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ROON:
The Examination of the
Bona Fides of a KGB Defector
1 Document dated February 1968
-
CI
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REVIEWED BY
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-4-78
2-15---78
Kenneth Klein
Kennett Klein
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Ehnit &
Smith
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FLAIR 78
04-27-75
77 Apr. 75
My75
2 MAX 38
316 May 18
JOHANNA SMITH
J. Rott Blog
in
Smith.
Smitt
SURELL BRADY
G. ROBERT BLAKEY
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ana Sule
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14-00000
1
Top Secret
The Examination of the Bona Fides
of a KGB Defector
Top Secret
OLC Cy #1 of
cy #10
TS No. 197124
Copy No 10 e
14-00000
TOP SECRET
1. Attached is copy number 10 of the February 1968
CIA study entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of
a KGB Defector Yuriy I. Nosenko."
-
2. Please note that the CIA finds this study to be
inaccurate in many important details and to contain the
results of faulty judgements leading to unfounded conclusions.
3. We have deleted certain portions of this study
containing information which bears on the security of
ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.
4. We request return of this study when it has served
your purposes.
TOP SECRET
0001266
14-00000
The Examination of the Bona Fides
of a KGB Defector
Yuriy L. NOSENKO
February 1968
0001267
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
14-00000
Introduction
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
Summary of Case
I FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS
NOSENKO's Statements About Himself
Soviet Officials' Statements
The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing
Positive Intelligence Information
Counterintelligence Information
Significant KGB Operations Not
Directly Related to NOSENKO'S
Claimed Service
"The KGB Agent in Paris"
(Sgt. ROHNSON)
"SASHA" (Identity Unknown)
"The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty'
(William VASSALL)
The KGB Audio Attack on the West German
Embassy
"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)
Edward Ellis SMITH
11
11
20
HOLEN
21
N222
21
22
24
24
24
28
28
"
30
www w
31
33
37
II
EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
Notes for the Reader
41
41
III
PRE KGB BIOGRAPHIY
45
Birth to 1945
45
Moscow Institute of International Relations
(1945-ca. 1950)
48
Naval RU Service (Ca. 1951-ca. 1953)
Summary and Conclusion
49
58
:
0001268
(i)
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
14-00000
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
VI SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)
Operational Activities (1955-1958)
Entrapment of MALIA 06.
Recruitment of BURGI 06
(Cont.).
Attempted Recruitment of GEHRCKENS 06
Contact with LANE and BIRSE 06,06
Recruitment of SUNDAR 06
Travel to London (1957 and 1958)
Operational Activities (1958-1960)
Recruitment of HARRIS 06
Compromise of (KRAFT) 06
Recruitment of DREW 06
Recruitment of LUKIS 06
Recruitment of WILBY US
Recruitment of TAYLOR 06
Recruitment of MERTENS] 06
Compromise of BARRETT 06
Compromise of WILLERFORD CO
Recruitment of ERIPPEL 06
Lee Harvey OSWALD
Summary
Knowledge of other Seventh Department
American Tourist Operations
113
114
115
121
122
123
124
127
128
129
130
131
131
132
133
134
136
137
143
144
145
Seventh Department Counterintelligence
Operations (1955-1960)
146
NOSENKO's Information
146
Information Furnished KGB by George BLAKE
KGB Tourist Study
148
149
Summary and Conclusion
150
VII AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(January 1960-January 1962)
151
Deputy Chief of Section
151
Transfer to Section
152
Predecessor as Deputy Chief
153
Responsibilities
Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief
General Supervisory Duties
154
156
159
(iii).
Top Secret
...
0001263
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
15:BR
14-00000
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
VII AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(January 1960-January 1962) (Cont.)
Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications
Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy
Suspected CIA Officers
Unsuspected CIA Officers
236
240
241
244
Personal Handler of Agents
248
Temporary Assignments Abroad
251
Planned Travel to U.S.
Travel to Bulgaria (April-May 1961)
251
Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)
252
254
Compromise of LUNT OL
256
Promotion and Transfer to Seventh Department
(January 1962)
259
Summary and Conclusion
261
VIII
SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964)
263
Introductory Comment
263
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth
Section (January 1962-July 1962)
265
NOSENKO's Agents
265
Operational Activities
268
Entrapment of JOHNSON 106
268
Entrapment of JONES 06.
272
Recruitment of BIENSTOCK 06
273
Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962)
275
Purpose of Trip
275
Investigation of SHAKHOV
276
Visits to KGB Legal Residency
Association with Other Soviets
Security Escort for Delegation
KGB Officers within Soviet Delegation
Supervising Case Officer for BELITSKIY
Contact with CIA
Operational Activities (continued)
Attempted Recruitment of ⒷB RAUNS 06
Summary and Conclusion
278
279
279
280
282
286
288
288
290
I
(v)
Top Secret
0001270
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
5189
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964).
(Cont.)
KGB Operations
Deputy Chief of Seventh Department
(July 1962-January 1964)
Investigation of SLESINGER 06
291
292.
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY 06
292
293
Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN 06
GRU Agent SHUBIN 06
295
296
Arrest of BARGHOORN
298
Investigation of OSWALD
303
Residence in USSR
303
Request to Return to: USSR.
3:05
Post-Assassination Review of KGB File
307
The CHEREPANOV Papers
309
Contents
314
NOSENKO's Travel Document
315
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)
316.
Purpose of Trip
317
Visits to KGB Legal Residency
Availability for Meetings with CIA
NOSENKO's Written. Notes
318
318.
319
NOSENKO's Defection
320
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department
Operations
Operational Activities (July 1962-
325
January 1964)
326.
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among
American Tourists
326
Information Furnished the KGB by
George BLAKE
3.27
KGB Study of American Intelligence
Tourist Operations
327
NOSENKO's Information
330
Summary
331
Summary and Conclusion
331
(vi)
0001271
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
4)BR
14-00000
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
IX
.
OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE
335
Relationship with General GRIBANOV
Communist Party Status
Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures
Awards and Decorations
Sourcing
Ranks
335
338
342
345
349
350
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
ΧΙ SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS:
355
NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
357
Annex B Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text
399
Index of Personalities
+
0001272
437
(vii)
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
10

Top Secret
Introduction
The judgment of NOSENKO's bona fides entailed the
distillation of the huge volume of counterintelligence
information assembled in connection with his case, including
the product of his lengthy interrogations, the analysis of
KGB operations which he related, the results of file checks
of thousands of individuals involved, comparison of his
assertions against collateral information from all sources
and with counterintelligence records on the KGB and related
matters. The examination herein reduces this volume of
material to manageable proportions, to essential elements
of NOSENKO's claims, in order to permit comparison of his
statements with matters of known fact and to permit appli-
cation of reasonable judgment. Conclusions are drawn from
the examination of each major period in his claimed
biography. The final conclusions represent the aggregate
of conclusions independently drawn from the examination of
each major period in his claimed biography.
0001273
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
Top Secret
CONTENTS
1
PAGE
1
IV. KGB ENTRY (ca. 1953)
Date of Entry
61
62
Role of General KOBULOV
Eligibility.
Processing for Entry
Initial Service
Other Aspects Relevant to KGB Service
Summary and Conclusion
AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
64
67
68
70
-72
74
(ca. 1953-June 1955)
75
Operations Against American Correspondents
75
KGB Files
77
NOSENKO's Agents
7.8
Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel
81
Custody of Case Files
83
NOSENKO's Agents...
84
NOSENKO's Targets.
MICKELSON 06
MEARNS OG
RICHARDS 06
87
87
88
89
[FELCHLIN] 06
90
BENSON 06
93
[STROUD 06
93.
MULE O
06.06,06
94
BENSON, MULE and STROUD Expulsion
.95
5. CARDELLA 06
97
☐ VAN LAETHEM 06
97
Additional Reporting
99
Summary and Conclusion
99
VI
SEVENTI DEPARTMENT (June 1955-January 1960)
101
Introductory Comment
10-1
NOSENKO's Agents
104
Soviet Citizen Agents
104
Homosexual Agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
110
Summary
112
(ii)
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
10/BR
Introduction
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
1
Summary of Case
I FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS
NOSENKO's Statements About Himself
Soviet Officials' Statements.
The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing
Positive Intelligence Information
Counterintelligence Information
Significant KGB Operations Not
Directly Related to NOSENKO's
Claimed Service
"The KGB Agent in Paris"
(Sgt. RPB&JOHNSON).
"The KGB Agent in the British Admiralty":
11
11
20
21
21
22
24
24
'SASHA" (Identity Unknown)
28
(William VASSALL)
30
The KGB Audio Attack on the West German
Embassy
31
"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)
Edward Ellis SMITH
33
37
II
EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
Notes for the Reader
41.
41
III
PRE KGB BIOGRAPHY
45
Birth to 1945
45
Moscow Institute of International Relations
(1945-ca. 1950)
48
Naval RU Service (Ca. 1951-ca. 1953)
Summary and Conclusion
49
58
0001268
(i)
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
1,4-QAQOB
Top Secret
Summary of Case
The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors:
of 
the Palais 
des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations
Disarmament Conference. 
A Soviet official approached an
American diplomat 
with the suggestion that they get together
for a talk the following 
day. The diplomat advised CIA of
the appointment
, explaining that he thought the approach so
unusual that it might 
be an offer of cooperation or defection.
He said he believed the 
Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO,
a member of the Soviet 
Disarmament Delegation.
a
Later meeting with the American diplomat, the Soviet
official 
identified 
himself as NOSENKO and stated he was
KGB 
counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the
security of the 
Soviet delegation. He knew that the American
had previously served 
in Moscow and erroneously believed that
he was the "American 
Rezident" in Geneva. NOSENKO stated
that he 
needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to
cover KGB operational 
funds which he had squandered on
liquor and a 
prostitute in Geneva. He offered for this amount
to sell two items of 
information to American Intelligence.
These were the 
identity of a former American Embassy employee
in Moscow who was a KGB
area, and the identity agent "near ciphers" in the Washington
a Soviet in Moscow who, although
an intelli-
ostensibly a CIA agent, was actually controlled by the KGB.
In reply, the 
American explained that he was not
gence 
officer, but that he could place NOSENKO in contact
with an 
appropriate U.S. official in Geneva later that same
day.
That evening NOSENKO was met by a CIA officer and a three-
hour 
meeting 
followed at a CIA safehouse in Geneva.
himself 
as a KGB major experienced in operations against the
Describing
American Embassy in 
Moscow and against tourists and other
travellers to 
the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA officer
of his 
financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell
3
Top Secret
0001275
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
14-00000
Top Secret
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
Top Secret
0001274
TS No. 197124
10
Copy
__
14-00000
Top Secret
(Summary of Case)
the
He said that the need for money
two items of information.
was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the
ensuing discussion he also expressed dissatisfaction with the
Communist regime in the Soviet Union.
times in Geneva
He
NOSENKO met CIA' representatives four more
in June 1962. With the second meeting on 11 June, his earlier
expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely.
answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and
operations. His knowledgeability was almost exclusively
limited to the KGB Second Chief Directorate (responsible for
counterintelligence and security within the USSR),
a KGB officer in a
seemed to be what he claimed to be:
sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.
NOSENKO
NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised
to collect information
to do everything within certain limits
on matters indicated to be of interest
The only
to CIA.
restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute
refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the
USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be
He promised
communicated to the American Embassy in Moscow.
to notify CIA via an accommodation address when he came
the West again. j
to
NOSENKO again accompanied the Soviet delegation to the
Since last
Disarmament Conference in Geneva in January 1964.
meeting with CIA he had been promoted to the rank of lieu-
tenant colonel and had become the Deputy Chief of the largest
At the first
department in the Second Chief Directorate.
of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced
He
that he had decided to defect to the United States.
cited as reasons his continuing dissatisfaction with the
Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would have no
further opportunities to travel to the West in the foresee-
able future. Although he implied that he wanted to defect
as soon as possible, he agreed to remain in place in Geneva
while arrangements for his reception were being made in
Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new
on KGB opera-
information, much of it in scribbled notes,
tional activity which he had collected in the 18 months
since his last meeting with CIA.
0001276
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
:
14:000
Top Secret
0
(Summary of Case)
On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively
selected for NOSENKO's 
defection, he reported that he had
received a cable from KGB 
Headquarters ordering his immediate
return to Moscow to participate 
in a KGB conference on
foreign tourism to 
the Soviet Union. That night exfiltration
plans were implemented and 
NOSENKO was driven across the
border to Germany where 
his debriefing was
Frankfurt 
safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February
resumed in a
to bring NOSENKO to the United 
States, and in the early
evening of 12 February 
he and his CIA escorts arrived in
Washington via commercial 
aircraft, thence to a safehouse
in the Washington area
.
At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments,
NOSENKO 
met on 14 
February with representatives of their
respective Washington 
Embassies in the offices of the U.S.
Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. He told both that
he had defected on his own free will after careful consider-
ation and that he had no 
desire to return to the Soviet
Union. In answer to 
the questions of the Soviet represen-
tatives, he orally renounced 
his status and rights as
citizen of the USSR.
a
CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on
18 
February, and on 24 
February he was introduced to
representatives of 
the FBI for questioning.
same time, there 
was
At about the
a marked change in NOSENKO's comport-
ment. While outwardly 
cooperative 
during most debriefing
sessions, it became 
increasingly difficult to get him to
respond to specific 
questioning. His free time in Washington
and nearby cities was 
punctuated by drinking bouts, crude
behavior, and disputes 
with his security escort.
He explained
his behavior by saying that he was under great tension as
a result of his defection, 
abandonment of his wife and
children, and the 
disgrace that he had brought to his family
name, and on this basis CIA acceded 
to NOSENKO's demand for
a vacation. On 12 
March, NOSENKO left Washington with a
CIA case officer and two 
CIA security guards for a two-week
visit to Hawaii. There his 
behavior deterioriated still
further. He drank 
heavily and almost constantly%; he
consorted with a number 
of prostitutes; he was loud and crude
in public places; and he 
spent money extravagantly and
conspicuously.
Top Secret
00012707
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
14-00000
Top Secret
(Summary of Case)
During NOSENKO's absence from Washington, consultations
were held with the FBI regarding steps to be taken to restrict
his movements and activities. This Agency was concerned
that his behavior would attract undesirable attention and
publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his
bona fides, which were becoming known to a widening group
in the U. S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to
NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April indicated it would
"not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's
freedom of movement, and the Acting Attorney General, the
Department of State, and the White House were advised.
On 4 April NOSENKO was driven to a new safehouse in a
Washington suburb, and told that this safehouse thenceforward
would be his regular place of residence. Since that time
NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been
under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to
news media.
j
Intensive interrogation of NOSENKO, including a polygraphic
examination, was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain
information which he had been reluctant to divulge earlier,
and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported.
The polygraph examination results were inconclusive. This
phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.
Despite the searching nature of the questions and the
implicitly and explicitly expressed doubts of his veracity,
NOSENKO asserted that he was willing to answer, or to try to
answer all questions put to him. Because more information
pertinent to the question of his bona fides was needed, a
new series of interrogations was begun in mid-May 1964.
Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was
resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of
neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.
After further consultations with the FBI, a round of
hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. Between
then and 5 March, NOSENKO was questioned for a total of
about 140 hours by individual interrogators and interrogation
teams, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous
assertions. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements.
had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions
6
0001278
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
Top Secret
(Summary of Case)
in his testimony.
Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had
been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United
States solely for the reasons he had originally given.
These interrogations were suspended on 5 March 1965.
Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn
1964.
4 and the interrogations of January and February loc of
concentrated
on the period of his claimed service in the
American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB
Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962
Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were
the comparatively large amount of collateral information
available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked;
the importance of the Embassy and its personnel as critical
KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from
the standpoint of American security; and the extent of
NOSENKO's claimed knowledge of the activities of the Embassy
Section, 
of which he claimed to have been Deputy Chief.
In keeping with a Soviet practice with which NOSENKO was
familiar, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series
of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols", most of
which concerned the period of his claimed service in the
American Department. These were written by the CIA interro
gators, and they were designed to set forth NOSENKO's exact
statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The
protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary
portions of a "confession", but rather as distilled and final
statements of what he did and did not know concerning
particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of
each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom
to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents;
he was 
allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to
ask any questions and make any changes that he wished.
(Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were
initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading™
each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether
he 
understood what was written there and whether there were
any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to
sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood
this report and certify it as correct", at the end of the
final page.
With one exception, he did so calmly and without
objections. In one or two instances he remarked that his
statements were presented in such a manner as to make them.
7
0001279
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
14-00000
Top Secret
(Summary of Case)
accurate.
look foolish, but he was not able to suggest any changes of
fact or presentation which would 
make them more
Commenting 
on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said
on 4 March 1965: "My life 
story is absolutely correct.
Anything I have signed 
is absolutely correct.
understand what 
I am doing when I am signing any paper.
I 
absolutely
This is an official document
, and I fully understand what
I'm doing when I sign it as 
being absolutely correct.
Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until
14 
August 1965 with the 
participation of Petr DERYABIN, a
former KGB officer. These 
interrogations, held in Russian,
were for the purpose of using 
DERYABIN's KGB experience to
obtain a clearer understanding 
of NOSENKO's claimed personal
and professional background.
During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was
questioned 
for 
seven days on specific aspects of selected
topics ranging from his 
identity to his involvement in and
knowledge of specific KGB 
operations.
both 
Russian and English.
Questioning was in
Although the interrogations
identified topics and time periods in NOSENKO's accounts
which contained the greatest 
number of contradictions and
discrepancies, neither the 
contradictions nor the discrep-
ancies could be resolved.
Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has
encountered among would-be 
defectors, the question of
NOSENKO's mental 
stability was
after his defection in Geneva.
a matter considered early
From his arrival in the
United States in 1964 NOSENKO has been under psychiatric
observation. A CIA psychiatrist 
and a CIA psychologist,
both with extensive experience 
with Soviet Bloc defectors,
monitored many of 
NOSENKO's interrogations.
the psychologist 
for three weeks questioned NOSENKO on his
In May 1965
life from birth until 1953, 
when NOSENKO claimed he joined
the KGB, in an attempt 
to identify psychological factors
which might underlie 
NOSENKO's contradictory and inconsistent
accounts. The psychiatrist 
has continued his periodic
observations of NOSENKO 
to the present time.
and the 
psychologist concluded independently, on the basis
The psychiatrist
of their observations, that 
NOSENKO was mentally stable.
8
0001280
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy

14-00000
Top Secret
(Summary of Case)
NOSENKO has not been interrogated since October 1966.
The period since has been devoted to the examination and
review of the accumulated interrogation notes, transcripts
and other materials, and in the preparation of the present
paper.
Top Secret
0001281
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
14-00000
Top Secret
CHAPTER I
FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS
Evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides is comprised of his own
statements, the corroborating statements of Soviet officials,
and the counterintelligence information he has provided.
NOSENKO's Statements About Himself
In his meetings in 1962 and 1964 with CIA abroad and in
the course of the interrogations since, NOSENKO has made
numerous statements about himself. More than any other,
however, a statement written in July 1964 (after the initial
hostile interrogation was concluded) is a thoughtful and
well-expressed exposition of how he wished CIA to regard
him. It is quoted here in its entirety.
My life, my childhood and youth passed in very
comfortable circumstances since the position of
my father gave us the opportunity to live without
lacking for anything. And the only difficult
periods of my life before the death of my father
were at the naval schools attended in Kuybyshev,
Baku and Leningrad, and at the beginning of my
working life, when I was in the Far East in 1950-
1952. The opportunity to be always well-dressed,
to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my
own car, to be able to use the car given me by my
family and also my father's car, the opportunity
to travel to the South and to vacation in the best
sanitariums, dachas, and so forth%3B all this
unquestionably Tert its mark on me and became
something of a habit. After the death of my father,
my successful progress in my work gave me a higher
salary, and although I did not have all that which
I had while my father was alive, still I did not
experience any serious difficulties. But already
I wanted to live still better.
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Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at
school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the
family--it was always pounded into my head that
Stalin was a great genius, that he was good, keen,
etc., and the thought never occurred to me to
question his words or his deeds because everything
that he said, and everything he did, were completely
axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved
traitors and it was considered and explained that
the betrayor of the people was Yezhow, the head of
the NKVD. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the
name of Stalin. Soon after Stalin's death in 1953
I read a certain document given me by my father.
This was a secret letter of the Central Committee
of the CPSU on the case of the doctors;' it was
not addressed to all communists but only to members
and candidate members of the Central Committee.
I was deeply shaken by this letter which described
in detail how these people, important specialists
in the field of medicine, were brought to such a
condition that they condemned themselves; that is,
they confessed to things which had never happened,
to things which they had never done. They were
simply forced to give the evidence which was needed
by the investigators. The secret letters on the
cult of Stalin and much that I heard in the KGB
about the reign of Stalin, all this left its mark
and forced me to think deeply about the real truth
and to look at I everything more critically.
I no
longer had faith in all those ideas which for years
had been pressed into my head.
The new leaders (Khrushchev and Company) used the
same methods but already diluted with the water of
democracy, with playing up to the people and attempts
to convince them that a new era would arise, a new
and better life, and that now the Party was always
going to concern itself with the welfare of the
people. In fact, it was a struggle for power and
the use of all means in this struggle, even micro-
phones (they listened to the conversations of
Beriya and his friends; later they listened to the
conversations of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and
others). Khrushchev's endless blabbing about
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The
successes, when in fact they didn't exist, the
figures about how the USSR had passed the USA in
the production of butter and milk, when in the
stores they were available only infrequently.
endless promises of a better life when in fact
nothing of the sort is taking place. All this
similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the
events which were taking place in the country, but
already the entire ideology of the Party, its
external and internal course.
The events in Novocherkassk where 20,000 to
25,000 people rose up and the way in which this
popular indignation was suppressed by troops with
many casualties. This also made a deep impression
on me. When I was resting in the summer of 1961
in Nikolayev, from my relatives--my father's
brothers--I understood well the real relation of
the workers both to the leadership and to the
Party as a whole. At the same time I saw how the
workers really lived, how they eat, what they have
and what they can buy with their wages.
:
I heard a great deal from my father about the
domestic policies of Khrushchev in regard to the
development and the course of construction in
industry, about his complete illiteracy in
engineering technology and industrial economics,
about incorrect decisions in regard to many
industries, and this was not only the opinion of
my father, but also of other important leaders in
various fields of industry.
But no one dared to
open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father
tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain
decision would be incorrect, he received such a
rebuff from Khrushchev that he was profoundly.
shaken and in the opinion of my mother this brought
him to his illness and death in August 1956.
The events in Germany and especially in Hungary
showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of
communist ideology. What was especially important
for me was the fact that in these countries it was
protest not of individuals or groups, but of the
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entire people who could no longer endure a regime
imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to
emphasize that the life of the people in these
countries was much better than that of the people
in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in
Czechoslovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt
they live better than the entire people of the
Soviet Union).
The split of the international Communist move-
ment became for me a clear fact and confirmed: my
opinion that the theory of Communism is a theory
built on sand and that it is practiced according to
the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given
stage of life and that in reality full material
welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but
only by the leadership and the Party and the
government
government
Working in the KGB I came to understand much and
became conscious of the contradiction between the
internal and external course of the USSR. Such
questions as disarmament, the ban of atomic weapons,
the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all
these are used only in the interest of propaganda
and as a screen for carrying out of the policies
needed by the communist party. (I was myself.
present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the
'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)
My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true
reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live,
how much they earn, how they can dress and live on
their wages, and I paid special attention to the
life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists,
engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the
enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of
the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the
'unbelievably difficult life' was immediately
dispelled. And what I met in my own work, how
which Soviet citizens get sent where abroad--this
finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my KGB
acquaintances think back with great pleasure about
life abroad.
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I entered the Komsomol completely without thinking
about it. The time came, the right age, and I
became a Komsomol member like all the others. It
was different in regards to the Party: I joined
the Party in 1956 after the death of Stalin and
while I was working in the KGB and already at that
time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness
in me. My father continually insisted on this,
saying that without the Party I would never
ahead and would not have success in life. But I
myself understood and saw that I would not be able
to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the
Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would
truly never move ahead in my career unless I entered
the Party. But from the very beginning of my entry
into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism
and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally
a torture. Especially when I became the Deputy
Chief and then Chief of a section, and then Deputy
Chief of a department, because then I had to speak
at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to
twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as
deeply dedicated to the Party and its course.
In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became
worse. The question of a change of climate was
raised. At that time the Second Chief Directorate
needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to
three years to conduct counterintelligence work
among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a
great deal of effort to personally talk Second Chief
Directorate Chief General GRIBANOV into letting me
go.
The Party and work references had been confirmed,
all the questionnaires were already filled out, the
photos had been submitted; that is, all the formal-
ities had been accomplished. But at the very last
moment the Central Personnel Office of the KGB began
to protest against my going with my family to
Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the
house check made at my place of residence they
received information that I sometimes came home in
a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels
with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was
necessary because of the health of my daughter
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(since 1963 the illness has become better) and also
it would have been advantageous from the financial
point of view. From this time on I understood that
Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family.
Knowing many officers in the First (Foreign
Intelligence) Chief Directorate, I began to under-
stand that being sent abroad is entirely determined,
not by knowledge, experience in work and success,
but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the
person's autobiography and complete assurance
his limitless dedication to the Party and the
"government, But not only being sent abroad but the
assignment of personnel in the First and Second
Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on
the reasons
as to
with the y me and also on good relations
in Central Personnel.
and good connections with workers
I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life
was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels
and basically they boiled down to the fact that she.
took an extremely unfavorable attitude towards my
delays at work and also when I would be delayed with
some of my friends and acquaintances after work and
Of
would come home with a few drinks under my belt.
course, I loved and love my children and only the
fact that they are taken care of financially until
they grow up and have received an education to some
extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave
the USSR.What do I have in mind when I speak of
financial security? After the death of my father,
the family received a large monetary allowance, plus
the money that my mother had saved and valuable
property, etc.. My mother many times offered to
divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother,
and for her, but I suggested that we not do this
before her death. And, of course, my mother will
not leave my children without attention, and my
share of the property and the money will be given to
my children.
"
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an
If the defections of [former KGB officers] PETROV,
RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any
particular thoughts, the defection to the United
States of GOLITSYN, whom I had heard of as
intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly
caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus,
it is necessary to have not only boldness and
decisiveness, but also great strength of will.
already I put to myself the question, will I be able
to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and
disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?
And
Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my
departure I myself of my own desire entered into
contact with you. The reason for this was the loss
of money received by me for operational expenses.
I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum
of money before my departure and there was nobody
to borrow from. To tell the truth about the loss
of the money would have meant that it would be
necessary to explain where and in what circumstances
it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion
from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party.
Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a
story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they
might think that I had appropriated the money, that
is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst
of all and I would, of course, in such event have
told the truth.
To tell the truth, it was only after my return
home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not.
immediately, began full to realize all the seriousness
And
of my contact with you and its full meaning.
although I did not give you any promises or assurances
about our continued contact in the future, I under-
stood that you sooner or later would set yourself
the task of continuing our contact. And here it was
that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I
have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself
the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity
and that I started to work towards being sent on a
trip abroad.
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›
Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort
of baggage' that is, with materials which could
be u useful and necessary for you. In this entire
period up to January 1964 I tried to collect infor-
mation which would be of the maximum value for you.
My assignment to the position of Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department in July 1962 gave me a greater
opportunity than before. But at the same time this
assignment almost excluded the possibility of a trip
abroad and it was only with great difficulty that I
was able to get away for the trip in January 1964.
It was necessary to convince my superior CHELNOKOV
and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince others. In
this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent
all the 
money (in foreign currency); that the
medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven
very successful and that I needed to buy some more
medicine to carry out one more series of treatments%3B
that this trip would not be a long one and that since
I was already the Deputy Chief of the Department I
would not be able to travel abroad any more and so,
therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of
course, all this was said at convenient moments and
outside of work. Things were easier with the
Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad)
because I was on good terms with the KGB officer
who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came
back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number
of presents.
:
The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of
the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the
newspaper Times it said outright that the English
learned about him thanks to the Americans who
learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962..
○ Fortunately, the leadership of the First Chief
Directorate, as I learned from my colleagues, came
to the 
conclusion that here the Americans had been
helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the
First Chief Directorate was not completely sure of
this. 
But the publication in the American press of
Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely.
This 
article in one spot said plainly that as far
as is 
known the KGB does not have any sources
:
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CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the
KGB.
From this moment, I do not conceal this fact,
I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow
learn of my contact with you. This article deeply
'interested' the KGB.
During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a
pass from the Second Department and went, in order
to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough
to simply look at a man,
to see how he holds himself
and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort
of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked
how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked
his appearance and I understood that everything
which had been said in the KGB about him and the
sort of person they were trying to make him out to
be (that he was morally degraded, that he had
descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was
nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the
same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater
confidence in the correctness of the decision taken
by me to leave the Soviet Union.
26 July 1964
Signed: Yu. NOSENKO ·
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Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO
The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
officials' statements about him since his defection coin-
cides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According
to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelli-
gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively
defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he
served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV
and in connection with operations against Americans he
occupied positions of progressively greater trust and
responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence)
Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection
wrought severe damage "for y years to come" to the KGB
because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American
targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and
disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of
many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to
assassinate him.
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The Product of NOSENKO's Debriefing
Positive Intelligence Information
At his first meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO asserted
that he was acquainted with Ministers of the Soviet Govern-
ment, who were friends of his father, and he heard what
was said in their circles. His debriefing and interroga-
tions did not bear out his assertion that he was informed
of the attitudes and aims of the Soviet leaders. His
responses to questions about the viability of the then
Soviet Government, for example, were couched in vague and
general terms and did not reflect any specific knowledge.
From his debriefing it emerged that NOSENKO had spent his
entire adult life either as a student or as a state security
official, and he stressed that since the early 1950's he
had had few interests and "no real contacts" outside of the
KGB itself. Questioned on a wide range of topics, including
various aspects of nuclear weaponry, missiles, electronics,
communications, unconventional weapons, military industry,
military units and equipment, and research and development,
NOSENKO repeatedly said that he had no knowledge of such
matters and that his responses reflected only personal
opinions. Because of his two assignments to Geneva with
the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, questions
were put to NOSENKO about Soviet underground testing, Soviet
efforts in the fields of chemical and biological warfare,
Soviet disarmament aims and Soviet views of the corresponding
attitudes and intentions of the United States. Because
his assignments to the Soviet Disarmament Delegation were
for cover purposes only, NOSENKO disclaimed any special
knowledge. He explained that he took no part in the
substantive work of the Delegation nor did he have any
connection in the USSR with officials or organizations
concerned with arms control or disarmament policies.
NOSENKO's failure to provide any useful positive
intelligence information was not unique, although previous
KGB defectors did not have NOSENKO's claimed access, either
on the basis of his family ties or on the basis of his KGB
counterintelligence position within the Soviet Union. KGB
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officers who defected earlier to Western services provided
no significant military, economic or scientific information
on the USSR, and the political information provided by a
few (usually relating to the personalities and relationships
in 
t
the ruling group of the Communist Party) was of marginal
value.
Counterintelligence Information
NOSENKO's knowledge of KGB foreign intelligence operations
was limited, for his whole career had been spent in the
Second Chief (Counterintelligence) Directorate concerned
with KGB operations within the Soviet Union. His information
on Second Chief Directorate operations, however, was
apparently a counterintelligence windfall, because most of
his KGB assignments involved operations against American
targets, either visitors to the Soviet Union or members of
the Embassy
represents in Moscow. From this circumstance he
as an authoritative source on KGB success
and failure in recruiting Americans in the USSR during the
years 1953-1963.
.+
NOSENKO has described scores of KGB operations mounted
against American Embassy personnel during that ten year
period.
Because of lasting relationships he established
with KGB colleagues, NOSENKO kept abreast of KGB operations
the Embassy, even while serving elsewhere than in
the
pagal bassy Section. NOSENKO has stated that he would
know if the facts were otherwise, and he has asserted
unequivocally that no American stationed permanently at
the Embassy was recruited between the early 1950's and his
defection in 1964. NOSENKO named six members of the Embassy
staff who rejected KGB recruitment overtures, and all have
confirmed his assertions. He provided information on the
vulnerability of a significant number of Embassy personnel;
in particular, two Foreign Service Officers were consequently
withdrawn from Moscow. Physical search has confirmed the
information he provided regarding the KGB audio surveillance
installations in the Embassy.
Among Americans other than Embassy personnel whom NOSENKO
described as KGB targets, he provided information leading
to the identification of 51 KGB agents, including seven
correspondents in Moscow, the Moscow representative of the
29 American Express Company, the former code clerk "ANDREY"
(Dayle SMITH, see p. 33), and Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,
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Mrs. JOHNSON, and James Allen MINTKENBAUGH. Twenty-five of
this number acknowledged KGB recruitment before or after
NOSENKO's information was received. In fifteen other
instances NOSENKO's information has been corroborated in
part by the individuals' admissions of contact with (if
not recruitment by) the KGB, or by other sources' reports
of their recruitment. Besides these 51, NOSENKO provided
leads to four other American KGB agents, including an
officer in an American military intelligence organization,
none of whom has yet been identified. Lastly, NOSENKO
identified 22 Americans whom the KGB knew or suspected to
be American Intelligence agents.
or the
From NOSENKO's information 68 non-American KGB agents
have been identified. Although investigations are still.
incomplete, in 39 of these cases the individual's KGB
recruitment has been reported by other sources,
individuals were suspect for other reasons. Among these
68 individuals were a French and a Canadian Ambassador to
Moscow, an Austrian and an Indonesian Army Attache, all
Director and a Deputy Secretary of the Indian Foreigni
Ministry, and a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL,
see below). In addition, NOSENKO provided leads on 22 other
NOSENKO's infor-
KGB foreign agents, yet to be identified.
mation about the KGB electronic attack on the [German] Embassyll
in Moscow was confirmed by subsequent technical and physical
search.
With respect to the KGB itself, NOSENKO named (if not
completely identified) approximately 1,000 Soviet citizens
who are or have been affiliated with. Soviet intelligence
and security organizations. These included over seven
hundred active KGB staff officers, of whom 435 were serving
in the Second Chief Directorate. Of the 165 KGB officers
he named as belonging to the First Chief (Foreign Intelli-
gence) Directorate, over one hundred had been previously
reported to be KGB personnel, as reflected in CIA files.
NOSENKO's information permitted updating CIA holdings on
previously received reports of the 1959 KGB reorganization,
particularly as it affected the Second Chief Directorate,
He described further refinement of responsibilities, the
Second Chief Directorate's absorption of previously inde-
pendent directorates, the creation of new units from elements
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formerly belonging to other numbered directorates, and
individual officers prominent in each. NOSENKO was not as
productive with respect to KGB operational methods and
Headquarters procedures, although he furnished numerous
examples, particularly regarding operations mounted against
Embassy personnel, which provided useful insight on these
topics.
Significant KGB Operations Not Directly Related to
NOSENKO's Claimed Service
All of the KGB operations which NOSENKO has described
are favorable evidence of his bona fides, but they break
down into two qualitatively different groups. Operations
which NOSENKO related to specific KGB positions he held at
particular times are described in the following section in
connection with an examination of his KGB career. The
remaining operations are those which NOSENKO said he learned
of informally, or by accident, or even despite (not because
Since these are
positions at various times in
:
of the KGB posts at the time.
not material to
the KGB, they are summarized in Annex B. (NOSENKO's leads
to most non-American KGB agents belong in this latter group,
but for reasons of brevity they are omitted from this paper.)
but for reasons of brevity to
Among the items of information which NOSENKO. provided
but which do not relate to specific KGB positions he held
at particular times, there are several which merit special
note here. These, which are among the most significant of
his revelations, are the leads to Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,
"the KGB agent
"SASHA" (the Ke the British Admiralty" (William VASSALL)
agent in American Military Intelligence),
"ANDREY" (Embassy military code clerk Dayle W. SMITH),
Edward SMITH (CIA officer) and the KGB electronic attack
on the West German Embassy in Moscow.
--115
"The KGB Agent in Paris" (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON)
The first item of information given by NOSENKO
upon meeting CIA in Geneva in 1964 was a lead to a KGB
agent who was an American serviceman stationed at a sensitive
U.S. military installation in the Paris area. The agent had
been the source of documentary intelligence which had been
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shown to Premier Khrushchev personally. Although still
active, the agent had lost access to classified documents.
some months earlier, in 1963. NOSENKO characterized the
lead as the most important single counterintelligence item
that he acquired during the year and a half he was
collaborator at KGB Headquarters in Moscow.
NOSENKO's Information
a CIA
Shortly after returning to Moscow from Geneva in 1962,
NOSENKO first learned of a KGB agent's successful penetra-
tion of a classified documents vault at an "important
American military installation" in the Paris area. Because
the documents included information on strategic targets in
France as well as in the Soviet Union, he assumed that it
was a "strategic planning installation". The installation
had its own airfield and that there were "procedures for
bringing Top Secret documents in and for taking them out".
There had been six successful entries of the vault, four
in 1962 and two in 1963. On each occasion Special Section
technicians travelled TDY to Paris under diplomatic courier
cover to assist the local KGB case officer in the technical
details of the operation. Their function was to advise the
case officer concerning the entry to the vault and later
surreptitiously to unwrap and re-seal the documents. The
case officer, on this basis, would give appropriate instruc-
tions to his agent, and the technicians probably never met
the American..
Although this was a First Chief Directorate operation,
officers of the Special Section of the Second Chief
Directorate were used. The Special Section was comprised
of technicians transferred from the KGB Operational-
Technical Directorate, and usually it handled surreptitious
entries to Western embassies in Moscow. Among these officers
were S.A. IONOV, L.A. LEBEDEV, S.D. ILYIN, V.V. SINITSYN,
V.Z. KARETNIKOV, M.I. PREOBRAZHENSKIY and Fedor FOFANOV.
IONOV, LEBEDEV and ILYIN took part in this operation, and
FOFANOV was later involved.
The specialists were not the ones that carried out the
operation. It was carried out by the case officers of the
Paris Legal Residency. The specialists just opened and then
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resealed the packages. LEBEDEV said that they also placed
some radioactive substance, with the help of the American
agent, in the lock of the vault door; when the substance was
removed, they could pick the lock. They did the same thing
(used some radioactive substance] to the safe in the vault.
Before everything was finally ready, the Special Section
technicians had to visit Paris several times. The first
time was the beginning of 1962. The Paris Residency couldn't
have launched the operation before 1962, because they
couldn't do it without the help of Special Section techni-
cians and the latter did not travel to Paris in 1960 or 1961.
Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the
agent used some radioactive substance to determine the
combination. The agent also photographed the lock for KGB
study. Subsequent entries were always made between two and.
five o'clock in the morning. The agent removed documents
from the vault and delivered them to his KGB case officer,
who in turn passed them to Special Section technicians.
The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made, the
documents were repackaged, and the envelopes were given
back to the case officer for return to the vault. There-
after, the Paris Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow
and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next
opportunity for entry.
young by for entry.
The KGB officers were able to complete the whole operation
during the agent's night duty. During this time, they had
to pick up the materials, drive some place ("maybe the
Soviet Embassy") open the documents, photograph them, close
them again just as they were, and return them to the agent.
The KGB could not specify which documents the agent was to
bring out; the fact that all the documents had to be opened
shows that they were sealed when they were received from
the agent.
Since he heard that almost all of the material obtained
was of interest to the Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO concluded
that it came from a military installation. The agent couldn't
bring out a great deal of material, only what he could hide
on his person. From what the KGB technicians said, NOSENKO
thought the agent was not alone on duty. The technicians
said that "the agent explained [to co-workers] that he is
going out for coffee or a sandwich", and that "he is gone
for only 5 or 10 minutes".
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The last time the vault was entered was in the fall of
1963. At about that time the agent, a military man,
received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch
duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the
United States but, with his promotion, he had obtained an
extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still
active in January 1964 and was still assigned to the same
military post, he had lost access to the classified
documents.
The information obtained from the agent's vault
I was highly sensitive and so valuable to the KGB that the
Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there
had been rewarded for their part in the operation.
Before leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964,
NOSENKO had been told that the technician FOFANOV had been
sent to Paris in the KGB hope that the agent would be able
to re-enter the vault again before his transfer to the
United States in May. When NOSENKO visited the Soviet
Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to
Geneva, FOFANOV was on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO
chatted with him. FOFANOV said he "was not doing good".
and he "would probably be sitting there until May", but
he had hopes "that something might happen".
+
The American agent was getting paid by the KGB and he
was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of
money. NOSENKO didn't know if he was recruited in Paris
or if it was even a formal recruitment, nor what plans the
KGB had for him after he left Paris.
NOSENKO learned of the case "in little pieces" at
separate times from various members of the Second Chief
Directorate Special Section who participated in it,
principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV in Moscow, and FOFANOV
later in Paris. [Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has
also alleged he learned of the case from IONOV, the Chief.
of the Special Section.] NOSENKO explained that he knew
LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV from their visit to his office to
discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels, when
NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
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Comment:
:
and
NOSENKO's lead was identified as Army Sergeant
Robert Lee JOHNSON, who served in the period
1962-1963 at a military courier station at Orly
Field, Paris. JOHNSON confessed to KGB
recruitment of himself and his wife, his
recruitment of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH,
the latter's subsequent collaboration with the
KGB. Mrs. JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH have
corroborated JOHNSON's statements.
NOSENKO is apparently unaware of JOHNSON's:
earlier (since 1952) involvement with the KGB
in Berlin, the United States, and in Orleans,
With respect to the 1962-1963.
Nous entires of the coarist sratios.
however, JOHNSON's admissions coincide
with the information provided by NOSENKO, with
no significant differences.
"SASHA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)
When NOSENKO announced in Geneva in 1964 that he
was going to defect, he was told that as a consequence
additional persons in CIA would be informed of his case
and he was asked to search his recollection for any
evidence of a KGB penetration of CIA.. NOSENKO knew of
none in CIA, but he recalled a KGB agent, an American
known as "SASHA", who was a member of a U.S. military
intelligence organization.
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO learned of "SASHA" from M.A. SHALYAPIN, the KGB
officer who, while assigned to the First Chief Directorate
and working in Berlin, recruited the agent in 1955-1957.
"SASHA" who had been recruited by financial inducements,
had officer status; he wore civilian clothes to his meetings
with his KGB handler and he could have been either a
civilian or military intelligence officer. "SASHA" returned:
to the United States "in the 1960's" or "in 1962". "SASHA"
was stationed in the United States at the time of the Cuban
KGB any
missile crisis but had been unable to provide the
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relevant intelligence of any significance. NOSENKO thought
that "SASHA
" served as a department chief in intelligence
when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 - early
1963.
In
NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or
October 1962 [after NOSENKO's first visit to Geneva and
initial contact with CIA] through his friend, Yu. I. GUK.
GUK had known SHALYAPIN when they had served together in
the First Chief Directorate in Moscow. SHALYAPIN had
served in the United States, Uruguay, Berlin, and Cuba.
1962 he had been assigned to the Latin American Department
of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer. He
retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO's intervention with
Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV,
SHALYAPIN obtained a position with Inturist. Presumably
out of gratitude to NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN felt free to talk,
and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treat-
ment by the First Chief Directorate which, without him,
would not have had the agent "SASHA" in Germany "at that
time" [1963]. NOSENKO heard such details as he knew of
"SASHA" in the course of several such talks with SHALYAPIN.
Under intensive questioning on the "SASHA" case NOSENKO
retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case
from SHALYAPIN, though maintaining that he was sure he had
discussed the case with SHALYAPIN "at some time". Pressed
to identify his first source, NOSENKO then cited several
officers--some First Chief Directorate, some Second-who
_ could have told him about it because they were likely to
know of it though none of them was actually involved in the
operation. Ultimately NOSENKO refused to commit himself.
on this point, saying he did not remember from whom he first
learned of "SASHA".
Comment:
"SASHA" has not been identified.
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William VASSALL ("KGB Agent in the British Admiralty")
Asked in the June 1962 meetings with CIA if he
was familiar with the case of George BLAKE, the former KGB
agent in MI-6, NOSENKO replied that he knew of another, more
important, KGB agent who was employed in the British
Admiralty.
NOSENKO's Information
1962
"
The KGB has now (in 1962) an agent in a high government
position in London who provides most valuable information,
some from NATO intelligence services' conferences. The
agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis
of a homosexual compromise. In Moscow he was a First
Secretary" or "chief of protocol" of the British Embassy.
After leaving Moscow he became an assistant to the Minister,
something like that"..
' 
in the Admiralty. "He may be an
assistant, chief of the secretariat, but he's close to the
Minister. All papers for the Minister go through him. He's
not an intelligence officer. He is meeting with the KGB
now
11
Several KGB officers received the Order of Lenin for
their part in the operation, including the London Rezident
RODIN. NOSENKO learned of the agent's existence, but not
of his identity, from his friend and colleague in the Second
Chief Directorate, V.A. CHURANOV, who had made the recruit-
ment while chief of a section in the British Department.
Comment
GOLITSYN had earlier provided a lead to a KGB
agent who was the source of Admiralty documents
which GOLITSYN had reviewed in KGB Headquarters.
On the basis of that lead, British security
authorities on 11 June 1962 passed to CIA a
list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL.
On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities a
preliminary report on NOSENKO's information,
on the basis of which the twenty-man list was
reduced to VASSALL and one other suspect.
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(Continued)
details of NOSENKO's information were passed to
British authorities on 20 August, and on 12
September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly
confessed.
VASSALL's confession confirmed what NOSENKO
had reported. He had been recruited in Moscow
in 1955, after a homosexual entrapment, by two
KGB officers, one of whom he identified as
CHURANOV. He continued to collaborate with
the KGB after returning to London, first in
his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence
Division, as clerical officer assistant to the
Civil Lord's private secretary, and finally,
as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval
staff. In London he was met by KGB officer
"KOROVIN" who has been identified as London
Rezident RODIN. VASSALL's last meeting with
the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962. At
the time of his arrest in September he had, in
preparation for his next meeting on 30 October,
fifteen rolls of film containing 140 photo-
graphs of classified Admiralty documents.
KGB Audio Attack on the West German Embassy
In 1962 and 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones
concealed in several Western embassies in Moscow. Aside
from the American Embassy (see p. 225), he furnished the
greatest detail on the microphones in the West German] Embassy.
NOSENKO's Information
The KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy
in Moscow, with the exception of the American and British
Embassies. It had been particularly successful with respect
to the West German] Embassy. KGB microphones monitored the
|| West German Ambassador as he dictated his reports or held
discussions with diplomatic colleagues, including American
Ambassador Thompson. The microphones were operative during
the period 1959 through 1961, and the KGB monitored then-
Ambassador Kroll's dictation of cables, dispatches and
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conversations as well as passages of a book he was writing
on the Soviet Union.
:
+
NOSENKO learned of the KGB microphones either from
O.S. BUBNOV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's
Third (Austria and Germany) Department, or Mikhail SKORIK,
Chief of that Third Department's First Section. In 1960-
1961 Tatyana GRISHNYAT brought from the Operational
Technical Directorate to NOSENKO in the American Embassy
Section daily monitoring reports from microphones in the
American Embassy. On such occasions she had a much larger
volume of material addressed to the Third Department, from
which NOSENKO concluded that the KGB was even more successful
in monitoring the West German Embassy than it was the
American Embassy.
Comment:
-%
NOSENKO's information was substantially correct.
Independent of that information, however, West |l
German authorities learned in 1963 that their
technical security officer in Moscow had been
recruited by the KGB. They surmised that the
recruitment may have taken place as early as
1956. In August 1964 the leader of a technical
search team was seriously disabled by mustard
gas poisoning, presumably at the hands of the
KGB. In 1965, finally, another search team
completed a
Embassy, year down" of the West Germani.
course of which two separate
audio systems with 24 microphones were found,
as well as 27 microphones in the residence of
the Ambassador. In addition, evidence was
found indicating that the Embassy had been the
Starget of a sophisticated electronic attack
against its cipher machines and its acoustic
room.
NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB microphones
were operative in 1959 and his sourcing of his
information to the periodic visits of Tatyana
GRISHNYAT to the American Section, are contra-
dictory. NOSENKO claims he was not in the
American Section until 1960.
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"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)
When contacting CIA in 1962 NOSENKO offered to sell
information about two KGB operations, one of which he knew
only under the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY", a KGB agent recruited
in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in
Washington "near ciphers".
NOSENKO's Information-1962
"ANDREY" was a U.S. Army sergeant who was spotted for the
KGB by "QUEBEC" (Roy RHODES). [RHODES served in Moscow
from April 1951 to July 1953. He dated his own recruitment
by the KGB as January 1952.] RHODES was still in Moscow.
when "ANDREY" was recruited by the Second Chief Directorate,
although RHODES was not aware of "ANDREY's" recruitment.
The KGB approach to 'ANDREY" was based on "women and money".
"
"ANDREY" worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB,
providing "materials" and information on ciphers. Не
promised that he would cooperate with the KGB in future
assignments abroad, but would not work with them in the
United States as he did not want to "sit in the electric
chair". He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow.
The KGB wanted to pay him more but he refused; he said he
could not plausibly explain the possession of too much
money. When the KGB offered him diamonds and other gems for
later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers
that possession could arouse the attention of the American
police. In 1950 the agent left Moscow for the United
States. The KGB waited for him to reappear in some other
country, but he did not. Finally, in 1955, the KGB sent
V.M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embassy Section
of the Second Chief Directorate, and a participant in
"ANDREY's" recruitment in Moscow, to the United States to
find the agent.
KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV",
under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the
Soviet Embassy in Washington.
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KOVSHUK, with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in
Washington, learned where the agent was living, identified
his automobile, and contacted him at the end of 1955 or
the beginning of 1956. KOVSHUK had looked for him a long
time. He found where "ANDREY" parked his car, but "ANDREY"
lived 
in a place where there were many other people and it
was difficult to get close to him. At first "ANDREY" was.
frightened and refused to work, but when at the third
contact he was offered $1,000, the agent accepted the money
from KOVSHUK 
because, due to his gambling, he was again in
financial straits. From that point on he worked well with
the KGB. He again provided good information, information
considered important by the KGB. When KOVSHUK found him,
"ANDREY" was working in the Pentagon and he was still
working there in 1962.
In reference to his modus operandi for meetings with
'ANDREY", KOVSHUK knew he was under surveillance by the
FBI. His meetings always took place in cars. KOVSHUK
would lose his surveillance the day before the meeting and
travel outside of Washington where he would wait by the
highway; "ANDREY" would drive by and stop, KOVSHUK would
sit 
with him in the
ff.
the Amer him the receive "ANDREY's" information
and given
Then KOVSHUK would get out, and
would drive on
The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL
[Reino HAYHANEN, who defected in Paris in May 1957] also
provided the information leading to the arrest of Roy
RHODES When RHODES was under investigation, "ANDREY"
was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES
in Moscow. "ANDREY".
was the only such witness called,
and he was called upon several times to tell how RHODES
had behaved in Moscow. "ANDREY" could be identified as
the only person who testified at the trial. During this
investigation of RHODES, "ANDREY" stopped meeting KGB
officers, because he was afraid he too would be exposed and
arrested. 
"ANDREY" may have feared that RHODES was involved
in his own recruitment, or he may merely have been panicky
because he knew he could be accused of the same thing as
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RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed his
meetings with the KGB, "having little other choice".
KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington
Legal Residency and returned to Moscow. NOSENKO did not
know who succeeded KOVSHUK as the handler, but KOVSHUK's
successor eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV,
who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961. NOSENKO. did
not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but asserted that there
must have been one since. "ANDREY" was still working with
the KGB in 1962.
NOSENKO's Information-1964
While continuing to associate "ANDREY's" recruitment
with RHODES' presence in Moscow, NOSENKO in different
discussions of the case asserted that "ANDREY" was recruited
in "1948-1949", "in 1952 or earlier", or "in 1953".
"ANDREY" had been recruited by KOVSHUK and N.M. BORODIN.
After returning to the United States, "ANDREY" worked at
the Pentagon, "in codes", but by the time KOVSHUK recontacted
him in the United States he was nearing the end of his
enlistment, and he was working in an Army recruiting office.
"He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV
took over the case from KOVSHUK.
It was not RHODES' trial at which "ANDREY" appeared, but
he was among persons called during the pre-trial investigation.
"ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death.
"ANDREY" did not testify at the RHODES trial.
In Moscow, "ANDREY" had explained to the KGB how the code
machines in the Embassy worked and may have given the KGB
parts of code machines such as "discs" [sic, meaning rotors].
Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy department chief in the
Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in
the "ANDREY" case: NOSENKO first saw him in 1953 during the
period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow.
SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to
discuss and plan KGB meetings with "ANDREY". The reason for
SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not
technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with
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questions to be asked of 'ANDREY". Since SELEZNEV came to
these meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO later
saw him in uniform in his visits to the American Department,
NOSENKO speculated that SELEZNEV may have attended some of
the meetings with "ANDREY". Although NOSENKO did not know
how the KGB exploited him, he repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY's
great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for
them in Moscow. "Thanks to his help they were able to read
your State Department codes. To date we have never been
able to read your military codes... A "ANDREY" brought no
military code material to the KGB, only State Department
material. Mainly, he described the operation of code machines
and what daily or other periodic settings were made.
"
"ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that
the first recontact was made in the United States until he
ceased meeting the KGB because of the RHODES trial. Again,
after the trial, he was able to furnish good material. This
was true both while KOVSHUK was handling him and while
BAGRICHEV was the case officer. Between June 1962 and
January 1964, while NOSENKO was in Moscow, he heard that
something is going wrong with this operation".
Comment:
"ANDREY" was identified as former U.S. Army
Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, who served as
a code
machine mechanic while assigned to the office
of the U.S. Military Attache in the Embassy in
Moscow from April 1952 to April 1954.
NOSENKO's information has been confirmed as
substantially correct by admissions of Roy
RHODES and Dayle W. SMITH ("ANDREY"). RHODES
informed the FBI in a 1963 interview that
among other American enlisted personnel of the
Embassy in Moscow, he reported on SMITH to
the KGB. After denying involvement with the
KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and
1965, SMITH admitted that he had been approached
by the KGB in Moscow in late 1953, that he had
been offered a large sum of cash and gems in
exchange for classified information concerning
Embassy cipher systems, and that he had provided
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Comment:
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He
the KGB with a mock code machine rotor.
further acknowledged that he had been recon-
tacted by the KGB in the United States in
1957, where he met KGB officers regularly
until September 1962. He identified by photo-
graph all of the KGB officers described by
NOSENKO as having taken part in the operation.
NOSENKO "cannot be certain" that he did not
know about "ANDREY" while he served in the
Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and when pressed
to describe specifically the source of his
information, he invariably indicated that he
learned of the American agent later, informally
from KGB colleagues.
Edward Ellis SMITH
NOSENKO's Information
In the context of a 1962 discussion of KGB operations
against the American Embassy in Moscow, NOSENKO was asked
whether he knew "about SMITH". He answered: "SMITH? The
red-head. Listen, he headed the FBI, he was a colonel and
headed counterintelligence. NOSENKO went on to describe
the mounting of a blackmail operation, of which he was
the case officer, against SMITH (whose KGB cryptonym was
"RYZHIY", or "REDHEAD"). .
was
who
SMITH had been sleeping with his Russian housemaid,
When the KGB was
an agent planted on him by the KGB.
unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs, she was
instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH's bed.
These were then combined with photographs of SMITH to
produce photomontages, copies of which were delivered to
SMITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with
the KGB. SMITH came. The KGB was represented at the
At
meeting by GRIBANOV, NOSENKO and one other officer.
this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked
come
SMITH agreed to
for classified information.
meetings.
to further
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When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting
with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the maid to find out what
had happened. She reported that SMITH was
in a state of
desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as
if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance.
To increase the pressure on him, the KGB sent him threatening
letters on each of the succeeding three days. Finally, on
the third day, instead of meeting the KGB, SMITH went to
Ambassador BOHLEN and reported the blackmail attempt. SMITH
was immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he
was "still in intelligence work".
In 1964 and afterwards NOSENKO denied that he had played
any personal role in the case. He explained that as a
junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time,
working on correspondents, he would not have taken part in
so important an operation. He said that he had heard about
the operation from V. M. KOVSHUK, SMITH's case officer.
(On a later occasion NOSENKO said that his only personal
role was being assigned to a phone-watch to receive
surveillance reports connected with the initial KGB approach
to SMITH.)
> GOLITSYN's Information
In February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1957 he had
read a two-volume KGB study which gave examples of successful
operations against the Embassy in Moscow. One case concerned
an American, probably single, who was either the Security
Officer or the counterintelligence representative in the
Embassy. He had a dog, and lived in an apartment in the
city or a country house outside Moscow. His Russian maid
or cleaning woman was his mistress. The KGB concluded that
the American would not succumb to ordinary blackmail and
consequently the maid, a KGB agent, was instructed to confess
to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her
will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB
tasks. The American agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed
that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters.
GOLITSYN also recalled that the American first supplied
only misinformation to the KGB, but when the KGB complained,
he provided a mixture of truth and misinformation. GOLITSYN
said the case study he read was based on a true incident
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which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure
that the operation actually resulted in a successful recruit-
ment, as was alleged in the study.
Comment:
1
Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), Embassy
Security Officer (and CIA employee) from
July 1954 to June 1956, reported to the
Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received
four letters from the KGB. The first,
received on 2 June 1956, enclosed incriminating
photographs of himself and his Russian maid and
requested him to come to a personal meeting
with KGB representatives outside the Embassy.
When he did not do so, SMITH subsequently had
received three threatening letters. In
reporting the matter to the Ambassador, SMITH
admitted having been intimate with his Russian
maid. SMITH was recalled from Moscow on
8 June 1956, and he left CIA employment a year
later. When interviewed in March 1962 on the
basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH
admitted that he had maintained his affair
with the Russian maid during most of the time
of his Moscow assignment, 20 July 1954 to
8 June 1956, and confirmed that to help her
he had in fact passed unclassified information
through her to the KGB for many months.
NOSENKO clearly ascribed the SMITH operation.
to the period when NOSENKO was in the American
Embassy Section, in 1953-1955. SMITH's state-
ment that he reported the blackmail attempt to
the Ambassador in June 1956 is confirmed. If
NOSENKO was, as he says, transferred to the
Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have
played any role in the KGB approach to SMITH.
If he played such a role, he was in the Embassy
Section in 1956, not in the Seventh Department
as he claims. If he played a role in the SMITH
case as well as in the Seventh Department
recruitment of BURGI (see p. 115), it remains
possible that he was neither an officer in the
Embassy Section nor Seventh Department and was
acting in some other KGB capacity.
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CHAPTER II
EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
What NOSENKO has said about himself, the information
about the KGB which he has provided, and the apparently
corroborative statements which Soviet officials have made
since his defection represent prima facie evidence that
NOSENKO is a former senior KGB officer. To permit a
conclusive judgment that he is a bona fide defector, the
information NOSENKO provides about his life and related
persons and events must be coherent, and his accounts of
important events must be consistent. Allowing for personal
vagaries such as lapses of memory and so forth, as well
as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information
he relates must conform within reasonable limits with that
which is known from independent and reliable sources to
the United States Government about Soviet realities and
about the events, topics and individuals NOSENKO describes.
Lastly, the information NOSENKO provides must plausibly
relate primarily to the KGB positions he held, and his
account of how he functioned in these positions must be
substantiated by verisimilar detail.
The following portions of this paper, organized in
chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this
examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims.
Notes for the Reader
In order to follow the examination as presented the
reader should note the following:
The examination tests the validity of the presumptive
evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms of coherence, consistency,
and compatibility with fact and plausibility.
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Notes for the Reader (Continued)
NOSENKO's claims are judged in the light of his own
assertions and in comparison with collateral information.
It 
is not the function of the examination to speculate
about possibly credible alternative explanations for the
paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO's statements, except when
such explanations 
are advanced by NOSENKO himself.
If there is no immediate explanatory note pointing out
the relevance or significance of some item in the text, the
reader may 
expect that the item's relevance or significance
usually will be developed in the immediately-following text.
Otherwise 
seemingly minor points are included because of
their 
aggregative significance: they will be a matter of
comment in the Summary and Conclusions section following
each major portion of the examination.
Where,
Direct questions and NOSENKO's replies about his
contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, retractions,
omissions and 
the like, are reflected in the text.
during his interrogations, it was not possible to pose
direct 
questions without furnishing NOSENKO information or
insight 
into the interrogators' purposes, the topic was
covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was
provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in
question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently
was 
not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn't
say
", 
or "
didn't comment" or "didn't indicate awareness"
and so forth, the 
reader properly may assume that the
matter 
was covered extensively.
i
In instances in which NOSENKO contradicts or retracts
earlier assertions, no more weight is necessarily given
to 
his final assertion as opposed to earlier contrary claims.
To assist the reader in following what are sometimes
lengthy and complex accounts of events, NOSENKO's narrative
is broken from time to time by a clearly identified
editorial comment which seeks to draw the reader's attention
to the relevance or significance of NOSENKO's assertions,
to what 
conclusion is drawn.
.or
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Notes for the Reader (Continued)
At the end of each episode in NOSENKO's biography
there appears a conclusion resulting from the examination
of NOSENKO's claims with respect to that period of his
life. The judgment of whether NOSENKO is a bona fide
defector is the sum of these independently drawn conclusions.
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CHAPTER III
PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY
NOSENKO's biography from birth to entry into the KGB is
relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to
establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and
his eventual eligibility for KGB service. Below are
summarized pertinent events in his early life, his study
at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and
his RU service, as reconstructed from statements he
volunteered as well as from the accounts obtained in
repeated interrogations.
Birth to 1945 NOSENKO's Account
NOSENKO was born on 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, in the
Ukraine. At the time of his birth, his father, Ivan
Isidorovich NOSENKO, was a shipyard mechanic and an evening
student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute. Shortly
after NOSENKO began kindergarten in Nikolayev, in September
1934, his father graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute
and the family moved to Leningrad, where NOSENKO started
the First Class of school in September 1935. From 1935 to
1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his father was director
of a shipyard. In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy
People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and the
family moved to Moscow, where NOSENKO completed the Sixth
Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out.
NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for
the next two years. In one, he said that on the outbreak
of hostilities he was enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval
School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished
the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Lenin-
grad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuated to
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Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.
In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow
Special Naval School required prior completion of the
Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he
and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he
completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned
to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the
Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he
completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943
NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School (then in Baku).
After just six months in Baku, without completing the
Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to
Moscow.
Comment:
NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran
away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and
that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku
and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of
Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.
NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the
Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he
resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO
received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being
hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.
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NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-
building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed.
the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer
Birth to 1945:
Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
This early life. However, this portion of his claimed
biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his
father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the
schools he claims to have attended.
Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics
(fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's
claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO
and t
the substance of his claims about his life until 1945
are accepted as true.
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Attendance at the Moscow Institute.
of International Relations (1945 ca. 1950)
In all of his accounts, NOSENKO has stated that he entered
the Institute's Faculty of International Law and English in
September 1945. He completed his first year in spring 1946.
:
In 1947, on completion of his second year at the Institute,
NOSENKO claims he received a commission as a junior lieutenant
"in the reserves"; he does not recall in what arm he received
a commission, other than being sure that it was not in the
Navy.
Comment:
Soviet students completing their second year of
higher institutions are commissioned, but in
an arm (Army, Navy, Air Force) of Soviet defense.
forces. At that time they receive their voyennyy
bilet (military booklet) which reflects their
assigned MOS and category (sostav). CIA interro-
gators were unable to resolve why NOSENKO
pleaded ignorance on this matter, and concluded
it may relate in some manner to his claims to
subsequent commissioned service in the Navy.
In 1947, also, NOSENKO married the daughter of a Soviet Army
Lieutenant General, Augustina K. TELEGINA "just after" her
father had been arrested in connection with Stalin's campaign
against Marshal Zhukov's associates. NOSENKO recalls neither
the date of that marriage, in what season of the year it
occurred, nor how long after her father's arrest. [The
significance of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO's contra-
dictory statements about when and how he obtained his divorce.
See below.]
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NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute
course was of four years' duration and that he entered the
Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years'
duration and that because he failed a state examination he
was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'
duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it
was of five. years' duration but he failed an examination
which delayed his graduation for three months.
Comment: See p..
.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB
upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
The duration of the Institute course and the
date of NOSENKO's completion are material to
the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service,
which he said followed almost immediately upon
his departure from the Institute.
Naval RU Service (ca. 1951
-
ca. 1953)
NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at
the Institute of International Relations he entered the
Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post,
finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the
intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
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The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact
that he claims it launched his intelligence career and
served as the means through which he secured appointment
to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more
years he 
claimed to have served in the RU represent a
significant period of his adult life for which he should
have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to
determining the time from which his claims about KGB service
can be judged credible.
NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his
1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of
his initial retractions and his first admission that he had
earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU
service was consequently prominent in interrogations in
1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations,
challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted
adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the
Institute on
claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as
challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-
ments with respect to his RU service. The extent of the
still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in
NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
NOSENKO's Information-1962
NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations
in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.
[He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In
September 1950 he o was offered assignments in Leningrad,
Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
no one would think he would take advantage of his father's
position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception
unit 
in Sovetskaya”
a 
Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite
Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by
monitoring the communications of American units operating in
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Returned
to Moscow and given a medical examination, he was diagnosed
to have "a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone"
and he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow
for two months. In summer 1952, again eligible for duty,
NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military-Diplomatic
Academy, but he rejected the opportunity because the
curriculum was almost identical to that of the Institute
from which he was graduated.
Korea. In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill.
In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of
Primorsk, "the former German city of Pillau". [Baltiysk, a
larger city close by Primorsk, is the former German city of
Pillau.] There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of
"agent-observation posts", in which candidates from among
Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teams and trained
as stay-behind agents in the event of war. In early 1953,
after less than six months in the Baltic assignment, NOSENKO
returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father's
dacha KGB General KOBULOV, First Deputy to then-MGB [KGB]
Chairman Beria. KOBULOV, on finding that NOSENKO did not
care for his RU assignment, invited him to consider joining
the KGB.
NOSENKO's Information-1964
He
Prior to NOSENKO's graduation he had been tentatively
assigned by the Institute's military commission to the RU,
and on the instructions of the Institute's "secret unit", he
was interviewed by a RU Colonel KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel
Department. After passing the state examination on the
second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in September 1950, when
he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior
lieutenant. He also received orders assigning him to the
Intelligence Staff of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet.
left Moscow approximately 1 October 1950, travelling for
ten days by train to his unit, which was stationed near
Sovetskaya Gavan'. He was there assigned to a Reports
Section with duties which included translating American
naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle
information of American naval forces in the Far East.
radio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO's
unit, but [contrary to what he asserted in 1962 and 1965] he
was not personally concerned with that unit's activities.
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In spring 1951 NOSENKO was promoted to the rank of
lieutenant. At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as an
"apprentice" in the Agent-Intelligence Section near
Sovetskaya Gavan', an assignment which involved subchaser.
delivery and pickup of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin.
In early 1952 NOSENKO filed by mail for divorce from
TELEGINA in a Moscow court. In April 1952 he returned to
Moscow on leave, where he visited the Naval RU Headquarters
personnel officer, Col. KALOSHIN, and requested a transfer
from the Far East. During May and June 1952 he was on
leave accrued during his two years' service in the Far
East. Following his leave, in summer 1952, NOSENKO was
ordered to proceed to Rostock but he refused and took.
unauthorized leave. (He could not learn what his actual
assignment was to be in Rostock, and he heard that the Naval
Intelligence Points in Germany were being closed down.) He
subsequently was assigned to the Baltic city of Baltiysk,
where he reported for duty with the Intelligence Staff of
the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval
Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk (sic, see p. 57),
a small town. "in Primorskiy Kray" near Baltiysk.
Comment:
Primorskiy Kray is in the Far East, as NOSENKO's
interrogators pointed out to him at the time.
NOSENKO subsequently claimed it was his earlier
post, Sovetskȧya Gavan', which was in Primorskiy
Kray, a fact known to him from the way his
letters were addressed. This is also an error.
See below.
In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents.
Comment NOSENKO also said that after refusing to go to
Rostock he himself had received training in
Moscow and then was sent to Rostock and Sassnitz,
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(Continued)
In
in East Germany, before going to Baltiysk.
retracting that claim, he explained that he
knew his CIA interrogators would not believe
that he had successfully refused the assignment
in Germany.
In August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow
for 7 to 10 days to complete the divorce proceedings which
he had initiated in the Far East. This was not regarded
as leave, but official business. He afterwards returned
to Sovetsk, but he did not like his work there, and in late
1952 he requested leave to return to Moscow to seek a transfer.
When his unit commander refused him leave, NOSENKO appealed
to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk, and because of the elder
NOSENKO's influence, was able to return to Moscow for a month's
leave in January 1953. At the end of January NOSENKO visited
the RU Personnel Officer, KALOSHIN, and stated his distaste
for his work. KALOSHIN told him to "look around", and
NOSENKO spent February 1953 "at the disposal of the Personnel
Department", not doing anything. Since he wasn't working,
he didn't receive his pay, and he lived with his parents.
Comment: Just before giving this account of his January
1953 leave, NOSENKO claimed that he spent
January and a part of February at the Kubinka
Sanitorium.
statements.
He has never reconciled these two
NOSENKO's Information-1965
Prior to his graduation from the Institute, a military
commission tentatively assigned NOSENKO to the Navy, after
which he visited a special section at the Naval Ministry
to file special forms for a security check. Although nothing
was said at the time, NOSENKO believed then that he was slated
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to join Naval Intelligence. After passing all of his
examinations, in the fall of 1950 NOSENKO received orders
calling him to active duty. Offered a choice of assignments,
NOSENKO 
chose the Far East "to prove that he was now ready.
to make 
a man of himself". Arriving in Sovetskaya Gavan' in
Primorskiy Kray (sic), NOSENKO was assigned to a Reports
Section.
Comment:
Questioned in 1965 on the location of Sovetskaya
Gavan', NOSENKO insisted that it was located in
Primorskiy Kray. Shown contemporary Soviet maps
clearly locating it in Khabarovskiy Kray,
NOSENKO angrily asserted that the map had been
falsified by his interrogators to confuse him.
NOSENKO's contention is somewhat analogous to
being stationed in Oregon for an extended;
period and thinking oneself to be in California.
In Sovetskaya Gavan' NOSENKO liked the work and did a
good job despite rigorous working and living conditions,
and 
during his service there he was commended as an out-
standing officer. NOSENKO and his officer colleagues
analyzed the product of some 300 radio intercept operators
as well as 
information received from Sakhalin and Vladivostok.
