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104-10332-10016
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC. 20505
13 December 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Executive Director
SUBJECT:
Assassination Records Review Board
(U) Identity of Human Sources
(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA
once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the
issues discussed below.)
1. (U) Issue. The purpose of this memorandum is to
relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the
release of the true names of human sources of intelligence
which appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal
on how this problem could be addressed.
I. Factual Background
2. (U) In general, CIA "sources" are foreign
nationals, recruited and living in a foreign country, who
provide information to the U.S. Government under a promise
of confidentiality. Their act of passing information to the
U.S. is generally against the national interest of their own
country and would be considered espionage, which is a
capital offense in most countries. Just as in this country
when a spy is caught, should a CIA source be discovered, it
would be "headline news," even 30 years after the fact. The
Review Board will recall that when former National Security
Agency employee Robert Lipka was arrested approximately a
year ago for espionage he allegedly committed 30 years
earlier, this received a lot of attention in the United
States. Lipka is currently awaiting trial in the U.S. for
his alleged espionage activities.
3. (U) This month, the Review Board will be
considering approximately 50-60 true names of human sources
for release. These particular sources range from encrypted
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assets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that
additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection
and will be reviewed in the future. It is important,
therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree on a
consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in
the JFK Collection at this time so as not to impede the
future review of documents.
4. (C) The Review Board has recently developed a
policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees.
Although there are many similarities between covert
employees and sources, there is an important difference that
should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at
this issue. With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in
this collection, it has been possible in some instances to
go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names.
Some of these former employees have even been made available
for interviews and depositions. With most sources, it is
not possible to do this. First, CIA has dropped contact
with some of these sources and may not be able to locate
them. Attempting to find these individuals would create
some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are
associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA
were unable to locate a particular source, there would still
be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot
locate him, does not mean that he is not alive and well-
known in his own community. Even if we were able to locate
a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he
would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many
years. More than likely, sources do not now want their past
association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in
their lives to do other things. Some may be in political or
private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would
damage them professionally and/or harm them and their
families personally.
"
5. (U) Another important distinction that needs to be
taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) "sources. Perhaps the most
significant difference is that many FBI sources provide
information with the understanding that the information and
the source will be publicly revealed. FBI sources are often
used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses. CIA, on the
other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its
sources. CIA sources rarely appear at public trials. In
fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from
public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within
the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a
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foreign national cooperating with CIA is usually committing
a unique violation of his own country's laws--espionage. If
one gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in many
countries is for a capital offense. On the other hand, a
foreigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usually
committing espionage. Cooperation may be with the full
knowledge of his government--such as cooperation in a
criminal investigation. Therefore, the risks for
cooperation with the FBI are not usually as great as
cooperation with CIA. In addition, the FBI has greater
means for protecting individuals who provide information to
it, for example, the witness protection program, which CIA
does not have.
II.
Legal Considerations
6. (U) Although Section 11 (a) of the JFK Act provides
that when the Act requires release of information, it takes
precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit
the true names of sources. CIA believes that it is
important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which
have been growing and developing over the years, to protect
classified information because they clearly reflect a larger
U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.
7. (U) By Executive Order (E.O.) and statute, the
President and Congress have made the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence
sources. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which
established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman
made the DCI responsible for protecting sources. With the
establishment of the CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this
responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section
103 (d) (3), codified at 50 U.S.C. §403 (3) (c) (5), requires the
DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized
disclosure. In addition, §403 (3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to
ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in
the collection of intelligence through human sources are
minimized.
8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working
with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.S.
lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For
example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of
1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 $403g, Congress specifically exempted
the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the
publication or disclosure of the organization, functions,
names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by
the Agency. Although the purpose of this law is to protect
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employees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it
indicates Congress' intent from early on to protect those
working covertly for the U.S. Government.
9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,
trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving
or potentially involving classified information. Working
with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has
successfully protected intelligence sources from public
release even in criminal trials where there are heightened
(i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to
the defendant of all government information relevant to the
defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in
which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and
relevancy of classified information, including the identity
of human sources who may have information pertaining to the
defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or
defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving
CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned
over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such
as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the
classified information and ruled that the harm to national
security outweighs the defendant's legal rights to the
information. In still other cases, the defense was never
notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case
as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed
this information was classified and outweighed any rights
the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney
General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those
cases where the risk to national security is too great.
10 (U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human
intelligence sources by passing the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §421 which criminalizes
the revelation of a source's identity. This Act subjects
anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert
agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and
$50,000 in fines. A covert agent includes: (a) a U.S.
citizen whose intelligence relationship with the U.S..
Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent,
informant or source of operational assistance to an
intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a
U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship
to the U.S. is classified information and who is a present
or former agent or informant of, or is of operational
assistance to, an intelligence agency..
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11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a
larger government policy to protect human sources from
public disclosure. There has also developed over the years
a significant amount of case law which further implements
this policy. For example, in Sims v. CIA, 10 S.Ct. 1981
(1985), the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the National
Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from
release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the
identities of individuals conducting research on projects
financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the
DCI's authority to protect sources was broad, and was not
limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed
confidentiality.
12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an
Executive Order on classified national security information
which came into effect in October 1995. Although it
requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts
than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958
affords human sources extra protection from its
declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information
that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be
declassified within five years. However, information
revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be
protected.
In
13. (U). The above federal statutes and case law show
a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who
provide intelligence information to the U.S. Government.
carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board
should give serious weight to this policy and afford the
protection of human sources the highest priority.
III. Operational Considerations
14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order
for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around
the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work
for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular
individual's affiliation with it. This is true even more so
with sources. In addition to the risk to a source's
personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal
any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with
whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the
(U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 is another
example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human
sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government
documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release
information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National
Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding
statute. Sims v. CIA, 105 S.Ct. 1981 (1985).
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affiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less
true with a source who no longer works for the Agency. A
source's prior affiliation with CIA is normally still
classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at
CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting
with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect
his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he
conducted.
15. (U) The public disclosure of an individual's
affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the
safety and lives of not only the source, but also their
families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and
other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact.
The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case
(since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in
which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to
be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent
years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and
their professional and personal lives were ruined. The
threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with
CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in
foreign countries, many of which have a local population
hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one
should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face,
one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were
murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in
Virginia. If this type of attack is possible right at the
CIA's front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal
risks that those working with the CIA abroad face. Clearly,
the risk is that much greater for those who are sources:
for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames' disclosures to
the KGB, 10 Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were
executed.
16. (U) Incidents such as these clearly demonstrate
that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an
important one. Individuals associated with CIA have been
and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and
physical injuries from foreign intelligence services,
terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile
to CIA or the U.S. Government. Individuals choose to
undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is
with the condition that the CIA will protect their
cooperation with the U.S. Government.
IV. Proposal
17. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is
important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA
sources in the JFK Collection. The Agency proposes that in
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In
If
most cases a substitution for the true name be used.
prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board
agreed to redact the true name and substitute "source."
the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular
sources throughout the records, a particular identifying
substitution can be used for an individual source throughout
(for example, "Mexican source 1").
18. (S) Among the names that are currently being
considered for release by the Review Board, the following
are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:
True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the
CIA and unilateral penetration of the Cuban
Embassy.
His wife also worked at the Embassy and
he was apparently suspected as being CIA though it
was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point
disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his
current situation is.
True name of ERTHYROID/3, the unilateral
penetration of the Nicaraguan Service. The Review
Board will recall that it has already been fully
briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the
protection of the fact that he was a unilateral
source.
Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022) was [is] a
member of the British Service. (As such, he was
[is] a liaison source. This raises concerns about
protection of our liaison relationships.
Moreover, Mr. Devere's identity constitutes
“foreign government information” which, as the
Board has already been informed, the CIA does not
have the authority to release.
:
19. (S) Another type of name that similarly should be
protected from release is the new identity provided to a
defector. Although defectors do not face some of the
dangers that "assets" overseas face, they are still given
new identities for their protection because there is some
risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. For example,
in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in
documents being reviewed this month.2 Since the time of his
defection, Golitsyn has utilized successive identities,
because they have been unofficially disclosed, that have not
2 (S) Golitsyn's identity had to be changed again. However, there is a
risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the
identification of Golitsyn's current identity.
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been officially released and that are closely held within
the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of
his family even though they live in the United States. CIA
cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of
Golitsyn's assumed new identities or for that matter of any
defectors that appear to date in the collection.
20. (S) CIA has noted that in some cases a source is
identified by only a first name or a code name. Where CIA
has been unable to identify any information about that
individual or there is no other source revealing information
that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would be
possible to release that name. For example, in a few
documents, the name "Tota" appears. To date, CIA has been
unable to determine who this person is and there does not
appear to be any further source revealing information in the
collection. It is probably that "Tota" is just a code name
or a street name known to his colleagues. As "Tota" is a
common name, such a release would not threaten the
particular individual or his family, and as the person can
not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.S.
Government policy to protect intelligence sources.
