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DOCUMENT INFORMATION
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FROM :
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TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA
FOR MEETING OF APRIL 23, 1963
DATE : 04/23/63
PAGES :
SUBJECTS
DOCUMENT TYPE
CLASSIFICATION
:
:
16
AGENDA FOR APRIL 23, 1963 MEETING.
SUMMARY OF APRIL 23, 1963 MEETING.
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
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RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
:
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
-08/06/98
08/01/2024
2025 Release under the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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-CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
F
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF APRIL 23, 1963
ITEM
TIME
1.
9:00 9:15
2
9:15-10:15-
11:"
13
The Chairman's Time
ご
SUBJECT
Status Report on Prior Board Recommendations...
Mr. Russell-Ash #
10:15 - 10:45 Discussions with the Director of Central
✓ 3. 10:15 -
.5.
18:00
10:45 11:25
Intelligence
Mr. John McCone
Mr. Lanian Kirkpatrick
Current Intelligence and Covert Operational
Activity Relating to Cuba
* Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell, State Department
CIA
Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald,
12:00-12:55 Mr. Bruce Clark, CIA
11:15-12:15
Status Report on Developments Pertaining
to the Defense Intelligence Agency
Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF,
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Wu, Col. Chas. Millie, Sgt. John Reite (ARE DIA)
12:15--12:40-Executive Session (fine laps)
35
7.
12:45 - 2:20-
نار
40
2:30-3:00".
10
9.
30
3:60-4:00
3.0
✓ 10. 11:00
(11.
-
5:00
5:00 5:10‍
Luncheon at the Metropolitan Club in Honor of
Dr. Killian
Mr. 
Clark Clifford
Host:
(Rd.mbre, Coyne, ash, McCone & Lundy at binchion.)
Status Report National Reconnaissance
Office
Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, NRO
Developments Relating to the National
Security Agency
Mr. John H. Rubel, Deputy Director, Research
and Engineering, Department 
of Defense
Lt. General Gordon A. Blake, Director
,
National Security Agency 
+ Bob Rich & 
Edwin Bartush
(2:00)
Intelligence Coverage of Foreign Diplomatic
and International Organization 
Establishments
and Personnel in the United 
States
Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director, FBI
Mr. Millen
Executive Session (ap)
*This item was not considered at the 4/23/63 meeting of the Board.
In lieu thereof the Board 
discussed the DCI's reportONFIDENTIAL
on Cuba dated 4/15/63, following 
a briefing thereon by Mr. Coyne
.
All Board Members Present,
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
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AGENDA (Continued)
-CONFIDENTIAL
ITEM
TIME
12.
5:15
✓13
515
13.
ی کا پہینچی
5:25
5:25 End of
Addendum:
Day
6;
SUBJECT
Meeting with the President
-
Presentation
of Commission to Mr. Clifford as new
Board Chairman
Executive Session with the new Board Chair-
man
Subsequent to the preparation of this agenda, the
DCI submitted his 
comments on the recommendations
(on Cuba and other subjects
) which the Board made
The DCI's
to the President at its 
last meeting.
comments are filed under 
Tab 14.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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54
Copios, Surios
Dagy
This document
congiste
of
C
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, April 23, 1963
The Board met at 9:00 a.m., April 23, 1963, in the Board's
offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building, at the call of the
Chairman, Dr. Killian. Present were Board members Doolittle,
Murphy, Clifford, Gray, Baker, Pace, Langer and Land, and Messrs.
Coyne and Ash..
;
Dr. Killian opened the meeting with the observation that when
the DCI joined the Board meeting later in the day, Bard members
should be prepared to discuss with Mr. McCone the latter's April 15,
1963, submission to the President of comments in response to the
14 recommendations made in the Board's March 8 report on Cuba.
Mr. Coyne
The Chairman asked Mr. Coyne to give the Board a brief oral
summary of the DCI's April 15 submission to the President.
did so by repeating for the information of the Board members the
comments which he had provided to Mr. Bundy in a memorandum dated
April 22, 1963, in response to Mr. Bundy's request that he be
furnished Mr. Coyne's own reaction (not that of the Board) to the
DCI's communication to the President.
