124-10365-10020
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Date:
6/9/2015
AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER:
124-10365-10020
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 65-68530-449
ORIGINATOR:
FBI
FROM:
WMFO
TO:
HQ
TITLE:
DATE:
'PAGES:
09/20/1968
268
Identification Form
Agency Information
Document Information
SUBJECTS:
NOSENKO BONA FIDES
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret
1B
Redact
10/19/1998
OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS:
MEMO, INC MEMO, ANALYSIS
v9.1
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 1
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
DIRECTOR, FBI
[65-68
[134-5437)
(65-68530)
CLASSIFIED AND
CIA HAS NO 05CT
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
Forcina
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT JM 6-17-98
DATE:
-9/20/68
EXTENDED BY 12.5% CAD 1/4/19
REASON F
SAC, WFO
SION
T: "NORMAN" (u)
R
DATE OF NEVIEW/FOR
DECLASSIFICATION.
FCIM, II, 1- 2
في يد مجھ
19/20/88±
૪
159
[ ]
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED
SLIP (S)
DATE
7-26-78
DECLASSIFIED BY
ي الي الامانة ان الله م
(JFK):
mat
5010-108
Re Bureau letter 2/29/68 captioned "SAMMY" which
transmitted copy of CIA letter dated 2/19/68. The CIA letter
had furnished to the Bureau copies of a 435 page Top Secret
paper entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
Defector." A copy of this paper was also furnished to WFO. ✗(u)
Enclosed are six copies of a paper dated 9/20/68
prepared by Agents of WFO which compares the contents and
conclusions of the CIA paper with information obtained during
the current (1967-68) interrogations of SAMMY.
(An extra copy
of this letter and of the WFO paper are enclosed for the
Bureau in the event the Bureau desires to furnish a copy of
✓ each to New York.) XU)
The WFO paper is classified "Top Secret" because it
contains excerpts of material from CIA so classified..
*(u)
It is noted that a brief chronology of events is set
forth in the preface to the WFO paper. It is indicated therein
that SAMMY is considered by CIA as a part of a large scale KGB
deceptive operation. ✓ (✓)
106
Classified
190-709-1031
Declassity hn. A
AL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERRIM
UNCLASSIFTED EXCEPT
WAS SPAIN OTHERWITC
REC-18 65-68530-449
In addition to those comments, it is noted that a
paper prepared in December, 1964, by CIA as an agenda for a
proposed CIA-FBI conference, concluded that SAMMY was dispatched
by KGB in March, 1962, as one part of a broad provocation effort
conceived as early as 1959 and set in motion in the latter part
of 1961. It was stated, "We believe that the major figures in
this provocation include at least three defectors, and at one
time or another more than eight Soviet officials in-place as
American Intelligence Service (AIS) agents. They are supported
828-4-0
$
③- Bureau (Enc.
1
WFO
ETT:arw
(4)
ENCLOSURE
A
น
ALL INFO
OCT 7 1968
ж Mon
PONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASIFIED EXCEPT
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll RE SHOWN OTHER USE.
Savings Plan
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 2
A nigh 2 de ref
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED
SLIP (S) C
DATE
80/18/6
·7-26.
DECLASSIFIED BY
JFK)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.8
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
[(65-68530)
DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)
(SAC, WFO 134-5
34-5437)
"NORMAN") ✗(u)
སྐ(༥)
ESP R
CLASSIFIED AND
CIA HAS NO BACT
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT JM 6-17-98
DATE: 9/20/68
EXTENDED BY 12.5% CAD 1/2/39
REASON FO
FCIM, II, 1-2
SION
DATE OF REVIEW/FOR
DECLASSIFICATION.
2+3
F
19/22/881
Brangs
Re Bureau letter 2/29/68 captioned "SAMMY" which
transmitted copy of CIA letter dated 2/19/68. The CIA letter
had furnished to the Bureau copies of a 435 page Top Secret
paper entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
Defector." A copy of this paper was also furnished to WFO.
K(u)
Enclosed are six copies of a paper dated 9/20/68
prepared by Agents of WFO which compares the contents and
conclusions of the CIA paper with information obtained during
the current (1967-68) interrogations of SAMMY. (An extra copy.
of this letter and of the WFO paper are enclosed for the
* Bureau in the event the Bureau desires to furnish a copy of
✓ each to New York.) XU)
The WFO paper is classified "Top Secret" because it
contains excerpts of material from CIA so classified.
*B(u)
It is noted that a brief chronology of events is set
Uforth in the preface to the WFO paper. It is indicated therein
that SAMMY is considered by CIA as a part of a large scale KGB
deceptive operation. * (u)
106
REC-18 65-68530-449
In addition to those comments, it is noted that a
paper prepared in December, 1964, by CIA as an agenda for a
proposed CIA-FBI conference, concluded that SAMMY was dispatched
by KGB in March, 1962, as one part of a broad provocation effort
conceived as early as 1959 and set in motion in the latter part
of 1961. It was stated, "We believe that the major figures in
this provocation include at least three defectors, and at one
time or another more than eight Soviet officials in-place as
American Intelligence Service (AIS) agents They are supported
u
cod 828-9-D
3
Bureau (Enc.
1
WFO
---
''ཊྛིཏཾ,, ཨསཾཎཔཊྛདྷཀྑནཾ,
ETT:arw
(4)
(u)
ALL INFOR
ENCLOSURE
น
OCT 7 1968
Mop
CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHER ISE.
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
5010-108
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 3
Dorlace
Classified
90-709-103x1
An
HEREIN UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
ALINFORMATION CONTAINED
WHERE
*
*
°
☆
27
(in)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Classifed v
190-709-
Declassify of DADR
楽
SECRET
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASS C AND/OR.
RELEASE CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. JP6-1798
K7/31/98
EXCEPT THE
BRACKETS
"NORMAN"
(u)
ALL PORN
CH CONTAINED
HERENSSIPTED EXCEPT
HERWISE.
7-26-98
CLASSIFIED 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLAUDITY
(JFK)
September 20, 1968
APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELON
ADVISED BY OU
S
DATE
CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 1259
REASON FOR T
FCIM, II.
AR
DATE OF REVIEW RØR
DECLASSIFICATION.)
gofam 1/3/19
2+3.
9/20/35
all Top Sugut informes
is CIA into
GROUP
SECRET
Excluded from automatic
- downgrading and
declassification
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 4
ia
CHOLOSURE
64500-449
III.
0
OP SECRET
DETAILS
COMPARISON OF PAPER AND CURRENT INTERVIEWS.. 20
A. Nosenko's Naval RU Service..
B.
Nosenko's Entry into KGB.
1. Date of Entry…….
2.
3.
Role of General Kobulov.
20
2222233
24
Komsomol and CP Membership..
Processing for Entry
28
KGB Building Pass
30
Designation of Directorates..
35
4.
5.
6. Location of Chief Directorate of Militia
C.. Nosenko's Assignment to 1st Section,
1st Department, March, 1953 - June, 1955....
1. Nosenko Sought to Avoid Discussion.
Assignment against Correspondents
2.
3.
4。
Assignment against Army Attache Personnel
Agents "Volodina" and "Raketa".
5. Colonel Earl L. Mickelson).(S).
6.
7.
8.
Ira B. Richards) (5).
Howard L. Felchling (s).
Expulsion of Benson, Mule and Stroud (5)
9. [George Van Laethem] (②).
D.
36
36
37
38
40
41
42
43
45
47
48
52
10.
Edward Ellis Smith.
11.
"Andrey".
12.
Service in 1st Section,
March, 1953 June, 1955...
53
Nosenko's Assignment to 7th Department, 1955-59... 57
1. Vladimir Muromtsev.
2.
Nataliya Shulgina.
3. Tamara Kungarova.
"
• °
88་པ བ པ 8
57
58
60
63
64
-69
71
72
75
77
80
-PAP
SECRET
+
4.
Yevgenia Danko...
5.
6. Martin Malia..
Agents Volkov and Yefremov.
7.
Richard Burghi ③).
.8.
9.
10.
11.
Arsene Frippel
Nosenko not a Counterintelligence officer.
1956-59 cases among Nosenko's Notes.
American Intelligence Use of Tourists.
ii
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 5
0
SECRET
E.
11. John Shubin] (S)..
11.
12.
13.
Audio Operations Against U. S. Embassy
Cryptologic Attack Against U. S. Embassy.
14. Nosenko's Knowledge of CIA Personnel.
Robert Barrett) (5)..
15.
16.
17.
18.
19°
Nosenko's Travel to Cuba...
Nosenko's Travel to Bulgaria...
Transfer to 7th Department..
Nosenko's Knowledge of [Morell and Garland.
-(5)
F. Nosenko's Assignment to 7th Department,
January, 1962 January, 1964.
1. Nosenko's Substitute as Chief..
2.
3.
4.
Nosenko's Contacts with (Frippel] (③
Volkov and [William J. Zubon] (5.).
Marina Rytova..
5. W. E. Johnson..
6.
1.
8.
William Carroll
nes 10::
门
Jones
KGB Officers in Soviet Delegation, Geneva.
Boris Belitskiy V. L. Artemev.
9. Horst Brauns? (S)..
10.
Pavel Fedorovich Shakhov.
1.
2.
3.
Nosenko's Assignment to 1st Section,
1st Department, January, 1960 - January, 1962... 93
Nosenko's Position as Deputy Chief of Section. 95
Kovshuk's Acquaintance with Americans.
Golitzyn's Information Re Recruitments.
4.
James Storsberg
Military Code Clerk.)
5.
James Keyzers..
6.
Matthew Peter Zujus..
7.
Paul Jenner
John Garland.
8.
Joseph Morone.
9.
Joseph Gaffey.
10.
John Abidian..
KGB File on U. S. Embassy.
° °
°
104
104.
°
108
115
.118
120.
123
127
128
131
134
141
145
147
148
149
.150
151
153
153
154
154
.155
156
157
159
0
161
164
165.
169
12.
Lee Harvey Oswald.
.170
13.
Nosenko's Temporary Duty Document.
171
14.
Nosenko's Notes..
.175
15.
Recall Telegram...
.178
16.
KGB Knowledge of American Intelligence
Tourist Operations..
181
SECRET
iii
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 6
G.
Miscellaneous Criticisms.
TOP SECRET
184
184
.186
•
1. Nosenko's Association with Gribanov.
2. Nosenko's Komsomol and CP Status.
3. Nosenko's Knowledge of KGB Forms..
Nosenko's Knowledge of KGB Files and
Checking Procedures..
4.
5. Nosenko's Sourcing of Information.
6.
Nosenko's KGB Ranks.
由 " •
7.
KGB Officers Reportedly Known to Nosenko
19
$
8. KGB Dining Rooms..
9. KGB Telephone Directories.
H:
Cases Not Directly Related to Claimed
Positions in KGB..
1. Actor /[ Proctor: (③.
2. Robert Armstrong.
3.
Harold Berman...
4.
Robert Charles Christner.
5.
Norman Fisk..
6.
Preston Grover..
7.
Stephen F. Hoffman.
8. Melvin (Marvin) Kantor.
9.
Kazan Komarek..
10.
Ralph Matlaw.
11.
Philip Nielsen
•
12.
Bernard Pechter.
13.
Aron Pressman.
14.
.189
°
191
..194
.196
"
め
.197
.200
°
.201.
.203
.204
.206
.206
.20%
.207
.208
.208
.209
h
痴
.210
210
.211
$
• °
•
° ° B
(S)
.211
• a
.212
•
•
.212
°
e
..213
16.
17.
18.
Walter Rask....
15. Spencer Roberts.
Johanna Ross...
John Rufe....
Collette Schwarzenbach.
•
°
°
#
°
•
•
19.
Sofia Greta Shattauer.
.
. 4
•
20.
Howard Sochurek.
21. William Taraska.
22.
Carmen Torrey. .
23. Vasiliy Volkov.
24.
William Wallace.
25. Ralph and Evelyn Younger
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825
Page 7
iv
°
#
•
°
.213
.214
.214
215
.215
.216
.217
.217
.218
218
✓✓ OP SECRET
NEW CASES AND NEW OR CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION.
IV.
A.
New Cases.
MOP SECRET
..219
....219
1. [George Lubin, Will and Sipe Burtin,] (s)
(FNU) [Smith..]
2. (FNU) Hoffman.(S)
3. Domenico Canala.
4. Ery Whitaker Kehaya (5).
5. Unknown Subject; American Owner
of Hotel or Restaurant.
Sam Sidney Hollander] (
219
" °
223
.224
227
228
..229
Significant Data on Cases Previously Reported.....230
6°
B.
2.
The Brussels Case
1. John Discoe Smith (Zhari)
°
3. Tatiana Fiaksel Sherich, Daniel Sherich.
Interesting New Data.
C.
1.
2.
Evgeniy Petrovich Granovsky.
Visit of High Ranking Officers.
3. Boris Aleksandrovich Komarov...
4.
Nikolai Skvortsov..
D. Significant Confirmatory Information.
1. Strukov and Uryvayev..
Richard Donald Shaffer..
230
.233
234
.236
.236.
。
.237
.238
.239
.239
.239
.240
.242.
.243
.243
.244
246
.248
250
2.
3. Ralph and Evelyn Younger
4. Trip of Nosenko's Mother.
5. Collette Schwarzenback]($)
Chelnokov.. •• ; •
6. Gabriel Reiner Vladimir Dmitryevich.
7. Virgil Kraft] (S)..
8.
Consistency in Identifications and
Information....
V. RESULTS OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 8
焚
SECRET
C
SECRET
I.
PREFACE
A. Purpose of Paper
This paper has been prepared to compare the results
of the 1967-68 interrogations of YURI NOSENKO with a CIA
paper dated February, 1968, entitled "The Examination of
the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector." This CIA paper was based
on previous interrogations of NOSENKO and concluded that
NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.
(u)
According to the paper, in arriving at this
conclusion the lengthy interrogations of NOSENKO, analysis
of KGB operations which he related and comparison of his
assertions with collateral information from other sources
were considered.
B.
Xu
Background
For convenience in assessing these papers,
following chronology of events is set forth:
:)(u)
the
NOSENKO first made contact with CIA in Geneva in
June, 1962. After several meetings he returned to Russia
and was not again in contact with CIA until his return to
Geneva in January, 1964. On his return to Geneva he indicated |
GROUP
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
1
☑P
SECRET
NW 50953' DocId: 32318825 Page 9
SECRET
Significant inaccuracies were detected in the CIA
(5)°
paper regarding the KEYZERS, MORONE and ABIDIAN cases.
Contrary to statements in the paper,
(s)
[KEYZERS WAS
KEYZERS was not inter-
viewed about homosexual activities before he left Moscow;
[MORONE] and
MORONE did have contact with a girl at American House posing
as a West German journalist; the Soviet maid TATYANA FEDOROVICH
did have access to ABIDIAN's living quarters within six months
after his arrival in Moscow.
COMMENT:
*
A number of previous CIA conclusions
regarding this period were based on deficient
interrogations of NOSENKO and inadequate
collateral inquiries.
These conclusions have
been invalidated by current interrogation and
collateral inquiries and there is no substan-
tial basis for doubting NOSENKO's basic claims
regarding this period. ✗(1)
F. 1962-64 Period
Perio
(u)
It is concluded in the CIA paper that NOSENKO's
claims of being Chief of the American-British Commonwea
wealth C
12
Balth (1/(u)
SECRET
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 10

SECRET
is alleged that NOSENKO did not indicate the sources from
which he obtained the information regarding the cases.
(u)
During current interrogation NOSENKO provided sources
or logical explanation for his knowledge in sixteen of the
nineteen cases referred to above. He also provided adequate
clarification regarding three of the other five cases which
were subjects of CIA criticism. In addition a current review
of his notes by NOSENKO provided the translation "ECTOR",
instead of "ACTOR" or "PROCTOR" Previously obtained, as the
Collateral investigation has developed
name of an agent.
(s)
a logical suspect by this name. (Logical suspects named
"ACTOR" or
COMMENT:
[PROCTOR ] were
were not previously identified.)
Previous interrogations of NOSENKO in
which information was not obtained regarding
the sources for these cases were obviously
inadequate. Current interrogations have
provided significant clarifying information.
(⑲(u)
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 11
15
焚
SECRET
3
I.
New Cases and New Information
泌
SECRET
The current interrogations of NOSENKO have developed
six new cases involving nine people which were previously not
uncovered during his interrogations.
Collateral investigation
has identified six of these persons and one (DOMENICO CANALA)] (S)
has been interviewed and admitted the allegations. This case
is considered significant corroboration of NOSENKO.
Additional significant data was developed on three
cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO.
Data in one case (the
Brussels case) may assist in the identification of a KGB agent
who supplied NATO codes.
*(u)
Considerable interesting, new and confirmatory data
was obtained during the current interrogations.
are cited.
COMMENT:
u)
The new cases, Rew information and
Twelve examples
confirmatory data obtained in the current inter-
rogations and collateral inquiries also clearly
establish that the previous interrogations were
deficient and collateral inquiries inadequate.
Failure to acknowledge significance of NOSENKO's
personnel identifications and organizational data
denotes lack of objectivity in CIA paper.
16
✗(U)
SECRET
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 12
SECRET
appear reluctant in the past. One was his
[extra
(s)
-marital affair ] with a friend of INGA
KARI AMOVA and the other was his arrest in
1954 when he used a KGB cover document to
obtain treatment for venereal disease
a result he was removed as Komsomol Secretary.
In addition the "Characteristic" which was prepared
on him in early 1955 was critical of him and his
mother had interceded with PETR FEDOTOV, Chief
of SCD, who transferred NOSENKO to the 7th
Department. This intercession possibly prevented
his dismissal from KGB
√2.
