198-10005-10018
v9.1
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Date:
6/24/201
AGENCY:
ARMY
RECORD NUMBER:
198-10005-10018
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
Identification Form
!
Agency Information
Document Information
ORIGINATOR:
MULTIPLE
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE:
PAGES:
00/00/0000
123
SUBJECTS:
ARMS SMUGGLING, CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS:
LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
CUBAN SPONSORED SUBVERSION
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret
4
Redact
10/07/1997
Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 30. Assorted documents related to Cuban material support of
Communist subversives in Latin America.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736
JFK Records Reviewd
Department of the Army EO 13526
☑ Declassify ☐ Exclude □ Exempt
Authority.
Refer To
Review Date 5/12/2015 By
Khine
12
Page 1
ARMS SHIPMENTS - ΤΟ
AND FROM CUBA
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736
Page 2
SECRET
ARMS SHIPMENT
General:
#
Arms Gaggling is one of the "facts of 14" in Lotio
America and has been engaged in by dissident elements for many yours..
Reports of Castro involvement in these activities have been frequent clace
shortly after his seizure of power early in 1959. Hone of these reports
has ever been proves. With the arrival of large quantities of Soviet Bloc
ema in 1961, Cuba recovered all U.S. arms in the hands of the populace
erine punishable by drath to have possession of weapons of
U.B. manufacture. The U.S. as furnished under the MAP to Former Cuban
övezmete together with those collected by Castro provide the Castro
government with large stocks which could be shipped to subversive grouns
In other countries. Identification of these arms with Cuba would be
extremely difficult.
1
Revorte of Nothod of Ovenation
This Psb contains five items: (1) Two reports alledging arms
smuggling by fisheran and by nonne of food products shipped to
Latin America; (2) A report which indiestes that a Cuban erma
cache discovered in Brazil is not of Cuban origin; and (3) Two
reports concerning è Cuban száenal purportedly being used to
supply arms for an invasion of scue Caribbean country or en
invasion of South America.
Reports of Arus Gaggling
This Tab captains a number of items reporting arm smuggling to
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panare, Venezuela, British Guiana and
Brasil. Note periicularly the top item in which the British
indicate the numerous reports on ams snuggling to British
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 3
SECRET
Gulans are without foundation and the second item which
refutes the report contained in the Life Magazine article
of 8 February.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 4
SECRET
"
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 5
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794. the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is, prohibited 
by law.
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
Exporte
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CUBA/LATIN AMERICA
Steve LutĊ-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM
POSSIBLE CONCEALMENT OF WEAPONS
FOR SHIPMENT TO LATIN AMERICA
DATE OF
LATE 1962
сло
اشا
REPORT NO.
TDCS DE 23/653,152
1 DATE DISTR.
6 FEBRUARY 1963
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
REFERENCES
IN
62553
35871
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL
SOURCE
UNITED STATES (4 FEBRUARY 1963)
6
FIELD REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
U.S. OWNER (C) OF A MARINA, FROM A FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER,
FROM THE BROTHER OF AN EMPLOYEE OF A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL.
1. IN LATE 1962 A DAY-SHIFT EMPLOYEE AT A CANNERY IN SAN
CRISTOBAL, PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE. FOUND A HAND GRENADE WRAPPED
IN NYLON AND BEDDED IN SHREDDED COCONUT IN A CAN WHICH HAD FELT
UNUSUALLY HEAVY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE
CAN HAD GONE THROUGH THE CANNING PROCESS AND HAD BEEN SEALED.)
AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCOVERY THE WORKER WAS ALMOST FIRED.
OF THE MILITIA GUARDS AT THE CANNERY SAID THAT AMMUNITION AND
OTHER EQUIPMENT IS REGULARLY CANNED AND SHIPPED TO LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES. A SPECIAL NIGHT SHIFT WORKS AT THE PLANT.
ONE
2. (FIELD COMMENT: AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN EARLY.
OCTOBER 1962 THAT IN JULY 1962 A STORY WAS CIRCULATING IN SAN
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS'
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR
DA
ARMY/ACSI
NAVY
AIR
JCS
SECDEF NSA
NIC
☑XX USIA
OC 1
ONE
OCR
ORR
081
REPCINCLANT
STATE/DIR
INS
00
FBI
EXO
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
FORM 1Kb
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 6
(15-201
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM
62553
IN
TDCS DB-3/653,
152
35871
PAGE
ANDRES, AN ISLAND POSSESSION OF COLOMBIA, THAT A PISTOL `HAD
BEEN FOUND EARLIER CONCEALED INSIDE A FROZEN CHICKEN WHICH
HAD BEEN PART OF A SHIPMENT RECEIVED F FROM CUBA.)
3.
FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 7
END OF MESSAGE:
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOR DISSEM
An arms cache of weapons and ammunition recently discovered at the
Idgas Camponesas guerrilla training center in the interior of the
Brasilian state of Goias is believed by US Embassy and CAS officers to
bo of Brazilian rather than Cuban arms, despite a Brazilian newspaper
suggestion that they were Cuban. There were also discovered about 125
copies of Communist publications including Che Guevara's well-known
treatise on "Querrilla Warfare". The training center was described as
organized according to that book. A confidential report on the discoveries
added that "members of the center want to be the Brasilien equivalent
of those who fought in the Bierre Maestra and so bring the hard Chinese-
Cuban type revolution to Brazil." Some 90 to 95 persons in the locality
are reported members of or sympathetic to the Ligas Camponesas activities,
but only 2 of the 24 for whom warrents were issued have yet been taken
into custody. (Am Emb, Rio de Janeiro 1122, 10 December, CONFIDENTIAL,
and CIA, Brasilia, IN 33026, 11 December, SECRET NOFORN)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 8
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
INFORM
ATION
"
WORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Expart of Rev.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Expionage Low Title
18, U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Wit
COUNTRY.
Cuba/USSR/Latin America
REPORT NO.
CS-3/530,898
SUBJECT
1.
Use of Soviet Fishing Boats
to Transport Arms to Latin
America
DATE DISTR.
11 December 1962
NO. PAGES
1
REFERENCES
RD _W-2107
RD-ACQ-01258
INFO..
LACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
2
2. Belgian Arms Dealer in Habana
Paras. 1 & 2: October 1962;
Para. 3:
August 1962
Paras. 1, 2: France, Paris;
Para 3: Spain, Madrid
Paras. 1, 2: 23 November 1962;
Para, 3:
12 October 1962
FIELD REPORT NO.
+38957
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
Paras. 1 & 2: An official French servicé; Para. 3: CC-1197,
Cuban refugee (F), a former employee of the Cuban diplomatic
service, who visited Santiago de Cuba in August 1962,
Appraisal of Content:
3.
Soviet fishing boats, under cover of fishing Atlantic waters,
are transporting contraband arms to Latin American countries.
The boats are met outside the territorial waters of those
countries, and arms are transferred in small quantities.
On board the Soviet boats are only Soviets and a very few
Cubans or other Latin Americans who talk with those who
pick up the arms. The arms being delivered are of American
manufacture, including those obtained during the Batista
regime and those taken during the Playa Giron invasion. .The
Soviet fishing boats also carry propaganda, and pamphlets
containing, military instructions, the same type of material
being sent by diplomatic pouch from Mexico.
A Belgian in Habana who says he represents a Belgian firm,
has offered the Cuban Government any type and nationality
of arms for payment in dollars. The Belgian has made a
similar offer of sale of arms to a representative of an
anti-Castro group in Habana.
In August 1962 a fisherman in Santiago de Cuba said that
on several occasions he had been forced by the Government
to use his boat for transporting small groups of men, in
civilian clothes, and supplies of arms: He also knew of
other fishermen who had been forced to do the same. The men
and arms were carried to small islands or transferred to other
boats at sea. Such trips sometimes lasted as long as four or
five days. The fisherman did not know the purpose or final
destination of the men and arms.
STATE
✗ ARMY
☑ NAVY
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
☑ AIR
☑NSA
COAST GUARD
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #
(Notes Washington distribution indicated by "X", Field distribution by "".)
INFORMATION REPORT
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 9
GROUP 1
Escuded ham dulomatic
downgrading and
declassification
☑ OCR
X DIA
1✗
IANS X
FBI
2
IN URM
PIFORT
COUNTRY: CUBA
SECRET
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CIA INFORMATION REPORT
Explant Rev.
CS-3/532,138.
26 December 1962
SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN VESSELS ALLEGEDLY PREPARED TO INVADE A
CARIBBEAN COUNTRY
DATE OF INFO: 28 NOVEMBER 1962
SOURCE: TRAVELING SALESMAN (F)
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 3
HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO TDCS-3/530,589, DATED 6 DECEMBER 1962, AS
OF MID-NOVEMBER TWO CUBAN SHIPS LOADED WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE SAMY
SAID TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI. SOURCE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE
NAMES OF THE SHIPS AND THEIR DEPARTURE DATE.
THE FRUCUBA AND THE FUNDADOR, CUBAN-FLAG VESSELS, WERE DOCKED AT THE ARSENAL
DOCKS IN CASABLANCA (HABANA) IN LATE NOVEMBER. THESE YEKS VESSELS WERE SCHEDULED
TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION OF SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRY.
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 10
SECRET

ARMS SHIPMENTS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CUBA
Stockpile of War Katariel for Latin
America (C)
Barly Jarmary 1962
Habana, c/a 7 January 62
183 316/36-6-62
19 Jamary 1962
1 of 1
DUJ
BUJ-43-62
بیمار ہے
1. Source reports an arsonal or stockpiling of war materiel at Casablanca,
Habana District, northeast shore of Habana Bey, Mebana Provinco.
2. Source has heard this materiel in targeted for an invasion of South America.
CONFIDENTIAL
DOWNGRADED 17 12 YEARS
RITERVALS NOT AUTO
MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIN 5200.10
OPNS BRANCH
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 11
Venezuela Uncovers Communist, Arms Cacne
in a raid on a small
uncovered a
The Venezuelan Government
village near Caracas on 5 January
large cache of arms and equipment which it claims
belonged to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National
Liberation, reputed to be emerging as a para-
military arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party.
Several tons of explosives and large quantities
of hand bombs, arms, and ammunition were seized as well
as a nearby clandestine Communist radio
transmitter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM).
SOURCE: TDCS 533,071 (S/NFD); FBIS (OUO); PRESS
10 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 12
Page
0
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 13
ARMS SHIPMENTS
12 Feb 63 "All the information available to Her Majesty's Government
and to the British authorities in British Quiena indicates that there is
no truth whatever in the continuing reports that arms are being shipped
to the colony from Cuba. Similar stories have appeared from time to time
in the past, but upon examination all have been found to be without
foundation."
(British Embassy in US to Reuters, AP and UPI).
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 14
N
12 February 763
1. The 7 February
the fallwig etis
(122 contains a try on Cuba
er the choto of a Naten freighter:
But resists bra the HOLLEY LIKES held to
ariel (Cuba) only last week with bolds
sent by Castro to British Guiana.
ships put out from
loaded with weapons
2. A debrief report of
Cuban hatonal who arrived at Port Everglades
on 25 January (963 copied the following
was told by Realstant ohl inapactor for the Port of Havana
that on 14 January 1963 we launches captained by a man with what
appeared to be an Italian accent had departed from the La Coubre
wharf (arana).
1st ba ship indicated the dentination was
ship Invector had been told by the
were loaded witn arIEL
stars.
TD/00-X-3249316 DTC 2015052
3. The following iaf. pation may refer to this arme shipment. An in-
tested CIA course, a member of the Communist Party of Colombia in
Calf, has stated Chat during a conversation on 5 January 1963 between
Amado de Jeans Zapata, member of the Department of Valla Regional
Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (FCC), and P.1. Plata,
& Cuban deep-cover agent working with the seventh of January Worker.
Student Peasant Movement (MOEC), in Golombia and Venezuela, Plata
said that the MOLC not a local movement but rather a part of Eatin
American concept which is being esisted by Castro and the Caban Govern
ment. He said he has been in Call for one year on a special assignment
from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, propaganda, and instruc-
tions from Yanesuela, originating in Cuba, get into the hands of the MOLC
groupa.
Plata da
Pract khi cent for MUSC is due to arrive from
1963. (Geets, capital of the Departe
lombia, is on the Venomselan horder and
gling between the two countries.)
CLA Report 1
30 7 63
Ref RD--2107
SECRET
5. Another report may also refer to thio armo shipment. According
to information dated 1 February 1969 from a CIA scurge and appraised
by the CIA preparing office as possible true, Pedro MATOS, who
together with the three-member regional command committee of the
Partido Comamieta de Vonemela (PCV) in the state of Zulis is
responsible for PCV arme matters in that state, said recently that
the party lo awaiting a shipment of arms from Cuba sed Przema bat
that the emot date of arrival in till mnknown,
CIA Report TDCS-3/534,942, Ad 9 Feb 63 Raf IN 64076
Replies to DIA SICR's on this subject from NBA and CNO do not
indicate any vessels departing Havana on or after 14 Jamary beand
for British Guiana, nor do State Department queries to Georgetown,
No reperts 
have
British Guiana indicate the arrival of any arms..
been received from service attaches in Venezuela er frem ocarces in
Panama concerning this particular matter.
Project Officer:
SECREU
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
JULNE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Erbiage Laws, The Yo, U.S.C Secs.
and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is 
prohibited by low.
CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(When Filled in)
COUNTRY
NICARAG
HONDURAS / COSTA RICA / CUBA
SUBJECT
PLANS TO LAND ARMS FROM CUBA IN HONDURAS
DATE DISTR.
16 JANUARY 1963
pais
Export
B
Drev
PRECEDENCE
REFERENCES
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/534,035
A
ROUTINE
IN 50511
DATE OF 9 JANUARY 1963
INFO.
PLACE &
NICARAGUA, MANAGUA (15 JANUARY 1963)
DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL 3
SOURCE
4.35
FIELD REPORT NO.
NNM-729
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A NICARAGUAN JOURNALIST (C) FROM A NICARAGUAN OFFICIAD(S) IN: SAN JOSE; FROM
CESAR AUGOSTO 
VILLAREAL CABEZAS
ACTION COP
OPERATIONS AREA
1. ON 9 JANUARY 1963 CESAR AUGUSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS, A NICARAGUAN
REVOLUTIONARY LIVING IN SAN JOSE, SAID THAT HE WAS AWAITING INSTRUC_
OTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES, HONDURAS TO RECEIVE A SHIPMENT OF ARMS
WHICH WILL COME FROM CUBA ON THE "CORK_C.", A MERCHANT VESSEL OF UNKNOWN
REGISTRY. HE SAID THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS: TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES WILL
COME FROM. CUBA THROUGH DR. EMILIO ORTEGA ΤΑΡΊΑ.
2. THE "CORK_C" WILL UNLOAD THE ARMS AT CAYO COCHINO WHERE THEY
WILL BE RECEIVED BY GRIFFIN (FNU), WHO LIVES IN PUERTO CORTES.
GRIFFIN WILL DELIVER, THE ARMS TO VILLAREAL AT PUERTO CORTES.
3. THE ARMS WILL BE TAKEN FROM PUERTO, CORTES TO PUEBLO NUEVO,
CONFIDENTIAL
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR
STATE/DIR ☐☐
بنم
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from automot
downgrading and
declassification
10
JCS
SECDEF NSA
NIC
AID USIA OC 1
ONE
OCR
ORR
081
00
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
DA IN 8112
FORM 1K OBSOLETE PR
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 17
(15
0000-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
IN 50511
TDCS-3/534,035
2
PAGE
NICARAGUA BY VILLAREAL, JULIO VELASQUEZ VELEZ, AND DR. HERNAN SILVA
ARGUELLO WHERE, THEY WILL BE TURNED OVER TO DR. EMILIO FLORES OBREGON.
4. ( SOURCE COMMENT: THE DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE "CORK C" IS UN_
☐
KNOWN. CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER.
IN HONDURAS, HAS RECEIVED ARMS FROM CUBA BY THE SAME SYSTEM.).
FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCARIB CINCLANT.
ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO.
DA IN
.DCSOP
8112
CONFIDENTIAL
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736
Page 18
0000
TELEGRAME INFORMATION REPORT | TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information afecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title'
an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
793 and 794, the transmission or 
revelation of which in my hanner to
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
N
NTRY
SECRET
1963 FEB 9 11 41
(When Filled In)
VENEZUELA
USC Secs
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/536,942
DIAAP-3
•
ROJECT
POBLE SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM CUBA AND
PANAMA TO WESTERN VENEZUELA.
DATE DISTR.
9 FEBRUARY 1963
ROUTINE
OF
1 FEBRUARY 1963
IN 64876
CE &
DATE ACQ.
