157-10014-10046
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY:
RECORD NUMBER
:
SSCIA
157-10014-10046
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-04
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM: HALLEY
TO :
TITLE :
DATE: 08/19/75
PAGES:
SUBJECTS :
159
JMWAVE
CIA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CASTRO, FIDEL
TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/31/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: Box 2
NW 50955 DocId: 32423434 Page 1
[R]
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ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Date: 08/06/95
Page:
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ཏཡཱ ཝཱ ཀསཱརཱཚཙ……ཐཱནྟདཱརཱvps,#T"" ""! *
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RMATION
Subject
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Vol. 3
The United States Senate 866
70076
00096.
Report of Proceedings
transcript file
INVENTORIED:
ON 3/2/77
Hearing held before
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Tuesday, August 19, 1975
Washington, D. C.
(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the 
Committee for destruction)
WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
(202) 544-6000
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(Witness: Halley)
EXHIBIT
CONTENTS
EXHIBITS
FOR IDENTIFICATION
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STAFF INTERVIEW:
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Tuesday, August 19, 1975
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United States Senate,
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Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities
Washington, D.C.
The Committes met, pursuant to notice, at 1:25 o'clock p.m.
in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.
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Staff Members.
Staff: Frederick Baron, Joseph diGenova, Professional
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Mr. Baron.
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PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Halley, is it true that you are here
testifying today under alias, and that Halley is not actually
4 your true identity?
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Mr. Halley. That is correct.
Mr. Baron. Your true identity will be on file with the
review staff of the CIA and available for verification by the
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Committee if that becomes necessary?
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Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.
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Mr. Baron. Let me show you a piece of paper marked
"Statement Regarding Testimony and Alias" and let me ask you
whether this is the statement you signed as we were beginning
here today which indicates your true identity and which I have
witnessed?
Mr. Halley. Yes, that is the correct statement that I
signed today. There is a blank there where we have not filled
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in the Senator's name.
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Mr. Baron. All right.
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For the moment, let us leave that blank and enter it into
2G
the record as is, as Exhibit 1.
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(The document referred to
was marked Halley Exhibit
No. 1 for identification.)
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Mr. Baron. It is your understanding, is it not, that we
2 have worked out an arrangement with the review staff whereby
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the statement will be attached to your transcript as
an Exhibit
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and in a sanitized form, leaving out either of the two references
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Agency.
to your true identity which will only be available at this
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Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.
Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel
before the Committee?
Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.
Mr. Baron. Are you appearing here, voluntarily here today
without counsel?
Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.
Mr.
Baron. Are you also aware that at any point you are
entitled to cease answering any questions and consult with
counsel if you wish?
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Mr. Halley.
Yes,
I am aware of that.
Mr. Baron.
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Finally, are you aware that all your Constitu-
tional rights are intact before the Committee here today,
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. including your Fifth Amendment
rights to remain silent?
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Mr. Baron.
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Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.
I think we should put into the record the
arrangement that we made before we began, and correct me if this
is not your understanding of the arrangement, that we are
testifying here today without placing you under oath because
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1 there is no Senator available for that purpose, but both you and
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I are contemplating having a Senator swear you in and ask you if
your transcript is true to the best of your knowledge at some
point as soon as possible as it can be arranged after today's
session.
Mr. Halley. Yes. The statement that you have just made
is my understanding of the agreement that we entered into prior
to this conversation going on the record.
Mr. Baron. Thank you.
Let us begin then with some very broad questions:
about your background in the Agency. Can you tell me what you
were doing in the Agency prior to your involvement with the
JMWAVE station?
Mr. Halley. I became involved with the Cuban affair in
approximately February of 1962. At that time, I was in Head-
quarters. I was Chief of Foreign Intelligence Activities for the
Eastern European Division. I was asked to be released from those
duties to conduct a survey of the opportunities for running
intelligence operations against Cuba. I was released from those
duties; I did engage in a survey of the possibilities for running
intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary operations
against Cuba.
Mr. Baron. Your position as Chief of Foreign Intelligence
for Eastern Europe did not involve Cuba in any way? That was
your last position before you became involved in Cuban affairs,
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is that correct?
Mr. Halley. That is correct.
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I want to qualify that.
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Undoubtedly, there were some
actions that were being conducted in the Eastern European area
that reflected on Cuba, but I was not involved in the Bay of Pigs
operation. I was not fully focused on Cuban operations until
approximately February of 1962.
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Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the Agency?
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Mr. Halley.
I joined the Agency originally in 1951.
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Mr. Baron. In a very general way, can you describe the
nature of your activities at the Agency prior to February of 1627
Mr. Halley. When I was first assigned to the Agency, I was
an Army officer on active duty. I went through the usual Agency
training program. I was assigned to Eastern European activities
where I originally was focused on Polish and German operations.
I subsequently served from 1952 to 1959 in Germany.. In the
course of that service, I spent most of my time working on the
Eastern European satellites, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
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Soviet operations and East German operations.
Mr. Baron. Did you have any involvement in Latin American
affairs prior to February of '62?
Mr. Halley. Yes. In the period 1960-62, I was responsible
for setting up operational activity in Latin America that
was targetted more explicitly on the Eastern European satellites
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to some extent on the Soviet Union. This was in a period of time
where the Eastern European satellites were expanding their
presence in Latin America. In my duties in the Eastern European
Division, I was responsible for getting this program going in
Latin America, so I did have an extensive exposure to Latin
America: in the period '60 to '62, as I recall those dates.
The accuracy of those dates can be checked from my official
travel records, and so on.
Mr. Baron. During that period of time you were actually
in Latin America helping to set up this program?
Mr. Halley. No, I was stationed in Washington, but I
travelled to Latin America during this particular period of
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time.
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Mr. Baron. Did you travel to Cuba at any point during the
course of that operation?
Mr. Halley.
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Not specifically. I think I transitted Cuba
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on air stops being routed to various countries.
I think I was
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at one or two Cuban airfields, but simply in transit.
Mr. Baron.
Not long enough even to talk to the people at
the Station in Cuba?
Mr. Halley.
No, I had no contact at any time with the
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Havana Station.
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Mr. Baron.
Did you pick up, during this period of time,
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a general sense of the attitude of Latin American governments
toward the Castro government?
Could you characterize that
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attitude, if you did?
7.
Mr. Halley.
political trend in the Hemisphere at that time, my interest was
I certainly was aware, I think, of the broad
much more narrowly focused at that time on the Eastern European
targets, and on the Soviet target, and I was not certainly
specializing in Cuban affairs at that juncture.
Mr. Baron. Cuba was not viewed at that juncture as part of
the Soviet target, as a Soviet satellite?
it was not.
Coming then to February of '62, is that the
point at which you joined the JMWAVE Station in Miami?
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Mr. Halley.
NO,
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Mr. Baron.
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Mr. Halley. No. When I first entered into this survey,
it was to do this on a TDY basis, temporary duty assignment,
to complete a report on my findings, to report those at that
particular juncture to Mr. Harvey who was the head of the Task
Force that was attempting to expand intelligence coverage of
Cuba and I was not assigned to the station at that particular
point in time.
Mr. Baron.
At what point did you join the JMWAVE Station?
Mr. Halley. Shortly after having completed this survey.
These dates are blurred now because the survey soon turned into
a permanent assignment. I would have to check the exact dates
from my service records, but after having completed the survey
report, shortly thereafter I was asked to go to Miami to become
permanently assigned to the station in Miami. I do not recall
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the exact date at which that permanent change of station took
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Mr. Baron.
Would you assume that that was sometime before
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Mr. Halley.
Yes. It was probably before that, but as I
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say, there are a couple of weeks gap that we would have to look
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at my service record to get the exact dates, but certainly it
could have been March, it could have been April: But I reserve,
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Mr. Baron. Certainly.
I should say generally at this point, if anything we cover
today gives you that kind of problem it would be immensely
helpful to us if you would check your answers against. documents
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that might be available in the CIA.
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Mr. Halley. Yes, all right.
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Mr. Baron. In fact, let me ask you if you would check that
one out, because it would be useful to know exactly when you
joined the JMWAVE station.
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During the period of time before you joined JMWAVE, while
you were conducting the survey, did you report to anyone other
than William Harvey?
Mr. Halley. In a formal sense, this TDY was conducted on
behalf of the task force commander, who was Mr. Harvey. While
I was in Miami conducting the survey, I obviously discussed
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matters pertaining to that survey to the team who was then in
charge of the operational activity in Miami.
That team was
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essentially headed by Mr. Al Cox, who has since died.
Mr. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of JMWAVE station?
Mr. Halley. Yes.
Mr. Cox was the head, then, of what would
be the equivalent of the JMWAVE Station.
Mr. Baron. Was he the head of JMWAVE until the point when
you replaced him, or until the point you became Chief of the
JMWAVE Station?
Mr. Halley. That is correct. He was the head of that
unit until such time as I replaced him.
Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this survey that you
were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-called
14 Special Group in the White House which was part of the National
15 Security Council structure and used the project named MONGOOSE
for anti-Cuban operations?
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Mr. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted
this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence
which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a
survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted against
Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General
Lansdale and Mr. Helms.
This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practical
purposes the task force unit which was managed by Mr. Harvey.
I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that you
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1 used, that is Project MONGOOSE, or whatever you said. I do not
2 know the exact words you used.
I am not familiar with that
terminology.
Mr Baron.
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During the whole period of your involvement
with JMWAVE, you were not made aware of Project MONGOOSE as
such?
Mr. Halley. I am not aware of Project MONGOOSE. I do not
recall it as an acronym, cryptonym or anything else that was in
common usage in my conversations.
Also, you have to understand that during that particular
time, Mr. Harvey was subordinate to the normal Agency chain of
command. In other words, he had parallel lines, if you will.
13 There was this three-man Task Force to whom he was reporting
regularly. At the same time, as the Task Force Commander, he
was reporting to the then-DDP who was Mr. Helms.
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Mr Baron. You began your survey just about the time that
Mr. Helms replaced Mr. Bissell as DDP?
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Mr. Halley. That is right.
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Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the command relationship
20 between the three-man group that you have mentioned and William
Harvey as head of Task Force W? Did that group task Harvey
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directly, or did Harvey's assignments have to come through Helms)
23 and through the DCI as opposed to this group that did not include
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the DCI?
Mr. Halley. My understanding of it at the time was we were
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1 really talking about parallel lines. In other words, this
2 three-man group was meeting. Mr. Helms was both a member of
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that particular group and the DDP. Therefore, when he came back
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it was, you know, tantamount to these things coming through two
channels simultaneously, one coming from this three-man task
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face value?
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force and the other instruction simultaneously coming from Mr.
Helms who was the DDP.
Mr. Baron. As far as Mr. Harvey was concerned, an assign-
ment or order from Richard Helms was an order to be taken at
Harvey did not have to question whether it had the
stamp of approval from the DCI or not? Would that have been
your operating understanding?
Mr. Halley. That would have been my understanding, yes.
Certainly an instruction received from Mr. Helms was a valid
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Mr. Baron. The DCI at this point was John McCone.
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Mr. Baron.
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Mr. Halley. That is correct.
Do you have any knowledge of the relationship
between this three-man group and John McCone at that point?
Mr. Halley. Not on a day to day basis. Once I went to
Miami, I came back on a regular basis to review operational
plans and programs. On one occasion I accompanied Mr. McCone
to the White House to give a presentation or sit in while the
presentation was being made.
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Mr. Baron. Where was this? What was the forum in which
2 the presentation was made.
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Mr. Halley. This was a meeting with President Kennedy and
4 other members of the then-Cabinet were present at that particular
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meeting.
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Mr. Baron. Was that a Cabinet meeting or was it a Special
Group meeting as a sub-unit of the National Security Council?
Mr. Halley. You know, that happened in 1962. This is
1975. I do not recall then with precision as to whether it was
a meeting of the Cabinet or whether it was a meeting of the
11 National Security Council, or whether it was a meeting of the
12 Special Group.
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Mr. Baron. That: is perfectly understandable.
14 which Cabinet members were present at that meeting?
Do you recall
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. Mr. Halley. Yes. My recollection of that was that Mr.
McNamara was present, Mr. Rusk was present, Mr. Kennedy, the
Attorney General, was present. You know, I am just vague now
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at this particular point. Those are the ones that stick out in
my memory as being present.
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Mr. Baron. Was the DCI present?
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Mr. Halley. Yes, the DCI was present, and he gave a
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As I recall, Mr. FitzGerald gave
the other portion of the presentation.
Mr. Baron. Who at that point replaced William Harvey as
Chief of Task Force W?
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Mr. Halley.
Right. You know, the chronology of the Chiefs
of our Task Force were that it was Harvey, then FitzGerald,
then Screber, after that, Hart. I served with all four of those.
This was a very active period, you know, with precision, I cannot
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outline for you today the dates when Harvey left and FitzGerald
took over, you know, when FitzGerald left and Screber took over
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and so forth. This is something that I would have to research
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to give you the precise dates.
Mr. Baron. What was the substance of this meeting that
they had in which the President was present?
Mr. Halley. This was a general review of activities that
were being conducted against Cuba.
Mr. Baron. Was there any mention of any assassination
effort at that meeting?
Mr. Halley. No, there was not.
Mr. Baron. You were attending at that point in connection
with the survey you conducted?
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Mr. Halley. No. I was attending at that point as the
Station Chief from Miami in order to make a contribution to the
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issues that were being discussed, to the fact that detailed,
substantive back-up for whatever questions might be put to the
22 Agency spokesmen. I made reference to that because you asked
me if I knew the relationship between Mr. McCone and this
three-man group. I said no, on a day-to-day basis I did not
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know the relationship, but that there were meetings that were
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like Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, who was a member of that
group.
Mr. Baron. Were you aware that that group might have gone
by any particular name or designation?
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Mr. Halley.
No, I am not.
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Mr. Baron.
You are not familiar with the term Special
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Group?
Mr. Halley.
Yes, I am aware of the term Special Group.
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I am aware that the chronology of the 303 Committee, Special
Group, 40 Committee and so forth, but as I mentioned to you
earlier, that particular time, I cannot distinguish between
whether this was an ad hoc meeting or this was a Special Group
.14 meeting, or what it was.
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Mr. Baron. Did you assume at that time that the three-man
group that you referred to, including the Attorney General,
General Lansdale and Richard Helms, had a formal relationship
to this larger Special Group? In other words, was that three-
man group a kind of decision-making sub-unit of the Special
Group, or do you think it operated entirely independent from
the National Security Council structure.
Mr. Halley. I do not think I can give you an authoritative
answer to that. I would go back to what I previously told
you.
When I entered into this project in February of 162, the
chain of command that I was familiar with was this three-man
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group in constant contact with Mr. Harvey. The second chain
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of command, paralleling that, was Mr. Harvey reporting to the
DDP and the DDP subsequently reporting through his chain of
command to the Director, and that would be the only way that
I could characterize that with any accuracy.
Mr. Baron. Did those two chains of command continue
as the channels of decision-making and tasking when you were ….
or during your tenure as Chief of Station.at JMWAVE?
Mr. Halley. That relationship changed, and again I do
not have the date at my fingertips at what time that changed.
I know that shortly thereafter I was in Miami, General
Lansdale came down to visit me, to talk with me, about the
progress that was being made in the operational program. At
some point after that, this three-man group for all intents
and purposes disappeared. General Lansdale was reassigned;
the group broke up; subsequent reviews of the program were made
at the Special Group level. As an example, we would have to
submit every month the number of operations that we were going
to run, such as infiltrations into Cuba through what would be
paramilitary means, and these were approved by the Special
Group. There was an approval procedure for setting those up,
so subsequently the three-man group disappeared and the regular
mechanism of the Special Group came into play.
I am sorry, I cannot give you a precise date for that
change, but I am sure it is in the record and I am sure you even
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have the date because the Agency has been researching all sorts
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of material for you.
I feel that you would just have to get
3 those dates for the record.
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Mr. Baron. We can do that.
Would you say that every major operation that you undertook
at JMWAVE would have been approved by the Special Group or at
least they would have been put on notice of the nature of any
major operation that you were planning?
Mr. Halley. Why do you not define for me what you consider
to be a major operation so we do not get into, you know, a
problem? If you feel that you cannot do that
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Mr. Baron. Perhaps we can turn it around and say, could
you characterize the kinds of operations generally that you
would refer to this three-man group initially, in the Special
to
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Group later, for their approval, or at least to put them on
notice the kinds that you might not refer and instead proceed
unilaterally?
Mr. Halley. Initially, the three-man group was seized
with the problem of conducting the survey of what could be
done against Cuba. As soon as that was more or less agreed
upon, my understanding of this, as I told you, the three-man
group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other things
and then the formal mechanism came in for approval, that is,
the Special Group. As procedures became more formalized, we
had to submit a monthly schedule of the kind of operations that
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would be conducted against Cuba in the paramilitary fields.
In other words, if we were going to run an operation that
was going to be a cache replacement in the Cuban mainland, that
had to be put in, say in our October schedule, that October
schedule had to be submitted to the Washington Headquarters so
they could make it available to the Special Group sometime in
September. So I would regard a cache, say the lowest kind of
8 operation in terms of sensitivity, and then you could move up
from team infiltrations that had to be approved in advance,
resupply missions, paramiltary operations against fixed instal-
lations would all be approved.
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Mr. Baron. If there had been any operation with the
assassination of Fidel Castro, or other high Cuban government
leaders as its objective, would such an operation have been
referred to either the three-man group or later the Special
Group.
Mr. Halley. If such an operation had been proposed from
Miami, it would have had to have gone through that particular
process.
Mr. Baron. Your answer seems to indicate that only
operations that originated at the JMWAVE Station would be
referred up for approval. Is that correct?
Mr. Halley. That is the kind of activity that I have
firsthand knowledge of. When I became the Station Chief, I told
you my time at this was essentially February of 1962 through
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1 either June or July of '65. That was my stewardship} That was
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my involvement in the Cuban operation.
During that particular period of time, my firsthand knowledge
4 of these events would be, if that kind of operation were to go
5
forward it would have had to go through this approval mechanism,
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it would have had to have been some formal action taken. If it
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were something that certainly would
for some reason might not
be committed to paper, somebody may have wanted to discuss it
orally from Miami, the chain of command would have been from me
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to whomever was the head of the Task Force in Washington, or
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chief
later, when the Task Force became reintegrated into the Western
Hemisphere Division, I would have had to talk to the Chief of
the Western Hemisphere Division, who at one time was FitzGerald.
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Mr. Baron. But a plan that originated at the CIA above
the level of the Chief of Station at JMWAVE would not necessarily
have been referred to Special Group for approval, is that
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correct?
Mr. Halley. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, there-
fore I am.trying to restrict myself to those things that I have
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thing that I think you should talk to, you know, those who were
involved directly, because I think you can talk to Mr. Harvey
or Mr. Screber or others who would be able to give you a better
perception of that.
I want to make one point here, that once I went to Miami,
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I was a regular visitor to Washington, but always for one or
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פו
to be discussed that related to the Station in Miami. I did not
4 carry here, I did not engage, you know, in idle conversation with
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my associates.
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Therefore, I was not aware of the firsthand
situation of how they conducted business on a sustained basis
on items that did not immediately impact on Miami.
Mr. Baron. Do you have any personal knowledge of any
operation run out of the JMWAVE Station that could be construed
as an assassination effort?
Mr. Halley. No, I do not.
Do you have firsthand knowledge of any operation
run out of Florida with CIA involvement that could be construed
as an assassination effort?
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Mr. Baron.
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Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any firsthand knowledge.
You also have to put this in a historical perspective. In
other words, from what I have read in the Press since then,
obviously I could put certain things together. You are asking
me in this timeframe, 1962 to 1965, did I have any firsthand
'knowledge at that particular time?
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Mr. Baron.
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Exactly.
Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no. I did not.
You also have to put yourself in the historical context of
that particular time.
Thousands of refugees were coming out of
Cuba, coming into Miami, Dade County up and down the Florida
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There was a regular mechanism to screen these people.
Any number of these people had plans or ideas for changing the
situation in Cuba, among those ideas for changing the situation
in Cuba were plans to assassinate any number of people in Cuba.
This was something that was talked about, you could go down to
any coffee house in downtown Miami and Cubans would be talking
that kind of language.
So I do not want to leave you with the impression that the
word assassination never came across my radar screen, but we
are talking about, and my answer was geared to a planned opera-
tion by CIA.
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Mr. Baron.
Or with CIA involvement of any sort?
Mr. Halley. CIA involvement? I know of no operation that
was a planned operational activity, you know, for the sole
purpose of assassinating, you know, Mr. A, B or Mr. C..This was.
ambiente
the ällente of the time. People were talking about these
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things in the refugee community, these kind of things were
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being discussed.
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Mr. Baron.
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Mr. A, B or C could have been Fidel Castro,
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Raul Castro?
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Mr. Halley. It could have been anyone. This was the mood
of the Latin American revolutionary where a coup, you know, is
a way of life, where restaurants and coffee houses abound with
conversation about how to run a coup. In the running of a coup,
one of the things that people talk about is how do you control
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the leadership which then exists at that time.
Mr. Baron.
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Are you saying that you are not aware of any"
operation, which could have had as one of its subsidiary objec-
tives, whether the primary objective or not, the assassination
of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, or Che Guevara, which was run with
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CIA involvement?
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Mr. Hallay.
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I would like to phrase that question slightly
differently, because I think, you know, you have several things
I would like to answer your question this way.
During my tenure in Miami, I did not put forth any proposals
In other words, there
was no formal plan, I did not put forth any operational proposals
along this line.
Secondly, I am not aware of any assassination plans being
put forth, you know, by Mr. Harvey or by anyone else at that
particular time. That is the way I would prefer to answer that.
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tied together.
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to mount an assassination operation.
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• I am trying to separate these out.
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Mr. Baron.
Right, I am interested in that.
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Mr. Baron.
What kind of problem did you have with the
question as it was asked?
Mr. Halley. Well, you lumped a number of things together.
In other words, you put in
there a secondary or tertiary consideration.
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Mr. Halley. That is what bothers me, because I did not
put forth any plans. On the other hand, I do not want to be
held responsible for such things as CIA being in touch with a
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1 paramilitary group in Cuba whose primary mission was the
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collection of intelligence, whose secondary mission might be to
3 organize a resistance and, unbeknownst to me, might have had
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their own ideas which were never consulted with us, you know,
never discussed with us, through the communications channels
6 that we had, who may have been thinking, may have planned, and
may have attempted, to implement assassination operations.
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I do not feel under the command and control mechanism that
existed that I could exercise through the Station over such a
situation that I could be held responsible for that.
Therefore,
I cannot accept your question on the secondary or tertiary
situation because I have no knowledge of those. You may have
some knowledge and you can confront me with some statement by
some Cuban who said that this was part of his mission. I have
to look at that at the time.
Mr. Baron. We will go over some statements, but in trying
to recover this ground one more time, I think it is important
to distinguish an attempt to pin the responsibility on you,
which I am not trying to do by my questioning
Mr. Halley.
That is a complicated question.
undoubtedly, the
Mr. Baron. The attempt to simply
attempt to simply bring out your knowledge and any awareness
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that you may have had of any kind of operation that had assassina-
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tion as one of its objectives, and also involved the CIA to
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any extent. That is what I am asking you for.
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Mr. Halley.
