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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION
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TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA
FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27-28, 1962
DATE : 12/27/62
PAGES :
SUBJECTS
:
9
AGENDA FOR DECEMBER 27 AND 28, 1962 MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE
:
SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 27 AND 28, 1962 MEETING
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
:
1B, 1C
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
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2025 Release under the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection
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ITEM IS RESTRICTED
206-10001-10008
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
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• CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27
-28)-1962
ITEM
TIME
December 27th
1
9:00
9:30
2.
9:30 - 10:00
3.
10:00 - 12:45
4.
12:45
5..
1:00
2:30
6.
2:30
3:30
3:30 - End of
Day
7:30 p.m.
9:00 9:30
10.
9:30 1:00
SUBJECT
The Chairman's Time
Review of Boards Draft Interim Report
to the President
Review of Draft Report on Intelligence
Community Activities Relating to the
Cuban Arms Buildup (Received from DCI
on December 26, 1962)
Depart for Lunch
Launch The Hay-Adams Hotel
(Quests of Dr. Långer)
Review of the World Situation
Mr. Ray-Cling, Deputy Director/Intelligence,
GIA
lại
Resume Review of Report on Cuban Ammis
Build p
Dinner at Residenco of Mr. John McCone
(3025 Whitehaven Street, Northwest, D. C.)
Chendid by all dip
Contended
December 26th
The Chains Time
and
Bank)
Caneyush)
Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms
Buildup with the Following Key Intelli-
gence Community Officials:
a. 9:30-10:30 Mr. John McCone
b. 10:30-11:00 Bt. General M. Carter,
Deputy Director, 
CIA
11:15 12:00
c. 11:00-11:30. General G. Blake,
Direct
ctor, NSA
12:00 12:35
11:30-12:00MF. Thomas Hughes, Deputy
Director, Intelligence and
12.35/30 Research, Department of Stat
12:00-1:00 Lt. General Joseph Carroll,
Director, DIA
CONFIDENTIAL
NW
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(December 28th Continued)
☐
-CONFIDENTIAL
ITEM
11.
ie.
1:00
we: 30
TIMS
SUBJECT
Lunch, Room 21 Executive Office Building:
-(3:15) Song Bed 
Dom Parrotts
2:30-3:30.
13.
3:30
END
Status of Implementation of Prior-Board ---
Recommendations
Mr-Russel-1-oh-
Resume Discussion of Report on the Cuben
Arms Buildup and Complete Preparation of
Report to the President.
-CONFIDENTIAL -
NW
THE WHITE HOUSE
HOP SECRE
WASHINGTON This document postales information
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
⠀ IDEALIST, CORONA
OXCART
SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1962
*
Those
The Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27.
present were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy,
Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Clifford and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.
Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft
report which had been furnished to the Board on the preceding
day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, setting
forth the results of the all-source review which the Board had
requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with
respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months
preceding October 22, 1962. The Chairman asked that Board members
make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise
for discussion during this two-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that
he was not sure the DCI's report had the approval of the intelll-
gerice community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone
was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it
was possible that some of the conclusions and factual details
might not have yet received final approval by the agencies which
contributed to the preparation of the report (CIA, DIA, State and
NSA). Accordingly, the Chairman noted the importance of the
discussions which the Board would have on the following day with
heads of the intelligence agencies.. The Chairman also thought
that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report
to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.
Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr.
McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs
to produce a solid report on the handling giver by U. S. intelli-
gence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy
assured that the President will understand that the Board is going
into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the
Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr. Bundy
who said that he had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from
a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not
get to the basic issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to
talk to Mr. McCone about this. Dr. Killian stated that he had an
appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he
would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of
this meeting.
Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.
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24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government is equally in the dark
about Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities involving.
other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking intel-
matters as these:
indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to
keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the pre-
sent time and in the future
his concern that our lack of information on
ligence on: Cuba/Communist China discussions. urphy reiterated
Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the con-
versation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy.. According to
Mr. Bundy, the President is fully aware that the Board is con-
ducting its review of the Cuba situation The President wants
an objective report from
of citizens who have no axe to
grind, and he is placing great store on this effort of the pand."