APPRAISAL
DURCE
VENTIJELA, MARACAIBO (1 FEBRUARY 1963)
3
PRECEDENCE
REFERENCES
FIELD REPORT NO. HVC-2651
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A MEMBER (c) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA
IN MARACAIBO.
N. PEDRO MATOS, WHO TOGETHER WITH THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND
COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY
OF VENEZUELA) IN THE STATE OF ZULIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PCV ARMS MATTERS
IN THAT STATE, SAID RECENTLY THAT THE PARTY IS AWAITING A SHIPMENT OF
ARMS FROM. CUBA AND PANAMA BUT THAT THE EXACT DATE OF ARRIVAL IS STILL
CUNKNOWN SOURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE LOCATIONS OF ARMS ARE KNOWN
D
TO MATOS AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
REA AROUND LA CONCEPCION AND LA PAZ; TOWNS APPROXIMATELY SOUTHWEST
ND WEST, RESPECTIVELY, OF MARACAIBO CITY IN THE DISTRICT OF MARACAIBO,
ARE
SITES). (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE REGIONAL
Y
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
GROUP
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
CE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OBI 00
STATE/INR
STATE/DIR
ELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMI
AAP-3
FORM ร.
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 19
(15-20)
:
SECRET
N
Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
IN 64876
TDCS-3/536,942
PAGE
2
COMMITTEE OF THE PCV IN THE STATE OF ZULIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AS OF EARLY
863 AND A THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE, ESTABLISHED).
2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.
SECRET
AAP-3
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 20
7. i.

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION..
INCOMING MESSAGE
AF IN: 50955 (24 Feb 62) X/eld,..
ACTION: CIN-17 (18)
RC 41/24 FEB 62
RQ/RQ/RQ
PRIORITY.
231841Z
FM USAIRA MEXICO CITY
TO CSAF WASH DC -
RETRANSMITTED TO: SAC, TAC,
CONAD, AFSC, MATS
(per req Mr Kerp-CIN-
25Fob62)
A/D: ARMY-2, NAVY-2, CMC-7, JCS-45, OSD-15
OSD/SDLU-1; STATE-15
, CIA-11, NSA-7
XPD-3, ISI-2, IDS-2 (
112) (Risd by
.
Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)
1127 USAF FAG FT BELVOIR VA //PROTECTED//
INFO CIARC ALBROOK AFB 
CZ
USAIRAS GUATEMALA BRAZIL VENEZUELA
BT
CONFIDENTIAL XX CITE CHARLIE DASH NINE SGD HARRIS PARA
MILITARY REP OF EURHPEAN WESTERN NATION ACCREDITED MEXICO
REPORTED TWO TWO FEB HAVING RECD INFO FROM TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES
THAT CUBAN SHIPLOAD OF ARMS HAD DEPARTED ÉITHER SANTIAGO 
DE CUBA
OR BAHIA DE NIPE TWO XERO DEGREE FOUR FIVE MINUTES NORTH 
SEVEN 
FIVE
DEGREES FOUR XERO MINUTES WEST DURING WEEK OF ONE ONE 
TO ONE SEVEN
FEB PD SHIP REPORTEDLY HEADED FOR BRITISH GUIANA OR NORTHEAST BRAZIL
PD LOCAL EMB INTEL AGENCIES UNABLE CONFIRM PARA SCP DASH 
THREE
BT
ACTION:: AF, (ARMY ACSI)
INFO
DCSOP. ORD
DA IN 205836
AFHQ NOV
50
0-309a
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM
MAY BE USED.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 21
OD DIN 5200:10
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
The British consul in Santiago de Cuba has informed Washington
and the Governor of British Quions that two alleged US citizens,
John Allram Johnson, aged 53, and his wife Margaret Frances Johnson,
were leaving Cuba on 31 December on the Cuban vessel BAHIA DE TAIAMA
destined for Georgetown, British Guiana. On board with them were 17
cases in their name, including two large wood crates understood to be
"very similar to those recently unloaded from a Soviet Union ship
in Santiago de Cuba." The British consul notes the unlikelihood of
US citizens' leaving Cuba in this manner, and the resulting doubt as to
their real identities and intentions. (British Foreign Office to
Washington, No. 9759, 31 December, 1962 (SECRET))
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736
Page 22
SECRET
INFORMATION EPORT
INFORM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ·
TION
ION REPORT
This material contains. information affecting the National. Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY
Cuba/British Guiana
REPORT NO.
00- K-3,210,102.
SUBJECT
Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana
DATE DISTR.
21 Feb 62
NO. PAGES
One
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
Dec 1962
--; Dec 1962
CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5
Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.
Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.
[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office
of preparation.]
I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter,
"Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo
ĭ
shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored
in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas.
A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 23
-end-
OUTGOING TELEGRAMY Department of State
INDICATE, ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
30
Origia
EUR
ACTION:
Arabassy GEORGETOWN
286
infot
02147
FEB 6 10 16 AM $63.
SS
UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE REFERRING
TO THIS MESSAGE BY CITE NUMBER
WILL BE DESIGNATED EFTO
The Feb 8 edition of LIFE contains story on Cuba with following
caption under photo of Russian freighter:
But refugees aboard the Shirley Lykes said two ships put out from
Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by
Castro to British Guiana. UNQUOTE
G
SAL
ARA
P
USIA
QUOTE
SCA
"NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
RMR
Would appreciate any available comment.
END
ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)
INFO
DCSOP, OSA, JCS
DA IN 827722
Drafted by
EUR:BNA RTapperial 2/5/63
Telegraphie transmission and
classification approved by..
TINA
Clearances
FORM
5-01
DS-322.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 24
1963
2125
RUSK
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".
000
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State*
54
Action
CONFIDENTIAL
8 1013
3
Control: 4682
Rec'd:
1953
Georgetown
EUR
FROM:
Info
/ ss
TO:
G
SAL
NO:
ARA
P
USIA
SCA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
MR
Secretary of State
245, February 7, NOON
February 7, 1963
12:57 PM
#
Reference: Department's 286 February 6.
Neither harbor master nor shipping companies have any
knowledge Cuban ships en route Georgetown. Guiana Import-
Export agents for sales rice Cuba, states it is always
notified as soon as rice ships leave Cuba so that necessary
arrangements at RMB wharf can be made. It denies having
receivéd any notice recently. Governor also reports
negative results his inquiries.
CONGEN has had numerous inquiries AP story mentioned TOUSI
Appreciate any clarification (not for release to press)
Department can give.
18.
TEK/18
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 25
MELBY
CONFIDENTIAL
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
FBIS 84 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH TO THE FAR EAST 1905 7 FEB 63 E
(EXCERPT) GEORGETOWN--BRITISH GUIANA IN A STATE OF NEAR PANIC
TODAY AFTER NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS PUT OUT A
WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT CUBA WAS SENDING TWO SHIPS
FULL OF SOVIET ARMS TO THIS COUNTRY. PREMIER CHEDDI JAGAN CALLED
THE REPORT FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR FANTASTIC AND UNFOUNDED.
A SPOKESMAN IN THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY SAID. THE GOVERNMENT
EXPECTED NO ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA.
7 FEB 749P FG/OP
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736
Page 26
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State
INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ ☐ GE TO
59
CONFIDENTIAL
04289
CUBA
FEB 9 1 17 AM '63
Origia
ACTION:
AmConGen GEORGETOWN
293
EUR
Info:
SS
SR
UrTel 245
G
SP
SAL
alleged munitions shipments from Cuba to Georgetown.
ARA
E
[z]
intelligence
DIAA 3.
1963 File
11°14 04
Washington investigation agencies have no information to confirm
STR
P
USIA
SCA
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
AIR
RMR
Story originated with caption current edition Life Magazine to
effect two Russian ships carrying munitions from Mariel, Cuba to BG.
O'Leary of Washington Evening Star apparently seized on Life story
as basis Evening Star article. Unlikely any responsible US official
confirm story as O'Leary alleged in article.
If repeat if Department is asked by press, we plan say we have
no information but are making inquiries.
Drafted by
END
2/8/63
Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:
EUR/BNA
INR/CS
Mr.
Simmons.
EUR: BNA: RJTepper: ldd
Clearances:
INR
Mr. Packman
EUR/P - Mr. McGowan
FORM
5-61
DS-322
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 27
CONFIDENTIAL
RUSK
M. Gordon Knox
ARAxxxMxxx
CCA
Mr. Follestad
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".
INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, US.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner 
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY
British Guiana/Cuba
SUBJECT
DATE OF
REPORT NO.
00- B-3,247,344
11 Jan 63
Jagan's Political-Econonic Viewpoints/Ex-DATE DISTR.
propriation of Foreign Properties Linked
to Foreign Aid/Futility of Jagan's 5-Year NO. PAGES
Plan/Peoples Progressive Party Infiltration
of United Front/Arms Smuggling from Cube/REFERENCES
Filariasis Disease Common in Guiana Back
Country.
Thru Oct 62
> INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
British Quiana/Thru Oct 62
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
Effort
Review
SOURCE:
3.
US national, executive in a US aluminum company!
Source has frequently traveled to and within British Guiana in connection
with geological surveys for his company. He has known Jagan for about
nine years, and on his latest trip had several conversations with Jagah.
On the basis of many conversations with Cheddi Jagan (mostly concerning
possible investments by my company in British Guiana), I am convinced
that he is 
not a Communist. In fact, Jagan does not know what he is.
He is simply looking for anything new that will help to pull up his
people quickly. In this context he sees Soviet and Chinese Communism
as the two principal Twentieth Century economic experiments --/and as
economic experiments he is willing to try them.
:
In talking with me, Jagan has made clear that he is not a "Castro Type.
He wants help from anybody. The one thing that might in the future
seriously hinder his getting economic aid from the USSR is that he
demands that aid be without strings.
Both Jagan and his Trade Minister, Frank Hubbard, have told we that
Jagan would hesitate to do anything (such as confiscating foreign pro-
perties in an attempt to increase revenues) which would offend the US
or the UN for fear of ruining any future chances of obtaining US or UN
aid. 
Jagan is of course quite conscious that he is still under the UK
and that it is therefore unconstitutional for him to expropriate anything.
After 
British Guiana achieves independence, I am confident Jagan would
not 
expropriate anything if he is getting aid from the US or the UN
that is, until the money is spent. If at any point (after independence)
Jagan 
is receiving no such aid and has no prospects of receiving such
aid, then anything could happen. I would, however, temper this somewhat
depressing estimate of Jagan by commenting that in 1953 when he entered
office, he was something of a wild-eyed fanatic without direction.
Since then he has matured considerably.
The PPP capability for increasing the industrial wealth of British
Guiana is hopeless. Jagan indiscriminately wants all kinds of factories.
His "Five Year Plan" is no plan at all. In his eagerness to do something
for 
British Guiana, Jagan thinks he ought to build any kind of factory
that the country does not have. Whenever he thinks of something, he
just tells a subordinate to add it to the Plan. But there is no one in
the 
Jagan government whe has done or can do the marketing research, etc.,
which is necessary for any such investment.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
STATE
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
FBI
AEC
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
0432
INFORMATION REP
REPO
NO DISSEM. ABROAD
INFORMATION REPORT
CONTROLLED.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 28
54321
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
- 2
00-B-3,247,344
5. In the last elections Jagan ordered some of his (Indian) Peoples
Progressive Party (PPP) supporters to join the United Front Party
6.
* (UTP) in order to impress the world in general and the US in particular
that democracy in British Guiana was working. By virtue of the fact
that the UFP membership was "growing," it was "obvious" that Jagan
was not a dictator. I was told this by two Indian Guianese who were
working for Jagan.
I was in British Guiana for about 12 months on my latest trip.
Since much of this time was devoted to geological surveying in the
hinterland, I was accompanied by an Indian Guianese doctor. A well-
educated man of the upper-middle class, he told me that arms were
being smuggled into the country from Cuba. He did not go into any
detail on the subject, but he did mention that his sons, who were
members of the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) frequently brought
arms into their home, kept them for a while, and then disposed of them.
The doctor was so much concerned and pessimistic
about the
situation that he emigrated from the country shortly after I departed.
--
Malaria is not a factor now. Even well into the interior there is
less than 1 percent incidence. But anywhere away from the coast
filariasis presents a problem. At first I did not believe it when my
Indian Guianese doctor said that mosquito bites incurred in the day-
time were harmless but mosquito bites at night would infect with
filariasis. After several months in the back country I believed him.
The disease seems to affect women more than men, causing women's legs
to swell. But the disease's affect on men's sexual organs was not
exactly encouraging. I never did understand why, but my doctor said
I that to be effective in detecting the disease a blood test must be
made at night (preferably between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m.), and analyzed
quickly. If filariasis is treated promptly, a man's sexual prowess
can be saved. We found that the disease is very common throughout
the country:
end
CONTROLLED DISSEM
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO DISSEM ABROAD
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 29
INFORMATION EPORT
☐
INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains. information affecting the National. Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY
Cuba/British Guiana
REPORT.NO.
00- K-3,210,102
SUBJECT
Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana
DATE DISTR.
21 Feb 62
NO. PAGES
One
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
Dec 1962
PLACE &
--; Dec 1962
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5
Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.
Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.
[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office
of preparation.]
I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter,
"Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo
shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored
in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas.
A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.
-end-
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 30

NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 31
COMMUNICATIONS
SECRET
There is little inforuntien available
Castro/Commuist
communication network with Latin America. Over the past yeare
trenstrous reports indicating that comunications are carried by
to and from Cuba, that Cuban bassies perve as occzmedication
points for Castre/Communist subversive ground in various countries,
and that directions to subversive (poups are transmitted by clandestino
in Cuba. Preceding items on radio propaganda and
profecinco soinuente, arms shipments, and the training of personnel
Cuba are closely related to commmtentions. Information on Commist
orgmizations and the Communist apparst also are related to the
question of communica
There have been some references to ins
from Cubs; however,
such evidence is not avaliable and copies of those documents made
Gailable in the past sould not withstand scrutiny.
TAB
1
Electroale Communic
Bus Tab contains the Steno: (1) A general comment on electrical
communications; (2) An item indicating the use of amytour saato
stations for comunications; and (3) A Report of clandestine
in the Dominican Republic.
This Tab cauteins an item referring to doamnata obtained fr
the
plane crada in Feru. Initially, the Peruvian press and Ferrion
officials indicated these documents proved Castro/Communist sponsor-
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 32
SECRET
い
[SECRET
ship of a revolution in Brazil; however, the Brazilian Goverment
has not taken priblie note of the document.
Couriers
This tab contains ilustrative reports of travellers to and froma
Cube who may act as courfers. This item le closely related to
information on individuals and groups travelling to Gune for
training or propaganda.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 33
SECRET
2
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 34
SECRET
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
સામણ a
162apང་ཀློང་5(243 2,73mhici"?5322མ་2276ཀར་བངཀ་ Fo
are numerous reports of a highly classified nature concerning
ctronice communications between Cuba and the Bloc, within Cube, and
between Cuba and Latin America. Some reporte infer that Prensa Intina
facilities may be used for other than news purposes and there are
frequent reports of clandestine radio instructions to Latin Amerion from
Cuba and between clandestine stations in Latin America.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 35
SECRET
ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIO
CONFIDENTIAL
Export
CONFIDENTIAL
Central "Ham Radio Transmitting Stations
Rancho Boyeros Airport, Habana Provino (c)
15-20 January 1962
Rancho Boyeros, Jan 62
0-3
DUJ 316/37-1-62
30 January 1962
1 of 1.
Kone
DUJ
DOJ
DUJ-39-62
1. Sub-Scarce roparts that the Government of Cubo had planned to inmagarate
in seatour radio transmitting station at the Rancho Boyeres Airport
, south of
Chata watons andis trons at 103, to fan aty 1962.
2. The purpose of the station was to be communication between Cuba and
Tegucigalpa, fionduras, on the 9077. frequency,
OPUS
BRANCH
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955. DocId: 32423736 Page 36
POAFORATED AT 12 TEARS
INTERVALS FOR AUTO-
MATICALLY DECLASSIXID
DUD HIR 5200.10
VINFORMATION REPORT
INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18. U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
Dominican Republic/Cuba
Clandestine Radio Receiving
Station in Santo Domingo
REPORT NO.
CS-3/535,788
DATE DISTR.
1 February 1963
NO. PAGES
1
REFERENCES
RD
DATE OF
INFO.
22 January 1963
PLACE &
Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo
DATE ACQ. 22 January 1963
SOURCE:
FIELD REPORT NO. HDC-553
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
Foreign businessman (B) with good contacts in Dominican
political circles. Appraisal of Content: 3.
One of the under-cover receiving stations for radio messages
from Habana is believed to be in a house at Calle Espaillat 56.
The house is occupied by Johnson (fnu), who has an electrician's
repair shop there.
