File #:
62-116395
Serial Scope:
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 1
51 THRU 100
Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88296 Date: 2025
IT
2.
3.
☆ •
2. S. F. Phillips
April 30, 1975
MATERIAL FOR SHITE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
'INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
“Organization
ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI
NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP:
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:
NA
LIM refers to request of the SSC for a list of
names and titles of certain FBI Intelligence Division (INTD)
personnel at FBIHQ and numbers only of certain other INID
personnel; and relates agreement reached between FBI officials
and Mr. William Miller, Staff Director of the SSC, that the
original request be modified as follows. The FBI will prepare
the necessary list and make it available for review at FBIHQ
by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff.
7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.
8.
9.
RELEASING AUTHORLIY: FBI
DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/75
REC- 106 62-116375-100
16 MAY 7 1976
LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-53
f
10.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
* Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp, Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
"
#moR6
11.
NONE.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
R 30 D
SFP:ekw
--(4)
Ident."
inspection
NOTE:
Intell.
DAKE 1/19/01 SP-2A5n1216
Original via liaison to Central Community Index in
Laboratory [connection with Senstudy 75.
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Secy
-
ROOM
NW 88296 Doch 20 Page 2
TELETYPE UNIT
妻
GPO 545
-11a (Rev. 3-21-73)
Big Bang S
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
KERFIA IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAR/12-11-8859-5 citator
intelligence Division
INFORMATIVE NOTE
Date
4/25/75
You were previously advised that
Douglas Durham, former MP 4115-E, who has
furnished high-level information regarding
activities of the American Indian Movement
(AIM), after being confronted by AIM lead-
ers, admitted being a confidential infor-
mant for the FBI. This information has
been made public.
Attached teletype from Omaha advises
that Assistant U. S. Attorney Keith E. Uhl.
Office of Special Prosecutor, stated he
received a telephone call 4/24/75 from
Durham and that Durham told him he had been
contacted by representatives of the Office
of Senator Frank Church, Washington, D. C.,
requesting Durham's presence in Washington
during the week of April 28, 1975, for
purpose of attending staff meetings to
determine his potential as a witness before
committee investigating operations of the
FBI.
Durham indicated he intended to com-
ply and would have no further contact with
the FBI. We are following this matter
closely and you will be kept advised,
1
1
1
-
General Investigative Division
Legal Counsel Division
External Affairs Division
- William O. Cregar
WDN 1£j
win
wrto
Ол
JED/WHA
дствие дня
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 3
DOJ/FBI
NR 005 OM PLAIN
4:39PM NITEL 4/24/75 RRH
TO:
Hink
FROM:
COMMATIONS SECTIUN
DIRECTOR (137-33264)
APR 248979
TELETYPE INFORMATION CONTAINED
MINNEAPOLIS (157-1458)
OMAHA (170-231) (P)
FORMER MP 4115-E. Conf
"
N IS UNCLASSIFIED
12-19-88 B-SR5 ilahi
SENSTudy-"7"
ON APRIL 24, 1975, AUSA KEITH E. UHL, ADVISED HE
RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM SUBJECT RELATING SUBJECT
HAD BEEN CONTACTED, BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICE
OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH, WASHINGTON, D.C., REQUESTING
HIS PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON DURING WEEK OF APRIL 28,
1975, FOR PURPOSE OF STAFF MEETINGS TO DETERMINE
SUBJECT'S POTENTIAL AS WITNESS BEFORE CHURCH
COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING OPERATIONS OF THE FBI.
SUBJECT INDICATED HE INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH REQUES
AND HAD DECIDED THAT IN VIEW OF THIS DEVELOPMENT, HE
WOULD DECLINE AND NOT SOLICIT ANY FURTHER CONTACT WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FBI.
END.
RSP FBIHQ
ROVED ON ANVELOPE
62-116375
BO MAY
X-30-1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fics & Com. I
Gen. inv.
☑✓
-141
Ident.
Inspection
Intl.
Laborary
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone B
Director Sely
5- Atta
Re
18 MAY 2 1975
2) 1975
ARE7
Affor
Original Filed In 137-35 36
NOT RECORDED
Hrick
JUN 11 1975
NW 88296 Docld32989628 Page 4
JUN 11 1975
1.
})
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
:MR. W. R. WANNALL
FROM
: MR. W. O. CREGAR,
0
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#MDR16
1
1
-
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. J. A. Mintz
DATE: April 22, 1975
1
1
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. A. L. Lacey
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2 ALM/296
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
t
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
The purpose of this memorandum is to record that
on 4/18/75 Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the
President, Executive Office Building, stated he had reviewed a
final copy of the Intelligence Division Position Paper on
Jurisdiction including Exhibit L, pages 36 and 37. Mr. Wilderotter
advised Bureau Supervisor Alonzo L. Lacey that The White House
interposed no objection to the Jurisdiction paper being furnished
to the Senate Select Committee.
With reference to the study entitled Intelligence
Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction, Mr. Wilderotter requested
that he be furnished a copy and this was done. In addition,
Wilderotter had previously on 4/4/75 reviewed the paper for
approval of the use of items concerning Presidential or National
Security Council interest.
ACTION:
ALL:ekw
(5)
62-116395
For information and record purposes.
لديل
雌
Рем
REC-106
werd
62-116375-99
джи
0
5-7
F
84 MAY 7 1975
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 5
-
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
SA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES:
FRNMENT
Memorandum
TO
Mr. J.
FROM
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 Mr. J. A. Mintz
1- Mr. W. R. Wannall
1- Mr. W. O. Cregar
4/7/75
DATE:
1- Mr. A. B. Fulton
1- Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.
SENSTudy 15
SUBJECT INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER
DATE 7-7-00 BX 39063 ELUT/BE/AMW
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ON AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT NATIONAL SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
Security Junii diction
The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize investigative
efforts to authenticate Hoover memoranda dated 8/24-25/36.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
1.
Inspection;
Intel
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
RA
Document Section, FBI Laboratory, determined the type appearing
on Hoover memorandum dated 8/25/36 was prepared on a Remington typewriter
with an elite type used since October, 1935. Hoover memorandum to Tamm dated
9/10/36, was prepared on an IBM typewriter with pica-style type used since 1930.
The letterhead used on both Hoover memoranda of 8/24-25/36 was
authorized FBI stationery effective August 14, 1936.
On 3/10/75, Mr. Donald B. Schewe, Assistant Librarian, Reference
Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, advised that
The White House Ushers Appointment Book contained entries showing that
on Thursday, August 24, 1936, from 9: 20 a.m. to 10: 12 a.m., President
Roosevelt met with Mr. Hoover in his residence at The White House prior to
leaving for his office. Schewe pointed out that this meeting was significant
since President Roosevelt met Mr. Hoover immediately after returning from
an extended trip, a departure from his usual practice. There was no entry
on 8/25/36, other than the President's departure for the Dakotas at 10:40 p.m.
On 4/2/75, review of Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress,
reflected that a Desk Diary (container #68, folder #295, microfilm #38) of
Secretary Hull contained an entry on 8/25/36 that the Secretary had luncheon
with the President between 1:00 p.m. to 3: 15 p.m. "
REG-&
Detailed memorandum attached.
42
Original Filed In 62
-27-1842
ACTION:
5 ENCLOSURE
MELISSIES
ALL: vb
For information.
yink 50 ADR 23-1915
MA
1075.
88296 Dould82989628 Page 6
apes
5
Ru 62-116395-
NOT RECORDED
¡ MAY 2 1975
BLACK.20
Mr. White
J. H. Mortimer
February 27, 1975
1 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM
FROM JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1936;
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM BY
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DATED AUGUST 25, 1936.
On this date, SA Alonzo L. Lacey of the Intelligence'
Division delivered the above-captioned memoranda to the Laboratory
with a request to determine the make of typewriter employed in
the preparation of the memoranda and the date of introduction
of the type styles employed. The purpose of this investigation
was to ascertain whether or not the type styles on the typewriters
used to write the lemoranda wore in use on the dates appearing
on the memoranda.
It was determined that the "Memorandum For Mr. Tamm
from John Edgar Hoover dated September 10, 1936" was prepared
on an IBM typewriter equipped with a pica style of type which
has been in use since 1930. The typewriting comprising the
"Confidential Memorandum by John Edgar Hoover dated August 25,
1936" was determined to have been prepared on a Remington
typewriter equipped with an elite style of type that has been in
use since October, 1935.
The memoranda were returned to SA Lacey.:
RECOMMENDATION:
The result of this examination be forwarded to the
Intelligence Division.
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Lacey
-
Mr. White
p
Mr. Mortimer
-
Mr. Oberg
WSO:mrg
(6)
ENCLOSURE
847
2-716395
NW 88296. Docid:32989628 Page 7
ENCLOSURE
OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
W
T.
Ba
Mr.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
few letterheads.
st
August 14,1936.
P
Mr. Caffey
Mr. away
Mr. Edwards
Mr. En
FXr, Iasveri
Mr. Gavin A
Mr. Hasho
. dereph
Hir. Koster
Mr. Nichols.
Mr. Quina...
2v. Schiller.
Mr. Tama
Mr. Tracy.
RECORDAD
函
AUG 29 12:2
INDEXED 66-412-23
W
L OF PVPOTICATION
AUG 18 1930 2. NL
OEP OUN
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ALE
作
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 8
ECLAUS 62-6672-7 184
716395
ENCLOSURE
2
EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR
ト
L
Federal reai destigațion
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. (.
DESTROYED
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 9
62-116395-
ENCLOSURE
ENCLO #ག་
Caffer
Man.
Mm.
M
Mv, Harbo
Dr. Later
Mr. Richals
374 Schilder
Br. Ta
• Gandy..
62 66727186/2
Marc 13, 1975
་
RESEARCH CONDUCTED AT FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT LIBRARY, HYDE PARK, NY
ON 3/10-12/75.
On 3/10/74, Mr. DONALD B. SCHEWE, Assistant
Librarian in the Reference Archives, Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, NY, was advised of our interest in
locating any communications bearing upon a conversation
between former President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and former
Secretary of State CORDELL HULL in the latter part of
August, 1936. Mr. SCHEWE was advised that this conversation
was concerned with the security of the US and that Mr. J.
EDGAR HOOVER of the FBI may have participated in this
conversation. Mr. SCHEWE was also advised that Mr. ROOSEVELT
allegedly reduced the subject matter of above conversation
to a memorandum and that we were interested in locating
this memorandum or some information bearing upon above
conversation. Arrangements were made to meet with Mr. SCHEWE
at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY,
on 3/12/75. Mr. SCHEWE indicated that in the meantime
he would conduct some research in this matter.
On 3/12/75, Mr. SCHEWE advised that he had
conducted some research relative to our telephone call
on 3/10/75, and inquired if we could be more specific
with regard to the dates of the information desired.
“SCHEWE was advised that to the best of our knowledge the
conversation we were interested in involving FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT (FDR), HULL and Mr. HOOVER, occurred on
approximately 8/24-26/36 and that the conversation concerned
the internal security of the US.
Mr. SCHEWE, at this point, furnished a Xerox
copy of a "buck slip dated 8/24/36, (copy of which is
attached) on White House stationery, classified "Confidential
and addressed to the Secretary of State from FDR".
Mr. SCHEWE stated that "buck slips" are nothing more
than a cover memorandum utilized to transmit communications
which are attached thereto. It is to be noted that this
"buck slip" indicates that attached to it was a memorandum
for the Secretary of State, unsigned, undated and
recommending coordination of activities of all agents
of the Government in foreign countries. SCHEWE advised
NW-88296 Docid:32989628 Page.10
62-716395-
ENCLOSURE
6-66007-1242

that the synopsis of this memorandum which appears on,
the "buck slip" was the usual practice at that time to
identify the documents attached to it. SCHEWE added.
that this was the only document he was able to locate
which may have some bearing on the desired information.
SCHEWE stated that the possibility exists that the
referred to memorandum may be located among the collection
of papers of CORDELL HULL which are now stored at the
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Mr. SCHEWE then exhibited to interviewing personnel
the White House Ushers Appointment Book which was
hand-written and kept on a daily basis. This appointment
book contained the following pertinent information:
Thursday, August 13, 1936, at 9:50 AM
- FDR departed the White House for a visit
to the flood areas in NY, Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania.
Thursday, August 24, 1936, FDR returned
to White House at 8:45 AM.
9:20 AM FDR met with Mr. HOOVER from
9:20 AM to 10:12 AM.
-
(Note *
There is no entry in this book
for Aug. 24, 1936, indicating that Mr.
HULL was there. Mr. SCHEWE advised that
it is interesting to note that. FDR met
Mr. HOOVER in his residence in the White
House on 8/24/36, prior to leaving for
his office in the White House. SCHEWE
also pointed out that this meeting was
significant since FDR. met with Mr. HOOVER
on 8/24/36, immediately after returning
from an extended trip. This, according
to SCHEWE was a departure from FDR's
usual practice.
There was no record in the White House
Usher's Appointment Book for 8/25/36, which would indicate
that FDR met with either Mr. HULL or Mr. HOOVER on that
date.
This book indicates that FDR departed the White
House on Tuesday, 8/25/75, at 10:40 PM for a trip to the
draught areas, in upper Maine, South Dakota and North
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 11
2
FDR did not
Dakota, as well as a visit to Mt. Rushmore.
return to the White House until Sunday, Sept. 6, 1936,.
at 10:02 AM.
The White House Usher's Appointment Book
further reflects that FDR, during the period July 10,
1936, to Aug. 10, 1936, was away from the White House
campaigning. FDR returned to the White House on
8/10/35, and remained there until 8/13/36, when he
again departed on a trip and returned on 8/24/36.
FDR also departed from the White House on 8/25/36,
and returned on 9/6/36.
· Mr. SCHEWE also produced to interviewing
personnel the appointment book of FDR's private secretary,
GRACE TULLY for the pertinent period. This 
appointment 
book
A 
review
reflects all of FDR's office appointments.
of this appointment book fails to reflect that FDR met
or had an appointment with Mr. HOOVER in his office
during the period 8/13/36 to 9/6/36. However, this
· appointment book does reflect that during this period
FDR did have a meeting with CORDELL HULL" on 8/25/36
,
at 1:00 PM.
Mr. SCHEWE further advised that he personally
reviewed the following and was unable to locate any
documents or references which could possibly shed some
light on the matter of interest to us:
1.) Papers kept in FDR's safe.
2.) Papers kept by his secretary in a separate
White House safe.
file.
;
3.) Papers kept in FDR's official presidential
4.) Papers kept in FDR's alphabetical file.
maintained by his secretary..
5.) Individual agencies files.
6.)
J. EDGAR HOOVER's file.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 12
7.) Attorney General's file.
8.) Assistant Attorney General's file.
9.) National Security file.
10.)
Internal Security file.
11.) FBI file.
In conclusion, Mr. SCHEWE stated that after
reviewing all of the above data, he concluded that the
pertinent document of interest to us is 
not at the 
FDR
Library at Hyde Park, NY. SCHEWE added that 
if any
such document is at the Library, it is misfiled 
and
as there are approximately 21 million pages of manuscripts
and documents at the Library, it would be 
impossible
to locate same.
It is to be noted that on the enclosed
"buck slip" there are four penciled notations, i.e.
285-C, X20, X285 and X67. SCHEWE stated 
that these
notations are part of the FDR Library cross-reference
system. SCHEWE added that he checked these references
and could locate nothing further regarding the matter
of interest to us. SCHEWE stated that these references
pertained to the enclosed "buck slip".
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 13
ALLEE
#M0216.
PRMATION CONTAINED
285-6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL,
MEMORANDUM FOR
August 24, 1935.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
×20
I find this in my file,
dating back two months. As I
understand it everybody is
agreed on it. What is the next
.step?
F. D. R.
Memo. from State, unsigned and undated, recommend-
ing coordination of activities of all agents of the
govt. in foreign countries: each agency as it is
*67 related to the others, and all in their relation
to the State Department; makes 9 recommendations
of coordination.
6%
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 14
62-116395
ENCLOSURE
d
NR 003 AX CODE
ΤΟ
11:43PM NITEL MAY 3, 1975 WMM
DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM ALEXANDRIA (62-NEW) (P)
SENSTUDY 75
RE BUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
S093
MAY 08 1975
TELET
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
* 1/19/01 ET SP2ALM/2/8
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm......
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection,
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Apfter
FORMER BUREAU AGENT WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 6302 GOLF COURSE SQUARE,
ALEXANDRIA, VA., CONTACTED MAY 2, 1975 AND STATED THAT IN EVENT HE IS
CONTACTED BY STAFF OF SENATE OR HOUSE COMMITTEES, HE MAY REFUSE TO BE
INTERVIEWED, BUT IF HE CONSENTS TO BE INTERVIEWED HE WILL REQUEST
PRESENCE OF FRI AGENT, IF QUESTIONS ARE ASKED RELATIVE TO SENSATIVE
TO BUREAU OPERATIONS.
5
INQUIRY AT RESIDENCE OF HAROLD P. LEINBAUGH, 1160 WIMBLEDON
DRIVE, MC LEAN, VA., ON MAY 2, 1975, REVEALS THAT HE IS PRESENTLY AT
CLES MEDITERRANEAN, HOTEL CARAVELLE, ST. ANNE, GUADALUPE, FRENCH
Galv
-
INDIES. HE IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO HIS RESIDENCE ON MAY 18,
-
-
1975
REC-106 62-116375-98
BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF ALEXANDRIA SHOULD CONTACT
NBAUGH UPON HIS RETURN.
1.
19
TJT FBI WASH DC CLR
The contact
ban siche
tough on 
return.
84 MAY & 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 15
15/27
@
16 MAY 7 1975
(Yangs)
cc:-7-5853301
6%
670 4 1427 (ein lange)
AR 002 BA PLAIN
1220PM URGENT MAY 3, 1975 BJD
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
BALTIMORE (62-NEW)
· SENSTUDY 75
RE BUREAU TEL, MAY 2, 1975.
TIDERAL CURLY OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 03 1975
TELETYPE
DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASE,
MARYLAND, CONTACTED INSTANT DATE BY SAC, BALTIMORE.
INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCED TELETYPE FOLLOWED. HANNING
ADVISED HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE SENATE OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO DATE. ADVISED
WOULD CONTACT SAC, BALTIMORE SHOULD HE BE CONTACTED IN
THE FUTURE.
ENDDSS FBIHQ CCLR
REC-106
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Cizzer
-
COPY
RETAINED
NI
PERSONNEL
RECORDS UNIT
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HURTS CLASSIFIED
D: 1/19/01 SP-2ALM/146
62-116395-97
16 MAY 7 1975
4 MAY 8 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 16
ر ناب دار
file
CC: )
67 94450
5°
68-1183-90
1.
NR 09 OM PLAIN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 0 2 1975
✓
TELETYPE
7:00 PM CST URGENT MAY 2, 1975 SKH
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
FROM: OMAHA (62-NEW) (P)
SENSTUDY 75.
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 BX SP-2ALMITTE
RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MAY 2, 1975. R
FORMER SA JOHN J. QUINN WAS CONTACTED BY ME PERSONALLY
AND ADVISED PER INSTRUCTIONS IN RETEL. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE
OF ADVANCED NOTICE RE POSSIBLE INTERVIEW AND STATED THAT
HE WOULD DESIRE AN AGENT BE PRESENT IF SUCH INTERVIEW
OCCURS. STATED HE WOULD PERSONALLY CONTACT ME IF HE IS
CONTACTED BY STAFF MEMBERS.
END.
BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.
MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE
WA CRLR
7
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm……………
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Cabe
REC- 106
62-116395
96
ÄÄ
COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNF
NW 882Aoold: 39628 Page 17
cc 67-436724(Quinn)
16 MAY 7 1975
S
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
1/19/01 SP-2 ALM/776
**EBIK IS VRCLASSIFLO
1.
2.
0
-
2 Mr. S. F. Phillips.
April 30, 1975
MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
7 INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
TITLE/SUBJECT: Policies and Procedures of the FBI
ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
FBI
3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum with
enclosures described below
4.
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified except for one
enclosure which is classified "Secret."
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: Should have
6.
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:
Following excerpts from the FBI Manual of Instructions:
(a) Table of Contents.
(b)
Preface.
Guidelines for FBI Investigations.
(c) Section 36.
Espionage (classified "Secret").
Registration Act.
Sabotage.
Investigations of Subversive
Organizations and Individuals.
(d) Section 84.
(e) Section 86.
(f) Section 87.
(g) Section 88.
REC-106
(h) Section 95.
Treason.
Voorhis Act.
62-1143.
(i) Section 97.
Sedition.
Jed
(j) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil
Unrest.
5. Co
hs
16 MAY 7 1975
Also, Table of Contents of the FBI Manual of Rules
Ext. Affairs and Regulations.
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident. _
Inspection SFP :ekw
Intell.
Laboratory (4)
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Secly
PR
MAILROOM ☐
KW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 18
TELETYPE UNIT
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
Ef
7
GPO 951-346
Material furnished includes policy, statutes,
instructions and related matters covering FBI investigations
in the security field generally. Limited, extremely sensitive
material excluded but available for review by appropriately
cleared personnel of the SSC Staff at FBI Headquarters.
7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST:
8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI
9.
DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/7/75
SSC. 3/19/75
10.
11.
LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-75
RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:
No direct relation.
NOTE:
Original via liaison to Central Community Index
in connection with Senstudy 75.
- 2 -
NEW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 19
Routing Slip
0 Rev. 12-17-73)
TO: SAC:
RE:
(Copies to ✓ces Checked)
Albany
Houston
Albuquerque
Indianapolis
Alexandria
Jackson
Anchorage
Atlanta
Baltimore
Birmingham
Boston
Buffalo
Butte
Charlotte
Jacksonville
Kansas City
Knoxville
Las Vegas
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Columbia
Mobile
Dallas
Newark
Denver
New Haven
Oklahoma City
Omaha
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
Richmond
Sacramento
St. Louis
TO LEGAT:
Beirut
Bern
Bonn
Brasilia
Buenos Aires
Caracas
Hong Kong
London
Madrid
Salt Lake City
Manila
San Antonio
Mexico City
San Diego
Ottawa
San Francisco
San Juan
Savannah
Detroit
El Paso
Honolulu
New Orleans
New York City
Norfolk
Seattle
Springfield
Tampa
Washington Field
Quantico
Paris
Rome
Singapore
Tel Aviv
Tokyo
SENSTUDY 75
5/8/75
Date
PERSONAL ATTN.
For information
Retention
optional
For appropriate
action
The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report,
sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.
dated
Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA
Remarks:
Enc.
Bufile
Urfile
Surep, by
conceal all
Attached should be brought to the attention
of Assistant Legat Armand Cammarota. For
his information, the SSC has exhibited an
interest in Bureau's communications to
Rome in 1964 and is aware Cammarota was
then Legat there.
by SSC personnel.
62-116395
He thus may be contacted
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Fale
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 DATE 1-19-01 BY 51-2126
Page 20
5.8

OPTION FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
SA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
fo Memorandum
ΤΟ
:
MR. CALLAHAN
FROM
:
J. B. ADAMS
3. Sper
SENSTUDY 1975
SUBJECT:
DATE: 2/7/75
#толь
ALL INFORMATION COM
HERBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/01 EX SP2 Au
Hot
On 2/6/75 Mr. Kelley and I met with Senator Church
/Dop. Ap Adm
Dep: 4 Duinv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intel ☑
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Train
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.
Director Secy.
FARASS TO
and Bill Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee.
Senator Church pointed out that he intended to run the Committee in-
a very responsible manner, had no intention of destroying or impairing
the effectiveness of the intelligence community and, in fact, hoped that
the efforts of the Committee would help to reestablish public confidence
in the intelligence agencies.
Parameters have not been drawn but Senator Church feels that
the Committee will confine its activities largely to inquiries into domestic
activities. The inquiries will be designed to determine whether agencies
have acted outside the law and the type of remedial legislation necessary
to prevent such abuses in the future.
Study will be largely concerned with the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency but will, of course, involve the FBI and other agencies
involved in domestic'intelligence.
The Committee hopes to have a nonpartisan staff of approximately
40 employees headed up by Mr. Miller and would appreciate having necessary
background investigations expedited to permit an early clearance. Miller
indicated he has already been in touch with Mr. Hotis and Mr. Bowers in
this regard. It was explained that the contemplated procedure involved the
FBI conducting the full-field investigation necessary with the results being
furnished to the Chairman, after which he would, upon being personally
satisfied as to their loyalty, furnish the results to CIA for final clearance.
Senator Church appeared satisfied with this arrangement. He stated that
he wanted to prevent leaks and be hopefully as successful as the Judiciary
Committee was on the impeachment inquiry. Our experience in this regard
was pointed out wherein the Judiciary Committee in connection with the 17
wiretaps had written us a letter indicating that if we made classified
JBA:am's (8)
1
-
Mr. Jenkins
1
1
-
-
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. McDermott
84 MAY 7 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 21
REC 68 62.
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Hotis
1975
=-griff
CONTINUEDALOUNSEL
OVER
Memorandum for Mr. Callahan
Re: SENSTUDY 1975
information available they would afford it appropriate security restricted
to members only, excluding staff, and would not make the information
public. Subsequent to the hearings, the Committee published its report
which contained our classified documents right along with the Top Secret
classifications. Senator Church was not aware of this, appeared surprised
by it, and stated surely the information must have been declassified. I
advised him that not by us and it was our information.
Senator Church was asked whether in his opinion the formation
of the Select Committee would have any effect on the proliferation of
committees seeking to obtain testimony from the FBI and it was his opinion
that this would have a favorable effect. He said he had been in touch with
other members of the Senate who felt that it was a waste of time to have
repetitious testimony on the same subject matter before a variety of
committees and he had the feeling that the other committees would hold off
until after the Senate Select Committee completed its hearings. He indicated
that he could not vouch for what would happen in the House, however, he
intended to speak to the House leadership in order to try to effect some
coordinated approach there also, because he was well aware of the large
number of committees seeking to provide oversight or obtain information
from the intelligence agencies.
A question arose as to the extent. of cooperation with the Committee
and Senator Church was assured that the FBI would be completely responsive
subject to certain limitations which would have to be delineated by the
President in order to protect sensitive sources and information. Senator
Church indicated that he was going to talk to the President in this regard in
order to secure his complete cooperation, and it was Senator Church's feeling
that the Committee should be entitled to answers to any questions they might
ask without restriction other than, of course, the identities of informants.
He felt the progress of the Committee would be severely impaired if it were
necessary to go to Court over such questions to obtain enforcement of their
right to have access to whatever information they need.
ACTION:
Information.
ای ما
- 2 -
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 22
CODE
TELETYPE
་
NITEL
#MORIE
ALL INFOVATION CONTAINED
HOREAN 
CLASSIFIED
DARE 1/19/01 DV SP-2
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident. _
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
TO SACS ALL OFFICES
FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)
t
SENSTUDY 75
1
"
1
1
-
•
1
-
Mr. T.J.Jenkins
Mr. J. B. Adams
5/2/75
Each Assistant Director
Mr. W. O. Cregar
PERSONAL ATTENTION
CAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTS
FROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STÚDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN
CONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAY SEEK
/INTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES.
ΤΟ
RECENTLY, THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS
INTERVIEWED SEVERAL FORMER EMPLOYEES AND IT IS ANTICIPATED
THAT MANY MORE SUCH PERSONNEL WILL BE CONTACTED.
THE FBI HAS PLEDGED FULL COOPERATION WITH THE COMMITTEE
W
AND WE WISH TO ASSIST AND FACILITATE ANY INVESTIGATIONS: UNDER-
TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, WE
DO HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO INSURE THAT SENSITIVE SOURCES AND
METHODS AND ONGOING SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIONS ARE FULLY
WOC:ekw
(18.) Pkw
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
3
MAY 01975
Telephone Rm, MA ELETYPE
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 23
A
REC-16
72-11-
93
SEE NOTE-PACAY TH01975
JB8
Puin
pesem
✓
TELETYPE UNIT
XEROX
11 1975
GPO 954-346
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
TELETYPE TO ALL OF CES
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
PROTECTED.
SHOULD ANY FORMER EMPLOYEE CONTACT YOUR OFFICE AND
HAVE ANY QUESTION REGARDING HIS OBLIGATION NOT TO DIVULGE INFOR-
MATION OBTAINED BY VIRTUE OF HIS PAST FBI EMPLOYMENT, HE SHOULD
BẸ INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LEGAL COUNSEL, FBIHQ, BY COLLECT CALL.
YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH FORMER EMPLOYEES MUST BE IN KEEPING WITH
OUR PLEDGE. IT IS BELIEVED SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD INSURE PROPER
PROTECTION AND ALSO FACILITATE THE WORK OF THE SSC.
THE ABOVE PROCEDURE ALSO APPLIES TO CURRENT EMPLOYEES
OF YOUR OFFICE. HOWEVER, CONTACT WITH THE LEGAL COUNSEL SHOULD
BE HANDLED THROUGH THE SAC.
NOTE:
Teletype prepared for all offices to alert SACS to
the possibility former employees may contact their offices seeking
guidance.
The Office of Legal Counsel in response to requests from
former employees will utilize the briefing paper prepared by the
Intelligence Community Staff of the Director of Central
Intelligence and concurred in by Assistant Attorney General
Antonino Scalia.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 24
-
2 m
24,
91204t
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962-EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
1
-
ME WRWannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.
DATE: May 1, 1975
1
1
:MR. W. R. WANI
VANNALI (!!!)
1
-
FROM
MR. W. ONOREGAR
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
5 10/61/1
Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips.
'
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
This memorandum for record purposes reports
discussion 4/25/75 between Bureau's Liaison Agent, L. F. Schwartz,
and Mr. Jack E. Thomas, Chief, Coordination Staff, Intelligence
Community Staff, relating to Abstracts we are to prepare for the
Central Community Index (CCI) in connection with Senstudy 75.
Attached are (1) memorandum 4/11/75 re CCI and its
attachments, memorandum 4/10/75 and Abstract format; and (2) letter
4/21/75 from Thomas to Schwartz and its attachment, Abstract format.
On 4/25/75 Schwartz and Thomas discussed applicability of
instructions in attachments and arrived at the following under-
standings.
The FBI will provide Abstracts only, not documents,
to have on record in the CCI a summary of what we have furnished
to the Select Committees. Abstracts should be dated when typed
without regard to delivery date of Abstract or date of communi-
cations to which they pertain. Under item number nine of format,
enter date of communication involved, not date it is delivered
to a Select Committee. We may use an abbreviated version for
the Select Committees' names, such as "Senate Select Committee."
We will title Abstracts as near as possible in a manner keyed to
the language of the request from the Select Committee. Inasmuch
as we will honor only written requests from the Select Committees,
the "Requester" will always be shown as the name of the requesting
Committee and not the name of any Committee personnel.
ACTION: None.
62-116395
Enclosures
For information and record purposes. 315-9f
REC-88
16 MAY 6 1975 %.
SFP:ekw
(6)
2. ENCLOSURE)
84 MAY 6 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 25
from wo
5/1/75
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
11 April 1975
Principals of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating
Group on Congressional Reviews
Inspector General, CIA
Event
SUBJECT
: Central Community Index
deliver
Cahurant tracks
1. The central indexing capability detailed in the
attached memorandum has been implemented. Format for
preparation of abstracts has been accepted and the Community
Index is ready to receive material. The address of the
Community Index is
Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505.
02430
The timeliness of reporting to the Central Index is
critical and you are requested to make this information
available to the appropriate organizational components
within your agencies.
2.
Sincerely,
Attachment
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
#mot16
ALL FEST INFORMATION CONTAINED
HURMIN IS UNCHALSELED
DATE 1-19-9 GY SP2 ALM
毗
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 26
62-116395
5-8
62-11--395-9.2
55
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
10 April 1975
#MoR16
HUCONTAINED
MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Principals
SUBJECT:
ALL NOTICEE
DATA)=19-01 SP.JALM 1776
Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional
Committees Investigating Intelligence
1
1
1. The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke,
Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will
keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to
progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House
Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular,
it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are
formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements
of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this
matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communi-
cations.
2. In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community
Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the
investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all
responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and
available to your designated representatives.
3. In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is
essential that it include:
a. File copies of documents or other materials which
each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the
Select Committees where the originating agency considers
the materials to involve aspects of Community activities,
and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning..
the functioning of the Community. The availability of this
documentation will be of particular importance if it is
expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the
materials provided and involving elements of the Community
other than the originating element.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 27
:
b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select
-
Committee unless the Intelligence Community registry
is provided with an actual copy of the material itself.
A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.
Attachment:
As stated
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 28
W. E. Colby
2
!
FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY
MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
1.
2.
j mi j
3.
TITLE/SUBJECT:
ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:
5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)
6.
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement
describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or
recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of
whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
7. DATE OF REQUEST:
8.
RELEASING AUTHORITY:
9.
DATE OF SUBMISSION:
10.
11.
LOCATION OF FILE COPY:
‘RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 29
#mor 16
1-19-01 SPO-ALM/JTG
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Ad Hoc Staff
45-358
W. O.
5/1/75
SFPierw
Intelligence Community Staff
Mr. L. Frank Schwartz
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Room 4637
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D. C.
Dear Frank:
21 April 1975
#MORIG
Recodfro
Jack Thomas
ALL FEX INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE=19-01 52 SP-2 ALM/796
Reference is your request for comments on the sample
abstracts prepared in the FBI as a report on materials being
provided to the Senate Select Committee.
As you know, we want to make the Community Registry as
complete a record as possible of what is provided to the
Committee, and for this reason hope that the actual copy of
special reports and particularly important documents will be
provided to the Registry. Where this is not done, an abstract
or summary of each document or homogenous set of documents.
We have amended the abstract format slightly to include
an entry for "Document Classification." A copy of the
amended format is enclosed.
Your sample abstracts require a few alterations to make
them more "indexable."
a. Item 1, "TITLE/SUBJECT" refers to the subject
matter of the material which is being provided. The
abstract on the FBI Manual of Instructions should have
an entry here something like "Instructions covering FBI
Investigations in the Security Field," rather than the
title of the Senate Committee.
b. The date at the head of the page should be
the date of preparation of the abstract. The date of
submission to the Committee is listed at Item 9.
C.
The entry "ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION" identified
the organization with authority to release the document.
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 30
62-116395
File
5
62-116-395-92
52/14/4
дом

d. The "SUMMARY OF CONTENTS" section should
be brief, but also should clearly indicate what is
being provided to the Committee. I wonder, for
instance, whether your sample on the letterhead
memoranda was issued in widely separated time periods.
The summary as written gives no indication as to
the particular subject of any of the memoranda and the
single sentence now used to describe all of them covers
the waterfront.
e. If the request for information comes officially
from the Committee, the Committee title should be entered
under "REQUESTOR, 11 but if the requestor is an individual
member of the Staff, his name should be indicated.
f. The last entry in the format, "PROBLEM AREAS,"
has particular significance since it is important to
know if there are Third Agency, or sources and methods,
or other sensitivity problems involved, and this is
the place to identify them. We are beginning to use
the abstracts prepared in our office as an aid to
obtaining release clearance when we are dealing with
the document for which another agency must concur in
the release. The "PROBLEM AREAS" section gives such
other agency an idea as to whether we see any important
reason why they should be concerned about release of
the document. The entry in this final section of the
format is expected to prove useful for this purpose.
5. One copy of the document or its abstract is all
that is needed by the registry.
6.
The mailing address of the registry is:
Community Index
Room 6E25
CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia 20505
Enclosure: as stated
Jack Thomas
Jack E. Thomas
Chief
Coordination Staff, ICS
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 31
2
FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT TO BE SUBMITTED TO
USIB AD HOC COORDINATING STAFF REGISTRY
MATERIAL FOR THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
1.
2.
m
.3.
4.
5.
TITLE/SUBJECT:
ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
NATURE OF MATERIAL: (Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION:
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP (YES/NO)
6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS: (Brief narrative statement
describing content, problems addressed and any conclusions or
recommendations. Summary should clearly convey basic thrust of
whatever was provided to the Select Committee.)
7.
DATE OF REQUEST:
8.
RELEASING AUTHORITY:
9.
DATE OF SUBMISSION:
.10. ·
LOCATION OF FILE COPY:
11.
RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS. (Identify)
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 32
#MOR16
TRI INFORMATION CONTATIVEITO
ITS UNCLASSINTSD
"TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA ĠEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: MR. W.
WANNALL
FROM
: MR. W. OWCREGAR
O
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
Date: April 21, 1975
1
-
Mr. S. F. Phillips
5.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On Thursday, 4/17/75, Mr. James Wilderotter,
Associate Counsel to the President for CongressionallInquiries,
was furnished the following four documents with a request that
he advise whether copies of such documents could be made available
to the Senate Select Committee: (1) An internal FBI memorandum
dated 5/16/72 captioned "FBI Jurisdiction, Criminal Intelligence
Information";B (2) An internal FBI memorandum dated 5/18/72 captioned
"FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters"; (3) A study
on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI Director L. Louis
Patrick Gray III dated 5/19/72; (4) A memorandum from the Director
of the FBI to the Attorney General dated 8/7/73 recommending the
issuance of an Executive Order concerning the conduct of domestic
intelligence investigations.
On 4/18/75 Mr. Wilderotter advised Section Chief
William O. Cregar that the above four documents were cleared
for delivery to the Senate Select Committee.
ACTION: For information and record purposes.
WOC:ekwekw
62-116395
REC-88
62-116385-91
#Mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/19/07 EXSP-2-ALM/1216
84 MAY 6 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 33
16 MAY 6 1975
1 Mr. J. B. Adams
-
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
1
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
April 28, 1975
1
1
1
-
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
Enclosed for your information is the original of a
memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of
captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Lish Whitson.
A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for your use in the
event you desire to furnish it to Mr. James A. Wilderotter,
Associate Counsel to the President.
Enclosures
-
2
62-116395
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2.20-81 BYS PLUMIN
1- 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1-67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)
SFP:ekw
(11)
REC-6
d.
6076
62-111-395-90
473
12
1.
hur.
EX-110
MAY 2 1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
7.
Intell. び
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
"NPC/
JBŁ
Pem
56 MAY 06.1975
MAIL ROOM
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 34
TELEI PE UNIT
GPO 954-546
UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN
62-116395
1
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
1
Mr. J. A. Mintz
1
Mr. W. R. Wannall
April 28, 1975
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-2081 BY SP4Pm1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
6026
1
Mr. J. G. Deegan
1
-
Mr. S. F.
U. S. SE ATE SELECT COMMITTED TO
STUDY GOVEAUMENICAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGE CE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
TEE:
INTERVIEW OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER
Phillips
my
Set out below is information available to the FBI
concerning captioned ratter.
SSC Intervict of Retired FDI SA Lich Whit on
On the afternoon of April 23, 1975, Mr. Lich hit: on
per.onally appeared at the office of an FBI official, tated
that he had just been interviewed by Mr. Michael Epstein,
Staff Member of the SSC, and was desirous of reporting the
recult. of that interview which (hitson related as follows:
He was
Epstein first asked Whitson then he entered the
FDI, then he first arrived for assignment at FBI Headquarters,
to thich Headquarters Division he had been assigned, and when he
retired. (FBI record reveal that Whitson joined the FBI as
an SA Hovember 20, 1933, and retired June 19, 1972.
assigned at Readquarters December 16, 1941, attached to the
Pomatic Intelligence Division and cerved in that Division
until hi retiroment. The current name for that Divi. ion-1:
Intelligence Divi. ion). En tein then told Whit on that he
Dep. AD Adm.now that Whitson had at one time called a package to
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Ers. Martin Luther King from Tampa, Florida, and asked Whit on
to relate the detail: concerning thi: matter. Whitson thereupon
-
I
-
-
100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
67-29405 (Personnel File Former SA Lish Whitson)
SFP:ekw
Laboratory (11)
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y.
(kW)
MAIL ROOM
NPJ
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 35
TELETYPE UNIT
Pen
SEE NOTE PAGE FIVE
62-11639
ENCLOSUN
GPO 954-345
V. S. SEXVID BUISCI COMITEED TO STUDY COVENCINICAL
OREMTIOUS VIIN UNFORGE TO WINVIDIOS (693)
AC: INAVIC? OF LITLUSED POI SPOCIAL ACCI (SA) DY
SSC STAFF MIBER
told Epstein that in the lato Commer of 1964, former FDI
Asclatant to the Director (illion C. Sullivan had telephoned
Thitcon at his home one Saturday and told him that lato
FBI Director Roover Wanted Whitson to deliver a pockage
to Mani, Florida, by plane and on arrival at the Iliani
airport to telephone fullivan for further instructions.
Whitcon did as directed and upon calling, Sullivan, vao
instructed to address the package to Mr. Martin Luther King.
Accordingly, Whitson had the package weighed, put postage
stamps on 16, and addressed it to Martin Luther King (not
Mrs. Martin Luther King au potein had indicated). The
Following day, Sunday, Whitson flew back to Washington and
on the next day, Monday, he informed Sullivan that his
instructions had been carried out. Sullivan commented to
Chitcon "Comeday I vill tell you about that."
Epotein asked Whitson who had paid for the stamps
to mail the package and Whitson raid that he had probably done
to utilizing per diem money. Epstein acted whether he had
put a return address on the package and Whitson replied in
the negative. Lostoin acted if thitson had gone to the Womi
FBI Office, whether any gent had met him at the Miami airport,
and whether Thit on had discussed this matter with anyone.
Whitcon cold Epstein that he had not gone to the Miant Office,
that no drent had not hin, and that he had discussed the matter
only with Sullivan. At this point, whitson acted pstain how
ho got the story. Epstein merely laughed and did not reply
to the question.
Epstein also asked Whitson whether he had over written
a Decorandu regarding this matter, to thich thitson replied in
the negative. Epstein asked if hitson had over coon a nonoranjun
on this matter and hitson again replied in the negative.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 36
1
2 -
V. S. IN SPLICI CIO CIUIZ COVRAZALIAL,
OREMZIONG WITH DEPUICE TO LITZULICHTICO (CTIVITIES (DSC)
IEVIR O BIRD FOI SVICIAL LORII (SA) BY
DOG AF HIN
On April 24, 1975, Whitson telephoned the FUI official
referred to above on to occasions to report additional infor-
ration which Enstein had secured from Whitcon by telephone on
April 24, 1975. This additional information vac as follows:
Epstein nubed hot thitson had made the trip to Illami;
that is, bo 16 tae paid for. Whitson told him he had lasued
a Government Transportation Aequest (CIN). Epocoin arkad
whether there was any prior written authorization for thit on
to make the trip and Whitcon told him there was none. Epstein
octed that kind of rccord would have been made covering the
trip and thition explained that the only record he knew of would
be the eponce voucher he cubmitted covering the expences involved
and possibly the copy of the CIR thich he had icenc. Whitcon
explained to Dostain that the voucher would merely cho that
the CIA had been issued for a round-trip to and from Mani
and how much per dien had been claimed in connection with the
trip. Ipotein inquired as to whether hitson and registered
at the Airport Hotel in Moni, and, if co, thether it uns unter
his own name. Whitson told Epstein that he had registered under
his mare of this hotel.
Additional Information Furnished to NDI By Whitcon
In addition to the foregoing, Whitcon furnished to
the FDI official the following information on April 23, 1075,
which information he did not_furnich to Ipstein.
Then Sullivan told Thitson he wanted him to fly the
package to Iliami, he stated that only ho, fullivan, Kr. Hoover,
Ir. Tolion, (then FBI Associate Director) and Ir. Delmont
(then TBI Acolctant to the Director) Ime of this situation..
(at the time, 1964, Sullivan was an Assistant Director.)
Sullivan never did explain to hitson anything more regarding
chi incident.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 37
3
4
0. 0.2570 WSMITTNE 10 SIODY COVITAL
OFENTIONS WITH ROSPECT TO HILLLIGUEL [CIIVIZIES (500)
DECOVIEW OF RETIRED FDI SPECIAL AGEIN (SA) DY
SSC STAFF LATER
Whitson cold that then he arrived at the forth
Terminal at National Airport, following Sullivan's telephonic
instructions, a young man who was unknown to Whitson but tho
addressed hin es "ir. Whitson," turned over to him a package
which vas trapped in brown paper and scaled with scaling tape.
It is Whitcon's recollection the package neacured approximately
oight inches by eight inches by one inch.
It is hitson's further recollection that at the time
the foregoing occurred, King was either just about to go abroad
to receive the Robol Peace Prize or probably had already goze
abroad. It was Whitcon's recollection that cometime shortly
after the mailing of the package, Sullivan commented to "hitson
that the package had not yet been received by Ring. Because of
this remark, Whitson is of the belief that the package was
mailed to King at the headquarters of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference and not to King'a residence. Further,
It was Whitson's recollection that it can not long after ho
had mailed the package that King had a personal meeting with
II. Hoover in the latter's office.
Whit on observed that in his opinion, the information
which was in the possession of Eputein prior to interviewing
Whitson must have originated with Sullivan. Whitson noted that
Hr. Hoover and Er. Tolcon are both deccaced and that he hac
heard nothing to indicate that Ir. Delmont has been contacted
by members of the Staff of the 250. One other factor thot
causes Thitcon to fool that Sullivan was the source of the
information vac a question Epstein zalced as to thother Whitson
Ind put a return address on the package then he addressed it to
Ring. hitson said he recalls that then he was in Iliant and
received the telephonic instructions from Sullivan, Sullivan
told him that he should put a return address on the package
and Whitson then pointed out to Eullivan that if he did co,
and the name of the addressen became meared, the package
could end up at someone's return address rather than in the
ร
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 38
* 4
V. S. COWIE SELECT CONCITITES TO STUDY GOVIARIAL
ONCIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO UNLTLICHICO ACTIVITIES (SIC)
RUG:
IIGIVICS OF RICHIED FBI SPECIAL ACHTE (SA) BY
OSC SIATT HABER
dead lottox office.
Cullivan concurred that no rotura address
should be used. Thus, Sullivan would probably have reason
to have commented regarding the use or nonuse of a return
address.
On April 24, 1975, Whitson furnished by telephone
to the aforementioned Bureau official the following additional
Information which he had not furnished to Epstein. Whitson
stated it trac no his recollection he had made the Iliami
trip cither in the late summer or early Fall of 1964 and that
Ring was "away" at the time.
TBI Records Concernin; Whitson's Travel
The following information is on record in the FDI
concerning the travel of thitson discussed above.
December 9, 1964, a Travel Voucher rac processed for payment
to Whitron the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period
Iovember 1-30, 1964. 00 record also is a memorandun copy of
à Government Transportation Request issued November 21, 1964,
to National Airlines in the sun of $107.40 for air coach travol,
Washington, D. C, to Iliami, Florida, and return. Kovember 21,
1904, has been determined to have been a Saturday. There is
not available in the FBI any copy of the actual voucher cubmitted
by Whitson.
NOTE: Original and one copy to the Attorney General (AG
may forward the copy to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel
to the President). Information herein taken from two memoranda
We.R. Wannall to J. B. Adams 4/23, 24/75, "Senstudy 75; Former
Voucher
Supervisor Lish Whitson, Assigned Intelligence Division."
and GTR information from J. D. Cox, Voucher Unit, Computer
Systems Division.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 39
- 5 -
"
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
6
1 Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
-
1
Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 18, 1975
1
Mr. R. H. Horner
1
Mr. T E. Burns
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
#mae16
ALD IN LUTION CONTAINED
IN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
(+18-01 SP-ZALMI HE
Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committee
dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and specifically Part IV,
Policies and Procedures.
Since the enclosed memorandum captioned "Microphone
Surveillance, dated May 20, 1954, originated with the Office of the Attorney
General and is covered under this request, we are deferring to your
judgment in this matter. The FBI interposes no objection to furnishing
this document to the Committee, it being noted that the document appeared in
toto in the United States Government Printing Office publication captioned
"Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillances, 1974."
Also enclosed for your approval is the original of a memorandum
to the Senate Select Committee apprising the Committee of our referral of
this matter to you. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.
Enclosures - 2
62-116395
.REC-100
4/25 Hpponed by A.6/
Hey Delind
Bill.
TEB: vb
(8)
NOTE:
2
16 MAY 2 1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
The request referred to above is one of several contained in the
referenced communication. We are referring this matter to the Department as a
matter of protocol in line with our policy of furnishing the Committee only
Ext. Affairs documents originating with the FBI.
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
Files & Com,
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED
PLM
TELETYPE UNIT
NV288299 bld:32988628 Page 40
...
'Evls
@
GPO 954-545

1- Mr. J. A. Mintz
1- Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. V. O. Cregar
1 Mr. R. H. Horner
1- Mr. T. E. Burns
April 18, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the
Attorney General from the Chairman of the captioned Committee, which
enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
This is to advise that with respect to the memorandum from
the Attorney General to the Director, FBI, captioned "Microphone
Surveillance," dated May 20, 1954, we are deferring action on this request
to the United States Department of Justice inasmuch as this communication
originated with that Department,
62-116395
1 - The Attorney General
TEB:vb
(8)
سور
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
✓
MAIL ROOM
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 41
字
ALT
#mo216
MATION 
CONTAINED
1-12-01 DSP-2ALM/796
WRW/TWL
TELETYPE UNIT
62-116315
89
GPO 954-546
t
#moe16
☐ IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THE
ENVELOPE
DATE 1-18-0 BXSP-2 ALMA6
“
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 42
2-89
62-116395-89
ENCLOSURE
11
i
STANDARD FORM NO. 64
3
Office Memorandum
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
ΤΟ
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FROM The Attorney General
SUBJECTMICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE
DATE:
May 20, 1954.
☑
155-26
declassified 4/218.23
TEBLAM
The recent decision of the Supreme Court entitled Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, denouncing the use of microphone surveillances
by city police in a gambling case makes appropriate a reappraisal of
the use which may be made in the future by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of microphone surveillance in connection with matters
relating to the internal security of the country.
It is clear that in some instances the use of microphone
Surveillance is the only possible way of uncovering the activities
of espionage agents, possible saboteurs, and subversive persons. In
such instances I am of the opinion that the national interest requires
that microphone surveillance be utilized by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. This use need not be limited to the development of
evidence for prosecution. The FBI has an intelligence function in
connection with internal security matters equally as important as
the duty of developing evidence for presentation to the courts and
the national security requires that the FBI be able to use microphone
'surveillance for the proper discharge of both of such functions.
The Department of Justice approves the use of microphone surveillance
by the FBI under these circumstances and for these purposes.
I do not consider that the decision of the Supreme Court
in Irvine v. California, supra, requires a different course. That
case is readily distinguishable on its facts. The language of the
Court, however, indicates certain uses of microphones which it would
be well to avoid, if possible, even in internal security investiga-
tions. It is quite clear that in the Irvine case the Justices of the
Supreme Court were outraged by what they regarded as the indecency of
installing à microphone in a bedroom. They denounced the utilization
of such methods of investigation in a gambling case as shocking. The
Court's action is a clear indication of the need for discretion and
intelligent restraint in the use of microphones by the FBI in all
cases, including internal security matters. Obviously, the installa-
tion of a microphone in a bedroom or in some comparably intimate
location should be avoided wherever possible. It may appear, however,
that important intelligence or evidence relating to matters, connected
with the national security can only be obtained by the installation of
a microphone in such a location. It is my opinion, that under such
circumstances the installation is proper and is not prohibited by the
Supreme Court's decision in the Irvine case.
NW-88296-Docid:32989628 Page 43
2
Previous interpretations which have been furnished to you
as to what may constitute trespass in the installation of microphones,
suggest that the views expressed have been tentative in nature and
have attempted to predict the course which courts would follow
rather than reflect the present state of the law. It is realized
that not infrequently the question of trespass arises in connection
with the installation of a microphone. The question of whether a
trespass is actually involved and the second question of the effect
of such a trespass upon the admissibility in court of the evidence thus
obtained, must necessarily be resolved according to the circumstances
of each case. The Department in resolving the problems which may arise
in connection with the use of microphone surveillance will review the
circumstances in each case in the light of the practical necessities
of investigation and of the national interest which must be protected.
It is my opinion that the Department should adopt that interpretation
which will permit microphone coverage by the FBI in a manner most
conducive to our national interest. I recognize that for the FBI
to fulfill its important intelligence function, considerations of
internal security and the national safety are paramount and, there-
fore, may compel the inrestricted use of this technique in the national,
interest.
H.B.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 44
༢.་
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
WALK
MR. WALSH
ΤΟ
:
✓ FROM ; L. C. GROOVER
LCG
CO/TC
DATE: 4/3/75
FmD216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
ATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/19e
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
108
Sen 160
Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum
dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church
dated 3/19/75.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y —
Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number
of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence
collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities,
together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters,
operations and activities ( page 3, item ÏÏÏC of relet).
The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal
Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached
herewith, to the above request.
It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security,
intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has
been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and
counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the
data for both of the other categories as appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION:
REC-100
62-116395-
88
That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the
Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter,
forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to
the Senate Select Committee.
Enclosure
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1
Mr. Mintz
1 Mr. Jackson
JJC:jmb
ENCLOSURE
84 MAY 2 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 45
ай
MAY 2 1975
SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO
SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE
5 UAB
Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities
ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75
шов
The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures
prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current
Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these
figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a
hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability
the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign
threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends
that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate
Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment
in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.
ани
инв
HSP
раз
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 46
-2-
JVER
Ok to
clanita
ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
PVD:dkedy 4-14-75
Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division
concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to
counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the FBI, the
Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:
do
Confadenitted
724
(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this
Division has had with Fred B. Griffith of the Inspection Division, it
appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be
classified confidential under Executive order 11652.
(2) Before making any determination as to whether we
make such information available to the Senate Select Committee, it
would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to
such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be
consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted
Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested
he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.
(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast
position that this information not be made available to the Committee or
that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for
this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such
as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the
Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.
IND
wiling
Tom Feeney acting
for 
Evo con OK a
a 4/28/15
Walsh 
ac 
claccification
gem
Ju
gantgião
see menso Cregors to wannale dated 1/1/75
Wocfeku
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 47
- 3 -
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED BY
Amoe16
ON
OF 1-18-07-2AMLING
THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
_ J
Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to
internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field
offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:
Special Agents
In Charge
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge
Special Agent
Supervisors
Special Agents
Internal Security
2.80
1.75
2.34
2.16
47.06
46.18
671.07
904.29
116375.
88
Total
Equivalent Full-
Year Agent
Employees
Counterintelligence
These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent
personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:
Internal Security
Counterintelligence
722.68
954.97
Special Agents
In Charge
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge
Special Agent
Supervisors
Percent of
Total Agent
Special Agents
4.2%
2.9%
11.9%
9.5%
Personnel
9.5%
3.5%
3.6%
11.7%
12.8%
12.6%
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 48
CONFIDENTIAL
9
Classified by
2 & 3
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite
ENCLOSURE
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM : Legal Counsel
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
DATE: 4-14-75
Asoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plán. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Soy
**
On 4-11-75 Doug Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney
General, was apprised of the fact we intended to affix a property stamp
on certain nonclassified documents we were furnishing the Senate Select
Committee (SSC). It was explained the stamp contained a caveat that
the particular document may not be made available to unauthorized
individuals without the Bureau's consent. He advised he felt this procedure
was excellent.
Way
On 4-14-75 Mr. Marvin requested that all future contacts
with the Department concerning SENSTUDY be coordinated with Jack Fuller,
extension 3892. Mr. Fuller is assigned to the Attorney General's office.
RECOMMENDATION:
For information.
HILS
1 - Mr. Wannall
1
1
-
Mr. Mintz
Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1
-
Mr. Daly
PVD:dkg (7)
di
Рем
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-Z ALM/216
REC-106
62-116395-87
APR 23 1975
84 APR 30 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 49
"lage
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GS GEN. REGANO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: MR. W. R. WANNAL
FROM
: MR.
JANNALLIN
%
CREGAR
SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75
$514/75
1
1
1
-
Mr JB Adams-
Mr J At Mintz-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
DATE: April 14, 1975
1
-
1
1
Mr. J. B. Hotis
Mr. L. F. Schwartz
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Mr. L. C. Groover to Mr. Walsh memorandum dated
/75 entitled "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities" forwarded to the Intelligence Division for review
the titles and numbers of FBI field office Agents assigned to
internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counter-
intelligence matters, operations or activities. This was in response
to requirement IIIC of Senator Church's' letter dated 3/19/75.
By addendum dated 4/4/75 the Intelligence Division
recommended that the Legal Counsel Division discuss with the
staff of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) our reluctance to
provide these type figures to the SSC.
On 4/11/75 I discussed with Mr. John Clark, Associate
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the intelligence
community, the request of Senator Church. Specifically, Mr. Clark
was asked if Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had received such a
request and how they responded. Mr. Clark advised that CIA had
not received a specific request for the titles and numbers of
CIA offices assigned to intelligence collection or counter-
intelligence matters. However, CIA had received a request to
identify the names and numbers of CIA covert officers assigned
overseas.
REC-106.
62-116395-86
Mr. Clark advised that CIA intended to advise the Staff
Director of the SSC that CIA was unwilling to provide such names
and numbers to the SSC for retention in its files. However, CIA
would be willing to allow a senior staff member or the Staff
Director to review the names and numbers of CIA covert officers:
overseas at the CIA headquarters building.
WOC:ekwCKU
(7)
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/116
APR 30 1975
Docid:32989628 Page 50
CONTINUED
-
OVER
APR 29 1975
SEE LEGAL COUNSEL ADDENDUM
PAGE 3

