198-10004-10076
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Date:
6/24/201
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER:
198-10004-10076
RECORD SERIES:
CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
Identification Form
Agency Information
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
ARMY
FROM:
JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO:
TITLE:
DATE:
PAGES:
00/00/1963
123
SUBJECTS:
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS:
EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND
CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret
1B; IC
Redact
07/24/1997
Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.
JFK Assassination Records
Department of the Army EO 13526
✓ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority_
☐ Refer To.
Review Date 12/8/2015 By K. Stoner
v9.1
2
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 1
NO.
SUBJECT
1
CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652,924
(SECRET-NOFORN)
2
4
Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C)
w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)
DATE
17 Jan 63
22 Jan 63
Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy
Towards Cuba (TOP SECRET) (in dupe)
23 Jan 63
;
Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above (TOP SECRET) 23 Jan 63
5
Memo for NSC Exec (Comm, subj as above, from
DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)
23 Jan 63
6
DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards
Cuba, Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1°
23 Jan 63
Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm,
Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba(TOP SECRET)
7.
Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for
NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan 63. (TOP SECRET)
24 Jan 63
00
8
9
National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and
Closed) (TOP SECRET)
Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examina-
tion of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency
Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)
Undtd
4 Feb 63
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☐
_
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 3
2
SECRET SENSITIVE
ARA
Cottrell
February 4, 1963
3
Subject: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy
and Contingency Planning on Cuba
In accordance with your instructions, over the week-and
I have reviewed the mein sources of policy on Cuba. The problem
40 I define it as follows:
The Problem:
Prior to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordinat-
Lag Committee of Cuban Affairs, much work bed bean done on Cuba,
both in the policy and contingency fields. The purpose of the
current exercise is to review and identify the main sources of
such policy and contingency planning in on effort to determine
if any of the work previously done will be of value to the
officers of your committed as we go forward with implementation
of the newly stated Cuban policy and objectives.
Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning:
The principal sources of policy and contingency planning
which may or may not be of value to the work of your committes are
as follows:
1.
The National Security Action Menotenda emenating
from the White House.
The Actions of the National Security Council.
The Besio National Security Polley of the 0.8.
(now awaiting final stages of formal elecrance
before presentation to National Security Council).
The Records
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 4
SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET
SENSITIVE
7.
10.
The Recorde of Action of the Executive Committee
of the National Security Council as they pertale
to Cubs.
The Reports of the Sub-Comulttees of EXCOM
during the Cuban Crials.
The Resolutions of the Organization of American
States and the Punta dal Bate Conference.
Public Statements of Government Officials, In
Particular Press Conference of President Kennedy
of September 13, 1962.
Meeting of Secretary Rusk with foreisa Ministero
of Latin America during Cuben Crisis.
Recently Approved New Policy Statement and
Objactives es brown Up by the Interdepartmental
Committee of Cuban Affairs.
Cuban Guidelinen Paper
(A guidelines paper as such does not exist on
Cube as is the case in a majority of other
countries.)
CLUSIONS:
There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with
Cuba, particularly thee generated during the recent October crisis.
This review is nearing completion, and I am segregating particuler
reports which may be of value to the members of your committee
as we go forward with implementation of the new policy and
objectives. In the attached documentation, I have sagregated
those National Security Council decisions and National Security
Action Memoranda which are carried as pending or closed in the
files of the Department of State. Where sction on a particular
NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to EXCOM, action
responsibility on these decisions would appear now to be within
the purview of your Coordinating Committed. from my zavier
to date,
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 5
に
SENSITIVE
SENSITIVE
to date, it appears that all of these decisions call for sctions
which have already been considered by your Committee. You will
note that in vous instances ection responsibility on an MSC
decision or NASAM has been transferred to the Special Group
(ir. Alexis Johnson).
Attachment:
List of Pending and closed
NSC and NASAN decisions
concerning Cubs.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 6
SENSITIVE
C
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 7
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
(PENDING AND CLOSED)
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 8
NSC Action No.
483 NSC 2422a
5/5/61
483 NSC 24224
5/5/61
483 NSC 24226
5/5/61
483 MSC 24228
5/5/61
463 NSC 24221
5/5/61
483 MSC 2422k
5/5/61
SECRET
Substance
Agreed that US policy toward
Cuba should aim at the downfall
of Castro regime.
Status
(Pending)
According to
files, out of
this NSC direct-
ive grew a policy
papers to be
handled different
ly from regular
guidelines papers
on each country.
As of 9/4/62, White House
was informed that action on this
NSC directive would be reported
in compliance with NSAM 181
which transferred certain NSC
NASA actions to special group
(Alexis Johnson).
Importance President
attaches to obtaining
adequate intelligence
on Cuban military
capabilities.
Importance President
attaches to publication
in free world press of
tezzorist actions of
Castro regime, etc. and
to possible political action
to end current terIOE.
Relations with Cuban
Revolutionary Council
should be improved.
Cuban refugees to be given
refugee status; refugees in
Miami to be relocated;
refugees to be eligible to
apply for travel privileges.
Initiation of negotiations
to enlarge willingness of
other American states to
join in action against Cestro.
(Pending)
Action to be
reported in
compliance with
NASAM 181
(Johnson channel)
(Pending)
Action trans-
ferred to EXCOM
(Pending)
Action trans-
ferred to EXCOM
(Pending)
Action trang-
ferred to EXCOM
(Pending)
Action trans-
ferred to EXCOM
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 9
NSC Action No.
483 NSC 2422m
5/5/61
483 HSC 2422a
5/5/61
483 MSC 24220
5/5/61
403 HSC 2422p
5/5/61
483 NSC 2422b
5/5/62
Substance
USIA will expand L.A.
program, but not initiste
electronic warfare against
Castro; means of propaganda
should be made available
to non-US groupe.
US military officers under
general guidance to be
prepared by Dept of State,
would discuse Castro threat
to all L.A. with L.A. officers.
Dept of State should prepare
a report on a possible new
Juridical basis for effective
anti-communist action.
Robert Woodward's assumption
of responsibility of Task Force
on Cuba on announcement of
appointment.
No US military intervention
NOW. Do nothing which would
foreclose possibility military
intervention in future.
Status
(Pending)
Action trans-
ferred to
Johnson channel
Per NASAM
$181.
(Closed)
completed action
as of 11/28/61.
(Closed)
S/P paper
"possible new
Basis for Anti-
Communist Action"
7/24/61
Closed.
Closed.
483 NSC 24226
5/5/61
No naval blockade or aizwar
against Cuba.
Closed.
463 MSC 24226
5/5/61
Detailed study to be made
by CIA with other Departments
of possible weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in elements
which control Cuba.
Closed.
Bissell memo to
Achilles
11/21/61 re:
"Situation and
Prospects in
Cuba"by Sherman
Kent 11/3/61.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 10
SECRET

NSC Action No.
483 MSC 2422h
5/5/61
SECRET
Substance
No sepárate Cuban military
forces should be organized
In U.S. Cuban nationals would
be encouraged enlist in US
Armed Forces.
Status
Closed.
to Pres.draft
program be
terminsted
6/30/62 due to
codest results.
Closed,
with President's
ection of 2/3/62
483 NSC 24225
5/5/61
No Lamediate trade embargo
on Cuba.
declaring total embargo on trade
with Cuba with exception
483 NSC 24221
5/5/61
HASAN 194
10/2/62
NASAM 100
10/3/62
CUBA NASAM 431
3/11/61
CUBA NASAM #181
8/24/62
medicine and food on humanitarian
grounds.
Allience for Progress to be
strengthened.
Policy Toward non-bloc
ships in Cuban trade (Action
US Government proposes to
take with regard to
shipping to Cubs.)
Contingency Planning for
Cabs.
Closed.
Weekly report
now from AID
to White House.
US Government must have ready
White Paper on Cuba and be
ready to give assistance to
Cuban Patriots in similar
effort.
Zyea only Limited Distrib-
ution. Reporting to be through
another channel and handled
personally by Deputy USecy
Pending.
Action trans-
ferred to
EXCOM.
Pending
Action trang-
ferred to
Johnson channel.
Closed.
Paper prepared
and translated:
"The Castro
Regine in Cuba"
9/61
Closed.
Johnson (understand this authorised response
Johnson channel)
on certain 
pending NSC Actions, 2 NASAMS Chru
3
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 11
NSC Action No.
CUBA NASAM 196
10/22/62
CUBA NASAM 209
12/6/62
EYES ONLY
CUDA NASAM 213
1/8/63
BECRET
Substance
Establishment of NSC Executive
Committee
Status
Closed.
Report Submitted.
Cuba Overflights. (This
Presidential directive
approved an attached
Guidelines for the Planning
of Cuban Overflights, and
requested CIA to come up with
en estimate of the adequacy of
such a system of intelligence
collection to meet the criteria
set forth, on assumption it is
supplemented by energetic collection
of information by all other available
means.)
Interdepartmental Organization
of Cuban Affairs - with
responsibility vested in a
Coordinator of Cuban affairs
in Department of State.
