AGENCY :
RECORD NUMBER. :
± RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
PFIAB
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
Date
09/24/98
Page : 1
206-10001-10015
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR :
NSC
FROM :
A. RUSSELL ASH
ΤΟ
:
THE FILE
TITLE
: CUBA (REVIEW ON 1/10/63 OF RECORDS OF THE SPECIAL NSC¨
5412/2 GROUP
DATE : 01/11/63
PAGES :
SUBJECTS :
13
CUBA
SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION
:
TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/14/98 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS
OPEN IN FULL
Duplicate
: Box 10, Covert Operations, 1954-1967.
contained in 206-10001-10011.
2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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206-10001-10015
Box 10.
Covert Operations
1954-1967
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
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206-10001-1001S
:
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Box 10
Covert Operations
1954-1967
206-10001-10015
,
Ө
0
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ASC
5-12
TOP SECRET
act
January 11, 1963
r
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: CUBA (Review on 1/10/63 of Records of the
Special NSC 5412/2 Group)
On 1-10-63 the writer reviewed in the offices of Mr. Tom
Parrott, Executive Secretary, Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the
records of the Special Group which Mr. Parrott identified as
relating to considerations given by the Special Group to recon-
naissance and covert action operations with regard to Cuba.
(Attached hereto is a copy, supplied by Mr. Parrott from his
records, of a "Memorandum for the Record" dated 10/21/62 on
the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba" which Mr. Parrott had
prepared for another purpose.)
There follows a detailed summary of the results of a
review made by the writer of the Cuba items referred to in
Mr. Parrott's summary memorandum, and of other items which
the writer reviewed in the Special Group records pertaining
to Cuba.
Minutes of Meetings of the Special Group
(Augmented) - "MONGOOSE"
Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)
Those present were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, General Carter, General Lemnitzer,
General Lansdale, and Dr. Cline (for part of the meeting).
The Group noted a paper presented by the State Department
member concerning "Guideline for a post-Castro Political
Program.
"1
General Lansdale briefed the Group on the number of agents
now in Cuba, including legal residents, plus infiltrated teams.
It was decided that a CIA proposal, for resupply of agent teams
and possibly of resistance groups, should be deferred pending
a broader review of the entire situation. General Taylor
specified, however, that if an urgent need arose for air supply
at any time, the proposal could be made to the Special Group
(Augmented).
Mr. McCone and General Lansdale stated that a sizable
number of intelligence reports were coming out of Cuba,
largely on political and economic matters. Mr. McCone emphasized
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that no high-level penetration of the Cuban Government had been
achieved. In answer to a question from the Attorney General,
General Lansdale said that intelligence indicated that although
there was widespread dissatisfaction with Castro, there was
no rallying point for active opposition.
The Attorney General and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need
for an effort to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activi-
ties by the Castro regime in the Hemisphere, Mr. McCone noting
that such efforts to date had been fruitless.
Dr. Cline showed the Group the extent of reconnaissance
coverage of Cuba. Mr. McCone emphasized that this program has
developed complete information on deployments and facilities
for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and he particularly noted.
that these missions have verified that there is sufficient
logistic support for a 75,000-man military force. "No missile
sites have been found."
The Group agreed on a complete review of MONGOOSE toward
the end of July, with participation by the Secretaries of State
and Defense. General Taylor emphasized that in the preparation
for such review, there would be a need for summaries of results
obtained to date, of intelligence developed, and of future
alternatives opened to the United States (including possible
activities in other parts of Latin America).
Mr. Johnson said that the State Department is investigating
the possibilities for subsidizing Japanese purchases of Dominican
sugar to divert purchases from Cuba and thereby deprive Cuba
of a source of dollars, and Mr. Johnson asked that MONGOOSE
operational representatives look into this further. Mr. McCone
said that the CIA could use unvouchered funds for this purpose,
but it would be illegal to use covert funds as a means of
evading the intent of Congress.
Minutes of the October 4, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)
Those present for this meeting with regard to Operation
MONGOOSE were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric,
General Lansdale, Mr. McCone, General Carter, and Mr. Wilson.
The Attorney General informed the Group that higher authority
was concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and felt
that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage
operations. The Attorney General wondered if a new look were
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not required in view of the meager results obtained, especially
in the sabotage field, and he urged "massive activity" within
the entire MONGOOSE framework.
General Lansdale thought that another attempt should be
made against the major target which had been the subject of
three unsuccessful missions and he said that six new missions
were in the planning stage.
Mr. Johnson said that the "massive activity" would have
to come from within, and he hoped to be able to present soon
to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand,
fully realizing that this will give additional visibility to
their activities. Mr. McCone reserved judgment on the feasi-
bility and desirability of such a program, and Mr. Johnson
agreed that he had reservations as well.
