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Date : 09/24/98 :
Page : 1
206-10001-10010
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
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TITLE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD MEETING
OF THE BOARD NOVEMBER 9, 1962
DATE : 11/09/62
PAGES :
SUBJECTS
:
10
AGENDA FOR NOVEMBER 9, 1962 MEETING
SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 9, 1962 MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS :
RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/90 08/01/2024
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2025 Release under the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
[R]
-
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
206-10001-10010
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
NW
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
MEETING OF THE BOARD
NOVEMBER 9, 1962
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MENTING OF NOVEMBER 9, 1062
ITEM
61%
TIME
0:00 - 9:30
SUBJECT
The Chairman's Timet Executive Session
9:30
10:15
10:15
10:30
10:30
11:00
5
11:00 -12100
1130-31
6.
12:00-1
-12:30
515-555
1:05
12:30 - 1:30
7:
7 8.
1:30
2.10.
1:45
1145+2:15
NOT
TAKEN
من
2:15 2:30
Preliminary Review by Board Staff of Recent
Cuban Developments.
Mr. Patrick Coyne
Recent Discussions of Cuban Developments with
the Defense Intelligence Agendy and the
National Reconnaisschee Office.
Mr. Gordon Gray
Recent Photographid Intelligence Acquisitions
Mr. Arthua Lundahl, MPIC
Defence Intelligence Agency Activities a
Including DIA's Role in the Cuban Situation
Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA
State Department Views on Recent Intelligence
Developments Relating to Cuba
Mr. Thomas Hughes, Acting Director, Intelligence
and Research, Department of State
-Loh Room No. 21, Executive Office Building
-
Status Report on CING Covert Operations
Mr. Robert Murphy'
Review or the Recent/Series of Soviet
Nuclear Tests
Dr Albert Wheelon
Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA.
Dr. Donald Chamberlain
Office
Scientific Intelligence, CIA
Executive Session
DCI = 11:00
DIA = 1:30.
No Board book
for this meeting.
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ITEM
TIME
11
2:30-4:00
SUBJECT
Discussions with the Director of Central
11:00 - 12:55 Intelligence Including Review of U. S.
Intelligence Activities Relating to the
Cuban and Berlin Situations
12.
41-00---4:15
4:30-5:15
13.
4:15 - 4:30
14.
4:30
5:00
-7
15. 5100
END
Mr. John McCone
Discussions with the President's Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs
M BAG nd
Board Review of U.S. Intelligence Activities
in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom
Mr. Coyne
Status Roport on Implementation of
Board Recommendations
Mi. Ash
Discussion of Board Panel Assignments and
Future Board Business
Board Personnel ly
Due to absence from the country, Board members Longer
and Pace will be unable to attend this meeting.
JOD SECRET.
THE WHITE HOUSE.
This decument consists of __
_o! 3 Coplus, Series
TOP SECRET
#2 pages
WASHINGTON
No. _
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Board Meeting of November 9, 1962
The Board convened in meeting at 9:00 a.m., on November 3,
1962, at the offices of the Board in the Executive Office Building.
Dr. Baker presided as Acting Chairman in the absence of Dr. Killian.
Board members Gray, Doolittle, Murphy and Clifford were present as
were Mr. Coyne and the writer.. (Messrs. Pace and Langer were out
Illness prevented Dr.
of the country at the time of this meeting.
Land's attendance.)
Dr. Baker informed the Board that Messrs. Coyne and Ash had
done a unique assembly of material for the Board's use in considering
the intelligence aspects of the Soviet missiles buildup in Cuba.
Dr. Baker expressed the view that the materials which had been
assembled are far too complicated for the Board to consider in the
course of only one day, and therefore the Board would look to
Mr. Coyne and Mr. Gray for selective reporting to the Board con-
cerning the highlights of the coverage which had been accomplished
thus far in the Board's review of the Cuba situation.
Dr. Baker observed that the conflict involving Cuba is an
intelligence conflict. The government does not know for sure the
positions of anti-aircraft artillery units which are protecting
the SA-2 sites in Cuba. Furthermore, intelligence is lacking on
such elementary things as the support facilities which serve the
SA-2 installations. Based on the intelligence which has been ob-
tained, it appears that except for Moscow and Leningrad the island
of Cuba is now equipped with the best air defense system in the
world. It is possible that Cuba is now on the verge of insuring
against invasion by reason of its possession of an assembly of the
most dangerous armaments which have heretofore been collected in
an area of that size. In the UN the United States is discussing
inspection and surveillance proposals and positions which in Dr.
