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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME:
CASE OF YURTY IVANOVICH
NOSENKO (835 PATE STUDY)
• VOL. II
PAGES FEE
603-835
BART VH, VILL, TX)
INCLUSIVE DATES:
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:
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ROOM:
DELETIONS, IF ANY:
CNETING OPERATIONAL MATERIAL
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RECEIVED
MAY 1978
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REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
1.
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603.
WURATED FOR HOLEASE 1999
STOLCAL REVIEW PROGRAM
VII. SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF HOSEIKO
A.
Opinions on Intelligence and Personality
1.
Graphological Analysis
Three pages of penciled notes and jottings in Russian made
by NOSENKO 
during an 
early debriefing session were submitted on
25 March 1964 to CIA handwriting 
analysts, together with a number
cf questions posed by the CIA 
officers handling NOSENKO.
graphologists 
were told only that the writer was a Russian male
The
aged 36, that he had a 
university-level education, and that he was
an intelligence officer by 
profession.
qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting
Their report, which was
specimens submitted to them, 
is quoted below.
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C
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(
605.
2. Reports by Psychologist
8.
Psychological Testing Results
A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a
series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's
report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers
of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.
.
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606.
"Emotional Balance and General Stability: NOSENKO appears to
"Social Relations and Inter-Personal Effectiveness:
NOSENKO
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607.
"Relations and Loyalty to His Parents: It is apparent
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FOR GLUMET C
608.
“Ideological Makeup and Loyalty to His Country: To a
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609.
"Psychopathic Personality Structure: Many volumes have been
Alternative Psychological Explanations
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611.
جی
C.
Psychological Interrogation:
For fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA
psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history,
from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGB.
The main purposes were to collect additional information on this
period, * to gain further psychological insights into NOSENKO's
personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful
account. Although conducted under the physical conditions of
interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and followed no rigid
outline. There were relatively few changes of story from pre-
vious versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in
detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be
untrue. An extract from the psychologist's report of these
interrogations is given below.
0 A comparison of information obtained during this series of
interrogations with information given earlier and later by
-NOSENKO-can-be_found_in_Part IV.

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6.
612.
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613.
3. Report by Psychiatrist
During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the
medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSENKO at regular
intervals, usually weekly, to examine him physically and to listen
to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation.
The psychiatrist familiarized himself with available materials on
NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months
immediately following the defection. A report which he submitted
on 20 December 1964 is given below.
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614.
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615.
B.
1.
a.
Views of Intelligence Personnel
Statement by DERYABIN
Introduction
Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed
closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of 
NOSENKO 
and
his information. He took part in the interrogations 
of NOSENKO
in April 1964, January-February 1965, and October 
1966 as an 
ob-
server and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during
July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal
past and early KGB career. On the basis of his direct, personal
knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGB organi-
zation and procedures prior to his defection in February 1954,
supplemented by continuing study of later information from 
a
variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much 
of 
what
NOSENKO has said about himself and the KGB is purposefully false
or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authorita-
tive comment on many aspects of NOSENKO's story, the following
section of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning NOSEN-
KO's entry into the KGB (then MVD) and his Communist Party affili-
ation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN was active
as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer. DERYABIN personally interro-
Since DER-
gated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965.
YABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then MGB and MVD) in
Moscow, with long experience in Communist Party activities, at
the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified
to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story.
DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, was graduated in 1945
from the higher counterintelligence school of Smersh (counter-
Following 
this he
intelligence with the Soviet Armed Forces).
worked in Naval Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work
in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate.
Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief
of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN 
trans-
He served as a Guards
ferred with him to the Guards Directorate.
Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the
ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section.
of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service
in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was 
also in
charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning
one of the Directorate's surveillance sub-sections
.
One
After requesting a change from personnel to operational
duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German
Until
Department of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate.
December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in
the Counterintelligence Sektor (desk) of the Austro-German Depart-
ment. He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence
Sektor of the same department, a position he held until March
1953. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy
Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible
for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany.
In September 1953 he was transferred to Vienna, where he became
Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency respons-
He defected to
ible for the security of Soviets in Austria.
American authorities on 15 February 1954.
:
'
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CRI:
DERYASIN joined the Komsomol in 1936 and remained a member
until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, he became a full Party member in
August 1941. During his Party career he held a number of responsi-
ble posts.
Before the war, when DERYABIN was a 
teacher in Altay
Kray, he was the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultan-
eously served as a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rayon
where he lived. From October 1940 until November 1941 he was
Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion
of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same
This was
position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh.
the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelli-
gence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in
1951. In the MGB DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of
the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his
transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-
He held
German Department of the Foreign. Intelligence Directorate.
this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in Sep-
tember 1953.
b.
DERYABIN's Comments
The following statements by DERYABIN are based on his question-
ing of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions
asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as
Subject) were during this period. Although the Soviet State Secu-
rity Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954,
this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific
organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN's
comments follow:
"NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security*
"Taking NOSENKO's. own statements at face value, it is highly
improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be
would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State
Security. The following factors are important in this regard:
a.
It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring
the children of high government officials.
From
b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the
man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain entrance into the
service, had no influence inside the MG9 apparatus.
about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office
inside the MGB or the VD buildings. I know personally that
in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of
the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad) **
which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and
later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was
located on Chkalova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad
Station (three blocks from my former apartment)..
See also Part V.B.
** WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a
further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO
join the KG3, see Part V.B.
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617.
C. It was physically impossible at the time for NOSENKO.
to be recommended for and accepted into State Security, as he
has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts
his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in Jan-
uary or February, his account is similarly impossible because
KOBULOV was not then in State ɓecurity.) It would normally
have taken a much longer time, but in addition to this it was
a period of reorganization and the personnel staff was not
actively conducting their work at that time, and permanent
staff officers were not sure that they would retain their
positions.
'd.
In March 1953. NOSENKO was already twenty-five and a
half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no
recommendation for Party membership and could not become a
member for a full year because of his transfer from one ser-
vice (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security
would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday he
would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or
Party membership. Even for the son of a Minister, the Secre-
tary of the Komsomol Committee of the KGB would have to talk
with the Personnel Office and would not give a recommendation
for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintel-
ligence (Second Chief) Directorate. In the case of a son of
a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secre-
tary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party
membership from the members of the Communist Party where
NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU. In this way the
secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO
would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during
the next year.
"However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and
1. contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, one must also
remember (according to NOSENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO's
file contained the following negative points.* They are serious
factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the
rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a
time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the
responsibility of accepting him:
a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry
into State Security.
b. He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter
and TELEGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in
jail the day that Subject entered State Security.
C. NOSENKO said that there was a file on NOSENKO's
father in which compromising material was collected on
Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of infor-
mation that would have been in this file was the fact that
his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under
sentence as a counter-revolutionary.
d. The social status background in the life of Subject's
mother was nobility.
'See also Part IV.B.
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618.
e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World
War II and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku
would have played a very negative role in any consideration
of his acceptance into State Security.
f.
fashion.
Subject never completed high school in the normal
g. Subject was a poor student at the Institute of Inter-
national Relations.
h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely
know that NOSENKO, was involved in an automobile accident
in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court),
found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a
negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB.
i. NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having
In fact, there was a rule
just recovered from tuberculosis.*
at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even
twenty years earlier) would be permitted to work in the KGB.
"In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a
personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would
have been noted in the file and would have played a negative role
in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after
KOBULOV's arrest in June 1953.
"I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the
anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his
++ I
former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.
*
then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's
aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the
Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that
Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and
the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was
searched--that he had been accepted into the KGB, particularly
in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN.
Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he
could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important
and influential position of his own father outweighed these nega-
tive factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.
"I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage
to the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned
* NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June
1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he
was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned
his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a
"glass of blood" at a time. Although DERYABIN's questioning
covered this part of NOSENKO's life in detail, there was no
mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DERYABIN's
comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here
for purposes of context.
**The anketa and DERYABIN's questioning on this subject are dis-
cussed further below.
i
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619.
it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he had unofficially run a name
check on his prospective 
bride (which was 'clean'), and that after
After con-
the marriage he had filled 
out another anketa in which he included
all the required data on 
his wife and her relatives.
siderable prompting, Subject said that he had indicated that she
and her parents had been in 
France, but that he had concealed the
fact that her grandmother had 
been in German-occupied territory
(He admitted 
that the KGB would have learned 
this
during the war.
I then reviewed for 
Subject the
in a routine check, however.)
negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of
KOBULOV, the fact that his new 
wife and her parents had been
abroad, the fact that her 
grandmother was in German-occupied
territory, the fact that Subject 
was now over-age for the 
Komsomol
but not yet a Party member or 
candidate, and the fact that Subject
received a 15-day sentence for 
misuse of cover documents and in-
curring venereal disease, and 
asked if he didn't think that his
personnel file had been reviewed 
in 1954, and if so, what grounds
Subject said
there could have been for 
retaining him in the KGB.
that he thought that his file probably 
was reviewed 
but that
Subject 
added
again the influence of his 
father had saved him.
that another important factor 
was probably his 
language qualifi-
I pointed out to
cation and particularly his higher 
education.
Subject that if his second 
wife and her parents 
had been abroad
it was impossible that her name 
check could have been negative.
He admitted it was illogical
, but insisted that this was so.
"NOSENKO's Knowledge of KGB, 1953-54
He
NOSENKO was reminded that he had pre-
"Entry Date into KGB:
viously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KGB.
replied that he did not remember 
the exact date, but he was 
sure
perhaps 13 or 15 March
that it was in the middle 
of March 1953
(15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for
why he previously claimed to have 
entered the KGB in
1952.*.
-
In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to
forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the 
very day because 
it
is used to compute length of service 
and must be entered on 
vari-
ous forms from time to time.
"Numerical Designation of the Intelligence and Counterintelli-
Asked 
to describe what directorates
gence Directorates in 1953:
existed in the MVD while BERIYA was Minister (March-June 1953),
NOSENKO named the First Chief 
Directorate (FCD) and the Second
Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said 
were the intelligence and
Asked if he were
counterintelligence directorates 
respectively.
sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, 
and that 
the only change that
took place was that later, under 
KRUGLOV, for a few months only,
NOSENKO stuck to this
the FCD became the SCD, and 
vice versa.
even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or
did not remember, perhaps realizing 
that he could not claim not
(Actually, the change
to remember what directorate 
he served in.
in numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after
STALIN's death in March 1953 and 
persisted until the KGB was
Thus, 
NOSENKO does not know what 
the
organized in March 1954.
correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that
he allegedly entered on duty with 
Soviet State Security and for
the entire first year of his alleged 
service there.
* NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he
See Part V.B.
told CIA that he joined the KCB in 
1952.
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620.
"MVD Leadership, 1953-54: Asked to name the chiefs of the
directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA
and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28. He was unable to name
the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, saying that he remem-
bered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief until 1955). Asked
to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only ROMASHKOV and
SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies as LUNEY and
SHATALIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of the
CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), NOS-
ENKO flatly denied that this was possible.
"Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGB was
organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or
late 1954. Told that he was a year off and asked to think it
over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.
"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's
story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in
He
1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time.
does not know many of the things that he should know about en-
trance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he
claims to remember. The disparities are so great that they can-
not be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that
KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance pro-
cedure for NOSENKO.
"The most important document filled out by prospective em-
ployees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history
questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spetsialnoco naznacheniya
sotrudnika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long,
and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to
forget. A background investigation is run on the basis of this
questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent
feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers
filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation.
He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he
filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly
before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was re-
quired in one copy only, and was never permitted to be taken
home since it was a classified document (even when not filled
in).*
"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical exam-
Such
ination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible.
an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing.
I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.
DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August
1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO
said that no anketa was required. He implied as much in his
most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned
by DERYABIN. This statement is given in Part V.B.
**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for
tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958.
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621.
"NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement that he
signed when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike
the agreement that was in use at that time for 
staff employees
.
It may be significant that NOSENKO's description of the 
secrecy
agreement he recalls signing resembles the secrecy agreements
that were taken from agents.
"NOSENKO insists that he did not fill out any other forms,
Actually, there
questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGB.
were a number of other routine forms that had to be filled out by
applicants and new employees.
"Location of ROZHENKO's Office: NOSENKO says that all his
entry processing was handled by a personnel officer named ROZHEN-
KO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO's 
office, which NOS-
ENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th
In fact,
floor, 8th entry, Building No. 12, Ozerzhinskiy Street.
neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel De-
They were all (including
partment were located in the 8th entry.
ROZHENKO) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of
Building No. 12.*
"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to
work in the KGB, NOSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles
as a case officer, 500 rubles for his rank of lieutenant, plus
He insisted that this was
secrecy, language, and longevity pay.
correct, even when told that KGB officers were no longer being
paid for rank in March 1953, and said that although he remembered
that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank,
he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this
pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers
in September 1952 and was not restored until April 1954.
"Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology
of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to
have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly
after joining the KGB. Told that this was impossible, and that
no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSENKO replied that
he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had re-
In fact, this is impossible:
ceived his promotion at that time.
all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took
over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.
"Visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit
to the KGB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to re-
call the procedures employed by the KGB Pass Office in issuing
visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained that the name of
In fact, the
the interviewer was not indicated on the pass.
name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the inter-
viewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on
KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might
have forgotter the details involved if he had only visited there
a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB-Head-
quarters for over ten-years as a staff officer and particularly
as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors,
and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well.
*NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers
prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicating
See Part V.B.
that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue.

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622.
In
"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass:
describing his first day at work, NOSENKO said that he went from
the Pass Office, where he obtained a visitor's pass, to the 4th
entry of the Building No. 2, where his pass was checked by the
guards, and then went unescorted to KCBULOV's office on 
the 
third
floor. Challenged on this point, he said he was sure that it was
possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was absolutely
impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without
escort if you did not have a properly stamped KGB (MVD) identity
document (see below).
"KGB Identity Document: NOSENKO was asked to describe the
KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the
KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connec-
tion with this document at that time. He replied that he knew of
nothing unusual. He was then reminded that after STALIN's death
and again after BERIYA's arrest it was necessary to have special
With-
stamps placed in the identity documents to validate them.
out the right stamp it was impossible to enter the KGB building.
NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything
about it despite a number of hints and leading questions.
ally, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and
again after BERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were tem-
porarily withdrawn in order to have special validation stamps
placed in them, and it was literally impossible to get in the
KGB buildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the
subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe
that an officer who served in the KGB at the time could have for-
gotten it completely.
Actu-
"Gastronom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB
Club, NOSENKO said that he did not remember any sign (there was
one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Gastronom (food store)
next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastronom was opened, he
said firmly that it was already there when he started to work
in the KGB. In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as
of 1954. It was opened sometime between 1955 and 1957, as Moscow
directories show. The KGB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building
No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and NOSENKO would have had to pass
it every day he went to work.
"Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Direc-
torate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO
replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was
located on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located
A staff
next to the main KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2.
officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have fre-
quent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.
"K.I. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelli-
gence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NCSENKO replied
that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Agricultural
Exhibition, the K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is
a confused and incorrect answer. "Asked for clarification, NCS--
ENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First
Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus,
NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since
1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agri-
cultural Exhibition were one and the same place.
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1
!
"NOSENKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol Secretary in the
Second Chief Directorate, KGB
"NOSENKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol
Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March
1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization
of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have
served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was re-
moved because he used operational-alias documents in obtaining
treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to
have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he
attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.
"Asked to describe how he transferred from the Komsomol Organ-
ization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Kom-
somol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO gave an entirely incorrect
description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from
the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/0 in the KGB.
He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by
the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic;
this is impossible.
"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is
elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/O. In
fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will
convene separately to elect the Secretary.
"NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a
specific manner.
"NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB
The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate
to him and would deal with him frequently.
K/O.
.
"NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O
or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he
dealt there.
"NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Kom-
somol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it
was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENKO
should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also
because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Kom-
somol for over-age in 1954.
"NOSENKO maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues
in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is
incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding
scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members
earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent; those earning
500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500
rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues,
and must know the right amount.
"NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress
took place while ne was K/O secretary, saying that they took
place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress
which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this
12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules
(Ustav). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved
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624.
in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was
a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and
could not be forgotten.
"
Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954,
his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated by
his more recent examination of reports from other sources. With
regard to what NOSENKO has said about KGB procedures, DERYABIN
stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a
Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in
1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial description of how such
checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him
to describe this process in detail, and he made several blunders
which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For
example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens
who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an
answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia
about this. NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located
on Kirov Street, but he was completely unable to stretch his
limited knowledge to provide a description of how these various
repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to
describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen
in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and re-
fused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spets-
proverka, which means a check for clearance.
-
"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to
dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubt-
edly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures
in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking
NOSENKO the difference between the 1st Spets Otdel (Special
Department KGB cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetniy
Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for
the 1st Special Department). He answered that the 1st Special
Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases while the
Operational Reports Department is for political and espionage
cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addi-
tion, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate
from criminal cres in the 1st Special Department. They were
in my time and must still be combined in one card file.
"NOSENKO states that he knows nothing about the files of
the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten
years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never
saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able
to check information on foreigners, especially on American Em-
bassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry
to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they
may have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO
should have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten
years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to
the American Department or the Tourist Department."
☐
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625.
i
2. Remarks by CIA Handlers
8.
Introduction
wit
inate
serv
Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have
recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions.
The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet
NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and inter-
rogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage) since
then; he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experi-
ence, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more
than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security
Services who were defectors or agents in place; he has also had
desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20
other such sources. A second case officer, who participated in
the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of
the operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely in
Soviet operations and has handled several Soviet sources in place,
as well as defectors. Three other officers, who began to work
with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted
the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations,
have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence
operations; among them, they command an extensive knowledge of
the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety
of agent and defector-handling experience.
NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of
circumstances:
-
In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in
Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide
range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none
of which could be covered in detail.
-
In concentrated but somewhat longer meetings in
place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the know-
ledge by all participants that items not adequately covered
then could be dealt with after the defection.
-
In routine debriefing sessions after his defection,
first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in
the Washington area, where a special effort was made not
to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his
statements.
-
Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially
April 1964 and January-March 1965).
In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which
NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965,
July-August 1965, and October 1966).
Thus there were opportunities to note his performance and reac-
tions under varied degrees of stress and control.
The features of NOSENKQ's conduct, manner, and techniques
discussed below are confined to those which were clearly and con-
sistently observed by all of the officers involved.
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626.
b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings
NOSENKO in brief, superficial, uncritical debriefings (of
the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings
and the debriefings prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonably con-
vincing in his manner. For example, on the basis of the hur-.
ried sessions of June 1962 in Geneva, which did 
not allow time
for systematic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer
in commenting on NOSENKO's conduct mentioned "the ease of his
manner, the sureness of his knowledge of matters which he should
have known, and the amount of checkable information he 
provided.
”
NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be "under little or no
restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us" and
"made a convincing and good personal impression: a vigorous,
temperamental and vital man." Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO's
manner caused doubts on the part of the FBI representatives who
took NOSENKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964.
The
It became apparent, however, when the cases NOSENKO had
mentioned briefly in early meetings were taken up in detail in
leisurely debriefings after the defection, that he could 
not 
add
He was unable 
to
facts consistent with what he had said before.
recall related incidents or additional circumstances which did
not come to mind in the first telling, despite being aided by
questioning from different angles or in different 
contexts.
same results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational
leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on KGB
Having once
procedures, installations, and operational methods:
reported on these general topics, NOSENKO could offer nothing
more when debriefed again, regardless of the method of question-
ing tried.
Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate
his points; new stories did not emerge. In a period of nine
months, NOSENKO was drained of information on his 
personal 
and
professional experiences and knowledge., Never before has the
CIA case officers encountered a defector who was totally 
de-
briefed.
A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his in-
ability to supply details and to forestall further questioning
has been to claim poor memory. "Different people have different
types of memories," he has said on many occasions, or on others:
"I have told what I remember. The case officers who 
have
handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excel-
NOSENKO did 
not
lent memory, although perhaps a peculiar one:
always recall most easily those events which had occurred most
recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to
him. He was able, for example, to remember detailed information
on the penetration of the Courier Transfer Station in Paris 
and
to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of the compromise
of PENKOVSKIY, in neither of which he claimed any personal role;
he has been able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to give the
dates on which many of them transferred from one component of
the Second Chief Directorate to another, and to describe their
Yet NOSENKO forgot where
responsibilities at particular times.
he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently dis-
cribe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a
consistent date for his entry into the KGB and for his transfer
from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962.
Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which,
like the "ANDREY" case in 1953, took place in the relatively dis-
tant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and
activities of his own target John V. ABIDIAN or details of opera-
tions against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961.
37
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627.
'
These limitations of knowledge and quirks of memory were
evident not only during meetings when NOSENKO was being debriefed.
They were also apparent in the interrogations which supplanted
the debriefings.
c.
(i)
NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation
Introduction
In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged
habits of behavior noticeable to each of the CIA officers present.
These characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting
events and his evasiveness, improvisations, and other defensive
techniques. They are reviewed below.
(11) Manner of Recounting Events
Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were
the following points.
Talking about operations he supervised and about his per-
sonal role in the KGB Headquarters aspects of other operations,
NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or
indicated that he was not alone in these activities ("there was
no accounting on who was working on any code clerk case--it was
GRYAZNOV, KOSCLAPOV, NOSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBAN-
OV," or "We made the decision--I and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or "I
and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him."') When asked where a par-
ticular conversation took place, he rarely located it in his own
office ("I was in KOVSHUK's office when KCSLCV called him about
the trip" or "I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to
KOVSHUK").
-
"
At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO some-
times quoted conversations in which he took part ("I then said,
"he said to me, etc.), but it was in just such matters that
NOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g.. his relationship
with GRIEANOV and his part in the recruitment approach to the
American code clerk James STORSBERG).
In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANOV case and the
provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOCFN are examples)
NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition
or omission. In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed
he learned "little by little from several different sources, he
Asked
presented the facts each time in nearly identical order.
for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often
with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he
would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the im-
pression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his infor-
mation by rote: Statements like "I don't remember what I told
you before" when queried agair on a particular case; detachment
and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of Soviets
who, like himself, had cooperated with American Intelligence:
POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV: an inability to correlate
dates and events in different operations which he said he was
handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to
W.E. JOHNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ABIDIAN's visit
to the Pushkin Street dead drop, and conflict between the dates
of his participation in the MORONE case and his travel to Cuba).
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i
!.
|::1
628.
NOSENKO, with a few exceptions (notably the compromise of
PENKOVSKIY and the ASIDIAN visit to the dead 
drop site), could
not supply specific or approximate 
dates for operational activi-
ties during the period of his 
service in the U.S. Embassy Section
.
Beyond recourse to the phrase "1960
, 1961," he refused to estimate
the dates or to associate 
these activities with the time of the
year or events in his personal life.
(iii) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses
In the debriefings before the interrogations, NOSENKO avoided
questions and topics not of his own choosing
, saying that he would
give full details "later," when 
systematic debriefing began.
When the question or topic came up anew 
in a later debriefing
,
"This morning
he would plead fatigue or boredom and 
propose:
Prior 
to 4 April 
1964 he provided
we drink; tomorrow we work."
only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only
after 4 April 1964 that he could be 
constrained to reply to 
de-
tailed questioning on other 
matters.
From that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar
He would try 
to change the subject or
to his interrogators.
to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how
He would claim bad memory
such things were done in principle.
on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy
He would dismiss 
the
personnel were hopeless and useless 
anyway.
details or the entire operation as unimportant (for example, the
He would set out reasons for
microphones in the U.S. Embassy).
his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own
"poor performance," preoccupation with 
other matters, inattention
to duty, absence from the KGB 
while on vacation, lack of time to
Unable to name or
a 
supervisor).
master details because he was
talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans,
cluding those in operations under his 
supervision, NOSENKO
disparaged the quality of, such 
agents ("they never reported 
any-
thing of interest on anyone"); he 
cited their low educational
level and their inferior status 
as servants and employees as
one reason none of them could give the KGB 
operationally 
useful
information. In fact, the 
record of many indicated previous em-
ployment which would demand at least the 
equivalent of a college
Numerous maids
degree or certificate from a 
technical institute.
were former school teachers, one was 
formerly a 
chemist.
in-
To use
When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that
Some of 
these evident 
improvisa-
NOSENKO improvised his answers.
tions led him into unacceptable statements or positions.
his responses to the questioning on 
John V. ABIDIAN as 
an example:
Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car, 
he said the KGB could not get
at it. (In fact, the car was held 
by Soviet customs for two
weeks, and later NOSENKO himself 
spoke about the way the KGB 
used
Not knowing of ABIDIAN's
Embassy chauffeurs for access to 
cars.)
trips out of the USSR, he claimed 
that 
the KGB had no way to
find out where Embassy officers went 
when they made trips out 
of
the country. (In fact, ABIDIAN had 
told his language teacher
each time and she, as NOSENKO said
, was a KGB agent; also, 
ABIDIAN
arranged his trips by long-distance 
phone from Moscow to his des-
Not knowing
tination abroad, and the KGB 
can cover such calls.)
of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he spoke of a vacation which
Asked why he did not know 
personal
he latter admitted to be 
false.
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629.
"
data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Biographic Register,
he said "only the First Chief Directorate" uses it; when the
interrogator pursued the point, NOSENKO said he remembered that
KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, "but an old one, 1956,
which didn't list ABIDIAN. Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit
to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the KGB thought that ABIDIAN may
not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earl-
ier given extensive details about how the KG3 had analyzed the
precise number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to determine
As another example, when he
where the drop, if any, might be.
was initially asked about George BLAKE, the KGB agent in MI-6,
the context of the question was a discussion of Second 
Chief
Directorate operations. NOSENKO labeled it as such and said it
Later, when the 
name was 
men-
"was not as important as VASSALL."
tioned again, he asked:
"Who's BLAKE?"
On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed
out or when he admitted ignorance of matters he acknowledge he
should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon one of the follow-
ing lines of defense:
-
"What I know I tell you; what I remember I tell
-- or a shrug.
you," or "I don't know," "I can't explain,"
It is
The details, even if confused or contradictory, are
not important. What is important is the "whole" or entirety
of the facts, their importance and their "reality.'
this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not de-
tails.
-
He must be genuine because otherwise "how could I
SARDAR and 'PROKHOR'?" (Johan
have been working with
PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptonym was "PROKHOR;" did con-
firm NOSENKO's role.) "How else could I tell you about
STORSBERG?". "The KGB would not use a staffer as a provo-
cateur,' nor would the KGB supply information on "live
cases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL
, 
and
reveal the names of its officers abroad.
-
If American Intelligence checked his story "fully,"
it would learn that despite all this confusion, he was genu-
ine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check
via an independent penetration of the KGB--there it would
verify that his name is registered as the case officer who
opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that
he was a KGB officer.*
NOSENKO referred to this method of corroborating him at least
He said
20 times during the interrogations of January-March 1965.
on 1 February 1965 that "maybe the day will come when you have
a source to check and you will find out" (that 
he was ABIDIAN'S
case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added:
"I see how poor and miserable I'm looking" with 
regard to ABIDIAN's
་ On
file, but anyone who can check in [KGB] Archives 
will see.
ǹ February he said, "I greatly wish that you will have 
as 
soon
as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at 
the
was the only such source at the time.
тар СГСОГТ
:
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630.
"Time
file on ABIDIAN. On the first page is written that 'I, NOSENKO,
Yuriy Ivanovich, opered this file'." On. 16 February he said:
will show I am what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times with-
in one hour to a check via such a source. He repeatedly stated
that "time will show" that he is not a provocateur. At one point
he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:
NOSENKO:
INTERROGATOR:
NOSENKO:
NOSENKO:
INTERROGATOR:
NOSENKO:
I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find
that I'm right.
We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB.
We're disputing that you held the positions you
say you held in the KGB.
That's what I'm saying. If you could check you
would find that I was only in these two departments
and only in these positions...
(later in the session)
I can't prove
I can't tell you anything more.
anything. Maybe the future will show.
What can the future show?
I don't know. But from what I understand the check-
ing has not gone very far. Maybe you can check
further... I mean, if you have any possibility now,
I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of
friends.
the KGB, with any of my acquaintances,
INTERROGATOR:
You mean our acquaintances, don't you?
NOSENKO:
INTERROGATOR:
NOSENKO:
d.
Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with
someone, because anyone
in the KGB should know
that, yes, there was a NOSENKO.
Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV?
No, of course not, because I gave you their names.
Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be
sure.
Additional Observations
(i) Inquisitiveness About CIA
NOSENKO's questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his
interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of
Soviet Intelligence defectors. Frequently he asked, even while
"You tell me 
about a 
case,
discussing his own KGB responsibilities:
and I will remember details." Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisi-
tiveness include the following:-
When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet
Officials Abroad" during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO
made inquiries about what organization prepared t and to what
part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.
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631.
(ii)
-
In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked
whether GOLITSYN had reported to CIA that Finnish President
KEKKONEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in
later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case
before he made the foregoing inquiry.)
-
NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence col-
lection in the USSR is directed and coordinated. The CIA case
officer responded: "What was that question?" NOSENKO there-
upon said:
"It was not a question--just general interest.
When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he re-
fused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other
matters.
-
He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washing-
ton area.
-
NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA offi-
cers in contact with him.
-
NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA offi-
cer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a
medal for that phase of the operation.
Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources
Under interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO
rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed
superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were
incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the
date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSO-
LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960
trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that
CIA knew more than he did on topics including conditions in the
USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility.
He never challenged DERYABIN's statements about KGB procedures,
although aware that his own information was more recent.
(e)
Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance
After admitting his inability to respond to questions about
operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes
He would admit
gave a general appraisal of his own performance.
that it was "impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree
that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your
place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It
will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were
fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen
times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his per-
formance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.
He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were
largely useless. Out of the 150-or-so--he said he had provided,
he stated that the great majority were "no good," unimportant, or
people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe 'ANDREY' became
not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any
more"; "some of the agents recruited by the Seventh Department
weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, how-
ever, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads.
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632.
ناز
C.
1.
Polygraph Testing
Test in April 1964
Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a
polygraph examination which the CIA handlers had told him 
was 
a
He 
was informed on
routine part of his defector processing.
3 April 1964 that the test would be administered the following
morning, and that it was therefore advisable for him 
to get a
NOS-
good night's rest and to refrain from alcoholic beverages
.
ENKO drank heavily on the night of 3 April, did not 
enter 
his
bedroom until 0300 hours on 4 April, and following breakfast at
Subse-
0730 hours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-torics.
quently, when NOSENKO thought he was not being observed, he was
seen to remove his hand from his lips hurriedly.*.
Following a medical examination by a physician who noted
that NOSENKO had been drinking, he was introduced to the 
CIA
polygraph operator. An experienced interrogator, fluent 
in 
the
Pussian language, this polygraph operator conducted 
the test in
His report 
is 
quoted
Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 April.
below.
"The question of Subject's (NOSENKO's) willingness to par-
ticipate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration,
since he had, on previous occasions, agreed that he would take
the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the
polygraph testing if confronted with attempted deception after
Con-
an initial test run, was one of the considered problems.
sequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's
terminating the test prior to its completion it was decided
that a minor deviation from the accepted polygraph 
technique
would be used during the polygraph testing; specifically, to
insure that a polygraphic record of Subject's reactions 
to 
all
the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging 
him 
on
any significant polygraphic deception indications 
his charts
might reflect... This plan was followed throughout 
the 
poly-
graph interview……..
* On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis
of six types of tablets which had been taken 
from NOSENKO's
personal effects. In this report, a CIA chemical expert made
the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic, 
and in-
"Sample No.
strumental analysis including the use of X-ray:
4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece
Micro-
of paper with the name 'Phenomin' written in Russian.
scopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of
a small amount of dl-amphetamine sulfate, a large amount of
lactose, and a small amount of corn starch; d-amphetamine is
a sympathomimetic agent employed mainly as a central nervous
system stimulant. The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug
in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate decep-
No phenothi-
tion responses especially for a weak reactor.
azine (a tranquilizer) which is the active ingredient in
The tablets 
do 
not
'Phenomin' was present in these tablets.
appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...As a result of the above
examinations it was established that none of the 
items sub-
Although either 
sul-
mitted are of the barbiturate family.
faguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240)
could be used (and indeed have been used) as 
secret ink, 
they
are also normal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and
Thore (a nothing in the formulation of the tablets to suggest
-
-
14-00000
633.
"Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown
drug prior to testing, there is no question, based both on analysis
of Subject's polygraph charts as well as personal observation dur-
ing the interview, that Subject has attempted deliberate deception
in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this
report.
"It is [my]) conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector,
but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a spe-
cific mission or missions.
"According to the plan, the different phases involving various
Chal-
pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically.
lenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and 'soft.' On no occa-
sion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the
possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied
and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the questions
which were asked of him. When the final test questions were com-
pleted and a record was obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic
responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed.
"Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent ques-
tions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only
explanation to (my) direct accusation was that he could not be a
dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volun-
teered to American Intelligence.
"Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected com-
plete self-control and composure, now exhibited a completely dif-
ferent picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered,
and his hands trembled. Prior to being confronted with (my] opinion
that Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on
one of the last test runs (a) if he were sent to penetrate Ameri-
can Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB
on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given
in a voice that actually trembled...
"Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.
"Series #1:
Yes.
(No reaction)
Were you born in the Soviet Union?
Were you born in the city of Nikolayev?
Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes.
Yes. (No reaction)
(No reaction)
Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when
you told us your autobiography?
No. (Reaction)
Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth?
Yes. (Reaction)
Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test
may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? No.
(No reaction)
Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidling?
(No reaction)
Yes.
14-00000
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634.
Were you a member of the Communist Party before 1956?
(No reaction)
No.
(Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Commu-
nist Party in 1956, and in mid-1957 was accepted as a member.)
Did you deliberately give any misinformation about your work
and service in the KGB? No. (No reaction)
Besides your children, is there anything in your life on
NO. (No re-
the basis of which someone may blackmail you?
action)
(Subject stated that his love for his children was the only
thing that is of any consequence which the Soviets might use
for blackmail purposes. ☐ However, Subject said he was not
worried, because regardless of threats against the welfare
of his children, he would not allow himself to be black-
mailed or controlled.)
Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activity?
(Reaction)
No.
Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education?
No. (No reaction)
Did you ever commit a major crime?
No. (No reaction)
Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military
service? No. (No reaction)
"Series #2:
Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva
in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)
Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in
Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction)
Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans?
reaction)
Yes. (No
Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the
Americans? Yes. (No reaction)
Were you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet
No. (Reaction)
Intelligence (with a special mission)?
Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and
Yes. (No
all other punitive organs of the Soviet Union?
reaction)
Did you establish contact with American Intelligence on
orders of the KGB?
No. (Reaction)
Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans?
No. (No reaction)
Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing
contact with you in America?
No.
(Reaction)
E
::
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C
635.
Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact
with Soviet Intelligence?
No.
(No reaction)
Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union
sometime in the future?
No.
(Reaction)
Are you performing a special mission for Soviet Intelligence
No. (Reaction
)
in connection with your defection?
Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet
agents into American Intelligence about which you 
are
aware? No. (Reaction)
Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intel-
ligence of American Embassy personnel which 
occurred after
RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No. (No reaction)
Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence
organs? No. (No reaction)
No.
Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters
you wrote to your wife (since your defection)?
(No reaction)
"Series #3:
Did you defect to the Americans in 1964?
Yes.
(No reaction)
Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva?
action)
Yes.
(No re-
Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of un-
No.
covering plans of American Intelligence against USSR?
(Reaction)
❤ Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment to find
out more about the structure and methods of operation 
of
No. (Reaction)
American Intelligence?
Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating
No. (Reaction)
American Intelligence?
Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatis-
Yes. (Reaction)
fied with the Soviet system?
No.
Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of discredit-
ing Soviet officers of the KGB who defected 
earlier?
(No reaction)
Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving mis-
information about Soviet agents' penetration 
of American
Intelligence? No. (No reaction)
"Series #4:
Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
No. (No reaction
)
trip to Geneva in 19627
Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
No. (No reaction
)
trip to Geneva in 19647
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636.
Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
trip to Cuba in 1960?
No.
(Reaction)
Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
trip to London in 19577 No. (No reaction)
Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
trip to London in 1958? No. (No reaction)
Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV
in December 1953? Yes. (Reaction)
Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957?
Yes. (Reaction)
Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962?
No.
(No reaction)
To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 19647
No. (No reaction)
Was GUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)
*Series #5:
Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1962?
reaction)
Yes. (NO
Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1964?
reaction)
Yes. (No
Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD?
(No reaction)
Yes.
Yes.
Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV?
(Reaction)
Were the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and passed
No. (Reaction)
to the Americans by the KGB?
Is it true that Soviet Intelligence has an agent, whose
name is unknown to you, among the American representatives
in Paris? Yes. (Reaction)
Did you bring with you personal identity documents which
No. (Reaction)
were fabricated by KGB?
Did you give truthful information about the structure of
Yes.
the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB?
(No reaction)
Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a
-specially-developed-KGB-plan? No. (No_reaction)
Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Dis-
information)? Yes. (Reaction)
To your knowledge, was PEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American
Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 19642
Yes. (Reaction)
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637.
*Series #6:
Did you drink more than you told me?
No. (Reaction)
(Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior
to testing.)
Did you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph?
Yes. (No reaction)
Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about
No. (No
American Intelligence's use of the polygraph.
reaction)
Did anyone in the KGB explain anything about the polygraph
to you? No. (No reaction)
During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medi-
cine or pills? No. (Reaction)
Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt
(Reaction)
to beat the polygraph? No.
Were you ever hypnotized by anyone?
No. (No reaction)
Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from
(Reaction)
abroad or from the Soviet Union)?
No.
Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not
told me? NO. (Reaction)
"Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of
pills with him which he brought from Moscow and which [were
]
in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had 
more 
liquor
than he told (me), that he had received specific instruc-
tions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any
type of pills during the last twenty-four hours."
14-00000
638.
2.
a.
Test in October 1965 on Lee Harvey OSWALD
Introduction
CIA conducted a polygraph examination of NOSENKO OD
18 October 1956 on the subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD. *
Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO
had been under close security guard, his movements restricted,
and in the interim had been interrogated in detail and accused
of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities.
NOSENKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six months
prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or
drugs, his food consumption had been normal, and his sleep
had been adequate.
NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph
examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take
place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the
person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and
one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had
first met on 4 April 1964.
In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case
were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian)
were recorded, the operation of the machine was explained,
and clarifications of the questions and his answers were
made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD
case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed
by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.
b. Results
"Series No. 1
1.
Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
2.
3.
Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
Did you receive special instructions about what to
tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?
4.
6.
Answer: No. (Reaction)
Did you personally meet OSWALD?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?
7.
Answer: No.
(Reaction)
Other than what you told me, did you actively parti-
cipate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
GSWATH
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639.
8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?
Answer: No. (Reaction)
9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?
10.
11.
12.
13.
Answer: No. (No reaction)
Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th
Otdel of the First Chief Directorate?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President
Kennedy?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President
Kennedy's assassination?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
"Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on
this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions
of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a,
and 10.
"Series No. 2
20.
21.
22.
Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
Did you ever read the OSWALD case?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?
Answer: Yes.
(Reaction)
23. Did you give us any kind of information about
OSWALD?
Answer:
Yes. (No reaction)
*Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator
14-00000
こ
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640.
24.
Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President
Kennedy's assassination?
Answer: Yes.
(Reaction)
24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President
Kennedy's death?
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
Answer:
Instead of the usual yes or no answer,
Subject answered: 'Before and after.'
When the question was repeated, he again
answered: 'Eefore and after.' Only when
the question was asked a third time on a
subsequent test did he answer 'No.' (Reaction)
(Subject reacted when he answered 'Before and
after,' and when he answered 'No."
Did the KGB consider OSWALD abnormal?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)
As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her
husband's plan to kill President Kennedy?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer
in Mexico?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961?
Answer:
Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction
to this question was inconsistent when he
answered 'Yes.' hence the (No reaction)
notation. However, it is noteworthy that
Subject did not attempt to correct the
date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.;
OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962
and not in 1961.
Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your
legend (cover story)?
Answer: No.
(Reaction)
30.
Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions
22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30.
"Series No. 3
1
14-00000
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641.
16.
13.
17.
17a.
18.
18c.
Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to
collect material on OSWALD?
Answer: Yes.
(Reaction)
Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Winsk
about the OSWALD case in 19637
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of
the KGB operational officers?
Answer: No.
(Reaction)
Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was
a bad shot?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of opera-
tional interest to KGB?
Answer: Yes.
(Reaction).
Did KGB give the OSWALDs any kind of help in their
departure from the Soviet Union?
Answer: No. (No reaction)
3a. Did you receive special instructions from the KGB
about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?
Answer: No.
(Reaction)
"Subject's reactions to the questions so indicated
were about equal in consistency and significance.
"On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts
obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and
testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my]
opinion that:
2. Subject was not personally or actually
involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while
OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.
b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's
assassination; however, he was not an active partici-
pant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably
briefed on the case by a KGB officer.
c. Subject-received special instructions
(from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to
tell American authorities about it."
TAP SECRET

14-00000
2.
VIII.
h.
642.
TOP SECRET
NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES:
Introduction
:
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is standard procedure to assess the bona fides of each
intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special 
care is
required in assessing sources of information 
relevant to the 
secu-
rity of the United States.
One difficulty in doing so with a Soviet source is that
Soviet realities, particularly in the KGB, are imperfectly known:
Except where independent information is 
available, it is risky to
say and impossible to prove what the Soviets
--most notably the
KGB--would or would not do in any given situation
, or what any
Independent 
informa-
given KGB officer should or should not know.
tion, voluminous ir. quantity although never comprehensive and
entirely current, nevertheless has been 
assimilated from the 
re-
ports of the several KGB staff officers 
who have defected, from
the KGB agents who have confessed, and from 
the Western services
There is, therefore, a
which have investigated KGB activities.
base of reliable knowledge upon which to predicate an assessment
of a source reporting on the KGB, even one who 
principally covers
a KGB component (in this instance 
the Second Chief Directorate)
upon which there previously had been relatively 
little inside
Information. Moreover, in the 
absence of direct evidence from
other sources, it would be arbitarily confining if 
an 
assumption
were not made that certain KGB standards are 
at least comparable
to those of Western services. Such prior knowledge 
and, to a
limited extent, such an assumption are factors 
in the 
assessment
of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO that is submitted 
here.
A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however,
is NOSENKO's own testimony. CIA has exhaustively 
debriefed and
interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, 
his information 
was
studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his 
bona fides
was thus assembled. These details, as 
well as direct evidence
from other sources and the views of specialists 
affiliated 
with
CIA, have been presented in Part III. through 
Part VII. of this
paper.
