180-10131-10325
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER:
180-10131-10325
JFK Assassination System
Identification orm
Agency Information
RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
014725
Document Info:mation
ORIGINATOR :
HSCA
FROM:
TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH
TO:
TITLE:
DEPOSITION OF BERNARD HUGH TOVAR..
DATE:
PAGES:
06/29/1978
48
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
CIA, METHODOLOGY
TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH, TEST IMONY BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE
OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIO ), DEFECTION TO RUSSIA
TRANSCRIPT
Top Secret
3
Redact
03/26/1997
COMMENTS:
Box 5
v9.1
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TESTIMONY OF:
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Bernard Hugh Tovar
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ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY
Thursday, June 29, 1978
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U. S. House of Representatives,
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D. C.
9 Deposition of:
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BERNARD HUGH TOVAR
11 called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee,
12 pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room 3370,
13 Second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at
14 2:00 o'clock p.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Public
15 in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf
16 of the respective parties:
17 For the Subcommittee:
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MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ. Staff Counsel
ELIZABETH WOLF
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For the Deponent:
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(There was representation by counsel)
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TESTIMONY OF HUGH TOVAR
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Mr. Goldsmith.
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State your name for the record.
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Mr. Tovar. I sign my name B. Hugh. My full name is
Bernard Hugh Tovar.
Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, my name is Michael Goldsmith,
Senator Staff Counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations
I have been designated by the Committee to take your deposition
today.
You are here voluntarily today?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. You have the right to have counsel present.
Do you waive that right?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read a copy of the Committee's
supporting resolution?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Have you had a chance to read Rule Number
4?
Mr. Tovar. I have.
The Committee rules provide for the tran-
script of a deposition to be made available to a witness and
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Mr. Goldsmith.
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the Committee a statement.
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actually be delivered for retention by any witness that gives
However, by virtue of the arrange-
ment that the Committee has worked out with the CIA, the Agency:
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has asked us to request Agency employees testifying before us
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to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the transcript.
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The reason for that is because the transcript frequently
will contain classified information and the Agency prefers for
that information to be kept in our secure area here. So I
,
would like to ask you to waive your right to receive a copy of
your statement but in so doing, I want to assure you that you
will be given a right to review the transcript for accuracy,
o make comment upon it and if necessary, to give an additional
statement.
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Mr. Tovar. I agree.
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Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you that the court
reporter will provide you with a transcript and the transcript.
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will be certified by the reporter as a complete, accurate and
true record of all the testimony that you give here today.
Now, you are employed by the CIA, is that correct?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. I had given you earlier a copy of a letter,
dated 23 March 1978 from Mr. Carlucci to the Chairman of this
Committee. Have you had a chance to read that letter?
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Mr.
Tovar. I have.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Do you understand it?
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Mr. Tovar. I understand it.
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Mr. Goldsmith. Then I think we are ready to proceed to
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the substance of the questioning.
What is your present position
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with the CIA?
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Mr. Tovar. I am the Chief of the Counterintelligence
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Staff of the Directorate o: Operations.
Mr. Goldsmith.
capacity?
How long have you been working in that
Mr. Tovar. Ever since a year ago April.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Agency?
How long have you been working with the
Mr. Tovar. Thirty years.
Mr. Goldsmith.
What was your assignement prior to becom-
ing Chief of the CI Staff?
Mr. Tovar. I was recently returned from overseas where
was Station Chief in Bangkok and three years before that,
Chief of the Station in Laos.
Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to assuming your position as Chief
14 of the CI Staff had you had extensive experience in the area of
IS
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counterintelligence?
Mr. Tovar. No, not particularly.
We don't as a rule
I do not consider
specialize. We are normally generalists.
18' myself a counterintelligence expert.
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Mr. Goldsmith. During the years 1959 to '63 what position
did you occupy with the Agency?
Mr. Tovar. In 1959 I was Chief of Station in Kuala
Lumpur in Malaysia.
In 1920, I came back and I was originally Deputy Chief and
then Chief of the Branch ir. Far East Division which controls
operations in the Phillipires, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia,
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New Zealand, and Oceania. That was until 1964.
Mr. Goldsmith.
:
Have you had a chance to review CIA
document number 1817 and the pages that follow it?
Mr. Tovar. Yes, I have read these. I had not read these.
They were released by one of my subordinates, Mr. Friedlander.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Are you telling us that today is the first
chance you had to read them?
Mr. Tovar. I did not read them this time. They went to
you, to the Committee but I have since read them.
Mr. Goldsmith. They were prepared by whom?
Mr. Tovar. Jack Friedlander, Chief of Operations.
They
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were signed by him, not prepared by him. They would have been
originated probably by Mr. Kowalski or Mr. Bradley, I am not
sure which. I think Kowal:ski almost certainly.
Mr.
Goldsmith. The memorandum which is labeled CIA No.
1817 was a response by the Agency to an inquiry by the
Committee as to whether it was standard operating procedure for
the Agency to debrief what in effect were repatriated defectors.
19 I believe it is fair to say by way of summary that the memo
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says that it was not in fact standard operating procedure
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during the years 1959 to '63 to debrief such individuals. Is
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that correct?
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Mr. Tovar.
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Insofar as I understand it. My knowledge is
limited to what I see here before me in the paper. During this
period in question I was not involved, so I didn't know what
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the current policy was then.
What I have been told since by those who should know is
that there was no policy as set forth here.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the criteria were for
selecting the 117 individuals whose files were reviewed?
Mr. Tovar. No. I think someone mentioned the other day
that the names were incorporated in a memorandum I think ori-
ginionally by the FBI but would not certify to that.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Mr. Tovar, since you have no direct
knowledge as to the manner in which this memo was prepared and,
for example, you don't know the criteria that was used for
choosing these 117 people, I am not going to ask you questions
pertaining to that document. I would like to request that you
communicate with the Office of Legislative Counsel at the
Agency and tell them the individual who was involved in the
actual direct preparation of the document so that I could spend
some time with him.
Mr. Tovar. The document, of course, is over my signature,
so I stand behind the document. I am responsible for what
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was said there. If it is incorrect then I am incorrect in
leeting that document out. I have no personal first hand know-
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ledge of the research he did to arrive at the conclusion here
which he presented to me and I endorsed.
24 behind it but I will give you his name.