**
(*(u)
Assignment Against Correspondent✓ ✓
Fages 76-80 relate to NOSENKO's assignment to
operations against American correspondents.
It was stated
that although NOSENKO could give a breakdown of the network
of agents used against correspondents in terms of number and
type of agents, he had forgotten their true names and could
them ☑X (u)
not provide personality Information on any of them.
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 13
37
SECRET
SECRET
necessary and they were suitable for use in a
'case.)
NOSENKO had files on both of these agents
which he turned over to PHILLIP VASIYEVICH KISLITSYN
when NOSENKO began work on military attaches. He
had no opportunity to use "RAKETA" in 1953.
"RAKETA" was an agent for some officer of Section II,
1st Department in 1960 or 1961
Hα (u)
ON] (S)
[Colonel EARL L. MICKELSON
On page 88 it is stated that [Colonel EARL L.
SON] S
MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside
the Soviet Union which NOSENKO did not report.
COMMENT:
During interrogation of NOSENKO he could not
recall specifically the arrest of MI
[
MICKELSON ] But
stated that there were many "akts" against U. S.
military attache personnel in which they were
detained and written descriptions of their so-called
"violations" were prepared. He indicated that the
attache personnel,. of course, in most instances
refused to sign such documents, but nevertheless
nevertheless
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 14
41
SECRET
SECRET
they were prepared.
$4(u)
2.
[IRA
IRA B. RICHARDS
On pages 89 and 90 the paper indicates that NOSENKO
correctly identified IRA B.
RICHARDS (
(s)
as an Assistant Army
Attache and named his maid MARIYA NEVEROVA as an agent reporting
on him..
It was stated, however, that NOSENKO referred to
LUDMILA GROMAKOVA in connection with another matter as a
KGB agent during 1960-62 but did not relate her to RICHARDS (S.)
or to the 1953-55 period. GROMAKOVA gave [RICHARDS] Russian
language
()
lessons. It was also stated that NOSENKO did not
(s)
know of VOLODYA who was RICHARDS' driver and therefore should
have been NOSENKO's agent.
COMMENT:
On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO, in
response to a request, furnished a handwritten list
of his agents. For the period 1953-54 he listed as
an agent a teacher of the Russian language who was
giving lessons to correspondent CLARK. He also listed
for the period 1954-55 drivers of the military attache(
and his officers, indicated there were five or six and
42
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 15
THE
SECRET
о
furnished the name of one as "SHNIREV."
VASILYEVICH SHNYRYEV).
TXP
TOP SECRET
(NIKOLAY
NOSENKO was not specifically
questioned concerning VOLODYA and GROMAKOVA's connections
with RICHARDS]
[HOWARD
HOWARD 1. FELCHLIN
Pages 90-93 of the paper relate to Assistant Army.
IN] (sht
Attache [HOWARD 1. FELCHLIN
It was indicated that NOSENKO
(s)
correctly identified [FELCHLIN] but knew nothing of his back-
ground, did not recall names of agents specifically targeted
against him, did not recall a newspaper article in March,
[FELCHLIN] Sand
1954, falsely accusing FELCHLIN and his companion, did not
recall any unusual circumstances involving the expulsion of
(s)
's)
FELCHLIN and MC KINNEY 1954 and when told that the expulsion
took place in that year stated this was not the correct date.
It was also indicated NOSENKO did not recognize the name of
ك
FELCHLIN' fold.
FELCHLIN's maid, FEDEROVA.
COMMENT:
On April 18, 1968, (N-182), NOSENKO stated.
that he had a file on FELCHLIN] and utilized a
chambermaid NEFEDOVA against him as well as
43
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 16
TOP SECRET
SECRET
drivers for the military attache's office. He
described the chambermaid and furnished her code
name as "SHEVEDOVA". When shown the name FEDEROVA
he indicated that this was the name of FELCHLIN's (5)
maid rather than NEFEDOVA. He also said that her
first name was probably MARIYA but recognized DORA
as the first name when it was mentioned to him. He
stated that a driver for the military attache office
was "SHNYREV" and accurately furnished his first name
as NIKOLAY.
He said there were several "akts" on
[FELCHLIN] suring his travel in the USSR which FFLCHLINS
He recalled that FELCHLIN
at FELCHLIN Was
(s)
refused to sign.
arrested with another officer while NOSENKO and his
wife were at Kubienka during the summer of 1954. He
said that this occurred on the 8th or 9th of the month,
probably July, and had appeared in the newspapers on
July,
those dates. He stated that he had been on vacation.
and his wife had given birth to a baby in August, 1954.
(Actually the arrest took place on July 4, or July 5,
1954, and may well not have appeared in the Soviet
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 17
44
же
SECRET
C
To
SECRET
newspapers until the 8th or 9th)
NOSENKO also pointed out that KGB obtained
considerable information from microphones concerning
operations and plans of the Military Attache personnel
including their discussions before trips, their plans
for visiting various cities and points of interest
and their conversations after their trips. In addition.
KGB knew how much money they had each year for
operations, the reactions of the officers to each
other, etc. Excerpts of information were given to
KGB. ☑(u)
the Disinformation Department of KGB.
(s)
Expulsion of BENSON, MULE and STROUI
LOUD 
&
Pages 95 and 96 deal with the expulsion from the
LE] (S)
Soviet Union of Assistant U. S. Army Attaches BENSON, MULE
and [STROUD: This expulsion resulted from seizure of equipment
carried by these officers on May 5, 1955, and they were declared
personae non gratae. It was stated that NOSENKO claimed that
this incident had occurred after he was transferred to the
7th Department; however, when the May 7 date was given to him
him
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*
SECRET
८
not.
very strong
he had turned the 1st Section files over to
SECRET
VALERIY BUDYLDIN who had worked for a short
period but was later fired from KGB and the
files were then transferred to VICTOR RASSADIN
RASSADIN A4 (u)
It appears that NOSENKO's failure to recall
details of this incident could be due to his
hospitalization at the time it occurred.)
*(W)
GEORGE VAN LAETHEM/
M/s
Pages 97 and 98 relate to GEORGE VAN LAETHEM Assistant
Army Attache, at the American Embassy from March, 1951, to
March, 1953.
NOSENKO had reported that ALLA LARIONOVA was
placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with an assign-
ment to strike up an acquaintance with VAN LAet
LAETHEM. ] (S) She
succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and tele-
phone number; however, he did not call her. NOSENKO heard
about this from PANKRATOV and knew of no other KGB interest
(5)
in [VAN LAETHEM]] (5) It
It was pointed out that [VAN LAETHEM denied
any meeting with LARIONOVA as alleged by NOSENKO and further
5)
VAN
VAN 
LAETHEM was again in Moscow from March 19 to May 19, 1955,
1955.
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P
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while NOSENKO was still the case officer responsible for
Army Attaches. He was reported to the Russians as an
Assistant Army Attache on permanent assignment although it
was actually a temporary assignment.
COMMENT:
As indicated above NOSENKO stated on
April 16, 1968, (N-181), that he was in the hospital
for 30 or 40 days just prior to transfer to the 7th
Department and would have been in the hospital during
(5)
April, 1955. When told that [VAN LAETHEM returned to
EMet
the USSR on March 19, 1955, NOSENKO said that he did
not remember it.
10.
EDWARD ELLIS SMITH
(4)
On page 99 the paper points out that NOSENKO claimed
to have personally participated in the KGB operation against
部门
EDWARD ELLIS SMITH in 1954-55 but the incident described by
NOSENKO in which SMITH was approached occurred in June, 1956,
after NOSENKO had been transferred to the 7th Department for
about a year.
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C
...(u)
ANDREY"
TOP SECRET
On page 99 it is also indicated that if NOSENKO
NOSENKO
served in the Embassy Section (1st Section, 1st Department).
during 1953-55, "It is difficult to perceive how he could
have remained unaware of 'ANDREY'S' identity."
claimed that "ANDREY" was spotted by ROY RHODES and was
recruited prior to NOSENKO's connection with KGB in March,
1953% 'ANDREY" was a crypto-repairman and the direct
subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic security
officer, Captain WALTER MULE, who was NOSENKO's target.
COMMENT:
(s)
NOSENKO has consistently stated that
"ANDREY" was being handled by KOVSHUK, assisted
by BORODIN, and that he obtained information
regarding "ANDRFY" through conversations with
KOVSHUK and BORODIN: Inasmuch as NOSENKO did not
enter the KGB until 1953, it does not seem
inconsistent for officers in his section not to
reveal to him the identity of an important agent
who was furnishing important information on a current
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☑
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their duties and in addition noted that there were
2. FCD officers who were assigned to the Section
"in practice" (for training purposes). He named
one of these officers. On the same date he listed
his special targets among the correspondents and
military officers during this period and discussed
the actions against them. He indicated that he had
operated agents against officers of the Military
Attache's office but was not responsible for the
officers of the Navy and Air Force. In addition he *-
said that the Sergeants of all of the services were
the responsibility of another officer in the section.
He stated that the main objectives against the Sergeants.
were to ascertain their weaknesses and place girls in
contact with them. Normally KGB officers were not.
sent with foreign Attaches, when they traveled in the
;
USSR except to look for electronic gear. He described
a search of the luggage of the Military Attache
FILLMORE K MEARNS
(s)
In which he participated with
54
&
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TOP SECRET
IONOV and KARETNIKOV of OTU whom he had known since
1953.
When shown a list of Soviets employed by
the U. S. Embassy in 1954 he selected the names
of eleven as agents of the 1st Section. On
February 8, 1968, (N-125), photographs of 18
Soviet employees of American House were displayed
to him. He identified an old woman known as
BABUSHKA as an agent who had worked at American
House before 1953 and who had retired about 1960.
In another group he recognized the photograph of
TAMARA ANTUFEVA as an agent utilized in the
MAHON
(S)
FREDERICK R. MC MAHON case who was sent to Berlin
[ FREDERI
to contact him but was unsuccessful.
He did not
recognize the photograph of GALINA G. MOROZOVA
and said he never saw her but Officer RAKOVSKIY,
who worked against American House and the Sergeants,
had an agent named MOROZOVA in 1953 or 1954. He
recognized the photograph of RAISA TROFIMOVA and
furnished her name
as
an agent of RAKOVSKIY,
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SECRET
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that CIA warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA. The paper noted
that CIA did not warn BELITSKIY against SHUIGINA but BELITSKIY
had reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent. SHULGINA
was for two years a Secretary-Correspondent of NBC Correspondent
IRVING R. LEVINE and according to BELITSKIY was involved in
the sexual entrapment and KGB recruitment of British MP TOM
[British
DRIBERG. It was stated that NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of
SHULGINA's involvement with LEVINE and other Americans belied
his claim that she was his agent during the 1955-58 period.
It was also noted that in 1964 he failed to recognize her photo-
graph; when shown her name he identified her not as his former
agent but as an SCD agent involved with BELITSKIY.
COMMENT:
On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO listed
SHULGINA as one of his agents and indicated that in
1960 she left Intourist and worked in the Radio
Committee. On January 24, 1968, (N-109), he stated.
that she was an agent of GEORGIY IVANOVICH RASTRUSIN
before she was turned over to NOSENKO with whom she
(x(u)
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59
TOP SECRET
☑O
SECRET
It
or have been her case officer in the 1955-57 period.
was further noted that KUNGAROVA, who had married an American
tourist, PHILIP NIELSEN was interviewed by the FBI and denied
collaboration with the KGB; that KUNGAROVA had died in 1965.
爽
COMMENT:
On December 6, 1967, (N-57), the name VIKTOR.
KOPEYKIN was displayed to NOSENKO who identified him
as a Lieutenant Colonel working as a Senior Case
Officer in the 2nd Section of the 1st Department in
1960-62. He stated that KOFEYKIN "was keeping my
former agent VERA" who married PHILIP NIELSEN.
i(s):
th NIELSEN] but
stated that she had left Russia with NIELSEN but
He
was coming back to Russia and KGB was also studying
(5)
the question of whether [NIELSEN] was connected with
American Intelligence.
*
On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO listed
TAMARA KUNGAROVA among his agents for the
1955-59 period. On January 11, 1968, (N-93),,
NOSENKO stated that she was "in close relations".
*(u)
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*
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with a representative of the Belgian airlines and
was trying to marry a foreigner to go abroad.
On January 30, 1968, (N-114), NOSENKO in
(
writing about KGB operations against the British
stated that in 1954-56 TAMARA KUNGAROVA and MARIANNA
ZHETVINA were agents of the 2nd Department of SCD
and were working in the British Embassy. Both knew
the English language and were later turned over to
NOSENKO understood that
y
NOSENKO by ALEKSEY SUNTSOV.
they had been "in close relations" with employees of
the British Embassy. NOSENKO identified the photo-
graph of MARIANNA ZHETVINA and on March 18, 1968,
(N-165), identified the photograph of TAMARA KUNGAROVA.
At that time he stated that she had worked for him two
or three years but in 1959 he had discontinued working
with her. She had been "in close relations" with
Americans on her own initiative; some of which she
did not report. He recognized the name of JOHN MEANS
(s)
THOMPSON as one of the Americans with whom she was in
in☑
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contact. She was also an interpreter for the
[Forrestal group. ✗
On August 24, 1968, (n-217), NOSENKO stated
for which
that he had seen the name PARSONS which reminded him
of a 2nd Department, SCD operation against a man by
He believed that TAMARA KUNGAROVA worked
that name.
against this man. This happened prior to the time
KUNGAROVA worked for him (NOSENKO) and probably while
she was working against the British; however, NOSENKO
Was of British nationality.
was not sure that [PARSONS] as
4.
YEVGENIYA DANKO
On page 109 the paper refers to YEVGENIYA DANKO who
worked for ARSENE FRIPPEL at the American Express Company ] (5)
office in Moscow and later for FRIPPEL's Aud
s successor, MICHAEL
MICHAEL
JELISAVCIC] It t was indicated NOSENKO stated that he took
DANKO over from another 7th Department case officer during
the period 1955-57 and she was used to report on both [FRIPPEL ] (S)
and JELISAV
JELISAVCIC
. (5) The
The 
paper noted that FRIPPEL Left Moscow in
1961 by which time NOSENKO had transferred from the 7th
Department.
$
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*
TOP
OP SECRET
COMMENT:
On November 4, 1967, (N-11), while discussing
or DOSENKO
[FRIPPEL, NOSENKO stated that the true name of Agent
"OKSANA" was EVGENIA VASILIEVNA DENKO. On December 11,
1967, (N-64), he listed among his agents EVGENIA DANKO
who was a translator at the permanent exhibition of
agriculture and industry in Moscow and from 1957
worked as a translator for the American Express Company] ($)
representative in Moscow. On April 18, 1968, (N-182),
NOSENKO stated that DANKO was a former Agent of IVAN
ALEKSEYEVICH KONSTANTINOV and NOSENKO received her
h
file in 1957 when KONSTANTINOV retired. At that time.
she was working at the permanent exhibition of agriculture
Later, however, she was assigned
as indicated above.
to
[FRIPPEL] e
RIPPEL when he inquired concerning an interpreter.
(s)
After [FRIPPEL Deft in 1961 she continued working in the
American Express office. A
√($)
[5. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV
] (u)
On pages 112 and 113 the paper refers to NOSENKO's
Agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. -It was noted that he was unfamiliar
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with their background and could not say where they lived or how
he got in touch with them when he required their service.
It
was noted that they were involved with one Dutch and five American
visitors, including three CIA Agents, in the Soviet Union which
was apparently unknown to NOSENKO. In addition they were
involved with two other Americans in 1959 while he was their
case officer but he learned about it only at the time he
retired their files in 1962-63.
COMMENT:
☆ (u)
On July 3, 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO described
in detail his relations with the agents VOLKOV and
YEFREMOV. He stated that as a result of the [MALIA (5)
case the Chiefs" of the 7th Department decided that
a homosexual agent was needed.
NOSENKO recruited the
young fellow who was connected with
[MALIA] and through
him tried to get others. Then he visited the Moscow
Investigation Department of the Militia (called
Criminal Investigation Directorate of Moscow) for
help. He was shown cards of Militia agents among which
was the card for ANATOLIY VOLKOV, a former agent of they
the
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65
тур
SECRET
TOP SECRET
Americans who were suspected by KGB of being CIA
agent's would likely be handled by KGB elements other
than the 1st Section of the 7th Department where
NOSENKO was assigned.
XX (u)
☑. [MARTIN MALIA] SK
Pages 114 and 115 of the paper discuss the MARTIN MALIA] Ś
case. MALIA
according to NOSENKO, was observed in contact with
homosexuals in Moscow but was not approached by KGB for recruit
(s)
ment. It was noted that although [MALIA had not been interviewed
in connection with NOSENKO's information, he had, in 1963, prior
to receipt of NOSENKO's information, denied any involvement with
homosexuals in the Soviet Union.
COMMENT:
(s)
栈
[MALIA has still not been interviewed concerning
NOSENKO's allegations but it is noted that in
September, 1963, SPENCER ROBERTS,
الوكلاء
an admitted homo-
fin
sexual, advised that he observed [MALIA] in Zurich.] (5)
Switzerland, in July, 1963, and saw and overheard
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proposition a young male for homosexual activities.
(s)
On May 16, 1968, ROBERTS changed his story but stated
(S)
()
MALIA S
that he attended [Navy Language School with MALIA
1944-45 and suspected that he was a homosexual. In
1963 he saw him in Cannes, France,
cen
in a group of
homosexuals on a beach frequented almost exclusively
by homosexuals.
**
In addition, information was reported to the
American Embassy in Rome, Italy, in 1966 regarding
[MALIA] and
a close association between MALIA and a young German,
JORG B. MARUSCZCZYK who according to a physician
appeared to be a homosexual.
