157-10014-10005
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IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : SSCIA
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157-10014-10005
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-05
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR :
SSCSGO
FROM
ANGLETON, JAMES
TO :
TITLE
:
113
DATE: 06/19/75
PAGES :
SUBJECTS: ANGLETON, JAMES
USSR
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CIA
FBI
NOSENKO, YURI
CIA, RELATIONSHIP WITH WC
OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD
TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS: NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 1
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ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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iminal sactions
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The United States Senate
Report of Proceedings
ORMATION
ject
R378
Peame
INVENTORIES
Hearing held before
BY.
2/15/77
BC
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Thursday, June 19, 1975.
Washington, D. C.
(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)
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James Angleton
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EXECUTIVE SESSION
Thursday, June 19, 1975
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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Government.
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m.,
in Room S.123, The Capitol, Senator John G. Tower,presiding.
Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Baker and Mathias.
William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick
Also present:
A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Charles Kirbow and David
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Aaron, Professional Staff Members.
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Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, I understand that you came
on very short notice. And I appreciate your accommodating
3 the Committee.
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You will have to be sworn.
Would you rise, please, and raise your right hand?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about
to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
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Mr. Angleton.
I do.
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Senator Tower.
Counsel, you may proceed.
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TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON
Mr. Schwarz. I would like to first get your name and
address on the record.
Mr. Angleton. James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Just some procedural matters.
right to counsel, you understand that?
You have a
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Mr. Angleton.
Yes, I understand it.
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Mr. Schwarz.
And if at any time you want to stop to ob-
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tain counsel you have a right to do that.
And if you wish
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to claim any of your Constitutional rights you have a right
to do that, you understand those things also, do you?
Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand them.
Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what
period of time?
Mr. Angleton. From the beginning until December, the
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end of December.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Mr. Angleton. 1974.
Mr. Schwarz. And were you the Chief of Counterintelligence
at the CIA for that period?
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Mr. Angleton.
I was.
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Mr. Schwarz.
For that entire period of time?
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Mr. Angleton. No, from 1954.
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Schwarz.
so respo
for relations
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10 with Israeli intelligence agencies?
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
Schwarz. Can you briefly state the connection, if any,
between Our counter intelligence work and the Israeli work,
or put even more generally, how did you happen to have both
those jobs?
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Mr. Angleton.
Well,
if I could ask you some clarifica-
17
tion, are we addressing ourselves here in terms of
18
this meeting to the Szule business, or are we trying to take
19 up everything?
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Mr. Schwarz
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No, we are not going to try to take up
everything. We may try to take up
few things beyond the
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Szulc business. What we are trying
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Mr. Angleton. I can direct my answers to you better
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if I know more where we are going.
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Mr. Schwarz. We are going to the Szulc busine
but it
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it would be helpful to have a few background first.
Senator Baker. If I may say so,
so that Mr Angleton
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1 not be taken by surprise, there are one or two things that
I would like to discuss. The nature of that material would be
similar to what you have already discussed with Rockefeller,
having to with the Oswald situation and other things.
7
Mr. Angleton.
8
1943,
in 1943 from
Well, to begin with, I went into OSS in
the infantry: And then Iwas assigned to an
embryonic counter intelligence unit under General
Donovan. My immediate hief was James R. Murphy, who had been
a protegee and obtained his law degree in General Donovan's
office. And he is a practicing attorney here in Washington.
And he was Chief of X-2, which was the counter intelligence.
were put together who
And during that time a number of
had never had any experience in the subject.
And that included
16
people such as Jonnie Oaks, who was the
head of the editorial
17
page of the New York Times, and Ben Wells
and a tremendous
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cross-section of American life.
And there was a training intensive in this country, and
I was sent to London. And the purpose of that was to ab-
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sorb the British experience, and more important the breaking
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of German codes.
The breaking of the German codes, which is relevant to
our activity, was really done in England.
And by way
digression, the Germans were using a receiver machine calle
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igma,
the blue prints of which were originally obtained by
a Frenchman. And I might add that the Frenchman never re-
ceived credit for it. And yet that perhaps was the most
single important breakthrough of the entire war. And he had
obtained it about eitht to nine or ten years prior to the out-
break of war, when it was non-operative. And he had the
prescience to know that the systems could only be one thing,
that it would be operative in a time of war.
I give this digression simply to point out that the
fruits of that breakthrough would first go to the military
And the counter intelligence
use of it would be the bottom of the list of priorities, in
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and the military operations.,
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one sense.
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But it would mean that a compromise of
the material
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in any fashion to the Germans would destroy the military
uses. And during the war or when the Germans went into the
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war, they brought it up from 10 percent recovery to about
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100 percent
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And I believe it was in the neighborhood of some 22,000
operational messages from the German high command.
I know
the Battle of Tobruk was fought on six intercepts.
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So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence
for the purpose of playing back German agents to their high
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✓ Command. And this was an elaborate deception. And when the
war ended I would say that 99 percent of all reporting agents
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that the Germans had were under our control. And in fact
when many of the German hierarchy tried to escape to the
west under aliases, their only point of contact for most
documentation and money was to our agent under control.
And it was called the Safe Haven program.
So London was in a sense a staging area with full access
to British, or the fruits of British activity, going back
8
through their entire history.
And it was the advance head-
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quarters for General Donovan, and Mr. Murphy.
And I took over the
I was then sent to Italy in 1943.
counter intelligence for Italy, the OSS, AFHQ, Allied Forces
Ileadquarters.
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Subsequently I became the Chief of OSS Italy.
And
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lished the counter intelligence services.
I want to say that my work then became more broad in terms of
espionage and all the other branches of OSs.
And I re-estab-
And I brought the
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French back into existence, particularly the man who
originally acquired the code, and who worked
it for many
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And by this time it was shifted to the Saudi bloc.
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I left Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back, and was
discharged and went into the Agency immediately.
And during
the period I was in the Agency, of course, I had both agent
operations, long distance operations, and counter intelligence,
and some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.
And probably the first overnight operation that there
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which was known as Plan Hope, which is simply putting the
Italians in an airplane and having them fly over to the
✓ Roumanian border and make very primitive photographs of the
whole region.
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And I was sent back to the Air Force.
And then I had
code operations, embassy penetrations, and so on.
So, in sense the resuscitation
the Italian service,
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Army and Navy, Air Force, and the Minister of the Interior,
was American rehabilitation. And I am not going to go into
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the details of the political situation.
There was the
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not fighting the war,
ing the post-wa
civil war in Greece, and the revival of the international
Brigade and in fact the Soviets had built up, when they were
period, assassinations,
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and instability.
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And throughout this we had very close
supervision from
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Mr. Murphy, and General Donovan. And we had special interest
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in the Vatican and what was happening in Berlin behind the
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Curtain.
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And the then acting Secretary of State for the Vatican,
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Montini who is the present Pope.
And so there was much
to do through our channels, and General Donovan, with Montini,
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the Pope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems
was
33
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the cold war. We did not buy the cold war, it came to us
and we worked with the Germans, and as we broke down the
opposition, we began to find that we were not getting the
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Germans, we were getting the Soviets.
But the penetrations and the operations which we ran
during the military phase began to take on a character of
their own in the civilian phase in the very long term Soviet
objectives against the U.S. in particular, and against the
allies
And then I got into all fields ofylabor, subversion,
illegal immigrants, and then revolution. I was in Greece.
And our penetrations at that period were fairly high level and
sophisticated, because of the reaction to Stalin.
And as the Soviet troops occupied new territories, it
was faced with these ambiguities, the defectors coming
over to us at very high levels.
And in the course of this, of course, was the Israeli
immigration. Technically we were still a part of AFHQ, which
was a combined and Allied Headquarters. And the British desires
were that our activities be directed in supporting their
responsibilities in the Middle East, and, therefore, to pre-
vent the immigration.
ever re-
And I think the only policy cable that was
ceived during that period was one we sent to Mr. Murphy, and
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through General Donovan to the President. That
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prevent immigration.
(was where we exercised our influences on the Italians to
And they addressed themselves to this
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issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it leaned
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toward the general proposition that we should not
scourage the British nor hurt the British directly, but
we should not interfere with the Italians to support the
British position.
And so my dealings were with Admiral Maugeria, who
had been Chief of the Italian Naval Intelligence, but was
then the Commanding Admiral of the Turanian Fleet generally
south, where all these illegal immigrants collected and were
9
sent down.
10
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And then they blew up the Irgum, and blew up the British
embassy in Rome, who were my opposite numbers.
with whom we had set up as the Italian intelligence through
And the man
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the rest of the Israelis
G GA
we had the members of the
to whether we
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group, and then we had the dilemma again as
turned them over to the British authorities, and so on.
And we were in a position to make decisions one way or
the other And eventually we came down on the side of re-
leasing them.
2.
And there is so much more of it. I am trying to keep
the thread of it.
Mr. schwarz. So you developed some kind of a relation-
22 ship, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons connected
with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of
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Israeli back in the 1940's?
Mr. Angleton. That is right.
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Mr. Schwarz.
And was there any other significant reason
why you kept the Israeli account, if that is the right ex-
ression?
3:
Mr. Angleton. There wasn't one after I left there,
nor was there one here in Washington.
But
other side of the Israeli problem was that you
༡
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And you had the
Soviets making use of the immigration for the purpose of
sending illegal agents into the West and breaking down all
the travel control, identifications and so on.
had thousands coming from the Soviet Union,
And so there was both a security problem and a political
problem. And one of my men married, I might say, the head of
So I had
the Zionist movement in Italy, the underground.
14
a connection to this man.
He was very important.
15
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So, coming back to Washington, I was Special Assistant
to Colonal Donald H. Galloway, who was head of the
17
clandestine side and covered the world,
on all sides of
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clandestine activity.
20 pionage
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123
And subsequently I was Chief of Operations for Es-
مگر
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And in 1954 I had a special operational unit, and was
made head of the counter intelligence.
Mr. Schwarz. In the period beginning in 1954 and lasting
until 1974, when you left the Agency, did you have any
relationship
is the Israeli account the wrong way to say it?
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Mr. Angleton.
It is all right. It is as goodeng ny
2
Mother.
NBRI
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Mr. Schwarz.
10
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Israe
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Mr.
Schwarz. Did you have any relationship with the
account?
Mr Angleton. No. That began in 1951. There was
no
6 relationship between the Agency and the Israeli intelligence.
You mean at all, or prior to 1951.
8
Mr. Angletona
There wasn't any from 1947
1946 on.
9
Mr. Schwarz.
Then it began in 1951.
And all
10
I am trying to establish
and not spend a lot of time with it,
11
is, do you have any relationship with Israel, Israeli intelli-
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gence, or the Israeli account on behalf of the Agency between
13
1951 and 1974.
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Mr. Angleton. It was resonstituted in 1951. And I was the
Teddy
15
negotiator of the arrangement.
The Mayor of Jerusalem, Pete
16
Kollek, was at the other end of the negotiation.
He was
17
stationed in Washington. But during the Jewish Agency period
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he was head of the intelligence in Turkey, during the war and
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prior.
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who was then Director.
Mr. Miller. How was that agreement negotiated
Mr Angleton. It was negotiated by finding waal
dis we have in common. It was reviewed by Admiral Hillenkoetter
And he was to be succeeded by General
alter Bedell Smith. And the decision was made during the
24
25 war that Bedell Smith was
to take over, and Allen Dulles return
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to this activity, that we would go ahead and re-establish a
relationship. And after a lot of bureaucratic problems, they
gave me the account.
Mr. Miller. What ws the nature of the arrangement that
was agreed upon between the two services?
Angleton. In most simplistic terms, they were in-
formed that we would not work with them against the Arabs,
that we would work with them on Soviet intelligence and
it existed.
which I take it was
9
Soviet bloc intelligence and Communism, where
10
Mr. Schwarz. Did that agreement
11
more flexible that
but did it remain in effect throughout
12
the period of your service with the Agency?
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Mr. Angleton.
More or less.
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Mr. Miller. Was this agreement in the form of a
15
paper?
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Mr.Angleton.
MF Miller. And under whose authority was the agree-
Paper and operations, discussion.
18
ment made?
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Mr. Angleton.
Under the authority of the Director of
20
✓ Central Intelligence, and the Prime Minister of Israel on
the other side.
Mr. Miller. And this involved the exchange of resources
23
of both countries?
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correct.
Mr. Angleton.
Everything except their own people.
The term "resources"
is not quite
It was giving
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up papers and signals, communications intelligence, and all
the other products of intelligence action.
Mr. Miller. So the Director of Central Intelligence was
4
aware of the agreement.
Was the President?
5
Angleton. The President was aware
OF
it. And the
Secretary of State was the brother of the Deputy Chief of the
CIA, and eventually was very much involved.
Mr. Miller Where is a record of this agreement kept,
9
as an instrument of the U.S.?
10
Mr. Angleton.
internal papers would be in the Agency.
11
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tive treaty which was cleared
The letters, copies of the letters from Ben Gurion to the
President or to the Secretary of State I assume are still in
the Agency. I dealt with other departments in connection
with Africa, and so on, underdeveloped areas.
If you are speaking as to whether there was a representa-
and people wanted these
17
things cleared
don't think there were any clearances
18
obtained from the Hill.
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Mr. Miller. Was it regarded as
commitment from the U.S.
an obligation
to Israel on certain matters?
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Mr. Angleton. When you use the word U.S. while you
may use it as contracting officers and all that, there was
very little reduced to writing. And it is a custom of
intelligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And
there have been very few directors to my knowledge that would
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put their pen to hand to sign an agreement to some under
standing. It is based on a fiduciary relationship and common
understanding.
So,
these were all understandings that were
generated by events. WE had the arrest of the nine doctors,
6
and the pogrom in Russia. And obviously you didn't go through
7
a lot of bureaucracy, it was there for everyone to see.
8 And it had a direct impact on the question of immigration of
Mr. Miller. How was it possible for succeeding directors
of the intelligence agency to understand what the
9
agents, and everything else that goes along with it.
And
10
I think that characterizes any good operation.
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agreements were between in this case the Israeli intelligence
service and the U.S. Intelligence Service?
Mr. Angleton. Very simple. They saw the production to
begin with. And they met with directors or the head of
Israeli intelligence. And they met with Ambassadors and prime
ministers. And they were very much involved.