In spring, 1951, after about seven months' service,
NOSENKO was promoted to lieutenant, the normally required
time in grade of one year having been reduced to six months
for 
Far East service.
In early 1952 NOSENKO published in a local newspaper his
intent 
to 
divorce his wife, and he forwarded the necessary
legal papers to Moscow.
NOSENKO's two-year tour would not end until October or
November 1952, nor was he entitled to any leave before that
time. 
An understanding superior, however, arranged for him
to take leave in April 1952 so that he could return to
Moscow in time for his father's birthday on 1 May. On 2 May
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he reported to the Naval Ministry and was told to return
NOSENKO was on
for reassignment at the end of his leave.
leave in May and June 1952, and he remained "at the disposal
of the Naval Ministry". [According to his 1962 and 1966
versions, he was hospitalized during this period.]
In the summer of 1952 NOSENKO was offered assignments to
the RU Military-Diplomatic Academy, to a special Naval
espionage school, and to a post in Germany, but he turned
them all down. He rejected the opportunity to attend the
academy, because he had had almost all of the courses
earlier at the Institute of International Relations.
"
"Sometime after his return to Moscow from Sovetskaya
Gavan',' NOSENKO completed the formalities to secure his
divorce from TELEGINA. [According to his 1964 account,
NOSENKO visited Moscow later, from his Baltic assignment,
to complete divorce proceedings.]
In August 1952 NOSENKO received an assignment to Sovetsk,
in the Baltic, where he arrived in early September 1952.
His assignment there was as a political officer, in which
capacity he was involved with sailors being trained for
wartime sabotage missions. His main task was to prepare the
training plan for the agents, to instruct them in such
subjects as "The Foreign Policy of the USSR", and generally
to see to their needs. NOSENKO did not care for his
assignment in Sovetsk and in December 1952 he obtained leave
to spend the holidays with his parents in Moscow. In January
1953 NOSENKO and his parents visited KGB General KOBULOV
at the latter's dacha and KOBULOV, learning of NOSENKO's
dissatisfaction with the RU, suggested he consider working
for the KGB....
After New Years in 1953 NOSENKO went "to rest for several
days" at the Hertzen "House of Rest", located 65-70 kilo-
meters from Moscow near Kubinka. There he met his second
[In 1964 and 1966
wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna KOZHEVNIKOVA.
statements NOSENKO claimed he was not "resting" but was
hospitalized with tuberculosis for several weeks in January
and February.]
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NOSENKO's Information-1966 (April)
At an interview with the military placement commission
at the Institute before graduation, NOSENKO indicated that
he wanted to work in "some sort of a military organization".
Soon thereafter the chief of the Institute's special section
gave 
him a telephone number to call. NOSENKO recognized the
number as one belonging to the MGB [the predecessor of, and
hereafter 
referred to as; the KGB]. NOSENKO was invited to
an interview with KGB officials who queried him about his
background and his k knowledge of English. Later, however,
...
"
the chief of the Institute's special section informed
NOSENKO that his qualifications were unsuitable for assign-
ment to the 
KGB. During the summer of 1950 "while state
examinations were underway" [in earlier versions NOSENKO
claimed the examinations were over in June], NOSENKO began
to process for entry into the Naval RU, through Colonel
KALOSHIN, the Chief of the RU Personnel Department. He
filled out questionnaires in duplicate, wrote two auto-
biographies and, in August or September, submitted copies
of 
his diploma. [Note that this version of events omits:
any 
reference to delayed graduation caused by his having
to take a state examination a second time.] For the next
nine months, until March 1951, NOSENKO awaited being called
to RU 
service. [In earlier versions, NOSENKO claims he
entered the RU in 1949 or 1950.]
1949 1950
On 12 March 1951 NOSENKO received two orders from the
Naval Ministry, one calling him to active Naval service and
the other 
assigning him as a translator to the Intelligence
Unit of the 
Seventh Fleet in the Far East. On 13 March,
on KALOSHIN's instruction, NOSENKO reported to the Moscow
City 
Military Commission and was issued his travel documents,
and 
NOSENKO departed Moscow for his post on 16 or 17 March.
At the end 
of March NOSENKO arrived at his post near
Sovetskaya Gavan' and began work in the Reports Section of
the 
Seventh Fleet Intelligence Unit.
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At the end of April 1952 NOSENKO left Sovetskaya Gavan'
on leave, arriving in Moscow on 28 April. [Note earlier
versions in which he was transferred because of illness,
and that he was permitted to return to Moscow because of
his father's birthday.] While on leave he became ill with
tuberculosis and spent almost two months in May and June.
1952 in a sanitorium near Moscow.
During the month of July 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to
the Naval Intelligence Point of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet
in Sovetsk, in Kaliningradskaya Oblast (at the head of the
Bay of Gdansk). Sovetsk was a small village located on
the spit of land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk. [The
only Sovetsk in Kaliningradskaya Oblast is located many
miles inland from Kaliningrad, in the opposite direction
from Baltiysk. When NOSENKO was shown their locations on
contemporary Soviet maps, he insisted that he was correct,
although Primorsk, where NOSENKO had said in 1962 that he
was assigned while in the Baltic, is located on a spit of
land between Kaliningrad and Baltiysk.] NOSENKO remained
in "Sovetsk" but a short time, and he returned to Moscow
at the end of 1952 to seek another assignment. Before
his departure he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant
of the Administrative Service. [In previous versions he
claimed to have become eligible for promotion and was
promoted while in the Far East, after less then a year's
service.]
On 1 January 1953 NOSENKO and his parents were guests at
the KOBULOV dacha. NOSENKO indicated his dissatisfaction
with his RU assignment and KOBULOV promised to find him a
place in the KGB.
From the middle of January to the middle of March 1953
NOSENKO was under treatment at the sanitorium near Moscow
where he had been hospitalized in 1952, and there he became
acquainted with his second wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna
KOZHEVNIKOVA. [NOSENKO's earlier accounts either omitted
reference to this period of hospitalization, or indicated
that it was of considerably shorter duration.]
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NOSENKO's Information-1966 (October)
In his most recent account, in October 1966, NOSENKO
said that before graduation from the Institute the military
placement commission sent him to the KGB, but there he was
told that he was not qualified as a candidate because of
mediocre academic record and drinking habits. NOSENKO said
the did not mention this rejection earlier, because his
interrogators would not have believed that he ever became
a KGB officer after once being rejected.
NOSENKO also volunteered that he had "lied" when he
claimed to have entered the Naval RU in 1950. In fact,
he said, he entered the RU in March 1951 and was on active
duty in the Far East from 1951 until 1953.
Comment:
This latest assertion discredits almost all
of his earlier claims regarding entry into
the RU, including the date of his graduation
from the Institute, the timing if not the
fact of his promotion, the number, sequence,
and purposes of his visits to Moscow, his
hospitalization with tuberculosis, and his
assignment to the Baltic Fleet.
Naval RU Service: Summary and Conclusion.
According to NOSENKO's contradictory statements, which
are still unresolved after interrogations over a three-
year period, he graduated from the Institute of International
Relations in either 1949 or 1950. Before graduation, he
(a) was selected for Naval assignment, (b) sought a Naval
assignment, or (c) was selected for and rejected by the
KGB and then he sought an assignment to the RU; or,
immediately following graduation, or three months or nine
months later (in the following year), he was called to
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With neither
active Naval service and assigned to the RU.
training nor indoctrination he was assigned initially to
the Far East for nine months or three years; there he
participated in agents' operational training, or reports
work. In the latter capacity he was or was not involved
in RU radio signals intercept operations. He either never
served in the Baltic or, if he did, it was for three
months or six months, during which he either participated
in agent training or was an administrative or political
officer. He was promoted to lieutenant in the Far East
or in the Baltic, after either seven months' or thirteen
months' RU service.
Despite his claimed active commissioned service in the
Navy, NOSENKO knows nothing of Soviet Navy tradition,
doctrine, organization, or procedures. He disclaims know-
ledge of RU organization other than at the posts where he
served, "because of his junior rank". However, even at
those posts he describes neither the staff, the functions
nor the personnel intelligibly nor does he describe the
posts' actual locations.
The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was
the personnel chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no
ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East intelli-
gence staffs.
Some thirty GRU officers he did identify,
by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU
service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow,
or through his visits to Geneva.
མ་བ
11
Conclusion.
NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the
capacities at the places and times he claimed.
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CHAPTER IV.
KGB ENTRY
Comment:
Stalin died in March 1953, an event which was
accompanied by 
extraordinary repercussions.
The Ministries of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) and
State Security (
MGB) merged under the MVD, of
which Beriya became 
Minister.
a 
period of widespread reorganization entailing
There followed
the transfer or dismissal 
of many personnel.
Beriya's arrest just 
four months later in June
1953 was followed by 
another extensive (if
bloodless) purge 
and reorganization, which
culminated in the 
creation of the Committee for
State Security (KGB) 
in March 1954. Vladimir
and Evdokia PETROV, Yuri RASTVOROV, and Petr
DERYABIN, among 
others; defected in the wake
of these events.. From 
information they pro-
vided, as well as from 
that acquired from other
sources, CIA has a 
substantial amount of infor-
mation against which 
NOSENKO's accounts of this
period may be 
weighed.
For the convenience of the reader, the term
'KGB
" is used hereafter 
to refer as well to its
predecessor organizations 
in 1953-1954.
In statements volunteered in his early meetings with CIA
in 
Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO mentioned 
that he had joined the
MVD/KGB in 1953. In a biographic 
statement written immediately
after his defection, however, he asserted 
his KGB service
began in 1952, a date he 
insisted was correct even after
reminded he had earlier said 1953
.
produced a variety of dates of claimed KGB entry, ranging
Repeated interrogations
from "the beginning of 1952" to 
April 1953, all of which
were accompanied by modified 
accounts of the circumstances
of his entry (as well as of his 
earlier period of service
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in the Naval RU and of his date of graduation from the
Institute of International Relations). To the extent to
which he has been consistent at all, he has cited March 1953
as the time of his entry to the KGB.
Date of Entry
NOSENKO at his first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962,
volunteered how and when he joined the KGB. NOSENKO had
just returned from his Naval RU assignment in the Baltic,
he said, when he met KGB General KOBULOV and KOBULOV urged
him to join the KGB. NOSENKO stated that after completing
his processing, he reported for duty in the Embassy Section
of the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in
March 1953, "just after Stalin died". (Stalin died on
5 March 1953.)
Comment:
According to KGB defectors, the precise date
of entry to the KGB would not likely to be
forgotten by a KGB officer. The date is the
basis for computing length of service and is
a common entry on KGB administrative forms
periodically filled out by KGB officers in the
course of their service.
According to NOSENKO in January 1964, he transferred to
the KGB from the Naval RU "in something like 1952"; "just
after Yu. I. GUK transferred from the Second Chief Directo-
rate".
Comment:
GOLITSYN had reported that GUK was transferred
out of the Second Chief Directorate in January
1952.
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In February 1964 NOSENKO wrote a biographic statement in
which he noted that he entered the KGB in 1952, and in which
he back-dated by one year his 1962 account of his activities.
in the period 1945-1955. Although he was then reminded of
his 1962 statement and the contradiction was discussed with
him, after study he indicated his approval by signing an
official biographic statement (for the Intelligence Community)
which indicated that he entered on duty with the KGB in
about May 1952.
At the first hostile interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO
was confronted with his contradictory claims. In response,
NOSENKO stated that he returned to Moscow from the Baltic in
August 1952 [by most of his other accounts, NOSENKO returned
in January 1953] and entered the KGB on 5-7 September 1952.
By March 1953, NOSENKO stated, he had already worked in the
Embassy Section for some months against American correspon-
dents, and it was "just after Stalin's death, after the
reorganization" that he assumed responsibility for operations
against American Army Attache personnel. [NOSENKO ultimately
settled on June or July 1954 as the time of this reassignment.
See p. 84.]
k
Challenged in April 1964 to resolve the contradictions of
his earlier claims that he joined the KGB variously in
January 1952, September 1952, or March 1953, NOSENKO
asserted that the truth was that his service dated from March
1953, after Stalin's death. He went on to explain that he
finished his Institute studies in 1949 (sic), "defended his
diploma" and then failed one of the four required State
examinations. All four examinations, he said, he had to
take over again, and as a result he didn't receive his diploma
until 1950 although he "officially" graduated in 1949.
NOSENKO said that to avoid admitting "this unpleasant thing",
he claimed he joined the KGB in 1952 and after claiming that
to be a fact, "did not want to correct it, to twist it around.
again". NOSENKO went on to say that the actual date of entry
was while Stalin was still alive, on "12 or 15 March 1953"
or about 15 March 1953.
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Comment:
NOSENKO's explanation takes no account of the
that
fact that he had already said (in 1962)
he joined the KGB in March 1953.
KGB defectors describe the period immediately
following Stalin's death in the KGB as one of
extensive reorganization and uncertainty in
which new candidates were not being accepted.
Other evidence of the improbability of NOSENKO's
entering the KGB in March 1953 is discussed
below.
|
NOSENKO repeated during 1965 interrogations the date
13-15 March 1953. In 1966, however, in a written statement,
he said he entered the KGB on 2 April 1953, but a week 
later
,
in another signed statement, he said it was the "middle 
of
March 1953".
Ξε
In his final interrogation in October 1966 NOSENÃO said
The entered the KGB in March 1953 and he acknowledged 
that
he had lied, and had known at the time he was lying, when
Asked by his interrogators
he had said he joined in 1952.
why he had lied, NOSENKO said, "There was no sense.
went on to explain that because he was only an average
student and a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable
by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 
1950
;
he had tried to conceal this by adjusting his account 
by
one year, since his interrogators would not have believed
that he was eventually accepted by the KGB after 
an 
earlier
rejection.
The Role of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV
In all of his accounts NOSENKO has attributed to General
KOBULOV's initiative and intervention his entry to the KGS..
In the account which he volunteered in Geneva to 
CIA in
1962, NOSENKO said KOBULOV was a friend of the elder NOSENKO.
whom he met when the KGB General "dropped by" the NISENKO
dacha outside of Moscow, and KOBULOV at the time ("early
1953") was First Deputy to Beriya, the Minister 
of the
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then-MVD. NOSENKO said that when KOBULOV learned of NOSENKO'S
dissatisfaction with the Naval RU, KOBULOV encouraged him
to enter counterintelligence and invited him to visit the
'General's office. NOSENKO said he did not, but nevertheless.
received a week later a telephone call from the KGB Personnel
Office asking him to appear at the secretariat of General
KOBULOV and informing him that General KOBULOV had already
arranged for a building pass.
NOSENKO gave a different, somewhat more detailed account
in April 1964. In this version, he first met KOBULOV, a
friend of the NOSENKO family, in February 1953. NOSENKO said
KOBULOV had visited his father in the latter's office, and
that evening the elder NOSENKO brought him to the NOSENKO
dacha to spend the weekend. [NOSENKO had just before been
informed by his interrogators that KOBULOV was at that time
posted in Germany, not in Moscow.] According to NOSENKO,
KOBULOV was in Moscow on a short visit from Germany. "My
father invited him to spend Saturday night and Sunday...On
Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV asked me what
I was doing, and I told him I was at the disposal of the
(Naval RU) Personnel Department and that I didn't want to
return to the Baltic." NOSENKO said that KOBULOV offered
to call the KGB Personnel Office and have them "look
NOSENKO over", and NOSENKO assented, after which he twice
visited the Personnel Office where he filed completed forms.
NOSENKO asserted that KOBULOV did not forget, because "just
as soon as STALIN died, KOBULOV immediately returned from
Germany" after being "summoned by Beriya or someone", and
on "maybe the 10th of March" NOSENKO received a call from
KOBULOV's assistant. NOSENKO claimed he reported to KOBULOV's
office; and although he waited two hours to see the General,
the latter was busy elsewhere. Instead of seeing KOBULOV,
however, NOSENKO said he was finally taken to the office
of Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief SHUBNYAKOV, who
assigned him forthwith to the Embassy Section of the American
Department.
In April 1964 NOSENKO introduced a new variant. He said
that he met KOBULOV while accompanying his parents on a
visit in January to KOBULOV's dacha [NOSENKO had previously
graphically described KOBULOV's weekend visit at the elder
NOSENKO's), KOBULOV intervened in his behalf, and he was
called to the KGB Personnel Office to be interviewed and to
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receive necessary forms.
NOSENKO stated that he heard
nothing further until after Stalin's funeral, when he was
summoned to KOBULOV's office and afterwards assigned to
the Second Chief Directorate.
During the July 1965 interrogations NOSENKO retracted
his earlier claim that KOBULOV and his father had been close
personal friends. He stated that his father's relationship
with KOBULOV was not personal, and that KOBULOV had never
visited the NOSENKOS.
In a biographic statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO
said that he had met KOBULOV but twice, once on 1 January
1953 at the latter's dacha, and the second and last time in
the elder NOSENKO's office as NOSENKO's father and KOBULOV
were departing to attend Stalin's funeral. On that latter
occasion, NOSENKO claimed, KOBULOV promised to concern him-
self with NOSENKO's entry into the KGB and it was several
days later that NOSENKO was summoned to KOBULOV's office'
and told he was appointed to the KGB.
Comment:
General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV was a career
security official, but from the immediate post-
war period until after Stalin's death he was
not assigned to KGB Headquarters. As of 1952,
he was posted to Germany with the Chief
Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad, then
directly subordinate not to the MVD but to the
Council of Ministers and latterly to the
Ministry of Foreign Trade. Until he returned
from Germany in March 1953 to assume the
position of Beriya's deputy, he had no office
in KGB Headquarters. KOBULOV was arrested
with Beriya in June 1953, and also later executed.
In light of the foregoing, it is improbable
that KOBULOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's
appointment to the KGB at the times NOSENKO
claimed. If KOBULOV ever interceded in
NOSENKO's behalf, it is probable that NOSENKO
would later have been purged after KOBULOV's
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Comment:
(Continued).
and Beriya's arrest and execution. NOSENKO's
eventual retraction of his assertion that his
father and KOBULOV were intimate acquaintances
makes it the more unlikely that KOBULOV played
any role at any time in NOSENKO's appointment
to the KGB.
Eligibility
Throughout the various versions NOSENKO has provided
about his entry to the KGB, he has emphasized how influen-
tial was his father's prominent position in the Soviet
Government.
Comment: In the period 1953-1954, during which NOSENKO
claimed he entered the KGB, it was KGB policy
to avoid recruiting the children of senior
Soviet officials.
NOSENKO asserts that he was rejected for KGB appointment
upon graduation from the Institute of International Relations.
Comment: Other than claiming to have completed an
undistinguished period of service with the Naval
RU, NOSENKO acknowledges that he was no more
eligible in 1953 for KGB appointment than he
was at the time of his rejection.
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NOSENKO states that in March 1953 he was already twenty-
five and a half years old, a member of only the Komsomol,
and that he had not been recommended for Party membership.
He further claimed that on entry to the KGB he became
secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organi-
zation.
Comment:
Eligibility for Party membership, if not
membership itself, is a requisite for KGB
appointment. By Komsomol statutes of that time,
twenty-five was at that time the maximum age.
Thus, at the time of NOSENKO's claimed KGB
appointment, he was within six months of being
dropped by the Komsomol as well as still
Sunqualified for Party membership. He could
not have been secretary of the Second Chief
Directorate Komsomol organization, as discussed
on p. 338.
NOSENKO has referred frequently to having contracted
tuberculosis for which he was periodically hospitalized.
Comment
According to KGB defectors familiar with the
standards in force at the time, no candidate
was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.
KGB Processing for Entry
NOSENKO has stated (in chronological order) that at his
initial interview with a KGB personnel, it was not necessary
for him to complete any forms or questionnaires since the
KGB had his Naval RU file; that he was told that the KGB
would request the Naval RU file and meanwhile he was given
three copies of a four to six-page biographic form to complete
at home; and (at his last interrogation in 1966) that he
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never spoke to any KGB personnel officers nor visited the
personnel office (and thus completed no forms provided by
them)
Comment:
The most important document filled out by
prospective KGB officers was a detailed 16-page
personal history questionnaire, Anketa
spetsialngo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB, which
was completed in one copy only. Classified
even when blank, the form was not permitted to
be taken home. KGB defectors have described
completion of the form "as an experience not:
likely to be forgotten". NOSENKO omits in all
accounts reference to other documents which are
known to have been required in connection with
a KGB officer's processing for duty.
NOSENKO insisted that he took no physical examination in
connection with processing for KGB entry.
Comment A medical examination was a routine and mandatory
part of a KGB candidate's processing. Former
KGB defectors could think of no instance in
which the examination could be waived, parti-
cularly for a candidate with a recorded history
of tuberculosis.
NOSENKO claims in all of his accounts that he entered the
KGB building and, with a pass obtained at the Pass Office,
was permitted to proceed without escort. NOSENKO specifically
asserted that the name of the interviewer did not appear on
the pass.
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Comment:
Persons not holding a valid KGB identity
document were not permitted entry to or move-
ment in the building without escort. The
interviewer's name did appear on the building
pass. The interviewer's name was essential
to the issuance of the pass: the interviewer
had complete responsibility for the visitor's
custody while on KGB premises.
Initial Service in KGB (1953)
NOSENKO stated that in the period of Beriya, in March-
June 1953, the two existing directorates were the First
Chief Directorate, which was the foreign intelligence
directorate, and the Second Chief Directorate, the counter-
intelligence directorate. The designations were later
reversed for a few months, he said, by Kruglov, Beriya's
successor.
Comment:
Beriya reversed the designations of the First
and Second Chief Directorates in March 1953,
and they were not changed back until March 1954.
NOSENKO does not know how his own directorate
was designated either at the time he allegedly
entered on duty or during his entire first
year of KGB service.
.
NOSENKO described the KGB identity document of the period,
but in spite of repeated questioning could not recall any-
thing unusual about it.
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Comment:
"
Twice, following Stalin's death in March 1953
and again following Beriya's arrest in June
1953, all KGB identity documents were temporarily
recalled for revalidation. On both occasions
new stamps were placed on the document, lacking
which the bearer could no longer enter the KGB
installation. KGB defectors state that the
events were the topic of numerous anecdotes at
the time.
NOSENKO claims he received no training in the KGB, but
was assigned operations responsibilities immediately upon
reporting for duty. He had explained that training was
unnecessary because of his Naval RU experience.
Comment:
NOSENKO's lack of training is unlike that of
any other KGB defector. His Naval RU service,
by NOSENKO's own account, provided little if
any preparation for his subsequent KGB duties.
11
NOSENKÖ stated that his initial KGB basic pay was 1700
rubles as a case officer, plus secrecy, language and
longevity pay, plus 500 rubles "rank pay" as a lieutenant.
He recalled that there was one year, 1954, when KGB officers
did not receive the pay for rank.
Comment:
KGB officers' rank pay was abolished in
September 1952 and not restored until April
1954, a period which covers NOSENKO's first
year of claimed service in the KGB.
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NOSENKO claimed that he was promoted to the rank of senior
lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB.
Comment: All promotions in the KGB were frozen from the
time Beriya became Minister in March 1953
until late 1953. NOSENKO's actual sequence of
promotions has never been established.
He has
also claimed this promotion occurred in 1952
and in 1954. See p. 351.
NOSENKO acknowledged that his qualifications for continued
KGB service were probably reviewed in connection with the
purges following both Stalin's death and Beriya's arrest,
during which reviews numerous negative factors in his back-
ground would have come to light. He stated, however, that
he could only assume that the important and influential
position of his own father outweighed the negative factors.
Comment:
NOSENKO has never mentioned any influence his
father had on his KGB service aside from that
exercised through KOBULOV, who was himself
arrested and executed.
Other Aspects Relevant to 1953 KGB Service
NOSENKO insisted that the KGB was organized from components
of the MVD not earlier than late 1954 or early 1955.
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Comment:
The KGB was organized in March 1954, in a final
reform of 
Beriya's organization of Soviet
security agencies. Preceded by a series of
purges, the inception of the KGB would presumably
be memorable to a 
KGB officer serving in Moscow
Headquarters at 
the time.
NOSENKO stated that the MVD Intelligence Directorate
(
subsequently to 
become the KGB First Chief Directorate)
was located in 
1953 in four buildings, including the
Agricultural Exhibition 
and the "KI (Committee of Infor-
mation) Building".
Comment: The Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI
Building" "were one and the same. From his
statement, NOSENKO is unaware that the KI
(a combined foreign intelligence agency)
ceased to exist 
in 1951, a matter perhaps
unfamiliar 
to a KGB officer serving at a
substantially later time, but one which
other KGB officers serving in Moscow in
1953 
recalled easily.
NOSENKO did not know where the Chief Directorate of the
Militia 
was located 
in 1953-1954.
Comment:
According to KGB defectors, a staff officer in
the 
Counterintelligence Directorate at the time
would have had 
frequent occasion to deal with
the Chief 
Directorate of the Militia.
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KGB Entry:
Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO's assertions regarding the KGB in the 1953-1954
period throw no more light on the actual date of his KGB
entry than did his claims of when he transferred from the
Naval RU; the contradictions and inconsistencies are
interrelated.
It is possible that a former KGB officer, relating the
truth as he recalls it about events occurring ten years
earlier, could be inconsistent; that he could forget his
date of entry, not remember what administrative procedures
were, fail to recall the circumstances of the organization
he joined were, be inaccurate about what his pay was, and
be vague on what his KGB identification document looked
like. Recognizing that administrative regulations and
procedures are on occasion honored in the breach, it is
also possible that NOSENKO was accepted by the KGB despite
the fact that he was the son of a senior official, that he
had tuberculosis, that he was unqualified for Party member-
ship, that he had been previously rejected and all at a
time when the KGB was not accepting new recruits.
The probability of these events being coincident, however,
is remote. On examination, NOSENKO's latest admission, that
he "actually" entered the KGB in March 1953, is no better
substantiated than earlier accounts citing other dates.
Conclusion
NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner nor at the
time he claimed.
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CHAPTER V
AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(ca. 1953-June 1955)
NOSENKO claims to have served in the American Embassy
Section of the American Department (Second Chief Directorate)
from his entry in the KGB until June 1955. His targets
during this period were at first American correspondents
residing in Moscow and later Army Attache personnel of the
American Embassy in Moscow. His assignment involving
American correspondents 1 lasted anywhere from six to eighteen
months (depending on the various dates he claimed he entered
the KGB). His involvement with the Army Attaches lasted
from sometime in 1954 until his transfer to the Seventh
Department in June 1955.
NOSENKO has
other KGB actio avoid discussion of his own or
during this entire period which he
characterized on occasion as "not relevant" or "of no
consequence". He has repeatedly stated that he "found
himself" only after this initial KGB service in the American
Embassy Section. Until then, he asserted, he was a wastrel
and "did not pay attention to the work". (He has variously
dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955 when he
transferred to the Seventh Department; in June 1956 in
connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI 06
case; and after August 1956 when the death of his father
forced him to pull himself together.).
Operations Against American Correspondents
NOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details KGB
work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow.
in 1953-1954 by saying that, as a new, very junior employee
he had no access to operational files and did not partici-
pate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
ca. 1953-June 1955)
Although able to identify correspondents in Moscow who were
then recruited KGB agents, 
NOSENKO learned this information
either in conversations with 
his superior [V.A.] KOZLOV or
at some point and in some undefined 
way after he no longer
NOSENKO made clear that
was working against these 
targets.
he was not the case officer responsible for the more important
"KOZLOV himself 
was working with them, the
correspondents:
chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO 
with SHAPIRO S 
06
wife. I also know that 
KOZLOV was working with (WHITNEY] 06
For each of these persons
and with (Andrew J.) STEIGER
.
According
there was an operational fife which I did not see.
to NOSENKO, he was in no way 
involved with STEIGER 
and 06
06 [Edmund STEVENS, American 
correspondents who he alleged 
were
recruited agents of the 
KGB.
06
"1
Comment: [SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by
GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received
from NOSENKO. SHAPIRO'S KGB agent 
cryptonym,
known to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN, appears 
in the
The KGB
CHEREPANOV papers (see p.309).
defector Nikolay KHOKHLOV in April 1954 06
identified the Polish-born 
wife of WHITNEY 
as
a KGB agent, an allegation which 
she denied.
1
1
NOSENKO said his early months in the job were spent
reading personality (not operational
) files on a number 
of
the correspondents in Moscow 
(none of which indicated the
individual's developmental 
or agent status) and familiarizing
Later NOSENKO was assigned the
himself with KGB methods.
"agent network" or drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics
surrounding four of the 
correspondents, SHAPIRO, GILMORE,
SALISBURY and WHITNEY . He 
met with his agents periodically
to determine whether they had developed 
any important infor-
mation. His superior KOZLOV 
often went along to the meetings
with NOSENKO, first to show 
him how to handle the agents and
afterward whenever something 
interesting would begin to
develop. In fact, according to 
NOSENKO, KOZLOV would
accompany him to meetings 
with these Soviet citizens-
agents
when there was even a hint 
that something of interest might
0606,06
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca. 1953-June 1955)
develop. NOSENKO has described some of these agents in
general terms, 
but for all but a few he recalled neither
their names nor 
personalia concerning them.
06
06.
KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY
On the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO
stated 
that he 
was taken directly to the offices of the
American Embassy 
Section. There he met the section chief;
V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO 
that he would take over the
work of the 
departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy
TORMOZOV, in operations 
against American correspondents in
Moscow.
I think
When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, he
found 
a desk in Room 
615 and, "There were three other guys
sitting there. At first 
I was running traces, and at the
same time I was reading 
the files on journalists..
there were 
seven files in all, and I didn't see any other."
NOSENKO listed these files 
as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy 06,06
GILMORE (as well as ones 
on GILMORE's wife (SEREBRYANKOVA 06
and her sister CHERNYSHEVA)
WHITNEY 06
Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas
06 06
·06
NOSENKO identified [SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours"
He 
said that 
WHITNEY] "worked for us while he was in Moscow
and gave us some material, but 
he refused to work for us
when he left 
the country" GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an
active recruitment target 
in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO
did not know whether 
he was recruited. Likewise, he did
not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953.
06
NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read
during 
the early period 
of his KGB service were develop-
mental files (delo 
formulyar) rather than the operational
files of the agents. 
The developmental files were less
sensitive, and from 
them "you would never be able to figure
out whether he (the 
subject of the file) is an agent or
not". NOSENKO explained 
that, once a person became an agent,
another file is set up, and 
these agent files were held by
the chief of the section
, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he
read the files on 
the seven persons "slowly and made some
extracts for myself 
in my personal log--such things as
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notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not
remember". He was also given the files on 
the agents ·
surrounding these correspondents, their 
drivers,
and cooks.
Agents Reporting on Correspondents
maids,
NOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents
who were reporting off SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, 
SALISBURY and the
GILMORES and met them regularly to 
learn whether "anything
was new, whom did SHAPIRO meet, 
what might be interesting
in his behavior, what might be suspicious in 
his behavior
,
He then 
reported to KOZLOV 
and
whom he is contacting, etc".
would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations
with the agents. Asked to describe 
these meetings, NOSENKO
replied:
06
I would
"Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO].
meet drivers about three times a month or even two
times. Of At the meeting I would ask the driver what
was new
in [SHAPIRO's 
behavior since our last meeting
,
whether SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with forei-
gners, about his meetings with Russians
, were they
conducted openly or, perhaps, was 
(SHAPIRO walking 
06
And then the man [agent]
behind the person he met.
would begin his report. Of course, if he spots
anything suspicious he calls immediately
, and I
Otherwise, I 
would
would see him the next morning.
tell him at the meeting that I would see him again
in about ten days or in two weeks, but if 
there 
was
something interesting he should call 
immediately.
Upon
It was the same with the maid and 
the cook.
returning to the office I would have to report to
KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally 
or in
writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK 
[
also of
the American Embassy Section] had a 
meeting with 
his
agents, he too had to report immediately 
to KOZLOV.
If the meetings were taking place late 
in the day
and lasted until midnight or later 
and there were
no written materials submitted at the 
meeting, I
could go home and then report the next 
morning."
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KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various
agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was
'teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something'
interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't
yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint
in a case of some other case officer.
NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and
clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and
their families. Asked to describe them, he said:
It
:
"My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who
was working at GILMORF's place. She also worked
at the Associated Press later. Her codename was
'AGLODINA', a funny one. (While reviewing a list
of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow, NOSENKO
in the fall of 1965 identified one Yelena S.
KOSIENKO as his former agent "AGLODINA". At that
time he told CIA that he had taken over KOSIENKO.
from TORMOZOVÁ upon entering the American Embassy
Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked
for and reported on GILMORE's successor, Richard 06
KASISCHKE NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO. "never
provided any interesting information.) "My second
agent was a chauffeur whose cryptonym, I think,
SERGEY'. I think he was driving for WHITNEY 06
Then I also had [SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little
fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, this
was my agentura [agent network]
was
Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this net-
work in terms of the number and type of agents targetted
against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true
names and could not provide personality information on any
of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all
river because they were turned over often.
NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled
the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office as secretary;
this agent had earlier worked in the offices of Moscow News,
an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.
passed by like a
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NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling
ten to twelve agents in operations against the correspon-
dents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more
experienced case officers might have as many as fifteen.
'NOSENKO described his agentura as follows:
Target
Eddy GILMORE C
06
Thomas WHITNEY]
Henry SHAPIRO 16
06
Harrison SALISBURY
name.
Agents
Two agents, the cook and the
driver; one operational contact,
a part-time cleaning girl; and
a girlfriend of [GILMORF's sister-06
in-law and GILMORE's Russian] wife.
06,11
One agent, his driver, "SERGEY"
06
Three agents; SHAPIRO's secretary
and his chauffeur, plus an old
woman who was a relative of
C6 SHAPIRO's wife and lived with
6 the SHAPIROS in Moscow.
(The
secretary and chauffeur later
worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and
reported on him to NOSENKO;
CG BRODNEY temporarily took SHAPIROS 06
place in Moscow. of
Two agents; SALISBURY's driver,
and a part-time cleaning girl.
...
NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral",
in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report.
The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-
language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His
cryptonym was "RAKETA", but NOSENKO could not recall his true
The second "VOLODINA", was a female teacher in this
same program who instructed some of the correspondents, and
Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the
When NOSENKO was relieved of his
true name of "VOLODINA".
responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over.
all of his agents to other case officers in the American
Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINA",
whom he continued to handle in his work with Army Attaches.
г
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Operations Against U.S. Army Attache Personnel
NOSENKO claimed specific responsibility for work against
American Army Attaches during twenty months of 1954-55, a
period in which NOSENKO claimed no supervisory responsibility
to divert his attention from personal operational duties.
(NOSENKO, explaining why he did not know more details about
the Embassy, Section's targets while he was its deputy chief
in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy
overseeing subordinates. Hence, NOSENKO continued, he could
s would
not be expected to remember as many such details as
be possible had he been a case officer working daily on only
four or five targets. Elsewhere, he contrasted operations
against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a
few days, with the work against the service attaches and
diplomats permanently stationed in Moscow, who could be
studied systematically and slowly.)
NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the
American Department case officer responsible for operations
against Army Attaches he received and was responsible for
assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the
individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned infor-
mation received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelli-
gence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; and
the microphones which were emplaced about a year before
NOSENKO entered the American Department.
Comment:
NOSENKO has said variously that the microphones
in the Army Attache offices were his most
valuable source of information on his targets
of 1954-1955; that he knew nothing of these
microphones until he re-entered the Embassy
Section in 1960; and that he learned of their
existence during 1953-1955 but not where any
were located.
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Information was also received according to NOSENKO from the
network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language 
instructors,
and other agents in the Embassy; permanent and 
roving
surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; 
fixed 
observation
posts next to, across from and near the 
Embassy; advance
notification of intent to travel by the 
attaches and 
their
itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, 
including
surveillance, agent networks, the Militia
, and the 
military.
The point of collecting and assimilating 
this information,
NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what 
the military
attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to 
control 
their
Far less important 
was
intelligence collection activities.
the goal of recruiting military attaches; NOSENKO knew of
only a few instances when this was attempted
, and all of
these efforts allegedly failed.
The KGB's principal interest in control rather than
recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation 
for knowing 
little
about the backgrounds and personal lives of 
his targets--such
information, he stated, simply was not pertinent 
to the
He 
has also used this 
explana-
primary mission of control.
tion to support his assertion that there were no recruitments
of American military personnel during 
this period.
Comment:
NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB's mission was
to control rather than to recruit American
military attaches is contradicted by the
emphasis KGB tradition and doctrine place on
conducting operations against the United
States, the "main enemy", in the KGB parlance,
in this case American officials with access to
classified information, who were residing in
the Soviet Union.
In the USSR, especially in the early 1950's
prior to the U-2 reconnaissance, the 
Service
Attache travel program was the primary means
by which the U.S. Armed Forces acquired intelli-
gence information on the Soviet 
Union's
The prevention
military-industrial complex.
or inhibition of this collection activity fell
consequently to KGB components concerned 
with
the security of military-industrial installations,
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Comment:
(Continued)
with transportation facilities, and with the
geographic regions to which the Service
Attaches travelled. Approval of Service
Attache travel itineraries was not within the
competence of a case officer within the Embassy
Section; the determination would have to have
been made by officials concerned with the
USSR's military and industrial security and
aware of reciprocal privileges being extended
to Soviet Service Attaches in the United
States, matters involving the GRU as well as
the KGB. An Embassy Section case officer
would have as a matter of course monitored
reports of Service Attaches' travel, searching
for personal vulnerabilities among his targets,
and assisted local KGB elements in setting up
provocations outside of Moscow. NOSENKO,
however, has included neither of these latter
functions as having been among his responsi-
bilities.
Custody of Case Files on Army Attache Personnel
"Sometime in the first half of 1954" NOSENKO said, he
was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent
cases, and from then until his transfer from the American
Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations
against the officer personnel of the Army Attache's office.
NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files.
to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files
is presented below.
.
-8 April 1964: "I took over the Army Attache cases from
Nikolay KHRENOV. When I was leaving in 1955, I turned
the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."
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-10 April 1964: "I made a mistake [when] I said I
accepted the cases from KHRENOV.... I accepted the cases
from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning
of 1954."
-15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned
over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned
to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked
when the PETROVS defected in Australia; he explained that
he was not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them
to another officer. "If KISLITSYN came back from Australia]
in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was some-
one else.”
-18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the Embassy Section
in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents.
BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the
files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV.
BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over
to me...
Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and
I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants.'
"
NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed
responsibilities for the Attaches. As noted above, he said
on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning'
of 1954. IIe had earlier said that he worked on the corres-
pondents "only about six months". If the date of March 1953,
which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is
correct, this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953.
On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned
over the correspondent cases and began work against the
Attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred
in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could
not remember when he changed assignments.
Agents Reporting on Army Attaches
Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network
(agentura) at his disposal in operations against Army
Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO
replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers...about ten
persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the
cryptonym 'DMITRIYEV'………. These additional two agents,
about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this
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network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from
the American Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent
about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met.
three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. The
Assistant Army Attaches used a pool of five drivers at
random, all of whom were his agents, NOSENKO said. Apart
from the permanent driver for the senior Attache, none
was targetted against specific members of the attache
office.
Comment:
As noted earlier, NOSENKO named "VOLODINA" and
"RAKETA" as agents he used against correspondents
and against Army Attache targets, but he never
again referred to them and, in describing his
own activities, he never indicated how or in
what cases they were used.
According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting
agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile,
the main source
of information on the Army Attaches being the microphones in
their offices.
་
12
Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this
position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache
06 Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor (Fillmore K. MEARNS 06
Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an
English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge
of English in order to overhear conversations or read
letters without taking them outside".
Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was
" and she
his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, cryptonym "SHVEDOVA,
was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, [Ira 06
RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin
woman, from whom he never obtained anything of interest.
They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.
"
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Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO named
"He
Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various attaches.
reported where they went, what they said, whether they took
notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages
with them, and so on.
11
When viewing photographs (see below) in September 1964,
NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as his former agent
"SERVIZNIY". He had been working in the Embassy since its
establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in
VOROBYEV had no
NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks.
direct connection with the Army Attaches, and NOSENKO said
he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to
handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was
delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone
listings of the Embassy, issued monthly.
11
"DMITRIYEV's true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV;
but
NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought,
was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who
worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and
elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires
and other wires he had observed on the top floors. Like
: VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEY" had no direct connection with the
Army Attaches.
Comment:
Elsewhere NOSENKO described an electrician who
provided some technical information on the
Embassy, but he related him to his second tour
in the American Embassy Section in 1960-1962
and did not then claim that the electrician was
his agent.
1
In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260
biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American
Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the
person involved and short biographic notes, including his
name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through
these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photo-
graphs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV
1
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and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYFV was familiar,
adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown
the Embassy biographic cards on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he
identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955
period in the American Department and equated them to the
cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when
shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as
"chauffeur for the military attache," NOSENKO exclaimed:
"Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a
good photograph of SHNYRYEV.
NOSENKO's Targets
Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel
for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955,
NOSENKO orally listed the following names: ["MICKELSON,
MEARNS, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and
CARDELLA."
06,06,06, 06, 06, 06, 06, 06
Comment: In the order as given by NOSENKO, the list
comprises two generations of Army Attaches in
Moscow. It is neither in alphabetical order
nor chronological according to date or service
in Moscow. It is, however, in descending
order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through
Captains MULE and STROUD to Chief Warrant
Officer CARDELLA.
06
06.
06
06
MICKELSON
Oh
NOSENKO correctly identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a
08 [colonel and the Army Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955,
PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, 06
and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked.
about agents who might have been working against (MICKELSON, 06
NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational
contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON]'s maid,06
whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA. In addition to
these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was 06
his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember.
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NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about
06 [MICKELSON] from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or
surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruit-
ment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or
derogatory information on CHEMICKELSON from any source.
об
56
Comment: MICKELSON was involved in at least two
06
incidents inside the Soviet Union which
NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was
arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of
having photographed a bridge. In August 1954.
CL MICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photo-
graphy south of Kharkov; on this occasion he
was held for two hours before being released.
It is judged that such events, particularly
those staged by the KGB, would be known to the
KGB case officer responsible for the attache
officer concerned.
MEARNS
06.
NOSENKO accurately identified Fillmore K. MEARNS) as
[MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsi-
ble case officer. There were two agents and one operational
contact working against MEARNS 16 of these, NOSENKO could
recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported
earlier on MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to over-
hear MEARNS conversations, NOVIKOVA was instructed to
search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find,
but she never overheard or found anything of interest to
the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that [MEARNS' personal effects 06
were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to
Moscow from the United States, and that all his service
records had been discovered and photographed. (NOSENKO
has told this same story about MICKELSON.) NOSENKO described 06
06 MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had 06
Deen and said that information from concealed microphones
showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest
concerning him was received from these microphones or from
telephone taps.
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06.
RICHARDS
06
NOSENKO correctly identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a
08 Tieutenant colonel who served as an Assistant Army Attache] 08
in Moscow. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO 06
could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym
"SHVEDOVA", but she had never provided any worthwhile
information about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers
reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from
them.
06
Comment: RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to
July 1956. There was a microphone in the office
which he shared first with MICKELSON and later
with MEARNS 06
06
06 RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was
his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman
who had a heart attack during the period she
was employed by him, an incident which was
not recalled by NOSENKO.
For about four months of his Moscow tour
06 RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from
Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During
these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor
conditions and wages in the United States and,
on one occasion, had her record her speech on
his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and
unmarried at the time. In another context,
NOSENKO named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent during
1960-1962 but did not relate her to RICHARDS] 06
or to the 1953-1955 period.
06 RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (the
diminutive of Vladimir) as his principal
driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya's
father was a rich jeweler in Moscow at the time
of the Revolution. Volodya himself was well
educated and, on one occasion while picnicking
outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with
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Comment:
06
(Continued)
36 [RICHARDS] about the Revolution, propaganda, and
news media. NOSENKO 
did not know of Volodya
who, as RICHARDS & driver, was 
NOSENKO's 
agent
by NOSENKO's own account.
FELCHLIN
06
NOSENKO correctly identified Howard L. FELCHLIN] as a
lieutenant colonel who served as 
Assistant Army Attache] in 
08
Moscow. By far the most aggressive 
of his targets and hence
the object of special interest, NOSENKO 
said [FELCHLIN served 
08
in the Soviet Union during 
1954 and part of 1955, until
NOSENKO did not recall
being declared persona non grata.
the names of any agents specifically targetted against
08 FELCHLIN, although he thought [FELCHLIN] must have had a maid 08
Additionally, NOSENKO
who would have been a KGB agent.
08 said, the Assistant Army Attaches shared a pool of cars and
Unable to recall the
drivers, and these were his agents
.
08 precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to
some event regarding Soviets 
stationed in the United States
for which the Soviet Government decided 
to reply in kind.
NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used 
to expel
08 [FELCHLIN], but said the action was based on information which
had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents.
✓ For example, [FELCHLIN] had been caught taking some 
photo-
graphs and a report had been written
; along with other
08 similar indications of [FELCHLIN's 
activities and 
reports of
agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report 
was filed away
NOSENKO was 
questioned further 
on
for possible future use.
He said
NOSENKO
C8 FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations.
08 then that [FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata,
and that no other attaches 
had been involved.
explained his having but few details concerning this action
by the fact that it took place after 
NOSENKO had transferred
from the American Department to the 
Seventh Department in
June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of 
FELCHLIN's background
.
08
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Comment:
08
FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman
and a diplomatic courier before arriving in
July 
1953 as an Assistant Army Attache 08 He
served in the 
latter capacity for one year,
until July 
1954, when he was expelled. He had
previously served in Austria and West Germany
and had been in 
official contact with known
GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the
United 
States. During his entire tour in
Moscow he was the object of intense KGB
surveillance.
08 Shortly after his arrival in September 1953
FELCHLIN
, with fellow Assistant Army Attache 08
08 Martin J. MANHOFF and two Air Force Attaches, 08
took a train trip to Siberia, 
the first trip
permitted 
such Americans in many years. Six
months later, on 
25 March 1954, the Soviet
newspaper Trud carried an article falsely
alleging that FELCHLIN and his companions had
lost some "
spy documents" on the train. On
another occasion, while travelling with a
British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to 08
his train 
compartment to find a scantily clad
Soviet female 
in his berth. NOSENKO recalled
neither of these incidents.
In June 1954, while in the company of
Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant 06,08,06
Army Attache, FELCHLIN] was arrested in Kiev
by a 
Soviet Army officer for photographing a
military 
target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned
YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked
for an identification, NOSENKO said that he
had heard 
it and that he thought YEAGER was 06
08 
the Air 
Attachel.) A large crowd gathered and,
after some jostling, 
FELCHLIN and YEAGER were
taken to 
a Militia station where they were
ordered to sign a confession. They were held
eleven 
hours, and their arrest caused the¨¨
American 
Ambassador to deliver a strong protest
note FELCHLIN 
was told on 3 July 1954 to
depart 
the Soviet Union within 48 hours.
06 Major Walter A. MCKINNEY
NEY
) the American Air 06
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ca. 1953-June 1955)
Comment:
(Continued)
06
Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling
companions at the time the "spy notes" were
allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata
at the same time. Ambassador Bohlen success-
fully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal,
that his personal plane be allowed into the
USSR to fly FELCHLIN and (MCKINNEY out. In 06,06
February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe
the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN] 06
left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch, as
he was no longer in the American Department
at the time. Told that the expulsion took
place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the
correct date.
06
Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and
Cb [FELCHLIN] immediately recognized his photograph
and name as one of the chauffeurs assigned to
the office of the Army Attache at the Moscow
Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip 06.
outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that
the Attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either
"Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or
"Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to
distinguish him from another chauffeur with
the same name. FELCHLIN] said that SHNYRYEV 06
drove primarily for the Army Attache himself,
but sometimes drove for the Assistant Army
Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was
not well, suffered from war wounds, and had
continuing chest or lung trouble. Asked whether
SHNYRYEV had any medical problem; NOSENKO said
he was not aware of any.
06 [FELCHLIN] said his maid Dora FEDOROVA was
in her 50's. When she spoke with [FELCHLIN] 06
about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a
month, which seemed excessive, :::D:D:D:D:D:HKELECHLIN 06
offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two
days later she returned and accepted. She
spoke little English. Other maids came to the
back door of [FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with06
her, and suspecting that they were reporting to
FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it.
06
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1953-June 1955)
Comment:
(Continued)
In the
FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy
gave her full name to columnist Drew Pearson
with a statement that she was one of the chief
Ispies and the local "boss" of the Embassy net-
work.. Pearson printed the allegation.
summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, 06
the maid approached FELCIILIN with the article,
waved it in his face, and accused him of being
06
Pearson's source. NOSENKO did not recognize
FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or
reading of this incident.
31
BENSON
.06.
06
06
08 NOSENKO correctly identified his target John S. BENSON
as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not 08.
recall the names of any agents working against BENSON] but 06
Ob said that BENSON was with MULE] and [STROUD] (see below) in-06,06
09 Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB
with electronic ":
'
spying" devices. They were declared
persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory infor-
mation on BENSON from any other source.
10% C
06 STROUD
06
06
08 NOSENKO correctly identified William R. STROUD pas
captain and an Assistant Army Attache 08 The only agents
working against him were the Army Atfache drivers. From
concealed microphones, the KGB learned before STROUD's 06
arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of
a
electronic spying apparatus: He was with BENSON] and [MULE] 06:06
10 in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with
them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB
knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any
source.
.06.
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Comment:
06
-
06
06
STROUD, with BENSON and MULE) was the victim
of the Soviets' seizure of technical equip-
ment in Stalingrad] and was declared persona :D
non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 09
he travelled to Kharkov from Moscow with First
Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an American 06
defector living there. According to NOSENKO,
06 [SISCOE] was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA
officer. The visit of ex-FBI agent SISCOE and 08,06
a military officer to an American defector is
judged to be an event in which the KGB would
have taken interest and one which the Attache's
KGB case officer would find memorable.
[MULE] 06
06
NOSENKO correctly identified Walter MULE] as an
Assistant Army Attache and as such said that he was the case
officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational
06 approach to MULE) in which he himself participated: In 1953
or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to
Soviets in the United States with the promise of money and
a new life.
After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided
to try the same measures, MULE was selected.06 He was only a
08 (captain) despite his lengthy service in the Army and infor-
mation from concealed microphones indicated that he was often
disparaged by the other Attaches. When MULE received letters of
from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned
these over to the KGB. From this mail it was understood
06 that MULE did not have a house in the United States but
lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two
Cochildren, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for
an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great
an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB
appointed N.M. BORODIN, a recruiter of the American Depart-
ment, to attempt to defect [MUL∞ Together with BORODIN,
KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's
special technical section), NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad
for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a
concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE s hotel room,
06
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ca. 1953-June 1955)
06
and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return. When
06 [MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN
and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the
door from the hall and prevented his escape. BORODIN
Obreviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about
his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow
Attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a
job as a "consultant". BORODIN had either $5,000 or
$10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According ⑯6
to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get
out.
Comment:
06.06
06
06
MULE reported this incident. He said that he
was locked in his hotel room and subjected to
a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling
himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000.
for "work" on a long-range basis. SIĘGAL
emphasized that MULE would not be required to 06
procure documents from the Embassy, and
☐ paccording to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts
Obconcerning MULE's personal life that could
I have been obtained only from listening devices
Ob in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left
after about 20 minutes, having warned (MULE] not 06
to report the incident. MULE identified
SIEGAL/BORODIN by photograph, but was unable to
identify NOSENKO.
06.
KGB lack of interest in recruitments, which
NOSENKO elsewhere cited to explain his ignorance
of the personal backgrounds of his Army Attache
targets, is belied by the MULE case. 06
06
BENSON, MULE and STROUD Expulsion from the Soviet Union
06,06
After NOSENKO had been transferred to the Seventh
Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD] were the targets
06
of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being
declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the following account
of this incident: For some time the Second Chief Directorate
had been trying to acquire a small, convenient piece of
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electronic equipment which American Intelligence officers
were known to be using during their travels inside the
Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, the
American Department had been given authorization from the
Central Committee of the Communist Party to steal this
equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of
such an operation was assured. Before his transfer to the
Seventh Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped to
develop plans for the operation and had even arranged an
abortive attempt to seize the equipment from an Attache at
a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON MULE and 06,06
06 STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's transfer)
it was learned that they had the equipment with them, and
the KGB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad 10 The
hotel rooms of [BENSON STROUD) and MULE were watched constantly
from a visual observation post and it was noted that they
never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in their rooms.
It was also noted that the apparatus was placed under a
pillow before they began to eat. While they were seated at
the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB officers suddenly
entered the room and seized the equipment. In order to
partially cover the illegality of this act, it was decided
to make a show of expelling (BENSON, MULE] and [STROUD from the 06
Soviet Union, and this was done by having the Foreign Ministry
declaring each persona non grata.
Comment:
06 06
The equipment was seized from BENSON, MULE and
06 STROUD on 5 May 1955, and the three were declared
persona non grata on 7 May, a month before
NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to the
Seventh Department. When the 7 May date was
given to NOSENKO during the February 1965
interrogations, he replied that the operation
was handled at a higher level, that he did not
directly participate in it, but that he had
been involved in the earlier planning to seize
the equipment. It was pointed out to him that
he had always said he was in the Seventh
Department at the time of this operation, and
that he had consistently said that he transferred
from the American to the Seventh Department in
June 1955. NOSENKO offered no comment.
1
1
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CARDELLA 06
"
NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was a
civilian administrative officer in the Embassy by the name
of James CARDELLA.06 The KGB had no interesting or unusual
information concerning CARDELLA from any source, and NOSENKO
could say nothing more about him. 06
Comment:
As a member of the Army Attache's staff,
✓ CARDELLA also would have been NOSENKO's target.
06 Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA) served in Moscow:
from September 1953 until June 1955. In 1964
a microphone was discovered in the Embassy office
06 CARDELLA had occupied. The microphone was
believed to have been emplaced in 1952. See
p. 227
VAN LAETHEM
06
06
08 NOSENKO incorrectly identified George VAN LAETHEM as
an Assistant Air Attache at the Embassy against whom an
operation was attempted in 1953 or 1954. He said that
during this period a Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was
placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with the
mission of striking up an acquaintance with VAN LAETHEM 06
which could be followed up in Moscow. She succeeded in
meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number.
Although she was certain that she would hear from him, he
never did call her in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he had
heard about this from P.F. PANKRATOV, the case officer
handling LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOV was the case
officer responsible for VAN LAETHEM, along with other 06
members of the Air Attache's office at that time. NOSENKO 08
knew of no other KGB interest in or activity concerning
VAN LAETHEM
ob
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06
Comment: [VAN LADTHE was not an Assistant Air Attache 08
but an Assistant Army Attach serving in
Moscow from March 1951 to March 1953. When
06 VAN LAETHE completed his two-year tour in
Moscow in March 1953 (when NOSENKO said he
entered the KGB), he was succeeded by [Walter 06
MULE, for whom NOSENKO has claimed responsi-
bility. The fact that he was Assistant Army 08
Attache] and [ULES predecessor should be known
to the responsible KGB case officer, in this
case, NOSENKO. As cryptographic security 08
officer and officer in charge of the Embassy
0806 Code room, VAN LAETHE: had supervisory respon-
sibility for the military code clerks and
mechanics, including Dayle SMITH, and he was
on fairly close personal terms with Sergeant
Roy RHODES until VAN LAETHEM's departure from 06
Moscow in March 1953. VAN LAETHEI's duties 06
also included responsibility for sensitive
electronic activities in the Embassy.
VAN LAETHEM was again in Moscow from 19 March
to 19 May 1955, when NOSENKO claims to have
been the KGB case officer for Army Attaches.
Although this visit was only a temporary as-
signment, it was represented to the Soviets
as a permanent assignment of an Assistant Army
Attache (and thus, presumably NOSENKO's tar-
get) because of the sensitive nature of his
duties. He was project officer for the entire
signals collection program at the Embassy,
and he went to Moscow to review the program
including the planned use of the new electronic
equipment which was seized from [BENSON, MULE] 06,06
and STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (while
06 VAN LAETHEM was still in Moscow). VAN LAETHEM] 06
stated that no meeting such as the one NOSENKO
described with LARIONOVA ever occurred.
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ca. 1953-June 1955)
Additional Reporting
Knowledge of another KGB operation involving Americans
was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in
the American Embassy Section, against CIA officer and
Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see p. 37).
NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in the
operations against E.E. SMITH in 1954-1955. The incidents
which NOSENKO described, however, occurred in June 1956,
by which time NOSENKO, by his own account, had been out of
the American Embassy Section for a year and when he was
involved in the Seventh Department recruitment of [Richard 06
BURGI
His involvement in the [BURGI] case has been confirmed.
06
NOSENKO has also described the KGB recruitment of military
cipher machine mechanic "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33),
whose true name he claimed not to have known. He dated the
recruitment as occurring "in 1949-1950" and "before he
joined the KGB", although he said that he knew of the
existence of the agent during his first tour in the Embassy
Section in 1953-1955. However, NOSENKO also related that
"ANDREY" was recruited while Roy RHODES was in Moscow, that
RHODES "had spotted 'ANDREY'" "ANDREY" and RHODES over-
lapped in Moscow from April 1952 to July 1953. "ANDREY"
fixes his own recruitment as occurring in December 1953,
and until his departure in April 1954 he was responsible
for the entire Embassy code room. In that capacity "ANDREY"
was a direct subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic
security officer, NOSENKO's target Army Captain Walter MULE. 06
If NOSENKO served in the 'Embassy Section during 1953-1955
as he claimed, it is difficult to perceive how he could have
remained unaware of "ANDREY's" identity.
American Embassy Section
-
ca. 1953-June 1955:
Summary and Conclusion
According to NOSENKO, immediately upon entering on duty
with the KGB he was assigned without training to what he
describes as the most sensitive and important section of
the Second Chief Directorate. There, after first handling
agents covering American correspondents resident in Moscow,
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ca. 1953-June 1955)
he was made the case officer solely responsible for opera-
tions against the commissioned officers of the Embassy's
Army Attache office, until his transfer to the Seventh
Department. Alleging complete knowledge of all service
attache operations, NOSENKO flatly asserts that there were
no KGB recruitments of American military personnel during
the period of his assignment to the Embassy Section.
Pertinent to the consideration of NOSENKO's statements
is his reluctance to discuss the 1953-1955 period, and his
inconsistent accounts of the dating and circumstances of
his entry into the Embassy Section, of his assumption of
responsibility as sole case officer for Army Attache tar-
gets, and of his transfer to the Seventh Department. Al-`
though NOSENKO could plausibly claim failing memory to ex-
plain some areas of ignorance, he does not do so. Instead,
he is positive and insistent that his statements about his
targets are a factual and complete account of what was then
known to the KGB. His assertion that the KGB was not in-
terested in his targets' vulnerability to recruitment is
belied by his own statements as well as by the [MULE] case, 06
as he himself related it. He is uninformed about both At-
tache personnel and agent-informants who, by his own ac-
count, were his targets and his agents.
Conclusion
NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section
throughout the March 1953-June 1955 period as he claimed.
Specifically, he neither entered the Section in March 1953
nor transferred from the Section in June 1955. In whatever
period he may have served, he was not the sole case officer
responsible for commissioned officers in the office of the
Army Attache. Unaware of many aspects of KGB activities
involving Army personnel and by his own account not involved
with either Air or Naval Attache personnel or diplomats,
NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB re-
cruited no American Embassy personnel during this period.
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CHAPTER VI
SEVENTH DEPARTMINT (June 1955-January 1960)
Comment: NOSENKO's claimed Second Chief Directorate
service during 1955-1960, in which he was
involved with Seventh Department operations
against American and British tourists, coin-
cides with the growth of a substantial
American and British] Intelligence program \\
aimed at exploiting tourists visiting the
Soviet Union. Beginning in 1956, the growth
of tourism which followed the post-Stalin
thaw in the USSR had grown to the point
where it could be usefully exploited by CIA.
Initially, returning American tourists were
debriefed on their experiences in the Soviet
Union and particularly with regard to their
acquaintances there with Soviet citizens who
might be susceptible to eventual recruitment.
Gradually, leads were developed to Americans
planning to visit the USSR, and from among
these, agents were selected, trained in
clandestine operational techniques, briefed.
on intelligence requirements, and instructed
how to identify and develop potential agents
from among their Soviet contacts. The
American agents performed a variety of clan-
destine tasks including passive assessment
of Soviet candidates for recruitment, propa-
ganda activities, and infiltrating equipment,
loading deaddrops, or mailing letters bearing
secret writing, all destined for CIA agents
in the Soviet Union.
The program reached its height in 1959,
by the end of which over one hundred and
fifty agents under tourist cover from CIA
alone had performed missions in the USSR; by
101
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June 1955-January 1960)
Comment:
(Continued)
then a substantial number of similar missions
had also been launched by American military
intelligence organizations and by the British__||_
and allied services.
It is a matter of fact, not of conjecture,
that as early as 1957 a large number of these
agents were coming to the attention of the KGB
within the Soviet Union. Few were arrested.
Instead, all were surveilled, and some pro-
voked or entrapped, as the Second Chief
Directorate and its provincial KGB counter-
intelligence elements sought to identify the
Soviet citizens with whom the American agents
were in contact, as well as the agents'
specific clandestine tasks. By the summer
of 1959 the KGB had obtained from its British
agent, George BLAKF, complete details of the
objectives and methods of CIA and British
Intelligence tourist programs, together with
a number of case examples.
It is within this context that one must
examine NOSENKO's claims to KGB service in
and consequent knowledge of Second Chief
Directorate counterintelligence operations
against American and British tourists in 1955-
1960.
NOSENKO claimed he served with the Seventh Department
from June 1955 until January 1960. According to him, the
Seventh Department exercised counterintelligence functions
involving foreigners then visiting the Soviet Union,
including businessmen, seamen, foreign delegations and some
tourists, as well as the hotels and restaurants utilized by
these visitors. He said that by 1958, however, the number
of foreign tourists visiting the Soviet Union had grown
appreciably, and in June 1958 the Seventh Department
Tourist Section was split, and two new sections were created.
NOSENKO explained that one of the new sections became
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responsible for counterintelligence operations conducted
against American and 
British Commonwealth nationals, the
other section was charged 
with all other nationalities.
It is convenient to divide the examination of NOSENKO's
claims 
to service in 
the Seventh Department into two
periods. The first 
of these covers the years from June
1955 until June 1958, during 
which NOSENKO said he was a
case officer handling and 
recruiting agents of all nationa-
lities and planning and 
managing other operational activi-
ties. The second period covers 
HOSENKO's service from June
1958, when he claimed to have 
become Deputy Chief of the
newly-created American-
British Commonwealth Section, to the
beginning of 1960.
NOSENKO described his personal and direct participation
in 
Seventh Department operations 
during this four and one-
half years as including:
NOSENKO's
-Recruiting and handling Soviet citizen agents and
targetting 
them against 
American tourists.
agentura 
varied in number from eight to fourteen agents,
most of whom were employees 
of Inturist.
-Mounting operations against fifteen foreigners,
principally 
Americans, in 
the Soviet Union.
NOSENKO
-Recruiting a pair of Soviet homosexuals as agents
to be 
utilized against 
foreign homosexual targets.
managed the pair 
from their recruitment in 1957 and 1958
until their retirement in 
1962 or 1963.
06.
-Recruiting and handling Arsene FRIPPEL the American 08
Express 
Company 
representative in Moscow.
Ob 
to meet FRIPPEL 
even after the latter was transferred from
(NOSENKO Continued
Moscow to New York and after 
NOSENKO was transferred from
the Seventh Department.
)
From personal involvement or otherwise NOSENKO claimed
that 
he learned of all 
the important operations conducted
against American tourists 
during this period of his Seventh.
Department service.
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June 1955-January 1960)
wwwwwwininky
NOSENKO's Soviet Agents
The Seventh Department Tourist Section, just established
when NOSENKO was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent
network for operations against American and British tourists.
Consequently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case officers
had to "start from the beginning".
As a first step NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow.
officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist. These
were not agents, he explained, but "just persons a KGB man
could approach with questions about somebody or something".
NOSENKO collected information on these and others with the
aim of formalizing their recruitments. By the end of 1955,
he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all
of them Inturist interpreters. During the following four
years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied.
Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another,
some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing
all the time, back and forth". In 1956, NOSENKO said, he
had about ten agents, in 1957 there were about twelve, in
1958 about eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was
preparing to return to the American Department) he had
approximately twelve. The substance of NOSENKO's descrip-
tion of his agents is as follows:
Larissa SOBOROVA
An Inturist English-language interpreter, SOBOROVA was
one of the first agents recruited in 1955 by NOSENKO within
Inturist. She reported to him on all foreigners with whom
she worked as an interpreter. She worked with NOSEN KO when
he served as a guide for British subjects [BIRSE] and [LANE] in 06
the summer of 1957. During 1957-1959 she was involved and
possibly sexually intimate with American (travel writer
Horace SUTTON). SOBOROVA was NOSENKO's agent until 1959,
when she married and "retired".
08,06
1
1
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Comment:
SOBOROVA was an Inturist guide for a number
of American tourists, including CIA agents,
between 1957 and 1959. SUTTON has identified 06
her. In 1959 she was the head of all English-
language interpreters at Inturist headquarters
in the National Hotel, Moscow.
Vladimir MUROMTSEV
MUROMTSEV, KGB cryptonym "LEBEDEV", was recruited by
NOSENKO from Inturist in 1955.. He was NOSENKO's agent
until called into the army in about 1959, when he was sent
to a Soviet Air Force Academy in Central Asia to serve as
an interpreter with Syrian students there. During that
period his file was held by the KGB organization in Central
Asia. When he returned to Moscow he was re-employed by the
KGB Second Directorate.
Comment:
NOSENKO has said elsewhere that MUROMTSEV had
been a Second Chief Directorate agent "since
1958" implying that someone else recruited
him and that he thus could not have been
'NOSENKO's agent in 1955. MUROMTSEV was
identified in 1957 as an Inturist guide by
two CIA sources.
Nikolay ROGOV
•
He
I was recruited in 1955. He
ROGOV, KGB cryptonym "OZERO"
had been formerly a "confidential contact" of the KGB.
worked in the central Inturist office which assigned inter-
preters to British and American citizens visiting the USSR.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT → June 1955-January 1960)
Comment:
CIA records refer only to one Alexander ROGOV
who in 1960 was a senior official at the main
Inturist office in the Hotel National in Moscow.
Nataliya SHULGINA
SHULGINA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO
in 1955. NOSENKO knew that double agent Boris BELITSKIY
[see p.282] "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY
against SHULGINA".
Comment:
KGB-controlled CIA source BELITSKIY reported
to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent: CIA did
not warn him. SHULGINA was for two years the
secretary-interpreter of NBC correspondent
Irving R. LEVINE after his arrival in Moscow
in July 1955. She served as a guide for an
American musical troupe's visit in the USSR
in 1956 and in 1956 and 1957 she served as a
According
guide for American tourists in Moscow.
to BELITSKIY, she was involved in the sexual
entrapment and KGB recruitment of British MP
Tom DRIBERG NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of
SHULGINA's involvement with LEVINE and other
06
Americans, as well as with DRIBERG), and of her 06
foreign travel, belies his claim that she was
Shown
his agent during the 1955-1958 period.
her photograph in 1964, NOSENKO failed to
recognize it. When he was then given her name,
he identified her not as his former agent but
just as a Second Chief Directorate agent once
involved with BELITSKIY.
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Tamara KUNGAROVA
KUNGAROVA was an Inturist interpreter recruited by
NOSENKO in 1955. In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a
KGB sexual entrapment operation of an American professor
06 John THOMPSON), but there was no attempt to recruit him.
Between 1957 or 1958 and 1960 she was targetted against
American tourist and suspect CIA agent Philip NIELSEN 03
(see p.420). KUNGAROVA [married NIELSEN and emigrated to 08,03
England, and the KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at 05.
the time NOSENKO left the Seventh Department.
Comment:
Elsewhere NOSENKO has said KUNGAROVA was an
agent who came to the Seventh Department from
the British Commonwealth Department in 1957
or early 1958. If true, he could not have
recruited her or have been her case officer in
the 1955-1957 period. In describing the
03 NIELSEN case, NOSENKO indicated he himself was
not involved and, although he commented on
KUNGAROVA's role, he never mentioned that she
was or had been his agent. KUNGAROVA was
interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's
information and she confirmed that she had been
an
06 intimate with THOMPSON) while serving as
Enturist guide, as well as with other Americans.
She denied, however, that she had ever colla-
borated with the KGB. KUNGAROVA died in 1965.
Aleksandr A. DMITRIYEV
DMITRIYEV, KGB cryptonym "TOMO" when NOSENKO recruited
him in 1958, was a candidate member of the USSR Academy of
Sciences and a specialist on Japan and Thailand. He spoke
Japanese and English and worked at the Japanese Exhibition
in Moscow. He "was used against British and American
nationals" DMITRIYEV was also used against communications
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personnel at the Japanese Exhibit, but while he telephoned
NOSENKO, he was meeting with another KGB case officer.
DMITRIYEV accompanied a sports delegation to Norway and a
Soviet circus to Japan.
Comment:
DMITRIYEV's travel to Norway and Japan in
1958 is confirmed.. From NOSENKO's own
statement he was aware of DMITRIYEV's
activities, but he was not his case officer.
(Fnu) IVANOV
Once a recruited agent in the Baltic area, when IVANOV
moved to Moscow the provincial KGB suggested he might be
of some use in the capital. IVANOV was a lawyer employed
by the Institute of Foreign Trade when NOSENKO became his
case officer. IVANOV was later turned over to the British
Commonwealth Department which "planted him in the British
Trade Mission or something like that".
Comment: CIA records contain no reference identifiable
with IVANOV.
Marina RYTOVA
RYTOVA, KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA" was turned over to
NOSENKO by another Seventh Department case officer, I.A.
KONSTANTINOV, in 1956 or 1957. She was educated at the
Military Institute of Foreign Languages, where she studied
military subjects as well as foreign languages. When
NOSENKO became her case officer she was working as an
interpreter at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow.
continued this job until about 1960, when she became an
instructor in the Greek language at the Institute of
International Relations. She reported to NOSENKO information
She
108
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which she obtained on foreign delegates or foreign tourists
who visited the Exhibit in Moscow, and on foreign delegates
attending meetings at the Ministry of Agriculture, where
she served as an interpreter in English and Greek. RYTOVA
served several times as an interpreter for Khrushchev and
once participated in a Csation he had with the Iowa
farmer [Roswell] GARST.