The above information effectively supports
NOSENKO's allegation that MALIA was involved with
(5)
homosexuals
On November 7, 1967, February 6, March 8, and
April 10, 1968, (N-14, 121, 125, 178), NOSENKO furnished
regarding the [MALIA] Case
detailed information regarding the MALIA case which
indicated he had a personal knowledge of that case.
(s)
(MALTA)
He said he had no doubt that MALIA was connected with
American Intelligence.
This conclusion was based on
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POP
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☑
SECRET
MALIA's behavior, his manner of studying people and
obtaining information from some of them. NOSENKO
believed that MALIA could have been recruited by
KGB and said that PERFILEYEV later regretted that
he did not permit an approach to [MALIA.] C
[RICHARD BURGHI] S
7(s)
Pages 115-121 relate to the RICHARD BURGHI case.
e RICHARD
On
page 120 it is stated that NOSENKO is unfamiliar with the mechanics
of KGB tracing procedures.
COMMENT:
On January 26, 1968, (N-111), NOSENKO stated
that the KGB has a rule that when the KGB Archives
are checked for information on foreigners, both the
FCD Archives and the Archives of the KGB must be
checked. On this date he discussed in detail the
handling of files pertaining to tourists and the transfer
of the files to FCD when the tourists leave the Soviet/
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-71
(u)
SECRET
T
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Union. Information furnished by NOSENKO on this
date and on other dates indicates that he does have
adequate knowledge of KGB tracing and filing procedures.
[ARSENE FRIPPER ☑
Fages 137-143 relate to the recruitment and operation
(s)
of ARSENE FRIPPEL. American Express Company representative in
f ARSENE
Moscow. It is noted that the versions of NOSENKO and FRIPPEL
[FRIPPEL] (s)
of the latter's recruitment and operation agree with some
exceptions. It is stated that NOSENKO and
[FRIPPEL Agree that...
with one exception, (when [FRIPPEL] was queried regarding [BOWDEN]
and WINTERS), ([FRIPPE]] ( a
was not used to report on American Embassy
[FRIPFEL, while
employees. It is also stated that FRIPHEL, while acknowledging
that NOSENKO participated in all meetings with him, stated that
CHELNOKOV was in charge of the entire operation.
(5)
It is:
further stated that FRIPPEL claims he saw NOSENKO on three
occasions, twice in Odessa while visiting the USSR in 1962
and 1963 whereas NOSENKO insisted that he met
LERIPPE
but once
in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period.
72
必
SECRET
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COMMENT:
A review of the results of FBI interviews
[FRIPHEL] our
of FRIPFEL during 1964 disclosed that
FRIPPELS
described the initial recruiting contact of "NIKOLAEV"
and "GRIBOV". He identified a photograph of NOSENKO
as "NIKOLAEV" and stated that "NIKOLAEV" displayed
photographs to him and carried out the interrogation.
He stated that "NIKOLAEV" conducted almost all of the
interrogations during their meetings; however,
"Colonel GRIBOV" was in charge of the entire operation S
This appears to agree with NOSENKO's account; he
said that he was the case officer and was accompanied
by Colonel V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the 7th
Department. When CHELNOKOV's photograph was displayed
The
FRIPFEL
to FRIPPEL he indicated that it resembled "GRIBOV"
but would not make a definite identification: ✗
FRIPHEL admitted having approximately six
meetings through December, 1960, during which "NIKOLAEV"
asked his observations of "various American Embassy
officials." He specifically requested on one occasion
occasion: ✗
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information concerning [BOWDEN and information
regarding an economist at the Embassy whom [FRIPPEL] (S)
presumed was GEORGE WINTERS. This also is consistent
with NOSENKO's account who stated that he questioned
FRIPPEL (S
RIPPEL about the Embassy and about Embassy officers
((W)
[BOWDEN] and WINTERS
XX
With regard to meetings in 1962 and 1963,
O
[FRIPHEL] said he visited the USSR in February, 1962,
and went to Odessa for one day where he was met by
"NIKOLAEV" and "GRIBOV.. At that time they asked
if any American Naval personnel were abroad the
☐ Olympia", Greek vessel] on which he was traveling.
Again in the summer of 1962 he accompanied a group
of newspaper editors to the USSR at which time he
was contacted by "NIKOLAEV" at FRIPPEL
FRIPPEL'S POSCOW
hotel room. He next visited the USSR in February,
1963, and again was approached by "NIKOLAEV", in
Odessa
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TOP SECRET
SECRET
On November 4, 1967, (N-11), NOSENKO, in
writing about the FRIPPEL cas
[FRIPPEL] 
Case, stated that
stated that 
[FRIPPEL] (5)
returned to the USSR in the summer of 1962 with a
group of correspondents and he saw him twice. In
March, 1963, FRIPPEL
[FRIPPEL was on the "Olympia")] in Odessa
嗯
"where I flew and have seen him.1
There does not appear to be any substantial
(S)
discrepancy between FRIPPEL's and NOSENKO's accounts
and no basis to suspect that NOSENKO is lying
NOSENKO Not CI Officer
(u)
lying()
On page 145, in discussing NOSENKO's operational
activities during the 1955-60 period, it is stated that the
evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English speaking
specialist in sexual entrapment and not a counterintelligence
officer. Further that NOSENKO furnished no information which
indicated that there was any material change in his duties and
responsibilities after he was allegedly promoted to Deputy
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section.
75.
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COMMENT:
SECRET
The statement of
[FRIPPEL] hat
RIPPEL that "NIKOLAEV"
(NOSENKO) conducted almost all of the interrogations
strongly suggests that NOSENKO was a counterintelli-
gence officer
rather than just an "English speaking
specialist in sexual entrapment."
A number of other
cases, all summarized in the CIA paper, establishes
this fact beyond reasonable doubt. RICHARD BURGHI's
s] (5)
(pages 115-120) description of his recruitment is one
such case. He described his meeting with a Russian,
'ANATOLI," [on June 18, 1956, for who introduced him to
"VIKTOR" and "YURI IVANOVICH" in a Moscow restaurant
16.] He
on June 20, 1956.
He identified the photograph of
YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO as "YURI IVANOVICH" and said
he left after about twenty minutes. On June 23, 1956,] (S)
(s)
[BURGHI]
[BURGHI 
traveled to [Kiev)] where he was met at the
airport by "YURI IVANOVICH" and "VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH"
who took him to an apartment and introduced him to
"ANATOLI SERGEEVICH" (undoubtedly ANATOLI SERGEEVICH
KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the 7th Department who F
](s)
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NOSENKO said accompanied him to [Kiev)] and
participated in the approach to [BURGHI)] (s) Burghi ] Ⓒ
said "ANATOLI SERGEEVICH" was the ranking
officer, referred to as Colonel, and he and
"YURI IVANOVICH" had come from Moscow. "VLADIMIR
STEPANOVICH" was assigned
Гео
Kiev "ANATOLI
SERGEEVICH" led the questioning and there was
no doubt he was in charge. However, "YURI
IVANOVICH" appeared to give orders to "VLADIMIR
STEPANOVICH" and also appeared to be in charge
during the brief encounter with "ANATOLI" and
"VIKTOR" in the restaurant in Moscow before he
went to Kiev
Kiev.](s)
*
It is submitted that a mere "English
speaking specialist in sexual entrapment"
③)
would not be taken to Kiev] by the Deputy Chief
of 7th Department after only a twenty-minute
(⑤)
encounter with BURGHI In Moscow. Further, such
a "specialist" would not give orders to a KGB
officer stationed in Kiev
This is clearly the
n Kiev. This
75b
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role of a case officer and [BURGHI'
confirms NOSENKO's account.
TOP SECRET
s description
锅
Four other cases cited in the CIA paper
support NOSENKO's contention that he was a case
officer. The subjects confirmed NOSENKO's accounts
of their recruitments
(x)(u)
$]&page
GIZELLA HARRIS page 128) identified NOSENKO
as one of the two men involved in her recruitment
and said he "was definitely the man in charge"
while the other "was merely present and listened."
()
[GEORGE DREW] (pages 130-131) identified NOSENKO's
photograph as his interrogator and said it was
clear that he was the man in charge.
(s)
[DAVID TAYLOR] (132-133) identified NOSENKO
as the "Colonel SERGEYEV" who recruited him and
said the mere sight of NOSENKO's photograph
"sent shivers down his back."
(s)
[GERARD MERTENS] stated the photograph of
NOSENKO might be the "GEORGE PETERSON" who
recruited him.
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 39
75c
SECRET.
SECRET
have had access to information concerning all of them
while Deputy Chief of the Section in 1958-59. [FISK)]) (S)
(s)
INSBERG was there in 1956 but
was there in 1959;
had subsequent trips; [KANTOR (4)
believed to have
visited relatives (As indicated above, such cases
would probably not have come to NOSENKO's attention);
[KARLOV] as a Swede Hather
than American (NOSENKO'
section may have had an interest if he was a part
(s)
of the Yale Chorus) PECHTER] was there in late 1959;.-
(S) PRESSMAN] was there in 1957 but did not go as a tourist
(S) SEVERN] probably did not visit the Soviet Union as a
RT $)
tourist; SHATTAUR had previously been recruited in
Poland in
Poland in 1946-47 and was re-recruited in 1962; TARASKA (S)
also visited relatives.
References to all of these.
cases could, of course, have been in the 7th
Department files reviewed by NOSENKO when he became
Deputy Chief of the Department.
SHATTAUR] and [KANTOR] wer
fand 
G
Three of them (RUFE,
KANTOR were in notes prepared for the
BOBKÓV list referred to above. Therefore, it does not
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79.
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TOP SECRET
appear that his retention and delivery of notes
regarding these cases should be given serious
consideration as an indication he is not bona fide.
His knowledge of the cases is consistent with his
plausible explanations regarding his possession of
the notes.
•
*
American Intelligence Use of Tourists
Pages 146-150 relate to NOSENKO's awareness of what
the KGB knew concerning the use of tourists by foreign intelli-
gence services. It was noted that he claimed to have prepared
a report for SCD Chief GRIBANOV in 1959, but could not remember
the content, any examples included therein or the conclusions
regarding American-British tourist intelligence operations. It -
is stated that he claimed no agents were definitely identified
among American tourists and no tourists had been caught in the
act of mailing letters, servicing dead drops, or contacting
agents with one exception.
This exception he named as MC GUIRE
who mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959. $ It
80
[as MC GUIRE
It was noted that this
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TYP
case as described by NOSENKO actually related to EDWARD
MC GOWAN, a CIA tourist agent who was detected by KGB mailing
an operational letter in Minsk in August, 1958; However, Lone
RE: St
ROBERT ALAN MC GUIRE visited the Soviet Union in April-May,
1959, and was the target of KGB provocations although he
had no intelligence connections. It was stated that inter-
rogation did not resolve how NOSENKO knew the name MC GUIRE.
E.] (③
but not the background of his case and knew the background of
[MC GOWAN'
frase
case but not his name.
*S
The CIA paper also relates that the KGB agent GEORGE
BLAKE furnished to KGB in 1959 a 19 page document covering a
conference held in London between British and CIA representatives
outlining British and American use of tourists for intelligence
purposes. The KGB was therefore fully aware of the use of
tourists and it was stated that the substance of this informa
tion, if not the document itself, would have been brought to
the attention of the Deputy Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section.
x(u)
reart
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✓
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tourists for intelligence.
The 1st Department
of SCD wrote the final report about overall
American Intelligence operations against the USSR,
but NOSENKO's portion regarding use of tourists was
considered good and was accepted as written.
•(u)
NOSENKO stated that there was an analysis each
year regarding use of tourists for intelligence and
even in 1955 there were some indications of tourist.
use by Americans including "little facts" how the
tourists acted, trying to get military information,
trying to find drops, studying candidates for
recruitment, etc. Each year they had good examples
for the analysis including the use of other
nationalities by the Americans.
NOSENKO, however,
could not remember any of the specific examples
used in the analysis.
ing a
• (u).
On April 1, 1968, (N-175), when questioned concern-
case involving ["MC GUIRE or something like that"
-83
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who was mentioned as mailing a letter, NOSENKO stated
that this case, at the beginning, was a task for the
7th Department.
(5).
"MC GUIRE" was an "aspirant" (student)
"and he arrived in Russia having several tours and
had about 30 or 40 days." He was young and alone
and although there was no information on him in the
Archives he was suspected because of his "legend"
(stated reason for coming to the USSR). He, therefore,
was the subject of coverage which detected his mailing
of a letter in Minsk. This was reported to Moscow by
KGB in Minsk, apparently directed to GRIBANOV,
turned the case over to the First (American) Department
which thereafter handled the investigation.
who
: This'
happened in the late 1950's but NOSENKO could not
recall the year.
NOSENKO stated that the letter
mailed by this (MC GOWAN MC GUIRE" was going to a
Russian. (The transfer of this case from the 7th to
the 1st Department suggests that the Russian to whom
the letter was mailed was being used in an operational
game by the 2nd Section of the 1st Department.).
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OP SECRET
TOP
It should be noted that the MCC GOWANY CHase
is mentioned in the KGB document acquired by CIA
in 1961 which, as noted below, NOSENKO reviewed
after the defection of ANATOLIY GOLITZYN. His.
knowledge of this case obviously could have been
acquired at that time, although it might well have
been acquired when KGB, Minsk, was covering him
under 7th Department guidance.
On March 7, 1968, (N-159), in response to a
question, NOSENKO said he saw very little information™
which emanated from the FCD regarding American use
of tourists for intelligence; however, he had seen
passages from a document which was in possession
of SCD and which related to discussions in London.
between American, British, and Canadian
representatives regarding use of tourists.
for intelligence. He could not specifically recall
when the conference took place but believed it was in
This document had come from FCD and he had
1958.
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85
had X (4)
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C
TOP
SECRET
(damage assessment).
He said the document contained
the names of foreigners against whom KGB was working
or planned to work. The document was prepared in
1960-61.
NOSENKO participated in discussions of
the content of the document after GOLITZYN's defection
and some cases mentioned therein were considered
compromised and "x'd out." He did not believe the
document contained the names of any persons who had
been recruited but mostly related to suspects. He
(5)
BARTHELEMY
volunteered the name BARTHELEMY as the only name that
he could recall in the document.
However, on
March 7, 1968, (N-159), he was shown a list of 26
names which were contained in the document and selected
ed D
the names of three as names he recalled.
It is considered significant that NOSENKO
is aware of the document pertaining to tourists
purloined by GOLITZYN. A review of this document
:
indicates that most of the cases referred to therein
as having occurred in 1958 and 1959, are such that
91%
汊
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NOSENKO would not normally have come into
possession of information regarding them while
he was Deputy Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section. Of the 19 cases mentioned
therein only seven occurred before 1960 and only
one appears to have been the type of case which would
have been handled by the American-British Commonwealth
Section. THOMAS BARTHELEMY went to Russia in 1959
as the representative of a tourist firm; JUDITH
GROUS
(s)
was an exchange student in 1959-60; MORRIS
2) Aparently
ETTENBERG apparently visited the USSR as a member
of a group; EDWARD MC GOWAN, discussed above, was
brought to the attention of the American Department
and was handled by that Department; LIONEL SIMARD] (s)
who visited in August, 1959, was introduced to a
KGB agent employed at the American Embassy and may
well have been handled by the 1st Department;
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E.
ESTOR for sited
TOP
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[WILLIAM BESTOR visited in 1959 with the Yale Chorus
and not as an individual tourist. (WHITMORE GRAY] (S)
visited during November, 1959.
November (5)
He was an Assistant
Professor at Michigan University and a CIA Agent. (5)
He was apprehended in Stalingrad November 13, 1959, ] (5)
while attempting to photograph a factory. His is
the only case among those in the document which
logically should have come to the attention of
NOSENKO while he was in the American-British
Commonwealth Section prior to 1960. Thus his lack
of knowledge does not appear to be suspect.
NOSENKO's Assignment to 1st Section, 1st Department,
January, 1960
January, 1962
Pages 151-261 of the CIA paper relate to the period
January, 1960, to January, 1962, when NOSENKO claims to have
been the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section (1st
Section) of the American Department (1st Department). It is
related that according to NOSENKO, he was supervisor of all
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operations against code clerks and for some months against
service attaches; case officer for the Embassy security
officer, JOHN V. ABIDIAN; custodian of the Embassy Security
file; and reviewer of all information obtained from microphones.
It is stated that a comparison of his assertions with collateral
information indicates that "he was none of these."
X(u)
It was also asserted that NOSENKO claimed complete
knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts against
"
U. S. Embassy personnel, knowledge of CIA personnel on the
Embassy Staff identified by KGB and status of the KGB crypto-
logic attack on Embassy communications. It is stated that his
(s)
(6)
h
apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with [MORE]] and
KOSOLAPOV's connection with GARLAND refute his contention.
about knowledge of all recruitment attempts and, contrary
to his claim, he does not know of CIA personnel on the Embassy
staff identified by KGB. It is also stated that his information
on the cryptologic attack on Embassy communications is superficial
and in error. It was concluded that NOSENKO was neither Deputy.
94
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тво
SECRET
included (1) The Agent net of the 1st Section,
(2) Knowledge that ROY RHODES furnished the
original information on American use of electronic.
apparatus.
(3)
Knowledge of attempts to obtain permission
of the Chairman of KGB to put microphones in a wing
of the American Embassy.
(4) Trips and aims of the trips of GRYÁZNOV to
Berlin in 1960, and KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in 1960
and Copenhagen in 1961.
(5) Knowledge of foreign agents obtained from
conversations with leaders of other departments.
(6) Planning for technical counterintelligence
'I'
from a building opposite American Embassy.
(7) Overdraft of operative money made by KOVSHUK.
(8)
Facts about the 2nd Section's cases pertaining
to BELITSKIY, BARRETT and others and the trip
of the Chief of 2nd Section, PETROV, to Frankfort
in 1961.