Right, and I will stand by my answer; that is,
I put forth no plans, I know of no plans put forth, you know,
during my tenure in Miami in which assassination was part of
the operational rationale. You know, the only way we can clarify
this perhaps to your satisfaction is to discuss some specifics.
If you are prepared to talk about specifics, maybe I can deal
with those within the framework of that general statement that
I made, you know. I know how Cubans talk. I know the rumors
that have existed over the years. I simply do not want to be
identified with any action conducted by some group over which
I had no knowledge or control. That is my key point.
Mr. Baron. I think that answers it for now, and we will
cover some specifics later.
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One more question on this dual chain of command:
on the
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one hand, the Agency chain of command from the DDP to Harvey
to you at JMWAVE, and on the other hand, the three-man decision
making group consisting of the Attorney General, Lansdale and
Helms. Would you say in the early days that this three-man
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group appeared to you to be in control of the decision making
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in a less formal way than they were later under the Special
Group?
Mr. Halley. I really could not address myself to that.
In other words, I never sat in on a meeting of the three-man
25 group. In other words.
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Mr. Baron. What about the kind of reporting that was
required of you by the three-man group as opposed to the Special
Group?
Mr. Halley. My requirements for reporting really stemmed
in the early days from Harvey. If there were any special
requirements, he was taking them from the three-man group and
translating them and, in fact, much of the system of reporting
in those early days was generated by me and what I thought ¨*.
was required to keep Mr. Harvey as a Task Force Commander
fully informed. I think that you undoubtedly know from the
record that I worked for Mr. Harvey prior to 1962 and therefore
I was familiar, you know, with his style of operation and thought
I had a clear understanding of what he needed in an informational
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sense. So when I went to Miami, I organized much of the
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reporting flow upward, if you will, from the field unit to
Headquarters.
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Mr. Baron. Had you worked for Mr. Harvey in Germany?
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Mr. Halley. Yes, I had.
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Mr.
Baron. In Berlin?
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Mr. Halley. Yes, sir.
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Mr. Baron.
This was on the famous and successful tunnel
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operation?
Mr. Halley. No, I do not deserve any credit for the tunnel
operation. That is Mr. Harvey's activity. He kept that very
tightly compartmented and in the days when that was going on,
I
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was involved primarily with Eastern European activities.
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Mr. Baron.
You were aware of Mr. Harvey's style of
3 operating?
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Mr. Halley. Yes. I worked with him
--
I think the date is
somewhere in June or July of '54 to somewhere in '59. I would
have to look that up in the record, the exact date.
[K*****
Mr. Baron. But you say you not only had a close working
relationship with Mr. Harvey, but you came to be a personal
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friend of his?
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Mr. Halley.
Yes, I would like to say I am a personal friend
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of Mr. Harvey.
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Mr. Baron.
Returning to your statements about the chain
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of command, you seem to be saying that Mr. Harvey served as the
funnel for both of these chains of command; as far as you were
concerned, you received directives from him, whatever the source
may have been originally, is that correct?
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Mr. Halley. Correct.
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man group.
I would see Lansdale
I want to make a point.
concerned, I would see Helms in his role as the DDP in the threet
as I told you, Lansdale came
Insofar as the three-man group was
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down to visit me in Miami on one occasion.
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that three-man group.
He came as part of
But my chain of command, during my
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visit was still from me to Harvey.
Lansdale was down there,
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programs, problems.
I was to be, you know, straightforward, candid, discuss plans,
But I received my orders and instructions
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1 the control of money and so forth was vested in the Task Force
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Commander, Mr. Harvey.
Therefore, I never dealt with this three-man group as a
body. I dealt with the individuals, you know, and various
mutations.
Mr. Baron. Would you say that the three-man group had a
less formal, more free-wheeling style of decision making, and
there was a real change in the rigor with which you were required
to report after the Special Group took over?
Mr. Halley. I would have to say that the total reporting
became more formalized the longer we stayed in business. I
cannot ascribe this to the difference of style of the three-man
group as opposed to the Agency chain of command or subsequent
with the requirements of the Special Group. This evolved from
a body of experience that was gained as the operation was
established and got some experience.
So I would not want to characterize that as being a result
of the groups.
Mr. Baron. You did not have any problem with the propriety
of the three-man group in the early stages?
Mr. Halley. No, I had no reason to believe that it was
not a duly constituted body. In other words, that officers that
I reported to, in that particular case, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Helms,
were my chain of command at that particular point, were the
ones who briefed me on the existence of this three-man body
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and I felt that that was a perfectly legitimate function of
that body.
Mr. Baron.
Mr. Halley.
5 from Mr. Harvey.
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Mr. Baron.
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Who. briefed you on the existence of the body?
My recollection of the initial briefing was
Do you recall how he described that three-man
group and the responsibilities?
Mr. Halley.
No. This was 1962, and this is 1975. As
you know from my records, these intervening years have been
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very active for me, therefore, I do not remember with precision
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that conversation in all of its details. I do recall my first
briefing on the existence of this three-man group being from
Harvey.
Mr. Baron. You mentioned that General Lansdale might
occasionally meet with you personally.
This is in Miami, at
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JMWAVE Station?
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Mr. Halley. I can only recall at this point one specific
meeting where he came down to Florida in Miami to visit.
Mr. Baron. What was the substance of that meeting?
Mr. Halley. He was given some briefings by my staff on
their areas of specialization, whether it was foreign intelli-
gence collection, whether it was maritime activities, or whether
it was paramilitary activities.
I spent a lot of time with him.
personally, talking about where we stood, where we were making
progress in the collection of intelligence, where we were having
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problems, and so on. It was a substantive management operation,
problem-oriented type of conversation.
Mr. Baronv. What period of time would you place this in?
Mr. Halley. Probably sometime in the summer of '62,
because my family was already in Miami at that point, and when
I think my
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wife joined me in Miami sometime in the summer of '62, you know,
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I would have to research that. It is obviously available from
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of station.
Mr. Baron: Was there any discussion whether direct or
indirect of assassination of Cuban leaders during your meetings
13
with General Lansdale?
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Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such conversations.
know, I think that from my point of view, we are off a little
bit on this perspective. I would like to try to focus on the
perspective for you in the historical setting.
You
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Mr. Baron. Please do.
Mr. Halley. I think by your questions and your interest,
you are narrowly focused on this assassination thing, but let
me turn that around a bit, and let me put it in my context at.
the time which may help you understand my answers.
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Mr. Baron. Before you do, can I stop you for one moment?
I would like to get back on the track that we originally
started on of asking you about the JMWAVE Station in general
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and the context at that time.
Could I ask just a couple of
29
specific questions before we do that, about the three-man group
that you raised, and then give you a full opportunity to pull put
out of what we have said so far and everything that will follow
into context.
Did you have any individual meetings with Robert Kennedy,
who was then-Attorney General?
Mr. Halley. You mean individual, one on one?
Are you saying did I have a meeting, a personal, private
meeting with the Attorney Genėral?
4.1,
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Mr. Baron. Yes.
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Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no.
Mr. Baron. Did you have any meetings with the Attorney
General of any sort during this period of time?
Mr. Halley. I mentioned to you earlier that at this meeting
that I went to with Director McCone, the Attorney General, Mr.
Robert Kennedy, was present at that White House briefing. He
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did ask some questions, which I do not remember what the
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questions were at this particular point in time. I answered
some of those questions that were put during the course of that
particular presentation. Throughout that whole period of time,
that was the only, if you will, direct contact with him that
I can remember. You know, unless you can show me something.
Mr. Baron.
During the entire period that you were
25 involved with JMWAVE?
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Mr. Halley.
That is right.
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Mr. Baron..
At that meeting
--
again, I realize what we
3 are doing is an isolation, out of context
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--
at that meeting that
you attended, with the Cabinet members and the President, was
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there any discussion either directly or indirectly or by means
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of any circumlocutions of the subject of assassination?
Mr. Halley. Not that I can recall.
You know, my recollection of that meeting is, we went to it
en masse, the first you know, Director McCone, myself,
chever
Bruce rever,
several other people who went. We went in
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We went to the meeting, the Cuban issue was the
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first item on the agenda.
As I recall the thing, the Cuban
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thing was over after this period of time.
We, the technocrats
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left, the Director John McCone stayed on.
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You know, during my
presence at the meeting there was nothing discussed about
assassinations.
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Mr. Baron.
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Was there any such discussion between yourself
and John McCone or Richard Helms at any point?
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Mr. Halley.
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I never recall discussing assassinations with
John McCone. Now, in terms of discussions with Richard Helms,
these were conversations in which atmospherics in Miami and
problems like that would be discussed, and I am sure somewhere
in some of these conversations the mood of the community, the
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subject of assassinations undoubtedly came up.
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of the life of that particular period.
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I cannot remember a specific date, you know, some time at
2 which that was discussed, and you know I never received any
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instruction from Helms to mount an assassination operation.
Mr. Baron. Again, I am not trying to unfairly pull these
5 kinds of conversations out of their historical context. Before
6
we flesh out the historical context, do you have any recollection
of the manner in which assassination might have come up between
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Mr. Halley. Again, I put it in this overall context of
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operations against Cuba with classical agent means. We were running
.collection against Cuba through paramilitary teams. We were
involved in paramilitary operations that could be described as
commando raids. Those were the kinds of activities.
We were dealing with exile groups, we were debriefing
refugees and in all of this conversations of assassination,
the Cuban penchant for it had to come up. I cannot pinpoint
Mr. Baron. You do not recall any reference of means to
be used or people to be involved?
Mr. Halley. No.
Even such things as discussions of
--
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various kinds of weapons, you know, people, as you probably
know from this experience, every individual who deals with
weapons has a different view on what is the ideal weapon. If
you took a squad of ten men and gave them the free choice, I
am sure all ten of them would come up with a different weapon.
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Therefore, when we were standardizing weapons to our
.32
paramilitary teams, things like that, weapons would be discussed
in terms of, you know, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, weight -
4 of the weapon for the Cuban to carry, because many of them were
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quite small. In this context, people would discuss what is
the range, can a guy use it to shoot somebody at a particular
range? Is this an assassination weapon? Is this a good weapon
for close combat?
Therefore the term assassination was just a part of the life,
of the fabric at that time. That is what I am trying to get
11 across. I just cannot articulate any more eloquently than
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that.
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Mr. Baron. I think you are being quite eloquent and
extremely informative.
tion would be used in the discussions about the kinds of weapons
that would be used for commando raids or equipping your
operatives.
You mentioned that the phrase assassina-
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Mr. Halley.
Paramilitary teams, right.
2005
Mr. Baron.
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Was the capacity of a weapon to be used as
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an assassination weapon among other uses a desirable capacity?
In other words, was that phrase used positively?
Mr. Halley. No, it was not. It is the kind of thing
that weaves itself into, you know, a conversation.
if you are planning a commando raid against
For instance,
something like an oil refinery, you have to think about how are
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One of the questions you have, of course, is if you
bypass them, you are successful to get in without a trail or any
kind of a struggle, that is great. But what happens if you are
implanting your starget and the guard stumbles on you, you know,
the guard force then becomes an immediate: risk to your operation.
Therefore, this becomes a
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and usually there is a fire fight.
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question of weapons. In other words, what weapon is going to
give the highest muzzle velocity and make the largest amount of
10 noise. Therefore, if you have two weapons of co-equal cyclic
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You might even silence it. You may make a silenced submachine
gune out of it.
These are the kinds of things that go into these discussions
of weapons.
Mr. Baron. The technology of assassination and targetted
--
shooting, are you referring to when you say assassination
weapon to a weapon generally capable of targetted shooting?
Mr. Halley. In this particular context, I think most
people felt that the Cuban penchant for assassination, for
discussing assassination, was the kind that would have to be
done from a long range.
You know, I think that it is generally an accepted thesis
that a group of dedicated men who are prepared to give their lives
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1. can in time assassinate almost anybody.
2
that kind of a person.
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Now, the Cuban was not
That was not his psychological make-up.
Ha tends to want to live, to enjoy life, to talk about his
Therefore, while they were brave and dedicated,
accomplishment.
they were the kind of people who would probably engage in
something like this in the context of using the sniper weapon
as a vehicle for assassination, long distance.
Therefore, in this context you are talking about range, you
know, one of the key factors becomes what is the accurate range
of a weapon if fired by an expert marksman.
Therefore, that is
the kind of thing that would go into, you know, discussions of
9
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weapons.
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Mr. Baron.
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When you were discussing weapons with high
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range and low muzzle velocity, was this ever discussed in the
context of shooting Fidel Castro or other key Cuban leaders as
opposed to targetted shooting on a commando raid.
Mr. Halley. I can recall, you know, no conversation in
which it was narrowly focused on the question of Fidel Castro.
Let us go back, then, to putting this all
Mr. Baron.
into historical context.
20
I am going to ask you if you can
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explain more about the structure of the JMWAVE Station, both
the channels upward from you to the Agency and the Special
Group and the channels downward from you to your operatives,
if in the course of explaining the structure, you would like to
make some comments about the historical context, that would be
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1 appreciated.
2
Mr. Halley.
3
I think what I would like to do is to try to
put this into some perspective.
The perspective really starts with the failure of the Bay
After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the
4
5
of Pigs Operation.
6
7
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Kennedy Administration wanted another look taken at the problem
of Cuba. In order to get that other look started, the Kennedy
Administration created this three-man task force or this three-
man group and wanted to see what else could be done against
10 Cuba, and that is when I came into this problem in February of
11 162.
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Mr. Baron. Is it possible that the three-man group that
13 you are referring to is actually the Robert Kennedy-Maxwell
Taylor Board of Inquiry into the reasons for the failure of the
Bay of Pigs operation?
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Mr. Halley. This three-man group stemmed out of that
inquiry.
What its relationship was to the inquiry, I do not know,.
because I was not involved and I never had an opportunity once
I plunged into this job, to go back and read those historical
documents. You know, I am sure there is a Maxwell Taylor Report.,
and so forth; but I have never read it.
All right.
Therefore, my first task when I became involved in this
was the task of coming up with an operational plan to see what
kinds of intelligence could be collected in Cuba, so that by
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collecting this intelligence, an assessment could be made based
on hard facts as to what could be done against Castro.
In other
words, the difference here was that people thought that the Bay
4 of Pigs operation was not soundly grounded in intelligence.
Therefore, this was an attempt to start the collection of
5
6 intelligence to see what could be done.
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In order to collect intelligence at that particular time,
it was believed that all avenues of approach should be used,
so that meant classical foreign intelligence operations,
counterintelligence operations, the debriefing of refugees, and
the use of paramilitary means to put teams into Cuba to collect
intelligence on that part of the island that could not be
covered by what you would call the more classical means of
foreign intelligence collection.
As the program was started essentially by me or accelerated
by me, we in fact got caught up with the Cuban Missile Crisis
that is, the advent of the Soviet intervention into Cuba
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and
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our whole effort shifted to covering that Soviet build-up in
Cuba, and this was an integral part to our having detected the
Soviet build-up and the United States government taking the
actions which they did, that is, to verify this.
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There was a great problem for a while when we were all
talking about hard intelligence, the President, John Kennedy,
was telling us, give us hard intelligence.
giving him hard intelligence. What he meant, in his definition
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of hard intelligence, as it turned out to be, was a U-2
photograph.
He never articulated that to us in those terms.
37
Then we got caught up into the eyeball to eyeball confron-
4 tation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When that was over, we
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got caught up with the problem of monitoring the disengagement
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of the Soviet presence in Cuba. That took us up through sometime
into early '63.
Then we took a look again, because we knew an awful lot
more about them than we had when we started in February of '62,
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to see what could be done against Cuba, and it was clear at
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that point that no external invasion was going to be possible,
because that was something that was excluded by the Khruschev-
In any event,
Kennedy agreement and then it was not feasible.
therefore it was a question of what could be done. So we were
collecting intelligence to continue to stay on top of the
situation. We were attempting to establish contacts with the
military establishment in Cuba to see if there was any force
that was opposed to Castro within the military establishment
that would be used to alter the situation and continue to see
whether there were any economic pressures that could be brought
on Cuba that would accelerate the whole problem of creating
an environment in which a resistance could be created on an
island.
Mr. Baron. Were those the two primary tactics used at
that point when Castro had consolidated his strength' and
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when the United States and Russia reached an agreement that no
2 external invasion of Cuba would take place, did you turn
3 primarily to the ways and means of finding a dissident group
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q within Cuba that might be capable of overthrowing Castro,
number one, and number two, of finding means of undermining
50
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the economic strength of the Castro government.
Mr. Halley. In addition, we were continuing to support
certain elements of resistance, you know, that were still there
that were not in the Army.
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Mr. Baron.
What kinds of elements were those?
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Mr. Halley.
These were paramilitary forces that were in
Cuba, that we had put in or established contact with, or people
who were already in the bush who we had already established
contact with or they had established contact with us, and we
were providing them with food, weapons and so forth so that they
16 could survive. So that it was a multifaceted approach at that
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particular time.
That went on from the middle of '63 until the middle of
'65, and these are two distinct phases of this operation.
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effect, one,
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a survey, and two, the Missile Crisis and its
post-mortem, and then the next phase was the continuation of
intelligence collection, the working or taking the sounding with
23 military dissidents, economic pressure, and working with
24
natural dissident elements that were still on the island.
25
I think you know that all of your questions have to be put
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39.
1 into these various timeframes.
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When you talk about, was there
ever a discussion of assassination, you know,
when people
were coming out and being interviewed, yes, some Cuban refugee
would say, by God, I would like to go back and shoot, you know,
X, Y or Z. It might have been some commandante in his particu-
lar area; it could have been Fidel Castro. This was just part
of the fabric of the times.
Mr. Baron. Can we turn now to the structure of the JMWAVE
Station and explain that a bit? How large was the Station?
What was the command structure within the Station?
Mr. Halley. The Station started expanding in whatever
12 timeframe it was, somewhere after the survey was completed.
It.
13
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must have started expanding sometime in March of 1962. You
14 know, by the time that it was at its peak, which was probably
somewhere just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, July, August
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of 1962, it was either the largest or the second largest
recollection was that it was the second largest station in
existence at that time. I would not want to be pinned down on
my
19
a particular number of people on any particular day.
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Mr. Baron. Could you give some idea as to the number of
employees at the Station during its peak?
Mr. Halley. I would say somewhere in the neighbordhood of,
you know, three hundred. You know, again, this means staff and 21
contract employees.
Mr. Baron. What do you cover with the term contract
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1 employees?
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Mr. Halley.
These would be, for instance, maritime case
officers. We hired people who had specialized skills, that is,
4
that they could manage a series of vessels for us, but they
5
were not longterm staff employees.
These would be people who
6
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would be used, if you will, in a management organization, basic
implementation of the program.
Mr. Baron. Did you have other agents or operatives among
the Cuban community or outside the Cuban community that were
affiliated with the Station although not employed by it
directly?
Mr. Halley. I think we are going to have to define some
10
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terms.
Mr. Baron.
What I am trying to do now is simply get a
picture of the scope of the Station's strength and in its
activities, how many people the Station had to call upon for
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its activities.
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Mr. Halley.
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Well, let me try to give you an answer, because
I think we are going to get into a semantic problem here.
When I talk about the Station, as such, I would say that
is roughly in the neighborhood of three hundred people, and that 21
was those people who would be involved in the management
23
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effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover
All right? Flowing
procedures, security, that kind of thing.
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out from that were people whom we would call agents, that is,
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1 people who were not knowledgeable necessarily of whom they
2 worked for or where the cover offices were located and so forth.
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Let us say, in the maritime part of the operation we might have
had at any one point in time, you know, up to five hundred
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5
people involved in maritime activities, you know?
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Again, if you pick a date, I am sure we can research it.
The records are still available and you know how many people
we had, but let us take these five hundred. What am I talking
about? These would be essentially Cubans who were the captains
of the vessles that were used in infiltration operations to
put people on the shore of Cuba, and there were a variety of
techniques. In other words, you might start on with the mother
ship, which would be an LCI I am not sure how familiar you
――
are with various kinds of vessels.
15
Mr. Baron.
What is an LCI?
16
Mr. Halley.
Landing craft kind of vessle, or a patrol
17
craft, a PC, 110-foot vessle, that would be a mother ship.
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This is the kind of ship that would take fuel supplies and
!
water, so that other smaller vessels could be serviced by it.
So you might start with an operation of a mother ship towing a
21 smaller boat, or having it on its decks and going down to
22
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fifteen or twenty miles from Cuba, putting the smaller boat
over the side, which was a faster boat, lower silhouette, less
likely to be picked up by Cuban coastal radar, and then that
25
would take the team in close to the shore where we might finally
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1 put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use
2
3
a silent outboard motor if the surf was high.
Mr. Baron. The people involved in manning those crafts
4 would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly?
5
They might be agents, even non-paid agents?
6
Mr. Halley. No, they were not paid. For instance, they
might work for a particular cover company. In other words, I
7
8 am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC
Shipping Company. That shipping company was a subsidiary of
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the Station, if you will, and the ABC Shipping Company ran
maybe one LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it
could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy-
--
I
five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them
was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels
would have to go and look at each vessel.
Does that give you a feel for the size of the problem?
Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in
existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries
or companies in cover and supplying the JMWAVE Station with
personnel or with equipment?
Mr. Halley. We are talking about all of these companies,
they probably went up into the hundreds. I distinguish between
companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed
to companies that were proprietaries.
You know, these terms
23
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mean different things to me.
The nature of the Agency's
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involvement in each is different. I am having a little
trouble
--
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Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of
companies you were receiving help from at that point, and about
how many of each there might have been?
Mr. Halley. I do not think I could do that. We are
talking about hundreds of companies that we used during that
8
period of time. Some of them might simply have been a company
?
9
set up and registered and run out of some attorney's
10
office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership of
11
the small boat.
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13.
Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have a
Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that.
Even if
14
I had access to the files to answer your question, it would
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take me weeks to pull all that together to give you an answer.
I don't think there is an overview statement.
Mr. Baron. Would it be fair to say that you had coopera-
tion on a grand scale from all kinds of people in private
enterprise.in the Miami area; or in Southern Florida?
Mr. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had
extensive cooperation - I do not like your word "grand"
we had extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in
--
that
23 Florida, in the state of Florida, to facilitate the conduct of
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this clandestine mission.
Mr. Baron. Did you also have extensive cooperation from
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civic officials and law enforcement agencies in being allowed
to operate free or the law? For instance, were you allowed to
3 put vessels onto the water which were not properly registered,
4 or which could be held immune for inspection by the Coast Guard
5
or other maritime authorities, and were you allowed to send
6 people through the streets of Southern Florida who may have
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agencies?
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Mr. Halley. You have asked me, in essence, three
11
questions.
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Mr. Baron. Right.
Mr. Halley. Let me try to divide that and deal with each
question separately.
Let me first deal with the vessels. Every vessel that we
had was appropriately registered. There were no short-cuts
insofar as the U.S. Coast Guard was concerned.
17
That is, any
18
vessel that was registered in the United States met appropriate
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safety standards and so forth, so we were not putting any
vessels into the water that any citizen could not have put into
the water. That is we are talking about ten, fifteen, twenty
foot boats, thirty foot boats, thirty-five foot boats, things
like that. These boats were owned in either a corporate name
or by a private individual who had to register them with the
Coast Guard and pass normal Coast Guard regulations.
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(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Baron.
