File #:
62-116395
Serial Scope:
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 1
441 THRU 5th NR 474
475
Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88296 Date: 2025
THE STATE LAW DEPARTMENT
1208 Munsey Building
Baltimore 2.
July 16, 1952
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Usi
tment of Justi
Post Office Box 2015
Baltimore 3, Maryland
Gentlemen i
I enclosing for your information copy of
letter dated June 8, 1950 from the Industrial Employment
Review Board to . surney; also copy of Mrs. Gurney's
letter to Dr. yra, President of University of Maryland.
I know that you will be interested in to. Gumay",
lotter
If you have any further Lifmation regarding.
Gurney I would certainly appreciate age, I am also
interested to know something more about the Industrial
Employment Ferlow owd, especially whether or not your
records are avail shle to it and the importance of its
findings.
Thanking you; for your
ess and cooperation,
Very truly yours,
Encs.
KMW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 2
OOOCKETT,
Special Assistant Attorney General
ENCLOSURE
"
62-116395
1
1
1
famed front fount
-
-
-
Mr
(1'
ntz
Mr J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. T. E. Burns
July 25, 1975
Mah
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE:
FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
#mpe16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/00 BYSP-
2 
ALT/775
Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and
other information from the FBI.
Item number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix B of refer-
enced communication requested Committee Staff access to all
indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated
by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the présent.
Attached to this memorandum is a list of all
retrievable programs, projects, surveys and procedures
employed in connection with domestic intelligence operations
of the FBI which may be of interest to you. There were a
number of other programs, projects, surveys and procedures
employed in connection with foreign counterintelligence
operations of the FBI which are not included. In the event
you desire information concerning these latter items, which
include extremely sensitive matters, we would be pleased to
discuss them with SSC Staff Members at FBI Headquarters.
Enclosure
1
-
The Attorney General
TEB:lek/lhb|hb
(8)
ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG
K
ENCLOSURE
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
джи
SEE NOTE PAGE 2
Рем
wtay
Woh
62-11/395-442X
GPO 954-545
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 3
བར བར བར བར ཟིན པར ར ད ན ན
LEZA CHILISSYTONA
**SHIG MOHS GEIHM
ŠI MIZUHA
ALE INFORMATION CONTAINIRO
ليل اليك الى العمل
CLASSIFIED BY SP-2ALM 17TG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25
% 1,6
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
· Policies and Procedures
PRO ED CLASSIFICATION.
I HAVE MOST FILES AT
MY DESK ON 
THESE
CODENAMES/CODEWORDS
FOR RESEARCH NEEDS.
1.
2.
NOTE:
☑P
SECRET
The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List
(PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra,
were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of
available INTD inspection reports and files.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPL
-A
Developing
Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries
positive intelligence information regarding personnel in the
United States from non-Soviet-bloc countries.
-
International Organization Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside
the Soviet-bloc Centralized compilation of potentially danger-
ous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the U. S. State
Department could initiate steps to deport or to lift
diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.
-
3. Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International
Organization Visas FBI maintaining results of name checks
conducted by various members of U. S. intelligence community
based on information provided to such intelligence organizations
by INS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.
-
es.](૯)
| (s)
4. Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel). U
5. (Alem - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States.
6. Anagram Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in
the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials.
(Mr. Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi-
tive information such as that regarding (Anagram) and electronic (5)
surveillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given
to Senators Church and Tower).
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 4
洳
OP SECRET
-
- 2 -
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3
7.
1
ཡ་ བ་ བ་ ་ བ་ འ
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
NOTE CONTINUED:
SECRET
8.
9.
10.
Banpop
-
Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer
of funds through Swiss banks.
Chinese Aliens Entering the United States
-
Identification
of ethnic Chinese legally entering the U.S.. with
intelligence assignments.
Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in the United States
Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese
background as foreign counterintelligence assets to be
targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC)
personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada.
Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship
Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
intelligence assignments.
11. Chinese University and Graduate School Index - List of
Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or
graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are
considered potential candidates for development as U.S.
assets.
12.
Cokma
-
Specialized physical surveillance directed against
I HAVE FILE 65-73750
foreign intelligence officers.) (S)
13. Canil
- Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in the
United States from Europe through Canada (s)
14. Chicoin Counterintelligence activities to thwart
efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country.
15.
(u)
DRC
MINS
Forest Screening of records of foreign students at New York
University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover
Soviet 
illegals. (5
✈OP SECRET
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 5
-
- 3
-
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
16.
17.
18.
NOTE CONTINUED:
SECRET
Proho [Program to detect homosexuals who have been compromised
or recruited by Soviet intelligence) (S) File 105-140972
Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents
with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments Investigations
conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established
criteria.
Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries
-
Interviews of selected
U. S. tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet-bloc
intelligence. U
19. Corkid
-
Technical penetration of Soviet establishments in the
United States.] (s) File 105-189368
20. Cloverleaf
21.
22.
23.
-
Technical penetration of new Soviet residential
complex, Riverdale, New York City (S) Filε 105-231856
York City(s)
Sam Survey Screening of mail to selected European cities. U
-
Gus Survey Screening of mail originating in New York,
New York, destined for specific postal zones.
U
Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets
Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence
and counterintelligence purposes,
24. Rega Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S.
as aliens during certain years.) ($) 65-73094
25. Secomex
-
Expanded Mexican border coverage to include
development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico.
10- (5) Fice 105-148076
OP SECRET
KW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 6
4
-
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
DCV Policy Memo
STATES MENTION OF
NAME ITSELF is
NOT CLASSIFIED
78
NOTE CONTINUED:
26.
咖
SECRET
Sobir - Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and
répatriates in an attempt to identify those previously
recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence.] (s)
27. Socap Review of certain records to identify Soviet
illegals who have applied for documentation as U.S.
residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide
cover identity. File 65-66114
28. Vietnamese Refugeė
-
Efforts to uncover possible
infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow
to the United States.
29. (Walklok
-
Screening of requests for birth certificates under
an established criteria to identify such requests which
may have originated with Soviet intelligence. (5) FILE 65-75130
30. Technical and Microphone Surveillance - Survey of telephone
and microphone installations functioning at certain times. U..
31. CAl Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying
Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADP
32..
330
equipment. (s)
Cuban Refugee
-
Detection of Cuban intelligence agents
who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee
channels. (5)
Deseco
-
Development of selected contacts to be directed
against Soviet-bloc officials. U
34.
East-West Exchange
-
35.
Provided internal security safeguards
regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite
nationals. U
Z Coverage Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission
to the United Nations, U
KM 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 7
TOP
OP SECRET
· 5 ·
-
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
NOTE CONTINUED:
TOP SECRET
36. Chiprop Screening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong
and the People's Republic of China (PRC). U
37.
Chiclet
-
Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong
and the PRC.
38. Alchemy "notional" Pro-Marxist
-
Leninist
-
Maoist domestic
revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets. directed_at
uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States. ) (5)
39. [Geology
40.
--
Verification of individuals entering selected
foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify
Soviet illegals) (5) FILE 65-72903
Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political
intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad for the SEE
information of the White House. U File 64-41404 REF.
41. Coarbit
-
Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.S.
military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S.
FILE
Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents. ☐ (5) 65-75385
.42. Phrenology
-
Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly
resided in a specific foreign country and whose present
whereabouts are unknown. ](s) File 65-75008
Classified by 6283, XCDS 1, 2 and 3, Indefinite.
KW 8296 Docld:32989624 Page 8
{
T
SECRET
-
- 6 -
-
NOTE:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
TO:
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
FROM:
FBI
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
✗ DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
For Review
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
X SSC
7/25/75
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
5.
Memorandum
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
SSC request 5/14/75, Part I, Appendix B, Item lb
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
U
8.
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Information Handling.
Intelligence Collection
Operating Procedures
SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
Access to all available indices and control files
regarding all programs operated by the Intelligence Division
from 1960 to present.
62-116395
AJD:1hb
(4)
#mDR 16
ALI, INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM 1776
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.
3791 (6-75)
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 9
TREAT AS YELOW
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
5-mjd
62-115-395-442X
INSTRUCTIONS
● Type, or print clearly. in ink.,
•
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted.
Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 10

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
:
FROM W. O. Cregar
woc
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
1
1
1
DATE:
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
Mr. W. R. Wannall
7/25/75
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intel
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
¡Director Sec'y
This memorandum records for the record my efforts
to meet with Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, on 6/25/75,
On the late afternoon of 7/24/75, Mr. Benson
Buffham, Deputy Director, National Security Agency (NSA),
made available to Liaison Agent Brian Murphy a copy of a
"Top Secret" memorandum dated 4/20/71, written by Louis W.
Tordella, who was the then Deputy Director of NSA. This
Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Shamrock, copy of which
is attached, makes reference to a file entitled Shamrock
available in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, United States Army.
Pursuant to your instructions on the evening of
7/24/75, I personally contacted Mr. Latimer at approximately
8:00 a.m., 7/25/75. In my conversation with Mr. Latimer, I
noted that it was imperative that I see him as soon as
possible regarding the contents of the Shamrock file.
Mr. Latimer was informed that the Bureau was attempting to
establish the line of authority relative to the Bureau's
procurement of foreign government's cable traffic sent
through international cable companies in the United States.
Z
REC-88 62-1163·75-442
Mr. Latimer indicated that he had received a calf
from Mr. Buffham on the late afternoon of 7/24/75 and was
aware of the Bureau's interest in reviewing certain memoranda
in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer indicated that this was
a matter of interest to the General Counsel of the Department
of Defense and that he would have to consult with them.
3 JUL 31 1975
Enclosure
62-116395
TOP SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED
WOC: 1hb 1hb
(5)
/- ENCLOSURE
84 JUL 31 1975
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 11
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395
He advised me he would have somebody from the General Counsel's
office, Department of Defense, promptly contact me regarding
a review of this file by FBI personnel.
Not hearing from Mr. Latimer by the late morning
of 7/25/75, I telephonically contacted his office.
He was
not available and I asked his secretary to have him return
my call. Shortly before noon, Mr. Latimer returned my call
and explained that he had discussed my request with
Mr. "Marty" Hoffman (phonetic) of the Department of Defense.
It was Latimer's understanding that Mr. Hoffman had gone to
the White House to discuss my request with Mr. Philip Buchen,
Counsel to the President. Latimer promised that he would
telephonically recontact me as soon as he could establish
contact with Hoffman. I again reiterated to Latimer that it
was imperative the Bureau have access to the Shamrock file
in order that we could advise the Attorney General as to
its contents hoping to clearly demonstrate that both the
then Attorney General Thomas Clark and, in fact, President
Truman himself were aware of certain information contained
in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer said he understood clearly
what was at issue here and that he would get back to me as
soon as possible.
At 1:50 p.m., 7/25/75, I again called Mr. Latimer's
office and his secretary informed me that Mr. Latimer had
stepped out of his office and that she would give him a
message to call me as soon as he returned. As of 4:00 p.m.,
7/25/75, I had not received a return call from Mr. Latimer.
ACTION:
For information and record purposes.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 12
дствот
WRW
дом тут завер
- 2 -
Per
TOP SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
OP SECRE
DISTRIBUTION LIMITED
20 April 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: SHAMROCK
Copy I of I
I
.
Mr. Buffham and I had an opportunity this morning to read
the SHAMROCK file in ACSI. Major General Joe! McChristian gave
us permission to view it but once we had read it, after careful con-
sideration he decided that he would not feel free to give NSA either
the file or a duplicate copy without personal permission from SecDef
inasmuch as SecDef had entrusted the file to ACSI in 1949. All of
us agreed that an approach to the Secretary would be unnecessary
and perhaps would generate too many questions. He did agree
after sealing the file again to limit access to the Secretary of Defense
on demand, the Director or the Deputy Director, NSA, on demand,
Chief of ACSI, and the Chief of the SSO, ACSI. This would be noted in
the outside inslope.
The file contained memoranda for record, one prepared after
a meeting in Forrestal's office attended by senior officials from ITT,
Western Union, and RCA plus Marks Leva (then Defense General
Counsel), Secretary Forrestal, and a representative from the Attorney
General's office. Colonel Carter Clark from ACSI, who was present,
prepared this memorandum. A subsequent meeting was held in Secre-
tary Louis Johnson's office attended by representatives. of the same
three companies and I believe the Attorney General himself. In Mr.
Johnson's own handwriting is a note to the effect that he showed the
memorandum for record to President Truman and a note that TCC, ap-
parently Attorney General Thomas Clark, either was present or had
also discussed the matter with the President. Both memoranda indi-
cated that the companies were informed that the work they were doing
was of very great importance to the U.S. and every effort would be
made to protect knowledge of its existence as well as to protect the
companies in the event of exposure.
The material is filed under TS Control No. 516652-3-5 in the
SSO ACSI files.
Downgraded to Secret
on 6/7/16 
per auto claclass
45780
NW-88296 Docld:32989624 Page 13
Louis W" Tordelle
رہا
LOUIS W. TORDELLA
62-116395-4 Deputy Director
TOP SECRET
ENCLOCURE
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: MR. W. R. WANNALL,
R WANNALLA R
FROM
MR. W.
EGAR
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
10/10/00 SP-ZALM/JTG
ALCACION CON Ar :4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
Mr. R. J. Gallagher
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
DATE:
-
-
-
1
1
-
-
July 24, 1975
Mr. W. A. Branigan
Mr. A. B. Fulton
Mr. J. G. Deegan
Mr. R. L. Shackelford
Mr. F. S. Putman
Mr. J. W. Redfield
Mr. T. J. McNiff
榨
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
*Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised
you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) 190 pages extracted from a 693-page document prepared by
CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities
may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities
cited in this document include references to Bureau operations of
an extremely sensitive nature, and it was also noted that the Senate
Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended
that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to
the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section
believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for
the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an
assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation
is involved.
This is to advise that the following pages from the docu-
ment were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of
the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose
of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:
General Investigative Division
Laboratory Division
-
Intelligence Division
Section CI-1
62-116395
-
Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151,
155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180,
181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354
Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221,
222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were
furnished for information purposes as these
pages contained information concerning
techniques used and/or developed by CIA
which may be of interest).
REC-88
Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72,
298, 329, 582, 615, and 628.
TJM:ekw (12)
84 JUL 3 1 1975
ски
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 14
102 116375-441
73, 77, 136, 140-142,
3 JUL 31 1975
CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
Section CI-2
Pages 30 and 329
Section CI-3
Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363,
368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468–470, 591-593,
and 615.
Section IS-1
Pages 188, 189, 283, 330
Section IS-2
Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203,
330, and 482.
Section IS-3
Pages 521 and 549
Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to
above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the
Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.
ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requested
assessment.
Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the
information contained therein should be closely
guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know
basis.
TAM
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 15
2
HO
PROJECT MOCKINGBIRD-
1
=
Project Meekingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted
between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-
based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles
based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency
and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.
Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's
office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections
were established with the assistance of a telephone company official
'who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.
Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr.
John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted
the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),
the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to
Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and
research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency
officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector
General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence
Houston).
The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-
tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources
of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they
received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators
and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,
of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff
member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an
Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number
of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span
of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through
these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official
data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen
for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines
were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.
Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, those materials related
to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access
of two Office of Security professionals: 116375-47500021
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 16
ENCLOSURE
SECRET EYES ONLY
WARNING NOT.CE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
UN METHODS IN VERY
SECRET
EYES ONLY
SUBJECT:
Soviet Defector
A Soviet defector,
defected to a representative of this Agency in
· 1964. The responsibility for
his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of
the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country
After initial interrogation by
representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-
house in
Maryland,
where he
was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote
wooded area at ISOLATION. The SR Division was convinced
that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long
period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their
contention and he was confined at ISOLATION in an effort
to convince him to "confess."
This Office together with the Office of General
Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality
of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under
these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong
representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by
this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the
Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the
responsibility for his
further handling was transferred
to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.
The Soviet defector
was moved to a comfortable safehouse in
the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,
sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr.
Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent
that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to
more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom
of independent movement and has continued to cooperate
fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
Office since that time. He has proven to be the most
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of Soviet
SECRET
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valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever
had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were
explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution
recruited agents
-in several
countries throughout the world. He currently is living
under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife
and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,
and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states
"while I regret my
years of incarceration, I have.
no bitterness and now understand how it could happen.
"
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 18
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i
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:
I..
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SURVEILLANCE'S
A. SIESTA
During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May,
and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of
Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and
Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom
Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emo-
tionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon
information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from
employees information in Information Processing Division
files, and that employees were visiting a photographic
studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax
City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance,
one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was
made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez
was aborted because of a door lock problem.
B.
PARAGON
Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved
by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69
and her associates at various times from May to September
1971. Iden 69° an acknowledged Latin American revolu-
tionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and
had given information regarding a plot to assassinate
or kidnap Vice President-Agnew and the DEI. Surveil-
lances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69
during two visits to the United States, technical cover-
age of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives
in New York City, and surveillance, including mail cover-
age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of
the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in
New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals
included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.
C. CELOTEXT
con-
At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was
ducted of
of the Washington Post during
Iden 180
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00026
:
;
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the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971
and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical sur-
veillance, an observation post was maintained in the
Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-
tained of the building housing his office. The sur-
veillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources
of classified information of interest to the Agency
which had appeared in a number of his columns.
D.
MUDHEN
con-
At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was
ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg
men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear,
from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the
physical surveillance, an observation post was main-
tained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite
Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance
was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for
highly classified Agency information appearing in his
syndicated columns.
E. BUTANE-
At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was
conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to
20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was
to determine his activities and contacts both with
Agency employees and other individuals in regard to
his proposed book and published magazine articles ex-
posing Agency operations.
II. POLICE SUPPORT
A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions,
the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police
Department was provided a communications system to
monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the
Washington area. This system consisted of a radio
receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division
Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency
Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans-
mitters and manned by two Agency employees, as well as; a
representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan.
Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that
the communications over this system were monitored at
the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of
possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in-
stallations.
2
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B.
During the period from 1968 to 1973, several
items of positive audio equipment consisting pri-
marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone
dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan
Police Department, Fairfax-County, Virginia, Police
Department, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police
Department, New-York-City Police Department, and the
San Francisco, California, Police Department.
III. GENERAL SUPPORT
A. SRPOINTER
Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-
cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail
and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy
Airport in New York City. This operation included not-
only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-
tious opening and photographing of selected items of
mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-
nal security interest which was disseminated to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now
in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether
the operation will be continued or abolished.
B.
AELADLE
For several years the Office of Security has pro-
vided support to
a Russian defector of
This support has consisted
interest to the CI Staff.
of numerous things, including documentation for a change
of identity
on three occasions.
˚ C.
REDFACE
In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious
entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu-
pied by a former defector working under contract for
the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and
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3
SEOPET
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100028
SECRET
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sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering
a safe within the vault. The purpose of the opera-
tion was to determine whether the individual had
any unauthorized classified information in his
possession.
D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
In January 1971, the Director approved a request
from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security
clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished
through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of
Security
operating in
Falls Church, Virginia. Support
includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,
medical clearance, and training. It has been divided
into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-
viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal
activities of other BNDD employees%;B (2) Recruitment
of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)
Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD
but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is
known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.
In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and
other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reim-.
bursable basis.
E. KITTENS PROJECT
As a result of a request from the Department of
State, approved by the DCI, this office has, since
October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis
to two sons of a foreign leader who are attending school
in the United States.
This support includes
the financing of the protection and the detail to the
Department of State of six armed Agents of this office
who are documented as State Department Office of Security
employees.
F. MERRIMAG
From February 1967 to November 1971,
an
Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled
several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring
SECRET
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00029
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 22
:
:
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dissident groups in the Washington area considered
to be potential threats to Agency personnel and
installations. One of these Agents _so_successfully
penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned
over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during
this period, the Office of Security field offices
were tasked with collecting available intelligence
on dissident groups. All such information was in-
cluded in a periodic report distributed to appro-
priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside
Government agencies.
6. F. ANTLERS
Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff,
and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this
office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of
a European country via commercial transportation and
gain entry into the United States without leaving
any trace of his true identity. .
5
SECRET
11
00030
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:
DE CEV
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey
11 May 1973
1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence
of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in
RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security
questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a
dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of
three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current
interest.
2. The principal object of Security's interest through this
informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years
until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation
of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does
not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at
the time of her resignation.
3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by
reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance
with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also
being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have
an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also sub-
sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among
clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these
employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.
4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID
employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the
Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this
capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially
those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought
to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.
R
00059
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-NW-88296 Docld:32989624 Page 24
.
5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,
but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-
Castro organizations this country. There are all reports that
his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other
episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part
with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.
6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant
in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the
principal informant.
7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed
interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds.
for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such
file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence
that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent
contact with her friend, the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On
one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions
from the Cuban to O/Sis principal informant. The informant has no
knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been
levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of
the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees
except social contacts.
8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for
over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelli-
gence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which
was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-
sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security.
As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions
it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security
has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com-
promising the operation.
9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied
with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures
to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watch-
ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that
would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge
of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current
Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues
- 2 -
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 25
SIDDET
00063
•
to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made
any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he
continues to see them socially. Thus, there is slir eason to believe
that further waiting will produce a break in the case.
10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now.
It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact
with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might
alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly
since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop
for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could
move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the
security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign
nationals.
operation.
This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's
11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.
The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing
information on CLA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further
delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban
has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage
to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any. possible gains from
continuing this CI effort.
si
John O. Lawrence.
- 3
00061
SESTET
-NW-88296-Docid:32989624 Page 26
A_MINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE JNLY
9 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy Director for Management & Services
SUBJECT
: Press Allegations re Use of Agency
.
Polygraph
:
1. This memorandum is for your information only
and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier
today.
2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on
American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New
York Times over the by-line of Iden 181.
It was
devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from
a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had
sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President
was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information and directed a sweeping
investigation within the United States Government to
determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation
was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and
Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman,
Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.
.3.
On the basis of investigations conducted by
State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--
one individual in the Department of Defense and three
individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--
were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted
me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph
the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect
in the Department of Defense.
!
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NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 27
00065
AUSTRAL USE OCT
4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time
in matters involving the national security the Agency had
detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State
Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for
his use in polygraphing State Department employees who
were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty.
I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's
approval and that State clearly understood that the examin-
ation was their total responsibility. I further informed
him that this was the only way we could undertake to enter-
tain his request and that even then it would require the
specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to
obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with
Mr. Gentile.
5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile
and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made.
Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same
polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect.
Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an
excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials
to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph
examination.
6.
The four individuals were Iden 182
of the Department of Defense and Iden 183
Iden 184
, and
Iden 185
of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph
examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the
results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature
to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering
memorandum is attached.
7.
Iden 186
a staff writer for The
Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971,
stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees.
suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in
July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
2
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
NW-88296-Doeld:32989624 Page 28
00066
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNIAL USE ONLY
:
Specu-
Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a
letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph
examinations had been conducted by another agency.
lation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so,
press speculation in this regard died away.
8. Iden 186
Mr.
apparently has never been satisfied
and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department
spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement.
Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press
conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press
this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by
Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible
he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State
Department Security officials utilizing an operator and
a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose.
do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide
investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to
Iden 186
but I suspect that it is and that this is the
reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David
Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an
internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the
White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was
the source.
I
Attachment
Howsed
barce
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
-NW-88296-Docid:32989624 Page 29
00067
:
5 ne 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT
: Items in John Clarke Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973
1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds
and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-
vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use
against a common target in the U.S."
2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA
being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
buying an apartment building.
There was also
Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem
here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.
3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political action influence
activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
00070
SECRET-EVES CHLY
CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT A DECLARESC
SCHELLE DE
§ 58(1), (3), (1 që die lande ans
-NW 88296-Docld:32989624 Page 30
(ales) ingestie, int onte on event!

funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply
additional detai He said Senator Russell a Repre-
sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but
asked not to be briefed in detail.
Attachment
:
Flies C. Rechards
John C. Richards.
Inspector
- 2 -
SECRET-EYES ONLY
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 31
12
00071
9 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Per your instructions
|
1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the
Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions
at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment
should be a matter of record.
2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point
raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill
Colby is fully conversant are:
13/45/17
--
--
Red.
ishite
R.
- DCI files
CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/D.
WHBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and
accumulation of Government capital.
Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S.
real estate for FBI and provision of technical
equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against
a common target in the U. S.
Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer
Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J.
trip to SEA.
twe
John M. Clarke
Curymo
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 32
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SECRET
00072
E IMPOET CL BY AL
5 ne 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
À SUBJECT
: Items in John Clarke Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973
'
•
1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CLA funds
and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-
vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for usé
against a common target in the U.S."
2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA
being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
buying an apartment building
-
There was also
Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem
here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.
3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political/action influence
activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
00073
SPEERT-EXES BOLLY
CLASSIFIED BY
SHINPT FROM GENERAL
CLE OF . C.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 33
(nalysing a war or certi
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown
in other documents in the Agency. It
has been kept very close with Mr. Yale,
Mr. Magnusson, and possibly Mr. Colby.
All files have been purged.
FORM NO.
1 AUG 54
101
REPLACES FORM 10-101
WHICH MAY BE USED.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 34
00076
(DATE)
(47)
:
07 MAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
Director of Central Intelligence
: Deputy Director for Management and Services.
:
Director of Finance
: Special Other Government Agency Activities
-
1. Project MHDOZEN Colonel White, Executive Director-
Comptroller, acting for the Director, authorized the Director
of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate
$2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to
disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be
determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by
the Chief, CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed
by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still
active.
2. EPHEDLEY · Rental of office space in New York City
for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella,
Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines,
Deputy Director for Plans.
-
3. Detailees The Agency has reimbursable and non-
reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of
Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda
between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.
40 Project TWOFOLD - Reimbursement from Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
a domestic Agency Security proprietary.
5.
Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the
Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of
$858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated
sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the
Deputy Director for Plans.
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 35
SECRET EYES ONLY
E2 IMPDET
CL BY:
006567
00077
1573
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Special Report
1. This memorandum is in response to a request to
provide information on situations or associations that
might appear to be irregular on the surface.
2.
Details to the White House and Government Agencies
Background: For many years the Central intelligence Agency has
detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House
per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate
office of the President such as the Council on International
Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries, clerical
employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable
and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no
clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White
House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their
Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.
I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as
late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a
laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed
invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds
were apparently available to run the White House and most of
our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees.
CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with
detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and
others on Defense and State and other Government entities
whose employees have Top Secret clearances.
Professional officers have been and are at the present
time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven
clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.
In addition to the above, we have technical specialists
detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and
security officers detailed to the Department of State to
1
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 36
CONFIDENTIAL
E 2 IMPDET C1 By 003935
00105
.protect foreign visitors. Recently, John Har was detailed
to the Secretary of the Treasury along with ur other Agency
employees. We have even, in rare. instances, detailed our
people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.
3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies
Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the
National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other
hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees
currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his
secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made
a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his
present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for
a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112
served for
over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for
AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during
that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability
retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire
automatically at the expiration of this leave.
Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or
other Government agency has been carefully considered and
approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were
involved.
4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are
providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be.
reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely
sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on
it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.
5.
Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more
general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes
contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out
domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are
domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided
in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of
certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.
6.
Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of
reporting "too much," I would remind you that Contract Personnel
Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American
firms to provide cover for Agency assets. The actual assign-
ments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped,
in the main, in the United States.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 37
2
CONFIDENTIAL
00106
7. Contractua Relationship - USJPRS: he Agency
organization, USJPR, has a contractual association with
approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract
employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that
they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic
activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research
Service) is a part of FBIS. They perform a translation service
of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent
contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments
as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated"
into the Bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C.
They are paid and administered by the Bureau. CIA reimburses
the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared
in Contract Personnel Division.
· 8.
Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of
External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request
from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or
resigning from the Agency.
sent him
of EEAB
Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38
received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Iden 38 if he had a
· retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks.
Iden 38
a resume on Thomas Amato who retired
31 July 1971. Iden 38
did not document his EEAB record
to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who
also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between
March and May 1972.
All of the above information was reported to the Office
of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with
the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.
9. Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract
employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the
External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job
after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was´
James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to
McCord, but Lambert was not hired.
In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from
Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co.,
a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had
NW-88296-Docld:32989624 Page 38
3
CONFIDENTIAL
00107
not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from
the D.C. area.) He aid he had been visited ya Special
Agent of the FBI wh told Lambert that his resume had been
found among McCord's papers. The Agent wanted to know if
Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained
how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him,
Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29
OS were notified immediately.
Harry B. Fisher
Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 39
4
:
CONFIDENTIAL
00108
24 MAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH
SUBJECT
:
Deputy Director for Management and Services
: Sensitive Activities Performed by the
Office of Logistics
1. This memorandum contains information for the Director
of Central Intelligence.
2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given
by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May
that Office Directors report on activities, either under their
cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which
could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed
within the statutory responsibility and authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the
Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein
reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re-
quest of another Agency component. We have prepared à brief
description of each action involved and then have included the
name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for
the requests for action by this Office will have to be deter-
mined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.
3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the
initiative of this Office are as follows:
a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedi-
cated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and
related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore,
Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary
is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to
obtain such materiel without associating the procurement
action with the United States Government. It is legally
necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the
State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in
Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland
State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE HOLLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVES
-NW-88296-Docld:32989624 Page 40
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SECRET OL3-2758
2
00110
IMPOST CL DY
.001777

SUBJECT: Sensitive
Logistics
ctivities Performed by th
Office of
•
The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's
association with this proprietary and have assisted us in
obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a
Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary
through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too,
have been briefed on the Agency's association with this
proprietary.
b. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of the U. S. Code
(1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is
prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local
law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it
almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence
equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship
to the United States Government is made. In order for the
Agency to covertly obtain such equipment and hide any
Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff of the
Procurement Division. has relied on an established working
relationship with a U.S. firm. .
supplier located in .
This firm, a prominent
Maryland, deals in a wide
range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment.
The Covert Procurement Staff has had a relationship with an officer
" in the firm
for over 15 years. The officer agreed to
allow us to place orders through his corporation to major
suppliers of this equipment with a billing to an Agency national
proprietary.There is an understanding that. if any inquiry
is raised by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would
immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff
who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact
the Department of Justice, identify the Agency's interest
in the procurement action, and clear the officer
of any
responsibility. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry
about the proprietary _ from an FBI agent making a routine
investigation of the officer's books. Through Office of
Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI,
. the agent was informed that it
is an Agency
notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry
and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry.
Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit
requisitions to us to acquire surveillance equipment.
majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-
gence service with whom liaison is conducted in various
foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and
The
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 41
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SECRET
00111
་་
SUBJECT: Sensitive
Logistics
ctivities Performed by th Office of
"
the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveil-
lance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI
Staff of the DD/O.
4 Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the
following items are pertinent:
a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then
Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a
meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.
· Colonel White explained that the Technical Services
Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance
to the FBI for a sensitive project
sub- ·
Colonel White did not dis-
close the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD
but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual
matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information
concerning the mission or purpose of Project
stantive questions concerning the subject should be
addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished
for the FBI-are-reported below. Specific mention is made,
however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap-
proximately $1 million, and the complex technical equip-
ment that has been involved in the undertaking.
b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two
requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reim-
bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television
cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200
is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of
these requirements pending further instructions which
will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
and Services.
C. Over the years, this Agency has often supported
other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel
standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved
request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency
would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for
the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by
the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are
legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This
Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
vide a service for, another Government agency when such
EYES ONLY
SECRET
00112
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 42
LIEU VI:LT
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
action would be more economical and eliminate the need for
one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities
readily available from another. A typical example of this
procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the
Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In
connection with the current reporting requirement, however,
I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and
Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
relevant to the subject of this memorandum.
2.
In connection with the disclosures during the sum-
mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly
safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook
two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West
Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 ….
to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy
himself that classified material furnished them by the
Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.
His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior
Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a
letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified
information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual
interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents
of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-
Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.
This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly
disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation
but that instructions had been issued to cease
distribution of classified reports. While no
other direct dissemination went to Rand, other
USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing
"many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as au-
thorized under USIB regulations. The memoran-
dum also states that Rand personnel had
requested searches and document retrieval from
the CRS facility.
5. In connection with action taken for the Office of
Security, there are three relevant items:
1
a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested
by the Office of Security to print a book written by
Harry J Murphy, Office of Security. The book was pre-
pared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution Federal
EYES ONLY
SECRET
00113
NW 88296.Docld:32989624 Page 43
"
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
.
Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's
What - Sources of Information for Federal Investigators."
It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-
formation that may be useful to an investigator. The
book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967.
Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made
in September 1968. The title page of the book gives
attribution to H, Office of Security, Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal
Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential,
and it is our understanding that the distribution was made
to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government.
A copy
of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if
desired.
Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested
that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at
LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It
was the intent of LEMA to make broad-scale distribution
to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director
of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
determined that the LEAA request should not be honored be-
cause the Agency should not put itself in the position of
publishing law enforcement material for general and un- .
classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-
ing facilities.
b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security re-
quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor
vehicles for use in connection with a special support
operation which would last approximately 3 months. The
Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memo-
randum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has
been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director
· and has his personal approval." The request was approved.
C. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has
requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of
materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by
them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some
of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in
other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made
by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete
listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 44
S
EYES ONLY
SECRET
00111
SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
.Logistics
6. In connection with the responsibility held by this
Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all
Agency operating components, the following information is .
relevant.
a.
A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 562" which
is Iden 88
'was made available to General Cushman's
office on 23 July 1971.
The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970
as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site
and in keeping with the approved requirement for a com-
plement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use.
The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older
high-rise building along Iden 89.
The nominal
lessee is Iden 90
a security-cleared
Iden 91
attorney with offices located at
· The cover story utilized is that
Iden 90, rents the apartment for business conferences,
meetings, and occasional overnight stays by his staff
and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term
was for a 1-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,
with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby
safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency
components to meet their short-term or crash requirements.
Control of the standby safe site and its security is the
responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of
each user, component, and date of use; however, no record
is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what
purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.).
Such information is maintained by the operating component
requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this
Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made
available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971 in
answer to a telephonic request.
b.
This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance
nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami
Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National
Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National
Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as
a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were
in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 45
6
EYES ONLY.
SECRET
00115
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant
operating component on this matter.
7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.
i
2 Atts
CC: DD/M&S
John F. Blake
Director of Logistics
-NW-88296 Docld:32989624 Page 46
EYES, ONLY
SECRET
1
__
00116
OLURLI
EYES ONLY
Requesting
Office
Date of
Request
Item
Quantity
Unit Cost
Receiving
U.S. Depart
ment or Agen
OS
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzer.
1
TSD
5/16/72
Transmitters, Radio Beacon
8.
1,350
313
BNDD
BNDD
OS
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzer.
1
˚ 1,350
White House
00118
Communicatio
Agency
Air Force
OS
˚ 3/23/72
Telephone Analyzers
13
1,400
OS
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzers
10
1,350
| State
OS
3/23/72
Telephone Analyzers
2
1,375
ABC
TSD
11/16/72
Camera Sets
20
656
FBI
TSD
4/17/72
Camera Sets
.10
700
FBI
TSD
11/18/71
Actuators, Recorders
50
488
FBI
TSD
4/19/72
Tessina Cameras
3
700
BNDD
TSD
12/7/72
Camera, Video
1
18,045
FBI
TSD
10/13/72
Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance,
Equivalent of W L 30691
1
4,639
FBI
TSD
3/26/71
Tubes, Image, W L 30691
2
4,607
FBI
TSD
4/20/73
Cameras, Television
2
18,300
FBI
SENSI
WALKING HOTICE
AN. SOURCES
NW 88296 Bocid:32989624, Page A7
EYES ONLY
SECRET
atarbir o me..001777
SEGRET
EYES ONLY
Requesting
Office
Date of.
Request
Receiving
U.S. Depart-
Item
Quantity
Unit Cost
ment or Agenc
TSD
12/14/72
Transmitters, Radio
3
313
BNDD
TSD
10/20/72
Actuators, Recorder
25
591
FBI
TSD
10/13/72
Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance,
Equivalent of W L 30691
1
4,639
FBI
TSD
5/26/71
Tube, Image, W L 30691
2
4,639
FBI
TSD
4/22/71
Transmitters'
M
1,372
FBI
TSD
4/22/71
Module, Plug-In
1
1,247
FBÍ
TSD
4/22/71
Power Supply UWP-39A
-
1
568
FBI
OL
2/25/71
Telephone Analyzers
2
1,350
Treasury
OS
1/30/71
Telephone Analyzers
22
1,350
Treasury
OL
8/12/70
Cable, Special-Purpose
Electrical
5,000 ft.
.42
00113
White House
Communication
Agency
Immigration a
TSD
1/10/73
Ink, Special Formula
1 lot
1,825
Naturalizatio
Service
TSD
6/28/72
Ink, Special Formula
1 lot
3,700
Immigration »
Naturalizatio
Service
TSD
7/26/71
Transmitter, Radio Beacon
l
728
U.S. Forestry
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 48
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PEPPLY
LIES ONLY
OJCS-594-73
11 MAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
THROUGH
SUBJECT
: Deputy Director for Management and Services
: Activities which might be considered sensitive
issues.
I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of
Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which
might be considered sensitive issues.
Most Sensitive Projects
OJCS
Project
Identification
HYDRA
Project Officer
Organization, &
Telephone
Richard Ober
CI Staff
Red 1465
SANCA
Iden 48
OS
Red 9298
ORDSTAT
John Hutchings
ORD
3061
Nature
of
OJCS
Reason for
Listing
Project
A special pro-
ject initiated
by DCI
Machine
index to
security files
Information
storage & re-
trieval of drug
related data
Type of
data being
collected.
Type of
data in
index.
Type of
data in
files.
(ORD's project
OFTEN)
Sensitive Projects
DRUGGS
Iden 18
OMS
7792
Computer file
of drug data.
Type of
data in
file.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 49
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00135
2
036490;
IMPCET CL BY.
'
Sensitive Projects (Continued)
OJCS
Project
Project Officer
Organization, &
Nature
OJCS.
of
Identificat
Telephone
Proj
PROFILES-
John Winnie
Statistical
Reason for
Listing
Source of
TSD
362-1922
analysis of
psychological
data. Con-
(sterile)
data.
tractors are
involved
with project.
Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern
TILAQ
Robert Hahn-
SB
Red 1185/
1251
Pattern
analysis of
surveillance
data from
Nature of
data. Tech-
niques of
system dis-
foreign liaison
sèrvice
cussed with
SPYDER
George
Data on
Swegman-
radio frequen-
OS
cies used for
5071
DMVREC
Iden 48
OS
APREGIN
Red 9298
Walter-
Kowalski
CI Staff
Red 9338
support of In-
Place Monitor-
ing System, a
system to identify
unauthorized
transmitters.
File of auto-
FBI.
Project
originated by
James McCord.
Nature of
data.
mobile license
numbers.
File of Agency
applicants who
Nature of
data.
were not
hired.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 50
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SECRET
00136