1959 or 1960 she was sent as
an interpreter with a small delegation visiting GARST's
farm in the United States, and was used by the KGB Legal
Residency in Washington to report observations made enroute.
and while there. RYTOVA was married to a captain or major
who works in a military office in Moscow. She had one
daughter, approximately 14 years old.
Comment:
RYTOVA served as an interpreter for Roswell
GARST in the USSR in 1955, 1959 and 1963 and
she visited the U.S. in 1958 and 1962. Her
biographic data is consistent with the infor-
mation related by NOSENKO.
Yevgeniya ("Jane) DANKO
DANKO, KGB cryptonym "OKSANA" worked in the American 29
Express Company office in Moscow for Arsene FRIPPEL 06
(NOSENKO's agent, see p.137) and later for FRIPPELTS 06
successor, Michael JELISAVCIC. NOSENKO took DANKO over
from Seventh Department case officer I.A. KONSTANTINOV in
1955-1957. She was used to report on JELISAVCIC.
Comment:
06
DANKO was an Inturist guide in 1956, 1958 and
1959, and she was working for the American 29
Express Company office in 1960 FRIPPEL left
Moscow in 1961, by which time NOSENKO had
transferred from the Seventh Department.
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1
Soviet Homosexual Agents
The KGB operations which NOSENKO described commonly
involved sexual entrapment
. Many of the operations in
which he claimed a personal 
role involved the use of homo-
sexual agents, KGB agents whose 
homosexuality was exploited
against susceptible male targets.
their 
official case officer, in specific recruitment-
While NOSENKO was 
never
entrapment operations he 
worked with "LUCH", "NIKOLAYEV"
"SIBI YAK", "KOSHIKIN" and "
STROYEV" (Victor BELANOVSKIY,
used in the compromise of 
Richard BURGI, VASSALL, and the
Canadian Ambassador WATKINS).
06
personality information on them and usually could not recall
He 
provided virtually no
their true names. Two such 
homosexuals, however, VOLKOV
and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO claimed were 
his own agents.
NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former
agent 
(cryptonym "SHMELEV") and 
recruited YEFREMOV
(cryptonym "GRIGORIY
") and to have been their sole case
officer from the beginning 
of their KGB careers in 1957-
1958 until they were discharged 
in 1963 because they had
become too well known. He said he 
met them frequently,
and directed them in at least a dozen 
entrapment operations
or other homosexual encounters.
them with him when he transferred to the American Department
NOSENKO claimed he took
in 1960 and back again in early 
1962 to the Seventh
Department.
YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
a
Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a
public 
toilet in Moscow, NOSENKO 
said, the KGB concluded
that A.I. VOLKOV might be a 
homosexual and hence of some
operational value. To verify 
this possibility in 1957,
homosexual agent of the Moscow 
Criminal Investigations
Department provoked VOLKOV 
into a compromising situation.
Then VOLKOV, who had previously 
been a KGB agent but was
at this time inactive, was 
summoned by the KGB and, after
NOSENKO interrogated him, he 
admitted his homosexuality and
agreed to NOSENKO's proposal to 
work for the KGB among
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homosexuals. VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to
recruit a homosexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not
recalled) YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked
as a team against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in
addition to specific targets, they had the general assign-
ment of associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the
purpose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described
on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents:
'
"Although I am a chief of section there I
have all sorts of agents. I have a good agent
apparatus. I have beautiful girls, whom I can
use as I like. I have homosexuals, in particu-
lar, one special pair. I am afraid they are
known to both you and the British... I permitted
this pair to work (without specific assignments]
on their own. I give them money and tell them
to go look around, but only Americans. Look for
American pederasts. They call me at night:
'Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister so-and-so
here. I say: 'Well, let him [do what he
wants]. We'll talk about it tomorrow. So the
next day they go to a special hotel room. We
make photographs. Then we think about what he
represents. Is he worth it? Then, as Chief, I
recommend that he be recruited or not--depending\
on his position, what he can give, what he can
tell. If he can give something, I say: 'Well,
let's have a go (igrat].' After this, I speak
to these boys: 'Well, go with him again. Do
whatever is wanted.' All this is observed by
the KGB. The [hotel] administrator enters.
'What are you doing?' The administrator calls
the Militia. An akt is drawn up. 'Well, you
are a foreigner. This is not our business. We
don't know what to do with you.
' Then the Chief
arrives and a conversation ensues: 'Listen,
what shall we do? Pederasty is punishable by
three to five years and now, on the basis of
recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand,
if your friends find out that you are a pederast--
and how can they help but find out'...'
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When NOSENKO moved from the Seventh Department to
the Second Chief Directorate's American Department in
January 1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFREMOV with him. They
were never used against targets in the American Embassy
but, NOSENKO said, the Seventh Department "used to call
me on homosexual prospects". VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued
as active KGB agents until some time in 1960 or 1961.
After they were employed once more [against .E. JOHNSON in 06
January 1962] it was decided that they were too well
known". NOSENKO claimed that the agents were retired and
that he himself sent their files to KGB Archives in 1962
or 1963.
1
NOSENKO's Soviet Agents:
Summary
NOSENKO claims to have been these agents' case officer
for two to five years, during which he met each regularly,
assigned them operational tasks, and received their reports.
With the exception of YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, however, NOSENKO
can cite few instances of their operational use, and he has
but superficial knowledge of their personal backgrounds.
It is unlikely that this is merely the result of failing
recollection. He knows no more about the three whom he
claimed he took with him to the Embassy Section, where he
continued to be their case officer for two more years, than
he does about the others. In the two instances where his
agents were involved in KGB operational activity, NOSENKO
is unaware of SHULGINA's work with LEVINE and DRIBERG, and 6
was not involved when KUNGAROVA was targetted against and
married CIA agent Philip NIELSEN. NOSENKO's familiarity
with the nine agents he named appears to be that which
would be acquired second-hand, not through personal contact
as he claimed.
With respect to YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, the evidence does
not sustain NOSENKO's claim that he was their case officer
in every operation from their recruitment in 1957 until
their retirement in 1962-1963. He is unfamiliar with either
agent's background, He cannot say where either of them
lived or, indeed, how he got in touch with them when he
required their services. With the exception of the [N.E.06
JOHNSON compromise in 1962 (see p.268), all of VOLKOV's and
1
1
1.
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YEFREMOV's known activities with respect to Americans took
place in the course of less than twelve months in 1959-
.1960. It is probable that NOSENKO's claim that he was
their sole case officer during even this relatively brief
period is also false. In the period April-November. 1959,
apparently unknown to NOSENKO, VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were
involved with one Dutch and five American visitors (including
three CIA agents) in the Soviet Union. Further, in other
contexts NOSENKO has described their involvement with
06 Americans MATLAW (see p.419) and KARLOV in 1959, 06
of which NOSENKO only learned when he retired VOLKOV's and
YEFREMOV's file in 1962-1963. KARLOV was a Swedish, not
an American, citizen.]
06
Operational Activities (1955-1958)
Tourist Section Case Officer
According to NOSENKO, he was among the first case officers
to arrive in the Seventh Department Tourist Section when it
was being formed. He took part with other officers in the
acquisition of an agent network from within Inturist, in the
establishment of facilities and methods, and generally
"getting things going". After several months, he partici-
pated in what he says was his first operation against an
American tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-the-scenes
(and hence unconfirmed) and unsuccessful attempt to compro-
mise American student Martin MALIA 06 NOSENKO's next case
(the first operation in which his participation is confirmed)
took place a year later, in June 1956, when he assisted in
the homosexual entrapment and recruitment of Professor 06
Richard BURGI. Sometime in 1957, he said, he was personally
involved in the attempted recruitment of the German] business-||
GERCKENS and in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of
06 SUNDAR, a Norwegian journalist. [Both GEHRCKENS) and [SUNDAR 06
admitted to having been the object of KGB recruitment
attempts, the former reluctantly in a private interview, and
the latter publicly in the press. It has been possible to
question neither in detail.] NOSENKO's presence in the
third "operation" in 1957 is confirmed: he accompanied the
113.
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0806
-
British publisher Sir Allen LANE and the latter's inter-
06 preter BIRSE on a tour of Soviet publishing houses.
According to NOSENKO, it was for the purpose of observing
BIRSE, a suspected British intelligence agents. 08
Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)
06
-06
NOSENKO's Information
[Martin MALIA], a graduate student, spent about four months
in the USSR in 1955 and was suspected by the KGB of having
connections with American Intelligence. Toward the end of
his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA was observed in 06.
contact with a Soviet citizen believed to be a homosexual.
The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and NOSENKO eventually
obtained a confession that he had had homosexual relations
.
Co with MALIA. NOSENKO arranged for the Soviet to introduce
66 MALIA to a KGB homosexual agent, and the latter enticed
06 MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room in Moscow. NOSENKO
was on the scene (but not directly in touch with MALIA) when 06
the introductions were made in a Moscow restaurant, and from
an observation point in a neighboring hotel room he watched
06 the KGB agent and [MALIA] in homosexual practices. MALIA 06
insisted on the lights being turned off, however, and it was
impossible to obtain compromising photographs (the KGB did
not yet have infrared photographic equipment) and therefore
no recruitment approach was made to MALIA.06 During this and
a later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "very cautious", 06
and the KGB never succeeded in exploiting MALIA's homo- 06
sexuality for a recruitment approach.
Comment:
06.
MALIA, a U.S. Navy intelligence officer during
World War II, visited the Soviet Union in 1955
and twice in 1962. While buying books for the
Library of Congress and several universities
06 in 1955, MALIA) travelled over 10,000 miles
throughout the USSR, an event sufficiently
unusual at the time to be publicized in the
Soviet press.
On 1955 and 1962 trips he had
contacts with dissident Soviet citizens and
he smuggled to the West literature for publishing
0001384
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Comment
06
.06.
(Continued)
abroad. In December 1963. NALIA was the object
of an attack in the Soviet press which charged
that during 1962 he had "spent his time in
Mosocw looking for dissension in the ranks of
young intellectuals at drunken debauches".
[MALIA) was then in periodic contact with CIA;
in the spring of 1963 he denied having had
any involvement with blackmarketeers, homo-
sexuals, or females inside the Soviet Union.
MALIA has not been interviewed in connec-
tion with NOSENKO's allegations.
06
Recruitment of BURGI (1956)
At the first meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO
gave a brief account of the recruitment of Richard BURGI, a 06
Yale professor. The recruitment was effected on the basis
of a homosexual provocation operation which began in Moscow
and culminated with an approach in Kiev in June 1956.
This recruitment, which occurred close in time to the
death of NOSENKO's father, was by NOSENKO's later accounts
a turning point in his personal and professional life.
From it, NOSENKO said he acquired a sense of self-confidence
and responsibility and began to "grow" from a wastrel into
an effective and successful KGB officer. As a result of
this operation, the first successful recruitment in the then
short history of the Tourist Section, NOSENKO asserted he
first came into personal contact with General GRIBANOV.
According to all accounts he gave prior to October 1966,
when he retracted the claim, NOSENKO received the first of
a series of KGB awards for operational performance because
Obof the BURGI case--a letter of commendation. Within a month
of this operation, NOSENKO said, he was promoted from the
rank of lieutenant to captain.
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NOSENKO's Information
св
NOSENKO stated that at the time of [BURGI's arrival in
the USSR, his file contained a copy of his visa application
(anketa), "maybe" an excerpt from a cable sent by the
Soviet Embassy in the United States saying that a visa had
been granted, a routine note from Inturist giving BURGI's 06
anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary inside the
Soviet Union, and the results of file checks of the KGB
main Archives and of the First Chief Directorate Archives.
NOSENKO himself ran the file checks, which proved to be
negative; there was no information on record concerning
86 BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the
C6 material available on BURGI, no other checks were made.
06 The KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact
08 that he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefore
had contact with students who might eventually work for the
U.S. State Department, American Intelligence, and for other
target organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first
suggested an attempt to recruit him.
06
When [BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in
contact with a number of KGB agents, and their reports were
placed in an informal file maintained by NOSENKO. NOSENKO
could not recall how many such agents there may have been,
their names, or what they might have reported concerning
06 BURGI 06 BURGI had an Inturist interpreter but NOSENKO did
NOSENKO
not know whether he was a KGB agent.) From some source,
name_forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB obtained indications that
[BURGI] was a homosexual, and it was decided to try to obtain
grounds for recruitment by homosexual compromise.
therefore approached Yu. A. LOPUKHOV, an officer of the
British Department who handleḍ the homosexual agent Viktor
BELANOVSKIY, and asked permission to use BELANOVSKIY in
setting up the compromise. After permission had been.
received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV and
NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make
[BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise
proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIV met BURGI, the 06
fact of common homosexuality was recognized, and [BURGI was 06
invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts
took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the
adjoining room and directed the compromise, although he did
not meet BURGI at this time.
>
06
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As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the compromising
photographs were ready by the following day. A report of the
compromise and a request for permission to attempt recruitment
were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors. The request came
back with the approving signatures of O.M. GRIBANOV and A.S.
FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Department of the First
Chief Directorate, which had expressed interest in using BURGI] 06
in the United States of BURGT's itinerary called for him to fly
from Moscow to Kiev a short while after this episode and,
having called the Kiev KGB with instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV
flew there to prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next 06
morning and
was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an
officer of the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under.
Inturist cover.
In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB
officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels in
Kiev were full at the moment because of various conferences,
but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for about a day
in a private apartment in the center of town; he would be:
moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the car arrived at
the apartment building in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S.
PETRENKO, a local KGB officer, and (fnu) RASTYKAITE, a woman
housekeeper, were waiting for them. NOSENKO could not
remember how or whether he introduced himself to BURGI]. The
recruitment conversation, he said, was handled by "KOZLOV-
NOSENKO" but NOSENKO had forgotten by 1965 who said what:
"I don't remember what I talked about and I don't
remember what KOZLOV talked about. Many things:
were discussed. It started with how he liked his
stay in the Soviet Union...Then we slowly pro-
ceeded to say how unfortunate it was that informa-
tion had been received about his conduct in Moscow.
We told him that his homosexual activities were
known, that this was punishable under Soviet law
according to article so-and-so of the criminal code,
etc., that he was not a diplomat, had no diplomatic
immunity, that he could be taken to court according
to the Soviet law... Well, he was scared, confused,
upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly
proceeded to say that everything could be smoothed
117
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'You have a
out, and the basis was prepared for the man to say:
We showed him the
'All right, I agree to help'...
pictures. He was embarrassed of course--he was
naked, Then we prepared the basis:
noble task. You teach; you have students; the
students may become future specialists on Russia or
may work as diplomats, etc., but many of these
students can be used by intelligence. They may be
sent somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will
tell us who among the students is preparing for
government service, how they are distributed, etc.'...
During the first conversation everything was made
completely clear... He was not at all willing to
He was told
help or work for Soviet Intelligence.
that he must understand that in this case 'helping
Soviet Intelligence' was a very broad term.
remember that I told him: 'Understand, nobody is
going to ask you that you help our friends over
there, or me, if I should be there, or that you do
anything bad or conduct any kind of subversive
activities, that you organize explosions or murder.'
After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to
[(Italy) to visit the (Russicum] of the Vatican], and 08 11
here KOZLOV grabbed the subject and began to ask
He told us a bit about
questions about this school.
of the Russicum and we asked him to write about it and
he wrote down some names of the professors who
teach Russian subjects...
"
I
According to NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five
06
hours; at its end BURGI signed a short statement that he
agreed "to assist the organs of Soviet Intelligence".
(NOSENKO first said that it was he who took this statement
06 from [BURGI] but later he could not remember whether it was
he or KOZLOV.) BURGI was then taken to a hotel.
06
06
This was the first time NOSENKO met BURGI. Following
the recruitment, he moved into the same hotel, a floor above
06 BURGI, and for the remainder of BURGI 's stay in Kiev became of
his constant companion and guide. An attempt was made "
to
smooth out all the dirty business that had been brought up
during the recruitment talk". NOSENKO took BURGI to an old 06
1
☐
1
1
1
1
1
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cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PETRENKO they visited a
kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in nearby Kaniv.
The subject of homosexuality was not raised again. From
66 Kiev, BURGI left the Soviet Union without returning to
Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had visited the
American Department of the First Chief Directorate and had
arranged with its chief, FEKLISOV, for a recontact plan in
New York City should BURGI be recruited. BURGI] was 06:06
instructed how to use a recognition signal for a first
meeting in the New York Public Library.
About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO
turned over all his materials on the BURGI operation to 06.
the First Chief Directorate. Somewhat later Sergey GUSKOV,
Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section,
KOZLOV, and NOSENKO visited American Department Chief FEKLISOV
in the First Chief Directorate and expressed an interest in
further developments in the case. FEKLISOV told them that
BURGI had been observed to arrive for the first meeting but
the KGB refrained from establishing contact. The first
actual meeting in New York City took place the second or third
06 time [BURGI Pappeared, and a KGB officer of the New York Legal
Residency continued to meet with him until the revolution in
Hungary in late [October] 1956, when (BURGI refused to colla-06
borate further. NOSENKO later heard from someone in the
American Department, First Chief Directorate that the case
was closed. For their roles in this first recruitment of
the Seventh Department, NOSENKO said he and KOZLOV received
letters of commendation and bonuses of one month's pay by
order of SEROV, Chairman of the KGB; PETRENKO was given a
letter of commendation and half a month's salary; and even
RASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.
got a comme
In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that his
superior, A.S. KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-
ment, had also taken part in this operation, but that he,
NOSENKO, was the responsible case officer. In August 1965,
when asked who had recruited BURGI, NOSENKO replied: 06.
"KOZLOV and NOSENKO. Asked who recruited him first,
NOSENKO said: "KOZLOV, naturally. He was the Deputy Chief
of the Department. The collection of the materials (in
preparation for the approach] was in the hands of Case
Officer NOSENKO.
"
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Comment:
In a 22 November 1957 interview with the FBI,.
66 BURGI had recounted how he was compromised
and recruited by the KGB while in the USSR in
June 1956. His version substantially confirmed
that provided eight years later by NOSENKO.
06 [BURGI asserted (contrary to NOSENKO's account)
that the KGB officers knew a good deal more
about him than what might have been acquired
06 during [BURGI]'s visit to the USSR, including
details of [BURGI]'s close relatives, his work
08 10 with the [Russicum in (Rome), his earlier travel
to Brazil, his military service in Korea, and
his acquaintance with Alexander KERENSKY.
06 on 25 May 1964 BURGI positively identified
NOSENKO (from a photograph) as being the
junior of the two KGB officers who recruited
him. The other KGB officer (KOZLOV) was 'the
controlling_figure and was in command".
06 The [BURGI case is the earliest confirmed
instance of NOSENKO's participation in a KGB
operation. See p.39 for comment on the
Of relevance of the BURGI case to the period of
NOSENKO's claimed service in the Seventh
Department.
06
NOSENKO's claim that BURGI's compromise
and recruitment was based only on information
routinely acquired from BURGI]' s visa applica-06
tion and from apparently chance meetings with
KGB agents on his arrival in Moscow, is
contradicted by BURGI 's description of the 06
KGB's familiarity with his personal life.
NOSENKO cannot sustain his claim of having
personally traced (BURGI) through First Chief 06
[Foreign Intelligence] Directorate files (the
probable repository of information on [BURGI] 06
which the KGB recruiting officers used).
NOSENKO, as described elsewhere, is unfamiliar
with the mechanics of KGB tracing procedures..
06 According to BURGI 's statement and NOSENKO'S
own eventual admission, NOSENKO lied when he
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Comment
(Continued)
06
first claimed to have recruited BURGI unaided.
NOSENKO has subsequently retracted all claims
regarding the effect of this case on his
career: Contrary to his earlier assertions,
he now says it won him neither awards nor
promotion.
06
Attempted Recruitment of GEHRCKENS (1957)
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO made an unsuccessful recruitment approach in 1957
08,06 to Hamburg shipping executive Hans GEHRCKENS, on the basis
06 of GEHRCKENS commercial ventures in the USSR. The responsi-
ble case officer originally was A.I. VERENIKIN of the Sixth
Section of the Seventh Department; this section was then
responsible for operations against foreign seamen. Since
VERENIKIN spoke no German] and [GEHRCKENS was known to speak06
English, NOSENKO was selected to make the approach because
he "knew English a little". When asked why a German 08
speaking KGB case officer was not used, NOSENKO answered:
"The higher-ups said 'go work on this case', and that was
all. After being rebuffed by GEHRCKENS), NOSENKO saw him
several more times during the 1957 visit to Moscow, but when
NOSENKO attempted to renew contact upon GEHRCKENS' return 06
to the Soviet Union in 1958, the latter refused to see him.
Comment:
06
(GEHRCKENS) was interviewed by CIA on 19 July
1965, and, while generally uncooperative,
described a "mild approach" in Moscow during
1956 or 1957 which may be the one described by
NOSENKO. (He was not questioned on the
identities of the Soviets involved.) GEHRCKENS
continues to have extensive business contacts
with Soviet commercial representatives in West ||
Germany and was recently reported to have
.
06
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(Continued)
08
negotiated a sizable shipping contract with the
Soviet Union shortly after a visit to the USSR.
His principal contact at the Soviet Trade
Mission in Cologne] has been a GRU officer.
06
10
06
Contact with LANE and BIRSE (1957)
NOSENKO's Information
"
06
The British subject Sir Allen LANE travelled in the
summer of 1957 to the Soviet Union to visit various publishing
houses and brought with him as an interpreter [Arthur BIRSE. 06
The latter was of Russian extraction, having left Petrograd
(Leningrad) before the Revolution, and he served in British 29
Intelligence during the Second World War. The case was
handled by another section of the Seventh Department, but
because of BIRSE's past, 'some of our leaders decided that
it would be good if one of our workers could approach him,
would get in on the case under the cover of the Ministry of
Culture, who would take care of this person, who would help
him meet with all sorts of people representing our publishing
companies. The choice fell to me. I was chosen for this
job.' Taking along the KGB agent Larissa SOBOROVA as an
interpreter and using the alias "NIKOLAYEV", NOSENKO
06 accompanied [BIRSE] and [LANE] in Moscow and Leningrad during
their stay there. The only object was to watch [BIRSE] 06
because he was suspected of having an intelligence mission,
and no approach was made or contemplated. NOSENKO explained
that the use of the NIKOLAYEV alias with [BIRSE] and [LANE made 06 06
it necessary for him to use the same name when travelling
to Great Britain in 1957 and in 1958.
"
Comment:
LANE was interviewed subsequent to NOSENKO's
defection, and he was able to identify NOSENKO's
photograph as that of a "Russian official he
met in Moscow who was introduced to him as
"NIKOLAYEV". LANE said that he could remember
06
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Comment:
(Continued)
nothing in particular about NIKOLAYEV except
that he appeared a "friendly, helpful man who
had opened up considerably towards the end of
my V visit to Moscow in July 1957".
NOSENKO seems unaware of the probable basis
for KGB interest in BIRSE.06 Born of Scottish 08
parents in pre-revolutionary Petrograd, BIRSE 10,06
served with the British Military Mission in 29
Moscow during World War II and was interpreter
06 for Churchill during the latter's meeting
06 with Stalin. He was the official interpreter 08
for the Royal Commission investigating the
revelations of KGB officers Vladimir PETROV
and his wife, who defected in 1954 in Australia.
NOSENKO apparently does not know that: BIRSE 06.
returned on similar trips to Moscow in 1958
and 1959 (while NOSENKO was still in the
Tourist Section) and that in the latter year
two KGB officers attempted to recruit him.
06
Recruitment of Egil SUNDAR (1957)
NOSENKO's Information
08.06
In 1957 or 1958 a Norwegian journalist, (fnu) SUNDAR,
visited the Soviet Union and an attempt was made to recruit
him. A Second Chief Directorate officer, N.A. ARKHIPOV,
06 made SUNDARS acquaintance and handled the entire operation
against him, but NOSENKO himself played a role. NOSENKO
presented himself to SUNDAR 0% using the name "SMIRNOV" or
"SERGEYEV" and posing as a painter, and told SUNDAR that he 06
could find women for him. A party was arranged with a KGB
O agent as SUNDAR's date and a Second Chief Directorate secre-
tary as NOSENKO's. Late in the evening NOSENKO and his date
excused themselves, and SUNDAR had sexual relations with the 06
female agent. Photographs of the scene were taken by the
KGB. When NOSENKO and SUNDAR saw one another the next day, 06:
06 SUNDAR announced that he had some articles, cameras and the
like, that he wanted to sell on the blackmarket.
NOSENKO
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06
offered to arrange the sale and took [SUNDAR to a dingy
section of Moscow. As they arrived before a small house,
06 NOSENKO asked [SUNDAR_ to give him the things to be sold.
this moment a KGB officer posing as a militiaman approached
At the Militia
and arrested the two for blackmarketeering.
At
cb station, (SUNDAR was recruited by K.N. DUBAS, then Chief of
the Seventh Department, under threat of imprisonment. There
was no further contact with SUNDAR after he left the USSR,C6
however, because on his return to Oslo he published an 10
article in which he described his experiences, "but not all
of them".
06,08,10
Comment: Egil SUNDAR, a journalist for Aftenposten in
Oslo, travelled to the USSR in December 1957
as a member of a press delegation in connection
with the opening of a new SAS air route to 29
Moscow SUNDAR wrote an article on his return
in which he described his arrest for blackmarket
activities and his subsequent recruitment; he
also reported this to Norwegian authorities.
06 According to SUNDAR]), he was introduced to
Moscow blackmarketeers by an artist, whose
name he did not know, and was apprehendėd
immediately afterwards. [SUNDAR has not been 0
interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's infor-
mation.
Travel to London (1957-1958)
NOSENKO reported that his first official travel outside
the Soviet Union was in 1957 when he was selected to
accompany a group of athletes who had been invited to visit
London. As he explained, it was a KGB order that a security
[NOSENKO elsewhere
officer accompany any such delegation.
cited this KGB practice, but later denied any such order was
issued]. The Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Direct-
orate (responsible for designating Second Chief Directorate
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officers for this purpose) telephoned K.N. DUBAS, Chief of
the Seventh Department, to request an officer who spoke
English. DUBAS asked NOSENKO whether he wanted to make the
trip. NOSENKO replied: "Why not? I have never been
abroad yet." NOSENKO consequently travelled to London,
using the alias Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and posing as
"the deputy chief" of the delegation. He wa
was specifically
instructed to observe one member of the delegation, a woman
named MYARIMYAYE, whose father had been killed in a Soviet
prison and whose political reliability was uncertain.
Additionally, he had the general task of watching all
members of the delegation for possibly suspicious contacts.
with foreigners. The delegation consisted of approximately
60 persons and to help him in carrying out these duties,
NOSENKO was assigned three or four agents and several
operational contacts among the delegation members. He was
the only KGB security officer which accompanied the group.
scurity officer
The second trip to London took place a year later, in
the fall of 1958, again as a security escort. This time
he accompanied a delegation of eleven or twelve boxers, and
again he used the alias NIKOLAYEV and the cover position of
deputy chief of the delegation. NOSENKO said he was the
only security officer with the delegation, and he had two
agents and two operational contacts among the boxers." His
assignment was general; no one in particular was kept under
observation, and the KGB had no derogatory information
concerning any member of the delegation.
NOSENKO used the NIKOLAYEV alias for travel to London
because it was the alias used earlier with the British
subjects BIRSE and LANE NOSENKO explained this situation
as follows: 06
06
06
06.
"With BIRSE and LANE I used the name NIKOLAYEV,
Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative of the Ministry
of Culture. And then when the question was raised
of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to
England, I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEV.
Because [of this] I went as the assistant head of
the delegation, again representing the Ministry of
Culture. I didn't go under my own name because it
was decided that when these people (BIRSE and LANE
06
06
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06
went back to England, they would tell who they were
with [report their contacts in the USSR). They
would probably question: DⒷKIRKKKKKCECECE especially, as one
who used to work in intelligence... BIRSF would 06
say: 'There was this man from the Ministry of
Culture, NIKOLAYEV. He was with us all the time,
even went to Leningrad with us. So they would
say: 'How does he look [what does he look like]?'
He would say: He looked so-and-so. I'd go there,
and they would look at me and say: 'How come this
man--his name is NOSENKO, and yet he is very
similar to the one described by BIRSE. That was 06
why it was decided I have to go again under the
name NIKOLAYEV. Just a matter of conspiracy.
Since I already became known as NIKOLAYEV to the
Britishers, this would be noticeable."
'
Comment: That NOSENKO (as NIKOLAYEV) took the trips is
corroborated by British records, according to ll
which, a Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV, born 30
October 1927, arrived at London from Brussels
on 20 August 1957. His visa application
described him as a member of a group invited
by the Light Athletics Association to partici-
pate in contests in London. He left on 27
August 1957. With the same name and date of
birth, NIKOLAYEV arrived again at London on
12 October 1958 with seventeen others, all
described as boxers. His visa application
described him as an "office worker", but on
his landing card, NIKOLAYEV was listed as a
boxer. He left London on 19 October 1958.
On neither visit did NIKOLAYEV attract the
attention of any (British security service] 29
While these trips are corroborated, they
are not material to NOSENKO's claims to have
served in the KGB positions he alleges he
held at the time.
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Operational Activities (1958-1960)
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
According to NOSENKO, the Seventh Department was reorgan-
ized in June 1958, and NOSENKO's section, which theretofore
had been concerned with operations against foreign tourists
from all countries, was split into two new sections, one
concerned with tourists from the United States and the
British Commonwealth and the other with tourists from Europe,
Latin America, and all other countries. NOSENKO claimed
that at that time he was promoted to the position of Deputy
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, "the
most important section of the Seventh Department".
vised the sexual
In September 1958, he claimed to have personally recruited
06 Gisella HARRIS. It was also in 1958, he said, that he super-
Department Chief DUBA ment of Virgil KRAFT, although Seventh
made the actual approach. Beginning
06.06.06.06
in the spring of 1959 he said he directed his agents YEFREMOV
and VOLKOV in a series of successful entrapments (DREW, LUKIS,
WILBY, TAYLOR, and MERTENS. NOSENKO stated that he also
06 used these homosexual agents in 1959 in compromising two
08,06 [American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLER-
FORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, he recruited the Moscow
representative of the American Express Company, FRIPPEL. 29,06.
NOSENKO claimed that his operational success during 1959
earned him a commendation from the KGB Chairman. [He has
since retracted all claims to any awards earned during his
KGB service.] It was because of his position as Deputy
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENIO
said, that he first became involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD.
NOSENKO asserted that the recruitment of agents among
foreign tourists was secondary to his department's principal
mission, the detection of Western intelligence officers and
agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the
Soviet Union.¨ In line with that counterintelligence mission,
on General GRIBANOV's order in the fall of 1959, NOSENKO
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reviewed what the KGB knew through 1958 about the use of
tourists and tourist 
cover by Western intelligence services.
It was from this task that 
NOSENKO claimed he learned of
all the important 
arrests and recruitments among American
tourists as recorded by 
the KGB at the time.
06
Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)
NOSENKO's Information 6
NOSENKO in 1958 recruited Gisella HARRIS), an employee of
29,10 the 
American 
Express Company in Salt Lake City.
ment was based on her romantic and sexual 
involvement with
The recruit-
a Soviet citizen, 
who told THARRIS::__ that he was in trouble 06
with Soviet authorities and 
persuaded her to accompany him
to the police. [HARRIS agreed 
to meet and cooperate with 06
the KGB in Salt Lake City]. The 
case was turned over to the 10
First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any
further contact with her.
Comment:
06
06,08
HARRIS, a former German citizen, visited the
USSR on 
a tourist visa in 1958.
statements made to the FBI in 1958, the purpose
According to
of her visit was to 
contact her former lover,
a Soviet 
soldier who had fathered her child in
Germany in 1953. She hoped to persuade him to
divorce his 
Soviet wife and marry her.
described 
her recruitment by two men, one of
She
whom resembled 
NOSENKO. When shown a photo-
graph in 
1964, she tentatively identified
NOSENKO as 
one of the men who recruited her
and 
said that, of the two involved, he "was
definitely 
the man in charge" while the other
"was merely 
present and listened".
to HARRIS, she has had no further contact with
According
Soviet 
intelligence.
1
:
0001398
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Compromise of KRAFT 06
06,08
NOSENKO's Information
Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the Chicago area with his
wife visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in 1957 or 1958,
and NOSENKO was assigned as the responsible case officer.
06 The KGB learned [KRAFT] had been intimate with a Soviet woman
during an earlier trip to the USSR, and NOSENKO arranged for
her to come to Moscow from Leningrad, where she was then
living, in order to compromise [KRAFT KRAFT) and the Soviet 06
woman were intimate in the latter's room in the Grand Hotel.
Photographs were taken, and then militiamen broke into the
Ob room, finding KRAFT and the woman unclothed. NOSENKO was in
a nearby room, supervising the operation. The recruitment
approach was then made by DUBAS, the Chief of the Seventh
Department. (NOSENKO had been the case officer and had
handled the operation, but he took no part in the confronta-
tion or recruitment approach "because DUBAS wanted it for
himself".) Although the recruitment was not firm, KRAFT 06
and DUBAS "had an agreement" that nothing would be done
about the compromise if (KRAFT did not criticize the Soviet 06
Union in lectures about his trip which he was to give in
the United States. DUBAS again contacted KRAFT] when he came 06
to Moscow in 1963, and afterwards his file was turned over
to the First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO recalled that the
First Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was not in a good 06
region of the United States. And also it smelled like he
had spoken of the approach made to him." Therefore, NOSENKO
concluded, he probably had not been contacted in the United
States.
Comment:
According to the FBI, some time before 1960
06 [KRAFT] wrote a pamphlet in which he described
the KGB approach, omitting reference to his
sexual compromise. In a statement given to
the FBI on 4 November 1964, KRAFT], who is an
129
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(Continued) 08,10
Associate Pastor of the Peoples Church in
Chicago stated that he had visited the Soviet.
Union in 1956, 1958, and 1963. He confirmed
NOSENKO's information in detail except that he
denied having been intimate with the Soviet.
woman involved. He related that the "Chief"
who interviewed him had "several photographs
which portrayed him and the female in intimate
compromising positions and which appeared to
have been taken in her hotel room". [KRAFT] said 06
that he had told the "Chief" that they could do
him no possible harm as "no one would believe
that they were valid photographs". KRAFT denied 06
agreeing to collaborate with the KGB at any
time.
06
Recruitment of DREW (1959)
06
NOSENKO's Information
(George DREW, an American who visited the Soviet Union in
the spring of 1959, was the responsibility of case officer
V.V. IVANOV. By chance, however, DREW] became involved with
NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV and they
reported this to NOSENKO, then the Deputy Chief of the
section. NOSENKO and IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS
and possibly GUSKOV, the Section Chief, and NOSENKO flew
alone to Leningrad to make the approach. (IVANOV was not
judged qualified.) NOSENKO arranged for DREW] to be 06.
compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homosexual
agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer
PERELETOV. Using the alias "Mr. SERGEYEV", NOSENKO alone
.06
Ob recruited [DREW] in an office of the hotel. The KGB First
Chief Directorate was interested in DREW's recruitment 06
because he might be able to spot other homosexuals, possibly
some in the U.S. Government.
0001400
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Comment:
06
DREW reported the approach in 1959, describing
a four-hour interrogation by "SERGEYEV' in
Leningrad and generally confirming NOSENKO's
account of the operation. Re-interviewed by
the FBI on 12 May 1964, DREW identified NOSENKO's
photograph as that of his interrogator and
said that, although NOSENKO was a young man,
from the way everyone reacted to him it was
clear that he was the man in charge. Another
man was present, HTC_DREW said.
06
قال
Recruitment of LUKIS (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
In June or possibly July 1959 NOSENKO personally recruited
a British subject, (fnu) LUKIS (or LUCAS)], in a room of the 06
Hotel Astoria in Leningrad after LUKIS had been compromised 06
by NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. The case
was then turned over to Ye. A. TARABRIN, at that time Chief
of the British Department of the First Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO furnished no more information on this case and did
not know its current status, but he believed the KGB has
not been in contact with LUKIS subsequently.
06
06.
Comment: LUKIS has not yet been identified by the
British services. 29
06.
Recruitment of WILBY (1959)
of WILBY (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
06
By himself NOSENKO recruited William Stanley WILBY in a
hotel in Moscow in July 1959, after WILBY had been compro-06
mised by either VOLKOV or YEFREMOV, NOSENKO's homosexual
agents. KEKECHERCHECK_LBY) is a British citizen and his case was also 06
(like LUKIS, see above) turned over to TARABRIN.
06
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Comment:
06
-
June 1955-January 1960)
10
WILBY] reported the approach to British authori-
ties in 1959, saying that he was "brought up
before SERGEYEV" (an operational alias some-
times used by NOSENKO). He has not been
re-interviewed since NOSENKO's information was
received.
06
Recruitment of TAYLOR (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
29
NOSENKO personally and alone recruited the Moscow
representative of British European Airways, whose name,
NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metropol in Moscow
during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach
was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's
agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV.
NOSENKO explained that the Seventh Department in 1959
had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which
was responsible for the BEA man. That section had asked
NOSENKO's section for help.29
"They said they didn't have any agents or any-
thing and didn't know what to do. So somebody said,
'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the
section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can
arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling
and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Direct-
the case,
orate) said I should report to him."
[In this passage NOSENKO was referring to himself, although
he has always claimed he was Deputy Chief of the section.]
132
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06
June 1955-January 1960)
Comment: David TAYLOR confessed homosexual,
is
described by British services] as a neurotic 29,
type who had been discharged from the R.A.F.] 29
on grounds of mental instability. In 1962
(before the NOSENKO lead was received) TAYLOR
admitted his recruitment to [British authori- ||
ties, indicating that it took place in August.
1959 on the basis of his homosexuality. He
reported in 1962 that the recruitment had
been effected by a "Colonel SERGEYEV", and
when re-interviewed in 1964, he "unhesitantly
identified NOSENKO as "Colonel SERGEYEV',"
adding that the mere sight of NOSENKO's photo-
graph "sent shivers down his back". TAYLOR
also identified a photograph of VOLKOV.
06
Recruitment of MERTENS (1959)
06
NOSENKO's Information
Gerard MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or
August 1959. NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and
YEFREMOV, seeking out American homosexuals, accidentally
Ob met MERTENS] in Moscow and reported their suspicions to
NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and
requested authority to take compromising photographs in
preparation for a recruitment approach, and DUBAS, his
chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had been 06
the responsibility of A.A. VETLITSKIY, another case officer.)
☐ Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between K
VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow.
06 When [MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested"
by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged
in relations with a KGB homosexual agent from Odessa, whom
NOSENKO had arranged by phone to bring to Uzhgorod. [He
did not recall his name, and could only supply CIA with a
physical description.] MERTENS was then brought before 66
NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting
approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with
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MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the
USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with
06 MERTENS), but he could not recall what last name he had
given him.
When he related the case in 1962, NOSENKO could not
recall the American's name. In 1964 he stated the name
was MARTIN, or MARTINS,
06
Comment:
06
He
[MERTENS] 06
In
In a signed statement given to the FBI on
5 August 1964, [MERTENS)], an American professor, 06
generally confirmed NOSENKO's account.
names his recruiter as one "George PETERSON"
and stated that NOSENKO's photograph might be
that of a person whom he had met while
visiting the Soviet Union in 1959.
reported one KGB attempt to recontact him
after he returned to the United States.
September 1959, according to arrangements
made at the time of his recruitment, he
received a letter signed "George PETERSON"
telling him to be at a rendezvous point in
New York. By the time he received the letter,
however, the date of the meeting had already
passed and so he ignored it. [MERTENS claimed 06
that there were no further attempts by the
Soviets to contact him.
06
Compromise of BARRETT (1959)
106
NOSENKO's Information
08
Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S. Exhibition in Moscow]
in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual_agents
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV whom he met at the fairground]. Although08
06[
BARRETT was 
not an active homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded after
a long period of development in involving him in homosexual
acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an
adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV,
0001404
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NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was
present when the photographs were taken, and he has described
the occasion in detail. (There was much complaining among
the photographic technicians because of the amount of time
they spent waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and
NOSENKO recalled that he provided them with drinks and
treated them well because they were a big help to him in
this operation.) The photographs were good, but the KGB
was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban
placed by the Central Committee on the recruitment of 4.S.
08 Exhibition guides due to Eisenhower's planned visit to the
Soviet Union.
06
NOSENKO reported that BARRETT) was recruited on the basis
of the 1959 photography when he returned with another
exhibition in 1961. The recruitment was carried out by
the First (American) Department of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate, and NOSENKO was not involved.
Comment:
Immediately on his return to the United States
in January 1962, BARRETT] confessed to the FBI 06
that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis
of photographs depicting him in a homosexual
act with VOLKOV, which had been taken during
his 1959 trip to Moscow. He claimed that the
photographs had been taken while he was
unconscious, after being drugged. [BARRETT was 06
contacted once by the KGB in New York City
following his admissions to the FBI. He was
contacted by KGB officers, including SKVORTSOV
of the First Chief Directorate, during later
trips to the Soviet Union in 1963, 1964, and
1965 and arrangements were made for meetings
in the United States. No Soviets appeared at
such scheduled meetings.
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06
Compromise of WILLERFORD (1959)
NOSENKO's Information
06,11,08
06
Frederick WILLERFORD, an American Negro), was BARRETT's
08 roommate during the 1959 exhibition] in Moscow.
Initially he
was a target of the Moscow City KGB Directorate which
06 
believed WILLERFORD] to 
be an FBI agent and had been collecting
information on him. Unaware of the interest of the other
KGB element, VOLKOV and 
YEFREMOV had made (WILLERFORD)]'s 06
acquaintance, and NOSENKO had 
arranged for compromising
photographs to be taken of 
WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow 06
hotel room. NOSENKO watched (
WILLERFORD] and YEFREMOV through 06
a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in
detail
. It was only 
after these compromising photographs
had been obtained that NOSENKO 
learned of the Moscow City
KGB Directorate's interest 
in CHILLER FORD)]) .06 NOSENKO's own
department and the Moscow City 
Directorate then made
request 
for operational approval to recruit (WILLER FORD)], but 06
permission was refused because of the ban on 
recruitment
attempts at the time. 
The case file was retained by the
Moscow KGB organization
, and NOSENKO did not know whether
[
WILLERFORD)] was 
approached subsequently.
06
06
a joint
Comment: WILLERFORD was interviewed by the FBI in July
1964 and "
advised emphatically that he had
never been 
compromised by anyone nor did he
feel that he 
ever could be compromised by
anyone 
except through the use of drugs, since
he felt that he 
was 'too smart ' and most
Soviets 
that he has ever met are aware of his
pro-American sentiments". (BARRETT has reported 06
36 
that [WILLERFORD had 
visited VOLKOV in his hotel
room and was 
friendly with him. BARRETT] said
that he had often 
wondered if (WILLERFORD was 206
homosexual because of his 
manner and bearing.
0001406
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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June 1955-January 1960)
06.
Recruitment of FRIPPEL (1959-1963).
"
As a member of the American-British Commonwealth Section,
NOSENKO in 1959 personally participated in the recruitment
of the American Express Company representative in Moscow,
Arsene FRIPPEL. He continued to be one of this agent's two
KGB handlers, even after transferring to the American
Department in 1960. FRIPPEL) left Moscow in 1961 but
returned on trips to the USSR in 1962 and 1963, when NOSENKO
met him. The only recruited American whom NOSENKO ever
claimed to handle, FRIPPEL confessed to his recruitment 06.
when questioned by the FBI on the basis of the NOSENKO lead.
Although the [FRIPPEL case only started during NOSENKO'S
first assignment to the Seventh Department (1955-1960) it
is described in its entirety through 1963, for the conven-
ience of the reader.
NOSENKO's Information
:
:
、..
".
At his second meeting with CIA in Geneva on 11 June 1962,
NOSENKO described the circumstances in which an unnamed
foreigner was compromised by a KGB female agent, Klara
Konstantinovna GORBACHEVA. He described the scene in detail
including the attempt by a KGB technician to take motion
pictures through a two-way mirror, and the confrontation of
the foreigner by the militiamen, who broke into the room.
NOSENKO identified that foreigner as FRIPPEL by name the 06
following day while discussing KGB successes in Moscow:
"There was another agent
[KGB cryptonym] 'Artur.'
He was not a correspondent. He knew me as George,
Yuriy Ivanovich, and my last name as NIKOLAYEV. He
was a permanent representative, not in the Embassy,
but of the American Express Company in Moscow. 29
06 FRIPPEL Arthur FRIPPEL He liked drinking, always
drank. He was also strongly attracted to women.
provided him with beautiful women. Well, we
decided to have a talk with him. Why? What could
he give? He now works in the American Express 29
Company][main office in New York City]. A new
137
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department has now been organized for the Soviet
Union and the Peoples' Democracies. And he is
chief of the department... He is no longer in
Moscow, but he was here two and a half or three
years. We hope that he will return. We are waiting
for him to come back. We know that the company
wants to send him again, because he knows the Russian
language very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this
FRIPPEL. And he also did a good and intelligent job
of establishing relations with Inturist
.
He had very
good relationships with ANKUDINOV, the Chairman of
Inturist, and with other people, both the chiefs and
the 
low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL 06
recruited? 
I was interested in knowing precisely
by whom, by name, and how approaches were being made
to our delegations (in the United States]. I was
interested in him from the point of view of counter-
intelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of
approaches are taking place to our people in America
and by whom? This is what interested me. But he
didn't know anything. He provided only superficial
information, nothing more.
06
NOSENKO was then asked whether FCRIPPEL would not have been
useful for coverage of Americans visiting the Soviet Union.
He replied no, that the KGB had already had great success in
this by 
other means.
In Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and
interrogations, NOSENKO made additional statements concerning
the 
FRIPPEL case.
06
06
NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL
recruitment as follows:
"In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy
Chief of the section, my area of activity was
narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at
that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the
section and I had my own little area--for example,
the permanent representative of the American Express 29
Company, and 
besides that I began to collect all the
material 
on all American tourist firms which have
anything to do with Inturist and which send tourists
to the USSR."
138
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06.
Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not
do so alone. Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later
Chief) of the Seventh Department, was present, and he and
NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early
September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case
officer.
06
.06.
NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL until January
1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with
CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPELT's home, where 06
06 they met Mrs. FRIPPEL Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her
husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and
CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with.
06 FRIPPEL. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate
case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives
present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was.
invited", and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved
in the recruitment"
he recruitment.
As Deputy Chief of a Tourist section of the Seventh
Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of
the American Embassy Section of the American Department,
NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and 06
restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost
invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I
06 met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with
CHELNOKOV. 11
Usually NOSENKO would arrange meetings with
06 FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continued to
meet with FRIPPED despite his lack of production, because
they "kept hoping he would give something". (In a different
context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO explained that
GRIBANOV insisted that even Department Chiefs of the Second
Chief Directorate must each have two or three agents.)
Open Directorate
When NOSENKO began to work in the American Embassy
Section of the American Department in 1960, he took (FRIPPEL 06
with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Americans
at the Embassy. NOSENKO questioned FRIPPEL about the Embassy:
and about Embassy officers George WINTERS and Lewis W.
BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything useful.
·06
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06-
NOSENKO continued to act as [F RIPPEL's case officer after
FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union and after 
NOSENKO had been
transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy 
Chief
He met 
twice with [FRIPPEL] 
during 06
of the Seventh Department.
this latter period when [FRIPPEL visited the Soviet Union as 06
a guide with groups of foreign 
visitors.
meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, without CHELNOKOV.
Both of these
NOSENKO
The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962, after
(FRIPPEL 
arrived 06
NOSENKO returned to Moscow from Geneva.
in the Soviet Union as a guide for some American journalists.
(NOSENKO was unable to give the composition of the 
journa-
list group or to recall where they stayed in 
Moscow and
where else they travelled in the Soviet Union
.)
contacted him in Moscow to learn what questions the newsmen
intended to ask Khrushchev during a scheduled 
interview;
[subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged that standard practice
required visiting journalists to submit their 
intended
questions for Khrushchev in writing to 
Soviet 
authorities
prior to interviews]. After the interview, 
he recontacted
FRIPPEL to learn the reaction of the journalists 
to their
Talk with the Soviet leader. NOSENKO 
could not recall 
their
specific reaction to the Khrushchev interview 
but did
remember that they were "satisfied". Another reason for
Obcontacting FRIPPEL, NOSENKO added 
in a later discussion,
was to learn whether any of the 
journalists might have
joined the group at the last moment in the 
United 
States,
which might suggest intelligence connections on 
their 
part,
06
06.
NOSENKO met FC RIPPEL alone for the second and last time
Since FRIPPEL was a 
guide for tourists 
06
during March 1963.
aboard the ship "Olympia", which stopped for a day in Yalta
and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Moscow 
and accosted
FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where the tourists 
were
having dinner. Finally able to get away from his group
,
06 [FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's 
hotel room, 
and
the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given: CERCRIPPEL
) a of
bottle of vodka as a gift, and 
FRIPPEL said he wanted to 
06
They 
drove in NOSENKO'S
give NOSENKO some whisky in return.
car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while
(He 
had invited 
NOSENKO
06 FRIPPEL went aboard for the whisky.
to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.)
14/BR
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06
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
06
June 1955-January 1960).
When FRIPPEL returned, he brought another American, so
NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist)
on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some
06.
more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact KCHTERER_RIPPEL
reported "nothing of importance", and his most interesting
news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in
December 1963 as the American Express Company representative. 29
(NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been 06
assigned elsewhere, and it was therefore unlikely that his
agent would return to Moscow. This report was submitted by
V.V. KÖSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal
Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City,
who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of
NOSENKO.)
FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during
NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when
[FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide,
Paroper returned to the soviet on as a tour gui
On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV
papers (see p.309) in Geneva, NOSENKO was asked about the
following passage dealing with FRIPPEL which appeared in 06.
the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN:
"He [BOWDEN] showed himself to be an indiscreet
person. One day, as though by chance, he
[BOWDEN] blurted out to our agent SHVEDOVA [the
fact of 'ARTUR's' affiliation with American
intelligence."
Asked who SHVEDOVA was, NOSENKO said she was "probably
a cleaning woman" [Elsewhere NOSENKO described
SHVEDOVA as his own agent working against American
Army Attaches, see p. 85..] Asked what connection
06FRIPPEL had with American intelligence, NOSENKO replied
that he could not say. To the inquiry why not, since
he was FRIPPEL's case officer, NOSENKO was silent.
06.
.06
Spencer ROBERTS] [whose KGB recruitment is described
on p.424] in August 1962 became friends with a young
Soviet male who acknowledged having been a KGB agent used
against French-speaking foreigners. Included among the
0001411
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10
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1
Top Secret
06
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
June 1955-January 1960)
06
06
latter, the Soviet told ROBERTS, was (FRIPPEL, whom the
KGB suspected of being an 
American intelligence agent.
[NOSENKO reported ROBERTS) 10% recruitment 
but has never
indicated awareness of other 
KGB agents being targetted
against FRIPPEL. 06
06
06
FRIPPEL's Information
tion
06
FRIPPEL, who uses the nickname "Arthur") was the [ American 29
Express Company] representative 
in Moscow from 7 April 1958
He was 
first interviewed on the basis
to 3 January 1961.
of NOSENKO's information on 30 April 1964, and when shown a
picture of NOSENKO, FRIPPEL admitted 
his recruitment by the 
06
KGB in 1959. During 
this and subsequent interviews with
the FBI, FRIPPEL has reported 
in detail on his association
06 with the KGB (F_RIPPED's version coincides 
with that 
provided
by NOSENKO to a 
considerable degree, with the following
exceptions:
06
S
FRIPPEL asserts that at the time of his recruitment
the KGB wanted only general 
information on American
Embassy officials and American 
tourists travelling
to the Soviet Union under American 
Express auspices
]
According to NOSENKO, FRIPPED was 
originally 06
recruited to provide information on 
American 
intelli-
gence approaches to Soviets in the 
United States,
and he claimed that FRIPPEL 
was not needed for 06
coverage of Americans visiting the 
Soviet Union,
since the KGB had already "great 
success" by 
other
means. NOSENKO stated that later
, when he trans-
ferred to the American Embassy Section
, he took
06 his agent FRIPPEL with him 
to report on acquain-
tances among the Embassy employees
.
NOSENKO and
06 FRIPPEL agree that, with one exception (when
06 FRIPPEL was queried regarding BOWDEN 
and 
WINTERS),
FRIPPEL was not so 
used.
06
66 FRIPPEL, while acknowledging that NOSENKO partici-
pated in all meetings and on 
occasion met FRIPPEL] 
06
alone, stated that CHELNOKOV 
"was in charge of the
entire operation".
08
0001412
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}

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the high
Top Secret
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1
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960)
06.
{FRIPPEL claims that he saw NOSENKO on three occasions,
twice in Odessa, while visiting the USSR in 1962 and
1963. NOSENKO insisted that he met RIPPEL but once
in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period.
:
06
06
Comment:
NOSENKO volunteered his account of the FRIPPEL
case in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. Ile freely
related the details of the summer 1962 and
February 1963 meetings with FRIPPEL in the 06
USSR. His account of FRIPPEL's activities is 06
consistent with FRIPPEL's version, except as
noted above.
:06
Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-1960)
For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO'S
alleged involvement with OSWALD in 1959-1960 and in 1963.
are described elsewhere. (See p.303.) According to NOSENKO,
he was involved with OSWALD in 1959 because he was then
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
of the Seventh Department. In that capacity he participateŭ:
in the decision that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB
and he should not be allowed to remain in the Soviet Union.
Comment:
NOSENKO's information on his involvement with
OSWALD in 1959 is insufficient to serve as
evidence confirming or refuting his claimed
service as Deputy Chief of the American Section
of the Seventh Department in 1959.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
Top Secret
:
June 1955-January 1960)
Operational Activities
1955-1960:
Summary
According to NOSENKO, after an uneventful assignment in
the American Department's Embassy Section, in 1955 he was
transferred to the newly-organized Seventh Department
Tourist Section as a case officer. Between 1955 and 1957
he assembled a network of agents and was involved in four
KGB attempts to recruit foreign tourists. One of these
attempts, that against [Richard BURGI, was the first recruit-06
ment of the Tourist Section; it won NOSENKO a commendation,
brought him to the attention of General GRIBANOV, and turned
NOSENKO into an effective and successful KGB officer. In
1958 NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section. He then
recruited the second member of his two-man homosexual team
and, in 1958 and 1959, participated in ten KGB attempts to
recruit American and British visitors to the USSR and one
American resident of Moscow. NOSENKO's success in the
Seventh Department prompted GRIBANOV to transfer him back
to the American Embassy Section as Deputy Chief with the
critical priority task of reviving KGB operations against
American Embassy code clerks.
It is worthy of note that of the fifteen cases in which
he personally participated, by his own admission, NOSENKO
became involved in nine not because they were operations of
his section, but because the targets were the victims of
homosexual or other entrapment. In addition, three of the
fifteen operations were not directed by his section, but
by senior Seventh Department officers. According to his
own statements, four others were specifically the responsi-
bility of other Seventh Department sections of KGB elements,
including the Foreign Seamen Section (GEHRCKENS); Delega- 06
06 Obtions Section (LANE and BIRSE), Commercial Representatives
06 Obsection (TAYLOR), and WILLERFORD] (Moscow City KGB). FRIPPEL] 06
does not relate clearly to NOSENKO's claimed Seventh
Department service: NOSENKO states he was also used as an
agent of the First Department Embassy Section. Even the
remaining case, that of HARRIS), was not necessarily a
ов
0001414
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June 1955-January 1960)
Seventh Department operation: by NOSENKO's other statements,
she was not a "tourist" and she would have been the target.
of the Moscow Oblast KGB because of her intention to marry
a Soviet citizen.
:
While NOSENKO's participation in the attempted recruit-
ment of the targets he describes, even where not confirmed,
is not disputed, the evidence suggest that he was an
English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a
counterintelligence officer responsible for the identifi-
cation of foreign agents among tourists or for the develop-
ment, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB.
Nothing NOSENKO has said indicates that there was any
material change in his duties and responsibilities after
he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-
British Commonwealth Section. The evidence is that he was
more active, but not that he had any administrative and
supervisory responsibilities.
Knowledge of other Seventh Department
American Tourist Operations
In
NOSENKO said that upon his return to the Seventh Depart-
ment in 1962 as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth
Section, he reviewed the section's activities during his
two-year absence, e.g. January 1960 to January 1962.
the course of that review he made written notes of the
section's operational targets during that period notes
which he brought to Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319.) NOSENKO
could not describe the operations other than to say that he
recorded the target's names and such details as he could
acquire at the time of his review. Eleven of the operations
included in his notes were those against Bernard PECHTER, 06,06,06,06,06,06,
Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, 06, 06.
<fnu_KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR,
06 Michael GINSBERG, and William TARASKA: 06 All were from the
period 1956-1959 and six of the eleven individuals were
identified by the KGB as homosexuals. All of these cases
are described in Annex B.
0001415
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-
Comment:
More
NOSENKO has never resolved why these cases,
which predated the records he claimed he
reviewed, were included in his notes.
important, he never could explain why he was
unfamiliar with American tourist cases which
occurred at a time when he claimed that he
was Deputy Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section and was knowledgeable
of all such cases.
KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among Foreign Tourists, 1955-1960
Besides those operations in which NOSENKO claimed personal
involvement or about which he learned in his capacity of
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section,
NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB knew of the 
use
of tourists in the USSR by foreign intelligence services
Information from 
other
throughout the 1955-1960 period.
sources serves as a basis for judging the validity of
NOSENKO's claim.
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO's Tourist Study
Sometime between May and October 1959, during the
tourist season, NOSENKO was ordered to gather facts for
Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV concerning the use
of tourist cover by foreign intelligence services during
the period 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO said he assembled
this material from the Seventh Department's annual reports
of the years 1955-1958, supplemented by information he
obtained from discussions with knowledgeable Seventh
Department case officers. NOSENKO recalled only that the
study incorporated statistical data on the growth of
foreign tourism; he did not remember the content of the
study, any examples included in it, or what the study
concluded about American or British Intelligence tourist
146
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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June 1955-January 1960)
operations. Nevertheless, based on his research for this
study as well as on his general and supervisory responsi-
bilities in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asserted that
he could accurately describe KGB counterintelligence
operations among tourists during the period 1955-1960.
Extent of KGB Knowledge
According to NOSENKO, operations against foreign tourists
were developing slowly during this period and very little
was known by the KGB about the American Intelligence use
of tourism at the time he wrote the study in 1959. No
agents were definitely identified among American tourists,
and no tourists were "caught in the act" mailing letters,
servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, with one exception.
06 (MCGUIRE sic, see below.) The Seventh Department, NOSENKO
said, developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists
because of their apparent interest in photography, or because
they were disseminating foreign literature. The KGB never
established any firm intelligence connection, however,
despite various operational measures taken such as vyemka
(covert baggage search) and maneuvering KGB agents in
contact with the suspect tourists. No American tourists
were definitely identified as American Intelligence agents,
NOSENKO concluded. On related matters, NOSENKO asserted
that during his 1955-1960 service in the Seventh Department
the KGB acquired no information regarding American Intelli-
gence use of tourism; specifically, the KGB obtained no
documentary information on this topic from any agent source.
American Tourist Agents
The one exception in which an American tourist was
observed performing a clandestine task, NOSENKO said, was
one whose name he recalled as MCGUIRE and who mailed a 06
letter in Minsk in 1959. NOSENKO said he never knew what
KGB operational activity led to the discovery of McGUIRE's
clandestine letter mailing.
147
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-
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT June 1955-January 1960)
1
06
Comment: NOSENKO here is apparently referring to Edward
MCGOWAN, a CIA tourist agent who was in fact
detected by the KGB while clandestinely mailing
an operational letter in Minsk, but in August
1958.
06
There was a [Robert Alan MCGUIRE who visited
the Soviet Union during NOSENKO's Seventh
Department service, but he was not connected
with American Intelligence at the time and he
mailed no letter. (MCGUIRE, however, was a 06
former CIA staff employee. He visited the
Soviet Union as a tourist in April-May 1959,
during which period he was the target of
numerous KGB provocations, including black-
market, females, and a Soviet citizens' request
for assistance in defecting to the Americans.
Also, a customs officer confiscated from
06 MCGUIRE a Radio Liberation Russian-language
66 script, and (MCGUIRE was compelled to sign an
acknowledgement of the event, although the
reasons were left blank. Interrogation has
never resolved how NOSENKO knew the name of
06 MCGUIRE, but not the background of the case,
or the background of MCGOWAN s case, but not
his name.
06
7/BR
Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE
In 1959 the KGB obtained from its agent in MI-6,
[George BLAKE, who was arrested by British authorities in
April 1961] the complete details of the CIA-MI-6 program for
In early
utilizing tourist agents in the Soviet Union.
June 1959 a three-day conference was held in London between
CIA and MI-6 representatives, at the conclusion of which a
nineteen-page document was drawn up which described opera-
tional doctrine on tourist operations, including agent
spotting, agent selection, agent assessment, agent training,
and agent tasks planned for the current (1959) tourist
The document stressed CIA planned use of tourists
season.
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for spotting, contacting, and assessing and, eventually,
communicating with agents in the Soviet Union. BLAKE
confessed to passing the document to the KGB as soon as it
came into his possession.
Comment
.
It is not advanced that NOSENKO should neces-
sarily have known of BLAKE, although his
statements on the matter have been ambiguous.
Asked in 1962 whether he knew of BLAKE (whose
earlier arrest had been publicized), NOSENKO
affirmed that he did but indicated that BLAKE
was a less important source than the Canadian
Ambassador (WATKINS) or the agent in the
British Admiralty (VASSALL). When BLAKE was
mentioned in 1964, NOSENKO asked "Who's BLAKE?"
The significance of BLAKE is that his
confession established that the KGB was fully
aware of the status and character of American
and British Intelligence tourist operations
while NOSENKO alleges he was in the Seventh
Department. It is judged, by any measure as
well as by NOSENKO's statements about the KGB
that the substance of the information if not
the document itself would be brought to the
attention of a key KGB counterintelligence
officer concerned, the Deputy Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section, which
NOSENKO claims was himself."
KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations
In 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy KGB Top Secret study on
the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence
for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union.
The KGB study draws recognizably upon the information
supplied by BLAKE and, although concerned primarily with
American tourist operations in 1960, it also refers to
American agents whom KGB counterintelligence elements
identified among tourists in the years 1958 and 1959, while
NOSENKO claims he was Deputy Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section and during which time he claims the
KGB identified no American Intelligence agents.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
1955-1960:
Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO's description of the activities of the Second
Chief 
Directorate 
Seventh Department in this period is
almost solely 
restricted to his account of these fifteen
KGB operations
. Other than to allege that certain KGB
officers he named 
were his subordinates, he provided no
information to 
substantiate his claim that he had any
supervisory 
or administrative responsibilities.
feature of the operations do not relate to NOSENKO's own
The 
common
description of the 
function of the Seventh Department's
Tourist Section or 
later, to the American-British Common-
wealth Section. 
Most were sexual or other entrapment
operations, and 
he acknowledges that several were operations
conducted by KGB 
elements other than his own section. In
short, NOSENKO 
need not have been in the Seventh Department
sections, as he claims
, to have learned of or participated
in the activities he 
describes. Although NOSENKO gives a
graphic account 
of the Second Chief Directorate's (and his
own) 
counterintelligence mission, his knowledge is not of
counterintelligence 
operations among tourists; in the only
three such operations 
he describes, the counterintelligence.
aspects were incidental. 
Contrary to his claims, NOSENKO
is aware 
neither of all important KGB operations conducted
against American 
tourists during the period, nor what was
known to the KGB 
about American Intelligence and British
tourist 
operations.
Conclusion
While NOSENKO was associated with a KGB element conducting
operations against American and other foreign tourists
during the 
period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case
officer nor Deputy 
Chief of the Seventh Department American-
British Commonwealth Section
.
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Top Secret
CHAPTER VII
AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT
(January 1960-January 1962)
Deputy Chief of the Section
NOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the
American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB
Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960.
until the first days of January 1962. This section, in
his words, was working against "the most important counter-
intelligence target in the Soviet Union", the permanent:
American representation in Moscow. It regarded every
American stationed there a possible spy and, simultaneously,
as a target for recruitment.
The functions of the American Embassy Section were
described by NOSENKO as being to monitor all contacts by
Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens, to collect all
information possible on American Embassy employees, and
to use this information
menting recruitments.
2 as a basis for planning and imple-
Americans' personalities, jobs,
personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security
precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major
and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis
for this work. To gather such information, the section's
officers employed large numbers of agents and informants
among the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet
citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country.
nationals with American contacts. The officers also
benefitted from the reports of numerous surveillance teams
at their disposal, as well as information obtained from
telephone taps and microphones in Americans' offices and
homes. Each officer had a limited number of American
targets with whom he attempted to become thoroughly familiar.
Annually, they submitted detailed operational plans for
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January 1960-January 1962)
exploiting the knowledge they had gained of their targets.
During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, within 
the section
special emphasis was placed on "identifying intelligence
officers in the Embassy and actively developing 
them,
acquiring ciphers, and painstakingly studying 
code 
clerks,
creating the basis on which they can be 
recruited".
As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO said, he had
access to all information concerning its activities
:
On this basis, 
he 
expressed
"Nothing was hidden" from him.
certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB recruited no
Americans associated with the Embassy, there were no KGB
agents among Americans assigned to the Embassy 
in this
period and, in fact, the KGB had recruited 
no American
recruited
Embassy personnel since "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH
,
ca. 1953, see p. 33). From continuing friendships with
his fellow-officers of 1960-and 1961, who 
remained in 
the
section when NOSENKO transferred, NOSENKO has 
also claimed
certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from 
the
time he left the section in January 1962 until 
his 
January
1964 departure in Geneva.
Transfer to the American Embassy Section
In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the
American Section of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO learned
from the Department Chief DUBAS of plans to 
transfer him
back to the American Department's American 
Embassy 
Section,
as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the 
move
and wanted to remain in the Seventh 
Department:
the
"I was used to it there and wanted to continue.
This
I wanted to stay in the Seventh Department.
Here I was the
[the transfer] was no promotion.
Deputy Chief of section and would be the same
there. The American Department is, of course,
most important. But here I was working against
American tourists. This is also important.
Furthermore, I showed [had proven] myself there in
'55, 156, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered 
to
be not a bad case officer. And there, in the
American Department, I must prove myself with new
people.
1
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January 1960-January 1962)
NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS to try to retain him. DUBAS
later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief
Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no
avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring
NOSENKO were issued.
On the day NOSENKO reported to V.A. KLYPIN, Chief of
the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told
to report to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO expressed his
misgivings about the change of assignment to GRIBANOV.
GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him but that he
GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all". GRIBANOV.
told NOSENKO that he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air"
to the American Embassy Section's operations and that he
was to pay particular attention to operations against
American code clerks, the "number one target".
Predecessor as Deputy Chief
Asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting
for duty in the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO replied:
"No one. He assumed responsibility for the Embassy security
file from KOVSHUK. Various case officers earlier had been
responsible for Embassy Security Officer Russell LANGELLE,
including MALYUGIŃ, then KUSKOV, KOVSHUK, and KLYPIN; but
LANGELLE had been expelled from the Soviet Union in October
1959 and his successor," John ABIDIAN, was not to arrive
until March 1960.
On several occasions between January and June 1964 NOSENKO
had referred to a KGB officer named Mikhail Fedorovich
BAKHVALOV--but never in connection with the American Embassy
Section. Thus, in January he first identified him as
Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV, the Deputy Chief of the Fifth
(Eastern Countries) Department. In February he identified
a V.A. ALEKSEYEV as the alias of a Mikhail Fedorovich, last
name not recalled, who was Deputy Chief of the Fifth
Department. In June, in listing KGB officers who had
received various awards for their service, NOSENKO included
the name of Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of "an unremem-
bered department" of the Second Chief Directorate.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
January 1960-January 1962)
On 18 June 1964 NOSENKO was asked to list the names of
all officers who had either 
joined or departed the American
Embassy Section from 
the time NOSENKO was transferred to
the Seventh Department 
in 1955 to his return to the 
American
NOSENKO listed fourteen officers
Embassy Section in 
1960.
as having joined the section, and five who had been 
trans-
In 
neither list did NOSENKO mention BAKHVALOV
.
ferred out.
A week later, however, on 24 June 1964 NOSENKO stated
that "in 1959 and possibly in 
1958 Mikhail Fedorovich
BAKHVALOV was the Deputy 
Chief of the American Embassy
Section. I replaced him 
in his position in 1960 and 
he
In 
September
went to the Fifth 
Department as Deputy Chief".
1964 NOSENKO asserted 
that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy 
Chief
, 
[not
the others he had 
identified earlier] had been LANGELLE's
In 1965 
NOSENKO first mentioned that
case officer.
BAKHVALOV, not KOVSHUK, had been responsible 
for 
maintaining
the Embassy security 
file and stated that BAKHVALOV had
shared with KOVSHUK 
responsibility for supervising code
clerk operations.
Comment:
Interrogation has never resolved contradictions
between NOSENKO's 
earlier accounts of what
functions he assumed from 
whom when he 
entered
the Section, and his belated 
assertions that
BAKHVALOV was his predecessor 
as Deputy Chief
.
Responsibilities
Shortly after reporting for duty in the American Embassy
Section and following 
his short discussion with GRIBANOV,
NOSENKO said he met with 
American Department Chief KLYPIN
and Embassy Section Chief 
KOVSHUK to discuss his responsi-
Repeating what
bilities and functions 
in the section.
GRIBANOV had said, KLYPIN 
stressed that 
NOSENKO's most
important single responsibility 
in the section would 
be
supervision of all KGB 
operational activity against 
American
military and State 
Department code clerks stationed 
in
Moscow. As for the 
other Americans at the Embassy, 
KLYPIN
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January 1960-January 1962)
suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be'
responsible for supervising operations against State
Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work
against the Army, Air Force, and Naval Attaches and their
assistants. NOSENKO was also to be custodian of certain
sensitive files in the section.
NOSENKO has signed a protocol which listed his principal
responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It reads in part:
"During the entire period in the First [American
Embassy] Section, First [American] Department in
1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of
Section. My responsibilities were the following:
Lottery responsibilities were the
:
-General Deputy to the Chief of the First
Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and
Acting Chief of Section in his absence.
-Immediate supervisor for the operational work
against American code clerks. In this capacity I
closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy
GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV-
-Case officer for American Embassy Security
Officer, John ABIDIAN.
-For about the first six months of 1960, super-
visor of the work against the offices of the Army,
Naval, and Air attaches.