To continue with this, I understand that
45.
3
safety regulations would have been complied with, but was there
4 some sort of immunity from inspection, say inspection for
5
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carrying armaments aboard a vessel that the CIA had arranged
with maritime authorities, or local law enforcement authorities?
Mr. Halley. When we had operations going, these were
coordinated with the Coast Guard in terms of their knowing that,
you know, at a particular date, time group, that there would be
10
a rendezvous between two vessels which were our vessels, and
11
this was coordinated with the Coast Guard.
12
Mr. Baron.
Would you return to the second part of that
13
large question?
Without reference to vessels, were CIA
14 employees or agents on the streets of cities in Southern
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Florida immune from search or arrest by local law enforcement
authorities?
Mr. Halley. They were not immune.
Let me ask to dispel one myth that I think has developed
which is reflected in your question. We were meticulous to
insure that no weapons were issued to anybody until the men
were on the vessel outside of the immediate waters of south
Florida, and we were meticulous to insure that when they came
back from a mission that they were met at sea and all the
weapons were taken away from them.
So, when you talk about a group moving around in Florida,
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we did work out through the entire state, and I did not want
L
you to feel that I was being less than candid with you, and
you keep saying south Florida, I want to say to you that we
4 operated in the state of Florida, men moving around armed under
5
our control in the state of Florida, is just not correct.
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This was all carefully controlled and they did not have their
weapons when they came back, we took them before they landed,
so they were not immune.
Mr. Baron. You did have general arrangements or agreements
with law enforcement agencies throughout Florida for the
treatment of CIA operatives who were affiliated with the JMWAVE
Station?
Mr. Halley. We did have, through our Office of Security,
a continuing dialogue with a number of law enforcement agencies
in Florida. If a problem developed, we would then contact them
and look at the issue within the context of what had transpired.
Certainly there was no immunity. In other words, this has to be
looked at on a case by case basis.
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For instance, you know, we had a training site in north
'Florida, as an example. If somebody came off of that site that
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was drunk and disorderly in town and could not speak English,
the local authorities did have a number to call to raise this
with us to see whether this was somebody that was of interest
to us, and then we would have to go and settle that particular
case.
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Mr. Baron.
Back to the structure of the relationships
2 between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatives
3
or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would
4
5
it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station
ultimately were channeled out through you?
6
Mr. Halley. They should have been, and they were you
7 know this Station went through several mutations in organization
8 during its existence. I guess the organizational structure that
existed for the longest period of time was something like I am
0
10 going to describe to you.
11
12
There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a
Deputy Chief of Station for operations. That is the gentleman
13 who is now retired, I think he is still alive, by the name of
14 Moore, Robert Moore. I had a second Deputy Chief of Station and
15
he was for Support Patterns.
16
retired, a Mr. Corris.
17
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That is a gentleman who is also
Then the rest of the Station was organized into a number of
branches.
Each branch was organized along functional lines.
Let me give you an example. There was a Foreign Intelligence
20
Branch.
These were people in, what in my terminology would be
classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to
. Cuban diplomat abroad, as an example, dealing with,
21
22
recruit a
23
you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in
Havana. They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might
24
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butcher or something but had a radio set in which they could
48
2 communicate with us, through which they could communicate to us.
1
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Then there was the Paramilitary Branch. This was the
4 group that ran the commando operations. This was the group that
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ran, and put people back into Cuba, into resistance groups, or
established contact with resistance groups. This was a group
that also worked in putting in caches that would supply people,
either paramilitary forces in Cuba or agents that were being
run by the Foreign Intelligence Group.
All right. Then there was a Covert Action, people who
11 dealt with exiled refugee groups that were involved in radio
activities, publications, that kind of thing. Then there is a
then there was Maritime, in terms of
12
13 whole panoply of
14 finance, and so on.
Security was a branch.
Obviously, under
15
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that kind of system, no executive, whether he is president of
a corporation or a Station Chief, can see every single piece of
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paper that comes in or out, but clearly there was a review
procedure whereby program reviews were conducted, individual
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operational reviews were conducted.
Mr. Baron. By yourself?
Mr. Halley. By myself. I do not want to leave you with
the impression that I knew every single thing that was going
on every minute and could account for the activities of three
hundred employees on a daily basis.
Mr. Baron. In talking about the personnel affiliated
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with the Station a moment ago, I think we may have created a
misimpression that the only people involved in CIA operations
3 were people who were paid by the Agency. Isn't it also true
4
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that there were many members of Cuban exile groups in Florida
who participated voluntarily from time to time in CIA sponsored
operations?
Mr. Halley. I think that you may have to sharpen that up
for me. I am not sure what you really mean.
If you are talking about foreign intelligence collections,
you know, the people who were producing
--
Mr. Baron. I am talking now about the paramilitary
operations.
Mr. Halley. No. I do not know of any people that were
involved in paramilitary operations that were not in some way
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paid.
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Mr. Baron. By the Agency?
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Mr. Halley.
By the Agency.
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Let me make sure that we understand each other, because
during this period of time there were a lot of independent
Cuban groups who claimed that they had sponsorship from the
Agency but did not, and were operating, and there was a period
in time when these groups could not run their operations from
Florida without running the risk of being picked up by Customs,
Immigration, Coast Guard, the FBI, or if we had information on
it, you know, we might pass the information to the Coast Guard
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so that they could keep them from going.
or
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If that is what you are referring to, somebody like Alpha 66
Commando L or somebody like that, they were not a part of
the CIA apparatus.
Mr. Baron. Although you might be aware of their activities?
We would be aware of their activities,
5
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Mr. Halley.
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certainly.
Mr.
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Baron. Can you explain if there is anything to add
to what we have already said? The chain of command, apart from
yourself as Chief of Station, to Task Force W and to the
11
Directorate of Plans within the Agency?
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later FitzGerald.
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You would report directly to William Harvey?
Mr. Halley.
William Harvey was Chief of Task Force W,
My chain of command was from me to them.
You know, they had a subordinate staff who helped them monitor
the Station's activity, so that it just was not the fact, you
know, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. FitzGerald were totally dependent
on what I told them.. To have an appreciation of what was going
on in Miami they had their own staff that was following
individual operations.
For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would
22 review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and
2
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might
say we think that the Station has overextended itself this
month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the
weather during this particular month of October. We do not
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think they could do it.
1
We think they should be guided to run
So they were not
2 only twenty, fifteen, something like that.
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totally dependent on me.
Mr. Baron.
What was the nature of the split of responsi-
bility between Task Force W and JMWAVE Station?
In other words, were there certain operations that were
run directly out of Task Force W?
Mr. Halley.
8
Also, you have to put this into a historical
time.
9
What period are you talking about.?
Mr..
Baron.
10
During the period of your tenure. If there
11
were changes during your tenure at JMWAVE, why do you not
explain those?
12
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Mr. Halley.
There were. Each one is different. Let me
give you a couple of examples.
14
Washington, Task Force W, essentially did not run y
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any paramilitary operations where they took command and control
for sending people to Cuba. For instance, if Task Force W in
Washington wanted to plant a radio in Cuba which was to be picked
up by foreign intelligence agents who could report, they would
task us to implant that radio in a cache in a particular area
in Cuba, for instance; Oriente province.
We would know simply
We would then put it into
that it was a radio perhaps..
Oriente province, write up the site, give them the rip cord.
23
They would communicate to the
24
agents in Cuba who would go
25
recover the cache.
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So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign
2 intelligence to them so they had collection assets that were
3 reporting to them along the same lines that we did.
4
They did
work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a
5
couple of groups
--
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in other words, they had contact with
Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group as a general
rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not
have contact with. So they were working with these kinds of
larger exile groups.
13,13
The Task Force also specialized in much more economic
activity than I did. That is a question of looking at such
12 things as England bus exports from Great Britain to Cuba.
Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary operations, if an
assassination operation had been run by Task Force W, would
you have assumed as Chief of Station in Miami you would have
been aware of such an operation?
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Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that.
Mr. Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial
practice to let you know that there was an operation that might
'have been run through Florida into Cuba?
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Mr. Halley. No.
22
You know, the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism.
23
You know, let us dispel one thing very promptly here.
If you
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are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with
25
the Mafia
--
and I think I can tell you fṛankly at that time I
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Harvey would come, you know, to Miami, to visit me
to review the activities of the station, and while there would
go off on his own and make his contact with whomever he was
meeting. I knew he was meeting somebody, but it was not up to
me to find out with whom he was meeting or why he was meeting
them or what he was doing with them.
Mr. Baron.
7
My question really was, I think more innocent
than that.
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Was ť strictly one of involving what correct management
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techniques would be, or what kind of knowledge the Chief of
C.
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Station of JMWAVE would have to have in order to do an effective
12
job in dealing with the Cuban community and running operations
into Cuba?
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You seem to be saying that it would not be
necessary to run an effective job to have knowledge of every
other operation that the CIA is running against Castro?
Mr. Halley.
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I think what I am saying during that particu-
lar time.
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I do not want you to come to the conclusion that
I was knowledgeable of everything that 'ran in from or through
the state of Florida, because during that period of time, for
instance, Mr. Harvey in particular was a very compartmented
gentleman, and it would be keeping with his style to run an
operation in which the locus of the operation might be Florida
and I would not know about it.
Now, that would be an unusual thing, but it is not precluded.
Mr. Baron. Let us turn for a moment to following up on the
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nature of your contacts with William Harvey in reference to any
operations he may have in running unilaterally against Castro.
Do you recall aiding Harvey in an operation that he was in charge
of and that was not affiliated with JMWAVE?
Mr. Halley. I do not recall anything, I do not recall
anything specific. In other words, the pattern was in terms of
command and control, I would come to Washington on a regular
basis to review activity with Harvey after we submitted our
Harvey was also a frequent visitor to Florida.
9
paperwork.
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We would have operational discussions.
Branch Chiefs, he talked to people.
He would talk to the
He also went out on his
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own, and he was meeting somebody, it was clear to me that he
was meeting people. But it was frankly in the way that the
Agency is run and managed, it was not a concern to me whom he
15
was meeting.
Mr. Baron.
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Would it have been proper of you to inquire
17
of him whom he was meeting?
Mr. Halley.
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No, it would not have been.
Mr. Baron.
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Did you have suspicions or speculation about
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whom he might have been meeting or for what purpose that he
was having these meetings?
Mr. Halley.
NO,
not for what purpose. There is a whole,
you know, panoply of things going on at that time. You know,
frankly I was a very busy guy, when Harvey was there, it occupied
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one hunk of a lot of my time.
If he wanted to go off, you know,
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do something else and was going to meet someone else, that was
fine with me. • It enabled me to get back to my immediate and
more pressing problems.
In this business you just do not ask your superior, what
are you doing? That is just not cricket; that is not the way
the game is played.
Mr. Baron. Do you recall a time when Harvey asked you to
procure arms and equipment to be passed to a Cuban exile?
Mr. Halley.
To a Cuban exile?
Mr. Baron. Let me strike the reference to a Cuban exile.
Do you recall a time when Harvey asked your aid in procur-
ing arms and equipment to be given to a man named Tony Varona
who was a contact of Harvey's?'
Mr. Halley. I know Tony Varona. He was in the period
prior to the Bay of Pigs, he was part of the consejo.
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in Harvey's
--
Frankly, if you've got something that you can sharpen that
up, I think you need some basis, that. I think that can trigger
my memory here. I do not remember frankly Tony Varona being
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Mr. Baran. In contact with Harvey?
Mr. Halley. You know, I may have procured something for
Harvey, some kind of equipment or done some kind of operational
support task.
Mr. Baron. Let us make it more specific.
Do you recall helping Harvey load a U-Haul trailer full of
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1 about $5,000 worth of arms and equipment to be left in a parking
2
lot and picked up there by a contact of Harvey's?
And this
ان
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would be in approximately April of 1962.
Mr. Halley. I do vaguely remember something about a rented
truck.
Quite frankly, I do not really recall all the details
of this at this particular time. I do not remember, you know,
personally procuring any material, but it is conceivable that
I did get a request from Harvey, that I did go to the logistics
apparatus, and whatever he had requested from official stocks
he was provided.
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Mr. Baron. During that same period of time
--
Mr. Halley. I do recall something about a truck. I do
not recall anything about a trailer. My recollection of this
truck incident seems to be
--
I do not remember what it was.
We did do something for him logistically, I do remember a truck
being involved with some logistic material in terms of a
parking lot. But frankly that is about all I can recall of it
at this particular time.
1
Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of hearing of
'poison pills in any connection during your tenure at JMWAVE?
poison pills? Poison
Mr. Halley.
NO,
I do not recall
pills, the only kind of thing I can recall occasionally when
people were talking about being on mother ships, you know, what
would happen if they were captured. This was a discussion
occasionally of whether any kind of drugs should be issued to
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the people who were manning these vessels so they could do
themselves in if they were to be captured, things like that,
57
but we never issued any such pills but there were discussions
of that kind of a problem. I do recall specific agents who
5 were sent back to Cuba to run a collection or to go back into
10
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the bush and so forth who asked for some sort of pills which
they could kill themselves with if they were captured.
8
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But other than that
--
if that is what you were referring
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Mr. Halley.
to, I think they are called L pills, or something, as they
were referred to in those days.
Mr. Baron. Why were they called L pills?
Everything has a number or nomenclature, I
13
do not know.
Mr. Baron.
14
Did you ever hear of poison pills to be used
15
in assassination operations against Fidel Castro or other
16
Cuban leaders?
17
Mr. Halley.
No.
18
Is that referencing to this material that I might have
19
provided for Harvey? Because if that is the case, I can dispel
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that quickly, because I would not have had access to them.
Mr. Baron. You would not have access to poison pills?
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Mr. Halley. No, I would not have access to them.
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Mr. Baron. Why not?
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Mr. Halley. I did not have them in my inventory.
not anything that I have, you know, command and control of.
That is
That
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Mr. Baron. They would have had to come directly from
Technical Services Division at CIA?
Mr. Halley. That is what I'm trying to clarify what it is
that you are trying to establish from me.
In other words, if you are saying
Mr. Baron. Let us move further, I think we can be more
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to do with that.
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Mr. Baron.
We have a document that. I am about to show you. I just
wanted to clear up the background of it before we discussed
the document.
Mr. Halley. Let me just make this point. If you are
talking about drug pills, I had no source of such things, so
if that is the nature of your question, I can say I had nothing
If you are talking about, you know
Arms and equipment
--
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Mr. Halley.
inventory. I could have issued that to Harvey, you know, guns,
ammunition, plastics, that kind of thing I could have had
'access to, yes. That is why I am trying to sort out really
where the thrust of your questioning is.
--
weapons or something, yes, that was in my
Mr. Baron. There were two
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prongs to the question, you
have picked both of them up. One is whether you had ever heard
of poison pills in connection with an assassination operation
against Fidel Castro, and your testimony would be that you had
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not, is that correct?
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Mr. Halley. That is right. I would not have had access
to those pills myself, nor did the Station. In other words, if
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I had wanted something like that, I would have had to corres-
5
ponded with Washington in order to have had access to it, if
in fact it existed.
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Mr. Baron.
You never had any such correspondence?
Mr. Halley. I never had any correspondence that I can
Mr. Baron. The other problem was the supply of arms and
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recall.
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equipment to which you already replied.
Have you ever read that Inspector General's Report of
1967, prepared at the request of the DCI to fill him in on any
assassination efforts to which the CIA may have been connected?
Mr. Halley. No, I have not read the report.
ન
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Mr. Baron.
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Before you came here today you were not shown
any excerpts from this report to refresh your recollection at
17
the CIA?
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Mr. Halley. The IG Report?
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Mr. Baron. Yes.
Mr. Halley. No, I have not.
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Mr. Baron. Were you shown any other documents at the CIA
--
today to refresh or in preparation for today's session
--
Mr. Halley.
No.
In preparation for today's session I have had several
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1 conversations with Seymour Boultin
2.
Mr. Baron. Walt Elder?
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Mr. Halley. I talked to Walt Elder on the phone. You know
the people who are involved in this thing. I have asked for
that, I talked to our attorney, Clarke
Mr. Baron.
George Clarke?
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Mr. Halley. Yes.
I talked to a number of people, I asked to see the
newspaper clipping from the Miami Herald on the McGovern
activity. Yes, I have looked at that kind of thing. But I
have not looked at the specific IG Report. I have not read it,
I have not seen an extract of the IG Report.
Mr. Baron. Were you given any specific instructions as to
the kinds of things that you could say or not say here today?
Mr. Halley. You know, nothing beyond what you and I
touched on which you have already put on the record.
Mr. Baron. Which is not to mention the names of CIA
officers who are still operating under cover?
Mr. Halley. Right, or agents who would still be viable
that I know of.
Mr. Baron.
Right.
Then let me show you a document which we will mark as
Halley Exhibit No. 2.
(The document
referred
to was marked Halley
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Exhibit No. 2 for
identification.)
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Mr. Baron.
Which is an excerpt from the Inspector General's
2 Report of 1967 at pages 49 and 50, and I will ask you to read
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the portions that I will bracket which deal with a report of
a meeting between yourself and William Harvey involving the
supply of arms and equipment.
(Pause)
Mr. Halley. I have no reason to doubt this.
I may have
provided this support. I do not recall sitting in a parking lot
observing
--
Mr. Baron. For the record, we are discussing the passage
that begins, "When the pills were given to Varona through
Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the
Roselli passed the request
to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of (Mr. Halley), the chief
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support of his end of the operation.
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of the JMWAVE Station, procured" .--.
Continuing. .--And then it continues to say a large shopping
list of arms and equipment, which cost about $5,000 and were
supplied in a parking lot of a drive-in restaurant in a rented
U-Haul truck.
Would the cost of $5,000 have been an unusual expenditure
at that time at JMWAVE Station for arms and equipment?
Mr. Halley. No, $5,000 would not have been an unusual
expenditure.
Mr. Baron. Not unusual enough, in fact, for you to have
a particular memory of the event?
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Mr. Halley. No.
64
Now that I read over this thing, I do recall, as I told
you earlier before you showed me this document something about
a rented truck and being involved with Harvey in providing him
some logistical support for an activity. I do not recall this
specific list of equipment being involved, you know, somewhere
you got this and if I could check it against the files, if there
are any files available, I could verify whether this is correct.
or not.
Mr. Baron. Whether or not the particular list is correct,
you would say that these couple of passages from the IG Report
generally characterize your involvement with Harvey in this
one incident correctly?
Mr. Halley. I would want to sharpen this up, because you
have one, two, two paragraphs here. In the first paragraph
there is a reference to some pills. I had nothing to do with
any pills. I have no recollection of any pills.
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Mr. Baron.
Let us jump then to the very last statement and
let me ask you if this confirms your own sense of your knowledge.
The report says:
"Harvey says that [Halley]" here I
am using your alias -- "never knew to whom delivery was made nor
[Halley] was merely called upon to furnish
22
for what purpose.
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support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise
excluded."
Does that generally characterize correctly your point of
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Mr. Halley. I would say that is correct.
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I want to go back to these other points, though, because
I want to be meticulously correct here. I do not recall the
specifics of this inventory of equipment. I do not recall,
you know, sitting in a parking lot, surveilling any kind of a
On the other hand, I do recall having been involved
vehicle..
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with Harvey in some sort of an effort with a U-Haul truck.
C.
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Now therefore that last sentence you have read is correct,
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to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which I
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Mr. Baron.
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was otherwise excluded.
You are not denying, are you, that you may have
sat near the parking lot and surveilled the truck until it was
picked up?
Mr. Halley. I have no recollection
Mr. Baron. One way or the other?
Mr. Halley. No, I would say that my sitting in a parked
car with Harvey surveilling a parking lot is the kind of thing
that would have stuck in my mind. I do not recall ever doing.
that and that is the thing that has me a little perplexed here
and I am having trouble matching this thing up with my own
memory. It would have been damned unusual for Harvey and I to
have sat in a parking lot, and I just do not recall that.
I do have a vague recollection of being involved with him
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in some sort of caper involving a U-Haul truck.
66°
Mr. Baron. At that time, if Harvey had made a request of
you to supply $5,000 worth of equipment like explosives,
detonators, .30 caliber rifles, .45 caliber handguns, radios
and boat radar, would you have supplied that equipment to Harvey
or to anyone he designated without asking him what the purpose
of the operation was?
Mr. Halley. Yes, I would have supplied it to Harvey or
to his designated representative, depending on how that person
identified himself to me with the equipment that he requested.
That was my chain of command and, if he had told me that he
had wanted this material for any operational activity, I would
have seen to it that it was issued to him. That is the way the
Agency functions.
Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure in a
paramilitary operation to procure equipment that would not have
been traceable to the United States as the IG Report indicates
was done in this case?
Mr. Halley. It depends. It depends on what was the
sponsorship that was trying to be conveyed to the paramilitary
group.
In other words, let us say there was a Venezuelan business-
man who may have been giving some assistance to a Cuban exile
group. If somebody had gotten in touch with that Venezuelan
businessman and he was saying I brought weapons into Florida
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or equipment which I will give you, then maybe under that kind of
a circumstance we wouldn't want anything that would clearly
3 identify it with the U.S. government and then that would be the
4 normal thing to do. I would have to know the sponsorship.
Mr. Baron. This request would not have been extraordinarý…
5
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either, to provide "sterile" equipment to a contact of Harvey's?
Mr. Halley. It would not have attracted my attention to
make it seem out of the ordinary.
Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the presence of a CIA officer
named Jim O'Connell in Florida at that time?
Had you been aware of any operational.
involvement that Jim O'Connell had with anyone in' Florida, at
10
11
Mr. Halley.
No.
: Mr. Baron.
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any time?,
Mr. Halley. I do not know Jim O'Connell. I have seen
references to Jim O'Connell in Jack Anderson's columns and
things like that since I have been reading the Press, but I
do not know Jim O'Connell. If he walked into this room, I
would not recognize him because I do not think I ever met the
man.
I do not know who he is. I asked several of my colleagues
when I first saw his name appear in the Press who it was, and
nobody could describe him in a way that would enable me to
remember ever having seen or met the man.
Mr. Baron. Had you heard of the man in connection with
operations against. Cuba
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Mr. Halley.
I had not.
Mr. Baron.
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recently?
Mr. Halley.
before reading it in the newspapers
Before reading in the newspapers and I do not
know what year I first read this, because somewhere in the back
of my mind is a Jack Anderson column
Mr. Baron. And a Drew Pearson column before that.
7
Mr. Halley.
--
a couple of years ago in which it was
8
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10
Agency named Brad something
--
I cannot think of his name
11
right now
--
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and that he was the source of that information. I
think somewhere in one of those articles, his name had
appeared several years ago. I frankly do not know who the quy
is.
Mr. Baron. At any point. in your operational relationship
with William Harvey in connection with Cuban affairs, did you
suspect that an assassination operation was being run out of
Task Force W against Fidel Castro?
Mr. Halley.
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No.
Mr. Baron. I would like to run down a list of the names
21
of some people who were involved in one way or the other with
22
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an assassination operation that was being run out of Task Force
W, and I will represent to you that there was indeed an
assassination effort or a series of efforts run out of Task
Force W beginning
--
25
and out of the CIA
beginning in October
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1
of 1960 involving connections between CIA officials and people
2 who have been characterized as members of the Mafia, of the
3 gambling Syndicate who had interests in Havana and which involved
4
the passage of poison pills to people inside Cuba purportedly
5
for use against Castro in the restaurant that he frequented.
