Union in July 1955. Although there is no evidence
that SHULGINA was directly involved, the KGB attempted to re-
cruit LEVINE in November 1955. She has travelied abroad twice,
the first time to Paris in 1956 and the second time as an inter-
preter at the Brussels Fair in the summer of 1958. As NOSENKO
indicated, BELITSKIY reported on SHULGINA, who he said was a
close friend. BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved,
probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation,
in the recruitment of a member of the British Parliament.
BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO
said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case was in Geneva
in the spring of 1962.)'
-
Tamara KUNGAROVA: Inturist interpreter recruited in
1955 (according to NOSENKO's statement in April 1964 see
above on SHULGINA). In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was trans-
ferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British
are discussed in Part V.D.4.d.
**NOSENKO reported in 1962 that the KGB controlled BELITSKIY,
a source of CIA (see Part VI,D.6.).
14-00000
"
111.
Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958.
In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise
operation against an American professor, which did not
reach the point of a recruitment approach. Between 1957
or 1958 and 1960 she was working against an American tourist
named Philip NIELSEN who was suspected of connection with
CIA and who was under study for recruitment by the KGB.*
KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two lived in
England. The KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at the
time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO be-
lieved there was no recruitment. Mrs. NIELSEN died in 1965.
Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several
other agents whom he recruited or was given while in the
Tourist Department. These included the following:
-Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB cryptonym "TOMO," a can-
didate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR and a special-
ist on Japan and Thailand. DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and
English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow.
NOSENKO did not indicate how. DMITRIYEV was used operationally
or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-British
target..
-(fnu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of
Foreign Trade in Moscow. NOSENKO did not personally re-
cruit this agent. IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic
area and his previous handlers there notified the Center,
suggesting that the agent might be of use in the capital.
NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the
British Commonwealth Department of the Second Chief Direc-
torate which, NOSENKO believed, "planted him in the British
Trade Mission or something like that."
" born about
- Marina RYTOVA: KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA,
1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of
Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist
students from foreign countries. There she studied military
subjects as well as foreign languages. She speaks English
and Greek well. NOSENKO could not recall who recruited her,
but she was turned over to him by I.A. KONSTANTINOV, a
Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957. At that
time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian
Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until
about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek
language school of the Institute of International Relations.
She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained
on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the
Exhibit in Moscow. As she was often invited by the Ministry
of Agriculture to interpret during meetings between Soviet
officials and delegates from America, England,, and Greece,
she also reported this information to NOSENKO. RYTOVA
served several times as an interpreter for KHRUSHCHEV and
once participated in a conversation he had with Iowa farmer
GARST. In 1959 or 1960 she was sent as interpreter with a
small delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United
States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington,
*NIELSEN was, in fact, in contact with CIA at the time (see,
Part VI.D.2.).
14-00000
D.C., to report on observations enroute and while there.
RYTOVA is married to a man who works in one of the military.
offices in Moscow and is a captain or a major. They have
one daughter, approximately 14 years old.
-Yevgeniya ("Jane") DANKO: KGB cryptonym "OKSANA."
She worked in the American Express Company office in Moscow
for Arsens FRIPPEL and later for FRIPPEL's successor,
Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO was handled by I.A. KONSTANTINOV
from about 1955 to 1957 and was then turned over to NOSENKO.
She reported on JELISAVCIC, who was not approached, according
to NOSENKO.
4.
Operations with Foreign Visitors
Of
NOSENKO said he participated in 14 operations with
foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American-
Nine of these
Canadian Section of the Tourist Department.
operations resulted in recruitments (excluding one who later
was recruited by another element of the KGB, but including
another whom NOSENKO classified as a borderline case).
the remaining five operations which did not end with a re-
cruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one
case, one target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was
unable to obtain compromising material for an approach to a
third, and for political reasons the KGB decided against
approaching the final two.
-
Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of
these operations does not always agree with that from other
sources, these cases can be grouped chronologically as
follows: 1955
two;
one; 1956
three; 1958 –
one; 1957
and 1959 seven. The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with
The re-
one exception, 1959 were homosexual provocations.
cruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was based on heterosexual
compromise.
For
These fourteen operations are summarized briefly below
in the approximate order in which the cases began.
each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by a summary of
the results of CIA investigations. The description of the
BURGI case is more detailed than the others, for reasons in-
dicated in the text.
Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)
NOSENKO's Information:
Martin MALIA, a graduate student,
spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was sus-
pected of having connections with American Intelligence.
Toward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA
was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to
be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and
NOSENKO eventually obtained a confession that he had had
homosexual relations, with MALIA. After NOSENKO had arranged
for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent,
the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room
in Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in
touch with MALIA) when the introductions were made in a
*See Part V.D.5. for further details on FRIPPEL and JELISAVCIC.

14-00000
1
Moscow restaurant, and from an observation point in a
neighboring hotel room he watched the KGB agent and MALIA
having relations. With MALIA insisting on the lights being
turned off, however, it was impossible to obtain compro-
mising photographs (the KGB did not yet have infra-red
photographic equipmont, NOSENKO said) and therefore no re-
cruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a
later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious,"
and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA's
homosexuality for a recruitment approach.
Investigation Results: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence
officer during World War II, has visited the Soviet Union
in 1955 and twice in 1962. While buying books for the
Library of Congress and several universities in 1955, MALIA
travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was
sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity.
in 1955 and 1962 he had contacts with dissident Soviet
citizens and clandestinely brought to the West literature
for publishing abroad. In December 1963 MALIA was the
subject of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that
during 1962 he had "spent his time in Moscow looking for
dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at drucken
debauches." MALIA had been in periodic contact with CIA
in recent years; in the spring of 1963 he claimed to have
had no involvements with blackmarketeers, homosexuals, or
females inside the Soviet Union at any time. He made a
similar statement to in October 1963. MALIA has
not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's informa-
tion about him.
b.
Recruitment of BURGI (1956)
NOSENKO's Information:
At the first meeting in 1962
and despite his stated fear for his own security and his
determination to discuss only the two leads he wished to sell
CIA, NOSENKO described his recruitment of Yale Professor
Richard BURGI on the basis of a homosexual provocation oper-
ation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach
in Kiev in June 1956. NOSENKO reported that he received a
letter of commendation (blagodarnost') and a bonus of one
month's pay for this recruitment, but in 1966 he retracted
this claim. The BURGI case was the first operation in which
NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB,
and NOSENKO said he counted it as a turning point in his
personal and professional life: It was with this success-
ful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he "began to grow" from
a spoiled playboy into a responsible and effective counter-
intelligence officer. The BURGI operation was the first
recruitment carried out by the Tourist Department after it
was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO. In 1964 NOSENKO
reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV,
Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also taken part
in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the responsible.
case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited
BURGI, NOSENKO replied: "KOZLOV and NOSENKO." Asked who
recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally, He
was the Deputy Chief of the Department. The collection of
the materials (in preparation for the approach was in the
hands of Case Officer NOSENKO. ་་
Because of the personal and
general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO,
it is discussed in detail here:
☐
14-00000
114.
In August 1965 NOSENKO reported that at the time of
BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of
his visa application (anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a
cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying
that a visa had been granted, a routine note from Inturist
giving BURGI's anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary
inside the Soviet Union, and the results of traces of the
general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate
Archives. NOSENKO himself ran the traces, which proved to
be negative; there was no information on record concerning
BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the
material available on BURGI, no other traces were made.
KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that
he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore had con-
tact with students who might some day work for the U.S.
State Department, American Intelligence, and other target
organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested
an attempt to recruit him.
The
When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in
contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were
placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO. * NO-
SENKO could not recall in 1965 how many such agents there may
have been, their names, or what they might have reported
concerning BURGI. (BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but
NOSENKO did not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some
source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indica-
tions that BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to
try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual com-
promise. NOSENKO therefore approached Yu.A. LOPUKHOV, an
officer of the British Department who handled the homosexual
agent Viktor BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use his
agent in setting up the compromise. After permission had
been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV
and NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make
BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise
proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the
fact of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was
invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts
took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the
adjoining room and directed the compromise. He did not meet
BURGI at this point, however,
As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the com-
promising photographs were ready by the following day. A
report of the compromise and a request for permission to
attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors.
The request came back with the approving signatures of O.M.
GRIBANOV and A.S. FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Depart-
ment of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed
interest in using BURGI in the United States. BURGI's itin-
erary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short
while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with
instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to
prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next morning and
was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of
the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist
*NOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists
until 1960--only "collections of materials."
མྨ** ཏནྟྭཱཔཋ བཱཏམཎྞགཎཾ
4-00000
115.
ག
: : --མདུན་པར་སློབ་
cover. NOSENKO was unable to recall how the car was ac-
quired, whether it was a KGB or Inturist vehicle, who the
driver was, whether he was in the employ of the local KGB,
or other details.
...
In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB
officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels
in Kiev were full at the moment because of various confer-
ences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for
about a day in a private apartment in the center of town;
he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the
car arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchatik Ulitsa
in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer,
and (fnu) KASTYKAITE a woman housekeeper, were waiting for
them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he intro-
duced himself to BURGI. The recruitment conversation, he
said, was handled by "KOZLOV-NOSENKO," but NOSENKO had for-
gotten by 1965 who said what: "I don't remember what I
talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about.
Many things were discussed. It started with how he liked
his stay in the Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded
to say how unfortunate it was that information had been re-
ceived about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his
homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable
under Soviet law according to article so-and-so of the
criminal code, etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no
diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court ac-
cording to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused,
upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to
say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand,
the basis was prepared for the man to say: All right, I
agree to help. '.. We showed him the pictures. He was
embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the
basis: 'You have a noble task. You teach; you have stu-
dents; the students might become future specialists on
Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these
students could be used by intelligence. They might be sent
somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who
among the students is preparing for government service,
how they are distributed, etc.
During the first conver-
sation everything was made completely clear... He was not
at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He
was told that he must understand that in this case 'helping
Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term. I remember that
I told him: 'Understand, nobody is going to ask you that
you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there,
or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subver-
sive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.'
After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to Italy,
to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV
grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this
school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked
him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the
professors who teach Russian subjects..." According to
NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end.
BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed "to assist
the organs of Soviet Intelligence." NOSENKO first said that
it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later said
he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI
was then taken to a hotel.
116.
This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following
the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor
above BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI's stay in Kiev
became his constant companion and guide. An attempt was
made "to smooth out all the dirty business that had been
brought up during the recruitment talk. NOSENKO took
BURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO
they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in
nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality was not raised
again. From Kiev, BURGI went directly to the West, without
returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had
visited the American Department of the First Chief Directo-
rate and had arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a re-
contact plan in New York City should BURGI be recruited.
Before he left BURGI was briefed on these arrangements,
which called for a first meeting in the New York Public
Library. BURGI was given a recognition signal and a KGB
cryptonym, but the latter was not discussed with Him.
About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENHO
turned over all his materials or the BURGI operation to the
First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV,
Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section,
KOZIOV, and NOSENKO visited FERLISOV in the First Chief
Directorate and expressed an interest in further develop-
ments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that BURGI had ar-
rived for his first meeting, but the KGB had not established
contact; the first meeting in New York City took place the
second or third time BURGI appeared and the New York Legal
Residency continued to meet with him until the Revolution in
Hungary in late 1956. NOSENKO later heard from someone in
the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the
case was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment
of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said in 1965, he and
KOZLOV received letters of commendation and bonuses of one
month's pay by order of KGB Chairman SEROV: PETRENKO was
given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary;
and even RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.
In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award
was for his longevity of service.
Investigation Results: BURGI was first interviewed on
22 November 1957 concerning his recruitment by the KGB.
☐
14-00000
In August 1965, AÐSENK
R
Moscow.
☐
118.
14-00000
hot
2 P
3.
ERÅRS
14-00000
120.
BURGI then continued to describe the reminder of his
stay in Blow (enerally agree)
NOSENKO'S account).
c.
Approach to
(1957)
NOSENKO's information: NOSEN
recruitment approach in 1957 to
on the basis of
indo an unsuccessful
ncerest in con-
unuing is commercial activities in the USSR. Originally.
the responsible case officer had been A. I. VERENIKIN of
the Sixth Section of the Tourist Department; this section
was then responsible for operations against foreign seamen.
Since VERENIKIN spoke no German and
was known to
speak English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach
because he "knew English a little." When asked why a German-
speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered:
"The higher-ups said 'go work on this ase, and that was
all." After being rebuffed by
MSIAKO saw him
'
several more times during the 1967 01-11 ::
NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon
the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refus co
"Investigation Results:
, but when
return to
ce him.
was interviewed by
CIA on 19 July 1965, and, while genially uncooperative,
described a mild approach" in Mosco. during 1956 or 1957
which may be the one described by: NOSENKO. (He was not
questioned on the identities of the Sovicts involved.)
F4*up****!t/\Tr
14-00000
ontacts
ontinues to have extensive insines
Let commercial representatives on any and
has recently reported to have negotiated a sizable shipping
contreet with the Soviet Union shordy after
the FSSR. His princiðaį
tn
.c. Recruitment of (fa)
__
In 1937 or 1958
visited the Soviet union A
atvorige was made to recrait his A Recond Chief Directorate
officer, N. A. ARKHIPOV, made
acquaintance and
handled the entire operation against hier, but NOSENKO him-
self played a role. It had somehow been determined that
had a fondness for girls. NOSENKO therefore presented
himself to him, using the name VERNOW" or "SERGEYEV" and
posing as a painter, and told
that he could find women
for him. A party was arranged, with a KGB agent as
*See Part. V.D.8 for more discussion of this point.
*This incident is described more fully in Part III.A.
14-00000
122.
date and a Second Chief Directorate secretary as NOSENKO's.
Late in the evening NOSENKO and His date excused themselves,
and
had sexual relations with the temale agent.
Photographs ☐ to secan were taken by the KC3 then NO-
SENKO and
saw one another the next day. -
nounced that had some articles, cameras and the like,
that he want to well on the bi
arket. NOBENKO offered
to arrange the sale and took
Moscow. As they arrived befor
asked
to a dingy section oi
small house. NODENKO
to give him the things to be sold. At this
mment an officer posing as a militiaan approached, and
arrested the 1 for blackbarketeering. As Relitia
station,.
was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of
the Tourist Department, under threat of imprisonment.
(It was DUBAD who had had the photographs taken the previous
after
evening.) There was no further contact with
to Oslo he
he left the USSR, however, because on his return
published an article in which he deserthed his experiences,
"but not all of them.
Investigation Results:
f. Recruitment of HARIS. (1968)
NOSTEKO's Information: NOSENKO in 1959 recruited Gisella
HARRIS, an employee of the American Express Company in Salt
Lake City, based on her romantic and sexual involvement with
a Soviet citizen. The Soviet told HARRIS that he was in
trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to accompany
him to the police. HARRIS agreed to meet and cooperate with
the Soviets if they established contact with her in Salt Lake
City, but the case was turned over to the First Chief Directo-
rate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.

"
14-00000
Compromise 84 KRAFT #1998
NOSENKO's Information: Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the
a tourist in 1957 or
Chicago area, visited the Soviet Union as
1958, and NOSENKO was assigned to be the responsible case offi-
cer.
During an earlier trip to the USSR, the KGB had learned,
NOSENKO arranged
KRAFT had been intimate with a Soviet woman.
Although his wife
for her to come to Moscow from Kiew, where she was living in
1957 or 1958, in order to compromise KRAFT.
was accompanying him in Moscow, KRAFT and the Soviet woman were
NOSENKO was
intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel.
Photographs
present at the time supervising the operation.
were taken. Then militiamen broke into the room, finding KRAFT
and the woman in the nude; a recruitment approach was then made
(NOSENKO 
had
by DUBAS, the Chief of the Tourist Department.
been the case officer and had handled the operation thus far,
but he took no part in the confrontation or recruitment approach
"because DUBAS wanted it for himself.") Although the 
recruit-
ment was not firm, KRAFT and DUBAS "hau an agreement
" that
nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not
criticize the Soviet Union in lectures about his trip 
there
DUBAS again con-
which he was to give in the United States.
tacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, and after this his
file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate.
recalled that the First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was
And also it smelled
not in a good region of the United States.
Therefore,
like he had spoken of the approach made to him.
NOSENKO concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the
United States.
19
NOSENKO
Investigation Results:
Recruitment of DREW (1959)
NOSENKO's Information: George DREW, an American who
visited the Soviet Union in the spring of 1959, had originally:
been the responsibility of V.M. IVANOV, a case 
officer of the
By 
chance,
section dealing with American and Canadian 
tourists.
however, DREW became involved with NOSENKO's homosexual agents
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2), and they reported 
this
NOSENKO 
and
to NOSENKO, then the deputy chief of the section
.
IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the
section chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad 
to make 
the
approach. (IVANOV was not considered to be 
sufficiently ex-
NOSENKO 
arranged 
for
perienced and his English was not good.)
DREW to be compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homo-
sexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad 
officer,
(fnu) PERELETOV. Using the name "Mr. SERGEYEV
," NOSENKO
1
14-00000
124.
alone recruited DREW in an office of the hotel. The KGB First
Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment te-
cause he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly some
in the U.S. Government.
Investigation Results:
Recruitment of
(1959)
NOSENKO's Information: In Jung or possibly July 1959
NOSENKO personally recruited a subject*, T
✓ in a room of the Hole Astoria in Leningrad after
had been compromised by NOSENO's homosexual agents VOL-
KOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.D.2.). The case was then turned
over to Yc. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief of the British De-
NOSENKO furnished
partment of the First Chief Directorate.
no more information on this case and did not know its current
status, but he believed the KGB has not been in contact with
subsequently.
Investigation Results:
j. Recruitment of
(1959)
NOSENKO's Information: By himself NOSEIKO recruited
in the Nova Moskovskaya (now the Bucharest)
had been compromised
Hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after
by either VOLKOV or 7EFRENEW, his homosexual agents (see Part
V.D.2.).
citizen and his case was also
is a
turned over to TARABRINI
Investigation Results:
k.
Recruitment of
NOSENKO's Information:
(1959)
NOSENKO personally and alone re-
cruited the Moscow representative of
NOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals
by saying that, after 1958, the Tourist Department had two
geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK 
citizens
NOSENKO
and the other with tourists from other countries.
was involved in the first of these, "so they assigned them
to me.
•
14-00000.
125.
whose name NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metro-
pol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The
approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's
agents VOLFOV and YEFFUNOV (see Part V.B.2.).
investigation Results:
1. Recruitment of MIRTENS (1959)
MERTENS visited the
NOSENYO's information: When Ga101
Soviet Union in July or August 1959. N
's her buxual agents
VOLECV and YEPREMOV, as part of thear
al assignment to be-
come acquainted with homosexuals (su
4.2.1, accidentally
met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO.
NOSENKO Wote a report of this conct requested authority
to take corpromising photographs in preparation for a recruit-
ment approach, and DUBAS, his chief, that assignal the case to
him: (MERZENS had previously been re espnsability of A.A.
VELITSKIY, another case officer. Photoy he wore taken of
homosexual relations between VOLKOV and RTERS C. two separate
occasions in Moscow. When MENTENS later travelled to Ushgored
he was "arrested" by RGB officers (posing as militiamen) while
he was engaged in relations with a homosexual agent of opera-
tional contact from Classa. NOSENKO arranged by phone to bring
this homosexual to Uchgorod; he did not recall his name,
but supplied CIA with a physical description. (NOSENKO could
give no background on the agent and when asked why not, said
he "wasn't interested.") MERTENS was then brought before
NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approxi-
mately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with MERTENS when
he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR.
said that he had used the name "George" with MERTENS, but he
could not recall what last name he had given him.
Investigation Results:
NOSENKO
NOSENKO explained that the Tourist Department in 1959 had
a section dealing with commercial representatives, which.
was responsible for the man, but had asked NOSENKO's
section for help. "They said they didn't have any agents
or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said,
'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section?
He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange every-
thing for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARA-
BRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report
to him." In this passage NOSENKO seemed to be referring
to himself, although he said he was deputy chief of the
section; the chief of the section at that time, M.A. LEONOV
is not known to have participated in operations stemming
from the homosexuality of the prospective agents..
14-00000"
126.
:
Compromise of BARRETT. (1959)
NOSENKO's Information: Robert MARRETT, a guide at the U.3.
Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, had become friendly 
with the home-
sexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.0.2.), whom 
he
met at the fairground. Although BARRETT was not 
a homosexual
,
VOLKOV succeeded--after a long period of development
--in 
involv
ing him in homosexual acts, which were photographed 
by HGB
As case 
officer 
for
personnel from an adjoining hotel room.
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the
compromise, was present when the photographs were 
taken, and
There 
had been much 
con-
has described the occasion in detail.
plaining among the photographic technicians because of the
amount of time they were forced to spend 
waiting for VOLKOV 
to
succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that 
he "had to
provide them with drinks and treat them well" because "they
The photographs
were a big help" to him in this operation.
were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because
of a general ban placed by SHELEPIN on the recruitment of 
U.S
..
Exhibition guides due to the possible repercussions 
on KHRUSH-
(NOGENKO 
reported
,
CHEV's planned visit to the United States. *
however, that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959
photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961.
This recruitment was carried out by another component of 
the
KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO had nothing to do
with it. **)
Investigation Results:
See the discussion of the WILLERFORD case, below, for addi-
tional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.
** In 1961, shortly before his recruitment, BARRETT had osten-
sibly accidental contact with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV 
in Moscow
.
NOSENKO has not mentioned this.
«ཀུ21གས་€སྐང་འ
14-00000
n.
127.
Compromise of WILLERFORD
NOSENKO's Information: Frederick WILLERPOPD was BARRETT'S
roommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he
was a target of the local G2 organization for the city of
Moscow, which believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had
been collecting materials on him. At the same time and, with-
out knowing of the interest of the local organization, VOLKOV
and YEFREHOV had made WILLERFORD's acquaintance, and NOSENKO
had arranged for compromising photographs of WILLERFORD and
YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. NOSENKO watched WILLERFORD
and YEFREMOV through a two-way mirror and was able to describe
the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising mater-
ial had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the local KGB's
interest in WILLERFORD. NOSENKO's department and the local KGB
unit then made a joint request for operational approval to
approach WILLERFORD, but permission was refused because of the
general ban on recruitment approaches at this time. The case
file was retained by the Moscow KG3 organization, and NOSENKO
did not know whether WILLERFORD has been approached subsequently.
Investigation Results:
Note: There is a similarity between NOSENKO's descrip-
tion of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which
prevented the Tourist Department from taking advantage
of its compromising photography of BARRETT and WILLER-
FORD, and information provided by the earlier defector,
GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN reported that an American employed
at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was
prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual com-
promise during 1959 and 1960. According to information
he said he learned from U.S. Embassy Section case offi-
cer. G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB had photographs of the
American in various stages of a homosexual act, and
there was no question about the recruitment being achieved:
"The only question was to where." At the time, however,
SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGB and was
stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments.
He was shown these particular photographs but decided that
an approach on their basis would be too crude and that
another way should be found. Although SHELEPIN did not
exclude the use of these photographs some time in the
future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against
using them at that time for fear of the propaganda reper-:
cussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed pub-
licly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was
subsequently carried out. The essential differences be-
tween this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN
implied the ban was in effect at least into 1960 and that
GOLITSYN appeared to be speaking of a general prohibition,
14-00000
123.
whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to
the U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park which ended on
4 September 1959.*
*
In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki
Park, Moscow, told
that both the
KGB and the GRU launched an all-out effort to recruit
Americans employed at the Exhibition. All officers at GRU
Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used
by the KGB in an attempt to compromise the Americans;
V.A. GRUSHA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer special-
izing in American operations of the First Chief Directorate)
directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU person-
nel were involved. As a result of this endeavor, "more
than one American" was recruited, and TS
indicated
that the technique of compromise--such as "bed pictures"-
was employed. When questioned on this subject
✓ reported that to handle the Exhibition, the
CPSU Central Committee issued a special directive to form
a committee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was in charge of one
section of this committee) and to which the GRU NIE.
Contributed personnel. Its purposes were two-
fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to dis-
rupt presentations, and to conduct counterintelligence;
and to recruit.
and that the GRU did not recruit
any Americans at the Exhibition.
TOP SECRET
#«n©Fsz «
14-00000
129.
5.
The FRIPPEL Case (1959-1963)
As a member of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO in 1959
personally took part in the recruitment of the American Express
Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued
to be one of this agent's two KGB handlers after transferring
to the American Department in 1960, and FRIPPEL was asked to
report on the U.S. Embassy as well as on two Embassy officials
in particular. FRIPPEL left the Moscow job in 1961 but returned
on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO met him.
The only recruited American whon NOSENHO ever handled as a re-
BG source,
RIPPEL
The accounts
of this operation by NOSENKO and PRIPPEL Glifer in several de-
tails, but both agree that FRIPPEL provided the KGB with no
significant information. These two versions are presented sopa-
rately below.
:
a.
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO first mentioned PRIPPEL luring the third meeting
in Geneva in 1962 while discussing KGB successes in Moscow:
"There was another agent (KGB cryptonym] 'ARTUR. ' He was not
a correspondent. He knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and
my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He was a permanent representative,
not in the Embassy, but of the American Express Company in Mos-
. Cow. PRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPEL. But he also has the cryptonym
ARTUR. He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly
attracted to women. I provided him with beautiful women... Well,
we decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could he give?
He now works in the American Express Company (main office in
New York City]. A new department has now been organized for
the Soviet Union and the People's Democracles. And he is chief
of the department... He is no longer in Moscow, but he was here
two and a half or three years. We hope that he will return.
We are waiting for him to come back. We know that the company
wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian language
very well.
He is, in fact, an emigre, this FRIPPEL. And he
also did a good and intelligent job of establishing relations
with Inturist. He had very good relationships with ANKULINOV,
the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs
and the low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL recruited?
I was interested in knowing precisely by whom, by name, and how
approaches were being made to our delegations (in the United
States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view.
of counterintelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of
approaches are taking place to our people in America and by
whom? This is what interested us. But he didn't know anything.
He couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial infor-
mation, nothing more."
NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been
useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union.
He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this
by other means and launched into a long description of the
methods of covering foreign tourists in the USSR.
NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL was
compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinovna
GORBACHEVA. NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail
as well as the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion pic-
tures of these activities through a two-way mirror, and the
confrontation with the militiamen who broke into the room.
TOP SECRET
ཨམྦྷpptqw: ག ཟ ལཿ ༠ ) ་
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130.
After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent
debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following
additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case:
Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he
did not do so alone; Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief
(and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present;
he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in
early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's
case officer..
-
NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL
recruitment to the following: "In 1953, after 1958,
when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area.
of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the
tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of
the section and I had my own little area--for example, the
permanent representative of the American Express Company,
and besides that I began to collect all the material on
all American tourist firms which have anything to do with
Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR."
-
FRIPPEL never provided any information of value to
Soviet tourist operations.
-
When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy
Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL
with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Ameri-
cans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL
about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George
WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO
anything along this line.*
FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during
NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when
FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.
-
NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL during
the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife,
in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at
FRIPPEL's home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette
FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent,
and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover
for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. Although unusual for
KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents
in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that
he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went "be-
cause he was also involved in the recruitment. "
-
First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist
Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of
the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department,
NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels
and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost
invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time
I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with
See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.S.
Embassy Section.
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14-06000
A-7
131.
In a
CHELNOKOV. Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetings
with FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued
to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, be-
cause they "kept hoping he would give something.
different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO ex-
plained: "You see, never mind if you are a chief or a
deputy chief of a department, you must have one, two, or
three agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget
how to work
. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Director-
ate do not demand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but they
must have two or three. They will have important agents
or those in leading positions."
-
NOSENKO continued to act as FRIPPEL's case officer
after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENKO had
been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy
Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIP-
PEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the
Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foreign visitors.
Both of these meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, with-
out CHELNOKOV.
-
The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962,
after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL
had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some Ameri-
can journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the compo-
sition of the journalist group or to recall where they
stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Sov-
iet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what
questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during
a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged
that standard practice required visiting journalists to
submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing
to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the
interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction
of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader.
NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the
KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were
"satisfied.” Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL,
NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether
any of the journalists might have joined the group at the
last moment in the United States, which might suggest
intelligence connections on their part.*
-
NOSENKO met. FRIPPEL alone for the second and last
time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for
tourists aboard the ship "Olympia,' which stopped for a
day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Mos-
cow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where
the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away
NOSENKO had earlier said on several occasions that one of
the things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroad
were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute
ådditions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signify
intelligence affiliation.
TOP SECRET
'
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**
from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's
hotel room, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had
given FRIPPEL a bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL
said he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return.
They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO
waited in the car while FRIPPED went aboard for the
whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but
could not obtain a pass for him.) When FRIPPEL returned.
he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for
himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three
returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting
drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL reported "nothing of
importance," and his most interesting news was that he
might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as
the American Express Company representative.*
- On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV
paperɛ** in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the following
passage which appeared in the KGB operational plan against
BOWDEN, dated February 1960 and signed by V.A. KUSKOV cf
the U.S. Embassy Section: "He [BOWDEN] showed himself
to be an indiscreet person... Ironically, one day as
though by chance, he (BOWDEN) blurted out to our agent
SHMEDOVA (the fact of "ARTUR's" affiliation with Ameri-
can Intelligence.
NOSENKO confirmed that the "ARTUR"
1: ✰✰⭑
of the CHEKEPANOV papers was FRIPPEL, but he said he
"could not say" whether PPIPPEL had any affiliation with
American Intelligence.
NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been
reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent
would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by
V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal
Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City,
who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of
NOSENKO.
The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part
VI.D.7.c.
There is no other report of BOWDEN making such a remark
and no basis for it. Although never contacted by or
associated with CIA in any way, FRIPPEL during 1960 was
under consideration for operational use in Moscow, and
in this connection background inquiries about him were
submitted to the FBI.
While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly be-
fore his recruitment on homosexual grounds (see Part
VI.D.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached on
ROBERTS and
the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male.
the Soviet, who spoke French, soon became friends, and
the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent
in several operations against French-speaking foreigners
in the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said,
adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an
American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided
much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not mention the
unidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing
FRIPPEL.
التي من المناسبة عيد النه.

14-00000
b.
the Soviet
on
that "if you and n
word in
to ay apartment.
20
PRIPPOL's Information
FRIT PLL,
Express Company reprezenta live
3 Jan
time
made
Sent i
ists."
the ni
Was the American
25 to
See Part III.
which describes NOSENKO's emphatic refusal
during the 1952 meetings to have any contacts with CIA in-
side the Soviet Union. During the October 1966 interrogations,
NOSENKO said that in 1962 he had "absolutely no idea" concern-
ing the possibility of CIA using FRIPPEL as an intermediary
for contact inside the Soviet Union,
14-00000 *
TRIPTEL Iso had so al contact w 1 SENKC's Larget John
NOS
said they did not know
ABIDIAN (see Part V.E.3.3.).
that FRIFPEL was ques-
one another. There is no indication
tioned on these contacts by NOSEIBO and/or CHELNGKOV.
In February 1965 NOSENFO denied that this meeting took place.
Department of State records show th November 
1961 FRIP-
FEL applied for a new passport initing 
that he intended
to depart the United States in February 1962 
aboard the
isit 
the Sovies 
Union.
"Olympia" for a cruise which would
།'''
:
!
14-00000
NOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to
request permission to board the vessel.
In February 1965, NOSENKO did not recall having told FRIP-
PEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done
So,
it was while he was drunk.
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136.
6.
Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963):
As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was involved with Lee
Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his assignment to the
Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955-
1960 and 1962-1964).* While Deputy Chief of the American-
British-Canadian Tourist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hand
in the decision in October 1959 that OSWALD was of no oper-
ational interest to the KGB And should be returned immediately
to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassi-
nation in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the
Tourist Department as its Deputy Chief, he was present at the
time the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned of OSWALD's
application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter
the USSR. After the assassination, he also played a role in
the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence
in the Soviet Union from October 1959 until June 1962.
Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the
Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he
may have had with Soviet intelligence, is meager and indirect.
It derives almost entirely from indications of primary
interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in
every defector to the USSR, and from inferences which may be
drawn from certain entries in OSWALD's "Historical Diary" and
certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during inter-
views on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President
Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United
States with official documents and letters pertaining to
OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his
marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This
information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with
the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by
the Soviet Government make no mention of any Soviet Intel-
ligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD.
In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was
and remains the only such information available on the 32
months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO's access to
For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's
alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in
this part of the paper.
"
** Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD
to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29
September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) con-
tact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet
Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any
such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that
OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO
explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist De-
partment Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head-
quarters from the KGB legal Residency in Mexico. The cable,
which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that
OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting
permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with
Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.
14-00000
གན
U
137.
information on KGB involvement with OSWALD in 1959, at the
time of OSWALD's request to remain in the USSR, derives ex-
clusively from the claimed fact that he, NOSENKO, was Deputy
Chief of the KGB Section"
at that time. He said he
of his position as Deputy
from mid-1952 until 1964. The central theme of NOSENKO's in-
formation, as given to CIA and the PBI, is that the 
KOD
determined as early as 16 October 1959, when OSHAL 
l
first declaration of intent to remain in the USSR, 
that 
ho
was "not normal" and thereupon "washed its hands" of kin
entirely. According to NOBENKO, the AGB had no operational
Interest in WALD and made no attempt to recruit of oven to
debrief him during the time he spent in Moscow and Minsh
or during his trip to Hattico shortly before killing the
President.
dealing with American tourists
knew of later developments becau30
Chief of the Tourist Detriment
ณ. Statements to the F31
his
-mit wt
|:|:|:2ཡཔཔར» -་
14-00000
** OSWALD attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship at the
American Embassy on 31 October, three days after leaving the
hospital. From his diary, the Warren Commission concluded he
received permission to reside in the Soviet Union on a year-
to-year basis about - January 1960, approximately the time
he moved to Minsk.
14-00000
14-00000
110.
ན ཝས ཝཱ, +
NOSENKO Tater told CA on one occasion that he "only
skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his pos-
session about 20 minutes. In October 1956 he again said that
he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of
OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKC. added that he never met
OSWALD personally.
** In October 1965 NOSENKO said he learned that OSWALD was
a poor shot from V.V KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had
been told this while visiting Minsk.
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12
b.
Statements to CIA
On the basis of the FBI interviews of NOSENKO and the
similar information which he had previously provided CIA,
further debriefings were conducted by CIA on 3 and 27 July
1964. New and explanatory information received during these
debriefings is presented below.
(i) KGB Interest in OSWALD
Until CSWALD mentioned to the Inturist guide his desire
to remain in the Soviet Union, he was treated routinely by
the KCB. When OSWALD made his request, this was reported
immediately to the Tourist Department, and it was from this
All
moment that the KGB began to pay attention to him.
available materials on him were thereupon collected and
examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters'
reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a
check of KGB Archives. KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter
to whom OSWALD had stated his desire. Although the KGB con-
sidered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent,
the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as "this
would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the
Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased
after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the
There was
KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions.
no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an inter-
esting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned
From the
on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.**
* NOSENKO provided details on this point to CIA (see below) and
made a similar statement when asked in 1964 why KGB agent
Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own
developmental target) and then emigrate to England; See Part V.D.3.
** When he appeared at the U.S. Embassy to renounce his 
citizen-.
ship on 31 October 1959, OSWALD told the counsellor 
officer that
he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had 
told a
Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any 
information
concerning the Marines and radar which he possessed.
14-00000
༢༩༠༠:༢༠
materials and reports immediately available it was decided
that something was not quite normal about OSWALD, and the
KGB therefore had Inturist tell him that he would have to
leave the USSR when his visa expired. OSWALD's suicide
attempt supported the Tourist Department's feeling that
it had been right in deciding to refuse OSWALD's request
for citizenship, particularly as the hospital also re-
ported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department
decided: "We will do nothing; we don't want to know him."
Inturist was subsequently told: "There is no KGB interest
in him. Do what you want!.. The KGB thought that he was
of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was
not normal, and that he should leave the country." The
Tourist Department and the KGB in general thereupon "washed
their hands" of this matter.
There was never any operational use of OSWALD nor was
there anything in OSWALD's file to indicate that the KGB
attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.S.
Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a
very little person and also it is felt that he is not nor-
The GRU
mal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him."*
Neither was any
was not informed of OSWALD's defection.
attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes
in Moscow or in Minsk. In short, there was no intelligence
interest or contact with OSWALD after the initial assess-
ment of abnormality.
(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD
The KGB had no knowledge or interest in Marina (nee
PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to
register marriage. In fact the KGB did not know that she
was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no
surveillance on OSWALD to show that he knew her. When the
KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the
Archives of the Minsk KGB as well as neighborhood checks and
checks at her place of employment. The people where she
lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple
girl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active
member of the KOMSOMOL. She was a simple "philistine," an
uncultured girl more interested in gossip than in anything
important. The KGB never considered recruiting her as an
informant on OSWALD "because it was considered dangerous to
recruit a wife to report on her husband." Nor was it con-
sidered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the
United States, "because she would tell him and also she
would probably tell the Americans, based on the assessment
of the type of person she was.
"
(iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR
NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties
in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her
departure from the Soviet Union. He replied: "The Soviet
law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner.
It was
* NOSENKO subsequently defined this KGB reservation about
OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable per-
son.
1