Closed.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 12
SECRET
22
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 13
صبح
( )
1
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
34
January 24, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject:
Papers for NSC Executive Committee
Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.
Attached are two revised papers "Summary of
Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States
Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to
members of the NSC Executive Committee for considera-
tion at the meeting of the Committee on Friday,
January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8
for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward⠀
the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted
on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be con-
sidered at the Friday meeting. They are: "United States
Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States"
and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba.'
"
Cloud for
William H.
Executive Secretariat
Attachments:
As stated.
Copy No.
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 14
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)
FROM
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
United States Policy
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the
following words:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the
Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall
neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
hemisphere.'
"We will not, of course, abandon the political,
economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But
these policies are very different from any intent to
launch a military invasion of the island."
NW 50955
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SECRET
SECRET
-2-
Objectives
Accordingly, the objectives of United States.
policy with respect to Cuba are:
1.
2.
3.
40
5.
Protecting the security of the United States
and the other states of the Organization of
American States (OAS) by assuring that
offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
Cuba;
6.
Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;
Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other Hemisphere states;
Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing
the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-
Soviet Communist purposes;
Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
it being understood that our ultimate
objective is replacement of the regime by
one fully compatible with the goals of the
United States;
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SECRET
SECRET
-3-
7.
8.
9.
10.
Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;
Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from other free world states,
and especially from states of the OAS.
Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
should be multilateral, preferably based upon
the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
or on resolutions adopted by the Organization
of American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere;
Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.
Supporting Actions
A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the
U. S. Government will be prepared to increase
the political economic, psychological and
military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
present themselves or can be created. The
actions listed below are those requiring immediate
approval and would be initiated in the sequence
set forth below. Recommendations for further
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 17
SECRET
SECRET
-4-
actions based upon the re-examination of
existing programs and upon the development
of new programs related to the foregoing
objectives will be forthcoming.
1. In addition to current covert program, such
as intelligence collection, recruitment of
Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC)
and other exile group activities and infil-
tration of propaganda materials:
a.
b.
c.
Intensify covert collection
of intelligence within Cuba, especially
within the regime;
Support the efforts of certain Cuban
exiles, who are associated with
the original aims of the 26 of July
Movement and who believe that the
Castro regime can be overthrown from
within in order that they may:
1) cause a split in the leadership
of the regime at the national or
provincial levels; and 2) create a
political base of popular opposition
to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;
Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials
from international waters into Cuba.
Launch propaganda balloons after an
operational capability has been
established.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 18
SECRET
SECRET
-5-
2.
3.
4.
With respect to the actions listed below,
the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
the 20-odd American prisoners should first
be ascertained. If these actions were taken
before the conclusion of the negotiations
they could jeopardize the release of the
Americans.
If these negotiations fail, or when the
prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
following timetable:
Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance
of the proclamation of the four point
shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
the orders to go into effect in five days).
These orders:
a.
b.
c.
Close United States ports to all
vessels of a country whose vessels
engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
Close United States ports to any ship
which has carried goods in the Bloc-
Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
it seeks to enter a United States port;
Prohibit all United States flag ships
and all ships owned by United States
nationals or residents from entering
any ports of Cuba and from carrying
any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
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SECRET
SECRET
-6-
5.
d.
Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department of the United States from
being shipped on vessels owned or
controlled by persons who own or
control vessels engaged in the trade
between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
Mission Conference January 20-30, or at
a later date dependent on the Donovan
mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
another representative of the President
will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
and Brazil to convey to them the importance
President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
the following resolutions:
a.
b.
An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
its actions which continue to endanger
the peace, deploring refusal to allow
inspection, condemning the presence of
Soviet troops, recommending continued
surveillance and continued vigilance
against subversive activities, and
terminating the invocation of the Rio
Treaty on the missile crisis, together
with
An OAS resolution which would
recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
to all items of trade except food and
medicine (fall back position: extension
of arms embargo to all strategic items);
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 20
SECRET

SECRET
2-7-
2)
prohibition of ships of OAS
member states from transportating
embargoed items and deny use of
ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
3) denial of Soviet over-flights and
transit rights for flights to Cuba;
and 4) a call on other states to
take similar action.
..
A
6. After obtaining the maximum possible
support of the key countries of Mexico,
Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
members will be approached in Washington
and in their respective capitals, a
simultaneously. It should be possible
for this consultation and OAS action on
the resolutions to be completed within
ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval
of the resolutions, we will inform our
NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
7.
At the first NATO meeting after formal
OAS action on the resolutions, we will
7. request that NATO include Cuba on the
list of countries to which shipment
of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.
8.
9.
After NATO decision on our COCOM request,
we will seek to get agreement from Free
World industrial nations to prevent
shipping of critical spare parts and
equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
In addition to the four point shipping
resolutions, and action under Section
107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue
to press Free World nations to keep their
shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
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SECRET
SECRET
-8-
B. Contigency Planning
New opportunities for accomplishing our
objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
action in other parts of the world; as a result
of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
result of uprisings or internal conflict within
Cuba.
Our contingency planning, which will be
undertaken immediately, should include preparations
for increased multilateral and/or bilateral
political and economic measures, large scale use of
Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive
air activity including both high and low level
flights primarily directed toward surveillance
and collection of intelligence, and which may also
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro
government and keeping the Castro forces on
continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
appropriate, including the imposition of a
POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
other countries; severance of communications
to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
destined for Cuba and on key installations to
Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately,
the use of U. S. military force. To the extent
feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-
trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
those Latin American nations desirous of
participating in the U. S. effort.
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SECRET
SECRET
8
Our programs should be designed to encourage
the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
community and engage in constructive pursuits
pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
them some special assistance but not to the extent
that they become a perpetual privileged class
within the community: Presidential action on their
behalf would single them out unnecessarily.
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SECRET
:
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
"
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)
FROM
SUBJECT:
1.
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations
U. S. Policy Objectives
The following are the objectives of the U. S. with
respect to Cuba:
a.
b.
C.
Protecting the security of the United States
and the other states of the Organization of
American States by assuring that offensive
weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;
d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other OAS states;
e.
Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
divorcing the Cuban Government from its
support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
f. Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
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SECRET
1
2.
SECRET
-2-
g.
h.
i.
j.
being understood that our ultimate objective
is replacement of the regime by one fully
compatible with the goals of the United States;
Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime%;B
Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from other Free World states,
and especially from states of the OAS. When-
ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should
be multilateral, preferably based upon the
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on
resolutions adopted by the Organization of
American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeopardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere;
Being prepared to meet, with the employment
of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives%;B and
Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.
Supporting Actions
Actions in support of these objectives and their
time sequence are set forth in the attached paper
entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the
four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 25
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches
to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and
shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.
Existing programs will be reviewed and further
recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the
variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken
at once.
In addition to current covert programs such as
intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and
other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda
materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are
recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
a.
b.
intensified covert collection of intelligence
within Cuba, especially within the regime;
support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to
return the 26 of July Movement to its
original aims.
NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the
foregoing actions may impair our ability
to accomplish objective b. (Removal of
remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because
taking these actions could provide the
U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining
its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval
of the foregoing actions is recommended.
3. Cuban Brigade
Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a
specially tailored civilian and military program for
Brigade members.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 26
SECRET
SECRET
040
The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit
and individual members urged to accept civilian training
or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program
for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.
Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade
members and creation of a privileged class in the exile
community would be avoided.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 27
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 28
ARTMENT
OF DEFEN
TOP SECRET
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
UNITED STATES OF
January 23, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC
Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now
been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m. - The revision
consists essentially of what is now denominated as
"ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy
and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supple-
mented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at
the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision.
supplemental material is derived from portions of the text
of "ALTERNATIVE II" in the original paper.
This
He,
At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed him
the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my
reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to
include the supplemental material referred to above.
in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will
thereafter be in touch with you. If possible, will you let me
know by noon tomorrow where you and he stand with regard
to the revised paper.
Enclosure
SIGNE
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
COASH 0031
cc: Mr. McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Yarmolinsky
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"Secuef Control No. 559
SECRET COPY
2
OF
6
COPIES.
♡
DOD
SECRET
DRAFT/23 Jan 63
PAGANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE
ROM
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
United States Policy
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of
United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept, out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.
And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate
nor permit aggression in thic hemisphere'.
"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
the island.' 09
Objectives
are:
Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba
1. Protecting the security of the United States and the
other states of the Organization of American States
(OAS) by acouring that offensive weapons are not
reintroduced into Cuba;
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 30
1
SECRET

SECRET
2. Romoval of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
action against other Caribbean statoo;
4. Reducing the capabilition of the Castro regime to direct
and support subversion and insurrection within the
other OAS states:
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
'Cuba that offer the possibility of Jivercing the Cuban
Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
purposes or replacing the Government with a regime
which would accomplish this purpose;
6. Maximising the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting
the Castro rogime;
7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime
from other free world states, and especially from
states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions
against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based
upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of
American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized
by seelding OAS actions of marginal value and which
might split the hemisphere.