Mr. Schwarz. Just one more background question and
then we will turn to the principle subject.
Following through on the subject of Israel up to your
departure in 1974, is there any connection between
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parture and handling of Israel?
And if there is, what is
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the connection?
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Mr. Angleton. Well,
I think I have said it all to the
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commission
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I don't know how wisely. You can always ge
different information from different people.
But Colby
Gold them, so I would like to give him the benefit of the
doubt on it. But over a period of time Colby,
who is not my
and in my
and Dr. Schlesinger,
5
cup of tea professionally or in any other way,
6
view is on the negative side of life
7
before he went to
Defense, said that Colby was the only other
B
person on Watergate
So you have got certain persons who
9
10
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were prominent. And there was the negative aspect of
self-inspection, and inferiors reporting on superiors, until
they came through the snake pit.
And in the course of all of this there was time when
he assumed the authority, and in total contrast to Schlesinger,
14
he began to regard the Israeli account as some-
15
thing where we had to open the windows and let the air in.
16
And he used phrases such as, we must
help out Henry and a few
17
other things.
18
19
Any position was that it was a political relationship,
and that we were not bound, or should not be bound to using
20
the Agency on tactical ventures when we had relationships
21
which had strategic implications.
22/
But one must rembmer that there are still three
million Jews in the Soviet Union. And the relationship is the
only place where you do it with high level agencies who
WO
25
for ideology and do not work for money.
So it is unique.
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And my second point was that everything should be run
on the grounds of need-to-know, and should not go into the Arab
Division until there was peace in the area. There was no
identity of interest or fundamental interest between Israelis
and an example is 500 Polish intelligence officers who were
Jewish who immigrated to Israel. They knew more about Polish
intelligence than the Poles. And the Soviets had worked with
the Poles in the West, and trained them in Moscow, where you
had the cohesion of 27 bloc services working together through
their own congress party apparatus into a collective with
10
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Moscow.
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grity of the immigration from
14
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And most important, our job was to preserve the inte-
bloc, because the problem
of escape to Israel is a religious problem, it is not a
be a prime minister who
political problem. There could not
would survive the day if he did not go along with the idea of
17
the return.
18
And, therefore, there is a certain kind of parallelism,
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2 2 2
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24
you might say, between handling the communications intelligence
during the war and where a low priority makes use of it and
endangers the whole with the question of immigration,
where the fruits of that immigration come to this government.
ing?
(Recess.)
Senator Tower. Will you go ahead and resume the question.
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Mr. Schwarz. You were in the middle of an answer,
believe.
Mr. Angleton. What I am trying to say is that immi-
gration is a source of very high level information, and it
is very comparable with its problems as communications intelligenc
5
6
during the war when the lives of men were involved in troop
7
movements.
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00
And,
therefore
the idea of opening up the doors and
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things, and so on, to me seemed Cabsolutely contrary to the
spirit, and what had been going on for 22 years.
And during that time we had obtained, for example, by
way of production, Khrushchev's secret speech which prac
tically created revolutions in Hungary and Poland.
gration.
I was just simply reiterating the problem of the immi-
letting the light
This idea of opening the doors and
in, and breaking down compartmentation, and breaking down
1
17
the need to know, would inevitably put in jeopardy
the immi-
18
gration, if the Soviets should learn the extent of
tivities,
19
the ac-
NOW,
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the production ran from everything, such as the
secret speech of Khrushchev's against Stalin, it ran
int
22
234
the first hard information on nuclear explosives, and it
ran into practically the whole gamut. And I think in a cer
24/
tain period of time it resulted in over 22,000 reports deal-
ing with the Soviet bloc which were unique.
And much of this
2.725
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came from, say, an engineer that had a factory, or what
in other words, it had a very direct bearing on our own
and our own defense budget.
Now, our own way of handling it was to give false
attribution, reports, so that if the report was ever compro-
mised, it would not compromise the operations or the immi-
therefore, that was one of the issues.
gration. And
On the other issue was that to politicize the Agency,
as I stated, on the tactical problems, which are going to
be with us for a long time.
And to break down the fiduciary relationship-- which is
after all a personal business-all the men I have had, were
men who stayed in it and came back to headquarters and went back
to Tel Aviv, they went to the National Security Council, and
went back to Tal Aviv et cetera, a small group of men. It
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devised in the
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was probably the most economical operation that has ever been
I don think there was more
than 10 people that were hired in the same process.
I started from the south side with two gewish men who
He sent them over as ordinary
worked with me during the war.
people under cover to establish the working hours of things,
and I brought over six others and put them through some months
of training, outside of the structure.
And one of them rose to be Deputy Chief of the Service.
But it is a part of the whole fiduciary business.
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For example, we had certain political overtones where
we were used in an affirmative way under President Eisenhower.
He wanted to make a real attempt to see if there could ever
be a peace in the Middle East. And with Alan Dulles, his
brothers, and myself, and Kermit Roosevelt, we put up a plan
to bringing in Robert B. Anderson, who had been Assistant
Secretary of the Defense.
And he was accredited as special emissary from the
President. And I handled his base to Israel, which was secret,
9
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black, as we call them to see Ben Gurion
--
and Shaffetz was
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the Foreign Minister
Kollek, who was in the Prime Minis-
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ter's office, and later Mayor
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And we took him back to Rome. And Kermit Roosevelt
would take him over to see Nasser And this went on back
and forth on many trips, until the conclusions were reached
that there could not be any peace.
But those types of initiatives could be done without.
publicizing without destroying it.
Mr. Schwarz. In any event, some dispute
connection
with these Israeli matters underlay your dispute with Mr.
Colby which underlay your leaving the Agency?
Mr. Angleton.
Yes. He offered me jobs or what not.
23
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But these are matters of principle, as far as I am concerned.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Angleton, you described the fiduciary
relationship. Were there points along the way where the U.S.
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interests and the interests of Israel were in conflict?,
Mr. Angleton. We never got into that. Of course you
only had to read the paper every day to see that,
Mr. Miller. But how did they come up ? You say they
didn t come up at all?
Mr. Angleton. Of course, they came up. There
wasn't anything secret about it.
Mr. Miller. But what examples can you give?
8
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Mr Angleton.
The recent visit of Rabun is a classic
10
case. The so-called reassessment of the Middle East. The
11
Times has better accounts of it than the Agency has.
12
Mr. Miller. I mean at your level.
13
Mr. Angleton. I don't quite get the thrust of your
14
question.
15
Mr. Miller. What I am saying is that you had an unusually
16
close relationship
17
Mr. Angleton. It was not unusual.
I have had it
18
with many chiefs of services in 80 different countries, so
19
it is not any more unusual than a lot of others. The French-
20
man who got the code is closer to me than the
21
Israelis are.
Mr. Miller.
22
Similar to the relationship
23
Mr. Angleton. I don't like the word unusual)
because to
me it is usual.
Mr. Miller.
25
Delete that. If your working relationship
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with the Israelis, where you had conflict of U.S. interents
Mr. Angleton. Give me an example of what you regard
as a conflict.
Mr. Miller. Can you think of any?
Mr. Angleton. You are the one who is posing it. I think
a lot of these things are illusions. But what would you regard
as a conflict? I don't think there is a conflict regarding
the Soviet Union or the balance of power. I don't think there
question in my view
May I suggest Suez as a conflict that
9
is any
10
Senator Mathias.
11
might have posed
12
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Mr. Angleton. Wh he Suez are we talking about?
Senator Mathias. The Israeli-British-French attack on Suez.
Mr. Angleton. The U.S. Government position was that we
had no commitments with Israel and we had no binding treaties.
16
We had two allies that had just fought a war with us, and
17
both of whom betrayed us. And Eden's head went with it. And that
1.8
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is very clear and well documented. The Israelis were not
blamed because we didn't have any agreements with them, they
had violated no agreements. The British had agreements.
The British tried to give us a deception plan, should they
have naval vessels in the Mediterranean, and they were there
23
24,
a different purpose.
Mr. Kirbow. Let me see if I can make a point on just
common sense level.
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Senator Mathias. Let me follow this Suez question t
little more closely.
That is a point at which the U.S. policy differed from
the policy which was adopted by British and France and Israel?
Mr. Angleton. Correct.
Senator Mathias. And would a situation of that sort con-
front you with difficulties in your operations because
Mr. Angleton. There have always been crises with them.
Senator Mathias. And how do you resolve a crisis of
that kind?
days.
Mr. Angleton\ You don't see the fellow for a few
Mr. Miller. I see
14
So your method was to deal with them on those matters
15
Mr. Angleton. A total neutrality of interest.
16
Mr. Schwarz. Could we turn to the subject of atomic
17
technology?
18
Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me. I think for the record we should
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, O.C. 20003
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make it clear, I think Mr. Angleton has ha
ad
an interview
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with the staff, and he has been made aware that a witness
testified here under oath as to certain matters and that that
is the approach that we are going to take now.
Is that clear?
Mr. Schwarz. I want to ask the question generally
first and then come to the other testimony.
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Mr. Angleton, has the Central Intelligence Agency directly
or indirectly transferred any atomic technology or know how to
Israel?
Mr. Angleton. From my knowledge, the answer is an abso-
lute no. That would be one of those grounds that Mr. Miller
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was referring to, where the Agency, in the person of
7
Mr. John McCone, had some of the sharpest words probably in the
history of the relationship.
Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned those at lunch, and you might
just put that on the record.
Mr. Angleton want to state that to my knowledge the
Israelis themselves never raised the question of their atomic
capability or their atomic interests, with one or
14
15
two small exceptions, which was where there had been somebody
who had been Ged
from the US, were he ever to get his visa
16
to come back and attend some meeting, something on that
17
level.
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Mr. Schwarz. I want to make sure that I have asked
the question broadly enough.
Did the Agency take any steps to make available
to the Israelis any personnel who had knowledge about atomic
22
matters.
23
Mr. Angleton.
None whatsoever.
24
Mr. Schwarz.
And specifically with respect to
man
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let's go off the record for a minute.
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(Off the record.)
Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.
Do you know a scientist called Dr. Wilfred Mann?
Mr. Angleton. I do.
Mr. Schwarz. Does he have any knowledge of atomic matters
Mr.. Angleton. Yes. He was one of the originators.
Schwarz. To your knowledge was he ever put in con
tact with any Israeli person direct: or indirectly?
Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge, never.
10
Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a journalist
called Tad Sculc?
11
Mr. Angleton I do.
12
13
Mr. Schwarz. Did you meet with him sometime this year?
Mr. Angleton. In March.
14
Mr. Schwarz.
Where did you meet him?
15
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Mr. Angleton At the house of Ben Wells.
Mr. Schwarz. And did the three of you then go for dinner
17
some place?
18
Mr. Angleton. That is correct.
19
Mr. Schwarz. At that meeting did you discuss
(Mr. Angleton. We went as Sculz's guests somewhere to
20
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dinner.
22
Mr. Schwarz. At that meeting did he raise
you the
23 subject of the transfer of atomic technology from the GIA
25
to Israel?
Mr. Angleton. Yes.
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Mr. Schwarz.
What did he say to you?
Mr. Angleton.
They prefaced his remarks by stating that
اوم
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was not a professional scientist, but he was a dew, and
so was his good friend Hersh. And they had some strange ESP
working in which one said to the other, have you heard what I
have heard, and the other one said, I think
may have heard
what you have heard. And then this thing went back and forth,
8
and then it finally devolved, one said, did it have anything
9
to do with Angleton, and the other one said yes, and it went
10
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on to where they discovered that each had had separate sources
that I had been instrumental in acquiring plutonium for the
Israelis, and as a follow-up, to help the Israelis on their
know-how by sending Dr. Mann to Israel clandestinely. And they
✓
both had their stories, and they had
gentleman's agreement.
And the matter was published without notifying the
16
other.
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Mr. Schwarz. And what did you say in response?
Mr. Angleton. My response to him was,
he had not identified the scientist. So, I asked
Mr. Scharz. When you say it was wrong
Angleton. His statement was wrong.
Mr. Schwarz. So you denied the story that atomic
technology had been transferred to Israel?
was wrong. But
Thim
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Mr. Angleton. I said, it is wrong.
Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure what it is.
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does constitute a denial.
Mr. Angleton. His story was wrong.
Senator Baker. Let me ask you, Mr. Angleton,
understand by that that you mean every material aspect of
the story was wrong and incorrect?
6
7
Mr. Angleton. I didn't mean quite that
terested in the fact that, one, he knew Tad Szulc
I was more in-
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I am sorry,
that I knew Hersh -- and that Hersh told him that his source
was the man who gave him the December 22 article, and whether
he "had been set up"
Senator Baker. What December 227
Mr. Angleton. That is the time they kicked off the
13
entire furor on the past espionage thing.
14
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Senator Baker Against American citizens?
Mr. Angleton: Yes.
Senator Baker. Did they do that once?
Mr. Angleton. No, because neither disclosed their inde-
pendent sources to the other.
Senator Baker. The point I am trying to clarify for my
own purposes is that the conversation you just related you said
was wrong.
Do I understand you to mean that every material aspect
of that statement was wrong?
Mr. Angleton.
Yes. But I didn't know my motives on
lot of questions that I had with him. Because this was the
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first live human being I saw that had actually allegedly,
heard from Hersh. And he thought they had been set up
and that was the biggest agony in the Agency.
Senator Baker. And the person who set him up
Angleton. Hersh told him, according to Szulc, that
6 he was scared of the story, because this was his source on the
December 22 article. And therefore he wondered aloud whether
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and
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he had been set
Senator Baker. Did he say who had been the source of the
December 22 information?
Mr. Angleton. Absolutely no.
Mr. Kirbow. Off the Record.
(Off the record.)
Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure, in your conversa-
tion with Mr. Szulc as opposed to your testimony here today
16 on the merits, did you deny to Mr. Szule that you or
17
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the Agency had facilitated the transfer of atomic technology
to Israel?
Mr. Angleton. I denied it. But the conversation drifted
rapidly, because Szulc was talking about a very great agent
that he had in the Agency. And he was bragging about the fact
that he had more sources than Hersh had. And then he said, do
you know Australia?
And I said, yes, I know Australia.
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Does the word Sydney mean anything to me?