14-00000
casy in this case because OSWALD was already living and
working 
in the Soviet Union. It would be more difficult,
of 
course, with tourists or others who are in the Soviet
Union only for a short period and want to marry Soviet
citizens."a 
Asked whether it is not unusually difficult
for Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKO
explained: "In this case it was easier because Marina
was already married to a foreigner." NOSENKO was next
asked what office or level of the Government or Party
must make the final decision regarding Marina's marriage
to OSWALD
. He described the procedure as follows: "They
would 
come to the Regional Registration Office to apply
to register their marriage. [There) they will be told
that they will have to wait a week or two while they think
it over to be sure they want to get married. During this
period the necessary checks are conducted. The Regional
Office would call the Militia, and the Militia would call
the 
Minsk KGB. The Minsk KGB said that it is all right
for them to get married--that the KGB has no objection.
But it 
is the law that allows them to be married.
are no formal approvals necessary."
There
Concerning the decision to permit the couple to leave
the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision
would be made on the local level, in Minsk, and that there
is no need to check in Moscow. On 27 July 1964 he corrected
this statement to say that, while local authorities make
the decision, it must be approved in Moscow by, he thought,
the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP).
(iv) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Embassy in Mexico
Asked whether he had any information on OSWALD's visit
toxico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew only
that 
OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come
to the Soviet 
Union. The Mexico City Legal Residency of the
KGB 
reported his visit to Headquarters by cable, requesting
information
%; this was the first that the KGB First Chief
Directorate had heard of CSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief
of 
Service Number Two (KGB counterintelligence abroad),
thereupon phoned V.K. ALEKSEYEV, Chief of the Sixth Section
of the Tourist Department, whom TURALIN knew personally, to
learn whether 
any information was available. NOSENKO believed
that 
ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. CHELNOKOV or A.G. KOVALENKO
to ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he himself was
present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given the background on
OSWALD, 
including his suicide attempt and the fact that he
was not 
considered normal, and was told to advise the First
Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re-
enter the Soviet Union. 
ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN
to relay 
this message. NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD
had spoken 
at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew
By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had
already 
written 
the American Embassy in Moscow, through Soviet
mails, of his 
desire to return to the United States. The letter,
dated 5 February 
1961, was mailed from Minsk and was received by
the Embassy 
in Moscow on 13 February. The OSWALDS were
married 
on 30 April 1961.
14-00000
contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representativ
of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.
(v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involvement in the
Assassination
When first discussing the OSWALD case with NOSENKO on 23
January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: "It is a very un-
fortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the Soviet
Union."
(NOSENKO apparently misunderstood the case officer's
intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the
assassination, but only that the fact of OSWALD's "defection"
placed the USSR under probably unfounded suspicion.) NOSENKO's
immediate response to this remark was: "That is not correct.
This is putting a false color to it, I am your friend.
I am
completely with you, and I will continue to work with you and
against the Soviet Union in all respects. But the truth
should always remain the truth. No matter how I may hate
anyone, I cannot speak against my convictions, and since I
know this case I could unhesitantly sign off to the fact that
the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way.
I say
this because I know they were frightened of this man [OSWALD]
and that everything should have been said to him or that he
should have been in any way worked on, in any was (by the KGB!
--God 
forbid!... I know this because I sat on this matter for
several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President.
To investigate in detail if anything had been done, particularly
by the local authorities, that is, by the local KGB in
Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and
even sent several workers down there to investigate--not
trusting official papers. Even without specific orders I had
to make a complete investigation on my end of things because
this is a serious matter when the head of a government is
assassinated... If you want to know, it would be a greater
advantage to the Soviet Union if the President were still
Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked
at many things in the eye boldly... In the history of any
intelligence service there have been assassinations of one
kind or another. I can say this: That in our organization,
not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by
the assassination--to think that this should happen in the
twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful
government in the world."
14-00000
Supervisory Responsil lities and Knowledge of Tourist
Operations
Information from NOSENKO
In June 1958 there was a reorganization within the Tourist
Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section,
which had theretofore concerned itself with operational activity.
against foreign tourists from all countries, was broken down into
separate sections; one section dealt with tourists from the United
States, Canada; and Great Britain, the other with tourists from
Europe, Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO said
that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deputy Chief
of the first of these new sections.
NOSENKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey
OSWALD, sters entirely from his having held this position. It
is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all
recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958 until he
returned to the American Department at the beginning of 1960.
His knowledge about recruitments is based additionally, he said,
on the fact that some time between May and October 1959, during
the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV,
GRIBANOV's secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning the
use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations during
the period from 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO gathered this material
from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talk-
ing with various case officers in the department. *
On the basis of his general and supervisory experience in
the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper,
NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department opera-
tions prior to 1960 (taken from the protocol he signed on this
subject on 25 February 1965):
"Operations against tourists were developing slowly
during this period and very little was known by the KGB
about the use of tourism by American Intelligence at the
time I wrote the report in 1959. No agents were definitely
uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or
1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were 'caught in the act'
of mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting.
agents, except one whose name I remember as MCGUIRE. I do
Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he
did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nor
could he recall any examples of the material he included in
it, what the paper said about CIA tourist operations, or what
other U.S. Intelligence organizations were using tourism as
an operational cover in this period. He did remember, how-
ever, that it incorporated statistical data on the growth
of foreign tourism.
14-00000
146.
b.
not know any details concerning the operational activity
which led to the discovery of MCGUIRE's letter mailing.
"I know of no case in which an American tourist was
definitely uncovered as an agent of American Intelligence
and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during
this period.
"I do not know of any such American tourists who were
CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this
period.
"In addition to MCGUIRE, the Seventh Department de-
veloped suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but
didn't learn of any specific intelligence connections.
Some were taking pictures, others were disseminating
literature. Although various operational measures were
taken against them, including vyemka (covert baggage
search) and the use of KGB agents, none of these tourists
received real operational development."
KGB Knowledge from George ELAKE
During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was
held in London, England, between representatives of CIA and the
British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly referred to as
MI-6) on the subject of "legal-travel intelligence operations
against the USSR. At the conclusion of this meeting there was
drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed
at the meetings. This summary spelled out CIA operational doc-
trine pertaining to tourist operations, including agent-spotting
techniques, criteria for agent selection, agent assessment, agent
training, and tasks to be carried out by tourist agents during
the coming (1959) tourist season. It stressed CIA's reliance
on tourists for the spotting, recontacting, assessing, and
communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union.
copy of the document as well, presumably, as other British docu-
ments relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE,
who has admitted having made a photographic copy which he passed
to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of
1959.
A
One Robert Alan McGUIRE, a former staff employee of CIA,
travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and
May 1958. Although he was debriefed on his return, he had
no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and
mailed no letters for CIA inside the USSR. While in the
Soviet Union, MCGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions
by Soviets seeking blackmarket deals., American girls, and
assistance in defecting to the Americans. While en route to
Leningrad, his brief case was overtly searched by a customs
employee, who confiscated a Radio Liberation script. MCGUIRE
reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated
that the script had been confiscated, but the reasons for the
action were left blank. NOSENKO, who has reported none of
these details, appears to have confused McGUIRE with Edward
MCGOWAN, a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August
1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said
MCGUIRE mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959.
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'
A second joint meeting on this same subject took place in
röm 20 to 23#Ap¥£L #1960", "und BEAXE"
Washington, D.C...
mitted providing the KGB with a copy of the 21-page summary of
the sessions.
C.
GOLITSYN's Tourist Document
When he defected to CIA in December 1961, GOLITSYN brought
with him a top secret KGB document dealing with the use by
American Intelligence of tourists for espionage inside the Sov-
iet Union and with RGB countermeasures.** This study relied
heavily upon the two documents supplied to the KGB by BLAKE,
and although it purports to be a study of American tourist opera-
tions during 1960, it cites as examples many cases which occurred
in earlier years. In these examples, the American agents de-.
tected by the KGB are named and their operational roles accurately
described. (As noted above, NOSENKO said that MCGUIRE/MCGOWAN
was the only American definitely determined to have intelligence
connections prior to 1960.) Cited below are excerpts from the
GOLITSYN document, along with additional information from CIA
records and investigations.
The document states: "MCGOWAN, Edward, born 1935, passing
himself off as a post-graduate student of Harvard University,
in Moscow, after a thorough check (for surveillance] sent an
Further investiga-
espionage letter containing secret writing.
tion of MCGOWAN showed that he specialized for a long period of
time on Russian and Polish questions at the Russian Research
He came
Center of Harvard University, which is a branch of CIA.
to the USSR at the expense of ROCKEFELLER and MORGAN, who are
financing the so-called 'Research' work on Russia."
This occurred at a time that NOSENKO claims to have been in
the American Department. During the 1962 meetings in Geneva,
when NOSENKO said he was Chief of the American Tourist Section,
The was asked about BLAKE. He replied only that BLAKE had been
"an agent of the British Department of the Second Chief Direc-
torate" and that he was not nearly as valuable as the Canadian
Ambassador) 12 or "the other Englishman" (VASSALL).
At the time of his defection, NOSENKO said he was First Deputy
Chief of the entire Tourist Department. Asked about BLAKE
after his defection, NOSENKO replied: "Who's BLAKE?" During
the February 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO was first asked
whether the KGB had received any significant information con-
cerning the use of tourism as operational cover by CIA during
1960 and 1961, when he was in the American Department, and
was then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained docu-
mentary information on this subject from an agent source.
.replied "no" to both questions.
In
He
** This document was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow
to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961.
content it is similar to the general description of the docu-
ment which NOSENKO said he himself wrote. NOSENKO said in
1964 that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that
it had been written in the Tourist Department.
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14-00500
During his trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1958,
MCGOWAN mailed in Minsk an operational letter containing secret
writing. In the CIA debriefing upon his return to the United
States, MCGOWAN described a number of incidents in the USSR. On.
20 August 1958, for example, while staying at the Metropol Hotel,
in Moscow, MCGOWAN met Alan BALLARD* and Gertrude SAMUALS, fel-
low Americans, and the three of them were photographed by a sur-
veillance team when leaving the hotel. Within several days of
his arrival in Moscow, MCGOWAN found he was incompatible with
his female Inturist interpreter/guide and succeeded in having
her replaced.. His new guide was V.L. ARTEMOV, who assured that
MCGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit. **
The document from GOLITSYN also states: "SIMARD, Lionel,
born in 1939, a college instructor, expressed an abnormal inter-
´est towards military literature of the USSR; he made contact
with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of ship-
building factories in Leningrad. Later it was recorded that this
'pedagogue', while in Moscow, sent espionage letters containing
secret writing. The letter contained the coordinates of a dead-
drop for an American agent."
SIMARD went to the USSR as a CIA agent in August 1959, and
he believed that he was under complete KGB coverage while there.
He was in and out of Moscow four times during his trip, and each
time he was assigned hotel rooms known to contain various KGB
observation equipment. On one occasion SIMAPD was introduced to
and went out to dinner with Svetlana N. IVANOVA, who attempted
to cultivate him. *** The characterization of his activities in
the GOLITSYN document is correct. NOSENKO has not mentioned
SIMARD.
Another part of the document supplied by GOĻITSYN says:
"An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor
at Michigan University, sent three espionage letters containing
secret writing, while in Kiev. In Stalingrad he was detained
while he was photographing a military factory."
GRAY arrived in Kiev on 3 November 1959 after having been
trained by CIA in countersurveillance and briefed on his letter-
mailing mission and other assignments in the Soviet Union. Be-
tween midnight that night and one o'clock the next morning he mailed
four operational letters. No surveillance was noted during the
NOSENKO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by
BALLARD, but said he was not aware of earlier ones.
:
This is the same ARTEMOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow
case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American De-
partment and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY
case in Geneva in 1962. ARTEMOV appeared again in operations
against American tourists in 1959 when he was assigned as
Inturist guide/interpreter for a group of Americans which in-
cluded a CIA officer. On one occasion, when this officer re-
turned unexpectedly to his hotel from the theater to which
ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his
hotel room. NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of
ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was Deputy
Chief of the section dealing with American tourists. In
October 1966, in answer to a specific question, NOSENKO stated
that ARTEMOV never had any connection with the American Section
of the Tourist Department.
:
NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an agent of the U.S. Embassy
Section of the American Department, but has not described her
earlier activities against. tourists.
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+4-00000
mailings, but GRAY detected surveillance daily thereafter until
he left Kiev and later in Yalta. He was approached on 17 Novem-
ber in Baku by an attractive woman who persistently offered her
services despite his refusal, and on 18 November by a girl in
Tbilisi who occupied a seat next to his in a theater and made
similar overtures. GRAY was also approached by blackmarketeers
and by purportedly disaffected young men. On 13 November he
was arrested in Stalingrad while photographing industrial in-
stallations and was released after interrogation and confiscation
of his film. NOSENKO made no references to GRAY.
-
The KGB document elsewhere states: "A guide of a tourist
group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian
at a college of Yale University; when in Odessa with a group of
tourists--American students--separated himself from the group
and travelled through the city alone. In a notebook which was
lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the
fact that he utilized his trip for the purpose of selecting
suitable places for the placing of deaddrops, or for checking
those deaddrops which were earlier selected by American agents.
In Moscow he selected routes which were used to check and dis-
discover the existence of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards
and following skillful methods. At the present time FRANCIS is
the chief interpreter of the State Department, servicing Soviet
delegations in the USA.
И
FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a
notebook with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not
mention losing his notebook. In 1954 and 1955 FRANCIS was in
frequent contact with V.V. KRIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who
served there until the late 1950's, has been identified as a KGB
First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in
the Correspondents Department, KGB. Second Chief Directorate.*
FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the
year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part
V.D.4.b.). NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did
not recognize his name.
Besides these and other examples in the document GOLITSYN
gave CIA, there are indications of KGB awareness of the clandes-
tine activities of many other CIA contacts who travelled to the
Soviet Union as tourists during the period from 1955 to 1960.
KRIVOSHEY was a participant in the Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON
case to which NOSENKO provided the lead (see Part VI.D.3.c.).
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7
TDY's to London (1957 and 1953)
travel outside
then he was
had been invited
1964, it is
NOSENKO reported that his first offf:
the Soviet Union occurred in the fall of
selected to accompany a group of athletes
to visit London. As he explained on 8 April
necessary for a security officer to accomp
any such dclc-
gation, and the Eleventh Department of the decond Chief Direc-
torate, responsible for recruiting Second Chief Directorate
officers for this purpose, telephoned ... 13, Chief
of the Tourist Department, to request is who spoke
English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether heated to make the
trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been abroad
yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London, using the
alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as "the deputy
chief" of the delegation. He was specifically instructed to
observe one member of the delegation, a woman name. MYARIMYAYE,
whose father had been killed in a Soviet prison and whose
political reliability was uncertain. Additionally, he had
the general task of watching all members of the delegation
for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. The dele
gation consisted of approximately 50 persons and to help him
in carrying out these juties, NUSENKO was assigned three or
four agents and several operational contacts among the dele-
gation members. He was the only staff security officer
making this trip.
The second trip to London took place a year later, in
the fall of 1958, again as a security watchdog. This time
he accompanied a delegation of 11 or 12 boxers, and again he
used the alias KIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy
chief of the delegation. NOSENKO was the only security of-
ficer with the delegation, and he had two agents and two
operational contacts among the boxers. His assignment was
general; nobody in particular was kept under observation,
and the KGB had no derogatory information concerning any
members of the delegation.
NOSENKO has associated his use of the NIKOLAYEV alias
in London with the use of the same name with the British
subjects are and t (see Part V.D.4.d.) shortly before
the first of these two trips. On 17 April 1964 NOSENKO ex-
plained this situation as follows: "With 78
I used the name NIKOLAYEV, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative
of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was
raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to England,
I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV. I was forced to.
And again under the cover of the Ministry of Culture. Be-
cause [of this] I went as the assistant head of the dele-
Egation, representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't
go under my own name because it was decided that when
these people N
XX came back to England, they
would tell who they were with [report their contacts in
the USSR]. They would probably question
as one who used to work in intelligence..
'There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV,
lle was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with
us. So they would say: 'How does he look (what does he
look like]?' lle would say: He looked so-and-so.' So,
especially
would say:
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11
of course, I would go there the same year. I'd go there, and
they would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is
NOSENKO, and yet he is very similar to the one described by
That was why it was decided I have to go again under the name
NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became
known as NIKOLAYEV to the Britishers, this would be noticeable.'
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14-00000
151.
of course, I would go there the same year. I'd go there, and
they 
would look at me and say: 'How come this man--his name is
NOSENKO, and yet 
he is very similar to the one described by th
That 
was why it was decided I have to go again under the name
NIKOLAYEV. 
Just a matter of conspiracy. Since I already became
known as NIKOLAYEV to 
the Britishers, this would be noticeable."
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14-00000
E. January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department)
1.
Introduction
NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the U.S.
Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief
Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days
of January 1962.* This section, in his words, was working
against "the most important counterintelligence target in the
Soviet Union," the permanent American representation in Moscow.
It regarded every American stationed there as a possible spy
and, simultaneously, as a target for eventual compromise and
recruitment.
The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by
NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by Embassy per-
sonnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information
collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees;
and third, to use this information as a basis for planning and
carrying out recruitment approaches. The Americans' personal-
ities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines,
security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the
major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis
for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers
directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants,
including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens
moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with
American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assim-
ilated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their
disposal, and they read and tried to exploit materials from tele-
phone taps and microphones placed in the offices and homes of
the Americans. Each officer had a limited number of American
Cargets and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with each;
annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit
the knowledge they had gained of their target. During 1960 and
1961, NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section
on "identifying intelligence officers at the Embassy and active
development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed
and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions on
the basis of which they can be recruited."
As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had
access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing
was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty
that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans
associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the
Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this
period, and that, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American
Embassy personnel since "ANDREY."** From continuing friendships
with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also
claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the
time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964
trip to Geneva.
In debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed partic-
ular emphasis on his activities during the period January
1960 to January 1962, since this information was of special
importance to U.S. Government security.
See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB
agent "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment has been
variously dated by NOSENKO between the years 1949 and 1953.
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14-00000
:
Meanwhile, no one replaced NOSENKO "Deputy Chief of the
Tourist Department's American Section because (as he explained
on 29 January 1965) the Tourist Department, which had earlier:
operated against members of delegations and various other
categories of foreign visitors; was being reorganized in January.
1960 for work against tourists alone and the Deputy Chief slot.
was eliminated. With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina
RYTOVA, and the homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENKO turned
over all of his agents to another officer in the section named
TIMOFEYEV. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two.
separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file
and an operational file, and that he turned the former over to
TIMOFEYEV. and the latter to V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the
Tourist Department. During later interrogations, however, NOSENKO
has said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S.
Embassy Section and was the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits
to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.**
2.
NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section
This
In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the
American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department,
NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of plans
to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief.
NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in
the Tourist Department: "I was used to it there and wanted to
continue. I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department.
[the transfer/ was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief
of section and would be the same there. But, of course, its more
important there. The American Department is, of course, the most
important. But here I was working against American tourists.
This is also important. Furthermore, I showed had proven my-
self there in '55, 156, 157, '58, and 159 and was considered to
be not a bad case officer. And here, in the American Department,
I must show [prove myself with new people. NOSENKO therefore
asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay.'
DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second
Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to
no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring
NOSENKO were issued.
11
"
On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the
American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report
to GRIBANOV's office. To GRIBANOV NOSENKO again expressed mis-
givings about the change of assignment. GRIBANOV replied that
DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, "had
his own plans and that was all." GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that
There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section,
however; as before, it continued to be responsible for
operations against tourists from the United States,
England, and Canada.
FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO continued to meet him
until he left the Soviet Union in January 1961 and again
when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in
1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.5.
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14-000006
154.
he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the U.S. Embassy
Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention
to operations against American code clerks, the "number one
target."*
Neither GRIBANOV nor KLYPIN told NOSENKO why he had
been selected for this position or who had recommended him for
it.
NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved
upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section. He replied:
"Nobody. He was then asked to identify the persons from whom
he had assumed certain of his duties as Deputy Chief of the
section (these are discussed in detail below). XOSENKO said that
he took the responsibility for maintaining the section file on
the security of the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section,
V. M. KOVSHUK.** Regarding his responsibility as case officer for
the Security Officer of the Embassy, NOSENKO explained that be-
cause former Security Officer Russell LANGELLE had been declared
persona non grata in October 1959 and because his successor John
ABIDIAN was not to arrive until March 1960, no one in the section
had this responsibility when he, NOSENKO, arrived in January
1960. Asked who had been LANGELLE's case officer, NOSENKO re-
plied: "LANGELLE was handled by several people by [A.S.] MALYU_
GIN, then after that by [V.A. KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then
* In late December 1961, GOLITSYN also commented on this subject
to his CIA handling officer: "The task of strengthening of
wor: against the Americans has been a standing requirement,
both in the past and most particularly at this time. This
work was particularly intensified after the appointment of
SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was recommended in the
KGB to intensify the work against the Americans at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other
countries... This question of intensifying work against the
Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB. Thereafter,
there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensifi-
cation of work against the American cipher-clerks."
The
**There is an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's desig-
nation of KOVSHUK as Chief of the First (U.S. Embassy) Sec-
tion in 1960 and information earlier supplied by GOLITSYN.
GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he had with KOVSHUK in
January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.c.2. concerning a
recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORS-
BERG) but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American
Department officer, without indicating his position.
only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was
in the context of questioning concerning KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret
Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956, GOLITSYN said that at this
time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of
the Second Chief Directorate, On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN
identified Vladimir PETROV as Chief of the "section concerned
with the American Embassy of the American Department of the
Second Directorate" in 1960. NOSENKO had identified PETROV
as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department,
which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence
operations inside the Soviet Union..
C
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YPIN. Yes. LANGELLE was before my time. Two months later
on 24 June 1964, NOSENKO stated: "In 1959 and possibly in 1958,
Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the U.S.
Embassy Section. I replaced him in this position in 1960 and
he went to the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department as Deputy
Chief."*
On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for the first
time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the section, had been
the case officer for LANGELLE. Under interrogation in early
1965, NOSENKO added that BAKHVALOV had also been responsible for
At
maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy.
this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKH-
VALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the
file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor. The file continued to
be charged officially to BAKHVALOV; however, even though he was
no longer in the section, and NOSENKO arranged for the official
change of custody shortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E.
3.f.). NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAKHVALOV
had shared responsibility for supervising code clerk operations.
with KOVSHUK before NOSENKO arrived to assume these duties him-
self. NOSENKO had been given a number of opportunities prior
to 24 June 1964 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, but
he did not do so. These are summarized below:
25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern
NOSENKO
Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate.
said: "The Chief of this department is Colonel Artem DAVIDYAN.
He is an Armenian. His Deputy is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV."
27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A.
ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from July to September.
1961 as a member of a trade delegation. NOSENKO immediately
recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief of the Fifth
Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He said that he
did not know this person's last name, but that his first name
and patronymic were Mikhail Fedorovich. When shown the last
name ALEKSEYEV, NOSENKO recognized it as an alias, but pro-
vided no further information concerning his true identity or
earlier service in the American Department.
10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the
names of KGB officers who had received various awards for
their service. He wrote: "The following got either the
Order of the Military Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star,
I'm not sure which: Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of a
section in an unremembered department of the Second Chief
Directorate.
"
18 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list all the
officers who had been assigned to the American Department
for each year since he joined the KGB. He named the chiefs
and deputies of the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 through
1956. When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could
not provide accurate information as to which officers were
assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was
he re-
With reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has
furnished only one other item of information:
ported that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959,
the Israeli Section was transferred to this department
after having been a component of the American Depart-
ment.
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+4-00000
allegedly in the Tourist Department in this period) and could
not describe their functions. On this basis NOSENKO was then
asked to list the officers who had joined the section between.
1956 and January 1960, when NOSENKO said he had returned. He
provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not among them. Asked
to name the officers who had left the section in the same period,
he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV.
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b"
:
14-00000
Duties and Knowledgeability
Introduction..
Shortly after reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy
Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV,
NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN and Section Chief
KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in
the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had already said,
KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single respon-
sibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB
operational activity against American military and State
Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the
other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division
of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for super-
vising operations against State Department personnel and
NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force,
and Naval attaches and their assistants.* NOSENKO was also
made responsible for maintaining certain files in the section.
On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation proto-
col which he agreed contained a listing of his principal
responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It read in part:
"During the entire period in the First [U.S.
Embassy Section, First American] Department in
1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section.
My responsibilities were the following:
-General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section,
Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of
Section in his absence.
-Immediate supervisor for the operational work
against American code clerks. In this capacity I
closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy
GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.
-Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer,
John ABIDIAN.
-For about the first six months of 1960, super-
visor of the work against the offices of the U.S. Mili-
tary, Naval, and Air Attaches.
-I maintained the file on American Embassy security.
-I maintained the log books for the reports sent
to the First (U.S. Embassy) Section by the Operational
Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information
obtained from all the microphones installed in the
American Embassy. I read all the reports and gave the
pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in
the Section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK
or GRYAZNOV.**
*NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for supervising at-
tache operations for the first time in 1965. These functions
are discussed below.
**The final sentence was added at NOSENKO's request at the
time the protocol was signed.
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b.
`-During this period I was the agent handler for
agents 'SHMELEV' 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR' and
'SARDAR'.
"Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618
of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzhershinskiy
Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this of-
fice with me throughout most of this period."
Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section
(i) Access
Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under re-
peated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with
the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he
had access to all information on the section's activities
and was obliged to keep current on this information. On
this basis he has been able to assure his questioners that
the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to re-
cruit Americans assigned to the Embassy in these two years.
NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to
section files and his discussions with section officers made
it certain that there were also no successes from 1953 to
1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964. His statements
'on this subject during the February 1965 were distilled in
a protocol which NOSENKO signed on 20 February (quoted in
full):
"1. As the only Deputy to the Chief of the
American Embassy Section, First Department, Second
Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOV-
SHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my func-
tions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to
assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the
Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform
this function I had the right and the obligation of
knowing the details about every important activity of
the section against the American Embassy and its per-
sonnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from
me.
"12. As Deputy Chief of the Section I know defi-
nitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy
were agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in
any way to the KGB during my service in the Section.
There were no approaches or recruitments made by the
Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962
against personnel of the American Embassy, including
personnel of the State Department, the offices of the
Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department
of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army
sergeants, State Department code clerks and Army code
clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both un-
successful approaches.
*VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Johan PREISFREUND, FRIPPEL, and
respectively, who are discussed in other parts of this
paper.
At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents
he handled in this period; they are discussed below.
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(11)
"3. There were no approaches or recruitments
made against any employees of the United States
Government who were assigned to the American Embassy
on temporary duty during this period. I have read and
understood this report and certify it as correct."
Duties
On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning
his supervisory duties as Deputy Chief of the section, par-
ticularly his function of supervising activity against code
clerks. The transcript of this discussion is quoted here:
Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have
mentioned did you have to devote the most time?
Answer:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
ö
A:
50
I don't know.
What was the most important?
Everything was important.
:
Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy
Section?
GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [Vladimir) DEMKIN, and later
[Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY who worked with DEMKIN.
Then there was [N.A.] GAVRILENKO, [I. Ya.] KURI-
LENKO, and BELOGLAZOV: working with the Attaches.
They were all in the First Section?
Yes.
What were their responsibilities?
⚫ GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks..
DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in
America House, except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY
helped him. GAVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches
and [their] assistants, and also he had the plane
of the Ambassador. He must think about watching
the pilots who were living in a hotel. KURILENKO--
Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy
Attache, assistants, and Marines.
What is your understanding of the meaning of the
word "supervisor"?
Persorally to be at the head, to direct.
So, i
- Nur auspɔnsibilities of supervising all
th work as a ne code clerks, this meant
that
wire tun lead of this work, that you were
directing this work, that you were participating
in discussio s concerning this work, and in these
discussions you were talking about what measures
were necessary.
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Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Interrupting.) When necessary, because there a
little questions which the case officer must de-
cide himself. When it was necessary.
And participating personally when necessary?
Yes.
What sort of case officer questions were you
answering?
All kinds. If I couldn't answer them, if my
authority isn't enough for this, it is necessary
to discuss them with KOVSHUK. I was discussing
with KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with (KLYPIN's suc-
cessor as Chief of the American Department,
S.M.] FEDOSEYEV. Several times, not once, we
Also,
were discussing questions with GRIBANOV.
concerning measures, concerning future steps.
When it was necessary.
What other duties did you have as a supervisor?
Q:
A:
I told you.
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
ở af
ö
A:
When it was necessary I was going
When it
to agent meetings with case officers.
was necessary. Or, besides, I net personally
with "PROKHOR" [PREISFREUND) or
"PROKHOR" was working against STORSBERG, "SARDAR"
against ZUJUS. I was working myself with them.
You personally worked agents "PROKHOR" and "SARDAR"?
Yes.
When did you find it necessary to go to an agent
meeting with a case officer?
Well, for example, DEMKIN would come to me and
say: "You know Ella [ UMANETS, an agent in
America House). Ella said that MORONE had looked
at her and was smiling." This is just an [hypo-
thetical example.... Okay, I am going with him,
hearing Ella myself, (to learn) what happened,
[whether] it is possible to make something or not.
You met Ella and talked with her?
Yes, with DEMKIN. Very, very difficult to say,
why and how we are going. When it was necessary
to go.
As a rule did you try to make it a practice to
visit the agents of the section who were working
against the American target?
Yes, I am telling you. There was such an agent,
Inga [VARLAMOVA]. GRYAZNOV was meeting with her.
But, we
It might be necessary to go to meet her.
knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. And,
you see, they don't like it when a new case offi-
cer appears. But, maybe, for the sake of the file,
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Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
ö
A:
it was necessary to go, to hear her. Not because
you do not believe GRYAZNOV.
No. But, you see,
to hear from the source (emphasized],"directly,
what is going on, and how it is going on, to get
a feeling. Because the source will tell the case
officer, then the case officer will tell you.
Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail,
every intonation. But in some cases, it is neces-
sary to feel this. But, of course, it depends on
the agent, on the target, whether you will go or
not go.
It's very difficult, again, to say.
Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the
section's agents?
No, I can't say.
Fifty per cent or 75 per cent?
I can't answer you.
What about your functions as a supervisor in re-
gard to safehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K. 's".*
Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yavochnaya
kvartira, which I brought from the Seventh
[Tourist Department). It was my own. GRYAZNOV
had his own yavochnaya kvartira. KOSOLAPOV had
also his own yavochnaya kvartira. And not one of
us had a conspirative apartment.
And you took the "Ya.K." from...
(Interrupting.)
Which I had from the Seventh.
And, by the way, when I was leaving the First
[American] Department, I took this file again
to the Seventh.
And not one of you had a conspirative flat.
No, because the section had only--how many?--
[P.I.] MASSYA had one conspirative. [V.P.]
FEDYANIN had one conspirative, and then there was
one conspirative flat, where, in fact, an agent
was living. In the First Section there were
three or four conspirative flats.
But among you, GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV there was
none?
Only "Ya.K.'s".
*A "K.K." 【konspirativnaya kvartira--conspiratorial apart-
ment) is defined by NOSENKO as a safehouse or apartment owned
and maintained by the KGB. A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira--
meeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a tenant who
is perhaps subsidized by the KGB and absents himself when
there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other
activities. The "K.K." is used for more sensitive operational
purposes, he said.

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UPAT
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
in
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
ö
A:
Q
:
Q'3
A:
;
162.
Who kept a record of these three?
The case officers.
Where was your "Ya.K."?
Vorovskogo Street.
And where was GRYAZNOV's?
GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street.
And KOSOLAPOV's?
Don't remember. Don't remember. (Pause.)
It
was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard.
KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. In the region of Arbat
Square.
KOSOLAPOV's.
KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's.
DEMKIN's I don't remember.
And you didn't have any responsibility for super-
vising the activity that went on at these flats?
I don't understand.
Was there some central control of the use of the
"Ya.K.'s"?
What kind of control?
Who would be using them, when they would be using
them, under what conditions?
No.
The case officer who was working with it
decides how to use this flat or how not to use
it, et cetera, et cetera. Besides that, very
often we were using rooms in hotels.
So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational
activity to his "Ya.K."?
He would also meet with his agents, with his
KOSOLAPOV
operational contacts in hotel rooms.
was meeting his agents in his own "Ya.K."; NO-
SENKO was meeting his agents or operational con-
tacts in his own "Ya.K.".
Could GRYAZNOV or KOSOLAPOV ever use these "Ya.K.'s"
without your knowing about it?
"
Of course. It's their own flat.
But you're supervising their work?
Must I keep them like a little, little child?
1
No, no. They don't have to report to me: "Today
I go to meet my agent at my flat."
They can use them whenever they like without checking
with you as supervisor?
Of course, of course. They are meeting their own
agents.
14-00000
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
(111)
You have no idea who they are meeting, or when
they are meeting them?
When they are meeting an active development agent,
they tell me afterwards. They are telling "this,
this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this,
this." But usually they are going to meet maids
or they don't have to report. There is nothing.
active and there is.... The file is going on.
What about operational vehicles?
Automobiles?
You see, we had one automobile for the whole
department. Besides this, we could apply, when
necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second
Chief Directorate and he would give a car, be-
cause he has a number of cars at his disposal.
Approximately how much of your time did you spend
supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?.
I can't say.
Was it the most important function?
Yes, it was important. All work in the First
Section was important. This was the most impor-
tant. But one day I could devote the whole day
to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day,
maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day
I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN,
or I will be having a meeting with surveillance,
or I will be at another place. The third day,
again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it.
No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situa-
tion.
Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence
As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of
NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief
when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled
that he fulfilled this function during KOVSHUK's two 30-day
leave periods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember
when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as
Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when
KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a
week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again..
NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or inspection
trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other
specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent
was for several days in connection with preparations for
President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in
1960.
NOSENKO's description of his duties in KOVSHUK's ab-
Bence was summarized in a protocol which he signed on 3 March
1965:
"I do not remember any particularly important
operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Sec-
tion, nor any unusual things that happened during
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C.
(i)
these times. The only specific responsibility KOVSHUK
had which I handled in his absence was to report to
the Chief of the First Department about all mail going
out of the First Section. I did not meet any of KOV-
SHUK's agents during his absences because there was no
necessity to do so. His only Russian agent whom I
remember was Ilya GLAZUNOV (KGB cryptonym "VRUBEL"],
whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I thick.
only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I remember was the
correspondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only thing that was
different for me as Acting Chief of the Section was
that I had to go every day to see the Chief of the De-
partment.
Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations
Introduction
The
Among the numerous KGB activities against American code
clerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five opera-
tions wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for
recruitment/defection purposes.. According to NOSENKO, none
was successful.. The five major cases are reviewed separately
below, one of them in the context of duty trips abroad by
NOSENKO's subordinate KOSOLAPOV.**
"
NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for
supervising operations against American code clerks, he
found a very "difficult situation. Prior to the assignment
of KOSOLAPOV to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all
operations against code clerks had been handled by A.S. MALYU-
GIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort. there had
beer no operational approaches and no successes. When
*The Edmund STEVENS case is discussed in Part V.C.2.
**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identified KOSOLAPOV's photograph
as that of a veteran KGB officer with whom he was personally
acquainted. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB
in about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a
member of the First [American] Department of the KGB First
Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City;
subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the
First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters. According to
GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB
Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with.
a KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of
1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks
stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added that
KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN's
identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence acti-
vity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and April
1955 he was assigned to the United Nations Secretariat Trans-
lation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an
interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection;
in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to
the United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which describes the
role of NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN in connection with the
KHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless.
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:.
163:
NOSENKO took over the were no active developmental opera-
tdons against code whacks underway, and the only agents or
operational content being used against them were poorly
educated maids and stresses, none of who had accomplished
anything of spott
No foreign agents were ring used
in operations 86-les coderoom personnel, and at the time
NOSENKO had no act of his own in America House, or in
the Embassy, with not be used in these operations.
In January February of 1960 GRYAZNOV was assigned
to the U.S. Ebay tion as a second assistant to NOSENKO
in his code clete fivities. From this point on, NOSENKO,
KOSOLAROV, and ChYAZDY shared the same KGB Headquarters
office (Roca 61a), There all KGB files on American code
clerks, as well files on agents available for work
against them, whored in one large safe, accessible to
all three office 4,
NOSLNKO supervised all of the section's
work along these Hg, and no provocations, compromises,
recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been planned
or carried out that his prior knowledge and agreement
*GOLITSYN_first semeð GRYAZNOV as a case officer of the
American Department, second Chief Directorate, on 31 Decem-
ber 1961. lie bald at that time that he had been personally
acquainted with GPTE/NOV Rince 1945 and that, as of the
spring of 1960, GRZANOV was "working only against code
clerks of the American Embassy in Moscow. GRYAZNOV had
travelled to the d States at some time in the past,
COLITSYN added.
20
"
On
"
5 June 1962 God told CIA that he had been a classmate of
GRYAZNOV during 14 and 1916 at the "SMERSH" counterintelli-
gence school in How; he described GRYAZNOV as a specialist
in operations auxing American code clerks, saying that
GRYAZNOV was "Very Experienced" and had had "some successes.
As an example, held of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the
spring of 1960 wiki he, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S.
Embassy Section of the American Department in connection with
his forthcoming assignment as a First Chief Directorate
counterintelligone officer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had com-
plained to GRYANY that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinki
at the time, and to CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying:
"Maybe we will help you.
According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV
went on to explain that he was handling an agent, a code
clerk in the U.H, Embassy in Moscow, who was about to be
transferred, perhaps to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that the
KGB had received information from this American code clerk
and classified him as a "real agent."
mentioned such an agent (who has yet to be identified) and
has denied that the KGB had any agents in the U.S. Embassy,
at this time. GOLITSYN identified a photograph of G.I. LAPIN,
who travelled with the Maiseyev Dance troup to the United
States and Canada in 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV.
CIA had no prior indication of intelligence activities by
GRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOV
in true name.
NOSENKO has not
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གས་ན་ག་ག་ན་
Pཎཱ ! 'q*t? {*#* ཝཱག༧
when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO went away on a 1918, AN
said, he would have been told about any such activity
his return.
When NOSENKO took over responsibility for paral
on
against code clerks, he read available files on tore And
(11:M
agents, discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, HUMKI &
U.S. Embassy Section case officer responsible for the yaaldents
of America House); GRYAZNOV, and XOSOLAPOV, and reported Ma
findings and recommendations to his superiors, RVS and
In Aglyba
KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result,
ducing a new program for the work of the section, Ma
suggested the use of third-country nationals (batter
and not Sovict) for agent work against code clerig; Tine
with this suggestion, he personally recruited aus, mili
tary officer, H
✓ cryptonym "SARDAR"), and led
(After his first 
fow Visthy
him against the America House.
was specifically targetted against military CAR Hark
Matthew ZUJUS.) Another such agent directly handled by #s
SENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFREUND
figured in the case of the military code clerk Jemen
BERG. NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity buical code
clerks prior to their arrival 
in the USSR and 
Epocifi-elly
proposed that operational measures be undertaken or that
operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the mily
through which most of the code clerks passed on their wNY
to Moscow.
Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the operationa
against code clerks was successful during the two young HH
spent as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Notion. #
did the KGB have any success between January 1962 and Jane
ary 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva.
lle sintaq
that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any successful
had taken place during this latter period.
(11) Approach to STORSBERG
Abprungles
A
From the start of his association with CIA, NOS
emphasized that the primary mission of the U.S, Embassy Hous
tion in 1960 and 1951, during his incumbency as Deputy Chlor
of Section, was the recruitment of an American military rypto-
grapher. He has explained the special stress pinced on this
requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of State Deppiment
code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had brokell Marthin
U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read
messages up 
to and including those classified "secret
had been no such success with American military cipled,
NOSENKO 
also has ample.
remained secure in this period.
hered
there
repeatedly that the KGB had not been able to recruit any Ameri-
can code clerk, either State Department or military. Huring
the years since the recruitment of "ANDREY" in 1953.
*See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY" GADO,
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OP SECRET
167.
RC-
On the several operations against military code clerks
which NOSENKO has described and in which he has claimed a
personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given
In 1962 NOSENKO said
to the case of James Harry STORSBERG.
that, in line with GRIBANOV's instructions that he pay parti-
cular attention to code clerk operations, he devoted most of
his time for almost a year to the STORSBERG operation, and
played a personal role in the unsuccessful KGB approach; he
described in the first person his conversation with STCRSBERG.
During the 1964 to 1966 period, NOSENKO denied not only that
he had personally participated in this way but also that he
had ever claimed to have done: he continued to say, however,
that he supervised the operation from beginning to end.
cording to NOSENKO, this operation got under way with the re-
cruitment of a third-national agent (Johan PREISFREUND, a
Finn) some time in the first half of 1960, The specific aim
in using this agent was to involve STORSBERG in compromising
activities, which would then form the basis for the approach.
The operation dragged on through 1960 and until the spring,
SKVORTSOV, a KGB
summer, or autumn of 1961; at this time N.S.
officer, was introduced in the guise of a wealthy French busi-
nessman to continue the development of compromising informa-
tion. PREISFREUND was then withdrawn from the operation,
Several weeks later STORSBERG was approached. principally on
the basis of his financial need, but he rejected the KGB bid
and the operation was over. NOSENKO was certain that STORS-
BERG had not reported the approach and said that the KGB would
use this fact as an additional element of pressure should
STORSBERG again be posted outside the United States.
also knew that GOLITSYN had reported to CIA concerning KGB
modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFREUND's part in
it.
NOSENKO
GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about
PREISFREUND having been used by the KGB in an operation against.
an American stationed in Moscow. Contrary to NOSENKO's infor
mation, he said that this American had been approached--and
recruited--by the KGB at the end of 1960,
AC-
A second item from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORS-
BERG operation": GOLITSYN told of learning in the spring of
1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Mos-
cow to the point that recruitment was virtually assured.
cording to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks
were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior
William S. HURLEY, the military communications officer who
NOSENKO has
additionally performed cryptographic duties.
said that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, and
·HURLEY has reported no approach.
!
In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO
on this case, the FBI and Army Intelligence have interviewed
STORSBERG (who confirmed NOSENKO's account and denied recruit-
ment) and CIA has talked to the KGB agent PREISFREUND (who
also generally confirmed the information given by NOSENKO
but did not know the outcome of the case). The results of
these interviews. together with information from GOLITSYN and
✓ from other sources, are summarized in this order below.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TAKAN
16
January 1960:
Early 1960:
Summer 1960:
Early 1961:
About May
1961:
June 1961.
STORSBERG arrived in Moscow (this date was
supplied by the interiogator and was accepted
by NOSENKO as accurate, which it is).
PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. (This
was consistent with earlier statements, and
NOSENKO had always said he first met PREISFREUND
a week or so after his recruitment, On 21 Octo-
har 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and
PREISFREUND first met in the middle of 1960,
in the summer of 1960. He subsequently stayed
with the general date mid-1960')
PREISFREUND first supplied a woman to STCRSBERG.
Compromising photographs of STCRSBERG and a
Sovist female were first obtained at the Hotel
Peking in Moscow,
PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the operation
and SKVORTSOV, alias MICHAUD, was introduced.
(NOSEIKO dated this by saying it was about
three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)
་་
Unsuccessful KGE approach to STORSBERG in the
Leningrad Hotel, MosNOW. (Earlier on 20 October
1966 NOSENKO had said that the approach was made
"a ronth or a month and a half before STORSBERG
left MosCOW. Told that STORSBERG was reassigned
in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach
was in June 1961, 1.e.. five months before
STORSBERG's departure date. STORSBERG has re-
ported that the approach was in October 1961;
see below.)
NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSBERG case later
in the October 1966 interrogations. He asserted on 21 October
that he had first met PREISFREUND in the summer of 1960 and
that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity
after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG. He saw PREIS-
FREUND most recently. he said. in Moscow during 1963. NOSENKO
also explained how PREISFREUND first came to know his true
name: Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only
by first name and patronymic. Yuriy Ivanovich, on one occasion,
however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in
Moscow and "lost his KGB certificate there. Thereafter
PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO, On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO
repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was
the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he
may have reported casually on other Americans he met during
his visits to America House. For the first time he specific-
ally named GRYAZNOW as the case officer holding the operational
file on STORSBERG. He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO,
supervised the operation against STORSBERG.
TEP GARLST
14-00000..."
STORSBER
14 and 18 September
1964 in connection
tified on the
had not been iden-
Official records, indicate that Jis was transferred from
Moscow to Lisbon, Portugal, in August 11. If these records.
are correct, STOPSPERC could not have seen MORONE with MICHAUD
on this night in October 1961.
14-00000
This is in reference to NOSENKO's statement that PREISFREUND
involved STORSBERG in speculation which 
PREISFRUEND also
claimed; see also GOLITSYN's second 
lead, discussed below
.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
179.
pe
(c)
Information from PREISFREUND
CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in.
Helsinki. (NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND
would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.) During this
first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly identified photo-
graphs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG. He maintained, how-
ever, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly
on a business level, that he had never had anything to do with
the KGB, and that he did not know what the initials "KGB" stand
for. Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that
he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity against
STORSBERG and agreed to tell the "entire truth" the following day.
On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been caught
in a blackmarket operation in Moscow and was, on this basis, re-
cruited by KOVSHUK "either at the end of 1959 or early 1960."
Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who
explained that KOVSHUK was unavailable and that the KGB wanted
him, PREISFREUND, to arrange an introduction between STORSBERG
and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general.*
PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two
months later, he took STORSBERG to the Peking Restaurant, where
the introduction was effected. PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina,
and another girl then went to PREISFREUND's hotel, where STORS-
BERG and Irina were intimate.
PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain
his recruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or
April. At the time KOVSHUK had refused to explain what the KGB
wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it
later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to
undertake anything detrimental to Finnish interests; nor did
KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND,
telling him only that the KGB would know where to find him.
PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions,
but no contacts were made. Just as he was beginning to believe
that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at
his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow. Asked to explain his
earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks
after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember
exactly how long it was, but that it was definitely on another
trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later.
:
He
PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG.
first replied that it had been at America House and recalled.
that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;"
it was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to
strike up an acquaintance at the bar. On second thought, PREIS-
FREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in
the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaint-
ance. Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made
repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG to
the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more
demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB. PREISFREUND added:
According to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA, an
agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was handled by A.V.
SUNTSOV.

14-00000..
son
"Both NOSENKO and KOVSHUK used to make all sorts of promises to
me about helping me out in my business and so on, but they never
did a damn thing for me. On the contrary. The only promise they
kept was that I would not be asked to do anything except the
STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn't help me
at all."
PREISFREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introduc-
ing STORSBERG to Irina as NOSENO wished and the three of them
returned to PREISFREUND's hotel room on a summer evening. PREIS-
FREUND slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina
shared his bed. He told his CIA interviewers on 10 July 1965
that at one point during the evening he caught a glimpse of
NOSENKO in the corridor wearing a rubber apron and from this de-
duced that NOSENKO had been taking surreptitious photographs of
STORSBERG and Irina together.* On orders from NOSENKO and KOV-
SHUK, it was the last time he saw STORSBERG.**
Toward the end of the 10 July 1965 mooting PREISFREUND
said that about six months elapsed between his recruitment and
the beginning of his involvement with. STORSBERG. "The job," he
said, "dragged out a long time." He reaffirmed that this was
the only operation in which he participated and that he nad
told to the best of his ability all he knew of it. He admitted
that he was a heavy drinker and said that for this reason he
could not be sure about his dates. PREISFREUND added that he
would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other
services for the KGB.
PREISFREUND was shown COLITSYN's photograph and remarked;
"Was he here [in Finland]? I don't know him." Shown the photo-
graph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited
a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and
that this person may have been asong them. When given the name
KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and
told that it was an alias, PREISFREUND asked whether KLIMOV had
signed visas. He was told this was correct and was asked for
the true name. PREISFREUND replied: "GOLUB? Yes?"
At the close of the 10 July 1955 meeting, PREISFREUND men-
tioned to his interviewers that he was planning to travel to
Leningrad by automobile with his family for about five days,
beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from
his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnel there
that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in
NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forth-
coming trip.*** He said that he was particularly concerned about
NOSENKO has not mentioned this.
PREISFREUND could not date this occasion precisely; he said
it was probably before the time he accidentally caused a
fire in a Moscow, hotel, which was in 1961..
liaison
An official
service has advised CIA that in discus-
sions with V. Ya. CHEKALOV, the Chief of the KGB Ninth
(Guards) Directorate
& repre-
sentative of that service was asked by CHERALOV for whom
PREISFREUND was working during his frequent visits to the
Soviet Union. CHEKALOV told the representative of the
service that PREISFREUND is considered to be an agent:
of American Intelligence.
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181
what his response should be if the KGB accused him of confessing
to American Intelligence and asked his interviewers to brief
him in this regard. During the final CIA meeting on 13 July
1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation
was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all.
Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Sov-
iet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July
1965.
TOP SECRET
:
14-00000
TOP SECRET
(d) Information from GOLITSYN
192.
GOLITSYN, who had served the KGB most recently as a counter-
intelligence officer in Helsinki during 1960 and 1961, reported
separately two possibly related leads to operations against Am-
erican personnel assigned to the United States Embassy in Moscow.
One of these was a developmental operation against a military
code clerk which the KGB felt was almost certain of success, the
other a recruitment approach to an Embassy employee which GOLIT-
SYN was told had been successful. GOLITSYN learned these two
items of information from different KCS Second Chief Directorate
officers at different times.
GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads on 23 December
1961, when he reported information he said he learned during
conversations with his personal friend GRYAZNOV at KGB Head-
quarters in Moscow some time between April and July 1960.* At
that time GOLITSYN was visiting the American Department of the
Second Chief Directorate in connection with his preparations
for assignment in Helsinki as a First Chief Directorate counter-
intelligence officer. GRYAZNOV told GOLITSYN that he, GRYAZNOV,
had personally prepared an operation involving an American mili-
tary code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure"
that the recruitment approach to this code clerk would be suc-
cessful. GOLITSYN subsequently narrowed the time of his conver-
sation with GRYAZNOV down to "April or May 1960" and quoted
GRYAZNOV as saying that the KGB "is certain that the recruitment
is prepared and will be successful." GOLITSYN also said that
the recruitment plan for this operation "evidently involved a
woman, but could provide no further details. During these same
talks, according to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although the
KGB had earlier recruited U.S. Department of State code clerks
in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk
in the office of the American Military Attache since the estab-
lishment of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department
(in the 1940's).
"
GOLITSYN reported on the second operation on 26 February
1962, while discussing the KGB agent PREISFREUND. GOLITSYN
said that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the
Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application
for travel to the USSR. On several later occasions, GOLITSYN
said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes.
According to GOLITSYN, PREISFREUND had been used in the recruit-
ment in Moscow of at least one American who "could have been a
code clerk or a diplomat." He also knew that the recruitment
had been accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that
PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow,
had helped to set up the target for the recruitment approach
by involving him in speculatory activities and by arranging his
introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought
that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after "he had helped
to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in
According to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at
this time. NOSENKO did not recall visits by GOLITSYN to the
U.S. Embassy Section in 1960.
1
14-00000
183.
ΠΕΤ
the approach, which was made by KGB officers. During an inter-
view by the FBI on 18 June 1962, GOLITSYN
This second lead, GOLITSY: said, stemmed from his conversa-
tions with KOVSHUK whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of
-the American Department, * while GOLITSIN was temporarily in Moscow
during "December 1960."** GOLITSYN related that he had visited
the American Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND
operationally in Helsinki. This request was refused with the
explanation: "You see, he (FREISFREUND) helped us in one recruit-
ment now, and it is necessary to be careful for about six months
* GOLITSYN could mean either Pomoshchik (assistant) or Zamestitel'
(deputy). The CHEREPANOV papers show that KOVSHUK was Deputy
Chief of the Department as late as 1959. NOSENKO said that, as
a result of a drinking incident, KOVSHUK was demoted from De-
puty Chief of the American Department to Chief of its American
Embassy Section in 1959 and held this position until early 1962.
GOLITSYN said he had known KOVSI:UK for about ten years and
characterized him as a capable officer with about 15 years of
KGB experience, at least ten of them in the American Department,
Second Chief Directorate. In about 1956, according to GOLITSYN,
KOVSHUK was handling KG3 agent Henry SHAPIRO. CIA records show
that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Moscow and Wash-
ington phases of the "ANDREY" case (he was identified by Dayle
SMITH; see Part VI.D.3.b.) and in the development in Moscow of
CIA officer George WINTERS (who identified his photograph; see
Part VI.D.7.c.). According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK took personal
part in the recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, in the
approach to Army Attache Walter MULE, code clerk Louis MANNHEIM,
State Department Officer Richard HARMSTONE, and code clerk
James STORSBERG, and in the interrogations of CIA officers
Russell LANGELLE and Richard JACOB.
**GOLITSYN's passport and travel records held by CIA confirm that
GOLITSYN travelled only twice to the Soviet Union after his
arrival in. Helsinki on 20 July 1960. The first of these trips
was on 19 January 1961, when he flew directly from Helsinki to
Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28
January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from
9 to 15 April 1961, when he appears to have spent all or most
of this period in Leningrad. A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN
had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with
GOLITSYN in Leningrad on a daily basis from 10 through 13 April
1961. Moreover, GOLITSYN has never mentioned being in Moscow
during this time. Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from
April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that
he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversa-
tions in the American Department and that he learned of the
second lead some time during the week of 19 January 1961. This
is the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times
in 1962 and subsequently (see above). NOSENKO has always
maintained that he was out of Moscow on leave at the time of
GOLITSYN's visit and that this was in the summer of 1961. When
he was told in February 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow. in:
January 1961, NOSENKO replied that CIA was either wrong or
was attempting to deceive him. NOSENKO declined to change.
his story of the summer leave.
KEP SECRET
14-00000.
184.
(e)
Information from other Sources
Information available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of
the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared
a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that
,
except for overlapping assignments during periods of turnover,
there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the
This military code clerk 
was
Embassy at any particular time.
responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all
three military services. In practice, at least one other mem-
ber of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic
clearance and has been trained and has performed the function
of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the
latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to per-
form his functions for other reasons.
STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the
Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett
HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his 
successor
,
Mathew ZUJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow 
in
January 1960 and departed in November 1961.
3
During the period of STORSBERG's tour in Moscow, back-up
cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communica-
tions Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed 
these duties on
a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to
Addi-
STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.*
tionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines
and directed certain other sensitive activities at the 
Embassy.
HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before STORSBERG's, in
December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.
The only other person performing official functions in the
military code room during the 1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS,
who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was 
assigned to
As a concurrent
the office of the Air Force Medical Officer.
secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the
office of the Air Attache. From February until mid
-April 
1961,
as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code
room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer.
He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons 
of low
Although NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's func-
tion as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as "
mili-
tary code machine mechanic," he said on one occasion 
that
he considered both to be within the general category of
"military code clerks.* NOSENKO reported that there was no
KGB operation against HURLEY.
zwe ཐཱ བྷཱ ཝཱ ཙ
14-00000
TOP
185.
aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from
Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*
:
NOSENKO has described an operation against KEYSERS (see
below), but because of the date of KEYSERS' arrival in Moscow,
he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLIT-
SYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available
information, it appears that the subject of this lead must
have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military
code clerks" in Moscow in the spring of 1960. The subject
of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STORSBERG, HURLEY,
or,
in fact, anyone else at the Embassy, although GOLITSYN
suggested that he might be a code clerk and might be a mili-
tary man. By his statement that there was no KGB operation
against HURLEY, together with his description of the opera-
tion against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and
his (and PREISFREUND's) assertion that PREISFREUND took part
in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--
NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were
to the STORSBERG operation, which ended in failure. This con-
flicts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved
in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are
also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads
as regards the progress of the operation. GOLITSYN reported
that recruitment of a code clerk was "99 per cent" assured
in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISFREUND describe
an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that
time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the
operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in
late 1960; NOSENKO reported that the only operation in which
PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to
STORSBERG in "mid-1961" or, on other occasions, in "autumn
1961.'
"
14-00000
TOP SECRET
(iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases
(a)
Introduction
According to NOSENKO, the U.S. Embassy Section officer
KOSOLAPOV travelled only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at:
that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying--together
with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul
Prancis JENNER, by train to Moscow. (The KGB later learned
that JENNER was not a code clerk but a pouch clerk who also met
couriers at the Moscow airport, NOSENKO said, and this KGB iden-
tification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S. Department
of State files.) The report by NOSENKO on KOSOLAPOV is contra-
dicted by two sources, travel records available to CIA and the
KGB defector GOLITSYN.
Statements made by JENNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those
of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young Soviets,
a man and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later
JENNER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport. Never-
theless, travel records contradict NOSENKO's statement that
KOSOLAPOV was the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the
24-hour journey.
Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single
TDY to Finland, in early 1960, travel records show that KOSOLA-
POV (under a different identity) went to Helsinki in both the
spring and fall of 1960. Travel records on the second Helsinki
TDY by KOSOLAPCV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne
out by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay
the groundwork for a future relationship in Moscow, accompanied
a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November
1960, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1961. Again on
the basis of travel records, it has been determined that on
16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an American
code clerk named John W. GARLAND on the daily train from Hel-
sinki to Moscow.
The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is
divided into three parts: KOSOLAPOV's false identity for
travel, the early 1960 TDY, and the November 1960 TDY. Each
part incorporates the information from all sources, including
NOSENKO.
(b) False Identity for Travel
Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm' on 19 Febru-
ary.1928.
According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich
KOLOSOV, born in Perm' on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from
31 March to 2 April 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 November 1960,
and in Denmark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965,
Johan PREISFREUND (see Part V.E.3.c.ii.on STORSBERG operation)
identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB offi-
cer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow
"
NOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in
1961 to recontact the YOUNGERS, an American man and wife who
were arrested for espionage and recruited by the KGB while
touring the USSR in 1961 (see Part VI.D.2.).
TOP SECRET
14-00000
in the fall of 1964 to ask whether he knew anything about NOSENKO'8
defection. Shown KOLOSOV's photograph in October 1966, NOSENKO
immediately identified him as KOSOLAPOV.
NOSENKO told th
Subsequently CIA pré
protocci, which NOSENKO read and signed, corroborating its accu-
racy. This protocol reads:
'
"I do not know about this trip of KOSOLAPOV's to
Helsinki in November 1960. I do not know that he
accompanied a coic clerk back to Moscow at that time.
"I was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January
1960 to January 1962 and would have to know and approve
any operational travel by KOSOLAPOV outside the USSR.
In the case of his trip in March 1960 to Helsinki to
accompany Paul JENNER, I talked with him about it, and
then approved after he wrote it, the cable to the Hel-
sinki residentura (Regal Residency) informing them of
his mission, and of course received his report after
the trip.
"Normally, I would know about and approve this trip
in advance. If I were away at the tire, normally I
would have heard about the trip upon 1 return. How-
ever, I don't remember anything about this trip either
before or after KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki. If there
were further developments in this case, I certainly
would have known about them."*
(c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER Case)
NOSENKO first mentioned a TDY by KOSOLAPOV in an interview
by the FBI.
NOSENKO reminded his Interviewer that he had travelled to
Cuba in November 1960. He was told that CIA travel records
show that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba
from Moscow on 15 November 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV
arrived in Helsinki. NOSENKO was then asked if he would have
learned of the trip in any case, whether or not he was in
Moscow, and he stated that he would have….
TOP SECRET
14-00000
188.
NOSEN O was interrogated by CIA on the JENNER case on
On the basis of this interrogation, a proto-
15 February 1955.
col was drawn up in question-and-answer form, incorporating
NOSENKO's responses, and on 19 February 1965, NOSENKO signed
The following is 
taken
the protocol, attesting to its accuracy.
from this signed statement:
Question: Did you supervise the work against JENNER?
NOSENKO: Yes.
Question: Did you read the file on JENNER?
NOSENKO: I don't remember.
Question: Did you read reports on JENNER?
NOSENKO: Yes, I read materials on JENNER, everything which
came into the section on JENNER 
and the other code
clerks.
Question: Did you ever see JENNER personally?
NOSENKO: Yes. We had his anketa (visa application].
Question: What was the operational plan on JENNER?
NOSENKO:
Before his arrival we had only the anketa, nothing
more. He was listed as secretary/archivist,* and
there was a date on this anketa which was the date
he was due to cross the Finnish border--the middle
of the month, the 15th. It was the beginning of
1960, not long after I had arrived in the First
Department. We decided to create an active opera-
tion. We knew the date, and we thought he was to
The position of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in
in Moscow was usually occupied by a code clerk, 
but as 
pre-
viously stated, this was not true in JENNER's 
case.
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14-00000
Question:
NOSENKO:
be a code clerk. We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Hel-
sinki with the mission of returning with JENNER on:
the same train, during which time KOSOLAPOV was to
study his behavior. JENNER was young and so was
KOSOLAPOV.
How old was JENNER at the time?
I don't know. We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina,
I think her
to Vyborg as part of this operation.
first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last
name; her code name was "SOLISTKA"... She was placed
on the train in Vyborg as if she had been visiting
The main
someone there and was returning to Moscow.
idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he
even arrived in Moscow. We wrote a proposal to the
Chairman of the KGB giving the reasons for doing this.
We explained that we had usually only one year in
which to work. The agent "SOLISTKA" met JENNER and
spoke with him. KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted
with JENNER and spoke with him, but I can't say that
they were all speaking together at one time.
gave JENNER a telephone number.
She
Question:
A KGB telephone number?
NOSENKO:
Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but
he didn't call her. We then noticed that he wasn't
O.K.,
working in the code room but in the mail room.
that was interesting too. We waited one or two
months for the call to come, but nothing happened.
When JENNER once went to the railroad station or
airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with
GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet
again. JENNER saw her but did not approach [her].
Instead, he turned in the other direction. Only
later did we learn that he is a very quiet person.
There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a
suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but
there was no proof. He was like a child.
Question: How much time did you have between the time of the
anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER's arrival?
A month, plenty of time to prepare.
NOSENKO:
Question: A month?
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Well, approximately a month. The usual approval
from the Central Committee was necessary so that
KOSOLAPOV could go abroad.
Who wrote this?
I prepared the kharakteristika (official form) on
KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel
Office.
Question: Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against
JENNER?
TOP SECRET

