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TITLE
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
: MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964
DATE : 10/01/64
PAGES
SUBJECTS :
21'
AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964 MEETING
SUMMARY OF OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964 MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
:
RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
08/14/98
08/01/2024
NW 88132
Docld:34671875 Page 1
2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
206-10001-10000
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
NW 881321
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MINUTES
O F
BOARD
MEETING
OF
OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1964
206-10001 - 10000
NW 185
Page?
NW 88132
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TOP SECRET
ITEM
TIME
1.
9:00' 9:45
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1964
October 1, 1964
SUBJECT
Chairman's Time.
2.
9:45 10:15
Major Board Recommendations
Mr. Ash
3.
10:15
a
10:15
10:45
10:30
Status Report
11:15 Audiosurveillance Collection and Counter-
10:45 - 11:45
10:30-11:15
11:15- 11:30
5.
11:45
11:30
measures:
Final USIB Assessment of Audio Penetrations
of U. S. Embassy, MoscOW
Mr. Howard Osborn
Director of Security, CIA, and Chairman of
USIB's Security Committee
Mr
.
Marvin Gentile in C. B
Director of Security, Department of State
USIB Conclusions and Recommendations on
Organization, Management and Coordination
of the Effort
Mr. Richard Helms
Deputy Director/Plans, CIA
Mr. Howard Osborn
Executive Session-
12:15 Highlights of Soviet COSMOS (Photographic
Reconnaissance Satellite) Efforts Targeted
Against the United States
Dr. Albert Wheelon + Mr. Sage Steve
Deputy Director for Science and Technology,
CIA,
-
White House Mess
Recent Tonkin Gulf Incident:
6.
12:15 1:00
Lunch
7.
1:00 1:30.
d
1:00 1:15
11:40:
1:40
11:15 1:30
2:10
General Highlights
Mr. Coyne
White House Intelligence Requirements
in Developing Crisis Situations
Mr. Bromley Smith
Office of the Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.
Handle via BYEMAN
Control System
TOP SECRET
NW
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October 1, 1964 Agenda (Continued):
ITEM
TIME
8.
1:30
4:30
3:20.
1:30-1:50.
2:10
b.
2110 3120
1:50 - 2:10
d.
ન્હા
2:10
3:20
2:30
13:45
12:30 - 2,50
3:45 4:05
2.50 3:10
SUBJECT
Alert Warning and Response Capabilities of
the U. S. Intelligence Community in Develop-
ing Crisis Situations (Organization and
procedures for analysis of current intel-
ligence; identification of Early Warning.
indicators; timely appraisal and reporting
to top Government levels ):
National Security Agency
Mr. Louis Grant + Jock Sharretts
Department of Defense
.Col...
Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Executive Session
Department of State
Mr. Thomas L. Hughes
t held
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. R. J. Smith
Assistant Director, Current/Intelligence Staff
f.
3:10.
3:30
Executive Session
3:30-4:30
4:15 5:00
Organization, Procedures and Communications
Support of the USIB Watch Committee and
National Indications Center
Mr. Huntington Sheldon
Chairman, USIB Watch Committee
9.
4:30 - 5:00
Executive Session
motherh
10.
5:00 - 5:10
11.
5:10. End of
Day
12.
7:30
Application of Executive Pay Bill to Key
Positions in the National Signals Intel-
ligence Community
Dr. William O. Baker
Chairman of the Board's Communications Panel
Resume Consideration of Item 2.
Dinner at the Residence of Mr. Gordon Gray
(Address: 1224 30th Street, Northwest)
-
stam
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ITEM
TIME.
13.
9:00' 9:45
14.
9:45
16145
15.
10:45'
16.
11:00
11:00
12+00
TOP SECRET
October 2, 1064
SUBJECT.
Chairman's Time
Current Intelligence. Briefing on Situations
in South Vietnam, North Vietnam', Laos,
Cambodia, Communist China, Malaysia-
Indonesia, Cyprus, Congo, Cuba
Mr
Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA
(or Mr. R. J. Smith)
Executive Session
B. Conzer
at he dich
Stat
The National Reconnaissance Program
1.2:15 Dr. Brockway McMillan & Bug gen. J
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Executive Session
17.
12:00
12:15
A held
18.
12:15 1:00
Lunch
-
White House Mess
19.
1+00
2:45.
