176-10033-10151
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY: NARA
RECORD NUMBER: 176-10033-10151
RECORD SERIES: Church Committee
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM
Bissell
TO Bundy, McGeorge
TITLE: Briefing Paper/Dominican Republic
DATE: 2/17/1961
PAGES: 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE: Paper, Textual
CLASSIFICATION: Declassified
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 3/28/2001
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Per your
quest
NO. 10.101 JAN 1952
UNDY
RICHARD M. BISSEL
17 February 1961.
SANITIZED
(DATE)
MK. 98.84 5/04
SECRET
BRIEFING PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
I. Situation
Following the break in diplomatic relations in August 1960
U.S./Dominican relations have worsened steadily, and the anti-U. S. sentiment
of the GODR was brought sharply into focus by the appearance of pickets
outside our consulate on 5 January in protest against the OAS vote to
extend trade sanctions against the Dominican Republic. The pickets
bore signs condemning the interventionist policy of the U. S. and calling
for the expulsion of Consul General Dearborn, whom they labeled a spy.
The Dominican radio and press continued to censure President Eisenhower
as being responsible for the present state of affairs, while maintaining
a reserve concerning President Kennedy, apparently adopting a "wait and see"
attitude, although it has previously expressed some reservations regarding
the President's choice of advisers on Latin America.
On 26 January the GODR ordered the expulsion of U. S. Vice Consul
James A. McNamara on the ground that he was making derogatory remarks
about the country; however, it is probable that this expulsion was in
retaliation and anger over the belief that the U. S. had provided information
to Venezuela on Trujillo's efforts to overthrow or assassinate President
Batencourt.
It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the
sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U. S. Congress in
March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U. S./Dominican relations.
Some say that the Trujillo government cannot last another six months if
they do not get their share of the Cuban windfall sugar; and rumors are
circulating in Ciudad Trujillo that if they are deprived of the windfall
the GODR plans to expropriate American properties and terminate U. S.
consular relations.
II Operational Summary
A. General It will be recalled that on 24 January 1961 the
Special Group authorized the Agency to provide dissident exiled Dominican
groups with limited arms and equipment provided their delivery to elements
within the Dominican Republic was effected by Dominicans. Immediately
following this decision we indicated to witting leaders of the VRD
(BETANCOURT
ORNES Group) and the FCR (Internal Dissident
Group withwhom DEARBORN is in touch) that we were prepared to provide them
a limited supply of arms and equipment provided they developed the
capability to introduce same into the Dominican Republic.
-
FIGUERES
-
On 27 January Station Caracas was authorized to inform
President BETANCOURT the U. S. is now providing financial support and
technical guidance to VRD activities directed by Horacio ORNES,
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specifically for ship repairs, recruiting and training crews, locating
sites and facilities for future PM activities, strengthening the political
organization of the VRD and propaganda. On 30 January Station Caracas
was authorized to inform BETANCOURT that Headquarters was prepared
to consider providing arms and equipment to any bona fide resistance element
with whom adequate contact can be established. BETANCOURT was to be
encouraged to recommend any new individuals or groups he considered useful
to further objectives of the project. Station Caracas reported that President
. EETANCOURT was gratified to receive the above information.
In Headquarters contact with FCR exiled leaders, they disclosed
their plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they were
provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation
devices. They also claimed to have a small boat infil-exfil capability.
On the other hand the VRD, while claiming no internal organization, claimed
a sea and air capability and are the chosen instruments of President
BETANCOURT and Jose FIGUERES.
B. Frente Civica Revolucionaria (FCR)
(1) We have recently been in touch with key exiled leaders of
the FCR and they have expressed a willingness to assemble a small cadre
in Puerto Rico. It is contemplated that they will develop maritime
capability, be in touch with their internal counterparts through
W/T facilities, and develop plans for implementing the internal group's
plan of action. In view of their reluctance to deal directly with the
ORNES Group (VRD) and in the interests of security we plan to keep
them compartmented for the time being.
(2) Through our Station in Ciudad Tujillo we are attempting
to ascertain the details of the FCR's plan of action and develop a stay-
behind communication capability.
C. Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD
(1) We are actively supporting the VRD (the ORNES group) in
repairing and outfitting their yacht so as to develop an arms delivery
capability. It is estimated that it will take from 45 to 60 days to complete
this work. Additional time may be needed to recruit and train a crew.
(2) Support is also being given to the VRD's propaganda and
organizational activities. A program is being developed with the hope that
the VRD can develop their own contacts and sources of information within
the Dominican Republic.
D. Possibility of Developing a Boycott Capability
(1) During the summer of 1960 WH Division made use of Fernando
MUNIZ Silva, Dominican exile in Puerto Rico and at the time head or the
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Syndicate of Free Dominican Labor in Exile (SLTDE), to organize picketing
activities in San Juan against Ships carrying cargo to or from the
Dominican Republic. The picketing had some success and showed promise of
becoming a threat to the Dominican economy, but was finally broken up by
the International Longshoremens Association (ILA), at least one officer
of which was reportedly in the pay of Trujillo.
(2) Inasmuch as the ILA has recently abrogated its contract
with the Dominican unions under pressure from George Meany it is felt that
now would be a good time to consider resumption of picketing activities. in
San Juan, in the hope that such action might spark similar activities in
other ports. Trujillo has demonstrated an awareness of the importance of
smooth labor relations in foreign ports and it is felt that a blow
at this time from international labor would do much to bring the
.dictator to his knees.
(3)
It should be noted that the Department of State last summer
disapproved any approach to U. S. unions on this subject. WHD feels
that perhaps this announced policy should now be reviewed in the light of
more recent developments and an attempt be made, through covert channels
if necessary, to build up an international shipping boycott against the
GODR.
III Conclusions
(1) In many respects initial talks with FCR and VRD leaders
reveal that they over-estimate their own capabilities. Neither has an
immediate capability to introduce arms into the area or a firm plan of action.
(2) That we have indicated to both organizations our willingness
to help has been a boost to their morale and has also precipitated a
noticeable withdrawal from earlier claims of "all we need is arms and a
little help and we can do the job".
While sources
(3) Recent reports on internal conditions in the Dominican
Republic clearly point out that the country is rapidly approaching a
stage of complete economic paralysis, a situation that has created
feelings of tension and desperation, not only among the opposition
elements but within the ranks of the Trujillo clique itself.
within the middle class express fears of eventual liquidation of that
class by the dictator and his son Ramfis, it is not likely that Trujillo
will move until he lears of the outcome in late March 1961 of congressional
action on the windfall sugar quota. If such action is favorable to
Trujillo, it is probable that he will continue to rule uneasily for an
indefinite period unless material outside pressure is brought to bear
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against him. If, however, his windfall is taken from him, it is the
firm opinion of this Division that a violent reaction on his part will
shortly thereafter be felt which will end either with the liquidation of
Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll-up of the internal opposition.
While the organization of delivery capabilities described elsewhere in this
memorandum is proceeding according to schedule, it is now feared that
these capabilities will not be ready for use until the appropriate time,
i.e., prior to 1 April, has passed and until there may no longer exist
internal assets with which to deal. WH Division, therefore, recommends
that consideration: be given to the immediate use of sea capabilities
now employed by WH/4 to cache the requested arms and other material
on land areas contiguous to the Dominican coast from whence, as informed
FCR elements claim they can do, infiltration of the arms can be carried
cut by members of the internal FCR by the use of fishing vessels.
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