The basic questions with regard to the bona fides of
NOSENKO are the following:
Is there reason to question the general accuracy
and completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his 
situation
and motivations in contacting CIA and later 
defecting,
his personal life, military service, positions in 
the
KGB, personal participation in KGB operations
, know-
ledgeability about KGB activities and 
the way he 
learned
of them, and his associations with KGB personnel
?
- If there are grounds for doubting the general
accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what
are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, 
for the
nature of the information he has provided, and for
other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal
life and KGB career?
In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method
has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, 
examining
his autobiography, and appraising him and the 
circumstances of
this operation. These points, with the 
conclusions drawn from
The discussion 
continues with a 
survey
each, are reviewed below.
of the sources who have corroborated NOSENKO's background and
status, and this is followed by argumentations 
on the various
The final
hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source
.
portion is a summary of conclusions about 
NOSENKO's 
bona fides.
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643.
B.
1.
Evaluation of Production
Introduction
What a Soviet source reports is one factor in assessing his
Even a genuine
good faith. Rarely, however, can it be conclusive:
and conscientious source may be poorly informed or misinformed; he
may be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcomings, or lack of
education; his reporting may be incomplete because he is not avail-
able long enough to permit amplification and clarification of his
information. On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who is
planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous,
and accurate information.
There are several standards which may be applied to the assess-
ment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified; none is
likely to be conclusive by itself; and all of them together may not
permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a
The standards are:
broader assessment of bona fides.
First, how does the information equate, in terms of complete-
ness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven
(In this, one judges the in-
position and access to information?
ternal consistency of the source's reporting and also compares it
with information from other sources and from investigations.)
(This point
Second, does the information harm the opposition?
is risky to judge, for a genuine source may simply not know any-
thing harmful to his country. Also, information which seems harm-
ful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for ex-
ample, the loss of an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated
by the KGB's possession of better or comparable assets still un-
exposed.)
Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This
point may in some cases be irrelevant, for information useful to
us may not harm the opposition, and the apparent usefulness of in-
formation may not balance against the time and effort required to
process and investigate it.)
These standards have been applied in evaluating the production
of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.
From a
NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counter-
intelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not
have any useful positive intelligence. This does not necessarily
affect the question of his bona fides, however, for NCSENKO claims
to have been a KGB internal counterintelligence officer.
comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who
defected to Western services has produced significant military,
economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few
have supplied political information (usually concerned with the
personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Commu-
nist Party). Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence_conse-..
quence is expected of NOSENKO, although some question might be
raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the
Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO's
continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death.
The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnnaires along posi-
tive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.
14-00000
FOR LUNCT
644.
W
NOSENKO's counterintelliçence production includes all of his
information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs
:
USSR.
-
their structure, functions, methods, and procedures;
their officers and their agents of Soviet citizenship,
their operational activities inside and outside the
For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Part VIII.C.
through Part VIII.P.) follows a format 
in which the evidence is
summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented.
2. KGB Organization, Personalities, Methods
Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general
and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely
minimal requirement for anyone who claims to have been 
employed
within that service. At the same time, current 
information on 
the
organization of an intelligence service is of classic interest 
to
opposing intelliger.ce and security services. 
Organizational
changes are indicators of policy and planning trends 
in the 
ser-
vice; short of a penetration of the service's leadership
, such
changes are perhaps the most reliable reflection 
of changes in
operational emphasis and tactics.
Had NOSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB
been novel in this sense, it would have been of considerable
value, while the exposure of this information--although perhaps
not a major loss to the Soviets--would nonetheless 
have been
NOSENKO's reports on the
against the KGB's best interests.
organization of the KGB in 1964 (Pages 352-358) agree with and
are a logical extension of that framework of KGB 
organization
newly revealed by the 1961 sources, but this weighs neither for
In the absence of 
contradictory
nor against him as the source:
information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion
because his reports show no redirection of the thrust of the
KGB. Purthermore, NOSENKO's statements indicating that there
have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 re-
organization and 1964 are acceptable in the light 
of 
available
The information 
which NOSENKO
information from other sources.
provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports
nor discredits his bona fides.
NOSENKO's information on some 1,000 Soviets connected with
intelligence and security activities is an impressive 
achieve-
ment of memory.
These identifications, however, must 
be 
evalu-
ated according to the damage inflicted upon the Soviets by his
In this respect, the 
discus-
exposure of these personalities.
sion must concern new identifications, for intelligence person-
alities previously exposed could not be damaged any further 
by
This discussion 
must be fur-
a repetition of their compromise.
ther restricted to new identifications of staff personnel, be-
cause the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for
occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and 
discretion
of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn 
that 
a
Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent re-
porting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already
been taken for granted, and besides, no action 
on such 
infor-
mation can be taken. Finally, the new identifications 
also
1
14-00000
TUK CECILL
645.
must be among persons who are identifiable and accessible, or the
information is useless to Western services 
and is no loss to the
Soviets. On this basis, only KGB First Chief Directorate 
as 
well
as GRU identifications merit inclusion in this 
valuation, since
these are the officers who normally appear abroad and participate
in agent operations. Although KGB Second Chief Directorate 
per-
sonnel have in the past transferred to the First 
Chief. 
Directorate,
this is not a predictable event and cannot be 
considered in dis-
cussion of current damage.
NOSENKO identified 165 First Chief Directorate personnel, but
only 149 could be located in CIA files (i.c., were identifiable by
name); the remaining 16 names from NOSENKO were valueless 
as they
were untraceable. Of the 149, there were 37 who 
were not known 
or
suspected as intelligence officers prior to the receipt of NOSENKO'S
information. Of 37, there were 24 who either 
resided abroad at the
time of NOSENKO's defection or were sent abroad since 
that time.*
in his identifications 
of all
1 Assuming that NOSEIKO was correct
it cannot be said
24 members of the KGB who were accessible. **
that the number is so large that the damage to KGB agent opera-
tions was substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique GRU identifica-
tions were abroad at the time of his defection or 
have been since
.
These personality identifications hence do not serve as evidence
of NOSENKO's bona fides. At the same time, his 
inability to do
further measurable harm to the KGB in this regard cannot be held
against him, either, for he has claimed service 
only in the 
Second
Chief Directorate throughout his career and so cannot 
be expected
to know a high percentage of the First Chief Directorate comple-
ment. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications
do not constitute a factor in finding for or against 
his bona fides.
NOSENKO has been the source of many interesting details and
examples of KGB modus operandi (Pages 359-360), but while 
useful
for illustrative purposes and valuable because of the 
fact that
the material was easily collatable for study purposes, none of
the methods described could be considered new and revealing, and
their exposure in any event would not prevent their continued use
in the future. NOSENKO's discussion of the only double agent case
in which he claimed to have played a role, however, demonstrates
his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an
operation. This case, BELITSKIY, is a subject of separate
sensitive sources
* Of these 24, ten were identified by
as KGB
M and thereafter, and two became prominently active in
insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.
**Other evidence has contradicted statements by NOSENKO to the
effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the 
KGB
;
in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB
Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete 
know-
ledge of KGB personnel, he named 15 of a KGB staff which 
he
said totalled at the most 18; CIA identifications 
of KGB 
offi-
cers in Geneva on the basis of other sources, investigations
and analysis totalled at least double this number and probably
triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets station-
ed there (a proportion which is consistent with other 
areas-
and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate
concerning even KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva,
Therefore, the accuracy of
as noted on Pages 12 and 13.
NOSENKO's original identifications, positive or negative,
cannot be accepted without question.
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646.
discussion below. This subject, too, must be considered neutral
evidence in the bona fides assessment.
NOSENKO has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate
in his answers to questions on KGB Headquarters staff procedures
He has been unable to 
contribute
(Page 360 and Pages 619-624).
any new information, although there has been no detailed reporting
(GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some 
new
on the subject since 1954.
material on procedures but was never comprehensively debriefed on
the topic.) Thus, information on the more up-to-date 
forms, co-
ordination requirements, mechanization of records 
and tracing
mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution 
to 
our
When
knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything 
of this sort.
he replied to questions about such matters for the period covering
his entry into the KGB, on which previous reporting 
is available
NOSENKO's
in detail, he answered incorrectly on numerous 
points.
tendency to improvise when he did not know the correct answer or
when he had forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychologist
as the behavior of a pathological liar saving 
face in a tight
When he could not produce a 
correct
psychological situation.
answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised
because he is a liar or because he is concealing 
an ignorance
(based on not having been a KGB Headquarters officer.
3.
a.
Operational Leads
Introduction
He
Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into
account the KGB positions and personal associations (with attendant
access to information) which NOSENKO has 
claimed for himself.
indicated that the breadth of his knowledge about KGB agent opera-
tions and development cases increased as he rose from 
case officer
in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955 
and in the American Tourist
Section in 1955-1958 to become Deputy 
Chief of the latter section
in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy 
Section in 1960-1961
,
and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist 
Department from 1962 until
his defection. Simultaneously he established 
lasting contacts with
his KGB colleagues so that, for example, 
even after leaving the
U.S. Embassy Section for the second 
time, in December 1961, 
NOSENKO
On these grounds
kept abreast of its most important activities
.
NOSENKO presented himself as an authoritative source, one who
could detail the successes and failures 
of the KGB in recruiting
Westerners--especially Americans--in the 
USSR over the years from
1953 through 1963. Repeatedly NOSENKO 
asserted that his leads to
KGB agents constituted proof of his 
bona fides.
b.
Operations Involving Americans
NOSENKO drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow
showing that:
Since the "ANDREY" case of the early 1950's* the KGB
recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff
, succeed-
ing only in recruiting one contract employee 
who was in
Moscow on TDY. NOSENKO reported 
on recruitment approaches
to six American officials stationed 
in Moscow, all of whom
to his entry into
NONENKO placed the roeraktment, date prior
The Kan in early 1951, but, Daylo W, BMUTIE (EGH Oryptnným
"ANDREY") said he became a KGB agent 
in November or 
December
1953.
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refused to collaborate with the KGB. He discussed 14 develop-
ment cases which never culminated in recruitment approaches
to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named
11 officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by
the KGB. These operations, NOSENKO asserted, comprised the
total KGB activity against Embassy personnel with the ex-
ception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII.B.4.).
Seven American correspondents in Moscow had been re-
cruited by the KGB, four of them known to NOSENKO from the
years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.S. newspaper-
men. Another two were under development by the KGB during
that period.
-
The American Express Company representative in Moscow,
Arsene FRIPPEL, had become a KGB agent in 1959; NOSENKO was
the case officer.
The number of American visitors recruited by the KGB
in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO
would have known about them in light of his senior position
in the Tourist Department during that period. Moreover, for
the years before 1962, NOSENKO provided leads to 19 other
American tourists whom the KGB recruited, plus one who was
serving the GRU when he came to Moscow. NOSENKO also de-
scribed 18 development cases and nine investigations in
which the targets were American tourists.
·
As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads
to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conver-
sations with KGB associates:. a U.S. intelligence officer having
the XGB cryptonym "SASHA" (still unidentified), a penetration of
Orly Courier Transfer Station (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee
JOHNSON), and two agents in Geneva (names not given and as yet not
positively identified). NOSENKO learned of the KGB agent status
of Horace G. LUNT] an American professor, because he tock part in
LUNT's recruitment while on TOY in Sofia, and of the
Legal Residency agent
HISM because of the connection
between and Bernard KOTE:, an American tourist with whose
case NOSENKO was personally involved. In addition, NOSENKO de-
scribed two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his know-
ledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB
had no ager.t sources able to supply information concerning the
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.
(i) Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of Reporting
If he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his
access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a
comprehensive review of KGB operations involving Americans in
the USSR.
Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKO's assurances
that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working
at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow:
GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code
clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward
this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY
(Pages 166-182). NOSENKO, the supervisor of operations
against Embassy code clerks in 1960-1961, stated that
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STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when inter-
viewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed
this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part
of 1961.
Ve
GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages
595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KGB's recruit-
ment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the pre-
sence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a кGB
agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female sec-
retary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KGB plan to
complete the recruitment of an American diplomat following
his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitment
of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee
(possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB
officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany an Embassy code clerk
travelling by train to Moscow. (There is documentary evi-
dence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about
the last of these cases; see below.)
On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be
faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tour-
ists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but
he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering
tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages
145-150).* He knew nothing concerning two documents of CIA origin
which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forth-
coming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a
year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist
Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by
George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist
season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familiar with any aspects of
the KGB operation with BLAKE. That the Tourist Department was
aware of U.S. Intelligence sending agents under tourist cover to
the Soviet Union in the years when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of
the American Tourist Section is demonstrable by four cases of
1958 and 1959 cited in a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN. NOS-
ENKO, although having no information on KGB countermeasures
against American tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the docu-
ment had been passed to CIA by COLITSYN and that it had been
written in the Tourist Department. Where NOSENKO's reporting
on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been
found to be incomplete.
* NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by
the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections
with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard
to Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CHRISTNER, who were on CIA
missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who neverthe-
less had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the
USSR in 1961 and 1962. Frederick BARCHOORN, arrested in the
USSR in 1963; had been affiliated with U.S. military intelli-
gence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his
association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to
Moscow in 1963. Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by
the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--
none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.
:
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649.
NOSENKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was a per-
sonal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, 
con-
Nearly 
all
tradicted by information available from other sources
.
of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared
In fact, the 
Americans whom he cited
with collateral information:
did visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known
to have been of operational interest to the KGB, as NOSENKO 
said.
The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, 
however, are
of major importance in themselves and in reference 
to his claimed
positions in the U.S. Embassy. Section during 1960-1961
:*
NOSENKO
U.S. Embasey Security Officer
John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO
was the responsible KGB officer,
visited the Pushkin Street dead
drop site in 1960 or at the begin-
ning of 1961. Later that same
day KOZLOV, Chief of the KGB Sur-
veillance Directorate! went to the
scene.
of
KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct sub-
ordinate, made but one TDY to
Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period;
NOSENKO would have known about if
not approved other TDY's in these
years when he was Deputy Chief of
the U.S. Embassy Section.
Returning from his single TDY to
Helsinki, KOSOLAPOV was abroad
the same train as his target, the
American military code clerk Paul
JENNER; as supervisor of all oper-
ations against code clerks at the
U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO was familiar
with the details of all such major
activities.
The KGB knew that the U.S. mili-
tary code clerk James KEYSERS,
whom NOSENKO personally contacted
in an effort to persuade him to
defect, did not report the earlier
recruitment approach by the KGB.
Collateral
CIA records on the PENKOVSKIY
case, in which the Pushkin
Street dead drop was used, show
that ABIDIAN visited the site
only once, on 30 December 1961
at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New
York City on the same day,
travelling via France, at the
completion of a TDY in the
United States. (Pages 231-
235, this subject is discussed
at greater length in Part
VIII.B.6.)
Travel records show that KOSO-
LAPOV was twice in Helsinki
during 1960, in March-April
and again in November. (Pages
186-200).
Travel records show that JENNER
and KOSOLAPOV travelled on
separate days. (Pages 186-200)
KEYSERS reported the recruitment
approach immediately after it
occurred, and the report was
submitted in an Embassy room
later found to have a concealed
microphone. (NOSENKO stated that
he was a customer for microphone
intercepts at the time and that
this microphone was monitored on
a continuous basis by KGB per-
sonnel.) (Pages 213-219)
An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later
service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts 
on 
the
According to
arrest of American Professor Frederick 
BARGHOORN:
NOSENKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had a per-
sonal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence
from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARG-
HOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the
day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow. (BREZH-
NEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November
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650.
In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam
BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV
, 
William
WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied 
having been
recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.
The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO's
reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the
HARMSTONE case, where he has given conflicting 
information on 
the
KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of his homosexuality,
and in his advice on how to identify "ANDREY"--that he 
was the only
witness to testify in Roy RHODES' trial and that he did not testify
at Roy RHODES' trial but was only interviewed in the pre-trial 
in-
vestigation once. Part VIII.D. covers the extent 
of his knowledge
about American cases in which he took part personally or as a
supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did
not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that 
it was his per-
sonal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on
nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam JAFFE, the KGB agent 
in
France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA"; and two unnamed agents in
Geneva), three development cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney:
General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN); three unsuccessful
recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and
Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations 
(Thomas 
BARTHE-
NOSENKO's alleged asso-
LEMY, Lewis BONDEN, and George WINTERS).
ciates in the KGB thus gave him the names of four recruited agents
and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent
investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental
operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations
have been identified.
(11) Damage to the Soviets
Three criteria can be used in assessing the harm to Soviet
interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:
First, the originality of his information on recruited
agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;
Second, the agents' access to classified information
at the time he reported on them; and
Third, the possibility of identifying them on the
basis of the details provided or in centimtion with details
received from other sources.
There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22
Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged
the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union
In an-
before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410).
-other-category, -NOSENKO's leads to 35 Americans under development
(Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their impor-
tance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with con-
fidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these
targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with
spasmodic or even continuing KGB access to the target, would be
Nevertheless, following
no guarantee that he is recruitable.
the criteria listed above, NOSE.KO's statements on KGB operation-
al interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about the
recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow.
!
2.
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651.
NOSENKO was the first source to report on the KGB recruit-
ments of 22 tourists (none with access to classified 
materials
and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information);
four correspondents (one said by NOSE KO to have 
become 
inactive
and on two of whom there was previous derogatory 
information);
the American Express Company representative in Moscow; a contract.
employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry 
a
Soviet national; and two agents whose names were not known to
NOSENKO but who were identifiable. The latter two agents were:
-
Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher
machine mechanic at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow recruited in
1953. Despite NOSENKO's statement that "ANDREY" was current-
ly supplying valuable information in June 1962, SMITH lost
his access to classified information through retirement from
the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before
NOSENKO first reported on him (Pages 413-426).
U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who with his
wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KGB in 1952 and
who made James MINTKENBAUGH an agent of the KGB in 1953
(Pages 427-462). Hedwig JOHNSON discontinued her role in
the operation in 1953, although thereafter remaining know-
ledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKEN-
BAUGH, according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost access to classi-
fied information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the
KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1953 (about
three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on
JOHNSON); JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.S.
Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSENKO reported in
January 1964 about the existence of this agent.
Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one
agent had access to classified information as of the date when
NOSENKO's reporting on him began. By the criteria given in the
preceeding paragraph, the single operational lead from NOSENKO
which could have damaged Soviet interests was that which un-
covered JOHNSON.
It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSON lead consti-
tuted a serious loss to the KGB. In the first place, if JOHNSON
can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document
while in charge of the "Classified Control Center" at Camp Des
His KGB case officer
Loges between August 1963 and May 1964.
later told him, JOHNSON said, that the information he could pro-
vide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts
of this sort should be made. JOHNSON also stated that he felt
his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable
for the Soviets, adding that his case officer had shown dis-
interest in his proposal to obtain for the KGP a top secret
document he (JOHNSON) thought of greater importance than any
other to which he had access. (NOSENKO indicated that JOHNSON
lost his access in the spring of 1963, while at the Orly Courier
Transfer Station.) In the second place, as the KGB knew, the
behavior of Hedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable.
Finally, the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly dis-
regarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activities
The KGB
and to observe other routine security precautions.
seems to have avoided full exploitation of JOHNSON in the latter
stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig's
mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the
TOD OF DET

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652.
threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparent
factors, the NOSENKO lead may have been considered expendable by
the KGB, without long-lasting adverse effect on the fulfillment
of its overall intelligence requirements.
NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBERG, a
U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a
target who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-
185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG
was discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on the
basis of this information, STORSBERG generally confirmed NCSENKO's
reporting on the case. GOLITSYN had earlier reported on what may
have been the same KGB operation, but GOLITSY. believed the mili-
tary code clerk had been recruited; from what GOLITSYN had pre-
viously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possible
that the KGB recruited either STOKSBERG or William HURLEY (who
If it
NOSENKO said was not recruited or approached by the KG3).
is assumed that STORSBERG was not recruited in the approach de-
scribed by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN,
the KGB suffered no loss in the American services learning of
this case. If it is assumed on the other hand that STCRSBERG or
HURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENKO assisted the KGB--
not the American services--by deflecting security investigations
from a recruited agent of the KGB.
· (iii)
Importance or Usefulness
The American leads from NOSENKO enabled U.S. security author-
ities to:
Confirm previous information on the recruitments of
13 tourists and three correspondents;
Verify previous derogatory information on 11 tourists,
two correspondents, and perhaps one military code clerk,
STORSBERG;
-
Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow; and
-
Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig JOHNSON and
MINTKENBAUGH.
食
One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD)
in the past had been in a position to pass classified information
to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to classified
information and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexuals
at the Moscow Embassy (APMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also had
access to classified information. From the standpoint of pro-
tecting the security of the U.S. Government, NOSENKO brought to
an end the JOHNSON operation and the KGB's potential for recruit-
ing ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN.
Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced
the amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. secu-
rity authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENKO's information
on 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessful
recruitment approaches, and 33 investigations by the KGB--a total
of 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing:
and interrogation of NOSENKO on these cases, but the investigative
Among these 32 agents were many whom the KGB had not recontacted
after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union,
others who had broken contact with the KG5, some who were known
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653.
work in the United States was accomplished mostly by other
agencies. It would seem, however, that the JOHNSON operation
was the only NOSENKO lead to be important or useful.
(iv) Remarks
Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the demonstrable in-
completeness in some of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authori-
tative or reliable source of information on operations against
Americans by the U.S. Embassy Section and the American Tourist
Section. Proven untrustworthy in other categories of operational
leads, there is no reason to accept at face value NOSENKO's state-
ment that SMITH was the only Moscow Embassy employee working with
the KGB from 1953 through 1963; indeed, evidence to the contrary
exists. The same may be true regarding American tourists and
correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitments not mentioned
by NOSENKO could have occurred. Furthermore, with the question-
able exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great
value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage
by occupying the attention and facilities of American security
authorities.
It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold infor-
mation on recruitments of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to
provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did
not hold the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American
Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations
about the bona fides of NOSENKO as a genuine scurce, and these
reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and
U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads. By itself, this
evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possi-
bility that the KGB dispatched NOSENKO to report to CIA, and that
the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security
services.
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654.
Operations Involving Other Westerners
(1) Introduction
As already indicated, NOSENKO's principal knowledgeability
of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet 
Union.
With the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case,
his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non-
American) operations stems from his association with the section
of the Tourist Department concerned with United Kingdom and Canad-
Where he has commented on
ian, as well as American, tourists.
sources for the rest of his third-national leads, he indicated
his knowledge was acquired either through conversations with
other officers or through his position as Deputy Chief of the
Thus he made no claim for com-
Tourist Department in 1962-1963.
pleteness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy
and full details on any one case. No attempt will be made here
,
therefore, to compare his information with other sources, except
in terms of whether NOSENKO's reporting harmed the Soviets and
assisted American security.
(ii) Discussion
Of the 90 third-national recruitment leads (Pages 474-502),
These cannot be
22 have not yet been positively identified.
evaluated at all except to point out that only two of them are
potentially significant, the NATO penetration in Belgium in 1962
(which may be the same as a lead from another source) and 
a code
Without
clerk in the West German Embassy in Moscow in 1961.
knowing the status of these two operations at the time NOSENKO
told CIA about them, it is not possible to measure the value to
us or the damage to the Soviet Union through the compromise of
these cases.
No
Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been
identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them.
conclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of
these, but the majority were said by NOSENKO to be travel agency
Five of the 30 hela
employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.).
positions of trust in their respective governments; these five
leads are discussed below in terms of potential value to U.S.
of the five who have been
security and potential damage to the KGB.
interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO information.
being recruited by the KGB, including ☑
four denied
(the only one
or those interviewed holding a government position), discussed
below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is
unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been ques-
tioned while in the USSR.
Among the 35 new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had
positions of trust, with known or presumed access to sensitive
information, in their respective governments:
KGB was working
: NOSENKO said in 1962 that the
When he was g
in Moscow, but he did not know whether
was recruited or not.
Cold CIA of his contacts in Moscow with
Soviets whom he suspected of being intelligence officers,
and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by
General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV),
whom
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65:.
he had known in Moscow. He has not be interviewed directly
on the Lasis of the NOSENKO lead, nor has he reported a re-
cruitment approach.
French
NOSENKO reported that
is either an agent
solid contact"
Indian
NOSENKO has identified him as
' ཏྭཱཝ ཏསབྷཱནཱམར
a KGB agent, with no further information. Stationed at the
Indian Embassy in Moscow from 1987 to 1951.
1960
there is no erogatory information on him in CIA files.
Indonesian
in Moscow: In 1960 20ENKO reported that p
1961 the KGB recruited the
Although NCSENKO had
spelled out the name in 1962, in 1964 he could recall no
such case but thought this must have seen a mistake for the
case of who had been the
that
time.
Aside from the fact that conditions in Indonesia
precluded CIA's passing this lead to the Indonesian service
for investigation, Indonesia's position until 1966 was that
of a semi-satellite of the Communist Eloc, and revelation
of such a recruitment in the prevailing situation would
have been of no value to the United States nor harm to the
Soviet Union.
Thus of the third-national leads originating with NOSENKO,
five might be considered to be important serause of their posi-
tion in government. In two cases
he was
not able to say whether there was a recruitment, however, while
a third (assuming that there was no further confusion on NOSEN-
KO's part) cannot be considered in important lead because of the
Communist bias of the Indonesian Government.
position as
an agent or contact loses significance in view of his previously
reported support of a powerful leftist political figure. The
possible importance of the
lead cannot,
be assessed
without investigation results.
The William VASSALL case (Pages 501-507) was the one third-
national lead which NOSENKO himself considered most important.
He invariably included this lead when talking about the impor-
tance of his reporting. The British security services neverthe-
I
14-00000
TOP SECRET
656.
less were well on their way to identifying the source of the
Admiralty documents identified 
by GOLITSYN, having narrowed
their list of suspects to 20 (
including VASSALL) by 11 June 
1962.
When they received the fragment 
of NOSENKO information which
focused on the British Embassy 
in Moscow, the number was 
reduced
Although 
the NOSENKO information
to VASSALL and one other.
apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL,
there is reason to believe that 
the identification would have
The lead was 
there-
been accomplished without this 
information.
fore not new or exclusive information
, and 
NOSENKO himself ad-
mitted in 1964 that he knew that 
GOLITSYN had known of the case
from the latter's work in the Information (
Reports) Department.
Of the identified third-nationals whom NOSENKO said were
being targetted or investigated by the KGB, 
none held positions
of significance, with the sole 
exception of the then member of
whose personal life
the British Parliament,
and career the Soviets subsequently attempted--with considerable
success--to destroy through a campaign 
of scandal.
(iii) Remarks
On the basis of the above examination, NOSINKO's information
on KGB operations against third-nationals 
cannot be considered a
As a pos3-
positive factor in the assessment 
of his bona fides.
ible negative factor in 
consideration of his bona 
fides, the in-
significance of NOSENKO's reporting on 
third-national leads must
be measured against the 
criteria of his claimed access and con-
trary evidence. In the case of 
foreign tourists his leads show--
and he himself has commented
--that such recruitments were of no
particular value; assuming that NOSENKO 
was Deputy Chief of the
Tourist Department, he should be 
able to make such a statement
without challenge. To date no 
independent evidence of foreign
Opera-
tourist recruitments has emerged 
which contradicts him.
tions against other Western embassies 
in Moscow are a 
slightly
different matter. NOSENKO's 
information, or lack thereof, can-
not be evaluated on the basis of completeness 
because he has 
made
no claim to full access to such 
information or to positions which
Except for those he said he
would have given him better access.
was informed of in connection with possible use against U.S.
Embassy targets, he has usually 
sourced such third-national
leads as he did have to particularly 
close relations with 
the
responsible case officer. It 
would not be valid to argue that
a source of one lead should have 
told him of others, or that 
he
Thus on all
should have had more close friends in 
the KGB.
applicable criteria, the NOSENKO leads to operations against
third-nationals must be excluded 
as a factor weighing for or
against his bona fides.
į
i
TOP SECRET
'
14-00000
TOP SECRET,
657.
hav
the
had
norm
inc
?
4.
a.
Technical Operations Against the U.S. Emb.qgay
Discussion
Attache.
NOSENKO
In reporting on KGB microphones in the U.S. Pribassy (Pages
248-269), NOSENKO said 
in 1962 that there were at that time "
four
or five points," later 
adding a sixth, from which conversations
were heard. They 
included the offices of the Miniater Counselor
,
the Military Attache, the Naval 
Attache, the Air Attache, one
(unidentified) "State Department 
employee," and the Agricultural
He also referred 
to a non-productive microphone in the
code room but did not count 
this as one of the pointe.
did not supply details of the information 
which the K(
I obtained
from any of these microphones 
except to make general allusions
to the importance 
of the materials from those in the offices 
of
the Minister Counselor and the Military 
Attache.
that the existence of these microphones was 
the 
Kill's "biggest
secret" and that only a 
very few people knew of thimli.
NOSENKO gave more details and provided 
a written list 
of the
offices where microphones 
were actively monitored in 1960 and
1961.
No strumbed
In 1964
NOSENKO's information on the microphones would appear, on
the basis of the findings of the 
sweep team in 1904, to be 
gener-
ally accurate. Where NOSENKO 
reported there was me production
but microphones 
were found audible, the discrepancy could be 
ex-
plained by KGB technical failure to receive 
the intercepts after
they left the point at which the sweepers 
tested, where HOSENKO
reported materials were 
obtained (such as from the Air Attache's
office) and the sweepers found 
the microphone inaudible, it could
be conjectured that the 
microphone died between early 1962 and
the date of the sweep in 1964.
However, NOSENKO's 16porting 
did
not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and had 
reported on.
one specific microphone, and another 
earlier (and probably com-
promised) source had also 
reported that the microplaned were
there.
The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when located and traced
back to the point where its 
wires left the building, would lead
to the uncovering of all the other 
microphones, in fact 
happen-
ed with the find in 
Room 1008 (Page 256).
NOSENKO was unable to expand on his microphone information
after his defection. Questioned 
repeatedly for details of the
operation or 
examples of the product of these microphones, he 
gave
almost no cperational details* and could 
supply only the same
three generalized 
examples of their product which he had 
already
given in 1962: the unproductivity 
of the code 100m microphone,
COLIT-
One of the few concrete incidents which NOSENKO recounted
connected to the microphone operation 
(with the exception
of the North Wing 
planning, see below) was the leas of a
document reporting the product from 
one of the microphones
?
GOLITSYN had already 
told the same story (Page 295).
SYN said he was present during 
the search for this 
document
and it was under these 
circumstances that he learned speci-
fically that there was a microphone in 
the office of the
Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 stressed that this
microphone was the most important 
in the Embassy,
TOP SECRET
H
14-00000
TOP Cent.
658.
Of these three
the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports
which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGB but
could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned;
and the Military Attache's planning of trips which permitted the
KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad in 1955.
examples given by an officer who said he culled all the micro-
phone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and
therefore useless microphone, the second concerned a microphone
(in the Minister Counselor's office; already reported by a pre-
vious defector, and the third concerned a well known incident
which took place years earlier (and which NOSENKO should have
planned and helped conduct, according to his claimed position in
1955; NOSENKO said he played no such role).*
In 1964 NOSENKO brought to CIA a sheet of paper which he
said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting and which had been obtained in
This, he said
1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 250-251):
then, was how he knew of the exact locations of all the actively
* A comparison betweer. NOSENKO's third example and a 1956 message
from a sensitive source who is believed to have been compromis-
ed to the KGB after that message (but before 1962) reveals sim-
ilarities which may not be coincidental.
-
"We are listening
NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260):
We know where they intend
to your Military Attaches there.
electric
to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machin-
Some of the things
ery and what targets interest them...
they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things,
where to go, what to see, what to take with them
And we are hunting for this electronic
equipment or not.
equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely cer-
tain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus
with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to
steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary
Because you now have improved your equip-
steps to steal it.
ment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."
-
Sensitive source, 1956 (see Page 254):
-
... All rooms
are being monitored by the KGB... The 'flap' involving the
American directior. finding specialists in Stalingrad in
the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGB because conver-
sations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy.
As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valu-
able direction-finding equipment from the American Intelli-
gence officers..."
It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were
reporting a well-known event, because GOLITSYN reported in
1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB
training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate
work. The training version may have included the role of the
microphone information (although GOLITSYN did not report that
it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention
of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call
into question NOSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of
the microphone product.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
659.
Sim-
NOSENKO was not
monitored and productive "points" in 1960-1961.
able to explain why he would need this list to know the locations
of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting,
and distributing the product of all of them for two years.
ilarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962
that there were eleven points--as the list showed--rather than
the four-to-six NOSENKO reported on in 1962.
NOSENXO's account of how the product from the microphones was
distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case
officers who had served in the U.S. Embassy Section since the
microphones were installed would know of their existence--despite
any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product as "agent re-
ports. NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that "it is a
tremendous secret that we are listening to you, and that the
microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the
Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could
reflect dangerously on him as the source.
u
•
"
Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude
and interest in technical matters, and therefore his inability
to provide specific technical details concerning electronic oper-
ations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:
NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called
"Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy
communications and at other times that it was used to
monitor them.
· Although he claimed to have personally participated
in the planning for the installation of audio devices in
the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the ex-
istence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill
found there by American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO
insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the
North Wing at the time of its, renovation for occupancy
by Americans.)
-
NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research
and development to substitute for or improve the fading
microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.
These three points relate to aspects of the KGE's audio-technical
attack on the U.S. Embassy in which the reporting of a source in
NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude,
could have been detrimental to Soviet interests.
Both GOLITSYN and the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First
Chief Directorate officers. That they both knew of the micro-
phones suggests that NOSEKO exaggerated the sensitivity of
the microphone operation, which had moreover always been
assumed by the Embassy to be active.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
659a.
b.
Remarks
Thus
NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic opera-
tions against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely.
His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones,
as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic
operations directed against the Embassy, was not commensurate with
his alleged position in the U.S. Embassy Section and his particu-
lar responsibility for audio operations. Significantly, the
essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report,
the existence of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's
office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have
been compromised six months earlier, with the defection of COLIT-
SYN. Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on
GOLITSYN's information, would have led to all the others.
the Embassy microphones must have been considered by the KGB to
have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoke of them in 1962.
Added to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that
the efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole
had seriously diminished by late 1961 or early 1962 due to, first,
normal deterioration of equipment and wiring and, second, the
installation of secure rooms and the implementation of more
For these reasons
stringent security precautions at the Embassy.
and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of
electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it cannot
be considered that the information provided by NOSENKO in 1962
and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to
American authorities. NOSENKO's denial of any installations in
the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of
coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as
yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to
have been responsible for the operational planning for the north
wing at the time it was being prepared for American occupancy,
would appear to be purposeful deception.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
BUY OLONE
660.
5.
The BELITSKIY Case
Introduction
NOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items
he wanted to sell) that one of its agents, the 
Soviet interpreter
BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had 
been planted on
CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this 
was a case run by 
the
Second ("Active Line") Section, but that he personally 
had a role
NOSENKO was
in the management of the case in May 1962 in 
Geneva.
able to give certain inside information on this case; for example,
he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers 
with the agent
.
b.
Discussion
NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was
correct. CIA had been running BELITSKIY as an agent, 
and the CIA
the latter from Washington
case officers (alias "Bob" and "Henry,
as NOSENKO said) had just completed a series of meetings with
BELITSKIY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were
inaccurate: BELITSKIY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO's
Also
, NOSENKO's claim
date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London.
that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at en-
ticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the
history of the case or by BELITSKIY's conduct, although 
it 
cannot
be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the 
KGB
NOSENKO's account of 
the 
case
still sought without appearing to.
thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in
it had been as claimed.
NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consis-
tent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic.
NOSENKO said in both 1962 and 1964 that he had had 
orders to
supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of
1962. The reason was that the case officer for 
BELITSKIY in
Ger.eva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even
NOSENKO was saying in
worked on the BELITSKIY case before.
effect--with the authority of direct knowledge and official re-
sponsibility--that BELITSKIY, a prominent Soviet citizen having
personal contacts with well placed members of the Soviet Govern-
ment, a man who had been under the ostensible 
control of a hos-
tile intelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the
KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with pre-
pared information, but that the KGB did not send with 
him 
the
responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible
for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsi-
bility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to
be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who
had had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even
local knowledge of Geneva conditions; then, after BELITSKIY was
already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO,
who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only
unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section
Chief responsible, who had no experience or training in handl-
ing double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva
TOP SECRET
77

14-00000
661.
by chance with delegation security functions, should guide the
other "less experienced" case officer.* As NOSENKO showed
under questioning, he did not know the contents of any of the
positive intelligence BELITSKIY was to pass to CIA as disinfor-
mation; he did not know BELITSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern
of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail how or when
the operation started; he did not know the nature of degree of
British involvement, nor the operational details and contact
arrangements. NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been placed on a
Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to "find"
and recontact him.**
C. Remarks
The circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO's
version of the case and his own access but also suggest that
NOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double
agents are handled. The examples he gave of his "guidance" to
ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 196; that he
had arranged the actual introduction to BELITSKIY of KISLOV, the
TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's need of a notional subsource
for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had appar-
ently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KIS-
LOV had had no connection whatever with the BELITSKIY case. NOS-
ENKO claimed to have met BELITSKIY, but did not recognize his
photo when shown it in 1966.
Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the
KGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite frequently expressed
doubts of BELITSKIY's bona fides, CIA was handling the operation
as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of
(The KGB is
exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR).
NOSENKO has reported that he handled only one American agent
(FRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA or even
vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent
operations. ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA
tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other opera-
tions against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine
search (see Page 148), and continuous American Department
service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1958-1959
operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they fell in the
operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the
time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.
** NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact
arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
662.
aware, as Soviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates,
of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as
such.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it
clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY
inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the
point of diminishing returns. It is perhaps significant that
NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until
10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva
had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final
appraisal of the operation's potential.
NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears
to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would
preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since
NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KCB operation
which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to
find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to this information
except that the KGB briefed him about it.
TOP SECRET
2155
14-00000
663.
6.
8.
(1)
KGB Investigations*
Compromise of POPCV
Introduction
Fixing the date and cause of the compromise of POPOV, the
CIA penetration source in the GRU (Pages 530-534) could 
affect
If what 
NOSENKO has 
said
the evaluation of NOSENKO's production.
is basically true, his story of POPOV's compromise (which has also
been reported by other sources) is not particularly important 
and
The KGB
has not harmed the KGB nor measurably assisted CIA:
assumes an awareness by CIA that it conducts surveillance of U.S.
Embassy personnel, especially those having known or suspected Am-
erican Intelligence connections (as with LANGELLE and 
WINTERS).
If NOSENKO on the other hand has been incomplete or inaccurate
in his statements about the compromise of FCPOV, then his claims
to knowledgeability on this subject must be questioned.
(11) Discussion
The information from NOSENKO and other sources on the POPOV
compromise may be collated and summarized in tabular form:
Cause
Date Implied
KGB surveillance of WINTERS
KGB surveillance of WINTERS
21 January 1959
21 January 1959
KGB intercept of WINTERS
letter
21 January 1959
Source
NOSENKO✶✶
CHEPEPANOV
document
POPOV message
of 18 September
1959***
!
sensitive
source
KGB surveillance of U.S.
Embassy officer
none
KGB surveillance of LANGELLE
4 January 1959
KGB agent
GOLITSYN, from
the KGB orienta-
tion paper on
the PCPOV case
*****
prior to 23 Nov-
ember 1957
GOLITSYN*
Under this heading, only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY,
and CHEREPANOV are considered; there is insufficient collateral
material available for an evaluation of NOSENKO's information
on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER
(Pages 571-575).
** NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS mailing a
letter which, upon being checked, was found to be addressed
to POPOV; he has contradicted himself about 
whether the KGB
applied metka to this letter.
***POPOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing
this letter.
(Footnotes continued on next page.)
TOP SECRET
だれ
14-00000
664.
POPOV was
The only other evidence available is analytical.
transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June
Until mid-August he
1957, an assignment of high sensitivity.
handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October
1957. Following home leave from 12 December 1957 to 19 January
1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where
Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not ex-
posed to him. Between March and November 1958 there were signs
of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling unit where POPOV
formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in November of that
year. These facts can be interpreted as follows::
POPOV's status as a CIA source was not compromised before
his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.
POPOV's status was compromised before his recall to Moscow
in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the
Illegals handling unit in January 1958, and possibly some time
earlier. The latter possibility is apparent from the Soviets'
knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in
December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy
that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-
half months prior to 13 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was
involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October
1957.
The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to
keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate
the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other
CIA sources.
This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's in-
formation that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival
of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before
23 November 1957.
(Footnotes from preceeding page.)
*****Since such orientation papers are written for general circula-
tion within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security prac-
tices would permit their contents to reveal sensitive infor-
mation; other sources have indicated that orientation papers
sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however,
reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in
about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence
had a source which had provided GRU information.
******This date, which is consistent with that cited in the final
sentence of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the
time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer
ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to
Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as
being a source of CIA.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
1
665.
(111)
Remarks
The completeness and accuracy of NOSENKO's information on
and the
the compromise of POPOV, supported as it is by
CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by
GOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot be finally evaluated.
Only with resolution of the bona fides of NOSENKO can a judgment
be made on this part of his production.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
i
b.
Compromise of PENKOVSK!Y*
(1) Introduction
666.
Recause his direct responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN
is an essential element in NOSENKO story of his 1960-1961 career,
because he insists that the KGB had no idea of U.S. involvement in
the FENKOVSKIY case until Richard JACOB went to the Fushkin Street
dead drop on 2 November 1962, and because he is adamant on the
point that the KGB until almost the end of the PENKOVSKIY case knew
of no connection between PENKOVSKIY and the Fuskin Street site
Which ABIDIN visited, NOSENKO's story of the compromise of PENKOV-
SKIY appears to bear directly on the question of ROSENKO's bona
fides. Each of the various versions of the compromise of PENKOV-
SKIY must be examined and compared with NOSENKO's story and with
the established facts.**
(11) Discussion
DAN sources agree on the cause, and two on the timing.
NOSENKO, 2
and the "official KGE report" attribute the
compromise to the fact that surveillance detected a meeting be-
tween Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet whom the KGB later identified
as PENKOVSKIY. NOSENKO dated this as around November or December
1961, the official report stated this occurred on 30 December 1961,
ard
did not give a date.
gave the cause as surveillance, but of Greville WYNNE
and PENKOVSKIY rather than Mrs. CHISHOLM, and stated that the com-
promise dated from May 1962.
200 gave two different
accounts, one that PENKOVSKIY was investigated for reasons unre-
lated to any suspicions of espionage and was thereby found out as
a spy, the other that his excessive spending and sale of foreign
merchandise led to an investigation which resulted in detection of
his espionage activities. She placed the timing of the first ver-
sion in 1961, without citing the time of year; in the second, she
associated the timing with a warning against association with
PENKOVSKIY which she and her husband received in about November
1961.
