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“PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA
FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 25-26, 1963
DATE : 01/25/63
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88
AGENDA FOR JANUARY 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING
SUMMARY OF JANUARY 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
TOP SECRET
1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/14/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS
08/01/2024
2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED.
NW 88132
Docid:34671886 Page 1
206-10001-10011
CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD..
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF JANUARY 25 201968
-
ITEM
TIME
SUBJECT
-
January 25th
1.
10:00
-
10:15
2.
10:15
11:30
3.
11:30 - 12:30
12:30
5.
2:20
1
6.
3:00
-
2:30
(Approx.)
7.
3:00
8.
3:10 - 3:40
9.
3:40 to End of
Day
Executive Session *
Consideration of Draft Report to the President
on Board's Review of Cuba Situation
Discussions with the Director of Central
Intelligence
Lunch
Depart Executive Office Building for
New State Department Building
Meeting with the Secretary of State
Return to Board's Offices
Report on Special Board Meeting with the
President on January 21, 1963
Dr. Killian
Resume Consideration of Item 2
January 26th
10.
9:00
-
9:30
11.
9:30
12.
-
9:45 10:55
13.
10:55
14.
11:00 - 11:30
15.
11:30 12:00
16.
12:00
17.
2:00 to End of
Day
Executive Session
Depart Executive Office Building for Fentagon
Review of Results Obtained from Reconnaissance
Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba
Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Room 2 C 468,
(Members will be met at the Mall Entrance)
Depart 2 C 468
Meeting with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Room 2 E 873
Meeting with the Secretary of Defense
Room 3 E 880
Return to Washington
-
Lunch
Completion of Final Report to the President
Discussion of
on Board's Cuba. Review and
Future Board Business
CONFIDENTIAL
*Dr. Killian will be unable to Join the meeting until after lunch;
serve as 
Acting Chairman.
at his request Mr. Gray has agreed to s
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act
of 1992
206-1000110011
NWE @24
Docld:34671886 Page 2
-CONFIDENTIAL
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
REVISED AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 26, 1963
ITEM
TIME
1. 9:00 - 9:30
2.
10:45
i ci m
3. 11:00
4.
12:25
5.
12:30
6.
1:00
7.
1:30
8.
2:45 to End of
Day
SUBJECT
Executive Session
Depart Executive Office Building for Pentagon
Review of Results Obtained from Reconnaissance
Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba
Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Room 2 c 468
(Members will be met at the Mall Entrance)
Depart 2 C 468
Meeting with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Room 2 E 873
Meeting with the Secretary of Defense
Room 3 E 880
Return to Washington
Lunch
Completion of Final Report to the President.
on Board's Cuba Review and Discussion of
Future Board Business
NW 185
Doold 250
NW 88192
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-CONFIDENTIAL
NW 88199
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, January 25-26, 1963
this fing
The Board convened in executive session at 10:15 a.m. on
January 25, 1963, on the first day of a two-day meeting in the
Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office 
Building. Present
were Board members Gray, Baker, Land, Clifford, Pace, Doolittle,
Murphy, and Langer; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.
Mr. Gray presided as acting Chairman in place of Dr. Killian
Mr. Gray noted
whose arrival was delayed by bad flying weather.
that the DCI, Mr. McCone, had been called to testify before a
Congressional Committee and would therefore be unable to meet
The 
acting Chairman 
then
with the Board at 11:30 as scheduled.
called for a general discussion of the Board's pending review and
draft report on the intelligence aspects of the 
circumstances
leading to the Cuba crisis.
Dr. Land expressed the view that although tidying up is an
obligation, and although looking back is a useful 
technique, 
the
Board's responsibilities go beyond the conduct of 
post mortems
for the purpose of identifying past mistakes 
in the foreign 
intel-
field. Without detracting from the 
importance of the
ligence after-the-fact review of the Cuba situation, Dr. Land
Board's
thought it equally important that the Board: become fully informed
on current developments as well.
Mr. Coyne called Dr. Land's attention to the fact that pre-
viously, in Dr. Land's absence, the Board had submitted 
a 
December
28, 1962, report to the President which was interim 
in nature, and
which contained recommendations looking ahead 
to the strengthening
of U. S. foreign intelligence capabilities in matters not necessarily
confined to the Cuba situation. Taking note of this
, Dr. Land
nevertheless thought that the Board should make sure 
that it 
knows
are the intelligence 
and
what is going on in Cuba today and what 
a
n by the U. S. intelligence
related actions which are being taken
community with respect to the Soviet presence in Cuba..
Dr. Baker, referring to the Board!
most searching and far sighted
that the Board has produced, and he noted that the DCI's written
on Cuba, felt that this is one of the December 28 interim report.
TOP SECRET
-TOP SECRET
response to this report was devestatingly empty and inadequate.
Dr. Baker saw no excuse for the fact that the DIA had been afforded
only two days notice to comment on the Board's report prior to the
submission 
of views by the DCI. (Dr. Langer thought it incredible.
that the DCI had given DIA only two days to comment on the Board's
December 
28 interim report.) It was Dr. Baker's thought that such
a 
procedure was contrary to the general agreement which had been
previously reached with Mr. Bundy (in a discussion between Messrs.
Bundy, Baker and Coyne) that White House action memoranda flowing
from 
Board recommendations would go directly to the agencies pri-
marily concerned. With regard to the latter point, Mr. Coyne
observed that Mr. Bundy had in
acquiesced with the
DCI's request that the DCI obtain and report the coordinated views
of the various 
U. S. intelligence agencies concerned with the
matters 
covered in the Board's report.
Dr. Langer pointed out to Dr. Land that at the Board's last
meeting (which Dr. Land had been unable to attend) the Board had
been 
briefed on current aspects of the Cuba situation. Dr. Land,
pursuing the point which he had raised, hoped that the Board would
be able 
to avoid the submission of a "boiler plate" report on the
errors made in 
the intelligence handling of the Soviet build-up in
Cuba. Dr. Land said 
he thought that the draft of the final Board
report now before the Board was a good effor, but he hoped that
it would not 
draw from the agencies involved a book covering past
errors. It was Dr. 
Land's view that in the intelligence system there
should be someone 
who knows the whole story and can inform the Board'
fully about it. Dr. 
Land's concern was that the intelligence ele-
ments involved m
may have
inept and that a year from now they
would be repeating the errors spotted in the Board's report, unless
the Board can get the agency heads to accept 
the Board's help in
profiting from 
lessons learned so that mistakes can be avoided in
the future.
Mr. Clifford observed that there is a question of timing in-
in the 
Board's present Cuba review, because the Board was
a special assignment from the President to prepare a report.
it made a hard-hitting report and recommendations,
= r
fford thought
that 
the Board would do a better.
an if
after
an appropriate interval the Board should ascertain whether the
recommendations were being put into effect and urge action on
those which 
the Board might find were not being implemented.
Dr. Land suggested that the Board should complete its work.
on the present draft of its Cuba report and then take steps to get to
the heart 
of things with respect to intelligence plans and programs.
NW 88189
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TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
3
regarding Cuba. He added that the Board's responsibilities go to
the effectiveness of the institution and framework within which
the U. S. intelligence community operates, the meeting of day-to-
day concerns which arise, and a determination as to whether re-.
creation or reorganization is needed based on the "massive approach"
represented by the draft report which the Board had before it."
draft report which the Board
Mr. Murphy expressed agreement with points made by Dr. Land.
It was Mr. Murphy's view that the intelligence community apparently
does not know enough about what is presently happening in Cuba He
thought that photographic co
Coverage was not e enough and what was
was deep cover clandestine agent coverage of Cuba. Dr. Land
that it was not enough for the Board to make recommendations
but there should also be a "violent surveillance" of their imple-
mentation.
Noting the agenda for the day, Mr. Murphy wondered what the
Chairman had in mind as to the nature and purpose of the Board's
scheduled visit to the Secretary of State. Mr. Gray recalled that:
when Mr. Bundy had met with the Board previously he had suggested
that in the course of the Board's Cuba review it might well be use-
ful to discuss with the Secretary's of State and Defense; and the
Chairman of the JCS, their views regarding the U. S. intelligence.
coverage given to the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Mr. Gray added that
it was his impression that Mr. Bundy's suggestion had been based
not only on the obtaining of facts pertinent to the Board's review
for intelligence purposes, but also in anticipation of a Congressional
investigation which might be made of the Cuba, experience.
Mr. Murphy thought it important that the Board organize its
interview to be had with the Secretary of State. Mr. Gray suggested.
that without going into a re-hash of the chronological summary of
the intelligence aspects, the Board's questions to Secretary Rusk
should include those which would determine the Secretary's views on
of
from the vantage point 
o
what would have been done differently, handling of the Cuba devel-
hindsight, with respect to intelligence
opment; whether there was a p proper weighing of the risks and the
intelligence a advantages involved in overflights of Cuba; whether the
intelligence analysis and reporting processes were hindered by pre-
conceived views of U. S. "Sovietologists"; and whether raw intelli-
gence reports were adequately communicated to the White House (Mr.
Gray recalling that Mr. Bundy had expressed to him the belief that
the President should have been informed of the contents of some of
these reports regarding the sightings of offensive missiles in
Cuba prior to the photography of October 14).
NW 88199
Docld:34671886 Page 6
TOP SECRET
NW 88192
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON:
TOP SECRET
January 26, 1963
Coigne to sign
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Cuba
In the course of the Board meeting of January 25, 1963,
the Board members and Mr. Coyne met at the State Department
with the Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Alexis Johnson
and Mr. Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State.
Utilizing the memorandum (copy attached) which contained a
series of questions which had
drafted earlier in the day by
s views on
the Board, the Board members ted Secretary Rusk's
a variety of intelligence subjects pertaining to the pre-buildup
and post-buildup period in Cuba.
"
He noted that Cuba
came up to the edge
At the outset Secretary Rusk stated that the two Administra-
tions must share the responsibility for Cuba and that each in turn
has taken full responsibility for what was done or what was not
done during their respective Administrations.
is a national problem; that because of it
of incineration in n the Western Hemisphere"; and that he personally
has a deep anxiety
the question as to where we go from here.
He observed that se of a Communist take-over in Cuba or
anywhere else, it is easier to prevent the occurrence than it is
to correct it once it has taken place.
The Secretary was queried as to whether he agreed with the
Board's present finding that from October 14 onward there was an
effective performance by the intelligence community in supplying
support in the policy decision process with respect to the Cuba
situation. The Secretary agreed stating the intelligence community
performance from October 14 onward was superb. He stated that this
performance enabled the panels of the NSC Executive Committee to
recommend the establishment of positions on which the Government
as a whole could and did act.
as a whole could and did act.
Secretary Rusk was next queried as to whether he agreed with
the Board's present findings that, prior to October 14 the intelli-
gence performance was clearly deficient and that perhaps this de-
ficiency was not fully known
Department of State at the time
The Secretary observed that this was a complex question and a
difficult one to answer He felt it was terribly important that,
TOP SECRET
NW 88192
2
TOP SECRET
as an outgrowth of the review of how the intelligence community
acquitted itself, we not paralyze the community as was done by
the Robert's Commission on Pearl Harbor day" He observed that
from the point of view of high policy we have got to depend 
on
must depend
people who see a great inflow of information and 
we m
on them to give us balanced judgments, particularly in such a
large area of operation as the Department of State where over
one thousand cables are received and dispatched daily.
thousand cables are received and di
The Secretary stated that it was his impression that in mid
September 1962 the intelligence community did not expect the Soviet
Union to put MRBMs or IRBMs in Cuba; that this was the imp jer
at higher policy-advisory levels; and that because of this
all judgment it is possible that intelligence analysts were
from the main point, namely, that offensive missiles
w going in. He thought this diversion might also
based upon the September 19 estimate of the intellige ave been
community
analysts
and that that estimate might have had the effect of the
feeling that they should pursue a "hands off attitude" as far as
anything that came up which concerned the USSR's introduction of
offensive missiles. He said the lesson to be learned from this is
that some means must be found to assure that we do not take any-
thing for granted in these areas. Also a means must be found for
stimulating the expression of reservations at policy levels, noting
that it is not easy to make these reservations operational
The Secretary stated that if one looks at the problem of
intelligence in
of the time factors involved he thought:
even before October 14 our intelligence was
He observed that except for two of the long-range
overflights ten days earlier than October 14 would have
seen nothing.
Mr. Murphy noted that the last observation of th
the Secretary
seemed to suggest exclusive dependence on photographs. To this
the Secretary observed that in its interim report the Board had
called attention to the need for re-enforcing classical intelli-
gence means.
The Secretary said that he agreed with:
that he considered it
DS prepared to i
cover te Board's
He said the
but that
as soon as possible; otherwise if
there is undue dependence on diplomatic cover embarrasments would
become greatly increased He noted that already 
the United 
States:
He
Government has had "many problem cases" involving CIA cover.
noted also that a good rule is now being followed in this area,
a rule which precludes a CIA agent to target in his country of
assignment. The Secretary emphasized the view that 
our 
government
other means must be deve provetremely
TOP SECRET
Docld:34671886 Page 8
3-
_ has "under-played old fashioned espionage".
TOP SECRET
He observed that it
is easy to fly U-2s but that such flights inevitably bring up
international problems since they violate sovereignty; 
and 
there-
fore the Department of State welcomes the idea of beefing 
up
traditional espionage activities which are not dependent upon
diplomatic cover.
The Board next inquired as to whether the Secretary believed
that the interests and requirements of the intelligence community
were aggressively spoken for at the policy level during the pre-
October 14 period. He responded that the United 
States would 
have
been better off with more intensive air
the period beginning October 1, but
sketchy, there was the problem of that (U-2 plane) coverage during
that time reports were
stand-down n of the U-2 because
of the Chinat loss, weather conditions were not optimum, etc. Re-
verting to the principal question asked of him the Secretary expressed
the view that the Special NSC 5412/2 Group operated adequately and 
is
with the Group
now operating adequately. He said that he is in tolic matter of in-
telligence collection flls a
from time to time on it, -
plans and he noted that on the
we have run 2500 peripheral flights
around the Soviet Union
every one of them is to some degree
dangerous. He said that the President and he personally examine
the particularly sensitive flights that
that in the State Department intelligen are proposed.
He said
He noted
requirements of the
community are accepted in this area and that the Department goes
along with the overwhelming number of flights proposed.
that in the case of Cuban overflights he personally made two sug-
The first involved the step-
gestions during the period in question.
up of peripheral
as
we wanted to and cover for putting flights
over the island when its around Cuba
11:
said that he had told the
OAS representatives about this, noting that the "risks of strays.
His second suggestion
of such peripheral flights was "very high".
involved breaking up one or two proposed flights into segments of
four flights (the Board members were fully cognizant of this)
.
Mr. Gray made reference to the delays which necessarily resulted
from breaking the proposed mission into a four-segmented one.
inquired of the Secretary as to whether he had been advised of the
fact that delays would necessarily result from his suggested amend-
The Secretary replied in the negative.
in the
ent of the mission. The Secre
He
At this point Dr. Land observed that there is not enough
personified pressure from intelligence; that a concentrated
statement of intelligence requirements and purposes should be
constantly served up to the policy level from suspicious intelli-
gence personalities and that these, of course, should be subject
to ultimate decision by the Secretary of State and others of high
NW 8813.28
Docld:34671886 Page 9
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
authority. The Secretary took issue with a portion of Dr. Land'
in'
statement on the grounds that it assumed that 
there is no one
the intelligence community who has any policy 
responsibility
.
The Secretary said that he thought this was 
incorrect because
the Director of Central Intelligence frequently 
acted as one
having policy responsibilities.
The Secretary observed that while the intelligence needs are
great there are other requirements which the United 
States must
take into account and that these must all 
be balanced out. He
emphasized again at this point that overflying another country
in peacetime is a difficult thing.
is
The Secretary then reverted to the question of traditional
espionage and expressed the view that "we have 
gotten a little
lazy on espionage". He noted that during 
World War II excellent
espionage results were obtained by virtue of a "most 
fabulous!
The 
Secretary favored
:
combination of blue bloods and thugs
11:
resumption now of this World War II practice.
At this point Dr. Killian inquired of the Secretary as to
whether he was satisfied that Mr. McCone
December 26th reflects a fair sta ts
views. The Secretary said he had
report on Cuba dated
the State Departments
unable to examine the
The
in the relationships
report fully; that he had complete confidence
McCone, but that he would take
which his Department has with Mr. 
M
exception to "the juxta-position of things on the four-flight.
matter. Mr. Hilsman joined the Secretary in this 
view.
Secretary urged that the Board members be as analytical as pos-
He encouraged 
them to
sible in examining the Cuba situation.
11 
He hoped the Board would
remember the "atmosphere of the times'
be as precise as possible" in examining the overflight matter
stating that "if you think the U-2 is not serious, 
you are on 
the
wrong track"
Mr. Gray indicated
it was the Board's understanding that
suggested that apparently they made.
the President approved averflights recommended, and he then
there w were some flights that were not
To this the Secretary
rejected, but neither were
stated that what ought to be looked at were the flights that
were laid on from September 20 to October 5 or 6. 
He noted 
that
19 
estimate of the
during this period, following the Some delay in distrib-
intelligence community on Cuba, there
and agent sources on the sightings of
uting reports from refugee
He again noted that just prior to
long-range missiles in Cuba.
over the
this period there was a loss of a Chinat operated U-2 
o
NW 88192
Docld:34671886 Page 10.
TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
China mainland on September 9. On the latter point Dr Langer
inquired whether the Secretary felt that flights over Cuba were
in the same category as flights over the Soviet Union or er
China The Secretary responded in the negative noting that "we
felt much greater freedom of action in the case of Cuba'
Mr.
Hillsmana added on this point that the USIB felt that two U-2
flights a month over Cuba were adequate.
The Secretary recalled that early in October he was requested
to authorize overflights based on indications of two specific sites
and he said he immediately approved.
Mr. Gray observed that there appeared to be some confusion as
to whether we had a policy of not overflying SA-2 sites, and
Secretary Johnson responded that the matter of overflying SA-2's
invariably came up in the Special Group but that he could not recall
any prohibition on overflying such sites. Secretary Johnson added
that in the Special Group he c
could not recall any kind of operation
ever being recommended where the atmosphere was as relaxed as it
was in the case of recommendations pertaining to the Cuba problem.
se of recommendations pertaining to lover where was
Mr. Hilsman stated t that at the e operational level there was
concern about losing a pilot over Cuba. Consequently
CORONA
Mission was programmed for Cuba from September 21 to September 24.
Mr Hilsman thought this concern over the loss of a man may have
been a factor which contributed to the low number of U-2 flights
flown.
The Secretary was asked whether he was satisfied with the
national estimating process and whether he considered that State
Department participation therein was provided for adequately.
The Secretary thought that State Department participation in the
national intelligence estimates
or on He said that from the point on was of th icy
officer it is essential that he know what the intelligence people
think; that on the other hand the policy officer wants to avoid
taking the intelligence view as "the Bible" and he wishes to
find a way for the intelligence community to "throw in contrary
indicators in their estimates in order that they might be flagged
for the policy maker.
The Secretary was then asked if he felt that the intelligence.
community analytical, estimative and reporting functions in the
Cuba situation were hindered by international political consider-
ations or by preconceived views of "Sovietologists" regarding Soviet
NW 88199
Docld:34671886 Page 11 /
TOP SECRET
6
Ⓒ TOP SECRET
intentions with respect to Cuba. The Secretary responded that
he did not believe that the "Sovietologists" did what has been
claimed. He did not believe that they had much influence on
estimates.
He thought, he detected an insufficient
alertness o on their part to possibility that the estimates
of the intelligence community were wrong. He expressed the
observation on this point that the direct indicators came in
after the September 19 estimate was prepared.
after the September 19 estimato was prepared.
The Secretary was next queried as to whether we are currently
informed in an adequate manner about Soviet objectives and activ-
ities in Cuba today. The Secretary responded that the principal
gap is out
inability to prove the negative because of the absence
of on-site inspections. He s
said we are running overflights regu-
larly; that we have improved our cooperation with allied govern-
ments in Cuba; but that we do not know for certain what the Soviet
objectives are insofar as Cuba is concerned.
are insofar as Cuba 1
When queried as to U. S. Government knowledge as to the
purpose of Mikoyan's stay in Cuba and as to what Mikoyan accom-
plished, the Secretary stated
deal about, the Mikoyan mission.
the
thought we know a great
He noted that for ten days,
He said that we are getting
Castro would not talk to castro and particularly Castro's
much better information regarding Cas
efforts in inspiring other Latin American countries. The Secre-
tary expressed the thought that the Soviet Union may be deciding
that Cuba is not the proper base from which to launch their Latin
American operations. He said rewarding gains have been made in
attempting to obstruct travel between Cuba and the Free World
He conceded, however, that we do not have the Cuba-Russian plan,
adding that we have not penetrated the Cuban regime as well as he
hopes we might be able to later.
lopes we might be able to later.
The Secretary was asked with reference
whether the Department of State has
collection effort to
to the Monroe Doctrine
an aggressive intelligence
too profitable to concentrate on
Secretary thought it y new violation of the Doctrine. The
this point and it would be mor ofitable to concentrate on the.
Rio Pact
Doctrine is violated by
He agreed, however, that the 
Do
the presence of the Marxist-Leninist system in the Western Hemis.
phere for he said there is no question whatever about the Soviet
presence in Cuba.
our
In conclusion the Secretary stated that he thought
intelligence on Cuba today is not complete but it is not deficient.