Comment:
'
Before 1965 NOSENKO never claimed responsibility
for supervising operations against service
attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO
for the first time claimed he was personally
responsible for (as contrasted to supervising).
operational activity against Naval and Marine
officers of the office of the Naval Attache.
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1
-I maintained the file on American Embassy
security.
-I maintained the log books for the reports sent
to the First [American Embassy] Section by the
Operational Technical Directorate, KGB, based on
the information obtained from all the microphones
installed in the American Embassy. I read all
the reports and gave the pertinent reports to the
appropriate case officers in the section.
In my
absence this work was done by KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV.
-During this period I was the agent handler for
agents SHMELEV', 'GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', 'ARTUR'
and 'SARDAR' [VOLKOV, YEFREMOV (PREISFREUND)], 06
FRIPPEL and WEISS respectively
).
06
06
'Throughout this entire period I sat in Room 618
of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzherzhinskiy
Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this
office with me throughout most of this period."
Comment:
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to each of
these claimed functions are examined in some
detail in the following pages.
Deputy and Occasional Acting Chief of Section
Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under repeated
interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSHUK, with the
responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he had
access to and was obliged to keep current on all information
relating to the section's activities. On this basis he
has assured his questioners that the KGB was 'completely
unsuccessful in its attempts to recruit Americans assigned
to the Embassy in these two years. NOSENKO has also said
at various 
times that his access to section files and his
association with section officers made it certain that
there were no such KGB successes even in the periods
156
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)
1955-1960 and 1962-1964, when he was assigned in the Seventh
Department. His statements on this subject during February
1965 were distilled in a protocol which NOSENKO signed on
20 February:
"As the only Deputy to the Chief of the American
Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief
Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK,
from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my
functions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy
and to assume the rights and responsibilities of
Chief of the Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In
order to perform this function I had the right and
the obligation of knowing the details about every
important activity of the section against the
American Embassy and its personnel.
of this nature was withheld from me.
No activity
"As Deputy Chief of the Section I know definitely
that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy were
agents of the KGB or reporting unofficially in any
way to the KGB during my service in the Section.
There were no approaches or recruitments made by
the Section during the period January 1960 to
January 1962 against personnel of the American
Embassy, including personnel of the Attaches
(Army, Navy, and Air), the Department of Agriculture
and USIA, including Marine guards, Army sergeants,
☐ State Department code clerks except against STORS-
BERG and KEYSERS] both unsuccessful approaches.
06
"There were no approaches or recruitments made
against any employees of the
ment who were assigned to the Dited States Govern-
American Embassy on
temporary duty during this period. I have read and
understood this report and certify it as correct."
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In the two years of NOSENKO's service in the section
there were a total of over three months when he said KOVSHUK
was ill or on leave, NOSENKO recalled that he was Acting
Chief during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and
1961, although he did not remember precisely in which months.
He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the
summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with
heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961, again
when KOVSHUK was ill, He recalled that KOVSHUK was also
absent for several days in connection with preparations for
President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in
1960.
As Acting Chief in KOVSHUK's absence, NOSENKO stated that
he was responsible for supervising the administrative work
and operational activity of the entire section and, in
particular, for assuming KOVSHUK's work in directing
operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to the
American Embassy.
NOSENKO could recall no operational decisions that he
made as acting chief, nor any specific or unusual occurrences
during these times. NOSENKO said that the only specific
responsibility of KOVSHUK's which he handled in the Chief's
absence was reporting to the Chief of the First Department
about all correspondence going out of the Embassy Section.
NOSENKO stated he met none of KOVSHUK's agents during his
absences, nor could he remember any of them except GLAZUNOV
[whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own agent and later
said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and the American
Of correspondent [STEVENS] [about whom NOSENKO had reported in
connection with his activities in 1953-55].
According to NOSENKO, KOVSHUK had personal contact, under
Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with "some" American
Embassy officers, but the only such Embassy officer he could'
identify was WINTERS, and he knew of no details about
KOVSHUK's relations with him.
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Comment:
.03.
NOSENKO knows neither that William N. MORELL
was identified formally by the Embassy to the
Soviet Government to be a CIA employee, nor
that KOVSHUK (who was aware of this fact)
was in personal contact with MORELL.
03
General Supervisory Duties
In interrogations of January 1965 NOSENKO was questioned
in considerable detail about his supervisory duties as
Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. He didn't know what
major duties occupied most of his time, nor which were the
most important: He stated that "everything" was important.
His subordinates were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV (responsible
for code clerk operations), [Vladimir] DEMKIN assisted by
[Yevgeniy] GROMAKOVSKIY (residents of America House),
[N.A.] GAVRILENKO (Air Attaches personnel and the aircrews
of the Ambassador's aircraft), [I.Ya.] KURILENKO (Army
Attache personnel), and [Victor] BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attache
personnel) Except for "little questions" which the
officers decided for themselves, NOSENKO said he directed
their activities, discussed with them various aspects of
their work, and responded to their questions as required.
If he could not t answer their questions, NOSENKO stated, or
if the problem was not within his authority, NOSENKO
discussed the matter with KOVSHUK. If it was necessary,
NOSENKO claimed he thereafter would discuss the matter with
American Department Chief KLYPIN or his successor, [S.M.]
FEDOSEYEV, and on some occasions, with Second Chief
Directorate Chief GRIBANOV.
NOSENKO stated he accompanied his subordinates to some
meetings with their agents, not because he didn't trust
them, but to hear for himself what the agent was reporting.
He cited as hypothetical examples occasions when DEMKIN.
might relay reports from Ella UMANETS or Inga VARLAMOVA
(agents working against America House residents), reports
which NOSENKO would want to hear for himself, personally.
NOSENKO would not estimate to his interrogators what percen-
tage of Embassy Section agents he met in this fashion.
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In addition to supervising his subordinates's direction
of 
agents, 
NOSENKO said he personally managed PREISFREUND 06
("PROKHOR") and (WEISS) ("SARDAR").
ов
Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations
When
NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for
supervising operations against American code clerks, he
found a very 
"difficult situation". Prior to the assignment
of KOSOLAPOV to the 
American Embassy Section in late 1959,
all operations 
against code clerks had been handled by
MALYUGIN, but 
during MALYUGIN's two years of effort there
had been no 
operational approaches and no successes.
NOSENKO took over 
there were no active developmental.
operations 
against code clerks under way, he stated, and
the only agents 
or operational contacts being used against
them were poorly 
educated maids and waitresses none of
whom had 
accomplished anything of importance.
citizen 
agents were being used in operations against code-
No non-Soviet
room personnel.
According to NOSENKO, in January or February of 1960
GRYAZNOV 
was 
assigned to the American Embassy Section as a
second assistant to 
NOSENKO in his code clerk activities.
From this 
point on, NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV shared
the same KGB 
Headquarters office. There, all KGB files on
American code 
clerks as well as the files on all agents
available for 
work against them, were stored in one large
safe accessible to 
all three officers.
all of the section's work along these lines, and no provo-
NOSENKO supervised
cations, compromises, 
recruitment attempts, or recruitments
could have been 
planned or carried out without his prior.
knowledge and 
agreement when he was in Moscow.
was absent on a trip, he would have been told about any such
If NOSENKO
activity upon his return
.
NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of
GRYAZNOV 
and 
KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing
their cases with them
, taking part in operational planning,
and approving or disapproving 
all operational measures.
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08,06
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
January 1960-January 1962)
When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations
against code clerks, he read files on targets and agents,
"discussed the situation with MALYUGIN, DEMKIN (the American
Embassy Section case officer responsible for the residents
of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and reported..
his findings and recommendations to his superiors, KOVSHUK
and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, NOSENKO
asserted. In introducing a new program for the work of
the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country.
nationals (neither American nor Soviet citizens) for agent
work against code clerks; in line with this suggestion, he
personally recruited a Syrian military officer, Samih WEISS 08,06
(see p. 181), and directed him against the America House.
After his first few visits, WEISS was specifically targetted 06
against military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS. Another such 08,06
agent directly handled by NOSENKO was the Finnish business-08,06
man Johan PREISFREUND), who figured in the case of the
(military code clerk James STORSBERG)] (see p.166). * NOSENKO
also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior
to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that
operational measures be undertaken or that operational
possibilities be studied in Helsinki, the city through which
most of the American code clerks passed on their way to
Moscow.
Comment: Questioned later on individual cases, NOSENKO
retracted his assertion that he read and
studied all the files on individual American
code clerks, stating instead that he did not
study any although he "may have skimmed some
He insisted, however, that in any event he
read all the current incoming information on
code clerks received from microphones, agents
and the like, and routed the reports to the
case officer concerned.
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GOLITSYN's Information About KGB Operations Against Embassy
Code Clerks in 1960-1961
The most significant collateral information about KGB
operations against American code clerks in this period,
with which to compare NOSENKO's assertions [on this topic),
is that provided by GOLITSYN after his defection in 1961.
"
GOLITSYN identified KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV by name and
from photograph as being two veteran KGB officers, personally
known to him, who were in 1960 "working against code clerks
in the American Embassy in Moscow. With respect to the
priority attached to the recruitment of American code clerks
in 1960, GOLITSYN commented in 1961 that: "The task of
strengthening of work against Americans had been a standing
requirement, both in the past and most particularly (in
1960]. This work was particularly intensified after the
appointment of SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was
recommended in the KGB to intensify the work against the
Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, and against American
colonies in other countries... This question of intensifying
work against the Americans was up before the Collegium of
the KGB. Thereafter there was a directive from SHELEPIN
regarding the intensification of work against the American
cipher-clerks."
· GOLITSYN said that NOSENKO was not assigned to the Embassy
Section in 1960-1961, since if he had been GOLITSYN would
have known about it.
Preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, GOLITSYN. in
the spring of 1960 visited the Embassy Section and learned
from GRYAZNOV that the latter had as an agent an Embassy
code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki.
The code clerk had already provided the KGB with some infor-
mation and he was considered by the KGB to be a "real"
agent. GOLITSYN was told by GRYAZNOV that, if the code clerk's
transfer materialized, GOLITSYN might have him in Helsinki
as his agent.
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January 1960-January 1962)
GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV in spring of 1960
that the latter had developed an operation against an
Embassy military code clerk in which the KGB was "99 per
cent sure" that the target would be recruited.
GRYAZNOV informed GOLITSYN in April or May 1960 that an
American employee of the Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code
clerk, was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on
the basis of homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and
concluding in 1960. The KGB had photographed the American
in various homosexual acts but SHELEPIN, who had just become.
Chairman of the KGB, at the time was stressing ideological
rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN said that the
homosexual blackmail was in this instance "too dirty", and
the KGB should find another basis for recruitment. SHELEPIN
did not exclude future use of the photographs, which the KGB
would hold in reserve.
While on a temporary assignment to Helsinki in November
1960, V.V. KOSOLAPOV told GOLITSYN that he had come to
Helsinki in order to accompany an Embassy code clerk back
to Moscow on the train. KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an
acquaintance with the code clerk which he could continue
to develop in Moscow. In September 1961 a friend of
KOSOLAPOV also visited Helsinki on temporary duty. GOLITSYN
tried to get him to talk about KOSOLAPOV's November train
operation, but KOSOLAPOV's friend would not discuss the
case. GOLITSYN reasoned that there would be no reluctance
to discuss the case if it had been unsuccessful, and that
therefore KOSOLAPOV must have been successful in developing
the code clerk on the train or afterwards.
GOLITSYN learned in January 1961 from V.M. KOVSHUK that
the Finnish agent Johannes PREISFREUND] had recently been
used in the successful recruitment of an American employee
of the Embassy
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Comment:
January 1960-January 1962)
Two of GOLITSYN's leads may refer to [STORSBERG) 06
Of and GARLAND] (see below). The other leads, more
than one of 
which may refer to the same
individual, have not resulted in an identifica-
tion of any code clerk target of the KGB.
Operations Against Military Code Clerks
Comment:
According to official U.S. Government records,
Service Attaches of the Embassy in Moscow as
of 1960 shared a single cryptographic center
and a single military code clerk (except when
two code clerks overlapped during periods of
turnover). The military code clerk was respon-
sible 
for enciphering and deciphering the
traffic of all three military services.
In
practice, at least one other member of the
Service Attaches' offices in Moscow held a
cryptographic clearance and was trained to
replace the regular military code clerk when
the latter was absent.
James STORSBERG was the only military code 06,08
clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from
February 1960 to September 1961, when his
successor, Matthew ZUJUS, arrived. [STORSBERG 06
himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and
departed in November 1961.
06
RS
During the period of STORSBERG's tour in
Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were per-
formed by the Military Communications Officer, 08.06
CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY] performed these duties 06
on a 
number of occasions, including the night
of the KGB approach to CCCTCTORSBERG) and he could 06.
be loosely termed a code clerk. (Although
NOSENKO has distinguished between (STORSBERG'S 06
function as "military code clerk" and (HURLEY'S U6
duties as "military code machine mechanic", he
considered both to be within the general category
164
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Comment:
(Continued).
of "military code clerks" NOSENKO reported
that there was no KGB operation against
06 (HURLEY] ) Additionally, HURLEY performed repair 06
work on the cryptographic machines and directed
certain other sensitive activities at the
Embassy 06 HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly
06 before (STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he
served there until June or July 1962.
The only other person performing official
functions in the military code room during the
1960-61 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived 06
in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned
to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer.
As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS 06
worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the
Air Attache. From February until mid-April
1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in 06
the joint military code room where he was in
training to serve as back-up cryptographer.
He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for
reasons of low aptitude and lack of interest;
in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because
of reported homosexual activities.
The significance of the following cases
particularly that of STORSBERG, is the extent 06
to which collateral information corroborates
or contradicts NOSENKO's claims to have been
Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section,
to have supervised all KGB operations against
Embassy code clerks, and to have certain know-
ledge that no Americans in the Embassy were
recruited between "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH) in
1953 and NOSENKO's defection in 1964.
165
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SBERG 706
Attempted Recruitment of STORSBE
NOSENKO's Information-1962
NOSENKO first alluded to a KGB attempt to recruit an
unnamed 
American 
military code clerk during his initial
meeting with CIA in 
1962. He was describing a new technique
(which he later claimed to be 
his own idea) introduced in
the 1960-1961 
period to overcome the reluctance of Americans
in Moscow to develop 
friendships with Soviet citizens.
Beginning in 1960 the 
KGB instructed "third-national" agents
(Germans, Frenchmen; 
and Finns, for example) to visit the
American Club on 
Kropotkinskaya Naberezhnaya to cultivate
American enlisted men 
living there.
one such agent of NOSENKO and the KGB concluded that GOLITSYN
(GOLITSYN learned of
had reported the KGB 
practise to the Americans, because
foreigners no 
longer were permitted to enter the America
House billets freely 
for dances, movies, and the like at
the club there.) NOSENKO 
had recruited the agent known to
GOLITSYN in order to 
develop an American military code
clerk. Without identifying 
either the foreign agent or the
American target, NOSENKO 
provided further details on the
case in subsequent 
meetings.
Recruiting a military code clerk from the Embassy was the
American 
Embassy Section's 
"number one assignment", and for
a year NOSENKO was 
involved in an operation against such a
target almost to the 
exclusion of all other duties.
case was 
considered to be the "number one" case, and KGB
The
Chairman SHELEPIN as 
well as Second Chief Directorate Chief
GRIBANOV impatiently 
inquired as to its progress.
was an American Army sergeant 
with about 20 years' service 08
The target
who, the KGB learned, 
wanted to retire and take a position
as a code clerk with the 
State Department.
of 
developing the target, NOSENKO recruited a foreigner who
For the purpose
visited the USSR 
frequently. The "third-national" agent was
placed in contact with the American
, and they had several
drinking bouts together
. After about two months; NOSENKO
instructed his agent to 
take the American to the agent's
hotel room and 
introduce him there to a KGB female agent.
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Although the girl and the American were intimate, no photo-
graphs were taken, nor were photographs taken the next time
the agent provided the American with a girl. On the third
such occasion, however, the KGB technicians did obtain
incriminating photographs: The foreign agent also involved
the American in an illicit currency transaction in which
the American contributed $300 as his share to finance the
purchase and subsequent sale of some jewels. The American:
was allowed to believe that he earned a $5,000 profit:
money was actually furnished by the KGB.
the
After a year's development, GRIBANOV decided that a
recruitment should be attempted, through another foreigner.
The original foreign agent was withdrawn from the operation,
and a 
KGB officer, Nikolay Semenovich SKVORTSOV, was
introduced to the American in the guise of wealthy French
businessman "Marcel MICHAUD". SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD met and
drank with the American several times, "even at America
House". It was SKVORTSOV's estimate that the American was
very careful, but that he might be susceptible to recruitment
while drunk. 
After meeting with the American at the club in
America House one evening, SKVORTSOV telephoned him and
invited 
him to SKVORTSOV's hotel room to meet "two Dutch
girls". When he arrived, SKVORTSOV explained that the girls
had 
refused to come ; but that he could call another girl for
the 
American. The girl [identified by NOSENKO in 1964 as
Inga 
VARLAMOVA] was a KGB agent of GRYAZNOV's who was used
for such operations, and she and the American were intimate
in 
SKVORTSOV's hotel room. In an adjacent room were GRIBANOV,
NOSENKO, 
KOVSHUK, and another KGB officer. In another
adjacent room were technicians of the Operational Technical
Directorate; who taped the American's conversations. When
the 
American left SKVORTSOV's room at two o'clock in the
morning, he was "very tipsy". NOSENKO and another officer
intercepted 
him in the hallway, escorted him into the adjacent
room, and locked 
the door. N NOSENKO himself solicited the
"
laboration with the KGB in exchange for
(which was offered in two packages of $10
notes) and the promise of additional sums. When the American
refused, the 
KGB officers disclosed their knowledge of his
plan to 
transfer to the State Department. They threatened
to inform 
the Embassy that he had collaborated with the KGB,
in which 
case he would get neither the cash nor the job with
167
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January 1960-January 1962)
the State Department, The American was adamant in his
refusal
, although he was held in the hotel room all night
long. At 
about six o'clock in the morning the KGB officers
received a 
telephoned report that the Embassy Marine guard
had called America 
House to advise that the American was
needed 
at the Embassy because an enciphered telegram had
arrived. The American 
was then released.
The KGB "knew" that the American did not report the
recruitment attempt. Using that circumstance for blackmail
rather than 
the incriminating photographs, the KGB planned
another attempt 
to recruit him if he ever returned abroad.
When the non-Soviet agent used in the first year of
developing the American target had come to the attention of
GOLITSYN, 
GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section to see if he
could use 
him in First Chief Directorate operations abroad.
NOSENKO was on leave 
at the time, but GOLITSYN talked with
another 
Embassy Section officer. GOLITSYN was told "Don't
touch him, 
he's ours". [The relevance of this incident is.
discussed 
below.]
NOSENKO's Information-1964
a
At the second 'meeting with CIA in Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO
identified 
the American 
military code clerk as "Jim" 06
STORSBERG. 
The foreign agent NOSENKO recruited for the
case was Johannes PREISFREUND (KGB cryptonym "PROKHOR")
Finn. In 
repeating the substance of his 1962 account of
the KGB 
recruitment attempt, NOSENKO emphasized his personal
role in 
directing both PREISFREUND] and the KGB officer
SKVORTSOV/
MICHAUD.
06
GRIBANOV and KOVSHUK, not NOSENKO, actually made the
recruitment attempt. NOSENKO was not present; he waited
outside the room 
with GRYAZNOV. Neither did NOSENKO recruit
O PREISFREUND. The latter was recruited by KOVSHUK "who
needed credit for the 
recruitment" although NOSENKO had
initially 
cultivated the Finn.!! Under KOVSHUK's orders,
NOSENKO 
served as (PREISFREUND' case officer, although
KOVSHUK accompanied 
him to operational meetings with the
agent.
}
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
06
-
January 1960-January 1962)
PREISFREUND was used in no KGB operation other than in
the development of (STORSBERG of His usefulness declined
because he was suspected, particularly by his fellow (Finns //
of having some relationship with the KGB.
Comment::
A report of the Finnish security service.
advised CIA 
in December 1960 that PREISFREUND ] 06.
"is a Soviet agent who calls at the America
Club in Moscow and develops Americans in an
attempt to penetrate Western circles".
After GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] NOSENKO (who
had 
by then transferred back to the Seventh Department) and
KOVSHUK concluded 
that PREISFREUND thereby had been identi 06
fied as a 
KGB agent to American Intelligence; and that
06 PREISFREUND should not be used again against American
Embassy personnel
. NOSENKO was told to use the Finn in II
Seventh Department operations, but he was unsuitable since
he knew only Finnish and Russian.
NOSENKO's Information-1965
In the February-March 1965 interrogations NOSENKO
provided some additions as well as further amendments to
what he had related earlier about (STORSBERG-16 GRYAZNOV wrote
the initial 
operational plan, which NOSENKO read and
approved. The plan called for a detailed study of STORSBERG 06
and the creation 
of some basis on which to make an opera-
tional 
approach. The case developed slowly in 1960. From
Oba 
female clerk named 
YAZHINSKAYA and other employees in the
Finnish 
Embassy, PREISFREUND obtained background information
on (STORSBERG, who sometimes 
visited the sauna in the Finnish 08
Embassy 
PREISFREUND was directed to visit America House
in 
order to strike up an acquaintance with STORSBERG, and
when he was 
successful, he managed to lure STORSBERG to his 06
hotel room, where the KGB 
obtained incriminating photographs
06.
Of of STORSBERG) and the female agent Inga VARLAMOVA. STORSBERG ] 06
visited PREISFREUND)'
s rooms many times at different hotels
66 
in Moscow, but the KGB took 
incriminating photographs on
169
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January 1960-January 1962)
06
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
-
06
only two occasions. (PREISFREUND] introduced [STORSBERG] to
SKVORTSOV, and when they had become 
acquainted, SKVORTSOV
06 
invited STORSBERG to his room 
at the Leningrad Hotel on a
number of occasions; but (STORSBERG] always 
refused.
evening in the middle of 1961, 
however, [STORSBERG accepted 06
·
On one
06
SKVORTSOV's invitation in the belief that he would meet
non-Soviet girls. NOSENKO 
was in the hotel and he had
made arrangements with the 
KGB Operational Technical
Directorate to call at 
once if audio coverage of the American
Embassy indicated anything which might 
affect the recruitment
attempt.
While NOSENKO waited outside the room; GRIBANOV attempted
Ob to 
recruit STORSBERG on ideological 
grounds; his proposal
was translated by KOVSHUK STORSBERG
, however, must have
given SKVORTSOV's hotel room 
telephone number to someone at
the American Embassy; because while 
GRIBANOV was talking to
him someone called SKVORTSOV's room 
looking for the American.
When this happened, either GRYAZNOV 
or NOSENKO knocked on
the door and advised KOVSHUK that 
the Embassy was searching
for STORSBERG. The recruitment 
attempt was thereupon
terminated, unsuccessfully.
NOSENKO "could not remember" if he had ever read the KGB
file 
on STORSBERG). 06 [In 
describing KGB practice, NOSENKO
consistently equated custody of 
a case file with being the
responsible case officer.] He had 
no interest in "earlier
reporting", although he had 
read current materials concerning
STORSBERG as they came into the 
Embassy Section.
Comment:
NOSENKO at that time in 1965 was then confronted
with the substance 
of the 1962 meeting trans-
cripts in which he 
claimed to have run the
operation, to 
have been deeply involved in it,
and to have 
personally spoken to (STORSBERG) 06.
during the recruitment attempt
:
NOSENKO
interrupted the reading of the transcript,
calling it "nonsense". 
He said he was drunk
at all the 
1962 meetings in Geneva and was
nervous in the 
presence of CIA officers. He
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Comment:
(Continued)
admitted that he had "painted himself" as being
somewhat more active and important than facts
justified, but said this reflected only
"white lies" which did not affect the otherwise
complete accuracy of his story with respect to
the position he occupied at the time nor the
events which then transpired.
NOSENKO's Information-1966
During the 1964 interrogations NOSENKO had been vague as
to the timing and sequence of events in the [STORSBERG opera-06
tion, and in 1965 he refused to specify dates for this or
any other operation he described, stating he could no longer
be sure when any particular incident occurred. Questioned
06 again about the (STORSBERG case in October 1966, NOSENKO
insisted that he had directed the entire operation from
beginning to end, and that it was his most important case.
At his interrogator's insistence, he provided the following
chronology:
06
January 1960: STORSBERG arrived in Moscow. (NOSENKO
accepted the actual date as supplied
by the interrogator.)
Early 1960 or [PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK.
mid-1960:
Summer 1960:
NOSENKO, after retracting his claim
he recruited PREISFREUNDY said he 06
first met PREISFREUND(" 'a week or so
6.06
after his recruitment" (which occurred,
according to most accounts, in early
1960). In October 1966, however,
NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND] 06.
first met "in the middle of 1960, in
the summer of 1960".
.06.
PREISFREUND first provided a woman to
STORSBERG.
об
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Early 1961:
About May.
1961:
June 1961:
06
-
January 1960-January 1962)
06
Compromising photographs of (STORSBERG]
and a Soviet female were first obtained
at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.
06
[PREISFREUND] was withdrawn from the
operation and SKVORTSOV was introduced
about three weeks before the approach
to STORSBERG
06
06
Unsuccessful KGB approach to STORSBERG]
in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow.
(Earlier in the 1966 interrogations
NOSENKO had said that the approach was
made "a month or a month and a half
Told
06 before STORSBERG left Moscow".
06 that STORSBERG was reassigned in
November 1961, NOSENKO said that the
approach was in June 1961, five months
Ob before [STORSBERG's departure.)
06 [STORSBERG) reported that the approach
was in October 1961. See below.]
06
[STORSBERG])'s Information
He
STORSBERG did not report the KGB recruitment approach
until the NOSENKO lead prompted his being interviewed by
the FBI on 14 September 1964. His reasons, he said, were
that the KGB officers had warned him not do so and he
feared that by reporting the approach he would jeopardize
his chance for employment with the State Department.
said that he provided no information to the Soviets during
or after the approach in October 1961. With the exception
of the timing of the recruitment attempt, TORSBERG'S 06.
account of the operation is fairly close to that provided by
NOSENKO, including the roles of PREISFREUND and SKVORTSOV, 06
whom he positively identified by their photographs.
was unable to identify photographs of GRIBANOV, KOVSHUK, or
NOSENKO.
06
He
[STORSBERG said that he first became acquainted with
06 [PREISFREUND] in February or March 1960, he was first intimate
with a female procured by PREISFREUND] "six months or so"
:
06
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January 1960-January 1962)
[e.g.
ca. June] after arriving in Moscow, and it was not
until more than a year later, in September 1961, that he
first met SKVORTSOV, posing as the Frenchman "Marcel
MICHAUD" STORSBERG was uncertain how he became acquainted
with SKVORTSOV, stating variously that he met him through.
State Department code clerk Joseph MORONE, through friends
at the Finnish Embassy, or that he became acquainted with
SKVORTSOV while he, (STORSBERG 2006 was serving as bartender in
the America Club. During September 1961 STORSBERG was 06
intimate with female friends of SKVORTSOV on two occasions.
in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.
06
In the middle of October 1961, on the evening of the KGB
recruitment attempt, STORSBERG saw SKVORTSOV, MORONE], and
an unidentified female sitting together in the America Club.
Comment:
06
06
STORSBERG Could not have met MORONE with
SKVORTSOV in October 1961 MORONE was trans-
ferred to Lisbon the previous August after he
himself was compromised by the KGB. See p. 198.
As far as CIA is aware, MORONE) has never been 06
questioned regarding his alleged association
with, SKVORTSOV/MICHAUD or STORSBERG · 06:
06.
06
106
While MORONE was dancing with the unknown female, [STORSBERG
was invited to visit SKVORTSOV's hotel for drinks. (STORSBERG
and SKVORTSOV left the America Club, and STORSBERG was again 06
intimate with a Soviet female in SKVORTSOV's hotel room.
It was immediately after leaving SKVORTSOV's room on this
night when STORSBERG was accosted by the KGB
06
In a signed statement which he gave a representative of
the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations on
29 July 1965% (STORSBERG) gave somewhat different details.
According to this account, three or four months after
arriving in the Soviet Union in November 1959 (sic), he met
PREISFREUND through friends at the Finnish Embassy. There-
after PREISFREUND] became a frequent visitor to the America
Club and a friendship developed between the two. On four
06
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06
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
Óó
-
January 1960-January 1962)
06
occasions [STORSBERG was intimate with females in [PREISFREUND]'s
hotel rooms. 06STORSBERG last saw (PREISFREUND Paround the end
of September or the beginning of October 1961, when [PREIS- 06
FREUND stopped coming to the America Club. At about that
time, he first met SKVORTSOV through [MORONE at the America
Club. 06 MORONE] left Moscow the previous August.] [STORSBERG 06
was not sure of the exact circumstances of his introduction
to SKVORTSOV nor did he know the latter's relationship with
MORONE After meeting STORSBERG, 06 SKVORTSOV frequently
visited the America Club and actively cultivated (STORSBERG'S 06.
friendship. This soon led to an invitation to visit
SKVORTSOV's apartment, where [STORSBERG was intimate with a06
Soviet female acquaintance of SKVORTSOV. It was after a
second visit to the apartment, about a week after the first,
that the KGB made its recruitment approach. According to
this as well as [STORSBERG's earlier account, the approach
occurred in the middle or toward the end of October 1961.
In connection with an OSI security interview on 5 August
1965% STORSBERG denied having furnished defense information
to any
'Communist intelligence agency" or having ever agreed
to do so, that he had been contacted by a member of a foreign
intelligence agency since his return to the United States,
or that he knew of anyone at the American Embassy in Moscow.
who had been contacted by a member of a "Communist intelli-
gence agency". He also denied having agreed in any way with
O PREISFREUND] to buy diamonds. 0 (STORSBERG's denial with
respect to the diamonds is in contradiction both with the
specific assertions of NOSENKO and with GOLITSYN's more
general allegation that the unnamed American was recruited
by the KGB after being compromised by PREISFREUND in illicit
speculation.]
06.
PREISFREUND's Information
06
1
1
.06
business relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO, that he never
had anything to do with the KGB, and that he did not even
know what the initials "KGB" stood for.
CIA interviewed [PREISFREUND] in July 1965 in (Helsinki
[NOSENKO himself had suggested that [PREISFREUND would 06
confirm his story of the (STORSBERG case. 16 While (PREISFREUND] 06
correctly identified photographs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and
STORSBERG, he maintained initially that he had only a
10
1
1
1
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06
06 first met [STORSBERG) of 100 visited the A
first
PREISFREUND finally admitted, however, that he häd been
involved in a KGB operation against STORSBERG] and he agreed 06
to tell "the entire truth". His version of the case, while
containing some internal contradictions, only partially
coincided with that provided by NOSENKO. (PREISFREUND] 06.
claimed to be hazy, on the date of all events connected with
his contacts with the KGB. The dates, however, could be
reconstructed from the known dates of otherwise related events
was recruited or
which he said occurred about the time
America House, and
so forth.] He described being recruited by KOVSHUK,
dating the event as at the end of 1959 or the beginning of
1960, and later as March-April 1960. According to 
PREIS- 
06.
FREUND], he was "cultivated" neither by NOSENKO or by KOVSHUK.
The first time he met either was when he was confronted and
recruited by KOVSHUK under threat of prosecution for black-
market dealings. [NOSENKO is unaware of that feature of
06 PREISFREUND's recruitment.] On NOSENKO's and KOVSHUK's
instructions, about six months after PREISFREUND's
ment, he became acquainted with STORSBERG, and in the summer 06
of 1960 on one occasion he lured STORSBERG into intimacy with 06
recruit-06
A female KGB agent (earlier b
hotel room. He never saw STORSBERG again, nor did he
participate in any other KGB operations
06
.
Referring to the night STORSBERG was intimate with the
female KGB agent in PREISFREUND's hotel room, (PREISFREUND 06 06
said he slept in the hotel corridor while (STORSBERG and the 06
girl shared his bed. At one point during the evening he
glimpsed NOSENKO in the hallway, wearing a rubber apron.
He deduced from this that NOSENKO had been involved in
surreptitious photography of STORSBERG and the girl.
Comment:
06
#106
NOSENKO stated that photographs were taken of
STORSBERG and a girl in PREISFREUND's hote 106
room. He has never said anything to suggest,
however, that he ever personally was involved
in photographing any of the compromises he:
claims to have arranged, nor has he ever
claimed any competence in clandestine photo-
graphy.
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Before his last meeting with CIA; PREISFREUND] mentioned
that he was planning to visit Leningrad with his family,
but that he had learned from business contacts in Moscow
that Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in
NOSENKO's defection. He was apprehensive and particularly
concerned that the KGB might suspect that he had related.
his role in the [STORSBERG case to American Intelligence. 06
During his final meeting with CIA on 13 July 1965 PREIS-06
FREUND asked his interviewers for advice as to whether he
should or should not travel to the USSR. He was told that
if the situation was as he described; it could be quite
dangerous for him to return. CEREREISTREUND)] stated then that 06
he agreed, that he would not go to the USSR after all.
Comment:
06
PREISFREUND] did shortly thereafter visit the
Soviet Union as he planned, and according to
\\ Finnish official travel records returned to
10 Helsinki on 24 July 1965. From his apparent
immunity to KGB pressure, it is concluded that
06 [PREISFREUND] is to some degree still under KGB
control.
"
GOLITSYN's Information
GOLITSYN, who served as a KGB First Chief Directorate
counterintelligence officer in Helsinki until his defection
in December 1961, reported that he had met in Helsinki on
several occasions in 1960 [a Finn by the name of PREISFREUND 108,06
whom he wished to use operationally. In December 1960.
[GOLITSYN's passport showed that it took place in January
1961] GOLITSYN visited the Second Chief Directorate's
American Department in Moscow to request the permission of
KOVSHUK to use (PREISFREUND against Americans in Finland. 06 11
KOVSHUK refused the request with the explanation that
06 PREISFREUND "helped in one recruitment now, and it is
necessary to be careful for about six months so as not to
arouse American_suspicions". GOLITSYN learned from KOVSHUK
that PREISFREUND had met the target at America Club in
06
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Moscow and had involved him in speculatory activities and
lured him into intimacy with various female KGB a agents.
According to KOVSHUK, the recruitment was accomplished "in
1960, at the end of 1960"; PREISFREUND] "had helped to create 06
the circumstances" and had been withdrawn from the operation
before the actual approach, which was made by KGB officers.
The American target of PREISFREUND, from what KOVSHUK related) 6
to GOLITSYN, was either a code clerk or diplomat. (GOLITSYN
later expressed his personal belief that the individual
probably was unmarried and might have been a "military
man".).
06
Comment:
If GOLITSYN's lead is not to STORSBERG, but to
some other American code clerk against whom
06 (PREISFREUND) was used, NOSENKO's claim to have
supervised all such code clerk operations is
refuted.
06
Attempted Recruitment of STORSBERG
"
Summary and Conclusion
In the absence of contrary evidence, it is judged that
GOLITSYN's lead refers to STORSBERG. 06 The role of PREISFREUND] 06
is the key to this determination. While the time of the
operation remains in dispute, GOLITSYN's timing is judged to
be the most plausible because of the circumstances under
which he acquired his information. These circumstances--
GOLITSYN's visit to and discussion with KOVSHUK in Moscow,
about the use of PREISFREUND are confirmed by NOSENKO and 06.
the date, January 1961, is established by passport informa-
tion. It follows that the operation against [STORSBERG] thus f
would have taken place more than six months prior to the time
NOSENKO and (STORSBERG claimed. Such a significant inaccuracy 06
by NOSENKO, about an event which he said took place less
than a year before he described it to CIA (in June 1962),
undermines his claim to the role he played in the case and
hence to his position as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy
Section and supervisor of code clerk operations.
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06
Attempted Defection of KEYSERS
съ
U.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class ☑James KEYSERS served
in Moscow from 20 December 1960 as an assistant to Embassy
Medical Officer Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force Captain.06,08
06 [KEYSERS was the replacement of Staff Sgt. J.G. BRADLEY] who 06
had been earlier withdrawn from Moscow because he was a
homosexual. Besides his duties with the Medical Officer,
KEYSERS was assigned administrative functions in the office
of the Air Attache. KEYSERS was trained also to perform
back-up cryptographic duties under James STORSBERG in the 06
military code room, but he was relieved of this duty in
April 1961. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies,
06 KEYSERS) was removed from Moscow by his American superiors
26
on 16 June 1961.
NOSENKO first spoke of what turned out to be the
KEYSERS case in Geneva in 1962, but without naming the KGB
target or identifying him as (STORSBERG's replacement. The 06
KGB and Embassy officials almost simultaneously discovered
the American to be a homosexual; he said; and when the KGB
found out that the target was to withdraw from the Soviet
Union, a letter offering him asylum in the USSR was sent to
the American. NOSENKO himself followed up the letter by
personally repeating the KGB offer to the American at the
airport just before his departure.
06
On 24 January 1964 NOSENKO described the KGB attempt
to recruit (STORSBERG and then proceeded to repeat his 1962
description of the KGB action taken against STORSBERG's 06
replacement, whom he identified as ZUJUS. Several days
later, NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse and requested
an urgent meeting with CIA. At the meeting he announced
that he had made a mistake, that STORSBERG's replacement was
Do not [ZUJUS, but KEYSERS KEYSERS not [ZUJUS 106 he said was
the homosexual code clerk whom he NOSENKO had personally
accosted at the airport.
06
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06.
NOSENKO's Information
06
KEYSERS was STORSBERG's replacement as military code
clerk, and the KGB sensed at once" that he was a homo-
sexual, and the case preoccupied NOSENKO the exclusion of
everything else: NOSENKO and other KGB officers, for
example, chased KEYSERS all over Moscow, attempting (without
success) to confront their target in compromising circum-
stances. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades troupe) came
to Moscow, and (KEYSERS) became involved at America House with
some of its male homosexual members. The Embassy Security
Officer learned of KEYSERS' activities at about the same time 06:
NOSENKO learned of them through a KGB agent. 6 The KGB would
have preferred to attempt to recruit KEYSERS, but it learned
that he was to be withdrawn from the Soviet Union. The KGB
then sent a letter to KEYSERS at his room in America House,
pointing out the trouble he was in, and offering him asylum
in the USSR.KEYSERS did not respond to the letter. On the
day of KEYSERS departure, KGB surveillants reported that he
had left America House for the airport, accompanied by an
Assistant Army Attache. NOSENKO sped to the airport and in
the terminal building found occasion to approach KEYSERS 06
alone. NOSENKO asked if KEYSERS had thought about the offer 06
in the letter, but KEYSERS did not respond and immediately 06
reported the approach to the officer escorting him.
:
In the 1965 interrogations NOSENKO added only that at
the time NOSENKO approached KEYSERS at the airport, the KGBOG
had concluded that KEYSERS had not reported receipt of the 06
letter inviting him to defect, because no information to
this effect was obtained from microphones or telephone taps
""
in the Embassy. 06
KEYSERS Information
ob
Prior to his departure from Moscow KEYSERS acknowledged
to his superiors his homosexual tendencies and he admitted
involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at America
House. He was rebuffed by a Marine guard in March 1961,
and he twice engaged in homosexual acts with members of the
Ice Capades troupe in May. He denied any public display of
his homosexuality but said he could not be sure that someone
had not entered his room at America House while he and a
homosexual partner were asleep.
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In a debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961, KEYSERS] 06
related the events leading to his withdrawal from Moscow.
On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache
06 Colonel URBAN, who advised him that he was being transferred
From Moscow the following day for excessive drinking, and
cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer.
Comment:
06
NOSENKO's information generally coincides with
that reported by KEYSERS and Embassy officials.06
However, before the events NOSENKO described,
KEYSERS behavior and reputation had already
been discussed between Security Officer John
ABIDIAN and Army Attache, [Colonel HOFFMAN, a 06
conversation which (HOFFMAN concludes was among
those sensitive matters compromised by micro-
phones later discovered in the Army Attache
offices. Similarly, Colonel URDAN's conversa-
a-
06
tion informing (KEYSERS] of his impending transfer
was concluded to have been monitored by the
same KGB microphones, from which the KGB would
have learned, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion,
To that KEYSERS did report the receipt of the
defection letter to his superiors.
об
خان
06 KEYSERS) described the Russian who approached
him at the airport as being 40 to 45 years old,
about 5 feet 8 inches tall, approximately 225
pounds, and having a dark complexion and light
hair. NOSENKO was then 34 years old, and he is
several inches taller and not rotund. When
KEYSERS was shown photographs of NOSENKO, he
did not recognize him.
According to NOSENKO, the KGB "sensed at
Obonce" that REYSERS was a homosexual. He is
unaware of certain information relating to
06 KEYSERS! homosexual activities, drinking, and
difficulties with his superiors, although that
information was available through KGB agents in
America House and had been widely discussed in
Embassy offices in which microphones had been
emplaced. No KGB officer directly connected
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Comment:
(Continued)
06
06
with the case could regard KEYSERS as STORSBERG'S
replacement 06 KEYSERS arrived in Moscow almost
a year before STORSBERG's departure, and was 06
assigned to the Air Attache office. ZUJUS 06
06
STORSBERG's replacement, arrived in Moscow and
Ob worked with [STORSBERG about three months before
STORSBERG] departed Moscow.0 KEYSERS stated
NOSENKO was not the person who approached him
at the airport. NOSENKO, in asserting that he
was, forgot the name of the single American
target whom he ever personally confronted.
.06.
06
11,08
Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS 06
In February 1964 NOSENKO reported that he had personally
recruited and handled Syrian army officer Samih WEISS the 11,06
"main agent" in a KGB developmental operation against U.S.)
Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUSZUJUS] arrived in Moscow
in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties
of STORSBERG)
and he remained there until January 1963.
NOSENKO did not recall the (ZUJUS case until he was reminded 06
of it by a reference to Samih WEISS which was among his
notes which he brought to Geneva. 06
NOSENKO's Information
.6.
08
NOSENKO recruited WEISS, a Syrian from Damascus, in 1961.
WEISS was a captain or major in the Syrian Army who was
studying at the Tank Academy. He visited the America Club,
and when he identified ZUJUS by photograph as one of the 06.
persons he had met there, he was told to develop him, not
to pay any attention to anyone else.00 (WEISS) and (ZUJUS had 06
Lebanon and the Syrian was from Damascus,
something in common in that [ZUJUS had been 
stationed in ob
Conly a short
distance away.00 WEISS merely studied and
during conversations at the America Club.
06 when [ZUJUS] agreed that it would be nice to
vodka, the KGB arranged for some to be sent
Residency in Beirut, and WEISS presented it
gift from friends.
1.10.
06
181
Top Secret
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coped (ZUJUS 06
On one occasion,
have some Lebanese] (
from the KGB Legal
to CHUCKUSA as a
06
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ZUJUS' case officer was GRYAZNOV, and besides handling the
06 "main 
agent" [NWEISS, NOSENKO 
supervised GRYAZNOV's activities
with respect to 2UJUS.06 
NOSENKO read the Second Chief Directo-
rate file on the American
, as well as all reports as they
came into the 
Embassy Section, and he discussed the case
with GRYAZNOV, 
KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible
for America House), and 
his own superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote
the operational plan, 
which called for thorough development
06.
by TECHCEMYCHICKSCHEME in order to 
learn everything about him and eventually
Ob 
to introduce an agent to [ZUJUS 
through the Syrian. 08
was slow because 
ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often
Progress
stayed alone, even 
in America House.
06 [ZUJUS became acquainted, they did not become good friends.
Although (WEISS and 
06
0% On the days (
WEISS planned to visit America House, NOSENKO
met him in hotels or restaurants, 
never in safehouses.
occurred every 
week or two, depending on WEISS' availability: 2016
When they met 
the day following: WEISS meetings with (ZUJUS 06
WEISS would report such things as which 
Americans were
drinking 
heavily and who at America House was involved with
which girls from 
foreign embassies. Although WEISS visited Ob
06
06
America House once or twice a month, and drank there with
(CUKURK_SK
_:_: 
he reported little of interest.
06
This
The KGB learned "something" about (ZUJUS
United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall:
family in the
he was sure, 
however, that there was nothing unusual or of
interest to the KGB 
about [ZUJUS' family background.
was no information 
on (ZUJUS received from KGB microphones, 06
There 06
telephone taps or surveillance, and 
the KGB was unaware of
any vices or 
vulnerabilities which (ZUJUS may have had.06
NOSENKO did not know of any 
other KGB agents working against
CZUJUS
. The KGB did not 
attempt to recruit (ZUJUS while Ob
NOSENKO was in the 
Embassy Section. If there had been a
recruitment attempt 
later, after he left the Section, NOSENKO
would certainly 
learned of it from GRYAZNOV.
"Because no one else knew him", at the American Depart-
ment's 
request NOSENKO 
continued to manage WEISS' contact 06
ob 
with ZUJUS after 
NOSENKO transferred to the Seventh Depart-
ment in January 1962. In 
March or April 1962 it was planned
Obthat 
WEISS would 
invite HUJUSE_ to a restaurant where he 06
would be introduced to "a friend
", but the meeting had not
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06
W
materialized before NOSENKO turned WEISS over to GRYAZNOV
and left for Geneva. When WEISS returned to Syria in April!
1962, he was not turned over to the First Chief Directorate:
his file was sent to Second Chief Directorate archives.
06 [ZUJUS] Information
During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities in
06 1963, ZUJUS confirmed an Embassy Security Office report that
in the summer of 1962 (ZUJUS] had been intimate with an 06
Austrian woman; "Lillian" (last name unknown), who had
visited America House with someone from the United Arab
Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she
was picked up by ZUJUS Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, 06
the America House manager interviewed "Lillian" and learned
that she claimed to be from Vienna and to be travelling with
her employer, a Czech. When the Embassy Security Officer
learned from the Austrian Embassy that no Austrian passport.
had been issued to "Lillian", he asked her for her passport.
She replied that she had forgotten it and then left, saying
she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never
returned to America House.
06.
Comment: NOSENKO described this incident, but in
connection with KGB attempts to entrap Joseph
66 MORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS in 1962.0b (See p. 194)
NOSENKO was not in the Embassy Section in 1962
Interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he
knew of this incident.
Interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965,
ZUJUS said that as manager of the America Club he had
frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS OZUJUS often used her
ån an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees
of America House and was able to provide considerable back-
ground information about her.
..
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Comment: NOSENKO has in other contexts identified
UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in
America House. He never related her to [ZUJUS)
06
06
In that same interview with CIA ZUJUS described having
met in Moscow a person from Damascus who_had been in Beirut, 10
or a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus, he could
not recall which. CUJUS] met him while acting as doorman at
America House, but they conversed only for about 15 minutes
Oband (ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about.
He
may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he
did not know his name nor why he was in Moscow, and he could
provide no physical description 6ZUJUS did not recall that
\\ this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but he acknowledged he
favored the beverage::::::ZUJUS confirmed to CIA that his
father, Matas, Dis secretary of the Lithuanian Roman Catholic 29
Alliance of America, an emigre organization concerned with
the liberation of Lithuania ZUJUS indicated that his father
often travels abroad in connection with his emigre activities.
Comment:
06.
11
Emigre organizations, including the Lithuanian)]
have been traditional KGB targets and most have.
been penetrated by KGB agents. The fact of the
elder ZUJUS emigre activities is almost
certainly to have been known to the KGB, making
ZUJUS) a matter of KGB concern for reasons quite
separate from his cryptographic duties.
From NOSENKO's unfamilarity with [ZUJUS 06
father's activities ZUJUS) intimacy with KGB
agent "Lillian" and relationship with KGB agent
UMANETS, it is concluded that NOSENKO's role
in the case, if any, was limited to his rela-
tionship with TCKCHECKCHECKCHECKED and that NOSENKO exercised
no supervisory function in the development of
ZUJUS D
0001454
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Operations Against State Department Code Clerks.
KGB operations against code clerks, for which NOSENKO
claimed supervisory responsibility, included those directed
against State Department cryptographic personnel as well as
military cryptographers at the Embassy. In several such
cases, NOSENKO's claimed subordinate, KOSOLAPOV, figures
prominently.
Development of Paul JENNER 06
NOSENKO first mentioned the JENNER case in a 1964
interview with the FBI, when he was asked whether he had
ever heard of a a case within recent years in which KOSOLAPOV
travelled to Helsinki to intercept and establish contact
with an American code clerk. NOSENKO "immediately recalled
such an incident which happened in 1960-1961. He explained
that because Embassy code clerks were not sufficiently
accessible to the KGB after they arrived in Moscow, it was
decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki as part of an effort
to probe for a new way to get in touch with the code clerks.
According to NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV made but one trip to Helsinki
in this new effort, and it was not tried again by others.
NOSENKO identified KOSOLAPOV's target in this operation as
Paul JENNER
06
NOSENKO's Information
06.
A month before (JENNER's arrival in Moscow the Embassy
Section received a copy of JENNER]s anketa (visa application)
listing his diplomatic title as Secretary Archivist and
indicating when he was to enter the Soviet Union from
Finland by train "at the beginning of 1960, in the middle of
the month". Believing him to be a code clerk (he was
subsequently found to be a pouch
to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki werk) "the group" decided
06
the mission of accompanying
JENNER on the train to Moscow to study JENNER's behavior.06
06 JENNER and KOSOLAPOV were about the same age. KOSOLAPOV was
to be accompanied by a female agent of G
GRYAZNOV's, "SOLISTKA"
Russian ballerina, who was to board the train after it
entered the USSR at Vyborg.
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A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approval
of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were
assigned to Moscow usually only for one year (thus limiting
their accessibility to the KGB for development) and that it
was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even
before they arrived in Moscow. When the Chairman's approval
was granted, NOSENKO prepared the kharakteristika (official
form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel
Office. KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explaining that
NOSENKO didn't sign the
he was coming for two or three days.
cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signa-
ture and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European)
Department of the First Chief Directorate for release.
was no other correspondence with the Helsinki rezidentura
concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow.
NOSENKO discussed the plan with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and
"maybe" they discussed it with KOVSHUK the day before
KOSOLAPOV left. KOSOLAPOV had (JENNER's photograph and his 06
name, and expected that the Helsinki residency could obtain
a ticket for KOSOLAPOV on JENNER's train.06 NOSENKO did not
recall precisely when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow or under what
name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was gone for about a week and
he travelled both ways by train.
There
NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV's otchet (official account) of.
his trip, and the report of the female agent, "SOLISTKA".
According to those reports, KOSOLAPOV became acquainted on
the train with JENNER) as planned, as did "SOLISTKA", whom
GRYAZNOV took to Vyborg and placed in JENNER's car.06
While
06"SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her Moscow telephone number.
in Helsinki KOSOLAPOV had spoken with the Rezident and Deputy
Rezident about obtaining their help in Helsinki with the
work against code clerks, and about using Helsinki agents
against American code clerks en route to Moscow. Nothing
came of the discussion, however; although the Rezident and
Deputy Rezident said they would see about it, the Embassy
Section later learned the Residency had "more important
questions",
0001456
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06.
Although the KGB later discovered that JENNER was not a
[code clerk but a pouch clerk, he remained a target for
development. Since he did not telephone "SOLISTKA" after
one or two months, the KGB arranged for her to encounter
him at the railroad station or airport when he went alone to
turning away. The KGB took no further steps to cultivate
JENNER T 
The 
KGB "had nothing on JENNER at all except a 06
suspicion 
he may have been a homosexual, but there was no
proof".
On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO confirmed the identification
of other CIA sources by identifying a photograph as that of
Vadim 
Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV, [born in Perm, 19 February 1928]
his former subordinate of the Embassy Section. The photo-
graph shown NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich
KOLOSSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927, in Perm,
who arrived in Finland by train from the USSR on 31 March
Ob1960 [the day JENNER left] and departed on 2 April. NOSENKO
acknowledged that that data accurately reflected KOSOLAPOV's
alias, cover, and itinerary during his trip to Helsinki to
accompany JENNER back to Moscow in 1960.
06
·
On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was confronted with the Finnish
train manifest showing that Paul JENNER was the single 06
passenger departing Helsinki for Moscow on 31 March 1960
and that KOSOLAPOV/KOLOSOV travelled on 2 April on a train
carrying no Americans. Repeating the substance of the KGB
operation and citing his recollection from reading KOSOLAPOV's
report of the trip, NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV travelled
on the same train with JENNERD and that the Finnish manifests
must 
be in error. [See accompanying exhibits.]
06
JENNER'S Information
.06.
After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960 JENNER reported
that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two
young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university
students" 
The two Russians struck up a conversation and
were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination
in the 
United States. They said that they might see JENNER 06
in Moscow. 
About three months later, on 29 June, JENNER 06
was 
performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers
0001457
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to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the
Russian girl, "Yuliya", who acted surprised to see him and
asked him to go outside to talk. "Yuliya" explained 
that
she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving
on a flight to Irkutsk JENNER had seen the Irkutsk 
flight
depart a half hour earlier) and told JENNER that her male 06
companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura
, had returned
to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with "Yuliya's"
Obquestions concerning [JENNER's impressions and personal
activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to
When
the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy.
JENNER said he must leave; she gave him her telephone number_
She advised 
JENNER
] 06
in Moscow and insisted that he call her.
that "it would be better if you did not mention our conver-
sation to anyone".
Comment:
06
As far as CIA is aware, JENNER has never been
asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph.
ob
Besides information about his Soviet companions on the
Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of State
security officials about sexual advances made by 
his 
first
maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his
second maid.
Comment:
Although NOSENKO has not identified either of
these women as KGB agents, he has said in another
context that all maids of American code 
clerks
were KGB agents or informants.
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Top Secret
Copy
400000
EXHIBIT 1
Top Secret
Complete Train Manifests, Helsinki-Moscow
Luettelo matkustajista, je
Sukimet
Junalla
inspuites Suomen Vainikkal a
Who Suomesta
Amewave Syntyminks
Kje
--
Mi
Sumica
06
Jenner, Paul Francis
arkist, sibi17.07.23 USA:n
U.S. A Lock. /F..
11
17
Possintarkestoje:
V.t.ylikonet.
B. Seukkonen
оо
31 March 1960
NOTE: JENNER single international passenger on train.
(Soviet passengers who may have boarded train in
USSR, including at Vyborg, would not be included.)
NOTE:
Luettelo matkustajista, juho
Junalla
a
ikkalan
11
-
marve
Voic
Ferdigend, suz V11 belm
Hourpilindi. Borla
Kolossov, Victor
Spotisja 10.04,26 Tenaken
konttorist: 20.02.19Kroikan.
31chin:n
Viskailija 10.03.27. Miliiton
Angea kangol picoti
Kottonikka:
Korbonen, Jouko Aarre Armas ✓
tydnies 16.11.24 Joensuu
น.
Laukkanen, Kirsti Hallin Irene, opalapul 24.07.23 Jystyl
Hossani, Tyyne Kyllikki VOLVE 03.09,1
V. Kank
Kask opettaja.
✓ var.bolt. 27.00.23
Ventimien 03.06.20
✓
Kazas, Elli Helena
T1111, Asko Y11 Join
Takala, Toivo Erkki
Utriainen, Erkki Olavi V
Easpio, Otto Allan ✓
Kaki-Reinikke. Antti
Karukonki, Unto Nattias
Järvinen, Arne Juhani
Supapan, Judith Josefina ✓
"
་
23.07.22 Lehts
13.07.20
toimittaja 08,10,19 Helsinki
111tt siht 12.06.28
mor.siht. 13.12.10 | Sunila.
in varastonis 27.01. Abijala
toto.spul. 03.03.15 Helsi
Min
J
реостана
Tenske-Afpuiston/
Tukholma-Hosk./F_
E.Hot.
Sasuu
Cope:/leak
'
Joensuu-lbsk. alus
Jyvaskyl-Cor
COPT.viia.
(15.1
Lahti-Zaporojo
(15.11.)
(1.5pY.viis
"
"
20
$2
Dessintarkastaja:.
V.t.likonst
E. Saukkonen
2 April 1960
No Americans on train with KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV.
Top Secret
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14-00000.
Top Secret
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
-
January 1960-January 1962)
Information From Other Sources
I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in
Helsinki, contacted the chief of the Helsinki police on
31 March 
1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American
Ob named (Paul F. JENNER, wilo was due to arrive in Helsinki
the day before.' SERGEYEV explained that he had some
"business
" with JENNER Dobut he did not specify its nature.
Reportedly, this was 
the first time that SERGEYEV had made
such 
a request of the police chief. GOLITSYN identified
the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet intelligence agent
from "about 1945 on".
06
Development of JLNNER: Summary and Conclusion
06-
NOSENKO's version of the JENNER case in some degree
resembles 
less the 
facts about JENNER] than KGB activities of
06 
directed against 
John GARLAND] (see below), activities which
NOSENKO asserts never 
occurred.06 GARLAND, not JENNER, 06
travelled on the 
same train as KOSOLAPOV, and GARLAND] not 06
06
JENNER, travelled "in the middle of the month". The Helsinki
Residency's 
query to the Helsinki police chief about JENNER) 06
indicates that KOSOLAPOV's cable contained information about
JENNER not 
just notice that KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki.
It was at the 
airport in Moscow, not on the train, that
06. 
"SOLISTKA" 
gave JENNER her telephone number, an event which
would be presumably 
memorable to NOSENKO (as supervisor of
all code 
clerk operations) if only because of his futile
wait for JENNER to 
call. Finally, NOSENKO is unaware of the
actions of KGB agents who 
were employed as maids by JENNER. 06
06
From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO was neither
KOSOLAPOV's 
supervisor, nor in this instance, supervisor of
all KGB operations 
against American code clerks.
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06
January 1960-January 1962)
öb
Development of John GARLAND
velopment
The GARLAND] case is of particular significance to
judging 
the validity 
of NOSENKO's claim to complete know-
ledge of all KGB 
operations against American code clerks.
NOSENKO is not 
merely unaware of KGB action taken wiṭh
respect 
to GARLAND) he vehemently asserts no such action was
Dó
taken.
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans
employed 
by the 
American Embassy in Moscow who were of
interest for 
various reasons to the KGB.
statement concerning each of the twenty, among which was
He gave a 
short
GARLAND, about whom 
NOSENKO said, "Code clerk, but nothing
doing "W Later asked 
to review the list and supply any
additional information 
he might have, NOSENKO stated that
Obthe 
KGB was studying 
GARLAND)) like the other code clerks, to
gather enough 
incriminating material to make a recruitment.
The case officer 
was KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not recall any
agents working against (
GARLAND) 6 hor could he recall whether
he had read 
the KGB file on (GARLAND)], but he thought he must
have read reports concerning 
him as they came into the
Embassy Section. 
There was no operational plan drawn up
Of 
for GARLAND) because the 
KGB developed no derogatory infor-
mation concerning him; no recruitment thus was ever planned
or attempted. 
NOSENKO_could recall no background informa-
tion concerning 
GARLAND)], such as his travels and acquain-
tances while stationed 
in Moscow.
Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence (see below]
of 
KOSOLAPOV's 
trip to Helsinki to accompany (GARLAND)] back Ob
to Moscow on 16 November 1960, 
NOSENKO was insistent that
there 
was no such trip, that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once
to Helsinki in connection with JENNER] in early 1960, and 03
that the KGB had taken no such action with respect to
GARLAND) (NOSENKO 
had earlier reiterated that he was
KOSOLAPOV's 
direct supervisor from January 1960 until
January 1962 and 
he would have had to know and to approve
12:BR
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)
in advance any operational travel performed by his sub-
ordinate outside of the USSR.) Reminded that he transitted
Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba on 15 November 1960
(the day before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki with GARLAND).06.
NOSENKO stated that he would have learned of KOSOLAPOV'S
travel in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow.
06
06 GARLAND's Information
GARLAND was first interviewed on 17 July 1962 by the
Regional Security Officer in Moscow as a result of the
GOLITSYN lead [see below]. In this interview GARLAND denied 06
having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description
during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied
having been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July
06 1963 [GARLAND] was interviewed by the FBI and on 31 July he
06
106
was given a polygraph examination. The latter, according
to the FBI, "disclosed no information indicating that
GARLAND was deceptive in his statements to us denying any
association with Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying ever
knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence agent"
GARLAND by his own statement, took the train on 16 November
1960 
from Helsinki to Moscow; to assume the duties as
supervisor of the State Department code room in the Embassy
08
;
GOLITSYN's Information
"
GOLITSYN, who was not posted to Helsinki until July 1960,
reported that "about the end of 1960, about November or
possibly by the beginning of 1961", the KGB Second Chief
Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residence
advising that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki
in transit 
to Moscow. The telegram stated that the respon
sible case 
officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki in
alias and under Vneshtorg cover for the purpose of striking
up an 
acquaintance to be continued with the American in
Moscow. The Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in
the American's 
compartment. GOLITSYN himself went to the
train to 
see off a Soviet delegation returning to Moscow,
and he talked with 
KOSOLAPOV. Later in the summer or fall
of 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Second Chief.
Directorate officer from the Embassy Section, and he inquired
191
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)
From the
about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV.
Embassy Section officer's refusal to discuss the case
GOLITSYN concluded that it must have resulted in a success-
ful recruitment; otherwise, the Embassy Section officer
would have been willing to talk to him about it.
beende
Shown GARLAND's photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962,
GOLITSYN failed to identify it "as being that of the unknown
individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki
with KOSOLAPOV".
Information From Other Sources
KOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960.
The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from
Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960, lists KOSOLAPOV (as
KOLOSSOV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W.
[See accompanying exhibit.]
06
Ob GARLAND, the only American.
As he had with regard to JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV of
the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 11 November 1960
asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to
GOLITSYN) for help in locating (GARLAND) an American who would
arrive there on 14 November.
06
Development of GARLAND:
06
Summary and Conclusion
Whether or not [GARLAND] was aware, and contrary to NOSENKO's
assertion GARLAND clearly was the target of a KGB operation
NOSENKO denies
entailing KOSOLAPOV's travel to Helsinki.
(with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately
reflect) that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Helsinki except in
connection with JENNER], and his assertion thus cannot be
☐ smissed as the product of faulty recollection in which he
confuses the cases of CCCECENTER] and [GARLAND).
06
06
NOSENKO's denial of the facts of the GARLAND] case is fatal
to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, and that
he supervised all KGB operations against American code clerks.
Moreover, the KGB action in the GARLAND) case impugns NOSENKO'S
claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section, he would
necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy
code clerks.
192
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Top Secret
EXHIBIT 2. Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-Moscow
Luettelo matkustajista, joka
Junalla.
(her)
Sulu- ja ennimet
✓ Nouravieve, Nonna
3 Parve, Ralf.
MOTOROV, Alexandre.
Otohamovski, Alexandre.
Caviilova, Laria✓
- SCOT
Mktiot Suomesta
Ammerti tal arvo Syntymisiks
✓ sos.min. dipl._
kirjailija 1919
dipl.kur. dipl.
"..
"
rouve
Vainikkalan
(bak)
Ansta
Kansalaisuus
Matrimes
Niliiton_
N:111tto
Eosti
Osolte Soometis
Lähetystö, H1.
N:111tto/N-S-F Kout takulku
1922.
N:111tto
196
061
Kolosmoz, Viktor_.
Agadjanov, Camik..
Akolzine,. Potr..
Lair, Jean Baptiste.
10 Cerlend, John Jr..
11 Bru bere, Henry Charles
Fantalainen, Aatu Ilmari.
1 Oksanen, Frans Oskar
14 Immonen, Seikki Juhani.
15
virkailija 19.05.27.
1922
sirkustait. 1913
dipl.kur. 17.08.07 Ranskan
sihteeri
22.03.33 USA:n
Suomen
tato sibt. dipl.
Sam
น
kirvesmies 14.11.19
sähk.asent 25.05.00
lainop kand 21.01.20
Kauttakulku.
Ulkoasiainministeris.
Kulmak. 2.H.85, Hki.
4.Linja,20.B.59, Hk1.
Kivalterint. 23.G, Hki.
NOTE
16
Passintarkastaja:
_V.t.likonst.:
..
E. Saukkonen
öb
16 November 1960.
GARLAND and KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV travelled on same
Erain.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
-
January 1960-January 1962)
06
KGB/Polish UB Operations Against MORONE
At his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO
'made a passing reference to an operation in which he had
placed a female Polish UB agent in contact with an unnamed
American from the Embassy while the latter was visiting
Warsaw and later brought the agent to Moscow to further
compromise the American. On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked
whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against
the American Embassy, and he replied that he himself
introduced the idea of using such agents to develop
Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls.
He had several such agents, he said, and he sometimes asked
the East German and Polish security services to supply him
with such agents. As an example, NOSENKO cited the case
of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who
travelled to Warsaw. The code clerk was intimate with a
Polish female agent, whom NOSENKO had planted in their
train compartment, on the train to Warsaw, and later in
Moscow.
In an FBI interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO
referred to the case again, and when the names of code
Doclerk Joseph MORONE] and Embassy Marine guard [Frank BEGGS] 06
were mentioned, he immediately identified them as the men
involved.
:06
06
NOSENKO's Information
MORONE's case officer was NOSENKO's subordinate and
specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read
the file on MORONE, and saw his visa photograph, but never
saw him in person. NOSENKO discussed the [MORONE] case with 06
KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions. Several.
KGB agents were employed against (MORONE including foreigners
as well as Soviet citizens.
06
193
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January 1960-January 1962)
Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waitress at America House
reported to DEMKIN, her case officer, everything she saw or
heard concerning [MORONE 06 KOSOLAPOV visited her several
times with 
DEMKIN to discuss MORONE Jband NOSENKO himself
met 
her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that
DEMKIN had 
at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any
specific information 
from IVANOVA on [MORONE) which was
interesting or useful.
06
SARWAT EL SHAZLY, an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian
Embassy and an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries)
Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, visited
America House and met MCM MORONE), but he reported nothing of
value that 
NOSENKO recalled. 06
Pietro CECCHI, an Italian cook at the American Embassy
and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw
about Americans 
to KOSOLAPOV, but NOSENKO recalled nothing
specific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE.
06
In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two
German women who could be used against the residents of
America 
House.. One of these, Hanna, a blonde, was documented
as a West German
. NOSENKO never met her but instructed
PREISFREUND) (see the [STORSBERG) Case) to take her to America
House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to
America 
House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that
she 
may have reported on MORONE]. The second East German
girl was documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO never met her
but he 
recalled that she was asked for her documents at
America House on her first or second visit there. She
replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America
House, and never returned. (NOSENKO did not remember the
time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he
was still 
in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the
Embassy security officer at the time.)
obr
From one of these agents, possibly in some other
manner
, the 
KGB learned that TMCRCRCRCRCTICE:D:D was planning to go on
leave in Warsaw. 
NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon
decided to 
employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to
compromise him, 
KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational
plan 
for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after
194
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION. January 1960-January 1962)
some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK. KOSOLAPOV next met
with a Polish 
UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Head-
quarters to 
discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the
target 
was an American Embassy employee, but not that he
was a code 
clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the
Poles.
As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained
by 
the Polish UB 
and sent to Moscow by train.
arrival 
she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow
Upon her
hotel where 
he gave her instructions concerning her role
in the operation
. The girl was told to meet MORONE] on the 06
train, flirt with him, have 
him fall in love with her,
continue 
the association, and study him. She was to tell
him that she had 
been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a
member of the Polish 
Trade Representation in Moscow, and
that she could 
meet him again on her next visit.
Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical
Directorate 
for 
a technician to be placed on the train in
the compartment 
next to that of MORONE] and his companion, Ob
BEGGS, for audio and visual 
(but not photographic) coverage.
064 :06.
NOSENKO did not recall wilen MORONE and BEGGS left Moscow.
The 
Polish agent 
did, however, succeed in making MORONET'S US
acquaintance, and 
the technician from the Operational Direc-
torate reported 
back to NOSENKO the day after the train
reached Warsaw
. The technician told NOSENKO the girl had
engaged in 
sexual intercourse with [MORONE) during the trip. 06
The technician also reported that the 
tape recordings ob-
tained were of poor 
quality.
Comment: At this juncture in NOSENKO's interrogation
he was 
reminded that he was en route to C Cuba
on 
15 November 1960 and did not return
Moscow until mid-December, and that State
to
06 Department records indicated that [MORE] and
BEGGS left Moscow on 13 November and arrived
on the following day. NOSENKO responded that
instead of having talked to the technician
personally, he may have read the technician's
195
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Comment: (Continued)
report and had seen "the film strips" after
his return from Cuba, NOSENKO, it will be
noted, had said earlier that there was no
photographic coverage of MORONE)'s train
compartment.
06
Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials,
KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again
be brought to 
Moscow and permission to acquire compromising
photography during 
her visit. The requests were approved
by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV
met her alone 
and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a
specially equipped room.
OCHouse, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel
The girl called [MORONE] at 
America 06
room 
two or three times, during which photographs were taken.
These were 
placed in the KGB's file on (MORONE]. He did not
fall in love 
with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she
had no further 
contacts with him.
Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it
was 
felt 
that there were insufficiently incriminating to
attempt 
to recruit [MORONE.The KGB wanted to trap him in
the apartment 
of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something
that was 
definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana
IVANOVA (see 
above) was supposed to lure MORONE out of 08
America House to 
somewhere in Moscow, but before anything
further could be done, the Americans ordered [MORONETE: Cute Cat: C:/:/::/
Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they
were concerned 
about his association with IVANOVA. There-
fore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no attempt to recruit
MORONE. 06
NOSENKO has also explained (to the FBI) that no attempt
was 
made 
to recruit MORONE because Khrushchev instructed
the 
KGB to refrain from any action which might affect the
improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the
United States
.
196
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January 1960-January 1962)
06.
MORONE
MORONE'S Information
Following receipt of information about his compromise,
received from a sensitive Polish source, MORONE was first 06
interviewed about the allegation in May 1961: On 19 August
1961 he was transferred from Moscow. In an October 1962
security interview: CHECKCMCMCRCRCRCRCRCRCRCRCRCR stated that he had travelled with 06
0 Frank BEGGS) to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train
he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her.
what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment,
and when he tried to engage her in sexual relations, she
slapped his face.. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw,
the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room
where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he b
had sexual relations with at least two other women while in
Ob Harsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident.
On 6 February 1961, after (MORONE had returned to Moscow, 06
the Polish girl from the train called him at America House,
and the following day he visited her in her room at the
Peking Hotel, where they were again intimate. On either
this or an earlier occasion the girl told him t that she had
an uncle in Moscow (MORONE] has denied being approached or
recruited by Soviet Intelligence.
Information From Other Sources
.
A sensitive Polish source reported i in 1961 that on
8 November 1960 a Polish female,
an
experienced English-
speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where
she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA". She
stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer,
apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second.