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
SENSTUDY 75
RE:
ACTION:
IFLES
If approved, the Legal Counsel Division should
the SCC that because of security considerations, the Hue and
numbers of Special Agents of the FBI assigned to internal
security and counterintelligence matters cannot be furnished
to the SCC in documented form for the Committee files. However,
the FBI would be willing to show the titles and figures to
Mr. Miller or a senior staff member at FBIHQ in an effort to
demonstrate a spirit of cooperation and credibility.
wiewiel
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 51
- 2 -
Addersum
ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
PVD:dkg
4-15-75
_Legal Counsel Division interposes no objection to
Intelligence Division's recommendation. If approved, Intelligence
Division prepare necessary communication to notify the SSC.
дет
дн
Sex memot a. G.
with 
evel for a 
busse
4/20/75 EWHERE.
Was
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 52
- 3 -
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MA1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
1
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wanna w
FROM
:
W.
ok
Cregar
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
1
1
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
DATE: 4/11/75
Waß
1
-
1
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
APRIL 11, 1975
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2-ALM 1196
이요
W.O 0
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AP Adm.
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On 4/11/75, from 10:00 am until 12:20 pm, staff
members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities were briefed by Assistant Director Wannall and
members of his staff in the Conference Room at INTD, Briefed
from the Committee were Mr. William Miller, Staff Director;
Mr. Frederick A, O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel; and
Messrs. Mark Gitenstein, Marvin Epstein, Patrick Shea, Britt
Snider and Loch Johnson, all staff members,
The first hour of the briefing was occupied with
the showing of the INTD slide presentation and commentary
which provided highlights of the work of the INTD, both in
the counterintelligence and internal security field. Following
this presentation a question and answer period ensued for the
rest of the briefing. Mr. Miller and Mr. Schwarz posed most
of the questions.
In the counterintelligence field the thrust of the
questioning was directed toward the continuing growth of the
hostile intelligence presence in the United States and its
short-term and long-term effect on the FBI's operations.
Mr. Wannall pointed out that the Director on previous occasions
had indicated his intention to "beef up" the counterintelligence
effort of the FBI by the addition of some 250 Special Agents,
and that INTD had also effected certain programs designed to
assign certain counterintelligence functions to non-Agent
personnel, thereby freeing additional Special Agents to function
as case officers. In response to a question as to whether the
additional investigative effort necessary to counter the
mounting hostile intelligence threat might not involve investim
gation of more and more American citizens, Mr, Wannall conceder
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-
OVER
APR 29 1975
5-1006
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Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re:
Senstudy 75
Briefing for Staff Members
by Intelligence Division
April 11, 1975
that this was inevitable. He stressed, however, the investi-
gative policies of the FBI which protected the constitutional
rights and right of privacy of such individuals,
On the domestic internal security side the thrust
of the questioning appeared to indicate an interest in the
predication, duration and administrative controls of investi-
gations of domestic organizations and individuals. Again,
Mr. Wannall stressed the precautions inherent in FBI policy
and instructions to the field in these matters, pointing out,
in effect, that these investigations are founded on statutory
authority and are closely supervised by experienced personnel
at Headquarters level. The Committee staff appeared to accept
these answers and no critical or hostile attitudes on their
part were evident.
The briefing was terminated at 12:20 pm, due to
commitments on the part of the staff. Mr. Miller and
Mr. Schwarz both expressed their appreciation for the briefing
and indicated it had been most instructive, They indicated
a desire to continue these discussions at some later date and
Mr. Wannall assured them that he would be happy to continue
the briefing at any future mutually agreeable time,
Perhaps most significant of all questions posed was
the final question by Mr. Schwarz in which he inquired as to
what advantages and disadvantages to the FBI could be anticipated
as a result of the Committee fulfilling its mandate. Mr. Wannall
replied that any statutory authority defining and affirming the
FBI's role in the intelligence collection field would certainly
be a positive achievement. He also stated that any result of
the Committee's investigation which would tend to limit the
investigative resources or the investigative effectiveness of
the FBI would surely be an unfortunate negative factor.
RECOMMENDATION:
None.
WBW
For information,
PLM
Jambar
дня
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 54
2 -
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5010-106
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
WR.
W. R. Wannalwar
SENSTUDY 75
FROM
:
DATE: April 23,
1975
SUBJECT:
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD/Adm
Deploy
Asst. Dir.:
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
VGG
.
At 3:17 p.m., 4/22/75 former Special Agent Lish Whitson
who for many years was a supervisor in the Intelligence Division
telephoned me to advise that he had received a request to appear
for an interview by Michael Epstein, staff member of the Senate
Select Committee. The interview was scheduled for 4/23/75.
ས་
In response to a question by Mr. Whitson, he was advised
that to the writer's knowledge this was the first former Bureau
employee who had been requested to appear for an interview by any
member of the staff of the Select Committee. Whitson stated that
he was proceeding on the basis that he would respond to questions
propounded to him but he had some reservation in his mind concerning
answering questions which would involve material which he knew to be
classified at the time he retired. He commented he had noted in the
news media that staff members of the Committee were reportedly to be
granted clearances through TOP SECRET Q (Atomic Energy Matters).
Whitson was advised by the writer that while it was true
staff members were being granted clearances, the Bureau was endeavoring
to establish procedures through the Attorney General whereby highly
sensitive and classified material could be revealed on a restricted
basis in response to Committee inquiries; for example, in some
instances we would request that only the Majority and Minority leaders
on the Committee be furnished certain types of material and in other
instances only the Senators themselves as opposed to all staff members.
REC-100
12-116375-84
62
Mr. Whitson said in view of this, it was his intention to be
as responsive and candid during the interview by Mr. Epstein as he
could be but if any questions arose in his mind with respect to
revelation as to what he, Whitson, considered to be sensitive material,
he anticipated he would express his concern to Mr. Epstein and advise
him he felt it would be appropriate to check with the Bracer
is aware of regulations by the Attorney General which preclude
revealing FBI information without the Attorney General's spec9YS
WRW: 1m1
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1
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Mr.
Mr. Mintz
Adams
•
Mr Cregar
Wannall
Mr.
84 APR 29 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 55
#MORK
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
11/18/01 DX SP-2 ALM/116
DATE
CONTINUED - OVER
5-6506
Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: SENSTUDY 75
FORMER SUPERVISOR LISH WHITSON
ASSIGNED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
prior approval.
Whitson stated that if the writer had no
objection, he would telephone again after his interview with
Epstein in the event any matters came up which he felt would be
of interest to the Bureau. He was assured that the writer had
no objection whatsoever and would appreciate any observations
which he cared to pass along.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
Ав
JBA
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 56
I
-
2 -
разни
дет
The Attorney General
1- Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
1- Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 22, 1975
Director, FBI
0
UNITED STATES SENÁTE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
17160
#MDR16
NATION CONTAINED
NI T
IRIS ASSIFIED
MM 1/18/01 Ex58-2 ALm/ZTE
By letter dated March 19, 1975, the Senate Select Committee
requested information from the FBI. Part I of the Committee's letter pertained
to the legal authority for investigations.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is the
original of a memorandum and four documents on the subject of legal authority
for investigations.
1
A copy of this memorandum, with enclosures, is being provided
for your records.
Enclosures
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لتمريرية
4/28/75 Beld to Mikelistre.
of CommiTTEL (SSC)
8
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident. _
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
-
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director
4-4
NOTE:
por
REC-100
62-1143
83
The Senate Select Committee's 3/19/75, letter was transmitted with
an attachment, prepared by the Committee's staff, which set forth examples of
the type of information concerning domestic intelligence jurisdiction of interest
to it. Among those items cited in the attachment to the Committee's 3/19/75,
letter was a study on jurisdiction prepared for former Acting FBI Director
Louis Patrick Gray III by the Office of Legal Counsel, dated 5/18/72. Representatives
of the Legal Counsel Division do not believe the 5/18/72 study is, in itself,
• appropriate to furnish in response to the question of the Senate Select Committee
on legal authority. However, Legal Counsel Division believes that two internal
FBI memoranda, prepared in connection with the drafting of the 5/18/72, study,
would be pertinent to the Senate Select Committee's inquiry. Accordingly, thes29 1975
two documents, items one and two of attached memorandum for the Committee,
are being furnished.
ENCLOSURE
JBA
"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
MAJE ROOM
W 88298 Bocid:32989628 Page 57
TELETYPE UNIT
work
while
GPO 954-545
1 Mr. J. A. Mintz
-
1- Mr. W. R. Wannall
1- Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 22, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES
soc.
soc. 
D.
Dep. AD/Adm..
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst Dir
Admin.
Camp. Sist.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Hell. -
boratory.
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Inv.
Sing
joun -
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Secy
Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting
certain documents and other information from the FBI.
Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of
the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":
1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned
"FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."
2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned
"FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."
3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI
Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.
4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney
General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive
Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.
Enclosures - 4
1 - The Attorney General
AFW:vb
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ALL INFO NION CONTAINED
HERWIN 
13 NOLASSIFIED
JBA
DATE 1/18/01 SP-2 ALM/4G
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NW896 Docid:32989628 Page 58
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ENCLOSURE
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GPO 954-546
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
སྐ
*
UN ED STATES DEPARTMENT OF USTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
April 22, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES
REVOLUTION
12/6
1976
BUCENTENNIAL
Reference is made to the March 19, 1975, letter from the
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to the Attorney General, requesting
certain documents and other information from the FBI.
Attached are the following documents responsive to Part I of
the Senate Select Committee's request, entitled "Legal Authorities":
1. An internal FBI memorandum dated May 16, 1972, captioned
"FBI Jurisdiction; Criminal Intelligence Information."
་
2. An internal FBI memorandum, dated May 18, 1972, captioned
"FBI Authority in Domestic Intelligence Matters."
3. A study on subversion prepared for former Acting FBI
Director Louis Patrick Gray III, dated May 19, 1972.
4. A memorandum from the Director of the FBI to the Attorney
General dated August 7, 1973, recommending the issuance of an Executive
Order concerning the conduct of domestic intelligence investigations.
Enclosures - 4
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 59
42.6515.83
ENCLOSURE
#M0R16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18:01 BX SP-2 ALMZ06
OPTIONAL FORN NO 10
* 10/10.
FORLIFUN, ELƏ, Kİ 37
5017-106
☐
UNITED STATES GOVER ENT
Memorandum
: Mr. Dalbey
DATE:
5/16/72
ROM
J. A. Mintz
UBJECT:
gm.
FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
#30216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SR-2 ALM
You requested analysis of the legal authority for FBI
criminal intelligence collection and its relationship to our statutory
jurisdiction in criminal matters.
"The gathering of criminal intelligence information"
describes activity not subject to precise definition. However, its
general objective is well understood by those engaged in law enforcement.
There exist individuals and groups whose daily occupations are directed
toward profit without regard to the restraints of the law. Yel, by the
very nature of their associations. little actual participation in criminal
acts may be observed by the most astute law enforcement observer.
Their existence and contribution to the sum of criminal behavior. has been
detected and to some degree measured by the collection of data concerning
their personal life-styles, property holdings, associates, influence, and
access to capital. Such information has been characterized as "criminal
intelligence."
For years, the FBI has been aware of the need to identify
these resources of the criminal element. Congress responded to this
need through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. The Congressional
findings were that organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains
billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and by
the illegal use of force, fraud and corruption. Legitimate business and
labor unions are infiltrated and corrupted and our democratic processes
are subverted. The problem was declared to be of of national concern
both as to our economy and the domestic security.
1
CONTINUED - OVER
62.116.5.2013.
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 60-

'
: Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI JURISDICTION; CRIMINAL
;
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
The Act attempted to attack organized crime by making
criminal the management of syndicated gambling and by prohibiting
racketeering activity characteristic of organized crime including the
use of illegal proceeds for investment in legitimate business enterprises.
The long-established suspicions of law enforcement officers.
were confirmed by the Congressional findings but statutory enactments
did not eliminate the conduct described as evil therein. There remains
the task of establishing the identities of those constituting the national
menace and developing prosecutable evidence of their guilt. "Criminal
intelligence" collection is one means by which this responsibility may
be fulfilled. It may be the only practical means in view of the scarcity
of witnesses willing to testify and of the high mortality potential of those
who do appear. A classic example of such intimidation is reported in
United States v. Addonizio, 451 F2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1972) where a prospective
witnong in a commuption
no found an anon
car which read "This could have been a bomb. Keep your mouth shut."
nuous note on the cost of his
Accepting the need for intelligence gathering as a practical
necessity, the issue remains as to its propriety in the face of Constitutional
protections. If the Supreme Court announces that individuals have a
Constitutionally protected right of privacy that may be overcome only
through established arrest, search, and subpoena procedures, the issue
will be settled. But, thus far, the Court has only drawn upon the concept
of Constitutional privacy to resolve cases involving special circumstances
such as marital affairs (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ) and
interception of communications (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1907)
More specific Constitutional limitations on the criminal
intelligence function may be found in the First Amendment protections of
speech and assembly; the Fourth Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable
searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination.
The theme consistently found in decisions having a bearing on th
relationship between these rights and the collection of criminal intelligan ce
is that, when in direct conflict, the collection efforts must yield. Such is
2
-
-NW-88296-Docld:32989628_ Page 61
Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI JURISDICTION; CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
not to label criminal intelligence as necessarily the product of malpractice.
but to recognize the paramount nature of the Constitutional interests being
safeguarded. Other incidents of government regulatory authority have
been required to yield as well when confronted with legitimate claims of
Constitutional protection, e.g. the administrative search cases, Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Overt and obtrusive conduct susceptible of being characterized
.as harassment may well be enjoined as, for example, was the case of an
· obvious 24-hour-a-day physical surveillance of an individual, his home,
relatives, friends, and associates (Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F2d 366
(7th Cir. 1964) cert. den. 379 U.S. 1001. Similar results might be
expected where an identified officer loiters in the subject's place of
business (Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary, 291 F. Supp. 622 (SD N.Y. 1968)
or openly attends organizational meetings where mis presence inhibits
communication and the francartinn of the business of the assembly (Local
309, United Furniture Workers v. Gates. 75 F. Supp. 620 (ND Ind. 1948)).
However, open photographic surveillance of public gatherings (Donahoe v.
Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (ED Va. 1971)) and secret monitoring of
criminal activities through the use of undercover agents (Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206-(1966)) and informants (Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 295 (1966)) have met with judicial approval.
Obviously, criminal intelligence information gained by un-
reasonable search and seizure or through compelled self-incrimination is
tainted and subject to judicial condemnation upon complaint of one having
the requisite standing.
Perhaps, the decision coming nearest to discussing the
legality of criminal intelligence collection was Anderson v. Sills, 106 N. J.
Super. 545, 256 A2d 298 (1969), (reversed on the ground more complete
record was needed to support the decision) 56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970).
New Jersey had responded to the threat of continuing civil disorders by
collecting intelligence information on persons and events alleged to have
some relationship to such activities. The trial court held the collection
effort to be unconstitutional because, it conflicted with the First Amendment.
NW-88296 Docid:32989628 Page 62
21
3.
-
Memorandum J. A. Mintz to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI JURISDICTION: CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATİON
However, the court order to destroy the intelligence files excepted instances
"where such information will be used to charge persons with specifically
defined criminal conduct." 256 A2d at 305. Thus, the decision may be
interpreted as drawing a distinction between collection of intelligence
information where political or social factors are involved and First
Amendment freedoms therefore may be directly inhibited and collection
of criminal intelligence information where the objective is the establishment
of criminal conduct and the identities of the offenders. While the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment may be enjoyed by the guilty and innocent alike, it
is improbable that the First Amendment would be stretched so far as to
protect freedom of speech and assembly when such speech and assembly
constitute elements of a criminal offense. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey returned the case for further development of the record
and observed ". . . the executive branch may gather whatever information
it reasonably believes to be necessary to enable it to perform the police
roles, detectional and preventive. A court should not interfere in the
avbonet of proof of bad faith on
200 A24 al 000.
azbile.
al
iness.
A tentative conclusion may be stated, subject to further develop-
ment of the case law. The gathering of criminal intelligence information
for the purpose of developing evidence of specific offenses characteristic
of organized crime is legally justified as well as practically necessary.
Where there is diversion from the proper objective and such collection
efforts are manipulated to cause harassment or where such activity conflicts
with Constitutional rights, to that extent the criminal intelligence program
must be reformed.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 63
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ROM
TIONAL FORM MO. 10
MAY 1942 80ISION
GBA OEN. BO. NO. 17
2016-106
UNITED STATES GOV ✓MENT
Memorandum
Mr. Dalbey
J. B. Hotis
DATE:
5/18/72
UBJECT:
FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
#M0R16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BT SPJ ALM
You requested an analysis of the Bureau's authority to conduct
domestic intelligence investigations. The question of the jurisdictional
basis for these investigations is being examined at length by the Domestic
Intelligence Division and will not be discussed here.
It is fair to say that the domestic intelligence program is one
of the more controversial areas of the Bureau's activities. For one thing,
an intelligence investigation casts a broader net than inquiries that are
directed toward the proof of a specific offense. A large amount of raw data
is collected, much of which has no immediate bearing on potential offenses
or offenders. But seemingly trivial information may later become important
in the detection and prevention of violence or civil disorder. There are
also fears that these investigations may eventually touch upon one's
political beliefs, habits or associations; or that information collected for
proper purposes may eventually be misused at the hands of Government.
Each is a legitimate concern. The notion of Government prying into the
personal lives of its citizens is repellent to all of us. And yet there is a
strong sense that the Government must acquire necessary intelligence
information if it is to meet its responsibilities in connection with the
national security.
One of the major concerns about our domestic intelligence
activities is that they are not supervised or monitored by any outside
agency. The claim is made that the Executive Branch has been left wide
discretion to define its own authority, and to choose the directions, methods,
and focus of its investigations: For one thing, the law has never made
clear what facts and circumstances must be present to authorize an
intelligence investigation, nor how far such an investigation may lawfully
proceed without being directed toward proof of a specific offense.
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 64
·
• CONTINUED - OVER
Memorandum J. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
-
And unlike the practice in criminal cases, our electronic surveillances in
security matters are not submitted for prior court approval. For another,
the exclusionary rule which provides the usual method of judicial control
over investigative procedures, is not often available in security cases.
Since the goal is largely preventive, these cases seldom come before the
courts. As a result, the public, the courts, and the Congress have very
little information about how we operate in domestic intelligence matters.
and what we do with the information acquired.
In response to this situation, some members of the Congress have
pressured for tighter controls over the Bureau, perhaps in the form of a
watchdog committee to oversee our operations. Senator Ervin, who chairs
the Senate Subsommittee on Constitutional Rights has expressed particular
concern about the right of privacy and the authority of the Government to
gather information. In an exchange of correspondence with the Department
of Justice, the Senator has requested specific documentation of the
Department's guidelines for the gathering and retention of domestic
intelligence information. He has also suggested that legislation might be
enacted, requiring a showing of probable cause before an investigation can
be initiated by the Government. It is doubtful that any such measure would
pass the Congress, but the proposal does show the mood of the times.
A parallel trend may be developing in the courts. In several
· recent cases, plaintiffs have made the claim that Government information
gathering, which goes beyond the effort to apprehend criminal suspects,
may have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of First Amendment rights.
These challenges thus far have not been successful. Anderson v. Sills,
56 N.J. 210, 265 A2d 678 (1970); Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308
(E.D. Va. 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Westmoreland, 323
F. Supp. 1153 (N.D. III. 1971).
The courts have generally recognized that one of the principal
functions of the Bureau is to gather information law violators, agitators of
violence and possible subversives.. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957
(D.C. Cir. 1971) cert. granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971); The Fifth Avenue
Peace Parade Committee, et al. v. J. Edgar Hoover, et. al., 70 Cv. 2646
HRT, decided February 16, 1972. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, has observed that the identity of the agency gathering
such information is determinative of the significance of any alleged chill to
-NW-88296_Docld:32989628 Page 65
- 2 -
.
Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
to First Amendment rights. Thus, in Davis v. Ichord, 442 F2d 1207 (D. C.
Cir. 1970) although appellants allegedly felt chilled by a Congressional
Committee's investigation of them, the Court of Appeals found there was
insufficient justiciability in their claims to create a viable case or
controversy. This was because appellants had "failed to bring the fear of
investigation by the present Committee home to themselves," their fears.
were wholly speculative; there were no criminal proceedings confronting
them; nor was any action pending. Moreover, the Court in Davis found
that the power of a Congressional Committee began and ended with the
investigation; whenever a Committee of the Congress seeks punitive action,
the Judiciary must become involved, and thus every investigation has a
judicial check which operates to guarantee the protection of constitutional
rights.
This latter aspect of the Davis decision was given perspective by
the Court of Appeals in Tatum. In contrasting the potential impact on First
Amendment rights occasioned by investigations conducted by the military
with investigations conducted by a civilian investigative agency, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Court observed:
The compilation of data by a civilian investigative
agency is thus not the threat to civil liberties or the
deterrent on the exercise of the constitutional right
of free speech that such action by the military is, because
a civil investigative agency has no inherent power always
being subject to the well-defined restrictions of law and
the approval of the courts. ***
There, the Court pointedly examined the "source of the chill" as it had in
Davis, and in applying the "chilling effect doctrine", singled out the FBI
as a source which does not generate a reasonable basis for inhibitions or
apprehensions. In this connection the Court stated,
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 66
- 3 -
Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. .Dalbey
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
•
Referring to our holding in Davis that the
"source of the chill" is important in determining whether
there is any inhibiting effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights, we think that there is a significant
difference between investigative actions taken by a
military agency in reference to civilians and similar
investigative actions taken by a regular investigative
agency of a civilian branch of the Government.
One of the functions of a civilian investigative
agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is
to compile information on law violators, agitators of
violence, and possible subversives. It has always been
recognized that this is a delicate function, and it is
exercised under the direction of the Attorney General.
Investigation is performed by men a majority of whom are
under the direction of lawyers in the Justice Department,
and the information compiled is only usable and effective
through court action. The EBI is powerless to imprison
or to affect his liberty in any way except through the
action of the courts.
As to the surveillance of public meetings through the use of
informants, it has been held that such surveillance is not per se actionable.
See Donahoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971) (police
surveillance of street demonstrations held not to offend First Amendment
rights).
The Supreme Court in Hoffa v. U.S., 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held,
that the use of secret informants is "not per se unconstitutional", and does
not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, nor
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Court upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
admission at trial of evidence obtained by an undercover informant to whom
a defendant spoke without knowledge that he was in the employ of the police.
385 U.S. at 300-303. See also Lewis v. U.S., 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and
Lopez v. U.S., 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
"
NWV 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 67
4.
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Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
RE: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Moreover, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971), recently held that the use of secret informants does not violate
any constitutionally justifiable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, even when an informant uses electronic equipment to transmit
his conversations with defendants to other agents.
If the use of undercover government informants without a
warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment and invade a defendant's
constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, Hoffa v. U.S., supra,
and such informants may write down their conversations with defendants
and testify concerning them, or simultaneously record and transmit such
conversations to others, who may testify against them, On Lee v. U.S.,
343 U.S. 747 (1952); U.S. v. White, supra, then clearly mere visuai
"Surveillance" of plaintiffs in plain view by informants at public meetings
would not violate their constitutional rights.
It would seem that those who elect to present their views actively
in the public arena deliberately expose themselves to the public. See
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Any recording of their
activities by the defendants does not invade their privacy any more than
does a newspaper, radio, or television story, and, indeed, much less since
any information compiled is usable and effective only through court action.
Tatum v. Laird, 444 F2d 947, 957 (D. C. Cir. 1971).
More difficult questions are presented where the investigation
delves into the private affairs of the individuals or organizations. Bụt
even here, the courts have generally sustained our procedures so long as
they comport with the restrictions of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
The Fifth Avenue Peace Parade Committee, et. al. v. J. Edgar Hoover.
et. al., 70 Civ. 2646 HRT, decided February 16, 1972. (examination oi
bank records) U.S. v. Gerhart, 275 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. W. Va. 1967)
(examination of bank records); Minker v. U.S., 312 F2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962)
(trash covers); Cohen v. U.S., 378 F2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967) (mail covers);
U.S. v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention and examination of
packages in the mail); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (seizure of
union records); Ioffa v. U.S., supra; U.S. v. White, supra; (use of
informants).
5
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 68
Memorandum J. B. Hotis to Mr. Dalbey
Re: FBI AUTHORITY IN DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
In summary, it is premature to say that the First Amendment
line of cases, dealing with the "chilling" concept offers any substantial
impediment to our intelligence investigations. There is less reason for
optimism, however, with regard to congressional intervention. We
should be prepared, therefore, to meet arguments regarding the need.
. for outside supervision. The sound answer, which should satisfy
governmental needs and individual rights, is found in tight internal
controls and carefully developed guidelines.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 69
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POSITION PAPER
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
IITFRSTIGATIONS ON SÍDVERSION
May 13, 1972
OVERVIEW
This paper deals with the conduct by the FBI of
Intelligence-typo investigations supervised by the Domestic
Intelligence Division. Authority for those investigations
is documented and outlined, including situations where there
is no direct violation of low. Criteria and controls and
dissenination policies implementing this authority are
detailed.
#30816
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALMATE
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 AF
NW-88296-Docld:32989628_Page 70
∙62-116375-83
ENCLOSURE

'
· TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
AUTHORITY
Congressional Enactments
Policy Instructions of Attorney General
Presidential Directives
National Security Council Directives
Interagency Agreements
IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITI
Administrative Index
Revolutionary Groups
Extremist Groups
Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals
Unaffiliated Individuals
Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations
Restrictious on Investigations
Information Storage and Retrieval
Dissemination
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 71
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#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
1811-18-01 BX SP-2 ALMATG
www
INITLLIGENCE COLLECTION
#MORIG
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/186
The FBI's intelligence function is well established
and documented.
Yet, our work in gathering intelligence has.
been the subject of continuing criticism from segments of the
press with charges being mare F/F the FBI is conducting without
authority security investigations of persons who are not in
violation of the law. It has also been charged that our intel-
ligence collection is uncontrolled, capricious and dwells on
personal idiosyncranted without there boing any security interest
involved. Fragments of information, distorted and twisted to
convoy the false impression that the FBI is wantonly disregarding
the privacy of citizens, have been published.
The FBI does not conduct security investigations of
individuals without clear-cut authority and tight controls.
Critics have taken fragments of intelligence which have come to
their attention and built them up into what is represented as
the end product of security investigations with political over-
tonea. In these instances, the items upon which such importance
was placed have been fragmentary intelligence from substantive
NW-88296-Docid:32989628 Page 72
1.
investigations and could not be viewed in their real significance,
except as they fit into the overall perspective of the case..
This is indicative of the danger of using piecemeal intelligence
taken out of context; properly used, however, intelligence
:
is a legitimate and necessary part of all security investigations.
Intelligence is information and the collection of it is
inseparable 'from efficient investigative operations. In fact the
two-investigation and intelligence--are mutually dependent.
In the security fiold, it is vital that the Federal
Government detect factors which have a direct bearing on
possible violations of law related to the emouthway on dealsuation
of the Government. Intelligence developed to identify individuals
who have a propensity for revolutionary er racial violence or
have affiliations with subversive or revolutionary groups is
essential in the enforcement of the laws designed to protect the
integrity of the Government. Intelligence is also essential to
the detection of attempts or conspiracies to move against the
Government, actions which may themselves be crimes.
No constitutional provisions, statutory enactments
i
or judicial rulings have attempted to deprive law enforcement
of its intelligence function, although various attempts have
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 73
2.
been made to define or limit the areas encompassed by
Entelligence and particularly the techniques of collection.
It is also recognized that some intelligence gathering
activities may have an incidental "chilling" effect on individual
citizens. The spectre of the Government's investigatory
presence may cause a reaction in citizens, inhibiting the
exorcise of their full constitutional rights. Therefore,
a-balance between the requirements of the Government and the
constitutional rights of citizens must be maintained.
The intelligence function of investigation, must be
hath mascatable and practical. It veving in agone and Intonatýy
with the seriousness of the provision it seeks to enforce.
It is neither reasonable nor practical to launch an aggressive
Intelligence collection effort concerning the activities of those
who might potentially violate a local antilittoring ordinance.
Detection of a conspiracy to borb the White House, on the
.Other hand, certainly justifies a continuous and intensive
intelligence effort to identify the participants and gain
knowledge of any specific plans.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 74
3
.
It is mandatory that a Government protect its
integrity and this has been recognized by judicial
authorities. Ordinary crimes victimize an individual or
groups; crimes against the existence of the government
victimize society. Carrying these crimes to their ultimate
produces the ultimate crime against society--the destruction
of that society.
It is clear that the aspirations of most revolutionary
groups far exceed their capability to achieve their ultimate
objectives. They are, however, quite capable of eroding
the integrity of the democratic system by lesser acts and, if
not discouraged or thwarted, might well accumulate the will
and power for more decisive action. The dramatic success of
the Castro revolution is a sufficient example. Consequently,
continuing intelligence collection relating to all revolutionary
individuals and organizations, commensurate with the immediate
threat posed, is imperative to proper vigilance.
The FBI serves as a prime producer of intelligence
for the Executive Branch. Over the years it has provided
information concerning hostile actions directed against the
U. S.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 75
4
4 "
by foreign governments," their intelligence services and others
3: acting in their behalf. On the domestic scene the FBI has
ponotrated conspiracies ranging from the communist underground
to the hooded night riders of the Klan who terrorized our
black citizens. But, in the 1960's explosive changes occurred
in the internal security problems faced by the country. These
changes were reflected in both the scope and nature of the
FBI's response and in the intelligence requirements levied
upon the FBI by the Executive Branch. .
In the decade of the '60's, social change and upheaval
added to the critical areas of the FBI's intelligence
esponsibilities the problems of revolutionary and extremist
activities.. America as stunned by violent student disruptions,
bombings and riots. Spanning the decade were civil rights.
protests, reactions against them, and tragically, the burning
and looting of Watts in 1965 and the conflagrations in Detroit,
Newark and Washington, D. C. And, what had been the youthful
idealism of the emerging new left in the 1962 Port Huron
Statement was drowned out by the obscene Weatherman war cries
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 76
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as they took their revolution to the streets of Chicago in.
1969 during their "Days of Rage."
As the tide of crime and disruption swelled, it
brought with it now and pressing problems on the domestic
security scone. FBI domestic security investigations increased
accordingly. There was also an immediate increase in FBI
intelligence collection concerning the lawlessness and violent
tactics of these omorging revolutionary elements.
Intelligence collection was essential in contending
with these new domestic security problema. This fact was
recognized by the reports of two Presidential Commissions.
The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(Kerner Commission, 1968)' stressed that the absence of accurate
Information before and during disorders created special control
problems. It aphasized that law enforcement organizations
must develop the moans to obtain adequate intelligence for
planning purposes and that law enforcement should "gather,
evaluate, analyze and disseminate information on potential as
well as actual civil disorders."
-NW-88296-Docld:32989628 Page 77
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Similarly, the President's Commission on Campus
Unrest (1970) took special note of the need for intelligence
in effective law enforcement. The Commission stated in its
report, "It is an undoubted fact that on some campuses there
are men and women who plot, all too often successfully, to
burn and bomb, and sometimer to main and kill." The report
:
concluded that the best,(AND sometimes the only, means
law enforcement has to thwart or prevent such plots is
through "clandestine intelligence work."
Provention is the very essence of the proper use
To be forewarned is to be placed in a
During
position to carry out countermensures to meet a threat.
the mass actions and violent confrontations of the 1960's,
FBI intelligence collection was crystallized in dissemination
of information to other government agencies. This intolligence
provided them with an essential working tool to contend with
public disorders and activities of a revolutionary nature.
In a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, 9/14/67,
Attorney General Clark stressed the importance of intelligence.
The Attorney General asserted. "It is most important that
NW-88296-Docld:32989628 Page 78
you use the maximum available resources, investigative and
intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing upon.
(riot_activity)." Elaborating on this point, "he said, "In
these circumstances we must be certain that every attempt is
being made to get all information bearing upon these problems;
to take every step possible to determine whether the rioting
is pre-planned or organized; and, if so, to determine the
identity of the people and interests involved; and to deter
this activity by prompt and vigorous legal action." The
Attorney General's evaluation of the importance of
intelligence in this instance applies with equal force to
other areas of the FBI's security work.
હેન્ડ
In December, 1967, the Department of Justice, aware
of the high priority of intelligence in dealing with civil
disorders, created the Inter-Division Information Unit. This
is a repository for "reports which relate to individual or
organizational activities which may play a part in instigating
or spreading civil disorders" and includes intelligence
"relating to black power and black nationalist organizations,
NW-88296 Docid:32989628. Page 79
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officers and members thereof, racial incidents throughout.
the country, and any specific demonstrations which are
being planned and are of such nature as to render them
subject to the possibility of violence." Quick retrieval
of this intelligence was emphasized through the use of computers.
Attorney General Mitchell wrote to the FBI Director
on May 17, 1971, concerning the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee, created to analyze and evaluate intelligence for
the guidance of the White House and other departments of
the Executive Branch. In this memorandum, the Attorney Goneral
stated, "Intensified activities on the part of militant
groups here in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere in the country
clearly point up the need not only for the gathering of
the highest quality intelligence available but also for an
expert analysis and evaluation of the intelligence product
itsolf."
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 80
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1

AUTHORITY
All FBI investigations and intelligence collection
functions in the internal security field are based on
authorizations in Congressional enactments, Presidential
directives, policy instructions of the Attorney General,
National Security Council directives and interagency agree-
ments as set forth below.
Congressional Enactments
Attorney General direction of FBI
Code, Section 533
28 U. S.
Treason - 18 U. S. Code, Section 2381
(U. S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3)
Rebellion and insurrection
SHO
18 U. S. Code,
Section 2383
:
Seditious Conspiracy
107
18 U: S. Code, Section 2384
Advocating violent overthrow of Government
18 U. S. Code, Section 2385 (Smith Act)
Sedition
2391
C:
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18 U. S. Code, Sections 2387, 2388,
Recruiting for armed hostilities against U. S.
18 U. S. Code, Section 2389
Designation of Organizations as "communist-action"
and of Individuals as members of such groups
after hearings by Subversive Activities Control
Board 50 U. S. Code, Sections 781-798 as amended
or repealed (Internal Security Act of 1950, Subchapter
I, called Subversive Activitics Control Act of 1950
and amendments by Communist Control Act of 1954)
See also Executive Order 11605 below
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Espionage
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18 U. S. Code, Section 792 et seq.
Sabotage
18 U. S. Code, Section 2151 et seq.
Private Correspondence with Foreign Governments
18 U. S. Code, Section 953 (Logan Act)
Registration of Foreign Agents 22 U. S. Code,
Sections 611-621
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 42 U. S. Code,
Section 2122
$30
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Deportation for Subversive Activities 8 U. S. Code,
Section 1481 (Immigration and Nationality Act 1952)
Possession, threatened use, or use of explosives
for illicit purposes 18 U. S. Code, Section 844
0.00
Travel in or use of facility of interstate commerce
• to promote or incite riot, to commit violence in
furtherance of riot or to abet others in inciting
or participating in a riot. 12 0. 6. Code;
231-233, 245, 2101-2102
Neutrality Matters
SAD
+
Cactions
18 U. S. Code, Sections 956,
958-962; 22 U. S. Code, Sections 1934, 401
(Munitions Control Act)
Intelligence exchange with CIA 50 U. S. Code,
Section 403 (National Security Act) .
Presidential Directives
Directive of the President 6/26/39
directing that investigation of all espionage,
counterespionage, and sabotage matters are handled
by FBI.
Directive of the President 9/6/39
requesting the Attorney General to instruct FBI
to take charge of investigative matters relating
to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the
neutrality regulations.
NW-88296 Docld:32989628-Page-82
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Presidential Directive
1/8/43
reiterated instructions of previous directive of
9/6/39 and requested law enforcement officers,
patriotic organizations and individuals turn over
to FBI all information regarding espionage,
sabotage and violations of neutrality regulations.
Presidential Directive 7/24/50
reiterated substance of 9/6/39 and 1/8/43 directives,
noting they provided for FBI to take charge of
investigative work in matters relating to espionage,
sabotage, subversive activities and related matters.
Directive of President 12/15/53.
referred to previous Presidential Directives
and added investigation by FBI of violations
of Atomic Energy Act.
Executive Order 10450 4/27/53
established programs to insure that the employment
and retention of aby Covernment employee is clearly
consistent with the interests of national security.
Requires check of FBI Fingerprint Files and, in
cases where derogatory information develops, FBI
conducts a full-field investigation.
Executive Order 11605 7/2/71
calls for Subversive Activities Control Board,
when petitioned by the Attorney General, to
determine after hearings if any organization is
totalitarian, fascist, communist, subversive, or
whether it has adopted a policy of advocating the
commission of acts of force or violence to deny
others their Constitutional or statutory rights.
By inference, the FBI, as investigative arm of
the Attorney General, would develop evidence for
hearings required. Also, FBI, by inference, would
develop evidence of membership in such organiza-
tions, which may be basis for denial of Government
employment.
Policy Instructions of Attorney General
September 14, 1967: instructions of then Attorney
General Ramsey Clark for FBI to investigate possibility
of conspiracy to plan, promote', or aggravate riot activity.
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NW-88296 Docid:32989628 Page 83
February 18, 1969: instructions from the Assistant
Attorney General, Internal Security Division, for
FBI to obtain information concerning possibility that
underlying subversive groups were giving illegal
directions or guidance to numerous campus disorders.
(Other policy instructions from Attorney General and
Department have been received, amplifying points set
forth above; many of these concerned specific cases.)
National Security Council Directives
.
Directive on Internal Security, March 23, 1949,
establishing Interdepartmental Intelligence
Committeo (IIC) responsible to coordinate investiga-
tion of domestic espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,
subversion and other related intelligence matters
affecting internal security. FBI represented on IIC.
United States Intelligence Board (USTB) established
September 15, 1958, to maintain coordination between
CIÀ and other intelligence agencies. FBI a member of
USIB to provide domestic intelligence for correlation
with foreign intelligence.
Interagency Agreements
Delimitations Agreement signed by IIC members
March 23, 1949, to establish jurisdiction in
investigations by members of espionage, counter-
espionage, subversion, and sabotage and to provide
for exchange of information on above matters.
FBI-Secret Service Agreement signed November 26,
1971, to provide for transmittal of information
from FBI to Secret Service regarding individuals
and organizations who, because of their pro-
pensities, represent or may represent a danger to
the safety of the President and certain other persons,
NW-88296-Docld:32989628 Page 84
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WEATHER MUMS INT TO THIS THE 2017STS IN 19
IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTHORITY
The criteria and guidelines for FBI investigations
are furnished to the field in a "Manual of Instructions,"
the "F. B. I. Handbook, " and in Letters to all Special Agents
in Charge. In addition, instuctions and guidance are given
to the field in HeadquartERS Communications on specific cases.
Compliance with criteria No guidelines is obtained by super-
vision in both the field and at Bureau Headquarters.
addition, regular inspections of field and Headquarters
Divisions assure that Bureau policies concerning investiga-
tions are being followed.
In
In the security field, the basic responsibility of
United
the FBI is to investigate revolutionary organizations dedicated
to the violent overthrow or destruction of the United States
Government. These include old-line Marxist groups, for example,
the Communist Party, USA, and the Trotskyist Socialist Workers
Party; and such new revolutionary groups as the Students for
a Democratic Society, the Black Panther Party and the Weatherman.
In the investigation of sub individuals a determination
is made of the dangerousness of the individual and efforts are
made to obtain evidence of violations of any applicable
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 85
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Foderal laws. To assist in cataloguing the level of
dangerousness of those individuals and to retrieve quickly
information concerning them, the Domestic Intelligence
Division maintains a card file known as the Administrative
Index.
Administrative Indox
"
Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950
(Emergency Detention Act) before it was repealed on
September 25, 1971, provided for emergency detention of
subversive individuals in the event of a national emergency.
To implement that provision of the act, the FBI and the
Department of Justice maintained the Security Index. This
Index was, of course, discontinued with the repeal of the
Emergency Detention Act. By memorandum of October 22, 1971,
however, the Attorney General noted that the repeal of
Title II "does not alter or limit the FBI's authority and
responsibility to record, file and index information secured"
in this field and concurred in the establishment of an
administrative index to assist in "making readily retrievable
and available the results of its (the FBI's) investigations
into subversive activities."
NW-88296 Docld:32989628 Page 86
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15
To this end, such an index (called Adex) was
instituted for making quickly retrievable information on
1 four categories of individuals in order of dangerousness:
I) National leaders of revolutionary or extremist
groups, members who have exhibited a propensity for violence,
members with training in sabotage, espionage, or guerrilla
warfare, unaffiliated revolutionaries with a propensity
for violence, and revolutionaries with access to key facilities.
II) Secondary leadership of revolutionary and
extremist groups, active members of these groups, and
unaffiliated revolutionaries or extremists with a propensity
for violence against property rather than persons.
III) Rank-and-file members of revolutionary groups.
within the previous five years, leaders of fronts for revolu-
tionary groups, and individuals with revolutionary ideologies.
likely in a national emergency to commit acts of espionage,
sabotage, or terrorism.
IV) Persons likely to assist, financially or
otherwisé, revolutionary groups, or persons in a position to
influence others to commit acts inimical to the national defense.
Investigation of an individual is conducted to
determine whether or not he should, consistent with the
criteria of these categories, be listed on the Adex.
If,
as
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 87
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the result of the investigation, it is determined he does
not meet the criteria the case is closed. If, on the
other hand, he does meet the criteria, he is listed in
the Adex according to the determined degree of dangerous-
ness. Category I cases continue under investigation for
as long as the individual conto warrant that Category
listing. When an individuak isted in Categories II,
_ III, and IV, however, the investigation is closed, subject
to periodic reopening to verify his location, to determine
his activitios and to ascertain whether he still qualifies
20 anclusion in the Adex. Provision is made for upgrading,
downgrading and purging an individual from the Adex as his
•
activities and level of dangerousness fluctuate.
Revolutionary Groups
Investigations of individuals for a determination
of whether or not they meet the criteria for Adex generally
involve their degree of affiliation with revolutionary and
extremist groups. The purpose of investigations of basic
revolutionary and new-left type groups is to: (1) provide
intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable the
President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;
NW-88296 Docld:32989628 Page 88
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(2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive
laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to
prevent such conspiracies from being carried out; and
(3) develop evidence necessary for the Attorney General to
file petitions before the Subversive Activities Control
Board in accordance with provisions of the Internal Security
Act of 1950 and Executive Order 11605.
The criteria, guidelines and restrictions on the
investigations of revolutionary groups are outlined below:
Investigation is initiated upon receipt of
information indicating that organization
aŭvocales overthrow of Government on engages
in activity to deny others their Constitutional.
or statutory rights.
Investigation is conducted to establish aims
and objectives, location and size, domination
and control by hostile foreign power, identities
of all leaders and members..
In regard to their front groups and organizations
which they have infiltrated:
Investigation is initiated upon receipt of
information that organization is dominated,
controlled or influenced to substantial
degree by revolutionary organization.
Investigation is conducted to determine
degree of infiltration, aims and objectives,
location and size and identities of all
leaders.
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Extremist Groups
The purpose of investigations of white hate
and black extremist organizations is to: (1) provide
intelligence to the Executive Branch which will enable
the President to fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities;
and (2) detect developing conspiracies to violate substantive
laws and initiate prosecutive action whenever possible to
„prevent such conspiracies from being carried out. Investiga-
tions of white hate groups are confined to those which have
actually or allegedly committed or have conspired to commit
acts of violence or have adopieů a policy of advocating or
inciting the use of violence to deny others their rights
under the Constitution. Investigations of black extremist.
organizations concern those groups which take extremist,
anti-U. S. Government, anti-white positions and whose
activities have involved them or may involve them in civil
unrest and/or subversive activity.
Subversive, Revolutionary and Extremist Individuals
Individuals referred to as subversives are
generally affiliated with old-line basic revolutionary
organizations; those termed revolutionaries are usually new
left types; and those called extremists are fundamentally
NW-88296 Docld:32989628 Page 90
19
19

involved in violent or revolutionary activities based on
race. Procedures for the investigation of these types of
individuals are similar and the criteria are outlined as
follows:
Membership in a basic revolutionary organiza-
tion
Espousing the YE OF FREvolutionary movements
R
Special training a
or leadership train-
ing, in a revolutionary group
Individuals having access to key facilities
who have been members of a revolutionary
group at any time
Dawsons with revolutionary. terrorist.
anarchistic of extremist beliefs who are
likely to seize upon a national emergency
to endanger public safety
Individuals who have actually or allegedly
committed, conspired to commit, or adopted
policy to commit acts of violence to deny
others their rights under the Constitution
Extremists and revolutionaries who have
demonstrated a propensity for violence,
have involved or may involve themselves
in civil unrest, or who advocate violent
overthrow of the Government
Persons who influence others to engage in
acts inimical to the tional defense or
who are likely to fish financial or other
assistance to revolutionary or extremist
elements because of their sympathies,
associations or ideologies
:
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 91
Unaffiliated Individuals
In the areas of revolutionary (new left) and
extremist activities, some investigations are conducted
of individuals who are not affiliated with organizations.
Investigation of an individual is undertaken when informa-
tion is received that the person:
Is a revolutionary and apperes to the
Weatherman ideology of advocating a
revolution now and uses terrorist tactics
in furtherance of revolution
Is a revolutionary or extremist and
demonstrates by acts or statements
propensity for violence against property
Exhibits revolutionary or extremist
ideology and is likely to seize opportunity
in national emergency to commit espionage,
sabotage, terrorism or otherwise interfere
with Federal or local governments or
defense efforts
Influences others to engage in acts
inimical to national defense or likely
to furnish financial or other assistance
to revolutionary or extremist elements
Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations
The mission of the FBI in the foreign intelligence
field is one of counterintelligence.
The objectives and
priorities of counterintelligence have been variously stated
and evaluated. Generally, these objectives may be listed in
declining priority as follows:
(1) the detection and
"
NW-88296-Docld:32989628 Page 92
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identification of intelligence operations and agents;
(2) the penetration of these operations for the purpose
of control and the development of intelligence information;
(3) neutralization of hostile intelligence operations through
disruption and disinformation; and, (4) prosecution. Whatever
the assigned priority, the overall objective is to deny access
to information sought by whatever practical means are available.
Foreign intelligence investigations are grounded in
the Espionage statute and related laws including the Registra-
tion and Atomic Energy Acts. Individual investigations are
initiated usually on the basis of a known or suspected connec
tion with a foreign intelligence service, foreign country or
subversive organization with such connections. Since these
investigations emanate from various censitive sources and.
involve special considerations, extensive criteria and
limitations are defined and enumerated in current instructions.
In general terms, the governing criteria are designed
to preclude initiation and continuance of investigations which
are not justified. The limitations are designed to control
the scope of investigation in order to insure security of our
interests through close supervisory scrutiny.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 93
514
22
22.
2
Restrictions on Investigations
FBI guidelines go beyond the rules for opening,
investigating and closing cases; they also impose restrictions ·
to make certain that we do not violate the constitutional
rights of any individual and to preclude investigations from
becoming "fishing expeditions. In the security field these
.1
:
are some of the restrictions WHICH are applied:
Security cases are evaluated continually
to determine if we are fulfilling our
responsibilities.
Those cases not
warranting further investigation are
closed promptly.
There are no investigations of members
of an organization which does not advocate
use of force to bring about existing changes
in the Government. Examples are the Socialist
Party, the Independent Workers of the World
and Independence Party of Puerto Rico.
Persons arrested during disruptive demonstra-
tions are identified since circumstances of
an arrest, in some cases, may indicate a
propensity for violence. However, a mere
arrest in connection with a demonstration is
an insufficient basis in itself for security
investigation. The arrest must be coupled
with a demonstrated propensity for violence
or with subversive or revolutionary activity
on the part of the individual arrested.
When it is determined that a security subject
is a member of the armed services, the
investigation is discontinued immediately and
the military advised.
Civil rights organizations are not investigated.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 94
23
✓ :
Ambassadors or heads of permanent missions
to the United Nations are not investigated.
No surveillances are conducted at the
White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court,
the House and Sonate Office Buildings or
the United Nations.
No telephone or microphone surveillances
are operated without prior written
approval of the Attor Jeneral.
Bureau authority is EQUĒDIY for:
f
Investigations of officials and diplomatic
representatives of foreign countries.
(Department of State authority is also
required.)
Investigation of communist infiltration.
of a political organization.
•
Developing sources connected with an
institution of learning.
Interviews of subjects of active, current
security investigations.
If
Investigations of faculty members.
approval is granted, only established
sources functioning in an administrative
capacity may be contacted on the campus.
Other established sources and informants
must be contacted away from the campus.
Contacts with students, graduate students
and faculty members must also have Bureau
☐ authority.
Interviews of labor leaders and persons in
educational, mass media or publishing fields.
These examples demonstrate a consciousness of the need
to impose limitations on investigations and the continuing imposi
tion of them.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 95-
•
24 -
نيه
:
Information Storage and Retrieval
The storage and retrieval of information is a
basic operational necessity of any investigative or
intelligence-gathering agency. Procedures within the FBI
for these functions provide for written records of informa-
tion received from a variety, ources confidential
informants; confidential TGA techniques, and open
sources--and the storage of this information in different
types of files. These include active investigative files
on organizations and individuals and some general files.
These "raw" files are maintained both at the Seat of Govern-
ment and in the various field offices. Information in the
· files is thoroughly indexed so that data can be retrieved.
In the intelligence field, when an allegation
within the jurisdiction of the FBI is received, a case on
an individual or on an organization may be opened, depending
on the quality of the allegation. Nonspecific information
that is received on an individual or organization is placed
in the pertinent file, if one exists, or is placed in a
general file if the organizativ or individual is not the
subject of a specific file.
NW 88296-Docld:32989628-Page-96-
--
25 -'
These files are an integral part of the intelligence-
gathering function. By the very nature of the FBI's assignment
to coordinate internal security information, the maintenance
of data over a period of time is required and it is necessary
that a system for retrieving this information be used.
Because these files contain derogatory
information that may not susTANTIATED sed by further investi-
gation (the derogatory information received may not be germane
to a matter within the FBI's jurisdiction), the Attorneys
General have long taken the position that these files should
not be available for public scrutiny. Incalculable damage
to individual reputations could result from the disclosure
of single items of information without knowing the full
background concerning the receipt of a particular item and
the context within which it was recorded.
The late Justice Robert Jackson, in his capacity
as Attorney General, wrote in 1941:
:
Disclosure of information contained in the
reports (FBI files) might also be the
grossest kind of injustice to innocent
individuals. Invest Live reports include
leads and suspicions. ¨nd sometimes even
the statements of malicious or misinformed
people. Even though later and more complete
reports exonerate the individuals, the use
of particular or selected reports might
constitute the grossest injustice, and we all
know a correction never catches up with an
.accusation.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 97
26
G
16
བའ་ཡན་
£8%°eue1ec2€ L
Dissemination
The Bureau's general policy on dissemination is
that information developed by or coming to the attention
of the FBI is promptly referred to all agencies of the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government having a
potential interest in it or
onsibility for taking
action concerning it, WHENEVER THE INterest or responsi-
bility is apparent or known. This policy is in accordance
with numerous formal agreements entered into between the
Bureau and other Government agencies. It is also in
ndcordance with Presidentiel directives obligating the
Bureau to act as clearing house for information affecting
The internal security of the U. S.
Despite this general liberal policy of dissemina-
tion, we have recognized that with regard to highly sensitive
information a determination must be made on an individual
basis as to what information should be disseminated and how
it should be transmitted. The degree of sensitivity and/or
the security classification will determine level of dissemina-
tion to any interested agency the method of transmittal.
In certain instances, sensitive information may be furnished
to a high-level official with a request that dissemination
in his agency be restricted to his personnel on a need-to-know
basis. Such information might be disseminated by secure teletype,
courier, liaison, and where necessary, by secure telephone.
Information furnished orally is confirmed in writing.
27
27
NW-88296 Docid:32989628 Page 98
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
Хосовн
'SCOPE OF FBI JULISDICTION
AND AUTHORITY INIDOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
August 7, 1973
токо
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1-18-01 BX SP JALIN/116
BY
During our meeting on July 20, 1973, you referred to a discussion
you had with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., of Maryland during your con-
firmation hearings as to the statutory authority of the FBI and the Department of
Justice in the field of domestic intelligence investigations. You then asked
Kir. William D. Ruckelshaus to work with the FBI in weighing the pros and cons
with regard to statutory authority in this area. I mentioned that research was
being performed on this subject at the present line and thai we would be in
touch with Mr. Ruckelshaus with regard to this matter when we have completed
the results of our consideration and findings within the FBI.
Actually, a study has been going on in the FBI for more than two¸
years as to the scope of FBI jurisdiction and authority, in domestic intelligence-
investigations. When Mr. L: Patrick Gray, III, was designated as Acting
Director of the FBI, he instructed that a position paper be prepared concern-
ing the jurisdiction and authority of the FBI to conduct domestic intelligence
investigations. A position paper was prepared which in essence stated that
authority of the FBI in this field is based on legislative enactments, even
though we may have publicly relied heavily on Fresidential directives as the
basis for such authority. Mr. Gray ordered an in-depth study made of the
position and in August, 1972, a detailed report was furnished to him. The
following is a summary of that report.
Over a period of several months there were a number of public
statements questioning authority and jurisdiction of the FBI to conduct domestic
intelligence-type investigations, particularly where there is no clear-cut
legislative authority apparent. One of the most searching inquiries was con-
tained in a paper presented by Professor John T. if at a two-day conference
at Princeton University in October, 1971, sponsored by the Committee for Public
Justice.
1
7777
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 99
62-116-15-83
ENCLOSURE
E
The Attorney General
A major thrust of Professor Elliff's paper concerned FBI authority
derived from legislative enactments as opposed to that derived from Presidential
directives, beginning with a directive issued by President Roosevelt in
September, 1939. Professor Elliff is of the opinion that the 1933 directive,
which was reiterated on three subsequent occasions, was magnified by the
FBI from its original purpose to a definitive order to conduct intelligence-type
investigations.
:
Senator Sam J. Ervin, as you know, had been probing into the
nature and extent of FBI intelligenco-type investigations. Senator Ervin had
even announced that he intended to propose legislation to prohibit the BI
from investigating any person without that individual's consent, unless the
Government has reason to believe that person has committed a crime or is
about to commit a crime. Other Congressmen indicated a similar interest
in FBI investigative activities.
Our study revealed that the FBI had declared publicly over a
long period of time that its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field
are authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential directives, and
instructions of the Attorney General. The Presidential directives are obviously
the 1) directive dated September 6, 1989, and reiterated January 8, 1943;
July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1933, and 2) Executive Order 10450 dated
April 27, 1953 (and amended but not yet implemented by Executive Order
11005 dated July 2, 1971).
In carefully analyzing the language of the first directive, dated
September 6, 1939, and considering that the subsequent directives are all
hinged on that one, we believe that there is a misconception as to the extent
of jurisdiction or authority conveyed to the FBI by these directives. It
appears that while the 1939 directive fixed responsibility on the FDI to handle
espionage, sabotage, and neutrality matters, it did not convey any authority
or jurisdiction which the FBI did not already have from legislative enactments.
It is difficult to read into this directive or in any of those which followed any
authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations which would or could
not be conducted under an umbrella of legislative enactments.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 100

