157-10014-10227
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Date:
7/7/2015
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER:
157-10014-10227
RECORD SERIES:
Identification Form
Agency Information
MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
07-M-132
ORIGINATOR:
FROM:
SSCIA
DAWSON, R.
TO:
TITLE:
DIEM
DATE:
PAGES:
06/00/1975
157
SUBJECTS:
CIA
Document Information
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
COLBY, WILLIAM
VIETNAM
KENNEDY, JOHN
DIEM, ASSASSINATION
SUMMARY
Declassified
IB; 1C
Redact
05/05/2000
v9.1
NW 50955
COMMENTS:
CC Box 133
DocId: 32423615 Page 1
AGENCY : SSCIA
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
Date: 08/08/95
Page : 1
AGENCY INFORMATION
RECORD NUMBER:
157-10014-10227
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-132
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM: DAWSON, R.
TO:
TITLE : DIEM
DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES:
157
SUBJECTS: VIETNAM
DIEM, ASSASSINATION
COLBY, WILLIAM
CIA
KENNEDY, JOHN
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION
:
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS:
SUMMARY
TOP SECRET
REFERRED
POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CC Box 133
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615 Page 2
DIEM
NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 3
ход
133
NW 50955
McCone
Coloy
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Nhun
Hillsman
Kennedy, John F. Tung
McNamarra
Lodge
Diem
DATES:
DIEM
11 Sept 63
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants
being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that
Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented
that he believed that we should move cautiusly, that we should talk seriously to Diem
gand that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic
view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach
be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we
had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared
by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President
asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent
to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some
real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the
President Could be well informed of any steps taken in this contextTAFFsuch as the
instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.
FILE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 21-22
DATE:
Dawson
6/27/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
KENNEDY, ROBERT F.
MC CONE, JOHN
DIEM
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
5 Oct 1963
DIEM
FOR SECRET
Gard
OCCURRENCE: On or about October 5, 1963 when the telegram of October 5 and 6 were sent
to Saigon, MC CONE was called over by PRESIDENT KENNEDY and met privately with PRESIDENT
KENNEDY and the Attorney General, ROBERT F. KENNEDY, and took the position that the CIA
"should take a hands off position as far as the assassination of DIEM was concerned. MC CONE
"felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reser-
vations concerning DIEM and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we
could on DIEM to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My pre-
"cise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I
was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a
good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if DIEM was removed we would have not one
coup, but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam, and it might
last several years as indeed it did. So it was for that reason that I felt there would be
SOURCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, Friday, June 6, 1975, McCone, Vol. 1, 2 of 5 DATE:
FILE:
pp. 62-32
29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Card 2 of 2
OCCURRENCE: more stability if DIEM could be persuaded to change his ways than remove him
and hope that some group of generals could run the country better.
SOURCE:
FILE.
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
DATE.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MC CONE, JOHN
DIEM
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 6
DATES:
5 Oct 1963
DIEM
F
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: On October 5, 1963, MC CONE sent, to some locations, including SAIGON the
following message: "Believe assassination discussions most careful handling. In general
best line is no line so that it is clear that we are sticking to position of having no
responsibility for actions of any of various contending Vietnamese groups. We certainly can-
not be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the
other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might
receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of DIEM. We be-
lieve in gaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes
of our position re others, re support of regime, etc. Consequently, believe best approach
is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan. This mes-
sage has been cleared with State Department.
SOURCE:
•
11
TOP SEED
Hearing held before Senate Select Committee Intelligence,
June 6, 1975, McCone, p. 60.
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE: 29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MINH, GENERAL
CONEIN
NGO DINH CAN
NGO DINH NHU
DATES:
October 3-4
1963
DIEME
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
OCCURRENCE: On October 3-4, 1963, CONEIN was asked to contact BIG MINH and did so by himsel
at MINH's headquarters. "At that time, BIG MINH explained to me that they had had, that
there was going to be a coup d'etat, that they didn't want this to be an American sponsored
coup d'etat, they wanted to be assured of American backing, specifically in the part where
it comes to military and economic aid after the coup had been successful." p. 24 "What the
GENERAL meant, he actually did not want U.S. participation in the coup d'etat. He did not
want the U.S. government to start the coup d'etat. He also outlined three general ideas,
this was the first time that a leader had mentioned the possibility of assassination. This
assassination was not of DIEM. This was if they could not do anything, it would be the
elimination of NGO DINH CAN, who was the war lord in central Vietnam and NGO DINH NHU.
At
that time GENERAL MINH did say that one of the alternative means was to eliminate CAN and
NHU and keep DIEM." That was one of the alteratives.
p. 25
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
--
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
רז זזיז
NW 50955
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
31 Aug. 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRE
In an August 31, 1963, CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0499), the following message appears:
"This particular coup is finished....GENERALS did not feel ready and did not have sufficient
balance of forces. . There is little doubt that GVN aware US role and may have considerable
detail.
(15)
"1
CIA
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Saigon Station
VIETNAMESE GENERALS
DocId: 32423615
Page 7
STAFF:
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 15
Dawson
DATE:
28.6.75
FILE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
DEFTEL 243
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
RICHARDSON
SPERA
CONEIN
TAYLOR
DEPTEL 256
LODGE
DATES:
29 Aug. 1963
DIEM
HARKINS
TRUEHEART
WEEDE, Gen. Richard G.
(Chief of Staff, MAC/V)
MINH
КУТЕМ
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRE
CARD 1 of 2
On August 29, 1963, the following report was listed within the Saigon Station's chronology
of August 1963 coup 
activities as follows:
"At 0745 hours, RICHARDSON, SPERA and CONEIN, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact
GENERALS 
MINH and KHIEM at 0815 same morning, were shown a message from GENERAL TAYLOR to
GENERAL HARKINS stating 
aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at WHITE HOUSE and com-
menting that 
second thoughts were beginning in Washington. Faced with this information and
given 
strictly limited time factors, RICHARDSON decided that the meeting with GENERALS MINH
and KHIEM should not 
be postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a
fact-finding 
mission without encouraging or discouraging GENERAL MINH.
"When SPERA and CONEIN returned from their meeting with KHIEM and MINH, (con't.)
Page 8
SOURCE:
FILE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 28.6.75
CARD 2 of
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECE
OCCURRENCE:
we proceeded to TRUEHEART's office to make our report. The AMBASSADOR came in and RICHARDSON
advised him of our 
meeting with GENERAL WEEDE, of TAYLOR's cable, and of the decisions which
RICHARDSON had made as a 
result of the TAYLOR cable. LODGE was angry and expressed the view
that RICHARDSON's decision 
had destroyed the possibilities of carrying out a coup.
expressed a firm 
dissenting opinion." (12)
RICHARDSON
SOURCE:
FILE.
STAFF:
ENTITIES:
TAYLOR, Maxwell
HARKINS, John
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DEPTEL 243
28 Aug. 1963
DIEM
TOP SECRET
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT Participation
OCCURRENCE:
The following telegram was sent from TAYLOR to HARKINS (JCS 3368-63) on August 28, 1963:
243 was prepared without DOD or JCS participation.
"Important WHITE HOUSE meeting on subject scheduled for 1200 28 August EDT, your views
urgently needed on overall feasibility of operation contemplated....FYI State to Saigon
Authorities are now having second
thoughts.'
"
(11)
NW 50955
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Page 9
STAFF: Dawson
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11
DATE:
28.6.75
FILE:
I DROONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, Henry Cabot
DIEM
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓
26 August 1963
TOP SECRET
OCCURRENCE:
NGO DINH DIEM. (8)
On August 26, 1963, AMBASSADOR LODGE presented his credentials to SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT
NW 50955
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Page 10
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 8
FILE:
STAFF: Dawson
DATE:
28.6.75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
RICHARDSON, John
KHANH
DATES:
26 Aug. 1963
CATEGORIES:
LODGE, Henry Cabot
DEPTEL 243
DIEM
CONEIN, CIA officer in Saigon
KIEM
SPERA, CIA officer in Saigon.
OCCURRENCE:
On August 26, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0304),
TOP SECRET
"RICHARDSON reports that the AMBASSADOR decided that the American official hand should not
show in the operation. It was agreed that CONEIN would see KHIEM and that SPERA would see
KHANH, CONEIN and SPERA were directed to convey the substance of DEPTEL 243, plus this
comment: 'We cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state.
Entirely their own action, win or lose.'" (9)
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 9
STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
RICHARDSON, John
LODGE, Henry Cabot
TRUEHART, William
DIEM
CIA
HARKINS, Gen. Paul D. (Commander, MAC/V)
WEEDE, Gen.
OCCURRENCE:
CIA
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
25 August 1963
DIEM
TOP SEGLE
On August 25, 1963, the following/cable from Saigon (SAIG 0296) had the message below:
"RICHARDSON reports the results of a conference among AMBASSADOR LODGE, DCM TRUEHART, GENERAL
HARKINS, GENERAL WEEDE, and RICHARDSON.
chance of success.
and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions. RICHARDSON gives headquarters
They accepted DEPTEL 243 (of 24 August) as a basic decision from Washingto
The group agreed that giving DIEM an option had no
his views on possible successor regimes." (7-8)
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 7-8
FILE:
Part C
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
28.6.75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 11
1. PERSONS/
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARRIMAN, Averell
HILSMAN, Roger
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
KENNEDY, John F.
TAYLOR, Maxwell
24-25 August
1963
DIEM
(Mil. ass't to
MCNAMARA, Robert
Pres.)
GILPATRIC, Roswell
(CARD 1 of 4):
MCCONE, John
RUSK, Dean
OCCURRENCE:
SECRET
The I.G. REPORT of 1967 (CIA) contains the following description of the events of August 25,
1963, from a book by MARGUERITE HIGGINS: "The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek
tragedy, opened with a cable. It was dispatched to Saigon late in the evening of August 24,
1963, a date made more significant because it was a Saturday. Washington usually empties on
summer weekends or lapses into a somnolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation.
"The telegram contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. EMBASSY in SAIGON.
It was drawn up at a meeting called by Under-secretary of State AVERELL HARRIMAN and ROGER
HILSMAN, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and head of the Vietnam task
force. The President's senior advisers were, for the most part, out of town. CIA DIRECTOR
JOHN MCCONE was in California. DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA was on vacation.
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 5-6
STAFF: Dawson
(con't)
FILE:
PART C
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
(cont)
HEIMS, Richard
DIEM
NHU
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
DATE: 28.6.75
CATEGORIES:
Diem
TOP SECRET
(CARD 2 of
PRESIDENT KENNEDY
SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK was attending a baseball game in New York.
was at Hyannis Port. GENERAL TAYLOR says he knew nothing of the meeting until it was over
and the telegram long on its way.
the cable proved historic. For the first time it gave the signal to
'unleash' the Vietnamese military, flashed a green light for the coup against DIEM of which
the generals had been talking for so many years,
"
the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy
of one war at a time. It envisaged the generals' making war on their own government, and
with the implicit blessing of the United States.
"The substance of the cable was that the U.S. EMBASSY was to make an effort (con't.)
NW 50955
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Page 12
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
(CARD 3 of
SA
to persuade DIEM to fire his brother, release the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and
restore other democratic liberties suspended under martial law. And if, as the cable antici-
pated, DIEM would not do these things, then the EMBASSY was to contact the VIETNAMESE GENERALS
and tell them that the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt.
the controversial August 24 cable was dispatched from Washington Saturday
evening after being cryptically summarized to PRESIDENT KENNEDY at the summer White House at
Hyannis Port.
"The ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROSWELL GILPATRIC
had the cable described
so him over the telephone. MR. GILPATRIC says he was frankly surprised that such an
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Diem
(con't.)
TOP >>kshab
CARD Hof
important set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not feel that he
ought to veto the telegram 
since
it had the 'approval of the PRESIDENT.'
"In MCCONE's absence, the cable was described, again cryptically, to RICHARD HELMS,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
of the CIA, who also 
did not feel disposed to veto something 'approved by
the PRESIDENT."" (5-6)
CARD 4 of 4
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 13
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)
NHU
DIEM
DEPTEL 243
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
24 August 1963
Diem v
CARD (2)
In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 243), on August 24, 1963, the following message appeare
"The DEPARTMENT informs the AMBASSADOR that the U.S. Government cannot tolerate a situation
in which power lies in NHU's hands. If DIEM is unwilling to rid himself of NHU, then DIEM
himself may have to go. The AMBASSADOR is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions
against BUDDHISTS must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders that the USG cannot
support a DIEM regime that includes the NHU's and that 'we will give them direct support
in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism; (3) to make statements in
Saigon removing the military taint on the pagoda raids."
"The telegram includes the following statement: The AMBASSADOR and COUNTRY TEAM should
urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how (con't.)
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 4-5
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 28.6.75
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE: (con't from card 1)
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Takke SE VOLME
we might bring about DIEM's replacement if this should become necessary. You will under-
stand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this opera-
tion should proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take
to achieve our objectives."" (4-5)
CARD 2 of 2
NW 50955
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Page 14
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Thich Tri Quang
Diem
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Aug. 21, 1963
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
SECRET
Higgins states that the Xa Loi pagoda, based on her own experiences, was more a political
command post than a holy place. It was the headquarters from which the militant
Thich Tri Quang and others had run their political war against the Diem regime.
According to Higgins, Thich Tri Quang told an Austrian journalist by the name of
Denis Warner early in August that he hoped in the process "they would kill one or two
of us."
Higgins goes on to note that the State Department regarded the actions against a dozen
pagodas a betrayal of Diem's promise to reconciliate the Buddhists.
(Page 181)
SOURCE: Our Vietnam
Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,
STAFF: Dawson
Harper and Rowe
FILE:
DATE:
July 3, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
GENERAL TON THAT DINH, MILITARY
GOVERNOR OF SAIGON, COMMANDER 3RD
21 August 1963 DIEM
CORPS
CONEIN
Lodge, Henry C.
NGÔ ĐÌNH NHU
AMBASSADORS NOLTING
OCCURRENCE: "On the night of the 21st of August, GENERAL TON THAT DINH, as military gov-
ernor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corps, has established a curfew. If I recall
correctly, the curfew was to start about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. Anybody seen after
that time would be shot. And that night, elements later on, we didn't know at that
time, later on proving to be elements of the special forces, which was praetorian guard of
NGO DINH NHU and the police dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saigon.
What was very bad about this, Ambassador NOLTING had already been relieved and Ambassador
LODGE was on his way to take over". p. 21
SOURCE:
TOP SECRET
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
STAFF:
DATE.
R. DAWSON
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 15
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Milting, Ambassador
Lodge, Ambassador
Diem
Thich Tri Quang
DATES:
Aug. 21, 1963
Diem
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
Higgins claims that "...the raids by the Vietnamese Army and the pagodas took place
five days after the departure of Ambassador Milting from Saigon, and a week before Henry
Cabot Lodge was expected to arrive on his first tour of duty in Viet Nam." Higgins goes
on to explain that Diem claimed that the reason that the raids were performed at this
time was because: "It had become clear that Thich Tri Quang of Buddhist was that no
intention of coming to any agreement with the government, irrespective of how many
consessions were made. Since the raids would create an anti-Diem propaganda explosion,
it would be less embarrassingto the United States if they took place when the new
not prese 12
Ambassador was President of Vietnam. For the same reason, great care was taken not
to inform the United States of the pagoda plans. The reasoning was that Washington
could
be blamed for something about which new nothing. (page 183)
"
SOURCE:
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CONEIN, CIA officer (Saigon)
DON, General
8/21/63
Diem
STAFF:
DATE:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECDET
"On August 21, 1963, at a meeting between CONEIN [an officer of the CIA
Saigon station] and General DON, the latter asked for US & government
assurances of support assurances support for moves against the DIEM
regime. (3)
If
STAFF:
SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, Part C, p3.
RD
FILE:
DATE:
€150 17
Page 16
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GENERAL DON
AMBASSADOR NOLTING
CONTIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
July 1963
OCCURRENCE: On July 4, 1963, CONEIN received a message from DON, Commander of I Corps
at the time, to meet with him in the Caravelle Hotel for a public meeting and the hotel
was jammed packed. CONEIN states that: "It was at that time on the 4th of July that I
had the first indication that something serious was being comtemplated, when GENERAL DON to
me that if the Buddhist situation does not get settled, that the military are planning.
ported this fact, and I believe it was around the 8th or 9th of July, that more indi-
cations... p. 20.
TOP SECKET
STAFF:
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
30 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
EN. DUONG VAN MINH
EN. TRAN VAN DON
AJ. GEN. LE VAN KIM
EN. TRAN THIEN KHIEM
DATES:
7/63.
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECE
OCCURRENCE: The initial conscias decision and agreement among the
cup principals occurred before total bang yan tik has been the indictable
July 4, 1963.
it this coup
• Hempt was
i
Aborted but the
...tention was
ibandoned row
Her the aust
failed.
Into the cap pincipals from the outof,
as been Gohern Nubia deputy and principal piziyor
>coute subliem officers and not minders.
Cub aral You Kis, probably the cost intelligent of the
conspirators, ang been responsible for aligning nonalist
9posttyp parties and fox developing political planing
.
Godeal an Thien Thieu's role was to legle Recomalry orders
and to aut as Chief of Staff to General Minh during the plotting
and the sctual coup.
SOURCE:
FILE.
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 10.
STAPF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId:32423615
Page 17
DIEM
GEN, KINH
NGO DINH NHU
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
7/63
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
] One of
the main Deters his affected the coup was the decision to
Waiata e Key President Dien, The majority of the officers,
Ucluding Coneral Minh, desired President tien to have honorably
rakliaments on the political sene South Vieben and exile.
28 to Nuo ih und Ego Dinh Cen, there was never dissension.
The attle was that their donthe, along with tatume Ngo Dinh
and welcomed.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page ten.
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Diem
STAFF: Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
10 July 1963
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
In SNIE, 53-2-63, on 10 July "the situation in South Vietnam" the
following quotation 
appeared: "if as is likely Diem fails to
carry out truly and 
promptly the commitment he has made to the Buddhists,
disorders will probably 
flare again and the chances of coup or assassina-
tion attempts against him become 
even better. . We do not think
the Communists would 
necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some
combination of his non-Communist 
opponents. A non-Communist successor
regime might be initially less 
effective against the Viet Cong, but,
given continued support 
from the U. S., could provide reasonably effec-
tive leadership for the government 
and the war effort." (1-2)
SOURCE:
1967 I.G Renant nant 0
STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId:32423615
Page 18
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
THÍCH TRÍ QUANG
DATES:
May 6, 1963 DIEM
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: Diem on May 6, 1963 revived a regulation banning the public display of any
religious flag--either the Buddhist or Catholic-- having any precedence over the National
Vietnamese flag in public places or in public view. Higgins does not doubt that the
Vietnamese government's decision to revive these flag regulations on May 6, 1963 made
possible the Hue tragedy. Ironically, action by Diem has been generally viewed as anti-
Buddhist. His May 6 circular had been provoked a few days earlier in Da Nang by the
excessive use by Catholics of the flag of the vatican with the National Vietnamese flag
on view being sometimes tattered and torn and few in number. (91)
TOP SECR
SOURCE:
1965
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, STAFF:
Dawson, R.
FILE:
DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1963
DIEM
MADAME NHU
OCCURRENCE:
CONEIN stated that the catalyst that brought down the DIEM regime was their
antagonism of the Buddhists. He explained that 80% of the Vietnamese people claimed to be
Buddhists. And that DIEM led a Catholic regime and that this drove people, particularly in.
light of MADAME NHU's statements to the effect that she'd like to furnish some mustard at
a bonzes barbecue, or something to that effect. This made people want to identify themselve:
against the regime and so they would go back to the pagodas. CONEIN did not know whether or
not this became the principal reason for the United States wanting to get rid of the regime.
pp. 42-44.