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Yes, he word Sydney does mean something to me.
Do you know sho is bicycling in India?
And Isaid, I am afraid I am not with you.
And he said, Sidney X. And Sidney X is one our most
sensitive employees who retired, and is bicycling in India.
And I give this as an illustration of the cat and mouse
business of this whole evening.
And he said he got that from his source.
Now, that man's name is Sidney Gottlieb. And he was the
head of our technical services department, which means that
there is a cross plant in our business. And the man who
was bugging and performing all the hundreds of technical
services, has access, unfortunately, to many of our operations.
-
is a breakdown of compartmentation And for him to indicate
that he knew Gottlieb, and the sources that had been raised in
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There is one juncture
in the business where there
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my mind, since I was talking about a scientist, plutonium,
18
atomic energy, and all these matters, that his source might
19
be in our Technical Services Division, which,
he was, he
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would knows everything, or could get into everything.
21
But I didn't tell him that.
22
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In fact, I expressed little or no interest in his source
other than asking him a few questions, is he Jewish, and this
that and so on.
Senator Baker. Could I ask you a question at this point?
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Mr. Angleton. Surely.
Senator Baker. What you are relating to me
seems to imply
at Szulc's information was very, very good on sensitive in-
formation?
Angleton. No. That information, sir, would have
been unclassified.
Senator Baker. I am speaking more of the Sidney X Gottlieb
relationship.
Mr. Angleton. But he only said that he was bicycling
8
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in India. But the way he went about,
do you know Australia,
11
do you know Sidney, do you think this,
and so on
12
it was that sort of thing
13
Senator Baker. Do you think he had a source in India?
Mr. Angleton. It started to worry me, because he was
14
15
talking plutonium, which was scientific.
Gottlieb,
16
before he went to that whole department of his, was transferred
17
to Carl Duckett. And that is the reason Gottlieb left.
18
Senator Baker. You mean he didn't want to work for
19
Duckett?
20
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Mr Angleton. That is part of it.
And there are also questions of principle You take it
from one director
it is lifeblocd
--
and get it to another
23
director.
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Senator Baker. Is this the same Gottlieb who was
charge of processing the photographs that were taken in Dr.
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Fielding's office?
Mr. Angleton. His office would have been.
Senator Baker.
Do you know of that situation?
Mr.Angleton. No, except
Senator Baker. Het me ask you this and I will turn it
back to counsel.
Was there any conversation in which Szulc or Hersh talked
to Colby about these matters? Did you ever get any impression
9
that they were implying that Colby was their source?
10
11
Mr. Angleton. The only thing that came up is that when
which is the first time since
I saw Colby yesterday
12
December
--
he told me that he had bought a theory of mine on
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Szulc, but he did not look with any misgivings on Hersh. lle
said that one year before he had seen Hersh about the submarine
article, and that had Hersh been a Soviet agent, the Soviets
would not have permitted the operation to take place.
And I told him that he was erroneous, that to use that
guide was simply not to understand what the game is all about.
And when Philby was stationed in Washington he helped
the FBI in working on some communications intelligence which
21
led
22
the identification of Klaus Fuchs. But in spite of
Philby being a Soviet agent, the Soviets were prepared to let
23
Klaus Fuchs go down the drain rather than hurt Philby.
24
Senator Baker. As an ultimate cover?
Mr. Angleton. Precisely.
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He was a more valuable agent. If he had not been un;
covered he would have been today Chief of British Intelligence.
In the case of George Blake, who was in the British
Secret service, he gave to the Soviets one year in advance the
entire plans of our so-called Tunnel of Love, that is, the
6
tunnel
built in Berlin
very elaborate
to tap all of
7
the Soviet military lines.
8
Now, even one year in advance, they took no preventive
9
action in order save George Blake.
10
11
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13
Now, what has happened since December 22 to the U.S.
intelligence community) in the position that Hersh enjoys, with
the prestige and the impact on the U.S. public, it stands to
reason that you can't get them to give any baby talk as to what
the Soviets would or would do, when you see something that
is the objective from the end of the last war to the present,
and destroy the agent
14
15
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17
Senator Baker.
Do you think Hersh is a Soviet Agent?
18
19
Mr. Angleton. I am not saying that he is a Soviet
agent. To begin with, when I went back to see Wells, who
20
was in counter intelligence with me in London during the war,
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'I told him I could not buy Szulc's article regarding Hersh, the
alleged meetings and that they had certain sources, and the
introduction of Dr. Mann's name and so on simply didn't hold
water,
and something was wrong.
But Dr. Mann is a suspect Soviet agent, a friend of
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Burgess, and a friend of Philby. And the home background
which is a factual thing, is only known to very
And for him to introduce it into this
scenario gave it a taint that lifted it out of just simply
10
few services.
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How would he ever know the name Mann?
Senator Baker. That is what I was driving at, is it
fair to infer from that conversation that there was an
indication that Szulc had a very good source within the
Agency?
Mr Angleton. Either that or the way I look at it, I
am prepared to admit, because of an article he wrote, in the
cryptonym Easy Chair in the Oval Office of the White House.
Talking about the bugging situation?
Senator Baker.
Mr. Angleton.
That crytonym Easy Chair was the most s
sanctified word in the Agency. And what it dealt with was
it was called Easy Chair for the simple reason that if the
Soviets were blocked, people abroad were moving into this
house or this office.
19
Senator Baker. Off the record.
20
(Off the record.)
21
Mr.
Angleton.
But let me put it this way.
22
He said, I called Ben Wells to see you, because
wanted
.23
a safe place in which to raise all this stuff.
Mr. Schwarz.
This is Szulc?
24
25%
Mr. Angleton.
This is Szulc.
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And in fact, I think they had been talking sometime before
I arrived.
And with Wells' background, the New York Times abroad, nd
Szulc's time abroad, apparently
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here?
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Senator Tower. Excuse me.
Will you go back just a bit
You raised a question of how did Szule know the name of
Mann and know about his association with Philby and Burgess.
Mr. Angleton.
Yes.
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Senator Tower: You raised the question but did not ans-
How do you think he could have known it?
Mr. Angleton.. This is what bothers me, that he is
either unwitting, or has a source who has knowledge and is
has a source who is mis-
working for an opposition, or
chievously exploiting him by, who may be retired, and does
know some facts, and therefore it is 10 percent true and 90
9
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wer it.
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percent false.
I would assume his financial situation is such that he
is very hungry. I mean that is my general observation, and
that he is having a rough time of saving a very lucrative
contract with Penthouse for supplying
X number
articles.
20
21
22
I mean, that is my general feeling.
23
24 could
Senator Tower. Let's go back a moment. You say that he
have come by knowledge of the Mann-Burgess-Philby
relationship through an external source?
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Mr Angleton.
Senator Tower.
Yes, either witting or unwitting.
The KBG knows this, and, therefore, it
could have come directly or indirectly from that source?
Mr. Angleton. That is right.
Senator Tower. That is a possibility?
Mr.
Angleton. That is a possibility. And he has some
brains about the fact that he does have contacts
8
the Roumanian
wwwww
he knows
Ambassador better than anybody in Washington,
and he knows the Poles, and he knows this. And it goes on
Cepil10009L
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WARD PAUL
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10
and on.
11
So, he is dealing with bloc people who will be reporting
12
back to their headquarters very detailed
13
assuming he is
totally innocent, and given his position in Washington,
14
15
Szulc would be a normal, Witting or unwitting, channel for
them in disinformation and for any other motive.
16
17
18
19
So, as to whether he is himself knowing what he is
doing, whether he is a dupe, is an outstanding question.
But for a man who goes and socializes with the black
Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr. Szulc ever work for the Central
20
Intelligence Agency?
21
Mr Angleton. I don't know.
He may have for some of
22
23
2 2 2 2
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25
our people in the field.
✓ Mr. Schwarz. Did he ever provide services?
Mr. Angleton. I don't know.
Mr. Schwarz.
Have you heard that?
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Mr. Angleton. I have heard that, but I haven'tlooked at
the dossier for the last ten years. He came to our attention
basically in connection with the leaks in the Bay of Pigs.
Senator Tower. Will you go back to the Szule-Wells-
5
Angleton meeting?
6
Angleton. This basically
7
the thing that began to
really disturb me was, number one, his comment, as I said before
8
tha Hersh told him that the thing that really bothered him
9
about this story was that it came fromthe same source who
10
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gave him the 22nd of December, without identifying him, and the
fact that when he was bing through this business that he had
the best sources in the Agency, and that was Sidney Gottlieb,
and here was a scientific allegation, plutonium and the
scientist and all the rest of themi.
And again, if he did have a live source in that
area, that means he would have a live source across the board.
When he asked me about my successor, told him that
I was not prepared to respond to that, that every new man was
entitled to one free shave.
And he says, I know your successor. And I don't think he
actually mentioned the name. But in this article which has just
come out he mentions him with his biographical sketch
Senator Baker. Who was your successor?
23
24
Mr. Angleton.
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George Kalaris.
I had never known him before.
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So obviously he was talking to me as somebody dis
affected from the Agency, et cetera. I mean that is my view
of why he was doing all this. Whereas my concerns were quite
different than his.
Mr. Schwarz. Do you think it is possible because of
those different concerns, that your effort to deny the story
did not get across to Mr. Szulc?
In other words, you are saying you had some concerns that
dealt with the scientist being involved, that dealt with the
newspaper source, that dealt with Easy Chair, that dealt with
the statement that maybe the December 1974 article was inaccur-
ate. And he pursued all these matters with some vigor and in-
terest.
Do you think it is possible that because of that that
whatever denial you made of the transfer of atomic parts of
9
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212223
Mr Angleton. My chief words to him was
realize what a thing like this implies, and what
said, do you
thestory didn't get across to Mr. Szulc?
Mr. Angleton. No, I think it got across to him.
Mr. Schwarz. Can you recall your words to him that
denied the atomic transfer?
22
23
24
t would
do depending on how the media picks it up, in destroying all
the efforts in the Middle East?
Mr. Schwarz. But words like that are as consistent
with beingtrue as being false?
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Mr. Angleton.
They were consistent, but they weren't
stated in that fashion. They were stated in the fashion that
British
Mann is a person who fits within the Philby, et cetera,
complex in a false story of this sort, which comes to the
who pull out a file on Mann, and they read down and
go back into the fact of Mann's association with me, Mann's
association with Philby, all this stuff, my actions with the
Israelis and all that, regardless of what the U.S. Government
tells the British or the French, or the Canadians, or the
Australians, or the New Zealanders, all of whom have fundament-
would be a confirmation to then,
ally the basic information
based on very high level secret information, that the story was
13
true.
14
Senator Tower.
Let me pursue just about three ques-
15
tions here.
16
17
18
Did Szulc specifically ask you whether or not, during the
early sixties, ofissionable material, along with nuclear
technology and technological assistance, was passed to the
19
Israelis?
20
21
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Did he ask youto confirm or deny that?
Angleton. I can't remember it with precisely that
22 type of precision. The story that he gave was a very lucid,
straightforward story without any if's, and's and but's
23
24
Senator Twoer. Did you deny only in part the validity
of the question that he asked?
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In other words, if he askedyou about the passage
both fissionable material and technology, did you deny wholly
in part that there had been a passage of fissionable
4
material?
5
Angleton. No, I denied his story
would like to
6
keep that
his story, something he came
and presented.
And
7
then when he
8
do with technology
down into the other things, which had to
all I can say is that anyone who follows
closely the Nasser, and then later on Sadat accusations against
CIA, it is voluminous terms of their spelling out the sophis-
9
10
11
ticated gadgetry which they discovered, which came from
12
13
Central Intelligence.
This is a thing that has ways concerned us, because
14
in the last war we lost
and we still do this today, we
15
don't know the extent of this
--
we lost some of the installations
16
which we had put in there.
17
Mr. Schwarz.
When you say "we"
18
Mr. Angleton.
you mean the CIA?
The CIA the Israeli lost entirely
Mr. Schwarz.
21,
22
23
2 2 2 2
19
20
the CIA put in there?
4,11
When he say we put in there, you mean
Senator Baker. What installations?
Mr. Angleton. The line of sight, electronics
Senator Baker. You are not talking about
Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the signal intelligence
And there was some very sophisticated gear that was put in
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1 there. And I want to complete this
10
q
5
6
7
8
because of the fact
that most of the information which we gained from the SAM's,
which had a direct bearing on using B-52's in Vietnam, we
gained through Israel. We could read a whole lot of the compu
terizing and so on of those SAM's. And therefore we were pre-
pared to give highly sophisticated equipment to Israel to
work against that Russian business in order to transfer the
knowledge to Vietnam.
So I told them, I said, yes, we have worked on questions
we have always helped them out technologically. And I think
I made the comment that any piece of gear we ever gave them,
that they turned it to a far greater sophisticated use
than we had, which was true in many instances.
And they would cannibalize, and we would get the product.
so that this is clearcut, there was
9
10
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17
the nuclear one was very clearly stated to him, that the injec-
18
19
tion of Mann into the story had a certain significance of its
own.
20
20
21
22
But there was no
no attempt to lead him on regarding the nuclear one, because
And I think Wells will bear me out very early on this,
that the injection of that could not be magic, it had to come
from somebody who is in the intelligence service. I mean that
23
element
--
and if this story without the introduction
NW 5093 "Docid:32423393 Page 42
had bee told, it would be just another of the many rumors
And Senator, there is something I forgot, and I want
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get back to it. After the Six-Day War the Soviets sent out
a barrage of propaganda in Arabic fto the Middle East from
Audio Moscow that the CIA
--
and then mentioned Bill Harvey,
who was working for us, and whom I had put in touch with the
5
Israelis during the Cuban business
6
Morris,
7
had met on a ship with
Chief of the British Intelligence, who had a back-
ground in the war with the Israelis, and had met there and pre-
8
pared and carried out all the strategic part of the Six-Day
9
10
11
12
War. And this is all PFIS. And there was a tremendous pike
of Soviet materials
cause it is directed
obviously they knew.
the Middle East in Arabic, and which
they never got much into our media, be-
13
They used Harveys) nam
instead of my name, because pro-
14
15
fessionally we were very close and more important,
I had introduced Harvey as the only officer to the Israeli op-
16
erational people on the Cuban business.