-
Headquarters Comment. Johnson (fnu) is probably identifiable
with the Johnson (fnu) reported by another source as a Com-
munist member of the Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio
(APCJ 14th of June Political Group). See CS-3/511,814, of
24 May 1962. Also see CS-3/528,287, of 14 November 1962, from
an official British service, which reports on a clandestine
group of pro-Castro Dominicans who are in radio contact with
Habana from a repair shop in Santo Domingo..
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 37
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 38
2
SECRET
NO FOR
SLLCEM
The CIA station in Rio de Janeiro has reported that some efforts
may be made to put pressure on President Goulart to publicly take some
note of the Cuban intervention in Brasil's internal affairs, allegedly
show by some 16 pages of Spanish-language documents found in the
Verig plane crash which carried a Cuban delegation to their deaths in
November. The documents are considered by a Brazilian source who made
them available to the CIA station to be "explosive, since they prove
the Cubans exre sponsoring revolution in Brazil." Paraphrases of those
documente have appeared in the lims press; but it is unlikely that
President Goulart will give any support to publicizing them. (CIA,
Rio de Janeiro, IN 43506, 2 January, SECRET NOTORN)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736
Page 39
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 40

123
"INFORMATION REPORT
INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
5
A
COUNTRY
Paraguay/Cuba
REPORT NO.
CS-3/536, 454
SUBJECT
Paraguayan Travelers to and
From Cuba
DATE DISTR.
7 February 1963
NO. PAGES
2
REFERENCES
RD
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE:
1
2.
3.
December 1962 20 January 1963
Paraguay, Asuncion
(24 January 1963)
FIELD REPORT NO. HYA-833
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
Paraguayan security officer (B) from a member of the Paraguayan
Communist Party (C). Appraisal of Content:
2.,
On about 20 January 1963 Cantero, a leader of the Partido
Comunista Paraguayo (PCP - Paraguayan Communist Party) in
Paraguay, 1 met with five rural leaders of the PCP from the
areas of Villarrica, Concepcion, Piribebuy. Tebycuarymi, and
Guarambare. These leaders received political instructions
from the PCP for their trip to Cuba, where they will receive
military and political training in rural organization.
Lopez (fau) 2 is the leader from Piribebuy, and Ignacio Acosta³
is the leader from Tebycuarymi.
Federico Tatter, a retired ensign in the Paraguayan Navy.
entered Paraguay from Cuba in the first half of December to
assume military direction of the Frente Unido de Liberacion
Nacional (FULNA - United Front for National Liberation).
Anibal Garcete 4. returned to Paraguay from Cuba to organize
the sugar-cane workers. Garcete is a PCP member masquerading
as a member of the Colorado Party.
1. Field Comment, Cantero is the PCP pseudonym of a person
whose true name is unknown.
Source Comments
Lopez was born about 1937.
3. Acosta is a cousin of Wigberto Acosta, a long-time
member of the PCP.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 41
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
2 -
CS-3/536, 454
Comment. Wigberto Acosta was reported in June 1960
Lave been a PCP member active in the labor dispute in
Tabycnarymi area involving the sugar cane worker's
Comand for higher salaries.
Source Comment.
TOP correspo
the Federati
te was mentioned in confidential
which time he was an officer in
O2 Bugar Cane Workers.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 42
SECRET NO FOR SEM
On 4 December Brazilian President Goulart telephoned General Alves,
commander of the First Army with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and
the highest ranking extreme leftist in the Brazilian armed forces.
told Alves to choose four or five junior officers of his absolute con-
fidence to escort certain people who were arriving from Cuba vie Bolivia.
Goulart said the people were coming with "much materiel.
Paulo, IN 30353, 6 December, SECRET NOFORN)
(CIA, Sac
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 43
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
NO FOREG DISSEM
Eight Dominican pro-Castro leaders vere aboard the Czech airlines
flight to Cuba which transited Shannon Airport on 14 December, according
to an official Irish service. The Dominicans included Maximo Lopez
Molina, Tomas Parmenio Erickson, and Gustavo Ricart, leaders of the
outlawed Dominican Populer Movement (MPD), one of the most active pro-
Communist groups in the Dominican Republic. The eight Dominicans vere
emons the ten who were deported from the Dominican Republic to France
earlier this year. Another source reported last November that the Cuban
ambassador in Paris had a meeting with the ten Dominican deportees to
discuss helping them travel to Cubs without passports. (CIA Dublin,
TDCS-3/531,991, 21 December, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 44
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Premier Castro is to deliver the closing speech at the Congress
of Women of the Americas on 15 January in Havane. Havana Radio
announced that the congress, scheduled to begin 11 January, will be
attended by more than 200 delegates from Latin America, the U. S.,
and Canada, as well as by guests from many other non-American countries.
Delegations from Communist China, Albanis, Czechoslovakia, North Korea,
and North Vietnam arrived in Havana on 9 January. (FBIS 03 and 51,
10 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 45
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 46
SABOTAGE
SABOTAGE
A mmmber of acts of sabotage have been comitted in various latin
American states. There is no conclusive evidence available to link
these acts of cabotage with the Castro/Communist agreratus.
Portions on training indicate that sabotage is being taught to
trainees in Cuba.
Reports of fabotage
This Tab contains four items: (1) A report that Cuba is training
personnel for sabotage missions in the U.S.; (2) A report that
Dominicans are leaving Cuba to sabotage cane fields in the
Dominican Republic; (3) A report on the controversial sabotage of
the Maracaibo oil fields in Venezuela. (Not substantiated by
evidence available to the U.S.); and (4) Report of an unsuccessful
attempt to sabotage a bridge in Venezvels.
Berrorist Activities
Tab contains an item reporting Castro/Communist inspired
terrorist activities in Venezuels linked to the Maracaibo sabotage.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 47
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 48
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
An expert Cuban electrical technician in the Borjita sugar mill
has told a former close associate who is now a regular clandestine
source that Cubs is training personnel in the techniques of using
explosives prior to sending them to the United States on sabotage missions.
It is intended that such persons will go in the guise of enti-Communist
refugees, and the sabotage will be so arranged that in some cases it will
be taken to be merely accidents. The electrical technician added that
there is a large Commmist espionage ring operating with a ring in the
United States across the border, with several plans already under wey.
(CIA DDP IN 29517, 4 December, SECRET NOFORN)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 49
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
0
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
A Dominican exile in Cuba reportedly told a source who was there
about mid-December that Dominican Communists are leaving Cuba for the
Dominican Republic to sabotage the cane fields there. (CIA, Panama
48599, 11 January, SECRET ROFORES)
City,
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 50
SECRET
FOREIGN DISSEM
}

COMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
42-41
Action
1545
DILAP-3
ARA
CONFIDENTIAL
Control: 1171
Rec'd:
NOVEMBER 3, 1962
11:29 P.M.
FROM: CARACAS
Info
TO:
SS
Secretary of State
G
NO: 548, NOVEMBER 3, 9 P.M.
SP
SAL
IO
NIACT
PR
P
DEPARTMENT PASS CINCARIB, CINCLANT
.IOP
INR
RMR
FOREIGN MINISTER FALCON BRICENO INFORMS ME HE WILL ARRIVE
WASHINGTON SUNDAY NIGHT TO MAKE SPECIAL SPEECH IN OAS/OC
MONDAY RE CUBAN SITUATION UNDERSCORING CUBAN INSPIRED
SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST VENEZUELA.
HE WILL PRESENT INTERCEPTED_CABLE TO VENEZUELAN STUDENTS
AND OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH HE HOPES OBTAIN FROM INTERIOR
MINISTRY. HE ASKS IF DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE HIM SUNDAY
AT VENEZUELAN EMBASSY WITH TRANSCRIPT RAUL CASTRO'S
STATEMENT. AFTER MARACAIBO SABOTAGE IN WHICH PRESS CLAIMS.
RAUL TOOK CUBAN CREDIT FOR INCIDENT.
SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAKE THIS AND ALL OTHER USEFUL FBIS
INTERCEPTS AS WELL OTHER EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM.
FALCON'S ARRIVAL NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WILL BE AVAILABLE
VENEZUELAN EMBASSY THERE. PLEASE EXTEND COURTESTES.
HE PLANS STAY US ABOUT EIGHT DAYS.
SMD
NOTE:
STEWART
PASSED TO CINCARIB, CINCLANT 11/4/62.
MESSRS. MOSKOWITZ, BOWDLER AND ALLEN (ARA) NOTIFIED
12:10 A.M., 11/4/62 TEM.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 51
CONFIDENTIAL
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
དང་བག་ལ་བརྟག་ན་རལྔ༩༧པ་ནསྲུང ཤེས པས
TELEGRAM INGORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ASD
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws. Title 18, U.S.C. Secs.
BASD 
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EXEC
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION _ DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
EUR
(When Filled in)
Mr. Rowen has seen
RESA
WCOUNTRY
VENEZUELA
FE
REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,176
SSA
FSUBJECT
FEA
CONTINUATION OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES
DATE DISTR.
1:3 FEBRUARY 1963
D/AC
2
DIS
D/PL
¿DATE OF
PINFO
OPEACE &
DATE ACQ.
PAPPRAISAL
8 AND 12 FEBRUARY 1963.
VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 FEBRUARY 1963)
FIELD REPORT NO.
COMP THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE
WPS
C/L
OPR
· PARA 1: FORMER POLICE OFFICIAL (c) WITH CONTACTS IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE
NATIONAL GUARD;B PARA 2: U.S. BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE
VENEZUELAN MILITARY.
PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY
REFERENCES
IN 67419
HVC 2655
1. ON THE EVENING OF 8 FEB 63 NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS WHO WERE PRO-
CETECTING THE CARACAS-LA GUAIRA TURNPIKE SURPRISED A GROUP OF MEN AT THE
ENTRANCE TO TUNNEL NUMBER 1 WHO WERE ATTEMPTING TO DESTROY TURNPIKE
BRIDGE NUMBER 1. FIRE WAS EXCHANGED FOR ABOUT THIRTY, MINUTES BETWEEN
H
THE SOLDIERS AND THE MEN IN THE TUNNEL AND LATER A BOX CONTAINING ABOUT: O
.?
100 POUNDS OF DYNAMITE WAS FOUND BELOW THE BRIDGE.
bali
2. TWO CAR LOADS OF GUERILLAS ATTACKED THE NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS ·
AT DABAJURO, A PIPE LINE OUTPOST BETWEEN AMUAY, IN THE PARAGUANÁ
PENINSULA AND LAKE MARACAIBO, STATE OF ZULIA, IN WESTERN VENEZUELA
ON 12 FEB. ABOUT 100 SHOTS WERE EXCHANGED BUT ALL THE GUERILLAS ESCAPED.
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
Tratt
SECRET
downgrading and
decoupbeaton
DA IN 16985
STATE INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR
STATE/DIR
JCS SECDEF NSA NIC
AID USTA
ONE.
OCR
ORR 0812 00
EXO
STELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
SECRET
FORM
IK
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
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$1000
(15-20
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(When Filled In)
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
TDCS -3/537,176
IN 67419
PAGE
نج
17
3. (FIELD COMMENT: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INCREASING IN
VENEZUELA. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION
NACIONAL (FALN, ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION) TOOK TEMPORARY
POSSESION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PREFECT IN THE TOWN OF SAN DIEGO DE
LOS ALTOS, ABOUT 20 MILES FROM CARACAS, ON 4 FEB. THEY TIED UP THE
POLICEMEN ON GUARD, STOLE A FEW RIFLES, AND PAINTED THE WALLS WITH ANTI-
GOVERNMENT, SLOGANS. ON. 5 FEB, AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE HOME OF COLONEL
JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL, LOCATED.
IN A WELL-TO-DO RESIDENTIAL AREA OF CARACAS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER.
ATTACK ON 12 FEB WHICH RESULTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHING ROAD
CLOCKS
BLOCKS AND SENDING TROOPS AND POLICE INTO THE AREA. ON THE
MORNING OF 9 FEB AN ARMED ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE AMERICAN (PORTION
*
GARBLED WILL FWD) WHERE OFFICES WERE SET ON FIRE AND EQUIPMENT DESTROYED,
AND ON THE NIGHT OF 9 FEB SEARS WAREHOUSE IN ANTIMANO WAS COMPLETELY
DESTROYED BY MEMBERS OF THE FALN. THREE BRIDGES ON THE PAN AMERICAN
HIGHWAY, BARQUISIMETO AREA, STATE OF LARA, WERE DAMAGED BY BOMBS
ON 12 FEB AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE ON THAT DAY TO BLOW UP A CREOLE OIL LINE.
IN CATIA LA MAG, FEDERAL DISTRICT, BUT ONLY ONE SMALL BOMB EXPLODED E
CAUSING MINOR DAMAGES).
40
* 5°
FIELD DISSEM:STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.
HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY
AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
S CRET ACTION: ACSL. NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO
DCSOP
DA IN 16985
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000
☐
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Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela'
Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several
months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions.
Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are
connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left,
the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces
of National Liberation - the Castro-Communist group
credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil
These activities are
fields during the Cuban crisis.
probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betan-
court Government.
The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency
in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly
to arrest terrorists.. They have rounded up extremists
responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing
supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint
warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of
guerrilla bands operating in the Falcon area of
northwestern Venezuela.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
་
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FOR LATIN AMERICA
COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
TOP SECRET
COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LATIN AMERICA
Information on the Communist apparatus for Latin America and its
relationship with Cuba and the Sino Soviet Bloc is largely derived from
highly classified intelligence which is provided separately. From the
reports contained in this section, it may be concluded that the organize-
tional links vary from country to country depending upon, among other
factors, the legal status of the Communist party, whether diplomatic
representation is located in a country, the relative strength of Communist
alliances with other leftist or opposition parties, and the character of
current government leadership in these countries. Next attached is an
unclassified report prepared in October for release as a White Paper.
Although this paper was not released due to the missile crisis, it repre-
sents an agreed summary (State, DOD, CIA and USIA) of the Communist
apparatus in Latin America. The report contains briefs on Communist
activities in each of the Latin American countries.
The reports vary with respect to the country priority for Castro/
Communist action in Latin America. Brasil, Venezuela, and British Guiana
are mentioned most frequently as the likely priority targets. There are
also conflicting reports on the relative independence of Castro from the
Soviet Union and indications that the publicized Sino Soviet disegreements
are reflected in local Comminist organizations throughout Latin Americs.
TAB 1
Cuban Relationships and Policies Toward Latin America
This tab contains relevant excerpts from the draft MIE
now under preparation. (USIB is meeting on this item and
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 57
SECRET
SECRET
TAB
TAB
the most current agreed positions will be made available
to you in the event there is any significant change.) Also
included at this tab are a number of significent reports
indicating the probable orientation of Castro/Communist actions
directed toward Latin America. The last item at this tab
summarizes the unsuccessful armed incursions of 1959 (Panama,
Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic).
Soviet Activities and Conflicts
This tab contains a number of items indicating possible Cuban-
Soviet conflicts as reflected in Latin Americs. The last two
items reflect the concern attached to the possible establish-
ment of a Soviet fishing port in Cuba.
Situation in Latin America
This tab contains a number of current situation and pertinent
background reports on various Latin American countries in the
following order: Central America, Panama and Mexico; Bolivia;
Brasil (4); Colombia; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Haiti; Mexico; Panamas
Peru (4); and Venezuela (3).
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 58
-2-
SECRET
MEMORANDUM:
4 October 1962
Cuban Subversion in Other Latin American Countries
I.
General Summary
1. The Castro regime denies that material support is being given
any anti-regime group outside Cuba. Castra claims that such assistance is
unnecessary since the people of these countries, thanks to Cuba's example,
are becoming aware of their revolutionary potential. The publicly stated
position of the Cuban leaders is that their country, "the first socialist
state in America, "has become the example, the "beacon". In fact, however,
Cuba's moral and material support to Communist and Communist-influenced
groups has been felt in varying degrees in every one of the 19 other Latin
American republics. The Castro regime has become an effective instrument
of the Sino-Soviet effort to weaken and eventually destroy democratic
political institutions in Latin America.
Cuban subversion has become more subtle since 1959, when a Cuban-
mounted expeditionary force was launched against the Dominican Republic and
smaller "invasion forces" left Cuba for abortive attacks on the governments
of Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Now Cuban subversive efforts generally fall
in three categories:
II.
盛
b.
The indoctrination and training of hundreds of Latin
Americans in Cuba;
The intensive propaganda beamed at Latin America by Cuban
radio stations and circulated through printed material and
the Cuban-subsidized international "news" agency, and;
The covert material support given subversive groups in
other countries.
