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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
Spec ip
File
26 March 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Notes on Special Group Meeting, 26 March 1963
"
98
1. [Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Comparative result of high-
level versus low-level photography were demonstrated by Mr. Lundahl.
After considerable discussion, it was decided that the matter would be
held in abeyance for a week pending further developments on the Donovan
matter. In general, Gilpatric's attitude was against low-level on the basis
of Defense intelligence needs, but would agree if State felt periodic low-
levels would establish "right of access". Johnson expressed general
objection at this time. McCone expressed two prevailing viewpoints within
CIA, but recommended proceeding with low-level. Bundy agreed to put
the matter to higher authority for final decision. McCone suggested he
was willing to accept responsibility for further delay.
2.
Action: Matter to be reconsidered each week. ]
98
[ Reconnaissance of Indonesia. State, Defense, and Bundy all
opposed overflying Indonesia. McCone recommended we support the
British effort and it was agreed that the matter would be put to higher
authority for decision. 7
3.
98
(Monthly Report of NRO was reviewed.
9.
McCone reported in detail
on the failure of recent CORONA shots; specifically referred to failures
of January, February, and March, and the fact that November and
December were not usually productive of good photography. He advised
Special Group that new estimates of Soviet capability could not be made
until the Fall, rather than in June and July as is customary. He advised
that the next flight was scheduled for Saturday, 30th of March, and it
will be a standard CORONA. Gilpatric reported that adequate emergency
back-up arrangements were being made, and delays of a type occurring
in the last 90 days would not be recurring.
McCone reported the difficulties incurred with the U-2 generators
and brushes and the fact that this had caused a standdown of flights in the
Far East, but not in Cuba. Condition was reported as having been cor-
rected and the North Korean, North China flight is on a weather alert.
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4. The two papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
on sabotage operations and additional covert programs were
returned for consideration by the Cuban Affairs Committee. It
was noted that the Cottrell Committee had not acted on these papers.
The procedure adopted was for Cottrell Committee action and
recommendations in much the same way that we now get Ambassador
endorsement of covert activities elsewhere. There was a general
concensus that actions against Cuba shipping would not be final
although it would be an irritant, since plan called for damaging and
making ships inoperative rather than destroying them. Several
details of the additional Covert Action Program were discussed.
The paper is to be revised and reviewed by the Cottrell Group.
98
5. Col. Steakley reported on the results of several recent
Elint missions, and Elint destroyer operations in the Far East and
Elint operation into the Baltic. Dr. Scoville reported on the
Chasse operation.]
98
6. Question was raised as to the results from overflights over
Laos.
Action: I would like a thorough briefing on this as I have
heard nothing on this . ]
98
7. It was reported that SAC seriously questioned CIA's con-
clusion that the SA-3 sites in Russia are low-level intercept
ground-to-air missile sites. Apparently SAC has prepared a report
on this. Gilpatric noted the March 18th CIA memorandum reaffirming
our conclusions.
Action: DD/I must pursue this matter and explore with
SAC their reasons for questioning our conclusions. This
is the second time in weeks that these conclusions have been
questioned. Ad vise me.]
JAM/ji
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26 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) meeting, 25 April 1963
1.
comment.
Attended by Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone
CIA weekly report on our activities was reviewed without
No requests were made. No actions are needed.
98
2. [Extensive discussions of DCI's recommendations for low-
level reconnaissance of Cuba. Gilpatric raised the question of political
consequences. Johnson responded that Mr. Hughes had submitted a
paper to him indicating the Soviets would take a harder line under these
provocations. He reported that Thompson appeared to feel that low-
levels would be used as a basis to halt withdrawal and possibly intensify
the situation in Laos and elsewhere and that our interests would be
adversely affected. I took the position that intelligence requirements
were such that low-levels must be continued. It was agreed to go to
higher authority with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
present. Arrangements were made for a meeting about 6:30, 25 April.]