1:10 1:50
20.
∙1:45 - 3:00:
21.
3:00 - 4:30
22.
4:30 End
of Day
NW 88132
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(5:00)
Briefing on Highlights of Recent U. S.
National Photographic Intelligence Activities
Dr. Arthur Lundahl
Director, National Photographic Intelligence
Center
Discussions of Future Board Business
Discussions with the Director of
Central Intelligence
Mr. John A. McConem.
Executive Session
Lyman Kirkpatrick
Handis Wa DVEMAN
Control System
3
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185
Dodd
Page
NW 88132
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
April 5, 1965
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR FILE
SUBJECT: Board Meeting, October 1-2. 1964
October 1, 1964.
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
convened at 9:00 AM on October 1, 1964 at the Board's.
offices in the Executive Office Building. Present were
Chairman Clifford; Board members Langer, Pace, Gray, Land
and Baker (Mr. Murphy was in Brazil); and Messrs. Coyne
and Ash.
In opening the meeting the Chairman pointed out that
ample time had been allotted during this two-day meeting for
Board members to discuss agenda items of special interest."
He then turned to some matters which he wished to bring to
the Board's attention before proceeding with the regular
agenda.
Chairman Clifford informed Board members that since the
last Board meeting he had met with the President a number of
times for discussions of various subjects, and on these
occasions had taken the opportunity to progressively acquaint
the President with the work of the Board. Mr. Clifford pointed.
out to the Board that, unlike President Kennedy who had re-
constituted the Board in 1961 and was thoroughly familiar with
its functioning, President Johnson has not been as intimately
associated with the Board primarily for the reason that no
intelligence-related incidents have thus far arisen in President.
Johnson's term to evidence his special need for the Board's
assistance. However, during the past few months the President
is beginning to get a better idea of the Board's accomplishments
as a result of Mr. Clifford's comments from time to time.
Chairman Clifford observed that otherwise it was unlikely that
the President would learn much about the work done by the Board,
and certainly not from the intelligence community itself and
probably not from Mr. McGeorge Bundy whose many duties of a
non-intelligence nature e are most demanding.
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With a view to keeping the Board fully informed of the
President's indicated reactions to Board's work, Mr. Clifford
said that for the time being the President prefers a quiet,
unostentatious operation of the Board. It is the President's
desire to try to avoid any explosions in the intelligence field,
and any resignations in heat by any members of the intelligence
community. After coming into office under most difficult
circumstances, the President has found people are eager to help,
and he relies heavily on Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and on
others such as the members of this Board.
Concerning contacts with the Director of Central Intelligence,
Mr. Clifford said that he has talked with him from time to time.
Recently, Mr. McCone had called to say that he was going to be
out of the country on a mission, and he asked that General Carter
of CIA be furnished the usual list of topics which Board members
wished the DCI to cover during this meeting of the Board.
At this point the Chairman asked that the Board take up
a matter in closed session, with Messrs. Ash and Coyne leaving.
the conference room and rejoining the meeting at the end of the
closed session. Chairman Clifford informed. Mr. Coyne that the
Board had discussed a report and recommendation which Mr. Pace
had prepared for the Board's consideration, and the Board had
unánimously agreed to propose to the President that the position
of Executive Secretary to the Board be placed in Level IV of the
Executive Salary Schedule recently established by the Salary
Reform Act. Mr. Clifford said that as a part of this proposal
it would be suggested to the President that meanwhile the s salary
of the Executive Secretary be raised to a level commensurate
with the compensation of positions classified in GS-18, pending
Presidential action to place the position in Executive Level IV.
Mr. Coyne expressed to the Board his appreciation for this
action not only as it applied to him as incumbent of the
position, but also as an action in keeping with the work and
level of effectiveness required of the position in performing
on behalf of the President and the Board the responsibilities.
involved.
The Board then recessed for a minute to greet former Board
member General Doolittle who had visited the Board's offices
to pay his respects to the members. (At the time of the visit,
through arrangements made by Mr. Coyne, General Doolittle was
debriefed by Mr. Henry Thomas of CIA in connection with the
suspension of various special clearances held by General
Doolittle at the time of his recent resignation from the Board.)