And, therefore,
17
it showed they had knowledge of Harveye
S
and so on.
18
The query then raised was whether
penetration was
19
20
20
21
22
23
that if you
I said that article, false as it is, with the
246
many things injected in it
--
I will be very frank with you,
here or was it in Israel.
Mr Kirbow. Did you express any concern to Mr.
Szulc about the use of Dr. Mann's name in this article?
Not Dr. Mann's name. My expression was
Mr. Angleton.
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I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story of
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these two journalists was so implausable, and I looked
2
to Ben a few times
G
and I know him well
dat w
and he had
3
absolutely a stoney expression, no expression on his face.
4 And this was something very, very queer, and the whole thing
9
5
was initiated by him. And that was why I asked Mr. Szulc,
6
did he come you or did you come to him.
Senator Baker. Did he come to you?")
Mr. Schwarz. He came to us.
Senator Tower. Let me ask you one specific question,
yes or
no.
Did you confirm to Szule that during the late fifties
subsequent to the Suez War that the CIA made available to the
Israeli Government technical assistance and the availability
of one or more distinguished nuclear scientists or physicists
for the purpose of developing atomic weapons?
Mr. Angleton. That is completely false.
Mr. Aaron Mr. Angleton, did you confirm or deny that
to Mr. Szulc?
Mr. Angleton. I am stating that I never made any such
statement And I stayed off of the nuclear business
Mr. Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn't deny,
is that correct?
23
Mr. Angleton.
24
25
It is very difficult for me to respond
that, because after all, this was a fast-moving discussion
covering an awful lot of subject. And furthermore, in the
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back of my mind was the fact that we had problems with
the Israelis in the nuclear field.
Mr. Aaron. What problems were those?
Mr. Angleton. They were very sensitive problems.
And
I don't think that they really shed any light on things that
you are talking about here.
Mr. Aaron. Do you recall a conversation with me and
Mr. Schwarz in which, in discussing this same matter, you
obligation to either confirm or deny
Yes,
know I used that phrase. There
was a denial. And I think hat Wells would second the fact
that there was a denial But when I got down to a lot of the
other questioning, mys thinking was to try to lead him around
back into the meeting with Hersh, and lead him back to this
source that had to do with Sidney Gottlieb, and so on.
9
said you felt under
10
this story with Mr. Szulc?
11
Mr. Angleton.
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22
Senator Tower. Are you saying in effect, then, that
any questions he raised with you about the transfer of
visual material or deeper technology, or manpower, for that
matter, to the Israeli Government, was couched in circumlocutry
terms of some kind?
Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way.
23
24
22
Senator Tower. That you got no direct questions
that sort?
Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, Senator. When
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I left there
and I think this is a very important
Point
first, I will have to explain we went to the restaurant, he
3 invited us to the restaurant, he was insistent on it. And we
4
went there. And here in the restaurant the entire discussion
5
6
7
was a recapitulation by him, in a restaurant that was fairly
full of people. Hersh was a person who had requested a secret
meeting in Wells'house, and then proceeded in a restaurant to
regurgitate thi entire matter.
8
9
Senator Tower.
Which restaurant was it?
10
Mr. Angleton.
It was the Sea Catch.
11
Senator Baker.
you ever have any impression that
12
it might be recorded, is that what you are driving at?
13
14
Mr. Angleton. I don't know.
mind. I looked at him, and he sort of
The thought crossed my
he could hide a lot
15
of things.
16
And so we got back to Wells' house. And it was very
17
late. And he tried to get me to come back to his place. And
18
I told him I just wouldn't do it. And that is how the thing
19
broke
20
21
Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, in your long relationship and
Position with the Agency, did you ever express your concern to
22 anyone out there that you thought this might have been
setup by a foreign source, or from internally?
Mr. Angleton.
25
Mr. Kirbow.
What might be a setup?
That this whole Szulc interview, story and
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everything else.
Mr. Angleton.
I never discussed this with anybody
the Agency until we had this lunch.
Senator Baker. Do you suspect that now?
Angleton. I do not
Hip and
I don't know what to suspect,
because I don't have access to files And I think one has
7
to review a
of material. I think one has to review
8
Szulc's files.
9
Mr. Miller.
spoke of that earlier, you described
10
it as a dossier.
11
12
13
first one, who made
Mr. Angleton. Well I think there is a file on it, a
security file. I think he was one of the journalists, the
reputation for blowing the whole Bay of
14
Pigs, and so on. And I think the fact that he is foreign-
15
born, and the allegations and so
And so the Bureau has
16
a similar file
17
And many of these files are created
they get to be accredited to the Pentagon, and therefore a
and
18
routine security check is made.
19
Schwarz. Are you aware
of any
surveillance of
20 Mr. Szulc?
21
Mr. Angleton. No.
22
2.
Mr. Schwarz. Past surveillance?
Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I am not aware of it
As I say, I don't think I have ever seen his file for five
or
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
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friend
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Mr. Kirbow. In your official capacity in the CIA you never
had any occasion to cross Mr. Szulc's trail or consider him
a person
Mr. Angleton. I separated him once in a fight with a
mine.
Mr. Kirbow. But nothing in an official capacity?
Mr. Angleton. No.
8
Mr. Miller.
me ask another question on this
9
file matter.
10
11
12
Yousaid that to your knowledge there were files on Mr.
Szulc. Were there files on other newspapermen?
Mr. Angleton. Yes there are files on other newspaper-
13
men.
Mr. Miller. And other Americans
Mr. Angleton A lot of them.
Senator Baker.
14
15
16
17
he say
WE UN
18
19
Hersh wrote a story about
xxp dan
what did
7,000 files. Was that right or wrong?
Mr. Angleton. I think it would be many more. I have
never counted them.
Senator Baker. How many? A hundred thousand a million'
Mr. Angleton. Well, when you consider all visa checks
20
20
21
22
23
Sof American sponsors and so on
--
this thing on all of
and we do 500,000 visa checks on foreigners
and the question
is a question of the gradual deterioration of our efficienc
because our staff was cut in half, and we had the problems
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of the Watergate, and we had all of these things. And
great deal of this stuff was there, but it wasn't being pro-
Ressionally worked upon.
Senator Baker. You have mentioned the Watergate twice,
Mr. Angleton.
Can you shed any light on that period in the Agency's
life, the impact that the Watergate investigation had or any
involvement of the Agency in any of the so-called
8
9
Watergate affairs?
10
Mr. Angleton.
Of the Agency itself?
11
Senator Baker.
12
Mr. Angleton.
anybody connected with it.
I am sorry, sir, that is a debatable
13
question there, and I want
get it accurate.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
33
23
What was that again?
Senator Baker, I don't want to narrow it. I want to make
it broad.
Mr. Angleton. I want to make sure I understand you.
Senator Baker. There are two parts of the question.
One, do you know of any Agency involvement of those who were
working in the working with the AGency in the Watergate,
in your break-in or the preparation for the cover-up or the
attempted cover-up?
Mr. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not.
24 by that I am separating the midnight channel 26 things and the
newspapers.
I know Jim McCord extremely well.
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Senator Baker.
Are you aware of the letters the
McCord wrote to the DCI after the Watergate suggesting how
you could avoid having this blamed on the Agency
Angleton. I am aware of what was in the press.
And Paul Nabami recently died who wrote those letters, and
it made great sense to me, and I had personal. relationships
beyond an official relationship.
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Senator Baker
He wrote two
Gaynor and three to
9
Helms.
10
Mr. Angleton. I didn't know
11
12
13
14
Senator Baker. I believe so.
Mr. Angleton. In any event, I can say that Gaynor's
connection, because he had great trust in Gaynor and he
was a very stubborn man and he left the AGency on conviction,
15
I assume, or troubles in the Office of Security.
16
Senator Baker In connection with Watergate?
17
Mr. Angleton. He left much earlier.
18
Mr. Miller. He being McCord?
19
Mr. Angleton. Yes.
20
21
22
23
Mr. Miller. Why did he leave?
M
Angleton. I don't know. And I was really surprised
that he didn't come by and say goodbye.
Senator Baker. Was he a prominent official at the
24 Agency?
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Mr. Angleton.
He was not.
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Senator Baker.
Did he have a prominent responsibility?
Mr. Angleton. He was a man that had a very difficult
case abroad, which meant that it had to be buried, no leakages.
And used him twice, and one was a pretty lengthy use of him.
4
5
And he
followed instructions to the letter.
He strayed on the
6
one. And it is not important. It is just something that
7
he did something that wasn't very wise.
8
Senator Baker
Doyou know
he went into the Watergate
9
Complex?
10
Mr. Angleton. I
can't understand it, because I would
11
say it was ideological with him.
There wasn't any difficulty
12
in understanding his views on a given subject.
13
Senator Baker. The equipment that was used, I am told,
14
was a fairly primitive sort for that sort of operation.
15
Does that agree with your appraisal
him?
16
Mr. Angleton.
That is what I read.
And that surprised
17
me also, because as a rule
let me put
this way, what
18
I am saying is, it was the Soviets who made
allegation
19
that in a certain country very close to us they were using
20
21
22
23
a laser beam on a window of the Minister of Defense, and
acquiring everything.
So, instead of using anybody in the clandestine side, I
took McCord and the group and sent them to that country for
six or seven weeks to work on it. So, McCord has great
knowledge of the
And
he knows the counter electronics.
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to know that you have got to know the other.
Senator Baker. He was familiar with the most exotic
source of intelligence gathering?
Mr. Angleton. Precisely.
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And that is why I can
understand
papers are correct in what they have stated,
I mean,
if the
though many
the sources were people who also sell electronic equipments
Senator Baker.
9
the original subject.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
I don't want to lead you too far away from
But I would be interested in knowing what
if any information you can give us about the Oswald situation.
For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it have
a file on Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more
than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they
have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission
through Mr. Raymond Rocca, who is my deputy.
And then there is a lot of undigested material that was
brought out after the Warren Commission.
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
18
19
Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry?
Or do you
20
have any opinion as
to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent?
21
Mr. Angleton.
22
23
Yes, I have a very strong opinion. I know
the time factor, I will try to shorten this.
But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should
24
24
not be
that there should be a statement to the effect that
25
the Commission, in the life of the Commission
on
that these are
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the conclusions on the available evidence. But given the fact
that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which is under
the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of
Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future
generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the
door, that it would really mean the investigation would be
pursued.
Senator Baker. John McCone, as I remember, was
queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of
9
10
certain people, including Oswald.
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Mr. Angleton.
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Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko.
Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that
time to McCone or other wise that the bona fides of that
Soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in cate-
gorical terms?
Mr. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Commission
we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko
going under the record, on a question of bona fides.
Senator Baker. Why?
Because we didn't regard him as bona fides.
Senator Baker. What did you regard him as?
Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who
23
was sent to mutilated the
leads. of very high grade Soviets
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whom we had acquired prior to that.
Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the Kennedy
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assassination?
Mr Angleton. Relating to assassination, KGB agents,
VASSALL
Vassily, the British agents, and many agents in France, a
alleged penetration in the U.S., et cetera.
Senator Baker.
And did McCone accept your advice?
Mr. Angleton. He did, except that I understood that
a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this
Schorz
interview recently with Shor, I called his executive officer
Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever
alleged to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides?
And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too
And he said, well, I will give it to you.
And I never heard from him since. But McCone was a man
whowould not have made this statement. He has total recall.
Senator Baker. I am sure he does.
12
well, et cetera, and don't
give me that stuff.
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Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was
infact a Soviet agent?
Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way.
I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too
many leads that were never followed up. There's too much in-
formation that has been developed later.
For example, in 1966, in a Soviet book on Cuba there is
a photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograph
Aucas
V
of a man called Alexiev, real name Shettov, KGB, with the first
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Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was
the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When the Mexican
police arrested Castro as a student, they found in his note-
books the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico.
Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for
Soviet citizens abroad. It is a bible, 75 percent KGB staff.
Photograph of Brezhnev, Castro, Alexiev, Leontov.
Now, we had a double agent after the assassination,
who made a number of allegations that he acquired from the
Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was a superior of Leontov.
Now, after the assassination Khrushchev
was in Cairo on a state
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visit. And he pulled an American journllist aside, and totally
out of context, expressed the view that there was a con-
spiracy, and it involved the Right Wing of the U.S.
15
The thingwas totally out of context.
And he planted
16
17
18
their personnel for
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20
under Johnson was to succeed in power.
21
this bug in this fellow's ear.
WE had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of
six months on working on the assassina-
tion, and had concluded that an American Right Wing business
And I am not talking
about petty informants. I am talking about men whowere ascer-
22
tained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet elite.
23
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never
up.
And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have
One is because of lack of manpower.
been followed
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Two, the general problem in Washington and the government
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that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the
intelligence community of a counter-intelligence nature.
I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in
4
high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman or somebody,
to
5
6
7
whom you can go with the information and talk to the Soviets and
FB1
pull the bureau and ourselves and everybody together.
Senator Baker. Could you give us at your leisure a memor-
andum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might
Mr. Angleton.
It would not be a pleasant one. I have
submitted and I don't think it is breaking any confidence
such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted
B
9
be constituded?
10
O-
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And my whole plea
a personal letter to the Vice Prsident.
was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and
beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as
Vice President he had a rare opportunity the first time these
matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's death,
and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the --
counter-intelligence forces.
18
19
20
And this
21
blow.
22
added thing of Hersh has about dealt the final
23
23
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22
ere I hat
to interrupt you, and I also hate
NGR
you this question, but can you make an evaluation of
the effectiveness of the Agency, in particularly its counter-
intelligence activities
his time?
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Mr. Angleton.
Very, very poor.
I have put in there, and I think it is very conservative,
3 that it has put us back 20 years. But I think in the eyes of
q
5
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8
every intelligence service in the Western World, where we
have had the leadership and we pulled everything together, and
where they have looked to us for guidance and for traces and
for understanding, that we have lost all of our prestige.
Senator Baker. Two more quick questions, and I will
yield my turn.
Do you know of or have any substantial information about
Russian KGB. activities in the U.S. such as the infiltration
of Congressional offices?
13
Mr. Angleton.
There
whole history of information
14
that relates to the past and to modus operandi and to targets,
1.5
and so on. And that is inclusive of
Of all the American life,
16
and in particularly visits to the Soviet Union, and so on.