14-00000..
190.
WOSENKO: It was the idea of the group.
Question: Did you advise KOSOLAPOV on what his role was to be
before he left--what he was to do?
NOSENKO:
I was discussing this case with GRYAZNOV and KOSO-
LAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the
day before KOSOLAPOV left.
Question: Was "SOLISTKA" an experienced agent?
ROSENKO: She had been working before 1960, but I don't know
for how long.
Question: Who handled her before GRYAZNOV?
NOSENKO: I don't know.
Question: How did you coordinate this trip of KOSOLAPOV's with
other units, for example, with the 
[KGB) First Chief
Directorate (FCD)?
NOSENKO:
KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying that he was coming
for two or three days.
Question:
Did you approve this cable?
'
NOSENKO:
I didn't sign it, but I read it, and then we took it
to KLYPIN for his signature. Once it was signed,
KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second [European] Department,
FCD.
Question: What cover did KOSOLAPOV use for this trip?
NOSENKO: I don't remember.
Question: What name did KOSOLAPOV use?
NOSENKO: I don't remember if he used his own name or another.
Question: What other correspondence was there?
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
Correspondence?
What other cables or letters were sent to or re-
ceived from the Helsinki Rezidentura [Legal Resi-
dency of the KGB) concerning this operation, KOSOLAPOV's
trip?
Only this cable, nothing else. KOSOLAPOV was to dis-
cuss with the Rezidentura the possibility of obtaining
their help in Helsinki with the work against code
clerks, to see what agents they had, or to study the
situation, the possibilities. We wanted to use agents
against the code clerks in hotels and 
restaurants,
to use girls...
With whom was KOSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki?
TOP SECRET
14-00000
NOSENKO:
Question:
He spoke with the Resident and the Deputy Resident.
He discussed this question with them and they said
they would see about it, but we were told that the
Residency has more important questions.
What was more important than the work against code
clerks?
NOSENKO: They didn't tell us.
Question:
NCSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what
was so important?
Code clerks in Helsinki would be more important for
them; this is the work of the FCD.
How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to recog-
nize him and make contact?
KOSOLAPOV had his photograph, knew his name, and
with the help of the Residency, I think, they found
out at the railroad station who was going on the
train. Then they bought a ticket on the same train
for KOSOLAPOV. We knew JENNER must cross on the
15th.
Question: When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki?
NOSENKO: I don't know.
Question: When did he return?
NOSENKO: I don't know, don't remember.
Question: How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all?
NOSENKO: About one week, not more than one week counting
travel time.
Question:
How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki?
NOSENKO: By train, both ways.
Question: Was he alone on the way down or did someone go with
him?
NOSENKO: He was alone.
Question: How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA" to board the
right train?
NOSENKO:
GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone to Vyborg and had the
local KGB officers there meet her and place her on
the correct train. They knew the date and would
establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV was on that train
before placing her aboard...
Also on 15 February 1965 NOSENKO made the following addi-
tional statement not included in the protocol: "The agent was
'SOLISTKA. She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960. GRYAZ-
NOV briefed her for the mission... KOSOLAPOV wrote a report on
TOP SECRET
1
14-88003
his trip. Nothing unusual or interesting in it. 'SOLISTKA' also
I gave a report to GRYAZNOV, but there was nothing there, either.
NOSENKO was questioned on 20 October 1966 about his respon-
sibility for and knowledgeability of KGB operations against
American code clerks. He was required to give only brief answers,
without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions.
and his answers were as follows:
Question: Did you supervise all code clerk operations in 1960
and 1961?
NOSENKO: Yes.
Question: Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV your subordinates during
this period?
NOSENKO: Yes.
Question: How many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in
order to travel to Moscow on the train with Ameri-
can code clerks?
NOSENKO: I know of one.
Question: When was that?
Which one?
NOSENKO: Don't remember. 15 March or April 1960.
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
Which code clerk?
It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was found
that he worked with the mail. He came as a secre-
tary/archivist and the First (U.S. Embassy) Section
thought he is a code clerk. Found out later that he
worked on the mail.
JENNER?
NOSENKO: Yes.
Question: Do you know of any others?
NOSENKO: No. What do you mean?
Question: Only one?
*NOSENKO: Only one--JENNER.
Question:
Was the operation successful?
NOSENKO: No it wasn't successful. But it was interesting.
It was the first try to send an officer to Helsinki
:
Question: When did it happen?
NOSENKO:
First part of 1960. I think approximately 15 March
or April.
*
Question: Other than the trip to meet JENNER, did KOSOLAPOV
make other trips abroad?
TOP SECRET
14-00000
NOSENKO:
He went to Copenhagen to meet this couple (the YOUNGERS]
and was in the United States at one of the General
Assemblies. That's all. That was in the '50's.
others.
Question: Did KOSCLAPOV personally meet JENNER?
No
NOSENKO: Yes.
Question: Did you read his report of this meeting?
NOSENKO:
Yes.
When on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photo-
graph fo: the first time, the following discussion ensued:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Do you know the person in this photograph, number 17
[Viktor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, employee of Vneshtorg,
born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSR]?
KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer
From
of First Chief Directorate, First Department.
'59, the end of '59, case officer of the First Depart-
ment, Second Chief Directorate.
Question:
We have information that a Viktor--
NOSENKO:
(interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich.
Question: Anything else you want to say about the name?
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
KOSOLAPOV.
Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March
of 1960 under cover of Vneshtorg, does that mean
anything to you?
I was telling you that there was trip when he was
returning with Paul JENNER.
JENNER, the code clerk?
He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as
a code clerk. He was working with mail.
Question: Well, according to official records he arrived in
Helsinki by train from Moscow.
NOSENKO: Yes.
Question: On the 31st of March 1960.
NOSENKO: Yes.
Question: And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the
train with him. Right?
NOSENKO:
'60 or 61.
I'm
I was thinking and I'm not sure.
not sure. '60 or '61. I'm not sure. I'm not sure
'60 or '61. I was telling '60, but I'm not sure.
I know he was in
Anyway, I cannot tell exactly.
Helsinki, that he was going to Helsinki.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
Finnish Travel Manifests for 31 March and 2 April 1960 (See
Part V.E.3.c.iii)
S
kustajale, p
Junalla
----
Jewer, Fax Pri
Me
032 -lb.,
T
5. LES
31 March 1960
Louble matkastajista, k
Junella
Sub
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Sp
Visi
Sickinta
Esurpilia, Boris
Kolos. Viktor
25 Kazzalaiseth
19.04.23 Teen
konttoristi76.6.19 | Krizan
12.03.27 :111a
Koren, You are amestymies
Laticalkke:
26.11.24 Joensu
● Limes, Kirsti Kellin Irsenal.apal 24.07.23 Jyvistys
Tyyne Kyllized roure 03.07.21
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mor.stat. 13.12.16 Sa
Jarvis Laze Juvanston:7.01.34
Busimm„ Judith Joserio✓
0.
toto.. 03.03.15 :
April 1960
SECRET
TOP SECRET
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Table.
1. st.
Sesun
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Joensun-lbst, also
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[15pv.viis.)
:
14-00000
TOP SECRET
194.
Question: It's 1960. He made a trip in 1950, in March, to
Helsinki by train using this name, KOLOSOV, and us-
ing this cover, Vneshtorg, and we also have a report
from official Finnish sources that he left Helsinki
by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow.
NOSENKO: I don't remember the dates. Don't remember.
be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March or 1 April.
Must
Question: No, he didn't arrive until 31 March. We have the
official record on his travel. We have his photo
here, which you just saw.
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
On the visa certificate, anketa, with this picture
of Paul JENNER, it was said that he must come; we
knew that he must come 1 April or 15 March, or some-
thing of this kind.
But we have the official records showing KOLOSOV's,
or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March.
I cannot give you any details. All I have said,
everything what I knew. If you need something on
KOSOLAPOV, I will try to remember.
The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left
Helsinki on 2 April. JENNER, Paul JENNER, according
to the same official sources, left Helsinki by train
to go to Moscow on the 31st. Two days before.
They were going in one train.
Question: They weren't even on the same train.
NOSENKO: Here, please, they were going in one train.
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
KOSOLAPOV remained in Helsinki.
(interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one
even carriage with Paul JENNER.
Then...
(interrupts) How do you know this for sure?
I was reading his report after his coming. I was
reading also the agent's report of the female agent
who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in
this train, and at the station Vyborg, the first
Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was taken by
GRYAZNOV, and was put in the same carriage, and she
was acquainted with JENNER. And later, it was a
try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but
JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her.
That's all. It was finished... And she was acquainted
with him and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV
himself was speaking with JENNER... I was reading
KOSOLAPOV's otchet (official account) about his (tripl.
That's quite possible. It's quite possible that they
gave you a report to read concerning this.
But it
is a fact that official records show that the two men.
were not on the same train. They were two days apart.
No (whispered).
1
1
14-00000
Question:
MOSENKO:
JENNER left on the 31st.
I don't know. I don't know. Maybe
I don't know.
I don't
this is a mistake of Pinnish officials.
know, but he was on the same train and he was return-
The same train
,.
ing from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.
** *** *
The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV's TDY in early 1960
comes from other sources:
After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER
reported that he was approached on the train 
from 
Helsinki
by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, 
probably uni-
The two Russians 
struck up a 
conver-
versity students."*
sation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial
They said 
that they
discrimination in the United States.
About three months later, on
might see JENNER in Moscow.
29 June, JENNER was performing his normal duty of escort-
ing Embassy couriers to Sheremetevo Airport 
when he was
again approached by the Russian girl, Yuli
, who acted
surprised to see him and asked him 
to go outside to 
talk.
Yuli explained that she was waiting to say 
goodbye to a
friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk 
(JENNER 
had
seen the Irkutsk flight depart a half hour 
earlier) and
told JENNER that her male companion on the 
train trip 
to
Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies 
in Vyborg.
Interspersed with Yuli's questions 
concerning 
JENNER's
impressions and personal activities 
in Moscow were 
others
about how often he came to the airport and how 
he liked
When JENNER said 
he must leave
,
his job at the Embassy.
she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted
that he call her.** She advised JENNER 
that "it would be
better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone."
-
Besides information about his Soviet companions on
the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of
State security officials about sexual 
advances made by
his first maid in Moscow and about 
provocative clothing
(NOSENKO has not 
indicated 
that
worn by his second maid.
either of these two women was ✓ KGB agent, but has said
in another context that all 
maids of American code clerks
were KGB agents or informants.)
- CIA investigations showed that I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a
KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki
, contacted
the police chief there on 31 March 1960 to ask his assist-
ance in locating an American named Paul 
F. JENNER who was
SERGEYEV
due to arrive in Helsinki the day before. 
***
explained that he had some "business" with JENNER, but he
KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time.
** NOSENKO has mentioned several times that GRYAZNOV's agent
"SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number
.
***GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet
Intelligence agent from "about 1945 
on."
TOP SECRET
i
14-00000
Thr
136.
did not specify its nature. Reportedly this was the first
time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police
chief. *
- CIA travel records show that JENNER arrived in Hel-
sinki en route to Moscow on 30 March 1960 and departed by
train the following day. KOSCLAPOV arrived in Helsinki
the same day that JENNER left, 31 March 1960, and remained
there until 2 April 1960 when he too departed for Moscow
by train. The Finnish train manifest for 31 March 1960
indicates that there was only one passenger abcard the
daily train leaving Helsinki for Moscow on this date,
Paul JENNER, listed as a U.S. citizen and secretary/archi-
vist. The manifest for 2 April 1960 carries the name
Viktor KOLOSSOV (KOSOLAPOV) and shows that no American
citizens were aboard.
(d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case)
Apart from denying that it ever took place, NOSENKO has said
nothing about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAPOV in November 1960,
but GCLITSYN said such a trip occurred and related it to an in-
cipient KGB operation against an American code clerk.
GOLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Residency in Hel-
sinki until July 1960, i.e., after KOSOLAPOV's first trip to
Helsinki, under the KOLOSOV alias. He has reported that at
"about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the begin-
ning of 1961," the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram
to the Helsinki Legal Residency. The telegram advised that an
American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to
Moscow; the responsible case officer would be KOSOLAPOV, who
was being sent to Helsinki under an alias and under Vneshtorg
cover; KOSOLAPOV was to strike up an acquaintance to be con-
tinued with the American in Moscow.
The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's
further remarks on this subject in early 1962:
Question:
You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came
to Finland?
GOLITSYN: Came to Finland.
Question: He came under cover?
GOLITSYN: Yes.
Question: Under a new identity?
With an alias?
GOLITSYN: Yes, as an employee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg).
But, of course, there may be some different dates.
Maybe November. I suppose (believe) it was the
end of 1960 or it can be the beginning of 1961.
And he waiting for some days, a week or so.
Question: In Helsinki?
ឃ
A similar request to the police chief was made by SERGEYEV
with regard to GARLAND (see below).
TOP SECRET
14-00000
F
SECRET
Finnish Travel Manifest for 16 November 1960
(See Part V.E.3.c.iii)
Luettelo matkustajista, joiks
Junnila
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Novi, Nonna
Parve, Falf
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sapna SuPIACEH
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SECRET
Vot.ylikonat.
E. Saukkonon
TOP SECRET
14-00000
197.
GOLITSYN: Yes. Maybe four days. Then we knew that the Ameri-
can Embassy took a ticket for him (the American tar-
get] for the train... And KOSOLAPOV took a ticket
in the same compartment. And before the departure
we knew exactly from the guide (conductor) of that
train that it's the same person--(I'm not certain
whether he was a] code clerk or not a code clerk*--
but his name, his real name. It was listed. And I
was at the railroad station at that time. I went
to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation.**
Question: See them off?
GOLITSYN: Yes, the delegation.
And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV:
"Who is this person? I suppose (he is an] American?"
I suppose (believe) he said: "He's a fat man, a
young fat man."
tip w
Question: The American? 2
GOLITSYN: Yes. And I suppose (believe KOSOLAPOV said] bespecta-
cled. *** And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were
smiling and looked through the window before depart-
Question:
GOLITSYN:
Question:
:
GOLITSYN:
ure.
In the compartment?
The train compartment?
Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from
KOSOLAPOV's division [the U.S. Embassy Section, Ameri-
can Department, Second Chief Directorate).****
When was this?
It was in summer or maybe September or so of 1961.
And I asked him. I reminded him about his case...
Question: Who was this? Do you remember?
GOLITSYN: I don't remember because he changed his name. I
know him but I... And I asked him how is that case
that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want
to discuss it. That's why I came to the conclusion
that this case was a success. Otherwise he would
have told (me). And I am not sure but I can try to rec-
_ ognize this person in pictures.
Question:
You think that you could?
When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the
American as a code clerk.
GOLITSYN was not asked details of this delegation. There
were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train.
KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is,
however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER.
**** NOSENKO has not mentioned this TDY, and the KGB officer
remains unidentified..
TOP SEONET

14-00000
GOLITSYN: Yes, probably, He reminds me a little of one of my
friends.
Question: He looks a little like your friend?
GOLITSYN: Yes.
Question: Which one?
KOSCLAFOV?
GOLDTSYN: No, no. This American
The Finnish railroad manifest
from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 Novem
as the passengers travelling
1950, KOSOLAPOV was one
of eight Soviets aboard the trail, ar John W. ONPLAND was the
only American. GARLAND, by his own ratenent, arrived in Hel-
sinki on 14 November 1960; he was tree ling to Moscow to assume
the duties of supervise of the Stats Dipartiment code room in
the U.S. Embassy.
SERGEYEY Of
As he had with regard to JENE (
the KGB Legal Residency in
ake the lul police chief
(and KGB agent, according to JULIT on 11 November 1960 for
help in locating GARLAID. an Zaerican who would arrive there on
14 November.
GARLAND was first interviewed by John AMDIAN, the Embassy
Security Officer in Moscow in connection with the GOLITSYN lead
on 17 June 1962. In this interview GAPLAND denied having met
any Soviet of KOSCLAPOV's physical description during the Hel-
sinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having ever been
approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 1963 GARLAND was
interviewed by the FBI
NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified 20 Americans em-
ployed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow who were of interest to
the KGB because they were suspect intelligence officers or
agents, or because they fell into some other category of in-
terest to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each
of these 20 persons. One of them was CARLAND, about whom
NOSENKO said: "code clerk, but nothing doing. NOSENKO was
asked on 2 September 1964 to review this list for the purpose
of supplying any additional information he might have concern-
ing the individuals named, NOSENKO stated: As with all code
clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND) in order to gather
enough material to make a recruitment. The case officer was
KOSOLAPOV. I don't remember the names or descriptions of any
agents, and I didn't hear of any derogatory information.
As
far as I know, there was no operational approach and no re-
cruitment. Although he could not recall whether he had read
the KGB file on GARLAND or not. NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said:
The thought that he must have read. current materials concerning
GARLAND as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO
also said that there was no operational plan drawn up for GARLAND
because the KGB had no derogatory information whatsoever concern-
ing him. NOSENKO has not provided additional information con-
cerning GARLAND, whom he had presumably never seen, and was unable
TOP USEET
14-00000
199.
to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any
details on his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Mos-
Cow.
In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/KOSOLAPOV's travels
to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October
1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had
not reported. The following is a transcript of this portion of
the discussion on that date:
Question:
Well, we started to look for other trips by KOSO-
LAPOV, or KOLOSOV, and we did run across another
trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias.
NOSENKO: To Copenhagen?
Question: No. This was a trip to Helsinki.
NOSENKO:
Oh. I don't know. Maybe after, after '61 maybe.
I don't know--'62, '63, I don't know.
Question: No, this was in 1960. When you say you were in
the First (U.S. Embassy) Section, First (American}
Department, Second Chief Directorate. He was on
NOSENKO:
Question:
the train, according to official records, on 16 Novem-
ber 1960, going from Helsinki to Moscow.
I know about one, he has took trip, when he was re-
turning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.
We looked at everybody else, all the other records
concerning this train trip to see who was on the
train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the
name he used.
NOSENKO: Yes?
Question: We found there was one American on that train with
KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow.
NOSENKO: Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can
say, of course?
Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk.
NOSENKO: He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul'
JENNER.
Question: You don't know this man's name?
NOSENKO:
(silence)
Question: Well, we checked further and we found out that
GOLITSYN had told us about a trip.
NOSENKO: When he was returning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER?
GOLITSYN was then out, yes?*
GOLITSYN arrived in Helsinki in July 1960, over four months
after JENNER passed through Finland en route to Moscow.
TOP SECRET
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Question: GOHITSYN told us that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to
Helsinki to meet a code clerk in November 1960.
You understand what I'm telling you?
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Yes, I understand. And KOSOĻAFOV must tell him about
the code clerk, but we found out that Paul JENNER is
not a code clerk when he began to work at the Embassy.
This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time
of year--
(interrupts)
When he began to work in Embassy.
Question: This is not March 1960. This is November 1960. A
different time. It's the same year, but a different
time.
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
I know only about his trip when he was returning with
Paul JENNER.
Well, how do you explain that this man, who's supposed
to be under your supervision in the Embassy Section,
is aboard this train with this American code clerk,
one of your targets, in November 1960?
I know only about one trip (by) KOSOLAPOV to Hel-
site, when he was returning with Paul JENNER, about
whom he was thinking also that he was a code clerk.
Yes.
KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with
JENNER. We have the names; we have the facts; we
have the official records. We also have GOLITSYN's
information about November 1960. GOLITSYN went with
KOSOLAPOV to the train station to see him off.
NOSENKO:
He must.
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
He was working as a case officer of counter-
intelligence, of the Fourteenth Department. Of course
he must, of course he must. And KOSOLAPOV must speak
with him.
KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV rode
with this American code clerk from Helsinki on the
train back to Moscow. But GOLITSYN was not in Hel-
sinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER.
With Paul JENNER I know, but I don't know of anybody
else...
I don't
You are giving me such a big bluff.
know, I don't know, I don't know.
It's no bluff. Do you have any idea who this other
code clerk was?
1
NOSENKO:
No.
There wasn't such a one.
Question: Well, I'll tell you who it was……. Did you ever hear
the name GARLAND?
-
NOSENKO:
Yes, I heard GARLAND. And there wasn't any approach
made to GARLAND. There wasn't any attempt to recruit
him. There was a study of him, yes, but there wasn't
recruitment or something else...
6 !Eན་
14-00000
(iv) KGB-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE
(a)
Introduction
In 1961 CIA learned from a Polish source who furnished
much reliable and sensitive information that, with the assist-
ance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB),
the KGB in November 1960 began using a female agent against
Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State code clerk assigned
The woman
to the American Embassy in Moscow in August 1960.
accompanied MORONE on a train trip from Moscow, became inti-
mate with him in Warsaw, returned to Moscow twice in February
The compromising
1961, and there had sexual relations with him.
scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were photographed.
This information on the KGB operation was received by CIA soon
On the basis of this
after the woman's second visit to Moscow.
report, MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in Oslo in May
1961, and he was transferred to Lisbon from Moscow in August
1961.
NOSENKO gave a few details on the same case, without men-
tioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in
Geneva. In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on the
MORONE case, identifying three KGB agents (besides the Polish
NOSENKO, however,
female) who participated in the operation.
said that two of them added no information of use to the KGB
against MORONE, and that he was unable to remember what the third
agent reported: statements by other sources indicate that re-
garding MORONE all three agents could have acquired information
NOSENKO has not reported,
of operational potential for the KGB.
as have other sources, that a fourth KGB agent named Ella UMANETS
was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVORTSOV--
posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least
one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was approached
by the KGB (see above). NOSENKO has confused the MORONE case
with another by saying that a fifth KGB agent was directed
against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the
The sensitive 
source of
American code clerk ZUJUS (see below).
the original report on MORCNE stated that a KGB officer "VOLODYA"
"(Vladimir, last name unknown) personally met the Polish female
agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said 
that the
NOSENKO at first
KGB officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV.
claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case re-
ported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA showed
him that travel records on NOSENKO made it impossible for the
According to
technician to have spoken to him as he described.
NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could.
take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates
MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities' concern
over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents.
(b)
NOSENKO's Information
At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made
a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a
female agent of the Polish service in contact with an American
from the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw.
Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow in-
order to obtain further compromising materials on this American.
14-00000"
་
202.
To Finland
Asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had had foreign agents
working against the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his having
introduced the idea of using such agents to develop-Americans.
afraid of contacts with Russian girls. He said that he himself
had several of these third-national agents, that he sometimes
would ask the German and Polish services to supply him with
agents, and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their
NOSENKO then
intended use in operations against Americans.
gave an example: "Listen, the sergeants (enlisted men] who
lived in America House had a custom--it was too far to go-to
America, so where did they go to rest (on leave]?
or Poland. Why Poland? Because they can find women there, the
What 
do we do?
rate of exchange is good, and so on.
We 
planted
Then she
a female Polish agent (on an American] in Poland.
comes to Moscow. We arranged a chance meeting, and things de-
veloped. Once two guys, a Marine guard and a code clerk went to
We knew
Warsaw. They were on leave for a week and a half.
when they would be going. I made an immediate phone call to
Warsaw. 'Give me a woman, I said. 'Get a good whore for me
there, a pretty one but not one who strikes the eye particu-
larly.' Well, they sent me such a girl. And I placed this
Polish agent on the same train, in the same car, even in the
same compartment. The train left. One of the Americans, the
one in whom we were particularly interested, the code clerk,
wanted the girl and there, in the compartment, they went to bed
I told the Poles in
together while the other American slept.
Warsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs.
Everything was
They arranged an apartment and he came there.
O.K. After a week and a half he returned to Moscow.
not rush things. A month passed. Two months. Let's not rush,
I said. A half a year went by. I insisted that nothing further
may be done any earlier. Then I said, 'All right, let's give
him this girl, this Pole.' She arrived (in Moscow) and they met
one another. I created the conditions: we created the condi-
A [Soviet]
tions. They slept with one another once, twice.
girlfriend showed up. The same thing. And he also began to
sleep with the girlfriend. The Pole left and he was with this
Russian, and she was our agent. You see, first the boys are.
afraid of Russians. But we gave him] a Pole and then trans
ferred him to a Russian."
We did
"I remember we were
NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964:
working on one of the members of the guard of the American Em-
bassy, who was going to Warsaw for a good time, for a few days'
relaxation.* We wrote to our advisors (KGB officers attached
to the Polish UB] to do everything possible--to get a pretty
Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate
scenes. The Poles introduced the guard to the girl, they did
have intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without
any intimate scenes. Just how they are sitting together, how
he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photographs
and some time went by and then we asked that the Poles send
us this Polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow.
They
The guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man
who accompanied MORONE to Warsaw. The facts, however, seem
to relate to MORONE, who has described his encounter with
the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow.
BEGGS has also reported (see below) that MORONE met a Polish
girl on the train to Warsaw and that she later contacted him
in Moscow: BEGGS has denied that he, himself, was 
contacted
by any such girl in the Soviet Union after the trip to Warsaw
with MORONE.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
}
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NOSENKO has also mentioned a prohibition on recruitment
attempts during the 1959 Sokolniki exhibition because of the
need to avoid incidents affecting US-Soviet relationships.
GOLITSIN told CIA of such a pichibition placed on the use
of homosexual compromise material, against a US Embassy.
employee in 1960 because of the impending visit of President
EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union As a result of the U-2
incident on May 1960, this visit never cock place, and
U.S.-Soviet relations, deteriorated Throughout the rest of
1960 and most of 1961 they remained very strained, and Soviet
pressures and hard lines culminated in the Berlin crisis and
wali-building in Berlin in August of 1961.
TOP SECRET
€ * ཧཱ། ཀཱ ༦༦
NOSENKO further reported to CIA that the KGB case officer
working against MORONE was NOSENKO's subordinate and special-
ist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV NOSENKO read the file
on MORONE and saw his visa photograph, but he never saw him in
person and so could not provide a physical description. NOSENKO
had discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a.
number of occasions.
NOSENKO said that the KGB agents working on MORONE were:
-
Svetlana IVANOVA a maid or waitress at America
House who reported to DEMKIN, the case officer responsi-
ble for Americans living there, on everything she saw or
heard concerning MORONE. KOSOLAPOV visited her several
times with DEMKIN to discuss MORONE, and NOSENKO himself
met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments
that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall
any specific information on MORONE which was interesting
or useful from this source.
an Egyptian employed at the
Egyptian Embassy who was an agent of the Sixth (Under-
developed Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate.
visited America House and met MORONE,
but he did not report anything of value that NOSENKO re-
membered.
One of two East German females imported for use
against the inhabitants of America House. In early 1960
GRYAZNOV went to East Derlin to obtain two German women'
who could be used for this purpose. The first of these
was Hanna, blonde, documented as a West German travelling
to Moscow. NOSENKO never met her but instructed PREIS-
FREUND (see the STORSBERG case) to take her to Americar
House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times
to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing
that she may have reported on MORONE. The other East Ger-
man girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENKO never
met her but recalled that she was asked for her documents
at America House on her first or second visit there. She
replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America
House, and never returned. NOSENKO did not remember the
time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he
was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN
was the Embassy security officer at the time.*
an Italian
at the American
Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he
heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAFOV. NOSENKO re-
called nothing specific that
had said about MORONE.
CIA has no information concerning such an incident in 1960-
1961, but the circumstances described by NOSENKO seem to
apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman
named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code
clerk ZUJUS. These details are given in Part V.E.3.c. (v).
In any event, the incident involving Lillian occurred after
the date when NOSENKO says he was transferred from the U.S.
Embassy Section. At the time, Hugh MONTGOMERY rather than
ABIDIAN was the Embassy Security Officer.
TOP SECRET
14-09000
ན ཝཱ ཡ
"
205.
From one of these agents, or possibly in some other man-
ner, the KGB learned that MORONE was planning to go on leave
to Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided
to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him.
KOSOLAPCV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt,
which was approved by GRIBANOV after some editing by NOSENKO
and KOVSHUK, chief of the section. KOSGLAPOV next met with a
Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to
discuss the plan. The role was told that the target was a U.S.
Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact
was deliberately kept from the Foles.
As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained
by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival
she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel, where
he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation.
The girl was told to meet MORONS on the train, flirt witn him,
have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and
study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as
a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representa-
tion in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next
visit.
:
Arrangements were made with the KOD Operational Technical
Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the
compartment next to that of MORONE and BEGGS and for audio and
visual (but not photographic) coverage.
NOSENKO did not recall when MORONE and BEGGS left Moscow.
The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making HORONE's
acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Technical
Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train
reached Warsaw. The technician told NOSENKO the girl had en-
gaged in sexual intercourse during the trip. The technician
also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor
quality..
Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KCSO-
LAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought
to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography
during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB
authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and
took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room.
The girl called MORONE at America House, and MORONE subsequently
visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which
photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on
MCRONE. He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had
hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.
CIA travel records show that NOSENKO transitted Amsterdam on
15 November 1960 on a through flight from Moscow to Cube
NOSENKO
:
returned from Cuba approximately 14 December 1960. When told
this, NOSENKO stated that instead of talking to the tech-
nician himself, he may have read the report and seen the film
strips after his return.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
SEGRE
206.
Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was
felt that there were insufficient materials for a recruitment
approach to MORONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apart-
ment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that is defi-
nitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVA:OVA (see
above) was supposed to lure MORCNE into the city, but before
anything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE
out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they
were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore,
NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE
and no recruitment of him.
(c)
Information from Other Sources
A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 Novem-
ber 1960 a Polish female, an expérienced English-speaking agent
of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB
case officer named "VOLODYA." She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw
in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American
Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November
1960 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in
Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE
on the train to Warsaw, where intimacies began. In Warsaw on
12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with MORONE, but pur-
suant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in
intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safe-
house suitably prepared for clandestine photography, and reveal-
ing photographs of an intimate nature were taken of MORONE
and herself. The female agent again travelled to Moscow on
5 February 1961 and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further com-
promising photographs were taken of her and MOPONE on this
trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and
on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her
and MORONE.
GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on
16 February 1962:
Question:
GOLITSYN:
Do you know anyone in the American Department of
the Second Chief Directorate who worked against the
American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?"
Yes, I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against
'the U.S. Embassy. Later he worked against the
British Embassy and later he was sent to Denmark..
Question: When was he sent? Do you know?
GOLITSYN: It was in '57 until probably '60... I suppose that
he will continue to work now in the First Chief
Directorate. He transferred there from the Second...
Question: Do you know anyone who used the name "VOLODYA" in
the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall
of 19607
GOLITSYN:
There is another person. It is [Vladimir Ivanovich]
PETROV. He is the employee of the American Department,
:Second Chief Directorate who works against the Ameri-
can Embassy. He evidently knows English. and he
worked in the American Department. I know him and I
met him in 1960. He was Chief of the American Section,
the Embassy Section...
TOP SECHET
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Question:
GOLITSYN:
207,
Well, in VOLODYA, I'm interested in a KGB case offi
cer who would be working against American code clerks'
in the fall of 1960.
Yes he (PETROV) is the chief of this section. That
is why.
He in the Chief of this section where GRYAZNOV
works. (GOLITSYN had earlier identified GRYAZNOV as
a code clerk specialist in the U.S. Embassy Section.]
Question: And GRYAZNOV is under him?
GOLITSYN:
Yes, he was an assistant at one time, but is not
(now), and then there was the reorganization and he
became a little "liquidated" (downgraded in position).
In an October 1962 interview, following his withdrawal from
Moscow, MORONE stated that he had travelled with Frank BEGGS to
Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl
outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke.
Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage
in sexual relations with her, she slapped his face. A day or
two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his
hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations.
According to MORONE, he had sexual relations with at least two
other women while in Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to MosCOW
without incident. On 6 February 1961 the Folish girl from the
train called him at America House, and the following day he
visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they had
several drinks and sexual relations. On this occasion or earlier
the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. MORONE had
denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence, a
statement which was supported by a polygraph examination admini-
stered in 1961. (Further details on this interview of MORONE
are inserted in a later paragraph containing information from
MORONE's associates in Moscow.)
The Marine guard BEGGS has confirmed MORONE's account in
general, with the exception that he has stated that the two
travelled to Warsaw on 13 November 1960 and that, after meeting
the Polish girl on the train, MORONE and she got into the lower
bunk in their train compartment. They arrived in Warsaw on
14 November and returned the 20th. BEGGS had heard from MORONE
that the latter had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Mos-
cow in February 1961.
The U.S. military code clerk STORSBERG has reported that
MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVORTSOV), who
laid some groundwork for the KGB approach to STORSBERG in the
fall of 1961. When interviewed by the FBI
In February 1965 NOSENKO said that SKVORTSOV undoubtedly met
other Americans on his visits to America House, but he did.
not remember who they were. He added that the KGB would not
be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerks
because "we told him not to squander his forces, to concen-
trate on Jim (STORSBERG). Jim was his target.
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208
MORONE's fellow code clerks and residents of America House
have described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a
ladies' man. Various reports indicate that OPONE was involved
in a currency-speculation ring operated by
W the
KGB agent mentioned by NOSENEQ. and MOPONE his confirmed that,
on at least one occasion,
arranged the introduction of
MORONE and other code clerks to Soviet females. MORONE had rela-
tions with one of them in
's apartment in the spring of
1961. MOFONE was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy
✓2 identified by NOSENKO as an agent of KOSO-
LAPOV, but not mentioned by him in connection with the MOPONE
operation. (MORONE admitted that along with other Americans,
he made it a common practice to purchage rubles illegally from
One report states that
asked a Marine guard to
deliver blackmarket rubles to MORONE in the State Department
code room,
a restricted area to which
had no access.
number of reports indicate that MORONE was sexually intimate
with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS,
another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO but
not mentioned by him in connection with MORONE. (MORONE denies
having had relations with IVANOVA but said that he told his
friends that he had been intimate with her. He said, however,
that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once
asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk
with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations
ensued. MORONE has also admitted sexual relations with a num-
ber of woren from various Western embassies in Moscow.)
A
14-0660800#*##73th79#Z4%
209
(v) Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS
(a)
Introduction
NOSENKO reported that he personally recruited and handled
the "ain agent" in the KGB developmental opera-
tion against U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, although
GRYAZNOV was the officer responsible for the EUJUS case.
W military officer posted to Moscow for training,
was used only in this operation, but NOSENKO continued to meet
him even after transferring from the U.S. Embassy Section 
to
the Tourist Department. While being interregated in February
1965, NOSENKO said that
could vouch for his bona fides,
for this purpose.
and he suggested that CIA approach
ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume
the military code clerk duties of STORSBERG (see above),
and he remained there until January 1963. After initially
confusing ZUJUS with James KEYSERS**, NOSENKO first described
the KGB operation against him in February 1964. According
to NOSENKO, neither nor any other source supplied sig-
nificant information to the KGB, and the KGB therefore did not
attempt to recruit CUJUS. Claiming not to know the names of
KGB agents besides
who participated in the operation,
NOSENKO nevertheless in other contexts has mentioned two
female agents who reportedly associated with ZUJUS.
Ella UMANETS, the other an East German woman posing as an
Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with
MORONE (see above), whereas it is clear that ZUJUS was the
American code clerk who met this woman. The date that she
and ZUJUS were together, however, falls during the summer
of 1962 when, NOSENXO said, he was no longer engaged in
operations against the U.S. Embassy.
(b) Information from NOSENKO
One is
The first reference by NOSENKO to the ZUJUS case was
made on 2 February 1964:
NOSENKO:
With respect to ZUJUS, I'll tell you exactly what we
tried to do with him because I spotted this in some
notes. This mistake [confusion of KEYSERS and ZUJUS}
made me so mad, I completely forgot about ZUJUS
until I saw my little note. In 1961 I recruited a
Syrian who was from Damascus.
and ne
ame ac
quainted with ZUJUS. The reason why they had some-
thing in common was that sometime carlier ZUJUS had
been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was
from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance
away...
Here is his name. He wrote it out hinself.
It is
and he wrote out his own address
The KEYSERS case is discussed in the next part of this
paper.
TOP STORES
14-00000
210.
Question:
NOSENKO:
here on one of the notes NOSENKO brought with him
to the meeting]. We did not work with him, and we
retired the case to Archives, and did not turn him
over to anyone. Here is his address. The street
is
I
worked
Timmyself at the
1961 and the
beginning of 1962. And when I was leaving Moscow
to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 1962
I turned him over for contact to GRYAZNOV. I said
goodbye to him and he was scheduled to leave the
USSR permanently in April, back to Syria.
What did you do against ZUJUS?
Nothing at all.
was merely studying
and devloping him. During the conversation [at
Americr. House) they even spoke of how nice it
would be to have some Lebanese vodka, and we
specially had some shippped in from the [KGB Legal]
Residency [in Beirut), and the Syrian brought
it to ZUJUS saying it had come from his friends.
ZUJUS by character is a very quiet, unexcitable,
calm person... Nothing disturbs him.
Question: Why didn't you turn.
NOSENKO:
Directorate?
over to the First Chief
There was no reason for this because he was a
If we were to turn him over to
anyone it would have been to the GRU.
But we
decided to hell with it and put the case into
our Archives.
Question:
NOSENKO:
Dide
know ZDJUS when you decruited him?
No, he didn't hardly know anyone--even by name.
So we showed him photographs, and when he said
that he had met ZUJUS. then we directed him to
develop ZUJUS and not to pay attention to any-
one else... If you want to approach him you
can use my name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich.
NOSENKO then proposed a false flag recruitment
whereby a CIA representative would approach
☐ saying
that he was from the KGB. A year later NOSENKO fold CIA
that if CIA talked to the latter would be able to
vouch for NOSENKO's bona fides.
Speaking of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO
said:
✓...I took with me, even though I had
transferred to the Seventh [Tourist Department [in January
1962]. But it had been decided that no one else knew him
from the First [American] Department; it would have taken
some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was
already working in the development of ZUJUS. So they the
First Department] said that they were asking me to continue
meeting with him, and they were counting on my cooperation.
They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV (Chief of the
Seventh Department) so that I would not have to stop
meetings with ZUJUS.
TOP SECRET
211.
When reviewing lists of employees of the U.S. Embassy;
between 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO on 19 September 1964 iden-
tified ZUJUS as STORSBERG's replacement and said that the
He said that
case officer working against him was. GRYAZNOV.
his (NOSENKO's) agent'
was working against ZUJUS, but
that he did not know the names of other agents involved, nor
of any unusual or interesting information concerning him,
although he had read the Second Chief Directorate file on
ZUJUS. There was no information on CUJUS from KGB micro-
phones, telephone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO
stated, did not make an operational approach to ZUJUS
and did not recruit him.
NOSENKO reported on 2 February 1965 that he himself
had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling of the operation and
personally handled the main agent,
NOSENKO
read all current reports on CUJUS as they came into the
U.S. Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with
GRYAINOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible
for the America House) and his superiors, GRYAZNOV wrote
the operational plan on ZUJUS, which called for thorough
development by
in order to learn everything
possible about hi
entually to introduce an agent
to ZUJUS through¨
was to invite ZUJUS to a
restaurant in March April 52, and a "friend" was to
be introduced to 2UJUS at that time. This had not been.
accomplished as of NOSENKO's departure for Geneva in 1962.
оп
Progress was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reservod
and often stayed alone, even in America House, plus the fact
that although
and ZUJUS were acquainted, they did not
become good friends. On the days
was to visit America
House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants (never in
safehouses) This was ce every week or two, depending
✓ They would meet again the
following y
Would report on which Americans were
drinking heavily and which were caressing the girls from
foreign embassies in Moscow. Although
went to America
House once or twice a month and drank there with ZUJUS, he
reported little of interest. The KGB learned something
about ZUJUS's family in the United States, the details of
which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however,
that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS's
family background. NOSENKO stated that the KGB was not
aware of any vices or vulnerabilities that ZUJUS may have
had. There was no recruitment and no approach by the
KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left the U.S.
Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have told him
about it.
(c) Information from Other Sources
In connection with a security investigation at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow, ZUJUS prepared a statement in January 1963
which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only
one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy.
During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities later in
1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations
with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S. Embassy,
Security Officer reported in the summer of 1962 that ZUJUS
had been intimate with an Austrian woman, Lillian (last
name unknown), who had gone to America House with someone
TOP SECRET
14-00000°
212.
from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a
few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. Since
ZUJUS was a cryptographer, the manager of America House
decided to interview the woman. . She told him that she
was from Vienna and was travelling with her employer, a
Czech. The manager then reported to the Security Officer,
who learned from the Austrian Embassy that no passport
had been issued to this woman. The Security Officer went
to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport;
she replied that she had forgotten it, and she then left
saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She
never returned to America House,*
The U.S. Army report of its debriefing of ZUJUS states
ZUJUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in
November 1955. Asked whether he had met any nationals of
Near Eastern countries while in Moscow, BUJUS named among
others a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus or a
person from Damascus who had been in Beirut--he could not
remember which. ZUJUS said that he had been acting as
doorman at America House when this person entered, and that
the two "shot the breeze" for about 15 minutes. ZUJUS could
not recall what they had talked about, but their conver-
sation apparently did not interest the visitor, because he
left after a short while and went to the bar.
ZUJUS may
have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could
supply no additional information. ZUJUS did not recall that
this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but did say he favored.
this beverage.
ZUJUS said that he did not know this man's
name or why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical
description.
ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had
frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named
by NOSENKO). ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his
dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was
able to provide a considerable amount of background infor-
mation concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements
that he had never been approached or recruited by Soviet Intel-
ligence.
FBI investigations indicate
See also NOSENKO's account of the KGB using one of two
East German women, who represented themselves as
Austrians, at America House in an operation against
MORONE.
TOP SECARY
14-00000
TOP SECRET
213.
-
(vi) Approach to KEYSERS
(a)
Introduction
U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his
tour in Moscow on 20 December 1960 as an assistant to the
Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force cap-
tain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative
functions in the office of the Air Attache, For a short per-
iod in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perform back-up
cryptographic duties under James STOKSBERG in the military
code room, but he was relieved of this in April 1961. because
of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest, Because of
his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude
and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American
superiors in June 1961. The decision to transfer him was
made on 13 June, and KEYSERS was informed of it the fol-
lowing day; approximately two hours before leaving America
House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter
from the KGB suggesting that he defect, This was followed
by an approach to him at the Moscow airport.
NOSENKO has claimed that he was the KGB officer who
spoke to KEYSERS on this occasion and has said that this
incident was his only face-to-face contact with an American
target during his 1960-1961 period of service in the U.S.
Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with
STORSBERG-See above). NOSENKO has confused the KEYSERS and
ZUJUS cases, but corrected this error prior to defecting.
In most particulars NOSENKO s account of the case matches the
details from KEYSERS and other sources. However, whereas
NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its
information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American
authorities of having received the letter, KEYSERS did so
before leaving Moscow; this conversation took place in an
Embassy room where a KGB microphone was then located.
(b) Information from NOSENKO
NOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming
KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: "Now I remember. He came to Mos-
cow, to the Embassy. He was to replace the military cipher
clerk [STORSBERG].* We sensed at once (that he was a homo-
sexual]. Well, everything was thrown at him. I stayed with
this case constantly. I didn't spend time on anything else.
We chased him all over Moscow but were late. We were in an
operational car. It happened like this. When there was
traffic, you couldn't get through, Whether we went up the
left side or on the sidewalk where people were walking, in
the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we were late,
late [i.e., could not catch him at anything]. But such
Although KEYSERS trained in Moscow to assume back-up
cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replace-
ment; Mathew ZUJUS, who arrived in September 1961, was.
KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for
Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, who had earlier been re-
turned from Moscow for reasons of homosexuality.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
214.
The
Let's
things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow.
He proved to be a homosexual. He sold himself, so to say.
American ice ballet (Ice Capades tour) arrived. There were
many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely
drunk, and was embracing and kissing a man. The Americans also
saw this. And decided not to... I thought, what to do?
write him a letter, in real English, on an English typewriter.
We'll send this letter to his room. We knew that he was supposed
to leave today, today. And we wrote it: 'Listen, they know
about you,
You have been naught. It will go very badly for you
back there. Come on. Stay here. We are waiting for your
answer. Well, as is customary, you had someone accompany him.
The Assistant Military Attache escorted him. I don't remember
who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON. a lieutenant
color.el. What was his name?* He accompanied him to Finland
and then returned by plane. Well, there was no answer from
him to this letter. And it was already the last moment, and
suddenly--Listen, they are taking you away, wait, they know
who you are, what you are, it's all over. If that's the way
it is, stay here.' No answer. What to do? Here's what happened:
We got into a car. They (KGB surveillance) had reported that he
and the Assistant Military Attache had pulled out from Kropotkin-
skaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the
plane. So we put on all speed to get there first. We got there
first, in order to have got to him.
No. It was WILSON." The
interview then continued: NOSENKO was asked who had accompanied
KEYSERS to the airport. He replied:
"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him
for a moment at the airport. I am turning around here, walking
there. There is coffee there and cognac. He didn't leave him.
I must separate them. O.K. So I said 'What about their
documents? Make some pretext to separate them.' They were
separated for two minutes. I approached him and said: 'Hello,
hello, what about the letter? You think about it?' He said
something to the Assistant Military Attache, that 'they tried
to approach me. So he was in Moscow in all only three or
four months. He gave himself away you see. If this ice ballet
had not come we would have worked on him. At the start we did
not know who he was or what he was 1,e.. we knew that he came
to replace the military code clerk, on whom we had spent much
time."
NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG
operation without naming KEYSERS.
'
After describing the recruitment approach to STOKSBERG,
NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: "Then his replacement
came. It was ZUJUS,** We began to study him carefully and
it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily
in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he
This officer's name is MASON.
See NOSENKO's statements on 28 January and 2 February
1964 (below). ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who
completed his Moscow tour in November 1961, five months
after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow.
TOP SECRET
1*1-00000
215.
We
was a homosexual. It appears that there was some visiting
ballet troupe in which some of the male members were homo-
sexuals. He met them in the America House and his behavior
towards them was reported to the American Security Officer
and at the same time our agent had reported him to us.
wanted to mount an operation against him but the Americans
had already decided to give him up. All we could do was
to have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned him'
that he was being sent out because he was a homosexual
and that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offer
was made to him to stay in the USSR. He did not answer
the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure.
He was escorted to the airport by two officers of the
Military Attache's office. At the airport--I even went
there with a group of assistants to see if we could get a
few words to him to change his mind, He left his group
for a moment to get a drink of water. When I made this
offer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed,
that he would receive great benefits, he panicked and ran
back to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. If
he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been able
to get at him."
While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to the
American Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKO said on 28
January 1964: "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can't
be in Moscow. That's the homosexual code clerk I told
you about, [the] homosexual who was urgently sent back to
the States with military guards. How come he is back in
19637 In August 1963? He couldn't be there. It is
impossible" He was asked whether he was sure of his
facts, and NOSENKO answered: "Yes, this must be the
same man, but this must be an error in your document.
He just cannot be in Moscow."
NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February
1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had
something important to say. The meeting with CIA opened
as follows: "I was thinking last night and I realized
that I have made a mistake and it bothered me, so I
wanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Re-
member when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG,
the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him?
And I said that we wanted to get a hold of him because he
was a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS.
In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to
KEYSERS."
"I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters
[with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving," NOSENKO
stated on 17 April 1964, "When he was being taken to the
airport we decided, 'Why not try, in case he's alone; why
not approach him and ask him if he wants to stay?' And sure
enough he stood there with these two officers and then he
walked into the restaurant alone... So I immediately ap-
proached him right there in the restaurant. "I don't re-
member what his name was--I think it was Jim.) So I said"
'Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because you
know what will happen to you when you return. Say, please.
He looked at me and turned around and without saying a word
he went into the waiting room and started talking rapidly
with the officers."
TOP SECRET
14-00000
When questioned on the ITE S approach in Aubrubry
1965, NOSENKO added no new details extent that. at the
time of the approach, he defato ha act reported
the KGB letter to his superiors at the Mori assy;
be said that there was no infuriation to this effect from
the microphones or teprione taps in the .. Embassy.
(c)
Information Other Satues
In Moscow prior to his eval and in subsequent de-
briefings, KEYSETS ad uitted homosexual tondancies and his
involvement in three nomosexual incidents during has tour
inscow, all an America House; one of these was an approach.
to a Marine security guard in March 1961, which was rebuffed,
and the two others wife he acts with
Ice Capades trouse visiting Moscow 2. Stan
that he ever and any public dispiny of his
out said he could not be at that
his room at America House
wow hats been grive;
Buring a detail.l
1 and 2
mers of the
He denied
Sekality
Stentored
i partner
acacions—
26
ending on to the
Hoste
June 1961 YERS
t..
approach ide at shy
leaving the Soviet Union
NAS
14-00000
Colonel S
NOSENKO
Microphones were subsequent
fice and in the office of the Minister Counsellor.
has reported that both were being monitored on a simul-
taneous basis in 1961:
This is not an accurate description of SENXO who was
34 years old at the time, is sev
hes taller, and
1