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)
OJCS
Project
Identification
Project Officer
Organization, &
Telephone
Iden 187
ISD/DDO
Red 1442
Nature
of
Projec
Cooperative
program with
Iden 188
OJCS
Reason for
Listing
Association
with the
named
organization.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 51
in
name grouping
techniques.
W. Dagher Chunersen
Fo
JOHN D. LAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support
3
EYES ONLY⠀
SECRET
00137
SL J3289/73
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD).
Office of Communications, Operational
Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies
1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit,
which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact
with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police
and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support
to these activities in monitoring, identification and
DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by
foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater
Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made
through the DDO's Chief, WH, Miami.
2.
In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/
DDO, requested that the Special Programs Division initiate
a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial
telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America.
The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of
interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of
the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,
the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92.
Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-
cepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the
intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage
was terminated by Division D because of possible legal
complications.
3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special
Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal
technical liaison with operating components of the FBI
for a number of years.
Initial contacts and arrangements
for support of specific activities have been made by the
Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of
Downgraded to sunt
en 6/7/16 per auto alecki-es
-Build 
713745780
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 52
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT
E2 IMPDET CL BY 061947
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA COMINT. CHANNELS
00140
I SEGRET
S. 03289/73
8 May 1973
exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical
assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment.
In the past several years, support has been rendered to
sensitive FBI projects MCHAWK, UNION and WUGRAVEL. Support
has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID
and ROSE. These projects are described in the attached
sealed envelope.
4.
An operational test of an NSA-developed HF/DF
system was jointly conducted by NSA, Division D/DDO and
OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972.
A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the
tests because of similarity to the actual target site and
environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on
the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site.
A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the
roof. A team member in effect told him that the group
was an advance security segment for the Democratic National
Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests
were completed and the equipment was returned to the
Washington area.
Att.
Downgraded to Shent
M
14/7/16 punts declose
"Guild J13745780
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 53
signed Iden 53
Chief, Special Programs Division, OC
TOP SECRET
HANDLE VIA CORNT CHANNELS
2
00141
MOHAWK-
-T
JINION.
-
ORKID
-ROSE
WUGRAVEL
-
SENSITIVE
9 May 1973
Electronic survey of Iden 63.
This operation was terminated approximately two'
months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for
two days.
en 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by
the Iden 94 Embassy on their diplomatic communi-
cation link. SPD/SEO support terminated two
years ago.
Electronic surveillance of Iden 64
Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning
at this time, (attendance at two meetings).
Electronic surveillance of Iden 62
SPD/CMT personnel performed an
electronic search of the Iden 62 area and SPD/SEO
personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording
○ of the spectrum covering 1-to-.6 GHz during the
period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for contin-
ued support by SPD in the future as requested.
Division D operation involving a Ider 95 code clerk.
SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in
use of device and stood by in Iden 97,
Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed.
The operation took place in July 1972.
HANDLE FLA ORMIRT CHANNELS
Downgraded to sment
auto cledess
03 6/7/16 par
NW8829303132989624 Page 54
D&P SHOKET
001
00142
SENSITIVE
12325574
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
29 May 1973
: Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to
Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
· in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S
: D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,
Subject: Watergate Principals Direct or
Indirect Involvement
-
1. The two notes of 13
by the DCI (at that time Mr.
for a sensitive CS project.
asked that DDO records be
and 20 January 1972 refer to approval
Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K
No further details were given, Mr. Colby
checked.
2. .DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a
project called Iden 99. This is a joint operation with the Iden 100
service for the collection of ELINT intelligence. The activity is
handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff.
:
3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to CI on
13 January 1972. It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that
the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount,ic., $30 to 32K
and not to two separate allocations.
даваше
Richarde
John C. Richards
00145
SECRET
2
E__ IMPORT CL BY.
NW-88296 Docid:32989624 Page 55
اران در اینجا که نار
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
May 1973
Executive Bogaming
3-37
2581
Deputy Director for Management and Services
-
Watergate Principals Direct or Indirect
Involvement
:
1.
This memorandum responds to the Director's request for
a report of any involvement in any capacity since 1 January 1969
with Messrs. Hunt, McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.
2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.
3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime
during the late 1960's when I was Director, Office of Computer
Services. I opposed plans for Technical Division, Office of
Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for
Iden 101.
Ted Hines of DD/S&T (then ORD)
was the computer individual working with TD and, I think, would
have details.
4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his
request, first through ONE, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf
of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. Indi-
vidual phone discussions are noted in the attached.
focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3;
Iden 3
The Agency
I understand
Copics of
has forwarded relevant documentation.
memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached
also.
5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to
all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will
not be available until tomorrow.
O\P\CV-8=\:: 29(3371712)
J D\ESR EÀL² QUJÀ BIJG
JME Cop
Q4 & 8 ]
-
-
iqqX.226F
Dapou:
/s/ Charles A. Briggs
Charles A. Briggs
Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting
Attachment
As stated
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 56
SECRET
00149.
BY CATE
IMPDET CL BY LO
4 Feb 72
7 Feb 72
7 Feb 72
Achment
23 May 1973
Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud" Krogh and his deputy,
Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign
travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was
alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the
travel.
Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips for 3 individuals--
all in FY 72. Cost probably $10K. Minnick ready to make
first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran
visit.
See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and
follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Colby
(2 Aug 72).
12(7) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/
Minnick attendance at a Latin American den 102
conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd.
ཨརིཔཾསམྦ ་ ཎོ
White House, was laying on with Iden 32 for
himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Europe.
23 Jun 72
6 Jul 72
2 Aug 72
1 Nov 72
Iden 3
commented on Krogh/Minnick interest
in getting CA activities, including large-scale PM,
on narcotics front. Iden 3
pushing small-scale PP.
Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film.
We will send.
H
Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel
orders ready; need money this FM (No record in my
notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint
recollection of its being to Mexico City). Sam Hines
and, Iden 73.
contacted by Iden 3.
>
Related? Iden 3 call. Again notes are cryptic:
WH/GAO-Grace Iden 32): Survey ENDD problems/
Mexico.*
:
00150
SECRET
-NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 57
On Mr. Colby's copy only:
13 Jan 72
20 Jan 72
ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30K for sensitive
CS project no details.
Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 58
:
SECRET
100151
19 Jul 972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman
•
1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I
dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida.
Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due
to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for
about 20 years prior to his retirement.
2. During a private conversation Jack told me that he had
been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with
the McCord-Hunt affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed,
and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard
Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security
Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in
January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt
who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Jack
furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him.
Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt
that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in
such activity.
3. According to Jack, during the meeting with Mr. Hunt
they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time
they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program
and a need for a good security system both before and during the
National Convention. Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that
the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security
programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even.
though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a
problem.
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES CWY
CLASSIFIER 37 Û316 - 16
00153
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATIO
GF E. C. 152. EXEMPTION CATEGOR
ASSE
Causal & Der
(less pel date
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 59
4. When Jack declined, he indicated that Mr. Hunt asked
for any other rect mendations he might have. According to Jack
he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the
Agency, but he did furnish the name of! IDEN-108 who might be
possibly ready to retire from the Agency.
5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau
obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He
said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions
and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning
his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, Jack
said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any
knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.
6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch
with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of
the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-
sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being
removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as
originally reported.
7. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr.
Bauman, and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the
matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name
connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation
took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion
relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record
and for information of the Director of Security.
NW 88296. Docid:32989624 Page 60
Charles W. Kane
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY
00153

DD/M&S 73-1809
loth
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT
> : Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter
1. I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central
Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such
significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with
the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of
such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the
proper format to do so.
2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the
Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former
Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In
December 1971 Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he
wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's
home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a
former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call.
I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message.
I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his
home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for
relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of
little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the
Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate
situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from
Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the
Record prepared by Iden 17 as a result of our conversation.
3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida
and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in
a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the
FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact
00155
SECRET
2
011018
E..
IMPOET CL BY...
WARNING LOTICE
SENSITIVE
COURSES
AND METHCS INOLVED
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 61
EYES CITY NEUR
(2)
with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported
this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for
the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the
memorandum is attached.
4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with
the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor
have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related
matters now receiving attention in the press.
Atts
Charles W. Kane
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director
for Management and Services
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 62
ཁ་་་།་
EVES CHAN SECRET
:
1
:
00150
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Charles W.. Kane
Iden 108
17 July 1972
.
1. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con-
tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects
worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests
of this nature were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the
subjects..
2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on
the "Watergate" case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry.
Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement
and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.
3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised
of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that
the Bureau does not wish to interview them.
4. The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108
the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interviewed.
Alrial &
آه
in
The five
2 7/21
.5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence
and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July.
I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.
"
6. Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to
how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen
Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was
the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 63
00160
by the fact that Mr Kane accompanied a technic
sweep team
to the Montevideo station. Mr. Kane stated further that around
Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman
who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked
· Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained
Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels
whereupon he passed the number on to Mr. Bauman.
7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman
has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the
current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may
have obtained his name from him.
-NW-88296 -Docld:32989624 Page 64
signed Iden 17
Deputy Director of Security
00161
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR: ·
Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH:
SUBJECT:
8 May 1973
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities
1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved
in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:
a. CI Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data
of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists,
etc.
b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program
for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American
Medical Association records.
c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern
listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.
2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from
New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on
data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).
3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with
possibly sensitive domestic overtones.
a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University
System."
Iḍen 103
for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction
b. DDS&T/ORD's Project
which involved the collection
of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms
terminated this program last Fall.
NW-88296 Docid:32989624 Page 65
SECRET/SENSITIVE
00163
:
CONFIDENTIAL 3-2
1 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SILJECT: Research Project on Robert Vesco
2.
:
On 15 October 1972 Hessrs. Freckinridge and Heintzelman,
in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the
Atlantic/Pacific Division of the Office of Economic reports. One
project cited was a overy from the Director, apparently at the re-
quest of Secretary Shults, to the effect, "What do we know about
Vesco," the man then running IOS. Two of OIR's analysts were assigned
to the project and, working through the Domestic Contact Dervice, ·
spent a day going over the files of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. There apparently was some contact also with EUR Division
of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current
Intelligence.
2. The information above is based on rough notes and obviously
is sketchy. It is cited now not to suggest any wrongdoing but because
of the current publicity about Vesco and the probability of continuing
probes into the subject by the press and the courts.
Scott D. Freckinridge
H. Henry Heintzelman
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 66
00173
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
Bill--
22 May 973
○ Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:
1. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68,
Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).
This document was produced in two versions--one
with the chapter on radical students in America (pages
25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,
and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the
other version without the references to the American
scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the
Agency. This document without the material on the
US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent ·
to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more
abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General
in March 1969.
2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969),
No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).
3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look
(12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign
Dissem (Copy 98).
Please note that these are our record copies and should
be returned.
# I - A
4/10/77.11.
Attachments
Edin !?!! Proto
Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 67
SECRET/SENSITIVE
00171
2.
CL BY
013329
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 68
D. 3/17/94 1980 SRM/sel
DHC
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM
SUBJECT
: Deputy Director for Intelligence
: Activities Possibly Outside CIA's
Legislative Charter
1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to
report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's
legislative charter.
2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate
have reviewed the past and present activities of their components.
I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any
activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into
the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with
three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were
reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two
improper activities:
Hunt:
Mitchell:
Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked
to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation
of a recommendation in support of the Agency's
nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National
Civil Service League Award.
While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General,
an OCI officer was assigned the task of
providing him with daily briefings on
foreign developments.
སྒྱུའམ༔
PICI
0:1.3/17/94.
Per GMB
9803 Ros/gel: 00183
980300s/gel
(FK)
Clorited by
¨U13329¯
APPROVED FOR PEACE 1903
CIA HISTORICAL NEVIEW PROGRAM
GMB 3/3/94
(9803 RAD/fel 3/17/94 JFK)
NW-88296-Docid:32989624 Page 69 .
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
Young:
Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS
had frequent contacts with Young during the
summer of 1972 in connection with Executive
Order 11652 and the implementing NSC
directive. This involved visits by Young
to CIA to discuss information storage and
retrieval and several meetings of an inter-
agency group dealing with the implementation
1 of the Executive Order and directive.
3. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported
domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.
Thar responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly
within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be
- viewed as borderline.
-
-
DCS collects information on foreign students studying
in the US.
DCS collects information on physicians practicing in
the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign
nationals).
DCS accepts information on possible foreign
involvement in US dissident groups and on the
narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal
with the FBI and BNDD directly.
DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of
US citizens to cooperate with CIA.
DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973,
was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas
calls.
1
Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques and methods.
NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery
from NASA programs to identify photography
too "sensitive" for public release.
-2-
00181
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 70

NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special
purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil
disturbances.
OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence
memoranda on possible foreign connections with
the US anti-war movement and world-wide student
dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of
the White House.
CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining
the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to
the Soviet, and occasionally other foreign, embassies
to acquire positive foreign intelligence.
FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work
directly for another agency, c.g., to the FBI to
translate Arabic in Washington.
FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports
covered by copyright. These are circulated within
the Government and stamped "Official Use Only".
This has gone on for three decades without problems.
FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio
broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens
such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda,
and Ramsey Clarke.
FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service
under Department of Commerce cover since 1957.
JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of
unclassified publications in foreign languages
and contracts with private individuals to do this
work. Most of these individuals are not witting.
of the CIA-J PRS relationship.
Attachments
-3-
Edward W
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 71
00182
SECRET
CTA INTERNAL USE ONLY
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
Director of Central Intelligence.
Deputy Director for Intelligence
: Director of Current Intelligence
: Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism
in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on
black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean
and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states.
Two DDI. memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black
Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black
Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970).
In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the
US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned
visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power
activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.
2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to
write a memorandum with special attention to links be-
tween black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of
black power in the US. The record is not clear where
this request originated, but it came through channels
from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially
sensitive and was to include material provided by the
Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff
material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful
evidence of important links between militant blacks in
the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of
the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced
in typescript form and given to the DCI.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 72
26th
SECRET.
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
Clasifed by „C2327
Exempt for natten sched
Option cae, WS.
53 (12)
o reite one or m2)
ACCN820 en
tunless inget so evqula
00183
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
3.
•
For several months in the first half of 1968
the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda
on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period
when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection
is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only,
although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 73
Richard Lehman.'
Director of Current Intelligence
SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
00183
SUALITE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT:
DCS Domestic Activity
7 May 1973
To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any
activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as
illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f
(i) of providing operational support within the US to all
elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are
perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if mis-
interpreted.
For example:
1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain
foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and
officials.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Identify foreign students in the US through collection
of foreign student lists from certain universities.
Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens
to determine their suitability and willingness to
cooperate with the Agency.
Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians
to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA
credentials.
Collect information on possible foreign involvement.
or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a
passive manner and only when the source has refused
to pass the information directly to the FBI.
6. Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again
only in a passive manner when the source has refused to
pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.
1
00381
SECRET/CELGITIVE
2 IMPET CL BY!!!
00-4176
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 74
J.
SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity
7. Collect specific information and supply duplicate or
master keys for foreign hotels.
8.
9.
Collect medical information from cooperative contacts
on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment
or examinations in the US.
•
Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing
in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were
foreign nationals, some were US. The taped information
included school, present' business address, date of birth,
and specialty.
10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas
telephone calls between persons in the US and persons
overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points
routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted
for approximately six months but has ceased.
j
11.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 75
This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques and methods.
R
炒
JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service
-2-
SECRET/CEEISTRIVE
00185
SECRET
EYES ONLY
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
: .
:
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Current Intelligence
Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then
Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of
worldwide student dissidence. Confronted by timult at
campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence
accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University
and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful
dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes;
financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences
hostil to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely
to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.
2. The paper was prepared by Paul Corscadden of OCI
with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI,
D/OCI, and Corscadden met with Rostow to elicit the reasons
for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the
sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed,
etc.
3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most
sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections.
The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest,
its motivation, histor; and tactics. This section drew
heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students
for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense,
the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page)
typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same
author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's request in
December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)
Chassifed by 025877
00193
Excerpt from real dadaitration schedule
* or mere)
SECRET
EYES ONLY
32
an pinyina amaneted on
EMINE
Disertate or eve
NW-88296 Docld:32989624-Page-76-
:
SECRET
EYES ONLY
4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign
student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which
then monopolized the field of student action here and
abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--
ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself
as a review of foreign student dissidence.
5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the
full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-
wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be
in the Johnson Library.
Following the paper's favorable reception by
the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC
on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently
was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.
7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in
September 1968 and then updated and issued again in
March 1969 and August 1970.
NW-88296-Docld:32989624 Page 77
Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence
SECRET
EYES ONLY
00191
SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
FROM
SUBJECT
:
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
: Director of Current Intelligence
Activity Related to Domestic Events
1. In late 1967 OCI participated in the preparation
of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the
foreign connections of US organizations and activists in-
volved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of
these reports, prepared at the request of the White House,
was to determine whether any links existed between inter-
national Communist elements or foreign governments and the
American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that
there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti-
war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of
direction or formal coordination.
2. In October 1967 President Johnson expressed
interest in this subject and ordered a high level inter-
departmental survey. In response to his personal request
to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect what-
ever information was available through our own sources and
through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which
was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the
President.
3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations
to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this
subject. Although agent reports on Communist front opera-
tions overseas were of some value, the primary source of
information on the activities of US activists--and that was
quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA,
which had been similarly tasked by the White House.
Ciscited by ds20
G:
TOP
SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY
7
x from general dentation sched de
0.1meia ca 20:3
TAMA. Ne vir morty
Downgraded to secut
on 6/7/16 per auto declass
Guild J13745780
-NW-88296-Docld:32989624 Page 78
te or event)
00193
SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY
4.-`A druft memorandum was jointly prepared by
He passed
OCI and CI Staff and forwarded to the DCI.
this typescript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the
President personally. The White House copy 
is now 
in
the fius of President Johnson's papers at the library
in Austin.
no
15:1 Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and
forwalued to the White House on 21 December and 17
Janua:: 1968. According to our best recollection
,
furthe finished intelligence reports on international
connections of the peace movement were produced.
!.!.
Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 79
TOP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY
0019-1
:
MEMORANDUM FOR:
O/DDI
SUBJECT:
7 May 1973
Involvement In Domestic Affairs
1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's
request for a listing of any questionable
involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe
that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable
man could construc as improper.
2. CRS does, of course, have several programs
to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes
and books either privately, secretly or without
acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user.
CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking
at the content of film cans addressed to the
Russian Embassy in Washington. Customs occasionally
also provides access to other film from denied
areas. It may be addressed to private citizens
or organizations or other embassies. These efforts
are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign
information.
3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S.
citizens or organizations. The biographic file-
building criteria specifically excludes U.S.
nationals unless the person has become of such
major importance in the political life of a foreign
country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge,
only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of
the opposition leader of Guyana and the other
is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include
some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we
have no way to separate them; we have files on
U.S. defectors to Cuba.)
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 80
SECRET
E IMPOET OU BY..
004050
00137

SEC.21
:
SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs
4. The CIA Library has several informal
snag files intended to aid the librarians in
answering the kinds of questions that they know
they will get on a continuing basis. An
appointments file is a collection of clippings
on appointed federal officials: who holds what
job when and what is his background? The extremist
files are a collection of folders on a variety
of organizations and a few people with intricate'
organizational links. Any sort of extremism
is grist for these particular files. And a few
persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver,
have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of
clippings from public media. These files are
unclassified and consist mostly of clippings
from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground,
scholarly.
5. I am not aware of any other kind of
involvement in domestic activities that is not
related to development of techniques or logistics
or legitimate training of CRS personnel.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 81
水
که
H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service
-2-
SECRET
00383
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:' DDI
SUBJECT
Sensitive Activities
May 1973
1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg
and Watergate cases.
2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From
time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of
Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving
close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion
recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several
FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-
term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg
of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and
that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS
participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with
the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help
in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of
an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe
recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another
Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training
of Chinese Nationalist cadets.
3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-
missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes
some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel,
and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled
by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without
specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's NCNA,
are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restric-
tion. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the
Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house,
correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private
point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of
material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official
Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor
from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright,
e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the
Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news
00202
P.
SECRET
ISIDA
2 IMPOET CLAY 01435
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 82
له
x
SECTET
agency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently,
however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use
Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under
the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into
alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services
with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of
those items vital to the government's business which we must continue
to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against
the risk of present procedures.
4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often
involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio
facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American
POW's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam.
At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the
approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion sub-
mitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as
part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such
cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved,
presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses.
(In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as
an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged
with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this
with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we
rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered
policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.
5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations
is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research
Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which
great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could
be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United
States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA
employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some
risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public
knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after
consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive
Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently
taking a second look.
Esiknoche
E. H. KNOCHE
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
-2-
SECRET
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 83
SANSITIVE
00203
"SECRET
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology
: TSD Support to Other Agencies
SUBJECT
1.
Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires
that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and
other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for
Operations.
2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this
support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department
of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency
for International Development, and the White House.
3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these
services have included training and materials, and in a few in-
stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance,
secret writing and related communications, personal protection,
disguise,
concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-
tion, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.
4. In most instances requirements for this support are
received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director
or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved
is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the
Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for
coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels.
Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development
and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is re-
quired.
5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to
the organizations named in Paragraph two.
SECRET
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 84
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059098
00215
i
:
-
2
This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques and methods.
8.
Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters,
whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires
approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance
would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group
Xt Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for
coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated
with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration
and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs
Staff.
9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must
be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has
been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support
until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material
is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded
of the outstanding documentation.
Attachment
Distribution:
O & 1 Addressee, w/att
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 85
li lz
Sidney Gottlieb
Chief
Technical Services Division
SECRET
00216
ATTAC MENT
Department of Defense
Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,
flaps and seals} counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses
have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department
of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests
are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at
Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn
these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities
documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing
systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected
audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type
cases.
Federal Bureau of Investigation
At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau
in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign
targets in the United States.
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for
overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,
SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel
responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.
All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination
with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.
Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his
designee before action by TSD is taken.
Immigration and Naturalization
CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in
developing tamperproof alien registration cards, special
fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests
are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if
technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper-
ational.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 86
SECRET
00217
Department of State
Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United
States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring
and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been
supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and
exposure of black letter operations against the United States
abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded
to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The
Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,
foreign visas and in the past passports on a priority basis.
Postal Service
1
The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected
personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has
been furnished foreign postal information and has been the
recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent
ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with
the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office has furnished TSD
with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities
for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have
an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert
a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.
Secret Service
Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential
campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID
photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval
for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for
Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.
U. S. Agency for International Development
We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical
Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border
Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under
Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation
is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are
given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 87
:
- 2.
-
00213
request of CI/PG. Trainees represent internal security or
national police from all countries participating in AID Police
assistance programs.
White House
Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great
Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy
Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.
Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and
Alexandria
During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes.
reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio,
locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry
were given to selected members from the above mentioned
cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of
Centeral Intelligence and in turn validation was required for
each course from the Director of Security.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 88
00210
SECRET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
SE CHLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
Sidney Gottlieb
Chief, TSD
203 South Building
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
DDS &T
2.
3.
4.
5:
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM
410 PREVIOUS
NW 88296 Bocla:32989624 Page
624 
PSEDET
DATE
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
EXTENSION
NO.
X-2831 DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
8 May 1973
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from when
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Attached herewith are additional
explanations of TSD support to
other U.S. Government agencies,
SECCET-EVES CITY
3
"
00220
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
ULUTET
ATTACHMENT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
the past few years.
TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over
The FBI is the only organization that has
been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The
following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were
involved in operations:
(A) Identity 59
Four masked transmitters were
installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.
(B) Identity 60
(C)
A TSD built masked transmitter
was installed to collect emanations from a crypto-
graphic machine. The system continues to function
when samples of the emanations are needed.
Identity 61
Two transmitters have been
installed and are operating. One is specifically
designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the
other is a straight audio transmitter to collect con-
versations. A FBI agent is manning the listening
post. A third system
is not oper-
ating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape
made from this room
was made by the National
Security Agency before failure.
(D) Identity 62
sultation covering
TSD furnished equipment and con-
Identity 62
First masked switched trans-
mitters were used in two apartments used as tempor-·
ary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters
and microwave transmitters were installed in the
permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa-
tions, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This install-
ation is not fully operational because the full comple-
ment of personnel have not yet arrived.
SECRET
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 90
00221