Since
* See Pages 535-547 for discussion of this case.
**It does not seem unusual for several sources to have reported
on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY: Fresumably this was the sub-
ject of widespread discussion within the two Soviet services,
for it was covered in the Soviet press and ir. at least one
"official report" disseminated by the KGB. Although their
differing situations within the Soviet services could partially
explain the differing versions that these sources have given,
some of them nevertheless have claimed either direct knowledge
of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. There-
fore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the
PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, and the
facts on the handling of the case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent
to the question of NOSENKO's bona fides.
FOR PECKET.
14-00000
LOST/MISSING MATERIAL
DATE
4/12/94
THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING
DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL
REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.
DOCUMENT NO.
OR
PAGE (ST
667
FROM:
DATED:
CIA JOB NO.
BOX NO. JFK Reel 46
2
FOLDER NO.
14-00000
668
PEIKOVSKIY that he had visited the site after he chose it in 1960,
although it is possible, especially as he had not been informed
of ABIDIAN having been sent to check on a possible signal from
him about the dead drop.
sensitive porce
however, makes it clear
that the ABIDIAN visit was not the first observed activity
at Pushkin Street to stir KGB investigative interest in the
site. As the report states, when massive surveillance of
U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this
address the first time, he was not followed inside by sur-
veillants, but on the second occasion he was followed
closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling
went on to say
down apparently tying his shoe.*
that, although this was not very unusual,
it was sufficient
to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American
had been observed visiting the same address on two occasions
for no apparent reason. There is no question about the
fact that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on
The
one occasion only, and that was on 30 December 1961.
reference to this as a second visit to this address by an
American from the Embassy is a clear indication that the
KGB had surveilled the first such visit, which was made
by the CIA officer MAHONEY** in January 1961, and not by
ABIDIAN. Thus where rose serred by indicating
one American went to Pushkin Street twice, the KGB must
have known that MAHONEY went there first, in January 1951.
and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December 1961.
said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted from
the second visit, and because of it PENKOVSKIY was sub-
sequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address
but did not visit anyone there. It was determined that
no one living at that address knew PENKOVSKIY and he be-
came a target of KGB suspicion and investigation.
The rest of the
story is completely in disagreement
with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here.
It must be noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance
among all the versions which places the compromise on the Amer-
ican side of the case, and the only one which makes a direct
connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB
detection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise
to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claim-
ed that the KGB was unaware of American Intelligence participa-
tion until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct
conflict with NOSENKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S. Embassy
official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN.
this regard, NOSENKO insisted that the date of ABIDIAN's visit
In
* ABIDIAN reported that a woman entered the vestibule behind
him while he was in there, and he knelt down pretending to
tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the
stairs.
**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had been identified to the
KGB as a CIA officer well before MAHONEY'S October 1960 arri-
val in Moscow.
TCP SECRET
14-00000
'
669
was the end of 1960 or the very beginning of 1961, whereas in
Despite the 
errors
fact MAHONEY's visit was in January 1961.
relating to loadings and unloadings of deaddrops at the Pushkin
Street location after the second (ABIDIN) visit 
there, this
story from establishes KGB knowledge of MACY's casing
of Pushkin Street.
Greville WYNNE's testimony concerning his interrogations by
the KGB also introduced elements contradisting the versions of
W and
NOSEIKO,
con-
As indicated in discussion of NUSEN's story of the
versation with DULACKI (Pages 536-538), the KGB was con inced
that PENKOVSKIY's question about his girlfriend "ZEP" was an im-
WYNNE
portant allusion and they demanded that WYNNE explain it.
either had forgotten the name or had never known it
, and 
he was
The fact that 
the KGB 
had
unable to tell the KGB who "ZEP" was.
& recording of this 27 May 1961 conversation shows also that the
KGB was at least suspicious of the relationship before 
that con-
versation took place and must have then become aware of the 
con-
spiratorial aspect of the PENKOVSKIY-WANNE relationship 
by 
virtue
The additional fact
of the cryptic nature of that conversation.
that the KGB surveilled WYNNE to the apartment of an unidentified
officer of British Intelligence on the same day the "ZEP" conver-
sation between WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY was monitored 
is evidence
that both YNNE and PENKOVSKIY were under strong suspicion of
Nor could those sus-
espionage as of that day, if not earlier.
picions have been explained away by the fact that PEIKOVSKIY and
WYNNE hed legitimate cover reasons for contact, in view 
of the
content of their conversation--there was nothing in their overt
relationship which required secrecy or even caution in conversa-
tion.
The indication fron
that the KG3 was aware
of MAHONEY's visit to the inside vestibule of the Pushkin Street
site in January 1961 is not only missing from all other versions.
but conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story; he claimed to know
everything the KGB knew about this American dead drop 
site, 
be-
NOSENKO 
on one occasion said
cause of ABIDIAN's visit there.
that he thought an American tourist (not a U.S. Embassy officer)·
might have visited the site a year or two earlier than 
ABIDIAN.
(iii) Remarks
NOSENKO did not know or did not report to CIA that the
only other American who had visited the Pushkin Street dead drop
area was MAHONEY. This fact suggests that either NOSEIKO 
was
deliberately withholding from CIA information 
of vital 
import-
ance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise, or he was unaware of the
KGB's possession of this information, despite his claimed posi-
tion in the U.S. Embassy Section and responsibility for cover-
age of ABIDIAN. The fact that his story on the PENKOVSKIY
compromise, like the "official report" of the 
KGB, does 
not
show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGB's possession
as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his withholding of in-
formation on the subject of the timing of PEIKOVSKIY's compro-
If 
NOSENKO
mise, which was definitely no later than this date.
was deliberately withholding information on this subject and
lying about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, then he is not a bona
fide defector. If he is unaware of the information 
which 
the
KGB has in its possession, then he was not in the U.S. Embassy
Section in 1960 or 1961 as claimed, and hence his bona 
fides
would be disproven.
21-6
TOP SECRET
14-00000
191
3.
670.
C.
Compromise of CHEREPANOV
(i) Introduction
NOSENKC's stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOV-
SKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause. In
the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-558), there is no question about
when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB
openly learned of the U.S. Embassy's possession of the papers.
The chief question is the authenticity of the documents themselves,
with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that
the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that
there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for
CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel
authorization (see also Part VIII.D.8.).
(ii) The Operational Plan in Draft
Examination of one draft document--the operational plan
against the CIA officer WINTERS--reveals the following points
related to form:
-
· Although only a draft, the title of the case officer,
the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor
as approving authority, and the designation of his office
component as well as the title of the confirming authority
(the head of the department) are spelled out in full, even
including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of
Ministers of the USSR. KGB practice, as reported by
other sources and as logic would dictate, does not require
that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are,
and the typist routinely fills them in as the official
copy is typed from the draft.
-
Although only a draft, this document has been signed
by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common
sense and KGB practice. NOSENKO himself noted this dis-
crepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done this.
-
Although only a draft, the name of the target of
the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors
have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the
name is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing
pool will not know the identity of the subject of the
report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to
appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after
the document comes back from the typist.
-
On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV,
this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been
drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this
time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been de-
tected in operational letter-mailing, and had been
associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this
TOP SECRET,
!

14-00000
!
I
671.
operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in
the CHEREPANOV package cited a KG3 cryptonym for him, and
he is always referred to in true name, but this is contrary
to the usage in the other operational plans in the package.
It is also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSEN.
KO and other sources.
-
The draft cited several technical aids to be used in
the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB
cryptonym of metha and "Neptun-80" for two of these techni-
ques, but immediately thereafter explains for what purpose
each one of them is used. In the other operational plans
from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established
KGB practice of inserting cryptonyms for such devices,
these preparations are not only not described, but the
blank line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand
after typing.
In addition to the above points of form, this same document
contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and
which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an
approved draft. One of the objectives announced in the plan is
to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact
with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetic-
ally as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be
an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval
thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen who had been
observed in contact with an identified officer of American Intel-
ligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the
nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the
KGB. This is in contradiction to all available information con-
cerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of
unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in
the Soviet Union, not to mention Western. Intelligence officers.
The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be sum-
marized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contra-
dictions:
To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence
activities in the USSR, six special tasks will be carried
out, including round-the-clock surveillance, metka,
"Neptun-80," hidden microphones, other audio-devices.
and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens.
-
Because he already been identified as an intelli-
gence operator, and he has a hostile attitude toward the
USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the
actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be
carried out because they might alarm him and cause him.
to leave the USSR prematurely.
-
Despite the statements of the second paragraph,
which indicate that recruitment is out of the question
and which precludes putting into effect the measures
outlined in the first paragraph, this third paragraph
sets forth the expectation that just before WINTERS'
scheduled departure and depending on further accumula-
tion of materials on WINTERS and the prevailing polit-
ical climate at the time, an opportunity is likely to
arise which will permit testing the possibility of
recruiting him.
TOP SECRET
:
14-00000
672.
If the WINTERS) operation plan were a draft like the others in
this collection, the above conflicting and confusing paragraphs
might be explained as variations jotted down as possible ap-
proaches to presenting a plan for the future, as yet undecided
in direction. This document, however, is the one 
which--to
NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved and signed in draft by
KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Depart-
ment, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer,
KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing pool that it was
to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance
of a draft which had been or was about to be made a matter 
of
official KGB record.
The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and dis-
regard for security considerations in preparation constitutes
evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft document.
(iii) The Summary on LANGELLE
A second document, a handwritten note in what NOSENKO
identified as CHEREPANOV's own handwriting, also is pertinent
to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO's account on
CHEREPANOV. This is a short summary of the operational activity
of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POPOV.
The document says in part: "In January 1959 a letter with secret
writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow,
WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed to a Soviet citizen,
Accord-
POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Army.
ing to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established
that POPOV was an American agent..."
This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's account of POPOV's
compromise (see Pages 532 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollec-
tion of the official report which he read, there is no reference
in this document to the report of about 1957 from an agent source
that there was a leak of GRU information; nor is there reference
to the indication that the KG3 knew that LANGELLE had been posted
to Moscow in order to handle a special agent, for this reason
If both of these
placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance.
items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their
omission from the summary report in what purports to be CHERE-
PANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV
was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case
officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/
The latter posi-
POPOV cperation was investigated by the KGB.
tion should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the com-
promise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN--informed
only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had
more detail, as well as conflicting information, on the same
case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case summary
would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the dis-
covery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeed un-
necessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing
it to an agent source. In thus supporting NOSENKO and others
as to the cause of POPOV's compromise, and contradicting
GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated in-
dependently), this document too appears to be a XGB fabrica-
tion.
The authenticity of another passage in the same document is
likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE's
two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for
TOP SECRET
14-00000
673.
the purposes of casing a drop site and putting down the dead
The document 
further stated that the 
dead
drop, respectively.
drop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of American Intel-
ligence who had recently been arrested 
by the Moscow KGB.
errors of fact in this passage belie KGB 
practice as known 
from
many sources:
Two
There is no reason to doubt that the KGB observed
LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills,
Both sites
both times to case a proposed dead drop site.
involved staircases, but they were two different stair-
cases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills 
park.
Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put 
down a 
dead
drop on either occasion. KGB surveillance could 
not have
seen him do so. If the KGB had reason to suspect 
that 
he
had done so, but could not locate it (since it was 
not
there). the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than
in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put
24-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable 
length
of time, in order to apprehend the agent for whom it 
was
intended. The dead drop was not actually put down until
7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the 
second
casing. Assuming the KGB had not stopped its coverage
of the area after only ten days, the CIA agent who did
put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this.
CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by attributing to LANGELLE
an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and 
which
the KGB almost certainly knew someone else had taken.
- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not
It
been designated for any agent. REPNIKOV included.
was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some
time in the future as necessary; the agent for whom it
might have been designated could conceivably not even
be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded.
REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person in-
tended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of Ameri-
can Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading
or at any time thereafter; neither was any dead drop
contemplated for him in the event that he might be re-
cruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have sug-
Again,
gested REPNIKOV as the intended recipient.
CHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned
the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop
was unassigned by CIA.
If this document were or purported to be the official
version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed
form, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentional
and part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make the
As it is a
KGB investigative work look better than it was.
handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of the person who
intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm
the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access
to the true facts, the absence of some comment further 
indi-
cates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and in-
complete.
'
TOP SECRET
!
14-00000
674.
(iv) Remarks
That at least two of the documents were not authentic is
evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB
for American Intelligence consumption.
There is no sensitive information contained in any of the
documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing
It 
is 
further
either in helping the West or damaging the KGB.
questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined
for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959
, and 
so
on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against
the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources
.
It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the
CHEREPANOV case, some dating from the earliest known history of
the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view
of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary.
It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a provocative
plan of the KGB. NOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually
confirming source on KGB affairs, must be 
interpreted as an
indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the
CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown
to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the
validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity
of his own information on the same topics which those documents
also covered.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
C.
Evaluation of Sourcing
1.
Introduction
675.
NOSENKO was able to provide logical and plausible sourcing
for most of his American leads, through 
his claimed professional
assignments. Among his foreign leads, these to 
which he had no
plausible direct access have been variously 
sourced to hearsay
from case officer friends (as with 
VASSALL, from his friend
CHURANOV) and involvement in peripheral activities (such 
as 
his
TDY to the city of Vladimir after the
Question-
had been spotted as homosexual during a visit here).
able sourcing by NOSENKO has occurred in his 
statements 
on his
one Couble agent case, four American cases 
and three involving
foreigners. They are reviewed below because 
they include the
most important leads NOSENKO has provided.
2. Discussion
There are two KGB Second Chief Directorate operations in-
volving Americans which NOSENKO has sourced inconsistently 
or
falsely.
He demonstrated uncertainty in his knowledge of the facts
of the "ANDREY" case (Pages 413-426) by making vague 
allusions
to having heard of it in "bits and pieces
" from a number of 
case
officers involved in the case at different 
times; his first know-
ledge of it, he said, was due to his own employment 
in the U.S.
Embassy Section in 1953-1955, "although I 
worked there quite a
bit later. But it was known. (In 1962 
he repeatedly dated 
the
"ANDFEY",
recruitment as "1949-50.") Dayle SMITH, 
identified as
fixed his recruitment date around December 
1953, and 
he did not
Since SMITH was directly 
sub-
leave Moscow until April 1954.
ordinate to the office of the Army Attache, which was responsible
for the Embassy's code room, NOSENKO as case 
officer for the Army
Attaches had a logical reason for knowing more 
than he claimed
MULE, who succeeded
about the case, including the agent's name
.
VAN LAETHEM as cryptographic security officer and SMITH's super-
visor, was supposed to be one of NOSENKO's 
more active cases at
this time. It is clear from NOSENKO's 
inability to claim direct
knowledge of the case that he was not aware 
of these, facts.
In the case of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 468-469), the U.S.
Embassy Security Officer from 1954 to 1955, NOSENKO's 
ignorance
of the objective facts of the case led him 
into statements con-
In
cerning his own knowledge of the case which 
cannot be true.
1962 he claimed to have played a significant 
role in the 
attempt
to recruit SMITH, but he admitted after 
the defection that these
claims were exaggerations designed to make him 
look better than
He said 
the case officer was KOVSHUK, and
he was at the time.
GRIBANOV was personally running the operation, but that in a
sense he did play a role; he was assigned 
to a phone watch 
in
support of surveillance during the final 
phase of the case.
again it is clear that he did not know 
the dates of SMITH's
assignment to Moscow (1954 to 1956) nor 
did he know that the
operation he has described took place between 
1 and 5 June 
1956,
This is
and that SMITH was recalled from 
Moscow on 8 June 1956.
Once
a full year after NOSENKO said he transferred from the U.S. Embassy
Section.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
676.
NOSENKO claimed to have had a direct role as the supervising
case officer in the BELITSKIY case in its 1962 Geneva phase.
As
a first-hand source, however, he was wrong about the origins of
the operation and ignorant of the content and the operational plac-
In this
ning of the 1962 meetings he was supposedly supervising.
instance, as in the Edward SMITH case, NOSENKO's information is
inadequate for his sourcing.
NOSENKO provided leads to nine KGB operations which had orig-
Six of these he claimed
inated with the First Chief Directorate.
to have learned about through his friend in that Directorate, GLZ.
of the
who was personally involved in most of these operations.❤
other three, two--the Paris agent (JOHNSON) and the Brussels/NATO
case--he said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians 
of
the Second Chief Directorate's Special Section who had assisted in
them. For both of the latter operations, numerous coincidences
were alleged by NOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragmen-
tary information from his sub-sources, and he was never able to
clarify what parts he learned from which of the four technicians
be named as sub-sources.
"
Later,
In describing his acquisition of information on the ninth
He 
first 
said he
case, "SASHA, NOSENKO has contradicted himself:
had learned about "SASHA" from SHA! YAPIN. providing lengthy and
involved explanations of how he became acquainted with SHALYAPIN
at the time of the latter's retirement from the KGB in 
1962.
under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that
SHALYAPIN was the original source of the "SASHA" story, first
attributing it to others and later saying that he could not rézes-
ber when and from whom he first heard it, but SHALYAPIN and others
had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time
he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate
with CIA; furthermore, when asked if "SASHA" was an important lead,
he agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one
occasion he had consistently failed to appreciate the significance
of such a lead, indicating that it was not considered important in
the KGB.
Also casting doubt on his sourcing of "SASHA" is the fact
that, in his first reference to "SASHA" and the Cuban missile crisis
of October 1962, NOSENKO said he had learned of this item from
SHALYAPIN, whereas later he said it was not from SHALYAPIN (but he
could not identify another source from whom he had heard this de-
tail).
Regarding NOSENKO's leads to
"illegal" in Canada--
-is pa.
Westerners. the case of
the RCMP'S
as to sourcing.
NOSENKO first said his friend GUK had told him of the case un-
officially, GUK having been involved in the operation in Moscow.
When asked why GUK should be involved in a Canadian; case in 1963
when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Directorate's
American Department against American targets, NOSENKO retracted
his initial statemeat and said that GUK somehow got in contact
with him, not as a KGB officer but simply as an acquaintance.
Despite the non-official nature of GUK's relationship as thus in-
plied by NOSENKO, GLK able to tell him all the operational de-
tails concerning
except his name. This 
case has an odd
*Although he had met GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that
they did not become friends until his visit to Geneva in 1962. and
only then did GUK begin to reveal operational details to him.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
?
aspect which NOSENKO failed to see:
677.
He said that this man had
come to Moscow on a Soviet visa issued on a separate piece of
paper, rather than entered in the man's passport, so that there
This
would not be a permanent record of his travel to the USSR.
implies, and confirmed, that he travelled under his true
name to Moscow.
✓ furthermore confirmed that he had gone
In view
as a tourist, entering the USSR on a Soviet tourist ship.
of the First Chief Directorate's operational jurisdiction in this
otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coor-
dination between the First Chief Directorate's American Department
and the Second Chief Directorate's Tourist Department, to prevent
any slippage (such as NOSENKO described in the SHUBIN case, when
the CRU failed to ccordinate with the KGP). Yes despite logical
professional need-to-know on NOSENXO's part, he first made his own
knowledge unofficial, and then his subsource's knowledge unofficial
as well.
of
NOSENKO was unable to explain how he had learned of the case
French
When pressed for a
subsource, he claimed that he had attended a reception at the Indian
Embassy in 1953 or 1959 with GRIEANOV, and when GFIBANOV told him to
he understood somehow that
take a glass of wine to //
an agent of CRIBANOV's.
was
His sourcing for the case of the French businesscan,
(Page 484), is not unlike that of that He said he had known
that there was a French businessman who was an agent. On one occa-
sion when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chief Directorate
When he
a call for GRIBANOV cane in and he asked who was calling.
was told it was A. then he knew somehow that this was
GRIBANOV's agent.
3. Remarks
NOSENXO's errors concerning "ANDREY" (particularly his early
insistence that "ANDREY" had left Moscow years before NOSENKO en-
tered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned
of the case in the way he later said he did.
NOSENKO's accounts of how he learned of the "Paris agent" are
vague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coin-
cidence. It is noteworthy too that he claimed to have been told of
this one operation by no less than four individuals, whereas the
rest of what he learned of First Chief Directorate operations in
eleven years of KGB service came from only two other individuals.
Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stemmed from elaborate and
apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to recon-
struct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO's inability to
give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the
"Paris agent" or "SASHA" must be judged in the light of the fact that
he first heard of both cases only just after promising to collect
such information for CIA. because these were among the most impor-
tant and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could
reasonably be expected that he would remember how he did so, espe-
cially since only a little over a year elapsed until his next
meeting with CIA.
and
leads seems
NOSENKO's sourcing for the
illogical and fabricated. It also appears that NOSENKO has given an
inaccurate version of the way in which he would have learned of
[not an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).
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678.
D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career
1.
Introduction
What follows is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his
Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the years 1951 and
1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 years in the
U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Department of the KGB Sec-
ond Chief Directorate. NOSENKO's naval service opens the dis-
cussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided
a springboard for his entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the
rank of lieutenant.
The discussion of each period in his career has two cen-
tral topics: First. NOSENKO's own description of his positions,
responsibilities, and access: and second, at assessment of this
description from the point of view of internal consistency,
accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge. operational
activities, and performance with his claimed senior and respon-
sible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This
assessment is based on a comparison of the information supplied
by NOSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt,
official, defector, and clandestine sources.
NOSENKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are,
of course, cumulative in that his claimed positions and activi-
ties during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding
periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated within
itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached.
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679.
2. Naval GRU Service
a.
Introduction
NOSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages:64-77)
have been reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility,
and examined for accuracy against information from other sources
.
(3)
b.
Discussion
Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military
service are about as follows:
-
He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, 9th and
part of 10th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku
and Leningrað. This would normally have nothing to do with
military service, except that NOSENKO says he took the mili-
tary oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, 
at the
age of 16.
(According to available collateral information,
the oath--formal entry into the military forces--was at no
time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of
"show" or "morale" as NOSENKO claimed it was here.)
claims to have deserted this school after taking the oath.
Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months
after starting anew later the same year in the naval school
in Leningrad and never finished school properly.
-
He
He was commissioned in the "reserves" in 1947 after
completing his second year at the Institute of International
Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot remember what
branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the
navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by volun-
While
tarily doing military translations at the Institute.
at the Institute he contracted venereal disease at least
twice and this went on his record.
In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy
However, he
by a mandate commission at the Institute.
failed one of his examinations ("Marxism-Leninism") upon
completion of the Institute of International Relations later
in 1950 which delayed his diploma--and hence entry into
the service--until successful re-examination later that
year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned
down by the KGB (then MG3] because of his school 
record,
drunkenness, and other bad marks in his record.)
-
He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in
1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel office several
times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and
write his personal history in connection with the required
security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a
record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in
There is no single account of this period of NOSENKO's life
which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the 
cir-
cumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next.
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680.
wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, still-valid marriage
to a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB employ-
ment, and a bad academic record including failure of a
course in Marxism-Leninism just at this time.
S ::
He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenant
on 12 March 1951, and without any indoctrination or train-
ing, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothes
for his first duty station, Sovietskaya Gavan' in the 
Soviet
Far East. NOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, con-
sidered generally to be the least desirable of all naval
assignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his father
that ne was a man. (The above was his account in 1966
, in
all earlier accounts he said he went to the Soviet Far East
in the fall of 1950, and in fact said that he had two months'
However,
leave in 1952, one for each of two years there.
according to the 1956 account, his service there lasted only
one year.)
In Covetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO's job was to extract in-
formation from American publications reporting naval de-
velopments. Asked in April 1964 for any personal account
of his own work, NOSENKO was able to think of only "four or
five trips" on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and
His 
own 
role,
three to Hokkaido, to drop or pick up agents.
he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along only "to learn
how it was done;" he himself never trained or dispatched any
agents, nor did he know the identities or missions of any
others. He also could not describe the ships he had travelled
on. Questioned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan' in 1965,
NOSENKO insisted that this city is located in Primorskiy
Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.*
- NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, accord-
ing to other accounts, because of having contracted tubercu-
losis) in April 1952. He then spent two months either 
in
his parents' Moscow home or, according to other accounts, in
a sanitorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis
.
He said he was coughing up "half a glass of blood at a time."
(X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 have
detected no indications that NOSENKO ever suffered from
tuberculosis.)
-
At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was
offered in Moscow an opportunity to attend the GRU strategic
intelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but
turned it down because he had already studied most of the
course matter in the Institute of International Affairs; be-
sides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical
examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.
.- NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to
the Far East--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet
at Baltiysk. He invented a story in 1964 about going there
In October 1966 NOSENKO was asked whether he had ever been
to Sakhalin; his answer was no.
** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Port-
land, Oregon and thinking oneself in California.
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C.
681.
via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sass-
nitz, but then said this was a lie he told because 
he felt
his interrogators would not believe him if he had said he
successfully turned down an assignment to these points,
then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk.
(As pointed out to NOSENKO, the assignment to the cold
,
damp Baltic climate of a recent ~B-sufferer appears unthink-
able, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's
son; he acknowledged this but said, "There were 
no other
positions available.")
-
He could not remember the name of the place he served
near Baltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which
fitted his description of its size and location) but 
from
There 
is no such village
1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk.
in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city
by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away
.
He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that
a rail line went to Baltiysk from Primorsk.
In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had
trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of
war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his 
description
of his functions, saying he merely prepared training mater-
ials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with
His service 
there was
or knowledge of the agent work.
limited to about six months, since he said he left there at
He either had had one or two leaves
the beginning of 1953.
In 1964
from there, depending on which telling is accepted:
NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given
a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel 
to 
Mos-
cow in order to formalize his divorce from his 
first wife;
in April 1966 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave
before going to Sovetsk.
NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initia-
tive and against the wishes of his commanding officer at the
He has
end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU.
told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what
leave status. It was during this period, he said, that
his conversation with KOBULOV led him to shift 
to the 
KGB.
-
In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to
the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while
stationed in Sovetsk. In earlier accounts he said 
that he
was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed 
in
the Soviet Far East.
Remarks
The notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the
changes of story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in
NOSENKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be 
attributable to
faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted 
from 
his
own elaborations and exaggerations, and 
inaccuracies might be
If 
all
explained by his inattention or indifference to 
detail.
the details were to be considered, the story would become even
more confused.
Certain general aspects stand out, however:
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(1).
682.
If his story of his personal life is true
MOSENKO would,
according to all available information, not have been accepted
into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts
of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GR'
officer service is, or both.
(2) The story is vague, unsubstantial, and contra-
dictory; no substance has been added to the base outlines
One might expec
of the story despite frequent questioning.
of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recol-
lection of military service completed 10 years earlier--the
locations where he served, whether he did or did not have
TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to
another, and what he did or what he experienced.
(3) NOSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of
the navy, and of the units with which he served is practic-
ally non-existent. He has provided no reason whatever to
make one believe that he actually was a naval officer.
(4) The functions he claims to have fulfilled involved
no direct involvement or personal responsibilities: They
sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like real life
or personal experience.
That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings
of the psychologist (Pages 605-611).
NOSENKO's description of his naval GPU service cannot be
On the basis of his statements, it appears
accepted as true.
moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any
other regular military service.
Since NOSENKO claims that his GRU status and service provided
him the platform for a transfer into the KGB (without such for-
malities as medical examination, personnel interviews or question-
naires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff
status from 1952 or 1953.
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683.
3.
a.
Entry into the KGB
Eligibility
The previous section discussed NOSENKO's eligibility for
admission to the naval GRU and concluded with the remark that,
on the basis of what NOSENKO has told CIA about his earlier
life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval
Intelligence. According to information available to CIA from
several knowledgeable sources, the KGB has more stringent entry
The candidate's
requirements than any other Soviet organization.
family background, personal conduct. and Party or Komsomol rec-
ord must be impeccable. NOSENKO would have American Intelli-
gence believe that in his case the KGB--specifically the offi-
cers responsible for signing their names to the approval--accepted
a person whose record showed (as noted on pages 679-680 above)
desertion from the armed forces, self-inflicted wound in wartime
drunkenness, venereal disease, previous marriage to the daughter
of a state criminal, a bad academic record including failure of
a course in Marxism-Leninism; and a prior rejection by the KGB
itself. The chly change since the carlier rejection had been,
according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military ser-
vice in the Naval GRU.
Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had con-
tracted tuberculosis, for which he was still under treatment
NOSENKO has
at the time he entered the State Security Service.
indicated on separate occasions that his illness was a matter
of record with the GRU, and that the reason he did not have to
take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the avail-
ability of GRU records. According to DERYABIN, however, KGB
regulations at that time would have precluded admission to KGB
ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though
already arrested.
b. Date of Entry
In
NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty
with the KGB and has provided several reasons for his changes of
story (Pages 86-89). During his first meeting with CIA, when
NOSENKO gave a brief personal and professional autobiography, he
said that he had joined the KGB in February or March 1953.
1964, however, first while still attached to the Soviet Disarma-
ment Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a bio-
graphic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account,
NOSENKO set this date back a year, to early 1952. During the
interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates,
NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained
with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two dif-
ferent reasons for this change of dates (which, he said in Octo-
ber 1966, was conscious deception). In the April 1964 interrogations,
he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism
at the Institute of International Affairs, which forced him to
take all his exams over again and delayed his career: This was
"unpleasant," NOSENKO said, and he was attempting to conceal it
from CIA. In the October 1956 interrogations, NOSENKO gave a new
and different reason. He described how he had been rejected for
employment by State Security while at the Institute and was trying
to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe
that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB.
NOSENKO's change of story took place in 1964 while still in the
relatively relaxed circumstances of an operational meeting in
Geneva; he came back to his original account only during the
April 1964 interrogations. NOSENKO's explanations of why he re-
vised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into
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684.
further inconsistencies.
Because of this and, in the absence of
any pressure of any kind (including any apparent psychological
pressure) to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explana-
tion for this change is that NOSENKO forgot in early 1964 either
when he joined the KGB and/or what he had told CIA in 1952.
DERYABIN has commented on the significance which the date of entry
holds for a KGB officer. He expressed the opinion that it would
be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date.
NOSENKO was questioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619)
As a
concerning the timing of his entry on duty with the KGB.
result of this interrogation it was determined that NOSENKO was
unaware that at the time he said he joined the KGB, the present
First Chief Directorate was designated the Second Chief Direc-
torate and vice versa. Therefore, NOSENKO would have joined a
component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953,
not the Second Chief Directorate as he says. NOSENKO did not
know or had forgotten various other facts, including the date
that the MVD was redesignated the KGB, and misstated the loca-
tions and existence of various buildings and offices in the
vicinity of the KGB Headquarters building in early 1953.
Ir. June 1962 NOSENKO said several times, in different meet-
ings, that the KGB agent "ANDREY" (Pages 413-414) had been re-
cruited and had left Moscow before he, NOSENKO, entered the KGB.
He estimated the date as 1949-1950. NOSENKO knew that "ANDREY"
was associated in Moscow with RHODES and when told that RHODES
was there from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might
be wrong.
NOSENKO continued to say, however, that "ANDREY" was
recruited before he (NOSENKO) became a KGB officer, and later
reverted again to his estimate that "ANDREY was recruited in
1949-1950. When he returned to Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO changed
this story and said that during his 1953-1955 tour in the U.S.
Embassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come
NOSENKO was
there to consult on the then-active "ANDREY" case.
unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the
"ANDREY" case was before his time; when he said in 1964 that
this was not so. Dayle SMITH confessed that he was recruited by
the KGB in late 1953, and records show that he left Moscow in
early 1954.
C.
Circumstances of Entry
NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB
to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Mcs-
cow, after returning from the Baltic. However, he has changed the
date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he
has told this story. In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with
KOBULOV at the NOSENKO dacha while on leave in March 1953; during
the April 1964 interrogations he changed the date to February
1953; in April 1965 NOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the
KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he lived
at home and was at the "disposal of GRU personnel" during Febru-
ary and March. Finally, in April 1966, NOSENKO said he first
spoke to KOBULOV at KOBULOV's dacha on New Years Day 1953, that
he was subsequently "resting" at a sanitorium connected with his
tuberculosis of the year before, and that he spoke again to
KOBULGV cr. the day of STALIN's funeral, while home for a few days
from the sanitorium. It was at this second encounter with KOBULOV
that the latter promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry
into the KGB.
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685.
In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he
entered the KGB, volunteering that there was no need to fill out
a questionnaire (anketa) as the KGB already had his files from
the GRU. In April 1964 when asked if he had not been required
to fill out any questionnaires or other documents, NOSENKO des-
cribed the anketa and other forms he completed (saying he took
them home to do so) and his various interviews with KGB per-
sonnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these claims
by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit in-
accurate, of the various forms and of his visits to KGB Personnel.
In 1966 NCSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no
talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and in-
plied that there were no forms to fill out.
d.
Remarks
According to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was
He met KOBULOV
the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB.
while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KGB
as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission
according to the early version was facilitated by the availability
of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA has concluded that NOSENKO
was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he
waa ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.
On the basis of generally available information concerning
Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the
FGB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in
the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at the time and had been himself a
KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person
with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into
His health alone would seem
the KGB in the manner he claims.
to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO described a
series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection.
NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications
add to the unlikelihood of his account.
It is concluded that, as in the case of NOSENKO's GRU ser-
vice, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of
his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not
enter the KGB.
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4.
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686.
Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section
a.
Introduction
His
NOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Embassy Section of
the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, during the
period from his entry on duty with the KGB until June 1955.
targets during these two years were at first American correspond-
ents in Moscow and later American Army Attaches at the Embassy.
NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB
activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dis-
miss the whole period as "not relevant" and "of no consequence."
NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he "found himself" only after his
initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section. (He variously dated
his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to
the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in connection with his par-
ticipation in and award for the BURGI case; and after August 1956,
when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.)
Before this, NOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and "did not pay
attention to the work."
b. Work Against American Correspondents
NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work
against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-
1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee
he had no access to operational files and did not participate
Although
personally in the handling of any of the correspondents.
able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then re-
cruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in
conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in
some undefined way after he no longer was working against these
targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading
personality (not operational) files on a number of the corres-
pondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's de-
velopmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB
methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" of
drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of
the correspondents (two of whom were recruited G5 agents at
the time); he met with them periodically to determine whether
Even here, however,
they had developed any important information.
NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility:
His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NCSENKO,
first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward when-
In fact,
ever something interesting would begin to develop.
according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings
with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a "hint"
NOSENKO has been able
that something of interest might develop.
to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he re-
called neither their names nor personalia concerning them.
C. Work Against Army Attaches
Regarding NOSENKO's work against American Army Attaches, he
claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he
alone was accountable and one about which something was previously
known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is
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14-00000
687.
the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility
to divert his attention from personal operational duties.
NOSENKO could not remember when he took over responsibility
for the Army Attaches, and he named two other KGB officers before
settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the
Attaches' files. When belittling his earlier responsibilities
for correspondents, he has said several times that he had been in
that job "only about six months." Assuming that NOSENKO entered
the KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer
to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In dis-
cussing this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently
said that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSENKO
bas variously replied "at the beginning of 1954," January 1954,
and May 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965. NOSENKO re-
fused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has
always said that he turned over these duties and transferred from
the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department
was established within the Second Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American
Department case officer responsible for operations against the
U.S. Army Attaches be received and was responsible for assimilat-
ing the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals
who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from
the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the
Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; microphones which were emplaced
about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a
network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and
other agents in the Embassy who together provided little useful
information; permanent and roving surveillance patrois outside
the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and
Dear the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by
the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Mos-
cow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the
military. The point of collecting and assimilating this infor-
mation, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches
were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence
collection activities. Far less important was the goal of re-
cruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several in-
stances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts failed.
The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruit-
ment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the
backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information,
be stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of
*On some occasions NOSENKO has said that the microphones in the
Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of informa-
tion on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said
that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the
U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed
to have known only of their existence during 1953-1955 but not
where any were located.
14-00000
688.
control. .
He has also used this explanation to support his claim
that there were no recruitments of military attaches during this
period.
:
An exception, wherein the KGB did carefully compile a great
deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by
NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104).
On the basis of these explanations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the
official and unofficial activities of his alleged targets 
in 
this
period deserves attention.
NOSENKO knew almost nothing about the personal backgrounds
and families of the eight members of the Army Attache Office
Although he was
whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106).
able to identify each by rank and position in the Embassy--some-
times inaccurately--and in a few cases to describe 
certain of
their operational activities, he was unaware of or 
had 
forgotten
such facts as:
Colonel Earl L. MICKELSON, the Army Attache in 1954
and 1955, was arrested twice by the Militia outside of Mos-
cow in 1954.
-
Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language
student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent);
by RICHARDS' account she sought to elicit biographic data
from him during the lessons.
-
William STROUD, the Assistant Army Attache, travelled
to Kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defector.
(NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD,
as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.)
NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known
independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what 
he
claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:
- NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for
the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant
He 
claimed to 
be
Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 101-103).
receiving agent information on him but could not recall the
(CH: HCMCHC: said
, for
names or cryptonyms of any such agents.
example: "I think FELCHLIN must have had a maid, and she
NOSENKO described 
FELCHLIN
would have been a KGB agent.")
as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the
object of special interest; yet he did not know 
or 
remember
NOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know
more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets 
while
he was its Deputy Chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor
he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence, 
NOSENKO con-
tinued, he could not be expected to remember as many such de-
tails as would be possible had he been a case officer working
In another 
context, 
NOSENKO
daily with only four or five files.
explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning
and organizing operations against tourists in 
the period 1955-
1959; he contrasted operations against tourists, who 
often
the work 
against
came and went in a matter of a few days, to
the Military Attaches and diplomats stationed in Moscow on
permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and
slowly.
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anything about FELCHLIN's background, presumably well docu-
mented by the KGB because FELCHLIN had been to the USSR 
in
two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic
courier, prior to arriving in Moscow as the Assistant Army
Attache; also FELCHLIN had had prior official 
association
with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States,
and he continued to be in liaison with one of them 
in Moscow.
NOSENKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence
activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or
In speaking of
what had been done about them by the KGB.
FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSENKO reported
the KGB file noted that FELCHLIN had been caught taking
photographs on some occasion, but he did not know that FEL-
CHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in Kiev with 
another Assist-
(Erroneously identified by
ant Army Attache, F.J. YEAGER.
NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have
been NOSENKO's target.) NOSENKO also did not know that
FELCHLIN, with another Army Attache and two Air Force Attaches,
in September 1953 had made an unprecedented train trip through-
out Siberia and that six months later, at the end 
of March
1954, had been the subject of a newspaper article which
charged that they had lost "spy documents" on the train.
NOSENKO was unable to provide a date for FELCHLIN's expul-
sion from the Soviet Union, and he knew nothing of the un-
usual circumstances of FELCHLIN's departure from Moscow;
he insisted that nobody else was declared persona non grata
along with FELCHLIN. In fact, FELCHLIN was expelled along
with Air Force Major Walter MckINNEY, and the Soviets re-
fused to permit the two to leave Moscow aboard the Ambassa-
dor's personal plane until Ambassador BOHLEN himself protested.
Confronted by his lack of knowledge of the persona non
grata action, NOSENKO said that he could not be expected to
know the details because this incident 
occurred after he
transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist
Department in June 1955. NOSENKO was then told the recorded
date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied 
that this
was not true.
Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO's account of one
of the best known incidents in the history of KGB operations
against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the
subject of reports by GOLITSYN and other CIA sources and the
This was the 
seizure of
subject of training Eaterials.
sensitive technical collection equipment on 5 May 1955 in
Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the
U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and
Captain MULE--and their expulsion from the Soviet Union two
days later. NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB
work against these officers (Pages 103-105
); he described
an earlier attempt to defect MULE, his own plans for seizing
this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his
role in developing plans for the successful operation in
Stalingrad. When NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to
give the entire story of the equipment seizure and the persona
non grata action, he said that the operation was carried 
out
after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore 
he knew
no more about it. When told that the operation took place
at least a month before his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could
offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge.
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d.
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NOSENKO identified George VAN LAETHEM as an Assistant
Air Attache in 1953 or 1954; he was a target of another U.S.
Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development
NOSENKO did not know
operation was carried out against him.
that VAN LASTHEM was actually an Assistant Army Attache, who
left Moscow in March 1953 and was succeeded by NOSENKO's own
target Walter MULE (see above). What NOSENKO additionally
did not know is that in Moscow VAN LAETHEM was the Attache
cryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH
(the subject of NOSE:KO's "ANDREY" lead--see below) and a
friend of the motor pool sergeant Roy RHODES, a KGB agent.
NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955,
again as an Army Attache, and only two years after being
transferred from Moscow, VAN LAETHEM was again sent to Mos-
cow, ostensibly on a PCS assignment but actually on tempor-
ary duty. During this latter assignment, when NOSENKO by
his own account should have been responsible for him, VAN
LAETHEM was in Moscow to review the entire electronics
program at the Embassy. (VAN LAETHEM's second tour in
Moscow involved the planned use of the electronic equipment.
which was seized in Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still
in Moscow.)
Additional Reporting
His information on two other operations involving Americans
was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S.
Embassy Section. One was the recruitment of the military cipher
machine mechanic having the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH,
see Pages 413-426 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and
VIII.C.). NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruit-
ment took place before he joined the KGB but that "ANDREY" had
left the USSR by then as well; he repeatedly estimated "ANDREY's"
recruitment date as "1949-1950. At all times he has claimed
certainty that "ANDREY" was the last KGB recruitment in the
Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in January 1964.
In 1964, however, NOSE:KO changed his story and said "ANDREY"
was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1954-
1955. The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach
to the U.S. Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see
Pages 468-469 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and VIII.C.
above) at a meeting with the KGB arranged through letters which
had been sent to SMITH. This occurred in 1954 or 1955/ NOSENKO
said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled
the surveillance phone-watch. SMITH admitted to U.S. authorities
having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 5 June
1956 (a year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S.
Embassy Section), but he denied having had any personal meetings
with KGB officers.
e.
Remarks
NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused,
contradictory, and, when compared with collateral information,
incomplete and inaccurate. He has been inconsistent in dating
his shift of responsibilities within the U.S. Embassy Section,
in dating his departure from the Section (viz., the timing of
the Stalingrad incident and the approach to SMITH), and in dating
his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy. Having
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4-00000
1
691.
few new details of importance on the American correspondents,
NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army
Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he
claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and acti-
vities of the others; and he lacked even the most important de-
tails on security affairs involving the majority of his eight
alleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost noth-
ing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy Section.
The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold
so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so uncon-
vincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S.
Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.
+
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114-00000
692.
5. Tourist Department (Jure 1955 to January 1960)
8.