17
Thereare communications intelligence more sensitive which was
18
broken during and after the war, KGB communications,
New York
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25
to Moscow, and Washington to Moscow, et cetera. And there were
cryptnyms given. And it runs into hundreds of thousands of
messages, of which a small percentage have been broken.
And they relate to Hiss and many things. And most of
those cases will not be subject to prosecution, because they
would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems
there. We have worked on it, and we brought the British, the
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Canadians, and New Zealanders and Australians, because we have
this common denominator of the military and other agreements
where they do share common information.
And there are many unresolved cases.
Renator Baker. Do you know of any cases, though, deal-
ing with penetration of a Congressional office?
Mr. Angleton. No. But my statement doesn't mean anything,
because I can assure you that it is the last thing I have
been concerned with in some months. But I have seen these
allegations in the paper, I wouldnt be surprised. And this is
the second time in my
or the third time, I have ever
been here. To come here and see how this whole set up is is
quite a shock.
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phone conversations?
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ife,
Senator Baker. What about communications intercept,
Congressional conversations, are you aware of any methodical
effort by the Russians or the KGB vis-a-vis Congressional tele-
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SA
Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. I think I am assuming now
that the people in NSR are correct, they usually are, that the
telephone, the formal telephone company traffic apparently,
without the knowledge of the caller, is quickly shifted to
microwave. That runs into hundreds of thousands of telephone
calls
Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the
penetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And it
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is a fingernail, arm and body affair. It takes an awfully
long time before you finally get into a code room and
place where you can do something securely.
What I am trying to say is that if you get enough
depth on any target or any installation you begin to know much
more about that installation than anybody who occupies it.
Senator Baker. If I were trying to confirm the rumor
that the KGB had the capability and did in fact record as many
simultaneous telephone conversations,
9
as 30 or 40 thousa
10
mostly related to governmental officials, and transmitted them
11
12
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14
my view correct. And I would say.
15
16
Chief of NSA who
now,
17
18
to the Soviet Union, and kept individual files on them, would
you confirm that for me?
Mr. Angleton. I would state that that is absolutely in
that the man who technically
could respond to that would be Dr Lou Tordello, a retired
I think, still a consultant there.
And he is probably amore sophisticated person to relate the pro-
ducts of NSA to the realities of the ques tion you asked.
19
And I think the other point I would ma
is simply that
20
what their KGB has, which we never will have,
is manpower.
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22
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In other words, we have to narrow the size of the target some
day the way the British did, and expel that 105,
Our State Department says that what happened in
England has no relevancy here, because we have had a different
setup, because among those expelled men who served in Washington,
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and who weren't in the U.K., were those who were on the
Anglo-American Desk, which meant that there was an
American whom they had handled in Washington who had been
transferred to London where the case officer follows the agent.
And that statement, official statement, was put out with-
6
out any consultation with the Bureau or ourselves.
7
are living
8
9
10
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12
So, we
dream world here in terms of Soviets, and time
fallacio
Placious
is short, it is detente, and it is all the fallation kind of
discussions and arguments one hears on the subject. We have
come to detente for information through operations and our
understanding of it, not wishful thinking.
as done to
And our views are shared by professionals all through
the Western World. And they laugh at the U.S. in terms of what
detente has done. But what its
the intelligence
services, or to the FBI, the FBI is only a shadow of what it
once was. And so there isn't any real internal security protec
13
14
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17
tion.
18
The Bureau's problems
19
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20
and I had
case of a KGB
officer threatening one of the people we are dealing with
in the Mid-west, he was from the United Nations, a young
21
KGB fellow. And I asked the Bureau,
was he a
22
And they said, we put him to bed.
2
?
They didn't put him to bed, he was where he wasn'
supposed to be. And I tried to get the department to go in with
him. And I am still up there.
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on two or three points. And I said, I am exercising my rights
under the CIA, and so on.
But he said, I have got to run, and it was about five
past five. And I asked him if he understood in effect what
he was doing, the implications.
And he said that is the responsibility, I would assume.
And I said, what about Mr. Meyer, and building up to be
our successors?
9
And we were about the same age
And he introduced
10
Meyer over the years into more sensitive operations, and all
I
11
the foreigns with whom we worked agents and what not. And
12
the reaction to him universally was, he was to be the successor
13
And he said, that is something I will have to negotiate.
14
And I said, what do you mean negotiate?
15
And he said, we will talk about it next
16
So, I got up and shook hands with him and walked out.
nash
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Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone having electronic
surveilance conversational recording in the Oval Office other,
than the Presidential (?) capability?
Mr. Angleton Never.
Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone who ever penetrated
the Presidential apparatus?
Mr. Angleton. Never, Senator
What has come out about the Joint Chiefs and all that
stuff in the paper
Senator Baker. I am speaking of anyone who might have
penetrated the taping capability in the Oval Office?
Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that
Senator Baker asked you about Oswald?
a picture of
What about the pictures, one of which was
Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's
pocket when he was arrested in Mexico?
10
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[13]
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and
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N
21
was
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Mr. Angleton.
There is an allegation.
Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between that
picture and that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald?
Mr. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico
to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the Soviets.
Mr. Schwarz. And was Leontov then in Mexico, or
Mr. Angleton. I don't know, because the double agent
whom we believe was actually controlled by the Soviets,
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Byetkov, gave us information which we would now regard as
private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any
implication with Oswald.
Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources
the information that the KGB had spent some six months
Mr. Angleton. We only acquired the hard stuff of six
months and what they did from one man who was very high in the
7
KGB.
8
9
00
10
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12
13
Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was,
when did you acquire the information?
Mr. Angleton.
1967, or thereabouts.
Mr. Schwarz. So it was after the Warren Commission had
reached its conclusions?
Mr. Angleton. Did you have any such information during
the life of the Warren Commission?
Mr. Angleton. I think the only thing was the Nosenko
Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom?
Mr. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived
at a very brief time after the assassination as
a KGB defector
14
15
16
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19
Senator Baker.
And he is the one that you think now as
20
a planted agent?
21
Mr. Angleton.
Yes.
They thought he was
sent on a
22
mission.
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Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom?
224
Mr. Angleton.
Suppressed from the Warren Commission.
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Mr. Schwarz. You said that Nosenko, one of the reasons
1
you suspected Nosenko was
a double agent, or a planted agent,
2
3
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5
rather, was because he was saying things that were contra-
dictory to some other high quality person who theretofore had
been giving you information before Nosenko came to this
country?
6
Mr. Angleton.
That is right.
7
Mr. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information
8
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relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality
person had given you?
Mr. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little
more sense.
In December 1961 a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected
He has never been in service,
to us. His name is Golitzen.
except Jack Anderson came out with an erroneous account of it,
alleging that he had stated there was
a plot to assassinate
16
17
Nixon. He did not make such a statement.
Mr. Kirbow. Do you think this statement should be on
18
the record?
19
Mr. Angleton.
I don't mind it being on the record after
20
20
the Anderson article.
They have been looking for him.
21
22
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Now, his is probably without any question the most major
defection since World War II as far as Soviet intentions,
Soviet organization, and Soviet operations are concerned.
And the reason, among others, that it was
so important was
25
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he had decided to defect many years prior to December of 1961,
1
if the opportunity ever arrived.
And therefore he used those
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3
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many years breaking down the compartmentalization of the KGB
in order to acquire the kind of information which would be most
valuable to the US, and to our allies.
Therefore he refused many assignemtns abroad, but tried
to always remain in headquarters and get himself appointed to
investigative commissions and other things of this sort which
Among other things
୫
would get into everybody elses's business.
9
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brag about their achievements.
he spent many years in the training schools for people who
came back for six weeks from different parts of the world to
And he absorbed all of this
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information.
And among other things, he stated that he gave the
crytograms and circumstantial evidence of penetrations
throughout the West.
And then the Soviets rapidly transferred 300 of their
And as is normal in a case of
people after his defection.
this kind, the big problem is to write a damage report, which
means the whole service would come to a standstill.
objective would he to review all paper files and everything that
showed his initials. And you usually would have three
And the
22
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categories of information:
you would have information which
he definitely had knowledge of, and information which he did
24
not have knowledge of, and information which you are not
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ceratin about.
2
a
Now, when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant
Dunlop who was working in the National Security Agency and
committed suicide, if I am not mistaken we came to approxi-
mately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to,
And it is interesting to note
although he may not have had.
that after his assassination, in a search of the quarters,
7
8
the Bureay, or whoever did the search, found six of my letters
Syn
to NSA relating to information from Golitzen.
9
Senator Baker. Did you speak of the assassination?
10
Mr. Angleton.
What did you say?
11
Mr. Miller. Did you say Mr. Dunlop?
12
Mr. Angleton.
After his suicide.
I am sorry.
13
Mr.
Miller.
You used the term assassination.
14
Mr. Angleton.
I meant suicide.
15
16
17
Mr.
Angleton.
18
19
a plastic bag, as I recall, in the attic.
20
Mr. Miller. The word is interesting, because it is
charged, as you know, that he was assassinated.
Maybe I was thinking out loud or something
1h
In any event, the 1969 Golitzen reports to NSA were in
And there was
question of whether he passed them before or after.
a
21
Mr. Schwarz.
Now, what we were on was,
I was asking you,
22
you testified earlier
223
20
24
Mr. Angleton.
I just wanted to say Golitzen was
Goltz
So
enormous to the Western world because we immediately moved on
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those cases which were perishable, the French, the British,
And we had never had a second Chief
1
and ourselves, et cetera.
2
7
Director, which means the FBI type of Soviet, defector in our
lives, and all of this out of the blue, and no contact as in
Geneva six months after the defection of Golitzen.
5
Mr. Schwarz.
And the date is when in relations to the
6
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Kennedy assassination?
Mr. Angleton.
not a
Well, this was a contact, this was
defection. He came to us once for information prior to the
assassination.
10
And then in Moscow the Soviets
--
and I am not going
11
into a lot of names,
a member of the Second Chief Directorate,
12
13
1001
gave an American tourist a stack of documents from the Second
Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating to how they got
14
(blank)
15
5
and others of our agents, which showed
but they got
they didn't get them through a
two-headed source,
16
Pyblank)
it through a
on our side.
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So the leads rant into the thousands from Golitzen,
and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interro-
gation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in
And out of
turn would refresh his memory on other courses.
that came the finalization of the case of Philby, Burgess, and
other cases, and many cases in France and so on.
22
all that, the Vassily case in the British Admiralty, and some
23
24
25
Mr.
Kirbow.
Did Oswald show up at that time?
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Mr. Angleton.
No, not from Golitzén.
But when the assassination took place
2
Mr. Schwarz.
The Kennedy assassination?
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Mr. Angleton.
༥ ང ་
When the Kennedy assassination took place,
Golitz on called me immediately and stated that the modus
operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet
Union required that he go through processing by the 13th
Department of the KGB.
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Angleton.
Which is their assassination department?
Which is their assassination department,
which is called their Affairs for Executive Action.
9
10
11
And there are two reasons for it.
Number one was, to
12
find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have
13
had that would be of use to them.. And number two, whether it
14
15
was more valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army
for future activity.
16
Mr. Schwarz. of the nature of assassinations?
17
Mr. Angleton. of anything. . It could be sabotage,
or
18
intelligence, or whatever.
19
AND THIS WAS THE SOP on the dealing with military
20
defectors.
21
Now. when the Soviet Government turned over
to the US
22
23
all the documents that led to the interest regarding Oswald
stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating
24
processing by Department 13.
Then after the assassination
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Nosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow.
And in my view he would have never come back on the scene
CHEREPANOV
•
because they brought this Cheraponov thing in to have the locus
shifted from where we would have controls, in Geneva, to
1
Moscow where they would have all the controls.
And that would
5
be the Directorate.
And therefore they would have the direct
6
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11
means of counteracting and mutilating the leads and the
importance of Golitzen's defection.
But the tourist gave the documents to the American
The Charge insisted on
Embassy. And we photographed them.
giving them back to the Soviets on grounds that it would be
appropriate.
12
Mr. Schwarz.
13
These are not the official documents deal-
ing with Oswald but the documents that the man tried to pass
14
in Switzerland?
15
Mr. Angleton.
The Second Chief Directorate, he took all
16
17
of the documents out of the FBI Soviet section and gave them
to the tourist and we read how we got caught on things.
18
So there is the assassination.
Cheraponov allegedly
19
was chased to the Turkish border and shot.
And in my view
20
21
this is a myth, because in 1948 Cheraponov was stationed in
Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us, and at another time
22
tried to establish liaison and contact with the Birtish MI-6,
23
at a time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning
24
that the approach would have been under Philby in 1948, and
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then he reappears in the early 1960's as a member of the
Second Chief Directorate.
That is enough of Cherapanov.
But it is important only
from the Soviet point of view, the best laid plans fall apart.
And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have
seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and
tells us he wants to defect.
Mr. Schwarz. And he provided information which was
inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent?
9
Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his career
so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing
he tells us is that while he was in the Second Chief
Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went
over his desk. And his first story, as I recall it, was that
it was
two volumes or three volumes. And finally it went down
to one volume and a small sheaf of papers.
Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald
was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot, and
therefore couldn't get a hunting license, and a lot of stuff
17
18
19
20
of this sort.
21
And then on all of these outstanding leads
22
penetra-
23
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tions, of the French, the Americans, the British codes, bugging
--
Nosenko had
of the Embassy, all of these different sorts
something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads. And
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in the normal course of events, we might have put Golitzen in
contact with Nosenko, which may have meant the assassination
of Golitzen, because the whole approach of Nosenko was one
where logically you would bring them in and have two bodies,
one from the First Chief Directorate, that is, Golitzen, the
5
CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the
6
system, and therefore you would have a very strong balance
7
against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were
8
certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko.
And
10
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as far as I was concerned, if he was bona fide he would have
answered one way, and he did not answer that way. And they had
to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the
2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of
1959, presided over by Shelepin and attended by many members
of the Central Committee on the reorientation of the Soviet
Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence
16
operations has a political objective.
And this is a part of
17
18
-
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22
breaking compartmentation.