SLUTL
(E) Iden
This is an operation with additional
participation by National Security Agency. It is
designed in anticipation of the Identity 64
in Washington. The listening post was
obtained by using the Agency covert mechanisms
for procuring the property. New systems are
being designed and produced by using TSD's covert
contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.
(F) Identity 65
Ten masked audio devices pur-
chased from TSD were installed in Identity 65
by the FBI. Part of the equipment was install-
ed in November and December 1971, the remaining
equipment was installed 17 25 March 1972. Tests
made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI
listening post on 8
-
9 November 1972, proved that
the target equipment no longer functioned and was
believed discovered by the occupants.
(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute
an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and
audio surveillance operations which might not be
known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a
relatively unsophisticated device was used against
a domestic target.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 91
- 2
-
SECRET
}
00222
!
SECRET
TSD/SDB Memo #3138-73
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD
ATTENTION:
SUBJECT:
1.
Executive Officer
Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations
In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB
provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for
selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police
departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County
police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the train-
ing came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.
2. On occasion during the past few years, under the
auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff
and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiari-
zation to police officers of several domestic police
departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection
Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These tech-
niques had been declassified and are currently available to
the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center
publishes periodic guidance in their uses.
3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities
in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB offi-
cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate
covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City
police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the
Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB offi-
cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference
in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the
recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison
with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete in-
formation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the
✓
Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.
/s/ Identity 120
C/TSD/OPS/S
1
00223
E2 IMPDET/CL BY 06198
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 92
---
Vinil
73-23841
ORD-2328-73
9 MAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
:
Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-
Foreign Intelligence Activities
The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined
with respect to all ORD services or dealings with
other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. In
addition, this report covers all our activities deal-
ing with the research and development of intelligence.
equipment for foreign use which has been tested in
the United States and might have collected domestic
information. Again, each member of ORD available
today was asked either directly or through his super-
visor to provide the above requested information,
whether he was directly involved or not. We have
used all diligence to search our records available
to us during this time period to ensure this is a
complete and factual list.
Attachments:
for Sayre Stevens
Director of Research & Development
1 - Contacts with Other
2
-
Government Agencies
Domestic Tests
SENSITIVE
NW 88296 Docld:32989624-Page 93°
CLASSIFIED BY
EXT
387323
= cruce)
(unlas „one or extaty
TE SUMATES
SECRET
00220
CONTACTS WITH HER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH
COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED
TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
Executive Office of the President
ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee
of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics
Control that is concerned with research support of
the narcotics control problem.
(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST)
Office of Telecommunications Policy
(Cianci/LS)
Technical surveillance countermeasures and
physical security information was exchanged with
them.
(Noe/TA)
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
Techniques and equipment for navigation and
tracking was discussed with BNDD.
(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)
(Van Dewerker/TA)
(Noe/TA)
Technical information was exchanged relating.
to the development of simple, portable sensor systems
for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and
narcotic laboratory effluents.
(Mr. John Gunn and
Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD)
(Parker/DSP)
Audio tapes were processed to improve their
intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.
(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)
(Scott/An)
00220
SECRET
ATTACHMENT 1
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 94
SUBJECT:
SECRET
Cont Its With Other U.S. Gove ment Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
BNDD (cont'd)
BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972
to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning
a Radar People Detector developed for ORD.
(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) ·
Identity 125 /LS)
A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed
for the detection of narcotics for application in
Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of
the instrument.
(Dr. Laster/OST)
(Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD)
(Terek/LS)
USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee
Continuing contacts were maintained with the
intelligence community regarding technical surveillance
countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange
of information, reports, and equipment has been con-
ducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves
State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and
Navy.
State Department
(Noe/TA)
(Noyes/PD)
Two contracts for development of countermeasures
techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.
2
(Noe/TA)
00233
SECRET
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 95
SEGRET
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Some of the AEC Laboratorics, e.g., Savannah
River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop
radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and
devices. These Laboratories have used sampling
techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear
plant releases.
(Mr. B. Benson, AEC).
(Walker/DSP)
At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard
Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the
AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation
occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some
anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction
detector.
(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC)
Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)
(Noyes/PD)
Reports and information about the ORD-developed
Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System
were made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in
August 1972. If they developed the system, it would
be used for civilian crowd and riot control.
(Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA)
Identity 125 /LS)
Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical
security information were exchanged with LEAA.
3
SECRET
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 96
(Noe/TA)
i
00231
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
:
Treasury
Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department
to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization
in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug
enforcement administration. The request for his services
was made by Identity 3,
the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-
nator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the
detailing through Mr. Colby.
(Leahy/LS)
Customs/Treasury Department
Technical discussions were held with Customs relating
to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over
the U.S.-Mexico border.
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)
Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS
(Lawrence/DSP)
About five years ago, assistance was requested in
domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared
scanners. This was turned down.
(Lawrence/DSP)
Secret Service
We have had numerous discussions with the Secret
Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques
and equipment.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 97
4
(Van Dewerker/TA)
00232
1
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Gove ment Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)
The results of our research work in the detection
of metals (NOLIR) were reported to FAA for possible use
in the detection of hijacker weapons.
(MacAnlis/RP)
· National Institute of Health (NIH)
At the request of ORD, OCS assigned a staff technician
to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser
Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was
done in cooperation with NIH.
(Ms. Coniver, NIH)
Identity 125 /LS)
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order
to structure ORD's BW/CW research programs to support
ACDA needs.
Identity 125/LS)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Technical information relating to detection of
radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with
them.
(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA)
5
(Walker/DSP)
00233
SEODET.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 98
SUIT
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
:
EPA (cont'd)
Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning
equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land
fill have been conducted.
(Mr. Gene James, EPA)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
(Risinger/DSP)
At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement
techniques germane to removing distortions from some
photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request
for specific support in processing the imagery was turned
down.
(Stephan/IPA)
Secret Service
FBT
U.S. Customs
Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies
in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been
in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-
hijacking, or drugs.
(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS)
(Noyes/PD)
(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)
NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)
We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to
develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne
multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.
(Mr. William Ruble, USDA)
(Mr. Leonard Jaffe, NASA)
(General Smart)
(Galinaitis/IPA)
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 99
SEGENT
0023-1
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association
would be SECRET)
The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experi-
mental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat
crop. A part of the information would be obtained from
a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-
truth data will be collected on North American crops.
(Briglia/PAS)
U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs
CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre
plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington
state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium
poppies.
(Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA)
(Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD)
Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force, Office of the Inspector General
Army, Office of Provost Marshall General
(Lawrence/DSP)
(Cianci/LS)
We have exchanged technical surveillance counter-
measures and physical security information with them.
U.S. Army
(Noe/TA)
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant,
Toelle Ordnance Depot
LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing,
storage and production facilities in the U.S.
7
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 100
SEGTET
Identity 125/LS)
00235

SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal
LS/ORD is sharing expenses with EA in field testing
an IR remote detector of CW aerosols.
Identity 125/LS)
U.S. Navy
BSD/ORD turned over about eight trained dolphins
to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued
our dolphin program.
(Lynch/LS)
U.S. Coast Guard
About six years ago, CIA infrared equipment was
made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means
for night search of life boats.
(then Lt. James McIntosh, USCG)
(then-Lt.
Identity 174
Sheriff's Office
(Lawrence/DSP)
ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.
Polygraph security findings were compared with the
Sheriff's own security findings.
(Sheriff)
Identity 125/LS)
A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-
ment methods in 1967-68.
(Sheriff)
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 101
8
'SECTET
Identity 125/LS)
00236
SUBJECT:
Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems
Chief, San Francisco Police
For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of
a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate
Chinese social groups. (1967)
(Police Chief)
Identity 125/LS)
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 102
9
1
SECRET
00237
DOMESTIC TESTS FOR
AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
1. As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the
research and development of equipment and techniques.
for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we
conduct experiments and tests in the United States.
Clearly, the design and development of our intelli-
gence equipments can be done more economically and
more securely in this country. Although most of
the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in
closed laboratories or in secure arcas simulating
the foreign environment, some of the tests and experi-
ments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.
2.
A review of the surveillance equipment or
techniques which have at some time or other been
exposed to domestic testing is as follows:
a.
-
Laser Probe About 1967, the laser
probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in
San Francisco under very closely controlled
conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed
portions of the test. Recordings that were
made of laser probe output were carefully
controlled as classified material and it is
believed that the tapes have long since been
destroyed. (Wood/TA)
-
About
b. Microwave Intercept System
1968, this system was tested in a light air-
craft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station
in Identity 127:, California. This system is
designed to permit intercept of microwave
telephone communication channels of systems
such as Identity 130
It
works equally well against the Bell Telephone
TD-2, as they are generically the same. Re-
cordings of these telephone intercepts were
carefully controlled and were destroyed several
years ago.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 103
SECRET
ATTACHMENT 2
00230
SUBJECT:
Domestic Tests for Agency Research and
- Development Efforts.
"
.C. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objec-
tive of this current program is to develop a
means to utilize foreign telephone systems as
a communication link without the knowledge of
the host system. In order to carry out this
objective, it is necessary to learn the com-
plete supervisory signalling and sequencing
control system hierarchy for the various foreign
telephone systems. Many of these are patterned
after the U.S. system and, for this reason,
limited monitoring to test the operation of
intercept equipment in the United States is
planned. The data to be collected would be
merely the signal tones from which supervisory
codes can be extracted. Message content is
of no interest and will not be recorded. Over-
seas testing is planned at a subsequent date.
To date, some domestic testing of this concept
has been carried out at the contractor's plant.
No recordings have been made of such data. Ex-
tremely brief tests exercising U.S. and foreign
telephone systems through supervisory tone sig-
nalling have been carried out to verify initial
concepts. The duration of testing was less
than one-half hour.
-
d. Other Sensor Testing Examples of
· engineering development tests of special sensors
within the United States include infrared and
high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR
(FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial efflu-
ent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magne-
tometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks).
In all these cases, the data output of such
testing has been used for engineering develop-
ment and the content has been restricted to
dissemination to those in Government involved
with the engineering design.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 104
2
SECRET
00230
SUBJECT:
Dometic Tests for Agency Research and
Devopment Efforts
:
e. Remote Physiological Measurements
An ORD-developed cryogenic magnetometer is
being tested at a contractor's site for use
as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph).
Some test subjects are witting, but most tests
are on naive subjects (they do not know they
are being tested). The magnetometer is com-
pletely harmless to the subject and the test
results are closely helá.
-
f. Personality Structure of Defectors
Study ORD undertook to determine the per-
sonality structure of defectors during the
period 1966-69. The work primarily involved
an analysis of the open literature on known
defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned
with a study of the phenomenon of defection
itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another,
or changing one set of political beliefs for
another. The work was conducted at Stanford
University. Identity 125/LS)
g. Trained Birds Birds have been trained
and tested in the United States to carry small
intelligence collecting packages such as audio
surveillance devices, small cameras, and cur-
rent measuring devices. Any data collected
from unwitting domestic sources would have been
used only for engineering purposes and then
destroyed.
h. Communications Link Loading Study - In
the period from 1970 through 1972 various means
were used to check out an intercept system designed
to operate against Iden 93 communications links.
Under carefully controlled conditions, some U. S.
microwave communications were recorded and passed
through the intercept system under test to prove
quality of performance. All intercept material
connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks
of the time of intercept and the material was never
checked for substantive content. NSA participated
and controlled most elements of the U. S. material.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 105
3
SECRET
00240
SECRET
ORD-2274-73
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
:
Deputy Director for Science and
Technology
Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign
Intelligence Activities
At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief
or his representative was instructed to query all of
his people and report back by this afternoon whether
or not they had provided any services or dealt with
any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.
The attached list is an inventory of all items we
were able to uncover. If additional information on
any of these topics is desired, we can provide either
a verbal or a written report on very short notice.
Charbe ?. M. Dinni
Charles E. McGinnis
Scientific Advisor
to
Director of Research & Development
Attachment:
As stated
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 106
CLASSIFIED EY
337323
FIFICATION
SCHED
CALARY:
:)
AL.
N
Sysoch to Determine
(örlesz mujos ule, insert date or event)
00241
Project TAMPER, an on-going program which may be
politically sensitive.
A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be
politically sensitive.
Narcotics--our foreign activities are well known
in DDS&T.
A negative report from the Support Staff.
ORD'S NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about
three years ago.
Robert Scott
-
No action was taken, to our knowledge..
Performed intelligibility enhancement
of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.
James M. Stephan At the request of FBI, we described
Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing
distortions from some photography they had on an
alleged bank robber. Request for specific support
in processing the imagery was turned down.
NW 88296 Docld;32989624 Page 107
SECRET
00242
C. V. NOYES
7 May 197
My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance
with domestic operations has been in the field of audio sur-
veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Speci-
fically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings.
which included technology exchanges and some equipment ex-
changes on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial.
I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman
of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard
Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening,
(date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies
created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.
Other persons contacted over the years have been:
Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service
Mr. Martin Pera, U. S. Customs
Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA
Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI
Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF
Major John Langager, ONI/USN
Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC
:
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 108
SECRET
00243
1
Thomas P. Noe
5/7/73
1. Continuing contacts with intelligence community.
regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and
physical security.
This is an exchange of information and
reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the
USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.
State
Air Force
Army
Navy
US Secret Service
NSA
DIA
FBI
2. Joint funding of two contracts with State Depart-
ment (TRW/LLL). Two electret microphones were furnished
to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of
one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD
contract (Bureau of Standards).
3.
Other DOD and Government contacts for information
collection or exchange only.
ARPA
LEAA/Dept. of Justice
DNA/DOD
Office Telecommunications Policy
Office of Army/Provost Marshal General
Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force/Office of the Inspector General
Air Force/Electronic Systems Division
SIGEET
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 109
00241
7 May 1973
LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES
1. BNDA (Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive
proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector
developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action was approved by
D/ORD.
Navy.
2.
BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the
Time: December 1969
3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System.
Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA
in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for
civilian crowd and riot control.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 110
SECRET
00243