14-00000
sent by A
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nofcater
to bionel JRAN, the
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0.11.2
KLYSERS' c
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See Part
referring
statement on security lesses as i
microphones in this office.
of EGE
14-00000.
219.
NOTE:
Part VI.D.2., a tabulation of NOSENKO's
leads involving American cases, includes
several operations against U.S. code
clerks for which he was the supervisor;
their names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY,
Joseph GAFFEY, John TAYLOR, and Maurice
ZWANG.
ཨུནཱཀཱནཱཡཉྩ བྷནཝ ༢༠༠༠ ཡོ॰ རྒོr་ལྷོ་pe་སྣ་s#y¥4%
TGP SECHEY
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14-00000
220.
d.
(1)
NOSENKO's Responsibility for Coverage of ABIDIAN
Introduction
John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer
in Moscow from 2 March, 1960 until February 1962, approximately
the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the U.S. Embassy
Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate.
During his Moscow tour. ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a
number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings
to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing a
dead drop to be used only for receiving two special types of
communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOV-
SKIY.
During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN
on several occasions, identifying him as the Embassy Security
Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ABIDIAN'S
letter mailing activities, and he said he was himself concerned
(zanimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After recontacting CIA in Geneva in
January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he had been the KGB case
officer responsible for coverage of ABIDIAN in Moscow; for the
first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIAN to the
PENKOVSKIY dead drop site.
The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO'8
case officer responsibilities and the information he learned
about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings
by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ABIDIAN and the Pushkin
Street dead drop.
(ii) Duties as Case Officer
On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from
the Hourist Department to the American Department in January
1960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was inter-
viewed by V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and
V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told
that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge
of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near
future. NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for cover-
age of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ABIDIAN
was the only American target for whom he, personally, was offi-
cially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.
NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for
six days in January and February 1965. He produced the infor-
mation in the following paragraphs at that time.
When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section,
ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however,
already had received some information on him, and this was given
to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's visa
Othervise,
One type was early-warning information, the other notifi-
cation of his forthcoming absence from Moscow.
sas of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in
Moscow via contacts with the British Embassy and the
British businessman Greville WYNNE. The PENKOVSKIY
is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.b.
}
'
:
TOP SECRET
14-00000-**
221.
application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters
files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the
First Chief Directorate. According to this report, based on
correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United
1 States, ABIDIAN had served as a Department of State Security
Officer concerned with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV
when he visited the United States in 1959; from the way ABIDIAN
had acted at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an
intelligence officer, probably with CIA." NOSENKO remarked that
the report, combined with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the
known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made
ABIDIAN one of the most important counterintelligence targets
of the U.S. Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second
Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later
assigned him the cryptonym "APSEN, since this cryptonym had been
used by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate,
KGB Second Chief Directorate, who were working against him,
NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about
the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the
American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but this
unit had no information in addition to that already included in
the original information report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB
Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further de-
tails, but they were never received. For these reasons, NOSENKO
said that he did not know and never obtained details about ABID-
IAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Depart-
ment of State, promotions, personal rank. previous foreign assign-
ments, military service. or status as Foreign Service Reserve,
Staff or Officer (FSR, FSS, FSO),
ག
CIA records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50
and then secured employment with the Department of State as
a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954,
After spe-
cial training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the
Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving
for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Depart-
ment's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this
period was arranging the security of and accompanying foreign
dignitaries visiting the United States. These included the
visits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956,
MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of
1959.
These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact
with a large number of KGB officers stationed in New York and
Washington. One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage
was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S.
Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became
NOSENKO's subordinate in operations against American code
clerks. 3
**NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials FSR, FSS,
and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the Department
of State Biographic Register for information on ABIDIAN'S
background, he replied that this publication is not available
in the U.S., Embassy Section. He subsequently recalled that
the Chief of the Section; KOVSHUK, did have a copy dated:
about 1956, which was of no use in gathering information on
ABIDIAN...
14-00000
10
222
Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was
made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his
arrival.. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least
two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was
The only
available to cover him if he left the U.S. Embassy.
time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO
said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in
1961, when surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in
As the
order to allow increased coverage of British targets. *
responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of
ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by
pertinent information in the surveillance reports.
Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the decision was reach-
ed not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or
provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulner-
ability, NOSENKO stated. It was considered better to concentrate
as LANGELLE's succes-
on surveillance coverage in the hope that,
sor, he might lead "to-another-PGPGV." Therefore; no-operational
This plan,
plan was written on ABIDIAN until about October 1960.
which NOSENKO wrote, called for no direct action but did specify
that:
-
ABIDIAN's maid, Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an operational
contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to
apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and NEPTUNE-80 to his
shoes. ***
(She put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing approxi-
mately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was
employed by ARIDIAN) The only item of operational in-
terest from her during this period was evidence that
ABIDIAN was having intimate relations with a female em-
ployee at the embassy. FEDOROVICH was unable to find
personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's apartment.
KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to
cultivate ARLIIAN and report whatever he learned concern-
ing him.
never obtained significant information
on ABIDIAN's personal life. ARIDIAN, NOSENKO said, was
developing
as an informant on American personnel
at the Embassy. but NOSENKO did not recall any specific
report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest
to the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO told CIA in 1962
In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of
British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOVSKIY.
** The POPOV case is discussed in Part VI.D,7.a..
***Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described
by NOSENKO. The former. a "thief powder" applied to
clothing, leaves a trace on anything with which it comes
into contact; its use in detecting clandestine letter
'mailings is described in greater detail below.
NEPTUNE-80,
a substance applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on
the ground wherever he walks and permits the KGB to carry.
out surveillance long after the target has travelled a
particular route. Dogs are used to follow the target's
trail.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
that ABIDIAN had recruited
left
for an unspecific
intelligence mission in France shortly before
the Soviet Union in December 1960 and that the KCO's U.S.
Embassy Section thereupon turned the case over to the KGB
First Chisi Directorate.*
Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to
the floorboards and foot pedals of A3.DIAN's car if neces-
sary.
-
All other agents and operational contacts of the
section were to be instructed to report every detail about
ARIDIAN (see below).
Surveillance teens wore to be instructed to check all
places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters,
Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to io continued.
Apart from those specified by the operational plan, the only
two KGB agents or operational contact who met 
ABIDIAN were Lyud-
mila GROMOKOVA and "KANO" (RGB cryptonym, name not remembered 
by
NOSENKO!. GROMOKOVA, a language instructor for U.S. 
Embassy 
per-
sonnel, was a KGB agent handled by the U.S. Embassy 
Section offi-
cer N.A. GAVRILENKO ABIDIAN took "only several" 
Russian language
lessons from GROMOKOVA and NOSENKO did not know 
whether these were
private or class lessons. He did not learn anything of operation-
al significance from GROMOKOVA's contacts 
with ABIDIAN, and there
"KAMO" was an agent 
of the
was no regular reporting from her.**
Moscow City KGB organization who accidentally met ABIDIAN at the
claimed he concocted this story for the KGB in order to
extricate himself when the KGB attempted to recruit 
him 
shortly
before his departure from Moscow.
** NOSENKO first identified GROMCKOVA as a KGB agent when viewing
The 
list on which
Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1964.
her name appeared indicated she was a Russian language teacher,
and NOSENKO said she was handled by N.A. GAVRILENKO 
during 1960
and 1951. NOSENKO was later shown GROMCKOVA's photograph 
and
failed to recognize it; when told her name, however, he 
again
said she was GAVRILENKO's agent and that she was valuable 
be-
cause she had a good education and was able to provide 
per-
He did not associate her
sonality sketches on her students.
with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in Febru-
NOSENKO
ary 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her students.
then made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIAN..
reported that he took regular language lessons from 
GROMOKOVA,
normally three one-half hour lessons a week. beginning 
shortly
.
after his arrival in Moscow and continuing until 
his departure.
The first few lessons were with a group of other Embassy per-
sonnel, and then ABIDIAN switched to private lessons for 
the
In reporting 
his
remainder of his tour in the Soviet Union,
contacts with GROMOKOVA, ABIDIAN said he refused to be drawn
into talking about his Embassy responsibilities during Russian
language conversation but kept the topic limited 
to his past.
personal life, travel, education, his fiancee, 
and his trips
on which he saw his fiancee. ABIDIAN also reported 
that on
23 June 1960 GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass a
letter to departing personnel officer Mary GORINHA for for-
When ABIDIAN
warding to Jean LIEBERMAN, a former student
.
refused, saying that this is against Soviet law, GROMOKOVA
tore up the letter.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
224.
Baku Restaurant. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his
telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that 'KAMO" try to develop
After arguing that this 
was 
against
a relationship with ABIDIAN.
the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against
ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" 
phoned
ABIDIAN, however, 
refused 
to
ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions.
meet him, and no further action was taken.*
NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in
the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but said that he
could check the room number if necessary since he had a copy of
the Embassy telephone list published monthly with the office room
number of each American employee. ABIDIAN's office 
was in the
"Zone of Security" (1.e., secure office areas).
A report from
some agent, whose name NOSENKO did not recall, indicated that
there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security
Office. NOSENKO did not know and said he was unable to deter-
No dictation or conversa-
mine whether ABIDIAN had a secretary.
"
tion was heard from ARIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone
was there, and NOSENKO said that he did not remember any specific
interesting or important information about ABIDIAN from other
microphones in the Embassy,'
**
NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in
He said that
the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished.
he did not consider data of this nature to be operationally
significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was
under active development,
Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times
while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries
he went or the time of year when the trips were made*** Such in-
formation, he stated, would have been of interest to him as
ABIDIAN'S case officer since, like LANGELLE s earlier trips
abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational pur-
There was, however, no possibility for the KGB to 
find
poses.
out where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the U.S. Embassy Section
did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done
See below for ABIDIAN's account of a similar incident involv-
ing a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenia.
** In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a room where an in-
operative microphone was discovered in 1964.
***ABIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years
in Moscow. In August 1960 he took personal leave to visit
his fiancee, a French girl, in the south of France and met
with a CIA officer while there. In February 1961 he flew on
the Ambassador's plane to Paris for meetings with CIA 
and
In September
then took personal leave to visit his fiancee.
1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to
New York City and Washington for briefings connected with
the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow.
****When CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have
photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow,
NOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not
photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet
Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, 
NOSENKO
added, it was not considered so important as to 
justify the
special effort involved.
TEP SELED
:
-14-00000**
225.
about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First.
Chief Directorate would not accept a request for operational
action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow.
number of times
In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked
whether he knew of any occasions on which ABIDIAN took trips in
the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, He replied each time that he
knew of no such trips and that if ABIDIAN had made such a trip or
trips he would have known of them and would remember them as it
would have been his responsibility as case officer to take cer-
tain actions. Among the latter he listed:
Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel
from the UPDK (the Soviet Government organization which pro-
vides services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).
- Notifying the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.
- Notifying appropriate local KGB offices on ABIDIAN's
itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and
other operational activity if desired.
-
Receiving. reading, and filing all surveillance
reports and reports of other operational activity carried
out by locak KGB units.
He stated
NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps.
further that even if he were absent when such a request for travel
was made, he would have seen all documents upor. his return and
that he did not remember seeing such documents in ABIDIAN's file.
NOSENYO's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIAN
travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1950.* Thereupon
NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave
in October 1950. He said that he could not recall exactly the
dates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but he
did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at
a dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel
time.
NOSENKO said further that he also remembered that he had
* ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publi-
cations Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 Octo-
ber 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the
Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency.). While
there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their
parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece
in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating
the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I,
and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near
the city of Yerevan, After returning to Moscow, an Armenian ·
whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN
When NOS-
at the Embassy. but ABIDIAN refused to see him.
ENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ABIDIAN attended a ser-
vice celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Kato-
likos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to
Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him
there. This agent, NUSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk,
and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN;
the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said
that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN'S
trip, and that he remembered no other details.
1
14-00000
226.
left the Soviet Union for Cube two or three, but not more than
five, days after his return from leave; he could not recall
the date of his departure for Cuba
°
Except for the American woman with whom APIDIAN was thought
to have been intimate. NOSENKO would not name ABIDIAN's close
American friends in Moscow or his close friends and professional
contacts with foreigners there.
NOSENKO received and reed transcripts of all telephone calls
that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the
Moscow city telephone system. He did not remember the names or
nationalities of people whom ABIDIAN called or who called ABIDIAN.
because there was nothing of interest in these conversations.
NOSENKO did not learn anything from telephone transcripts about
ABIDIAN's relationship with any foreigner in Moscow.
– པརཐརཾ, ཀྐཱ''མ
0
NOSENKO departed Moscow for Cuba on 15 November 1960 and
therefore, by his own statement, would have been back from
leave by 10 November at the earliest (five days before
departure). It was pointed out to NOSENKO that. in this
case, his 30 days of leave could have begun no earlier than
10 October and that he must therefore have been on duty on
5 October 1960 when ABIDIAN left Moscow. In October 1966,
however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in
interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February
1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said he
had no reason for this lie other than he had claimed to
be on leave "in conditions of interrogation when lies and
truths were all a porridçe,“ He told CIA again for the
first time. that his 1960 leave was taken in January of
that year, immediately after joining the U.S. Embassy
Section. Additional details on this January leave period
are given below, in discussion of NOSENKO's claimed
responsibility for operations against U.S. military
attaches in 1960.
14-00000
227,
(sii) ABIDIAN'S Letter Mailings
During the 1962 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO reported KGB
knowledge of one type of operational task perfe
by ABIDIAN
(see above).
in Moscow in addition to his recruitment of
This task, NOSENKO said, involved mailing at least three clan-
destine letters, in each case to KGB double agents.
*
According to NOSENKO on 11 June 1962, the KGB detected all
the letters mailed by ABIDIAN; he said that this was achieved
through the use of metka: "Stop mailing letters from the Embassy,
by Embassy employses. After LNIGELLE you didn't mail letters
for a year and a half, and then you begin again. ABIDIAN mailed
several. ABIDIAN, John ABIDIAN the Embassy Security Officer.
Listen, we have this cold /i.e. complete coverage of clandestine
mailings/. We have a machine, and the mechane finds the letters
which are mailed. Without surveillance. The machine itself.
This is a big, big secret. Here's how it works. They enter
your room
you live in Mogcow, work and even live in the Em-
bassy. They Soviet maids/ clean up the room and simply pour
a powder or apply it with a reg [to your clothes/. A rag, even
like a handkerchief. There is no smell. They put it in the
pockets where you might put a letter. And there is a special
little machine at a station in Moscow... All letters which are
mailed in Moscow pass through this machine, under a fotoapuarat
☐ literally a camera; NOSENKO probably means some sort of light-
sensitive device/. We now have 12 machines/ and hope to have
100 in Moscow. And all the letters pass through the apparatus
and the machine itself selects the letter which was mailed by
you or him. Do you understand? The machine itself finds it...
This is how it was with the letters that ASIDIAN mailed. We had
them all because this machine gave them to us. I even would
phone surveillance and say: 'He's out walking around. ABIDIAN
is out walking around, checking, checking.' I would say: 'Drop
him. But give me all the letters today.
mines whether there is a special letter there."
The machine deter-
Three days later, at NOSENKO's fifth and final meeting
with CIA in 1962, he was asked whether he knew to whom these
letters were addressed. NOSENKO replied: "To whom did ABIDIAN
mail letters? First he mailed a letter to a guy in Odessa.
Then ABIDIAN mailed one to still someone else. He mailed two
or three letters. One letter was to the Baltic area.
same kind, that is we hai planted this man on you. I think
it was to Riga, to our double agent. And still, I think,
two or three other letters, also to double agents.* ☆☆ But we
The
* NOSEN KO's information is substantially correct. LANGELLE
was declared persona non grata in connection with the arrest
of CIA agent FOPOV in October 1959. Two letters were mailed,
one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February 1960
(one of which was to an agent now known to have been under
KGB control at the time); no more letters were mailed until
1 April 1961, when John ABIDIAN mailed one, again to a KGB-
controlled agent. LANGELLE's arrest, however, was not the
cause of this break in letter-mailings; the suspension re-
sulted from other considerations.
**In 1961 ABIDIAN mailed three operational letters for CIA,
one to an agent in on 1 April, the second to an
agent in on 2 July, and the third to a
agent on 1 September.
}
1
TOP SECRET

14-000000
228.
didn't uncover any agents on the basis of letters he mailed,
There weren't any. I was concerned with ABIDIAN; therefore I
know. I can't tell you anything about the agent in the Baltic
area because he was handied by the Second Section of the Am-
erican Department, the Active Line
penetration."*
NOSENKO has described in greater detail how ABIDIAN was
detected mailing the letter to Odessa While discussing per-
sonnel assigned to the American Department of the Second Chief
Directorate, he said on 24 June 1964: "I first saw Aleksey
Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second Section in 1960, although I
heard that he was there in 1959... He is considered a specialist
on working against letters containing secret writing... SUMIN
sees all the letters mailed by Americans. even the American
tourists. The letters are caught either by surveillance or by
use of metka. There are several types of metka with different
colors, and one type will be used on American Embassy personnel,
another type on British Embassy personnel and another type for
tourists.** The same type is not always used against the same
group. They are switched around An example is in 1961 when
ABIDIAN mailed a letter to an agent in Odessa. This was a
'game igra - double agent operation The agent was 'ARK-
HANGELSKIY /KGB cryptonym/ I think. ABIDIAN used to park his
car and walk around, visiting many shops on Gorkiy Street.
went to one commission shop where there was a large mirror in
the shop window, and he would check for surveillance, He was
even followed to a post office and one of the surveillance
men got in there ahead of him, but he didn't do anything. Then
He
NOSENKO has explained that the so-called "Active Line" Section
of the American Department was concerned with the penetra-
tion of U.S. Intelligence, primarily by serving up KGE-
controlled agents for recruitment.
*** CIA has conducted a series of tests designed to determine
whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB
control device For the purpose of these tests, articles
of clothing worn by members of the U.S. Embassy and those
of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA
Headquarters. The clothing in each case had been sent to
Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted
to hang unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or
in the apartments of Embassy employees Special filter
paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same
paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers,
and the like. The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet,
chemical, and microscopic analysis as well as to examination
for traces of radioactivity. Results have been consistently
negative with a single exception. One test, on one item of
clothing, produced a sharply positive reaction.. This article
of clothing belonged to a third national diplomat who was a
CIA operational support agent in Moscow; he was also the
only person known to CIA to have been a victim of radio-
active isotope tagging in connection with an operational
task (not letter-mailing) which he had performed for CIA.
There were no positive reactions for this agent's clothing
in subsequent tests.
TOP SECRET
229
i
Two
The walked by a post box on the street and was checking it.
or three times he was followed by this post box but the sur-
veillance never saw him mail a letter. Still the KGB would
On the
remove the contents of the letter box and send it in,
second or third time SUMIN round the letter he mailed with
metka.
Of
He had also mailed a cover letter to his parents.
course, SUMIN also knew the address of the agent since it was
a 'game'."
NOSENKO described how
Under interrogation in January 1965
metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how,
in particula: this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN
mailed to the agent ARKHANGELSKIY in Odessa and to his parents
in the United States The following is taken from the protocol
of these interrogations which HOSENKO signed as being accurate.
on 4 March 1965:
"ABIDIAN s maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH.
-She-was-ar operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV, She
started to work for AbIDIAN a few months after his arrival,
perhaps three months but no longer than six months after
his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work
for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order
to evaluate her and give her general instructions about
her work for ABIDIAN, I do not know the exact date of
I wrote
this meeting but it was before the fail of 1960.
the operational pian on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960.
At this time FEDOROVICH was aiready working for ABIDIAN.
This operational plan stated that FEDOROVIC: would con-
tinue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN s clothing.
"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIANs clothing during
She did this
the entire period that she worked for him.
every two or three weeks except for a few times when she
was sick or on leave No one else had access to ABIDIAN'S
apartment and therefore no other person. had the pos51-
bility of putting metka on his clothing.
"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational
letter to the KGB aouble agent ARKHANGELSKIY', He
mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he
had gone several times earlier, Surveillance did not
see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was con-
trolled and the letter to ARKHANGELSKIY was found,
along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these
letters had metka on them. as I was told by SUMIN.
cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter
except that it was sometime in 1961.'*
I
In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a
photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for
Marion ALEAMONTE and Myra KEMMER, Embassy secretaries, until
There-
KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961,
after FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-:
time for ABIDIAN ABIDIAN explained that he had no maid at
all for the "first year of so" of his Moscow tour and that
FEDOROVICH was the only maid he employed there, when
ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy
TOP SECRET
14-00000
230.
(continuation of footnote from preceding page)
code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records
show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine
letters or. 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to
"ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961. IF ABIDIAN's recollec-
tion is correct (a review of Embassy phone lists shows that
KEMMER was in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in
August of that year), it appears that FEDOROVICH could not
have been responsible for the metka which, NOSENKO said,
led to discovery of the first of these letters; also, it
is possible that she was not employed by ABID AN at the time
the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third
clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, appar-
ently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him. When NOSENKO
was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVICH could not have
been applying metka regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the
time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter-mailing, he repeated
that no one but FEDOROVICH had the possibility of doing
so and that he was sure she had. When his interrogators
suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned
ABIDIAN's apartment on an informal basis before being
formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was
possibly the case. (CIA does not know whether this was
so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression
in December 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until
hiring FEDOROVICH.)
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TOP SECRET
231.
4) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop
In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB sur-
veillance had observed a visit by ABIDIAN to a probable dead
drop on Pushkin Street in Moscow at the end of 1960. This dead
drop figured prominently in the PENKOVSKIY case.
-
NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April
1964: "I left the U.S. Embassy Section/ in 1962. There was an
interesting 
move. This address where JACOES* was caught in the
PENKOVSKIY 
case the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in
1960, or at the beginning of 1961. And at that time I went there
together with V. A./ KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance
Directorate. M. G. MATVEYEV /Deputy Chief of the American
Department also went there with us. We went to that address
several times, at Pushkin Street. It was very interesting, this
radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to
place an observation post there, and that post was there for
about three months after ABIDIAN's visit... That was in 1960,
1961... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams
had to be occupied there for 24 hours every day. I was there
then in the 
U.S. Embassy Section for the entire time that sur-
veillance was watching the Pushkin Street site... At the be-
ginning I came there two or three times.
MATVEYEV once,
I came there with
twice with KOVSHUK; we came there with Venyamin
KOZLOV... But no one appeared here and so they were not writing
anything meaning that 
the Surveillance Directorate was not sub-
mitting written reports/. No one appeared. That's why, only
orally, KOZLOV was 
saying 'nothing.'
A week passed
the next week passed
'nothing,'
I shall tell you why I
didn't mention this to you in June 1962. Because I had
occasions where there were many such places, and they were
watched for 
nothing. And it would just pass away and in a
month it would 
be forgotten... So we waited a month, two,
three. Nothing. 
So they let it go at that and had forgotten.
Of course, the 
surveillance team had it all recorded, but we
had forgotten about that in the First American Department...
In 1962, I 
was in the Seventh /Tourist/ Department. I trans-
ferred in 
January 1962.
-
"
'nothing'
On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during
April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965
on ABIDIAN's 
visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is
consistent 
with and somewhat more detailed than earlier state-
ments not recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interroga-
tions:
In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case
officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy
to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow.
A stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN
leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the
Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the
car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned
specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to
a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but
Richard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servic-
ing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962.
FOP SECRET
14-00000
shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. He walked around
the corner and entered a residential building next to a
meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a
few seconds. The surveillance team saw him go in but did
not follow him. This unusual incident was reported by
the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance)
Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day
by the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance
Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Chief of the
American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,
MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building
and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of
ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway
particularly the radiator in it for use as a dead drop
-
site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief
Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a station-
ary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover
this location. Because of the short time available, it was
not possible to place this post inside the building, so it
was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator
was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic
container, had been concealed behind it. This stationary
post was maintained around the clock for 30 days, after
which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another
two months. If a package or magnetic container had been
found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning,
it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger
a signal should someone remove the package. At the same
time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed
on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of:
sight from the hallway below. During the three months
that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed
behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen
entering or leaving the building. The post was then dis-
continued, but the address was placed on a list of sus-
picious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Direc-
torate. The true significance of this location became
known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOV-
SKIY in 1962.
NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the sus-
pected dead drop site on the day it occurred. . He was
sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone
call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although
NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief
of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the
stationary surveillance post on this location was made at
a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in
the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO him-
self visited the building on Pushkin Street the following
day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes
and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that
there was a radiator there.
As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled re-
ceiving the surveillance report of his visit to the
Pushkin Street building and placing this report in
ABIDIAN'S file. (This is the case file which NOSENKO
TOP SECRET
14-00000
233.
turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December
1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.)
-
NOSENKO received no written reports on the results
of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss
this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during
the first month of surveillance, periodically after that.
These discussions took place either by telephone, or when
KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO
visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV
or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had
been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these
conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of
interest occurred during the period of the stationary sur-
veillance.
-
NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section during all
the period that the stationary surveillance-post-was-watch-
ing the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard
from KOZLOV that the post had been replaced by periodic
inspections.
-
NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance
on the Pushkin Street dead drop site to his CIA contacts
in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been
discontinued by this time without anything unusual or sus-
picious having been noted. Therefore he thought that this
incident would not be particularly interesting to the CIA.
CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street
dead drop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a year later than
NOSENKO says, in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY.
The sequence of events was as follows: On 27 December 1961,
following receipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal
from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded, Air Force Captain
Alexis DAVISON drove from his apartment to the U.S. Embassy to
alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN
left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence
where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station,
Paul GARBLER, about the signal. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso
House with the other guests at about 0200 on 28 December in
ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part
of his "drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was to leave a mark.
Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in his own
car drove from the Embassy to DAVIDSON's apartment, where he
first checked the telephone pole visually from the window and
then walked by it for a closer examination. Although it was
not certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December
had, in fact, been a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no
supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision
was reached to check the drop. Therefore, at 1115 on 30 Decem-
ber 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Embassy Economics
Officer, left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet
driver and proceeded to a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin
Street. At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop
site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and
left one minute later.. The pair then returned to the Embassy.
These facts were outlined to NOSENKO during the February
1965 interrogations. It was pointed out that, by his own most
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recent account, NOSENKO had transferred from the U.S. Embassy
Section to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 and
that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to
American citizen W. E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been con-
firmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore. NOSENKO was told, much
of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin
Street affair became untenable. NOSENKO's response to this
observation is described in Part V.F.3., which discusses
NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON.
Also during the February 1965 interrogations NOSENKO refused
to sign the page of a protocol which read as follows:
"I have been told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's.
only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 Dec-
ember 1961. Therefore, I was told that:
a.
I could not have placed the surveillance
report in ABIDIAN's case file because I had already
turned over the file to GRYAZNOV.
b. I could not have received reports about the
stationary surveillance while still ABIDIAN's case
officer, since I was already in the Seventh Depart-
ment in January 1962.
C. The three month period in which the sur-
veillance post was watching the Pushkin Street site
did not expire until 30 March 1962 more than two
weeks after I left for Geneva.
Thus I could not have known in June 1962 that the surveil-
lance of the dead drop site had failed to produce results
or that it had been discontinued.“
Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involve-
ment with ABIDIAN as summarized in the protocol, NOSENKO said
the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "look silly."
On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols
dealing with other subjects.
NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concern-
ing ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO reaffirmed that
ABIDIAN was under special surveillance coverage throughout his
Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from
the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street and back; he would date this
only as "sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB sur-
veillance had detected any unusual movements by ABIDIAN during
the period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop
site (a reference to his movements on 27 and 28 December 1961
as described above). He replied that he knew definitely that
surveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that
ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB surveillance at
any time during this period.
On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why, in his opinion,
ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In re-
sponse, he told CIA for the first time that in about 1960 an
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American tourist or delegation member had gone to the Pushkin
Street address and that it was the "opinion of the Second Chief
Directorate" that this American had selected it as a dead drop
site, it was thought that ABIDIAN. went there merely to check
the suitability of the proposed site.
•
When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited
the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been
Been there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't
remember. I do not want to say that I visited the dead drop. I
don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me
that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited
it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes, ' and I cannot say 'no.'"
As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day
ABIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December
1961) the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV,
inspected the Pushkin Street building. The FBI had reported,
however, that KOZLOV was on TDY in the United States from
15 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30 December
1361, travelling via France. The timing of ABIDIAN's visit to
Pushkin Street, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern Standard).
time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having
gone to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO said he did.
The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOV-
SKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initi-
ally contacted CIA. . The only known visits by Americans to
this address and the only ones connected with its use as a
dead drop location occurred on 12 November and 4 December
1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address
from the outside, and on 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY
returned and entered the building to check the precise
dead drop location. See Part V.E.3.f. for a discussion
of HOSENKO's knowledge of MAHONEY.
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236.
Supervisor of Activities Against American Service Attaches
At the beginning of the interrogation session on 29
January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he as-
sumed upon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in Jan-
uary 1960. As he had on a number of earlier occasions,
NOSENKO replied that he was given responsibility for the
supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB
case officer for American Security Officer John ABIDIAN
who was to arrive in the near future, and was charged
with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of
the U.S. Embassy and his section's file on the materials.
from microphones in various Erbassy offices. Later in
this same session NOSENKO recalled--and told CIA for the
first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising
activities against officers assigned to the U.S. Army,
Navy, and Air Force Attache offices. The pertinent
portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogation was as fol-
lows:
Question:
NOSENKO,
-
Questions
NOSENKO:
Questions
Who briefed you or gave you instructions on
what was expected of you in the Section?
I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.
What did KLYPIN say?
That "you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I
consider that you must also pay special atten-
tion to code clerks. We must study them and
It's necessary
make an approach to one of then.
"
to work on this." KOVSHUK was in KLYPIN's
office and I remember also that he raised the
question: "O.K. He will supervile this kind
of work, but maybe he can also take the military.
All three attaches. Well, KLYPIN did not say
yes and did not say no. I couldn't say anything
because I had not begun; I didn't know how much
work this would involve. I couldn't say. And,
you see, KLYPIN said; "Let's try it a short.
period of time." It was that way. It was
decided that I will supervise the code clerks
and then the three attaches. And KOVSHUK took
But,
the diplomats and a whole pile of work.
of course, in the absence of KOVSHUK I must
take everything and in my absence, KOVSHUK
must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -- I
don't remember dates later I was not super-
vising the military attaches but concentrated
only on code clerks.
--
Later you were not supervising military attaches,
but only code clerks?
NOSENKO: Yes.
Questions What do you mean you were supervising military
attaches?
HOSENKO, What does it mean? If the case officers of the
three attaches have any questions or any papers
to report to the Chief of Section, they go to
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Questions
237.
me, not to KOVSHUK.
questions with me.
They were deciding all
This is what supervising
the work on these three attaches means. They
were deciding all questions with me. For ex-.
ample, the case officers who were working
against diplomats -- KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN,
CHEREPANOV -- they were reporting any questions,
You see, there was
any papers, to KOVSHUK.
such a division (of labor].
Am I correct that by military attaches you
mean Army, Navy, and Air Force?
NOSENKO$
Yes.
Questions
Attaches and their assistants?
NOSENKO
Yes, yes, yes.
Question: And enlisted personnel?
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO $
Question:
DEMKIN was handling enlisted personnel, and he
was also coming in to me for advice.
Roughly how long did you have the responsibil-
ities for the attaches?
(pause) I don't remember.
Several months.
By several, you mean...?
NOSENKO: Five or six.
Question:
NOSENKO:
And why was this responsibility removed from
you?
there
I didn't have time. No time. No time. You see,
besides this, which is simple to explain,
were too many other questions which...
Question:
What occupied most of your time?
NOSENKO:
Then
Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of
Department to study and develop this question,
then this question, then this question.
something to prepare for GRIBANOV, then some-
thing to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report,
then something to prepare for myself...
Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have
mentioned did you devote the most time?
NOSENKO: I don't know.
Question. What was most important?
NOSENKOs They were all important.
Question:
Can you tell me where you were spending most of
your time to cause the removal of your respon-
sibility for military attaches?
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...