J. Patil Co
Patrick Coyne
NW 88192
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NW 88199
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TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON:
January 26, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:
SUBJECT: Cuba
members
In the course of the Board meeting of January 26, the Board
and the
he 
writer met at the Pentagon with 
General Maxwell
Taylor Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
, at which time the
members discussed with General Taylor the series 
of questions.
set forth in the attachment to this memorandum
. The highlights
.
of the discussion follow.
General Taylor felt that the performance of DIA during the
in fact indispensable.
Cuba period was "on the whole good
hole good
t 31 to September 21,
General Taylor noted that from August
he, Gilpatrick and McCone were all absent from the Washington
area but he quickly added that things 
probably would not have
that particularly
been different had they been here.
er Job that he could
after
ney been here.
no General Taylor disparaged the value of the refugee reports
emanating from Cuban exiles in Florida 
during the months 
preceding
the crisis. He said most of their information 
was unreliable
although on reflection he concluded that some reports 
were in 
fact
reliable. When General Taylor was asked 
by a Board member lihether
the intelligence communi
could have been hinde imating and reporting functions
pre-conceived views of Sovietologists
regarding Soviet indications with respect to Cuba, General Taylor
stated that either Khrushchev was stupid 
or we were He said,
"In the minds of most of us we just didn't think that 
the 
Soviets
would put nuclear weapons on the island." He added 
that the dirth
to SAC's discovery 
was occasioned
communist mainland
anywhere) and the
of U-2 flights over Cuba prior O
2 over
by the shoot-down of a U-2
(causing us to go slow on authorizing
highly unsatisfactory weather conditions which prevailed in the
Caribbean during the period preceding the 
discovery on October 
14
Caribbean during the period the
Dr. Killian asked whether DIA had been as effective as it
might have been and General Taylor responded that particularly
after October 14 it had done such an excellent 
job that he 
could
He 
said that in
the
not suggest
any way of improving on it.
"wasn't going
pre-October 14 period the intelligence community 
"
at full steam. He added that all efforts 
in the 
Mongoose
Committee to achieve a better intelligence base produced very
little and that in the Mongoose Committee "we never 
received
any urgent information of value on Cuba
TOP SECRET
NW 88199
Docld:34671886 Page 14
TOP SECRE
Mr. Pace inquired as to why Guantanamo had not been used
more extensively as a base for the acquisition of intelligence.
General Taylor responded that t "We may have viewed it as a Sacred
Cow. He had a feeling that the Navy might consider enlarged.
intelligence activities at Guantanamo as prejudicing the U. S.
Naval base there.
11
Mr Pace inquired as to whether the intelligence community,
had been sufficiently agressive in placing its requirements on
the Special Group and on the Mongoose Committee. General Taylor
emanating
the community that were not supported from higher
levels. (In an aside General Taylor mentioned that when t
the
missiles were discovered in Cuba "I was a hawk" meaning that
he favored the launching of the U. S. military strike against
the missile bases in Cuba,) General Doolittle asked whether at
the present time General Taylor feels he is getting sufficient
intelligence on Cuba. General Taylor responded "obviously not"
adding that photographic intelligence is practically all we are
getting today. General Taylor stated that "Most of us are
well aware of the frailty of our intelligence system - we can
beat the DCI over the head but he just can't produce the
intelligence we need.
respondethe effect that he knew of no intelligence requests.
11
Dr. Killian elicited General Taylor's recommendations on
the Special NSC 5412/2 Group asking whether the General had any
constructive suggestions to make in light of his having chaired
the Special Group prior to his appointment as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Taylor had no specific suggestions
to make. He noted that as Chairman of the Special Group, he
always had the feeling that representatives of the President's.
Foreign Inteland Advisory Board were closely examining covert
action programs:
were constantly going around the world to see
what the intelligence community was doing both in the intelligence
and covert action field. He said that this activity on the part
of the Board gave him a good feeling - a feeling of insurance -
in his capacity as Chairman of Special Group. General Taylor
added that "If your Board didn't exist we would have to invent you.
not in fact
Mr. Clifford stated that he had the impression that relations
between defense and CIA were not too close and General Taylor
expressed the 1 hope that that was:
the case. General
Taylor recognized, however, that there was a feeling of consider-
able rivalry between CTA
Defense, particularly SAC, when
responsibility
reconnaissance over Cuba was transferred
from CIA to SAC.
the flights, that
was
Cassandra-like on this issue and
(Mr. McCone later denied to
the Board that CIA CIA e transfer but the Board's files
clearly reflect that C
in violent opposition; that it
protested the flights to the White House both orally and in
writing; and that the animosity became so severe that Deputy Director
Scoville of CIA did not even speak to the Director NRO for a
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period of days, after SAC's first flight brought back the
first photographic evidence of 
intermediate range nuclear
missiles in Cuba.).
General Taylor volunteered the view that the creation.
of the DIA will improve rather than 
aggravate the relations
between Defense and CIA 
although he acknowledged that there
will always be some rivalry between 
civilian intelligence.
collectors in CIA and military 
intelligence collectors in
DIA and the Services. To this 
Mr. Pace observed that some
rivalry is good and healthy.
Finally, when queried about the posture of service attaches,
General Taylor noted that he had 
recently returned from a lengthy
trip in the course of which he 
visited with a number of the
attaches and he had found that 
they had "improved enormously
"
over prior times.
Jme
Enclosure.
J. Patrick Coyne
TOP SECRET
SPECIAL LIMITED DIST BUTION
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OXCART
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD.
January 25, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD
SUBJECT: Board Meeting of January 25 - 26, 1963
For the information of the Board members the following documents
are enclosed:
Tab 1:
Tao 2:
Tab 3:
Tab 4:
Tab 5:
January 19, 1963, A
Memorandum for the President from the Board dated:
concerning the handling of OXCART
and of projects in the Department of Defense associ-
ated with OXCART.
Board's Interim Report to the resident dated
December 28, 1962, and the DCI's 1/22/63 response thereto.
Draft of final report to the President on the
Board's comprehensive study of intelligence
activities relating to the military buildup in Cuba.
Memorandum for the Chairman from Mr. McGeorge Bundy
dated January 9, 1963, concerning Presidential in-
structions relative to control of intelligence infor
mation on offensive weapons in Cuba.
ation on offensive weapons in Cuba,
Memorandun on Mr. Ash's review of Special Group
records pertaining to developments in Cuba.,
Tab 6: CIA memorandum concerning cable correspondence between
CIA headquarters and Mr. McCone while in Europe
(August 30 September 21, 1962)
Tab 7:
Tab 8:
30 - 21, 196
General Chronology of Events in Cuba, 1957 - 1962,
prepared by the Board's staff.*
General Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the
Military Buildup in Cuba, prepared by the Board's
staff *
Reviewed at earlier meetings of the Board
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*
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Tab 9:
Tab 10:
Tab 11:
Tab 12:
Tab 13:
Memorandum concerning CIA Field Station Reports
(received by NSC or White House staff elements)
dealing with the military buildup prior to
October 14, 1962.*
CIA Memorandum concerning the Caribbean Admissions
Center, Opa locka, Florida.*
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy from Mr. Ray Cline, CIA,
entitled "The Effect of Weather on Overflights
of Cuba, 29 August - 14 October 1962".
Report by the Director of Central Intelligence to the
Board on "Intelligence Community Activities Relating
to the Cuban Arms Buildup".*
Letter to the Chairman from Mr. Murphy dated Dec. 8, 1962.
J. Patrick Coyne
Reviewed at earlier meetings of the Board.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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January 11, 1963
8
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: CUBA (Review on 1/10/63 of Records of the
Special NSC 5412/2 Group)
On 1-10-63 the writer reviewed in the offices of Mr. Tom
Parrott, Executive Secretary, Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the
records of the Special Group which Mr. Parrott 
identified 
as
relating to considerations given by the Special Group 
to 
recon-
naissance and covert action operations with regard 
to Cuha.
(Attached hereto is a copy, supplied by Mr. Parrott 
from 
his
records, of a "Memorandum for the Record" dated 
10/21/62 on
the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba" which Mr. 
Parrott had
prepared for another purpose.)
There follows a detailed summary of the results of a
review made by the writer of the Cuba items referred 
to 
in
Mr. Parrott's summary memorandum; and of other items 
which
the writer reviewed in the Special Group records pertaining
to Cuba.
Minutes of Meetings of the Special Group
(Augmented) - "MONGOOSE"
Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)
Those present were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, General Carter, 
General 
Lemnitzer,
General Lansdale, and Dr. Cline (for part 
of the meeting).
The Group noted a paper presented by the State Department,
member concerning "Guideline for a post-
Castro Political
Program.
General Lansdale briefed the Group on the number of agents
now in Cuba, including legal residents, plus 
infiltrated teams.
It was decided that a CIA proposal, for 
resupply of agent teams
and possibly of resistance groups, should 
be deferred pending
General Taylor
· a broader review of the entire situation
.
specified, however, that if an urgent need arose for air supply
at any time, the proposal could be made 
to the Special Group
(Augmented).
Mr. McCone and General Lansdale stated that a sizable
number of intelligence reports were coming out of 
Cuba,
Mr. McCone 
emphasized
largely on political and economic matters.
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that no high-level penetration of the Cuban Government had been
achieved. In answer to a question from the 
Attorney General,
General Lansdale said that intelligence indicated 
that 
although
there was widespread dissatisfaction with 
Castro, there was
no rallying point for active opposition.
The Attorney General and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need
for an effort to obtain hard intelligence on 
subversive 
activi-
ties by the Castro regime in the Hemisphere, Mr. 
McCone noting
that such efforts to date had been fruitless
.
Dr. Cline showed the Group the extent of reconnaissance
Mr. McCone emphasized that this program has
coverage of Cuba.
developed complete information on deployments and facilities
for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and he 
particularly noted
that these missions have verified that 
there is sufficient
"No 
missile
logistic support for a 75,000-man military force.
sites have been found."
"
The Group agreed on a complete review of MONGOOSE toward
the end of July, with participation by the Secretaries 
of 
State
and Defense. General Taylor emphasized that 
in the preparation
for such review, there would be a need for summaries 
of results
obtained to date, of intelligence developed, and of future
alternatives opened to the United States (
including 
possible
activities in other parts of Latin America).
Mr. Johnson said that the State Department is investigating
the possibilities for subsidizing Japanese purchases of Dominican
sugar to divert purchases from Cuba and thereby 
deprive Cuba
of a source of dollars, and Mr. Johnson asked 
that MONGOOSE
operational representatives lock into this 
further.
said that the CIA could use unvouchered funds for this purpose;
but it would be illegal to use covert funds as a means of
evading the intent of Congress.
Minutes of the October 4, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)
Mr. McCone
Those present for this meeting with regard to Operation
MONGOOSE were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric,
General Lansdale, Mr. McCone, General Carter, 
and Mr. Wilson.
The Attorney General informed the Group that higher authority
was concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and 
felt
that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage
operations. The Attorney General wondered if a new 
look were.
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not required in view of the meager results obtained, especially
in the sabotage field, and he urged "massive activity" within
the entire MONGOOSE framework.
General Lansdale thought that another attempt should be
made against the major target which had been the subject of
three unsuccessful missions and he said that six new missions
were in the planning stage.
Mr. Johnson said that the "massive activity" would have.
to come from within, and he hoped to be able to present soon
to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand,
fully realizing that this will give additional visibility to
their activities. Mr. McCone reserved judgment on the feasi-
bility and desirability of such a program, and Mr. Johnson
agreed that he had reservations as well.
Mr. McCone said that he had received the impression
that although high levels of our Government wanted increased
activity, they still want to keep it at a low noise level,
but Mr. McCone did not believe this would be possible and he
felt that any sabotage would be blamed on the United States.
Mr. McCone cited the enormous number of telephone calls
directed at CIA at the time the skin divers landed in east
Cuba, and the time that the Cuban exile students shot up the
apartment house.. Mr. McCone therefore urged that responsible
officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they
want to get on with operations.
The Attorney General, in partial rebuttal, said that the
reasons people had such concern were. (a) the fact that the skin
d.vers were Americans, and (b) the fact that the student activity
was irresponsible and foolish - and if either of these had
in fact been engineered by the United States it would have
been a great mistake. The Attorney General also related the
possibility of attributability to the importance of the
particular undertaking, and he questioned whether we are going
down the right road or whether more "direct action" were not
indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans
be developed.
Mr. McCone said that internal restrictions are so rigid
that internal uprisings would surely be brutally suppressed.
(It was agreed that the current guidelines did not call for
inciting such an uprising.)
Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous
efforts necessary to insure that operations such as the sabotage,
operation previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on
the United States. (After discussion, the Group agreed that
it was not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to insure
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nonattribution, and that short cuts were desirable.)
Mr. Gilpatric informed the Group that the Defense Depart-
ment was hard at work on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits.
would be trained from four to five months and then placed on
call for any future action.
General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff.is refining
various contingency military plans based on a variety of
possible situations, including Soviet action against Berlin;..
"the presence of bloc offensive weapons in Cuba"; an attack
against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion
in the Hemisphere; and "the establishment of a direct threat
to the United States.
"
Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present at this
Group meeting for an item regarding reconnaissance of Cuba.
It was pointed out that the CIA is "restricted to using its
high-performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba,
because of SAM sites." It was questioned whether this was a
reasonable restriction at that time, particularly when SAMS
were almost certainly not operational.
#
Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described a spectrum
of reconnaissance activities which could befundertaken,
ranging from low-level, Navy fighters through drones, up to
the Agency's capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar
countermeasures. As a result of the discussion there was agree-
ment that the Department of Defense and the CIA should get
together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require
coverage, and on recommendations as to how to achieve this
coverage. A meeting was set for the following Tuesday when
Defense and CIA were to be prepared to discuss all possibilities,
including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.
There was some discussion of the desirability of mining
Cuban waters, using nonattributable mines appearing to be home-
made and laid by small aircraft operated by Cubans.
It was agreed that the Attorney General would act as
Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) for the time being.
It was agreed that four major points which had emerged
from this meeting were: (1) we ought to go all-out for increased
intelligence; (2) there should be considerably more sabotage;
(3) restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that
training and preparations can be subject to short cuts; and
(4) all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative
approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.
In the "Memorandum for the Record, October 21, 1962, on the subject.
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a
"Reconnaissance of Cuba" it is stated: "The DCI pointed out that the
Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the southeastern quadrant
of Cuba, because of SAM sites. It was questioned 
whether this was
reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the 
SAMs 
were
Beside this 
item in the summary
almost certainly not operational.
memorandum, there appears the penciled notation "Also agreed should
go all out for intel."
11
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Minutes of the October 9, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)
Present for this meeting were the Attorney General,
Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. Mc-
Cone, Mr. Wilson, Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville, Colonel Steakley,
and Colonel Ledford, CIA.
The Group discussed various possibilities of accomplish-
ing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from low-level coverage
by tactical aircraft to high-performance aircraft and drones.
It was
Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.
agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission
in the western part of the island, to be accomplished by all-
out ELINT support, and depending on the results of this, a
number of similar sorties might be mounted. (The first mission
was later approved by higher authority, with the decision on
the second proposition left open. The entire package was to
be discussed at the USIB nd by the Chiefs on Wednesday,
October 10.)
Along with the minutes of this October 9 Meeting there
was in file a memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, dated
October 11, 1962. It was reflected in Mr. Parrott's memorandum
that Mr. Gilpatric had called at 2:15 P.M. to say he and Mr.
McCone had finally agreed that the one high-performance flight
CIA had
would be flown as a military flight with a SAC pilot. 11
wanted to stick to the existing system for the first flight;
simply to avoid any delay. The SAC pilot would require some
additional training because the equipment in the improved
vehicle was new to him, but Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone
apparently felt that this was an acceptable delay and it was
It was further
hoped to get the flight off over the weekend.
stated in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that it seemed agreed that
within the terms of the authorization given by higher authority
it would be necessary to go back for approval of the next:
phase contemplating two or three more high-performance missions,,
and Mr. Gilpatric seemed to feel that the discussion which had
taken place with high authority was explicit enough to get
Mr. Parrott further in-
an emergency authority by telephone.
formed Mr. Bundy that the Cover Committed (Messrs. Charyk,
Hilsman, Scoville, Parrott, "et al") had met that morning and
had agreed on a new cover story for a military pilot and a
revised cover story for civilian pilots, and with the necessary
changes it was thought that the cover story would be ready
that afternoon. Mr. Parrott pointed out to Mr. Bundy that, on
the military side, the flight is characterized as military
reconnaissance of the periphery of the target area, with parti-
cular reference to the Secretary of State's recent comments to
the OAS Ministers to the effect that we are increasing surveil-
lance activities, (A penciled note on the file copy of this
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memorandum read: "Later was delayed due to disagreement on
account of training required.
"
"
There was also an October 12, 1962 addendum to the above-
mentioned October 11 memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy,
stating: "Later. The memorandum related that, according to
Mr. Knocke, Mr. McCone had decided the day before (October 11)
that these flights must be either entirely overt or entirely
covert, and he didn't particularly care which so long as they
were accomplished as soon as possible. In Mr. McCone's absence,
General Carter had come to an agreement with General McKee,
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, along those lines on
October 11; later, however, Mr. Gilpatric said that this was
not his understanding of the terms of authorization from higher
authority. Mr. Gilpatric felt that the idea was that a uniformed
pilot should operate the Agency's vehicle.
On October 12 at 12:45, General Carter had a meeting with
Mr. Bundy and at that time General Carter stated that the Agency
operation was ready to go except for weather, and that this
would hold it up until at least Sunday, and meantime the SAC
pilot would have received the necessary training. It was agreed
that if the pilot was sufficiently trained by the earliest time
the mission could be mounted, the flight would go, with all
other arrangements within the Agency framework.. If the pilot.
were not ready by the time the vehicle was ready, the mission
would be mounted as a completely Agency operation, i.c., with
a civilian pilot. According to Mr. Lay, the USIB had taken.
the following actions at its October 10, 1962 meeting with
respect to the targets listed in the COMOR paper of October 6:
(1) The Group I targets were not discussed by USIB, the impli-
cation being that there was no problem from the point of view
of USIB's jurisdiction. (2) Groups II and III should be
covered as rapidly as possible initially, and after that the
frequency of coverage would be further examined. (3) COMOR
was to re-do the section of the October 6 paper dealing with
Group IV, with targets to be broken out in categories of priorty,
and USIB would consider this new paper on October 17.. US IB
did not consider any operational aspects, but confined them-
selves to the importance of the targets and the frequency
of coverage.
Minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group
The following summarizes the minutes of the Special Group
Meetings which were identified by Mr. Parrott as including
consideration of the subject of Cuba.
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Minutes of Rebruary 1, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. Helms.
On the subject of Cuba, the Chairman read his memorandum
to higher authority dated January 26, 
summarizing; progress up
The memorandum 
from General Lansdale suggesting
to that timb.
a different approach to the content of the minutes 
of the
meeting of the preceding week 
on Cuba was discussed, and 
it
General
was agreed that the minutes would 
stand as prepared.
Langdale's report of February 1 
on popular support 
for the
Mr. 
Parrott's summary states
'
OAS meeting was distributed.
that the Cube missions were stepped up from one per month
to two per month.
Minutes of June 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson,
Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter..
"
On the subject of "Request for Special Cuban Missions,'
it was stated that the COMOR proposal 
dated June 13, 1962 
was
approved. (A handwritten notation 
on the file copy of these
minutes stated that "Higher authority 
inforined June 15 about
11 
and 
there was also a notation that
possibility of uprising,
'
the June 13 memorandum regarding the COMOR request had been
"rewritten for book.")
Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
The Group agreed to recommend approval of various requests,
for authorizations. In the case of Cuba
, the minutes reflect
agreement to continue with the presently 
authorized schedule
General Taylor asked that for the
of two flights per month.
purpose of discussing this matter with higher authority, CIA
should prepare a paper on Cuba, setting 
forth a summary of.
information which had been 
obtained to date, the number of
missions mounted, what is proposed to be looked 
at in the
future, and the frequency of further 
coverage desired.
Memorandum for the President from the Special Group,
July 20, 1962
The Special Group records contain a memorandum for the
President from General Taylor dated July 
20, 1962, bearing 
a
handwritten notation by General Taylor
, "Approved by H. A.
(presumably higher authority') 20 
July 1962,"
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the memorandum to the President was as follows:
In the Special Group we are aware that we have been
proceeding on a day-by-day basis in requesting authority
for overflight reconnaissance. At our meeting yesterday,
we took a long look ahead at the estimated requirements
for the next few months and agreed that the following
program is the minimum which meets military require-
Cuba:
ments
Two flights monthly
all U-2
flights with CIA civilian pilots
•
We would like
to get your approval in principle of the foregoing
program with the understanding-that on the first of each
month you will be presented with the specific flights
recommended for that month.
Minutes of August 9, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present were General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,
and Mr. William Bundy.
On the subject of "Cuba Reconnaissance" it was stated
that the Group agreed that the second mission authorized for
August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the im-
mediate situation with respect to Soviet material justifies
it..
It was noted that this would use up existing authority
for August, and if a third mission should become necessary
later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at
that time.
Minutes of August 30, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gil-
patric, General Iemnitzer and Mr. Bundy.
The minutes reflect that in connection with the Agency's
monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be
(In the
an additional requirement for flights over Cuba.
"Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject
"Reconnaissance of Cuba, attached hereto, there appears beside
the item dealing with this meeting the penciled notation
"primarily low-level.")
11
Minutes of September 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present at this meeting, which took place in Mr.
Bundy's office, were the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,..
the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, "and others.