The Attorney General
As a matter of historical fact, President Roosevelt in August,
1936, did request formor Director J. Edgar Hoover to conduct investigations
of subversive activities in this country, including communism and fascism.
This request, however, was a confidential oral request and there is doubt
that any record of it was made outside the FBI. This request, or Presidential
mandato, was based, incidentally, on the fact that the law provided that the
FBI could conduct such investigations if the Scoretary of State should so
request.
The study revealed that while the 1000 ct seq. directives did not
grant any special intelligence-gathering authority to the FDI, we were respon-
sible under these directives to collect all intelligence information furnished
by local, state, and Federal law enforcement agencies and patriotic citizens
and to sift and coordinate all such: information for indications of subversive
activity covered by Federal statutes,
The study concluded that the FBI has the responsibility to con-
duct whatever investigations tre necessary to determine if statutes relating
to espionage, sabotage, insurrection or rebellion, sedition, seditious con-
spiracy, advocacy of overthrowing the Government, and other such crimes
affecting the national security have been violated. In this connection we
note that in a letter dated September 14, 1907, the Department of Justico
advised that the FBI is continually alert to the problem of recurring riots
and is submitting intelligence reports to the Lepartment of Justice concern-
ing such activity. This letter enumerated several Federal statutes and
stated these could be applicable in using maximum available resources,
investigative and intelligence, to collect and report all facts bearing on
the question of schemes or conspiracies to plan, promote or eggravato riot
activity.
In other words, the Department was roquesting all possible
intelligence-type invectigative activity based on the existence of curtain
statules. We see this as being no different from our intelligence-type
investigations relating to plans of groups or individuals to overthrow,
destroy, interfere with or threaten the survival of effective operation of
national, state, and local governments.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 101
- 3 -
The Attorney General
.
Based on this study, we believe that had there never been a
single one of the Presidential directives in question the FBI would have
conducted and will, through necessity, continue to conduct the same intelli-
gence-type investigations as were conducted from 1939 to the present date.
We also believe, however, that in order to counter the criticism and skepti-
cism of such individuals as Professor Elliff and Senator Sam J. Ervin that
an up-to-date Exceutivo order should be issued clearly establishing & need
for intolligance-type investigations and delineating a clear authority for the
FBI to conduct such investigations based on guidelines established by the
Attorney General and adhering to constitutional principles.
The study concluded with two basic recommendations.
1) That the Department of Justico bo requested to sponsor comprehensive
legislation spelling out the FBI's investigative authority in the collection of
intelligence information reinding to the matthal socurky and; 2) that the
Department of Justice be requested to seck a comprehensive Executive order
which would cover any posable gap between statutory authority and Executive
necessity in protection of the national security.
At first glance those recommendations may appear to contradict
our position that we already, have statutory authority to conduct security-type
investigations; that this being the case we do not need additional legislative
enactments, nor do we need an Executive order. But being realistic we think
that the basic statutes upon which we rely for our authority to conduct
domestic intelligence investigations need to be updated to fit 1973 needs.
Title 16 U.S.C. Sections 2333, 2384, and 2335 relate to the national security,
but the legislative history of 2363 and 2384 indicates that they were designed
for the Civil War era, not the Twentieth Century, and Section 2385 has been
reduced to a fragile shell by the Supreme Court. These statutes are unques-
tionably still valid, but updating is certainly indicated. The bills introduced
as II.1. 6046 and 8. 1400 in the 93rd Congress appear to contain language which
should fill our statutory needs, except perhaps for those groups, such as the
Ku Klux Klan, which do not seek to overthrow the Government, but never-
theless are totalitarian in nature and seek to deprive constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 102
++
4.
-
The Attorney General
As to the need for an Executive order, we think that two issues
are involved. We have statutory authority, but what we need is a dofinitive
requirement from the President as to the nature and type of intelligence data
he requirca in the pursuit of his responsibilities based on our statutory
authority. In other words, there is a need, from our standpoint, for both
authoritative and definitive guidelines. The statutes give us the authority.
The Executive order would define our national security objectives.
Members of Congress, including such men as Senator Robert C.
Byrd of West Virginia, have proposed legislation to spell out jurisdiction and
authority of the FEI in this field. It would appear that the President would
rather spell out his own requirements in an Executive order instead of having
Congress tell him what the FBI might do to help him fulfill his obligations and
responsibilities as President.
The political climate of suspicion and distrust resulting from
disclosures coming out of the Watergate heurings could present an obstacle
to getting any such Executive order signed in the immediate future. However,
the rationale is nevertheless valid and when scrutinized closely, the language
in the Executive order we hereinafter propose establishes definitive guidelines
which have heretofore been unclear. It is my belief that we should go forward
with this.
We therefore propose and recommend that on Executive order
along the following lines be submitted to the White House with a strong
recommendation for approval. The language which follows is merely to
illustrate the type of Executive order which we think would be appropriate
and does not necessarily represent an ideal format or style which should
be submitted to the White House.
EXECUTIVE ORDER
"Whereas the Constitution of the United States was established to
insure, among other things, domestic tranquility; to provide for the common
defense; and to promote the general welfare for the people of the United States:
and
-NW-88296-Docld:32989628 Page 103
- 5-
"
0 •
!
The Attorney General
"Whereas the President of the United States has the constitutionally
imposed responsibility of defending the Constitution and the existence of the
Government thereunder; and
"Whereas there have been continuing unlawful acts of violence
perpetrated against the Government of the United States or against citizens
of the United States or against persons entitled to the protection of the
United States thereby endangering the domestic tranquility, threatening the
common defense, and jeopardizing the genoral welfare of the people of the
United States; and
"Whereas the Congress has enacted laws prohibiting acts such as
treason, sedition, sabotage, espionage, insurrection and rebellion, seditious
conspiracy, civil disobedience, rioting, assassination, kidnaping, ɑeprival
of civil rights, and conspiracies to commit such acts; and
"Whereas the President of the United States as Chief Executive
in the maintenance of the Government thereunder must have intelligence
information for appropriate decisions in the discharge of his constitutionally
imposed responsibilities;
"Now by authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes
of the United States and in the interest of orderly operation of this Government
and in furtherance of the domestic tranquility, common defense, and general
welfare of the people of the United States it is ordered that;
"The Attorney General prepare and issue guidelines, conforming
to the principles of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and outlining the
necessary direction, coordination, and guidance of investigations to assure
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provides on a continuing basis
intelligence information essential to the execution of laws portaining to sub-
versive activity and other such activity affecting the national security,
domestic tranquility, and general welfare of the United States."
1
The Nation has been going through a time of terror. The concept
of urban guerrilla terrorism has been adopted by various extremist elements
in the United States. Bombings of public buildings and national institutions;
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 104
-8-
The Attorney General
killing of police officers who, by their uniform, are a symbol of the democratic
establishment; hijacking of aircraft in furtherance of revolutionary movements;
terrorist assaults on foreign diplomatic personnel and establishments; and open
declaration of war on our form of government are only a few of the violent acts
which have been perpetrated by domestic subversives who seek to destroy or
seriously cripple our Government. Terrorist guerrilla attacks which were
once confined to far away places and related to problems of no immediate con-
cern of ours are now possible in this country. Foreign terrorist groups in
collusion with domestic terrorists have laid plans for an airport massacre of
the type which recently cecurred in Israel. Other foreign terrorist elements
have laid plans for terrorist attack: on American soil. Already one foreign
official has been assassinated, possibly by terrorists.
It would be folly to adopt an investigative policy based on
the concept of investigation only when there is reason to believe a crime
involving the national security has been committed. The FBI must
obviously anticipate the crimes described above. We believe that in
order for the Clovernment to be in position to defend itself against revolu-
tionary and terrorist cfforts to destroy it, the KEI must have sufficient
investigative authority to conduct intelligence-type investigations not
normally associated with enforcement of the statutes. In other words we
think the President has the inherent Executive power to expand by further
defining the FBI's investigative authority to enable it to develop advance
information concerning the plans and aspirations of terrorists and revolu-
tionaries who seek to overthrow or destroy the Government. However, we
also believe that such expanded authority must be formally set forth in an
Executive order and that this recommendation is responsive in the Attorney
General's expressed interest in leying more formal guidelines to our work
in areas where definition is not now clear.
We consider the issuance of a new Executive order delincating
our jurisdiction, authority, and responsibility to gather and report intelligence
information relating to the national security to be a very important and high
priority matter. We believe the issuance of guidelines by the Attorney General
under Title 28, Section 533, United States Code, to be equally important.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 105
-7-
The Attorney General
For your information, our own investigative guidelines as con-
tained in our Manual of Instructions relating to domestic subversive investiga-
tions have been completely rewritten to conform with the concept that our
domestic intelligence-type investigations are based on Federal statutes. These
guidelines provide that in each instance, the domestic intelligence investigation
must be predicated on information indicating that the organization or individual
is engaged in activity which could involve a violation of specific statutes relating
to the national sccurity. A copy of the new guidelines was previously provided
to the Department of Justice in connection with the request of Senator Edward I.
Kenndy to obtain a copy of the FBI's Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions.
The effective date of the new guidelines was August 1, 1973.
1- The Deputy Attorney General
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 106
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
о
1
1
2
1
-
-
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Legal Counsel Division
April 22, 1975
(1-Mr. Farrington)
Mr. E. W. Larson, Jr.
#MORLS.
ALY: INATION CONTAINE
HEMEN IS CLASSIFIED
De 1/18/01 37 SPJALM THE
Trolls
Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select
Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents
and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes
a response to one of the requests set forth in referenced
letter. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your
records.
Enclosures (2)
62-116395
EWL:ekw
(kW)
(8)
4/24 Approved by 1.6 (Zarchiwiller)
4/25 Delivered to Mile Epstate.
of 55c
раз
issoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv,
st. Dir.:
dmin.
bmp. Syst.
£t. Affairs
'iles & Com.
Sen. Inv.
(dent.
Inspection
Intell.
* Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
*raining
k
al Coun.
phone Rm.
ctor Sec'y
pctor
NOTE:
REC-100
6-2-11630-82
The Senate Select Committee has made a request for
titles and number of FBI field office Agents in the internal
security and counterintelligence field as well as the percentage
of manpower assigned in these areas.. The Administrative Division
has compiled this information. However, it is not felt this
data should be furnished formally in a written response to the
Committee. This data can be classified "Confidential" under
Executive Order 11652. Over and above this technical classi-
fication a great deal of sensitivity attaches to these figures
since should they be made public or otherwise fall inte the
_ENCLOSURES
MAIL ROOM
-
TELETYPE UNIT
KW 88/296 Dold32989628 Page 107
337
NOTE CONTINUED PAGESTAPR 29, 1975
ww
GPO 954-346
う
300
The Attorney General
NOTE CONTINUED:
hands of hostile foreign intelligence services, they would
reveal the current capability the FBI employs in the field of
counterintelligence against the total foreign threat.
It is noted that a precedent exists for making the
information available for review only at FBIHQ. By letterhead
memorandum 4/8/75 we advised the Committee that we would not
furnish them a requested list of names and titles of all
Intelligence Division personnel at FBIHQ down to, and including
Unit Chiefs together with a number of personnel below that level
but that this list would be made available for review by
appropriately cleared personnel of the Committee staff at
FBIHQ.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 108
- 2.
1
Mr. W. R. Wannall
1
Mr. W. O. Cregar
2
-
Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
Anril 21, 1975
-
UITED STATES SE WIE SELECI COIHIIICH TO 1 Mr. E. W.
STUDY COVER DEAL OPERATIO IS WITH RESPECI
TO INTELLIGE CE ACTIVITIES
RE: ORGANIZATION
Larson, Jr.)
Reference is made to letter dated March 10, 1975,
to the Attorney General from the Chairman of canrioned Committee
which enclo od certain requests for documents and other infor-
mation from the Feroral Bureau of Investigation.
Under Iren III entitled "Organization," paragraph C
requested at the field level, the +i+les and mumber of FBI
field office Agents accimmed to internal security, intelligence
collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or
activitier, together with the nercentage of total Agent manhour:
devoted to ruch rators, oneration, and activities.
You are mivised that a current survey of all FDI
field officer has been made to obtain the data requested.
Sine
this information is concivered to be highly sensitive,
is 1 not being furnisher directly to the Committee; borever,
the requested data is being maintained in the Intelligence
Divi on at FBINQ and is available for revie? by arro¬riately
cleared morsonnel of the Committee (raff unon reque:".
1
-
The Attorney General
Assoc. Dir.
EWL:ek
(8)
Dep. AD Adm. 62-116395
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. -
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM ☐
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 109
ENCLOSURE
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
RANGIPILD
FORGIN IS UNCLASS
DART. 1/18/0/17 SPJALM/276
JBA
wrid
12 11639522
E.
GPO 954-346
Moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIRED ON THIS
IS UNCLASSIFIED
ENVELOPE.
DATE 1/18/0/ BY SP-2 AT MATE
62-116395-82
EXPOSURE.
_ _
88296 Docld:32989628 Page 110
كس حسن شهر
+

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
A GEN. REG. NO. 27
3010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
MR. WALSH
FROM
L. C. GROOVER
LCG/WC
DATE:
4/3/75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Responelin
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
•
Reference Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams memorandum
dated 3/20/75 captioned as above and letter of Senator Frank Church
dated 3/19/75.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Can.
Gen. Inv.
ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Evel
Spec. inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Relet requested, among other things, the titles and number
of FBI field office agents assigned to internal security, intelligence
collection and/or counterintelligence matters, operations or activities,
together with the percent of total agent man-hours devoted to such matters,
operations and activities (page 3, item IIIC of relet).
The purpose of this memorandum is to forward to the Legal
Counsel Division, through the Intelligence Division, the response, attached
herewith, to the above request.
It is noted the request specifically mentions internal security,
intelligence collection and counterintelligence matters. Our response has
been constructed in the traditional two categories of internal security and
counterintelligence. Intelligence collection (informants) is included in the
data for both of the other categories as appropriate.
RECOMMENDATION:
That this memorandum with enclosure be forwarded to the
Intelligence Division for review, classification and approval and, thereafter,
forwarded to the Legal Counsel Division which is coordinating replies to
the Senate Select Committee.
Enclosure
1 - Mr. Wannall
1
-
1
-
Mr. Mintz
Mr.
JJC:jmb
Jackson
#MORK
ALL INTIMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALMENTE
NW 88296-Bocid:32989628 Page 111
ве
SEE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE TWO
SEE LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM PAGE THREE
5.1006
Memorandum to Mr. Walsh
Re: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Activities
ADDENDUM: Intelligence Division, WOC:aso, 4/4/75
шов
The Intelligence Division has reviewed the attached figures
prepared by the Administrative Division. Under the criteria of the current
Classification Act it would be impossible to justify classification of these
figures; however, should they be made public or fall into the hands of a
hostile foreign intelligence service, it would reveal the current capability
the FBI employs in the field of counterintelligence against the total foreign
threat. In view of the above, the Intelligence Division strongly recommends
that the Legal Counsel Division discuss this with the staff of the Senate
Select Committee pointing out the vulnerability implicit in this attachment
in an effort to have the Committee withdraw its request identified as III C.
CCHB
FSP
کن شد
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 112
- 2
OVER
ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
PVD:dkg 4-14-75
Regarding the observations of the Intelligence Division
concerning the making available the amount of manpower dedicated to
counterintelligence and domestic intelligence work in the IBI, the
Legal Counsel Division has the following observations:
(1) Based on our analysis and conversations this
Division has had with Fred B. Criffith of the Inspection Division, it
appears that the information contained in this memorandum may be
classified confidential under Executive order 11652.
(2) Before making any determination as to whether wo
make such information available to the Senate Celect Committee, it
would appear we should determine from CIA what their response to
such a request will be so that our position and that of CIA will be
consistent in this area. In this regard SA Paul V. Daly has contacted
Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Section of Intelligence Division, and requested
he determine from CIA what their position in this regard is.
(3) It is not believed that we should take a hard and fast
position that this information not be made available to the Committee or
that we make an effort to have the Committee withdraw their request for
this information. We should rather develop some fallback position such
as that this information will be made available to the Chairman of the
Committee or will be made available during an oral briefing, etc.
week
206
#MOR16...
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 113
ALL FEMONCTON CONTAINE
DATE 1/18/01 DISR2 ALM/1TG
DAGE
FROM
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. Adams
Counse
: Legal Counsel
#Morig
TNFORMATION CONTAINED
IS UNCLASSIFIED
BE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/ZA6
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DATE:
4-10-75
Poo
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AB Adm.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspecti
Intell
Laboratory
Eigelloun..
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
+
In connection with our investigations of staff members for
captioned Committee, we have developed derogatory information on two
individuals which has been brought specifically to the attention of William Miller,
Staff Director of the Committee. One of these involved Mrs. Diane Eloise
| LaVoy whose sister-in-law questioned her loyalty and declared she "does not
love America." The sister-in-law said Mrs. LaVoy constantly criticized the
U. S. Government and its policy and underlying weaknesses of our society.
Another individual said she was highly critical of CIA activities. This information
was pointed out to Miller on 3-25-75 when the results of the investigation were
delivered to him, and he also was advised that the CIA would be furnished the same
data in accordance with our agreement concerning these matters.
#
161-11022
On 3-24-75 and 3-28-75 results of the investigation concerning
Mrs. Betty Dale Ellison were delivered to Miller and he was advised that a prior
supervisor with eight years of training and experience in psychiatric care stated
he felt Mrs. Ellison needs psychological examination. He termed her a troubled
maker and said he would have fired her if he had the authority. He described
her definitely as a security risk due to her mental and emotional instability.
also was pointed out to Miller that other former supervisors described her as
unstable when working under pressure and unable to get along with fellow employees.
Miller was told that this information also would be furnished to CIA.
On 4-2-75 Miller advised Inspector Bowers he had considered the
matter involving Mrs. LaVoy and had discussed it with the Committee Chairman,
and they had decided to proceed with her as a staff member since they did not feel
the derogatory remarks by her sister-in-law were sufficiently strong enough to
disqualify her since the remainder of the investigation was favorable.
1 - Mr. Adams
-
1 Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
DWB:kjs (10)
kj
PR. 29. 1975
NW €8296 Docid:32989628 Page 114
1/2-116375-8
REC-100 1 Mr. Cregar
-
1
-
Mr. Steel
1- Mr. Farrington
1
Mr. Bowers
APR 22 1975
LE
CONTINUED - OVERMEN
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Miller also advised on 4-2-75 that their review of the Ellison
investigation showed justifiable concern for her being cleared for the staff, and
he asked for any guidance we might give him. It was pointed out that the only
real solution to the situation seemed to be that she not be added to the staff.
Miller said he would appreciate any comments from the CIA also in this regard.
This request was conveyed to CIA by Section Chief William Cregar of the
Intelligence Division who subsequently advised that Charles Kane, Director of
Security, CIA, had reviewed the file on Ellison and agreed there was sufficient
cause to question her suitability for assignment to the Select Committee staff.
Kane stated CIA Director Colby concurred in this observation.
These views were conveyed to Miller on 4-9-75. Miller stated
at that time that they had resolved the situation by assigning Mrs. Ellison to
purely administrative tasks and that she would be fully isolated from any sensitive
or classified information in connection with her responsibilities.
RECOMMENDATION:
For information.
Auß
дека
пре
ww
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 115
- 2 -
f
'TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
:
Legal Counsel
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
See Momo Cregar to Wannall
4/11/75 prepared by Fun jul
DATE: 3-21-75
#moR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/00/ BY SP-2 Acm/
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD
AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On 3-19-75 Inspectors John B. Hotis, David W. Bowers,
and Special Agent Paul V. Daly met with William Miller, Staff Director;
Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; and Michael T. Epstein of
the Senate Select Committee (SSC) staff. During the meeting Mr. Schwarz
requested a briefing be arranged for staff members of SSC concerning the
operations of the Intelligence Division, that they be furnished copies of training
documents pertaining to matters handled by the Intelligence Division, and that
they be furnished a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field. He pointed
out the aforementioned material would greatly assist in the SSC staff developing
an understanding of the Intelligence Division operations and hopefully prevent
misunderstandings or needless requests of the FBI.
Mr. Miller advised that Senators Frank Church and John Tower
intended to contact the Director in the immediate future to discuss arrangements
relating to the SSC's review of the FBI activities.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) Intelligence Division review and where possible make available
training documents relating to training concerning Intelligence Division matters
and a glossary of terms used in the intelligence field, or recommend a counter offer,
(2) Legal Analysis Office in conjunction with the Intelligence
Division arrange a briefing for Senate Select Committee staff members.
1 - Mr. Adams
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Farrington
Mr. Hotis
Mr. Daly
80
PYD:kis 1965
day
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 116
D
REQ 44
git 62-116375
17 APR 22 1975
F
OPTIONAL FORAL NO. 10
MAY 1562-EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES
5010-106
VERNMENT
| Memorandum
TO
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
:
Legal Counsel
SUBJECT SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
DATE:
4/17/75
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Le
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training.
Telephone Rm.
(Director
Director 
Sec'y
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALm/116
At 11:00 a. m. on April 17, 1975, Inspector John B. Hotis
Special Agent Paul V. Daly and I met with Deputy Attorney General Tyler
and Associate Deputy Attorney General James Hutchinson at the request
of the Deputy Attorney General.
Deputy Attorney General Tyler advised that he had been requested
by Burke Marshall and F.A.O. Schwarz, III, who are consultant and General
Counsel, respectively, for the Senate Select Committee, to meet with
him on Monday afternoon, April 21, 1975, to discuss matters relating
to the Committee's activities. The Deputy Attorney General said that he
has been personally acquainted with Mr. Marshall for a long time and also
is acquainted with Mr. Schwarz. He considered the possibility of having
a Bureau representative attend the meeting, but then decided it would be
best if he would meet with Marshall and Schwarz privately to determine
whether they desire to discuss details of the Committee's responsibilities
and if it became necessary, he would request the Bureau to send a
representative to the meeting. REC 44
62-116395-99
The Deputy Attorney General said that he would, of course,
advise us orally or in writing of the results of his conference with Mr. Marshall
and Mr. Schwarz.
7 APR 22 1975
The Deputy Attorney General inquired as to the procedure
currently being employed in responding to the Committee's requests
and Inspector Hotis explained the current procedures. I mentioned to the
Deputy Attorney General the existence of the Ad Hoc Committee of
Intelligence Agencies and suggested to him that he might desire to designate
a representative to attend those meetings in order to be on notice as to the
policies being developed by the White House and the intelligence community
in responding to Committee requests. I explained to him that James
Wilderotter, formerly Associate Deputy Attorney General, was the
62-116395
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 Mr. Cregar
54APR 22 1975
JAM:mfd (7)
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 117
1 - Mr. Moore
1 - Mr. Hotis
Mr. Mintz
CONTINUED
-
OVER
P
Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Department's representative on the Committee, but he has now been
reassigned to responsibilities at the White House. I told him that
Assistant Attorney General Scalia had been scheduled to attend the last
meeting of the Committee, although he was unable to attend. The
Deputy Attorney General said that he would discuss with Mr. Scalia
the possibility of having Mr. Scalia attend as the Department's
representative.
I asked the Deputy Attorney General whether he was undertaking
the principal responsibility in the Department for matters relating to the
Senate Select Committee and other committees that may be inquiring
into the FBI and he said that that was not clear as yet because the Attorney
General has taken a personal interest in these matters and it appeared that
the responsibilities are still fragmented within the Department. It was
his opinion that the responsibilities should be centralized and he appeared to be
willing to undertake that responsibility.
It was my impression that the Deputy Attorney General was
interested in being of assistance to the FBI in these matters and expressed
a willingness to cooperate by having the FBI participate as much as
possible with the Deputy Attorney General.
RECOMMENDATION:
For information.
Dir was advisey
and 
Mility on 417
ута
Ремо
дет
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 118
- 2 -
TO
FROM :
SUBJECT:
for
الله
"LZITINGÓNMCKS MUZITÁ
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/776
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X_
MDR16 1-23-01
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINE
PEPDIP IN VIC
ފގ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA-GEN.REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GORNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Wanna 110
W. A. Branigan
WILLIAM G. MILLER
IS - R
ට
CONFIDENTIAL
Sunstuity-75
I Mr.
1
-
-
B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
B
DATE: 4/14/75
1
1
王佳工
--
-
Mr. W. A. Branigan
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. V. H.
Weimar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD
Dop AD iv.
Ass
Admio.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Bringan
Mr. William G. Miller is the Staff Director
for the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with respect to intelligence activities. On 10/5/73,
representatives of our Washington Field Office, (WEO)
interviewed Mr. Miller, with Bureau approval, [relative to
contacts he had had with members of the Soviet Embassy,
Washington, D. C✓ ✓ At that time, Mr. Miller was the
Director of the Special Senate Committee to Terminate the
National Emergency. On that occasion he was most coopera-
tive, and upon being advised that the FBI's interest in
[Soviet Embassy personnel focused more on their personalities
rather than Soviet policies per se, Mr. Miller agreed to
be interviewed whenever the FBI felt such was necessary.
WFO has recently conducted an interview with
Mr. Albert Ashton Lakeland, Jr., Executive Assistant to
Senator Jacob Javits of New York, [relative to his pasi · con-
tacts with Grigoriy A, Rapota, a former Third Secretary
assigned to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. Rapota
was a known officer of the Committee for State Security
(KGB), Political Branch (PB), who was extremely active on
Capitol Hill (s) In the course of the interview with
Mr. Lakeland, he advised that among others Mr. William G.
Miller was known to have had numerous contacts with Soviet,
Embassy personnel, although he was not able to state withy
certainty that Mr. Miller had been in contact with Raporty (S)
62-116395
21 APR 2 1975
WFO has now requested Y RECORDED еau through the
Legal Analysis Office obtain concurrence of the chairman.
of the aforementioned committee APR 195 of WFO to again
interview Mr. Miller concerning his possible contact with
105-213145 ($)
VHW:danc
(7)
Enc.
CONTINUED
M
OVER
CONFIDENT
IŢIAMITT on Patoran
Classified by 5683
ORIGINAL FILED IN
105-213145-193
Кольшой
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Ingefinite
Sent 4-17-75
88992989628 Page 119 *
1975
RECORDS
Place cc 67116395
(SENSTORY - F)
CONFIDENTIAL
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
William G. Miller
Re:
[105-213145] ($)
Rapota and possibly other Soviets. WFO has noted that
Mr. Miller is also known to have been in contact with
Aleksandr A. Kokorev, a First Secretary of the Soviet
Embassy, Washington, D. C., and a known officer of the
Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (s).
While Mr. Miller was most cooperative on the last
occasion he was interviewed by the FBI, it is noted he did
not provide any particularly significant information con-
cerning the Soviets with whom he had contact::_(s) While it is
not known at this time whether he could presently provide
meaningful information, an interview with him at this time,
when he is now the Staff Director of the Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations, could well be untimely and
indiscreet.
ACTION:
(1) In view of impending contacts which will be
had by FBIHQ with Mr. Miller, the purpose of this memorandum
is to draw attention to the fact that Mr. Miller has had
( past contact with representatives of Soviet intelligence
services and may be continuing to have same.
☐ (S)
WRW/FSP
-
(2) If you agree, there is attached a communication
to WFO captioned, "Grigoriy A. Rapota; IS R (SOVEMB-
KGB)" which denys authority for an interview with Mr. Miller
at this time and instructs that office to promptly advise
FBIHQ of any additional contacts between Mr. Miller and
representatives of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.,
which may come to its attention. (5)
Kw
wespen
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 120
WRWJFSP
CONFIDENTIAL
PEM
2
Jm
JBH
SECRET
давай

The Attorney General
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1- Mr. W. R. Wannall
1- Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 10, 1975
Director, FBI
G
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
ALL THORPYON COLITAINED
HEREIN
DATE 1/18/01 DSP-2 ALME
Reference is made to a letter from the Senate Select Committce
dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the Committee is
the "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13,
1975, setting forth a study and analysis of the investigative authority
granted by Presidential Directives, the National Security Council and Attorney
General instructions, as well as a list of statutes from which the FBI draws
investigative jurisdiction in the security and intelligence area of operation.
Certain exhibits are extracted due to the "Third Agency Rule," however,
approval for release is now being sought and the exhibits will be forwarded
as soon as possible. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits due to
privacy considerations.
Also enclosed with the jurisdiction paper is an original
memorandum for the Committee and one copy for your records.
Enclosures 3
-
Appre
§.
to SS.C K
3. by A641, 175
run
ALL: vb/
(6)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Evo
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sep'y
-
=3.
"ENCLOSURE IN BULK
ROOM"
REC- 106
Vim
12/14/10/74 pr
45-116395--78
Jambor
CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED
MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 121
ET APR 25 1975
GPO 954-546
#MOR16
ALL TIECENATION CONTRAINED
BREAN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 SPA ALMAZTE
1 - Legal Counsel Division
-
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
-
1 Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 10, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
пил
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Troining
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975, to the
Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee, which
enclosed certain requests for documents and other information from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Attached is the FBI "Intelligence Division Position Paper
on Jurisdiction," dated February 13, 1975, which, though not specifically
named, falls within the spirit of the documents requested in the letter of
March 19, 1975.
The purpose of this paper is to set forth a study and analysis
of the investigative authority granted by the Presidential Directives, the
National Security Council and orders of the Attorney General, as well as
to list statutes from which the FBI draws investigative jurisdiction in the
security and intelligence area of operation.
It is noted that certain exhibits are extracted. Extractions
were made because of "Third Agency Rule" requirements. Approvals
are being expeditiously sought and these exhibits will be made available
as scon as approvals are obtained. Certain names are deleted in the exhibits
due to privacy considerations.
We are attempting to identify Items 1, 2, 3, and 4, of the
examples cited in the attachment to your March 19th letter. When identified,
immediate consideration will be given to furnishing the Items to your
Committce.
Enclosure
-
1 The Attorney General
ALL: vb
(6)
PLM
Jenkin
This document is prepared in response to your
request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee.
Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee
and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized
CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ATTACHED
personnel without the express appr₁ATBP.
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 122
ENCLOSURE
We
62-119631-78
}
8 per P V DIB
April 15, 1975
This is to acknowledge receipt of
classified material by letterhead memorandum
dated April 10, 1975, from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
Ben Marshall
for Senate Select
Committee on
Intelligence Activit:
is
#30216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SR2ALM/28
[ENCLUSURE 62-116395-
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 123
D
G☑
91789144
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
WANNA tyew
ΤΟ
:
MR. W. R. WANNALL
FROM
:
MR. WMCREGAR
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
TE 1/18/01 BY SP-CARME
1
1
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. T. Jenkins
DATE: April 15, 1975
-
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv,
Asst Dir
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
1 Each Assistant Director Gen. Inv.
1
1
-
Mr. W. O.
Cregar
Mr. S. F. Phillips
3.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _
My memorandum to you 4/10/75, tickler copies as
above, advised of the formal establishment of a task force
called Project Senstudy 75 for the purpose of implementing responses
to requests for information from Senate and House Select Committees
on Intelligence Activities.
From time to time, requests will be made of various
Divisions at FBIHQ for assistance in preparing responses. The
Office of Legal Counsel has already contributed considerably in
support of Senstudy 75 and is an integral part of the Project.
In order that we may keep an up-to-date record of the
cost to the Bureau in handling this Project, each Assistant Director
is requested to effect the necessary procedures to maintain such
records and by the third of each month furnish by routing slip to
W. O. Cregar, Room 4063, JEH Building, the following information:
(1) Name of Division reporting; (2) Month for which reporting,
which will be month just ended; (3) Man days devoted to Project
assistance, broken down by (a) Agent and (b) clerical, including
GS level for both Agent and clerical. An example submitted by
5/3/75 would be as follows: (1) GID; (2) Report for 4/75; (3) (a)
one-half day @ GS-16%; one day @ GS-15%; three days @ GS-14; (3)(b)
two days @ GS-7%3B two days @ GS-5.
(3)(b)
This is effective commencing 4/1/75 and first routing
slip report due 5/3/75 will be for the month of April, 1975.
If a Division has not participated during the preceding
month, merely submit a routing slip to this effect.
The cooperation of all is urged so that the necessary
cost data may be compiled each month. It is recognized that exact
figures will not be feasible and that estimates will be most
practical and will C-4302-116395
suffice
+
ACTION: For action as above by each Assistant Director
62-116395
SFP:ekw (18)
82
ekw
51APR 28 1975
XEROX
f
JUN 11 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 124
15 APR 22 1975
LUBWHTML
рет
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
1
1
1
-
-
-
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr. J. B. Adams
Each Assistant Director
DATE: 4/10/75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep: AD Adm.
Dep D Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
ΤΟ
: Mr. W. R.
Wannal
war
1
-
Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
FROM
: W
صول بيانية
Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#MO.R16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BX SP-2 ALMAZTE
لالة
This memorandum records the formal establishment
a task force entitled Project Senstudy 75.
was
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Seciy
The concept behind the establishment of this Project
is to develop a capability of implementing requests received
from Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive and
timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to conduct
its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as possible.
We believe that by creating this facility we will be able to
meet the requirements of these Select Committees with the
exception of the research that will have to be done in the
substantive Divisions.
While the Project will direct internal work and
related liaison with the intelligence community and the
White House staff, we envision the Legal Analysis Unit Office
of Legal Counsel Division as continuing to be the primary
point of direct contact with the Select Committees of the
Congress. They will receive all requests and deliver all
responses to these Committees. In addition, they will meet
with the staffs of the Committees to insure the reasonableness
of requests. If necessary, they will call upon the expertise
of the substantive Division for determination as to whether
a proposed request from the Committees can be responded to
within a reasonable period of time and within the capabilities
of the FBI's information retrieval syster-100 67
At the present time four Supervisors have been
delegated to work exlusively on the Project: “ They are as
follows:
"
1
Section-Chief
12 APR 23 1975
The Project Manager will be Section Chief William O.
Cregar, CI-2 Section, Intelligence Division.
His duties will
encompass the review of all incoming requests from the Select
Committees in an effort to identify policy questions;
WOC:1mhimh
(18)
XEROX.
JUN 11 1975
CONTINUED
-
OVER
56306
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 20-11646-
He
84 APR 23 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 125
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
ambiguities requiring recontact with Committee staffs; the
assignment of research responsibilities to substantive Divisions;
following such responsibilities to insure timely responses;
as well as representing the FBI on the Executive Committee
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group for Congressional Review of
the Intelligence Community. Assistant Director John A. Mintz is
also a member of the Executive Committee. This latter responsi-
bility will provide Cregar and Mintz with direct liaison not
only with senior officials of the intelligence community but
also with the President's counsel.
Mr. Elmer W. Larson, Unit Chief, Training Unit, IS-3
Section, Intelligence Division will act as Cregar's Number One
Man; will administer the work of the Project; and act in the
absence of Cregar.
Seymor F. Phillips, Unit Chief, Civil Disorders
Reporting Unit, IS-1 Section, Intelligence Division will serve
as the Review Coordinator for the Project. His responsibilities
will be to review all research; coordinate all responses; be
available to consult with substantive Divisions as to proper
form of our responses; identify any conflicts in FBI positions
where several Divisions are responding to a particular question;
as well as to insure the quality, completeness and adequacy
of responses to Select Committees requests. Additionally,
Phillips will be responsible for the preparation of abstracts
to be furnished to the Interagency Registry maintained at CIA
Headquarters. This Registry established by the Executive Committee
of the Ad Hoc Group at the suggestion of and with the concurrence
of the White House will serve as the coordinating mechanism
for the entire intelligence community.
Mr. Leon F. Schwartz, Liaison Officer with CIA, CI-4
Section, Intelligence Division will function as the Liaison
Officer with the intelligence community responsible for coordi-
nating and clearing all information under the third agency rule
where FBI responses are of interest to or are of a proprietary
interest to other agencies of the intelligence community. Schwartz
will serve as the Bureau's representative on the Ad Hoc Coordinating
Group for Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 126
2
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Senstudy 75
Re:
Because of the White House insistence that all requests
and responses be completely coordinated and available for review
by White House representatives, it is imperative that the Project
have a self-sustained records facility to insure immediate access
to requests received from and responses furnished to the Select
Committees. In addition, in those instances where certain FBI
documents furnished to the Select Committees must be sanitized
(excised), it is imperative this records facility not only retain
copies of the sanitized documents but also copies of the original
text. For these reasons a senior clerical employee has been
requested to function as a Records Manager for the Project.
In addition to the above, there will be stenographic
and clerical personnel assigned to the Project to support the
work of the Bureau Supervisors. We have not committed any more
personnel to the Project than are absolutely necessary at the
present time. Should the requests of the Select Committees
require additional personnel, appropriate memoranda will be
submitted with a complete justification for additional personnel
assigned to the Project.
Although the physical space for the Project is
limited, all personnel connected with Project Senstudy 75
will be located in Room 4063, J. Edgar Hoover Building. This
space is physically located within the Intelligence Division.
As a matter of interest, Mr. James Wilderotter,
Associate Counsel to the President, has requested that should
any member of the intelligence community get requests from other
Committees of the Congress which impact on the intelligence
community; could be of interest to the White House; or are of such
sensitivity that coordination is required, copies of both the
requests and an abstract of the responses should be made
available to the Interagency Registry.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 127
gra
3
-
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2
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1
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1
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 9, 1975
#тонь.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS CLASSIFIED
BT
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE DATE 1/18/01 
: 
SPJALM196
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Reference is made to a letter from the Sonate
Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain
documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum which responds
to the Committee's request for the table of contents of
the FBI Manual of Instructions and the FBI Manual of Rules
and Regulations and those portions of these Manuals which
pertain to internal security, intelligence collection,
and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.
A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records,
Processing of the additional requests is continuing
on an expeditious basis and further responses will be
forthcoming,
Enclosures 13
Mis
REC-106
65 11-313-75
EWL:jvl.
(7)
12 APR 23 1975
ان
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Secty
4/87500
ENCL BEHIND FILE
3 - ENCLOSURE T
MALL ROOM
to se Box had
929
Pem
SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
TELETYPE UNIT
188242989628 Page 128
шки
GPO 954-545
m
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
مین
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
#MOR16
IL TIFORMATION CONTAINED
HIS 
ASSIFIED
11/18/01/SP2ALM/116
2
1
1
-
-
Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 9, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTED
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975,
to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned
Committee, which onclosed certain requests for documents
and othor information from the Federal Bureau of Investiga.
tion (FBI).
Under IV. A. (Policies and Procedures) the table
of contents of the FBI Manual of Instructions and certain
portions of this Manual were requested. In accordance with
this request the following material is onclosed:
1) Table of contents; 2) Preface. Guidelines for
TBI Investigations; 3) Section 36. Espionago (classified
"Secret"); 4) Section 84. Registration Act; 5) Section 30.
Sabotage; 6) Section 37. Investigations of Subversivo
Organizations and Individuals; 7) Section 85. Sedition;
8) Section 95. Treason; 9) Section 97. Voorbis Act;
10) Section 122. Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest.
Not included as enclosures are Section 105,
Internal Security Nationalistic Tondoney (Foreign Intolli-
gonce), classified "Secret"; Section 107," Part I, Internal
Security Informants and Confidential Sources; Section 107,
Part II, Foreign Counterintelligence Assats; or Section 130,
Extremist Informants and Sources. These Sections are deamed
to contain extremely sensitive information and for that
reason are not being transmitted; however, they are available
for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the
committee staff at FBI Headquarters.
Under IV. D. the table of contents of the FBI
Manual of Rules and Regulations and pertinent portions of
this Manual wore requested. There is enclosed a copy of the
table of contents of the FBI Manual of Rulos and Regulations.
EWL:jvl'
(7)
MAIL ROOM
SECRET KATENIAL ATTACILED
TELETYPE UNI ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 129
PLM
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
Eur
25
GPO 954-546
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTED
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
From a review of the table of contents of this Manual it can
be seen that the material contained in this Manual pertains
to administrative rather than investigativo operations of
the FBI, and for that reason it has not been possible to
solcct portions of this Manual which portain directly to
intornal Security, intolligonco collection, and/or counter-
intelligence matters, operations, or activities rosponsive
to the Committee's request. The various other requests
contained in the Committee letter of March 19, 1075, are
receiving attention and further response will be forthcoming
at the carliest possible timo.
Enclosures
1
-
11
The Attorney General
NOTE:
Table of contents for Manual of Instructions and
Manual of Rules and Regulations, as well as the several Sections
of the Manual of Instructions which are being transmitted to
the Select Committee, have already been made available to the
General Accounting Office in the past, with the exception of
Section 36, Section 105, and Section 107, Part II, Sections
105, 107, Part I and Part II, and Section 130 are not being
furnished to the Committee, but the Committee will be allowed.
to examine these Sections at FBIHQ, Section 36, dealing with
espionage, although classified, does not contain sensitive
material involving sources and we feel in the spirit of the
requirement we should furnish this Section to the Committee.
As a matter of interest, all of the material with
respect to the Manual of Instructions which has been made
available to GAO is actually maintained in FBI space.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 130
-2