6
And this plot by William Harvey's own admission was directed
7
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by Harvey during Harvey's tenure as the Chief of Task Force W.
Mr. Halley. I take due note of what you are saying. I
have no knowledge of that. I will be glad to comment on any
of the names. My commenting on names is in no way to reflect
any knowledge on my part of this particular activity, because
12 I have no knowledge of it.
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Mr. Baron. You have already stated that you have no
knowledge of any assassination effort involving poison pills?
Mr. Halley. Yes.
Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of any assassination schemes
which may or may not have been put into effect involving
exploding sea shells that Castro might pick up by scuba diving?
Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall any exploding sea shells
while Castro was scuba diving, but the problem of Castro being
an avid scuba diver is well-known to me. As I recall, somewhere
in this thing there was a refugee group or Cuban exile group
2 2 2 2
23
or somebody at one time in this whole activity who had focused
24
on the question of whether Fidel Castro was vulnerable at the
25
time that he was scuba diving. I have heard that discussed but
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1 frankly I do not remember in what forum, and your reference to
2
the scuba diving has triggered that response.
Nothing about
10
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exploding sea shells.
Mr. Baron. You do not recall ever hearing Desmond
ང FitzGerald mention that subject or hearing that Desmond
6
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FitzGerald was involved in exploring that possibility, planting
an exploding sea shell?
Mr. Halley. The exploding sea shell is enough of an off-
beat kind of thing that I think I would have recalled it. I
don't recall it.
I do recall Castro's scuba diving, and that representing
a vulnerability and somewhere in the recesses of my memory,
that does strike a bell with me that some exile group, somebody
14 was talking about Fidel Castro being vulnerable while he was
15 scuba diving.
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Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of a plan to present Castro
with a skin-diving suit in which bacteria injurious to his health
would have been cultured, bacteria that would have produced
tuberculosis and would have produced a dreadful disease?
Mr. Halley. I have never heard of any bacteria approach
to the problem of dealing with Fidel Castro.
I do want to come back to this that I do recall something
about scuba diving, you know, on the range of Fidel being
vulnerable at the time he was scuba diving, but I do not recall
exploding sea shells or bacteria.
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Mr. Baron.
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Let us turn then to the list of name
71
Mr. Halley. Wait a minute. Just let me make a note to
myself.
(Pause)
Mr. Baron: Do you have any knowledge, acquired directly
or indirectly, of any involvement of John Roselli in Cuban
operations?
Mr. Halley. Other than reading the papers
Mr. Baron. Other than what you read recently in the papers
did you acquire any knowledge during your period as Chief of
Station at JMWAVE of John Roselli's involvement in Cuban
operations?
1. Mr. Halley. No. I had the impression from Harvey going
off that he was meeting with somebody, and at one point in time
attempt to try to find two Soviets at one point who were of
interest. The fellow who provided the lead to that had been
13
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I came to the impression that he was meeting a guy by the name
of John. Who John was, I had no idea. We were involved in an
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Mr. Baron.
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a member of one of the casinos in Cuba at some time.
Do you remember who that was?
Mr. Halley. No, I do not. I do not remember the man's.
name. It may come to me. You are asking me things that
happened, you know, in 1962. As I have told you, I have been
in a lot of places.
Anyway, when we put in a request for a trace on the source
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1 of this lead, I was surprised with the speed with which we got
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<
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a response back on this man and the details run down that we
got on him in terms of who he was and where he worked and so
forth, and I think I concluded at that time that somebody knew
this fellow very well and somewhere in the whole labrynth, either
Justice or we or somebody had access to somebody who could give
7
8
us a great deal of insight into people who had been involved
with the gambling establishment in Cuba.
Those are the only two things that I can say to you that
9
I knew at the time. Obviously I have since read the papers and
10
11
I have put together in my own mind by deduction that the John
12
13
that I was aware of that. Harvey was in touch with must be John
Roselli, but I cannot provide to you
--
14
Mr. Baron. Would this person with contacts with gambling
15
interests in Havana have been Santos Trafficante?
16
Mr. Halley. I would have no way of knowing. I know who
17
Santos Trafficante is.
18
Mr. Baron.
How do you know this?
19
Mr. Halley. This is like asking me whether I knew where
7th Street is in downtown Miami. Santos Trafficante is a name
20
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that constantly was discussed among Cuban exiles and he was a
well-known figure. You could not possibly be involved.
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Mr. Baron. Did you know of any involvement that he had
in Cuban operations that were connected in any way to the CIA?
Mr. Halley. None that. I know of. To the best of my
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recollection when I was in Miami, Santos Trafficante was in the
2 Tampa area and that is my recollection of it at the time.
3
4
I also think that there was some large scandal, when I was
in Miami, that was played up in the Press. I forget, some
5 Federal agent who was somehow involved with the Mafia and with
6
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the Syndicate and there was some linkage in the Press between
Santos Trafficante, Cubans and the Federal agent, but I do not
remember the details of it.
Mr. Baron. The Federal agent was not a CIA employee?
Mr. Halley. No, he was not. My recollection is he was
Narcotics or something.
Mr. Baron. You would
make the same statement about John
16
17
13 Roselli that you had no knowledge of his connection with any
14
CIA sponsored operation against the Cuban government or against
15 Castro personally?
--
you know, I
Mr. Halley. At the time that I was there
want to caution you that I have read the Press. If I have
18
trouble sorting this out, I want you to understand that
--
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Mr. Baron. I understand that clearly.
20
Mr. Halley.
--
that this is a dilemma for me.
Obviously
I told you I made my own deduction that John, the one that
Harvey was in touch with, must have turned out in the context of
20/15 hindsight to be John Roselli. At the time, I did not
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know that.
25
Mr. Baron. What about Robert Maheu? Did you have any
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knowledge that he was involved with Cuban operations affiliated
with the CIA?
Mr. Halley. No.
Again, at the time I had no knowledge of Robert Maheu. I
have since read about Robert Maheu in the Press, allegations:
and so forth. The name is familiar to me now.
Mr. Baron. The same question for Sam Giancana.
Mr. Halley. Again, I say in answer that at the time that
I was involved in '62 and '65 I did not know anything about
Sam Giancana. I have since read in the Press about him.
Therefore, the name is familiar to me today.
Mr. Baron. Did you know at that time that Sheffield
Edwards,
who was then Director of the Office of Security, was
connected in any way with those efforts against Castro personally
or against the Castro government?
Mr. Halley. At that time, Shef Edwards was known to me
as Director of Security. That is all. I had no knowledge of
his involvement in any activity against Fidel Castro in a
personal sense.
Shef Edwards did help Security Officers assigned to my
staff in Miami. Therefore I would periodically go to him about
the performance of his officers who were on my staff. So during
the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs, yes, I did see
him, yes, I did talk to him about Cuban affairs in Miami, the
performance of his officers on my staff, but nothing about anything
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that he might be doing, you know, against Fidel Castro.
75
Mr. Baron. I will represent to you that we have testimony
from Edwards and from Jim. O'Connell who was an officer working
in the Office of Security under Edwards that they were involved
5
in the early stages of an assassination plot against Castro
6
which was run out of the Office of Security and later transferred
9
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7
to the DDP. But you are saying that you had no knowledge of
8
any such operation at that time?
Mr. Halley. I had no knowledge. As I told you before, I
did not even know Jim O'Connell.
Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Juan Orta?
12
13
Mr. Halley.
that has appeared, you know, across my scope.
That name is familiar to me.
It is a name
I cannot tell
14
15
you why I am familiar with it. I would have to have a trace
run, you know, and look at the results of the trace. But the
That does ring a passive bell
16 name Juan Orta is known to me.
Mr. Baron. Do you remember William Harvey having any
17
in my memory.
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2 2 2 2 2 2
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direct contact with Juan Orta?
Mr. Halley. No, I do not.
Mr. Baron. You do not have any specific recollection of
Juan Orta's point of involvement in operations against Castro?
with.
Mr. Halley. Juan Orta, no. It is a name I am familiar
I think you will find, you know, that there are a number
of names
you asked me to look at that other thing a number
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of names that do ring balls with me. I really would have to
have back-up material to clarify why they ring a bell. This is
one that happens to ring a bell with me, but I have no way of
linking it to anything, and certainly I do not link it in any
way in my memory to Mr. Harvey.
Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever hearing of a Cuban contact
of William Harvey's who went by the name of Maceo?
Mr. Halley. No, I do not.
8
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Mr. Baron.
He also used the name of Garcia Gomez and :
10
the name Godoy:
11
Mr. Halley.
The only name that rings any bell with me
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in Cuban contacts is Arturo Godoy. Is this the same man?
Mr.
Baron. We do not have the first name of that alias.
In what connection had you heard of Arturo Godoy?
Mr. Halley. My recollection is I've known Arturo Godoy
16
17
is that he was the fellow who was active in the Cuban immigre
community in Miami. That is all I can tell you at this point.
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I would have to go back.
•with?
Mr. Baron. You do not remember what group he was connected
Mr. Halley. No, I do not. But it was a name that
obviously, you know, frequently referred to in reports. You
know at one time we did monitor the Cuban community as to what
was going on in terms of these various groups and what they
had been doing. For some reason, Arturo Godoy rings a bell with
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me. As I recall, he was some sort of an activist in soma
2
77
Cuban exile group. To give you a definitive answer, you know, I
3 would have to get the name, trace him, "have a run on this fellow
4
and try to put it together in some kind of context, but that is
the only Godoy that rings any bells with me.
5
6
Certainly in my relationship with Harvey, this has no
7
meaning to me.
Godoy and Harvey just do not ring any bells.
8
Mr. Baron. One more name that we already discussed,
that
9
is Tony Varona.
10
Mr. Halley. Yes.
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Mr. Baron. You said that you did know Tony Varona?
Mr. Halley. I know of Tony Varona, that he was leader of
the consejo, the revolutionary counsel that had been set up to
sort of administer the Bay of Pigs operation. In the post
Bay of Pigs era, Nua Cardona and Tony Varona were people who
still appeared on the exile scene and were prominent. We had
some dealings with Nua Cardona, officers in the Station had
dealings with Nua Cardona and Tony. Varona to pay off, you know,
injuries to peopoe who had been suffered during the Bay of Pigs,
'things like that, widows and so on. I know who he is and so
21 forth, the name is very familiar to me. I never personally met
2 2 2 2
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with Tony Varona.
Mr. Baron.
Were you aware that William Harvey had an
independent line of communication with Tony Varona?
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Mr. Halley.
No, I am not.
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Mr. Baron.
Mr. Halley.
frankly.
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Would it surprise you if that were the case?
The Tony Varona thing would surprise me,
I think I would not -- I would be surprised, yes.
Mr. Baron. Why is that?
Mr. Halley. Well, because here is a case where the guy
was a prominent exile figure, essentially residing in Miami, and
7
I knew of no contacts or had no reasons to suspect any contacts
8
with this kind of an exile figure, though once it specifically
9
appeared, I was aware of and it was discussed.
This was done
10
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under FitzGerald's stewardship with the Task Force. I was
aware of that. I would be surprised if someone was in touch
with Tony Varona and I did not know about it. If you told me
that is what happened, that is what Harvey has testified to,
I accept that. I am surprised by it.
Mr. Baron.
15
What was the nature of the CIA relationship
to Artime?
16
17
Mr. Halley.
Well, the Miami Station had no direct relation
1
18
ship with him. As to the nature of the project, you know Artime
19
ran from the Agency, from other people who actually worked with
him on a first time basis.
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Mr. Halley.
22
Mr. Baron.
Were you aware of a project called AMLASH?
Let me make sure we are talking about the same
23
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thing.
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Mr. Baron. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
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Mr. Baron. We have just gone off the record to straighten
out the fact that we are both talking about the same Cuban' high
military officer who was known to the CIA by the cryptonym of
AMLASH.
Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Halley, that you and I agree
that we are referring to the same person that we have identified
off the record?
Mr. Halley. Yes, we have.
Mr. Baron. Were you aware of contacts between AMLASH-1,
as he was known, and Artime?
Mr. Halley. I think at the time that this was going on, I
10
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do not know whether I was or I was not
--
I was aware that the
13
CIA was in touch with AMLASH.
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Mr. Baron. Did you deal directly with the case officers
who ran AMLASH?
Mr. Halley. I did not.. My recollection of this AMLASH
case is as follows. . At some point in time; I had a conversation
with Desmond FitzGerald in Washington during one of my periodic
visits to Washington from Miami. We discussed at that meeting
the nature of our approach to the military establishment in
Cuba. In the context of that conversation, Mr. FitzGerald asked
me if I thought whether it would be a good idea for him to meet
one of these Cuban military personalities, and he subsequently
identified to me the personality he was talking about was
25 AMLASH-1.
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My advice to him was that it would probably not be a good
idea for him to meet him, and the only thing that I could see
3 coming out of that kind of a contact would be that he, Mr.
4
5
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FitzGerald, would get a personal feel for what makes some of
these people tick, in human terms, and that that probably was
too high a price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong,
7
an individual as prominent in Washington as, both within the
8 Agency and the social world in Washington, would be exposed in
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the Press. That would create a flap that I thought was not
worth what would be gained from that meeting.
Mr. Baron. Would this have been in the fall of 1963?
Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the time.
Subsequent to that, Mr. FitzGerald told me that he had
indeed met him and that he had had an interesting conversation
with him. I subsequently recall that this gentleman was met
in Spain at some point in time
--
Mr. Baron. This gentleman being AMLASH-1?
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Mr. Halley. This gentleman, being AMLASH-1, was met in
Spain. I also recall after having left the Cuban activity that
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'I read a Press article showing that he had been apprehended
and I remember reading the publicity of that particular
activity. It is also my recollection that we put in a cache
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for him.
That is about the sum and substance of it.
Mr. Baron.
25
Do you recall what the purpose of that cache
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was? Was it a cache of arms?
Mr. Halley. It was a cache. I think that you could
3 gostothe record to establish what was in the cache. I do not
4 recall specifically what the material was that was in the
5
cache.
6
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Mr. Baron. At the point that you were having these
conversations with Desmond FitzGerald, though, in the first
8 instance the prospect of his contact directly with AMLASH-1,
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in the second instance his reaction to his contact with AMLASH-1
do you recall FitzGerald mentioning to you the fact that
AMLASH had requested assurances that high officials of the U.S.
government would stand behind him if he undertook operations on
behalf of the CIA?
Mr. Halley. I do not recall this at the time.
You know, I also want to say, as you probably know from
the record, I was later Chief of the WH Division from 1972 to
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1973, and I did read some of the files. I am familiar with
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the case.
--
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But at the time I am trying to be schizophrenic,
you know, to put this in the time sequence in which we are
talking about. My recollection of that is that I did not know
that.
Mr. Baron. It would then be your testimony that Mr.
FitzGerald never broached with you the subject of making a
representation to AMLASH-1 that. Robert Kennedy or other high
officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him?
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Mr. Halley.
I do not recall that kind of a conversation
2 taking place with FitzGerald in this timeframe that we are
3 talking about.
Mr. Baron. Do you recall any such conversation at any
4
5
point?
6
Mr. Halley.
No, I do not, in the timeframe that we are
7
talking about.
8
Mr. Baron.
When I say at any point, I mean at any point.
9
since 1962.
10
Mr. Halley.
Well, you know, in the period 1972-73, I did
11
look at some of the files, I did read some of the files.
I am
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familiar that such conversations took place and that there
were a series of meetings. You know, I know who the case
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officer was and so forth.
Mr. Baron. You never discussed the subject directly with
FitzGerald?
Mr. Halley. With FitzGerald, no. I can only say that my
knowledge of that is secondhand from having subsequently read
the files.
Mr. Baron. Was it your impression at that time that one
of the objectives of the contact with AMLASH-1 was the assassina
tion of Fidel Castro or other high Cuban leaders?
Mr. Halley. No. I never had the impression that assassina-
tion was a thrust of the activity. In other words, we were
working across-the-board, both in the context that Desmond
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FitzGerald and his staff were working on what I was doing in
Miami to try to establish contacts with the Cuban military.
In other words, we saw this as a multi-faceted approach.
First,
4 we wanted penetrations of the Cuban military so that we could
5
collect intelligence. What were their strengths, weaknesses,
6
what was their mood, where were things going? Secondly, we
7
wanted from these sources operational intelligence. Who
--
in
11
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an overthrow of the Castro government.
8
9
other words, who in these groups were dissatisfied as Fidel
consolidated. Who could provide leadership for a counter-
10 movement against Fidel?
We were looking for people, once we had identified them,
to see if we could establish contacts with any of these leaders
so we could see whether there was a basis for working toward.
You know, those were
15
the basic steps.
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17
Now as you got down to talking about how you overthrow
Castro, obviously the question comes in of how does a 'group who
18
wants to run a coup or take power take power, and obviously
19
one of the things that has to be looked at is where does the
20 existing leadership going to be during this event, who has \
21 control of the various units. So our discussions were all in
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that context.
Mr. Baron. Would it have surprised you or would it
surprise you now to learn that at least part of the contact
with AMLASH would have involved planning for an assassination
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attempt against Castro.
time,
Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the
as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the
'72-'73 period, seeing any evidence of that in the file at the
time.
Mr. Baron. There are fourteen folders in the AMLASH file.
Did you read all of those files?
Mr. Halley. No, I did not.
Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that
was in the AMLASH files?
Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes
of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases
keep coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry
at the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or
discussing it with my staff and so on.
Mr. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the objective of
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Mr. Baron. Yes,
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Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Artime thing was looked at
as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to
see if they could sort of do it on their own.
If they could
simply be given, you know, X number of dollars, some equipment,
the contact with Artime?
Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Artime?
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some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban
25
solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know,
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1 and if you have not, you should talk to the people who ran the
2 Artime operation, when this was set up, I think I participated
3 in giving Artime some tutorial training for a couple of weeks
4 when this operation was first established in order to familiarize
5
him with some of the problems of trying to manage a large
6
operation against Cuba because he had been out of things for a
7
couple of years.
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Mr. Baron. Were you aware that he had been supplied a
weapon which we already agreed could be characterized as an
assassination weapon?
Mr. Halley. You say "we." You and I?
12
Mr. Baron. Yes.
13
Mr. Halley.
Which weapon was that?
Mr. Baron.
14
A high-powered rifle with long-range and low
15
muzzle velocity.
16
Mr. Halley. I am aware of the fact of this project that
Artime was involved in that he got a number of weapons, any
17
number of which could have been used for sniper type activities.
18
I am aware of the fact that he had a base in Nicaragua to
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have activities, so I would find it hard to single out a weapon.
My recollection of that that he was given a large number of
weapons.
Mr. Baron. Was one of Artime's objectives to have been
to assassinate Fidel Castro?
Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of.
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Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear any discussion to the
2 effect that the Agency was attempting to achieve through Artime
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indirectly. what they did not want to achieve directly in a
4 fashion that would be attributed to the CIA, namely the
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assassination of Castro?
Mr. Halley. I think that you have tied two issues together
there and I do not think I can answer the question that way.
I would like to separate the question into two parts.
Mr. Baron. Go ahead.
Mr. Halley. The first part, as I mentioned to you earlier
11 the CIA did establish a relationship with Artime and he was
given funds and other support to run his approach to solving
the Cuban problem. He was one of two such activities that were
run at the time. And therefore I think that your statement is
correct that perhaps he was set up so that there could be no
direct attribution in his activities to the United States,
because he set up a base in Nicaragua, and the story as I recall
it was put out that he was receiving assistance from the
Nicaraguan government, and therefore there was a part of the
whole cover story, if you will, for him.
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So, yes, there was an attempt to set him up as a parallel
track or a separate track. That does not follow from that, in
my perspective, that was geared towards an assassination
operation, because that was a fantastically large operation
involving lots of people, you know, with substantial amounts of
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1 money. I was opposed to it at the time.
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And once it was set
up, and I did what I was supposed to do, which was to train
3 Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an
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awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up,
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you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period,
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and talked to officers who had, you know, more intimate knowledge
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of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had
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occurred.
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Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was
supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating
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Castro?
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Mr. Halley.
No, not for the specific purpose of assassina-
ting Castro.
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Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASH-1
was a reliable agent?
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Mr. Halley. I really do not know that much about him,
you know. This was an operation that was run at that time out
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of Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it
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to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, Madrid, newspaper
articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe.
Mr. Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling
Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were
connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational
purpose including the intelligence gathering?
Mr. Halley. The only case that I recall is this case that
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I mentioned to you earlier when we were in touch with an
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individual whose name I cannot remember who had been involved
3 with one of the gambling houses in Cuba who came to us with
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leads to Soviets from a missile site who wanted to defect.
That is the only case that I know of. I cannot think of the
man's name. I can give you a physical description of him, and
so forth. I honestly cannot think of his name.
Mr. Baron. You are not. aware of any other use of people
with gambling interests in Cuba for intelligence gathering?
Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of. If you have something
specific that you want to pursue, if you can give me some other
clue than that, I just do not, out of my past memory, I simply
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do not recall any other case but that one.
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Mr. Baron. Are you aware of any contact between the CIA
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and Meyer Lansky?
Mr. Halley. No, I am not aware of any contact between the
CIA and Meyer Lansky.
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Mr. Baron.
Was Howard Hunt connected with any Cuban
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operations during the period of your tenure at JMWAVE Station?
Mr. Halley. Howard Hunt was involved in the Bay of Pigs
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Operation.
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After the Bay of Pigs Operation was over, he did not
participate in the Cuban activities that I was aware of.
You
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have asked me a couple of questions here of things that I am
not aware of. You may know something • that I do not, but
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certainly he did not come across my horizon at the time that I
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was in Miami.
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Mr. Baron.
Have you ever heard the phrase Executive
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Action?
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Mr. Halley.
Yes.
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Mr. Baron.
What does that signify to you?
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Mr. Halley.
Well, Executive Action is some sort of a
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euphemism
--
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to eliminate somebody, I guess is how it appears.
in the popular jargon.
Mr. Baron. Did you hear it in the Agency?
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Mr. Halley.
No.
I think that this is a term that has been
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bandied about in the Press that has come about. in the Press to
be synonymous with killing somebody or something like that.
Mr.
common usage within the Agency?
Baron. It is not, as far as you know, a euphemism in
Mr. Halley.
No.
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Mr. Baron.
Had you ever heard of the ZRRIFLE Project run
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by William Harvey?
Mr. Halley. No, I do not know what it is.
Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of
Mr. Halley. I want to make sure here that I am accurate,
you know.
something.
You are asking me ZRFIFLE. That is a cryptonym for
Mr. Baron. Let me explain further.
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Mr. Halley.
I want to sort of say, in the last thirteen
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years I have seen literally
(Discussion off the record.)
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Mr. Halley. Let me go back. You asked me about ZRRIFLE.
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This is one of a thousand or hundreds of cryptonyms.
Every day
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I read, you know, hundreds of pages of traffic, so when you ask
me do I know what ZRRIFLE is, I must answer you off the top of
I have asked you
my head no. I have tried to be helpful.
several times if you could give me a steering tip or show me
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what direction you are going, I might be able to try to comment
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on it, but ZRRIFLE as such means nothing to me. You really
could not expect that it would, given the thousands of these
things that come across my desk.