8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U.S. combat oloments and/or logistical
support, the wide variety of military contingencies
that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
and;
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
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1
Дод
Ef
SECRET
3
9. Producing comprehensive intolligence related to the above
objectives.
'Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow
of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible
with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims
of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government
will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic,
psychological and military presqureo, no appropriate opportunition prosont
themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime in
overthrown.
cover l
ем
Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist
regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic,
psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward
our ultimate objective.
Supporting Actions
:
The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth
below:
1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with
Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners.
Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.
2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered,
procedd on the following timetable:
3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve kours in advance of the proclamation
of the four point chipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
close United States ports to all vessels of a
country whose vessels engage in carrying armo
to Cuba:
b. close United States ports to any ship which has
carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days
of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships
owned by United States nationals or residents from
entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any
goods bound to or from Cuba; and
NW 50955
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SECRET
обзо
d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department or agency of the United
States from being shipped on vessels
owned or controlled by persons who
own or control vessels engaged in the
trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission
Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30
Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents
of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the
importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining.
hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following
resolutions:
5°
v
До An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its
actions which continue to endanger the peaco,
deploring refusal te allow inspection,
condemning the presence of Soviet troops,
recommending continued surveillance and
continued vigilance against subversive
activities, and terminating the invocation
of the Ric Treaty on the missile crisis,
together with
An QAS resolution which would recommend
1) extension of arms embargo to all items
of trade except food and medicine (fall back
position: extension of arms embargo to all
strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR
ships from transporting embargoed items and
deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba
trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights `and
transit rights for flights to Cuba; and
4) a call on other states to take similar
action.
After obtaining the maximum possible support of
the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the
other QAS members will be approached in Washington
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 33
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TOP SECRET
050
1
and in their respective capitals, simultaneously.
It should be possible for this consultation 
and 
OAS
action on the resolutions 
to be completed within
ten days. Prior to formal COAS 
approval of the
resolutions, we will inform our 
NATO allies of 
the
impending OAS action.
6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action
on the resolutions, we will request 
that NATO
include Cuba on the list of 
countries to which
shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items 
is
prohibited.
8.
100
After NATO decision on our CCCOM request, we will
seek to get agreement from Free 
World industrial
nations to prevent shipping of 
critical spare 
parts
and equipment to Cuba, not on 
the COCOM list.
In addition to four point shipping resolutions,
' and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
Act, continue to press Free World 
nations to keep
their shipping out of Eloc
-Cuba trade.
In addition to current covert programs such as
intelligence collection, radio 
broadcasts,
recruitment of Cuban cfficials as 
agents, 
support
of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities,
and infiltration of propaganda materials, the
following are recommended for approval and immediate
initiation:
蕊。 Intensify to maximum.degree possible
b.
intelligence and counterintelligence coverage
of Cuba;
Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
who are associated with the original aims of
the 26 July Movement and who believe that
the Castro regime can be overthrown from
within in order that they 
may: 1)
SECRET
cause
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 34
$
C.
SECRET
060
a split in the leadership of the regime
at the national or provincial levels; and,
2) create a political base of popular
opposition to the regime; and, 3)
intelligence;
Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
secure
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials from
international waters into Cuba.
Launch
propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established.
NW 50955
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7
KET
9
In addition to these immediate actions, we should make
preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more
positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of
the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise
either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a
result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/
Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal
conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal
with these situations.
Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-
scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including
both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance
and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of
embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on
continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the
imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other
countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of
sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in
Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S.
military forces.
We should be in a position to respond with open military support
(to include 
such 
items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special
Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military
forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist
group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,
which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible
with those 
of the U.S.
To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans
and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of
participating in the U.S. effort.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 36
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C
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 37
TOP SECRET
SENSLIVE
23 JAN 63
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)
FROM
Department of Defense Representative on the Inter-
departmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba
SUBJECT:
United States Policy Toward Cuba
Policy
Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the
overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement
by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where
possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this
objective, the U. S. Government will apply increasing degrees of
political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as
appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created,
until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate
objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free
World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal
dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its sub-
versive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase
the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal
of Russian troops from Cuba.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 38
SENSITIVE
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
SECRET . DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
TOP SECRET
SENSOWE
Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist
regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic,
psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance
toward our ultimate objective.
We should be in a position to respond with open military sup-
port (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and
Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of
military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/:
Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability
"
to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are
compatible with those of the U. S.
Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished
(from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should
not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist
and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the
hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U. S. retaliation
for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.
NW 50955. DocId: 32276061, Page 39
2
TAR
SECRET CITAIGITIVE
TOP SECRET
SECRET
To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed
against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained
free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations
desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.
Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence
gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective
of the national intelligence effort.
Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be
multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization
of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the
Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of
marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of
this policy will be prepared.
Discussion
The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a
phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological
3
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 40
SENGLIVE

SECRET SENSITIVE
and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping;
propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime;
psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of
Cubans in the U. S.. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive
air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed
toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping
the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appro-
priate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of
Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to
Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on
key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately,
the use of U. S. military forces.
In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut
of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions,
such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified
surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive
activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restric-
tions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed
to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and
participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.
TOD
NW 50955
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waffled
TOP SECRET
This course of action has the advantage of attaining the
objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than
the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the
only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective.
It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure
of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.
From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S.
will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the
uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of
the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for
"intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the
missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations.
throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations,
(will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For
example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active
policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become
impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of
(this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions
from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America,
increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.
5
TAD
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 42
SECRET
SECRET SENSITIVE
The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that
the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in
the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the
more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from
the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures
on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to
*
overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply
involved. The further we progress along this route, the more
significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon
it.
The successful execution of this policy will require careful
timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed
plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the over-
throw of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning
purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate.
changes to the international situation.
In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be neces-
sary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions
already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages
of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and
dangers of such activity.
TOP SECRET
SITIVE
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 43
Gruf
SECRET
Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the
possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime
from the Bloc.
Coordinator's Recommendation
I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator.
The objectives stated in the Coordinator's paper do not sufficiently
commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime.
The Coordinator's paper depends too much upon events outside the
control of the U. S. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate
the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castro/
Communist regime. The specific actions recommended in the
Coordinator's paper are consistent with the policy recommended in
this paper and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that
would be taken in executing that policy.
Recommendation
I recommend that the policy stated above be adopted as the
United States policy toward Cuba.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 44
For SECRET
SENSITIVE
SECRET
DRAFT/23 Jan 63
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE
FROM
COMMITTEE
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
United States Policy
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of
United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.
And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate
nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
the island. "
Objectives
are:
Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba
1. Protecting the security of the United States and the
other states of the Organization of American States
(OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
reintroduced into Cuba;
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 45
SECRET
COTY
OF SECRET
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
action against 
other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct
and support subversion and insurrection within the
other OAS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban
Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
purposes or replacing the Government with a regime
which would accomplish this purpose;
6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting
the 
Castro regime;
7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime
from other free world states, and especially from
states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions
against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based
upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of
American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized
by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which
might split the hemisphere.
8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical
support, the widd variety of military contingencies
that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
and;
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 46
✓ SECRET
2
SECRET
3
9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above
objectives.
Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow
of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible
with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims
of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government
will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic,
psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present
themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime lo
overthrown.
Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist
regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic,
psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
and could creato propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward
our ultimate objective.
Supporting Actions
The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth
below:
1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with
Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners.
Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.
2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisomers are recovered,
proceed on the following timetable:
3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation
of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:
&,
b.
close United States ports to all vessels of a
country whose yessols engage in carrying arms
to Cuba;
close United States ports to any ship which has
carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 dayo
of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;
c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all shipo
owned by United States nationals or residents from
entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any
goods bound to or from Cuba; and
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 47
SECRET
SECRET
обзо
d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department or agency of the United
States from being shipped on vessels
owned or controlled by persons who
own or control vessels engaged in the
trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
4. At the tormination of the U. 8. Chiefs of Mlesion
Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30
Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents
of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the
importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following
resolutions:
Qo An QAS resolution condemning Cuba for its
actions which continue to endanger the peace,
deploring refusal to allow inspection,
condemning the presence of Soviet troops
recommending continued surveillance and
continued vigilance against subversive
activities, and terminating the invocation
of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis,
together with
b.
An QAS resolution which would recommend
1) extension of arms embargo to all items
of trade except food and medicine (fall back
position: extension of arms embargo to all
„otratogle iecis); 2) prohibition of An
ships from transporting embargood items and
deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba
trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and
transit rights for flights to Cuba; and
4) a call on other states to take similar
action.
5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of
the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the
other QAS members will be approached in Washington
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
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SECRET
SECRET
050
and in their respective capitals, simultaneously.
It should be possible for this consultation and OAS
action on the resolutions to be completed within
ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the
resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the
impending CAS action.