Having heard Mr. Coyne's resume of his comments to Mr. Bundy
on the DCI's report, Dr. Killian thought that the comments were
sound and well presented, although Dr. Killian was of the view that
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Briefly referring to his visit to the NPIC quarters at the Naval Gun Factory,
General Doolittle noted that the facility has considerable room for expansion and
the activity is being carried on there under greatly improved conditions. The f
Department of Defense personnel contingent which is housed at the facility operates
as a self-contained unit. Mr. Lundahl, Director of the NPIC, reports that although
the facility does not possess usfficient manpower to handle a double load which might
be imposed should two emergency situations occur simultaneously, he nevertheless
feels that the space and equipment expansion now under way at the new quarters would
accommodate the additional personnel who would be required in such a situation.
At the Chairman's request, Mr. Murphy briefly informed the Board concerning
the meeting which he and Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne had recently with Mr. Cord Meyer
of CIA on the subject of covert action programs. Mr. Murphy pointed out that
i
The CL briefing
Mr. Meyer's briefing covered operations in Latin American countries, but the subject
of Cuba was excluded inasmuch as that subject was to be covered at today's Board
meeting. Mr. Murphy said the briefing consisted primarily of light touches in-
Nothing new was brought up
cluding information on the China frontier situation.
with respect to Europe or the Middle East, Mr. Murphy said.
reflected the existence of positive evidence that the entourage of the Brazilian
President Goulart is communist-penetrated. Mr. Murphy observed that this briefing
had been presented by CIA at the request of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Gray, and it was
Mr. Murphy's impression that the briefing was rather routine in nature, and therefore
seemed to downgrade the importance which the Board attaches to the subject of covert
action operations and requirements.
Dr. Land observed that from his experience, every time that secrecy is used
as a cloak for an assumed efficient but sensitive operation, one may well later
firl on removal of the cloak that there was nothing there. Dr. Land thought that
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it is up to the Board to ascertain specifically whether the President desires that
the Board go into covert action programs deeply, and if that is the President
wish then the Board should take steps to insure that it receives full and significant
briefings from the agencies concerned. In this connection Mr. Clifford asked
Whether there was any limitation at all on the Board's right to know about these
matters. Dr. Killian replied that there were no limitations and that this is well
established.
Mr. Coyne informed the Board at this point about the telephone call which had
been received from the Office of the DCI the preceding day, Mr. Kirkpatriék of
CIA had conveyed the DCI's wish that the scheduled CIA briefing of the Board today.
on certain clandestine operations be conducted in the absence of Mr. Cottrell,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, who Mr. McCone
understood was to join the Board meeting at the same time the CIA briefing was to
be given. The basis for the DCI's request was the fact that certain aspects of the
CIA briefing to be given on clandestine operations with respect to Cuba involve
covert action operations which Mr. Cottrell is not privy to. Mr. Come noted that
the Board's agenda had been revised to accommodate the DCI's request, although
Mr. Coyne found the request to be somewhat surprising in view of the responsibi
which have been assigned to Mr. Cottrell by the White House for coordination for
all matters relating to Cuba.
ties
Mr. Gray observed that if at today's meeting the Board in fact received'
full story concerning clandestine and covert actions being planned and executed
under CIA auspices, this would certainly constitute a milestone in the Board's
efforts along this line. Dr. Land thought the Board should take the position that
unless the CIA briefing presents a full story, the briefers should be asked to:
continue until the Board has received a full picture: Mr. Clifford thought that
the better procedure to follow would be for the Board to listen to the CIA briefing
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and to ask any questions which it may have during the course of the briefing, and
if the Board still has unanswered questions at the conclusion of the briefing
they should be compiled by the Board staff for discussion at the next meeting of
The Board agreed with Mr. Clif
the Board and pursued further with the DCI.
suggestion.
Mr. Murphy added that the Board should endeavor to ascertain the
context of any over-all plan which the government has with respect to Cuba and under
Dr. Killian emphasized the desira
which the intelligence community is operating.
bility that on the occasion of the CIA briefing today, pertinent questions regarding.
Mr. Clifford observed that if the Board
Cuba should be pressed with the briefers.
does not receive sufficient information from CIA in these matters, it might be well
to consider the alternative of the Board preparing itself for the conduct of a
searching examination of appropriate CIA representatives who are knowledgeable
in this area, and have a stenographic record prepared of the proceedings.