April 16, 1975
D/Ø
This is acknowledge per PVD /
acknowledge receipt of
classified material by letterhead memorandum
dated April 10, 1975, from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 131
Marches
for Senate Select
Committee on
當
Intelligence Activities,
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SPA ALM
62-116375-75
ENCLOSURE
TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
:
Legal Counsel
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
BRIEFING FOR STAFF MEMBERS
BY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION-
APRIL 11, 1975-
2.
DATE: 4-8-75
#MORIC
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 EX SP-2ALM/1T6=
Haterjon
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD-Adm.
Dop AD-Inve
Asst. Du.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Intell
Laboratory
Plan.& val.
Spec! Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
As you were previously advised, William Miller, Staff Director
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, requested that we
provide a briefing for certain staff members of the Committee on the functions
of the Intelligence Division. He asked that the briefing cover both internal
security and foreign counterintelligence operations and that it provide a broad
overview of our investigative responsibilities.
heid 4/01/75
The Intelligence Division is prepared to offer a two-hour briefing
beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Friday, 4-11-75. It will include a slide show to
be followed by a general discussion and an opportunity to afford questions. and
answers. After a luncheon break, the staff members will be given a brief tour
of the Files and Communications Division.
Since the briefing will cover classified materials, no staff
members will be invited unless they have appropriate security clearances. As
a consequence Professor John Elliff, who has been tentatively named Director
of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence, will not attend. It
is hoped that we may provide him with a private meeting at some later date.
REC 106
62-11674
It is expected that those attending the briefing will include:
Mr. Miller, F. A. O. Schwarz III, Chief Counsel, Mark Gitenstein and
Marvin Epstein, staff members. Since no Committee members will be present,
we are not recommending that the staff meet with the Director***
RECOMMENDATION:
12 APR 23.1975-
That the above-named staff members of the Senate Select Committee
be given a briefing by the Intelligence Division and the Files and Communications
Division on 4-11-75.
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 Mr. Adams
-
1 - Mr. Jenkins
1 - Mr. Wannall
JBH:dkg (10)
84 APR 2 8.1975
дет
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 132
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
15 Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
PLM
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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GUAREG NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES OVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM : Legal Counsel
SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75
#MOR16
DATE: 4-10-75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
REIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DASE1/18/01 BY SPJALIM/116
DA
Assoc. Dir.
Dop. AD Adm
Dop. AD Any
Asst Dif
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gon. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Labaratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
"The Washington Post," Thursday, 4-10-75, edition
on page A31 contains an article reporting an interview of Senator Frank
Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.
Senator Church, according to this article, stated that the Committee is
reserving the right to make public eventually any documents it gets and is
accepting nothing with "strings attached."
Inasmuch as this Committee is also the Committee which the
FBI is furnishing information to, it is believed a clarification of Senator Church's
statement must be obtained and in the interim we should furnish the Senate
Select Committee only those documents which do not have a caveat such as
classified documents or documents bearing the property stamp.
Section Chief William O. Cregar advised that he had contacted
Dr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Committee
concerning Senator Church's reported statement. Clarke stated that CIA
Director William E. Colby was highly upset at Church's remark and that
this statement would be a topic of a discussion of the Executive Committee meeting
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review the morning of
4-11-75. We will be represented at that conference by Section Chief William O.
Cregar and Assistant Director John A. Mintz. Clarke indicated the position.
that the CIA will apparently take regarding this problem is that the White House
should obtain the clarification although CIA Director Colby initially was prepared
to send a letter over his signature to Senator Church to obtain such clarification.
EX-110
REC-462-116395-13
Inasmuch as the request by this Committee was forwarded through
the Department, Senator Church's statement was brought to the attention of
Douglas Marvin, Assistant to the Attorney General, who has been handling
all FBI responses to Senate Select Committee requests. Marvin indicated he
was concerned at Church's statement and stated it was the Attorney General's
desire that he be advised of any Bureau response to the Committee concerning
ARB:12 
1975
this matter.
Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1 MA Mintz 82
1- Mr W 64 cagar
PVD:dkg (9)
NW 88296 Docld32989628 Page 133
-
1 – Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Hotis
1
-
Mr. Daly
RECOMMENDATION
CONTINUED - OVER
Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75
RECOMMENDATION:
No action be taken by the Bureau to obtain clarification
of Senator Church's statement pending the results, 4-11-75, meeting of
the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional
Review, and that in the interim we furnish the Senate Select Committee only
those documents which do not have a caveat such as classified documents
or documents bearing the property stamp.
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 134
- 2 -
°
Senate CIA Committee Says
White House Stalls on Data
By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer
Church said he did not|jected round of public hear-
know "what the hang-up is" ings this summer. The House
The Senate Committee on since White House aides have has also ordered a similar in-
Intelligence Operations dis- indicated they consider the quiry
but its committee,
closed yesterday that the committee's entire request as headed by Rep. Lucien Nedzi
White House is still stalling "perfectly proper."
(D-Mich.), has yet to choose a
mestic.
'
.
Bader is a former Senate.
on a month-old request for Church did not spell out all staff director.
the directives involving covert of "the more sènsitive data" The Senate committee's
activities by the Central In- that is still being withheld, chief counsel, Fritz Schwarz,
telligence Agency and other but he said it includes both said directors have now been
arms of the Government. the Colby report and the top-named for all four of its task
Sen. Frank Church (D- Secret White House and Na- forces. They are William
Idaho), the committee chair- tional Security Council direc- Bader, head of the foreign in-
tives dealing with covert oper- telligence task force; John El-
man, told reporters after a
closed, 22-hour meeting that ations, noth foreign and do- liff, head of the domestic in
he had been authorized to
telligence task force; Alton H.
write another letter to Pres- The Idaho senator said the Quanbeck, head of the Mili-
ident Ford asking him to ex-committee is reserving the tary intelligence task force,
pedite the request.
right to make public eventu- and David Aaron, head of the
The committee asked Mr. ally any documents it gets and task force that will study the
is accepting nothing with intelligence community's
Ford on March 12 for all the "strings attached." But he de command and control struc-
executive orders and top-
clined to speculate on whether ture."
secret 
National Security Coun- this might be the reason for
cil 
directives concerning the the administration's hesitance. Foreign Relations Committee
CIA and the rest of the in- Church 
said all of the recaide and has recently been
telligence community, includ-
ing the command structure at committee's mandate to inves-dation. Elliff is a Brandeis
ords were 
essential to the working with the Ford Foun-
the White House.
tigate the CIA and the rest of University professor and ex-
The President was also the government's intelligence pert in domestic law enforce-
asked 
to supply the committee community
. He said he still ment activities. Quanbeck has
with a copy of CIA Director had no reason to think at this
been director of the Brookings
William E. Colby's January point that the White House
Institution's defense analysis|
report to Mr. Ford on allega- would refuse to give them up, project and Aaron has served
tions of illegal domestic spy- but he emphasized that 
he saw
on the National Security
ing by the agency.
no reason for further delay.
Council staff.
But all the committee has Church said the committee
gotten so far, Church said, also authorized its staff of
has been what the White about 35 lawyers and investi- the task forces will cut across
House evidently regards as gators to start gathering evi- the lines of 
various intelli-
the least sensitive documents dence and interviewing wit- gence agencies 
and focus on
⚫ on the list.
nesses as the prelude to a pro- general avenues of 
inquiry,
such as the "legal authority
and legal restraints" for intel-
ligence work; the targets and
techniques of intelligence-
gathering, counterintelligence
and covert operations, and the
question of who orders and
controls those activities.
#10816
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN, IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BT SP2 ALM/716
"The Washington Post"
April 10, 1975
Schwarz said that each of
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 135
ANCLOSURE
62.115-09-73
FROM
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
:W
W./104 Cregar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#MD416
DATE 1-18-01 BYSPA AU00/716
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
1
1
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
DATE: 4/7/75
1
1
1
-
-
1
-
1
Mr. Bassett
Mr Mintz
Mr. Walsh
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Hotis
1
-
Mr.
Cregar
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting
of the Executive Committee of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community (here-
after referred to as the EXCOM), held at CIA Headquarters on
the morning of 4/4/75.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
DeprAnt
Asst. Dit:
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Laboratory
Legal Coun
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _
bingh
•Aper
This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role as
the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were
Mr. Roderick Hills, Assistant Counsel to the President; Associate
Deputy AG Wilderotter%; Mr. John Clarke; as well as senior officials
from Defense, Treasury, National Security Council, Office of
Management and Budget, and the Energy Research and Development
Administration.
The following items of interest were discussed:
Mr. Roderick Hills reported that he had a meeting
with the Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select Com-
mittee (SSC) to discuss having Legal Counsel present when members
of a particular agency were being interviewed by SSC staff person-
nel.
The essence of this meeting resulted in the SSC being
receptive to such an arrangement but it would be incumbent upon
each agency, department or bureau to negotiate the specific
arrangements for such representation with the SSC. Hills also
discussed the problem of the unknown employee or former employee
who might request to be interviewed unbeknownst to the parent
agency. It was suggested to the Counsel and Staff Director by
Hills that such an employee be interviewed by only one staff
member, that the staff member attempt to determine the scope of
this individual's testimony and then REGees such testimony wi
the parent agency to insure the agency could provide advice
to the sensitivity of the unknown employee's testimony. No firm
decisions were made but it would appear the Counsel and
Director will agree to allow Counsel to be present'
1572
Aduring the
APR 
16.1575
Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(9)
ENCLOSURE
5 APR 21 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 136
ST-106
CONTINUED OVER
-
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE:
SENSTUDY 75
testimony of a secret employee and following such testimony
the employee will be allowed to meet with staff members of
the SSC in an Executive Session. It is anticipated more
definitive information on the final decisions regarding this
aspect will be forthcoming from the White House.
The question was raised by the Bureau representative
as to whether the Ad Hoc Group and/or the interagency registry
should be notified as to requests members of the Intelligence
Community receive from other Congressional committees.
Mr.
Wilderotter advised that this would be a judgment question%;B
however, if a request from a Congressional committee other than
the Select Committees impacted on the Intelligence Community,
involve sensitive issues or would be of interest to the White
House, such requests should be provided to the interagency
registry along with an abstract of the response.
Attached is a list of those members of the SSC staff
who have been certified for access to compartmented information.
Also attached is a paper identifying 10 issues likely to grow
out of Select Committee deliberations. The pencil notation in
the right-hand column identifies those agencies of the Intelli-
gence Community responsible for preparing a paper which addresses
these issues. It is noted that issue identified as number eight
is entitled, "Intelligence Files and Privacy." Mr. Colby asked
that the FBI prepare this paper. Assistant Director Mintz advised
that the Bureau has a study underway on this very subject and
agreed that the Bureau would prepare this study. The deadline
for completion of the study is 4/25/75.
Also attached is a copy of the survey of the SSC facility,
Room G-308, Dirksen Building, covering all aspects of physical and
technical security. None of the participants of the EXCOM had any
objection to the facility and we presume the SSC will abide by
the procedures outlined in the attached survey report.
ކ
Attached also for information is a draft of an employee
notice and agreement concerning treatment of confidential material
being considered by the SSC. It is to be noted that to date neither
the Committee nor its staff has signed any such Secrecy Agreement.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 137
2
-
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
Tur
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 138
nowy
Рем
wow
-
3
дни
AGREEMENT
I have read the foregoing employee notice
concerning treatment of confidential material and
have read the Resolution establishing the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities, and the
Committee Rules.
I understand that to qualify as an employee of
the Select Committee, I am required to, and I hereby.
agree to abide by those Rules. I further understand
and agree that the obligations hereby placed
upon me continue after my employment with the Committee
has terminated.
SIGNATURE
SWORN TO BEFORE NOTARY
HMDR16
ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINTED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATEL-18-01 FISP2 ALM/776
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 139
-3-
those staff members with appropriate security clearances
and a need to know.
•
"7.5 Testimony taken in Executive session or papers
and other materials received by the staff shall not be
made public or disclosed to any person outside the
Committee unless authorized by a majority vote of the
Committee, or upon termination of the Committee, as
determined by a vote of the Senate.
"7.6 Before the Committee is called upon to make any
disposition with respect to the testimony, papers, or other
materials presented to it, the Committee members shall have
a reasonable opportunity to examine all pertinent testimony,
papers, and other materials that have been obtained by the
inquiry staff. No member shall release any of that testi-
mony or those papers or other materials to the public or .
any person outside the Committee unless authorized by a
.majority vote, a quorum being present at the time the vote
is taken.
"9.3 The staff of the Committee shall not discuss
Neither the substance or procedure of the work of the
Committee with anyone other than a member of the Committee
or other Committee personnel. Upon termination of employ-
ment by the Committee, each member of the staff, or con-
sultant, shall surrender any classified material which
came into his possession while in the employ of the Committee.
19.4 The employment of any member of the staff who
fails to conform to these Rules shall be immediately terminated."
In addition to the strict security precautions adopted
by the Committee there are, as you no doubt know, sections of
the United States Code and Executive Orders which relate to
„keeping certain material confidential--they are sections [To
DW SEATED
which are annexed hereto.
E
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 140

-2-
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Committee Rules include
provisions relating to the confidential treatment of material
received by the Committee.
These provisions are contained in
Rules 6.113 7 (and each of its subsections), 9.3 and 9.4 which
provide the following:
"6.11 Release of Testimony and Other Matters. No
testimony taken or material presented at an Executive
session shall be made public, in whole or in part or by
way or summary, unless authorized by a majority vote of
the Committee. Unless authorized by the Chairman the
name of any witness scheduled to be heard by the Committee
shall not be released prior to his testimony.
"RULE 7.
Procedures for Handling Select Committee
Classified or Sensitive Material
"17.1
Staff offices on the first floor of the Dirksen
Office Building shall operate under strict security
precautions. One guard shall be on duty at all times by
the entrance to control entry. All persons, bèfore entering
the offices shall identify themselves. An additional guard
shall be posted at night for surveillance of the secure
area where sensitive documents are kept..
. "7.2
Sensitive documents and other materials shall
be segregated in a secure storage area. They may be
examined only at secure reading facilities. Copying or
duplicating of such documents and other materials is pro-
hibited except as is necessary for use in Committee
meetings or to prepare for the taking of testimony or for
interviews.
"7.3 Each member of the Committee shall at all times
have access to all papers and things received from any
source by subpoena or otherwise. The staff director
shall be responsible for the maintenance, under appropriate
security procedures, of a record of all papers and things
in the possession of the Committee, which log shall be
available to any member of the Committee.
17.4 Access to classified information supplied to
the Committee shall be limited by the staff director, the
chief counsel and the counsel to the minority, and to
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 141
DRAFT 3/28/75
SENATE 'SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Employee Notice and Agreement Concerning Treatment of
Confidential Material
NOTICE
Concern about security and the maintenance of confidenti-
ality of information provided the Senate Select Committee has
been stressed since the outset by the Senate and the Committee.
Section 7 of the resolution which established the
· Committee requires the Committee to:
"institute and carry out such rules and pro-
cedures as it may deem necessary to prevent the
disclosure, outside the Select Committee of any
information relating to the activities of the
Central Intelligence Agency or any other depart-
ment or agency of the Federal Government engaged
in intelligence activities, obtained by the
Select Committee during the course of its study
and investigation, not authorized by the Select
Committee to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure,
outside the Select Committee, of any information
which would adversely affect the intelligence.
activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in
foreign countries or the intelligence activities
in foreign countries of any department or agency
of the Federal Government."
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 142
-71
SECRET
DD/A 75-1549
APR 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
SUBJECT
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
✓ Deputy Director for Administration
ation /
2 APR 1976
: Security Survey, Senate Select Committee
Facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building,
Capitol Hill
1. Attached to this memorandum is a letter to
Mr. William G. Miller for your signature.
2. A security survey of the Senate Select Committee
facility, Room G-308, Dirksen Building, as requested by
Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Director of that Committee,
was completed on 24 March 1975.
3.
With the security procedures now in effect and
those planned for implementation, the facility will provide
adequate protection for the handling and storage of CIA
documents of all levels of classification. Also attached
for your information is a copy of the survey report.
Att
.CC: DD/A
Chairman, SECOM
Charles W. Kane
Director of Security
Refer
CFA
Regraded Unclassified when separated
from Classified Attachment(s)
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 143
SECRET
OS 5 1284
E-2 IMP-DET
CL BY 063417
SECTET
SURVEY REPORT
Senate Select Committee Facility
Dirksen Bldg. 1st & C Street, N. E.
Washington, D. C..
1. In response to a request from Mr. Ben Marshall, Security
Director, Senate Select Committee, (tele. 224-1700). Messrs.
Nicholas R. Zubon and Robert E. Burgener conducted a comprehensive
security survey of the Senate. Select Committee's Facility on
24 March 1975.
2. Mr. Marshall provided both a comprehensive tour of the
facility and a detailed explanation of the operation.
3. The following are pertinent facts concerning the security
procedures as related to the Senate Select Committee Facility:
A. Type of Facility
The Committee is in the auditorium (Room G. 308) of the Dirksen
. Building at 1st and C Streets, N. E., Washington, D. C. Access to
the auditorium is gained easiest by entering the building from the
1st and C Streets. entrance. A 24-hour guard post is located just
inside this entrance. The Select Committee facility is 40' east:
of the building guard post. It is nearly in direct line of sight,
however, a foyer surrounded by a 6' high temporary partition pre-
cludes the auditorium entrance door from being visible. The
entrance to the auditorium is protected by a 24-hour guard post.
The auditorium (Room G. 308) is approximately 100' long x 45'
wide. The floor, ceiling and walls are made of 6" to 8" solid
masonry. The ceiling has a false ceiling approximately 18" deep
in which the air handling equipment and sundry other service
components are housed. All major air handling equipment is on
the roof above the auditorium. Access to the roof which is strictly
controlled by the Director of Security, is gained by a stairway
in the southeast corner of the auditorium. The sidewalls each have
a 2' x 3' register approximately 12' above the floor through which
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 144
SECTED,
air is passed from the auditorium to the air handling equip-
ment on the roof. These registers are solidly bolted into
the walls.
The front of the auditorium (south wall) is covered by
a large movie screen. To the right and left of the movie
screen are two rooms 6' wide and approximately 15' long used
by the research section clerical personnel. These rooms
have countertop openings approximately 3' above the floor
for access from within the auditorium. Countertop openings
exist along both sidewalls for approximately three quarters.
of the length of the wall. The sidewalls have intercorridors
on the opposite side of the countertops which have been con-
verted into unpartitioned office space. The only reproduction
machine, a xerox model 3100, is located in the west corridor.¨
The east corridor has been converted into a compartmented
information storage room and a compartmented document reading
room. The Security Director indicated that he may move his
office to the head of the compartmented reading room to provide
a larger measure of access control to this sensitive area.
The auditorium has six wooden exterior doors, 7' high and
3" thick. The entrance door into the auditorium (west and
north wall) will have an electrical push-button lock installed.
A similar door in the east end of the north wall will be barred
and bracketed on the inside to prevent unauthorized entry. The
west wall has 2 exterior doors leading into the Capitol Police
offices. The east wall has two exterior doors with one leading
to the roof while the second door exits into the Capitol Police
Garage. All exterior doors will be alarmed. The doors now
have Yale 197 1/4 locks with the keys controlled by Mr. Marshall.
The fire safety factor concerning these locked doors was dis-
cussed with him.
The auditorium has a small second floor area at the north
end. Access is gained by two stairways on the east and west
side of the auditorium. The second floor space consists of a
large projection room, currently filled with projection equip-
ment, and five small private film viewing rooms.
The five small rooms will be converted into witness inter-
view rooms.
The windows in each of these rooms will be covered
during the stay of the Select Committee in the auditorium.
2
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 145
B.. Access Controls
Access to the Dirksen Building is gained by either the
main entrance on 1st and C Streets, ground level, or the
Basement Tunnel Entrance at the rear of the building. Both
entrances have a 24-hour guard post where persons entering
are checked for identification. Brief cases and packages
are processed through x-ray machines. Vendors entering the
main entrance are checked for ID, however, all boxes are not
checked.
Entry into the auditorium is controlled by a guard at the
door. His instructions are that all persons entering must·
show an ID card. Visitors are permitted only by appointment.
They are logged in and escorted at all times while in the
auditorium. From 1800 hours Friday through 0800 hours Saturday,
and from 1300 hours Saturday to 07.00 hours Monday everyone must:
sign the log in and out and show an ID. In the event an access
problem arises at the guard post, regardless of the hour, Mr.
Marshall is alerted.
C. Guards
The Dirksen Building and the auditorium are protected by
members of the U. S. Capitol Police Department. The Building
has two 24-hour/7day-a-week guard posts at the entrances while
the Senate Select Committee has one 24-hour/7 day-a-week guard
post at the entrance and an after-hours roving patrol inside.
the auditorium. All police officers are well trained, wear
the Capitol Police uniform and carry Smith and Wesson 38 caliber
revolvers. After-hour patrols check all doors, the entire
auditorium for classified material that may not have been
secured, and the second floor hourly during the night. The
guards on duty at the time of the survey were alert and
responsive to their duties. During off-duty hours, guard
supervisors make at least two unscheduled visits to the guard
posts during each shift. In addition the guard at the
stationary post has four telephones, two of which have a pickup
and automatic ring feature with Capitol Police Headquarters.
There will be no rotation of police officers during the
occupancy of the Committee. The same officers will be assigned
to these posts.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 146
3
$23230
D. Alarms :
All exterior doors to the auditorium will have contact
(microswitch) alarms. The Remington Rand safes, being
obsolete, will be protected by a proximity alarm. The
compartmented storage room and an adjacent reading area
will be protected by a volumetric alarm. For fire pro-
tection a smoke detector/rate of rise alarm will be
installed in the compartmented area. All alarms will
enunciate at the guard desk at the entrance to the
auditorium. The ADT Company will install and maintain
the alarms.
E. Safes
The facility has 22 safes. Sixteen 4-drawer Remington
Rand Safes located below the movie screen. Three class six
Mosler 5-drawer, two class 1 Diebold 2-drawer, and one class
2 Diebold four-drawer are located in the compartmented storage
room. With the exception of the Remington Rand safes, all
other safes are in good working order.
The safe combination and repairs are under contract with
the Safemaster Company. The safe combinations were recently
changed by that company. All safe combinations are under the
control of Mr. Marshall. However, an assist on day-to-day
operations is provided by Mr. Pat Shea, Assistant Staff
Director, who acts as backup for safeguarding the combinations
to the safes in the compartmented storage room. Messrs. Larry".
Kieves, John Petersen and Ms. Jan Orloff are backup for the
combinations to the sixteen Remington Rand Safes. Mr. Marshall
was given two change keys in the event he decides to change the
combination himself should staff personnel rotate.
F. Document Control
Incoming CIA documents will be delivered by Agency courier
to the guard at the entrance door to the auditorium. The
registry officer will receipt for them and take them to the
Registry Section where all documents will be logged. Com-
partmented and Top Secret material will be taken to the Com-
partmented Storage Room and placed in a safe after it has
been logged in Registry. Individuals, on an access list
promulgated by Mr. Marshall draw the compartmented documents
from the safes but must read them in the adjacent area dedicated
for this purpose. Documents classified below TS/Codeword will
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 147
REOSET.
be stored in the Remington Rand safes. The documents in the
Remington Rand safes can be drawn by anyone on the staff, but
must be receipted for with the Registry Officer. The documents
are to be read on the tables placed there for that purpose in
the Research Section.
Further control of classified documents is directed through
the assigning of a staff employee given responsibility for the
reproduction of documents on the xerox machine.
He will con-
trol the number of copies made on typewriters.
´All classified material is secured in safes at the end of
the working day.
H.
Classified Waste
It is estimated that one 50-pound bag of classified waste
will be generated each week while the Committee is in session.
Once the bag is filled with classified waste, it will be
placed in the locked trunk of Mr. Marshall's automobile and
taken to the Federal Reserve Building incinerator where he
will witness destruction by burning. In the event this incin-
erator is booked to capacity, he will take the classified waste
and burn it at the D. C. incinerator. Should either incin-
erator become unavailable to the Committee, Mr. Marshall was
assured that CIA would consider assisting him in the secure
disposition of Committee classified waste.
I. Compartmented/TS Storage
A room dedicated as the codeword/TS storage room is in
the northeast corner of the auditorium. Its five walls are
solid masonry ranging from 6" to 8" thick. A 1/8" stainless
steel door frame is bolted to the masonry walls. A pre-
fabricated 9 gage wire cross-patch metal frame door is attached
to the steel frame serving as access control to the dedicated
room. The door will be secured by lock and key once classified
material arrives for storage. This room will be alarmed.
J. Telephone
The Facility has six standard telephones in the auditorium.
Five of the telephones will be equipped with conversation
5
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 148
SEGREL
masking devices. A central switch installed ahead of the
telephone instruments will disconnect all telephones
simultaneously, should the need arise. The telephone system
is maintained by the local telephone company.
K. Security Briefings ·
All new members of the committee receive a thorough
briefing from Mr. Marshall on security procedures and
security responsibilities. Briefings are periodically
reinforced when conditions warrant.
L. Security Duty Check Procedures
Custodians secure the safe cabinets assigned to them,
i.e. Mr. Shea, codeword room, Messrs. Kieves, Petersen,
and Ms. Orloff, Research area. Mr. Marshall double checks
behind them. The custodian, Security Director and the
roving guard patrol check the entire auditorium to ensure
all classified material has been secured at the end of the
day.
M.
Counteraudio Inspection
Mr. Marshall has taken action on this requirement and
continues to monitor this area to provide the Committee
with as much security protection against the Audio threat
as possible..
N.
Shredder
The facility has one Destroyit Model 51 Shredder used
only for shredding the most sensitive documents. Other
documents are not shredded in this machine because of its
limited shredding capability.
0. General Observations
The
The security procedures implemented within the Senate.
Select Committee facility are sufficient to provide a proper
environment for the protection of classified materials.
survey officers were pleased with the security director's ·
dedication to the objective of providing the best security
possible for the Committee.
SEGRET
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 149
6
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 150
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NW.88296 Docid:32989628. Page 151
SECOND
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NOTES FOR SESSION.
ALL NOTE
FISERIN IS UNCLACETED
DATE
: 1-18-01 BY SP-
ZALM/316
In previous sessions we discussed the importance of
highlighting issues likely to grow out of Commission or
Committee deliberations. We observed that we should identify
'some of those on which a legal brief or annex would be helpful
to Executive Branch initiatives. The idea was to select, a
. few where a solid research paper with options, pros and cons,
etc., could help us develop a firm grip on the questions in
the issue and identify options. For example, the question of
Executive privacy presents itself, and I gather is being
worked on.
There are others we feel it would be useful for the group
to address and assign responsibility for further work. For
example:
Suggested Action
Treasury.
1. Economic Intelligence and National
Security--new discussion
2. Covert action and the law
3.
The Intelligence Budget--open, black,
or closed--rational and procedures for handling
past, present and future
4. Joint Congressional oversight committee
for Intelligence
5. GAO and the audit authorities of U.S.
Intelligence Agencies
6. Confidential funds authorities,
contingency reserves, legal base, history and uses
7: Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions
legal and administrative issues
8.
-
Intelligence files and privacy
2
9. The "fact of" question--international,
legal and political considerations
10.
"Sources and methods" legislation
-
What human being preponsible by with Friday
Iwerks Cat Executive Session
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 152
CIA
отв
CIA:
ماییم تھی میری مار
areprim legal
-
Corinal
CIA-DOD
CIA-Stit
FBI b
State
Sale
On 13
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS. VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLD.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S, SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
Vlnited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO.
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
March 31, 1975
#moris
+
Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear John:
FB7
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BYSP-2 ALM/776
With respect to our letter to you of March 17, 1975
you will find attached the first list of members of the Committee
staff designated to receive compartmented information.
With best wishes,
Enclosure
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 153
Sincerely,
Witham G. Miller
William G. Miller
Staff Director
ATTACHMENT
The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee as
identified below by date and place of birth and social security number
have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting the
requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified information
up to and including Top Secret and are designated to receive compartmented
information. They also meet the requirente
NAME
12
Ulay
set forth in DCID 1/14
DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
William G. Miller
8-15-31
N.Y.
109-26-4349
Frederick A. O. Schwarz
4-20-35
N.Y.
084-30-2047
William Bader
9-8-31
N.J.
545-30-3377
Burton V. Wides
6-14-41
N.J.
139-30-1936
Elliot E. Maxwell
7-24-46
N.Y.
133-34-4225
Daniel O'Flaherty
11-4-42
Ill.
239-62-8495
Michael J. Madigan
4-18-43
D.C.
042-34-3797
Lawrence Kieves
1-4-48
N.Y.
068-38-6464
Charity I. Benz
7-23-46
N.Y.
053-38-7410
Benjamin Marshall
5-4-19
Neb.
485-28-4530
Maratha E. Mecham
2-11-40
Cal.
528-48-6848
Audrey H. Hatry
6-10-23
Md.
216-14-8691.
#MORIE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 154
ALL BEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERMIOLACSITED
DATE 1-12-01 5: SP-2 ALLTE
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 155
#MDR 16.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
THIS
IS UNCLASSIFIED ENVELOPE
DATE 1/18/01 
BX SP-2 ALTE
- ENCLOSURE
10.2-116395
ENVELOPE
EMPTY
Official DocLab Instruction(s) - Revised 10-Apr-2014
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 156
ΤΟ
FROM
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962-EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W.R. Wan
: W.
w.owere
egar
✓✓ SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
was
DATE:
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
4/10/7RECO
mich
DATE 1/18/01 BY. SP-2 ALM/2/6
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
breki
On 4/8/75 Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman of the
Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, forwarded
the attached copy of a letter dated 3/28/75 from Mr. William
Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee,
enclosing a list of staff members who have been certified
for access to classified information up to and including
Top Secret.
Copies of the list are attached to tickler
copies of this memorandum for retention by personnel who
may be in contact with the Select Committee staff.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE
62-116395
LFS: tdp (8)
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
1
-
1
-
1
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Mr. Adamš
Mr. Mi
Mr. J.B. Hotis
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Mr. J.C. Farrington
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Cregar
Mr.
51APR 21 1975
Schwartz
ST-106
REC-40 62-116395-
11
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
¡Director Sec'y
RR
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15 APR 16 1975
5-616
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 157
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
LTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
BERT MORGAN, N.C.
ARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., 7.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 24TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
March 23, 1975.
Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D..C. 20505
Dear John:
#MOR16
ALL FEI INFORMATION CONTA
ERIN 
13 UTCLASSTED
DATE 
1118/01 
35% SPALM 
12TG
The following staff members of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and
place of birth and social security number have received a
security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
within the past five years and are hereby certified as meeting.
the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to
classified information up to and including Top Secret.
Sincerely,
William S. Miller
William Miller
Staff Director
62-116375-
95-71
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 158
C
ATTACHMENT
NAME
DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Davi Aaron
Nancy Brooks
8-21-38
IL.
550-44-7971
2-14-40 KI
313-38-6773
Barbara Cheśnik
4-18-46
WI
390-46-2235
Mary De Oreo
6-13-47 OH
287-42-6258
Daniel
8-24-52
-MA
023-44-8792
Peter Renn
12-12-47
MA
213-50-1123
Edward Greissing
11-27-50
Germany
296-50-4113
Mark nderfurth
9-29-46
NC
245-74-5617
Dorothy Johnson
Loch Johnson
Howard Liebengood
Naldeen MacDonald'.
6-8-25
OR
540-20-6413"
New
2-21-42
Zealand
566-62-0478
"
12-29-42
IN
307-44-9707.
10-19-51
Brazil
225-78-8708
Benjamin Marshall
5-4-19
NE
485-28-4503
William
*Miller
8-15-31
NY
109-26-4349
Susan
10-24-53
Canada
020-40-7638
Alan Romberg
12-1-38
NY
107-30-8583
Frederick A.0. Schwarz,III 4-20-35
NY
084-30-2047
Patrick Shea
2-28-48
UT
528-64-1965
Stephanie Smith
3-23-54
он
282-58-6476
Mary Towell
4-25-44
TN
566-64-7628
62-116395-
71
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 159
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
2 - Legal Counsel Division
1
-
1
(1
Mr. Farrington)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Gregar
April 14, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
KU BESAPARIC
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
RC IS UNCLASSIFIED
DY: 031/18/01 B: SP-2 ALM/116.
Reference is made to the Senate Select Committee letter dated
March 19, 1975, requesting certain documents from the FBI and my
letter to you dated April 10, 1975, enclosing a memorandum and a copy of the
"Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction," dated February 13,
1975, less certain exhibits, for the Committee's use.
The purpose of this letter is to make available for your infor-
mation a copy of the aforementioned paper with all exhibits intact. The
Committee's copy of the paper has missing exhibits because of "Third
Agency Rule" requirements. Authority to release these exhibits is being
expeditiously sought so they may be made available to the Committee.
The exhibits extracted from the Committee's copy included
Exhibit I, J, K, M, and P.
REC-106 62-1163-70
Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President,
has reviewed and approved all exhibits left in the paper and has requested
to review the extracted exhibits after "Third Agency Rule" approval has
been granted and before the exhibits are forwarded to the Committee. This
will be done at the earliest possible time.
Enclosure
до
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
sst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Inv.
tion
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GPO 954-546

The Attorney General
Director, FBI
1
1
food fol
-
Legal Counsel Division
Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 9, 1975
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
NGL INFORMAT
HEREIN ISL
#MORI6
DATE: 1/18/01 SP-2AEM/11/6
Reference is made to a letter from the Senate
Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain
documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes
a response to a request set forth in referenced letter.
A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.
Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an
expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.
Enclosures (3)
DRD:mjg
(6)
_:
NOTE: This is the most current FBI Functional Organization Chart. A
new chart would not be available if prepared in response to the Senate
Select Committee's request for approximately 7 to 10 days.
"/REC-105 62-116,2756 9
4/1
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5-
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Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
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Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
ENCLOSURE
KENCLOSURE ATTACHED"
Telephone Rm.
MANROOM
Docid:32989628 Page 161
TELETYPE UNIT
• APR 21 1975
while
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13,5
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GPO 954-546
#MDR16
11/18/01 58-2AZ/286
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
April 9, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTED
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Reference is made to letter dated March 10. 1975
to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned Committee
which enclosed certain requests for documents and other information
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FEI).
In response to the Committee's request for a detailed
current organizational chart attached hereto is a document entitled
"FBI Functional Organization Chart.
警肇
This chart was prepared January 14. 1975. and since
that time the following changes concerning the position of Assistant
Director have been made. The Assistant Director of the Files and
Communications Division is John T. McDermott. The Assistant
Director of External Affairs is Donald W. Hoore Jr. The Assistant
Director of the Training Division is William II. Mooney.
The various other requests contained in the Committee's
letter of March 10, 1075, are receiving attention and response will be
forthcoming at the earliest possible time.
Enclosure
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
1 - The Attorney General
DRD/PVD:mjg/kjs
(6)
MAIL ROOM
M
146
wkeyes
This document is prepared in response to your
request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee.
Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committce
and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized
personnel without the express approval of the FBI.
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 162
ENCLOSURE
62-1763% -69
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 163*
#MDR.
ALL TIPORMATION CONTAIRED ON THIS
IS UNCLASSIFIED
ENVELOPE
DIA 1-180) BY SP-2 ALM 1996
ENCLOSURE
6241033-69
ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
FIELD OFFICES
CHARLOTTE
CHICAGO
HOUSTON
ALEXANDRIA
CINCINNATI
INDIANAPOLIS
JACKSON
ANCHORAGE
CLEVELAND
JACKSONVILLE
ATLANTA
COLUMBIA
BALTIMORE
DALLAS
BIRMINGHAM
BOSTON
DENVER
DETROIT
KANSAS CITY
KNOXVILLE
LAS VEGAS
BUFFALO
BUTTE
EL PASO
LITTLE ROCK
LOS ANGELES
HONOLULU
LOUISVILLE
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(ADMINISTRATION)
THOMAS J. JENKINS
FBI FUNCTIONAL ORG
DIRECTO
CLARENCE M. K
ASSOCIATE DIR
NICHOLAS P. CA
IDENTIFICATION
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD H. ASH
RECORDING SECTION:
FINGERPRINT SUBMISSIONS
INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE
LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL MATTERS
POSTING SECTION:
FUGITIVE WANTED NOTICES
PROBATION AND PAROLE FLASHES
CARD INDEX SECTION:
CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND DECEASED
KANE INDICES
TECHNICAL SECTION:
CLASSIFICATION AND SEARCHING
CRIMINAL FINGERPRINT FILE
CIVIL FINGERPRINT FILE (ALIEN, CIVIL
SERVICE, MILITARY AND PERSONAL
IDENTIFICATION)
MIRE ROOM SERVICES
ASSEMBLY SECTION:
FILING AND MAINTENANCE OF
FINGERPRINT JACKETS
VERIFICATION OF IDENTIFICATIONS
MICROFILMING
FINGERPRINT CORRESPONDENCE
SECTION:
UPDATING AND DISSEMINATION OF
FINGERPRINT RECORDS
CERTIFIED RECORDS
MISSING PERSONS UNIT
MAIL ROOM
LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION:
DECEASED HAND AND FINGER EXAMINATIONS
DISASTER IDENTIFICATION SQUAD
FINGERPRINT PHOTO LAB
FINGERPRINT TESTIMONY
GENERAL APPEARANCE FILE ON
CONFIDENCE MEN
LATENT FINGERPRINT EXAMINATIONS
LATENT FINGERPRINT INSTRUCTION
NATIONAL UNIDENTIFIED LATENT
FINGERPRINT FILE
SINGLE FINGERPRINT FILE
TECHNICAL FIELD ASSISTANCE
AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH
SECTION:
AUTOMATED IDENTIFICATION DIVISION
SYSTEM (AIDS)
CCH/CIRFO DESK
FINGERPRINT AUTOMATION RESEARCH
TRAINING
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOE DAVID JAMIESON
QUANTICO:
FBI ACADEMY-TRAINING CENTER
FIELD FIREARMS TRAINING
FIREARMS INSPECTION AND REPAIR
IN-SERVICE FIREARMS TRAINING
LAW ENFORCEMENT COMBAT ARTS RESEARCH
PROGRAM (LECARP)
NATIONAL ACADEMY FIREARMS TRAINING
NEW AGENTS FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIALIZED POLICE FIREARMS TRAINING
SPECIAL REAPONS AND TACTICS (SEAT)
TRAINING
RADIO STATIONS
FB1 NATIONAL ACADEMY
IN-SERVICE COURSES
DEFENSE PLANS FOR DIVISION
LEARNING RESOURCE CENTER
DEFENSIVE TACTICS COURSES
NEW AGENTS TRAINING
POLICE INSTRUCTOR COURSES
PHYSICAL TRAINING
SUPERVISORY AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING
EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT COURSES
ASSESSMENT CENTER - CAREER
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
TRAINING RESEARCH
POLICE INSTRUCTOR BULLETINS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SYMPOSIUMS
LAW ENFORCEMENT SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS
FACULTY DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH UNIT
INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY SERVICES
FIELD CLERICAL TRAINING ASSISTANCE
POLICE VISITORS
LIAISON-PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING
SOCIETIES
LIAISON-UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA AND
OTHER INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
LIAISON-NATIONAL ASSOCIATION STATE
DIRECTORS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
(KASOLET)
LIAISON INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE
LIAISON INTERAGENCY POLICE GROUP
HEADQUARTERS:
BUREAU MANUALS
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLERICAL RETRAINING COURSES
FIELD POLICE SCHOOLS
FORMS MANAGEMENT
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
SAC MEMORANDA
REPORTS MANAGEMENT
STENOGRAPHIC TRAINING
SUGGESTION PROGRAM
NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER
FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY ADMISSIONS
INDOOR RANGE
ADMINISTRATIVE
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
EUGENE W. WALSH
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING
SECTION:
ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT
BUDGET AND FISCAL MATTERS
BUREAU ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS
PHYSICAL SECURITY MATTERS
EXHIBITS SECTION:
ARTIST'S-CONCEPTION DRAWINGS
GRAPHIC PRESENTATION OF INVESTIGATIVE
AND STATISTICAL DATA
PREPARATION OF CREDENTIALS AND
SPECIAL FORMS
TRAINING AIDS (DIAGRAMS,
ILLUSTRATIONS AND DISPLAYS)
TRIAL EXHIBITS (CHARTS AND MODELS)
J. EDGAR HOOVER FBI BUILDING
MECHANICAL SECTION:
AUTOMOTIVE POOL
EXPLOYEE PARKING
ENERGY CONSERVATION
PHOTOGRAPHY
PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION
SPACE MATTERS
SUPPLY AND STORAGE
PERSONNEL SECTION:
APPLICANT RECRUITING AND PLACEMENT
AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
COMMENDATIONS AND AWARDS
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE
EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
HEALTH PROGRAMS
LEAVE
LIVING QUARTERS
PAY ADGUNISTRATION
PERFORMANCE RATINGS
PERSONNEL MATTERS
PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS
POSITION CLASSIFICATION
RETIREMENT MATTERS
SAFETY PROGRAMS
VETERANS' COUNSELING
VOCATION AND AVOCATION RECORDS
PROCUREMENT AND ADMINIS.
TRATIVE SERVICES SECTION:
PROCUREMENT (SUPPLIES-EQUIPMENT)
CONTRACTING
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
TYPEWRITER REPAIR SHOP
MAINTENANCE
SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS
AND MOVEMENT UNIT:
PERSONNEL LOCATION RECORDS
SPECIAL AGENT TRANSFERS
RESIDENT AGENCY MATTERS
FILES AND
COMMUNICATIONS
DIVISION
ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
J. WALLACE LAPRADE
RECORDS SECTION:
AUTOMATION AND RESEARCH
CHIEF CLERK MATTERS
CLASSIFYING
CONSOLIDATION
CORRELATION
FILE REVIEW
FILING
GENERAL INDEX
MAIL ROOM
MESSENGERS
KAME SEARCHING
NUMBERING
PERSONNEL RECORDS
RECORDING
RECORDS MANAGEMENT
ROUTING
SERVICE
TRAINING
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION:
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS (INTRA-BUREAU)
TELEGRAPH, TELETYPE, AND MESSAGE
ENCODING/DECODING SERVICES
TELEPHONE SERVICE
LABORATORY
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
BRIGGS J. WHITE
FRONT OFFICE:
FORENSIC SCIENCE TRAINING UNIT
PLANNING AND EVALUATION UNIT
TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS AND
CORRESPONDENCE UNIT
CRYPTANALYSIS-GAMBLING-
TRANSLATION SECTION:
CRYPTANALYSIS
GAMBLING EXAMINATIONS
POLYGRAPH
SECURITY OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS
TRANSLATIONS
DOCUMENT SECTION:
CHARRED PAPER EXAMINATIONS
HANDWRITING AND HANDPRINTING
INDENTED WRITING
INK AND PENCIL EXAMINATIONS
OBLITERATED WRITINGS
PAPER EXAMINATIONS
PHOTOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS
PORTRAIT PARLE EXAMINATIONS
PRINTING
RUBBER STAMP, CHECKWRITER, AND
OTHER MECHANICAL DEVICES
SHOEPRINT EXAMINATIONS
TIRETREAD EXAMINATIONS
TYPEWRITING
MISCELLANEOUS
RADIO ENGINEERING
SECTION:
CW RADIO NETWORK ENGINEERING
FM RADIO SYSTEMS
MAINTENANCE COORDINATION
MOBILE AND PORTABLE RADIO
RADIO FREQUENCY LIAISON COMMITTEES
EVIDENCE EXAMINATIONS
PHYSICS AND
CHEMISTRY SECTION:
BIOCHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL
EXPLOSIVES
FIBERS AND HAIRS
GENERAL CHEMICAL
GLASS FRACTURES
GUNPOWDER TESTS
GUNS AND AMMUNITION
INSTRUMENTAL ANALYSIS
METALLURGICAL
MINERALOGICAL
NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
NUMBER RESTORATION
PHARMACOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
TOOLMARKS
TOXICOLOGICAL
WOOD
X-RAY
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOHN J. MCDERMOTT
PRESS SERVICES OFFICE
CORRESPONDENCE AND
TOURS:
CORRESPONDENCE-CITIZEN INQUIRIES
CORRESPONDENCE REVIEW
MAILING LISTS
DISTRIBUTION OF REPRINTS
TOURS OF FBIHQ
SPEECH MATTERS
RESEARCH SECTION:
FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
INVESTIGATOR
TOP TEN FUGITIVE PROGRAM
FUGITIVE PUBLICITY PROGRAMS
SPECIAL PROJECTS
LIBRARY
BUREAU-WIDE INFORMATION PROGRAM
YOUTHFUL CRIMINALITY
RADIO-TV NEWS MEDIA CONTACTS
NEWS RELEASES
COMPUTER SYSTEMS
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ANDREW J. DECKER, JR.
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
SECTION:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED OR
ASSAULTED STATISTICS
NATIONAL BOMB DATA STATISTICS
NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION
CENTER SECTION:
NATIONAL CRINE INFORMATION CENTER/
COMPUTERIZED CRIMINAL HISTORIES
SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
NCIC/CCH OPERATIONS
NCIC/CCH CRIMINAL HISTORY CONVERSION
DATA PROCESSING SECTION:
ACCOUNTING REPORTS
COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
DATA PROCESSING
TELEPROCESSING
OPERATIONS RESEARCH
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
PAYROLL
RETIREMENT RECORDS
STATISTICAL TABULATIONS
VOUCHERS
SECTION
JANUARY 14, 1975
KW 88296 Docid:32989628-Page-164-
ANIZATION CHART
R
ELLEY
#MORI6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
=
DATE 1-18-91 BY SP-2ALM /796
ECTOR
.LAHAN
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR-
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
(INVESTIGATION)
JAMES B. ADAMS
FIELD OFFICES
MEMPHIS
OKLAHOMA CITY
SAN ANTONIO
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
OMAHA
PHILADELPHIA
PHOENIX
PITTSBURGH
PORTLAND
RICHMOND
MOBILE
NEWARK
NEW HAVEN
NEW ORLEANS
NEW YORK
NORFOLK
SACRAMENTO
ST. LOUIS
SALT LAKE CITY
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN JUAN
SAVANNAH
SEATTLE
SPRINGFIELD
TAMPA
WASHINGTON, D.C
TOTAL 59
OFFICE OF PLANNING
AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD J. GALLAGHER
STUDIES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS:
OPERATIONS
PLANNING
POLICIES
PROGRAMS
INSPECTION
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
HAROLD N BASSETT
INSPECTIONS-FIELD AND HQS
SPECIAL PROJECTS
SURVEYS
INTERNAL AUDITS
SECURITY COORDINATOR
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION
INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
W. RAYMOND WANNALL
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH:
Cl-1 SECTION:
ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY
CI-2 SECTION:
ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
INTERNAL SECURITY
CI-3 SECTION:
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT-VIOLATIONS
ESPIONAGE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT
FOREIGN ECONOMIC MATTERS
FOREIGN FUNDS
FOREIGN MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS
FOREIGN SOCIAL CONDITIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY-NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY
NEUTRALITY MATTERS
SECURITY MATTERS AND INTERNAL SECURITY
BOMBING MATTERS
ANTI-RIOT
ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS
AND FOREIGN GUESTS OF U.S.
CI-4 SECTION:
DOMESTIC AND MILITARY LIAISON
FOREIGN LIAISON MATTERS
FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH:
IS-1 SECTION:
EXTREMISTS AND
ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
EXTREMISTS
ACTIVITIES
CIVIL UNREST AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE
EXTREMIST INFORMANTS
IS-2 SECTION:
SEDITION
SABOTAGE
COMMUNIST
GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND
ORGANIZATIONS
SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL
SOURCES (EXCEPT ESPIONAGE)
IS-3 SECTION:
CENTRAL RESEARCH
ANALYTICAL RESEARCH
TRAINING
SPECIAL RECORDS
DEFENSE PLANS
.LEGAL COUNSEL
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
LEGAL COUNSEL
JOHN A. MINTZ
LEGAL ANALYSIS
LEGAL INSTRUCTION
LEGAL LIAISON
LEGAL RESEARCH
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
CRIMINAL SECTION:
GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT E. GEBHARDT
ASSAULTING OR KILLING A FEDERAL OFFICER
ASSAULTING FOREIGN PERSONNEL
CONGRESSIONAL ASSASSINATION STATUTE
ASSAULTING THE PRESIDENT (OR VICE-
PRESIDENT) OF THE UNITED STATES
AUTOMOBILE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ACT
BANK ROBBERY
BILLS OF LADING ACT
CRIVE ABOARD AIRCRAFT
CRIVE ON INDIAN AND GOVERNMENT RESERVATIONS
CRIME ON THE HIGH SEAS
DESECRATION OF THE FLAG
DESTRUCTION OF AIRCRAFT OR MOTOR VEHICLES
EXTORTION
FALSE ADVERTISING OR MISUSE OF NAMES TO
INDICATE FEDERAL AGENCY
FALSE ENTRIES IN RECORDS OF INTERSTATE CARRIERS
FEDERAL CIGARETTE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT
FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT
FEDERAL TRAIN TRECK STATUTE
FIREARMS ACT (A) NATIONAL (8) STATE FIREARMS
CONTROL ASSISTANCE ACT (C) UNLAWFUL POSSES-
SION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS
FRAUDULENT PRACTICES CONCERNING MILITARY AND
NAVAL DOCUMENTS, AND SEALS AND SYMBOLS OF
AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLEGAL MANUFACTURE, USE, POSSESSION OR SALE OF
EMBLEMS AND INSIGNIA
ILLEGAL USE OF COVERNMENT TRANSPORTATION
REQUESTS
ILLEGAL USE OF RAILROAD PASS
ILLEGAL TEARING OF UNIFORM
IMPERSONATION
INTERSTATE OBSCENE OR HARASSING
TELEPHONE CALLS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREWORKS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF PRISON-MADE GOODS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN CATTLE
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR
VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF UNSAFE
REFRIGERATORS
IRREGULARITIES IN FEDERAL PENAL INSTITUTIONS
KIDNAPING
MAY ACT
POLICE KILLINGS
PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS-
CRIMINAL
SITCHBLADE KNIFE ACT
THEFT, EMBEZZLEMENT, ROBBERY, AND ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC ACT
CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION:
CIVIL RIGHTS
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
ELECTION LANS
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND SLAVERY
NAME CHECK SECTION:
NAME CHECKS
SPECIAL MEMORANDA
ACCOUNTING AND FRAUD SECTION:
ACCOUNTING CONTROL
ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRIES
ADMIRALTY MATTERS
ANTHRACKETEERING
HOBBS ACT
LEA ACT
INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEM
ANTITRUST
ASCERTAINING FINANCIAL ABILITY
BANK FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT
BONDSMEN AND SURETIES
BRIBERY
CENSUS MATTERS
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
COPYRIGHT MATTERS
COURT OF CLAIMS
DEPENDENTS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950
DESTRUCTION OF INTERSTATE PROPERTY
EIGHT-HOUR DAY LAW
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT
FALSE CLAIMS-CIVIL
FALSELY CLAIMING CITIZENSHIP
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
FEDERAL LENDING AND INSURANCE AGENCIES
FEDERAL REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACT
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STRIKEBREAKERS
JURY PANEL INVESTIGATIONS
KICKBACK RACKET ACT
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947
LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT OF 1959 (INVESTIGATIVE MATTER)
LANDS DIVISION MATTERS
MAIL FRAUD
MIGRATORY BIRD ACT
MISCELLANEOUS - CIVIL SUITS
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT
OBSTRUCTION OF COURT ORDERS
OBSTRUCTION OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
PASSPORT AND VISA MATTERS
PATENT MATTERS
PERJURY
RAILWAY LABOR ACT
RED CROSS ACT
RENEGOTIATION ACT-CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
SOLDIERS AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF
ACT 1940
TARIFF ACT OF 1930
UKREPORTED INTERSTATE SHIPMENT OF CIGARETTES
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MATTERS
WAGE AND HOUR LAX
TELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM V. CLEVELAND
CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE..
ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION:
ANTI-RACKETEERING (INTELLIGENCE)
EXTORTIONATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS
ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS-OBSTRUCTION
INTERSTATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF GAMBLING
DEVICES
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF LOTTERY
TICKETS
INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING
INFORMATION
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF
RACKETEERING
INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF WAGERING
PARAPHERNALIA
RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS
SPORTS BRIBERY
TOP-ECHELON CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
FUGITIVE SECTION:
BOXD DEFAULT
CONDITIONAL RELEASE VIOLATORS
CRIMINAL INFORMANT MATTERS
DESERTERS AND DESERTER-HARBORING
ESCAPE AND RESCUE
ESCAPED FEDERAL PRISONERS
FUGITIVES
HARBORING
PAROLE VIOLATORS
PROBATION VIOLATORS
SELECTIVE SERVICE, INCLUDING FUGITIVE AND
RE-EMPLOYMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID CUSTODY
OR CONFINEMENT
UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID GIVING TESTIMONY
UNLAYFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION
EMPLOYEES SECURITY AND
SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION:
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
APPLICATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE CLEKENCY AND
APPLICATIONS FOR PARDON AFTER COMPLETION
OF SENTENCE
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (APPLICANT OR EXPLOYEE
INVESTIGATIONS)
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION)
DEPARTMENTAL APPLICANTS FOR PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS
INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION
LOYALTY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND OTHER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS
MAINTENANCE EMPLOYEES
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
PEACE CORPS
SECURITY OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
SPECIAL INQUIRIES FOR WHITE HOUSE,
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND OTHER
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
U.S. COURTS APPLICANTS
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
NW-88296_Docld:32989628-Page-165-
OPTIONAL FORM N. 10
MAY 2 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
✓ Memorandum
TO
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
: W.
ook@gar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED MORTG
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/18/01 BY SP-2 Aumta
1
-
1
-
1
DATE:
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
4/7/75
Mr. Bassett
-
Mr. Mintz
Mr.
Walsh
Mr.
Wannall
1
1
1
1
-
Mr. Hotis
1
-
Mr. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun
Plan. &
. & Evol.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y —
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of
the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the
Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the morning of 4/2/75.
"
The study prepared for the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) entitled, "Human Intel-
ligence, has come to the attention of the Senate Select
Committee (SSC). The major contributors to this report were
the FBI and CIA. It is an extremely sensitive document and
for that reason any requests from any committees of the
Congress for copies of this report should be referred to the
White House. At the present time, the consensus of those
persons in the White House dealing with the subject of release
of information to the committees of Congress is that this
report will not be provided Congressional committees at this
time.
ww
The SSC does recognize a requirement to comply with
the Third Agency Rule which states in effect that classified
information or material originating in one department shall
not be disseminated outside any other department to which it
has been made available without the consent of the originating
department. CIA's General Counsel has produced a paper entitled
"The Third Agency Rule, copy attached, which they have requested
be reviewed by the Legal Counsels of all agencies making up the
Intelligence Community. A copy of CIA's paper referred to above
has been made available to Assistant Director Mintz who has
indicated he will be in direct contact with Mr. Warner, CIA's
General Counsel.
重量
REC-106
62-116345-68
Attached is a copy of sanitization guidelines for
documents provided Congressional Select Committees.
The Gbu1975
asked that these guidelines be reviewed and concurrence of
Enclosures
WOC:ebc
سال (9)
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Doc@:3298902824919766
CONTINUED
-
OVER
こっ
050-3
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
objections be furnished to the Security Committee of the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for consideration.
A copy of these guidelines has been furnished to the Freedom
of Information Unit of the Legal Counsel Division for review.
Their comments will be furnished to the Bureau's representative,
Mr. Frank Schwartz, on the USIB Committee in compliance with
the mandate from the Ad Hoc Group.
Also attached is a copy of the abstract which all
agencies of the Intelligence Community are being required to
use in abstracting information that agency has provided one
of the Select Committees. These abstracts will be retained
in an interagency registry to be available for review by any
members of the Intelligence Community as well as the White
House. The purpose of this interagency registry is to have
available in one location all information in abstract form
that members of the Intelligence Community have provided the
SSC.
Attached is a memorandum for Mr. John Clarke, Chairman
of the Group, advising the names and titles of individuals on
Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed
Services Committee who have been approved for access to classi-
fied material. It is assumed that these persons will have
continuing close relations with Congressman Nedzi and may be
officially associated with the House Select Committee.
Also attached is a letter from Senator Church, Chairman
of the Select Committee, addressed to the President enclosing a
list of documents which the SSC is requesting from the White House.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 167
TUL
2 -
Вси
для
wRw
дет
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
TE 1/18/01 RESP-211
The Third Agency Rule
1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was
included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked.
Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense
information originating in another Department or agency" to an
agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the
consent of the originating Department or agency". The only excep-
tion to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority
of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes ---
the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelli-
gence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where
appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".
2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate
intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is
the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Commu-
nity. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is an homogenous
product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the
receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.
3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order
11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not
specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the
following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The
originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in
conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with
respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information
and material, including those which presently relate to communications
intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.
4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order
11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security
Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassi-
fication and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This
directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have
four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what
historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:
A. (2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a
security clearance, a person must have a need for access
to the particular classified information or material sought
in connection with the performance of his official duties or
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 168
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-68
Atractual obligations. The deter nation of that need
shall be made by officials having responsibility for the
classified information or material.
D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination
by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section
102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50
U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating
in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any
other Department to which it has been made available
without the consent of the originating Department.
E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information.
Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING
NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any
manner outside authorized channels without the permission
of the originating Department and an assessment by the
senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department
as to the potential risk to the national security and to the
intelligence sources and methods involved.
F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The
establishment of special rules limiting access to, distri-
bution and protection of classified information and material
under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior
approval of the head of a Department or his designee,
5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:
(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are
received from all members of the Intelligence Community and
then disseminated to members of the community under the
authority of the DCI;
(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State
Department may not be sent by the State Department to
the Department of Commerce without the permission of the
CIA;
(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's
Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or
to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus,
a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA
information should be referred to CIA for action so that
the necessary protection of the information can be insured.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 169
(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations
with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation
in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has
received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinc-
tion here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part
of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would
not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate
intelligence.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 170

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
28 March 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group
SUBJECT:
Handling of Third Agency |Matters in Response
to Congressional Select Committees
1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted
to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. . It is
expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will
be hearing from Sènator Church.
2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to
involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.
3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652,
"Classification and Declassification of National Security Information
and Material," the President directed the following:
"D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination
by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495,50 U.S. C.
403, classified information or material originating in one
Department shall not be disseminated outside any other
Department to which it has been made available without the
consent of the originating department."
4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following
quotes 102 (e) in full:
"(3) To the extent recommended by the Național Security
Council and approved by the President, such intelligence
of the departments and agencies of the Government, except
as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,
#MDR16
ALL, WEI DIFORMATION CONTAINED
HERMAN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/8-01 BJSP-2.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 171
CHOLOSURE
62-116395-68
j
shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the
national security and is possessed by such departments and
other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter
provided, shall be made available to the Director of
Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and
dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written
request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available
to the Director of Central Intelligence such information ..
for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be
essential to the national security."
5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and
investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document
which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence
Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor
will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin..
6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation
being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-
relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence
community. Clearing each and every such reference with ovózy
agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time
and manpower.
"
7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure.
Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the
material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will
be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before
release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly
or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the
agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select
Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance
with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such
material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and
agency striving rec
I al coating a
Es
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 172
all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will
designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and
telephone number of the releasing party.
8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and
come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.
.NW.88296 Docld:32989628 Page 173.
Throchs
John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
28 March 1975
'MEMORANDUM FOR: USİB Ad Hoc Group
SUBJECT:
V
Sanitization Guidelines for Documents
Provided Congressional Select
Committees
1. Attached is a copy of a statement, "Guidelines for
Sanitizing Certain Documents Provided Select Committees"
prepared by the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, for
consideration by the Ad Hoc Group. This step is a follow on to
the understanding the DCI has with Senator Church that sanitization
of selective documents will be undertaken before the documents*
are released to the Committee. Similar understandings have been
discussed with House Staff as well.
2. It is important that, to the extent possible, all intelligence
organizations follow generally the same sanitization guidelines.
Accordingly, the USIB Ad Hoc Group should consider utilizing these
or similar guidelines within their respective organizations.
3. If requested by the Chairman, the DCI will discuss
orally with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate and House
Select Committees the content of the sensitive USIB or CIA material
excised from documents. Where appropriate, the DCI may discuss
this sensitive material with the entire Select Committee. He
considers it essential that the written record provided to the
Committee staff not include such sensitive information for the
protection of intelligence sources and methods.
Attachment: As Stated
John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 174
#MDR16
ALL NEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
RESURGASSE
DATEL-18-01
5%
62-116 375-68
DRAFT
28. MARCH 145
GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS
· PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES
1. The Director of Central Intelligence has recently discussed
with Senator Church the need for special consideration and treatment
by the Select Committee of certain sensitive aspects of intelligence
activities and the Senator has expressed his recognition of this need.
Included in such matters are the identities of sensitive sources,
material provided to the United States by cooperating foreign
intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems
and of operational methods, the identities of certain employees whose
safety could be jeopardized if revealed, the identities of American
;
citizens and organizations who have cooperated with US intelligence
and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would.
create serious foreign policy or national security problems. Such
material should be protected not only from exposure but indeed the
risk of exposure. Further, recognition should be given to the need
to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,
might impair the privacy rights of individuals.
NW-88296-Docid:32989628 Page 175
MORIG
ALL FISI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSITED
BY SP
DATE 1/19/01 BY
DATEL1/18
ALMAC
the
2. One form of this special consideration may include use
of sanitization procedures to avoid the risk of exposing such matters
and at the same time satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full
understanding of the community's activities.
3. What May Be Sanitized
While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which
may be levied by the Committees for documenting material and not
possible to determine specifically what material should be excised
from these documents, the following illustrations are offered in
certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet
the test mentioned above..
4. Collection of Intelligence
..
(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how
intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual
rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal
of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel,
:
and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be
substituted, i. e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the
opposition party. No sanitization should be used in connection with
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 176
. 2
names of individuals whose employment or former employment by,
or association with a department or agency, does not remain secret
or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the
department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements
remain secret.
(b) Some information may be required with respect to
technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications
activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material
is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under
various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived
by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details
of the technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding
and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was
obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from
documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be
referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the
Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in
the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples
of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of
verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committees
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page
177
-3.
for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization
of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of
technical capabilities.
5. Intelligence Estimates
Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and
estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not
normally require sanitization. However, departments and agencies
should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.
6. Administration
Information concerning the internal administration arrangements
´of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing.
chart with occupants identified. Sanitization of individual, Identities
of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning-in a cover
assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future
'be considered for a covert assignment..
7. General
The following categories of information or specific examples
may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested
by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should
be given by the department or agency concerned to the necessity of
NW 88296, Docid:32989628. Page 178
· deletion or sanitization of this type of information, prior to
providing the document.
(a) Agent or informant names or operational information
revealing them.
(b) Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive
methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human-source-
collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the
department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.
(c) The numbers, locations, times and other indications of
recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign
organizations.
(d) The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any
given targetted foreign organization.
(e) Names of particular employees whose physical safety or
future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure.
(f) Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed
to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who
would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.
(g) Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly
and neutral countries.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 179
- 5-
(h) Identifying collaborative operations between the United
States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison
services against targets within the country extending the collaborations
or within a jointly targetted third country.
(i) Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in
signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which,
if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries
involved.
(j) Identification of technical intelligence operations of high
technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.
(k) Specific identification of foreign technical collection
installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.
(1) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with
US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign
intelligence operations..
(m) Specific information on special relationships with private
firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This
includes names of firms or industrial associations that collaborate
in a special manner such as providing cover for foreign intelligence
operations.
NW 88296 .Docld:32989628 Page 180°
-6.