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On
The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's
planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral
coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space,
all in one flight. He said he had no objection to the
peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue
to establish our right to fly over international waters.
the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical
coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba
at this time. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine
extensive overflying of international waters with actual over-
flights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flights
would draw undue attention to the mission and, further, should
the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight hác
occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position
for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.
Taking these views into account, the Agency's plans to
break this proposed coverage into four parts: the Isle of Pines;
the area roughly east of longitude 77 west; and two legs along
the coast one north and one south.
Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this
morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for
which authority is currently outstanding. Priority will b
given to the two overflights. (A notation on the file copy
of these Special Group minutes states that as of this morning
it appears that weather will not permit a flight until at least,
Friday, and longer range weather prospects are not very good,
consequently it will be some little time before these three
authorizations are used up.)
4200
In connection with the minutes of this meeting, the Special
Group records contain a note for the file dated October 25,
1962, stating that COMOR later recommended that the Bay of
Pigs area should be looked at since it had not been seen since
June
Time over mainland would be 12 minutes for a total
of 75 miles
depth of penetration, 13 miles
nearest
known SAM site, 35 miles away. The file note further stated
that after considerable negotiation with the Department of
State it was agreed that this additional coverage would be
accomplished.
•
•
(In quoting the minutes of this September 10 meeting in a
memorandum from: Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962, there was an addendum which
stated: "N.B. Mr. Bundy said on 13 September 1962 that he
thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that
the entire number of four missions would be considered as being
approved. This thus extends the outstanding authorizations
from three to four.")
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Minutes of September 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present were Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze,
General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.
The minutes of this meeting reflect that a JCS representa-
tive (Colonel. Steakley) outlined the capabilities for low-level
coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the
Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered
further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same
area became available. General Carter said that special
efforts will be required to identify certain installations,
the nature of which is not clear at present. Colonel Steakley
distributed charts for the monthly book, on supplementing
ELINT coverage of Cuba which was begun today.
The Group
had no objection to these missions. It was agreed that the
Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military
reconnaissance or surveillance flights in the Cuban area.
(The Special Group record of these minutes is contained in
a memorandum dated November 30, 1962, from Mr. Tom Parrott
to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric.)
Minutes of September 27, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric,
General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.
CIA's October forecast of reconnaissance activities was
noted. The special mission request for Cuba was approved.
This brings the number of authorizations for this area back to
four, i.c., four had been previously authorized and one has
been successfully completed, leaving authority for three out-
standing.
Minutes of October 15, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group
A memorandum prepared for the Special Group records by:
Mr. Parrott reflected that at a special meeting on this date.
two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved,
and that these were concurred in by higher authority. It is
reflected that after the 15th of October additional coverage
was agreed on at other meetings, but the Special Group was not
convened for this purpose.
Memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric,
November 30, 1962
The Special Group records contain a copy of a memorandum
(previously referred to) from Mr. Thomas A. Parrott to Deputy
Hands Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels
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Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962. The
memorandum began with the statement that it had been prepared.
in answer to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's request on the
preceding day for minutes of the special meetings of the.
Special Group which bore on Cuban "reconnaissance, in order
that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor might be informed.
It was stated in the memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric and General
Taylor had been present on August 30 and had then returned
to the Group on September 27. It was further stated that at
the meetings of the 6th and 20th of September the subject of
Cuba réconnaissance did not arise. The memorandum then pointed
out that the meeting of September 10 was not a regular meeting.
of the Special Group but had nevertheless resulted in particu-
larly significant decisions. The memorandum then went on to
set forth the minutes of the meetings of September 10, 14 and
27.
Attachment
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11
A. Russell Ash
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OPY
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21 October 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD.
SUBJECT:
Reconnaissance of Cuba
Following is a chronological resume of considerations by
the Special Group (5412) and the Special Group (Augmented) of U-2
reconnaissance activities over Cuba. This summary begins as of
1 May 1961 (1.e., a after the Bay of Pigs).
11 May 1961. It was a agreed that policy approval for U-2
flights over Cuba is still in effect.
1 February 1962. The Cuba missions were stepped up from
one per month to two.
14 June 1962.
A COMOR recommendation that two additional
flights be author for June was approved by the Group.
12 July 1962. (Augmented Group). Mr. McCone emphasized
that reconnaissance of Cuba has developed complete information on
deployment and facilities for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and
that it has verified the fact that there is sufficient logistics c
support for 75,000 man military force. No missile sites have
been found.
12 July 1962. The Group agreed to continue with the
presently-authorized schedule of two flights per month..
19 July 1962. Cuba was considered as part of a set of
The two flights per
proposals covering reconnaissance world-wide.
month pattern was reiterated. (This was later approved by higher
authority.)
August 1962. The Group agreed that the second mission;
authorized for August should be flown whenever the DCI decides 
that
the immediate situa espect to Soviet materiel justifies it.
It was noted that.
use up existing authorizations for
August and if a third mission should become necessary later in the
month, it should be considered on its merits at that time.
NOTE: Coordinated with Reber, then shown
to General Carter who put a covering memo
on it. The Carter memo, this one and a
compilation
the COMOR point of view,
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFOR
MATION REFERRING TO IDEALIST
BYEMAN
BYE 3746-62
done by Mr R were given to Mr..
McCone at the White House just before.
the 2:30 meeting today.
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30 August 1962. In connection with the Agency's monthly
forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional
requirement for flights over Cuba.
10 September 1962. At a special meeting attended by the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting DCI and others,
the Secretary expressed concern over the Agency's planned coverage
of Cuba. He objected particularly
proposal to combine ex-
tensive overflying of international way with actual overflights.
one
As a result of this discussion, it w was agreed that the Agency's pro-
coverage would have to be broken into four parts one over the
posed 
c
Isle of
the eastern end of Cuba, and d two legs along
approval for
already authorized, with priority
the coast nesend
one south. Within this framework, higher
authority later:
flights in addition to those
3. (NOTE: The
Isle of Pines leg over
Agency later secured agreement
to 
outs.
the Bay of Pigs area, after considerable negotiation with State.)
14 September 1962. A JCS representative outlined the
capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It
was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation
considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the
same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts
will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of
which is not clear at present.
approved.
27 September 1962. An additional mission for Cuba was
4 October 1962 (Augmented Group). The DCI pointed out
that the Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the south-
eastern quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM sites. It was questioned
a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly
a
whether this were almost certainly not operational:
since the SAMs.
spectrum of possible onnaissance activities.
9 October 1962 (Augmented Group). The Group discussed the
It was agreed that
first priority should given to one U-2 in the w western part of the
island. Depending on the results of this, a number 
of similar 
sorties.
might be mounted. (Higher authority later approved the one mission,
leaving the second proposition open.)
15 October 1962. At a special meeting, two U-2 missions
designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved These were concurred
in by higher authority.
After the 15th of October, additional coverage was agreed
on at other meetings The Special Group was not convened for this.
purpose.
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Thomas A. Parrott
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II.
Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military
Buildup in Cuba
}
Presented below is a summary of information on the subject
which has been assembled by the staff in a chronological arrange-
ment of selected excerpts of data received from intelligence
community sources and from public sources. The chronology is
somewhat incomplete because it does not include: (a) the all source
all community review which the DCI is making at the request (11/14/62)
of the Board, (b) significant information in the files of the NSC
Special 5412/2 Group on intelligence and covert actions relating to
Cuba, and (c) all of the information believed to have been submitted
to the White House during the period of the military buildup in Cuba.
1. 1/2/59 - Castro proclaims provisional Government headed by
Urrutia as President.
.
•
ex-
2, 1/7/59 - U.S. recognizes the Castro Government
presses the sincere good will of the Government and people of the U.S.
3. 12/31/59 - Cuba and Communist China sign trade agreement
under which Cuba is to sell Peiping 50,000 tons of sugar.
!
On
4. 2/4/60 - Mikoyan arrives to open a Soviet exhibition.
2/13/60, Fidel Castro and Mikoyan sign a joint Soviet-Cuban communi-
que describing their conversations as "carried out in an atmosphere
of frank cordiality.'
"
5. 2/13/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign trade and economic aid
agreement.
6. 2/20/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with
East Germany.
7. 3/31/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with
Poland; with Czechoslovakia on 6/10/60; with Communist China on
7/23/60; with Hungary on 9/15/60; with Bulgaria on 10/7/60; and with
Rumania on 10/26/60. During this period Cuba established diplomatic
relations with these countries and with North Korea, North Vietnam,
Albania and Outer Mongolia.
.8. 7/9/60 - Khrushchev stated that the USSR is "raising its
voice and extending a helpful hand to the people of Cuba
Speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen
can support the Cuban people with rocket fire.
11
9. 7/10/60 - Guevara stated that Cuba is defended by the Soviet
Union, "the greatest military power in history.'
""
10. 7/21/60 - The Cuban press reported Raul Castro's statement
in Moscow that Cuba is grateful for political and moral support from
the USSR.
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-
11. 8/24/60 Castro charged the U.S. with supporting counter-
revolutionaries, and stated that Cuba would be friends with the
Soviets and Chinese Peoples Republic.
12. 11/18/60 - U.S. stated that at least 12 Soviet ships have
delivered arms and ammunition to Cuba since July 1960, and that Soviet
bloc arms provided to Cuba amount to at least 28,000 tons.
13. 12/19/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign joint communique through
which Cuba openly allies itself with the domestic and foreign pol-
icies of the Soviet Union and indicates its solidarity with the Sino-
Soviet bloc.
-
14. 1,/2/61 Cuba holds military parade displaying bloc arms,
including tanks, assault guns and field guns. * Castro said this
represents only a "small part" of the arms which Cuba had received
from the bloc.
15. 1/3/61
The United States severed diplomatic relations
with Cuba.
16. 12/23/61
-
Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro declared that
the Chinese People's Republic has sent Cuba hundreds of machine guns.
17. 3/24/61 - In a letter to the New York Times, Mr. Juan Bosch
of New York City (former Minister of Finance of Cuba prior to the
Batista Administration) stated that: "Just recently I have received
confidential information that in the western part of the island of
Cuba, specifically in the vicinity of the town of Soroa, Province of
Pinar del Rio, an installation is being finished that has required
hundreds of tons of portland cement, and has led observers to conclude
that a rocket-launching pad is being prepared for use by the Soviet
Union. Many reports of other secret military installations are being
received continuously in my office. Do the American people not realize
that these installations may be used to pinpoint atomic destruction to
any part of the United States, and that a military base in Cuba would
be invaluable to the Soviet Union, not only because of its military
value as a base at the very back door of the U.S., but also because
of the prestige that this would give the Russians?"
18. 4/3/61 The U.S. Department of State stated that since mid-
1960 over 30,000 tons of arms valued at $50 million had arrived in
Cuba from the bloc; the Cuban armed forces are dependent on the
Soviet bloc for their armed power; Soviet and Czech military advisers
and technicians had accompanied the flow of arms; Cubans had gone to
Czechslovakia and the USSR for training as jet pilots, ground mainten-
ance crews, and artillerymen; and that, except for the U.S., Cuba had
the largest ground forces in the hemisphere at least 10 times as
large as those maintained by Batista's and other previous Cuban
Governments.
--
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19. 4/17-19/61 The CIA-directed effort against Castro met
with disaster at the Bay of Pigs..
20. 4/20/61 - President Kennedy stated that any unilateral
American intervention would have been contrary to our traditions and
to our international obligations, but that we do not intend to
abandon Cuba.,
21.
4/20-12/1/61
-
CIA relaxed its intelligence collection and
covert action efforts against Cuba, according to the oral report
made to the Board on 6/26/62 by CIA Deputy Director Helms.
22. 6/15/61 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence
of MIG-15s and MIG-178 in Cuba.
23. 7/15/61 A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence |
of MIG-19s in Cuba.
"
24. 12/2/61 - Castro declares himself a bona fide Communist.
"I believe absolutely in Marxism
I am a Marxist-Leninist and
will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life.' He admits
that he hid his true political ideology during his revolutionary,
struggle because he felt that "if we, when we began to have strength,
had been known as people of very radical ideas,unquestionably all the
social classes that are making war on us would have been doing so
from that time on.
"
25. 1/31/62 - The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics,
meeting at Punta del Este, declared that because of its public align-
ment with international communism, the present Marxist-Leninist govern-
ment of Cuba is excluded from participating in the Inter-American
system.
26. 2/3/62 In a Proclamation by the President an embargo was
placed on trade with Cuba.
"
27. 3/7/62 Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/3,
entitled "Priority National Intelligence Objectives, provided guid-
ance to the intelligence community on its intelligence collection
effort. This guidance included the following:
"First Category: Objectives of such vital importance as to
require a maximum intelligence effort ... B. Present and pro-
spective Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities for nuclear
attack on the U. S.
.
"Second Category: Objectives of such critical importance
as to require an intensive intelligence effort
F. Presert,
and prospective Soviet, Chinese Communist, Satellite, and Cuban
capabilities and intentions to initiate, conduct, and support
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(27 3/7/62 Continued)
"internal warfare in countries on the periphery of the Sino Soviet
Bloc, and in Africa and Latin America.
"
"Third Category: Objectives of such great importance as
to warrant a major intelligence effort
Z. The stability,
internal policy, and international relations of the Castro
regime in Cuba; the locus of power within the regime; the
progress of its reorganization of the economy, the political
structure, and the military establishment; its capabilities
to control the population and to defend itself against internal
and external attack; the extent and nature of popular disaffec-
tion and of organized internal resistance; the regime's
economic, political, and military relations with the Soviet
Bloc and with Communist China; its subversive capabilities
and activities in Latin America. 11.
28. 3/15/62 - According to a CIA memorandum of 11/16/62, the intelligence
community established on 3/15/62 an interagency refugee interrogation center
(Caribbean Admission Center) at Opa-Locka, Florida, manned by 40 personnel
representing CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, USIA and VOA. Cuban
refugees were arriving at Miami at the rate of 1400 per week. On arrival, male
refugees were screened at the Center for intelligence and counter-intelligence
potential. From 3/15 to 10/23/62 (the date on which civil air travel was
suspended), 10,000 refugees were interviewed at the Center, and 5608 intelli-
gence reports were disseminated to the community..
According to the 11/14/62 CIA Chronology: "On 15 February, 1962 an
interagency interrogation center was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near
Miami, to handle Cuban refugees and improve the quality of intelligence
'collected from them
The establishment of Opa Locka coincided with
a sharp drop in reports of missile activity received in Washington. When the
defensive phase of the Soviet buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting
rose very rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equipment
coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the security precautions
imposed by the Soviets on this operation such reports were the basis for
the Checklist item cited
(See Items Nos. 54 and 59, infra).
"
(NOTE: As reflected in Item No. 134, infra, a somewhat different CIA assessment
of the reports appears elsewhere in the CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 wherein it
is stated that CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports on missile and
missile-associated activity in Cuba before January 1, 1962, all of which were
either totally false or misrepresentations by the observer of other kinds of
activity. The CIA Chronology adds that CIA analysts had come to view such
reports with suspicion.)
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29. 3/21/62 - The DCI circulated NIE 85-62 on "The 31tuation
and Prospects in Cuba". It stated that Cuban military capabilities
are "essentially defensive' and that "we believe it unlikely that
the 
Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air
and naval 
capabilities suitable for major independent military opera-
tions 
overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will
station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the
period of this estimate the next two years). This attitude would
(CONTINUED ON PAGE 5)
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(29. 3/21/62 Continued)
"
"not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors,
and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and
equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement
of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service
Soviet units. A foreword to the above estimate states that
"Our
information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable
as we could wish. On some matters, it is seriously inadequate
In general, the information available is sufficient to support the
estimate."
•
•
"Arms
30. 3/27/62 - The U.S. stated that the Sino-Soviet bloc has
furnished $100 million worth of military equipment and technical.
services to Cuba, and that several hundred Cuban military personnel
have received training, including pilot training, in the bloc.
include 5 to 75 MIG jet fighters; 150 to 250 tanks; 50 to 100 assault
guns; 500 to 1000 field artillery; 500 to 1000 antiaircraft artillery;
500 mortars; 200,000 small arms, and some patrol vessels and torpedo
boats. No evidence of missiles, missile bases or bombers.
(Source: Chronology prepared by the State Department at the request
of Senator Morse.)
11.
31. 4/11/62 - DIA initiated mee ings with JCS and CIA personnel
to discuss refugee interrogation guides for use at the Opa-locka
center and to review intelligence requirements on Cuba.
(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)
32. Spring of 1962 - "The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a
military base must have been made by the spring of 1962 and prepara-
tions within the USSR must have been under way from that time on.
There also must have been planning activities in Cuba, in particular,
reconnaissance and survey work. The only indication of these opera-
tions which can be found is a single intercepted personal message
(4/11/62) addressed to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at
the Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not judged
important enough to warrant inclusion in current intelligence publica-
tions (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
33. May 1962 A Cuban "Indications Center" was established at
CINCLANT on the recommendations of DIA and NORAD.
(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)
34. 5/31/62 - On this date the NPIC began publishing a series
of formal reports dealing with NPIC's evaluation, from a photographic
standpoint, of refugee and agent reports on Cuba. Between 5/31 and
10/5, NPIC examined 138 refugee and agent reports. The CIA Chronology
of 11/7/62 stated that only three of these reports cited missile
activity which could not be linked to the SAM and cruise missile de-
ployments, and "NPIC's evidence negated those three. Elsewhere in
the CIA Chronology it is stated "CIA current Intelligence was ordered
on 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of
5 "
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(34. 5/31/62 Continued)
'missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC."
Between 14 August and mid-October one CIA office sent NPIC 13
memoranda "asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing
information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet
offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were.
checked with NPIC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPIC
either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding.
35. 6/1/62 - DIA issued intelligence requirements regarding
the missile buildup in Cuba including missiles of intermediate range.
These requirements were described by General Carroll as detailed and
comprehensive and as including suggested clandestine intelligence.
requirements for CIA.
(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)
L
36. 6/26/62 - At the PFIAB Meeting on this date, Mr. Richard
Helms, Deputy Director of Plans, CIA, reported that CIA relaxed its
intelligence and covert action efforts against Cuba following the
abortive Invasion in April, 1951; that since December 1961 CIA has
mounted a major intelligence effort against Cuba; that there have
been weekly U-2 overflights of Cuba; that an interrogation center
has been set up at Opa-locka, with Defense participation, where
1600 Cuban refugees a week are interrogated with 250 weekly-intel-
ligence reports resulting therefrom; that such intelligence reports
are coordinated with U-2 photography as the basis for disseminating
intelligence data on the status of the military situation in Cuba;
that CIA is operating intelligence agents in Cuba; that some intelli-
gence is also received from British, French, Maxican and other govern-
ments still maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba; that the
Cubans are credited with being stronger militarily than any other
Latin American country, but that the Cuban ground forces do not
represent an offensive capability; that they have no guided missiles;
and that no nuclear weapons are known to have been supplied to Cuba
by the USSR.
-
37. July 1962. According to the CIA Chronology of 11/7/62,
"intelligence officers dealing with Cuba were focusing during July
on the direction Soviet-Cuban relations would take following Soviet
acquiescence in Castros' assertion of his leadership of Cuban
Communism in the Escalante affair.
B...
38. 7/4/62 - The President's Intelligence Checklist, prepared
by CIA, referring to Raul Castro's visit to Moscow, noted that Raul
was probably seeking more Soviet military aid such as MIG-21s and
surface-to-air missiles which the USSR was already providing to
Indonesia, Egypt and Iraq.
39. 7/19/62 - CIA's President's Checklist noted that the fact
that Raul leit Moscow without publicity indicated that this was a
"pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive". (Source: CIA
Chronology, 11/7/62)
6
-
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40. 7/19/62 The NSC Special 5412/2 Group (and later the
President) approved a proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba "be con-
tinued at their current level of two a month". This recommendation
was based on a memo from the DD/I to the DCI following a request
made of the DCI on 7/10 by General Taylor who had asked for a compre-
hensive review of all aerial photography activities. The justifica-
tion advanced for the DCI's proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba be
"continued at their current level" was (1) that earlier missions
over Cuba had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports
of submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false", and (2)
that "our most important need is for any evidence of the deployment.
of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba".
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
.
41. 7/26-29/62
-
Soviet ships carrying equipment and personnel
for the Soviet buildup in Cuba first began arriving at Cuban ports.
evidence gradually accumulated that the behavior pattern of
these ships was Similar to that of Soviet ships carrying arms to
other countries, that even greater security measures than usual were
in effect, that a number of the ships were coming from the Baltic
rather than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger ships,
and finally that there was a general movement of Bloc shipping toward
Cuba on an unprecedented scale, Apparently, the first recognition of
unusual activity in any intelligence publication was a note in a
daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal use
this paper stated on August 1, that at least some if not all of the
ships involved probably are carrying additional military equipment
to Cuba'. This statement was in direct contradiction to NSA's
comment on the same information, 1.e., that it tended to corroborate
a report by the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana (earlier intercepted
by NSA) that Raul Castro had asked the USSR to take back excess war
materiel.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
11.
.
•
•
•
.
As
42. August 1962 - "
It should be noted for the record that
CIA was in disagreement with DIA over interpretation of intelligence
on the movement of shipping to Cuba throughout the month of August.