29 MAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management
Committee
SUBJECT
: Reported Identity 61
Burglary
.
1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the
reported break-in of Identity 61.
An investigative report
by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the
offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.
-
2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio
operation conducted against Identity 61
by the FBI, at the
Agency's behest and with its technical support. This presents a
related question that should be noted. James McCord's' testimony
indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity
61.
He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping
that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge
the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield,
says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure"
they "were subjects of national security wiretaps."
,
3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the
Identity 75
run by the FBI, about which CI Staff believes McCord
knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation
against Identity 61
, and assumed that it was also a telephone
tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping
that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and
that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped
because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive
operations. At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in,
and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations
may lead to exposure of the operations.
B J.
iam V. Broe
Inspector General
00351
Attachment:
As Stated Above
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 111
(unless taposible, set date or event
24 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT
: Reported Burglary of the Identity 61.
Identity 61
13-14
1. The press reported a burglary of
May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive
Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a
number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent
fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states
that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61
registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed,
Identity 61
making it clear that they suspected something other than
ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject.
There had been an earlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61
which is described below.
Identity 61
2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency.proposed to the FBI the instal-
lation of technical coverage of
The opportunity
for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign
Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid
for a contract to renovate Identity 61
Upon securing the
contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate
or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed
to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic
support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community
was cited.
3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned
down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms
sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI
turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and
national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April
the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington
Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.
00382
CL'
25078
(ies)
2 vasart date or creati
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 112
..c)
:
4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the
technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered,
installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency
personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of
equipment in
Identity 61
From May to February Agency tech-
nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions
of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did
they enter Identity 61.
5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 . be
stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and
might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61°
was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the
best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972
when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The
request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76
delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on
nationalization of foreign holdings,
While the FBI was still
in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of
State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible
coverage of Identity 61
and on 22 December 1972 coverage
was partially reinstitutėd with full coverage in effect by 26 December
1972.
6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against
the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was
not worth continuing. On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI
to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised
that microphone surveillance of Iden 61
was discontinued.
- 2 -
Johni
C. Richarde
John C. Richards
SECTUEE ཀ་བཤ་ཡ་
00363
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 113
el sin
ints
This
Τη
files, but
all out of
.
Addendum
..
ferred to in JCRichards' 24
paragraph 2, re Identity 61
1. The Foreign Resources Division asset/was
who owned the
Identity 78
hv 73 memo to IG,
Break-in
Identity 77
.
The Agency had initially agreed
to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500. The final
amount of remuneration turned out to be $4,828.53. Another FR
asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79
plumber and
elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.
2.
TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening
post were: Identity 80,
Identity 30
of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D.
and Identity 45
00368
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 114
3.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Break-in at
Identity 61
15 May 1973
SUBJECT:
1. Information has been received from WH Division
which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61
on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. The Iden 76' Desk
of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that
time.
2.
I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66
of CI Staff (Red 1731), who advised that the FBI did
have coverage of Identity 61,
and the Agency sup-
ported this operation. He indicated that this was identified
as Operation WUDOOR and he would be able to provide additional
details on this if Mr. Colby requests it.
/s/ Identity 10
Acting Executive Officer
CONFIDENTIAL
· E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008246
00371
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 115
DRIDZD
8 MAR 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Deputy Director for Operations
WII Comments on Jack Anderson Column
Jack Anderson's Washington Merry-Go-
Round Column of S March 1972: "Chilean
Break-ins Reflect watergate"
1.
WHI Division has reviewed the referenced column
(copy attached) by Jack Anderson and finds that it con-
tains no new information. To the best knowledge of the
Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that
2. Howard Hunt was engaged on behalf of ITT in breaking
into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and
New York.
2. Any connection between ITT and these break-ins
is purely conjectural and the column takes care to
point this out.
3. Harold Hendrix, ITT Latin American representa-
tive, has told us that he had no relationship with
Hunt on this or any ITT matter. He had anticipated
that Anderson might imply such a relationship in his
column and had assured us that this was not true.
Attachment: As stated
/s/ Identity 81
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division
PROVED FOR 1
CIA HISTORICAL R
GMB 3/3/94
JFK)
(9803 RAD/ged 3/17/94 JER)
DECIRECTED 57 9803 Rs/ace
11/13/12/94 per GMB (JFK)
182 LIDT
CL BY 001804
00373
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 116
USS EPS FORM 101
6/70
EALCUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE
INCIDENT REPORT
:
4. LOCATION
(NATION) I
Chile
16. REPORTED BY:
(STREET DRESS)
1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.WL.
7. ADDRESS
Hernan Navarro
10. OFFICE ASSIGNED
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
- Sergeant Riley M. Richardson
11. DATE
5. MATURE OF INCIDENT
1. SERIAL (CASE) NUMBER
DATE OCCUR
F-72-398
5-13-720-05-15-721
13. H.
Halmo
Burglary It
1706 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va.
12. HOUR
13. DAY OF WEEK
:
() () ³
M' T
8. ..OME FRONE
321-7222
9. OFFICE PRE
785-1746
ཉ S 6 (7)
Y!
T F
14. WITNESS
N/A
18. WITNESS
N/A
05-15-72
15. ADGRESS
1330 hrs.
19. ADDRESS
N/A
N/A
22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT (BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT. CONTINUE ABOVE ITEMS AS NECESSARY INDICATING ITEM)
jam
16. HOME PHONE
N/A
17. OFFICE.
WA
20. HOME PHONE
N/A
N/A
21. OFFICE PRONE
At approximately 1330 hours, Monday, May 13, 1972, Foreign Missions Division-
Control Center was advised by K.P.D.C., 3D, that a burglary had taken place at the
Chancery of Chile, 1736 Massachusetts Avarua, ILL, sometime between 1600 hours on
Friday, May 13, 1972, and on 0855 hours this date.
Sergeant Filey M. Pichardson and the undersigned were dispatched at approximately
1335 hours in Cruiser # 23.
The undersigned was advised by Mr. Hernan (MI) Navarro, Lôministrative Courestor_
of the Imbassy of Chile, that the Chancery of Chile was entered and all the offices
were ransacked. At this tire the nothod of entry or items taken is unknom.
Mr. Navarro advises that he will contact the Foreign Missions Division-Watch Courant
phen determination of missing articles is made. (continued)
(USE EPS FORM 102 SUPPLEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS)
24. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.
23. PHOTOS
☐ YES
FSE
x/s
LAST NAME
FIRST
MIDCLE
ADDRESS
(1)
RACE
SEX
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES
DATE OF BIRTH
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
LAST NAME
FIRST
MIDDLE
ACORESS
(2)
RACE
SEX
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES
DATE OF BIRTH
25. ARREST PO
25. ARREST NO.
27. ARREST OFFICER (NAME AND BADGE NO.)
:
30. INCIDENT STATUS
31. REPORTY
OPEN
(SIGNATURE), HOLD
Sergeant Stevens E. Putler
33. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED
N/A
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 117
B.}{
CLOSED
DATE
KOUR
C. ☐ UNFOUNDED
NATIONAL
NATIONALITY
28. DATE COF ARREST
29. NO
D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST
05-15-72
1500 hrs.
32. APPROVING OFFICIAL (SIGNATURE)
Bitch man
Cantain Pete 1. Manthes
DATE:
HOUR:
DATE
HOUR
34. USSS-1D CASE NO.
N/A
0
1503
00376
2. NATURE OF INCIDENT
Burglary II
3. REPORTED BY:
Herman (MT) Navarro
7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:
INCIDENT REPORT - SUPPLEM
1. SERIAL (CASE) ME
E-72-393
4. ADDRESS
5. HOME PONE
10321-7727
7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Val
6.
765-1716
The following were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifton 0. Gill, Badge # 147,
M.P.D.C.,3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, M.P.D.C.,3D, also M.P.D.C
Print Cruiser # 735.
S/A Michael F. Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.
jam
8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.
LAST NAME
FIRST 1
- MIDDLE\
ADDRESS:
N/A
(1):
RACE 1
SEX
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES 1
DATE OF BIRTH |
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
NATIONALITE
.LAST NAME
FIRST 1
MIDDLE
ADDRESS
:
(2)
RACE 1
SEX. \
HEIGHT
1
WEIGHT |
HAIR 1
EYES
DATE OF BIRTH!
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
NATIONALITY
9. ARREST PD 1
10. ARREST NO. 1
11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)
12. DATE
13. HOUP
14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTION
OPEK
S
16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION}
OPEN
B. CLOSED · 1 C. UNFOUNDED
18.CLOS
17. REFING OFAGER (SIGNATURE) |
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
NW-88296-Doeld:32989624-Page-1-18-
15. USSS-ID CASE NO.
D. CLEARED BY ARREST !
N/A
0037
Teemanthies
18. DATE
13. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)
05-15-72
Captain Pete 1. Manthos
20. CATE
05-2
2. NATURE OF INCIDENT
Burglary II
3. REPORTED BY:
Herman (IRT) Navarra
7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:.
4. ADDRESS
7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Val
5. HOME FRONE
321-7121
6. OFFE
705-1746
At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Mr. Navarro contacted Officer
Adrian Roman-Gonzalez at 1310 L. Street, N.W. and stated the following items missing:
(4 Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo AM/FM Portable Radio, two (2) Panasonic AM/FM Radi:
and one (1) Westinghouse AM/FM/SW Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver,
one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an unknown number of books.
jam
8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS, IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.
LAT NAME
FIRST 1
. MIDDLE
ADDRESS:
N/A
(1);
RACE
SEX
i
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES |
DATE OF BIRTH:
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.,
NATIONALITY
LAST NAME |
FIRST
MIDDLE
ADDRESS
(2):
RACE
SEX.1
HEIGHT
WEIGHT
HAIR
EYES 1
DATE OF BIRTH |
SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
NATIONALIT:
.S. ARREST PD 1
10. ARREST NO. |
11. ARREST OFFICER (HAME & BADGE NO.);
12. DATE
13. MOR
14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTION |
Aptyg༡cx』 -E-༼༼༠sr༠ · |
16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION
OPEN
1
.
17. REPORTING CELICER (SIGNATURE) 16
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 119
.15. USSS-ID CASE NO.
c.UNFOUNDED
D. CLEARED BY ARREST I
N/A
18. DATE
15. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)
"Fite Ma
05-15-72 Captain Pete N. Manthos
00378
20. DAT
05-15-7
1 PERSON OR PROPER: 1
14. EX. COPIES 15. DIST.
.30
16. DEAT
17. R. A.
18. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS E
1
N/A
19. DESCRIBE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PREMISE
> CHILE EMBASSY
20. VEHICLE USED TAG NO. AND STATE
21. YEAR MAKE
CODE:
MODEL COLOR(S)
A
Embassy Of Crike
3. STREET ADDRESS
1736 MASS. Ave
OYED 5. WHERE EMPLOYED OR SCHOOL ATTE
O-OWNER R-REPORTING PERSON
C-COMPLAINANT P-PARENT/GUAR
22. NAME (Last, First, M.ddie)
* NAVARRO, HERNAN
N/A
7. SEX RACE
DOB
4
9. LOCATION OF CRIME (Address)
..
8. CRIME
N.W.
G
BURG, II
1736 MASS. Ave N.Ill.
11. WEAPON, TOOL, FORCE OR MEANS USED
4
12. METHOD USED
༢
UNK
UNK
CODE RES. ADDRESS
Springfield
× 248-42"
14. HOME PROTE
N/A
6. BUS. PHONE
785-1740
10. DATE, DAY TIME
See Ten37
5.1.1-TAFS
PHOTOS
☐ YES
☐ NO
FS:
13. CLASSIFICATION
41
HOME PHONE
BUS. PINE
R 7605 HAM/e/ST. VA 321-7121 785-17;
Hamletst.
2.3.
24.
4
Ministrative
Counselen
25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUMBER (Include Nome, Address, Set, Race, Age, Height, Weight, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.)
IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (Omit description if arrested)
(1)
N/A
(2)
4
26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION ON BODY
न
28. TRANSPORTED BY
N/A
30. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN
4
UNK
33. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY
36.
Inside Embassy
le
NARRATIVE:
ITEM
NO.
31. LOSS VALUE
ار رہوں گام
29. TREATED BY
27. HOSPITALIZED – WHERE?
N/A
NA
YEAR AND MAKE
N/A
32. TRADEMARKS, ACTIONS OR CONVERSATION OF SUSPECT
134. POINT OF ENTRY 135. VEHICLE FROM TAG NO. STATE
FUNK
WHICH THEFT
OCCURRED
☐ ADMIT
☐ FELEA
(1) CONTINUATIONS OF ASOVE NEWSTE (DE) INCLUDE ROCITICIIAL SUSPECT
LINED ABOVE. (2) BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT AND ACTION TAKEN. (3) DESCRIDE OVIDENCE
PROPERTY INDICATE DISPOSITION AND DESCRIBE ALL PROPERTY INVOLVED. USE CONTINUATION RE
PORT IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED. RECORD VALUE OF LOSS ESTIMATED BY VICTIM!!.
R-1 Reports BeliveeN The hours of 1600, 5-15-72 ANd 0855,
5-15-72 The Embassy of chile was entered AND ALL TI
OFFICES RANSAKed, Unknown whaT WAS TAKEN AT THIS i
FULL Report To Follow Later,
CBU 2444 Sgt GiLL ON Scene,
PRINT CRU 735 ON Scene
OFF Leitz of E.P.S, Notified AT 1330.hrsc
9391
T.T. NUMBER
39. REPORTING OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.
DATE & TIME THIS REPORT
5-15-72 500
40. STATUS (Check One) ☐ UNFOUNDED
MS.Kordik LA ED 3770 YOPEN ☐ CLOSED ☐ SUSPENDED
43. SECOND OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.
B.L. DUNNING
PD 251 RLVISEO:3/71
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 120
44. SUPERVISOR APPROVING
UNIT & BADGE NO.
St C... Gill 147
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE USE ONLY
37 DATE/TIME TYPE NO.
33. REPRODUCE NO
41 UNIT REFERRED TO
42. UCR DISPOSITI
45. REVIEWER
WASHINGTON D'À
AJ.
00379

OGC 73-0930
.25 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Identity 61
Break In on 15 May 1972
;
1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson,
General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if hẹ
had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved
in a break in at Identity 61
in Washington, D.C. on
15 May 1972. Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but
suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and
the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive
Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identi-
fied two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from
the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated
15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest
of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy,
and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated
15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of
investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service.
I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison
man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.
2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent
Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received
a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry
about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington
Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd
District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61.
between 5:00 and 8:00 a. m. on 15 May 1972.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 121
00384
Reported loss at tha
me consisted of four am/fmradios
The police investigation identified
and one electric razor.
some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints
was made. Since the reported loss was under $5,000 and there
was no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did
not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported
that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.
J. K nep
JOHN K. GREANER
Assistant General Counsel
cc: Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
OGC:JKG:cav
Orig Subject: Watergate Case
-
1 JKĠ Signer
1 Chrono
-
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 122
-2-
00385
:
EYES ONLY
ว
1. June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby
SUBJECT:
Special Activities
1. Following our recent conversation, I have
searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples
of activities which to hostile observers or to someone
without complete knowledge and with a special kind of
motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities
exceeding CIA's charter.
2.
First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962,
DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists
Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify
their sources for classified information which was appear·
ing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared
to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me
personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA,
orally, which I did. I understand more complete information
on this operation is available from the Director of Security.
I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of
what precise actions were taken, what information was gained,
what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.
As a result of a developing relationship with
theIDEN-123representative in Washington,
3.
IDEN-122
,
and also as a result of certain information conveyed by
IDEN-124
James Angleton, with the approval of
Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation
against the IDEN-95
in Washington. This involved
breaking and entering and the removal of documents from
FYES GILY
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 123
སྙ་
23MPORT 5,007789
CL BY
00457
SECRET SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
2
the
IDEN-126
On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and
Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the
operation without going into operational details. Later
on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed.
Actual breaking and entering occurred, somewhat later, and
on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy
alone and briefed the President on the details of this
new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney
General was briefed and he agreed that he would not
mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised
it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone
with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the
operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed.
On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State
Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed
reservations about the propriety of such an operation.
He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations
with McCone on 17 April 1964. 28 May 1964, and 14 June
1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express
grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the
IDEN-95 be informed directly that we knew about their
espionage operations in the United States and ask them
to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed
these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and
President John F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara
was also present, and there is no record that he had
previously been made aware of this operation.
4. Although certain activities never got beyond
the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples
of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.
One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice
crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved
a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear instal-
lations. Outside the United States Government, General
Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which
assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by
Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence
collection effort against foreign installations in this
country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected
EXES ONLY
00453
NW-88296 Docid:32989624 Page 124
325
EYES GREET
3
ta
exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the
Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear
to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the
effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and
indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase
the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and
generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and
indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between
DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting
taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.
It is clear that the TBI was opposed to any such proposal
then, as now, and the plan never went forward..
5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in
charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office
learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured
the cooperation of several prominent US business firms
in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question
but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-
ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.
6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came
to DCJ McCone on behalf of American business interests,
offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a
favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly
after this approach. WDEN-128
of
IDEN-129
made a similar proposal to McCone in connection
with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of
the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of
American business could not be accepted. it being neither
a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business.
This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent
ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has
'forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing
to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations
and private business.
7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert
Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy,
✓ McCone injected the Agency, and particularly IDEN-36
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 125
EYES C
00459
SEGRETICE
EYES CILLY
4
into the US labor situation, and particularly to try
to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and
Walter Reuther. IDEN-36
steered a very skillful
course in this connection, but the Agency could be
vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back,
or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's
wishes.
8. There are three examples of using Agency
funds which I know to be controversial. One was the
expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing
the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of
this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike
Miskovsky
IDEN-131
and James Smith. Second,
as you well know, when Lou Concin received his summons
to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on
1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.
My impression is that the accounting for this and its
use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at
one of the early Special Group meetings attended by
McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend
Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West
Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His
general position was that such expenditures were not
within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow
such spending only on the direct personal request of
the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or
the White House.
9. I raise these issues of funding because I
remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the
House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000
for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors
to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.
10. Under the heading of old business, I know that
any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried
about the fact that conversations within the offices and
over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 126
OPO
FB
00460
SEGNET/SENSITIVE
EYES CHEY
5
tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,
his inner office, his dining room, his office in East
Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven
Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such
an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to
spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this
score.
11. Also under the heading of old business, I
well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl
Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a
contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet
Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was
a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,
and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard
officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced
with surprisingly little excitement at the time.
12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was
a special arrangement with the Office of Communications
whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA
traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after
Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal
Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy
in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball,
Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to
discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally
quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as
to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.
Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent
several weeks putting this one to rest.
13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know,
operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of
his activities could be misunderstood: One example was
his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and
Maria Callas flown from Rome to. Athens on Air Force KC 135.
Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the
attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 127
00462
EYES ONLY
6
Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for
Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety
of this action.
14. The use of
IDEN-132
aircraft
has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself
forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite
exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the
San Francisco airport for the Republican National Con-
vention in 1964 aboard the
IDEN-133
with
the highly visible tail number IDEN-134. This was, I
explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate
charter, but he didn't like it.
15.
McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen
in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a
luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps
indicative of the press's relations with him. However,
in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible
Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher
and the authors to change things. They did not change
a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing
again.
16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle
Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with
the Vatican, including Pope John X X III and Pope Paul
would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.
VI,
17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a
sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that
allegations from any quarter which cast these things in
• the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,
and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight.
If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further
details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 128
£17
00462
GlenEY/BANDITIVE
EYES CHLY
7
out that I was very much in the position of the
enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers
were aware of these activities and better able to
judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-
pretation.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 129
Welder
WALTER ELDER
j
EYES CILY
:
:
ish
00463
SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR
SECRET SENSITIVE
:
Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program
which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipu-
lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division
difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various
parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are
often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist,
and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing,
radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset
might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the
Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for
some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his
Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embar-
rassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each
case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is
kept informed on a regular basis.
NW-88296 Docid:32989624 Page 130
SECRET SENSITIVE
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061090
00483

4
CORNE
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT:
Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy
in 1971 and 1972
1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in
Washington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of
C
this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used
Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed
operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-
Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-
Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was dis-
continued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it
appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before
Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and
identify this operation as CIA instigated.
2. The operation consisted of the following three
technical devices:
a An AC- powered, masked transmitter and
two switches in the office occupied by the Deputy.
-Chief of Mission.
-
..b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the
_ office of the Ambassador's secretary which was
NW 88296 Docid:32989624-Page-131-
"SECRET
00468
-2-
designed to pick up high quality audio of typing
in the office. It was hoped to break these audio
signals into clear text using advanced computer
techniques developed by Division D. No useful
product, however, was ever obtained.
C.
A battery-powered, masked transmitter
and switch concealed in the
door of the
Embassy, which would supply crytographic information
for NSA.
(Produced excellent quality signals
until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of
battery failure.)
3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of
the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited
value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations
of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because
of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 government mission
arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level
talks with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt
- renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the -
-two-countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December
1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 132
SECRET
:
00469
SHINE
-3-
Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request
was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of
this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing
to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the
mounting disclosures about CIA involvement in LDEN-76 This
was especially so because of our reservations about maintaining
proper security for the listening post which, as with other
operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 133
00470
SECRET
SECRET
e. Alias Social Security Cards. 171 backstopped
accounts have been established for contract personnel
whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed
but who are entitled to Social Security coverage.
Following expiration of the contractual relationship,
at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts
are merged permitting the individual to receive com-
plete benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility.
f. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security
numbers have been registered for the purpose of open-
ing 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 in-
dividual tax accounts have been established with IRS
on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.
g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities
(43 corporations: 61 sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers
and 61 telephone answering service addresses are main-
tained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.
h. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliases
for signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notion-
al company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1
proprietary-hire as follows:
CCS/lqs 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8
proprietary entities and 1
notional company.
CCS/NY PMC* 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13
proprietary entities.
CCS/NY PMC*
-
CCS/MD PMC*
-
-
1 proprietary-hire (1 alias)
on 3 proprietary entities.
1 officer (2 aliases) on 2
proprietary entities.
*Proprietary Management Company
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 134
-3-
SECRET
F
00510.
sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise
of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for
this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured
bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirees
are currently being handled.
k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Non-
official Cover Torsonnel. Dividends (interest) carned
on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover
are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based
on 50 U.S. Code 403g or Internal Revenue Code Section
6041.
Individuals under cover may borrow money from the
Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; however,
the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared
lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).
Paragraph 1. deleted because it contains sensitive
Agency operational methods and techniques.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 135
-5-
i
00512
SECRET,
CORPORATE COVER
1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the
placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover
of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.S. This
process involves the selection of companies; research on
their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts
with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency;
arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the
companies, including letters of understanding; funding of
salaries, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitor-
ing of each integrated case throughout the course of the
cover use. The overall objective is to match the individual
being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner
that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and pro-
tection of the company integrity.
2.
Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover
is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in
47 foreign countries and 12 are located in the United States.
To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are re-
searching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies
at any given time.
3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating
company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in
the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has
been established policy that no more than two individuals
would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present
time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total
number of companies now being used and efforts are under-
way to effect further reductions toward the goal of one
individual per company.
4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function
described in paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing
contact with two U.S. car rental firms and two U.S. credit
card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit
cards in alias for operational use in the United States and
abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being
used by 34 individuals.
གས་པས་
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 136
SECRET.
00514
SECRET
DEVISED FACILITIES COVER
1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-
stopped notional facilities which were created to pro-
vide cover for Agency personnel in the United States
and abroad and to provide an attributable source for
Agency funds used in operations and requiring conceal-
ment of Agency or U.S. Government interest. The facilities
comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover,
payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscel-
laneous support such as title to property, funding, etc.;
61 sole proprietorships providing status and operational
cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207
non-registered companies providing support for high risk
operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reim-
bursements, and proprietary funding.
2. 224 Agency personnel engaged in operational
activities are payrolled by the facilities, an essential
procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salaries with-
out documenting the Agency as the source.
3. The facilities provide a capability for passing
Agency funds to 30 Agency proprietaries and 97 bona fide
companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts
located in 36 banks throughout the United States provide
the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.
:
SECRET
POST CL BY
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 137
00515
SECRETT
PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER
1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic
proprietary management companies which provide funding and
operational support for 49 Agency entities; including 13
controlled and directed by CCS.
✓
2. The three proprietary management companies are
staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the
commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going
operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of
entities supporting operations, and provide cover and
funding channels for operational activities as required.
Most importantly, professional services are furnished in
a manner responsive to required security standards and
at a cost considerably less than would be charged by
bona fide management firms.
The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS pro-
vide cover for ten individuals in the United States and
3.
three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide
commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and
serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventory and
aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding
notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government
affiliation or interest.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 138
00526
SECRET,
SECRET
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
Items for Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI
1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to
identify to you for possible briefing of the
Director activities which in certain contexts could
be construed as delicate or inappropriate.
2. At the request of the Director of Security,
from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January
1973 safesite number 583 was made available to the
U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence
by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was
under threat of assassination by organized criminal
elements.
3. SB Division over the past three months has
interviewed four graduate students as prospective
candidates for assignments under American business
cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate
cover jobs on their own.
4. For approximately two years the SB Division
has had the cooperation of the Commander of the
Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police
Department in training officers scheduled for
assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to
conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The
arrangement was made through the Office of Security.
5. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven
FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in
response to requests from the FBI. We have shared
with them through lectures and discussions lessons
we have learned which are relevant to their counter-
espionage responsibilities.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 139
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059952
Fox
00521
SECRET
2 -
6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational
experience we have invited three FBI officers to be
students in our Soviet Operations Course from 14 to 25
May 1973.
7. A Soviet defector
was
confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to
September 1967 while efforts were being made to
establish whether he was a bona fide defector.
Although his present attitude toward the Agency is
quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the
press could cause undesirable publicity if it were
to uncover the story.
:
David H. Bice
David H. Blee
Chicf
Soviet Bloc Division
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 140
SECRET
00522