(n) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence
agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially
those having large foreign clienteles).
(o) Proprietary information relating to contractors
or furnished in confidence..
8. What Should Not Be Sanitized
There are general categories of intelligence activities which
have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media
or authors with background experience in intelligence departments
or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events
which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in
requested documents.
There is an increasing body of information which has been an
'released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization
of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's
rights to privacy.
9. Techniques of Sanitization
Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the
act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing
from written communication with or without regard for the residual
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 181
7
content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident
is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity
of the material without revealing the true identity. Sanitization
does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material
in this context.
The integrity of official records must be maintained. The
following sanitization techniques apply only to copies of records.
(a) Physical Sanitization
-V
Names may be cut out and
:
the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names
may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed.
copy may be submitted to the Committees.
сеева хохо
The xerox
(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN.“
he defted material is provided on a separate, IDEN list which
The defted
contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.
(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with
substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal
the sensitive material.
(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents
and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information
NW-88296. Docld:32989628. Page 182
8
as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing
department or agency. This technique may be employed when
physical sanitization or excision of material results in unintelligible
gibberish as residue..
(e) Within a category of inquiry, it may be desirable to
extract a complete document from requested material when the
request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence
of such a document should be made known to the Committees but
retained by the agency or department for review under escort
of a representative of the department or agency.
10. Management of Sanitization
The original record and a copy of the sanitized version provided
should be readily available in all cases. Materials developed within an
agency or department in response to requests should be reviewed at an
appropriate level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. In
the case of documents or materials of a community nature, the release
should be done in coordination with the departments or agencies and/or
the Program Manager concerned and any sanitization should be agreed
upon during coordination.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 183
This proposed use of sanitization as a special arrangement.
to protect selected issues contained in material provided to Select
Committees by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not
practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies.
It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies attempt
to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as
required. This paper can serve only as general guidelines on
sanitization.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 184
10
W NH
2.
FORMAT FOR ABSTRACT OF MATERIAL SUBMITTED TO
THE SENATE (HOUSE) SELECT COMMITTEE
INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SUBJECT:
ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION:
NATURE OF MATERIAL:
(Report, briefing, chart, etc.)
4.
TITLE:
5.
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:
bi
REQUESTOR:
7.
DATE OF REQUEST:
8.
DATE OF SUBMISSION:
9.
10.
LOCATION OF FILE COPY/COPIES
DOES MATERIAL RELATE TO AN
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PROBLEM?
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 185
IF SO, IDENTIFY:
(A brief narrative statement which
describes content of the material
provided, problems addressed, and
any conclusions or recommendations.
Summary should be of sufficient
length clearly to convey the basic
thrust of whatever was provided
to the Select Committee.)
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP.J ALMAL
13
1/
62-11.6395-68
IC-75-1951
28 March 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Clarke
SUBJECT
-
: SECURITY House Select Committee
Cleared Personnel
1. The following information has been obtained from the
Office of Legislative Counsel and addresses those individuals on
Congressman Nedzi's staff or on the staff of the House Armed
Services Committee, who have been approved for access to classified
material. It is assumed that they will have continuing close relations
with Congressman Nedzi and may be officially associated in the near
future with the House Select Committee.
Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek
Chief Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B
Mr. William H. Hogan, Jr.
Counsel, Armed Services Committee Staff
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK
Mr. John L. Boos
Chairman Nedzi's Assistant for Intelligence
Matters
Room 2343 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B
2. The following secretaries are approved for receipt of
classified material at the levels indicated:
Berniece Kalinowski (Slatinshek)
Room 2117 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK, B
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 186
62-116395--68
Rita D. Argenta (Hogan)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI
Oneta L. Stockstill (Boos)
Room 2339 Rayburn House Office Building
Cleared: TS, SI, TK
3. Safe storage facilities are available in Mr. William Hogan's
office which have been approved by CIA. Mr. Slatinshek and Mr. Boos
keep classified material meant for Congressman Nedzi in this area.
Дом
Donald E. Moore.
Dist: RTaylor:mm/28Mar75
O-Adse
1 - IC Reg
1 SECOM :
-
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 187
C. TOWER, TEXAS. VICE CHAIRMAN
PLA
SCH
whatta in moÉTALE, MINN,
WAL Z DNG HOT Dypton, KYŲ
realet Mumban, N.C.
HOWARD SI, BAKER, JR.. TENN.
CANY HART, GULG
•
3.
A
BARRY COLDWATER, I
CHARLES MCC. MATH., MD.
RICHARD 5. SCHWEIX
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
United Blates Benatë
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO 5. RES. 21, 91TH CONGNESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
March 12, 1975
The President
The White Houser.
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
#mOe16
ALL. FOREFORMATION CONTAINED
THE STEEL UNCLASSIFED ALM 1976
DAB11-18-01
On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities, Senator Tower and
I want to thank you for the opportunity we had on March 5 to discuss
the work of the Committee. I want to express my personal appreciation
for the direct and forthright manner in which you addressed some cî,
the initial questions that lay before the Select Committee, and your
willingness to assist the Committee to meet its responsibilities under .
the mandate of S. Rec. 21.
We are in agreement that the work of the Committee should proceed
as expeditiously as possible and the Committee is gratified at the full
and complete cooperation that we have received from the Executive
agencies up to this point. In every respect thus far, the agencies
have been fully cooperative with the Committee and the staff and I
believe this augers well for a constructive and expeditious conclusion
to our inquiry.
At our meeting on March 5th with you, we discussed the general
areas in which the Committee would need initial documentation.
As we
discussed, our first requirements are to determine the legal basis
for the activities for the intelligence agencies of the United States
Government. In this regard, it will be helpful to the Committee to
receive from whomever you may designate, the documents, files, and
other papers that might be required to fully determine the legal basis
for the activities of United States intelligence agencies. With the
unanimous approval of the Committee, I respectfully request that the
documents on the attached list directly relevant to the inquiry
authorized by S. Res. 21, be supplied to the Committee at the earliest
opportunity.
With kind regards,
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 188
merely,
Sincerely,
Chamish
Frank Church
62-116395-68
'
ע
ATTACHMENT
1. The report furnished to the President by Director Colby in January 19
*
2. All Executive Orders, National Security Decision Memoranda.
(NSDI is) or Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs), and other White House" directives
pertaining to the charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert
foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities.
3. All Executive Orders, National Security Council memoranda and
directives, and other White House instructions pertaining to the structure,
functions or organization of intelligence policy organizations within the
Office of the President, including the Forty Committee and the Washington
Special Action Group (and their precedessor organizations, e.g., the Operations
Coordinating Board, Special Group, 54/12 Group, 303 Committee, etc.).
4. Organization charts and staffing patterns (for the present and,
to the extent reasonably convenient, back to 1947) for all intelligence-
related organizations within the White House (ISC, Forty Committee, OEP,
WSAC, etc.) including names of key officials and staff personnel.
#moelb.
ORMATION CONAN
NCLASSIFIED
"White House" as used in this listing is meent to include the President,
the Office of the President, including the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, the National Security Council and the Office of
Management and Budget.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628. Page 189
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
ΤΟ
:
UNITED STATES G
ERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM Legal Counsel
:
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BYSP-2 ALM/748
DATE:
бешево
4-3-75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD
Admi
Dep. AD thv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm..
Director Sec'y
By memorandum dated 3-20-75, you were advised of a
request received from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.
The Intelligence Division requested that an attempt be made to modify portions
of the Committee's request.
Regarding Part I titled Legal Authorities, the Intelligence Division
pointed out that this particular request was wide-ranging and required a considerable
file review as it requested any memorandum discussing the legal authority of
the FBI to "(1) investigate internal security matters, (2) collect intelligence
information, and (3) engage in counter-intelligence activities; together with
copies of all constitutional and statutory provisions, executive orders, presidential
directives, Attorney General opinions and memoranda, and any other materials
asserted as sources of such authority." With regard to Part III concerning the
FBI's administrative organization, they requested the identities by name of personnel
in the Intelligence Division, Unit Chief and above. This caused concern in the
Intelligence Division that there would be a needless proliferation of a list of
Bureau personnel working in this field which list, of course, would be of interest,
to foreign intelligence sources.
On 4-1-75 Inspector John B. Hotis and SA Paul V. Daly discussed
these matters with William Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee;
John T. Elliff, who has been nominated to head the task force for the Committee
looking into FBI activities; F. A. O. Schwarz, Counsel to the Senate Select
Committee; and staff member Michael Epstein. They agreed to modify the request
in Part III to the extent that personnel in the Intelligence Division need not be
identified by name below the level of Assistant Director in the organization chart
to be furnished them pursuant to their request of 3-19-75. They asked as an
alternative the Bureau prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence Division down
to the level of Unit Chief with names included which they would have access to
review in Bureau space.
Enclosure
1 - Mr. Callahan
-
Enc.
1 - Mr. Adams - Enc.
1 - Mr. Jenkins - Enc.
REQ 17 62-116545-01
My
1 Mr. Walsh Enc. ENCLOSURE
-
-
1 - Mr. Wannall
Enc.
PVD: PR 22 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 190*
275
1 - Mr. Mintz - Enc.
1 - Mr. Farrington - 15 1975
1 - Mr. Hotis - Enc.
1 - Mr. Daly - Ence
CONTINUED - OVER

Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75
I
With regard to Part I relating to legal authorities, they stated
they were amenable to the Bureau furnishing them whatever documents they
have retrieved up to this time which have been recovered pursuant to their
request of 3-19-75 and that no additional detailed review need be conducted
until they review the aforementioned documents. At the end of their review
they will make any additional specific requests concerning this part of their
request. They also asked that in our response we furnish them copies of documents
listed on a three-page paper prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee,
a copy of which is attached.
Staff Director Miller requested that the Bureau expedite their
response to the Senate Select Committee's request as the first meeting of that
Committee is scheduled for Wednesday, 4-9-75, and he felt strongly that they
must have material that showed progress in their study of the FBI prior to that
time. Mr. Miller requested that, if necessary, the request be responded to in
a piecemeal basis and that the complete response does not necessarily have to
be made at one time.
It is suggested that we make available to this Committee as soon
as possible those documents which we have furnished the General Accounting
Office (GAO) which also fall within the 3-19-75 request of the Senate Select
Committee. In this regard staff members have advised they are in contact with
GAO auditors concerning the FBI.
By way of observations it is obvious that the staff members of
the Committee are well versed in Bureau policy and procedures. To this point
they have been cooperative and we should insure that we give a timely response
to their various requests.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That the Intelligence Division advise whether modification
of the Senate Select Committee's request concerning legal authorities for
investigations and the modification of the table of organization of the Intelligence
Division are acceptable and, if so, expeditiously prepare the necessary response
to the Senate Select Committee.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 191
- 2 -
-
RECOMMENDATIONS
CONTINUED - OVER
4/8/75
Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75
(2) That we furnish all information which has previously been
furnished GAO and is within the ambit of the Senate Select Committee's request.
Material furnished to GAO reviewed, are information wredin
SSC has been fornito 55C
Ambit
- of
all
4/8/75
wab
(3) That as our response to any one of the five particular areas
of inquiry as set forth in the 3-19-75 letter is completed, we furnish it to the
Senate Select Committee.
4/8/75
sone
(4) This material should be sent to the Deputy Attorney General/
by letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should specifically
identify the request, for review and subsequent transmittal to the Senate Select
Committee.
Ju
риз
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Ahire
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wRw
рав
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 192
- 3 -
inference
Bresterial, Perenoriation
colewing fetters Chordab
directed to Moy
Lesvol
4/8/75
Gam
e of the kypan of materials
od und ihr 1:
Niction which wer
fore the Comm
insty-Third Controor
3. Gundion 2 Subversion on FOI Jun
epared for Di for Grat Den Hvariu te
on the Judiciary. United Stater bona
(Pirc, Bursion) on the Hominion of Louis imbrick Gray III,
0 Connecticub to be pinoctor.
(2875), 19.7 and 14.
Dvosti Zsion
2. Paper prepared on jurisdiction which was discussed
by Director Gray and others at a Quantico meeting on May 23
and 24, 1670. I. p. 151.
5. Koortdum from the Director of the FDI to tho
Attorney General. d: tod August 7. 1973, recommending the
issuance of an executive order concerning the authority of
the REI so conduct domestic intelligence operations. See
the Attorney General's reply to this memorandum which is
published in the Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Adinistrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary
and the Qubo sited on Surveillance of the Committee on
Foreign Relations. Ninety-Third Congress (Second Bession), on
Warrantloss Wirelanning and Electronic Surveillance (1974).
pp. 31-32.
11.
An Intelligence Division study which was furnished
to the Office of Legal Counsel. Department of Justice, by
Director Kelley. See Hearing before the Subcommittee on
FBI Oversight of the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Soutte. Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session) on
3. 2106. Ten-Year Term for FBI Director (1974), pp. 12-13.
5. Homorandum from Attorney General Clark to Director
Iloover, dated September 14, 1967. See Hearings before the
Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives,
Kinety-Third Congress (Second Secasion), Domestic Intelligence
Onerations for Internal Security Purmones. Pare 1 (1974),
pp. 3104-37
DD.
5. The two PRI nomorar in which record instructions from
President Roosevelt to Director Hoover concerning: FBI investi
Cations of subversive activities. and which indierto meetings
beton Preden Roosevels and Director Hoover on August al
028193. Id. at pp. 3302-3312.
7 Nemorandum from Director Hoover to Associate Director
Taara. dated September 10, 1930. Id. at p. 3777.
6. Presidential directives dated September C. 1930;
January 0, 19 July 24, 1950; and December 15, 1059.
Id. at nu. Bon
#MOR16
INFORMATION CONTAINED
EIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BX58-27
FNW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 193
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-67
ample of the types of materials requested under Part II:
1. 1.Seë Delimitati Agreement in the Ilearin before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Coand be on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, Rinety-Second Congress
(First Session), on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill
of Rights (1971), Part II, pp. 11/2-11/9.
2. See Agreement of Coordination in the Hearings before
the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives,
Ninety-Third Congress (Second Session), Domestic Intelligence
Operations for Internal Security Purposes.(1974), Part 1,
PP. 3309-3303.
For references to items requested in Part IV, see:
1. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress (Second Session), on
the Nomination of Richard G. Kleindienst, of Arisona, to be
Attorney General (1972), pp. 03-67.
2. Hearings before the Committee on Internal Security,
House of Representatives, Iinety-Third Congress (Second
Session), Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal
Security Purnoses. (1974), PP. 3509-3570.
3.
Hearings before the Judiciary Committee, United States
Senate, Ninety-Third Congress (First Session), on the Nomina-
tion of Louis Patrick Gray ITT. of Connecticut, to be Director,
Federal Lareau of Investigation (1973), PP. 150-151.
An excised copy of the Report requested under Part V, Iteri A,
is published in the record of the Hearings before the Committee
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third
Congress (Second Session), pursuant to II. Res 803 (Impeach-
ment), Book VII, Part 1, pp. 384-431.
The original COINTELPRO Report which is requested in Part “V,
Iten B, is referred to in the Hearings before the Civil
Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Minety-Third Congress,
Second Session), THI Counterintelligence Programs (1974), p. 21.
NW-88296 Docld:32989628 Page 194
Memorandum from the Attorney General to the
Director, FBI, dated May 20, 1954, captioned "Microphone
"Surveillance. See parings before the Subcom Attee on
"Administrative Prac ce and Procedure of the a
mittee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress
(Second Session), Warrantless Wiretapping (1972), p. 178.
:
NW-88296 Docid:32989628 Page 195
رکنا
//To
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
Y9GEDIMON
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GORNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM Legal Counsel
:
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/198
C
DATE: 4-3-75
Couns Soctudy -75) 1
Sackdy.
RESSI
SUBJECT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
A
Dop. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Comm.
Plan & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that all
responses for the production of records, etc., received from Congressional
committees be forwarded by letterhead memorandum through the Deputy
Attorney General to the requesting committee, and also that in selected instances
a property stamp or statement be affixed to certain documents limiting access
With the proliferation of committees in Congress looking into
FBI operations, it is essential that a standard procedure for the forwarding of
documents to the requesting committees be established. Inasmuch as requests
such as the request of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities
have been forwarded to this Bureau through the Department, it would appear
logical that responses to such inquiries and all other inquiries of Congressional
committees, whether they be directed to the Department and/or the Bureau,
be responded to through the Department. Such a procedure not only will make
all our responses consistent but will also give the Department an opportunity
review and approve documents being made available to Congress.
My
ORDED COPY FIRED IN
65 // 6-987
16
11-894
In connection with our preparation of responses to requests
Congressional committees, it is suggested that all responses should be by
letterhead memorandum, the first paragraph of which should clearly describe
the specific request which is being responded to in the letterhead memorandum
104
REC-16 62-116.395-66
592491-37
In those instances where documents are of a nature that we ares
not desirous of unauthorized personnel, whether they be in Congress or otherwise,
having access to, we should affix a property stamp. This property stamp should
read as follows:
1 - Mr. Adams
21 APR 11 1975 1
"This document is prepared in response to your request and
is not for dissemination outside of your Committee. Its use
is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the
contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel.without
the express approval of the FBI."
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Jenkins
1
1
-
1
-
All Assistant Directors:
PVD:kjs (21)
NW882964bd32989628-Page 196
APERTS 1975
泚
1 Mr. Farrington
1 Mr. Hotis
1
-
Mr. Daly
JUN 11 1975 RECOMMENDATIONS - OVER
LEGAL COUNSEL
Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams Memo
RE: CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
REVIEW OF FBI OPERATIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(1) That all responses to Congressional inquiries concerning
FBI operations be forwarded to the Congressional committees by letterhead
memorandum through the Deputy Attorney General. Upon approval, these
letterhead memoranda will be hand-delivered to the Deputy Attorney General's
office by Legal Counsel Division.
(2) That in instances where access to a particular document
should be limited because of the contents of that document, a property stamp
in line with the above be affixed thereto.
дж
сменя
дек
DIV. 5 is
obtaining of soprale
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 197
.2.
-
#moris
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
MINIS CLASSIFIED
DALE 1/18/01 DYSP-2 ALM/198
111
-
-
-
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 8, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Reference is made to letter dated Larch 19, 1975,
to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned
Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents
and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI).
Attached are copies of various documents which
are jurisdictional agreements between the FBI and other
Federal agencies or guidelines prepared by the Attorney
General with reference to investigative responsibilities
between the FBI and other Federal agencies insofar as they
pertain to internal security, intelligence collection,
and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities.
1. Delimitations of Investigative Duties of the
FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Intelligence
Division of the Army and the Office of Special Investigations,
Inspector General, U. S. Air Force, dated February 23, 1949,
with supplemental agreements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Supplemental
agreement number 2 is no longer in effect.
2. Agreement between the FBI and the Central
Intelligence Agency, dated February 7, 1966, classified
"Secret."
3. Agreement between the FBI and the United States
Secret Service, effective July 30, 1973.
RIM:mam
(6)1772177
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
-
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
ތމ
wi
65
TELETYPE UNIT
(that)
GPO 954-545.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 198
1
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
The Attorney General
}
Director, FBI
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
-
1 Mr. J. A. Mintz
1
-
22
April 8, 1975
Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 Mr. W. O. Cregar
-
Reference is made to a letter from the Senate
Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting_certain
documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes
a response to the request entitled, "Jurisdictional
Agreements." A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for
your records. Processing of additional requests is
continuing and further responses will be forthcoming.
Enclosures (2)
RLM:mam
(6)nim
BLM
2.
ENCLOSUR
DSPR 1 MAOM
1
IGE
#толь
REC- 106
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
BURBIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
* 62-11682
AME: 1/18/01 WYSPDALE/4162
SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
TELETYPE UNIT
NW-88296 Docid:32989628 Page 199
یا
_ 65
7 APR 17 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
4. Investigative guidelines with reference to
Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation
of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General of the
United States, submitted by letter to the FBI on January 11,
1973.
The various other requests contained in the
Committee's letter of March 19, 1975, are receiving attention
and response will be forthcoming at the earliest possible
time.
Enclosures (4)
1
-
The Attorney General
NY 88296 Doeld:32989628 Page 200
2
CJ

#mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BX SP-2 ALTS/11576
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 201
62-116395-65
ENCLOSURE
February 23, 1949
Subject: Dedimitation of Investigative Duties of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Office of Naval Intelligence, the
Intelligence Division of the Army, and
the Office of Special Investigations,
•Inspector General, U. S. Air Force.
The Agreement for Coordination of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Intelligence
Division of the Army, and the Office of
Special Investigations, Inspector General,
U. S. Air Force.
VI
ण्
I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the
President's Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his
Directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitations Agreement of
February 9, 1942, and the Presidential Directive of October 30,
1947. In addition. cognizance has been taken of the provisions
or the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and the specific application
of that Act is set forth in Section II hereof. All other pro-
visions of this Agreement are apart from and have no relation to
the stated requirements of the Atomic Energy Act. In view of the
above, it is now agreed that responsibility for the investigation
of all activities coming under the categories of espionage,
counterespionage, subversion and sabotage (hereinafter referred
to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated herein-
after. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given
field carries with it the obligation to exchange freely and
directly with the other subscribing organizations all information
of mutual interest. When the organization with primary operating
responsibility is unable for any reason to produce material in
that field desired by the subscribing agencies, such special
arrangements as may be legal or desirable will be worked out
through negotiation at the national level prior to activity by
one agency in another agency's field. It is recognized by the
subscribers hereto that the Headquarters Department of the Army
has decentralized such functions to its major subordinate commanders.
When the major subordinate commanders of the Department of the
Army cannot effect satisfactory special arrangements, the matter
will be referred to the Director of Intelligence of the Army for
further negotiations at the national level. Close cooperation
and coordination between the four subscribing organizations is
a mutually recognized necessity.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 202
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2 An 1-116
II. FBI will be responsible for:
All investigations of cases in these categories involving d
civilians and foreign nationals of all classes in the continental
United States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the State of
Hawaii, and the State of Alaska* except as specifically described
hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5.
2. All investigations of violations of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946. There are no territorial or personnel limitations on
this provision.
3. The coordination of the investigative activities of
civilian agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and the State of Alaska except as specifically
described hereinafter in Paragraph V, Section 5, which provide
information regarding subversive movements and activities in
these categories.
4. Keeping the other subscribing organizations advised of
important developments in these categories within its cognizance,
particularly:
a. Activities of inactive reserves of the armed
service, including the National Guard.
b. Developments affecting plants engaged in armed
forces contracts.
C.
Developments concerning the strength, composition,
and intentions of civilian groups within its
cognizance which are classed as subversive and
whose activities are a potential danger to the
security of the United States.
d. Developments affecting those vital facilities and
vital utilities which have been designated by the
Secretary of Defense.
Developments affecting critical points of trans-
portation and communications systems which have
been designated by the Secretary of Defense.
(For b, d, and e above no protective coverage is contemplated.)
-
*Editorial revision of this Agreement to reflect the statehood
of Alaska was approved by the IIC on January 7, 1959.
**Revision to reflect the statehood of Hawaii was approved by the
IIC on September 9, 1959.
NW 88298 Docld:32989628 Page 203
III.
ID, Army will be responsible for:
1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these
categories involving active and retired military personnel of the Army.
2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these
categories involving civilian employees of the Army in the
United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
v
3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these
categories involving civilian employees of the Army stationed in
areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have
ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the
Virgin Islands.
4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving
civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the
other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Army Commander
has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein,
including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands.
5. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any
important developments.
6. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity
and location of the plants engaged in Army contracts.
IV.
ONI will be responsible for:
1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these cate-
gories involving active and retired naval personnel of the Navy.
2.
The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in these
categories involving civilian employees of the Navy in the
United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
3. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these
categories involving civilian employees of the Navy stationed in
areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have
ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands.
4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving
civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the
other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Navy Commander
has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces stationed therein,
including possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands, and in the State of Alaska except as described
in Section 5, below.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 204
-
3 -
5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving
civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the other
subscribing organizations and with the exception of civilian employees
of the Executive Branch of the Government on Kodiak and Afognak
Islands adjacent to the Alaska Peninsula and Adak Island in the
Aleutian Chain.*
:
6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any
important developments.
... 7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity
and location of the plants engaged in Navy contracts.
.V.
The Office of Special Investigations, Inspector General,
U. S. Air Force will be responsible for:
1. The investigation and disposal of all cases in these cate-
gories involving active and retired military personnel of the
Air Force.
2. The disposal, but not investigation, of all cases in
these categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force
in the United States, Fuerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
30 The investigation and disposal of all cases in these
categories involving civilian employees of the Air Force stationed
in areas other than the United States, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands, except that part of such investigations as have
ramifications in the United States, Puerto Rico, or the
Virgin Islands.
4. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving
civilians and foreign nationals who are not employees of the
other subscribing organizations, in areas where the Air Force
Commander has supreme jurisdiction over the armed forces.
stationed therein, including possessions of the United States
other than Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The investigation
of the same cases described above in that portion of Alaska
described in Section 5, below, with the exception of civilian
employees of the Executive Branch of the Government.
5. The investigation of all cases in these categories involving
civilians, except as described hereinabove, (1) in that part of the
Alaska Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay
-
4
-
*This paragraph added. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of
September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 205
northwest to the town of Old Iliamna and thence following the
south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak 
River to the Kvichak
Bay; (2) in the islands adjacent to the Alaska 
Peninsula 
excluding
Kodiak and Afognak Islands which are 
the responsibility of the
Office of Naval Intelligence; (3) in 
the Aleutian Islands 
excluding
Adak Island which is the responsibility 
of the Office of Naval
Intelligence; and (4) in the Pribilof 
Islands.*
6. Informing the other subscribing organizations of any
important developments.
"
7. Advising the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the identity
and location of the plants engaged in Air Force 
contracts.
VI.
1. Where Sections III, IV, and V involve general territorial
coverage, responsibility for such coverage will 
pass from one
element of the armed forces to another 
automatically when a
This provision is
change of command responsibility ensues.
subject to modification by direct agreement between the interested
elements of the armed forces.
2. While investigative jurisdiction over the civilian
populace in former enemy territories occupied 
by the armed 
forces
those
has been provided for in Sections III, IV, 
and V above,
provisions are subject to direct adjustment 
with the 
Department
of State if and when that Department assumes governmental
direction in such areas of occupation.
VII. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of
changing conditions to modify or amend this 
Delimitations
Agreement. Subject to the exceptions already 
provided 
for
above, general amendments or modifications 
involving all 
of the
four subscribing organizations shall 
be issued in the form of a
revised Delimitations Agreement and not as separate 
instructions
.
VIII. During periods of martial law, or periods of predominant
armed forces interest not involving martial law, 
when agreed 
upon
by the subscribing agencies, the provisions of Appendix A 
or B,
hereto attached, will additionally apply.
IX. All agreements of a continuing nature and applicable to two
or more of the subscribing agencies to the 
Delimitations
Agreement which affect the basic jurisdiction thereof which are
- 5 -
*Original paragraph changed. See IIC Working Committee Minutes of
September 15, 1954, and June 8, 1955.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 206
***
now or hereafter mutually entered into by any of the subscribers
thereto will be reduced to writing; will thereafter become
supplements to the Delimitations Agreement, and distributed
only to the extent agreed upon by the co-signers.
APPROVED
(Signed)
(Signed)
S. Leroy Irwin
Director of Intelligence,
Department of the Army
Thomas B. Inglis
Chief of Naval Intelligence
(Signed)
J. Edgar Hoover
(Signed)
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 207
Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation
Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Office of Special Investi-
gations, Inspector General, U. S. Air
Force
- 6 -
APPENDIX A
PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW
10
I. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has
· been declared by the President, the armed forces commander will ·
His
. assume responsibilities for coverage in these categories.
authority to direct and control the subscribing agencies of the
armed forces will be limited only by such instructions as he
may receive from the Secretary of Defense. He will have authority
to coordinate the intelligence activities of the subscribing
agencies in his area of responsibility, within the limits of
their available personnel and facilities, by the assignment of
missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of
such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not
authorized to control the administration or discipline of the
subscribing agencies in the area of his responsibility, nor to
issue instructions to them beyond those necessary for the purposes
stated above.
II. Personnel of the subscribing agencies in the area of responsi-
bility of the armed forces commander will still send reports to
and be under the continued supervision of their respective head-
quarters. They will render such aid and assistance to the armed
forces commander and his designated representatives as are
possible and practicable. They will furnish all pertinent informa-
tion, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or
desirable to the armed forces commander by the most expeditious
means and methods possible consistent with requisite security.
Each headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be
advised by its agencies of all information and data appropriately
identified as having been furnished to the armed forces commander.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 208
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1118/01 BY SP-2 ALM/196
APPENDIX B
PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY
INTERESTS, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW
எ
I. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as
potential theaters of operation. When an armed forces commander
of such a potential theater is designated, he definitely has
interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the
area. In order that the armed forces commander may prepare him-
self for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may
affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:
•
1. Agents of the FBI; of ONI; ID, Army%3B and the OSI, IG,
U.S. Air Force will continue to function in accordance with the
provisions of Sections II, III, IV, and V.
20
In addition thereto, the armed forces commander may take
steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the
_ manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law
is declared. Adequate liaison with the other subscribing agencies
will insure that the armed forces commander will have the benefit
of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives
of the other agencies.
3. The armed forces commander is authorized to request and
receive such information from the other three agencies as he may
desire and they may be able to furnish.
When
II. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the
coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any
additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake.
the commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it
is recognized that he is authorized to augment the coverage with
such elements of the subscribing agencies as are under his
jurisdiction. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally
coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agencies,
the armed forces commander should obtain the necessary authority
from the Secretary of Defense.
-
III. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations
have placed the initiative in the hands of the armed forces
commander, whenever any of the other services feel that such
a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken,
it should be so recommended.
-
ii
-
#moR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BYSPALM/176
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 209
Supplemental Agreement No. I
to the Delimitations. Agreement
-
Cooperation and Coordination Between
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Intelligence Division of the Army
The Office of Naval Intelligence and
:
The Office of Special Investigations
Inspector General, U.S. Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Army, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Naval
Intelligence and the Director. of the Office of Special Investi-
gations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, with a view to
promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination
between the Field Services of these agencies agree that the
following recommendations will be transmitted to their field
installations:
(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Divisional Offices, Military Intelligence Officers
of the pertinent Armies, District Officers of the Office of
Special Investigations, Inspector General, U.S. Air Force, and
Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal
liaison between those offices and their representatives, including
a meeting of representatives of the four agencies, preferably the
officers in charge, at least twice per month, for the purpose of
discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and
any other subject necessary to insure that there is proper co-
ordination of their investigative work.
(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained
between representatives of the four agencies at all times should
insure that there is not duplication of effort in any field, and
that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is main-
tained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any
duplication in connection with the use of informers.
(c) A distinction should be recognized between the
investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage
interest. It is believed that all four agencies should study,
from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in
order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of
information are adequately covered by at least one of the partici-
pating agencies.
(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the
other agencies is interested in information collected, it should
be transmitted to the other agency.
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED.
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
1/18/01 BX SR2 ALM/196.
BY
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 210

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain
classes of information are of general interest to the Military,
Naval, and Air Force Intelligence Services in connection with
background and knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations,
even though the Military, Naval, and Air Force Intelligence
Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.
(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature
occur, the directors of the four intelligence agencies feel that
with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily
adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional
organizations.
(Äpproved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)
NW 88296 Docid:32989628, Page 211
E PAS {"
2
,
Supplemental Agreement No. III
to the Delimitations Agreement
(As Amended June 8, 1950)
Investigative Jurisdiction on
Vessels of Military Sea Transportation Service
10
1. The investigative jurisdiction of all activities
under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion
and sabotage on vessels of the Military Sea Transportation Service
is as follows:
.
a. Investigative jurisdiction on vessels purchased
by the Navy will be the responsibility of the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
D.
Vessels obtained by the Navy through a "bare boat
charter" will be under the investigative jurisdiction of the Office
of Naval Intelligence.
C.
Vessels allocated to the Military Sea Transportation
Service which are manned and supervised by their private owners
are under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI.
3. When civilian personnel who are subjects of an
investigation under a or b above reach a U.S. port or a port
where the FBI has a field agency, or prior to reaching such port,
if practicable, the Department of the Navy will promptly furnish
the FBI all pertinent information concerning the investigation.
If personnel who are subjects of an investigation as above remove
themselves from the vessel upon arrival of the vessel in port and
further surveillance is considered necessary, the Navy will
continue surveillance until notified by the FBI at local level
that the FBI will make every effort to transfer responsibility
upon arrival of the vessel at the port.
3. When the FBI opens an investigation under c above
or when an FBI investigation in progress develops or is believed
about to develop ramifications under a, b or c above, the FBI
will promptly furnish all pertinent information to the Navy and
will thereafter coordinate its actions with the Navy whenever and
wherever deemed necessary to insure proper pursuit of the case.
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1/18/01 BY SP-2ALM/316
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 212
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 
1-18-01 
BY SP-2 
ALM
Supplemental Agreement No. IV.
to the Delimitations Agreement
Investigation of Private Contractors
of the Armed Forces
It is agreed by the subscribers of the Delimitations
Agreement (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) that with
reference investigations of civilian employees, applicants for
employment, directors and key personnel of privately owned plants
and facilities, working or bidding en contracts important to the
Army, Navy or Air Force (hereinafter referred to as the Armed
Forces) procurement, the following will be followed insofar as
practicable. Exceptions thereto will be adjusted by mutual
agreement between the subscribers concerned.
a. The Armed Forces will conduct background
investigations of such persons unless there is a particular_reason
for requesting that an investigation be conducted by the FBI or
the FBI has a special interest in a particular case and has
notified the Armed Forces of such interest.
b. The FBI will conduct complaint investigations
of such personnel upon specific request in each case by one or
more of the Armed Forces. If one of the Armed Forces has no
further need for an investigation requested, but not completed,
prompt notification will be made to the FBI.
C. Investigations conducted by the Armed Forces
under a above will be terminated and all information passed to
the FBI when credible derogatory information of a loyalty nature
is uncovered. Upon receipt of such a case, the FBI will proceed
as under b above if one of the Armed Forces so requests.
d. When one of the subscribers is aware that
another is conducting an investigation on a person or firm
identical or closely connected with a person or firm it
contemplates investigating, no investigation will be under-
taken without the consent of the subscriber which has an investi-
gation in progress. The investigating agency will make available
to the other interested agency copies of the reports of the
investigation made.
Normally, identity of confidential informants
will not be communicated from one subscriber to another; however,
when such communication occurs, the receiving subscriber will
employ the highest possible safeguards to insure that such informants
are not compromised. No transmittal of information concerning
confidential informants to a third subscriber or to another agency
is authorized except by specific consent of the originator.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 213
_
f. A subscriber who receives a report of investi-
gation from another subscriber may freely transmit copies of such
reports to a third subscriber except as provided in e above.
-
g. A report of complete investigation received
by the Armed Forces from the FBI will not be reopened without the
approval of the FBI except to obtain additional background informa-
tion. In such case, the FBI will be furnished copies of all
information obtained. Other information required by the Armed
Forces will be requested of the FBI:
i
h. If one of the Armed Forces requests the FBI
to conduct an investigation or to conduct additional investigation
as provided under a above, and if for any reason the FBI declines
or is unable to conduct such investigation or additional investi-
gation, the Armed Force concerned may proceed with the investi-
gation. The FBI will be furnished copies of the results thereof
if the FBI so requests or if the Armed Force concerned considers
the results to be of FBI interest.
1. Nothing above is to be construed as altering
the basic Delimitations Agreement of 1949 or current agreements
concerning subversive organizations.
(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)
NW-88296-Docld:32989628 Page 214
-
2
Supplemental Agreement No. W.
to the Delimitations Agreement
Investigation of Reserve and Civilian
Components of the Armed Services
It is agreed by the subscribers to the Delimitations
Agreement that the Army, the Navy and the Air Force may conduct
background investigations on members of the imactive reserve
and National Guard who are anticipated being called back to
active duty, or where an investigation is undertaken for the
purpose of determining whether the individual should be disenrolled
from his military status, or to determine whether the individual
may be granted access to classified military information. The
following procedures shall be pursued in each of the above
circumstances:
(1) The Intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy or
Air Force before undertaking such background
investigation will consult the FBI to
determine: (a) if the FBI has an investigation
in progress; if so, no investigation will
be undertaken by the intelligence agencies.
except as may be mutually agreeable to the
Armed Force concerned and the FBI; (b) if
the FBI already has made an investigation;
if so, the results will be made available to
the other agencies; (c) if the FBI has
information on the individual, even though
it may not have conducted an investigation.
(2) If, after consulting the FBI, investigation is
undertaken by the other agencies, it will be
pursued no further than is mecessary to make
the determination required by the other agencies,
and all information developed pertinent to the
four categories will be furnished promptly to
the FBI.
#толь
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HASEIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED.
(Approved by I.I.C. June 2, 1949)
DANES 1-18-01 BY SP-2 ALM/198
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 215
Supplemental Agreement No. VI
to the Delimitations Agreement
Investigation in Areas Not Specifically Assigned
It is agreed by the military subscribers to the
Delimitations Agreement that the references therein in
paragraphs III. 4., IV. 4., and V. 4. to "areas where the
Army (Navy, Air Force) Commander has supreme jurisdiction
over the armed forces stationed therein" shall be interpreted
as referring to areas where the Department of the Army
(Navy, Air Force) is responsible for the administrative and
logistic support of the Headquarters of Commands established
by the Secretary of Defense.
(Approved by I.I.C. November 4, 1959)
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 216
#mdelb
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALME
in Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
U
AI DUASAG OF IKVBST
PON
WASHINGTON, D. C.
20535
February 7, 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1) CIA will not initiate an investigation of any
foreign official in the United States without the concurrence
and coordination of the FBI. In this context, the term
"investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or
procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances.
or neighborhood inquiries) aiming at developing information
concerning an individual's activities or background;
"investigation". does not include the acceptance or the
development of information through social contacts or contacts
normally made by CIA agents in discharging their cover
functions. (5)
(2) CIA will seek concurrence and 'coordination of
the FBI before approaching for recruitment any foreign
official or communist-bloc visitor in the United States.
The FBI will concur and coordinate if the proposed action
does not conflict with any operation, current or planned,
including active investigation of the FBI.
.(S).
(3)
CIA will advise the FBI prior to any planned
meeting between a CIA asset and a foreign official or
communist-bloc visitor of known or presumed interest to
the FBI (this would include all communist-bloc officials
and visitors) for purposes of assessment and social
development. (5).
(4) Clandestine CIA staff operatives, domestic
American agents of CIA, and foreign agents of CIA recruited
abroad who come to the United States will be identified to
the FBI by name or appropriate description depending on
the national security interest involved. (S)
:
(5) Pursuant to paragraph 4 above, when a CIA agent
arrives in the United States for a visit or for an (5)
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/76
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X/
10-61-19180w
-NW-88296 Docld:32989628 Page 217
SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency
Operations in the United States
assignment, the Bureau will be advised and the two agencies
will confer regarding the handling of the agent in the
United States. It is recognized that each case will have
its individual peculiarities. The governing principle will
be positive, intelligence interest as weighed against
internal security factors. CIA will continue its
contractual relationship for the purpose of handling
the training, the procurement of positive foreign
intelligence, the fulfillment of CIA commitments to
the agent, and the preparation of the agent for his
-next assignment abroad. (S)
"
(6) In those cases where CIA will be handling its.
agent in the United States, CIA will service FBI security
- or counterintelligence requirements and will provide the
FBI all agent information bearing on counterintelligence
or internal security matters, including the scope and
nature of the agent's access to information and the
identities of the agent's significant contacts, particularly
in the communist-bloc field. In such cases where CIA
servicing has been inadequate to FBI internal, security
interests, the FBI will have direct access to the agent,
(s)
NW 88296-Doold:32989628 Page 218
2
SECRET
1'1
INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES
TITLE XI, ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970
REGULATION OF EXPLOSIVES
.
v
1. General
Title XI of the captioned law amends Title 18, United
States Code, by adding a new chapter 40 with section numbers 841
through 848 governing the importation, manufacture, distribution
and storage of explosive materials and creating certain Federal
offenses pertaining to the unlawful use of explosives. Administration
of explosives regulation is vested in the Secretary of the Treasury
as is investigative jurisdiction over the unlawful acts proscribed
in section 842. Under authority contained in section 846 the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) have concurrent investigative jurisdic-
tion as to the remainder of chapter 40, i.e., the unlawful acts
proscribed in subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of section
844. Although not specified in chapter 40, the Postal Inspection
Service shall have jurisdiction to investigate all incidents
involving explosive or incendiary devices sent through the mails
or directed against U.S. Postal Service property.
Title XI greatly broadens Federal authority pertaining to
explosives-connected offenses. At the same time, Congress has
expressly disclaimed any intent to occupy the field to the exclusion
of state law on the same subject matter. To effect both Congressional
purposes and to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort it is
essential that the limited Federal investigative resources be carefully
allocated, particularly in cases in which both the ATF and the FBI
have jurisdiction.
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Jurisdiction in General
(a) Effect on prior jurisdiction - This agreement applies
only to those incidents as to which the FBI had no investigative
jurisdiction prior to the enactment of the captioned law and to
incidents previously subject to FBI investigation by reason of chapter
65, Title 18, United States Code (malicious mischief). Investigative
procedures in other types of incidents (e.g., train wrecking, damaging
aircraft and motor vehicles, racketeering) shall remain unchanged.
#торть
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-18-01 BYS.P-2 ALM
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 219
/196
- 2 -
(b) Primary jurisdiction - Subject to the provisions
hereof, the FBI will exercise primary jurisdiction over all alleged
violations of section 844 which are directed at foreign diplomatic
facilities or at activities, such as transportation and tourist
offices, operating under the aegis of a foreign government although
not in a diplomatic status, over all alleged violations of subsections
844(d) through (i) which are perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary
groups or individuals and all other violations of subsections 844(e)
through (g) which are not directed at Treasury Department or Postal
Service buildings or functions.
(c) Type of Investigation to be Conducted
30
(1) Offenses perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary
groups or individuals The FBI will immediately initiate a full
investigation of all alleged violations of section 844 which appear
at the outset to have been perpetrated by terrorist/revolutionary
groups or individuals as defined in advance by the Internal Security
Division of the Department of Justice. If ATF or the Postal
Inspection Service has properly initiated investigations and infor-
mation is subsequently developed indicating apparent involvement of
terrorist/revolutionary groups or individuals, responsibility shall
be relinquished to the FBI unless a determination is made by the
Department of Justice that a transfer of responsibilities will
unduly impair further investigative efforts.
(2) Alleged offenses against Colleges and Universities
The FBI will immediately initiate a full investigation of any alleged
violation of section 844 which involves the use or attempted use of
explosive (as distinguished from incendiary) materials against the
facilities of a college or university. Investigation of alleged viola-
tions involving use or attempted use of incendiary materials will be
limited initially to the development of background information as
prescribed in paragraph 6 below.
-
(3) Alleged offenses directed against foreign
diplomatic facilities and related activities The FBI will immediately
initiate a full investigation of all alleged violations of section 844
which are directed at foreign diplomatic facilities and related
activities as described in paragraph 2(b) above.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 220

