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BAK
Robert R. Kierce
Chief
Special Security Unit, DDO
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1015
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
DATE
14 June 1976
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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C/EAB/SSD
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL 
REVIEW PROGRAM
PRIORITY
Form No. 160 Use Previous
1. Dec 56
FORM
3-62
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14-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
14 JUN 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Activities Branch, SSD
: Manuscript by David Phillips
SUBJECT
1. The following passages are a compilation of
observations made by the SSU regarding Mr. Phillips'
manuscript. The comments are by no means a total list
of reservations concerning the submitted chapters but
those noted from the perspective of the SSU.
2. In general the undersigned felt somewhat enlight-
ened but rather uncomfortable in reading the submitted
manuscript. This uneasy feeling appears to be based upon
two impressions. Throughout the text, there is an obvious
effort on the part of Mr. Phillips to "set the record straight"
with regard to events, techniques and activities involving the
CIA. Regrettably, as is often the case when one attempts
to clarify and present the real facts, there is a possibility
of further compounding a confused and ambiguous circumstance.
Because of the various ramifications of the activities of the
Agency, the SSU gained the feeling that more was lost rather
than won in Mr. Phillips' efforts. The second disarming im-
pression is that because an individual has proved to be an
effective and successful CIA operations officer, there is no
clear-cut assurance that he can achieve the same success as an
author. The SSU was continually pained by Mr. Phillips' efforts
to employ certain techniques often seen in spy fictions. The
problem with author Phillips is that he is not writing fiction
and has been identified as a former CIA employee with over
25 years in intelligence service. Although Mr. Phillips
labored to introduce some humor into his manuscript, some of
his anecdotes appear to be in bad taste.
3. The following comments are codified to complement
those parts of the manuscript reviewed in this reading.
Epilogue
Page 6: Although Mr. Phillips makes a considerable effort
to conceal the true identity of "Abe", there is a question
as to whether the fact that two cables were sent from Head-
quarters to (Chile) in May 1973, and if this manuscript is the
proper vehicle to surface such information.
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Page 13: Mr. Colby is quoted by the author indicating
certain information revealing complications between
Mr. Colby and Dr. Kissinger. In addition to breaching
personal confidences, the author contradicts what he had
indicated earlier to be an intent to permit Mr. Colby to
speak for himself.
Page 14-18: Mr. Phillips again refers to "Abe" and
his evaluations of the various congressional select committees
investigating the CIA. In effect these comments are suggestive
of Agency judgments and evaluation regarding the conduct and .
success of the investigative efforts as well as other person-
alities critical of the Agency.
Chapter 3
Page 5:
Have the circumstances regarding Mr. Wisner's
death ever been surfaced with such particulars as provided
in this text?
Page 14: The information regarding the "laundering of
money" as set forth in the first paragraphs of this page
serves as a confirmation of official involvement in such
activities. This should be deleted.
Page 21:
There is a serious question raised regarding
the author connecting Ernest Hemmingway and the Havana Chief
of Station implying the prospect of a professional as well as
personal affiliation.
Page 48: If it is in fact correct, has it ever been
officially acknowledged that a U.S. citizen, a businessman
in Havana, implied by the author as being a CIA agent was
executed? Note: This chapter is replete with a profusion
of illustrations of tradecraft and operational activities
too numerous to set forth.
Chapter 5
Page 1: Mr. Phillips in his writing provides a
historical chronology of senior assignments within the Agency
with particular reference to the LA or WH Division. This is
illustrated on this page in his reference to Colonel King
"regaining leadership of the WH Division". Anyone interested
in noting the organizational hierarchy and key personalities
in the WH or LA Division during the period of Mr. Phillips'
tenure with the Agency, would be aided considerably on page 2
and further as the author proceeds to identify Mr. Winston
Scott as the Chief of Station Mexico.
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Page 3: Although it has been publicly surfaced that
Mr. William F. Buckley had worked for CIA in the past,
the author on this page now ties him in with Howard Hunt
and Mexico City and further as an American contract agent.
The best interests of the Agency are not served nor for that
matter the interests of Mr. Buckley and Mr. Hunt are not
served by such revelations.
Page 4-6: The SSU believes it is totally unwise to
have the mission and organization of the Mexico City Station
outlined as explicitly as contained in these pages.
Page 5-6: The above observation is further complicated
by the author's remarks regarding operations levied against
the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.
Page 8:
The SSU further challenges the information set
forth on this page regarding the biographic details of
Mr. Winston Scott's assignments in Cuba, (London), Eur Division
and Mexico City.
Page 15:
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The undersigned does not believe the content
of the information set forth regarding the Agency's procedures
associated with the purchasing of scotch liquor. He is implying.
things which may perhaps have been unique to that station but
certainly has not been a worldwide practice. Mr. Phillips'
anecdote about the prospects of the Agency printing counterfeit
tax stamps and the details involved in such planning, even
though perhaps presented in jest would not be viewed as such
in the eyes of many individuals in the United States today.
