177-10002-10105
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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177-10002-10105
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TITLE:
SPECIAL REPORT--WEEKLY REVIEW
DATE:
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09/13/1968
11
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
UNITED
STATES OF
AMERICA
AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top Secret
No Foreign Dissem
The Developing Soviet Submarine Force
Special Report
WEEKLY REVIEW
Handle via Comint Channels
Top Secret
1
13 September 1968
SC No.00787/68B
57
i
C
TOP SECRET
SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelli-
gence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence.
The Special Reports are published separately to permit more
comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by
the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Re-
search, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of
Science and Technology. Special Reports are coordinated as
appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the
normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working
level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically
indicated.
WARNING
The SPECIAL REPORT contains classified information affect-
ing the national security of the United States within the mean-
ing of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794,
and 798.
THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES
The SPECIAL REPORT is to be seen only by US personnel es-
pecially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICA-
TIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be
maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE REGULATIONS.
No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTEL-
LIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the ad-
vantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
The SPECIAL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOR-
EIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the frame-
work of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID 1/7.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
TOP SECRET
Page 1.
TOP SECRET TRINE
No Foreign Dissem
THE DEVELOPING SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE
The Soviet naval leadership, commanding the
world's largest submarine fleet, is undertaking a pro-
gram to increase the operational capabilities of the
force. Four new classes of submarines-three tor-
pedo-attack classes and a new Polaris-type missile-
firing submarine-are in production, and several older
classes are being improved and reconditioned. In ad-
dition, since the early 1960s the range, number, and
duration of open ocean patrols by Soviet submarines
have been generally increasing.
TOP SECRET TRINE
SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68
TOP SECRET TRINE
No Foreign Dissem
Fleet Modernization
The new Polaris-type sub-
marine--designated the Y-class--
carries 16 SS-N-6 ballistic mis-
siles with ranges of some 1,500
miles. These 425-foot-long sub-
marines are currently being built
at Severodvinsk in the Soviet
Northern Fleet area. The first
units should be operational soon
and 40 or more could be in serv-
ice by the mid-1970s.
Two new classes of nuclear-
powered attack submarines are
also being built--one at Lenin-
grad shipyard and the other at
Gorkiy. At least one of these
classes probably was specifically
designed to engage enemy subma-
rines. A third class of attack
submarine is under construction
in the Soviet Far East; its means
of propulsion is not yet known.
In addition to these new con-
struction programs, the Soviets
are reconditioning many of their
older classes of submarines.
There are no indications that
the Soviets intend to introduce
a new class of cruise-missile
submarine, however, and con-
struction of these submarines
is apparently ending as the
Soviets approach their desired
force level for these anticar-
rier units.
Operational Implications
Strategic targets in the
middle of the US are beyond
reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5
carried on the older ballistic-
missile submarines, but are
within range of the SS-N-6
carried on the Y-class. By
the mid-1970s, Soviet ballis-
tic-missile submarines may
present a strategic threat com-
parable to that of the US Polaris
fleet and be able to operate with
less risk of detection than
earlier classes of Soviet mis-
sile submarines.
The introduction of the new
classes of attack submarines
suggests that the Soviets are
attempting to come to grips
with the Polaris threat. The
Soviets apparently are counting
on their submarines to help
blunt that threat by attempting
to destroy Polaris submarines
before they cân launch their
missiles.
Soviet ballistic-missile
submarines frequently patrol
within range of US Polaris
bases and could destroy a num-
ber of Polaris submarines by
attacking these bases. The
new Soviet attack submarines
may be able to locate and de-
stroy a few Polaris submarines
in confined waters through which
those submarines frequently
must pass, such as the Irish
Sea or the Sicilian Straits.
Combined operations with new
Soviet surface ships, such as
the Moskva-class helicopter car-
riers and Kresta- and Kashin-
class guided-missile ships,
will provide some antisubmarine
capability in the ocean approaches
Page 2
TOP SECRET TRINE
SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68
TOP SECRET TRINE
The Soviet Submarine Force
Severomorsk
Kaliningrady
Sevastopol
• Fleet Headquarters
Nuclear-powered
Ballistic missile
Cruise missile
Attack
Northern Fleet
Baltic Fleet
Black Sea Fleet
16
201
9
0
0
14
0
0
174
Diesel-powered
Ballistic missile
18
Cruise missile
11
Attack
91
-38
1
64
32
152
65
890700
6
Vladivostok
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES
280
335
Y-CLASS
Nuclear powered
Carries 16 SS-N-6 missiles in huli
425 feet long
Now being deployed
H-CLASS
Nuclear powered
Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in sail
380 feet long
9 in service
758
G-CLASS
Diesel powered
Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in sail
320 feet long
22 in service
91849 8-68 CIA
TOP SECRET TRINE
Z-CONVERSION CLASS
Diesel powered
Carries two SS-N-4 missiles in sail
295 feet long
6 in service
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Pacific Fleet
TOP SECRET TRINE
No Foreign Dissem
CLASSES OF SOVIET SUBMARINES
Nuclear Powered
Diesel Powered
Ballistic Missile
Y.