Resuming in executive session, the Chairman called attention
to the next item on the regular agenda dealing with the audio-
surveillance and countermeasures problem generally, and with
the intelligence community's assessment of damage to the
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national security resulting from the 12-year penetration of the
U. S. 
Embassy in Moscow through the Soviet microphone system
which 
had recently been uncovered there. In this connection,
Mr. Pace observed that 
the September 24, 1964 report which the
Board had 
received from General Carter of CIA (concerning the
status of actions taken in response to Board Recommendation
No. 35 of June 1962) was not responsive to the Board's
recommendation calling for the organization of a major research
and development effort in the audiosurveillance field.
At 10:40 AM the Board meeting was joined by Messrs.
Richard Helms, Karamessines and Harold Osborne of CIA, and
Mr. Brown who represented the Director of Security of the
State 
Department.
Chairman Clifford asked Mr. Osborne of CIA (Chairman of
the USIB Security Committee) to speak to the intelligence
community's damage assessment of the Soviet microphone penetration
of the 
U. S. Embassy at Moscow.
Mr. Osborne read from a draft report on the damage assess-
ment, 
which was 
scheduled to be considered by the USIB Security
Committee 
on the following Tuesday preparatory to submission
to the USIB. 
He noted that the 52-microphone system had been
installed during the 
Soviet-controlled construction and renovation
of the Embassy 
building prior to its occupation by the U.S."
It was 
tentatively concluded that the penetration did serious
damage to 
the U. S. which is not possible of precise proof.
The penetration 
provided the Soviets at least with the knowledge
of Embassy 
operations, especially those of the U. S. military
attaches; 
knowledge of the Attaches 'travel plans and intelligence
targets in the 
USSR; and information on the habits, problems
and 
weaknesses of Embassy personnel as a basis for possible
exploitation 
by Soviet Intelligence Services. Mr. Osborne said
that 
Ambassador Thompson has expressed the intention to give
the Security 
Committee a damage assessment which is understood
to reflect 
the judgment that the damage to U. S. political
interests 
was not serious and could only have given the Soviets
a short-
run advantage.
Mr. Osborne said that the damage assessment has pointed
up certain deficiencies which have long been recognized by
U. S. 
security officers, namely: the fact that Soviet bloc
control of U. S. embassies during construction periods prevents
security inspections which would identify installations being
made of clandestine listening systems; the U. S. does not have
an effective technical capability to detect buried microphones;
and there is a 
need for a stronger interagency mechanism to
develop necessary countermeasures. He added that State now
has a program 
to demolish at least one room in each U. S. Embassy
located behind 
the Iron Curtain, and other U. S. agencies have
been invited to 
join State in the conduct of "sweep" procedures.
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One action resulting from the Moscow incident has been
the alerting of appropriate U. S. agencies to the type of
installation uncovered in Moscow. The USIB will be asked to
urge the agencies involved to seek adequate funds and personnel
to perform necessary security inspections of facilities overseas.
The agencies will be asked to monitor the U. S. personnel who
were subject to compromise by Soviet technical penetrations,
to ensure that Soviet exploitation attempts are not successfully
made against them. It will be proposed that a new interagency
mechanism for countermeasures coordination be established within
the USIB, with a view to achieving such goals as U. S. observation
of the construction of our overseas facilities; the employment
of U. S. personnel rather than local maintenance personnel in
the Embassys%; the assignment of more U. S. technicians to
security inspections of U. S. posts overseas; the assignment of
resident U. S. security technicians at sensitive posts abroad;
intensified security indoctrination and briefings of U. S.
personnel scheduled for assignment abroad; and expanded research
and development in the audiosurveillance countermeasures field.
Chairman Clifford asked whether the USIB Security Committee's
assessment had produced actual showings that the Soviets had
intercepted Embassy messages. (Mr. Clifford recalling the
incident last year when Khrushchev boasted to Ambassadors
Harriman and Kohler that he knew the contents of a message that
Kohler had sent to Washington recommending against U. S. approval
of a sale of West German pipe to the USSR.) Mr. Osborne could
shed no light on this. Mr. Coyne stated that he had followed
up with State Department several times regarding this incident
but the Department never had come up with a meaningful report.
Mr. Osborne said that Ambassador Thompson's forthcoming annex
to the Security Committee's assessment was expected to go into
the matter of whether the Soviets were known to have acted on
any information which was obtained through the microphone
penetration.
At Chairman Clifford's request, Mr. Helms spoke to the
subject.