3
844(f)
--
-
(4) All other alleged violations of subsection
offenses involving use of explosives against United
States property or federally financed organizations, and (g) -
offenses involving possession of explosives in buildings owned,
leased, used, etc., by the United States The FBI will immediately
initiate a full investigation of all violations of subsection 844(g)
over which it has primary jurisdiction hereunder, and those violations
of 844(f) which are directed at federal property (e.g., å military
facility) or a federal function (e.g., a Selective Service or ROTC
facility). In other violations of 844(f) the FBI will develop and
disseminate background information as indicated in paragraph 6 below.
3.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division (ATF) Jurisdic-
tion in General
(a) Violations ancillary to firearms laws violations or
violation of section 842 - The Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division
(ATF) of the Department of the Treasury will exercise investigative
jurisdiction over violations of section 844 which are ancillary to its
primary jurisdiction over the Federal firearms laws or over section
842 of Title XI.
-
-
(b) Violations of subsection 844(d) interstate transporta-
tion of explosives with unlawful intent and subsection 844(1) -
offenses against property used in or affecting commerce Subject to
paragraph 2b, above, the ATF will exercise primary investigative
jurisdiction over violations of subsection 844(d) and (i) and will
conduct a full investigation thereof unless notified by the Criminal
Division that pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(1), above, the Department of
Justice has requested FBI investigation in a particular matter.
(c) Violations directed at Treasury Department property or
functions The ATF shall have primary jurisdiction to investigate all
violations of section 844 which are directed at Treasury Department
property or functions and will conduct a full investigation of such
violations.
NW-88296 Docld:32989628 Page 221
.4.
4. Postal Inspection Service Jurisdiction
The Postal Inspection Service shall have primary juris-
diction to investigate all violations of section 844 which are
directed at U.S. Postal Service property or functions.
5. Special Considerations
(a) Bomb Threats, false information (section 844(e))
The ATF and the Postal Inspection Service shall have jurisdiction
over violations of section 844(e) against Treasury Department or
Postal Service property or functions, respectively. The FBI shall
have jurisdiction over all other violations of section 844(e). Upon
receipt of information alleging or suggesting a violation of subsection
844(e), the investigative agency concerned will review available
information to determine whether the identity of the offender is
known or can be readily ascertained and, if not, whether the evidence
suggests a pattern or pian of such offenses by à particular offender
or against a particular victim. If such a pattern appears or if the
offender is identified, all available information will be disseminated
as indicated in paragraph 6 below.
(b) Use/carrying explosive in commission of a felony
(section 844(h)) - Violations of 844(h) should be handled as an
adjunct of the felony from which they arise and should be discussed
with the appropriate United States Attorney or Division of the
Department handling prosecution of the underlying felony offense.
The agency having jurisdiction over the underlying felony will have
investigative jurisdiction over the 844(h) violation (e.g., bank
robbery is under FBI jurisdiction).
(c) Violations of 26 U.S.C. 5861 (destructive devices) -
In incidents involving alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. 844 (which
may also involve a violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861), ATF shall not
exercise its primary jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 5861 involving
destructive devices, but the incident shall be treated in accordance.
with the provisions of these guidelines. This is in no way a
relinquishment by ATF of its investigative jurisdiction under Title
II of the Gun Control Act of 1968.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 222
5.
-
6. Development of Background Information
Some incidents such as those directed against Federal
property or functions (paragraph 2(b) above) require immediate full
federal investigation. Others require a more circumspect approach
and will result in full Federal investigation only after considera-
tion of factors pertinent to the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.
Accordingly, in those incidents which these guidelines do not prescribe
immediate full investigation, the investigative agency having juris-
diction will develop background information which includes (a) facts
bearing on motivation such as involvement of the suspected perpetrators
in terrorist/revolutionary activities, organized crime, labor-management
disputes, or racial-religious hate activities; (b) the applicability
of state and local laws and likelihood of state or local investigative
and prosecutive actions%; and (c) any other available facts indicating
whether or not the offense warrants Federal investigation and prosecu-
tion. Such background information will be submitted telephonically
(202-739-2745) or by teletype (710-822-0008) to the General Crimes
Section of the Criminal Division and to the appropriate United States
Attorney. The Criminal Division will advise the investigative agency
concerned whether the matter warrants submission to any other
Division or Section of the Criminal Division, and when so warranted
the Criminal Division will transmit the information to such other
Division or Section.
7. Full Investigation
A full investigation will be initiated immediately in
those instances wherein such investigation is specified herein. In
other instances full investigation will be initiated only upon direc-
tion of the Department of Justice after consideration by the Division
having cognizance over the matter of the background information
developed under paragraph 6 above.
8. Reports
Copies of case reports prepared in matters investigated under
these guidelines will be furnished directly to the Department of Justice
and the appropriate United States Attorney. All investigative agencies
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 223
- 6 -
shall submit initial reports as soon as practicable to the Department
of Justice and shall submit progress reports once each 30 days or
as soon thereafter as possible. The Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice will be informed as soon as possible in each
instance wherein an investigative agency initiates an investigation
under section 844. Such notification is of critical importance to
the avoidance of duplication of investigative activities. Also each
agency subscribing to these guidelines shall, upon instituting inves-
tigation regarding possible violations of section 844, immediately
notify other subscribing agencies having a logical interest therein.
Also, a sufficient level of follow-up liaison and dissemination shall
be maintained to avoid duplication of investigative effort.
Additionally, each such agency will exchange information
on a timely basis and in a manner which will not interfere with
ongoing investigations relative to types, sources, movement, and
storage of explosives which are the subject of its investigations.
Information regarding significant developments in investigations
being conducted under these guidelines and information of an intelli-
cence nature developed incidental to investigations which is of logical
interest to the Department of Justice shall be furnished promptly to
the Criminal Division of that Department which will be responsible
for any necessary further dissemination within that Department.
9. Review of Guidelines
These guidelines shall be reviewed on a continuing basis by
the parties hereto to determine whether problems exist in their admin-
istration which should be alleviated or whether modification of any of
the terms of the agreement are needed in the interests of better law
enforcement.
10. Summary
Section
842
Type Violation
Primary Jurisdiction
Regulatory provision viola-
tions
ATF
844(d)
Interstate transportation
ATF
(except by mail) of explosives
with unlawful intent
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 224
Section
-7-
Type Violation
844(e)
Bomb threats
-
false infor-
844(f)
844(g)
844 (h)
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 225
Primary Jurisdiction
ATF
mation Treasury buildings
-
or functions
U.S. Postal Service buildings
or functions
Other
Offenses against property of
the United States or federally
financed organizations --
Treasury buildings or functions
U.S. Postal Service buildings
Other (including colleges and
universities)
Possession of explosives in
buildings owned, leased, used
by the United States
but wit
Treasury buildings or functions
U.S. Postal Service buildings
or functions
Other
U.S. Postal
Inspection Service
FBI
ATE
U.S. Postal
Inspection Service
FBI
ATF
U.S. Postal
Inspection Service
FBI
Use/carrying explosives in
commission of a felony
Agency having juris-
diction over underlying
felony
ร
1
8
Section
844(1)
All Sections
Type Violation
Offenses against property
used in or affecting commerce
All offenses perpetrated by
terrorist/revolutionary groups
or individuals
Primary Jurisdiction
ATF
FBI - Unless another
agency has started
investigation before
receipt of information
indicating terrorist/
revolutionary involvement.
In this event see para-
graph 2c(1) above.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 226
=
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES
· SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
"AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE UNITED STATES
SECRET SERVICE CONCERNING PROTECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
["I. Purpose of Agreement
"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) originates, and receives from
other sources large numbers of reports on individuals and organizations.
One purpose of this agreement is to define that portion of the information
on file with, or received or originated by, the FBI, which the United States
Secret Service (USSS) desires to receive in connection with its protective
responsibilities.
The
"The USSS has statutory authority to protect, or to engage in certain
activities to protect, the President and certain other persons. (Certain
other persons, as used in this agreement, refers to those persons protected
by the Secret Service under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056.)
authority of the USSS to protect the President or certain other persons is
construed to authorize it to investigate organizations or individuals and to
interview individuals who might constitute a threat to the President or cer-
tain other persons. The FBI has statutory authority to investigate assault,
killing or kidnaping and attempts or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the
President and other designated individuals.
"The FBI will make available to the USSS information it may request on infor-
mation which by its nature reveals a definite or possible threat to the
safety of the President and certain other persons.
"A second purpose of this agreement is to insure the most effective pro-
tection for the President and certain other persons by establishing a clear
• division of responsibility between the FBI and the USSS. Such division
will also avoid compromising investigations or sources and needless duplica-
tion of effort.
"II:
General Responsibilities
"The USSS is charged by Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056, with the
responsibility of protecting the person of the President of the United
1 States, the members of his immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice
President or other officer in the order of succession to the office of
President, and the Vice President-elect%; protecting the person of a former
President and his wife during his lifetime and the person of a widow of a
: former President until her death or remarriage, and minor children of a former
President until they reach 16 years of age, unless such protection is declined;
protecting persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary
of the Treasury, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, as being
major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who should receive such
protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection); protecting
the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government
and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors
to the United States and official representatives of the United States
› performing special missions abroad (unless such persons decline protection).
#mor/6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
JATEL-18-01 BXSP-2 ALM-1816
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 227
"The Executive Protective Service, under the control of the Director,
USSS, is charged by Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202, with protection of
the Executive Mansion and grounds in the District of Columbia; any building
in which Presidential offices are located; foreign diplomatic missions
located in the metropolitan area of the District of Columbia; and foreign
diplomatic missions located in such other areas in the United States, its
territories and possessions, as the President, on a case-by-case basis,
may direct.
"The FBI is charged under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, with investiga-
tive jurisdiction over the assault, killing or kidnaping, and attempts or
conspiracies to assault, kill or kidnap the President of the United States
and other designated individuals.
"The FBI has responsibility for Federal investigations of all violations
of Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117 and 1201, relating
to the 'Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests
in the United States.'
"The FBI has investigative jurisdiction over violations of a wide range of
the criminal statutes of the United States including primary jurisdiction
over matters affecting the internal security of the United States.
"III. Exchange of Information and Coordination of Responsibilities
"The USSS undertakes to identify individuals or groups who because of their
propensities or characteristics, may be dangerous to the President of the
United States and certain other persons. To assist the USSS in identifying
such individuals and groups the FBI agrees to furnish to the USSS, information
(other than public source information or information originating with other
U. S. agencies) from its files or which may come to its attention which by
its nature reveals a danger or possible danger to the President or certain
other persons, or which can be construed as falling within the categories of
information desired by the USSS as set forth in Section IV of this agreement.
"The FBI will inform the USSS of the identity of individuals or organizations
who come to the attention of the FBI as knowingly and willfully advocating,
abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, or propriety of over-
throwing or destroying the Government of the United States, or the Govern-
ment of any state, territory, or possession, or political subdivision
therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of
any such government. The FBI will furnish the USSS with reports on such
individuals or organizations as requested. During investigation by the FBI
of such individuals or organizations, the FBI will be alert and promptly
notify the USSS of any information indicating a possible plot against the
person of the President and certain other persons.
"The USSS agrees that it will conduct no investigation of individuals or
groups identified or suspected of being threats to the internal security of
the United States without notifying the FBI. However, when time for
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 228
I
consultation is not available, and an indication of immediate danger
exists, the USSS may take such action as is necessary with respect to carry-
ing out its protective responsibilities. Any information obtained by the
USSS during such action will be furnished to the FBI as expeditiously as
possible.
"The FBI will not conduct investigation of individuals or groups solely
for the purpose of establishing whether they constitute a threat to the
safety of the President and certain other persons unless there is an indica-
tion of a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751, or other
statute over which the FBI has jurisdiction.
"It will be the responsibility of the FBI to advise the USSS when investiga-
tion is being initiated under Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1751 and there-
after to furnish the USSS with copies of the FBI investigative reports as
they are prepared. It will be the responsibility of the USSS to furnish
the FBI any information in its possession or which may come to its attention
which reasonably indicates that a violation of Title 18, U. S. Code,
Section 1751, has been or is being committed.
"The USSS also agrees to furnish the FBI any information in its possession
or which may come to its attention indicating a violation of any other
statutes over which the FBI has investigative jurisdiction.
"The FBI, under its responsibility for investigation of violations of
Title 18, U. S. Code, Sections 112, 970, 1116-1117, 1201 and 1751 will take
cognizance of the protective responsibilities of the Treasury Department
under Title 3, U. S. Code, Section 202 and Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056 Ka
and thus does not limit of interfere with the authority of the Secretary of
the Treasury in the discharge of his statutory protective responsibilities.
This is not to be construed as vesting concurrent investigative jurisdiction
with the Treasury Department with respect to investigations of individuals
or organizations engaged in activities affecting the national security includ-
ing terrorism, treason, sabotage, espionage, counter-espionage, rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, seditious conspiracy, neutrality matters, Foreign
Agents Registration Act, or any other Statute or Executive Order relating to
national security. Any investigations of such groups or individuals for
any reasons other than in connection with protective responsibilities
must be closely coordinated with and have the concurrence of the FBI in
order to minimize interference with national security responsibilities of
the FBI.
"IV.
Information to be Furnished to the United States Secret Service by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation
"A. When an individual or group is referred by the FBI to the USSS,
the following information will be furnished to the extent
available:
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 229
:
"Individual Identification data including
Ame or names,
addresses, photograph (or statement as to availability of
such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment,
and marital status.
"Organization Name or names, address or addresses, officers,
size, purpose or goals of organization, source of financial support,
background data and such other relevant information as may be
available.
"Reason for Referral
-
Statement of the class or classes of
information described in Section IV B under which the individual
or organization belongs.
"Information in FBI Files
-
A summary, as appropriate, of per-
tinent portions of any FBI file on an individual or organization
referred.
-
"FBI Identification Records The USSS will make specific requests
in each instance where a check of the FBI identification records
is desired.
"B. Types of information to be referred:
"1.
"12.
"130
"140
115.
116.
Information concerning attempts, threats, or conspiracies
to injure, kill, or kidnap persons protected by the USSS
or other U. S. or foreign officials in the U. S. or abroad.
Information concerning attempts or threats to redress a
grievance against any public official by other than legal
means, or attempts personally to contact such officials for
that purpose..
Information concerning threatening, irrational, or abusive
written or oral statements about U. S. Government or foreign
officials.
Information concerning civil disturbances, anti-U. S.
demonstrations or incidents or demonstrations against foreign
diplomatic establishments.
Information concerning illegal bombings or bomb-making;
concealment of caches of firearms, explosives, or other
implements of war; or other terrorist activity.
Information concerning persons who defect or indicate a
desire to defect from the United States and who demonstrate
one or more of the following characteristics:
a.
Irrational or suicidal behavior or other emotional
instability.
b. Strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment.
C.
A propensity toward violence.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 230

"V.
117
1
_
Information concerning persons who may be considered poten-
tially dangerous to individuals protected by the USSS
because of their background or activities, including evidence
of emotional instability or participation in groups engaging
in activities inimical to the United States.
Provision of Federal Bureau of Investigation Personnel to Protect
the President and Other Protected Persons
"The USSS may, in accordance with Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 3056
request FBI Agents be detailed to the USSS in order to augment the capacity
of the USSS to perform its protective duties. Such requests should be
addressed to the Director of the FBI.
"FBI Agents detailed to the USSS are under the direction and exclusive
operational control of the Director of the USSS for the period of their
assignment. The FBI Agents so detailed may perform an armed or other
protective function.
"VI. Implementation of Agreement
"In order to errect the best possible security of the President and certain
other persons and places whose protection is the responsibility of the USSS,
the FBI and the USSS will construe the terms of this agreement liberally
and will take such steps as are necessary to insure the proper exchange and
coordination of information.
to
"The agreement shall be reviewed annually by representatives of the FBI
and the USSS, or at such other times as the FBI or the USSS may request,
insure that the agreement is both practical and productive.
Revisions may
be made on the authority of the Director of the FBI and the Director
of the USSS.
"This agreement supersedes all prior agreements between the FBI and the
USSS.
July 16, 1973
Date
July 30, 1973
Date
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 231
"
BY /s/ Clarence M. Kelley
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
BY /s/ James J. Rowley
Director
United States Secret Service"
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2 ALTW/196
REC-106
1.2-116-393-604
Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mrs. Davis:
April 9, 1975
BY LIAISON
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Flemister
1-Mr. Rachner
In connection with a request of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities, it is requested that
the following documents, which were originated or received
by representatives of the National Security Council, be
cleared for transmittal to the Senate Select Committee:
Memorandum dated November 6, 1950, Iron
J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council
Representative on Internal Security, to
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference, and Ir. Raymond P.
Whearty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security
DELIVERED BY LIAISON Letter dated November 8, 1950, from
ON
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm,
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection 40
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
-
AP
ADR 
1
BCR:hc
(7)
•he
NW 886 DocTROOM
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference, to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne,
National Security Council, which encloses a
report captioned "Report by the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference to the National Security
Council Regarding the Recent Outbreak of Violence
by Puerto Rican Nationalists"
Letter dated July 25, 1961, from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference,
JB:
Pem
TELETYPE UNIT
Page 232
W
RCR
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO.
Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
to Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs,
which encloses a memorandum concerning
United States internal security programs
under the control of the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Committee
Inasmuch as the Senate Select Committee requested
the above documents by close of business April 7, 1975,
your prompt attention to this matter would be appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
NOTE:
Clarence M. Kelley
Director
In view of the urgency of the Senate Select
Committee request, the above documents were hand carried to
the NSC Staff on 4/4/75, by Liaison Agent B. C. Rachner.
This letter constitutes a formal request which as in the past
has been requested by the National Security Council Staff.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 233
03
1
Mr. Wannall (D
#m0R16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/216
April 7, 1975
вода
Sinustudy - 75
The statement in the attached of the Third Agency
rule is accurate and does not present legal problems.
As an observation paragraph number 7 of the
document titled "Handling of Third Agency Matters in Response to
Congressional Select Committee," dated March 28, 1975, (attached)
appears to be subject to various interpretations. This paragraph and
in particular the second sentence of the paragraph appears to allow the
.agency receiving the Committee's request to respond in instances where
a Third Agency is indirectly involved and the material is sensitive with-
out first contacting the Third Agency. Any notification of the Third
Agency in this instance of the furnishing of such information to the
Committee would be after the fact. The term indirectly is not defined.
Additionally, this paragraph allows the Agency receiving the Committee's
request to respond in instances where a Third Agency is directly involved
and the material is nonsensitive without checking with the Third Agency
involved. It would appear the language in paragraph number 7 should
be tightened up and the appropriate terms defined.
3 ENCLOSURE 7
REC- 106 62-116315-6
Legal Counsel Division
6
APR 15 1975
Enclosure
4/9/75
ABOVE WAS Brought
THE ARTH OF JOH'S LARGER,
Generol (GED, LIA, WHO
WOWED THAT ME RREO) WITH
går
дн
BUIL'S OBSERVATION AND WOULD ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM
IN NEW PAPER BEING PREPARED
PVD:dkg (4)
62-116395
SELFS
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 234
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group
SUBJECT:
28 March 1975
#MOR16
"ALL TRI UNIFORMATION CONTAINT
SITI UNCLASSIFED
011-11-18-01 BV SP. 2 ALM 13TG
Handling of Third Agency |Matters in Response
to Congressional Select Committees
1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted
to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. . It is
expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will
be hearing from Senator Church.
2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to
involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.
3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652,
"Classification and Declassification of National Security Information
and Material," the President directed the following:
"D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination
by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S. C.
403, classified information or material originating in one
Department shall not be disseminated outside any other
Department to which it has been made available without the
consent of the originating department."
4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following
quotes 102 (e) in full:
"(3) To the extent recommended by the Național Security
Council and approved by the President, such intelligence
of the departments and agencies of the Government, except
as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 235
ENCLOSURE
62-1163-64
0
shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the
national security and is possessed by such departments and
other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter
provided, shall be made available to the Director of
Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and
dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written
request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available
to the Director of Central Intelligence such information ..
for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be
essential to the national security."
* 5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and
investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document
which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence
Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor
will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.
6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation
being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-
relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence
'community. Clearing each and every such reference with every
agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time
and manpower.
X
7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure.
Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the
material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will
be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before
release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly
(DK is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the
agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select
Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance
with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such
material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and
1,
agency receiving is
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 236
کیا
all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will
designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and
telephone number of the releasing party.
8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and
come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 237
John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC
.:
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
28 March 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Group
SUBJECT:
Handling of Third Agency |Matters in Response
to Congressional Select Committees
1. As you are aware, Senator Church already has submitted
to me a long list of materials which he requests be provided to his
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities. He has submitted other lists to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the White House. It is
expected that other elements of the Intelligence Community will
be hearing from Senator Church.
2. The scope of the investigation necessarily is going to
involve Third Agency relationships to a considerable degree.
3. In the implementation of Executive Order 11652,
"Classification and Declassification of National Security Information
and Material," the President directed the following:
"D.
Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination
by Recipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S. C.
403, classified information or material originating in one
Department shall not be disseminated outside any other
Department to which it has been made available without the
consent of the originating department. "
4. As regards Section 102 of the 1947 Act, the following
quotes 102 (e) in full:
"(3) To the extent recommended by the Național Security
Council and approved by the President, such intelligence
of the departments and agencies of the Government, except
as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security,
#MOR16
ALLTTLE TORTATICA CONTAINED
INA 
IN UNCLASSIFIED
DADBLL-
18-01 BT SPJALM
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 238
ENCLOSURE
62-116395=648
shall be open to the inspection of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the
national security and is possessed by such departments and
other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter
provided, shall be made available to the Director of
Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation and
dissemination: Provided, however, that upon the written
request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall make available
to the Director of Central Intelligence such information ..
for correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be
essential to the national security."
* 5. If I am requested to provide certain materials and
investigation indicates that the material asked for involves a document
which originated within an organization other than the Intelligence ·
Community Staff or the Central Intelligence Agency, the requestor
will be asked to redirect his inquiry to the office of origin.
6. It already is apparent, however, that the documentation
being requested inevitably is going to include references to inter-
relationships among various of the elements of the intelligence
¨ community. Clearing each and every such reference with every
agency mentioned could manifestly be extremely consuming of time
and manpower.
7. I propose the Ad Hoc Group agree on the following procedure.
Where it appears that truly sensitive matters are involved, the
material will be sanitized by the agency concerned and a check will
be made with the appropriate Third Agency organizations before
release. Where the reference concerns a Third Agency indirectly
(or is not considered sensitive and does not pose policy concerns, the
agency concerned may forward the material to the requesting Select
Committee without an item-by-item, mention-by-mention clearance
with Third Agencies. However, in all cases notification that such
material has been forwarded will be made to the central index and
1. agency receiving,
گاه
<>
کی نا
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 239
じ
all agencies alerted through that mechanism. Agencies will
designate on their submissions to the central index, the name and
telephone number of the releasing party.
8. Ad hoc members should be prepared to discuss and
come to some agreement on this matter at the next meeting.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 240
Janet
John M. Clarke
AD/DCI/IC

The Third Agency Rule
#MORIG
ALL FEI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HBRAIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/10/01 BY SPZ ALM
1. As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was
included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked.
Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense
information originating in another Department or agency" to an
agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the :
consent of the originating Department or agency". The only excep-
tion to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority
of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes --
the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelli-
gence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where
appropriate, existing agencies and facilities".
2. Historically, the responsibility of the DCI to disseminate
intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence". This product is
the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Commu-
nity. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a homogenous
product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the
receiving agency must come from the Central Intelligence Agency.
3. Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order
11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not
specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the .
following controls: Sec.. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The
originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in
conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with
respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information
and material, including those which presently relate to communications
intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.
4. In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order
11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security
Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassi-
fication and Safeguarding of National Security Information". This
directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have
four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what
historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:
A. (2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to à
security clearance, a person must have a need for access
to the particular classified information or material sought
in connection with the performance of his official duties or.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 241
ENCLOSURE
62-116395-64
tractual obligations. The deter nation of that need
shall be made by officials having responsibility for the
classified information or material.
:
D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination
by Recipient, Except as otherwise provided by Section
102 of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50
U.S.C. 403, classified information or material originating
in one Department shall not be disseminated outside any
other Department to which it has been made available
without the consent of the originating Department.
--
E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information.
Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING
NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED" shall not be disseminated in any
manner outside authorized channels without the permission
of the originating Department and an assessment by the
senior intelligence official in the disseminating Department
as to the potential risk to the national security and to the
intelligence sources and methods involved.
F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The
establishment of special rules limiting access to, distri-
bution and protection of classified information and material
under Section 9 of the Order requires the specific prior
approval of the head of a Department or his dosignos,
5. Examples of the application of the Third Agency Rule are:
(a) In a national security estimate, contributions are
received from all members of the Intelligence Community and
then disseminated to members of the community under the
authority of the DCI;
(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the State
Department may not be sent by the State Department to
the Department of Commerce without the permission of the
CIA;
(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President's
Commission may not be disseminated to other agencies or
to the Congress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus,
a request from the Congress to the Commission for CIA
information should be referred to CIA for action so that
the necessary protection of the information can be insured.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 242..
If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations
with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation
in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has
received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinc-
tion here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part
of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would
not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate
intelligence.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 243
но
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
:
Mr. Cleveland
NS
DATE: 4-3-75
FROM
:
SUBJECT:
CSENATE
HMDRUG
DATE 1-18-01 BY SP-2ALM/116
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED -
G. R. Steels
“SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (HSC)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.
Admin
Comp Syst
Ext Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Edl
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
The
COPY FILED IN
By agreement, the FBI is currently conducting full field
investigations regarding SSC staff personnel. These have extremely
short (2 week) deadlines which are identical to those afforded
Presidential appointments and are, therefore, given preferential
treatment in opening, assigning, and following field progress.
Special Inquiry Unit of the Employees Security and Special Inquiry
Section, which has about twice its normal case load, is handling
these requests. Senator Church, Chairman, SSC, originally estimated
that between 35 and 40 staff members would be submitted for investie
gation. As of today, 4-3-75, we have received requests for 65 such
investigations from the SSC and the end does not appear to be in
sight. They are received in bunches as many as 6 at a time, which
is not the even flow expected and presents an additional burden.
In addition it is expected that similar requests will be-
forthcoming in the near future from the HSC since we have a similar
agreement with it. Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the HSC, has
estimated "probably no more than about 25 staff members will be
hired.' It remains to be seen if this estimate also falls short of
actual receipts.
31
UNRE
Since there is no charge for these full field investigations
they will have to be considered in the budget. It is not ed the
current charge for a full field investigation, where applicable, is
$2028.
EX 104
MCT
44
pc RECTA 62-116395--63
ACTION: For information. Since it appears the nucleus of the
Committee has been formed, it is suggested Senator Church be con-
tacted and queried regarding a more realistic (30 day) deadline on
the remaining investigations concerning future staff members and
their replacements.
1 Mr. Adams
1
-
Mr Walsh
GRS: dc
-6-
1075
1973)
APR 17 1975
NW2:39989628 Page 244
1
-
Mr. Mintz
1
-
1
-
-
(Legal Analysis Office).
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Steel
Рема
XEROX
JUN 11 1975
9
UNRE
Discus, be
Discussed 
with wmmies.
4-4-75, be
· 30-Day Deed 
to
CRS futes except
whew which he wille
indicate still 
need in
2 weeks.
62-116395-62X
62×1
CHANGED TO
JUN 12 1975
Hmk/cz
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 245
62-116464-2
3
4-528
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALM/196
PARO 1118-01 BY SP2 ALM
TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN REGNO. 27
5040-706
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
:W.
Cregar
ENSTUDY
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#MORI6
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/276
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
3/3/75
Mr. Adams
DATE:
1
-
1
-
Mr. Mintz
1
Mr. Wannall
1 Mr. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
✓✓ Intell
Laboratory
-
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
This memorandum recommends that the attached
draft of a paper prepared by CIA entitled, "Ambiguities and
the Law, " be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for comment
and that a member of the Division be named to represent the FBI
in future meetings with legal representatives from other U. S.
Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies and departments. The purpose
of such a group is to develop recommendations for changes in
existing laws or the proposal of new legislation which Mr. Colby
as the Director of Central Intelligence can offer to the Senate
Select Committee for their consideration.
At a meeting of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on
Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community 2/27/75, a
draft paper entitled, "Ambiguities and the Law, was distributed
to all members. This paper was drafted by Mr. Marvin Smith of
CIA. It is considered a starting point for the Intelligence
Community to identify areas in existing statutes that should be
changed, as well as to recommend new legislation deemed necessary
to clarify for the Congress and the American people the authori-
ties, the limitations and missions of various member agencies
or departments of the Intelligence Community.
In furnishing copies of this paper to members, the
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Mr. John Clarke, acknowledged the
paper presents a starting point and in no way should be considered
a final draft. He suggested that Legal Counsel representatives
of each agency or department of USIB review the document and
submit their comments directly to Mr. Marvin Smith, on Agency
code 143, extension 4055. Following the receipt of such comments
from the legal offices of member agencies and departments, it
was proposed that a meeting would be called in an effort to
begin drafting a paper representative of the Intelligence Community
which would reflect recommended changes in existing statutes or
proposals for new legislation.
Enclosure
62
REC-10 62-116395-
SEE ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL
DIVISION, PAGE 3
62-116395
WOC: din/ebc
ENCLOSURE
Grad)
(5)
CONTINUED VOVER
(5)
3211975
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 246
1
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
The Department of Justice is represented on the
Ad Hoc Group by Mr. James Wilderotter, Associate Deputy
Attorney General, and there will be Departmental participa-
tion in this matter.
ACTION:
(1) That the attached CIA paper entitled, "Ambiguities
and the Law," be reviewed by the Legal Counsel Division for
comment in concert with representatives of the Intelligence
Division.
(2) That the Legal Counsel Division designate a
representative to participate in the drafting of a paper to
be furnished by Mr. Colby to the Senate Select Committee for
their consideration.
TUL
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 247
2
11
CONTINUED - OVER
Memorandum to Mr. Wannall dtd 3/3/75
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
ADDENDUM, LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, 3/5/75, JH:msl
In view of the direct impact on operations of the Intelligence
Division, we feel that representatives of that Division should participate
in and coordinate these matters. Legal Counsel will review attached
CIA paper and will furnish representative to assist the Intelligence Division
regarding proposals and legislative language.
JOF
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 248
- 3 -
упа
дами
AMBIGUITIES AND THE LAW
DRAFT
CIA, NSA, DIA, FBI and, to some extent, several other
Federal Agencies, collect information and produce intelligence, but
of different kinds and for different purposes. This is recognized in
practice but is not as clearly established in the law. Given some
lack of clarity in the law and some uncertainty regarding limits
placed on intelligence activities, misunderstanding and fear of abuse
of power easily thrive. In reality, however, in the implementation
n
of mission and charters and in direction and control, there are not
as many unresolved ambiguities as the uninformed may suppose.
The experience following the National Security Act of 1947 is
such that it is now possible to eliminate some of the vagueness of
the language of the Act. The certainty and public confidence that
should result from clarifications in the law should far outweigh any
disadvantages. A number of possible amendments or additions to
current laws have already been mentioned, and proposed legislation
has already been submitted for some. These ideas and others are
suggested, below.
#MOR16
ALL FRI INFORMATION CONTAINED
EMENDE CLASSIFIED
1-19-01 BY SEα ALM/776
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 249
ENCLOSURE
62-116375-62
1
!
-2-
1) Clarify CIA's mission and charter by
amending the National Security Act of 1947 to
reflect:
--that included in the proper functions
of the Agency are (a) collection of foreign
intelligence information; (b) conduct of
activities to carry out CIA's counter-
intelligence responsibilities overseas;
and (c) conduct of covert action operations
overseas when authorized by the President;
--that CIA's responsibility to produce
intelligence relates only to foreign
intelligence;
--that it is a duty of the Agency to develop
advanced technical equipment to improve
. the collection and processing of foreign
intelligence information; and
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 250

i
-3-
2)
--that the conduct of any counterintelligence
operation or other activity overseas directed
specifically at U.S. citizens (other than CIA
'employees) will be undertaken in coordination
with the FBI or as requested by the FBI or by
other USG agencies in coordination with the FBI.
3
Establish the authority for those agencies engaged
in the collection and production of foreign intelligence to
carry on certain specified activities within the United
States, such as:
--protection of classified information and
their own installations against penetration
and compromise;
.--investigation of employees, applicants,
and those persons who could assist the U.S.
foreign intelligence effort;
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 251
-4-
--investigation of employees and other
individuals to be granted access to sensitive
information;
--collection of foreign intelligence
information from foreign nationals and.
from cooperating U.S. citizens;
--establishment of mechanisms in support
of foreign intelligence activities; and
--cooperation with the FBI in investigations
relating to the unauthorized disclosure of
foreign intelligence.
3) Remove uncertainty regarding responsibility for
internal security matters by modifying appropriate laws to
establish clearly:
--that the collection of counterintelligence
information in the United States and the
collection of information related to internal
security are functions of the FBI;
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 252
-5-
--that the responsibility for the
production of intelligence related to
ب
internal security rests with the FBI; and
--that with due regard to assessed
reliability of the information and
responsibilities for protecting sources
and methods, those agencies engaged in
foreign intelligence activities will make
available to the FBI and other Federal
agencies, as appropriate, the security
and counterintelligence information relating
to foreign nationals in the United States and
to U.S. citizens which is derived as a by-
product of foreign intelligence activities.
4) Recognize international terrorism and international
illegal drug activities as threats to U.S. national security
and proper targets for U.S. foreign intelligence efforts,
as well as for internal security operations.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 253
-6-
·5) Provide protection against the unauthorized
disclosure of intelligence sources and methods by:
-
--providing for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods on a statutory basis
independent of Executive Order 11652;
--clarifying that the Director of Central
Intelligence is responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods related
to foreign intelligence and foreign
counterintelligence;
--assigning to the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation the duty of protecting
intelligence sources and methods related to
internal security and to counterintelligence
' .
within the United States;
· --imposing specific burdens, upon officers
and employees of all branches of the govern-
ment and others granted official access, not
to disclose such information without authorization,
NW,88296 Docid:32989628 Page 254
-7-
1
and providing criminal sanctions for unauthorized
disclosures;
↓
--establishing effective injunctive recourse,
through the Attorney General, for protection
of all intelligence sources and methods;
--providing for in camera judicial review
of material revealing intelligence sources
and methods when relevant and necessary
to criminal and civil proceedings;
--delineating authorities and responsibilities
for investigating suspected for discovered
unauthorized disclosures by (a) U.S. citizens
overseas and (b) all persons within the
United States.
6) Delineate areas of interagency assistance that
facilitate performance of authorized missions, promote
economy of resources, and as a matter of policy are
desirable, for example:
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 255
-8-
--cooperation in research and development
-
of technical collection and information pro-
cessing equipment, methods and techniques;
--loan or supply of equipment, methods and
techniques;
--provision of training in special skills and
techniques;
--passage of information derived as a by-
product of foreign intelligence activities to
those agencies responsible for the matters
involved.
A few changes in the procedures for reviewing intelligence
activities might add considerable understanding and confidence. Of
paramount importance is a form of congressional oversight that permits
the provision to Congress of the necessary information in a timely,
efficient and controlled manner. It is recognized that a number of
Committees in both the Senate and House must be informed of sub-
stantive intelligence, operational matters and fiscal details in varying
degrees. Just as in the executive branch, the test of access should be
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 256
-9-
"need-to-know." To apply this test and to control and protect
sensitive information provided to Congress, a focal point within,
Congress would be extremely helpful. Whether a joint committee
or not, such a focal point would also be valuable in facilitating
changes in laws affecting intelligence activities. Congress might
!
find that a more uniform approach to budget presentation and review
would provide better insight and understanding.
The foregoing suggestions are by no means definitive. They
do, however, present areas that in the experience of the intelligence
community deserve careful attention.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 257
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO ERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
: Legal Counsel Division
FROM : Mr. W. R. Wannall
wiRw
1 - Legal Counsel Division
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 Mr. W. O. Cregar
-
DATE:
4/7/75
1 Mr. A. L. Lacey, Jr.
-
SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE MATERIAL;
AUTHORIZATION TO RELEASE EXHIBITS IN
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION POSITION PAPER
ON JURISDICTION" DATED 2/13/75
火
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Ing.
Training
count
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that on 4/7/75,
Mr. James Wilderotter, Executive Office Building, Washington, personally
reviewed and approved each of the following exhibits from the captioned paper
for release to the Select Committee:
9/201
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP-2 ALM/
1) Exhibit A - Historical Highlights.
Confidential Memoranda: John Edgar Hoover, 8/24/36;
8/25/36; and, 9/10/36.
2) Exhibit B
-
3) Exhibit C - Presidential Directives: 6/26/39; 9/6/39; 1/8/43;
7/24/50; 12/15/53; and, 10/30/47.
4) Exhibit D - The Delimitations Agreement of 2/23/49, as amended.
5) Exhibit E - National Security Council Charters of the IIQ and
the ICIS.
6) Exhibit F - National Security Action Memorandum 161, 6/9/62.
7) Exhibit G - Department of Justice Memorandum dated 3/5/64,
setting forth new Charter for the IIC under supervision of the
Attorney General.
8) Exhibit H - Preamble and Section 101 of the National Security
Act of 1947.
EX-110
REC-28/62-116815-
9) Exhibit L - Excerpt from former FBI Director Hoover's briefing
of the National Security Council on 11/6/58.
5 APR 10 1975
S
ALL: vb
مهور (5)
17
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 258
'CONTINUED - OVER
LEGA
Memorandum to Legal Counsel Division
Re: U. S. Senate Select Committee Material; Authorization to Release Exhibits
in "Intelligence Division Position Paper on Jurisdiction" dated 2/13/75
10) Exhibit N - Background information concerning the emergency
detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
11) Exhibit O - Memorandum by former FBI Director Hoover, dated
5/11/61, concerning Cuban individuals and groups.
12) Exhibit Q - Memorandum of former Attorney General Ramsey
Clark dated 9/14/67, concerning urban riot activities.
13) Exhibit R - Departmental Memorandum dated 2/18/69, concerning
instructions on campus disorders.
14) Exhibit S - Excerpts from testimony of former Director Hoover.
15) Section of paper on "Statutes."
It was explained to Mr. Wilderotter that the extracted exhibits were
letters and reports to and from The White House and/or National Security Council
with which there are Third Agency Rule" problems. As soon as cleared, it
was planned to forward these to the Committee. He requested to review these
exhibits prior to forwarding.
ACTION:
Upon "Third Agency Rule" approval regarding other exhibits, have
same reviewed by Mr. Wilderotter. INTD will insure exhibits are made
available for Mr. Wilderotter's review.
QXX
шви
- 2 -
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 259
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STAT
5010-106
COMERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wann
VEROM
:
W. O.
стебазов
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
7MORI6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN, IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
-DATE 1/18/01 BY SP2,
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
-
Mr. J. J. McDermott
(Attention: Mr. J.W. Awe
Room 5644, JEH)
DATE:
4/11/75
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
W. O. Cregar
Mr.
Mr.
S. F.
Phillips
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Gomp Syst.
Files &@gm.
Affairs
JJME
Project Senstudy 75, established within the
Intelligence Division, for the purpose of developing a
capability of implementing requests received from the
Select Committees of the Congress, Bureau file 62-116395!
has been opened for this Project,
Gen Inv.
Jdent.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
406
Because of the unusual factors relating to this
entire Project, such as the sensitive nature of much of the
material involved, urgency for handling, necessity for having
the file very readily available to the working staff at all
times, and similar other reasons, it is essential that the
file be maintained in the work area of the Project which,
effective 4/14/75, will be in room 4063, JEH. The purpose of
this memorandum, therefore, is to have Files and Communications
Division take necessary steps to arrange for the maintenance
of the file in the designated room rather than in the usual
manner.
Peragament
Meetencer 
Awe 
(Print)
+ Prillys (2155)
We 
will NOT
There has already been much publicity about the
Select Committees and we anticipate much more. This involves
many newspaper stories. It is, therefore, believed very
desirable that a Sub A file to the main file be opened as
the standardized repository for newspaper articles,
As a
first step, it will be necessary that a few articles already
in the main file be extracted and laced in the new Sub A
file in the usual chronological order,
pena suGA-
for 
newsclipe
beet 
peepsler
ue T
-folder
4/11/25
Project-
Special File Room
Handled By
4-25-7578
-
COFT FILLD IN
66-17404-
REC-642-116390-60
The foregoing matters have been already discussed
with Mr. J, W. Awe, Unit Chief, of the Files and Communications
Division,
RECOMMENDATION:
8 APR 15 1975
This memorandum to be referred to the Files and
Communications Division for appropriate action as above.
62-116395
SFP:jvl
(6)
84 APR 25 1975
шос
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 260
WRwwar
FAVE
1.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES
5010-106
VERNMENT
Memorandum
wa
ΤΟ
: Mr. W. R.
Wannall
FROM
: W. O. Regar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#mor16
1
1
1
DATE:
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. T. W. Leavitt
Mr. H. E. Helgeson
4/9/75
Mr. A. B. Fulton
Mr. J. G. Deegan
Mr. H. C. Flemister
Mr. W. O. Cregar
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEMINIS CASSIFIED
JAIN 1/18/0/BX SP-2-PLM/276
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
This memorandum provides for the record the
temporary reassignment of Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence
Division.
Project Senstudy 75 has been established within
the Intelligence Division, effective 4/4/75. Its purpose is
to develop a capability of implementing requests received
from the Select Committees of the Congress in a comprehensive
and timely fashion but yet allow the Bureau to continue to
conduct its day-to-day business in as normal a manner as
possible.
Pursuant to the establishment of Project Senstudy 75,
certain Bureau Supervisors in the Intelligence Division have
been relieved of substantive assignments. They are as follows:
Section Chief William O. Cregar, effective 4/4/75,
has assumed the responsibilities of administering the Project.
Unit Chief Elmer W. Larson, effective the same date,
will function as Cregar's Number One Man.
62-116:15-59
Liaison Supervisor Le-M. Schwartz has been relieved
of his regular liaison duties and will function as the Liaison
Officer in contact with the intelligende community for
Project Senstudy 75.
2 APR 10 1975
Unit Chief Seymor F. Phillips, effective 4/8/75,
was assigned to the Project and will function as the Review
Coordinator.
1
Personnel file of W. O. Cregar
1
-
Personnel file of E. W. Larson
1
1
-
Personnel file of L. F. Schwartz
Personnel file of S. F. Phillips
WOC: 1mh mh
(12).
D4APR 16 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 261
9019-5
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
At this time the length of the temporary assignment
is indefinite. Upon the termination of Project Senstudy 75,
the Bureau Supervisors mentioned above will revert back to
their substantive assignments and an appropriate memorandum
for the record will be prepared.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 262
I
2
1
M
11
"
OPTIONAL F
FORM NO. 10
CAY 1962 EDMION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO ERNMENT
Memorandum
\TO Mr. J. B. Adams
:
FROM Legal Counse①
Q
UBJECT
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
2/21/75
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED MOR,
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/18/01 BY SP
12
DATE:
3-12-75
_Assoc. Dir.
Dep. Ad
Dep. AD
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intel
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
☑
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
In attached W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall
memorandum of 3-6-75, captioned as above, it is recommended
that the Legal Counsel Division coordinate and assign respon-
sibilities to appropriate Divisions for the collection and
preparation of certain materials we can anticipate the Senate
Select Committee (SSC) will soon request from the FBI.
5
Fulton
In this regard, it is suggested that all Divisions
receiving requests for information in connection with testimony
before this Committee respond in the same commendable and expedi-
tious manner that they responded in connection with the preparation
of the Director's Brief on his testimony before the House Subcommittee
on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights. The format of this infor-
mation should generally be as follows:
contents;
1 Heading in all caps, centered, brief description of
2
-
-
White, watermarked bond paper, 8 x 10 1/2";
3 At least a 2" left margin. This is essential since
material will be inserted into a folder;
4
5
6
-
-
-
Double spaced;
Do not number pages;
Each Division will be responsible for the accuracy
and completeness of the information furnished in final form. This
will also include up-dating any information previously furnished;
7
-
104
EX
REC-23 2 1/43
58
Use "Mag" card typewriter (courier Ball); identifying
caption on the card folder should be adequate to readily identify
it with the corresponding paper. In addition to the caption, cards
folder should also have the name of the originating Division.
8
-
APR 10 1975
Furnish all "Mag" cards to the Legislative Matters
Section, Legal Counsel Division, along with the write-up
Enc.
1 Mr.
Callahan Enc.
1
-
Each Assistant Director
Enc.
-
Enc.
-
Enc.
1
-
Mr. Adams
MI.
Jenkins
56 APR 18 1975/11
NW 88296 Docid:329896
CONTINUED
OVER
се
Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memo
Re: Senstudy 75
All mail should be routed through and coordinated
with the Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division,
and all contacts with the Senate and House committees will be
handled by representatives of the Legal Analysis Office,
Legislative Matters Section, Legal Counsel Division.
Each Division should advise the Legislative Matters
Section the identity of individual who will be the contact
and coordinator of that Division's responsibilities along
with his phone extension.
The Intelligence Division will be responsible for
representing the Bureau on the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and
the identity of such individual should be made known to the
Legislative Matters Section. In addition, the Intelligence
Division should accumulate the data identified in paragraphs
1 and 2, as they pertain to the FBI, in Mr. John M. Clarke's
memorandum to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group and
submit this in the form suggested above.
The Administrative Division is requested to obtain the
information set forth in paragraph 3 of Mr. Clarke's memorandum,
also furnishing this data in narrative form as explained above.
RECOMMENDATION:
Jet
For information.
Ew
Jona
gen
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 264
- 2 -
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
⚫ GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27,
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO RNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
: W.
Gregar
gar
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#MOR16
ALL YNFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
- 19/81/1
Mr. Callahan
DATE: 3/6/75
1
-
1
-
Mr. Adams
WRWITUL
1
-
1
-
Mr. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Each Assistant Director dent.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Spe
This memorandum recommends that the Legal Counsel
Division coordinate and assign responsibilities to appropriate
Divisions for the collection and preparation of certain materials
we anticipate the Senate Select Committee (SSC) will soon request
from the FBI.
M
Memorandum W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall, dated
3/5/75, reported the results of a meeting between Senator Church
and Mr. Colby wherein Senator Church advised he anticipated
asking all agencies and departments of the Intelligence Community
for (1) Organizational charts broken down to a branch level going
back to 1947, (2) Copies of all budgets since 1947 and (3) Docu-
ments reflecting all cash flows since 1947.
Attached is a copy of a short letter from Mr. John
Clarke, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congres-
sional Review of the Intelligence Community to Mr. William G.
Miller, Staff Director, SSC. Also attached is a copy of a
memorandum from Mr. Clarke to all members of the Ad Hoc Coordina-
ting Group on Congressional Review of the Intelligence Community.
This memorandum sets out in more detail what information the
SSC will be seeking from all agencies making up the Intelligence
Community. It should be noted that on page two of Mr. Clarke's
memorandum he notes a formal request from Senator Church to all
agencies can be expected.
The Intelligence Division believes considerable time
and effort will be required from several Divisions to pull this
information together. It is believed we should begin now to
assemble the data in anticipation of a request. ENCLOSURE
EX 104 REC-23 6.2 116395
ACTION: If you agree, the Legal Counsel Division will coordinate
this matter and assign responsibilities to appropriate Division
for the collection and preparation of the material we anticipate
the SSC will request from the FBI.
Enclosures
WOC:ebc
سلاو (16)
FUNCI
Twe
LEGAL Gunge
Mr. 
Adams 
Meny
3/15/75 JCFILAW
NW 88296 'Docid:22983628 cage 265
ہی
】 APR 10 1975
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGEN
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
4 March 1975
Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Miller:
1-18-01
#тоев
TION OREANED
Pursuant to your request, I have advised all members of the Ad Hoc
· Group of the United States Intelligence Board and Mr. Thomas K. Latimer,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, of Senator Church's request
to provide legal authority and organization charts of USIB entities from
their inception. I also have alerted them to the Committee's desire for
comprehensive historical data on personnel, budgets, and cash flow for
the same periods. They will expect to hear more directly from Senator
Church on these matters.
By early next week, we will begin providing you the CIA data in
response to the Chairman's request. The first set of annexes developed
under the auspices of the USIB Ad Hoc Group is ready and I am having
five copies of each run off for your use. Please advise if more copies
are desired.
Sincerely,
John
John M. Clarke
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
Attachment:
Memo to Ad Hoc Group
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 266
62-116395-58
_ ENCLOSURE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
#MORI6
FORMATION CONTAINED
MENCLASSIFIED ALM LITE
1-18-01 BY S
4 March 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Principals of the Ad Hoc Coordinating
SUBJECT:
Group on Congressional Review
Information Requested by Senate Select
Committee Staff Director
1. Senator Church has asked the Director to provide to the
Senate Select Committee copies of CIA legal authorities and organi-
zation charts to branch levels, 1947-1975. He also indicated he
wants similar authorities and charts for all USIB entities from
their inceptions. In the case of CIA this will be from 1947; NSA
from 1952; DIA from 1961; etc.
2. The Committee is seeking a comprehensive historical
base line for each U.S. intelligence organization--its structure and
the people involved over time. Therefore, Senator Church has asked
that the names of all incumbents who have held supervisory responsi-
bilities over the period, down through the branch level, also be pro-
vided. The Staff Director has been made aware of the difficulties
involved în tracing personnel assignments too far back but asks that
every effort be made to meet the request. CIA is proceeding
accordingly.
3. Senator Church has also asked for budget and cash flow
data on all U.S. intelligence organizations from their inceptions.
The CIA finds that the source and uses tables, employed in annual
financial reports, provides the historical profile desired. Supple-
mental data on specific programs can follow if requested. Senator
Church wants data which will show specific patterns of expenditures
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 267
62-116395-58
ENCLOSURE
as distinct from budgets and appropriations. A formal request
from the Chairman to all agencies on this matter can be expected.
4. The Senate Select Committee will be ready to receive
classified material this week. It is suggested that Ad Hoc Group
members begin assembling the legal, organizational, personnel,
and budgetary data for early submission. I have provided Mr.
Miller, Staff Director, with a list of Ad Hoc Principals, phone
numbers, titles, etc. He understands that the central point for
DOD is Mr. Thomas K. Latimer and for Treasury, Mr. Edward
C. Schmults, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 268
-2-
де
John M. Clarke.
Associate Deputy to the DCĪ
for the Intelligence Community
FROM
:
SUBJECT:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES
5010-106
VERNMENT
Memorandum
:
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. W. R. Wannall
SENSTUDY 75
1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Jenkins
DATE:
3/21/75
1-Each Assistant Director
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Farrington
1-Mr. Fulton
Sef By memorandum Legal Counsel to J. B. Adams
dated 3/12/75, the Legal Counsel Division indicated that its
Legislative Matters Section would coordinate and assign
responsibilities within the Bureau for the collection and
preparation of material for the Senate Select Committee.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
eit:
Laboratory
Legal Coun
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training -
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Hot
Boke
This memorandum instructed Intelligence Division
to accumulate data which was identified in a memorandum from
Mr. John M. Clarke from the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group of the
Intelligence Committee. Clarke's memorandum was attached to
W. O. Cregar to W. R. Wannall memorandum dated 3/6/75.
The identified data to be collected outlined in Clarke's memorandum
was proposed-type data that the Senate Select Committee has
- indicated an interest in.
In view of 3/19/75 letter subsequently received from
Senator Frank Church (Democrat, Idano), Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee, to the Attorney General outlining a request for
specific FBI documents they are interested in receiving, the
Intelligence Division has begun accumulating this specific data.
In view of this request for specific data, the Intelligence Division
will not accumulate the data outlined in the Clarke memorandum
since it was only in the nature of proposed data and differs from
the specific data to be collected which is extensive in nature.
ACTION:
#moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
T
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 Atm/16
ABF:enm
(19)
70 APR 15 1975
дет
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 269
EX 104
For information.
P
Рем
REC-23
au
sil
12-116395-57
洲
APR 10 1975
2007-5
OPTIONAL FOR NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GO ENMENT
Memorandum
TO
: Mr. Groover
FROM J. J. Clynick
0
DATE: 4/8/75
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
In order to respond to item III-C of Senator Church's
letter dated 3/19/75, it was necessary to survey all field offices. This
was done, the response summarized and forwarded to Legal Counsel
Division by memo dated 4/3.
Attached hereto are the file copies of the teletypes from
the field used to compile our response. It is believed these should be
filed as one item as an EBF.
RECOMMENDATION:
Enclosure
That attached be filed as an EBF.
Huld pick
JJC:jmb
63
ENCLOSURE
70 APR 16 1975
= T
REC-11 62-116355--56
ST-112
APR 10 1975
#M0R16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
REIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/61 BY SP-2 ALM 176
KWV 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 270
3-JC