Mr. McCone said that he had received the impression
that although high levels of our Government wanted increased
activity, they still want to keep it at a low noise level,
but Mr. McCone did not believe this would be possible and he
felt that any sabotage would be blamed on the United States.
Mr. McCone cited the enormous number of telephone calls.
directed at CIA at the time the skin divers landed in east
Cuba, and the time that the Cuban exile students shot up the
apartment house. Mr. McCone therefore urged that responsible
officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they
want to get on with operations.
--
The Attorney General, in partial rebuttal, said that the
reasons people had such concern were (a) the fact that the skin
divers were Americans, and (b) the fact that the student activity
was irresponsible and foolish and if either of these had
in fact been engineered by the United States it would have
been a great mistake. The Attorney General also related the
possibility of attributability to the importance of the
particular undertaking, and he questioned whether we are going
down the right road or whether more "direct action" were not
indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans
be developed.
Mr. McCone said that internal restrictions are so rigid
that internal uprisings would surely be brutally suppressed.
(It was agreed that the current guidelines did not call for
inciting such an uprising.)
Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous
efforts necessary to insure that operations such as the sabotage
operation previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on
the United States. (After discussion, the Group agreed that
it was not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to insure
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nonattribution, and that short cuts were desirable.)
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Mr. Gilpatric informed the Group that the Defense Depart-
ment was hard at work on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits
would be trained from four to five months and then placed on
'call for any future action.
General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining
various contingency military plans based on a variety of
possible situations, including Soviet 'action against Berlin;
"the presence of bloc offensive weapons in Cuba"%3B an attack
against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion
in the Hemisphere; and "the establishment of a direct threat
to the United States.
1
Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present at this
Group meeting for an item regarding reconnaissance of Cuba.
It was pointed out that the CIA is "restricted to using its
high-performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba,
because of SAM sites. It was questioned whether this was a
reasonable restriction at that time, particularly when SAMs
were almost certainly not operational.
"
*
Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described a spectrum
of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken,
ranging from low-level, Navy fighters through drones, up to
the Agency's capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar
countermeasures. As a result of the discussion there was agree-
ment that the Department of Defense and the CIA should get
together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require
coverage, and on recommendations as to how to achieve this
coverage. A meeting was set for the following Tuesday when
Defense and CIA were to be prepared to discuss all possibilities,
including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.
There was some discussion of the desirability of mining
Cuban waters, using nonattributable mines appearing to be home-
made and llaid by small aircraft operated by Cubans.
It was agreed that the Attorney General would act as
Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) for the time being.
It was agreed that four major points which had emerged
from this meeting were: (1) we ought to go all-out for increased
intelligence%3B (2) there should be considerably more sabotage;
(3) restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that
training and preparations can be subject to short cuts; and
(4) all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative
approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.
In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject
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(Continuation of footnote from previous page)
"Reconnaissance of Cuba" it is stated: "The DCI pointed out that the
Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the southeastern quadrant
of Cuba, because of SAM sites. It was questioned whether this was a
reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAMs were
almost certainly not operational. Beside this item in the summary
memorandum, there appears the penciled notation "Also agreed should
go all out for intel."
11
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Minutes of the October 9, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)
Present for this meeting were the Attorney General,
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. Mc-
Cone, Mr. Wilson, Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville, Colonel Steakley,
and Colonel Ledford, CIA.
The Group discussed various possibilities of accomplish-
ing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from low-level coverage
by tactical aircraft to high-performance aircraft and drones.
Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.
It was
agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission
in the western part of the island, to be accomplished by all-
out ELINT support, and depending on the results of this, a
number of similar sorties might be mounted. (The first mission
was later approved by higher authority, with the decision on
the second proposition left open. The entire package was to
be discussed at the USIB and by the Chiefs on Wednesday,
October 10.)
Along with the minutes of this October 9 Meeting there
was in file a memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, dated
October 11, 1962. It was reflected in Mr. Parrott's memorandum
that Mr. Gilpatric had called at 2:15 P.M. to say he and Mr.