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*
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SECRET
2. KOVSHUK's Acquaintance with Americans (6 (1)
On page 158 it is stated that NOSENKO said KOVSHUK
LL] ②
had personal contact with some American Embassy Officers but
NOSENKO could identify only WINTERS. On page 159 it is
indicated that NOSENKO did not know that [WILLIAM N. MORELL
was identified formally by the American Embassy to the Soviet
Government as a CIA employee; he was also not aware that
KOVSHUK was in personal contact with MORELL.
COMMENT:
with MORELL. J
On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO stated
that KOVSHUK had social meetings with LEWIS W.
BOWDEN. ((u)
April 26, 1968, (N-186), NOSENKO
stated that he believed KOVSHUK also knew
JAMES ALEXANDER RAMSEY] and [ROBERT OWEN
巨
GOLITZYN's Information Re Recruitments
(S)*
(u)
On pages 162 and 163 information is set forth which
was obtained from GOLITZYN pertaining to recruitments or possible
recruitments of American personnel. It was reported that GOLITZYN
visited the Embassy Section in the Spring of 1960 and learned
迎
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It is considered probable that the 1961
communication referred to by GOLITZYN is identical.
with, or related to, data furnished by SHAMROCK) in (S)
1967 which indicated KGB was emphasizing operations
against code clerks in 1961. The contents of the
document made available by [SHAMROCK undoubtedly (S)
emanated from JOHN DISCOE SMITH, a former State
Department code clerk and crypto technician who
resigned in December, 1959, left the United States
in May or June, 1960, and whose whereabouts there-
after were unknown until he was publicized as a
defector by the Soviets in the Fall of 1967.
OK (W)
In this connection it is not clear how GRYAZNOV
of the SCD would have knowledge of SMITH in the Spring
i
of 1960. If SMITH was an agent prior to that time he
would have been an agent of FCD.
NOSENKO has reported,
however, that another friend of GRYAZNOV's, NIKOLAY
SKVORTSOV of FCD was handling "ZHARI" (believed to be
the crytonym of SMITH) in 1961 and later "ZHARI" was
107
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being handled by ARTEMEV of the SCD.
The possibility exists that GOLITZYN obtained
information regarding the "real agent" from SKVORTSOV
rather than GRYAZNOV. SMITH could have arrived in
Moscow or otherwise have been in contact with
SKVORTSOV during the period April July, 1960,
which GOLITZYN indicates in the period he talked
to GRYAZNOV. At any rate, there is no certainty that
an American code clerk assigned to Moscow in the Spring
of 1960 had been recruited by KGB as alleged (:):):)(u)
JAMES STORSBERG
JAMES
..
Military Code Clerk (⑤)
Page 163 also sets forth information obtained from
GOLITZYN who said that in the Spring of 1960 he was told by
"
GRYAZNOV that the latter had developed an operation against
an Embassy military code clerk. $5 KGB
KGB was 99 percent sure that
[this code clerk] would be recruited. 18
(5)
In January, 1961, GOLITZYN learned from KOVSHUK that
JOHANNES PREISFREUND, then a KGB agent, had recently been used
(s)
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108
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in the successful recruitment of an employee of the American
Embassy. (It should be noted that when GOLITZYN was interviewed
by FBI concerning this matter GOLITZYN related that he had inquired
fo
concerning his possible use of PREISFREUND] but had been denied
permission because he had been used in another operation..
GOLITZYN could not be sure that the operation had been successful
and presumed that it was against an employee of the American
Embassy. From KOVSHUK's comments he assumed that the operation
+(4)
was successful.) 3 (4)
The comments of GRYAZNOV and KOVSHUK undoubtedly refer
to KGB efforts to recruit [the military code clerk JAMES STORSBERG. (S)
Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning this operation is set
forth on pages 166-177 of CIA paper. It is noted therein that
(S)
GOLITZYN's information concerning the use of PREISFREUND) in the
attempted recruitment of [STORSBERG dates the incident at the end
(s)
(s)
of [1960.] NOSENKO claimed that the approach took place about
June, 1961, and STORSBERG for Kaimed
that it took place in October,
1961. It was concluded that GOLITZYN's timing was more plausible and
therefore the operation against STORSBERG took place more than six
months prior to the time claimed by NOSENKO and (STORSBERG
✓ TORSBERG. ]
P
(S)
TOP SECRET
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It was stated that such an inaccuracy by NOSENKO concerning an
event which took place less than a year before he described it.
to CIA in June, 1962, undermines his claim to the role he played.
and his claim to have been Deputy Chief of Section 1 and Super-
visor of code clerk operations. ✗
COMMENT:
It is noted that [STORSBERG] when interviewed
substantially confirmed NOSENKO's version of the
approach except for the date. He also related that
in the middle of October, 1961, n
the evening of
the KGB recruitment attempt against him, he saw
MORONE and
"MICHAUD" (SKVORTSOV), JOSEPH MORONE and an
unidentified female sitting together in the American
7(5)
House Club. (Note that MORONE actually left Moscow
in August, 1961.
51.758
[MORONE as
MORONE was interviewed by FBI Agents on
May 22, 1968, and readily identified the photograph
of SKVORTSOV as MARCEL MICHAUD whom he had seen on
one occasion at American House. He related that he
had visited American House Club one evening during thes
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TXIP
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middle of the week and observed several people
sitting at a table. He probably recognized someone
at the table (he cannot recall specifically) but
approached the table and asked one of the two
females at the table to dance. While dancing she
said she was a "journalist" from West Germany, that
she was with MICHAUD (who posed as a French businessman,
a furrier) but he was bothering her and she did not want
to stay with him. After dancing with this girl he met
MICHAUD who praised the French female's ability to make
love. MORONE described the girl as age 24, attractive,
(s)
dark hair, five feet two inches. He did not recall her
name
果
()
MORONE stated that STORSBERG ] Buld
TORSBERG Could have been at-
the table but he could not recall specifically seeing
(s)
(STORSBERG) on this occasion. He was positive, however
that this was the only occasion that he had seen MICHAUD
at American Hous
Duse
Later in the evening the West German girl went
to his room for a drink. He arranged to see her agains
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at which time he visited Red Square with her and
recalls seeing a puppet show.
Thereafter she returned/
returned (u)
to his room and performed a perverted sex act on him.
Jould
MORONE could not recall the date of this incident
but believed that it occurred approximately the
beginning of February, 1961. ( He
He was certain that it
to Helsinki he
did not occur before his vacation trip to Helsinki the
last week of January, 1961.
61. JSHe
was also certain that
it occurred in cold weather because the female wore
winter clothing when they visited Red Square and he
recalled the wheather was very cold. He stated that
h
the incident definitely occurred before the first week of
[May, 1961) Dec
May, 1961 because during that week he went to Oslo
> Os1o
and did not return until mid-July, 1961. At the time
of his return there was a letter waiting for him from
this West German girl. He left Moscow permanently in
August, 1961] 5
(S) [STORSBERG Jwa
STORSBERG was interviewed on August 15, 1968, by
FBI Agents in an attempt to fix as accurately as possible
Ossible
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*
SECRET
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the date on which KGB made the recruitment approach
to him. (It is noted he stated on September 28, 1964,
that on the evening he was approached, prior to leaving
American House, he had seen JOSEPH MORONE dancing with
(ك)
a girl who accompanied MARCEL MICHAUD (SKVORTSOV) to
American House. It is also noted that
MORONE In inter-
view on May 22, 1968, recalled seeing MICHAUD on one
occasion only. He was certain this took place prior to
Komen
榀
the first week of May, 1961, when he left Moscow for
Oslo returning in mid-July, 1961.
(in 1961.] 5
(5)
[STORSBERG recalled seeing (MCORONE: Erth MICHAUD
h
on one occasion which he believed was either the evening
of the recruitment approach to him or the date of the
prior visit to MICHAUD's apartment about ten days
earlier. He also recalled that the weather was very
cold at the time of the approach. On the first visit
to MICHAUD's hotel it was snowing and on the night of
the approach it was very cold because he wore a heavy
coat and a hat
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[STORSBERG ($)
TO SECRET
STORSBERG at first stated that the approach was
about four months before he left Moscow and then stated
it was about one and one-half months and not more than
two months. He claimed that he did not have long to
go until the end of his tour of duty. He is certain that
(5)
his replacement [(ZUJUS) had not arrived at the time of
the incident. ((_ZUJUS] arrived in Moscow in September,
1961.) He also stated the incident occurred after he
saw the message which pertained to KEYZER's homosexual
activities. He believed the incident occurred quite
sometime after the Ice Capades people were in Moscow
because he had a good time when they were there and he
did not have a good time after the approach. He stated
that he did not believe he could have "sweated it out"
for as long as six months; that regardless of how it
may appear, his recollection is that the incident could
not have happened more than two months before his departure
(S)
Despite [STORSBERG's] contentions, it is noted that
both he and NOSENKO have indicated that MICHAUD did not
114
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visit the American House over an extended period of
(5)
time; that [STORSBERG Secalls MORONE 52/th
ONE with MICHAUD just
prior to his visit to MICHAUD's hotel; that
(5)
MORONE dates
MOR
the incident when he saw MICHAUD as prior to May, 1961;
and that both [MORONE] and [STORSBERG refer to the cold
weather. [MORONE left Moscow in August, 1961, and ZUJUS
(s)
arrived in September, 1961] (S) (Both probably before
very cold weather.) These factors together with
NOSENKO's assertion that [STORSBERG (2)S
ORSBERG was approached
before [KEYZER's departure on June 16, 1961 strongly
indicate that [STORSBERG was approached sometime before
May, 1961, and that NOSENKO's version of the date of
the approach is more accurate than GOLITZYN's version.
5. JAMES KEYZERS (6)
Pages 178-181 relate to the KGB attempt to defect
(s)
JAMES KEYZERS, a U. S. Army specialist who served in Moscow.
from December, 1960, to June 16, 1961. The paper raises a
number of questions concerning NOSENKO's version of this incident ✓
115
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It is stated that no KGB officer directly connected with the
(5)
case could regard KEYZERS as a replacement for STORSBERG: (③✓) It
was noted that [KEYZERS forla
was noted that KEYZERS did not identify the photograph of NOSENKO
as the individual who approached him at the airport and his
description of this person did not fit that of NOSENKO. It
[KEYZERS & Prior
was stated that KEYZERS, prior to his departure from Moscow,
acknowledged to his superiors that he had homosexual tendencies
and admitted being involved in three homosexual incidents at
American House. (It is noted that NOSENKO claimed that KGB knew
from the microphone coverage that his homosexual activities were
(S)
not discussed with
[KEYZERS] Pior
EYZERS prior to his departure and hoped to
h
induce his defection by sending him a letter which would suggest
he was in trouble because of these activities.)
The paper also concluded that KGB would have learned
from microphone coverage, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, that
[KEYZERS] did report the receipt of the KGB defection letter to his
(s) [KEYZERS]
superiors.
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COMMENT:
[KEYZERS ] as
TYP SECRET
The fact that KEYZERS was trained for a period
of time by [STORSBERG) in the military code room] could
well suggest to the KGB that he was to be the replace-
ment for [STORSBERG] (5) The U
U. S. Army intelligence file
was reviewed by FBI representatives on July 10, 1968,
and contained no indication that KEYZERS' homo sexual
KEYZERS]
activities were discussed with him before he left Moscow
on June 16, 1961. On the contrary a memorandum prepared
by his superior, Colonel PETER L. URBAN
✓e
he U. S.
Army Attache dated June 16, 1961, which summarized
sif Activities,
[KEYZERS' activities, mentioned derogatory comments
which had been received about his relations with
members of the American Ice Capades who were known
(s)
or suspected homosexuals and noted that KEYZERS had
been informed of the reasons for his transfer from
Moscow, "except that he was not informed of the
allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate
the possibility of a rash act by him while within the
Soviet Union.'
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This memorandum clearly supports NOSENKO'
version of this incident.
XX (u)
With regard to [KEYZERS failure to identify
NOSENKO it is pointed out that he saw the individual
who approached him only momentarily, but it is
recognized that his description of the individual
is not close to that of NOSENKO.
6. MATTHEW PETER ZUJUS] ✗(S)
Pages 181-184 relate to the KGB operation against
[ ប.
7(5)
U. S. Army Sergeant MATTHEW PETER ZUJUS who arrived in Moscow
h
(s)
in September, 1961, to assume the code clerk duties of [STORSBERG ] (S)
and to remain there until January, 1963. On page 183 it was
(S)
stated that [ZUJUS admitted to U. S. Army authorities in 1963
that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an
Austrian woman "LILLIAN" who had visited American House with
someone from the United Arab Republic and returned alone a few
days later. The American House manager interviewed her and
learned that she claimed to be from Vienna and was traveling
with her employer, a Czech. The Embassy security officer learned
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that she had no Austrian passport and asked her for her
passport.
She left and never returned to Americn House. It was
stated that NOSENKO described this incident in connection with
KGB attempts to entrap [JOSEPH MORONE D In [1960]
(s)
not
(5)
[ZUJUS in 1962] (5)
that interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he knew of this
'incident.
Also with regard to the [ZUJUS] case,
it is stated that
NOSENKO identified ELLA UMANETS as a KGB agent employed at
American House but never related her to ZUJUS
COMMENT:
[ZUJUS]
On March 20, 1968, (N-167), NOSENKO related
that in 1960 GRYAZNOV had gone to East Germany and
brought to Moscow two girls who were to be targeted
against American House. One of these girls, possibly.
known as "HANNAH", described by NOSENKO as a fat
blonde in her mid thirties, posed as a correspondent
from West Germany. This girl was introduced into
American House with the help of CRP: REISFREUND
IND &
NOSENKO stated that another woman had been
documented as an Austrian but had not been successful
心
119
y
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as an agent against American House. He said this
woman had some difficulty at American House regarding
her passport (KX (u)
From information set forth above obtained from
[MORONESS) t
MORONE, it appears clear that NOSENKO did not confuse
(s)
the use of a female agent in the MORONE ease with that
in the ZUJUS case.
(s)
[ZUJUS as
[MORONE ] Case
ORONE confirmed that he had contact
MORONE 6
with a West German "journalist" at American House. The
[ZUJUS] could
"LILLIAN" described by ZUJUS could be the girl documented
as an Austrian as related by NOSENKO or could be still.
a third female.
The discrepancy between NOSENKO's description
(5)
of the "journalist" and that by MORONE is not considered
particularly significant although NOSENKO appears to be
in error. He probably confused the "West German" with
the "Austrian.
**
R. FAUL JENNER] (3) [JOHN GARLAND
DJ (S)
Pages 185-192 relate to KOSOLAPOV's trips to Helsinki
and the FAUL JENNER and JOHN GARLAND cases.
120
It is stated therein
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T
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that NOSENKO claimed KOSOLAPOV traveled to Helsinki in early
1960 for a double purpose (1) to probe for a new way to get in
touch with American code clerks and (2) to make contact with
75)
[PAUL JENNER who was to come to Moscow via Helsinki. NOSENKO
claimed to have read KOSOLAPOV's report indicating that he
had made contact with [JENNER] on the train trip from Helsinki
It was noted that in fact (JENNER' (rom
to Moscow.
on the train manifest for March 31 f$960,
name is listed
and the alias used
by KOSOLAPOV is listed on the manifest for (April 27 $ 1960.
KOSOLAPOV could not have contacted (JENNER on the train
contactID:D:D:D:DECENCE/REKCID)
It was concluded that the discrepancies indicated
Thus
NOSENKO was neither KOSOLAPOV's supervisor nor supervisor over
all KGB operations against code clerks. This conclusion was.
strengthened by the fact that NOSENKO could not recall a trip
(s)
by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, at which time he
th[JOHN
apparently returned to Moscow on the same train with
JOHN GARLAND.
NOSENKO emphatically denied that KOSOLAPOV had traveled to Helsinki
case. It was concluded that
[JENNER]
-(5)
except in connection with the JENNER
121
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this denial is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's
supervisor and supervised all operations against American
code clerks.
COMMENT:
On November 6, 1967, (N-13), NOSENKO submitted
comments concerning KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki similar
to that information previously furnished by him. On
June 1, 1968, (N-200), he insisted KOSOLAPOV made
contact with JENNER
the train trip to Moscow
and wrote a report to this effect when he returned.
This discrepancy has not been clarified
$(4)
With regard to KOSOLAPOV's second trip to
Helsinki it is noted that it took place at about
the same time NOSENKO traveled to Cuba. It is also
(5)
noted that [GARLAND denied that he was contacted on
the train by any Russian, despite the fact that
KOSOLAPOV apparently rode the same train. Since
there was no approach to GARLAND And
RLAND and nothing "important"
happened on the train, it is not considered
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تما
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inconceivable that NOSENKO just never was advised
of KOSOLAPOV's trip. There appears to be nothing
sinister about his denial of knowledge of this trip
[JOSEPH MORONE (805)
NE] =
Pages 193-199 relate to the KGB operation against
JOSEPH MORONE is stated that NOSENKO is apparently unaware
involvement with friends of KGB agent SVETLANA
of [MORONE of Sexual
(r
h
IVANOVA at the apartment of SARWAT EL SHAZLY, his illicit currency
dealing with PIETRO CECCHI and his relationship with ELLA UMANETS.
It was also stated that NOSENKO erred in relating the East German
female agent sent to the American House to MCCORONE: that this
incident occurred later. It was concluded that this case
indicates NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations
against American code clerks.
COMMENT:
As indicated above MORONE has furnished information
regarding his relationship with a West German journalist
who is undoubtedly one of the East German girls brought
to Moscow by GRYAZNOV, one of whom posed as a West German
correspondent as related by NOSENKO.
