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RECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10018
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Date: 08/15/92
Page: 1
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TITLE :
SSCI TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 11, 1975, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL
DATE: 06/11/75
PAGES: 135
SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/29/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS:
SSCI Box 231, Folder 5, Testimony of Richard Bissell
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1 to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, until
after I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962.
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Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probably
with Bundy and Rostow the capability in developing more
capability of assassinations. And you may have discussed
it in the context of various potential targets without
deciding on them. Once you decided on a target, or you were
going to recommend a target, what was the process of getting
clearance?
Mr. Bissell. I can't answer you that, simply because
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no specific target was ever recommended.
And to the best
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of my knowledge and belief, other than the case we have discussed
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at length of Castro, which in time preceded the SRRIFLE pro-
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ject. The issue of obtaining clearance never arose. I
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can speculate on how that would have worked if you wish.
Senator Mondale. No.
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The Chairman. Let's go ahead then with the questions.
Mr. Schwarz. Senator Baker asked, did Helms succeed you?
Mr. Bissell. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz.
Did you turn over SRRIFLE to him and
did you tell him about it?
Mr. Bissell.
I believe I did. And I also believe
that Mr. Harvey told him about it promptly after the turnover.
Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a man called Justin O'Donnell?
Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do.
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Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him in words or substance to
kill Mr. Lumumba?
Mr. Bissell. I asked him to investigate the possibility
and to make explanation for so doing.
Mr. Schwarz. When did you do that?
Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may
have it on a chronology here, but I imagine that is a matter
of record, or that he has testified to that date. I don't
remember the date.
Mr. Schwarz.
Did you tell him this connection with
making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?
Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did.
Mr. Schwarz.
Did he tell you he wouldn't do it?
Mr. Bissell. Later he told me that he didn't want to
do it. But he also said that he thought it was an inappro-
priate action, and that the desired object could be accom-
plished better in other ways.
Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized you to tell Mr. O Donnell
to take steps to move toward assassinating Mr. Lumumba?
Mr. Bissell.
Nobody.
Mr. Schwarz. Did you inform the White House of that?
Mr. Bissell. No.
Mr. Schwarz. To the best of your knowledge, did anybody
inform the White House of that?
Mr. Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, no.
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Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr.
Lumumba?
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Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. I
told a member of the clandestine service to make plans and
develop the capability so to do if it were approved and
ordered.
Senator Goldwater. Approved by who?
Mr. Bissell. It would have then had to have approval
at the highest level of government.
The Chairman. Where did the idea come from?
Mr. Bissell. I don't remember, Mr. Chairman.
It could
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possibly have been mine.
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The Chairman. It could possibly have been yours?
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Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rostow that was your initiative?
Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruction as to
O'Donnell was my initiative.
Senator Baker. How many others did you plan on, just
a contingency?
How many other people did you instruct to draw up plans
to assassinate?
Mr. Bissell. I don't believe there were any others which
went to the point of instructing that a man be prepared.
Senator Baker. How many were there that didn't go that
How many murders did you contemplate?
Mr. Bissell.
Well, Senator
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quoting a cable concerning the asset WIROGUE, who was sent
to the Congo in the fall of 1960.
The Chairman. Mr. Bissell, the memorandum to which
counsel has referred reads as follows:
"In recommending the agent or asset ROGUE, the Chief
6 (of Station, Leopoldville, the Chief of the Agency's African
Division, probably Bronson Tweedy, wrote in late 1960:
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'He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong,
but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong
in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case offi-
cer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he
will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution
without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize
all actions'".
Is that fairly representative of the philosophy that
applied to such matters at the time?
Mr. Bissell. Well, it certainly applied within the
range of matters that would have come under SRRIFLE.
Could I say, Mr. Chairman, that I know of no way in
which it is possible to operate a secret intelligence agency
or a secret service unless it has at least a number of
employees who are willing to and can be depended upon to
carry out orders involving acts of this sort.
The Chairman.
That assumes, of course, that the
United States ought to assassinate foreign leaders.
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meant to suggest that that was entirely comparable?
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Mr. Bissell. It was not meant to suggest that it was
entirely comparable, but the individual whom I have mentioned
were all perceived in their time and place as menaces to
their own countries and the U.S. interests.
Senator Goldwater. Might I ask a question based on his
experience?
From my readings in trying to learn more about intelli-
gence, I gathered the impression that the actions such as
you have been describing up to and including assassination,
are practiced by every intelligence organization that have
been studying, is that correct?