Mr. Baron. That is absolutely understandable. I want to
try to see what happens in the way of getting an unrefreshed
recollection from you, then I will go back over these two,
especially the next one, QJWIN.
went by the cryptonym QJWIN?
Do you recall a CIA asset who
17
Mr. Halley.
NO,
I do not.
Knowing the system, and so
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forth, normally it would have something to do with Spain. It
does not ring any bells with me. That is all I can give you,
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a sort of Pavlovian response. You flash QJWIN on the screen,
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I am telling you now I do not know, but it probably has
something to do with Spain.
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2.Q
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Mr. Baron. Were you aware that a project involving the
development of a capability of carrying on assassination was
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run by William Harvey?
Mr. Halley. To develop the capability to carry on the
assassination?
Mr. Baron. Yes.
Mr. Halley. No.
I have no knowledge of Harvey being
focused on a project or given the capability of carrying one
out.
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Mr. Baron. Harvey has testified, as has Richard Bissell,
I will represent to you, that instruction was given by Bissell
to Harvey to set up, to develop such a capability in early 1961
and that Harvey took steps to develop such a capability in
coordination with an asset in New York named QJWIN and I think
that period of greatest activity was in 1962 and WIN was
involved in spotting potential assets among the criminal under-
world in Europe and might be used for any number of dirty
deeds.
Mr. diGenova. It should be emphasized that the Executive
Action Plan that you are referring to has had as its goal the
incapacitation of foreign leaders, one possibility of
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was just not assassination.
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incapacitation being the ultimate weapon, assassination.
It
It was a spectrum of activities
that could be used to incapacitate a foreign leader anywhere
from illness, chemical warfare, and then including death.
Correct me if I am wrong, but it was not just assassination.
Mr.
Baron. Does that ring any bells?
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Mr. Halley.
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No, it does not.
Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection that the ZRRIFLE
Project involving the development of an Executive Action"
capability would have been tied in in any way to an operation
against Cuba?
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Mr. Halley.
No,
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soever.
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Mr.
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that does not ring any bells, none what-
Baron. I would like to introduce as Halley Exhibit
3 an article from Harper's Magazine entitled "The Kennedy
Vendetta," subtitled "How the CIA Waged a Silent War Against
Cuba," written by Taylor Branch and George Crile III.
Let me show you this article and let me ask you whether
you have read it?
Mr. Halley. Yes, I have read the article.
(The document referred
to was marked Halley
Exhibit No. 3 for
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Let us pick out some specifics and discuss
2 them briefly here.
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Near the beginning of this article, it mentions that JMWAVE
Station operated within an annual budget of well in excess of
$50 million.
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Would that be accurate to you?
Mr. Halley. I do not recall whether that is an accurate
figure. We would have to go back to the records.
You know, as
I explained to you earlier, the start of the operation taking
10
place in March and escalated up to a high point and then
11
dropped off. In the budgetary cycle, we are dealing with a
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mass of figures, and I would not want to give you an inaccurate
13
answer. That is something that could be researched
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the files
--
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place the annual
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we have
rather than speculate for you on the buildup and
reduction in the operation. I do not feel that is usefulv
Mr. Baron. As a ballpark figure, would you be able to
budget of the Station in the neighborhood
of tens of millions of dollars?
Mr. Halley. No, I would not, because of this transition,
you know, period, the costs were very high in the beginning to
get a start-up operation, brought to a certain peak, and then
tapered off and starting to be peeled back.
I would not want
--
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to draw a figure of
--
Mr. diGenova.
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What would the start-up cost?
Mr. Halley. In terms of what they involved or dollars?
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Dollars.
I have no recollection of the dollars.
Mr. Baron. Would you say that $50 million would be in the
right ballpark for your activities at the peak?
Mr. Halley. I just have no recollection of the dollar
figure. You might want to get that figure when you can retrieve
it in the files. It is available.
Mr. Baron. Were the operations of JMWAVE coordinated with
other Latin American CIA Station's, as the article indicates
here?
Mr. Halley. I think my recollection of that phase is that
12 Cuban activities with other Latin American stations were
coordinated with JMWAVE.
Coordinated with JMWAVE?
Who had the central coordinating responsibility?
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Mr. Baron.
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Mr. Halley.
With JMWAVE.
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Mr. Baron.
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Mr. Halley.
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Washington.
Mr. Baron.. Was that delegated by Washington to you?
Mr. Halley. No. Essentially Washington had the overall
coordinating responsibility, but that needs some elaboration.
Let me say that we would become aware in our activities in
Miami that a number of interesting people had come in on a
flight to Mexico City. We would send a cable down to Mexico
City with an information copy to Washington outlining who we
were interested in, and I would probably send somebody down to
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Mexico to look at the particular Cuban or the operational
opportunity in conjunction with the Station Chief in Mexico
City.
So we were in some cases a clearinghouse.
The final coordination authority rested in Washington.
I
will say that if Miami wanted to do something and for local
political reasons in Mexico the Mexican Station Chief did not.
want to do it, that would be adjudicated, not by Miami, but by
Washington.
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Mr. Baron.
Let me quote you a passage here and see if it
comports with our discussions earlier of special arrangements
you may have, the JMWAVE Station may have had, with law enforce-
ment authorities in Florida.
The article says: "All the boat missions to Cuba were tech-
nically illegal under the Neutrality Act, the Maritime Laws,
and Immiġtation statutes, so that the Station had to work out
special arrangements with Customs, Immigration and the Coast
Guard."
:
Is that generally accurate?
Mr. Halley. I think, as I described to you before, there
• was coordination with the Coast Guard in terms of vessel
departures. The other is Immigration?
Customs, Immigration and Coast Guard.
Immigration, there would not have been
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Mr. Baron.
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Mr. Halley.
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coordination on a particular, you know, boat dispatch.
On the
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a small boat could not recover its position and get back to the
mother ship to be picked up and it was adrift or came in to one
of the islands or came in to the Florida coast anywhere and was
picked up and picked up by Immigration inspectors, then they
would ask to have their case referred to a particular individual
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It may have been a code number, a color code, it may have been
phrase. But then Immigration would get in touch with us and say
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we have this group, here is what they say, what is your interest
in this particular group, and then that would be adjudicated
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at that point.
C..
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Now the third group was Customs.
Customs did have a
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number of patrols and at times when boat loadings were conducted
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off the Florida Keys in particular, those were coordinated with
the Coast Guard so they would not be expending their manpower
to run down groups that were extricating with us, in fact the
Agency was doing.
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explosives in the cars,
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Mr. Baron. The article continues to say: "It was illegal
for agents to travel around with machine guns and plastic
as they often did. The Station had to
liaison with seventeen police jurisdictions along
the Florida coast and into the Keys.
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any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to
illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released."
Is that accurate?
Mr. Halley. I commented on that before, and we are on the
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1 record on that as saying that we did not drive around,
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3 weapons on them.
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In other words, you are coming back to the same point,
5 because as I explained to you, the weapons were only given to
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them on the vessel and taken back from them when they came back
from a mission, so that the statement is not actually correct.
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Mr. Baron. What about the end of that passage where they
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say that the result, and I understand that you would disagree
as to whether it was a result of this kind of a practice which
you say was not carried on at all. --
Mr. Halley. It was not.
Mr. Baron. Did a situation exist where any agent who was
arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession
of firearms would be quickly released.
Mr. Halley. I have to go back and divide your question
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into two parts.
There were no firearms
Mr. Baron. I am not saying firearms supplied to them by
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the CIA for a CIA mission or any agent travelling down the
street in Miami who happened to have a Saturday Night Special
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in his car or who happened to be drunk while driving.
Would
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such a person be released right away or once the CIA connection
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surfaced?
Mr. Halley. My answer to that is no.
In other words, if
he had a Saturday Night Special and was picked up by the police
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and detained, and if he then asked to be in contact with us,
the case would be looked at at that particular point and if he
had a Saturday Night Special, you know, there would not be any
intervention on his behalf because it had nothing to do with
his task on the behalf of CIA.
I did mention to you earlier we had training camps in various
parts of the State. If somebody came out of the training camp
and did get drunk and was picked up and did not speak English
or something and the police jurisdictions did have a way of
disorderly conduct.
Mr. diGenova. How was that established, the relationship o
liaison with these jurisdictions. Had it been set up with
JMWAVE directly through Washington and down through the FBI?
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getting in touch with us and we might intervene on a
case of
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How had that been done?
Mr. Halley. It varied. When we started expanding the
operation, you know, there had already been a Station there
and there also were two security units in the greater Miami
area. In some cases the existing contacts at the Station were
'expanded, the same with Dade County. In other cases, the
security of personnel who had established contact with other
jurisdictions were used to effect the introduction. In some
23 cases, we had our security people who were on my staff go out
to these jurisdictions and identify themselves simply with a
badge and a name and discuss the kinds of things that they were
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interested in so that there would not be a cross of problems
99
2 with these jurisdictions and therefore a liaison was opened on
3 that basis, a multiplicity of approaches.
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Mr. Baron. The article discusses the fact that regular
commando raids were run out of JMWAVE Station to the shore of
Cuba, and that those commandos were equipped with all kinds of
explosives and armaments.
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Is that generally a fair statement, that we were running on
9 a regular basis commando raids to Cuba?
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Mr. Halley. Yes. There were a series of commando raids
run from the Miami Station against targets in Cuba.
Mr. Baron. Were assassination weapons, that is, high-powered
rifles with low muzzle velocity and telescopic sights, supplied
to those commando teams as a matter of course?
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Mr. Halley. No, they were not. For most of those
commando teams, you were looking for a different kind of a
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weapon. You are looking for a weapon with a high range of fire
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rather than the kind of, you know, weapon that we are talking
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about.
In other words, you would find that type of a group armed
with a submachine gun, as for example.
Mr. Baron.
If an assassination weapon as we have
described it was supplied to a commando team, they would have
to have a specific purpose in mind for its use?
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Mr. Halley. Yes.
Also, again, all of these weapons were controlled,
3 weapons that were issued at the time of the mission on the
the
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ship, so there was accountability for the weapons.
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Mr. Baron. Would it have been unusual to supply what we
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have called an assassination weapon to a commando team?
Mr. Halley. Well, that depends on the mission. For
instance, let me use an example.
Most of the missions that were run were run against targets
that were in fairly close proximity to the shore. If you are
going to put a party to attack your objectives, let us say the
objective was a petroleum storage tank, if you were going to do
this by putting charges up against the petroleum storage tank
that meant that you had to have a group infiltrate close
Some distance away
enough to put the charges on the tank.
from them you would give them a second element of the commando
team which would be providing covering fire for this group in
case they got into trouble and cannot handle it on the ground.
This covering fire group might have had a light machine gun,
a Belgian weapon. They could have these kinds of weapons and
they did have these kinds of weapons" which in the definition you
are using could be used as a sniper weapon or whatever, but the
basic reason for having that weapon was to provide fire support
for the other members of the commando team. And therefore when
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1 this mission was over and they returned, those weapons were
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so that we did not have weapons disappearing out of our
control.
Mr. Baron. Such weapons, high-powered rifles with telescopic
6 scopes, conceivably with silencers, were supplied with some
7 regularity, but they were kept under tight control?
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Mr. Halley. We had high-powered rifles. I cannot think now
of a case where there was a sniper scope attached to the rifle.
10
I can think of no case where there was a silencer attached to
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a rifle in any of these commando raids. There were a number of
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raids conducted, some of them involved teams of fifteen or
twenty men. I am not prepared to say that no man ever had one,
but I do not recall one. You know, if you gave me an inventory
which are in the files, for each of the operations and say here
is the operation plan, does this list of equipment fifteen years
later look reasonable to you, I would be able to tell you yes
or no. But off the top of my head, I do not recall a sniper
scope or a silenced rifle.
Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Rolando
Martinez?
Mr. Halley. Of Watergate involvement?
Mr.
Baron. Yes.
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Mr. Halley. Yes, I know of him. I have never met him
24
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personally. I know of him.
He was a member of our boat
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1 infiltration team. He was a UDT man.
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Mr. Baron. In the Harper's article, it says that Martinez
indicated that "More than once he was given personal charge of
4 weapons drops in which special rifles with silencers and tele-
5
scopic sights were left in designated inland spots."
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Do you know of a factual basis for that statement?
Mr. Halley.
Martinez is undoubtedly factually correct when
8
he says he put caches on the coast of Cuba that contained weapons
9
I do not know how he would be able to tell what kind of weapons
10
were in the cache. The reason I say that is that when one of
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these missions were planned, the cache was put together and
packed by our logistics group and once the cache was put
together it was brought on board the vessel and the cache was
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then turned over to the team for infiltration so he would never
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have seen the contents of the cache, he would not have opened
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it up because it was always in a sealed container.
It is conceivable that in the pre-mission briefing that
he got before he went down that he was told that we are putting
18
19
20
21
cache type.
in a cache containing a radio or putting in a cache containing
weapons because that would influence what he selected as a
In other words, if it were a radio, we would want
22
it higher and drier than we would a can containing weapons that
23
24
were wraped in cosmolene and so forth. He might know that they
were weapons, but he wouldn't know that they were silenced
25
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and they had a scope.
I must honestly say to you I doubt that.
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Mr. Baron. Did you know of any weapons drops that were
made for the purpose of supplying someone inside Cuba with a
weapon for the assassination of Fidel Castro?
Mr. Halley. No, not for that clearly stated purpose. As
I told you, we put a lot of weapons caches in. The weapons were
multi-purpose weapons, could be used. I know of no cache that
went in specifically for the task of playing a contributory role
to assassinating Fidel Castro.
Mr. Baron. It would not have been contrary to the policy
10 directives under which you were operating at the time to
גג
supply such a weapon to someone inside Cuba who might have
12
access to Castro?
13
Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been. For instance,
14
15
I can remember several resistance groups that we had that had two or
three hundred men that we were supplying on a regular basis.
16
Mr. diGenova.
Inside Cuba?
17
Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba, that were essentially living in
18
19
got ammunition to them and so forth.
20
the bush to a large extent, whom we did supply weapons to and
And that was why I was
very careful when you mentioned this linkage before to saying
21
that I could not be a guarantor as to what these men would do
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22
with these weapons once they got their hands on them.
They
23 were free agents.
Mr. diGenova.
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come up before.
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We are aware of our reading of the record that
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1 what you have said is a concern of not only yourself in terms of
realizing that it was a possibility but of people like Dean
22
10
4
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Rusk and Mr. McCone, who also said, you have to realize then
once these agents are in another country and are supplied that
there is little if anything we can do to control those weapons
after they receive them. It would be safe to say that that, of
course, was understood that there was a lack of control, and
to the extent that it was a problem, it existed and had to be
tolerated because of the nature of the operation, would that
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10
be correct?
11
12
Mr. Halley. I do not know whether I want to phrase it
exactly as you have in terms of this lack of control.
Our
13
14
15
mission in dealing with these groups was to first, to put them
in areas where we did not have other intelligence covers.
first task was to collect intelligence.
Their
16
The
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that gave us an opportunity
missions.
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second task was to organize a resistance which would
take armed action if we ever got a total package put together
that was the first and secondary
Once we issued the weapons to the team leader, if
you will, he had freedom to recruit from among the peasants
anybody he wanted to. If he gave the peasant a weapon, there
was no guarantee either by the team leader or by us that that
peasant would not do something that we did not want him to do.
To even shoot a militiaman, you could have an argument, you
know, over a woman. Any number of things.
--
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Mr. diGenova.
Were there any restrictions, once, for
example, those weapons caches were delivered either by land or
3
air
--
4
5
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7
and we have spoken to Mr. Murray who was in the Havana
Station, for example, for awhile and Arthur Avignon who
was head of the Havana Station for awhile who indicated that
they were aware of the weapons drops and were intimately
familiar with where they would be.
8
9
10
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12
Mr. Halley.
knowledge of that.
Mr. diGenova.
That was all before my time. I have no
During my time, we made no drops by air.
Were there any limitations that were
placed of how the weapons would be used that were delivered into
Cuba to these internal resistance groups?
13
14 addressing.
Mr. Halley. I cannot speak to this period that you are
15
Mr. diGenova.
During your period.
16
Mr. Halley.
During my period, the weapons were issued
17
18
in the bush.
19
20
essentially as self-protection for the people who were living
Secondly, to be used in a military operation at
such time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they
were to be used for self-protection if they conducted raids,
ambushes, sabotage operations.
Mr. Baron. There is one further quote from Martinez in
this article that I would like to ask you to comment on.
21
22
23
24
He is quoted as saying: "I took a lot of weapons to Cuba, some
25
of them were very special weapons for special purposes.
They
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were powerful rifles with sophisticated scopes, Springfields
with bolt action, rifles only used by snipers. They were not
5 sent to shoot pigeons or to kill rabbits.
4
Everyone in the
Underground was plotting to kill Castro and the CIA was helping
5
the Underground.
6
7
8
9
10
I was with the Underground as well as the CIA,
so you can see I was involved in the plots too, but that is
also obvious."
You commented before that there was a lot of talk in the
air about assassinating Castro. Martinez seems to be taking
that a few steps further, saying that there were actual plots
11 underway in the Cuban Underground to assassinate Castro and
12 that people who worked with the CIA were aware of those plots
and were aiding them in effect by the weapons they were
supplying.
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Is that an accurate statement?
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Mr. Halley. No, I do not think I can go along with that
statement. Martinez' role as I described it to you, he is
accurate when he says that weapons were put in and that
he participated in putting them in. I again question how he
would know what was in each cache. I just do not see that, and
I would have to accept that as a sort of secondhand statement
by him because of the way that the caches were put together.
I just do not see his knowing that.
Now I don't want to exclude, however, that any particular
kind of weapon did not go to Cuba. Maybe bolt-action
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1 Springfields did go in.
2
Mr. diGenova.
.107
Could he have found out about this after
3 the fact from people that he knew in Cuba, members of the
4
resistance in Cuba that he knew of who would have told him the
5 nature of the items that they would have received in a cache
6
7
delivery?
Would that be one way that he could have found out?
Was he that intimately involved, to your knowledge?
Mr. Halley. He was not at the time. This is the period
8
9
that I am familiar with, '62-'65. I do not know.
Maybe some
10
11
12
13
14
of these people have come out since then, and may be he has
talked to people who have come out in '68, '69, things like that
I cannot exclude that.
At the time, I do not think, however, he would have had
that kind of firsthand knowledge, and therefore I have trouble
15
with that statement and I cannot identify with it.
16
17
18
Mr. Baron. The Harper's article says: "By the end of
1961, several men affiliated with the CIA had already been
foiled in attempts to kill him"
meaning Castro
--
'among
19
them, Luis Toroella, executed; Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, still in
20 prison; William Morgan, executed; and Antonio Veciana, escaped
22222
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to the United
States. Had these men succeeded, their efforts
would have been tied to the U.S. only indirectly, if at all."
Let me show you the passage I am reading from and ask
you whether you have any knowledge of the connection of any of
those men named to the CIA.
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Mr. Halley. No, there is no connection that I know of
108
3 between these names and CIA. This guy Luis Toroella does not
4
ring any bells with me. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo was a leader of
5
Alpha 66. He may have been in Cuba in '61. During the time
6
that I was involved in Cuban affairs he was in exile for
he
7
was in Miami for -a long period of time.
8
Mr. Baron.
Can you explain what Alpha 66 is for the
9
record?
Mr. Halley.
Alpha 66 was a Cuban exile organization that
10
11
12
13
was engaged in a number of raids against the Cuban government.
They claimed to have attacked Cuban shipping, fishing boats, and
claimed to have an organization in Cuba that was a resistance
14
organization.
Gutierrez Menoyo was therefore a well-known name
15
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20
to me. We had no direct contact with him.
William Morgan is also a well-known name. His activities
and exploits in Cuba are well-known to anybody that has dealt
with Cuban affairs.
Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a connection
between any of these people and assassination attempts against
21
Fidel Castro?
22
Mr. Halley. I have none,
no connection between these names
23
24
25
and CIA and attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.
Mr. Baron.
The fact that they are listed here as having
been involved in assassination attempts whether or not they
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1 were connected with CIA is news to you?
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10
Mr. Halley.. Well, no, I would not say that.
109
If you had
Gutierrez Menoyo sitting here and if he were to say in 1962 I
4 attempted to shoot Fidel Castro, that is Gutierrez Menoyo did
5
6
this, I would have no reason to doubt. I would have no basis
for proving it, either.
Mr. Baron. You have never heard of these alleged assassina-
7
8
tion attempts before?
9
Mr. Halley. No.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Morgan's name I would have to do a file trace to get myself
back up to date. Morgan did get himself in trouble with Fidel
over some issue;, as I recall was in prison. I do not recall,
remember if he was executed, although this says he was executed.
Mr. Baron. What about the last name on the list,
Antonio Veciana?
Mr. Halley. That is a name that rings a bell with me, but
17
I do not attach anything to it. In other words, it is a name
18
I have probably read in various and sundry kinds of reports.
19
I remember no operational relationship with him between the Miami
20
Station and this man during my tenure in Miami.
Mr. Baron.
21
During your tenure, would you have been in a
22
23
24
25
22
position to know that these people had led assassination
attempts against Castro, if that were indeed the fact?
Mr. Halley. Not necessarily.
I would say that the odds.
would have been high that we would have, particularly, say
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1 Gutierrez Menoyo.
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We did have a steady stream of reporting on
the activities of all exile groups and Alph: 66 was high on the
list of groups that had a capability of doing this kind of
thing. Therefore, they received quite a bit of coverage from
5
us,
6
7
from the FBI, from Customs, and others.
They were on everybody's sort of watch list.
Mr. Baron. Let us turn now to a document that we will
8
introduce as Exhibit 4, which is a report by Fidel Castro on
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alleged attempts to assassinate him that he connects to the
United States government and especially to the CIA.
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(The document referred
to was marked Halley
Exhibit No. 4 for
identification.)
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Mr. Baron. Which was released recently by George McGovern,
to whom Castro had sent this report.
Mr. Halley, is it true that I had asked you to review this
report before we began our session today?
Mr. Halley. Yes, you did, you did ask me to look at the
report.
Mr. Baron. Can you point to any names or incidents in
this report that are connected in any way in your mind to
actual assassination attempts against Cuba:
--
Castro?
10
Mr. Halley. No, I cannot point to any names that in my
11
12
mind are attached to an assassination attempt against Castro:
You asked me to look at this originally to see if any of the
13
names were familiar to me in any way.
I made a list of some
14
of the names that rang a bell with me, for various reasons.
15
One name is Humberto Sori Marin.
I recall that he was
16
active, he was active with the DRE.
17
Mr. Baron. At what page is that?
18
19
21
Mr. Halley. There is no page number.
For instance, here's a name, Humberto Sori Marin. That is
20 familiar to me. I do not know whether that was from the
reporting showing that he was in prison, you know, we constantly
got reporting on, or why, it is a name that I recognize in the
counterrevolutionary sense, that it is something that crossed
my desk, to see the name.
22
23
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25
All right. The other name that is familiar is Tony Varona.
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1 That was a Cuban exile leader. We talked about Tony Varona. I
2 told you I did not know that Tony Varona had any connection with
3 Mr. Harvey.
4
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There is another name in here, Manolo Ray. I mentioned
Manolo Ray to you. He was one of two exile leaders who had a
You know, I told you Artime was
relationship with the Agency.
one; Manolo Ray is another. He is familiar to me as a result of
8
that.