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12
At 10:15 a.m., the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone,
joined the Board meeting, accompanied by Mesors. Kirkpatrick,
Fitzgerald and Clark. Referring to events of the past twenty-four
hours, the DCI expressed satisfaction that the U.S./Cuba prisoner
exchange had included the return to the U.S. of the 3 senior CIA
personnel who had been imprisoned in Cuba early in the Castro regime
when they were caught in the act of bugging the Chinese Communist
mission in Cuba. Mr. McCone said that the exchange which the attorney
Donovan had worked out with Castro called for the release of 22
Americans in exchange for the return to Cuba of Molina (Castro body-
guard) who was in the custudy of New York authorities following the
slaying of an Argentine girl in a night club, and the 3 Cubans who
were under Federal indictment in New York on sabotage charges. The
DCI said that he personally negotiated with Governor Rockefeller
the release of Molina, and that the Attorney General handled the
release of the other three Cubans.
ก
>
In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy, the DCI stated that
the terms of the exchange agreement were not of a nature to affect the
conduct of present or future U.S. intelligence and covert action oper-
ations with respect to Cuba. Mr. McCone added that Castro did not
seek any conditions other than the release of the 4. Cubans being held
in the U.S. Mr. McCone thought it interesting that Castro had pressed
for no conditions involving U.S. policy toward Cuba, and had sought
no assurances regarding U.S. aerial surveillance, espionage operations,
told
military policy, or anything else. Vallejo, Castro's assistant,
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attorney Donovan to tell President Kennedy and Mr. McCone that
Castro realizes that he must gain a rapprochment with the U.S.,
and Mr. McCone expressed the belief that in agreeing to the recent
prisoner exchange Castro is seeking to retain a thread of contact
with the U.S. as insurance in the event of a double-cross by the
USSR. The DCI had no idea why he had been included in the message
to be delivered by Donovan.
Mr. McCone pointed out that the attorney Donovan has
become our only direct channel to Castro.
However, Donovan has
announced that his mission is ended and that with the completion
of the recent exchange he had gone into Cuba for the last time (for
one thing Donovan had to make the announcement to head off continued
appeals by Cuban exiles in the U.S. to help obtain the release of
numerous relatives still remaining in Cuban prisons). Therefore,
Mr. McCone noted, if any future us. is to be made of Donovan's entree
to Castro, it would undoubtedly have to be on some basis other than
prisoner releases.
Messrs. Kirkpatrick and Fitzgerald noted that apparently the
Castro regime had not succeeded in connecting the 3 CIA personnel
to employment with CIA.
Next, Mr. McCone turned to several matters which he wished to
mention to the Board.
(
In the coordination field, the DCI informed the Board that the
new NRO agreement is now in effect and working well. Plans and
arrangements for the DIA's use of the NPIC are progressing.
In the
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Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald of CIA (DD/P Area) exhibited a chart reflecting the
following information concerning clandestine agents in Cuba as of April 1, 1953,
and the intelligence reports which they had produced during the 12-month period.
ending April 1, 1963:
82 resident agents 665 reports.
2.11legal teams 77 reports.
29 legal travelers
67 reports.
46 shipboard agents
39 reports.
26 penetrations of Cuban installations.
192 reports.
In answer to questions raised by Board members, Mr. Fitzgerald elaborated
upon the statistics displayed on the chart which he exhibited to the Board.
The resident agents" are not third-country diplomats but are Cubans.
As
Thereafter, 480 individuals
Of the number which were recruited,
of March 1, 1962, there were 50 such agents in Cuba.
were considered for possible use in this category.
34 resident agents in Cuba have been lost (one is known to have been executed,
27 are, unaccounted for, escaped after arrest). As of April 1, 1963 the total
number of resident agents in Cuba is 82 as indicated previously by Mr. Fitzgerald.
of which there are 2 in Cuba,
With reference to the "illegal teams:
Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the teams consist of 2 men each, but that as many as 100
The recruitment and operation of the
sub-agents have been developed by the teams.
2 teams are in the "black"; the teams were introduced by sea and their mission
is primarily intelligence gathering. A principal intelligence mission is the
obtaining of information concerning military aspects of the Soviet presence in
Cuba
Also, Mr. Fitzgerald stated, the illegal teams are designed to create resistance
networks among the Cuban population if possible, but the policy is not to pursue large:
For the most part reports are received from
scale, dangerous activity of this sort.
members of the illegal teams in the form of secret writing messages dispatched.
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in the regular mail by way of Mexico, and Mr. Fitzgerald stated in this connection.
ith additional radios (they)
that efforts are being made to equip the team members'
have agent-type radios now); and it is hoped that the team members will soon be
equipped with radio units which are small in size (the transmitter and receiver
together about the size of 2 cigarette cartons) and capable of medium speed trans-
Mr. Fitzgerald further informed the Board
missions for spans of only 60 seconds.
that there were 4 illegal agents in Cuba as of March 1, 1962, and in the 12-month
period ending April 1, 1963, 45 agents were infiltrated, 32 were ex-filtrated, and
agents comprising the
13 were lost, and as of April 1, 1963 there are in Cuba
2 illegal agent teams.