3. Mr. FitzGerald presented the proposed new covert policy
toward Cuba, reviewing the situation and specific operations in con-
siderable detail. The Group were impressed with the planning. They
were not prepared to act, and suggested the matter be discussed with
higher authority, and also that action be withheld until the Standing
Group had further deliberated on the question.
98
4. _ Covert action in the Congo was discussed.
reported briefly. The CIA proposal was approved.]
5.
98
Bronson Tweedy
The proposed feint operations of GROSBEAK were discussed
in some detail. Colonel Steakley suggested this operation might prejudice
their ELINT operations. However, it was agreed that the exercise would
be undertaken during the May dark-of-the-moon period and the results
reported back to the Special Group prior to reaching a decision for reaching
approval of continuing operations. Jorgenson was instructed accordingly.
ACTION: CIA is authorized to undertake this operation;
it should be watched carefully, reported accurately and
fully, and brought before the Special Group at the time
we're considering the June operations.]
:
!
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98
6. The
The 
status report on the Italian elections was briefly
discussed. Approval was expressed on the manner in which this
had been handled. Apparently, the political observers on Mr.
Bundy's staff views coincided with those reported by the Rome"
Station.
98.
7.
May 1 meeting on British Guiana. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Johnson
expressed the view that it was important that the strike be continued.
They were concerned that it might be settled prior to May 30 and
CIA was instructed to look into this and jointly with MI6 take such
action as might be indicated as desirable to ensure the continuation
of the strike. Mr. Bundy expressed the view that the $10,000 a day
figure in the CIA paper would be cheap if a continuation of the strike
for a protracted period would ensure the fall of Jagan and the destruc-
tion of his political support.
✓ McCone reported on the proposed plan for the April 30-
ACTION; McCone should discuss with Helms and,
if desirable, to arrange for a discussion with Fulton
by Cline or by McCone in Paris over this coming
weekend.
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Spec. Grp file
11 April 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting, 11 April 1963
1.
98
Reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam was reviewed.
The Group expressed approval of the CIA program. They authorized two
flights over Laos and North Vietnam on the assumption that one of the
NEFA flights would cover the extreme western targets desired by Sarit.
If, on the other hand, the four India Communist China border flights
were not executed at this time, then CIA was authorized to fly three
flights over Laos and North Vietnam to cover all of the targets desired
by both Sarit and COMOR.]
-
98
2. [Status of negotiations for India Communist China recon-
-
naissance was reported. It was agreed that this question should be
pursued further by CIA. No immediate action was indicated. Dr. Scoville
reported that no further information would be forthcoming from either
India or Thailand until about the 20th of April.]
3. Cuban operations. The proposed infiltration-exfiltration
operations, past and projected, were reviewed and approved. The
proposed program of sabotage and harrassment, both the general
program and the detailed plan, was discussed at length. It was reported
by Mr. Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the
direction of higher authority. It was not the intention of higher authority
to approve and authorize specific actions; what he was seeking was de-
tailed information concerning our capability and what might be expected
on a series of operations which were within our capability. I took the
position, which was supported by Alexis Johnson (somewhat less vocally,
however) that I questioned the advisability of proceeding with the program
until we had crystallized the total policy designed to remove the Soviets
from Cuba and also remove Castro. I said I was not clear as to how this
was to be accomplished, nor did I feel that there was any agreed series
of actions designed to meet this end objective. Therefore, it appeared
to me that we are projecting a few of the annoying operations, none of
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;
which would permanently impair the facilities under attack nor would
they seriously impair Castro's economic or military posture and, hence,
serve no useful purpose. Furthermore, I estimated that under the laws
of averages, a number of the teams would be rolled up and they would
as they had in the past attribute the whole thing to the U.S. Government
and the CIA. Since we had stood down the ALPHA 66 and others, more or
less disenfranchised ourselves from the Cuban colony in Miami as a result
of the Miro Cardona incident, we would have no plausible denial and in fact
would find ourselves in a rather difficult position. It was agreed this matter
should be further studied and reported on next Thursday, and possibly
discussed with higher authority on Friday. An important part of this
issue is the SNIE now under preparation which has to do with the future
of Castro.