I am prepared to stand
Mr. Goldsmith. I wan: to ask you some questions about theị
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document. CIA no. 1818 indicates that CI Staff has completed a
review of the files of 117 US persons who had "defected" to
the USSR between 1959 and 63 and since returned to the United
States. Is that correct?
Mr.
Tovar. Yes.
'58 to '63?
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Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review the statement
under the name Thomas Morridian M-O-R-R-I-D-I-A-N.
While you
read that paragraph, I will state for the record that the way
the memo is set forth it indicates that it was not standard
operating procedure to deb::ief such individuals, that of 117
people whose files were reviewed only ten were debriefed.
Then it proceeds to list the ten individuals who in fact were
debriefed.
I have now requested Mr. Tovar to read the first summary
which is right next to the name of the first person who was
debriefed.
Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.
Mr.
Goldsmith.
When did that individual defect?
Mr. Tovar. 1947 is the year he went to the USSR. I
assume that is the year he defected, if that is the term.
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Mr. Goldsmith. So that in fact that individual was not
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someone who defected between 1958 and 1963?
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Mr. Tovar. That is correct.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Let us look at the next individual under
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B, Joseph Marshall.
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Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.
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When did Mr. Marshall defect?
Mr. Tovar. It is not clear. He was born in the US in
1897. He said he was employed in Hawaii in 1921.
There is no
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indication whence he went to the USSR.
Mr. Goldsmith. There is no indication he defected between
'58 and '63?
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Mr. Tovar. No.
He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945.
Conceivably he might have ‹lefected after that.
Mr. Goldsmith. The letter "C", Tommaro S-G-O-V-1-0.
Would you please read that section and tell us when this indi-
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vidual defected?
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Mr. Tovar.
Again, he went to the USSR with his parents
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in the 1930s. No indication when he defected.
He left the
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USSR in 1960. No way of telling.
This individual did not defect between
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Mr. Goldsmith.
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58 and '63?
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Mr. Tovar. At last we have no indication he did. One
would assume to the contrary.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Letter "D", Mary Mackler, will you please
read the first summary and tell us when she defected?
Mr. Tovar.
There is no indication when she defected.
She went to the USSR with her parents in 1931. Sometime after,.
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married a Soviet.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Again, no indication she defected between
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Fred A-S-I-N-I-A-N.
Mr. Tovar.
Would you look at letter "E". Sonia and
When did they defect?
They renounced their US citizenship in 1948.
So I assume that is the operative year.
Mr. Goldsmith. Will you look at the letter "F" now?
Mr. Tovar. Jack Kura.lski.
Mr. Goldsmith.
When did he defect?
Mr. Tovar. He recounced his US citizenship in '34 and
departed USSR I assume in 1934.
Mr. Goldsmith. The point I am trying to make is that the
memo responding to the Committee's inquiry makes reference to
ten individuals who defected between the years '58 and '63.
It then proceed to provide us with ten names. But in fact,
if we continue to look through the list we will see that seven
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Some of them did return during that time period.
Mr. Tovar. And were debriefed.
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Mr. Goldsmith. And were debriefed.
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Mr. Tovar.
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Contacted.
Mr. Goldsmith. Of the ten, perhaps three or four returned
during the relevant time period. I asked those questions
mainly to draw your attention to the fact that the response
given was not really
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Mr. Tovar.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
precisely what you wanted?
Yes.
Mr. Tovar. I don't know the answer to that. I would
assume that the criteria they applied here as best they could
was when did he defect, when did he return, was he debriefed
or contacted? In some cases they hit one out of three, in
other cases two out of three. I think they were giving the
best correlation with your criteria that they could.
Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. My point might be thenį
that the introductory section should not have stated that these
were people in 1958 and '63 when in fact they were not.
Mr. Tovar. You are right. That is an incorrect statement
Is your requesting memo here? That is not a very good state-
ment.
Mr. Goldsmith. Here is the letter dated April 6, 1978
which I show you just for your information to show you what the
Committee was requesting from the Agency. If you will look
under number two.
Mr. Tovar. Then this would appear to correlate with that.
You asked to indicate whether the AGency from '58 to '63
interviewed or debriefed former American defectors.
So, the
time they defected is not the operative consideration.
Mr. Goldsmith. No, it was not.
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The time of the debriefing
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Yes, that would be the focus.
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So these would be at least consistent with that.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Yes, that is true. I would like also for
purposes of further clarification, to have you read the letter
dated May 12, 1978 starting with the second full paragraph.
It is not numbered.
Mr.
Tovar. Yes.
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Mr. Goldsmith. I show you that only for your background
purposes, not to ask you any questions about it. In any event,)
I would appreciate having the name of the individual who
prepared the memo passed along to the Office of the Legislative
Counsel.
Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.
Mr. Goldsmith. The response that was provided to the
Committee
indicates that the CIA had no standard precedure for
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debriefing returning US de:ectors.
What was the basis for that
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policy or actually for the absence of the policy?
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Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate only
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know what mentality of those in charge was at that time.
Mr. Goldsmith.
What would your specilation be?
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Mr. Tovar. I would speculate that the contact with and
debriefing, in effect the supervision of Americans in that
category would be FBI's prerogative and the Agency as a rule
would not have had any basic interest or reason to be involved
unless there were a specific counterintelligence concern.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Does the Agency today have a policy of,
as a matter of routine operating procedure, debriefing return-
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Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.
Mr. Goldsmith. Again would you say you relied on the
FBI to conduct those interviews?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any coordination between the
Agency and the FBI so that the Bureau is informed when someone
in fact is returning?
Mr. Tovar. On American defectors, the type you are speak-
ing of here?
Mr. Goldsmith. An American defector who is repatriated.
Mr. Tovar. I know of no case where they would be
interested in the subject. I can't say there is a procedure
in being. Knowing the way we relate to the FBI, if we knew of
a case of returning Americans, Say we learned it from an
overseas station and it seemed of interest, we would probably
refer it directly to the FBI by letter.
I am speculating here because I know of no case in point.
Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard procedure for contact-
ingthe Bureau and informing them of a returning defector?
Mr. Tovar. Not that : am aware of.
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You would be the person who would be aware
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Mr. Tovar.