Cuban Subversive Programs
A. Training of Latin Americans in Cuba:
3. Fidel Castro announced on 9 June 1961 that his government would
grant 1,000 scholarships to "poor students" from other Latin American
countries for the next school term and 100 scholarships to students from
other countries of the world. Hundreds of young Latin Americans have been
subjected to Communist indoctrination. In addition to whatever formal
training they receive in the, many of them receive training in guerrilla
warfare and other techniques of revolution.
4. Cuban refugees who have arrived recently in the United States have
provided detailed information on the training programs offered to some of
these young Latin Americans.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 59
One refugee, a deserter from Castro's army, reported from
personal knowledge that in late 1961 there were a number of students from
Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Quatemala, and Brazil living in a Havana suburb
who regularly attended classes in Marxism-leninism, propaganda techniques,
and other subjects to prepare them for active revolutionary roles in their
homelands. He reported that those male students who were between 16 and 20
years of age were sent as part of their training to the Mines del Frio
training center in Oriente province. During this phase of their training they
received familiarization in the use of small erms and hiked to the top of
Cuba's highest mountain, Pico Turquino, in the Sierra Maestra, the locale of
Castro's guerrilla warfare against the Batista dictatorship.
b. Another refugee, who lived in Oriente province, learned from
conversations with militia-men in the area and from Latin Americans training
there that continuous training of students from other Latin American countries
is going on at Las Arenas, Oriente. The trainees receive instruction in
military tactics, guerrilla varfare, subversion, sabotage, propaganda, and
Communist ideology. The refugee did not know how many Latin Americans were
involved, but believed the duration of each course was about eight weeks, after
which another group replaced the one that had been training.
5. Much of the travel of Latin American students to Cuba for training
and indoctrination is handled by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los
Pueblos (ICAP Cuban Institute for Friendship with Feoples).
6. Cube is also a major takeoff point for Latin Americans traveling to
and from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Over 400 Latin Americans returned from last
July's Communist-sponsored Youth Festival in Helsinki @board a Soviet passenger
vessel with the 400-man Cuban delegation. They disembarked in Havana and
stayed in Cuba some weeks before some of them began returning to their home
countries. Others may well be remaining in Cubs for some time.
B.
Cuban Propaganda:
7.
International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a
relatively constant propaganda level at all times, with regularly scheduled
and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions
to all of Latin America. The general theme of all these broadcasts is
that "the Cuban example" is avakening the "people" of Latin America to
the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in
power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them.
8. There are regular programa beamed by Havana radio to Nicaragus,
the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Peru, and Honduras. They are all
subversive in content and frequently incite to rebellion. These programs
to specific countries are apparently directed and produced with the
guidance of exiles from the countries concerned resident in Cuba.
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2

9. The program to the Dominican Republic, for instance, is announced
as the program of the Dominican Liberation Movement (MID), and the program
is entitled Patria Libre. At present, Radio Havana beams the 20 minute
Patria Libre program to the Dominican Republic on Thursdays and Saturdays.
Just prior to the program, the Radio Havana announcer explains that the.
station is making its facilities available to the MLD for its program.
There are some areas in the Dominican Republic where, due to the absence
of local radio stations, the Cuban broadcasts are the only ones heard.
Last July, the subversive content of these broadcasts to the Dominican
Republic led the Dominican government to protest to the Organization of
American States.
10. The content of such broadcasts is exemplified in the stated goals
of the "Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua," the program which is regularly
beamed by Redio Havens to Nicaragua. On 31 August this program celebrated
its first anniversary by repeating its original statement of its purposes:
11-
"The Voice of Revolutionary Nicarague has set itself the goal
of contributing to pointing out the real way to Nicaragua's
liberation from the dominion of Yankee imperialism and the
Somoza tyranny. Elections (scheduled for next February to
choose President Somoza's successor) with the Somozas in pover,
and under the State Department's economic and political control
of Nicaragua, will be a farce. Without. a prior revolutionary
overthrow of the Somosa tyranny there can be no free elections
in Nicaragua nor can a popular government be established. This
program will be at the service of the revolutioneries and
against the electioneers...The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua
will defend the Cuban revolution because it is an important
part of the Latin Americen people's liberating revolution."
Cuban propaganda is also disseminated through the offices of
Presna Latins, the Cuban-subsidized international "news agency" which
bas close working relations with TASS, the New Chine News Agency, and other
propagande media for the Sino-Soviet bloc.
12.
Cuban printed material is circulated throughout the hemispherej
Che Guevara's book on guarrilla warfare has received vide distribution.
Periodically, the Mexican government, most recently last August, has been
obliged to confiscate large quantities of propengenda materials from Latin
Americans passing through that country enroute from Cube to their homelands.
C. Cuben covert support for subversive groups:
13. Cuban covert support for Communist or pro-Communist groups in
other Latin American countries is provided in a number of ways. In the five
Latin American countries where Cuban diplomatic missions are still resident
(Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia), these missions have often
been the channel. The Cuban embassy in Mexico is known to have provided
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 61
3
frequent assistance to exiles from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and other Central
American countries living in Mexico. In other instances, assistance is
provided through travelers coming from Cube and through Prensa Latina
representatives.
14.
The assistance is usually financial. The Cubans appear to have
been careful since 1959 to avoid being caught in a blatant act of subversion
that could be used to justify concerted inter-American action. Financial
assistance is often just as useful and much less risky than actual weapons
deliveries. In a number of American countries, small arms and other wespons
are available for a price. Unscrupulous or careless arms dealers in the US
have also contributed to the arme traffic from which pro-Castro groups have
benefitted, directly or indirectly.
15. As the following country-by-country rundown indicates, Cuban support
för subversive activity has affected in varying degrees every one of the 19
other Latin American countries.
E. Argentina: Ernesto "Che" Cuevare, an Argentine by birth,
has retained his deep interest in Argentina's political affairs. On 25 May,
the Argentine national holiday, he addressed the group of Argentine citizens
resident in Cuba and told them that he hoped that next year they would be
celebrating in Argentine under "the flag of socialism." At another point
in this address he said: "Our revolution is one which needs to expand its
ideas...and other people are helping us. Let the other peoples of the hemisphere
get angry and take up arms or seize power and ald us in this task which is
the task of the entire hemisphere and of humanity."
The
The Argentine commanity in Cuba last April organized the
"Cuban-Argentine Friendship Institute" with headquarters in Ravana. One
of the leaders is John William Cooke, who was for a time chief of former
Argentine dictator Peron's political machine in Argentina. Cooke continues
active in that faction of the Peronista party which seeks concerted action
with the Argentine Communists. Cooke maintains regular contact with sympathizers
inside and outside Argentina through travelers and through his wife,
Alicia Eguren de Cooke, a resident of Montevideo, Uruguay, who apparently
has regular means of communication with individuals in Argentina. Argentine
citizens have been recruited through this channel to go to Cube for training.
There are also strong indications that terrorist activities by Argentine
Peronists and Communists have been encouraged and perhaps assisted through
this channel.
Frio
Prior to the diplomatic break between Argentina and Cuba.
last February, the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires provided financial assistance
to anti-government groups there. An Argentine journalist who has contacts in
the Communist party there reported last December, for instance, that the
Argentine Communist party had received the sum of 50,000 pesos from the
Cuban embassy as a contribution to the railway workers who were then on
strike in the province of Cordoba.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 62
On
Though the Cuban embassy is no longer in Buenos Aires, Cuban
clandestine assistance to Argentine Peronist-Communist groups continues.
19 July of this year the federal police in Buenos Aires reported the un-
earthing of a center of Communist and Peronist activities in the capital.
Two Buenos Aires policemen were shot and killed at a surburban warehouse in
June. Investigations revealed that a quantity of explosives and propaganda
were stored in the warehouse. The trail led to the arrest of one Jose
Maria Aponte, a journalist and known Peronist activist, and one Mario
Massi, owner of the firm which owned the warehouse. It was revealed that
Massi had been maintaining contact with Cuban Communists, with John William
Cooke, and with an unidentified woman associated with the Cuban embassy in
Uruguay who was probably Alicia Eguren de Cooke referred to above. According
to the Argentine police investigation, some 150 Argentine citizens had been
sent from Argentina to Cube (through Uruguay and Mexico) for training in
guerrilla warfare. On their return to Argentina, these men were to be used
in planned activities in the provinces of Formosa, Tucuman, Salta, and the
wooded areas of eastern Argentina. A number of other individuals were appre-
hended by the Argentine police in connection with the subversive activity
revealed in these investigations.
b. Bolivia: Bolivia has been the recipient of special Cuban
attentions. The number of Bolivians receiving "scholarships" in Cuba this
year--between 130 and 150-- appears disproportionately high. The Bolivian
government felt obliged to request the departure of Cuban Ambassador Tabares
in 1960 and of Cuban Charge Garcia Trians in 1961 for blatant intervention
in internal Bolivian affairs, including support for Bolivian Communists and
attempts to incite extreme leftist members of the governing MNR party to leave
the party. In June 1961, the Bolivian government published a series of
documents linking the Cuban embassy with a Communist conspiracy to seize
control of the government. One of these documents, a statement by an arrested
Bolivian agitator who had been in close contact with the Cuban embassy,
gave the names of a number of Bolivians who had received financial support
from the Cuban embassy. This evidence was used to justify the request for
the Cuban charge's recall.
The present Cuban charge in Bolivie, Ramon Aja, has also been
active though perhaps a bit more discreet than his predecessors. He has
been particularly energetic in cultivating relations with Bolivian campesinos.
The peasant union in the Cliza Velley of Bolivia has been reported to be the
recipient of Cuban financial assistance.
C. Brazil: During the past two years the Castro regime has
developed increasingly close ties with Francisco Juliao, self-proclaimed
Marxist and leader of the Peasant Leagues in the troubled northeast region
of Brazil. Juliao, whose wife and children are resident in Cuba, has
traveled there on several occasions, and a number of his associates and rank
and-file members of the Leagues have gone to Cube for agricultural
training which is undoubtedly heavily larded with ideological indoctrination.
Transportation direct from northeast Brasil to Cuba has been provided by
Bubana airlines on at least one occasion. Circumstantial evidence strongly
suggests that Juliao has received financial assistance for his movement from
the Cuban government.. Brasilian Communist leaders have privately stated, in
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 63
5
P
fact, that Juliao's Peasant Leagues have received not only money but also
shipments of small arms from Cuba. These Brazilian Communist leaders also
said that the reason Juliao sent his family to Cuba was his fear that they
might be endangered in the civil war he expects to erupt shortly in Brazil.
The Cuban government has also during the past year cultivated
particularly close relations with leaders of the dissident Communist Party
of Brasil (CPB). One of the CPB leaders who had visited Cuba last May
told a friend of a long conversation he had had with Fidel Castro in late
May. Castro expressed identity of feeling with the dissident Brazilian
Communists and criticized the regular Communist party for its failure "to
take a strong revolutionary line" in accordance with the decision of the
22nd party congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Castro
approved the insurrectionary policy of the CPB and urged the leaders to
organize guerrilla activities and start the revolutionary movement in Brazil
"as soon as possible." Castro advised them that government reprisals against
revolutionary action in Brazil would serve only to increase popular dis-
content in Brazil and swell the ranks of the revolutionaries. He advised
CPB leaders to give special emphasis to securing asyride a base as possible
among agricultural workers and the inhabitants of rural areas.
The Cuban embassy in Rio de Janeiro, like Cuban embassies
elsewhere in Latin America, has been a source of assistance to Communist and
pro Communist elements. Last May leaks to the Brazilian press reported dis-
cussions in the Brazilian cabinet on the subversive activities being directed
by Cuban ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas. The Navy and Army Ministers are
reported to have expressed particular concern over Hernandez' activities.
a. Chile: Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's
Communist-dominated popular front and a leading presidential aspirant, has
made at least two trips to Cuba.
The Cuben embassy in Santiago is the source of propaganda
support for pro-Communist groups, mostly those associated with Allende, who
are intent on coming to power in Chile through elections or revolution.
Orlando Prendes, cultural attache of the Cuban embassy, is known to be super-
vising the printing of Cuban propagands on a clandestine printing press in
the home of Julio Bocanegra, who also prints propaganda for the Chilean
Communist party. This activity has been going on for some time.
As long
ago as August, 1961, Chilean officials investigating political agitation
and resulting unrest in the Salamanca area learned that after a visit to the
area by a Cuban diplomat the previous month, pro-Cuban propaganda was being
distributed in the area, and Communists and pro-Communists there were saying
"The mountains of Salamanca are going to be the Chilean Sierra Maestra.
Last March, when Cuban Minister of Education Armando Hart
went to chile for an international conference he took with him several sacks
of propaganda.
Colombia: The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR),
organized early this year by Colombian extremists, is believed to have
received financial assistance from Cuba to promote its objective of creating
e guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the government. A Colombian
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 64
citizen who has contacts among FUAR members reported last June that Fidel
Castro had just given the group $15,000 and promised further financial
aid semi-annually. Gloria Gaitan de Valencia, the wife of a FUAR leader
and the daughter of the Colombian leader Gaitan whose assassination in
1948 sparked the disastrous Bogota rioting, is a long-time personal friend
of Fidel Castro. He has visited Cube frequently and probably returns to
Colombia with specific advice and assistance from the Cuban government.
The FUAR has succeeded in drawing members from the extremist wing of the
regular Colombian Communist party who are dissatisfied with that party's
reluctance to engage in ipen revolutionary action.
Costa Rica: The amall Costa Rican Commmist party, the
Popular Vanguard party (PVP), is charged by the Cuban government with the
selection of young men to be trained in Cuba. Riboberto Carmona and Jose
Murillo, PVP members, left Costa Rica last June for training under this
program, and PVP leaders had plans for organizing guerrille training programs
in Costa Rica under the direction of the Costa Ricans who had received training
in Cuba.
The Dominican Republic: The provisional Council of State,
which is preparing the country for its first free elections this December
in more than 30 years, has been a major target for Cuban subversion. A
cadre of Dominican Communists is headquartered in Cuba, and clandestine con-
tact is probably maintained with sympathizers inside the Doninican Republic.
Broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Cuba have helped incite the
frequent riots in Santo Domingo. The fact that broadcasts from Cuba have on
occasion referred to very recent events in the Dominican Republic strongly
suggests the presence of clandestine radio contacts between the two countries.
h.
Ecuador: The Communist party of Ecuador has formed the
nucleus of a small guerrilla organization. This group was drawn largely from
the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE), which was
involved in a two-day battle with government forces last April. The leader
of the April affair, as well as several other Ecuadoreans involved in sub-
versive activities, has received guerrilla training in Cuba. A URJE leader
told a friend last June that this organization has so far in 1962 received
$22,000 in financial aid from the Cuban government.
Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, pro-Communist former Ecuadorean Minister
of Interior who has visited Cuba and who recently traveled in Communist
China, appears to be working with the URJE. He is reported to have received
a considerable amount of money from the Cuban government for his efforts,
according to a private statement by the URJE leader.
1. El Salvador: On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran government
broke relations with the Castro regime after it had received evidence of
conversation between the Cuban charge, Roberto Lassalle, and leading Salvadoran
Communists in which Lassale urged increased revolutionary activity.
J. Guatemala: On 5 March 1962, a Cuban arrived in Mexico with a
message for a leader then in Mexico of the Guatemalan Communist-influenced
3
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7
13 November group, which had recently engaged in guerrilla activity in
Guatemala. The Cuban gave him $4,000 which be sold was the first install-
ment of a total of $10,000 to be used to establish a new guerrilla front
in Guatemala. On 8 March, Castro's emissary gave the Guatemalans the balange
of the $10,000 and told one of the 13 November leaders that the decision to
provide them with the money was taken by Fidel Castro personally. Castro,
be said, had sent instructions that the group did not have to account for how
the money was spent, that no strings were attached, and that he hopes they
are successful so he can provide them with additional assistance.. Later the
Cuban emissary met with leaders in Mexico of the orthodox Guatemalan
Communist party. These Guatemalan Communists had apparently complained that
the Cuban money was not going to them. They were told that Castro wanted
the money to go to the 13 November group because this group had demonstrated
its capacity to fight the Guatemalan government, & capacity which the
Guatemalan Commmists had not shown. The Cuban said: "It is not a matter
of standing around with Arab fatalism waiting for events to take place-
We should act efficiently so as to precipitate the death of imperialism.
Because of this we are ready to help anyone who may decide to struggle against
imperialism anywhere."
Cuban propaganda media have sought through publicising the
activities of the 13 November group to increase its prestige and chances for
success. A Prensa Latins reporter published an alleged interview with
13 November leader Yon Sosa.
k. Haiti A cadre of Haitian Communists led by Rene Depestre is
resident in Cuba, and many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern
Cuba are now being subjected to Communist regimentation and indoctrination.