4.
5.
ACTION: I should discuss this subject with
General Carter and some of the
Senior Staff on Friday morning to
prepare an agreed CIA position
and also to schedule the completion
of the SNIE.
North Vietnam monthly report was accepted.
98
[The funds for Kong Le were approved. However, Alexis
Johnson was asked to go back to Ambassador Unger with an insistent
message that Phoumi support Kong Le with money now in which came
from the United States. However, if this appeal failed, the support
recommended in the paper should be given for a limited period of time.]
98
6. The covert annex to the Bolivian internal defense plan was
remanded because the Special Group (CI) had remanded the basic internal
defense plan. However, there was no objection expressed to the annex
but it must not be construed that the Special Group approved any subjects
covered in the annex.]
7.
[The Colombian internal defense plan was not considered.
98
98
8. [Colonel Steakley submitted a report on inadvertent over-
flights by reconnaissance since 1 January 1961. This report was noted.
DCI raised the question as to why he had not been informed. Apparently
this was an oversight as written procedures had been established by
Colonel Steakley for prompt informing of all members of Special Group
when instances of this type occurred. Apparently, Alexis Johnson was]
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98
[informed by Colonel Steakley's office and he was under the impression
that I was informed. However, he was on leave and therefore did not
know that I had not been informed.
98
9. British Guiana situation was opened up for discussion and
placed on the agenda for next week. Alexis Johnson reported on
Mr. Burdette's position, substantially parallelling Helms', with the
effect that he was disappointed in the British position, that he felt time
had run in favor of Jagan, and they would like an appeal made to
Macmillan. Bundy took exception. McCone stated that CIA felt much
as Johnson reported and furthermore objected to the British plan to
involve CIA in its own political actions which would be attributable
both whether they succeeded or failed. It was agreed to place subject
on agenda for next week. 7
ACTION: Subject should be carefully reviewed by staff.
JAM:bd
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SEGRETES ONLY
CALY
24 May 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Special Group 5412 Meeting - 23 May 1963
98
[After
1. After general discussion the North Viet Nam paper as presented
by Colby was approved with the exception of Item b. State took the position
that work with isolated ethnic groups in North Viet Nam should not be
undertaken unless specifically approved by the Department. Defense raised
the question of more extensive operations than anticipated by CIA and
indicated that the JCS had developed a plan which would be submitted to
the Secretary of Defense and then to the Special Group. I raised the
question as to whether the General Harkins command working with the
South Viet Nam army could conduct truly covert operations north of the
17th parallel, pointing out that if such actions were attributed to either
the United States or the South Viet Namese, then the North Viet Namese
with their substantial military organizations could retaliate against the
South Viet Nam with punishing consequences. The JCS plan was not
formally presented. No actions were taken withexx although it is expected
that it will be presented in the near future.
ACTION: General Carter has had this matter under
consideration with Admiral Riley. We
should receive and study the JCS plan
immediately upon its approval. ☐
2. Defense indicated that the Army have developed plans for large-
scale operations against Cuba involving sabotage. No presentation was made
however the Special Group was advised that such a plan would be forthcoming.
98
3. [Plan for disposing of the 14,000 sacks of sugar in Puerto Rico was
discussed. I explained the actions being taken by DDP under FitzGerald's
direction and indicated the sugar would probably be sold by the Soviets to a
New York sugar broker who would in turn sell it to a non-U.S. port. The
800 bags in question would be disposed of.
of 
.]
98
4. I reported the current status of British Guiana as outlined in the
attached paper.
ACTION: Mr. Bundy asked that Mr. Helms follow
British Guiana closely and keep in close
communication with me and with him.]
:
ER-63-331-£6
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ECRET-EVES CALY
98
5. The probable position of the Nenni Socialists at their July
Congress was discussed.