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
T.... 1
1070
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 19
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
TRUEHEART, WILLIAM
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
June 1963
DIEM
MECKLIN, JOHN (Dir. USIA)
NOLTING, AMBASSADOR
Card 1f2
OCCURRENCE: Mecklin stated that the American position following the incident at Hue
was to "urge Diem to repair all Buddhist grievances forthwith, to accept responsibility
for the May 8 killings, and to indemnify the victims and apologize, perhaps by visiting
Hue himself to do so." (Ambassador Nolting was on a Meditterranean vaction at the time.)
"According to Mecklin, William Trueheart, the Charge d'Affaires, applied on orders from
Washington, 'direct, relentless, tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States
had seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government...' In despair Trueheart
in June resorted to a formal warning to Diem that if he continued repressive measures
(police effort to prevent and disperse illegal demonstrations), the United States would
be forced to disassociate itself publicly from such actions, as indeed we did two months
later. The warning was a momentous step. It amounted to direct official command from
(continued next card)
SOURCE:
Row, 1965
FILE:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper
STAFF
Dawson, R.
DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CARD TWO
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: (continuation)
Cand 2
of 2
the United States. Public disassociation could have disasterous results, encouraging the
Buddhists, heartening the Viet Cong, strengthening the regimes foreign critics..."
perhaps even stimulating the Vietnamese Army to try another coup" (100)
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, STAFF:
TO
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 20

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONTIN
NHU, NGO DINH
MADAME NHU
DATES:
"Summer 1963" DIEM
CATEGORIES:
CAN, NGO DINH
OCCURRENCE:CONEIN stated that the attacks in May in Hue followed up by an attack in Augus
on the pagodas in Saigon consolidated the three or four different sects of the Buddhists
by making them become a political entity which they had never been before. CONEIN stated.
that it had become obvious to people in the State Department, USAID and JMSPAU, as well
as persons within the CIA and the country team generally, that the true power of the govern-
ment at that time was not DIEM but rather NHU and CAN, as well as MADAME NHU, the chief of
the womens' solidarity movement. DIEM was felt to be out of touch with reality and not get-
ting the true facts as everything was being channeled through his brother, NHU. pp. 44-45
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
July 1, 1975
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
"middle May
1963"
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN said that the DIEM government started the Buddhist antagonism but
could not understand their doing so. 
He gave his personal opinion as that "they had a
chance to get out of it and 
get out of it very gracefully within the first two weeks after
the 8th of May incident in HUE by 
meeting the demands of paying off the families of those
people who were killed when the 
military attacked the pagodas in Hue.
been done, I think 
that we would have been much better off....This was a turning point of
If this would have
the political situation....".
pp. 
41-42
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
TIP.
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 21
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
May 8, 1963
DIEM
MAJOR GEN. TRAN VAN DON (sp.?)
OCCURRENCE:
"Immediately after May 8, President Diem ordered a formal investigation
of the Hue affairs. For this purpose he appointed a 3-man technical commission led by
Major General Tran Van Don, the acting head of the army (General Don was considered a
man of integrity by the Americans.)" The commission also included the Surgeon General
of the Vietnamese Army and its Chief of Ordinance. After extensive interrogation of
witnesses General Don's mission cited plastic charges as the cause of the deaths on
May 8.
"At the time, nonetheless, Diem's regime claimed that plastic bombs caused the deaths was
widely ridiculed.
"Unfortunately, no American officials were witness to the incidence. The American con-
sul had been out of town but he tended. to disbelieve the government's efforts to place
scopatinued)
the blame on viet Long plastics. He felt that the american supplied grenades were
reponsible for the 
killings.
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and
URCE:
Row, 1965
STAFF
DATE:
Dawson, R.
July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
THÍCH TRÍ QUẢNG
NGUTEN VAN BANG (Province Chief)
MAJOR DANG SY (ASST. PROV. CHIEF)
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
May 8, 1963 DIEM
CATEGORIES
SECRET
Nguyen Van Bang later at the trial of Major Dang Sy said that "While we
were inside, two loud explosions suddenly reverberated on the veranda. Then came the
sounds of broken glass, gunshots, and exploding hand grenades." In the confusion Major
Dang Sy heard the explosions also and in attempting to signal what he feared may be a
Viet Cong attack fired three shots in the air. Unfortunately this was the prearranged
signal authorizing his troops to use grenades to disperse the crowds. At least 15 of
these grenades were throw and the explosions caused at least 8 dead at the radio station.
(95) This statement though, appears to be in conflict with later medical evidence coming
from the Interior Minister which found that none of the bodies of the dead had metal
splinters in their organs, but rather the weapons expert said that the bombs were probably
made of plastic and that "plastic is the arm of the Viet Cong guerilla." (95-96)
SOURCE:
1965
FILE:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,
STAFF:
Dawson, R.
DATE: July 2, 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 22
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
THÍCH TRÍ QUANG
NGUYEN VAN BANG (Province Chief)
MAJOR DANG SY (Asst. Province Chief)
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
May 8, 1963 DIEM
CATEGORIES:
FOR SECRET
According to Higgins on May 8, 1963 on the Buddhist birthday Thich Tri
Quang, in the middle of a religious ceremony, began to give a vitriolic anti-government
speech on the subject of the non-existent ban on Buddhist flags. About 8 pm Thich Tri
Quang arrived at the radio station carrying in his hands a tape recording which he then
made the demand upon the director of the station to play. He was refused. Thich Tri
Quang proceeded to encourage an already active angry crowd which in the middle of this
oration began to shout and press forward. The director of the station called up Nguyen
Van Bang who soon arrived and attempted to appease Thich Tri Quang, but the latter would
not listen. Nguyen Van Bang then asked for armored cars in hopes that this would
fighten the crowd and prevent any violence to the radio station. Major Dang Sy
then arrived with some armored cars and got some general orders to disperse the crowd.
Police arrived and attempted to turn fire hoses on the crowd. (93-94)
SOURCE:
1965
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, STAFF:
Dawson, R.
FILE:
DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Trich Tri Quang
Diem
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
May 8, 1963
Diem
OCCURRENCE: "No evidence can be adduced showing that before the Hue incident of
May 8, 1963, there was a religious issue in Vietnam.
If there had been, assuredly
Complaints of
the critics of Diem's leadership would have trumpeted it to the world.
alleged religious repression made by Thich Tri Quant and his accomplices in a campaign
of letters to the United Nations and prominent foreigners, had begun, but they represented
no more than the early activity of determined propagandists.
. Most hostile criticism toward Diem centered not on what he did but on his methods and
techniques of governing."
".
I STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 23
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Colby
go, Dinh Can
10/63
Dien✓
Concin
Nhu
OCCURRENCE:
☐
TOP SECRET
Colby explained that a couple of weeks before the assassination the thought
of assassination was 
not aimed at Dien but at Nh and
brothers who were considered the evil influence of the government.
Can, Dien's 
two
idea of 
removing Nhu from Vietnam was one that was discussed in great detail
The
and a great 
deal of pressure was put on Diem to send his brother out of
the 
country. "At one point I made a suggestion that perhaps I could con-
vince him of the desirability of leaving 
the country for the benefit of
is own, of the country 
itself. That I could go over and argue him into.(t)
That I think is the separable thing from the actual decision to shoot Diem.
I think the decision 
to shoot Diem was a conscience decision taken by the
Generals which 
came as a very new development during the coup, but let's face
is 
something you have to anticipate may taken P1 STAFF:
a government." Pages 33-34
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
SOURCE:
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
overthrow of
Dawson
DATE:
7/1/75
DATES:
11/2/63
CATEGORIES:
Diem
uu, Mo Dinh
ncin
.nh
OCCURRENCE:
nein stated that at no point in the climatic days leading up to the assassina-
on was there a discussion of the killing of Diem. Further, there had never
en any discussion at any time about Diem himself being killed by anybod.
1 fact, the generals and many people wanted Diem to be around but they could
it stand Nhu and Madame Nhu, Diem's wife. Page 64-66.
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSC, Concin, June 20, 1975
Dawson
NW 50955
DocId:32423615
Page 24
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY, WILLIAM
MINH GENERAL
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1 November 1963
DIEM
NHỮNG
CONVEIV
Nhu
OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "Apparently the decision by several of the generals, the
ones that were present, that he (DIEM) would be executed when they got him. They sent an
officer, a small armored unit to pick him up after they found out where he was down in the
other part of town. He and his brother were put in an armored personnel carrier with an
officer, a young Vietnamese who was an aide to GENERAL MINH, head of the coup group, and
they went into the armored personnel carrier and when the carrier arrived back at head-
quarters, the two were dead and had been shot several times. That officer, incidentally,
and a rather bizarre aspect of this, was himself apparently, when this junta of generals
was overthrown about two months later. Somebody took that occasion to shoot him.
pp. 18-19.
SOURCE:
TOP SECRE
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 18-19
FILE:
"
STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE:
29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
THÍCH TRÍ QUANG
DATES:
May 7, 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
The Diem circular to ban all religious flags reached Hue on May 7, 1963.
Since the city was already bedecked with flags the Vietnamese Minister of Interior,
Vui Van Long, arriving in Hue on the same date as the circular arrived went to the Bud-
dhist leaders and explained that the flag regulation would not be enforced. "The leaders
of the monks were very pleased," said Minister Long. "They listened to me and told me
that I had given complete satisfaction to their desires Quang was present during this
exchange and joined in expressing satisfaction with the arrangement not to enforce
the regulation. Some police in Hue did take down flags before the Province Chief could
reverse the order to enforce the regulation. But the precipitating factor, according
to Higgins was that Kuang sent a few monks around to tell the people to haul down the
flags, even though he knew this was no longer required, thanks to the Interior Ministers
actions. "The monks were told to tell the population that this was being done as a
SOURCE: result of Diem's order to ban the Buddhist flag. "(91-92) STAFF:
1965
FILE:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,
Dawson, R.
DATE: July 2, 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 25
McCone
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Diem
Nhu
Kahn
OCCURRENCE:
TOP
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓
In responce to a question as to whether McCone was aware of a suggestion to assassinate
IF HE
Mr. Diem and had sent a telegram in conjunction that suggestion, McCone testified
who was the target
that he did not think it was Mr. Diem He testiffed that "there was a proposal, one
of a number of proposals, in connection with the difficult political situation that
existed in South Vietnam, to dispose by assassination Mr. Nhu and General Kanh....
when that was brought to my attention I ordered a telegram sent out to stand that down"
(4) McCone testified that "The situation in Vietnam was unlike other situations. We
were really at war there. My opposition was more on the basis of considered judgement
that the action recommended by the station wouldn't in final an alysis solve any
problem." (5).
SOURCE:
FILE:
McCone, June 6, 1975
STAFF:
Gordon Rhea
DATE:
6/27/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 26
NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 27
1960162
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LANSDALE
ALAN DULLES
DATES:
Mar 16, 1960
CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE
SPECIAL GROUP
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
On March 16, 1960 at the Special Group Meeting there was discussion of stepped up plans
to use the base radio at Guentameo Bay to expand the stations listening audience.
VIETNAM Mr. DULLES Referred to the worsening security situation in South Vietnam... and
commented that this appears to be a situation where S. F. training might be in order.
DULLES asked whether it would be "politically feasible for Col. LANSDALE to visit the
area to assess the situation on the spot." DULLES also discussed briefly "the possibility
of assisting the South Vietnam government to mount guerrila operationsin the north."
OP SEA
STAFF:
SOURCE:
Minutes of Special Group Meet
March 16, 1960.
KELLEY
DATE:
FILE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Lansdale
May 12, 1960
Dulles
Diem
Special Group
Hare
Irwin
OCCURRENCE:
On May 12, 1960, the Special Group discussed the subject of the invitation
from President Diem for 
General Lansdale to visit Viet Nam.
Mr. Hare said
"that he assumed that the way in which Diem would like to use General
Lansdale would 
not be acceptable to the U. S., but that some adjustments
could no doubt be made. 
Mr. Dulles said that "Lansdale could be counted
on to 
carry out whatever instructions he had in a manner least calculated
to upset Diem."
TOP SECRET
SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting May 12, 1960
STAFF: Bob Kelley
DATE: June 29, 1975
FILE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 28
ERSONS/ENTITIES:
STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
NGỌ DINH NHU
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR-GOVERNMENT
OF VIETNAM, COLBY,
WESTMORELAND, GENERAL
HARKINS
77
DATES:
1962
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "In 1962 COLBY assigned him to work with the MINISTER ·
THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM to be responsible for liaison between CIA and th
MINISTER on a program called THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. The idea for this program was
that of NHU, the President's brother and counsellor, which was to establish security withi
hamlets and villages in order the people could deny access of food and taxes to the
VIET CONG. In this position, CONEIN was able to travel quite extensively under the auspic
of the MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, and to talk to the unit commanders down to and including
small sections." p. 17. CONEIN. "This was done with the permission of GENERAL HARKINS an
it was known to GENERAL WESTMORELAND when WESTMORELAND took over." p. 18.
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
30 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
JFK
Maxwell Taylor
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
27 Sept 62
CATEGORIES:
Special Group Aug-
mented
MOONGOOSE"
Diem ☑
Taylor states that the Special Group and the Sepcial Group Augmented considered a proposal by
CIA for covert activities 
designed to harass the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
been prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense.
This had
Taylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared.
It was 
agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support
of this 
program.
An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of
battle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. This will be flown out
of Saigon, using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese
Air Force markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalists pilots documented South Vietnam-
se citizens.
SOURCE:
Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, dated
Sept 27, 1962. 000050)
STAFF:
PGW
FILE:
רז מחA
6/20/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 29
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONLIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
February 1962
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air
Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first
indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th
was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the
different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was the
political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the
military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was un-
able, at this time, to determine this fact. There was an isolated dissidence within the
military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
30 June 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 30

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONTIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
February 1962
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air
Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first
indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th
was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the
different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was the
political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the
military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was un-
able, at this time, to determine this fact. There was an isolated dissidence within the
military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
30 June 1975
NW 50955
DocId:32423615
Page 31
1963
NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 32
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
1963
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: "Most manifestations of political oppostion," wrote Henderson, "were
vigorously suppressed. Civil liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal. Elections were
far from free and many of the devices used to stimulate popular support for the regime
bore the the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian practice. No doubt these moves could
be justified, at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelming problems confronting
Diem during his first few years in office and also the inexperience of Free Viet Nam's
people with the forms and substance of democracy, but...Diem had still to prove that his
professed devotion to the democratic cause represented anything more than a facade to
disguise increasingly plain reality of stern dictatorship." (164-165)
ECRE
SOURCE:
Row, 1965
FILE:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and
STAFF:
Dawson, R.
DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NGO DINH CAN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1963
DIEM ✓
MINISTER OF INTERIOR
CONCIN
OCCURRENCE:
CONEIN stated that: "On May 7, 1963,..... "The MINISTER OF INTERIOR, myself a
his entourage flew to Hue in central Vietnam. While in Hue, it was on my aircraft that I
assigned to me for that day -- while in Hue, they had a very large meeting of different
military authorities and at that time I did not realize what was going on.
They had met w
the President's brother, NGO DINH CAN who was considered the war lord, in a way, and some
decisions were made, of which I was not aware of (sic). We returned quite late the night
the 7th; though I wanted to stay, the MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR told me it would be impossi:
I wanted to see burnt boats 
wit'
I wanted to see the celebration of the birthday of Budda.
the candles lit going down the perfumed river, but it was not to be. The next day there was
an attack by the military forces on the Buddhists. At that time, the Buddhists as an ent
was not a political force and therefore thought of being, and when the attack on the Budd
came about, this was, in my estimation, one of the turning points in what was happening i
Vietnam."-- 19
SOURCE:
STAFF:
•
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
R. DAWSON
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 33
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, Henry CABOT
CONEIN
DATES:
1963
CATEGORIES:
DEIM✓
OCCURRENCE: 11 .I worked for Ambassador LODGE.
I reported to Ambassador LODGE and I re-
ceived my instructions from Ambassador LODGE. They were cable instructions, he had a very
good habit of not reading something. He would fold a piece of paper and what pertained to
you for instructions, he would let you read that and that alone so that you didn't know why
was sending it or where it came from. He just read that and he said those are the instruc-
tions, do you understand them? Yes, sir; allright, we'll carry them out."
SOURCE:
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
p. 23
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
R. DAWSON
DATE:
20 June 1975
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1963
DIEM
'wein stated that:
OCCURRENCE: "I had never, and even right up to the very end, I had never been asked for any
resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual." p. 25
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF:
DATE:
R. DAWSON
June 30 7975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 34
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Dawson
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1963
Diem
National Security Council
State Dept
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
Colby stated that the policy of the chain of command wanted a determination
whether it be by the Security Council or by other authority is made to carry
out that policy is normally transferred from the National Security Council
to the ambassador. "The ambassador is the President's representative and
has overall authority of all agencies in that country, and therefore, an
important question like this (the Diem coup) would be passed to the ambassador
tohandle. "Now, the other agencies in town would be informed of the policy
directive that we might have additional communication as to the details as
to how to implement them, which in this case (the Diem coup) were done through
directive to our Station Chief to make sure he operated very directly and in-
mediately under the control of the ambassador." Page 35.
SOURCE:
FILE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
7/1/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Special Forces
Colby
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1965
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
Colby stated that "the Special Forces first arrived in Vietname working for
CTA in this country program of developing villages for their own defense.
When it got to be as I remember 750 of them the question arose as to whether
they should be transferred out of CIA into military control, and this was
done during 1963; military took over responsibility for that program and
I will have some more words to say about that at another time." Page 28-29.
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20,1975, Colby
Dawson
DATE.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 35
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
BUNDY, MC GEORGE, TAYLOR, MAXWELL
BALL, GEORGE
FORRESTAL, MICHAEL
HILLSMAN, ROGER; AMBASSADOR NOLTING
MC CONE, JOHN, MC NAMARA, ROBERT
STERATRENCES
ROSWELL
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1963
DIEM
TOP SECRET
COLBY stated that the persons typically in attendance in the conference
room or situation room to discuss matters in Vietnam during 1963, MESSRS. BUNDY, BALL,
FORRESTAL, HILLSMAN, MC CONE, MC NAMARA GILPATRIC, TAYLOR. p. 70 COLBY also stated that
generally the Attorney General was generally not in attendance. If the meeting was to be
with the President, then it would have been in the Cabinet room and then the Attorney
General would have been there. pp. 70-71, The chairman of the meetings downstairs which
President never attended would have been Mr. BUNDY. pp. 71-72 Mr. HARRIMAN would come son
times, COLBY recalled, and Vice President JOHNSON would always attend the ones upstairs in
the Cabinet room, but did not take a particularly active part. pp. 72 Ambassador NOLTING.
when he returned, after his replacement in Vietnam took a very active role opposing action:
against President DIEM to the extent that he was invited to participate. And his advice wa
not accepted. p. 73
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
1 July 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Summer and
Fall 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: "There were (sic) not one coup plan. There were several. The problem that wa
facing the people that were making assessments of this was which one had the most likely
chance of succeeding? We were at the point of no return. There was no chance of going back.
because there was going to be a coup. The best thing to do was to monitor and keep the U.S.
government advised of who the principal players were, what their intentions were then and in
the future. It was an impossible situation, and also during this time, it was getting down
to the critical element. In October, the generals had to have assurances that I was speakin
for the Ambassador. Several attempts were made to get these assurances, and it was practi-
cally impossible because of the security around the generals, who were already suspect.....
p. 28
TOP SECRET
་་
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 36
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
.Diem
OCCURRENCE:
11
DATES:
Summer 1963
Diem
CATEG
CATEGORIES:
And this
..Diem was not conforming to Western standards of democracy.
was really the heart of the case against him. Implicit in their criticism was the assump-
tion that Occidental style democracy was, in fact, the answer to Oriental Vietnam's problems.
It was an assumption with which Ngo Dinh Diem disagreed on both practical and philosophical
grounds."