Introduction
NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 1960, his
first period of alleged service with the American-British-Canad
ian Section of Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Direc-
torate, are described in Pages 107-151. For the purposes of the
following discussion, it is convenient to divide this period into
two parts. The first of these covers the years from June 1955
to June 1958, when NOSENKO said he was a staff case officer,
handling and recruiting agents and planning and managing opera-
tional activity. The second part covers NOSENKO's service from
June 1953 to the beginning of 1960 as Deputy Chief of this section.
Apart from his personal involvement in a number of recruitment
operations in the latter period, it is this service which provides
a basis for NOSENKO to claim awareness of all important arrests
of spies and recruitments from among American tourists visiting
the Soviet Union; it is also this service as Deputy Chief of Sec-
tion which NOSENKO cites as a basis for his involvement in the
case of Lee Harvey OSWALD inside the Soviet Union.
b.
The Early Period (1955 to 1958)
(i) General
According to NOSENKO's story, he was among the first case
officers in the Tourist Department. He arrived there just as
the Department was being formed and took part with other officers
assigned in the acquisition of an agent network from within
Inturist, in the establishment of facilities and methods, and in
generally "getting things going." Several months later he parti-
cipated in what he says was his first operation against an Ameri-
can tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes (and hence
unconfirmed) organization of an unseccussful attempt to compromise
Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113). NOSENKO's next case (the first
operation in which his participation is confirmed) took place a
year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in the homosexual en-
trapment and recruitment of Richard BURGI (Pages 113-120). This
recruitment, which occurred close in time to the Minister NOSENKO's
death, was by NOSENKO's account a turning point in his personal
and professional life. With it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense
of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a
Wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a re-
sult of this operation, the first successful recruitment in the
then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came
into personal contact with General GRIBANOV. According to ali
accounts prior to October 1965, when he retracted the claim,
NOSENKO received the first of a series of KGB awards for opera-
tional performance because of the BURGI case--a letter of com-
mendation. Within a month of this operation, NOSENYO said, he
was promoted from the rank of lieutenant to captain, his last
promotion prior to defecting eight years later.
NOSENKO's direct operational activity in the next two years,
before his appointment as Deputy Chief of the Section, was des-
cribed by NOSENKO as follows: Sometime in 1957 he was involved
in the attempted recruitment of the German businessman
(Pages 120-121); after surrounding him with agents, NOSENKO
TOP SECRET
$4-00000
personally spoke to him.
ment of
693.
NOSENKO explained his (unconfirmed)
participation in this case, which was not among the responsibili-
ties of his section, by saying there was no KGB officer available
who spoke German but was known to speak "a little Eng-
lish," a language in which NOSENKO had fair fluency. In 1957
NOSENKO was also involved in the sexual and blackmarket entrap-
Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of
NOSENKO's section, being neither American, British or Canadian);
NOSENKO has not explained how he care to be involved in this
operation, but he said his role was that of involving
with
women and blackmarketeers so that another officer, ARKHIPOV, could
recruit him.
has not identified NOSENKO, but reported on
an individual whose role corresponds to the one NOSENKO claimed
as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENKO's third operation in 1957
was really not an operation at all. he was assigned to accompany
the British 24524
and the latter's interpreter
a tour of Soviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his
purpose was only to watch
a suspected intelligence agent
who recognized
or officer. His presence was confirmed by
NOSENKO's photograph.
του
This is the sum of NOSENKO's reported, scretimes verified,
operational role during the three years preceding his promotion
in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-
Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the
American Tourist Section.
The only case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting
in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NOSENKO ascribed
the greatest importance, was the recruitment of BURGI. For this
reason, the BURGI operation is discussed in detail below, with
particular attention being given to those aspects of the case
which reflect upon NOSENKO's own personal role.
(ii) The BURGI Case
There
NOSENKO's statements of this operation generally agreed with
that BURGI provided to the FBI in 1957. The part NOSENKO played
in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two
homosexuals in the Moscow restaurant on the evening of BURGI's
compromise (20 June 1356) and in the Kiev events (23-28 June 1956)
would appear to be one normally taken by a KGB staff officer.
The identities of the other two KGB participants in the Kiev
recruitment, KOZLOV and PETRENKO, seem clearly established.
were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGI's versions, but
most of these could stem from NOSENKO's faulty memory nine years
after the events. (Such discrepancies include NOSENKO's failure
to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI: the identity,
role, or even existence of the person "Anatoliy" whom BURGI says
introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual
compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI;
the location of NOSENKO's bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared
to BURGI's; NOSENKO's reference to BURGI's "interpreter when in
fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to
remember the unusual circumstances of BURGI's departure from
Kiev.) Other contradictions and omissions in NOSENKO's reporting
relate to matters of greater operational consequence:
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- NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGB first
learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember
who first proposed an operation against him.
- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his
dealings with the First Chief Directorate on this case.
NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on
BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this opera-
tion. The initiative for the operation came, he said, from
the Second Chief Directorate, and when NOSENKO traced BURGI
in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on
him there.* The KGB's only information on BURGI at the
time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa application
(which showed him to be a professor of Russian) and a few
agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow:
BURGI,
on the other hand, reported that during the recruitment
KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the
names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the
sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and
military service, BURGI's relations with the Russicum in
Rome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR;
and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.
NOSENKO cited "his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as
one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI's
story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely
establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of
KOZLCV--it was KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.
:
DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers
to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how
the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the person-
nel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics
of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.
L
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C.
695.
Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section
NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had
formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized into
two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case offi-
cer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist
Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most important
in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he,
in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain
that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision.
d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent Personnel
NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other
officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The
Soviet agents of his section whom NOSENKO has identified were
mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted
from case officer to case officer and hence it was "difficult to
say just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he had approxi-
mately eight Soviet agents in 1958 and about 12 or 14 in 1959,
most of them employed by Inturist (Pages 109-112). With the ex-
ception of the two homosexuals, YEFREMOV and VOLKOV discussed
separately below, NOSENKO cannot supply personal data on his own
agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.
e.
Knowledge of Section's Activities
As of June 1958, according to NOSENKO, the work of the
section of which he was deputy chief was "just getting going."
Its mission was, first of all, to detect Western Intelligence
officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visit-
ing the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed
toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists.
In his new position NOSENKO was responsible for supervising
other officers in the section in efforts along these lines.
cause of this and because at GRIBANOV's request he personally
reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western
intelligence services and KGB counteraction through 1958 (Pages
145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these
subjects during the 1955-1959 period.
Be-
CIA started its so-called "legal travelle."
program in
1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations. Now
there is . firm collateral information on what the KGB knew of
this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the }
American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should
have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959. More-
over, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO did and did not
know can be compared with information from other sources. These
facts are reviewed below.
(i) BLAKE
A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning
for the operational activity of its Tourist Department in the
late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE
(Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959
he passed the KGB_a_19-page summary of the results of a three-day
meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representa-
tives of CIA and MI-6; these sessions were on the subject of
"legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR.
TOP SECRET
This
report baktus
14-00000
696.
X
summary spelled out in detail the complete CIA operational doc-
trine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed CIA's
reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, assess-
ment, and communications support of internal assets.
While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with CIA modus
operandi in the field of tourist operations, he has never men.-
tioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting
which described these methods in full detail. NOSENKO does
not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his im-
NOSENKO never volunteered the name of
portance to the KGE.
BLAKE in his debriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962
about BLAKE, the KGB agent in British Intelligence, he said
that he had read the dossier and that BLAKE had been "an agent
of the Second (Britishi Department (of the Second Chief Direc
who was not nearly es valuable as the
for the other Englishman" (VASSALL). By 1964 Re
could not recall any such agent of the British Department.
When the name BLAKE was mentioned, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"
BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of
a 21-page summary report of a second, follow-up conference be-
tween CIA and MI-6 on "legal travel" operations which was held
in Washington from 20 to 25 April 1960. NOSENKO, although not
in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was
received by the KGB, said that he reviewed all important ma-
terials of the American Tourist Section when he became its Chief
in January 1962. Asked whether the Tourist Department had re-
ceived documentary information from any agent source while
NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961,
he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could
have provided such documentary information.
(11) GOLITSYN Document
NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time
of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official
top secret KGB document concerning Western Intelligence opera-
tional activity in the field of tourism (Pages 147-149). He
did not mention this fact in the June 1962 meetings. Although
NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by
the Tourist Department, he has not been able to describe the
document in detail and specifically did not mention that this
particular document was in large part based, as subsequent
analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted
to the KGB by George BLAKE.
(iii) Tourist Agents
NOSENKO asserted that the KGB detected no agents among
American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959, and that no
tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servic-
ing dead drops, or contacting agents, except one in 1959 whose
name, NOSENKO said, was MacGUIRE (actually McGOWAN in 1958).
NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts.
TOP SECRET
4-00000
TOP SECRET
697.
The KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN, however, refers to
a number of cases of American tourists who were found by the
KGB to be engaged in intelligence collection or intelligence
support activities. In addition to MCGOWAN, the GOLITSYN docu-
ment cited the cases of SIMARD, GRAY and PRANCIS, all of them
These years
CIA agents detected by the KGB in 1958 and 1959.
coincide with the time when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy
Chief of the section which was responsible for monitoring and
uncovering activities of this sort, but NOSENKO has never men-
tioned them. Furthermore, the annual reports of the section
which NOSENKO would have helped to write, by virtue of his
claimed position as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section,
presumably included all of these cases.
f. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper
NOSENKO was questioned at length on the review of Western
tourist operations which he claimed to have written for GRIBANOV.
He said he gathered the material for this study from earlier
annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with
various case officers, then took the study to GRIDANOV's
office. NOSENKO could not remember whether he discussed his
findings with GRIBANOV, could not give any examples of the
information which he included in the report (other than statis-
tical information on the increase in foreign tourism), could
not recall what the report said about CIA tourist operations
(other than there appeared to be increased use of tourists
travelling by automobile), and did not know what other American
Intelligence services were sending agents into the Soviet Union
under tourist cover during these years. On the basis of his
research for this report and his cŵn experience, NCSENKO said
he knew that KGB operations against tourists had been develop-
ing slowly and that, at the time the report was written during
the tourist season of 1959, the KGB knew little about the use
of tourism by the American services.
BLAKE's confession that he passed documentary information
on this subject to the EGB, but more particularly the intensity
of KGB operations against tourists at this time as reflected
in the GOLITSYN document and other reports indicate, that this
statement by NOSENKO must be erroneous.
g. The OSWALD Case
According to NOSENKO's account of his direct involvement
in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-144), his partici-
pation seemed to stem solely from his supervisory role as
Deputy Chief of the American Section.
In this capacity, NOSENKO
said, he was the one who made the decision that OSWALD was
"not normal" and of no interest to the KGB. On other occasions
NOSENKO has reported that he made this decision together with
his subordinate KRUPNOV, or that "they decided," or "it was
decided." NOSENKO's information on the handling of OSWALD in
1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against
which it can be reliably measured. The results of the poly-
graph examination in October 1966, however, indicated that
NOSENKO lied in having said that he was personally connected
with any aspect-of-the-CSWALD-case and that he had heard of
OSWALD before the assassination of President Kennedy.
polygraph results also indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKO
special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell
U.S. authorities about it.
The
TOP SECRET
000
SI SECKED
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L
h.
NOSENKO's Operational Activities (1956-1954)
(i) General
NOSENKO appeared in one operation snortly after being pro-
moted to the position of Deputy Chief, the recruitment of the
American woman HARRIS in September 1958 on the basis of her
HARRIS tentatively
romantic involvement with a Soviet mile.
identified NOSENKO's photograph as that of one of two Soviets
who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, he was
"definitely the man in charge." She denied having had further
In 1959,
contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union.
NOSENKO said, he also supervised the sexual entrapment of
but did not become personally involved in the approach, which
was made by his superior DUBAS. Some time during this year,
NOSENKO said, he recruited the second of his pair of homosexual
agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the sṛping of 1959 he used the
two in a series of successful recruitment approaches
and . In the case of
400
as a commercial representative ☑ in Moscow, was not the
responsibility of NOSENKO's section, NOSENKO was asked to make
the approach because he was a "specialist" in this type of
operation.) In 1959 NOSENKO also used these agents in opera-
tions against two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit,
BARRETT and WILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, in 1959 he
accomplished the recruitment of the American Express Company
representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL, on the basis of sexual con-
promise.
(ii) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
There is a preponderance of homosexual recruitment opera-
He has referred
tions in NOSENKO's account of his KGB carcer.
to several homosexual agents with whom he has worked on spe-
cific recruitment-entrapment operations, but said that he nim-
self was never their official case officer. They include
"LUCH," "STROYEV," "NIKOLAYEV," "SIBIRYAK" 
and KOSHKIN. 
He has
remembered only a few of their names and has supplied no
He identified only VOLKOV
personality information about them.
and YEFREMOV as his our agents.
He met
NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former
agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym
"GRIGORIY") and to have been their scle case officer 
from the
beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were
deactivated in 1963 because they became too well known.
them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment
NOSENKO took then
operations or other homosexual encounters.
with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960
(but used them in no operations during 1960 and 1961) and back
again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were
used only once, inmediately after his return). He gave a rela-
tively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 
107-108),
-
He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV's
patronym.
but:
He does not know the home address, general area
of Moscow residence, family circumstances, job details,
or other basic information about either of them.
:
TOP SECRET
0000
(iii)
€93.
- He said that during the five or six years he
handled them, he never was at their homes, never met them
in a safehouse (only on the street), and never met either
of them alone without the other's presence.
He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's en-'
counters with and development of one Dutch and five other
of the Americans,
Americans, independently known to CIA.
three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known
American diplomat and author Charles W. THAYER.
-
He told about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's compromise
of Robert BARHETT in 1959 (Page 126) but did not know that
they had met BARRETT again in 1961, shortly before 
BARRETT
was recruited on the basis of the 1959 compromise.
He did not know details of why or how VOLKOV and
YEPREMOV first came into contact with their most recent
target, W.E. JOHNSON, nor how they set up the compromise
which led to NOSENKO's entry as a "police official
" 
under
the name Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).
Homosexual Entrapme: Operations
During 1959 NOSENKO said he made recruitment approaches
to five U.S. and British citizens on the basis 
of homosexual
entrapment operations involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV.
All five approaches were successful, and the four 
Westerners
who have now been identified have, in 
turn, identified NOSENKO
With 
the ex-
in one way or another as the recruiting officer.
ception of the FRIPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of
BARRETT and WILLERFORD (which did not result in approaches dur-
ing NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section
), these were
the only operations in which NOSENKO took part in 1959 and
they represented, in fact, the caly recruitments 
by the 
section
He claimed 
repeatedly in 1962,
during this year, NOSENKO said.
1964, and 1965 that at the end of 1959 he received a commenda-
tion from the KGB Chairman for his recruitment of the 
five 
homo-
In October
sexuals and FRIPPEL (discussed separately below).
1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.
In discussing the ste case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had
forgotten details which, from his confirmed participation
, 
he
certainly once knew. He said that (as with 
the
case--
see below) another case officer (IVANOV) had the file materials
NOSENKO stated that 
his agents
on the target before he did.
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported to NOSENKO in Moscow on TERE
homosexuality and then "IVANOV and I and possibly 
GUSKCV, 
the
Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of 
the Tourist
Department. NOSENKO could not remember the arrangements 
for
taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel 
the photography
took place. When ent to Leningrad, NOSENKO was sent
case).
there to approach him, flying alone (as in the
Asked
All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local KGB.
"I 
was told
why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO replied:
to go.' Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, 
he 
answered:
"He was not considered capable," his English 
was "not bad 
but
NOSENKO did
he didn't have enough operational experience.”
not remember who wrote the request for permission to make the
"
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1000000
1
700.
approach daybe I did, or maybe I dictated it to IVANOV9") or
whether was staying in the hotel where the Leningrad com-
promise and approach took place. He named the Leningrad case
officer, FERELETOV, but said that he, NOSENKO, made the re-
cruitment
Baid another man was present.
NOSENKO's account in general matches A statements
on this approach (Pages 125-126). The discrepancies, as well
as the omissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty
of the facts, may be attributable to faulty memory on the part
of NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO was at this time Deputy Section
Chief, when asked to explain his own selection as recruiting
officer, he said that he did not know why "they" chose him
and, when pressed as to who selected him, said "DUBAS, I think."
when asked why the case officer VETLITSKIY, who originally had
the materials on could not do the job, he answered:
"I don't know." NOSENKO claims that he himself arranged the
transfer of a KG3 "agent or operational contact" (he did not
remember which) to Uzhgorod from Odessa for this case, and
said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written.
He gave a physical description but had no other knowledge of
this agent, neither name nor code name nor job nor background
nor XG3 status ("I wasn't interested"). The agent, he said,
travelled alone; NOSENKO did not arrange to receive him in
Uzhgorod because the local KGB took care of everything.
met him only once, and then in the company of a case officer
of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or other data he has also for-
gotten. NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscow about progress
and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops in this
operation, nor obtain permission to travel alone with the agent
to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in
Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said. NOSENKO could
not describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk,
where he said "the only thing I needed was a car from the air-
port to the city."
said they travelled by train.)
Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB procedures
for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this
operation.
(iv) The Agent PRIPPEL
NOSENKO
FRIPPEL (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with
whom NOSENKO ever had more than fleeting operational contact
in his whole KGB career and is the only foreign agent he claims
to have run for more than two meetings at any time in his car-.
eer (with the exception of
Pages 201-212, and "PROKHOR,
Pages 173-181). The American Express Company representative
in Moscow, FRIPPEL was not recruited so that he could report
on American tourists visiting the Soviet Union, or on official
and unofficial Americans living there, but in hopes of learn-
ing about approaches being made to members of Soviet delegations
visiting the United States. With a wealth of reporting assets
in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did not need him there.
FRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there were
no plans to contact him through the local KGB Legal Residency.
FRIPPEL is identified by KGB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers
as a suspected American Intelligence agent. That FRIPPEL was
considered such by the KGB is confirmed by statements of a self-
admitted KGB agent in contact with the American tourist ROBERTS
in 1962.
1
When
Zwym, ar jam
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701.
NOSENKO said PRIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly:
"I recruited him.myself. In 1962 no other KGB officer was
mentioned by NOSENKO, who quoted from a number of his conver-
sations with FRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOKOV
"had carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the
case officer. According to FRIPPEL's account, CHELNCKOV was
the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings.
NOSENKO never met PRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed
in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said,
when PRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief
visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FRIPPEL's visit to Moscow
in the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FRIP-
PEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings
took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had
exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to PRIPPEL, in the
February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether
he could accept FRIPPEL's invitation to board the ship; the
answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that
there was no one in Odessa superior to nim, and as a Deputy De-
partment Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.
NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and their wives dined at FRIPPEL's
house in Moscow some time after FRIPPEL's recruitment. NOSENKO
acknowledged this to have been a most unusual procedure and
could name no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asked why it
happened, he said: "Because he invited me, and when asked
why CHELNOKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: "Because
he was also involved in the recruitment.
"
a
NOSENKO said he retained operational control of FRIPPEL,
then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when NOSENKO
shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the Ameri-
can Department; Later NOSENKO also maintained responsibility.
for contact during FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR after FRIPPEL's
PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own re-
turn to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw
no sign of change in NOSENKO's reponsibilities during his rela-
tionship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had
stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, prob-
ably in 1960.
FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only
once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically on
BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who claimed case officer re-
sponsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 1960-1961
as well as for FRIPPEL said the two did not know each other;
in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could re-
call nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB,
dismissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never
gave anything of value." The only question NOSENKO posed
when he came to FRIPPEL in August 1952, FRIPPEL said, was
whether the agent knew "what the newspaper editors he was es-
corting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. Accord-
ing to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed
no questions and merely made polite conversation until FRIPPEL
excused himself.
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702.
During the early 1965 interrogations, NOSENO volunteered:
"If you had been clever you could have made me work inside the
" NOSENKO
USSR; you could have contacted me through FRIPPEL...
was asked in October 1966 whether he had expected or hoped CIA
would attempt to establish contact with nim inside the USSR
through FRIPPEL. He strongly denied this.
i. Remarks
NOSENKO claims to have participated directly or indirectly
in every recruitment operation with American tourists in the
years 1955-1959.
His presence in KGB operations during this
period has sometimes been confirmed, but not always did these
cases involve tourists of the three nationalities--American,
British, and Canadian--for which NOSENKO said his section was
responsible:
Years
Name
Nationality
Status in USSR
Confirmed
1955
MALIA
American
Tourist
1956
BURGI
American
Tourist
1957
German
British
Commercial/Tourist
Norwegian
Tourists (under in-
vestigation)
Quasi-official visitor No.
No
Yes
No
Yes
1958.
HARRIS
KFAFT
American
Tourist
Yes
Americar.
Tourist
No
1959
DREW
American
Tourist
Yes
British
Tourist
No
British
Tourist
No
British
Resident
Yes
MERTENS
American
Tourist
Yes
BARRETT
American
Temporary Resident
No
WILLERFORD
American
FRIPPEL (to 1963)
American
Temporary Resident
Resident, later tour-
ist
No
Yes
were
This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations
involving American (six) and British (three) tourists than any
other category, but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of
other nationalities and having different status in the USSR.
FRIPPEL and were neither tourists nor (according to them
and NOSENKO) used against tourists;
from continental Europe; BARPETT and WILLERFORD worked in Moscow
for several months. The tabulation also shows that, according
to NOSENKO, his operational work was considerably more intensive
in the time after he became Deputy Chief of the section than.
before, when as a senior case officer his administrative respon-
sibilities presumably would have been far less demanding.
Although NOSENKO's participation in five cases of the Ameri-
can Tourist Section is confirmed, his acknowledged role in five
others of different varieties--with corroboration by other
sources in two of them--raises doubts about whether he belonged
to that section as a senior officer. The doubts are strengthened
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703.
by the nature of his information about the four individual cases
reviewed at length above:
In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge
of the extensive background information on the recruitment
target which the KGE possessed at the time of the approach;
or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described
as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tour-
ist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO
has admitted lying about his having received an award for
his role in the recruitment of BURGI.
-
Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen
for the approach (made on the basis of homosexuality) be-
cause the regular case officer lacked operational experi-
ence. By April 1959, however, the KGB had arranged "hundreds"
of homosexual compromises in the USSR, NOSENKO reported in
another context. His earlier personal experience with
Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in
the BURGI case and a principal role in the HARRIS case,
the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is
difficult to comprehend how NOSENKO would have qualified
for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not.
- There are gaps in NOSENKO's information about a
number of significant aspects in the case, includ-
ing staff planning and management of the operation, opera-
tional support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying
KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain why he
was selected to make the approach tol
CHELNOKOV was the senior case officer for FRIPPEL.
NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in
Moscow as the American Express Company representative,
and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instruc-
tions at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occu
pation and his entree into the American community ir. Moscow,
FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGB against
tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targetted
to report on matters to which he had no access; hence
there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL
case to have been transferred from the American Tourist
Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Al-
though available information verifies the continuity of
NOSENKO as FRIPPEL's handler, it cannot be considered firm
evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of
these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence.
that he was not.
Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the opera-
tional activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV,
NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American
Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide
rudimentary background information of these two individuals,
who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section.
NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and
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14-00000
704.
YEFREMOV because they were too well known is incompatible with
his other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an
operation between 1959 and early 1962.
In further reference to NOSENKO's claims to having been
the case officer in these various operations, he has been unable
to recount in any detail KGB staff procedures involved in these
operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other com-
ponents, obtaining approvals for action, etc. Finally, of his
alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section,
NOSENKO's described activity against foreigners accounts for
only about three months; if the bulk of his time was spent with
recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be ex-
pected to remember something about some of them. He can barely
remember names (and only a few), has given confused accounts of
their recruitment, remembers nothing about any of their spe-
cific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no per-
sonality background data on any of them.
Even if it were assumed that NOSENKO was a case officer of
the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy
Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could not explain
his appointment to the job. He did not know about the CIA
"legal travel" operations compromised to the KGB in 1958 and
1959 when he was allegedly in a supervisory capacity. NOSENKO
knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE
gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the ut-
most interest to the American Tourist Section, among all KGB
Headquarters elements. These documents offered material that
could have proven valuable to the preparation of NOSENKO's own
paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genu-
ine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to
CIA by GOLITSYN. As with his status as a case officer in the
American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not
describe how data on tourists was received, general and spe-
cific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, and leads
channeled.
The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that NOSENKO
has not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the Ameri-
Can Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Depart-
ment are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable
that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGB (not necessarily the
American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a
principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about
the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the
OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of NOSENKO's
having been involved with this case in any way prior to the
assassination of President Kennedy.
TAP SECRET
705.
6.
a.
U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961)
Introduction
From January 1960 until January 1962 NOSENKO claims
to have been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of
the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate
,
under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285)
is the most significant in NOSENKO's account of his KGB
career for a number of reasons:
<
sensitive
source
- The section is the specific unit working against
the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO's cwn staterents the KGB'5
most important counterintelligence target in the 
USSR.
Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly
The section has the 
two-
affect American security.
fold purpose of knowing of and controlling all access
of Embassy personnel to Soviet citizens and of collecting,
assimilating, evaluating, and using information from
all possible sources to recruit Americans 
stationed
in Moscow.
NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief of this sec-
tion provided him his access to most of the major counter-
intelligence information he has reported, including
recruitments of foreign embassy officials and micro-
Most impor-
phone operations against the U.S. Embassy.
tant, it provided NOSENKO with his authority for
stating that there were no successful recruitments
of or agents among official Americans in Moscow for
this two-year period, or for a time both before 
and
after. (This is the same point made by indirection in
the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is contradicted
by information from GOLITSYN. Although the 
latter 
did
not serve in the U.S. Embassy Section, he knew 
members
of it and gave leads to KGB operational interest in
and possible recruitments of official Americans in the
Some of these appear
Moscow Embassy during this period.
to be related to information items NOSENKO has provided.)
The apparent importance of NOSENKO's information
on this period contrasts sharply with that from 
other
periods. His accounts of recruitments 
in the tourist
field covering the five years prior to this assignment
and the two years following have been checked thoroughly
and not one of them represents a penetration of any
government; none has access to classified information;
most were inactive, suspect, or already known to
Western counterintelligence organs.
- NOSENKO's work against the U.S. Embassy is con-
firmed by and less directly by other Soviet
It is denied by
sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI.
GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in
the section during these years.)
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706.
b.
Entry into the Section
NOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to
be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has
never given a precise date, usually saying "January 1960"
or "at the beginning of 1960."
As described on Pages 153-154, the shift was made at
GRIBANOV's insistence and against NOSENKO's own personal
wishes. GRIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview,
at which HOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer
was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put
new life into operations against American code clerks, the
GRIBANOV
primary target of the Second Chief Directorate.
did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been
selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression
it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Depart-
ment. (sec Part VIII.D.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not
have been a result of his close personal relationship with
GRIBANOV or because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's:
NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of
his relationship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directo-
rate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few
personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also
said that his father never met GRIBANOV.
NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on
coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however,
that BAKIVALOV was his predecessor but left the section
before he (NOSENKO) arrived. NOSENKO's confusion on this
point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain
files from BAKHVALOV although the latter had transferred to
another department, and the opportunities NOSENHO had to
name BAKIVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did
so are described on Pages 154-156.
C.
Functions as Deputy Chief
In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief
of the section from the same position in another section
was definitely an important promotion: He now became
second-in-charge of the most important operational section
of the entire Second Chief Directorate. As KOVSHUK's
deputy, NOSENKO had the right and obligation to be aware of
all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory
functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting
Chief of the section when necessary.
· NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden from
He claimed to have
him for the two years 1960 and 1961.
had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Section's activi-
ties during the relatively recent years of 1960 and 1961
and to know of all significant operational successes achieved
He has also said he
in the years before and after this period.
It was on this
has told CIA all he knows of these activities.
basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell Mr. McCone
that there were no recruitments. I was there.
When NOSENKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed
on a division of supervisory duties within the section.
KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for
TC
14-00000
'
1
707.
the section's operations, to supervise in particular opera-
tional activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned
to the U.S. Embassy. NOSENKO had been specifically instructed
by GRIBANOV and American Department Chief KLYPIN to concentrate
his efforts on the supervision of operations against the
most important American recruitment target, the code clerks
at the Embassy, with the aim of revitalizing these acti-
vities and making recruitments. (NOSENKO said there had
been none since the early 1950's.) According to the agreed-
upon division of labor. NOSENKO also assumed case officer
responsibility for John ABIDIAN. the Embassy Security offi-
cer (identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer. but actually a
CIA cooptee). Additionally, he was responsible for maintaining
the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical
security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseminating
materials from the microphones concealed in various U.S.
Embassy offices. These were functions held, NOSENKO said,
by his predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO
at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV: Apart from
these duties, which apparently were routinely assumed by
the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part
of 1960 (as NOSENKO first said in 1965), the work of the
officers responsible for operations against the Amorican
Armed Forces Attachos in Moscow; in October 1966, NOSENKO
reported that he was personally responsible during this
period for the operational activity against Naval and Marine
officers in the Naval Attache's office.
d.
Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief
As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said, he was aware of
all the operations being conducted by the section during
this two-year period; by his own statement, nothing was
kept from him. There were in these two years a total of
over three months when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at
In
these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section.
the latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising
the administrative work and operational activity of the en-
tire section and, in particular, assumed KOVSHUK's work in
directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Therefore, pertinent to his
claims are the facts presented in the following paragraphs.
NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions
that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual
occurrences during these times. In answer to a question,
NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSHUK's
which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the
Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going
out of the U.S. Embassy Section.
NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his
absences. He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents,
except GLAZUNOV (whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own
agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and
the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had
reported in connection with his responsibilities in 1953-55).
NOSENKO also said that in 1960 KOVSHUK recruited PREISFREUND,
although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had done
this. (Regardless of who the recruiter might have been,
KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO's meetings with PREISFREUND.)
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708.
NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSHUK had per-
with some
sonal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover,
U.S. Embassy officers and was aware that one of these had been
WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK's contacts with WINTERS,
nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend and few-
quent source of operational information LOPUKHOV, were also in
touch with WINTERS ( He could not remember who else KOVSHUK
NOSENKO
knew, or what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why.
knew neither that William MORRELL (declared to the Soviet Govern-
ment as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who
was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORELL.
Unlike KOVSHUK, ARTEMEV, KOSOLAFOV, BORODIN, BIRYLKOV,
KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers,
NOSENKO never had any direct contact, even for cultivation
or assessment, with any American officials, either stationed
However, his English
in the Embassy or visiting the USSR.
had been proven good enough to qualify him particularly for
tourist recruitments and his operational flair had been tested.
(It was this which caused him to be picked for the DPEN,
and other approaches and the only reason why he,
an inglish speaker. would have been specially selected to
who spoke "some English.")
work on the German
DERYABIN and other defectors from the KGB have stated
that the deputy chief of a section working against a foreign
embassy in Moscow would be responsible for approving and
retaining monthly schedules for the planned use of safehouses
by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting schedules
with individual case officers and approve and retain a list
of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an indi-
vidual basis; and that he would approve the acquisition of new
agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one opera-
tion to another. By contrast, NOSENKO first did not list
these functions among his responsibilities and later denied
that he had them. NOSE KO did not understand the question
when asked whether he had any responsibility for supervising
the use of safehouses in Moscow (Page 162) and said that as
the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case officers,
they could use them when and how they liked without informing
anyone; only when they were meeting an active development
agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only
after the meeting. NOSENKO said that, while he was Deputy
Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had
safe apartments, but he did not remember the location of any
of them. Neither NOSENKO nor his subordinates GRYAENOV 
and
KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure
"meeting apartments" (which are used in the absence of the
full-time occupant). NOSENKO was able to locate his own
"meeting apartment" (which he said he brought with him when
he transferred from the Tourist Department and later took
back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could
do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the location
of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.
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14-00000
709.
•
e.
Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical Security
NOSENKO was
According to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical
security at the U.S. Embassy, and it contained 
detailed
floor plans and photographs of the installation
.
unable to give the location or the floor of 
the 
office of
any single individual or component of the 
Embassy, 
including
those of the Ambassador, or his own targets 
(ABIDIAN, the
military code room, and the State Department communications
rook). NOSKNKO Baid that all important. Rebandy 
offices
were located in the "zone of security," which he has variously
reported as the "seventh, eighth, ninth, and 
tenth floors,"
NOSENKO 
did
or "seventh and up," or the "top four floors."
not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor
was he even sure how many floors were included in the restric-
ted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of 
the top
three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.)
f.
Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel
For
NOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every
officer in the section could identify the known and suspected
Nevertheless
,
American Intelligence personnel in the Embassy.
he himself did not know about three CIA officers (MAHONEY,
MORELL., and GARBLER) whom the KGB had definitely identified
as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961
.
example, MORELL', whose overt CIA affiliation was officially
announced by the Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foreign
Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSHUK
and the KGB First Chief Directorate officer K.N. SMIRNOV 
in
1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although asked
leading questions and given hirts) and did not identify
Four of the seven officers whom
MORELL as a CIA officer.
he said the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such
affiliation. He could not give any information at all on
the person he said the KGB considered to be the 
CIA chief
in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contacts
or on the extent and results of KGB coverage, or on his per-
sonal situation and background. He could not explain why
KLOSSON was considered to be the CIA chief, but said that
"every officer thought he was.
g.
"
Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations
As his main task, the prime reason he was moved into
the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise
In 
this
the operational work against American code clerks.
capacity he closely guided the work of case officers GRYAZNOV
and KOSOLAPOV. * NOSENKO shared an office with his 
two sub-
ordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of
*According to GOLITSYN, who knew both men well. GRYAZNOV was
"a very experienced" case officer with some success; he had
spent about the last five years of his 16 years in 
the KGB
in the American Department and was a specialist in code
clerk operations. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had about
ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing
against code clerks in 1960.
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one another and used a single safe, which contained files
on the American code clerks and the agents involved with them.
NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV
and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases
with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving
or disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originally
asserted that he had also read and studied all the files
kept on the American code clerks; under questioning on indivi-
dual cases, however, he retracted these statements and said
that he may have skimmed some of the files, that he did not
study any of them, but that in any event he read all the
current incoming materials on the code clerks from microphones,
agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officer
concerned.
CIA has two types of information against which the re-
ports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists of
the detailed debriefings of code clerks returning from
Moscow, administered routinely by the Department of State
and the military services; it also includes the special de-
briefings and interrogations of the Department of State,
the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB operational activity
which has become known from various sources. On this basis,
CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateral
information on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section
involving United States code clerks during the period NOSEN-
KO said he was its Deputy Chief. The second type of infor-
mation is the reporting on KGB operations by GOLITSYN who,
from contacts with U.S. Embassy Section officers in Moscow
and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he
said were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's infor-
mation thereby directly contradicts NOSENKO's statement that
the KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment opera-
tions from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of
the subjects of GOLITSYN's leads have been positively identi-
fied. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generally
substantiated by other sources. In one case, this confirma-
tion has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on the
STORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it,
and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREUND pre-
sents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN's
leads. Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an
operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order to estab-
lish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary
evidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-
Moscow train with an American code clerk at the time and
under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such
a trip was made by KOSOLAPOV.
NOSENKO has been questioned in detail about each of the
code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His in-
formation concerning KGB activities involving five of these
Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and
*As discussed below, there are important differences in the
accounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the
outcome of this operation.
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game ali ka sjɔ sumido na vittek tie
T
:
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711.
his lack of information concerning a sixth (GARLAND) is
NOSENKO's
discussed in detail in Pages 166 
through 219.
information on a number of other 
cases, less 
important in
his opinion, is described in the 
tabulation of American
Certain of these 
cases
case leads giver on Pages 364-410
.
are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO's
knowledge equates with details which 
the deputy and acting
chief of the U.S. Embassy Section 
could reasonably be
expected to know and retain.
(1) The STORSBERG Case
The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was,
NOSENKO said, the most important case 
he had as supervisor
The KGB, 
while able to break
of code clerk operations.
certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with
military cryptographic systems, 
and therefore NOSENKO
"dropped everything for a year
" to involve himself 
with the
development of James STORSBERG, 
the military code clerk at
the U.S. Embassy. The following 
facts are pertinent to 
an
evaluation of NOSENKO's story of this case
.
NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly
He told how
at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 
1962.
GOLITSYN, during a visit to the 
American 
Department in 1960,
at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had 
requested permission
to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, a 
Finn, in his own 
opera-
During his 
discussions in the American
tions in Helsinki.
Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was
being used in operations against 
Embassy employees living 
in
America House. NOSENKO said that 
the KGB realized that
GOLITSYN had passed this information on to 
the Americans
following his defection, for the regulations 
governing
visits to America House by third 
nationals had been 
tightened.
At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the 
Finnish agent or
specify his involvement in any particular 
operational 
acti-
vity nor did he date the visit by 
GOLITSYN.
Later in the 1962 meetings NOSENKO gave a detailed
summary of the Finnish agent's involvement 
in the 
unsuccess-
ful recruitment attempt against an American 
military code
clerk. NOSENKO, without naming 
the Finn or the American,
said that he personally conducted 
the recruitment confron-
These early accounts were 
full
tation with GRIBANOV present.
of quotes of what NOSENKO said to the American and vice
versa. descriptions of the American's 
reaction to the 
confron-
tation, and statements of NOSENKO's 
admiration for the Ameri-
Following 
his defection,
can despite his refusal to work.
NOSENKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact,
He identi-
in more detail than he gave for any other 
case.
fied the Finn as PREISFREUND and 
the American 
as STORSBERG
and described and referred to the case 
whenever possible
(over 50 times). When asked for details 
of other code 
clerk
cases, for example, he repeatedly 
diverted to discussion of
the STORSBERG case to illustrate 
how the KGB operated against
code clerks in general.
After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally con-
fronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal 
role was 
limited
to directing STORSBERG into the 
hotel room where the approach
was made; after first saying that he 
had never claimed any
other role, he admitted that he may 
have been "painting"
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This
himself (exaggerating) in his descriptions of 1962.
admission came only after the tape of 
NOSENKO's 
1962
statements had been played to him and he had successively
said that (a) it was not his voice, (b) 
he was drunk in
1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had 
made him
nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of
Still, NOSENKO
tape together to make this false one
.
said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end,
Interrogated 
further
and it was his most important case..
concerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October
1966, NOSENKO said that he had never read the 
KGB file on
STORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV.
GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, didvisit the American
Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND opera-
tionally in Helsinki, and did report this to 
CIA in late
GOLITSYN also 
reported 
that,
1961 following his defection.
in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUND
had recently been used in the successful 
recruitment of 
an
American Embassy employce, possibly a military man 
and 
pos-
sibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK 
said,
PREISFREUND could not be used for six months 
or so in 
other
operations, for otherwise the Americans might become suspi-
cious. NOSENKO has not reported these details
, but has 
said
only that GOLITSYN was instructed to drop interest 
in PREIS-
FREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department
of the Second Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that
he was on leave outside of Moscow on the occasion of COLITSYN's
Since defecting he has
visit to the American Department.
insisted with absolute certainty that this visit took place
in the late spring or carly summer of 1961 and has described
GOLITSYN'S passport
his leave, where he went and with whom.
and CIA travel data show that GOLITSYN was on TDY in Moscow
in January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue,
that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after 
his
return from leave in July '1961, and that he was certain that
he (NOSENKO) was in Moscow in January 1961.
NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation of
which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the American
He did 
so by
Department was the operation against STORSBERG.
his assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used in
Thus, 
as to 
the
only one operation, that against STORSBERG.
outcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSEN-
KO's information and that earlier provided by 
COLITSYN.
There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements that
the recruitment approach took place some time after May 1961
(NOSENKO's dates have varied from June to 
October 1961,
STORSBERG said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's state-
ment that this approach had already been made in January 1961
when he learned of it.
GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appears
to confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case.
GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department
*GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not in
the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.
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713.
in the spring of 1960,* he learned from GRYAZNOV that he
(GRYAZNOV) had developed an operation against an American
military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99
per cent" certain that a recruitment approach to this code
clerk would be successful. GOLITSYN said that GRYAZNOV
told him that this would be the first recruitment of a mili-
tary code clerk (as contrasted to a State Department code
There
clerk) in the history of the American Department.
were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in
Moscow at the tine GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG
ard HURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY performed
If
back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG's absence.
NOSENKO's report that there was no development of or approach
to HURLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSYN would
There is a conflict
apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY.
between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this
second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation
which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whereas
NOSENKO (as well as STORSBERG) asserted that the STORSBFRG
operation was just under way at this time and was long and
drawn-out.
(11)
The JENNER Case
Apart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been
able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the
operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Department
pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed
as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly
Because of
after he arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section.
the inaccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in
Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Hel-
sinki in order to strike up an acquaintance with a code
clerk entering the Soviet Union aboard the Helsinki-Moscow
train. The first (and last) time this was attempted, NO-
SENKO related, was in March 1960, when the KCB learned that
JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist" and thus assumed
by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit
Helsinki en route to his assignment at the U.S. Embassy in
Xoscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore
travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER.'
Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agent to the town,
of Tyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the
same train. Both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent met and
spoke with JENNER en route to Moscow, and the girl gave him
After JENNER's
her telephone number, asking him to call her.
arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV submitted
written reports to NOSENKO describing the contacts on the
train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only
a pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of
interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female
agent, the two were brought together in a "chance meeting"
at the Moscow airport. JENNER would have no part of the
agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore
went no further.
7
*When NOSENKO was told of the GOLITSYN visit in May or June
1960, he denied that it took place, saying that he reces-
sarily would know if it had.
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714.
on
JENNER reported to the Security Officer at the U.S.
Embassy upon his arrival that he had been contacted by two
Soviet students from Vyborg, a young man and a woman,
the Helsinki-Moscow train. He also reported having been
given a telephone number by the girl and later reported
having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport
.
CIA has documentary evidence, in the form of official
Finnish train manifests, that JENNER travelled from Helsinki
This document shows
to Moscow by train on 31 March 1960.
that JENNER travelled alone and no Soviets were aboard when
the train lett Helsinki. CIA also has an official travel
manifest showing that KOSOLAPOV, using the name KOLOSOV,
travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by rail on 2 April 1960,
two days later, and that no Americans travelled on this train
with him. NOSENKO identified KOLOSOV's photograph as that
(NOSENKO earlier said that
of his subordinate KOSOLAPOV.
he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for this
trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV
had an alias passport; he agreed that he would have 
had to
authorize such a passport.) When he was told of 
CIA 
evidence
that KOSOLAPOV did not travel on the same train as 
JENNER
and therefore could not have met and talked with him as
XOSENKO had reported, NOSENKO refused to believe it; he in-
sisted that he had read the reports of both KOSOLAPOV and
GRYAZNOV, and that the events were exactly as he described
them.