With reference to the shipboard agents, Mr. Fitzgerald said that these
agents are on board Cuban ships, of which there are only 19 operating outside
of Cubar waters. With regard to penetrations of Cuban installations previously
referred to, Mr. Fitzgerald stated that these involve Cuban diplomats and Cuban
He added that some 14 Cuban diplomats are
diplomatic installations abroad.
providing information and 2 of these have furnished reports which are considered
to be good. In answer to Mr. Murphy's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that the
only penetration of Castro's immediate entourage has been through Castro's
He added that the penetrations referred to included 12 of an
younger sister:
Referring again to the 665 intelligence reports.
audio aurveillance, nature.
which have been obtained from resident agents in Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald said that
these reports are heavily devoted to military subjects and a few of them have,
proved really worth while, as for example, during the October crisis when these
it is reported:
On the economic side)
reports served to pin-point MREM locations
that curtailed exports of special lubricating oil components gives the Cubans
a serious problem in the operation of inuustrial machinery
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meeting.
this point, Mr. Cottrell of the Department of State joined they Board
In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Fitzgerald said that the intelli-
gence teams mostly confined their activities to intelligence gathering rather than
covertraction, although the teams do have the mission of creating low-key "iresistance
and "subtle sabotage". Mr. Fitzgerald said that although CLAchas no policy guidance
for positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature, there is policy
guidance for leaflet drops and radio propaganda, and an example of "subtle sabotage"
would be the shorting out of a high tension power line by throwing a copper wire
overbit
Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the Special Group-approved the monthly plans of the
CIA for infiltrations of illegal agents into Cuba, and thereafter the success of
infiltrations is determined by such matters as weather conditions and the requirement
for
ing out infiltrations in the dark of the moon.
carrying
CIA was kept informed about U. S. Army
Mr. Coyne asked whether
iltrations into Cuba, and Mr. Fitzgerala
replied that while CIA received notice of such activity, hone had occurred to his
knowledge for the past 6 months.
Mr. Murphy asked whether there is available any evidence of organized resistance
Mr. Fitzgerald replied that while there is
against the Castro regime within Cuba.
Sbattered resistance it is not organized. He recalled that in 1962 resistance
Organizations composed of students and other groups had been infilt
Castro Security Service and after a time Castro rolled up the resistance groups and
smashed them completely. The only resistance which is now active in Cuba is in the:
form of small bands.
Referring back to Mr. Fitzgerald's earlier comment that the CIA has no policy
guidance with respect to the conduct of covert action programs in Cuba, Mr. Coyne
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inquired as to the function of Mr. Cottrell's Interdepartmental Coordinating
Committee with respect to Cuba. In response to this question, Mr. Cottrell
described his coordinating function, beginning with the point that the President
had requested last January that coordination be supplied to the activities of the
6 or 7 U S. agencies which were dealing with the 4 or 5 Cuban exile groups. The
President directed that there be established a focal point for coordination of
policy recommendations and execution of approved policies assigned for implementation
by various U. S. agencies following decisions by the Executive Committee of the NSC
with respect to Cuba. Having been given this coordinating responsibility, Mr. Cottrell
named Secretary of the Army Vance and Mr. Helms of CIA to serve on the committee,
with provision for drawing upon representatives of other agencies as might be re-
quired from time to time. Mr. Cottrell said that his committee is charged with
coordinating policy with respect to Cuba, the objectives being to prevent Cuba from
becoming a base of Soviet aggression; to prevent the overt export of military equip-
ment from Cuba to other Latin American countries for communist purposes; to prevent
the export of subversive activities to other Latin American countries from Cuba and
to seek the removal of the Soviet presence in Cuba.. Mr. Cottrell went on to say that
when CIA proposes covert actions with respect to Cuba, the Cottrell Committee
considers the proposals and comments on them to the Special Group, and if a policy
issue is involved in a given proposal the matter is referred to the Executive
Committee of the NSC for decision.
Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Cottrell if he would state for the Board Mr. Cottrell's
concept of what U. S. policy toward Cuba is today, for instance whether the policy.
is of a defensive or an offensive character. Mr. Cottrell answered by saying that
in his opinion that the U. S. policy toward Cuba is not defensive, and as an
indication of this he referred to the visit which he and Deputy Attorney General
Katzenbach made to Nicarauga where a conference was held with officials of Central
American countries concerning visa and other travel controls which might be
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improved or instituted for the purpose of restricting the travel of Castro's
representatives in Latin American countries. In further describing the U. S
policy, Mr. Cottrell said that in his own view our government does not intend to
invade Cuba except as a last resort, and our policy holds, that
liberation of
Cuba is the responsibility of the Cuban people themselves However, Mr. Cottrell
added, it is felt by a number of people that the time has long past when we might
expect a successful popular uprising in Cuba against the Castro regime
Mr. Gray asked whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba would alter:
the point of view just mentioned by Mr. Cottrell to the effect that we cannot hope
for a successful popular uprising in Cuba. Mr. Cottrell preferred that this question
be answered by Mr. Fitzgerald who expressed the opinion that withdrawal of Soviet
forces would not significantly affect the situation because of the strong internal
security measures which are maintained by the Castro regime in Cuba.
Referring again to Mr. Fitzgerald's earlier statement that CIA is lacking in
policy guidance on covert actions, Mr. Coyne inquired as to whether requests
for such guidance had been made. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that a decision in this
area is being sought this week. Mr. Cottrell observed that previously the government'
prime objective had been to obtain the release of the 22 Americans imprisoned in
Cuba, and now that this has been accomplished, Mr. Cottrell predicted that future.
operations would include low-level reconnaissance missions, increased sabotage
operations, and intensified efforts to obtain OAS action. He added that inasmuch
as the 'noise level" is down it is hoped that aggressive programs may now be pursued."
Mr. Cottrell also said that he believes the time has come to begin creating tensions
in the Cuban area, and he noted that critics of the Administration have been charging
that our government has fallen into a co-existence policy with respect to Cuba.
In Mr. Cottrell's opinion Castro must feel that his recent release of the
American prisoners will aid rapprochment efforts with respect to the U. Sand
Castro probably hopes that he may now quietly go on building up his communist
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Next Mr. Bruce Clark of CIA (the DD/I Area) briefed the Board with respect
to certain aspects of intelligence coverage of Cuba
Mr. Clark stated that during the period February 15 to April 20, 1963 the
CIA believes that most
Soviets have removed approximately 4,700 personnel from Cuba.
of the 4,700 Soviet personnel were military people because of their age
and appearance
und because there is little likelihood that the Soviets would be removing economic
personnel from Cuba. CIA estimates that only 500 or 600 Soviets have arrived during
this period, and CIA reasons that the 4,700 Soviets who have been withdrawn are
military personnel who have completed tours of duty, including some entire logistic
units. CIA estimates that this leaves in Cuba Soviet personnel totaling on the
order of "12,000 plus". Mr. Clark, said that the validity of the latter figure
depends on the validity of the original estimated total of 17,500 Soviet personnel
in Cuba, a figure which was arrived at on a strict table of organization basis,
taking into account the estimated number of persons logically required to operate.
the equipment which has been observed in Cuba. In the opinion of Mr. Clark, the
estimated figure of 4,700 Sovict withdrawals is far sounder than the previous
estimate of 17,500 total personnel in Cuba.
Dr. Killian asked whether there is evidence of re-introduction of Soviet
military personnel into. Cuba and their deployment and concealment by means of
camouflage. Mr. Clark said that in view of the redundency of the high altitude
overage and the fact that nothing has been seen in photography since November 1962,
evidence is to the contrary.
In answer to Mr. Murphy's question as to what Soviet personnel are presently:
doing in Cuba, Mr. Clark estimated that 7,500 are connected with: SAM installations
and activity, another 7,500 are in the category of military engineers, and 2,000.
Mr Clark indicated that Soviet personnel are
are engaged in naval operations.
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scattered out over the island of Cuba and the greatest concentrations are the
In answer
2,500 to 4,000 Soviet personnel in the 4 major Soviet armored camps
to Dr. Langer's question as to what the 2,500 to 4,000 personnel are doing, Mr.
Clark stated that their main mission was probably the furnishing of training
Mr. Clark said that COMINT obtained this week confirms
to Cuban military forces.
reports that Cuban pilots are receiving training in MIG-21's.