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Harper
"Our Vietnam Nightmare", Marguerite Higgins,
Row, 1965, p. 165
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Thich Tri Quang
McNamara
Diem
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Summer, 1963
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
Gard=1
Higgins states in her book that, "Washington generated pressure on Diem for concilia-
tion was based on the assumption that Thich Tri Quang's grievances concerning flags and
such were what motivated his Budist protest movement. But it was evident that what Thich
Tri Quang wanted was a pretext to see. His objective was not a solution, but nonethe-
less than Diem's head.
"Perhaps Diem might have had a better image in the United States if he had personnally
shown immediate public concern for the victims of the Hue tragedy. He then instantly
order generous indemnification of the families who suffered losses, but this was never
publicized. Perhaps he was too
So inwardly assured of his innocence was
Diem that he did not
of going through the trouble of proving it. He would certainly
or two
(Continued on Card-2) have pleased Madison Ave. boys at the Embassy
fut sun strategy would scarcely have appeased Thich Tri Quang, who.
"not Diem's image
SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,
but
Harper and Rowe
STAFF: Dawson
DATE: July 3, 1975
"(101
זזרוּ
Page 37
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
GEN. HUYUH
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
7/63
TOP SE
CATEGORII:
DIEM
SECRET
Ceneral Huynh Van Cao, Commanding General of IV Corpy
was never taken into the confidence of the coup principals.
The participants preferred to work with Colonel Bui 
Fru 
hon,
With 
the 7th Division and 
the
Conreader of the list Division.
9th Division, the conspirators dealt with regimentul commanders
This 
thetle applied also
and by anand the division commandos.
to the Marine Brigade and the Airborne Brigade and, to a leasØP
extent. to the Armor Command,
SOURCE:
་ ་
FILE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page ten.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
GEN, DO CAO TRÍ
7/63
GEN. NGUYEN KHANH
GEN. TON THAT DINH
GEN. DON
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Other general officers such as Do Cao Tri
and gay on which were informed of the coup planning but did not
General
otky bielgabe in any of the actual planning.
Now That plan, Comanding General of III Corps, wankundled
Division
wompletely differenthy than by other officer.
Commanders were contacted by General Don directly or were
Daquestal to our at the Joint Ceceral Staff then their
military situnnin germitted or when visiting Seigne
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
Dawson
page 10.
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 38
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUED ON ANOTHER CARD:
DATES:
7/63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRE
50
elements of the Presidential Guard bad boen contacted
and then a vara early dedections during the fighting.
The Range
Corund s not contacted since Ranger Units were assigned to
olividual corps and divisions. Those designed to couɔ min
vete sotted to be loyal to that unit. The Air Force was
100 para md with the coup plottors with the exception
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page ten.
FILE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUED FROM FIRST CARD:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
The medical
plators.
of its amanding officer, Colonel Thyah Au
service, a non-coat, sos with the co
We may always codsidexed faithful to President Dien, who to
full to the exterody of the Vitacnose Byectal Forces with
Abs Quader issuing the necessary poders under davon.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 11.
STAFF:
Dawson
PILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
5b
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 39
1 Mid
OCCURRENCE:
DA Fmb 1
7/63
CATEGO
DIEM
TOP SECE
Unfortyntely, the officer, Mag (2) Thien (phonetic),
had the 1ssion to escort Captaia Ho Tan Quyen, Commanding
Officer of the maval Forces, killed the Captain prior to 1200
Hours. This early upset the timing of the pla, Fortunately,
De masiven directly to the Military
and no one knew
of his bath oncept the coup principals and the doutors Joyal
to the
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
Page 11.
Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
7/63
DIEM ✓
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
The Saigon Garrison troops, including support troops
such as quartermaster, sigoal, engineers, ste,, were contacted
through individual commanders. Victuanese Special Forces,
its dubious role as the scutie arm of the secret
police, as never contacted but was always considered by the
Qepersie es keing completely loyal to President Dien.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 10-11.
FILE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/30/7
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 40

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NGO DINH NHU
CONEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
July 11, 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that: "On July 11, 1963, NHU called the generals together for
staff meeting and shocked them by telling them that he knew of some coup planning going on
the generals. This scared the generals and other officers, needless to say, that NGO DINH
NHU would be completely aware that there was some dissidence in the ranks."
p. 20-21.
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
30 June 1975
DATE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Krulik, Major General Victor H.
Kennedy, John F.
Mendenhall, Joseph, State
National Security Council
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Diem
3/63
Higgins notes that Kennedy dispatched Krulik and Mendenhall to Viet Nam to make a tour of
the country to determine the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the war against the Viet
Cong. Returning to Washington, Krulik and Mendenhall each gave a different report on the
effect. Higgins notes that Kennedy asked wryly, "Have you two fellows been in the same
country?" Higgins goes on to note that this was indeed indicative of the American reac-
tion to Vietnam generally. Krulik, Higgins points out, visited the theatre of war by go-
ing to all core areas as well as six divisional and some twenty-five regimental and bat-
talion headquarters. But Mendenhall saw the theatre of the political intrigue, i.e.,
Hue in Saigon. These latter two areas was the only Viet Nam that Americans knew during
that time, and it was the slightly Effett, volital society whi
Nam's chronically critical and bickering intellectuals.
SOURCE:
Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite
Harper and Rowe
881
Was the haven of Viet
104-105)
STAFF:
DATE:
Dawson
10:37
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 41
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NHU, NGO DINH
CONEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
August 1963
OCCURRENCE: The coup
"aborted, because, one, they did not have necessary forces.
I'm talking about the coup plotters, did not have the necessary forces to combat those
loyal to the DIEM government, namely elements of the Marines, elements of the Rangers,
presidential guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the best
armed troops available. Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was paying to have
a coup. This was a very shrewd and calculating move on any man on the quality NGO DINH NH
who was a shrewd politician and also master of psychological warfare.
TOP SECRET
pp. 22-23
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE:
20 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES
COLBY
August 1963
DIEM
TAD SCOPET
OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that: As part of the pressure on the government in the Augus
period, in response to the fact that these SPECIAL FORCES with Vietnamese military and wit
Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagodas, CIA was directed to suspend its assist
ance to the SPECIAL FORCES. We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to the
military who were involved in that, but CIA is an easy thing to turn off, turn on and off.
The other programs are much more difficult to turn on and off. In a simple way, I think t
has had a certain influence in what they did. I know it resulted in the transfer of sever:
units outside of Saigon when we said we would continue to support them." p. 78-79
SOURCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
FILE:
DATE:
1 July 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 42
MADAME NHƯ
CONTIN
DATES:
August 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
CONEIN states that:
"Just before August 21, 1963, there were periods the
bonzes burned themselves and that there had been local press releases made by MADAME NHU
Sthat were sometimes not too well received by the Americans, and also antagonized the popul
tion."
p. 21
50955
DocId: 32423615 Page 43
TOP SECHET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM
DIEM
COLBY, WILLIAM
NGO DINH NHU, CONEIN
OCCURRENCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
31 June 1975
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
August 1963
TOP SECRET
COLBY stated that the United States sought to put pressure on President DIEM
and the government, particularly to remove NGO DINH NHU from the country, to bring about cer-
tain changes of policy in August of 1963 that was thought necessary to improve the perfor-
mance of the government of South Vietnam. Among these were the suspension of Public Law
480 aid the suspension of the commodity import program. And also through various contacts
with dissident generals, the United States was requested whether it would stand aside if
the generals ran their own coup, and they were given the response in general terms that,
"Yes, we would stand aside, and yes, we would continue the aid program if a successor gov-
ernment took over and looked reasonably able to carry on the war. This can only be read as
a green light to the generals. This message was passed through a CIA officer, but his cre-
ditentials were checked by the generals receiving this kind of a message, with the Ambassador
and with the Chief of the Military Aid group in Saigon so
that there was no question
SOURCE: about what U.S. policy was, nor that the CI officer STAFF:
was speaking for the Ambassador with his knowledge and consent."
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 10-11
FILE:
DATE:
R. DAWSON
29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
COLBY, WILLIAM
NOLTING
LODGE, Henry Cabot
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
August 1963
DIEM.
OCCURRENCE: COLBY testified that during August, 1973 between the change of ambassadors
from NOLTING to LODGE, that the government of South Vietnam took that period and raided
Buddists pagodas and essentially sought to surpress the Buddihist dissidence. COLBY stated
that DIEM went out and supressed this kind of active dissidence, justifying it in his mind
and publicly as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation, which that
country was faced with. COLBY claimed that this suppression only served to adversely affect
DIEM's image here in the United States and intensify the feeling of dissent within the educa-
ted class in Saigon and in the cities, weakened himself, rather than strengthen himself.
TOP SECRET
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 44
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 8-9
R. DAWSON
FILE:
DATE:
29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
DATES:
Aug. 7, 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
NOLTING, AMBASSADOR
RICHARDSON, JOHN
OCCURRENCE: Higgins asked Diem in an interview on August 7, 1963 whether Diem thought
the United States was plotting against him. Diem replied: "I do not think Ambassador
Nolting is plotting against me. I do not think Richardson of the CIA is plotting
against me. I know there are American officials who are preparing the way in the event
the decision is taken to try and get rid of me. I cannot forsee the future. And I
cannot believe that America would turn against an ally under attack, engaged in a struggle
for its very existence. But some people are crazy--and the world is crazy. Still,
Miss Higgins, I hope that your government will take a realistic look at these young
generals plotting to take my place. How much maturity or political understanding do
they have of their own country, let alone the world?" (169)
SOURCE:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and
SECRET
Dawson, R.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
TEM, LODGE, AMBASSADOR
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615 Page 45
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Aug. 7, 1963
DIEM
Card 1 of 2
OCCURRENCE:
During an interview by Higgins with DIEM on August 7, 1963 "...Diem
sent an aide for document, which I later deduced to be a memorandum of a recent con-
versation with an American official."
"Your ambassador, "Diem resumed, "comes and tells me that it enhances my
posture of the liberal image to permit demonstrations in the street by the Buddhists'
and the political opposition...I cannot seem to convince the embassy that this is Viet
Nam not the United States of America. We have had good reason to ban street demonstra-
tions in the middle of a war, and the reason is that the Viet Cong ane everywhere...what
would happen if the Viet Cong should infiltrate the demonstration here in Saigon, toss
What would '
liberal
a bomb, kills dozens of persons, including some American pres
opinion' say of me then? Would they believe my government when it said that the Viet
Cong were responsible for the killings because only the Communists could profit from
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,
SOURCE:
1965
FILE:
STAFF:
Dawson, R.
DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CARD TWO
OCCURRENCE:
(continuation)
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
Cand 2 of 2
such an event? Consider what happened at Hue. These plastic bombs were throw by the
Viet Cong...but whom did the Americans blame? They blamed me--
--the President of Viet
Nam and the Vietnamese Army. Would they be any more charitable next time? This is
not child's play; I am not inventing Viet Cong terror. Yet when I try to protect the
people of this country--including the Americans--by good police work, keeping control in
the streets, I am accused of persecuting the Buddhists!" (167)
TOP SECRE
SOURCE:
STAPP:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,
Dawson, R.
1965
FILE:
DATE: July 2, 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
PERSONS/ENTITIES (Milting, Amb.
Affair, Saigon Embassy]
Hilsan, Roger, Assistant Secretary of State]
DATES:
Trueheart, William] (Mechlin, Director, USIA 3/14/63
Hiet Nam-
CARD 1
CATEGORIES:
Diem ✓
Card 1 of 2
OCCURRENCE:
Higgins points out that on August 14, 1963, Hilsman, in a voice of America
broadcast, declared that the Buddhist crisis was "beginning to affect the war effort."
Higgins decided to check this story with the Saigon Embassy in approached Milting, who
was at that time in conference with Trueheart and Mechlin. Milting told Higgins that
"Our report shows that the Buddhist crisis is not having any impact at all--though,
of course, it could if riots become severe enough to necessitate diverting front-line
troups.'
"1
"We have made a special check," the Ambassador continued, of the rumor that Bud-
dhist and Catholics are eating apart an Army messes. Nothing to it. I don't know what
Hilsman based this statement on. But he isn't basing it on anything that went out of
his Embassy, the military mission, or the CIA." Mechlin suggested to Milting that
perhaps he should not publicly deny Hilsman's commenta
Milting's boss." Higgins, returning to New York
(Continued on Card 2)
SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,
Harper and Rowe
Halsman was, after all,
thereafter, called Hilsman
STAFF: Dawson
Page 46
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
DATE:
July 3, 1975
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: Card 2
Card 2 of 2
Hilsman conceded that in fact he had
to find out what was the basis for his broadcast.
based his account upon the reports in the New York Times and other press dispatches out
of Saigon. (page 124-125).
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
FILE:
STAFF:
DATE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 47
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Diem
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
14 August 1963
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
In the Current Intelligence Memorandum (OCI 2339/63):
South Vietnam" the following quotation appeared: 11
"Coup Rumors in
the coup reports
and rumors which have arisen since the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect
but
some serious coup plotting, we have no firm evidence of advanced planning
by any group to attempt to overthrow the regime . . ." (2).
SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, part C, p.2.
STAFF:
RD
FILE:
Cage
DATE:
6/28/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
8/21/63
Diem
Ball, Undersecretary of State
Helms, Richard
Colby, Wm.
OCCURRENCE:
On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied
Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial
law. At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants
from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it
was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division
that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was
pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control."
(2)
TOP
DEULI
SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, Part C
FILE:
Cage
STAFF:
RD
DATE:
6/28/75
NW 50955
Docla:32423615 Page 18
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
DATES:
8/21/63
Diem
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
On 21 August 1963, the current intelligence memorandum (OCI 2341/63):
"Coup Rumors in South Vietnam" stated that 
"additional reports of plot-
ting against the DIEM government have been 
received. While there is no
hard evidence of imminent action, the Buddhist issue continues to make the
situation dangerous." (3)
SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, Part
c, p. 3
FILE:
Cage
STAFF:
RD
DATE:
6/28/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
DINH
NGO DINH NHU, GENERAL DON
DATES:
21 August 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
OCCURRENCE:
"During the period between 21 August and the lifting of marshall law on 16
September, GENERAL DINH actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of
the DIEM regime. DINH, on approximately 31 August had the audacity to inform both President
DIEM and counsellor NHU that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himsel
NHU's reaction was to order him to Dalat for a rest." During this period of time, DINH
realized that he had been played for a dupe by DIEM. The generals would recognize this fact
and GENERAL DON started playing on DINH's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and
that, above all, should have been thanked by DIEM and NHU for saving the government.
pp. 12-13
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein
R. DAWSON
TTA
DATE.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Diem
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615 Page
DATES:
August 21, 1963 Diem
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: (card-1)
Higgins characterizes the raids *xakai on the XaLoi and
OP SECRET
on
August 21, 1963, as the turning point in American policy toward Viet Nam. She states
that this crystalizes the feelings of a powerful action inside the Kennedy Administration
that Diem had to be opposed.
"
A
raised stories from Saigon scene that had all the inventiveness of an
Oriental Ian Fleming. Soldiers in battle dress were wearing gasmasks "stormed" into
shortly after midnight.
of
bells, a blood-curdling
scream shattered the spirits
serenity. One eye witness professed to see
two monks thrown twenty feet from a balcony. Extravagant rumors about the number of
death and wounded spread like a wild malignancy.
"When the United Nations
in Viet Nam investigated the rumors in charges
(Continue to Card 2) 3 months later, he could find no evidence that anyone had been killed!
SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins
7 The
Harper and Rowe
investigators talked at length.
STAFF: Dawson
who had been
DATE:
July 2, 1975
FILE: present during the entire affair Xa Loi and elsewhere. (180-81)
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
8/21/63
Diem
Ball, Undersecretary of State
Helms, Richard
Colby, Win.
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SEGLIC
On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied
Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial
law.
At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants
from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it
was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division
that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was
pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control."
(2)
SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, Part C
FILE:
Cage
STAFF:
RD
DATE:
6/28/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 50
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DIEM
21 AUG. thru
16 SEPT.
TOP SECRET
During the period between
21 August and the lifting of martial law on 16 September, Genaral
nich patually considered himself the hero of Vista and the
sarior of the Die Karime.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
Dawson
page 12.
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GENERAL DINH
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/1/63
21 AUG. thru
16 SEPT. 163
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
Dink's
TOP SECRET
sections during this period as
Militway Governor did not endear him to the population on the
other ficers.
STAFF: Dawson
SOURCE:
Hearings, S. S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 12.
DATE: 6/30/75
FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
HILLSMAN, Roger (Assistant
Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs)
8/22/63
CIA
OCCURRENCE:
Diem
CARD 1,072
On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334), the following
message appeared: "Ref dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which Hqs.
not yet seen) states basic line to be taken and directs that it be pushed
at all levels. Hilisman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to station
pointing out this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and
who real power is. Pressing this line could maximize possibility of obtain-
ing US objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can substantially
assist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessary
drive, abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overall contingency
planning and serve as focus of build-up program. Hqs. will comment and in
SOURCE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 51
1967 I.G. Report, Part C
FILE:
Cage
STAFF:
RD
DATE:
6/28/75
i
CATEGORIES:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
HILLSMAN, Roger
(Assistant
Secretary of State for Far
8/22/63
Eastern Affairs)
CIA
OCCURRENCE:
CARD #2
FL
Diem
CARD 2 of 2
TOP SECRET
further detail after seeing message, if necessary, but passes above at
Hillsman's request." (3)
SOURCE:
STAFF:
1967 I.G. Report, part C.
2
c, p. 3
RD
DATE:
FILE:
Cage
6/28/75
NW 50955 DocId: 32423615
Page 52
СТА
RICHARDSON, John (CIA station.
chief in Saigon)
Saigon Embassy
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
8/22/63
Diem
P
TOP SECLE
On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0208) Chief of
Station RICHARDSON forwarded his personal views concerning alternate
leadership: ". . . Recent events have made us feel that hope for civilian
government to replace DIEM administration is unrealistic. The solution
seems even more improbable than ever before. Would appear that we should
have either DIEM or military junta... View time factor have not coordinated
this message with embassy but we have exchanged views fully on subject mat-
ter." (3-4)
SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, part c, pp 34
FILE:
Cage
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HILLSMAN, ROGER
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
CONEIN
STAFF:
RD
DATE:
6/28/75
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
22 or 23 August
1963
DIEM
When he arrived he found that Saigon was
OCCURRENCE: LODGE arrived on 22 or 23 August.
armed camp.
"During this period of these attacks on the pagodas, there had been many con-
tacts made by a lot of people to anybody who would listen to them talking about 
doing some
thing about doing away with the existing regime, I had talked with 
different generals and
the one in August I don't recall if it was the 23rd or 24th
, we received a cable which
later been known as the famous ROGER HILLSMAN cable which practically gave 
us the go-ahead
that this type of thing could not continue." pp. 21-22
--
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
TOP SECKER
STAFF:
DATE.
R. DAWSON
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
23 August 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
"There was a lot of talk of coups. We met with generals on different occasion
I met with them, other people had also. We had met with colonels and junior officers. Are
we anticipated that there would be some type of action taken in the latter part of August.
p. 22.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 53
UP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARRIMAN, W. Averrel (Undersecretary
of State for Political Affairs)
HELMS (Deputy Director for Plans, CIA)
RUSK, Dean (Secretary of State)
OCCURRENCE Roswell (Deputy Sec
of Defense)
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
30 June 1975
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
8/24/63
Diem ✓
TOP
On August 24, 1963, in a telephone call from HARRIMAN to HELMS at 2000
hours, HARRIMAN outlined to HELMS the substance of what eventually turned
out 
to be Deptel 243 to Saigon. In notes recorded by HELMS, in response to
HELMS query, 
"HARRIMAN confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained
an implicit pullout of American forces and support if the Nhus' were not
ousted. 
HARRIMAN said the message had been cleared with Hyannisport,) with
the Secretary of State and with Mr. 