123
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On January 11, 1968, (N-92), NOSENKO gave a
written summary of the [MORONE case which was basically
the same as his previous information but added that
છ
[MORONE) and a U. S. Marine in 1961 met out in the city
of Moscow, a female agent who worked at American House,
and her girl friend. They went to a restaurant and
about one or two o'clock in the morning returned to
the American Embassy (or American House) where the
girls remained until morning. He also related that
1(5)
MORONE
MORONE was not approached by KGB primarily because
[STORSBERG] Was
RSBERG was considered more important and KGB did
not want to prejudice that case.
On April 6, 1968, (N-177), NOSENKO stated that
he believed that the Marine who went to the restaurant.
(s)
[MORONE
with MORONE was [BEGGS, further that SARWAT EL SHAZLY
also reported something about [MORONE but he could not
recall what it was
**
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On May 7, 1968, (N-190), NOSENKO stated that
girls working in the American House were reporting.
i(s).
on [MORONE and he was particularly friendly with
SVETLANA IVANOVA. He said PIETRO CECCHI also
reported "pieces of information" about [MORONE Sut
bu
NOSENKO did not know of any black market dealings
between CECCHI and (MDRONE: :(:(C): He stated that the
photographs of [MORONE] th
with the Polish girl were
considered insufficient to compromise him and KGB
wanted to create something more, possibly photographs
with Russian girls. IVANOVA was considered as a
prospect in this connection and she and her girl
[MORONE] Jand
friend had met MORONE and a Marine in a restaurant
and thereafter spent the night in the "flat" of one
of the Marines. At this time he stated that the Marine
with MORONE on this occasion was possibly [GARCIA (S&
It is noted that when
MORONE / S
NE was interviewed
on October 16, 1962, he furnished information
regarding his intimacy with the friend of SVETLANA
IVANOVA in the apartment of MORRIS ZWANGS &
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0
TOP
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C
TOP
(5)
He stated that [GARCIA was also present and
presumably was intimate with SVETLANA. He
છ
[ZWANG] had
P SECRET
related that he and ZWANG had also met three
Russian girls in SARWAT's apartment but were not
intimate with them. (This is inconsistent with
data set forth on page 198 of the CIA paper.
[MORONE] Som1
ONE admitted exchanging currency with
PIETRO CECCHI but claimed that these exchanges did
not exceed $200 or $300
$300
Thus, contrary to the CIA paper, NOSENKO is
(s)
forexual
aware of MORONE's sexual involvements and the
East German girl was involved with CMCORONE: (CSC_CHOSENKO'S
information seems adequate for a supervisor
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9. [JOSEPH GAFFEY]
SECRET
Pages 203 and 204 relate to JOSEPH GAFFEY, a military
enlisted man
Moscow who was a target of KGB. KGB attempted
to lure him into downtown Moscow using SVETLANA IVANOVA. It
was related that NOSENKO stated [GAFFEY] had refused her invita
tions and KGB had no derogatory information regarding him.
It was also noted that during a State Department security
interview [GAFFEY admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the
American House and at her apartment; that she had told him that
him
she was pregnant and asked for money for an abortion.
COMMENT:
[GAFFEY for
GAFFEY was discussed with NOSENKO on
*
January 27, (N-113), and April 6, 1968, (N-177),
but he could furnish no additional information.
It is noted, however, that GAFFEY during State
Department interview on July 27, 1962, stated that
he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on
December 27, 1961, and was intimate with her in
her apartment on approximately three occasions thereafter
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-127.
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She told him she was pregnant about May 1, 1962,
and he was transferred from Moscow during that
NOSENKO transferred from the American
month.
Embassy Section in early January, 1962, and thus
would logically not have knowledge of GAFFEY's
intimacy with IVANOVA.
10. JOHN ABIDIAN
7
[CAFFEY's ] (5)
Pages 205-220 relate to the Security Officer
JOHN ABIDIAN and the KGB operations against him. NOSENKO
had furnished detailed information regarding this case which
included data indicating that a female KGB agent TATYANA
FEDOROVICH was used to place "metka" (an odorless substance)
on ABIDIAN's clothing. Later this substance was found on
letters mailed by ABIDIAN and traced to him. It is stated
that ABIDIAN had no maid until 16 months after his arrival
in Moscow and FEDOROVICH did not become employed by him until
July, 1961. It was concluded therefore, that FEDOROVICH could
not have applied metka as claimed by NOSENKO which resulted
in the interception of the letter mailed by ABIDIAN on April 1
128
+
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1961, and probably she was not yet employed at the time of
his mailing of a letter on July 2, 1961
(w)
The CIA paper also takes issue with NOSENKO'
statements regarding ABIDIAN's visit to a dead drop site
on December 30, 1961. NOSENKO claimed to have read the initial
surveillance report covering this visit, to have visited the
site himself and to have reviewed reports covering observation
of the site for approximately three months. It was concluded
that NOSENKO was not ABIDIAN's case officer..
COMMENT:
(4)
NOSENKO was interviewed concerning ABIDIAN on
May 1, 1968, (N-187), and stated that KGB knew that
MYRA KEMMER,
female employee of the American
TATYANA FEDOROVICH
Embassy, was ABIDIAN's mistress.
KEMMER' ] maid
was KEMMER's maid and was sent to ABIDIAN's apartment
by KEMMER 2
clean his apartment.
This agent placed
"metka" on his clothing as early as 1960.
ABIDIAN was subsequently interviewed by a
representative of CIA and confirmed that this maid/
129
ra1༽
༼
།)(u]
TOP SECRET
Tip
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disclosed that the name following number 33 was
[LUBIN
[SMITH: 3 that following
LUBIN, that following 34 was SMITH, that following.
(s)
35 was WILL BURTIN and that following 36 was [CIPE] ③
BURTIN. (5) The
The 
other two names were of KGB case
officers who NOSENKO stated were undoubtedly the
case officers of [LUBIN] and [SMITH] S HOSENKO stated that
these were four individuals of interest to PETROV
and the 2nd Section was interested in placing
microphones against them. (This is discussed later
in this paper under: New Information and as indicated
(5)
therein, [LUBIN) and the (BURTINS) have been identified.
They were in the USSR in 1961 in connection with
(s).
ition and had been in contact with components
USIA exh
exhibit
of CIA.
具
The above information would appear to be a
plausible explanation as to how NOSENKO came into
possession of the list of microphonës.
*(u)
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SECRET
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the Embassy. He furnished information possibly
pertinent to this matter on March 22, 1968, (N-168).
He stated that in 1961 the First Department had initiated
planning in connection with the establishment of an
apartment across the street from the American Embassy
which was to contain some special equipment. This
equipment was to be provided by the Department of
Defense which would supply experts to operate it.
operation was discussed with officers of OTU and
reference was made to checking on waves or short
waves. The planning resulted from coordination of
the coverage of all western attaches under YEVGENIY
NIKOLAYEVICH ALESHIN, Deputy Chief of the 1st
Department who was supervising it.
KOVSHUK, Chief
of the 1st Section did not handle it. In the late
1950's or early 1960's the 1st Section of the 2nd
Department had found out that the British were
__hat the British were
3/ The
monitoring GRU radio transmissions.
The monitoring
This
was done from the British Embassy and a cottage owned
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-(s)
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C
Хор
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by the British
the British In
In 1961 discussions were held
regarding checking of the American cottage as well as
the American Embassy. ] (u)
NOSENKO also stated that the Ministry of
Defense had a permanent post behind the American
Embassy which was not related to the above matter.
When NOSENKO went with VENYAMIN KOSLOV to visit
surveillance posts of the 1st Department, 7th
Directorate, located around the American Embassy,
KOSLOV pointed out the building where the Ministry
of Defense monitoring post was located.
had been set up prior to 1961.
(u)
This post
On March 26, 1968, (N-169), NOSENKO expressed
the opinion that the new installation which was
planned in 1961 was not related to either the
[British
shunt
ring
British monitoring or the permanent post of the
Ministry of Defense, but was a different kind of
technique.
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14.
uj
NOSENKO's Knowledge of CIA Personnel
Pages 240-248 relate to NOSENKO's knowledge of CIA
personnel within the American Embassy. It was noted that NOSENKO
claimed that he would necessarily know whom the KGB knew or
suspected as CIA officers.
NOSENKO had stated that [BORIS KLOSSON] (S)
was considered to be the CIA resident. ((KLOSSON had
(KLOSSON had 
no connection
(s)
with CIA.) ABIDIAN was considered a CIA officer on the basis of
his conduct. (He was a State Department officer who was utilized
by CIA and was, in effect, the CIA resident.) STEVE WASHENKO
was correctly identified as being connected with CIA. LEWIS
BOWDEN
7
according to NOSENKO was suspected of being a CIA
officer, had no affiliation with CIA. The same was true of
RICHARD FUNKHAUSER.
WILLIAM HORBALY was correctly identified
by NOSENKO as being connected with CIA, as was GEORGE WINTERS. 75
According to NOSENKO, STANLEY BROWN, (WILLIAM MORELL), ]) (S)
EUGENE MAHONEY and
EUGENE MAHONEY and 
PAUL GARBLER were not suspected by KGB. (They
were CIA employees.)
The paper noted that both [MORELL] and
GARBLER were known to KGB as CIA officers although this was
2
apparently unknown to NOSENKO.
GARBLER was known as a CIA officer
to GEORGE BLAKE.
*/
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COMMENT:
TO SECRET
On January 27, 1968, (N-113), NOSENKO was shown
a list of names including some American and Soviet
employees of the American Embassy. He recognized the
name of RICHARD FUNKHAUSER, stated he was suspected of
connections with American intelligence and VYACHESLAV
ALEKSANDROVICH KUSKOV was working against him. Concerning
(s)
stated that WASHENKO as
the name STEVE WASHENKO he stated that WASHENKO was an
Agriculture Attache
che 
in
In 
the American Embassy and "mailed
letters" and was considered to be connected with
American intelligence.
In connection with NOSENKO's statements regarding
KLOSSON S
DAVID MARK
t is suggested that the fact he replaced
(5)
who had been regarded by KGB as the CIA
resident, would be sufficient for KGB to consider that
(5)
[KLOSSON] S
SON was connected with CIA despite the fact coverage
of his activities disclosed no clandestine operations.
It is also noted that FAUL GARBLER did not arrive
in Moscow until November 29, 1961. Information
identifying him as an American intelligence officer
146
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TO
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would undoubtedly have been in possession of FCD
but there is no assurance that it would have come to
NOSENKO's attention prior to his departure from the
1st Section, 1st Department, SCD in January, 1962.
It is suggested that FCD would have been very careful
in disseminating information received from FCD agent
GEORGE BLAKE prior to BLAKE's apprehension by the
British.
15. ROBERT BARRETT
On page 248 it is stated that NOSENKO did not know
contact
of ROBERT BARRETT's contacts with homosexual agents VOLKOV and
YEFREMOV in 1961 although NOSENKO claimed to have been their
case officer at that time.
COMMENT:
Elsewhere in this paper NOSENKO's relations.
with these two agents is set forth in some detail.
NOSENKO stated that he possibly did not know of all
contacts these homosexuals made with Americans.
November 14, 1967, (N-22b), NOSENKO described in
BAR
(s).
On
some detail the BARRETT case indicating that these
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two agents were used in
in 1959/00
[1959 to get compromising
photographs of BARRETT (S) The compromising materials
were furnished to the 2nd Section of the 1st
Department which recruited him when he returned
to the USSR in [1960. or 1961
1.✓ ✓ PETROV,
PETROV, Chief of
(s).
the 2nd Section, told NOSENKO that [BARRETT] had
admitted connections with American Intelligence;
that his task was to find Russians for future
recruitment. The 2nd Section was preparing some
individuals (to serve as double agents). The
case officer was VADIM UDILOW
*
The fact that the 2nd Section was handling
the case in 1961 may well explain why NOSENKO would
(5)
not be aware of BARRETT's 1961] contacts with these
two homosexual agents.
16.
NOSENKO's Travel to Cuba] (u)
On page 254 it is stated that NOSENKO's planned trip
to the United States and his travel to Cuba damaged his claim
that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks
in 1960.
It was indicated that with active operations going her & (u)
148
TYP
SECRET
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COMMENT
On November 4, 1967, (N-10a), NOSENKO furnished
basically the same information concerning the Bulgarian
trip set forth in the CIA paper. The fact that there
was no apparent necessity for the Bulgarian Minister
of Interior to request a KGB officer for consultation
is not a reasonable basis for judging this account to
be untrue.
(4)
18. Transfer to 7th Department
(u)
On page 260 it is stated that NOSENKO dated his
transfer to the 7th Department from the 1st Department as
occurring before the defection of GOLITZYN which he dated as
mid-January, 1962, despite being advised that the correct date
was December 16, 1961
COMMENT:
(~> (u)
NOSENKO during interview on March 6, 1968,
(N-157), recalled that KGB had sent a cable to
Helsinki after GOLITZYN's defection instructing that
(5)
the residency make contact with FREISFREUND to warn
him. NOSENKO and KOVSHUK contacted TARABRIN of
FCD to arrange for the cable to be sent. KOVSHUK
150
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and NOSENKO were Chief and Deputy Chief of 1st
Section, 1st Department. It appears that his
previous recollection of transfer before GOLITZYN's
defection was in error.
(u)
NOSENKO's Knowledge of [MORELL] and GARLAND
GARLAND (S)
On page 26] it is stated that NOSENKO's apparent
(5)
ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with MORELL and KOSOLAPOV's
connection with GARLAND] refute his contention that he would have
known of all KGB recruitment attempts.
COMMENT:
During the April 10, 1968, (N-178), interview.**
h
NOSENKO stated that KUSKOV had the file on MORELL who
Javi
was the Economic Advisor at the Embassy.
he never heard anything particular about
He advised
[MORELL (S)
With regard to [GARLAND NOSENKO on April 6, 1968
(N-177), stated KOSOLAPOV had his file; however, NOSENKO
insisted that he had no knowledge of KOSOLAPOV's trip
LANDSS
with GARLAND nd
to Helsinki in connection with GARLAND and he would
have known about it if anything important developed.
It is noted that CARLAND] denies any recruitment
approach.
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C
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On April 22, 1968, (N-184), NOSENKO stated
that he could not make a flat statement that he
would have known of any recruitments in the American
Embassy during the 1955-59 period but believed he
would have heard of them. He would have known of
any such recruitments in 1960-61. He believed he
would also have known of any recruitments in the
1962-63 period because he saw GRYAZNOV frequently
and GRYAŻNOV talked freely because NOSENKO helped
him advance from Senior Case Officer in January, 1962",
to Deputy Chief of Section 1, then Chief of Section 1,
and then Deputy Chief of Department 1 about August
or September, 1963
3. (u)
In view of NOSENKO's stated knowledge of DEMOCREFCLIT (SE)
and GARLAND Lond
and GARLAND and the officers who had their cases and
since there is no evidence that either was the subject
of a recruitment approach or other important
development,⠀ pit is submitted that his lack of knowledge
4152
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тоже
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[MORE] and
of KOVSHUK's relationship with MORELL and of
KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki does not refute his
contention that he would have known of all important
developments pertaining to the 1st Section, 1st
Department in 1960-61
**
F. Assignment to the 7th Department
January, 1962
January, 1964
(u)
Pages 263-333 pertain to NOSENKO's claims of
assignment to the 7th Department during 1962-64, first as
Section Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
to July, 1962, and thereafter as Deputy Chief of the 7th
Department until his defection. It was concluded his claims
are not credible.
*x(u)
-)(u)
NOSENKO's Substitute as Chief/
On page 265 it is stated that NOSENKO claimed he had
no Deputy Section Chief and did not indicate who was assigned
his duties in his absence.
COMMENT:
(()
On July 3, 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO specifically
stated that V. G. DERA was the officer whom he designated
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He
to act as Section Chief during his absence.
also utilized NOSKOV in this capacity on occasion
NOSENKO's Contacts with
FRIPPEL (S)
(s)
On page 266 in discussing the ARSENE FRIPPEL] So
(5)
case
it is stated that FRIPPEL asserted he met NOSENKO in Odessa in
February, 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies.
COMMENT:
On November 4, 1967, (N-10b), NOSENKO wrote
concerning the FRIPPEL S Pase
FRIPPEL
(5)
IPPEL case that FRIPPEL returned
to the USSR in 1962 with a group of correspondents
and "I have seen him twice. In March, 1963, Artur'
5)
(FRIPPEL) on the ship 'Olympia' was in Odessa, where
J flew and have seen him." Whether NOSENKO saw him
in Odessa in February, 1962, has not been clarified 5/4
VOLKOV and WILLIAM J. ZUBON
LLIAM
CON (S)
On page 267 it is stated that NOSENKO is apparently
uninformed regarding the use of VOLKOV in a KGB entrapment
operation against American tourist WILLIAM J. ZUBON in July,
ZUBON 1155
1962.
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T
TOP SECRET
COMMENT:
TOP SECRET
This has not been clarified but as indicated
above, NOSENKO stated that VOLKOV and YEFREMOV may
have had contacts with Americans without advising
(s):
him. On July 27, 1968, (N-212), ZUBON's name was
[ZUBON's]
included in a list displayed to NOSENKO. He failed
to recognize it.
[4. MARINA RYTOVA
(S)
AQU
On page 268 it is stated that NOSENKO claims that
he was officially registered as the case officer of MARINA
RYTOVA until his defection in 1964 although she had obtained
a job at the Communist Party Central Committee school and had
ceased all agent work.
COMMENT:
1x (u)
On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO
stated that although RYTOVA was no longer being
used, her file had not been retired and he was
still considered the case officer until his
defection.
(u)__
155
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SECRET.
715)
W. E. JOHNSON 4
Pages 268-272 relate to the KGB entrapment of [W. E.