The resulting difficulties in coordination of items for the Central
Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), held up publication from 3 August to
9 August of the first item on this subject in that publication.
late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily Intelligence Summary said
that 'The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases
in trade between the USSR and Cuba
There were further diffi-
culties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the interpretation of
photography of aircraft crates deck-loaded on Soviet ships; the
record shows that CIA was right. Finally, it should be noted that
there is a long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photography
on deck cargoes and faster service in returning these pictures to
Washington. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
7
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1
We
43. 8/1/62 The DCI circulated NIE 85-2-62 cn "The Situation
and Prospects in Cuba", which stated that 
the capabilities of the
Cuban armed forces "have been and are 
being greatly enhanced by 
the
Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment 
and instruction.
Cuban military capabilities however are 
essentially defensive.
believe it unlikely that the bloc 
will provide Cuba with the 
capa-
bility to undertake major independent 
military operations overseas
.
We also believe it unlikely that 
the bloc will station in Cuba bloc
combat units of any description, at 
least for the period of this
estate. (The estimate was 
Tover the next year or so".)
respect to this estimate CIA reported 
that "The Intelligence
.
Community view of the Cuban problem in 
this period was 
crystallized
in NIE 85-2-62. as the intelligence 
foundation for MONGOOSE".
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
i
With
44. 8/4/62 - CIA's President's Checklist ("not being under a
requirement for USIB coordination was able to 
report the 
accumulating
information fully to the President") 
stated that "Eleven Soviet
ships are on their way to Havana and we 
strongly suspect they 
are
carrying arms. Such a delivery would 
not be far short of the 
total
amount of arms delivered in the 
first half of 1962".
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
45. 8/5/62 - "The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions author-
ized for August was flown on August 5, probably 
just too soon to
detect significant reflections of the 
Soviet equipment entering 
the
(Source: CIA 
Chronology, 11/7 '52)
island at that time.
11
46. 8/8/62 - "Observations (in reports later reviewed) at the
port of Mariel suggest that preparations 
for construction of the
Prefabricated
Guanajay MRBM sites were being made 
in early August.
concrete slabs up to 12x4x2 feet in size 
and more 
than thirty dark
colored cylindrical tanks about 30 feet long 
and 10 feet in diameter
were off-loaded about 8 August. Tubular 
and semicircular shaped
Similar
concrete forms arrived in Mariel 
during the same period.
items have been photographed at the IRBM sites in the Guanajay-Bauta
area. One source reported that this 
material was designed for use
in building missile bases, and that 
some of the cargo was delivered
to the Bauta area.
"
"Concrete forms similar to those observed at Mariel were
off-loaded at the port of La Isabela (in the Remedios IRBM 
site 
area)
(Source: 
Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)
during August
"
8/8/62
-
47.
"The DCI briefed the Republican Policy Committee,
emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
"
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48. 8/9/62 - CIA's President's Checklist for this date said "Soviet
ships have been arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July.
Some 32
vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe to be carrying arms.
Five passenger ships with a total capacity of about 3,000 persons have already
arrived. Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians, and we have
no reason to doubt this. We do not believe that there are any combat troops
among them."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62).
49. 8/10/62 - At a MONGOOSE meeting, the DCI stressed the importance.
of intelligence received on the arrival of Soviet military equipment and
technicians in Cuba. The DCI "raised questions as to what purpose was behind.
the sudden movement of men and materiel, and said that the United States must
face the possibility of the USSR locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could
justify because of U. S. missile bases in places like Italy and Turkey."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
--
50. 8/14/62- There arrived in Havana the first shipment of KOMAR class
patrol craft in Cuba each carrying two homing missiles with a range of 10
or 15 nm and carrying 2000 pound HE warheads. The KOMARS were transported to
Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. By 10/20 there
were a total of 12 KOMAR craft in Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report,
10/20/62)
-
--
51. 8/14/62 "CIA current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's
office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the construction
of missile bases until they had been checked out with NPIC this instruction
was in the field of intelligence technique rather than of policy; it had no
relation to later restrictions (see Item No. 152, infra) .
Between 14
August and mid-October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check
on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the
possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports
were checked with NPIC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either
lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding." (Source: CIA
Chronology, 11/14/62)
52. 8/15/62 - On this date, in an effort to supply guidance and
requirements for photographic reconnaissance, the DIA asked NPIC to conduct
a study and review of photographic intelligence which had previously been
obtained with respect to three particularly suspect areas in Cuba. On 8/17
photographic evidence indicated that SA-2 equipment was located in two of
these three suspect areas, although there was no evidence of their deployment.
(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, on 11/9/62)
minor
53. 8/15/62 - "Construction material for the Guanajay fixed IRBM
sites began to arrive at Mariel about mid-August
activity of an indefinite type was noted there in the 29 August photo-
graphy, and major construction had probably begun by 15 September.
(The fact that shipments to Guanajay started before those to San
Cristobal reflects the longer lead-time required for construction
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(53. 8/15/62 Continued)
11
'of a fixed site.) It is not possible to say how soon after 15.
September the activity might have been recognizable 
from the 
air as
an IRBM site. (Source: CIA Chronology, 
11/7/62)
11
54. 8/18/62 CIA's President's Checklist reported that "There
are grounds for thinking that the large influx of Soviet 
military
equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could 
be connected 
with
the beginning of construction of surface-to-air 
missile sites. 
What
we know so far is that the shipments have included 
quantities of
electronic, transportation and construction equipment
, some of 
it
similar to Soviet equipment which showed up in Indonesia 
for the
building of SAM installations, and that many 
of the arriving 
Soviets
are construction personnel
(The CIA Chronology 
at this point
•
11
states that "Soviet operations in August involved primarily the
establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast 
defense 
missile
positions. By the middle of August CIA was receiving a large volume
of agent and refugee reporting which, while understandably garbled
and fragmentary, enabled its (CIA's) analysts to pinpoint 
areas of
construction and identify some of the equipment coming 
in.")
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
55. 8/20/62 - "The COMOR Targeting Working Group (chaired and
staffed largely by CIA) set up the first comprehensive card 
file
system for Cuban targets.
11
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
56. 8/21/62 At a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office (attended
also by Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney.
General, General Taylor, General Lemnitzer and Mr. 
McGeorge Bundy
)
the DCI said that "information available since 10 August 
indicated
the extent of Soviet aid was much greater than previously 
thought,
and that this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic
"The
installations or missile sites, probably ground-to- air."
possibility of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba was again raised 
by 
the DCI,
which developed a discussion of possible U.S. courses of 
action
.
It was agreed that the DCI would fully brief the President the next
day (which he did) and that Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, 
Bundy
and the DCI would discuss the situation with the 
President on
23 August.
11.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
57. 8/23/62 A meeting was held with the President with Messrs.
Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone in attendance
.
This meeting resulted in the issuance of NSAM 
(National Security
Action Memorandum) #181 dated 8/23/62, reflecting that "
The 
President
has directed that the following actions and studies be 
undertaken in
the light of evidence of new bloc activity in Cuba
"2. What information should be made available in the United
States and abroad with respect to these new bloc activities in
Cuba?"
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(57. 8/23/62 Continued_
The line of activity projected for operation MONGOOSE
PLAN B PLUS should be developed with all possible speed.."
114.
"5. An analysis should be prepared of the probable military,
political and psychological impact of the establishment in 
Cuba
of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-
to-surface missiles
which could reach the United States."
"6. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of making a statement that the United States would not
tolerate the establishment of military forces (missile or air,
or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against
the United States.
117.
A study should be made of the various military alterna-
tives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate
any installations in Cuba capable of launching a nuclear attack
on the United States. What would be the pros and cons, for
example, of pinpoint attack, general counterforce attack, and
outright invasion?"
18.
A study should be made of the advantages and disad-
vantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or
other action beyond the MONGOOSE B PLUS, in the context of an
aggravated Berlin Crisis.".
....
NSAM No. 181 indicated there would be a further meeting with the
President about 9/1 to review progress on the above items and that
in the event of important new information an earlier meeting would
be called. The NSAM concluded with the statement "The President
emphasizes again the sensitive character of these instructions.'
"
Further-
58. 8/23/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 referring to the
meeting with the President, which resulted in the issuance of NSAM
#3181, states:
Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the highest
levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet military devel-
opment in Cuba, including the probable establishment of surface
-to-air
missile sites, and the danger of surface-to-surface missiles.
more, the President had taken action on the intelligence received.
There was at this time no evidence of any sort that surface-to-
surface weapons were being installed. in fact, the MRBM units had
- scarcely started en route from the USSR but the possibility had
been discussed by the President and his advisers.
--
"
59. 8/23/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:
"Most of our information from within Cuba on the influx of
Soviet equipment and technicians has come from Cuban sources.
We now have several reports from the British Embassy whose
people have been out looking.
11
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"They have spotted at least one camp southwest of Havana,
where the number of vehicles suggested the presence 
of 'many'
more than the 200 presumed young Russians they 
did see, and 
where
This they think
a radio antenna field had already been 
erected.
could be connected with radio monitoring.
11
"Their information on the equipment coming in--some hard,
some not--leads them to suggest that an expert 
might consider
the possibility of antiaircraft rockets 
and radar.'
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
60. 8/24/62 On the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62 Senator
Engle stated that "On August 24 the Department 
of State gave a 
back-
ground press and radio news briefing" on 
the subject of Soviet
activities in Cuba. The Senator then 
quoted a number of 
articles
from various U.S. newspapers dated from 
8/24 to 8/26/62, which
"All these stories contain 
the
Senator Engle summarized as follows:
same set of facts. All of them mention 3000 to 5000 Soviet techni-
cians. All of them mention the strengthening of coastal 
and air
defenses
All of these articles relate 
that the information
(Source: Congressional Record)
came from U.S. officials.
"
61. 8/27/62 - In a memorandum of this date, General Carter
reported to Mr. Bundy on actions taken in response 
to NSAM 181:
(a) Task Force "W" would look into the 
possibility of removing 
the
restrictions on the mounting of clandestine operations 
out of
Guantanamo, (b) the Board of 
National Estimates would "establish 
a
procedure to ensure continuing analysis" of the numbers 
and types 
of
Communist Bloc personnel and 
equipment entering Cuba and its probable
use, and of all construction, particularly 
missile sites, (c) the
Board of National Estimates would assess the 
physical and 
psychological
dangers to the U.S. and Latin America of 
missile installations in
Cuba, (d) a daily CIA "Cuban Highlights" 
memorandum would be pub-
lished for distribution to the President 
and others, (e) CIA would
arrange intelligence collection overflights "as 
frequently as the
situation demands, and (f) Task Force 
"W" would prepare a plan 
of
(Source: CIA 
Chronology, 
11/7/62)
operations for "MONGOOSE B PLUS."
"1
-
62. 8/27/62 On this date, pursuant to NSAM 181, OCI of CIA
began publishing a daily paper, Cuban Highlights," 
using a "
philos-
It was to
(President's
) Checklist.
ophy and format similar to the
include current intelligence estimative assessments and press coverage
for distribution to the President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric
,
(A few 
officials
Lemnitzer, Rusk, Taylor, and the Attorney General.
'It was 
discontinued on 19
were later added to the distribution
.)
September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded that suf-
ficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban 
reporting in 
regu-
(Source
: CIA Chronology, 1177/62
)
lar intelligence publications.
11
63. 8/27/62 - "Based on refugee reporting the COMOR Targeting
Working Group pinpointed four farms in (the Sagua 
La Grande) area
(Source: 
CIA Chronology, 11/7/62).
as suspect missile sites.
11
12
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64. 8/29/62 - The State Department briefed a bipartisan group
in the House of Representatives, according to Senator 
Engle's 
state-
ment on the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62. He said 
that the state-
ment which had been supplied to the House of Representatives by 
the
Department of State on 8/29 read as follows
: "Soviet Military Aid 
to
Cuba. After a lull since early 1962 the Soviet Union resumed 
large-
scale military deliveries to Cuba in the last week in July.
then, Soviet ship movements to Cuba have totaled at least 25, in-
cluding at least 5 passenger ships. This is in addition 
to 
normal
tanker and cargo movements. The shipments contained both 
military
.
and economic goods and personnel. Although full details 
are not 
yet
available on the contents of the ships, nor of the breakdown 
"
between
military and nonmilitary, information to date indicates the 
following
:
"Cargo: Military cargo, perhaps as much as half of the total,
included large quantities of transportation, electronic, and construc-
tion equipment, such as communications vans, radar vans, 
trucks, and
mobilé generator units. Much of the equipment is likely to go into
The size and shape of
the improvement of coastal and air defenses.
some of the boxes delivered suggests that it is possible they could
contain ground-to-air missiles for antiaircraft use, but we have 
no
information on that as yet. These missiles are not adaptable for
nuclear use.
"Nonmilitary cargo, roughly half of the total, consists of de-
liveries, already behind schedule, of industrial and agricultural
equipment under aid and trade agreements.
"Personnel: A large number of additional Soviet specialists
arrived in Cuba in the same period. With the recent arrivals, the
total number in Cuba or on the way, both military and nonmilitary
may be as high as 5000. The breakdown between military and technical
personnel is not known, but the additional numbers of military special-
ists are not incompatible with the training and setting up 
of the
There is no evidence
complex military equipment which has arrived.
of the arrival of Soviet combat troops from other Soviet bloc coun-
tries.
"The shipments consist of both economic goods and defensive
military goods. They appear designed to enhance the Cuban regime's
defense capabilities against an internal threat, and to increase the
effectiveness of the Cuban military establishment for possible in-
ternal use. Information to date indicates that the shipments will
not improve significantly the very limited offensive capabilities of
the Cuban armed forces.
"The recent shipments indicate a significant increase in Soviet
involvement in Cuba. The increased amount of military assistance
accompanies stepped-up Soviet economic aid to try to relieve Cuban
shortages. The shipments must have been planned several months ago
to have arrived when they did. The Cuban regime, facing economic
deterioration and rising popular discontent, probably hopes to
strengthen its internal position through new demonstrations of
Soviet support." (Source: Congressional Record)
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65. 8/29/62- SAM sites in Cuba were "first observed" as the result
On this date 8 SA-2 
sites
of the U-2 photographic mission flown on this date
.
one on 9/26 -- one on
were identified. (Three more were 
observed on 9/5 
-
1 on 
10/15 1 on 10/17
9/29
1 on 10/5 6 on 10/7 -- 
2 on 10/14
24 sites). (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62, Table 3)
"
--
--
Total
66. 8/29/62- Referring to results of the 8/29 U-2 mission, the CIA
Chronology states 'Read out of the 29 August 
coverage showed an SA-2 site 
near
Sagua La Grande which apparently was the 
basis for the reported activity there
'
(i.e., the pinpointing of four farms in the 
Sagua La Grande area as "suspect
'the target card was
missile sites, referred to in Item 
No. 63 Above).
It should 
be noted that knowledge that
changed to show a confirmed SA-2 site.
this site was in the area could have lead analysts to misinterpret any sub-
sequent reports of MRBM activity as part of 
the SAM development, but in fact
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)
no such reports were received.
"
-
67. 8/29/62 A DIA study of the 8/29 U-2 photography and a study of
refugee reports, suggested some sort of clandestine 
activity in progress in
the San Cristobal area. This prompted the 
DIA to request additional photo-
graphic coverage of this area, but such coverage 
was not accomplished until
10/14 for a variety of reasons including 
poor weather and the requirement 
that
(Source: Oral report to Board by
the U-2 not overfly SA-2 installations
.
Director, DIA, 11/9/62)
63. 8/29/62
-
The minutes of the USIB meeting on this date show that
The paper
Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military buildup in Cuba.
requested by Mr. Hilsman and the Board of 
National Estimates 
memorandum already
requested by the DD/I (on 8/24) were 
combined.
"
Successive drafts of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff,
were quickly overtaken by the photography which became available 
after 29 
August.
At the USIB meeting of 7. September, 
further attempts to write such a paper
were deferred until 19 September, by which 
date the new information could 
be
digested. This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, 
was in fact passed by USIB on
19 September
"
At the USIB meeting on this date, two other subjects were discussed:
(1) the question raised by General Carter and 
Mr. Cline of more rapid 
delivery
from Turkey and Denmark of Navy photography 
of outbound Soviet ships, and
(2) the action which General Carter had 
taken on 8/27/52 in asking General
For F8U
Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level 
photography using F-101 o
aircraft to which General Lemnitzer 
had replied that "something 
could be
dug up.
(This action by 
General Carter in calling General Lemnitzer was 
the
result of an instruction telephoned from out of town 
by the DCI who had left
Washington on August 23 for the West 
Coast, then left the country on August 
30
The DCI "was concerned over
for the Riviera, and returned on September 
23.
the long delay of the 29 August mission 
by 
weather."). (Source:
Chronology, 11/7/62)
"
CIA
14
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69. 8/29/62 CIA's President's Checklist contained the report
"There is no sign of a let-up in the movement of Soviet equip-
ment and personnel into Cuba.
"By latest count, there have during the past six weeks been some
80 voyages to Cuban ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships 
under
Communist charter.
"We note that deliveries of industrial equipment, foodstuffs,
and other nonmilitary items are being made largely on chartered
Western ships, probably because so many Soviet ships are involved in
hauling military gear.
(Source
: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
70. 8/30/62 At a meeting of the Special Group, General Dem--
nitzer told the Group of his discussion with General 
Carter who had
on 8/27 asked General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level
photography using F-101 or F8U aircraft. The Special Group agreed
to take cognizance of the matter and "reopen it when specific targets
and information needs could be identified.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
71. 8/30/62 - A draft prepared by the JCS on 8/30 in response
to NSAM 181 of 8/23/62 presented to the White House 'a study of the
advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by 
blockade
or invasion or other action in the context of aggravated Berlin
crisis". The following are selected highlights from the draft:
In NSAM 109 of 10/23/61, the President described the four phases
into which he expected progressive U.S. and Allied military action
to fall, in meeting and countering Soviet/GDR measures to force the
Western powers out of Berlin.
"The JCS are of the opinion that positive action of oppose
communist agression in any geographical area will be evidence of the
determination of the United States and will influence the Berlin.
decision. However, they consider that actions outside of Germany
should be complementary to, and not substituted for, actions to be
taken in Central Europe to maintain our rights in Berlin and prevent
denial of access!
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated repeatedly that the United.
States cannot tolerate the permanent existence of a communist govern-
ment in Cuba and that the requirement to remove the communist vern-
ment from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing
capabilities.
11
"Conclusions": (a) a blockade would be an act of war (b) the
undertaking of the liberation of Cuba by invasion during a period of
contingent upon
aggravated crisis in Berlin is militarily sound
the call-of of substantial additional forces to active duty and a
firm preparedness to execute full mobilization if necessary, and
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(71. 8/30/62 Continued)
(c) other actions (such as covert measures to eliminate Cuban nuclear
launch installations) would be less effective than full scale military
intervention and would produce only partial or temporary results.
Military Alternatives
The JCS draft also included a section ("Item 7") in response.
to the provision of Par. 7 of NSAM 181 which called for a Department
of Defense study of "the various military alternatives which might.
be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations
in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U. S. . . (for
example, (a) pinpoint attack (b) general counter-force attack, (c)
outright invasion).
In a preface to this study the JCS pointed out that (1) although
the current evaluation of reported SAM sites in Cuba is that they are
for defensive purposes and designed for air defense, if these sites are
effectively used to derogate U.S. aerial reconnaissance the Cubans
will have an opportunity to develop such offensive capabilities as
missile launch sites and submarine bases (2) a Cuban offensive capa-
bility would fill gaps in the Russian missile coverage of the U.S.
and also provide the Cuban Communist government with a means of
countering future U.S. actions against Cuba through blackmail, and
(3) continued development of Cuban capabilities would increase U.S.
defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.
The JCS analysis of alternative U.S. military actions was then
set forth in essence as follows:
2.
•
.
Pinpoint attack (1.e., a localized attack against a specific
facility followed by planned withdrawal
This might be done by
pinpoint air attack, or by covert commando-type raids (not recommended)
on targets adjacent to coastal areas). Advantages: economical in
force applied
minimizes U.S. and Cuban casualties, and pre-
attack publicity. Disadvantages: eliminates nuclear launch capa-
bility only on a temporary basis
no less belligerent than any
other act of war
even if covert will brand U.S. as aggressor
affords Cuba with outcry before international organizations
and a legal justification for retaliatory attacks on the U.S.
gives USSR precedent for retaliation against U.S. installations on
periphery of Bloc
little or no effect on Cuban Communist regime
.
•
or other Cuban militaryforces.
.
b. General counter-force attack (1.e., an attack designed to
destroy or neutralize Cuban nuclear capability installations or areas,
through air attacks, naval gunfire, or possible overt airborne or
amphibious assaults with or without immediate subsequent withdrawal).
Advantages: moderately economical in use of U.S. forces if adequate
air and naval support
fewer U.S. and Cuban casualties than if
a full scale invasion. Disadvantages: same as disadvantages of "Pin-
point attack", above, and also... could lead to invasion to extri-
cate U.S. forces ... gives USSR precendent for rep isal against U.S..
16-
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71
(71. 8/30/62 Continued)
installations on periphery of Bloc, Formosa, etc.
affords USSR
with opportunity for stepped-up military material and technical
buildup.
Outright invasion (1.e., would be accomplished through
execution of existing U.S. military contingency plans with full
preparation for positive and effective overt U.S. intervention).
Advantages: permanent elimination of Cuban facilities having present
or potential capability to launch nuclear attack on the U.S. ..
would eliminate Communist government in Cuba and expel direct Soviet
influence
is equally effective against coastal or inland target
areas, whether missile sites, airfields or potential submarie bases
would clearly establish that the Monroe Doctrine is effective
instrument of U.S. foreign policy
would reassert U.S. determina-
tion to maintain integrity of Western Hemisphere and reaffirm princi-
ple of government by self-determination . . would restore U.S.
prestige, world-wide. Disadvantages: would reduce in some degree.