Chief Directorate, on n 10 November 1960 (sic) pointed MORONE 06
out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under
KGB instructions, the Polish female met: MORONE and was 06
intimate with him on the train to Warsaw. In Warsaw on.
12 November 1960 (sic) she was quite friendly with [HORONE)
but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to
engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a 06
suitably-prepared Polish UB safehouse where incriminating
photographs were clandestinely taken of MORONE) and herself. O
The female agent again travelled to Moscow on
February 1961
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and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising 06
photographs were taken of her and [MORONE) on this 
trip
.
The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on
12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her
and MORONE. 6
06
06 The Marine quard BEGGS) has confirmed that the Polish
girl and MORONE were intimate on the train to Warsaw, and
Nothat [MORONE__ had been recontacted by the Polish girl in
Moscow in February 1961.
06
and
MORONE's fellow code clerks and residents of America
House described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler,
a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that MCCORONE was 06
involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by SARWAT
EL SHAZLY, the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and MORONE 106
confirmed that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the
Ob introduction of [MORONE] and other code clerks to Soviet
females MORONE) was intimate with one of them in SARWAT's
apartment in the spring of 1961 (MORONE) was also said to
be a close friend of the Embassy cook, and KGB agent Pietro
ObCECCHI, and MORONE) had admitted that along with other
Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles
illegally from CECCHI. One report states that CECCHI asked
a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to (MORONE in the 06
State Department code room, (a restricted area to which
CECCHI had no access). A number of reports indicated that
MORONE had been sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA,
DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent
at America House identified by NOSENKO. 06 (MORONE) denied
having been intimate with IVANOVA. He said, however, that
he had told his friends that he had, that he knew both
IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA.
to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two
Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued,
06
The Army code clerk [STORSBERG has reported that [MORONE] 0%
was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who, as
was involved in the KGB attempt to recruit
"MICHAUD",
66 STORSBERG (See p. 173.106STORSBERG] recalled meeting MICHAUD
at America House; MICHAUD 
had frequented the bar there.
one version of his recruitment STORSBERG said that MORONE
06
06
In
was
198
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in SKVORTSOV's company the night SKVORTSOV lured [STORSBERG] 06
to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit him.
06
Operation Against MORONE
Summary and Conclusion
06.
NOSENKO relates but one aspect of the MORONE case, the
use 
of the 
Polish UB female agent. He is apparently unaware
of information 
known to KGB agents (and hence to the KGB),
Ob such as MORONE's sexual involvements with IVANOVA's friends
and at SARWAT EL 
SHAZLY's apartment, his illicit currency
dealings with CECCHI, and his relationship with UMANETS.
0 / 
He errs in 
relating to MORONE] the East German female agent
sent to America 
House: the incident occured, but later,
☐ when MORONE was no longer in Moscow nor was NOSENKO himself
still in 
the Embassy Section. (See p. 183.) The KGB did
not lack 
a sufficient basis for attempting to recruit
MORONE: if it refrained from the attempt, it was for other
KGB 
inaction did not relate to Khrushchev's concern
for Soviet-United States relations; this was the period
between 
the U-2 incident (May 1960) and the Berlin crisis
(August 1961)
reasons.
Even with respect to the Polish UB agent, there is
persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPÓV
played the roles NOSENKO described: NOSENKO was travelling
to Cuba and 
KOSOLAPOV was in Finland in connection with the
GARLAND case.
047
It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO in this
instance, was not supervisor of all KGB operations against
American 
code clerks nor would he necessarily have known of
recruitments 
among Embassy personnel.
Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code Clerks
In connection with his responsibility for directing
KGB operations against American code clerks in 1960-1961,
NOSENKO has commented on five other State Department code
clerks 
who served in Moscow during that period. Their brief
treatment 
in this paper reflects not their unimportance but
NOSENKO's limited 
comments and the lack of collateral
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information. The significance of these cases is the extent
to which 
information provided by NOSENKO accurately reflects
the KGB's knowledge 
of each target.
| Maurice ZWANG 06
06
06.
NOSENKO identified ZWANG] as
clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961
a State Department 
code
period. 
An Egyptian agent, name not recalled, introduced
ZWANG 
to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incrimi-
nating 
photographs, but the female did not like (ZWYWANG] and 06
refused his sexual advances. 
In January 1962 (when NOSENKO
claims he 
left the Embassy Section) the KGB was engaged in
no activity against 
ZWANG The KGB agents had no agents
in contact with 
him, and had no information indicating
ZWANG was vulnerable.
06.
Comment:
In connection with a State Department security
interview conducted after [ZWANG) returned from 06
Moscow ZWANG) 
related that in March or April
1961 an Egyptian introduced him to a Soviet
female whom he visited in her apartment on
* several occasions but with whom he was not
intimate. Although [ZWANG denied it, a poly-06
graph examination indicated that he was
intimate with his maid during visits to her
apartment.
06 ZWANG's maid has been identified as a KGB
agent. Various Americans stationed in Moscow
have reported that ZWANG was active in currency
speculation and blackmarketeering with the
Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV's agent, CECCHI.
ob
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06
John TAYLOR
06
NOSENKO identified (TAYLOR as a State Department
code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was inter-
Dested in TAYLOR] because of his intimacy with his Russian
maid ( (a KGB agent) and "his sympathy towards the Soviet
06 Union and its people". No attempt was made to recruit
TAYLOR because of the lack of 
compromising photographs of
06 TAYLOR and the maid, and because the KGB did not want to
jeopardize the more important STORSBERG case by risking a
scandal with TAYLOR-06
Comment:
06
об...
TAYLOR has acknowledged that he was intimate
with his maid from about September 1960 until
his departure in early 1961, on one occasion
in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow, and that
0) maid had told TAYLOR she was pregnant and
OG TAYLOR offered her money for an abortion.
06
TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961 and the
KGB attempt to recruit STORSBERG] did not occur 06
until June 1961, according to NOSENKO,
October 1961, according to STORSBERG 06
Frank DAY
or
NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Department code:
clerk at the Embassy who was a target either of KOSOLAPOV
or 
GRYAZNOV. The KGB knew nothing interesting about him
such 
as who his friends in Moscow were, or his travel in
or outside of the Soviet Union. The KGB had no derogatory
information 
about him and was unaware of any vulnerabilities
he may have 
had. No operational measures were taken against
him.
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The two
08,06
Comment: [DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 until October
1961.
In July 1961 he travelled to the
Caucasus with his friend and former Covert CIA
employee, Agricultural Attache BROWN
were under surveillance by five persons at
all times on this trip. On one occasion they
found "repairmen" in their hotel room upon
returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and
on another an "attractive and available Soviet
female" was believed to have been planted in
their train compartment.
06
Robert DWELLY
Reviewing an American Embassy telephone_list_in
September 1964, NOSENKO said that he "believed" (DWELLY] was 06
a code clerk during the 1960-1961 period.
There was no
06 approach to DWELLY and he knew no details of the opera-
06
tional plan against DWELLY nor the identity of any agent
who might have been used against him. DWELLY] S
officers were KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.
06
case
Under interrogation in February 1965, however,
NOSENKO said that the KGB was "100 perccent sure" that he
was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior when visiting
a public men's room". There was a "big hunt" for DWELLY] and 06
on a number of evenings when [DWELLY was known 
to be free 06
from work, NOSENKO himself, 
GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and
NOSENKO's homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in
vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DWELLY would06
visit downtown Moscow and they could establish 
contact with
there was 
no
him. No photographs of DWELLY were obtained:
approach and no recruitment.
06
NOSENKO later added that "perhaps"
GRYAZNOV's
06
homosexual agent "VOLODYA" had spoken with DC: WELLY) in a
public toilet in a museum or a park and it was on 
this 
basis
that he concluded (DEC:CYCELLY] was a homosexual.
06
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Comment:
DWELLY was assigned to Moscow as a code clerk
from April 1959 to July 1960. In a Department
of State security interview in March 1966
(prompted by NOSENKO's information), he cate-
gorically denied being a homosexual. He
described two occasions in Moscow when, while
walking alone, two men, who by their general
appearance and actions made him think they
were "queer", were trying to attract his
attention. He recalled that, on one of the
two occasions, one asked him the way to the
toilet.
06.
Joseph GAFFEY
06
NOSENKO originally identified [GAFFEY] as a military
enlisted man in Moscow during the 1960-1961 period, and an
operational target of DEMKIN. In February 1965, however,
he identified him as a State Department code clerk for whom
the responsible case officer was KOSOLAPOV, whom NOSENKO
supervised. The KGB attempted to lure (CAFFEY_ into downtown Ob
Moscow using Svetlana IVANOVA, the maid in America House.
who was one of DEMKIN's agents, but GAFFEY rejected her 06
repeated invitations. The KGB was unaware of any vices
OGAFFEY might have had and had no derogatory information
regarding him.
06
Comment: GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961.
06
A fellow resident of America House, Fred
KADERA reported during a State Department
security interview that [GAFFEY had told him Ob
that he had been intimate with a girl at
America House. 06 GAFFEY told KADERA] that he did 06
not know she was Russian until he was walking
her home and met IVANOVA, who identified her
America House manager Peter BINDER 06
reported rumors in America House that (GAFFEY 06
as such.
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(Continued)
was having an affair with IVANOVA in America
House. He described [GAFFEY as the heaviest 06
drinker in America House and said that occasion-
06 ally GAFFEY could not report to work due to
his drinking. In describing the KGB approach
made to him in early 1963, [BINDER) (see p.405)
0b
quoted his interrogator as saying that [GAFFEY] 06
took IVANOVA to BINDER's room in America House, 06
implying that he was intimate with her at that
time.
Ob GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the
summer of 1962, before the expiration of his
tour, because of drunkenness. During a State
Department security interview, [GAFFEY admitted Ob
being intimate with IVANOVA at America House
and at her apartment : GAFFEY] reported that
IVANOVA had told him she was pregnant and had
asked for money for an abortion.
Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations:
Summary and Conclusion
According to NOSENKO, on transfer to the Embassy Section,
operations against the American code clerks were the Section's
priority task and thus his most important single responsibility
as Deputy Chief. He asserts to be complete his awareness of
what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time, because
of his senior position, his personal review of relevant files
and correspondence, his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and
GRYAZNOV, and his personal participation in their operations.
Without exception, in every one of the cases NOSENKO describes
there are facts substantially at variance with his account,
in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information
available.
Conclusion
From the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither
Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all
operations against American code clerks. Consequently,
he would not necessarily have known of recruitments among
other Embassy personnel.
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Case Officer for Embassy Security Officer
John ABIDIAN
Comment: John V. ABIDIAN served as the Embassy Security
Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until
February 1962, approximately the same period as
NOSENKO's claimed service in the Embassy
Section of the American Department. The State
Department replacement for CIA officer Russell
LANGELLE, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform
a number of operational tasks, including
performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA
agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing
deaddrop emergency communications from CIA
source GRU Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.
ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then
secured employment with the Department of State
as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until
1954. After special training at the CIC school
at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service school,"
ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for
Moscow in 1960 a
as a special agent in the State
Department's Office of Security. A large part
of his work in this period was accompanying
foreign dignitaries visiting the United States,
including Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov
November 1956, Mikoyan in the spring of 19 in
and Khrushchev at the end of 1959. These
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(Continued)
duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB
officers stationed in New York and Washington
as well as among the Soviet delegations. One
of the members of the Khrushchev entourage was
KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's subordinate in the Embassy
Section.
During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned
ABIDIAN in several instances, identifying him as the Embassy
Security Officer and as "a CIA officer" and describing his
letter-mailing activities. His knowledge of ABIDIAN was
attributed to his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the
Embassy Section.
After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the
first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGB case
officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first
time described ABIDIAN's alleged servicing of a deaddrop in
1960. NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole
American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during
his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service, and one of the most
important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section
and therefore of the entire Second Directorate.
Duties as a Case Officer
When he reported for duty in the Embassy Section NOSENKO
was told by KLYPIN and KOVSHUK that one of his duties would
be case officer for ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was
then expected in the near future. ABIDIAN was to be the
only American target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially
accountable while he served in this section. KOVSHUK gave
NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN.
Included was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results
of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared
by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate.
According to that report, which was based on correspondence
from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN
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had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned
with the safety of Premier Khrushchev when he visited the
United States in 1959; from ABIDIAN's behavior at that time,
the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer,
probably with 
CIA. 
That report and the fact that ABIDIAN was
replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security
Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counter-
intelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore
of the entire Second Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and
later adopted for him the cryptonym "ARSEN" used earlier by
personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate of the
Second Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more
about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief
of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate,
but that 
unit had no information not included in its original
report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in
the 
United States be asked for further details, but none were
ever 
received. NOSENKO thus never learned of ABIDIAN's
education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department
of State, 
promotions, personal rank, previous assignments,
military service, or foreign service status
Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the KGB decided not
to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or
provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal
vulnerability. It was considered better to concentrate on
surveillance 
coverage in
successor, he might lead the hope that, as LANGELLE's
another POPOV". [POPOV, a
GRU Lieutenant Colonel and CIA agent, according to KGB
sources 
was apprehended in 1959.]
Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he
was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of
his arrival. 
He was always under 24-hour surveillance by
at least two and often 
three KGB teams, so that at any hour
a team was available 
to cover him if he left the Embassy.
The 
only time this intensity of coverage might have been
reduced, NOSENKO 
said, was during a period of about one and
one-half months in 
1961, when surveillance of the Embassy
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was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage
of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case.
As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the
surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational
possibilities offered by information from surveillance
reports.
In line with the emphasis on surveillance, the opera-
tional plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960
called for no direct action but specified that:
-ABIDIAN's maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an "operational
contact" of the Embassy Section, was to continue to apply
metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and "NEPTUNE-80" to his shoes.
(According to NOSENKO, these are surveillance aids. Metka
is a "thief powder" applied to clothing pockets, leaving a
trace on anything with which it comes into contact. Its
primary purpose is to aid in the detection of operational
letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers
and agents. NEPTUNE-80, applied to a target's shoes,
leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long after-
wards can follow with a dog.) The only item of information
received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an
affair with an Embassy female employee. FEDOROVICH was
unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN's
apartment.
-Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV's
agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever
he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any
significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life.
"ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American
personnel at the Embassy", but NOSENKO did not recall any
specific report CECCHI gave to ABIDIAN that was of interest
to the Embassy Section.
-Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to
the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if
necessary.
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-All other agents and operational contacts of the
section 
were to be instructed 
to report every detail about
ABIDIAN (see below)
-Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all
places 
where ABIDIAN might be 
mailing letters.
-Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.
Apart from those specified by the operational plan, two
other 
KGB agents, Lyudmila GROMAKOVA 
and "KAMO" (a KGB
agent whose identity 
NOSENKO did not recall) were
involved with ABIDIAN.
for Embassy personnel, was an agent handled by Embassy Section
case officer GAVRILENKO.
language lessons from GROMAKOVA and NOSENKO did not know
ABIDIAN took 
"only several" 
Russian
whether these were private or 
class lessons. He learned
nothing of operational significance 
from GROMAKOVA's contacts
with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular 
reporting from her.
GROMAKOVA, a language instructor
Comment:
Although he had earlier identified GROMAKOVA as
a KGB agent, NOSENKO never associated her with
ABIDIAN until told 
that ABIDIAN had been one of
her students. In 
actuality ABIDIAN took
regular language 
lessons from GROMAKOVA, normally
three one-half hour lessons 
per week, from
shortly after his 
arrival until his departure
from Moscow.
The second KGB agent, "KAMO"
City KGB organization who met ABIDIAN at the Baku Restaurant
. was an agent of the Moscow
by accident. When informed that 
ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his
telephone number, NOSENKO 
recommended that "KAMO" try to
develop a relationship with ABIDIAN.
this was 
against the policy of taking no aggressive or
After arguing 
that
provocative action against ABIDIAN, 
KOVSHUK and KLYPIN
finally agreed, and "KAMO" 
phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB
instructions. ABIDIAN, however
, refused to meet him, and
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no further action was taken. [See below for ABIDIAN'S
account of a similar 
incident, but one which occurred in
Armenia.]
NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office
in 
the Embassy or on 
what floor it was located, but he could
have checked, if necessary, 
with a copy of the Embassy tele-
phone list published monthly, 
since it contained the office
room number of each American 
employee. [The Embassy telephone
[There
list contained apartment, but not office room numbers.]
ABIDIAN's office was in the 
"Zone of Security" (i.e., secure
office areas). NOSENKO said 
that a report from an agent
(identity not recalled) indicated 
that there was a sign on
ABIDIAN's office door which 
said "Security Office".
was no such sign.] · 
NOSENKO was unable to determine if
ABIDIAN had a secretary
. No dictation was monitored in
ABIDIAN's office because no 
KGB microphone was installed
there. [In 1964 a microphone
, albeit then inoperative, was
found in the room occupied in 
1960-1961 by ABIDIAN.]
recalled no particularly 
interesting or important information
about ABIDIAN obtained from 
other microphones in the Embassy.
NOSENKO
NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment
in 
the Embassy building, nor 
how it was furnished, since
"data of this nature was not 
operationally significant
unless the target had shown 
vulnerabilities or was under
active development".
Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three
times 
while stationed in 
Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to
which countries he went or 
the time of year when the trips
were made. Such information would 
have been of interest to
him as ABIDIAN's case 
officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier
trips abroad, ABIDIAN's 
trips were presumed to be for
operational purposes.
the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the
Embassy Section did establish 
where ABIDIAN would travel,
nothing could be done about 
it because the foreign Legal
Residencies of the KGB First 
Chief Directorate "would not
accept a request for 
operational action against an American
diplomat coming from Moscow".
However, there was no possibility for
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With reference to whether the KGB could have photographed
ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO said
that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph pass-
ports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union.
this procedure would not be impossible, it was not considered
so important as to justify the special effort involved.
While
Comment:
According to ABIDIAN, he openly discussed his
travel plans with Embassy language teacher
GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO's agent), and on at least
some occasions used international telephone
calls to arrange for accommodations at his
destination in Europe. Also, the Foreign
Ministry UPDK (which office provides adminis-
trative services to foreign diplomats in
Moscow), to which ABIDIAN sent his passport for
an exit visa for each departure, could have
noted from passport entries the whereabouts of
his earlier travel.
"
ABIDIAN took no trips in the Soviet Union outside of
Moscow, since if he had, NOSENKO would have known and
remembered them, as it was his responsibility as case
officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he
listed:
-Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel
from the UPDK (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which
provides administrative services to the diplomatic
community in Moscow).
-Advising the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.
-Advising appropriate local KGB offices of ABIDIAN'S
itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance
and any other necessary operational activity.
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-Receiving, reading, and filing all reports of
surveillance and other operational activity carried
out by 
various KGB units,
Even
NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps.
if he 
were absent when such a request for travel was made,
he would have 
seen all documents upon his return; he did
not recall 
seeing any such documents in ABIDIAN's file.
Comment:
ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks
the Armenian language with a high degree of
proficiency, made a trip to Armenia between 5
and 9 October 1960. While in Armenia ABIDIAN
visited with various churchmen, their parish-
ioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from
Greece in 
1946. ABIDIAN attended a service in
Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the
accession of 
the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and also
visited some relatives of his in or near the
city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow,
an 
Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip
tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but
ABIDIAN 
refused to see him.
After being told ABIDIAN had attended a
service celebrating the fifth anniversary of
the 
Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO
recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin
and that an agent had reported a contact with
him 
there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was
a priest or a monk, and the report concerned
only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent
had no 
further contact with him. NOSENKO said
that this was his sole recollection concerning
ABIDIAN's trip...
With reference to ABIDIAN's travel to
Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO recalled
having been on leave at the time. However,
NOSENKO's reconstruction of the timing of his
alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at
the 
time of ABIDIAN's trip. In 1966, NOSENKO
· stated that he had lied, that his 1960 leave
was taken in January, not October.
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Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was
thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO knew none of
ABIDIAN's close American friends in Moscow nor his close
friends and professional contacts among foreigners there,
NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone
calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and
apartment via the Moscow city telephone system, but he
recalled none of their names nor nationalities, because
there was nothing of interest in the conversations,
At the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations
concerning ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little
about this important KGB target. He was "working badly" as
ABIDIAN's case officer, he said, because he had had to
concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks.
ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings
During the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO in Geneva, he
reported KGB knowledge of ABIDIAN's mailing of at least
three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB-controlled
agents. According to NOSENKO, the KGB detected all the
letters mailed by ABIDIAN through the use of metka. He
cautioned the CIA representatives from further use of Embassy
employees for mailing letters to agents in the Soviet
Union. He noted that after LANGELLE, no such letters were
mailed for a year and a half, until ABIDIAN mailed several.
He explained that Embassy employees' servants applied an
odorless substance (metka) to clothing pockets, and traces
of the substance rubbed off on any thing it contacted, such
as a letter. All the letters mailed in Moscow were passed
through a machine which identified letters bearing tracing
of metka, he said, and this was how letters ABIDIAN mailed
were intercepted. [NOSENKO said the machine was a fotoapparat,
literally a camera, but presumably he meant some sort of
light-sensitive device.] NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had
mailed a letter to someone in Odessa, and two to the Baltic
area, probably to Riga, and all were detected by metka, not
by ABIDIAN's surveillants. According to NOSENKO, no new
agents were discovered, however, since all of the agents to
whom ABIDIAN mailed letters were already controlled by the
KGB.
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Comment:
NOSENKO's information is substantially correct,
that no letters were mailed for one and 
a half
years after LANGELLE's expulsion, and that
ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including
No
ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa,
letters were mailed from February 1960 until
ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the
three letters ABIDIAN mailed, one was to Odessa
and one each to Latvia and Estonia.
CIA has conducted tests to determine whether
a substance such as metka was being used as a
KGB control device. Ultra-violet, chemical
and microscopic analyses developed one possible
Analysis 
of an
use of a metka like substance,
article of clothing of a foreign diplomat in
Moscow who served as a CIA support agent
produced a sharply positive reaction.
NOSENKO later described how metka was applied to ABIDIAN'S
clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this 
led to
the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed 
to the agent 
in
Odessa and to his parents in the United States
.
"ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH.
She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV.
She started to work for ABIDIAN a few 
months after
his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than
I met her shortly
six months after his arrival.
after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get
acquainted with her, in order to evaluate 
her and
give her general instructions about her work 
for
ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date 
of this
meeting but it was before the fall of 1960.
wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa
October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH 
was 
already
working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated
that FEDOROVICH would continue 
to put metka 
regularly
on ABIDIAN's clothing.
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"FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing during
the entire period that she worked for him. She did
this every two or three weeks except for a few times
when she was sick or on leave. No one else had
access to ABIDIAN's apartment and therefore no other
person had the possibility of putting metka on his
clothing.
"I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational
letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY' (in
Odessa). He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya
Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier.
Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter
but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to
'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to
ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka
on them, as I was told by SUMIN (a KGB secret
writing specialist) I cannot remember the date
that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was
sometime in 1961."
Comment:
ABIDIAN had no maid in Moscow until sixteen
months after his arrival; FEDOROVICH worked for
him part-time from July 1961 until he left
Moscow. Thus FEDOROVICH could not have applied
the metka which as NOSENKO claimed resulted in
the interception of the letter ABIDIAN mailed
1 April 1961, and probably was not yet employed
by ABIDIAN even at the time the letter to
"ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2 July 1961.
ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September
1961, while FEDOROVICH was working for him.
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Told that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying metka
regularly to ABIDIAN's clothing at the time of the
"ARKHANGELSKIY" letter mailing, NOSENKO insisted that no
one but FEDOROVICH had access to ABIDIAN's apartment, that
he himself briefed her on the use of metka, that the letters
were intercepted' by use of metka, and that FEDOROVICH was
responsible.
ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Deaddrop Site
In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that in 1960
or in early 1961 the KGB had surveilled ABIDIAN visiting
what was believed to be a deaddrop site on Pushkin Street
in Moscow. He provided additional details when questioned
again in 1965.
NOSENKO's Information
In 1960 or early 1961, while NOSENKO was his responsible
case officer, ABIDIAN was surveilled from the Embassy to a
residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A KGB
stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave
with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in
a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally
used.
ABIDIAN's surveillance team followed the car to a
bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but
shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone and walked around the
corner, where he entered a residential building next to a
meat market on Pushkin Street. The surveillance team saw
him go in but did not follow him. ABIDIAN emerged after a
few seconds. This unusual incident was reported by the
surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Direct-
orate, and the building was inspected that same day by KOZLOV,
the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance
Directorate, and MATVEYEV, the Deputy Chief of the Second
Chief Directorate's American Department. Taking into account
the character of the building and its inhabitants, the
duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the
suitability of the hallway particularly the radiator in
it - for use as a deaddrop site, it was decided by the leader-
ship of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance
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Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should
immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of
the short time available, it was not possible to place this
post inside the building, so it was set up across the street.
In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if any-
thing, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind
it. The post was manned around the clock for 30 days, after
which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another
two months. If a package or magnetic container had been
found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning,
it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a
signal should someone remove the package. At the same time
a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the
landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from
the hallway below. During the three months that the post
was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator.
nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the
building. The post was then discontinued, but the address
was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily
by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of
this location became known to the KGB only later, after the
arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.
"
NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected
deaddrop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in
KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from
MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was
ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief of the Embassy
Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance
post at the site was made at a higher level; neither of them
was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue
the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin
Street the following day or the day after, but he remained
only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the
hallway, except that there was a radiator there.
As was a radia
As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the
surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building
and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This case file
NOSENKO turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about
28 December 1961, just before he transferred to the Seventh
Department.)
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NOSENKO received no written reports on the results of the
stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss this matter
with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during the first month
of surveillance, and periodically after that. These discus-
sions took place either by telephone, when KOZLOV was
visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO visited KOZLOV's
office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV or perhaps someone
else, NOSENKO learned that the post had been discontinued
after 90 days. On the basis of these conversations with
KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of interest occurred
during the period of the stationary surveillance.
NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section during all the period
that the stationary surveillance post was watching the
Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard from KOZLOV
that the post had been replaced by periodic inspections.
NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance on
the Pushkin Street deaddrop site to his CIA contacts in
Geneva in June 1962 because by that time the post had
already been discontinued without anything unusual or
suspicious having been noted, and he thought that this
incident would be of no particular interest to CIA.
When last asked whether he had visited the Pushkin Street
address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as
he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied:
"I don't remember. I do not want to say that I
visited the deaddrop. I don't remember now whether
I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited
it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited
it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes', and I cannot
say 'no'."
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Comment:
ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street deaddrop
site only once; on 30 December 1961, a full
year after the time reported by NOSENKO. As
NOSENKO reported, accompanied by an Embassy
Economic Officer, ABIDIAN left the Embassy in
an official car with a Soviet driver and
proceeded in a bookstore on the corner of
Pushkin Street. Leaving the bookstore, ABIDIAN
entered the building where the site was located.
determined that the drop was empty, and left
rone minute later, returning to the Embassy,
The deaddrop was proposed by PENKOVSKIY in
August 1960. CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY walked OS
by the site on 12 November and 4 December 1960;
on 21 January 1961 (MAHONEY) briefly entered the 03
building to confirm the site's precise location.
If the KGB had surveilled (MAHONEY's visits and 03
had 
put the site under surveillance, NOSENKO
might be relating those events by mischance in
attributing the visit to ABIDIAN.. In such a
circumstance, however, NOSENKO, as ABIDIAN'S
case officer, would have known that his target
visited a site which had been previously noted
in connection with the suspicious movements of
another Embassy official. Further, NOSENKO's
description of ABIDIAN's route, companion, and
sequence of movements is so precise as to refer
clearly to ABIDIAN. Lastly, NOSENKO dislcaims
any knowledge of MAHONEY or his activities; he 03
asserts that MAHONEY] was neither the object of 03
KGB suspicion or 
concern. 
For 
reasons no
combination 
of circumstances nor NOSENKO himself
can plausibly explain, NOSENKO can describe
ABIDIAN's deaddrop site visit although it
occurred at a time when NOSENKO was no longer
ABIDIAN'S case officer and when he was assigned
to another Second Chief Directorate department.
If he turned over ADIDIAN's file on 28
December 1961 to another Embassy Section officer,
as he claimed, NOSENKO could not have received
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Comment: (Continued)
If
nor filed the initial surveillance report of
ABIDIAN'S visit to the Pushkin Street site.
he transferred to the Seventh Department two
days after ABIDIAN's visit, as he claimed (and
NOSENKO's participation in the ✓.E. JOHNSON case 06
indicates that he was working against tourists.
by 5 January 1962), he could neither have visited
the site as he described nor could he have
received thereafter the daily surveillance
reports. He could not, of his own knowledge,
assert that the surveillance was terminated
after three months, since well before the three
months' surveillance ended he was abroad in
Geneva. Lastly, it cannot be for the reason
NOSENKO claimed (that the surveillance was
unsuccessful) that NOSENKO did not mention
'ABIDIAN's activities to CIA in Geneva in 1962.
Case Officer for John ABIDIAN: Summary and Conclusion
If for no other reason than ABIDIAN's security functions
with the Khrushchev entourage, files of the First Chief
Directorate would record his name: If NOSENKO states to
the contrary, that traces were negative, NOSENKO did not run
the traces himself nor know the results. According to
NOSENKO, ABIDIAN was "one of the most important targets of
the Second Chief Directorate";" all KGB resources were
employed for two years, including 24-hour surveillance, the
exploitation of all agents with access to him, audio sur-
veillance, and technical aids, with almost absolutely negative
results. The results could not have been negative: for
NOSENKO to so assert can only mean that NOSENKO was not
informed of the results. In the two instances NOSENKO cited
of Embassy agents' activities against ABIDIAN, he made
fundamental errors: ABIDIAN's maid was not employed by
ABIDIAN at the time NOSENKO insists she was applying the
metka, and GROMAKOVA taught ADIDIAN Russian throughout his
stay in Moscow, not just 'several times". NOSENKO acknowledges
"
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that ABIDIAN's travel in the Soviet Union would have had to
been approved by the KGB, 
and that the responsible case
officer would have issued 
orders for his surveillance out-
side of Moscow and would 
have later received reports of the
target's activities. NOSENKO 
acknowledged that he was not
so involved, although he 
belatedly recalled one trip ABIDIAN
made. Lastly, although NOSENKO 
claims to know, from his
Embassy Section assignment
, details of ABIDIAN's visit to
the Pushkin Street 
deaddrop, the event occurred at a time
when NOSENKO by his own 
account could not have been physically
present in the Embassy Section.
Conclusion
It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO was not
case 
officer for Embassy 
Security Officer John ABIDIAN.
Supervisor of Operations Against
American Service Attaches
Questioned in detail in 1964 on his responsibilities in
the 
Embassy Section, NOSENKO 
claimed no personal role in
operations against American 
service attaches.
that when he 
arrived in the section, DRANOV was the respon-
He said only
sible case officer for the Naval 
personnel, including the
Embassy Marine guards, and when 
DRANOV was transferred
shortly thereafter, 
his responsibilities were assumed by
BELOGLAZOV. Listing the names 
and functions of American
Department personnel, NOSENKO 
mentioned that Yevgeniy
Nikolayevich ALESHIN was 
Second Deputy to Department Chief
KLYPIN: ALESHIN had the special 
assignment of coordinating
Second Chief Directorate activities 
against all foreign
military intelligence 
personnel, including service attaches,
In January 1965 NOSENKO claimed for the first time that
he 
had among his other 
responsibilities as Deputy Chief that.
of supervising operations against 
American service attaches,
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and for the first time claimed case officer responsibilities
against American targets other than ABIDIAN. He related how,
at his meeting with KLYPIN and KOVSHUK on entering the section
in January 1960, KOVSHUK suggested that NOSENKO assume super-
visory responsibility for the service attaches while KOVSHUK
supervised operations against the civilian diplomatic staff
of the Embassy. NOSENKO stated "supervising" meant that the
case officers for the service attaches referred their ques-
tions to him, not to KOVSHUK. These included case officers
GAVRILENKO, responsible for Air Attaches, KURILENKO, for
Army Attaches, and DEMKIN, for enlisted personnel of all
services. "While he was getting acquainted with the section
on DRANOV's retirement", NOSENKO himself took case officer
responsibility for the Naval Attache personnel. This res-
ponsibility was subsequently assumed by DRANOV's former
assistant, BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO could not initially recall
how long he supervised service attache operations; he later
said "several months" and finally "five or six months".
Neither could NOSENKO recall what other pressing duty or
duties caused him to be relieved of this function. He said
this resulted from KOVSHUK's proposal that supervision of
the service attaches be assumed by ALESHIN who was Deputy
Chief of the Second Directorate's American Department and
coordinator for Second Directorate operations against
military intelligence officers of all nationalities.
Supervisor of Service Attache Operations:
Summary and Conclusion
Because of the tardiness of NOSENKO's claim to have been
responsible for operations against service attaches and
because he was not able, when challenged, to substantiate
his claims by providing any details of KGB activities against
these targets, it is concluded that this aspect of his
claimed KGB service is a fiction.
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Custodian of KGB File on Embassy Security
As former Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the
American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of KGB
knowledge of its American Embassy target. Specifically,
NOSENKO claimed to have been custodian of the Second Chief.
Directorate's file on Embassy security.
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO's knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy
derived both from his general supervisory functions during
1960-1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially
registered custodian of the KGB file on the Embassy security.
He received the file from the Section Chief, KOVSHUK, when
he arrived in January 1960. As was permissible under KGB
procedures, as long as the custodian was still in the same
directorate, the file was charged to BAKHVALOV. [See p. 153
for NOSENKO's various assertions with respect to BAKHVALOV.)
NOSENKO had custody of the file charged to himself, and from
January 1960 until NOSENKO was leaving the section on 25-28
December 1961, only KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and GRYAZNOV and
KOSOLAPOV (both of whom shared NOSENKO's office and safe) had
access to the file.
:
The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old
building on Mokhovaya Street and the second (about an inch
thick) on the new Embassy building occupied in 1953 on
Chaykovskiy Street. The file contained detailed floor plans
and photographs of both buildings.
No operational analysis or planning by NOSENKO or others
was done on the basis of this file during NOSENKO's two years
in the Embassy Section: It was used only for reference
purposes, since the
for a Soviet citizen GB had concluded that it was impossible
penetrate the secure areas of the
Embassy because of the American security precautions in
effect,
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All Soviet employees of the Embassy who entered the
restricted areas, "the seventh through the tenth floors",
were carefully questioned because of the special KGB interest
in these offices, [The secure area barred to unescorted
local employees is comprised of the eighth through tenth
floors.]
NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in
the Embassy security file, while he was custodian, None of
the information was of interest or important or useful
enough for him to remember, and he recalled none of the KGB
agent sources. [In another context NOSENKO cited an instance
in which an unrecalled KGB agent had reported [erroneously}
that ABIDIAN's office had a sign on the door reading "Security
Office".]
Nothing could be recovered from the Embassy classified
trash, which was always burned at an unrecalled location by
a non-commissioned officer or Marine guard accompanied by
an officer. [At the Moscow Embassy the Marine guard detailed
for the purpose has always burned the classified trash alone.
NOSENKO may be unwittingly referring to a U.S. military
security procedure requiring a commissioned officer to witness
and to certify the destruction of classified documents. If
NOSENKO is aware of any such procedure, he has never indicated
it in any context.]
In 1960-1961, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief, he either
knew the location of all offices and personnel within the
Embassy or he could obtain them from the monthly Embassy
telephone lists which the KGB received regularly from agents.
The lists gave office numbers. [The Embassy telephone lists
contain names, apartment numbers and telephone numbers, but
omits office room numbers.] :
In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived
at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret
conversations. None of the technical specifications of the
room were known, nor was its location. An unrecalled source
reported only that meetings were held in the room, which was
in the restricted area.
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The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material
during 1960-1961. A charwoman who was an agent of BELOGLAZOV
stole a bag of papers from the Naval Attache office, The torn
and crumpled contents included a draft of a report of Naval
Attaches' observation of ships and factories on a trip to
Leningrad. The report was only of routine interest to the
KGB. The charwoman was granted a cash award.
Custodian of Embassy Security File: Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO cannot describe the location (even by floor) of
any of his own targets, such as ABIDIAN, the military code
room, or the State Department communications center. In
fact, he cannot describe the location of the office of any
individual or unit in the Embassy, even of the Ambassador.
When challenged to substantiate his claim to knowledge of
the Embassy security file, NOSENKO asserted that he had never
read it nor paid any "special attention" to its content in
the two years he was file custodian. It is concluded that
NOSENKO's claim that he was custodian of the file is an
invention.
Audio Operations Against the American Embassy
NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB microphone system in the
Embassy derived from his alleged responsibility as Deputy
Chief of the Embassy Section for receiving and routing to
appropriate KGB personnel the reports of monitored conversa-
tions. Also, in his capacity as Deputy Chief and custodian
of the monitoring reports logbook NOSENKO claimed to have
attended a meeting at the end of 1960 or the beginning of
1961 at which he learned details of the locations of specific
microphones hidden in the Embassy. Lastly, NOSENKO claimed
he obtained information on the KGB audio operations against
the Embassy, even after he left the Embassy Section, from his
former subordinate GRYAZNOV. NOSENKO regarded the information
about the KGB microphones, first mentioned in Geneva in 1962,
as the most important he provided CIA.
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NOSENKO's Information
Handling of Monitor Reports
These
According to NOSENKO, only a limited number of KGB
personnel, all in the American Department of the Second
Chief Directorate, had access to the monitor reports.
included Department Chief KLYPIN (but not his deputies),
KOVSHUK, NOSENKO himself, and GRIBANOV, to whom important
items were shown. The existence of the audio operation and
its product were concealed from personnel in other KGB
Departments. The reports were produced by the Second Special
Department of the Operational Technical Directorate (OTU).
The OTU Second Special Department has several sections, one
of which was the English Section under Colonel N. Ya. KUZMIN.
KUZMIN's monitors, fluent in English, listened to and
transcribed the tape recordings. Their reports of the
preceding day's product were brought daily by Tatyana
GRISHNYAT (of the Second Special Department) to the American
Department. (In some accounts NOSENKO has said that he
received the reports first, at other times that they went
first to KLYPIN.) NOSENKO reviewed the reports, marked
significant portions and usually within twenty-four hours.
returned the reports to the Second Special Department.
In NOSENKO's absence either KOVSHUK or GRYAZNOV reviewed the
reports. The Second Special Department prepared sterile
abstracts of the portions NOSENKO had marked, abstracts
which disguised the source of the information contained:
the abstracts were returned to the American Department for
the reference of individual case officers in the Embassy
Section and for filing in the delo-formulyar (developmental
file) kept on each American employee in the Embassy..
Location of the Microphones
In the 1962 Geneva meetings with CIA, NOSENKO emphasized
that the KGB was listening to all conversations of the
service attaches and particularly, to conversations held in
the office of the Minister Counsellor. In addition, he
referred to "points" (microphones) in the office of an
unnamed State Department employee, in the Agricultural
Attache office shared by BROWN and HORBALY, and in the
Embassy code room.
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In 1964, at the second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced_
a 
handwritten 
note which he asserted listed all the micro-
phones in the Embassy which were operative in the years
1960-1961. 
NOSENKO explained that at the end of 1960 or
the beginning of 1961, he and KOVSHUK met with Department
Chief 
KLYPIN. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss
the possibility of releasing monitors from some of the
Embassy microphones so they could be assigned to Vladimir
PETROV, Chief of the American Department's Second Section
for use against non-Embassy targets. (PETROV had earlier
requested English-language monitors from the Second Special
Section, 
but had been told that English linguists were
engaged on priority targets.) At the meeting, KOVSHUK and
KLYPIN 
reviewed the microphone coverage of the Embassy
chancery 
to decide which rooms offered information of little
value
, so that the monitors for those microphones could be
released to 
PETROV's Second Section KOVSHUK used NOSENKO's
notebook in which to list Embassy apartments and offices
then 
being covered on a full-time basis and to note those of
lesser importance. KOVSHUK decided to relinquish, tempor-
arily, 
monitoring of Embassy apartments. He continued the
monitoring 
of the code room, despite the limited value of
the information 
obtained. At the end of the meeting KOVSHUK
gave or 
NOSENKO took the list, and NOSENKO retained it in
his 
office safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964.
NOSENKO's list showed that microphones were located in
the following offices of the noted occupants:
'Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;
"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;
"Office of the Army Attache, URBAN;
"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;
"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO
and SACHANEN;
"Office of the Assistant Army Attaches, MASON,
REITZ and WILSON;
"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;
"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;
"
Military Code Room;
"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;
"
Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN] and [NEILSEN)];
"Eighth Floor Bar 
(Marines)
"
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NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in
the chancery building before the Americans 
occupied it, 
but
he did not know how many were installed 
in all, how many
were in any particular room on KOVSHUK's 
list, or where 
they
He did recall that most of
were located in specific rooms.
the microphones were emplaced in the outside wall, the wall
nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most 
of the offices faced
this street and microphones emplaced there 
were less 
vulner-
able to technical search and discovery.
According to NOSENKO, there were no fixed microphones in
America House, the Embassy quarters of enlisted 
military
In 1960-1961 there had 
been a discussion of 
using
personnel.
KGB agents employed there to emplace temporary audio devices
for one or two days at a time in the 
rooms of the Americans,
These 
plans were vetoed,
as well as in the Embassy garage.
For the same
however, because of the risk of discovery.
reason there was no attempt made in this period to emplace
a device temporarily in Spasso House, 
the Ambassador's
residence, or in the apartments of 
Embassy officers.
KGB was afraid that they would be detected 
and there 
would
be a scandal.
Performance Characteristics of the Microphones
The
According to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the
microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear 
to 
zero,
The KGB 
could
but the microphone system was deteriorating.
do nothing about it because they could not gain access to
the inside of the Embassy. Referring to 
the microphone 
in
the Minister Counsellor's office, NOSENKO said 
that it was
becoming increasingly difficult towwork with 
its product.
The microphone was fading, and the recording 
tape sounded
as if "somewhere far away, somewhere in 
the cellar, someone
is speaking in a whisper". KUZMIN, the 
KGB officer respon-
sible for the monitors, said that 
soon the KGB could recover
nothing. Of the microphones then (in 1962) in 
place, about
twenty no longer were operative.
In 1964 NOSENKO referred again to the microphone in the
NOSENKO 
learned from
Minister Counsellor's office.
DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of
OTU Second Special Department] how difficult 
it was to
228
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'ten,
monitor conversations in that office, Only very experienced
linguists were used, 
but even they had to listen
fifteen, even twenty times" in order to understand portions
of the recording
. After NOSENKO left the Embassy Section,
on several occasions in 
1962-1963 GRYAZNOV, his former sub-
ordinate and his 
successor, referred to the microphones'
decline. GRYAZNOV 
said the microphones were picking up
only snatches 
of conversation, and that in a year or two
they would be 
completely inoperative.
told NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was insisting on the recruitment of
As 
a result, 
GRYAZNOV
code clerks at 
all costs. Besides the fading quality of
the microphone's 
signal, GRYAZNOV, KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEV
attributed the 
diminishing value of the audio operation to
the Embassy use 
of the "room-in-a-room".
that in 1960-1961 the KGB had information that, in prepara-
[NOSENKO said
tion for President 
Eisenhower's visit, a "steel chamber"
had been 
constructed within the Embassy where secure conver-
sations could be held.]
Microphones in the North Wing
:
According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio
devices 
were 
ever installed in the north wing (as distinct
from the 
chancery) prior to the Embassy's occupancy of the
building in 1962. In 
his first meetings with CIA in Geneva
he described how he 
knew. When it was decided to permit
the Embassy to 
construct the north wing, NOSENKO wrote a
proposal that 
audio equipment be installed. Approval was
held up by KGB 
Chairman Shelepin, who had reservations
because of the 
political consequences of discovery. By
the time Shelepin 
approved the proposal two or three months
later, renovation 
was far advanced, and Embassy Security
Officer ABIDIAN was 
already inspecting the premises. The
opportunity was lost 
and the KGB installed no microphones.
Consequently, 
NOSENKO suggested to CIA that the Minister
Counsellor, 
the service attaches, and others presently
occupying rooms in 
the chancery which had microphones, be
moved gradually 
to the north wing, where the KGB had neither
audio equipment 
nor the capability of installing any.
9.
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Amount, Type, and Value of Audio Surveillance Production
In 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information
the KGB obtained from monitoring, NOSENKO referred only to
the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the service
attaches. According to NOSENKO, Counsellor FREERS dictated
Top Secret and Secret cables. If the content justified,
GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman
immediately. FREERS also dictated fitness reports on Embassy
personnel from which the KGB learned of various American
officers' personal weaknesses. With respect to the service
attaches, NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones
where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find
out
He
In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details.
said that audio reception was good from the military code
room, but that the occupants rarely spoke, When one of them
was monitored, the monitor report was sent immediately to
the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers.
Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and
teletype room because of the interference from the noise of
the teletype machines. The microphones in the apartments
produced rarely anything of interest. An exception was
advance information obtained of a social affair, for which
the English-language Section of the OTU Second Special
Department would be asked to pay particular attention.
was a microphone with good reception in GLEYSTEEN's (a
political officer) office, but no secret information was
obtained. Similarly, the conversations were overheard in
the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing significant
was obtained except "something" which made the KGB suspect
HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence.
There
In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized
his knowledge of the value of the information obtained by
the KGB via microphones in the Embassy:
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"I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from
microphones in the American Embassy for a period of
approximately two years, from January 1960 to January
1962. The following is the only information which
I can remember as being important, interesting or
operationally useful to the KGB:
"From the microphone in the office of the Minister
Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally
dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of
certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government
and advised the State Department on positions for
negotiations with the USSR. This information was
of such importance that special reports were written
to the Central Committee of the CPSUM However, I
cannot remember any specific incidents or events
which these cables reported nor any specific
Revaluations or recommendations made in these cables.
"Also from the microphones in the Minister
Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated
fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve
officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any
of these officers were or any details from the
reports. There was nothing in these reports which
was of interest or useful to the KGB.
W to the KGB.
"From the microphone in the Army Attache's office
I remember that the service attaches regularly
discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the
targets that they wanted to cover. They also dis-
cussed the results of these trips after their return.
However, I cannot remember any information about
specific trips planned by specific service attache
personnel or any specific targets that they planned
to cover or any specific operational activity taken
by the organs of the KGB against service attaches
on trips within the USSR which was based on infor-
mation obtained from this microphone. There was no
interesting, important, or useful information about
the personal or professional lives or about the
vulnerabilities of anyone in the service attache
offices (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this
microphone.
231.
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"I remember that from the microphones in the State
Department code room occasionally a code clerk would
read numbers; These numbers were only of interest.
to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryp-
tology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversa-
tions from this microphone. There was no information
from this microphone of any of the code clerks which
was interesting, important, or useful to the Embassy
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate,
KGB.
"During the approximately two years in which I
daily reviewed the production from all the micro-
phones in the American Embassy I do not remember any
information on any American in the Embassy which was
interesting, important, or useful to me as the
Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points
noted in the above paragraphs.
:
Results of Technical and Physical Search
..
NOSENKO's information [no action had been taken as a
result of GOLITSYN's earlier report that there was a micro-
phone in the Embassy office occupied by the Minister
Counsellor] was, as far as it went, confirmed by a search
of the Embassy chancery in spring 1964. According to the
USIB Security Committee damage report which followed, a
microphone and associated probe was first discovered in the
outside wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery.
(In 1960 this room had been the office of the Army Attache,
where NOSENKO reported a microphone was emplaced.) The
microphone's cable was traced to a major cable which ran
horizontally (several inches) under the outside surface of
the east face of the chancery, to the roof area of the north
annex. A number of vertical cables were found to run to the
various microphone installations. Fifty microphones were
positively identified [ultimately, fifty-four were found],
although the system apparently was devised for a considerably
greater number. The microphone system covered all outside
rooms on floors six through ten, with certain exceptions.
The USIB damage report concluded that the microphones were
installed before the Embassy took occupancy of the chancery
in 1953.
0001504
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The discoveries in the chancery led to the discovery of
other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing.
Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the
north wing roof, there were found three coaxial cables, all
terminating in the concrete floor of the north wing attic,
The coaxial cables appeared to be of more recent installation
probably prior to the Soviets evacuation of the north wing
in 1962.
Comment:
While not definitely established, it is assumed
that the Soviets, before the Embassy occupied
the north wing, used it as a listening post for
monitoring microphones in the chancery. In
preparation for American occupancy the main cable
from the chancery was concealed and run from the
north wing roof to the basement, and presumably
from there to a listening post elsewhere. The
three coaxial cables may have been either
installed at that time or earlier. Their purpose
is still unknown, but they may have been a
feature of a highly sophisticated electronic
attack against the code room, the existence or
character of which NOSENKO did not know and need.
not have known. When NOSENKO was informed in
1965 by CIA that there had been a technical
discovery in the north wing, he offered his
personal assurances that nothing was installed
in the north wing and insisted that whatever
was found must be something unrelated to an
audio system.
Damage Estimates
With reference to the damage caused by the audio penetra-
tion, the previously-cited USIB damage report stated that "it
must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetra-
tion, 
the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to
the 
United States. The Soviets have gained considerable
233
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knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations
within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache
collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon
certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible
for them to identify priority intelligence and probably
Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement
specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must
have amassed considerable information concerning the personal
habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel
assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes
of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future,
"
Col. Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from
May 1959 to May 1961 (a period coinciding with some eighteen
months of NOSENKO's claimed two years' service in the Embassy
Section), has been more specific. Interviewed by CIA, Col.
HOFFMAN recalled instances which the KGB, by monitoring just
the conversations held in his office, could have become aware
of the vulnerability of service attache personnel. As
examples, he cited the two occasions on which military code
0b clerk STORSBERG was reprimanded for absenteeism (unavailable
for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl
friends"); HOFFMAN's conversations with America House manager
06 Peter BINDER (the personality problems, drinking habits and
other incidents relating to America House residents and
visitors to the America Club), and the detailed circumstances.
prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk KEYSERS) 06
from Moscow (homosexuality)... (Besides his general duties as
Chief of the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claims special responsi-
bilities for each of the persons mentioned. He supervised
the KGB officers operating against code clerks and residents
of America House, and asserts he was personally involved in
the KGB attempts to recruit (STORSBERG) and (KEYSERS 6 (The KGB
attempted later to recruit [BINDER, as well.)] In summing up
his views, Col. HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I
would assume that some of our modus operandi, some of
our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal
weaknesses were compromised."
...
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Audio Operations Against American Embassy:
Summary and Conclusion.
Given that NOSENKO's information about microphones in the
chancery has been confirmed, that information's significance.
remains the extent to which it substantiates his claims,
e.g., that his knowledge derived from his position as Deputy
Chief, and that he for two years reviewed the reports of
what the KGB monitored from microphones emplaced in the
chancery.
NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones' existence is not
proof that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, (or
even proof that he served in that unit). KGB sources serving
elsewhere than in the Second Chief Directorate earlier
reported the microphones' existence; GOLITSYN specificall
identified one as being in the Minister Counsellor's office
NOSENKO's acquisition of the list of microphones in
"1960-1961" is singular (the more so since he never hinted
of the list's existence while describing the microphones in
the chancery to CIA in 1962). * He asserts that he had no
plan to defect in 1960-1961, when the list was acquired,
that for no apparent purpose he risked keeping a highly
sensitive document in a safe he shared with two subordinates
:(GRYAZNOV and KOSOALPOV), and keeping it even after he left
the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department. NOSENKO
has never plausibly explained the circumstances which
prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he
produced it for CIA in Geneva.
Produced it for CTA
According to NOSENKO, he reviewed what must have been
literally hundreds of monitor reports in the course of two
years, important ones of which were forwarded to Second
Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV, and others of such signi-
ficance that they were the subjects of special reports sent
to the Central Committee of the CPSU. Yet when challenged
he cites not a single example, despite the fact that this
period included such critical events affecting Soviet-United
235
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)
States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB),
as the U-2 and President Eisenhower's visit. Of the micro-
phones which produced useful information, NOSENKO describes
those in the Minister Counsellor's office, the office of
the Army Attache, and in the code room; when challenged to
cite examples of information obtained, he asserts that none
produced any information of interest to the Embassy Section.
Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery
microphones as sources of information on which he relied to
direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy
personnel, he again can describe no actual instance.
the single case in which he asserted that he relied on
information procured from microphones:CHECKCKEYSERS" failure to 06
report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error.
In
Conclusion
From the foregoing it is concluded that, NOSENKO's claims
to the contrary, his information on the chancery microphones
does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief
of the Embassy Section, or his claim that he personally
reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports.
Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications
As former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the
American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of
the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on
Embassy communications, He has consistently asserted that
the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communica-
tions of the service attaches (for which reason he claimed
6001508
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ary 1962)
AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
-
January 1960-January 1962)
est to the KGBhe recruitment of a military code clerk was his priority
Of the micro-ask in 1960-1961]. He "knew", 
however, that the Eighth
ENKO describes irectorate was reading at 
least some State Department
office of Imbassy traffic.
hallenged to
rts that none
bassy Section.
chancery
he relied to
r Embassy
tance. In
elied on
NOSENKO's Information'
At his second meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO expressed
oncern that the American Embassy 
in Moscow might be informed
f him, an event which would be fatal 
since the KGB was
reading all the State 
Department ciphers". He knew this
Decause he saw the clear-text messages every day. In a
5' failure to 
ubsequent meeting NOSENKO 
revised his earlier statement to
was in errorxplain that while no service 
attache traffic was being
lead, certain State Department 
codes had been broken.
ad only rarely seen the 
clear-text of deciphered cables,
t the most, "ten or twelve times
" during 1960 and 1961.
He
The Russian text of those deciphered State Department
essages was sent to KGB Chairman 
Semichastnyy, who some
imes forwarded it to GRIBANOV, 
Chief of the Second Chief
ENKO's claim 
rectorate. GRIBANOV at times 
forwarded some of the
y microphoneaterial to Vladimir 
Alekseyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American
Deputy Chiefepartment, or KLYPIN's successor, 
S.M. FEDOSEYEV. NOSENKO
rsonally aw such material on the desk of 
KLYPIN and later on
EDOSEYEV's desk, but was never 
permitted to read it.
ikolay ZEMSKOV, from the 
Secretariat of the Second Chief
irectorate, brought a book 
containing the broken State
epartment messages to KLYPIN 
or FEDOSEYEV. He would open
tions
he book to certain pages which had red paper and permit
LYPIN or FEDOSEYEV to see the 
material.
irectorate 
material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how
This was Eighth
EMSKOV got it... At times 
portions of this material were:
ead aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, 
but they concerned the
osition of the American Ambassador 
or the U.S. Government
in political questions and were 
of no significance to him.
nfrequently there was mention of 
the expected arrival of
mericans who were not permanently 
assigned to the Embassy,
dgeable of 
nd NOSENKO remembered that one such item 
concerned the
ack on
rrival of a one-or two-man "
commission", to check the work
erted that 
the Political Section.
d 
communicatate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on
The 
attitude of the Secretary of
he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but 
NOSENKO took no interest
of the
TS No. 197
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in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent
activities. NOSENKO noted, however, that the material
concerned messages from the Secretary of State to the American
Ambassador, Moscow. All of this material was highly sensi-
tive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to
know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated
more carefully than Top Secret information.
Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth
Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State crypto-
graphic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate methods
as known to him. One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on
12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy
officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and MCSWEENEY)
When the texts
dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud.
were picked up on the KGB microphones, the Eighth Directorate
compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by
other means.
NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest
in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations
picked up by the microphones in the State Department and
military code rooms.
"Now, we also listened to the code room and the
teletype office, but we could never get anything out
of the teletype office because of interference
[equipment noises which drowned out conversations].
In the military code room--that was where (James H.106
STORSBERG and later (Matthew P.) ZUJUS worked--we 06
didn't get much. We could hear [STORSBERG] Swearing 06
on occasion, and then he would mention a group of
numbers. This was, of course, all recorded and we
turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate,
dealing with coding and decoding. Of course, all
other intercepts were turned over to them also."
With respect to the use of code clerks by the American
Department, NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB
was helped a great deal by [James H.] MCMILLAN (a military
code clerk of the Embassy staff who defected in 1948), and
by "ANDREY" [Dayle SMITH, see p. 33]. It was thanks to
:
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"ANDREY's" help that the KGB were able to read State Depart-
ment and ciphers. [At the time of SMITH's tour in Moscow
a single code room was shared by State Department and
military code clerks. As the only cryptographic machine
technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access to both
State and military cryptographic equipment.]
NOSENKO also named MARTIN and MICHELL [NSA mathematicians
who defected to the USSR in July 1960] and "an American
code clerk brought to the USSR from India" (unidentified,
but possibly John Discoe SMITH, State Department communica
tions technician who defected to the USSR sometime between
1960-1967, when his presence in the USSR was publicized].
NOSENKO said the Eighth Directorate was submitting
regular reports to Khrushchev and the Central Committee on
their intercepts until "the end of 1961 or the beginning
of 1962". He learned this from GRYAZNOV, his successor in
the Embassy Section. At about the same time he learned
that various Embassy officers were less often overheard from
KGB microphones in their offices discussing significant
information. This development GRYAZNOV and American Depart-
ment Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to a "room-within-a-room".
installed in the Embassy and other Embassy security measures.
(The acoustical room was installed in December 1962.] After
his own departure from the Embassy Section, NOSENKO also
learned of the KGB's loss of its code breaking capability.
from Second Chief Directorate Chief, GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV
told him that the Central Committee was exerting consider-
able pressure on the KGB Chairman for continuation of the
information formerly obtained in this manner; consequently,
the KGB Chairman was demanding maximum effort from all KGB
officers concerned with the recruitment of code clerks.
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Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications:
Summary and Conclusion
From USIB and NSA damage assessments following the
discovery of the microphones in the chancery, it has been
concluded that it was equally feasible for the Soviets to
have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine
emissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the
period 1952-1962, and from enciphered State Department
traffic during 1952-1959. "ANDREY" (see p. 33), the code
machine mechanic the KGB allegedly recruited in 1953,
serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service
attache code room; his access was not limited, as NOSENKO
indicates, to State Department traffic. On the basis of
these fundamental errors, it is concluded that NOSENKO
was not knowledgeable of the extent of KGB cryptologić
attack on Embassy communications, and that such information
as he provided can not be related to his claim to have
been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.
Knowledge of CIA Personnel within Embassy
As Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the
American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed that he would
"necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a
CIA officer" under diplomatic cover within the Embassy.
Within the section, "special emphasis" was placed on the
identification and development of American Intelligence.
personnel, with the objective of an eventual recruitment.
The KGB believed that the Ambassador, code clerks, and
Marine guards would not be used to perform intelligence
missions: any diplomat, however, was noted as "suspect
240
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American Intelligence", the notation referring to CIA.
Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to the
Embassy during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who
were known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers, and
on 
some officers who were not.
Embassy Personnel Suspected to be CIA Officers
Boris KLOSSON 06
06
KLOSSON was considered to be CIA "Resident" in Moscow;
for reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced
06 David MARK, who had been regarded as "Resident" because of
his behavior under 
surveillance and of his clandestine letter
mailing
. KLOSSON's case officer was MIKHAYLOV. NOSENKO.
recalled the names of none of the KGB agents working
specifically 
against [KLOSSON 06 He never read any agent or
surveillance report 
indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in
06
any 
clandestine activity. NOSENKO was unaware of KLOSSON's 06
job in the 
Embassy, whether his family was in Moscow or
any other 
features of his personal life, of his travels
inside the Soviet Union, the identities of his close American
associates 
or any of his Soviet contacts. NOSENKO never
read 
KLOSSON's file,
:06.
06.
Comment: KLOSSON was not a CIA officer and had no
connection with CIA in Moscow.
John ABIDIAN
ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer on the basis
of his 
conduct as 
a Department of State security officer
during Premier 
Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States.
and because 
he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE.
Surveillance 
confirmed that he clandestinely mailed opera-
tional letters and 
visited a deaddrop site in Moscow. (See
P. 206)
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Comment:
ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted
by CIA.
Although not a CIA staff employee, he
was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in
Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961.
03
Steve WASHENKO
03
[WASHENKO was identified as a CIA officer on the basis
of his mailing of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double
agents in the Baltic area. Additionally, from a KGB micro-
phone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report
shortly after he returned from a field trip.
03
Comment: WASHENKO was a CIA employee detached from his
Washington overt assignment as an economic 08
analyst to be assigned to Moscow. He was used
there for limited operational support activity,
including clandestine mailings. He reverted to
overt CIA employment after his Moscow assignment,
Lewis BOWDEN
BOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons
unknown to NOSENKO. KOVSHUK was in contact with BOWDEN under
Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover.
Comment: BOWDEN had no affiliation with CIA.
0001514
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Richard FUNKHAUSER
FUNKHÄUSER was suspected of being a CIA officer because.
he was a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly on
economic matters. NOSENKO remembered the names of no KGB
agents working against FUNKHAUSER, nor any information about
him which was regarded as derogatory by the KGB.
Comment: FUNKHAUSER had no affiliation with CIA.
William HORBALY
HORBALY was suspected of being a CIA case officer or
cooptee because the KGB monitored through a microphone in
the Embassy his discussion or dictation of observations made
on a field trip. NOSENKO knew the names of no KGB agents
working against HORBALY, nor whether the agents ever obtained
any derogatory information about him. The KGB did not try
to recruit HORBALY.
Comment:
Like
and NKO, HORBALY was an overt employee
analyst of CIA before being
appointed to a State Department position in
Moscow, where he openly discussed the fact
that he had formerly worked for CIA. In
January 1962 he accepted an appointment to the
Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department
of Agriculture. While in Moscow HORBALY had no
connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine
activities.
"
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George WINTERS
WINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and was given
special attention because of his operational activity in the
POPOV case (see p. 207 ). 
KOVSHUK was in personal contact
with WINTERS under the 
cover of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. In addition he 
was overheard from a KGB microphone
dictating an intelligence 
report shortly after he returned
from a field trip.
Comment: WINTERS was a CIA officer.
CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB
Stanley BROWN
NOSENKO did not recognize BROWN's name, whose name was
on a 
list which NOSENKO 
brought to CIA in 1964, a list in-
dicating that BROWN 
shared an office with HORBALY.
office there 
was a KGB microphone providing good reception,
In that
but insignificant 
production.
Comment:
Like HORBALY and [WASHENKO, BROWN was an overt
employee of CIA 
who was transferred to the De-
partment of Agriculture prior to being assigned
to the 
Embassy in. Moscow. He was engaged in
no 
clandestine activities during his tour.
In 
1960 ne visited Leningrad with WINTERS, whom
NOSENKO correctly identified as a CIA officer.
BROWN 
and another member of the Embassy staff
were 
under constant surveillance during a trip
within 
the USSR in 1961 24
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MERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)
as given
stivity in the
al contact
⠀ Foreign Af-
3. microphone
he returned
William N. MORELL
MORELL was not suspected of being a CIA officer.
06.
Comment:
06
[MORELL was an overt employee of CIA who was
identified as such to the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs prior to his assignment to
the Embassy as a Minister Counsellor. In
attempting to recruit Francis STEVENS) (see p.430) 06
a KGB officer allegedly commented to (STEVENS 06
Of that [MORELL] openly acknowledged himself to be
a CIA employee. KOVSHUK, under Ministry of
Foreign Affairs cover, was cultivating [MOREL].06
03
Eugene MAHONEY
NOSENKO identified MAHONEY's name as that of an employee
hose name was the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Nothing was
a list in- 
Town of MAHONEY such as his previous career, whether he
Y. 
In that new Russian, when he arrived or departed Moscow, or where
i 
reception, 
e lived while there.
CIA officer.
The KGB did not suspect that he was
03
vas an overt
ed to the De-
being assigne
engaged in
his tour.
WINTERS, who
CIA officer.
ibassy staff
luring a trip
His
Comment: MAHONEY was a CIA officer who served in Moscow
from October 1960 until September 1961 as an 32
assistant General Services Officer)].
specific CIA mission was to support communica-
tions with PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union.
From the start of his tour he was active in
attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow.
and he frequently toured various areas of the
city on foot. 03 (MAHONEY went to the vicinity
of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site on two
occasions during November and December 1960,
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Comment:
(Continued)
and examined the site itself on 21 January
1961. See p. 219.) Throughout his tour (MCMAHONEY] 03
was subjected to intense KGB surveillance, On
25 October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that "I find
this type of coverage (five surveillants on a
recent trip to a barber shop) completely out
of character with that which is usually given
a new arrival of similar rank. My only
inference is that the KGB has at least strong
O suspicions of MAHONEY)'s primary role as a CIA
"
officer. (ABIDIAN'S own surveillance at the
time was occasional and extremely discreet.)
U MAHONEY lived throughout his tour in Moscow in
America House, for which NOSENKO's subordinate
DEMKIN was case officer and which NOSENKO had
described as thoroughly penetrated by KGB agents
among the local employees. MAHONEY spoke
Russian, and his administrative tasks exposed
him more than most Americans to KGB agents and
informants among Embassy local employees.
Paul GARBLER
GARBLER was a naval officer in the office of the Naval
Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO knew the
names of no agents working against GARBLER. The KGB obtained
no interesting information concerning GARBLER from microphones,
telephone taps, or surveillance. NOSENKO "did not know"
whether or not he had read GARBLER's file. (It will be
recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO said that all Service
Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence officers.)
246
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Comment:
The CIA Chief of Station while in Moscow,
GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy
in 1952, and he served CIA under Naval cover 32;10
in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955.
He resigned his naval commission in 1955, and
in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to
''
[the American Embassy in Stockholm, under the 32,10
cover of Second Secretary and Political Officer
He returned to active duty with the Navy in
June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally
proposed as a candidate for the position of
Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow.: In response
to a request from the Soviet Naval Attache
office in Washington, in September 1961 GARBLER
forwarded to the Soviet Embassy an official
biographic summary, followed by an official
call on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER
arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961.
:)
Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER
had served in Korea where he was acquainted
with George BLAKE. GARBLER was a participant
in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington
in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE had
admitted passing to the Soviets. (See p.
CIA thus assumed GARBLER to have been identified
to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to his
arrival in Moscow. This assumption was confirmed
by an article appearing in Izvestiya in October
1963 in which the author alleged that GARBLER
had earlier been involved in subversion and
espionage in Sweden.
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Knowledge of CIA Personnel in Embassy:
Summary and Conclusion
With the exception of ABIDIAN, there is a paradox
connected with each of NOSENKO's identifications, as is
most evident in the cases of MORELL) and GARBLER. It is a 06.
fact that both these individuals were known to the KGB as
CIA officers, a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware.
His claim is thus false, that he would necessarily know
whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer, and to the extent
he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
Embassy Section, that latter claim is unsubstantiated.
Personal Handler of KGB Agents
-
NOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have
handled while Deputy Chief of the American Section during
1960-1961.
YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
NOSENKO continued to manage these two homosexual agents
whom he had recruited and managed during his assignment in
the Seventh Department, and brought with him when he trans-
ferred to the American Department (see p. 111). They were
used in no operations during the period 1960-1961. [NOSENKO
described the compromise of Robert BARRETT) in 1959 and knew 06
of his later recruitment in 1961. (See p. 134.) NOSENKO
does not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 06
in 1961, when he claims to have been their case officer.]
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FRIPPEL
NOSENKO continued to manage the Moscow manager of the
29 American Express Company] during the 1960-1961 period, as
he had earlier during his assignment to the Seventh Depart-
ment.
was
(See p. 137.) FRIPPEL an uncooperative and
unproductive source reporting on his acquaintances in the
American Embassy.
DMITRIYEV
NOSENKO's English and Japanese-speaking agent during the
1955-1960 Seventh Department period was employed in the
Japanese Exhibition in Moscow.. (See p. 107.) He was not
used operationally during 1960 or 1961.
Marina RYTOVA
NOSENKO's agent from 1956 or 1957 (see p. 108) at the
Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not used
operationally during 1960-1961.
Maya LEVINA
on and librarian at the
American language
The
LEVINA was a language teacher
Embassy used as an informant c
She
students, among whom were a number of code clerks.
provided no worthwhile information on any American nor was
she ever used in operations. At the end of 1960 or the
beginning of 1961 she was fired by Paul SMITH and NOSENKO 06
turned her over to another Embassy Section officer.
British Department planned later to use her in either the
British or Canadian Embassies. [LEVINA was employed at the
Embassy from January 1958 through January 1962. [Cultural, 08:06
Affairs Officer SMITH] left Moscow in September 1961, and
could not have been directly involved in LEVINA's termina-
tion. LEVINA thus was employed at the Embassy throughout
NOSENKO's tour of duty with the Embassy Section.]
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www
06
PREISFREUND
06.
Recruited by KOVSHUK, [PREISFREUND was handled by NOSENKO
in the operation against [STORSBERG] (see p. 166). He was 06
used in no other operation during 1960-1961.
[WEISS 06
06
The Syrian Army captain studying in Moscow was first
targetted against America House occupants, then used in
06. the development of (ZUJUS), STORSBERG) s successor (The
latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the
Embassy Section in January 1962.
Personal Handler of KGB Agents:
Summary and Conclusion
Of the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with
him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh
Department assignment, none was used operationally during
1960-1961. If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed, he
would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy
served throughout his Embassy Section assignment and was
not fired earlier, as he asserted. PREISFREUND] and [WEISS] 06
are discussed in considerable detail in connection with
the KGB operations against CDC (STORSBERG and (ZUJUS) 06 NOSENKO'S
claims regarding the agents he handled during the 1960-1961
period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy
Chief of the American Section, responsible for code clerk
operations, or provide conclusive evidence that he did or
did not serve in the Embassy Section.
11BR
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Temporary Assignments Abroad
NOSENKO claims that he was scheduled to travel to the
United States in November 1960 (a trip which was cancelled)
and that he travelled to Cuba in November-December 1960
and to Bulgaria in April-May 1961, on KGB assignments.
The significance of his travel is the extent to which it
relates to his claimed position and functions in the Embassy
Section, and to operations in Moscow for which he claimed
supervisory responsibility.
Planned Travel to the United States
In one of the initial meetings in 1962 NOSENKO stated
that he had been in the United States. He later amended
this to explain that he had been scheduled to make a trip
to the United States, but that the trip had been cancelled.
He was to travel under true name, he said, to avoid being
connected to the name NIKOLAYEV, under which he travelled
to the United Kingdom in 1957 and 1958. In his early
account he claimed that the decision to use his true name
was his, personally; later he asserted that the decision
was made by "the people in charge of such operations".