MEMORA. DUM FOR: Mr. Colby
Attached is the material we requested of Dick
Ober:
A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
Republican National Convention
B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
Democratic National Convention
. C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to
Secret Service for Democratic and Republican
Conventions
Ober advises that the only American we reported
on to the IEC is Rennie Davis.BE (14 May 73)
FORM NO.
1
AUG 54
REPLACES FORM 10-101
101
WHICH MAY BE USED.
NW-88296-Docld:32989624-Page-141-
✓ (DATE)
Eb054s
(47)
TO
2
3
q
10
5
SENDE
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
T
SECRET
NAME AND ADDRESS
Inspector General
DATE
TRITIALS
G
ACTION
AREPOVAL
CUMENT
CONCURRENCE
Remarks:
Mr. Broe:
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
FILE
PREPARE POPLY
PENDATION
INFORMATION
RETURN
SIGNATURE
Dick Ober has been advised that this package
is being sent to you. Since knowledge of the
existence of this Committee has been strictly
Uriited. Pye asked that it be delivered to you
unopened. Although it has an ER number on it,
it has not been sent through that office
I gave
then only the day, subject, and originator.
--
Combin
00547
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
O/ES/MC/Barbara Pindar
UNCLASSIFI.D
FORM NO. 237
1-67
Use previous editions
CONFIDENTIAL
DATE
15 May 73
SECRET
(40)
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 142
SUBJECT: (Optional)
LT
ROUTING AND RECOND SHEET
FROM:
Richard Ober
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
IDEN-73
0/DCI
2.
3.
Mr. Colby
4.
5.
6.
DATE
RECEIVED
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
1465
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
FORWARDED
14 May 1973
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from when
to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment
Attached are:
1. Background note on
Committee per your reques,
of this morning.
2. Copies of memoranda con-
corning Agency support to
Secret Service (7 April and
23 June 1972).
7.
\
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
5.
1
610
USE ATEN DUS
ECHONS
☐ SECKET
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 143
EYES ONLY
00548
CONFIDENTIAL
☐
LININAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASS
:
EVES CILY
14 MAY 1973
SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff
1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce
fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,
including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism
and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chair-
man); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of
Defense; Secret Service%3B National Security Agency; Central
Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of
other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-
pated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive
Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied
by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant
to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney
General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later
William Olson. IES has received requirements directly
from and delivered reports directly to john leat of the
White House. The White House has insisted that the
existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness
of its existence within this Agency has been limited to
DCI, DDO (DOP), C/CI and Your officers of this office.
2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign
aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or at-
tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign
intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the
Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representa-
tive on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and
as the alternate to the Agency representative on the
Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).
3.
Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure
of Classified Information, November 1971. This study
was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a con-
sequence of the President's concern about the release
of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert
Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking
the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES
Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency partici-
pation was editorial review.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 144
EVES CULLY
SENSITIVE
SECRET
2
IMPDET
00549
EYES COILY
4.
Republican National Convention (21-24 August
1972): At the request of the White House, a series of
estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Dis-
ruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention,
Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from
February through August 1972 periodic contributions for
these estimates concerning foreign support for activi-
ties planned to disrupt or harass the Republican
National Convention (copies attached).
5.
Democratic National Convention (10-13 July
1972): At the request of the White House, a series of
estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disrup-
tions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami
Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and
July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activi-
ties planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic
National Convention (copies attached).
i
Attachments: a/s
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 145
EYES CHLY
SENSITIVE
00550
. FOREIGH DISCENTO DISSEL ADROAD
CONTROLLED DISSEN
23 FEB 1972
.
SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt.
or Harass the Republican National Convention
1. There are only limited indications thus far of
foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of
activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23
August 1972.
2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled
World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of
Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles,
attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international
demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican
National Convention. A representative of the San Diego
Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action
groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested
the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World
Assembly to include a specific call for international
support of activities against the Republican convention
in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World
Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too
divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indica-
tions that the proposal would be taken to the floor of
the Assembly.
3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided
financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid
- the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representa-
tive of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' repre-
sentative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations
for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.)
Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNON-supported pro-
ject, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC),
of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to
direct New Left protest activities at the Republican
National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative
to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;
it is not known if the Republican National Convention was
discussed.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 146
CONERONED DESEN
ninn-..
00552
innoin
J FOREIGN DIESEG!/1.9 DISSEN ADKURD
CONTROLLED DISSEM
4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its
harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft
plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a
special television network to broadcast video-taped messages
from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic
demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public
address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese
in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the
United Nations.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 147
21A
COMEROLLED DISSEM
Dire
E
60*
:
00550
FURETER DISSEMENTS DISSERT ABNUAD
CONTROLLED DISSED
21 MAR 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
Indications. remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts
to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican
..Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated
international support for domestic activities in the United
States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for
Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the
Conference issued no specific call for international support of
disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.
BACKGROUND:
At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and
Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles
from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans
for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic
National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the
Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted
by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination
for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter-
national support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and
demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with
the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic
Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."
The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the
Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February
1972; drafted by the "Political Commission" states:
"In the United States particularly, the protest against
the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various
· forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demon-
strations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in
_the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum
to deserters and to support their right to repatriation.
All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help
to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace,
and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 148
CONTROLLED DISSEN
HO FOREIGN DISSEN NO DISSEN ADROAD
00554
YU FURETOR BROSCHINO DISCENT ADRUAD
CONTROLLED DISSEM
DEVELOPMENTS:
The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the
'domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Con-
vention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a
"large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72,
which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles
of people all over the world." Plans for activities at
Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special
television network to broadcast video-taped messages from
other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demon-
strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address
systems of live telephone calls. from the Vietnamese in Paris
and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.
In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank
NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition
can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries
and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demon-
strations."
COMPITCHED
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 149
L
、;"་
t
00555
COMPROBERED DISSEN
2.4. APR 1972
Foreign Suport for Activities Plann to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY:
There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts
to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to
disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San
Diego, 21 to 23. August 1972. The Students for a Democratic
Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning
actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal
to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstra-
tion in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego
Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting
on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from
the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indica-
tion of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact
will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported
plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the
Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in
Paris.
DEVELOPMENTS:
At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at
the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National
Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate
with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during
a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be
entertained.
The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to
the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a
letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the
· American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the
North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been
circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972,
•expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC,
and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant soli-
darity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC
write often and "send us materials you have."
CONTROLLED DISSEM
00556
NO FOREYON DISSENANG DISSENT ABROAD
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 150

CONFIGLED DISSEM
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY:
23 MAY 1972
Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
..to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in
* Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedish
Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-
tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
in the United States against the war based on a submission
by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).
The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
the Republican Convention.
DEVELOPMENTS:
.
I. mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
for Vi tnam, who is also an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference
on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish
Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be
hectic right until the elections in the U.S."
The International Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publica-
tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished
: by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
included the following entry:
August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego.
Demonstrations organized by the San
Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267,
San Diego, Ca. 92103.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 151
רין
☐
00557
710 TUT
CONTROLLED DISSEM
The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically
call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 152
j
00558
ONTROLLED DOSSEN
Lin rཤnཎྜ་ན་༔ rt8--,
GURTROLLED DISSER
14 JUN 1972.
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY:
The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of
interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to
the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar
organizations in the United States for demonstrations in
connection with the political conventions of both major
parties.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese
Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to
contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent
trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official
gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstra-
tions during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
official stated that he was especially interested in plans
for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican
National Conventions.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 153
NO FOREIGN DISSEN/NO DISSER ABROAD
CONTROLLED DISSEN
00559
Controlled Dissem
1
28 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention.
There are no additional indications of any substantial
foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advan-
tage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24
August 1972.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 154
No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem
00560
Excluded
CONTROLLED DISSEM
26 JUL 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
SUMMARY:
New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire,
support, influence, or exploit activities designed to dis-
rupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami,
Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A
leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice
(PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to
take place at United States and allied military installa-
tions abroad during the period immediately before and during
the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that
representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will
participate in activities in connection with the Convention.
*The Anti-War Union (AMU), a domestic organization which has
been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the
Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to
Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently
available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican
Convention have been discussed at these meetings.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In an carly July 1972 meeting with prominent members of
foreign antiwar organizations, a representative of the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an impor-
tant position within that organization, discussed the plans
of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign
in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that
during the period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against
Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manu-
facture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and
that similar actions will be organized at United States and
allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representa-
tive further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest
00561
WARNING GOTICE
NSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
NW 88296 "Docid:32989624 Page 155
CONTROLLED DISSEM
HIS FACTION ARSENING
CLASSITING 57
EXTHAT FATE GENERAL DICLATED
SCHËNULT ONE. 9. 11.32, ININ HELGA ON
§ 5-(1), (C) (3) er (1) (chids ens or
AUTOMATICALLY DICHERREN OF
Impossible to determin
Qualças impossible, intret dite or co
CONTROLLED DISSÉLI
of the bombing in ietnam are being organized by the "Repub-
lican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on
21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August
actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the
Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of
the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam.
(Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of
Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United
States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we
have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm
Conference representatives to participate in activities con-
nected with the Republican Convention.)
The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic group engaged in
organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Con-
vention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists
to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolu-
Stionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party
has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss
the agenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. Although
no information is presently available indicating that actions
at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are sched-
uled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation
and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AhU
advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials
regarding the stance the AWU should take on certain questions
relating to the presidential elections. It is also known
that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party
about the political mood in the United States. One of the
AWU delegation. members has stated that upon their return to
the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members
will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television,
to "educate the American people about the consequences of
voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat
Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations
at the Republican Convention will be "unique."
CONTROLLED DISSEN
NO FOREICH DISSEINATO DISSENY ABROAD
00562
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 156
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
2 AUG 1972
.
SUMMARY:
=
There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to
inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or
harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August
1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between
American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic
of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the
DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the
American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National
Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire
American délegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials;
at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private
exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than
the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972
for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American
delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to dis-
cussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnam-
ese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar
movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Repub-
lican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen
Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions
of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention."
TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven
Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part,
refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demon-
strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 157
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN MISSOS NO GIOGEN ALREAD
CLASSIFIED BY
00580
EXIT FROM GENTRAL DECLASSIFICATI
SCHEDULE OF E. C. 12232, EXEMPTION CATLESHI
§ 53(1), (). (3) (1) (circle one or more
AUTOMATICALLY RECENSORED ON
impossible to determine
CONTROLLED DISSEN)
Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation,
the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation.
Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by
the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there
is no information available concerning the substance of these private
exchanges.
A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with
the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972
for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second
group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the
AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for
discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from
his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at
both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's
chief target would be the Republican Convention.
☑
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 158
00564
i
CONTROLLED DISSEN
!
CONTROLLED DESEN
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party
in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE
LIQENCE SOURCES
NW 88296c Docid:82989624 Page 159
60
113 PORSCH
i.
9 AUG 1972
00535
ཀ
DISCENT ABROAD
CLASSIFIED BY
EXENIT FROM GENERAL BRO
SCHEDULE OF E 0152
§ SE(1), C) (3. g (ià i
AUTOGATICALLY DOE
انا
impossible to determine
....
CONTROLLED DISSEM
16 AUG 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention
There are no new indications, as of this date, of
foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take
advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass
the National Convention of the Republican Party in
Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.
00566
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
CONTROLLED DERSEN
NW 88296 ID32989624 Page 16NG FOREIGN DISSENIANO DISSEN ADROAD
CLASSIFIED T
--
(EX MPT !ATI! GRAL DETLAN
50. 11.27, EKET, JIAN
$55(1)(2) (3) (4) (rivels es or
HAUTATICALLY DESIGNLD C
Impossible to determin
(val olie, insert date or

O
CONTROLLED DISCEM G
0-6 MAR 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
Or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:
There are no direct indications thus far of foreign
efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities
designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of
the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept
of coordinated international support for domestic activities
in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent
World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples.
of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific
call for international support of disruptive actions at the
American national political conventions.
BACKGROUND:
At. the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace
and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in
Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of
American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican
and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft
resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" con-
tains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose
goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions
in the United States. It calls for international support
to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations,
from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the state-
ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party
Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."
The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly
for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People"
of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission"
states:
"In the United States particularly, the protest
against the war is voiced more and more strongly,
CONTABULED DISSEM
00563
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 161
NO FARFICU DECLINARS DISSEN ASREAD
CONTROLLED DISSEN
under. various forms, such as draft evasions,
desertions, resistance, demonstrations which
now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
calls for support to these progressive and
antiwar forces in the United States, and asks
the governments to grant asylum to deserters
and to support their right to repatriation.
· All together, the peoples of the world will
efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Govern-
ment the restoration of peace, independence
and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."
CONTRALLED DIRGEN
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 162
A
Manri
i
An
00569
CONTROLLED DISCENT
09 MAY 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
...::
SUMMARY:
New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire,
support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt
or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13
July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the
Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a
statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace
and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's
pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international
support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the
United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican
Conventions, but made no specific call for support of dis-
ruptive actions at the conventions themselves.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed,
in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities
conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference
member stated that these actions were part of an international
campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts
during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate
at the election conventions in July and August."
The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the
Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was
a major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement
in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's
."Action Commission." The appendix called for international
support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demon-
strations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with
the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic
Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."
NW-88296-Docid:32989624 Page 163
CONTROLLED DIESEL)
NO FORCION DISSOLUTO DISSIM AD8313
OFGEET
00570
HJ TORCION DISSERT REM RERUMIş
CONTROLLED DISSEN
23 MAY 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY:
Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish
Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-
tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
in the United States against the war based on a submission
by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PĊPJ).
The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
the Democratic Convention.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference
on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish
Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be
hectic right until the elections in the U.S."
The International Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publica-
tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished
by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
included the following entry:
July 9 - 12
Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.
Demonstrations organised by Florida
People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa,
Florida 33612.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 164
.CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEN NO DISCEM ADRENO
00571
HIU TURCIO DIGSEM, 1.03
CONTROLLED DISSEM
The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically
call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.
=
CONTRALLER DISSEM
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 165.
:
00572
CONTROLLED DISSEN
7 JUN 1972
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
.
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
SUMMARY:
The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is an expression of interest
by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris
Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations
in the United States for demonstrations in connection with
the political conventions of both major parties.
DEVELOPMENTS:
In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Dele-
gation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact
him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip
to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave
the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demon-
strations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
-official stated that he was especially interested in plans
for actions in connection with the Democratic and National
Conventions.
CONTROLLED DISSEN
un range
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 166
MIDOTIC.PAPEGAD
F
00573
بنیت
Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
21 JUN 1972
There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to
disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,
Florida, 10-13 July 1972.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 167
CONTROLLED DIESEL
00574
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 168
:
# .
:
00575
:
:
23JUN
1972
File
૮
4955-
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
SUBJECT
1.
Executive Director/Comptroller
Acting Deputy Director for Plans
: Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service
(USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July
1972) and National Republican (21-24 August
1972) Conventions
This memorandum is for the information of the Executive
Director/Comptroller.
20
Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service
for the Democratic and Renublican National Conventions is con-
tained in a moborandum of 7 April 1972 Fron Chief, CI Staff to
the GCI which was concurred in by the ADUP and approved by the
DČI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).
3. On 13 April 1972 the COS, MI/Miami met with the Miani
USSS representative and Mr. Mastrovito of USSS beadquarters to
discuss preliminary planning for Station Miami support to the
USSS prior to and during subject conventions. un 17 Anril 1972
the C/TH/000 and C/CI/LSN met with “r. Hastrovito at Headquarters
to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in ani and
to determine the extent of Headquarters_support required by the
USSS.
4. The basic agreement Eutually concurred in by the USSS
and leadquarters representatives provided that:
ն a.
Station WH/Miami would conduct name traces, on
all Cubans of interest to the CSSS.
CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on
all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.
C. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events
in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would
have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during
the convention periods. This would include briefings
on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and
on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which
could affect the security of the conventions.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 169
00576
<-2-
d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the
United States would be the responsibility of the FBI
since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly
targeted against these groups since it was now considered
an internal security function.
S. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffor office
of Station WH/Hiani
with the USSS Chief of Communica-
tions, Station personnel and a fleadquarters representative. It
was agreed that name traces would be handled by Miami security
Field office courier from the LSSS toffer office until the USSS
ostablished communications links from their command post in
convention center, at which time trace requests would be sent
from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA
Headquarters. Cuban name traces are relayed to Station Ni/iami
by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted by KH/COG.
Replies to USSS requests on non-Cubans are coordinated with
CI/SO.
6. Station MH/Miami has arranged the rental of a safehouse
about five minutes from convention conter which will provide a
secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel.
This safchouse will be available just prior to and during both
conventions. A Headquarters officer will TDY to “iami prior to
the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to
assist the Station in providing the support described in paragraph
four above.
1.
Station WP/Miami is in daily contact with the USSS in
Miami, utilizing buffer office as a meeting site when necessary. The
location of Station #H/iani
has not been revealed to
the USSS. (Station
is located some distance from buffer office.)
Additionally, the Hiani Security Field Office maintains normal
liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.
8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present
at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment
unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other
facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624-Page-170-
SEGRET
00577

May 1973
SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities
:
-You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972,
I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI.
These funds may still be possibly held in a special
account for that use. This is one of the areas where
TSD has been very much involved.
Chuck Briggs would
have the details as this was handled through the Executive.
Director's office and of course Angleton would have
additional information.
NW 88296. Docid:32989624 Page 171
Signed
LEN-1
Chief
Missions and Programs Staff
دیا
EYES ONLY
SECRET
E2 IMPDET CL BY 357737
00582
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR :
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT
:
Areas of Possible Embarrassment
to the Agency
1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John
Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to
the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was
non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with
the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the
President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.
2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the
Agency on this subject:
a.
b.
C.
Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director
Helms.
Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI,
General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation).
Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and
John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels
were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by
the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.
3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since
it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to
uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve -
ment of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity.
· The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were
coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this sub-,
ject died down and we did not pursue it further.
4. Please return the attachments when they have served your
purpose.
SECRET
E2 IMPDET CL BY 05451 ?
00593
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 172
5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober. The original
meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House
and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then
Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian
and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.
Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always
possible that he might draw in the Agency.
6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency
representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings pre-
sided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms
that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-
perience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split
between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis
one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly
passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This
was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from
the Bureau.
Attachments (5)
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 173
pos bicen
for James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
SECRET
00584
་
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT
: Counter Intelligence Staff,
Police Group Activities
DEN-168
1. Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG)
is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office
of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and
programs involving assistance to foreign pelice/security
forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and
programs for intelligence purposes.
2. CI/PG maintains liaison with the Office of Public
Safety, Arency for International Development (GPS/AFP)
and its training facility, the International Police Academy
(IPA). CI/PG also administers and suorvises Project
IDEN-171 and its training proprietory facility, DEN-172.
In addition, CI/PG coordinates a joint OPS/ATD Tecifical
Services Division, Contral Intelligence Agency (TS/CIN)
Technical Investigations Course. CI/PG provides guidance
and counsel to the Aren Divisions in matters pertaining
to police/security functions and activities. Specific
details of these functions are as follows:
LIAISON WITH OPS/AID
CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a
daily basis and consists principally of:
A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some
of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are
of interest to Agency components,
B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored partici-
pants in IPA/OPS/AID training prograns,
C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AIR briefings and tours for
foreign police/security representatives sponsored
by CIA Area Divisions,
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 174
SECEFT
00597
CL BYR
!: '
- 2 -
D. obtaining biographic and assessment data. on
IPA/OPS/AID trainces,.
E. providing general information pertaining to
police/security organizations, activities, equip-
ment, and personalities requested by Agency
operating components,
F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the
Technical Investigations Course designed to
familiarize the trainees with the technique
required to properly investigate terrorist
activities wherein explosives have been utilized,
G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve
abroad. At one time as many as 50 CIA employees
were covered in Latin America, the Far East and
Africa. This total has been reduced during the
past several years to 10 serving in Thailand, *
H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID
sponsored participants.
PROJECT IDEN-171 - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172-draining
function of
IDEN-168
IDEN-172 Training Academy is a commercial interprise.
It was incorporated under the laws of the State of Maryland
in 1952 and conducts its business in the District of
Colombia. It is engaged principally in training foreign
police/security personnel under an overt contract with
OPS/AID, and selling police/security equipment to foreign
police/security personnel and organizations.IDEN-172 also
provides special training programs and briefings to
foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency
operating divisions. It provides biographic and assessment
data on trainces to country desks. RecentlyIDEN-172 has
acquired the capability of providing training to foreign
police/security personnel in VIP protective security
for Chiefs of State.
sell's goi
gra
Consulti
Servic
:
* CIA personnel under this cover will not be replaced as
such and all will be phased out by June 1974.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 175
SROGET
00538
'
-
3
COMMENT
· CI/PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison
with any law enforcement organization, local or federal,
at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is
sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or DEN-172without
divulging Agency interest. OPS/AID has such contacts
at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities
(training of foreign police/security personnel at hore
and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the
world. IDEN-172 has such contacts at hore local and
-
federal level - because its personnel are personally
acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the
United States. Members of the [DEN-172 staff (not identified)
as CIA) have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal
institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S.
Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.
3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the
previous paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varying
degrees with foreign police/security organizations through
its field stations. The existence and extent thereof,
however, is a decision to be made by the Area Division,
and is not the responsibility of CI/PG.
4. The CIA station as a member of the Country Team in
Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had sone contact with ban
Nitrions, who was murdered by the Tupanaros.
Dan Mitrione,
an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, was
a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission
in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.
for ft Ro
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
00593
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 176
SZERET
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT:
The MHCHAOS Program
May 73
is, cetizes
reak
:
1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for
clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign
efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic
U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,
North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the
Arab fedayeen.
2. The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct-
ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection
purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented
activity in the United States has been of two types:
a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel
abroad in connection with their extremist activity
and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile
foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups
have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters
officers. The briefing has included appropriate
operational guidance, including defensive advice.
b. Americans with existing extremist creden-
tials have been assessed, recruited, tested and
dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract
agents, primarily sources offered for such use by
the FBI. When abroad they collect information re-
sponsive to MICHAOS program requirements, as well
ás other Agency requirements. They are thus used
primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Com-
munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back-
ground and their particular access permits. It
should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the
MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is
similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.
3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign pro-
gram, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity
described above. The program is and has been managed so
as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of exist-
ing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets
WARRING HOTIGE
SENSITIVE CHUTERENCE SOURCES
AND HUIS
NEVED
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 177
00501
SENSITIVE
SECRET
|_
2 IMPORT CL DY: 01
SENSITIVE
have been recuited and run exclusively for the MICHAOS
program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploi-
tation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product
capability or a concurrent capability for provision of
information responsive to the program's requirements.
This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-
tion requirements and operational guidance. This collec-
tion program is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-
ment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam
Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division opera-
• tions and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an
American "Movement" background .or who have known connec-
tions with the American "Movement" are useful as access
agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to dis-
cern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and
to develop operationally exploitable relationships with
recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets
are of interest to our targets because of their connec-
tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement."
Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been
approximately 20 important areas of operational interest,
which at the present time have been reduced to about ten:
Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers,
Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.
4. The MICHAOS program also utilizes audio opera-
tions, two of which have been implemented to cover tar-
gets of special interest.
Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive
foreign operation.
Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive
Agency foreign operation.
"
NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 178
SENSITIVE
SECRET
00592
SENSITIVE
5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the
program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted
in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and
who appear to have extremist connections, interests or
background are reported upon. Other individuals are re-
ported upon in response to specific Headquarters require-
ments received from the FBI because such individuals, are
of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.
6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the
MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is
not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the In-
formation Services Division. The control and retriev-
ability of information obtained, including information
received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Spe-
cial Operations Group.
7.
Information responsive to specific FBI require-
ments is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled
dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable
traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind
memoranda.
8. Information of particular significance, when col-
lected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over
the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to
the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as
to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the
Director of the FBI.
SENSITIVE
SECRET
00593
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 179
SECRET/SENSITIVE
FR 73-183
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities with Possible Flap Potential
เ
FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May
1973, same subject
1.
The answers to your questions are as follows:
a.
Question: Do we recruit Americans?
Answer:
Yes, we recruit Americans to be
used as academic support assets and access agents.
These Americans are used for spotting and assess-
ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-
ments.
Paragraph 1. b. and 1. c. are deleted
because they contain sensitive agency
operational methods and techniques.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 180
E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223
00611