25
the process of de-Stalinization. And so when we took him
unwittingly chronologically through his career, he : omits
all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test
things, where their damage report would not show that Golitzón
had access, because it was part of his way of getting in and
And therefore they would have no
evidence that he had sufficient knowledge.
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Mr. Schwarz.
And so Nosenko looked funny to you, he
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looked wrong to you?
Mr. Angleton.
Absolutely.
Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you?
Mr. Angleton.
Precisely.
Mr. Schwarz. And among the information that he provided
to you was that Oswald was
a mental case and was a bad shot?
Mr. Angleton.
Right.
7
Mr. Schwarz.
8
Mr. Angleton.
And you had also received from Nosenko
570
I'M
Golitzen -- from Golitzon
information
9
10
11
that suggested the normal practice was for Department 13,
which had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assassina-
tions, to interview miltitary defectors.
And we had observed
12
that when the Russians transferred documents concerning
13
}
14
debriefing by Department 13.
15
Oswald, that there was no reference in there to any such
And another important part of
it is that there was a man who was handling George Blake from
16
17
London, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy.
returned he became head of the 13 Department, General Rodin.
And when he
18
But he was there under an alias as a civilian.
He was the
19
Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man.
Then
20
21
22
he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it.
Mr. Schwarz. And what was his connection with Oswald?
Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department
I mean, he had
23
13, and was head of Department 13 at a time
24
25
--
a long history in that, in other words, the prominence of
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Department 13 and this is a point I think I should make, that
the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination
department. The Soviets have always had an assassination
And
department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the
organization. People from the outside know very little about
People career-wise stay in there.
what goes on in that.
they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who in
And therefore it is an entirely
7
turn report to the Politboro.
8
sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action,
9
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KGB
12
an illegal sabotage or what,
whether it be sabotage
illegal directorate which is independent of the rest of the
nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and
infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war.
an
And of
13
course assassination, the assassination of Ukrainian leaders
14
in West Germany.
15
།
16
17
Mr. Schwarz. Do you recount that simply because it makes
more significant the absence of any reference to Oswald because
you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, or
18
did you recount it because there is a more direct connection
19
with Oswald?
20
Mr. Angleton.
This is related to what I told Mr. Dulles,
21
22
I thought it was absolutely wrong to close the door on the
life of the Commission, and instead there should be
23
that we are not in a position
24
23
a statement
that on the fact available to
us during the given period, these are our conclusions.
And
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then to spell out in detail Department 13 and its organization
'
--
and the burden of proof shigts.
But not only the burden
2
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of proof, but you never know when a worm goes into somebody's
And that bring you up on
head to defect from Department 13.
1
the entire story.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of
You have recounted the significance in your
Department 13.
mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in the
documentation on Oswald turned over by the Soviets to the US.
And you have recounted the strange nature of the information.
provided by Nosenko.
Mr. Angleton.
Correct.
Let me ask you another line of questions
13
about each one of these items.
As to the Nosenko information,
14
15
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16 F
19
ང
20
21
you stated that that information was suppressed from the
Warren Commission?
Mr. Angleton. The word suppression is probably not the
right word because, I will be very honest with you, I was
told
the other day that the information was given classified, and
it was given to Helms or somebody, or Mr. McCone, who passed
it as a classified document.
haven't seen it.
I have asked for it, but I
22
i
23
Mr. Schwarz.
Why did you say a moment ago that it was
suppressed?
24
Mr. Angleton.
Because I never knew where it went.
When
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I was sitting in the position as to where that information
would go, I was opposed to it. And my pfficial position was
that. And I ghought until relatively recently that it never
went.
And then all of a sudden they have declassified a lot of
stuff. And Mr. Rocha, who was the point of record of the
Agency's dealing with the Warren Commission, told me that
7
Nosenko stuff was the stuff they were declassifying.
8
Now, his
9
10
11
role was not one of the executive nature. Actually it was
simply because he was a great scholar and a great many other
things, and therefore he had the most catholic background to
handle something as eomplex as the Warren Commission, not in
exercising executive power, but working on behalf of the
Director and all the Directorates and everything pertaining
He is a tidy individual.
And in
fact Mr. Belin has made a great deal of use of him in the
Commission's business, and he is the one that had done all the
12
13
14
to the Warren Commission.
15
16
17
digging for the Commission, and so on,
on a whole series of
12
matters that I am not familiar with.
19
2
But my point to you and this is very difficult to
is that the question of Nosenko created a very
explain
21 #
22
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great division in the life of all counterintelligence as
bona fides, as in all questions of when you are dealing wi
double identification agents, there is always dispute.
to
with
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But let me just line up the order of battle here.
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Chief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man
1
was a provocation.
2
His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted
the fact that the man was a provocation.
Mr. Schwarz.
Do you mean provocation, or providing
.1
false information?
5
Mr. Angleton.
6
An Agent Provocateur.
I said he was false. My man said he was false. And it
isn't a parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and
S
analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And Golitzen,
who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in
Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in advance that
because of the enormity of his defection they would send a
provocateur into the West to destroy and mutilate his leads.
So it was a question of awaiting, you might say, who
knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko.
Now, since then the Chief of the Soviet Division who is
no longer there, has recanted in a way
---
the Inspector
General went into all this he is today the NIO dealing in
Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer on Soviet
Affairs. And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named
two Admirals Bagley,
Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the
and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and is now
in Belgium in private life. And I can go all the way through
these other people who have been dispersed.
24
25
But the record
will clearly reflect that the preponderance of all individuals
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was that Nosenko was sent on a mission.
Mr. Schwarz. And provided false information?
Now, is it your current understanding that what was
provided to the Warren Commission was the raw infomration.
brought by Nosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided
with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you
have recounted that he was providing false information?
Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commission was
ever faced with the issue of the internal issues of Golitzen
or Nosenko.
Mr. Schwarz. You first said that the information was
suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no,
it is your understanding now
Mr. Angleton. Well, the word suppression isn't the right
word, I said. One went to argue the matter and it was agreed
15
by higher authority that the information shouldn't be
--
16
Senator Mathias.
There was a value judgment made as
to
17
the usefulness of the material?
18
and not to do what the
19
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-
Mr. Angleton. That is right
Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which eas to give it
prominence and have it come out as an official part of the
record and documents and articles, and so on.
Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the
information was provided?
Mr. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out in
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public.
Mr. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the
Commission?
Mr. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion.
Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time
that at leat certain experts withing the Agency thought it
was false information?
Mr. Angleton. I think, as I understand it now, that in
spite of our feelings, either Helms or McCone made a
presentation of it.
Mr. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings,
certain experts thought that it was false?
Mr. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know.
Mr. Schwarz. What about the information derived from
Golitzen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the
documents provided by the Soviet Union were, I think you put
16
17
18
it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not
include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was
information provided to the Warren Commission?
that
19
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22
23
24
Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. But all
I can say there is this, to be realistic. No one would expect
the Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents,
secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their
agent. And I say, I can go all the way back through history,
the way they falsified the official record, they had it with
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the Italians in 1923, Constatinople, and cases on diplomatic
issues, the complete thing was fabricated, and so on. And 1.
there is no way of testing them, the security is such that
they can't be tested.
So we are not under any illusions of expecting them to
state that he went through the 13 Department, which asked him
the following questions.
Mr. Schwarz. So you say that as far as that matter goes
there is no possibility that anybody on the Warren Commission
was fooled?
Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't think anybody was. I
Packa
didn't follow the Warren Commission, Rocha followed it, and he
10
11
12
was running over there all the time, and so on.
13
14
15
that as
16
Mr. Kirbow. Let me ask you. There would have been no
reason why anyone on the Warren Commission would have known
a matter of everyday business that they did in fact
run every defector through Department 137
17
Mr. Angleton. I don't think we ever told them.
But you
18
see, Allen Dulles
--
that is what I am coming to
11
I used to
19
20
see Allen Dulles regularly, and I was an advisor officially
to him on a lot of headaches, and I dida lot of leg work for
21
him.
And I regarded him as a very personal friend.
And I am
22
Executor of his papers, among other things.
But the point I am coming to is, to try to give him
guidance of what the jungle is around here in terms of the
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FBI's position and Mr. Hoover's, and so on, so that he would
be more sensitive to the things, no longer being Director,
that were no longer germain to his position on the matter.
Mr. Schwarz. Was there a connection between the FBI and
Oswald?
Mr. Angleton. I don't know the full FBI story. I know
there was a tremendous flap in the Bureau. And one of the best
7
men they had in my view is a professional a man called Burt
8
Turner, who I understand just got his law degree. And Burt
9
10
Turner was one of the finest men on Soviet KGB activities in
the US, one of the analyzts. And he was in the Washington
11
Field Office.
And it is my understanding
and this is
12
basically hearsay, but from pretty good sources
--
that Burt
13
Turner was handling the Oswald ore related matters at the time
14
the President made the trip down to Texas, and that there was
15
some confusion that the Bureau had not turned over, or had
16
not taken enough initiative in turning over, all the informa-
17
18
19
20
21
22
tion on Oswald to the local police. I had been told that
there was a black mark put against Turner's name, and that he
confronted Mr. Hoover and stated he was not going to permit,
or have it be known to his children, that his negligence was
responsible for the death of the President.
And he was pretty
forceful about his position. And as a result, this was
24
2%
expunged or something to that effect.
And that is the reason
25
DOCIUTOZZITY
he went to the Washington Field Office instead of staying in
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Headquarters.
And then he retired. And I think his retirement had
something to do with this fact.
But this is all by virtue of hindsight with the thousands
of cases. And I cannot see any Western intelligence service
seizing on facts that Oswald will return to the US, and then
going and saying, we will get all of this, and we will send
it to Texas.
What I am trying to say, is that the difference in their
system. With the manpower and the computers, which are mainly
And
we know enought about the Second Chief Directorate and the
controls, the total controls, to know that if a Soviet returned
automatically, to any part of the Soviet Union he went, there
would be a dossier that would go, and there would be also an
operational directive to put him on tap, check his mail, to
do the following, and so on and to put an agent near him.
There wouldn't be any leaking anything in the air on that.
There would be total encapsulation of that individual until
10
ours, and whatnot, a situation of that sort is automatic.
11
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it was ceratin beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was not sent
back as an agent.
Mr. Schwarz. A moment ago in talking about the line-up,
as I think you put it, of views on Nosenko, you recounted the
views of a number of people. And you said that one person
23
24
25
had changed his mind or recanted subsequently. And you made
a reference in that connection to an Inspector General's
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report. What was that report?
80
Mr. Angleton. At one stage in all of this
2
much later, after all the dust settled
- -
10
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and it was
Helms got the
Inspector General, who had come from the clandestine side of
our business, to institute -- I don't like to use the word
inspection, it is too authoritative
ways www
to go into the Nosenko
matter and see if there is anything there that he should know,
7
because Helms is fully aware of the split on this whole
8
question of bona fides, and it bothered him, because I had
9
brought him in touch with Golitzen, and he was fully aware of
10
11
12
13
14
all my activities, and travels and so on.
And so this person who was chosen began to interview
everybody and reopen the whole thing.
safe leads of stuff if you really got into all of the Golitzen
and Nosenko and the other things that pertained, as I pointed
I mean,
there were 21
15
16
17
out. to the Warren Commission, to the asininity of what has
happened, of 27 years of experience of myself and my two
colleagues, that these are the facts, that there are 20 cases
18
19
Mr. Schwarz. You said Warren Commission.
You mean
20
Rockefeller?
21
Mr. Angleton.
Excuse me,
Rockefeller.
22
23
11
There are 20 some odd cases that a counterintelligence
officer in our busienss should know before he even begins to
2.
get his feet wet.
25
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Now, when Dr. Schlesinger came in, and I started hearing
all of these things of manaement by objectives, and synergistic
and a lot of other things, being applied to the art forms which
3
we had developed, I finally got so frustrated that I thought
A
I would take him up on his own thing. So I got statisticians
5
in to take all the safes and figure out the linear footage of
6
every safe drawer, all the way on through, and to computerize
7
how long it would take the normal case officer to
come up to
8
this elemental stage of being able to be launched.
9
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people back and forth and all the rest of it.
16
anybody in that job as
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That was sort of a preparatory business.
figured it out and they said it would take 22 man years, we
meant that if we were 100 percent incorrect, it would be 11
man years. And that was simply to apprise Schlesinger, and
Colby, who had never been in counterintelligence, of what all
this problem was about. They had the idea of transferring
And I nver chose
[guest]
a rule who had either been in the FBI
or had not had very rich experience in counterintelligence.
And normally I kept outside leaks to anybody in the business
I had men who stayed with me for 11 years, Rocca was with
me for 31 years, even though they went into operational situa-
tions abroad and returned, and so on.
And I say this to you, because here was an IG, and
Inspector General, who had had a very lofty mission in Germany
where we used to have two or 300 new people
And they
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Mr. Schwarz. Was this Mr. Ermine?
82
1
Mr. Angleton. No, he was never brought.
2
Stewart
4
He was Gordon
and he is retired -- a very able man, and a fine
executive. And I mean this sincerely. He is one of the
really top-notch men.
5
But he as to undertake this burden.
And it was a farce
6
in terms
so he would talk to people and get their views
7
and so on.
8
9
who was then stationed in Paris
10
I never read the report
11
When I went to the former Chief of the Soviet Division,
Que expe
and this is only hearsay,
the former Chief of the Soviet
Division stated, when I look back it, perhaps I have given
12
too much latitude to my subordinates.
And he wouldn't say yea
13
14
or nay, but he withdrew his very firm statement of the past
NODENRO
that this man was an agent provocateur.
15
Mr. Schwarz. Did the review concern in any way the
16
17
18
19
handling of the matter with the Warren Commission?
Mr. Angleton.
No,
not to my knowledge. I mean, this
may be something. I don't think I have evern seen the review
in fact, I don't know whether the review was ever put in
20
the paper.
But I mention it simply so that you don't get the
21
idea that it was just the CIA staff that had this view.
CIA Staff
This
22
23
was a view that was shared by numbers of people who had
dealings with Nosenko.. And I think the greatest authority of
24
all is
Goltz zen himself, who was in the KGB, and who knew
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everything. And he lived there for 16 or 18 years of his life.
Earlier you mentioned that you put Mr.
Mr. Schwarz.