COCK (1) It
JOHNSON
It is stated on page 272 that although (JOHNSON ] (5)
apparently confirmed NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of
the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual
time frame. It was pointed out that according to his version,
+5)
within five days of JOHNSON's arrival KGB would have discovered
he was
a homosexual, concluded he was a threat, after intercepting
The rapid pace of
his letters, and arranged his entrapment.
events suggests that his homosexuality was already known to
KGB. Therefore, NOSENKO's participation contradicts his
assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American
Department
COMMENT:
On November 7, 1967, and March 6 and 7, 1968,
(N-15, N-157, N-159), NOSENKO discussed the [CKCHECKCHECKCE: (SCE)
JO
case, furnishing basically the same information
previously furnished. He added that DERA was the
case officer for this case and DERA had posed as the
Administrator of the hotel in which (JOHNSON was registered
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took the "akt" from him and then brought him to
NOSENKO who obtained the agreement not to criticize
the Soviet Union
On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated
that the homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
spotted JOHNSON soon after his arrival. At about
the same time his letters were intercepted. KGB
had no advance information concerning his homosexuality
Considering NOSENKO's limited role in this matter
and his claimed position as Chief of Section, it seems
that his recall of this matter is adequate.
With regard
to the rapid pace of the operation, it is believed that
KGB is certainly capable of moving rapidly when
necessary.
NOSENKO's account does not appear
discussed.
implausible..
WILLIAM CARROLI JONES
(S)
On pages 272-273 the WILLIAM CARROLL JONES Case is
WILLIAM
It is stated that NOSENKO's ignorance of: CHICONES:] (③S_)
Bible smuggling and the fact that his activities had been
义
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publicized in the Soviet press indicates that he had no
intimate connection with this case
COMMENT:
On May 25, 1968, (N-198), NOSENKO related that
when he returned to the 7th Department as Chief of
Section 1 he was shown, at his request, materials
(S)..
on Section 1 cases which included the JONES Case
JONES
[JONES Case
JONES was suspected of intelligence connections;
however, NOSENKO disagreed with this conclusion.
Although JONES was involved with a girl he carefully
]
turned off the lights during intimacies and was not.
successfully photographed; he drank with her in
restaurants and gave gifts to Baptists; he had
indicated he would return to the USSR and consideration™
was given to covering him again at that time,
NOSENKO identified the photograph which was
supplied by JONES (6
supplied by JONES of the girl with whom he was involved,
LUDMILA BUGAEVA, and said he had seen her a couple of
times.
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C
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Considering NOSENKO's position and connection
域
(S)(u)
with this case, his recall appears adequate.
E. KGB Officers in Geneva (C)
(u)
Fages 279-280 discuss NOSENKO's comments regarding
KGB officers within the Soviet delegation to Geneva in 1962.
It was noted he identified only OLEG GRINEVSKIY as having a
connection with KGB although he described A. K. KISLOV and V. G.
FILATOV. It was stated that CIA tentatively identified all three
of these Soviets as KGB officers, KISLOV was observed in KGB
operational activity in Washington and Moscow; FILATOV served
as an alternate contact in France with the KGB agent GEORGE
PAQUES. British intelligence reported that GRINEVSKIY handled
()
a British double agent "On page 280 it is noted that NOSENKO
reported in 1964 for the first time that KISLOV had been a
KGP operational contact in the U. S. and had been introduced;
to NOSENKO by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to their departure
for Geneva in 1962.
*
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65-68530-449
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TOP
was a Section 2 case, but as a part of his duties in Geneva
It was
as a counterintelligence officer he was to direct BELITSKIY
only if the Americans should make contact with him.
stated that ARTEMEV, contrary to NOSENKO's claims, was not
inexperienced and had been involved with a series of CIA American
tourist agents in the Soviet Union of which NOSENKO was unaware
although it occurred in 1958-59. It was also stated that NOSENKO
had limited knowledge of the BELITSKIY case and it was concluded
that he did not exercise any supervisory functions. X (u)
COMMENT:
One of the CIA tourist agents involved with
(s)
ARTEMEV was EDWARD MC GOWAN who was in Russia in
1958.
NOSENKO has advised that coverage of ☑MC GOWANEJ (S)
was started by 7th Department but 1st Department took
T(S)
the case over after (MC GOWAN was observed to mail a
letter. Since NOSENKO was in 7th and ARTEMEV in the
1st, it is not unreasonable NOSENKO did not know of
ARTEMEV's connection
Another CIA tourist agent involved with
ARTEMEV traveled on a diplomatic passport.
It is
is ☑W
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NOSENKO stated he was thankful at the time to the
Americans for continuing the BELITSKIY operation
1962) (u)
although he had exposed it in 1962 (
The
On August 1, 1968, (N-213), NOSENKO stated
ARTEMEV was selected as Security Officer for the
delegation because he knew English and French.
2nd Section did not have anyone with language
capabilities. This may explain why an officer of
the 1st Section, would have been given the task of
directing BELITSKIY in Geneva rather than an officer h
of the 2nd Section which handled the case. It is also
noted that BELITSKIY was the subject of investigation.
However, NOSENKO in the current interviews does not
claim that ARTEMEV was inexperienced or that he
(NOSENKO) exercised any supervisory functions of
ARTEMEV's handling of BELITSKIY.
[HORST BRAUNS
$(u)
On page 290 t is stated that NOSENKO was unaware
that HORST BRAUNS had corresponded with a girl friend in Leningrad
(s)
!
164
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and that she had spent a week with BRAUNS in Moscow during
which the recruitment attempt was made by KGB
COMMENT:
B☑
On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated
that he did not know about the girl friend of BRAUNS
of BRAUNS.] (S)
He said this was probably known to KRUPNOV, his
subordinate, who was the case officer.
Considering
NOSENKO's limited participation in the case, his lack
of knowledge of the girl friend does not seem unusual.
[10. PAVEL FEDOROVICH SHAKHOY: ✓ (CC)
On page 291 it is concluded that NOSENKO did not
direct the investigation of PAVEL FEDOROVICH SHAKHOV in Geneva
in 1962. The SHAKHOV case is discussed on pages 276-278 and
it is noted therein that NOSENKO claimed SHAKHOV was not and
never had been a KGB officer. It was stated that RASTVOROV had
identified him as a KGB officer, PETROV and DERYABIN reported
that his photograph was familiar, BOURBON identified him as an
"employee" of KGB, an FBI source said he was a pure diplomat and
(s)
[SHAMROCK] said he was still under suspicion. ✗(u)
165
TOP SECRET
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(s)
(It is noted that [SHAMROCKS described SHAKHOV as an
agent rather than an officer of KGB.)
COMMENT:
NOSENKO was interviewed concerning SHAKHOV on
February 24, 1968, (N-108), and related that he was a
diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the
1930's and before that had worked for the Young
Communist League in Leningrad. In the 1940's he
In the
had worked for the Soviet "Embassy" in the USA and
was an FCD agent with the code name "RICHARD".
1950's KGB stopped work with him as an agent and put his
file in the archives. He participated in many meetings
and conferences relating to disarmament. In the late
1950's KGB started a "checking file" on him because
he was suspected of connections with American
Intelligence and there was a "signal" indicating
a connection with the American diplomat [MARK. ] (5)
Because of these suspicions, in 1962 a plan was prepared
to check him and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva as security
166
TOP SECRET
TH
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This suspicious behavior was somehow connected with
(s)
[DAVID MARK who had worked in Moscow and who was known
as an active intelligence officer. KGB decided
SHAKHOV must be an agent or contact of [MARK(S)
In addition, SHAKHOV was close to one
(S) EPSTEIN] (possibly [WILLIAM EPSTEIN, Canadian] (5)
employed by the United Nations) who was suspected
of connection with American, British, and Israeli
Intelligence and was also at one time connected with
Soviet Intelligence. Investigation of SHAKHOV had
been initiated before 1962, possibly 1960 or 1961.
After NOSENKO's 1962 report regarding coverage in
Geneva, PETR IVANOVICH MASSYA was later sent to
Geneva with a delegation and also checked SHAKHOV
negatively. ✗
NOSENKO commented that, although the file was
closed, any KGB officer who would be present at any
conference attended by SHAKHOV would be told to keep
an eye on him. Also SHAKHOV would never be trusted/
168
($(u)
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and would not be reinstated as an agent of KGB.
(u)
With regard to the identification of SHAKHOV
by the defectors mentioned above it is noted that
only SHAMROCK and
and NOSENKO were in a position to have
accurate knowledge of his connection with KGB and
both identified him as a former agent rather than an
officer.
1.
*(u)
((s)
JOHN SHUBIN
On page 296-297 the JOHN SHUBIN case is discussed.
(5).
NOSENKO claimed that SHUBIN visited the Soviet Union in 1958-59 *-
was placed under KGB surveillance, was observed in a Ministry
of Defense automobile and GRU later admitted to KGB he was of
(s)
additional KGB investigation because of GRU's interest.
(s).
interest to GRU. Subsequently in 1962 while NOSENKO was reviewing
a list of foreign visitors he noted SHUBIN's name and prohibited
The paper
asserted that SHUBIN had no valid U. S. passport between 1940 and
June, 1961, and if he visited the Soviet Union during that
period it was not as an American tourist under his true name.
Consequently he could not then have been the tourist target of the
169
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7th Department as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO was mistaken and
(s)
was referring to SHUBIN's 1961 visit he could not have noticed
his name while reviewing tourist lists because NOSENKO was in
the American Department at that time.
COMMENT:
This case has not been clarified but no
ulterior motive is seen in NOSENKO's insistence
that the first incident occurred in 1958-59, if it
were not true. His insistence can only raise
questions concerning the accuracy of his
recollections. (W).
12.
LEE HARVEY OSWALD u
On page 309 it is stated that NOSENKO's apparent
ignorance of LEE HARVEY OSWALD's communications with the Soviet
Embassy in Washington (in efforts to return to the USSR in 1963)
discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the
*(u)
KGB relationship with OSWALD. XS (u)
COMMENT:
This matter has not been completely clarified
although NOSENKO's lack of cognizance of this matter
would not appear to seriously discredit him. OSWALD'
(4)
за
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With further reference to the 1957-59
cases, NOSENKO stated on July 27, 1968, (N-212)
that there was no time limitation put on BOBKOV's
request. He wanted a list of recruitments
and the list was prepared from available files,
recollections of officers etc. without reference
to year of recruitment.
(u)
[15. Recall Telegram] ☑(4)
Pages 324 and 325 relate to the recall telegram and
h
it is noted that NOSENKO alleged that a telegram had been
received by the KGB Residency in Geneva on February 4, 1964,
ordering NOSENKO to return to Moscow. Eventually NOSENKO
retracted this assertion and stated that there was no recall
telegram; that he invented the telegram to hasten his defection.
It is stated that special intelligence does not confirm the
existence of the recall telegram but SCOTCH reported on
February 20, 1964, that the KGB resident in New York had
advised members of the Residency on February 18 or 19, 1964,
concerning the content of telegrams received from KGB
*
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other officers of 7th Department examined
the document to assess the effect its dis
closure to the Americans by GOLITZYN would
have on 7th Department cases
*(u).
NOSENKO described the document as
ten or twelve pages in length and stated
it contained the names of several foreigners
against whom 7th Department was working or
planned to work. He volunteered that the
BARTHELEMY S
name BARTHELEMY was one of the names in
the document and stated he did not think
it contained the names of any recruited
agents but only suspects or those 7th
Department was interested in recruiting
in the future.
幾
It is clear from the above that
NOSENKO not only had knowledge of data
received from FCD regarding use of tourists
by American Intelligence, but he also
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document for treatment of venereal disease.
However, he continued as a member of the
Komsomol until the year was up and kept the
card for some period after his birthday. *
NOSENKO described the Komsomol unit as
very small, consisting of approximately 17
people. The Secretaries of most of the
Departments were females. Dues were collected
every month and there was some type of meet-
ing every month. NOSENKO did not remember
the name of the Secretary of the KGB Komsomol
but stated that he dealt with MARAT SOKOLOV,
a member of the Collegium of the Komsomol
Bureau who was supervising the Komsomol organ-
ization in the SCD.
(2 (u)
On April 22, 1968, (N-184), NOSENKO
stated he was chosen as Secretary of the
SCD Komsomol Unit at a meeting in September
September 1
ex 
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previously failed to acknowledge that he knew some of these
individuals. NOSENKO's current reactions to their names or
photographs are set forth below ( x)()(u)
[A.A. LEBEDEV] (S)
Page 362
On December 2, 1967, (N-52), NOSENKO was shown a
list of names which included (A.A. LEBEDEV
vistie
He said he knew
[LEV LEBEDEV who was a Deputy to the Chief of the Special
Section, SCD but he did not know A.A. LEBEDEV.
V.A. ZAYTSEV
Page 364
u)
}
On February 15, 1968, (N-135), NOSENKO said he knew
of some ZAYTESEVS but did not know this one whose photograph h
was shown.
(XX (u)
N.P. KULEBYAKIN
age 370
On April 26, 1968, (N-186), NOSENKO said KULEBYAKIN
was well known but he did not know him personally. *
(FIRST NAME UNKNOWN) [KUROCHKIN (S)
✓ Page 372
*
N(S)
NOSENKO made no comment when this name was mentioned
to him on November 14 (N-23); and December 2; 1967, (N-51) (✗(u)
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O.D. KALUGIN
Page 373
# (5)
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NOSENKO made no comment regarding this name on
October 31, (N-3), and November 20 (N-33) ✓ (4)
VLADIMIR TULAYEV
Page 373
On December 21, 1967, (N-77), NOSENKO did not recog-
nize this name but leter recalled there was an Intourist trans-
lator by the name of TULAYEV
[YU. V. LYSOV (S)
Page
Page 375
On February 14, 1968, (N-133), NOSENKO, when shown
this photograph stated he had seen this person once or twice.
He did not recall his name but said he was a young officer of
FCD who took English examinations with NOSENKO
YU. N. PERFILEV
Page 379
(s)
(4)
On December 15, 1967, (N-73), NOSENKO did not
recognize the photograph of this individual. He said he knew
his father and knew there was a son but he had never seen him
ANATOLIY GOLITZYN
Page 383
On November 6, 1967, (N-13), NOSENKO stated that he
was not acquainted with GOLITZYN and did not talk to him.
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GOLITZYN did talk to various other SCD officers.
[V.D. AVDEYEV(S)
Page 389
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8(4)
On July 20, 1968, (N-211), although he had not
previously recognized AVDEYEV's Photograph when displayed to
him, NOSENKO stated he thought this photograph was familiar.
It is considered possible that he recalled the photograph
from it's previous showing to him.
8.
8.
*
KGB Dining Rooms ✗(u)
On page 375 (in Annex A) it is noted SCOTCH stated
that NOSENKO knew many of the Chiefs and Deputies of KGE
Directorates and Departments and would have knowledge of
KGE hierarchy by reason of access to a dining room reserved
for Chiefs and Deputies of Departments.
The paper stated
that NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until
January March, 1965, when he volunteered that he had eaten
occasionally in the Chief's dining room.
COMMENT:
\(u)
On November 24, 1967, (N-39), while
discussing VASILIY ROMANOVICH SITNIKOV whose
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current interrogations have clarified practically all of
these cases.
(n)) MA
Actor/Proctor] G
Page 399 refers to a case involving ACTOR (or PROCTOR)] (5)
It indicates that NOSENKO said he was a valuable FCD agent who
traveled overtly to Western Europe and thereafter clandestinely
to the USSR.
COMMENT:
7
This case was referred to in notes brought
out by NOSENKO in 1964. FBI translated the
name in these notes as "EKTER. On December 8,
1967, (N-60), NOSENKO translated the name "ECTOR"
but acknowledged it could be "ACTOR." He related
that he had noted this name when a representative
of the FCD had complained to the 7th Department,
SCD, that this name had been included in a
communication sent by Intourist through the
open mails to various Soviet stations abroad.
FCD was afraid its valuable agent would be
compromised. This protest took place in 1963.
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NOSENKO believed the agent had travelled
to the USSR just prior to the protest. (^)
The translation of the name as "ECTOR".
by NOSENKO has produced a more likely suspect
for deferred
than VERNON W. PROCTOR, referred to in the
CIA paper.
ECTOR, JR.
This individual is JOSEPH FORTE
born January 25, 1936, at Houston, ✗(s)
Texas He
He 
was a communications technician
with the United States Air Force in Germany
from April, 1957, to March, 1961. GABRIELLE
(s)
HAMMERSTEIN reported that a Soviet officer
with whom she was in contact requested that
she obtain biographic data concerning various
individuals in West Berlin, one of whom was
JR.st
JOSEPH FORTE ECTOR, JR
It appears that this
request was made of HAMMERSTEIN about February,
1961.
Investigation disclosed that he is
currently an employee of NSA but no record
of travel since his return to the United States
in March, 1961, has been located.
RA
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[R
ROBERT ARMSTRONG|
ARMSTRONG 
S
非
D
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On page 402 it is indicated that NOSENKO provided
no source for his information regarding ROBERT ARMSTRONG
COMMENT:
On November 14, 1967, (N-22c), NOSENKO
stated he had heard from GRYAZNOV that the
1st Department suspected ARMSTRONG was a
homosexual and planned "active" work against
him.
3.
[HAROLD BERMAN (3)
On page 403 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate
the source of his information on [HAROLD BERMAN.] *1(5)
COMMENT:
On August 1, 1968, (N-213), NOSENKO stated
(5)
that BERMAN was in the USSR several times.
He was first of interest to the 7th Depart-
ment in 1957 or 58 but later in 1960, when
he came in connection with the Powers case,
he was of interest to 1st Department.
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It is noted that NOSENKO was in the
7th Department from 1955 to 1960 and in.
the 1st Department in 1960-61.