U.S. capability to react in other contingency areas during the
operation.
JCS conclusion:
..
the advantages of a decisive execution
of an outright invasion, together with the many disadvantages of any
lesser alternative, conclusively indicate that this is the only
course of action which should be adopted in order effectively and
permanently to accomplish the mission.
"Accordingly, it is recommended that in executing a decision
to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear
attack on the U.S., only overt full-scale military action should be
considered. Further, noting the increasing complexities attending
the delay of U.S. intervention in Cuba, a previous recommendation is
reiterated, that a national policy of early military intervention be
adopted by the United States.
72. 8/30/62 - The following excerpt from the President's press
conference of 8/30/62 was reported in the Congressional Record on
9/5/62:
The President: "We have no evidence of troops.
In response
to your specific question, we have no information that troops have
come into Cuba
the main thrust of course is assistance because
of the mismanagement of the Cuban economy . However, we are con-
tinuing to watch what happens in Cuba with the closest attention and
will respond to -- will be glad to announce any new information if it
should come immediately.
"
.
Question: "Mr. President, I wonder if a distinction could be
made with respect to the troops in Cuba. Some of us were told at the
State Department the other day that there is Russian military person-
nel in Cuba, that these are military technicians, and that they are
people who are going to operate missiles, similar to the Nike
missiles.
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(72. 8/30/62 Continued)
The President: "I don't know who told you that at the State
Department, that they are going to operate Mille missiles, because
that information we do not have at this time. There certainly are
We don't
technicians there and they may be military technicians.
have complete information about what's going on in Cuba, but since
the word 'troops' has been generally used they had a military ad-
visory commission there for a long period of time, so there may be
But on the
additional military advisory personnel or technicians.
question of troops, as it is generally understood, we do not have
evidence that there are Russian troops there. There is an expanded
advisory and technical mission. That is correct.
1.1
Question: "Are there no antiaircraft missiles shipped to Cuba?"
•
that does
The President: "We have no information as yet
not mean that there have not been, but all I am saying is that we have
no such information, as yet."
73. 8/31/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:
"Preliminary information from the 30 (sic) August U-2 mission
shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the western half of the island.
Manning of this many sites would require some 1500-2000 Bloc troops.
We are able to report on the basis of what is known so far that con-
struction of the sites appears to be fairly advanced and that there
are canvas-covered missiles in the vicinity of some sites. The
existence of additional sites can probably be assumed.
"The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet missile-equipped
The Cubans
torpedo boats and an undetermined number of Soviet tanks.
have had Soviet tanks for some time, but this is our first indication
that they now have boats of this type. They appear to be KOMAR-class
converted PT-boats, mounting two surface-to-surface missiles with an
estimated range of 35 nautical miles." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7).
-
74. 8/31/62 Par 5 of NSAM 181 called for an analysis (by the
White House, consulting with State, Defense and CIA) of "the probable
military, political, and psychological impact of the establishment
in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface
missiles which could reach the U.S." Accordingly, such an analysis
was made and set forth in a memorandum (labelled "Top Secret and
Sensitive") signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy under date of August 31,
1962. There follows a summary of selected highlights from that
memorandum, under the topic headings set forth therein:
111.
Soviet missile possibilities in Cuba"
"The most probable present Soviet missile activity would
be the introduction of SA-2 missiles." Preliminary photo
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(74.
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interpretation shows 7 SA-2 sites in early stages of construc-
tion
a modern first-line AA missile with an engagement
range of 30 miles and high reliability from 2500 to 60,000 feet,
and limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet
probably
capable of use with a nuclear warhead, but there is no evidence
that the Soviet Government has ever provided nuclear warheads to
another state, and it seems unlikely that such a move is currently
planned although there is little reason to suppose that the
Soviets would refuse to introduce such weapons if the move could
be controlled in the Soviet interest.
--
--
Other missiles which could be introduced now or later are
surface-to-surface missiles with ranges from 150 miles to 2000
miles (the Soviet MRBM), which would be of little value without
nuclear war heads. Longer range surface-to-surface missiles
shorter
would require relatively substantial installations
range missiles of this sort could be introduced very quickly and
mounted without elaborate construction
As missile capabil-
ities increase in the remainder of the 1960's, it will be pro-
gressively easier for the Soviet Union to install in Cuba light-
weight mobile missiles with increasing range and destructive
power against aircraft and against targets in the U.S.
"2.
in Cuba:
•
Military impact of the introduction of Soviet missiles
"A. Surface-to-air missiles"
Extensive deployment of SA-2s would make reconnais-
sance overflight and other clandestine air operations
difficult and dangerous, and would substantially in-
crease the problem of neutralizing air defense in event
of open conflict . .
"B.
Surface-to-surface missiles"
•
SSMs with nuclear warheads would be a very signi-
ficant military threat to the U.S... It appears
probable that on military grounds alone the establish-
ment of such a capability would be unacceptable.
It may well be that the introduction of nuclear
warheads into Cuba is a more significant dividing line
than introduction of any given class of missiles as
such but the covert introduction of nuclear warheads
would be very hard to detect.
--
Attention should also be given to the possibility
that the Soviets may attempt to set up a submarine
missile base in Cuba.
191
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(74. 3/31/62 Continued)
"3. Political and psychological impact of a Soviet
missile cstablishment in Cuba
In supplying Cuba with missiles of any sort, the Soviet
Union is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale military
foothold in the Western hemisphere
the delivery of
MIGS a year ago did not greatly disturb American or hemis-
phere opinion, but missiles are something else again.
and we cannot expect that the public mind will serenely
distinguish between aircraft missiles and a direct threat
of missile attack on the U. S.
Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics
of the Administration's "softness" on Cuba. This effect
can be somewhat mitigated by words and actions being con-
sidered in other responses to NSAM 181, but it cannot be
prevented while the missiles remain in place.
"
There will be a distinct difference in impact
between missiles for defensive use against aircraft and mis-
siles capable of use against the United States
inter-
national acceptance of action against defensive installations
would be lower than in the case of action against missiles
posing a direct nuclear threat to the U. S.
In Latin America the psychological and political effect
of missile installations in Cuba (no matter what kind) will
be substantial . . . the missile sites would be seen as
proof of strong Soviet support for Cuba
in the absence
of prompt and effective U. S. counteraction, it would be
judged that Castro is here to stay
in the Caribbean
this would lead to heavy pressure for more U. S. support
against Castro's subversion..
other Latin American
states would be more than ever inclined to accommodate to Cuba
. . and all this would accentuate inter-American strains.
"SUMMARY: In sum, the expectation is that any missiles
will have a substantial political and psychological impact.
while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition
of great alarm, even in the absence of proof that nuclear
warheads were arriving with them.
"
75. 8/31/62 - Senator Kenneth B. Keating included the following
in his remarks on the floor of the U. S. Senate:
"
I am reliably informed--when I say 'reliably informed,
I mean that has been checked out from five different sources, and I
am certain I can state it as a fact--that between the dates of 8/4
and 8/15, 10 or 12 Soviet vessels anchored at the Marante dock area
at Mariel. The dock area previously had been surrounded by the con-
struction of a high cinder-block wall. The Soviet ships unloaded 1200
20-
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(75. 8/31/62 Continued)
"troops. Troops is what I mean, and not technicians. They were
wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms.
"On August 13 five Soviet torpedo boats unloaded from Soviet
ships, and are now moored at La Base. There is every indication'
that the naval complement to handle these boats disembarked at the
same time.
"Again let me emphasize that these could not reasonably be
called technicians.
"On August 13, 1,000 non-Cuban personnel in fatigue uniforms
were seen working in the area near Finca La Guatana, in all probability
on or near a missile base located in that area.
The
"On August 3 a large convoy of military vehicles manned by Soviet
personnel was observed on the highway in Las Villas Province.
convoy moved in military order and contained the first amphibious
vehicles observed in Cuba; also jeeps, 6x6 trucks, and tracked trucks.
"On August 5 there was a movement seen of a 64-vehicle convoy
heading west on Carretera Central. The convoy was moving in military
order. It included tanks, cannonlike trailers, and flatbed trailers.
"On August 8 there was observed a night movement of a convoy on
Carretera Central. Flatbed trucks were observed transporting concave
metal structures supported by tubing. The convoy included a number
of closed vans. The convoy appeared to be moving toward an installa-
tion 4 to 5 kilometers from Canimar in a closely restricted area
believed to contain a rocket installation.
"There have been other observations of activities there, which
have been confirmed.
"
Soviet
Since July the Soviet Union has greatly stepped up.
shipments of men and equipment. More than 20 cargo ships have arrived
from Communist ports in the last few weeks. Many have been unloaded
under maximum security. Between three and five thousand so-called
'technicians' have arrived in the course of the past year.
statistics reveal that by the end of the year the Soviets will have
Cuban
shipped nearly $1 billion of goods and equipment to Castro.
trade with non-Communist countries will be down to about 30 percent
next year and Cuba will be virtually isolated from the free world--a
Communist enclave within the free world where the Soviets can operate
unchecked and to a large extent unobserved.
More ominous reports suggest that the Soviets are con-
structing missile bases and sending over technicians and experts to
man them. In this way the Soviets could expect to discourage deter-
mined refugees of other nations of this hemisphere from any kind of
concerted attack on the Cuban dictatorship. They could also strengthen
Castro to resist increasing internal dissatisfaction against his
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"regime. That supposition, which our Government has never openly
admitted or discussed, is a source of serious concern to the people
of all the Americas. It should be fully aired. The dangers in-
herent in the situation should be known and appreciated by all the
people of this hemisphere, and particularly by those nations which
so far have actively blocked measures to combat the menace of
Castroism.
'Another very real possibility and, in my judgment, a probability
that should be a source of even greater concern to the U.S. and which
has so far not been openly discussed at all in this country is that
the Soviets are deliberately taking advantage of the proximity between
Cuba and Cape Canaveral to conduct other activities. There is no
question at all of the possibility of interference with American
space flights by sensitive equipment mounted in Cuba and operated by
Communist experts..
(Source: Congressional Record)
.
"
This
76. 8/31/F2 - In retrospect "a thorough review of refugee
reports concerning the general areas now containing IRBM and MRBM
sites has produced some probable indicators. of scheduling.
collateral information indicates that plans to deploy ballistic
missiles in Cuba were being implemented by the end of August. Site
locations apparently had been selected and the surveys for the initial
IRBM installations were probably completed by that time. IRBM site
construction was apparently under way in September and preceded the
MRBM sites. This sequence is also indicated by the photography."
"Reported activities indicate that probably all of the San
Cristobal sites were selected by MRBM deployment in August since an
area which includes some of the sites was made a restricted zone.
during late August-early September.
"1
"Refugees had also reported "about August 22 the owner of a farm,
now the location of San Cristobal MRBM Site 3, was evicted and the
secondary road to the farm was improved by 24 August ... (A Soviet
survey team was reported in the vicinity of San Diego de los Banos,
a village about 4 miles west of Site 1; on 5 September)".
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62, Supp. 4)
77. 8/31/62 - CIA distributed a raw intelligence report which
was based on information acquired in the U.S. on 8/23/62 (presumably
from refugee sources) and which stated in part "A platoon of Soviets
who are specialists in rocketry and atomic arms is assigned to the
Ministry of the Cuban Armed Forces".
117
78. 8/31/62 Information received by an American correspondent:
in Mexico from a prominent Cuban exile and reported to the U.S. Embassy
in Mexico City:
. Soviet military presence in Cuba was a fact
among the thousands of Soviet technicians who recently arrived.
on the island, many appeared to be between 18 and 20 years of age, too
young to acquire any technical experience to impart to the Cubans
' ...
fl
these young Russians dress in sports clothes but give the appearance.
of having only recently completed their military training
two
sites with antennae, presumably used for monitoring activity at Cape
Canaveral, will be converted into missile bases
(Source: State:
Department Airgram from Mexico City No. 737.00/8-3162, dated 8/31/62)
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79. 8/31/62 - A column by Henry J. Taylor (date and newspaper
not identified) was inserted into the Congressional Record of 8/31/62
page A6569, by Congressman William C. Cramer:
we help Cuba mightily by having no policy at all. Ad-
mittedly, enemy rocket sites are available there from which to reach
Miami Cape Canaveral, and even Washington (only 1,139 miles), New
York (1,317), Boston (1,801), Chicago (1,333), Kansas City (1,497),
Denver (1,819), Los Angeles-San Diego (2,299), and easily as far as
Seattle (2,843) on a pinpoint basis. Why does the administration
consistently pooh-pooh and soften the indications these rocket sites
are being built? It you were Khrushchev wouldn't you build them?
Disliking the inevitable does not make it less inevitable
-
.
•
11.
80. 9/1/62 In response to NSAM 181 the Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State, submitted to the Secretary
of State and the White House a paper analyzing the meaning of in-
creased Soviet aid to Cuba including an analysis of Soviet and Cuban
motives behind the recent Soviet economic and military shipments to
Cuba. This analysis stated in part: "In addition to training and
arming Castro's forces, the Soviets may be establishing some kind of
overt military presence with Soviet-manned installations in Cuba.
But we believe at present such activities are likely to be limited
to the setting up of unacknowledged intelligence collection and de-
fensive facilities
More risky, and politically less justifiable,
would be demonstrably offensive installations, such as bomber bases
or pads for missiles capable of reaching adjacent countries. We
believe that the Soviets would rule out this type of military presence
for the foreseeable future. In sum, we think there is some possibility
that intelligence and defensive installations may be set up at least
temporarily under purely Soviet control, while offensive installations
would not be likely, certainly for a considerable time. The State
Department analysis stated at this point "It should be noted in this
connection that presently available information makes it extremely
difficult to assess Soviet intentions in this field and that a harder
estimate must await more clear out evidence.'
It
81.
9/4/62 The White House issued the following Presidential
Statement: "All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this
hemisphere have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet
Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba.
Information has reached the Government in the last 4 days from a
variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets
have provided the Cuban Government with a number of antiaircraft
missiles with a short range of 25 miles which are similar to early
models of our Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are
apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equip-
ment which is required for their operation. We can also confirm the
presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-
ship guided missiles having a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet
military technicians now known to be in Cuba or enroute approximatel;
3,500 is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to
use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make
23
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(81. 9/4/62 Continued)
"information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.
There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba, from any
Soviet bloc country, of military bases provided to (sic) Russia, of
a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo, of the presence
of ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offensive capability
either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it
otherwise, the greatest issues would arise. The Cuban question must be
considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats
to peace
It continues to be the policy of the United States that the
Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force
or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be
necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere
82. 9/4-5/62 - "General Carter briefed a number of Congressional
leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees".
(CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)
83. 9/5/62 This was the first U-2 mission for September (of the
two which had been authorized "as a routine matter" by the Special Group on
July 19 based on the DCI's recommendation that "U-2 flights over Cuba
be continued at their current level of two a month"). This flight (and the
August 29 flight) covered areas which in retrospect are known to have been
the sites of MRBM and IRBM installations but the September 5 photography
"
--
'gave no recognizable evidence that any construction was then under way,
although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material
at Guanajay Site 1 on August 29. In fact there was probably no ballistic
missile equipment in Cuba at that time. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/60)
"
84. 9/5/62- On this date photograph: of the Remedios IRBM site
was negative, but road improvements began shortly thereafter, and a flow of
construction from the port of Isabela, on the north coast
"the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature
is not determinable. The estimated date for the beginning of major
construction is about 1 October". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
85 9/5/62 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of
MIG-21s in Cuba. (Source: NPIC)
86. 9/5/62 - Senator Keating, speaking on the floor of the Senate
in response to Senator Engle's earlier remarks that day (see Items 60 and 64,
above):
I have said that the whole story has not been told the
American people. That is still the case
even after the latest
White House announcement yesterday.
I apologize for the embarrassment I am about to cause the
Senator from California. On the 14th day of August, in an effort to
get some official information, I wrote to the Department of State to
ask them about Cuba and the buildup there. Sixteen days later on
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TOP SECRET
August 30th, the Department wrote a letter to me which arrived at my
office just today (9/5/62)
This letter an incredible letter
in the light of what has happened since August 30, and indeed what
had happened before that reads in part as follows:
--
Several Soviet passenger and cargo ships arrived in Cuba during
late July and early August carrying large quantities of technicians
of various kinds.
"The Department has established that personnel landed from ap-
proximately five of the ships. We have no specific information about
the number of persons.
'We have no information that any Soviet-bloc troops have landed
in Cuba. Although the full significance of these developments is not
clear, there is no evidence that supplies and technicians have arrived
in Cuba in such numbers as to provide support for external aggression
from Cuba against other countries. (Source: Congressional Record).
87. 9/6/62 - "After further analysis" (of the August 29 flight).
there appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September
the information which had previously been included by the CIA in the
President's Checklist of August 31, 1962, regarding photography of
the August 29 flight which disclosed SA-2 sites in Western Cuba, plus
KOMAR-class PT-boats and tanks. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
.
88. 9/6/62 - By this time "more detailed readout of the 29
August mission had . . led CIA analysts to suspect the presence of
another kind of missile site possibly surface-to-surface -- at
Banes, on the northeast coast. General Carter so informed the Presi-
dent on September 6.
(For this reason the information was never in-
cluded in the Checklist)"
Programs were then set in motion to determine the characteristics
and range of the missiles at Banes: On 9/9/62 at the request of the
Secretary of State, COMOR reviewed the vehicles available for recon-
naissance of Banes. On 9/10 General Carter sent a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense requesting necessary actions, including Special
Group
approva to provide for "tactical-type reconnaissance" of
of 
the
Banes area, w en directed by higher authority. On 9/14 a Special
Group meeting as briefed by JCS on capabilities for low-level cover-
age on
certain targets" in Cuba. but the Secretary of Defense did.
not want the operation considered further until there were available
the results of further U-2 reconnaissance which had been decided upon
at a White House meeting of 9/10.
11
(On September 18 the CIB reported the results of a further CIA
study of the 9/5 U-2 photography, namely, the conclusion that the
Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile.)
tended for a short-rar
'One additional item was picked up by the 5 September mission,
the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield along
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"with several others still in crates. This was not reported by CIA
in the Checklist but was reported in the CIB of 8 September. Actually,
these MIG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs) had
arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship which had
been photographed en route, but the photographs were not received
in Washington for several weeks. Upon the arrival of these and
photographs of other ships carrying MIG-21 crates, an item was
published in the CIB of 27 September with DIA withholding concur-
rence that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had been delivered to Cuba.
This information was also reported in the Checklist of 27 September."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
--
89. 9/6/62- "Mexico City, September 4. -- A detailed report
on distribution of nearly 20,000 Russian, Chinese, Algerian and
African military men, naval and air bases and guided missile launching
pads was released here today by a Cuban student exile office
One missile station is being installed near the port of Bahia Honda
and another near Varadero Beach in Matanzas Province
More than
3000 Russians were landed at Bahia Honda for work on a launching pad.
the statement said. (Source: Congressional Record)
11
90. 9/7/62- On this date the DCI (who was on the Riviera and
was being kept informed by CIA cable) sent a cable to General Carter
urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that "my
hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-
surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command
important targets in Southeast U.S. and possibly Caribbean areas.
(These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National
Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
"1
91. 9/7 (or 8)/62 "The first large pieces of equipment for
the MRBM sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR
on the ship "Omsk" which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62).
11
92. 9/8/62 - The CIB on this date included a report on results
of the 9/5 photography which disclosed the presence of one assembled
and several crated MIG-21s at Santa Clara airfield. Apparently infor-
1 mation on the presence of MIG-21s in Cuba was not reported in the
President's Checklist until 9/27/62. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62).
93. 9/8/62 DIA reported that the scope of Soviet Bloc assis-
tance to Cuba suggests motives going beyond the lending of support
and encouragement of the Castro regime. (Source: DIA report to Board
on 11/9/62).
94. 9/9/62 - COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State,
reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes (as the
result of U-2 photography of 9/5 indicating the possible presence of
an SSM site at Banes). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62).
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195.
TOP SECRET
9/10/62 - Senator Thomas J. Dodd stated in the Senate:
"I have reason to believe, on the basis of information from
reliable sources, that the situation in 
Cuba is even more grave 
than
has yet been indicated to the American public
"The fantastic buildup of Soviet planes and tanks and missiles
and advisory personnel that has gone on in 
Cuba over the past year.
(Source: Washington
cannot be dismissed as purely defensive.
Evening Star 10/24762)
"
11
96. 9/10/62 - Upon instruction of the President, General Carter
(The DCI
briefed General Eisenhower 'on the Cuban situation
".
briefed General Eisenhower again on 10/3.)
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
97. 9/10/62 - On this date the DCI sent a second cable to
"Difficult 
for me to
General Carter from the Riviera stating:
rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba
1 appears to me quite possible measures now 
being taken are 
for
purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive 
capability such as
MRBMS to be installed by Soviets after present 
phase completed 
and
country secured from overflights. Suggest Board 
of National 
Estimates
study motives
(These views were provided 
to the DD/I and the
Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62).
.
-
98. 9/10/62 In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,
General Carter requested "necessary actions (including 
Special 
Group
approval) to provide for the employment, when directed 
by higher.
authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance" 
against the cruise.
missile site at Banes.. (Source: CIA Chronology, 
11/7/62).