(iii) The GARLAND Case
GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was
stationed in Helsinki, probably in November--not March --1960,
KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial
cover in order to make the acquaintance of an American code
KOSOLAPOV's arrival had
clerk on the Helsinki-Moscow train.
been announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the
Helsinki Legal Residency. According to GOLITSYN, the Legal
Residency learned which train this American was to board and
succeeded in placing EOSOLAPOV in the same compartment with
him. GOLITSYN saw KOSOLAPOV board the train with this Ameri-
can. Later, when another American Department officer visited
Helsinki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAFOV's operation with
the code clerk had gone; from the officer's refusal to answer,
GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success.
CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV made a second
trip to Helsinki in November 1960, again under the KOLOSOV
alias. Finnish railroad manifests show that KOSOLAPOV left
Helsinki by train on 16 November 1960 and that one of his
travelling companions on this train was GARLAND, who was
en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the
State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page
198). There were no other Americans on this train.
Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in
November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train
as an American code clerk, one of his own targets, NOSENKO
said that this could not be. He agreed that, as in the case
of KOSOLAPOV's trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily
have been involved in the planning of such a second trip
and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence
in connection with it. Even if such a trip took place when
NOSENKO was out of Moscow, he said, the details of it would
B
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28.
have been known to him upon his return, and he would not
(In fact, CIA 
travel 
records show
have forgotten about the trip.
that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 November 1960 and
that NOSENKO left Moscow for Ansterdam, en route to Cuba,
on 15 November.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that
there was no such trip.
(iv) The MORONE Caso
.
Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case was men-
tioned at NOSENKO's first meeting with CIA; he cited 
it as
an example of a technique which NOSENKO introduced for using
third nationals to obtain access to American 
code clerks who
were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens
.
According to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early
1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard 
(
BEGGS)
KOSOLAPOV thereupon
planned to travel to Warsaw on leave.
drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK
and approved by GRIBANOV, proposing that a female 
agent of
the Polish UB be introduced to MORONE on the 
Moscow to 
War-
saw train for the purpose of obtaining compromising materials.
KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials 
in Moscow
to have such an agent sent to Moscow, met her when she
She was 
then
arrived, and briefed her on the operation.
placed on MORONE's train together with a KGB technician
whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compro-
mise. Events went according to plan: MORONE not the girl
and was intimate with her on the train, but when the tech-
nician reported to NOSENKO the day after the train 
arrived
in Warsaw, he said that the tape recordings were of low
In 
a
quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose.
further attempt to acquire compromising material on MORONE,
KOSOLAPOV later brought the UB agent to Moscow, and on this
occasion photographs were obtained of their intimacies in
a Moscow hotel room. Still, the KGB felt, there 
was not
enough blackmail material to ensure recruitment, and it was
further planned to have the America House maid IVANOVA
attempt to lure MORONE to a room in Moscow where truly
compromising photographs of intimacies with a Soviet citi-
zen could be obtained. Possibly because they 
noticed 
MORONE's
interest in IVANOVA, NOSENKO said, the Americans ordered
MORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be taken.
Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of
detail on MORONE's trip to Warsaw, there were numerous
In 1962 
he said
variations in his different accounts.
that he had handled the entire operation himself, including
telephoning Warsaw with the request for the girl; he also
said that the UB obtained compromising photographs 
in 
Warsaw
and that several months later the female agent was brought
to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to
a Soviet girlfriend. This, NOSENKO said, was successful 
and
While
MORONE was soon having intercourse with a KGB agent.
still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSEN KO gave a
different version: "We," he said, arranged for the girl by
a dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw; moreover
,
the Poles, who had obtained compromising photographs in War-
Saw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping
the best ones for themselves, and this is why she had to 
be
brought to Moscow. NOSENKO told the FBI later in 
February
1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in War-
saw but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV 
had
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given instructions that no actions were to be taken which
might embarrass then existing good relations 
with the 
United
States. When in February 1365 it was pointed out that MORONE
arrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that 
NOSENKO left
for Cuba on 15 November 1960, NOSENKO revised his story of
receiving the personal report of the technician to say that
he had perhaps read the technician's report after returning
from Cuba in December 1960.
CIA learned of the MORONE train trip and subsequent
involvement with the UB agent in 1961 from a Polish source
who had provided much sensitive and reliable information
previously. The Polish source submitted a 
considerable
amount of detail including the date of the 
operation (
which
NOSENKO did not recall) and the fact that the Polish 
agent
was handled in Moscow by a KGB officer named "Volodya.
It was on the basis of this report that MORONE) was withdrawn
from Moscow in May 1961.
In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has con-
KCSOLA-
sistently named KOSOLAPOV as MORONE's case officer
.
POV drafted the plan for the operation on the train, discussed
it with NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, met with a UB 
official in Moscow
to arrange for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, and
NCSENKO has not been 
asked
briefed her on her assignment.
and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent
on the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscow
on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on 
the 14th; from
12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLAFOV is confirmed to have been
in Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation in-
It is
volving the American code clerk GARLAND (see 
above).
also noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officer
supervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV's trip
to Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 
1960 with a dele-
gation going to Cuba.
He
NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents
in contact with MORONE and what was learned from them
.
reported that an Egyptian agent visited America House, met
MORONE there, but did not report anything of 
interest con-
cerning him. NCSENKO also mentioned IVANOVA, a 
maid at
America House, who knew MORONE and whom the KGB 
wanted 
to use
to lure MORONE into a compromising situation (see above).
NOSENKO said that he, himself, had met with IVANOVA several
times to discuss MORONE, but that he could not recall any-
thing specific of interest or use that she reported concerning
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717.
Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKO
said, was an East Geraan girl sent to America House to pose
as an Austrian; NOSENKO was not sure what she might 
have
reported or when this was, other than it occurred 
when 
he
was working against ORONE and that it was during ABIDIAN's
tour in Moscow, for he had come to America House to question
the girl.
Various reports indicato that VORONE was involved in
illegal currency speculation with the Egyptiar agent 
and
that on at least one occasion the Fgyptian 
introduced 
MORONE
NOSENKO
to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate
.
did not know that MORONE was also involved in illegal cur-
rency dealings with
Mahon NOSENKO has identified 
as
KOSOLAPCV's agent and who, he said, was involved with and
NOSENKO did 
not 
know
reporting on NOSENXO's target ABIDIAN.
that IVANOVA once introduced MORONE to a Soviet female, with
whom MORONE was intimate; additionally MORONE was reported
by a number of his co-residents at America House 
to have 
been
Some
intimate with IVANOVA herself (which MORONE denied).
of these same Americans reported also that NORONE was inti-
mate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identified 
by NOSENKO;
Finally, the
MORONE hiuself said he knew UMANETS "well."
incident involving the East German girl posing as an Austrian
involved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took place
after NOSENKO clains to have been transferred from the U.S.
Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ABIDLAY's successor,
MONTGOMERY.
(v) The KEYSERS Case
The approach to KEYSERS is the only time during his
service in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSENKO claims to
have had direct contact with an American stationed 
in Mos-
cow. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the only
face-to-face encounter he could recall; and, on another
,
that it was possible that STORSEFRG--the only other possibility--
may not have seen him on the night he was approached 
in the
Moscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independent
American source who could confirm that NOSENKO was involved
in operations against American Embassy personnel in 1960 or
1961. NOSENKO himself pointed out, however, that 
this cor-
tact was of very short duration, and that it was possible
This was 
the case:
that KEYSERS would not recognize him.
KEYSERS failed to identify NOSENKO's photograph and described
the officer who approached him as a man considerably 
older,
shorter, and probably of a much heavier build than 
NOSENKO
was. Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description of
this incident, he did not know much about 
the overall KGB
case against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have been
noted.
In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS,
without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORS-
BERG. Since defecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued to
In fact, KEYSERS
identify him as STCRSBERG's replacement.
was sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Embassy medical
officer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache as
a collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was under
training in the military code room as a "back-up" crypto-
grapher for STORSBERG. STORSBERG's replacement in Moscow
was ZUJUS.
TOP SECRET,
"
14-00000
'
718.
On 24 and 28 January 1964, before the defection, NO-
SENKO incorrectly named ZUJUS, who he said was STORSBERG's
On 2 February
replacement, as the target of this operation.
1964 NOSENKO called a special meeting with his CIA handlers
to correct this mistake. He said that, in fact, KEYSERS
was STORSBERG's replacement, and the approach had been made
to him. (Thus NOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one
American Embassy official he ever approached.)
In
In February 1965 NOSENKO said that the KGB believed
that KEYSERS did not report the receipt of the defection
letter and that there was no indication that he had from
microphones or telephone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.
fact, KEYSERS reported the letter at once in the office of
the Military Attache, where a microphone was discovered in
1964. NOSENKO had earlier said that this particular micro-
phone was being monitored around the clock by the KGB.
(KEYSERS' homosexuality and drinking problems had also
NOSENKO was
been discussed widely in Embassy offices.
unaware of these discussions.) ·
NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB
delivered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport
approach which NOSENKO claimed to have made.
(vi). Other Code Clerk Cases
Frank DAY: NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department
code clerk and the target of either KOSCLAPOV or GRYAZNOV.
As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he
knew of any interesting information about DAY, whether he
knew of any of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels
inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc. NCSENKO answered
"no" to all these questions. He said that the KGB had no
derogatory information on DAY, was unaware of any vulner-
abilities he might have had, and that no operational mes-
sures were taken against him. Records show that DAY was in
Moscow from Kay 1960 to October 1961. In July 1961 he tra-
velled to the Caucasus with his friend, the U.S. Agricul-
tural Attache BROWN, formerly an overt CIA employee.
later reported that the two were under surveillance by five
persons at all times on this trip, that on one occasion they
found four "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning
unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during
this trip an "attractive and available Soviet female" was
placed in their train compartment.
DAY
John TAYLOR: NOSENKO said TAYLOR was a State Department
code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not
know of TAYLOR's previous service abroad or of any back-
He
ground information the KGB might have had about him.
described an operation against TAYLOR which centered around
his intimacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sym-
No compro-
pathy towards the Soviet Union and its people.
mising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the maid,
however, and no approach was made to him, possibly because
the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORS-
BERG case by creating a "flap." According to TAYLOR, he was
intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until the
beginning of 1961. On one occasion they were intimate in a
"friend's apartment" in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know that
the maid told TAYLOR she was pregnant or that TAYLOR offered
T
14-00000
:
i
719.
her: money for an abortion.
TAYLOR left Moscow in February
1961, whereas the approach to STORSBERG was reported by
NOSENKO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to eight months
afterward.
Maurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State
Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during
the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, whose name NOSEN-
KO did not recall, introduced ZWANG to a ferale KGB agent
in an attempt to obtain compromising photographs, but the
agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercourse
with him. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Sec-
tion in January 1962, there was no further activity sur-
rounding ZWANG. The KGB had no agents in contact with him,
and there was no vulnerability data concerning hia. When
ZWANG was interviewed by the State Department after returning
from his Moscow assignment, a polygraph examination indicated
that ZWANG had had intercourse with his Russian raid, else-
where identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent; ZANG admitted
visiting the maid's apartment several times but denied
intimacies. In March or April 1961, an Egyptian introduced
ZWANG to another Soviet female; ZWANG also admitted visiting
her apartment on several occasions, but again denied having
had intercourse with her. ZWANG as reported by various
other Americans stationed in Moscow to have been active in
currency speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian
and and agent of KOSOLAPOV according to NOSENKO.
NOSENKO was unaware of this.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
h.
720.
Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN
NOSENŁO said that, as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy
Section, he was directly responsible, is case officer, for
all coverage of the Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN.
This was NOSENNEO's only individual target responsibility.
NOSENKO said that
and no KGB officer shared it with him.
he opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN before ABIDIAN's arrival
in Moscow in early 1950, and that he turned this file over
officially to his successor, GRYAZNOV, when transferred from
It was NOSENKO
the U.S. Embass; Section at the end of 1961.
who wrote the KGB plan for operations against ABIDIAN in
about October 1950. ARIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was con-
sidered by the KGB to be a CIA officer and, as LANGELLE's
successor, was also considered to be the most important
ABIDIAN was thus
counterintelligence target in the Embassy.
made a special target of surveillance from the day of his
arrival in the USSR; this meant he was always under surveil-
lance by several teams of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance)
Directorate. The intensive coverage of ALIDIAN included
mail censorship, telephone taps, and agent reporting; it was
instituted. NOSENKO said, "in the hope that he might lead
the KGB to another PCPOV." ABIDIAN was detected, NOSENKO
continued, in three letter-mailings--all to agents already
under KGB control. He was seen to enter a suspected dead
drop site on Pushkin Street, the significance of which did
not become known to the KGB until later, when it was learned
that this site was to be used by PENKOVSKIY. In the hostile
interrogations of early 1965, NOSENKO agreed that he was the
single person in the KGB responsible for knowing everything
possible about BIDIAN.
NOSENKO said he knew nothing about AEIDIAN's personal
background, his education, his studies in France, his mili-
tary service, his date of entry into the State Department,
his State Department rank, his previous foreign assignments
with the State Department, or his status as a Foreign Ser-
vice Reserve, Staff, or Officer status (FER, FSS, FSO).
NOSENKO said he tried to learn these things, but the informa-
tion was unavailable in the Second Chief Directorate cr in
KGB Central files, and although he requested information
from the First Chief Directorate, nothing was received.
only information the KGB had on ABIDIAN. insofar as NOSENKO
knew, was that contained in ABIDIAN's visa request and in
a report from one of the Legal Residencies in the United
States; the report provided a basis for believing him to be
a CIA officer.
The
NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials
FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the
Department of State Biographic Register for information on
ABIDIAN's background, he replied that this document was not
available to the U.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently.
recalled that there was an old copy of the Biographic Register
"from about 1956" in KOVSHUK's office, but that it contained
no information on ABIDIAN.
NOSENKO reported that one of the reasons ABIDIAN was
considered a CIA officer was his behavior while serving as
a Department of State Security Officer with KHRUSHCHEV's
delegation when the latter visited the United States in

14-00000
721.
;
1959. NOSENKO never mentioned that KOSOLAPCV, who ne
said was his immediate subordinate and shared NOSENKO's
office in KGB Headquarters, was a member of this same
delegation.
NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's office was located
in the U.S. Embassy. He said he did not know and was
unable to find out who ABIDIAN's secretary was. He reported
that some agent told the KGB that ABIDIAN had a sign on
the door of his office which said "Security Officer."
There was no such sign.
NOSENKO did not know where APIDIAN's apartment was
located. He did not know its contents and said that the
KGB was not interested in this. He did not know whether
ABIDIAN changed apartments in Moscow, which he did.
NOSENKO identified GROMAKOVA, an Embassy language
teacher, as a KGB agent who was valuable because she was
intelligent and was able to provide personality sketches on
her students based on classroom discussions. He never
associated ABIDIAN with GROMANOVA. en told that ABIDIAN
had taken language lessons from her. NOSENKO recalled that
ABIDIAN took "several" lessons from GROMAKOVA at the beginning
of his tour but discontinued; she reported nothing of signi-
ficance and there was no regular reporting from her on
ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN, however, reported that he took regular,
private Russian lessons from GROMOVA throughout his tour
in Moscow and that they discussed in class his past personal
life. travel, education, fiancee, and his trips abroad to
see his fiancee.
NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN travelled out of the USSR
two or three times, but had no idea when these trips took
place or what countries ABIDIAN visited. NOSENKO said that,
as ABIRIAN's predecessor LANGELLE was known to have travelled
outside the USSR for operational reasons in connection with
the POPOV case. it would have been of interest to learn
where AbIDIAN had gone, but the KGR had no way of finding
this out. (Note in the previous paragraph that GROMAKOVA
know.) When NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out the possibi-
lity of photographing ABIDIAN's passport upon his return to
the USSR, NOSENKO replied that the KGB does not photograph
the passports of foreign diplocats entering the Soviet Union.
NOSENKO said that ABIDIAN made no trips outside Moscow
within the USSK and explained that. as case officer, he
would necessarily have been aware of any such trip as he
would have had to handle all arrangements for surveillance
during it. When NOSENKO was told that ABIDIAN travelled to
Soviet Armenia in October 1960. NOSENKO said for the first
time that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admitted
in October 1966 that he knew nothing of ABIDIAN's trip.
NOSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN's
close American friends in Moscow or his friends and profes-
sional contacts among foreigners there.
NOSENKO said at the end of the January-February 1965
interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that the reason he knew
so little about ABIDIAN was because he was "working badly"
as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he
14-00000
i
122.
said, as that he had to concentrate on supervising the work
against code clerks and therefore had very little time
left for ABIDIAN (see above concerning cɔde clerks).
In 1962 NOSENKO correctly described all of the three
clandestine letter mailings carried out by ARIDIAN in Mos-
He also provided ac-
cow at CIA request (Pages 226-230).
curate information on CIA letter-mailings in general.
pointing out that none at all were mailed for a year and a
(No
half after the arrest of LANGELLE in October 1959.
letters were mailed from 22 February 1960 until 1 April
1961, when ABIDIAN mailed his first one.) NOSENKO explained
that the KGB completely controlled this activity through the
use of metka, a thief powder applied to the clothing of
foreigners in the USSR; a trace is left on anything coming
into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected
. Despite
by special machines through which all mail passes.
the fact that all of ABIDIAN's letters were mailed to KGB
double agents and would therefore have been detected anyway,
it was metka, NOSENKO said, which in each case led to their
initial identification. After his defection NOSENKO described
how the metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing (and
hence to the letters) by the agent FLDOROVICH, who began
working as ABIDIAN's maid several months after ABIDIAN ar-
rived in Moscow in March 1960. NOSENKO insisted under inter-
rogation that FEDOROVICH was the only agent who had access
to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he. NOSENKC. had personally
briefed her on the application of metka, and that he was
sure that ABIDIAN's letters were detected by means of metka.
From a CIA debriefing of ABIDIAN, however, it appears that
FEDOROVICH did not begin working as ABIDIAN's maid until
some time in July 1961, whereas ARIDIAN mailed his first
letter in Moscow on 1 April 1961 and his second letter on
2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 Septem-
ber 1961, after FEDOROVICH began to work for him.
i.
Reporting on ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead
Drop
NOSENKO's account of the visit by ABIDIAN to the
PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street in Mosocw is
described in detail on Pages 231-235. In summary, NOSENKO
reported that at the end of 1960 or early 1961 KGB surveil-
lance followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to Pushkin
Street, where ABIDIAN was noted to enter a residential building.
Upon examination it was decided that this was a likely
dead drop site, and a stationary surveillance post was as-
signed to watch it. After three months, since nothing sus-
The true
picious had been noted, this post was removed.
significance of the location did not become known to the
NOSENZO
KGB until after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.
said he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and was ABIDIAN's
He heard of it
case officer when this event took place.
while sitting in KOVSHUK's office on the day it happened.
visited the site the following day with V. KOZLOV (Chief of
the American Department of the KGB Surveillance Directorate),
placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN'S file.
and discussed the results of the stationary post with KOZLOV
on an almost daily basis during the first month and periodi-
It was ECZLOV
cally thereafter until the post was removed.
who told NOSENKO that after three months the stationary
☐
14-00000
722.
NOSENYO did not tell
CIA about this incident in 1362, he said, because he knew
that the watch had been discontinued and that nothing sus-
picious had been noted; therefore, he thought the incident
to American Intelligence
.
would not have been of interest
surveillance had been discontinued.
NOSENHO has stressed that ALIDIAN 5s under special
surveillance by at least two surveillance teams at all times
and that, on the day he visited Pushkin Street. LILIAN 
was
under continuous watch from the moment he left the imbassy
NOSENKO has been able to give a detailed description of
ABILIAN'S Rovement to the dead drop site.
Despite the special surveillance coverage of ADIDIAN,
NOSENKO Stid, he was unaware of any unusual movements by
ABIDIAN during the days immediately preceding his visit
to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO said that he knew definitely
that surveillance had reported nothing unusual during this
period and that he was sure ABIDIAN had not eluded the sur-
According to CIA 
records.
veillance at any time during it.
three days before ABIDIAN went to Fushkin Street in response
to indications that the dead drop had beer, loaded. ABIDIAN
left the U.S. Embassy in his private car for Spasso House
at about nine o'clock in the evening: at about two o'clock
the next morning he and BARELER ] (CIA Chief of Station) went
in ABILIAN's car to check the telephone pole for 
the signal
PENKOVSKIY was to leave as part of his signal that the drop
had been loaded. Two days before ABIDIAN went to Pushkin
Street he drove his car to the apartment of Air Force Captain
DAVISON; he again checked the telephone pole from a window
NOSENKO
in the apartment and then walked by it on foot.
identified GARBLER as a U.S. naval officer but not as a CIA
employee (see above).
Asked why, in his opinion. ABIDJAN went to Fushkin
Street at the time he did, NCSENKO replied that in about
B60 an American tourist or delegation member had gone tɔ
this address. It was the "opinion of the Second Chief
Directorate" that this American had selected the 
site 
as a
there merely
dead drop location, and that ASIDIAN went
In
to check the suitability of the site for this purpose.
fact, ABIDIAN went to Pushkin Street in response to what
appeared to be a prearranged telephone signal from PENKOVSKIT
It has
signalling that he had loaded the dead drop there.
been confirmed that PENKOVSKIY did not give this signal
and, because of the circumstances and type of signal given,
CIA has
the possibility of coincidence has been ruled out.
therefore concluded that the signal came from the KGB.
The
The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by
PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter through which
There is no record that a
he initially contacted CIA.
"tourist or delegation neuber" visited this address.
only known visits by Americans to the building on Pushkin
Street--the only ones having any connection with its use
as a dead drop. location--occurred on 12 November and 4
December 1960 when the CIA officer MAHONEY checked the
address from outside, and on 21 January 1961 when MAHONEY
entered the building and dhecked the specific location of
the dead drop. MAHONEY is known to have been identified
to the KGB as a CIA officer before arriving in Moscow and
was the target of heavy surveillance throughout his tour.
(NOSENKO did not know about MAHONEY or his CIA status.)
14-00000
724.
NOSENKO's date of "late B60 or early 19641" is incorrect,
almost exactly by a year. NOSENKO Bald he turned ABIDIAN'S
file over to GRYAZNOV about 28 December 1261. ABIDIAN
checked the Fushkin Street dead drop en 30 December 1961.
NOSENKO has described his participation in an approach to
the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON as happening "right after
returning to the Tourist Department in 1962. Because
NOSENKO's participation in this case was confirmed by JOHNSON.
and because the approach to JOHNSON took place on 5 January
1962 (se reported it to the U.S. Fabassy at once), it can
be said with certainty that NOSENKO's entire story of his
own participation in the surveillance of the Pushkin Street
dead drop site is false. NOSENKO: (a) could not have
visited the dead drop site with KCZLOW (who in any event
was not in Moscow at the time); (b) could not have placed
the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file,
which GRYAZNOV held as of 28 December 1961; (c) could not
have received almost daily reports from KOZLOV for about a
month and periodic reports thereafter; and (d) could not
have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drop
in 1962 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street
had been discontinued after three months without anything
suspicious being noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March
1962, only two and a half months after ABIDIAN checked the
dead drop.)
NOSENKO has refused to admit that he lied about his
part in this incident. The page containing the contradic-
tions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only page of
a "protocol" which NOSENKO refused to sign during the hostile
interrogations of early 1965. In October 1966, when he was
again asked whether he went to the Pushkin Street dead
drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could not remem-
ber whether he had gone there at all.
14-00000
725.
j. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache Operations
On 29 January 1965 NOSENKO told his interrogator that
for the first five or six months of 1960, immediately after
transferring to the U.S. Embassy Section and as part of his
responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second
Chief Directorate activities against American service at-
taches in Moscow. By this he meant, NOSENKO said, that when
GAVRILENKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches),
KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attaches and
Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would
come to him rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section,
After about six months he was relieved of this duty because
his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this
function and because it was considered more suitable that
ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as
Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.
NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on
his resposibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never
before mentioned this one. NOSENKO told CIA in June 1964
that when he reported for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section
in January 1960, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for
the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival,
NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and
his responsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had
earlier been assisting DRANOV against these targets.
NOSENKO said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon,
or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S.
Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either
immediately before or right after this leave KOVSHUK told
him that he would be responsible for activities against
the Naval Attaches. DRANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO
the files on Naval and Marine personnel. This was NOSENKO's
first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or
of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel
of the Naval Attache's office in Moscow. (At the same time
he said that he had lied about going on leave in November
1960.)
NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had
said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations
against all U.S. service attache personnel. NOSENKO re-
plied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working
on (supervising) all of them.
"
NOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific
operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S.
Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all
attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI's
contact with (or attempt to recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent
which he has described in detail (see Page 488)
took place after he was relieved of these functions.
TOP SECRET
0000
5
726.
k.
TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case
In the spring of 1261, NOSENKO said, four months after
returning from Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that in about
a week's time he would leave for Bulgaria to consult 
with
the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR concerning
operations against the American Legation in Sofia (Pages
279-283). NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where
he was met by A.S. KOZLOV, an advisor there and a former
employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSENKO had
known at KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria
until about the middle of May. While there he discussed
both general matters and particular cases with the Bul-
garians, gave several lectures on operations against Ameri-
can installations and personnel as well as against tourists, ·
and finally directed the successful homosexual operation
against the American Professor LUNT.
Aside from being told that he would be advising the
Bulgarian service on operations against Americans at the
Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO apparently received no prepara-
tion for this trip. He said in answer to specific questions
that nobody told him what he was supposed to discuss with
the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian
liaison representatives in Moscow before leaving, and that
he knew nothing of the organization, personnel, area of
responsibility, or problems of the American Department of
the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia.
NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact
that he was extremely busy with his duties in the U.S. Embassy
Section (see above discussion of his responsibilities for
code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite
the fact that KOZLOV was permanently assigned as an advisor
in Sofia. NOSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a
"very experienced officer" and has said that KOZLOV was Chief
of the American Department until 1953 and then from June 1955
until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist De-
partment, Second Chief Directorate. (KOZLOV, assisted by
NOSENKO, had recruited BURGI in June 1956.) Asked why KOZLOV
could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that 
he
was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away
from active operations in Moscow too long.
NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties.
as an advisor on operations against the American Legation.
On the other hand, he accidentally became involved in a homo-.
sexual entrapment operation against an American tourist who
was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation
in considerable detail. (NOSENKO's previous speciality was
tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual
compromise.)
NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed
greatly between 1962 and 1964. During the first meeting -
series he described in detail how he set the operation up
and what he said to LUNT when he personally confronted the
American with the evidence. Since defecting in 1964, how-
ever, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part in the
approach itself, that he remained in his office, and that he
merely advised how to set it up. (A comparison of his account
and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at
the time.)
TOP SECRET
14-00000
727.
NOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service became aware
of LUNT's homosexual tendencies only after he saw LUNT's
name or heard it mentioned; he recognized the name as that of
a professor who had been assessed as a homosexual when
carlier visiting Moscow, and traces with the 
KGB 
Second Chick
In 
state-
Directorate confirmed that this was the same man.
ments made to U.S. authorities after the approach, LUNT said
he had had homosexual relations at least five 
different 
times
LUNT
with a Bulgarian during an earlier trip to Sofia.
gave this Bulgarian travellers' checks, which the latter
planned to sell on the blackmarket, was on one 
occasion
stopped on the street with him by a Bulgarian civil police-
man, and corresponded with him in the interim 
between his
first visit and the one during which the approach took place.
LUNT had written the Bulgarian homosexual that he was returning
to Sofia before arriving on the second occasion.
The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TUY
NOSENKO said that in October 1960 he was assigned to
accompany a delegation of automotive specialists on a visit
to the United States but that when this trip was 
concelled,
After he had com-
he went on [DY to Cuba (lages 274-278).
pleted arrangements for his passport and had submitted his
true name to the U.S. Embassy for a visa, the Soviets 
were
informed by U.S. authorities that the delegation could not
At about the same
then be accepted in the United States.
time, a delegation of nickel industry experts was being
readied for departure to Cuba. At first, NOSENKO explained,
it was not considered necessary for a security officer to
accompany this delegation to a friendly country, but at the
last moment, two days before the delegation was scheduled to
leave Moscow, the Central Committee of the Communist Party
Because there was
demanded that such an officer go along.
:
no time to do otherwise, NOSENKO was chosen for this job
since he already had a valid passport and authorization to
travel abroad. Visa arrangements were made for the transit
countries and NOSENKO left with the delegation, returning to
Moscow in mid- or late December 1960.
NOSENKO's U.S. visa request submitted to the U.S. Em-
bassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this
(He travelled to
name in connection with travel abroad.
England in 1957 and 1958 as NIKOLAYEV, NOSENKO said, because
he had used this name with British citizens
in the Soviet Union; aš
as suspected of being an intel-
ligence officer, NOSENKO was exposed under this identity.
He applied for U.S. entry: under true name, however, despite
the fact that he had also used the NIKOLAYEV name with
Americans; one of them was FRIPPEL who, according to the
CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, was suspected by the
KGB to be an American intelligence agent. NOSENKO further
explained that he could not use the name NIKOLAYEV because
the automotive delegation cover he planned to use in the
United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he
had used in Great Britain, and the KGB feared that this.
would be noticed when the American and British services ex-
changed notes. The proposed automotive cover, however, con-
flicts in the same way with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
cover NOSENKO used, again under true name, in Geneva in 1962.
TOP SECRET
:
14-00000
TOP SECRET
728.
NOSENKO Raid that the decision to send him to Cuba
was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because
a security officer was required and he happened 
to have a
passport and authorization to travel. The 
delegation 
left
Moscow on 15 November 1960, and therefore 
this decision
NOSENKO, who
was reached on 13 November or thereabouts.
had been transferred to the U.S. Embassy Section in order
to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks,
the Section's most important recruitment target, consequently
left Moscow on the day that MORONE also departed by 
train
for Warsaw and at a time that his subordinate 
KOSOLAPOV 
was
in Helsinki (12-16 November 1960), apparently in connection
with an operation against John GARLAND.
NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the
In 1962 
he related 
in
purpose of his assignment to Cuba.
detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban-
intelligence service was operating against Americans 
sta-
tioned in Havana, particularly intelligence 
officers. and
Since 1964
,
described what he did to fulfill this 
mission.
however, NOSENKO has claimed merely to have been the security
officer with the delegation.
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:
729.
1.
Personal Handling of Agents
YEFREMOV
When NOSENKO transferred from the Tourist Department
to the American Department, he took along 
a number of the
agents he had used in tourist 
operations with him:
and VOLKOV, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV, 
and RYTOVA. During 
this
period he also handled LEVINA, 
a librarian and language-
teacher at the U.S. Embassy who 
was turned over to him 
by
U.S. Embassy Section case officer 
MASSYA in 1960; and
PREISFREUND and who were 
used in code clerk 
opera-
tions. These agents and NOSENKO's 
handling of them are 
dis-
cussed below.
(1) YEFRENOV and VOLKOV
NOSENKO continued to meet with these two homosexual
agents during his two years as Deputy Chief 
of the 
section.
He did not use them in any way
, however, according to his
account. The only contact of 
the two known to CIA was a
In 
1959, while in Moscow 
and
meeting in 1961 with BARRETT.
a CIA agent, BARRETT was compromised by YEFREMOV and VOLKOV:
in 1961, shortly after an 
apparently chance meeting with
them, BARRETT was recruited 
by the KGB on the basis of 
the
NOSENHO described the compro-
Materials obtained in 1959.
wise of BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he had been recruited
in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's 
contacts with YEFRE-
MOV and YOLKOV in 1961.
(11)
FRIPPEL
NOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPFEL during the
1960-1961 period, despite the fact that he never 
provided
anything of value, because he and 
CHELNOKOV (the Chief of
the Tourist Department who was always 
present at these
meetings) "kept hoping he would give 
something."
left the Soviet Union in January 
1961, but 
NOSENKO continued
to be registered as his case officer
.
(111)
DMITRIYEV
FRIPPEL
DMITRIYEV, a specialist on Japan and Thailand who
spoke Japanese and English, had been 
NOSENKO's agent 
during
DMITRIYEV was then employed by the
the 1955-1960 period.
Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate
NOSENKO did not
how he was used in tourist operations.
describe any operational use of him in 1960 or 1961.
(iv) RYTOVA
RYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Department
after 1956 or 1957, at which time she was 
employed at the
An English speaker,
Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow
.
she reported any interesting information concerning visitors
NOSENKO 
has not referred to any KGB opera-
to the exhibition.
tions in Moscow in which she participated during his service
there.
(v) LEVINA
LEVINA worked as a language teacher and librarian at
the American Embassy and NOSENKO handled her 
because she
Не
had a number of code clerks in her language 
classes.
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730.
met with LEVINA a number of times, but she never reported
anything interesting and was never used directly in opera-
She 
29 fired from the
tions involving the Americans.
Embassy at the end of 1960 or early 1951.
(v1) Johen PREISFREUND
As described in Pages 173-131 and discussed above,
PREISFREUND was, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK 
in 
1960
and was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against 
James
STORSBERG. Both NOSENKO and PREISFREUND 
said that this 
was
NOSENKO 
suggested
the only operation in which he took part.
to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his
description of this case, and CIA interviewed PREISFREUND
PREIS-
in Helsinki and Stockholm during the summer 
of 1965.
FREUND's account generally agreed with NOSENKO's and he was
able to supply a considerable amount of 
personality and
background information concerning his 
former case officer
.
From PREISFREUND's manner during these 
interviews, the 
nature
of his responses and statements, and his 
actions after the
interviews were completed, there was no 
reasonable doubt
that he remained under KGB control while 
meeting the CIA
representatives.
(vii)
WKGB cryptonym "SARDAR") was recruited by NOSEN-
KO in 1961. A Syrian A
HUD in Moscow,
was first targetted against America House in General, but
was then used only in the development operation 
against
ZUJUS, the successor to James STORSBERG as military code
clerk in Moscow.
met and developed ZUJUS, 
but 
nothing
had come of the operation at the time NOSENKO transferred
No other use 
was made of 
this
from the American Department.
NOSENKO first
agent and there was no approach to ZUJUS.
suggested that CIA actempt a "false flag" recruitment of
Causing his (NOSENKO's) name for this purpose
; he 
pro-
Yin Damascus 
so that
vided CIA with
Later NOSENKO said that
contact could be established,
like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO's position as his
handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212).
viewed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled having met
recall his name and denied that his relationship with
was as close as NOSENKO reported.
CIA inter-
did not
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14-00000
731.
Transfer to the Tourist Department
Some time in the fall of 1961, NOSENKO said, he heard
of GRIBANOV's decision to promote him to the position of
NOSENKO,
Deputy Chief of the entire American Department.
however, knew that his chief and friend KOVSHUK wanted the
job. and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored
KOVSHUK for this position. Realizing that his own appoint-
ment would therefore place him in a difficult position and
wishing to avoid this, NOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the
At
Tourist Department, CHELNOKOV, about returning there.
CHELNOKOV's suggestion. NOSENKO went to GRIBANOV with the
request to be returned to the Tourist Department as Chief
of the American Tourist Section, with the understanding that
he would be made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department
upon the retirement of the incumbent. BALDIN, in July 1962.
To this GRIBANOV agreed. NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV did
not discuss with him his reasons for wanting to appoint him
Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing
him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did he discuss
with NOSENKO his personal requirements for these positions.
On one occasion, in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was
because GRIBANOV "thought I was a tough guy, a good case
officer. In 1959 I saw him often and was involved in a lot.
According to
of questions which were reported to him."
his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially transferred
from the American Department at the end of December 1961
and reported for duty in the Tourist Department on about
3 January 1962.
KOVSHUK, who was also a candidate for the job as Deputy
Chief of the American Department, had earlier held this po-
He had been per-
sition, according to NOSENKO and COLITSYN.
sonally involved in many of the more significant American
These in-
Department operations during the previous decade.
cluded the recruitments of RHODES and SMITH (the latter one
of NOSENKO's most important leads, according to NOSENKO);
the handling of SHAPIRO; the attempts to recruit STORSBERG
HARMSTONE, and MANNHEIM%; the development of the CIA officer
☑INTERS: and the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection with
the POPOV arrest.
By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate for the job,
NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOV recruited BURGI, and himself
recruited HARRIS and five homosexual tourists who visited
the Soviet Union in 1959: Furthermore, NOSENKO's perfor-
mance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. as he
admitted under interrogation, was "not good.
NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his
transfer to the Tourist Department. In 1962 NOSENKO said
at various times that this took place in January 1962 and
in February 1962: in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling
some time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February
1965 he arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after
it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach to W.E.
JOHNSON on 5 January. (On this basis, he said that the
official order was issued about 25 December 1961 and that
he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOV several
days later.) NOSENKO contradicted this latter estimate.
however, by saying that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section
for the entire period of the three-month surveillance of
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the Pushkin Street dead drop, i.e., until late March 1962,
and by his insistence that he had returned to the Tourist
Department by the time GOLITSYN defected; he placed this on
15 January 1962 and refused to believe the correct date of
15 December 1961.
D.
Remarks
For no single responsibility has NOSENKO substantiated
his alleged Bervice as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy
Section in the years 1960-1961. His statements about the
appointment to and transfer from this position have been
inconsistent; his comparatively narrow experience and his
acknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship with
the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV,
dispel the likelihood that these personnel assignments were
made in the way he claims. Repeatedly he has been contra-
dictory about his activities during this two-year period,
shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring how
each succeeding version made all of his claims increasingly
incredible. The limited extent of NOSENKO's information
betrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties,
targets, and most of the operations which he has ascribed
to himself; in a certain few instances, however, such as
his description of ABIDIAN's route to the Pushkin Street dead
drop, he has recounted events just as they are known from
other sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where col-
lateral information has covered the few subjects on which
he provided details, it has almost invariably contradicted
him and showed him to be ignorant of significant facts.
The reporting by NOSENKO thus was so superficial, so in-
without
complete, and so demonstrably erroneous as to suggest 
wit
reservation that he never served as an officer in the U.S.
Embassy Section, much less as its Deputy Chief.. All avail-
able evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who were
CIA and FBI sources (see Parts VIII.H. and VII.I. below),
combines to formulate this conclusion.
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___ VORGALWYN MARONIZES USA
CITLI
733.
7.
8.
Tourist Department (1962-1964)
Introduction
NOSLNKO agreed during the interrogations at the beginning
of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the
In this
American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.*
job he was responsible for planning and supervising KGB acti-
vities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian
nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encom-
passed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 295-
287).
In July 1962, in conformity with GRIBANOV's intentions,
NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the
entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of
close to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handling opera-
tions against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintained
the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO
received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Department, a
During this
"paper" promotion as there was no other deputy.
period in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervi-
sory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in
detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several
tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American
tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents.
It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two
of the most widely publicized cases of this period, the arrest
of BARGHOORN, and the case of OSWALD.
b.
Absences from Moscow
During his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO
was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the
time. After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after
the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1962, NOSENKO spent sev-
eral weeks "getting the feel" of things by talking to case offi-
cers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the
previous two years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tour-
ist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assign-
NOSENKO has
ment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation.
said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Depart-
ment of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging
for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as
well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation
of suspected American agent SHAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did
this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties,
but has noted in another context that these preparations required
sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal
part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962.
On
15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with
the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to
return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section.
(He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it
is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.)
according to NOSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief
Thus,
This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his
approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have
occurred on 5 January, as CIA records show.
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734.
of the American Tourist Section, he was in Moshow only three
months and for much of this time was involved 
in breaking in
on his new job or in preparing for his temporary assignment
abroad. NOSENKO said he had "no accomplishments
" in this
period.
In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a month in
NOSENKO has estimated 
that 
six
Sochi with his wife and mother.
months of 1963 were spent on various temporary assignments in
the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, plus a one-month's vacation
in 1963. From 15 June 1962 to his arrival in 
Geneva on 19 Janu-
ary 1964, a period of 18 months, NOGENKO was absent from 
KGB
Thus in the period 
1962-63,
Headquarters for eight months.
holding supervisory positions, NOSEIKO was absent or "reading
in" for about 13 months, or about 50 percent 
of the time.
C.
Personal Participation in Operations
In
NOSENKO had direct operational contact with three Americans
during 1962 and 1963. Two of these (the approach to 
JOHNSON
and the interrogation of HARGHOOFCR) were 
unusual in that 
they
were provocations without any attempt to recruit the 
target;
NOSE:KO could name no other examples of such operations
.
both cases, the victim of the provocation has verified NOSENKO's
presence. The third case, the recruitment approach 
to BRAUNS,
was unsuccessful. Additionally, NOSENKO 
supervised the homo-
sexual compromise of KOTEN, who was closely 
tied in with,
sensitive source and related.
(1) The W.E. JOHNSON Provocation
JOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSENKO said, was in Moscow as
a tourist in early January 1962 and was considered for recruit-
ment, but a decision was made that he was not worth 
the effort
as he had no access to classified materials and lived too far
from the KGB Legal Residencies in Washington and New York City.
(JCHNSON's home was in Texas.) Several days after this 
deci-
sion was made, postal intercepts showed that JCHNSON 
was 
writing
They were 
"so
abusive letters concerning the Soviet Union.
bitter" and critical that the KGB decided that something had
to be done to stop him. At about the same time the KGB received
an indication that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was 
decided
to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to
write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when
he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected
by use of NOSENKO's homosexual agents, 
and NOSENKO was able to
describe the confrontation scene, his second meeting with JOHN-1
SON, and JOHNSON's frightened telephone call to the U.S. Embassy
reporting that NOSENKO had recontacted him.
"
NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in
this operation "in January. When he contacted CIA in Geneva
in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON's
name and the date "5 January 1962." This was the 
actual 
date
of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date 
bore no
relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took
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735.
place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly be-
It was only when 
confronted with
cause he wore no overcoat.
official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that
the approach was in January and recalled that it 
was made
immediately after NOSENKO returned to the 
Tourist 
Department.*
NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow
there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was
a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value.
Then JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked 
up
About the same time there 
were 
indi-
through postal intecept.
cations of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted
JOHNSON
against him. This implies a very tight time 
schedule.
arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961; 
NOSENKO said he 
reported
for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON 
reported
his first contact with NOSENKO's homosexual agent 
VOLKOV the
evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 Janu-
ary.
1
Although NOSENKO implied in 1962 that his homosexual agents
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were the ones who originally 
determined
JOHNSON's homosexuality, he said in 1954 only that 
there 
were
"signs. NOSENKO did not know what these 
indications were or
where they came from. JOHNSON reported that he 
first met the
agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when 
the latter sat
down at his restaurant table; on this 
same occasion VOLKOV 
in-
The 
fact that
vited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day.
VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited and set him up for the approach
without leaving the table suggests that there 
had, in fact,
been signs of his homosexuality beforehand and that operational
plans had been laid by this time.
NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual
entrapment cases and has named several which were called 
off
It is, therefore
, unusual 
that
because of a risk of scandal.
the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an
American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting let-
ters and articles.
NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this opera-
tion the day after he reported for duty in the senior position
of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a 
Deputy Chief of
During his
the Second Chief Directorate, told him to 
do it.
talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as
"Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV," (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV)
the "Chief of Police.'
(ii) The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest
The arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took
place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he
NOSENKO has
was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department
.
How NOSENKO's self-stated and confirmed participation in a'
Tourist Department operation on 5 January 
1962 carries
implications for his account of ABIDIAN's 
visit to the
PENKOVSKIY dead drop is discussed above.
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736.
info from sensitive source
described in detail the selection of BARGHOCPN as a hostage for
IVANOV (the KGB officer arrested shortly before in 
New York
City as a result of
of the provocation, Ouel
FGB
the planning
Ping BAIGHOORN
which were not related to the provocation, BARGHOORN's arrest
Except
in Moscow, and the early stages of his interrogation
.
for some variation in dates, NOSENKO's 
accounts of 
BARGHOORI's
movements and of the sequence of events in the 
provocation-
This case is in two ways
arrest matched that of BARGHOOR!!.
It was an operation
similar to the approach to W.E. JOHNSON:
in which there was no thought of recruitment, and BARGHCOPN was
able to identify NOSENKO as a participant.
BARGHOOR" reported that the day after his arrest he was
questioned by the same officer who had 
interrogated him the
evening before about the "compromising 
materials" which had
With 
this officer on this one occasion
been planted on him.
was his "chief," whom BARGHOORN subsequently identified by photo-
NOSENKO has said that 
he was told by the
graph as NOSENKO.
Chief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (NOSENKO)
present in the interrogation room at the time 
when BARGHCOPN
admitted that he had the 
compromising information in his 
posses-
NOSENKO did 
not know why his pir-
sion at the time of arrest.
ticular presence was needed or desired, but he complied despite
the fact that he did not want to reveal 
his face to BARGHOOPN
NOSENKO said that he
as he know BARGHOORN would be released.
stayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogating
BARGHOCRA
officer secured this admission 
and then he left.
has reported that NOSENKO attended one of the interrogation
sessions, that this session covered only 
biographic and 
background
matters, and that the compromising documents 
and his possession
of them had been discussed the previous 
evening, right after his
arrest.
In describing the planning of this provecation, NOSENKO
told CIA that the suggestion to provide BARGHOORN 
came fron
GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting 
BARGHOORN to KGB 
Chair-
man SEMICHASTNYY, but did not divulga tɔ 
him that it would be.
based on provocation. This was on the 
day before the arrest.
SEMICHASTNYY agreed with the idea of the arrest 
and secured
permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, 
as KHRUSHCHEV was
Reliable 
sources show, however,
out of Moscow at the time.
that KHRUSHCHEV was in Moscow on 30 October, the day when SEMI-
CHASTNYY allegedly called BREZHNEV, and was 
also there on 31
BREZHNEV was not seen by
October, the day of the arrest.
Westerners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.
'(iii) The Approach to BRAUNS
NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tour-
ist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning 
to Moscow
BRAUNS had lived 
in Leningrad until 
World
from Geneva in 1962.
War II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually
settled in the United States, where 
he was a technician working
at an "interesting company making computers, 
adding machines,
or other instruments." NOSENKO had 
originally instructed his
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737.
subordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KRUPNOV was not able
to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach
called NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO went to the Moscow 
Hotel 
where
KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured
BRAUNS' agreement to cooperate, against threat of imprisonment
for treason on the basis of his wartime flight from the 
Soviet
Union. BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and 
be-
KRUPNOV was
cause NOSENKO felt the recruitment was "shaky,
BRAUNS refused
sent after him to consolidate the agreement.
to see KRUPNOV however, so again NOSENKO went to help him.
was clear to NOSENKO, however, that BRAUNS was so frightened
that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO thereupon decided
to terminate the case, and BRAUNS was sent on his way.
It
NOSENKO could not recall his position at the time he approached
BRAUNS, he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union,
and he was unable to name any Soviet citizens with whom 
BRAUNS
BRAUNS, in fact, had spent
came into contact while in the USSR.
During
almost a week in Moscow before the approach was made..
this time he spent his days with an Inturist tour and his even-
She
ings with an old girlfriend he had known before the war.
had been writing to BRAUNS in the United States for about a year,
telling him of her unhappy marriage and impending divorce.
BRAUNS had written her of his intention to 
visit the USSR
, and
she travelled specially from her home in Leningrad to Moscow to
spend this time with him.
According to the account given by BRAUNS, the man (NOSENKO,
according to NOSENKO) who joined him and his original interro-
gator in Moscow was the person who first approached him in Lenin-
grad. This suggests, if correct, that it was 
NOSENKO who was
BRAUNS
sent there to consolidate the recruitment, not KRUPNOV
.
was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph but explained that
he was so frightened that he probably could not recognize any-
one involved. Other aspects of his story therefore may be con-
fused.
(iv) The Arrest of KOTEN
NOSENKO said he supervised the homosexual provocation and
arrest of American tour guide KOTEN in 1963 and the develop-
ments in the case were reported to him (Pages 298-303); he was
NOSENKO explained that
not in face-to-face contact with KOTEN.
KOTEN, a member of the CPUSA, had frequently visited the USSR
since the war, had numerous suspicious contacts there, and was
considered possibly to be a "plant" (presumably of the FBI) in.
the Communist Party. Prior to his arrival in 1963,
Legal Residency reported that KOTEN was in contac
with an important ✓ Pacgent in that he was carrying
the address of relatives of this agent with him on his trip
,
On this basis, it was
and that he intended to visit them.
considered that he might have the mission of investigating
the agent inside the USSR.
As it was suspected from earlier trips that KOTEN
was a homosexual, the KGB planned to compromise him, arrest
him, break him, and provide time for the agent 
to make 
his
KOTEN was arrested, 
but the
escape from the United States.
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738.
agent refused to leave the United States, and when the CPUSA
protested the arrest of one of 
its members, KOTEN) was released
.
KOTEN was a long-time Communist, and there are no apparent
His homosexuality
reasons why the KGB should doubt 
his loyalty.
was well-known to his acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at
the time of his trip to the Soviet 
Union he was acting as a 
tour
guide for the New York firm "Afton 
Tours," which is owned by
(NOSENKO 
said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a 
Communist,
SVENCHANSKIY.
was his own agent at the time of KOTEN's arrest.)
NOSENKO was able to give a considerable amount of identi
ing data on the "important
agent"
This agent had been identified QUERI
tri
year before KUTEN's
wembad B
The fact that KOTEN had been arrested on charges of homo-
sexuality was leaked by Inturist to press 
services two days
after the reported date of the 
arrest, resulting in wide 
pub-
(The U.S. Embassy was no noti-
licity in Western newspapers.
There was no apparent
fied officially until two days later.)
reason for this extremely 
unusual step 
by the KGB, which can
be assumed to manipulate Inturist 
for operational support 
pur-
poses.
After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was re-
He was told 
that the incident was a 
mistake
leased from prison.
which had been corrected, that he was free to go anywhere 
he
wanted in the Soviet Union, and that he 
could return anytime
.
the 24 agent, has since 
repatriated to the Soviet
Union.
d.
Agents Handled by NOSENKO
When NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to
the Tourist Department, he took with him 
the two homosexual
and RYTOVA
agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, 
PREISFREUND,
(Pages 287-289). The homosexuals 
he 
used the day after his
This was 
their
return, in the operation against 
W.E. JOHNSON.
first operational use since 
the fall of 1959; 
they were never
used again before being terminated 
at the end of 1962 or early
PREIS-
1963, NOSENKO said, because 
they were "too well known."
FREUND was considered compromised 
to American Intelligence
following the defection of GOLITSYN
, so he also was never 
used
again, although NOSENKO met him 
socially when PREISFREUND re-
During
turned to Moscow on business 
trips as recently as 1963.
the first part of 1962, on 
instructions from KOVSHUK 
and the
Chief of the American Department
, NOSENKO continued to meet
with
who was still involved 
in the development of 
ZUJUS,
31 before going
NOSENKO last saw
the American code clerk.
to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left the Soviet Union to return
RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had
to Syria while NOSENKO was away.
Some time in 1962 she moved
been his agent since 1956 or 1957.
from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute.
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14-00000
739.
of International Relations to a position in the school of the
Although she
CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent 
work.
was inactive, NOSENKO continued to be registered as her case
officer until 1964, when he defected.
(i) PRIPPEL
Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, FRIPPEL
(Pages 129-133' and' Part VIII.D.5.) returned 
several times to
NOSENKO, who remained his
the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963
.
case officer although PRIPPEL now lived and worked in New York
FRIPPEL 
said there were three such
City, met him each time.
occasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and
CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times 
in Moscow and Odessa
,
NOSENKO 
denied that he met PRIPPEL
when NOSENKO came alone.
in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met
twice with him alone after returning to 
Moscow from Geneva.
The first of these meetings was in the summer 
of 1962 when 
FRIP-
PEL was accompanying a group of American 
newspaper editors tour-
FRIPPEL said 
NOSENKO called briefly at
ing the Soviet Union.
his hotel room to enquire what questions the editors planned
When FRIPPEL
to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a planned interview
.
said he did not know, NOSENKO departed 
and 
FRIPPEL later re-
(
NOSENKO
ported that he did not see NOSENKO again on 
this trip.
said he called again after the 
interview to learn the 
"reactions"
of the editors.) The second meeting was in 
Odessa, when FRIPPEL,
visited the Soviet Union as a guide on a tour 
ship. According
to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO 
apparently 
made
a phone call to ask permission to go 
aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and
it might have been at this meeting or 
the earlier one that
NOSENKO told him something of his personal 
background. (
FRIPPEL
knew a considerable amount of information 
about NOSENKO's father
and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that 
he would have
to request permission to board the vessel 
and said that if he
had told FRIPPEL anything about 
himself, it was when he was
drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that 
FRIPPEL 
provided
no information of value during any of these 
meetings.
(ii)
SVENCHANSKIY
NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," as
an example of the Second Chief Directorate's 
use of foreign
travel agents to signal the KGB when an 
interesting tourist 
is
SVENCHANSKIY
about to visit the Soviet Union (
Pages 295-298).
was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used
to send open-code signals to the Tourist 
Department by marking
visa applications whenever he spotted anything 
significant.
Some of SVENCHANSKIY's signals had 
been, considered, NOSENKO
In September 1963
,
said, "of definite operational interest
."
NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer,
NOSKOV, and his name was listed 
in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the
responsible officer.
NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file
He
and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed 
it.
met twice with his new agent, once in 
September 1963 and 
once
later in the year.
On both occasions, 
NOSKOV was present.
*-vw ན,67£Sw$ vox?7%}36!P39!?R+Y%i%pa!!pLEYSOUF5m#E$e#NT€oln}EL¢{2m་་ 8}
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14-00000
740.
NOSENYO said that at the time SVENCHANSKIY was recruited
in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was 
known to have had con-
tacts with AMTORG in New York, there 
was some suspicion that
NOSENKO was unable to be more pre-
he might be an FBI agent.
cise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how
NOSKOV had resolved them, was 
able to say only that NOSKOV
"felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not 
an American agent.
NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from
He'
the one-volume file kept on him in the 
Tourist Department:
did know that SVENCHANSKIY was 
recruited in 1961 on the 
promise
of commercial favors, that he had at 
one time been detected
in blackmarket transactions in the 
USSR, and that in addition
to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY 
ran a Russian-language 
book-
PBI and CIA 
records show that SVENCHANSKIY
store in Chicago.
has been employed by a series of registered Soviet Government
organizations in the United 
States since the early 1930's,
that he was released from his 
position as a United Nations 
radio
officer broadcasting to the Soviet 
Union in 1952 when he failed
to answer questions of the Senate 
Internal Security Committee
concerning alleged subversive 
activity, and that both his 
travel
agency and his book store are 
affiliated with registered Sov-
Allegations on file of
iet agencies, Inturist and 
Mezhkniga.
SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espion-
In August
age activities date back to the 
Second World War.
1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKIY 
to the Soviet 
espionage
The FBI has re-
network in the United States 
during the war.
ported
identified as having it one time been the
confidential secretary of GOLOS, the "director of Soviet espion-
(NOSENKO knew that someone called
age in the United States.
Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she
is not a KGB agent and was not the 
one who marked the visa
applications.)
e. The OSWALD Investigation
As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO
said, he was directly involved in the 
investigation of OSWALD's
activities in Minsk which 
was ordered after the assassination
It
of President KENNEDY (Pages 136-144 
and Part VIII.D.5.).
is from his role at this time and 
his reading of the 
Minsk KGB
file on OSWALD that NCSENKO derived 
his authority to state that
the KGB "washed its hands of OSWALD
" after his attempted sui-
cide in the USSR, that there was 
no attempt to recruit either
OSWALD or his wife, and that 
KGB interest in OSWALD while he
lived in Minsk was restricted to 
passive observation.
f. The CHEREPANOV Investigation
Part VIII.B.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV
case, in which NOSENKO claims to have 
been involved in Novem-
ber 1962 while Deputy Chief of the 
Tourist Department.
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14-00000
741.
g. Remarks
Leaving aside NOSENKO's unsubstantiated claims to super-
visory jobs in the Tourist Department in 
1962-1963, when he
indicated he was absent from KGB 
Headquarters nearly half 
of
the time, his personal role in operations 
and investigations
of the period appears artificial in 
some instances and im-
NOSENKO's 
knowledge of the origins 
of
plausible in others.
the JOHNSON case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other
activities attributed to himself, the 
expressed purpose of
the compromise in unique, and the outcome 
seems to have 
little
consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON 
to confirm that NOSENKO
appeared in it. Although BRAUNS may 
have been in a position
to corroborate NOSENKO's appearance 
in that operation, he has
not done so and his statements 
contradict NOSENKO on the part
the latter played. So too do the statements 
of BARGHOORN, who
recognized NOSENKO as a person who was 
seen briefly during the
interrogation sessions; certain facts 
from other sources con-
tradict NOSENKO on one important detail 
(KHRUSHCHEV's presence
ir. Moscow) of the BARGHOOFN arrest, explaired 
as a retaliation-
hostage action for events in
NOSENKO's informat 15.
Te Soviet arrest
of the American Communist KOTEN seems simply to have confirmed
earlier information
NOSENKO's
of the S CHARSKIY cperation is
information on the backgro
fragmentary, lacking even the most important facts known from
several, mainly overt, sources; his 
attendance at meetings
with SVENCHANSKIY: was confined 
to the two times when the
The position 
of 
NOSENKO in
original handler was also present.
the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases is discussed in Part VIII.D.5.
In summary, NOSENKO's operational work was not 
commensurate
with that of a Section Chief and Deputy 
Department Chief, 
nor
Where the
with that of a case officer, regardless of rank
.
participation of NOSENYO in Tourist Department activities has
been or might be confirmed by 
other sources, it is therefore
unproven that he was in a supervisory 
position in the KGB or
that he was even a case officer.
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14-00000
f
E.
742.
Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography
1. KGB Awards and Ranks
a.
Awards
At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOSENKO
described a series of awards and decorations which he received
over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief
Directorate (Pages 313-321). He claimed to have 
received the
Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order 
of 
the
Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from
KGB Chairman SEROV for his role in the BURGI recruitment and
the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the Ameri
can or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three
NOSENKO 
told of a
British and three American homosexuals).
number of other commendations which he received--almost one a
In October 1966 NOSENKO
year--for his "general good work."
said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational
performance, only a medal for satisfactory completion of 10
years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal
.
b.
Ranks
NOSENKO's descriptions of his various rank promotions fol-
low a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326).
He has given two separate sets of circumstances for 
his 
first
According to
promotion, from junior lieutenant to lieutenant.
the first of these, the one NOSENKO adhered to during 1964 and
1965, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while 
serving
in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning of 1951.
NOSENKO explained that the required time in grade is sometimes
cut in half for officers serving at this undesirable 
post, and
that this is why he was promoted after only six months of
active duty. In 1966 NOSENKO said for the first 
time 
that he
did not enter on active duty until March 1951 and 
that his
promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in
Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, NOSENKO 
has 
said
that he entered the KGB with the rank 
of lieutenant as this
had been his rank in the naval GRU.*
During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962
NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had
already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant
colonelcy. NOSENKO gave an apparently accurate 
description
of the structure of his salary as a major (so much for rank,
so much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he 
was 
fill-
ing a position (Chief of Section) normally held 
by a lieutenant
colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO 
claimed the
rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this 
claim with the
TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV 
search, ** which
See Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that
NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.
金曲 See Part VIII.B.7.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV
case.
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☐
14-00000
743.
gave NOGENKO's rank as lieutenant colonel and was signed by
GRIBANOV himself and testified to it by his signature on the
"official biographical statement" prepared in Frankfurt.
The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promo-
tions came during the interrogations of January 1965 when he
volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he had
never held the rank of major but rather, because of a series
of administrative slip-ups and GRIBANOV's advice and help, had
jumped directly from the rank of captain, which he received
in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant colonel in late 1963.
NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 that
he was a major.*
In an unsolicited statement given to CIA in April 1966,
NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and that the TDY authori-
zation for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error.
C. Remarks
NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awards and promotions
directly affect his self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly
rising KGB officer. They also have a bearing on one of the
alleged reasons for this rise
b; it was
GRIBANOV's favoritism. NOSENKO almost invariably linked GRI-
BANOV's name to each of the awards he earlier claimed to have
received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who decided that
NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was
The
GRIBANOV who physically presented the award to NOSENKO.
same is true of NOSENKO's account of his rank promotions:
GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be pro-
moted directly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when
the Personnel Department made a mistake and only promoted
NOSENKO to captain, GRIBANOV advised him to accept this rank
and promised that when he had completed sufficient time in grade
for promotion to major, GRIBANOV would see to it that he was
promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. This is what happened,
NOSENKO said in 1965, and after he received his rank of lieu-
tenant colonel, GRIBANOV called him in and congratulated him.
On the basis of NOSENKO's admissions, there is additional rea-
son to question his relationship with GRIBANOV.**
NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against EGR regulation
and for no reason he could explain, an official KGB document
listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV him-
self as well as by two provincial authorities. This suggests
strongly that the lie concerning NOSENKO's rank was not NOSENKO's
alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV
papers were fabricated by the KGB, then there was no genuine search
for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated' and
not a mistake as NOSENKO claims.)
This change of story coincided closely in time with a change
in the information reported by
Shortly after NOSENKO's
defection had said that remarks by his KGB associates
made it expear that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel.
ROSENRO was only a captain.
that
** NOSENKO's retractions and changes of story concerning his
personal and operational relationship with GRIBANOV are
discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).
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14-00000
744.
CECET
2.
a.
Affiliation with Communist Part; Organs
Introduction
NOSENKO drifted into the Komsomol, he said, in 1943 or
All of
1944 without giving the step any thought whatsoever.
Or.
his friends at the Baku school were joining, so NOSENKO did
too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist
youth organization throughout his school and university years,
in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer.
arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Depart-
ment in 1953, NOSENKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of
the small Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Director-
ate, a group of about 17 members.
b.
Discussion
NOSENKO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Kom-
somol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a super-
ficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of
certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this
position should have. Thus, for example, NOSENKO provided a
description of the system of levying dues on Komsomol members
unaware that a Kom-
which was substantially incorrect and was
somol Congress (the first in many years and therefore a major
event) had been held during his claimed tenure as Secretary.
NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komosmol Organi-
zation Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954,
when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias
documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment
for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately
after this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from his
position and a "strict reprimand" was placed in his Kom-
sorol file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th
birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was
too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was
admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, he was the only officer in the KGB who was neither
a Komsomol nor a Party member. NOSENKO's account of his expul-
sion from the Komsomol on reaching his 27th birthday is con-
tradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect
at that time. These regulations stipulate a maximum age of
25 years and NOSENKO should therefore have been forced out at
This
the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday.
was explained to MOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member
until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions
were made in his case.
C.
Remarks
The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limi-
tation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal
disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretary-
ship is true. The date which he gives to this incident is
after that on which he should have been expelled from the Kom-
somol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral
disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent
punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent;
see Pages 80-81).
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00000
745.
The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular
aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further
suggests that his entire account for this period of his
career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.).
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0000
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746.
3. Schooling
a.
Introduction
There is relatively little reliable collateral information
Other than what
concerning NOSENXO's schooling up until 1950.
he himself has reported, available information consists of overt
press releases pertaining to the Minister NOSENKO's career (and.
giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB
NOSENKO's own account, together with
officer and one defector.
references to these other sources, is summarized below.
With the exception of minor variations in dates, attribut-
able to memory, NOSENKO's story of his early years until the
• beginning of World War II, when he had just completed the sixth
grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various
tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Lenin-
grad and Moscow agree with information concerning the positions
In con-
and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years.
trast, the period immediately following, during which NOSENKO
allegedly received his early training in naval matters is char-
acterized with frequent changes of story, contradictions, and
admitted falsehood.
b. Discussion
In 1964 and 1965 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the
Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately
after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacuated
with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September
(An article in the Sov-
to begin studies in the seventh grade.
iet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 January 1967
confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in
the Soviet Union in April 1940. One of these was in Moscow.
However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed
the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow!
school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENKO remembered that
he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been
evacuated to Chelyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh
grade of a regular school.
In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in
1964 and 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the summer of
1942 and secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School, along with which he was evacuated by train to Baku in
the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year
spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events
up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the
Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of
1941. NCSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to
the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the
fall of 1943, not 1942.*
* Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School, NOSENKO explained that the Moscow special
naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia 
and
The
that this was farther from home than he wished to go.
Red Star article mentioned above said that the special naval
schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school
apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk,
but was shut down.
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14-00000
TUT JEVILI
747.
In
Again to accommodate the added year in Chelyabinsk, NOSENKO
said in 1966 that he spent half a year (actually, according 
to
the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku 
before run-
ning away from school back to Moscow in January 
1944.
earlier accounts he said he was at the preparatory school there
Earlier he had also
from October 1942 until January 1944.
giver. expansive and changing accounts of his escape from school
to join the Soviet front against the Germans 
at Tuapse; now he
admitted that this was a lie. By cutting the 
time he was in
Baku from 15 months to about three, NOSENKO also 
admitted 
im-
plicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received
in the preparatory school, of the summer he spent 
working at
the school rather than returning to Moscow on 
vacation, and 
of
his "certainty" that he celebrated his 15th birthday 
in Baku
were also false.
NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the
events of 1944. In 1964, 1965 and again in 
1966 he told of
studying as an "external" student in Moscow to 
complete his
ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his 
classmates from
Baku when the naval preparatory school returned 
to Leningrad
in the autumn of 1944. On several 
occasions during 1964 and
1965, NOSENKO described how he and his classmates 
spent 
October
and November 1944 working in the woods near Leningrad 
before
beginning their tenth grade studies late in the 
year; he 
omitted
this account from his April 1966 autobiography.
NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked
(In the
with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods
.
latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that
he attended the Frunze Naval Academy from 1943 
to 1944, that
he was on active military duty until being demobilized 
in 
1945,
and that he was shot in the hand by a jealous young 
naval offi-
cer in 1945.) According to the account given under 
interroga-
tion in April 1964, NOSENKO was shot 
in the hand at a party in
the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from 
the
preparatory school, and received a certificate 
of 
satisfactory
completion of the tenth grade, although he 
had been in school
In 1965 and 
1966 NOSENKO said, re-
only since November 1944.
spectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February
or March 1945 and that he shot himself in "early
" 1945; 
since
the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that 
he received
a statement of the courses he had attended at the 
preparatory
school and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuild-
ing Tekhnikum in Leningrad.
The earliest collateral information specifically concern-
ppears to rst
ing NOSENKO's educational background
general period described abo
the Soviet Navy defector ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval
preparatory school with NOSFNKO during the period 
1944 to 
1946.
ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO's defection was 
publicized, said he
had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO 
in the naval school 
in
He was then shown a picture 
of
Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.
However, according
NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man.
to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two
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-
743.
classes behind ARTIMONOV, and would have been at the school
It is conceivable that 
the 
presence
for only about two months.
of the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding would be widely known
in the school and later remembered, 
but so would that son's
self-inflicted wound and disappearance, which 
ARTAMONOV has 
not
mentioned. It is unlikely, moreover, 
that ARTAMONOV could (20
years later) reliably recognize a photo of 
a person who had 
been
(NOSERKO
there such a short time and not in 
ARTANONOV's class.
claims not to have known ARTAMONOV nor to recognize the name.)
In all accounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKO
has said that he entered the Institute of International Rela-
His descriptions of courses
, events
tions in Moscow in 1945.
and friends are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts of
his earlier schooling. He has given various 
dates for his
graduation and has explained that he did so to 
cover up 
the
fact that he failed his final examination 
in the subject of
NOSENKO most 
re-
"Marxism-Leninism," of which he was 
ashamed.
cently claimed that he received his diploma in the end of the
summer of 1950.
C.
Remarks
NOSENKO's own admissions, as well as the small amount of
collateral information. available, make it clear that much 
of 
his
The 
reasons for this
account of his education has been false.
are not at all clear and perhaps, in fact, there is no logical
explanation. The CIA psychologist who tested 
and questioned
NOSENKO about his youth suggested that, 
under conditions of
interrogation, he may lie for no other reason 
other than 
his
need to save face. This view is an accurate 
description of
NOSENKO's behavior when questioned in detail on this and other
aspects of his pre-KGB life; it is not so with 
regard to ques-
Nor does the psychologist's
tioning on his intelligence career.
view appear to explain why NOSENKO forgot or was unwilling to
tell CIA about an entire year of his life, 
particularly such 
a
significant one, after consistently and apparently 
accurately
(judging from the Soviet press accounts 
of the Minister's
It is not
activities) describing the years preceding it
.
apparent why NOSENKO originally volunteered the story of his
travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when 
this was untrue, or
why he said that the Moscow Special Naval School was evacuated
to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that 
the school was
closed, if he was there.*
* The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims
to be (and with a completely false life history
, or one
lived by someone else) has been examined 
carefully, but
no clear conclusion can be drawn on the basis 
of 
available
evidence.
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14-00000
749.
U
F.
1.
Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Opera-
tional Circumstances
Introduction
Appraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his motivations
must be founded, as with any source
, on factors which are
often immeasureable, but fewer 
reservations need be attached
to an appraisal of the other 
circumstances affecting the
These opera-
course of events in Geneva 
in 1962 and 1964.
tional circumstances can be 
analyzed and 
evaluated in much
the same manner as were NOSENKO's 
production, sourcing, and
In the
biography for they are tangible 
pieces of evidence.
next portions of this paper 
are presented these 
appraisals,
which draw chiefly upon Pages 
603-641 (for NOSENKO the man)
,
Pages 20-29 (for his motivations
), and Pages 11-19 and 30-
43 (for the operational 
circumstances).
2.
NOSENKO
The CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO found him to
be of above-average intelligence
, one of them saying that
"his effective intelligence 
is more cleverness than intel-
He is capable
lectuality, more shrewdness than 
efficiency."
of good memory and, as illustrated by bis repeating certain
Tacts in the same sequence, capable 
of what appears to be
On the other hand, there 
were
good memorization of details
.
numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings
of various events, he himself claimed 
an odd or poor memory
,
and he was the exceptional defector by 
having been totally
debriefed within a relatively 
short period.
Parts VII. D. and VIII.E. discuss NOSENKO's truthfulness
with reference to his Soviet Intelligence and 
personal
backgrounds. Here may be added other 
observations by 
the
CIA specialists: NOSENKO can exercise 
deception cleverly
,
he improvised and was evasive under 
interrogation, and he
has a "remarkable" disregard for 
the truth where it serves
his purposes. The results of the 
polygraph examination 
were
that NOSENKO "attempted deliberate deception."
The gaps and errors in NOSENKO's testimony therefore
do not seem attributable to low 
intelligence or to consis-
tently poor memory, but to a 
conscious attempt to mislead
Independently, then, this conclusion
American Intelligence.
raises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched 
by
Regarding the latter
the KGB and if so, why he was chosen
.
"This
point, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed:
man is capable of playing 
a role and playing it 
effectively,"
"From a distance NO-
and that a CIA psychologist 
stated:
SENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors) as a possible
penetration agent, but close up 
he leaves much to be desired
."
It was "close up, " in the 
CIA debriefings and interrogations,
that NOSENKO displayed an inability 
to explain the gaps and
errors in his reporting.
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750.
3.
Motivation
Part of one's motivation for such a drastic act as
treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there
may be underlying causes which any source might not want
or be able to admit even to himself. Thus, what NOSENKO
said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and
for this reason the whole question of his motivation must
remain a minor weight in the overall assessment of bona fides.
He
NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explanation
and has changed or adjusted his story to this end.
initially insisted that he had no ideological motives but
simply wanted to "make a deal" in order to get out of
The amount of
trouble; yet this claim is open to question:
operational money which NOSENKO needed to replace was hardly
enough to have driven him to treason, especially since
there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV who might
Furthermore, only two
have helped him make up his loss.
days after CIA had rescued him with the funds. NOSENKO
spent the CIA money in another drunken debauchery (with the
The discre-
same companion) and came back needing more.
pancy between the degree of the need and the seriousness of
of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented
to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper
explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added new
reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regize,
his resentment of KHRUSHCHEV, and his liking for Americans.
By his defection in 1964 NOSENKO changed the course of
his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully and
unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute
danger. In 1964 he could give no conerent explanation for
the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the
first time, that he had said in 1962 that he would not de-
fect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the
level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel
abroad any more. (This contradicts NOSENKO's 1962 state-
ments: anticipating imminent promotion to Deputy Department
Chief, he said that he would leave the USSR at least once
a year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems
to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising
career, an undisturbed family life and children of whom
he was fond, cast shame on his father's memory and his re-
maining relatives, and departed forever from his own country.
A
His own unease concerning his motivation evidently con-
tinued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explanation.
No part of this statement was ever borne out by his conduct,
attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, wherever his
reactions seemed spontaneous, to dislike the United States,
to have no interest in it politically, culturally, or
scenically, and to preserve a preference for the USSR.
CIA graphologist commented on NOSENKO's "strong emotional
ties to his traditional background," while a CIA psycholo-
gist reported: "Emotionally he has not defected in spite
of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he has.
The psychologist also said that it is "almost impossible to
determine his true loyalties and true beliefs."
"
5
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751.
4.
Operational Circumstances
a.
Presence in Geneva (1962)
1962
When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962, NOSENKO
was a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second Chief
Directorate, having held this position for two 
months.
He himself acknowledged to CIA that it appeared 
strange
for the KGB to send a new Section Chief on an 
extended 
trip
His reasons 
for being
abroad unconnected with his own work.
in Geneva have varied and to some degree contradict one
&nother: The Disarmament Conference was not expected to
last more than "a few weeks," but NOSEN KO did not 
begin 
his
work against SHAKHOV (one of the main 
reasons for his being
there) until six weeks after arrival; GRIBANOV 
played a
role in his TDY, but NOSEN KO later denied this
; there 
were
in 1962 "new rules" requiring & staff officer to accompany
a Soviet delegation, but in 1965 NOSENKO said 
he did not
remember such regulations. He was permitted 
to go to 
Geneva
in 1962 and 1964, as well as to Cuba 
in 1960 and England
in 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint despite
his claim to a record so bad that he was not 
cleared by the
KGB for permanent posting to Ethiopia in 1960.
'
b.
Fresence in Geneva (1964)
NOSENKO said on one occasion that GRIBANOV was one of
those who allowed him to come to Geneva in January 1964,
as a personal favor; he later not only denied this 
tut 
said
He re-
in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew nothing about the 
TDY.
ported the 1064 TDY might, because of his new position,
be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor
" of his
superiors to permit him this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO
said he had the assurance that as Deputy 
Department 
Chief
(which he knew he was about to become) 
he would in the 
future
Also, NOSENKO 
could
come to the West at least once a year.
not explain why a First Deputy Department Chief, if allowed
out of the USSR as a "treat." would go abroad 
for a 
conference
which could be expected to last many weeks, 
probably months.
This question is compounded by the fact 
that NOSENEO would
be needed in Moscow: He said that a KGB 
conference to 
plan
the handling of the tourist season was to be held at about
this time, and he stuck to this story even 
after admitting
that the telegram recalling him for this Moscow 
conference
was an invention (see below).
C.
Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIA
NOSENKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Resi-
dency in Geneva every weekday morning, although he claimed
that he had no reason and that it is normally 
forbidden (
as
When 
asked how and why he
other sources have confirmed).**
sensitive source
cited GRIBANOY's personal authorization of NOSENKO's
trip in the face of derogatory information as one 
cause of
GRIBANOV's dismissal.
.
**NOSENKO said he did not visit the KGB Legal Residency in
London more than once during his visits there in a 
similar
capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip to Cuba 
in
1960.
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752.
did so in Geneva, NOSENKO has given different answers at
different times. His stories of simply "dropping in and
hanging around" for lack of anything better to do are
unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice.
His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or
First, his our con-
or intervention were contradicted by:
fused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second,
his own statements at other times that it was GUK who was
primarily responsible for NOSENKO's visits to the Residency.
NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on 11 June
1962, although thereafter he limited meeting times to shorter
This seemed
and shorter periods until his departure.
natural at the time since he would presumably have his own
responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet
However, in 1964
colleagues in his proper surroundings.
he seemed not to have any official responsibilities or any
calls on his time: He was willing to spend all his time in
meetings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the
fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless would
have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about
to become a defector. Ho showed no concern at the time,
but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact afraid;
it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall
telegram, in order to hasten his defection and put an end
to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible
to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one
would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties,
that he would be required to participate for cover reasons
He
in more of the Soviet delegation's official activity.
said that any absence could be explained as "security duties,"
since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected
that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions
of other Soviets conforms neither with obsérved Soviet
practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet
intelligence and security officers under cover go to some
pains to hide their true affiliation.
NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom
and availability in 1964 and his limited free time in 1962
by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in
Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him in
his free time. (This story does not explain his ability in
1964 to get away during conference working hours; neither
GUK nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)
d.
Timing of 1962 Contact
NOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962
when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it
was only two weeks before his departure. He came to David
MARK only 10 days before leaving. This had the effect of
limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO's contact came only
about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a
series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who
had been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during
earlier visits to the West. NOSENKO, as one of the two
primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BELITSKIY
had been under KGB control from the outset (Page 517).
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e. Willingness to Meet CIA
753.
Although in 1962 MOSENKO claimed that he wanted to
sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and
ther disappear, there were indications from 
the outset that
he expected and planned to come back for 
further meetings
with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention 
to
certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting
that he would tell it later; even as he protested his unwilling-
ness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample
details about himself which would inevitably have compro-
mised him to CIA and forced his future collaboration.
he finally agreed to return for more meetings, he said:
"Maybe I'll meet you again Monday' (two days after the first
meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated 
inducements,
In fact, 
when he did
to meet on the intervening Sunday.
Before
return on Monday, he said that he had spent Sunday with
friends, drinking and "discussing recent USSR foreign policy
moves and speeches by KHRUSHCHEV."
f.
The Recall Telegram
NOSENKO's confession that he fabricated the story of
his having been urgently recalled to Moscow by a telegram
leaves only two
possible interpretations:
g.
- There was a telegram, but NOSENKO's mind has
slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between
fact and fancy. This, however, is not borne out 
by
his general conduct nor his performance under interro-
gation in 1966.
-
There was, in fact, no telegram.
Thus,
out by Special Intellicance.)
(This is borne
the invention was
not NOSENKO's but the
KGB's; the KGB briefed NOSENKO to report to CIA that a
telegram was sent; and NOSENKO made an error 
in later
admitting that it was not.
Remarks
The operational circumstances so far reviewed point
out the facts that:
NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in
stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and
1964;
-
He had unusual access to the KGB Legal Residency
and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to
impinge upon his security;
He was willing to return to meetings with CIA al-
though having at first said that there were but two
items of information for sale;
- He was "in place" as a CIA source for the last
six of his 100 or so days in Geneva in 1962, thus
restricting the amount of time he could provide continu-
ing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and
-
which
After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he
forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram,
appears to have been a fabrication.
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754.
1
Taken together, these facts suggest the possibilities
that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on both 
occasions for
the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB 
wanted the
opportunity to gauge CIA's reactions 
to the walk-in in 
1962
and to the defection plans in 1964, 
and that the KGB guided
NOSENKO after contact was established in both 
years.
or
A further examination of the operational circumstances
During the
in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities.
1962 meetings. NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions
by saying: "I will have to think about that 
tonight,"
"I will have some time tonight to jot down and 
prepare 
a
good answer for you," or "I don't want to give 
you an 
answer
་་ He would
to that right off--I am afraid to mislead you
.
return to a later meeting with the information, after having
In 1964 
there were other
visited the Legal Residency.
examples of what may have been backstage guidance by the
KGB:
- He called for an urgent special meeting to cor-
rect something he had said in an earlier meeting.
Initially NOSENKO had named ZUJUS instead of KEYSERS
as the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally
This seemed remarkably urgent and
approached in 1961.
important to him at the time, and in retrospect this
It was the only time
case gains special importance:
he claimed to have had direct contact with a U.S.
Embassy staff employee during his alleged tour in the
If he could not
American Department in 1960-1961.
remember this one name, it might call his entire story
into question. It is hard to find another explanation;
had he simply made a careless mistake, with his cus-
tomary indifference to names and dates. 
NOSENKO 
would
be unlikely to mull over what he had said at the meeting
nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement
.
Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency
meeting to do so.
-He came to meetings with "chance" items picked
up at the Legal Residency, each of which would require
quick action and the commitment of assets on the 
part
of CIA in Geneva. Also, NOSENKO originally said 
in
January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but
various steps taken or planned by his CIA 
handlers
Each step, however.
kept him in place for a time.
quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some
information NOSENKO had picked up by chance
.
was
-He asked, out of context and without any explana-
tion, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President
of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not
coherently explain where he had heard this, why he had
not told CIA about it in 1962, and why 
he had asked.
In addition, the Soviet reactions to the defection were
unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for example, the
Soviets' avoidance of publicity concerning 
GOLITSYN's defec-
tion in 1961. The post-defection actions by 
the Soviet
Government created publicity which had the superficial effect
of underlining NOSENKO's authenticity, establishing 
him as
a public figure, confirming that he had a 
family, and 
veri-
These
fying that his defection was of alarming consequence.
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1
755.
reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris
in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paris Match; the photo-
grapher passed photographs of NOSENKO's wife and children
as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abandoned
family of a "top Soviet intelligence officer" whose defec-
tion had caused the "biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet
Intelligence. There is no independent press in the USSR,
no Soviet journalist Allowed to publish as he pleases, and
the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposi-
tion to dramatize defections from its most secret agency.
The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on
KGB instructions.
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736.
G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO
1.
Introduction
The preceding portions of Part VIII. present an
analysis of the NOSENKO case without giving detailed con-
cideration to information about him from Soviets re-
porting to CIA and the FBI. because their evidence generally
runs counter to the results of the foregoing analysis, it
is reviewed here separately so that the concentrated examina-
tion of NOSENKO would not be diverted by asides as to the
authenticity and reliability of these Soviets. As indicated
below, the CIA and FBI sources who have directly supported
NOSENKO's intelligence background are
and the defectors
A sensitive sources
Ma and GOLITSYN.
Nome except COLITSYN claimed to know no personally or
to have worked with him, and WOTENKO contradicted GOLITEYN
by saying they had never ret. Some of them, as well as
CHEREPANOV, supported NOSENKO indirectly through overlapping
information on specific KGB operations, but this aspect
of their reporting is reviewed in Part IX.
2.
Corroboration of ROSENKO's Intelligence Career
The statements of
the sources confirm that'
NOSENKO was a KGB office with access to sensitive information:
sensitive ure
Wysail NOSENKO was a KGB lieutenant colonel (later
changed to captain), a friend and protege of the head
of the KG3 Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, who
approved NCSFNKO'S (1964) TDY to Geneva.
NOSENKO
was a KCB "chief," with access to details on KGB opera-
tions against the U.S. Embassy, and was most recently
Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. lic also stated
that NOSENKO, with his information on U.S. Embassy micro-
phones and KGB operations involving correspondents and
tourists, was "more valuable (to American intelligence]
than PENKOVSKIY, NOSENYO "could do tremendous harm
to the KGE,“
and moreover, the
KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years"
(i.e., until 1956). He described the repercussions in
the KGB caused by NCSENKO's defection: new KGB regu-
lations to increase security, the dismissal of many
KGB officers including GRILANOV and the recall of many
others ☑
Asked
whether NOSENKO could be a "trick," i.e., a
expressed the conviction the
provocateur,
NOSENKO was not.
sensitive source
!
stated that NOSENKO had attended the GRU's Mili-
Tary-Diplomatic Academy (NOSENKO has indicated he de-
clined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic
intelligence school in the early 1950's.) Afterwards,
NOSENKO served in the GRU and then entered
14-00000
757.
-
According to
source
NOSENKO was in "Intelli-
gence." His defection brought about the recall of a
KGB secretary from Geneva
, the rumored transfer of 
some
60 Soviet officials from assignments 
abroad, and the
dismissal of KGB personnel including 
NOSENKO's friend
In addi-
GUK, who had recommended the 
TDY to Geneva.
tion,
reported, immediately after the de-
fection representative of the Exits 
Commission of
the CPSU Central Committee went 
to Geneva to speak 
to
the Soviet Government employees there
.
said that NOSENKO had been tried in absentia in Moscow
for treason and sentenced to death (
see Pages 46 and
342).
-
S
GOLITSYN failed to comment when shown NOSENKO'
his 
ever 
having
name in 1962, and there is no reco
mentioned NASER D?ior to the Western press announce-
ment of the defection in 1964, even 
though he had named
people known to him in the American 
Department of the
KGB Second Chief Directorate. 
(Shortly after defecting
GOLITSYN said that he had visited 
this Department in
After
1960 and at the turn of the year 1960-1961
.)
NOSENKO defected, GOLITSYN was given 
a 
summary of
NOSENKO's Liography. Thereupon 
GOLITSYN reported 
that
NOSENKO was a KGB officer 
whom he first met in 1953 and
last saw in 1959. From 1953 to 1957 
or 1958, GOLITSYN
stated, NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy 
Section of the
American Department, responsible 
for coverage of U.S.
military personnel and later 
either for others in the 
Mos-
As of 1953, GOLITSYN:
cow Embassy or for correspondents
.
said, NOSENKO was a senior 
officer 
in the Tourist Department;
as of 1960, he was definitely not 
in the American Depart-
ment. GOLITSYN added that GUK, 
CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV
were friends in the KG3 whom he shared 
with NOSENKO (see
Pages 343-344).