Noting that Mr. Fitzgerald had stated that CIA had 4 agents in Cuba in 1962
and now has 4 agents in Cuba in 1963, Mr. Clifford wondered whether efforts are
being made through other Latin American countries to infiltrate clandestine agents
in Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said that efforts are being made to develop agents from
He added that while Mr. Clifford's
other Latin American countries to operate in Cuba.
recollection was correct concerning the constant figure of "illegal" agents in Cuba
as of a year ago and at the present time, nevertheless there are approximately
87 "resident" agents in Cuba who are engaged in clandestine intelligence collection.
Messrs. Cottrell, Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald and Clark departed the Board
meeting at this point.
At 12:00 noon, the Board meeting was joined by General Carroll, the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and by General Quinn and Colonel
Cillis, members of General Carroll's staff.
General Carroll recalled that at a Board meeting last year he had discussed
the status of the organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the responsi-
bilities which had been assigned to DIA or were being considered for assignment to
DIA. General Carroll said that at this time he would like to point out the present
status of organization of the DIA and the responsibilities which have been recently
assigned to it.
General Carroll pointed out that DIA has the responsibility for handling
military intelligence requirements for the Department of Defense as a central
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figure for NSA was given as 20,000 in comparison with the UK total of 6,600
personnel engaged in this type of activity.
With respect to SIGINT collection on Cuba, General Blake informed the Board.
that in March 1961 there were 10 NSA intercept positions and 5 processing staff
personnel working on Cuba, which was increased by February 1963 to 100 positions.
and 1,660 people. Mr. Clifford inquired as to whether any SIGINT which was obtained.
on Cuba entered into U. 5. policy decisions during the October 1962 Cuba crisis.
General Blake said that the policy makers were supplied with SIGINT on Soviet shipping
to Cuba as early as the spring and early summer of 1962. Dr. Tordella added that:
also in the early summer of 1962 NSA was able to report on the SIGINT buildup of
the Soviets in Cuba, and was able to provide information on defense communications:
networks as well as the plain text of communications sent by the Soviet Ambassador
to his superiors in Moscow.
Mr. Murphy, inquired as to whether NSA now has an ability to penetrate Soviet
communications to Cuba. Dr. Tordella stated that in spite of the short distance
which separates Cuba from the U. S. the security precautions followed by the Soviets
would not permit a hit-and-run commando type effort to pre-empt the communications
equipment involved. General Blake had no suggestions to offer in response to
Mr. Coyne's inquiry as to whether the NSA would like to extend its operations with
General Blake did refer
respect to Cuba beyond those which are now programmed.
to efforts which are being made, through direction finding methods, to pin-point
the location of the Soviet communications equipment in question, hopefully within
the range of 1 mile. General Blake pointed out that the Russian SCRAMBLER system,
which is employed on 2 links running from Moscow to Havana, and which operates at
the rate of 66 words a minute, may be approaching a solution on the part of NSA
meanwhile, some traffic analysis is being obtained from it.
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Dr. Tordella mentioned that NSA is getting good results from its attack on
SILVER, the Soviet government communications channel within Russia which handles
approximately 40,000 messages a quarter. The exploitation of this break-through
will be increased when NSA obtains 15 million dollars in additional equipment
Dr. Tordella said that NSA is on the
during the remainder of this year and next.
feeds
verge of solving the Soviet COPPER system which is used by the Soviet Navy and 
feeds
into the SILVER network. It is expected that NSA will solve the COPPER machine
within a year.
Dr. Tordella said that the Soviet ALUMINUM SCRAMBLER system is approaching
a 50% probable solution by NSA. This system has the greatest number of Soviet users
including those in Cuba and is of greatest interest to NSA.
Dr. Tordella said that.
the Russian ALBATROSS system, utilizing a manual machine and which is also in use
in Cuba, has been the subject of NSA attack since 1945 and during the last 7 months'
He added that the Russian diplomatic cipher
has shown promise of possible solution.
system involves the use of hand systems (one time pads) which were inaugurated
in 1948, and which if properly used are purely random systems, and NSA has no
hope whatsoever of reading this traffic.
Mr. Murphy asked whether the Russians are exploiting U. S. diplomatic traffic.
Dr. Tordella said that he became confident that the Soviets were exploiting our
diplomatic traffic in Moscow on the basis of compromising radiations emanating from
Accordingly, Dr. Tordelia
the printer unit associated with U. S. encryption machines
succeeded in getting a ruling to prevent the use of such U. S. machines behind
the Iron Curtain until this problem is resolved.
Dr. Killian asked for General Blake's estimate of the FOCUS project at
Princeton University. General Blake said that he supports this effort because it
brings outside scientific thinking into a security-closed effort, and this can
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