He observed that CIA has over 300 telephone taps and
These
many other listening devices operated world-wide.
operations not only are for intelligence collection, but they
also provide CIA with an idea of the kind of countermeasures
used by the opposition as, for example, in the case of the
Chinese Communists' discovery of CIA's audiosurveillance operation
directed against the Chinese in Geneva. Mr. Helms said that
without audio coverage the CIA would not have known that
Lee Harvey Oswald sought a visa at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico
City in 1963. In Burundi, wh
when a Chicom attache defected to
the U.S. and asked for asylum, the Chicom Legation pressured
the Burundi Government to attempt to seize the defector and
return him to the Chicoms -- but CIA learned of this plan
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through audiosurveillance coverage and was able to thwart the
Chicoms and spirit the defector 
out of Burundi to the U. S.
In answer to Mr. Clifford's inquiry, Mr. Helms said that
one major lesson learned from 
the Moscow penetra on incident
is simply that such penetrations 
are just being invited when
the host country controls 
construction of the premises and
supplies the maintenance 
employees.
Dr. Baker asked what was being done to protect the U. S.
Embassy in Moscow and whether there are 
plans to use plastering
and paint to cover walls such 
as those in which pin-hole apertures
were found to lead to the 
concealed microphones. Mr. Brown
of State said that he understood 
that research and development
planning is being done on this
. Dr. Baker observed that this
is not an R and D problem and 
that such materials are available
now for use in placing protective 
coatings on walls in our
Dr. Baker recalled that the 
code.
sensitive facilities abroad
.
room is jeopardized in the U. S. Embassy in Paris where the
Embassy is joined to a contiguous 
building not under our 
control,
and Dr. Baker wanted to know 
what is being done about that?
situation. Mr. Brown of State was 
unable to say but he 
pointed
out that current countermeasures 
plans are directed to the
protection of U. S. posts in 
the Iron Curtain countries,
France.
not
Dr. Land said that there appeared to be some protective
steps which could be done right away, 
such as "painting and
plastering" but it seemed 
that there is a bureaucratic 
problem"
which prevents such action, and 
Dr. Land wondered what was
_ was it necessary
considered necessary to get the 
job done -
to obtain a Presidential Executive Order to do these things?
Mr. Helms commented that one of the USIB 
Security Committee's
recommendations will call for putting 
the responsibility in
the USIB and the agencies will 
look to the DCI for guidance 
in
Dr. Baker 
said that all this seemed confusing
such matters.
because the individual agencies have responsibility in 
this
field, and he wondered whether a mere 
change in organizational
labels would provide the necessary 
coordination and action.
Mr. Helms thought that one task 
is to get the agency heads 
to
realize the importance of the problem 
of audiosurveillance
countermeasures. Dr. Baker 
observed that there are already 
in
existence NSC directives which emphasize 
the seriousness of the
threat. Mr. Gray pointed out in 
this connection that the
preliminary USIB damage assessment 
of the Moscow penetration
reflects that in some quarters 
in the State Department there
is the view that maybe it was a 
good thing if the Soviets did
get our information on the theory 
that the Soviets were thereby
convinced of the firm intentions back 
of U. S. policy 
pronouncements.
Chairman Clifford asked whether anyone in our Government
had ever considered the idea of telling the USSR in direct terms
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cld 2490
that we want to build an Embassy in Moscow ourselves, so that
we can be certain that there are no audiosurveillance systems
installed in it. Mr. Helms said that this is one answer and
should be tried, but right now there is a hassle about which
agency should chair the proposed new USIB Committee to coordinate
such matters. Mr. Brown of State said that consideration had
been given in the past to the possible use of U. S. employees
instead of local maintenance people. Granting this, Mr. Clifford
repeated his inquiry as to whether the intelligence community.
had ever proposed that the U. S. adopt the policy of bluntly
telling the Soviets that we want the right to build a microphone-
free Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Helms knew of no such proposal
having been made by the intelligence community, but he thought
that this was a matter which the President's Board could deal
with in a recommendation to the President. Mr. Coyne at this
point read to the Board the text of Recommendation No. 16 which
the Board had made in the Dunlap Case (adoption of a U. S..
policy that the USSR not be permitted to build a new Embassy
in Washington unless the U. S. is given comparable permission
in Moscow), and the State Department's reply to the effect that
the U. S. was committed to the USSR in writing to help the
Soviets get a new Embassy in Washington, in return for the
Soviet action a few years ago in refurbishing and making available
the North Wing of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow (Mr. Coyne poined
out that it was in this same, North Wing that a number of
concealed microphone cable connections and antennae were found
in the course of digging out the recently-discovered microphone
system in the Embassy).