ACTION: CIA was requested to explore the possibility
of political action at this time designed to
influence a favorable decision by the Congress
concerning the Party's support of NATO and
the West as contrasted with the taking of a
neutral position. As an alternate possibility,
it was suggested that the Party might be
influenced to refrain from making support
of NATO an issue on which the Government
might be brought down. Such a course would
make it possible for the Christian Democratic
Party to conduct its support of NATO even
though the CD are closely associated with the
Nenni Socialists.
stated that NSAM
McCone stated that Mr. Karamessines
would report on this matter at the earliest
possible time.]
98
6. After a brief discussion on conditions in Haiti, Mr. Bundy
would be issued and would impose on CIA
certain responsibilities for covert action among exile groups.
7. After
ACTION: CIA should immediately study the prospect of
creating an exile group around dependable
leadership, prepare a plan, estimate of cost,
and a forecast of success of intervention in
Haiti and make specific recommendations on
course of action if one is indicated. Care should
be taken not to initiate action until policy has
been agreed upon at appropriate levels of
Government and of higher authority. Under no
circumstances should a course of action by
tied to a particular date or be otherwise 7
inflexible.
98
After a brief discussion of the overflight problem in India, Special
Group urged that CIA seek an appointment with Amb. Bowles prior to his
departure in order to acquaint him with the background of this program, the
history of the attitude of the Indians, the current status and other dimensions
of the problem so that he will be fully informed upon his arrival in New Delhi
and will not necessarily be prejudiced by the views of Amb. Gailbraith.
th
.]
JAM/mfb
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SECRETERES ONLY
27 June 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting 27 June 1963
98
1. In connection with the scheduled monthly overflights,
Johnson brought up the question of overflights on Laos and North
Viet Nam, stating that he understood the COMOR requirements for
Laos had been completely filled and nothing was left over, but there
was a requirement for one flight on North Viet Nam. McCone answered
he was not sure but would check up. It was agreed that any unfilled
requirements on Laos would be taken care of.
of 
.]
98
2. [Reference use of ChiNats in North Viet Nam, this is O.K.,
providing the use is part of a South China mission which then passes
over North Viet Nam, because weather conditions permit, and then
exits. State would not agree to a straight North VietNam-La os
flight flown by ChiNat pilots because of the political implications if
anything happened.]
98
3. The program for Labor Training in Spain was O.K.]
4. The Cuban program was reviewed by Mr. FitzGerald and
was approved. McCone brought up the question of extensive coastal
defenses being built up by the Cubans as evidenced by the arrival of
new PT boats and advised the Group that we must plan contingent
methods for evading such coastal defenses. Also McCone stated
that he had asked for a review of all reports for the last 90 days
because of his continuing concern over the large number of
unexplained reports we are getting on Cuba which indicates some
ominous situation might be developing.
JAM/mfb
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=
=
DCI
(CLASSIFICATION}
Handle Via Indicated Controls
99
[BYEMAN]
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the mean.
ing of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmis-
sion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in cny
manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign govern-
ment to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoc-
trinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be
maintained in occordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.
This document contains information referring to Projects:
(CLASSIFICATION)
mc
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group (5412) - 8 August 1963
Present were: McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson,
General Carter and Paul Eckel
98
1. Reconnaissance Requirements for Current Contingency in
the Far East
The requirements for overflights were approved subject
to the following:
available.
For the Sino-Indian border when a base becomes
Bundy wanted to know if we were ready for a high-level
approach to Nehru. I asked him to hold off until we had taken a better
reading and our team had returned. As to the Mainland of China,
to include Manchuria, Bundy did not want to go near the Soviet border
and felt that 10 or 15 miles was entirely too close. He had no objec-
tion to anywhere over the Mainland of China providing we kept well
clear of the Soviet border. I told him that if we did this we would
not be meeting the requirement to keep track of anything occurring on
the Sino-Soviet conflict along the border and the general consensus
was that we could do without this type of reconnaissance rather than
run the risk of an incident. The Group established a "bank of two"
missions for operations against Laos, north of the 17th parallel, and
against North Vietnam. There appeared to be no problem about
replenishing the bank when it was drawn down. The mission against
Laos south of the 17th parallel was approved. The mission for cover-
ing North Korea was approved as a high priority requirement subject
only to the return of Secretary Rusk.]