Berween the Soviet-East European Division and
CI Staff we should be aware of it. The two were most primarily
concerned with the USSR. I think one or the other of us would
inform the Bureau. This is not our primary concern: The
Americans, even when they have been naughty boys, having gone
to USSR and decided to return, we still don't have necessarily
a professional interest in that type of person.
Mr. Goldsmith. What is the responsibility of the CI Staff
within the CIA?
Mr. Tovar. In a couple of sentences it is a little
difficult. I will tell you what we do. The CI Staff has two
principal areas of activity. We are first of all a staff.
Are you familiar with the staff as opposed to the division?.
Mr. Goldsmith. No, I am not.
Mr. Tovar. You have seen the table of organization of
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DDO?
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Yes.
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Mr. Tovar. You know generally how we are organized?
Mr. Goldsmith.
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Yes.
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Mr. Tovar.
The main set of components of the Directorate
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is divisions and staffs.
The divisions operate a function overt
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seas. We are staff and that is in the military sense we support
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the Directorat and we support the Director, we suppor one
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another in an advisory capacity and in various ways.
So, we
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are not an operating component. We don't run spies.
We have
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a lot of activities which impact on operations but we are not in
the true sense of the term an operating element.
So, having said that, the primary field of activity for
the CI Staff is research and analysis, and then the other,
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what we refer to as operations coordination.
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Now, that is sort)
of the term which does not -- research and analysis is clear.
We examine and analyze cases, essentially cases. We are not
scrutinizing people. We are looking at intelligence operations
old and current, primarily things that are not terribly
current. We don't tend to follow current operations in the
analytic sense. We take old cases and look them over to see
if mistakes were made, to see if we can derive lesssons from
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community at large, all in the R&A field.
On the other side we unction in the sense of a true staff.
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We keep our fingers on the activity of the Directorate overseas
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We monitor what they are doing, not in the sense of being
spooky but we simply read the correspondence. We are given
normal distribution of most: correspondence coming back from
overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence
activities abroad.
To do this, we obviously have to have reasonable currency
on operational activity across the board. So, we are generally
aware of the operational patterns of activity that prevail in
On that basis we are in a position
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various overseas stations.
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to advise the DDO or Directorate as to the level of performance,
the kind of activity conducted; the quality, the proper or
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improper degree of emphasis. We maintain an overview on behalf
of DDO.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is your concentration oriented towards
counterintelligence threats of a foreign nature?
Mr. Tovar. Yes, totally.
Mr. Goldsmith. You would not be concerned at all with
counterintelligence threats domestically?
Mr. Tovar. None whatsoever.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that would be the
responsibility of the Bureau?
Absolutely.
Now, Lee Harvey Oswald returned from the
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Soviet Union in 1962.
While in the Sovietion Union he worked
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as a worker in a radio factory. Upon his return I imagine there
was someone concerned about his being a counterintelligence
threat. Is it fair to say, and I do not want to ask you leading
questions but would it be fair to say that would be more
the responsibility of the Bureau rather than the Agency upon
his actual return?
Mr. Tovar. Yes, the question whether or not he was, let
us say, a counterintelligence threat.
Mr. Goldsmith.
KGB agent?
Mr. Tovar. That would be a Bureau concern, no question
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Mr. Goldsmith.
However, would the Agency make any effort
to interview Osald while Oswald was entroute from the Soviet
Union to the United States?
Mr. Tovar. You are speaking of what the Agency might havej
done in '63 or '62?
Mr. Goldsmith. 162.
Mr. Tovar. Again, we are speculating concerning the
intelligence of the men who were in charge then.
Today I.
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At the time I don't know. I would think, why not. On the
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could, as I assume they did, the Bureau would discharge its
responsibilities vis-a-vis any American of questionable
propensity, I should think they would be deferring to the
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Bureau.
Mr. Goldsmith. That would be the aspect of Oswald where
there was a concern taht he posed a counterintelligence threat.
What about the fact that Oswald may have had positive intelli-
gence information that would have been helpful to the Agency?
That would not be within the jurisdiction of the Bureau?
Mr. Tovar. I think in that context it might have been
appropriate for the Agency, if the assumed the point you made,
to seek an interview with him. I think the appropriate
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vehicle for that would have been the Domestic Contact Division
which I think handled most of the contacts referred to in this
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memorandum.
Mr. Goldsmith. What is the function of the Domestic
Contact Division?
Mr. Tovar. They are responsible for intelligence that
can be checked properly and legally in the United States
normally through American businessmen or American persons and
nonofficials who travel abroad and acquire intelligence of
interest. This is not jus: USSR. It could be any other
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Their primary field of activity is to contact and
debrief on a vluntary basis, if they so choose to respond,
Americans who return from overseas.
Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that the Committee's inquiry
concerning the CI's policy as to returning American defectors
was routed to your staff, CI Staff. When the memo was prepared
17 by the CI Staff for the Committee, was it done with the thought
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of representing the entire agency or just the CI Staff?
Mr. Tovar. It is difficult for us to presume to speak for
the entire Agency. I think on this matter we are speaking for
the Directorate of Operations, not for the entire Agency.
Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. That is really the area with which
I was concerned anyway, Directorate of Operations.
Mr. Tovar. The only other element of the Directorate of
Operations that would be of an interest in this type of thing,
which might be construed as having an interest in this type
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of activity, would be the SC Division. On this I think the
CI staff could be considered as speaking for the Directorate.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Domestic Contact Division part of
the CI Staff?
Mr. Tovar. No, part of the Directorate of Operations.
Mr. Goldsmith. The response of the Agency dated April
20, 1978, which appears in CIA Number 1818, indicates that
contact seems to be based on opportunity and circumstance.
Then it goes on to say only ten of the 117 persons have had
any contact with CIA. Would it be possible for you to go into
more dtail on what is meant by opportunity and circumstance?
Mr. Tovar. In the asecne of a policy, of a guideline, a
procedure, internal instruction which says you will debrief
Americans who return from having resided in the USSR, in the
absence of that, this thing is left to chance obviously. I
cannot explain to you how the names of these 11 passed the desk
of whoever was in charge at the time, but assuming they did,
my guess, and it is really only a guess, would be that the
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person who read that, whatever document it was, would say,
"Hmmph! He looks like he might be interesting", and perhaps
would then get in contact with CCD and suggest if they get in
contact with a person, let us say he is known to be living in
New York, suggest that they might want to seek out his location
and if possible interview him.