6. At the first NATO meeting after formal .OAS action
on the resolutions, we will request that NATO
include Cuba on the list of countries to which
shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is
prohibited.
7.
After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will
seek to get agreement from Free World industrial
nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts
and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM List.
In addition to four point shipping resolutions,
and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep
their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
In addition to current covert programs such as
intelligence collection, radio broadcasts,
recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support
of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities,
and infiltration of propaganda materials, the
following are recommended for approval and immediate
initiation:
80.
Intensify to maximum degree possible
intelligence and counterintelligence coverage
of Cuba;
Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
who are associated with the original aims of
the 26 July Movement and who believe that
the Castre regime con be overthrown· from
vithin in order that they may: 1) cause
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 49
Q
C.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 50
SECRET
-60
О
a split in the leadership of the regime
at the national or provincial levels; and,
2) create a political base of popular
opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;
1
Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials from
international waters into Cuba. Launch
propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established.
SECRET

P SECRET
7
In addition to these immediate actions, we should make
preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more
positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of
the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise
either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a
result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/
Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal
conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal
with these situations.
Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-
scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including
both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance
and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of
embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on
continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the
imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other
countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of
sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in
Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S.
military forces.
We should be in a position to respond with open military support
(to include such items as material, advisors, training, and Special
Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military
forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist
group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,
which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible
with those of the U.S.
To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans
and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of
participating in the U.S. effort.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
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OP SECRET
United States Policy
- 7
ALTERNATIVE II
1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is
the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its
replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the
U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free
World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government
will apply increasing degrees of political, economic,
psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
opportunities present themselves or can be created,
until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.
2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the
Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from
the Bloc%; weaken it economically; promote internal
dissension, erode its domestic political support;
frustrate its subversive activities%; negate its influence
in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of
sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian
troops from Cuba.
3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the
Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all
feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and
covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for
further advance toward our ultimate objective.
4. We should be in a position to respond with open
military support (to include such items as materiel,
advisors, training, and Special Forces support and,
if necessary, up to the full range of military forces),
to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist
group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to
survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose
aims are compatible with those of the U.S.
5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as
distinguished from military support upon request of
indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the
absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or
Soviet
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 52
SECRET
Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the
hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S.
retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/
Communist or Soviet forces.
6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces
employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S.
militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces
of those Latin American nations desirous of participating
in the U.S. effort.
7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence
gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary
objective of the national intelligence effort.
8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba
should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions
adopted by the Organization of American States. The
newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue
should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of
marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in
support of this policy will be prepared.
Discussion
The active pursuit of our ultimate objective in-
volves a phased and controlled series of political,
economic, psychological and military actions. Such
actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging
sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psycho-
logical operations urging defections; large scale training
of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside
Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low
level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and
collection of intelligence, and which may also have the
effect
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 53
COP SECRET
SECRET
effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the
Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade;
harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries;
severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of
sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key
installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and,
ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.
In addition, this course of action would involve a
broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psy-
chological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions,
Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance
of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive
activities in Latin America, application of Four Point
shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and
a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest
extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation
in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.
This course of action has the advantage of attaining
the objective more rapidly and under more controlled
conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator.
Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will
accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater
risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of
money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.
To a
From the standpoint of international politics, the
U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for
aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult
to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments.
They may attack the U. S. for "Intervening" or they may react
favorably (as they did during the missile crisis).
large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the
world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will
depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For
example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our
active policy and the courses of action under it may
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 54
SECRET
-10-
eventually become impossible to conceal.
If properly
handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not
only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other
countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin
Americe, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/
Communist Cuba.
The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear
that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a
communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of
military posture, the more active approach may be
subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc
elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Commmunist
Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime,
U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further
we progress along this route, the more significant will be
the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.
The successful execution of this policy will require
careful timing and coordination of our actions and the
development of detailed plans. While such plans would be
designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime
within a given time frame for planning purposes, they
would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
changes to the international situation.
In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will
be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to
review the actions already taken and those contemplated and
to assess the advantages of continued and escalated
activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such
activity.
Commitment to this course of action does not exclude
the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the
Castro regime from the Bloc.
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 55
SECRET
-11-
COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION
I recommend approval of Alternative I.
STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE
do not concur in the policy recommended by the
Coordinator, Alternative I does not make the overthrow
of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S.
In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently
contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the
downfall of that regime. The specific actions
recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the
policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases,
would be among the initial steps that would be taken
in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of
Alternative II.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
Page 56
CO SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 57
SECRET
23 JAN 6.3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)
FROM
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
There are submitted for your consideration two alternative
statements of policy and related courses of action with 
respect
to Cuba. Alternative I was prepared by the 
Department of State
.
Alternative II was prepared by the Department of 
Defense. The
Coordinator's Recommendation that Alternative 
I be approved,
and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear 
at the
end of this paper.
ALTERNATIVE I
United States Policy
.
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in 
the
following words:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems
are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere
in the future, under adequate verification and 
safe-
guards, and if Cuba is not used for the 
export of
aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in
the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 
'we 
shall
neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
hemisphere'.
"We will not, of course, abandon the political,
economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to
halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 58
Tom SECRET
SECRET
and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be
truly free. But these policies are very different
from any intent to launch a military invasion of the
island."
Objectives
Accordingly, the objectives of U. S. policy with
respect to Cuba are:
1.
2.
Protecting the security of the United States and
the other states of the Organization of American
States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons
are not reintroduced into Cuba;
Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
action against other Caribbean states;
Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to
direct and support subversion and insurrection within
the other OAS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the
Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet
Communist purposes or replacing the Government with
a regime which would accomplish this purpose.
6.
Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;
7. Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from other free world states, and
especially from states of the OAS;
MILZALL
8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U. S, combat elements and/or logistical
support, the wide variety of contingencies that
may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
and;
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 59
CADET
SECRET
-3-
9.
Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.
Supporting Actions
The following actions should be initiated in the
sequence set forth below:
1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation
with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American
prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could
jeopardize their release.
2.
If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners
are recovered, proceed on the following time--
table:
Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of
the proclamation of the four point shipping orders.
(The proclamation calls for the orders to go into
effect in five days). These orders:
a.
close United States ports to all vessels.
of a country whose vessels engage in
carrying arms to Cuba;
close United States ports to any ship
which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba
trade within 120 days of the time it seeks
to enter a United States port;
prohibit all United States flag ships and
all ships owned by United States nationals.
or residents from entering any ports of
Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to
for from Cuba; and
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
Page 60
SECRET

SECRET
140
4+
5.
d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department or agency of the United
States from being shipped on vessels
owned or controlled by persons who wo
own or control vessels engaged in the
trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission
Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30
Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents
of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey 
to them the
importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
hemispheric solidarity by supporting the 
following
resolutions:
An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its
actions which continue to endanger the peace,
deploring refusal to allow inspection,
condemning the presence of Soviet troops,
recommending continued surveillance 
and
continued vigilance against subversive
activities, and terminating the invocation
of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis
,
together with
An OAS resolution which would recommend 1
(1) - extension of arms embargo to all items.
of trade except food and medicine (fall back
position: extension of arms embargo to all
strategic items); 2) prohibition 
of AR
ships from transporting embargoed items and
deny use of
trade; 3) Ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba
trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and
transit rights for flights to Cuba;
and
4) a call on other states to take similar
action.
After obtaining the maximum possible support of
the key countries of Mexico, Chile and 
Brazil, 
the
other OAS members will be approached in 
Washington
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 61
SECRET
SECRET
-50
6.
and in their respective capitals, simultaneously.
It should be possible for this consultation and OAS
action on the resolutions to be completed within
ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the
resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the
impending OAS action.
At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action
on the resolutions, we will request that NATO
include Cuba on the list of countries to which
shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is
prohibited.
7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will
seek to get agreement from Free World industrial
nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts
and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
☑
← In addition to four point shipping resolutions,
and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep
their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
In addition to current covert programs such as
intelligence collection, radio broadcasts,
recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support
of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities,
and infiltration of propaganda materials, the
following are recommended for approval and immediate
initiation:
bi
Intensify to maximum degree possible
intelligence and counterintelligence coverage
of Cuba;
Su
Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
who are associated with the original aims of
the 26 July Movement and who believe that
the Castro regime can be overthrown from
within in order that they may: 1) cause
NW 50955
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Page 62
SECRET
060
SECRET
a split in the leadership of the regime
at the national or provincial levels; and,
2) create a political base of popular
opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;
Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials from
international waters into Cuba.
Launch
propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established.
COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION.
recommend approval of Alternati
NW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page: 63
SECRET
1
United States Policy.
7.
ACRNA II
1/2 bitimate objective
the overthrow of the stro/Communist rein
replacement by ptible with the objectives of
LAAR the aims of
r
World. at love this objective, the U.S. Governmen
will apply increasing degrees of political, economic,
psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
(Opportunities present themselves or can be created,
until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.