NOSENKO stated that he was to travel under the cover of
an employee of the State Scientific-Technical Committee
(GNTK], and was to accompany an automotive delegation.
The visit, however, was part of the Soviet-U.S. exchange
program, and when the visit was postponed in 1961, NOSENKO'S
travel was cancelled,
:
Comment: The name of NOSENKO appeared along with 11
others on a 20 October 1960 request to the
Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a
Soviet automotive exchange delegation which
was scheduled to visit the United States in
November 1960. NOSENKO was listed as an
engineer employed by the State Scientific-
Technical Committee,
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January 1960-January 1962)
Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)
When NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in
1962, in Geneva), he claimed that he travelled under the
NIKOLAYEV alias, and he provided colorful details of his
activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy
there 
for operational possibilities. In subsequent versions
NOSENKO 
asserted that he travelled in true name, and that
his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation
as a security 
officer
.
NOSENKO's Information
In the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was
preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a
special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan,
the 
Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for
departure for 
Cuba. The delegation was a routine onę,
consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of
the 
Soviet Union. Since there was no one under any sort of
suspicion
, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Depart-
ment of the 
Second Chief Directorate decided it was unnec-
essary to include a security officer. Two days prior to
the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee
of the Communist Party ordered that a Second Chief Direct-
orate 
officer accompany the group. Because of the short
time 
remaining before the delegation's scheduled departure,
the Eleventh 
Department protested that it would be impossible
to find a 
suitable officer who could get his necessary
travel 
documents ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV
of the 
Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO, who had been
supposed to go to the United States and who had a valid
passport (in true name). The Cubans issued NOSENKO a visa
immediately as did The Netherlands a transit visa.
NOSENKO's functions with the delegation were purely of
a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in
October or November and spent about a month and a half
there
. During this time he accompanied the delegation
1
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everywhere it went, to different plants, and to meet repre-
sentatives of the so-called 
Institute of Agrarian Reform
to discuss how to 
increase production.
assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly
NOSENKO's cover'
before departing Moscow he 
was introduced to the othër
members as such. He 
had one agent within the delegation.
and developed several "
confidential contacts" during the
trip. NOSENKO would 
not have accepted the assignment had
he known how long and uneventful 
the trip was to be; he
I 
had really wanted to go 
only to the United States.
On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special
mission
. As he was leaving from 
Havana Airport, the KGB
Legal Rezident in Cuba, 
A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package
with instructions to deliver it to 
Moscow.
know 
the contents of the package until he arrived in
NOSENKO 
did not.
Amsterdam en route home. 
There the wrappings became loose
(it was bound only by thin 
string) and NOSENKO took the
opportunity to 
determine that it contained copies of "letters
between Mikoyan and Khrushchev 
concerning the prices of
sugar" and drafts of agreements 
between the Soviet Union and
East Germany, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.
arrival at the airport 
in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that
On
a message had been received 
from the Central Committee of
the Communist Party 
instructing that the package was to be
delivered "urgently" to Che 
Guevara, who was touring Eastern
Europe and was then in Berlin. 
While the delegation continued
on to Moscow, NOSENKO was driven to the Soviet Embassy in
The Hague, and in the late 
evening of his second day in The
Netherlands he left by train 
for East Berlin.
arrived in Berlin 
Guevara was found to have left Berlin for
When he
Hungary, and NOSENKO 
delivered the papers to "Guevara's
deputy in Berlin and continued 
on to Moscow.
Comment:
Travel records obtained by CIA, which include
photographs taken 
in both Amsterdam and Caracas.
of NOSENKO's 
true name service passport and
his passport 
photograph, confirm that NOSENKO,
a "minerals 
engineer", transitted Amsterdam én
route to Cuba on 
15 November 1960, was in
.
253
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· January 1960-January 1962;
Comment:
(Continued)
Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas
for Havana on 19 November. According to flight
manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in
Amsterdam from Havana en route to Moscow and
left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December.
NOSENKO was travelling on a service passport;
he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. It is
thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a
courier, bearing documents of the nature he
described as he claimed.
NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States
and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his
claim that he was supervising operations during
this period against Embassy code clerks in
Moscow. The trip occurred at the time his
alleged target, State Department code clerk
✓ MORONE), was to be entrapped on the train en
route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his
subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16
November) in connection with another code clerk
target, John GARLAND)].
06
Travel to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April-May 1961)
In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent.
to 
Sofia 
as a KGB response to a Bulgarian Ministry of
Interior (MVR) request that the KGB provide a Second Chief
Directorate 
American Department officer to discuss opera-
tions with 
Bulgarian counterparts. While in Sofia NOSENKO
asserted he 
played a key role in the compromise of American
professor Horace G. LUNT.
06
NOSENKO's Information
Consultation with the MVR
NOSENKO first heard of the Bulgarian assignment from
S.I, YEGOROV, Chief of the KGB unit handling liaison with
Bloc counterintelligence representatives in Moscow. YEGOROV
0001526
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as
light
in
nd
cember.
sport;
ites
S
ring
lerk
nt
an
Top Secret
-
(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)
I said that the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior had
requested the KGB Chairman to provide an officer from the
American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for
consultation with the MVR American Department in Sofia.
American Department Chief KLYPIN subsequently instructed
NOSENKO to go. NOSENKO was told that he was going for
'consultations" and that KGB advisors would discuss his
duties with him. KLYPIN told NOSENKO only that he should
see how the MVR worked, and tell them how the KGB managed.
ats operations. NOSENKO had no meetings or discussions with
MVR representatives in Moscow before his departure, and
knew nothing about the size or responsibilities of the MVR
American Department, the names of any MVR officers, or what
the MVR's particular problems were.
The is particular problems wer
NOSENKO flew from Moscow to Sofia in early April 1961
and was met at the airport by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second
Chief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.
The following morning he was picked up in an official
vehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian
MVR building. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of
him and was told that "they want to know about how to work
against the American Legation, everything, right from
letter 'A'". NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGB
advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of the
MVR's American Department; after which he was assigned an
office in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks he
discussed both general matters and particular cases with
individual Bulgarian officers working against the American
target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers
on th
principles of operations against foreign military
personnel in Moscow
and on another he visited an MVR
surveillance post opposite the American Legation. He
discussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists.
He also addressed the entire American Department for about
five hours to tell them "what is necessary, what to pay
attention to, how to work". At the end of his visit, some
time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First Deputy
Minister of the MVR about what had been accomplished and
his recommendations for improving operations against Americans.
ROV
7124.
255
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January 1960-January 1962;
Comment:
NOSENKO doesn't know why he was selected to
consult with the MVR in Bulgaria, As far
as is known to CIA, such consultation was a
function of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom
NOSENKO himself described. The American
Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened
in February 1960. By 1961 the MVR had demon-
strated that it had lost none of its earlier
demonstrated efficiency in controlling the
activities of resident foreigners and in
establishing the basis for mounting operations
against American diplomats. There was no
apparent necessity for NOSENKO's Sofia assign-
ment, and therefore his account is judged to
be untrue.
Compromise of LUNT
06
06
In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of
LUNT in graphic terms, including his own personal confron-
tation of LUNT✓ In his subsequent accounts he had stated
Obthat while he never saw [LUNT] personally, he supervised the
activities of the MVR officers who dealt with [LUNT
قال
About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the
end of April 1961, NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of
foreigners scheduled to visit Bulgaria, when he came across
the name of Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic
linguist of that name had been reported to him in Moscow by
When MVR
VOLKOV or YEFREMOV as a possible homosexual.
06
officers confirmed that this LUNT was a Slavic specialist,
NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB
records, for which purpose he telephoned Moscow. An almost
immediate reply confirmed that this was the same (LUNT) who 06
had visited Moscow previously, and that he was a homosexual.
(The KGB had never exploited its knowledge of LUNT]'s homo- 06
sexual activities and the MVR had not known that LUNT] was 06
a homosexual.)
10182
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
January 1960-January 1962)
KOZLOV and the Chief of the MVR American Department
were very interested in NOSENKO's lead, and KOZLOV appealed
to NOSENKO for his help, since "the MVR had never 
recruited
an American". The three discussed the matter 
with General,
DUMKOV, the Chief of the MVR Second Chief 
Directorate, and
NOSENKO suggested that a MVR homosexual agent should 
be.
employed, an apartment prepared, and preparations 
made 
for
clandestinë photography. They then advised 
YEGOROV, the
senior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called 
GRIBANOV
in Moscow. GRIBANOV prohibited NOSENKO's personal involve-
ment in the entrapment of LUNT and NOSENKO's 
role thereafter
was merely advising the MVR officers, "who 
didn't know what
to do"
NOSENKO suggested that the MVR officers get two
homosexual agents, since "maybe [LUNT] wouldn't like one of 06
them", and he advised them to weigh the time 
element in
deciding whether to entrap LUNT with a view 
to 
attempting 06
to recruit him at once, or merely to obtain evidence 
for
later blackmail. The MVR American Department Chief 
and 
his
Tourist Section chief were to attempt the recruitment
.
NOSENKO remained in a MVR office where he could be reached.
by telephone in the event the MVR officers needed 
further
assistance.
NOSENKO learned from the MVR officers involved that
the recruitment had been successful, and that LUNT had 06
NOSENKO
agreed to meet them again on the following day.
later was told that the MVR did not give 
LUNT 
arrangements 06
for a contact in the United States because he was expected
to return to Bulgaria for a Slavic Language conference in
1962 or 1963.
06
06
LUNT's Information
LUNT travelled directly from Sofia to Belgrade and there
on 9 May 1961 he reported to American Ambassador George
Kennan and to CIA that he had been recruited under duress
by the MVR in Sofia on 5 May. After being entrapped with
a homosexual and accepting recruitment, he was instructed
to meet clandestinely with a MVR officer in Paris en route
back to the United States. He was given no other tasks
.
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[LUNT] stated that while on an earlier trip to Sofia in
November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev
ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on
at least five separate occasions. He had given ALEKSIEV
American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to
sell on the blackmarket. Once, while in LUNT]'s company, 06
ALEKSIEV 
had been recognized and questioned by the Bulgarian
civil police: (LUNT] corresponded with ALEKSIEV after
departing from Bulgaria in 1960, and he had advised ALEKSIEV
of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia.
.06
Comment: [LUNT] s account refutes NOSENKO's claims that
the MVR had no evidence of [LUNT's vulnerability 06
prior to receiving NOSENKO's information in
May 1961, and that NOSENKO's personal partici-
pation in the MVR operation was such that he
knew that [LUNT was given no MVR contact in the
United States, ()b
06.
NOSENKO's involvement in the [LUNT case is
unrelated to the assignment he claims at the
time. Although NOSENKO cites the LUNT] case in 06
connection with his Embassy Section duties,
it resembles most of all a Seventh Department
operation.
NOSENKO's presence in Sofia in May 1961
(when he claims his operation against [STORSBERG 06
was approaching a climax and when his subor-
dinates were apparently planning to exploit
KEYSERS' newly-discovered vulnerability)
indicates that NOSENKO's presence in Moscow
was dispensable. The LUNT case is thus not 06
evidence supporting NOSENKO's claims regarding
Embassy Section service in April-May 1961, nor
regarding supervisory responsibility for all
American code clerk operations.
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Promotion and Transfer to the
Seventh Department (January 1962)
NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh Department
resulted from GRIBANOV's wish to promote him from Deputy
Chief of the Embassy Section to Deputy Chief of the whole
American Department, However, according to NOSENKO, the
new American Department Chief, FEDOSEYEV, wanted as his
deputy KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior. Under the circumstances,
NOSENKO said he preferred to be transferred back to the
Seventh Department, in any capacity. NOSENKO reported that
he spoke to Seventh Department Chief V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the
latter proposed that NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV to be returned to
the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section,
with the understanding that he would be appointed Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as the incumbent
deputy [B.A.] BALDIN retired in July 1962. NOSENKO asserted
his proposal was made and approved by GRIBANOV in September
or October 1961. GRIBANOV, according to NOSENKO, never
indicated his reasons for planning to appoint him Deputy
Chief of the American Department or for later promoting him
to Section Chief and then Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-
ment in 1962.
In view of his impending transfer, starting in December
1961 NOSENKO said he spent several hours each day in the
Seventh Department, There he stated he talked with Depart-
ment Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain
files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current
operations and operational possibilities with the officers
assigned to this section. NOSENKO said the formal order
for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December
1961, and within the next few days NOSENKO officially signed.
over the ABIDIAN case file and the Embassy security file to
his successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section,
GRYAZNOV. As he had when he transferred into the American
Department in 1960, NOSENKO said he took his active agents
with him when he returned to the Seventh Department.
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)
Comment:
NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring "before.
GOLITSYN's defection", which he insists.
occurred in mid-January 1962 even after learning
from CIA that the correct date is 15 
December
1961. Obliged to take the latter date into
account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing
chronology of his departure from the Embassy
Section and his assumption of duties in 
the
Embassy Section and his assumption of duties
in the Seventh Department. Repeated interro-
gation has never resolved the reason 
NOSENKO
attached so much significance to the date on
which he believes GOLITSYN defected.
In claiming to have transferred from the
Embassy Section just prior to 5 January 1962
(when his participation in the Seventh Depart-
ment compromise of W.E. JOHNSON] is 
confirmed)
.06
NOSENKO's account makes it impossible 
for him
to have played the role he claimed in the events
connected with ABIDIAN's visit to 
the Pushkin
Street deaddrop. (See p. 216.)
NOSENKO's assertion that he was GRIBANOV's
candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief of the
American Department is implausible. In contrast
to NOSENKO's self-admitted undistinguished
performance, KOVSHUK was a former Deputy Chief
of the American Department who had been personally
involved in such American Department operations
of the previous decade as recruitments of 
Roy
RHODES and Dayle SMITH, and the development of
CIA officers WINTERS and [MORELL] and the interro-03
gation of CIA officer LANGELLE, and the more
recent attempt to recruit (STORSBERG. 06
260
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(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
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January 1960-January 1962)
DEPUTY CHIEF of the AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION
Summary and Conclusion
1960-1962:
According to NOSENKO, between January 1960 and January
1962 he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section,
in which capacity he was occasional Acting Chief, super-
visor of all operations against code clerks and for some
months service attaches, case officer for priority KGB
target ABIDIAN, custodian of the Embassy security file, and
reviewer of all information obtained from microphones
emplaced in the Embassy. From a comparison of NOSENKO's
assertions, amendments, and retractions with collateral
information, he was none of these. Further, while he may
have been familiar with the activities of some agents of
the Embassy Section, his relationship with them was not in
the manner nor circumstances he claimed.
From his position as Deputy Chief NOSENKO claims complete
knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts among
Embassy personnel during the period 1960-1961 and thereafter
of CIA personnel identified by the KGB on the Embassy staff,
and of the status of the KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy
communications. His apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's rela-
tionship with MORELL 03 and KOSOLAPOV's connection with GARLAND] Of
refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB
recruitment attempts; that he was seemingly unaware of such
events while Deputy Chief demolishes his claim that he would
necessarily have learned of them later, and while assigned
elsewhere
. Contrary to his claim, NOSENKO does not know of
CIA personnel on the Embassy staff who were identified by
the KGB
. NOSENKO's information on the KGB cryptologic
attack reflects no 
special knowledge; it is superficial and
in error.
Conclusion
NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy
Section nor a supervisor in that section.
261
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Top Secret
CHAPTER VIII
SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962 to January 1964,
Comment:
The
By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the
complete 
substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist
agent program in the USSR. The information cb-
tained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, in-
cluded accurate details of the objectives and
targets of those operations, as well as the
practices employed for the selection, recruit-
ment
, training and briefing of the agents in-
volved. 
As a probable consequence of reports
received 
from BLAKE as well as by the indepen-
dent 
confirmation of tourist agents identified
in the 
USSR, the KGB by 1961 was mobilizing all
of its 
resources to counter the threat.
KGB's tasks were made no easier by the increase
in bona fide 
tourists to the Soviet Union, the
numbers of which were increasing by thousands
annually. Evidently uncertain of the success
of domestic 
measures it was taking, the KGB
extended responsibility for countermeasures to
KGB elements 
outside of the Second Chief Direc-
torate
. To that end, selected First Chief
Directorate residencies abroad were instructed
to exploit all of its facilities in developing
tourist 
agent countermeasures. In describing
the magnitude 
of its tourist agent problem,
KGB 
Headquarters cited the scores of American
tourist agents who had been identified in just
one year 
in the Soviet Union.
In fact, by the time NOSENKO returned to
the Seventh Department in January 1962, the
threat 
against which the KGB was deploying had
passed. 
By early 1961 the tourist agent pro-
gram was suspended when technical collection
programs and other agent operations made the
use of 
tourists unnecessary.
The statements of NOSENKO with respect to
Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department
counterintelligence operations among American
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Comment:
(Continued)
tourists during this period must be examined
in light of the foregoing facts. Since NOSENKO
claims to have held key KGB positions from
which vantage he asserts he was particularly
well informed about KGB operations against
American tourists, it is appropriate to hold
him closely accountable for his statements.
NOSENKO's claimed assignment to the Seventh Department,
first 
as Chief 
of the American-British Commonwealth Section
and then as a Deputy and then First Deputy Chief of the
entire Department, extended from January 1962 until his de-
fection 
in Geneva in January 1964. By the time NOSENKO re-
turned to the 
Seventh Department for this assignment, the
KGB 
reorganization of 1959 had been completed, and according
to NOSENKO, the Department was divested of all of its former
functions 
unrelated to tourists. A newly-created Service
(
sluzhba), NOSENKO explained, assumed responsibility for
foreign religious figures, emigres visiting the Soviet Union,
and 
persons: travelling to the USSR to visit relatives. The
Seventh Department's former responsibilities for operations
against foreign 
seamen, commercial delegations, and so forth
were similarly transferred elsewhere.
In addition to performing supervisory and administrative
duties, NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally
was involved 
with KGB operations launched against six Ameri-
can tourists 
and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey
OSWALD and of a 
disaffected KGB colleague from the American
Embassy Section, A.N. CHEREPANOV. In this period, also, he
travelled on 
two occasions to Geneva on missions unrelated to
his Seventh Department duties.
Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied
during his period of service in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO
claimed full 
awareness of all significant KGB operations
against American tourists,
:
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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January 1962-January 1964)
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
(January July 1962).
As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section
NOSENKO said he was responsible for planning and coordinating
all KGB activities against American (and British and Canadian
tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operation-
He had no
al work of fifteen subordinate case officers.
deputy, and he did not indicate who assumed his duties in his
absence He required several months at the beginning of 1962
to "get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments"
In mid-
his part in the initial period on this new job.
February 1962, within a few weeks of his transfer, he began
preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarma-
ment Delegation. This involved discussions with the Eleventh
(Soviet Delegation) Department of the Second Chief Directorate,
as well as with case officers responsible for the investiga-
tion of one particular Soviet delegate to Geneva, SHAKHOV.
NOSENKO claimed that his preparations for his trip were only
part-time and in addition to his other regular duties.
spent his early weeks talking to case officers, reviewing.
reports of the section's activities during the previous two
years, and discussing plans for the coming tourist season.
He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist.
firms in Moscow with an eye to their recruitment by the KGB,
a proposal which was accepted. [NOSENKO elsewhere attributed
the proposal to his earlier assignment in the Tourist Depart-
ment in 1958-1960, which he alleged resulted in the recruit-
ment of FRIPPEL. 106
::
NOSENKO's Agents.
He
NOSENKO claimed that when he transferred to the Seventh
Department he brought with him the agents which he had been
handling in the American Department Embassy Section:
ов
Arsene FRIPPEL 06
FRIPPEL
29.06.
American Express manager FRIPPEL departed from Moscow
in early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he continued to be the
Second Chief Directorate case officer since FRIPPEL had no
contact with the KGB in New York City, and that he met
06 FRIPPEL twice in the USSR in 1963. According to NOSENKO,
06.
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January 1962-January 1964)
FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practi-
cally nothing." NOSENKO said that although 
he had recruited
him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL 
was not an agent."
nevertheless 
hoped that (FRIPPEL] would be reassigned to Mos- 06
The KGB06
cow at some future date.
FRIPPEL case.)
06
06
(See p.137 for details of the
Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice,
in the USSR in 1963. 
However, ERIPPEL asserts
he also met NOSENKO 
in Odessa in February 1962,
06
which NOSENKO 
flatly denies. [FRIPPED is known 06
to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union
at that time, 
and there is no apparent reason
why he would make a 
false claim on this matter.
06
Johannes PREISFREUND
06
The KGB considered (PREISFREUND] compromised to American
Intelligence 
after GOLITSYN's 
defection (in December 1961] and
thus unsuitable for further use 
against Americans at the Em-
'
bassy in Moscow. For this reason
, NOSENKO was told to take
06 
[PREISFREUND] with him when he 
transferred to the Seventh De-
As the agent spoke only 
Finnish and Russian, however,
he was of no 
use against English
-speaking tourists.
met with PREISFREUND on the 
latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,
but did not use him in any 
operations.
partment.
-
.06
NOSENKO
Comment: PREISFREUND] asserts that he was no longer a KGB
agent after the 
STORSBERG operation (see p.175,06
and that although he 
saw NOSENKO on his frequent
return visits to 
Moscow, it was only because
NOSENKO sought 
a companion for wenching and
drinking.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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-
January 1962-January 1964)
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV
According to NOSENKO, he used the two homosexual
agents in the entrapment of [W.E. JOHNSON]) several days after 06
returning to the Seventh Department. This was their first
operational activity since 1959, because they were employed
in no operations during the entire period he was their case
officer while assigned to the Embassy Section, After the
[JOHNSON entrapment, these agents were not used again. NO-
SENKO claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired, and he
personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives. (For
details of VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's activities see p.110
. Comment:
06
There is evidence that VOLKOV was involved in
a KGB entrapment operation directed against
American tourist William J. ZUBON] in July 06
1962 (while NOSENKO claims he was still his
case officer), an event of which NOSENKO ap-
parently is uninformed.
Samih WEISS
After his transfer to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO
claimed he was instructed also to continue directing Syrian 11.06
military officer WEISS, who was targetted against military
Obcode clerk [ZUJUS] (see p. 161 ), NOSENKO continued to meet
06 WEISS during the first months of 1962, and in February or
March he attempted to have (WEISS arrange a social affair
06 with [ZUJUS] so that another KGB agent could be introduced to
the code clerk. Just before leaving for Geneva for the first
time, NOSENKO turned WEISS over to GRYAZNOV, NOSENKO's suc-
cessor as Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy.
Section.WEISS was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow
in May 1962, after which NOSENKO believed he returned to
Syria. [
7,6.
11
Comment:
Because of the political climate in Syria, there
has been no opportunity to query WEISS regarding
NOSENKO's allegations.
06
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January 1962-January 1964)
Marina RYTOVA
Until 1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the
Institute for International Relations, RYTOVA obtained a job
at a CPSU Central Committee school and thereafter ceased all
agent work. Nevertheless, NOSENKO asserted that he was offi-
cially registered as her case officer until his defection 
in
1964.
NOSENKO's Agents: Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO's claims with respect to these agents do not sus-
tain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this
period, since none were utilized in Seventh Department opera-
tions.
Operational Activities (January
-
June 1962)
As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of
the Seventh Department during the period January-July 1962
NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of [W.E. JOHNSON 06
in January, briefed himself on the Section's activities, and
prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer
with a delegation travelling to Geneva. During March and
June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and, by his asser-
tion, supervised the case officer handling of KGB double
agent Boris BELITSKIY. Shortly after his return to Moscow
in June he claimed he recruited Horst BRAUNS. 06
Entrapment of W.E. JOHNSON 06
NOSENKO's Information
об
NOSENKO first referred to JOHNSON in Geneva in 1962, when
he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been
used in the homosexual entrapment of a tourist, JOHNSON), a 06
08 Young Baptist from California, The KGB was angered that the
American was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union.
Although the American agreed to NOSENKO's demand that he work
with the KGB in the United States, the American immediately
reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy.
268
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Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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In February 1964 NOSENKO produced among other notes which
he had brought with him to a meeting with CIA (see p.319.)
one bearing the name of Everett Wallace[sic] JOHNSON and the Ob
date "5 January 1962". Questioned about the note, NOSENKO :
recalled the significance of neither the name nor the date,
and stated that the case was not a recruitment but "some
sort of developmental operation"
NOSENKO next mentioned JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Al-
though not immediately recalling (JOHNSON's name, he eventually 06
remembered that it was something Tike (JOHNSON or JOHNSTON, and 06 06
that he was a Baptist from the California coast of NOSENKO
placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his
return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered he
wore no overcoat at the time. 16 JOHNSON, who had come to the
Soviet Union as a tourist, was discovered to be a homosexual,
and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered
him as a recruitment target. 06 The Second Chief Directorate
was not interested in JOHNSON as an agent because he had no
access to important information and he lived too far from the
KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient con-
tact.
06
::
Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON
mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they
were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry,
critical, that the KGB decided something had to be done" to
prevent his writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements
on his return to the United States. Of "At about the same time"
there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was
decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to
halt JOHNSON)'s criticism of the USSR. No recruitment was to
be attempted because neither the First nor the Second Chief
Directorate had any use for him as an agent and because the
KGB had concluded that he was unlikely to accept recruitment.
NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach
to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (NOSENKO
said he had reported on duty in the Seventh Department only
the day before. F.D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second
Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Seventh
Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV
were selected to compromise: (JOHNSON__._
06
269
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
06
January 1962-January 1964)
[JOHNSON] became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the
Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON that they had recently ar-
rived in Moscow and invited (CROHNSCCCCCCACCC visit their hotel room.
06 JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away.
They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals)." Under the
guise of the hotel administrator and a militiaman, KGB offi-
cers burst in on the trio. Photographs of the incident had
been taken (but had yet not been developed). A report.
describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and [JOHNSON] 06
was then transferred to another room. By this time NOSENKO
had arrived at the hotel from his office and he went into the
room where JOHNSON) was being held.
06
Ob The "militiaman" described what had happened to NOSENKO,
in JOHNSON's presence. Addressing JOHNSON NOSENKO said:
It
"How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going
to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and...people
are given from five to eight years for such relations.
used to be three to five, now it's from five to eight.
Frightened JOHNSON wrote out and signed a promise not to
criticize the Soviet Union in the future.
"
The following day, after the incriminating photographs had
been developed, NOSENKO approached [JOHNSON] in the cafe of the 06
Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his
promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO 06
presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photo-
graphs and said that they would be released to the foreign
Dopress if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later
Oblearned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a
later version) the American Embassy and the KGB thus assumed
that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall
what name, if any, he had used during this operation.
In 1965 NOSENKO dated the entrapment operation as having
occurred in summer in either 1962 or 1963. Reminded that his
notes paired [JOHNSON]) so name with the date of 5 January 1962,
NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the
name, that he recalled the operation as having taken place in
summertime.(0)6 [NOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 as
the date of JOHNSON's entrapment, since it occurred "immediat ly
after his transfer back to the Seventh Department.]
0001541
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06
JOHNSON's Information
He was in-
According to a statement given to the FBI, prior to his
06 visit 
to the USSR 
JOHNSON had written a church authority in
Moscow requesting 
permission to preach there.
formed that 
some official permission was needed. JOHNSON 06.
subsequently 
travelled to Moscow as a tourist, and he did
preach on one occasion but he suspended further such activi-
ty on the advice of 
Russian Baptist colleagues 29 During his
ten-day stay in 
Moscow: CROHNSON] wrote and posted letters to
some twenty 
persons outside the USSR.
06
06
JOHNSON] reported to the Embassy in Moscow on 5 January
1962 
that he had 
experienced an incident with Soviet plain-
clothesmen at the 
Hotel Metropol earlier that day:::DJOHNSON, 06
who had arrived in Moscow on 
31 December 1961, explained
that he was 
dining alone at the Metropol restaurant on the
evening of 4 
January when he was joined by a Soviet citizen
who identified 
himself as "a doctor from Riga". The "doctor"
Soon
spoke English poorly, and [JOHNSON]] agreed to visit the doctor's06
room at the hotel on the 
following day, when the doctor would
have with him a student 
friend who spoke English well.
06after 
TJOHNSON 
arrived in the doctor's room on 5 January, the
"student" made homosexual 
advances.06 JOHNSON protested and
started to leave when 
two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared
in the room and announced 
that all were under arrest. After
signing a 
statement in Russian, JOHNSON was taken to another 06
room where he was confronted 
with a man who identified him-
self 
as Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV. "the Chief of Police".
Ob 
After 
threatening (JOHNSON with imprisonment, "NIKOLOV" of-
fered to dismiss the matter, 
provided JOHNSON would sign a 06
commitment not to 
criticize the Soviet Union when he returned
to the United 
States.
06:
On 8 January (JOHNSON telephoned the Embassy to report that
he 
had been recontacted by the "
Police Chief" who reminded him
of his pledge and 
showed him incriminating photographs alleged-
ly taken of JOHNSON and the 
"student" in the hotel room pre-
viously.
06.
.06.
Shown photographs of VOLKOV and NOSENKO, JOHNSON thought
VOLKOV 
to be "familiar
", but he could not identify NOSENKO as
the "Police Chief".
0001542
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
January 1962-January 1964)
Comment: From their modus operandi the "doctor from
Riga" is undoubtedly VOLKOV and the "student"
NOSENKO frequently used the opera-
YEFREMOV.
tional pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV
and was called Georgiy. 06
Although JOHNSON apparently confirmed
NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case
is incompatible with what must have been the
actual time frame. According to NOSENKO's
version, within five days of JOHNSON's arrival 06
in Moscow the KGB had discovered that he was
a homosexual, concluded from "two or three"
censored letters that he was a threat, and ar-
ranged his entrapment. The rapid pace of
events suggests that [JOHNSON]'s homosexuality 06
was already 
known to the KGB (if not to NOSENKOį
06 before JOHNSON's arrival in Moscow. NOSENKO's
Ob ignorance 
of CROHNSON's preaching (probably the
actual cause of 
KGB concern) is further evi-
dence that NOSENKO did not know the complete
background of the KGB operation, and that his
role was merely that of playing the "Police
Chief
".
NOSENKO's participation in this case con-
tradicts his assertions about the timing of
his transfer from the American Department.
(See p. 260.)
06
William Carroll JONES
06
NOSENKO's Information
[JONES), a wealthy Baptist layman, visited the USSR on six 29.
or 
seven occasions
, each time meeting with Russian Baptists.
He is 
personally acquainted with President Johnson and knew
President 
Kennedy. He was the target of Seventh Department
case officer Vitaliy 
DERA. While visiting the Soviet Union
06 
in 1962 JONES) 
became involved with a Soviet female.
she was 
not a KGB agent, the KGB took control of her relation-
Although
Ob 
ship with JONES 
and, on [JONES subsequent trips to the Soviet
Union, unsuccessfully 
sought to obtain incriminating photo-
graphs.
272
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Comment:
Interviewed by the FBI in June 1964, JONES
(the sponsor of the annual Presidential08
"prayer breakfast" in Washington) confirmed
the substance of NOSENKO's information but
denied sexual intimacies with any Soviet fe-
male. JONES claimed to have made 24 trips
to 
the Soviet Union and to have successfully
8 smuggled Bibles into the USSR on numerous
occasions. According to JONES, Obin 1963
Pravda publicized an incident in which a num-
ber of Bibles were confiscated from his lug-
gage.
08
A 1961 KGB document furnished CIA by
GOLITSYN cited JONES by name in connection 06
with a description of his Bible smuggling 08
activities.
Об
NOSENKO reported the JONES case in 1962
in Geneva and stated that the Seventh. De-..
partment case officer, DERA, was NOSENKO's
subordinate in the Section. However, NO-
SENKO's ignorance of JONES' Bible] smuggling 06,08
(the 
activity which most likely prompted KGB
action) and of the fact that JONES activities
had been publicized in the Soviet press, in-
dicate that NOSENKO had no intimate connection
with the case.
06
Recruitment of Natalie BIENSTOCK
NOSENKO's Information
06
The KGB recruited [BIENSTOCK] during her 1962 visit to the
USSR
. The Seventh 
Department case officers were K.G.
KRUPNOV 
and A.G. KOVALENKO, who were acting in behalf of
the Leningrad 
KGB. The latter had become interested in the
American tourist while she was staying with a Soviet boy
friend in 
Leningrad. (NOSENKO himself would have attempted
the 
recruitment, but he was busy preparing to leave for
Geneva in 
April 1962.) During the recruitment, the KGB
officers 
did not disclose their knowledge that she was an
American 
Intelligence agent and that she had been involved
273
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January 1962-January 1964)
in the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written
message to a 
Soviet ballerina in the United States.
ballerina received the message, but passed it to the KGB,
The
which concluded 
that [BIENSTOCK) was an agent either of CIA 06
or of the FBI. After recruitment
, BIENSTOCK) was turned 06
over to First Chief 
Directorate officers of Department D
(Disinformation)
. If she returned to the USSR the KGB
planned to secure her confession of her relationship with
American 
Intelligence.
06
Comment: [BIENSTOCK was employed as an interpreter with
a Bolshoi 
troupe touring the United States
when she was asked by CIA to pass a letter to
the 
ballerina, a letter destined for the bal-
lerina's 
brother in the USSR. BIENSTOCK re-06
fused
, and the letter was delivered by other
means. Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of
NOSENKO's 
information, BIENSTOCK] acknowledgedx
in July 
1964 that she had been recruited. by
the 
KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in
1962, and that she had been intimidated by the
KGB 
accusation of her involvement with the
ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB
withheld_its knowledge of that involvement.)
BIENSTOCK 
also admitted having contact in the
United 
States through secret writing with KGB
officers, 
until the letters ceased at KGB in-
itiative in late 1962 or early 1963.
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Trave
to Geneva (March-June 1962)
NOSENKO visited Geneva between 10 March and 15 June 1962
as a security officer accompanying the Soviet delegation to
the Disarmament Conference. In addition to performing that
function, NOSENKO claimed he supervised the activities of
another KGB case officer's meetings with a KGB-controlled
CIA agent, visited the KGB rezidentura in Geneva and asso-
ciated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period.
Six days before his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO con-
tacted CIA.
Purpose of Trip to Geneva
NOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 10 March 1962 listed offi-
cially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs attached to the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament
Conference. NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN's defec-
tion in Finland (in December 1961] an order was issued that
no delegation was to be permitted to depart the Soviet Union
without an accompanying KGB security officer. [NOSENKO has
since stated that he can recall no such order.]
a that he can r
:
Explaining in 1962 how he came to be designated, as the
security escort, NOSENKO said he argued that he was needed
to direct the fifteen case officers in his section, but
GRIBANOV stated that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading
the delegation and that someone of an appropriate senior rank
should accompany the delegation, not just a senior case offi-
cer, but a section chief or a deputy chief or a chief of a
department. NOSENKO was the most junior section chief. His
immediate superior in the Seventh Department approved the
trip on the basis that it would last only a month.
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In addition to his general security duties with the
delegation, NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a
special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor,
Pavel Fedorovich 
SHAKHOV (see below).
During the 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO provided somewhat
varying accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Geneva.
He said that GRIBANOV 
had nothing to do with his assignment,
but that [
S.G.] BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second
Directorate 
who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad
Department, 
made the selection. The latter department was
investigating 
SHAKHOV, and BANNIKOV was concerned with the
selection 
of a security officer because SHAKHOV, who was
suspected 
of being a Western agent, was to be in the delega-
tion. Because 
of the seriousness attached to the case, the
Delegations Department wanted a chief of section as case
officer
, and when a request was made to the Seventh Depart-
ment Chief, 
CHELNOKOV, the latter agreed to NOSENKO's as-
signment
. NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV, his superior and
friend, let him go 
to Geneva as "a treat", even though he
had just 
assumed his duties as Chief of the American-
British 
Commonwealth Section, he had no deputy, and the trip
was occurring on the 
eve of the tourist season.
Investigation of SHAKHOV
According to NOSENKO, M.G. SITNIKOV, representing the
Soviet Delegations Department, conducted investigations of
SHAKHOV in Geneva in 
1961, but had been unable to resolve the
KGB 
suspicions about him. Because of the failure of these
early efforts, the KGB decided to send a "senior guy" to the
Disarmament talks 
in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish
things 
up". Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO
discussed the SHAKHOV 
case with SITNIKOV and with LYALIN, the
Soviet 
Delegations Department case officer in charge of the
SHAKHOV case
.
He also 
read various materials on the case,
including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN.
NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962
because 
he was 
working with different delegations at different
conferences, and 
there was some evidence that in Geneva ear-
lier he was 
somehow connected with American diplomat David MARK],
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who was (erroneously) considered to be a CIA officer.
SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK] in 1960 or 1961,06
but 
NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-
intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M.
GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he
had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United
States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent] by
KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV
liked life in the Unites States; American products, and
money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good"
and 
'not wanting to work as an agent".
and not wanting
NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that
service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV
was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being
an 
American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his
trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and
furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of
the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin. According
"
to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.!
Comment:
SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United
States since 1942, when he was assigned to the
Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-
tended the 1945 Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
tended a number of sessions of the UN General
Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet
Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV iden-
tified him as an MVD (KGB] officer whom he is
certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN
have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV'S
face "was familiar". An FBI source, however,
in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat":
and 
that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged
in no Soviet intelligence activity until that
time.
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NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions
of SHAKHOV in Geneva.
watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American
He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then
contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform counter surveillance
tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,….
while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had
forewarned the Americans about the meeting.
revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and
checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared
Finally NOSENKO
materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way.
conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion,
and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-
NOSENKO's
turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.
Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation
NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-
man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as
such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the
entire delegation.
TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left
[KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.
Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.]
To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO
had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB
who were serving in the delegation.
ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates
[NOSENKO has never re-
in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants
provided him.]
NOSENKO has never been précise about how he spent his days
and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he
pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most.
of the delegation.
known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
No one paid him any attention.
officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings
It was
at any time.
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Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal Residency
Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to
the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for
more than a day or two, Legal Rezident S.I. GAVRICHEV would
invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.
GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference,
and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962,
NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled
members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at
GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesita-
tion on the part of the Legal Rezident that all of his subor-
dinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. In return
for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance
on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed
by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver
to go shopping and carry out other private errands. [NOSENKO
was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva
and his claims as to his activities there, aside from his
meetings with CIA, can be neither confirmed nor refuted.]
KGB Officers within the Soviet Delegation
NOSENKO claimed that he would know of any others, and he
was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Dele-
gation in 1962. Among delegates he identified only Oleg
GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB. GRINEVSKIY
was one of NOSENKO's own agents within the delegation: in
Moscow he was handled by KGB officers of the Intelligentsia
and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate.
Among other delegates NOSENKO described A.K. KISLOV and V.G.
FILATOV. According to NOSENKO, KISLOV was head of the Ameri-
can Section of TASS and was "a genuine correspondent"; "de-
finitely not an intelligence officer".
Comment:
CIA had tentatively identified all three of
the delegates as KGB officers. ‘KISLOV was ob-
served in apparent KGB operational activity in
both Washington and Moscow. FILATOV served as
an alternate contact with the KGB agent in NATO,
Georges PAQUES. British Intelligence] has re- ||
ported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the per-
manent Soviet delegation in Geneva who handled
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Comment:
(Continued);
a British double agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva
at the time.
Association with Other Soviets
According to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in
Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and
M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the
"ANDREY" case:
see p. 33.)
A.K. KISLOV
TASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other dele-
gates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva.
NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to be given as a
notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy
to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank
and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was
NOSENKO's companion in early June, when NOSENKO either
squandered or was robbed of KGB operational funds. [the loss
he asked CIA to make good), and on the night of 10 June, when
he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and
women. With reference to the threat posed his security by
KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV
was "too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event
constituted no threat.
In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV
had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the
United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV
by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in
1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference. On the
basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said,
KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return.
In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the
Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV.
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Yu.I. GUK
Implying that their friendship was of long standing,
NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly
every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a
few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to
the residency and was able to elicit information about some
of GUK's operations in Geneva, He described his "big. big
friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
only "strong officer" in the residency.
Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
GUK..
M.S. TSYMBAL
In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and
identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the
KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with
him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.
In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with
TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some
candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back-
ground would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegalsi
Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-
quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer
to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be
assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had
dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied
by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,
NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency
in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was
granted access in 1964.
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Association with British Female Secretary
of
NOSENKO has described his association with a British
secretary 
whom he 
met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva as
one of an amorous pursuit
: he disclaimed any operational
interest in the girl. After 
several dates, NOSENKO could no
longer reach her at her apartment
, and he concluded that she
had told her superiors 
that he was a Russian and had pro-
bably believed him to be an 
intelligence officer.
Comment:
है।
According to an official British report, when
NOSENKO 
became too persistent in his attentions
and the secretary 
reported the contact to her
superiors 
she was withdrawn immediately from
Switzerland 
and she later resigned from the
Foreign 
Office.29
This same incident came to the attention of
the Swiss service)], which later reported it to
CIA, without 
details, as an attempt by NOSENKO
to recruit the 
girl. According to this report,
"after a time it became 
evident that NOSENKO's
interest in her was not only sexual, but also
in information 
to which she had access in the
course of her 
duties". A Swiss official) in \(
Geneva told 
CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried
to recruit the 
secretary and that he attempted
to obtain "disarmament 
secrets" from her.
1402
Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA Agent
BELITSKIY
NOSENKO's Information
Among his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised
a 
younger and less experienced 
KGB case officer's handling of
KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He 
first heard of the BELITSKIY
case under the code name "BELKIN
", when he was working in the
American Embassy Section 
of the American Department.
He
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learned of the case through his friendship with the chief
of the 
Second ("Active Line") Section of the American Depart-
ment, V.I. PETROV. BELITSKIY wasia KGB agent whom American
Intelligence 
had recruited in London: he had never been met.
by the Americans in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO did not know
the 
date of recruitment but knew the case was already in pro-
gress 
during his second assignment with the Embassy Section
(January 1960-January 1962). BELITSKIY had been a KGB agent
for a "long, long" time and was a KGB agent when he first
went abroad (prior to his recruitment by American Intelli-
gence
).
:
The KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was
to 
lure 
American Intelligence into meeting the agent inside
the Soviet 
Union, to learn the channels and means through
which American Intelligence communicated with agents inside
the 
Soviet Union. This was the "most important task" of the
Second Chief 
Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, in meeting
with his American case officers, continually pleaded fear of
contacts with 
American Intelligence in Moscow, this was a
ruse; the 
real KGB intent was to use BELITSKIY to lure Ameri-
can Intelligence into contacting him in the Soviet Union.
After 
BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on
with him...didn't hold any meetings with him". Nevertheless,
he said, the 
KGB "cherished the hope...to lead him in some-
what deeper". The KGB First Chief Directorate, with its own
responsibilities and objectives, was unaware of Second Chief
Directorate 
objectives in the BELITSKIY case. The First
Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformat-
siya [
disinformation] at the Second Chief Directorate's re-
quest, but in this case, as in other "games", it did not know
for what 
ultimate purpose the disinformation would be used.
(In such cases I.I. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not
even know in what country the disinformation was to be used,
let alone 
the identity of the agent.)
Comment:
According to GOLITSYN, Department D runs its
operations alone or in conjunction with (never
subordinate to) other KGB departments.
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NOSENKO did not actively participate in the case until he
received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to give
advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L. ARTE-
MOV. ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow
either; he also had been sent to Geneva to work on counter-
intelligence matters and only to direct BELITSKIY if the Ameri-
cans should contact the agent. BELITSKIY had been "inserted"
in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA
would "find him".
As a result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO joined with
ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY's meetings with the latter's
American case officers. BELITSKIY was first met in Geneva by
the American case officer "Bob", and later by "Henry", who
was "called out from the States". BELITSKIY noted that the
name on the door of the apartment where he met his American
case officers was not the same as that of the person whose
apartment it was alleged to be, and that the apartment itself
had an "un-lived-in" look.
When the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he
could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament
Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from
the Soviet Foreign Ministry. NOSENKO proposed instead that
BELITSKIY claim to get information from the head of the
American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV. The information,
of course, would be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB.
In case the Americans would check, NOSENKO and ARTEMOV ar-
ranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.
The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona
fides. From the KGB viewpoint, however, while BELITSKIY was
not a bad agent, he was apt to go too far sometimes, and "add
things on his own". For this reason, the KGB limited BELIT-
SKIY's time spent with CIA, to lessen the chance that the
agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that
he was a plant.
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Comment:
NOSENKO's information about the BELITSKIY-CIA
relationship is substantially correct, except
for some inaccuracies about the origin of the
case. BELITSKIY, a commentator for Radio. Mos-
cow, as NOSENKO described, in Geneva did meet
CIA officers using the aliases "Bob" and "Henry"
in a safe apartment.
NOSENKO's version of his role in the case,
however, is implausible. He asserts that BELIT-
SKIY, a prominent Russian with acquaintances
among influential officials of the Soviet Govern-
ment, an agent ostensibly under the control of
CIA for several years, was sent by the KGB to
Geneva to resume contact with CIA. The KGB, ac-
cording to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible
case officer nor an officer of the KGB section
responsible for the operation. NOSENKO states
that the KGB instead detailed a "young and in-
experienced" KGB officer who happened to be in
Geneva at the time, an officer who had no prior
connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even
knowledge of operating conditions in Geneva.
NOSENKO further states that the KGB then instruc-
ted NOSENKO, who had learned of the case unoffi-
cally, who had no experience or training in
double agent operations, and who was similarly
in Geneva for other reasons, to guide the other
"inexperienced" KGB officer. NOSENKO can cite
no guidance provided by KGB Headquarters; al-
though he claims he exchanged messages with
Moscow about the case.
ARTEMOV was not inexperienced. He had had
continuous service with the Second Chief Direc-
torate at least since 1958, and had been involved.
with a series of CIA American tourist agents in
the Soviet Union. Although allegedly familiar
with ARTEMOV, NOSENKO is unaware of the latter's
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Comment:
(Continued)
involvement with American tourist agents in
1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO
claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department's American Section.
Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know
how, when, or where the BELITSKIY operation
started, did not know the nature of British | ||
involvement, did not know the operational de-
tails and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had
with CIA, did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of
activity in Moscow or in Geneva, and did not
know the alleged objective of the KGB opera-
tion, e.g., the substance of the "disinformation"
which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA.
From the foregoing it is concluded that
NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory func-
tion in the BELITSKIY case.
2
Contact with CIA
сь
On 5 June 1962 U.S. Foreign Service Officer [David MARK]
reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached by a
Soviet 
citizen whom he believed to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO,
a member of 
the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO had
merely suggested that they get together for a talk on the
following day. In late afternoon on 6 June, NOSENKO told
06 [MARK
] 
privately that he would like to talk to [MARK] as soon as
possible. He was "not going to pump him for information", but
'simply wanted to tell him some things". A luncheon meeting
was 
arranged 
for 9 June, although NOSENO indicated that he
preferred an earlier date.% MARK] advised CIA of the appoint-
ment and commented that the approach seemed so unusual that
it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.
06
خان
At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO identified him-
self as a counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure
the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that [MARK] had Ub
previously 
served in Moscow and [erroneously] believed him to
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be an American intelligence officer. NOSENKO said he needed
approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB opera-
tional funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prosti-
tute in Geneva, and offered for this amount to sell two items
of information to American Intelligence. The first item was
the identity of an American, a former employee of the Embassy
in Moscow, who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washing-
ton area. The second item was the identity of a Soviet citi-
zen in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, had been
planted on CIA by the KGB. Although NOSENKO proposed a one-
time transaction, he acknowledged to MARK that he might be
unable to avoid deeper involvement with American Intelligence.
06.
06
MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer the evening of
9. June and NOSENKO was taken to the first of five lengthy
meetings held in a CIA safehouse. At the initial meeting
NOSENKO described himself as a KGB major experienced in opera-
tions against the American Embassy in Moscow and against
American tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union.
He told of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer
to sell the two specified items of information. He said that
the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting
CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he asserted also that
he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet
Union. NOSENKO emphasized that he had no intention of be-
coming an American agent and that after his proposed trans-
action, he would have no further contact with CIA. Despite
✓ ayle SMITH, see p. 33 ) and the KGB double agent BELITSKIY
assertion, after describing the cases of "ANDREY"
(see p. 282), NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic infor-
mation about himself and also discussed in general terms cer-
tain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization
and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had
told MARK earlier, that CIA would want more information, and
he agreed to meet again two days later.
he 
agroco
-06°
NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva.
With the second meeting on 11 June, his initially expressed
reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most
questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most
of his information being limited to the Second Chief Directo-
rate. Besides "ANDREY" and BELITSKIY, he provided leads to:
more than a score of American citizens who had been compro-
mised or recruited by the KGB, and information on the KGB
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audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow.
Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian
Ambassador WATKINS (see p. 23 ) and described a British Ad-
miralty employee (William VASSALL, see p. 30). He talked
freely of his activities in Geneva, including his association
with KGB officers there, his visits to the KGB residency
and his security duties with respect to the Soviet delega-
tion. NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB
officer with personal knowledge of important and sensitive
KGB operations. He described his education, his service in
the Naval GRU, his entry into the KGB and the general func-
tions and operating techniques of the various components of
the Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along
with the approximate dates of his service.
Ultimately the only restriction which NOSENKO placed on
his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communica-
tion with him in the Soviet Union. He was willing to meet
with CIA representatives during future trips outside the
Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once every other
year. He said he would not consider defecting except in cir-
cumstances in which his personal security was endangered,
citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and
fear of KGB reprisal against them if he fled), his widowed
mother's dependence on him, and his love of Russia and the
Russian people.
NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were
made for him to do so, when he came to the West again.
Meanwhile, he expressed the intention to do everything within
limits imposed by concern for his own security to obtain in-
formation which he was informed was of interest to CIA.
.06
Attempted Recruitment of Horst BRAUNS
Immediately after returning to Moscow from Geneva, NOSENKO
claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit
American tourist BRAUNS.
06
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OW.
ian
Ad-
ed
ation
a-
GB
ve
in
of
g_
on
ica-
at
NOSENKO's Information
BRAUNS was Russian born, and he lived in Leningrad until
the Second World War when he fled when the Germans retreated] 06, 08.
He eventually settled in the United States where the First
Chief Directorate learned he had become a technician working
for an "interesting company making computers, adding machines,
and other instruments". When BRAUNS visited the Soviet 06
Union, NOSENKO assigned his subordinate (K.G.] KRUPNOV to
handle the case, and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take
06 BRAUNS out of the Inturist hotel and assign him to a room in
another hotel where KRUPNOV met him. “KRUPNOV "couldn't get
Obanywhere" with (BRAUNS, 0b and he called on NOSENKO for help.
NOSENKO joined him in BRAUNS' room, and eventually secured
06 BRAUNS agreement to cooperate with the KGB, under threat of
imprisonment for treason (based on BRAUNS' wartime flight from 08
the Soviet Union) 06 BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Lenin-
grad, and because NOSENKO thought the recruitment was "shaky",
ob he sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad to consolidate the recruitment.
Every BRAUNS refused to see KRUPNOV, and NOSENKO went to Leningrad
cir- and again talked to BRAUNS. BRAUNS was frightened, how-
ever, that NOSENKO concluded that he would never work for the
KGB; NOSENKO decided to terminate the case and BRAUNS] was sent
won his way.
06.
NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visited the Soviet Union,
nor was he able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNS
met in the USSR.
.06
06
'and
d
thin
in-
06.
So
In 1964 NOSENKO asserted that he had mentioned the BRAUNS
case to CIA in 1962, but could not at that time recall his
name.
Comment:
ENKO
Suit
197124
06
06
NOSENKO did not mention BRAUNS in 1962. BRAUNS
arrived in the Soviet Union on 24 June 1962,
after NOSENKO had met with CIA in Geneva.
☑BRAUNS' version is consistent with the events
as related by NOSENKO, although he could not
identify NOSENKO by photograph. In other con-
texts NOSENKO has explained that the Seventh
289
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Comment:
(Continued)
Department was not concerned with foreigners
visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet
expatriates, both of which were the responsibi-
lity of other KGB elements. NOSENKO acknowledges
that the KGB knew that BRAUNS was a former Soviet 06, 08
citizen BRAUNS' plan to visit relatives in
Leningrad was informationaalso available to the
KGB through his visa application.06 BRAUNS] had
corresponded for a year before his visit with a
former girl friend in Leningrad. She spent the
first week with him in Moscow (during which the
KGB recruitment attempt occurred). The existence
of the girl friend was presumably known to the
KGB, if not through mail censorship, then from
surveillance connected with KRUPNOV's planned ap-
proach to BRAUNS in the hotel. NOSENKO was un-
aware of these facts.
06
Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section:
Summary and Conclusion
According to NOSENKO, he requested transfer to the Seventh
Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American
Department over his then-superior, the experienced and highly
successful KGB officer KOVSHUK. He is adamant that the trans-
fer took place "before [the defection of] GOLITSYN", which he
asserts occurred in mid-January 1962. Among his other functions
in the Seventh Department, he cites directing five agents
whom he brought from the American Department. In his initial
capacity as Chief of the American Section, NOSENKO claims in-
volvement only in the W.E. JOHNSON case, his time being spent 06
either in "reading in" on his new job or preparing for his
initial trip to Geneva. He alleges that he was directed to
accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended
period, in behalf of another Second Directorate Department,
over his objections, when he had no deputy to assume his func-
tions in his absence, and on the eve of the tourist season.
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In Geneva he said he supervised the KGB double-agent BELIT-
SKIY's meetings with CIA, before contacting CIA himself to
sell information for a relatively small sum. Back in Moscow
immediately after participating in the KGB approach to BRAUNS, 06
he claims he became Deputy Chief of the entire 100-man
Seventh Department.
Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO's account of seeking
transfer "to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American De-
partment", his dating of the transfer impugns his claims.
GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred,
as he said, in mid-January 1962, his earlier participation in
Of the [JOHNSON compromise (see p. 268) is not evidential of his
Seventh Department service. If he transferred just in time
06 for the JOHNSON] operation, he could not have played the role
he claimed in the Embassy Section (re ABIDIAN and the Pushkin
Street dead drop, see p. 216 ). In the period with one excep-
tion, none of his claimed agentura participated in a Seventh
Department operation. No change marked his claimed increased
responsibilities and new functions upon being promoted to
Section Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief
Directorate. Of the five operations NOSENKO described as
occurring during this period, all had aspects for which, by
NOSENKO's description of Seventh Department's mission,
jurisdiction of another Second
Chief Directorate Department. NOSENKO's various explanations
for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 prompt scepticism be-
cause of tortuous contradictions. In Geneva he neither
directed the investigation of SHAKHOV nor supervised the BELIT-
SKIY case, as he claimed.
they could have been in the ".
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department
(July 1962 January 1964)
In July 1962, in line with the personal wish of the Chief
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, General GRIBANOV, NOSENKO
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was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief
of the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made
First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV
and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist
operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of
about 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations
against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSENKO
claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as
Deputy Chief of otherwise, of a number of KGB operations
against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and
investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey
OSWALD. NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB posi-
tion during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent
and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy
Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO re-
turned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.
06
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY
NOSENKO's Information
In September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate,
Seventh Department case officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the management
of KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY) (cryptonym "ANOD").
[SVENCHANSKIY was the president of "Afton Tours", a travel 29,08
agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian- 10,08
language bookstore. There was originally some suspicion
Ob that SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was
Cbalso concerned over [SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG per-
sonnel in New York City. 06 NOSKOV, the case officer at the
time, "felt" that [SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and
recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for
blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. [SVENCHAN-
✓ SKIY's cooperation was secured against KGB promises that
Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel
agency.
مان
[SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of
prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who
might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected
such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph
on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick
or pencilled mark on the application form.
0001563
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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When NOSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September
1963, NOSENKO's name as the handling officer was entered
in the single-volume case file, although NOSKOV ac-
companied NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings with
SVENCHANSKIY in Moscow (in September 1963 and at the end
of 1963).
06
29,10,29,10
Comment: SVENCHANSKIY a Russian-born naturalized
American citizen, is president of Afton
Tours of New York City and the Cross World
Books and Periodicals in Chicago. His
partner, and the actual operator of Afton
Tours is Sonya SOKOLOW, reportedly a one-06
time confidential secretary" of Jacob_GOLOS). 08,06
Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist
sympathies and probable involvement in Soviet
espionage date back to the Second World War.
His involvement in espionage has been pub-
licized in the press (notably in a 1953
New York Times account of Harry GOLD's 06
allegations). 06.
Since [SOKOLOW] manages the Afton Tours 89
office, while SVENCHANSKIY usually is
occupied
would be re with his other firm, he
to review and mark
suspect visa applications, as NOSENKO
alleged. SVENCHANSKIY's background is such
as to have prevented his being interviewed
on n the basis of the information NOSENKO
provided.
✓ NOSENKO did not refer to his association
with SVENCHANSKIY spontaneously, but described
it only after referring to the written notes
he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319)
06
Suspected FBI Source Alfred SLESINGER
Of on 8 July 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB interest in
an American named SLESINGER, a proprietor of a photographic
shop in New York City, who was suspected by the KGB of
"having connections with the FBI."
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06
106.
NOSENKO's Information
[SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
Chief Directorate because of his business transactions
with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in
whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The
First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that
SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
Some Soviets, to study them.0 SLESINGER had visited the
Soviet 
Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned 06
another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he
might make some contacts or do something interesting"
while visiting the Soviet Union.06 The KGB wanted to
resolve 
its suspicions that [SLESINGER was possibly an
agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had
a file on SLESINGER 1) and a senior case officer in the
American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent
of the 
Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly
Owith SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet
Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.
06 SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN
directed 
the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who
could 
watch his behavior. If there had been any indication
of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted.
to 
recruit SLESINGER % but since no evidence was developed,
no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
Soviet Union before, several times.
Comment:
06
06
NOSENKO's information was substantially
correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, 06
reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a
Soviet official who exhibited "intimate
knowledge" of his business in New York
City and had asked whether [SLESINGER] had
"ever been bothered by the FBI." 06
294
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Comment:
(Continued)
06
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI that
he was in touch with a 
Moscow photographic
shop proprietor, and he 
described evidence
of KGB interest in him 
during his visit to
Odessa in 1962. Previous 
to visiting the
Soviet Union in 1962, 
SLESINGER had been 
in 06
contact with a number of 
Soviet officials
from the United Nations
.
NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned
of SLESINGER, who may 
represent a First Chief Directorate
case. 06
06
KOTEN's Arrest
NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
involved in the arrest of 
an American tourist in the
Almost at once; NOSENKO
USSR in the fall of 1963
.
identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN a guide for
29 [Afton Tours in New York 
City (and hence an employee of
06 Alexander SVENCHANSKIY
, see above) who had been arrested
on homosexual 
charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that [KOTEN] 
06
was involved with an 
American agent of the KGB 
Scientific
NOSENKO did not know the
and Technical (S&T) 
Directorate.
agent's name.
06
NOSENKO's Information
KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist
Party and a frequent visitor 
after the Second World War
to the Soviet Union, where 
he had extensive contacts 
among
dissident literary figures and 
other Soviet citizens,
[NOSENKO explained 
in
particularly among Russian 
Jews.
another context that 
the KGB is 
wary of foreigners' contacts
with Soviet Jews because 
the Israeli Intelligence Service
has frequently inspired 
such contacts.] Because of these
many suspicious contacts
, both the KGB First and Second
Directorates had 
concluded that (KOTEN] might be a "
provocatio
agent" planted in or recruited 
from the ranks of the
Communist Party in the 
United States.
295
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06
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
06
-
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On the eve of (KOTEN's arrival in 1963, the Seventh
Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of 
the 
First
Chief Directorate's S&T Department that 
[KOTEN] was. 06
carrying with him the address of relatives 
of an.
important S&T agent of the New York residency
, 
and that
[KOTEN] intended to visit the agent's relatives 
while in
the USSR. The S&T agent had asked to 
be repatriated 
to
the USSR, but when the KGB eventually assented, 
the
agent balked, arousing: KGB suspicions. When 
it was
.
0bfound that KOTEN was acquainted with the 
agent, the
06 KGB concluded that [KOTEN "evidently received from
American Intelligence an assignment 
to visit [the
agent's relatives].": After KOTEN 
visited the 
relatives 06
in the Crimea, the decision was made to 
arrest him as
a suspect American Intelligence agent. [KOTEN]) was en-06
trapped with a KGB homosexual agent and 
arrested,
although he was released when the American Communist
Party and other organizations strongly protested.
Ob NOSENKO did not personally participate in the arrest
nor meet [KOTEN, although he supervised the 
arrest from
KGB Headquarters..
06.
Comment: [KOTEN's arrest on charges of homosexual
activities were publicized at the time in a
report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist
which was carried in the New York Times. In
an interview with representatives of the
Department of State, KOTEN described how he 06
had been arrested by the KGB in Kiev on 28.
August 1963, accused of being an American
Intelligence agent and interrogated for three
days, and held in jail for a month.
06
GRU Agent John SHUBIN
06
The name of John Andrew SHUBIN and his year of birth
were among the notes which NOSENKO brought 
to the 1964
meetings with CIA in Geneva.
296
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06
06
NOSENKO's Information
SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-
traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
in New York City. 06 SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet
Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958
or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of
duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, [SHUBIN 06
was the target of Seventh Department case officer
A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that [SHUBIN] was 06:
placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance.
observed SHUBIN) as a passenger in a Ilinistry of Defense
automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They
very furtively said that they were interested in him, "
from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.
06.
܂
In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name 06
and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office.
and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN])'s presence (or, according 06
to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by
others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for
having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's
interest in SHUBIN
Comment:
06 SHUBIN] had no valid U.S. passport
between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
the Soviet Union during that period it was
not as an American tourist under his true
name. Consequently, he could not then have
been the f the Seventh
Department.
as NOSENKO claimed.
If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring¨
06 to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further
contradiction: NOSENKO could not have
noticed his name while reviewing tourist
lists in the Seventh Department, because'
The claims he was in the American Department
at the time.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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Arrest of BARGHOORN
At the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO
described 
the 
provocation and arrest of Yale University
Professor Frederick BARGHOORN 
in late 1963. NOSENKO's
most comprehensive statement, from which the following
paragraphs 
were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964.
NOSENKO said that 
the purpose of the KGB operation
against BARGHOORN 
was to retaliate for persona non grata
action taken against 
three Soviets in New York City in
the case of John W. 
BUTENKO (in November 1963] and to
secure 
a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet (Igor
IVANOV) in the 
BUTENKO case who was jailed.
had asserted in Geneva, earlier, that the operation
(
NOSENKO
against BARGHOORN 
"was to discourage future arrests
such as that 
of IVANOV, not because of any special im-
portance of IVANOV 
himself.")
NOSENKO's Information
In 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers
assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in
operational activity 
in the United States.
three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur
Of the four
,
and had only 
a service passport. The three Soviet
diplomats were 
held three or four hours by the American
authorities and then 
released. IVANOV, the chauffeur,
was 
arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.
GRIBANOV, Chief of 
the KGB Second Chief Directorate,
learned 
of this arrest probably the next day and was
directed by KGB 
Chairman Semichastnyy to take "necessary
measures. "
GRIBANOV 
thereupon called to his office
NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Seventh Department;
and G.I. GRYAZNOV and 
Yẹ. M. RASHCHEPOV from the
American 
Department. After describing the arrest,
GRIBANOV asked what 
information the Second Chief
Directorate Departments had on any American, Embassy
employee or tourist
, that could serve as the victim of
an [
retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said
that at 
that very moment there were three or four
American 
Service Attaches in Rostov and that, in the
opinion of the American Department, these officers might
be carrying 
electronic apparatus. It was known that they
had cameras, 
that they had been taking photographs, and
they had been-
observed taking notes.
arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to
They could be
Moscow.
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GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the
American Department to write a report on what other
possibilities existed. He also told them to request
permission to arrest and search the Service Attaches.
GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was
held by the Seventh Department. He was told that there
were relatively few. American tourists in the Soviet
Union at that time. 6 These included BARGHOORN, who was
mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not
recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however,
that the KGB had no "strong" materials to use against
them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of
the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon
as possible.
Returning to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section
in their office. In a general discussion, it was
decided that BARGHOORN was the only possible American
target. All information on BARGHOORN was gathered,
and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took it to GRIBANOV.
GRIBANOV read it and was pleased; he was sure that
BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence.
He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi
and that, in fact, Ye. N. NOSKOV (case officer,
American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman
doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate
for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the
doctor had some special substance which had been used
to make BARGHOORN so violently ill that he had to be
hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful
search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of
operational interest had been found. In addition, a
KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient;
he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN
"materials"; but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait.
At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN
was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the fol-
lowing morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that
he had an appointment with (Theodore ORCHARD of the 06
29 British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following
evening.
299
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It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving
"materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that
this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that
this made no difference. He instructed NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass
the compromising material to BARGHOORN and told them
to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a
proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him
"when he obtains materials which are of interest to
American Intelligence. This was to be sent in letter
form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV's signature; the
letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive
the materials. (That the evidence was to be planted
was not to be mentioned.)
--
"
While
GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along
with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV
concerning the Service Attaches, to Semichastnyy.
the four NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV
were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return,
GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB
organization informing him that the Service Attaches
were in the air on their way back to Moscow.
thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the
Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the
Khrushchev was
Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN.
absent from Moscow at the time, but Semichastnyy had
called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.
Shortly
When GRIBANOV. learned from GRYAŻNOV that the Service
Attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he
became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or
die."
Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the
"Department D" (the KGB element responsible for dis-
information, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate)
to provide materials on missiles which could be passed
to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO
and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the arrest.
BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance
At 1810 hours a radio
upon his arrival in Moscow.
message was received from one of the surveillance cars
that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy, and it
was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25
to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as
as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appoint-
ment with [ORCHARD of the British Embassy at 1900 hours,06,29
but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN
0001571
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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had left the American Embassy in the American
Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the
Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while
BARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on
✓ TORCHARD established that he was in the downstairs
hall of the hotel waiting. It was therefore
decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car
at the hotel.
No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car
than the agent approached. "You are an American?"
the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it, the
agent said. The agent put the packet containing the
materials on missiles in BARGHOORN's inside coat
pocket and then ran off.
:
BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he
was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case:
officer 
of the American Tourist Section, and told
he was under arrest.' A surveillance car pulled up.
BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on
GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in
the United States had received similar treatment):
and driven to a Militia station where a room had been
prepared.
L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American
Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station,
KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be
the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the
station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and
a document was prepared requesting permission to hold
him 48 
hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORN
was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the
Seventh Department case officers were released with
instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours.
NOSENKO and the others went home.
KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000
hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good
Russian, 
YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed
to interpret. .NOSENKO entered the room several times
during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not
want to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knew
BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told
KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached
the point 
where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained
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the missile documents.)
The first sessions
concentrated on general matters, such as
BARGHOORN's life history.
"
After one and one half hours of questioning
BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him
when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had
He said that 
he thought
been placed on his person.
that he did not
they were "newspapers or something,'
know what they were. The package was then opened and
shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 
25 pages
"BARGHOORN was not, 
of
of information on missiles.
course, given a close look" at the materials.
GRIBANOV
Following BARGHOORN's admission, another declaration
was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV,
NOSENKO and 
KRUPNOV 
then
KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV.
took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where
the incident report, the first interrogation, and
the first and second declarations were reported to
MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor.
directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including
information from KGB Archives, be given to the KGB
Department of Prosecution so that they could begin
After 
this, 
all
legal proceedings against BARGHOORN.
interrogations were conducted by that department;
KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YẺFREMOV
continued to act as interpreter,
Comment:
BARGHOORN's version of his entrapment,
arrest, and interrogation coincide fairly
precisely with the version provided by
NOSENKO. He identified NOSENKO from a
photograph as a KGB officer present at
one stage of the interrogation on the
second day of his arrest and said
NOSENKO took some part in the pro-
ceedings. He recalled NOSENKO as being
"clever and quick-witted" and as "giving
the impression that he was not a dedicated
careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive:
he seemed not to care about what he was
doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."
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The OSWALD CASE
NOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in
OSWALD stemmed from his claimed Tourist Department
assignments. He asserted that while Deputy Chief
of the American Section in 1959 he participated in
the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational
interest. In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy
Chief of the Tourist Department, he was informed of
OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to
apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following
President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO,
Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB
records of OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union including
the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.
as
For continuity of presentation, both periods of
NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case
(1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.
The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD
case is significant if it substantiates. NOSENKO' S
claimed positions in the KGB and confirms the validity
of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement
with OSWALD.
NOSENKO's Information
Residence in the USSR.
Prior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was
completely unknown to the KGB. · Moreover, upon
receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief
Directorate e determined that he was not of sufficient
importance to justify any special interest by the
Seventh Department. Not until about October 1959,
when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR.
did he come to the attention of NOSENKO,
who was, at
that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of
the Seventh Department. All available materials on
him were thereupon collected and examined - the visa
application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports,
reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check
of KGB Archives. NOSENKO's subordinate, KRUPNOV
interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated
his wish to stay in the USSR.
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Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD
might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to
investigate this possibility because "this would be
done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet
Union. Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after.
his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB
in an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV
sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information
which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum
cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where
OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary
and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom
OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet
Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV
had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.
"
From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded
that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed
that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal. For this reason
NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the
Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to
remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on
the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a
permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet
Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders,
and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD
failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his
Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several
hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily
from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident.
from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief
of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in
turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's original decision
that the KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and
that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.
There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was
not an interesting person and wasn't normal.." OSWALD was
never questioned on his past nor asked to write an auto-
biography.
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NOSENKO did not know who eventually granted
OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR.
or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit.
The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live
in the Moscow area. Either the Soviet Red Cross or the..
Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision
to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh Department updated
his file, 
and it was sent, along with a cover letter pre-
pared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk.
KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically in-
structed local authorities there to take no action con-
cerning OSWALD except to observe his activities "passively"
to make 
sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent
on temporary "sleeper" s status. NOSENKO read this letter,
and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions
contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could
be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval. It was
NOSENKO's opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during
his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his
place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and
associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD's
threatened second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its
hands of him" and that even though there was considered
to be some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent,
KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk.
was "practically nil.
Request to Return to the USSR
The KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned
with OSWALD's return to the United States in June 1962,
by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department. No further word on him was received at KGB
Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico City in September 1963 and requested a visa to
return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residency
reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, re-
questing information. The KGB First Chief Directorate
had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of
the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Counter-
intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department. to
see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD,
The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department,
V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the in-
quiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO.
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NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV
was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt
and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was
told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should
not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV
relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.
NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts
between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban
Government there or elsewhere.
Comment:
Independent sources, however, reported on
visits by OSWALD to the Cuban. as well as
Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29
September and 3 October 1963 and on his
(apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer
under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy
there. NOSENKO originally said he knew
nothing of any such contact. In October 1966
he revised this to say that OSWALD did not
have contact with the KGB in Mexico City.
NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in
the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N.
DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Head-
quarters from the KGB Legal Residency in
Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did
not personally see, reported that OSWALD had
visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
requesting permission to return to the USSR
and that the cable specified that OSWALD had
dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel
only.
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Post-Assassination Review of KGB File
S
NOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a result
of President Kennedy's assassination. About two hours after
President Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this fact
in a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. A
short while later he was told, again by telephone, that the
President had died. About two hours later, NOSENKO was told
that OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officers
of the American Tourist Section were called in to determine
whether the KGB had any information concerning him. After⠀⠀⠀
establishing OSWALD' identity from KGB files and learning
that his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGB
office in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB dictated
over the telephone a summary of its file on OSWALD. This
summary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minsk
had attempted t
'
to influence OSWALD in the right direction".
GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB's
efforts because it had been given specific instructions to
carry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALD
there. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining to
OSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of the
meaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flown
immediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personally
read the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of
this statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD's file when
it arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to S.M.
FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGB
Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary
memorandum for GRIBANOV. This memorandum, which NOSENKO
read, was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichästnyy, and
Semichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committee
and to Khrushchev concerning it.
OSWALD'S file from Minsk contained no information to
indicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action with
respect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Head-
quarters. From the date of OSWALD's arrival in the USSR
until his departure, the KGB had no personal contact with
him and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.
A
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OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assign-
ments. If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had
wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure
permission from the Seventh Department, which originally
opened his case file. In view of OSWALD's apparent mental
instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particu-
larly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage)
KGB Head-
Department, would have considered using him.
quarters did not maintain a control file on him following
his settlement in Minsk, as it would have done had OSWALD
been of any operational interest. The only KGB record on
OSWALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his
name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a
file concerning him.
There
The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSWALD;
all information about her was kept in OSWALD's file.
was no indication in OSWALD's file that the KGB had had any
interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union
or after she left for the United States.
1
|
|
Comment:
NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he
"only skimmed the file" and on another that he
had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In
October 1966 he again said that he read the
file and that while doing so he saw a picture
of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added
that he never met OSWALD personally.
NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief
Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he
applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in
The
September 1963 is probably incorrect.
consular file turned over to the U.S. Govern-
ment by the Soviet Embassy in Washington
after the assassination indicated that the KGB
First Chief Directorate would have known of
OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier.
That file contained Marina OSWALD's letter of
February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from
OSWALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had
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Comment:
(Continued)
earlier requested permission to return to the
Soviet Union. In the last dated letter of the
file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised
the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel
under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact
with an official (whom CIA identifies as a
KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.
City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate
and his efforts to reach Havana in order to
visit the Soviet Embassy there. Without regard
to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD'S
request for a Soviet visa addressed to the
Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require
the Washington Residency to report the matter
to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico
City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent
ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the
Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his
claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of
the KGB relationship with OSWALD.
The CHEREPANOV Papers
Comment:
On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA
employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV, passed
to an American book-buyer a package which he
requested the American to deliver to a trust-
worthy person at the American Embassy. Embassy
officials found the package to contain a
bundle of typed or handwritten documents which
appeared to have originated in classified KGB
files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which
could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy
for possessing classified Soviet Government
documents, Embassy officials had the documents
photographed and on the next day, 5 November,
returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
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At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO
related how a disaffected former KGB colleague, A.N.
CHEREPANOV, had stolen documents from the American Embassy
Section and in November 1963 sent them through an inter-
mediary to the American Embassy. CHEREPANOV's treason was
discovered, NOSENKO said, when the Embassy returned the
documents to Soviet authorities. CHEREPANOV fled Moscow,
and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search
for him. NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official
KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for
CHEREPANOV.
The significance of the CHEREPANOV incident is twofold.
The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent to the
Embassy appear to have originated in the American Depart-
ment's Embassy Section, and the documents relate to KGB
modus operandi, personnel, targets, and technical devices
employed in operations during 1958-1960, during part of
which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the
Embassy Section. The KGB document, the "temporary duty
authorization", is an item of physical evidence NOSENKO
has offered to substantiate his claim to personal parti-
cipation in the CHEREPANOV case and to having held the rank
of KGB lieutenant colonel. [The document does not itself
refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner.]
NOSENKO's Information
The KGB officer, A.N. CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or
1921, During World War II he was a KGB officer working
with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in
Yugoslavia for four or five years, and was probably Deputy
Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade.
1
1
Comment:
CIA records contain references to an Aleksandr
Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a Soviet diplomat and
suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in
1953. CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956. A
Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in
1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an
intelligence officer.
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When CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow, he had some (unspecified)
problem getting a job, but finally the KGB Second Chief
Directorate took him into the American Embassy Section of the
American Department, working against State Department
'personnel in the Administrative Section of the Embassy. He
worked in the same room as V.A. KUSKOV, and was case officer
for three KGB targets: Richard SNYDER and John McVICKAR,
counsular officers, and Marion ALBAMONTF, secretary to the 6
(personne]] officer. CHEREPANOV's work as a case officer was
poor, and as it grew worse, the KGB decided to retire him.
Because of his service in World War II, for which he
received three years' pension credit for each year of military
service, he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for
retirement. Also, he was just over the minimum age (40) for
retirement from the KGB.
Upon retiring in July
Upon retiring in July or August 1961, CHEREPANOV got a
job with MEZHKNIGA. Unhappy about his enforced retirement
and angry at the KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when
MEZHKNIGA turned down his several attempts to go abroad.
_
Prior to leaving the KGB, CHEREPANOV had stolen draft
copies of documents he had handled in the Embassy Section.
In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own
handwriting, evidently having been unable to steal the
document itself. All of the documents he had stolen were
intended for destruction.
"
In November 1963 Yu. I. GUK brought NOSENKO news about
"a catastrophe" in the KGB. GUK said he had the story from
B. D. MAKASHEV, a common friend of GUK and NOSENKO. MAKASHEV
had been in Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's office when
the CHEREPANOV papers were brought there, after their delivery
by Thomas FAIN of the Embassy. MAKASHEV saw the name of
(Second Chief Directorate Chief) GRIBANOV on some of the
papers and saw that one of them was a plan for agent opera-
tions against an American. He noted that one of the documents
was at least an inch thick. Gromyko immediately called KGB
Chairman Semichastnyy, who notified GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV s
deputy went to Gromyko's office and picked up the papers.
The KGB then began an investigation of all the personnel
assigned to the American Department during the time period
covered by the papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961.
:
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When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents,
they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB
provocation, and they wondered what the Russians were
trying to do. The Embassy officials photographed the
documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. When the Americans gave the documents
to the Ministry, the KGB wondered why the Americans gave
them back.
The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during
its investigation for 20 or 25 days. When the KGB examined
the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's hand-
writing, but no documents were found which pertained to
CHEREPANOV's own case work, or that of the American Embassy
Section. The KGB found no documents dated later than
1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus
there were a number of indications pointing towards
CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961. The KGB did
not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him,
but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and
office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous
action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him who, in
the course of conversation, mentioned the great disturbance
in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents
to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the
news and was quite cool about the matter. The next day the
surveillance post observed him leaving his house in the
morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work,
but the surveillance post at his office soon reported that
• he had not arrived at work. He had "simply dropped out of
sight".
.
An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued,
then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls
were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to
Republic and local KGB and militia offices, and all means
of transport were covered. Reports began coming in from
various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV's
description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there.
Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast
strongly indicated the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence
there, so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check.
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NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-
PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep:
woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the
seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku,
where he was on his way to the Iranian border.
:
A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying
S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-
cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow,
interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed
to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked
why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and
besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some
money in return for the documents. He confessed that on
4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist
who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he
had given the documents to the American in the entrance
hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also
housed.
Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two
fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the
Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock
surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB
that if he had detected his surveillants he would have
written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest
against "such an indignity, such persecution"; and then
would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
of his guilt.
Comment:
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the
CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to
his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department at the time.
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Contents of the CHEREPANOV Package
The KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package totalled
103 pages in the original Russian version, divided almost
equally between typewritten reports in final form and hand-
written draft reports or notes, plus two copies of letters
written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The
longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report,
dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in
the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence
Organs against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in
the U.S.A. in 1957-1958". The report was signed by Colonel
A. FEKLISOV, [alias FOMIN, the former KGB rezident in
Washington] whose title is given as "Chief, First [American]
Department, First Chief Directorate". The rest of the
documents refer to KGB coverage of various American Embassy
and American diplomats in Moscow during the period August
1958 to 15 October 1960. Most of the documents were prepared
by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section,
First Department, Second Chief Directorate, Major V. KUSKOV.
(NOSENKO has identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer of the
Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV
from about 1958 to 1961.) Two reports were on Americans who
had left the Soviet Union, Edward L. KILLHAM, Second Secretary
from July 1957 to July 1959, and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache
from June 1956 to July 1958. There were operational plans
for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed
in Moscow, Richard HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A.
RAMSEY, and George WINTERS. Other documents included were
an agent's report of her relationship with WINTERS, a summary
of LANGELLE's activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet.
citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted
by the KGB, a handwritten summary (signed by CHEREPANOV) of
derogatory information on a Soviet youth who had been in
touch with American Consul Richard SNYDER, and various hand-
written drafts and notes on the foregoing Americans.
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Top Secret
January 1962-January 1964)
The operational plan on WINTERS, as an example, indicated
that WINTERS had already been identified as an intelligence
officer
, and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence
activities, the KGB was to employ round-the-clock surveil-
lance, 
technical aids metka and "NEPTUNE-80", audio surveil-
lance, and investigation of his contacts among Soviet
citizens
. The plan reflected that while the KGB judgment
was that 
WINTERS "had a hostile attitude toward the USSR":
and 
that there "was no basis for recruitment" care should
be taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country
prematurely, since there still might arise an opportunity
to attempt 
to recruit him.
NOSENKO said that he had never seen the documents
CHEREPANOV passed to the Embassy, although he was familiar
with their substance
.
]
Comment:
The information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was
substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had
said earlier in 1962 regarding WINTERS, LANGELLE,
HARMSTONE and Embassy Section operational
techniques such as the use of metka.
NOSENKO's Travel Document
When NOSENKO first related to CIA in Geneva in 1964'
his knowledge of the CHEREPANOV case, he produced a document
(see accompanying 
exhibit) which he said was his official
KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast
to search 
for CHEREPANOV. The document, signed by General
GRIBANOV, 
authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to travel to
Gorkiy during the period immediately before NOSENKO's trip
to Geneva
, 15-30 December 1963. NOSENKO acknowledged that
it was 
"illegal" to have kept the document and to have
brought 
it with him from the Soviet Union. He did it, he
said, to show CIA.
0001586
315
Top Secret
TS No. 197124.
10.
Copy
14-00000
Top Secret
-
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)
Comment:
NOSENKO has never provided a satisfactory
explanation for his retention of the document
nor for bringing it to Geneva. According to
an earlier KGB defector, the bearer of a
temporary duty authorization is held strictly
accountable for the document which has to be
turned in with the financial voucher. What-
ever NOSENKO's purpose, the effect of presenting
the document to CIA was to corroborate his
statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate
his claim that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel.
NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350).
When he eventually said in 1966 that he was
only a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to
explain how he came to possess an official KGB
document signed by General GRIBANOV and
identifying him as a lieutenant colonel.
NOSENKO asserted that it came about "by mistake".
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)
NOSENKO was detailed a second time to perform security
escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament
Conference, and he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where
he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to
defect. He brought with him a considerable number of hand-
written notes to which he referred when describing to CIA
officers KGB operations of which he claimed he learned at
KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation
security duties were not onerous. He visited the Geneva
Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently
while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration
from Switzerland, tentatively scheduled for some three
weeks later. .A little more than a week after his arrival,
however, NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once,
because he had received cabled instructions to return to the
USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was taken from
Switzerland to Germany, and on 12 February he was brought
to the United States.
316
0001587
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
14-00000
Top Secret
Exhibit 3
Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel
Yuriy 
Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963
FRONT
11933
Committee for State Security Under
the Council of Ministers, USSR
15. December 1963
Issued to:
For duty to:
Length of
temporary
assignment:
through:
Lieutenant Colonel
NOSENKO
Yuriy Ivanovich
UKGB of Gor'kaya
Oblast!
15 days.
30 December 1963
Authorization: directive of Chief
of a Chief Directorate
Effective on presentation of
identity document No.: NK-2513
Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorate
of Department
Committee for State Security Under
the Council of Ministers, USSR
0001588.
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy 1
14-00000
Top Secret
-
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)
Purpose of Geneva Trip
NOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that
had brought him to Geneva, that he was allowed to travel as
"a treat" when it appeared to be the last occasion he might
have to travel to the West. [NOSENKO said in 1962 that when
he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, as he
expected to become, he would travel to the West every two
or three years.] He had discussed the possibility of the
trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV,
and secured his agreement. He also talked with officers
of the Soviet Delegations Department, but after it had been
decided that he should go, the Chief of that Department,
[N.T.] ZHARIKOV, suggested that it might be unnecessary for
a security officer to accompany this particular delegation.
[A.G.] KOVALENKO, the new Chief of the Seventh Department,
supported NOSENKO's assignment as a personal favor. Although
at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he
has later asserted that GRIBANOV was not involved and that
if GRIBANOV had learned of NOSENKO's plans, he would not
have permitted NOSENKO to go.
NOSENKO's only mission was to concern himself with the
general security of the delegation, as he had done in 1962.
He had no specific tasks such as on his earlier assignment.
(e.g., investigating MAKIDV or supervising the BELITSKIY
operation).
Comment:
"
NOSENKO has never satisfactorily explained why
In
a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department would
draw an unrelated assignment abroad which
would last many weeks if not months.
another context, NOSENKO had described a KGB
conference to take place about this time where
plans were to be drawn up for KGB operations
he acknow-
during the coming tourist season:
ledged that he was expected to attend, but
nevertheless went to Geneva.
317
Top Secret
0001590
TS No. 197124
10
Copy
14-00000
Top Secret
EXHIBIT 3
Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963
REVERSE
1. Командированный не позднее 3-дневного срока по возвращении из ко-
мандировка обявал представить авансовый отчет об 
израсходованных
в связи с командировкой суммах.
2. При получении проездного билета предъявить в жел.-дор, кассу коман-
дировочное удостоверение для наложения компостера.
ОТМЕТКИ О ТЕБЫВАНИЯ В ПУНКТАХ
КОМАНДИРОВКИ
(указываются даты прибытия и убытия, заверенные
Прибыл
1x11-1968
не пользовался
Моя. Шахунского гом
мне буду
нермия
Убыл
43 2. Waxy64 17/x-198
бесплатной квартирой не
пользовалско
Убол
дол. Шогунец гом
из Ирокных
ОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕН
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ
ПРИ СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ ССР
бесплатный
Убыл из Москвы
Прибыл в Москву
Печать
ФИНО
Нач. секретариата
หน
*
КОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
при СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР
Выдано:
Руб.
Аванс на расходы по командировке в сумме
Перевозочные требования №№ 005867 005870
Таловы на плацкарту №№
Ст. бухгалтер
NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES OF
TEMPORARY DUTY
"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy
16 December 1963".
"Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye.
17 XII 1963 Did not use.
free quarters"
s./Chief of Shakhun'ye
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major_
(fllegible)
"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63
Did not use free quarters"
s./Chief of Shakhun'ye.
Chief Militia Section,
Militia Major_
(Illegible)
"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"
(Illegible)
0001589
TS. No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
14-00000
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
Top Secret
January 1962-January 1964)
Visits to Legal Residency
As in 1962, NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Resi-
dency daily. According to strict rules, he explained, an
officer in 
his status (temporary duty assignment which was
independent 
of Residency) should not do so, but his case
was 
exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief of Department
and because 
of the relationship he established in 1962
through the 
intervention of M.S. TSYMBAL.
orate Chief TSYMBAL, NOSENKO related in 1964, was an old
Illegals Direct-
friend; they had become acquainted in Moscow before meeting
again in 
Geneva in 1962, when they dined together frequently.
TSYMBAL's wife once had 
taught NOSENKO in school, and
TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in the Illegals
Directorate. 
NOSENKO asserted that TSYMBAL's introduction
of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO
to frequent 
the Legal Residency in 1964.
Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the
Residency to his "old friend Yuriy GUK", not
TSYMBAL, He mentioned TSYMBAL's presence in
.
Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance.
Availability for Meetings with CIA
In 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official
responsibilities or any demands on his time, and he was
willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA. He
said that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation could
be explained as "security duties" since everyone on the
Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer.
From the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February,
NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings usually
lasting for five or six hours. By mutual agreement, most
of the meetings started in the afternoon. On two occasions
NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings
continued until past midnight.
318
0001591
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
1
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
January 1962-January 1964)
NOSENKO's Written Notes.
After returning to KGB Headquarters from Geneva in
1962, NOSENKO said, he had availed himself of various
opportunities to record what he learned of KGB operations
in order to inform CIA, and to pilfer appropriate KGB
documents to which he had access, when he could safely do
so. He brought to Geneva in 1964 three KGB documents and
a large number of handwritten notes. The latter reflected.
items which he had. excerpted from various documents to which
he had access, principally the Seventh Department Chief's
special file containing periodic summaries of all Seventh
Department operations. He last had access to this special
file, he stated, in connection with his review of it in
December 1963 to confirm that it was intact after the
CHEREPANOV affair. While the file contained no true names,
he claimed he learned such true identifies as were contained
in his notes by asking KGB colleagues. For safekeeping,
NOSENKO said he kept the notes and documents in a wall safe
of the office which he occupied alone, as Deputy Chief of
the Department.
Questioned repeatedly about the KGB operations referred
to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand
on what he 
had written: He insisted he had written everything
he could 
discover, and knew no more.
Comment:
NOSENKO's sourcing for the notes does not
explain how he learned of the cases described
in the notes dating from 1957-1959, a period
not covered by the documents NOSENKO claimed he
reviewed. Neither can NOSENKO explain why he
was not knowledgeable, without the notes, of
operations which occurred while he was Deputy.
Chief of the Seventh Department's American-
British Commonwealth Section.
NOSENKO acknow-
ledges that his access to a personal safe in
319
Top Secret
0001592
TS No. 197124
10
Copy

14-00000
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
January 1962-January 1964)
Comment:
(Continued)
which to keep the notes was just fortuitous,
since 
neither all offices had such safes, nor
even all offices of Deputy Chiefs.
NOSENKO's Defection
On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the
second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that
after 
long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting
series
, he had decided to defect. He explained that he had
recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief
of the Seventh Department, and that because of the stature
and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few if
any opportunities for him to visit the West in the future.
Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand
and to flee 
to the United States at once, leaving his family.
behind. 
He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children
being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty
years". NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part
with 
my family". He had, however, carefully considered their
fate as the close 
relatives of a defector, and he felt that,
because 
of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm
would come to 
them.
NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his
decision 
to defect
. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for
him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all
his 
personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would
exfiltrate 
him from Switzerland to the United States. He
wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the
CIA 
officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain
in place for at least three weeks more.
NOSENKO for this request were:
The reasons given
-The desire to obtain further information on the
local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to
the 
Disarmament Conference while he still had access;
6001593
320
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
1400000
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
January 1962-January 1964)
-The value of having NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV.
made 
a 
visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known
to CIA only through NOṢENKO;
-The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's
in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the
Soviet representation in Geneva;
-The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to
NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.
In a three-and-a-half hour meeting on 26 January
NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was
necessary and useful for him to remain in place unțil
GRIBANOV visited Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as
possible thereafter.
28
On 28 January NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not.
be coming 
g to 
Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman Semichastnyy
was apparently 
reluctant to permit him to travel beyond
Vienna. 
NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite
information 
on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.
On 30 January NOSENKO said that there appeared to be
little 
likelihood 
that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.
[
From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he
was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO
as a KGB counterintelligence officer.] Therefore, he wanted
to defect 
right away. He cited as reasons the emotional
strain 
of any further delay and the fact that he and his
case 
officers were wasting their time working against the
local KGB 
Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or
promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could
be obtained 
from the Soviet delegation because: "Tsarapkin
himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by
Moscow the 
day before". CIA handlers, however, delayed the
defection 
for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement
to assist 
in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install
listening 
devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency,
and NOSENKO 
said he would check certain physical aspects
of the 
delegation buildings. As the best time for the
defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February,
because 
he probably would not be missed until the following
321
Top Secret
0001594
TS No. 197124
Copy 10
14-00000
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
January 1962-January 1964)
Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO
again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a
trace". He also asked about exfiltration plans.
On 31 January NOSENKO reported the results of his
reconnaissance of the KGD Legal Residency in connection with
the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone
transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he
had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building
used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the
scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain
in place until the arrival of the CHERFPANOV Papers, (see
p.309) which he was told were en route from Washington. He
explained that he had been alarmed at the previous meeting
because the delegation was supposed to move from its hotel
to a Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappea-
rance would be noticed more quickly. This move, as he had
now learned has been postponed pending the arrival of a
housekeeping officer from Moscow.
At NOSENKO's request on 1 February, it was firmly
agreed that the defection would take place on the morning of
8 February. NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would be by
automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United
States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption.
On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHERFPANOV materials.
The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.
"1
NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel
room in the early afternoon of 4 February and said: "I want
to come now and not go back. After arriving at the CIA
safehouse he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal
Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament
Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow
immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism
in the Soviet Union. The residency was arranging for a
ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following
day and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's
duties as security officer for the Soviet delegation in
Geneva. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO
then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating
the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had
0001595
322
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
14-00000
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
January 1962-January 1964)
agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries
in this connection. Semichastnyy had decided that it was
time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and stra-
tegies" for handling the increased number of tourists
expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the
entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to
prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the
report would be read to the conference either by himself or
by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief
Directorate.. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one
who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB
Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new
man in this line of operations, having been there only four
or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by.
great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable
arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the
morning of 5 February.. He had arranged for a Soviet chauf-
feur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning.
for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and
therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border
before morning". NOSENKO felt, however, that there would
be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for
a time following his disappearance, and that there would be
no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet
uncertainty, he had left his clothing lying around his hotel
room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe-
house. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss
authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or
early on the 6th.
on the 6th.
NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February
and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when
press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for
an immediate interview with NOSENKO dictated that he be
brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in
the United States on the evening of 12 February 1964.
323
6001596
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TS No. 197124
Copy
10
14-00000
www
Top Secret
-
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations
-
The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964
(see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB
operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as
tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited
in the description of these operations in Annex B, these
operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service
in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department.
0001597
325
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
---
4-00000
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
January 1962-January 1964)
Operational Activities
July 1962-January 1964:
Summary
To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO
describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY] 06
Of the arrests of KOTEN] and BARGHOORN, and the investigations
06 of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV
86
his discovery that [SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment.
to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as
the described and they were as he described (there are substan-
tial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB
elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical
with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Depart-
ment operations. They do not accurately characterize, as
NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against
tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department
service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to
Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier
assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was
not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization
indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy.
Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would
have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions
which he claimed to have held.
KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963
Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed
awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to
326
Top Secret
4/BR
0001598
TS No. 197124
Copy
14-00000
Press
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
January 1962-January 1964)
tourist operations, and, specifically, awareness of all
significant KGB operations against American tourists.
Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKE
The KGB agent' in MI-6, George BLAKE, in 1959 furnished
the KGB with a documentary account of the joint CIA-MI-6
meeting in June of that year, (see p.148) and he was to
furnish other information by which the KGB could keep
current on such hostile operations. Another CIA-MI-6 meeting
was held in Washington in April 1960, of which a twenty-one
page summary was made. BLAKE also passed this document as
soon as it came into his possession to the KGB.
KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist Operations
The lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier
(see p.149) reflects the detailed and accurate information
in possession of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO's
alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963.
Pertinent portions are quoted as follows:
"It has been established that the Intelligence
organs of the USA are displaying special activity
in the utilization of legal channels, specifically,
in tourism, for the purpose of conducting subversive
work against the USSR. Numerous facts indicate that
American tourists and members of various US delega-
tions, in the USSR strive to visit areas and instal-
lations to which employees of the Embassy and mili-
tary attaches have no access, establish contact with
Soviet citizens, and collect intelligence informa-
tion. In this regard, the channels of tourism to
the USSR are used to dispatch experienced intelligence
agents to develop individual Soviet citizens with
the objective of their eventual recruitment. In
line with the preparation and dispatch of such
agents, among the tourists the Americans also make
extensive use of persons not directly connected
with American Intelligence organs. These latter'
agents are given one-time assignments such as
collecting information leading to the ideological
development of Soviet citizens.
6001599
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TS No. 197124
Copy 10
*:
14-00000
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
January 1962-January 1964)
"With the objectives of accomplishing subversive
activities, a so-called 'Information Center; has
been established in the US with the participation
of 
the Department of State. The 'Center' officially
advertises that its purpose is to inform intending
American 
tourists to the Soviet Union about the
opportunities and restrictions existing there.
Actually, however, the 'Center' is involved in the
ideological preparation of American tourists, whom
it instructs regarding their conduct in the Soviet
Union 
and the methods to be used there for propag-
andizing the American way of life. The Center'
collects information about the Soviet Union from
returning American tourists, including the political
attitudes 
of certain Soviet citizens, their addresses,
etc. The 
direction of the 'Center' is controlled
by experienced intelligence officers of CIA.
"Candidates for missions to the USSR are selected
carefully. They ordinarily possess knowledge of
the 
Russian language, know the fundamentals of photo-
graphy, have specific technical training and must
look 
upon their mission as a responsible assignment
and not 
as a pleasure trip. American Intelligence
organs prefer to use persons who have previously
visited the USSR and person having relatives there.
apon having relat
"Once selected, the American tourist agent is
instructed as to his intelligence assignment and
his 
route, and he is acquainted with the security
conditions in the USSR, including passport controls,
documentation 
and customs controls, the hazard of
both physical and technical surveillance, as well
as the 
possibility of provocations and compromise
making the agent vulnerable to blackmail.
g the agent vulner
'Among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks
there 
are 
included visual observation and clandestine
photography, the establishment of contact with Soviet
citizens, and spotting among such citizens persons
who 
may be developed as sources of information. For
American Intelligence, any Soviet citizen, regardless
0001600
1
328
1
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
1
14-00000
區
Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
January 1962-January 1964)
of his social status or his personal access to important
information, is of interest, because of his ability to
travel to regions of the USSR which are of interest to
American Intelligence.
"American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB
agents Soviet citizens who too openly express anti-
government sentiments, who volunteer information about
friends or relatives who work in secret establishments,
who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but
display an awareness of security principles, who quickly
request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a
good knowledge of foreign languages.
"
Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet
Union from 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960, the docu-
ment instructs a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residen-
cy abroad
"to utilize all its resources to expose among American
tourists persons suspected of belonging to the enemy in-
telligence or counterintelligence organs.
"
Promising its assistance, KGB Headquarters instructs the
Legal Residency.
"to inform KGB Headquarters of foreigners temporarily
visiting the USSR who are of operational interest in the
work against the main enemy [the U.S.]. With this aim,
the Legal Residency should intensify its work against local
services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence
work in the USSR; determine the role played by anti-
Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; ex-
ploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR,
with the aim of obtaining information regarding the firms
being exploited by hostile intelligence services; and
telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Head-
quarters regarding tourists believed to be of operational
interest, including the individual's surname, name, pat-
ronymic, date of birth, profession, date to arrive in the
USSR, means of travel, itinerary, description of group
with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent
information available to the Legal Residency about the
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Lastly,
tourist. The Legal Residency is further directed to in-
clude where possible among tourists 
groups agents of the
Residency, informing KGB Headquarters 
in advance of their
presence and advising how the KGB 
could contact t
agents in the USSR if 
it should become necessary.
the
the Legal Residency is 
instructed to provide all possible
aid, including financial assistance, 
so that persons
favorably disposed to the USSR 
can visit there, with the
objective of their recruitment in 
the Soviet Union for the
purpose of exposing enemy intelligence 
agents among other
tourists."
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO insisted that the operations he described accurate-
ly 
reflected the extent of KGB 
counterintelligence operations
among American tourists during his 1962-1963 
service in the
Seventh 
Department.
terrogation, NOSENKO asserted that the Seventh Department,
In response 
to questions during his 
in-
during his absence in 1960-1961, had 
only noted that "automo-
bile tourism had increased and that 
American Intelligence had
increased 
its use of multi-national 
tourist groups.
that 
the Seventh Department 
received no information during
" He 
stated
1960-1961 regarding American 
Intelligence use of tourism as
a 
cover for espionage.
survey 
conducted in the KGB after GOLITSYN's defection, that
He was aware, he 
said, from the damage
American Intelligence had obtained a
operations
, a document which had been written in the Seventh
a 
KGB document on tourist
Department.
Comment:
NOSENKO does not know the content of the docu-
ment, which he 
describes as a statistical sur-
vey similar to the study 
he himself drafted in
1959 (see p. 146)
"
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T
KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among 
American Tourists: Summary
BLAKE's confession and evidence obtained from internal
KGB 
documents establish the 
KGB concern for the threat of
American tourist agent 
operations and the scope of KGB
actions to thwart that threat.
statements is that the KGB did not know of the American
The effect of NOSENKO's
tourist agent program. He averred that the operations he
described accurately depicted the nature 
of KGB counter-
intelligence operations 
during the period.
SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
-
1962-1964:
Summary and Conclusion
According to NOSENKO, in January 1962, at the direction of
General 
GRIBANOV, he was 
appointed Chief of the Seventh De-
partment American-British 
Commonwealth Section in the expec-
tancy that he soon would be 
named a Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department. As a Section Chief, he 
personally handled agents
and supervised all Second Chief 
Directorate operations against
American and British Commonwealth 
tourists, of which he de-
scribes four. In this period 
NOSENKO also was assigned the
unrelated duty of serving as a 
security escort officer with a
Soviet delegation travelling 
to Geneva in which capacity he in-
vestigated a delegate of suspected 
loyalty, SHAKHOV.
Geneva he drew also the 
assignment of supervising another KGB
While 
in
case officer's management of the 
KGB double agent, BELITSKIY.
On that visit to Geneva NOSENKO 
first contacted CIA.
1962, NOSENKO 
claims that as GRIBANOV promised, he became one
In July
of three Deputy Chiefs of the 
entire Seventh Department; in
this position he learned of all 
KGB operations against Ameri-
can tourists. In this connection 
he described five operations,
as well as his accidental discovery 
of the identity of an
American GRU agent, and the 
investigation and search for a
disaffected former KGB colleague
. In July 1963 NOSENKO states
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he became First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
Again assigned to escort a delegation 
to Geneva in January
1964, NOSENKO met CIA representatives 
again and delivered
notes of KGB operations of which 
he had learned since his
last meeting with CIA in 1962.
time 
a KGB travel document to substantiate his claimed rank
He also presented at this
of lieutenant colonel. Finally
, he announced the receipt of
a telegram recalling him to Moscow, an 
event which prompted
CIA to accept his immediate defection.
NOSENKO's claimed date of transfer into the Seventh De-
partment is in dispute because 
of contradictory claims he made
regarding his Embassy Section activities
.
formation 
sustaining his claim to have become Chief of the
He provides no 
in-
American-British Commonwealth Section
; his description of
his functions does not differ 
materially from that given in
connection with his earlier claimed 
service in the same sec-
tion, as a case officer, and he 
describes no administrative.
supervisory responsibilities. 
None of his claimed
nor
agents,
opera-
with one exception, was employed in Seventh Department a
tions he described. Because of contradictions and the con-
flicts in his varying accounts, 
neither of the reasons:
NOSENKO cites for his assignment 
to Geneva in 1962 or 1964
is credible. In Geneva, it is 
implausible that he conducted
the investigation of SHAKHOV as he 
claims, and he clearly
did not supervise the management 
of the double
SKIY
agent, BELIT-
NOSENKO offers nine "tourist" cases as evidence that he
served 
in the 1962-1964 period 
in the Seventh Department, part
of the time as Deputy Chief. These cases, 
which included two
religious figures, two American 
Communists, one emigre, one
suspected FBI agent, a First Chief 
Directorate target who in-
tended to marry a Soviet citizen, a 
hostage, and a permanent
resident or former permanent resident 
of the Soviet Union, all
have aspects for which KGB elements other 
than the Seventh
Department may have been 
responsible. This fact and the
anomalies of NOSENKO's accounts 
of the cases aside, however:
the cases are evidence that NOSENKO 
did serve during the
period in the Seventh Department
, although they are not per-
suasive of his claim to have been 
Deputy Chief.
that latter claim must 
rest primarily on an appraisal of other
A judgment of
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aspects of his statements, including those relating to his
supervisory duties and to 
the nature of Second Chief Direc-
torate operations against 
American and other foreign tourists.
NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he was a lieuten-
ant 
colonel, a rank 
appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate
Deputy Chief of Department, and 
asserts that he was never
promoted beyond the rank of 
captain.
Most damaging to NOSENKO's claims that he was a supervisor
in 
the Seventh Department is his 
assertion that he accurately
describes KGB counterintelligence 
operations against foreign,
particularly American, tourists. A 
senior Seventh Department
officer would be aware of the Second Chief Directorate's pre-
occupation with American tourists: 
If NOSENKO is unaware of
the extent of KGB activities in connection with American
tourists, he was not 
a Section Chief of Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department.
Conclusion
NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the
American
-British 
Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a
Deputy Chief of the 
Seventh Department, are not credible.
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CHAPTER IX
OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB SERVICE
Most of NOSENKO's assertions can be examined in a chrono-
logical fashion, as has been done in the proceding sections.
Some can most easily be examined separately, since they
relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor
to any specific position he claimed he occupied, but to his
entire KGB career. The principal aspects in this category
of claims are those he made about his relationship with
Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV, his Party status,
his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures, his
sourcing of KGB operations, awards he earned for KGB service,
and his KGB rank.
Relationship with General GRIBANOV
From his first meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO main-
tained that he had a close personal and professional rela-
tionship with Major General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second
Chief Directorate. NOSENKO described recruitment approaches
in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations
they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV
played in his promotions, awards and assignments, and their
after hours carrousing. According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was
wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his
appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the American
Department Embassy Section in 1960, and when NOSENKO later
rejected GRIBANOV's offer to make him Chief of the entire
American Department, it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return
to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section and who shortly thereafter appointed
him a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department.
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NOSENKO's Information Post 1964
Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to
refer to this special and personal relationship, which
touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service.
Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain
this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted
or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by
other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted
from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote
the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given
(Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness
reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women
provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two
occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);
recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO
(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit-
ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);
NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in
1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador 06
DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied
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06.
GRIBANOV on only one such occasion and learned from "friends"
in 1958-1959 about DeJean); GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy
Section 
in 1960 as Deputy Chief to supervise code clerk
operations (Contradicted. NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief and
did not 
supervise code clerk operations); GRIBANOV approved
NOSENKO's 
operational plan for MORONE's recruitment (Retracted.06
The plan 
was written by another KGB officer.); GRIBANOV
ordered NOSENKO to prepare study on foreign intelligence
services 
use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could recall
no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed it
with GRIBANOV.); GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly
to lieutenant 
colonel from the rank of captain and (subse-
quently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to
lieutenant 
colonel (Retracted. NOSENKO never was promoted
past the rank of captain.); GRIBANOV was instrumental in
NOSENKO's receiving personal commendations from the KGB
Chairman, the Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and
the Order of Lenin (Retracted. NOSENKO received no such
awards.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to Geneva in 1962
(Retracted. NOSENKO went at the request of the Soviet
Delegations Abroad Department.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO
to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted.
NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.); GRIBANOV
allowed NOSENKO to go to Geneva in 1964, "as a personal
favor" (
Retracted. GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO
was to return to Geneva a second time.): and finally,
GRIBANOV was NOSENKO's patron (Retracted. Their relation-
ship was no closer than their relative rank and position
indicated
.)
Conclusion
NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to
his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single
and most important unretracted claim, that NOSENKO, on
GRIBANOV's appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department.
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Communist Party Status
In addition to other stringent requirements, candidates
for the KGB must normally be Communist Party or Komsomol
members. The significance of NOSENKO's statements about
his Party status is the extent to which they are consistent.
with what is known about Party activity in the KGB, and
consistent with NOSENKO's account of his KGB career.
NOSENKO said his formal participation in Communist Party
activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined
the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory in Baku.
The step
was a casual one, he said, and he took it without much
thought, mainly because all of his friends were joining.
He continued his pro forma membership in the Komsomol while
in the Naval RU, and when he "transferred" to the KGB in
spring 1953, he transferred routinely to the KGB Komsomol
organization from his Naval RU Komsomol unit in the Baltic.
He was registered with the KGB Komsomol, he said, without
referring the matter to his former Baltic Komsomol unit.
Comment:
According to knowledgeable KGB defectors, a
member's acceptance in another Komsomol unit
is contingent upon the endorsement of the
individual's former unit; NOSENKO's acceptance
by the KGB Komsomol without referring the
matter to his Komsomol unit in the Baltic "is
impossible".
In the fall of 1953 NOSENKO claims he was elected
secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organi-
zation. He was elected, he said, at a meeting of the
Komsomol membership.
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Comment: The Komsomol membership elects only the
Komsomol Committee. The latter elects the
secretary.
NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol secre-
tary 
in 
any specific manner. He does not know who was the
secretary of the KGB 
Komsomol organization, nor could he
describe his 
dealings with that official's office.
Comment:
The secretary of the Second Chief Directorate
Komsomol organization is directly subordinate
to 
the KGB Komsomol secretary and would have
occasion to deal with the latter frequently.
NOSENKO stated that he did not know whether there was a
Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol secretary of the
Second Chief 
Directorate, but that the Congresses were
ordinarily held 
yearly.
Comment: The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was
held 
in March 1954, entailing considerable
work by every Komsomol member and especially
by the 
unit secretaries.
As Komsomol secretary, NOSENKO collected the dues of the
members 
of his 
unit: All members paid in the amount of two
percent of their 
monthly salaries.
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Comment:
Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding
scale in which 
members earning 500 rubles
monthly paid .5 
percent, those earning 500 to
1500 rubles paid 
one percent, and those
earning over 1500 
rubles paid 1.5 percent.
NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-1954 the maximum age for a
Komsomol member was 26 years of age
, and that he was a
member until he became overage in 
October 1954, and that no
special privilege was extended to him
.
Comment:
According to Komsomol statutes at the time,
the maximum age was 
twenty-five, a fact which
would be known by a 
person who served as a
Komsomol secretary 
at the time. NOSENKO would
have thus been excluded 
from the Komsomol when
he became overage 
in 1953, not in 1954 as he
claimed.
The March 1954 Komsomol Congress retained
the 
25 year age limit, 
but provided for two-
year extensions in 
certain cases. Because of
age at the time, and because of his claimed
position as 
Komsomol secretary, the matter
would have been of 
vital interest to NOSENKO
if the facts he 
related were true.
From the time he was dropped from the Komsomol because
of 
age, until he was accepted 
as a candidate member of the
Communist Party in January 1956
, NOSENKO claimed that he
was the only officer in the KGB 
who was a member of neither
organization.
340.
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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)
Comment:
NOSENKO is the only Soviet official known to
CIA who claims to have occupied a position of
trust and who claims he was not a Party member
at the time.
In the period following, "to show his eagerness" and "to
improve himself", NOSENKO asked for Party assignments. For
more than 
a year he ran errands and collected newspapers and
performed other 
such tasks. He stated that he applied for
Party 
membership in January 1956, was accepted as a candidate
member in 
1956, and that he was accepted as a full Party
member in 1957.
Conclusion
NOSENKO's claims about his Party activity do not sustain
his claims to KGB service, and they suffer from identical
discrepancies with respect to chronology, plausibility,
and contradiction 
by independent sources. It is concluded
that NOSENKO 
was never a Komsomol secretary and, if a member
at all, 
was no longer a member after reaching his twenty-
sixth 
birthday in October 1953. The period in which he had
no Party status was twenty-eight months, not the fifteen he
claimed, and it covers the period of his first tour in the
Embassy Section as well as a portion of his initial Seventh
Department assignment. An officer unqualified for Party
membership 
is ineligible for KGB service.
evidence provided by examination of NOSENKO's Party status
Consequently
, 
the
indicates 
that he was not serving in the KGB through at
least a portion of the 1953-1956 period.
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Knowledge of Certain KGB Forms and Procedures
In the course of his various interrogations, NOSENKO had
occasion to comment generally on 
various KGB forms and
procedures.
Interrogation on these points, however, developed
that while he 
was generally familiar 
with various aspects
unexpectedly there were some of 
which he was ignorant. Some
of these topics are described on 
page
his KGB entry, 
and others which are described below.
in connection 
with
KGB Forms.
NOSENKO was familiar with the anketa, the KGB Personal
History 
Statement, including 
its appearance, the nature of
the questions included, and the 
purpose of the document.
However, he maintained that it was 
required to be completed.
in two copies, that it could be 
completed outside of KGB
premises, and that it consisted 
of four to six pages.
Comment The anketa is a detailed, sixteen page question-
naire. As a sensitive 
document, it is not taken
from KGB premises. 
Defectors' describe its
completion as 
"an experience not soon to be
forgotten". If 
NOSENKO was a supervisor as he
claimed, he would recall 
the form from reviewing
personnel files in which 
the anketa is a.
prominent basic 
document..
NOSENKO maintained that he had never heard of the Communist.
Party 
Questionnaire, (Lichny Listok 
po Uchetu Kadrov). Shown
an exemplar, NOSENKO stated that he 
had seen it in personnel
files, but had never himself filled one 
out.
personnel files 
he had seen the document, NOSENKO first said
Asked in whose
those of civilians (interpreters, 
etc), and finally expressed
his belief that the KGB did not use the 
document.
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Comment:
The form is completed by every KGB officer, and
while it is not of critical importance to the
KGB itself, a copy is filed in every officer's
personnel file, a fact known to any Komsomol
secretary or supervisor responsible for reviewing
KGB personnel files.
·NOSENKO was unfamiliar with the name of the KGB personnel
action form, and said he did not know of it. When its purpose
was described to him, he gave a superficial description of
its content.
Comment: A senior KGB officer would be familiar with the
form, which he would see on every occasion in
which one of his subordinates was promoted or
transferred.
NOSENKO was familiar with the Employment and Service
Record (Posluzhnoy Spisok), but he claimed he filled it out
only in "1958 or 1957".
Comment: The Employment and Service Record is completed
on entry on duty with the KGB. In citing 1957
or 1958, NOSENKO is claiming that he completed
it only four or five years after entering the
KGB.
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Visitor's Pass Procedures
NOSENKO has described procedures entailed in a non-KGB
visitor's gaining access to a 
KGB installation, but he
maintained that the interviewer's 
name did not appear on the
visitor's pass. (See p. 70.).
Comment:
The interviewer's name does appear on the pass,
.
a fact which a senior officer of more than a
decade's KGB 
Headquarters service would recall,
since he would have 
frequent occasion to admiṭ
visitors to KGB buildings
.
Name Checks of KGB Central Files
NOSENKO on many occasions claimed that in connection with
his 
direction of an operation 
he personally performed the
check of the target's name 
against KGB files.
among these cases were 
BURGI (see p.115) and ABIDIAN (p.205).
Prominent
06
Comment:
NOSENKO could not describe specifically how he
performed the name checks 
he claimed, and his.
description contained 
numerous errors of fact.
Among these were 
assertions that the Militia
retained court 
records of all Soviet citizens,
and that the First 
Special Department holds its
criminal index separate 
from political and
security card indices
.
with the KGB term spetsproverka, meaning a
NOSENKO was unfamiliar
clearance check. 
Despite NOSENKO's claim that
he performed name 
checks of American Embassy
personnel, he pleaded 
ignorance of any aspect
of the files held by 
the First Chief Directo-
rate, where any KGB 
record on foreigners is
kept.
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Conclusion
NOSENKO's ignorance of the foregoing forms and procedures
is evidence that he did not occupy the position nor perform
the functions he claimed during his alleged KGB service.
1
Awards and Decorations
Since 1964 NOSENKO has claimed to have received various
awards, commendations, and decorations for his KGB service.
His assertions are material to any judgment of his general
credibility and, as well of the validity of his claims to
having occupied various KGB positions.
In January 1964 NOSENKO mentioned that in 1962, shortly
after meeting with CIA in Geneva, he received the Order of
Lenin for ideas which he developed to "enlarge the experience
and improve the quality" of Second Chief Directorate per-
sonnel in Moscow.
In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked about
his awards, and he first said he received the Order of the
Red Banner, then corrected himself to say he received first
the Order of the Red Star. He confirmed that he received
the Order of Lenin, in 1963. [Earlier he had said 1962,
"just following visiting Geneva".] He claimed he received
the Order of Lenin for his performance in his Seventh
Department assignment, but when he was asked what recruit-
ments justified his receipt of the award, he said the main
task of the Seventh Department was not to make recruitments,
but to counter the hostile intelligence service operations.
[For his contradictory statements regarding the Seventh
Department's mission, see pages 103 and 326 .] The Order
of Lenin was the highest decoration for which a KGB officer
is eligible, NOSENKO said, and besides himself, the Chief
and former Chief of the Seventh Department received it.
NOSENKO said he received in 1962 the Order of the Red Star,
he "thought" for his service in the Embassy Section in 1960-
1961, not for Seventh Department service; no explanation
accompanied that decoration.
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The question of NOSENKO's awards, orders and decorations
were of some interest to the interrogators since they might
reflect the importance the KGB attached to particular
operational activities in which NOSENKO engaged. However,
before the April 1964 interrogations were suspended, NOSENKO
retracted his claim. that he received the Order of Lenin,
saying that it was just an idle boast. GRIBANOV, NOSENKO
explained, had promised in 1963 that NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV,
and KOVALENKO would receive the Order of Lenin "for creating
the Central Operational Communications System of the Second
Chief Directorate" within the Seventh Department, but the
award had not materialized before NOSENKO left for Geneva in
January 1964.
1
Comment:
Earlier NOSENKO claimed he received the Order
for ideas he developed "to enlarge the experi-
ence and improve the quality of Second Chiếf
Directorate personnel". Questioned, NOSENKO
reverted to the earlier claim.¨
In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO was asked to
list the dates, reasons, and types of awards, decorations,
and bonuses he had received in his KGB career. He replied
that he received nothing from 1953 until 1956, when he
received a commendation and one month's pay for the recruit-
Ob ment of BURGI [see p.115] by order of the KGB Chairman Serov
GRIBANOV 
informed him of the commendation, NOSENKO said, and
NOSENKO saw his name on the list of recipients which was
circulated. No written certificate accompanied the commen
dation, according to NOSENKO, but personnel recorded the
event in each KGB recipient's personnel file. Almost every
year after 1956, NOSENKO stated, he received something,
"perhaps on the KGB anniversary, or May Day, or Army Day".
In 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO did not recall exactly, he received
"something" from GRIBANOV, "maybe on the anniversary of the
Soviet Army": GRIBANOV's deputy, PERFILYEV, made the presen-
tation at an 
assembly of officers in the KGB Headquarters
auditorium. NOSENKO said he received in 1959 a second
commendation and one month's pay from KGB Chairman Shelepin
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for "several recruitments, including Americans [MERTENS, DREW],
06 06
06 [
FRIPPEL," and three British citizens 
whose names he could
not recall. Along 
with a large group of KGB officers, NOSENKO
received a commendation 
from GRIBANOV in 1960, he said, "for
good work in 
general". He received in 1961 the Order of the
Red Star, he 
stated, with a group of Second Chief Directorate
case officers "for 
general good work"; IVASHUTIN made the
presentation, 
which included a medal and a certificate which
the officer 
may retain.
Comment: A week later, NOSENKO said that he received this
award 
in December 1962. He said he recalled
that the presentation was planned for the KGB
Anniversary on 20 December, but the presentation
was 
delayed and not made until the end of the
month.
In 1962, NOSENKO claimed, he received another commendation
from 
GRIBANOV 
for "general good work", and he also received
the Unblemished 
Service Award for ten years' service.
:
Comment:
At this juncture his interrogators reminded
NOSENKO that his most recently claimed date
of entry to the KGB was March 1953, and that
in 
1962 he would only have had nine years'
service. 
NOSENKO said that he could not under-
stand why, but he was certain he received the
service award after his return from Geneva in
1962. (The date is consistent with NOSENKO's
earlier retracted claim that he entered the
KGB in 1952.) The following day NOSENKO
announced that he recalled why he received the
medal 
in 1962 rather than in 1963; the medal
was awarded to servicemen as well as to KGB
officers, and prior military service is taken
into account in computing KGB officers' time
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(Continued)
in service. NOSENKO entered the Naval RU in
1950, he said, 
and should have received the
medal in 1960, 
but did not because of some
administrative 
mixup. (See p.56 for NOSENKO's
eventual claim that 
he entered the RU in 1951.)
In 1963, NOSENKO said, he received another commendation from
GRIBANOV for "general good work
", and GRIBANOV told him that
along with others he would
the Order of Lenin "for
on 20 December 1963, the
inspiring the Seventh Depar
KGB anniversary.
NOSENKO said because he left for Geneva,
[NOSENKO arrived
he did not actually receive the medal.
in Geneva 
on 19 January 1964.]
Interrogated in August 1965 regarding his claim to having
received a commendation from KGB 
Chairman Shelepin for his
recruitment of the three Americans and 
three British citizens
in 1959, NOSENKO said that he was 
nominated for the Order
of the Red Banner for these 
successful recruitments, but he
did not receive it, probably 
because he transferred to the
American Embassy Section at that time
.
Comment:
NOSENKO apparently is referring to the KGB
practice of 
conferring decorations on KGB
anniversary, 
20 December.
transferred to the Embassy Section in January.
NOSENKO claims he
When NOSENKO's claims to various KGB awards was reviewed
with 
him during the October 
1966 interrogations, he said
that during his KGB service he 
had received only the Red
Army anniversary medal and an 
award for satisfactory comple-
tion of ten years' service, and that 
he had received no KGB
award, decoration, or commendation 
for his operational work.
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Conclusion
NOSENKO's claims to having been the recipient of various
awards for KGB service are inextricably linked with his
claimed operational successes, his rank, and GRIBANOV's
patronage, on all of which topics he had made virtually
categoric retractions.
NOSENKO's Sourcing
NOSENKO cited four general sources for KGB operations he
has related, and in all four there have been inconsistencies,
contradictions, and retractions. Three of these categories,
each with an example typifying the difficulty of judging the
validity of his sourcing, are personal participation W.E.
06 JOHNSON] p. 268) cases learned in the course of specific
Obofficial duties (SHUBIN), p. 296), and information obtained
informally from KGB colleagues (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON,
p. 24).
The fourth category of sourcing relates to the
notes of KGB operations which he brought to CIA in Geneva
in 1964.
Regarding the notes, NOSENKO said he collected them at
various opportunities in order to bring them to CIA. He
kept them in a wall safe in the office which he occupied as
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. [In this connection,
NOSENKO admitted that not all offices had such wall safes,
and not all offices of Deputy Chiefs of Departments, but
asserted that his did.] Most of the notes are in NOSENKO's
handwriting. Those that are not include the only copy of a
typed top secret summary report from one of the Seventh
Department section chiefs, a similar handwritten report by
another Seventh Department officer, and a carbon copy of a
KGB document which summarized the recruitment of an Austrian ] 11
businessman
. NOSENKO said he copied the date for the
remaining notes from such sources as the "Special File",
which was held ordinarily by the Seventh Department Chief.
According to NOSENKO, he obtained access to it for various
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reasons from time to time. The "Special File" contained no
true names, 
however, and NOSENKO said he obtained such true
names as 
were included in his notes by asking various case
officers for them. 
Questioned on case after case which
appeared 
in his notes, NOSENKO insisted that he had written
everything he 
could learn, and could add nothing more.
Conclusion
NOSENKO's sourcing for many of the events he has related
is 
not credible.
NOSENKO's KGB Rank
When he first met with CIA in Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO
identified 
himself 
as a KGB officer holding the rank of
major. He 
said at that time that he had served the requisite
time in grade and 
expected to be promoted shortly to the
rank of lieutenant 
colonel. On defecting in 1964 NOSENKO
said that he was a 
lieutenant colonel.
career as he initially described it, his military rank pro-
In the course of 
his
motions had generally 
parallelled his assumption of
successively 
greater supervisory responsibilities, culminating
in his becoming 
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
Under 
interrogation, however, questioning about his rank
has evoked a series 
of inconsistent and contradictory state-
ments leading to his 
eventual assertion that he had never
advanced beyond 
the rank of captain. The matter of NOSENKO's
statements about his rank is 
significant with respect to his
general credibility, 
to the fact that he brought to Geneva
in 1964 a KGB 
document identifying him as a lieutenant
colonel, 
and to the paradox that as a company grade officer
he held supervisory 
positions in which KGB officers of
significantly senior rank were his subordinates.
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In June 1962 NOSENKO volunteered that he was then a major,
but 
that 
he would soon be promoted to lieutenant colonel.
In 1964, in Frankfurt awaiting transportation to the
United States, NOSENKO reviewed and approved a biographic
statement which 
included the claim that he had been a senior
lieutenant in the American Embassy Section from 1952 (sic)
until 1955, that he was promoted to captain in 1956, to major
in 1959, and 
to lieutenant colonel in November 1963.
In the April 1964 interrogations NOSENKO claimed that
at the end of 1953 or the beginning of 1954 [not in 1952].
he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant. When it
was pointed out to him that that was less than a year after
he entered 
the KGB, he asserted that his Naval RU service
was taken into consideration.
Asked in June 1964 to list his promotions, chronologically,
NOSENKO 
asserted that 
he became a senior lieutenant in 1953,
in 1956 a captain, in 1959 a major and, in October [in
Geneva, just afterwards, he said November] 1963, he was
advised by Personnel that he had been promoted to lieutenant
colonel 
and afterwards was personally congratulated by
General 
GRIBANOV. NOSENKO did not recall the month of his
earlier promotions.
Comment: KGB defectors have commented that it would be
unusual for a KGB officer not to recall his
date of rank, from which he computes his
seniority and time in grade towards his next
promotion.
In January 1965, while discussing his role as case officer
for Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, NOSENKO volun-
teered 
out of context that he had never been a major nor was
he promoted to captain in 1956, as he had claimed earlier.
He explained that he became eligible for captain in 1956,
but 
his promotion was withheld as punishment because he had
obtained 
treatment for a venereal disease under an alias,
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with the use of KGB operational documents.
thus he was a senior 
lieutenant still in 1959, and although
He stated that
GRIBANOV had promised him that 
he would be promoted directly
to major at that time, an administrative 
error was made in
the personnel office, and he 
was just promoted to captain.
Instead of rectifying the mistake, 
NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV
persuaded him to remain a 
captain until (if a major) in 1963
he became eligible for promotion 
to lieutenant colonel.
In October 1963, he concluded
, he was promoted directly to
the rank of lieutenant colonel; he 
was never a major, and
he had served as senior lieutenant 
from 1953 to 1959, and
a captain from 1959 to 1963.
Comment:
According to this chronology, NOSENKO was merely
a captain when he claimed 
to have been Deputy
Chief of the American 
Embassy Section, and
still a captain 
for much of the time that he
was Deputy Chief 
of the Seventh Department.
In August 1965 interrogations NOSENKO still claimed that
he 
was proposed for advancement 
to captain in 1956, but he
stated that he was not promoted 
because of shortcomings in
his work. [He earlier had claimed 
he was being punished
for misuse of operational documents
.]
interrogator's question, NOSENKO replied that he had claimed
In response to his
earlier in 1962 and 1964 to have 
been a major because he
thought the truth would not have 
been believed.
In a voluntary statement written in April 1966, NOSENKO
alleged 
that he had been promoted 
to the rank of senior
lieutenant in 1956 [he earlier 
claimed 1953], to captain in
December 1959 [he could not previously 
remember the month]
and that at the end of 1963 he was 
recommended for the rank
of major. Continuing, NOSENKO 
said he had never held the
rank of lieutenant colonel, and 
the travel order (which he
brought to Geneva in 1964] 
indicating his rank as lieutenant
colonel; was filled out erroneously
.
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NOSENKO said in October 1966 interrogations that he had
lied when he had claimed in 1964 to be a lieutenant colonel,
that actually he had been but a captain. Asked why he had
claimed in 1962 that he had been a major, NOSENKO denied
that he had ever even mentioned his rank to CIA in 1962.
Conclusion
NOSENKO has stated that he became a senior lieutenant in
the KGB in 1952, April 1953, 1954, or 1956. He was promoted
to the rank of captain in 1956 or September/October/December
1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a lieutenant
colonel in October/November 1963. He brought to Geneva in
1964 an official KGB document dated November 1963 identifying
him as
a KGB lieutenant colonel. In retracting his claim
that he was ever a major or lieutenant colonel, NOSENKO
asserts that nevertheless as a captain, he held the position
of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. :
NOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to
his KGB rank parallel and are apparently related to his
contradicted and retracted claims regarding Naval RU
service, date of entry to the KGB, KGB assignments and
positions held, and in short, to the totality of his claims
regarding KGB service, few of which are credible.
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CHAPTER ✗
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
in his defection in Geneva.
Because of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has
encountered among many would-be defectors, the question of
NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early.
after
From the time of his arrival
United States he has been under psychiatric observa-
tion. In addition, he has undergone psychological examina-
tion. 
The CIA psychiatrist and psychologist, besides being
highly-qualified professionals, have both had extensive
experience with Soviet Bloc defectors. Their findings were
reached 
independently.
Psychological Examination
In April 1964 NOSENKO was administered a series of
psychological tests by the CIA psychologist. After monitoring
numerous 
interrogation sessions, the psychologist interviewed
NOSENKO for fourteen days during 3-21 April 1965, in an
attempt to develop sufficient insight into NOSENKO's persona-
lity to 
permit the obtaining of a truthful account of his
life.
Findings
NOSENKO is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive
person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons.
He is not a compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate what
he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the
truth as he knows it.. He lies by design as well as for
effect, however, and he does not always embroider just to
bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and
he suffers from 
no "delusions". NOSENKO's rationalizations.
are not the product of derangement.
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Psychiatric Examination
Since April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation
of 
the 
CIA psychiatrist. Besides monitoring many of the
interrogation 
sessions, the psychiatrist has visited NOSENKO
weekly for the 
first year, monthly until 1967, and at some-
what less 
frequent intervals since.
Findings
NOSENKO is neither psychotic nor neurotic. Of above
average intelligence, he is shrewd, perceptive, and highly
adaptable. His 
memory is not defective. Besides suffering
from ordinary 
lapses of memory, however, he sometimes
falsely claims lack of recall. NOSENKO's thought processes
are unimpaired; 
he is rational and fully capable of distin-
guishing fact 
from fiction.
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT:
Conclusion
The findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel
the 
notion that NOSENKO's 
behavior and his statements are
other than 
willful.
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
successively senior positions of authority from which he
derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and
results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet
Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim,
he provides an impressive array of information about KGB
personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent
that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his
bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-
gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's
claims.
The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known
facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects
the test to which his accounts were put: whether his
accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known
fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has
from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held.
In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own
accounts?
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This examination had led to the following findings,
arrived at independently:
-NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the
capacities or at the places and times he claimed.
-NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at
the time he claimed.
-NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section
throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.
-During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior
case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Depart-
ment 
American-British Commonwealth Section.
-NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American
Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in
the 
Section during the period 1961-1962.
-NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the
American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter
a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.
-NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB
recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and
his defection 
in 1964.
These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of
probability 
or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance
of available 
evidence in each instance.
The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive
evidence 
of 
NOSENKO's bona fides. The contradictions in
NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so
extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable.
While truth 
and fact in this case frequently cannot be
established with certainty, it is evident that truth and
fact 
are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test,
virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by
fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own
statements. 
NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus
he is 
not a bona fide defector.
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Top Secret
Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide
defector, it t is necessary to attempt to determine his true
motives for contacting American Intelligence and for
providing the information he has given. Here, it must be
recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's
own assertions
, does not permit unequivocal conclusions.
Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character
of the 
information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some
of his 
false claims have been corroborated by Soviet offi-
cials, 
and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's
future 
all require that at least a provisional judgment be
made.
Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's
misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a
a
swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of
personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged person-
ality or 
unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated
his actual 
rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply
personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB
agent.
The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That
NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for
personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident,
we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization,
personnel and operations which he has provided and which
could only derive from within the KGB itself.
Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and
psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out
the 
possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the
product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind.
It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB
officer who served.
some or all of the at least some of the components for
time periods that he claims, but who
greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to infor-
mation, and invented some matters outright, to achieve
greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation,
however, fails 
to accommodate the fact that several KGB
officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior
359
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positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with
respect to his rank, 
GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall
telegram, and the like, 
cannot be just a product of his own
invention, since these were the 
subject of comment by other
sources.
Because none' of the above explanations is consistent with
the 
data developed in interrogations 
and investigations, we
are left with the hypothesis that 
NOSENKO was dispatched by
the KGB. While this explanation 
does not reconcile all the
anomalies, none of them renders it 
untenable.
In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or
other 
persuasive evidence to 
the contrary, CIA finds that
the evidence establishes a 
presumption that NOSENKO was
dispatched by the KGB, and 
believes that prudence requires
that he be regarded as still 
responsive to KGB control, and
that his information should be 
assessed accordingly.
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Annex B
Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text
There follow NOSENKO's descriptions of KGB operations
involving Americans which 
do not clearly relate to specific
KGB positions he held at 
particular times and which thus
could not be 
usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB
service. The cases 
include, for example, Seventh Department
operations of which he 
said he learned while serving in the
American Department, 
and vice versa, as well as operations
conducted by KGB elements 
other than the Second Chief Direct-
orate. Unless otherwise 
specified, each entry reflects all
of the information 
NOSENKO provided.
-06.
ACTOR/PROCTOR
NOSENKO's Information
06.
An American known as ACTOR OF PROCTOR a valuable
First Chief Dobtained other documents with
agent who travelled overtly to
Western Europe
which to continue clandestinely to the USSR.
Comment:
-06-
The lead may refer to one Vernon W. PROCTOR
who visited 
the Soviet Union in the summer
of 
1963. The investigation is not complete.
NOSENKO's information 
was limited to that
contained in notes he brought to Geneva in
1964.
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06
[ALBINGER, Donald
св
NOSENKO's Information
[ALBINGER an American citizen born in 1937, visited the
USSR 
in 1963 and there was the 
target of a KGB investigation
in Sochi because he was believed 
to be an American Intelli-
gence agent. In Sochi (ALBINGER was in touch with a KGB
agent, "TRAPEZUND".
06
06
By NOSENKO's account, the ALBINGER case
by a provincial KGB element while NOSENKO was assigned to
was directed
the Seventh Department 
in Moscow.
Comment:
06
a
According to the FBI, Donald ALBINGER visited
the Soviet 
Union in 1963 and while there, in
Sochi, was 
associated with one Gazarian
OHANNES (sic, probably Oganes GAZARYAN),
Lebanese national who repatriated to the USSR
in the 1920's. 
OHANNES allegedly offered
06 (
ALBINGER 
intelligence-type photos which
06 ALBINGER 
said he refused to accept.
06
ALLOYAN, Lawrence
NOSENKO's Information
06
An American of Armenian background, (ALLOYAN visited the
USSR in November 1963 and contacted the KGB.
He stated to
KGB officers that he had been asked by an American Army
captain and military 
intelligence officer, to inform the
KGB of American 
Intelligence use of the Monterey Language
School.. The Army captain's 
name is possibly Hugo VAN KRAKOV), 06
and the KGB planned to contact him
.
NOSENKO noted the case
06 when ALLOYAN], a tourist, first contacted the KGB in Moscow
through a Seventh Department 
case officer.
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Comment:
an
but
Interviewed by the FBI in January 1965,
06 ALLOYAN denied having been in the USSR in 1963.
He stated that he 
was acquainted with a Hugo 06
VAN KRAKOW who had a son of 
the same name,
disclaimed 
knowledge that the latter was
Army captain
. 06 [ALLOYAN] said he had not seen
the son for 
twenty years. The younger VAN 06
KRAKOW was interviewed 
by the FBI and said
that he 
was discharged from the Army in 1953
a staff 
sergeant, and that he was not in
contact 
with [ALLOYAN. 06
as
* NOSENKO's Information was limited to that
contained in 
notes brought to Geneva in 1964.
APISSON, Henry] 06
NOSENKO's Information
06
An American citizen of Armenian origin, Henry EPISON
(sic
) was recruited by the 
KGB of the Armenian SSR in
April 1963, on 
ideological grounds. The recruitment was
believed not to have been firm, however, and the KGB
planned to renew it 
if EPISON returned to the USSR in 1964.06.
06 
EPISON had access to a military 
installation in the New
York suburbs.
Comment:
06
Henry APISSON, a naturalized American and the
owner of a 
hotel and restaurant near West 10
Point, N.Y.
, visited the USSR in 1963. In
1964 he 
acknowledged having had contacts with
Soviet officials 
in 1963 in Armenia, where he
may have 
conveyed an impression of willingness
to see them 
if they should later visit West 0
Point 06 APISSON
] claimed he did not realize the
approach was for 
intelligence purposes.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.
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06
[ARMSTRONG, Robert
06,08
NOSENKO's Information
ARMSTRONG, the American Ambassador's aide)] is known by
the 
KGB to be.having a homosexual 
affair with a
of the Danish 
Embassy,
a 
Code clerk 08,06
one Johannes BUHLE
close friend of another homosexual officer of the American
Embassy, Stephen HOFFMAN] (see below).
Comment:
06
ARMSTRONG is a
Recalled from Moscow and interviewed on the
basis of NOSENKO's allegation, [ARMSTRONG] 06
acknowledged the truth 
of the allegations.
Before resigning 
from the Department of State
in August 1964, he 
asserted that he had had no
contact with the 
KGB while serving in Moscow.
NOSENKO provided 
no source for his infor-
mation 
regarding 
ARMSTRONG), which was
Embassy Section 
case at a time when NOSENKO
claimed to 
be serving in the Seventh Depart-
ment.
a
06
06
BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin
06
NOSENKO's Information
[BARTHELEMY] twice led American tourist groups to the USSR
in 
1959, during which visits the KGB assessed 
him to be an
American Intelligence agent
.
one 
V.A. LAINE, a Finn] who was
He was subsequently in contact with
a 
KGB agent.
06,11
.06.
NOSENKO only learned of the BARTHELEMY] case and of his
Обсо
contact 
with [LAINE] while visiting 
the Leningrad KGB in 1963.
.06 [
BARTHELEMY]'s Seventh Department file 
indicated that he had
been under surveillance in 1959 because the KGB had informa-
tion he had graduated from 
an intelligence school.
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Comment:
06
BARTHELEMY was a CIA contact whose intelligence
connections were assumed to have been compromised
during his visits to the USSR. . He reported his
contacts with LAINE to CIA. BARTHELEMY's name 06
appeared in the KGB document on Western tourist
operations which GOLITSYN provided CIA.
(See p. 149 .)
0
0
0
0
.06.
BERMAN, Harold)
11
NOSENKO's Information
While on one of his frequent visits to the Soviet Union“,
American lawyer and prominent professor of law BERMAN was 06
surrounded by KGB agents, but the KGB "could do nothing with
him".
06
Comment: BERMAN) is a professor at Harvard University]
06
who is a specialist in the Soviet legal system.
He has visited the USSR on several occasions
for study and research, and he had described
E several incidents which occurred in Moscow
which appear to have been KGB provocations.
NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his
Of information on BERMAN, nor did he provide the
date he acquired the information.
BINDER, Peter
NOSENKO's Information
08.06.
The "top sergeant in charge of America House", BINDER,
was involved with a Soviet female employee at America House,
with whom at various times he had been intimate in his room.
He obtained for her items of clothing from the United States.
Since the KGB had been unable to obtain compromising photo-
06 graphs of BINDER and the Soviet girl, it had no means to
exert pressure on him, and a recruitment attempt thus failed.
403
0001635
Top Secret
+ BR
TS No. 197124.
10
Copy
14-00000
Top Secret
(Annex B)
06
BINDER, Peter (Continued).
NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI,
a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher.
Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer
Obworking against BINDER, and the Chief of the American
Department S.M. FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment
attempt, in 1962, by which time NOSENKO had transferred to
the Seventh Department and thus knew no further details.
Comment:
06
[U.S. Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER served
as [manager of the America House from 16 March 08, 09
1961 to 22 January 1963. On 15 January 1963 he
reported to Embassy officials that he had been
abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothes-
men, taken to a Militia station, and interro-
gated on the substance of a letter alleged to
have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his
interrogators threatened to send to the
Ambassador. The letter alleged that BINDER] 06
had lived with MORELLI as "man and wife" from
25 November 1961, had warned Soviet employees
against Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN,
that_MORELLI had told [BINDER she was pregnant 06
06 and BINDER] instructed her to get an abortion,
had engaged in blackmarketing::BETHTHEBECK_HK_NC_DER_ had 06
told ABIDIAN's replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY
about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY
had told him not to worry about it, and that
06
BINDER had told MORELLI that Embassy Officer
Richard C. JACOB was a "well-trained spy" and
that she and other Soviets should be wary of
him.
When BINDER] denied the allegations and 06
challenged the interrogators to send the
letter on to the Ambassador, he was allowed
to go free. 06 ⒷINDER] acknowledges that he was
intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her
gifts of money and clothing; and that she
said she thought she was pregnant in February
or March 1962; she never mentioned an abortion
and made no other demands of BINDER. BINDER
06.
06
404
0001636
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
13132
14-00000
ZAPE
(Annex B)
Top Secret
Comment:
:(Continued)
states that MORELLI "disappeared" in June or
July 1962, while BINDER was on leave.06.
Except for dating the recruitment attempt
in 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO's fragmentary
information coincides with BINDER's account. 06.
NOSENKO asserts that the notes brought to
Geneva in 1964 contained all information he
was able to discover. NOSENKO claims to have
been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section in
1961, supervising BINDER's and MORELLI's case
officers, but he relates his knowledge of the..
case neither to that period nor to the position
he then held.
06
BROCHES, Adam] 306
06
NOSENKO's Information
BROCHES, born in 1896, visited the Soviet Union with a
tourist group in 1960. He has relatives in the USSR, and
he was recruited in September 1960 by the KGB on ideological
grounds.