Mr.Bissell. That is my impression likewise, Senator.
Senator Goldwater.
Including England?
Mr. Bissell. I believe so. In fact, I think definitely
it has been used by MI6. I couldn't give you specific
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Senator Goldwater. Certainly KGB.
Mr. Bissell. Certainly the KGB
although as, the Chair-
man pointed out the other day, I at least cannot point to
any case where the KGB has carried out the assassination of
a chief of state.
Senator Goldwater. Would you assume that in the cases
of those other countries that this ruler would have knowledge
of this in every case?
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Mr.Bissell. In the case specifically of the U.K.,
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I would answer in the affirmative. I also believe, however,
that the Chief of the Intelligence Service of any one of those
countries would flatly deny that the chief of state had
knowledge of such action.
Senator Goldwater. Thank you.
Senator Baker. Would you deny it?
Mr. Bissell. In our case here?:
Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bissell. Yes, it would be appropriate to do so.
Senator Baker. Have you done so?
Mr. Bissell. I have not had occasion to, because I am
unaware of any high level assassination that occurred by
the U.S.
Senator Baker. Doesn't that amount to a denial?
Mr. Bissell. It is a denial that any has occurred,
at least in the period that I am aware of.
Mr. Schwarz. Was your answer to Senator Baker meant to
indicate that you would perjure yourself on this matter?
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Senator Baker.
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The question was, very simply, would
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you try to protect the President in such a case as you des-
Mr. Bissell. It depends a little bit on the context.
There are occasions when I would go a long way to protect the
President of the United States from certain kinds of embarrass-
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cribed, MI6 or otherwise?
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Mr.Bissell. I can conceive of so doing, Senator.
Senator Tower. May I pursue that just a moment further?
You might say one thing in sworn testimony before a
committee like this, but say another thing publicly, is that
what you mean?
Mr. Bissell. That is exactly what I mean.
The Chairman. Have you lied to this committee?
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Mr. Bissell. No, sir.
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The Chairman. Would you lie to this committee?
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Mr. Bissell. No, sir.
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Senator Tower. I think that distinction has to be made.
I think I would have lied about the U-2 myself!
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The Chairman.
Shall we proceed with the questions?
Mr. Schwarz.
The remaining topic I have is Trujillo.
It is respectfully indicated, and involves a lot of documents.
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And we have some procedural matters that we need to take up.
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I know we can't finish Trujillo before 12:30, and I would
suggest that we ask the witness and whatever Senators that
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can return to come back this afternoon on Trujillo.
The Chairman. We have a Senate order that there will
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be no further committee meetings this afternoon.
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I doubt that we can obtain unanimous consent.
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almost any kind of paramilitary operation, such as the
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operation that has been discussed in the press in Iran
and
which resulted in the ouster of Mossedeg and the return of the
Shah, there is an expectation that such operations will involve
military or semimilitary action, and that some people will lose
their lives in the process.
Senator Baker. Yes, but I am speaking rather more
precisely of a single person or a group of people who were
targeted, or discussions were held about targeting them, for
what would be an assassination were it not for the legal
significance of the term.
Mr. Bissell. I don't think I remember any cases in
which that sort of matter was discussed or was the subject
of planning, other than the ones which have already been
mentioned in testimony.
point.
Senator Mathias. Could I interject a question at this
But of course that contemplates what we have seen in
the earlier testimony, that when you begin an operation
and I think this was the history of the Castro operation
to in some way incompacitate him politically, that it often
moves to the extreme of incapacitating him physically, isn't
that true?
Mr. Bissell. That is correct, sir.
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AFTERNOON SESSION
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2:17
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D)
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning
It will be understood that the oath still continues to
Mr. Schwarz.
Before we turn to Trujillo, two quick
questions. On the subject of Sukarno, were you involved in
the making of the movie in whi an actor was made up to look
Like Sukarno, and her engaged in sexual activity, with the
proposal, the plan, being that that movie would be released:
in Indonesia?
Mr. Bissell. I have no recollection of that.
Mr. Schwarz. And if I took out any of the details and
broke it apart you would have no recollection?
Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.
Mr.
Schwarz. And the second thing, to pin down on Mr.
Helms, did you brief him about the Mafia matter?
Mr. Bissell. I am reasonably clear that I did not brief
And my
him in the early stages, that is to say, in 1960.
impression is that he may very well not have been briefed on it
until I was about to leave the Agency in early 1962.