1. Honduras: Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic
relations in April 1961, Cuban personnel under the cover of consular and
diplomatic offices engaged in proselyting in the north coast region of
Honduras. Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious regular radio
program beemed especially to Honduras by Radio Havana. Many Hondurans are
in Cuba under the "holarship" program.
1. Mexico: The Cuban embassy in Mexico City, the consulate in
Merida, and the Cuban-Mexican Cultural Center" in Merida have all g
engaged in propaganda activities designed to encourage the pro-communist cause
in Mexico, particularly the Communist-influenced National Liberation Move-
ment (MLN). Former Cuban ambassador in Mexico Portuondo is reported by people
in close contact with MLN leaders to have concluded an agreement whereby
some of the money sent by Havana to cover the expense of the embassy is ear-
marked as a contribution to the MLN. Mexican officials were disturbed at the
participation of Cuban embassy officials in inciting the anti-US demon-
strations by Mexican students in July and August 1960. Mexican authorities
have periodically impounded quantities of Cuban propaganda being sent through
Mexico to other Latin American countries. The most important aspect of
Mexico in Cuban propaganda and subversive operations in Latin America is its
use by the Cubans as a way station or jumping off place between Cuba itself
and the rest of Latin America.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 66
8
Cuba.
n. Nicaragua: A cadre of Nicaraguan Communists is based in
Contact between them and pro-Castro Nicaraguans in Nicaragua and in
exile in other countries of the Caribbean area is maintained at least on a
sporadic basis. A number of Nicaraguans periodically have traveled to Cuba
and some have received training there in guerrilla tactics. Reliable reports
indicate that some of these Cuba-trained Nicaraguans have been among the
small guerrilla bands that have infiltrated Nicaragua across the largely un-
guarded Hondruan border. The Nicaraguan government is the target of a
regularly broadcast Radio Havana program to Nicaragua which is announced as
the program of "free Nicaraguans."
#
0. Panama Cuban Financial assistance is believed to be
channeled to the pro-Commmist National Action Vanguard (VAN) in Panama.
of the VAN leaders, Deputy Thelma King, is a frequent traveler to Cuba and
claims to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro.
One
p. Paraguay: Paraguayen exides in Uruguay and Brazil have
received Cuban financial assistance. Four members of the United Front for
National Liberation (FULNA), a Communist Paraguayan exile group in Uruguay,
receive the equivalent of $230 monthly each from the Cuban embassy in
Uruguay to finance clandestine pro-Castro activities in Uruguay, according
to a Paraguayan exile in Uruguay who is in close touch with FULNA.
<Baru!
At least eight Peruvians traveled to Cuba by way of
Mexico last June to receive training and indoctrination in that country.
Other Peruvian Communists or pro-Communists have long been in Cuba and a
regularly broadcast Radio Havana program is beamed to Perus
Uruguay: The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been engaged
in promoting pro-Castro propaganda. In January 1961 the Uruguayan govern-
ment was obliged to declare the Cuban ambassador persona non grata for
intervening in internal Uruguayan affairs.
B. Venezuela: The Castro regime has been extremely vitriolic
in its propaganda blasts against the Betancourt administration in Venezuela.
Cuban assistance has been channeled to members of the militant opposition
Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), which is attempting to develop a
guerrilla movement in Venezuela with the aid of its ally, the regular Vene-
zuelan Communist party. While there is little evidence to indicate direct
Cuban involvement in this Communist effort, a significant number of the lead-
ing figures involved, including Fabricio Ojeda, are known to have traveled
to Cuba, where they probably received financial and other assistance in
addition to official encouragement and propaganda support for their activities.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 67
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 68
SECRET
EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
:
Policies Toward Latin America
42. Here Castro has more capability for independent
action than in any other field except the internal politics of Cuba.
Gastro is deeply committed to a policy of armed insurrection
throughout Latin America. Because of his own experience he has
a deep-seated belief that only through insurrection can revolution
be promoted in Latin America. Further, he apparently believes that
a successful revolution in another Latin American country would give
great impetus to the revolutionary movement and would also consoli-
date his own regime in Cuba. In trying to foment insurrections, he
apparently does not believe it crucial that he cannot now give direct
military assistance to them, nor does he seem to consider it impor -
tant whether he has or has not Soviet support. For the Soviets,
however, such an inflexible approach smacks of the Chinese position
and causes great problems in dealing with other Latin American
Communists. Most important, however, it is probable that the
Soviets believe such a posture will damage Soviet prospects for
penetration of Latin America and inevitably bring about a confronta -
tion with the US.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 69
SECRET
2
SECRET
EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
18. Cuban overseas military capabilities remain severely
limited by lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans could
probably not undertake an overseas operation on a ssale larger than
one battalion. For political as well as military reasons, the Castro
regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature.
It would prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to
local insurgents.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736
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SECRET
"

SECRET
EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
31.
The decline of his prestige has at least for the moment
reduced Castro's capability for subverting popular groups and
moving them into action against their own governments and
against US interests. Local fidelistas have encountered greater difficulty
in mobilizing mass support for anti-government strikes and demonstrations
on other than local issues.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 71
CRET
SECRET
EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
32. Nonetheless, Castro continues his appeal for revolution in
Latin America on the Cuban model. Those Latin Americans who are
committed to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help,
particularly from his training program in Cuba and his large-scale
dissemination of printed and broadcast propaganda. Communist
agitators are concentrating their efforts increasingly in rural areas,
as they have done in Peru recently. In addition, there has been an
increase in sabotage and other violence perpetrated by extremists,
of the sort not requiring the participation of large popular groups, yet
designed to provoke drastic countermeasures by governments and to
increase popular anti-government sentiment. These widespread
activities have demonstrated that the ability of local Communists to engage
in terrorist and subversive activities and their willingness to accept Cuban
and Soviet support do not dpend upon Castro-s prestige or upon their
opinion of his doctrines and policies.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 72
SECRET
i
JECRET
Che Guevara's mother, who lives in Argentina, told a clandestine
source in mid-December that during her recent visit to Cube her son
told her that Cuban leaders now feel they will have to rely more end
more on their own efforts to promote Communist penetration in South
America. Guerrillas will be used on a large scale after they have
received training in Cubs, Guevara said. He explained to his mother that
this is necessary since both he and Castro feel Khrushchev "let them
down" and has no further interest in spreading Communism in South America.
Guevare added that he and Castro believe they and the Chinese are
better Commmmists than Khrushchev. (CIA DD/P Buenos Aires, 19 December,
SECRET)
Comment: This report is consistent with recent public speeches by
Guevara which have emphasised the important role of Cubs with respect
to the "anti-imperialist revolution" in Latin America. (SECRET)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 73
SECRET
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CIA Report 21 Dec 62 Rome
Translation of report dated 6 Dec 62 from Italian Embassy Havana to
Foreign Ministry in Rome. "As I noted in my 9 November report is is
difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime
will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive
propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the
states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures
against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that
he
today Castro can do much more and that/constitutes a real menace to the
security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds.
I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brasil that the Cuban
leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one
country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, in-
cluding the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in
passing that, eccording to what was told me by the aforementioned
Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative
accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when
asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so."
SECRET (NOFORN) (CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 74
SECRET!!
NO FOREIGN Dissa
SECREE
A relative of a leading Communist in Cuba (who has previously
given reliable advance information of important developments) expressed
the opinion on 30 November that there will be revolte in Caribbeen
countries which vill masquerade sa "national revolutiona" so as to
negate the accusation of Cuban complicity. In fact, however, these
revolutions will be directed from Cube through revolutionaries from
various countries who are now being trained in Cubs. (CIA DD/P IN 46717,
12 January, SECRET)
Comment: This points up what is probably the most affective
means of Cuben subversion in Latin Americe
the training of hundreds
and perhaps thousands of Latin Americans in Cuba. (SICRET)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736
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SECREE
2)
SECRET
TOREIGN DISSEM
The recent spate of public addresses by leading Cuban officials
on the subject of insurrection in other Latin American countries reflects
a more aggressive stance than prior to the "missile crisis" and suggests
that a decision to step up Cuban support for subversive groups in other
Latin American countries may be under discussion within the inner circle
of Cuban leaders.
The
Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart have been in the
forefront since late November in publicly expressing the view that the
only road to the "liberation" of the Latin American peoples is the road of
insurrection. Fidel Castro's earlier public line had been to deny the
necessity for Cube to "export" its revolution; Cuba's'ezomple" was
sufficient. This line is given only perfunctory attention in the recent
Guevara and Hart speeches. The line emerging in these speeches appears
even stronger than that espoused in the "Second Declaration of Havana"
promulgated last February which suggested that in certain circumstances
Commmist-dominated coalitions could come to power by peaceful means.
whole tenor of the recent speeches suggests that Cuba intends to provide
every assistance within its means to Latin American insurgents. The
attention given in the Cuban press to developments in Venezuela in recent
weeks strongly suggests a more than academic interest in developments there.
Canadian Ambassador Kidd, speculating on the "Trotsky-like dedication
to permanent revolution" apparent in a 21 November opeech by Armando Hart,
commented that Cuban leaders may be attempting to counter "the humili-
ation of the withdrawal of the Russian missiles" by making renewed efforts
to "light revolutionary fires in neighboring countries." (Comment on:
Canadian Embassy, Havana, 23 November, CONFIDENTIAL) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEN
い
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 76
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SUPPLEMENT
THE CASTRO THREAT TO LATIN AMERICA
Despite diminished prestige, especially among government
leaders, Castro retains great influence over politically
unsophisticated Latin Americans. He is also supported by
Western Hemisphere Communist parties and the vast majority
of extreme leftists. Castro's main appeal lies in his claim
to be the leader of a successful revolution against "Yankee
imperialism" and in the support he is ready to provide
subversive activities throughout Latin America.
The degree to which Cuba is involved in current
hemisphere unrest is not clear. Antigovernment nationals and
Communists of various Latin American countries, however,
have made frequent visits to Cuba to receive pro-Castro
indoctrination and propaganda. During 1962, 1,000 to 1,500
are believed to have received intensive education and training
in sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Significant representation
has been noted from Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. . There is no definite
proof that Cuba is now exporting arms to any dissident groups,
but propaganda materials, explosives, and financial support are
reliably reported to have been furnished..
Cuban leaders have also called with increasing frequency
for open rebellion as the "only road" to liberation for the
Americas; they have been especially vociferous since the first
of the year.
Leading officials, such as Castro, Blas Roca,
Che Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Juan Marinello are
among those calling for revolutionary violence. The
"Betancourt tyranny" in Venezuela has been designated a
primary target, but Peru and Chile apparently also have high
priority. The use of the Prensa Latina organization and
the agent network already in existence makes it virtually
sure that Havana will intensify its clandestine activities.
10
Latin American governments are generally now more alert to
Castro's threat. Inadequate security forces and widespread
poverty throughout the area, however, make it almost certain
that Cuban-supported insurgency will have an effect out of
proportion to the number of people involved.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
8 Feb 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 77
Page (1)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Cuban Developments
Following Fidel Castro's call for revolution in
Latin America in his 2 January speech, other Cubaṇ
speakers are emphasizing the same theme. Che Guevara
told a group of Central American delegates in Havana
recently that they must prepare for simultaneous
revolutions in all Central American countries and pointed
to Venezuela and Chile as major targets for revolution.
Long-
time Communist leader Blas Roca, on 23 January,
praised Venezuelan Communists for their recent
acts of sabotage and pledged continued Cuban
support for the struggle of the people against the
Betancourt "tyranny." Venezuela has long been a
major Castro-Communist target, and Blas Roca's
remarks imply Cuban support for the present upsurge
of Communist 
activity there.
28 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 78
Page
EXCERPT FROM UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATES WHITE PAPER ON CUBA ISSUED
AUG 1960)
1. Armed Incursions.
No sooner had the Revolutionary Government of Cuba taken power
than it launched a program for exporting its revolution to other countries
in the Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area. The memories of
the invasions and attempted invasions of Panama, of Nicaragua, and of
the Dominican Republic, following closely upon one another in the spring
and summer of 1959 are still fresh. Support of Cuban officials for
military expeditions against the Governments of these countries, although
vehemently denied, has been established beyond reasonable doubt. With
the invasion of the Dominican Republic came the realization among the
American Reptiblies that international tensions in the Caribbean area,
to which Cube had significantly contributed, had risen to the extent that
a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
States was necessary.
The Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS,
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the Panama case in June, 1959 con-
cluded "that the Republic of Panama was the victim of an invasion,
organized abroad, that sailed from a Cuban port and was composed almost
entirely of foreigners". The Committee report stated that the Chairman
of the Committee was able to confirm that 82 of 84 imprisoned invaders
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 79
3
were Cubans. Further, the Government of Panama, prior to the departure
of the invasion group from Cuba informed the Cuban Government of reports
about this impending event, invoking the 1928 Habana Convention on the
Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The Cuben
Foreign Minister in turn assured Panama that the Cuban Government would
take the necessary preventive measures.
In connection with several of the invasions or sttempted invasions
of Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Honduras in June, 1959, and the
individuels organizing them, documentary and other types of evidence
which came to light demonstrated Cuban officials support in the form of
arms and financial contributions.
Official Cuban complicity in the invasion of the Dominican Republic
in the same month was clear. The expedition was organized, trained, and
equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials. An
officer on active duty with the Cuban Rebel Army was one of the expedi
tion's leaders. The Cuban Navy escorted the three landing craft used
by the invading force on their voyage to the Dominican Republic.
Even during the Fifth Meeting of Consultation in Santiago, Chile,
e report was received of the invasion of Haiti on August 13, 1959 by a
group of armed men coming from Cube. The Haitien Government after the
Santiago meeting expressed its fears of further invasion attempts. It
charged that the August 13 invasion from Cuba was a violation of the
1928 Habana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of
Civil Strife. The assistance of Cuban officials, including the Cuban
(2)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 80

Ambassador to Haiti and his five military attaches, in the attempt to
overthrow the Haitian Government was denounced by that Government. The
Cuban Government, though admitting that the invasion was launched in
Cube and all but one of the participants were Cubans, conveniently dis-
avowed the acts of the Cuban citizens involved.
..
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 81
(3)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 82
SECRET
EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
F
33. There have been indications of disapproval of Castro-s
policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties
which are committed to a more gradual and less violent approach to
revolution. Castro has shown himself willing to collaborate with any
group, Communist or not, willing to resort to violence and in so doing
to circumvent some of the regular Communist parties. Some of the
latter resent such tactics and have appealed to the Soviets against
Castro. It seems likely that the question of relations with other
Iain Am Communist parties, as well as the question of tactics,
is likely to hamper Communist revolutionary efforts in Latin America
and cause strains in Soviet-Cuban relations.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 83
ECRET
い
SECRET
EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963
29.
Among much of the revolutionary left, discussion has
tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and
away from internationalism and alliance with Moscow-oriented
Communists and fidelistas.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 84
SECRET
SECRET
Panamanian Communist Party (PDP) leader Ruperto Thomas' recent
trip to Cuba was evidently an effort to persuade Castro to support the
PDP rather than the more activist Panamanian pro-Communist VAN group.
When he returned to Panama on 14 December, Thomes reportedly said that
Jorge Turner, who also went to Havans in September and has not returned,
and other VAN leaders are still campaigning against the FDP in Cube.
However, the Cubans claim to have told VAIl leaders they must cooperate
with the PDP to get Castro support.
The Castro government seems consistently to favor the VAN with
funds and international trips. The Cubans may distrust the PDP's poor
organization and believe VAN charges that the PDP is infiltrated. However,
the VAN is a rather unstable group and the Cubans are probably trying to
keep on good terms with both. Thomas said he received no military training
but was taught a few things like how to dismantle a machine gun.
Thomas commented that no particular group seemed to be in command
in Cuba, resulting in such disorder that it was a wonder the revolution
had survived. He believes the ORI is merely a mechanism.
Mexico would not issue Thomas a viss, so he returned to Panama via
Prague where he talked with Czech Communist officials and may have
pleaded the PDP case against VAN with them. (CIA Panama City TDCS-3/
531,754, 20 Dec, SECRET)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 85
SECRET
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18. U.S.C Sec:..
793 and 794 the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET
(When Filled In):
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY VENEZUELA
EAST GERMANY
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537;107
SUBJECT
VENEZUELAN ATTENDANCE AT THE
DATE DISTR.
12 FEBRUARY 1963
EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
P/AC
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
REFERENCES
JANUARY 1963
IN 65920
6/ST
P/PL
DATE ACQ.
VENEZUELA,
CARACAS (1 & 7. FEBRUARY 1963)
CIMA
APPRAISAL 2.
FIELD REPORT NO. HVC 2652
KAPL
SOURCE
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
PARA 1: A MEMBER: (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM A FELLOW CELL
MEMBER WHO WORKS IN THE NATIONAL PARTY OFFICES.