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238.
HOSENKOS No. I can't tell you.
Question: Who was given the responsibility for military
attaches?
NOSENKOs
Question:
!
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Just a moment. I think he was... I don't re-
member how, or what date, when there appeared in
the First (American] Department a Deputy Chief
of Department; It was either before I came,
or it was in January, or it was a little bit
later.
Who was this?
ALESHIN.*
new one ---
And his job was such -- it was a
supervision of work against military
intelligence officers, not only Americans, but
of other departments also, the First, the
Second, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth. Co-
ordination of the whole work against all military
intelligence officers. And that's why, later,
KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you
supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You are
the Deputy of the Chief. It was not only be-
cause of the lack of time. Also it wasn't con-
venient to the case officers. They were re-
porting to me. Then ALESHIN would invite them
in and they would have to report the same thing
to him.
Who were you supervising?
..GAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and
assistants; KURILENKO had the Army Attache and
assistants; and BELOGLASOV the Naval Attache,
assistants and marines.**
During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO
changed his earlier statement that the only operational
file he held in the U.S. Embassy Section was that on
ABIDIAN. At the same time, he described a leave period
that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When
I began to work (in the U.S. Embassy Section!, after a
month or so, I took the files on the Naval Attaches. And
NOSENKO had mentioned this earlier. On 18 June 1964 he was
asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Sec-
tion officers in 1960. He said: "In 1960 the Chief of the
First Department was KLYPIN. MATVEYEV was still there as
First Deputy. The Second Deputy was, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich
ALESHIN. He was given the special assignment of coordina-·
ting the activities of the Second Chief Directorate against
all foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned
to the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK
was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to
general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising
the work against code clerks and the Embassy Security Officer.'
In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV was re-
sponsible for the Naval Attache's office in January: when
NOSENKO arrived, but he was transferred and his duties were
taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had been working with him
against this target.
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239.
then after two months I gave them to BELOGLAZOV. I im-
After 
two 
weeks
mediately went on vacation after I came.*
I went on leave for a month. I took over the files either
before or after the leave.*** NOSENKO was asked why he
had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and
I 
should take only:
replied: It was decided by KOVSHUK.
the Navy while I was getting acquainted with the section.
At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and
I didn't take the Army.
he handled only Naval officers.
or Air Force.
"
NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he
was responsible only for the Naval Attaches during early
1960. He answered: "I took the files only on the Navy
,
but I was working on all of them.
"
ཀ་༢ -༧ ༧༦.༩ །
There-
In other contexts NOSENKO has always equated custody
of a file with case officer responsibilities.
fore, he seems to have indicated here that for the
approximately two months when these files were in his
name,
he was officially the KGB case officer charged
with the American Naval Attaches.
** During a subsequent interrogation session, NOSENKO was
asked to describe the leaves he took during 1960 
and
1961. He repeated that he took a month's leave im-
mediately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, "part
He had gone,
of January and part of February" 1960;
He
he said, to the Caucasus with his wife and mother.
then added: "You want me to say I was not telling the
truth in February [1965] when I said I was on leave be-
fore I went to Cuba (in November 1960]. I 
know this."
(See Part V.E.3.d., which describes this November 1960.
leave and its relationship to NOSENKO's responsibilities
as case officer for John ABIDIAN.)
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240..
(1)
Knowledge of the Target
Introduction
His position and duties as Deputy Chief and sometimes
Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required him to
know, the extent of the U.S. Embassy Section's knowledge.
of its target. He has therefore been questioned at length
by CIA about the locations and occupants of the EmbascY
offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB
had identified as CIA officers. The information from
NOSENKO on these two topics is presented below.
(11) Physical Premises
NOSENKO has said that his knowledge of the physical
layout of the Embassy derives both from his general super-
visory function during 1960 and 1961 and from his respon-
sibilities as the officially registered custodian of the
KGB's file on the security of the Embassy. According to
NOSENKO, he received the latter from his chief, KOVSHUK,
when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly
thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat
of the Second Chief Directorate to have custody transferred
officially to his name from that of M.F. BAKHVALOV, his
predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained
that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time
but that, under KGB procedures, it was permissible for an
officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging
to the U.S. Embassy Section, even after leaving the American
Department, so long as he remained in the Second Chief
Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV
approximately during the period 25 to 28 December 1961, no
one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the
section, and GRYAZNOV and KCSOLAPOW, who shared the office
and safe where this file was kept.
NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never
studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention
to this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a
position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no
operational analysis or planning by himself or others was
done on the basis of this file during his two years in the
section.. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old
building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch
thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy
Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for
reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was
impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure
areas of the Embassy because of the security precautions in
effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NCSENKO was
generally interested in the floor plans of the Embassy by
virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the section.
NOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in
the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements
are given in the next paragraphs.
All KGB employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone
of Security") of the Embassy on the seventh through tenth floors*
The seventh floor is not one of the secure areas; the
eighth, ninth, and tenth are.
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241.
were carefully questioned on what they saw, because these
NOSENKO knew
areas were of special interest to the KGB.
no KGB employees who entered the secure areas during
1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them.
He did not remember any information that such KGB employees
ever reported to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV,
an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955,
had observed antenna wiring in the attic, the details or
significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of
1965.
NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents
in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it.
None of the information, he said, was interesting, im-
portant, or useful enough for him to remember, and he
In another
could not name the agent sources of the KGB.
context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he
had received a report from some agent (name unknown)
that there was a sign "Security Office" on the office
door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer.*
NOSENKO did not study the Embassy security pro-
cedures in detail and did not remember where the classified
trash was burned. He said that nothing could be done with
this information operationally, because the trash was al-
ways burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard ac-
companied by an officer.**
The Embassy office or floor where any section was
located or any individual worked during the years 1960
and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO. This reply was
also given when he was asked about the rooms and floors
for the offices of the ambassador, the political officers,
ABIDIAN, and the code clerks.*** NOSENKO said that he
either knew these locations at the time he was Deputy
Chief of the section or could have found them in the
in the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these
regularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office
numbers and phone numbers.
There never has been such a sign; NOSENKO's responsi-
bility for the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN is discussed
in, Part V.E.3.d. All Soviets who enter the top three
floors of the Embassy have a marine escort.
A check with two former Embassy security officers in-
dicates that there has never been such a regulation.
The trash is burned by the marine on duty who "in-
variably does it alone." One of the security officers
questioned said: "I can think of no reason why the Sov-
iets would think this to be the case, since whatever
collateral information they have on it would point to
the truth."
Part V.E.3.c. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and parti-
cipation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks.
****The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office
numbers. They do, however, provide apartment numbers.
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242.
In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived
at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for
secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was
located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an
unknown source that in 1960-1961 meetings were held in a
secure room in the "Zone of Security." He did not know any
of the technical details of this room.
The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified
material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1960
and 1961. A charwoman (name or cryptonym not recalled),
who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOG-
LAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval
Attaches. Most of the papers were torn or crumpled. They
included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches' sighting
of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad. Since
this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO
said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft,
including the date, except that the charwoman was granted
a cash award.
(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover
According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S. Embassy
of greatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section
were the identified CIA officers. When questioned on 2
September 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence por-
sonnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO
stated that the KGB immediately listed any officer associated
with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member
of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat as "suspect
American Intelligence," the latter notation always meaning
CIA. One of the tasks of the section was to determine which
of these diplomats was the CIA "Resident" (KGB nomenclature
for Chief of Station), which were CIA case officers, and
which were the CIA agents or cooptees. The KGB knew that
code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions
and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and
the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a pro-
tocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and
occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily
know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer in the
Embassy."
=
NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all
American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and
1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select
those known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers. The
persons he so identified, together with his comments con-
cerning them were:
-Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA "Resident"
in Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why
KLOSSON was considered as such but said: "Every officer
in the First (U.S. Embassy) Section thought he was the
Resident.' KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job,
NOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the
CIA Resident on the basis of his behavior under KGB.
surveillance and of his letter mailing.* NOSENKO did
HARK was a CIA cooptee while in Moscow, not a CIA officers
see Part II.B..
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243.
* ⭑
not recall the names of KGB agents working specifically
against KLOSSON and never read any agent or surveil-
lance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in
clandestine activity. NOSENKO did not know KLOSSON's
position: in the Embassy, where he had been previously
stationed, what trips he took inside the Soviet Union,
where he lived in Moscow, about KLOSSON's wife or
whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything
about his personal life, the names of close American
friends and his Soviet contacts. "I didn't read the
file" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965.
"was
The responsible KGB officer, A.M. MIKHAYLOV,
reading [the file). I can't tell you why (we believed
KLOSSON was the CIA Resident]. There was opinion--his
previous position, attitude. Little, little details.
I don't remember."*
-John ABIDIAN: Considered to be a CIA officer
on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Department of
State security officer in connection with Premier
KHRUSHCHEV's 1959 visit to the United States and be-
cause he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE
in Moscow. Surveillance established the fact that he
mailed operational letters and visited a possible dead
drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.).
-George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA officer and
was given special attention because of his operational
activity in the POPOV case. ** WINTERS was in personal
contact with KOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible
for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV.
-Steve WASHENKO: Known to be a CIA officer. As
far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WASHENKO
as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or
two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic
area. In addition, from a KGB microphone he was over-
heard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he
returned from a trip in the USSR.
Lewis BOWDEN: Suspected of being a CIA officer,
but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK,
under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact
with BOWDEN.
See below; William MORELL was identified by KLOSSON to the
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer be-
fore MORELL arrived in Moscow.
The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in
Part VI.D.7.a.; further KGB information on WINTERS is re-
viewed in Part VI.D.7.c.
*** The CHEREPANOV document, which sets forth a KGB plan for
operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he
was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy.
NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February
1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDEN
as FBI on later occasions also. Sea Part VI.D.7.c. on
CHEREPANOV.
༄༄༄།། བ ྩོ་
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244.
-
Richard FUNKHOUSER:
Suspected of being a CIA
officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union,
particularly economics. NOSENKO did not remember the
names of any agents working against FUNKHOUSER nor any
derogatory information concerning him.
William HORBALY: Suspected of being a CIA case
officer* because the KGB heard him, by means of micro-
phones in the Embassy, discussing a report he had
written, or dictating it, about his observations on
a trip he had taken in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO said
that he did not know the names of agents working
against HORBALY or whether the agents obtained deroga-
tory information concerning him. As far as NOSENKO
knew, there had been no operational approach to or
recruitment of HORBALY.
Of the seven U.S. Embassy officers designated by
NOSENKO as known or suspected CIA personnel, three--WINTERS,
WASHENKO, and HORBALY--were in fact CIA officers. When
HORBALY was first assigned to Moscow, however, he was
detached from overt employment as an economic analyst in
CIA. In January 1962 he severed his connections with CIA
to become a full member of the Foreign Agricultural Ser-
vice of the Department of Agriculture. When HORBALY first
arrived in Moscow he openly discussed the fact that he had come
to the Embassy from CIA. While in Moscow he had no connection
with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities. WASHENKO was
similarly detached from overt employment as an economic analyst
with CIA when he was assigned to Moscow, but was coopted by
CIA for limited operational support activity, chiefly mailing
agent letters. After his return from Moscow he reverted to
his overt CIA employment. John ABIDIAN was a State Department
officer coopted by CIA; although not a CIA staff employee, he
was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from Febru-
ary 1960 until November 1961. The remaining three--KLOSSON,
BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA.
During the time NOSENKO said he belonged to the American
Embassy Section there were stationed in Moscow two CIA
officers, Eugene P. MAHONEY and Paul GARBLER, whose status
as such was subsequently found to have been known to the
KGB before their arrival in the Soviet Union. In addition,
one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA
employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before
arriving in Moscow. Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page
374) reported having been asked by one of the two KGB offi-
cers trying to recruit him whether MORELL was a CIA employee;
when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer
stated: "He openly says he does." Another officer (G. Stan-
ley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the
U.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to
the Embassy. The latter two were not engaged in clandestine
activities in Moscow on behalf of CIA, but the first two CIA
officers were.
NOSENKO indicated that he did not know about the intel-
ligence affiliation of any of these four persons:
-
NOSENKO was shown a photograph of MAHONEY, whom
he did not recognize. He was then given MAHONEY's
name, which he recognized as being that of an employee
of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. NOSENKO
ssified ECERALLY
Earlier NOS
CIA cooptée,
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245.
st
"
said that, other than this, he did not know anything
about MAHONEY--his previous career, his knowledge of the
Russian language, when he arrived in Moscow, when he
departed, where he lived, his activities there, or
evidence that he was an intelligence officer.
"It
wasn't known he was a CIA officer, NOSENKO said on
3 February 1965. "If there was evidence I would have
known. But there was none. NCSENKO was told that
MAHONEY's CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by
a KGB penetration of British intelligence (George
BLAKE]. He replied that he was certain that the U.S.
Embassy Section's file on MAHONEY contained no infor-
mation from such a source concerning MAHONEY, and that
had there been such information available, he would
have been a special target and would have been handled
by one of the best officers in the section. NOSENKO
added that he could not understand why this infor-
mation about MAHONEY was not given to the section by
the KGB First Chief Directorate.
-
शु
NOSENKO identified Paul CARBLER as a naval officer
who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the
case officer working against him as BELOGLAZOV. He said
that he could provide no other details on GAPBLER.
NOSENKO specifically said that he did not know the names
of any agents working against GARBLER, that he knew of
no unusual or interesting information concerning GARBLER
contained from concealed microphones, telephone taps,
or surveillance, and that he did not know whether he
had read GARBLER's file or other "materials" concerning
him.
-
NOSENKO did not identify William MORELL as a CIA
officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the
Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO's
superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer
of the KGB First Chief Directorate.
-
NOSENKO did not recognize the name of G. Stanley
BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA,
BROWN shared an office with HORBALY, whom NOSENKO said
was a suspected CIA officer; in this office was a KGB
microphone with good reception but insignificant pro-
duction, according to NOSENKO.** Reportedly BROWN and
another member of the Embassy staff were under constant
surveillance during a trip within the USSR during 1961,
and in the same year he travelled to Leningrad with
WINTERS, correctly identified by NOSENKO, as a CIA officer.
CIA records show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served
in Frankfurt during 1955 and 1956 and was connected with a
joint CIA/MI-6 project which handled the NTS, a Russian emigre
organization. His work brought him into liaison in true name
with both MI-6 and the French Service; he was known to NTS:
personnel by his true first name only.
See first footnote, Page 243.
1956.
In discussing the goprones encasey, NOSENIO said
that in late 1960 or early 1961 the U.S. Embassy Section
had decided to withdraw the requirement for continuous
kajmy mama ada kegs Rob'e no) APAM's office.
w that Flite midten king good targata uf
Chigher, priority,
t: Past.t.
TOP SECRET
..
14-00000
TOP SECRET
246.
MAHONEY arrived in Moscow on 4 October 1960 as the
Assistant General Services Officer at the U.S. Embassy.
His specific CIA mission there was to support the handling
of PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. MAHONEY lived in
America House. From the start of his tour he was active in
his attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he
frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. In
checking locations connected with the PENKOVSKIY case,
MAHONEY went to the Pushkin Street dead drop location on
two occasions during November and December 1960, and he
made a thorough examination of the dead drop itself as
well as of its related signal site on 21 January 1961.
Throughout, MAHONEY was subjected to intensive KGB surveil-
lance. In a report dated 25 October 1960, ABIDIAN com-
mented on this as follows: "I find this type of coverage
(five surveillants on a recent trip to the barber shop)
completely out of character with that which is usually
given a new arrival of similar rank. My only inference
is that the KGB has at least strong suspicions of MAHONEY's
primary role [CIA officer]. As for surveillance on my-
self, it continues to be occasional and extremely discreet.
"
George BLAKE, the KGB penetration of MI-6, was arrested
in London on 14 April 1961. In his confession he said that
he had passed the KGB a master list of the names of persons
connected with the joint U.S.-British project with which
MAHONEY had been connnected in Frankfurt, as well as other
materials on this project. On this basis, MAHONEY was
relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with
support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn from
Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival.
CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA
by the Navy in April 1952 and served CIA under Naval cover
in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. In the fall
of 1955, he resigned his naval commission, and in May 1956
he was assigned as a CIA officer to the U.S. Embassy in
Stockholm. GARBLER served there until August 1959 in the
cover position of Second Secretary and Political Officer (FSR).
On 3 June 1961, he returned to active duty with the Navy,
and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as
Assistant Naval Attache to Moscow, with the rank of Commander.
In September 1961 his official biographic data was forwarded
to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who
had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER
made an official call at the Soviet Embassy. GARBLER arrived
in Moscow on 29 November 1961. He was the CIA Chief of
Station there.
Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in
Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE. In April
1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-MI-6 discussions
in Washington on the question of tourist operations into
the Soviet Union (see Part V.D.8); BLAKE, who had access
to information on the agenda and participants for these talks,
admitted after his arrest in 1961 that he had photographed
the minutes of this meeting and had passed them to his Soviet
handlers. On this basis CIA presumed that GARBLER_was
identified to the KGB prior to arriving in Moscow at the
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;
<.
..
!
* UP SCHET
247.
end of 1961. (BLAKE was arrested the previous April.) He
was definitely identified as such 
in an article carried in
the Soviet Government newspaper 
Izvestiya in October 1963.
This article, entitled "A Cruel 
Lesson, was allegedly
written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian 
who defected to 
the
West in 1955 and returned to the 
Soviet Union in 1963; 
in
it HAMAN attempted to expose how "
the U.S. Secret Service
,
riding roughshod over Swedish 
sovereignty. recruits agents
for subversion and espionage against 
the Soviet Union and
other countries...making active 
use of the official U.S.
HAWAN named
missions in Stockholm, newsmen
, tourists...'
This article,
GARBLER as having been involved in this 
work
.
which appeared at about the same 
time as the 
arrest of
WENNERSTROM, described a 
number of fabricated activities
of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, 
GARBLER had no connection
with HAMAN or with anything which 
HAMAN describes.*
GARBLER's part in ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY
dead drop site on Pushkin Street is 
discussed in Part
V.E.3.d.
See Page 394 for other KGB operational
TOP SECRET
use of HAMAN.