21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be
particularly important to the JFK story. In such cases, the
CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to the
appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a
record search for information on that individual. It may be
that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no
living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree
that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need
to protect that source from disclosure.
22. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review
Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the
identity of human sources that will not undermine the
important policy of protecting those who work covertly for
the U.S. Government. As usual, my staff and I are available
to discuss this matter with you.
I. Perena
John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group
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G: /CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.doc
Distribution:
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Addressee
CSI/HRP Chrono
D/CSI
C/CSI/HRG
Barry Harrrelson, CSI/HRP
Linda Cipiriani. OGC
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MEMORANDUM
September 25, 1998
To:
Laura Denk
Executive Director
Bob Skwirot
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
CC:
CIA Team Leader
From:
Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review
Subject:
No Evidence of Contact Between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA's Office of
Operations
One of the enigmas that has surrounded Lee Harvey Oswald's defection and re-defection is the
question of whether the CIA's Office of Operations (later the Domestic Contacts Division)
interviewed or took note of Oswald either before his trip or upon his return from the Soviet
Union. The available evidence is somewhat contradictory. The CIA has long claimed that
Oswald was never a source, asset, or employee of the CIA. Yet, a November 25, 1963
memorandum discusses the recollections of a CIA staff officer that the Agency considered
interviewing Oswald. Further, another former CIA officer, Donald E. Deneselya, has stated that
he recalls reading an OQ debriefing report in the summer of 1962 from a former Marine re-
defector who had worked at the Minsk Radio Factory. The Review Board could not corroborate
the recollections of the two former CIA officers with additional records or information.
In an effort to clarify the mystery, the Review Board searched for records that might confirm or
deny any contact between Oswald and the CIA before or after his time in the Soviet Union. In
the early 1960's, the Office of Operations (OO) was a part of the Directorate of Intelligence.
This office, which interviews American citizens who might have come into contact with
information or individuals of intelligence interest overseas, later became the Domestic Contacts
Division (DCD) of the Directorate of Operations. This office normally only contacts individuals
after receiving questions or requirements from intelligence community customers looking for
particular types of information.
The Review Board staff examined OO records and operational histories to gain an understanding
of OO practices in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Review Board staff could find no
evidence of contact between Oswald and OO either before or after his time in the Soviet Union.
Had Oswald departed for his trip to the Soviet Union through New York City, as did most
travelers, he possibly might have come to the attention of OO. The Review Board staff did not
locate any reference or record to Oswald's departure from New Orleans via freighter that
predates the assassination. The Review Board staff also could not locate any information to

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document an OO interest in Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union. While OO was
interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general information in the 1950's, by
1962 only travelers with special access, knowledge, or skills were of intelligence interest. 00
had no specific policy covering contacts with returning defectors although a local field office
could initiate a contact if justified by a particular situation. According to the records located,
00 only made contact with three of twenty-three defectors in the 1954-1962 time period. No
records or reporting showing any OO contact with Oswald could be located. The Office of
Operations did interview re-defector Robert Edward Webster in June 1962 on his work at the
Plastics Institute of Leningrad.
While a DCD "A" file on Oswald does exist in the CIA's sequestered collection, most of the
documents in the file are from the mid-1970's, none predate the assassination, and the file
appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of contacts
with Oswald in response to various congressional investigative bodies. This file has been
processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.
Excombsided wwwpd
File 4.50 (Wrap Up Memos)
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9 October 1997
Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn
From:
Subject:
Reference:
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
CIA/CSI/HRG
October 14 Meeting
-
Source Names
"A" Name List of Sources
(CIA requests that this memorandum and its attachments
be returned once the Review Board has completed its
deliberation on the names discussed below.)
1. Manuel Calvillo, an unwitting source of Alfonso
Wichtrich (see below). Calvillo became a figure in the JFK
story, when Elena Garro de Paz identified him as the person
who sequestered her in a hotel after she protested at the
Cuban Embassy. Because of this link to stories related to
Oswald's visit to Mexico City, Calvillo is considered a JFK
assassination figure. His name and all assassination-related
information have been released in collection. 5 However, his
crypt when linked to his true name has been deleted. The
CIA requests that his crypt not be released when associated
with the true name in order to protect Wichtrich and other
involved with the LIHUFF project. The linkage of Calvillo's
true name with his crypt could lead to his association with
and identification of Wichtrich and his assistant.
2. CIA concurs with the release of the following name
in the specific documents cited:
Miguel Nazar-Haro in documents 104-10052-10058
and 104-10014-10016.
Because of the relationship of this individual with the CIA,
future documents containing his name must be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis; there may be situations in which the
Agency will request that the name be protected.