SECT
WAS
PARA 25
. A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM POMPEYO MARQUEZ.
OPR
JESUS FARIA, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PARTIDO
COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA),
AND OLGA LUZARDO FINOL, SECRETARY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS OF THE PCV,
WERE TWO OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PCV TO THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST
PARTY CONGRESS HELD DURING JAN 63. THEY RETURNED TO VENEZUELA WITH A
LENGTHY DOCUMENT WHICH CLEARLY DISCUSSES THE IDEOLOGICAL
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF CHINA AND THE USSR.
THIS DOCUMENT IS BEING CIRCULATED AMONG SOME MEMBERS OF THE PCV.
2. POMPEYO MARQUEZ, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PCV,
ON 1 FEB SAID THAT THE VENEZUELAN AND CUBAN DELEGATIONS AT THE EAST
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE INR ☐ DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OC! ONE OCR ORR OS 00
STATE DIR
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM”
DA IN 16376
000
FORM
1K. OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 86
(15-20)
SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION
MINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
E
65920
TDCS-3/537,107
PAGE
:
GERMAN 'COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TOOK A NEUTRAL POSITION REGARDING THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN. CHINA AND THE USSR WHEREAS THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN
COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF
THE USSR. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AT THE
CONGRESS CAUTIONED THAT EXTREME CARE SHOULD. BE TAKEN BY THE PCV IN USING
GUERRILLA FORCES.
3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CIPNCLANT CINCARIB.
ACTION:
INFO:
ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
DCSOP, DEAT
DA IN 16376
SECRET
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 87
END OF MESSAGE.
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.
NO-FOREIGN DISSEM
000
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Cuban Anniversary Celebrations
(See pictures following)
The Cuban Armed Forces parade in Havana yesterday
included infantry, naval, artillery, armor, and air
formations. The most significant display was that
of SA-2 missiles and possible cruise missiles.
Ground units included 15 companies of the 2d Western
Army, units of the National Militia, and other
infantry units in a "new parade step" resembling the
goose step. The artillery unit had antitank guns, heavy
artillery, multiple rocket launchers and AA artillery.
Three battalions of medium tanks, heavy tanks and
assault guns, along with the surface-to-air and possible
cruise missiles made up the final unit of the parade.
The air formations included helicopters, propeller-
type training planes, and MIG-15's, 19's and 21's.
Soviet participation in the parade has not been established,
although Soviets and Czechs may have piloted some of
the aircraft.
Premier Castro's speech following the parade brought
no surprises aside from its unusual brevity. He
made an effort to indicate Cuban control of the air
defense system, including the SA-2's, and, in a
probable reference to US reconnaissance flights,
there could be an incident "at any time"
said
Castro reiterated the five demands he first made
after the announcement that the Soviets would
withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba. He
included his usual anti-US statements and slurs at
President Kennedy and made a low-keved appeal for
"unity" within the Communist Bloc. He called for
revolution in Latin America, with special emphasis
on Venezuela, and cited Cuba's "historic task
of serving as an example" for that revolution.,
In the USSR, Cuban and Soviet spokesmen lauded Cuban-
Russian friendship and unity, and the Soviet
spokesman, Suslov, pledged that his country would
"never leave Revolutionary Cuba alone in distress."
(CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE:
VARIOUS
And have
3 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bullet in
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 88
Page 1
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
reportedly continues, the threat of retaliatory action from forces
rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently
diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports
President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to
leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the
presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor.
The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want
to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new
elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should
Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his
candidacy and the coming months may be critical.
Honduran President Villeda Morales, although not a strong
leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal
Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections,
and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado,
President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders,
has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces
regard him as the least desirable and a developing anti-Rodas
coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading
candidates would probably follow the present government's policies,
including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists,
while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their
influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's
discouraging political, economic, and social conditions.
El Salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat about
two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress,
but there 
are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who
assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional
government, still has widespread support and military backing.
The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but
there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes.
Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still
retain a subversive capability particularly among labor and
student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a
pro-
Communist as rector of the university, a center of sub-
version and intrigue.
Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and
politically stable countries in Latin America but there are
reverberations of unrest stemming from the deteriorating economic
situation
. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was
returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested
but 
peaceful election, represents the liberal left, although it
includes a 
number of moderates such as President Orlich and some
members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small and illegal
but wall 
organized and effectively led. It recently instigated
disorders in 
the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat,
has long-
range potential should economic conditions worsen.
28 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 89
Page (2)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Although Panama has failed to
Panama is relatively quiet.
receive any commitment for a long-sought renegotiation of the
areas of disagreement 
and
Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on
some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anți-US
propaganda. Public emotion may again be 
aroused, however, by the
recent petition, filed by a Communist lawyer
, requesting the 
Supreme
President Chiari
Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional
.
has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation
On the internal 
scene, President
during the forthcoming talks.
Corruption
Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration.
continues%; the cabinet is divided by 
conflicting 
loyalties and
ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet 
been adopted; and
the chronically depressed economy remains 
stagnant.
The stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of
Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI
) is 
gradually
being eroded. Extreme right and left factions 
of the PRI are
vying for domination. In attempting to 
placate both, President
Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent 
and vacillating policies,
Forces outside the PRI 
also pose an
pleasing neither group.
increasing threat particularly the recently formed Independent
Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist 
ex-President Cardenas is
associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among 
the land-
less peasants, may also attempt to challenge the 
PRI politically.
To undercut the CCI, the government plans to 
complete the land
distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' 
term late 
next
year. Although this may alleviate discontent 
in the agrarian
sector, rising population and mounting unemployment 
will 
continue
to be major problems.
(SECRET)
28 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 90
Page (3)

Construction of the fishing port in the Bay of Havana, whose
ennouncement as a Soviet undertaking caused so much concern last fall,
will be directed by a team of Soviet technicians and Cuban engineers
and will start in February
according to a Havana radio announcement.
The port is to be completed by the end of 1963 and is to cost 12 million
pesos, which will be met by a loan from the Soviet Union, to be amortized
over 10 years. The port is expected to serve 130 vessels of the Soviet
fishing fleet and from 24 to 30 of the Cuban fleet. It will have
installations such as freezer plants for 10,000 tons of fish, factories
for processing sea products, machinery for making no less than 80 tons
of ice a day, a fleeting dock to repair ships of up to 2,500 tons, and
well-equipped repair shops. The announcement emphasized that the port is
to be operated by and will be the "absolute property of the Cuban state.
It has also been announced that Poland has now formulated plans for
building the shipyard envisaged in the port of Mariel. The installation
will be managed by Cuban technicians who are presently receiving training
in Polish shipyards on the Baltic. Ship construction will reportedly
reach a level of 70,000 tons per year. (FBIS 58, 17 January, and Daily
Report, 16 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)
"
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 91
OMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
48
Action
W
CONFIDENT IAL
Control:
7384
PASSED TO Rec'd:
GEN. CARROLL
GEN. QUINN
FROM: Kingston
GEN. HALL
0
TO:
Secretary of State COL. QILLIG
NO:
567, February 11, 6 p.m.
UR
IO
UFW
SIA
NSC
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
COM
February 11, 1963
9:11 p.m.
LIVED
PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
Ref by 
nog member in
unclassified reply prohibited.s
Exporting Protation
Permanent Secretary External Affairs Ministry told Embassy.
today that GOJ concerned over 
reports it had received that
USSR furnishing Cubans not 
only fishing vessels, but also
torpedo boats and submarine 
chasers.
supplied ships as having potential adverse effect on Jamaican
He foresaw Soviet-
fishing industry as well as 
presenting possible security
problem. He asked whether 
US could provide more detailed
information on these ships 
which would operate from Soviet-
built "fishing base" in Cuba
.
In view of reports, he planned to urge Cabinet to take early
action on deciding and publicizing 
limits of Jamaican territorial
waters in order to avoid incidents 
with Soviets and Cubans.
He is considering 
recommending to Cabinet that Jamaica claim
territorial waters of six-and-six 
miles.
claims 
three-mile limit.
Jamaica now apparently
Although GOJ obviously counting on receipt US military equip-
ment, seems unlikely that this 
expression GOJ concern motivated
primarily by desire to speed 
up delivery. Embassy inclined
to view Jamaican approach as 
healthsome indication GOJ at
technical level beginning 
to appreciate ramifications of
Cuban problem.
ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACST)
INFO
DCSOP, OSA, JCS, USDEL IADB
DOHERTY
DA IN 16465
AAP-3
ہے
SMD:CT
CONFIDENTIAL
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
.000
CONFIDENTIAL
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 92
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 93
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SUPPLEMENT
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA, AND MEXICO
Central America is relatively stable. Preparations are
under way for President Kennedy's scheduled meeting with the Chiefs
of State of these countries at San Jose, Costa Rica, on 18 and 19
March. Tensions are rising, however, in those countries having
elections scheduled this year%3B Mexico's political stability is
threatened; and the Cuban subversive potential remains a problem
throughout the area.
--
During the forthcoming meeting, an attempt will be made to
center discussions on areas of common interest. Economic integra-
tion of the Central American region one of the major objectives
of the Alliance for Progress Program will undoubtedly be em-
phasized. Central America, which has been moving toward greater
political unity, has begun to take steps toward economic integra-
tion, and presently envisages the creation of a Common Market by
1965. The Cuban subversive threat is also likely to be given top
priority. All of the Central American countries regard this as
one of the major problems and are seeking ways to meet it.
--
--
On 3 February, Nicaraguans are scheduled to cast ballots for
the first time in nearly 30 years for a Presidential candidate
who is not a member of the Somoza family. Rene Schick
the
government's Liberal Party (PLN) candidate and hand-picked by the
Somozas is expected to win easily, however. Effective oppo-
sition to Schick collapsed when the major opposition party
Traditionalist Conservative (PCT) - boycotted the elections
because the government refused to permit OAS supervision. The
only opponent is Diego Manuel Chamorro Bolanos, a last-minute
candidate of the splinter Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN),
whose entry into the race seems to have been engineered by the
government to provide a semblance of opposition. Castro-
Communist elements, militant conservatives and others may attempt
to create disorders before or during the elections, but the
Nicaraguan National Guard is believed capable of controlling
any troubles short of a general uprising or wel 1-coordinated
rebel invasion neither of which seems likely.
Anti-Somoza Nicaraguans have alleged fraudulent registra-
tions and may attempt to challenge the elections. Although
Schick may not turn out to be a Somoza puppet, opposition
suspicions will be reinforced with the likely retention of
General Anastasio Somoza as Director of the National Guard.
Repercussions in Guatemala from the recent abortive Air
Force revolt have not been too serious. Although plotting
C
28 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Page (1)
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 94
diyaga ould deposed A Bozde Chibite
Clinished and the majority of the armed forces still supor
President digoras The President's intention with regard
leftist residents Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the
residancy in next December's elections, is an unsettling autor
The armed forces Universally oppose Arevalo, Some Tections fant
to replace Yoigoras with a civilian military junta and ball. new..
Clections before Arevalo become's eligible to run in archy Should
Arevalo return the military will probably move to prevent dis
Candidacy and the coming months may be critical
froufran President Villeda Morales, although not a s
Toader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling
Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections,
and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado,
President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders,
has used his position to build up strength, but the armed urces
regard him as the least desirable and a developing anti-vŭdas.
Coation ay prevent his nomination ther of the three leading
candidates would probably follow the present government policies,
including its relatively soft Communist stand the Communists
While ovet a direct threat, are steadily increasing thea
influence in the labor field and are exploiting the comin
discouraging political economic, ene social conditions.
Salvador, faced with a sericus Commun threat
continues to show political aid econozc
are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, p
assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutiota
governtent, still bas wide spread support and litery backing
The goverment is moving ahead with, it's reform progra
there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes
Communist activities have been curbod but the Commimists Stil
retain a subversive capability particularly among labor, and
student groups. There is concern over the likely election of
ro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of strb-
ertion and intride.
Costa ca ountinues to be one of the most democratic and
politically stable countries in Latin America but there are
reverberations of rest stemming from the deteriorating economie
Situation. The un National Liberation Party which
rau, đẹỀ Đà power in last year's election in a bitterly contested.
But bu election, represents the liberal lett, although it.
no vudes a munter of moderates such as President Orrób and some
or of ne cabinet lhe Chawaist Party is small end ikke e
ukene zecime effactively léđ. __la_recently, instigated
Where in the banana zone and while not, ahediate treat,
test alle quolo conditions worsen.
Diligence Bulletin
(REVERS
BLANK)
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Page
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736
Page 95
S
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Panama is relatively quie
desive any commitment
anal Zone treaty co
some Joncessions
ormaganda Pab
Recent petition
Court to dec
has also indic
during the font
Chieri has fall
continues the
Ambitions
bad!
the chronically
The stabl
Marico's Par
being eroded
Vying for compl
Dopez Mateos hab
pleasing notches
incressing three
Asant Contral
igh Panama
on areas of disa
softener
aroused
lacaterbo
s failed to
of the
ment and
nt anti-US
abovex by the
Correption
ies and
080098
gradually
Prasidon
nd. vacillasing policies.
ths Phi also pose an
xecently zed Indee
To undexON
distribucion
year Although
to bordajor pr
(SECRET)
discopton là the a
and counting uncapleygant.
SECRET NO BORSION DISSEM
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 96
Campesino Strike Scheduled in Bolivia
A planned Campesino (peasant) strike in Bolivia today
could lead to violence if it occurs. The Government
reportedly plans to block all entrances into La Paz,
and campesinos loyal to the government are assembling
and arming to counter the strikers who are led by
pro-Communist Torribio Salas. A government spokesman
claims that the Cuban and Czechoslovak Embassies are
financing the strike and that the Cubans are training
campesino militia in other areas as well.
President Paz has reportedly said he will do every-
thing to prevent the strike but will call on loyal
campesinos for aid if he fails. If armed conflict
develops between the two groups of campesinos,
the Armed Forces would probably be forced to step in.
President Paz might also have to take action against
trouble makers like Salas, something he has tried to
avoid.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE: ARMA LA PAZ CX-11 (c)
C..
28 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 97
Page
SECRIAL
DISSEM
Three top Brazilien Communist Party officials, including Luis
Carlos Prestes, are reported leaving for Cuba vie Prague prior to
15 January to discuss certain political problems with the Cuban
Communists responsible for pro-Cuban activities in the different Latin
American countries. Before leaving they planned to be briefed by a
Brazilian Communist Party member who has just returned from a visit to
party leaders in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Bolivie to get their
opinions about holding the "Latin American Congress in Support of Cuba,"
now rescheduled for March, in Rio or Sao Paulo. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro,
IN 42868, 31 December, SECRET NOFORN)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 98
SECRE
NO FOREIGN DISSEN
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
The National Executive Commission of Brazil's orthodox Communist
Party (PCB) reportedly planned to meet on 7 January to discuss the
party position in relation to Francisco Juliso, Brazilian Peasant-League
leader who has been closer to Brazil's dissident hard-line Communist
Party than to its orthodox group (CPB). The PCB leaders planned to
consider the possibility of sending a high-level party delegation to
Cuba to confer with Fidel Castro, not only to improve relations but
to protest a report that Castrol is supporting Juliao. (CIA Sao Paulo,
TDCS-3533404, 9 January, SECRET)
Comment: Cuba has for some time had a divisive influence on
Brazilian Communist affairs. The dissident Communist Party formed in
late 1961. has - like Juliao favored a more revolutionary line and has
apparently received considerably more support from Cubs than has the
orthodox party. Another indication of the divisive influence of Cubo
is the report that Francisco Leives Otero, FCB leader responsible for
matters pertaining to Cuba, attached party subservience to the CPSU at
a national PCB conference on 29 November. Leivas maintained that the
PCB should discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute with complete independence,
rather than maintain silence on it as it had been doing. (SECRET)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 99
SECRE
IGN DISSEM
О
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Titia 18, U.S.C Socs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
_SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY MEXICO/BRAZIL
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICENTE LOMBARDO
TOLEDANO AND PRESIDENT MATEOS; REASONS FOR
LOMBARDO'S TRIP TO BRAZIL
:12 FEBRUARY 1963
DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (12 FEBRUARY 1963)
APPRAISAL
SOURCE
REPORT NO.
TDCS -3/537,187
DATE: DISTR.
1 FEBRUARY 1963
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
67594
REFERENCES
FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 7016
IN
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A PERSON (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH LOMBARDO.:
ASD
1.