9
Mr. Baron. You did not know of any involvement of Manolo
10 Ray in an assassination effort against Castro?
11
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Mr. Halley. I do not.
Here is another name mentioned in the same paragraph,
Aureliano Sanchez Arango. That is a name that is familiar to
me as a prominent Cuban exile.
Mr. Baron. You have no more specific recollection?
Mr. Halley. I am trying to be responsive to your question,
telling you which names ring a bell with me as I run through
this.
Mr. Baron. All I am trying to do is clarify for the
record the exact nature of your recollection of each of these
21
22
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25
names.
Do you have any recollection of a plot alluded to in this
report to shoot Castro with a bazooka at the Havana Stadium?
Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any recollection of that.
According to this, if this is correct, it took place in October
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of '61 which I would not have had any knowledge of because I
was not involved in Cuban affairs until, as I told, you, early
3 February 1962.
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Mr. Baron. The same would go for the shooting of a
bazooka towards the Presidential Palace?
Mr. Halley. I have no knowledge.
Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of any efforts to
assassinate Fidel Castro run out of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base?
As you know, Guantanamo had
Mr. Halley. No, I do not.
a number of Cuban exiles in it, people who had taken refuge in
9
10
11
the base at one time or another. During the time that I was the
12
Station Chief in Miami we did have contacts with people at
13
Guantanamo. We did use them for intelligence collection
14
15
16
17
purposes, but I do not have any linkage between that intelligence
project and assassination.
Mr. Baron.
Guantanamo Bay?
They were not during my time as Station Chief
There was an office of ONI, Office of
Were paramilitary operations run out of
18
Mr. Halley.
19
20
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22222
23
in Miami by CIA.
Naval Intelligence representative on Guantanamo.
24
25
I have no
knowledge of what they may have been doing during various
periods of time. I am talking about CIA.
Mr. Baron. Any other names that struck a chord with you
in this report?
Mr. Halley. Well, you have a name here, Mario Salabarria
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1 Aquiar; that name rings a bell with me, for what reason, I do
2
10
3
not know. You know, we would have to run a name trace to get
a rundown of what is in the files and what is in the central
4
index for me to be able to comment on it.
10
6
7
8
9
As I told you earlier
I know that the Agency is doing all these traces after they are
completed and you get them and you want me to take a look at
it, I will be glad to do so. It may trigger some response.
This name, Ramon Grau Scerio, it rings a bell with me. It
is quite possible that he may have been a collection agent, just
as is written here. I am making a deduction, but again, I would
have to look at the name traces, but it is a name that rings a
bell with me.
Mr. Baron. You do not remember him in connection with an
attempt to poison the Prime Minister in June of 1965 as it says
10
11
12
13
14
15
there?
16
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18
Mr. Halley. No, I do not.
Then the next name that is on here, that is familiar.
Here is one that we discussed, that is AMLASH-1. We already
19
went over that one.
20
The other name was Manuel Artime, whom we have talked
20
21
22222
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about.
Mr. Baron. Right.
Mr.
Baron.
The last name on here
--
I cannot find it
the other name is Antonio Cuesta Valle. I cannot find it now,
24
25
but that is the last name that rang a bell.
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Mr. Baron.
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Do you have any recollection of Cuesta
Valle's specific activities with the CIA?
115
Mr. Halley. No. I would have to run traces on him and
take a look at what the information is.
Was Frank Sturgis connected with the JMWAVE
4
5
Mr. Baron.
Station?
6
7
Mr. Halley.
He was not.
Mr. Baron.
Not under the name of Frank Fiorino either?
8
Mr. Halley.
NO,
he was not. This is again one of these
9
10
great myths. At this whole Cuba thing, Frank Sturgis was a
11
12
soldier of fortune, was constantly involved on the periphery
of the Cuban exile community. lle was involved in free lance
13 operations against Cuba. He was somebody that the FBI,
14
15
16
17
Customs, CIA, everybody, reported on. He was a household name,
18
19
but he was not on the CIA payroll during the period that I was
involved in Cuban affairs, that is the payroll of the Miami
Station. I remember name traces being run on this guy and so
forth, and the Agency had no contact with him during that
period of time.
20
20
Are you aware of his ever having been on the
21
22
22
23
MN. Baron.
payroll of the CIA?
Mr. Halley.
I personally am not aware of it, and I think,
you know, if you had gone to the Agency that they must have given
you all sorts of traces on this fellow and told you the same
23
24
25
thing.
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Are you aware of the AMOT program?
116
1
Mr. Baron.
2
Mr. Halley.
Yes, I am.
3
Mr. Baron.
How was that spelled?
4
Mr. Halley.
AMOT.
5
Mr. Baron.
What was that program?
6
7
Mr. Halley.
group that was used as an operational support mechanism to
That was a program involving a Cuban emigre
8
support the Miami Station.
9
Mr. Baron. What kind of support did they provide?
10
Mr. Halley.
They were interviewers of refugees who came
11
ཌལའ
out of Cuba. They provided translator personnel to translate
the Spanish language publications that were of interest to us.
They provided information on the various mainstream activities
that were going on in the Cuban exile community.
Mr. Baron. Did they provide support for paramilitary
operations against Cuba?
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
fit into other paramilitary programs.
20
222
Mr. Halley. They might have identified people whom they
thought we should interview or look to or see if they would
In other words, they
had the contacts in the Cuban community.
21
ment for a diesel engineer.
22
22
23
24
25
Say we had a require-
We would say to the AMOT organiza-
tion, we would say we are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel
engineer who has a first engine's license, and they would go.
through all of their contacts until they would come up with
one,
a week or ten days or whatever, having identified:
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tage 7
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8
the fellow, where he was, what he was doing. We would then
send somebody around to talk to him independent of them and
pick him up to work for us in our maritime activities.
It was that kind of operational support.
Mr.
Baron. People who were part of this program were
not used as paramilitary operatives, at least insofar as they
operated under the aegis of this program. There were some of
them who may have been in the paramilitary program and then
left it and were subsequently picked up in the AMOT organiza-
tion.
Could we go off the record for a moment?
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Halley. We are now back on the record.
The AMOTS also worked with us on a common project, which
was monitoring Cuban naval traffic, things like that, so they
16
were used across the board for operational support tasks.
Mr. Baron. One more general question.
17
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Did the JMWAVE Station have an operational relationship
with the FBI?
Mr. Halley. I would not
Mr. Baron. Was the FBI involved in supporting your
activities in any way?
Mr. Halley. I would rather phrase that in my language,
because I think
Mr. Baron. Go right ahead.
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Mr. Halley.
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I do not know if your question means the same
thing to me. I would prefer to say we had a liaison relation-
3 ship with the FBI, that is, on matters dealing with counter-
4
5
intelligence matters.
There was a regular exchange of data
with the FBI. There was an exchange of name traces on people
6
that they were conducting investigations on, for counterintelli-
7
8
9
10
gence purposes, We would trace certain individuals and with the
FBI there were a couple of counterintelligence cases that we
discovered that were turned over to the FBI.
So this is in the context of the normal CIA-FBI liaison
11 that existed between the two agencies.
Mr. Baron.
paramilitary
But the FBI was not involved in supporting
commando raids to the shore of Cuba, is that
12
13
14
correct?
15
16
Mr. Halley. I do not know what you are driving at.
there. I am having a little trouble with that. Are you saying
17
that the FBI dispatched paramilitary teams to Cuba as
18
an organization?
19
Mr. Baron. Were they involved in paramilitary training
20 of any of the CIA operatives?
21
22
23
24
24
25
Mr. Halley.
No.
The FBI did not train any CIA personnel
during my tenure in the Miami Station.
Mr. Baron. Did the FBI at any point provide with you
links to people who had gambling interests inside Cuba?
Mr. Halley. No. We covered the gambling thing previously.
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1
The one case that I mentioned is this man who gave us the
2
10
3
4
5
6
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8
9
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11
lead of the two Soviets from the missila site, and that did not
come to the Miami Station through the FBI.
Mr. Baron. Were you ever made aware of a CIA attempt to
secure the aid of a pilot, a Cuban pilot, to arrange for an
"accident," to occur to Raul Castro when he flew on a Cuban
plane?
Mr. Halley. I read this somewhere in the record in post
years,
.
but I was not aware of this at the time, at the time I
was in Miami.
Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had
12 been given to the tactic of assassination at CIA Headquarters
13 during your period of involvement with Cuban affairs?
Mr. Halley. No, that is in the period 1962 to '65 when
I was the Station Chief in Miami, I was not aware of any serious.
you know, program operational effort towards assassinating
14
15
16
17
Castro.
18
Mr. Baron.
Were you aware that serious consideration had
19
been given to the tactic or to the use of the tool of assassina-
20
'tion at CIA Headquarters prior to your coming on as JMWAVE
21
22
2 2 2 2 2 2
23
24
Station Chief?
Mr. Halley. No, I was not aware of any, you know, planned
program effort at assassination.
Mr. Baron. If we limit it
Mr. diGenova.
25
--
What do you mean when you say that?
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Mr. Halley. I went through this before before you came
in and explained to Mr. Baron that the subject of assassination
was constantly being discussed in the Cuban community and was a
part of the fabric of the times.
Mr. diGenova. That I am aware of. You are not the only
one who has expressed that knowledge that they were all saying
let's kill him, let's get together:
Mr. Halley. There was a lot of discussion of this kind of
subject of assassination and that is why I keep trying to be
precise that there was no programmatic operational program that
I was aware of to assassinate Castro.
9
10
11
12
Mr. Baron.
Although the context in which we discussed the
13
14
15
16
talk that was in the air of assassinating Castro was coffee shops
in Miami and conversation among Cubans as opposed to conversa-
tions among high CIA officials back in Headquarters, were you
aware that there were at least serious discussions of the
17
18
19
12 20
22
23
2 2 2
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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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24
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use of assassination against Castro at CIA Headquarters?
Mr. Halley. No, I was not. We are plowing the same ground
that we covered before in this.
As I indicated to you, people would come out of Cuba and
discuss these kinds of things. Some of these were reported in,
you know, traffic back to Washington.
People would discuss
what are the prospects of somebody assigned to assassinate
Castro.
In that particular context, yes, discussions on the
assassination of Castro took place. That is why I keep coming
TOP SECRET
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767
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
TOP SECRET
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1 back, if you are saying that if anybody outlined an operational
2
פו
plan to ma, did I help construct the plan, did I make a contri-
bution to a plan, my answer is again no. We talked earlier,
4 you asked me about those exploding sea shells of which I said
5
6
I had never heard of but I had heard discussions of Castro's
vulnerability because he was a scuba diver. And you asked me
about bacteria, I said I had never heard of an introduction of
bacteria, but I had heard again about Castro's vulnerability
7
8
9
in this context..
10
not remember.
11
12
Where I heard it, as I told you before, I do
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
23
2222
24
25
Mr. Baron. I realize we are plowing some of the same
furroughs again. I am trying to be meticulous in the way you
were before. You just now said that the subject of assassina-
tion probably came up in the context of discussing the contin-
gencies of Castro's death. Did it come up in terms of discus-
sing whether or not a plan should be put together to assassinate
Castro, whether or not an operation should be mounted
--
it
Mr. Halley. ○ I cannot recall any such discussion, but in
any state where there is a leadership dominated by one man,
'is always a discussion of succession. That question has come
up, you know, if something happened to Fidel Castro, if he is
thrown over, if he does something foolish himself or if somebody
is successful in assassinating him, somebody who decides sudden-
ly to take his machetti and just get out in the sugar cane
field, again, the question was, who replaces Castro, and we
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Left.
1
2
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3
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5
TOP SECRET
generally focused on Raul. There was talk of a collectiva
leadership.
These are all kinds of things that are always done. against
that kind of a one-man state, whether it is, you know, a
Communist state or whatever you want to talk, call it a
military dictatorship or a dictatorship of the Right or the
8
9
Mr. Baron. Again, discussion of what to do upon the
contingency that Castro dies, by whatever means
10
Mr. Halley.
Non-Agency induced.
Mr. Baron.
11
As opposed to this, which is my question:
12
were you aware of any kind of a discussion at CIA Headquarters
on whether or not the CIA should induce the death of Fidel
13
Castro?
14
15
Mr. Halley.
I do not recall any such discussion.
That
16
17
18
19
20
Castro was discussed.
is why I have gone into all this background to try to explain
the mood of the times and that is why I keep referring to, in
my sense of the word, as a professional intelligence officer,
of an operational plan, I was not a participant in any discus-
sion in which an operational plan for the assassination of
That is, I think, the heart of the
21
matter.
22
Mr.
23
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
24
25
Baron. I have no further questions.
Joe, do you have any?
Mr.
diGenova. Mr. Halley, who was your immediate superior
TOP SECRET
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76070
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in terms of reporting from Miami?
Mr. Halley. Could we go off the record?
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. diGenova. Mr. Halley, we have just had a brief
5 discussion here about some of the things that were covered
6
7
before I arrived by Mr. Baron and you. I do not want to cover
any more of that ground.
8
9
10
11
It is my understanding in discussing the structure of
JMWAVE's relationship with Headquarters, General Lansdale's
name came up, and that on one occasion, General Lansdale actually
came down to Miami to visit the Station to get firsthand
12
knowledge of what was transpiring.
Is that correct?
13
Mr. Halley. That is correct.
14
Mr. diGenova. Do you have any idea when that was?
15
16
Mr. Halley. No. I stated earlier it was in 1962. It
probably was in the summer of 1962 because it was after my
17
family arrived in Miami. I do not remember the exact dates.
18
It could be established probably from records of the Agency.
19
20
22 2
21
22
22
23
24
22
25
I do not recall it specifically.
Mr. diGenova. To your knowledge, did he travel by himself
or was he with compatriots or aides?
Mr. Halley. My recollection of that was that he came down
on a special airplane. There may have been other people on the
plane with him, I do not recall, but he landed at Homestead
Air Force Base.
As I recall, we picked him up from there.
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Mr. diGenova. Did General Lansdale travel under his own
name or under a cover name?
Mr. Halley.
Throughout the time that he was in contact
with me and the Station he was operating as General Lansdale.
Mr. diGenova. Did he have contact when he was there with
some of the assets themselves?
Mr. Halley. He had no contact with any Cubans that I am
aware of.
He did spend the night that he came down with some
friends at Homestead Air Force Base, but I do not recall, I
would have no way of knowing what he did that evening.
Mr. diGenova. For the time that he was at JMWAVE he was
with officials such as yourself who had a supervisory capacity
at JMWAVE Station?
9
10
11
12
13
14
Mr. Halley. That is correct.
15
Mr. diGenova. I have no further questions.
16
Mr. Baron. On the record, I just want to thank you for
17
your testimony here today. It has been a long day and we
18
have gone over a lot of things quite carefully and it has been
19
20
2 2 2
21
22
23
most informative.
I would also like to ask you, if you would, to pursue for
us that one name of the man who was connected with gambling
interests in Cuba and supplied some intelligence to JMWAVE
Station.
24
25
22
(Discussion off the record.)
(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock the hearing was concluded.)
TOP SECRET
SECRET-EVES ONLY
HALLEY
Ехнівіт
believed he was being supported by U.S. businessmen with
financial stakes in Cuba.
Roselli needed Giancana and Trafficante
in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba.
He did not need them in the second phase, because he had Varona.
However, it would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take
the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he
was working in a territory considered to be the private domain
of someone else in the syndicate.)
Varona.
When the pills were given to Varona through Roselli,.
requested arms and equipment needed for the support of his end of the
operation.
Roselli passed the request to Harvey.
Harvey, with the
help of Ted Shackley, the chief of the JMWAVE Station, procured
explosives, detonators, twenty .30 caliber rifles, twenty .45 caliber
Harvey says that the
hand guns, two radios, and one boat radar.
"shopping list" included some items that could be obtained only from
Harvey omitted those items, because Roselli,
the U.S. Government.
posing as a representative of private business interests, would not
have had access to such equipment.
The cost of the arms and equipment,
about $5,000, was T/A'd to headquarters.
Harvey and Shackley rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name,
loaded it with the arms and equipment, and parked it in the parking lot
of a drive-in restaurant.
The keys were then given to Roselli for
10002000092
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OCIUY3Z4
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SPORET-CES ONLY
10402
SECRET-EVES ONLY
delivery either to Maceo, to Varona, or to Varona's son-in-law.
After
Evidently Harvey and Roselli had not yet come to trust each other.
Perhaps fearing a double-cross, cach set about Independently to
assure himself that the equipment reached the proped hands.
parking the truck, Harvey and Shackley kept the parking lot, under
surveillance until the pass was completed. Roselli, accompanied by
O'Connell, did the same. Neither pair knew that the other was
watching. Eventually the truck was picked up and driven away.
It
Harvey says
was returned later, empty, and with the keys under the seat as
prearranged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency..
that Shackley never knew to whom delivery was made nor for what ✓
purpose. Shackley was merely called upon to furnish support for a
headquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded.
May 1962
Harvey and Roselli arranged a system of telephone communication.
by which Harvey was kept posted on any developments.
.
Harvey, using a
pay phone, could call Roselli at the Friars Club in Los Angeles at 1600
Roselli could phone Harvey at Harvey's home
hours, Los Angeles time.
in the evening. Roselli reported that the pills were in Cuba and at
the restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro.
་
7
NW 50955" Docid:32423434
Page 128
NW 30995 Did:32423434
La Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA)
de Estados Unidos, ha jugado el papel
principal en la historia de las agresio
nes contra Cuba, promoviendo, organizan
do, financiando y en muchos casos diri-
giendo anciones vandálicas, no sólo con
tra el territorio cubano sino también
contra nuestras representaciones e inte
reses en países extranjeros o en aguas-
acionales.
nte
-
The United States Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) has played the leading role in the his-
tory of the agressions against Cuba, promoting,
organizing, financing, and, in many cases,---
directing vandalic actions, not only against-
the Cuban territory, but also against our
representations and interest in foreign coun-
tries, or in international waters.
---
дув
Page 129
--
--
En esta amplia gama de actividades des-
plegadas por la CIA, y demás órganos
subversivos de Estados Unidos contra
nuestro país, se destacan por su peli--
grosidad, los reiterados planes dirigi-
dos a la eliminación física de los prin
cipales dirigentes de la Revolución y,-
en especial, contra la figura de nuestro
Primer Ministro.
--
Las pruebas que aportamos evidencian
que, desde 1959, éste ha sido uno de sus
objetivos principales, mediante el em--
pleo de los más variados métodos técni-
cos de precisión. En los casos de agen--
tes radicados en el exterior, les han
facilitado medios de traslación y comu-
nicación.
--
---
In this wide variety of activities carried
out by the CIA and by other United States
subversive bodies against our country, the
reiterated plans toward the physical elimina-
tion, of the principal leaders of the Revolu-
tion, and specially, against our Prime Minis
ter, stand out because of their dangerousness.
---
The proofs we provide, evidence that, since
1959, this has been one of its major aims, by
using the most varied technical precision
methods. In the case of agents living abroad,.
they have been given means of transportation-
and communication.
Is de destacar que en las innumerables-
filtraciones organizadas por la CIA,-
utilizando miembros de organizaciones
contrarrevolucionarias, uno de los obje
tivos constantes ha sido también la eli
minación física del Comandante en Jefe-
Fidel Castro Ruz.
La CIA, para la ejecución de sus planes,
ha utilizado elementos contrarrevolucio
narios en el interior y exterior del
país. No sólo ha tenido como colaborado-
res a los desplazados del poder, sino
también a elementos de distinta proce--
dencia social, incluyendo a exponentes-
de todo tipo de lacras.
-
Igualmente, no han tenido reparo en re-
clutar a destacados jefes y elementos
de la maffia norteamericana, a quienes-
les han conmutado fechorías a cambio de
su participación en los planes de aten-
tado contra nuestros dirigentes.
No han vacilado tampoco en tratar de.
ejecutar sus acciones en lugares públi-
cos, donde el número de víctimas inocen
tes hubiese sido incalculable, como fue
los atentados planificados en el
Stadium Latinoamericano, Plaza de la Re
---
It is worth noticing that, in the innumerable
infiltrations organized by the CIA, using
members of counterrevolutionary organizations,
one of the permanent goals has also been the-
physical elimination of Commander in Chief,-
Fidel Castro Ruz.
The CIA, in orden to carry out its plans, has-
used counterrevolutionary individuals inside-
It has had as.colla-
and outside the country.
borators, not only those who had been shifted
but also individuals of different
fron power,
social origins, including samples of all types
of viciousness.
In the same way, they have had no objection -
to recruting well-known leaders and members-
from the American maffia, to whom they have
barred their offences, in exchange for their-
participation in the plots against our leaders.
--
Nor have they hesitated in trying to carry
out their actions in public places, where the
number of innocent victims would have been
incalculable, as were the crimes planned to -
take place at the Latin American Stadium, the
the University of Ha--
Revolution Square and
NW 50955 DocId: 32423434
Page 130

NW 50954Dotid:32423434
›
-
la prensa nor-
Durante los últimos meses.
teamericana ha publicado una creciente y-
amplia información sobre la realización
de estas actividades, ofreciendo en deta-
Ales la participación de la Agencia Cen--
tral de Inteligencia en la elaboración y-
ojecución de los planes de atentado.
-
In los informes rendidos por la llamada
Comisión Rockefeller y la presidida por
el senador Frank Church, para las investi
gaciones sobre las actividades ilegales
de la CIA, ha quedado demostrado de forma
categórica lo antes expuesto.
-
Un ex-agente hizo públicas declaraciones-
sobre la participación de dicha agencia
en el criminal atentado perpetrado contra
el vapor francés "La Coubre", donde más
de un centenar de cubanos resultaron muer
tos y alrededor de 200, heridos graves.
Brinda detalles pormenorizados sobre su
realización, tratando de "justificar" esta
Estanza por un desperfecto en el mecanis-
o del equipo explosivo utilizado.
During the last month, the American press has
published an increasing and extensive informa
tion about the accomplishment of these acti-
vities, offering details about the participa
tion of the Central Intelligence Agency in
the elaboration and execution of the crimi--
nal plans.
---
-
In the reports of the so-called Rockefeller-
Commission, as well as the one headed by
Senator Frark Church, for the researches on
the illegal activities of the Central Intelli
gence Agenci (CIA), all that we have stated-
above, has been undoubtedly demonstrated.
---
A former agent made public statements about-
the participation of this Agency in the cri-
minal act carried out against the French
steamship"La Coubre", where more than one
hundred Cubans were killed and about 200,
were seriously injured. He offers details
about his accomplisments trying to "justify"-
this killing by blaming a slight damage in
the mechanism of the blowing equipment which
was used.
--
Page 131
NW 30935"
DUCTH:32423434
4)
Resulta significativa la información
aportada por el columnista Jack Anderson
en el diario "The Washington Post" sobre
la intervención del ganster John Rosselli
en varios planes de atentados contra el-
Primer Ministro Fidel Castro, algunos de
ellos mediante envenenamiento con pasti-
llas entregadas por la CIA. Posteriormen
te, según la propia prensa norteamerica-
Rosselli admitió ante la Comisión de
Inteligencia del Senado su participación
con esta Agencia en varios complots para
asesinar al Primer Ministro Cubano.
na,
Paulatinamente,
'
---
funcionarios, senadores,
jefes, oficiales y ex-agentes de la CIA,
así como conocidos columnistas de la
prensa norteamericana, han hecho categó-
ricas declaraciones, que coinciden con -
las denuncias formuladas, oportunamente -
por el gobierno de Cuba.