Harvey in touch with the Israeli's during the Cuban business.
And we have had a lot of testimony about Mr. Harvey, so we
are moderately well aware of his activities.
Mr. Angleton. I am sorry.
Mr. Schwarz. We know who Mr. Harvy is and we have had a
fair amount of testimony about some of the things he had done.
the connection between him and the Israeli's during
8
What was
9
the Cuban business?
10
Mr. Angleton. I will put it very briefly
--
business. I guess I should ask first, what do you mean by the
What
11
Senator Tower. What is the Cuban business specifically?
12
Mr. Schwarz.
The witness used the expression Cuban
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Cuban business, and second, was is the connection between Mr.
Harvey and the Israelis on this matter?
Mr. Kirbow. You are really asking, what is the
importance of putting him in touch with them in relation to
Cuba?
Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey was put in charge of taking
over the Cuban business, the Cuban business being the
Clandestine Services activity into Cuba. Now, what struck me,
not having had any part of the Bay of Pigs, because of
differences with Bissell, was that it seemed to me that both
the Cubans and the Soviets knew everything that was being
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planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and
it was foredoomed.
Mr. Schwarz.
Through the exile community in Miami?
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Mr. Angleton.
No, through Soviet agents and everything,
and so on, there was no cover or second investigation or
anything.
So when Bill took over in the Cuban business, then I
decided that since we were very close friends that I would
try to help him out by getting him a source totally unknown
And I went to the Israeli's. And I had them
assign a man to Havana, whom I happened to know very well.
2
He was born in Bulgaris.
He can speak Russian and the Balkan
countries' languages. He is today their senior man on Soviet
intelligence.
He was a young officer in the days I am speak-
ing of. And he was sent to Havana, which meant that here he
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to everybody.
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Dick Helms.
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Mr. Schwarz.
McCone?
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Mr. Angleton. I can't remember whether
yes, McCone
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was
and the communications were from him in a one time
pattern, I mean total security, from Havana to Tel Aviv, to
me, and from me to Bill. And no one knew of his existence
or his identify, except Harvey and myself, and of course,
23
would have know, but he wouldn't have been interested.
What I am trying to say is, he knew.
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Mr. Kirbow.
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Mr. Angleton. He knew, because even before I went into
this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and
so on.
And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio
going to be put into Havana, and let somebody say we need a
radio in Havana, or drop some men in. And then the point is,
I get the radio to Tel Aviv, and to Havana and then put it
someplace, and then tell him, you go to such and such a place
1 and find the radio, and then have some men come in and call
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some men to make contact, with the view that I couldn't trust
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the whole setup.
So for many a long period of time this worked perfectly.
This individual established his cover. They only had two or
three people in the Embassy there. He would go to a
Hungarian restaurant where the Soviet officers would also go.
And he would spot one of the waiters or a headwater who was
Jewish and it wouldn't be long before he would say, you are
from the Israeli Embassy, and pretty soon one thing led to
another, and his production was without question the greatest
production there was.
Well, it got so complex in names and geography, and so on)
that is when I came to the point that I brought Harvey
together secretly with this individual, the only person I put
in touch was an Israeli, in this context. So later on the
Soviets come out with the statement, is Bill Harvey on the
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with.
It looks big today to you, but when you think of what
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the Agency's efforts were at that time in the Miami base with
all the boats and the biggest Navy in the world, and all the
rest, a little thing involving one man was not a thing that
you went up and made a fuss to Mr. McCone about.
Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Mr. Harvey pretty well, was
he someone you knew?
Mr. Angleton. Very well indeed. In fact, I just called
him the other day, his mother died.
Mr. Schwarz. I heard that.
Did you know anything about his use of underworld
figures in connection with
Mr. Angleton. I know the allegations.
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Mr. Schwarz. At the time did you know of that?
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Mr. Angleton. I only know one incident.
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Mr. Schwarz. Okay.
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Mr. Angleton.
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Simply the Bureau, the FBI, ran a
surveillance. And Sam Papich, who was the Liaison Officer
of the FBI, who is now Head of the Criminal Commission in
/ Mexico, was at my house around 10 o'clock at night. And the
Washington Field Office or Headquarters Miami located Papich
at my house. They were absolutely boiling, because they had
surveiled the Mafia all the way from California to National
Airport, and he had got off the plane and was met by a man who
was the physical description of Bill to a tee. And they
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thought it was Bill. And they were checking with Papich.
what to do.
Mr. Schwarz. That was Mr. Roselli, was it?
Mr. Angleton. I think it was.
Mr. Kirbow. And the Bill you speak of here is Bill
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Mr. Angleton.
Bill Harvey:
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So I could get the gist of Bill's questions to them.
And
I told him I made a motion to put his hand over the phone
--
and not to let them discuss it. And I said, tell them not to
do anything until they hear from you.
And that is what he told them, he said, stand down on
this and I will be back in touch.
And then Bill told me the whole story in detail of how
he had gone over from California and followed him in this
thing, and how Harvey had put him in his car and he went off.
(
Mr. Schwarz. That was in 1973 shortly before Mr. Harvey
17
went to Rome?
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Mr. Angleton. It wasn't shortly before, it was,
I think
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quite a long time before.
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this
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So then I told Sam, I said, look, let's go very easy on
because I didn't know anything about Bill's connection
with the Mafia and all that, but I did know him well enough
to know that he was not a frivolous man, and that this thing
happened, and keep in mind that ex-FBI men, contrary to public
opinion, were not very much liked by Mr. Hoover when they left
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the FBI.
So I called Bill's house, and I asked his wife, is Bill
around?
And she said, no, he is out to dinner tonight.
And I said, look, we have some very serious trouble.
Would you please tell me where I can locate him.
And she said, he is at Duke Zeibert's.
And I called
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Duke Zeibert's and I managed to get him. And I turned the
phone over to Papich, because I did not want to be on the
record showing that this was Angleton, et cetera.
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And Papich talked to Bill, and actually I didn't hear
the discussion. It was something about, I will see you
tomorrow.
And Sam told the surveillance and all the other people
to forget it, and the Headquarters would take over.
And that is my knowledge, direct knowledge of what
Anderson and everybody else has stated.
Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, to your specific knowledge
did Bill ever attempt to use the excellent contact he had in
Havana to carry out the mission of eliminating the leader down
there, or try to get any help out of him in that regard?
Mr. Angleton. He knows that I would have cut his throat.
Mr. Kirbow. That would have jeopardized your entire
contact with the Israeli's?
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Mr. Angleton.
Yes sir.
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Senator Tower.
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We will take a recess for about two
minutes while we go up and vote.
(A short recess was taken)
Senator Tower
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Schwarz. I don't have anything more.
Senator Tower. You have read this, and Szulc
this galley
Penthouse:
9.0
in
this is a galley of the Szulc article in
"Although: the details of the Israeli nuclear enterprise
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1956 Suez war, the Eisenhower Administration resolved to
10
are still top secret, it is known that
the wake of the
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the CIA was
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provide Israel with all possible help in developing an atomic
weapon. The Israelis had the theoretical knowledge, but they
'needed technological support at their Dimona nuclear research
center in the Negev Desert
"According to the stop intelligence sources,
charged with the responsibility of providing this support to
the Israelis."
Do you have knowledge that the CIA was charged with such
responsibilities?
1
Mr. Angleton.
Senator Tower.
Angleton.
Absolutely to the contrary
"--Angleton directed the effort?"
False.
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Senator Tower.
That it totally false?
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Mr. Angleton.
That is totally false.
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"Several nuclear scientists were secretly sent to Israel
to work with Dimona scientists."
Mr. Angleton. False. I will interject here that the
French sent 400 as a matter of the original deal with the
Israeli
to Dimona.
Senator Tower.
The reference here is to nuclear weaponry
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And this means sent by the CIA, as In interpret it.
Mr. Angleton.
Senator Tower
It is false.
"The most important of them, according
an
to intelligence sources was a British-born physicist, now
American citizen working for the US Government in Washington,
with special and esoteric
Mr. Angleton.
es to the CIA."
The allegation is false.
Senator Tower The answer your previous question would
cover that one, too, I assume .
"Persons close to Angleton have confirmed this account in
17
recent interviews. Reflecting Angleton shown position, however,
they have denied assertions from other sources that the CIA
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team made fissinoable material
Sup wwwy
plutonimum
available to
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the Israelies from United States stocks."
Mr. Schwarz. As far as your are concerned is that
statement right or wrong?
it.
Mr. Angleton. I am saying, when he says deny it deny
Senator Tower. I think it was taken care of in that
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second paragraph, is where all the questions are raised.
Really, the CIA would be hard put to transfermany
fissionable materials without the knowledge of the Atomic
Energy Commission, would it not?
Mr. Angleton. Sir, I can assure you that the CIA
don't really know what the word fissionable means anymore.
We have atomic
much use of the atomic energy.
I
6
There is
7
battery
8
Senator Tower
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10
Mr. Angleton.
By fissionable materials, I think the
reference here is that could be converted to weapons.
I jus don't categorically
in my whole
11
history in the CIA, no
ng
12
except intelligence about it
ever involved fissionable material
speculations regarding leakages
13
and so forth.
14
Senator Tower.
In other words, the CIA doesn't have
15
16
control over any stocks of fissionable materials independently:
Mr Angleton. No.
Senator Tower.
And therefore the CIA could not acquire
such materials except through the knowledge of the Atomic
17
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20
Mr. Angleton.
That is right
I hate to nit pick, but
21/
I want to simply state that there was
a problem in the Agency
Energy Commission?
once where you have, say, somebody simply approach you and
state, I have access to fissionable materials, and therefo
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if it is
25
a covert thing, and it raises a big policy question,
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how do we deal with those kinds of cases, where someone
allegedly, a confidence man, or whatnot, who wants to
the stuff?
penetrate.
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be if we
The purpose then was to penetrate, or try to
And I wonder if there wasn't a question at one
to what we do about it, and what the dangers would
the diplomatic pouch, and there are thousands of
And it did happen in the Far East. And it was a
false case, confidential case. But it did happen. There was
questions.
an offer to sell us atomic fissionable material or something.
But my point is, there has never been initiative to my
knowledge, or an interest of the CIA in any shape or form
wanting any fissionable material.
Senator Tower. Dave
Mr. Aaron. Two small points. Mr. Szulc said that "In
effect Mr. Angleton said at one point that should I surface
Mann's name, he may go as far as to
15
Mr. Mann's name,
16
commit suicide
17
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Did you ever say that to Mr. Szulc?
Mr. Angleton. I don't think I said it to him. But in
the back of my mind
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was what I think
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I told you
--
and maybe I didn't tell you, maybe I
told Colby,
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that is what bothers me
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
22
still have an open espionage case in which a report
theirs
23
alleges that either Dr. Mann being present or something that
24
someone tried to cut his throat in Philby's house in
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Washington, when Philby was stationed there.
Now, whether
we had the report or not I don't know. So I am a little
confused as to that statement.
Because I don't think the
question of using Mann's name came up other than the
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context of the allegation that Mann was sent by me, and would
this mean if it came out in terms of the Head of Services,
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who had called for phrases, British, French, et cetera, and
they would have this confirmation, one do they know anything
7
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9
about my Israeli activities now, and then the most damaging
would be the entire information on Mann and Philby, et cetera.
Mr. Aaron. Let me just read one other segment of his
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testimony:
12
"Angleton said after recounting the story of the
WARD
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transfer of atomic technology Mr. Szulc went on and said,
Angleton said that he was rather taken back by this information,
said that in effect he could confirm it with corrections:
one,
the timeframe was wrong, that it was not the early '60's,
but indeed the late '50's after the Suez war, and number two,
17
18
that as far as he was concerned there was not delivered by the
CIA, or anyone to his knowledge any fissionable material such
19
as plutonium or other material."
20
. Angleton. I don't follow that at all.
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Mr. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?
22
Mr. Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying.
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Mr. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?
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Senator Tower. He is reading
actually what he read
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a little earlier to you was in terms of trying to bring out
that you did not agree with his story, that you did not
Confirm the validity of it.
Mr. Angleton. That part is correct. But I am not follow-
ing this last part you are reading.
Mr. Aaron. Let me show it to you and you read it.
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr.
Would you identif the page and the line?
Aaron. The page is page 40, beginning at line 19 and
running to the end of the page
Mr. Angleton. That said in effect he could confirm it,
that is the "it" business?
Mr. Aaron. Start 'back further and get the general
story.
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n/effect he could confirm the two corrections."
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Mr. Angleton This is false on page 40, from line 8,
"Mr. Angleton told me that essentially this information was
correct, that is absolutely false.
And never made any such statement that I could confirm
it -- lines 19 and 20, "Angleton said he was really taken back
That is
--
Mr. Aaron. I think that covers it.
Mr. Angleton. And this is false: "one or more
distinguished pure scientists or physicists whose services
were a vailable to the US Government", that is totally fal
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Mr. Aaron. Let me ask one last question.
96
Mr. Angleton. When I say technical assistance, that is a
quite different matter.
Mr. Kirbow. You do not mean technical assistance in the
nuclear field whatever?
Mr Angleton. He knew what I was stating was this stuff
that has come out in volumes of Sadat's resume of CIA's help
to the Israelis, which was accurate.
Senator Tower. By technical assistance here, as I
understand it, he means technical assistance and nuclear
weapons development.
Mr. Angleton. That is right. And that is deliberately
on his part a misstatement of the fact. And that is what I
am trying to say.
Senator Tower. He did admit to technical assistance in
terms of intelligence?
Mr. Angleton. No, it wasn't a question of my admitting,
I told him that it was well-known that in the whole field of
ELINT and many things, that we have worked closely with the
Israelis
Senator Tower. But not specifically, technical
assistance and nuclear weapon development?
Mr. Angleton. That subject wasn't in existence.
Mr. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, is it possible that one source
of this story could be alleged operations by the Israelis
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intelligence service in the US in regard to the efforts to
acquire nuclear technology or material?
After
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Mr. Angleton.
No.
Let me just state my own feeling about some
this.
talked to me about having all those great sources
which were better than Hirsch's, he said, I also have talked
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was a lie.