ON 12 FEBRUARY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO, SECRETARY GENERAL
HASE OF THE PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA (PPS - POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY)
CONFERRED WITH HUMBERTO ROMERO PEREZ, PRIVATE SECRETARY OF ADOLFO
EXEG
D/RA
EUR
NESA
W LOPEZ MATEOS, PRESIDENT. OF MEXICO. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WANTED
THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW ABOUT HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL AND WHY HE WAS
GOING. HE ASKED ROMERO TO TELL LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD LEAVE
FIRA
PEA
D/AD
DIS
D
0/87
P/FL
COMA
MAPL
260R
COMP
MEXICO CITY FOR RIO DE JANEIRO ON 13. FEBRUARY, AND EXPECTED TO BE
BACK IN MEXICO CITY ON 23 FEBRUARY. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WOULD
CONTACT HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM BRAZIL IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A PRIVATE
LOMBARDO SAID HE HAD SEVERAL THINGS
MEETING WITH. THE PRESIDENT.
M&T
WPS
G/L
DA IN 17084
OPR
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACS NAVY AIR
JCS SECDEF NSA
NIC
AID USIA OC 1
ONE * OCR
ORR
081
00
STATE DIR]
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
SECRET
FORM
8-02
K
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 100
1
0000
(15-20)

SECRET
(When Filled In)
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
IN
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
67594
TDCS -3/537,187
PAGE 2
TO DISCUSS WITH LOPEZ MATEOS.
2. LOMBARDO GAVE ROMERO THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR HIS TRIP TO
BRAZIL.
HE SAID THAT A GROUP OF BRAZILIAN PERSONALITIES AND
INTELLECTUALS HAD CONVOKED A CONGRESS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD.
IN RIO DE JANEIRO IN MARCH 1963. HE SAID THE TWO PRINCIPAL AIMS
OF THE CONGRESS ARE:
A. TO CREATE AN ORGANIZATION IN DEFENSE OF CUBA.
B. TO EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS EXISTING IN LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA.
3.
LOMBARDO SAID THAT SOMETHING WENT WRONG IN BRAZIL BECAUSE,
APART FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH CONVOKED THE CONGRESS, A SECOND
SEPARATE COMMITTEE HAD SPRUNG UP WHOSE AIMS ARE THE SAME, AND
:
THAT A SORT OF RIVALRY HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS.
LOMBARDO SAID THE RESULT WAS "THAT MY COMRADES IN EUROPE HAVE
ASKED ME TO GO TO BRAZIL TO INTERVENE INTIHE MATTER, TO TRY TO ORGANIZE
A SINGLE UNITED COMMITTEE, AND MAKE DEFINITE PREPARATIONS FOR THE
HOLDING OF THE CONGRESS. IN ORDER TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS."
LOMBARDO
SAID "THE COMRADES IN EUROPE" SHOULD HAVE SENT AN ARGENTINE, A CHILEAN;
A URUGUAYAN, OR SOMEONE NEARER BRAZIL, BUT THEY INSISTED ON SENDING
HIM BECAUSE HE HAS EXPERIENCE, AND THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT HE CAN
STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT SATISFACTORILY.
4 LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO THAT IF THE CONGRESS IS HELD IN MARCH. AS
SECRET DA IN 17084
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
0000
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 101
SECRET
(When Filled In)
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM·
IN
67594
TDCS-3/537,187
PAGE
3
SCHEDULED, HE WILL NOT ATTEND IT. HE SAID "THE PRIMA DONNAS"
AND ORNAMENTAL FIGURES WILL TAKE OVER THEN, AND I AM NOT ONE OF
THOSE." ROMERO REMARKED THAT LOMBARDO IS A MAN OF WORK.
LOMBARDO
SAID, "I GO TO ORGANIZE SO THE CONGRESS WILL NOT FAIL, THAT IS MY
MISSION, NOTHING MORE, AFTER THAT ANY ONE FROM MEXICO CAN ATTEND."
5° :(FIELD COMMENT. LOMBARDO'S PLAN TO LEAVE MEXICO ON 13 FEBRUARY
FOR PANAMA AND RIO DE JANEIRO HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED.)
6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB.
ACTION: ACS NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO:
DCSOP
DA IN 17084
SECRET
SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 102
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
0000
ཡནཱ, ཙ
༧ཀ་ག%གཡམ་DR
CTION
ARA-4 25
RMAR REP
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM
EUR
PC
A-234
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CSM 9-6 BRÁZ
FOR RM USE ONLY
Mr. Rotin Had
NEA
CU
INR
NO.
TO
: DEPARTMENT OF STATE:
P
INFO
: RIO DE JANEIRO
F80
AID
5/12 U/18
j
AGR
COM FRO
FROM
Amcongen, SAO PAULO
VIGUTION
HANDLING INDICATOR.
DATE: February 6, 1963.
INT
LAB
TAR
SUBJECT: Sample survey of worker sentiment shows receptivity
toward communism; São Paulo business leaders re-
ported by one observer as generally unconcerned over
Communist danger.
TR
XMB
AIR
REF
ARMY CIA
4
NAVY
5/105
OS
USIA INSA
Two straws in the wind that have come recently to my atten-
1283 tion indicate the existence of an unhealthy attitude toward communism
EUR
MESA
FLA
3/20
0/55
PAL
PROC
COMP
M&T
WPS
9/L
on the part of at least some segments of São Paulo's working and
managerial classes. Further indications in support of or in refutation.
of these signs will be submitted as they are noted.
On January 31, I was visited by the two top American ex-
ecutives of a Brazilian subsidiary of a large American corporation. §
They said that their firm, following a practice instituted some years
ago of periodically sampling worker sentiment in their plants, had
just finished a small survey conducted very informally by trusted
Brazilian employees among 55 or 60 of their semi-skilled workers
to discover how the latter would feel about the establishment in Brazil
of a communist system of government. The result of this survey was
so shockingly different from that of earlier pulse-taking that these
executives thought the Consulate General should know about it. Eighty
percent of the workers approached had indicated that while they did not
pretend to know much about communism, they thought they would be
better off under a communist regime than they are at present. Among
the reasons most commonly given were that things were so bad in
Brazil that any change would be for the Sex and that communism
would put an end to the rascality (malandragem) which is so prevalent.
The other twenty percent thought that communism would be bad for the
country.
☐ § Names withheld at their request.
better
FORM
4-82
DS-323
DMBraddock:tmn 2-6-63
ances:
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 103
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☑ h
Out
Contents and Cla sification Approved by:
に
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
-2-
Jao tailo
A-234
The company executives attributed the pro-communist
sentiment as revealed, mainly to the economic difficulties ex-
perienced by low-income families as a result of the rampant,
inflation. They said their labor relations were good, that while
their pay scales were not as high as those in some other industries,
some popular fringe benefits were provided, and that to the best of
their knowledge there had been no communist agitators at work
among their employees.
Not long before this visit I was lunching one day at the
Jockey Club with Sr. Paulo Ayres Filho, a Brazilian banker and
pharmaceutical manufacturer who is the spark-plug of IPES
(Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Sociais), the principal demo-
cratic action group in the local business world. Looking around him
at the other tables, occupied by a good many well-known figures of
São Paulo's conservative upper classes, Sr. Ayres said to me,
"Apart from the two of us, there isn't a man in this dining room who
is seriously concerned over the communist danger in Brazil."
No conclusions, obviously, should be drawn from such
slender indications. It has been my observation, however, that
most Brazilians either believe that a communist take-over would
be impossible in Brazil, or believe that even if it occurred, it
would take a relatively mild form with which they could live. The
Brazilian's boasted calm, which is genuine and in most circumstances
a virtue, could in the present state of affairs be the cause of his undoing.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 104
Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General
OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
INFORMATION
FORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 704, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY
Colombia/Cuba
REPORT NO.
CS-3/536,069
SUBJECT
Cuban Support of Guerrillas
in Colombia
DATE DISTR.
4 February 1963
NO. PAGES
1
REFERENCES
RD
DATE OF
October 1962
INFO.
PLACE &
Germany, Munich
DATE ACQ.
(14 December 1962)
THIS IS UNEVALUATED
SOURCE:
1.
FIELD REPORT NO.
INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
An official German service, from "a fairly reliable source
with contacts in Buenos Aires.' Appraisal of Content:
"
6.
Maximo Gruber, a major in the Cuban Army and one of the
leaders of the G-2 section, has been appointed technical leader
of the Communist guerrillas in Sumapaz, Colombia. 1 Gruber,
a Polish Jew, was formerly a commissar in Spain. His wife
is European. His son Maximo is a graduate of the Lenin
Institute in Moscow. On his frequent trips to Bolivia,
Uruguay, and Cuba he carries a Bolivian diplomatic pass-
port identifying him as "traveling inspector of the
Bolivian Foreign Ministry.
2. Gruber is being assisted in his tasks in Colombia by
Jaime Guerra, also known as Captain Veneno. One of his
liaison officers to the Communist Party of Colombia is
Blanca Diaz y Collazo, a lawyer and former member of the
Cuban Embassy in Bogota, who was trained in Prague in 1952.
1.
Headquarters Comment. An official British service
reported in April 1961 that Maximo Grobart, nationality
unknown, was training guerrillas in the Sumapaz area;
Grobart, who claimed to be of Hungarian origin, had a
Cuban passport in the name of Jose Blanco and might
I have had other passports of different nationalities.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 105
INFORMATION REPORT
INFORMATION
С
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REPORT
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of 
which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
S-E-C-R-E-T
COUNTRY
Costa Rica/Cuba.
REPORT NO.
CS -3/534,724
SUBJECT
Departure of Costa Rican Communist to
Live in Cuba
DATE DISTR.
22 January 1963
NO. PAGES
1
REFERENCES
RD
DATE OF
November 1962
INFO.
PLACE &
Costa Rica, San José
DATE ACQ. (23 November 62)
SOURCE:
FIELD REPORT NO. HRS-3006
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Costa Rican Communist Party
circles. Appraisal of Content
: 2.
Carlos Guillen Fernandez, Costa Rican Communist who was formerly very
active in the Sociedad 
de Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana (Society of
Friends of the Cuban 
Revolution), left Costa Rica on 14 November, on his
way to Cuba, where 
he planned to remain indefinitely and to work.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 106
3
INFORMATION REPOR!
INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 704, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person 
is prohibited by law.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
COUNTRY Ecuador/Cuba/Latin America
SUBJECT
Request by Cuban Diplomat in
Chile to Member of the
Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean
Youth for Information on Leftist
Activity in Ecuador
DATE OF
INFO.
Mid-January 1963
REPORT NO.
CS-3/535,791
DATE DISTR.
1 February 1963
NO. PAGES
1
REFERENCES
RD-W-2107
PLACE &
DATE ACQ. Ecuador, Guayaquil (22 January 1963) FIELD REPORT NO. HEG-2108
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE.
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
SOURCE: Member (C) of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth.
Appraisal of Content: 3.
Alfredo Vera Arrata, a member of the National Executive Council
of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) until his
expulsion from URJE during its National Convention held in early
January 1963, has received a letter from Pedro Martinez Pirez,
First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, Chile, in
which he asks Vera to send a person to Chile to inform him on
current leftist activity in Ecuador. Vera plans to send
Jaime Galarza Zavala, also expelled from URJE, if funds can be
raised for the trip.
Field Comment. Martinez is in charge of Cuban subversive
activities in Chile, Peru, and Ecuador.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 107
SECRET
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission 
or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SECRET
(When Filled in)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONTROLLED DISSEM
BA/H.
COUNTRY CUBA HAITI
SUBJECT
PLANNED MILITARY COUP TO OVERTHROW
PRESIDENT DUVALIER OF HAITI
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
8 FEBRUARY 1963
DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (28 JANUARY, 8 FEBRUARY 1963)
APPRAISAL 3
SOURCE
Mr. Rowen has seen
REPORT NO.
TDCS DB-3/653,274
DATE DISTR.
14 FEBRUARY 1963
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
REFERENCES
IN 67457
FIELD REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
AN OFFICER (B) OF NEWS DISTRIBUTING MEDIA; FROM A COLLEAGUE OF EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL.
ASD
DASD
EXEC
D/RA
EUR
NESA
WHEM
SSR
PAUL E. MAGLOIRE, FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT, IS PLANNING FE
TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI
FEA
D/AC
DIS T
D/PL
IN A MILITARY FMRA
COUP. MAGLOIRE CLAIMS. TO HAVE THE BACKING OF THE HAITIAN ARMY.
THE DATE OF THE COUP IS EXPECTED TO BE SET AT A SECRET MEETING Ħ
WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK ON 20 FEBRUARY.
2.
P/PL
DOMA
MAPL
PROG
MGT
CAL
MAGLOIRE EXPECTS TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MANPOWE COMP
FROM CERTAIN CUBANS IN EXILE. ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ Y ECHAZABAL, WPS
FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO HAITI, IS LINING UP CUBAN EXILE SUPPORTE
RODRIGUEZ HOPES THAT IF THE CUBANS PLAY A PROMINENT ROLE, THEY
SECRET
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY
STATE/DIR
AIR
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONTROLLED DISSEM
JCS SECDEF SA NIC AID USIA OCIONE OCRO ORR
TREASURY
FBI
I&NS
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
081
00 EXO
REPOINCLANT
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
DA IN 17056 SECRET
FORM
5-62 1K
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423736 Page 108
000
(15-20)
SECRET
SECRET:
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONTROLLED DISSEM
IN
TDCSDB-3/653,274
67457
PAGE
2
MIGHT BE GIVEN A BASE FROM WHICH TO OPERATE ACTIVELY AGAINST CASTRO
IN THE FUTURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: RODRIGUEZ HAD BEEN A DELEGATE OF THE
26 JULY MOVEMENT IN PUERTO PRINCIPE UNTIL JANUARY 1959 WHEN HE WAS
NAMED AMBASSADOR TO HATTI BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.
IN LATE 1959
RODRIGUEZ MANAGED TO ESCAPE ASSASSINATION).
3.
EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL OF THE CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE..
CUBA EN EXILIO (CTCE-CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS IN EXILE)
IS ASSISTING RODRIGUEZ, A RELATIVE.¨
FIELD DISSEM:STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.
ACTION:
INFO
DA IN
ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
DCSOP
17056
SECRET
RET
END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRECONTROLLED DISSEM
000
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 109

N
MEXICO, FOR CURE NIK Twist COM ROCAISE CI
CASTRO BUZ COMMURSYIME MINIS
CL PACITA GUTIERRER
BETAN
ISTEM STATE EST CILCAR
WORKERG AT
LA
OLLOWAW INFORMAT
CENTRAL INTELLIGITÁR Aaquicy
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Lams, Tile 18, U.S.C Sess
793 and 773 the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to unauthorized ded¨ ¥
ぐっ
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ
PANAMA/CUBA A IN : 9477 (13 Feb 63) R/bEESORT NO. TOCS, 3/5371022
CUBAN PROPOSAL. TO THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO
TO ASSIST IN 
ESTABLISHMENT OF CUBAN
ESPIONAGE 
NET IN PANAMA
17 DECEMBER 1962
PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (21 DEC 62)
GRADINGS ARA
DATE DISTR. 12
1963
PRECEDENCE ROUTINE.
REFERENCES.
IN 36943
FIELD REPORT NO.
FINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
APPRAISAL 2 THAT THOMAS IS ACCURATELY QUOTED
THIS IS 
UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOU
REGIONAL OFFICER (B) OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO, FROM THOMAS WHO IS A PERSONAL
FRIEND.
SOURCE
OTION
(IN-9
NFO:
IA-30
1.
ON 17 DECEMBER 1962, RUPERTO LUTHER THOMAS, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF PROPAGANDA,
OF THE 
PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMUNIST), SAID THAT
WHILE HE 
WAS IN CUBA HE HAD COMMITTED THE PDP TO ACCEPT A PROPOSAL MALE
BY THE CUBANS, WHO PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH AN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA,
TARGETED 
AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE,
IA-CIIC-2 TO BE FUNDED THROUGH THE PDP. THOMAS SAID THE CUBANS ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED
(41)
IN THE MOVEMENTS 
OF MILITARY SHIPS. THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL, AND THAT THEY
TOLD HIM THAT 
THE NET WOULD REQUIRE TWO MEN, ONE A RADIO TECHNICIAN, THE
OTHER A 
CODE EXPERT. THOMAS WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER A RADIO TRANSMITTER COULD
BE BOUGHT 
IN PANAMA..
2.
THOMAS SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ATE/INR DIA ARMYFACS NAVY
ATE/DIR
SEC
OC1
ONE
CCR
00:
/EXO/
REP
YGRAM INFORMATION REPORT
IN 16496.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 112
0000
CLASSIFICATION
_ DISSEMINATION CONTE
ASSIFICA
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSIM
[TDC9 3/637_022
COMMITTEE (CEN) OF THE POP ON 16 DECEMBER BUT THAT HE HAD NOT TOLD THE CEN
THAT HE HAD COMTEL
THE PDP TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL.