62-116375-56
MDR16 ON THIS
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ENVELOPE
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BX SP-2 ALMESTE
88296 Docid:32989628 Page 271
NR004 AL CODE
-
4:09 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 CHP
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM:
SAC, ALBANY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
#MDR16.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
REIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/0/ BYSR ZALM/116
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Assoc. Dir.
-
Dep.-A.D.-Adm......
Dep.-A.D.-Inv...
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
-
-
Budkoff & Heal;
انتار عامل
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS DATED MARCH 24, 1975.
IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED
BUREAU TELETYPE, THE FOLLOWING IS ALBANY DIVISION'S RESPONSE:
1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS
AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS ASSIGNED
ON PART-TIME BASIS TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND THE PERCENTAGE
OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:
8 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT
15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 20 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 30 PERCENT; 1
AGENT AT 35 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 45 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 50 PERCENT;
1 AGENT AT 60 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 75 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT
85 PERCENT.
1 FIELD SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS AND SPENDS 40 PERCENT OF SUPERVISORY TIME. 23 AGENTS
ASSIGNED ON A PART-TIME BASIS TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND
THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS ON
3/
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 272
PAGE 2
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AS FOLLOWS:
6 AGENTS AT 5 PERCENT; 5 AGENTS AT 10 PERCENT;
4 AGENTS AT 15 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 30 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS
AT 35 PERCENT; 1 AGENT AT 45 PERCENT; 2 AGENTS AT 60 PERCENT;
1 AGENT AT 85 PERCENT.
END.
1130
* 13
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 273
NR001 AQ CODE
10:55AM URGENT 3-36-75 PD
TO:
IRECTOR
FROM:
ALBUQUERQUE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
2
Nil
Assoc. Nr.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Donly.
I:
L
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.
ALBUQUERQUE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS
25 PER CENT OF HIS TIME IN THE SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTERS AND THREE AGENTS WHO WORK THESE MATTERS
ON A PART-TIME BASIS WITH 20 PER CENT, 40 PER CENT AND 40
PER CENT OF THEIR TIME DEVOTED TO THESE MATTERS.
ONE OF THE ABOVE AGENTS SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF
HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
THERE ARE 15 RESIDENT AGENTS EACH OF WHO WORK
APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERSENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTERS.
END
JTG FBIHQ CLR
g;
Tr
Legal Coun.
Telephone Hmm.
Diretor
cy
6025 JEH
#mpe 16
ALI, INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
1/17/01 
DISP2 
ALM
NWWW 88296 Doold 32989628 Page 274
But
NR006 AX CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
VANTEL TYPE
6:20PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VANTELETYPE
TO:
FROM:
mll
R-10-28
BUREAU (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTIONS)
ALEXANDRIA (80-131)
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.
ALEXANDRIA, HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL
SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.
APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS
MATTERS AND FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS.
ALEXANDRIA AGENTS PERFORMING IS WORK AND PERCENTAGE
OF TIME SPENT IS AS FOLLOWS:
Assoc. Dir,
my
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext Affairs
Files & Um,
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Int..
Labratory
www
**
Plan & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Im.
Director Sce'y
-
-
3 SPECIAL AGENTS
2 SPECIAL AGENTS
4 SPECIAL AGENTS
NINETY PERCENT ·
SIXTY-FIVE PERCENT
FIFTEEN PERCENT
TEN PERCENT
5 SPECIAL AGENTS
ALEXANDRIA HAS THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO CI WORK AS
FOLLOWS:
1 SPECIAL AGENT
TEN PERCENT
2 SPECIAL AGENTS
FIVE PERCENT
END.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 275
#10216
UNCLASSIFIED
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
DATE: 1/17/01 SREALM/316
BY
6
3/11A
NRØØ1 AN CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
5:45 PM 3-25-75 NITEL MAB TELETYPE
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM:
SAC, ANCHORAGE
গা
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inson
In :
(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION) La
-
y
Plan. & Eval
Sp.c. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.
ANCHORAGE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
ARE SUPERVISED BY THE SAC, WHO SPENDS 15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME
ON THE FORMER AND 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON THE LATTER CATEGORY.
THERE ARE 3 AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THEY
SPEND 40 PERCENT, 5, PERCENT, AND 2 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME,
RESPECTIVELY, ON THIS CATEGORY. ONE OF THE 3 AGENTS SPENDS 10
PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
END
☐
TJT FBI WASH DC HOLD
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 276
#MDR16
ÁLL YNICEMATION CONTAINED
HERIIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BYSP-2 AM 1376
3/17
X
NR008 AT CODED
Y
5:44 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 LAP
DIRECTOR, FBI
TO:
FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
Dond
TELETYPE
세
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm._
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
r
St
9722.
Eval
Qun.
Rra.
-
Sec'y
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
FOLLOWING IS BREAKDOWN OF ATLANTA AGENT PERSONNEL PRESENTLY
WORKING ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS ALSO
INCLUDING IN THIS AREA ALL OF CLASSIFICATIONS GENERALLY REGARDED
AS SECURITY WORK AND EXTREMIST WORK, AS WELL AS THOSE RELATING TO
EXPLOSIVES AND INCENDIARY DEVICES:
POSITION
1 SAC
1 AS AC
1 SUPERVISOR
WORK ING
"
"
PER CENT OF TIME
5
#MORIS
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
DANE 1/17/01 ET SP-24m 1316
3
75
1 SUPERVISOR
"
3
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS
WORK ING
100
"1
"
"
"
4
90
"
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"
2
80
"
"
"
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50
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"
"
1
2
40
"
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20
3/10
Note Suprevious charlic Hognes, Atlanto, Telighericall;
contacted 320 3/27/75. He will send Nited 9/27 breading
above out by IS & CI matter exponitely,
وظ
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 277
!
R
PAGE TWO AT 100-0
POSITION
-
3 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS
3 RESIDENT AGENTS
4 RESIDENT AGENTS
"
"
WORKING
PER CENT OF TIME
10
"
10
"
6
"
3
"
2
1
THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE INCLUDED IN ARRIVING AT THE
ABOVE COMPUTATION:
1, ½, 14, 61, 64, 65, 97, 98, 100, 102, 165, 108, 109, 110, 111,
112, 113, 117, 134, 135, 157, 163, 170, 174, 176, AND 185.
END
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 278
NR 007 AT CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 27 1975
Dow
SSPELETYPE
5 Revised
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D-Adm
Dop. A.D-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Ad: Y
Che p
Ext. Affairs
FE
G
14
I
9:46 PM NITEL MARCH 27, 1975 SSP
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: ATLANTA (100-0)
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE ATLANTA TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, MARCH 26, 1975.
Is
L
✓
Pluch
Sp
Tr
1
Legat d
Telephone I
Dire Senty
UNDER PER CENT OF TIME COLUMN, "IS" STANDS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY
AND "CI" STANDS FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
POSITION
PER CENT OF TIME
IS
CI
1 SAC
1 ASAC
WORKING
4
"
2
1 SUPERVISOR
"
45
30
1 SUPERVISOR
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT
"
3
0
"
100
0
"
1
"
"
"
85
15
་་
"
"
80
20
"
"
"
"
90
0
"
"
"
0
90
"
"
"
"
85
5
"
1
"
"
75
$5
"
"
"
"
i
60
99
20
#Empe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1-17-01 BT SP-ALM-796
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 279
3/1/A
A
PAGE TWO
AT 100-0
PUSITION
PER CENT OF TIME
IS
CI
1 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENT
WORKING
80
-0
"
I
"
"
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20
40
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 280
60
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PAGE THREE
AT 100-0
IN CONSIDERING ABOVE COMPUTATIONS, THE FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS
WERE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY HEADING:
3
14, 61, 98, 100, 117, 134 (INFORMANTS) 157, 163, 170, 176, 185. THE
FOLLOWING CLASSIFICATIONS WERE CONSIDERED UNDER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
HEADING: 2, 64, 65, 97, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 134
(ASSETS).
END
HOLD FOR 5 MORE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 281
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 282
MAR 27.9 53 PM '75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
62-116395-56
-
NR 014 BA CODE
10:14PM NITEL 3/25/75 JAN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TO CTOR CATTN: BUDGET AND TRYING SECTION 7
DIRECTOR TECTYPE
CCOUNTING
FROM
BALTIMORE 66-NEW
Budget
6008
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
6
Dep-D
Depa
Admin.
Come
E
F
2.
G
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I
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S.
T.
TIME
Ich
Director Lec'y
RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL OFFICES DATED MARCH 24, 1975.
BALTIMORE HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 33 AGENTS DEVOTED FURm.
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY (IS). TWENTY AGENTS
DEVOTE 100 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME TO IS MATTERS. THIRTEEN AGENTS
DEVOTE 75 PER CENT TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PER CENT TO IS MATTERS.
THE SAC'S OVERALL SUPERVISION INCLUDES 20 PER CENT OVER IS AND CI
MATTERS.
END
." 17
3
#MOR/6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DAX: 1-17-01 BISP-2 ALM/JTG
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 283
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 284
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
그
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm._
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Adoin.
Corp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
G.
& Com,
NR 002 BH CODE
241 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 DGS
TO:
DIRECTOR
FROM:
BIRMINGHAM (66-2204)
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Id t
In
Ir
La
2
Plan Eval.
St Inv.
+
Tr
3
Legal Cun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Soc'y
Buday
REBUTEL, 3/24/74, REGARDING PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL
SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS.
BIRMINGHAM HAS NO AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED FULL-TIME TO THESE
MATTERS. FOLLOWING REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF AGENT TIME:
AGENT
IS PERCENTAGE
CI PERCENTAGE
95
0
A
В
C
D
BOA NE U I
50
40
80
0
40
10
60
0
F
35
15
G
5
10
0
25
770816
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
MAREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DALE: 1/17/01 BY SEZALMN0
I
30
30
ل
25
0
K (SUPERVISOR )
40
"
20
3612
END
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 285
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MAR 25 5 co PM 75
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 286
62-116395-56
$75
CAT
NRØ17
BS CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
6:58 PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 MCC
TO DIRECTOR/
FROM BOSTON
BUDGE
(66-82)
ATTN/ BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
✓ucket
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
REBUNITEL 3/24/75.
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BOSTON HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND TWENTY-ONE AGENTS, ALL
ASSIGNED FULL TIME, TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IN ADDITION,
TWELVE RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE
AND ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.
BOSTON HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND TEN AGENTS ASSIGNED
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIME. IN ADDITION, ELEVEN
RESIDENT AGENTS ARE WORKING THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE AND
ONE-HALF AGENTS FULL TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
BUREAU SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SAME RESIDENT AGENTS, WITH
ONE EXCEPTION, WHO ARE ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY
MATTERS, ARE ALSO ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
END
#MDR16
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm._
Dep. A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Cup. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fi & Com.
Gen. L
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laborabry
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
2ALM-1876
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAAR 1-17-01 BY SPZALM 1976
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 287
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 288
62-114395-56:
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
I
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fib & Cum.
Gm. Inv.
Ident.
I
tion
Int.
L
-
JV
NR001 BU CODE
4:04 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 TRR
ΤΟ
FROM
DIRECTOR
BUFFALO
KYYXXX(6 6- NEW)
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
Plan Eval.
Inv.
Trining
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Budget of Auct.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
REBUTEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.
605 Ji H
BUFFALO DIVISION HAS TWO SUPERVISORS AND 28 SPECIAL AGENTS
ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT
NOT NECESSARILY ON A FULL TIME BASIS.
FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
TO THESE AREAS ON FULL TIME BASIS:
-
-
SAC
AS AC
SUPERVISORS
SPECIAL AGENTS
INTERNAL
#MORIS
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
DATE:1-17-01 BY SPA ALM/896
HMREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
0
0
0
0
0 6
0
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 289
0
W
3/10
PAGE TWO BU 66-NEW
IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, COMPUTATION OF ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE
OF TIME SPENT BY OTHER AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED THESE MATTERS
WOULD REPRESENT EQUIVALENT OF FOLLOWING NUMBER OF FULL TIME
PERSONNEL:
SUPERVISORS
SPECIAL AGENTS
.
GRAND TOTALS:
INTERNAL
SECURITY
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
I
1/2
71/2
5
SUPERVISORS
1
1/2
SPECIAL AGENTS
13 1/2
5
END
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 290

יז:
W
44 USPH 775
PELETYPE UNIT
RECEIVED
:
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 291
62-116395-56
QNR 006 BT PLAIN
FEDERAL BURGAY OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1970
TELETYPE
9-13 QP PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 TDS
TO DIRECTOR
FROM, BUTTE
10
Assoc. Dr.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A.1.-Inv.
Asst. Di:
Admin.
Comp. Svgt.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laborat
y
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Km.
Director Sec'y
-
-=
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
SECURITỶ MATTERS SUPERVISED BY ASAC FIVE PERCENT OF HIS TIME.
ONE HEADQUARTERS AGENT HANDLES FIFTY PERCENT OF HIS TIME AND ONE
RA TEN PERCENT OF HIS TIME. NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORK BUTTE
DIVISION.
END 1
V
FBIHQ FLC FR THREE TELS TKS AND CUL.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 292
7 B
#MDR16
ADD INFOTHETION CONTAINED
DATE 1/17/01 DYSF2ALM/816
3/00
17
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MAR 25 11:14 PM $75
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 293
62-116395-56
NR 009 CE CODED-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
5:33 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 KCL
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
FROM CHARLOTTE (100-00)
AR151975
Rudopt
6038
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBULET MARCH 24, 1975.
11
CHARLOTTE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO
SECURITY MATTERS, NO OTHER SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLE SECURITY.
THERE ARE 3 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME SECURITY
MATTERS AND ONE ADDITIONAL HEADQUARTERS AGENT ASSIGNED 75 PER
CENT TO SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS. ONE RESIDENT AGENT IS ASSIGNED
75 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, 4 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS
ARE ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO SECURITY MATTERS, AND 9 ADDITIONAL
RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED FROM 5 TO 15 PER CENT OF THEIR WORK
IN SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.
NO SUPERVISORY OR AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM WHICH WAS DISCONTINUED PER BUREAU
INSTRUCTIONS IN 1971.
END
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ………………
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
C mp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fik & Com.
(Inv.
Me t
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Labratory
Plan. & Eval.
Sp. Inv.
Tr ining
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Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
#30216
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,
BEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
-
-
-
-
DATE 1-17-01 EXSP-2 ALM /516
Note: Charlote: security supersicer Telephonics ily
contacted 2 th n 3/27/75 and The difference between
in,
Counterintelligence program, and CII, matters cxplained
to him. He will send corrected Nitel 3/27.
BIR
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 294
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 295
62-116395-56
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NR 005 CE CODE
5:26 PMNITEL MARCH 27, 1975 KQ
ΤΟ
FROM
DIRECTOR
CHARLOTTE (100-00)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 27 1975
TELETYPE
Ruda
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Revised
Rico
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident,
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975, AND CHARLOTTE TEL MARCH 25, 1975.
CHARLOTTE OFFICE HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO
BOTH SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE HEAD QUARTERS
AGENT IS ASSIGNED 50 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS,
AND A SECOND HEAD QUARTERS AGENT DEVOTES 25 PER CENT TO COUNTER·
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TWO RESIDENT AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED 25 PER
CENT TO COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND TWO ADDITIONAL RESIDENT
AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED BETWEEN 5 TO 10 PER CENT TO COUNTERINT ELL I-
GENCE MATTERS. OTHER RESIDENT AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS WHEN NEED ARISES, HOWEVER, NO EXACT PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE
SINCE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS GREATLY FLUCTUATE.
END
-
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 296.
#MOR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
BEREIN IS
CHASSIFIED
D:F: 1/17/01 SP-2 ALM/58
颜
31-PM 775
TELETYPE UNIT
RECEIVED
1
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 297
62-116395-56
NR026 CG CODE
610PM NITEL 3-25-75 RWR
DIRECTOR
TO
FROM
CHICAGO
FEDERAL BULEAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
... 151976
Dan
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
19-6.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
12
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intl.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975, TO ALL SAC'S.
THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF AGENT TIME IN THE CHICAGO
DIVISION SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY
MATTERS:
SAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, 20 PERCENT; INTERNAL
SECURITY, 10 PERCENT.
ASAC: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PERCENT; INTERNAL SECURITY,
20 PERCENT.
SUPERVISORS:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, FOUR, FULL TIME;
INTERNAL SECURITY, ONE, FULL TIME, ONE, 50 PERCENT.
(THE
OTHER FIFTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR'S TIME IS SPENT ON
EXTREMIST MATTERS.)
AGENTS: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 76, FULL TIME (INCLUDES 10
AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE);
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION COLTAINED,
AGRWYN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAY-11-17-01 BY SPZ ALOT/176
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 298
3/117
PAGE TWO
INTERNAL SECURITY, 28, FULL TIME.
IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, 10 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL
TIME TO EXTREMIST MATTERS.
THIS REPRESENTS A TOTLE OF 114 SA'S ASSIGNED SECURITY
WORK EXCLUSIVE OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL.
END.
PLS ACK FOR TWELVE
NEED A RERUN OF UR NRTS HAVE AN OVERLINE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 299
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NW'88296 Docld:32989628 Page'300
62-116395-56
;

سے
FLUCHAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NR 004 CI CODE
MAR 25 1975
748PM NITEL 3/25/75 KOD
TELETYPE
ΤΟ DIRECTOR
FROM CINCINNATI (105-7038)
ATTENTION:
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
Rm,
己
ACTIVITIES
13
Ascoe. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm..
Dep-A.D.-Inv..
Asst:
Adrain.
Coryst.
Ext. Affairs
Fils & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ide .t.
Inspection
Int"
Lay
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Tr in g
Legal C.un.
Telephone Km.
Director Sec'y
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24,1975.
FOLLOWING ISBREAKDOWN OF AGENT PERSONNEL TIME BEING EXPENDED IN
CINCINNATI DIVISION OM INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS (CIM):
#Moel6
HELD IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALL INFORMATION 
CONTAINED
DALE 1/17/01 37 SP-2 ALM/JTG
SAC AND ASAC
-
NO NE
IS
CIM
ONE SUPERVISOR
65 PERCENT
Ø PERCENT
ONE SUPERVISOR
53 PERCENT
36 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS
100 PERCENT
Ø PERCENT
TWO AGENTS
80 PERCENT
Ø PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS
60 PERCENT
40 PERCENT
ONE AGENT
27 PERCENT
73 PERCENT
ONE AGENT
45 PERCENT
ONE AGENT
50 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS
ONE AGENT
50 PERCENT
73 PERCENT
55 PERCENT
50 PERCENT
Ø PERCENT
27 PERCENT
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 301
3/187
PAGE TWO CI 105-7038
IS
CIM
ONE AGENT
30 PERCENT
ONE AGENT
40 PERCENT
50 PERCENT
20 PERCENT
ONE AGENT
25 PERCENT
THREE AGENTS
10 PERCENT
ONE AGENT
10 PERCENT
SIX AGENTS
5 PERCENT
TWO AGENTS
2 PERCENT
FOUR AGENTS
5 PERCENT
25 PERCENT
Ø PERCENT
25 PERCENT
5 PERCENT
8 PERCENT
Ø PERCENT.
END
REC 4 DBS FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 302
In
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TMTC
T
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TELETYPE UNIT
ALLWAYED
MAR 25723 PM 75
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 303 62-116395-56
NR 005 CV CODE
8:25PM NITÉL 3/25/75 RJB
TO
DIRECTOR
FROM: CLEVELAND (66-5641)
CONFIDENTIAL
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TÉLETYPE
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Increction
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sealy
Budget 14
CLEVELAND HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED
TO INTERNAL SECURITY WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS
TWO, AGENTS 20. THE FOLLOWING NUMBER ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTER-
INTELLIGNECE WORK: SAC NONE, ASAC NONE, SUPERVISORS ONE,
AGENTS 16. THE THREE SUPERVISORS HANDLE SECURITY-TYPE
MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY.
CLEVELAND HAS UTILIZED PERCENTAGES OF AGENT'S TIME SPENT
IN THESE CATEGORIES WHERE APPLICABLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE
RESIDENT AGENCIES.
END
CLASSIFIED BY 6020, XGDS CATEGORY 2,
INDEFINITE.
1876
HOLD FOR ONE
TJT FBI WASH D
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 304
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NR005 CO CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
7:00PMEDT NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WCA
TO DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTENTION:
كة
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM COLUMBIA (105-NEW)
15
Budout
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
COLUMBIA PRESENTLY HAS ZERO AGENTS ASSIGNED COUNTER
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep. A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
(mn. Syst.
Eat. Affairs
Fr & Com.
( Inv.
Ident.
I
I A.
n
Lupatory
Plan. & Eval.
-
-
Spre. Inv.
Training
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Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
623
ген
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS COLUMBIA
HAS THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF AGENTS AND SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED
THE FOLLOWING PERCENTAGES OF TIME:
END.
-
75, 1
-
30, 3
-
'
20,
-
10,
AGENTS
3
-
5 OR LESS
SUPERVISORS
DBS FBIHQ
CLR
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 306
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NW 88296 .Docid:32989628 Page 307 12-
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OCIN32
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26189 286
CPE
NR008 DL CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
5:44 PM NITEL 3/26/75 DRH TELETYPE
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: DALLAS (105-NEW)
"Budget Helsing
6028 Meh
ATTN: INTD SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.
16
IN REPLY TO BUREAU REQUEST, THE DALLAS OFFICE HAS ONE
SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO WORK ON INTERNAL SECURITY (IS),
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE (CI), APPLICANT AND RELATED MATTERS.
FIFTY-FOUR PERCENT OF HIS TIME IS SPENT ON IS MATTERS AND
THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT ON CI MATTERS. THERE ARE SIX HEADQUARTERS
AGENTS HANDLING IS AND/OR CI MATTERS, THREE RESIDENT AGENTS
WORKING THE MAJORITY OF THEIR TIME ON BOTH IS AND CI MATTERS
AND EIGHT RESIDENT AGENTS WORKING A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THEIR
TIME IN THE IS AND CI FIELDS. DATA FOR SURVEY WAS OBTAINED
FROM THE FEBRUARY, 1975, CASE LOAD. THE NUMBER OF DALLAS
AGENTS WORKING IS, CI OR BOTH AND THE PERCENTAGE OF THEIR
TIME SPENT IN THESE FIELDS IS SET OUT BELOW:
Assoc Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A D.-Inv.....
Asst
Admin.
Comp Syst
Ext. Affairs
Files &m.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
In 1.
_
La at ry
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Km.
Director See'y
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 308
#MDR16
*17 INFORMATION CONTAINED
NENI 
UNCLASSIFIED
AL:11-17-01 EXSP 242/376
3/int
PAGE TWO DL 105-NEW
SAS
3X
1X
IS PERCENT
100
ㄓㄨ
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34
63
62
24
30
165
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100 66
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38
76
16
SAS
1 1 1 1
IS PERCENT 13
6
2
CI PERCENT
8
X RA AND HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS AND CI SQUAD.
END.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 309
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NW 88296' Docld:32989628 Page 310 2-116395-56

' NRØØ7 DN PLAIN
*535 PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
JEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JSG MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
12
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Svet.
Ext. Affirs
-
(ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM: DENVER (66-DEAD)
Files &
Ger
A-702
Id.
Ir
I'
L'
Pla
T:
Leg. 1
Tel
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL OFFICES, MARCH 24, 1975.
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER† Director See'y
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS (CI):
SAC 0
ASAC-0
SUPERVISOR
AGENTS
-
-
ONE FULL TIME, 3/4 OF TIME OF IS, 1/4 TO CI
12 AND 1/2, 3/4 TIME TO IS, 1/4 TIME TO CI.
IN DENVER OFFICE, IS AND CI MATTERS ARE HANDLED BY FIELD
SUPERVISOR ON FULL TIME BASIS. DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES ALSO
HANDLED ON SQUAD BUT ONLY FRACTION OF SUPERVISOR'S AND SQUAD
TIME IS USED ON THESE CASES. SAC AND ASAC ARE KEPT ABREAST OF
IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND, OF COURSE, HAVE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY BUT
HAVE NOW IS OR CI MATTERS ASSIGNED TO THEM. BESIDES SUPERVISOR,
THERE ARE 8 SPECIAL AGENTS (SA) IN HEADQUARTERS CITY ASSIGNED
FULL TIME TO IS AND CI MATTERS WITH ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF
THIS TIME GIVEN TO DESERTER FUGITIVE CASES. ALL BOMBING MATTERS
NW-88296 Docld:32989628 Page 311
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
ISTINAS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DAME
1/18/01 SP-2 ALM/776
3/10
PAGE TWO
(DN 66-DEAD)
(174 CLASSIFICATION) ARE CONSIDERED A PART OF IS INVESTIGATIONS.
TWO OF EIGHT SAS FULL TIME AND ONE SA HALF TIME HANDLE CI MATTERS,
M
REMAINDER HANDLE IS.
IN RESIDENT AGENCIES (RA) FOLLOWING SITUATION EXISTS:
ONE AGENT IN COLORADO SPRINGS SPENDS 50 0/0 AND ANOTHER AGENT
SPENDS 25 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON IS AND CI MATTERS. IN BOULDER RA
ONE FULL TIME AGENT AND ONE AGENT SPENDING 60 0/0 OF HIS TIME HANDLE
IS AND CI MATTERS. IN FORT COLLINS RA ONE AGENT SPENDS 50 010
M
AND THE OTHER 40 0/0 OF THEIR TIME ON THESE MATTERS. IN CHEYENNE RA
ONE AGENT SPENDS 25 0/0 OF HIS TIME ONE THESE MATTERS. IN THE OTHER
RAS ONLY A MINOR FRACTION OF THE TIME OF EACH RA IS DEVOTED TO
IS AND CI MATTERS. TOTAL TIME WOULD POSSIBLY EQUAL THAT OF ONE
SA FULL TIME. IN ALL INSTANCES, ABOUT 3/4 OF TIME SPENT ON
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IS ON IS MATTERS WITH REMAINING 1/4 ON
CI MATTERS.
END
MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR FOUR
WA CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 312
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62-114395-56
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NR 032 DE CODE
FEDERAL LUREAU OF INVESTINATIC.
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
5:42 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WGM
DIRECTOR
MAR 1976
Dew
TO:
FROM:
DETROIT
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
18
Assoc. Dir.
-
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
DETROIT DIVISION CURRENTLY HAS ONE SUPERVISOR AND FOURTEEN
AGENTS ASSIGNED 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY
INVESTIGATIONS.
ADDITIONALLY, ONE ASAC IS ASSIGNED FIVE
PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT, THREE SAS FIFTEEN PERCENT, ONE SA
TEN PERCENT, ONE SA FIVE PERCENT.
DETROIT DIVISION AL SO HAS ASSIGNED ONE SUPERVISOR AND
-
ELEVEN SAS SPENDING 100 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNT ER –
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. IN ADDITION, ONE ASAC FIVE PERCENT, THREE
SAS 75 PER CENT, ONE SA 50 PERCENT, ONE SA TWENTY PERCENT AND ONE
SA TEN PERCENT. CONE SAC HAS FIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL
SECURITY AND FIVE PER CENT OF TIME ON COUNTER INTELL IGENCE
MATTERS.
END
HOLD PLS
#MOR16
-
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 314
ALE TRENTON CONTAINED.
LASSIFIED
DANE 1/17/0/31 SPZ ALIN/ETTE
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307
21 PM
TELETYPE UNIT
RECEIVED
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 315
62-116395-56
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 75
1 Assoc. Dir.
DAD.-Adm.
n-Inv.
ти
NR 002
EP
CODE
TELETYPE
6:28 PM
NITEL
3-25-75
MJT
TO:
DIRECTOR
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM: EL PASO (66-NEW)
///IP///
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
an 10x8
REBUTEL MARCH 24, 1975.
ASAC HANDLES NO
SAC, EL PASO CURRENTLY SPENDS 3 PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING
INTERNAL SECURITY, 2 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE;
SECURITY MATTERS; SUPERVISOR NUMER THREE DESK DEVOTES 15 PER CENT OF
TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 5 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
FOUR AGENTS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED SECURITY MATTERS, WITH ONE AGENT
DEVOTING 60 PER CENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY, Ø PER CENT TO
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; SECOND AGENT SPENDS 10 PER CENT ON INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTERS, 75 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; THIRD AGENT 50
PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 10 PER CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; FOURTH
AGENT, WHO IS RELIEF SUPERVISOR, DEVOTES 10 PER CENT OF TIME TO
INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, 65 PER CENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
END
#толь
ALD 1986RMATION CONTAINED
BIS 
UNCLASSIFIED
1/17/01 BY SR2 ALm/276
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 316
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 317
62-116395-56
403
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
20
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm..
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affai
Files & Com.
-
-
TELETYPE
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
NR 001 HN CODE
5:08 PM HST NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 JVS
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR
HONOLULU (66- > 1P
ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.
TENTIO
Budge
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.
Inspection
Intel.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
HONOLULU CURRENTLY HAS FOUR SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED PRIMARILY
SECURITY MATTERS BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
INTERNAL SECURITY AS FOLLOWS: 2 AGENTS 90 PER CENT ON COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE AND AND 10 PER CENT EACH OTHER MATTERS; 1 AGENT 75 PER CENT
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 25 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY; 1 AGENT 30 PER
CENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, 40 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 30 PER
E
CENT OTHER MATTERS. 3 ADDITIONAL AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 15
PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY.
ASAC, SUPERVISES SECURITY MATTER, SPENDS 35 PER CENT OF
TIME ON SECURITY BROKEN DOWN AS: 25 PER CENT COUNTER INTELL-
IGENCE AND 10 PER CENT INTERNAL SECURITY.
END.
HOLD
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 318
#40116
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERTION 
IS UNCLASSIFIE)
DATE: 1/17/01 SPAALM/ET6
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NR008 HO CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR
TELE
5:55 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 BNG
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR
HOUSTON
all
Budan Viet
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
+
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SET FORTH BELOW ARE SAC, SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS CURRENTLY
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REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL:
Assoc. ir.
Dep.-D.-Adm_
Den
Aust
Admin
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Ct
Ext. Affairs
Fm.
Gen. Inv.
Id.. t.
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Int.
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Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
AGENTS
SUPERVISOR
SAC
INTERNAL SECURITY
2.05
.30
.02
END
HOLD
),
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 320
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
2.70
.40
.04
-
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ALL TEFORMATION CONTAINED
ANAS UNCIASSIFIED
Die 1/17/01 335P2A21/196
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5:39 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 RXH-
FEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
22
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D-Inv.
Agpt. Dir.:
Ad in.
Cc p. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
PE & Com.
TV.
11 1
Int
DIRECTOR
ΤΟ
FROM
ATTENTION:
INDIANAPOLIS
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE BUREAU TEL, MARCH 24, 1975.
Lak
try
Plan & Eval
Spe: Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director See'y
Badgecomberg
Сеготов
AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED TEL, FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BEING
FURNISHED CONCERNING INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:
SAC
ASAC
NONE
NONE
END
SUPERVISORS
.30 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND .40
INTERNAL SECURITY
SPECIAL AGENTS
6.25 ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND
HOLD FOR FIVE MORE
9.50 ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 322
#morib
177, TAPORATION CONTAINI
# 16 UNCLASSIFIED
1-1201 SP-FACETE
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NW 88296. Docld:32989628 Page 323
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FEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
4:07PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JWD
TO DIRECTOR, ATTENTION:
FROM JACKSON (100-0)
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
23
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.
SAC AND ASAC, JACKSON OFFICE, HAVE NO CASES ASSIGNED IN
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD. TWO
SUPERVISORS HAVE CASES ASSIGNED AND THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS
EQUIVALENT TO FORTY PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN INTERNAL
SECURITY AND FIFTEEN PERCENT OF ONE SUPERVISOR IN COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE, MATTERS. THERE ARE FIFTY FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO
CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE FIELD. THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME IS EQUIVALENT
TO THREE POINT SIX TENTHS AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE POINT ONE TENTH AGENTS ASSIGNED
FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
END
DBS FBIHQ CLR
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
A min.
Chap. Frst.
Ext. Affairs
FL Com.
G-
Int.
I
In
Lab r. ry
Plan & Eval
Spr. v.
Trill
Legal Can.
Telephos Rm.
Director Sec'y
me
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 324
#MOR16
ANG INVORMATION CONTAINED
MICHNIS VNCIASSIFIED
DS1/17/61 DX SP2 Azm/776
3/08
I
NW 88296 Docid:32989628. Page 325
62-116395-56
306
I
J
NR003 JK CODE
FLDENAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
hrr
TELETYPE
7:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 GLB
TO
FROM
DIRECTOR
-
Rm
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
JACKSONVILLE (100-NEW) (RUC)
24
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com,
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Km.
Director See'y
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU NITEL, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.
THE FOLLOWING IS SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED NITEL
FOR JACKSONVILLE DIVISION:
ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FIFTY PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY
AND TEN PERCENT INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
1
PERCENTAGES OF AN AGENT'S TIME, NONE ASSIGNED FULL TIME
TO THESE ACTIVITIES, ACCUMULATED TO REPRESENT FOUR AGENTS
ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND ONE AGENT ASSIGNED
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
END
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 326
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERMIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE
1/17/01 DX SP-2 ALM/816
YIL
V
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 327
62-116395-56
NR 003 KC CODE
6:15 PM 3/25/75 NITEL JAW
TO:
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BHTEAU OF INVEST
COMMINICATIONS SECTION
Din
25
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D. Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
-
(ATTN:BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM: KANSAS CITY
(100-0)
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBUNITEL 3/24/75.
KANSAS CITY DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO HANDLE
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. TIME SPENT
IS 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 40 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY.
TWO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AND NO AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY.
KANSAS CITY HAS THIRTEEN ADDITIONAL AGENTS HANDLING BOTH
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, BROKEN DOWN
AS FOLLOWS: FIVE AGENTS, 90 PERCENT, INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE AGENt,
90 PERCENT, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: TWO AGENTS, 30 PERCENT ON EACH:; FOUR
AGENTS, 10 PERCENT ON EACH, AND ONE AGENT 50 PERCENT ON INTERNAL
SECURITY.
END
HOLD
ثر
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 328
#тое
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
DATE: 1/17/01 BX SP-2-ALM/8186
2/NA
ERITIVITA
I
.: UT
IT TAN MOPJE IJJLTVIAN TRUCO PAYTINUDÈN JÄST: I
•
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628. Page 329 62-116395-56
+
I
QUCH V
3
* NR004 KX CODE
d
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 1976
Den
8:10 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 WEH TELETYPE
2.6
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI (ATN:
BUDGET & ACCOUNTING SECTION).
FROM:
SAC, KNOXVILLE (100-00)
1-$10/28
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAP-
TIONED AS ABOVE.
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Assoc. Dr.
Dep-A-
Dep-AD
Asst. Dir.:
Admin
Corp. Shrt.
Ext. Affairs
Files &
Gen. Inv.
Ident
Inspection
Int: 11.
Labnet ry
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Km.
Director Sec'y
ALI: INFORMATION CONTAINED
HAPHY IS NOTASSIFIED
#MDR16
50
DA: 1/17/01 7582ALM/896
MATTERS ARE SUPERVISED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ASAC'S
DESK IN THE KNOXVILLE DIVISION. IT IS ESTIMATED
THAT THE ASAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF
HIS TIME ON SUCH MATTERS, DIVIDED 15 PERCENT TO IN-
TERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
IN ADDITION, THERE ARE FIVE AGENTS WITHIN THE
DIVISION WORKING PRIMARILY ON SECURITY MATTERS.
TWO
OF THESE AGENTS SPEND 80 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON IN-
TERNAL SECURITY WORK AND 5 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; ONE AGENT SPENDS 75 PERCENT ON
INTERNAL SECURITY AND 20 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE;
ONE AGENT SPENDS 60 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND
35 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; AND ONE AGENT SPENDS
20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 75 PERCENT ON
'
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 330
3/iA

NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 331
PAGE TWO
KX 100-00
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
SECURITY ITEMS REQUIRING THE PERSONAL ATTENTION
OF THE SAC UTILIZE ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON EACH
CATEGORY.
END.
DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE AND CLR
יד
02-001 XH
OPT
17
KOKTEITTÄ JAMOS TYTIQUE
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 332
62-116395-56
•
NO CH
TELETYPE UNIT
ALIVED
MAR 25.7 47 PM 75
NR 011 LV CODE
838 PM NIIEL MARCH 25, 1975 MLP
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM LAS VEGAS (100-00)
ATTN:
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE, MARCH 24, 1975.
2Z
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm._
Dep.-A.D.-Inv...
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. 17.
'Ideri.
In
Int
in
Lab/my
Plan Eval.
Spre Im
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Secy
Budget Prest
LAS VEGAS SAC AND ASAC DO NOT SUPERVISE INTERNAL SECURITY
MATTERS.
LAS VEGAS HAS NO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
LAS VEGAS HAS ONE FIELD SUPERVISOR WHO SUPERVISES INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTERS AMONG MANY OTHER CATEGORIES. IT IS ESTIMATED
THIS SUPERVISOR SPENDS TEN PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON MATTERS OF AN
INTERNAL SECURITY NATURE.
LAS VEGAS HAS FIVE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO ARE NORMALLY ASSIGNED
INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TWO OF THESE
AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 95 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON THESE
MATTERS. ONE OTHER SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT, AND THE
OTHER TWO, APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT.
END
TJT FBI WASH DC CLR
#MDR16
LG THRONATION CONTAINED
CLASSIFIED
3
Dow: 1/17/01 EX SP-ZAIN/OTG
HE
① Supervisor Don Smith cortested and advises Counterial Miginaa
matters should be as follows: No supervisory time.
2/27/75
545 pm
2 agents involved, one about 3%
of his time & one about 230,
3/DA
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 333
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 334
62-116395-56
VBLOVI WIL
OCT 9HMTO
INI LI MCH JC CFL
NR 004 LR PLAIN
MARCH
3:09 PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 GM
TO
DIRECTOR
FROM LITTLE ROCK (66-1880)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
Rudor if he
ATTENTIONC BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.
FOLLOWING SET FORTH IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCED
TELETYPE:
28
EN
TWO AGENTS IN LITTLE ROCK DIVISION ASSIGNED PART-TIME
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH
BREAKDOWN OF TIME SPENT AS FOLLOWS:
ONE AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 45 PERCENT OF TIME
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS. SECOND AGENT SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT
OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT ON COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY
8 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 2 PERCENT
ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
END
له
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 335
#MDR16
ATA: ENFORMATION CONTAINED
SANPAO 
JE VICLASSIFIED
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.………
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Cum.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 336
62-116395-56
717
NR 009 LA/CODE
FEDERAL CHREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
12:09 PM URGENT 3-26-75 SMA
TO DIRECTOR
FROM LOS ANGELES
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE BUTEL, MARCH 24 LAST.
29
Acres. Dir.
In-AD-Adm._
TD-Inv.
2.:
Affairs
โ
Ival
1 Tri
+ Legal Can.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
✓ Budget
608 JEH
LOS ANGELES DIVISION HAS CAREFULLY BROKEN DOWN BY PERCENTAGES
THOSE AGENTS WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
WORK USING THOSE CLASSIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY SUPERVISOR GROOVER.
DIVISION HAS A TOTAL OF 91 AGENTS PLUS ONE SAC, FOUR SUPERVISORS
ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED TO
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ASSIGNED TO SUCH CLASSIFICATIONS. THIRTY
FIVE OF THESE WORK COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND 56 WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.
ADMINISTRATIVE
LOS ANGELES IS SUBMITTING FOR BUREAU'S CONSIDERATION, IF
PERTINENT.
THREE OF THE ABOVE 56 CLASSIFIED AS SECURITY AGENTS
WORK FULL TIME ON BOMBING MATTERS WHICH ARE ALMOST ALL MATTERS
WHEREIN WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION EXCEPT FOR DATA KEEPING FOR
NATIONAL BOMB DATA CENTER.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 337
TWELVE OF THE 56 SECURITY AGENTS
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
PEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/776
3/02
PAGE TWO
ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN OUR FALSE IDENTITY PROGRAM. THIS
PROGRAM ORIGINATED WITH OUR WEATHFUG ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER,
THE FRAUDULENT USE OF DECEASED INFANT IDENTITY PAPERS HAS
EXPANDED TO SUCH A DEGREE THAT THE VAST MAJORITY INVOLVE
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN SECURITY WORK. SEVEN OF THE 56
AGENTS ON SECURITY ARE INVOLVED FULL TIME IN FUGITIVE
INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ORIGINATE WITH SOME DEMONSTRATION OR
ACT OF TERROR, ETC, BUT AT THE PRESENT THEY ARE CLEAR CUT
CRIMINAL FUGITIVE INVESTIGATIONS. ONE OF THE 56 IS INVOLVED
FULL TIME IN THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN POLICE COOPERATION
MATTERS WHICH IS TECHNICALLY AN APPLICANT-TYPE INVESTIGATION,
BUT THE 163 CLASSIFICATION WAS INCLUDED IN THE SECURITY
CLASSIFICATIONS. SUMMARIZING THESE EXCEPTIONS WE HAVE A TOTAL
OF 23 AGENTS WHO ARE ASSIGNED TO SECURITY WORK BUT ARE, IN
FACT, NOT INVOLVED IN ANY INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS,
LEAVING ONLY 33 AGENTS DEVOTING THEIR FULL TIME EFFORTS TO
INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS PLUS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED 35
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS.
END
JTG FBIHQ CLR
3
12
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1
NR013 LS CODE
9:45 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 HSH
ΤΟ DI
RECTOR
FROM LOUISVILLE
FEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
DOW
Da
TELETYPE
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
30
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBUTEL TO ALL SACS, DATED MARCH 24, 1975.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
G
1
Fla
Eval
Tr
Legalva.
Telephone Em.
Direct: See'y
PURSUANT TO REFERENCED COMMUNICATION, FOLLOWING DATA
PERTAINS TO LOUISVILLE DIVISION AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS:
SUPERVISOR (1) 40 IS, 10 CI; AGENT (1) 85 IS, 10 CI;
AGENT (1) 25 IS, Ø CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1)
25 IS, Ø CI; AGENT (1) 30 IS, 40 CI; AGENT (1) 40 IS,
* I
10 CI; AGENT (1) 50 IS, 25 CI; AGENT (1) 10 IS, Ø CI.
END.
--
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 340
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DATE1-17-01 3X SP ZALM7888
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 341
62-114395-56
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE
31
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.__.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Et Affairs
& Com.
G Inv.
Ide
Ir
ia
Lary
Plan. & Eval.
NR 005 ME PLAIN
9:12 PM NITEL
TO DIRECTOR
FROM MEMPHIS
MARCH 25, 1975
JL C
ATTN: BLD GET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Int
REBUT EL MAR CH 24, 1975.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
✓Budget
MEMPHIS OFFICE USES APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF ONE
SUPERVISOR'S TIME IN THE SECURITY FIELD, 20 PERCENT ON INTERNAL
SECURITY AND 5 PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.
IN ADDITION, SIX AGENTS ARE UTILIZED, THE FOLLOWING TABLE
SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TIME SPENT BY THESE AGENTS IN THIS
FIELD:
-
ен
TIME ON
TI ME ON
TI ME ON
SECURITY
INTERNAL
COUNTER-
AGENT
CASES
SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE
A
100
100
ต
B
75
50
25
0
50
50
0
D
50
25
25
نتا
E
25
25
F
25
0
25
#MDR16.
HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED
ALL, INTERATION CONTAINED
6
1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/TE
IN ADDITION TO THE ONE-FOURTH SUPERVISOR TIME, THIS OFFICE
USES THE EQUIVALENT OF THREE AND ONE-FOURTH AGENTS IN THE SECURITY
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 342
3/DA
PAGE TWO
FIELD; TWO AND ONE-HALF AGENTS ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE
EQUIVALENT OF THREE-FOURTHS OF ONE AGENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
END
PLS ACK FOR FOUR TES
ACK FOR 4 AND HOLD
TJT FBI WASH DC
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 343
I'
T
MAR 25 10.14 PM 75
TELETYPE UNIT
RECEIVED
"
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 344.
62-116395-56
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 27 1975
NR002 MM CODE
925 AM URGENT MARCH 27, 1975 JWB
TO DIRECTOR
FROM MIAMI 1P
یا
Section
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
TELETYPE
Budget
wn, 602 JEH
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
FOLLOWING ARE MIAMI OFFICE STATISTICS SHOWING PERCENTAGES
OF TIME ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CD) MATTERS AND INTERNAL
SECURITY (IS) MATTERS BY SPECIAL AGENT PERSONNEL:
SACS 0; ASACS - 0.
SUPERVISORS - CI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 90 PERCENT; ONE
ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT. SI MATTERS: ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE
ASSIGNED 5 PERCENT.
SPECIAL AGENTS- CI MATTERS: 15 ASSIGNED FULL TIME; TWO
ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 40 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 5
PERCENT. IS MATTERS: TWO ASSIGNED FULL TIME; THREE ASSIGNED
75 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 60 PERCENT; ONE ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT;
ONE ASSIGNED 30 PERCENT; FIVE ASSIGNED 10 PERCENT.
END.
JDR
FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 345
#mDR 16"
ALL INFMHAGION CONTAINED
HSIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
STAT 1-12-01 JE SPO-ALM/ATE
DA
3/04
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9.29 AM 75.
WEICH
MAR 4 1 14 AM 75
:
REC'D
T
NW 88296', Docid:32989628 Page 346
62-116395-56.
IEDERAL CUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NR 004 MI CODE
7:08PM NITEL 3 / 25 / 75 LSK
0:
DIRECTOR
FROM:
MILWAUKEE (66-NEW)
MAR 25 1975
TEL
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
REBUNITEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.
good
33
MILWAUKEE HAS 2 SECURITY SUPERVISORS, #5 AND #6, NEITHER OF
WHOM IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO SECURITY WORK . 23 AGENTS ARE
ASSIGNED TO THESE 2 SECURITY SQUADS, INCLUDING HEADQUARTERS AND
RESIDENT AGENTS (RA'S). 4 OF LATTER ARE ENGAGED FULL TIME IN
SECURITY WORK. 15 ADDITIONAL RESIDENT AGENTS NOT ASSIGNED TO
EITHER SECURITY SQUAD ALSO HANDLE SOME SECURITY WORK IN THEIR
VARIOUS AREAS. PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN IS AS FOLLOWS:
Assc. Dir.
_
Dep.-A.D.-Adm..
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director See'y
INTERNAL SECURITY
COINTEL
OTHER
#5 SUPERVISOR.
70
5
25
#6 SUPERVISOR
#5 SQUAD 12 agents"
#6 SQUAD 11 agents*
RA'S 15 cputs *
END
ACJ FOR FOUR $$$
30
55
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59
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33
44
44
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2.5
4.5
93
* for plans all
phase all 45/m,
4550m, 3/27/75 with George Whopte,
Supervisor of #6 squad in Milworke
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 347
#10816
ALL XINFORMATION CONTAINED
JERFIN 
CLASSIFIED
DATE: 1-17-01 DSP-FA/1876
DAID
22
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628
Page
34862-114395-56
0.5
A007 701 GOA
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NRØ01 MP COD ED
CONNICATIONS SECTION
34
7:13 PM NIT EL
MARCH 25, 1975
D SC
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
Bud
FROM
MINNEAPOLIS
(100-NEW)
Ascoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intel.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Lec'y
-
-
H
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.
MINNEAPOLIS HAS ONE SUPERVISOR WHO SPENDS 50 PER CENT OF HIS
TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON
CO UNTER INTELLIGENCE. A SECOND SUPERVISOR SPENDS 40 PER CENT OF HIS
TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY. THERE ARE FIVE AND ONE HALF AGENTS
WORKING COUNTER INTELLIGENCE AND 14 WORKING INTERNAL SECURITY.
END
H
0
L
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 349
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1-12-01 BY SPA ALMA
...
MAR 25 316 PM 75
.RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIM
شده، الذي مادة الاع
لال
دنان بارود
MIA P
"
NW 88296 'Docld:32989628 Page 350
62-116395-56
Lomo
یا

NR005
3
35
MOBILE PLAIN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 27 1975
TELETYPE
11-12
PM
NITEL MARCH 26, 1975
VFP
TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM MOBILE (66-1145)
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUTEL TO ALL SACS, MARCH 24, 1975.
Assoc. Dir.
THE MOBILE DIVISION HAS ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDING FIFTY
PERCENT OF TIME SUPERVISING INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; ONE
AGENT WHO SPENDS TWENTYFIVE PERCENT OF TIME ON COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCY MATTERS; ONE AGENT WHO SPENDS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF TIME
ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE ARE NINE AGENTS WHO SPEND
AN AVERAGE OF FORTY FIVE PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTERS.
END
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
TMA ACK FOR TWO FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 351
#moe 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
IT 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
1-17-01 EXSPL/776
MAR 21 17 AM 75
RECEIVED
TÉLETYPE-UNIT
NW 88296 Docid:32989628. Page 352
62-116395-56.
NR 007 NK CODE
6:06PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975 JCG
ΤΟ
DIRECT OR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM
NEW AR K
36
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plau. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Buda fiest
EH Telephone Rm.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUNITEL TO SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.
Director Sec'y
IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN RE NITEL
NEWARK SUBMIT S FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN OF AGENT PER SONNEL ASSIGNED
TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND
PER CENT AGE OF TIME SPENT BY PERSONNEL IN THE TWO SEPARATE
CATEGORIES:
INTERNAL
1 ASAC
-
SECURITY:
15 PER CENT
1 SUPERVISOR
-
50 PER CENT
7 SA'S
-
- 100 PER CENT
7 SA'S
-
70 PER CENT
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 353
#MDEL6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
AIM 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 32SP-20
m
B/DA
NK
PAGE TWO
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:
1 ASAC - 35 PER CENT
END
1 SUPERVICSOR
-
50 PER CENT
1 SUPERVISOR
-
100 PER CENT
23 SA 'S 100 PER CENT
6 SA'S
-
50 PER CENT
3 SA'S
-
10 PER CENT
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 354
MA
",
>
MAR 26 6 04 PM *75
TELETYPE UNIT
RECEIVED
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 355
62-116395-56
www.
NRØØ2 NH CODE
1038PM NITEL MARCH 25,1975 LM
TO:
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
DGJ
TELETYPE
FROM: NEW HAVEN (105-13579) (RUC) IP
ATTN; BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SE NATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
37
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
In
Int
Lin
Lawy
Plau. & Eval.
Spec. inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
028
REBUTEL MARCH 24,1975.
ONE SUPERVISORY AGENT DEVOTES ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME TO
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND ONE THIRD TO INTERNAL SECURITY.
SEVENTEEN AGENTS ARE REGULARLY ASSIGNED EITHER COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS IN ADDITION TO OTHER CLASSIFICA-
TIONS. OF THESE 17 AGENTS THE EQUIVALENT OF FIVE AGENTS WORK
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS FULL TIMW AND FIVE AND ONE THIRD
AGENTS WORK INTERNAL SECURITY.
END
FBIHQ FLC FR TWO TELS CLR TKS
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 356
#10216
ALT, IMITATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAN:: 1/17/01 AEM/ATE
307
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 357 62-116395-56
☐
NRØ01 NO CODE
2:49PM URGENT MARCH 26, 1975
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FODERAL DREWN UP FIVESTIGATION
PAMANNUATIONS SECTION
MAR 36 1975
DCB
JELETÝPL
FROM: SAC NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)
ATTENTION: BUGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
38
Budgeti Acct.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24, 1975.
NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS)
MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE;
PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT;
*
PERCENTAGE OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 60 PERCENT;
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
END MESSAGE...
MAH FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE
WA CLR
Assoc Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep-A D-Inv..
Asst i:
Admin.
Coum Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Insertion
Intel.
Labat ry
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
PRIX IS LICLASSIFIED
1-1201 SPO ALM/196
Note: Security Supervisor contacted 529, 3/27/75 re
counterintelligence matters, He will check & got
The obvious error corrected, either Through call back
or corrected Nitel.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 358
།
2/DA
fy
;
"
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 359
*
*
2
* 4
+
:
TELETYPE UNIT
NEVERVED.
MAR 26 3 47 PM $75
62-116395-56
NR 015 NO CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 27 1975
11-2
TELETÝPÉ
7:15PM URGENT MARCH 27,1975 JMF
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM SAC, NEW ORLEANS (66-2832)
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
SENAT
38 Revised
Ascoc. Dir.
Dop.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Corp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
F
S
Com,
-
L
FL
· Evel
-
30%
Tr. "
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.
Director Sea'y
Buda
R
RE BUREAU NITEL MARCH 24,1975; NEW ORLEANS TELETYPE
MARCH 26,1975; BUTEL CALL MARCH 27,1975.
THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS TO REFERENCED NEW ORLEANS
TELETYPE. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY
(IS) AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, ONE; NUMBER OF AGENTS
ASSIGNED TO IS MATTERS, TWELVE, OF WHICH SEVEN ARE ALSO
ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. PERCENTAGE OF AGENT
TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS, 25 PERCENT AND PERCENTAGE OF AGENT
TIME SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS 35 PERCENT. PERCENTAGE
OF SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON IS MATTERS 25 PERCENT, AND 35
PERCENT SPENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
|
END MESSAGE.
DBS FBIHQ CLR
44
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
+
JF-H
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SPZ A2m/276
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 360
3/PA

TIGVIJA
RTVIDA H
49
NW 88296. Docid:32989628 Page 361
KINI
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62-116395-56
NR 003 NY CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NIPEL 3/25/75 SENT 9:25 AM 3/26/75 GMD
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM:
SAC, NEW YORK
ATTN:
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU TELETY PE, MARCH 24, 1975.
39
NEW YORK HAS ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Chap. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Budgeti
acchanting
MATTERS (DIVISION III) AND ONE SAC ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTERS (DIVISION IV). THERE ARE NO ASACS IN NEW YORK
OFFICE.
SAC, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (III) SPENDS FULL-TIME
ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
SAC, INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION (IV) SPENDS 40 PERCENT
OF HIS TIME ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 60 PERCENT IS
SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.
SIX SUPERVISORS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND
14 SUPERVISORS HANDLE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
114 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND
331 AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
END.
JTG FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 362
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
KAUNIS UNCLASSIFIED
6028 JEH
DATE: 1/17/01 BY SPE 2 ALM/2765
3/A
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 363
62-116395-56
MAR 26 9 30 AM *75 ·
TELETYPE UNIT
RECEIVED!
.55
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1
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محمد
11.
1
{
NR 002 NF PLAIN
444PM NITEL 3-26-75 SNB
TO DIRECTOR
FROM NORFOLK (66-981)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBUTEL TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.
FOLLOWING IS INFORMATION REQUESTED IN RETEL:
POSITION
INTERNAL SECURITY
40
$$28
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Assoc. Dir.
'Dep.-A.D.-Adm._
Den.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Carin. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fi & Com.
Ga. Inv.
Ident.
In
Int 11.
Larry
Plan. &val.
Spe. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
ONE SUPERVISOR
THREE SAS
50 PER CENT OF TIME
50 PER CENT OF TIME
10 PER CENT OF TIME
TWO SAS
THREE SAS
75 PER CENT OF TI ME
50 PER CENT OF TIME
20 PER CENT OF TIME
0
TOTAL AGENT PERSONNEL OF NORFOLK OFFICE ASSIGNED IS ONE
SUPERVISOR AND EIGHT AGENTS FOR PERCENTAGES INDICATED ABOVE.
END
DBS FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 364
#moe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM1276
3/17
740
༑༑
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 365
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NR008 OC PLAIN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
9:30PM MARCH 25,-1975
NITEL DSM MAR 265 $975
ΤΟ
DIRECT OR
Dew
TELETYPE
FROM
OKLAHOMA CITY
(105-2398)
41
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Corp. Syst.
Et Affairs
Fa & Com.
(r
mv.
I
+
Ir
I.
I
27
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECT IO N
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBUT EL MARCH 24, 1975.
1
Plan & Eval.
Sp. Inv.
Tr. ining
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
THE SAC AND THE ASAC OF THE OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE ARE NOT
ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THE
OKLAHOMA CITY OFFICE HAS NO SUPERVISOR OR SPECIAL AGENT ASIGNED
FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND / OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS.
FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN IN PERCENTAGES OF SUPERVISOR AND
AGENT'S TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNT ER INTELL IGENCE
MATTERS:
NUMBER
INTERNAL SECURITY
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
SUPERVISOR
1
75
5
SA'S
31
615
OF THE THIRTY-ONE SPECIAL AGENT S, IT IS NOTED THAT 8 ARE
ASSIGNED 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS BUT ACCOUNT FOR 550 PER CENT OT THE
615 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY TIME AND 62 PERCENT OT THE 65 PERCENT
OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE TIME.
END PAGE 1
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 366
#MDE16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
RAREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAVE 1/17/01 BTSP-2 ALM/#76
3/17
PAGE 2
OC 105-2398
IN SUMMARY, THERE IS 75 AND .05 SUPERVISORY EQUIVALENT
•
TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINT ELL IEG ENCE,
RESPECTIVELY.
THERE ARE 6.15 AND 65 AGENT EQUIVALENT TIME
•
SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE, RESPECTIVELY.
END
ACK FOR 1 TJT FBI WASH DC CL
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 367
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MAR 25 1975
in
TELETYPE
42
=
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
NR 004 OM CODE
4:38 PM NITEL 3/25/75 BJP
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR
OMAHA
ION =
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELÈCT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Plan. & Eval.
-
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Secy
-
Budist & Unit
GORK JEH
RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL OFFICES MARCH 24, 1975.
OMAHA CURRENTLY HAS SEVEN AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO
INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS, WITH TWO AGENTS SPENDING 60 PER
CENT AND TWO AGENTS SPENDING 25 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME ON
IS MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT
OF HIS TIME ON IS MATTERS.
TWO AGENTS AND ONE SUPERVISOR SPEND APPROXIMATELY 10 PER
CENT OF THEIR TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
END
MSE FBIHQ
:
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 369
#MORIS
ALI, INFORMATION CONTAINED
PRINS CLASSIFIED
DAY 1/17/01 DE SP. 2:1/1888
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 370
62-116395-56