2. Our immediate objectives are to declare the
Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from
the Bloc; weaken it economically promote aceral
dissension, erode its domestic political support
frustrate its subversive activities; luence
in the hemisphere; increase the cost
sustaining the regime; and obtain the size i Russian
troops from Cuba.
3. Isolating, undermining and discredited the
Castro/Communist regime throw
feasible diplomatic, economic,
covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for
further advance toward our ultimate objective.
4.
We should be in a position to respond with open
military support (to include such items as material,
advisors, training, and Special Forces support zisk,
if necessary, up to the Sul ange of military es),
to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist
group or groups in Cub, which demonstrate an ability to
survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose
ains are curatible with those of the U.S.
5.
tion of Cuba by U.S. milin
distinguished from militery support upon
irces,
est of
as
innigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the.
absence of aggression of other Castro/Comm/or
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 64
www.qngelik
Soviet
Soviet actions that then the peace or security of the
hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate 0.5,
retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castrel
Communist or Soviet raak.
t. To the extent Finai 10, U.S. military forces
employed against Cuba onould be accompanied by U.S.
militarlly-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces
of those Latin American nations desirous of part at
in the U.S. effort.
3
els
7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing
gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a pr
objective of the national intelligence effort.
8. Whenever possible, 0.8. actions against Cuba
should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance (Rie Pact) or on resolutions
adopted by the Organization of American States. The
newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban sus
should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions d
marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.
Overt and covert annexes of specific Active
support of this policy will be prepared.
Discussion
The active pursuit of our ultimate objective la
volves a phased and controlled series of political,
economic, psychological and military actions
actions might include leaflet dropping propane preis.
sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regie: psycho-
logical operations urging defections; large sale training
of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside
Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low
level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and
collection of intelligence, and which may also have the
effect
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 65
SECRET
Castre force on
t
Ak
Teretaliately was
appropriate, including the rosition of POL blockadey
fff;
saves of boinic onaj magavo of
sabotage on shipping destined for Oba and on key
Installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and,
ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.
the
as
In addition, this course of action would involve
broad gamut of carefully time) political economic, psy-
chological and covert actions, such se il sanctions,
Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance
of and publicity concerning Cantro/Oqmist rubversive
activities in Latin America, application of Your Point
shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and
a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest
extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation
in the campaign to unreat the Castro/Communist regim
This course of action has the advantage of attaining
the objective more rapidly and under more controlled
conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator.
Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will
accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater
risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of
money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.
From the standpoint o international politics, the
S. will probably be subjected to criticism for
aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult
to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments.
They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react
favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a
large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the
world, and Ma Shoularly Latin American nations,
depend upon bow rently these actions are handled.
example, there my oven be advantages to the fact the our
active p
1 courses of action under it may
l
Wes
NW 50955 Docid:32276061 Page 66
SECRET
SECRET
ibal.
If properly
hadled, que overt aspects of this policy may serve not
only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other
countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin
erica, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/
Communist Cuba.
The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear
that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a
communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of
military posture, the more active approach may be
subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc
elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist
Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime,
U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further
we progress along this route, the more significant will be
the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.
The successful execution of this policy will require
careful timing and coordination of our notions and the
development of detailed plans. While plans would be
designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime
within a given time frame for planning purposes, they
would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
changes to the international situation.
In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will
be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to
review the actions already taken and those contemplated and
to assess the advantages of continued and escalated
activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such
ertivity.
Commitment to this course of action does ist exclude
the possibility of actively suing the isolation of the
Catro regime on the Blow
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 67
przy ajang C
SECRET
-11-
DINATOR"
RECOMMENDATION
I recommend approval of Alternative I.
STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE
I do not concur in the policy recommended by the
Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow
of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S.
In addition, Alternative 1 does not sufficiently
contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the
downfall of that regime. The specific actions
recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the
policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases,
would be among the initial steps that would taken
in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of
Alternative II.
☐ SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
Page 68
NW 50955
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SECRET
Draf₤23 Jan 63
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday January 25, 1963, 14 p.m.).
FROM
:
SUBJECT:
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
United States Policy Toward Cuba
United States Policy
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines
of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following
words:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.
And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate
nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
the island.
Objectives
Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to
Cuba are:
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 70

SECRET
2
1. Protecting the security of the United States and the
2.
3.
other states of the Organization of American States
(OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
reintroduced into Cuba;
Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
action against other Caribbean states}}
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct
and support subversion and insurrection within the
Hemisphere
other DAS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban
6.
Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
purposes;
Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban
Government with a regime that would break with the
Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our
ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by
one fully compatible with the goals of the United
States;
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting
the Castro regime;
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 71
8.
THE SECRET
3
8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro
regime from other free world states, and especially
from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S.
actions against Cuba should be multilateral,
preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by.
The newly-won
the Organization of American States.
hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not
be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere.
Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical
support, the wide variety of military contingencies
that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
and;
Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the
above objectives.
Supporting Actions
A.
To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-
ment will be prepared to increase the political, \ economic,
psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 72
SECRET
degrees
opportunities
:
SECRET
unkt the
Ледення Ва її
отел Пличен
opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions
listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would
be initiated in the sequence set forth below.
Recommendations=
for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing
programs and upon the development of new programs related to
the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.
1.
In addition to current covert program, such as
intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban
officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of
the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other
exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda
materials:
a) continue to intensify covert collection of
intelligence within Cuba, especially within
the regime;
b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
who are associated with the original aims of
the 26 of July Movement and who believe that
the Castro regime can be overthrown from
within in order that they may: 1) cause a
split in the leadership of the regime at the
national or provincial levels; and (2) create
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 73
C.
✔ SECRET
5
a political base of popular opposition to
the regime%; and, 3) secure intelligence;
Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability
to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other
propaganda materials from international waters
into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an
operational capability has been established.
WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIONS LISTED BELOW, THE
2. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations
with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American
SHOULD BE ASCERTAINED.
prisoners / Any of the actions listed below, If there
They
action taken before the conclusion of the negotiations, could
3.
.4.
case of the Andreass
jeopardize their release.
If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are
recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the
proclamation of the four point shipping orders.
(The proclamation calls for the orders to go into
effect in five days). These orders:
a.
close United States ports to all vessels of
a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms
to Cuba;
NW 50955
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SECRET
b.
SECRET
6
b.
close United States ports to any ship which has
carried goods in the bloc Cuba trade within 120
days of the time it seeks to enter a United
States port;
C. * prohibit all United States flag ships and all
ships owned by United States nationals or residents
from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying
any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 75
5.
d.
SECRET
-7-
prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department
1
or agency of the United States from being shipped
on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own
or control vessels engaged in the trade between
Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference
January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan
mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representa-
tive of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile,
Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance
President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric
solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions
which continue to endanger the peace, deploring
refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence
of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance
and continued vigilance against subversive
activities, and terminating the invocation of the
Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
b.
An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension
of arms embargo to all items of trade except food
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 76
SECRET
-8-
6°
and medicine (fall back position: extension of
arms embargo to all strategic items)%3B 2) prohibit-
of OAS member states
ion of A ships from transporting embargoed items
Λ
and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit
rights for flights to Cuba; and
4)
a call on other states to take similar
action.
After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key
countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
members will be approached in Washington and in their
respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be
possible for this consultation and OAS action on the
resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to
formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform
our NATO allies of the impending OAS action..
7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the
resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the
list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic)
items is prohibited.
NW 50955
8.
After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek
DocId: 32276061
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ST
SECRET
-9-
to get agreement from Free World industrial nations
to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment
to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
The
9.
In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and
.B.
action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
continue to press Free World nations to keep their
shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
Contingency Planning
New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise
either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a
result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the
Castro-Communist regime itself%;B or as a result of uprisings or
internal conflict within Cuba.
Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,
should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or
bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of
Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity
including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward
aurveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping
the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures,
appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-
as
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
Page 78
SECRET
SECRET
-10-
ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of
communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping.
destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive
naval patrols%;B and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military
"
force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed
against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained
free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations
desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.
M 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 79
SECRET
SECRET
Draff23 Jan 63
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
in of 25, 1963, 4. p.m).
Prepared for the melting of
FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT:
United States Policy Toward Cuba
United States Policy
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines
of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following
words:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.
And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate
nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
the island.
Objectives
Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to
Cuba are:

SECRET
1. Protecting the security of the United States and the
2'.
other states of the Organization of American States
(OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
reintroduced into Cuba;
Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct
and support subversion and insurrection within the
Hemisphere
other OS states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
6.
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban
Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
purposes;
Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cubap
Government with a regime that would break with the
Sino-Soviet Bloc it being understood that our
ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by
one fully compatible with the goals of the United
States;
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting
the Castro regime;
8.