Soviet source,
Source
indicated she had
been told by her KGB friend SVIRIN that NOSENKO was a
"civilian"; he had nevertheless 
provided information 
on
microphones in the U.S. Embassy 
and had caused "
considerable
also have cor-
damage.'
roborated certain non-Intelligence aspects of ROSENKO'S
background.
3.
Remarks
Source,
aside, the Soviet sources have certified
that NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer, and all asserted or
implied that he had access to information 
valuable to Ameri-
can Intelligence--the microphones 
in the U.S. Embassy being
one item in common.
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759.
Most of them have described the serious repercus-
sions of NOSENKO's defection, The possibilities with regard to
the accuracy of these sources' reporting are:
First, they are correct. If so, the foregoing
analysis is in error, they are valid sources, and
NOSENKO is what he claims to be: a genuine defector
whose previous positions in the XGb enabled hir to
divulge all important details on operations against
Westerners, mainly Americans.
Second, they are misinformed. If so, the fore-
going analysis is correct, they may be valid sources,
For
and NOSENKO has always been under KGB control.
this to be true, it would have been necessary for the
KGB to dispatch NOSENKO with only a highly restricted
number of FCB personnel (including GRILANOV) aware of
The KGB,
the actual circumstances of the operation.
at the same time, would have propagated within and out-
side of the Soviet Intelligence Services the 
fiction
that NOSENKO was an actual but disloyal KGB officer
and would have supported this fabrication in various
ays
about the severity of the loss of NOSENKO, etc.).
Third, they have been purposefully misleading.
American Intelligence for their own or KGB purposes.
If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, and some or
all of them have participated in a KGS conspiracy to
support the bona fides of NOSENKO, a KGS-controlled
source.
These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX.
the razor spreadin
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:
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H.
1.
Alternative Explanations
Introduction
759.
* Parts VIII.B. through VIII.P. have discussed the
inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies,
and incompleteness of NOSENKO's reporting about himself and
the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story
of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation
There
for his actions and the nature of his information.
are three alternatives:
First, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has
a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or
boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a
combination thereof; or (b) he is insane.
Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to
save face.
Third, NOSENKO has misrepresented himself, either
on his own or at the instigation of the KGB.
Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed
below.
2.
First Alternative
According to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in
the KGB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory,
and/or has embellished or boasted:
a. Faulty Memory
NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding
that "different people have different memories" and that
his own is "funny,' and this is supported by his forgetful-
ness and errors concerning events he is known independently
to have lived through, such as the BURGI and
cases.
But it cannot be said that he is, in general, "very bad with
names," because he has almost total recall of names and
positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the American and
Tourist Departments. He has a good memory for faces and
rarely failed to recognize photographs of people he claimed
to know. He remembered consistently details about certain
operations (the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY,
the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER
case, the arrest of BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV,
to cite a few examples). NOSENKO was precisely accurate in
his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel
from June 1962 onward.
b.
Selective Memory
Although having a selective memory is probably true of
nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as
a psychopath who would register each passing event only in
This
relation to its effect on himself at that moment.
would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics
of other people, for example, and to the sequence in which
events transpired; the aspects important to him might not
appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would
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14-00000
$
760.
:
suppress unpleasant memories and would have no real appre-
His re-
ciation of or respect for an "objective 
truth."
porting, like his perception and his memory, might therefore
seem distorted. He might recount events according 
to his
mood of the moment. Thus, for example
, if real attachments
to family or friends is impossible for a psychopath
, there 
wo
be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily 
remember
his childrens' birthdays, why in 1962 (or 1965) 
he appears
to have lied--or been indifferent to the truth
--about his
older daughter's schooling, and why he cannot recall 
when
he first married. In theory this hypothesis can 
explain
In 
its
any aberration, since it involves the unknowable
.
most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to
discriminate between fact and fancy, it would 
encompass 
and
explain away the facts that his story is obviously untrue
and contradictory in major ways; that his account 
of his
personal and professional life and his rendition 
of the
information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial
; 
that
he cannot (and/or does not care to) remember or 
recount
how he did the things he did. Most important, it would
dismiss any conclusions based on NOSENKO's testimony since
This hypo-
nothing NOSENKO said could be taken seriously.
thesis, however, is unsupportable because of several
factors.
First, NOSENKO claims--and other sources confirm--that
he quickly rose to high supervisory responsibility in a
counterintelligence organization which is known to require
attention to detail. He would have risen in the KGB 
while
'
scandal, indiscip-
overcoming the black marks in his file:
line, negative background factors, and bad Party record.
NOSENKO admits that his performance was not good; he was
inattentive and inactive and almost none of his operational
That his rise re-
activity was carried out unaccompanied.
sulted from his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is unten-
able, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage
(itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and 
could 
not
Mental aberration to
be dispensed upon such a mental case.
the degree which would explain his poor performance under
CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered 
his 
per-
formance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges, and
and hence cost him the career which NOSENKO has claimed for
himself.
A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psycho-
pathic personality is that such a person could be induced
to recall certain details with the help of discussion
,
questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy
reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his 
memory
or knowledge. Years of questioning have not succeeded 
in
Even when reminded,
dredging up any new details or incidents.
he could not recall, for example, one of KOSOLAPOV's TDYs to
Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment
from the U.S. Army Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date
of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence of KHRUSHCHEV 
in
Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN
.
"
Another factor is the impossibility of applying this
If 
the
hypothesis to the totality of NOSENKO's reporting.
hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and
others are not, and that he therefore remembers the 
former
and forgets the latter, it is refuted by the inability to.
TOP SECRET

14-00000
761.
find a category of information about himself which he con-
sistently remembered nor any that he consistently forgot.
If what is important is his own direct experiences, for
example, it is odd that he reconed the operations of others
better than his own; he remembered the names of hundreds of
KGB officers, but could not recall names of his own agents
and people involved in his own career; he could recount
details of the PENKOVSKIY investigation, in which he did
not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies
among tourists, such as MCGOWAN, for which he was responsible;
he remembered details of the 1955 MALIA case in which he
did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the
1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance
to him of recruitment operations against U.S. Embassy em-
ployees which permitted him to recall some details of the
STORSBERG and MULE operations, it is not important enough
to help him recall some of the other details which were
equally pertinent to him personally; and it is not selective
memory which made him forget almost every detail about CIA
If it is
personnel in Moscow and KGB action against them.
said that his parental family is important to him ( hence
his memory of his father's funeral and the names of his
uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details
about his childhood. If drinking with important people is
meaningful to him, it would explain why he remembers one
GRIBANOV evening with sharp clarity, but it does not explain
why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what
season of the year or in what restaurant they took place.
Finally, with reference to the "selective memory" hypo-
thesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers
best and which he told most confidently that the majority of
inexplicable contradictions arise. Nothing could shake him
from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABIDIAN
or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among
numerous examples.
C.
Embellishment
The third possibility is that he has simply embellished
and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth
somewhere near what he has reported. NOSENKO has, after all,
admitted many "white lies" and boasts ("painting" himself, as
he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were
repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often
in ways which led him into more contradictions and further
admissions of white lies. Perhaps then, according to this
hypothesis, he simply invented, on his own, various aspects
of his career. Perhaps he dated his entry into the KGB
earlier to make himself seem more experienced, and invented
his service in the American Department to make himself more
interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only
a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough
from his operations and from his handlers to think he could
pose as one. This hypothesis would certainly explain many
of the dubious aspects: the story of his career, his lack
of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of
major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship
with GRIBANOV, etc. This theory, however, founders on a
number of points:
TOP SECRET
:
14-00000
☐ wo sources
762.
-The validity of the information he has provided.
To get such information he would have to be a KGB
staff officer, must have worked in both the American
and Tourist Departments as he says he did, and must
have been a fairly senior officer with broad respon-
To
sibilities (in view of the number of Tourist Department
operations revealed by name in his 1964 notes).
name a few other examples from among hundreds possible:
(a)
NOSENKO not only knew the identity of a KGB
double agent against CIA, BELITSKIY, but gave checkable
details from inside the case, including the names by
which the CIA case officers identified themselves to
the double agent;
(b) NOSENKO was able to report, with almost com-
that CIA ceased clandestine letter-
plete accuracy,
mailings inside the Soviet Union for over a year after
the arrest of Russell LANGELLE in late 1959;
(c) He identified several Americans recruited or
approached by the KGB in operations in which he said
he did not directly participate, including "ANDREY"
(Dayle SMITH), Sergeant Robert JOHNSON, and Henry
SHAPIRO;
(d) KOSENKO knew inside information on Americans
at the Embassy in Moscow, including operational activi-
ties of John ABIDIAN, CHIEDENTERS) mailing of a letter to
POPOV, the homosexuality of two diplomatic officers,
etc; and
(e) He knew certain details of the story of Alek-
sandr CHEREFANOV which would not have been available
outside the KGB staff.
Thus there would not be any great need nor much room
for embellishment.
-The confirmations of others.
He appeared before
A
BARCHOORN and other KGB targets as a "chief," and sensitive source's
importance:
subsources confirmed NOSENKO's unusual
that he was a Deputy Department Chief in
the KGB, that his defection was a severe blow to Soviet
Intelligence, that he was more important than PENKOVSKIY,
A Soviet journalist told Paris Match that
and so on.
NOS ENKO's defection was the greatest less ever suffered
by Soviet Intelligence.
reported the recall to Moscow of many KGB staffers as
a result of the defection, and these officers did
indeed return to the Soviet Union.
Thus any embellishment must concern only minor details such
as his rank, which he has already admitted.
d.
Combination of Above
Another possibility might be that NOSENKO's poor per-
While
formance was due to a combination of bad memory, psycho-
pathologically selective memory, and embellishment.
this theory is intrinsically more logical and might correct
and round off some obvious weaknesses in any one of the
i
[
1995
P SECRET
14-00000
763.
individual theories, it cannot explain the counterarguments
discussed under component parts above.
e.
Insaaity
It might be postulated that NOSENKO went insano and that
this was the cause not only of his seemingly 
unmotivated
contact with CIA in 1962 but of shortcomings 
in his story
.
However, NOSENKO thereafter handled sunior 
KGB functions
well enough to be promoted and to be permitted 
abroad in
1964; he has been examined periclically 
by a CIA 
psycholo-
gist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has been in 
contact over
considerable periods of time and under varying 
degrees 
of
stress with experienced CIA and FBI personnel
; he has 
main-
None
tained his equilibrium under difficult 
circumstances.
of the foregoing results in an indication of 
insanity 
and
there are countless other arguments 
which would invalidate
this hypothesis.
3.
Second Alternative
It has also been postulated that NOSENKO is a psycho-
path, is what he says he is, but that for 
psychological
reasons and while under interrogation
, he did not want 
to
tell what he knew. By this line of reasoning
, NOSENKO 
has
lied for no other reason than to save face
; by dwelling on
the inconsistencies in NOSENKO's statements
, the interro-
gator merely caused more inconsistencies or 
else received
the false answers that NOSENKO did not 
know or did not 
re-
member the facts. Under interrogation, however
, NOSENKO
recalled and repeated what he had previously 
said in the
less inhibiting atmosphere of the relaxed 
debriefings 
prior
to 4 April 1964. This alternative 
explanation
thus does not account for the factual contradictions in
NOSENKO's reporting before the interrogations
, such as 
the
errors in dates, in sourcing on the "
ANDREY" case, in de-
It also
tails about the Pushkin Street dead drop, 
etc.
fails to account for NOSENKO's retractions about his rank as
lieutenant colonel, in the face of the KGB TDY 
travel autho-
rization which shows him to be a lieutenant 
colonel, and
about the telegram recalling him to NGB Headquarters 
in
January 1964. eOS
The suggestion that NOSENKO lied to
save face Consequently can be dismissed.
4.
Third Alternative
The only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not what
he claims to be, in which case his misrepresentation 
was
done either on his own or as part of a KGB 
operation.
If he is misrepresenting himself on his own, there are
He is merely 
exag-
(even in theory) only two possibilities:
gerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or
he is a fabricator. He cannot be a 
fabricator, however, 
since
the Soviets have certified him in many ways; including 
his
diplomatic status at the Geneva Conference
, Soviet official
protests and Soviet Embassy confrontation in 
Washington,
Soviet officials' remarks in various 
areas of the world, 
and
other sources on his 
KGB status and
reports from
importance.
Sensitive sorce and
1
P SECRET
14-00000
764.
This
There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrep-
resented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation
.
hypothesis could accommodate the argument that 
the KGB 
would
not dispatch a KGB staff officer as a double agent 
against a
hostile service because, whether or not the argument 
is 
valid,
NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIII.D. above) has not proven his
If 
he has
claim to having served as an officer of the KGB.
been and is now under KGB control, it would appear that he was
being built up for years to look like an officer 
and was shown
This could
to Westerners in certain recruitment operations.*
explain NOSENKO's revelations to FRIPPEL and others about his
family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. 
JOHNSON
case, and NOSENKO's appearance in the BARGHOORN interrogation.
It could explain NOSENKO's uneven memory and 
performance under
detailed questioning: Much of what he should 
have known by
personal experience could have been mercly 
memorized as part
of his KGB briefing. Nothing in NOSENKO's 
production (see
Part VIII.B. above) would preclude his being a KGB-dispatched.
agent. That he was a KGB-dispatched agent was the 
conclusion
independently arrived at by the CIA specialist 
who administered
a polygraph examination to NCSENKO in April 
1964.
4.
Pemarks
The first alternative above has been rejected while the
possibility that NOSENKO on his own misrepresented himself
is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO
has been manipulated by the KGB in an operation 
directed
against American Intelligence.
His American Department service in 1960-1961 was not supported
by any such "show" appearances--he did not 
insist on the
truth of his claim to participation in the 
KEYSERS case,
which, moreover KEYSERS could not confirm; 
PREISFPEUND 
is an
is not 
accessible to
unreliable witness; and,
interview.
10P SECRET
:
1400000
765.
.sitive
Sources
I.
Summary of Conclusions
CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO
case for the purpose of 
reaching a definitive conclusion
about the bona fides 
of this man who says he is a KGB
officer detector 
collaborating with American Intelligence
.
As this point-by-point analysis has demonstrated,
there is no reason to accept 
any of NOSENKO's claims 
to
a career as an officer 
in Soviet Intelligence, to 
authority
concerning the range and 
degree of EGB operational successes
in the USSR (particularly 
with U.S. officials and private
citizens), to accurate 
knowledge regarding rajor security
cases in that country, 
or to cooperation with American 
Intel-
ligence.
It would be sufficient proof of his mala fides to
verify that NOSENKO lied about 
a single segment of his
lic cannot have been truthful in 
saying
career in the KGB.
that he was the Deputy Chief of the U.S. E: 
bassy Section.
American Department, EGR 
Secon: Chief Directorate. in 
1960-
Numerous
1961 and a Deputy Chief 
in the Tourist Department of the
same directorate from 
1962 until his defection.
indications make it doubtful 
that NOSENKO, as 
he contended,
belonged to the naval GRU in 
1951-1952, to the U.S. Embassy
Section in 1953-1955, 
and to the American Tourist Section
He was unable 
to support his alleged staff
in 1955-1959.
officer status in the EGB, providing 
incomplete and inaccu-
rate information on his 
sub-sources and on such topics as
Headquarters staff procedures 
while making illogical state-
Neither a supervisor nor, pro-
ments on modus operandi
.
bably, a case officer, it remains dubious but 
possible 
that
he was a KGB principal 
agent whose speciality in the past
Whatever the capacity
was compromising Western 
homosexuals.
in which NOSENKO served, it was not in the KGB ranks, holding
the KGB titles, or with the 
KGB honors he has ascribed to
himself, and this fact is 
enough to prove the falsity of
his claims to being a 
genuine defector.
He has
There is no question, however, that NOSENKO has had
the benefit of inside 
information from the KGB.
the Soviet 
Government's
said so, other sources have 
said so.
reactions to the defection 
implied 
as much, and his reports
contain details which could 
have coze only from the KGB.
He was introduced into several 
operations, the first as
early as 1958, in a 
position appearing "senior" to known 
KGB
He 
has provided data on organization, per-
staff officers.
sonnel, and methods complementing and 
supplementing that 
from
others affiliated with 
the KGB. Purposefully misleading
about himself, NOSENKO 
has also been deceitful in discussing
the compromises of CHEREPANOV
, PENKOVSKIY, and perhaps POPOV
,
although here his reporting 
often correlates with that from
Analysis shows
CHEREPANOV 125
several
that -- NOSENKO and others to the contrary
a KGB provocateur, PENKOVSKIY 
was detected 
at the latest in
early 1961 not 1952, 
and POPOV was probably uncovered earlier
than January 1959 because 
of a KGB agent rather than surveil-
lance. NOSENKO thus has 
not merely misrepresented himself but
Appraisals of
has practiced deception 
under KGB guidance.
NOSENKO's performance 
under interrogation, 
his alleged motiva-
tion, and the operational 
circumstances support this view.
•
--
14-00000
TOP SECRET
766.
Furthermore, it is the only acceptable explanation, among
the alternatives, for what has transpired since 
contact 
with
CIA began in 1962.
CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is
unequivocal: He is a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB.
Part IX contains a discussion of the implications of
the foregoing conclusion for the Soviet sources who,
have corroborated 
the 
bona
Tides of NOSENKO.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TERHES FOR OPAL 16:
strefustion
sensitive sources
sources
The conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB
positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA
and the FBI by (two categories of Soviet Intelligence sources;
(1).) the defector COLITSYN
(2)
A
These sources, all of
if the con-
whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly with American
Intelligence, stated or implied that NOSENKO held arator
positions in the KG3 Second Chief Directorate.**
clusion of this study of NOSENKO's bona fides is accurate, none
of the
e sources can be correct, and they must therefore be
informed about NOSENKO or purposefully misleading.
either
In assessing whether and how
could have been innocently misinformed about NOSENKO after he
defected, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the KCB
might have created and supported a legend for a counterfeit KGB
officer-defector like NOJENKO. The MGB might have accomplished
this by the following mears:
-
NOSENKO's legend would have required the KGB to
brief him in depth on numerous cases and various targets
The KGB
which he would be free to discuss with CIA.
would also have to familiarize him with KGB staff organi-
zational structure and procedures, *** and KGB officers
prominent in his story (e.c., GUN, KOVSHUK, TSYMBAL,
GRIBOV) so that he could not only recognize their
photographs but also lend reality to his remarks about
them. NOSENKO would also have to visit KG3 installations
and other areas which appeared in his legend.
sensitive
Sources whose reporting tended to support NOSENKO but who
have not been members of the Soviet Intelligence Services
are eliminated from detailed consideration here because
their connections with NOSENKO are less direct then the
has
sources with service in the KGB and GRU.
never been a Soviet Intelligence officer, and his support
for NOSENKO has been relatively limited. However, he re-
ported on repercussions in Geneva caused by NOSENKO's de-
fection and like NOSENKO, he said that the KGB suspected
the U.S. State Department official David MARK of belonging
to CIA. He has also reported on certain personalities
prominent in NOSENKO's reporting, including Yu. I. GUK
and V.V. VAKRUSHEV.
** Although all of them supported NOSENKO by confirming his
KGB status, there is nevertheless a distinct difference
between COLITSYN's opinion about him and the statements
by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NOSENKO to be a
KGB-dispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was
a genuine defector.
***That these preparations were imperfect, or at least that
NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in
his performance under interrogation.
Source
TOP SECRET
:
14-00000
768,
Another phase of the properations would have boan
MOSTNAD's actual and devonstiable participation in opera-
Presumably this would
tims, sceaingly as a XGB officer.
be done so that Westerners (e.g., BARGHOORN, FRIPPEL, and
M.E. JOHNSON) could certify that they had seen HOSENKO. in
some such role.*
-
The KGB presumably would have restricted the number
of its officers aware of some or all of the operational
plan, it would nonetheless be faced with the problem of
how public knowledge of NOSENKO's defection might affect
others in the service. KGB officers abroad uninformed of
the operational plan might be indiscreet with foreigners,
in meeting Western. double agents, or before microphones in
their homes and offices, making such remarks as "I never
heard of this man NOSEIKO or speculating close to the
mark. Thus the KGB might have tried to support the bone
fides of NOSENKO SRSTAR
W by the spreading of taise
rumors about his authenticity (this on the part of the
limited few aware of the facts of the case), by recalling
KGB officers from the posts in the Fest (ostensibly b
cause they were known to NOSENKO). by announcing the whole-
sale dismissal of those responsible including GRIPANOV
(although in fact they may have routinely retired or may
have been removed from the main stream of KGB Headquarters
activities). and by making general announcements within
the KGB,about the loss" purred by the defection
more,
OK
Further-
since it is common Soviet practice to make a bad ex-
ample of defectors, such announcements might be expected
with venereal
to denigrate NOSENKO as a "bad character
disease
an odd Party record, self-inflicted wound, etc.,
in his background. The KGB might also have taken pains
to support NOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence
sources, notably double agents recognized by the KGB to
be such, told of the seriousness of the defection.
sensitive surces
It is within this possible framework that one might judge whether
the reports of
☐ concerning 
NOSENKO
were unwitting repetitions of widely disseminated misinformation,
or whether their reports constituted purposeful passage of KG3
disinformation.
Their direct and indirect support of NUSENKO's bona fides,
as well as the statements by COLITSYN, are presented and evaluated
in the next sections below, together with presentations and
appraisals of their information on topics of reporting in common
with NOSENKO'S. Certain reports by
Source
* It is noteworthy that such participation was limited to Tourist
Department operations. NOSENKO did not claim physical partici-
pation in any contacts with American Embassy officials during
the periods 1953-55 or 1960-61, except for MULE and 
STORSBERG
(where his claimed role was uncheckable since it 
involved 
only
holding a door) and KEYZERS (which KEYZERS did not confirm
and on which NOSENKO did not insist, admitting that he doubted
KEYZERS would remember or recognize him.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
769.
Lurces
PLAINER are also considered because they
overlap SJQ's to me extent, although by saying he was
contradicted his 
claim to KG3 staff
civilian, AG
officer status. A number of general correlations between the
NOSZAKO case and the
operations are then reviewed.
the final section of Part IX is
summary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO
· case and the reporting about him by GOLITSYN,
sensitiits sources
TOP SECRET
i
14-00000
1
B.
1.
TOP SECRET
C.
.:
1.
2.
B
"
NAREMAAN.
meter of soviet deing at
donforme in Colet
gave 15 indication that he
☐
::
iu. .;
W
the 1962
Shown
session of the Dir
1.
o's and Wa Ch the list bei GoulTY:
cognize the mare.
On June 1962, after MA's initial meetings with NOSENKO
and because of the targe overlap of NOSENKO's information and con-
tacts wit GOLTSTN's, one of the CIA care officers who 
had met
Gent root, with GOLITSYN to ontein has comments 
on 
some
GOLAISYN WIS told that CIA had receiver:
Story it.
an angnyakua letter thien reported certain inferma-
The FGB. She CTA Cffiner stoLITBYN thot
NOSINAV
of the
ן'
Klapped
1:35,
i ca as
hi D.
Pad
; these
10.
these
.
with B
'
::
ار
that organizat to an 1961 for the AMT,
in general, anking the full
coul! s..y
','તા
ther.
.'
2010
in what
case. It was not ġ ven to MIT.
he had seen; he warto se
q, incluna
and c
perhaps in
10.08 from NOSENHO
Second Chicf
Tes was shown him,
personnel whom the
_nu) NOSENKO, and
b; C records,
one Aleksanur
11. Japan when
furtir
Tentified as RGB
COLEPSYN said
N
by for an asscss-
of disinformatica
formation on the
On 10 February 1964 NOSENKO's uerection then the Soviet Dis-
armament delegation in Geneva, Switzerland was publicited, includ-
When GOL 
hear his news he inedi
ing his KGB aflation,
frea Switzerland and linked
ately recalled the June 1962 "Rutte:
He recalled NOSENKO as a
NOSENKO to 11; he thereupon stated that
member of the Second Chief rectorate working “gainst American
citizens.
On 11 February 1964 GOLETSTN raised the boily of his
participation in interrogations of ROSPIRO, and at this 
time 
he
was given some "backgörūnd of the can, and 
an indication of CIA'S
Over 
the next several
reservations about NOSE:RO's bon rides.
from the 1962 and 1964
months GOLITSYN was provided with miterial
meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at his request was
supplied with all the available biographic data of 
NOSENKO 
to
On 23 June 
1964, 
GOLITSYN
assist him in analyzing the operation.
He confirm:ea
was interviewed in detail on the subject of ROGENEO.
NOSENKO's identity as the son of the former Minister of Ship-
building and said that he was a KGS ettieer who 
had worked in 
the
American Department and the Tourist Bipiifment of the KGB's Second
Chief Directorate. He was shown a photograļā, 
ef NɔSKNKO, (not
buried in a photo sproud, but singly) and he clent 
111cd it as 
a
photograph of the man he knew. Ae this ure 
he gave the 
information
about SENKO which is summarized below
.
TOP SECRET
L

14-00000
The NOJENKO case tws not been discussed with GOLITSYN since
the 29 June 1964 interview; thus he has not been questioned
further on the circumstances which led to the encounters with
NOSENKO described by him, nor have the results of subsequent
discussed at length in
detailed reinterrogations of NOSENKO
the foregoing sections of this paper
him for review, analysis, or comment.
-
been made available to
2.
Resume and Discussion of Information*
American Department
-
1953
He
NOSEZIKO has said that he entered the KGB in March 1953**
and was first assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American
Department of what is now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB.
stated that his duties from his entry until sometime in 1954, per-
haps about June, were to work on files of American correspondents
on permanent assignment to Moscow and to meet with the Soviet
citizens who were agents or informants reporting on the corres-
pondents to the KGB.
GOLITSYN stated that he met NOSENKO in the American Depart-
Iment of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate*** a couple
of times in 1953 when he, CULITSYN, was there on other matters.
GOLITSYN had earlier identified his own job between December
1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the American Sector, Counter-
intelligence (Ninth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the
Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and re-
From April 1953 until his departure
organized in April 1953).
The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO
on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments
thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in this section are
a discussion and an evaluation of what GCLITSYN said about
NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate (see
Pages 313-344).
Among the various dates given by NOSENKO for this entry, March 1953
has been given more often than others and is more 
consistent with
the rest of NOSENKO's story.
**Thin in
now designated the KGB Second Chief Directorate.
TOP SECT
4-00000
SECTI
E
for Vienna in October 1953 GOLITS: was Deputy Chief of the
Emigre Sector, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Intelligence
Department, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. COLITSYN has not
indicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of these
positions which would have necessitated his visiting the American
Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, although
certain activities of common interest with the latter would appear
logical. NOSENKO's description of his alleged duties with corres-
pondents, however, did not encompass his having official contacts
with representatives of any component of the Counterintelligence
Department of the Foreign Directorate. According to NOSENKO'z
description of the location of his claimed office in the American
Department, and his description of the duties of the co-workers
he said shared it with him, chance contacts there with such a
representative would have been precluded. Even by NOSENKO's account,
then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not have
been in the course of interdepartmental liaison between their
respective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSENKO's office.
GOLITSYN's lack of reporting on KCB operations against American
correspondents (other than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956
or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his business
in the American Department was unrelated to NOSENKO's claimed
activities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statement on the 1953
encounters implied that his meetings with NOGENKO were accidental.
Fleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could
have led GOLITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO
was a member of the staff within the American Department.
American Department/Tourist Department 1955-1960
-
NOSENKO stated that he transferred from the American Depart-
ment to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in the
Tourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section
there in 1958.
GOLITSYN, however, insisted that NOSENKO remained in the
American Department until at least 1957, or possibly as late as
1958. GOLITSYN added that the KGB would not be aware that he knew
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TOP SECRET
•
HOSEN KO's true position in the American Department in 1957 or
GOLITSIN did not indicate how he acquired his knowledge
1958.
indicate
-
on this nor why the KGB subsequently would have been unable to
determine that he had. If his access to this information was in-
deed that remote (as GOLITSYN's assignment in 1957 and 1958 would
see below), it is readily apparent that it could like-
wise be somewhat garbled. COLITSYN was unable to explain the
fact that ROSENKO's physical presence in exclusively Tourist
Department cases had been positively established through photo
identifications made by several of the individuals involved, who
met NOSEIKO as early as 1956.
He
1
From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSENKO claimed to
have been in the Tourist Department) GOLITSYN was enrolled in
the KCB Higher School. He was detached from the school, in the
period January-March 1959, in order to gather material for his
thesis. At that time GOLITSN spent just under two months in
the Tourist Department,* but GOLITSYN's work did not involve hia
in any day-to-day operational activities of this department.
has reported having "occasionally" met NOSENKO in 1959; although
he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems
probable that it would have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked
NOSENKO in 1959 where he was working and NOSENKO told him the
Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters
must have been brief, superficial, and not work-related, hence
insufficient for GOLITSYN to arrive independently at a well-founded
conclusion as to NOSENKO's actual status and function with the
Tourist Department.
*In describing his own and others' responsibilities in the Tourist
Department, NOSENKO has made no reference to this unit having a
formal or regular relationship with the KGB school or to students
from the school having been detached to the department.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TOP SECRET
Information Net villable to COLITizi
The detailed interrogations of NOSENKO cergerning his claims
to XGB positions between 1953 and 1964, did not take place until
many months after COLITSY: made his statements, and they were based
upon all collateral information knownfrelating to each phase.
of the results of these interrogations was made available to
GOLITSIN, so he was not aware of the countless points on which
NOSENKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of
activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged
✓
these departments.
tenure in these
3.
Comments on COLITSYN
None
Several factors influence the evaluation of CCLITSYN's states
ments on NOSENKO:
-
First,
as stated in Part VIII.I., it is concluded
that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed.
GOLITSYN's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as
NOSEN KO's claims about service in the U.S. Embassy Section
of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned.
over,
More-
in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB "letter-writer"
(actually NOSENKO) was under KGB control in submitting infor-
mation to American Intelligence.
At issue, therefore, is the
..
evidence from COLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an
officer in the American Department (until 1957 or 1958, whereas
HOSENKO said he was reassigned from the department in 1955)
and in the Tourist Department subsequently.
-
Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification
of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's
defection, despite many previous opportunities to do so (e.g.,
in discussions of GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV) and despite
GOLITSYN's proven excellence of memory for names and tasks of
KGB personnel. GOLITSYN gave little detail on the circum-
stances of his encounters with NOSENKO, and he has not been
Nevertheless, as indicated in
questioned further about them.
the foregoing remarks on the circumstances in which the two
men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would
have been brief, infrequent, casual, extra-official, and
---hཧ..
TOP SECRET
S
VI.
The following discussion considers COLITSIN's information.
about NOSENKO in conjunction with NOSAKO's denial about having
been in contact with GOLITSY.I.** Possible explanation: for
GOLITSYN's having referred to their encounters but having mis-
identified RUSENKO's positions in the KCB are: First, GOLITSM
could have erred; second, GOLITSYN could have lied for personal
reasons, and third, COLITSMI could have lied at the direction
of the KGB because he (like NOSENKO) is under XGB control. To
examine each of these points separately:
-
GELITSYN could have erred. Apart from the denial
by HOSERRO, who is an unreliable source, there is no evidence
to refute COLITSYN's statement that he and NCSO met in
the American Department in 1953 and in the Tourist Department
in 1958 or 1959. (The conclusions art VIII.I. about
NOSENKO's bona fides do not rule out the possibility that
he was physically present on occasion on the premises of the
two departments in these years, although not in the capacities.
that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however,
could have been such that GCLITSY erred in assuming because
NOSENKO was seen on or near the premises of the two departments,
and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYN in 1958 or 1959 that he was
-
-
in the Tourist Department that NOSENKO was therefore an
officer of these specific elements of the RGB Second Chief
Directorate. Thus, if GOLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he
mistakenly identified NOSENKO as being a member of the staffs
of the American and Tourist Departments at these times.
-
GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons.
He may
have believed that to say he met NOSENKO or to say he knew
* There is insufficient information available to reach a conclusion
about, or even speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSYN':
defection occurred in January 1962, as contrasted with the fact
that it took place on 15 December 1961.
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14-00000
TOP SECRET
HoJiLiko's positions in the KUB would wi uthenticity to
his earlier evaluation of the NOSENKO information of 1962,
to his contradictions of NOSENKO's statements concerning
service in the U.S. Embassy Section and the operations of
that section, and to his contention that the KGB would try
to counteract his (COLITSYN's) information by spreading
purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports
on the same subject matter. In summary, COLITSYN's intention
in lying about NOSENKO could simply have been to add greater
credibility to his expressed opinion that sZKO was a KGB
provocateur.
- COLITSY could have lied at the direction of the KGB,
an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness
and not because CIA has any reason to believe GOLITSYN is under
KG3 control. This explanation would mean that COLITSYN,
although offering partial confirmation for NOSE:KO's claims,
directly attacked the bona fides of another KGB-dispatched
agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. acting
under KG9 instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine
NOSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSENKO
said he was providing reliable and comprehensive information
about KGB operations against American officials and tourists
in the USSR. At the same time, NOSENKO was not giving an
account of their relationship that was consistent with COLITSYN's.
by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting the earlier
reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union,
and NOSENKO was seeking to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that
experienced by GOLITSYN. According to this hypothesis, two
-
-
sources under KGB control each striving for acceptance
deliberately gave conflicting stories of their relationship,
and each tried to undermine the bona fides of the other,
GOLITSYN explictly and NOSEIKO by implication. This explanation
is so illogical, as well as so detrimental to the KGB, that
it must be rejected from serious consideration.
TOP SECRET
r
14-00
TOP SECRET
n.
"The choice thus seems to lin between the first two explanations
for GULITSYN's misidentification of NOSENKO, one un understandable
error of 15sumption drawn from their few chance encounters, the
In either
other a misguided attempt that had no sinister goals.
case, GOLITSYN's testimony does not contribute to a determination
of the status of NOSENKO within the KCB as of the years prior
to 1960.
There are two explanations for NOSENKO's denial about having
met COLITSYN. One explanation is that they were never in personal
contact, the KGB was aware of this fact, and -
GCLITSYN's statements to the contrary
-
unprepared for
the KGB briefed NOSO
accordingly. If in this particular instance NOSENKO told the
truth and (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional
or different conclusion can be drawn about the bona fides of
NOSENKO and his claims of service in the KGB.
The second explanation
is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take place in 1953
•
and again in 1958 or 1959, but because of their casual and fleeting
nature, NOSENKO (unlike GOLITSYN) has not remembered them.
TOP SECRET
:
14-000
711.
2. Regume of Intervation"
According to COLITSYN, he personally met 10SENKO two or
three times in 1999, while visiting the U.S. Eni axisy inction of
the kiet tean, D. pit Ument, a component of the internal security
directorate, and gain in 1958 and 1949. On the other hand,
NOSENKO 20s unable to identify COLITSYN's photograph and he denied
ever having seer, him GOLITETNI said that GUK, CHURAHOV. and
KASHG!EYEV were triends of 8OSENKO as well as of Col. (NOS-
ENKO claimed to be on friendly terms with each of thự in three
KGB offers; meucknowledged, however, that his acquaintance
with GUK had beợn meresy casual until NOZENKO's three-month TDY
to Geneva in 100% which made them the best of friends.) From
1953 to 1967 or 1968 COLITSYN said. ROSENKO was a case officer
in the US. Baba my tution, then thanáterred in the four fast.
Department, where he
Semiot case of faces 10 1949 ODLITSYN
stated unejarvocally that NOSERYJ was not a Deputy Chief of, the
U.S. Emassy Section or otherwise serving in that section or
the American Department as of the time he (COLITSY!) onsulted
with various officers there in April-June 1960 and January 1961.**
COLITSY: spoke there with officers wira HOSENKO claims as close
colleagues including KOVAHUK and CRYAZIOV, and would doubtless
have known iỊ NOSENKO were supervising or otherwise involved in
coie clerk operationS. Ir. Summary
CLITSYN corrobotited some
of NOSENKO s alleged onsignment in the KGB Second Chief Directorate
but not all of thea
While NOSENKO contradicted GOLIT SYN by saying
that the two men had never met
3. Comments on S
From December 1952 until April 1953 GOLITSYN was Chief of
the American Desk Counter intelligence Department. Foreign
Directorate. Eh (then MGB) and for most of the period from
January to March 1959 was on TDY craining assignments to the
Second Chief Directorate In the first job at least COLITSYN
presumably would have had regular dealings with the US. Embassy
Section, and perhaps also in the second he would have been in
contact with the Tourist Department. in which NOSENKO claimed
to have been then serving Despite this and despite his
proven excellence of memory for the names and tasks of KGB
personnel, COLEPSYN never mentioned NOSENKO in debriefings
during the years 1962 and 1963. nor commented on his name on
the two occasions when it was shown to him. although he had
numerous opportunities to mention him in connection with the
names of CHURANDY, FASHCHEYEV. and UK.
The relationship between the reporting by COLITSYN and
ROSENFŮ on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595,
while in
with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659
the section which follows below are a discussion and an
evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments
in the Second Chief Directorate,us described on Payes 343–344.
**As stated in Part VIII.1., however, it is not credible that
NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953. 55 or
1. 1960-1962.
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14-00000
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TOP SECRE
712.
There would appear to be no reason why ROSEHKO, if he had
ever met COLITSYN, should not have said no to 
Aerican intelii-
. To have done to would have given 
NOSE
:KO
gence representatives.
concrete support for his claims of Ki stuff service, which he
knew to be in question. On the contrary, however
, NOSENKO 
consis-
tently denied any contact and manufactured a 
demonstrably false
story to explain his own absence during COLITST's 
admitted 
visit
to the section in which HOSENKO claims to have 
served in January
1961. (See Page 183, second footnote.)
On the other hand, GOLITEYH'S claim must be reasured against
In the ab-
the background and circumstances of his statements.
sence of any comments about or identification of NCSENKO by GCLIT-
SYN prior to the public announcement of 
his defection from the
KG, and in view of the amount of information made 
available 
to
him from NOSENKO materials prior to is making any statements
about his alleged acquaintance with him, COLITSIN's 
"
identifica-
tion" of NOSENKO as a KGE staff officer known to him 
personally
cannot be considered as spontaneous or uncontaminated' information.
about
The weight of independent evidence against NOSERKO's alleged
service in those positions which GOLITSIN corroborated
, combined
with the conflict between GOLITSYN's and NOSENKO's 
testimony
their personal acquaintenceship, makes it impossible to accept
GOLITSYN's verification of NOSENKO's claimed 
KGB status during
any stage of the latter's career.
Direct relationship
with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and im-
portant to remaining KGB officers; even if 
temporarily 
forgotten,
post-defection reminiscences would almost 
certainly bring back
memories of such recent and direct contacts 
as COLITSYN relates
.
*It is not likely that he would forget it.
TOP SECRET

14-00000
77747
2.
NOSENKO's Background and Career
Date of Information
¨10 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
12 February 1964)
10 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
12 February 1964)
10 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
12 February 1964)
19 February 1964 (Re-
ported to the FBI on
20 February 1964)
Source
Information Peported by
NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approxi-
mately 16 years, since about 1947, and was 
an
employee of the Second Chief Directorate in
Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to
the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also
There
Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry.
is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in
the Ukraine.
news-
The photograph which appealed in U.S.
papers is not that of NOSENKO.**
worked with NOSENKO for several years in FGB
Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person
who likes to be fashionably dressed at all
times and 5 fond of women, by nature u friendly
individual and generally well-liked by his fol-
low workers. NOSENKO worked in 
the Second
Chief Directorate.
"It
peared quite certain
chat NOSENKO had the rank o
Teutenant colonel in the KGB."
....
so identified
as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
T
775.
14-00000
776.
(Reported to the FBI
on 20 Febru
1964)
(Reported to the FBI
on 22 February 1964)
(Reported Lo CIA by
the FBI or 8 February
1965)
was asked
whether he felt
NOSENKS actually defected of whether he felt
the defection might be a "trick" by the KGB.
replied that from his own knowledge of
this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's
defection was not a "trick" by the KGA.
NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with his 
help
agents were developed among these Americans,
It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar
with the number and location of microphones in
the U.S. Embassy,
Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to
the Chief of a department in the Second Chief
Directorate. While working in the Seventh
(Surveillance) Directorate in Moscows
on three separate occasions participated in
conferences between "important people" of the
Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Direc-
torate. NOSENKO was present at all of these."
Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief 
he held
only the rank of captain in the KGB,
attributed this (the disparity between job and
rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV 
exerted
on the behalf of NOSENKO.
2
TOP SECRET
14-00000
LOST/MISSING MATERIAL
DATE
4/12/94
THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING
DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL
REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.
DOCUMENT NO.
OR
PAGE(S)
777
FROM:
DATED:
CIA JOB NO.
BOX NO. Ree146
FOLDER NO.
ZA
14-00000
j
10 February 1964 (50-
ported to the FBI on
12 February 1964)
10 February ☐ 64 (Re-
ported
12 February
FBI on
19 Eruary 1964
(Re-
ported
No the FBI on
Rebrafty)
778.
Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO
would have a great deal of important informa-
tion which he could impart to intelligente
agencies of other countries. Certainly, he
would be acquainted with many KGB employees
and could identify them. He also would be
intimately acquainted with a large number of
Soviet agents working inside the USSR against
American and British nationalɛ.
The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB
activities would revolve around the intelli-
gence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also ·
KGB personalities working in Headquarters.
NOSTAKO Es aise undoubtedly familiar with all
KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew
some KGB personalities in other countries.
NOSENKO had been in
the Seach Chief Itorate for about 14 years
and was acptainted with almost all of the cm-
He was aware of
ployees of this directorate.
the structure of the RCB and knows many person-
nel of the First Chief Directorate.
:.
ROSENKO,
as Deputy to the Chief of the Tourist Department,
had in his possession a telephone directory
which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB em-
ployees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Ch
of Departments had these phone books.**
xpressed the opinion that "NOSENKO
TOP SECRET
14-00000
1
(Reported to the
FBI on 9 March 1964)
779.
is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than
was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he
knows so much about the methods of work of the
First and Second Directorates of the KGB and
is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB,
both in Moscow and abroad.
that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American
and British Intelligence with a lot of informa-
tion concerning defense secrets of the Sovint
Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable
in intelligence and counterintelligence opera-
tions of the KGB.
"
NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies
of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB
Headquarters in Moscow. In E53 Headquarters
there are four separate dining rooms for per-
sonnel who work there; one such dining room is
reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments.
Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast know-
ledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.*
21 March 1964. Ro-
ported to the FBI on
23 March 1280)
HOSENKO volunteered for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten
occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.
TOP SECRET
TOP S ONE
14-00000
780.