2. Cuban Operations of August
Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Special Group along the lines
of his briefing notes (SAS 63-481 of 7 August). Everything was
approved except that State had an opportunity to reclama the sabotage
operations if they felt the need--Johnson said he would know definitely
by Sunday (presumably thinking that Rusk may have had some private
conversations with Khrushchev that could indicate the need for soft
pedaling actions in Cuba).
23
[BYE-44284-63
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3. [The
98
The covert action project for Bolivia was approved.
980.
4. Matt Baird put on a fine briefing on CIA counterinsurgency
training. Bundy indicated he would reassure the Attorney General
and I do not think we will have any further problem as to outside
inspections or overseeing of our training program. ]
5. There was no discussion of the minutes or next week's
agenda.
98
6. I reported on the high-level coverage of Cuba in accordance
with the Reber memorandum, and I also gave them a briefing of our
U-2 carrier operations to include the pornographic pictures. _
M. S. C.
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SECRET
19 JUL 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Meeting of the Special Group 18 July 1963
PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. John A. McCone
Mr. Roswell Gilpatric
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Thomas A. Parrott
Mr. Desmond FitzGerald
ith
1.
The undersigned was present at this meeting
only for the brief item on Cuba which involved the
final decision whether or not to postpone the two
external sabotage operations planned for 26 July.
Mr. Bundy referred to the fact that the Agency repre-
sentatives had previously stated that they would
prefer, in terms of the morale of the case officers and
agents, to have a decision to postpone made at the
earliest possible moment rather than to have such a
decision reached at the last minute. Mr. Bundy stated
that in light of this he felt it reasonably certain
that Higher Authority would consider that negotiations
in Moscow were proceeding in a sufficiently favorable
manner to warrant a postponement decision at this time.
Mr. Bundy said that if the undersigned did not hear
from him during the course of the day Higher Authority's
decision to postpone could be assumed. Mr. Bundy
further said that it was only fair to warn that there
might be a resumption of Moscow negotiations at a later
date perhaps August and that these resumed nego-
tiations might in turn call for postponements. (Mr. Bundy
did not call and the operations have been postponed until
approximately the 15th of August.)
--
--
Exclud
GRO
1
automatic
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2. On the morning of the 19th of July the under-
signed called Mr. Bundy and confirmed this fact and
said that a field message now indicated the possibility
of an internal sabotage operation to take place on the
26th. Mr. Bundy said that such an operation would be
perfectly acceptable and that the only bar was on
"across water" operations. Mr. Bundy also added that
Higher Authority asked him to convey to us the fact that
Higher Authority, in reaching the decision to postpone,
was well aware of the morale problem that might result
among the Agency case officers and therefore had con-
siderable difficulty in reaching the decision. Mr. Bundy
authorized the undersigned to quote Higher Authority
accordingly to any staff personnel concerned and to add
that Higher Authority retains his enthusiasm and interest
in the program.
Desmond FitzGeral
Chief, Special Affairs Staff
SECRET
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SECRET
30 AUG 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Meeting of the Special Group 29 August 1963
SUBJECT:
PRESENT:
General Marshall Carter
Mr. Roswell Gilpatric
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Thomas A. Parrott
Mr. Bruce B. Cheever
1. Mr. Johnson opened the discussion of the paper
"Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups" (i.e., Support
to Commandos L) by commenting that he was under the
impression that Mr. McCone had indicated at the last
Special Group Meeting that he would look into the
proposal further and that Mr. Johnson wondered what his
views now were.
2. Mr. Cheever was not able to express Mr. McCone's
personal views on this matter, but pointed out in general
terms the reasons why we considered the proposal desirable
as a supplement to the already approved program. Further
discussion centered on the question of the use of
British territory and the possibility of attribution of
the raids to the United States. No mention whatsoever
was made regarding the question of attacking Cuban ships.