3
SECRET
7
8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro
regime from other free world states, and especially
from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S.
actions against Cuba should be multilateral,
preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by
the Organization of American States, The newly-won
hemispherec solidarity on the Cuban issue should not
be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere.
9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical
support, the wide variety of military contingencies
10.
that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
and;
Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the
above objectives.
Supporting Actions
A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-
ment will be prepared to increase the political,.. economic,
psychological and military pressures, as appropriate.
UP SECRET
opportunities
opportunities present themselves or can be created.
The actions
listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would
be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations.
for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing
programs and upon the development of new programs related to
the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.
1°
In addition to current covert program, such as
intelligence collection, recruitment of Cubam
officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of
the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other
exile group activities and infiltration of propagands
materials:
a) continue to intensify covert collection of
intelligence within Cuba, especially within
the regime;
b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
who are associated with the original aims of
the 26 of July Movement and who believe that
the Castro regime can be overthrown from
within in order that they may: 1) cause a
split in the leadership of the regime at the
national or provincial levels; and 2) creates
132
DELKEL
5
a political base of popular opposition to
the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability
to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other
propaganda materials from international waters
into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an
operational capability has been established.
2. Await results of Mr. Donovan'a imminent negotiations
with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American
prisoners. Any of the actions listed below, if
taken before the conclusion of the negotiations could
jeopardize their release.
3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are
recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the
proclamation of the four point shipping orders.
(The proclamation calls for the orders to go into
effect in five days). These orders:
close United States ports to all vessels of
a country whose vethels engage in carrying arms
to Cuba;
SECRET
b.
bo
close United States ports to any ship which has
carried goods in the blos Cuba trade within 120
days of the time it seeks to enter a United
States port;
c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all
ships owned by United States nationals or residents
from entering any ports of Cube and from carrying
any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
SECKET
5.
proibit any cargo sponsorid
or agency of the United State
Omenl
from being shipped
on vessels owned or controlled s persons who ow
or control vessels engaged in the ade between
Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
Ac the termination of the U. S. Chinfs of Mission Conference
January 20-30, or at a later date, dependent or the Donovan
mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or inst [ representa-
tive of the President will visit the Preside is of Chile,
Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the import ince
President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
Spheric
solidarity by their supporting the following solutions:
a. An OAS resolution condearing City for its actions
which continue to endinger the peate duploring
refusal to allow Inspection, contes
1g the presence
of Soviet troops, recommending cont surveillance
and continued vigilance against subversive
activities, and terminating the invocation of the
Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with
b.
An OAS resolution which would reconde 1
of arms embargo to all items of trade except food
SECRET
107
SECRET
-8-
6,
7.
and medicine (fall Back position: extension of
arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibit-
ion of AR ships from transporting embargoed items
and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit
rights for flights to Cuba; and
4) a call on other states to take similar
action.
After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key
countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
members will be approached in Washington and in their
respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be
possible for this consultation and OAS action on the
resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to
formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform
our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the
resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the
list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic)
items is prohibited.
8.
After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek
SECRET
B.
9.
SECRET
1499-
to get agreement from Free World industrial nations
to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment
to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and
action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act,
continue to press Free World nations to keep their
shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
Contingency Planning
New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise
either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a
result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the
Castro Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or
internal conflict within Cuba.
Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,
should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or
bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of
W
Cubans who are not inside Cuba; more extensive air activity
including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward
aurveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping
the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures,
appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-
TOP SECRET
as
SECRET
-10
ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of
communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive
naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military.
force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed
against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained
free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations
desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.
SECRET
C
こ
k
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 90

(WITH REVISIONS)
CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)
38
January 22, 1963
M
NDUM FOR:
The Honorable Mcge
Bunkey
1 CT
T
All Members of the NSC Executive Committee
CUBA
Back-up Papers and a Summary of
Recommendations of the Coordinator
of Cuban Affairs
The enclosed papers are submitted by the Coordinator
of Cuban Affairs.
1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
2.
3.
United States Policy Toward Cuba.
United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization
of American States.
4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.
5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.
It is understood that the recommendations will be
considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on
Thursday, January 24.
coul
for
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary
Enclosures:
As stated.
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 91
CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES,
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)
FROM
SUBJECT:
1.
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations
U. S. Policy Objectives
The following are the objectives of the U. S. with
respect to Cuba:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
f.
Protecting the security of the United States
and the other states of the Organization of
American States by assuring that offensive
weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;
Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other OAS states;
Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
divorcing the Cuban Government from its
support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 92
SECRET
1
=
SECRET
-2-7
2.
g.
h.
i.
being understood that our ultimate objective
is replacement of the regime by one fully
compatible with the goals of the United States;
Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;
Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from other Free World states,
and especially from states of the OAS. When-
ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should
be multilateral, preferably based upon the
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on
resolutions adopted by the Organization of
American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeopardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere;
Being prepared to meet, with the employment
of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and
j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.
Supporting Actions
Actions in support of these objectives and their
time sequence are set forth in the attached paper
entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the
four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 93
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3.
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-3-
action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches
to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and
shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.
Existing programs will be reviewed and further
recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the
variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken
at once.
In addition to current covert programs such as
intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and
other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda
materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are
recommended for approval and immediate initiation:
a.
b.
intensified covert collection of intelligence
within Cuba, especially within the regime;
support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to
return the 26 of July Movement to its
original aims.
Kapampanga
NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the
foregoing actions may impair our ability
to accomplish objective b. (Removal of
remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because
taking these actions could provide the
U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining
its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval.
of the foregoing actions is recommended.
Cuban Brigade
Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a
specially tailored civilian and military program for
Brigade members. .
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 94.
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SECRET
обра
The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit
and individual members urged to accept civilian training
or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program
for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.
Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade
members and creation of a privileged class in the exile
community would be avoided.
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 95
SECRET
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)
FROM
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba
United States Policy
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the
following words:
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the
Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall
neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
hemisphere.'
"We will not, of course, abandon the political,
economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But
these policies are very different from any intent to
launch a military invasion of the island."
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 96
SECRET
SECRET
-2-
Objectives
Accordingly, the objectives of United States.
policy with respect to Cuba are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
.5.
6.
Protecting the security of the United States
and the other states of the Organization of
American States (OAS) by assuring that
offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
Cuba;
Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;
Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other Hemisphere states;
Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing
the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-
Soviet Communist purposes;
Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
it being understood that our ultimate
objective is replacement of the regime by
one fully compatible with the goals of the
United States;
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 97
SECRET
SECRET
-3-
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;
8.
9.
10.
Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from other free world states,
and especially from states of the OAS.
Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
should be multilateral, preferably based upon
the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
or on resolutions adopted by the Organization
of American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere;
Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives%3B and
Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.
Supporting Actions
A.
To achieve the foregoing objectives, the
U. S. Government will be prepared to increase
the political economic, psychological and
military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
present themselves or can be created.
actions listed below are those requiring immediate
approval and would be initiated in the sequence
set forth below. Recommendations for further
The
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 98
SECRET
Li
SECRET
actions based upon the re-examination of
existing programs and upon the development
of new programs related to the foregoing
objectives will be forthcoming.
1.
In addition to current covert program, such
as intelligence collection, recruitment of
Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC)
and other exile group activities and infil-
tration of propaganda materials:
a.
b.
C.
Intensify covert collection
of intelligence within Cuba, especially
within the regime;
Support the efforts of certain Cuban
exiles, who are associated with
the original aims of the 26 of July
Movement and who believe that the
Castro regime can be overthrown from
within in order that they may:
1)
cause a split in the leadership
of the regime at the national or
provincial levels; and 2) create a
political base of popular opposition
to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;
Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials
from international waters into Cuba.
Launch propaganda balloons after an
operational capability has been
established.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061
Page 99
SECRET
SECRET
-5-
:
2.
3.
4.
With respect to the actions listed below,
the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
the 20-odd American prisoners should first
be ascertained. If these actions were taken
before the conclusion of the negotiations
they could jeopardize the release of the
Americans.
If these negotiations fail, or when the
prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
following timetable:
Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance
of the proclamation of the four point
shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
the orders to go into effect in five days).
These orders:
a.
Close United States ports to all
vessels of a country whose vessels
engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
b. Close United States ports to any ship
which has carried goods in the Bloc-
Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
it seeks to enter a United States port;
C.
1
Prohibit all United States flag ships
and all ships owned by United States
nationals or residents from entering
any ports of Cuba and from carrying
any goods bound to or from Cuba; and
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 100
SECRET

SECRET
-6-
5.
d.
Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department of the United States from
being shipped on vessels owned or
controlled by persons who own or
control vessels engaged in the trade
between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.
At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at
a later date dependent on the Donovan
mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
another representative of the President
will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
and Brazil to convey to them the importance
President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
the following resolutions:
a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
its actions which continue to endanger
the peace, deploring refusal to allow
inspection, condemning the presence of
Soviet troops, recommending continued
surveillance and continued vigilance
against subversive activities, and
terminating the invocation of the Rio
Treaty on the missile crisis, together
with
b.