Dr. Baker said that he
Baker's view are a century out of date.
does not know how much the President is aware of these things, but
there is a serious proposal being discussed which would contemplate
one or two inspections a month, whereas we well know 
that within
72 hours there can be made operational a most dangerous offensive
capability.¨¨
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Mr. Murphy wondered what specifically had caused the decision
to be made to transfer from CIA to SAC the responsibility for re-
connaissance of Cuba. Mr. Maphy thought that an understanding of
the reasons for this shift of responsibility is important because
the Board itself seemed to have been oblivious to developments
which were of such a nature as to warrant the stepped-up coverage
by SAC. Mr. Gray's comment on this was to the effect that he had
noted an uncertainty in the past with regard to whether the problem
of Cuba had been removed from the Board's area of responsibility.
Mr. Gray recalled remarks by the Chairman at a Board meeting last
summer indicating that the Cuba situation was being looked at else-
where in Government. Therefore, Mr. Gray thought that if in fact
the Board's responsibility extends to Cuba this should be made clear
for the benefit of the Board. In Mr. Gray's opinion if the Board
in fact had such a responsibility, then the Board should have been
addressing itself to the implications of public statements such as `
those being made by Senator Keating and others, and particularly
the statement by Senator Keating on October 10, 1962, that ballistic
missile installations were being constructed in Cuba.
Acting Chairman Baker informed the Board that he had confirmed
with the Chairman that the Chairman's remarks at the last summer's
Board meeting were intended to convey that it was only in the
NSC 5412/2 area that Cuba matters where being handled outside the
purview of the Board.
Continuing, Mr. Gray said that it was a matter of personal
regret to him that the public statements by Senators Keating,
Humphry and others had not served to flag the situation.
Mr. Coyne said that following that line of reasoning he him-
self could be said to have been at fault. Mr. Coyne went on to
point out in this connection that Senator Keating and others were.
speaking from the benefit of Executive Branch briefings which they
had received, including General Carter's briefing of the Republican
Policy Committee. In any case, the Senators had only information.
which was in the possession of the Executive Branch. Insofar as
this information was based on foreign intelligence acquisitions,
Mr. Coyne pointed out that all of the U.S. foreign intelligence
agencies are under instruction and have an obligation to furnish
the Board with all significant information derived from the
foreign intelligence effort; and if such instructions and under-
standings were not in effect the Board would be in the position
of having to dig out the intelligence information which the
agencies are obligated to provide to the Board on a systematic
basis. In the case of the developing Cuban situation, however,
Mr. Coyne pointed out that a top level decision was made to give
limited distribution of intelligence information on Cuba and the
Board was excluded from those elements of the government which
were designated to receive it.
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15
a periodic regional intelligence bulletin on Southeast Asia,
and that consideration is being given to issuing similar:
regional intelligence bulletins for consumers in other areas.
He described this particular recommendation as being a "good.
suggestion.'
"1
At this point Mr. Clifford, reverting to the discussion
on the Hanson Baldwin matter, asked whether a separate investi-
gative unit is being established as recommended by the Board,
in lieu of the referral of leaks for investigation by the FBI.
Mr. McCone responded that this matter is still under considera-
tion; that in his own office he is prepared to set up such a
unit; that he and the President feel this action must be taken;
but that there is growing concern in some quarters that the
creation of such a unit might ultimately lead to the establish-
ment of some kind of internal Gestapo..
Mr. McCone next turned to the subject of Cuba. He said.
that in late July there was first witnessed an increased tempo
of Soviet bloc shipments to Cuba, and by August the rate of
shipments had more than doubled. On August 10, 1962 there was
held a meeting of Principals (the President not participating)
to discuss Cuban operations which had taken place during the
preceding months of 1962. Up to that time there had been an.
exploratory intelligence effort primarily aimed at providing
a basis for deciding what covert actions could be taken
against the Castro regime. The results of this intelligence
effort had been reflected in reports appearing in the Central
Intelligence Bulletin and in items which were set forth in the
Presidential Check List. At that time, Mr. McCone said, he
analyzed the developments in Cuba as indicating (1) the establish-
ment of a sophisticated SIGINT operation to be directed against
our space activities at Camp Canaveral, (2) the establishment
of a comprehensive air defense system, or (3) the introduction
of a MRBM capability, or possibly all three. However, no one
shared Mr. McCone's feeling that the Soviet activities in Cuba
were directed toward the establishment of a ballistic missile
capability. On the contrary, the Department of State and the
Office of National Estimates within the CIA considered that such
action by the Russians would be a departure from established
Soviet policy.
Mr. McCone said that throughout August a careful watch
was maintained with respect to developments in Cuba, and in
late August the construction of SAM sites was detected.