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I think it would be a matter of chance in the sense that
the analyst or whoever it was who reviewed that document, might
react, and yet he or she might not, too, depending on how they
woke up that morning. It s sheer whimsy.
7
10
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ia
Mr. Goldsmith. Let me explain to you why the question
whether or not it was standard operating procedure to debrief
returning defectors is important to the Committee.
Since
the assassination of the President, there has arisen a group of
researchers who have reviewed the Warren Commission Report and
have reviewed releases made under the Freedom of Information
Act by the CIA and the FBI.
Having reviewed these materials the argument has been made
that Oswald received unusual treatment at the hands of the CIA.
One example of this unusual treatment is that there is no
record of Oswald having been debriefed by the CIA upon his
return. For that reason, we are focusing on this issue. Is
there any way you can give us guidance on how to respond to
that question?
Mr. Tovar. I can't becuase I am sphculating every step
along the way. I would hesitate to say more than Oswald
simply didn't connect with whoever happened to be looking
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let us assume his name appeared.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
No.
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debriefed.
Was his namde in the list?
That is the list of people who were
2s
Mr. Tovar. One hundred seventeen?
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Mr. Goldsmith. I haven't seen the list of 117 people.
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Mr.
Tovar.
What is this?
3
Mr. Goldsmith.
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That is a list of 350 odd people was
going to ask you about.
However, since you don't have knowledge
of the 117, I am not going to ask -ou about them.
Mr.
Tovar. If Oswald's name was on the list, I can't
explain why he might not have been contacted.
Maybe he didn't
appear attractive or interesting enough. I don't know what
information might have been given with these names on the list,
such as a memo from the FBI or State Department, whoever had
originated it, what they said that would have titilated the
analyst who might have seen it that would have elicited a
response on the part of the analyst who would say "Ah, let us
look into this further."
Mr.
Goldsmith. In particular, a lot of focus has been
given to Mr. Robert Edward Webster, who appears in CIA Number
1820 who defected approximately the same time that Oswald did
and returned at approximately the same time that Oswald did and
who was debried by the CIA for two weeks in Virginia.
Mr. Tovar. I didn't know that he was. It doesn't say so
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here.
.22
13
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this Committee.
Mr.
Goldsmith. That does not indicate the extend of the
debriefing. That information was obtained independently by:
25
Mr. Tovar. The name means nothing to me so I can't m
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enlighten you on it.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
21
Does the CIA have any affiliation with
3 organizations in the United States who might be responsible for
debriefing someone?
5
Mr. Tovar. Not that I am aware of.
6
7
Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, if anyone is going to be
debriefed it would be by the Domestic Contact Division?
In the sense of
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Mr. Tovar. In the intelligence sense.
elucidation of intelligence, DCD would do it.
A different typę
of inquiry, personal investigation, the Office of Security,
whoever it works through, would be the one.
05
The one we are talking about, DCD is the only organization
I know of. I can visualize a circumstance under which operating
components might seek out an individual or might have in times
past but I can't think of a case in point in my own recollec-
tion. I would say, given the strictures on our operating in
the United States, we would rely upon DCD to do it if they had
any positive intelligence connotation. If it were of an
operational nature today, the Foreign Resources Division might
Mr. Goldsmith.
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20
pursue it.
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23
Yes.
Mr. Tovar. It is the division level of the Directorate.
It is the division which seeks in the United States to develop
24
potential intelligence assets for abroad I think I had :
༡༤
better defer to the other people on that.
That is roughly where
--
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it stands. They certainly would not have interest in debrief-
ing defectors that am aware of.
Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, for the purposes of summary,
there is today no standard operating procedure of interviewing
returning defectors?
Mr.
Tovar. Right, insofar as I am aware, there is none.
Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard operating procedure
between the Bureau and the CIA which would coordinate any effort
to contact returning defectors and share information?
Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.
11
12
13
Mr. Goldsmith.
Turning to another area which I would like
to get into briefly, would you define what a 201 file is?
Mr. Tovar. A 201 file is a file or files
--
it could be
14
several volumes to it
--
It .
15
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17
which relates to an individual.
might pose a dicotomy, a 201 file and project file. A project
file might deal with an activity, say collection operations in
Timbucktu, a broad scale of activity involving several numbers
of people, there might be several 201 files, A, B, C, who were
associates in that project. The 201 file would be on the
20 individual himself.
19
21
Mr. Goldsmith. Ti would contain primarily biographic
22
information?
123
some
24
Mr. Tovar. No. It would contain a much vaster
of them might contain one sheet of paper with name, rank and
25
date of birth. But if the association with him developed and
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became more extensive, it might contain a considerable amount
of information. If he became involved with this ope-ation it
might include operational material, intelligence operations
as well, all part of the 201 complex.
The point I am making is that it is an individual file
as opposed to an activity file.
Mr. Goldsmith. If you wanted to learn about the operations
that an individual was involved in, would you go to his 201
file or to his operations file?
Mr. Tovar. I would go to the 201 file first. There might
not be an operations file. In fact, in the vast majority of
the 201 cases there are no operational files because there is
no hard and fast rule on when you open a 201 file or who opens
a 201 file.
If I, for example, am overseas and I become interested in
a person who looks to me to have considerable promise from the
operational standpoint, say a local foreign type, I might give
my own local checks, I might examine my own files to see if I
know anything about him. 'Then I say to headquarters "here is
Joe Doe. He is interesting to me for these reasons.
Will you
please check against headquarters records and other agencies
ånd let me know if you have anything of interest on him."
I might not ask for a 201 file. Headquarters might then,
because they thought he was interesting, open a 201 file.
Conversely, I might likewise say this looks terribly interest-
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ing Please open a 201 file and give me all of the information
you can collect on him."
Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that the fact that someone
has a 201 file does not mean at all that the individual was
involved in any operations of the Agency. If you wanted toget
information of an operational nature, would you go both to the
201 file and operations file?
Mr. Tovar. Assuming there was information of an opera-
tional nsture?
10
Mr. Goldsmith.
Yes.
Mr. Tovar. Yes, indeed we would.
12
Mr. Goldsmith. If someone is an agent of the CIA
13
am not referring now to case officers or staff agents
--
some-
14
one is a field agent for the Agency, would that fact be indi-
15
cated in the 201 file?