14-00000
248.
g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy
(i)
Introduction
NOSENKO had three basic pieces of information on KGB
audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Em-
bassy in Moscow: The presence of microphones in the
chancery building, the absence of audio-technical devices
in the north wing of the Embassy, and the existence of a
beam which monitors and jams transmissions from the Embassy.
These are discussed separately below. Except for knowing
that a resonant cavity (wireless) microphone had been found
in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO
said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and tech-
niques (other than the chancery microphones) in use against
the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by
such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to
the best of his knowledge, there were no wireless micro-
phones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters)
in the Embassy.* His information on KGB electronic opera-
tions against this target dated mainly from the period when
he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American
Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and
derives from his special responsibilities in this period;
from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NO-
SENKO said, he learned only that audio installations
existed.
(11) Microphones in the Chancery
Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important
information, the microphones in the chancery building were
first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva.
In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in de-
tail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on
the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of
reception, and the value of production. He has not given
the date when the microphones became operative, but pre-
sumed (in agreement with the KGB defector COLITSYN) that
they were installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was oc-
cupied by U.S. Government representatives.** Of the 16
microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the impor-
tance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor,
the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and
subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In
1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old
*NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American
counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the micro-
phones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since
a microphone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this re-
mark suggests either that there was an external power source
for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or
that NOSENKO himself did not have rudimentary knowledge of
such matters.
**The investigations by American technicians leave no doubt.
that the microphone-and-wire system would have had to be
in place at the time of occupancy.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
.249.
system varied from very clear to zero; he said in 1964.
that the quality was deteriorating and that "in a year or
two they (the microphones) will be completely 
inoperative
."*
Although the microphones produced a great deal of 
politi-
cal intelligence, NOSENKO said, the found nothing worthwhile
for use against U.S. code clerks or others of operational
interest to him. ** All pertinent details from 
NOSENKO 
and
other sources on the microphone system in the chancery
building is presented in the following portions of this
paper.
(a) NOSENKO's Sources
Nearly all of NOSENKO's knowledge about the microphone
system in the chancery building was, he said, derived 
from
two circumstances: First, his responsibility as Deputy
Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and
disseminating transcripts of conversations there%; and second,
a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity 
as
Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and 
custodian of
Additional 
information was 
ob-
the microphone information.
tained by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his
former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the
Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV during this
period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were
dead while others had become less efficient 
since 
NOSENKO's
reassignment to the Tourist Department in January 1962.
NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources of infor-
mation on the microphones are presented in chronological
order below.
"We are listening to everything the military attaches
say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches
,"
✓ NOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. "All the reports go through
me. I read them....Only a limited group of people read
these reports. They are all in the First Department of the
Second Chief Directorate. Who are they? The 
Chief of the
Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief
of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people.
Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important
.
Ne conceal the fact that we are listening to the Americans
from our workers in other departments, from the English
Department, from the French Department.... We are listening
Don't
to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor
.
even send coded cables about me (to Moscow). If you do it
will be the end of me....Only three people know that we
are listening to you. Even within the Second Chief Directo-
rate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you.'
"
NOSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which
be received the audio intercept reports and whether these
He answered: 
"No.
reports were delivered to his office:
Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned
*Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians
later in 1964 resulted in recordings of high intelligibility
in certain instances.
**Vulnerability data on Americans in Moscow could be obtained
from the microphone system, according to the damage report
by the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence 
Board (
USIB):
and according to the views of the U.S. Army Attache 
whose
office in the Embassy was the site of a microphone.
TOP SECRET
14.00000
TOP SECRET
250.
with this function which is called the Second Special
Department. It is a part of the Operational Technical:
Directorate (OTU). The Special Department has several
sections within it. Take, for example, the section under
Colonel [N. Ya.] KUZMIN. He has the entire English line,
everything. He has young girls and boys there who have an
excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with
special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this,
everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They
listen to it two or three times so as to get every word....
[They prepare the materials.) The materials from the
American Embassy used to come to me...and I decided what to
keep and what not to keep. Why? A summary report would
come to me with the notation that the information in it
was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but -
I was required to return the report within two days' time...
So, I would read through the materials to see what was use-
ful and what was not. It's not all suitable. And I would
underline this (the significant items) with a pencil.
No,
(I was wrong. The report first went to the chief of de-
partment and then I underlined with a pencil what was neces-
sary and gave it back to them (the Second Special Department,
OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had
received it from them and they gave me a receipt when I
returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these
extracts alone one cannot tell where the material came from,
but from the report one realizes that the Americans are
being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts
to place in the files. We have a file on each person working
in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formulyar (developmental
file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee."
During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in
✓ Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number of notes from
his wallet. Pointing to one of them, he said: "This piece
of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents
the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those micro-
phones which are actively used in monitoring conversations
in the U.S. Embassy." This list named eleven offices and
apartments in the chancery which contained microphones.
When asked whether he had copied the list from records or
had drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came
from an operational review of what "listening points we had
in the U.S. Embassy."
A detailed explanation of his acquisition of the written
list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:
Question:
NOSENKO:
How did this list come into your hands? What
caused you to write it?
I came to KLYPIN (Chief of the American Depart-
ment] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK (Chief.
of the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department]
was writing and he put the list on my book.
KOVSHUK said this one (microphone) is working
well, this one badly, and so on.
Question: What was the date of this? What year and month?
NOSENKO: Oh, I don't remember, 1960...maybe the beginning
of 1961.
Question:
At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961
you and KOVSHUK net in KLYPIN's office?
TOP SECRET
:
14-00000
3312
251.
NOSENKO:
Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. It is dif
ficult to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK
in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was writing in
KLYPIN's study room. I don't remember.
NOSENKO then described the purpose of the meeting:: To dis-
cuss the possibility of releasing monitor positions from
some of the chancery microphones and of assigning these re-
leased positions to Vladimir [patronymic unknown] PETROV,
Chief of the American Department's section for work against
American tourists and delegates suspected of being con-
nected with American Intelligence; PETROV had earlier re-
quested English-language monitoring positions from the Chief
of the English-Language Section of the OTU's Second Special
Department but had been told that all such interpreters were
already engaged on priority targets. At the meeting KOVSHUK
and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the chancery
to decide which rooms offered information of little value
and which monitoring positions could be released to PETROV.
KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments
then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those
of lesser importance. At the end of the meeting, KOVSHUK
gave the list to NOSENKO, who retained it in his safe until
bringing it to CIA in 1964. NOSENKO has added nothing fur-
ther on the locations of microphones in the chancery building,
and much of his information concerning the quality and value
of the production by these microphones came from this
meeting.
Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his
responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts
He said on
received from the Second Special Department.
14 May 1964: "All the materials after they were read and
signed were returned to the Second (Special) Department of the
Some of the material from
Operational Technical Directorate.
this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read
it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know
that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK and I read all of this.
From this we gave information to those who needed it, de-
pending on their interest. If there was something inter-
If KLYPIN saw
esting, it was given to KLYPIN to read.
something interesting he could take it and give it to GRI-
BANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT (from the Second Special Department]
She went to KLYPIN.
came by car with this material.
times she left them with me.
་་
.
Some-
"One of
These
A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states:
my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department,
Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give
to appropriate case officers the production from microphones
in the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained
the control book (journal) for these transcripts.
transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Direc-
torate of the KGB. Every day a female worker of the OTU
brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy
from the previous day. I regularly returned all of the ori-
ginal transcripts to this female worker; they were usually
in my possession for one day. In my absence this duty was
performed by [my superior] KOVSHUK or [my subordinate]
GHYAZNOV.".
TOP SECRET
14-00000
SECRET
252.
(b) Number and Locations of Microphenes
The information from NOSENKO on the number and locations
of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S.
Embassy is separated from that furnished by other sources.
NOSENKO's Information
☑
11 June 1962: [NOSENKO has just been assured that none
of the information he had given CIA would be used without
first consulting with him.] "Well, because you are such
good guys, I will give you even more. Have the Minister
Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office....
Listen, move the Minister Counsellor from his present office
to the north wing of the Embassy (where NOSENKO said there
were no listening devices; see below). We are not listening
to the Ambassador. But move the Minister Counsellor..
And we are listening to all your military attaches there.
All of them--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the
Air Force Attache.... We have four or five points [from which
we are getting intercepts!. We hear the Minister Counsellor,
all three attaches--that's four points--and the fifth is
where one of the State Department employees sits.
And yes,
there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the
Agricultural Attache. [C. Stanley] BROWN is working there
now and someone else, a young man (William HORBALY].
we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest
secret. Only a few people know this. I was Deputy Chief
of the section and received this information. I decided
what to give the Chief of Department and what not to give
him. Do you understand? This is to say nothing about the
other departments and the [U.S.] Embassy Section itself."
So,
12 June 1962: "We lost the microphone in the private
residence of the Ambassador. This was not THOMPSON, but the
one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had some-
thing there, but you found the [Great Seal where it was
located. But in the Embassy itsel, in the Ambassador's
office, we have nothing. The one we hear now is (Minister
Counsellor FREERS. Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around
his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this
is important material."
14 June 1962: "When I was Deputy Chief of the American
Embassy Section I received reports on the microphone material
daily. If there was something important in it, I reported
to the Chief of the department. The rest KOVSHUK and I
read and then distributed to the workers the parts that con-
cerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against
the three attaches knew about this [microphone) equipment....
Nothing was received from the code room. These machines
were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting
alone and there was nothing. [NOSENKO is evidently describing
the military code room. ].... There is a point there from which
we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there in nothing
there. They talk about what interests them in the field of
agriculture. Nothing interesting.”
24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 list which
NOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following
offices and apartments in the chancery contained microphones:
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TOP SECRET
253.
"Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Military Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN:
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;
"Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, REITZ
and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Roon;
"State Department Code Room and Telotype Office;
"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"
Altogether, sixteen spaces are listed, but of the NOSENKO
said that the microphone in one (the Marine bar) had 
never
worked and that nothing of importance was learned from 
the
This leaves
microphones in the four Embassy apartments.
eleven; when presenting the list to CIA, NOSENKO said that
while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section, "there were a total
of eleven listening posts." (In discussing the late 1960
or early 1961 meeting at which ROVSHUK and KLYPIN received
the microphone coverage, NOSENKO said on 14 May 1964 that
it was decided to release the microphone positions in the
GLEYSTEEN office, the KORBAY Y-BROWN office, the State De-
This 
would
partment code room and the teletype office.
leave a total of eight "listening posts.")
14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of micro-
phones in the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO said that "many" were
installed in the chancery building before the 
Americans 
moved
in, but that he did not know how many were installed in all
,
how many wege in any one of the rooms included 
in KOYSHUK's
He
list, or where they were located in specific rooms.
did recall that most of the microphones were placed in the
outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Strect, 
as most 
of
the offices faced this street and the placement of the micro-
phones near the outer wall would make it more difficult 
for
American technicians to find them if they examined only 
the
inner walls.
January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no
fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted
He said that there was
men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
discussion during 1950 and 1961 of using the KGB agents
employed there to place temporary audio devices for one or
two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as
in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, be-
cause such devices are too easily found.
For the same rea-
son, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period
to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's
residence) or in the apartments of such Embassy officers
as John ABIDIAN. The KGB was "afraid that they will be
there will be a scandal."
detected and that
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TOP SECRET
254.
Information from Other Sources
In 1956 a sensitive source holding a senior position
in the KGB submitted a written report to the U.S. Ambassador
in Moscow with the cautionary Remark: "Do not speak about
this information in the rooms of the American Embassy."
The report itself contains a portion reading as follows:
"Because all rooms in the American Embassy in Moscow are
being monitored by the KVB, I strongly ask that there be no
conversations and discussions concerning this information
in the American Embassy. The flap involving the American
direction-finding specialists in Stalingrad during the
summer of 1955 was organized by the KGE because conversa-
tions were overheard in the 100ms of the American Embassy.
As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valu-
able direction finding equipment from the American intelli-
gence officers. The KGB did not possess this type of
valuable equipment, and it would have been necessary for
Soviet technicians to work and experiment for a long time
in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening
devices are so skillfully installed in the walls, floors,
and ceilings of the rooms of the American Embassy that it
is impossible to find them, even with special-perpose instru-
ments."
GOLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the exis-
tence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor
and said that many wore had been installed in the chancery
prior to 1953. :OLESYN was debriefed in early 1962 and
his information on this subject was disseminated within the
U.S. Government approximately two weeks before NOSENKO's
initial contact with CIA.) GOI SYN said he had learned of
the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office when by
chance he happened to see a particular document in an office
at KGB Headquarters. According to COLIISYN, during one of his
visits to the American Department in 1960** he heard and saw
*This is a reference to ine arrest of U.S. Military Attaches
BENSON, MULE, and SEROLD and the seizure of sensitive elec-
tronic equipment they had with them in Stalingrad in the
summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of
this equipment was based on information obtained from micro-
phones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b. (viii).
**GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Sec-
tion of the American Department on a number of occasions in
the spring of 1960 as part of his preparation for assignment
to Helsinki in July of that year; he has also said that he
returned on temporary assignment to Moscow and again con-
sulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960.
With regard to the latter visits, however, GOLITSYN's pass-
port and CIA travel records indicate that he was in Moscow on
temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that he is
therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits
took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement
that this incident occurred in 1960 (he has not been more
specific), he could have been referring to either his visits
to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits
in January 1961.
TOP SECRET
!
14-00000
TOP SECRET
255.
that a report or reports concerning the results of audio-
surveillance in the U.S. Embassy had been misplaced: While
GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chier of the American De-
partment ordered all personnel present to search for these
papers, and all the KGB officers searched again through
their files, without success. GOLITSYN noted a large num-
ber of reports with red stripes across their covers, indi-
cating that they were the property of the Operational Tech-
nical Directorate. The only office in the U.S. Embassy that
GOLITSYN recalled being mentioned in connection with this
search was that of the Minister Counsellor. *
No technical investigations were undertaken as a result
of GOLITSYN's information, and so it was largely on the basis
of NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the
chancery building for the presence of microphones in the
spring of 1964. The results have been described in the
damage report submitted by the USIB Security Committee on
7 October 1964: "On 23 April 1964, a low-impedance dynamic
microphone and associated seven-inch probe tube were dis-
covered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the
Chancery of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The cable to this
microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several
inches under the outside surface of the cast face of the
Chancery. This major cable run consisted of a single
twenty (20) pair and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed
audio cable which ran along the cast face of the Chancery
At
to the roof area of the North Annex of the Embassy.
this point, these cables were spliced into a one hundred and
one (101) pair cable along with two ten (10) pair cables....
A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten,
twenty, and thirty pair cables to the various microphone
installations. Fifty (50) microphones have been positively
identified.** Two (2) microphones not physically located
*On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the
loss of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy
Section had received from the Second Special Department of
the Operational Technical Directorate "in 1960 or 1961."
This document, according to NOSENKO, was "one of the reports
with Minister Counsellor] FREERS dictating"; as a result of
its loss, "the month of December, the whole month, the U.S.
Embassy Section was in a turmoil" searching for the document.
The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful,
however, and, in the end, the case was closed with the con-
clusion that the document had probably been burned inadver-
tently, without a record of destruction having been drawn up.
In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in Decem-
ber 1960, which approximates GOLITSYN's second series of
visits to the U.S. Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSYN's
NOSENKO
erroneous estimate of when these visits took place).
has never reported that GOLITSYN was present in the offices
of the U.S. Embassy Section during the search for this docu-
ment and, in fact, has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section
either in the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961.
The only visit by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section reported
by NOSENKO was one in the spring or summer of 1961, at which
time NOSENKO claims to have been on leave; GOLITSYN was not
in Moscow at the time.
**Four more were subsequently located, for a total of 54.
TOP SECKET
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TOP SECRET
256.
can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment GJ based on
the symmetry of the known installations. The microphones
located were situated so that all microphones and probes
were behind radiators. The microphone system discovered
covered every outside room on floors six through ten, with
the exception of those offices with doors entering onto
balconies and when exterior building constructions were ad-
jacent to outside wall sections bearing radiators."
The first microphone found was in Room 1008, in what
is now the Army Finance office and which in 1960-1961 was
the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported
a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately
traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all
rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of
the latter were inoperative when found--one in the Ambassa-
dor's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being
heard in 1960-1961 and the other in the Security Office where
NOSENKO said there was none. The damage report concluded
that all the microphones were installed before the U.S.
Government took possession of the chancery building in 1953.
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TOP SECRET
257.
(c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones
NOSENKO made the following evaluations of the quality
of intercept received from the chancery microphone installa-
tions:
11 June 1962: "They are dying, the microphones, and
we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into
the Embassy [to make new installations). In that respect
your Embassy and the British Embassy are the only ones we
can't get into."
14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of
course, are from the... [Note: one or two words on the tape
are unintelligible here; from earlier and subsequent remarks,
particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear
that HOSENKO is speaking of the microphone in the Minister
Counsellor's office.] And I tell you honestly that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to work with this. The
shayba microphone;, as we call them, is fading and only two
or three people are able to make out what is being said.
That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away,
somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper.
It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is
fading. But, what can you do? They tell us categorically
and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second
Special Department responsible for this, tells us that
soon we will not have anything there. There are a great
number of microphones there, but they don't work. I know
that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work.
They have all gone deaf."
24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code
room and the teletype office, but we could never get any-
thing out of the teletype office because of interference
[probably speaking of machine noise). From this point
[pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he
was speaking about] the reception became progressively
weaker until it finally stopped: evidently it wore out.
Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor.
This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus,
out of the eleven points, nine were working... [NOSENKO then
referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after
leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.] GRYAZNOV said that the
equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches
of conversation and that in a year or two they will be com-
pletely inoperative. GRIBANOV is insisting on getting to
[recruiting) code clerks at all costs."
1 5·31 January 1964: "Here in HORBALY's and BROWN's room
office of the Agricultural Attaches), there is no acoustical
[sic] and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this,
but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These
microphones were installed] when this building was being
built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building,
but when the building was under construction... [NOSENKO was
asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now`our-
rently active.] It couldn't be more, anyhow.'
"
14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard
from Minister Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, "but
for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very
.
:
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TOP SECRET
258.
difficult to hear. I was sitting with (S.G.] DMITRIYEV
[Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second
Special Department) and they told me how difficult it was.
The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters
were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times
to the same place (on the tape).... [After 1961) GRYAZNOV
was telling me that they were getting almost nothing from
this point. [He said this) in 1962, 1963. I was thinking
you had given a command (had cautioned FREERS). We were
getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several
times in 1963. The mikes were working not bad at all in
1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Navy, Air Force....
I don't know [how reception was in 1962]. I know only that
GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting
little, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing
everything. We have no materials. We have little, little
pieces, but nothing...in general (from all of the micro-
phones]." NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this
was the fact that the Americans in the Embassy were not
saying anything significant, but he said he did not know
this to be the case. Speaking of the microphone in GLEYSTEEN's
office, he said: "There was something heard. In 1960 and
1961 it was working I remember. Reception was good but
there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's
room was good in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 1961--good re-
ception." According to NOSENKO, reception was good from
the State Department code and teletype room "only always
the sounds of [teletype] machines. In 1960 and 1961--machines
only....Reception was good when conversation came through.
I don't know [about reception in 1962 and 1963).... Reception
was good from the military code room in 1960 and 1961."
On-site tests made by American technicians after the
1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones
in the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of Decem-
ber 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB
damage report emphasized that it had not been possible to
determine how long these microphones had been inoperative:
-one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval
Attache;
-three microphones in the apartment of the senior Air
Attache;
-one microphone in the apartment of the Economic Counsel-
lor;
-the microphone in the office of the Publications Pro-
curement Officer;
-Yhe microphone in the
Marine bar;
-the microphone in the Internal Affairs office
-the microphone in the Ambassador's office;
-the microphone in the office of the Security Officer;
-the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery;
-the microphone in the office of the Air Attache;
-the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air At-
tache;
-the microphone in the office of the Assistant Naval
Attaches;
-the microphone in the Navy administrative office;
-the microphone in the Air Force administrative office.
This list includes the office of the Ambassador (from which
NOSENKO said no intercepts were being received in 1960 and
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"TBP SERACT
259.
1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NOSENKO
has said no microphone was installed).* On-site recordings
made from twelve selected microphones in 1964 indicate that
the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counsel-
lor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelli-
gibility" as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in
the military and State Department code rooms in the office
of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high intelli-
gibility. As pointed out below, however, the possible pro-
duction by the code room microphones would have been sharply
reduced by the installation of acoustical roons during 1962.
:
*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S.
Embassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his having
been approached by the KGB for recruitment in May 1959.
HARMSTONE did, in fact, report the approach, and the report
vas made in the office of the Security Officer.
TOP SECRCY
༧,' + ༢ 'T༎ཐཱམ ༥, ཁས ༨
TOP SECRET
260.
(d) Amount, Type, and Value of Production
Evaluations of the quality of production have been
given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned
with the microphones in the chancery building.
NOSENKO's Statements
11 June 1962: "Well, perhaps, there would be some kind
of fitness report (kharakteristika). Sometimes there the
Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before MCSWEENEY, dictated
something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weak-
nesses. We had not known that. We are listening to your
military attaches there. We know where they intend to travel,
what they want to find-out. We know what machinery and what
targets interest then--always.... They chatter sometimes.
Some of the things they say are surprising (from the point
of view of security]. They discuss, among other things,
where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic
equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic
equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely cer-
tain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus
with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take it,
to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary
steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your
equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955,
but now you have better apparatus.... What do we do (when we
know the attaches are taking special equipment)? Well, they
are getting ready to go and we hear that such-and-such data
interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them
think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's
absolutely nothing there, understand? Absolutely nothing.
We make it appear on the radio (by spurious transmissions]
that there are rockets there; we even have patrols standing
there and everything.... They talk about interesting things,
but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent
operations, not once."
་
.
-
12 June 1962: [Speaking again about coverage of the U.S.
Service Attaches] "They say: 'Today, let's go to such-and-
such a place. They go to the military attache, the two
assistants, and say: 'This region is interesting. They have
something there. We know it at once. I personally tele-
phone surveillance at once and tell the Chief of the depart-
ment to come at once. He arrives and I say: 'Throw in
three, four, five brigades (surveillance teams].' We work al-
most openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in
particular, walks around in his office and dictates. All
this is recorded. Well, this is very important material. We
do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Con-
fidential cables (in the clear). We receive the clear text
and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or
not. If we decide that this must be reported to the [KGB]
Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away.
2
"
24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code
room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything
because of interference [teletype machine noise)....We didn't
get much out of the [military] code room; we could hear [the
code clerk James STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and then
he would mention a group of numbers.* This was, of course,
*See Part V.E.3.c. on the STORSBERG case.
TOP SEENEY
14-00000
TOP SECRET
261.
all recorded, and we turned it over at once to the Eighth
Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding.
"
14 May 1964: Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUK
and the decision to withdraw U.S. Embassy Section require-
ments for full-time monitoring of certain microphones, NO-
SENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information from the
rooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the Agricultural
Attache. The flats [Embassy apartments) --no; the bar--
nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the room
of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldom
The code clerk is
anything received except several numbers.
saying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take,
NOSENKO then continued:
not permanently, but temporarily."
"KOVSHUK said to give them these flats....But you see,
nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't speaking
or were talking about steak and eggs. There was nothing
of interest from an operating standpoint. Sometimes we
heard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibility
to hear something. In this case we would call DMITRIYEY
[English-language Section of Second Special Department) and
say: 'This evening, this day, this flat. Maybe we will
get something. The mikes were working not bad at all in
When
1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force.
the man was alone we heard nothing. But when two or three
men were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard.
For example, when they returned from a trip and discussed
what they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip....
But we heard nothing about agents.
"
Later on this occasion the following diagogue took
place:
NOSENKO:
GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that
they were getting little, little, almost nothing.
He said we are losing everything. We have no
materials. We have little, little pieces, but
nothing.
Question:
Was he talking about the Military Attaches?
NOSENKO:
In general. I think they were speaking very
little. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinking
they were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV,
FEDOSEYEV, and KQVSHUK considered that there was
a room-in-a-room--a room (acoustic) for the
meeting.
Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the-
room?
NOSENKO:
First it was known when, I think, Eisenhower was
going to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had informa-
tion that the Embassy had such a chamber made out
*President Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled for
the summer of 1960 but was cancelled over the U-2 incident.
on 2 May 1960.
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14-00000
D. NEP
262.
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
of steel....In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEY-
STEEN's office was working, I remember. Recep-
tion was good, but there was no secret informa-
tion. I don't know ( about reception from this
mike in 1962).
What about GRYAZNOV's statement (concerning
diminishing production of the Embassy microphones)?
This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell
which room. I think he was speaking about the
group...
How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's
office?
Not good, but we did get something which made us
suspect he was connected with intelligence.
HORBALY.
Question: What about the code room and teletype office?
NOSENKO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machines
in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times
during these two years maybe somebody said one
phrase or one of the guys said several numbers.
Question: What about the military [code] area?
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
The reception was good. He [STORSBERG) seldom
spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself.
And sometimes a mechanic of code machines came
to him, a military guy, a sergeant (William
HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer). They said two
or three phrases. "Did you check this?" "Yes.
"This side good." Et cetera.
"
In all this time that you read all this material,
there must have been something that impressed
you as extremely valuable.
Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was in-
teresting from FREERS' room. It was given to the
special group of GRIBANOV. They were writing
special information to the (KGB) Chairman to the
[CPSU) Central Committee. There were political
questions, for example.
26 January 1965: - The following is taken from an inter-
rogation protocol signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed
all of the transcripts from microphones in the American
Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from Janu-
ary 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only infor-
mation which I can remember as being important, interesting
or operationally useful to the KGB:
From the microphone in the office of the
Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he oc
casionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evalu-
ation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet
Government and advised the State Department on posių
tions for negotiations with the USSR. This information
TOP SECRET
.14.00000
FOR SLOHET
1
263.
was of such importance that special reports were
How-
written to the Central Committee of the CPSU.
ever, I cannot remember any specific incidents or
events which these cables reported nor any specific
evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.
b. Also from the microphone in the Minister
Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness
reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in
the Embassy. cannot remember who any of these offi-
There was
cers were or any details from the reports.
nothing in these reports which was interesting or
useful to the KGB.
C. From the microphone in the Military Attache's
office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly
discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the tar-
gets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed.
How-
the results of these trips after their return.
ever, I cannot remember any information about speci-
fic trips planned by specific Military Attache per-
sonnel or any specific targets that they planned to
I do not
cover or any specific results from any trip.
remember any specific operational activity taken by the
organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips
within the USSR which was based on information obtained
from this microphone. There was no interesting, impor-
tant, or useful information about the personal or pro-
fessional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone
in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air)
obtained from this microphone.
d. I remember that from the microphones in the
State Department code room occasionally a code clerk
would read numbers. These numbers were only of inter-
est to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Crypto-
logy) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations
from this microphone. There was no information from
this microphone on any of the code clerks which was
interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate,
KGB.
During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed
the production from all the microphones in the American
Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in
the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to
me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the
points noted in the above paragraphs.
"
28 January 1965: "In 1960 and 1961 I don't remember
Never. Nothing
any report from the mikes about agents.
But FREERS
about work with agents or work with contacts.
or WALMSLEY (Minister Counsellor 1954-1956) were dictating
interesting opinions of the Embassy. concerning the political
situation and this material was looked at by the information
group and then they were preparing special reports for
KHRUSHCHEV."
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14-00000
TOP SEC
264.
Evaluation by Others
Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May
1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the micro-
phone discoveries. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN
was succeeded by Colonel URBAN as Army Attache.) While in
Moscow, Colonel HOFFMAN occupied room 1008, where the first
microphone was found and his statements below relate to
matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to
the U.S. Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO
claims to have been its Deputy Chief.*
"James H. STORSBERG (military code clerk) was
dating a foreign national, 1 believe a secretary in
the British Embassy, name not recalled. On one or
two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to
encode for dispatching a message and was not avail-
able. He would be off with his girl friends, and we
couldn't find him. He was verbally reprimanded in my
office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeism.
"M/Sgt. Peter BINDER manager of America House]
and I discussed frequently the administrative problems
encountered in his operation of the America House.
We also discussed the importance of his keeping me
informed of the conditions, personality problems,
drinking habits, and any other incident of importance
that might occur in the America House or the America
House club. All discussions were conducted in my
office.
"In May or June 1961, James C. KEYSERS (military
code clerk was found to have allowed one or more
male members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group
touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his
room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual
activities, and he admitted to me being a participant
in homosexual activities. I believe these admissions
and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in
room 9, identified now as the shielded code room, lo-
cated on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave
SAVAGE [his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal
instructions in my office to immediately prepare the
necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the
station and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as
to the details of the incident.
"I remember...a discussion I held with the U.S.
Air Attache in his office (where a KGB microphone was
located] concerning homosexual activities on the part
of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station...
The discussion in his office concerned the administra-
tive procedures necessary in removing the individuals
from Station.
*Apart from his general duties as Deputy Chief of the U.S.
Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for
each of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN:
He super-
vised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and the
residents of America House, and he personally participated in
approaches to the two code clerke named, STORSBERG and KEYSERS,
STORSBERG and KKYBERS cases are discussed in Part V.E.3.0. ___
TOP SECRET
14-000.00
SECRET
265.
[Summing up] "To be perfectly frank, I would
assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our
targets, some of the results, and all of our personal
weaknesses were compromised. This is not a very de-
finite answer%; however, it is the best estimate I can
make.
"
In its general introduction, the USIB damage report
states: "Although there has been no observable indication
that the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment
of the United States based upon information considered pos-
sibly compromised, it must be concluded that due to the ex-
tensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has
resulted in serious damage to the United States. The
Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effective-
ness of United States operations within the Soviet Union,
particularly the military attache collection program.
Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence
collection areas has made it possible for them to identify
priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby
The
permitted them to implement specific counteractions.
Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable infor-
mation concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes
and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which
can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any
time of their choosing in the future.
་་
The following extract from the USIB damage report con-
cerns the declining value of the production from the micro-
phones in 1962 and 1963.*
The
"The security practices and procedures appear to
have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at
A
which time the first plastic room was installed.
change occurred in the work habits in that the more
senior State Department officers utilized the plastic
room for sensitive discussions and dictation.
room could accommodate only a limited portion of the
Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number
of classified discussions were held outside this secure
area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an ac-
cepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy
Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices
routine classified operations of the Embassy and to
dictate classified documents and telegrams....In Sep-
tember 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for
the typing section for the handling of sensitive classi-
fied material. From December 1963 to date it was indi-
cated that no classified telegrams have been dictated
*As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that in 1962 and 1963
he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy
microphones. One reason was the natural decline in 
effi-
ciency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB
believed that other reasons were the installation 
of
acoustic rooms in the Embassy and tightened security pro-
cedures.
TOP SE
14-00000
266.
The military attaches
outside of the acoustic rooms.
reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or.
typed by the originator and then turned over 
to the
In certain instances
code clerks for transmission.
cables were dictated in the offices. There were many
discussions in the offices relating to official duties,
office routine, proposed travel, personal observations
and normal office talk not specifically in themselves
considered classified. From 1953 to 1959, sensitive
classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the
accompaniment of external noises, such as radios 
and--
street noises.... In 1959 a secure inner room was 
con-
structed in the attache section and has since been
utilized for classified discussions and debriefings...
TOP SECRET
"
14-00000
TOP
.267.
(iii) Microphones in the North Wing.
According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices
were installed in the north wing (as distinct from the chancery)
of the U.S. Embassy prior to its occupancy in 1962. (For this
reason, NOSENKO advised CIA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive
offices gradually--to protect NOSENKO's security--from the
chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.) He has commented
several times on this subject, and these remarks are presented
below.
11 June 1962: "The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy
Street. When they decided to give the north wing to the Embassy,
I wrote an entire report about it. SHELEPIN was still there
then [as KGB Chairman. proposed that! equipment be installed
in the walls, gave the justification for this, etc. SHELEPIN
wrote: 'Is it worth it?' At the time there was an improvement
in mutual relations (between the Soviet Union and the United
States). SHELEPIN was a good lad, but feared that...and before
this you found 18 or 20 microphones in the new building in War-
saw.* SHELEPIN wrote: 'Is it worth it? We now have good re-
lations with America. It isn't worth it,' He didn't want com-
plications. And then time was lost. Two or three months passed
and we again wanted to try it. SHELEPIN also wanted to, but it
was already too late. ASIDIAN was going there all the time, the
Security Officer. It was already too late because this can be
done only while the building is being built. When the windows
and doors have been begun it is already too late... The north
wing was almost ready. We don't have anything there. So, you
should move the Minister Counsellor there. Move him to the
north wing from his present office... Don't do it at once. Do
it slowly. Don't hurry; don't be in a hurry. Have him say that
he doesn't like this room and wants to move there... We hear
all the military attaches--the Military Attache, the Naval
Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow. Everything is
recorded. But again, don't do anything at once. Don't make
any (sudden) changes. Quietly transfer one and then another
there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assist-
ants... You must be very, very clever and very, very foxy...
Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the build-
ing, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and
won't have anything."
31 January 1964: "When the construction of this right
(north) wing had begun, when you started the right wing, the
new addition to the building, there was a plan to install as
many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick them
everywhere. It really wasn't important how many of them would
really work. The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was
SHELEPIN. He didn't go for this. Whether it was the flap
with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether it
was something else or whether it was the international situa-
tion, they were afraid that this may be uncovered. But then,
later, when the building was finished, and when you were
finishing or putting up the addition yourself, at that point
it was too late to put these things in. It was impossible
to do it.'
"
NOSENKO is referring to the discovery in June of 1960 of
19 microphones in the new U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.
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14-00000
TOP SECRET
.268.
After being told by CIA on 31 January 1965, that a lead
cable had been found in the north wing, NOSENKO said: "I
personally can assure you that nothing was done in that
right wing. Nothing, absolutely nothing. There was nothing
done there, so it must have been something else.
No extensive counter-audio checks have yet been carried
out in the north wing of the U.S. Embassy, and no wired
microphones have been found there. Investigation of the
microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however,
to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed
in the north wing. The USIB damage report stated: "Three-
coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the one--
hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof
area to the basement of the North Annex... [All three cables
were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable
runs were as follows:
"1. The first coaxial cable...terminated under six
inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic.
The center conductor was connected to the lead sheath
of the 20-pair and of the 30 pair cable which in turn
come from the east face of the chancery. The shield of
the coaxial cable was unconnected.
"12. The second coaxial cable...followed the same path
as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated.
The center conductor was terminated in an insulated
metal grill. The grill is located in the upper crust
of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension
in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the
Chancery and the North Annex. The long dimension is
normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The
grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods
spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The
overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4'7".
The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the
grill....The grill is located as close as possible to
the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the
State Department code room. The grill 'points' in the
general direction of the code room as the plane of the
grill is parallel to the plane of the ground.
"3. The third coaxial cable ran along the approximate
path of the other coaxial cables to the block of rein-
forced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above.
This coaxial cable terminated in a four-inch piece of
fine Lits wire. The shield of the coaxial cable was
unterminated..."
The damage report added: "The coaxial cables appear to be
of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation
of the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial
cables were carefully insulated."
The coaxial cables and their terminations were evaluated
as follows in the damage report: "All tests that have been
performed indicate that the grill work and the lead sheaths.
[of the cables 20 and 30 pairs were used as antennas....
No function has been determined for the third coaxial cable
which terminated in a short piece of Lits wire....The location
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TOP SECRET
269.
of the grill in such close proximity to the State Department
Code Room indicated that an operation was directed against
that area.... The lead sheath may have had other uses.
The
possible uses that have been suggested are listed below.
The most likely use is as an antenna although the other pos-
sibilities have not been completely discarded.
"C.
"d.
Antenna for collection effort directed against code
room.
Antenna for use in connection with some other
surveillance device or technique..
An alarm system to 'protect' the microphone
system.
Part of a hum removal system connected with the
microphone installation.
'
"18.
Not in use.
"
TOP SECRET
:
E
(iv)
270.
Monitoring/Jamming Bean
NOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the
so-called "Moscow Signal." (This is an "S" band signal
that has been directed against the top floors--the "secure"
area" of the U.S. Embassy since the early 1950's from an
Detailed
apartment building located about 200 feet away.
investigation of the signal has been underway since Octo-
ber 1962, but its exact nature and purpose have not yet been
established. Although there is some speculation that the
signal is meant for harassment purposes only, the view now
generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has sor
intelligence-collection function. No change in the signal
has been noted since the discovery and the cutting of the
cables referred to in the preceding section.) The inter-
view went as follows:
NOSENKO:
There is a beam, there is a ray which works
against the Embassy. I know.
Question: Do you know what it is?
J
NOSENKO: No, I don't. But I know that they work and they
put things in, and they listen and they do some-
thing, and they...
Question:
NOSENKO:
(Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?
Yes, they keep working: all the time. Perhaps
periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is
something in the back of the Embassy on this
Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in
front of the Embassy, too.
Question: And it is for listening in?
NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with
stationary equipment.
Question: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't
operate properly?
NOSENKO:
Look, I'm not a specialist. I don't know the
details. I know only that the work is being
done in this particular area, in this particular
direction. But what they do, I don't really
know.
Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining in-
formation?
NOSENKO:
Question:
Let's say you go on the air. So we find out
whether you're listening in on some of our com-
munications or something like this.
To what extent would you in your (American] De-
partment, in your (U.S. Embassy] Soction, know
about these technical aspects? Would you have
to know it? Would you know the details of these
things?
TOP SECRET
=
TOP SECRET
271.
NOSENKO:
No.
No. This is something that the members of
the (KGB) Eighth Directorate (responsible for
communications and ciphers) should concern them-
selves with, the ones who work in OTU. This
doesn't concern us in the American Department,
in the U.S. Embassy Section.
Questioned again later, NOSENKO said that the signal
I was used to jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building.
It was this system, he said, which had determined that the
_ Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications.
The beam was designed "both to monitor and to jam" trans-
**missions from the Embassy. NOSENKO repeated that "not being
a specialist" he was ignorant of the technical nature of the
Job, or any further details.
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TOP SECRET
276.
Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted
to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request,
NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his
true name for all travel abroad.
C. The Cuba TDY (1960)
In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation
of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with
a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first men-
tioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with
'CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the
question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been
in Germany. Yes, yes.
I was in Cuba in '6]. Well, as NIKOLAYEV.
I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was
there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it ever to
see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me
to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going.
I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just
on you.
Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three,
five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could
go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me.
The fellows reported: 'He (an American) is there. My mission
was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days,
but for a month or two, to provide an opinion.. I worked pretty
cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant.
They would say to me :
'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and
can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mir-
ror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and
that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc.,
etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an
intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I
would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an in-
telligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences
with them [the Cubans). They didn't know a thing... They had
turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The
Communist Party complicates it.
In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in
1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re-
called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba
and that his function there was that of security officer.
Question:
When did you travel to Cuba?
NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.
Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?
NOSENKO: No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain
how this happened. I was supposed to go to America,
sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan,
automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been
submitted for coordination and, in particular, my
name had been given to the American Embassy there
[Moscow). But the American Embassy announced that
this delegation could be accepted, but a little
later. And my passport had already been issued.
My passport had already been signed authorizing travel
abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic
one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to
The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January
1961.
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s
14-00000
273.
Her job was simply to inform us in case something interesting
happens and somebody interesting comes to the library, but prac-
tically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she
tell us about these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons,
that she was supposed to be reporting on? In the first place,
they were lazy buns. They would go to a lesson once and then
miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one
or two. In September 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never
been targetted against any particular individual and had never
provided any interesting reports on her American contacts. At
the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she
was released from the Embassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because
she was a little deaf and one had to speak loudly to her to be
understood.* NOSENKO turned LEVINA over to another officer be-
fore he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British
Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canad-
ian Embassies.
CIA records show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as
a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she
was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary of the Embassy
in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and Publications
Procurement Officer from May 1959 until approximately Septem-
ber 1961, when he left Moscow.
TOP SECRET
14.00000
274.
a.
Overseas Assignments
Attempt to Obtain Assignment in Ethiopia (1960)
During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for
a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had
prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oksana's asthma.
O.M. GRIBANQV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved
his request, but then the KGB Personnel Department turned it
down when a file review revealed potentially dangerous character
weaknesses.
NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows:
"Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Department of the Second
Chief Directorate in 1958. Before 1956 he was studying in the
Higher School of the KGB and when he finished the school in 1956
he was assigned to the KGB Personnel Department, and then he came
to the American Department in 1958. So GRYAZNOV had very good
connections in the Personnel Department. So in 1960, when I
wanted to leave, to go abroad on permanent assignment I said to
When the Per-
GRIBANOV: 'Let me go for two years to Ethiopia.'
sonnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have
to know what was there in my personal file. I had to learn what
it was that was causing all this. By that time GRYAZNOV was in
the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and hap-
pened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire
directorate, and he at one time had worked in the Personnel Office
himself. He said: 'Give me this thing and I'll see what I can
find out about it.' So he went to the Personnel Department and
through his friend there got my personal file. Then he gave me
a call and said to come over. I went to his office and he locked
the door. Of course,
he couldn't give me this file, couldn't
let me hold it in my hands so to speak. So he read this case
to me, this 1954 case to me, about the woman and so forth,* and
then said that at that time they made an investigation of my
previous residence. And they found out that while I was study-
ing at the Institute (of International Affairs) and was living.
on Pervaya Meschanskaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me;
different girls, a new girl would visit me almost every week.
This was in my file. Then this case that took place in 1954.
And then in 1960--and, incidentally, GRIBANOV mentioned this to
me also--the file said that I was drinking quite a bit, and for
this reason I had many fights with my wife. And that was all
that appeared in my file. Nothing else, whatsoever, besides
these things that I just mentioned."
b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)
NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October
1960 request to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for members
of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled.
NOSENKO is referring to the incident he says took place in
1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true
identity while seeking treatment for venereal disease.
Part IV.B.
See
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14-00000..
OP SECRET
275.
NOSENKO was.
to visit the United States in mid-November 1960.
listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical
Committee (GNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had
been scheduled to accompany this delegation as a security offi-
cer but that the delegation's visit to the United States had
He therefore did not travel
been postponed at the last moment.
to this country.
This
He further explained, on 17 April 1964, why his visa appli-
cation had been submitted in true name and under a different
cover: "In 1957 and 1958 I went to London as NIKOLAYEV repre-
Then in 1959 I didn't go any-
senting the Ministry of Culture.
where. Then when this question came up of my going to the States
in 1960, I said: 'I'm not going. I've been going under the
Ministry of Culture [cover] and with sports delegations.
has to be changed somehow at this point.' So we thought about
Perhaps
it and finally somebody said: 'Lock, how about this?
So I said:
[you can use this committee of RULNEV's (GNTK].'
'Well, it's up to you. You decide.' By that time my passport
was ready, but the Americans and the Soviets hadn't come to an
agreement yet. It was decided that this delegation would go to
the U.S. in 1961." NOSENKO was then asked why he could not
have used the NIKOLAYEV name for his trip to the United States.
He replied: "Sure, I could have gone as NIKOLAYEV, but I just
didn't want to. Because, look, it was known to us that the
British and American Intelligence exchange information on people
they suspect of being KGB, and that the British, of course,
had probably watched me when I was in England (in 1957 and 1958)
and probably there it was noticed that here's this man under
He's not a sportsman. 
It
the cover of Ministry of Culture.
kind of looks suspicious. Then he goes to the Soviet Embassy.
And if
Also suspicious. So then I have to go to the States.
I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I couldn't use
the same cover of Ministry of Culture because of the type of
the delegation. I'd have to use a different cover. So I'd go
there and they'd say: 'Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under different
cover now. But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard
the name. Nobody knows the name. Everything would be O.K.
NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under
some other alias. He answered: "That's the way it was de-
cided.
I guess so as not to get all mixed up they decided to
send me as NOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in
charge of these operations. They are the ones who decide.***
$
"
This visa application was submitted approximately six months
after the KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to
Ethiopia.
** With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 1958, NOSENKO
said that he had been forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV because
this was the name he had used with British citizens ☑
when they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he
could not, he said, have shown up in England with another name
as
upon their return from the USSR (Bee Part V.D.4
This apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name
for the U.S. visa application, for NOSENKO had used the name
SERGEYEV in his approach to American George DREW in 1959 (Part
V.D.4h.) and the name: PETERSON when he recruited 
Professor
NOSENKO was in
Gerard MERTENS, also in 1959 (Part V.D.4.1.).
contact with Arsene FRIPPEL under the name NIKOLAYEV during this
period. NOSENKO and other sources have said that the KGB sus-
pected that FRIPPEL was an American agent (see Part V.D.5.).
TOP SEC
ག༢༠༠༩ , ། འp
14-00000
TOP SECRET
276.
Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted
to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request,
NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his
true name for all travel abroad.
C. The Cuba TDY (1960)
In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation
of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with
a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first men-
tioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with
˚CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the
question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been
in Germany. Yes, yes.
I was in Cuba in '6]. Well, as NIKOLAYEV.
I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was
there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it over to
see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me
to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going.
I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just
on you.
Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three,
five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could
go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me.
The fellows reported: 'He (an Aunerican) is there. My mission
was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days,
but for a month or two, to provide an opinion..
I worked pretty
cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant.
They would say to me : 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and
can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mir-
ror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and
that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc.,
etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an
intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I
would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an in-
telligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences
with them [the Cubans). They didn't know a thing... They had
turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The
Communist Party complicates it."
In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in
1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re-
called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba
and that his function there was that of security officer.
Question:
When did you travel to Cuba?
NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.
Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?
NOSENKO:
ร
No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain
how this happened. I was supposed to go to America,
sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan,
automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been
submitted for coordination and, in particular, my
name had been given to the American Embassy there
(Moscow). But the American Embassy announced that
this delegation could be accepted, but a little
later. And my passport had already been issued.
My passport had already been signed authorizing travel
abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic
one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to
The U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January
1961.
TOP SECRET
1
14-00000
IDE SECRET
$
Question:
NOSENKO:
277.
go to Cuba. GRIBANCV's deputy (S.G.) BANNIKOV,
said that a worker (KGB officer) should be sent.
But they decided not to send a worker to Cuba.
"Why bother?" [they said]. "Is Cuba worth it?"
Suddenly there was a phone call from the Central
Committee (of the Communist Party]. Someone from
the Central Committee said: "No, there is a direc-
tive that one of our workers must go nevertheless."
And only two days remained before the departure of
the delegation. Who could they send?
The first person they come
across.
"
Those who have passports.
I had a passport. I was
ready. And they decided: "Get going immediately.'
We flew through msterdam, through Geneva. We spent
a night in Amsterdam and then made a short stop in
Geneva, then the Azores, Santa Maria Island, then we
were supposed to fly to Curacao. But we had a head-
wind and the pilots were evidently afraid that we
wouldn't have enough fuel. So the plane went out
of its way and made a landing on the island of Bar-
bados. This was not a Soviet plane, but KLM. We
flew to Amsterdam on a TU-104 and then went by KLM.
Then from Curacao we flew to Aruba. We also spent
a night in Aruba, an interesting island; the water
and natural surroundings are beautiful. From Aruba
we flew through Kingston, through Jamaica, and then
to Cuba. And we flew the same route back, but we
did not spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we
landed in Caracas for about 40 minutes, and through
Pararari --Dutch Guiana--across the ocean, some
island or another there, and from there again Lis-
bon, Geneva, and Amsterdam. But here the entire
delegation flew [to Moscow) after a day or two and
I took a train through West Germany (to East Berlin).
All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have
been generally consistent with that given on 14 June 1962. His
story has been as follows: In the latter part of 1960, at the
same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the
United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts
from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was prepar-
ing for departure to Cuba. The delegation was a routine one,
consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the
Soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of sus-
picion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of
the Second Chief Directorate had decided that it would not be
necessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the
departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case
officer must go along. Because of the short time remaining be-
fore the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh
Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suit-
able person and get all the necessary papers ready in time.
this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said:
"Just a minute. We have a man who has his passport all ready.
His passport has been formalized. NOSENKO. He was supposed to
go to the States... and his foreign passport has been issued
and signed. Why don't you take him?" NOSENKO's statement con-
tinued: "So somebody said: 'How about a visa?' And KUZNETSOV
At
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14-00000
278.
says 'Never mind. The Cubanз will give him an entry visa.'
And then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying
through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in
two days. The Cubans gave their visa immediately and The
Netherlands issued their visa also right away."
NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this deleça-
He flew with 
the dele-
tion were purely of a security nature.
gation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month
and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delega-
tion everywhere it went: "I was with the delegation. They go
I was with them 
all
to a plant--I go with them to the plant.
the time. They went το ifferent plants, to watch the produc-
tion. They met with some representatives of the so-called Insti-
tute of Agrarian Reform. They would meet with these people 
and
they would have many discussions about how to increase produc-
tion." NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the dele-
gation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced 
to
the other members as such. He had one agent within the 
delega-
tion and developed several "confidential contacts" wuring the
trip, which turned out to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO,
somewhat long and dull. He explained that he would not 
have
to be,
accepted the assignment had he known how long the trip was
and that he had really wanted to go only to the United States.
on his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special
mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal
Resident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with in-
structions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the
contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route
home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by
thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that
it contained copies of "letters between. MIKOYAN and 
KHRUSHCHEV
concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between
the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
and Rumania. Arriving with his delegation at the airport in
Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received
from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing
that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che GUEVARA,
who was touring the Satellite countries and was then 
in Berlin.
While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore
was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late
evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train
for East Berlin. When he arrived, however, he found 
that
NOSENKO refused to go any
GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary.
further. The package was delivered to GUEVARA's deputy in
Berlin, and NOSENKO then returned to Moscow.
CIA travel records show that NOSENKO, listed as a mineral
engineer, transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November
1960; and that he transitted Caracas from Amsterdam on 
17 
Novem-
ber 1960; and that on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas
Our records also show that NOSENKO again
en route to Havana. *
arrived in Amsterdam en route to Moscow from Havana on 13 Decem-
There is
ber 1960 and that he left for Moscow on 15 December.
no record that he travelled to Berlin. **
CIA obtained a photocopy of NOSENKO's passport while he was
passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas.
** It appears possible that his name was not removed from the
original passenger manifest for the 15 December 
flight to
Moscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went 
un-
noticed.
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$279.
The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case
In the spring of 1961, four months after returning from
Cuba, NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about 
a
month to Sofia, the only trip he took in other than a security
"watchdog" capacity. According to NOSENKO, it 
happened this
way: "I think I first heard that I was going 
to Bulgaria, a
week or so before I left, from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the
section having contact with the counterintelligence representa-
tives of the Countries of the Peoples' Democracies in Moscow
...
He said: 'You must go to Bulgaria. GRIBANOV 
has decided.'
He 
said:
He asked, 'Do you know about this?' and I said 'No.'
• But
'KLYPIN (Chief of the American Department) must tell you.
YEGOROV 
said 
that the
this was the first I had heard about it.
Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the
KGB to send an officer from the American Department 
of the Sec-
ond Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with 
the
- American Department, Second Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria.
He repeated
After one or two days KLYPIN told me about 
it.
the same thing and after about one and a half weeks I flew to
Sofia. The discussion continued as follows:
Question: What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before
you left?
What briefings or discussions 
were held
concerning what you were to do in Sofia?
NOSENKO: I was told: "You are going for consultations. There
are KGB advisors there. They will 
discuss it with
you." No one was speaking with me about 
my trip.
Question: What discussions did you have with your department
chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do 
on this
trip?
NOSENKO:
Nothing.
"You will go.
He told me:
You will see
what they are doing. You will tell them how to
work."
Question: Did you have any meetings or discussions with the
representatives of the Bulgarian 
MVR in Moscow 
be-
fore you left?
NOSENKO: NO.
Question: What discussions did you have with YEGOROV or his
section about what you were going to do 
in Sofia
?
NOSENKO:
YEGOROV said: "You will go. You will tell us what
they are doing.”
Question: Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know any-
thing about the size of the American Department of
the Bulgarian MVR?
NOSENKO: No. Nothing.
Question: Did you know the names of any of the officers of the
American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?
NOSENKO: No.
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Question: Did you know what any of their particular problems
we're?
NOSENKO: No.
Nothing.
Question: Did you know just what was the area of responsibility
of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?
NOSENKO: No.
Nothing.
NOSENKO flew from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met
at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief
The follow
Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow. *
ing morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and was
taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far
away. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was
told that "they want to know about how to work against the Ameri-
can Legation. He said he wanted me to tell them everything about
how to work, right from letter 'A.'" NOSENKO was then intro-
duced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and
to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he
was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing
weeks he discussed both general matters and particular cases
with individual Bulgarian officers working against the American
target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers
on the principles of operations against foreign military person-
nel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance
post opposite the American Legation. He discussed, KGB methods
He also addressed the
of operations against foreign tourists.
entire American Department for about five hours and told them
"what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work.”
At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred
with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been
accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations
against Americans.
As an outgrowth of his TDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has pro-
vided one lead to a case in which he said he took personal part.
About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of
April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists of foreigners who were
scheduled to visit Bulgaria in the near future, and he came
across the name Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a man
named LUNT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him
in 1958 or 1959 by one of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or
YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual. He asked the Bulgarians
whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages. When
the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO de-
cided to check his recollection against KGB records and an
immediate phone call was placed to Moscow, asking for traces.
NOSENKO had earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the
Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate,
until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to
Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been
Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. For the two years
immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been
Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief
Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked
why KOZLOV was unable to "advise" the Bulgarians in this
instance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on
higher levels and that he had been away from the work for
a number of years.
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"Yes..
A reply was received almost at once: .
This is the same
NOSENKO told CIA that
LUNT who was in Moscow. Homosexual."
the KGB had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT'ɛ·
homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not pre-
viously known of them.
NOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows:
"KOZLOV and the Chief of the American Department were very in-
terested. KOZLOV said: 'George (NOSENKO). you must help them.
I said that 
I would do what
They never recruited an American.'
O.K.; I said, acquaint
This is the first
Then we
I could. The three of us went to see General DUMKOV, the
I asked them
Chief of the Second Directorate, Bulgarian MVR.
if they had a homosexual agent. They checked and said they
had one who is an operational contact.
them, prepare a flat, make the pictures.
stage. I also told them, of course, to find out how long he
had been there, why, who his acquaintances were, etc.
went to YEGOROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and KOZLOV. called
GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV, I later found out, was in a meeting with
the department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was
not in a good mood. Why, I don't know. He didn't 
understand
what KOZLOV was saying. GRIBANCV thought that I, myself
, 
wanted
to make the approach to LUNT. KOZLOV got confused on the phone
.
GRIBANOV asked to speak to me. I took the phone. 
'What are
you doing?' he said. 'You are not at home, you are abroad.
You were sent only for consultations, but 
you are living as 
if
I said: 'O.K., O.K. I wasn't going to 
do
you were at home.
anything.' He hung up.
I told KOZLOV that even if the Bulgar-
YEGOROV became
ians were to ask me, I could not do it myself.
upset. He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians
were asking. 'What they ask, I will tell,' I said, '
but I am
not leaving the office to go any place or do anything.
only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is
But the
caught. I can dictate the questions to be asked.
approach and recruitment I cannot do myself.'
I can
I
"The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active
I told 
them
participation, but they didn't know what to do.
to get two agents. Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one.
The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there long
.
told them that if they wanted to take pictures and 
make 
a pitch
later, that's one thing. But if they wanted to do it 
all in
one step, that is another. I told them they should 
consider 
the
time element... The Chief of the American 
Department, KOVACHEV,
and the chief of the section dealing with tourists and American
The approach was
delegations were to make the recruitment.
made at the end of April, I think."
NOSENKO went on to say: "I was in the office during the
'If you need my
approach. I told them I would not leave.
advice,' I said, 'come to me. KOZLOV and I were sitting in
his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next
day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they approached
LUNT.
I only advised them that after the first conversation with
I said
him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate.
I
they should have an apartment ready... not far from Sofia.
told them that if he agreed, they should change the 
place 
right
away. Take him some place nice to finish the 
conversation.
That's what I suggested.
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282.
The outcome was not known to NOSENKO) for he said:
didn't read any report of the results, and I didn't ask to see
one.. I took a neutral position. They said everything was O.K.
The next day LUNT was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief.
I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part of 30 April, 1,
2, and 3 May. When I returned they said everything was O.K. and
that he [NT] had left. I asked them what they had decided for
the future, a contact in the United States or not. They said
they decided against it because he was to come to Bulgaria in
1962 or 1963 for a Slavic conference."
This account, which NOSENKO gave on 6 October 1964, differs
somewhat from what he had said earlier, on 11 June 1962, during
his second meeting with CIA. NOSENKO claimed then that he per-
sonally participated in the recruitment of LUNT against GRIBANOV's
The Minister 
of 
Internal
wishes: "They sent me in '61 to Bulgaria.
I went to
"Where
I left the
I de-
Affairs there asked for a specialist to help them.
help. An (American) professor arrived, a very prominent special-
ist on the Slavic countries... They (the Bulgarians) had never
The Sov-
tried (to recruit] an American. 'Let's try,' I said.
iet advisor in Bulgaria telephoned GRIBANOV and reported that
NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American.
GRIBANOV Was in a conference at the time. GRIBANOV said:
the hell's NOSENKO? Let me talk to him... What the hell are
Then he hung up.
you doing? I sent you only as an advisor.'
What could I do? The Bulgarians had already made all prepara-
tions... I was embarrassed, but what could I do?
office of the advisor and they were waiting for me...
I felt that
cided to go ahead. I was sure that it would work.
it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited...
I spit on everything and went ahead with the Bulgarians.
told them to grab him. If it will be difficult for you, tell
me and I myself can recruit him. Well, they began and I came
there. He [NCSENKO is speaking of himself] was under the guise
of a Bulgarian and spoke in English, although my English was
poor... I said: 'You are a pederast. He also proved him-
self to be a homosexual there [in Bulgaria)... 'Well, what will
society think of you, those whose know you?' Well, what did
this person decide? He agreed.“
I
The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated
directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still
in Geneva. He volunteered the following: "In Bulgaria in
April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate
in this, I went there, and. I helped them there with the whole
process of recruitment of this professor. I helped the Bul-
garians with what to do and how. He was the professor of
philolery, LINT."
NOSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation
against LUNT. In the account quoted above, he said that the
approach was made the day before he left on his May Day holi-
day. On 24 April 1964 he said: "I remember that it was 
at
And we got
the very beginning of May that this name came up.
the information from Moscow the same day, telling us it was
the same LUNT. I went on a trip the 1st, 2nd, 3rd of May.
That is the 30th of April, 1st and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of
May in the morning I was back. So it was in the very beginning
after the night of the trip. And Moscow was called right away,
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given all the data, and they called back right away and said:
'Yes, this is the same LUNT who was in Moscow... As soon as
this was established, the next day the Bulgarians planted this
homosexual on him. They planted this man either next to him
or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNT and they got tc-
gether and decided to meet with each other the same day or the
next day. This was all done very rapidly."
According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took
place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had
contacted an official in the U.S. Embassy. He travelled on
9 May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia, where he at once re-
ported the incident to U.S. Ambassador George KENNAN, an aca-
demic acquaintance. LUNT told the Ambassador, and later CIA,
that he had visited Sofia on one earlier occasion, from 8 to
28 November 1960. During this first trip he became involved
with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homo-
sexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to
whom he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended
to sell on the black market. On one occasion during the first
visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian
civil police while walking on the street with LUNT. After
leaving Bulgaria in November 1960, LUNT received two letters
from ALEKSIEV and prior to his next visit, on 25 April 1961,
LUNT wrote ALEKSIEV saying he would be returning.
:
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284.
Transfer to the Tourist Department in January 1962
In the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis
of NOSENKO's own request, to return him to the Tourist Depart-
ment. GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NOSENKO from
the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the
post of Deputy Chief of the American Department; NOSENKO's
superior and friend KOVSHUK had long had his eye on this job,
however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the Ameri-
can Department for it. (In fact, NOSENKO said, KOVSHUK had
once held the job, losing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.)
NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation
which his own promotion to this post would have created. NOSENKO
described his transfer in the February 1965 interrogations.
following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965:
The
"The decision for me to return to the Seventh (Tourist)
Department. in January 1962 was actually made in about Septem-
ber or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy
Chief of the First (American] Department, but the new Chief
of the First Department, FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take
this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this
position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEV,
I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back
to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had already
spoken to [V.D.) CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the
Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested
that I go to GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh
Department as Chief of the First (American-British-Canadian]
Section with the understanding that I would be appointed
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this
position would be vacated by (B.A.) BALDIN (who was retiring
in July 1962]. ...GRIBANOV did not tell me his reasons...
for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Depart-
ment in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and
later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He
did not discuss with me my personal qualifications for
each of these positions.
"
Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity
during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tour-
ist Department. There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV,
familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist
Section, and discussed current operations and operational possi-
bilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal
order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 Decem-
ber 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file
and the U.&. Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy
Chief of the American Embassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the
next few days.* As he had when he transferred from the Tourist
to the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said, he took his
active agents and his safehouse on Vorovskiy Street with him when
he returned to the Tourist Department in 1962.
These specific dates were arrived at under interrogation in
February 1965. On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said
that he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date);
he said in February 1965 that he was "officially" transferred
at the end of December and reported to his new position at
the beginning of January (see below).
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285.
January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department).
Date of Transfer
NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left
the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department to become
Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist
Department. During the Geneva meetings of 1962 he said on
different occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and in
February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between
15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSENKO gave the
date as 2 or 3 January 1962. He has also reported that he was
in the U.S. Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN
serviced the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus
placing NOSENKO in the U.S. Embassy Section until late March
1962) and that he had transferred to the Tourist Department by
the time GOLITSYN defected (which NOSENKO placed in mid-January
1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 1961).* W.E.
JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operation** con-
firmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 January 1962.
In February 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct
The CIA
date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962.
interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described
on several occasions his visit to the dead drop site on Pushkin
Street and his receipt of reports from the surveillance post
for three months afterwards; during all of this period, NOSENKO
had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Depart-
ment. NOSENKO was told that CIA records show that ABIDIAN made
only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961, six
days before the approach to JOHNSON. He answered only that he
might have been confused, but despite any contradictions the
"facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any corre-
lation of dates.
2.
Functions and Activities
As Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the
Tourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the
American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO
said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all
KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as
for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case
officers. He had no deputy. NOSENKO told CIA that he required
several months at the beginning of 1962 "to get the feel of
things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the
initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the
influx of American tourists during the forthcoming 1962 season
consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the
tourists as in the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965
Statements by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in
Part VI.E., and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street
dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.
.:.
See Part V.F.4. for details on this operation.
H
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whether, in his first several months in the Tourist Department,
he had originated any new methods for operations against An-
erican tourists. He replied that during this period he had
proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms
in Moscow with an eye toward the KGB attempting to recruit
them. *
This suggestion, NOSENKO said, had been accepted.
In March 1965, NOSENKO was asked what new knowledge con-
cerning the use of tourism for espionage purposes by foreign
intelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during
his two-year absence from the Tourist Department. He replied
that the KGB had noted an increase in automobile tourism and
that American Intelligence had increased its use of multinational
tourist groups.
NOSENKO was then asked what new information
concerning the use of tourism as a cover for espionage activity
had been obtained by the KGB from any agent source during this
period. NOSENKO answered that he neither knew of any such new
information nor had he heard of such an agent.
NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, O.M. GRIBANOV, he was pro-
moted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist
Department in July 1962, immediately after his return from
Geneva. A year later he was made First Deputy Chief of the
Department, a promotion which involved only a change in title
as there was no Second Deputy Chief at the time. Apart from
saying he was V.D. CHELNOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962
to January 1964 and as such general supervisor of all KGB tour-
ist operations, NOSENKO has not detailed the functions attached
to this position; NOSENKO has not been questioned specifically
concerning these duties.
NOSENKO's first operational activity after transferring to
the American Tourist Section was supervision of a homosexual
approach to W.E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962. Additionally, during
the 1962-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO took part
in the recruitment approach to Horst BRAUNS, in the interrogation
of Yale University Professor Frederick BARCHOORN, and in the
arrest of the American tour guide Bernard KOTEN. For a short
time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY,
owner of a tourist agency in New York City*** and a Russian
language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois. By virtue of his
NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal
in 1958-59, forming the basis of the FRIPPEL operation (see
Part V.D.5.).
✰✰ See Part V.D.7.b., which discusses the KGB agent George
BLAKE, a staff officer of MI-6, who confessed after his
arrest in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet
handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by
CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington
during April 1960. These meetings were held to coordinate
the American and British programs for legal travel opera-
tions, mainly with tourists, into the Soviet Union.
Part V.D.7.c. describes a top secret KGB document on
Western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which was
prepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB
Second Chief Directorate. This document, which the
defector GOLITSYN gave CIA, quoted verbatim certain
portions of the minutes given to the KGB by BLAKE.
***KOTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR
by this tourist agency.
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supervisory position in the Tourist Department NOSENKO also be-
came involved with John SHUBIN, a GRU agent. (These six cases
JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN are
discussed below.) NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the
approach to Natalie BIENSTOCK (see Part VI.D.2.) was prevented
by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962. Finally,
NOSENKO said he participated in the KGB investigation of Lee
Harvey OSWALD after President KENNEDY's assassination in Novem-
ber 1963 (see Part V.D.6.).
NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962
to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above because of the
considerable amount of time spent on temporary duty assignments
outside Moscow during these two years. In mid-February 1962,
soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the American Tourist
Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which
lasted from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III.B.). NOS-
ENKO estimated that he had spent a total of six months outside
Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments. These included a two-
day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL, an inspection tour of the
Leningrad KGB organization, a five-day trip to Leningrad for a
conference on border control, a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for
a conference on tourist travel with KGB representatives from
the Soviet Central Asian republics, and an eight- or ten-day
inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a team headed by
GRIBANOV. NOSENKO said he travelled to Gorkiy Oblast on 16-17
December 1963 to assist in the search for CHEREPANOV, who had
passed top secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see
Part VI.D.7.c.).
3. NOSENKO's Agents
When NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the
first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had
been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.
These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO's com-
ments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.*
a.
Arsene FRIPPEL:
FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but
NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case offi-
cer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him. (FRIPPEL
had no KGB contacts in New York City.) Describing FRIPPEL's
past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he
said he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said:
"FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing... He was
a weak agent... I recruited him but, speaking honestly, he
Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped
that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future
date.
When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in
1963, NOSENKO met with him, once in Odessa and once in Moscow,
was not an agent.'
"
The only other agent whom NOSENKO handled during this
period was the American Alexander SVENCHANSKIY. (See
Part V.F.6.).
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but FRIPPEL provided nothing useful on these occasions.*
Whereas NOSENKO had normally met FRIFPEL in the company of
CHELNOKOV during FRIPPEL's Moscow tour, he went alone to the
two 1963 meetings.
b.
Johan PREISFREUND:
After GOLITSYN's defection, NOSENKO said, the KGB considered
PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore
ineligible for further use against Americans at the Embassy in
Moscow. For this reason NOSENKO was told by the U.S. Embassy
Section to continue to handle PREISFREUND while serving in the
Tourist Department, but as PREISFREUND spoke only Finnish and
Russian, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists.
Although NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to
Moscow in 1962 and 1953, this agent was not used operationally.
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV:
C.
NOSENKO's two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV took
part in the entrapment approach to W.E. JOHNSON several days
This was
after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department.
their first operational activity since 1959, for they had not
been used in any homosexual operations while NOSENKO was in the
U.S. Embassy Section. It was, according to NOSENKO, the last
At the end of 1962 or
time they were engaged in KGB activity.
the beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and their files were
sent by NOSENKO to KGB archives. NOSENKO explained that VOLKOV
and YEFREMOV had become too well known for their operational
activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate.
d.
When NOSENKO was transferred to the Tourist Department,
he was instructed by the Americar. Department Chief, S.M.
FEDOSEYEV, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section,
to continue to handle TAILLEUR NEEDS
studying in Moscow. NOSENKO had personally recruited
and had used him in the development of U.S. military code
clerk Matthew 2JJUS (see Part V.E.3.c.) in 1961, an operation
which was still underway at the time of NOSENKO's transfer.
NOSENKO continued to meet during the first months of
1962, and he recalled that in February or March of that year
he instructed CCEKKN to attempt to arrange a social meeting
with ZJJUS in a Moscow restaurant so that another KGB agent
could be introduced to the KGB target. This meeting had not
Just
taken place by March 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva.
before leaving Moscow, around 12 March 1962, NOSENKO turned
over to G.I. GRYAZNOV, according to NOSENKO, then the
Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. was scheduled
to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, and NOSENKO be-
lieved he left at that time to return to Syria.
07
FRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV
in Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State
Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended
* to visit the USSR at that time. NOSENKO said there was
no such meeting. See Part V.D.5.
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289
Marina RYTOVA:
Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSENKO by I.A. KONSTAN-
At that time
TINOV of the Tourist Department in 1956 or 1957.
she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent
Exhibition in Moscow. In 1960 or 1961 she became an instructor
of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations,
and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central
Thereafter
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
she ceased all agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as
He did not indi-
her case officer until his defection in 1964.
cate that RYTOVA took part in any operations from January 1962
until she began work for the Central Committee.
4.
Approach to W.E. JOHNSON
a.
NOSENKO's Information:
. NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American
tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1952. He did not name
JOHNSON at this time: "In January of this year I recruited (an
American. I cannot remember his name. He is from California,
a Baptist, a young guy, healthy, somewhat fat, and he turned out
to be a homosexual.* He loved men. I have an agent network
capable of anything and, in particular, although I head a section
there, I have a good agent apparatus, i.e., I have beautiful
In partic-
girls... and I have young pederasts, homosexuals..
ular, I have one special pair /VOLKOV and YEFREMOV/
that they are known to you and the English...
happened. He gave me a signature. I told him: 'Write it your-
self.' So he typed it on a typewriter. I said: 'No, I don't
want it typed. Write it out longhand.
He had a very re-
His attitude was
-
I'm afraid
Here is what
I
actionary attitude toward the Soviet Union.
such that he insulted us terribly. He visited Baptist groups,
churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the government horribly.
He sent letters, and we read them all awful letters, i.e., the
government is lousy and everything here is poor. I said to him:
'Write, damn it, that the best country in the world is the
Soviet Union, that the best government is the Soviet Government.
Write, write.' In general he did everything I asked but then,
This
right away, he ran to the Embassy_and told everything.
was in January of this year [1962]. He told everything. I
know that he told. But he gave me his signature that he would
help the Soviet security organs, etc. I know this. I was
there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying.
sat down and waited. Surveillance was on the job.
when he comes, I ordered/. I sat down. 'He has come,
surveillance team reported/. 'Where is he?' I asked/. 'In
his room, [they said. "We'll wait,' (I replied/. They re-
ported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went
there at once. He was sitting alone. I approached him:
'Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him.
that he had told everything in the Embassy. I said: 'How
And our
are you? How about our connection in the States?
I said to
work in the States? what do you think about it?!
him: 'Will you work? Can you give us something important or
not?' He answered: 'I have nothing..' I said: 'And if I
'
'Tell me
'
I knew
Other sources, personal acquaintances of JOHNSON, have:
reported JOHNSON's having homosexual tendencies.
the
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make it public that you are a pederast, what will happen then?'
'No,' he said, 'I will do anything you want.' But I couldn't
tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said:
'Listen, brother, I don't believe you. You are a bad person.
We decided that we couldn't do anything with him. 'Go home,
damn you,' I said. 'But if you write one insulting article
about Russia I will find you, even in the U.S.' He is a
Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy. And I left. He
pushed aside his food and ran to a pay telephone and called
[the Embassy: 'This afternoon in a restaurant George was
frightening me.' We know he called the Embassy. We heard
everything."
"
NOSENKO's first reference to JOHNSON in 1964 was at a meet-
ing on 2 February, when he produced a note bearing that name and
the date 5 January 1962. "Here I have a name jotted down,
Everett Wallace [sic] JOHNSON, NOSENKO said. "The date was
5 January 1962, but what took place I have absolutely no recol-
lection. I don't think it was a recruitment, but it was some
sort of contact, or he was being studied or worked on, or some-
thing like that. But I remember nothing."
NOSENKO next mentioned his approach to JOHNSON on 17 April
1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he
eventually remembered that "it was something like JOHNSON,
JOHNSTON, or something that starts with a 'J'" and that he was
a Baptist from the California coast. NOSENKO placed the opera-
tion sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow
from Geneva, because he also remembered wearing "just a coat,
no overcoat at the time." JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet
Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this
basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a
recruitment target. When the Second Chief Directorate checked
whether the KGB First Chief Directorate would have any use for
JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest
in JOHNSON: He had no access to important information, and he
lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United
States for convenient contact.
Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON
mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were
found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical,.
that they the KGB/ decided something had to be done" to stop
him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on
his return to the United States. At about the same time there
was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided
to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt
JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR no recruitment was attempted,
because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorates
had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had deter
mined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal
anyway. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the
approach to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go."
(F. D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate,
supervised the activities of the Tourist Department.) NOSEN-
KO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to
compromise JOHNSON.*
In 1962 NOSENKO implied that the KGB received its first
indication of JOHNSON's homosexuality from one or both.
these agents.
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291
JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the
Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON that they had recently ar-
rived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room.
JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away.
They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals) and so he came,
and when they were engaged in their business, our people walked
in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and
one militiaman." Photographs of the incident had been taken,
but these had not been developed at the time of this, the first
confrontation of JOHNSON. A report describing the circumstances
(an akt) was prepared, and JOHNSON was then transferred to another
room. By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his
office, and he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in
accordance with KGB orders. NOSENKO discussed the situation
with JOHNSON, then asked him to type and sign a statement that
he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union."
JOHNSON did as he was told.
The following day, after the incriminating photographs had
been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the
Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his
promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO
presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photo-
graphs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press
if 
JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later learned
that 
JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later ver-
sion) the U.S. Embassy and assumed that he had reported the
approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had
used during this operation.
Questioned further on 24 April 1964, NOSENKO said that,
upon his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise,
the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's pre-
sence. Addressing JOHNSON, NOSENKO had said: "How come? How
could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After
all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from
five to eitht years for such relations. It used to be three
to five, not it's from five to eight." Frightened by this,
JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate
the 
Soviet Union in the future.
NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an
operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary
letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't
jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this way. And not
everything that is written this way gets into their hands.
In this case there was a coincidence. There was something we
could hit him on. For instance, if the fact that he is a
homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably'
just say: 'All right, to hell with him. We have to get rid
of him. Let's see that his trip is cut off.'".
"
While discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January
1965, the following dialogue took place:
NOSENKO: This (the approach) took place in the summertime
of '62 or '63.
Question: In your notes, you have the date 5 January 1962.
NOSENKO: No, it doesn't concern JOHNSON at all. I remember
it was summer; I think it was
63.
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296.
course, because we haven't seen him yet. But even that first
signal is very helpful. So if he goes on a Soviet plane, they
will start watching him from the time the flight starts. Now,
as soon as he crosses the border, he will be watched by the
border guards; he will be watched the entire route of his travel.
This is a very important business, because the main task in re-
gard to tourists is to uncover within the general flow of tourists
those persons who are of interest from the operational point of
view... Let's just say that this person is processing a group
of American tourists who are going to the Soviet Union, and,
when the processing is almost finished, another person is added
to the group. Nobody knows this person in the group... but he
was added at the last minute. So this is an indication. This is
what he the agent/ was taught to pay attention to when he was
being trained in Moscow... Now, if some official government
agency makes a request that a man be sent to the Soviet Union as
a tourist, this immediately arouses suspicion, of course... In
such things he has been trained... He comes to Moscow once or
twice a year.
You know, such a little Jewish fellow an emigre
from Russia
The
in the past, you know, scared of everything.
last time he came he told us: 'You know, I'm thinking about it
all the time,' he says. So they asked him: 'Are you afraid?
why are you shaking?' He says, 'Well, I'm not afraid; I'm not
shaking. But why should I be caught like an idiot... His
pseudonym is 'ANOD' and his last name is SVENCHANSKIY.
I'll give you all this later."
-
-
Well,
NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was
recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSENKO, had taken over
the handling of this agent from Tourist Department case officer
Ye. N. NOSKOV.* SVENCHANSKIY had sent the KG3 many open code
messages such as those described above, and a number of these
messages have been considered to have been of definite opera-
tional interest. NOSENKO identified SVENCHANSKIY as the presi-
dent of "Afton Tours" in New York City and the owner of a
Russian-language bookstore in Chicago.
There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time
of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENKO reported on 1 March
1965, because SVENCHANSKIY had had contacts with AMTORG in New
York City. The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in con-
tacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this
was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was de-
termined that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO re-
plied: "NOSKOV felt it;" he had no further explanation.) The
recruitment was based mainly on an agreement that Inturist
would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated.
NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested for black-
marketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement..
NOSENKO took over the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, and
his name was entered in the single-volume file of SVEN CHANSKIY
as the handling officer as of that date. Together with NOSKOV,
NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKIY when
the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September
and one towards the end of 1963.
Information from Other Sources:
CIA records reflect that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY was born
on 6 March 1909 in Theodosia, Russia. He immigrated to the
United States in 1923 and became a naturalized citizen on his
སྐ
At this time, NOSENKO has stated, he (NOSENKO) was Pirst
Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.
14-00000
297,
father's papers in 1929. His carliest exployers were the "All-
Russian Textile Syndicate" from February 1928 to March 1931,
by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by
the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington from
May 1942 until December 1942. During the Second World War.
SVENCHANSKIY served in the U.S. Army Air Force as "official
translator" at the White Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had
frequent contacts with members of Soviet aircraft crews.
From
October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for re-
fusing to answer questions by the McCarran Committee concerning
alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United
Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the
USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was listed as president of
Afton Tours, Inc., New York City, and president of Cross World
Books and Periodicals, Chicago. Afton Tours is a branch of the
Package Express and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent
of Inturist. Cross World Books and Periodicals was registered
in 1961 as an agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Knica, the Soviet Foreign
Trade Administration dealing with the distribution and sale of
Russian-language books, periodicals, films, and visual aids.
SVENCHANSKIY has made numerous trips to the USSR, including one
in August and September 1963.
Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and pro-
bable Soviet espionage activities date back to.
Force service in Alaska,
3 of his strong pro-Soviet bias and suspiciously close con-
with Soviets. In August 1950 Harry GOLD, then in prison
as an admitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet
espionage network in the United States.* GOLD stated that in..
March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWAN, had been in-
strumental in introducing his "co-conspirator" Abraham PROTHMAN
to "another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage.' A
CIA report of 14 November 1950 cites a "tested source" (a Czech
national employed at the United Nations) as stating: "I believe
that Alexander SVEN CHANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of
the Russian Division of the United Nations, is a Communist and
possibly a Communist agent,
"
Identified as a Soviet agent by Eliza-
beth BENTLEY, KAZAKEVICH has since emigrated to the Soviet
Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate by COLITSYN and by NOSENKO. Virtually all the
individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business
arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had con-
nections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet
Intelligence Services. His business dealings have also brought
him into frequent contact with Soviet officials in this country,
including a number of identified intelligence officers (two of
them reported on by NOSENKO).
The 21 October 1953 edition of the New York Times carried
the story of GOLD's testimony under the headline "Ex-U.N.
Aide linked to Spy Ring by Gold;" the Times reported that
GOLD had executed an affidavit to this effect the week
before.
...
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An FBI report.
SVEN HANSKIY
298
564'
7.
a.
KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent
Information from NOSENKO
NOSENKO was asked in Geneva on 26 January 1954 whether he
had been involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the
USSR in the fall of 1903 Almost at once, NOSINKO recognized
this as the case of Bernera KOIEN, & guide for Afton Tours in
New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY
see below) who had been apprehended on homosexual charges in Kiev.
NOSENKO explained that, while he had not personally participated
in the arrest and had never met KOTEN, he had supervised the case
from KGB Headquarters and "the case was reported to me.'
"
-
NOSENKO said that KOT had long been a member of the Am-
erican Communist Party and was a frequent visitor to the Soviet
Union after World War II. On these trips he had a large number
of contacts with dissident literary figures and with Soviet
Because
citizens in general, particularly among Russian Jews.**
of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and the
Second Chief Directorates had come to the conclusion that KOTEN
might well be a provocation agent planted in or recruited from
the ranks of the Communist Party of the United States. More-
over, on the eve of KOTEN's 1963 trip, the Tourist Department
learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's
Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate that KOTEN waз
carrying with him the address of relatives of an important
agent of the KGB's
Legal Residency, and that KOTE:
intended to visit them while in the USSK, NOSENKO said he did
not know the name of this agent
This agent was a naturalized American citizen, about 40
to 45 years old, an engineer born in Russia, who was employed
"interesting industrial company or technical organization
in the New York City area. For some time he had been working
in an
"
CIA told NOSENKO of this information about SCHOLOW. in March
1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for
SVENCHANSKIY but said that "we considered that he (SVEN-
CHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO
did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to SOKOLOW.
NOSENKO has explained in another context that the Second
Chief Directorate is wary of foreign contacts with Soviet
Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has fre-
quently sponsored such contacts.
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299
actively for the
Legal Residency and had provided the
KGB with "good, solid information" with "very valuable material
for technical intelligence;" at the same time the agent had been
asking to be repatriated to the USSR, to become a Soviet citizen,
but the KGB had been putting him off in order to continue to
exploit his access. Since the amount and quality of the agent's
production had recently deteriorated, the KGB decided to accede
to his request for repatriation. Now, however, the agent de-
clined, saying that "he was not ready to go just yet. First he
was practically begging to come to the Soviet Union and now he
was balking," This by itself appeared suspicious to the KGB, but
in addition, it was about this time that the agent came into con-
tact with KCTEN NOSENKO learned from BARKOVSKIY that KOTEN
"used to go to some bookstore that sells Soviet literature and
through a saleslady in this story whom KOTEN knows, he became
acquainted with the agent who also used to go to this store.
After that, he used to meet with the agent without the saleslady."
On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Directorate
suspected that KOTEN had been directed specifically to this store
in order to meet and "work on" the agent and that, having learned
that the agent had relatives "in Stantsiya Loo, about 17 kilo-
meters from Sochi... he had evidently received the assignment
(to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence. Evidently
they had gotten on the trail of this agent and were checking on
him. The KGB also had suspicions concerning the relatives,
former kulaks who were still well-off financially. It was known
to the KGB, for example, that the agent had written his sister
in Stantsiya Loo that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union,
and she had replied: "Is there any sense in your coming here?"
"
KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to Sochi. From
there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband
in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him. When
they arrived at KOTE's hotel, however, the hotel administrator
told them that KOTEN was on an excursion and refused to allow
a meeting. KOTEN then took it upon himself to travel to Stant-
siya Loo where he eventually contacted and spoke to the rela-
tives. In the course of this meeting KOTEN took photographs
of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the
sister to the agent on a tape recorder he had brought along.
From this the KGB deduced that "U.S. Intelligence wants to get
documentary data" and it therefore decided to "try to get hold
of KOTEN."
There had already been some indication during KOTEN's
earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual, but the
KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a
loyal Communist Party member. With these recent developments,
the situation had now changed. Although NOSENKO's superiors.
were absent from KGB Headquarters at the time, immediate action
was required. NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on
myself because everybody got excited. Everybody said: 'Let's
go. American Intelligence is active, none of our bosses are
here, the situation is right, the decision must be made right
now. By this time KOTEN had travelled to Tbilisi, and there
a homosexual KGB agent managed to entice him into relations
in a public park. These were suitably documented, and he was
then picked up by the local Militia. (In the absence of his
"
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ཡ ནྟི བྷསྶ བྷཱནདྷཨ སཱཙནཎྞསཱུསཾཀ
superiors and fearing the possible trpercussions, NOSENKO had.
insisted that the illegal acts take 
place in a public place,
and that the KGB not participate in KOTE's apprehension
.)
After questioning by the Militia. KOTE was 
permitted to 
cɔn-
tinue his itinerary to Kiew, where he was 
scheuled to stay
for two days before leaving the 
USSR
Meanwhile, the First Chief Directorate, which was growing
agent of the
increasingly concerned that the
agent had
Residency would be apprehended by the PPI, wanted to get him out
To establish the
of the United States before this happened
.
true purpose" of KOTEN s presence in the USSR and whether he was
an American agent, as well as to hold 
him until the
arrived safely in the USSR (as NOSENKO toll 
the FBI 
on 24 Feb-
ruary 1964), it was requested that KOTE! be 
detained in the
The decision was made 
to arrest him at once 
on
Soviet Union.
the basis of the compromising materials obtained in Tbilisi.
Following the arrest by the Kiev Militia, KOTE 
was turned 
over
to the KCB for interrogation; the purpose, NOSENKO 
said, was to
"break him, " to secure the admission that he was 
an American
At the same time
the agent
Intelligence agent,
had failed to keep a number of scheduled meetings with his KGB
case officer, and the Legal Residency feared that something had
He did eventually appear. however
, and NOSENKO has
gone wrong.
described the subsequent meetings as follows: "They asked him:
He said
: 'Well, I don't
'Are you going to leave the States?
So we said: 'No,
know. I have to think about it some more. '
you have to leave or else we will wash our hands of the whole
So he said: You know I was thinking 
of leaving 
with
affair.'
To make a long
my wife, but my wife does not want to leave. '
story short, they spent three meetings trying to talk him into
He didn't 
seem to want to
leaving, and he kept hesitating.
Look: we are breaking off con-
leave, so then they told him:
tact with you. If you decide to go. you know how to do it.
You are to go from the United States to some place in Europe
They will give us a signal
and go to the Soviet Embassy there.
Put as far as we're con-
and the visa will be issued to you.
cerned, we're breaking contact with you.
: "
After this, according to NOSENKO, the KGB released KOTEN
when the American Communist Party and other organizations
strongly protested his arrest and imprisonment,
b.
Information from Other Sources Concerning KOTEN
At the time of his arrest KOTEN was an instructor of
Russian at New York University director of the Library for
Intercultural Studies, and a regular contributor to the New
Both the Library
World Review and the magazine Jewish Life.
for Intercultural Studies and Jewish Life have been designated
"Communist fronts" by the House Committee on Un-American
Activities; the New World Review has been cited as a propa-
KOTEN has said 
that,
ganda organ of the Soviet Government.
despite his arrest and imprisonment in the USSR, he hopes to
return there in the future and that he "still 
loved the
Russian people and believed in the basic humanitarianism of
the Soviet Government."
Regarding the arrest the New York Times on 29 August
1963 carried an article under the headline "
U.S. Guide 
Missing
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DEUNEI
.
After Soviet Trip; the article stated that
of the Soviet Union need
apparent arrest of the New York guide ident
Koter of Afton Hours." And article d
Moscow, reported that an official of the
organization sait today that Bernard L.
an American
tour
with the
das Fornard L.
13 29 August,
Inturist trivel
hd boun arrested
He
on charges of homosexual acti.itics with sevi citizen.
said that Nr. Koten... was tested in Fix Tuisy night (27 Aug-
ust) and was being held in Tills (ble the alleged
offense took place." A third Time article, filed in Moscow on
28 September 1963, coated that KOTE, o had been arrested on
26 August, had been released on 26 Septimber and was enroute to
Vienna; the anticle also noted that "officials of Inturist re-
ported Mr. Koten's release, but declined to comment on th: reasons.
and circumstances of his arre.t.
"
Several of KOTINN's friends have also commented on his arrest:
- Isadore Gibby NEEDLEMAN, a New York lawyer, self-
avowed Marxist, and allegedly a Soviet espinage agent in
the past, was reported by an Fat buren
Eda GLASER, a "close associate of OTEN" and the
office manager of the Four Continents Look Store, a Soviet
book outlet in New York, termed the entire incident as
"fantastic" and a
crication.
"
-
SVENCHNISKIY, who returned to the United States from
Moscow while KOTEN was still bein, mold, stated that the
morals charge against him was true bit ne (SVENCHANSKIY)
had been assured that the matter would be cleared up and
that KOTEN would be released.
FBI sources reported that KUTEN later made the following
remarks concerning his arrest and imprisonment:
1
.