GILPATRICK."(4)
SOURCE:
STAFF:
1967 I.G. Report, part C. p.y
C,
RD
FILE:
DATE:
6/28/75
Cage
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HILSMAN, Roger (Ass't. Sec.State for
Far Eastern Aff FE)
LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)
OCCURRENCE:
--
DATES:
25 August 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓
TOP SECRE
On August 25, 1963, in a cable from HILSMAN to LODGE (personal), sent via CIA channels
(DIR 63854), there appeared the following message:
"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest levels. Course outlined is
dangerous but all agree that delaying clear cut US stand is even more dangerous. It won't
be easy for you, but be assured we will back you all the way." (5)
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 54
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 5
PART C
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
28.6.75
CIA
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, Henry Cabot
DATES:
25 Aug. 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECI
SECRET
Es
In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855), of August 25, 1963, the following message appeared:
"FYI CIA not consulted re cable being sent separately, which however cleared at highest
levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek
ways accomplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact text, understand it invites
LODGE final judgment.
Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away
bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. Thus
suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same
time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we
probably unable to affect it.) This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least
interim period. . . ." (7)
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 7
STAFF: Dawson
ERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
ICHARDSON, Saigon Chief of Station 25 August 1963
LA NH, General (SVN)
EM
PERA, CIA officer in Saigon
OCCURRENCE:
2
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECI
CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291), the following message appears on August 25, 1963:
CHIEF OF STATION RICHARDSON reports that GENERAL KHANH requested an immediate meeting with
RA Can officer of the CIA Saigon Station). At the meeting KHANH requested assurances that
e U.S. Government would support the VIETNAMESE ARMY if it should move against the DIEM
SCHIME." (7)
age 55
SOURCE:
FILE:
CIA
I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 7
PART C
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 28.6.75
DATES:
26 August 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
COD SEADET
TOP
On August 26, 1963, in a CIA document entitled "ONE Staff Memorandum, No. 60-63, Internal ONE
Working Paper, CIA 
Distribution Only, the following statement appears:
11.
"On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US interests and attainment
of US objectives 
in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Communist
nationalists with sufficient 
military support to obviate prolonged civil war.
Such a group
night not 
prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might eventually prove no better
than the present regime
. Such a development would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist
nationalist elements 
to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors of
bast years, months, and weeks. 
In such a fresh start, we believe, lies the only viable hope
For the attainment of US 
interests and objectives in South Vietnam." (8)
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 8
STAFF:
FILE:
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HELMS, Richard
LODGE, Henry Cabot
DATES:
CARTER, Gen. Marshall KENNEDY, John F. 26 August 1963
ENHU
DIEM
CIA
DEPTEL 243
FELT, ADM. Harry D. (CINCPAC)
OCCURRENCE:
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
☑On August 26, 1963, HELMS' record of a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, is below. The other
CIA participant was GENERAL MARSHALL CARTER, DDCI.
The question was raised as to whether there had been such a significant change in the Vietnam
situation that it really appeared desirable to dump the NHU's and possibly DIEM himself. Prin-
"cipal points discussed were: ADMIRAL FELT's concern over the dangers inherent in the current
US action in South Vietnam; the fact that LODGE had not seen DIEM to discuss the future role
of the NHU's%; the meaning of the phrase 'give direct support to military commanders' in DEPTEL
243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the action taken over the weekend
failed. The PRESIDENT asked for another session on August 27 with participants to present
biographic data on key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession." (8-9)
STAFF: Dawson
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 8-9
FILE:
DATE: 28.6.75
SONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
CIA
RICHARDSON, John
KHIEM
MINH
26 Aug. 1963
DIEM
CONEIN
SPERA
KHAOCCURRENCE:
In a CIA cable from Saigon on August 26, 1963 (SAIG 0330),
TOP SECDET
"RICHARDSON reports the results of the CONEIN/SPERA approaches to the generals.
KHANH said he was not yet ready, and KHIEM said he would have to 
check with MINH."
In essence,
(9)
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 9
STAFF: Dawson
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, John F.
HELMS (DD/P)
COLBY, William"
CARTER
LODGE, Henry Cabot
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
HARKINS (MAC/V)
CIA
27 Aug. 1963
DEPTEL 243
CATEGORIES:
OP SECRET
On August 27, 1963, there was a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. The record was taken by
HELMS or by COLBY for the CIA, and the other CIA participants were CARTER and HELMS:
"The PRESIDENT stated that a coup should not be attempted unless it would be successful and
asked whether we could turn back at this point. The PRESIDENT asked that the judgment of
LODGE and HARKINS be sought on the prospects for victory or defeat of a coup. A cable was
drafted asking if they still agreed with their concurrences to DEPTEL 243." (9-10)
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 57
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 9-10
STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 28.6.75
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DEPTEL 243
DEPTEL 256
27 Aug. 1963
DIEM
KENNEDY, John F.
LODGE, Henry Cabot
FILE:
HARKINS, John (Commander, MAC/V)
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 256), on August 27, 1963, the following message appeared:
•
"Examination of reports to date gives considerable hope but leaves unanswered questions.
Proceeding from the concept outlined in DEPTEL 243 
as modified, now desire your prompt interim
appraisal of present prospects. . .
of developing 
situation, presently favor operation as currently planned by generals.
Highest authority asks 
whether you and HARKINS
, in light
to give you all possible support in best available 
course but not to insist on any decision
We 
wish
that developing evidence makes it wise to modify." (10)
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10
STAFF: Dawson
FILE:
TERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
31 August. '63
11/1/63
DIEMC
GEN. DINH
COUNSELLER NHU
DocId: 32423615
Page 58
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President
Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial
post for himself.
SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
pages 12-13.
STAFF: Dawson
FILE:
UNS/ENTITIES:
RICHARDSON, John
DATE: 6/30/75
DATES:
28 Aug. 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
1 August 28, 1963, RICHARDSON reports in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0363) that:
Situation here has reached point of no return....Unless the generals are neutralized before
ing able to launch their operations, we believe they will act and that 
they have a good
ance to win....We all understand that the effort 
must succeed and that 
whatever needs to
done on our part 
must be done...." (10)
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10
ILE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
HARKINS
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
HELMS, Richard
29 Aug. 1963
DIEM
TOP SECRET
CIA
Docfd: 3242
KENNEDY, John F.
OCCURRENCE:
At a NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam on August 29, 1963,
with a record taken by DD/P HELMS, shows that
The consensus was that HARKINS should confirm to the generals that the approaches from CIA
were bona fide and represented the views 
of the US government.
better information 
was needed on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether
There was agreement that
It was militarily feasible. A telegram giving 
the sense of the meeting was drafted for
RESIDENTIAL approval. (12)
(Other CIA participants were not identified.) (12)
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12
FILE:
STAFF: Dawson
DATE:
28.6.75
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
BUNDY, McGeorge
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
RUSK, Dean
NSC Exec. Com.
28 Aug. 1963
DIEM
MCNAMARA, Robert
TAYLOR, Maxwell
LODGE, Henry Cabot
HARKINS, John
OCCURRENCE:
FOLD
On August 28, 1963, the PRESIDENT met privately with RUSK, MCNAMARA, TAYLOR, and McGEORGE
BUNDY. He reported to the rest of the NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE merely that three telegrams
were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to LODGE from the PRESIDENT, a general message
from the DEPARTMENT to the AMBASSADOR, and a telegram from TAYLOR to HARKINS. (11)
(This is reflected in notes taken by HELMS (DD/P) of the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam. Other CIA participants are not identified.) (11)
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11
FILE:
STAFF: Dawson
DATE:
28.6.75
11: RUSK
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
JOHNSON, Lyndon B.
MCNAMARA
BUNDY
30 Aug. 1963
DIEM
HELMS
CARTER
COLBY
A.
OCCURRENCE:
TOD SECRET
August 30, 1963, there was a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, with HELMS, CARTER,
and 
COLBY participating. The record is provided by 
C/FE COLBY which shows that:
N
"BUSK referred to recent cable traffic and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing
with or what they were planning. MCNAMARA pointed 
out that there was some question whether
the generals ever did have a plan. BUNDY said he 
had re-read the earlier traffic and noted
that they never said they did. GEN. CARTER said 
he believed that the general's coup was not
12 kely at this stage and that in another week we will 
be approximately where we were before
He attack on the Buddhist temples. BUNDY suggested we 
consider additional contingencies
efore the GROUP and whether the assumption that 
NIU is impossible is well founded." (13)
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13
FILE:
STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 28.6.75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
JOHNSON, Lyndon B.
COLBY
HARKINS
CARTER
31 Aug. 1963
DIEM
RUSK
HELMS
MCNAMARA
LODGE
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
At a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on August 31, 1963, a record by C/FE COLBY reflects
that:
"RUSK suggested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam situation made us think of a coup
and what might be done to improve conditions in Vietnam. MCNAMARA suggested the first re-
quirement was reestablishment of communication between LODGE and HARKINS. RUSK directed
that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to what we might ask the GVN
to 
do." 
(14)
DDCI CARTER and DD/P HELMS also participated.)
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 14
STAFF:
Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
RKINS
HEM
ODGE
HOCCURRENCE:
ني
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
31 Aug. 1963
DIEM
TOP SECRET
August 31, 1963, in the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities, the
lowing report appears:
GENERAL HARKINS was authorized to meet with KHIEM to give KHIEM assurances of USG backing.
HEM showed a reluctance to talk and suggested that HARKINS meet with GENERAL MINH. KIEM
дmented that MINH had called off the planning and was working on other methods which KHIEM
ld not describe. KHIEM further stated that the generals were not ready as they did not have
nough forces under their control. HARKINS decided not to give KHIEM assurances which he had
een authorized to impart. LODGE approved HARKINS' decision on 31 August after HARKINS re-
orted." (13)
SOURCE:
I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
State Department
Defense Department
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
STAFF: Dawson
DATE:
28.6.75
Fall 1965
Diem
McCone
CATEGORIES:
Colby stated that the "...in this situation we were having almost daily
meetings with senior officials in the CIA, State Department, Defense De-
partment and so forth, in the basement of the White House and there was
no question that this was national policy and hammered out. ...at these
meetings, these were the meetings at which Mr. McCone and I argued very
strongly that we should not move against the Diem government we should
continue to work with it."
Page 36
TOP SECRET
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 62
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Fall 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
"
CONEIN stated that; there was dissidence within the coup group, the people who
were going to pull the coup and one general didn't like the other general. The best way I
can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese generals sitting and talking to you, one general
would talk, walk out of the room to go to the "john", two would tell you, don't trust that
one, and finally the one who had out-waited the other two, there would be one left, and he
would say, don't trust those two. p. 31
"
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
July 1, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STATE DEPARTMENT
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Fall 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "I would say that the embassy's position, the political
section and the ambassador, was much more sympathetic to the proposition that the war coul
not successfully be conducted with President DIEM still in power without a major change in
his style of operation. However, there is an additional factor, this which was the public
pressure on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and the United States, and
think this public pressure was felt particular by the people in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUN
and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT."
P. 61
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
COLBY
General HARKINS
Fall 1963
DIEM
LODGE, H.C.
NSC
NW 50955
stated
OCCURRENCE: Mr. COLBY that:
"The Defense Department was almost totally in a position the
the wars in the countryside, that the countryside seems to be going along reasonably well,
that this (DIEM's continuance in office) is an urban problem, urban political problem which
should not interfere with the main things going on. This was true of the Secretary and
General HARKINS out there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth".
P. 62
DocId: 32423615
Page 63
STAFF:
R. Dawson
DATE:
1 July 1975
SOURCE:
TOP SECRET
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
Fall 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
COLBY stated in response to a question as to whether there was any serious.
attempt to persuade DIEM to leave office voluntarily that: "There had certainly been dis-
cussions to have NHU leave Vietnam at various times". But, "there was almost no direct
P. 66
contact between our ambassador LODGE and President DIEM, very little contact.
NHU
LODGE, H.C.
COLBY
TOP SECRET
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY
NW 50955
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Fall 1963
DIEM
NSC
STATE DEPARTMENT
OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the public pressure that was brought upon or was felt by
the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT was "one of distast
for President DIEM." p. 61
DocId: 32423615 Page 64
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
FILE:
STAPP:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
1 July 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY
PRESIDENT KENNEDY
GENERAL KRULAK
MR. MENDELHAY
DATES:
Fall 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that: "The most dramatic way in which this was posed, this has
been described publicly a number of times, was that at one time, particularly with the
frustrating period the President (Kennedy) faced with these two strong positions, he sent
two officers, one a General Krulak, who was an assistant to Secretary McNamara and a Mr.
Mendelhay, who had formerly been the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about
five days to make an assessment on the spot and they came back to the camera room, and one
sat on one end of the room and one sat on the other and General Krulak first said he had be
to 20 provinces and talked to 20 provinces and 30 military chiefs and all that sort of thir
and the war business (was) going on basically and there were some problems, but the thing
was that they seemed to have a strategy and they seemed to be moving along on it, then
Mendelhay said he went to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants and political
people, and all the rest of it and there was a general feeling that the cause hopeless be-
cause there was so much distaste for President DIEM and so much opposition, and the general
feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, looked at them and
SOURCE: Sand, dy you twis felles
to the same country? Hond the
answer is they did.
They twokal ut two different
yo
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
PTIE.
2.
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE.
NW
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Eh, Tonthat
Hu, Ngo Dinh
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
9/63
☑Diem
TOP SECRE
OCCURRENCE:
Conein stated that Diem and Nhu did not understand Dinh's role as a double
Cent.
Diem or Nhu had planned to have a Bravo I and a Bravo IT that Diem
☑Nhu would have their own coup and go down to Vongtau as if they were
caping and there would immediately be a counter-coup to bring Diem--all
stigated by Nhu back to power by popular acclamation. So on November 1
1 p.m. in the afternoon when troops were moving it was assumed by Diem
d Nhu that this was part of Diem's plan to have a counter-comp.
Page 66-68.
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSC,
Conein, June 20, 1975
STAFF:
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
7/1/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
CONEIN
DINH
GENERAL DON
HUAN, Commanding Officer, Military
OCCURREademy at Delat
September 1963 DIEM
DON promised DINH that he would personnaly speak to the President on DINH's
behalf and that he would ask that DINH be granted the Ministry of Interior, while he, DON,
would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. DINH believed that DON had his personal
interest at heart and DON did in fact make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his
government, but made the proposal in such a way that it would have been impossible for DIEM
or NHU to accept. Deadlines were given. DINH was informed that the President would give hi
the ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and DINH had not received what he tho-
ught was his proper recognition, GENERAL DON and other officers including HUAN continued to
lend sympathy to DINH. while DINH was still waiting for his ministerial post. p. 13
SOURCE:
TOP SECRET
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein
DATE:
DAWSON
June 20 1075
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GENERAL MINH
KHIEM
LODGE, Hey! CABOT
DON, GENERAL
CONFIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
September 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: "During the month of September, there was still more talk of coups, and at th
time, the month of September, I had been told by Ambassador LODGE that I 
was to monitor co
I had conveyed messages 
to BIG MINH
planning only....That I was to convey any messages.
on two occasions, GENERAL KHIEM on one occasion.
on another occasion. On several occasions, I had met with GENERAL DON and other military
leaders." p. 23
I had met with GENERAL KHIEM and BIG MIN
TOP SEGHET
50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 66
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
RICHARDSON, John
DIEM
NHU
CIA
COL. TUNG
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
2 Sept. 1963
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
20 June 1975
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
TOE
CEADET
on September 2, 1963,
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523),/the I.G. REPORT provides the following summary:
"RICHARDSON cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that DIEM and the NHU's are fully aware
that the USG encouraged the GENERALS to attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of
this encouragement. He judged there was an even possibility that all major programs could
go forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the Stations future relationships with
COL. TUNG. He noted his dissatisfaction with TUNG as a GVN liaison vehicle through which to
conduct PM programs, but noted that the GVN had offered no alternative. Unless we were willing
to discontinue our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must continue to work with
TUNG. 【NOTE: PM programs paramilitary programs]
======
"The Times of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting and financing a coup
and was giving asylum to the chief anti-DIEM Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widely
played by the New York Daily News, the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other prominent
SOURCE:
newspapers. (15-16)
AÄINEN
ACD
-7
STAFF:
Dawson
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, John F.
HELMS
COLBY
RUSK
LEDGE
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
NHU
BUNDY
MADAME NHƯ
6 Sept. 1963
DIEM
At a PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the fol-
lowing summary:
N
RUSK stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out
the necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth-
coming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction.
HUSK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MADAME NHU but
expressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK
commented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT
replied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16
STAFF:
Dawson
FILE:
DATE: 28.6.75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
TENNEDY, John F.
R&MS
CLBY
USK
GE
COCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
NHU
BUNDY
MADAME NHU
6 Sept. 1963
DIEM
TOP
AL
to a PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the fol-
owing summary:
2
FOSK stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out
he necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth-
oming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction.
USK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MADAME NHU but
xpressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK
mented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT
eplied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)
SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16
FILE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
28.6.75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
Special Forces
CIA payments
CIA
8 Sept. 1963
Tung, Col.
DIEM
Bell, David
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
On 8 September 1963 wire services in prominent newspapers carried a story that the
Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on the 21 August were still being
paid secretly by CIA. This story was attributed to a highly reliable source in
Washington and gave details of support to Col. Tung in the amount of $3,000,000
annually, and of payment of $250,000 on 3 September. The story was datelined in
Washington and in Manila. David Bell warned in a television interview that the
U.S. Congress might cut pack aid to Vietnam unless the Diam government changed
its policy.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) P. 17
Dawson
و
DATE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Krula PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
Cowlack, Victor Gen., Mendenhall, Jos. A. 10 Sept. 1963
Counterinsurgency Specialists UN Advisor
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Rusk, Dean Sec. of State
McCone John DCI
OCCURRENCE:
Bureau Far Eastern
Affairs
Kennedy, JohnF,
Richardson, John
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
At a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with Carter and Colby in attendance, the
following record by Colby is provided of the meeting of September 10, 1963.
His 
conclusions were 
that the
General Grack reported his findings in Vietnam.
war was going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Vietcong war could be won
the
if current U.S. military and socological programs are continued. Mendenhall,
Ştate representative who accompanied Slack, expressed the view that 
there 
was
complete breakdown of the Siagon civilian government in the security situations in
the provinces had deteriorated. The President asked where the two gentlemen had been
insame country. Rusk suggested that the focus be on what happened in July and August
Mr. McCone talked 
from a
that reversed the optimistic judgments in May and June.
personal telegram which he had received Richardson recommending against any cut in aid.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19
Page 69
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
Diem
Richardson, Chief of Station CIA Siagon
DIEM
10 Sept 1963
OCCURRENCE:
On 10 September 1963 in a cable from the CIA station in Siagon (SAIG0760) to
Washington, the following quotation appears: "Am inclined to feel general officers
will seek evolutionary accomodation with Diem, (if he permits them to do so)
unless overall situation clearly deteriorates, there
is breakdown of civil order or of governmental machinery, or unless war effort
begins to go backward seriously (despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21 August
am inclined to believe we should be able to resume successful prosecution of war
in military and civil sections) do not align myself with the view that USG should
suspend aid ".
V
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19
STAFF:
Dawson
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 70
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Kennedy, John F. President
CIA
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
10 Sept. 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
On 10 September 1963, in an interview by Huntley and Brinkley, the President denied
the charge that the CIA makes its own policy.
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19
FILE:
Bundy,
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Colby
McCone
McNamarra
Kennedy,
President
DATES:
DIEM
10 Sept. 1963
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council executive meeting on Vietnam, with
Bundy
Carter and Colby participating for the CIA, Colby provided the 
following record:
stressed the need to unify U.S. government posture, 
to coordinate press guidance 
and to
control outgoing messages to Saigon. He emphasized 
the importance of following the
President's guidance on this delicate problem, 
in spite of intensly differing views 
of
What should be done and how, the risk, minimum 
objectives, and facts. McNamarra stated
that his position was virouously against throwing 
out this government without seeing
Mr. McCone commented that the problem
an alternative and that none appeared to exist
.