Comment
06
BROCHES was born in 1890. His brother,
06 Alexander, was born in 1896. GOLITSYN reported
that a Seventh Department officer told him in
061960 that Adam BROCHES had been a Soviet agent
in the 1920's and 1930's in Paris and that
when he visited the USSR as a tourist guide in
1959 or 1960 the KGB suspected that he might
be on an American Intelligence mission to
contact V.M. ZARUBIN, his one-time Soviet.
Intelligence superior in Paris. According to
GOLITSYN, the KGB placed (BROCHES under surveil- 06
lance and the Chief of the Seventh Department
was planning to discuss with ZARUBIN what
action the KGB should take.
0001637
405
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
GIBR
14-00000
(Annex B)
Top Secret
Comment:
(Continued)
06
Interviewed by the FBI, BROCHES said that
he escorted tours to the USSR three times in
1960, and that on his last trip, in September
1960, he was approached by Soviet officials
for information on members of his tour group.
06 BROCHES claimed he refused to cooperate and
denied that he had ever been a Soviet agent.
0 BROCHES said, however, that the allegation
might refer to another of his brothers, [Ignacy], 06
now dead.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in his written notes which he brought
to Geneva in 1964. NOSENKO claimed to have
been in the American Department when the
Seventh Department recruited BROCHES). 06
06
BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter
06
NOSENKO's Information
[BUNDARIN, born in 1917, the son of a Russian emigre, and
an employee of the "Four Winds Travel Agency) in New York 29
City, was recruited by the KGB in 1962 on ideological
grounds. He left the Four Winds agency) and his case is 29
inactive because the KGB is waiting for him to open his own
8 travel bureau. [BUNDARIN was handled by Seventh Department
case officer V.G. DERA.
Comment:
06
BUNDARIN, born 25 April 1917, the son of an
emigre and an employee of the Four Winds 29
agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen
days in 1962. He left the Four Winds agency] 29.
in 1962 to travel abroad, and he now works for
29 Hermes Travel of California. Interviewed by
06 the FBI, BUNDARIN denied any connection with
Soviet Intelligence. FBI reports indicate
406
0001638
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
TUBR
14-00000
(Annex B)
Top Secret
Comment:
(Continued)
06 BUNDARIN and parents associate with CPUSA
Dembers and participate in CP front organiza-
tion activities.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in his written notes which he
brought to Geneva in 1964.
06
CHRISTNER, Robert Charles]
NOSENKO's Information
While reviewing after his defection in 1964 a list of
Americans who had visited 
the Soviet Union, NOSENKO noted
06 
that one CHRISTNER 
had been arrested while touring the
Soviet Union by automobile. He 
did not indicate the source
or date of his acquisition of 
the information.
Comment:
06
FAIN, Thomas
06
As described in press accounts of the period.
and stated in a KGB 
document on American
tourists which GOLITSYN provided, CHRISTNER] 06.
He had a
was arrested in the Soviet Union on charges
of 
espionage in the summer of 1961.
CIA 
mission at the time, but he reported that
he had managed 
to maintain his tourist cover
throughout his 
intensive interrogations.
In
the summer of 1961 NOSENKO claims he was in the
Embassy 
Section of the American Department.
NOSENKO's Information
[FAIN] an "American consul" stationed in Yugoslavia, ] ||
visited Moscow in 1959. During that visit he encountered
NOSENKO's agent, VOLKOV
, who reported his suspicion that
407
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197124
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(Annex B)
.06
FAIN, Thomas (Continued)
06 [FAIN] was a homosexual. There was insufficient time during
06/FAIN's visit to arrange his entrapment.
06 [FAIN] was assigned permanently later in Moscow, and the
KGB planned at that time to entrap him with a homosexual.
Comment:
In a Department of State security interview
06 FAIN has stated that he recalled no Soviets
whom he had met during his five-day visit to
Moscow in 1959, except a female Inturist
guide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist.
reported no noteworthy incidents during his
later permanent assignment in Moscow.
06
FINK, David]
06
NOSENKO's Information
He
FINK is an American professor from Philadelphia and
frequent visitor to the USSR whom the Leningrad KGB hoped
to recruit on an ideological basis and through the use of a
female 
agent..
Because of his sister's love affair with a
Soviet he was refused a visa in 1963, but the KGB has
arranged so that he will be admitted to the USSR if he
applies again. NOSENKO learned of the case when the
Leningrad KGB objected to FINK's being denied a visa: 06
NOSENKO 
was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the
time.
S
Comment:
Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964,
06 [FINK] acknowledged that his sister was trying 08
to marry a Soviet citizen, but that she had
been refused a visa to visit the USSR for the
purpose. FINK admitted involvement with a
female in Leningrad, during his visit to the
:
408
0001640
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
12/BR
14-00000
(Annex B).
Top Secret
Comment:
06
[FISK, Norman
06
(Continued)
USSR in 1961, but denied recruitment. FINK 06
asserted that he had visited Europe every
summer since 1957 (except in 1959, when he
went to Mexico), and that he had only visited
the USSR once, in 1961.
NOSENKO's Information.
FISK visited the USSR as a tourist in 1959, when he was
assessed to be a homosexual. The KGB planned to attempt to
recruit him if he returned to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO
Obnoted [FISK's name while reviewing files of YEFREMOV and
VOLKOV (see p.145) in 1963.
Comment: FISK visited the USSR with his wife and parents
in 1959. In an interview with the FBI in
December 1964 he claimed that his only Soviet
contacts i in the USSR were with Inturist
personnel and a spinster niece. NOSENKO
never explained why he learned of the case
only from the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in
1963, since he claims he was their case officer
at the t
time FISK visited the Soviet Union, in
1959.
06
06.
[GINSBERG, Michael]
NOSENKO's Information
NOSENKO'S
06
A professor GINSBERG visited the USSR in 1957 or 1958,
when operational contact was established between him and
the KGB.
409
Top Secret
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TS No. 197124
Copy
10
S/BR?
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(Annex B)
Comment:
Top Secret
06
One Professor Michael GINSBERG] reported to U.S.
officials in Helsinki in 
August 1956 that he
had been the target 
of a Soviet recruitment
attempt earlier in 
Moscow.
been identified by CIA as
His contact has
a KGB officer whom
06 (GINSBERG)], according to the FBI, has met during
subsequent visits to the USSR.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in his 
written notes which he
brought to 
Geneva in 1964.
06
GROVER, Preston
06
NOSENKO's Information
08
GROVER, currently (in 1964) [Associated Press corres-
pondent 
in Moscow, is a recruited KGB 
agent handled by the
Tenth Intelligensia and Correspondents
) Department of the
Second Chief Directorate.
Comment:
06
Preston GROVER retired in 1965 and now lives
in France with his 
wife. % GROVER's wife was
born in Russia and 
apparently emigrated at
about the time of the 1917 Revolution. GROVER] 06
a corres-
According to
met her in Moscow, where she was
pondent 
for a French newspaper.
FBI reports
, she associated with known
Communists in 
the United States during an
earlier assignment 
here. NOSENKO indicated
no source of his information on
[GROVER]. 06
0001642
410
Top Secret
GIBR
TS No. 197124
Copy

14-00000
(Annex B).
nex
06
HAMZAVI, Charles P
P]
Top Secret
NOSENKO's Information
.06.
An American, one Charles KHAMZAL (sic) was the object of
considerable interest to the KGB during his 26 October-1
November 1963 visit to the USSR. A KGB officer under cover
was in contact with him in Moscow and the KGB planned to
resume this contact in the United States The Seventh
Department action with respect to KHAMZAI was in response 06
to a request from the First Chief Directorate for assis-
tance in developing a contact with him in Moscow.
Comment:
NOSENKO's lead has been identified as Charles 06
P. HAMZAVI, who has been noted in frequent
contact with Soviet officials from 1955, when
he immigrated to the United States, until 1963.
According to the FBI, he was in Moscow in 1963,
when he was in contact with a Foreign Ministry
official which CIA identifies as KGB officer
I. D. BORISOV.
HARMSTONE, Richard
NOSENKO's Information
In 1958 or 1959 the American Department's Embassy Section
attempted to recruit HARMstone, a Second or Third Secretary 06,08
at the Embassy. Both male and female agents were used
against him, and photographs were obtained of HARMSTONE'S 06
homosexual as well as heterosexual activities. When confronted,
Obhowever, [HARMSTONE refused to collaborate with the KGB.
06 HARMSTONE reported the approach to American officials, but
asserted that he was involved just in heterosexual compromise.
NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV documents (see p.. 309) in
1964, including the KGB plan of operations against HARMSTONE]. 06
NOSENKO confirmed the substance and eventual success of the
plan, which was to get HARMSTONE drunk and photograph him
06
0001643
411
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
10
111BR
14-00006
Top Secret
(Annex B)
06
HARMSTONE, Richard (Continued)
Because the
while in intimate relations with a Soviet girl.
KGB concluded 
that [HARMSTONE had not reported the homo-06
sexual compromise, it was 
planned to attempt to recruit him
again later, when he was 
transferred elsewhere abroad.
If
66 HARMSTONE) had reported the homosexual compromise, it would
have been monitored by the KGB
Minister Counselor's office.
over the microphone in the
In later questioning NOSENKO stated that he learned of
the KGB case officer was, but was certain that the latter
had left the 
Embassy Section. If HARMSTONE] had reported 66
his compromise, he surmised, he 
would have been withdrawn
immediately 
from Moscow, and HARMSTONE did not leave the 06
Soviet Union prematurely
.
Obthe HARMSTONE case from KOVSHUK. He could not recall who
Comment:
06
06
HARM-
Richard C. HARMSTONE), who served in Moscow [from
October 1957 to 
October 1959 as Second 08.09
Secretary, 
reported to the Embassy Security
Officer 
on 23 May 1959 that a KGB officer had
tried to 
recruit him after threatening exposure
through 
doctored photographs purporting to
show [
HARMSTONE's homosexual activities.
STONE 
subsequently identified from a visa
application photograph the KGB officer as
"KOMAROV", 
an overt contact of Embassy
colleague WINTERS. [HARMSTONE left the Soviet 06
Union six 
months later, admitted homosexual
activities, and resigned from the Department
of State. 
The relevant portions of the
06
CHEREPANOV Papers confirm HARMSTONE's admissions 06
with respect 
to KGB agents with whom he was
involved. 
"KOMAROV" has been identified as
KOVSHUK
, NOSENKO's superior in the Embassy
Section and 
the source of what NOSENKO said he
learned 
of the case.
412
0001644
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Copy
121182
14-00000
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1
108,06
(Annex B)
HOFFMAN, F. Stephen 06
NOSENKO's Information
_ An American Embassy official and a friend of the
Ambassador's aide Robert ARMSTRONG)] (see above), HOFFMAN (06
is known to have engaged in homosexual acts with an Armenian
in Yerevan. The KGB currently (in 1964) is planning to
attempt to compromise and recruit [HOFFMAN
Comment:
06
06
Interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allega-
06 tion, HOFFMAN] in a State Department security
interview denied homosexual activities.
Informed that the results of a polygraph.
examination indicated he had practiced deception
on that question, HOFFMAN resigned from the
Department of State on 31 July 1964. [HOFFMAN G
asserted that he had no contact with the KGB
while assigned in Moscow, an assertion.
supported by the polygraph examination.
NOSENKO claims he was assigned to the
Seventh Department at the time [HOFFMAN was 06
target of the Embassy Section of the
American Department.
the
HOWARD, Herbert
06 08
NOSENKO's Information
0b
HOWARD, a USIA employee, was assigned temporarily for
four months to the Embassy in Moscow in spring 1962 as a
[publications procurement officer. He was recruited by the
KGB. G.I. 
GRYAZNOV, of the American Department Embassy
Section, requested NOSENKO's help in obtaining a hotel room
adjacent to HOWARD's, for a woman from Leningrad.
:06
413
Top Secret
112/BR
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Copy
10
14-00000**
(Annex B)
Top Secret
06
Comment: HOWARD denied recruitment in an interview with
the FBI, although 
a polygraph examination
indicated he was 
disturbed on related questions.
06 [HOWARD] had earlier declared his intention to
divorce his American wife 
and marry a Soviet
national. His 
contract with USIA] expired in 29
December 1964 and was not renewed
.
NOSENKO claims to have been serving in the
Seventh Department at the time [HOWARD_)
target of the Embassy Section.
06..
HUSTON, Hayden Henry]
06
NOSENKO's Information
06
was a
One HUSTON (fnu) travelled to the USSR on official U.S.
Government business from his 
assignment in Belgrade.
06 
Moscow [HUSTON was photographed 
making a blackmarket deal
In 
10
in a taxi, but the KGB did not 
exploit the incident because
06 
HUSTON did not again visit the 
USSR.
Comment:
08.06
USIA employee Hayden Henry HUSTON was inter-
viewed on 30 October 
1963 regarding a report
that he had been 
arrested in Yugoslavia] in !(
1954 as a result of his sexual 
activities.
06 HUSTON served in Yugoslavia) for eight years-\(
From 1953 until January 
1962. During that
interview he stated that during his tour in
10 
Belgrade he made 
two trips to the USSR, and he
asserted that there were no 
other incidents in
| 
Yugoslavia or 
elsewhere in the Soviet Bloc
which could be used 
to compromise him.
29 
Currently on
a
06
USIA assignment in Taiwan)], [HUSTON]
has not been 
interviewed with 
respect to
NOSENKO's 
allegation.
6001646
414.
Top Secret
18/BR
TS No. 197124
Copy
14-00000
Top Secret
(Annex B)
JAFFE, Sam 06
06
NOSENKO's Information
08
In
JAFFE Can ABC correspondent in Moscow, is an active KGB
agent who was cultivated and recruited by V.A. KUSKOV.
1963, while in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asked Ameri-
can Department Embassy Section officer GRYAZNOV for an agent
who could be used against a visiting American delegation,
and GRYAZNOV suggested JAFFE.
66.
Comment 4. Before NOSENKO's information was received,
✓ JAFFE reported his recruitment by one "Slava
KISLOV" in October 1962. In a CIA interview
06 in December 1966 JAFFE did not recognize A.K.
KISLOV's photograph but identified a photo-
graph of KUSKOV as being the KGB officer who
recruited him in 1962. JAFFE was expelled 06
from the USSR in October 1965. As far as CIA
is aware, he has not been interviewed on the
basis of NOSENKO's information.
KANTOR, Marvin
NOSENKO's Information
to
Melvin (sic) KANTOR, a Harvard student, was recruited on
His case was turned over
ideological grounds in 1961.
the First Chief Directorate.
Comment
Marvin KANTOR, a Slavic-language instructor
'at the University of Michigan, visited the USSR
in 1958 or 1959. When interviewed by CIA in
1961 he admitted having had contact with Soviet
Intelligence officers in the Soviet Union in
1959, but asserted that he then had flatly
refused to collaborate with Soviet Intelligence.
415
Top Secret
0001647
TS No. 197124
10
Copy
7:53
(Annex B)
Top Secret
Comment:
(Continued)
When interviewed in 1963, KANTOR said he had
not travelled 
to the USSR since 1959.
NOSENKO's information was limited to written
notes 
brought 
in 1964 to Geneva. NOSENKO
claims he was in the Seventh Department in
1959, at the 
actual time of KANTOR's recruit-
ment, 
and does not explain why the KANTOR case
was included 
among cases he noted
occurred while he was
as having
in 1960-1961.
in the Embassy Section
KAZAN-KOMAREK 06
06.
NOSENKO's Information
KOMAREK, an American of Czech descent and somehow
connected with a tourist 
service in the United States, has
been identified by the 
Czech Secret Police as being in
contact with Western 
Intelligence and they have been trying,
to locate him. The Czechs have 
learned that [KOMAREK] might
possibly visit the Soviet 
Union and have requested [the KGB]
that he be arrestedcon arrival 
and deported to Czechoslovakia.
The Soviets have agreed and 
Inturist is currently attempting
to induce [KOMAREK into visiting the 
Soviet Union.
Comment:
06
The subject of NOSENKO's lead was [Vladimir 06.
Joseph KAZAN-KOMAREK
, a naturalized American
citizen and the operator of the Harvard Travel 29,10
Tourist Agency in Cambridge, Massachusetts
).
He has never had any covert relationship with
CIA or other 
U.S. intelligence agencies.
August 1963 
the FBI was advised by another
In
source of the Soviet-Czech plan to lure (KAZAN - 06
KOMAREK to the Soviet Union and take him to
Czechoslovakia 
where he would be tried for
espionage.
0001648
416
1
1
TS No. 197124
1
Top Secret
Copy
7138
1
14-00000
(Annex B)
Top Secret
Comment:
(Continued)
NOSENKO's information, which he reported
only to the FBI, was substantially accuratė.
In October 1966, after being warned of the
risk by the FBI, KAZAN-KOMAREK visited Moscow 06.
for an Inturist travel agents conference and,
en route back to Paris, was arrested in Prague
when his AEROFLOT flight was diverted.
NOSENKO's sourcing for this lead, which
presumably relates to his 1962-64 service in
the Seventh Department, had not been established.
CIA did not learn of NOSENKO's report on [KAZAN-06.
KOMAREK until the latter was arrested in
Czechoslovakia in 1966, by which time NOSENKO's
interrogation had been suspended.⠀
06
[MATLAW, Ralph]
06
NOSENKO's Information.
One MATLO (sic) visited the USSR, in 1959, and the KGB
concluded that he was a homosexual and planned to attempt
to recruit him if he should return to the Soviet Union.
NOSENKO noted the information while reviewing YEFREMOV and
VOLKOV's file prior to their retirement.
Comment
The identity of NOSENKO's lead has been
confirmed to be one Ralph MATLAW.06 The case
is still under investigation. NOSENKO claims
to have been YEFREMOV's and VOLKOV's case
officer at the time one of them was in touch
with MATLAW] in 1959, but learned of the case
only later when reviewing those agents' files.
417
Top Secret
6/BR
0001649
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
14-0000-
Top Secret
(Annex B)
06
NIELSEN, Philip
06
NOSENKO's Information
connected
NIELSEN visited the USSR the first time in 1957 or 1958.
Because he made the acquaintance of some "teddy boys" in
Moscow and tried to acquire from them a
Telephone Directory, the KGB suspected that he was
with CIA. NIELSEN) was kept under surveillance during this
copy of the Moscow
and all subsequent trips, but was
intelligence tasks.
fell in love with KGB agent Tamara KUNGAROVA), and the KGB 06
used her in the development of (NIELSEN.06 For purposes of
assessment, LEONOV, a Seventh Department officer, was
never observed in other
On one of his visits to Moscow, NIELSEN
06
Obintroduced to ENCIKKEKELES:CHECKED)]) in the role of (KUNGAROVA)'s father, but 06
NOSENKO heard later that DNCIELSEN] ÜC
with no positive result.
and KUNGAROVA had married and were living in London.
06.08
NOSENKO was involved in the determination of [NIELSEN]
possible intelligence status on his first trip.
himself and LEONOV, American Department case officer Viktor
's 06
KOPEYKIN was also involved.
Besides
Comment:
08.06
NOSENKO has asserted variously that he recruited
KUNGAROVA] in 1955 and that she was his agent
until 1960, and that she was already an agent
in 1958 when she transferred into the Seventh
Department from the British Commonwealth Depart-
ment.
06
visited
One of his
[NIELSEN, a CIA agent at the time,
the Soviet Union in April 1958.
tasks on this trip was to obtain a Soviet
telephone book. (NCKIELSEN) met [KUNGAROVA on a
later trip, in January 1959. Despite CIA
06
a
warnings that he was involved in what appeared
to be a KGB operation, NIELSEN returned to see 06
her in Moscow in January 1960, and there met
person representing himself as KUNGAROVA's 06
father. 06 NIELSEN returned to Moscow in 1962,
married KUNGAROVA, and they moved to France.
[KUNGAROVA] died in France in 1965. In January
06
418
6001650
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
20139
1
14-00000
(Annex B)
Top Secret
Comment:
06.
(Continued)
1960, when NOSENKO claims personal knowledge
66 of NIELSEN's meeting with KUNGAROVA's "father", 06
he was not in the Seventh Department, but in
the American Embassy Section.
[NIXON, Dmitriy]
NOSENKO's Information
06
An American tourist, NIXON was recruited by
○ eventh
Department case officers in June 1963. NOSENKO was not in
Moscow at the time, and knew no further details.
Comment:
Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's
06 information, NIXON] admitted having been
recruited while visiting the Soviet Union. He
was not contacted by the KGB in the United
States, although such arrangements had been
made at the time of his recruitment. On a visit
to Moscow in 1964, after NOSENKO's defection,
06 NIXON was again contacted by the KGB and he
agreed to collaborate for fear of reprisals
against relatives in the USSR.
06
Paul]
OMELICH, Paul
06.
NOSENKO s. Information
OMELICH was contacted by KGB officers during the Winter
Olympics at Squaw Valley, California. Although he was not
recruited, he was to be recontacted by KGB officers later,
in Switzerland. Off When: TCKMEMEKLICH visited Moscow in August 1963,
Seventh Department American Section case officer K.G. KRUPNOV
arranged for First Chief Directorate officer (fnu) ZAYTSEV
to meet the American.
419
Top Secret
0001651
TS No. 197124
100
Copy
98R
(Annex B)
Comment:
Top Secret
06
He
In 1963 [①MELICH] reported his earlier contacts
with Soviet officials at Squaw Valley.
denied that he had ever met KGB officers later,
or that any meeting arrangements were made for
Switzerland, although he admitted "he may have
given the impression of sympathy toward Soviets".
PECHTER, Bernard
06.
NOSENKO's Information
[PECHTER was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1959.
06
Comment: In December 1959, a month after [PECHTER'
06
S
return from the USSR, the FBI learned that he
had revealed his homosexual compromise and
recruitment by the KGB to
group.
a member of his tour
NOSENKO cited the PECHTER case not 06
from memory, but from his written notes brought
to Geneva in 1964. Although presumably a
Seventh Department case, NOSENKO did not relate
it to his service there in 1959, nor did he
indicate the source of his information.
[PRESSMAN, Aron]
NOSENKO's Information
06
Patrick (sic) PRESSMAN visited the USSR in October 1957
with a delegation of American metallurgists and was recruited
at that time by the KGB.. The case was afterwards turned
over to the First Chief Directorate.
420
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Comment:.
NOSENKO's lead is believed to relate to Aron 06
PRESSMAN, a long-time Communist and a friend
06 of Bernard KOTEN (see p.295), whose sister
has resided in the Soviet Union since her 1945
marriage to a Soviet citizen who has been
identified as a courier for Soviet Intelligence.
0 PRESSMAN accompanied a delegation of metallur-
gists from NYU on an exchange visit to the
Moscow Mining Institute in 1957%; he himself
surveyed Soviet language training programs
during this visit. He denied any recruitment
approach was made to him there or on subsequent
trips to the USSR.
06:
NOSENKO cited the PRESSMAN case from his
written notes brought to Geneva in 1964.
He
did not relate it to his Seventh Department
service nor did he indicate the source of his
information.
06
PROCTOR, fnu
See ACTOR Db
RASK, Walter 06
06.08
NOSENKO's Information
RASK, the president of World Wide Tours, was recruited in
the USSR in 1960. He has returned to the USSR several times
since. He is used for spotting tourists suspected of having
intelligence affiliations.06 The KGB has received only one
open code message from [RASK since recruitment. [RASK] was 06
recruited by Seventh Department case officer Ye. N. NOSKOV
while NOSENKO was assigned to the American Department. On
subsequent visits to the USSR he was met by Seventh Depart-
ment case officers of the American-British Commonwealth
Section.
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(Annex B)
06
Comment: [RASK]), a former CIA contact who visited the USSR
several times, reported the KGB recruitment
approach in 1961.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in written notes he brought to Geneva
in 1964. He did not relate the case to his
1962-1964 Seventh Department service.
06
ROBERTS, Spencer
06
NOSENKO's Information
[ROBERTS] was recruited at the end of 1962 after being
compromised with a homosexual in Sochi, USSR. The case was
turned over to the KGB First Chief Directorate, and [ROBERTS 06
was recontacted by a KGB officer in the United States.
06 [ROBERTS confessed his recruitment to the FBI, news of which
reached the KGB, and his KGB case officer in the United
States was hastily recalled to Moscow.
06
The
[ROBERTS was handled by the American Department because
he was a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow.
case officers were V.M. MIKHAYLOV, V.A. KUSKOV, and V.M.
KOVSHUK. NOSENKO learned of the events in the U.S. from
B.A. SOLOMATIN, a First Chief Directorate American Depart-
ment case officer.
06
Comment: [ROBERTS had been coopted as a CIA represen-
tative in Moscow in 1950, while he was a State
Department officer assigned to the Embassy in
Moscow. He confessed his recruitment by the
KGB to the FBI in the fall of 1962. He was
contacted by a Soviet official from the UN in
New York in mid-1963. That official apparently
suddenly departed the United States in December
1963. NOSENKO did not indicate the original
source of his information on (ROBERTS).
422
06
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ROSS, Johanna
06
NOSENKO's Information
The former governess to the American Ambassador's family
who now (in 1964) teaches at the American school] in Moscow 08
was recruited by the KGB on the basis of sexual involvements.
The case was handled by the American Department at the time
NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department.
Comment:
NOSENKO's information was limited to written
notes brought to Geneva in 1964. He does not
indicate the source of his information.
06 ROSS reported to the American Embassy of
her arrest in Kiev in 1958 on charges of immoral
behavior with a Soviet citizen. In a May 1965
FBI interview she admitted contact in Moscow
in September 1963 with the KGB, which stemmed
from her continued relationship with the same
Soviet citizen, but she denied that the KGB
attempted to recruit her or contact here..
thereafter.
RUFE,
06
John
NOSENKO's Information
·06.
The KGB discovered that RUFE was a homosexual during his
visit to the USSR in 1959.
1962, he was entrapped and
marginal value to the KGB,
When he returned to the USSR in
recruited. The case was only of
and it was terminated in 1963.
423
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06
Comment: RUFE a New York City attorney, has admitted
that he had 
been compromised while visiting
the USSR in 1962 
and that he was in contact
with KGB 
officers in the United States until
November 1963
.
06
NOSENKO did not relate the [RKKUKKE_ case
specifically to his Seventh Department service
when he cited it 
from writen notes brought to
Geneva in 1964, 
nor did he indicate the source
of his information
. His notes state that [RUFE] 06
was recruited on 
homosexual grounds by the
American-British 
Commonwealth Section of the
Seventh Department, jointly with the UKGB of
Leningrad Oblast.
06
SCHWARZENBACH, Collette
06
NOSENKO's Information
The
an
SCHWARZENBACH, who was working in Moscow at the time,
fell 
in love with a male KGB 
agent and was
unsuccessful 
KGB recruitment attempt in 1958 or 1959.
the target 
of
KGB had incriminating 
photography, but NOSENKO did not
believe it was used, the 
KGB appeal being based solely on
her affection for the Soviet 
people.
the 
American Department Embassy Section directed the opera-
V.M. MIKHAYLOV of
tion. NOSENKO never read the 
SCHWARZENBACH file, but he
later saw it and the 
incriminating photographs.
Comment:
06
06
06,08,09
(SCHWARZENBACH was during 1955 and 1956 secre-
Eary to Mrs. BOHLEN
, the wife of the American
Ambassador, 
and director of the Anglo-American
School in Moscow. 
In 1956 and 1957 she worked
for Henry SHAPIRO, United Press correspondent] 06,08
in Moscow (see p. 76). While employed by
SHAPIRO she became 
acquainted with one Viktor
I. SERGEYEV, a 
Soviet publishing functionary.
424
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(Annex B):
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01
Comment:
(Continued)
In
January 1959 she was approached in Riga by
a KGB officer who confronted her with incrimi-
nating photographs and solicited her cooperation
in providing information on the U.S. Embassy.
She. immediately reported the event to [SHAPIRO, 06
who informed then-Ambassador THOMPSON, and
O SCHWARZENBACH left the USSR shortly thereafter
In early 1959. She provided details of the
KGB recruitment attempt to a State Department
Regional Security Officer in [Geneva] on 4 June
1959.
10.
06
☐ NOSENKO did not recall from whom he learned
of the SCHWARZENBACH] case, which was directed
by the American Department Embassy Section while
he was assigned to the Seventh Department.
06
06
SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene Sergey
NOSENKO's Information
.06
29
a
In 1955-1957, SEREBRENNIKOV, an employee of the Library
of Congress, visited Moscow with a Congressional delegation.
SEREBRENNIKOV had a brother who was a Soviet citizen, a
doctor living in Sverdlovsk. Assigned to the Seventh
Department at the time, NOSENKO himself arranged for the
brother to be brought to Moscow and briefed him for a
Ob meeting at which (SEREBRENNIKOV would be "felt out" as
prospective collaborator with the KGB. The meeting took
place, but the brother told the KGB that he had had no
opportunity to discuss with (SEREBRENNIKOV] the possibility 06
of his helping the Soviet Union. [SEREBRENNIKOV was in 06
Moscow only for a few days, and there was no opportunity
for another meeting. The KGB concluded that SEREBRENNIKOV's 06
suspicions were aroused by his brother's behavior.
425
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Comment:
SEVERN
According to his 1964 interview with the FBI,
06 [SEREBRENNIKOV) visited the Soviet Union in 1956
in the company of Senator Henry H. Jackson.
On his 
last night in Moscow he received in his
hotel room a 
telephone call from a person
claiming to 
be his brother from Sverdlovsk,
whom he had 
not seen since 1918. The "brother"
requested 
a meeting, but [SEREBRENNIKOV] was 06
convinced from the 
caller's uneducated speech
and other 
signs that he was
06 SEREBRENNIKOV's brother, and he refused to
not in fact
him. 
SEREBRENNIKOV] immediately advised
Senator Jackson 
of the incident, as well as
Embassy 
officials. After [SEREBRENNIKOV 06
returned to the 
United States, the incident
was described 
in an article in Newsweek
сь
magazine.
Gerald
see
об
NOSENKO's Information
[SEVERN, KGB cryptonym "EDVIN" was recruited in Moscow
by 
the Seventh Department in 
1958 or 1959 on ideological
grounds. He is a valuable 
all-purpose agent.
His case
officer was V.M. IVANOV.
06
Comment: SEVERN], a naturalized American citizen whose
name 
originally was [Gennadiy SEVASTYANOV), had 06
Russian-born parents
. He enjoys special
residence arrangements in Moscow, and prior
to receipt 
of the NOSENKO lead he was suspected
to be a KGB 
agent .06 SKEEVERNI :) has not visited the
United States since 
1961, and he has not been
interviewed 
by the FBI.
NOSENKO's information was limited
contained in his written notes which he brought
to that
to Geneva in 1964.
426
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06:
SHATTAUER, Sofia Greta
Top Secret
NOSENKO's Information
:06
In September 1962 SHATTAUER visited the Soviet Union and
was recruited by Seventh Department case officer D.A.
DITYATEV. She had originally been recruited in Poland in
1946-1947 but she was never contacted again because the KGB.
believed her to be known to American Intelligence.
Comment:
06
In 1962 an FBI source reported that SHATTAUER]
stated she was looking forward to her trip to
the USSR and "to being away from the imperia-
list policies of the United States", and that
06 SHATTAUER "appeared enthusiastic about Russian
ideology". In July 1964 (SHATTAUER] admitted to 06
the FBI that she had had intelligence contact.
with Soviet officers in Poland in 1947 and that
she was recontacted by the KGB in September
1962 in Moscow, after which she periodically.
met a KGB officer in New York City until May
1964.
NOSENKO's information was limited to that
contained in his written notes brought to
Geneva in 1964. He did not indicate the source
of his information.
06
SOCHUREK, Howard
NOSENKO's Information
08,06
The former Time-Life correspondent in Moscow, SOCHUREK
was probably recruited by the KGB and was an agent of
Vadim BIRYUKOV.06 [SOCHUREK returned briefly to Moscow in
1962 when Seventh Department surveillance noted his associa-
tion with BIRYUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth (Intelli-
gensia and Correspondents) Department of the Second Chief
Directorate.
0001659
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Comment:
06
06
[SOCHUREK who was assigned to Moscow in 1958-
1960, reported to the Embassy a number of
instances in which Soviet officials attempted
to pressure him or in which he was in touch
with identified KGB officers. [SOCHUREK has 06
named BIRYUKOV as the guide and interpreter
who invariably accompanied him while he was
stationed in the USSR. NOSENKO has not
indicated the source of his information on
SOCHUREK
06.
STEVENS, Francis
06
NOSENKO's Information
08
STEVENS, an American correspondent, visited the Soviet
Union in 1961 as a tourist.
Department officers KOVSHUK and KLYPIN, who entrapped him
He was the target of American
with a Soviet female, accused him of rape, and blackmailed
him into accepting recruitment,
06 "SERGEY". STEVENS, however, described the recruitment
His KGB cryptonym was
attempt in a letter to his mother which he deposited at
the Embassy. The letter was opened and read by the
Minister Counsellor, who immediately dictated a cable
summarizing the events described in the letter to the
Department of State. The KGB monitored the dictation
through the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.
First Chief Directorate officers nevertheless planned to
resume contact with STEVENS) in New York City.
06
08,06
Although a tourist and a [correspondent, STEVENS was
concern of the Embassy Section because he was
member of the Embassy staff.
a former
08
the
0001660
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(Annex B)
Comment:
06
06
STEVENS, after his compromise concerned for
his safety for the remainder of his 1961 visit
to Moscow, did deposit with the Embassy a
letter to his mother. However, he also gave
Ambassador Thompson a written report of the KGB
entrapment, immediately after the incident,
and he was interviewed about the matter by the
Minister Counsellor the following day. Inter-
viewed periodically by the FBI following his
return to the United States in 1961, STEVENS] 06
has denied any further contact with the KGB.
According to the notes which NOSENKO
brought to Geneva in 1964, on the basis of
which he reported the STEVENS] case, STEVENS 06
recruitment was accomplished jointly by the
American British Commonwealth Section of the
Seventh Department and the American Depart-
ment's Embassy Section.
TARASKA, William
06
·08.
NOSENKOs Information
TARASKA, a New York City policeman, had been developed
by the KGB while visiting the Soviet Union in 1958.
Although considered in 1958 a "stupid and unpromising
target", the Ukrainian KGB was still interested in
attempting to recruit him while he was in the Soviet Union
in June 1963.
Comment:
0%
TARASKA, who had visited the Soviet Union in
1958, was recruited by CIA for a mission in
1960. When he returned to the United States
he reported that the KGB had attempted to
recruit him on both visits. TARASKA returned 06.
to the USSR in 1963 and later reported to the
FBI that the KGB had again attempted to
recruit him during that visit.
429
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(Annex B)
Comment: (Continued)
2 1:| ༨
Top Secret
NOSENKO does not indicate the
information on
source of his
TARASKA
06
06
THOMPSON, John
NOSENKO's Information
06
American professor (THOMPSON), a specialist in Russian
literature or Russian History
, became involved with Tamara
KUNGAROVA, a KGB agent within 
Inturist.
with 
KUNGAROVA and incriminating photographs were taken.
He was intimate
The KGB did not attempt to 
recruit him, however,
planned to continue 
his assessment and establish additional
grounds for his recruitment if 
he returned to the USSR.
When he did not return, NOSENKO 
reviewed THOMPSON's file 06
and recommended that the case be 
retired to KGB Archives.
06,08
but
Comment: Dr. John M. THOMPSON, Associate Professor of
History at 
Indiana University, was interviewed
by the FBI in April 1965. 
He identified
KUNGAROVA's 
photograph as that of his Inturist
guide during a trip 
outside Moscow in 1959,
and admitted 
having been intimate with her.
When he returned to 
Moscow in 1960 he had
sought 
out KUNGAROVA, who told him she had
been demoted 
in Inturist because of her
[declared intention to marry an American (see
Philip NIELSENT). THOMPSON 
also visited the D6
Soviet Union In 
1964:06 [THOMPSON stated that
he was unaware of any 
photographs the KGB
might have and that 
he was
by the KGB
never approached
on either trip.
of, 06
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(Annex B)
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1
Comment:
06
(Continued)
KUNGAROVA was interviewed by the FBI in
June 1965. She confirmed that she had been
intimate with THOMPSON in 1959 but denied that 06
she had been instructed to compromise him.
NOSENKO has claimed KUNGAROVA was his agent
in 1959, although he has not related that claim
to his description of her role in the THOMPSON] 06
case.
TORREY, Carmen
06.
NOSENKO's Information
TORREY who was in love with a Soviet citizen, was
recruited by Seventh Department case officers on that basis
in 1960 and turned over to the First Chief Directorate,
which helped her obtain employment at the UN (also given as
NATO). NOSENKO was in the American Department at the time.
06-
Comment: In 1960 it was reported that TORREY planned to
defect to the USSR because she was in love
with a Soviet citizen. In 1961 she married an
American. In 1962 GOLITSYN reported KGB
attempts to recruit an American identifiable
06 as TORREY during her October or November 1959
visit to Moscow.06 TORREY worked for the Pan 29
American Union in 1954-1959, but there is no
indication that she was ever employed by the
UN or by NATO.
NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his
information on TORREY & In 1959, when GOLITSYN
reported the KGB attempted to recruit TORREY], 06
NOSENKO claims he was in the Seventh Depart-
ment, not the American Department.
431
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06
TWAROG, Leon
Top Secret
NOSENKO's Information
An American professor of Russian Literature and a fluent
Russian 
speaker (DCM [TWAROG] visited 
the Soviet Union in 1962
or 1963. The target of Seventh 
Department case officer
K.G. KRUPNOV TWAROG] was 
lured into intimacy with a female
KGB agent, of which the KGB took 
incriminating photographs.
At one point Seventh Department 
case officer Yevgeniy NOSKOV
was placed in direct contact with 
[TWAROG, but no recruitment 06.
attempt was made because the KGB had concluded that the
incriminating 
photographs were not sufficient to ensure
success. The KGB deferred further action pending (TWAROG's 06
expected return to the Soviet Union in 
1964 or 1965.
Comment:
06
one
In a 1965 interview with the FBI, TWAROG) said
he had visited the USSR 
in 1957, 1960, 1962,
and 1964. 
On his 1962 trip he had met and
befriended one 
Nina S. PETROVA, and on
occasion 
they attended a party accompanied by
friends of hers, a 
Soviet couple. The man
name was Yevgeniy 
06 TWAROC stated that he
was later 
intimate with PETROVA, but was
confronted by 
anyone about that fact.
S
never
In 1964
(after NOSENKO's defection), TWAROG] stated, he 06
was approached in the USSR by Arthur HAMAN, an
Estonian whom he 
had met in Cambridge,
Massachusetts 
in 1962. HAMAN, who had defected
in Sweden in 
1955, redefected to the USSR in
1962. 
According to TWARDOG_B HAMAN offered 06
$50,000 if TWAROG
] would provide background 06
summaries of members of 
his tour group and
threatened him 
with the denial of future entry
C6to the USSR if CHECKCWCWCARROG did not comply. [TWAROG] 06
stated that he refused, and no further pressure
was applied,
NOSENKO provided the information
from 
notes
, in Geneva in 1964.
on
[TWAROG] 06
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06
VOLKOV, Vasiliy Andreyevich
06
NOSENKO's Information
VOLKOV, construction company employee and an American,
was recruited by, a Seventh Department case officer in the
summer of 1962 while visiting the Soviet Union. He was to
be used in emigre operations.
Comment:
.06
VOLKOV has been identified as a carpenter
living in California who travelled to the
Soviet Union in 1962. He is a religious.
fanatic with a record of many arrests, and
The may be mentally disturbed. In an FBI
Obinterview VOLKOV denied that he had been
recruited by the KGB.
NOSENKO does not indicate the source of
his information, which was contained in
notes brought to Geneva in 1964.
06
VOLSKIY, Boris
NOSENKO's Information
08
06
The president of "American Travel Abroad". VOLSKIY was
recruited by a Seventh Department case officer in 1962 on
idecal. unds. His mission is to advise the KGB by¨
open
tourist whom he suspected of having some
connection with American Intelligence.
06
Comment:
Interviewed by the FBI in May 1964, VOLSKIY
advised that he travelled annually to the USSR
on tourist business and has frequent contacts.
with Inturist officials in the Soviet Union.
He denied having any intelligence contacts,
with one possible exception. In about 1962
he was visited in his Moscow hotel room by a
433
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Top Secret
Comment:
06
(Continued)
06
person represented to be an Inturist official
who solicited (VOLSKIY's aid in curtailing
foreign tourists' distribution of Bibles and
literature in the USSR. COLSKIY asserted that 06
he was in no position to provide such assis-
tance, and he was not contacted again.
NOSENKO's information is limited to that
contained in written notes brought to Geneva
in 1964.
WALLACE, William
NOSENKO's Information
10,06
the University of Vienna,
was
A student at the University of Vienna, WALLACE
recruited on ideological grounds while visiting the Soviet
Union in 1961. 
The Seventh Department made the recruitment,
06 
and 
turned [WALLACE] over to the First Chief Directorate,
which was still 
managing the case in 1964.
Comment:
10
Interviewed in February 1965 in Vienna),
◎6 WALLACE admitted having been approached by an
unidentified Soviet during a visit to the USSR
in 1961. He claimed he refused to "help
them", and said there had been no further
attempts to contact him.
NOSENKO's information is limited to that
contained in written notes brought to Geneva
in 1964; he has not indicated the source of
his information.
0001666
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(Annex B)
06,06
YOUNGER, Ralph and Evelyn
06
NOSENKO's Information
The YOUNGER couple were identified as American Intelli-
gence agents and arrested and recruited by the KGB while
they visited the USSR in 1961. However, later they failed"
to meet their KGB case officer as planned, in Denmark. The
case was handled by the American Department while NOSENKO
was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO's former subordinate,
V.V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case.
Comment:
·06
06
The YOUNGERS were on a mission for the U.S.
Army at the time of their arrest, and they
reported their recruitment immediately upon
leaving the Soviet Union. KGB officer
KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen under alias
in 1961, at the time when the YOUNGERS were Ob
scheduled to meet with the KGB in Denmark.
NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his
information which he related to CIA in Geneva
in 1962.
ZIRING, Stanley
06
NOSENKO's Information
ZIRING, a student who visited the USSR in 1960, was
recruited by the KGB after being apprehended in blackmarket
dealings.
Comment:
06
Interviewed in London in 1964, ZIRING admitted
blackmarketeering but denied recruitment.⠀
British authorities concluded that he may have
given the impression of willingness to cooperate
without realizing the purpose of the Soviet
offer. British authorities report no evidence
of subsequent contacts between (ZIRING] and
Soviet officials.
06
NOSENKO claims he was in the American Depart-
ment at the time (ZIRING was recruited by the
Seventh Department. 06
435
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Top Secret
Index of Personalities
0
ABEL, Col. Rudolf Ivanovich
ABIDIAN, John. V.
34
153, 155, 180, 194, 205-222, 224, 225,
229, 241, 242, 246, 259, 260, 344, 351, 404
ACTOR, fnu (See PROCTORD CO
AGAYANTS, Ivan Ivanovich
06
399
283
"AGLODINA" (KGB cryptonym for Yelena S. KOSIENKO)
(ALBAMONTE, Marion
311
1.06 ALBINGER, Donald 4005
ALEKSEYEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich
ALEKSEYEV, Vladimir Kuzmich
ALEKSIEV, Georgi Velev
ALESHIN, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich
ALLOYAN, Lawrence 400, 401 06
79
253
305, 306
258
221, 222, 390
22, 33-37,
376,
3917
387, 395706
95706
138
06
292
ANDREY"
(KGB cryptonym for Dayle Wallace SMITH)
99, 152, 165, 238, 239, 287
06 ANDREYEV, Igor Ivanovich
ANDRIANOV, Vladimir Nikolayevich
ANKUDINOV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich
"ANOD" (KGB cryptonym for Alexander SVENCHANSKIY)
06 SAPISSON, Henry
"ARKHANGELSKIY"
06
401
215, 216
ARKHIPOV, Nikolay Alekseyevich
PARKHIPOV, Petr Mikhaylovich
O ARMSTRONG, Robert
123
3727
402, 413]
"ARSEN" (KGB cryptonym for John V. ABIDIAN)
ARTAMONOV, Nikolay Fedorovich (Defector)
ARTEMOV, Vladimir L'vovich
214, 284, 285
"ARTUR" (KGB cryptonym for Arsene FRIPPEL) 06
06[AVDEYEV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich
389, 390]
35,
36
207
47, 373
137, 156
1
BAGRICHEV, Nikolay Grigoryevich
BAKHVALOV, Mikhail Fedorovich
BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich
153, 154, 223
259
]
BANNIK, Maj. Gen. (See BANNIKOV)
BANNIKOV, Sergey Grigoryevich
BARGHOORN, Frederick
389
276, 384, 390
298-302,
326
BARKOVSKIY, Vladimir Borisovich
296
}
06 BARRETT, Robert
127, 134-136,
248
]
437
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0
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06 BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin 402, 403
06 BEGGS, Frank 193, 195, 197, 
198
]
BELANOVSKIY, Victor (KGB cryptonym "STROYEV")
BELITSKIY, Boris Yefimovich
317, 331, 332, 337
110, 116
106, 268, 280, 282-287, 291
"BELKIN" (KGB cryptonym for Boris BELITSKIY)
BELOGLAZOV, Viktor 159, 221, 222, 225, 246
BELOV, Ivan Andreyevich
(BENSON, John S.
BENYAMINOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich
0
06,
391
87, 93-96, 98
06 BERMAN, Harold
403
06 BIENSTOCK, Natalie
273, 274
06 BINDER, Peter
06 BIRSE, Arthur
BLAKE, George
50, 363
282
203, 204, 234, 403-405
104, 114, 122, 123, 125, 126, 144
BIRYUKOV, Vadim Osipovich
427, 428
30, 102, 148, 149, 247, 263, 327, 331
269
BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich
06 BOLSHAKOV, Georgiy Nikitovich (GRU)
398]
BORODIN, Nikolay Mikhaylovich (aka Norman M. BORODIN)
35, 94, 95
BORISOV, Ivan Dmitriyevich
BORISOV, Petr Pavlovich
BOWDEN, Lewis W.
06 BRADLEY, Jerome G.
0
✓ BRAUNS, Horst
O BROCHES, Adam
06 FROCHES, Alexander
06 DROCHES, Ignacy
06 BRODNEY, Kenneth
411
377
139, 141, 142, 242, 314.
178]
268, 288-2917
405, 406
405
406
80708
BROWN, G. Stanley [202, 226, 227, 244
BUBNOV, Oleg Sergeyevich,
06
BUDYLDIN, Valeriy
BUHLE, Johannes
32
83 84
402
406, 407
06. BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter
BUTENKO, John W.
0 CARDELLA, James
99, 110, 113, 115-120, 144, 344, 346
298, 368
87, 97
CECCHI, Pietro
CHELNOKOV, Col. Vladimir Dmitriyevich
142, 259, 276, 292, 305, 346
CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr Nikolayevich
194, 198, 199, 200, 208
322, 326, 381, 411, 412
18, 29, 139, 140,
76, 264, 309-313, 319,
387, 390, 395
77)
06 CHRISTNER, Robert Charles
407]
06 CHUCHUKIN, Vladimir Aleksandrovich
CHURANOV, Vladimir Aleksandrovich
370, 372
30-31,
97
CHERNYAVSKIY, Viktor Petrovich
CHERNYSHEVA, fnu (Eddy GILMORE's sister-in-law)
438'
Top Secret
0001669
TS No. 197124
Copy
2418R
14-00000
☐
Top Secret
06
DANKO, Yevgeniya "Jane"
[DAY, Frank
109
201, 202]
DEMKIN, Vladimir (mnu)
159, 161, 182, 194, 203, 222, 246, 406
272, 273, 406
DERA, Vitaliy Grigoryevich
DEREVENSKOV, Gennadiy Georgiyevich
370
DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich (KGB defector 1954)
380, 381, 396
DITYATEV, Dmitriy Alekseyevich
"DMITRIYEV"
84
427
107, 108, 249
228
221, 222
DMITRIYEV, Aleksandr Anatolyevich
DMITRIYEV, Sergey Georgiyevich
__DRANOV, Vasiliy (mnu)
OG DREW, George
127, 130, 131, 347]
06 DRIBERG, Tom 106, 112
DUBAS, Konstantin Nikitovich
152, 153, 304-306
DUMKOV, Gen. (Bulg. MVR)
17, 61, 277,
124, 125, 127, 129, 130, 133,
257
294
202, 203)
06.
DVORKIN, Yuriy Mikhaylovich
DWELLY, Robert
"EDVIN" (KGB cryptonym for Gerald SEVERN])
EL SHAZLY, Mohammed Sarwat
06 EPISON, Henry (See Henry APISSON)]
06 FAIN, Thomas 407, 408]
194, 198, 199
06 FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. 392, 393]
FEDOROVA, Dora'
FEDOROVICH, Tatyana
FEDOSEYEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich
313, 406
426
92, 93
208, 214, 215, 216
159, 229, 237, 239, 259, 307,
158
117, 119, 314
87, 90-93
279, 294
FEDYANIN, Vladimir Petrovich
FEKLISOV, Aleksandr Semenovich
06 FELCHLIN, Howard L.
堂
06 FISK, Norman
FILATOV, Vladimir Gerasimovich
06 FINK, David 408, 409
FOFANOV, Fedor (mnu)
145, 409)
25, 27
FOMIN (alias of A. FEKLISOV)
FREERS, Edward L.
314, 368
227, 230, 231, 2381
OFRIPPEL, Arsene
103, 127, 137-144, 249, 265, 266, 347
06 FRIPPEL, Odette (Mrs. Arsene FRIPPEL)
FUNKHAUSER, Richard
66 [GABELKO, Sergey Stepanovich
139]
243
376
386, 387
06 GAFFEY, Joseph 203, 204
GAMKRELIDZE, Revas Valeryanovich
GARBLER, Paul
06 GARLAND, John
GARST, Roswell
246-248
189-192, 199, 254]
109
GAVRICHEV, Sergey Ivanovich
279, 318
6001670
439
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
10
17/BR
14-00000
1567
1
Top Secret
GAVRILENKO, Nikolay Aleksandrovich
GAZARYAN, Oganes
06 GEHRCKENS, Hans
06 GILMORE, Eddy
06 GINSBERG, Michael
400
113, 121, 144
76, 77, 78, 79, 80
145, 409, 410
GLAZUNOV, Ilya Sergeyevich
DO GLEYSTEEN, Culver 227, 230
06 GOLD, Harry 293
GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich
158
159, 211, 222
17-19, 30, 38, 39, 62, 76
162, 163, 166, 168, 169, 176, 189, 191, 192, 232, 235,
266, 273, 283, 290, 330, 364, 376, 380, 381, 383, 396,
403, 405 407, 431
Of GOLOS, Jacob 293
GOLOVKO, Admiral Arseniy Grigoryevich
GOLUBEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich
GORBACHEVA, Klara Konstantinovna
"GRAY"
392
53
277, 384, 385
137
15, 20, 37, 38, 115,
GRIBANOV, General Oleg Mikhaylovich
117, 127, 144, 146, 153, 154, 159, 166, 167, 168, 170,
172, 194, 235, 237, 239, 257, 259, 260, 275, 276, 291,
298-302, 304, 307, 311, 315-317, 321, 331, 335-337,
346-349, 352, 360, 367, 368, 384, 385, 387-392, 3947
"GRIGORIY" (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey YEFREMOV)
GRINEVSKIY, Oleg Alekseyevich
GRISHNYAT, Tatyana (mnu).
GROMAKOVA, Ludmila
279
32, 226
89, 209, 211, 220
GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy (mnu)
06 GROVER, Preston
410
GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy Ivanovich
.156
159
155, 156, 159, 160-163, 168-170,
182, 185, 186, 193, 194, 202, 204, 217, 223, 225, 226, 229,
235, 239, 259, 267, 298, 300, 382, 413, 415
GUK, Yuriy Ivanovich
".
62, 280, 281, 311, 318, 383, 384, 387
GUSKOV, Sergey Mikhaylovich
HAMAN, Arthur
432
☐ HAMZAVI, Charles P. 411
"Hanna" lnu
.
194
HARMSTONE, Richard.
127, 128, 144
HAYHANEN, Reino (KGB defector 1957)
119, 130
08
314, 315, 411, 412]
66 HARRIS, Gisella
34
HOFFMAN, F. Stephen
402, 413
06 HOFFMAN, Col. Theodore F.
180, 234]
.06.
HORBALY, William
226, 227, 243, 244.
HOUGHTON, Captain J. C
227]
HOWARD, Herbert
HURLEY, William S.
06 HUSTON, Hayden Henry
413, 414]
164, 165
414)
440
Top Secret
0001671
TS No. 197124.
Copy
16/BR
14-00000
Top Secret
ILYIN, Sergey Aleksandrovich
ISAKOV, Viktor Fedorovich
IVANOV, fnu
108
66 IVANOV, Boris Semenovich
370, 374, 386]
366
25
46, 50, 324, 362, 363, 366, 369,
IVANOV, Igor Aleksandrovich
IVANOV, Vladimir Maksimovich
IVANOV, Vladimir Vladimirovich
IVANOVA, Svetlana N.
IVASHUTIN, Petr Ivanovich
JACKSON, Henry H.
298
428
130
194, 196, 198, 199, 203, 204
347
JAFFE,
426
06
JACOB, Richard C.
404
Sam 4159
109
06 JENNER, Paul
164, 185-190, 192]
06 JELISAVCIC, Michael
JOHNSON, Hedwig (Mrs. Robert Lee JOHNSON)
JOHNSON, Robert Lee
06 JOHNSON, Wallace Everett
22, 24-27, 349, 380
06 JONES, William Carroll, III
06 KADERA, Fred 203
.061
KALNINSH, Khariy Yanovich
KALOSHIN, Colonel (RU) (fnu)
KALUGIN, Oleg Daniilovich
"KAMO"
209
KANTOR, Marvin (or Melvin)
23, 28
112, 220, 260, 267-272, 290, 291, 349]
272, 273
385
51-53, 56, 59
372, 373
145, 415, 416
KARETNIKOV, Venyamin Zasimovich (or Venedikt Vasilyevich)
25, 27
06 KARLOV, fnu
113, 145
79
Ob RASISCHke, Richard
KAZAN-KOMAREK, Vladimir Joseph
416,
417]
157, 165, 178-181, 234, 236, 258]
06 KHAMZAI, Charles (See Charles P. HAMZAVI)|
117
06 KEYSERS, James G.
KHODAKOVSKIY, fnu
KHRENOV, Nikolay (mnu)
83, 84
KILLHAM, Edward A.
314
[374]
KHOKHLOV, Nikolay (KGB defector 1954)
76
mansick
]
]
]
06/KIPTENKO, Vadim A.
KISLITSYN, Filip Vasilyevich
84
KISLOV, Aleksandr Konstantinovich
KISLOV, Slava (alias of and see V.A.
Co KLOSSON, Boris
241
KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich
279, 280, 284, 415
415
KUSKOV)
153, 154, 159, 161, 186, 206,
209, 222, 226, 227, 237, 255, 428
KOBULOV, General Bogdan Zakharovich
06 KOLOBASHKIN, Aleksey Mikhaylovich
49,51, 55, 57, 62, 64-66, 7
380]
KOLOSOV, (alias of V.V. KOSOLAPOV)
KOLOSSOV, Viktor Dmitriyevich (alias of V. V. KOSOLAPOV)
187,
192
441
6001672
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Copy
10
16/8R

14-0000
☐
ย
06/KOMAREK (See KAZAN-KOMAREK)]
KOMAROV, Vladimir Mikhaylovich (alias of V.M. KOVSHUK)
·KONSTANTINOV, Ivan Alekseyevich
KOPEYKIN, Viktor
418
KOROLEV, Yuriy Dmitriyevich
KORNIENKO, Georgiy Markovich
"KOSHIKIN"
110
108, 109
396, 397
366
KOSIENKO, Yelena S. (KGB cryptonym "AGLODINA")
KOSOLAPOV, Vadim Viktorovich
33, 412
7.9
155, 156, 159, 160-163, 182,
185-196, 199-204, 206, 223, 235, 254, 261, 435
KOSTYRYA, Vladimir Viktorovich
141
06 KOTEN, Bernard 295, 296, 326, 4217
KOVALENKO, Anatoliy. Grigoryevich
323, 346
KOVALEV, Feliks
366
KOVSHUK, Vladislav Mikhaylovich
273, 298-300, 302, 305, 317,
33-36, 78, 94, 95, 153-159,
161, 163, 167, 168, 172, 174-177, 186, 195, 206, 209, 217,
222, 223, 226-229, 242, 244, 245, 250, 259-261, 290, 412,
422, 428
KOZHEVNIKOVA, Lyudmila
Yulianovna
55, 57
117-120, 255, 257
KOZLOV, Anatoliy Sergeyevich
KOZLOV, Veniamin Alekseyevich : 76-79, 216, 218
OR RAFT, Virgil 127, 129, 130
06 KROTKOV, Yuriy Vasilyevich 372
KRUPNOV, Kim Georgiyevich
"KRYMOVA" (See Marina RYTOVA)
KUKOLEV, Dmitriy
86, 87
273, 289, 290, 301, 303-305, 419, 432
370, 374, 379, 394, 398]
06 KULEBYAKIN, Nikolay Panteleymonovich.
KUNGAROVA, Tamara
107, 112, 418, 419 08430, 431
159, 222
KURILENKO, Ivan Yakovlevich
KUROCHKIN, fnu 372]
153, 311, 314, 415, 422
226, 228
252
KUSKOV, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich
KUZMIN, Nikolay Yakovlevich
KUZNETSOV, Aleksandr Ivanovich
ObLAINE, V.A.
065
402, 403]
06 LANE, Sir Allen 104, 114, 122, 125, 144]
LANGELLE, Russell
314, 315
LARIONOVA, Alla
06
153, 205, 207, 210, 213, 214, 241, 260,
97, 98
"LEBEDEV" (See Vladimir MUROMTSEV)
LEBEDEV, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich
LEBEDEV, Lev Aleksandrovich
LEONOV, Mikhail A.
LEONTIYEV, Yuriy (mnu)
LEVINA, Maya (mnu)
LEVINE,
Irving R.
362)
25, 27,
94
418
84
249, 250
106, 112
8470
SIZESSIN
BOOTHER
1
6001673
442
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
14-00000
$ 0
"Lillian"
0
sop accret
183, 184
314
116
LITTELL, Wallace L.
LOPUKHOV, Yuriy Aleksandrovich
"LUCH"
110
06[LUKAS (See LUKIS)]
ObLUKIS, fnu
127, 131
☐ LUKYANOV, Pavel Pavlovich
06 LUNT, Horace G.
LYALIN, fnu
06 LYSOV, Yuriy Vasilyevich
368
254, 256-258]
276
362 375]
06 MAHONEY, Eugene
219, 245, 246
06 [MALIA, Martin
MAKASHEV, Boris Dmitriyevich
MALYUGIN, Aleksandr Stepanovich
MANHOFF, Martin J.
COMARK, David 241, 276, 286]
::: CHECKMARTIN, Captain Donald C.
MARTIN, William Ilamilton
MASON, Major Anthony
061
Ub MATLAW (also MATLO), Ralph
MATVEYEV, Mikhail Georgiyevich
311
.
113-115
917
153, 160, 161
178
239
227]
113, 145, 417]
]
06 MATLO (See MATLAW )
216, 217
MAYOROV, Igor Sergeyevich
278
DHE MCGOWAN, Edward
148
06 MCGUIRE, Robert Alan
147, [148]
0b MCKINNEY, Walter A.
91, 92
MCMILLAN, James H.
238
06 MCSWEENEY, John M.
238
311
W
1
McVICKAR, John
06 MEARNS, Fillmore K. 85, 87, 88, 89]
MEDVEDEV, Viktor Sergeyevich
06 MERTENS, Gerard
.383, 384
127, 133, 134, 347
MICHAUD, Marcel (alias of N.S. SKVORTSOV)
06 MICKELSON, Earl L. 85, 87, 88, 821
167, 173, 198
241
422, 424, 426
23, 28
MIKHAYLOV, Aleksey Mikhaylovich
MIKHAYLOV, Valentin Matveyevich
MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen
MISHUTIN, fnu
MITCHELL, Bernon
MONTGOMERY, Hugh
302
239
404
159, 245, 248, 260,
404, 405
261]
337]
06 MORELL, William N., Jr.
MORELLI, Galya
66 MORONE, Joseph
06 MULE, Walter
173, 174, 183, 193-199, 254,
87, 94-96,98-100]
MUROMTSEV, Vladimir (mnu)
MYARIMYAYE, fnu
125
105
443
Top Secret
0001674
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
2339
14-00000
2
06
06
NEVEROVA, Meroge
NIELSEN, Melvta
(NIELSEN, Phil:
NIKOLAYEV (alt.)
NIKOLAYEV, T.,
122, 125, ::
NIKOLOV, Georgly
NIXON, Dmitriy
NOSENKO, Ivat
NOSKOV, Yevger!,
NOVIKOVA, fae
OHANNES, Gazaster
"OKSANA" (See Yett
06 OMELICH, Pac: ]
OSWALD, Lee Harse.
OSWALD, Marina
Of ORCHARD, Theoitte
'OZERO" (See Rel
PANKRATOV, Pavel 2
PAQUES, Georget
Ob PAVLOV, Gleb A...
0 PECHTER, Berserk
PENKOVSKIY, Co
245, 369
PERELETOV, Botte
PERFILYEV, Nikolet
PERFILYEV, Yuris
Top Secret
་
* 2
PETERSON, Geotge
PETRENKO, Vladial
PETROV, Evdokta (1
PETROV, Vladini: Seks
PETROV, Vladimi? 7
84, 123,
**
PETROVA, Nina $7
POCHANKIN, Vital
PETUKHOV, Ivaz
.
POPOV, Col. (GET) .
POPTSOV, Petr (
281 252
$
allas used by NOSENKO)
* NOSENKO)
271
293, 299, 301, 421,
* 300-309, 326
]
432
205, 208, 217, 219,
* *
346
缘。
134
12, 119.
61
it defecter 1954)
17, 61,
06 PREISFREUND, Jetesse.
160, 161, $3
PREOBRAZHENSKIY, RIA
PRESSMAN, Aron t
PROCTOR, Vernon
"PROKHOR" (KGB
"RAKETA"
RAMSEY, James A.
KASHCHEPOV, Yevge
383. 384
207, 244
*0# <reptonym "PROKHOR")
☐
23
FALISEREUND)]
06
298. 300
156, 160
HHHHHH
11/3R
Top Secret
0001675
TS No. 197124
Copy
14-00000
Top Secret
RASK, Walter
423, 432]
RASTYKAITE, fnu
06 REITZ, James T.
RASTVOROV, Yuriy (KGB defecte:
RESHETNYAK, Nikolay Timofeyev
117
17, 61, 277, 396
119
227
388
06
RHODES, Roy
33-37, 98.
RICHARDS, Ira. B.
85, 97
06 ROBERTS, Spencer
141
106,
ROGOV, Nikolay (mnu)
ROSS, Johanna
105
[423]
ObTRUFE,
John
145, 380,
603.
06
RYTOVA, Marina L'vovna
108.
749.
268
SACHANEN, Felix
277
-
Rustic
SALES
O SAGATELYAN, Mikhail 'Rachyanovi.
06SALISBURY
, Harrison
76-78
"SARDAR" (KGB cryptonym for Far
SARWAT EL 
SHAZLY (See Mohammed
Collette
Of SCHWARZENBACH,
06
SENIO, Walter P.
227
כתִּי יִ
06
156, 160
Narvat FL SHAZLY)
79, 80
123, 130-133
SEREBRENNIKOV, Eugene Sergey
OSEREBRYANKOVA, fnu
π
425. 426]
'SERGEY" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)
"
SERGEY" (KGB 
cryptonym for Francis STEVENS] 06
SERGEYEV or Col. SERGEYEV 
(alias used by NOSENKO)
SERGEYEV, Ivan Yefimovich
184
SERGEYEV, Victor I.
06
SEVERN, Gerald
424
"SERVIZNIY" (KGB cryptonym for Vladislav VOROBYEV)
SEVASTYANOV, Gennadiy 
(See Gerald SEVERN)
145, 426)
SHAKHOV, Pavel Fedorovich
SHALYAPIN, Mikhail Aleksandrovich
SHAPIRO, Henry
06 SHATTAUER, Sofia
84.
86
265, 276-278, 291, 317, 331, 332, 398
28
76-80, 396, 424, 425
145, 427
389
296, 297, 326, 3497
65
106, 112
364
86, 97, 92
SHCHERBAK, Maj. Gen. Fedor Alekseyevich
06 SHUBIN, John Andrew
`SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor Grigoryevich
SHULGINA, Nataliya
SHUSTOV, Vladimir Viktorovich
"SHMELEV" (KGB cryptonym for A.i. VOLKOV)
SHNYRYEV, Nikolay (mnu)
156
85, 89, 141
95
"SHVEDOVA" (KGB cryptonym for Mariya NEVEROVA)
"SIBIRYAK"
110
SIEGAL, Jack (alias of N.M. BORODIN)
SISCOE, Frank
94)
06
445
Top Secret
0001676
TS No. 197124
Copy
10
2UBR
14-00000
☐
FIRM
SITNIKOV, Mikhail G.
Top Secret
276
SKVORTSOV, Nikolay Semenovich
06 SLESINGER, Alfred Lazarevich
SMIRNOV (alias used by NOSENKO)
SMITH, Dayle W. (See 'ANDREY")
287
SMITH, Edward Ellis
SMITH, John Discoe
06 SMITH, Paul 249]
SNYDER, Richard
SOBOROVA, Larissa
06 SOCHUREK, Howard
06 SOKOLOW, Sonya.
"
135, 167, 170, 172-174, 198, 199
293-295, 326
123
33, 36, 98, 99, 238, 239, 260,
37-39, 99, 336
239
311, 314
104, 105, 122
427, 428
293]
SOKOLOV, Gen. (GRU) Vsevolod Sergeyevich
"SOLISTKA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)
SOLOMATIN, Boris Aleksandrovich
06 SPRECHER, George Herman
06 STEIGER, Andrew J.
76]
06 STEVENS, Edmund
76, 158
06 STEVENS, Francis
06 STORSBERG, James
201, 234, 238,
06 STROUD, William R.
422
377,378]
245, 428, 429
297
185-187, 189
157, 161, 164, 165, 166-179, 194, 198, 199,
250, 260, 266
87, 93-96, 98
215'
"STROYEV" (KGB cryptonym for Victor BELANOVSKIY)
SUMIN, Aleksey Konstantinovich
SUNDAR, Egil
113, 123, 124]
06 SUTTON, Horace 104, 105]
06 SVENCHANSKIY, Alexander
292, 293, 295, 326]
SVIRIN, Vasiliy. Grigoryevich
SYCHEV, Aleksandr Anfimovich
TARABRIN, Yevgeniy Anatolyevich
392
Cb TARASKA, William 145, 429, 430
CO TAYLOR, David
390
131, 132, 391, 394
48, 52, 55
362, 381]
127, 132, 133, 144)
TELEGINA, Augustina Konstantinova
TITOV, Col. Viktor Nikolayevich
THOMPSON, John M.
107, 381, 430, 431
"TOMO" (KGB cryptonym for Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV)
06 TORMOZOV, Anatoliy 79
TORREY, Carmen
431
"TRAPEZUND" (KGB cryptonym for Oganes GAZARYAN)
TSYMBAL, Mikhail Stepanovich
TULAYEV, Vladimir Yevgenyevich
TURALIN, Mikhail Ilich
278, 280, 281, 318
373
400
305
06 [TWAROG, Leon 432
UMANETS, Ella
06 URBAN, Peter
06 VAN KRAKOW, Hugo
06 VAN LAETHEM, George
159, 183, 184, 198
180, 227
400, 401
97,98
0001677
446
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
Copy
22188
14-00000
VARLAMOVA, Inga
Top Secret
159, 167, 169
VASSALL, William John C.
18, 23, 24, 30, 31, 110, 149
121
VERENIKIN, Aleksandr Ivanovich
VETLITSKIY, Arseniy Aleksandrovich
133, 297
VLADIMIROV, Vladimir Viktorovich (alias of V.V. KOSTYRYA)
141, 362-364, 369
VLASOV, Gennadiy N.
380
VLASOV, Ivan Pavlovich
372
VOLKOV, Anatoliy Ivanovich
110-113, 127, 130-136, 202, 248
256, 267-271, 407, 409, 417
06 [VOLKOV, Vasiliy Andreyevich 433]
"VOLODINA" (KGB, cryptonym, identity unknown)
Volodya, lnu
89, 90
"VOLODYA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)
Volodya, 1nu (unidentified KGB officer)
06 [VOLSKIY, Boris 433, 434]
VOROBYEV, Vladislav (KGB cryptonym "SERVIZNIY")
80,
85
202
197
86, 87
WATKINS, J. B.
06/WALLACE, William
06 WASHENKO, Steven
06 WHITNEY, Thomas
WEISS, Samih (KGB
250, 267
☐ WILBY, William Stanley
CGWILLERFORD, Frederick
06 WILSON, Charles
06 WINDSOR, David M.
434
242-244
110, 149
cryptonym "SARDAR")
160, 161, 181-184,
76-80
127, 131, 132
127, 136, 144]
2277
227
139, 142, 158, 244, 260, 314, 315, 412
169
91]
110-113, 127, 130-136, 202, 248,
WINTERS, George P.
ObYAZHINSKAYA, fnu
06 YEAGER, F.J.
YEFREMOV, Aleksey (mnu)
256, 267-270, 272, 409, 417
YEFREMOV, Leonid Ivanovich
YEGOROV, Mikhail (mnu)
YEGOROV, Sergey Ivanovich
YEREMEYEVA, Nina Ivanovna
06 YERMAK, Yevgeniy Ivanovich
06 YOUNGER, Ralph and Evelyn:
"Yuliya", Inu
"Yura", lnu
ZAYTSEV, fnu
1
301, 302
255, 257
ZARUBIN, Vasiliy Mikhaylovich
254
383
372
435]
36 ZAYTSEV, Valentin Aleksandrovich
188
188
405
419
363, 364]
ZEMSKOV, Nikolay
237
06.
_ZHARIKOV, Nikolay Timofeyevich
317
ZIRING, Stanley.
435
06 ZUBON, William J.
267
06 ZUJUS, Matas
184]
06 ZUJUS, Matthew P.
161, 164, 178, 181-184, 238, 250, 267,
6 ZWANG, Maurice
2003
447
Top Secret
6001678
TS No. 197124
10
Copy
20183