99. 9/10/62 - CIA reports that on this date a meeting took place.
at the White House attended by Secretary Rusk, 
Messrs. Robert Kennedy
The purpose
and McGeorge Bundy, and Generals Carter and Lansdale
.
of this meeting was to make "a full review of the overflight program
for Cuba;" and it was prompted by "the results of the 
29 August and
the 5 September missions, in particular the 
confirmation of SA-2 
sites.'
CIA reports that the factors involved and the decision reached
at this White House meeting were as follows:
(1) Because of f the Soviet protest of the August 30 U-2 overflight
of Sakhalin Island, and because of the 
September 8 shootdown of a U-2
over Communist China, the participants at the meeting 
"were naturally
reluctant to authorize any flights over areas where 
SA-2s might be
operational.'
(2) The hard intelligence
systems had been foreseen in
NIE 85-2-62 of August 1 and had subsequently been fully reported.
Therefore, the hard intelligence was not such as to 
produce a 
sense
SA-2s and other advanced defen. Aus far received on the presence of
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X (99. 9/10/62 Continued)
"of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required
confirma-
tion came not as a shock but as a problem to be dealt with deliberately
•
•
It may have even served to relax the sense of urgency generated
by the President's decision of 23 August, the known usually being 
less
alarming than the unknown
The participants 
therefore felt 
that
the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the areas covered by
the two previous missions (of August 29 and September 5).
"
(3) "Finally, the participants (at the meeting) were operating in
The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda
the atmosphere of the time
throwing
apparatus was attempting to focus attention on Berlin
up a diplomatic smokescreen
•
Furthermore, they (the participants
at the White House meeting) must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was.
potentially the campaign issue that could most seriously 
damage the
Administration in the election campaign then beginning.
(4) The CIA proposed two extended overflights covering the remainder
of the island not covered in the August 29 and September 5 missions
.
"The Secretary of State objected" and insisted that "
coverage of the 
rest of
Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights over 
international waters
would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory
.'
The
(5) "To meet (the Secretary of State's) wishes, the program was
divided into four flights, two overflights and two peripheral"
& over the Isle of Pines, and 
(b) 
over the east
overflights were to be:
The veripheral flights were to be:
of Cuba to cover Guantanamo and Banes.
All four
(a) over the North coast of eastern Cuba, and (b) the south coast.
flights were to be designed for maximum safety, and the overflights were to
be quick "in-and-out" operations. In obtaining approval 
for the tracks it
was necessary to provide assurance that there would not 
be flights over
known SA-2 sites.
"The President approved this program" for four flights in September.
"Thus the record shows that the President authorized 
everything the Special
Group requested." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)
100. 9/11/62 Senator Tower, speaking in the U. S. Senate:
'Russian tanks, rockets, military planes and high velocity artillery
have been brought into Cuba. They threaten the 
entire U. S. east of 
the
Mississippi. Pads for light rockets have already been 
built in Cuba by
Russians and Chinese.
I am reliably informed that 
launching 
pads for
medium rockets with a 1500-mile-plus range can be built in under 4 days
(Source: Congressional Record):
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.
.
TOP SECRET
101. 9/11/62 Senator Humphrey, speaking on the floor of the
Senate said:
I think it is ridiculous and 
insulting to the
American people for grown men to wring their hands publicly about
I do not
Cuba's being a military threat to the United 
States
underestimate the fact that there are missiles
, 
intermediate and
short range.
But I do know
that we have it within our capacity
without even so much as violently (flexing a muscle, to destroy every
So I do not want the people
single military installation in one day.
•
of my state to lose a single night's sleep worrying about the might
of Cuba.
(Source: Congressional Record)
•
"
102. 9/12/62- General Carter briefed the House Armed Services
and Foreign Affairs Committees "on the Cuban situation".
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
103. 9/12/62 - A Cuban National being processed at the Refugee
Center at Opa-locka, Florida, reported that on this date he observed
20 Soviet-driven trucks pulling 4-wheel double axle 
trailers from
65 to 70 feet in length; that these trucks were observed driving
from Havana to Camp Libertad; that the beds of the trucks were loaded
with black crates; that the trailers were loaded with what the source
believed to be large canvas-covered missiles; that there were 4 fins
The source of the 
information
at the trailing edge of each missile.
drew sketches of the missiles and these missiles resembled surface-to-
surface MRBMs.
CIA disseminated this information to the intelligence community
on 9/21/62.
104. 9/13/52 - "On 13 September a source was informed by a
resident of the general area that a rocket base was being constructed
by the Soviets at a location now identified from photography 
as
Remedios (IRBM) Site 1. A second base was also reported, but a
missile site has not yet been found in photography although new road.
construction exists in that area." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report,
10/24/62)
-
105. 9/13/62 On this date the DCI sent a third cable to
General Carter from the Riviera "repeating these premonitions" which
he had set forth in cables to CIA on 9/1 and 9/10 regarding the
(These views
possibility of Soviet introduction of MRBMs into Cuba.
were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.)
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
106. 9/14/62 At the Special Group meeting, a JCS representa-
tive briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of "certain
targets" in Cuba. However, "the Secretary of Defense was recorded
as not wanting to have the o
the 
operation considered further until results
of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets were available, i.e.j
proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-2
General on 10 September (at the White House meeting on that
coverage
date).
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
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JOL
107. 9/14/62 - de CIA reported in the Pre lent's Checklist
that "The number of confirmed SAM attes remains at 12, but the likeli-
hood that others are under construction grows, with the latest evidence
pointing to the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations"
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
ހ
13
108. 98/15/62 - Major construction at the Guanajay fixed IRBM
sites "had probably begun by 15 September" (the construction equip-
ment and material having arrived at Mariel beginning "about mid-
August").
"It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the
activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62).
109. 9/15/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist
that "A message intercepted yesterday on a net serving Soviet forces
in Germany called for 'volunteers for the protection of Cuba'. We
are not sure of the weight to be placed on this and another intercept
referring to the isolation of volunteers'. If valid, they would
suggest that the influx of Soviet military personnel to Cuba is not
finished, We are investigating further.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
11
110. Mid-September, 1962 2 - At this time there was first noted a
high frequency circuit in operation between Moscow and Havana relayed
through Bomako, Mali. The fact that manual operations and one-time
codes are used argue against a command and control function for this
link. It is believed that this link was established to meet a require
ment for additional back-up communications,
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)
111. 9/16/62 - On this date, the DCI sent a fourth cable to
General Carter regarding the possibility of a ballistic missile
buildup in Cuba, stating: "Do not wish to be overly alarming this
matter, but believe CIA and community must keep Government informed
of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps
possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system operative.
(These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National
Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
112. 9/17/62 - The second shipment of equipment for the MRBM
sites at San Cristobal arrived at Mariel on 9/17/62 on the chip
"Poltava" (the first shipment had arrived on September 7 or 8).
"This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by truck at night with
the first convoys probably arriving at the sites about 17 September
That is, 17 September is the earliest date at which photography might
have detected the first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal"
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
113. 9/18/62 There appeared in the Central Intelligence
Bulletin on September 18 a report on the September 5 photography which
reflected the presence of a surface-to-surface, short-range, coastal
defense missile site. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
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114. 9/18/62 The CIA reported in the Pro dent's Checklist
that "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger vessels en route
to Cuba. Their arrival will raise our estimate of technicians on
the scene to about 4,200. We are beginning to see some tenuous
evidence foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey
Province. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
that:
11
115. 9/19/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist
"The interception on 15 September of a signal from a missile-
associated radar, probably coming from the surface-to-air missile
site at Mariel, suggests that the site is or soon will be operational."
"The message asking for volunteers for service in Cuba, which
we reported Saturday, has now cropped up on enough Soviet military
radio nets to reveal that a fairly general recruiting campaign is
going on. There is no indication yet of the numbers involved.".
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
-
116. 9/19/62- (USIB Meeting) "As a result of the DCI's
pressure (presumably his cables to General Carter from the Riviera
from 9/7 to 9/20/62) there was a renewed examination of other
methods of reconnaissance of Cuba. (It should be noted here that
this discussion was in terms of what might be necessary after the
establishment of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2
impossible, with the implicit thought that only at this point would
the Soviets risk the Introduction of such weapons as MRBMS). On
September 19 at USIB, General Carter stated his desire to see RF-101's
over Cuba. He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over
Cuba could be justified to the Special Group, adding that 'we cannot
put a stop to collection in Cuba; otherwise the President would never.
know when the point of decision was reached.1" (Source: CIA Chronology,
11/7/62)
117. 9/19/52
USIB issued SNIE 85-3-62 on "The Military Buildup
in Cuba. Among the key findings of the SNIE were the following: (1)
"We believe that
the main purpose of the military buildup in
Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the
Cubans and Soviets conceive to be a danger that the U.S. may attempt
by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope
to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities
and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time,
they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military
base in Cuba might provoke U.S. military intervention and thus defeat
their present purpose; (2) (the Soviets) are well aware that the
question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has
become a major political issue; (3) the establishment on Cuban soll
of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the U.S.
would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it.
willingness to increase the level of
It would indicate a far grean the USSR has displayed thus far
risk in US-Soviet relations
however, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered
the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic
posture, and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of dism
playing nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this contingency
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(117. 9/19/62 Continued)
"must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet
policy; (4) Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMs and IRBMs
to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be
operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-
launched missiles; (5) the establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike
capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet
practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite
territory. the Soviets might think (it) would be worth a good deal if they
could get away with it, however, they would almost certainly estimate that this
could not be done without provoking a dangerous U. S. reaction; and (6) although
the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba, as a strategic strike base,
the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to
the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not
propose to win the region for communium by military conquest. They count
instead on a process of political action
****
***
CIA's retrospective comments on SNIE 85-3-62: (1) the judgment on the
degree of risk which the USSR was willing to accept was gravely in error and the
community was virtually unanimous in support of this judgment (2) the deployment
of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was unprecedented
(3) while the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba between
9/7-15/62, the first reports by ground observers who had seen them had not
arrived in Washington by 9/19/62, and there was no evidence that MRBM were on
the way (4) the estimate failed to give adequate weight to the pace at which
Soviet operations were moving and to the great probability that the new in-
stallations were manned by Soviet personnel (5) the community was still thinking
in terms of rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid programs for the UAR,
Iraq and Indonesia, and for Cuba in the 1960-1962 period, but there was already
good evidence that the Cuban program had departed from this pattern (6) also
the Indonesian situation had broken the Soviet pattern only a month before when
the USSR showed itself willing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk
"for the sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet interests"
(7) the USSR had shown in the Indonesian affair that it was "willing to take
some risk of military engagement with an ally of the United States, albeit the
degree of risk involved was far less than in the Cuban venture, and (8) ".
For the record, there is no evidence that the existence of SNIE 85-3 had any
inhibiting influence on later decisions. It was not, for instance, cited to
support an argument against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect currant
intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the estimative
process and provides a check on the continuing validity of standing estimates".
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)
܀
118. 9/20/62 - CIA disseminated an agent report quoting Castro's personal
pilot, Claudio Morinas, who said on 9/9/62: "We have 40-mile range guided
missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air.
mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets
11
There are also many
This report was considered
"too general to be used in the processe (in which CIA analysts made up target
cards) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
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119. 9/20/62 ☐ntercepted messages (COMI indicated the
presence in Cuba on this date of Lieutenant General Pavel B.-
Dankevich, Dankevich is believed to have held a command in Vinnista
probably as late as November, 1961. Vinnista is the location of a
probable Soviet MRBM command and the headquarters of a Long Range
Air Army. It is not known how long Dankevich may have been in Cuba
prior to September 20, 1962. The intelligence publications available
to the Board fail to reflect that any particular significance was
attached to Dankevich's presence in Cuba until after the President
made his public address relative MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. On
October 27 CIA distributed a memorandum stating that Dankevich's
presence in Cuba "indicates the high priority assigned by Moscow to
the missile bases in Cuba," (Source: CIA memorandum of 10/27/62;
DIA Intelligence Summary 10/27/62; Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)
120. 9/20/62 - On this date the DUI sent a final cable to CIA
from the Riviera, commenting to General Carter on the conclusions
of SNIE 85-3 of 9/19 which had been cabled to the DCI. The DCI's
cable expressed reservations on the SNIE conclusions and stated "As
an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will
provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position
in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might
take unexpected risks in order to establish such a position. These
views were provided to ti
the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.
(We have no
the views
by the DCI in his several cables from the Riviera
The State and DIA members of USIB advised the Board on 11/9/62 that
they had not been informed of the DCI's views.)
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
nce that the intelligence community was informed of
121. 9/20/62 The Defense Intelligence Agency on this date
attempted to obtain broad area coverage of Cuba through CORONA. On
that date the DIA member of COMOR addressed a memorandum to the
Chairman of COMOR with the request that
recommend the program-
ming of an engineering pass of the CORON le over Cuba "where
the western end of the island is, temporarily at least, off limits
and where we need to know if any other SA-2 sites have been con-
structed
122. 9/21/62 - An article in the Washington News by Virginia
Prewett under date of 10/31/62 entitled "Why Didn't JFK Act Earlier?"
stated that a report made by Miami's Cuban Student Directorate on
9/21/62, stated that: "One of the European Ambassadors in Havana
recently reported to his respective country that if the countries
military action against Castro immedi-
Cuba will possess
of this hemisphere do not take ext six months
ately, or at least before the
Russian missile bases armed with atomic and nuclear weapons capable
of destroying in a few minutes the most strategic zones in the United
States. Besides, it is known that the construction will be carried out
secretly, with this end in view--that while the work continues, the
American government will go on believing that the military installa-
tions are purely defensive measures.
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123. 9/21/62 The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:
"Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's canvass of its military forces for
volunteers to serve in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen
anything like it before. The move may be purely administrative: to replace
personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to stay for
some time. On the other hand, it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet
personnel in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely to be engaged
in combat. We are trying to get a better answer. (Source: CIA Chronology,
11/7/62)
124. 9/22/62 - "The most likely ship to have carried the large items
(of equipment for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites) is the Kimovsk which docked
(at Casilda, on the south coast) on 22 September. This equipment must have moved
to the site during the last week of September, and was probably detectable from
photography after 1 October. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
"
125. 9/27/62- The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:
"Photography snapped earlier this month show at least two Soviet ships
delivering 22, perhaps more, MIG-21s. We now estimate there are 25-30 aircraft
of this type in Cuba." (This paragraph was quoted in the CIA Chronology of
11/7/62 but not in the revised Chronology of 11/14/62.)
"Our running account of the number of Soviet dry-cargo vessels making the
voyage to Cuba since mid-July is now over 100. About 85 of these probably were.
carrying military hardware.
"
"The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered Western correspondents to put
in for new credentials by today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's
city limits is out of bounds except by special permission." (Source: CIA
Chronology, 11/14/62)
126. 9/27/62 On this date CIA received a report of an observation made
on 9/17/62 of a convoy moving toward San Cristobal. This report dovetailed with
the earlier report of the 9/12/62 sighting of MRBMs near Havana (Item 103, above).
"The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts to a tentative conclusion
that the two observers had in fact seen the same convoy, and that there was a
possibility of the SS-4 identification being genuine. A day or so earlier, a
target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report
of "Russians building a rocket base. Now this card was removed and, with the
two reports cited above and other less specific information on activity in this
area which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared between 1 and
3 October which was in effect a priority requirement for photographic coverage.
This card was used in the targeting of the 14 October flight. It read as
follows: "Collateral reports indicate the existence of a restricted area in
Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of including an SSM site under con-
struction, particularly SS-4 Shyster. The area is bounded by a line connecting
the following four town: Consolacio del Norte (8332N/2244W); San Diego (lel Los
Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (9301N/2243W); and Las Pozos (8317N/2250W).
Requirement: Search the area delineated for possible surface missile comtruc-
tion, with particular attention to SS-4 Shyster. (Source: CIA Chronology,
11/14/62)
""
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127. 9/27/62 -
At some point, probably just after 27 September,
an item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might have been
written for CIA current intelligence publications. It could not be written.
because there was an injunction not to do so (see Item No. 51, above)...
It should also be noted that the order not to publish anything on missile sites
without NPIC. corroboration had never been rescinded. The effect this would have
had on reporting in late September and October if the other ban had not been in
effect (1.0, the USIB restriction see Item 152, infra) is difficult to
determine. These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist, but the Checklist
writers drew ... largely on the Cuban Daily Summary
published by CIA.
Since the Summary was affected by the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the
sheer volume of raw material coming in on Cuba, had the effect of cutting the
Checklist off from information on offensive weapons. "Moreover, neither the
Checklist group, nor any other current intelligence officers, knew that the
possibility that a Soviet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba
had been raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by the President and his
advisors more than a month earlier (see Item No. 57, above). In other words,
the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by time and bureaucratic processes
that it reached the working level only in the form of SNIE 85-3 which held that
establishment of such a base was most improbable (see Item No. 117, above).
"It is difficult to say whether information from ground sources would have
been published had there not been a blanket injunction against it. The analysts
too were sensitive to the political impact of the reports they were receiving
In addition, rigid compartmentation was maintained between the COMOR
Special Group organization for collection and the intelligence components re-
sponsible for analysis. Few, if any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem
even had IDEALIST clearances. As a result, they did not know that no overflights.
of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September program, or that
this program was seriously delayed. They had no way of knowing that the photo-
graphic verification they had requested would not soon be forthcoming, and they
might well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it..
"Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunction against
publication had not existed there would have been some reflection of the refugee
reports in the Cuban Daily Summary, which is not highly selective.. In retro-
spect, it seems quite possible but by no means certain -- that they would have
been picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they would have
survived the coordination process for the Central Intelligence Bulletin. Thus,
at the most the President might have learned that there was suspicions activity
around San Cristobal lightly more than a week before he apparently did.
In sum,
the CIA analysts believed they had done their duty by targeting
the San Cristobal arca for photographic coverage, but no word of their concern
over activity in this area had appeared in an intelligence publication. It
appears highly probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at its
meeting on 9 October (see Item No. 143, infra) when it ordered a U-2 mission
which covered the area.
"The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correlation of reports and
the Special Group Meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes
of the administrative structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was
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designed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper work before.
each decision was made, procedures reaching back into the
e early history of the
U-2 operations over the USSR. They were intended for the control of deliberate
strategic reconnaissance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such
as that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact, after readout
of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned. (Source: CIA Chronology,
11/14/62)
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128. 9/28/62 At the Board's 9/28/62 meeting the DCI indica-
d been in-
ted he did not believe that offensive, strategic missiles had
stalled in Cuba, but he considered this a possibility at some future
time, but only after Cuba's defensive capability was such as to deny
Cuban airspace to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. The DCI reported that
"our intelligence collection on Cuba has improved since the first of
the year
and that "CIA now has 45 third-country agents (meaning dip-
Tomats reporting throughout Cuba."
re-
129. September 1962 "Offensive missiles identified: Western
Cuba: Two launch sites consisting of 8 field-type launchers and 16
1020-nm MRBMS (SS-4)
these missiles are probably those
ported moving into this area during September.
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report of 10/18/62, prepared by GMAIO/
JAEIC/NPIC)
130. 9/29-10/2/62 Pursuant to the 9/20/62 request of DIA, a
pass over Cuba was made by the Corona vehicle launched on 9/29/62.
The resulting photography was good by Corona standards but not of
sufficient quality to reflect significant photographic intelligence
on MRBM or IRBM developments on the island. When this CORONA photog-
raphy was he against the photography obtained from the SAC-
operated U-2s was possible to relate some of the earth scratchings.
appearing in the CORONA photography to the construction at some of
the long range missile sites which were detected beginning October 14..
Without the U-2 photography however, these scratchings could not
possibly be identified as being associated in any way with MRBM or
IRBM construction. The photographic interpreters at the Strategic.
Air Command believe that if all nine sites had been completed at the
time of the CORONA pass, the CORONA photography might have resulted
in the identification of the IRBM sites but not of the MRBM sites.
Dr. Charyk, in commenting on this subject to Board Member Gray,
noted that this experience makes it obvious that satellite photography
cannot be wholly relied upon when it provides negative evidence; and
that this gives one pause when we consider the reliance which has been
placed on satellite photography seeking evidence of missile installa-
tions in the USSR.
131 10/1/62 - A memorandum prepared on this date in DIA by a
DIA analyst, on the subject "Analysis of SAM Sites," dealt with the
15 confirmed SA-2 sites in Cuba and the discernible pattern whoih
was developing from their location:
(1) In Oriente Province, the 3 SA-2 sites form a triangular pat-
tern around the new military airfield at Holguin which will probably
soon be operational .. no MIGs there now but the MIGs believed to
be stationed at Camaguay airfield will probably be moved to Holguin
when Holguin becomes operational. (No SA-2 sites identified at
Camaguay.
--
(2) 4 SA-2 sites form a rectangular pattern around the military
airfield near Santa Clara in the Central Army area where MIGs have
been for several months and also the field on which the first MIG-21
was identified.
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(131. 10/1/62 Continued)
(3) In the Western Army area, the 3 (possibly 4) SA-2 sites form
a linear pattern for the defense of the military airfield at San
Antonio de los Banos and the Havana-Mariel complex (San Antonio is
headquarters for the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force and the assembly
point for all MIGs except MIG-21s).
(4) Further west, in Pinar del Rio Province, a triangular
pattern of SA-2 sites cannot be connected with any significant
military installation. There are 2 underground facilities within
this triangle whose use and purpose are unknown. One of these 3
SA-2 sites is located very near to the San Julian military air base,
but this is a most unlikely spot to place SA-2s for the defense of
this
"Therefore, curiosity is immediately aroused as to
the air base
purpose 
of this triangular pattern on the far western tip of Cuba."
