202-10001-10187
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
AGENCY
RECORD NUMBER
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
JCS
202-10001-10187
RECORDS SERIES 469 FOIA SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 188
ORIGINATOR OSD
FROM :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Date 08/28/98
Page
ΤΟ :
TITLE: MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON MONGOOSE 6
SEP 62
DATE : 09/06/62
PAGES
SUBJECTS
5
MONGOOSE
DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION
: TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS
RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS. : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State.
NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
CIA
DATE: MAR 2016
NW 50955 DocId: 32424918 Page 1
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
State
excision
6(1)(c)
f.
General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed
to selected.
8. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to
be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected.
overnight.
with number 1
General Carter urged that, in connection with/number 22
(submarine broadcasts) General Lansdale should be given more latitude
in working up other deception possibilities Mr. Bundy felt, on the
other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-
measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look
at other possibilities in some detail.
1. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as
to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in, economic harrassing actions.
He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27
will not in themselves be especially effective in recking the Cuban
economy
PERTINENT BACKGRand
The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 (agricultural
sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any
such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-
thing going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to
the U.S.
He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to
accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in
He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop
the paper.
NW 50955 DocId:32424918 Page 2
(OBC)
efusing
in 
blue
6(1)(c)
2,4,5
5.
failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear
to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about
any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result
of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must
avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc., unless
they could be completely covered up
A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which
could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter
explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can
be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinat
to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of
Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.
7.
The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against
exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.
8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looke
into further.
to how
General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as
much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government
within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be
a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great
degree.
10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
of
NW 50955 DocId: 32424918
Arham
Page 3
A WANAAST
State
excisitys
6(1)(c),
f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed
to selected.
g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to
be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected
overnight.
General Carter urged that, in connection with
General Lansdale should be given more latitude
in working up other deception possibilities Mr. Bundy felt, on the
other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-
measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look
at other possibilities in some detail.
1. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as
to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in, economic harrassing actions.
He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27
will not in themselves be especially effective in grecking the Cuban
economy.
PERTINENT BACKGRANd
The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32
General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any
such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-
thing going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to
the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to
accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in
He mentioned specifically the possibility of
the paper.
(QB)(C)
Stab
efusing
in 
blue
< (1) (c)
Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about
any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result
of local Cuban disaffection or of
avoid external activities such as
but that we must
-3. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which
could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter
explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can
be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatio
to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
52,4,5/2
It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of
Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered
7.
The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against
exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.
8.
It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked
into further.
9.
General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government,
within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be
a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great
degree.
10.
Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
Af
Atham
hom
on for m
MONGOOSE