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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief, Support Branch
DATE:
1 July 1963
FROM
:
Mr. Ramon R. Hart
SUBJECT
:
Manuel F. ARTIME Buesa
#210 838
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1. On 24 June 1963, Mr. Charles Matt, SAS/MOB/PM, extension
6488, was referred to me by the SAS Security Officer, Mr. George
Ladner, and visited me in Room 4 E 21 to request some operational
support beginning 1 July 1963. Mr. Matt advised that two leaders
of the Cuban Exile Group were coming to Washington, D. C., on that
latter date to confer with CIA and other Government officials,
including probably Robert F. Kennedy, the Attorney General, concern-
ing the "new program" for the exiles.
02.
Mr. Matt explained that a covert site (#302 922) located
at 9218 Aldershot Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, had recently been
procured to billet these exiles and to serve as the meeting place
for these sensitive discussions to take place. Mr. Matt said that
SAS is vitally interested in what these two exiles say to each other
when the U. S. Government officials have departed after a day's
discussions. He, therefore, requested that microphones be concealed
in the house to monitor their comments.
3. Mr. Matt said that the two men would arrive on 1 July and
would be in Washington at the house for about a week or ten days.
The audio coverage was requested for this entire time. Mr. Matt
also said that the house would be retained for several more months
and that the two exiles would return to Washington several more
times in that period and that an audio surveillance would probably
ASS/10 be requested for these latter visits also.
ADD6/10S
C/SAB
4. Mr. George Ladner supplied the true name of the leader of
the two men, the captioned Subject. Having been informed by Mr.
Matt that the covert site was a private dwelling place in an
expensive neighborhood, I assumed that there would be only two
methods of making an audio penetration of the premises:
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(a.) Concealing a tape recorder in the attic, base-
ment, or garage, and using a voice-operated
relay to actuate the recorder.
(b.) With the use of directories, search the
environs of the safehouse for the purpose
of locating a potential listening post where
radio transmissions could be monitored.
5. After checking with Mr. Joseph Langan, Acting Chief,
Operational Support Division, I assigned the case to the District
Field Office and directed some agents to case the house and the
neighborhood to determine which method of penetration should be
used. Mr. John Cryer was designated responsible agent at the
District Field Office, and after a quick survey, he reported that
the concealment and servicing of a tape recorder on the premises
would be impossible and that the only method would be the use of
a transmitter and a nearby listening post.
6. Using the directories in SRS, I ran the names of all the
residents of the houses within a quarter-mile of the covert site
of through SRD Indices and found one Fred C. Thomas, Jr.] (#57 328),
of 9127 McDonald Drive, Bethesda, Maryland, to be a Staff employee.
Through telephone information, I located Mr. Thomas at the Langley
Headquarters Building and personally contacted him the first thing
in the morning of 25 June 1963. I indicated to Mr. (Thomas) the fact
that there was a safehouse in his neighborhood which we wanted to
"bug" and that he was the only Staff employee who lived within range
of our covert transmitters. I asked him if it would be too much of
an imposition on him for us to set up a listening post in his house.
Mr. [Thomas explained that he was scheduled to depart for Karachi, 10
Pakistan on a PCS assignment in approximately a month but that he
would be glad to make his home available as a listening post. He
confided that his primary mission in Karachi was to be the audio
penetration of the Communist Chinese Embassy and so he would look 24
forward to the next week's operations in his home as valuable
training. The next step I took was to set up a meeting among
George Ladner, Charles Matt, Sam Halpern, Executive Officer of SAS,
and myself in Mr. Halpern's Office. I advised Mr. Halpern that the
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audio surveillance appeared to be technically feasible since I
had located a possible listening post. However, I admitted
to him that, even though the Office of Security has the "charter"
to conduct the surveillance, TSD controls the necessary expensive
equipment; Mr. Halpern must arrange for TSD to transfer this
equipment to the Office of Security. Mr. Halpern declared that
the procurement of the necessary equipment should pose no problem
after he would make a few telephone calls. I then returned to
my office and made out a list of the equipment which I felt
would be necessary, and awaited advice from him as to whom to
contact in TSD to obtain it.
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7. After checking with: MC:R:.: :CHECK.CRATCH.C: D:D:Dent of the Audio Opera-
tions Branch of TSD as to appropriate equipment and after check-
ing through the specifications in the "Audio Manual" of TSD,
I selected the following:
Two voice-operated relays, QSC-2,
$1,100 each
-
Two Transmitter Radios, FM, 130 140
MCS, SRT-6H, @ $275 each
$2,200.00
550.00
Two Battery Packs, 130 hrs. ops.,
UWB-7, $25 each
50.00
Two Battery "A", 1.5 volts, Burgess 2 F
$ . 54 each
1.08
One Battery "B", 45 volts, Burgess A-30
1.87
$1.87 each
TOTAL
$2,802.95
8. About Noon on 25 June, I received a telephone call from
Mr. John W. McBee, extension 2481, of TSD, who told me that every-
thing had been laid on by SAS for me to obtain from TSD any
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equipment necessary for this operation. Mr. McBee directed that
I fill out a Form #88 and have the technicians hand carry it to
the Franconia Depot in order to obtain the equipment. The use of
the Form #88 disturbed me in this matter because I had assumed
from Mr. Halpern that he would arrange it so that TSD would turn
over the equipment to us without charge to anyone. The use of
the Form #88 implies that a division is allocating funds for the
purchase of equipment. However, I filled out the Form #88,
listing the above equipment, and walked it down to SAS, where I
gave it to Charles Matt to have signed. The form, bearing the
SAS Cost Center #3132-5455-3400, was completed and returned to
me within an hour, whereupon I gave it to DFO Agent Stan Lach,
who drove with it immediately to the Franconia Depot. I called
ahead to Bob Woods and Charlie Beall of the T & I Shop at Franconia
and requested that they give a little briefing concerning the
operation of this equipment to Mr. Lach and Mr. Cryer, who was to
meet Mr. Lach there. Neither Cryer nor Lach had ever had any
experience with any of the pieces of equipment on the list.