121
SITIV
d. Question: What is the arrangement re.recruiting
out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?
Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically
requires approval by the ADDO or DDO for any
recruitment attempt made in the United States
against an American member of the academic
community or a foreign target attending an American
academic institution. This regulation is presently in
the process of revision in that this approval authority
for academic recruitments in the United States is to
be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority
for recruitment attempts against American students
outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief
of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions
at the present time are those precluding recruitment
attempts against foreign students here in the United States
on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.
2. If you have further questions, please let me know.
signed/IDEN-173
Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division
00612
SECRET/SENSITIVE
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 181
SECR#7/SENSITIVE
FR 73-180
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities with Possible Flap Potential
1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational
activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk
that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency.
We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with
our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under
the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which
FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain some-
what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed
these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:
a. The New York Base provides a fairly considerable
amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the
Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines
and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other
than the inordinate amount of time spent by New York Base
personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of
money that has been expended in support of these efforts.
b. A CIA Officer
is to be assigned to FR Division.
CIA Officer is presently assigned. overseas
under deep
cover; his cover is the Mullen Corporation. This is the cor-
poration that employed E. Howard Hunt. In discussions between
NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would
be pulled out
and reassigned in the United States.
FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.
The
E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223
00611
SECRET SENSITIVE
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 182
SECRET/SENSITI. E
12/
We have concluded that the best solution is to have this
officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least
a year, working towards an advanced degree until there
has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan
to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever,
during the period of time that he is attending the university.
Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the、
situation and decide the next course of action at that time.
Paragraph 1. c. is deleted because it contains sensitive
Agency operational methods and techniques.
d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the
existence of an audio operation done by the FBI but with close
TSD support in San Francisco.
against IDEN-62.
been exceptionally well done.
I
This operation is directed
understand the operation has
However, the responsibility
for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction .
with SB Division.
in the
e.
Three microphones were planted in various locations
IDE N-61
by the FBI. The equipment was pro-
duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no
CIA personnel have entered the premises. The operation was
deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however,
are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause
some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is
unlikely the finger would point to CIA.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 183
SECRETSINGITIVE
00615
VIII.
SECRE
Coordination.
A.
Internal
བ་
In developing its cadre of general support assets
and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact
with the Domestic Contact Service of the Directorate for
Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever
possible to support FR's operational activities. То а
more limited degree, FR Bases maintain contacts with Office
of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives,
pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by these officers
and using their entre to specific individuals who can
provide access to targets of operational inteṛest.
B.
External
FR officers in the field maintain coordination with
There is limited cooperation
their FBI counterparts.
with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving
Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are
of occasional help in operations involving other nationals.
The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the
presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on
occasion provided backstopping on cases where there was.
some flap potential.
Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent
recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between
the Agency and the FBI dated 7 February 1966.
The Bases also have contact with local Immigration
and Naturalization Service offices although these contacts
are less frequent and less important than the contacts
with the FBI offices.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 184
SECRET
00630
1
-
Mr. Wannall (detached)
July 16,
1
1
SENATOR GARY W. HART 1
1
1
Reference is made to the letter
General dated May 28, 1975, and signed by
Church and Senator John C. Tower.
-
-
-
1975
Mr. Mintz (detached)
Mr. Hotis (detached)
Mr. Daly (detached)
Mr. Cregar (detached)
Mr. Farrington (detached)
to the Attorney
Senator Frank
المصرية محمد
ཡ
5.
4
A review of the central files of the FBI revealed
that a file pertaining to your application for employment
with the Department of Justice and a file which lists you as
the victim in a case involving the Congressional Assassination
Statute are maintained by this Bureau.
Enclosed herewith are pertinent documents from the
Departmental Applicant file. Certain data in this file is
exempt from public disclosure pursuant to the provisions of
Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b) (2), (b) (5), and
(b) (7) (C) and (D). As I am sure you are aware, these exemptions
allow for the withholding of information related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; inter-
agency or intra-agency documents not available through discovery
proceedings during litigation; information which would constitute
an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of another
individual; and information which would disclose the identity
of a confidential source.
[3
The other file pertains to an investigation concerning
a threat against your life. Although your name is carried in
the title throughout the file as the "victim, only a minimal
amount of information refers to you. The file indicates that
the Denver Police Department received information that a
particular individual was in Denver to kill you if you were
elected as United States Senator from Colorado on November 5,
1974; that the polls indicated you would be elected; that you
and your Denver Office were aware of this threat; that the
Denver Police Department afforded protection for you until you
departed Denver the morning of November 6, 1974, for vacation
in Mexico; and that an Agent of this Bureau attempted to see
you to display a photograph of the suspect, but was advised
by your assistant that the Denver Police Department had
1
-
The Attorney General
2
-
1
The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser
Attn: K. William O'Connor
Bufile 62-116395
jdv:cdj
(14)
NM 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 185
195
NOT RECORCED
46.
SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWOIK 15 15/6
#MDR16
1012/00 SP-2-ALM/FTG
2/
ORIGINAL FOR IN
Senator Gary W. Hart
displayed the photograph to you and you did not recognize the
suspect. For your information this is no longer an active
investigation as the unknown subject was not identified and
the original allegation was not corroborated. Other than the
reasonably segregable portion of the references to you as set
forth above, this file is exempt from disclosure under the
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5,
United States Code, Section 552 (b)(2), (b) (5) and (b) (7) (C)
and (D).
Also, our records contain two documents from the
United States Department of Justice concerning you which have
been referred to the Attorney General.
If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered,
it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the
Attorney General.
Enclosures (12)
NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter dated
7/16/75, captioned, "Request For Information in FBI Files by
Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias,
Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.” DRW:mlh.
Senator Hart is subject of favorable Department
Applicant file 77-93050. He is the victim of a civil rights
case under the "Congressional Assassination Statute,”
Bufile 44-62521. Airtel from Denver dated 3/3/75, sets forth
info that Carbon County, Wyoming is in the process of filing
First Degree Murder charges against Thomas Eugene Creech
(Suspect of Bufile 44-62521) in connection with the murder
of Ridgley Stewart McKenzie. Ascertained 6/11/75 from
Supervisor John Brockton, Denver, case closed for reasons
cited in instant letter. The 58 pages being furnished to
Senator Hart are located in Bufile 77-93050.
NM-88296 Docld:32989624 Page 186
-
2
-m
1
1/25/00
#MORIS
CLASS PRETTY SPRAEM/ZJG
DECLASSIFY ON. ESXL
July 16, 1975
1
I
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
Mr. Wannall (detached)
Mr. Mintz (detached)
Mr. Hotis (detached)
Mr. Daly (detached)
Mr. Cregar (detached)
Mr. Farrington (detached)
SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE
I
Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney General
signed by Senator Frank Church and Senator John Tower dated
May 28, 1975.
A review of the central files of the FBI revealed
the following records portaining to you. It is noted that you
have not boon the subject of an FBI investigation; however, a
correspondence file pertaining to you has been maintained since 1964.
Also, our records contain three investigative files
in which you are shown to have been the victim of an attempted
extortion. Copies of excised documents from two of these files
are enclosed. The third file, comprised of one hundred and eighty-
three documents, includes six extortion letters which you or
one of your assistants furnished the FDI. In this regard, your
office was advised of the final disposition of this matter by
the FBI on February 10, 1971. Although some of the documents from
this file are subject to disclosure, they are not being included
since you would be aware of the contents of this data.
Additional information concerning you which is
contained in our central records is exempt from disclosure as
provided by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b) (1),
(b) (2), (b) (5), (b) (6), (b) (7) (C) and (D). These exemptions
protect, respectively matters that are specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
information relating to the internal personne rules/and
practices of this Bureau; inter-agency or intra-agNOT RECORDED
memorandums or letters which would not be available through
discovery proceedings during litigation; information in 29 1976
personnel file the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; Information
the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion
of privacy of third parties; and the identity of and information
furnished by sources pursuant to an assurance of confidentiality.
1
-
2
The Attorney General
The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M Hauser
Attn: K. William O'Connor
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 187
Bufile 62-116395
Iam:dal (14) CONTINUED OVER
ORIGINAL FILED IN
Se fator Walter F. Mondale
If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered,
it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the Attorney
General.
Our records also revealed a classified document from
the Department of State pertaining to you. We have referred
this document to them with the request that they communicate
with you directly.
Enclosures (39)
NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General memorandum
dated 7/16/75, captioned, "REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN FBI
FILES BY SENATORS GARY HART, WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, CHARLES
HCC MATHIAS, HALTER F. HONDALE AND ROBERT MORGAN, MEMBERS OF
THE U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES."
DRW:mlh
Senator Hondale is the subject of Bufile 94-60489 and
is shown as a victim in Bufiles 9-44386; 9-52508; 9–54750.
The original of excised documents released to the Senator are
in Bufiles 1-11800-3;5; 9-52508-1;2; 9-54750- 1;2;3; 61-3176-
4490; 62-89475-592; 62-100230-1; 92-0-3355; 94-60489-1;3;4;
5;6;7;8;9;10;11;12;13;14;15;16;17;19;20;21;22;100-435179-42;
100-454565-463; 105-25263-1047; 1246x; 1410; 105-74505-275(5)
157-4-33-A-Washington Post and Times Herald 5-24-61; 157-7-6-43-25.
See memorandum Mr. McDermott to Ir. Wannall dated 6/3/75,
and 6/19/75 regarding classified material pertaining to Senator
Mondale exempted from disclosure. Also see Mr. McDermott to
Mr. Wannall memorandum dated 6/16/75 captioned "Congressman
Donald W. Riegle" regarding classification review of Bufile
105-229897. Serials 81 p.6; 114; 117 p. 216; 113; 140 ep 248;
143 of Bufile 105-229397) refer to Senator Mondale.
By letter dated 5/14/75, CIA furnished 23 FBI documents
concerning Senator Mondale which they had surfaced in a review
of their files in connection with a FOIA request from Senator
Mondale to Mr. Colby, Director of CIA. SA T. II. Bresson
advised CIA by telephone of our pending request for information.
By letter dated 7/14/75 to Department of State reference
105-188989-8) was referred to them for action.
105-18
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 188
2
91200#
1
1
"
1
1
-
-
1
-
1
Mr. Farrington (detached)
Mr. Wannall (detached)
Mr. Mintz (detached)
- Mr. Hotis (detached).
Mr. Daly (deſtached)
July 16, 1975
Mr. Cregar (detached)
ALL INFORMATION CONTAZHME
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIH
DATE 11/21/00 #SA
1
for
Senste
SENATOR ROBERT MORGAN
Reference is made to the letter to the
Attorney General dated May 28, 1975, signed by
Senators Frank Church and John G. Tower.
A review of the central files of the FDI
revealed the following records pertaining to you .
which we are authorized to release. Other information
concerning you is exempt from disclosure pursuant
to Title 5, United States Code, Section 5$2 (b) (2),
and (b) (7) (C) and (D). These exemptions allow the
withholding of material which relates solely to the
internal personnal rules and practices of an agency;
exempts information the disclosure of which would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
of third parties; and exempts information which would
disclose the identity of a confidential source, and
information furnished under circumstances of
confidentiality.
•
Other documente in our central records
reveal that while in the official capacities of
Attorney General for Worth Carolina and Judge for
Harnett County, North Carolina, you were one of the
subjects in three Civil Rights investigations
conducted in 1958, 1971, and 1973. You were advisod
of the 1958 and 1973 investigations. The 1971
investigation was referred to the Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, for adjudication. The only
other references concerning you pertain to a
Civil Rights complaint in 1974, an extortion letter
received by you in 1970 threatening Governor Robert
Scott; and information regarding your resignation
from the office of the Attorney General of
North Carolina to run for the United States Senate.
1
sib
2
MO
The Attorney General
The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: 'Susan M. Hauser
Attn:
K. William O'Connor
Bufile 62-116395
Siw:mlh (14)
MAX.441976
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 189.
62-116395
NOT RECORDE
46 MAR 19 1976
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
این ایده کورم میکر پیا 94
ORIGINAL FILED IN
Senator Robert Morgan
If you wish to have any of the material
reconsidered it would be appropriate to discuss this
matter with the Attorney General.
Enclosures (13)
NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter
dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in
FBI files by Senators Gary Hart, Walter. D. Huddleston,
Charles McC. Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert
Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee
'on Intelligence Activities. DRW:mlh
I'
'Morgan is subject of Bufiles. 44-13052, 44-50587,
44-57418 and 94-68460. He is also mentioned in eleven
other files. These files contain no derogatory information,
and our relations with the Senator have been cordial.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 190
:
:
1