After an inconclusive discussion, Mr. Johnson reiterated
his desire to hear Mr. McCone's personal views on the
proposal. Mr. McBundy concurred and the question remains
open until the next Special Group Meeting.
3. Mr. Cheever has the distinct impression that
State continues to be completely opposed to this proposal
and hopes Mr. McCone will "shoot it down" for them,
whereas it is believed that Defense will concur but will
not "front-run" the proposal.
minded on the matter.
Mr. Bundy appears open-
Docu
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4. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the operation
to remove and destroy the "Streatham Hill" contaminated
sugar. The briefing covered the chronological details
from initiation of negotiations for purchase until
completion of the dumping of the sugar at sea. Identities
of the various brokers, cover companies, etc. were not
asked for nor revealed. The Group expressed its
satisfaction with the operation. (Mr. Parrott had
previously advised Mr. Cheever that Mr. Bundy did not
desire a paper on this matter.)
"
5. The after-action report on the Casilda/Santa
Lucia operations was briefly discussed. Mr. Johnson
questioned the motives for the amount of material
abandoned on the scene. Mr. Cheever commented that
while it was unfortunate that the material had been
left, it was explainable in terms of the reaction of
soldiers under fire and especially those in their first
fire fight. The Guatemala press release on "Commando
Mambises" was favorably commented on by Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Bundy asked about the comment in the after-action
report that "One cannot predict what Castro's ultimate
reaction or reprisal will be. Mr. Cheever stated some
of the people who closely study Castro believed that he
would be personally furious over the attacks and that
one could expect more reaction than had appeared to date.
In response to Mr. Bundy's question whether there would
be additional operations of this type next month,
Mr. Cheever advised that several were in the planning
stage, but that until he talked to our people coming up
from Miami this weekend, he could not be certain but
that he doubted we would ask to mount any the next
moon period. Mr. Cheever mentioned the cancellation
of the scheduled South Coast Caching operation due to
the Cuban alert, the execution of the three members of
the DOGGO team, and the probable doubling of the ATHENA
team. Mr. Bundy asked if the Attorney General had been
briefed on Casilda/Santa Lucia. When advised to the
contrary, he asked that this be done when the Attorney
General returns to Washington next week (week of
3 September).
B
Амии
BRUCE B. CHEEVER
Acting Chief
Special Affairs Staff
SECRET
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 23, 1963
WE
SECRET EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP
SUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba
Security Within
the Government
As you know, in August the U. S. Government directed two
"exile" raids against targets in Cuba. From the evidence now
available, it appears that our security, with respect to U. S.
participation in these operations, was excellent.
While there will always be public speculation as to the extent
of U. S. involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all
agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation,
and no direct knowledge. Unfortunately, the maintenance of a
high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the
numbers of people within the Government who have to know a
little or much about a U.S. -directed raid against Cuba.
For example, without counting CIA personnel and secretarial
and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over
20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August
raids while many other people were generally acquainted with
the U. S. involvement. Among others, the Navy knew where the
attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS
knew about the "comings and goings" of the raiders; a few DOD
people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids,
could presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere;
and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told,
for their background, that the U. S. Government was aware of
the raids.
--
I think there are two important, if obvious, security lessons
we have learned from the August raids one, that it is in the
nature of the problem that many people probably have to know
something about such raids; and two, that these people apparently
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September 23, 1963
can maintain adequate security.
At the same time, in view
of the truth that security leaks are more likely to occur when
substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems
essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance
of security to others who are privy to information about our
covert activities against Cuba. May I ask that members of
the Special Group take such steps within their areas of
authority as they think appropriate, and may I in particular
urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent
for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security
to all those with whom it has necessary business on these
matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security
set in these recent operations.
Mafuy
ian (
McGeorge Bundy
SECRET
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