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I said, after 22 years' work with some people,
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སྔལ་དམག་
In other words, in 22 years I have never known them to withhold
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anything germain to our common activity. So that for American
jounalists to go and try to pump things out of me regarding
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first thing. That is the fact. And he said this Israeli
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fellow said something about,
something I don't discuss, or
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words to that effect, I can't remember that part of it.
So there isn't much more to say about that.
Mr. Aaron. Were there Israeli intelligence efforts in
the US in the 1960's or at any time aimed at acquiring either
nuclear technology or information that would have a bearing
on this story?
Mr. Angleton. There have been many efforts.
many
✓ countries to acquire technical knowledge in this country, and
23
that doesn't exclude the Israelis.
Mr. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of instances
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while you were employed with the Agency, Mr. Angleton?
believe that might be a fair question.
Senator Tower. In your capacity as Head of Counter-
intelligence, did it ever come to your attention
--
did you
ever have any certain knowledge that Israeli agents were
actually trying to acquire nuclear secrets in the US, atomic
1
secrets?
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Mr. Angleton
I have to respond to that?
Mr. Kirbow Would you like to go off
record a
moment,
Chairman.
*Senator Tower. We can go off the record.
(Off the record discussion).
Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that
perhaps we defer that subject for the moment.
will be meeting with Mr. Angleton again.
13
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the meantime.
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I am sure we
Senator Tower. Then, too, we can get the FBI matter in
I have just a couple of questions that I would appreciate
it if Mr. Angleton would give us his evaluations as
18
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on.
20
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an expert
And they go back to his testimony relative to the Kennedy
assassination.
As I recall, you said that immediately after the assassi-
nation Golitzen on his own initiative communicated with you
and advised you that it was normal practice for a defector who
had a military background to be processed in Department 13?
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Interrogated, or processed.
Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of
this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through
this process, and that therefore at least that he might have
4
5
6
been acting within the context of the Soviet plan, is that
right?
Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying
7
to say.
His English is such that it is very difficult.
8
But then some years
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later
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Senator Mathias. I understand.
my recollection is that you said it was in 1967 or
1969 you learned that the KGB had spent six month of
employment of their top operators in the investigation of the
Kennedy assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind
negate the implication of the original Golitzen call or that
they were involved?
Mr. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that
man is a man who is also a suspect of Nosenko.
Senator Mathias.
You mean in 19677
Mr. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are
treading on, Golitzen gave us information regarding the
penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an
identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking
about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work.
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And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man,
the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and we
and
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advise that you send it to the Army.
And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was
the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent
FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X".
--
was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept
that. And in 1967 a Soviet on whom we had a dossier on this
thing, because he was once stationed in India, and therefore
with an unknown
7
we knew who he was, and all the rest of it
8
coming to us as Nosenko was, he was a real man,
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we had years
of surveillance on him, and so on. And he came, and he
インリ
and he was a TDC, temporary duty in Washington
and he established contact with the first Mrs. Helms.
alleged
11
here
--
12
And eventually I was called to take the case.
And he stated
13
that among his missions to the US was to effect the redefection
14
or the return to the Soviet Union of a man, and that man was
15
the man whom we had identified as a Soviet agent.
And he went
16
into the whole background, that this man was
one of the
17
highest grade illegals that they had ever had, and he was
in
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our Agency.
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So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because
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he was one of the two interrogating officers.
And I can't
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talk to you about professional pride, but for a
competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt.
man of his
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So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know
about George Blake?
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Blake
And then his response was, he says, we think he is dead.
Now, hwere is a man who is supposed to be Special
Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose
mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore
from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was
the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of
Nosenko's father. And Golitzen had told us that men chosen
for very dangerous missions of penetration and duplicity came
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from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their fathers
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and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union.
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dead.
So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is
Two to three weeks later is when Blake escaped from
Scrubb's Woods to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to
the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of
Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in
the West as an illegal from the end of World War II, and
gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the
па
exfiltartion plans of George Blake, which would have been
simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TDC.
So we handled him for six or seven weeks.
And some of the most telling parts of the interrogation
was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have
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access to archives.
And what was on our mind, and what
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cryptonym that we wanted him to work up and this would
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relate to the third part of the damage part on Golitzen
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what did Golitzen know that they did not know he knew?
What
agents in the West could be under our control as
a result of
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Golitzen's disclosures regarding those things?
And you can see the tremendous quality this man had of
almost getting from our man those four or five
crytonyms,
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which would have told them what they wanted to know, because
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there are cases they are not sure whether he knows or doesn't
know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on.
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So he wasn't given that.
sort of medium low level stuff, you couldn't call it chicken
He was given stuff that was
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but we never told him we disbelieved in him.
And he
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said, if you do those things for me, I have an opportunity,
because of my mother and so on, to become Head of the American
Department of the KGB.
And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the
Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he stated
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there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to
acquire all the information possible on the whereabouts of
Golitzen and Nosenko. And I was actually in Wisconsin.
And
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I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there is any
proposal put up by that individual that would expose
and I
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use the crytonym name of Golitzen
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don't.
A week later is when he got to Moscow and he sent a cable
to tell us that he can give them word on everything on
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Golitzen.
Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus paper and
with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a
part of the thing to confirm Nosenko's bona fides, and the
And he is the one who gave the full description of
build-up.
the fact that for six months the place was immobilized for this
investigation, of all the high level all over the works, is
the way he put it.
Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russians
treat a returned defector, and the way we treat them. And
in that connection, to your knowledge was Oswald every
interrogated when he teturned from Russia?
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Mr. Angleton.
I don't know
--
I probably would know, but
I don't know whether the military normally that would fall
within the jurisdiciton of the military, since he was a
military man who defected. So I don't know' the answer to that
Senator Mathias. What about from Cuba?
Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that.
Senator Mathias. Or at any time?
Mr. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him.
Senator Mathias.
The Bureau, not the CIA?
Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no.
Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did?
Mr. Angleton. That is just my sensation that they did.
Senator Mathias. We will follow that up.
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This is the very last question.
You referred to files
that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the
Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to
pursue that in a personal way.
About two years ago Arbotov was in this country, and he
came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of
Would this kind of thing be a matter of
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If there was any technical cover
Soviet Embassy, then my answer would be yes.
Senator Mathias. My recollection is, he came
person with him, whose name I don't remember.
one
Mr. Angleton. If the Bureau had him under surveillance,
and he came here 2 now, I am getting ont
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ground I don't
the newspaper said Mr. Hoover gave an order that the
Hill was off-base, and whe the Soviet came here he was never
surveilled, and whom he saw was unknown. That is what the
newspaper said. My own observation would be in any technical
coverage of an installation, the door of an individual, would
result in dossiersson all people who had contacts, if the
man was suspect or there is a reason.
Senator Tower. Excuse me. You are talking about a
Soviet person visiting members here on the Hill?
Senator Mathias. Yes. And what I am trying to get at
s the circumstances under which a file or dossier might
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opened on a member of Congress, and I offered myself as a
guinea pig that Arbatov lunch as a starting point.
At this point my question is on purely hypothetical
point.
I plan to go next week with the Senate group which is
making a parliamentary visit to Russia. And may see Arbatov
in Moscow I would assume it would be likely Would that
become a continuing entry in such a dossier as far as you know?
Mr. Angleton. We don't have any coverage in Moscow.
Senator Mathias. Is that the kind of thing that
Mr. Angleton.
are not living in a very ideal world
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in the Agency.
We can't even process the hard material.
السلام
Senator Mathias.
Since it is a hypothetical question,
12
let me make it even more hypothetical.
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Let's say our mission,
instead of visiting Moscow, visits Rome or Paris or someplace,
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where it is very easy for you to operate.
And there were
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to us,
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a report on the meeting. And we have examples
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defector told us about a member of Parliament,
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meetings with Russians who were known to have visitied me in
Washington. Would that be the kind' thing which would get
to a Congressional file?
Mr. Angleton. No.
because of the Russians in London, would pass through liaison
there was something suspicious, would pass through
and what the cryptonum was, and how he was
Where Czech
a Soviet agent,
recruited. And you
have got other cryptonyms on British members of Parliament
I imagine the British MI-5, though,
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that you have not then identified.
We know what they passed
or some of the stuff which was passed.
Senator Mathias.
lunch two years ago
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fact
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Mr Angleton.
Assuming a file was set upon that
The file wouldn't be set up there on the
with your name on it, it would be the Soviets, and
you would be buried in the file, which would probably be that
thick, of that Soviet activity in the US. And there would be
the fact that he was here, and that he went to New York, and
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he did this or that.
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Senator Mathias. So that wouldn't show up in Mathias'
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file, that would show up
an Arbatov file?
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Mr. Angleton.
That is right That is the way it is
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supposed to be. And the only time where I can see a file
would be opened on an American Congressman or Senator would
be where there was a substantial basis for opening up that
file. But that wouldn't be at the initiative of the CIA, it
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the Attorney
would be a matter that would go to the FBI and
General, and then there would be somebody in the Senate or
the Congress who would be contacted and notified, and so on.
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And I think this is the way he handled it
And think Mr. Hoover's practice was that he would learn
through his own sources that a person who is not good was
going to have lunch with a Congressman or was cultivating him,
and he would pick up the money or this is what they say.
he would simply
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call him on the phone and say, I think you should know,
following, and there would be a notification that Mr. Hoover
notified, et cetera. He called me once when there wasn't
enough time factor for him to send a letter to me. He said,
you are doing something at such and such an hour, you should
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know that this man is a homosexual, or so on and so on. And
it may have been useful to change the course in a hurry. But
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it is formalized in the Bureau. When Mr. Hoover intervened
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on those things it was either a question of time or a
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question of emphasis.
But the formal part goes on regardless,
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if a person, regardles
of who he is, is involved, or is
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passed a document, or comes up in a telephone tap, or any
number of things, their
Senator Mathias In other words, you are saying what a
political friend of mine once said, that you don't get news
unless
you make news?
Mr. Angleton. That is one way of looking at it.
Senator Mathias. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Mr Angleton. I want to commend you again on that
question, because that fixes several things. Because if there
is one thing I regret about leaving the Agency, it is the
unresolved cases. And that is one of the biggest, because we
know so much about that person when he was in India. And, he
was the most sophisticated, cultivated, high level intelligence
record on it.
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Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to
to rehabilitate the Agency in particular in counterintelli-
gence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating,
what things in particular would you do?
Mr. Angleton. My feeling is that the Agency has to go
these fires that no man would
through the purgatory that
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put out
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and therefore let it be shocking or whatever.
let all the political repercussions take place, and if you go
8
to purgatory, my view is, the bigger the fires, the better.
9
So my view is, let it all come out.
And let people take the
10
consequences.
I am not a believer that an agency can have
11
two fathers. And I don't believe in inferiors reporting on
12
their superiors by directive
And I don't believe that the
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Agency below the Director has
be responsive to two
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authorities.
Senator Baker. What two authorities?
Mr. Angleton. I mean the Congress and the Executive.
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In other words, if Colby is asked, what
you know about
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Chile, my view is that on Chile would yoy
ease ask the White
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House And that is what I am trying to get a
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told Colby what it might be.
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at least so
then they can come back with Colby after the Executive part has
But to throw the burden on the
Director to respond to a question on Chile, gives him he
And something doesn't
seem
is always in that dual position.
to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, even to
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my level, to be resonsive to more than one authoity is chaos.
And I am not making any puns.
Senator Baker. To be responsible to the Congress and to
the
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Angleton. The word response is what disturbs me
somewhat, because the secrets that we have just been discussing
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here are so germain to everything in this country relating to
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the world balance of power and what the Soviets will strike
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That is what I am trying
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in other words, the intelligence
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community has never really had a day of peace in a way.
When
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Hoover passed away, and Gray came aboard, everyone in the
intelligence community lieved, now we can normalize this
situation. It has never been normal before. Mr. Hoover never
attended an Agency meeting. Mr. Hoover never permitted one
of his representatives to go beyond this jurisdiciton question
And you cannot run a government that way and you cannot run
counterintelligence that way. So when Mr. Gray came to see
Mr. Helms and Helms called me in before him and said, what
position should I take, and I said, he wants to come and
normalize relations, and he wants to reestablish liaison. And
said, I wouldn't accept it form him, they are the ones who
Brok it off. Therefore tell him that when he has read your
correspondence with Mr. Hoover, and reviewed all of that if
he feels that he is capable of handling it, that you will
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prepared to sit down and discuss the question of liaison,
because liaison is a tiny part of the question of penetration
and double agents and all the rest of it.
And in fact that happened, and everybody thought, we had
got captain that didn't make admiral aboard who will settle
And then we will have his demise.
this.
And then you had Mr. Ruckelshaus come
Director.
as as acting
And then the Watergate and all of that. So there
has never been a stabilizing factor in this Government as it
relates to, not counterintelligence alone, but the intelli-
And now I amstrongly opposed to professionals
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gence community.
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being Directors.
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I would say that a professional Director of the Agency
doesn't work, he doesn't have a basis on the outside, or the
And I think the Rockefeller Commission's
perspective.
observations were first rate in terms of the idea of two
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Deputy Directors who have to be confirmed and whatnot. And
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I think that no directorate should be expected to follow the
nuts and bolts and at the same time handle all the duties of
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meeting and all the rest of it and try to keep an eye inside
the business.
Senator Baker. What do you think of the Rockefeller
Commission reports?
Mr. Angleton. I don't see anything wrong with it.
Senator Baker. Do you think it will work?
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Mr. Angleton. I really don't know this area. So I am
not competent to speak or go around seeing what will happen
in Congress, just on the simple question of Chile and the
akages and the damage that is done to US posture abroad, how
much of it does this take?
Senator Baker. It wouldn't take many
That is an argu-
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Mr. Angleton. All the cases we are discussing, in the
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hands of the wrong people, and our files in the hands of the
wrong people, would have very decisive political impact upon
our elections. That is what I mean, to be very frank about it.
Senator Baker. How would that happen?
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Mr. Angleton. There are all kinds of information which,
if it falls into the wrong hands or should they want to use
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it for their own ulterior motives, would be absolutely
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damaging.
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Senator Tower. In other words, this information could
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be used
damages
politicians as a political football?
Angleton. Precisely. But a man who would do it
Senator Mathias. Would you give an example?
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(Off the record discussion)
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(Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned,
subject to the call of the Chair.)
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