Chairman Clifford asked Mr. Helms to provide the Board
at an early date with a list of protective actions which could
be taken right now to increase defenses against audio penetrations
c. our posts abroad. Mr. Helms agreed to do so.
Messrs. Helms, Osborne, Brown, et al, departed the Board
meeting at the conclusion of this agenda item.
Dr. Albert Wheelon, Deputy Director of CIA for Science and
Technology, joined the Board meeting, accompanied by Mr. Stevens
of CIA, to report to the Board on Soviet satellite reconnaissance.
operations directed against the U. S. Describing this as the
Soviet COSMOS program, Dr. Wheelon said that of the total
number of Soviet satellite shots (46 in all) 17 have been
launched from Kapustin Yar. During the last three years 22
launchings have been made from Tyura Tam, and these were pretty
clearly reconnaissance satellites. These carried 10,000-pound
payloads in a photographic general search system like our
CORONA. The camera weighs 2000 pounds. Four of the shots,
however, were of the 15,000-pound payload variety, and are
spotting systems like our GAMBIT. The repetition rate over
U. S. targets is increasing. We are getting data on each mission,
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1
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The Congo
being supplied through Burundi and Brazzaville.
situation could become dangerous to the U.S. position in"
African public opinion, Chinese Communist influence is
persuasive
, and seven African countries will recognize
Communist China and vote for its admission into the U.N.
The Chicoms offered a Central African Republic $4 million
for diplomatic recognition, and got it.
With regard to the Cyprus situation, Mr. Cline noted
that although fighting has stopped neither side is backing
down. The Cypriot leader will not agree to the Turks' pro-
posal to rotate 1/3 of their troops on Cyprus unless the
Turk Cypriots withdraw from positions along the coast. The
USSR wants an independent Cyprus with a Communist-influenced
government. Nasser wants an independent Cyprus subject to
Egyptian influence. In reply to a question from Mr. Coyne,
Mr. Cline stated that the Navy SIGINT installation has been
scaled down so as to be ready for quick evacuation. This
cut-down in U.S. SIGINT coverage has been replaced somewhat
by installations in some Middle East capital cities.
Concerning South Vietnam, Mr. Cline said that the past
60 days have witnessed increased weakening of the political
fabric of the government of that country. Khanh's inability
to meet challenges is apparent, and his authority has
steadily eroded.. Khanh is trying to build support from the
young officers and Bhuddists. (Mr. William Sullivan has
just returned to the U.S. and says that the SVN people
generally feel that the U.S. will pull out after the
November elections). There is no change in the military
situation, Mr. Cline said, but there is a creeping paralysis
in the SVN army. The Viet Cong is shifting from terrorism
and fighting to all-out political activity. In the USIB
yesterday CIA expressed the view that there will be further
political decay in SVN, increased friction with the U.S.,
and a petering out of the war effort.
Cuba In Cuba, there are signs that either the Soviets or 2
elections, and the "303 Committee" is studying courses of
action which mit be taken by the U.S. in such an event.
One objective of the DCI's recent European trip was to
emphasize to NATO commanders that U.S. U-2 missions over
Cuba are not mere whimsy, but are necessary for intelligence
coverage which cannot be provided by satellite overflights.
At 11:00 a.m., Mr. Cline left the Board meeting which
was then joined by Under Secretary of the Air Force Brockway
McMillan (Director of the NRO) accompanied by General Stewart
the new Staff Director at the NRO (previously attached to
the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Staff).
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At 3:00 p.m., the Board meeting was joined by the Director
of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA,
in order that the DCI might cover the items in which Board
members had indicated an interest in discussing with Mr. McCone.
Mr. McCone first took up the September Tonkin Gulf incident,
pointing out that he was out of the country when it occurred
.