McCone had finally agreed that the one high-performance flight
would be flown as a military flight with a SAC pilot. CIA had
wanted to stick to the existing system for the first flight,
simply to avoid any delay. The SAC pilot would require some
additional training because the equipment in the improved
vehicle was new to him, but Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone
apparently felt that this was an acceptable delay and it was
hoped to get the flight off over the weekend. It was further
stated in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that it seemed agreed that
within the terms of the authorization given by higher authority
it would be necessary to go back for approval of the next
phase contemplating two or three more high-performance missions,
and Mr. Gilpatric seemed to feel that the discussion which had
taken place with higher authority was explicit enough to get
an emergency authority by telephone. Mr. Parrott further in-
formed Mr. Bundy that the Cover Committee (Messrs. Charyk,
Hilsman, Scoville, Parrott, "et al") had met that morning and
had agreed on a new cover story for a military pilot and a
revised cover story for civilian pilots, and with the necessary
changes it was thought that the cover story would be ready
that afternoon. Mr. Parrott pointed out to Mr. Bundy that, on
the military side, the flight is characterized as military
reconnaissance of the periphery of the target area, with parti-
cular reference to the Secretary of State's recent comments to
the OAS Ministers to the effect that we are increasing surveil-
lance activities. (A penciled note on the file copy of this
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memorandum read: "Later was delayed due to disagreement on
account of training required.'
"
11
There was also an October 12, 1962 addendum to the above-
mentioned October 11 memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy,
stating: "Later. The memorandum related that, according to
Mr. Knocke, Mr. McCone had decided the day before (October 11)
that these flights must be either entirely overt or entirely
covert, and he didn't particularly care which so long as they
were accomplished as soon as possible. In Mr. McCone's absence,
General Carter had come to an agreement with General McKee,
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, along those lines on
October 11; later, however, Mr. Gilpatric said that this was
not his understanding of the terms of authorization from higher
authority. Mr. Gilpatric felt that the idea was that a uniformed
pilot should operate the Agency's vehicle.
On October 12 at 12:45, General Carter had a meeting with
Mr. Bundy and at that time General Carter stated that the Agency
operation was ready to go except for weather, and that this
would hold it up until at least Sunday, and meantime the SAC
pilot would have received the necessary training. It was agreed
that if the pilot was sufficiently trained by the earliest time
the mission could be mounted, the flight would go, with all
other arrangements within the Agency framework. If the pilot
were not ready by the time the vehicle was ready, the mission
would be mounted as a completely Agency operation, i.e., with
a civilian pilot. According to Mr. Lay, the USIB had taken
the following actions at its October 10, 1962 meeting with
respect to the targets listed in the COMOR paper of October 6:
(1) The Group I targets were not discussed by USIB, the impli-
cation being that there was no problem from the point of view
of USIB's jurisdiction. (2) Groups II and III should be
covered as rapidly as possible initially, and after that the
frequency of coverage would be further examined. (3) COMOR
was to re-do the section of the October 6 paper dealing with
Group IV, with targets to be broken out in categories of pŕiorty,
and USIB would consider this new paper on October 17. US IB
did not consider any operational aspects, but confined them-
selves to the importance of the targets and the frequency
of coverage.
Minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group
The following summarizes the minutes of the Special Group
Meetings which were identified by Mr. Parrott as including
consideration of the subject of Cuba.
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Minutes of February 1, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. Helms.
On the subject of Cuba, the Chairman read his memorandum
to higher authority dated January 26, summarizing progress up
to that time. The memorandum from General Lansdale suggesting
a different approach to the content of the minutes of the
meeting of the preceding week on Cuba was discussed, and it
was agreed that the minutes would stand as prepared. General
Lansdale's report of February 1 on popular support for the
OAS meeting was distributed. Mr. Parrott's summary states
that the Cuba missions were stepped up from one per month
to two per month.
Minutes of June 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.
"
On the subject of "Request for Special Cuban Missions,
it was stated that the COMOR proposal dated June 13, 1962 was
approved. (A handwritten notation on the file copy of these
minutes stated that "Higher authority informed June 15 about
possibility of uprising,' and there was also a notation that
the June 13 memorandum regarding the COMOR request had been
"rewritten for book.")
"
Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
The Group agreed to recommend approval of various requests,
for authorizations. In the case of Cuba, the minutes reflect
agreement to continue with the presently authorized schedule
of two flights per month. General Taylor asked that for the
purpose of discussing this matter with higher authority, CIA
should prepare a paper on Cuba, setting forth a summary of
information which had been obtained to date, the number of
missions mounted, what is proposed to be looked at in the
future, and the frequency of further coverage desired.
Memorandum for the President from the Special Group,
July 20, 1962
The Special Group records contain a memorandum for the
President from General Taylor dated July 20, 1962, bearing a
handwritten notation by General Taylor, "Approved by H. A.
(presumably 'higher authority') 20 July 1962." In essence,
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the memorandum to the President was as follows:
In the Special Group we are aware that we have been
proceeding on a day-by-day basis in requesting authority.
for overflight reconnaissance. At our meeting yesterday,
we took a long look ahead at the estimated requirements
for the next few months and agreed that the following
program is the minimum which meets military require-
ments
Cuba: Two flights monthly
flights with CIA civilian pilots .