-
Sin pretender relacionar todos los pla--
nes de atentados fraguados, exponemos a-
continuación algunos casos, que en su --
casi totalidad no han sido de conocimien
to público y prueban la diversidad y rei
teración de la participación de la CIA y
otras agencias subversivas en estos e--
Very significant is the information given by-
the journalist Jack Anderson from"The Washing
ton Post" about the gangster John Rosselli's-
participation in varicus plots against Prime-
Minister Fidel Castro, somo of them by means-
of poisoning, with pills handed to him by the
CIA. Afterwards, according to the American
press itself, Rosselli, before the Senate
Intelligence Commission, conceded having parti
cipated with this Agency in various plots for
assassinating the Cuban Prime Minister.
Gradually, officials, Senators,
--
---
chiefs, offi-
cers and former CIA agents, as well as well
known American press press journalists, have-
which coincide--
made categorical statements,
with the denounces expressed, apropos, by the-
Cuban Government.
Without pretending to mention all the plots--
attempted, we expose some of them the majority
of which have not been publicly known.
They prove the diversity and recurrence of --
the CIA as well as other subversive agencies
participation in these actions:
Page 132
NW*
DOCTH:32423434 Page 133
A mediados del año 1960, los elementos con
trarrevolucionarios Armando Cubría Ramos-
y Mario Tauler Sagué, miembros de la orga-
nización contrarrevolucionaria"La Cruz",-
se infiltraron por la zona de Punta de Hi
cacos,
Matanzas:
Tauler Sagué, elemento gansteril, junto a-
Cubría Ramos traían la misión de realizar
nuestro Primer Ministro, así
un atentado a
como perpetrar distintas acciones de sabo
taje y terrorismo. Para cumplirla fueron-
pertrechados por la CIA de gran cantidad-
de material bélico y equipos, los que fue
ron ocupados al ser detenidos.
In mid 1960, the counterrevolutionary Armando
Cubría Ramos and Mario Tauler Sague members--
of the "La Cruz" counterrevolutionary organiza
tion, were infiltrated through the Punta Hica-
cos zone, in Matanzas Province.
'
-
---
Tauler Sagué, a gangster, together with Cubría
were instructed to carry out a plot
Ramos
against cur Prime Minister, as well as to
commit various sabotage and terrorism actions.
For accomplishing this, they were given great
quantity of warlike material and equipment by-
the CIA, which were taken from them when arres-
ted.
NW 409 No: 32423434
Page 134
El traidor Humberto Sorí Marín, con cua
tro contrarrevolucionarios más, se in--
filtraron en marzo de 1961, por la cos-
ta norte de La Habana con el objetivo -
de reagrupar a las organizaciones con--
trarrevolucionarias, realizar un atenta-
do al Comandante en Jefe y desarrollar-
todo tipo de actividades subversivas pa
ra apoyar la invasión de Playa Girón.
Para tales fines fueron entrenados y ar
mados por la CIA, ocupándoseles gran can
tidad de material bélico y otros equipos
al ser detenidos.
Entre los principales encartados figura
ban: Rogelio González Corcho, Manuel Lo-
renzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodríguez Na-
varrete, Gaspar Domínguez Trueba Varona,
Eufemio J.Fernandez Ortega y Rafael Daz
Hanscons, responsables de diversos grupos
y organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias
dirigidas por la CIA.
n
---
-
The traitor Humberto Sorí Marín with four other
counterrevolutionaries, were infiltrated in
March 1961, through the north coast of Havana,
with the purpose of grouping the counterrevolu-
tionary organizations, of carrying out the
assassination of Commander in Chief and of deve
loping all type of subversive activities in
order tu support the Playa Girón invasion.
----
For this purpose, they were trained and armed--
by the Central Intelligence Agency. A great
quantity of warlike material and other equipment
were taken from them when arrested.
Among the participants were Rogelio González Cor
cho, Manuel Lorenzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodrí--
guez Navarrete, Gaspar Domínguez Trueba Varona, -
Eufemio J. Fernández Ortega and Rafael Díaz Hans
heads of various counterrevolutionary
groups and organization directed by the CIA.
cons,
En junio de 1961,
se celebra una reunión
con la asistencia de un elemento infil--
trado en Cuba por la organización contra
revolucionaria "Frente Revolucionario De
mccrático" (FRD), quien traía la orden de
realizar un atentado al Comandante en Je
fe Fidel Castro Ruz.
Para ejecutar dicha acción fueron desig-
nados: Juan Basigalupe Hornedo, Higinio-
Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo Coula Ferrer
y otros, entregándoseles dinero para su-
Iragar los gastos de la operación.
-
El plan consistía en situar dos jeeps --
sito en las
con bazookas en el garage,
Avenidas de Rancho Boyeros y Santa Cata-
lina, y un panel por la Ciudad Deportiva,
con hombres portando granadas. Al pasar-
nuestro dirigente obstaculizarían el
tránsito, abriendo fuego.
Al ser detenidos, Guillermo Coula Ferrer
a la CIA de-
e Higinio Menéndez, acusaron
ser el principal director del plan. Los-
encartados mantenían contactos a través-
de la Base Naval de Guantánamo y la Emba
jada Suiza, con miembros de la CIA y auto
ridades norteamericanas, quienes les pro
In June 1961, a meeting was celebrated with
the attendance of an individual infiltrated
in Cuba by the "Frente Revolucionario Demo-
crático" (FRD) counterrevolutionary organita
tion, who was instructed to carry out a
a plot against Commander in Chief Fidel Cas
tro Ruz.
---
-
To accomplish this action, Juan Basigalupe
Hornedo, Higinio Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo
Coula Ferrer and others were appointed, and
they were given money to meet the expensės
of the operation.
The plan was to place two jeeps with bazookas
in the garage which is at Rancho Boyeros and
Santa Catalina Avenues, and a light truck at
the Ciudad Deportiva (Sports City) with men -
carrying grenades. When our leaders would
pass by, they would stop the traffic and open
fire.
When they were arrested, Guillermo Caula Fe-
rrer and Higinio Menéndez accused the CIA of
being the principal director of the plot.
The indicted kept contacts through Guantánamo
Naval Base and the Swiss Embassy, with members
of the CIA and American authorities, who gave
them means and instructions to carry out
NW 50955 Docid: 32423434
Page 135
NW 50955 DocId: 32423434
8
Después del descalabro de Playa Girón, la-
Agencia, Central de Inteligencia continuó-
sus actividades subversivas contra nues--
tro país, iniciando el reagrupamiento de-
las dispersas organizaciones contrarrevo-
lucionarias bajo la organización "Unidad-
Resistencia".
Esa labor fue llevada a cabo por los agen
tes de la CIA infiltrados: Emilio Adolfo-
Rivero Caro (Brand), Adolfo Mendoza (Raúl)
y Jorge García Rubio (Tony) entre otros.Se
guidamente se dieron a la tarea de desa-
rrollar todo tipo de actividades subversi
vas, incluyendo un atentado contra el Co-
mandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz du-
rante el desarrollo del acto provincial
del 26 de julio de 1961 en Oriente; la
autoagresión a la Ease Naval de Guantána-
mo, con el fin de justificar la agresión-
por parte de las Fuerzas Armadas norteame
ricanas; así como ataques a las repúbli--
cercanas para provocar un conflicto
internacional.
--
Los planes contemplan también un atenta--
do contra el Comandante en Jefe en el ac-
to central de la misma fecha en la Plaza-
-
After the Playa Girón defeat, the Central
Intelligence Agency continued its subversive
activities against our country, starting
the prouping of the disperse counterrevolu-
tionary organization, under the "Unidad Re-
sistencia" organization.
This task was carried out by the infiltra--
ted CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro
(erand), Adolfo Mendoza (Raúl) and Jorge --
García. Rubio (Tony) among others. Afterwards,
they tried to develop all types of subver-
sive activities, including a plot against
Division Commander(Lieutenant Colonel)
Raúl Castro Ruz, during the provincial
celebration of the 26 de July at Oriente
Province in 1961; the selfaggression to
Guantánamo Naval Base, with the purpose of-
justifying the aggression by the American--
Armed Forces as well as attacks to neighbor
republics, in order to provoke an interna--
tional conflict.
---
The plans included also a plot against the
Commander in Chief, during the central
rally the same day, at the Revolution
11-
Page 136
NW 50955 DocId: 32423434
9.
--
-
de la Revolución, para lo cual fue a ccor
dinar on territorio de Estados Unidos el-
contrarrevolucionario José Pujals Mederos,
quien salió clandestinamente hacia ese
país. Allí se entrevistó con los oficiales
de la CIA, Jim Bender, conocido por Jim Boul
ding, Harold Bishop y Carl Hitch. En esta-
entrevista Mederos fue nombrado jefe de
los oficiales de la CIA que operaban en
Cuba, en sustitución de Alfredo Izaguirre
conocido por Tito, que estaba detenido.
En la Base Naval de Guantánamo se lleva--
ron a cabo las reuniones conspirativas,y-
sus autoridades (Capitán Schenweias) propor
cionaron gran cantidad de material bélico
y equipos para la realización de estos
planes.
1 mencionado Capitán Carl. E. Schenweias, ex
jefe de la Base Naval, fue uno de los más-
activos organizadores de las agresiones.
Detenidos todos los encartados, se les ocu
pó gran cantidad de material y equipos bé
licos.
Es de significar, que todos estos planes
subversivos fueron denunciados oportuna--
mente por el Comandante Ernesto Guevara
en Punta del Este.
-
For this purpose, the counterrevolu-
Square
tionary José Pujals Mederos made an under
cover visit to the United States, in order-
to coordinate this action. There, he met --
CIA officers Jim Bender, known as Jim Boul-
ding, Harold Bischop and Carl Hitch. During
this meeting, Mederos was appointed chief
of the CIA officers, who opperated in Cuba,
substituting Aldredo Izaguirre, known as
Tito, who was arrested.
-
The conspiratory meeting were carried out--
at the Guantánamo Naval Base, and its
authorities (Captain Schenweias) supplied a
lot of warlike material and equipment for
the accomplishment of these plans.
one of
The mentioned Captain Carl. E. Schenweias,
formes chief of the Naval Base, was
the most active organizers of the aggres--
sions.
--
When all the indicated were arrested, a
great number of warlike material and equip
ment was taken from them.
It is worth noticing that all these subver
sive plans were denounced opportunely, by-
Commander Ernesto Guevara, at Punta del
Este.
-
Page 137
NW
1933
Douru 32423434 Page 138
10
En la segunda quincena de julio de 1961, un
grupo de elementos contrarrevolucionarios-
de las organizaciones" 30 de Noviembre", "Mo
vimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo" y "Fren
te Revolucionario Democrático", planeaban-
atentar contra nuestro Comandante en Jefe-
y otros dirigentes.
Recibían orientaciones de la CIA a través-
contactos con Tony Varona, Manuel Ray y-
Aureliano Sánchez Arango en el exterior
del país, y con el Almirante Burke y agen-
tes de la CIA en la Base Naval de Guantána
El atentado se efectuaría en las cerca
nías del domicilio de la compañera Celia
Sánchez Manduley, en el Vedado. Resultaron
detenidos Mario Chanez de Armas, Francisco-
Roberto Coscuyuela Val---
Chanez de Armas,
cárcel, Orlando Ulacia Valdés, Francisco
Gil Cruz, Segundo González González y
otros, a quienes se les ocuparon armas y -
explosivos.
-
----
During the second fortnight of July, 1961, a
group of counterrevolutionaries from "30
de Noviembre", "Movimiento Revolucionario-
del Fueblo" and "Frente Revolucionario De-
mocrático" organizations, were plotting
against our Commander in Chief and other--
leaders.
They received CIA instructions through
contacts abroad with Tany. Varona, Manuel
Ray and Aureliano Sánchez Arango, and with
Admiral Burke and CIA agents in Guantánamo
Naval Base. The plot would be carried out-
in the proximity of Celia Sánchez Mandu---
ley's house, in Vedado. Mario Chanez de Ar
mas, Francisco Chanez de Armas, Roberto
Coscuyuela Valcárcel, Orlando Ulacia Val--
dés, Francisco Gil Cruz, Segundo González-
González and others were arrested and
weapons and explosives were taken from
them.
----
NW50975 DOLT:32423434 Page 139
76000070212
Entre sus planes figurala también el fraca--
sado atentado al Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez
llevado a efecto el 13 de setiembre de 1961
cuando dicho dirigente regresaba de Matan--
zas hacia La Habana. Con ese fin, un grupo-
de contrarrevolucionarios pertenecientes a-
las organizaciones antes mencionadas, esta--
con representantes del-
blecieron contactos
"Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria"
(MRR). Al frente de los mismo se hallaba
Juan José Martore Silva.
Estos elementos mantenían estrechos víncu--
los con un agente de la CIA, así como con un
jefe de bandidos en la provincia de Matan--
zas. Al resultar detenidos se les ocupó el-
material bélico que poseían..
Among their plans was also the failed plot
against Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, which
was attempted on September 13th, 1961, when
he was coming back from Matanzas to Havana.
With thar purpose, a group of counterrevolu
tionary individuals, belonging to the
organizations mentioned above, contacted
representatives of the "Movimiento de Recu
peración Revolucionaria" (MRR). The group's
leader was Juan José Martore Silva.
:
---
-1
These individuals kept close relation with-
a CIA agent as well as with the chief of a-
band in Matanzas Province. When arrested, -
warlike material was taken from them.
NW UND 32423434
Page 140
2
-
En octubre de 1961, las organizaciones con
trarrevolucionarias "II Frente del Escam--
bray" y "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolu
cionaria" (MRF) dirigidas por la Agencia -
Central de Inteligencia (CIA), aprobaron un
plan conjunto de sabotajes en la capital, a
fin de provocar la indignación popular e
influir sobre la concurrencia masiva al ac
to de recibimiento al Presidente de la Re-
pública, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, a
su llegada de Punta del Este.
-
-
Esta táctica estaba encaminada a viabilizar
el plan de atentado que ejecutarían el día
4 del propio mes, disparando con una bazoo
ka hacia la tribuna situada en la terraza-
del antiguo Palacio Presidencial desde un-
un edificio conti--
apartemento situado en
guo. La retirada sería cubierta con el cri
minal lanzamiento de granadas contra el
público, para crear la confusión y el páni
CO.
--
Sus propósitos fueron frustrados al ser de
tenidos, todos los encartados, ocupándose
gran cantidad de material bélico.
On Octuber 1961, "II Frente del Escambray"
and "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucio-
naria" (MER) counterrevolutionary organiza-
tions, directed by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), approved a joint plan for a-
sabotage in the capital, in order to cause
people's indignation and to influence on
the mass gathering to welcome the President
of the Republic Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, -
on his arrival from Punta del Este.
--
--
---
This tactic was aimed to facilitate the
plot, which would be carried out on the
4th of the same month, shooting with a
bazooka in direction to the tribune located
on the terrace of the former Presidential
Palace, from an apartament located in a
nearby building. The withdrawal would be
covered by the criminal launching of grenades
against the public, in order to cause confu
sim and panic.
--
Their purposes were frustrated when all
of the indicted were arrested and a great-
number of warlike material was taken from-
them.

NW30 Id: 32423434
Page 141
13
--
A principios de 1962, siguiendo orientacio
nes de la CIA y la Ease Naval de Guantána
mo, el contrarrevolucionario Jorge Luis
Cuervo Calvo se da a la tarea de restructu
rar algunos grupos y organizaciones contra
revolucionarias, creando la denominada
"Unión de Unidades Revolucionarias" (UDUR).
---
Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl Cay
Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert y otros se reu
nieron para elaborar planes de alzamiento-
e informar sobre los contactos estableci--
dos en la Base Naval norteamericana de
Guantánamo para recibir material bélico y-
equipos.
---
-
--
La CIA persiste en sus planes de atentar
contra la vida del Primer Ministro y de
producir una autoagresión a la Base Naval.
Cumpliendo estas órdenes, el contrarrevo--
lucionario Cuervo Calvo hace contacto con-
la organización DRE, procediendo a elabo--
rar lo que denominaron "Plan Z" , que con--
atentar contra la vida del Dr.-
sistía en:
Ministro de Relaciones Exterio--
Raúl Roa,
res, lo que les permitiría llevar a vías
de hecho otro atentado de mayor proporcio-
nes contra el Primer Ministro y demás diri
gentes de la Revolución que concurrieran
al sepelio.
In early 1962, following instructions from
the CIA and the Guantánamo Naval Base
the
counterrevolutionary Jorge Luis Cuervo Cal
vo reorganized several group and counter--
revolutionary organizations, and created
the "Unión de Unidades Revolucionarias"
(UDUR).
--
Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl
Cay Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert and others
met in order to prepare plans for uprising
and inform about the contacts established-
with the Guantánamo Naval Base for receiving
warlike material and equipment.
-
The Central Intelligence Agency insisted.
on its plots against the Prime Minister's-
life, and to carry out a self-aggression
to the Naval Base. Following these instruc
tions, the counterrevolutionary Cuervo
Calvo made contacts with the DRE organiza-
and elaborated what would be known
tion.
which consisted on attempt---
"Plan Z")
ing against the life of the Minister of
Foreigh Relations Raúl Roa, what would
enable them to carry out another plot of -
bigger proportions agains the Prime Minister
and other revolucionary leaders who would-
attend the burial.
as
--
---
1
14
Es de destacar que los autores intelec
tuales de este plan fueron los contra-
revolucionarios Cay Hernández y Cay
Gispert, militantes de la organización
DRE, que era dirigida por el agente de
la CIA, infiltrado en nuestro país, Ju-
lio Hernández Rojo.
It is worth noticing that the intellectual
authors of this plan were the counter-----
revolutionaries Cay Hernández y Cay Gis---
pert, members of the DRE organization,
which was headed by Julio Hernández Rojó,-
a CIA agent infiltrated into our country.
---
NW SIDS : 32423434
Page 142
76000070216
NW 30953 Dold: 32423434
Page 143
1
ستا
1167371
ᎨᎸ .
]]
La organización "Resistencia Cívica Anti-
comunista" (RCA) en cuyo seno se agruparon
el "Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN)
"Movimiento de Recuperación Revoluciona--
ria"(MRR), "Agrupación Montecristi", y --
otros, era dirigida desde el exterior por
la CIA, a través de su agente Nino Díaz.
En 1963, la CIA orientó al bloque RCA or-
ganizar y ejecutar acciones internas que-
aparentaran la existencia de una resisten
cia popular activa, con vista a solicitar
la intervención armada a Cuba, en la reu-
nión de Presidentes de países miembros de
la CEA.
Las instrucciones eran suministradas por-
la CIA a través de la Base Naval de Guan-
tánamo. A partir de entonces la RCA elabo
nuevos planes de acción y atentados, en
apoyo a la invasión armada que esperaban-
en el mes de julio.
ra
Con motivo de los actos conmemorativos
del 13 de Marzo, planearon asesinar al
Comandante en Jefe, desde una casa cerca-
na a la Universidad de la Habana, disparan
do hacia la tribuna, con un mortero. Los-
principales encartados fueron Samuel Car-
The "Resistencia Cívica Anticomunista"-
organization (RCA), to which "Ejército de-
Liberación Nacional" (ELN), "Movimiento de-
Recuperación Revolucionaria (MRR); "Agrupa--
ción Montecristi" and others were joined, -
was directed from abroad by the CIA, through
its agent Nino Díaz.
In 1963
RCA
----
the CIA gave instructions to the-
ror organizing and carrying out--
block
internal actions in order to give the
impression of the existence of a popular
civic resistence, and therefore, demanding -
an armed intervention in Cuba, at the
meeting of the Presidents of countries
members of the OAS.
The instructions were given by the CIA
through Guantánamo Naval Base. Since then,-
the RCA elaborated new plans for actions
and crimes, for supporting the armed inva--
tion which was expected in July.
--
On the occasion of the acts conmmemrating
the 13th of March, they plan-ed to assesinate
the Commander in Chief, from a house near
the University of Havana, shooting with
mortar in direction to the tribune. The
principal persons indicted were Samuel Car-
111
1
(15
NW 50953 Id: 32423434
16
ballo Moreno (agente de la CIA, Luis Da
vid Rodríguez González, Ricardo Olmedo-
Moreno, José A. López Rodríguez,
Lucio Morales Sosa y
otros.
Juan
Simultáneamente al atentado proyectaron
ataques a locales de los Comités de De-
fensa de la Revolución y Milicias Nacio
nales Revolucionarias.
ballo Moreno CIA agent), Luis David Rodrí
guez González, Ricardo Olmedo Moreno, José
A. López Rodríguez, Juan Lucio Morales
Sosa and others.
--
Simultaneously with this plot, attacks to
the Committees of Defense of the Revolu--
tion and the National Revolutionary Mili-
tias sites, were planned to be carried
out.
--
Page 144
762) Za
NW 50953"
Docid:32423434 Page 145
1
17
Ante el fracaso, la RCA elabora un
nuevo plan contra el Primer Ministro,
esta vez en el stadium Latinoamerica-
no el 7 de abril de 1963. En el mismo-
participarían 16 hombres armados de
pistolas y granadas de fragmentación.
-
· Entre los principales encartados se--
encontraban Enrique Rodríguez Valdés-
conocido por "Mulgado", Ricardo López-
Onorio Torres Perdomo y Jor-
Cabrera,
ge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.
Having failed, the RCA elaborated a new
plot against the Prime Minister, this time
at the Latin American Stadium on April 7th,
1963. Sixteen men armed with pistols and
fragmentation grenades would participate
in it.
-
Among the principal persons indicted were-
Enrique Rodríguez Valdés, known as "Mülgado"
Ricardo López Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdo
mo and Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.
76000070219
NWSSORS FA peld: 32423434
Page 146
(18)
Flaboraron otro plan, esta vez contra la
vida del Ministro de las Fuerzas Armadas
Comandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz,-
en la Plaza de la Revolución, con motivo
de la celebración del 26 de Julio. En el-
mismo tomarían parte cuatro grupos diri-
gidos por René Sigler Sánchez Evias, Je-
sús Montes de Oca Cruz, Oscar Sibila So-
ria y Eliecer Rodríguez Suárez. El jefe-
de estos grupos era Ibrahim Machin Her--
nández.
Todas estas acciones, organizadas y fomen
tadas por la CIA a través del bloque RCA,
fueron frustradas, detenidos sus encarta
dos y ocupadas gran cantidad de armas y-
equipos.
---
They elaborated another plot, this time
against the life of the Minister of the
Armed Forces, División Commander (Lieutenant
Colonel) Raúl Castro Ruz, at the Revolution
Square, during the celebration of the 26th-
of July. Four groups leaded by René Sigler-
Sánchez Evias, Jesús Montes de Oca Cruz, Os
car Sibila Soria and Eliecer Rodríguez Suá-
rez, would participate. The head of these
groups was Ibrahim Machin Hernández.
All these actions, organized and promoted
by the CIA through the RCA block, were
frustrated, the persons indicted were
arrested and a great number of weapons and-
equipment were taken from them.