(Reported to the FBI on
27 March 1964)
20 May 1964 (RO-
ported to No FBI
on 21 May 1204)
*There seems to be unanimous opinion among the
KGB chief that NOSENKO... could do
the KGB a tremendous amount of harm." NOSENKO
in his position as a deputy chief in one of the
departments of the Second Chief Directorate
would have been entitled to have one personnel
directory of approximately 30 pages setting
forth the identities of all of the supervisory
officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would
also have had a 200-pace directory listing by
name and telephone number all the rank-and-
file employees working in Moscow. The opinion
was expressed by some
KGB "chiefs"
that if NOSTNKO were merely able
to make these two directories available to
American Intelligence, the KCB would be severely
damaged for the present and for several years
to come.*
The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only
40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed
by the Soviets in the Embassy.
Weels
quite sure that NOSENKO was response for
furnishing information to the Americans which
resulted in the microphones being found. It
was his opinion that NOSENKO knew only the gen-
eral location of the 40 microphones which were
found and does not have any knowledge of the
remaining ones.
Reported to C.A.
by the FRI on
11 June 19641
See above; NOSENKO did not mention these directories.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
101
☐
781.
(Reported to the I
on 22 June 1964)
(Reported to CIA
by the FBI 11 8
February 1805)
The general consensus among KCB employees
is that in the future the KGB will
Te feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's es-
NOSENKO is 
con-
cape to American Intelligence.
sidered to be vastly more important than either
GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to
be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO
worked against personnel stationed at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were
Second, it
developed among these Americans.
15 assumed by KGB personne that because of
his closeness to the U.S. Embassy in the past,
NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number
of microphones which had been installed in
the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of
these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief
of a department, NOSENKO would normally have
had access to a telephone Directory listing
all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in
MOSCOW. Another factor, which is a formidable
one in the minds of other KCB employees, is
that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential
He high in
circle of friends in Moscow who
the Soviet Government.
these comments cited as reasons for NOGENKO
being an "important catch" for 
American 
Intel-
no one in 
the
ligence, but Qu
KGB really knows exactly how much information
NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.
The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's de-
fection is "unpredictable. NOSENKO know few
employees of the First Chief Directorate work-
ing abroad, but knew many such employees serving
in KGE Headquarters by virtue of seeing them 
in
the dining room which is reserved for 
chiefs
and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
14-00000
782.
Repersuasion of NOSENKO's Defection
19 Febuary 1964. (Re-
ported to the put on
23 Fet ruary 164)
TOP SECRET
14-00000
7 1944 (RO-
1962
De
1964)
TENKO provided no information conceTNI BA PPDATA
783.
ARME FUROCHAIN, a KGB S6 ir edukkan per
to Washington, will not be
"well known" to NOSENKO. In the code of his
duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN) had very often visited
21 department 
where NOSENKO worked and
result, ROSENIO is "more than casually
with him.***
2
inquainted"
TOP SECRET

TOP SEGRET
14-00000
(Reported
FGY
28 February (5)
torte
Depart
A lone
23
the FBI
194)
784.
i
TOP SECRET
14-00000
20 March 1964 (Re-
ported to the PBI
པ°
Harch Y-61)
rood to
ed to
19 Jun
. F
237
portel te
on 14 A
785.
TOP SECRET
}
14-00000
101
(puported to the FB:
on 5 May 1964)
ported
ted
ARI OP
786.
Two comanieithus have been established by the CPSU
for the purposes: (a) to determine why KCU em-
ployees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO
defected while serving abroad; and (b) to attempt
to eliminate "weak" KGB employees and improve the
efficiency of the KGB.
(nt Repo
29 Jaly 1
An investigating commission of the CPSU Central
Committen checking into the circumstances sur-
rounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been
responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15
These in-
Second Chief Directorate employees.
clude GRIPANOV, who was also expelled from the
CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant
general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small
This
pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen.
drastic action was taken sinde the primary re-
sponsibility for the defection was placed on
GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to
being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at
TOP SECRET
14-00000
787.
the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a por-
sonal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less
treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many
steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB.
It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware
of NOSENKO's plans to defect.
Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled
from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General
BANNIK Of the 11 other Second Chief Direc-
torate employees expelled, some were found to
have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some
of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO
details of operationg in which they were working.
S.M. GOLUBEV,
KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be
leaving for Moscow because the investigating com-
mission had determined that GUK, a mutual frien
of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV
had been assigned to the Washington Legal Resi-
dency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO
in KGB Headquarters sometime in the past, but
subsequently NOSENKO and GOLULEV were given dif-
ferent assignments within the KGB and thereafter
did not associate with one another in the course
of their daily activities.
See Pages 327-336 in which NOSENKO's description of his relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed.
*** NOSENKƆ identified GOLUBEV by name and photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer,
NOSENKO said that he first
who had served in New York City under United Nations cover 
in 1960 and 1961.
Because 
GOLUBEV 
had at one point been assigned
met GOLUBEV in 1959 and knew nothing of his earlier career.
to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament. Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Foreign
NOSENKO said he last saw 
GOLUBEV
Ministry personnel in the delegation before his own assignment 
to Geneva.
in KGB Headquarters in 1963. At that time GOLUBEV was assigned 
to the 
New York Direction of the Counter-
intelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate
, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this
Department as long as he had known him.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
14-00000
788.
(Reported to on by
FBI on 29 January 1965)
(Reported to CIA by
the FBI on 8 Feb-
ary 1965)
自由
It is common knowledge among KGB employees that
GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and
is now on pension, partial rather than full, as
When NOSENKO
a result of the NOSENKO defection.
was being considered for assignment to Geneva
(in 1964), a summary statement of his activities
was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and
sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained con-
siderable "compromising information" concerning
NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have
removed him from consideration for this trip.
GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line
through all of it, and added the notation: "Send
him to Geneva. The general feeling is that
GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's
deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time
friendship with NOSENKO's father.
"
In
GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, ex-
pelled from the CPSU, and is presently living
on a small pension. His dismissal occurred
immediately after NOSENKO's defection.**
addition, not less than 50 other people were dis-
missed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV.
Most of these were from the First and Second Chief
Directorates, with the majority from the Second
Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of
the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General
BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved
by the Central Committee of the CPSU.
One of
his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.
NOSENKO said that his father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted.
GRIBANOV was reportedly in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently
as late autumn of 1964. At that time he turned his contact over to another KGB officer.
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Early June 1965 (Re-
ported to CI by the
PHI on 29 June 1965)
by
Disye
ber 1965
***
10 Septim-
789.
Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary
Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having
replaced GRIPANOV who was expelled from the KGB
because he supported NOSENKO in his career.*
GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside
Hoscow as the chief of security at an import-
ant military plant and is now a "nothing."
After the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted
an extensive investigation to determine which
employees knew him and the nature of their rela-
nship. During this TAPABRIN was questioned;
la said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and
only because of limited contacts within the KGB.
The investication determined, however, that
TAKABPIN and GRBANOV were friends socially and
that TARABRIN attended several parties at which
NOSENKO was present Girls invited by NOSENKO
described one such
were also there
party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hear-
ing and was accused on willfully concealing
As a result he was expelled
vital information.
from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of
all pension rights.***
and
NOSENRO said that it was PANNIRO who authorized his 1964 trip to Geneva, during which he defected,
Never-
that to the best of his knowledge, GRIRANOV did not know that 
he (NOSENKO) was making this trip.
theless, NOSENKO said that he thought that 
GRIBANOV might be fired from the KC3 as a result of 
his defection
NOSENKO sad that BANNIKOV would not be punished because
because he was responsible for pushing me ahead."
he had done nothing other than support him as a candidate for the 1964 Geneva assignment (see Pages 333-334).
NOSENKO reported that TARABAIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, at which time he be-
came Deputy Chief or "ervice No. 2," the reorganized 
Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief
Directorate.
on each occasion TARABRIN was present.
NOSE:KO said he saw GRIBANOV thred times socially during his KGB career;
NOSENKO reported that he provided gizis for CRIBANOV and 
TARABRIN at 
parties in 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961.
He could not recall any details of the 
1962 party (e.g., who the girls were, where they went, what they did,
etc.). He was, however, able to describe the 1963 
party, which took place in October or November,
siderable Cctail
in con-
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According to and m
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the sign
up to NESCO's confientation with
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ury the Soviet
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NOMINKO -
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Os agreat to meet the
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-
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the vets were then notified,
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of the same day.
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a.
(2)
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797.
b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY
(i)
Introduction
and NOSENKO agree on only one aspect of the
PENKOVSKIY compromise (see Part VIII.B. 6. b.): They both
attribute the initial compromise to KGD surveillance. Al-
though
report agrees with NOSENKO that
the KGB learned of American participation in the operation
only after PENKOVSKIY was arrested, subsequent reports
contradict this by tying the compromise directly to surveil–
lance of U.S. Embassy personnel visiting the Pushkin Street
dead drop site. 16 ma story of the events stemming from
the compromise of the dead drop site is at odds both with
the facts of the case and with all other reporting by
Soviet sources of CIA and the FBI.
(ii) Discussion
report on
1962--the month
after the KGB terminated the operation--indicated that the
KGB had been aware of PENKOVSKIY's involvement with Ameri-
cans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about
two and one half months prior to the arrests. This state-
ment is inaccurate concerning JACOB, who was a last-minute
substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop
on 2 November 1962 and who never before had personally par-
ticipated in the operation. A statements otherwise
agree with NOSENKO's subsequent report and the "official
report" regarding KGB ignorance of the role of American
Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY case.
We report on the case, however, is contra-
dictory to his first report and to the other sources: He
'said in
1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy tar-
gets detected a visit to the Pushkin Street site by an
American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the
site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon
he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evi-
dence besides the statements by
that PENKOVSKIY ever
went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by CIA
personnel.
In 4 1963 reported at greater length about
the role of Pushkin Street in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At
this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkin
Street not once but twice; surveillance had observed him on
both occasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed
him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who
entered the building reported that the American appeared to
be tving his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself,
▶ continued, the fact that it was the second visit to
the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion,
and as a result the KGB installed a closed circuit TV camera
to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PENKOVSKIY was ob-
served checking it (see preceding paragraph): an American
was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit
(radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a
radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the
dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the
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material in a concealment area in his desk; the EGD also
continued in serveillance of the dead drop site, observed
PENKOVSKIY lend the crop, and seed an American
(JACOB) who came to unload it. FENHOTSHIY was then confroated
with photographic evidence of the loadings and unloadings and
could offer no defense. This report as the caly indication
from a Soviet source that the KGB had surveilled the two
visits to the Peshkin Street site made by U.S. Embass} of-
ficers: while a report stated that one American
visited the site twice. in fact two different Americans
visited the site once each, MAHONEY on 21 January 1961 and
ABIDIAN on 30 December 1961.
(iii)
:
(iv)
Remarks
The Pushkin Street dead drop was never used for communi-
cation to PENKOVSKIY. and in fact was loaded only once, Then
the KGP did so and activated it on 2 November 1962, thereby
apprehending JACOB. Horcover, the first visit to Pushkin
Street, in January 1961, predated any personal contact bet-
ween PENKOVSKIY and Western Intelligence, either American or
British. Thus,
report on Americans visiting there
is only partially curate, and the use of these "surveilled"
visits as an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY
is unsupportable. In reporting incorrectly on this matter,
☐ could have erred merely because his sub-sources (one
unnamed, the other apparently despite the conflict in
reporting about his position) repeated erroneous informa-
tion in his presence.
nevertheless is the only starce to reveal that the
KGB was aware of the Pankin Street dead drop is early as
21 January 1961, when MAHONEY went to the site. there-
fore has detracted from the bona fides of NOSENT by showing
KG3 awareness of a Cth officer having gone to the dead drop
site 11 months before LIDIAN's visit there, and even before
PENKOVSKIY finally succeed in establishing personal contact
with Western intelligence services. It was the ABIDIAN visit,
NOSENKO said, which first aroused KGB interest in the site at
Pushkin Street.
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D.
1.
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809.
Introductior.
While in general terma corroborating NOSENKO's claims to
service in both the GRU and the KGB, has supplied some
details which are incompatible with the statements by NOSERKO on
his intelligence career. Although not as prolific a reporter on
has had several topics in
NOSEIKO as
common with NOSENKO: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, CHEREPANCY, SHUBIN,
SLESINGER, and the contacts between the GRU officer BOLSHAKOV and
Attorney General Pobert KENNEDY in 1962. When compared with
NOSENKO's information, the reports by.
on the case of POPOV,
PERKOVSKIY, and QHEREPANOV are interlocking:
and NOSENKO agree that POPOV was compromised
after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958
and in consequence of KGB surveillance.
-
CHEREPANCV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV's
compromise.
concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that
CHEREPANOV was a genuine source of American Intelligence, and
this statement by
learned some of his
sand
details on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, and
NOSENKO 1:ave indicated that this compromise resulted from
KGB surveillance of PENKOVSKIY's British contacts in Moscow.
Presented below are
a review of the topics
2.
Statements on NOSENKO
is remarks about NOSENKO, followed by
common to these two sources.
When discussing NOSENKO for the first time,
said on
that they were not personally acquainted, but
that "various persons" in Moscow (whom he did not identify) had
spoken to him about NOSENKO. The statements by
☐ and NOSENKO
on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:
As a young man, NOSENKO attended
the GRU's Military-Diplomatic
Academy (NDA) and then was in
the GRU Information Department--
in all, perhaps a year of service
in the GRU.*
NOSENKO
NOSENKO said his entire ser-
vice in the GRU, in the years
1950-1953, consisted of duty
in the Naval GRU, first in
the Far East and then in the
Baltic.**
Until the late 1950's, the course at the MDA, the strategic
Sintelligence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more
recently, the course has been of three years' duration.
**During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was
separate from the rest of the GRU.
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810.
:
A "very undisciplined person“
while in the GRU and "not very
good," NOSENKO was to have been
discharged from the GRU.
"
NOSENKO's father, "a very in-
fluential person in the Ministry
of Shipbuilding,' was able to
get NOSIKO transferred to the
KGB.
NOSENKO was "an important boss"
in the KGB (directorate or
department unkno:m).
NOSENKO
NOSENKO's statements about him-
self during the 1950-1953 period
appear to agree with the evalu-
ation, but he has said nothing
about facing discharge by the
Naval GRU.
His transfer from the Naval GRU
to the KGB in 1953, NOSEIKO
said, was at the initiative of
KGR General KOBULOY, a friend
of his father; the elder NOSENKO
was Minister of Shipbuilding.
According to NUSENKO, his most
recent KG3 title prior to de-
fecting was Deputy Chief,
Tourist Department, KG3 Second
Chief Directorate.
stated that NOSENKO gave 'very, very good information"
to the United States, having had "great access" to KGB information
which included "all means of KGP coverage of people in Moscow,
The U.S. Embassy,
microphone systems in the embassies, etc.
Continued, had found microphones on the basis of information
that NOSENKO had provided.
3.
Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting
The CHEREPANOV Case
"
8.
(i)
Summary
One of the two ways in which
has corroborated NOSENKO
on the authenticity of CHEREPANOV as a cenuine source of American.
Intelliger.ce was to cite information he had learned from
CHEREPANCY had formerly served in
the KGB; CHEREPANOV cave some papers to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,
which returned them to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA); the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced
them by analysis to CHEREPANOV; meanwhile, CHEREFANOV had tried
to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkish border and
executed. In every major respect, therefore A agrees with
NOSERIKO's version of the case. When asked whether the CHEREPANOV
incident might have been "a trick" by the KGB to embarrass the
U.S. Embassy,
replied that it was definitely not.
The second way in which
was a genuine source is indirect.
CHEREPANOV documents,
had
of a U.S. Embassy officer trought
(ii) Remarks
has certified that CHEREPANOV
Like NOSEKO and one of the
indicated that KGB surveillance
about the compromise of POFOV.
As stated in Part VIII.B.6., the CHEREPANOV incident was a
KGB provocation against the U.S. Embassy, but it is conceivable
that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made
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811.
agreement with
both CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO on the cause of POPOV's compromise,
however, appears to be based on
direct involvement, and
does not appear to be attributable to sub-sources having provided
him with erroneous information; this is discussed further below.
b.
The Compromise of PEKOVSKIY
5 dates on the compromise of PE:KOVSKIY are at vari-
ence with NOSENKO's and they disagree on whether the KGB knew
American Intelligence to be involved in this operation before
JACOB of CIA was apprehended at the Pushkin Street dead drop on
2 November 1962. Both sources stated, however, that surveillance
led to the detection of PENKOVSKIY, although again they differ on
the person with whom PEROVSKIY was first seen by the KGB;
said this individual was the British businessman WYNE, while NOS-
ENKO said it was the Englishwoman Mrs. CHISHOLM.
According to PEROVSKIY had been working openly
with WYNNE, explaining that he was trying to develop WYNNE, and
the KGB learned of their meetings through surveillance. * CIA
records show that WYNNE Let PENKOVSKIY in Moscow during April-
May 1961, May-June 1961, August 1961, and June-July 1962.
report that PERKOVSKIY came under suspicion in May 1967
therefore is not consistent with his statement about KGB surveil-
lance of the WYNNE-PENKOVSKIY meetings, nor does this report co-
incide with. the evidence from WYNNE himself that the KGB was
sufficiently suspicious of their meetings to record a converse-
tigr they had had
1951 (one year earlier than in the
NOSENKO dated the PENKOVSKIY compromise at a
month or two after he was first seen, but at the time not iden-
tified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in November or December
1961.
version).
Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participa-
tion of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY operation until
JACOB was detained, reported that while PENKOVSKIY was
at a reception in Moscow, he was observed making contact with an
American in a lavatory.
did not date this event, but
Padded
CIA records show that it was on 27 August 1962.
that the KGB "invented" the incident at Pushkin Street on 2 Nov-
ember 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to
catch the American unloading the dead drop. **
PENKOVSKIY was not personally known to him,
stated.
named.
no other sub-sources were
* The same statement was made by NOSENKO and in the official
KGB document on PENKOVSKIY's compromise.
**This is obviously true, although the date of PENKOVSKIY's
arrest may have been more than a month before.
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812.
C.
(1)
The Compromise of POPOV
Introduction
Of all the sources available to American Intelligence,
is the best placed to report on the compromise of POPOV:
information rees with that provided by NOSENKO and
CHEREFANOV, as well as that in the 16 September 1959 message from
POPOV to CIA (believed to have been dictated by the KGB). These
four sources have indicated that the compromise resulted from KG3
surveillance of a U.S. Fabessy official following the recall of
PCPOV in November 1958. however, has not precisely dated
the incident (dated by inference by the others at 21 January 1959),
has associated it with an American Intelligence dead drop for POPOV
(whereas the others have said it was CIA's mailing of a letter to
PCPOV), and has not the CIA officer involved (George WINTERS):]
The evidence from like that from NOSENKO, CHEREPANCY, and
the POFOV message, conflicts with that from COLITSYN whose state-
ments on the compromise of POPOV are supported by analysis of events.
in 1957 and 1958 on which FOPOV reported (se: Pages 663-665).
(ii) Details
reported
on the POPOV com-
POPOV's correspondence with his Austrian girlfriend
appears to have been the prelude to the POPOV compromise;
PCFCV, said had made a "very serious mistake" by using an
accommodation address supplied by American Intelligence to receive
mail from a girlfriend in Austria.** "In sore fashion" this came
to the attention of the Austrian police,
and
it was determined that she had been sending mail to a Soviet offi-
cer in Berlin. The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and
eventually FOFOV was confronted by the chief of his GRU component
in Berlin. 出賣出 GRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled
in
reference to POPOV's compromise
that POPOV made the mistake of providing in-
formation traceable to himself. No sub-source for this remark
was given KY
☐ and since then
'has not
resolved the discrepancy between this version and the other
one treated at length here.
** CIA did not supply POPOV with an accommodation address, but
he did secretly correspond with KOCHANEK.
went to the Austrian police on 25 August 1958 with
information that included the identification of POPOV as a
Soviet Intelligence officer. POPOV's superior confronted him
on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEK and received from him an
admission to having had some correspondence with her concern-
ing his search for operational leads: the superior told POPOV
that the Soviets believed "she was working for someone" and
that "possibly she is the cause" of the Berlin unit's opera-
tional difficulties. PCPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 Nov-
ember 1958 ostersibly, for a week's TDY to discuss the case
of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He
did not return to Berlin.
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813.
and when he was unable to do
so, the facts were turned over to the KGB for full-scale investiga-
it not been for POPOV's
tion. N
to Moscow to explain the situation,
correspondence with an Austrian woman, "they would never have
caught him," and that FOPOV was 
"arrested because of a 
connection
at 
the end of 1959 POPOV
with a girl;" also,
ME KGB
was recalled to Moscow "for something“
While the foregoing KGB investigation was in progit
routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Embassy official in
Moscow. This person was observed renting 
a boat in Gorkiy Park
,
going to the vicinity of a new bridge near 
the Moscow Stadium,
and there taking photographs of the bridge 
and surrounding 
area.
Its suspicions aroused, the KG3 
covered this area and observed'
He was arrested, 
doubled, and
POPOV unloading a dead drop.
"operated" against American Intelligence for a year and one-half.*
Eventually, the KGB put in motion a 
plan to attempt to compromise
The KGB photographed
the American official who was meeting POPOV
.
a meeting in a Moscow restaurant, then arrested the official and
showed him pictures of his meeting with POPOV 
and of FOPOV un-
After 
the American refused
loading the deed drop at the bridge.
to work for the KGB, he was released and declared persona non
grata.
CIA questioned ch
on POPOV's
He said at this time that he had heard POPOV was
compromise.
PCPOV "apparently was under
apprehended through a dead drop.
and when they (presumably the GRU)
suspicion there in Berlin,
recalled him to Moscow, they wondered who his future contacts
would be, and they were told the following: 'KGB 
workers 
place
They 
observed 
an
American Imbassy employees under surveillance
.
American at the staircase... and they found a dead drop under the
staircase. So they established coverage 
of the dead drop and ob-
They made a report
, and
served POPOV come and unload the drop.
Then he was called in
after this POPOV was under surveillance...
and told thus-and-so. They showed him photographs.
They told
He
him he was going to work for them to expose his contacts.
agreed to it...
Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE
was arrested the following October, he could not have 
been
doubled against CIA for more than eleven months
.
** Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush
contacts in Moscow with the CIA officer 
Russell LANGELLE of
the U.S. Embassy, culminating in the detention and interview
of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October 1959.
***As previously stated, no Moscow dead drops were used by CIA
in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did survey 
the possi-
bilities for dead drops to be used in other operations
. 
One
of these was located in Lenin Hills, an area 
of Moscow not
far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium, and it was
situated beneath a staircase;
LANGELLE visited the area of the dead
drop site on 24 28 May 1959, but the dead drop was loaded
by a CIA legal travel agent (on 7 
June 1958) rather than by
LANGELLE. The CHEREPANOV document, discussed 
on Pages 563-
564, stated, in the course of reviewing LANGELLE's operation-
al activities in Moscow, that this dead drop 
was for use with
an agent named REPNIKOV; in fact, 
it was not intended for
the REPNIKOV case.
:
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814.
(111) Sun-sourcing by
In
that he had learned these
details about in coronise of POPOV from a conversation
'who conducted some of the in-
Vent luation of POPOV because at the time he was a
• FZ 15
The same sub-source was cited by
information te supplied CIA in
(iv) Remarks
gave
Preported, inaccurately, that American Intelligence
an accommodation address in Berlin, that a dead drop
was used in the Moscow phase of the operation, and that the KGB
doubled POPOV for a year and one-half before terminating the case.
Each of these incorrect items came to
since
participated in the investigation of
PCFOV, presumably would have recognized them to be untrue.
explanation for the inaccuracies might be that
precisely what he had been told, but
One
caliberately mis-
informed him. There is, however, no evident reason why ra
would have done this. Another explanation might be that☑
misunderstood his sub-source, or in relaying the information to
A
garbled
the details. This would mean that
was less than fully
attentive to details on a personal acquaintance who had gained
notoriety, details which he was told at a time when he was in a
position comparable to POPOV's in contact with
gence.
Intelli-
None of these explanations seems
entirely satisfactory, and the answer may lie elsewhere.
has been inconsistent about the degree of suspicion
surrounding POPOV when he was recalled to Morov in November 1958
in connection with his correspondence with
On one hand,
in 1962
Undicated that the KGF surveyance of the U.S.
Embassy officer was coincidental with the separate investigation
of POPOV's relationship with this Austrian woman. C: the other
hand, in
'implied that as a result of the suspicion
of POPOV in Berlin, there was interest in POFOV's future contacts
ir. Moscow, an interest which would be covered by the KGB's sur-
veillance of U.S. Embassy employees.
*However, in another version
said that as soon as the
Illegals reported their compromise in January 1958, POPOV
immediately fell under suspicion. The conflict between
statements has not been resolved.
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d.
SHUTIN, PLESINGER, and BOLSHAKCY
In three instance 1964 NOSEIKO confirmed reports made by
the identification of SHUEIN as a GRU agent, the
Soviets' suspicions that SLESINGER was in contact with the FBI, and
the status of FOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.*
SHUBIN was previously known to have been associated with two
GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1940's, but indepen-
dent of NOSENKO and
there is no verification of his having
more recently been an agent of the GRU.
FSI.
POLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of
source,
and NOSENKO, has not been named as a GRU officer by any other
nor has he been observed in ratings with GRU agents. Both
and NOSENKO spoke of BOLSHAW's having inet Attorney
NOSENKO added that, in initiating
General Robert KENNEDY 1n 1962.
the contact, the Attorney General knew HOLSHAHOV to be a "military
intelligence officer," but this report has not been corroborated.**
4. Comments on Y
confirmation that NOSENKO is a genuine KGB officer-
defector is comprised of hearsay evidence. and hence the conclusion
that NO ENKO was dispatched by the KGS would not necessarily bring
bona fides into question: much would depend upon
sub-sources, as yet unidentified.
and NOSENKO are mutually supporting on the compromise
and both
of POPOV, a man
have authenticated
the validity of a CHERE-
PANOV document which concerned the POPOV compromise and which was
In
prepared by the KGB for transmittal to American Intelligence.
addition,
and NOSENKO support one another about the PENKOV-
about the contact between BOLSHAKOV
and Robert KENNEDY, and about SHUBIN and
Their information on. BOLSHAKOV and SHUBIN is unique; on SLESINGER
it is corroborated by actions taken by the KGB, as reported by
SLESINGER; on POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV it is confirmed
by KGB controlled sources.
SKIY compromise,
With the exception of his details on PCFOV,
report-
ing on NOSENKO and on common topics can be explained, individually,
by misinformation received and innocently passed along.
These items taken together, however, in the light state-
with GOBITSYN's
ments on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict
reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that
is controlled by the KGB.
**If Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to be a GRU officer,
the question remains as to how NOSEIKO was aware of the fact,
since
) was the only source to have made this identifica-
tion before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met.
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sensitive source
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:
:
Tur SCOMET
820
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821.
F.
1. Introduction
counterintelligence production has been ex-
tremely limited. For the most part she has provided only super-
ficial reports, generally only in response to questioning and
frequently citing her own lack of access to information of value.
Her professed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of,
certain situations on which NOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably
false is therefore noteworthy in the context of her total perform-
He's reporting on NOSENKO, despite vagueness
ance.
and contradictions, has the net effect of supporting his bona
fides and affirming the importance of the information he has re-
ported. Her accounts of the CHEREPANOV caso emphasized the depth
of his treason and the retribution of the KGD--themes watch
dominate the NOSENKO account
Her reports on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, while differing
markedly from NOSENKO's in basis, scope, and detail, confirmed
almost to the month NOSENKO's dating of the compromise. Her
confessed participation as an agent of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate, despite her repeated claims to know nothing of im-
portance concerning its operations, has placed her in NOSEIKO'S
milieu, and the KGB officers who figured in her reporting are
(with two exceptions) personalities who have previously been
identified as KGB officers only by NOSENKO.
2.
NOSENKO's Background and Career
has claimed no first-hand or authoritative
knowledge of NOSENKO, reporting at various times that she had
heard gossip, had heard about him from her KGB friend SVIRIN
(who she believed only "knew about" NOSE:KO, i.e. did not know
him personally), or had heard about him from "someone from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN." She has reported frag-
ments on NOSENKO's background: his father's position, his mother's
ethnic background, and NOSENKO's non-KGB status. She initially
said that NOSENKO's Eather was a general, later said she was not
sure of that, and still later amended her description to "general
or minister, adding that he was Ukrainian thus approaching
an accurate statement only after several conversations about
him. Her consistent statement that NOSENKO's mother was Jewish
and involved in black market activities has not been elsewhere
reported, and her statement that NOSENKO was a civilian, rather
than a KGB officer, contradicts his own account and that of
other sources who have confirmed his KGB status.
sourcing of her limited information on NOSENKO to her KGE friend
SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to
some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by
NOSENKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American
Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and before
that of the Third Department of the Directorate of the KGB
Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received
an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKIY.)
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3. NOSENKO's Knowledge
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822.
Damage to the X63
-
has mentioned NCSERKO's disclosures to the
Americans concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy her
only reference to information he might have provided - on each
occasion when she has discussed NOSENKO. She once attributed to
SVIRIN the remark in. October 1966 that NOSENKO had done consider-
able harm to the Soviet Union by revealing this information, thus
(and specifically only in this context) underscoring the importance
of NOSENKO's information. (NOSENKO himself has characterized this
information as the most important he has provided.) The context
in which she has discussed NOSEIKO has been the general one of
defectors from the Soviet Union: she has repeatedly emphasized
that the Soviets attempt to convince all Scriet citizens that
"anybody who defects will find his crave by the hand of KGB
"people"
with reference to NOSENKO, she
ONCE quoted SVIRIN as ving said that NCSENKO, too, would one
day be exterminated, thus clearly implying that NOSENKO was a
genuine defector.
4.
Parallels with NCSE:KC's Reporting
a. The CHEREPANOV Case
✓s account of CHEREPANOV's disaffection, treason,
arrest, and execution confirms in general cutline and in emphasis
that of NOSENKO.
claims direct knowledge of the
case through her own and
Isband's personal friendship with
CHEREPANOV and his wife.
described her husband, in
fact, as the only friend of CHEPPANOV who remained faithful
enough after CHEREPANC's downfall to call on CHEREPANOV's widow,
whose address
knew. This direct knowledge is com-
parable to that of NOSENKO and
She introduced her account of the CHEREFANGV case, as in her
discussions of NOSENKO, by references to the determination ar¿
effectiveness of the KGB in apprehending and executing those who
were "running away"; she offered CHEFEPANCY as an example' of a
Soviet traitor who had been caught and executed. Her account of
the details, however, differs sharply from that of NOSENKO (and
others). Her identification of CHEPEPANOV as a classmate of ter
husband at the GRU's Military Diplomatic Academy (MOA) from 1956
to 1959 is unique among the sources who have reported on CHERE-
PANOV. For the period during which
said CHEREPANOV
attended the MDA, NOSENKO has made no specific statements con-
cerning QHEREPANOV's career; he has said only that at some un-
specified date after CHEREPANOV's return from Belgrade (elsewhere
reported as mid-1956) and before early 1960 CHEREPANOV had been
assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section. American Department, KG3
Second Chief Directorate.
We also stated, however,
that after his graduation from the MDA in 1959, CHEREPANOV
"finally" obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, sug-
gesting that he had no intervening assignment. Where NOSENKO
has failed to establish a clear motive for CHEREPANOV's having
collected KGB documents during his assignment to the U.SI F-bassy
Section for later transmittal to the Americans,
has
described his increasing bitterness from the date of his entering
the MDA in 195ć. She was not sure that he had been a KGB officer;
she neither mentioned nor did her account allow for his assign-
ment to the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960-196! (as stated by
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:
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823.
by NOSENKO); and she described the documents which he turned over
to the Americans as having come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
She stated, therefore, rather than demonstrated, the point that
"these were such important documents, important enough that...he
was shot.”
During her second account of the GIEREPANOV affairs
EX sourced her information differently and added first-hand
details which she had previously disclaimed having. She said that
"In two days this man was arrested... In two months he was shot."
This is also at variance with NOSEKO's account of a KGB investiga-
tion of up to 20 or 25 days, followed by the KGB officer's visit
to CHEREPANOV on 8 December 1963, GHEREPANOV's flight, and a sever.-
day search for him before his arrest.
b.
The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY
Her
Closely conforming in this sreet to NOSENKO's account of
PENKOVSKIY's compromise,
placed the date of initial
suspicion of PENKOVSKIY at about October or November 1961.
statements of the basis for this suspicion, however, differ com-
pletely from the reasons advanced by NOSENKO (and other sources).
Her account is vague, in consonance with her claimed lack of any
first-hand contemporary knowledge of the investigation leading to
his arrest, and is colored by her expressed personal dislike for
PENKOVSKIY the man and by the professional misfortunes of her hus-)
band which resulted from PENKOVSKIY's arrest.
cited
her KGB friend SVIRIN as the source of some of her information,
as the source of the indirect warning to her husband to stay away
from FENKOVSKIY, and as someone who knew about PENKOVSKIY's trial
and had beer. somehow associated with the investigation
confirming NOSENKO on SVIPIN's participation in the PENKOVSKIY
investigation.
c. Reports or. KGS Personnel
-
thus
Thas named relatively few KGB officers who have
figured in her career as a KGB agent or about whom she could re-
port any substance. Of her KGB handlers:
-
CIA has been unable to identify one, Gennadiy Fedor-
ovich, whose last name she did not know, her handler while
she worked at the Embassy of Nepal in 1964. NOSENKO has not
referred to operations against this Embassy.
-
Two KGB handlers were assigned to
Leningrad
in
V. I. DEMIDOV and Georgiy PCHELIN. Both of these
officers had previously been identified by NOSENKO as officers
of the Leningrad KG3 and have not been identified by any
other source. They were two of the total of four Leningrad
KCB officers named by NOSENKO.
Her KGB handler while she was employed by a Canadian
correspondent in Moscow was Vladimir Ivanovich KCSTYRYA.
Only NOSENKO has identified KCSTYRYA as the KGB officer who
had been in the United States under the rame Vladimir
Viktorovich VLADIMIROV; NOSENKO considered this, as he said
in 1965, his most important intification among KGB per-
sonnel.
RUSTIRTA WAS in the U.S. under Inturist cover:
relationship with him was not related to her earlier inturist
work, however, but her connection with a foreign corres-
pondent, which was KOSTYRYA's responsibility after his re-
turn to Moscow.
1
1
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824.
has
of the four other KGB officers on whom
reported in any depth, three were previously identified by NOSENKO
and only ly NOSENKO:
V.G. SVIRIN, her KGB friend, is ubiquitous figure
in much of her reporting on other subjects and in her account
of her personal life, as well as her primary candidate for a
Western recruitment approach. SVIRIN had previously been
identified by NOSENKƆ as a KGB officer of the American De-
partment, Second Chief Directorate, previously involved in
the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments
-
has confirmed).
In connection with SVIRIN,
recounted an
incident in which a KGB officer whom she described in deroça-
tory terms, Valentin MJZEYNIK, had narrowly escaped dismissal
as a result of a drunken brawl with a militiaman. MUZEYNIK
had not only survived, however, but continued to bear a
higher NGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and sub-
ordinate, SVIRIN. NOSEIKO said MUZEYNIK was an officer of
the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.
-
Vadim BIRYUKOV was identified by,
KGB officer under Novesti cover assigned to
interview in August 1966 of
as the
Sort on the
NOSENKO had previously given information concerning BIKYUKOV,
a KGB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief
Directorate, targetted against foreign correspondents.
5.
Remarks
There is confusion in
s sub-sourcing for her
information on NOSENKO and inconsistency in her statements that.
on one hand, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of
microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she
was briefed by the KGB to report to American Intelligence on N05-
ΕΙΚΟ
as inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however,
has personally supported the bona fides of NOSENKC
by offering direct confirmation of the bona fides of CHEREPANOV,
by corroborating NOSENKO's details on the PENKOVSKIY compromise,
and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Director-
ate personalities.
Note: Aside from her support of NOSENKO and CHEREFANOV,
there are many aspects of the
case which in-
dependently led CIA and other western services to conclude
that she is a KGB-dispatched agent. Some of these aspects
are as follows:
The circumstances of her claimed relationship with
the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.
description of her husband's recall
from Stockholm ad his punishment for having previously
worked as a GRU colleague of PENKOVSKIY in the GKNNR fit
neither the treatment of other GRU officers whom PENKOV-
SKIY also identific nor the logic of the situation: Her
husband was sent to Stockholm after PENKOVSKIY was un-
covered and even after he was arrested. (That the brief
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825.
assignment in Stockholm may have iner, a KGB-organized pre-
lude to the defection of
is also suggested by
the fact that the one operational contact her husband is
known to have had there was a Western double agent, and
was able to provide identifying data on this
agent.)
-
Nearly all of wha
's identifications o
Soviet Intelligence personalities were previously known.
-
She has given conflicting accounts of her motivation
for defecting, of her relationship with her husband, and of
her associations with KGB personnel.
-
Against the background of the claimed difficulties
in which she and her husband found themselves, it seems un-
likely that
jay would have been permitted to leave
the USSR.
There are oddities in her relationship with the
Canadian correspondent who employed her in the USSR and who
was her alleged KGB target, as well as in her conduct in
the West and in her husband's situation and behavior since
the defection.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
G.
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Qual st
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the
it is no
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MINIKI
not acentify our int pietret lens of the U
sidering the conclusion
assumption can it made that
...
the bora
the JOHNSON-PIENPA operation.
the circumstances that * operation
ise because of vari
cult handling colt
JOHNSON had not
lead was recei
MAINING
lugince source,
Into Soviet
NOBANKO's identi-
Vi! 2, ho,
complex--he did
warnment, Con-
NOSENKO, the
feasible to sacrifice
the peanche may have lain in
יי.
The vet of NOCLE
Recruited Zidane invotted open
promised, who were insetite,
to classified information,
vie
the
threat of CompLO-
posed diffi-
ment at ss, and
A before the NOSENKO
able leads to
had not previously com-
already lost their access
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SP SE 827
sensitive sources
TOP SECR
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TOP SECRET
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204
.ri.
acti
• and
dine operation
mainly fro
involved with th
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particularly;
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crate wEL:
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at provided lenin
TOP SECRET
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and agent
Inte.
sources
With RGH
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BULETINSKI was
14-00000
TOP SECRET
831.
Other techniques on which various sources have confirmed one
another include the following:
ported
that the surveillance equipment used by the
KGB Surveilance Directorate includes special paint invisible
to the naked eye co visible through use of a special device
closed circuit
It 13 used in conjunction with her opters
A similar technique
television at Fridges E
was described by CLINIAWSKI
NOSENKO
and HEPANOV paper have cos-
to dogs Eut
in uvedliance
crined a special mical Compound sensitive
to humans N
which a
that maurophones and
automobiles in the
1.0
transmitters 49 nitaried in Ameri
Soviet Union. by punnel of the KSh Surved chance Directorate
COLENIENEN
provided many dis
developed a trem
this technique
KGB had
Esang paput-thin parties so snaped
34it.
a man S
blat pads of
They
that they can fit in the
rex.us. Thus
also car. Le concealed in the covers ui
concealed. they are used in Moscow by the RE to listen to
conversations between foreign dipanas particularly at the
Hotel Metropol and the hotel National
devices nave
NOSENKO
inter alia
3130
generated by
Sun miniaturized
012211EWEKI COLITSYN
aire (HEREPANOV papers.
W papers gave the KGB
cryptonym as 'NARSIPA,
-
HOSENKO and
of switining telephiuro
18. ported the KCB technique
natendea for the US. Embassy
ܕ:
in Moscow to a KB installation where they are intercepted
by a Soviet posing as an American
Where the bulk of NOSEIKO s reporting on KGB operations was
concerned with those ɔ: the Second Chief Directorate. this res
been true with
and
TWO
named here.
howeve: have also
given details on specia 202 inistral counter intelligence activi-
ties in addition to their statements on the compremise of CIA
and CHERE-
assets within the UFSk la topic of reporting by
and
PANTY as well). The information from
is summerized malow
ACD Second
ar. Moscow in
has able to provide details t
Chief Directorate activity. He reported the FGD's discovery of
an American employsa at the Sokolniki Exhibition
* The existence and feasibility of such a substance has not been
verified.
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232.
(This
clandestine contact with an unidentifie Soviet female.
contact is not identified with any CIA oporation 
at the 
Exhibition:
in 1959.) He spoke of the KGB's knowlege 
of an American Intelli-
a pnch in the area of the 
Agricultural
gence deadarop under
Exhibition, He said that the KCS controlled
tacts in Moscow, including one with an old mar
ENKÛ reported on an individual who may re identical with this
agent).
which NOSENKO and others have
operations against foreigner
S. agent con-
in his 60's (NCS-
cloned to have filled functions
described as standard procedure in
and Soviets in the Soviet Union.
said she was a Second Chief Directorate agent
targetted acainst the Nepalese Ribassy in Moser and later against
the Canadian corn spurdent who employed
C.
Remarks
12
wis only attor
the defections of
As previously indicated
the genuine source: GOLITSYN ani ( 1211EHbH in 1961 that American
Intelligence began to inette voluminous and mutually corroborative
information from others on the activities of the KGB Second 
Chief
The
and Surveillance Directorates.
timing of this information
therefore appears to to significant in addition to the overlap of
The fat that
specific details
including
torate information may
phasize or sacrifice it.
elect
even
ty of these sources,
proderi becond Chief Direc
ntralized decision to em-
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TOP SECRET
833
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834
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sensitive source(s)
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H.
Evaluation
835.
The conclusion that NOSENKO is on a KGBssion could carry
damaging implications for the American Intelligence sources who
have supported his bone fides. Unless their statements or NOSENKO
can be convincingly explained as innocent repetition of misinfor-
mation spread by the FGB within the Soviet services, these sources
might be concluded to have been deliberately misleading either as
promɔtors of their own persona! interests or as parties to a KGB
conspiracy.
Regarding GOLITSYN. the opinion of CIA is that he purpose-
fully gave false support for HOSENKO in an attempt to make his
opinions more authoritative. This is not a satisfactory explana-
tion for the remarks on NOCENKO by
however, there seem to be no personal
es which their
support of NOSENKO's bona fides might have served. The choice
thus seems to lie between these three officers being genuine
sources of American intelligence but unwithing channels of KGB
misinformation and, on the other rand, one or more of them being
in league with the KGB.
The possibility that
are under
KGB control was tested further in the context of the NOSENKO opera-
tion by reviewing parallels in their reporting and his. and general
correlations that appear from one case to another. At the same
time. the NOSENKO -
connections were shown for compar-
ative purposes. Here Touming was found that would eliminate
from consideration as possibly being
KGE provocation agents.
This examination against the conclusion that NOSENKC is
under KGB control, has brought the bona fides of
into serious question. LE NOSENKO 15 a dispatched
agent o: the KGB, these ctner soces se also to be.
TOP SEC