An OAS resolution which would
recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
to all items of trade except food and
medicine (fall back position: extension
of arms embargo to all strategic items);
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 101
SECRET
i
SECRET
-7-
6.
7.
8.
9.
2) prohibition of ships of OAS
member states from transportating
embargoed items and deny use of
ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
3) denial of Soviet over-flights and
transit rights for flights to Cuba;
and 4) a call on other states to
take similar action.
r"་ཪ་སྡེ་
After obtaining the maximum possible
support of the key countries of Mexico,
Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
members will be approached in Washington
and in their respective capitals,
simultaneously. It should be possible
for this consultation and OAS action on
the resolutions to be completed within
ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval
of the resolutions, we will inform our
NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
At the first NATO meeting after formal
OAS action on the resolutions, we will
request that NATO include Cuba on the
list of countries to which shipment
of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.
After NATO decision on our COCOM request,
we will seek to get agreement from Free
World industrial nations to prevent
shipping of critical spare parts and
equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.
In addition to the four point shipping
resolutions, and action under Section
107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue
to press Free World nations to keep their
shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 102
SECRET
B.
SECRET
-8-
Contigency Planning
New opportunities for accomplishing our
objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
action in other parts of the world; as a result
of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
result of uprisings or internal conflict within
Cuba.
Our contingency planning, which will be
undertaken immediately, should include preparations
for increased multilateral and/or bilateral
political and economic measures, large scale use of
Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive
air activity including both high and low level
flights primarily directed toward surveillance
and collection of intelligence, and which may also
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro
government and keeping the Castro forces on
continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
appropriate, including the imposition of a
POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
other countries; severance of communications
to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
destined for Cuba and on key installations to
Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately,
the use of U. S. military force. To the extent
feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-
trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
those Latin American nations desirous of
participating in the U. S. effort.
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 103
SECRET
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m.).
FROM : Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.
SUBJECT:
United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of
American States.
PROBLEM.
To determine the future Course of
tion white. U.S. Dhad seek
In the OAS respect. Cuba.
Discussior
The Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in Japa
6 put the prole of Cuba clearly in the hemispheric context.
1. that meeting the Foreign histers excluded Cuba from partici
on the merican system, declared en arms embargo, and
ected
An ageinst Cuba subversive activities in the
sply
The invoked the flo reaty on October 22, 1962 Pursuant
thereto, the Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to act provision-
ally as the Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (OC)
Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanircul
passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all offensive
eapons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such action,
including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to preven
continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prevent.
the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere.
In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. insti-
tuted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican
Republic cooperated with us in the quarantine and 9 others offered
their assistance and facilities.
-
With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the
Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Con-
sultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing
to concern themselves with subversion and possible extension of
economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for
some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken,
SECRET
NW 50955
DocId: 32276061 Page 104
COURSES
SECRET
-2-
COURSES OF ACTION
(1) Continue the COAS/OC in being under the Rio Treaty but
take no further action at present.
Considerations:
The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being
for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis.
If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either
be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed
circumstances.
(2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC which
condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace,
deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of
Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued
vigilance against subversive activities.
Considerations:
This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would
represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step following the
conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.
Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is
believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.
Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insur-
rection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.
It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently
vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put
the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemis-
phere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to
the Soviet Union.
(3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This
would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions
II and VIII of Punta del Este (which provided for a Special Consul-
tative Committee on Security and a Special Committee to study the
further suspension of trade.)
Considerations:
This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was
called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32276061 Page 105
Taken
SECRET
-3-
Taken by itself, this course of action might raise doubts.
concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are
continuing our surveillance.
Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would
appear as though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence
of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification
surrendered (on-site inspection and re-introduction of offensive
weapons)
(4) Combine (2) and (3).
Considerations:
This combination of actions is feasible and is likely to
obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.
The termination of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the
resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.
Termination of the COAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed
resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3).
Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accom-
panied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic
sanctions.
(5) Seek to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was
invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a
resolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.
Considerations:
With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able
to obtain a substantial majority.
Such action would give a better basis for urging such addi-
tional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).
It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless
we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement
action.
(6) In addition to (5), seek authorization under the Rio
Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force,
to bring about the withdrawal of soviet troops in Cuba if the
OAS call is not heeded.
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Considerations:
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Considerations:
This action should be seriously considered only if we are
determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet
troops.
While it should be possible with adequate consultation and
preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political
and economic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet
troops, it would be difficult to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority
for authorization of the use of armed force.
(7) Seek a resolution in the COAS/Octo sever all diplomatic
and consular relations with Guba (probably possible only in con-
junction with (5) or (11).
Considerations:
This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase
the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies
encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.
Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for
such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would
be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile,
Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments would have some appeal.
"
Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained
for this.
(8) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all economic
and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba
(probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11)
Considerations:
The severance of all economic and commercial relations would
go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides
for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the
U.S. to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
Such action would expose us to charges of inhumanity and would
probably nullify our public statements that we have no quarrel
with the Cuban people.
A number of telecommunications between Latin America and
Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services
would interrupt communications vital to many of our Latin American
friends. Further, U.S. communications with Cuba should be main-
tained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national
interest and those for humanitarian reasons.
These
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These considerations would make it extremely difficult to
obtain a 2/3 majority in the COAS/OC.
(9) Seek resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta
del Este which would recommend:
(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except
food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of
arms embargo to all strategic items);
(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed
items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
(c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet air-
craft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also
be added to No. (8).)
Considerations:
This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could
be taken independently of other steps.
With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity
should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual
effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned
is more psychological than practical because Latin American countries
ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement
and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an
appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps. ⠀
It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S.
unilateral steps in controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the
Foreign Assistance Act, and for urging other states to control Soviet
flights to Cuba.
(10) Intensify through COAS and SCCS programs of recommended
controls over subversive activities. Seek COAS resolution warning
Castro that continued subversive activity may result in action
under Rio Treaty.
Considerations:
The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being
presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and
should be continued. However, it would be difficult to get unani-
mous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because
of the reference to the Rio Treaty.
Arpatilor tay
th
(11)
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(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued
subversive activities.
Considerations:
If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs.
the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be neces-
sary to invoke the Rio Treaty since the present functions given the
COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under
Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveil-
lance and recommendations to governments for control measures.
The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in
the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive
activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become
a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing
possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection
in Latin America.
The basis of any such action should consist of the production
of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in
subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, in-
sufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS
action. (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under
way.)
(12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory
Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB).
This could be done:
(a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to
the IADB;
(b) by the COAS seeking the advice of the IADB%; or
(c) having the OAS member governments designate their
representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.
942Y«གཡ*བ་གསལ་པཔ་ཏུ!!??
Considerations:
As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred
to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover,
amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and
requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governments.
As to (b), this is a feasible course of action which the
COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be diffi-
cult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the
Council of the desirability of such action.
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As to (c), member governments could take this course on an
individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that
"exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this
action under the OAS Charter.
COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION
In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with
respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international
complications were key factors which I have carefully considered.
Courses of action (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance
us toward our objective, would be politically feasible, and would
involve minimum adverse international effects. We could probably.
obtain a near-unanimous vote in the OAS for these courses except
(10) and (12).
Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) and (12) would advance us
considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11)
particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would
involve adverse international effects, including akprobable acute
confrontation with the USSR.
I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best
interests at this time.
I recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).
Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio
Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to
endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns
the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveil-
lance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and
This would still
(b) terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis.
leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII
of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative
Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further sus-
pension of trade.
L
Course (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution
VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:
(a)
extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except
food and medicine (Fallback position:
arms embargo to all strategic items);
extension of
(b)
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(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items
and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;
(c) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet air-
craft on Bloc-Cuba runs.
(d) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar
actions.
Rationale
The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our
objective, carrying the OAS with us, without committing us to any
further action.
After these initial measures are in effect, we should assess
the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with
any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which
may be opened to us by events.
I believe we should develop our pressures steadily and gradu-
ally, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation
under constant review for the optimum opportunity to initiate
additional measures.
I do not believe we should take a track now which will break
hemispheric unity. We may need unity later in an emergency.
Neither do I believe we should push the OAS into probable
acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.
Both of these prices the U. S. may find it necessary to pay.
for action at a later date but not now, in my opinion.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)
FROM
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT:
Cuban Brigade
PROBLEM
To determine the future of the Cuban
Brigade (participants in the Bay of
Pigs invasion recently released from
Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who
participated in or trained for the
invasion. To determine the future of
existing Cuban training programs.
:
DISCUSSION.
Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay
of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great
In December 1962 over
majority of whom were captured.
1100 were released.
A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and
other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically
proceed from whatever over all policy the U. S. adopts
toward Cuba.
A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively
marginal military value because of its quantitative
limitations and restricted military capability, but its
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politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban
resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate
for its limited military utility.
Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be
weighed.
COURSES OF ACTION
Three courses of action appear
feasible with respect to the
Brigade's future.