Bundy
was not so much the existance of an alternative as to how to put one into power.
summarized the President's position as one in which we 
must express our 
reservations
as to mistakes and misdeeds of Diem but not be a 
position where we can not deal with
him further.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Richardson, John
Weede, General
CIA Station Siagon
11 Sept 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0797) Richardson
reported that the country team attempted to agree on a six page summary cable to answer
cable from the department requesting views. The team was unable to agree even on the
Nirst three pages of the summary. Weed and Richardson dissented on the basis of the
Draft summary was too sweeping and too negative including definitively about the country
On an inadequate basis of data. He said: "in some ways we seem to have reached the
point in the official American community, where if you think we can win with the present
government, you are simply not running in the right direction with the majority."
71
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 20
FILE:
McCone
Colby
Rusk
Bundy
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Lodge
Nhu
DATES:
11 Sept 1963
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 meeting of the National SEcurity Council
Executive Committee meeting on Vietnam, the record taken by Colby (with McCone also
being present for the CIA) the following appears: "Rusk said he believed that we were
not likely to achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminte Nhu. At the same
time he was not willing to say that Diem should go, he saw no alternative. Rusk commented
that we should work with Lodge on Diem to take over the real leadership and become the
real President. McCone suggested also the desirability of negotiating with Diem. Bundy
read off a CIA suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
Godge, Ambassador Henry Cabot
11 Sept 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
In a state telegram from Saigon (SAIG478) Lodge provided the following reflection on
The situation: "My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is (a) that
t is worsening rapidly; (b) the time has arrived for the U. S. to use what effective
Sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing government and the installation
Of another; and (c) that intensive study should be given by the best brains of the
government to all the details, procedures and variants in connection with suspension
of aid."
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 21
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
McCone
Coloy
bibun
Hillsman
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Kennedy, John F. Tung
McNamarra
Lodge
Diem
DIEM
11 Sept 63
OCCURRENCE: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants
being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that
Mr. McCone commented
Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon.
that he believed that we should move cautiosly, that we should talk seriously to Diem
and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic
view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach
The President asked whether we
be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure.
had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid. (as proposed in a paper prepared
The President
by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies.
asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent
to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some
real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the
Preside;URCould be well informed of any steps taken in this contextsuch as the
-contpar
instance involving CTA payment to Col Tung last week.
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
✓ Shellman, Huntington
Truehart, William, DCN
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Don, General
DocId: 32423615
Page 73
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
13 Sept 1963
DIEM
In a CIA cable from Saigon on 13 September 1963 (SAIG0890) Hungtington Shellman who
visited Saigon reported his views of the situation in Vietnam. He included as part of
his report the substance of a discussion with DON\Truehart: "The Ambassador is
considering charging McVey with making the approach to SV military. He mentioned Gen.
Don, to attempt to stimulate early coup action with appropriate U.S. assurances. I
inquired had Ambassador made such a proposal to Washington and was told this was within
Lodge's authority."
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 22
DAWSON
FILE:
DATE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Halberstan, David
McCone, John, DCI
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
15 Sept. 1963
1
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
CHADER
17
On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence
Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members
of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their
chief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence
gathering.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Dawson
NW 50955 DoeId: 32423615
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Eberstan, David,
Cone, John, DCI
igon Station
$
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
15 Sept. 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence
Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members
of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their
Thief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence
gathering.
74
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 23
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Richardson, John
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
16 Sept 1963
DIEM
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to
Washington's request for his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain
ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He
cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long
as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with
respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly
tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious
and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders
willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully
explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure
These measures would be
Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed.
more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)"
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24
STAFF:
Dawson
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Richardson, John
Diem
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
16 Sept 1963
DIEM
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to
Washington's request for his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain
ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He
cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long
as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with
respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly
tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious
and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders
willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully
explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure
Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures would be
more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)"
Page 75
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
610717
CATEGORIES:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
Smith, David R.
CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963
Sept 17, 1963
DIEM
Richardson, John
Lodge
Dunn, Mike
OCCURRENCE:
In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17, 1963, he reported
"Smith (discuss 
with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson
(Mike Dunn) 
had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one
occasion 
Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can run the stations for
a 
temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?' "
STAFF:
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Smith, David R.
CATEGORIES:
DATES:
Sept 17, 1963
DIEM
Lodge
Saigon Station
CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963
Richardson, John
Dunn, Mike
OCCURRENCE:
In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17, 1963, he reported
"Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson
(Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one
occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can run the stations for
a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?' "
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 76
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24
FILE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean
McCone, John
Sept 19, 1963
DIEM
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Richardson, John
OCCURRENCE:
In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk
that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale (replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish
to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your
desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would
not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to
abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced
We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead
us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a
replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may
occur even before you receive this letter....."
SOURCE:
☐ TIG.
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25
STAFF:
Dawson
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 77
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Kennedy, John F.
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Sept. 19, 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
On September 19, 1963 in a state telegram from Saigon (544) Lodge stated to the President
that "I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove the prosent government in
the immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as
an interim measure pending such eventuality.
substantative changes. "
Frankly, I see no opportunity at all for
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24-25
FILE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/25/75
CATEGORIES:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean
McCone, John
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Richardson, John
OCCURRENCE:
Saigon Station
Sept 19, 1963
DIEM
In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk
that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale (replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish
to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your
desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would
not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to
abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced.
We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead
us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a
replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may
occur even before you receive this letter.... . "
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25
STAFF:
Dawson
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 78
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
McCone
CIA Subcommittee on House Armed Services
Sept. 23, 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
On September 23, 1963, the McCone briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services.
He told them that the agency was urging a slow cautious approach to the 
problem of
ousting the Diem regime and that there appeared to be no replacement 
for the then
current regime that was capable of running the government.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
16/25/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NHU
DINH
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
October 1963
DIEM
COLONEL TUNC
CONEIN
OCCURRENCE: DINH's desire to become a Minister was greater than his allegiance to President
His facile, 
and at times
DIEM. He became the actual key to the success of the coup.
brilliant mind, was used to the general's advantage in that GENERAL DINH convinced President
DIEM that he, General DINH, along with COLONEL TUNG, should be given blanket 
orders to be
a counter-coup force. DINH also convinced TUNG to move four of his 
principal airborne 
com-
panies on a bootless operation outside of Saigon on 29 and 30 October
, so that these troops
DINH is the Minister of Security 
in the provisional
would not be present on 1 November.
government. p. 13
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein
DATE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615 Page 79
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
October 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that he looked upon his job as conveying orders from his am-
bassador to the people that were planning the coup and to monitor those people who were
planning the coup, and to get as much information so that our government would not be caught
with their pants down. He did agree not to thwart the coup and in fact, to supply economic
and military assistance if the coup succeeded, but did not conceive his objective the en-
couragement or the promotion of the coup, nor did he ever discuss the possibility of dis-
couraging the coup. CONEIN stated that if the United States had now shown any interest or
remained neutral in opposing DIEM, there would have been a coup anyway.
pp. 38-41
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DINH
MINH
DON
COLONEL CO, Dinh's Deputy
DATES:
Early October
1963
DIEM
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
July 1, 1975
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
When the ministerial post for DINH did not materialize by early October, the
coup principals realized that they had DINH actively thinking against the regime. It is
evident from statements during the series of meetings with GENERAL DON and GENERAL 
MINH 
dur-
ing the month of October that they still did not trust DINH, but felt they had 
compromised
him sufficiently with his troops, and, if necessary to eliminate DINH if he showed 
any 
sign
of compromising the generals. DINH was surrounded by officers who surveilled 
him 24 hours 
a
day including CO, his deputy. p. 13
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
COLBY, WILLIAM
DATES:
October, 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "The CIA officer (CONEIN) received a call on October 30
(1963) to come over and join the general staff and come to the meeting and essentially
sat with them as they continued the operation from thereon. They didn't move to the de-
cision to run the coup and he sat in the headquarters during most of the time. He went home
at one point, etc."
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 11-12
R. DAWSON
DATE:
29 June 1975
FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Conein
Gen. Don
Gen. Duong Van Minh
Gen. Ton That Dinh
Ngo Dinh Nhu
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Oct. 2, 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓
TOP SEGRE
Conein/Gomeral Don moeting at Nha Tawag with the
following significant points (2) Conexal Drong Van
Min desired a private conversation with Convein;
(b) General Ton What Dinh (Commanding Conoral, III
Corps) (realised he had been duped by Dloa Covera-
ment during his tenure as Military Governor of
Baigte betroen 21 August and 16 September 1953;
(c) Generals, during the mouth of September 1903,
subuitted a request to President Dida to accord
the positions in different ministrios which they
not cxpert Dion to honer; (4) Ion stated that
SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One. p. 4
CONTINUED ON NEXT
CARD
STAFF: Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 81
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: CONTINUED FROM LAST CARD:
TOP SECRET
the Generals Low have 2 plan; (e) prior to
General Dich's press conference of FD August, an
unidentified Viotnadese civillan told Counsellor
Ngo Dinh Nho that the Americans wave contacting
various Vetermoso in order to quoy28ge a coup
Don was called by Nha and shown a list prepared
by bu Dondag Sunvicams engaged in coup plotting;
Conda's Dane was not on the list.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId:32423615 Page 82
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
AMBASSADOR LODGE
CONEIN
GEN. DUONG VAN MINH
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
10/3/63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP
SECRET
Ambassador Lodge Deproved Conein's reeting with
General Dong Van Minh
SOURCE:
STAFF: Dawson
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, p.4.
FILE:
DATE: 6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
McNamarra
Lodge
McCone
Richardson
Smith
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct 3-4,1963
DIEM ✓
TOP
SECRE
On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what
I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think
of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA
cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared:". it is clear that
Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 20 hours...". In a
comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head-
quarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon
Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."
-
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
LODGE
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Dept. of State
MCNAMARRA
TAYLOR
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
5 Oct 1963
D
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
TOP SEODEE
On 5 October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534) it was stated as a fourth
instruction that the Ambassador should continue his 
policy of "cool correctness "toward
GPN.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 83
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
McNamarra
Lodge
McCone
Richardson
Suith
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
STAFF:
DATE:_
CATEGORIES:
Oct 3 4,1963
DIEM
On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what
I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think
of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA
cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared:"....it is clear that
Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 20 hours...". In a
comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head-
quarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon
Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 84
LODGE
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Dept. of State
MCNAMARRA
TAYLOR
DATES:
5 Oct 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
On 5 October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534)it was stated as a fourth
instruction that the Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness "toward
GPN.
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
WHITEHOUSE
OCCURRENCE:
STAFF:
DATE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
October 5,
1963
In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears:
"...Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give
any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with
closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with
possible alternative leadership as it appears...."
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30
STAFF:
Dawson
NW 50955 DocId:32423615
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓
October 5,
1963
In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears:
"... Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should 
be taken to give
any active, covert encouragement to 
a coup.
closest security under broad 
guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with
It should be urgent 
covert effort with
possible alternative leadership as it appears.
"
Page 85
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30
MILE.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Kennedy, John F.
Colby, William
Commodity import Program
McCone
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
STAFF:
Dawson
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 5, 1963
DIEM
On 5 October there was a Presidential meeting on Vietnam. The only CIA participant was
McCone. He provided the following record. The meeting was held to discuss matters that
DCI said it was 
the
became the subject of DEPTEL 5/34 (See later entry of 5 October.)
opinion of CIA with the exception of Colby, Chief Fareast Division, that fiddling with
the commodity import program as a political lever would be much more likely to create
an economic crisis undermining the war effort than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more
cocperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning
of the Vietnamese business community and quickly engender inflationary measures at
large of a more serious nature. It was the concensus of the meeting that some meaningful
political movements had to be made but exactly what they should be was not 
determined.
SOURCE:
TC Report 1967 (CTA) p. 27
STAFF:
Dawton
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
SMITH, DAVID
CONIN
LODGE
MINH
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct 5, 1963
DJEM
OCCURRENCE:
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1447) of 5 October 1963, DAVE SMITH, the Acting Chief of
Station cabled that he had discussed this latest CONEIN/MINH meeting with Ambassador
LODGE and DCN TRUEHART. SMITH reported that he had recommended to Ambassador LODGE
that: "we do not set ourselves errovacably against the assassignation plot, since
the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or protracted struggle
which can rip the Army and the country asunder."
SOURCE:
FILE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.28
TOP SEMPAT
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
Page 86
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Nhu, Ngo Dinh Conein
Cân, Ngo Dinh Lodge
Diem
Minh, General
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Oct 5, 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
✓
FAD SECRET
On October 5, 1963 in a CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG1445) it was stated that the
meeting with Conein (approved by Ambassador in October) General Minh requested a
statement of the U.S. Position with respect to a change in the GVN in the near future.
He said he did not expect U.S.G. support of a coup effort but did need USG assurances
that USG would not try to thwart his plans. He outlined three possible plans for the
accomplishment of the change of government: (a) assassinationof Ngo Din Nhu and Ngo
AN
Dinh Cin, keeping President Diem in office%3B (b) encirclement of Saigon by various
military units%; and (c) direct confrontation between military units involved in the
coup and loyalist military units.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 27-28
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
ODGE, HENRY CABOT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
KENNEDY, ROBERT F..
DIEM, MC CONE, JOHN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
FOR SECRET
5 or 6 Oct.
1963
DIEM
COCCURRENCE: MC CONE recalled a meeting with President KENNEDY and Attorney General
ROBERT F. KENNEDY had with him on or about October 5 or 6, 1963. The Attorney General was
'rather non-committal in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together, and he said,
John, are you sure you are right? And I said, I think I am and he said I'm rather surprised
at the position you took. And I said, well, you didn't disagree with it..."(T) This dis-
cussion had nothing to do with assassinations. This was whether we should let the coup go
or use our influences not to. Then interestingly enough, the President sent a series of mes-
gages to CABOT LODGE urging that he'd do all that he could to get DIEM to change his ways.
CABOT LODGE's first attempt failed and then he was called CABOT LODGE was called by DIEM's
Office and DIEM said, you tell the President to tell me what he wants me to do and I'll do
it. Unfortunately, the forces were surrounding the palace at that very moment and the coup
was on. It was a kind of a dramatic little part of the history of that tragedy."
SOURCE:
-
STAFF:
FILE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 6, 1975, McCone, pp. 63-64
R. DAWSON
DATE:
29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KAHN, CONEIN, LODGE, TRUHART,
NGO DINH KAHN
SMITH, DAVID
COLBY, WILLIAM, MC CONE,
JOHN
DATES:
WM.
5-7 Oct. 1963
OCCURRENCE: COLBY testified as
ber 1963 which reads as follows:
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
to the events surrounding the cable from Saigon of 5 Octo-
"We do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assass-
ination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon, or a pro-
And the response on
tracted struggle which could rip the army and the country 
asunder."
"MC CONE 
directs that you withdraw
6 October 1963 which COLBY wrote for MC CONE 
as follows:
recommendation to Ambassador concerning assassination plan under MC CONE instructions as we
cannot be in a position to actively condone such course 
of action thereby endangering our
our responsibility, therefore COLBY explained that 
this second message he drafted was to
eliminate assassination as an alternative. COLBY 
stated that the assassination of DIEM's
A reply was sent on October 
7
other brothers NHU and KAHN, NGO DINH KAHN, were to continue
.
from Saigon in response to the MC CONE cable saying that action was taken as directed, mean-
ing that the Ambassador had been so informed to 
withdraw the recommendation."
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 12-17
R. DAWSON
FILE:
DATE:
29 June 1975
MCCONE
LODGE
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
SMITH
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Oct 6, 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR73661of 6 Oct) the following appears: "... MCCONE directs
that you withdraw recommendations from Ambassador (concerning assassignation plan)
under MCCONE instructions as we can not be inposition actively condoning such course
of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore."
Page 88
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 28
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
TRUEHART
LODGE
MCCONE
SMITH
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Oct 7, 1963
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
In a response to the CIA cable of Oct. 6, 1963, to Saigon, the station in Saigon
responded (SAIG1463 7 Oct): "Action taken as directed." In addition since DCM
TRUEHART was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal
recommendation at MCCONE's instruction was also conveyed to TRUEHART.
LODGE commented that he shares MCCONE'S opinion."
Ambassador
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 29
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
BUNDY
COLBY
JOHNSON
KILPATRICK
OCCURRENCE:
MCCONE
10/8/63
DIEM
SPECIAL GROUP
On October 8, 1963 at a special group meeting the DCI expressed concern that there
was a lack of intelligence coverage during the period when "the U.S.
was maintaining
a posture of almost no official contact at top levels." They refer to the fact
Mr. MCCONE also referred
that NHU and DIEM are not being contacted by Americans.
to "theorientation of (Saigon) station functions." Mr. BUNDY pointed out that "for
Americans to resume top level contacts at this time would appear to represent
a political rapprochement. Ambassador LODGE might feel that this was running
counter to his policy." The Group gave its approval to the basis realignment of
station functions. (The nature of such functions are not outlined.)
உ
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 89
SOURCE:
STAFFH DUAL
k
Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct.17, 1963
Kelley
DATE:
FILE:
6/28/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Tung, Col.
Phillips, Rusus, AID
Colby, William
Smith, David
Acting Chief of Station
Siagon after 10/5/63
Oct 8, 1963
DIEM
Richardson, John "Jocko "Aid to Diem Regime
OCCURRENCE:
On 8 September 1963, the CIA IG report reflects in a comment that the U.S.
government publicly confirmed on Oct. 8, 1963 that aid had alraady been cut
quitely and over a period of some months. Bill Colby, Jock Anderson and Dave Smith
told us that the public announcement of the aid reduction was a signal to the
general and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that
that
the cut in aid was deliberately planned to spur the generals on, but if so,
intention did not find its way into the record. The nearest thing to it is in the
record of a presidential meeting of 10 September 1963. The President asked
Rufus Phillips of AID what specific actions Phillips recommended and he suggested
"cutting aid to Colonel Tung which would be viewed by the generals with much
enthusiasm as an indication of virgouous of American position. " "In general,
ald cuts were discussed in terms of bring pressure on Diem to make needed changes in
his SOURCE ever planned, or however looked upon by the US/ won, it is
clear that the Vietnamese considered the official confirmation of
token of their support of coup planning.
UTI.
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 17-18
DATE=
a clear
Dawson
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
RICHARDSON, JOHN
6/27/75
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 9, 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
On October 9, 1963 Presidential news conference the President stated that "I know that
the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated 
public servant, has led to
surmises but I can assure 
you flatly that the CIA has not 
carried out independent
activities, but has operated 
under closecontrol of the 
Director of Central Intelligence
operating under 
with the cooperation of the National Security 
Council and under
☑my 
instructions."
NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 90
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
COLBY, WILLIAM
Oct 9, 1963
DIEM
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
OCCURRENCE:
PEPPE
In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228)
which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears: "... while we do not wish
to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart
a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime 
and 
if
it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular
support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges
that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating 
that
The text states that these 
"
additional
MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success."
general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been
cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense.
11
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
RICHARDSON, JOHN
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 91
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 9, 1963
DIEM
On October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that
the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to
surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent
activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence
operating under with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under
iny instructions."
--
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
MINH, GENERAL
DON, GENERAL
Oct 10, 1963
Oct. 9,1963
DIEM
COLBY,
WILLIAM
OCCURRENCE:
In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese
generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to
be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the
matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a
high prospect of success. While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do
not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government
or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable
of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."
"
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33
STAFF:
DAWSON
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, HENRY CAPOT
COLBY, WILLIAM
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
Page 92
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct 9, 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228)
which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears: "... while we do not wish
to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart
a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if
it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular
support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges
that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that
11 
The text states that these "additional
MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success.
general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been
cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."
SOURCE:
FILE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
Oct 10, 1963
Oct. 9,1963
DIEM
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
MINH, GENERAL
DON, GENERAL
COLBY,
WILLIAM
OCCURRENCE:
In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese
generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to
be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY 
had stated that the
matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer 
a
high prospect of success. While we do not wish to stimulate a coup 
we also 
do
not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government
or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it 
appeared capable
of increasing effectiveness in military effort…...