.
•
•
all U-2
We would like
to get your approval in principle of the foregoing
program with the understanding that on the first of each
month you will be presented with the specific flights
recommended for that month.
Minutes of August 9, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present were General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,
and Mr. William Bundy.
On the subject of "Cuba Reconnaissance" it was stated
that the Group agreed that the second mission authorized for
August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the im-
mediate situation with respect to Soviet materiel justifies
it. It was noted that this would use up existing authority
for August, and if a third mission should become necessary
later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at
that time.
Minutes of August 30, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gil-
patric, General Lemnitzer and Mr. Bundy.
The minutes reflect that in connection with the Agency's
monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be
an additional requirement for flights over Cuba. (In the
"Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject
"Reconnaissance of Cuba, 11 attached hereto, there appears beside
the item dealing with this meeting the penciled notation
"primarily low-level.")
Minutes of September 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present at this meeting, which took place in Mr.
Bundy's office, were the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, "and others."
"
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On
The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's
planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral
coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space,
all in one flight. He said he had no objection to the
peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue
to establish our right to fly over international waters.
the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical,
coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba
at this time. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine
extensive overflying of international waters with actual over-
flights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flights
would draw undue attention to the mission and, further, should
the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had
occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position
for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.
Taking these views into account, the Agency's plans to
break this proposed coverage into four parts: the Isle of Pines;
the area roughly east of longitude 77 west%; and two legs along
the coast, one north and one south.
Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this
morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for
which authority is currently outstanding. Priority will be
given to the two overflights. (A notation on the file copy
of these Special Group minutes states that as of this morning
it appears that weather will not permit a flight until at least
Friday, and longer range weather prospects are not very good,
consequently it will be some little time before these three
authorizations are used up.)
In connection with the minutes of this meeting, the Special
Group records contain a note for the file dated October 25,
1962, stating that COMOR later recommended that the Bay of
Pigs area should be looked at since it had not been seen since
June
Time over mainland would be 12 minutes for a total
of 75 miles
depth of penetration, 13 miles
known SAM site, 35 miles away. The file note further stated
that after considerable negotiation with the Department of
State it was agreed that this additional coverage would be
accomplished.
•
nearest
(In quoting the minutes of this September 10 meeting in a
memorandum from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962, there was an addendum which
stated: "N.B. Mr. Bundy said on 13 September 1962 that he
thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that
the entire number of four missions would be considered as being
approved. This thus extends the outstanding authorizations
from three to four.")
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Minutes of September 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present were Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze,
General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.
The minutes of this meeting reflect that a JCS representa-
tive (Colonel Steakley) outlined the capabilities for low-level
coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the
Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered
further until the results of Agency rèconnaissance in the same
area became available. General Carter said that special
efforts will be required to identify certain installations,
the nature of which is not clear at present. Colonel Steakley
distributed charts for the monthly book, on supplementing
ELINT coverage of Cuba which was begun today. The Group
had no objection to these missions. It was agreed that the
Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military
reconnaissance or surveillance flights in the Cuban area.
(The Special Group record of these minutes is contained in
a memorandum dated November 30, 1962, from Mr. Tom Parrott
to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric.)
Minutes of September 27, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric,
General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.
CIA's October forecast of reconnaissance activities was
noted. The special mission request for Cuba was approved.
This brings the number of authorizations for this area back to
four, i.e., four had been previously authorized and one has
been successfully completed, leaving authority for three out-
standing.
Minutes of October 15, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
A memorandum prepared for the Special Group records by
Mr. Parrott reflected that at a special meeting on this date
two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved,
and that these were concurred in by higher authority. It is
reflected that after the 15th of October additional coverage
was agreed on at other meetings, but the Special Group was not
convened for this purpose.
Memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric,
November 30, 1962
The Special Group records contain a copy of a memorandum
(previously referred to) from Mr. Thomas A. Parrott to Deputy
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Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962. The
memorandum began with the statement that it had been prepared
in answer to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's request on the
preceding day for minutes of the special meetings of the
Special Group which bore on Cuban reconnaissance, in order
that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor might be informed.
It was stated in the memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric and General
Taylor had been present on August 30 and had then returned
to the Group on September 27. It was further stated that at
the meetings of the 6th and 20th of September the subject of
Cuba reconnaissance did not arise. The memorandum then pointed
out that the meeting of September 10 was not a regular meeting
of the Special Group but had nevertheless resulted in particu-
larly significant decisions. The memorandum then went on to
set forth the minutes of the meetings of September 10, 14 and
27.
Attachment
A. Russell Ash
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