Page 16: Because Philip Agee has revealed the secret of
the camera operation in his book, is it necessary for Mr. Phillips
to repeat and in effect collaborate what a diseffected employee
of the Agency is purporting? From a friendly alumnus of the
Agency, this serves as a verification of Agee's statements and
provides a violation of sources and methods of this organization.
Page 18-19: Pursuing the aspect of sources and methods,
the SSU questions the author's anecdote regarding the identif-
ication and employment techniques of the material "why me".
It would seem that in so far as any chemical or technical
devices of this nature used by the Organization should not be
surfaced in a book such as this.
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Page 25-27: The specifics associated with the Cuban
Missle Crisis of 1962 involving former Director John McCone
and others are subject to strong question as to whether they
should be included in this text. Again, what is provided
by Mr. Phillips in this manuscript is drawn from such personal
experiences realized in his Agency duties.
Page 33-35: The SSU takes exception to the information
presented regarding "walk-ins" based upon the same rationale
as contained above. It also flirts with the concerns of
sources and methods of this Agency.
Page 46-48: All remarks concerning technical operations
such as hidden microphones, quick plants, etc, are out of
order particularly with reference to the development of a
microphone in the armchair. This again violates the Agency's.
concern regarding sources and methods.
Page 55-61: Considerable inside information is provided
regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his activities in Mexico.
The SSU defers to LA Division, SE Division and OS regarding
the advisability of inclusions of this material in this
manuscript.
Chapter 7
Page 26: Although there is a legal basis for the serving
of alcoholic beverages in the DCI dining room, is it appropriate
to include such "tidbits" providing the news media with grist
to conjure up stories of senior CIA executives making critical
decisions following an alcoholic luncheon. This implication
is synonymous with the problem of beer being available to the
Secret Service when they are on assignment with the President.
Page 31: Throughout the manuscript the author in his
narration confirms the fact that CIA has stations located around
the world and in his writing procedes to verify the location of
these stations. The comments relating to where he was assigned
and where others in the Agency have been or are assigned, not
only relates to the South America area but on this page the
author confirms the fact that there was a CIA station in
(2-32 (Brazzaville.) Other than in the change in name there is no
effort made to dispel the prospect that the station continues.
Page 42-44: Although it is a most timely subject,
information regarding any U.S. Government effort to assassinate
Castro is highly explosive. Mr. Phillips is reporting information
which he has privy to as a direct result of his Agency exper-
iences. These should not be contained in this book.
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Page 44: Although (Camp Peary) has unfortunately been
identified as a CIA facility, is it necessary for the author
to reinforce media articles regarding this establishment by
spelling out the cover background and other "chapter and
verse" items regarding this facility. I believe comments
regarding firearms training, counterterrorism training should
be avoided.
Chapter 8
Page 7: The author's remarks concerning CIA support
to the Elbrick kidnapping again is a violation of sources
and methods, and should be deleted.
Pages 13-21: It is understandable but regrettable that
the author continues to single out sensitive issues; i.e.
assassination and in this instance CIA involvement in Chile.
The information contained in these pages are volatile and
should not be included in such a commercial venture. Any
such information is liable for quotations out of context
warping or reinforcing the involvement that the Agency did
have in the political activities of Chile.
Page 25: For the first time the SSU was made aware of
the daughter of a CIA officer who was stripped naked and held
with a knife at her throat by political assassins. If this
is in fact a true statement, I question the value of such an
inclusion in this text particularly in light of the terrorism
problems that this Agency and other elements of the U.S.
Government are experiencing around the world.
Page 27: The statement the author makes with regard to
promotion to GS-17 is not correct.
Page 31: I believe that Office of Communications should
be consulted on the entire section relating to communications,
communications personnel and the Office of Communications,
however, the SSU raises the question concerning the inclusion
of teletype decoding speeds on this particular page.
Chapter 10
Note: Chapter 10 continues in the same vein as all of the
other chapters. It further reinforces the earlier remarks that
the more one tries to explain and clarify a point the more
confusing it becomes. The remarks contained in pages 23 and
24 regarding Chile are illustrative of this.
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4. In summary, the SSU joins those who feel that this
book would better have been left unwritten. It is a text
replete with names, details, operational information and
close personal privileged information based upon the author's
assignments which has been rendered into a commercial version
of Mr. Phillips' affiliation with this agency for over 25
years. This manuscript reinforces the difficulty of a retired
operations officer to develop a non-fiction text which is
attractive to the public but does not contain information
regarding intelligence personalities, organization and sources
and methods.
Robert R. Kience
Robert R. Kierce
Chief
Special Security Unit, DDO
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