FEDERAL BUNEAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
43
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
De A.D.-Inv..
A. Dir.:
C
Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fil.Com.
G
Inv.
TELETYPE
NR 002 PH CODE
245 PM URGENT
MARCH 26, 1975 DMS
TO:
DIRECTOR
FROM:
PHILADELPHIA (66-NEW) (P)
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
.
REBUTEL, MARCH 24,
1975.
Id it.
Indon
Ini !!.
Laimes av
Pl.
Eval
Spr
Trng
Legal Cun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
✓ Bucket Hock
PHILA. DIVISION UT IL IZES FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ON INTERNAL
SECURITY (IS) INCLUDING EXTREMISTS, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)
MATTERS:
IS
CI
1 SAC
1 AS.AC
5
50
1 SUPERVISOR
LOO
1 SUPERVISOR
100
13 SAS AT HEADQUARTERS
100
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS
50
9 SAS AT HEADQUARTERS
100
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS
75
1 SA AT HEADQUARTERS
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 371
85
#MOR16
JEH
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
DATE 1/17/00 BY SP-2 ALM/176
3/0A
PH 66-NEW
PAGE TWO
THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SAS IN RAS:
IS
CI
1 SA
5
1 SA
45
45
1 SA
2
2
1 SA
50
25
1 SA
30
10
1 SA
75
20
1 SA
5
70
1 SA
2
5
1 SA
70
30
1 SA
10
1 SA
10
5
10
1 SA
55
15
1 SA
เก
5
1
1 SA
1 SA
1 SA
I
5
35
50
5
3
10
IN SUMMARY, 16 RAS AVERAGED 24 IS,
AND 19 CI.
END
KAC FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 372
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 373
MAR 26. 258 PM $75
· RECEIVED-
TELETYPE UNIT
62-116395-56
NR 003 PX PCODE
12:35 AM MARCH 26, 1975 NITEL JRL
ΤΟ
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 2.6 1975
TELETYPE
DIRECTOR (ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECT)
FROM PHOENIX (100-8529) (1P)
SENATE SELECT COMMITEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975.
44
PHOENIX DIVISION HAS FOLLOWING AGENT PERSONNEL ASSIGNED
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS:
A. INTERNAL SECURITY
Asst. Dir.
Dep. A.D.-Adm. _
I-A.D.-Inv.
Art. Dir.:
Amin..
Chip. Syst.
Ex Affairs
& Com.
G.n. Inv.
Ident.
In
Inspection
Laverty
17.
Pha val
Sp.
Tr. ining
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director See'y
6028
END
ONE SUPERVISOR
-
40 PER CENT
TWO AGENTS -100 PER CENT
TWO AGENTS
-
75 PER CENT
THREE AGENTS - 50 PER CENT
B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1. DOMESTIC
-
NONE
2. FOREIGN-
7MBR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HARBIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BISP-2 AUNITE
MPM FBIHQ CLR
ONE SUPERVISOR
30 PER CENT
ONE AGENT
-
100 PER CENT
TWO AGENTS- 25 PER CENT
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 374
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 375
62-116395-56
i
NR 09 PG PLAIN
7:35 PM NITEL-MARCH 25, 1975 RGM
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR, FBI
PITTSBURGH (62-NEW)
FEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
45
تجمد ملام
REBUNIȚEL MARCH 24, 1975.
60
THERE ARE 110 SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE PITTSBURGH
OFFICE (75 HEADQUARTERS CITY AGENTS, 35 RESIDENTS AGENTS (RAS)).
ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) FULL TIME.
ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) FULL TIME.
11 HEADQUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED CI FULL TIME AND 7 HEAD-
QUARTERS AGENTS ASSIGNED IS FULL TIME.
RESIDENT AGENT ASSIGNMENTS AS FOLLOWS:
の RAS 2 PERCENT CI
5
RAS 2 PERCENT IS
3
RAS 3 PERCENT CI
2
RAS 3 PERCENT IS
3
RAS 5 PERCENT CI
I
RA 4 PERCENT IS
2
RAS 6 PERCENT CI
2
RAS 5 PERCENT IS
3
RAS 7 PERCENT CI
I
RA 7 PERCENT IS
2
RAS 8 PERCENT CI
2
RAS 11 PERCENT IS
1 RA 25 PERCENT CI
END PAGE ONE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 376
1 RA 12 PERCENT IS
#MOR16
ALL TWFORMATION CONTAINED
PERRIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
PARE: 1-17-01 EX SP-2 ALM/116
DA
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm………………
Dep.-A.D.-Inv...
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inteli.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
-
Telephone Km.
Director Sec'y
-
-
3/00
PAGE TWO, PG 62-NEW
1 RA 16 PERCENT IS
I
RA 24 PERCENT IS
I
RA 28 PERCENT IS
THE ABOVE PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES WERE ARRIVED AT BY COMPARING
THE NUMBER OF CI AND IS CASES WITH THE TOTAL CASE LOAD OF EACH RA.
END
DBS FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 377
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NW 88296 Docld;32989628 Page 378
62-116395-56
NR 007 PD CODE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
8:57 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 LLD TELETYPE
TO:
FROM:
DIRECTOR
PORTLAND
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
46
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Fil & Com.
G. Inv.
Ident.
Ins ti n
-
-
I k
L ༄།།
rv
Plan Eval.
Spe. Inv.
i frien
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director See'y
PORTLAND HAS TWO SUPERVISORY DESKS HANDLING SECURITY
MATTERS. ONE DESK HANDLES ALL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI) AND
ACCOUNTING MATTERS. BOTH DESKS HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY (IS)
AND SOME CRIMINAL MATTERS. BECAUSE OF OFFICE SIZE, PERSONNEL
OF BOTH DESKS NECESSARILY PARTICIAPTE IN BANK ROBBERY AND
OTHER MAJOR CRIMINAL MATTERS.
ALTHOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS,
SAC EXPENDS TIME IN DIRECTIONAL AND OVERSIGHT CAPACITY ON CI
AND IS MATTERS.
ESTIMATED SUPERVISORY TIME SPENT ON SECURITY MATTERS
EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGE:
SAC (ONE), 5 PERCENT CI, 5 PERCENT IS.
ASAC (ONE), NONE.
SUPERVISORS (TWO), 45 PERCENT CI, 85 PERCENT IS.
AGENTS AND PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON SECURITY MATTERS:
#MDR16
ALT, INFORMATION CONTAININ
HERE 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAY 1-17-01 BY SP-2-ALM-KATG
-
3/DA
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 379
PAGE TWO
CI:
90 PERCENT
-
TWO
80 PERCENT
-
TWO
70 PERCENT
-
TWO
IS:
90 PERCENT
->
FOUR
80 PERCENT
-
SIX
50 PERCENT
-
TWO
40 PERCENT
-
TWO
20 PERCENT
-
O NE
10 PERCENT
-
FOUR.
LOWER PERCENTAGES ATTEMPT TO ACCOUNT FOR TIME SPENT
BY RESIDENT AGENTS IN COVERING LEADS IN THESE FIELDS AND TO
DISCOUNT TIME SPENT ON OTHER MATTERS BY HEADQUARTERS AGENTS.
END.
TJT FBI WASH DCC LR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 380

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NR 004 RH PLAIN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 5 1975
3:50 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975 EJM
✓
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SEC.
FROM RICHMOND
1P
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
REBUTEL TO ALL SACS MAR 24, 1975.
些
Asste Pin
Dep-AD-A
Dep-1D-I
Arti
Ai
Ext. Afins
FL & Com
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Insertion
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
Budge
Room Hale yen
RICHMOND HAS ONE AGENT ASSIGNED APPROXIMATELY 30 PER CENT
OF HIS TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND NO AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR DEVOTES LESS
THAN 5 PERCENT OF HIS TIME TO SUCH CASES.
END
DBS FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 382
#Mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 DYSP-2
ALM/186
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MAR 25 5 00 PM ˚75
NR002 SC PLAIN
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9:23 AM URGENT 3/27/75 VLS
ΤΟ
FROM
DIRECTOR
SACRAMENTO (66-511)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 27 1975
TELETYPE
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS 
UNCLASSIFIED
48
DATE 1-17-01 BISP-2-ALM/196
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.
سا
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv...
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gon. Inv.
Ident.
In action
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spre. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Budget
IN HEADQUARTERS, SACRAMENTO HAS ONE SUPERVISOR ASSIGEND FULL
TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. 7 AGENTS
ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS; 3 AGENTS ARE
ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS; 1 AGENT EXPENDS
75 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO INTERNAL
SECURITY.
IN RESIDENT AGENCIES, 1 AGENT WITH 90 PERCENT ON INTERNAL
SECURITY AND 10 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE; 1 AGENT WITH 50 PERCENT
INTERNAL SECURITY AND 50 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. 7 RAS HANDLE
VARIETY OF CLASSIFICATIONS AND ALSO HANDLE INTERNAL SECURITY AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. THESE 7 AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 25
PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS (20 PERCENT INTERNAL SECURITY, 5 PERCENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE).
END
FBIHQ CLR SMD
NM 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 384
3/19
MAR 27 12 28 PM °75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
PM *75
WED
YPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 385
62-116395-36
NR 001 SL PLAIN
8:30AM
ΤΟ
URGENT 3/27/75 TJO
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 27 1975
M
TELETYPE
49
✓ Budget & Printing
پاک
SECTION
PU: G
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM ST. LOUIS (94-297) RUC
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBUNITEL TO ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Int ll.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spee. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
πMori6
ARVEY:N CONTAIN
HORREN IN UMAANSIFIED
-
DATE: 1-17-01 DX SP2 ALM/7065
THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELL IGENCE MATTERS
IN THE ST. LOUIS DIVISION AS REQUESTED BY RE COMMUNICATION.
NEITHER THE SAC OR THE ASAC ARE ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
ONLY ONE
SUPERVISOR IS ASSIGNED TO SUCH MATTERS, HE SPENDS APPROXIMATELY
55 PER CENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND TWO PERCENT ON
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTER S.
SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 75 PER CENT OF THEIR TIME
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND ONE PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS.
THE REMAINING AGENTS SPEND NO TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
MATTERS BUT SPEND THE LISTED PERCENTAGE OF TIME ON INTERNAL
SECURITY: THREE AGENTS, 50 PERCENT; THREE AGENTS, 25 PERCENT;
ONE AGENT, 10 PERCENT; TWO AGENTS, 5 PERCENT, TWO AGENTS, 2
PERCENT.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 386
3/047
PAGE TWO SL94-297
ABOVE FIGURES REFLECT BOTH HEAD QUARTERS CITY AND
RESIDENT AGENTS IN THIS DIVISION.
END
JDR
FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 387
RECEIVED
TÉLETYPE UNIT
MAR 27 9 34 AM *75*
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 388
62-116395-56
ལ)ཀ
NR006 SU PLAIN
FEDERAL BURLAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
8:46 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
#MOR.1.6...
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
MARTIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
50
1-12-01 SPZ96
(ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM: SALT LAKE CITY
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep. A.D.-Investor
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director See'y
Budar of Heat y
#Weets
Jell
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE (CI) -MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:
SAC: NONE.
ASAC:
TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).
SUPERVISORS: NONE.
SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI).
ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT
(15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CD. ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS,
10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS).
TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.
END. M
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 389
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 390
62-116395-56
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1

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NR006 SU PLAIN
846 AM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 VLD
TO:
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
Res
TELETYPE
PARENTOBUDE AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM: SALT LAKE CITY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
50?
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
✓ Budget rects
$2& ICH
RE BUREAU TELETYPE MARCH 24, 1975.
PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE (CI) MATTERS IN SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION AS FOLLOWS:
SAC:
ASAC:
NO NE.
TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS, 10 PERCENT CI).
SUPERVISORS:
NO NE.
SPECIAL AGENTS: ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT IS, 30 PERCENT CI).
ONE FULL TIME (70 PERCENT CI, 30 PERCENT IS). ONE TWENTY PERCENT
( 15 PERCENT IS, 5 PERCENT CD. ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT IS,
10 PERCENT CI). ONE TWENTY PERCENT (10 PERCENT CI, 10 PERCENT IS).
TWO TEN PERCENT EACH ON IS.
END.
JTG FBIHQ CLR
#moel6.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2AEN/816
3/bit
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 391
☐
MAR 26 10:57 AM 75
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 392
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
6:55PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975
TO
DIRECTOR
FROM
SAN ANTONIO
MAR
LPP
Dow
TELETYPE
✓
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION.
REBUTEL, MARCH 24, 1975.
51
R-602
SAC ONLY SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL HANDLING SUPERVISION
OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN SAN
ANTONIO OFFICE. ASAC AND SUPERVISORS HAVE NO SUPERVISION OF
THESE MATTERS. SAC SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 20 PER CENT OF TIME ON
SUPERVISION OF INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS AND TEN PER CENT OF TIME
ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
THREE AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS
AND 4TH AGENT DEDICATES APPROXIMATELY 50 PER CENT OF HIS TIME TO
THESE MATTERS.
FIVE AGENTS ASSIGNED EXCLUSIVELY TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, THIS
BEING A MATTER BEING HANDLED AS A SPECIAL.
END.......
#MDRIG
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp St
Ext. Affairs
Filem.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
Inspection
Labat ry
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Km.
Director Sec'y
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALIA/286
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 393
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NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 394
62-116395-56
☑
]
NR Ø2 SD COD ED
*12:11AM MARCH 26 1975 NITEL GDF
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAN DIEGO (66-NEW)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
52
AR 26 1975
TELETYPE
'ATTN:
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESŲ
ES✓
Ват
6A
REBUTEL TO ALL SAC'S, MARCH 24, 1975.
Assce. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm._
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
A
୯
Ext. Affir3
Wike C Cora.
Chen. Inv..
Ident.
Trip 2.2
In tell.
Laboratory
Plan. al.
Spec. Inv.
Trining
Legal Can.
JEH, Telephone Rm.
Director e'y
THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS SUPERVISORY AND AGENT TIME DEVOTED
TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS IN THE SAN
DIEGO DIVISION:
SAC - SIX PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST
MATTERS; TWO PER CENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
AS AC- SIX PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND EXTREMIST MATTERS;
TWO PERCENT ON COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
-
ONE SUPERVISOR
-
40 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS;
40 PER CENT ON COUNTER INTELL IGENCE MATTERS.
ONE SUPERVISOR
-
20 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.
SEVEN AGENTS
-
EACH 100 PERCENT ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
TEN AGENT S
-
EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY
MATTERS.
FOUR AGENTS
-
END
THAT IS ALL
SSSSSSSS
MPM FBIHQ CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 395
EACH 100 PERCENT OF TIME ON EXTREMIST MATTERS.
моль
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
BEREIN IS UICIASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BT SP-2 ALM/776
3/02
4
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MAR 26 3, 17 AN
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 396
C.
NR 004 SF CODE
12:28 PM URGENT 3/26/75 MCC
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
FROM SAN FRANCISCO
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
ATTN BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
RE BUNITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.
THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN EXCLUDES ON A PERCENTAGE BASIS
Assoc.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.......
Dep.-A.D.-Inv...
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Budget Reconsis
MAN DAYS SPENT ON CRIMINAL MATTERS BY AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES.
SAN FRANCISCO HAS 70 AGENTS AND 5 SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED
FULL TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY. IT HAS 73 AGENTS AND 3 SUPERVISORS
FULL TIME AND ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR 25 PER CENT TIME ASSIGNED
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. ONE SAC AND ONE ASAC 25 PER CENT EACH
ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE.
END
IEWTZ
JTG FBIHQ
*
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 397
#mDe16
CE, TUFORMATION CONTAINED
TU IS UNCLASSIFIED,
DAR: 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/216
3/DA
·:༑
REUNIT.
MAR 26 3:26 PM 75
你
NW 88296 Docld;32989628 Page 398.
62-116395-56"
NRØ03 SJ CODE
10:06 PM NITEL 3-25-75 JXC
FEDERAL BURFAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
TELETYPE
54
As
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep. A DIV
Asst:
Admin.
Comp
Ext. Affairs
Files &M.
Gen. Inv.
Idit.
Inspertion
Intel.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
ATTENTION: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
FROM SAN JUAN.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
EL
Budget Vet
облем
REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALL SPECIAL AGENTS IN CHARGE
DATED MARCH 24, 1975, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.
THE FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF SUPERVISOR AND AGENT
PERSONNEL IN THE SAN JUAN DIVISION ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY
MATTERS:
-
ONE SUPERVISOR FULL TIME; ONE SUPERVISOR TWENTY PER
CENT OF THE TIME; FOURTEEN SPECIAL AGENTS
-
-
FULL TIME; THREE
SPECIAL AGENTS
-
END.
FIFTY PER CENT OF THE TIME.
AT THIS TIME, THE SAN JUAN DIVISION HAS NO COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE MATTERS IN A PENDING STATUS; THEREFORE, NO AGENT PERSONNEL
ARE ASSIGNED TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
DBS FBIHQ ACK FOR ONE GA
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 399
#MORIE
2 mm/116
ALLFORMATION CONTAINED
EN IS CLASSIPIND
DATE 1-17-01 BISP-2 ALM
3/17
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 400.
62-116395-56.
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NR002 SV CODE
715 PM NITEL 3/25/75 PNR
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
FROM SAVANNAH
FEDERAL BULLAU OF INVESTIG
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 25 1975
5 1975
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
REBUNITEL ALL SACS MARCH 24, 1975.
55
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adra.
Dep.A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Iaw.
Ident
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
IN RESPONSE TO RENITEL, THE FOLLOWING BREAKDOWN IN PERSOnnel
ASSIGNED INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS BEING
SET FORTH:
INTERNAL SECURITY
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
1 SAC
:0
0
1 ASAC
0-
0
1 SUPERVISOR
40 PERCENT
10 PERCENT
1 AGENT
"
90
0
1 AGENT
50
"
10 PERCENT
1 AGENT
10
"
0
1 AGENT
0
30 PERCENT
ALL OTHER AGENTS' ACCUMULATIVE TOTAL OF TIME WOULD EQUAL 10 PER-
CENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND O FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FOR ONE
AGENT.
END
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 401
#nDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HINDI 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 11/20/ ZALM/6186
p.ས
3/4
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NW 88296 Doçid:32989628 Page 402
62-116395-56
1. I
1
EVERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NR002 SE CODED
3:59 PM NITEL MARCH 25, 1975
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
FROM
SEATTLE
SELEC
MAR 5 1975
U
CSC
Bude
ONE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU NITEL, MARCH 24, 1975.
56
SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO INTERNAL
SECURITY MATTERS:
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.......
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ert. Affairs
F&Com.
G 1. Inv.
Idt.
I
tin
Lactory
_
-
Plan. & Eval
Spc. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Secy
ONE SUPERVISOR- FULLTIME; FIVE AGENTS
-
FULLTIME; THREE
AGENTS
-
85PERCENT OF THEIR TIME.
SEATTLE DIVISION HAS THE FOLLOWING ASSIGNMENTS TO COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS:
ONE SUPERVISOR:
END
HOLD FOR ONE MORE
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 403
80 PER CENT OF TIME; SEVEN AGENTS
-
FULLTIME.
#PM0R16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
REIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 
1-17-01 BY SP-2 
ALM
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MAR 25,789 PM '75-
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TELETYPE UNIT
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NW 88296 Docid:32989628,' Page 404
62-116395-56.
ཏྭཱ་
...!
Infow
'
NR 013 SI CODE
10:22 PM NITEL 3-26-75 DJK
FEDERAL BUKŁAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
57
Assoc. Dir.
Dop-AD-Adm.
DAD-I
Dir:
Syck
Fat Affairs
& Com.
12
TO DIRECTOR
DXREC:
CATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION)
FROM SPRINGFIELD (66
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SAC'S MARCH 24, 1975.
Pla
ry
Eval
-
Legal Cu
Teleph Rm.
Director See'y
AN ESTIMATE OF THE TIME SPENT BY AGENTS OF THE SPRINGFIELD
DIVISION ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
IS AS FOLLOWS:
THIRTY-SIX AGENTS SPEND APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF THEIR
TIME ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. ONE OF THE ABOVE SAS SPENDS
APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS,
AND ONE OTHER SA SPENDS APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ONE SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY
25 PERCENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND APPROXIMATELY 5 PERCENT ON
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHILE ANOTHER SUPERVISOR SPENDS APPROXIMATELY
15 PERCENT OF HIS TIME ON INTERNAL SURITY MATTERS.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 405
FMDR16
LIN INPORATION CONTAINER
HAIN 
IS CLASSIFIED
LAND 1-1201 3X SPZ ALMIG
3
รุ
SI 66-
PAGE TWO
THE SPRINGFIELD DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SQUADS OF
AGENTS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO THESE MATTERS AND THE ABOVE
ESTIMATE HAS BEEN DETERMINED FROM THE UTILIZATION OF TIMES
SPENT DURING A TWO-WEEK PERIOD ON MATTERS BY AGENTS OF THE
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION.
END
DBS FBIHQ CLR
37.17
x
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 406
MAR 26 11 33 PM 75
RECEIVED
TELETYPE UNIT
62-116395-56
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 407
NR Ø10 TP CODE
FEDERAL DUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
6-10PM NITEL MARCH 26, 1975 JFD
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR
FROM
TAMPA (105-0)
MAR 26 1970
TELETYPE
ATTN: BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
58
Recount.
Budig
602/2/106
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
RE BUNITEL MARCH 24, 1975, REQUESTING THAT EACH SAC SUTEL
THE NUMBER OF AGENTS ASSIGNED TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
Assoc Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. ir.:
Admin.
Comp Svst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intl.
Lab alry
Plan. & Eval.
Spec Inv.
Trig
Legal un.
Telephone Rm.
Direct See'v
TAMPA HAS ONE SQUAD WHICH HANDLES INTERNAL SECURITY AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS AS WELL AS OTHER CLASSIFICATIONS,
SUCH AS APPLICANT, SELECTIVE SERVICE, DESERTERS, AND EXTREMISTS.
NO NE OF THE AGENTS ARE ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO INTERNAL
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
1 AGENT WHO IS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
THE PERCENTAGE OF AGENT TIME SPENT ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS IS AN ACCUMULATION OF THE TIME SPENT
BY EACH AGENT WORKING SUCH MATTERS.
INTERNAL SECURITY SUPERVISOR, 20 PERCENT; AGENTS, 3.5
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
END
-
NW-88296 Docld:32989628-Page 408-
SUPERVISOR, 15 PERCENT; AGENTS,
#mor16
AIL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERNIN 
IS UNCLASSIFED
1.5.
Pa 1-17-013: SP-ZALM/16
3106
NR004 WF CODED
2:57 PM URGENT 3-26-75 KLS
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 26 1975
TELETYPE
TO:
DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: 1 SAC, WFO
+
ATTENTION BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING SECTION
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
59
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. _
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Agst. Lir.:
A'.
୯
3. Syst.
Affairs
☐ Com.
G.. Inv.
✓
Вис
I
tion
Int.
Loratory
Eval.
Inv.
g
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
REGARDING BUREAU NITEL DATED MARCH 24, 1975.
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (WFO) HAS ONE ASAC DEVOTING
12 PERCENT OF TIME TO INTERNAL SECURITY (IS) AND 78 PERCENT
TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CD MATTERS, THE REMAINING 10
PERCENT BEING ADMINISTRATIVE, POLICE AND LIAISON DUTIES.
IN ADDITION, WFO HAS 162 SPECIAL AGENTS AND 6
SUPERVISORS ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO CI, AND 21 SPECIAL
AGENTS AND I SUPERVISOR ASSIGNED FULL TIME TO IS MATTERS. ·
ONE ADDITIONAL SUPERVISOR DEVOTES 75 PERCENT OF HIS TIME
TO CI MATTERS AND 25 PERCENT TO IS MATTERS.
END.
JRM FBIHQ
CLR
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 409
#толь
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 1-12-01 BI. SP-2 ALM/JTE
3/DA
LEA
pier
Hanaly
1-3
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 410
39773JG7
0
J'
.I
MAR 26 3.02 PM 75
TELETYPE UNIT
RECEIVED
662-116395-56
T :I

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GS GEN: REGENO. 27
3010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
ROUTE I ENVELOPE
Memorandum TYP
ΤΟ
: Mr. J. B. Adams
SECRET
1 Mr. J. B. Adams
-
1 Mr. J. A. Mintz
-
Downgraded to SECREPATE: 4/4/75
60324 
UC BAW/SAB/ML =
1/12/2011
FROM : W. R. Wannall
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
RODERICKT HILLS, ASSOCIATE-
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINER
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED FICAT.
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWIS
1
-
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
0R16 1-17-01
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM1776
DECLASSIFY ON: 
25X_)
So) 124
Memorandum captioned as above, 3/27/75, from Legal
Counsel to you, noted that you and Wannall were to meet with
Mr. Hills and Mr. Phillip Buchen, Counsel to the President,
on 3/28/75. Your addendum to the memorandum pointed out the
results of this meeting and the various matters discussed.
Assoc. Dir ☐
Dep. AD. Adm.
Dep, AD Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Inver
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
As a follow-up to this meeting, you, Legal Counsel
Mintz and Wannall met on 4/4/75 with Mr. James Wilderotter,
who is presently working under Mr. Buchen in coordinating
intelligence community matters relating to the inquiries
underway by the Senate Select Committee. Mr. Wilderotter was
given a briefing similar to that which had been afforded to
Buchen and Hills. In addition, the discussion covered matters f
of a sensitive nature relating to the DTC RACHID and similar programs.--
electronic surveillances, specialized handling of informants,"
and Bureau Source 4 (access to social security records). Many of
these matters discussed covered topics with which Mr. Wilderotter
had become familiar when he was assigned to the Department as an
Assistant to former Deputy Attorney General Silberman.
Wilderotter said it was the feeling at The White House
that while raw FBI files should not be made available to the
Committee, it might be necessary to permit the Committee to review
a few such files in order that the integrity of the FBI could be
established with the Committee. It was pointed out to him that
we did not agree to this that we could furnish summaries of
material from the files Wilderotter said he did not feel that
WRW:dsh
(5) dak
REC-11-62-1163
TOP SECRET
CONTINUED OVER
1.
APR 11 1975
Classified by 12
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
4APR 16 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 411
5-607?
1
TOP SECRET
RE:
Memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES;
RODERICKHLĻSASSOCIATE
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
furnishing reports and letterhead memoranda which had been
prepared for dissemination would satisfy the Committee's
needs. He was advised by both you and Mr. Mintz that it was
our feeling that we should not furnish the raw material but
summaries could be prepared for the Committee's purposes and
if necessary, Bureau officials could be placed under oath
and attest to the correctness of the summaries. Wilderotter
said that this was a matter which he would afford further
consideration.
As during the conference with Buchen and Hills,
it was obvious as the result of our meeting with Wilderotter
that The White House was most anxious that it not be caught
by surprise by revelations of activities which in any way
might be considered questionable. The White House is making
every effort possible to become cognizant of any such situation
prior to the Committee hearings.
Classified "Top Secret" to protect highly sensitive
investigative techniques and matters relating to foreign
relations.
ACTION:
For information. Further contacts with Wilderotter
or other White House Staff Members will be duly reported.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 412
джа
TOP
SECRET
2
-
PLM
ghin
TO
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. W. R. Wannalī
W. Negar
FROM
:
C
SUBJECT SENSTUDY 75
DATE:
--
4/4/75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory _
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
This will confirm that on 4/4/75 Mr. James Wilderotter
of the White House orally approved the Bureau's dissemination to the
Senate Select Committee the following two memoranda: confidential
memorandum of J. Edgar Hoover dated 8/24/36, confidential memorandum
from John Edgar Hoover dated 8/25/36, both dealing with conversations
Mr. Hoover had with the President.
ACTION:
For record purposes.
WOC:aso (3)
1 Mr. Cregar
1
-
Mr. A. L. Lacey
iligi
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-17-01 BY SP-J-A2M/776
22
54APR 1 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 413
REC-5: 62-116395-5
12 APR 8 1975
5-106
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
27
3:
Loga Counsel Division
(1-Mr. Farrington)
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr W. O. Cregar
1
1 1
•
April 8, 1975
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Lego
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Reference is made to a letter from the Senate
Select Committee dated March 19, 1975, requesting certain
documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum which constitutes
a response to a request set forth in referenced letter.
A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your records.
Processing of the additional requests is continuing on an
expeditious basis and further responses will be forthcoming.
Enclosures 2
EWL: jvl
(7)
MAILED 7
APR 9 1975
57 APR 16 1975
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
-
-FBI
2.
дет
Ena
#MDR16.....
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEIN, IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY 582-72/216
nive
ENCLOSURE /
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 414
REC-38
EX-110
вет
62.116=15.53
5 APR 10 1975
U
GPO 954-545
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
2
1
1
--
WE
Legal Counsel Division
(1-Mr.Farrington)
Mr W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
April 8, 1975
UNITED STATES SETIATE SELECT COMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Reference is made to letter dated March 19, 1975,
to the Attorney General from the Chairman of captioned
Committee, which enclosed certain requests for documents
and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI).
One of the requests contained in referenced letter
was for a list of names and titles of all Intelligence
Division personnel at FBI Headquarters down to and including
unit chiefs, together with a number of personnel below the
level of unit chief categorized by unit. At a meeting on
April 1, 1075, Inspector John B. Hotis and Special Agent
Paul V. Daly discussed this request with Mr. William Miller,
Staff Director of the Senate Select Committed. It was
agreed that the request as stated would be modified and that
the FBI would prepare a list of personnel in the Intelligence
Division down to the level of unit chief, with names included,
which would be made available for roview by appropriately
cloared personnel of the committee staff at FBI Headquarters.
This is to advise that the list has been prepared
and is available for review under the above conditions.
1
-
The Attorney General
EWL:jvl
(7)
leviral to
MAIL ROOM
дат
Jups
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 415
PM
ENGL
#MDR16
SIL VIWORMATION CONTAINED
ALL IS UNCLASSIFIED
2 1/17/01 SP JALM1
"Jamby" wew
62-116395-
53
GPO 954-545
#mor16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2 ALM/706
ассеге
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 416
only
chuch 7/28
#mpe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
S UNCLASSIFIED
ON THIS
ENVELOPE
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-2. ALMitic
62-111-375-53
ENCLOSURE
NW-88296--Docld:32989628-Page 417-
#mor16 11701
CLASSIFIED 
BY SP-2 
ALM/ZTG
DECLASSIFY ON: 
25XK6.
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
ALL INFONY COSTAŁY
HOKSELN IS US CASTED
W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director
IV
Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch
4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
F. Anthony Tansey
Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector Deputy Assistant Director
Internal Security Branch
Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor
Harry E. Morris,
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
Jr.
William A. Branigan
Eugene C. Peterson
Special Cases Unit
Section CI-1
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
James P. Lee
Unit Chief
Five Special Agents
New York Unit
Alfred E. Smith
Unit Chief
Five Special Agents
Washington Unit Chief
Wilfred R. Schlarman
<
Four Special Agents
Unit Chief
One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.
Section CI-2
William O. Cregar
James W. Redfield
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
This document is prepared in response
your request and is not for dissemination
outside your Committee. Its use is limited
to official proceedings by your Committee and
the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized
/personnel without the express approval of the FBI.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 418
Chinese Unit
Herbert J. Morgan
Five Special Agents
Satellite Unit
Unit Chief
Howard H. Wallace
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Coordination Unit
John P. Thomas
Two Special Agents
Forrest S. Putman, Jr.
Sebastian S. Mignosa
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit
Richard J. Doily
Four Special Agents
(5)
Unit Chief
Section CI-3
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
Unit
Chie
Middle East Unit
Carl F. Freeman
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
(5)
Far East Unit
William W. Hamilton
Two Special Agents
Unit Chief
Cuban Unit
Charles H. McCarthy
Unit Chief
Two Special Agents
Nationality Unit
Vinicio Henry Nasca
Two Special Agents
Home A. Boynton, Jr.
H. C. Flemister, Jr.
Liaison Supervisors
Six
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 419
Unit Chief
Section CI-4
-
2
-
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
AGNET
Foreign Liaison Unit
Robert A. Bermingham
Two Special Agents
Unit Chief
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH
Joseph G. Deegan
William H. Atkinson
Black Nationalist and White
Hate
-
Central Unit
William D. Neumann
Two Special Agents
Black Nationalist and White
Hate - East unit
Paul E. Nugent
Two Special Agents
IS-1 Section
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
Black Nationalist and White
Hate
-
West Unit
Garnett T. Tunstall
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Black Nationalist
WAD
South,
Klan and Informant Unit
Homer A. Newman, Jr.
Two Special Agents
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit
Seymor F.. Phillips
Two Special Agents
Robert L. Shackelford
Conrad W. Thompson
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 420
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
IS-2 Section
3
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
1

!
Trotskyist Unit
George J. Lex, Jr.
Three Special Agents
Communist Party Unit
Louis J. Brune, Jr.
Three Special Agents
Security Informant Unit
Edward P. Grigalus
Two Special Agents
Extremist-West Unit
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
k
William N. Preusse
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Extremist-East Unit
Thomas J. McNiff
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Arthur B. Fulton
Section IS-3
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
Fred J. Cassidy
Training Unit
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Central Research Unit
Robert P. Finzel
Unit Chief
Four Special Agents
Special Records and Related
Research Unit
Unit Chief
Russell H. Horner
Two Special Agents
Analytical Research Unit
David Ryan
Seven Special Agents
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 421
4
Unit Chief
1
#mor16 1-17-01-
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 
ALM/2016
DECLASSIFY 
ON: 
25X6
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
W. Raymond Wannall
Assistant Director
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINE
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXOPO
WHERE SHOWN OFFERVISE.
Thomas W. Leavitt
Inspector
-
Deputy Assistant Director
Counterintelligence Branch
4:00 p.m. to midnight Supervisor
F. Anthony Tansey
Hunter E. Helgeson
Inspector - Deputy Assistant Director
Internal Security Branch
Midnight to 8:00 a.m. Supervisor
Harry E. Morris, Jr.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
William A. Branigan
Eugene C. Peterson
Special Cases Unit
James P. Lee
Section CI-1
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
Unit Chief
Five Special Agents
New York Unit
Alfred E. Smith
Unit Chief
Five Special Agents
Washington Unit Chief
Wilfred R. Schlarman
Four Special Agents
Unit Chief
One Special Agent on special assignment at National War College.
Section CI-2
William O. Cregar
James W. Redfield
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
This document is prepared in response
to your request and is not for dissemination
outside your Committee. Its use is limited .
to official proceedings by your Committee and
the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized
personnel without the express approval of the FBI.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 422
(5)
Chinese Unit
Herbert J. Morgan
Five Special Agents
Satellite Unit
Unit Chief
Howard H. Wallace
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Coordination Unit
John P. Thomas
Unit Chief
Two Special Agents
Section CI-3
Forrest S. Putman, Jr.
Sebastian S. Mignosa
Bombing-Antiriot Laws Unit
Richard J. Doily
Four Special Agents
Spe
(s)
Middle East Unit
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
Unit Chief
Carl F. Freeman
Unit Chief
·
Three Special Agents
Far East Unit
William W. Hamilton
Two Special Agents
(5)
Cuban Unit
Charles H. McCarthy
Two Special Agents
Nationality Unit
Vinicio Henry Nasca
Two Special Agents
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
Homer A. Boynton, Jr.
H. C. Flemister, Jr.
Liaison Supervisors
Six
Section CI-4
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 423
2
SECEZ
Foreign Liaison Unit
Robert A. Bermingham
Two Special Agents
i
13
Unit Chief
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH
IS-1 Section
Joseph G. Deegan
William H. Atkinson
Black Nationalist and White
Hate Central Unit
William D. Neumann
Two Special Agents
Black Nationalist and White
Hate
East Unit
Paul E. Nugent
Two Special Agents
Black Nationalist and White
Hate
-M
West Unit
Garnett T. Tunstall
Three Special Agents
-
Black Nationalist South,
Klan and Informant Unit
Homer A. Newman, Jr.
Two Special Agents
Civil Disorders Reporting Unit
Seymor F. Phillips
Two Special Agents
Robert L. Shackelford
Conrad W. Thompson
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 424
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
Unit Chief
IS-2 Section
02
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
Trotskyist Unit
George J. Lex, Jr.
Three Special Agents
Communist Party Unit
Unit Chief
Louis J. Brune, Jr.
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Security Informant Unit
Edward P. Grigalus
Two Special Agents
Extremist-West Unit
Unit Chief
William N. Preusse
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Extremist-East Unit
Thomas J. McNiff
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Arthur B. Fulton
Section IS-3
Section Chief
Number 1 Man
Fred J. Cassidy
Training Unit
Elmer W. Larson, Jr.
Unit Chief
Three Special Agents
Central Research Unit
Robert P. Finzel
Unit Chief
Four Special Agents
Special Records and Related
Research Unit
Unit Chief
Russell H. Horner
Two Special Agents
Analytical Research Unit
David Ryan
Seven Special Agents
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 425
Unit Chief
1
A
CONFIDENTIAL
THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
4/3/75
Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to
internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field
offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:
Special Agents
In Charge
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge.
Special Agent
Supervisors
Special Agents
Internal Security
.2.80
1.75
2.34
2.16
47.06
46.18
671.07
904.29
Total
Equivalent Full-
Year Agent
Employees
722.68
954.97
Counterintelligence
These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent
personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:
Special Agents
In Charge
.. 4.2%
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge
Special Agent
Supervisors
Percent of
Total Agent
Special Agents
Personnel
2.9%
11.9%
9.5%
9.5%
3.5%
3.6%
11.7%
12.8%
12.6%
Internal Security
Counterintelligence
7"
#MDR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/776
ON 1-17-01
. NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 426
KASTAMTRAY 639
CONFIDENTIAL
CRassified y
2 & 3
Exempt from CDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinito
CONFIDENTIAL
THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
4/3/75
Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to
internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field
offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:
Special Agents
In Charge
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge
Special Agent
Supervisors
Special Agents
Internal Security
2.80
2.34
1.75
2.16
47.06
46.18
671.07
904.29
Total
Equivalent Full-
Year Agent
Employees
722.68
954.97
Counterintelligence
These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent
personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:
Special Agents
In Charge
Assistant
Special Agents
'In Charge
Special Agent
Supervisors
Percent of
Total Agent
Special Agents
Personnel
Internal Security
4.2%
2.9%
11.9%
9.5%
9.5%
Counterintelligence
3.5%
3.6%
11.7%
12.8%
12.6%
#MORI6
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/ZK
ON 1-17-01
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 427;
9
Classified by
Exempt from CDS, Category
2 & 3
Date of Decke sification Indefinito
of Decke
mp3t
Op "
CONFIDENTIAL
THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
4/3/75
Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to
internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field
offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:
Special Agents
In Charge
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge.
Special Agent
Supervisors
Special Agents
Internal Security
2.80
1.75
2.34
2.16
47.06
46.18
671.07
904.29
Total
Equivalent Full-
Year Agent
Employees
722.68
954.97
Counterintelligence
These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent
personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:
Internal Security
Counterintelligence
Special Agents
In Charge
4.2%
3.5%
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge
Special Agent
Supervisors
Special Agents
Percent of
Total Agent
Personnel
2.9%
11.9%
9.5%
3.6%
11.7%
12.8%
12.6%
9.5%
MDRIG
DECLASSIFIED BY SP 2 ALM 1216
ON 1-17-01
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 428
CONFIDENTIAL
9
Cassified by
2 & 3
Exempt from DS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite
CONFIDENTIAL
THE NUMBER OF FBI FIELD OFFICE AGENTS ASSIGNED TO
INTERNAL SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS
4/3/75
Based on a survey of all FBI field offices, it has been determined that matters relating to
internal security and counterintelligence require the following commitment of manpower in FBI field
offices, stated in terms of equivalent full-year employees:
t
Special Agents
In Charge
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge
Special Agent
Supervisors
Special Agents
Internal Security
2.80
2.34
1.75
2.16
47.06
46.18
Counterintelligence
671.07
904.29
Total
Equivalent Full-
Year Agent
Employees
722.68
954.97
These equivalent full-year employees represent the following percentages of total field office agent
personnel assigned as of 2/28/75:
Internal Security
Counterintelligence
Special Agents
In Charge
4.2%
3.5%
Assistant
Special Agents
In Charge
Special Agent
Supervisors
Special Agents
Percent of
Total Agent
Personnel
2.9%
11.9%
9.5%
3.6%
11.7%
12.8%
12.6%
* MOR16
DECLASSIFIED BY SP-JAUNJ16
ON 1-17-01
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 429
9
CONFIDENTIAL
Exempt from CDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite
of pectussil
Classified
2 & 3
9.5%
FIFTY
FROM
CITIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAT 1962 EDITION
GENEO. 2711
5610-106
UNITED ST DES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
Mr. J. B. Adains
: Legal Counsel
SUBJECT: JOHN T. ELLIFF
C
DATE: 3-21-75
#MD316
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/23/01 BY SP-2 ALM/116
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICS
BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS
Asso D
Dep. AD Am.
Dop. AD Inv. .
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
On 3-18-75 Professor John T. Elliff advised Inspector John B.
Hotis that he had been contacted by William Miller, Staff Director for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, and was asked to serve
as Director of the Committee's Task Force on Domestic Intelligence. This
is one of four Task Forces being formed by the Select Committee and it
will focus primarily on the activities of the FBI. The other Task Forces
are on Foreign Intelligence, Military and Technological Intelligence, and
Command and Control.
ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-1152-7
Elliff said he had not decided whether to accept the offer
and believed that others were also being considered for the position. He
said he was reluctant to do anything that would interfere with the excellent
working arrangements he had developed with the Bureau. He feels that his
initial obligation is to the Director, and the purpose of going to the Police
Foundation was to get formal support for a project that would be of primary
benefit to the Bureau and only secondarily to the Attorney General and Congress
He said he would be guided by our judgment in this matter and not want to
break any commitments that he might have made with the Bureau.
ti
If he accepts the appointment Elliff said he would, of course,
suspend work on his research project until he had terminated his employment
with the Committee. He said he would also agree not to use any classified
material that he acquired in his capacity as Task Force Director. Elliff
has discussed this matter with John Heaphy, Assistant Director of the Police
Foundation. Heaphy said the Foundation had no objections whatsoever for
his accepting the position with the Senate Select Committee, and he would
be free to resume his project after the Committee work was done,
1 - Mr. Adams
1
sant
Mr. Wannall
1
-
Mr. Mintz
REC-10 62-116395-52
1 - Mr. Reed 1/
1 - Polon
-4
Mr
JBH:dkg (7)
-
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 430
1975
NOT RECORDED
102 APR 10 1975
TO MAR 201975
MONTER
CONTINUED - OVER
:

☑
B.C
Legal Counsel to Adams Memo
RE: JOHN T. ELLIFF
It should be noted that the Select Committee considered
offering the position to Larry Baskir, Counsel to the President's Clemency
Board. Mr. Baskir formerly served as Chief Counsel to Senator Ervin's
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, and we had numerous contacts
with him in that capacity. Our purpose was to reach some common agreement
on privacy legislation that Senator Ervin planned to introduce in the 93rd
Session of Congress. There were numerous meetings with Baskir on the
same subject in the Deputy Attorney General's office. These efforts proved
unsuccessful and after several months we discontinued the discussions.
In our opinion, Mr. Baskir was unwilling to work out any reasonable
compromise and seemed unsympathetic to the legislation concerns of law
enforcement.
It is clear that this is a matter for Professor Elliff to
determine and the Bureau should not express an official opinion. Although
we have not always agreed with his views on intelligence matters, we
have had no occasion to question his objectivity or his integrity as a scholar.
Mr. Miller knows that Professor Elliff enjoys our confidence and it is
our understanding that he offered Elliff the position in order to avoid an
adversary relationship between the Bureau and the Committee.
Professor Elliff said he would make no commitments to
the Senate Committee until he hears from us.
RECOMMENDATION:
That Professor Elliff be advised that it would be inappropriate
for us to express an opinion on whether he should accept the appointment
offered by the Senate Select Committee.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 431
½
2-
Par
Ina
Handles 3/25/750
нор
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962. EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITER STATES GO ERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
Cregar
FROM : W. 0.
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#NDRIE
MAAT 1-17-01 BY SP-2 ALM/J
ALL INFONCTION CONTAINED
HERMAL WNCLASSIFIED
ساتیں ہو رہا ہوں۔
1
1
G
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Adams
Mr. Mintz
DATE: 3/31/75
1
1
1
-
1
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Hotis
Mr. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Copnut
Evdi.
Plan. &
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
This memorandum reports the results of a meeting
of the Ad Hoc Coordinating Group on Congressional Review of
the Intelligence Community (hereafter referred to as the
Group), held at CIA Headquarters on the afternoon of 3/25/75.
Google
This meeting was chaired by Mr. Colby in his role
as the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance were
Mr. Philip Buchen, Counsel to the President; the then Deputy
AG Laurence Silberman, Associate Deputy AG James Wilderotter;
Mr. John Clarke, as well as officials from Defense, Treasury,
National Security Council, Office of Management and Budget,
and the Energy Research and Development Administration.
The following items of interest were discussed:
M
Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate
Select Committee (SSC), and the Committee's Counsel, Mr. F.A.O.
Schwarz, III, visited CIA Headquarters to discuss SSC business.
Mr. Miller suggested that a tactic the SSC was considering is
the identification of several key issues that the Committee
could look into in-depth. For example, the SSC might propose
to identify two or three covert actions engaged in by CIA and
examine them in-depth rather than try to cover each and every
covert action CIA might identify. Colby advised that this
appeared to be an encouraging development and possibly each
agency of the Intelligence Community might be asked to provide
a series of key issues from which the Select Committee could
select one or two for an in-depth study.
EX 104
REC-1062-116395-
51
The question of the SSC staff signing a Secrecy
Agreement is still not settled. The Staff Director raised
some constitutional questions regarding the Secrecy Agreement.
Mr. Schwarz admitted, however, that some type of arrangement-
would have to be made to insure that the Intelligence Community
had some protection against unauthorized disclosure
members of the SSC.
Enclosures
WOC:ebc
(7) be
-\342
ENCLOSURE
STAPR 1 A Je
16
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 2
by $æff
CONTINUED
-
OVER
5. Uns
-
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
SENSTUDY 75
RE:
Both Miller and Schwarz accepted the Third Agency
Rule and agreed to abide by it. For the record, the SSC's
interpretation of the Third Agency Rule (which is consistent
with the Intelligence Community) is as follows: Classified
information or material originating in one department shall
not be disseminated outside any other department to which it
has been made available without the consent of the originating
department.
The Security Committee of the United States Intelli-
gence Board (USIB) will meet to develop some ground rules and
standardization for sanitizing documents to be furnished to
the Select Committees.
The question of Intelligence Community personnel being
represented by counsel was discussed. The position of the White
House on this issue has been fully reported in a memorandum from
the Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams, dated 3/27/75, entitled "Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, Rodney Hills
Associate Counsel to the President."
It was also agreed at the meeting of 3/25/75 that the
President's Counsel would attempt to negotiate with the SSC to
insure that all interviews of Intelligence Community personnel
would be conducted on the premises of the bureau, agency or
department employing the persons to be interviewed.
Attached also for the record are the following:
A letter dated 3/20/75 from Staff Director William G.
Miller to Mr. John Clarke advising that Mr. Ben Marshall has been
designated as the Security Officer of the SSC;
A letter dated 3/17/75 from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke
listing employees of the SSC who have been cleared by the
Committee for certification by CIA for access to classified
information up to and including "Top Secret";
A letter from Mr. Miller to Mr. Clarke dated 3/20/75
advising that Mr. Ben Marshall was cleared for access to
classified information up to and including "Top Secret";
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 433
2
-
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum for Mr. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
A memorandum from the Chairman of the USIB Security
Committee advising that arrangements had been perfected for
the delivery of classified documents to the SSC and describing
how such documents should be delivered.
ACTION:
Wiew/TWI
For information and record purposes.
P2M
дна
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 434
3.
I
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER,
BARRY GOLDWATER
CHARLES MCC. MA
RICHARD S. SCHWEIK
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
TENN.
JR., MD.
>PA.
Vlnited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
March 20, 1975
Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear John:
Mr. Ben Marshall, Security Officer of the Select
Committee on Intelligence Activities, has been designated
Compartmentation Officer.
Sincerely,
Wellani Green Huller
William G. Miller
#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE SP-212/28
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 435
ENCLOSURE
62-116395
-51
1
:
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMA
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAI
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN,
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
x
HOWARD H. BAKE, R., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
* RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO 5. RES. 21, 24TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
March 17, 1975
Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear John:
'#MOR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 BY SP-ALM/276
Thank you for your letter of March 13, outlining a
procedure for clearance for the Select Committee staff. The
procedure you have suggested has been adopted and attached
to this letter is the Select Committee's first listing of staff
who have been cleared by the Committee. This listing is the
result of the investigation undertaken by the FBI and a con-
sideration of the FBI reports on individuals by the Chairman.
As further investigations by the FBI are received, we will send
additional persons to be granted clearances.
As to access to compartmentalized information, those
members of the staff who will be designated will be indicated
to you in subsequent communications.
With best wishes,
Enclosure
Sincerely,
William G. Miller
William G. Miller
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 436
ENCLOSURE
.6.2-116395
51
ATTACHMENT
The following staff officials of the Senate Select Committee
as identified below by date and place of birth and social security
number have received a security investigation by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation within the past five years and are hereby certified
as meeting the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to
classified information up to and including Top Secret.
NAME
DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
Charity Benz
7-23-46
N.Y.
053-38-7410
Michael Taylor Epstein
3-10-37
Mass.
026-28-6318
Mark Henry Gitenstein
3-7-46
Ala.
420-60-8767
Audrey Helen Hatry
6-10-23
Md.
216-14-8691
Lawrence Kieves
1-4-48
N.Y.
068-38-6464
Michael James Madigan
4-18-43
D.C.
042-34-3797
Elliot Everett Maxwell
7-24-46
N.Y.
133-34-4225
Martha Evans Mecham
2-11-40
Cal.
528-48-6848
James Daniel O'Flaherty
11-4-42
Ill.
239-62-8495
Jan Orloff
11-14-47
Cal.
558-74-8394
John F. Peterson
6-15-41
Cal.
565-56-7707
Lewis Brittle Snider
1-12-45
N.C.
246-72-0956
Burton Victor Wides
6-14-41
N.J.
139-30-1936
As the FBI completes its investigative work, other names will
be sent to you.
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 437
i,
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER P. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MPS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHW, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
Vlnited State Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO 3. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
Ad Hoc Staff
75-181
March 20, 1975
Mr. John Clarke
Associate Deputy to the D/DCI/IC
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
Dear John:
20505
The following staff member of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities as identified below by date and
place of birth and social security number has received a
security investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
within the past five years and is hereby certified as meeting
the requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to
classified information up to and including Top Secret.
Benjamin Marshall, May. 4, 1919, Walnut (now Verdigre)
Nebraska, soc sec no 485-28-4530
Sincerely,
William B.Mellen
William G. Miller
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 438
#MOR16
D: 0.3.1-17-06-24 SPF ALM/776
ENCLOSURE
62-11639; --51
#MORIG
ALLWTORBORMATION CONTAINED
KEBUS LE 
DINCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/17/01 SPRALM 1716
UN ED STATES INTELLIGENCE BRD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
SECOM-D-49
21 March 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of USIB on
SUBJECT
:
Congressional Review
Security - Arrangements for Receipt of Classified
Material by Senate Select Committee
1. On 19 March 1975 I telephonically inquired of Mr. Benjamin C.
Marshall, Security Officer of the Senate Select Committee, whether he
was in a position to begin receiving classified documents. He advised
that arrangements had been perfected and that effective 20 March 1975
such documents could be delivered as follows:
The courier should enter the 1st and C Street entrance
of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, inquire of the guard as
to the location of Room G308, go to the front door of G308,
advise the guard there that material is being delivered and
have him call Mr. Marshall or Charity Benz, both of whom
are authorized to receive classified documents up to and
including TOP SECRET*.
2. Mr. Marshall requested that prior to delivery he or someone
in his office be telephonically advised (224-1700) of the impending
delivery and the estimated time of arrival so that he or someone from
his office can be available. He also stated that if delivery was desired
to a specific staff member, Mr. Marshall would try and have such
person available, but stated he was authorized to accept documents
for members of the Committee and staff.
3. The Committee has not yet advised as to compartmented
clearances but Mr. Marshall has been designated Compartmentation
*Mr. Patrick Shea is expected to be added as a person to receive
documents but the certification for this access to classified material
has not as yet been received by your office.
NW 88296 Docld:32989628 Page 439
ENCLOSURE
12-116395-51
Officer and has advised that the same delivery arrangements will
י
be in effect for compartmented material. When necessary clearance
arrangements have been perfected so that delivery of compartmented
material can begin, you will be advised.
Donald E. More
ed
Donald E. Moore
Chairman
NW 88296 Docid:32989628 Page 440