Mr. Schwarz. But at that point you did brief him?_?
Mr. Bissell. I don't remember whether I personally
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they might eventually be so used.
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Mr. Schwarz. Is that a supposition, or is it based upon
any recollection?
Mr. Bissell. I would say it is a faint recollection.
But I find it very difficult in this case to distinguish
between an element of supposition and a dim recollection.
Let me come to what I seem to remember about this matter.
There was,
as you have already indicated, several discussions
in the Special Group, and one or more at least in other very
small groups with representation from State, the White House
and the Agency. And I am clear I do recollect that the
plans at that time contemplated the arming of obviously a
relatively small group inside the Dominican Republic, that is,
the provision of arms perhaps for a dozen or so people, but
not for something like a Bay of Pigs invasion or a major
geurilla activity.
Now, in discussing that kind of an operation, I am
perfectly certain that everyone that participated in the
discussion was clear that weapons so supplied might very well
be used against Trujillo or other senior supporters of his.
Mr. Schwarz. For how many countries in your experience
at the CIA has the US Government supplied arms to dissident
groups within the country?
Mr. Bissell. Well, we have talked about two cases;
Indonesia is another case during the time I was in the Agency,
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or before I was DDP. Off hand I can't remember other cases,
but there may have been some. Well, earlier before I was ever
in the Agency, there was the case of Iran. And there was the
reasonably well publicized case of Guatamala.
Mr. Schwarz. And the Iron Curtain countries?
Mr. Bissell. I think we have.
Mr.
Schwarz. But what I am driving at, it is fairly
common to supply arms to dissident elements in countries all
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over the world?
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Mr. Bissell. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. Does taht also imply that there is an
assassination contemplated or not?
Mr. Bissell. I would say definitely not, in most cases
not. In a large scale operation like Guatamala there was
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no intention of any assassination. I think you would include
it under that term.
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The same is true in Iran of course the possibility
that a chief of state would be killed.
The Chairman. But you would distinguish this matter from
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just supplying of arms to dissidents?
In other words, there
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was an element of knowledge here that the arms were supplied
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for a purpose, and that that purpose might well be the assassi-
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nation of Trujillo or other highly placed people in this
Government, correct?
Mr. Bissell. The way I would prefer to state it, Senator,
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I think is basically consistent with what you said. I would
say that in the planning of this operation, and in the approval
process, those involved would probably have given a higher
probability to such use being made of the weapons than they
would in some of the other operations that I have referred to.
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Mr. Schwarz. However, just focusing on the Special
Group as of the 12th of January, you can't tell from the
minutes which state of mind existed, but you have a faint
recollection that the more targeted state of mind existed as of
the 12th of January?
Mr. Bissell. My impression is that as of that time, as
I mentioned at the end of the testimony this morning, the
reason that the State Department, and probably the Agency's
representatives in the Special Group, favored this group was
a pragmatic reason. It was to maintain and strengthen political
ties with the dissidents:
Mr. Schwarz. The next matter of record that we should
focus on is a memorandum of January 25, 1961, apparently
reflecting a discussion of Project EMDEED. Was EMDEED the
code for the overthrow of Trujillo?
Mr. Bissell. I suspect it was the code name for the
project of support to the dissidents.
Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember the name EMSLEW?
I show you the memorandum of January 24, 1961 headed
"Discussion of Project EMDEED Does it appear to be a
"
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and this record, which is a record we have obtained from
the Agency, may be unfair to you. But do you not agree
that on this record it appears that on the item of the pass-
ing of the weapons which were the weapons that were in fact
used, it appears that the AGency elected to keep the State
Department uninformed on that item?
Mr. Bissell. No, sir, it does not quite appear that way.
if I put these two together
It appears
Mr. Schwarz. By these two you mean your cable of March
24 and the cable of May 1 relating to certain matters is
not to be discussed with the State Department?
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Mr. Bissell. Yes.
The earlier cable of those refers to
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Mr. Schwarz. And to the pouching of revolvers?
Mr. Bissell. And the pouching of revolvers. And
I believe that what eventually passed to the dissidents
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of these cables in fact refers to the passage to the dissi-
dents out of U⚫K.'s control
This cable states the conditional willingness at some
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That permission
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It refers to pouching revolvers. And I don't
know whether there was a record that those were ever passed,
or even intended to be passed, to the dissidents.
And it would
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