Mr. McCone said that previously in a meeting with the Secretaries
of State and Defense and the President, Mr. McCone had expressed
the view that if the proposed De Soto patrol remained outside the
12-mile limit it would not be attacked by the North 
Vietnamese
or Chicoms. The DCI said that the night before he left for
Europe he repeated this belief to the Secretary of 
Defense,
pointing out to him the absence of military attack preparations
and the lack of other indications of hostile intent. The DCI
felt that there was no real intelligence requirement for the
De Soto patrol which had in fact been proposed for the purpose
of emphasizing freedom of the seas and our right to enter the
Tonkin Gulf with U.S. vessels. At the time of the 
incident 
the
DCI was in conference with a NATO officer in Europe; and he
immediately put in a call to McGeorge Bundy on the KY-9 and
offered to return to Washington, but was told not to do so
Mr. McCone
because of the uncertainties as to the need for it.
pointed out to the Board that CIA's assessment in the Central
Intelligence Bulletin on Saturday morning reflected that there
was no evidence that Hanoi had ordered an attack on U.S. vessels
but that North Vietnam naval units had been alerted to avoid
acts of provocation and were concerned with defensive action
only if fired upon.
1 inter-
Mr. McCone noted the Board's expression of interest in cence
discussing a mechanism to improve current intelligence 
assess-as
ment and reporting of such incidents as the Tonkin Gulf episode.
He said that he had found room for improvement in one area:
certain NSA intercept messages had been passed back to the
field stations for processing, and had been sent to 
the
National Indications Center, but were not passed immediately
Mr. McCone said that
and directly to the CIA for analysis.
In any case,
he had since corrected this reporting procedure.
when the NSA messages reached the NIC they were sent on to CIA
without serious delay. However, Mr. McCone said, there developed
a dangerous situation which the Board should look at, namely,
the fact that top policy officials grabbed onto fragments of
raw intelligence and made decisions before the 
information 
had
been evaluated in the light of the total information available
and relevant to the situation. Policy officials should 
make 
use
of the evaluating machinery which is at hand.
Dr. Langer said he understood that there had been no inter-
agency evaluation of the SIGINT messages in the Tonkin Gulf 
in-
cident. Mr. McCone said that by the time the Central Intelligence.
Bulletin was ready for publication on Saturday morning there was.
no opportunity for complete interagency coordination of the
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evaluation which CIA had made of the situation.
TOP SECRET
Dr. Langer
wondered whether there was sufficient DIA and State Department
representation at the CIA center where the Central Intelligence
Bulletin was prepared. Dr. Langer added that the White House
staff followed the wrong procedure; that instead of querying
CIA, Mr. Bromley Smith had called Mr. Coyne for help in getting
a coordinated evaluation of the situation. Mr. Coyne corrected
this by pointing out that in fact Mr. Smith had talked to State
and others in the intelligence community; and thereafter called
Mr. Coyne to obtain help in getting an up-to-date comprehensive
summary of the SIGINT messages from NSA, and Mr. Coyne there-
upon spent two days at NSA observing the work of NSA officials.
in reviewing and summarizing the messages which had come in from
NSA field collection points, and the operational U.S. Navy
messages to the extent that they had been made available to NSA.
Mr. Pace thought it strange that the availability of a
channel to CIA had not been known to Mr. Bromley Smith, and
Mr. McCone said that he too was surprised and intended to
discuss this with McGeorge Bundy.
Turning to the subject of Cuba, Mr. McCone said that he had
little to report in addition to that which he had reported to
the Board at its meeting before last. CIA has 100 agents re-
porting on Cuba; they report comprehensively but under difficult
circumstances requiring resort to clandestine radio equipment
and secret writing reports through the mails. CIA has a
reasonable number of sources (14) in the Cuban diplomatic
corps, but Castro apparently doesn't have confidants among the
Cuban diplomatic corps abroad. CIA has relations with friendly
foreign diplomatic personnel inside Cuba. Mr. McCone said that
he is not satisfied with the information being obtained from
Cuba; the task is difficult; it is a matter of providing a
negative. CIA has had to rely mainly on U-2 coverage results to
check on the 45 reports received this year that there are Soviet turned
missiles in Cuba. The SA-2 sites have probably been over to
the Cubans by the Soviets, and a defector from an SA-2 crew has
told CIA about Cuban operations. Castro has expressed intention
to bring to the UN the matter of U.S. U-2's over Cuba, and has
told Danish and Norwegian officials that after the U.S. elections
in November, U.S. U-2's over Cuba, will be shot down%3B Castro
claiming that U.S. can rely on satellite photography of Cuba
and must cease U-2 operations over the island. Mr. McCone said,
that by November 1, 1964, OXCART will be ready for missions
over Cuba at a speed of Mach 2.8 and 80,000 foot altitude.