4.
()(u)
☑(S)
ROBERT CHARLES CHRISTNER XK(S)
On page 407 it is stated NOSENKO did not indicate
the source or date he acquired information on ROBERT CHARLES
CHRISTNER] (S)
COMMENT:
On February 16, 1968, (N-141), NOSENKO
stated that he remembered the name of [CHRISTNER (S)
as an auto tourist handled by the 6th Section,
7th Department, who was arrested in 1960 or
1961. He could recall nothing more.
[NORMAN FISK
AM
On page 409 it is stated that NOSENKO has not explained
why he learned of the [NORMAN FISK Jase only in 1963 when he
JS
was reviewing the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV although : FISK_
was in the USSR in 1959 when they were agents of NOSENKO.
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On February 27, 1968, (N-147), NOSENKO
of FISKfs!
said he remembered the name of FISK as a
tourist, possibly a father and son but could
recall nothing more. (It is noted that
FI SKI was
NOSENKO's notes in which the name CISK was
included have been destroyed:.:CC::CK
6. PRESTON GROVER] (S
☐ On page 410 it is stated that NOSENKO indicated no
source for his information on FRESTON GROVER.
COMMENT:
On March 18, 1965, (N-165), NOSENKO
stated that he got this information from
VLADIMIR KRIVOSHEI.
☑(u)
2. [STEPHEN F. HOFFMAN
On page 413 it is stated that NOSENKO claimed to be
(5)
MAN] was
in the 7th Department at the time STEPHEN F. HOFFMAN was a
target of the 1st Section, 1st Department.
COMMENT:
On December 12, 1967, (N-66), NOŠENKO
stated that in June, 1963, GRYAZNOV of 1st/
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Section, 1st Department, had requested.
SECRET
NOSENKO's (7th Department) assistance in
obtaining a hotel room for a homosexual
agent who was acquainted with HOFFMAN: Ist
Section desired to obtain photographs through
the infrared process of the meeting between
the agent and [HOFFMAN
[THOFFMAN
] (S) ☑
✓ 8. MELVIN (MARVIN) KANTOR] (1)
On page 416 it is stated that NOSENKO did not explain
()
why the case on MARVIN (MELVIN) KANTOR was included among cases
he noted as having occurred while he was in the Embassy Section“
in 1960-61.
COMMENT:
As indicated previously, NOSENKO related
that in 1963 he was requested by a Deputy
Chief of SCD to prepare a paper regarding
agents of the 7th Department.
NOSENKO in
turn requested three of the Section Chiefs.
to give him information.
Information regarding)
吸
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SECRET
[KANTOR]
(854)
was furnished by EVGENI NOSKOV,
Senior Case Officer, Section 1, 7th
Department, who was acting in absence
of VATALI DERA, Chief of the Section.
This listing of cases was not confined
to the 1960-61 period but included recruit-
ments in other years.
59.
3.xe
2. KAZAN - KOMAREK S *
On page 417 it is stated that NOSENKO's sourcing
of the lead pertaining to [KAZAN-KOMAREK] has not been estab-
lished.
COMMENT:
On November 6, 1967, (N-12a), NOSENKO related
that in 1961 or 1962 this individual had con-
tacted Intourist with a proposal to send
tourists to the USSR. This, of course, was
within the responsibilities of 7th Department
with which NOSENKO was affiliated in 1962.
20. [RALPH MATLAW] (S
S)
On page 417 it is noted that NOSENKO saw information: :✗
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pertaining to RALPH MATLAW only when he was reviewing files
of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV although he was their case officer when
they were in touch with MATLAW in 1959.
COMMENT:
It is noted that NOSENKO's notes on
[MATLAW] S
ATLAW have been destroyed. This case has not
yet been discussed with NOSENKO for clarification,
11. PHILIP NIELSEN
On page 419 it is stated that NOSENKO claims personal
(s)
knowledge of PHILIP NIELSEN's meeting with agent [TAMARA
KUNGAROVA'
5 ② father", although he was in the American Embassy
Section at the time.
COMMENT:
On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO
stated that he had heard of this meeting through
another officer. The incident happened after
NOSENKO had turned her over to another case officer.
12. [BERNARD PECHTER S
On page 420 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indi-
cate the source of his information on BERNARD PECHTER] (S)
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211
$(4)
COMMENT:
C
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P
[PECHTER](s)
NOSENKO's notes which pertain to PECHTER (S
have been destroyed. On May 23, 1968, (N-197),
NOSENKO stated that this case happened in 1959
before he went to the 1st Department in 1960.
VLADIMIR IVANOV was working against [PECHTER] and
consideration was given to using GRUSHA, who had
been publicly compromised in the United States in
the operation. The idea was to photograph PECHTER] (s)
with GRUSHA as a means of exerting pressure on
5)
[PECHTER (S
ť a later time. This was a 7th Depart-
ment case while NOSENKO was in the 7th Department.
13. [ARON PRESSMAN (6)
$(4)
On page 421 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate
the source of information on ARON PRESSMAN(S)
COMMENT:
On December 5, 1967, (N-54), NOSENKO stated
that the information was obtained from the
special file of the 7th Department in 1963.
24. [WALTER RASK]
On page 422 it is stated that NOSENKO did not relate
the WALTER RASK case to his 1962-64 service in the 7th Department.
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COMMENT:
On November 28, (N-46), NOSENKO stated that
this case was included among the notes furnished.
to him by EVGENI NOSKOV acting for Section
Chief VITALI DERA in 1963 (as noted above)/.
15. [SPENCER ROBERT
RTS/13934
On page 422 it is stated that NOSENKO did not
indicate his original source of information on SPENCER ROBERTS S
COMMENT:
On March 18, 1968, (N-165), NOSENKO stated
that he did not recall how he learned about
this case but it happened after he left the
1st Department in January, 1962.
✓. [JOHANNA ROSS]
1(S)
(4)
On page 423 it is stated that NOSENKO did not
indicate the source of his information on JOHANNA ROSS.
COMMENT:
On November 10, 1967, (N-18d), NOSENKO
ess
fas
✓ stated that ROSS was in the USSR as a tourist
in 1959, and an agent of the 3rd Section, 7th
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Department, had relations with her at the
National Hotel which were photographed.
In 1962 or 1963 NOSENKO heard from
GRYAZNOV that she was again in Moscow
a tutor for the American Ambassador's
(5)
ك
children and was in "close relations"
with a foreign Negro. 1st Department was
planning to approach her and, if successful,
to use her against American code clerks (u)
[JOHN RUFE]
On page 424 it is stated that NOSENKO did not relate
the [JOHN RUFE lease to his 7th Department service and did not
indicate the source of information
COMMENT:
NOSENKO stated on November 28, 1967,
(N-46), that this was one of the cases fur-
nished by EVGENI NOSKOV in 1963 acting
for VITALI DERA as indicated above.
✗8. COLLETTE SCHWARZENBACH
§ (u)
On page 425 it is stated that NOSENKO did not recall
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from whom he had heard about the [COLLETTE SCHWARZENBACH case.
COMMENT:
On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO
stated he saw the file on this case. The
file was still in the ist Section, 1st
Department, in 1960 0.x (u).
29. [SOFIA GRETA SHATTAUER
On page 427 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate
the source of his information on [SHATTAUER]]
COMMENT:
On November 28, 1967, (N-46), NOSENKO
advised this was from NOSKOV as indicated
above.
☑20. [HOWARD SOCHURER ($)
On page 428 it is stated that NOSENKO did not
indicate his source of information on HOWARD SOCHUREK S
COMMENT:
On January 10, 1968, (N-91), NOSENKO
recalled this case while discussing cases
where KGB or GRU officers came under suspicion.
He stated that 7th Directorate surveillance
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detected [SOCHUREK in contact with a KGB officer.
Such contact had not been previously approved.
This was reported to the Chairman through
regular channels and there was a scandal in
SCD. GRIBANOV personally reprimanded the
officers involved
21. [WILLIA
**
WILLIAM TARASKA] (5)
On page 430 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate
his source of information on WILLIAM TARASKA (S)
COMMENT: It is noted that NOSENKO's notes pertaining
to
TARASKA]ve
have been destroyed; however, on
November 16, 1967, (N-25), NOSENKO stated that
this case occurred in 1959 when he was Deputy
Chief of the 1st Section, 7th Department.
The case officer for [TARASKA was MICHAEL
VINOGRADOV. On March 29, 1968, (N-174),
NOSENKO stated that the Chief of 7th
Department, DUBAS, had one or two meetings
with him. He was considered to be recruited)
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T
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TO SECRET
but NOSENKO did not know if he ever worked
for KGB.
पा
22. [CARMEN TORREY] S
On page 431 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate
his source of information on [CARMEN TORREY
COMMENT:
RREY]
On February 27, 1968, (N-147), NOSENKO stated
that he remembered this name and that she was
not an American. He said the 2nd Section of
the 7th Department was working against her.
(TORREY (5)
(TORREY was in the USSR January
[23. [VASILIY VOLKOV]
February 1960)
On page 433 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate
the source of his information on VASILIY VOLKOW(S)
COMMENT:
On November 28, 1967, (N-46), NOSENKO stated
that this case was among the cases furnished
to him in 1963 by EVGENI NOSKOV, acting for
VITALI DERA as noted above.
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C
SECRET
₤24. [WILLIAM WALLACE] Ⓒ)
On page 434 it is stated NOSENKO has not indicated
the source of his information on WILLIAM WALLACE!
E(S)
COMMENT:
This was also one of the cases fur-
nished NOSENKO by EVGENI NOSKOV as noted
above. (✓ (4)
25. RALPH and EVELYN YOUNGER
YOUNGER] [(S)
On page 435 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate
the source of his information on RALPH and EVELYN YOUNGER/S)
COMMENT:
On November 25, 1967, (N-41), NOSENKO stated
that they were auto tourists who were caught by
the 7th Department engaging in intelligence.
activities but the case was taken over by the
1st Department when they visited the USSR in
1961. NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the 1st
Section at that time. KOSOLAPOV, who worked
closely with NOSENKO, was directly involved in
the case
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IV.
NEW CASES AND NEW OR CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION
Information set forth above regarding the cases
discussed in the CIA paper has clearly indicated that the
current series of interrogations of NOSENKO in 1967 and
1968 have been much more thorough and have produced
voluminous information clarifying data obtained from him
in previous interviews. Of particular significance,
however, in addition to that set forth above is information
obtained during the current series of interviews which is
completely new. Some of the information relates to new cases
and some of it is new information on cases mentioned previously.
Set forth below is a summary of the most significant data
in these categories and additional new and confirmatory data
obtained during the current interrogation.
This material not
only suggests that the previous interviews were inadequate
but also appears significant in assessing the bona fides of
NOSENKO
☑(u)
A. New Cases
(s)
1. GEORGE LUBIN, (S)
WILL) and SIPE BURTING and
(FNU) SMITH] (5)
h
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219

C
TYP
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people of interest to PETROV of the 2nd Section. These
(5)
names were ("LUBIN," "SMITH," "WILL BURTIN" and "SIPE BURTIN. "Js)
The name A. A. MIKHAILOV was listed beside the name of [LUBIN ](s)
and Y. E. CHERNETSOV was listed beside the name [SMITH.] (S)
NOSENKO stated that these were the case officers handling
the cases of 4 [LUBIN/a and SMITH] Ditto marks under the name
CHERNETSOV suggested that he also was handling the cases
[BURTINS. At the bottom of the sheet was a name
involving the BURTINS.]³ At
and some numbers which NOSENKO said was the name "ZAITSEV" and
a KGB telephone number.
*
This is new information and so far as is known
this material had not heretofore been observed or translated
by CIA.
*(u)
Investigation has disclosed that [CLUBIN ] & probably
LUBINT
(5)
identical with [GEORGE LUBIN who was in the USSR in connection
with the "Plastics, USA Exhibit" in 1961, which was under the
auspicies of USIA.
(s)
INTS
[WILL and SIPE BURTIN] appear to be identical with a
man and wife who in applications for passports in April, 1961,
indicated they planned to depart about April 20, 1961, for a
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?
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business trip of four weeks to Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union
and England, A subsequent passport application filed by
(5)
WILL BURTIN Indicated that he was in Moscow from May 20-29,
1961, for "USIA." Inquiry at USIA disclosed that/WILL BURTIN
at (WILL BURTIN ((s)
was given a contract on April 13, 1961, to design, produce
(5)
and install the exhibit, "Medicine, USA)] in the Soviet Union.
He was instructed, however, on October 20, 1961, to stop work
on the exhibit and travel expenses of $1600 submitted by him
were disallowed
On July 19, 1968, the Director of Security, CIA,
advised that in May, 1961, a component of CIA was in contact
5)
with BURTIN 200 discuss problems in the medical science
cience 
field;
however, it was not known whether his services were utilized.
The Director of Security of CIA has also advised that/GEORGE
(s)
LUBIN was of interest to a component of CIA in 1959 when he
represented his company at a fair in the USSR and in 1960
when he was again scheduled to visit the Soviet Union.
(5)2
((FNU) SMITH] has not been identified but may be
identical with WALTER BURGESS SMITH, II, who was in contact with,
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YURI V. ZAITSEV, Attache, Soviet Embassy in Washington in
1955; became employed by State Department in 1958; was
detached to USIA in 1959 and assigned to the American
National Exhibition in Moscow; and is currently a State
Department employee. The connections of both LUBIN] and
[BURTIN] hith
BURTIN with USIA and the fact that they were both of interest
to CIA are completely consistent with NOSENKO's comments
regarding the type of cases handled by the 2nd Section and
with PETROV's interest in establishing coverage.
would apply to [WALTER BURGESS SMITH, II, If he traveled to
The same
the USSR in 1961. However, it cannot be stated with certainty
that these are the cases PETROV had in mind or, if so, whether
they were the only cases in which he was interested at that
time
✓. (FNU) HOFFMAN] (s)
On November 27, 1967 (N-43), when shown a list of
American Embassy personnel which included the name JEROME
DAVID HOFFMAN, NOSENKO stated there was a military officer
who was in Russia for a short period in 1962 who was of
interest to the 1st Section of the 1st Department which
必
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Tok
SECRET
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initiated an operation against him. This man was born in
Russia or his parents were born in Russia and KGB put a
female agent "ELLADA" (KLARA GORBUNOVA) in contact with him
and NOSENKO believes that photographs were taken of their
relations. HOFFMAN told the agent that he would come again
to Moscow. NOSENKO stated that he was told about this case
by GRYAZNOV. Investigation to identify this individual has
not been initiated but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy
of NOSENKO's information.
DOMENICO CANALA
ANALA])
On
On January 13 and 30, April 10, and August 1, 1968,
NOSENKO furnished information pertaining to this case.
January 13 (N-97), he stated that ALEKSANDR STEPANOVICH MALYUGIN
was working with agent "AMICO" (PIETRO CECCHI), an Italian
cook working in Spaso House. He said that MALYUGIN had
another Italian agent who was working in the Argentine Embassy.
On January 30 (N-114), NOSENKO stated that MALYUGIN recruited
an Italian cook of the Argentine Embassy, a friend of PIETRO
CECCHI, in the late 1950's. About 1960 or the beginning of
1961 this agent left Moscow for New York to work as a cook
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о
TOP SECRET
for the representative of Holland to the United Nations.
This agent's file was transferred to the 1st Department of
FCD which was planning to work with him in the U. S.
(u)
On April 10, 1968 (N-178), NOSENKO stated that this
Italian agent may have been recruited on a homosexual basis and
had gone to New York to work as a cook for either the Belgian
or Dutch representative to the United Nations. BORIS IVANOV,
KGB resident in New York, was in Moscow about this time and
was very interested in this cook. NOSENKO believed that he
might recognize the name of this agent
\.](s)
Investigation disclosed that the individual referred
to by NOSENKO was most likely identical with DOMENICO CANALA,
Italian, born in 1920, who arrived in New York August 31, 1960,
and thereafter served as an employee in the household of the .
{)
Belgian Ambassador to the United Nations, [WALTER LORIDAN
(5)
Subsequently, in 1961, he began employment as a cook in the
Argentine] Embassy in Washington, D. C
On August 1, 1968 (N-213), NOSEKNO was shown the
[D
photographs and names of PIETRO CECCHI and DOMENICO CANALA] (s)
at which time he stated that he recognized CANALA' s name
h
$
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225
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and he was the friend of CECCHI recruited by MALYUGIN. He
said
(s)
[CANALA] had given "some hint" to MALYUGIN concerning
another Italian working in another Embassy who was a homosexual.
CANALA AS
CANALA was interviewed by FBI Agents on August 14
and 16, 1968. He immediately recognized the photograph of
MALYUGIN and related how he had been "set up" in Moscow for
black market activities.
An Indian had requested that he
sell some watches. He sold one to a Russian chauffeur and
was in contact with another Russian to sell two more. They
were picked up by KGB and he agreed to additional meetings
under threat of prosecution. MALYUGIN translated at the time
of the arrest and subsequently was in contact with [CANALA] about
Prior to his departure from Russia another
four or five times.
Soviet was introduced to [CANALA_ _ _ _ He
[CANALA. She 
selected the photograph
of BORIS SEMONEVICH IVANOV as resembling this individual whom
he saw for about fifteen minutes.
Arrangements were made for
[CANALA
subsequent contact in New York but CANALA did not follow through.
In 1961 or 1962 he was contacted by a Soviet in Washington.
selected the photograph of VLADIMIR PAVLOVICH ZAITSEV as the
5)
Soviet. CANALA maintained that he refused to cooperate with
(ك)
ZAITSEV and has had no further contact. [CANALA] also denied
He
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that he had furnished information to the Soviets in Moscow.
but stated that he was afraid not to continue to meet with
them.