11
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33
SOURCE:
STAFF:
DAWSON
TEASUNDY BRI
AMBASSADOR LODGE
SEN. MINH
NW 50955 DocId: 32423615
Page 93
GEN. DON
OCCURRENCE:
SOURCE:
Oct. 10, '63
DIEM
TAD SEPDET
Ambassador Lodge instructo
contact with Coneral Mich or Conexal g, but ik
the Qonals initiate contact, such 
contacts were
authorized; in the course of meetings with 
Lua or
Kiah, arqURANCOS were to be given 
that the G
will not tart a change of government or 
deny
economic or military angistence to 
a new regime 
i7
it appeared apable of increasing 
effectiveness of
military offort, assuring popular support 
to win
the war, and inproving working 
relations with 
the
United States.
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,
page 2 5.
STAFF: Dawson
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
ODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F.
MINH, GENERAL
DON, GENERAL
COLBY, WILLIAM
OCCURRENCE:
DATE: 6/30/75
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct 10, 1963)
Oct. 9,1963
DIEM
In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese
generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to
be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the
matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a
high prospect of success. While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do
not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government
or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable
of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."
11
SOURCE:
FILE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32
33
STAFF:
DAWSON
DATE: 6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
MCCONE
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct 10,1963
DIEM ✓
OCCURRENCE:
A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that
"we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively
would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our counsel to proceed
cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something
of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on
the sidelines."
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 94
SOURCE:
IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33
FILE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
MCCONE
Oct 10,1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that
"we have not seen a successor government in the wings 
that we could say positively
Therefore it has 
been our counsel to proceed
would be an improvement over DIEM.
cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something
of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the 
victor merely by sitting on
the sidelines.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
.6/27/75
NW 50955
CONIN
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GENERAL DON
DIR74228
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Oct 23,1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
In a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals
Coup", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the
Generals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week following 26 October. CONFIN
under instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek
permission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's
geyes only.
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 33
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
Lt. Col. PHẠM NGỌC THAO
Oct. 24, $63
OCCURRENCE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
AD PEADE
TOP
SECRE
A report is received at aggroidmately 1280 hours
that Lt. Coloaol Ben Ngoc Thao was planning a
colp achodalod Zoe 1800 homes; the comp failed to
Later, Theo admited that the coup
saulted transportation, otherwise the con
would have begun as reported.
SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit STAFF:
page 7.
FILE:
DATE.
Dawson
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
ONEIN
AMBASSADOR LODGE
NW 50955 DocId: 32423615
Page 96
DATES:
10/23/63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRE
Conein anked why the
goals had not spoken to Ambassador Lodge at the
18 October reception; Don stated that apcurity would
not peguit an approach to the Ambasador since other
ambers of the Q were present; Don promised be
would seek permission of the coup comittee to give
Coacia their political plan for the Anbassador's
eyes only and requested a meeting in downtown
Beigon on 24 October.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,
page 6.
FILE:
NEIN
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NERAL DON
R74228
DGE, HENRY CABOT
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
CATEGORIES:
Oct 23,1963
DIEM
CEODE
a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals
up", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the
nerals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week following 26 October. CONEIN
der instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek
rmission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's
es only.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 97
JON
Conein
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
JON
DATED:
CHILCONIES.
Oct. 23, 163.
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
Coneral Don requested Coneixemost him at J18
Herductors; Ich stated the uyaneval cificers
con combo had decided to attempt to take
Advantage of the 26 Octobox National Hay da ovder
to stage a comp within a wook; a member of General
Don's staff, Colonel Nguyen Kluang, had leaked to
D suthorities that a coup was to one on ox
About 27 October; thong overtures to the Americans
had reached the calue and as a result President
Now had ordered the 5th and 7th Divisions, which
Vere key elements in the Belgoa area for the coup..
to go on extended operations outside odgon:
STAFF:
SOURCE:
Dawson
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit one, P.
6.
DATE:
FILE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 23, 163
DIEM
ONEIN
R. HUAN
OCCURRENCE:
SECRET
Doa
ded to know the showers to previous questions
17th Pospect to the 680 attitude toward a coup:
*Cousin nader instructions, toll on
uld not out a chatre of
the USG
o dany
SOURCE:
the whc and improving
working relations with
bite 180 Don confined that he had thempted to
contact Congin through Mr. Han;
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, P. 6. STAFF:
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
1
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
SEN. MINH
10/18/63
DON
EN. HARKINS
ONEIN
OCCURRENCE:
DocId: 32423615
Page 98
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Hoth Generals Minh and Don present
gdy
deoption
general Harkins no well as rost other
ARN generals; though Ambassador to than with all.
generals, none mentioned Concin.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One.
Page 6.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/1/63
10/21/63
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
In patition to the above paneuvering, Colonel Do
ow for goal General), Chile Altary becurity Service,
played kéo rols by tuming Poles military intellig mee resorts
Which went to Prouident Diom. These reposts stated en or
shob 84 dobober bat built as of tige Cong
Boyces cup Saigon fox kad ponied the
Enteen Stad to toe appropriate orders, aged by the
Prusidandits Savonable to the conqdancy to the
octekints of Saigon and also to move units, such as the
Special Forces, away from Baigon.
SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
pages 13-14.
FILE:
Exhibit one,
STAFF Dawson
6/30/75
DATE.
Conein
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Huan
G
"Gen. Harkins
Ambassador Lodge
DocId: 32423615
Page 99
DATES:
Oct. 17, 163.
OCCURRENCE: Cobain and man hold meeting
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OP SECRET
TOP
which Than
conflrued the fact that he attempting to contact
aud had a moueage from the generals. At a reception
to be givon 18 October by General larking for
Tubauendon Lodge, one of the generals would
approach the Ambassador and as the latter so
vouch for Copeing if the Ambassador confirms that
Cmnein to speaking with the Ambasador's ghor
Me should be prepared for a future seeking enfadde
Palyon; Kenn wen only going a message and did
not slabovute Further,
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,
page 5-6.
STAFF: Dawson.
FILE:
DATE: 6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LAM NGOC HUAN
AMBASSADOR LODGE
DATES:
Oct. 16, 163
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
SOURCE:
TOP SECRET
Mr. Lun Ngoc Huan, Manager of Caravello Hotel and
FOONGE ARVN office who was retired due to 543-
photons of involvement in November 1940 coup plot,
apore Nelied 
on Rabassy officer after a social event
and stated he was trying to establish coctect with
a 
military offiour designated by Ambassador Lodge
to take part in confidential discussions. Huan
claimed he was representing some Vietnamese
soovals and other officers who wanted to talk to
en American military officer about the situation
In South Vietnam.
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One.,
page 5.
STAFF: Dawson
+ + רז
1
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
MC NAMARA
NGU YEN QUANG
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615 Page 100
PHẠM NGỌC THAO
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
12 October 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: When CONEIN was asked to explain the reference to Secretary MC NAMARA at p.
5, Exhibit 1, he stated that there were different elements contacting the same group, i.e.,
NGU YEN and THAO. But did not explain the reference to MC NAMARA.
p. 29
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
DATE:
R. DAWSON
July 1, 1975
J
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
AMBASSADOR LODGE
SECRETARY MACNAMARA
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Oct. 12, 163
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Captain Ngayon Coming Nguyen, Chiff of Operations,
Aunor Cantated he was contacted by twe
different coup groups during the week of 5-12
October; the headed by Colonel
Can Stoe acabe claimed to
with
alux lodge and try or who had_
staged pork, whom Crylain Nguyen as non-
1 Lt. Colonel Thas offered money; Nguyen
dø 64112 9addecided which group to will support,
STAFF:
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One.
Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
DON
OCCURRENCE:
CON'T ON NEXT
CARD
SOURCE:
FILE:
DATES:
Oct. 24, '63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Conoin and Don net at 1280 hours; (a) Don did not
receive permission from the cong committee to tura
oper the golitical plan; (b) Dan had been
authorized to outline the political thinking of the
con committee (1) the succending_goxeennen i
would be 
civilian and no member of the coup committee
would hold 
a senior position in the new government;
(2) 
the new government would, a5 coon 5 possible,
free non-communist political prisoners, hold free
cleations, and permit operation of opposition
political parties erept for the Viet Cong;
(3) there will be complete freedom of religion and
STAFF: Dawson
Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein,
age
Exhibit One, ра 7.
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 101
7
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 24, 163
OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUATION OF
LAST CARD:
CONARDON NEXT
SOURCE:
no stvoritism of Stocrishimation shown toward aay
exead; (4) the now government would be pro-s
but not a pawn of the DSG; (5) the now government
would carry the was against the Viet Cong to a
sacdassful conclusion with Woetern, partiquiarly
US, help; (c) Don said that Conela would be in
close contact with coup headquarters to losure a
close line of communication between the comp
Deniquarters and the Ambassador; (4) Don stated
that once the coup started, is would do no good for
the US to attempt to stop it; (e) Don was aware
of coup plotting on the part of Lt. Colonel Phan
Rigns Time; (f) the cong committee was in contact
STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 102
OCCURRENCE:
SOURCE:
FILE:
1/MD.
CONTINUATION OF LAST TWO CARDS:
TOP SECE
with Tano, but Thao does not have the Lecessary
force to carry out his plan; (3) The gemorals'
coup comitto had come to the conclusion that
the entire gomily had to be eligibited from the
political sense in Couth Vistraz (a) A now meeting
was scheduled for 20 October.
P. 7, cont
STAFF:
DATE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORD
DON
EONEIN
DocId: 32423615
Page 103
GEN. HARKINS
10/24/63
DIEM
TOP SECRET
OCCURRENCE: al Don's alde vequested Conoin to be at the
VIP longe at Saigon airport at 0615 hours; General
Bon told Coacia that he had seen Canal Wackies
the noting of 25 October and General Barkins
informed him this the 7.8. milizury #uld not thwart
any plans of the gooerale; Con informed Consle thut
ahh plans were complete and had been checked and
webechood. The bessary military units were
SOURCE:
avattable and cilling to join the coups the 207935
would occur within the moot wook and in no case
later Been 2 Nombor Don requested a moeting
Club egoning at a dantistols oflice in downtown
Saigon,
Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit
FILE:
pages 6-%
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
HARKINS
BUNDY, MC GEORGE
STAFF:
one
Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
October 24, 1963 DIEM
GENERAL DON
CONTIN
OCCURRENCE: In a cable marked "eyes only" to LODGE and HARKINS from BUNDY dated October
24, CONEIN characterized this telegram as activating the disengagement between the U.S.
government and DIEM. The text of that cable is as follows: "There may be danger. NHU
attempting entrapment DON's approaches to CONEIN. Feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKIN
can stand back from any non-essential involvement. It seems wise to maintain close control
over meetings between DON and CONEIN."
p. 33
OURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
FERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
BUNDY
JOHNSON
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 24, 1963
DIEM
SPECIAL GROUP
GKILPATRICK
MCCONE
N
OCCURRENCE:
"
Eon October 24, 1963 Mr. MCCONE had a special group meeting "expressed his fear that
the top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved
Ein conversations between General DON and COEIN. Such involvement could destroy CONEIN
usefullness and involve Ambassador LODGE and General HARKINS in operation difficult
to deny. The Special Group authorized a message to LODGE and to HARKINS emphasizing
a secure system of contacts with Genral DON and Vietnamese military and an assessment
of DON's status and his future plans and the tightening of control over the DON/CONEIN
meetings. The group agreed to firm up policy thinking re Vietnam before LODGE returns
to Washington and hear Mr. LODGE's views on what courses of action should be taken.
ODGE
STAFF
96TOP
ET
SOURCE:
Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct. 24, 1963
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
DATE
6/28/75
CATEGORIES:
BUNDY
ON, GENERAL
ONEIN
OCCURRENCE:
Oct. 24, 1963
DIEM
HAND SKAPET
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY it was noted that: "CAS has
been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each
eeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance
explicitly..."
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35
DAWSON
FILE:
DATE:
6/27/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 105
LODGE
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
HARKINS
BUNDY
CONIN
NHU
OCCURRENCE:
Oct 24, 1963
DIEM
TAP SISCRET
In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following
message appears: "...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's
approaches to CONEIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back
from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over
meetings between DON and CONEIN."
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
BRENT
CONEIN
CRITIC
STAFF:
DAWSON
DATE:
6/27/75
DATES:
24 Oct 1963
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
JGS headquarters
SMATION
OCCURRENCE:
The IG Report notes that, "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is
'In
well known in official circles. On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the STATION:
Rather you
future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel.
should slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR BRENT.' As a consequence, the firse cabled reports
from the STATION came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network here 
at
headquarters."
SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
DATE:
R. DAWSON
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HANSEN, BUREAU OF BUDGET
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIA
GLODGE
DocId: 32423615
Page 106
RICHARDSON
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
DATES:
Oct 24, 1963
DIEM
On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and
KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at
This initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive
Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing
"with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the
hill tribes; 3. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was
caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government
officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible%3 6. CIA acted on its
own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or
"Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were
erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had
been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the
Ambassador, and had been carried out with good judgment and with a high quality of
perform QURCEHANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting with SE, LODGE hadnot
yet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a few days later.
(This appears to be a record by the CIA of a source which it had in the Bureau of the Budget
for finding out what Lodges thinking was at this time.)
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 34
DATE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DON, GENERAL
HARKINS, GENERAL
CONEIN,
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 24, 1963
DIEM
In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals
Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON
reported he had been informed by Gehial HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart
any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete%;B the necessary military units were
available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting
DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON
to outline its substance, which he did.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/27/75
LODGE
HARKINS
BUNDY
CONEIN
NHU
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct 24, 1963
DIEM
C
SECRET
In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following
message appears: "...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON'S
approaches to CONEIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back
from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over
meetings between DON and CONEIN."
Page 107
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HANSEN, BUREAU OF BUDGET
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIA
LODGE
RICHARDSON
OCCURRENCE:
STAFF:
DAWSON
DATE:
6/27/75
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct 24, 1963
DIEM
On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and
KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed 
charges made by LODGE 
at
his initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the 
record prepared by the Executive
1. CIA was improperly dealing
Director, details the following charges made by LODGE:
with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the
hill tribes; 3. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the 
GVN and the Buddist and was
caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and 
entertained government
officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large 
and too visible; 6. CIA acted on 
its
own initiative without coordination and without 
control either at the Ambassador or
Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought 
LODGE's charges 
were
erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything 
the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had
been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried 
out under the directions of 
the
Ambassador, and had been carried out with good judgment 
and with a high quality of
performanRCEHANSEN noted that at the time of his 
first meeting with STOUGE, LODGE 
hadnot
vet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. 
This took place a few days later.
which It had in the Bureau of the 
Budget
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DON, GENERAL
HARKINS,
CONEIN,
GENERAL
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 24, 1963
DIEM
In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals
Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON
reported he had been informed by General HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart
any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete%3B the necessary military units were
available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting
DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON
to outline its substance, which he did.
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35
FILE:
LODGE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
BUNDY
DON, GENERAL
CONEIN
OCCURRENCE:
Oct. 24, 1963
DIEM
TOP SECRET
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY it was noted that: "CAS has
been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each
meeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance
explicitly..."
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35
DAWSON
NW
MCCONE
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
NHU
"LODGE
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct.25, 1963
DIEM
In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from
✓ CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose
✓ of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to
coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in
Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government
prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in detail.
In sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and
therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making
and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional
Manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak
leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war might be lost during
period of political confusion, (7) civilians capable of running South Vietnam could not
be injected into the government and exercise effective control; (8) cannot discuss
important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9)
we either have to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggresive steps to remove them
and it is not clear that the succeeding government would be much better.
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MCCONE
NHU
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
LODGE
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct.25, 1963
DIEM
In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from
CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose
of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to
coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in
Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government
MCCONE stated his views in detail.
prior to the return of LODGE for consultations.
In sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and
therefore could assume little responsibility%3B (3) DON could have a coup in the making
and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional
manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak
leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war might be lost during
periode pitical confusion, (7) civilians capable of running South Mnam could not
be injected into the government and exercise 
effective control; (8)
discuss
important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9)
we either have to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggresive steps to remove them
1
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
"DON, GENERAL
LODGE, AMBASSADOR
ECONEIN
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 28, 1963
DIEM ✓
The October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals
Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador.
LODGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador that the U.S. government
g should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coup The Ambassador agreed with DON.
m
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
STAFF:
DAWSON
DATE:
6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
DON, GENERAL
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
CONEIN
28 October 1963 DIEM
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN said "in the latter part of October, he was informed by DON to convey
to LODGE 
that they were ready to have a coup and that CONEIN was to stay home and await fur-
ther orders, and that the coup would be accomplished before November 2, 1963. LODGE, who
was preparing to return home on the 31st of October, was requested through CONEIN by DON
that 
LODGE not change his plans as it might be a signal to DIEM and NHU that something was
going on.
p. 48
.
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
ESTILWELL, GENERAL RICHARD
SCONEIN
DocId
GENERAL DON
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
DATES:
Latter part of DIEM
October 1963
CATEGORIES:
✓ OCCURRENCE: In the latter part of October, CONEIN stated, the people in Washington figured
Sthat CONEIN was being set up as "patsy" and that this would be highly embarrassing for the
U.S. government in case he was found out to have been set up. Therefore, the people in Wash-
Gington made made recommendations that somebody more senior to him and with extensive militar
_background should take over from him. When Washington then sent a message to Ambassador
E LODGE and recommended that a capable officer and a personal friend of CONEIN's, GENERAL
STILWELL take over, GENERAL DON and the coup members said, no, we trust CONEIN, we don't want
Hanybody else. pp. 31-32
H
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DON, GENERAL
LODGE, AMBASSADOR
DOMIN
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Oct. 28, 1963
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
July 1, 1975
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
The October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals
Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador.
ODGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador that the US government
should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coup. The Ambassador agreed with DON.
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37
STAFF:
DAWSON
namr
EON, GENERAL
CONEIN
HODGE, HENRY CABOT
Doc
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct 28, 1963
DIEM
En an October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon station "History of the Vietnames Generals
Coup" it is noted that: CONEIN met with Genral DON for the last time before the
Coup was launched.
N
for CONEIN.
plans.
__
DON confirmed he had talked with the Ambassador who had vouched
DON stated that he was leaving on 29 October to coordinate final
DON requested CONEIN to remain at home until 30 October until further
notice. DON repeated that the Ambassador would have the plans before the coup
began,, but when pressed on his previous commitment to make them available, 48 hours
in advance, DON said that possiblythe hours would only be made available 4 hours in
advance. DON said that nothing would be happening within the next 48 hours and that,
if there was a good reason for the ambassador to change his planned 31 October departure,
the Ambassador would 
be informed in time to make his own decision.
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) P. 37
FILE:
STAFF:
DAWSON
DATE:
-- 6/27/75.
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 113
CONTIN
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GEN. DON
AMBAS. LODGE
GEN. DO CAO TRỊ
GEN. NGUYEN KHANH
OCCURRED.
CON'T ON NEXT
CARD
SOURCE:
FILE:
DATES:
Oct. 28, '63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECREE
Chata and General Don met at a dentist's office
la downtown Saigon 81045 bours. (2) Doa D
Cined that he and tolked to Ambassador Lodge who
bad waelic for Conging (b) Bon Mtated that the
Smals' comittee wished to avoid sorterans'
Involvement in the coup and requested that other
1.8. personnel stop talking to colonels and majore
about may coup Actiong (c) Don was informed that
Ambassador Lodge was scheduled to depes Saigon
on or about 31 October; (4) Daa was interested in
the azob was the busstor intended to depart
CN 31 October, stating that he hoped the Ambassador
would not change his chetule as a change might be
Dawson
Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit
page 8.
one,
STAFF:
DATE: 6/30/75
19
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
CON'T FROM LAST
CARD
espected by the GVM;
TOP SECRET
(1) Con stated that he was
leaving on 80 October to coordie final plans
wals Do Cee 20% had guy on Akanks (g) Doa
Dequested Conada to remain at kone Irma 30 Cetober
qward until thor wote; (2) Conein spioned
fan wegaming Conacal Ton That Diab's particiga tion
do con pluwing, Don stated at Dinh was not
pavalofoniing in the glanning and then the cong
Committee synthizers had amoral Dinh continuously
#exomadol and had instructions to eliminate Dich
if he chowed any signs of compromising the coup;
(2) Dhe, although dating that he was not
SOURCE: P. 8, CON'T.