By August 23, when Mr. McCone left the country (on his honey-
(moon), there had been obtained photographic evidence of the
construction of seven SAM sites together with evidence of
extreme security measures being taken with respect to the
unloading of ships at Cuban ports. These developments, Mr.
McCone related, gave rise to considerable worry on his part,
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and prior to his departure from the country, on August 23,
he took the occasion on August, 21, 22, and 
23 to express 
his
worry to the President and to the Secretary of 
Defense.
Mr. McCone acknowledged that he had no positive 
evidence 
to
support his concern, but he reasoned 
that the extensive air
defense buildup which was underway in Cuba had 
as its 
immediate
purpose the denial of the surveillance by 
the United States of
the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba. The 
U-2 photography which
was being obtained reflected that 26 SA
-2 sites would be
installed in Cuba. Mr. McCone observed that 
while the 
photo-
graphy obtained at the time did not provide evidence 
of 
missile
sites, a current review of that photography 
indicates the
presence of tents and some construction equipment
.
Cone said that when he left the country on 
August 
23, the
instructed that a daily CIA bulletin be initiated 
at 
once with
respect to Cuban developments, and he initiated 
issuance of
When in 
September
this reporting after consultation with the 
USIB.
Mr. Mc-
an incident was created by the U-2 which "wandered". over Soviet
territory, and also when the U-2 was shot down 
over Communist
China on September 8, these incidents caused 
Mr. McCone to be
It 
developed,
concerned. Nevertheless, overflights were 
ordered.
however, that from September 17 to September 
20, 
weather con-
ditions would not permit the overflights of Cuba.
1
At about that time the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, as well
as the CIA, became convinced that some risk was involved 
in
For 
that reason,
the conduct of U-2 operations over Cuba.
Mr. McCone said, the flights which were scheduled were of a
peripheral nature. Four flights were authorized 
and flowm
in late September and in early October, but because 
of 
their
peripheral or semi-peripheral character they 
did not cover 
the ✓
western area of Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled 
that in early.
October there had been seen refugee reports concerning mysterious
shipments being transported over Cuban roads, and 
there were
other things of this nature reported by refugees.
As reflected in the SNIE dated September 19, 1962, Mr
McCone said that the USIB dismissed the possibility that MRB Ms
were being introduced into Cuba, and this view 
was based on
the belief that such introduction would 
confront the USSR 
with
so many difficulties that the action would not be undertaken
.
Mr. McCone said that he was in France when he 
received a sum-
mary of the SNIE, and he disagreed with its conclusions because
he could not see why the Soviets were establishing 
such a
comprehensive air defense system in Cuba unless this 
was 
being
done to shield the island against U. S. surveillance 
and to
protect the conduct of some clandestine operation.
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20
became greater. But even if this flight had been conducted,
in Mr. McCone's opinion there would not at that 
time have
been obtained information of a more convincing 
nature 
than
was later obtained as a result of the October 
14 mission.
Mr. McCone said that on September 7 he made a recommendation
that more frequent flights be conducted, and it 
continues to
be Mr. McCone's view that there should have 
been more in-
tense U-2 coverage during September.
Mr. Clifford asked why and from where was there concern
Mr. 
McCone 
said
over a possible U-2 incident involving Cuba.
that this view was held within the NSC 5412 Group and in CIA
as well. Mr. McCone said that he held a different 
view but
He cited as a current 
example of
he was away at the time.
concern attaching to the possibility of U-2 incidents the fact
that today the Special Group considered a U-2 
flight over the
China-India border, and great concern was expressed 
in the
Group because the mission would have to include an overflight
of Burma, and the prospect of the Burma overflight 
creating
another U-2 incident was a matter of considerable sensitivity
within the Group.
Mr. Clifford observed that while this concern might well
be understandable in the case of Burma, he was nevertheless
unable to understand why there should be a similar concern
about reaction to a U-2 incident which might arise 
with 
respect
to Cuba. Mr. McCone said that such concern with respect to
Cuba does not exist today and, as a matter of fact, on that
very day there were being conducted ten low-level 
and 3 U-2
.
missions against Cuba.
Mr. Clifford made the comment that he feared that the
Board might possibly be subjected to criticism in the light
of the fact that there was no photographic reconnaissance over
Cuba between September 5 and October 14, despite the DCI's
own suspicions and the content of refugee reports 
with 
respect
to a Soviet missile buildup in Cuba.
Mr. Murphy inquired of Mr. McCone as to whether clandestine
Mr. McCone'
agents are being successfully operated in Cuba.
answered by saying cuba mere have been three rather ineffective
teams operating in
with the principal objective of organizing
Castro regime rather than obtaining
dissidence against that there are approximately 40 third-
intelligence.
country agents planted in various foreign embassies in Cuba, but
we obtained no hard 
intelligence from them regarding the military
buildup.