The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about
the prospect that the Congress
matter. However, Mr. Bundy feel make inquiries into the
there is a bare possibil that
Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to raise hypo-:
thetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having
been made by a group such as
as 
the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope.
that the Board will carefully
tized version of the report, fth the preparation of a sani-
Board and the President feel
that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepare a
report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of
the Congress.
Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been
that Mr. Bundy
covered in his discussion with Mr. Bundy. He sa to accept the
had expressed concern over the failure of the
Suggestion that there be submitted
one which the DCI forwarded to tha more adequate report than the
Board on December 26. Mr Bundy
noted in this connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy
makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to
intelligence handling.
intelon the question
On the question of availability of Special Group records for
purposes of the Board's study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman
and that
that certainly the Board should examine such records 
a
they could be obtained from Mr. Parrott (Mr. Bundy commented thatv
the Board is the only group which can have this kind of access).
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As to the Board's study, Mr. Bundy told Dr. Killian that
the Board should include in its review discussions 
with the
Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Mr. Bundy indicating that the Secretary of
Defense has particular reservations about the DCI's 
report...
Another matter mentioned by HP. Bundy was his belief that
the moralo of the intelligence community as a whole stands to
suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report
which is boing expected from the Board.
With regard to the interim report which the Board has under
Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that the report could be
delivered to him or it could be presented to the resident directi
and Mr. Brundy thought it important that the Bodin present ip th
the President porson. One other matter discussed was the Board's
sonvern about any intelligence let-down in the make of the Cuba
cribis, de boing Mr. Bundy's belief that no such 
led-down is in
prospect if prosent directives, and diboubstorio on the abject have
any effect in Govorriment.
(A hd conclusion of the Obairman's co-curit
with Mr. Bundy) the Doard recessed for lunch)
Ab 12:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation
Miomas: Lawlor, senior intelligence officer in CIA'S Office of
Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was
on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board
meeting). H. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities
oluded the handling of current intelligence matters, thb seldation.
and write-up of current intelligence) items (e.g. in the IB and In
melobanda for the White House), and the preparation of internal in-
Mr. Lawler
ligne natos for use at the CIA working level.
pointed out that his dubles were in the areas of analysis and
production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing
the Board Inpluded the following subject matters
USSR/Chicom relations Recriminations between the USSR and
Comunist: Chinh are the greatest in the history of their dispute,
and an open break in party relations is most likely noor.
USSR/Cuba: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreign
policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath!
USSB/Berl
and this
The UPSR 10 at a diplomatio
ceable to the USSR/Chicom rift.
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The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE activity
presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba:
situation. Mr. McCone said that it had not. He said that
in the MONGOOSE activity, the Special Group and the Attorney
General had given a great deal of consideration to the need.
for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but the
intelligence needed was primarily for covert action rather
than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity
contributed to the over-all intelligence collection effort
on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the
collection/ of intelligence on Cuba, after the Bay of Pigs in-
Vasion, and when he Book office in November 1961 Mr. McConc
was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees
was aking place. Thereafter, following discussions with
the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee
interrogations under, wdy.
Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down.in
intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident.
McCone said that this. took place before his time, but he
assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and
other psychological factorsl In response to Dr. Killian's
question as to whether another intelligence Let-down was in)
store in the wake of the Cuba crisis Mr. McCone said that.
there was in fact a great danger of such a development following
what come officials consider was an "intelligence victory"
for the United States. Mr. McCone, noting that the Soviet
SA-2's remain in Cuba, baid he had brought this up forcefully
a week ago at on MSC Executive Committee meeting and the
President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any inter-
Terence with our acrial reconnaiss tice of Cuba would be
considered as being mout grave and Messrs. McCloy and
Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCona
added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have beep.
suspended, should any ominous development occur 10 will be
necessary to obtain Presidential approval of the resumption
of low-level flights
Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were any prohibition
on the conduct of intelligence operations with regard to Cuba.