Ballistic Missile
G
H
Z Conversion
Cruise Missile
E-1
Cruise Missile
E-11
W Conversion
Attack
N
Attack
F
V
C
R
One New Class "B"
91870 8-68 CIA
ONIZENRW
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
RELEASABLE TO UK AND CANADA
to the USSR and in the Mediter-
ranean.
Deployment Patterns
Soviet submarines are as-
signed to each of the four
fleets--Northern, Pacific, Bal-
tic, and Black Sea. Because
of the restricted exits from
the Baltic and Black Seas, how-
ever, most of the missile-
equipped units and all of the
nuclear-powered units are based
in ice-free ports of the Kola
Peninsula (Northern Fleet) and
in the Pacific Fleet.
The Soviets are apparently
trying to reduce the dispropor-
tion between the two major
fleets--the Northern and the
Pacific. Although the North-
ern Fleet still holds the favored
position, several nuclear sub-
marines have been transferred
under the polar ice to the Pa-
cific and a number of modern
diesel units have joined the
Northern Sea Route convoy in
past summers.
The Baltic Fleet is re-
sponsible for protecting Soviet
coastal waters and for furnish-
ing diesel submarines for pa-
trols off the US Polaris base
at Holy Loch. Moscow has also
begun sending Baltic Fleet sub-
marines to the Mediterranean to
take some of the strain off the
Northern Fleet, which has been
furnishing most of the units
operating there. There are no
nuclear submarines in the Bal-
tic, and the few cruise-missile
units there operate in coastal
waters.
-
The Montreux Convention
of 1936 places severe limita-
tions on the passage of Soviet
submarines through the Turkish
Straits. Black Sea based
submarines can pass into the
Mediterranean only if they are
headed for another fleet area
for repairs. For this reason,
only older diesel units are
based in the Black Sea. Once
in the Mediterranean, however,
these units operate there for
about 60 days on their way to
and from Baltic shipyards.
Patrol Activity
Most of the increase in
the level of Soviet submarine
operations during the past year
is attributable to the station-
ing of a force of six to ten
submarines--mostly diesel attack
units--in the Mediterranean since
TOP SECRET TRINE
Page 4
SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68
TOP SECRET TRINE
No Foreign Dissem
June 1967; at least one nuclear
unit is usually included in
the force. There was an over-
all increase of nearly 20 per-
cent in the number of Soviet
submarine patrols beyond local
fleet operating areas in 1967,
but if the trend noted so far
this year continues, fewer sub-
marines will deploy in 1968.
Patrols this year have been of
longer duration, however,
thereby resulting in more sub-
marine time at sea.
Soviet
Submarine Deployments
1965-1968
No confirmed patrols by
H-class ballistic-missile units
have been noted since late 1966,
and there have been periods dur-
ing the past year when no Soviet
ballistic-missile submarines
have been on patrol in either
the Atlantic or Pacific. The
G-class is the only such sub-
marine now being used for mid-
ocean patrols.
Conversion and overhaul
of first-generation ballistic-
Total 138
Total 116
Total 102
16
14
2
0
1965
1966
NORTH
Total 114
77
33
15
20
9
10
1967
1968
✓ BLACK
☐ BALTIC
Number of deployed units, not including routine interfleet transfers or fleet exercise participants.
91946 9-68 CIA
PACIFIC
TOP SECRET TRINE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
RELEASABLE TO UK AND CANADA
Page 5
TOP SECRET TRINE
SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68
TOP SECRET TRINE
No Foreign Dissem
i
In
missile submarines and the re-
assignment of their crews to
new Y-class units have probably
been at least partly responsible
for the decline in ballistic-
missile submarine activity.
addition, the loss of a G-class
submarine in the Pacific in mid-
March apparently resulted in a
three-month standdown in patrols
by these units. That incident
probably caused the Soviets to
implement new safety measures.
Moreover, as the Soviets prepare
to deploy new Y-class submarines,
they may be reassessing the
military value of sending their
diesel-powered units into the
mid-Atlantic and mid-Pacific
patrol areas.