(5) In the north central portion ci Pinar del Rio Province is a
trapazoid-shaped restricted area (15-20 miles on a side) controlled by
Soviet military personnel recently introduced into Cuba. . no known
military installations in this rough and sparsely populated area
Cuban refugees arriving in Miami say all Cubans have been evacuated
from the area. Purpose of this restricted area is unknown.
11.
(6) Information on the deployment of Soviet military personnel
and technicians" in Cuba is derived from unevaluated refugee sources.
A plotting of all reported locations indicates that there is a definite
correlation between the location of Soviet personnel and missiles or
missile activity. Significantly, the greatest concentration of Soviet.
personnel, activity and camps is in the western end of Cuba indicating
a greater interest by the Soviets in Pinar del Rio than in other Prov-
inces.
(7) The source of an unevaluated report says that on September 12
he saw some 20 SS-4 (or possibly SS-3) missiles in the vicinity of
Campo Libertad (a small airfield on the western edge of Havana). This
report is unconfirmed and there are no other reports of such missiles.
However, it is significant to note that by taking the approximate
center of the trapozoid-shaped restricted area previ of an red to,
as the point of origin for a radius of 1100 nm (range)
missile) the arc includes Philadelphia, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, San
Antonio, Mexico City, all Central American capitals, the Panama Canal,
and Venezuelan oil fields. "The presence of operational SS-4 missiles
in this location would give the Soviets a great military asset.".
Based on the foregoing, DIA on 10/2/62 proposed to the COMOR
Working Group that the Pinar del Rio search area be included in COMOR's.
reconnaissance objectives for C
Cuba.
(This was done at the October 4
COMOR meeting and the c
cbjective was incorporated in the reconnaissancé
objectives list.) (Source: Letter to Coyne from Director, DIA,
11/13/62)
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132. 10/1/62 - According to reports subsequently reviewed, "On
October 1 explosions were reportedly occurring at a highly secure construction
project at a location now identified.
Grande area). Material delivered to the Photography as Site 1 (Sagua La
fabricated concrete forms. This suggests
way at that time.
11
project included lumber and pre-
site construction was under-
Report, 10/24/62)
(Source: Joint Evaluati
133. 10/1/62 This is the estimated date for the beginning of major
construction on the Remedios IRBM site.
the date at which the site
acquired a recognizable photographic signature is not determinable."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
134. 10/1-3/62 - CIA reports that during this period CIA prepared
a new target card which was in effect a requirement for photographic coverage
of the San Cristobal area (see Item No. 126, above), and that in spite of
time lags involved in receiving reports of refugees and CIA agents,
"Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the San Cristobal area had been pinpointed
as a suspect MRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requested.
This represents a considerable technical achievement.
the Intelligence
Community had been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and missile
installations in Cuba
CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports
During
on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before 1 January
1962. All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the
observer of other kinds of activity. CIA analysts had naturally come
come 
to
view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion.
By September,
the volume of agent and refugee reporting had become very large indeed.
the month 882 reports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated,
exclusive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine collectors
report that their output represented only a small publishable fraction of the
raw material collected.) A substantial proportion of these dealt with the
deployment of defensive missiles and related activities. Knowledge on the
part of the analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the
normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in telling an offensive
missile from a defensive one, tended to throw a sort of smoke-screen around
the Soviet offensive deployment when it finally began. The CIA analytic
apparatus, however, recognized and correlated the first authentic reports
of MRBM equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action upon them.
It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another location where alleged
missile activity should be negated by photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site.
This process took about three weeks, from the date when the first observation
was made on the ground in Cuba to the preparation of the target card
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)
(NOTE: The fact that CIA considered San Cristobal as a suspect MRBM site
was not included in any of CIA's current intelligence publications until
after photographic confirmation was obtained in mid-October.)
135.
10/2/62.
135. 10/2/62 - CIA distributed to the White House and other recipients
a raw intelligence report, based on information acquired in Cuba on 10/1/62
which stated in part that on 9/19/62 large intercontinental rockets more
than 67 feet long were unloaded in Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province and that
the rockets were on long trailers when unloaded from the ship. In distributing.
this report CIA Headquarters appended the comment "It is more likely that
Bource observed SA-2 missiles being off-loaded"
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136. 10/2-3/62 The Final Communique of the Informal Meeting of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American 
Republics held in Washing-
ton, 10/2-3/62 stated in part that "The 
Soviet Union's intervention in
Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas 
and its democratic institu-
tions and it called for "the adoption of 
special measures, both 
indi-
The communique 
observed that "it is desirable
vidual and collective".
(CONTINUED ON PAGE 39)
38-a
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(136. 10/2-3/62 Continued)
"to intensify surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of
war and all other items of strategic importance 
to the communist re-
gime of Cuba, in order to prevent the secret 
accumulation in the
Island of arms that can be used for offensive 
purposes against 
the
Hemisphere.
."
137. 10/3/62 The President signed Senate Joint Resolution 230
which had been adopted in the Senate and House of 
Representatives
during September. The Joint Resolution expressed the determination
of the United States to (1) prevent by necessary 
means, including 
use
of force, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from 
extending by force
or threat of force its aggressive or subversive 
activities in this
Hemisphere; (2) prevent in Cuba the creation or 
use of externally
supported military capability endangering U.S. 
security; and (3) 
work
with the OAS and with freedom-loving Cubans to support 
the aspirations
of the Cuban people for self-determination.
138. 10/3/62 The DCI briefed General Eisenhower "on the Cuban
situation (the General had previously been briefed by 
CIA on 9/10).
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
139. 10/3/62 - On this date the DIA member of COMOR submitted
to the Chairman of COMOR a memorandum which (1) 
noted the concerns 
of
the Sec/Def and JCS about the (insufficient) amount 
of intelligence 
on
Cuba that was being made available to responsible decision makers 
in
Government; (2) noted that certain portions of the 
island, notably 
the
view
western end, had not been seen since August 29; (3) expressed Cuba
of DIA and J-2 that the best way of collecting intelligence on
under the present circumstances was by resuming frequent and regular
U-2 overflights and that coverage on the order of once a week was
essential; and (4) proposed that COMOR send 
to the USIB a draft
"intelligence justification" which had been prepared by 
the DIA 
as
the basis for authorizing frequent and regular U-2 flights 
over 
Cuba.
The DIA "intelligence justification" pointed to the buildup of
SAM sites,
and on the Isle o of Pines. The DIA proposal called for
U-2 coverage to meet requirements for up-to-date intelligence on (a)
the location of SA-2 sites; (b) confirmation or negation 
of reports
from reliable sources concerning the sightings of SS-4 missiles 
in
Cuba; (c) the number of KOMAR class PGMGs in service; and (d) the
number of MIG-21s in Cuba.
western C and "SSM" sites which had been observed in eastern and
The intelligence justification drafted by DIA gave recognition to
the increased risk to U-2 aircraft in the light of SA-2 and 
MIG-21s
present in Cuba. Nevertheless, this recognition of risk was followed
by the statement: "But it must be stated 
that the current need is
extremely urgent, and the risk involved should be very thoroughly
weighed before this coverage is denied.
The DIA memorandum to COMOR also included a proposed list of
target objectives in Cuba to meet the intelligence requirements which
DIA had outlined.
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(139. 10/3/62 Continued)
With few changes or omissions, the DIA's 10/3 draft of the intel-
ligence justification for revised 
overflights of Cuba was forwarded
Simil
consideration and approval.
by COMOR on 10/5 to the USIB for
arly, on 10/6 COMOR sent to the Director of NRO, at his verbal request,
the intelligence justification and 
statement of target requirements
for overhead reconnaissance of 
Cuba (with copies also being sent by
COMOR to the USIB for information and 
any comments prior to the
Special Group meeting on 10/9/62.)
and the listing of
In summary, the intelligence justification
requirements and specific objectives
, which went 
forward to NRO from
COMOR on 10/6 included the following:
(1) A statement of the pressing need for photographic coverage
of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, 
particularly with regard to (a)
SA-2 sites, (b) possible MRBMS, (c
) MIG-21 aircraft, and (d) tanks,
artillery, and other conventional 
weapons and equipment "which are
arriving in large quantities.
11.
☐ installations. (".
(2) SIGINT coverage to obtain up-to-date intelligence on the
Cuba which is known to 
include
Soviet-furnished air defense buildup in 
c
(a) radar EW, GCI, HF, MC, AQ 
and FC; 
(b) missile systems consisting
of 3 confirmed and 1 probable cruise-
type coastal defense short range
missile sites, 15 SA-2 sites, and missile 
storage and support facili-
ties; (e) MIGS -- 60 MIG-15/17/19 
and 36 MIG-21s estimated; and (d)
37mm and 57mm AAA to
a general dispersal throughout Cuba
a two-
defend airfields, ports and military
fold collection program is necessary: first, a continued coverage of
the early warning (EW), ground control 
intercept (GCI), and communi-
cations networks which is now adequately 
covered by peripheral air,
shipborne and ground efforts; second, 
overflight missions by a
vehicle capable of stimulating 
this defense system into an 
offensive
reaction. From this reaction, the 
readiness and effectiveness of
weapons can be determined.")
(3) Conclusions: "Some of these requirements are currently being
However, only 
overflights will permit the
met by peripheral means.
accomplishment of all objectives. COMOR will provide a 
continual
review and up-dating of requirements
.
"
11
(4) Recommendation: "It is recommended that reconnaissance.
programs be initiated to satisfy these requirements
.
(Source: DIA letter to Coyne, 11/13/62
)
tor to Coyne
140. 10/4/62 - The Director, DIA, established a Cuba "Situation
Room operated on a 24-hour basis.
11
141. 10/4/62 - On this date at a meeting of the Special NSC.
were now restricted by
5412/2 Group, the DCI noted that U-2 f115 tern quadrant
the presence of SAM sites to the southeas
DCI questioned whether this was a reasonable restricti I
Cuba. The
at this time
particularly since the SAMS were almost certainly not operational. The
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(141. 10/4/62 Continued)
Special Group then directed the NRO to prepare an over-all program for recon-
naissance of Cuba for presentation 
at the Special Group meeting of 10/9/62.
-
The
142. 10/9/62 NSA units in Puerto Rico, Key West, Florida, and on the
On October 
27,
USS Oxford detected for the first time 
the Cuban air defense net.
1962, this net shifted from an experimental 
to an operational 
status.
Cuban air defense net is now a Russian 
network in almost every respect
, utilizing
Russian call signs, the Russian grid system 
and Russian operators.
(The first
The Russians are employing the Albatross machine in Cuba.
time it has ever been detected outside 
of the Bloc except on 
Soviet ships in
certain instances., NSA has reason to 
believe that the Russians are possibly
employing two Aluminum Scrambler links 
running between Havana and MoзcOW.
(Aluminum is considered by 
the Russians to be their most secure Scrambler
system. Up to now it has never been employed 
outside the USSR except on 
a
Soviet cruiser and then only when 
Khrushchev was aboard.)
(Source: Deputy Director, NSA, 11/7/62
)
143. 10/9/62 NRO (Dr. Charyk) made a presentation to the Special
This presentation
Group of an over-all program for reconnaissance 
of Cuba.
was based on the DIA-recommended, COMOR
-proposed 
submission of a paper on
"Intelligence Justification and Requirements 
for Overflights of Cuba.
This
The operation,
"At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's first recommendation
was 'A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM 
site as soon as weather permits.
referred to the area targeted by 
COMOR near San Cristobal
which was to be supported by ELINT collection 
aircraft 
off the coast, also was
designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites 
which was thought to be most
nearly operational. Thus the 
secondary objective was to determine the 
status
of SA-2 defenses in order to measure 
the risk involved in getting complete
U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as possible
. NRO's second recommendation 
was
'If there 
is no SA-2 reaction to the initial U-2 sortie
,
therefore conditional:
maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-28 
simultan-
eously, as soor as weather permits
.' (There were also certain other recommenda-
tions for low level, oblique, and 
FIREFLY missions.)
"The Group gave first priority to the San Cristobal mission and recom-
The President gave his approval
mended to the Fresident that he approve 
it.
and the
San Cristobal reports at this time
presumably learning of the
It was delayed by weather, however, froin 10
mission was immediately mounted.
through 12 October. On that date operational control was transferred to SAC
by direction of the President 
in a meeting with the Deputy SecDef and the DCI
.
There is no reason to believe that the 
transfer in any way delayed launching
The pilot did not fly the
the mission, which SAC flew on 14 
October.
Fortunately the
prescribed track, but took a course at an angle to it.
planned and actual paths crossed over 
San Cristobal, 
and the primary mission
(Source: CIA 
Chronology 11/14/62)
was accomplished."
NOTE: This is in error.
See Item 143-a, next page.
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143-a.
(See Item 143, above.) On 12/7/62 SAC representatives exhibited
to a Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board the plan
for and actual flight track of the 10/14/62 U-2 mission over 
Cuba, as laid
out by SAC. The material shown to the Board Panel reflects 
that the pilot
.
flew the mission precisely as prescribed.
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(143. 10/9/62 Continued).
Prior to this decision, CIA had operated 21 U-2 missions over
or peripheral to Cuba during 1962. The 
dates of these 21 missions
.
are listed below:
2/21/62
1/19/62
2/2/62
3/15/62
4/1/62
紅燈
5/2/62
6/29/62
9/5/62
5/22/62
7/8/62
9/17/62
6/6/62
6/15/62
8/5/62
7/12/62
9/26/62
9/29/62
6/18/62
8/29/62
10/5/62
10/7/62
(Source: NPIC)
144. 10/9/62 The DCI briefed Congressman Cannon "on the Cuban
situation. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
.11
145. 10/9/62 Senator Kenneth B. Keating, speaking on the floor
of the U.S. Senate:
"Mr. President, the President of Cuba, like a two-bit Khrushchev,
has disgraced the name of the United Nations
of
•
"Cuba represents a new and menacing shift in the world balance
I trust that all of us, regardless of party
, are
power
united in the hope that this Nation, through its chosen leaders and
in cooperation with its allies, will progress 
resolutely toward the
stern decisions which may be necessary to 
deal with the Soviet cloud
now darkening our national horizon
Cuba
"Late in August I called attention to the Russian arsenal in
"My first suggestion, made August 31, called upon the Administra-
tion to tell the American people all of the facts 
about the island
buildup. Reliable information had reached me 
concerning the number
of ships, types of armament, and Soviet troops 
arriving in Cuba..
nt, and Soviet
"On
August 29, just 2 days earlier, the President told a reporter
that he had no information that Russians,
State Department source to
siles to Cuba, after the reporter cited were sending Nike-type mis-
that effect. Following my revelations on the Senate floor, on August
31, the Administration first declared, through a 
Senator on the other
side of the aisle, that Senator Keating was misinformed
'. Never-
theless, there followed from other 
quarters an effort to make it
appear that the information I had reported 
had been released 
earlier
by the State Department.
by the State
"On September 4, however, the President conceded that Nike-type
missiles had been delivered to Castro and confirmed 
in almost every
The 
President 
character-
detail the facts I had stated 4 days earlier.
ized the buildup as 'defensive This in my view was a tremendous
That was their line
,
error and a serious concession to the 
Soviets
It should not be ours.
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(145. 10/9/62. Continued)
Under Secretary of
have delivered troops and war State Ball now admits that 85 ships
2 18 estimated that the
that
goods t to the island. He admits that
15 missile sites have been established, and it
total will eventually reach 25. This knowledge has been possessed
for a long time by many of us. Under Secretary Ball said
four missile sites of different types have been identified.
that these sites are similar to known Soviet defense missiles sites
which are believed to contain anti-shipping missiles having a range
of 20 to 25 miles. The significant sentence, rather buried away, is
that several more such sites will be installed.
He said
"Many other facts have been stated which have been known to some
The 
statement
of us but which have not been publicly stated before.
It 
will be remem-
was made that 4,500 troops are stationed in Cuba.
bered that the first figure given was 3000. I stated that there were
at least 5000. The first figure given by the President 
was 3000.
I 
stand
That was advanced to 4200. It has now been advanced 
to 4500.
on my statement that more than 5000 troops are stationed in Cuba.
Five thousand is a modest figure. But I commend the Under Secretary
of State for revealing these additional facts
(Source: Congressional Record)
"1
146. 10/10/62 - USIB discussed the COMOR submission on "Intel-
ligence Justifications and Requirements for Overflight of Cuba", in
response to the Special Group's request of 10/9 for USIB opinion re-
garding the COMOR-approved paper, especially as regards frequency 
of
Coverage the various groups of objectives and targets 
proposed 
by
COMOR
the Special Group USIB's view that (a) the targets in Groups II and
III should k
。 Art 2iscussion USIB agreed that the DCI should express to
be surveyed as promptly a 
termin 
and that the results
of such initial surveillance should
of
the subsequent frequency
coverage to be recommended, (b) COMOR submit for USIB consideration
at its 10/17 meeting a specific list of those priority targets in
Group IV which should be covered.
Group II and Group III listed "those targets for which surveil-
lance is desired primarily to provide order of battle and operational
status information. Ground resolution of 2-5 feet or better will
suffice for this purpose. Group II includes targets for monthly
coverage; Group III includes targets for weekly coverage.
action
10/10/62.
the records of the NSC Special 5412/2 Group have been
thus far to
to 
the Board's staff we are not clear as to what
taken by the DCI on the basis of the USIB discussion of
(It may be that by this time. or shortly thereafter, action
on the USIB decision was overtaken by decisions at higher levels in
Government including the decision of the President to transfer from
CIA to SAC responsibility for operation of U-2 missions over Cuba.)
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147. 10/10/62 On this date CIA received Navy photographs
taken of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Ciba, showing clearly identifi-
able IL-28 crates which later showed up in U-2 photography of 10/17
at San Julian airfield -- "along
with a number of others which must
have come in on unphotographed ships.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
11:
148. 10/10/62 The DCI briefed the CIA Subcommittee of tho
House Appropriations Committee "on the buildup, including the IL-28s.
He also commented on MRBMS essentially along the lines of his cables
from Nice, adding that there were many experts who did not believe
the Soviets would make such a move, but that he differed with 
them
.
He told the Subcommittee that he had authority for an overflight in
the next day or so.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
149. 10/10/62:
declared that:
11
On the floor of the U.S. Senate, Senator Keating
"Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites
for intermediate range tactical missiles. Intelligence authorities
must have advised the President and top Government officials of this
fact, and they must now have been told that ground to-ground missiles
can be operational from the island of Cuba within 6 months.
"My own sources on the Cuban situation, which have been 100
percent reliable, have substantiated this report completely.
my reliable sources
"The fact of the matter is, according to
that six launching sites 
are under construction 
- pads which will
have the power to hurl rockets into the American heartland 
and 
as
far as the Panama Canal Zone.
(Source:
Congressional Record)
150. 10/11/62 - On this date CIA reported in the President's
Checklist the information from Navy photography of 10/10 showing
IL-28 crates on the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
ronology, 11/7/62)
151. 10/11/62 - On this date General Carter said to Senator
the
Saltonstall "much the same thing that the DCI had said on
preceding to the CIA Appropriations Subcommittee of the House,
1.e. that he differed with experts who were of the view that the
Soviets would not place MRBMS in Cuba.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)
152. 10/11/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 indicates that
the "USIB principals.
aware that they were dealing with an ex-
plosive political issue and aware also that leakage of intelligence
seriously limit the Presi
on offensive weapons, true or false, would
dent's freedom of action in dealing 
with w 
what might become a major
international crisis, they had evolved a system f for limiting dissemin
ation of such information Analysis would continue and senior policy
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(152. 10/11/62 Contid)
These in-
"officials would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal intelli-
gence publications without the approval 
of the USIB principals.
structions were first issued orally
, (CIA does not say when) and 
later on
October 11, 1962 formalized by USIB in the 'PSAIM' 
system. The key 
passages
in USTB's order were 'such 
information or intelligence will be disseminated
outside each USIB intelligence component 
only to specific individuals on an
EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their 
responsibilities as advisers to the
President have a need to know', and '
there is no intent, hereby, however, 
to
inhibit the essential analytic process.
(Despite the advisory role to the President which is supposed to be
be performed by the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, the 
latter
Board was not included as one of the 
approved recipients for PSALM reports.
Accordingly, the Board received its first 
official notification of offensive
missiles in Cuba when the President 
made his address on 10/22. The Board
thereafter requested the restricted 
"PSALM" intelligence reports which 
were made
available to the Board by CIA on 10/29/62
.)
b
153. 10/13/62- General Carter of CIA addressed a letter to Mr. McGeorge
Bundy requesting reconsideration of the 
Presidential decision to transfer from
Mr. Bundy
CIA to SAC operational responsibility for 
U-2 missions over Cuba.
acknowledged General Carter's letter
, stating in essence that the 
decision had
During the period immediately preceding and
been made and that it would stand
. D
following the Presidential decision, CIA personnel expressed considerable 
con-
cern relative to the transfer on the 
ground that SAC did not have capability 
or
experience to effectively operate 
such U-2 photographic missions.
is pertinac to the question
(The following resume of SAC U-2 operations
SAC es-
raised by CIA as to SAC's competence to 
conduct 
overflights of Cuba:
tablished the 4080th Wing in May 1956
, and U-2 aircraft began to 
arrive in
June 1957. Thereafter, the 4080th operated 
from a variety of locations in 
Puerto
Rico, Alaska, Panama, Australia, Guam
, Okinawa, Korea, the United Kingdom and
the United States. The 4080th flew 
peripheral photographic reconnaissance
against the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Russian 
land mass in the East Siberian
Sea, and the Laptev Sea area of
of these areas available to Air Bia, obtaining thereby the first photographs:
planners.