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turn to the
he could
3p co. We are
"
and
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www....
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304.
8. Arrest of BARGHOORN
Information from NOSENKO
At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO
described the provocation and arrest of Yale University
Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963; he was ques-
tioned further on this case on 3 February 1964 and again
while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States.
NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the
following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June
1964.* On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the pur-
pose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate
for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets
in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO and to
secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the
BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO
maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to
discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV [the
jailed Soviet), not because of any special importance of
IVANOV himself."
NOSENKO said that in 1963 four KGB First Chief Direc-
torate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency
were caught in operational activity in the United States.
Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a
chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three
Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the
American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauf-
feur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.**
"
GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,
learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed
by KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY to take "necessary measures.
GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G.
KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZ-
NOV and Ye.. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the Ameri-
can Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV
asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on
any American--U.S. Embassy employee or tourist--that could
*The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case
reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the
depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, fur-
nish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting
with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length.
BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB
suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the
general outlines of other operational activity centering
around BARGHOORN during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.
**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 Octo-
ber 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent,
BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A.
PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Soviet Mis-
sion to the United Nations; they claimed diplomatic immuni-
ty and were released; a few days later they were declared
persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV,
who was named in the charges by the U.S. Government, but was
not arrested. Another Soviet citizen, I.A. IVANOV, a driver
for AMTORG, did not have diplomatic immunity and was jailed.
All have been identified as KGB officers
TOP SECRET
305.
serve as material for an arrest.
RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV
said that at that very moment there were three or four
American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the
opinion of the American Department, these officers might
be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they.
had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and that
they had been observed taking notes. If permitted, they
could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return
plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to know what other pos-
sibilities existed and instructed the two representatives
He
of the American Department to write a report on this.
also told them to request permission to arrest and search
the military attaches.
GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held
by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were re-
latively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that
time; these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRI-
BANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong"
materials against them. They were ordered to make an im-
mediate study of the situation and to report back to GRI-
BANOV as soon as possible.
Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in
their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that
BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything
worth consideration. All the materials on BARGHOORN were
gathered together, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took them to
GRIBANOV, explaining that he was the only possibility.
GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with them;
he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American
Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO
and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi
and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case officer, American
Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from
the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose
of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special
item which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently sick
to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he
was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his
belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been
found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's
room as a patient%; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered
BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the
bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN
was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following
morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an
appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy
at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.
It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving
"materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow.. NOSENKO said that this
would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made
no difference to him. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO
*On another occasion, NOSENKO estimated their number
'about 60."
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ཐ, 'ཛཱསཉྩ ,
14-00000
306.
to locate an agent who could be used to pass the damaging
materials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of
BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second
Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials
This was
which are of interest to American Intelligence."
to be sent in letter form to SEMICHASTNYY over GRIBANOV's
signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN
was to receive the materials (i.e., the fact of provocation
was not to be mentioned).
GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOOPN, along
with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV con-
cerning the military attaches, to SEMICH.ASTNYY.
While
the four--NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOVALENKD--
were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV
received a telephone call from the local KCB organization
in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in
the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter,
GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB
had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well
as BARGHOORN. (KHRUSHCHEV was absent from Moscow at the
time, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured his
approval.*)
When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military
attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he be-
came furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die."
Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D"
(the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate
to the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materials
on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these
were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to
their office to plan the provocation.
The
BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon
his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was
received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN
had gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that the
agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be
placed in contact with him as soon as he came out.
KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the
British Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report
was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S. Embassy in
the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the
Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in
the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was
in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was there-
fore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at
the hotel.
.
*NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN re-
turned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN
was arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned from
Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on
31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on
30 October, the day before the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV greeted
Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and
later in the day attended a luncheon in his honor. On 31
October, the day of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA at-
tended a performance of Swan Lake in Moscow. BREZHNEV was
not seen in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.
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14-00000
307.
1 SHUPL
No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than
the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent
asked. "Yes."
"Please take it," the agent said. The
agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry
in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.
BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was
seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of
the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest.
A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the
car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets
arrested in the United States had received similar treat-
ment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where
a room had been prepared.
i
L. I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American
Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV
to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter.
When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident
report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared
requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200
and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison.
At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were
released with instructions to report for duty at 0930
hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.
NR. KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000
hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian,
YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret.
NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions.
(Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARG-
HOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV
had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they
reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained
the damaging materials.) The first sessions concentrated
on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.'
After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN
agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested,
but he maintained that they had been placed on his person.
He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something,"
that he did not know what they were. The closed package
was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about
20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN
was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.
Union twice 2010
resence of sury
1
f
valid.U.S.
to the FLI
*In October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had
been present on the day after the arrest. At this interro-
*Most of 1gation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV questioned BARGHOORN "concerning
NOSENKO, 11 personal background, employment, etc." - Then NOSENKO asked
BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials
on his person at the time of his arrest. When BARGHOORN
could be admitted this, NOSENKO left. As noted below, BARGHOORN.
mentation reported that the materials were not discussed at this par-
ticular interrogation.
Apart from Sile
the USSR in 193
to the Soviet Un
TOP SECRET
14,00000-***
OP SECRET
292.
The CIA interviewer then read to him the report which fixed
the date of the approach as 5. January 1962, the date contained
in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSENKO used the name
NIKOLAYEV. (see below). Acknowledging that "maybe" he had used
the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with JOHNSON, NOSENKO
said: "I don't know why I made this mistake with the dates.
think it (the approach) was the first or second day that I was in
the Seventh (Tourist) Department. I saw myself that he had
(homosexual) intercourse... Your date is absolutely right, but
this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the
Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?"
Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Department?
NOSENKO: Now I remember that it was immediately
b.
-
one or two
I
days. I know I returned in January 1962. I knew I
would be going to the Seventh (Department) already in
December. I was visiting the Seventh already then.
I had not too many papers to turn over to the First
(American Department), and now I remember that I
moved to the Seventh immediately (NOSENKO's emphasis)
after 1 January 1962.
Information from JOHNSON:
JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January
1962 that he experienced an "incident with Soviet plainclothes-
men in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." JOHNSON, who
arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer
that "he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the
evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a Soviet
citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This
was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON,
little conversation transpired because the Riga 'doctor' spoke
English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the 'doctor'
said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who
spoke English well. JOHNSON then agreed to come by the 'doc-
tor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON
said that he dropped by the 'doctor's' room about 10:00 the
morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the 'doctor' and
his 'student' friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV)
began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he
protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen
suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under
arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was
asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this state-
ment and was taken to a man in a third room who identified him-
self as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.* The
police chief first cold him that Soviet law had been violated
and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or
perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein for
NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriv
Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally
called Georgiy, a variation of Yuriy, by family and friends
in Moscow.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
293.
a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his power
to dismiss the whole affair, provided JOHNSON would do him a
favor. The favor turned out to be a signed commitment that he
would not speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the
United States."
In the afternoon of 8 January, JOHNSON called the Embassy
to say that he had been recontacted by the Chief of Police, who
reminded him of his pledge and showed him four pictures. JOHNSON
said: "I don't know where they got them, but they were dillies.
During the interviews by the FBI
1965, JOHNSON repeated substantially the same story, continuing.
to deny that he had actually been compromised. In addition to
letters to his parents, JOHNSON said he wrote to about 20 other
people, mostly "minister friends" abroad; apparently he did not
tell the FBI of their content. Shown pictures of VOLKOV and
NOSENKO on 13 May 1965. JOHNSON said he had seen VOLKOV "some-
where" and suggested that the photograph of NOSENKO was that of
a younger man whom he had seen in Djakarta in 1962-1963.
5.
a.
Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS
Information from NOSENKO:
"
NOSENKO made the following statement or 2 February 1964:
"In 1962 some U.S. citizen by the name of Horst BRAUNS came to
the Soviet Union. I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that
time could not recall his name.* We tried to recruit him but
did not succeed. He lived somewhere in Leningrad, and in 1942
he went back with the German troops to Germany. And he served
in the German Army, and after the war he changed his name and
went to the USA and became a U.S. citizen. He is either a
skilled mechanic or a worker. His real name is different.- it is
Russian because he changed his name when he was in. Germany.".
-
NOSENKO went into the operation against EBRAUNS in greater
detail on 17 April 1964: "This was K.G. KRUPNOV's case.
This fellow was a Russian and lived prior to the war in Lenin-
grad. In 1942, he was in Tikhvin, near Leningrad, when the
Germans came, and when the Germans were retreating they took
him along and some other people, local people, and so he found
himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, he
was kept in various prison camps and when the war was over he
worked in West Germany and then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - I
don't remember which year/ he came to the United States and
settled down. why we became interested in this fellow...
✓ NOSENKO thought his name was something like 'BRUNKS' or
'BRONX' is because he came from Russia. So, according to
Soviet law, he never lost his Soviet citizenship... Leaving
with the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor
of your country. So there was something to talk to him about.
Besides, KRUPNOV found out either in the Information Section
for some other section of the KGB First Chief Directorate/
that the man is working in some very interesting company that
makes computers or adding machines or some other instruments.
But when I talked to him he already left the company. He
wasn't working with this company any more.
BRAUNS did not arrive in Moscow until after NOSENKO had
returned to the Soviet Union from Geneva in 1962, accord-
ing travel records.
14-00000
:
294.
"They called him to Inturisti They gave him a room in the
Inturist / Hotel. Then KRUFNON transferred him from the Inturist
to another hotel, put him in a room in the hotel, and started
talking to him. Then he left him in his room and called us up
said that he needed help, that he can't do anything with the
man.
I thought that he would be able to handle him all by hin-
self, so I said to KOVSHUK:*
'I'm sorry. I thought he'd be able
to handle it. He tells me that he doesn't seem to get anywhere,
so I guess I'd have to go help him." I got there and I see that
the man is scared stiff. He doesn't talk about anything, doesn't
want to listen to any of these reasons. He was told that, after
all, he is a traitor to his country, that he went with the Ger-
mans... This fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his
consent, he agreed to help us.
If
"The next day he went to Leningrad. so felt that this
agreement wasn't very firm, reliable. So the next day KRUPNOV
and I went to see QIELNOKOV /Chief of the Tourist Department].
And I told him: 'I feel that this agreement of his is quite
shaky. I'm not sure about it. So are we to follow through?
we decide to do so, then we'll neve to go to Leningrad. So
KRUPNOV went and called the mar, and the man_refused to palik to
ham. So then I was told to go. So I went to Leningrad/ and...
I went to his hotel room. He locked the door, and he wouldn't
let me in. The only thing, fortunately for us, the lock in
the door wasn't a very good one, so we called a locksmith, and
he found a key that opened the door. So we entered the room,
and we started talking to him. The fellow was terribly scared,
he was shaking, so it was quite obvious that he would never work
for us.
So we finally decided: Look, it's okay. We don't want
anything from you. Go ahead, leave. Goodbye. And that was
all; that was the end of it. I don't know whether it was BROOKS
or BRONX or some name like that which he used in the States,
but his true name was IVANOV."
In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came
to be involved in the BRAUNS case. He also said that he did
not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and that he
could not name any Soviet citizens with whom ERAUNS was in con-
tact in Moscow.
b.
Information from BRAUNS
Interviewed by the FBI
NOSENKO is apparently in error. At this time, he has re-
ported, V.M. KOVSHUK was not in the Tourist Department but
in the American Department. He may mean V.D. CHELNOKOV,
Chief of the Tourist Department.
TOP SECRET
}
6.
The SVEINSKIY Cas
a.
Information from NOSENKO:
ROSENKO provided the lead to Alexarder SVENCHANSKIY, KGB
cryptonym "NOD," on Ob January 1964 in the course of discussion.
of KGB use of foreign travel bureau personnel to spot tourists
of possible operational interest. Well, here's an examplei
One of our agents is the director of a smell tourist agency, "
NOSENKO said, "He takes the tourist's application form which
´has a photograph, and if he suspects the tourist of having ties
to American Intelligence, he will move the photo slightly, for
example.
Further, on the fifth line, where, it says 'nation-
ality, he
the stampan make a small pinprick. And at the end, where
the tourist agency is placed, ne can make a check-
mark with a pencil. That's all. He indicates an agent to us.
but why he the tourist/ is suspected we dor.' know yet, of
TOP SECRET

14-00000
THE TOP SECRET
308
Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution
was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO,
and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office
of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first
interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were
reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MISHUSTIN), the First Deputy
to the Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV further directed that all
materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB
Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the
KGB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against
BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted
by this department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case,
but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.
b.
Information from BARGHOORN
BARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the
Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963.
The purpose of his visit, as stated in his visa application,
was to gather information for a book on how effectively the
Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political ed-
ucation and political system. His itinerary took him to
Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 Octo-
ber, Tbilisi from 10 to 17 October, and short visits to
Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alma-Ata from 17 to 25
October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October and
On the
was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October.
latter date he was arrested and held by the KGB until
16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he
was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no
intelligence mission.
་་
His
Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was
debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA.
information indicated a high degree of KGB operational in-
terest in him throughout the trip, including encounters with
at least five probable KGB agents during his first week
there: an attractive waitress who invited him to "do the
town,
a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attrac
tive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from
Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his
first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental
in the drugging described by NOSENKO. At dinner in his
hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a
young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music
Conservatory. They left the hotel for a walk and ran into
a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the
three of them went to a cafe for coffee. None was available,
*Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that
BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, was
of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely re-
called the girl on the plane but either did not know or had
NOSENKO
forgotten details of any other specific activity.
said that none of this activity was directly related to the
provocation operation, which was based on a last-minute de-
cision.
TOP
14-00000
%
SECRET
309.
but the young student went to the kitchen "to arrange things,'
and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting coffees" appeared.
Within an hour, BARGHOORN was in the hospital, acutely ill.
He was assigned to a room where there was another patient,
and a woman doctor took care of his case. He was in the
hospital for four days. During this period his clothes,
notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authori-
ties.
Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October, BARG-
HOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The next six days.
were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with
his research. In the late afternoon of 31 October he called
on friends at the U.S. Embassy for cocktails, and at 1910,
already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for
a dinner appointment (prearranged by telephone) at the Metro-
pol with Theodore ORCHARD, a British diplomat.
BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely
parallels NOSENKO's. Having been handed the incriminating
materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to Militia
Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uni-
formed Militia officer. The KGB was called. Within 30
minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name might
have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him,
assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* All question
were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered most of them
in English. The package of materials was opened and con-
tained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of
rockets. This session lasted until about midnight and
centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs
and his "intelligence mission." He was then taken to the
Lyubyanka prison.
Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the
original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARG-
HOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The
questioning concerned BARGHOORN's biography, and nothing was
asked about the compromising materials. The following day
the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu)
PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB
officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN
was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his
arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as "clever and quick-
witted" and as giving "the impression that he was not a
dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he
seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good
job nevertheless."
*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the interro-
gations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons,
that he had to sign documents connected with the interroga-
tions. BARGHOORN confirmed that YEFREMOV had participated
throughout the entire series of interrogations and had
signed interrogation reports attesting to the accuracy of
translation.
TOP SECRET
310
hn Andres SHUBIN
ohn Andre SHUBIN and his year of birth
es which NOSENKO brought to the 1964
in Geneva. NOSENKO identitu SHUBIN as a
of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker.
rofessor in New York City. According to
rsonally involved in SHURIN's fourth trip
62 or 1963. SNUBIN had become known to
gent during his third visit to the Soviet
fessor of economics at New York Univer
eviously known to the FBI
The following paragraphs
ormation Iron NOSENKO and other sources on
ormation
been imprecise in dating SHUBIN's third
t Union." He said on 25 January 1964 that
cow some time during the period 1959 to
1 1964 NOSENKO said he was unsure of the
t by SHUPIN but thought it occurred in
any event, prior to 1930 and while he was
tour of duty (June 1955 to January 1960)
t Department, NOSENKO indicated on 26 June
LITSKIY was the case officer in the Tourist
sible for SHUBIN, and since at another time
VELITSKIY transferred from the department
would appear that he was placing the date
trip as some time before the transfer.
rted that SHUDIN was placed under surveil-
He has offered
during the third trip.
as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO
as that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet
e;** on 2 February 1964 he explained-the-
illance as having been founded on the KGB's
ing for this trip, as variously given by
nflict with the fact that SHUBIN had no
rt between 1940 and 12 June 1961, according
xplanation for this discrepancy, however,
BIN went to the USSR without valid docu-
JN's own admission about having gone to
there is no other evidence of his travel
ion prior to 1961.
܂
14-00000
".
Information Otar Bouters
The can detector la
lead whien bied
1 intervie
CHUDIN, Ahose father was
in Los Angeles on 20 February
rative of Russi
1815.
After receiving
information of 19.
was Lorn
the NOSENHO
intervieSHUPIN
14-00000
TOP SECRET
313.
:
10.
a.
BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Introduction
NOSENKO volunteered at his second meeting with CIA
in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOV was his "old friend"
and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On 26 January,
1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKOV's
name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good
friend." In the 1 February interview, after displaying an.
initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a "sensitive"
subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV's
alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General,
Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said,
derived from his friendship with BOLSHAKOV in Moscow, where
BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following a tour
in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the
magazine USSR). NOSENKO claimed a personal role in this
affair, in that he personally proposed to the KGB leader-
ship that the KGB take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) con-
tact with Robert Kennedy.
NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of con-
munication between BOLSHAKOV and the Attorney General had
developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detail
the circumstances of their introduction at a social function
by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he
"thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOV was a
"military intelligence officer," and he implied that they
regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a
useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the
KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it
was "obvious" that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way.
NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States
"during the Cuban missile crisis, "* no one took over his
role as a confidential channel to the White House. After
the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the
Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through
their close friend, the artist William WALTON, during the
latter's visit to Moscow in December 1963. NOSENKO reported
that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert
Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he had proposed two
plans which would have enabled this to take place, the
second involving WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however.
Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSENKO said that the
GRU had "played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to "tell
Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba, whereas
there actually were such weapons there.
According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington
for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962.
On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently
to the President that "something new and different" was
going on with respect to Soviet aid to Cuba, Ambassador
DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the
President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet
The Cuban missile crisis occurred during October 1962, and
as indicated above, BOLSHAKOV was not reassigned from
Washington until two months afterward.
TOP SECRET
i
14-00000
314.
activity in Cuba. On 4 September FOBRYMIN gave Robert
Kennedy "an unusual personal message from 
KHRUSHCHEV 
for
the President": KHRUSHCHEV pledged that he 
would not 
stir.
On
up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. elections
.
the same day, the President stated publicly 
that 
the United
States had no proof of a Soviet offensive missile capability
in Cuba. Also on the same day, the Soviet Union 
sent a
harsh note to the U.S. Government concerning 
the (
uninten-
tional) violation of Soviet airspace by an American U-2
plane on 30 August; the note threatened "appropriate re-
taliatory measures" against U-2 bases should 
such 
incidents
be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-2 
flights
over Cuba were temporarily suspended, and they did 
not 
re-
sume until 14 October. On 6 September 
DOBRYNIN again told
SORENSEN that the Soviets had "done nothing 
new in Cuba
and gave his assurances that all their steps were defensive
in nature and did not represent any threat to... 
the United
States.". On 13 October DOBRYNIN informed 
Chester BOWLES (
a
Special Representative and Advisor to the President
) that
Simi-
the USSR would never send offensive weapons to Cuba
.
lar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEV to U.S. Ambassador
KOHLER in Moscow on 16 October (the same day 
that the 
Presi-
dent was shown the U-2 photographs which revealed the pre-
sence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign 
Minister 
GROMYKO
to President Kennedy in person on 18 October.
Also on 18 October, the FBI reported,
Two days later
BOLSHAKOV told washington correspondents Joseph ALSOP and
Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had no offensive weapons
in Cuba, and said he had been instructed by KHRUSHCHEV and
MIKOYAN on 1 October (the day before his departure from
CIA 
has
Moscow) to inform President Kennedy of this fact.
no indication that BOLSHAKOV delivered this message to the
President, or ever directly to the Attorney Ceneral, or
that, prior to his meeting with BEGLOV in New York 
City
.
he made any remarks about Soviet weapons in Cuba, 4
there is no
report of BOLSHAKOV's having played any role in the Cuban
missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP 
and
BARTLETT. Discussions at the White House, State Department,
and Defense Department about the crisis culminated in the
decision to impose a blockade on Cuba; this decision 
waS
announced by President Kennedy over nationwide television
and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overtures for a peace-
ful settlement of the situation were initiated on 26 Octo-
ber by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S. FEKLISOV,**
FEKLI-
in contacts with the American journalist John SCALI.
SOV's proposals were along the same lines as those received
*BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the "Third Un-
official US-USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at
Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962. Also
present at this conference was Boris BELITSKIY
, identified
by NOSENKO four months earlier as a KCB-controlled 
source
of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.). BELITSKIY indicated 
at that
time that BEGLOV might be affiliated with the KGB.
**FEKLISOV, who served in Washington under the alias FOVIN,
was the author of one of the documents among 
the CHEREPANOV
papers (see Part VI.D.7.c.).
TOP SECRET
་ ། ། ། ས ། ་ ་
315.
at the White House late that night in a secret letter from
KIRUSHCHEV. At a farewell party for BOLSHAKOV in December
1962, Presidential Press Secretary Pierre SALINGER asked
BOLSHAKOV who would "do his work. ** POLSHAKOV replied that
no one would do precisely the same job, but that if SALIN-
GER had "anything special to say, he might contact A.I.
ZINCHUK.*
b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis
NOSENKO has rot indicated that BOLSHAKOV had an infor-
mation-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As
for Soviet sources at this time, NOSENKO stated on several
occasions in 1964, in different contexts, that the KGB "had
not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in
the U.S. Government" in October 1962. On more than one oc-
casion he said that the KGB agent "SASIA"** was unable to
furnish any information of value in this regard. He said
this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned
about "SASHA" on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO
said: "During the Cuban missile crisis the [KGB) First
Chief Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the
U.S. will do. KHRUSHCHEV*** was not satisfied with the work
of the Intelligence. No agents were producing information
on this."
NOSENKO continued by saying that "SASHA" re-
ported nothing to the KGB during the Cuban missile crisis.
In fact, he couldn't know anything. I heard that this was
very tightly held information. There were just a few
people around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they
were sworn to keep it secret.
་་
*ZINCHUK was identified by DERYABIN by name and photograph
in October 1954 as a KGB staff officer. NOSENKO has said
that ZINCHUK was a KGB cooptee rather than a staff officer.
**For a discussion of the "SASHA" case, see Part VI.D.3.d.
***Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962,
KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the
United States for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban situa-
tion had been influenced by "information from our Cuban
comrades and other (unspecified] sources. This informa-
tion had 
been received, KHRUSHCHEV stated, on the morning
of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). As previously indicated,
however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to
the President was received at the White House on the night
of 26 October 1952.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
316.
NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV
"
་་
"
NOSENKO repeatedly emphasized BOLSHAKOV'S GRU affilia-
tion and the fact that the KGB was in no way 
involved in
this channel to the U.S. Government via Robert 
Kennedy.
He first volunteered BOLSHAKOV's name during 
a 
discussion
of the use of Novosti as a cover organization for 
Soviet
"Yuriy BOLSHAKOV 
of the GRU also
Intelligence officers.
"He is a colonel and a friend of
sits there," he said.
mine. Two days later, out of context with the preceding
"Then there is
discussion, he introduced the name again:
this BOLSHAKOV. He is from GRU who was in the United
States. NOSENKO then commented that this was "a very in-
"We shall talk 
about it later.
teresting case" and added:
When his case officer thereupon turned to another topic,
"I know BOLSHAKOV
NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say:
very well.
He is my old friend...I met him through Yuriy
GUK... [who was with him in the United States...and we are
He calls me up and consults 
me 
for
now very good friends.
advice... On 1 February 1964 NOSENKO said he thought the
Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military inteiligence
officer; "yet for some reason they chose him
" as a channel
BOLSHAKOV, NO-
between the U.S. and Soviet Governments.
SENKO added, "reported directly" to the Chief of the GRU
concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy.
NOSENKO said BOLSHAKOV was introduced to Robert Kennedy
by an American journalist (unnamed) at a reception in the
United States. The journalist invited BOLSHAKOV 
to go 
for
a walk, and as they strolled "down an alley," there 
was a
"The 
jour-
man sitting on a bench directly ahead of them
.
nalist said: 'Listen, George (BOLSHAKOV), are you acquainted
with Robert Kennedy, the brother of the President 
and the
BOLSHAKOV 
said:
Chief of the Department of Justice?'
'Would you like me to
Of course, I have heard of him.'
introduce you?' 'Of course, BOLSHAKOV said, 'please do.'
There was this feeling
He led him to the man on the bench.
that all this had been pre-arranged."
.
'No.
This contact"was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy...
BOLSHAKOV was called in for this. As you know, 
the whole
idea of this contact was to pass information 
to Kennedy
from KHRUSHCHEV and from Kennedy to KHRUSHCHEV..
It happened
to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not BOLSHAKOV who sought to
BOLSHAKOV
have the meeting....Then the relationship grew.
They would first
was a visitor in Robert Kennedy's house.
talk about ordinary things, and then the conversation-
turned to other matters...Robert Kennedy did not say
:
. He would say: 
'
You
'Please tell KHRUSHCHEV so-and-so.
know, some of these problems seem insolvable. And BOL-
SHAKOV would say: 'And you know, at home 
they think this
and that way... without actually saying that 
this was 
coming
from KHRUSHCHEV. But, of course, this was 
clear without
explanations. It was an exchange of views 
on important 
poll-
tical questions of the moment. He was 
like an intermediate
point..." NOSENKO commented that he personally thought
that it was a "case of mutual 'feelers' 
being sent out 
by
both sides--exploring some given current political situation.
After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, NOSENKO stated, no one
Asked
replaced him as a channel to the U.S. Government.
whether ZINCHUK could have taken over upon BOLSHAKOV's-
TOP SECRET
...
14-00000
τη
317.
departure, NOSENKO said: "Oh, no. There is no contact
like there was before. It was broken at the time BOL-A
SHAKOV left. ZINCHUK was an agent or a cooptoe....No,
there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOV left.
He passes
no more messages."
Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV contacts; NOSENKO
told CIA on 26 January 1964: "You have shown considerable
interest in him ! BOLSHAKOV], even after his return to the
Soviet Union...because all this was done by by-passing CIA."
He said on 1 February 1964: "It was pretty obvious that
this relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had
nothing to do with CIA, and CIA was not witting of it. It
was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy." The KGB
determined that CIA was unaware of the exchange between
Kennedy and BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOL-
SHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A. KERST and
Malcolm A. TOON*-tried to elicit information from him
about his relationship with President Kennedy. "The most.
important thing" they had tried to find out, according to
NOSENKO, was whether the President and BOLSHAKOV had met
personally. Although BOLSHAKOV did not admit the fact to
them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy--"he
was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door
into the White House," NOSENKO said.
NOSENKO reported that William WALTON visited Moscow in Decem-
ber 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOV, whom he had
previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of
their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's
future political plans: "WALTON said that Bobby...did not
expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presi-
dency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of
running for Governor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he
felt that there were "some feelers sent out on the part of
WALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion.
WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that every-
thing was left without an answer....My personal opinion was
that these things were told to WALTON so that he could pass
them on as, so to speak, Bobby's plans for the future."
Another topic covered in the WALTON-BOLSHAKOV discussions,
NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy.**
"As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion--and his opinion re-
flected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was
no Russian involvement in the murder of the President. No
suspicion at all."
NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the KGB could take
over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the
first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would
personally invite the Attorney General to come to the Soviet.
Union. There the KGB would "set him up in private living.
quarters, give him everything he wants...so that he would be
*Neither KEKST, who NOSENKO said was suspected by the KGB
of being the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, nor TOON was
affiliated with CIA in any way.
**See also Part V.D.6. on NOSENKO's information concerning
Lee Harvey OSWALD.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
318.
”
pleased.. Not to make an agent or cooptee out of him,
but just to promote a rapprochement." In addition, on the
basis of what BOLSHAKOV, had told NOSENKO about Robert
Kennedy's interest in a Soviet ballerina, this plan called
for the two to be brought together, and the ballerina, who
"is quite free in her behavior with the opposite sex,
would do "everything necessary for the State." Defore
NOSENKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan,
the President was assassinated and the matter was dropped.
NOSENKO conceived his second plan during WALTON's trip to
Moscow in December 1963: "BOLSHAKOV told me that he was
going to meet WALTON, and asked me whether we had an in-
terest in it.... I told the chiefs about it and said: 'Lot's
utilize WALTON ourselves. Why should we let the GRU us
hin?'" NOSENHO suggested that the KGB "tell BOLSHAKOV
that we are working on HALTON--that this is a Number One
target as far as we are concerned. BOLSHAKOV will do any-
thing we ask him." However, "the boss said: 'Well, you
know, it will worsen relations between the KGB and the GRU.
As long as they are working on it, let them do it.'"
NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually assumed
authority for the operation in Moscow iron the GRU, as he
had proposed, the KGB Legal Pesidency in Washington would
have then taken over, and "someone new" probably would have
been sent from KGB Headquarters to develop the association.
This KGB officer would have been "someone with a broader
outlook who could carry himself well in social contacts.
d.
Information from
In addition to NOSENKO, one other Seriet source had
identified SOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.
"
repo ed that
had
:
another member of the GRU
gal Residency
"recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOV an informant who was
an American correspondent based in Washington. This jour-
nalist,
had accompanied Vice President Nixon
"
to the USSR in July 1959 and while there had agreed to coop-
erate by "furnishing political information. BOLSHAKOV was
to "concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*
FBI
TOP SECRET
+