必
ERY WHITAKER KEHAYA
رهم
On April 2, 1968 (N-176), NOSENKO stated that while
looking at an encyclopedia he had seen the name of a flower
which reminded him of a KGB agent with an unusual Jewish name
FIAKSEL. This agent was married to an American furrier. He
also recalled another furrier whose name was "HOI
"HOLLENDER" Cond
another case involving a father and son who were in the tobacco
business.
This father and son were Americans who had traveled
to the USSR and were of interest to MIKHAIL FEDOROVICH SHISHKIN
of the 7th Department which had an operation against the son
involving KLARA K. GORBACHEVA.
(NOSENKO later corrected this
name to KLARA KONSTANTINOVA GORBUNOVA.)
On April 4, 1968 (N-176), NOSENKO stated that SHISHKIN
at one time was Chief of the 1st Section of the 7th Department
but later was demoted and became a Senior Case Officer in the
Section handling businessmen in the late 1950's.
involving the American tobacco man and his son occurred in the
THE
The case
TOP SECRET
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227
C
period 1957-59 and possibly in 1959.
TYP SECRET
NOSENKO stated that
possibly the name of the young man was "ERIC."] (S)
On April 12, 1968 (N-179), a list of names including
(⑤
(5)
those of ERYIK KEHAYA and his son ERY WHITAKER KEHAYAT was
displayed to NOSENKO. He selected the name [KEHAYA] and stated
he believed this was the name of the father and son previously
mentioned by him. After seeing the name he recalled that he
name of the young man was ERY] Sather than TERIC. He
did not
know if a recruitment approach had been made to these individuals.
Investigation disclosed that the KEHAYA'
sieve
been
in the tobacco business for many years and have traveled
throughout the world including trips to the USSR.
[5. Unknown Subject;] (u)
American Owner of Hotel or Restaurant
(u)
(u)
On December 15, 1967, (N-73), NOSENKO stated that
when Premier KHRUSHCHEV came to the United States he was
accompanied by various individuals including a Deputy Chief
of the 9th Directorate of KGB named SAHNO (or SAKHNO). This
individual dealt with managers of hotels and restaurants in
connection with KHRUSHCHEV's visit. In 1962 an American tourist,
who was the owner of a hotel or restaurant,
(AU)
probably in New 20
OP SECRET
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228
TOP SECRET
York, came to Moscow and requested through Intourist to see SAHNO.
SAHNO told NOSENKO that he knew this man and asked NOSENKO to
accompany him to a meeting with him. The meeting took place in
the office of ANKUDINOV, Chief of Intourist and VLADIMIR BABKIN,
Chief of an Intourist Department, was also present.
The meeting
was purely social and there was no recruitment attempt. On
March 15, 1968 (N-164), NOSENKO in discussing this case, stated
that this man was probably manager of a hotel and merely wanted
to see SAHNO out of politeness. CRCRCRCRCRC)
Investigation to date has not identified this
individual. (Note: NOSENKO made reference to this incident
while discussing the 9th Directorate on July 9 or 13, 1964 but n
a separate case was not initiated.) (②✓ ✓ (4)
name of
逗 SAM SIDNEY HOLLANDER ] E(S)
HOLLENDER" for
As indicated above NOSENKO mentioned a furrier by the
's)
April 2, 1968.
This case was discussed
with him again on April 4 and 12, 1968 (N-176, 179). He stated
that he did not know the first name but the man was a furrier.
who was in the USSR on several occasions.
KGB was working
against him in the early 1950's and possibly also in the late
1950's. His case, was handled by the Section in the 7th Department
NOSENKO did not know whether this
which handled businessmen.
man had been recruited.
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Investigation has disclosed that the individual
referred to by NOSENKO is undoubtedly SAM SIDNEY HOLLANDER,] (s)
a fur broker in New York who has made a number of trips to
the Soviet Union. HOLLANDER has been interviewed and has
advised that he lived with a Soviet woman during his stay
in the USSR from 1941-1945
√ This
This woman's name was [RAYA GRANICK.] (③
He also advised that he had met TATIANA FIAKSEL about 1946 in
the Soviet Union. She later married a friend of his, DANIEL
SHERICH also engaged in the fur business in New York. [HOLLANDER ] (s)
did not admit being contacted by Soviet Intelligence but stated
he had always suspected that TATIANA F. SHERICH was working for
Soviet Intelligence from the time that he had first met her.
B. Additional Significant Data
On Cases Previously Reported
xX (u)
[1. JOHN DISCOE SMITH (ZHARI)] (u)
This case illustrates the inadequacy of the
processing of information obtained from NOSENKO during
previous interviews. On June 25, 1964, NOSENKO furnished
information concerning an American code clerk who had defected
:
to the USSR and who was being handled by NIKOLAY SEMENOVICH
(x)(u)
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5)
TOP SECRET
TOP
KGB as reported by SHAMROCK during early 1967.
NOSENKO's
information relating to "ZHARI's" connection with India
suggested that he was identical with SMITH who was stationed
in India from 1955 to 1959 as a code clerk and communications
technician. He transferred to Vienna, Austria, in late 1959
but resigned from State Department in December, 1959. SMITH's
whereabouts was unknown from May or early June, 1960, until
October, 1967, when the Soviets publicized his defection and
reported he was in the USSR.
X(u).
NOSENKO was reinterviewed concerning this matter on
October 31, November 29, and December 6, 1967 (N-3, 47, 57),
and furnished basically the same information as previously
furnished.
He was of the opinion that FCD had taken "ZHARI"
from India and believed that he had first heard about him
in 1961; however, ARTEMEV was connected with him in 1962.
(u)
There is little doubt that inquiries in 1964 regarding
communications personnel stationed in India prior to 1961 would
have discovered the JOHN DISCOE SMITH case three years before
the case was reported by (SHAMROCK (S)
(uj
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SECRET
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for this agent was PAVEL FEDEROVICH PANKRATOV who introduced
the agent to NOSENKO because NOSENKO was considering the
possibility of using her against correspondent [KENNETH
BRODNEY.
(5) He
He and PANKRATOV had a short meeting with her on
the street and NOSENKO was introduced to her by PANKRATOV
as his KGB colleague. She had been an agent for some time
and used on a "neutral base," (occasionally when there was
a need on a particular target). PANKRATOV told NOSENKO it
would be easy for her to agree to have "close relations"
(intimate relations) with a foreigner and NOSENKO said he
did not use her against BRODNEY but later saw her file when
it was in possession of KOVSHUK.
(5)
On
NOSENKO said that he had met this agent with
PANKRATOV in 1954 and it would have been before mid-1954
when PANKRATOV was transferred from the 1st Department.
April 16, 1968, (N-181), NOSENKO said that KOVSHUK had the
file on FIAKSEL in 1960 or 1961 but he did not know why
KOVSHUK was holding the file and did not know if KOVSHUK had
taken the file over from PANKRATOV in mid-1954. At the time
KOVSHUK had the file it was reported that she was coming back
to Russia (from the U. S.)
(u)
235
TOP SECRET
h
NW 50953 DocId: 32318825 Page 132
嗽
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4. NIKOLAI SKVORTSOV] ☐ (x(u)
On June 29, 1968, (N-206), a photograph containing
the name of ALEKSANDR MIKHALYLOVICH CHECHEVITSYN was displayed
to NOSENKO who identified the photograph as an old photograph
It is noted that CHECHEVITSYN had accompanied
of SKVORISOV.
ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH SOLOVYEV to Bangkok in 1960 were SOLOVYEV
was in contact with a State Department communications technician,
ANTHONY LAPKA.
This contact was the first step of an attempted
A. ②This
of [LAPKA]
recruitment of LAPKA who went to Italy later in 1960.
It is
noted also that NOSENKO advised that SKVORTSOV during 1960-61
was trying to get a visa to go to CID:::::C)_.
S
Recruitment approaches were made to [LAPKA] by the
Soviets in Italy in 1960 and in France in 1962.
He was
prominently mentioned in information furnished by SHAMROCK
which undoubtedly emanated from JOHN DISCOE SMITH, who was
well known to
D.
[LAPKA.] (s)
Significant Confirmatory Information
STRUKOV and URYVAYEV
. (B)(u)
On June 29, 1968, (N-206), NOSENKO was shown a list
of 165 Soviets who applied for visas to come to the Unite
¿ \(u)
h
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239
*
SECRET
TOP SECRET
States in 1963 and 1964 under the sponsorship of the Council
on Student Travel of the YMCA East-West Committee. NOSENKO
selected the photograph of VLADIMIR GRIGORYEVICH STRUKOV which
he said was familiar and he thought he was a young officer who
"practiced" in SCD in 1962-63 after studying at the higher
school of KGB. He also recognized the photograph and name of
YURIY VLADIMIROVICH URYVAYEV as a senior case officer in Section
4 of 7th Department. He then recalled that STRUKOV had been.
afraid to come to the United States. He and URYVAYEV had been
selected as security officers for the group but URYVAYEV for
some reason did not receive a visa.
STRUKOV became an officer
in 2nd Section, 7th Department in 1963.
3(7) (u)
After the interview of NOSENKO a recheck of FBI
records disclosed that STRUKOV did come to the United States
but URYVAYEV did not. While this is not of major importance,
it is considered a significant indication that NOSENKO's
knowledge of KGB was not derived from KGB briefing but from
actual service as an officer. ✓ (u)
☑(u)
1
RICHARD DONALD SHAFFER (✓C_)
On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO recognized the
name RICHARD DONALD SHAFFER on a list of American Embassy
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240
P
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personnel.
TOP
SECRET
He described [SHAFFER
s)
He described SHAFFER as head of the Sergeants
at American House who was spying on the Russian agents in
American House and giving KGB trouble.
The KGB, therefore,
used some "medicine" against him to make him leave. This
was done by placing the "medicine" in his bed. This caused
an illness which, the doctors did not diagnose.
thought SHAFFER Left Moscow in 1960. The case officer working
against him was VLADIMIR DEMKIN.
**
FBI files indicate that [SHAFFER'
ب كرة
NOSENKO
S. Army Attache
and security files were reviewed on May 6, 1963.
They disclosed
that he arrived in Moscow May 8, 1958, and was assigned duties
·
h
as manager of American House. He was scheduled to leave Moscow
May 7, 1960, but got an extended tour for another year. However,
he left April 10, 1961, before the year was up as he was suffering
from erysipelas with severe skin rash, swelling about the face
(s)
[SHA
and a temperature. It was noted that SHAFFER had excellent
efficiency ratings and had been commended for his assistance to
the exhibit manager of the American National Exhibition in Moscow
This also is considered as significant indication that
NOSENKO is furnishing information from personal knowledge and
not from KGB briefing.
✓ ✓ w
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OP SECRET
k
3. RALPH and EVELYN YOUNGER ((__)
TØR
TOP SECRET
Page 435 of the CIA paper describes the KGB operation
involving the captioned individuals who were arrested and
NOSENKO
recruited by KGB during 1961 while visiting the USSR.
reported that his former subordinate, V. V. KOSOLAPOV, was
directly involved in the case.
After the YOUNGER's departure
from Moscow they reported their arrest to U. S. authorities
and furnished descriptions of the individuals involved in
their recruitment.
On June 22, 1968, (N-205), the descriptions furnished
He suggested
by the [YOUNGERS were discussed with NOSENKO.
Jer
that "VIKTOR" described by them would be KOSOLAPOV; the
"General" described by them was probably SERGEY MIKHAYLOVICH
FEDOSEYEV, and "OLA" was probably BOGDANOVA, a female officer
of 1st Section. When shown photographs of one NINA BOGDANOVA
and one ELENA BOGDANOVA, NOSENKO believed that NINA BOGDANOVA
was identical with the female officer of the 1st Section, 1st
5)
case. He also
Department, who was involved in the CYCLOUNGER CLEA
stated that VLADIMIR L'VOVICH ARTEMEV, an officer of the 1st
Department, was involved: (✗XX✗K
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:
Subsequently photographs of KOSOLAPOV, FEDOSEYEV,
ARTEMEV, and the two BOGDANOVAS were displayed to the
[YOUNGERS]) who made firm identifications of KOSOLAPOV, FEDOSEYEV,
and NINA BOGDANOVA as being involved in their case. They
were not certain that ARTEMEV was involved. ✗
4. Trip of NOSENKO's Mot
other
IN (1)
On May 15, 1968, (N-194), NOSENKO in conversation
mentioned that his mother had accompanied Madam KOSYGINA on a
trip to the Mediterranean and Western Europe in 1956, possibly
on the "Poebeda.'
i)
An Italian source reported to CIA concerning the
visit of the "S. S. Pobeda" to Naples, Italy, on September 11-14,
1956.
Included in the list of 400 passengers were KLAUDYA
KOSYGINA born in 1908, passport number 123494, issued August 27,
1956, and TAMARA NOSENKO,
issued August 27, 1956
forn
1910, passport number 123495
5. [COLLETTE SCHWARZENBACH
(s).
Pages 424 and 425 of the CIA paper contain information
concerning the captioned individual.
NOSENKO reported that while
she was working in Moscow she fell in love with a KGB agent
and was the target of an unsuccessful KGB recruitment attempt.
((")
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To
SECRET
It was noted that she reported this recruitment approach
in January, 1959, and later furnished details of this attempt
to a State Department security officer.
This case is undoubtedly identical with a case
previously reported by ANATOLIY GOLITZYN concerning an American
secretary who rebuffed a recruitment attempt. The two cases
had not been tied together prior to the current series of
interviews of NOSENKO(
6. GABRIEL REINER (5)
✗ VLADIMIR DMITRYEVICH CHELNOKOVÝ
On November 18, 1967, (N-30), NOSENKO furnished a
written memorandum in which he identified/GABRIEL REINER
as head of CCCosmos" Travel Bureau who dealt with Intourist
(5)
and visited Russia several times. He worked with his son,
(ડ)
[SAM] nd
and both were suspected by KGB of having FBI connections.
In 1960 CHELNOKOV, who was Chief of the 7th Department, became
acquainted with REINER under cover of Intourist. Thereafter
છે
h [REINER] he
he was in contact with REINER when the latter was in Moscow.
[REINER had CHELNOKOV's telephone number and CHELNOKOV received
a telephone call from/REINER (who was abroad) on one occasion
when NOSENKO was in CHELNOKOV's office/
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On November 18, 1967, (N-31), NOSENKO stated that
5)
although REINER would have considered CHELNOKOV to be an
Intourist official, NOSENKO believed [REINERY who was very
sly, "suspected" CHELNOKOV and used him to settle questions
which could not be settled through Intourist. He did not
believe that REINER Would know CHELNOKOV's full name and
said that CHELNOKOV had a "city number." NOSENKO had previously
explained that KGB officers frequently gave their contacts a
"city telephone number" rather than the telephone number of
their KGB office although the telephone would be physically
located in the office of the KGB officer
On July 3 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO stated he did not
know whether REINER Knew CHELNOKOV under his true name.
On
June 10, 1968, a photograph of CHELNOKOV was displayed to
(s)
REINER who failed to recognize it. However, he stated that he
knew two Soviets named CHELNOKOV; one worked in the section of
Intourist that handled Intourist guides and appeared to hold
the position of supervisor. The other was introduced to him
in 1958 by an Intourist official SERGI M. GUSKOV, as "an
important friend" who could help REINER secure an appropriate
REINERL
※
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gift parcel license. The introduction took place in the
Intourist office in Moscow and subsequent meetings occurred
REINER recalled having
REINER' Lotel.
in this office or at REINER
(s)
telephoned CHELNOKOV on several occasions from the U. S.
concerning specific situations involving issuance of tourist
visas and related matters.
MA
22. [VIRGIL KRAFT](s)
Pages 129-130 of the CIA paper discuss the case
[VIRGIL KRAFT ✗(S)
reported by NOSENKO involving KGB approach to VIRGIL KRAFT,
a clergyman from the Chicago area.
✓ NOSENKO had reported that
was compromised on the basis of intimacies with a Soviet
[KRAFE 345
woman which were photographed by the KGB. The recruitment
[KRAFT
(s)
approach to KRAFT was made by DUBAS, Chief of the 7th Department,
KRAFT front
who extracted an agreement from KRAFT not to criticize the
Soviet Union. This approach was made in 1957 or 1958 and
DUBAS again contacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963.
Thereafter [KRAFT's file was turned over to the FCD.
Thereafter [KRAFT's 1
is)
KRAFT was interviewed by FBI Agents in November, 1964,
and confirmed that he had been approached and photographs of him
and the Soviet female in compromising positions displayed to him;
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however, he denied intimacies with the Soviet woman or
agreement to collaborate with the KGB
During the interview [KRAFT] made available a photo-
graph depicting him and the Soviet woman (NADEZHDA KOLESNIKOVA
or KOLESHNIKOVA or KALESHNIKOVA). This photograph was displayed
to NOSENKO on May 3, 1968, (N-188), who immediately recognized
Sand
the photograph of KRAFT and stated that he believed the woman
was the Soviet woman with whom he had been compromised.
However,
he could not be absolutely sure because the hair style appeared
to be different.
NOSENKO stated that although DUBAS (KONSTANTIN
NIKITOVICH DUBAS) was Chief of the 6th Department in 1962 or
5)
1963 when KRAFT returned to the USSR, he was invited to contact
1)
KRAFT because he had previously talked to him. NOSENKO believed
that YURIY BELIKOV served as interpreter for DUBAS during the
first interview (1957 or 1958), but DURAS was probably accompanied
by somebody from the 6th Department in the 1962 or 1963 interview
On July 15, 1968, photographs of DUBAS and BELIKOV
1969,
were displayed to KRAFT) by FBI Agents. He immediately identified
the photograph of DUBAS as "the Chief" who had made the
approach to him. He said the photograph of BELIKOV resembled,
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