Until mid-1967, E-class
cruise-missile submarines con-
ducted regular patrols in the
Atlantic. Since June 1967,
patrol activity in the Atlantic
has diminished; however, a
series of single E-class units
has been almost continuously
present in the Mediterranean.
Some of the submarines on re-
cent patrols have also engaged
in other activities such as
hydroacoustic research and
support of naval training ma-
neuvers. J-class diesel-powered
cruise-missile submarines ap-
parently have been used primarily
for peripheral defense.
In
late 1966, the first of these
units to venture into the
Mediterranean broke down and
limped back to its base in the
Northern Fleet. Some of the
older W-class units are equipped
to launch cruise missiles, but
these, too, operate only near
Soviet shores and probably are
being retired from service.
Recent patrols by diesel
attack submarines in the Medi-
terranean have been extended
to as long as six months through
the use of Arab and Yugoslav
ports for upkeep, reprovision-
ing, and crew recreation. Pre-
vious patrols by Soviet sub-
marines in the Mediterranean
had lasted less than two months.
Last year, a submarine
support group operated for nearly
six months off the west coast
of Africa in a program to study
the feasibility of submarine
operations from a floating base.
The group consisted of a sub-
marine tender and a missile
supply ship, and was assisted
briefly by a survey vessel and
two intelligence collection
ships. Several other ships
provided logistic support. Four
submarines participated in the
group's operations. One of
these--a nuclear-powered unit--
was away from home waters for
more than six months.
Once the new ballistic-mis-
sile submarines go on patrol,
the Soviets may make greater
use of such floating support bases
on the high seas. Floating base
ships would be vulnerable in
TOP SECRET TRINE
Page 6
SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68

300 nm
line
TOP SECRET TRINE
1500 nm range
(Covers al US)
650 nmrange
Soviet
PATROL
Submarine-Launched
Missiles
100 fathom line
US
DESIGNATION
IOC
OPERATIONAL
RANGE
WARHEAD
WEIGHT
CRUISE
MISSILE
SS-N-3
1961
250 NM
1,000-
2,000 lbs.
BALLISTIC
MISSILES
SS-N-4
1960
300 NM
About
2,200 lbs
SECRET
NO FOREIGN
DISSEM
4
SS-N-5
1963
650 NM
1,600-
2,400 lbs
SS-N-6
Probably
1968
1,500 NM
700-
1,700 lbs
TOP SECRET TRINE
TOP SECRET TRINE
REMARKS
Carried by E-I and E-II-
class nuclear submarines
and by J-class diesel units.
A few W-class diesel torpedo
attack submarines were modified
to carry this missile. Surface
launched.
Carried by most G-class
diesel submarines and by
some H-class nuclear units.
A few Z-class diesel torpedo
attack submarines were
modified to carry this missile.
Surface launched.
Carried by most H-class
nuclear submarines and by
some G-class diesel units.
Underwater launched.
Probably intended for the
new Y-class nuclear sub-
marines. These 16-tube
Polaris-type units first
went into service in
mid-1968.
TOP SECRET TRINE
No Foreign Dissem
wartime, but ballistic-missile
submarines operating from such
bases south of the Azores, for
example, could remain on-station
off the US coast longer than
could units deployed from the
Kola area. Cruise-missile and
attack submarines would also
profit from mid-ocean bases,
reducing the number of long
transits to and from patrol
areas.
The USSR recently has
achieved several technological
advances in submarine support.
New and more powerful radio
transmitters serving submarines
on distant patrols are now in
A navi-
operation in the USSR.
gation satellite system cur-
rently being tested may permit
Soviet submarines to determine
their positions with greater
accuracy even in the most un-
favorable weather and sea con-
ditions. Hydroacoustic re-
search ships have conducted
surveys in the past few years
in areas of the Atlantic and
Pacific where the Soviets might
hope to detect Polaris subma-
rines and in the Canary Island
Basin and Philippine Sea where
they may intend to operate their
own submarines. (TOP SECRET TRINE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK AND
CANADA)
☑
(
*
*
Page 8
TOP SECRET TRINE
SPECIAL REPORT 13 Sep 68
v9.1
JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date:
3/6/2018
Agency Information
AGENCY: LBJ
177-10002-10105
RECORD NUMBER:
RECORD SERIES : NSF, CF, USSR, VOL. 21, BOX 226
1
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM:
TO:
Document Information
TITLE:
SPECIAL REPORT--WEEKLY REVIEW
DATE:
PAGES:
09/13/1968
11
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Top Secret
Consulted; Mandatory Review Material
Redact
07/06/1994
DOC. #57
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