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--
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. In the Directorate of Operations someone
might open up a 201 file on an individual if the person was
of a potential positive intelligence significance?
Mr.
Tovar. Or counterintelligence, either one.
Mr. Goldsmith. That was going to be my question.
The
CI Staff in particular, when would you have occasion to open a
201 file?
Mr. Tovar. CI staff would not necessarily be the only one
to open a 201 file. In the case of a person of CI interest,
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a field station might have a counter-person I described earlier
2
and become interested in him because he did have some CI
3
attraction or interest.
The station itself or the division would
5
8
open the 201 file. It would not be us. The CI Staff as a rule
is not involved in that type of thing.
At this stage of the game since we are not operating and
we are not out soliciting new contacts, we are not working in
that sense of the term, we don't to my knowledge originate 201
files.
10
Mr. Goldsmith.
The C Staff does not open up 201 files?
=
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Mr.
Tovar. There is no reason that we couldn't.
Mr. Goldsmith.
As a pratical matter?
Mr. Tovar. As practical matter it does not work that way.
Our research is primarily ocused upon established cases, cases
that may even be dead, terminated, or dormant, or even current
16
17
18
in certain cases, but as a A rule not very many! 201 file is
opened by someone else. We may examine those files and review
them. We do review other activities. But the 201 file would
19
be in existence.
20
20
They whould not be created by ourselves.
In former days when C Staff files were segregated from
the rest of the Directorate it might have been different. I
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22
don't know.
23
Mr. Goldsmith.
When was that?
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25
Mr. Tovar. Say prior to 1974, 1957. Today our foles are
integrated in the files of the Directorate or it is in the
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process of being integrated.
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We have been working on this.
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3
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This is one of our major final exercises in the past two or
three years to make sure, when you go to the central files and
research a name, if there is something in the CI Staff reposi-
S
tory that will turn up when you are making a check of the
6
index.
7
Mr. Goldsmith.
8
10
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12
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14
Will nost 201 files be open as a result of
information coming into headquarters from the field, one of
the field stations?
Mr. Tovar. Yes, the vast majority. In years before when
they has such programs as NH Chaos, I assumed they opened 201
files of their own.
Mr. Goldsmith.
What is that?
Mr. Tovar. MH Chaos-program?–
For the record, will you indicate what that
15
Mr. Goldsmith.
16
program is?
17
13
19
20
21
22
13
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Mr. Tovar. I frankly would rather not becuase I don't
know the precise definition of the program. It was a program
which has been described in the press as domestic surveillance.
Whether that is the correct: proper designation, I don't know.
Our CI Staff does not normally open a 201 file. We don't have
occasion to.
for?
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the term CI/SIG stands
Mr. Tovar. Counter Intelligence/Special Investigative
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think it is. Investigative or investigations, I don't
2
know which.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is that group
still in existence today?
Mr. Tovar.
No.
Mr. Goldsmith.
When did it go out of existence?
Mr.
Tovar. I don't know exactly.
Before my time.
think it ended in '73, '74, 175.
I am not sure.
7
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the function of that
group was?
Mr. Tovar.
10
11
12
Only in a very vague sort of way. I have heard
about it, it was the investigative group in the CI Staff that
investigated whatever the CI Staff did in those days.
I can't
.
13
speak to that with any first hand knowledge. I know some things
14
they did but I would be hesitant to make a general definition
տ
is
16
17
13
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20
21
of their function.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Do you know whether the function of that
group was to investigate Agency employees who were suspected
of having been penetrated?
Mr. Tovar. I think, because I have seen nothing in writing
on the subject, but I have been given to understand that was one
of their functions in the context of their responsibilities
that was included.
But I am no authority on the subject.
22
Mr. Goldsmith.
Do you know whether CI/SIG would have
23
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occasion to open a 201 file?
Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate. I don't know.
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Mr. Goldsmith. What would your speculation be?
Mr. Tovar. I would speculate in the days when they were
functioning they probably lid. You have a very unauthoriative
witness on that subject.
Mr. Goldsmith. What is the relationship if any between
the Office of Security and the CI Staff?
The
Mr. Tovar. We have basically different functions.
Office of Security is unde:: the Directorate of Administration
and is responsible for the personnel and physical security of
the entire division. It focuses on personnel security and
physical security.
12
The CI staff as I described it, is an element of DDO
13 concerned with research and analysis and operation and coordi-
nation. The relation between us and the Office of Security is
simply that between us and another fraternal element of the
1S
16
Agency which has responsiblity which sometimes comes close
17
together.
18
19
20
21
Mr.
Goldsmith. Does the Office of Security maintain
files which contain information of a derogatory nature on
individuals, not necessarily limited to Agency employees?
Mr. Tovar. To my knowledge they don't.
My assumption is
22
ii I have never seen what is in their files
13
my assumption is
that they have files only on Agency personnel. I cannot
--
24 visualize circumstances under which they would maintain infor-
25
mation on people who are not in the Agency or who had not been
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applicates for employment and then left.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Office of Security interested in
maintaining information so that if in the future an individual
was being considered for employment in some capacity with the
Agency the Secuirty Office would have that information on
8
9
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12
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14
15
16
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19
him?
Mr. Tovar. I cannot visualize that heppening today.
Mr. Goldsmith.
I would like to ask you to read CIA 0786,
which is a document that this Committee obtained from the
Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald.
Mr. Tovar. That sort of suggests they maintained such
information then. I still cannot visualize there doing it
today.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think the function of the Office of
Security may be different today from what it was in 1959 with
regard to maintaining such files?
Mr. Tovar. The function, I would use the term function,
I would say the policy of the Office as far as the way the
office operates today. I don't know what they do intrinsically.
20.
21
22
13
I cannot visualize their maintaining that kind of current
records today. Maybe this is historic, it was in the files
since 1969. With the injunction against destroying files,
the files remained.
24
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If it was John Q. Doe appearing today in a similar context
I would not visualize the office of Security maintaining this
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kind of document.
Mr. Goldsmith.
To whom would this document go today?
Mr. Tovar. You mean from the State Department?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, a State Department document. Which
is indicating that an American citizen is giving information,
intelligence information to a foreign country, to whom in the
CIA would that document go?
Mr. Tovar. I am not sure it would come to the CIA at all
because the CIA does not have responsibility for that type of
person. I think it would go to the FBI.
Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the individual is overseas?
Mr. Tovar. Yes. He is an American. Again, this is
speculation.
I don't know what moves the person who releases
cables to the Moscow Embassy today. He might decide or some-
body here in State Security might decide that CIA should see
this. In that event, it probably would go to the Office of
Security as a matter of information..
Mr. Goldsmith. Would information contained in this type
of telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?
Mr. Tovar. I would think not.
Mr.
Goldsmith.
21
22
Mr.
Tovar.
13
Why not?
There is nothing that suggests here this
is going to be of continuing interest to the CIA. This is
24 1959. Let us say in 1962 the man came back and another message!
223
25
came over and it indicated that he was available for discussion
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3.
or was of interest and so on and maybe there are reasons for
debriefing, I can visualize a 201 being opened if the matter
were of apparent continuing interest. I can see no reason why
a 201 would be opened in this case.
Mr. Goldsmith. What if this telegram was followed by a
aable indicating that the individual had decided to defect?
Mr. Tovar. What do you mean? He is applying for Soviet
citizenship, so he is defecting here?
9
Mr. Goldsmith.
10
You are correct. I withdraw the question.
Mr. Tovar. I think basically my point is that it is a
11
fact that a 201 need not be opened up on this type
--
this is
12
a casual piece of informat:.on.
.
13
If one could eliminate the
name Lee Harvey Oswald, which raises flages, it is John Doe
14
and there is nothing in this
--
15
16'
.17
1a
someone might say what an SOB
this is but there is nothing to indicate anything but an
unfortunate incidental event, I would say today, "why bother..
We have enought to do without opening 201 files on people of
"
that nature. The encyclopedic approach is not one that we
try to apply.
19
20
Bear in mind, I am doing a lot of speculating here.
21
perhaps shouldn't.
22
Mr. Goldsmith.
You really aren't aware of what the
13 procedure would be in 1959 for dealing with a telegram like
24
this?
E
25
Mr. Tovar.
No.
I would still say today I would not expect
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IS
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that kind of document to be retained in Agency files anywhere.
You know, inter-departmental correspondence is firing paper in
all directions all the time on an informational basis. That
does not mean it is retained.
Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to this document, after 1959
your testimony is moreorless speculation but you are saying
that today you don't think that this type of document would be
retained and have any special significance?
Mr. Tovar. I don't think so. I am scratching my head
trying to visualize circumstances under which it could be
There is nothing of interest to the Agency. There
retained.
is nothing of immediate counterintelligence interest. I don't
know who would retain it on why.
Mr. Goldsmith.
For the purpose of clarification, if the
CI asked that of the CIA, by that I mean the counterintelligence
aspect of the CIA concerned primarily with a foreign counter-
intelligence threat; in otehr words, foreign nationals, foreign
citizens?
Mr. Tovar. You are asking is it?
Mr. Goldsmith.
Mr.
Tovar.
Yes..
Primarily yes, but not solely. We are
concerned with Americans of counterintelligence interest. If
22
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an overseas station is informed by somebody that an American
is contacting the Soviets and is apparently engaged in what
looks like espionage, we would become interested. That is
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espionage I am talking abou:.
Mr.
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Goldsmith. I understand.
Mr. Tovar. You realise of course with the sensitivity
of Americans investigation:; of Americans we have to be an we
are extremely careful in making the determination as to when a
person is of counterintelligence interest. We have very strict
rules and regulations on the consideration of investigations,
considerations retaining information, the rights of a person.
The criteria are very stringent. They are under esecutive
order and Attorney General guidelines. We don't approach this
casually at all. It is proscribed activity.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Mr. Tovar.
Both as to Americans?
Primarily Americans. The Attorney General
is not concerned essentially with non-US persons. Our focus of
sensitivity is on US persons who are US citizens or residents,
aliens or US entities, organizations, which are primarily
15
16
17
American in composition.
13
19
20
20
21
Mr. Goldsmith. Again, would you focus outside the-borders
of the United States?
Mr. Tovar. Yes. Inside USuis FBI.
Mr. Goldsmith. Before when you made reference to a
22 station overseas, you became aware of an American who might
23
24
be involved in espionage for another country, you were refer-
ring to an American who was living abroad, is that correct?
Mr. Tovar. Yes, or traveling abroad.
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Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you CIA. Number 788
which is the field personality file request form that was used
to open Oswald's 201 file. In the middle of the page there is
box which states the term 'Other identification".
=
If someone
wrote the number or letter "AG" down, what does that stand for?
Mr. Tovar. I have no idea. What are they referring
7
to here?
I cannot think of anything.
6.
Mr. Goldsmith. The form also indicates that Oswald's
file was restricted.
Do you know of any reason why Oswald's
10
12
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ia
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20
file would have been restricted?
Mr. Tovar. Where is that?
Mr. Goldsmith. Here.
Mr. Tovar. No, I don't know. I don't know what criteria
they would have used at that time or even today for that matter,
to open a restricted file. Bear in mind, there is a lot of
latitude given to the individual who opened these things. He
could be a very junior analyst who for reasons of his own
decided he would do it this way. Supervision would not neces-
sarily get down there very closely behind him.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the inter-agency source
register is?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
21
22
13
Mr. Goldsmith. What is that?
24
Mr. Tovar. As I understand it, it is a register maintained
in which other agencies of the government register their
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interest in a person. Let us take, for example, you are working
for the Army Intelligence and you are in Germany and you become
interdsted in Mr. Smith. Let us say you check Mr. Smith with
the CIA and with the other agencies and in so doing you wish
to have him recorded under the ISR, Inter Agency Source
Registry, the entry of his name in the ISR will normally flag
prior interest on the part of somebody in the government, in
this case you are in the A:my.
I don't know what this; symbol is but they put two asterisks
which indicates to anybody else who checks that name later the
US Army has a prior interest in that person.
Mr. Goldsmith. What kind of interest would that be?
13
Mr. Tovar.
Intelligence interest to me, potential
14
15
16
17
1a
intelligence interest. Again, the ISR may have ramifications
that I am not aware of. In my experience the ISR has been the
place we go to check, say, a new or potentially new source to
see if there is ny other previously established government
interest in the person which means keep your hands off. The
military rely upon this very heavily because we coordinate their
clandestine intelligence operations.