Mr. McCone said yes it is desired to follow a more aggressive
pattern of agent infiltration into Cuba He would like to see
a or month effort directed toward, the obtaining of straight
intelligence on Cubal (in lieu of political warfare, for example).
to determine the trend of Soviet plans in Cuba. The DCI Noted
that the Soviets may quietly get out of Orga, or they may th
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fact take one step back and two steps. forward, and hold on to
the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base,
as a means of keeping Castro under control, or in order to
retain a capability for quick restoration of a Soviet offensive
capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action which
the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration of the Castro
government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent teams
in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain the assistance.
of British, French and German representatives in Cuba (4) the
possible obtaining of useful intelligence from the attorney,
'Donovan, who is hegotiating prisoner releases, and (5) possibly
the obtaining of useful information from the captain of the
"African Pilot" who had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who
yesterday asked to see a U. S. intelligence officer.
Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of
Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and.
Mr. McCone said that he would
related operations against Cuba.
not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo.
for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support
for Cuba's demands for U. S. evacuation of the Naval 
Base.
Answering General Doolittle's' question, the DCI stated that:
U-2 overflights of Cuba were going at the rate of two a day, re-
sulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of
Mr. 
McCone 
said
some important targets (e.g., harbors) more often.
that COMOR and USIB list the targets and that he then establishes.
flight schedules.
Mr. Pace asked whether
Going back to the subject of Guantanamo;
the DCI had made, a study of the expected intelligence return that
would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from
the Base. Mr. Pace adding that he thought such a study should be
Mr. McCone said.
made before a final policy decision was reached.
that he had not made such a study. He added that in August the
operators in CIA had proposed the MONGOOSE Group that Guan-
was opposed at the policy level.
Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the
proposal at this time. In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry,
McCone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT operations at
Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that NSA had only recently
added two more positions there.
tanamo Base be so used, but the to i
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Mr. Murphy asked the DCI to state the meaning of "MONGOOSE
B PLUS Mr. McCond explained that in the 
MONGOOSE Group It
was originally conceived that Phase I would be 
one of 
gathering
intelligence on the possibilities for the 
organization and 
supply.
of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was 
only Tainly
successful" because Castro has some 
100,000 informers in plade: 1
Cuba and exercises internal security controls 
through a system 
of
ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams 
into:
Oubaas had heen hoped. On August 10, Phase II was 
reached with:
-
MONGOOSE plarming for (a) violent actions (b) a relatively 
high
level of actions, or "B PLUS", and lesser 
actions, or "B MINUS"
.
Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed
"B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing
,
because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be 
faced 
with
MRBMS in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE offort 
became divertell
by considerations of Soviet activities in 
Cuba, Mr. McConal stated
.
In answer to a question from Mr Murphy as to who chairs the
MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did 
not 
know
Whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now 
serving as
Chairman.
With reference to the absence of photographic evidence of Soviet
offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography
, Mu
Come said that if one looks at photography 
of cuba bo
September 5 it is possible to spot evidendo of ectivity 
at the 
Sup
Cristobal MRBM dito, but this activity 
could have been the of
agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile
activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern that 
Soviet cam
Mr. McCone expressed his
ouflage operations may be deceiving us.
own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage
methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimétés 
leave a
certain margin for error, H. McCone noted that it is nevertheless
Impossible for us to say that we know all that is going 
on in the.
In response 
to Dri-
Killian's
USSR with respect to missile activity.
[comment that public discussions seem to indicate that U. S. missile
capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered
.
that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and 
could lead
to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the US.
missile program by an economy-minded Congress.
that in his presentations to select Committees
always expresses reservations concerning U. S
Mr. McCone added
of the Congress, he
missile superiority.
Dr. Killian wondered whether the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that
"nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. McCone said that
undoubtedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photo-
graphic intelligence.
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