(1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military
unit, with no further U. S. special assistance.
If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and
their families would be eligible for the benefits now
accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area.
(approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent
to those received by American citizens in Dade County,
Florida who are in need. The principal ones include:
financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family
and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization
and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals
for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities;
employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation
and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied
children; special English and refresher courses for doctors
and lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program
for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides
up to $1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade
County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of
cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary
and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part
of special language courses and vocational training; and
physical examinations and inoculations at time of
entry into the U. S.
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DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the
U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18
and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program
for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides
20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they
are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve status.
They are not required to know English. A two week period
for resettlement is also provided at the termination of
the training.
of the
Another DOD program enables former officers
Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly
selective basis for programs in the U. S. Armed Forces.
Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is
necessary. The officers are in civilian status. They
receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and
a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer
available.
Considerations:
This course of action would provide the simplest and
most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide
equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent
to benefits offered to American citizens.
Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for
service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill
and country knowledge could be distributed through various
U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.
The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that
it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade
as a result of Administration statements and actions; it
would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique"
the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying
Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would
probably engender some adverse political reaction
domestically as well as from the Brigade and its
sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect
on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the
Free World concerning the determination of the United States
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to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to
arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence
with the Castro regime.
(2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a
unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve
component of the U. S. Armed Forces.
Considerations:
Under this course of action whater "mystique" the
Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps
be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used
to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile
community.
It would constitute an immediate political and
psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans
within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin
Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a
striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the
present Cuban regime.
It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed
by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit
among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with
the statements and actions of the Administration in
connection with the future of the Brigade.
But it would inevitably become a focal point for
Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and
morale, discipline and esprit would be difficult to
maintain over the long term without early employment to
retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and
military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups
in the U. S. armed forces reserve component. There is a
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risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members,
as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of
serious embarrassment to the U. S .
(3) Tailor a special civilian and military program
for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue
as a "fraternal" unit similar to the "Flying Tigers",
Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current
military training program for Cubans to establish a
Brigade military reserve component which other U. S.
militarily-trained Cubans could join.
Under existing authority, HEW could provide the
following additional benefits for Brigade members in
need, over and above those now offered: special employ-
ment counseling and placement service; extended student
loans to provide for all institutional costs such as
tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per
year (living costs to be provided by another agency);
expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased
financial assistance to needy persons while in training;
increased distribution of surplus food (with approval
of the Department of Agriculture).
The following additional programs could be under-
taken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such
action would contribute to the defense and security
of the United States or advance its foreign policy
interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for
vocational training anywhere in the United States%; an
expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of
Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost
of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure
of $2,500 per person per year would be about $2.5 million.
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Establishment of additional programs, after a
Presidential determination, would increase costs even
more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary"
privileges for Brigade members.
COORDINATORS'S RECOMMENDATION
I recommend course (3), a specially tailored
program for Brigade members.
1.
I recommend against a Presidential determination
providing broader privileges for Brigade members.
2:
3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military
training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve
unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should
be permitted to join.
4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than
forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange
consultation with them immediately if this course of
action is approved.
Rationale
Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we
should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may, in the
future desire the presence in the U..S.. Armed Forces of
militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade
members to enlist in the existing military training
program for Cubans and to enter a U. S. Reserve Unit
thereafter...
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8
ww
Our programs should be designed to encourage
the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
community and engage in constructive pursuits
pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
them some special assistance but not to the extent
that they become a perpetual privileged class
within the community: Presidential action on their
behalf would single them out unnecessarily.
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!
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, 1963 at 10 a.m)
FROM
SUBJECT:
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Current Problems Concerning Cuba
1.
2.
3.
4.
Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
Removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.
Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons plus ✗
Mr. Robert Geddes, British subject married to
U. S. citizen.
Cuban subversive activities in the Western
Hemisphere.
5. Future activities of Mr. Donovan.
-Pay to mit
6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a
political weapon against the Castro regime.
7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban
Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
basic ✗
8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic
paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba.
Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in
intensified intelligence collection%3B Policy on
illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia
flights to Cuba.
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C
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2

NINFOMATION CHORI ALFORM MON REPO
This document consists of
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCI 10. _Copies, Sies
pages
This material contatus information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Lawe, Title
18. U.S.C. Becs.. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
Cuba
Analysis of the Cuban
Situation by the Italian
Embassy in Habana
REPORT NO.
CS DB-3/652,924
DATE DISTR.
17 January 1963
NO. PAGES
4
REFERENCES
RD-W-2088
RD-W-2107
B
6 December 1962
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
THIS IS
Italy, Rome
(21 December 1962)
FIELD REPORT NO.
Palilial
UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A qualified, astute observer (B) who has contacts in the
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of
Content: 2, that the document is genuine.
The following is a translation of a report dated
6 December 1962 sent by the Italian Embassy in.
Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the
considerations regarding the consequences which the recent
crisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I
will now add some comments on the conjecture which has been
reported by some members of our representations.
1) The possibility that there will soon be a loosening of
the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me
to be nil at this time. The fact that the talks with Mikoyan
were long and difficult and that Castro expressed in private
his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still
alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce that
Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance
cannot be replaced by the Chinese.
Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have
done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and
in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspection).
Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is
intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR
in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me
that China can furnish more than it has furnished to date,
which consists of second quality foodstuffs, rather shoddy
S-E-C-R-E--T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
STATE
GROUP
Excluded from automo
downgrading and
desiossification
TE X ARMY X NAVY ✗X AIR X NSA ✗OCR ✗DIA X FBI 2
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #
I&NS
(Note: Washington distribution Indicated by "X", field distribution by "#").
X
in onnis
RMATION REPORTE INFO
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2
CSDB-3/652,924
wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores
in Habana are full. As for machinery and spare parts, China]
is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied
by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined
as pro-Khrushchev, is tied to the USSR in such a way that he
cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this
regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during
the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations,
he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends
of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations.'
Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director
of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a good
resume of the situation, i.e., a) Soviet leaders have for
some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character
and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by
Moscow. b) The USSR will continue to give all its economic
support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a
grave blow particularly in Latin America.
2)
Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that
the revolutionary regime of Castro can be changed into a
"Titoust" regime. It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador
Zoppi reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even some
Latin American countries desire such a change and are doing
everything possible to provoke it. It is also possible that
some Cubans share these sentiments. But, in my opinion, it
is impossible that such a change can take place while Castro
is in power. As I pointed out in my previous report, it is
not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned", to
imitate anyone, and even less to take Tito as a model.
Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this
possibility seems very remote.
3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for
Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime
will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate
subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated
by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including
Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination
of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can
do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the
security of other countries, if only because he lacks the
necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the
Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to
concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and
that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, includ-
ing the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note
in passing that, according to what was told me by the afore-
mentioned Ambassador, "during the recent meeting of the OAS the
Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the
recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish.
proof, he was unable to do so.
It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious
pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely
Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in
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CSDB-3/652,924
Buenos Aires. But it is an extremely remote possibility. The.
countries which could 
do it do not have the necessary material
means. 
A partial solution would worsen the situation and a
definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. I
think 
therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by
material 
strength can obtain results in Cuba.
In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is
necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament
of Fidel 
Castro, the influence which he has on a part of the
population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United
States. It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary.
regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example
for other 
Latin American countries. This would not take into
account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly
their chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to
imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another
path. 
As Guevara said the other day in an interview for the
Daily 
Worker, "this is a battle to the death with the United
States in which the most possible damage must be done to the
adversary.
...
Undoubtedly, after the events of October and November,
Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this
descent will 
last no one can say today. The only certain
thing is that the economic situation is getting worse every
day and 
therefore the revolutionary regime needs the
assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night
commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who
heads the most important institution of the country the
Institute for Agrarian Reform left. The mission will go
first 
to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that
new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits,
to permit the Cubans to last through 1963, which will cer-
tainly be the most difficult year.
But economic assistance can permit this country to
survive, not resolve its problems. For a definitive solu-
tion it would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans
to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the
machines which they have. Agricultural production, princi-
pally sugar cane, as has been recognized even by the
fanatics of industrialization, constitutes the basis of
the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good
harvest if, for 
example, the tractors furnished by Hungary
which should last ten years are unusable after two years?
It is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime
solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer
from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But for another
year they will find a way to get by.
Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent
policy followed by the United States in the recent months
is the best and perhaps the only policy. After the danger
of strategic weapons has been eliminated, the wisest measure
is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Castro will
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present some more "headaches" to the United States; but the
atmosphere is changed and -even without counting on the
hypothetical coup d'etat of Castro which would force the
solution of the problem one can hope for a perhaps not too
distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as the
Cubans insist on the known five points and the United States
refuses any guarantees; so long as the USSR is obliged to
feed Castro to permit his survival, the less uncomfortable.
position appears to me to be that of the Government in.
Washington.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO. FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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