Mr. Goldsmith. Would an ISR index be checked prior to
opening up a 201 file as a matter of routine?
19
20
21
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Mr. Tovar. It has been so many years since I have done
this. The way we have become mechanized today I would assume
75
that a normal file check through the central files of the
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Directorate would include or would turn up anything that was
in the ISR. I am just not sure how it works.
Mr. Goldsmith. If someone were an agent of another
intelligence organization would that be indicated in the 201
file?
Mr. Tovar. If it were an agent, agent of another service,
that would be in the ISR only if it had been of interest to
another agency which said "Put Joh Doe's name in the ISR and
indicate he is a US Army intelligence source,"
at the very
10
11
least a person of interest to the US Army Intelligence Agency.
It would not be there if the Army had not put it in.
So you
L
12
might not know.
13
14
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15
16
17
18
Again, I think almost any agent of the military would rely
upon the ISr, I would think almost certainly would be entered
in the ISr, because they want to maintain control of it, to
make sure nobody else gets in the way arnd interferes with their
operations.
Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone were an agent it would in
is checked by a CI person prior to opening up the file, he would
take note of that fact?
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all likelihood be indicated in the ISR and assuming the ISR
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Mr. Tovar. Say that again. Some of this is pretty fuzzy
to me. I don't want to mislead you by extrapolating from my
own ignorance.
Mr. Goldsmith. If someone is an agent of another
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intelligence service, that fact would be noted in the ISR?
Mr. Tovar. Another US intelligence service?
Mr. Goldsmith.
Yes.
Mr. Tovar. A US military intelligence service only, yes,
the military intelligence service would normally be registered
in the ISR. Other than the military, the FBI intelligence
assets would not be registered in the ISr to my knowledge.
Mr. Goldsmith. But the military tends to make that list-
ing?
Mr. Tovar. In my experience the miltiary has been the
primary element involved in the use and the exploitation of the
ISR. Let me interpose ano her point here. I am not an expert
in these procedures and I am way out of touch. You live most.
of your life overseas, you don't do these things back at
headquarters.
These procedures may be quite different in
actuality. I am groping through my memory to see how they were
dealt with on an active basis.
A fellow like Bill Donnelly might enlighten you much more
than I could about the ISR.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
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I understand that. I think you can tell
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I am not pressing you for detail on it.
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Mr. Tovar. I would like to help you.
specualte as I have been doing on things that are somewhat
I am prepared to
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beyond my direct experience and direct responsibility.
is a limit.
There
Mr. Goldsmith. Now, if someone checking ISR notes that
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an individual is a military intelligence agent would the fact
of that agency status be noted and a 201 file opened on that
individual?¨
Mr. Tovar. I am not sure. I would think it would be.
I think almost certainly if I were
Again, I am speculating.
doing a file check on a person whose name came from one of the
field stations and it turned up the fact he was already
registered in the ISR, if a person is of interest let us say,
to the US Army Intelligence, that would automatically sort of
proscribe further attempts on my part to go in and get involved.
I think a notation would be made in the 201 file.
Mr. Goldsmith. As a practical matter that would be a good
reason for making the notation?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Does the CIA regularly use the ISR?
Mr. Tovar. We maintain it as I understand it.
Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone is an agent of the CIA,
would that fact be noted in the ISR?
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Mr. Tovar. No, I don't believe it would.
Again, you
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much better on it. I cannot visualize all our sensitive sources
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being registered there.
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how internal memoranda prepared
by James Angleton when he was head of the CI Staff, how internal
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paperwork relating to the JFK assassination was prepared and
subsequently stored?
Mr. Tovar. No, I really don't. I have no idea. I have
seen no documents on that subject. I have seen nothing either
originated or approved or signed by him. You realize that any
files on this subject are dead files. I am just doing my
current job. Until you poeple became interested, we were not
dealing with them on a daily basis.
Mr. Goldsmith. What happens to the personal files of an
individual such as Angletons or even yourself after leaving the
CI STaff?
Mr. Tovar. After leaving the staff or leaving the Agency?
Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take the first after leaving the CI
Staff, what would happen to your personal papers?
Mr. Tovar. The personal file, official file on the person
in the Agency is retained by the Office of Personnel.
Mr. Goldsmith.
That would givern your personal file,
your personal papers. Wha: about internal memos, soft copy
type files, what would happen to them?
Mr. Tovar. Having been only one element of the organiza-
tion during my career, it is hard to say.
Mr. Goldsmith. I am not talking now about personnel file.
I am talking about soft copy, working files that an individual
may maintain.
Mr. Tovar. You mean the files he himself as an individual
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maintained?
Mr. Goldsmith.
Yes.
Mr. Tovar. Most individuals don't maintain personal files,
I don't think. I would say, for example, anything I write,
I dictate a memorandum and I send it to anybody you want to
name, in a sense that is my work, I have done it but I don't
keep a personal file on that. That goes into my office file.
It is part of the office chronological file which is maintained
by my secretary. Let us say multiply that by 500,000 over, a
period of years the foles grow. At the time I leave I am
incidental in a sense. I just happen to be the person in the
job at the time. The files will still be there.
There is a normal retirement and destruction under normal
conditions, retirement and destruction program which eliminates
the accumulation of excessive useless material.
Most paperwork would go in this office
Mr. Goldsmith.
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chrono file?
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Mr. Tovar. Yes, anything of significance would go in the
office chrono file. Anything I write to the Directorate of
Operations, DDO, CI, it is normally part of the chrono files.
If I want it, it is there. It is my own file in the sense that
when I am on the job I have total access to it. If I left
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the job and wanted to look at it six months later, it is still
in the fole and I would ask somebody who took my place could I
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Mr. Goldsmith. If it is an office chrono file does that
meant that everything is filed in a chronological order?
Mr. Tovar. Not necessarily.
Here you ought to consult
my secretary. There might be a subject breakdown.
Ordinarily
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no point in it. Let us say something I signed off on, here
is a case in point, memos that are signed on my behalf or
that I might have signed, if I were there that day, I would
not maintain that in my front office as a rule. That would
probably be maintained by the office of origination.
I think
if I signed it my secretary would certainly maintain a log of
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But I don't
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would maintain a routine memorandum just because I happened to
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off on a host of things which are not really my creation. I
am representing the staff as a whole.
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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when Mr. Angleton left the CI
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Staff?