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3. Phillipe Thyyraud De Vosjoli:
Former head of the French Service in Washington
(1951-63), De Vosjoli retired and became a CIA/FBI asset. As
a USG asset, he had contact with German and Canadian
Intelligence Services in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. He
became a naturalized US citizen c.1971. Apparently his case
was not handled in normal defector channels as the
responsible component has no records of De Vosjoli. His 201
file shows that his last substantive contact with the Agency
was in 1972 and was initiated by him from Florida. Although
De Vosjoli has publicly acknowledged his unilateral
relationship with the Agency during his tour in Washington,
it is not clear if the extent of his activities following
his defection is widely known. Official confirmation of his
“defection" could potentially affect the Agency's foreign
liaison relationships.
4. The CIA requests that the three names discussed
below from the A List be protected. All are, or were,
covert assets of the Agency. The Agency has a moral, and
possibly a legal, obligation to protect their identities.
As a basic tenet of the covert relationship, the Agency
agreed to protect the fact of their relationships with the
USG; and they, in turn, promised to keep those relationships
secret. To our knowledge, the individuals have honored this
basic contractual commitment. The Agency believes that the
possible harm to the individuals, their families and/or
associates, and the potential for damage to sensitive
intelligence operations, outweigh the contribution the
release of these three names would make to public
understanding of the assassination. The Agency is
particularly concerned about the erosion of the principle of
protecting the identity of sources and the potential
chilling effect on future agent operations and recruitment.
The Agency is further concerned about the possibility of
liability to the individuals and their families for failure
to honor its commitments of confidentiality.
A. Franklin Anthony Garcia Wheelock.
The Agency acknowledges that Wheelock is a key figure
in the Alavarado story, and it has released all information
(including his crypt) except for his name. It is not known
if Wheelock is still alive. However, he had five children
who may still be living in Nicaragua and are probably
unaware of their father's Agency relationship. The release
of his name could have negative repercussions for Wheelock
and his family. Nicaragua is a small, provincial place, and
Wheelock's patronymic name is a prominent one in the
country. Revelation of his name and his relationship with
CIA would be quickly disseminated within Nicaragua, and his
family members would be easily identified. Such
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identification could result in anything from public
humiliation to dangerous retaliation by the thriving leftist
Sandinistas. In either case, disclosure would undercut the
Agency's ability to recruit sources in small countries such
as Nicaragua.
-B. Jose Marie Mankel.
Mr. Mankel is a central figure in the Agency project
named ZRRIFLE. The Agency has released his crypt and al-
most all the information related to the project. Mankel's
relationship with the Agency commenced in November 1960 and
ended in February 1964. Our files do not reflect any contact
since that time. It is presumed that, if Mankel is still
alive, he is living in Luxembourg.
Mankel had numerous acquaintances in European criminal
circles, and, on behalf of Agency/ZRRIFLE interests, he
sought out individuals from this element. Acknowledgment
that Mankel worked for the USG/CIA could result in personal
harm to him, his family, and associates. In addition, his
201 file, which is in the JFK collection, contains a number
of references to his support of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs. Given the potential compromise of
individuals and operations totally unrelated to the JFK
story, the Agency requests that Mankel's true name continue
to be protected. Coordination with DEA may also be required
in this case. Mankel's 201 File is available for review in
the CIA secure area.
C. (Alfonso Rudolph Wichtrich.
A WWII intelligence officer, Wichtrich worked with the
Agency in Panama during 1947-49 and in Mexico City from
1954-70 in various capacities (Station contact, field agent,
and contract agent). A prominent businessman, he was general
manager of the Royal Crown Cola Company in Mexico and later
was executive vice president of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Mexico. During the JFK time frame, he was
primary agent on a CA project (LIHUFF), initially set up to
support a conservative front organization. He later became
the sole focus of the project. In that role he also served
as the cut-out for an unwitting individual, Manuel Calvillo
(see above). Wichtrich's only link to the JFK story appears
to be his relationship with Calvillo. A review of his files
(OP, 201, C, Production) by the ARRB staff did not identify
any other connection to the JFK story. A selection of
documents from his file are attached.
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Given Wichtrich's high profile, the release of his name
could impact both past and future intelligence operations
and directly affect Mr. Wichtrich and his family. His son
had contact with the Panama City Station in 1979; we are
trying to determine the extent of that relationship. In this
case, the Agency believes that the potential for harm
clearly outweighs the contribution the release of
Wichtrich's name would make to the JFK assassination story.
оваа
Han
J. Barry Harrelson
Attachments: As stated
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