NW 50955 DocId: 32423434
(19
:
76000070221
-
Fara el 26 de setiembre de 1963, aniversa-
rio de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolu
cion, los contrarrevolucionarios Orlando
Martiniano de la Cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel-
Cazañas León, Jesús Plácido Rodríguez Mcs--
quera, Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francis
co Vlanco de los Cuetos, Federico Hernández
vinculados al agente de-
González y otros,
la CIA Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, prepararon-
un plan de atentado contra nuestro Primer-
Ministro.
Istos elementos, agrupados en las organiza
ciones contrarrevolucionarias"Frente Inter
no de Unidad Revolucionaria"(FIUR),"Triple
A","Movimiento Democrático Revolucionario"
(MDR),"Ejército de Liberación Nacional"
(ELN), contaron con el asesoramiento y ase-
guramiento de la CIA.
--
--
El plan consistía en dinamitar las conduc-
toras del alcantarillado que pasa por deba
jo de la tribuna presidencial. Liquidado el
plan y detenidos los autores,
el agente
Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, ciudadano francés
residente en nuestro país, confesó que tra
bajaba para la CIA desde hacía dos años
aproximadamente, facilitándole informacio-
nes de diversa índole.
For September the 28th 1963, anniversary of
the Committees of Defense of the Revolu---
tion, the counterrevolutionary Orlando Mar
tiniano de la Cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel Ca
zañas León, Jesús Plácido Rodríguez Mosque
ra, Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francis-
co Vlanco de los Cuetos, Federico Hernán--
des González and others, related to the
CIA agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, prepared
a plot against our Prime Minister.
-
These individuals grouped into the "Frente
Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria" (FIUR),
"Triple A", "Movimiento Democrático Revolu
cionario" (MDR), "Ejército de Liberación Na
cional" (ELN) counterrevolutionary organiza
tions, had CIA advice and support.
--
›
The plan was to dynamite the sewage pipes -
which pass under the presidential tribune.
Once the plan frustrated and the authors
arrested, the agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure
French citizen living in our country,
confessed that he had been working for the-
CIA for aproximately two years, and that he
had given this Agency information of various
sorts.
----
Page 147
REX
العادة
2500
ད“སྐ
howt
ocId 32423434 Rage 118
-
En el mes de marzo de 1964. se gestó otro-
plan de atentado contra el Comandante en
Jefe. El principal encartado, Mario Salaba-
rría Aguiar, elemento gansteril, mantenía -
contactos con la CIA a través del agente
Bernardo Milanés López, Jefe de una
red, quien pasó la información del plan al
Centro CIA y gestionó desde España la ayu-
da de los apátridas Tony Varona y Juan
Bosch, amigos de Salabarría.
Bx.
El plan consistía en instalar una ametra--
lladora calibre 30 6 50 en un vehículo y
aguardar la posibilidad del paso del Coman
dante en Jefe, para atentar contra su vida.
La CIA entregó a Salabarría las armas y me
dios necesarios, incluyendo grandes sumas-
de dinero.
In March 1964, another plot against Commander-
in Chief was elaborated. The principal indicted
· Mario Salabarría Aguiar, a gangster, had con---
tacts with the CIA through the agent Dr. Ber--
nardo Milanés López head of a net, who informed
of the plan and sought, from
the CIA center
Spain, the support of Salabarría's friends, Tony
Varona and Juan Bosch.
-
-----
The plan consisted in installing a machine gun
caliber 30 or 50 in a vehicle and waiting for-
the occasion when the Commander in Chief
would pass by, in order to attempt against his
life. The CIA gave Salabarría the necessary
weapons and means, including great sums of
money.
--
&
0.
21
7600197
A mediados del año 1954, los contrarrevolu
cionarios Osvaldo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez,
conocido por "Mankeca", Reynaldo Figueroa-
Gálvez, Felipe Alonso Herrera y José Ma---
nuel Rodríguez Cruz, conocido por "Lolo",-
miembros de la organización "Movimiento de
Liberación Nacional", que formaba' parte
del bloque de organizaciones, RCA, dirigi--
das por la CIA, comienzan a preparar un
plan de atentado contra el Primer Ministro.
--
---
--
Estos individuos estaban vinculados a los -
agentes de la CIA, Alberto y Ramón Grau
Sierra, quienes formaban parte de la red
dirigida por Ramón y María Leopoldina Grau-
Alsina, que posteriormente-en junio de 1965
intentaron envenenar al Primer Ministro.
--
El plan consistía en el lanzamiento de gra-
nadas contra nuestro Primer Ministro en el-
Stadium Latinoamericano, por un grupo de
nueve hombres, quienes fueron detenidos, y-
ocupados los equipos bélicos.
In mid-1964, the counterrevolutionaries Os-
valdo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez, known as
"Mankeca", Reinaldo Figueroa Gálvez, Felipe-
Alonso Herrera and José Manuel Rodríguez
known as "Lolo" members of the "Movi-
miento de Liberación Nacional", which be---
longed to the RCA block of organizations,--
directed by the CIA, began to prepare a
plot against the Prime Minister.
Cruz,
These persons were related to the CIA agents
Alberto and Ramón Grau Sierra, who belonged
to the net headed by Ramón and María Leopol
dina Grau Alsina, who latter in June 1965
attempted to poison the Prime Minister.
The plan consisted on throwing grenades
against our Prime Minister at the Latin
American Stadium, by a group of nine men
who were arrested and whose warlike equip--
ment was taken from them.
d: 32423434
Page 149
d: 32423434
Page 150
22
-
En setiembre de ese mismo año (1964), un
grupo de contrarrevolucionarios de las cr
ganizaciones "Ejército de Liberación Na--
cional" (ELN) y "Frente Interno de Libera-
ción" (FIL), que cumplían misiones de ob--
tención de información para la CIA, comen
zaron a gestionar la unificación, cumplien
do también órdenes de dicha Agencia.
Enfrascados en estas labores de unidad, el
contrarrevolucionario Nemesio Cubillas Fé
rez, pone en conocimiento de Angel Miguel
Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola y
otros el plan de atentado que venían fra-
guando contra nuestro Primer Ministro en-
la Calle 11, en el Vedado, orientados por
la CIA.
A principios de 1965, los contrarrevolu--
cionarios Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermín-
González Carballo y Giraldo Reynaldo Die-
go Solano, miembros del "Ejército de Libe
ración Nacional (integrado al bloque de la
RCA, dirigida por la CIA) comienzan a ulti
mar detalles de un plan de atentados con-
tra el Comandante en Jefe en Santiago de-
las Vegas.
In september of this same year (1964), a group
of counterrevolutionaries from the "Ejército-
de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and"Frente In--
terno de Liberación" (FIL) organizations, who
were accomplishing instructions of obtaining
information for the CIA, began to seek uni--
fication, according, to the CIA's orders.
While accomplishing these tasks for archiev
ing unity, the counterrevolutionary Neme--
sio Cubillas Pérez, informed Angel Miguel -
Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola and
others about the plot they were elaborating
against our Primer Minister at 11 St., Veda-
do, according to the CIA instructions.
At the beginning of 1965, the counterrevo--
lutionaries Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermín
González Carballo and Giraldo Reynaldo Die-
go Solano, members of the "Ejército de Libe
ración Nacional (integrated into the RCA
block, directed by the CIA) began to
complete details of a plot against the
Commander in Chief in Santiago de las Vegas.
-----

d: 32423434 Page 151
MA:
23
Desisten de esta primera variante y pro--
yectan otro plan que sería perpetrado en-
el stadium Latinoamericano con hombres ar
mados de granadas de fragmentación, y
otro grupo, apostado en un edificio cerca
no, abriría fuego de ametralladoras con--
tra el público para crear el pánico y la-
confusión y garantizando así la retirada.
They gave up this first plan and devised
another plot, which would be committed
by armed men with fragmentation grenades
at the Latin American Stadium, and in a-
near building, there was another group--
which would open fire with machine guns-
against the people producing panic and
confusion and, thus, guaranteeing the
withdrawal.
-
--
痧
Id: 32423434
Page 152
24
-
In junio de este mismo año según se ha mon
cionado anteriormente- una red de agentes
de la CIA, dirigidos por Ramón y María Leo-
poldina Grau Alsina(conocida por "Folita")-
se dedicaba a todo tipo de actividades ene-
migas y otras de carácter antisocial para
lo cual se valían de contactos con sedes ca
pitalistas en el país, que servían de enla-
ce con la Agencia Central de Inteligencia.
-
Estos elementos formaban parte de las orga-
"Movimiento Anticomu-
nizaciones "Rescate",
nista Revolucionario" (MAR) y otras dirigi--
das y subversionadas por esa Agencia.
María Leopoldina Grau Alsina recibió ins---
trucciones de la CIA de fraguar un plan pa-
ra
envenenar al Primer Ministro Fidel Cas--
tro, para lo cual le enviaron un frasco de-
pastillas venenosas, que fueron entregadas-
a Alberto Cruz Caso, quien a su vez las en-
tregó a los miembros de la organización (MAR)
Jesús Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Cari-
dad Pérez Núñez, para que efectuaran el
atentado en el hotel Habana Libre.
-
----
As it has been said before, in June of this
same year, a net of CIA agents, headed by
Ramón and María Leopoldina Grau Alsina
(known as Polita) were devoted to all type-
of enemy activities, as well as others of
For this purpose, they -
antisocial nature.
made use of contacts with capitalist
representations in the country, which were-
used as liaisons with the Central Intelli--
gence Agency.
------
These individuals were part of the organiza
tions "Rescate","Movimiento Anticomunista Re
volucionario" (MAR) and other organizations
directed and sponsored by that Agency.
María Leopoldina Grau was given instructions
by the CIA to plot for poisoning Primer Mi--
nister Fidel Castro, thereby, she was sent a -
poisonous pill bottle, which was given to Al-
berto Cruz Caso, who, in turn, gave it to Jesús
Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Caridad Pérez
Núñez, members of the Organization (MAR),
that they would commit the attempted crime
at the Havana Libre Hotel.
SO -
25
Al fallar este intento, el contrarrevolucio
nario Tony Varona envió otro frasco con 500
cápsulas, a fin de tratar de realizar nueva
mente el hecho.
--
Asimismo, "Polita" recibió de la CIA para
iguales propósitos, varias armas con silen-
ciadores y proyectiles especiales para aten
tados personales, las que fueron ocupadas
en junio de 1965, al ser detenidos estos
elementos.
---
The counterrevolutionary Tony Varona sent
another bottle with 500 capsules when
this attempt failed, in order to try to
carry out the act again.
-
Likewise, "Polita" received from the CIA
some weapons with mufflers and special -
projectiles for personal assassinations, -
which were taken from them when arrested-
1965.
in June,
Id: 32423434
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7 6 2017
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76000070220
Page 154
☑Una vez más, en 1965, la Agencia Central de
* Inteligencia intentó reagrupar las disper--
sas organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, -
bajo la denominada "Unidad Resistencia
(UNARE).
--
--
En estas actividades, los elementos contra-
revolucionarios Enrique Abreu Vilahu, conoci
do por Henry, Carlos Vicente Sánchez Hernan
dez, Julio de las Nieves Ruiz Pitaluga y
otros, planean un atentado contra el Coman-
dante en Jefe, aprovechando su visita al
restaurant "Vita Nuova", en el Vedado. En es-
te lugar, Abreu Vilahu abriría fuego con --
una subametralladora Thompson contra el
Primer Ministro y postas del Ministerio del
Interior ubicadas frente al restaurant,
fin de crear confusión y evadirse.
---
a
-
Al detenérseles, en julio de ese propio año,
se les ocupó el material bélico para la rea
lización de sus propósitos.
.
----
--
Once more, in 1965, the Central Intelligence
Agency attempted to group the dispersed
counterrevolutionary organizations, under --
the named "Unidad Resistencia" (UNARE). In
these activities, the counterrevolutionaries
Enrique Abreu Vilahu, known as Henry, Carlos
Vicente Sánchez Hernández, Julio de las Nie-
ves Ruiz Pitaluga and others, plotted against
the Commander in Chief, taking advantage of-
his visit to Vita Nouva's restaurant, in the
Vedado. In this place, Abreu Vilahu would
open fire with a Thompson machine gun against
the Prime Minister and the guards of the
Ministry of the Interior building located
across the restaurant, in order to create
confusion and escape.
--
---
--
--
On being arrested on July of that same year,
warlike material they had for the fulfillment
of their purposes, was taken from them.
76800070222
También en 1966, fue detenido el ex-Comandan
te Rolando Cubela Secades, por ser el prin-
cipal encartado en un plan de atentado contra
el Primer Ministro. Dicho plan fue articula-
do por la CIA aprovhchando el viaje de Cube-
la a Madrid, lugar donde fue reclutado por
los agentes de la CIA, Manuel Artime, Jorge -
Robreñic conocido por el "Mago", luis Enrique
Trasancos y Carlos Tepedino.
-
Igualmente intervinieron en los planes del
atentado, los traidores José Luis González
Gallarreta, funcionario de la embajada de Cu
ba en Madrid y Alberto Blanco conocido por
"El Loco".
-
En la entrevista de Cubela con Manuel Artime-
éste último le garantizó la entrega de embar
caciones piratas, armas y hombres para una
invasión que sería el complemento, en menos-
de 72 horas, de un atentado contra el Primer
Ministro.
A tal efecto, antes de regresar Cubela a Cu-
ba, recibió de José Luis González Gallarreta
un fusil con mirilla telescópica y silenciador
que le fue ocupado al ser detenido, conjunta
mente con gran cantidad de armas y equipos
que la CIA le había hecho llegar. También
fueron detenidos Alberto Blanco Romariz y Jo
--
---
Being the principal indicted in a plan to -
kill the Prime Minister, the former Commander
Rolando Cubela Secades was also arrested in-
1965. That plan was prepared by the CIA,
takin advantage Cubela's trip to Madrid,
where he was recrutide by the CIA agents Ma-
nuel Artime, Jorge Robreño known as "The
Magician" (El Mago), Luis Enrique Trasancos
and Carlos Tepedino.
----
Others that also partipated in the plot,
were the traitors. José Luis Gonzalez Gallarre
ta official at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and
Alberto Blanco known as "The Crazy" (El Loco).
In the interview of Cubela with Manuel Arti--
me, the later garanteed the delibery of pira-
te crafts, weapons and men for an invasion
wich would support the plan for the assassina
tion of the Prime Minister in les that 72
hours.
---
For that purpose, before Cubela came back to-
Cuba, he receiver from José Luis González ---
Gallarreta a rifle with telescopic peephole
and muffler, wich was taken from him when
arrested, together with a great number of
weapons and equipment that the CIA had sent
to him. Alberto Blanco Pomariz and José Jia-
---
--
27
Id: 32423434
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28,
760000799 39
_
bre
Dirigidos por la CIA, las organizaciones
y "Movimiento 30 de Noviem--
"Comando L"
con representación en territorio -
norteamericano, se dan a la tarea de pre-
parar dos embarcaciones artilladas para-
infiltrarse en nuestro país y realizar
actividades subversivas, a mediados de
1965.
--
Desisten de la infiltración y deciden ti
rotear la zona de becados de Miramar y
el hotel Riviera, dirigiendo sus ataques-
fundamentalmente contra la residencia
del Presidente de la República. Después ·
de esta acción regresan a Estados Unidos.
-
En mayo de 1966, estos elementos se in--
filtraron por la zona de Monte. Barreto,-
en la capital, con`la misión de realizar
un atentado al Primer Ministro. En la ac-
ción resultaron muertos Armando Romero
Martínez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García,
y detenidos: Antonio Cuesta Valle, cabe--
cilla principal de los" Comandos L",y Eu-
genio Enrique Zaldívar Cárdenas, a quienes
se les ocupó gran cantidad de equipos y-
material bélico.
Estos elementos recibieron entrenamiento
de la CIA en Puerto Rico y algunos de
-
The "Comandos L" and the "Movimiento 30 de
Noviembre", with representation in the U.S.
territory, directed by the CIA, undertook
the task of making ready two crafts equip-
ped with guns to be infitrated, and
subversive activities in our
committ
country, about the mid-1965.
-----
They gave up the infiltration and decided
to shoot at the scholarship zone in Miramar
and at the Riviera Hotel, mainly in direction
to the residence of the President of the
Republic. After this action they returned
to the United States.
In May, 1966, these men were infiltrated by
the Monte Barreto zone, in the capital, with
the mission of assassinating the Primer
Minister. In the action, Armando Romero Mar
tinez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García were
killed, and Antonio Cuesta Valle, principal
head of the "Comandos L", and Eugenio Enri
que Zaldívar Cárdenas, were arrested and
a great number of equipment and warlike ma
terial was taken from them.
-
These men were trainned by the CIA in Puer-
to Rico, and some of them were the authors-
PERHEESTA Id: 32423434
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--
Id: 32423434
ellos fueron los autores del cañoneo
al buque mercante "San Pascual",
fon
deado en el Puerto de Caibarién, Las
Villas.
'
Page 157
29
of the bombardment to the "San Pascual"
merchant vessel anchored at the Caibarién
in Las Villas Province.
Port,
7600007023|
Id: 32423434
30
760301712
El 17 de marzo de 1967, resultaron deteni-
dos Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez
Díaz y Gustavo Areces Alvarez, al tratar de
infiltrarse por la zona de Cayo Fragoso, -
procedentes de Estados Unidos.
El objetivo principal que traían era reali
car un atentado contra nuestro Primer Mi--
nistro y desatar una actividad sistemática
de sabotajes con explosivos plásticos, todo
ello complementado con ataques piratas, pa-
ra dar la imagen en el exterior de activi-
dades subversivas de grupos en distintas
zonas y crear una situación que permitiera
a las organizaciones contrarrevoluciona---
rias radicadas en Estados Unidos, recabar
ayuda oficial.
-
Para llevar a cabo sus actividades en te--
rritorio cubano, los mismos fueron entrena
dos por la CIA, a través de las organiza--
ciones "M-30-11", "RECE","Los Pinos Nuevos",
"Comandos L", "Alpha-66" y otras.
Para esta misión se les facilitó todo el
material bélico necesario.
Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez Díaz
and Gustavo Areces Alvarez were arrested on
March 17th, while they tried to infiltrate-
by the Cayo Fragoso zone, coming from the
United States.
-
---
The main objective they should carry out-
was to assassinate our Prime Minister and
launch a sistematic activity of sabotage
with plastic explosives, all that supported
with pirate attacks, in order to give abroad
an image of the existence of subversive
activities in different areas and, thus, to
create a situation which would permit the
counterrrevolutionary organizations located
in the United States to succeed in getting-
official support.
In order to carry out their activities in
Cuban territory, they were trained by the
CIA through the "M-30-11","RECE","Los Pinos
Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" and others
organizations. For this mission they were -
given all the neccessary warlike material.
Page 158
Id: 32423434
31
76000070 233
te
-
En 1971, con motivo del viaje del Comandan-
en Jefe a Chile, se fragua un atentado
en ese país, para el cual se unen la CIA, .
fascista chilenos y contrarrevolucionarios-
cubanos de la organización "Alpha-66".
El principal encartado en este plan era Je-
sús Domínguez Benítez, conocido por " El
Isleño", para quien(a través de contrarrevo
lucionarios cubanos radicados en Venezuela)
se obtuvo documentación falsa que lo acredi
taba como periodista venezolano, lo que le-
permitió cubrir la visita de nuestro Primer
Ministro en dicho país.
El plan se ejecutaría mediante una pistola-
adaptada a una cámara de televisión, pero
desistieron efectuarlo por considerar que
no existían garantías para la conservación-
de sus vidas.
,
Domínguez Benítez, perteneció a la organiza
ción terrorista "Poder Cubano". fue acusado
por las autoridades norteamericanas de pro-
mover acciones terroristas en Estados Uni--
dos y otros países como miembro de dicha or
ganización, y arrestado por el FBI en 1968.
On 1971, due to Commander in Chief's trip to
Chile, a plot was elaborated in that country
for which the CIA, the Chilean fascists and-
Cubans counterrevolutionaries from "Alpha_66")
organization came together.
The major indicted in this plan was Jesús Do
mínguez Benítez, known as "The Islander".
Through Cuban counterrevolutionaries settled
down at Venezuela, he obtained false documents
which identified him as a Venezuelan newspaper
which permitted him to report our Prime-
Minister's visit in that country.
man,
---
The plan would be carried out using a gun
camouflaged into a television camera, but
they gave this up on considering there were
no guarantees for the preservation of their
lives.
Domínguez Benítez, belonged to the "Poder Cu
bano" terrorist organization. He was accused
by the American authorities of promoting
terrorist actions inside the United States
and other countries, as a member of that or-
ganization, and was arrested by the FBI in
1968!
-
Page 159
cId: 32423434
32
Sin embargo, en 1970 participa en el frustra-
do intento de infiltración del "Alpha-66" por
Oriente, refugiándose en la Base Naval, donde -
nuevamente se le arrestó, esta vez, por in---
fringir las condiciones de una fianza sobre
una condena de 18 meses por la causa anterior
mente mencionada.
-
No obstante, queda en libertad y sale sin difi
cultades de Estados Unidos a Sudamérica para-
participar en el atentado. Posteriormente re-
gresa a Estados Unidos.
However, in 1970 he participated in the
"Alpha-66" unsuccessful attempt of infiltra
tion through Criente Province, and sought
refuge at the Naval Base, where he was
arrested again, this time because he violated
the conditions of a bond over an 18 months-
condemn due to the trial just mentioned
before.
Nevertheless, he is set free and leaves
United States without any difficulty, and -
moves to South America in order to partici-
pate in the plot. Afterwards, he returns to
the United States.
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7602a ay

cId: 32423434
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33
(w)
Consideramos que el análisis de las infor
maciones que aportamos, las públicamente-
conocidas y las que las autoridades nor--
teamericanas poseen y no han sido publica
das, permiten afirmar que la eliminación-
física de dirigentes de la Revolución Cu-
bana, principalmente del Primer Ministro-
Fidel Castro Ruz, ha constituído una polí
tica reiterada de los Estados Unidos a
través de sus agencias subversivas, utili-
zando para ello a contrarrevolucionarios-
cubanos, ciudadanos norteamericanos y to-
do tipo de elemento corrompido, tanto in--
terna como externamente, sin tomar en con
sideración las víctimas que ocasionarían-
estas acciones.
--
Con este objetivo han sido facilitadas en
grandes cantidades, armas, explosivos, me--
dios técnicos, de transporte y comunica--
ción a los participantes, para la realiza
ción de sus planes.
· Estos son algunos hechos connotados y com
probados de las numerosas actividades sub-
versivas que ha realizado la CIA destina-
das a la eliminación física de los diri--
gentes, del Gobierno Reviolucionario de
to
---
We consider that the analysis of the informa
tions we offer, the publicly known, and the-
ones that the American authorities possess -)
and have not been published, allow us
affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban
Revolutionary leaders, specially the Prime
Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterat
ed policy of the United States through its
subversive agencies, making use of Cuban
counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizen and all-
kind of corrupted individuals, inside the
country as well as abroad, without taking
into consideration the victims that would
result from these actions.
--
---
---
---
With this purpose, they have provided the
participants with a great number of weapons, -
explosives, technical means of transportation
and communication for the accomplishment of
their plans.
-
---
These are some of the coonoted and proved
facts of the numerous subversive activities
that the CIA has carried out aimed to the
assassination of the leaders of the Revolutio
nary Government of Cuba.