In
The 4080th has flown under
every conceivable weather condition including snow, ice, fog and desert.
addition to photographic missions
, it has flown U-2 ELINT missions during 
1961
Further, it has flown about 3500
and 1962 in the Far North and 
Far East areas.
The 4080th's
sampling sorties since 1957 in support of 
the 
national effort.
The 4080th
of 
which 600 hours is in U-2 aircraft
.
crews average 3500 hours, 
c
Since its establishment six years ago,
has flown about 1500 overseas sorties.
eight crews have been lost by accidents (one RAF, seven USAF). During the
period from October 14 through November 
5, 1962, the 4080th had flown 36 U
-2
sorties over Cube, with 
the loss of one aircraft which was shot down on
October 27, 1962.)
(Source: SAC, as provided to Coyne by Generals Power and Smith)
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154. 10/14/62 SAC flew its first U-2 mission over Cuba.
This mission produced the first photographic 
identification of 
MRBM
launch sites at San Cristobal No. 1. (This area had last 
been
covered by a CIA U-2 Tlight on August 29.)
From 10/14/52 through 11/8/62 SAC flew 43 U-2 missions over Cuba:
October 14
1
October 19 3
October 15.
October 17
October 18.
2
October 20
October 22
October 23
mmmm
3
3
3.
October 25
October 27 - 1*
November 3
November 4.
17
November 5.
November 6
November:
5 November
-
-
TOTAL: 43
www.
5.
3#
During the period October 23 through November 8, the Navy flew
54 F8U low-level (Blue Moon) photo flights over Cuba. In the 
same
period the Air Force flew 52 low-level photo missions over 
Cuba.
*this mission was lost
#aborted.
155. 10/14-17/62 - During this period SAC U-2 missions identi-
The dates 
of identification and
fied 9 MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba.
the dates of the last previous CIA U-2 coverage of these sites follow:
Site
Identified
14 Oct
Last Coverage Prior
to Site Location
29 Aug
"1
it
San Cristobal #1.
San Cristobal #2
San Cristobal #3
San Cristobal #34.
Sagua La Grande #1
Sagua La Grande #2
Guanajay #1.
If
17 Oct
05 Sep
15 Oct.
29 Aug
Guanajay #2
Remedios
H
17 Oct
11
05 Sep
156% 10/15/62
-
In the early evening the read-out of SAC's
initial U-2 mission over Cuba first became available. It reflected
The
identification of an
Director, DIA, notre ite in the San Cristobal area.
ficials of the
Depa
October 15, 1962.
number of key civilian and military of-
Defense of this fact on the night of
the Deputy Director of Intelligence,
CIA, notified Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Hilsman (who notified the
Secretary of State) The following morning 
the President was
notified.
157. 10/15/62 Following SAC's flight the previous day, a
meeting was held at the White House attended by Messrs
. Bundy,
Gilpatric, Johnson, McCone, Scoville, Charyk 
and General Taylor
, and
by General Kompton SAC's Director of Operations
, and General Smith
Messrs 
McCone and Scoville were
SAC's Director of Intelligence.
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At the meeting, Mr. Bundy re-
critical of SAC's ability to fly U-2 missions.
affirmed the decision made on 10/12 and indicated that SAC should continue to
fly these missions. Mr. Scoville was critical of SAC's 
flight plans for up-
coming missions, and he complained that his office 
had not received the ELINT
cake from the first SAC mission of 10/14. Subsequent 
inquiry reflected that 
the
ELINT take had been delivered to CIA immediately following 
its receipt, but that
it had become bogged down in CIA's essage center resulting 
in delay in its
delivery to Mr. Scoville.
158. 10/15/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of crated
IL-288 at San Julian.
158-a. 10/15/62- General Carter briefed Sena or Stennis ("before the
photography of the previous day was available") along 
the same lines of his
answer to Senator Saltonstall's question, four 
days earlier, about Senator
1.e., 
"General Carter said 
that
Keating's charges of known MRPM sites in Cuba
there were refugee reports but no hard evidence". (Source: CIA Chronology 11/14/62)
159. 10/17/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of un-
crated IL-28s at San Julian.
160. 10/18/62- Gromyko talked to President Kennedy at the White House,
saying that he was instructed by the Soviet Government 
to state that Soviet
assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing 
to the 
defense
capabilities of Cuba".
161. 10/18/62 There was initiated the daily issuance of Joint Evalua-
prepared 
jointly
tion ("PSALM") Reports on the Soviet Missile Threat in 
Cuba
by GMA IC, JAEIC, and NPIC, based on photographic, ELINT, COMINT, and other
sources. These reports were cumulative beginning 
10/18. (See Item 152, 
above)
162.
10/19/62 The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba
with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning 
for
this operation must have started at least one year 
ago and the operation 
itself
10/19/62)
begun
ast spring. (Scirce: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/
163. 10/19/62 On this date the first FRUITSET radar signal from Cuba
was a C-
Band
was intercepted, possibly emitted from a SAM site at Senado. This
signal, indicating that the USSR 
has committed its most recent 
version of the
SA-2 system in Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 
10/20/62).
the
164. 10/19/62 - "There are several refugee reports indicatio
presence of tactical (FROG) missiles in Cuba, although 
there is no 
photographic
confirmation thus far". (Source: Joint Evaluation 
Report, 10/19/62)
"Photography (Mission 5012 of 10/25) confirmed the presence of a FROG
missile launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios 
a tactical unguided
rocket of 40,000 to 50,000 yard range, similar to the U. 
S. Honest John".
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)
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165. 10/21/62 - This was the arrival date in Cuba of a TU 114
CLEAT transport. The unusual circumstance of KRUG flight tracking,
normally reserved for especially important flights, suggests that
high ranking Soviet command personnel may be among the 140 passengers
aboard. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)
166. 10/22/62 By this date seven Soviet ships identified as
possible ballistic missile carriers (having cargo hatch openings of
at least 75 by 15 feet) had made a total of 13 trips to Cuba since
"late July. These ships were the KASIMOV, KIMOVSK, KRASNOGRAD,
OKHOTSK, OMSK, ORENBURG and POLTAVA.
"
As of 10/22 the KIMOVSK, OKHOTSK and POLTAVA were en route to
Cuba. Two of these, the KIMOVSK (en route from the Baltic) and the
OKHOTSK (from the Black Sea) "are among seven ships which were con-
tacted by individual cipher messages from Moscow six hours after the
President's public statement. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report,
10/24/62)
"1
167. 10/22/62 The President made his racio-TV address to the
Nation, reporting unmistakable evidence of a series of offensive
missile sites in Cuba and noting that "the first preliminary hard.
information of this nature" was received by him at 9:00 A.M., on
10/16/62.
-
168. 10/23/62 The President issued a Proclamation asserting
that (1) world peace and U.S. security had been endangered by the
establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military cap-
ability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles (2) in a
Joint Resolution passed by the Congress and approved on 10/3/62, it
was declared that the U.S. was determined to prevent by whatever means
necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in
Cuba from extending its agressive or subversive activities to any
part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use
of an externally supported military capability endangering U.S.
security, and (3) that the Organ of Consultation of the American
Republics meeting in Washington on 10/23/62 had recommended that the
Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individ-
ually and collectively, including armed force, deemed necessary to
ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot receive from the Sino-
Soviet powers military material and related supplies threatening the
peace and security of the Continent, and to prevent the missiles in
Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat.
to the peace and security of the Continent.
Therefore, the President proclaimed that the forces under his
command were ordered, beginning at 2:00 P.M., on 10/24/62 to inter-
dict the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to
Cuba, specifically: surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft;
bombs; air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any
of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support.
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(168. 10/23/62 Continued)
or operate the above items; and any other classes of material here-
after designated by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of effectu-
ating this Proclamation.
The President authorized the Secretary of Defense to employ the
land, sea and air forces of the U.S. (in cooperation with any forces
made available by other American States) to carry out this Proclama-
tion.
Further, the President authorized the interception of vessels or
craft proceeding toward Cuba and the taking into custody of any
vessel or craft failing to comply with directions to identify itself
and submit to visit and search -- with force to be used only to the
extent necessary.
169. 10/23/62 A message passed within Cuba from Las Villas to
Placetas suggested
an intent to conceal "equipment" and "fuel station"
in a railroad tunnel in an area south of the Remedios IRBM site. The
message read: "Today situate equipment in the railroad tunnel of
Placetas. Also situate the fuel station in this place.
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)
170. 10/23/62 - The Director, DIA, initiated the issuance of
daily shipping reports and of a summary of Soviet ship movements.
177. 10/24/62 - On this date Khrushchev "categorically stated"
to American businessman W. E. Knox, in a conversation held in the
Kremlin, that "the weapons which the Soviet Union had furnished to
Cuba included antiaircraft missiles and ballistic missiles with both
conventional and thermonuclear warheads. Khrushchev added that "even
the Americans would not trust their NATO allies by turning over ther-
monuclear devices to them. (Source: N.Y. Times Magazine, 11/18/62)
The DIA initiated the issuance of a Special
Intelligence Summary on Cuba.
172. 10/25/62
-O
173. 10/26/62 - James Reston, writing in the New York Times,
stated: "Privately, there are several misgivings. First, many
people find it hard to believe that the offensive Soviet missile sites
in Cuba suddenly mushroomed over the weekend. Accordingly, there is
considerable suspicion either that the official's intelligence was
not as good as maintained, or the Administration withheld the facts."
174. 10/28/62 SCRAMBLER communications were established
between the USSR and Cuba. "We consider these links as the best
candidates identified to date for Soviet command and control of the
missile forces in Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/28/62)
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175. 10/28/62 - Until immediately prior to the President's
statement of this date welcoming Khrushchev's decision to stop.
building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning.
them to the Soviet Union, it appears that in Cuba the Soviets contin-
ued at feverish pace with the construction and camouflaging of their
MRBM and IREM bases in Cuba.
176. 10/29/62 - By this date, accumulated evidence showed that
the Russians had put first-line modern equipment in Cuba, including
such items as FRUITSET radar with C-Band, armored personnel carriers,
etc.
-
Senator Scott said, "We
11
177. 10/30/62 Senator Scott of Pennsylvania, appearing on the
CBS radio program "The Leading Question" on the night of 10/30/62,
said that he and other Republicans had "very hard information early,
in September that the Bans were building missile bases in Cuba."
it began early in September and any infor-
mation we had we knew was available to the administration and to the
President. Referring to President Kennedy's radio-television broad-
cast of 10/22 in which the President said that he received the first
preliminary hard information of the offensive missile buildup on
Tuesday, 10/16, Senator Scott declared, "You don't build a missile
site in a week. Those missile bases were there a long, long time
before the President spoke. Senator Scott further stated, "On
September 13 Secretary of State Dean Rusk in testimony before the
Armed Services Committee admitted that a Soviet arms build-up was
going on in Cuba. He added, "I think the only conclusion can be
that the President himself may not have received the information
there may have been a failure of intelligence. On the other hand,
there may have been a cautious reluctance to move which is under-
standable but was not shared by the Republican Party or the American
people." (Source: Washington Evening Star, 10/31/62)
--
178. 10/31/62 Writing in the New York Times under the heading
"An Intelligence Gap" Hanson Baldwin stated "The effectiveness of the
country's Intelligence organization is again in question as a result
of the Cuban Crisis.
"Considerable mystery in the opinion of some members of Congress
and military men, still surrounds the Administration's sudden decision
to impose a blockade of Cuba after a missile buildup that must have.
started weeks or months ago. The questions being asked are primarily.
these: Was the nation's factual information about the Communist
military buildup in Cuba adequate in quantity and quality, and was
there a long delay after the missiles actually arrived?"
"Were the interpretation and evaluation of this information
influenced by policy considerations; in other words, were the esti-
mates tailored to fit top policy beliefs? Or did Administration
officials, until action was finally taken, reject the intelligence
estimates as erroneous?
11
"Has the marked centralization of intelligence activities in the
two years of the Kennedy Administration improved or hampered the
production of objective, nonpartisan intelligence analyses?'
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179. 11/5/62- Dr. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force,
expressed to Board Member Gordon Gray the opinion that the following
lessons were learned from the Cuba situation:
(1) There is a need for a group at the policy level, having
access to all pertinent intelligence, which can perform the task of
rapidly identifying intelligence requirements and objectives. (Dr.)
Charyk believed that in this instance USIB did not perform the function
he had in mind.)
(2) There is need for a focal point to ensure the availability
of intelligence-related resources for use in contingency situations
(e.g., film for photographic reconnaissance purposes).
(3) Comparisons of CORONA and U-2 photography of Cuba reveal
significant instances where U-2 photography was rositive, whereas
CORONA photography of the same targets had been interpreted as nega-
tive. Dr. Charyk felt that based on this experience it is obvious
that satellite photography cannot be wholly relied upon when it
provides negative evidence. He observed that this gives one pause
when we consider the reliance which has been placed on satellite
photography for evidence of missile installations in the USSR. (Dr.
Charyk added that recent satellite photography shows a new missile
site at Tyura Tam which is not served by rail facilities heretofore
noted as an identifying characteristic of this type of missile in-
stallation -- suggesting the possibility that our readings of sat-
ellite photography have failed to locate other missile sites because
of the absence of rail or other characteristics we have assumed for
them.)
180. 11/6/62. The Washington Star of this date records the
lawyer and an agent of
the Students Revolutionary Directorate, that Soviet missiles have
been placed in seven caves and other underground installations in
Cuba. (At Hershey, Victoria, Fenon, Sierra de Cubitas Las Villas
Province, Oriente Province and Pinar del Rio Province.) Garcia re-
ported that the underground sites are strongly guarded by Russians
and that no Cubans have been allowed to approach them since the sites
group issued a statement in Miami
were completed. Garcia's studen the verge of being a victim of
claiming that "The free world
a new swindle of the Soviet Union. We have in our hands sufficient
Information that there exist on Cuban territory bases of missiles
like the ones that have caused the present crisis and some of even
greater range in subterranean installations that cannot be photo-
graphed by reconnaissance aircraft
"The photo planes have localized on Cuban territory nearly 30
launching pads while our information assures us that there are many
more missiles in Cuba. The Soviet Union can take out of Cuba and
permit the inspection of more than 50 missiles, but there are on
Cuban territory sufficient missiles to destroy half the continent.
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181.
11/6/62 - (IL-28s) As of this date photographic evidence
reflected the following regarding IL-28 medium jet bombers in Cuba:
9 already assembled or in the process of assembly at St. Julian
20 packaged in crates at St. Julian
9 packaged in crates at Holguin
4 packaged in crates at a point near Holguin
TOTAL: 42 IL-28s in Cube.
182. 11/9/62 - When the DOI met with the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board on this date, he reported that from
France he had protested, without success, the conclusions reached
by USIB in the SNIE on the Soviet buildup in Cuba, and in commenting
upon the lessons to be learned from the recent developments pertaining
to Cuba, the DCI (1) expressed the belief that "we were too timid with
respect to the conduct of surveillance operations over Cuba in Septem-
ber; (2) expressed concern because of the lack of weight given to
refugee reports by the intelligence analysts; (3) expressed the view
that a state of mind had developed in the intelligence community to
the effect that the Soviets just simply would not undertake an offen-
sive ballistic missile buildup in Cuba; (4) reported that CIA has been
operating three rather ineffective intelligence teams in Cuba but that
they have not produced hard intelligence on the subject because they
have been occupying themselves mainly with staying alive; (5) advised
that there were approximately 40 third-country agents (meaning diplo-
mats) reporting from foreign embassies in Cuba but that CIA "obtained
no hard intelligence from them regarding the military buildup;" (6)
advised that from the standpoint of reasonable and proper UN verifica-
tion we do not have satisfactory coverage of Cuba, and that "we have
little unofficial on-site information; and (7) stated that currently
'is not getting intelligence on Cuba through conventional means.
CIA
-
He
183. 11/9/62 When the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
met with the Board on this date, he expressed the view that there was
danger in placing undue reliance on photography in seeking answers to
questions that plague us from the standpoint of intelligence.
noted that DIA received no significant information from agent sources
concerning the Soviet missile buildup. He suggested that the Army
should play an increasing role in terms of clandestine intelligence
penetration of Cuba. He also noted that an additional important
lesson to be learned was that there must/be provided to the Washington
area a first class photo processing facility if we are to be prepared.
adequately for similar Cuban situations in the future.
184. 11/9/62 - When Mr. Thomas Hughes, Acting Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State, met with the Board on
this date, he identified the f following areas as warranting further
examination: (1) The need for establishing an improved capability for
the evaluation of indicators as distinguished from the process of pre-
paring intelligence estimates; (2) The need for getting across to top
level officials the full brunt of such indicators. (Hughes noting that
this did not happen in State, and in fact that State received some of
the refugee indicator reports as much as two months after they had
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(184. 11/9/62 Continued)
been prépared.); (3) The need for clandestine intelligence collection.
(Hughes noting that we do not have espionage agents on the ground in
Cuba providing significant data.); (4) The need for a better warning
views such as those
Riviera (Hughes noting, as did the
Director, DIA, that the DCI's dissent was registered internally
within CIA, but was not communicated to USIB until after the Cuban
crisis broke.)
mechanism; (5) The need8istering with USIB v
expressed by the DCI from
185. 11/14/62 - The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, following its preliminary review of the subject on 11/9/62
requested the DCI for "a review on an all-source, all-agency basis
of the actions taken and results obtained within the intelligence.
community in providing ence coverage, reporting and estimates
on the developing buildup." The Board requested that the report
setting forth the results of the intelligence community's review
Include: (a) an identification of the requirements levied on intel-
ligence collection elements of the Government, (b) a resume of the
intelligence information obtained from such sources as foreign diplo-
matic personnel, Cuban r refugee interrogations, in-place agent reports,
COMINT, and ELINT, (c) the scope of distribution given such informa-
tion to higher authority and laterally within the intelligence com-
munity, and (d) the extent to which such information was reflected
in reports and assessments provided to policy level officials.
186. 11/21/62 - The Minutes of the USIB Meeting of this date
reflect the following entry: "Noted a view expressed by General Carter
in related discussion of the Cuban situation that, for intelligence
planning for the future, Cuba should be considered as a satellite
of the USSR.
187. 11/23/52 The DIA Summary of this date contains a detailed
analysis of Soviet military forces in Cuba as of 11/23. In summary
the analysis states Soviet military forces in Cuba are now believed
to number about 15,000, including some 4,000 ground combat troops,
3,000 IRBM and MRBM personnel, 7,800 in air defense and air force
elements, and 1,200 naval personnel.
"
-
188. 11/24/62 - Broadcasting from Havana on this date Allen.
Oxley stated (heard on CBS in New York) that "there is now no doubt
that not all the Russian missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba. While
the Russians have removed 42 missiles it is known that others remaln
and one type a rocket with a range of about 25 miles is believed
to be controlled by the Cubans.. Information received from Mariel
and Bayia Onde, the two main seaports of the Province of Pina Del Rio
reveals that at least 88 medium and long range missiles were unloaded
there from Russian ships; 36 in the month of September and 52 in
October. In addition a large number of short range rockets arrived
There are unconfirmed reports of missiles remaining in Cuba
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(188. 11/24/62 Continued)
"which have been hidden underground in concrete shelters where American recon-
and
The island is alive with rumors,
naissance planes cannot detect them.
it is difficult to sift facts out of the stories of the big Russian
Some of these stories 
tell of big 
concrete
countryside and underground rocket bases still
being built by the Russians in the mountains.
constructions in the
military buildup still
189. 11/26/62 At Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, the President
commended the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical 
Air Command for the
which they had taken
photographs 
w
build-up of offensive weapons in
irst gave us conclusive proof of the
11;
" The 
President noted that: "the work.
of these two units has contributed as much to the security of the United
States as any unit in our history, and any group of men 
in our history."
On the same date at Key West, the President commended the Navy stating:
"We express particular thanks to you for your work 
of the last five weeks.
The reconnaissance flights which enabled us to 
determine with precision
the offensive build-up in Cuba contributed directly 
to the security of 
the
United States in the most important and significant way.'
"
190. 12/4/62 - In a briefing provided to Messrs. Gray and Coyne, the
Director, DIA, advised that photographic
on board ship deperting Cuba;
that the Soviets removed either partially or totally the canvass covers on
36 of the 42 outgoing MRBMs (the Soviets refused 
to exhibit 6 of them)
the missiles 
were in no way removed; 
that
and in all instances the skins of
or exiting Cuba; that the intelligence
no IRBMs were detected entering,
community estimates that the IRBMs had not yet been introduced into Cuba
but may have been on some of the ships which turned 
back at the time the
quarantine was declared; that the 9 known 
MRBM-IREM bases in Cube have 
been
dismantled; that no evidence has been developed 
reflecting the existence
of nuclear warheads in Cuba; that it would be 
relatively simple to 
introduce
such warheads with little likelihood of detection
; that "black boxes" were
employed with negative results in an endeavor 
to detect nuclear emanations
from the ships exiting Cuba with the MREM.
Cuba; that it subsequently identified gence identified: 33 MRBMs in
Ing Cube with the MRM
The Director, DIA, also reported that photographic evidence reflected
that at least 42 D-28s had been introduced into Cuba; 
that as of this
date three of the IL-28s have been put aboard 
a Soviet vessel which has
exited Cuba; that assembly of other IL-28s has apparently 
ceased; and 
there
are indications that the remaining IL-28s 
may be in the process of being
readied for shipment out of Cuba.
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