STAFF:
DILD.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
OCCURRENCE:
CONT. FROM LAST
CARD
SOURCE:
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
participating in the sotial planning of the units
that mould participate in the coup, stated that
Iron the peetings of the coup comittee he knew of
the following units! Ono-belt of the Airborne
Dvigade, 3 Battalions of Marines, all of the Alr
Borbo with the exception of Colonel Huynh Mun Hian,
the autire Och, 7th, and 21st Divisions, half of
the 90vd Division, and slowents of the 9th Division.
(3) The Command Fest for the coup would be Joint
General Staff Headquarters.
P. 8, con't.
STAFF:
DATE:
NW 50955.
DocId:32423615 Page 114
FILE:
inh
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
hung, CAPT
Concin
chu, Ngo Dinh
Bam, Col
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/2/63
Dicm
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
Ham was returning with Diem and Nhu and an aide of Diem to the headquarters
in an armored personnel carrier when Minh in a separate column in radio com-
munications with Lam's column found out that Diem and Nhu had been taken.
Soncin states that Minh with his aide, crossed the column, halted it and
Thung stepped into the armored car and upon orders from Hinh hung lilled
them. The bodies were then taken directly to the General Staff Headquarters
and later on in the afternoon they were later removed from the General Staff
Headquarters to Clinique St. Paul.
SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
7/1/75
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1 November 1963 DIEM
CONEIN
OCCURRENCE: On or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on November 1, 1963, there were
communications between LODGE and DIEM. CONEIN was in both radio and telephonic contact
with the Embassy, keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what was trans-
piring. CONEIN was to convey, one of the first messages from the generals that the genera
did not want any U.S. military officer or advisor with any of the attacking units. They d
not want any American participation within the coup.
p. 50
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
IL
OCAT
Tiina 30
1075
n
STAFF:
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
BAN THIEN KHIEM
INH
RAN VAN DON
DOCI 32423615
Page 116
CURRENCE:
2400 hours
Nov. 1, 163
DIEM
TOP SECRET
a Chica Phi is exting as Minh's Chief of Staff for
Operaticas, but Your Van Oon is defind boy the No. 2 in
the generals' group. Cateral Chieu is neuigbing General
hion and is following military operations closely,
Hamdorbed by goral competent colonels and jors.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 21.
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Nov. 1, 163
2400 hours
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
Vice President gayon Nype 'The also has not been located,
SOURCE
STAPF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 21.
Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
FILE:
NW 50955
NHU
FERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/1/63
2140 hours
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECKET
Troops moving to the place ages and covering the foot
insure that Dion and Hu do cut attough to picape rough
never text in the Zoo avna.
DocId: 32423615
Page 117
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 19.
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CATEGORIES:
DATES:
11/1/63
2400 hours
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
ol Tho heading group dated to blow up the
finlace. 24 from the floor Quara which lad joined
the coup, and we of the voed als from My Tho
Towing into three colures. Thusay #113 suve in on the
tee the Most. The tards are ded by
og former dol of Died Province.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 21.
Dawson
DATE.
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MINH
AMBASSADOR LODGE
1923
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/1/63
1925 hours
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Michord that Ambassador Lodge will receive the
gonevals after the coup la 0705.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,
page 18.
STAFF: DAWSON
DATE:
FILE:
6|30175
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/1/63
2140 hours
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP
SECRET
Presideista ad olxeats in the continu Tigg
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, Page 19.
Dawson
DocId: 32423615
Page 118
NW 50955
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Vice President NGUYEN NGOC THO
DocId: 32423615
Page 119
DATES:
11/1/63
1545'
CATEFORIES:
DIEM.
OCCURRENCE:
SWI
TOP SECRE
Pro-vestor civilian politicians at 308 vith gem
will hool new civil govemment, No military per
XV govorament which should be established nuder civil
carol in 870 to throo days. It is latex Revouled that
Vice President Nyhyen Ngoc Tho and Dal Lender Pun
My Quat ake the only ones thus far colected fox the new
govatment.
SOURCE:
FILE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 16.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
NHU
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
Gener
11/1/63
1645
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Quid polnoe, talk with Coub:
mentioned above talked with in
Tel Nguyen Vos L, Chpitul
tawy D
Tran Ngoc T, Statugi Wnion Romag
3/gramul tion Tu Cal, Payliar; B/Goal Mayon G
Assistant to Chief, Joint Ceneral Study Fox Querrilla;
phun limo wander arrest at Jo and Octal
is forced at pun potut to abUOROG
ham.
Foxco Caramander Hien did not speak; ang bay bem
slindased,
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
STAFF:
Dawson
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DƯƠNG VĂN MINH
TRAN VAN MINH
TRAN THIEN KHIEM
301880000
DATES:
11/1/63
1545 hours
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
Mato VCVN ls under comp control taped broadcost handy
bat de relay polet had been blown,
The following generals are at JOS:
M/General Duong Van Mink, Military Advisor to
The President
M/General Tran Van Minh, Permanent Secrets.xy
Coneral, MHD.
B/General Tran Thien Thien, Chief of Staff,
Joint Cost Stoff.
B/General Is Van Kin, KID
M/Gem Nguyen Ngoc be, Inspector, Self Defense
Cerpe/Civil Guard
By'General Dhan Kean Chien.
SOURCE! Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit 1 STAFF: Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
page 16.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GEN. NGUYEN KHANH
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/1/63
1545 hours
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
6/30/75
TOP SECRET
The following are claimed also to be supporting the dougi
B/General Nycyca Khanh, Commanding Conera; II
Curbs
Bien Hoa nzd My Tho under cup control.
Joint Chiswal Staff propering heavy adr bombardment for
the palace.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one
page 16.
STAFF: Dawson
6/30/75
DATE:
PILE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 120

1330
OCCURRENCE:
NATES:
Nov. 1, '63
1330 hours
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Mardans pour into Saigon from the direction of Bley ca;
Inter Dallested to be from Quang Trung Training center,
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 
14.
STAFF:
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
CATEGORIES:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COL. Le QUANG TUNG
DATES:
11/1/63
1400 hours
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
Colonal Lp Quang Tung captured; directed to order
Vietmese Special Forces to ceasefire; ring mouse
12 VEEL W
Fighting at palace; about 200 bros served.
26 swered cars moving bowed the ice,
SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 14.
FILE:
STAFF: Diem
6/30/75
DATE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 121
2 ARDOMS/ENTITIES:
COLBY
LODGE, A.C.
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
November 1, 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: When DIEM called LODGE directly preceding his death, COLBY states that the
message that he saw of the summary of the conversation was that DIEM, "....said that he was
going to require his officers to have filled their oaths of loyalty to the constitution, th
Vietnamese constitution, in his office as president. He was very stiff about his position
President." p. 67
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
PILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
1 July 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
STATION (SAICON)
DON, GENERAL
JGS headquarters
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1 Nov 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: On November 1, 1963, "CONEIN went to JGS headquarters and remained at the
command post throughout the struggle
. Before leaving his home, CONEIN alerted the STATION
by radio. Upon arriving at 
JGS headquarters, CONEIN was told by GENERAL DON that DON had
tried unsuccessfully to reach 
CONEIN earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that
CONEIN's telephone was out of 
order. CONEIN was told that he was to keep a telephone line
open to the Ambassador. Because there 
was a CIA officer on the scene and in intimate con-
tact with the coup principals
, the STATION was able to report almost minute-by-minute progres:
of the coup. "
SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 41-42
FILE:
TOP SECLET
STAFF:
DATE:
R. DAWSON
29 June 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 122
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
COLBY, WILLIAM
DIEM
MIHN, GENERAL
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
1 November
1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
COLBY states that "When CONEIN was told by the generals, GENERAL MINH,
that the NHU brothers, DIEM and NHU, had committed suicide, CONEIN thought it incredible
on its face. This was because both brothers were very strong Catholics and CONEIN doubted
that they would have done such a thing. According to COLBY, CONEIN was offered a chance
to look at the bodies but turned it down. In trying to reconstruct the period of the assass-
ination on November 1, COLBY reports that there was a telephone conversation between Presi-
dent DIEM and the generals. In fact there were several of them. President DIEM was very
strongly rejecting the generals, calling them to discipline, and so forth, in the early
stages. At a later stage, in the early morning of November 1, he called and indicated that
he would surrender if he would be properly handled. The generals then sent somebody down to
receive that surrender and found that President DIEM was not there. He'd actually gotten
out through the back door of the palace and had gone down to another section of the city.
SOURCE: CONEIN was not in attendance.
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 17-19.
FILE:
R. DAWSON
DATE: 29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
CRITIC
JGS headquarters
STATION
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
1 Nov 1963
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
The IG Report makes the following statement: "The fact that CONEIN was at
JGS headquarters is well known in official circles", and bolsters that notoriety by the
following statement: "The first cable (on the coup) was received at headquarters at 0117
hours, (November 1, 1963,) Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network at 0159.
At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC cable, headquarters instructed the
STATION to put the coup reporting on the CRITIC network at the STATION. Sometime during the
day of 1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters
cabled a warning to the STATION against including the names of CIA personnel in its CRITIC
cables. CONEIN is identified by and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages,
seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at
headquarters."
SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42
FILE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
29 June 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 123
CONEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1 November 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
When the generals took over the PTT which controlled the communications, they
left only the 
embassy lines open. The 
telephone terminals had been taken out prior to the
coup and instead of leaving CONEIN's 
telephone into his home open, it had been disconnected
P. 51
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY, WILLIAM
Nhu
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
July 1, 1975
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
11 November 1963
DIEM ✓
OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "The CIA had nothing to do with the assassination of Pres-
ident DIEM and Mr. NHU. The actual assassination was a shock and surprise to everyone in
the United States govemment and when it was announced it was a matter of grave concern.
In retrospect, one must realize that there was, however, considerable debate about encoura
ing and supporting the generals in an overthrow of the DIEM regime, and that the record is
very clear that the United States through its overall policy was in support of that overthr
and, of course, I think it is fair to say that in launching a violent overthrow of a
gime involved such as this, people are going to get hurt, and in this case, the leaders we
killed in the process." pp. 19-20
SOURCE:
TOP SECR
re-
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 19-20
DAME.
00 Tomo 1075
R. DAWSON
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 124
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GENERAL DINH
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/1/63
21 AUG. thru
16 SEPT. 163
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
Dink's
TOP SECRET
the actions during this period as
Maltury Governor did not endear him to the population or the
otox officers.
STAFF: Dawson
SOURCE:
Hearings, S. S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 12.
DATE: 6/30/75
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
1 November 1903 DIEM
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on several occasions, he warned the embassy that certain
shellings were going to take place, or bombings by aircraft were going to take 
place at a
certain time in order to alert American personnel who might be 
living around the area to
watch out or stay under cover, because they would find 105's in the center 
of the city.
The 
Vietnamese suffered about 100
There were no American casualities during this coup.
dead.
p. 51-52
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 125
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
11/1/63
CATEGORIES:
DATES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
There was a leak to the President prior to the actual
coup bolig 
launched, Because 
of this, the President ordered
the 41st Ranger Hattalion to move 
into Saigon and to take the
PTT and to surround the palace.
block in the generals' plan.
This caused another stumbling
surprise by this maneuver and had to negotiate with the
They were completely taken 
by
compage of the battalion 
to withdrew his unit.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 11.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GEN. DINH
COUNSELLER NHU
DATES:
31 August. '63
11/1/63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TUP SECRET
Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President
Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial
post for himself.
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
pages 12-13.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 126
OCCURRENCE
CONT
GEN. MINE
CON'T. ON
NEXT CARD
OCCURRENCE
11/1/63
DIEM
TOP SECRET
The method used by the generals to neutralize opposi-
tion elements of doubtful officers was to hold a luncheon
meeting for all general officers in the Saigon axes (with the
exceptice of General Don That Diah) and all comanders of
Sepat units. Once overy as of these officers bad appetised
at Seal Staf headquarters and were seated (with the
Sception of Capsala uyes who had been killed), General Mich
sapounced that be and a group of oflicers were going to
the government by daree. At this tice, a section of
Day Poliou owed with sub nichine guae came into the room.
Cuberal Mich Maked for those officers who were yes to go
@long with the coup to stand up... En told then they would be
SOURCE:
FILE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
pages 11-12.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
TOP/SECRET
Ive in more around General Staff headquarters but were not
to leave the command post. Those who did not join the coup vere
incedieroly placed under great and put under med guard. Once
the non-coup abors and heen taken away, Cooral in ordered
# tupe coordey brought to the conwood post at which time he
read the proclamation and objectives of the cozy plotters which
was recorded. He then asked each officer who had agreed to
participate in the coup to speak his name into the tape
recorder, Several tyes vere made from the original and
alptributed in different parts of the city in pro-arranged
hiding place so that in the event the coup failed, no officer
could claim that he had not voluntarily participated in the C
SOURCE: P. 12, LAST CARD CONTINUED
FILE:
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
CATEGORIES:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 127
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COL. KHANG✓
CON'T ON
NEXT CARD
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/1/63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM.
TOP SECRET
(mace the comp had started, Colonal Khang of the
Matine Brigade and Colonel Lan of the Civil Guard decided to
jala the 
coup. Colonel Lam at this time recorded instructions
O kone Recorder which was to be later 
broadcast to all Civil
Cowed units 
ordering them to cooperate with the Generals'
Resolutiomory 
Committee. Lt. Colonel Khang, Commander of the
Marine Brigade telephoned 
his unit commanders not then partici-
ipating in the coup and 
ordered them to support the coup.
The Compeed of the 
Air Force the given to Colonel Do Khao Mai
vice Colonel Hien, 
The command of the 7th Division was given
to Colosal Nguyen 
Ves Co. Temporary command of the IV Corps
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 12.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD
TOP SECRET
we give to Colocel Bui Huu Nhon, Command of troops
Baigon tas given 
to General Ton What Dinh.
overall command were Saigon support troops, the Marine Brigade,
Under oueral Dinh's
the Airborne Brigade, 40 
tanks from the Armor Command, the 5th
and 7th Divisions, 
supported by the Air Force and the Thu Duc
Officer's Training Base 
which joined the coup under the
comamed of Colonel Lan Son
.
86.
SOURCE:
Page 12, con't.
STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 128
DINH
MINH
DON
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
11/1/63
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
Then this did not
Enterkape by early October, the cap principals Realized that
they had Dish batohy thinking against the regime. It 4G
evident vom stabsments during the series of asstings with
General Dox and General Wih daring the month of October that
they still 444 not satish but felt they had promised him
pilly So who his troops and, 12 secessary,
Cab 10 he showed a sign of songsomdaing the generals. Dink
ded by of sullied bin 84 hours a day
including Calompi Co, his deputy, now 17 Cmps Contander and
coyly $3.9ked to Brigadier General/
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 13.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
FILE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 129
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
11/1/63
ES:
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
In ten to the above paneuvering, Colonel Do Hiu,
gadier General), Chiel od Millkory Security Serviso,
played hia role by issuing falss military intellige for 1:3
which went to President
These report started ga us
abent 34 October zud bailt ng a picture of ptg at Dong
Toome caching Balgon for stick and pod
d
Canal State to lose sopropriate orders, goed by the
Pro to have units Favorable to the ecu quizsay to the
Ofits of Bigon and also to move units, such as the
Special Formen, away from Satuon.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
pages 13-14.
Dawson
6/30/75
FILE:
DATE:
NGỌ DINH NHU
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
11/1/63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM L
GEN. DON
GEN, DINH
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
Ayo Dinh Nhu's resation bas to externato Cast
Cacing fuis period of sine, Dion lied thas
p for a dupe by Nyo Dink Dien,
werogated the Tent and Obvezal Don started playicy on
Getuality by telling hin that he was a real hero
and that he, above all, should have been shanked by Dian and
SOURCE:
FILE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
page 13.
STAFF:
Exhibit one,
Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 130

GEN. DON
CONEL
AMBASSADOR LODGE
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD
SOURCE:
FILE:
DATES:
Nov. 1, '63
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
General Dob stated to Senain that Dou had tried to
Alert Conein at the latton's residence since before
Boon and wo one doved. A later check revealed
bac Conel's telephone was out of order. Co2nin
was bold that he was to keep a telephone line open
to Amboweodor Lodge; Don informed Coneta that
Colonels Le Qwing Tung (ARVI Special Foxes Commander
Thynh Exp in force Comparder) and Colonel
020 Van Vlen (Conauader of the Airborne Brigade) wewe
arrested; that Colonel Mong Ngoc Lu (Copmander of
the Civil Guard) and 6. Colonel Le Nguyen Khang
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one
рада 9.
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
STAFF:
Dawson
one;
DATE:
6/30/75
CATEGORIES:
CONT FROM LAST CARD
OCCURRENCE:
SOURCE:
TOP SECI
3p
(Caucander of the thrive Brigade) were under guard
and not yet declared and considered neutral.
Colonel Pung was brought in under armed guard and
forced at gunpoint to order a ceasefire between the
Special Forees, units adjacent to JGS beqATESTB
and two plessons of the Bth Division.
cakse fire had bean declared between Special Forces
and 305, thirty-five amored personel carriers
loaded with troops in combat gear started moving
toyard Baique proper.
P. 9, cont
Once the
STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 131
WCO DINH NHƯ
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COL. HUAN
GEN. DON
OCCURRENCE:
CON'T ON NEXT CARD ALSO
DATES:
11/1/63
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
De promised
in that he would pay speck to the wesident on Diph's
behalf and thus he would ask that Dibh be granted the Ministry
of Interior wheu, Don, would ask for the Ministry of
Bigh believed that Don had his sal
inbasis at heart and Own, in fact, we such an Hopeal
go to Diasident to anlage his government but sad the proposal
la auch & way that it would have been possible Sex Dion o
Dinh saod that
Wto 2000. Caudlines were given,
the Proaldeat would give him a ministerial pist. After the
dandlinbau bad passed and Dinh had not received what be thought
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page. 13.
Dawson
FILE:
DATE: 6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
TOP/SECRET
0 bis er wattion, Gonural Don and other of fleers,
thulating Colonel 
T43, Common Officer of the Kilisoxy
Angdemy Wo Dalat, coated to lend synthy to Dish.
Wish 
yan waiting for his ministerial post
Still,
ab
SOURCE:
P., 13, Con't.
STAFF:
੧੬
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 132
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Lansdale
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Afternoon
11/1/63
Diem
Lodge
Colby
OCCURRENCE:
"
TOP SECRET
Colby stated that although he did not have the copy there was a telegram
which recounts a call made from Diem to Lodge on the afternoon of the coup.
Diem said that he was having trouble. ... an offort was being made against
him by his Generals, and that he believed it essential to put this down.
He urged that the U. S. consult General Lansdale and me (Colby) by name
because we understood something about this situation. This was in the
afternoon of the coup. The response, I believe, Ambassador Lodge did
mention something about assistance in leaving the country Pages 49-50.
11
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
7/1/75
NW 50955
DocId:32423615
Page 133
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARKINS, LODGE, BUNDY, DON,
DATES:
30 Oct. 1963 DIEM
TOP
CATEGORIES:
SECRET
OCCURRENCE: On 30 October 1963, LODGE replied to BUNDY's cable (DIR 79109) of the
same date by CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063):
11
...do not think we have the
power to delay or discourage a coup. DON has made it clear many times that this is
a Vietnamese affair......I believe we should continue our present position of keeping
hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information. CAS has
been anaylzing forces for some time and it is their estimate that the generals have
probably figured their chances pretty closely.......It does not seem sensible to have
the military in charge of matter which is so profoundly political as a change of govern-
ment....As to requests from the generals, they may well have need of funds at the last
moment with which to buy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be
passed discreetly, I believe we should furnish them....If we were convinced that the coup
was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop it. HARKINS has read
SOURCE: this and does not concur.