THOMAS WAS WORRIED
ABOUT THE MATTER BECAUSE AT THE 16 DECEMBER MEETING MIQUEL PORCELL,
NATIONAL SECRETARY OF ORGANIZATION OF THE PIE, HAP OPPOSED THE IDEA.
DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PDP SHOULD ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITY AND SAID THAT
IF THE CUBANS WANTED THIS KIND OF INFORMATION THEY SHOULD GET IT THEMSELVES..
RUBEN SOUZA, NATIONAL SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PDP, DISACRIED WITH PORCELL,
SAYING THAT SO LONG AS THE POP COULD USE THE INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY SUCH
AN OPERATION HE BELIEVED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL SHOULD BE ACCEPTED.
WAS TO BE DISCUSSED FULLY AT THE CEN MEETING SCHEDULED TO BE HELD
18 DECEMBER 1962. (FIELD COMMENT:
THE SUBJECT
THOMAS WENT TO CUBA 14 SEPTEMBIR AND
RETURNED TO PANAMA, VIA ZURICH, 14 DECEMBER.
DETAILS OF THOMAS: EUROPEAN TRAVEL.)
TDOS 3/531,754. „GIVES
3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLAND, CINCARIB.
END OF MESSAGE
ACTION:
INFO
ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD.
DCSOP
DA IN 16496
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
FREAKS
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 113
CONTROLS
0000
SEADET
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
ASD
This
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Expionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs.
DASD793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
EXEC
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
D/RA
_ SECRET
EUR
(When Filled In)
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NESA
COUNTRY PERU
REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537,185
FE
SSIC
SUBJECT
FEA
1. DECISION OF GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO RELEASE
COMMUNISTS
DATE DISTR.
14 FEBRUARY 1963
D/AC
2. COMMUNIST LEGAL ADVISER IN GUARDIA CIVIL
PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE
BIS
REFERENCES
12 FEBRUARY 1963
IN 67560
DATE OF
0754
INFO.
P/PL
(PLACE &
IDATE ACO. PERU, LIMA (12 FEBRUARY 1963)
TARPRAISAL 2
COMP
SOURCE
WPS
C/L
OPR
FIELD REPORT NO. HPL 2756
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER (B).
1. MAJOR GUILLERMO HINOSTROZA, WHO WAS NAMED AS THE GUARDIA CIVIL
JUDGE TO TAKE THE STATEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS ACCUSED OF
PLOTTING SUBVERSION, DECIDED ON 12 FEBRUARY 63 THAT HE COULD NOT ASSUME ·
RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS TO TRIALL! HE INTENDS TO
RELEASE THEM ON 15 FEBRUARY IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THE
GOVERNING JUNTA (FIELD COMMENT: THE PRESS REPORTED HINOSTROZAS
APPOINTMENT AS AD HOC JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE FOR THE SECOND POLICE
JUDICIAL ZONE IN THE ARRAIGNMENT PROCESS. IT ALSO REPORTED THAT
COLONEL ENRIQUE DIEZ CANSECO WAS THE GUARDIA CIVIL LEGAL ADVISOR
IN THE CASE. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE. WITH GOOD
SECRET
_HA IN 17081
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from cutomatic
downgrading and
declassification
STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY
STATE/DIR
AIR
JCS SECDEF NSA
NIC
AID USTA OC 1
ONE
OCR
ORR
081
00
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
SECRET
FORM
9.42 IK OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
NW 50955
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0000
(15-20)
SECRET
SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
IN 67560
TDCS-3/537,185
2
CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, THE PARTY IS PLEASED
[PAGE
THAT DIEZ CANSECO IN THE CASE BECAUSE HE WAS A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER
WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE PARTY IN THE NINETEEN FORTIES.
PARTY.
RECORDS FURNISHED BY THE POLICE IN 1950 SHOW ACTUALLY THAT HE WAS
A PARTY MEMBER).
2.
NAVY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE CARBONNEL, CHIEF OF THE SERVICIO DE
INTELLIGENCIA NACIONAL, PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH
INSISTS
THE PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTAN AND URGE HIM TO PREVENT THE RELEASE
OF THE COMMUNISTS. JAVIER CAMPOS MONTOYA, CHIEF OF THE STATE
SECURITY DIVISION OF THE POLICIA DE INVESTIGACIONES DEL PERU,
THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS AMPLE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING SOME CONFESSIONS,
ON WHICH TO CONVICT THE COMMUNISTS. CAMPOS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT
AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE JUDGE, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS WEAK,
BUT HE HAS SOME HOPE THAT THE JUNTA WILL OVERRIDE THE DECISION.
3. FIELD DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB.
ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO
DCSOP
DA IN 17081
SECRET
SECRET
NW 50955
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END OF MESSAGE
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
0000
!
SECRET
Three Cuben ustionale have been identified, according to a usually
reliable and competent source, asing the leaders of the 17 December
strike violence of the US-omed Cerro de Pacco mine in La Oroys, Peru,
One of the three Cubema has also been active in promoting the seisund
02 ranchland in the Peruvian highlands by Andean Indians. Communist-led
Indiana were said to have planned to synchronize a sajor new seizure
campaign with the violence against Carro de Pasco, No such incidents
have been reported yet. (STORER)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736
Page 116
SECRET
C
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Peruvian Communist Elements Coordinating Their Activities
Orthodox Communists in Peru are apparently putting
aside their differences and moving toward closer
co-operation with the extremist Trotskyist faction,
believed to be leading the recent outbreak of
disorders. The groups are reportedly co-ordinating
previously random plans to carry out extensive
destruction of industrial and agricultural
installations and to provoke uprisings. Cubans and
other Latin American nationals as well as Havana
and Moscow-trained Peruvians are said to be.
instrumental in this latest development.
Members of the Peruvian junta have expressed
serious concern over the internal situation
and hinted that they favor strong action. Although
constitutional guarantees have been suspended in a
fourth department, and several Army units have been
moved into the areas of disorders, the junta has
taken no further action. It has requested riot
control equipment from the US and says it is
ready to embark on an anti-Communist program upon
assurance that the equipment is forthcoming.
(SECRET)
SOURCE: EMB LIMA 612 and 613 (S); AIRA LIMA C-1 (c)
4 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955
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Page
00
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
С
Peruvian Junta Makes Firm Anti-Communist Move
Continued Communist-incited disorders and an alleged
Havana-Moscow plan to take over the government
prompted the military junta to suspend constitutional
guarantees in Peru and institute a nationwide state
of siege early on 5 January. Military commanders
assumed political control in their respective zones,
and a reported 800 Communist Party leaders and pro-
Communist subversives have been arrested. The
Lima headquarters of several Communist and
Communist-front organizations, as well as their
publications, have been closed.
According to the Communist plan, subversive activity
was to have been intensified between 15 and 20
January in all parts of Peru, with assaults on
banking and commercial institutions, military
garrisons, vital communications facilities, and
universities. A clandestine radio station operating
on the Bolivian border allegedly was to direct
and co-ordinate this activity.
The junta has regarded members of the leftist but
non-Communist American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance (APRA) a greater danger than the
Communists and originally tended to blame them
for the disorders. There is no proof that APRA
has been involved in anything but legititmate
strike activity. Suspension of constitutional
guarantees would enable the junta to strike at
APRA to discredit and weaken it before the scheduled
elections next June. (SECRET)
SOURCE: EMB LIMA 622 (S), 623 (LOU) and 624 (U)
7 Jan 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK)
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 118
Page 11
C
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SUPPLEMENT
THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION
A number of high-ranking Cuban leaders since the first of
the year have publicly called for revolution, in other Latin
American countries, with Venezuela singled out as a country
with top priority.
Coinciding with these appeals have been reports that the
Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) planned to step up terrorist
activity to discredit President Betancourt before his US
visit. The recent incidence of terrorism, which has included
attacks on the US Chamber of Commerce office building and the
burning of Sears, Roebuck warehouses, is apparently part
of this campaign.
Involved in the current terrorism is the Armed Forces of
National Liberation (FALN). The FALN, although purporting to
represent all of the opposition, includes some prominent
Communists and is emerging as a paramilitary force of the PCV
with its main strength in the Caracas area.
Guerrilla bands also operate in western Venezuela, but
there is no firm evidence that their activity is coordinated
with that in the Caracas area. Venezuelan army units, with
air support, have been used in a recent campaign against
these guerrillas.
The armed forces are generally capable of maintaining
internal security and of defending the nation's borders
against neighboring countries. The vast majority supports
constitutionality and is loyal to the Betancourt government.
The armed forces would not hesitate, however, to take over the
government in order to maintain order or to forestall a
Communist uprising. The armed forces were earlier greatly
frustrated over the government's inaction against Communist-
instigated disorders. Betancourt's recent willingness to
take more vigorous action, however, coupled with the strong
support given the US during the Cuban crisis, has overcome
much of this dissatisfaction, and armed forces' support of
the government is greater now than it was six months ago.
The officer corps is generally free of Communist
penetration, although there has been some infiltration in the
Marine corps, two or three battalions having been involved
in leftist-led revolts during the spring of 1962.
(SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
13 Feb 63
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
(REVERSE BLANK).
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 119
Page (1)
NW 50955
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela
Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several
months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions.
Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are
connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left,
the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces
of National Liberation the Castro-Communist group
credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil
fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are
probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betan-
court Government.
The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency
in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly
to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists
responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing
supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint
warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of
guerrilla bands operating in the Falcon area of
northwestern Venezuela. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE: VARIOUS
SECRET NO FOREIGN, DISSEM
DocId: 32423736 Page 120
2

C-
C
PPADET
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Venezuelan Communists Plan to Increase Violence
As part of its terrorist campaign, the Venezuelan
Communist Party reportedly plans to mark the fourth
anniversary of Betancourt's presidency on 13 February
by 
guerrilla bombings in the Caracas area. Other
Communists are to see to it that the capital is
flooded with propaganda that day. According to un-
confirmed 
reports, Venezuelan authorities have
charged the Castro government with ordering the recent
'
terrorism 
in both Venezuela and Colombia under an
extensive plan to create collective panic and insecurity
in both countries
. Colombian military authorities
have reportedly drawn up a plan to prevent terrorism
in Colombia's 
cities.
(SECRET)
SOURCE: TDCS 3/537,117 (S); FBIS (U)
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 121
14PA43
O
IX.B.2
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Leites/Mandelstam/DRAFT/14 Mar 63/fre
SUBJECT:
Alternative US Public Posture on Subversion in Latin America
1. Although our public posture on subversion in Latin America may
be too firmly established for instant and radical revision, the following
analysis is offered on the assumption that some change in emphasis is
both possible and desirable, now or at some time in the future.
2. Given the existence of a Communist state, of either major per-
suasion, what is the likelihood that it will engage in subversion toward
neighboring states?
a. Total. All experience of the past forty years demonstrates
that a Communist state emanates subversion as the sun emanates heat.
b. But let us be clear that two kinds of subversion are involved:
that is, funds, guns, tools of
(1)
Hardware-centered
sabotage.
3.
(2) Egalitarian and libertarian ideals.
How much does this fact of inevitable subversion raise the prob-
ability of Communism spreading to target countries?
a. Subversion is never a sufficient condition and frequently
not a necessary one.
If subversion is really dangerous to a target state, there
(France's "Wasser
is per se something seriously wrong in that state.
Fallacy" of 1956; France embarked on the Suez adventure on the assumption
that if Nasser were disposed of, the trouble in Algeria would magically
disappear. Although the game was not played out, few would dispute the
conclusion that France's assumption was wrong; or, for that matter,
NW 50955
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SHORT-SENSITIVE.
о
SECRET SENSITIVE
that France would have been in an even deeper morass if her military
forces had managed with the British to occupy Cairo.)
4. How feasible is it to control subversion at the source without
destroying the Communist State?
Usually it is infeasible to do so or the costs are prohibitive.
For instance, the costs of a protracted tight quarantine which
could prevent the export both of hardware-oriented and idea subversion,
would be very high, even if the activity were accepted by Cuba and the
Soviet Union. This would mean inspecting every vessel, searching every
traveler, forcing planes down for inspection, etc. We submit (a) that
ideas would still be exported and (b) that by so doing we would magnify
the importance of Cuba beyond imagination. It would become a kind of
forbidden fruit. The analogy with prohibition in this country comes to
mind. This course involves an increment of prestige and lure to Cuba
which would be likely to outweigh the doubtless desirable diminution in
the export of trained subversives and associated hardware.
given the success of such an effort, the obvious Soviet counter would be
to use other channels which we could not surveil without major East-
West confrontation. The Cuban subversion export organization might well
move to Moscow, Prague and/or even Peiping. Therefore, to take a public
stance opposed to Cuban subversion without having resolved on invasion
is to be committed to & policy bound to demonstrate US impotence.
Furthermore,
5. If we want to control subversion at the source by destroying
the Communist State, Cuba, how useful is it for us publicly to emphasize
hardware-centered subversion as the reason?
NW 50955
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.2
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
POP SECRET SENSITIVE
3..
For many people outside of the US, even the export of
subversion by force and sabotage also involves ideas and dedication,
as well as funds, arms, and other equipment. (We, for example, are
not ashamed of the Bay of Pigs expedition except that it failed.)
b. Usually attitudes toward violent subversion depend on
attitudes toward the target,
(Example: acts against Jiminez, Trujillo
it
Subversion
did not offend US/ most of Latin America/ most of the world; the paral-
lel today: Somoza, Ydigoras, Stroesser). We run the danger of falling
into the USSR projection of the US as the "world gendarme.'
directed against the Dutch government would outrage not only all Americans,
but also all non-Communist Europeans; its legitimacy is total, But the
same can not be said for most LA governments. The difference is decisive
and perhaps sometimes neglected.
C. Most people generally recognize that when violent subversion
is powerful, it is because it taps fundamental sources of discontent.
d. We in the US tend to look at subversion in Latin America
from the point-of-view of hardware. But a great deal of the subversion
in Latin America is or at least appears as idea-centered, not hardware-
centered. The export of "armed aggression" by dedicated revolutionaries
is only a part of the process. Another part, which is at least as impor-
tant, and probably more 80, is the export of propaganda. This, however,
to much of the world, including Latin-America outside of the oligarchies,
will appear as an export of ideas and ideals (perhaps wrong, but never-
theless ideas). Our approach, then, tends to pass rather than meet the
3
NW 50955 DocId: 32423736 Page 124
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
SECHET SENSITIVE
Latino viewpoints. We are very close to putting ourselves into the
position of the Tsarist gendarmes who tried to use brute force against
the power of ideas. The trap is that we may seem thereby to be acknow-
ledging the decline and imminent fall or our own ideas.
One consequence of this line of reasoning would be that,
if we ever find it necessary to invade Cuba, we should do so "to stop
the firing squads," "to guarantee free elections,
Somoza.
#
but not to save
6. How feasible is it for us to control both kinds of subversion
at the target rather than at the source?
a. It is often feasible. This is how we have in fact success-
fully controlled subversion except in the dubious case of S. Vietnam.
Even in the difficult case of Greece, we succeeded by a combination of
military and economic measures.
b. The point is not that this is always a feasible way of hand-
ling the problem; rather it is often practicable and also often the most
desirable way.
7. Suppose that we decided to invade Cuba to control subversion
with the result (three cases):
"reforms"
b.
C.
That we restored the statim quo ante Castro.
That for reasons of expediency we try to maintain Castro's
1.e., what many Latinces would regard as "socialism.
That we gave the Cuban people an obvious free choice, no
matter what ensued..
How would the prospects for Communism in the Western Hemisphere
be affected?
STALIM CENSULEVE.
NW 50955
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C
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
Case A: Boomerang we would almost certainly enhance the
prospects for Commmunism.
Case B: There would be strong popular Latin American support,
some governmental outrage, but the prospects for Communism would be
diminished.
Case C: Paradoxically, the result would depend on what ensued,
· because most Latin Americans do not trust the US (and particularly would
be skeptical of "free elections" if US soldiers were present).
CONCLUSIONS
1. Conditions in most parts of Latin America are such that sub-
version (Cuban or Bloc or both) is really dangerous.
2, Since this is so, the US public posture should not recognize
this; and we should abstain from public pronouncements that subversion
is conceivably a casus belli.
3. The point-of-view set forth in this paper, insofar as it can
be made operative, may tend to bring a fundamental alignment between the
US public posture and LA opinion.
4. The US course of action towards any IA country has to weigh the
advantages and disadvantages, in any given case at any given time, of
subversion control (a) at source or (b) at point of impact.
5. The same principles would apply if another Communist-oriented
government were to come to power in any part of Latin America.
NW 50955
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