As for South Vietnam, the DCI said that it is most difficult
to get intelligence on the Viet Cong. He has discussed with
Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, and the CIA Station Chief in Saigon,
how to improve this intelligence coverage. SVN intelligence
. organizations get very little information concerning the Viet Cong
NW 88
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BYEMAN-COMINT.
CONTROL SVCSTENS
29
TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET ;;
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD.
September 24, 1964
SUMMARY
Recommendations Previously made by the Board
for Strengthening Capabilities of the U. S.,
Intelligence Community in the Timely Analysis
and Reporting of Current Intelligence on
Developing Crisis Situations
NW 185
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TOP SECRET-
Board Report of July 2, 1961
TOP SECRET
Rec. #4: That the U. S. Intelligence Board create the meon's
for assessing and reporting early warning indications 
of
developing "cold war" crisis situations in any 
part of 
the
world (such early warning to be handled separately from
"hot war" indications dealt with in the National Indications
Center of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee
).
Board Report of July 2, 1961
Rec. #1 (7): That the DCI be responsible for (1) overseeing.
the preparation of national intelligence estimates by 
the
intelligence community, (2) assuring the timely flow 
of
intelligence to the White House, and (3) providing intelligence
briefings to the President and other White House officials 
as
required..
Board Report of January 11, 1962
Rec. #26: (Based on a review of the Berlin Wall and Syrian
coup incidents): That (1) a sense of urgency 
be imparted 
as
field and headquarters levels of U. S. intelligence, agcholes
with a view to ensuring timely reporting, dissemination 
ant
assessment of intelligence indicating the imminence 
of 
crisis
situations which are of potential significance to the foreign
policy and national security interests of the United States
;
(2) without imposing undue delay on the transmission of raw
intelligence to Washington, State Department officials at
overseas posts prepare periodic appraisals of developing
crisis situations, for use at the field level and for consider-
ation at Washington in the preparation of intelligence analyses
and estimates; (3) procedures of the U. S. Intelligence Board,
and its subsidiaries such as the Watch Committee, ensure that
intelligence appraisals reflect significant differences of
view which may develop in the intelligence estimative process;
and (4) in keeping with the DCI's responsibility for the timely
flow of intelligence to the White House, the DCI be requested
to review arrangements and procedures to ensure that (a) CIA'S
intelligence assessments and spot reports on developing crisis
situations are made available for timely consideration by the
President and other officials, and (b) copies of assessments
and spot reports to the White House from other agencies are
furnished to the DCI for information and for use in preparing
intelligence estimates.
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
185
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TOP SECRET:
185
Board Report of January 20, 1962.
TOP SECRET
Rec. #32: That the Director of Central Intelligence, in
consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, review.
functions of the U. S. Intelligence. Board's. Watch Conuit dee
and National Indications Center, to determine 
their 
effective-
ness in carrying out their mission of providing early 
warning.
Board Report of March 8, 1963
Rec. #49(11) (Based on the review of intelligence coverage,
assessment and reporting by U. S. agencies with respect 
to
the Soviet military buildup in Cuba in 1962): That concerted.
efforts be made to (1) devise an effective mechanism 
for the
integrated assessment (and cumulative periodic appraisals) of:
early-warning and indicator-type intelligence and prompt
reporting thereof to policy-making and command officials; and
(2) conduct intensified research concerning automatic 
data
processing techniques, to facilitate the review and assessment
of the great volume of material dealt with in 
the United 
States
intelligence community.
(011100PM)
Related Board Recommendations Regarding
Improved Communications Capability for the
Quick Transmittal of Vital Intelligence Data
Board Report of October 17, 1961
the
In lieu of a recommendation, this was. a report to the
President on progress achieved by the Defense 
Department 
in
performing its share of the responsibility for the efficiency
of the Critical Communications (CRITICOM) Network 
for the 
quick
transmittal of vital early warning and other intelligence data
from overseas posts to headquarters in Washington.
Board Report of January 20, 1962.