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23.
Mr.
could be reintroduced into Cuba as below-deck cargoes.
Clifford thought that it would be a good idea to continue our
surveillance in order to ascertain the destination 
of these
ships and the disposition made of the missiles, and Mr. 
Mc-
the ships 
into the
Cone said that we can probably track
Black Sea and the Baltic, but that we would not be able to
cover the unloading and transshipment of missiles into Soviet
ports.
Mr. Murphy wondered what had beeh the inspiration for
the commitment not to invade Cuba. Mr. McCone supposed that
this resulted from a Russian offer to do certain 
things in
return for things which they asked for.
Mr. Clifford asked whether it is possible for the United
States to develop intelligence sources in Cuba which would.
relieve our dependence upon photographic 
intelligence. Mr.
McCone said that this is difficult to do primarily 
because
Castro had instituted a police state in Cuba and, as 
an 
example
of this, Mr. McCone cited the practice of the Castro 
regime
in following a procedure whereby in effect the 
ration cards
of the Cuban people serve as identification 
cards. Mr. 
McCone
said that previously eight or nine teams of trained 
agents
had been introduced into Cuba since April. 
Three of these
been either 
killed 
ör
teams remain in Cuba; the rest have
came back from their mission. Mr. McCone said that we have
not been able to obtain much intelligence from these 
three
teams because their principal activity has been 
to 
maintain.
their survival.
Mr. Clifford said that he found it hard to understand
why the United States has not been able to develop intelligence
sources within Cuba, a country situated only 90 miles away
from the United States, and one with which we have 
enjoyed
Mr. McCone
the friendliest relations for 60 years.
and at that rate practically all of the responsible
have left the island. Mr. McCone said after 
the 
Bay of Pigs
invasion an intel paralysis" set in for a time.
approximately 2000 Cubans are coming out of Cuba t
Then, in December
the President and the Attorney General.
and Mr. McCone had discussions leading to the instigation
of some operations in Cuba. Mr. McCone said that 
he was
aghast to learn at that.
tions being conducted,
established at Opalaka.
He
there were no refugee interroga-.
so the interrogation center was
said that within CIA a 500-man
task force was set up to work on the Cuba problem and dis-
appointing results have been obtained. Mr. 
McCone said 
that
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.24
he is now concerned and he has had under review the question
as to whether too much dependence is being placed on refugees
as sources of information, and consideration is being given as
to whether it may be necessary to send U. S. citizens into
Cuba as intelligence agents. He said that we are not getting
Mr. Murphy
intelligence on Cuba through conventional means.
observed that this is a salient point of interest to the
Board. Mr. McCone repeated his concern which he had earlier
expressed that even with the Soviet missiles removed, the
Castro regime will continue to be a center of insurgency.
for Latin America, as indicated by the fact that during the
recent days of the Cuban crisis orders were issued from
Within Cuba for the initiation of insurgency action in other
Latin American countries.
At this point Mr. McCone's visit with the Board terminated
and the Board recessed for lunch.
At 1:45 p.m., General Carroll, Director of the Defense
General Carroll
Intelligence Agency, joined the Board meeting.
said that in an attempt to anticipate the specific matters
in which the Board might be interested, he had prepared some
materials regarding the Cuban situation over the period from
He said that
last summer up to October 14 and thereafter.
the extreme pressures which had prevailed, and the requirement
for daily presentations to top level officials concerning the.
progress of the Cuban situation, had made it impossible for
him to complete a detailed survey up to this time, but that
such a survey was in process within the DIA.
General Carroll began by describing briefly the role of
the DIA'S CIIC which was responsible for the coordination of
intelligence regarding the Cuban situation. In July 1962, the
CIIC reported on the increased Soviet shipping into Cuba.
In August, reports were disseminated with regard to increasing
introduction of Soviet materials. On September 8, the CIIC
reported that the scope of the Soviet bloc assistance to Cuba
suggested motives going beyond the lending of support and
encouragement to the Castro regime. On August 15, in an effort
to supply guidance and requirements for photographic recon-
naissance, the DIA asked that the NPIC conduct a study and
review of photographic intelligence which had previously been
obtained with respect to three areas in Cuba. On August 17,
photographic evidence indicated that SA-2 equipment was
located in two of the three areas, although there was no
evidence of deployment as yet. The next photographic mission
flown on August 29 disclosed the presence of two SA-2 sites
and the presence e of a third site at Banes. Moreover, a
study of the photographic evidence concerning the SA-2 sites,
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