Woods and Mr. Beall were quite cooperative in this request.
Mr.
I
9. Several problems kept appearing and disappearing while
the DFO technicians were transporting, installing, and testing
the equipment. One problem was the payment of the equipment.
received a telephone call from Mr. Dayton S. ("Doc") Barrows of
TSD, informing me that SAS had reneged on paying the $2,802.95 for
the equipment, but that if I would tell him what equipment we
wanted, he might be able to arrange to lend it to us. I told Mr.
Barrows that as far as I knew, we had indeed obtained the equipment
with the Form #88, but that if we needed anything else, I would
contact him. Another problem which appeared was the rumor that
it was not two Cuban exiles who would be residing in the safehouse,
but only the captioned Subject and a Spanish speaking Staff employee.
If the rumor were actually true, it would seem that an audio
surveillance of the safehouse would not be necessary. I called
Charles Matt for an explanation, and he informed me that Senor
Artime was going to be the only person living in the house after
each day's discussions were completed no Staff employee would
be living with him. I asked Mr. Matt to whom Senor Artime would be
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1
holding the conversations which we were to record. He replied
that he was interested in any visitors which the Subject might
receive and any telephone calls which he might make. I suggested
that possibly a telephone tap might be sufficient under these
circumstances. Mr. Matt disagreed and still requested a micro-
phone installation to cover the whole house if possible.
10. In addition to the equipment obtained from TSD, the DFO
agents took their own SRR-4 tuneable receiver and the SRR-4 charged
to the WFO. These receivers would be used in the listening post to
pick up the radiations from the two SRT-6H transmitters.
It was
suggested to the DFO agents to borrow the two WFO transceivers to
be used to communicate during the installation between the listening
post and the safehouse; however, the agents chose not to use them
and relied solely on telephonic communications. The "A" and "B"
batteries picked up at Franconia were to be used in the SRR-4
receiver so that checks could be made from an automobile to see
just how far the radiations extended around the transmitters. A
report on the area covered by the transmitters was requested of
the DFO agents.
11. The first test of the SRT-6H from the safehouse to the
listening post was a failure. Its 50 milliwatt output, ordinarily
good for a quarter mile, wasn't sufficient to reach the receiver,
2/10th's of a mile away. Its failure was blamed partly on the
distance, partly on the brick construction of the listening post,
and partly on the hilly contours of the housing development, which
deflected the 135 megacycle, line-of-sight radiations.
12. When this disheartening news arrived, I immediately
telephoned Mr. Barrows of TSD and requested a pair of the more
powerful 150 milliwatt SRT-7 transmitters. I telephoned Mr.
Barrows rather than filling out another Form #88 to avoid a
possible furor within SAS. Mr. Barrows consented to loan two of
these transmitters with their proper receivers on a hand receipt
to us, and Stan Lach was dispatched to Franconia to pick them up.
An opportunity to test it on 28 June 1963 was thwarted because
Mr. Thomas] was having foreign visitors in for cocktails
that afternoon. But the equipment was installed and tested the
next day, Saturday, 29 June, and appeared to work satisfactorily.
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13. At 1330 hours on 1 July 1963, Mr. Cryer telephoned Head-
quarters to announce that one SRT-7 transmitter had been insed
in the ceiling over the bar and telephone in the basement of
safehouse and that the SRR-1 receiver was picking up the trans
missions satisfactorily in Mr Thomas's basement The QSC-2 voice->
operated relay was also satisfactorily actuating the Ampex tape
recorder when conversations began to take place in the safehouse.
The AC-powered FM transmitter is crystal controlled to operate
at a frequency of 157.4 megacycles in the VHF Band. Its operating
range is supposed to be approximately one mile.
14. The DFO agents also fitted the transmitter with a hidden
switch which would enable the case officers to turn the transmitter.
off when they are present at the house holding the sensitive dis-
cussions and to turn it on when they leave.
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15. Mr. Thomas and his wife have consented to do most of the
operating of the tape recorder themselves in their own basement.
With the use of the voice-operated relay, the monitoring will
almost 100% automatic anyway. No more than one visit a
field office agent, should be necessary to pick up the day'
and to make minor adjustments, repairs, or corrections to the
receiver, actuator, and recorder. Mr. Thomas is well-known to his
friends as a "hi-fi bug", and the presence of the new equipment, in
his basement would not raise the eyebrows on an
he eyebrows on 
any of his visitorg
some of whom are expected to be foreign dignitaries
ill be going to Katachi under Department of State cover
amen
Ramon R. Hart
Mr. Thomas
Vay
cc #57 328
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