Rec. #2327 (11) (Based on review of U. S. intelligence activities
That the Defense Department
In seven Middle Eastern countries):
equip field elements of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM)
Network with capability for rapid communication of critical
messages among major and subordinate military commands in the
field.
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
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TOP SECRET
Board Report of October 5, 1962
1.TOP SECRET
Rec. #10 (Based on review of U. S. foreign intelligence
that 
the
activities in Southeast Asia and 
the Far East):
Defense Intelligence Agency take action regarding the military
Special Security Offices (SSO) 
Communications System for
transmitting sensitive information with 
a view to: (1) 
con-
solidating parallel SSO networks running 
between Pacific
military commands and Washington civilian 
officials, and
(2) reorienting the SSO system to make it 
a primary 
service
and support to Commands in the 
field and command (as
distinguished from Service) elements in 
Washington.
3
_TOP SECRET
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185
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INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION
Reed
10-1-14
EL VP CR
773#2328
ISIC
DIA
Watch Alert
UNIFIED & SPECIFIED
COMMANDS
• ATTACHES
WARNING CENTERS
INFORMATION
Joint Military Estimates
Military Operations
Military Capabilities
STATE
RSB
• FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS
INFORMATION
Political
Foreign Policy (US)
OCI
CIA
INDICO
• CLANDESTINE SERVICES
FOREIGN INTELL LIAISON
INFORMATION.
National Estimates ONE
Economic
Scientific
ORR
OSI
US Overt Sources
Foreign Broadcasts FBIS
Foreign Documents FDD
WATCH
COMMITTEE
by mi Sheldon
Move: Distributed to member of meeting
NSA.
SIGINT COMMAND
CENTER
• COMINTA
• ELINT
(
NW 185
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ATOMIC
MISSILES
JABIC
GMAIC
CCPC
FB1
Liaison Division
• COMMUNIST
PARTY, USA
SPECIAL USIB. COMMITTEES
TRADE
[IC
ASC
"Intell Division
• ATOMIC
• SCIENTIFIC
EXCHANGES
SREC. BERLIN
COMMITTEE
SECRET
Bistres
20:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
February 27, 1963
AL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 226
SUBJECT:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
e General
The Attorney
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Emergency
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman/Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigad
Directive Relating to Transmittal of Infor
to the Watch Committee of the United State,
telligence Board
Thereby approve he attached directive relating to the
tal of information by appropriate departments and agencies
of the Covernment to the Watch Committee of the United States.
Intelligence Board.
#2328
Abovo-rcforanced directivo
Note: Distributed to mentre
at meeting by
Mi Sheldon
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Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information to the
Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National
Security Act of 1947, as amonded, and for the purpose of providing
of the United States
necessary support to the Watch Committee
Intelligence Board (USIB) in the accomplishment of its mission, all
appropriate departments and agencies of the Government are author.
ized and directed by the President:
To make fully available to the Watch Committee of the
US13 all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility
Hortiment to its mission and functions (as defined in DCID 1/5.-
(now sories), attached horeto), without restriction because of
source, policy or operational sensitivity,
To keep the Watch Committee of the USB informed
oncerning significant diplomatic, political, military, or other
for immediate imple-
courpes of action by the U.hich might bring about
mentation or in process of
action by the USSR, or its
military reaction or early hostile a
allies, thus endangering the security of the U.S. This inform
tion is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee)
and those members of the National Indications Center who need.
to know of it in order to
o 
perform their functions.
taken up
2. When, in the opinion of a department or agency, overriding
considerations affecting the national security exist which justify an
attooption to a. or b. above, the decision as to withholding or delaying
ransmission of the information to the Watch Committee shall bo
with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there is dis-
referred to the President. In the case of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the matter shall be taken up by the Director.
thereof with the Attorney General who shall consult with the 
Director
of Central Intelligence,
e, 
and if there is disagreement the matter 
shall
bo referred to the President.
Undor normal circumstances such data should be cont to tho
Director of the National
onal Indications Center, Pentagon Building.
When
cm is considered of exceptional sensitivity, it should be addressed
SECRET
NW 88192
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SECRET
to the Chairman of the Watch Committee, in care of the Director,
National Indications Center.
Copy
ished:
Copy of Director of Central
Intelligence Directive (DCID)
No. 1/5 (New Series)."
Each member of the United States
Intelligence Board.
SECRET