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ФИНО
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
176.
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Видено!
Asane a pac IN ROM
Пapesusetume powe№ 065867 00:870
Телови на планирту №№.
Ст. будилер
Temporary Duty Authorization
December 1963
SECRET
Reverse
TOP SECRET
! haཎཱ
Committee for State Security
Under the Council of Ministers
USSR
15 December 1963
Issued to:
Lieutenant Colonel
NOSENKO,
Yuriy Ivanovich
For duty to: UKGB of Cor kaya
Length of tem-
porary assign-
ment:
Oblast'
15 days
through: 30 December 1963
Authorization: directive of
Chief of a Chief Directorate
Effective on presentation of
identity document No.:
NK-2513
Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate
of Department
Committee for State Security
under the Council of Ministers, USSR
Front
NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES
OF TEMPORARY DUTY
"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963"
"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963
Did not use free quarters"
s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia.
Section, Militia Major (illegible)
"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"
s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia
Section, Militia Major
"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"
s./
(illegible)
Reverse (endorsements only)
TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV
(Illegible
14-00000
=
319.
G. NOSENKO's KGB Promotions and Awards
1. Rank
NOSENKO has been questioned at length concerning his
progress through the KGB ranks, from lieutenant to lieuten-
ant colonel. He has volunteered additional information on
this subject himself. His various statements follow in
chronological order.
11 June 1962: "As a Chief of Section, I now receive
2,500 rubles per month), plus 700 for my rank, for major,
plus pay for longevity. I receive more than 4000, i.e.,
450-470-480 [rubles per month] in new money. This is
enough for me...I am now a major but I should receive
lieutenant colonel soon. I have already completed my time
From major
in grade. We have a system of time in grade.
to lieutenant colonel it is necessary to have four years...
My time in grade was up in December, in December of last
year [1961]."
23 January 1964: At the first of his 1964 meetings
with CTA in Geneva NOSENKO had in his possession the tem-
porary duty authorization which he said he had been issued
in December 1963 to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy Oblast in
connection with the search for CHEREPANOV. * This official
KGB paper had been signed by O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the
Second Chief Directorate, and authorized. "Lieutenant Colonel
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local KGB organiza-
tion in Gorkiy Oblast on official business between 15 and
30 December 1963." It bore official stamps of arrival and
departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the
town of Shakhunya.
10 February 1964: In Frankfurt, while awaiting ex-
filtration to the United States, NOSENKO was asked to review
a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case
officers on the basis of statements he had made during the
* 1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva. NOSENKO went over the
biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated
that it was correct. The biography included the information
that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the
American Department as a senior lieutenant from 1952 [sic]
to 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major
in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, shortly
before leaving Moscow for Geneva.
8 April 1964:
NOSENKO was questioned about the date
"I
when he became a senior lieutenant, and he replied:
think in the end of '53 or the beginning of '54 I got the
senior lieutenant."
Question:
That's less than a year after you entered the
service [KGB].
*See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search and
of NOSENKO's claimed part in it.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
NOSENKO:
320.
Well, I had the GRU service. That counts two
It was
years, as military service, of course.
considered as a continuance of military service.
So you got it when? At the end of 1953?
Question:
NOSENKO:
At the end of $53 or beginning of '54.
got captain in 1956.
Then I
Question: When in 1956?
NOSENKO:
I don't remember. You see, they are not given
Sometimes the
exactly in February or in March.
So,
scheduled time passes before they give it.
'56--Captain, '59--Major, and '63--...
16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the
date of his promotions within the KGB from the date of
entry, NOSENKO stated: "I began in the GRU as a junior
lieutenant. While in the GRH I became a lieutenant, and I
entered the KGB with this rank in 1953. Not long after I
entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but I don't
know the month. It was still 1953. In 1956 I was promoted
to the rank of captain. I don't know the month. I became
a major in 1959. I don't know the month. In October 1963
I was made a lieutenant colonel.... Personnel called me on
Later I was
the telephone and said I had been promoted.
told that GRIBANOV wanted to see me. I went to his office,
but,
of course, I didn't let him know that I already knew
that I had been promoted. He gave me his congratulations.
You never see the attestation. It goes into your official
file."
26 January 1965: While discussing his role as case
officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN,
NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never offi-
cially been a major. He explained this situation as
follows: Having been promoted to the rank of senior
lieutenant in April 1953, he became eligible for the rank
of captain in 1956. When this time came, however, he was
not promoted because a senior KGB official held against
him his illegal use of KGB documents to cover treatment for
gonorrhea in 1954. NOSENKO therefore remained a senior
lieutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible
for promotion to the rank of major had he received his
captaincy on schedule. Although GRIBANOV had promised NO-
SENKO that he would be promoted directly from senior lieu-
tenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an admini-
strative error was made by the KGB Personnel Office, and
NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had in-
stead been promoted only to captain. Instead of rectifying
this mistake, GRIBANOV persuaded NOSENKO that it would be
to his advantage to remain a captain until he became eligible
for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1963. NOSENKO there-
fore was a captain from September or October 1959 until
October 1963 when, as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted
TOP SECRET
14-00000
321
directly to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In this manner it
turned out that he never officially held the rank of major.*
10 August 1965; Under questioning by DERYABIN, NOSENKO
repeated the chronology of his promotions given on 26 January
1965. He again explained that he was put up for captain in
1956, but this time said that the promotion had been blocked
on the grounds that he should be made to wait because of
shortcomings in his work. Asked why he had told CIA that he
had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the
"biography prepared in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied that he
thought the true story would not be believed.
17 April 1966; In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wrote
the following: "In March 1951, with the rank of junior lieu-
tenant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh-
Fleet in Sovetskaya Gavan....From August 1952 until 1953, I
worked at the intelligence base of the Naval Intelligence of
the Fourth Fleet in Sovetsk, where I received the rank of
lieutenant of the Administrative Service.... In 1950 I received
the rank of senior licutenant [in the KGB), in December 1959
the rank of captain, and at the end of 1963 I was recommended
for the rank of major. I have never held the rank of lieuten_
ant colonel and the travel order which you know of, with the
rank of lieutenant colonel, was filled out erroneously.**
.19 April 1966: In a new version of his autobiography,
NOSENKO included the following statement: "in July 1956 I
became a candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I re-
ceived a promotion at work: I became a senior case officer
and was given the rank of senior licutenant. In August 1957
I was accepted into the CPSU, and during the second half of
1958 was appointed Deputy Chief of the Second Section, Seventh
Department. On 29 December 1959 I was promoted to the rank of
captain.
26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant
colonel in 1964. _ was only a captain. Asked why he had
said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied:
"There was no conversation about rank in 1962. About my po-
sition, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all."
To summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while
serving in the KGB: He became a senior lieutenant in 1952,
April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain in 1956 or September/Octo-
ber/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a
lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. (The latter
claim was verified by the official KGB document listing him as
a lieutenant colonel as of December 1963.). On the other hand,
NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was
captain, and that he never advanced to a majority or a lieu-
tenant colonelcy.
$
*At about this time, in early 1965,
NOSENKO was only a captain and had advanced to his senior
KGB position because of his close relationship with GRIBANOV.
shortly after NOSENKO's defection,
reported
having received information from fellow KGB officers which
made it "appear quite certain" that NOSENKO was a lieutenant
colonel.
**See above; NOSENKO was referring to the TDY authorization
Issued for the CHEREPANOV search in December 1963.
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:
2. Awards and Decorations
Not long after reestablishing contact with CIA in
January 1964, NOSENKO mentioned that he had received the
Order of Lenin "shortly after the 1962 meetings" in Geneva
as a reward for the ideas which he had developed to "en-.
large the experience and improve the quality" of KGB Second.
During the
Chief Directorate staff personnel in Moscow. *
:
first series of interrogations, NOSENKO on 6 April 1964-
claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for:
his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Direc-
torate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962
for his performances while in the American Department.
The following discussion of the subject took place on
6 April 1964:
NOSENKO:
Yes, I received a big gold medal.
Question: It was the Order of Lenin?
NOSENKO: It was at first the Order of the Red Banner--the
Red Star, I mean. In '63 I received the Order
of Lenin. In '63.
Question:
NOSENKO:
What for?
GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working a long
period in the Second Chief Directorate--(V.D.]
CHELNOKOV got one, (A.G.) KOVALENKO got one--
many, many [received the Order of Lerin].**
Question: You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant
service?
NOSENKO:
No.
For working in the Seventh [Tourist] Depart-
ment, which is considered good.
Question:
What is good? Were there recruitments?
recruitments?
NOSENKO:
What
You must know that the main task of the Seventh
The main task is
Department is not recruitments.
countering the intelligence activities of the op-
position.
Question: So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department got the Order of Lenin?
NOSENKO:
Yes.
*NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest
decoration for which a KGB officer can be eligible.
**In June 1964 NOSENKO said that the only Second Chief Direc-
torate officer whom he knew to have received this award was
V.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who re-
On the
cruited William John VASSALL (see PART VI.D.5.b.).
same general topic, NOSENKO asked his CIA case officer whether
he, the CIA officer, had received a medal for his part in
the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO.
in Geneva.
He asked this in January 1964
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323.
Question:
NOSENKO:
CHELNOKOV and KOVALENKO?
Yes. And CHURANOV got and I got and who else?
[S.M. FEDOSEYEV got and [W.M.] KOVSHUK also got
the Order, the second time. The first time he
got it several years ago, and this was the second
time.
Question: When did you get the Order of the Red Star?
NOSENKO: Red Star I'got--I don't know for what.
Question: But then one year later they gave you another
one, because this (order of the Red Star) wasn't
enough?
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Because the awards are given out--now, wait one
moment; up until 1961, if there were any awards
for the Chekists (KGB personnell it was very rare,
and they were only awarded for a specific thing.
Such as CHURANOV, for instance. He was rewarded
for a specific deco [the recruitment of VASSALL}.
But in 1962, 1963--these first years--whether it
was the idea of the Party to encourage the
workers, they decided to let SAKHAROVSKIY [Chief
of the KCB First Chief Directorate] declare his
medals and GRIBANOV to declare" his medals. They
get together with their deputies and decide to
whom they will give them. They don't say to
whom--they say, for instance: 'One order to your
department; you decide who should have it.'
Like that. Then we would get together, I
CHELNOKOV, KOVALENKO, are we decided (who would
get one]. In our department. [V.I.) YAKOVLEV
got a medal. Who else got a medal? In 1962, I
got one, and then LEONOV who was Chief of the
Second Section he got the Order of the Red Star.
We decided on these individuals. As far as we
ourselves were concerned. that decision was made
by GRIBANOV and his deputy.
Did the Seventh Department catch any spies?
Well, as I have already told you, there was this
Italian fellow
This was considered a
good case because the First Department later--
the Seventh Department was only involved at the
time of the arrest--began meeting with him.
So you got the Order (of the Red Banner) in 1962
because of your work in the Tourist Department?
I think in 1962 GRIBANOV gave it to me not for
the Seventh Department, but for my work in the
First American] Department in 1960, 1961.
Question: You think so?
NOSENKO: I think so.
Question: The Order just came, without any explanation?
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324
FOSENKO: It was just done at the order of the Chairman.
Question: And the Order of Lenin was the s**?
NOSENKO: The same. Well, the way it says, "For work well
done for the organs of the KGB" there is no indi-
cation exactly what it in for.
NOSENKO admitted o April 1964;
"In 1964 [in Geneval
I told a lie about the Order of Lenin. Why? It was a
boast." NOSENKO then explained what he said to be the true
circumstances and gave the reason for which he was to have.
received this decoration. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO stated, had
promised in 1983 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and KOVALËNKO
would get the Order of Lenin: "He said: I am submitting
your names for the Order of Lenin for creating the TROPS
[Central Operational Communications System of the Socond
Chief Directorate), for this new thing you have tried to
create in tourist work.' But December (1963) had gone by.
I left (for Goneval and nothing happoned, "*
NOSENKO WAG asked on 15 April 1964 to list the dates,
reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses he
had received during his KGB career, as well as to indicate
from whom he had received each of these. His reply was
as follows: "I received nothing in 1953, 1954, and 1955,
In 1956 I received a commendation and one month's pay.
SEROV, the Chairman of the KGB, awarded me this for the
recruitment of Richard BURGI [see Part V.D.4.b.) while I
was working in the Seventh (Tourist)] Department of the
Second Chief Directorate. It was signed by the Chairman,
and GRIBANOV told me about it. As usual, this Order of
the Chairman of the KGB was circulated, and I and all case
officers saw my name listed. There is no certificate or
anything. Personnel just makes a note in your official file
that on a certain date you received the commendation from
the Chairman of the KGB.
"From 1956 on, I received something almost every year,
but it was nothing special. Perhaps it was the KGB anniver-
sary or May Day or Army Day. In 1957 or 1958, I got some.
thing from GRIBANOV. Maybe it was the 40th anniversary of
the Soviet Army. I don't remember. It was given to me and
a group of people in the hall (auditorium) between the third
and fourth floors (of the KGB Headquarters building). PER-
FILYEV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, made
the presentation.
"In 1959 I received a commendation and one month's
pay from SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several re-
cruitments, among them the professor from Tennessee (MERTENS),
DREW, FRIPPEL, and three British people. There were six in
*NOSENKO later reverted to his original statement, which
related the award to his efforts to "inspire" the work of
the Tourist Department.
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325,
all; three Americans and three British. I can't remember the
British names just now.
"In 1960 I got a commendation from GRIBANOV for good work
in general. A lot of officers got this. In 1961 I received
the Order of the Red Star. With a group of case officers I got
this for general good work in the Second Chief Directorate.
KOVALENKO and KOVSHUK got this too. IVASHUTIN gave it to me
(made the presentation). Personnel makes a note in your official
file, but you can take the medal and the little certificate that
goes with it and either keep it at home or in your study room
(office).**
"In 1962 I got a commendation from GRIDANOV for general
good work. I also received the Unblemished Service Award'
for ten years' service. They counted this from October 1950,
when I joined the GRU, and they were late by two years in
giving it to me. This is not unusual. SHCHERBAK, Deputy
Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, gave it to me in the
See Parts V.D.4.1. and h., Part V.D.5., and Parts V.2.4.1.,
j., and k., respectively, for descriptions of these recruit-
ment operations and NOSENKO's role in them. NOSENKO also
said during interrogation by DERYABIN on 10 August 1965
that, in 1959, his name was submitted for the Order of the
Red Banner in connection with these recruitments, but that
he did not get it, probably because he was transferred to
the First Department at that time (January 1960), NOSENKO
has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third
highest award a KGB officer may receive. Asked what KGB
officers had received this award, NOSENKO said on 10 June
1964 that GRIBANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY, and several other high-
ranking KGB officers were awarded it for the important role
they played in smashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956,
** On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the
Order of the Red Star, along with a group of other Second
Chief Directorate officers, at the end of December 1962.
He recalled this because they were planning the presenta-
tion for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but
the presentation was delayed and was not made until the
end of the month. NOSENKO and about 70 other officers of
the Second Chief Directorate, including KOVSHUK and G.I.
GRYAZNOV, received the award "simply for achievements, for
good results in work. NOSENKO told DERYABIN in August 1965
that the order accompanying his award had read:
"For ex-
ceptional performance of mission." When asked what mission
was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for
good work in general.
"
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3262
hall along with a certificate. In 1963 I received a
commendation from GRIBANOV for general good work. Also,
GRIBANOV told me that I, along with some others, was to
receive the Order of Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB
anniversary date, but I left for Geneva.**I was to re-
ceive it for arousing (inspiring] the Seventh Department."
NOSENKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never re-
ceived any KGB award or decoration for his operational
work. The only awards he received during his KGB career,
he said, were a Red Army anniversary medal and the award
for satisfactory completion of ten years of service.
"
*NOSENKO's wording here reflects earlier intensive ques-
tioning concerning the ten-year service medal. NOSENKO said
on 15 April 1964: "In 1962 I had ten years of service in
the KGB and got a medal for unblemished service. It is
usually given for ten years and to KGB men only....That was
in 1962. I had ten years of service then. When it was
pointed out that, according to his most recent statement,`
he had joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would
have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he
did not understand why but that he was certain that he had
been given the medal after his return from Geneva in 1962.
(The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statements
that he joined the KGB in 1952.). The following day, 17 April ·
1964, NOSENKO said that he remembered why he had received
the medal in 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled,
is awarded to servicemen as well as KGB officers, and prior
military service is taken into account in computing the
service time for the latter. NOSENKO had entered the GRU
in 1950 and therefore should have received the ten-year
medal in 1960. Because of a mix-up in the KGB Personnel
Department he did not receive it until 1962.
**NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 19 January 1964.
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14-00006.
ECRET
327.
1
a.
NOSENKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV
Information from NCSENKO
Summary
From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO
maintained that he had a close personal and professional relation-
ship with Major General O.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief
Directorate. NOSENKO has described recruitment approaches in which
he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on opera-
tional matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promo-
tions and receipt of various awards, and his afterhours carousing
with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate counterintelligence
officer Ye.A. TARABRIN. NOSENKO has also frequently mentioned the
role which GRIBANOV played in his, NOSENKO's, professional advance-
ment within the KGB: GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against
NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy
Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in
January 1960; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make him
Deputy Chief of the entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged
his return to the Tourist Department as Chief of the American
Tourist Section and his later appointment as Deputy Chief of the
Tourist Department.
NOSENKO's remarks concerning his direct involvement with
GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are included in other
parts of this paper. Among them are his early statements on the
approach to code clerk James STORSBERG (Part V.E.3.c.), his 1962
account of the arrest and attempt to recruit CIA officer Russell
LANGELLE (Part VI.D.7.a.), and his early reports on the attempt to
recruit CIA officer Edward Ellis SMITH (Part VI.D.2.). In all
three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played the role he
originally attributed to himself and denied having had personal
contact with the Americans involved. NOSENKO has also altered his
original accounts to say that he received no awards or decoration
for operational activity and that he had not received the promo-
tions he claimed.
b. Details
The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his
personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRIBANOV assisted
his rapid rise within the organization of the Second Chief Direc-
torate.
12 June 1962: "Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy.
A real pal. We, so to say, used to meet one another illegally
and had women together... GRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on
me. It was the very best that can be given, brilliant. GRIBANOV
wrote the very best fitness report on me. He had an excellent
regard for me, excellent... I am supposed to become Deputy Chief
of [the Tourist] Department. I believe that GRIBANOV is promot-
ing young people, new people, who already have experience, good
experience, who have made recruitments. I know two or three (of
the people he is moving ahead). I personally have about 12 re-
cruitments, four or five of them were British and the rest Ameri-
cans. He [GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the
question of my advancement is right now under consideration...
will be Deputy Chief of Department. You must give thought to the
I
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"
328.
fact that I have been talking with you. You can ruin everything.
I have a career. I have bright prospects. My boss GRIBANOV, my
highest boss, has a very high degree of respect for me. He some-
times bawls me out and I-- Well, I make it look like this is un-
pleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a pleasant thing because
inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. I
know that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. He
sometimes calls me personally (to his office] and says:
'You
come with me. I have to meet an ambassador." I go with him..
We arrive and have the conversation. He is there all night. He
comes out and says: 'Well, where shall we go for a drink?'
know beforehand (that he will say this] and everything is ready
at the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there. 'Well, what shall we
drink!' [GRIBANOV says). I answer: 'Well, Oleg Mikhailovich,
cognac, of course! He is the highest chief. 'I don't drink
cognac. I'll have vodka,' I say. 'Well, we'll have vodka tḥen,'
[GRIBANOV says)..." One of NOSENKO's CIA handlers suggested at
this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older
brother would. NOSENKO replied: "That's his attitude toward me."
23 April 1964
Question: * Did you ever go to GRIBANOV's house?
NOSENKO: ´ I never went in the house. I have driven to it.
Question: Did he ever come to your house?
NOSENKO: No.
Question:
Were you ever out at night with him, after work?
If so, how, under what circumstances?
NOSENKO: After work? Yes, once.
Question: Who else was there?
I
NOSENKO:
TARABRIN.
Question: What was the occasion?
NOSENKO:
No specific reason.
GRIBANOV called me at midnight.
I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked
me how long it would take me to get dressed and come
down to the Praga Restaurant, first private room..
Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finish
the evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down
to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. I
drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at 6:00
a.m., gave him some pills to help him.
Question: When did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?
NOSENKO:
I might have seen him in 1953 or 1954, but I did not
have a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in two
group operational discussions (about 15 people present)
about work against Military Attaches in 1954; that was
the first time I ever spoke to him.
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.329.
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
When did you first have any personal conversation with
him?
I don't remember. He gathered groups of people.
Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist
Department (i.e., between 1955 and 1960).
When did you develop a personal relationship with him?
It is difficult to say how it got started. I was
still working in the Seventh Department.. It was in
1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and
said I should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did,
and GRIBANOV said I should quickly be ready to go to
a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him
and Vera [Ivanovna) ANDREYEVA.
Question: Why you?
NOSENKO:
Question:
oh,
yes,
I don't know... (pause)
this is the story.
this is it, this is why he started favoring me.
Earlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on
Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girlfriend, Rina GUDKOVA,
friends of (Yu.I.] GUK and [V.M.) KOVSHUK and [V.A.]
CHURANOV. CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was
a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted
with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV's
dacha one night. The girls were talkative and told me
all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told
CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did,
and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it; he re-
marked once: "You are not a gossiper..."
How did he find out that you knew and didn't tell any-
one?
NOSENKO: I don't know, but he did.
Question:
Who wrote your fitness reports?
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
The one
My last one was written by (V.D.) CHELNOKOV.
before that by (V.A.] KLYPIN, in the First Department.
Before that in the Seventh Department it was written
by (K.N.] DUBAS, before him by (V.A.) KOZLOV, then
[S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the First Depart-
ment, by (A.M.] GORBATENKO.
Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?
He may not have actually written them, but he signed
them, those reports written in connection with pro-
motions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general
reviews of personnel.
-
15 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 20 February 1965):
"Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of
Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV and knew nothing about him. As [F.G.)
SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy Director of the
Second Chief Directorate responsible for supervising the acti-
vities of the First Department of the Directorate, where I worked,
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:
330
.
it may have been several months after I began my KGB service that
GRIBANOV first came to my attention. I don't know when I first
saw GRIBANOV but it may have been approximately 1953 at a meeting.
before May Day or the 7 November holiday. I would not necessarily
remember 
this as I frequently met much more important people, who
were friends of my father, and seeing GRIPANOV wouldn't have been
particularly important to me.. Sometimes during 1954 and 1955, it
was necessary to obtain the signature of a Deputy Chief of the
Second Chief Directorate on a cable that I had written and, if
SHUBNYAKOV was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV
for approval. Though I was only a junior case officer at the
time, I would take the cable, after it had been approved by the
Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directly to GRIBANOV,
who would simply sign it with no discussion. I do not remember how
many times I took cables to GRIBANOV nor do I remember the contents
of any specific one of them. The first meeting with GRIBANOV that
I specifically remember was in the summer of 1956. I think it was
in June. I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing
a spravka on BURGI, PERFILYEV, KOZLOV, and I went to see GRIBANOV.
KOZLOV didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, but GRIBANOV
knew that I was NOSENKO because the plan for the BURGI operation
said that I would participate and because PERFILYEV had made an
appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIBANOV at this time.
The meeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOV read the re-
port on BURGI's recruitment and asked some questions. KOZLOV
answered some of these and I answered others. Other than asking
what Ukrainians took part in the operation, I can recall none of
GRIBANOV's questions nor do I remember any of the conversation
which took place at this meeting. When we were through, KOZLOV
and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBANOV.
Perhaps the
first time I was alone with GRIBANOV was in 1958 when I attended
a reception given by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetskaya Hotel
in Moscow. Usually (A.V.) SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBANOV on such
occasions, but he was sick at the time. I don't know why SUNTSOV
usually went with GRIBANOV, why I was selected to go, or what I
was supposed to do at the reception. I think GRIBANOV called the
Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know
why he picked me. GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was
to 
refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV. I was to
introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use
the 
last name NIKOLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used
the name Vera Ivanova. After work, I went home to change my
clothes and we went in GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel
Sovetskaya. GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in
back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen
GRIBANOV altogether. From 1959 on I saw him more frequently.
Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of sections and
their deputies and I would take part in these. I had begun to
call GRIBANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1958, when I
was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department,
but at these meetings I called him 'Comrade General.' In 1959
I also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with the
FRIPPEL case and, sometime between May and October 1959, took
him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of tourist
cover by foreign intelligence organizations.
"
23-24 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 26 February):
"GRIBANOV was never in my own office, my home, my parents home
or my parent's dacha. My father never knew him. I was never
in GRIBANOV's home or his dacha.
tional apartment with GRIBANOV.
I was never in any KGB opera-
I never introduced any of my
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"
own agents to GRIBANOV.
331
GRIBANOV knew about agents
and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL), but I never specifically
discussed them with GRIBANOV. I dia discuss with GRIBANOV the
On three occasions I have been
agent 'PROKHOR' (PREISFREUND).
with GRIBANOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions
TARABKIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we
had parties with girls. I don't remember when the first time
On
was, but the last time was in September or October 1963.
this occasion they called me at home late at night and asked me
to join them at the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female
It'
companionship and this party lasted until early morning:*
was at this party that I gave GRIPANOV some pills I had for
hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva in
1962. A few days after this party (GRIBANOV's secretary Ye.S.]
KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking
This is the note I gave to my.
me for some more of these pills.
I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars
CIA case officers in 1964. **
perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an
Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to
ricetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with.
GRIBANOV played
the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN.
I think he could not
absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB.
have played any personal part in my assignment to the First
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since
at that time GRIBANOV was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-
torate supervising the Second Department and not the First De-
partment. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me
from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but
I did not have any personal contact or conversation with GRIBANOV
concerning this decision. I do not know if GRIBANOV played any
personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in
the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was
I did not per-
responsible for my appointment to this position.
GRIBANOV decided
sonally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV.
at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the
First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and
this appointment took place sometime in January 1960.
the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV
planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to
GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get
GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about
this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had
recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any.
GRIBANOV did tell me that my
reason for my having been selected.
appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more
senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself
and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return 
to the 
Seventh
Department in January 1952 was actually made in about September or
October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief 
of the
First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department,
FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not
DUBAS,
See below for a more detailed version of this affair.
When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note
addressed: "Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I." In translation the
note read in full: "Yu.I., get me please some more tablets
like the one you gave me once. [signed] GRIBANOV
."
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:
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331
own agents to GRIBANOV... GRIBANOV knew about agents
It
•
☐ and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL), but I never specifically.
discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the
agent 'FROKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions I have been
with GRIBANOV in social circumstances. On all three occasions.
TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we
had parties with girls. I don't remember when the first time
was, but the last time was in September or October 1963. On
this occasion they called me at home late at night and asked me
to join them at the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female
companionship and this party lasted until early morning. *
was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pills I had for
hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva in
1962. A few days after this party (CRIBANOW's secretary Ye.S.).
KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking
me for some more of these pills. This is the note I gave to my
CIA case officers in 1964.**. I have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars
perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an
Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to
meetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with
the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played
absolutely no part in my entry into the KGB. I think he could not
have played any personal part in my assignment to the First
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since
at that time GRIBANOV was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-
torate supervising the Second Department and not the First De-
partment. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me
from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but
I did not have any personal contact or conversation with GRIBANOV
concerning this decision. I do not know if GRIBANOV played any
personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in
the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was
responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not per-
sonally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided
at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the
First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and
this appointment took place sometime in January 1960.
DUBAS,
the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBA NOV
planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to
GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get
GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself about
this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had
recommended me for this new position and did not tell me any
reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my
appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more
senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself
and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh
Department in January 1962 was actually made in about September or
October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the
First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department,
FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not
See below for a more detailed version of this affair.
** When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note
addressed: "Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I. - In translation the
note read in full: "Yu.I., get me please some more tablets
like the one you gave me once.
[signed] GRIBANOV.
☐ TOP
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.332.
In
want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the
wishes of PEDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be
transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any position. I
had already spoken to CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the Seventh
Department, about this matter, and he had suggested that I go to
GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Department. * GRIBANOV
finally agreed that I should return to the Seventh Department as
Chief of the First Section with the understanding that I would be
appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this.
position would be vacated by (B.A.] BALDIN. In July 1962 I was
appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. This decision
was made by CHELNOKOV and GRIBANOV in accordance with the intention
stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appointed
to this position as soon as possible. I had no further personal
discussions with GRIBANOV about this appointment at this time.
1963 CHELNOKOV [GRIBANOV's Deputy, F.D.] BOBKOV, and GRISANOV
decided that I should be named First Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department. They did not discuss this with me beforehand and no
order was issued about this appointment. I was simply told that
from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of the
Department. At this time I was, in fact, the only Deputy Chief of
the Seventh Department, since KOROBOV did not come to the Seventh
Department until about November or December 1963. GRIBANOV did
not tell me his reasons for appointing me Deputy Chief of the
First Section, First Department in January 1960, for wanting to
appoint me Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961, or
for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department in 1962. He did not discuss with me my personal
qualifications for each of these positions. GRIBANOV had nothing
at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I think that
the kharakteristika written about me for this trip was signed by
BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-
torate who supervised the Seventh Department. I did not personally
discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow.
My candidacy for this assignment was supported by BANNIKOV, the
Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the
work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative file
on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would
go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected
of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation.
There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted
on me in connection with my being approved for this trip. My
assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Person-
nel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel
Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU. GRIPANOV
had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964.
The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV.
the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of
the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of
KHLOBU-
the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip.
STOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as
a personal favor to me. I did not discuss my 1964 trip to Geneva
with GRIBANOV prior to my departure. In fact, I was even afraid
that GRIBANOV would find out that I was going and would object to
my making this second trip."
For
1
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14-00000
333.
23 February 1965: NOSENKO commented further on his social
encounters with GRIBANOV and TAPABRIN. The following, which was
not included in the protocol quoted above, is taken from case
officer notes.
Question:
NOSENKO:
Tell me about the occasions when you were with GRIBANOV
and TARABRIN.
Three times--drinking in cafes. Twice afterwards there.
were girls. The most recent time was in September or
October 1963. I don't remember the first time. In
1963 I received a call from TARABRI:] at home. Then
GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car
and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. I didn't
take his car because I didn't want to call the duty-
officer. I took a cab and went to the Praga. They
were sitting there and drinking in a private room. I
joined them. They were drinking champagne, but I took
cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about 1230 and GRIBANOV
made me go to the office to get my notebook. I called
one girl I knew--her and her sister. When I got back
to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and
TARABRIN still there. We went to the girls' (apartment).
They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.
Question: Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurant (i.e.,
to provide girls)?
NOSENKO:
I think so. It was the second time I had participated
in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his
name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Chief
Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to
reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna.
Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't
remember her last name. GRIBANOV was drinking and she
told him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief
of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV
told her that he would give her a job and told me to
arrange for a job in the American Department of the
Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in
the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on
Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV's driver drove him.
home at 0600 and he was in the office by 0830.
3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must
have caused the KGB, NOSENKO said: "I believe they will punish
people in the Second Chief Directorate (SCD)... Even GRIBANOV...
He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing
me ahead.
Question: What sort of punishment? …..
NOSENKO: Even firing.
Question: Do you think any others would be punished, or even
fired?
NOSENKO:
Maybe KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and people in the Eleventh
Department. Many others, too.
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14-00000
334.
Later in the same session the interrogator returned to this subject.
The following is a transcript of the discussion:
Question:
You said you think GRIBANOV. might be fired. Yet, there
is nothing in the protocol you signed (see above) about
your relations with GRIBANOV which would seem to make
him personally responsible for you. Is there something
else, something you haven't told me?
NOSENKO: No.
Question: Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired?
NOSENKO: (no answer)
Question:
(repeats)
NOSENKO: Don't know.
Question: Well, what is your opinion at least?
NOSENKO:
Nothing, nothing.
Let's not discuss this.
Question: Why not?
NOSENKO: It's simply my opinion, that's all.
I don't know why.
Question:
Well, what is your opinion?
NOSENKO:
Question:
3
NOSENKO:
He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of
Department.
But you had already gotten ahead before; you said he
didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.
Yes.
Question: Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?
NOSENKO: It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief
of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.
Question:
NOSENKO:
Why would BOBKOV be punished?
He was my supervisor, and in '61 he was Secretary of
the KGB Party Organization.
Question: Would others in the Party Organization be punished?
NOSENKO:
Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh
Department and of the SCD.
Question: Would BANNIKOV be punished?
NOSENKO: No. He did nothing, just supported my candidature for
Geneva.
Question: Would KOVSHUK be punished?
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335.
NOSENKO:
Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV,
who talked to me.
Question: How about the First Chief Lirectorate and the Seventh
Directorate?
NOSENKO: No. I wasn't close to them, except GUK.
Question: How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?
NOSENKO: [S.I.] GAVRICHEV might be recalled from Geneva.
Question: You must be withholding something about your relation-
ship with GRIBANOV.
NOSENKO:
Question;
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO
"
No, I was telling you I visited his office. He told
me: 'I found out you're drinking too much.' I said
no, not especially. He said: 'Stop this drinking
with KOVSHUK. It's not good for you.'
But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's position now.
They would review my file, and find that it contained
the report about the woman in '54;* the fact that I
was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking,
scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved
my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Department) anyway.
Why did he promote you?
GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six re-
cruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds
great for the First Department, which was having no
success with Americans in the Embassy.
Question: But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?
NOSENKO:
He thought I was a tough guy, good case officer.
'59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of
operations which were reported to him.
In
Question:
But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you
Deputy Chief of Department.
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
(shrugs)
Who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Depart-
ment?
se
Must be higher than a Department Chief--bec
GRIBANOV signed. They could get him for his, especially
those who are against GRIBANOV.
Who?
NOSENKO: Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to Deputy
Chief of Department in 59-60 but didn't. He was in an
inspection group of the Collegium, checking the Seventh
Department.
Presumably this is a reference to NOSENKO's contracting venereal
disease (see Part IV.C.2.).
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14-00000
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
2.
But GRIBANOV must have approved all the other Deputy
Department Chiefs, too. Would the same happen if on
of them defected?
Well, if it was from the Second Department; for example
no, because GRIBANDY wasn't personally supervising it.
It would be someone else's proposal. In my case it was
his own initiative.
Was anyone in the First Chief Directorate punished as
a result of GOLITSTN's defection?
No, absolutely not.
Information from
As indicated in Part III.I., a number of sources have reported
that GRIBANOV and other KGB officers were discharged from the KGB
in the wake of NOSENKO's defection. *
According to sensitive
source
15 KGB officers had already been dismissed from the KGB because
of the defection, and that GRIBANOV and three of his deputies were
included in this number. One of the deputies was named "BANIK"
(BANNIKOV). GRIBANOV's quilt was said to rest in the facts that,
as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, he had been ultimately
responsible for NOSENKO's flight; that NOSLNKO was his personal
friend and protege; and that, therefore, he should have been aware
of NOSENKO's intention to defect.
According to sensitive an
when NOSENKO was reing considered for inclusion in the Soviet dele-
gation to go to Geneva, a summary statement of NGSENKO's activities
and capabilities was prepared by employees of the Second Chief
Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV...
said he understood
• information re-
this summary contained considerable 'compromising
'
garding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed
NOSENKO from future consideration for the trip to Geneva.
stated, however, that he understood from conversations with other.
KGB employees, whom he could not recall specifically by name,
GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it,
that
In addition, a Western Ambassador with whom GRIBANOV was in
operational contact in Moscow-has-stated that GRIBANOV disap--
peared from the scene sometime in mid-1965 and was replaced by
another KGB handler. (He has also indicated that GRIBANOV.
disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHEV's downfall in October
1964.)
Sensiti
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1
14-Q6000
and put the notation on the summary, 'Send him to Coneva.!
the general feeling among KCB person-
nel the CRISANOV was willing to overlook a lot of deficiencies
about NOSENKO because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with
NOSENKO's father.
"
According to sensitive source,
GRIBANOV's dismissal took place immediately after NOSENKO'
defaction in February 1964 and no less than 50 other officers,
Most of them from the Second Chief Directorate and many of them
close friends of GREBANOV, had been fired subsequently.
prior to NOSENKO's defection, NOSENKO had
been the deputy to a Department Chief in the Second Chief Direc
torate but that he held only the rank of captain in the KCB.
C attributed NOSENKO's high position to the influence which
GRIDANOV exerted on his behalf.
☐ rather than being fired, Major General "BARNIK" (BANNIKOV)
had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in
GRIBANOV's stead. *
after the defection of NOSENKO, the KGB conducted an ex-
tensive investigation of personnel in HGB Headquarters to find out
which KGB officers knew him. One of these questioned was TAPABRIN,
who said he was acquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relation-
ship was only casual and was limited to occasional official con-
tacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however,"
that TAPABRIN and GRIBANCV were close friends socially and had
attended several parties which NOSENKO had arranged and attended.
As a result of
Girls provided by NOSENKO were at these parties.** ·
his willful concealment of this information, TARABRIN, like GRIBANOV,
was discharged from the KGB and dismissed from the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union.
BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the
Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that
BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection.
NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who sponsored NOSENKO's
1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it
or the 1962 trip.
** These evidently were the parties described by NOSENKO (see
above).
his removal from the NGB,
at the time of
BTN was the Chief of the British
NOSENKO said
Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate.
that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he was
promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the newly established
"Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief
Directorate.
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338
I. Confirmation from Other Sources
1.
Introduction
Since NOSENKO's Jefection several Soviet sources and
defectors have provided information Supporting SENKC's
claims of having held certain positions in the KGB at cer-
tain times.
Soviet scientist with suspected intelligences connections
who was approached by CIA, Soviet caso officers for an
double agent (a NOSENKO lead), and the KGB officer
handling Robert Lee JOHNSON (also NOSENKO lead), a Sov-
iet journalist who contacted the magazine Paris Match
with a proposal to write an article on NOSENKO, and two
defectors. Some of these sources had supported NOSENKO
directly by reporting that he was a Second Chief Diroc-
torate officer in the various positions he says he was.
Others have offered indirect support by confirming NOSENKO'i
knowledge of particular pieces of information or con-
firming the validity of information which NOSENKO said he
learned while in particular KGB jobs. As will be noted,
the information from one source sometimes contradicts
that learned from another or from NOSENKO himself.
:
has corroborated: NOSENKO's story indirectly
by his descriptions of the repercussions of the defection
within the KGB (particularly the firing of GRIBANOV)
✓✓ and
by his statements concerning the probable street that
defection would have on KGB operations.
reported at
various times that NOSENKO is "more valuable than PEN-
KOVSKIY," that he is "vastly more important than DERYABIN
or GOLITSYN," that the AGB "will not be able to operate.
normally for two years " that it is the Junanimous opinion"
"ROSENKO could do tremendous harm to the KGB," and
that this damage would be severo "for several years to
come".
has also given indirect support to NOSENKO's
statement that he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy.
Soction. *
NOSENKO as a "chief" had
access to dettiis on ACD activities against the U.S.Em-
bassy, and ☑ASH
the loss suffered by the
KGB as a result of SEO's knowledge of the microphones
installed in the Embassy. (NOSENKO has said that this in-
formation was available to him only because was Deputy
Chief of the American Embassy Section.
reported that NOSENKO's position as a "chief"
Chief Directorate gave him access to the names and backgrounds
in the Second
however, is not known to have stated specifically
that NOSENKO was a senior official in the American Embassy
Section of the American Department in 1960 and 1961.
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of many KGB officers in the
and to sensitive inform
and method.. This status
to NCDENFO a "30-page per?
339
on 835 rition, creations,
rade available
iphone list from Moscow Headquarters of the RG
operational leans b
Juppo
The agent
was John RUFS, named by: NOSENKO as a person recruited in
Leningrad in January 1962 on homosexual grounds; this
information NOSENKO said he learned as Chief of the
American Tourist Section of the Tourist Department.
Further examples of t supporting NOSENHO in this
way are reviewed else in this paper
in Part V.D.7.c).
and the CHEREPANCA
also offered specific althoug
firmation of NOTENHO's claimed besitions in
incident
✓✓✓ that from the very beginning of his employm
the HGB NOSENKO worked in the Second Directorat.
he once worked against personnel of the U.d. Embassy
in Moscow; later he was assigned to work against C.S.
journalists in Moscow. During his last years with the KG3,
he was assigned to the task of working against American and
NOSENFO has never mentioned those documents.
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Eurcean tourists in Moscow. His last
was that of beputy to the
artment, Second Chief Directorate
NOSENKO secured this relati
cause of help he received from
Chief of the Second Directorate.
out NOSENKO's career GREANOV had
saw that he was promoted..
With regard to NOSENKO's KGB rank,
'it appeared quite cortain that NOSO
Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB,"
СЭГ
☐ esition
reported having learned from
that NOSENKO was in fact
1 GRIBANOV,
through-
dhim and
rark of.
KGB of
only a captain, **
He
asked f
he feels that NOSENKO has actually defected or whether he
feels that this might be a 'trick' by the KGB.
replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he is
convinced that NOSENKO's defection is not a 'trick" by the
KGB.".
3.
sensitive source.
said that "he had heard about NOSENKO
from various persons in Moscow."lle said he had never known
NOSENKO personally. He said NOSENKO was an important boss
in the KGB. He said he did not know, what directorate or
department NOSENKO had been in.
con-
tinued that when NCSENKO was a young man he was in the
GRU Military Academy *** and then [was] sent to the Infor-
mation Department of the GRU for a short time; in all,
RA Until January 1965 NOSENKO maintained that he had pro-
from
gressed through the KGB ranks in normal sequence,
lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. On 26 January 1905,
however, he said that because of administrative confusion
and GRIRANOV's advice he had skipped the rank of major and
had moved directly from captain to lieutenant-colonel in
late 1963. In April 1966 NOSENKO told CIA that he had
never held the rank of lieutenant colonel and was really
only a captain (see Part V.G.I.).
*** The Military-Diplomatic Academy is the strategic intel-
ligence school of the GRU. Although NUSENNO said 
he
attended various naval-type schools before joining the
GRU, he insisted that he was never
establishment of the
Soviet Navy. He claimed to have turned down an offer to
attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he called the
GRU Military Academy) because it offered too many political
See 
Part IV.B..
courses that he had already taken.
intelligence course of any train, enrolled in a formal
TSP SEGRET
14-00000
FL
P. SECRET
11.
perhaps a year.
NOSENKO -ad
the GRL and 'nota
very good. He was to have been discharged from the GRU,
however, his father, who as a very influ̟catial person in
the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSNKO-trans-
ferred to the KGB.
it was the opinion of the per-
been a very undisciplinea person while
sons from whom he he the information about NOSIN KO that
NOSLNKO had given very, very good information to the U.S.
after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access
to FOB information which included all pans of CD cover-
mierovome svate the er
age of people in
bassies, etc.
bassy had found many 30% the it
information."+
1227 the .S. Em-
Pabed on NOSENRO
confia
tion.
which
KC as reported
tiou
SHURIN was the only GRU
agent named by OSENKO. who sourced his knowledge of SHUBIN
to an incident which occurred about 1959, while NOSENKO said
he was in the Tourist Department.**
*As indicated ir Part V.E.3.g.. the final sentence is largely
but not entirel
**Sce Part V.F.8.
CorreeL.
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342.
5.
at the time of the defection, NOSENNO was rooming in Geneva
with Nikolay RESHETNYAK, a representative of the Inter-
national Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. RESHETNYAK told
that NOSENKO
often left his quarters without saying where he was going,
but it was assumed that NOSENKO was "intelligence" and had
some mission to accomplish.**
•
MRESHETNYAK had been interrogated by the KGB in
connection with the NOSENKO defection. RESHETNYAK also told
✓ that he had attended the Moscow trial of NOSENKO,
held in absentia, at which NOSENKO was found guilty of
thought
treason and was sentenced to death.
the KGB might go so far as to send someone to the United
States to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he has reported
on the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, in-
cluding GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions
within the KGB of NOSENKO's defection (see Part III.1.4.)
6.
GAMKRELIDZE
NOSENKO's service in the American Department was con-
fimed in the fall of 1964. by the Soviet mathematician R.V.
GAMKRELIDZE.*** At that time an American scientist brought
up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-POWERS exchange****
Ano
See Part VI.b.7.c.
NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament
Delegation. Asked on 24 January 1964 whether RESHETNYAK
might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with CIA,
NOSENKO replied: "He thinks I'm KGB...so of course there's
no problem if I come back late."
re-
ported that RESHETNYAK had been dismissed from the KGB as
a result of the defection of NOSENKO. CIA has no other
reports of RESHETNYAK having served in the KGB.
GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet
Intelligence because of his statements and actions, as
we 1 as his unusual freedom of movement, often alone, while
on visits to the United States. When approached by a CIA
GAM-
representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964,
KRELIDZE declined but added that he "welcomed the op-
portunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...
since this enabled him to compare the Soviet Intelligence
officers he has met with their American counterparts."
During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of
NOSENKO again, describing him as "obviously a traitor to
his country."
****The exchange of the KGB. Illegal Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL
for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2 pilot, took place in
February 1962.
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:
343.
Ex-
and asked whether the Russian people had been told about it.
GAMKRELIDZE replied that they had not been told officially but
knew it had taken place since there was "quite a grapevine" in
Moscow. As an example, he said that it was in this way that be
had heard about the NOSENKO defecuson and its significance.
panding, GAMKRELIDZE stated that the "grapevine" indicated that
the defection "was very damaging in Soviet Intelligence in that
NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the
identities of all Soviet agents in the United States."
7.
GOLITSYN
The defector GOLITSYN is the caly source of information on
NOSENHO's KGB career who claims to have been personally acquainted
with him. GOLITSYN. Said that he met NOSENKO for the first time in
1953 when visiting the American Department of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate on business, and that he saw and spoke with NOSENKO on
a number of occasions subsequently, most recently in 1959. This
first-hand information from GOLITSYN, however, is not always con-
sistent either internally or in comparison with that supplied by
NOSENKO.
• CIA has no record that GOLITSYN, prior to the publicity
attending NOSENKO's defection, ever mentioned him by name or in
connection with the KGB Second Chief Directorate. On 15 March
1962, prior to NOSENKO's first contact with CIA, GOLITSYN was
shown NOSENKO's name among those of other Soviets in Geneva fo
the Disarmament Conference. He failed to comment on it.
On 26 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO
and because of the large overlap of NOSENKO's information and
contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CIA case officers who had
met NOSENKO in Geneva met with GOLITSYN to obtain his comments
on some of the NOSENKO material. GOLITSYN was told that CIA had .
received in Switzerland an anonymous letter which reported cer-
tain information from within the KGB; the CIA official stated
to GOLITSYN that the information so closely overlapped his own
reporting, including prominent mention of COLITSYN's friends GUK,
KOVSHUK, and CHURANOV, that the possibility of disinformation
was suspected, perhaps in relation to GOLITSYN's own defection.
Ten major items from NOSENKO were discussed with GOLITSYN, all
pertaining to Second Chief Directorate operations, and a list
of 15 names was shown him, identified as names of Second Chief
Directorate personnel whom the letter writer had named. Among
these names was (fnu) NOSENKO, and GOLITSYN indicated he had
previously reported on him; CIA records, however, show that
GOLITSYN had reported only on one Aleksandr Fedoseyevich NOSENKO,.
who had been a KGB officer in Japan when RASTVOROV defected to
the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made no further comments on these
names, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that
organization in 1961 for the MVD. GOLITSYN said that in general,
lacking the full details necessary for an assessment, he could
say that there were serious signs of disinformation in what he
had seen; he wanted to see the full information on the case.
Subsequently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this informa-
tion, complaining to Attorney General Robert KENNEDY and senior
CIA officials because his request had not been granted.
On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's defection from the Soviet Disarma-
ment delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, was publicized, including
his KGB affiliation. When GOLITSYN heard this news he immediately.
recalled the June 1962 "letter" in Switzerland and linked NOSENKO
to it; he thereupon stated that he recalled NOSENKO as a member
of the Second Chief Directorate working against American citizens.
GOLITSYN on 11 February 1964 raised the possibility of his
participation in efforts to "break; NOSENKO, and at this time he
was given some background on the case and an indication of CIA'S
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344.
reservations about NOSENKO's bona fides. Over the next several
months GOLITSYN was provided with material from the 1952 and 1964
meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and as his request was sup-
plied with all the available biographic data to assist him in
analyzing the KGB operation. On 29 June 1954; GOLITS was inter-
He confirmed NOSEN.
viewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKO.
KO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding
and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in the American
Department and the Tourist Department of the KGB's Second Chief
Directorate. He was shown a photograph of NOSENKO (not buried
in a photo spread, but singly) and he said that the photograph
depicted NOSEIKO, GOLITSYN said he knew this because he was per-
sonally acquainted with NOSENKO, having met him two or three
times in the U.S. Embassy Section while there on KGB First Chief
Directorate business in 1953. He had also seen NOSENKO occasion-
ally at work during 1958 and 1959, and when COLITSYN asked him
where he was working in 1959, ROSENKO told him that he was in
the Tourist Department. Finally, GOLITSN said, he and NOSENKO
knew one another through their mutual friendships with u. I.
GUR, V.A. CHURANOV, and Ye.G. KASHCHEYEV." According to GOLITSYN,
NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957
or 1958 and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of Amer-
ican military personnel in Moscow during the first year of this
period. For the remainder of his service in the U.S. Embassy
Section, until 1957 or 1953, GOLI ISYN said. NOSENKO may have had
these same responsibilities or he may have been working against
other Embassy personnel or correspondents, He was definitely in
the American Department during this entire period. In 1957 or
1958. NOSENKO transferred to the Tourist Department and was a
senior case officer there as of 1959. ** GOLIPSYN was certain that
NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second
! Chief Directorate at any time during 1960. This he said he knew
because he had visited the U.S. Embassy Section on at least three
occasions during the early part of 1960 and again in about Decem-
ber 1960 (sic, accually January 1961). *** COLITSYN said that he
knew in detail who was in the section, and that he would have
"known if NOSENKO had been there. particularly if he were the
Deputy Chief¸****
NOSENKO. on the other hand. failed to identify COLITS/N'S
photograph and has consistently denied ever seeing or meet-
ing him.
After the defection, NOSENKO was asked what he knew
of GOLITSYN. He immediately gave
a detailed account of
an incident which GOLITSYN himself had previously reported
to CIA: GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV in 1951 or 1952 had written
a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party
proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief
Directorate intelligence activities: as a result of this
letter COLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV had been received by MALENKOV
and STALIN, and their proposals were accepted. This was
NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV, but he added at this
time that he was personally acquainted with him, had seen
him periodically at KGB Headquarters, sometimes had a drink
with him after work, and had once entertained KASHCHEYEV ať
his dacha in 1953 or 1954. GOLITSYN saw NOSENKO's reply to
his question prior to making the above statement, and KOSEN.
KO's claims of friendships with Yu.I. GUK and V.A. CHURANOV
were included in the file GOLITSYN studied.
(Footnotes continued on next page.)
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14-00000.
34.40
(Continuation of footnotes from preceding page.)
This chronology differs from that provided by NOSENKO and
described previously: According to NOSENKO, he served in
the American Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Depart-
ment from 1955 until January 1960, in the American Depart-
ment during 1960 and 1961, and again in the Tourist Depart-.
ment from 1962 until his defection. NOSENKO's confirmed
1956 operation against BURGI and his 1957 operations
against
and Gisella HARRIS tend to confirm
his connection with tourist operations in 1956 and 1957.
*** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December 1961 of these
visits to the U.S. Embassy Section.
****GOLITSYN had earlier reported that G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting
as the assistant of the chief of section at this time. He
has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy
Section nor indicated that such a position was on the
table of organization.
TOP SECRET
self-professed former
Directorate agent
told U.S. authorities
Second Chief
NOSENKO. Was a KGB officer.
that she did not think.
At the same time, however,
said she knew that NOSENKO had told the Americans about
the microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The following is
from the transcript of her remarks:
Question:
Question:
Question:
Question:
Question:
Question:
Do you know anything about NOSENKO, the one who
defected in Geneva?
I didn't have any real information. I heard some
gossip, and the gossip was that he is the son of
a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that his
nother was always involved in some blackmarketing,
that his father had great concern over the family.
This is, you know, iule talk. I don't really know--
it was just gossip.
Would you say that this idle talk was among KGI
people or--
You know, 1 didn't know many KGB people. It way
only Mr. SVIRIN.*
But he told you about this?
He didn't tell me, he told
husband), ah--you know, they like to think they
are all-powerful, that this man of course will
be exterminated one day. They always repeat it.
Well, somebody committed suicide. The old de-
fector, that GUZENKO, I think. Yes--I read in
the paper.
But what were you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO?
His mother is Jewish, his father was a general.
What was his father in?
I really don't know.
Were there others who suffered as a result of this?
I really don't know. . I never heard. I never knew
that defector. I never knew. He wasn't a KGB
person.
I beg your pardon?
He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.
V.G. SVIRIN was said by
to have been a KGB
officer under cover of the State Committee for Sciences and
Technology (GKKNR) during the period of her husband's em-.
ployment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit con-
ducting operations against the U.S. Embassy. He maintained-
a friendly association with
and her husband to
the date of her defection. According to NOSENKO, SVIRIN was
a KGB officer who participated in the PENKOVSKIY investigation
(see Part VI.D.7.b.).
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346
Question:
Question:
Question:
Question:
Question:
Question:
Question;
The fellow from Geneva?
No.
He wasn't a KGB person.
No? What was he?
He was a civilian, I think.
You never heard anything about his family, his
friends?
No.
But you say he was not a KGB person?
I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have
much gossip on these things. It is never safe.
So gossip isn't popular. Besides, each of them
have their own grudge, sort of department, and he
knows very little except gossip, very little ges-
sip from outside. And so, for instance, maybe
Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in a position to know about
this person straight, so he repeated the tiny
scraps he heard.
And that was only that he had a Jewish mother and
a general for a father, but nothing about him.
Nothing... I don't know. Everybody was saying
that he was detestable, when he ran away. He
tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans
about the microphones and things in the Embassy.
In the Embassy in Moscow?
In Moscow, yes.
But yet, he was not a KGB person?
But you know every Russian who is allowed to see
foreigners is connected (in some way with the KGB].
You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person
who works at this place, as an officer, and every-
body else involved is somehow related to the KGB
but not KGB persons themselves.
During a later debriefing by CIA,
clarified her
sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning
the microphones in the U.S. Embassy came from SVIRIN when he
visited the
✓ The infor-
mation that NOSENKO had compromised the RGB microphone system to
the Americans was also received from SVIRIN during another social
visit
On this occasion SVIRIN TC-
marked to
that SENKO had done considerable damage
to the Soviets by revealing the fact of the microphones to U.S.
-authorities.
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Case officer for RebertL-
In on 181 debriefing
18.
Case Officers
double abent
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Soviet Journalist KORGLEY
In October 1966, Yu.D. KOROMEV, Who said he was a Soviet
journalist, offered to write a story on the life of the family of
a "Soviet secret agent" for the French magarine Paris Match.***
The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their life in Mos-
cow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement on
NOSINKO which FOROLLY handed, Faris Match editers stated in part:
"NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police.
organization, defected to the USA without his family about two
years ago and asked for political asylum in the B.S.; it was
The JOHNSON lead from NOSENKO is discused in detail in
Part VI.1.3.0.
›NOJENKO provided information on
(see Bart VI.D.5.c.)
***Sec Part III.H. for more details concerning KOTOlky's offer
to Paris Match..
14-00000
**
348.
granted to him. That was the most serious defeat the Soviet
Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espion
age and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted
with the country's leading families and homes."
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