CIA IG Report 1967, p. 39
FILE:
STAFF:
R. Dawson.
DATE:
29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
FELT, ADMIRAL CINCPAC Commander
CONEIN
31 October 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on or about October 31, 1963, FELT came to Vietnam and
landed and had an interview with DIEM in the morning.
P. 48
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
STAFF:
DATE:
R. DAWSON
T7
1075
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 134
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE
BUNDY
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
30 Oct 1963
DIEM ✓
OCCURRENCE: On October 30, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) the following
cable from LODGE (in its entirety) occurred: "Thanks for your sagacious instruction.
carry out to best of my ability."
Will
SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 40
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE
BUNDY (?)
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
29 June 1975
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
30 Oct 1963
DIEM
GRE
TE
11
OCCURRENCE: On October 30, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 79407) the following
quotation appeared: ....We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power
to delay or discourage coup....We cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your
message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention....U.S. authorities
will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side.... ( the IG Report here
states without further showing the author of the above message that "the White House re-
peats its instructions on command of the country team after LODGE leaves." The inference
can probably be drawn that the message although looked upon as a CIA cable to Saigon, it
was undoubtedly emanating from the White House.)
SOURCE:
STAFF:
CIA IG Report, 1967 p. 39
R. DAWSON
FILE:
DATE:
29 June 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 135
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
SMITH,
DAVID
HARKINS, GENERAL
MCCONE
HELMS
Oct. 29, 1963.
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBY
KENNEDY, ROBERT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
TOP SEGLET
In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY
In attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested
that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a
committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should
not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to
provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions
in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not
clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General
felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy evidence. The DCI stated his view
that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might
only be solved by a second or third coup.
SOURCE:
FILE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38
STAFF:
DATE:
Dawson
6/27/75
OCCURRENCE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
HARKINS,
DON
MINH
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
DIEM
LODGE
Oct 30, 1963:
BUNDY
In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR79109) of OCT 30, 1963, BUNDY wrote to LODGE saying that
"...chances of action with or without our approval now so significant that we should
urgently consider our attitude and contingency plans. We believe our attitude to
coup group can still have decisive effect on itsdecision.
We must have assurance
balance of forces clearly favorable...CONEIN should express to DON that we do not find
presently reveal plans to give clear prospect of quick results...we badly need some
corroborative evidence of men or others directly involved....highest authority desires
it clearly understood that after your departure HARKINS should participate in all coup
contacts supervision and the event coup begins he become head of country team..."
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 39
STAFF:
Dawson
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 136
LODGE, AMBASSADOR
DIEM
NHU
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Oct. 29, 1963
DIEM
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of
CIA, LODGE 
gives his view on the seemingly inminent coup: "In summary, it would appear
that 
a coup attempt by the generals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by
the USG 
can prevent a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU...Although there
have no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must
anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."
SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, AMBASSADOR
DIEM
NHU
DATES:
Oct. 29, 1963
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/27/75
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP
E
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of
"In summary
, it would appear
CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly imminent coup:
that a coup attempt by the generals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by
the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing DIEM 
and NHU...Although there
have no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial 
support, we 
must
anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."
SOURCE:
STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38
Dawson
PILE.
DATE:
.5
DocId: 32423615
Page 137
NW 50955
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
10/28/63
GEN. DON
AMBASSADOR LODGE
CONEIN
OCCURRENCE:
SOURCE:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
General Don approached baseador Lodge at Dolat
Airport on the occasion of the departake of
President Diew and basundor Lodge for their
rature to Saigon and asked if Conein was speaking
for the Anbasqulox; furbassador, Lodge replied in the
mative; Don told the Ambassader the 500 should
wab interfaza at boy to stiralate & cong; the
Ananssador agreed, the USG wrated no patelliĝes und
the 000 would out that an atomp*,
1
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,
page 7-81
Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
SMITH, DAVID
HARKINS, GENERAL
DATES:
MCCONE
HELMS
Oct. 29, 1963
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBY
KENNEDY, ROBERT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
OP SECLIED
In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY
in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested
that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a
committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should
not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to
provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions
in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not
The Attorney General
clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching.
The DCI stated his view
felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy evidence.
that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might
only be solved by a second or third coup.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 138
GEN. DON
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GEN. DO CAO TRỊ
NGUYEN KHANH
SON'
CON'T.
NEXT
CARD
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
62
5. Several days before the coup was to take place, General
Don coordinated the final plan with Generals Do Cao Tri and
Newyen lanh and with the Commanding Of Noer of the filitary.
Academy at Bala. The signal to start the soup was based 
on 
a
previous decree issued by President Dien 
which stated that
after 1 November there would be no s'està cad there 
would 
be
By Madio and telephone, the
only a one-o lunch period.
coup 971 elpats had issued instructions to equp participants
that as of 1 November working hours would begin at 
1330.
Sorties at 0780 homes 1 Bovember the dasturctions were trine-
libe to us furthest away from Saigon, 1.0, and 
in
721t time so that the forces which were to attack Saigon
STAFF: Dawson
SOURCE:
FILE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 11.
6/30/75
DATE:
TOPISECRET
OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUATION OF LAST CARD, p. 11.
66
One wit of the 7th Division
would be in position at 1430 hours.
received its festructions to move at 2330 hours but actually
moved 1815 3. This also was one of the minor incidents
which nearly upset the coup as there was fear that this would
be detected by the forces loyal to Diem,
SOURCE:
FILE:
STAFF:
DATE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 139
CONEIN
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
GEN, DUONG VAN MINH
GEN. TRAN VAN DON
Nov. 1, 1963
CATEGORIES:
TRAN THIEN KHIEM
TRAN VAN MINH COMITY
OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUED ON NEXT
CARD
SOURCE:
FILE:
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
Copain was contactel by Captain Bon, Alde de Cany
to 
Boneund Dog, at 1818 hours stating that Conein
was mented Remediately at Cencal Staff Red-
Quarters.
Since this was not within revious
aboncity armgements for the next meeting, Canein
questioned 
Hon who wild be was only carrying out
lastne blows 
and stated that Goody should come in
Uniform to GS and he then departed,
tato vettorm, the dentist whose offive led been Nood.
While getting
for watings 
appeared at Conela's home with con-
rate 
of the mosage that Gonoin was to proceed
impedia 
body to 
JOS headquartos. He further stated
than the c000 
was a progross.
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one
Pages 8-9.
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75
CONT. FROM LAST
CARD
Balxon via kadto net voldg a pes voice code
and proceeded to the Wer Boon at 48 hodquarters.
Eresent were dorevals Duong a Man Can van ron,
Nguyen Ngoc Lo, Mai Thun Xean, Le Van Kid, Tran Tu
Le Fan Nghiem; Colonels Do Non, Ngayon Khuong,
Duong Ilgos Len; Majors Le Nguyed Khang, Do Kane Mai,
and unidentified junior officers,
SOURCE:
P. 9.
FILE:
STAFF:
DATE:
Page 140
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
11/2/63
VICE PRESIDENT THO
0310 hours
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
0310 Vice Arend deat Tho at JGS
Palace is under heavy attack
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, Page 22.
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 141
ROUND/ENTITIES:
MINH
NHỮNG
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
2 November 1963 ✓ DIEM #
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
CONEIN stated that around 6:30 or 6:40 on November 2, 1963, DIEM talked
to MINH for the 
first time. DIEM asked MINH 
for full honors and MINH replied that he could
not guarantee full honors, if and during the time 
that Vietamese were still killing one
another. DIEM stated that he would order 
the cease fire at the palace and CONEIN recalls
that this took place at about 7:50, November 2
, 1963. CONEIN stated as follows: "At this
stage, there were four armored cars and 113's 
an escort of military police proceeded imme-
diately from the joint general staff headquarters 
toward GAI LONG PALACE.
his aide, CAPTAIN NHUNG got 
into a sedan and with MTS Corps, went out the back road from
BIG MINH with
the general staff headquarters toward the back 
of the golf course and took a different road
from the armored cars that went down Cong Le."
p. 52-53
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MINH
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
July 1, 1975
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
11/2/63
2420 hours
0020(?)
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECLET
Augly hpawy obtack on the palace.
this the palace be takon at eay cost.
both by woof.
ordered
16 aroad vehicles
Appeoniettely ana
3
nagy a foot poldiers moving up to the
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 23.
STAFF:
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 142
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Don, General
Concin
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/2/63
CATEGORIES:
Diem✓
Conein stated at the time they were going to bring the press in for the core-
mony on the capitulation of Diem, Don 
said" get the hell out we are bringing
in the press Page 74.
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSC Concin, June 20, 1975
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
7/1/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LAM, DUONG NGỌC
NHU
XUAN
GENERAL MAI HUU
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Ton/or/about 10 DIEME
November 1963
November, 19/63
CATEGORIES:
TOP SECRET
XUAN and LAM receiving the message that DIEM and NHU had been spotted, took
off with armored cars and went to the church. XUAN reported to the President, saluted,
and told him to get into the armored car. NHU protested and asked for a sedan. DIEM and NHi
were shoved into the car and were told by the commander of the column LAM, who was a little
fat guy who wore a mustache and used to command the civil guard and not the individual who
later became I-Corps commander, that the use of the armored car was for their physical pro-
tection. p. 59-60
SOURCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 143
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Concin
Lodge, H.C.
DATES:
11/2/63
Diem
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
Concin stated he kept contact with the junta "until the day that the U. S.
officially recognized the South Vietnamese government. There were several
countries that recognized, and I was acting as the liaison officer for the
ambassador to the junta during this period for approximately ten days or
two weeks.
TOP SECRET
SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20,
1975
STAFF:
Dawson
FILE:
P. 61
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Tuan
Thu
Conein
DATES:
11/2/63
Diem
DATE:
7/1/75
CATEGOR
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE:
Colby stated that another officer who had worked with Concin was apparently
executed about that same time as Diem and Nhu were. Tuan had been head of
the Special Forces and had worked very closely with Diem and hu and Concin and
was executed by the Generals that morning. Page 27-28.
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
7/1/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 144
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Tinh
Thut, Ngo Dinh
Conein
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/2/63
CATEGORIES:
Dicm
Concin explained that although it was baffling as to why Dien left the palace
to go to the church in Cholon, and although he did not know exactly how they
got out the general assumption was that there were secret tunnels in the palace
which was the former Governor General's Palace called Gailong Palace. The
tunnel took them under and through the palace and the half block to City Hall.
Page 63-64.
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
7/1/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Bang, Major
phen, Ngoc
Tau
Nhu
Minh
Concin
11/2/23
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
Bang was in the armored column and returned about an hour after Minh had left.
Conein asked Bang (whom Conein had met in llanoi in 1945 what his orders were.
Bang stated the orders going through the palace was that we were not to fire
unless we were fired upon and that they had not been found at that time.
The expectation was and everybody assumed, that Minh and Nhu were at the
palace.
SOURCE:
Hearings, SSC1, CoNein, 6/20/75
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
Dawson
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 145
PERSONS/ENTITIES: CONT ON NEXT
ку
CARD
DATES:
11/2/63
0310 hours
CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓
OCCURRENCE 411 general officers except Gamersls 17. You Thanh Cao,
Euynh Van Cao, Thui Quang Houng.
LIST OF OFFICERS Colonels: Lan Van ghat
PARTICIPATING IN
THE COUP:
CON'T on NEXT
CARD
Do Man, Chief of Military Becurity Service
Nguyen Le Co
Nguyen Van Chuan, J., JGS
Nguyen Thuong, Chief of Stuff for Infantry
Bui Huu Nhon, 00, 20stry Division
Duong Ngoc Lam, Director Cereal. Civil
Guard and Sell Datonce Corps
SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 22.
FILE:
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
Dawson
DATE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
NGUYỄN CAO KỲ
OCCURRENCE:
✓ LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:
LASTCARD CONT.
Lt. Colonels:
SOURCE:
Le Ngayon Shang, Commander, Horine
Brigade
Do Mai, Chief of St
Air Force
Tok
Vietnese;
✓
Nguyen Cho Ky, CO, let sport Bud)
Viete mesa Air Force
TOP SECRE
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
STAFF:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 146
DIEM
TOP SECRET
OCCURRENCE:
LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:
CONTINUATION FROM
LAST CARD:
SOURCE:
FILE:
Majors:
My Lee
gay Wendy Touc
STAFF:
DATE:
10c
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 147
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
11/2/63
CATEGORIES:
NHU
OCCURRENCE:
1330 hours
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Lt. Colonel Thao and L. Lab agreed that Die and Nhu could
on malined Selephone communications from the Cholon
ville Broughout the city place lihen ran Iron Gia Long
police to at the new from Thai Due to tho Stolen vilia.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,
Pages 24 - 25.
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
DON, GENERAL
MINH, GENERAL
CONEIN
JGS headquarters
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
2 Nov 1963
DIEM
CATEGORIES:
"According to one of CONEIN's reports, DIEM called GENERAL DON at 0650 hours
2 November and offered to surrender unconditionally. GENERAL MINH immediately ordered all
telephones 
removed from rooms in their JGS command post area. This cut off all communicatio
with the outside except 
for radios under MINH's control.
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 148
NHU
1180
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
Nov. 2, '63
1130 hours
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Lt. Colcael Dhoon Food Theo said that he and his forces
sukazed Gia Long lege during the sarly not Lng hours to
socort Dion med fh to the JCS after their 
savrender,
Archealed they were not at the palace and had not
Robe during the coup. 21:30 Nported back to 
the 
30S.
Pillas An Saigon and Cholan known to be and by the Ngo
Hamily wano parchad.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit one, page 24.
Dawson
DATE:
FILE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
11/2/63
1330 hours
DIEM
HU
OCCURRENCE:
TOD SECRET
Officer in J-2, 198, reported that Diam and M
orderly were caught and hilled by Qualà personal at a
church in Chu guna, Cholon, Captured with than
Captain Do Mui, a nephew of to Mou, MAS Olief.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
"Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 25.
Dawson
PILE:
I DATE:
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 149
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
AMBASSADOR LODGE
DATES:
11/2/63
1000 hours
OCCURRENCE:
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
TOP SECRET
Anbassador Lodge cheered envowbe to the Clincsxy.
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 24.
Dawson
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GEN. MAI HUU XUAN
NHU
DATES:
11/2/63
DATE: 6/30/75
CATEGORIES:
1130 hours
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRE
Kuan
eneral Mani u Kuna, Ted the detail which located Dien
and hu at a ville on Pang ang street in Cholon.
returned to the Jheir bodies.
this time is nakaown,
Course of death at
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Dawson
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit one, page 24.
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 150

NHU
NHU
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/2/63
CATEGORIES:
1000 hours
DIEM
TOP SECRET
2000 a wad Nu va popouted as 205. This is ucconfirmed.
We also cons that Diou and to hure scaped.
ル
SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein
Exhibit One, page 24.
STAFF: Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DATES:
11/2/63
CATEGORIES:
1000 hours
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOP SECRET
Y and Meported at 305. This is confined.
Mors are that bland
have sscaped.
L
SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein
Exhibit One, page 24.
STAFF:
Dawson
FILE:
DATE:
6/30/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 151
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Vice President THO
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
11/2/63
CATEGORIES:
0420 hours
DIEM
TOP SECRET
-Time President The has accepted position as fine Hinister,
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 23.
DATE:
Dawson
6/30/75
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
11/2/63
1000 hours
DIEM
Spurnille peall aims fire continues,
TOP SECRET
SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,
STAFF:
Dawson
¬
་ ་་
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 152
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DON
CONEIN
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
2 Nov 1963
DIEM
OCCURRENCE: On 2 November 1963, GENERAL DON informed CONEIN that he needed money to pay
the families of persons killed during the coup. CONEIN gave GENERAL DON an additional
1,750,000 piasters. One bundle of 250,000 plasters was overlooked and was found later in
CONEIN's safe. (The IG Report goes on to note as follows:
obviously a very sensitive matter.")
"The passing of these funds is
SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 40-41
FILE:
TOP SEGLIET
STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:
29 June 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 153
1964
NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 154
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KHANH
MAJOR DANG SY
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Jan. 1964
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
At the trial of Dang Sy by the Khanh regime that succeeded that of the
coup leaders temporary or provisional government, Khanh's prosecutor insisted that the
deaths had been caused by American-supplied grenades of the type known as MKIII whose
use had been ordered by Dang Sy, and the conviction by the military court was that the 8
deaths were caused by these concussion grenades. Higgins argues in her book that this
conviction is contrary to the Pentagon's assessment of the MKIII grenade which found that
at worst the effects of such a grenade are non-fatal. Nor does such a grenade have suffi-
cient force to decapitate or mutilate persons, let alone bring down the ceilings, doors,
and windows that were adjacent to the veranda of the radio station. (95-96) Higgins also
states that: "The conviction of Major Dang Sy certainly throws no light on the matter
one way or another. The trial was clearly rigged from the start." (96-97)
SOURCE:
STAPP:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,
Dawson, R.
1965
FILE:
DATE: July 2, 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 155
I DAJUNS/ENTITIES:
Thich Tri Quang
McNamara
Diem
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Spring, 1965
Diem
OCCURRENCE:
"Thich
Higgins, in her book, quotes McNamara as stating in Spring of 1965 that:
Tri Quang has made serious trouble for us before, and he will again. Perhaps the
greatest mistake we made was when we gave Thich Tri Quang
Embassy."
(from September through November 1963) Page 103
TOP SECRET
at the U. S.
SOURCE:
Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,
Harper and Rowe
STAFF: Dawson.
DATE:
FILE:
July 3, 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 156
Colby, Wm. E.
Breckinridge
OCCURRENCE:
DATES:
CATEGORIES:
Pearson, D.
Diem
3/67
IX
C - 2 - b
Castro
Breckinridge actually put together the I.G. Reports and he did so in
response to a 
March 1967 Drew Pearson column to the effect that the agency
was involved with 
criminal syndicates to assassinate Castro. As a result
of discussions caused by the Pearson column, staff members in the I.G.'s
office were 
directed to put together reports on CIA involvement in the
assassination 
of Castro, Trujillo, and Diem (50).
TOP SECRET
SOURCE:
SSCI; testimony of Wm. E. Colby, 6/4/75
STAFF:
JFD
FILE:
Cage
DATE: 6/28/75
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 157
PERSONS/ENTITIES:
IG REPORT
CONEIN
SPERA
DON, GENERAL
DIEM
DATES:
31 May 1967
DIEM,
CATEGORIES:
OCCURRENCE: In concluding, the IG Report makes the following observations:
"To recap:
(a) CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the DIEM regime, but faithfully carried
out instructions. (2) CIA officers CONEIN and SPERA were the contacts with the coup gener-
als, but only as approved and under instructions. (c) A CIA officer, CONEIN, was at the
generals' command post throughout the fighting. (d) CONEIN furnished GENERAL DON about
$65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress.
no hand in the assassinations and had no foreknowledge of them.' "
SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44
FILE:
(e) CIA had
TOP SECRET
STAFF:
DATE:
R. DAWSON
29 June 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 158
IBROGNOS/ENITIES:
COLBY
DATES:
1975
CATEGORIES:
DIEM
OCCURRENCE:
TOR SPORT
COLBY stated in response to the difficulty for the United States once it has
sought to accomplish objectives through foreign nationalists to control the actions of the
foreign nationalists, that "Certainly the foreigner makes his own decisions at various tim
the degree to which he is going to do one thing or the other. The U.S. cannot control it.
The U. S. can assist them, the U.S. can counsel him and advise him, perhaps influence him,
but the control, that is....when you are dealing with essentially another soverign, why ti
are limits to your degree of authority over them." p. 76
SOURCE:
STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
R. DAWSON
FILE:
DATE:
1 July 1975
NW 50955
DocId: 32423615
Page 159