200000
104-10336-10034
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
"Fils by
17 September 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Ms. Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB
FROM:
J. Barry Harrelson
SUBJECT:
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM
CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number
104-10151-1-206
1. The following is in response to subject request.
2. Searches were made for information responsive to
subject request and materials were provided for examination
by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members
selected a number of documents. Those documents have now
been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be
processed and released to NARA.
3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Han
J. Barry Harrelson
13-00000
MEMORANDUM
September 12, 1998
To:
CC:
From:
Subject:
Laura Denk
Executive Director
Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader
CIA HAS NO
DECLASE
ROSC
Michelle Combs Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review
CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206
In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the
Review Board requested additional information on a source identified-in RIF number
104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina
Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA
searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this
source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA
provided the source's 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No
assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of
briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the
source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source
was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald's 201 file. All of these
materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK
Collection at the National Archives.
Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review
Board agreed to protect the source's true name and cryptonym. Documents from this
source are identified as the product of "a valued American intelligence source who was
a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former
USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for
internal counter-intelligence efforts."
e:\combs\cia-ir35.wpd
File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4
13-00000
SECRET
OIM-98-0084
06 August 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR: (U)
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
FROM:
(U)
Lee S. Strickland
SUBJECT:
Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency
(S)
Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym
1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I
respond to the Assassination Records Review Board ("ARRB" or
"Board") regarding their current deliberations as to postponement
of certain very limited information in one document
specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source ((IJDECANTER).
It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym,
in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of
15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times
article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable
benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant
damage to US intelligence interests.
2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose
and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a
fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym
⠀ IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and
would otherwise be releasable.
3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask
the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this
memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly
cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the
conclusion of your deliberations.
4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has
been released almost in its entirety. The released version
reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided
SECRET
CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Dect On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym
information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It
continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a
credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA
assessment is supported by reporting from another source
(identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER). It concludes by
stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides
... fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is
critical to our request. By having released this substantive
information
and by otherwise
having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we
must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence
judgment of CIA is not compromised.
--
"bona fides
... established"
--
and
proceeds from
5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI)
hence the issue of damage to national security
four basic questions:
--
•
what information was compromised?
what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
information?
what understanding of the information did the
service(s) have?
what information did the intelligence service(s)
believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the
detriment of the United States?
6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can
be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph
interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three
and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important
for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target
intelligence service.
7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a
foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the
import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and
the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect
example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information
compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a
2
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym
satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating
to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other
information they had acquired through signals intelligence,
concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-
operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their
territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-
operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e.,
concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of
intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they
took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was
directly and immediately lost.
8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the
quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service
believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment
of the United States; if they do not, the United States may
escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical
question that a foreign country must answer and it is the
critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in
our fold.
9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by
what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own
knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially
released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The
Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to
the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they
know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he
said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus
incorporated his information into our operational practices and
activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm
to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow
them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a
US intelligence success.
10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,
we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the
Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did
not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed,
the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and
this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the
Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period
of time.
3
SECRET
13-00000
SUBJECT:
SECRET
(S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym
--
--
11. (S) In sum, question 4 bona fides is the CI key.
The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information
relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must
protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we
are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal
Security Service when they assess this new information in light
of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
of course, information on the public record via the media.
12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage
is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are
three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:
First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the
Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the
United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This
specific release might well be viewed as a public move
to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate.
tensions.
Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to
the Russian service. This specific release could
arguably provide them with insights into our capability
to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian
service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not
know this for certain.
And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has
never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector
in our custody and under our control; the CIA has
pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that
it is publicly known at least to some degree. However,
because his wife, child and father remain in Russia
today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and
consider postponement also for this reason. Quite
candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether
the Russian government today would take action against
the family from this proposed release. But I would
urge caution here since the information at issue is
minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and
arguably harmful to living persons.
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
(S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym
13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in
person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that
this important information can be postponed from public release.
Lee S. Strickland
5
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
Office of
OIM
Information Managemen
CIA TALKING
POINTS
re Protection of ("IJDECANTER" Cryptonym
Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)
26 AUGUST 1998
The ADDO
Jim Pavitt
has asked that I address the Board
on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of
Operations and the CIA.
•
We request the postponement of certain very limited.
information in one document specifically, the actual
cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).
It is our considered judgment that the release of this
cryptonym, in the particular context of the given
document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed
with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997,
would:
•
•
provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-
intelligence effort,.
result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence
interests, and,
have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and
prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which
could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.
Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and
objectives, we propose however:
a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g.,
"TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym (IJDECANTER in this or
any other document where it appears and would otherwise
be releasable, and/or,
SECRET
CL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIM
CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the
nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., "a
valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but
not general rank, official in the intelligence service
(KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the
Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for
internal counter-intelligence efforts."
•
As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released
almost in its entirety.
•
The released version reports that a Soviet official
(Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect
that OSWALD was a KGB source.
It continues by stating that CIA did not believe
ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is
supported by reporting from another source (identity
redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER).
It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has
had his "... bona fides .. fully established [by CIA].'
"
•
It is this final fact which is critical.
By having released this substantive information
fides
established"
--
"bona
AND by otherwise having
IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt,
THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key
intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.
I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some
degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from
this disclosure the disclosure of the crypt in this
--
particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.
2
SECRET
पर
;
13-00000
SECRET
--
The practice of counterintelligence (CI) and hence the
issue of damage to national security proceeds from four
basic questions:
•
what information was compromised?
what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
information?
what understanding of the information did the receiving
intelligence service(s) have?
what information did the receiving intelligence
service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and
to the detriment of the other party?
The first two questions are largely factual and can be
acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph
interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.
Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and
the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service
and the target intelligence service.
Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not
really an issue here since the US fully understood the
information presented.
Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for
exploitation.
•
If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset
(e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the
detriment of the other service.
3
SECRET

13-00000
SECRET
•
If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully
or to some degree.
• This is the critical question that a foreign country must
answer and it is the critical information that we must
protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.
In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the
Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and
what they have acquired from the substantially released
document and the Los Angeles Times article.
•
•
•
The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER)
defected to the United States;
they know or suspect what he told the US;
they know or suspect that we fully understood the import
of what he said;
they do not know, however, whether we believed him and
thus incorporated his information into our operational
practices and activities.
And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to
the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and
allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what
heretofore has been a US intelligence success.
In sum, question 4
bona fides
is the CI key.
The CIA to date has released all of the substantive
information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular
document.
But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this
particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial
CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when
they assess this new information in light of their
previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
4
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
of course, information on the public record via the
media.
There is additional damage that will accrue from not
officially protecting the identity of IJDECANTER.
•
Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a
devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence
organization.
--
--
It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets
current and past who will logically fear that CIA
will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at
some future point in time.
Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take
self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current
assets or public statements by inactive ones).
Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most
assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future
assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA.
Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our
ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly
against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).
There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in
the interests of the Board's time. They are not
insignificant, however.
ONE, is foreign relations.
In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after
Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of
reprisal.
This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to
embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
5
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the
Russian service.
This specific release could arguably provide them with insights
into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.
The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does
not know this for certain.
THIRD, is an equitable issue.
A
The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a
defector in our custody and under our control;
• The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
•
•
--
While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to
some degree nevertheless his wife, child and father remain
in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial
action the current government might take.
Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether
the Russian government today would take action against the
family from this proposed release.
But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is
minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably
harmful to living persons.
6
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g:\irg_frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc
(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)
7
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