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Mr. Tovar.. Yes.
I am not certain of the precise date.
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I think it was either December '74 or January '75. That is the
position of Chief, Counterintelligence?
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Yes.
Mr. Tovar. I believe he may have retmained in the office
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Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, after Mr. Angleton
left the CI Staff, any type of followup was done by that staff
on the Nosenko issue?
Mr. Tovar.
Followup work?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. For example, one of the issues, the
key issue with regard to Mr. Nosenko was his bona fides.
Mr. Tovar. Yes, indeed.
Mr. Goldmsith. After Mr. Angleton left was any additional
analytical work done on that issue?
Mr. Tovar. A very detailed study was done by my predecessor
George Kalaris. A very thorough analysis was made of the whole
12 Nosenko question.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Are you referring to the Hart Report?
Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the Hart report was any type of
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departure?
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Mr. Tovar. I don't know for certain. The Hart Report is
19 a thick piece of paper. In the preparation of that report
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of preliminary jobs. All that I know would be in the context
of that report. All I know would be same representations in
response to the Director's inquiry or your inquiry or someone
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else's inquiry as to what happened, what did it say, what does
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Think for a moment on the Nosenko issue.
As Chief of the CI Staff, if it were demonstrated to you very
clearly that the story given by Mr. Nosenko on Lee Harvey
Oswald was full of contradictions and in addition to contra-
dictions, it was in many ways simply incredible, what impact
would that have on the Agency's assessment of Mr. Nosenko as
being a bona fide rather than a dispatched defector?
Mr. Tovar. Well, it is difficult to answer. You are
posing a question in a narrow sense. You are focusing on one
point, Nosenko vis-a-vis Oswald and contradictions that may
emerge there.
I would answer by saying that again I am not an
expert on Nosenko. I don': profess to have a full grasp of
his bona fides or anything related to it.
I would say that question alone would not be enough to
satisfy me that the inquiry had been made carefully.
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much more to it than what Nosenko had to say about Oswald.
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There are more aspects about the bona fides issue, more than I
could give you today.
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Mr. Goldsmith. I have read the Hart Report.
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Mr. Tovar. He tried to deal with the whole consideration,
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the whole Oswald, the handling, the methodology.
He did not
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Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, the Hart Report did not mention
the word "Oswald" even one time. Even so, the question I have,
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if it were demonstrated to you that Nosenko's story on the
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Oswald issue is untrue, cannot be believed, would that have any
impact on the Agency's assessment of him as a bona fied?
Mr. Tovar. The first reaction would be I would be deeply
distressed and concerned, I would want to know more about it.
Other people
You have to exptrapolate from me to the Agency.
have views on this other than myself. If you carried this thing
further and convinced ever/thody, the point you made is valid,
then you would have --
Mr. Goldsmith.
We are talking hypothetically now. Let
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us go beyond you. If it were demonstrated to the Director of
the Central intelligence Agency that the story given by Nosenko
on Oswald I am not talking about any of the other information
he gave, but on Oswald
simply cannot be believed because,
--
A, part of it is incredible, B, it is full of contradictions,
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what effect do you think that would have on the Agency's
assessment of him as a bona fide defector?
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Mr. Tovar. I literally don't know. I am not sure what
the comparative weight of that point would be when considered
Mr. Goldsmith. As Chief of the CI Staff, you would
personally be troubled by that?
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against the backdrop of the full Nosenko question.
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Mr. Tovar. Yes, I think I would be troubled by it.
would be troubled. I would be troubled that our current !
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Again, I would say, loo, if this is a serious proposition
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you are making, let us say you adduced a number of analysts
who examined this thing thɔroughly and were in a position of
making that kind of judgment, I would say, "I want to have
these analysts talk to my analysts because I am not in a posi-
tion to make that kind of judgment."
Mr. Goldsmith. First of all, I am not making the statement
that Nosenko's story on Oswald is inaccurate in any way.
Secondly, even if the story is inaccurate, I don't want
to suggest that because of that anyone on this Committee has
any feeling that that means Nosenko is not bona fide. My
question is really very limited. A, if it were demonstrated
that the story on Oswald is inaccurate, what impact would that
have on your overall assessment?
Mr. Tovar. You mean demonstrably inaccurate?
Mr. Goldsmith.
Yes.
Mr. Tovar. It would have to be examined. It would have
to be examined the full panoply of the whole Oswald issue.
I would say we will get this team of analysts and we will
fight it out. We are talking about hypothesis.
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Mr. Goldsmith.
Yes. I would prefer to stay away from the
term "fighting it out" because there is no one here who is in
the posture of making a fighting issue out of it.
I no longer have any questions. I will have questions to
ask whoever on your staff participated in the preparation of
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the memo that we discused earlier.
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Normally whenever a witness has an opportunity to testify
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minutes at the end to make a statement.
before the Committee at a nearing, the Committee gives him five
This is not a hearing.
A
However, if you would like to make a statement for the record,
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feel free to do so. If not, you will be given a chance to
verify the record for accuracy.
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Mr. Tovar. Since I have no position to present and no
point to make it is probably improper to make a statement.
The only think I would reiterate is that I have been sort of
speculating here in many respects. Bear in mind there is an
area here where I have a purview that is perhaps valid. We
are talking about a lot of things which are way beyond my
immediate experience and certainly my current responsibility.
I would say, take some of my speculation with a grain of
salt, because I don't mean to be dogmatic on these things.
The procedure for handling the 201 file, there are some GS-7
17 girls down the line who could tell you much more about the 201
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files than I would ever be able to compile for you. They are
19 the ones you really should talk to.
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Things like the ISR, ⠀ know the ISR in a limited framework
from the standpoint of a guy overseas who is dealing frequently
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and checks the ISR either on behalf of the military or to see
if they have already registered prior interest and so on. There
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professional advice on.
I think your questions; have been reasonable. I have found
no objection to try to meet you more than halfway on it.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Fine. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
I, Alfred Joseph LaFrance, the officer before whom the
foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the
witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition
was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was
taken by me in stenotype to the best of my ability and there-
after reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said
deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said.
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witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed
by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition
was taken; and further that: I am not a relative or employee
of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto,
j
nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the
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action.
ད
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Notary Public in and for the
District of Columbia
My Commission expires November 14, 1980.
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