he
-i-b
ORIGINAL FILED IN
#MDrib
1
I
1
1
-
-
July 16, 1975
Mr. Wannall (Detached)
Mr. Mintz (Detached)
Mr. Hotis (Detached)
Mr. Daly (Detached)
Hr. Cregar (Detached)
• Mr. Farrington
SENATOR WALTER D. HUDDLESTON 1
SELAFOR
(Detached)
Reference is made to the letter to the
Attorney General dated May 28, 1975, signed by Senators
Frank Church and John E. Iower.
A review of the central files of the FBI
revealed the enclosed records pertaining to you. Those
portions which have been deleted and the remainder of the
files are exempt from disclosure pursuant to the provisions
of the Freedom of Information lct, Title 5, United States
Code, Section 552 (b)(2), (b) (5), and (b) (7) (C), (D) and (F).
Subsection (b) (2) excerpts documents which relate
solely to the internal rules and practices of our agency.
Subsection (b) (5) exempts inter-agency and intra-agency
memoranda the disclosure of which would have a detrimental
effect upon the development of policy, guidance and admini-
strative direction. Subsections (b) (7) (C), (D) and (E)
allow withholding information the disclosure of which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy of those individuals interviewed or mentioned
during the course of an investigation; reveal the identity
of and information furnished by confidential sources; and
divulge investigative techniques and procedures.
If you wish to have any of the matorial
reconsidered, it would be appropriato to discuss this
ratter with the Attorney Ceneral.
Inclosures (13)
I
-
2
The Attorney General
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Attention:
Susan II. Hauser
- Bufile 62-116395
①-
See Note Page 2.
61 MAR 251976)
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 191
62-111-595-
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 19 1976
Senator Walter D. Huddleston
NOTE: See Director, FRI, to the Attorney General memorandum
dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI Files
By Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias,
Walter F. Ilondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRW:mlh.
Senator Huddleston is identical with subject of
Bufiles 166-5980, 94-67291, and 94-1-676-300. Huddleston
was contacted by Bureau liaison to offer any assistance
to the newly elected Senator, which is standard Bureau policy.
Huddleston's Executive Assistant called the Congressional
Service Office on 1/9/75, and requested a speaker from the
FBI to address the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce Convention.
Speaker granted. Huddleston was alleged to have taken a
bribe of $15,000 while he was a State Senator in Kentucky.
Several persons approached him to find out if they could
establish a bank charter. His supposed reply was that this
could be accomplished for a certain amount of money. The
bank charter was eventually established and one of the
individuals who originally approached him, hand-carried the
$15,000 in cash to him at his office. On 9/5/73, the
Department advised the FBI that it desired no more invest-
igation in this case at that time. Senator Huddleston was
never interviewed regarding this matter. Excised documents
taken from 94-67291-3,2,1; 94-1-676-300; and 166-5980-9,7,5,4,
and 1.
KW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 192
- 2
P
ALL INFORMATION CONTAIRO
ĦEREIN IS UNGLASSIFIED RIGUI
WHERE SHONA DÜHERWISH,
#MDR16
11/21/00
CLASSIFIED BY SPI A
DECLASSIFY ON: 25%
ALL INFORMATIO
Senaturlig
SECRET
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
- Mr. Wannall (detached)
Mr. Mintz (detached)
Mr. Hotis (detached)
Mr. Daly (detached)
Mr. Cregar (detached)
Mr. Farrington (detached)
July 16, 1975
SENATOR CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.
A review of the central files of the FBI has been
conducted to locate records pertaining to you in accordance
with the letter to the Attorney General dated May 28, 1975,
signed by Senators Frank Church and John G. Tower.
Enclosed is one copy each of 52 documents from our
files. The deletions which have been made were based on the
Freedom of Information Act.
Additional information concerning you which is
contained in our central records is exempt from disclosure as
provided by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b) (1),
(b)(2), (b) (5), (b) (7) (C) and (b) (7) (D). These exemptions
allow withholding of information classified pursuant to
Executive Order; information related solely to the internal
rules and practices of this agency: information within the
category of intra-agency memoranda not available through
discovery proceedings during litigation; information the
disclosure of which could constitute an unwarranted invasion
of the personal privacy of a third party; and the identity
of ané information furnished by individuals under circum-
stances of confidentiality.
Also, our records contain two documents from the
United States Department of Justice concerning you which have
been referred to the Attorney General,
If you wish to have any of the material reconsidered
it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the Attorney
General.
Enclosures (52)
1
-
2
-
Attorney General
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: Susan M. Hauser
Attention:
62-116375-
NOT RECORDED
K. William O'Connor
46 MAR 19 1976
①Ⓐ①- Bufile 62-116395
hamn:rar
147
61 MAR 23 1976
(14)
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 193
SECRE
ORIGINAL FILED IN
.94-5447225
SENATOR CHARLES MC CURDY MATHIAS
SEGIET
NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter
dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI
Files by Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles
McCurdy Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members
of the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities,"
DRW:mlh. Mathias is the subject of the following Bufiles:
9-45767 "Victim, Extortion" (3 serials); 9-47912" "Victim,
Extortion" (4 serials); 94-49643 "Victim, Extortion-Racial
Matters" (5 serials); 9-53432 "Victim, Extortion" (3 serials);
56-5105 "Possible Violation of Title 18, USC 602 and 603,
Election Laws" (3 serials); 89-2560 "Possible Victim, Congres-
sional Assassination" (5 serials); and 94-54474 "R-Maryland"
(13 serials). He is being furnished excised copies of the
following references: 9-53432; 9-45767; 9-47912; 56-5105;
94-54474; 62-96529-268; 5-0-1861; 7-16021-6; 47-52807-2;
62-116270-7; 65-74060-765; 94-1-32555-148; 174-3-6723; 94-
37990-101; 100-443916-278; 89-2560; 64-29833-345-188; 65-
74060-589, 1168, and 1276. U. S. Secret Service documents
are being given per Robert Goff on 6/26/75, with "No objection
from USSS," 9/49543-1 and 4. L. Miller, CIA Legal Office,
contacted SA D. R. Williams 7/15/75 concerning FBI LHMS
(dated 12/13/67 re Kerekes, "IS-HU"; 2/6/69 re Bubnov, "IS-R";
2/18/70 re Soviet Diplomatic Activities, "IS-R"; 4/17/70
re Romanian Diplomatic Activities in the United States, "IS-
Romania"; and 6/8/72 re Peoples Republic of China Mission)
(5) maintained in their files]] they are in general terms referring
to documents in CIA response to Senator Mathias. He was
advised our review will cover these documents. Mathias is also
identified in the following references which are being denied:
73-15725-5, 100-429998-82 p.6, 105-36731-429, 134-22930-15 - (S)
100-434886-54, 105-18784-754, 105-124338-120, 105-229897-77
ep.136, 105-10828-1970, 89-2560, 65-74060-1205 p.49, and
95-45505-24. Justice Department documents contained in 56-
5105-1 and 62-115695-4 are being referred. Per addendum to
memo from Mr. McDernott to Mr. Wannall dated 6/19/75
the (b) (1) exemption is being utilized.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 194
2
SECALY
ΤΟ
.
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1373 EDITION
" GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Deputy Attorney General
William O'Connor
Director Kelley.
FROM
:
Douglas Marvin
SUBJECT:
Senstudy -7.5
Indy
Procedures for
review of 
Materia
DATE:
FRI
EMBR 6
Assoc. Dir.
3. 28
July 16, 1975
нов
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BXSP-2 AUM/276
Attached is a proposed procedure for dealing
with the Senate Select Committee.
Please provide your comments to me by
11:00 a.m. on Thursday, July 17.
Attachment
Done.
7/17/75 by Mr. Adams
Procedure to be forther
Considered.
дела
Dep. AD
Dep. AD In
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Cou
Plan. & Etal.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
REC
Ph
The
62-116395-474
AUG 5 1975
84 A
| ENCLOSURE
65-1263.95
1 Xerox made and given to Mr. Adams
1975.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 195
5 wob
7-17-752dm
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
(1)
(2)
(3).
(4)
(5)
(6)
PROPOSED PROCEDURE
FBI
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE16/2100 BY SP-2 ALM1276
The Committee will request those documents to which it
wishes access.
The Department will furnish access to those matters
requested to:
(a) the members of the Committee where it is deter-
mined by the Attorney General that the matters
(b)
are peculiarly sensitive;
in all other cases, the appropriately cleared
staff will have access to the materials.
The Committee staff shall select those documents which
it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and
necessary for the examination of witnesses or the
establishment of certain facts during the course of
the inquiry.
These documents may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171
of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as
deemed appropriate by the staff.
,
The notes will be left in the secure room of the Hoover
Building during the study.
Upon completion of the study, the staff can prepare a
summary of the information which it considers appropriate
for Committee use.
(7) The summary will be checked with senior Bureau executives
to ensure the protection of national security matters,
confidential sources of information and interests of
NM 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 196
1.2-1-474
LOSUR
:
!
-2-
individuals in privacy. Thereafter, the summary may
be removed to the Committee's office and all the
staff notes will be destroyed. The original documents
may be referred to as extensively as necessary to
check the summary.
(8) The Committee staff shall designate those documents that
it wishes to make copies of for transfer to the
Committee's offices. Before the copies of the docu-
ments are taken to the Committee's offices, appropri-
ate excisions of the documents will be made.
agreement cannot be reached at the staff level with
respect to the appropriate excisions, the matter shall
be taken to the Attorney General and the Committee.
If an
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 197
from
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. CALLAHAN
FROM
:
J. B. ADAMS
полходна
DATE:
7/24/75
SUBJECT: REQUEST BY VARIOUS SENATORS ON
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW
THEIR FBI FILES
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AÐ
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
3 Affairs.
iles & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun
Haters
Desp
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y.
At the meeting between Mr. Kelley and the Attorney
General, along with their respective staffs on 7/21/75, the Attorney
General determined that there should be broad disclosure of material
in the files of those Senators on the Senate Select Committee requesting
access to same and that in the main the Bureau should only restrict
access to revelation of live informants or information which would
reveal the identity of live informants. In addition, he indicated that
in his review of the file on Senator Hart he noted certain derogatory
information on relatives which he felt Senator Hart should not see.
Also, there may be criminal investigations against one of the Senators
of such a nature that revelation should be restricted.
It was agreed that Deputy Assistant Attorney General
O'Connor and I should review the files in order to determine problem
areas and Mr. O'Connor would consult with, Judge Tyler as needed.
MEC-88 62-116395
--
473
Files have been reviewed and there is general agreement
that almost all of the information can be revealed with certain limited
excisions taking care of problem areas. Mr. O'Connor advised on
7/24/75 that he has been in touch with the Committee and they will make
arrangements to come to my office and review their fires Amy presence
along with Mr. O'Connor. Senator Goldwater has added his name to the
list and Mr. McDermott has been advised in order to insure all pertinent
material is accumulated.
ACTION:
None. Information only.
1 - Mr. McDermott
JBA:ams
(3)
84 AUG 5 1975
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 198
K
лад
пре
5"
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 10/2/00 BY SPZ ALM/776
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
CALLAHAN
MR.
FROM
: H. N. BASSETT
HN By one
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
‛༼ f }*r^p"
DATE:
ID
7/29/75
10/23/00 SP2 ALM/JTG
WRI
In compliance with instructions of Mr. J. B. Adams
as relayed through SA S. F. Phillips, there are attached hereto
Field Inspector's Manual #763 and Headquarters Inspector's Manual
#225 for turn over to the Senate Select Committee. These manuals
are currently charged to SA F. B. Griffith and should be removed
from his property record.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. That this memorandum be routed to the Intelligence
Division to turn over the manuals to Senate Select Committee
representatives.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
iMall. ✓
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y —
472
Del. to SSC.
sel.
2. That it also be routed to the Administrative Division
for removal of the manuals from SA Griffith's property record.
Enclosures
1 - Mr. Adams
1 Mr. Walsh
-
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
FBG:wmj
(6)
Manuals
to SA Wriffith's record
receipt for been destroyed
In quale will
N84 AUG 6 1975
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 199
7-31-75
Повто
джа
REC-88
6
Рем
9 AUG 5 1975
File
6.8
68-116395
#MBR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTATED
DATE 10/2/00 EX SP-2 ALMA
read from
Cia
7/31/75
Intelligence Community Staff
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
ZBI
DCI/IC 75-2675
28 July 1975
(Senatury
Sensterly 
-75
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating
SUBJECT
Group
: Select Committee Requests
Attached for your information are four requests, two of
which are levied on the Central Intelligence Agency, one on
the Department of Defense and one on the Internal Revenue Service.
The Central Intelligence Agency requests are dated July 22 and 25.
The request to the Department of Defense is July 22, and the
Internal Revenue Service request is dated July 9.
P
Attachments: a/s
DBLOSU
REC-88
62-114-395-471
Harriet Thort
Harriett D. Mowitt,
9 AUG 5 1975
Executive Secretary
Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
on Congressional Review
original
treat
as
#M8R16
Day 10/2/00 by SP Z ALM
1276
62-116395
84 AUG 5 1975
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Pagé 200

OTIS G. PIKĖ
FIRST DISTRICT, NEW YORK
COMMITTEX:
WAYS AND MEANS
75-34
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
28 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315
AREA CODE 202
TELEPHONE: 225-3826
MRS. BETTY' ORR
OFFICE MANAGER
DISTRICT OFFICE:
209 WEST MAIN STREET
RIVERHEAD, NEW YORK 1190)
TELEPHONE: 727-2332
July 22, 1975
Mr. William E. Colby
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D., C. 20505
Dear Mr. Colby:
#moR16
10/23/00 SAZ ALM 17TG
As Chairman of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee
be furnished with copies of all documents and materials
provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.
I would like to make a priority request for
all documents and materials related to budgetary authority
and procedures, all budget information for the past 15
years, and any General Counsel's opinions of the authority,
mandate, or charter of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Until such time as the materials can be delivered to the
Committee, I request that arrangements be made for the
Committee staff to review them at the Agency.
Your cooperation in this matter is very much
appreciated.
Sincerely,
Chad Like
Otis G. Pike
Chairman
$
62-116395-471
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docd:32989624 Page 201
PRANK CHURCH, 15MHO, CHAIRMAN *
“JOHN D. TOWỀN, TEXAS, VICE CHAINMAN
A. HART, É
YER F. MONDALE, MINN,
TER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
THE MONGAN, N.C.
WHART, COLD.
HGAWARD II. BAKER, JI., YENN,
BARRY COLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC, MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD 5. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
DCI/IC 15-8663
Mnr. An
Misrites States Senate
States Senate 
Mr.
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 9TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 25, 1975
Mr. Briten
Zmen
J. Selitig
Mr. Walter Elder,
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia
Dear Walt:
REVIEW STAFF
75-2027
This is to confirm our telephone conversation of July 25, 1975,
in which I conveyed to you the requests of the Senate Select Committee
for full and complete information on the following topics:
Any financing by CIA, direct or indirect, of U.S.-.
Towned, including proprietaries, domestic or foreign
media, including but not limited to books, articles,
publishing houses, films, TV programs, scholarly
journals, magazines and news services.
2. Full and complete information, direct or indirect
. CIA use of United States citizens who are news-
paper men, journalists, movie, TV or any other
·persons connected with the media in any way.
•
Full and complete information on the direct or in-
direct involvement of the CIA with U.S. citizens who
were connected directly with religious groups, including
churches and missionaries, with activities or relation-
ships in foreign countries.
With kind regards,
#mpr.16
10/23/00 SP2ALMG
NW-88296 Docld:32989624 Page 202.
Sincerely,
Bell.
William G. Miller
42-1163955-47)
-ENCLOSURE
WIKITTER:
EW YORK
YS AND MEANS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
2.42.8 BAYBURN HOUSE Orrict. DuttonNT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315
ARTA Cont. 202,
TELEPHONE: 225-3026
MRS. BETTY ORR
OFFICE MANADER
DISTRICT OFFICE:
209 WEST MAIN STREET
RIVERHEAD, New York 11901
TELEPHONE: 727-2332
July 22, 1975
DCI/IC75-2658
The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Schlesinger:
#mo216
10123/00 SPZ ALM78
As Chairman of the House Select Committee on
'Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee
be furnished with copies of all documents and materials
provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities;
in relation to the National Security Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and Armed Services intelligence
components.
I would like to make a priority request for all
documents and materials related to budgetary authority and
procedures for the past 15 years, and any General Counsel's
opinions of the authorities, mandates, or charters of the
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence. Agency,.
or Armed Services intelligence components. Until such time
as these materials can be delivered to the Committee, I
request that arrangements be made for members of the Com-
mittee staff to review them at the respective agencies.
Your cooperation in this matter is very much
appreciated.
Sincerely,
C. G. fill
Otis G. Pike
Chairman
10968
62-116395--471
ENCLOSURE
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 203-
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTERY, MONDALE, MINN,
WALTER D. RUDDLESTON, KY.
ROHER MORGAN, N.C.
GORY MART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TEN
DAPHY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JI
RICHARD 5. SCHWEIKER, PÅ.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. &MOTHERS, MINONITY COUNSEL
0.
#MDR16
10/23/00 SP-2ALM/776
United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 14TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 9, 1975
DCI/IC 75-2608
Mr. Thomas V. Glynn
Assistant to the Commissioner
Internal Revenue Service
Washington, D.C. 20224
Dear Tom:
1975
We would appreciate your advising the Select
Committee of the following regarding possible IRS
participation in or furnishing information to the Intelli-
gence Evaluation Committee: 1) whether the IRS had a
representative on the IEC and, if so, who; 2) if there
was such a representative, what duties he had; 3) what
information, if any, IRS furnished to IEC. We request
that the IRS identify for inspection and copying by the
Select Committee staff all documents relating to or.
constituting information furnished by IRS either
directly to IEC or furnished to persons in the Treasury
Department or elsewhere which was ultimately provided to
IEC.
The Committee has reason to believe that at a
March 26, 1971, meeting of the IEC, Mr. Eugene T. Rossides,
then Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Treasury,
Enforcement and Operations Division, was introduced to the
IEC as the person responsible for, inter alia, intelligence
gathering by IRS, and that he would be called upon to make
.contributions from that source to the Committee's work.
Essentially, the Committee requests that the IRS
come forward with all information it has regarding direct
or indirect IRS participation in the work of the IEC.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 204
2-116375-471
ENCLOSURE
Mr. Thomas V. Glynn
•Page two
July 19,
1975
Mr. Arthur Jefferson of the Select Committee
staff is the individual primarily concerned with the
investigation of IEC and will be in touch with you soon
regarding the development of the requested information.
Sincerely,
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 205
Arthur W. Harrigan, Jr.
1
-
Mr. Adams-Encs.
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.
-
-
- Mr. Cregar-Encs.
Mr. Wannall-Encs.
July 21, 1975
1 - Mr. Hotis-Encs.
1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.
#MDR16
10/2/00 SP2 ALM/776
During the executive session of captioned Committee
on July 16, 1975, members of that Committee requested that they be
furnished answers to the following questions:
(1) How are files established on Congressmen?
(2) How long are such files maintained?
(3) Who has access to the Congressional files and
"official and confidential files???
Attached for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is an original of a memorandum in response to the above-
mentioned questions. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for
your records.
3
Enclosures (2)
RECE
Nelivered to Committee 7/24/7508
62-11-32-170
9 AUG 5 1975
کیا به بهانه تا
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
62-116395
1
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
کرده و در مناطقه
NOTE: The attachment to the enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled
"FBI Information-Gathering Practices with Respect to Members of Congress"
was prepared in conjunction with the appearance of the Attorney General and
the Director before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights
of the House Judiciary Committee. This statement is responsive to questions
(1) and (2). Question (3) was answered in coordination with Files and Communi-
cations Division.
11
Telephone Rm. PVD:dkg (10)
Director Sec'ys
_
84 AUG 51979 ☑
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 206
Jm
BLM
IBH/12
mly!
GRO 954-545
1 - Mr. Adams
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
July 21, 1975
1 - Mr. Daly
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEL
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SEC)
During the appearance before the 250 on 11ay 10, 1975,
the following questions were asked by members of that Subcommittee:
(1) How are files established on Congressmen?
(2) How long are such files maintained?
Tho has access to the Congressional files and
"official and confidential files"?
Attached is a response to questions one and two and,
in part, question three. With regard to that portion of question three
concerning access to the official and confidential files, be advised that
those files are maintained in the Special Tile Room of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Fios and Communications Division. Access to these
files is strictly limited and those only having a necessity for access may
review these files. A log is maintained as to who has access to the
official and confidential fllos.
Enclosure
62-116395
1 – The Attorney General
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
PVD:dkg (9)
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 207
#MDR 16
10/2/00 SP2 ALM ITE
Inil
Рем
да
GPO 954-345
FBI INFORMATION-GATHERING PRACTICES
WITH RESPECT TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
There is a total of more than 6,500,000 files at
FBI Headquarters. Most of these contain information gathered
during investigation of matters--including some 100 types of
criminal, security, and applicant-employee cases--assigned to
the FBI by laws of Congress, directives of the President, and
orders of the Attorney General.
include:
The remainder of these more than 6,500,000 files
(1)
(2)
; (3)
Personnel files regarding FBI applicants and
employees;
General files regarding FBI contacts and
dealings with a variety of individuals and
organizations concerning matters that do
not require or involve FBI investigation; and
Administrative-type files, such as those of a
policy nature, those containing statistical
reports, those detailing FBI cooperative
services, and the like.
An unknown, but extremely small, percentage of
these more than 6,500,000 FBI files contain information
regarding present or former Congressmen and Senators which
may have been accumulated prior to, during, or after their
tenure in Congress.
WHAT FBI FILES CONTAIN ON CONGRESSMEN:
FBI Files contain substantially the same types of
information regarding Senators and Congressmen as is contained
in them about other citizens. Basically this information falls
into the following categories:
སྐམ ས ༈ ་ ༨༦ ཀ* ¥#© ¥ 3€9 ¥mm€*v=° ?
(1)
Violations of Law
Allegations that Congressmen or Senators have
violated Federal laws within the FBI's jurisdiction.
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINNO
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAZE 10/2/00 BX SP-ZALM1276
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 208
ENCLOSURE
62-116375
470
The FBI investigates such allegations whether they
relate to Members of Congress or any other person. The
results of these investigations are furnished to United States
Attorneys and/or other prosecutive officials of the Department
of Justice. The investigation may establish (a) that the
Congressman or Senator has, in fact, violated a Federal law,
(b) that a Federal law has been violated, but that the involve-
ment of the Congressman or Senator in that violation cannot be
established, (c) that a Federal law has been violated, but
that the Congressman or Senator clearly had no involvement
in its violation, or (d) that no violation of Federal law
was committed.
Included among such allegations involving Congress-
men and Senators have been the following types of violations
within the FBI's jurisdiction: Bank Fraud and Embezzlement;
Conflict of Interest; Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice; Election
Laws; Fraud Against the Government; and Interstate Transporta-
tion in Aid of Racketeering.
(2) Violations of Federal laws within the FBI's
jurisdiction involving Congressmen and Senators as victims.
i
The results of FBI investigations of such violations
are furnished to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecu-
tive officials of the Department of Justice. In many instances,
the original complaint in these cases is received from the law-
maker-victim himself; however, if the information originates
elsewhere, the FBI promptly notifies the Congressman or Senator
involved of the threat which has been made. In addition; other
' law enforcement agencies which have a legitimate interest in
these cases are notified of the threat.
· Violations of the Congressional Assassination, Kid-
naping and Assault Statute, Bomb Threats, and Extortion are
among the crimes within the FBI's jurisdiction which have
involved lawmakers as victims.
(3) Allegations that members of the staffs of
Congressmen or Senators have violated Federal laws within the
FBI's jurisdiction, or that these staff members have been
victims of such violations.
The FBI investigates such allegations and furnishes
the results to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecutive
officials of the Department of Justice. Where appropriate, the
Congressman or Senator involved is also advised of the investi-
gation.
NW-88296 Docld:32989624 Page 209
2
Congressmen and Senators may be interviewed by the
FBI in these cases involving Congressional aides--just as they
may be interviewed in connection with other types of FBI
investigations--and both the fact of, and the results of,
such interviews are noted in the file reflecting the FBI
investigation.
(4) Allegations that Senators or Congressmen have
violated laws within the jurisdiction of other investigative
agencies.
These allegations are brought to the attention of
the agency concerned--Federal, state, or local. Such allega-
tions are not investigated by the FBI. However, the coopera-
tive services of the FBI Laboratory, Identification Division,
and National Crime Information Center are available to other
law enforcement agencies in the investigation of these, as
well as other, crimes.
Applicant Investigations
(5) Present and former Congressmen and Senators
often are considered for positions in the Executive or
Judicial Branches of the Federal Government which require
that the FBI conduct a thorough background investigation
of them.
Dependent, upon the nature of the position involved,
the results of these investigations are furnished to the White
House, the Department of Justice, and/or other appropriate
Government agencies.
(6) Congressmen and Senators often are interviewed
in the course of applicant-type investigations regarding
other persons who are being considered for Executive or
Judicial positions--as well as during applicant-type investi-
gations conducted by the FBI (at the request of the Committee
chairman involved) concerning staff members of a limited
number of House and Senate Committees. Both the fact of, and
the results of, the interview of the Congressman or Senator
are noted in the file reflecting the FBI's investigation.
Security Cases
(7) Either prior to, during, or subsequent to their
tenure in Congress, there may be files pertaining to security-
type matters which relate to members of the House and Senate,
or Congressmen may be identified in FBI files as actual or
intended victims of acts by subjects of security-type cases.
-
3
Amt ' ༤༥ཨཱ
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 210

The Statutes covering such matters are Title 18, Section 2383
' (Rebellion and Insurrection), Title 18, Section 2384 (Seditious
Conspiracy), and Title 18, Section 2385 (Smith Act
Advocating overthrow of Government by force).
Oral or Written Contact
-
(8) An unknown number of FBI files contain copies
of correspondence between the FBI and Congressmen and Senators
concerning a wide variety of matters which include bills
pending in, or passed by, Congress; personnel matters; the
Bureau's cooperative services; and FBI policies, procedures,
and investigations. Many of these letters from Congressmen
and Senators have been prompted by inquiries which these
lawmakers have received from constituents or other interested
citizens.
The FBI's files also contain memoranda regarding
telephone calls and personal contacts the FBI has had with
Congressmen and Senators regarding the above-cited variety
of matters.
'Miscellaneous Information About Congressmen
(9)
An unknown number of FBI files contain informa-
tion reflecting favorably or unfavorably upon the character,
integrity, and loyalty of Senators and Congressmen--which
information does not require investigative action at the time
received on the part of the FBI or other law enforcement
It consists of:
agencies.
(a)
(b)
Information contained in unsolicited letters
received by the FBI from persons and organi-
zations representing a variety of backgrounds,
viewpoints, and walks of life.
Information volunteered orally to FBI Agents by
the same broad range of individuals and organi-
zations as cited directly above.
(c) Newspaper clippings, as well as data from
magazines and other news dissemination media.
(d)
Miscellaneous information received from FBI con-
fidential informants and/or other sensitive sources.
rage news. Expert.com
.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 211
4
-
ཅག༌གཏང་ཡ-ས
Fingerprints of Congressmen
(10) The files of the Identification Division
contain the fingerprints of an unknown number of Senators
and Congressmen. Some of these relate to their having been
arrested for violations of Federal, state, or local laws.
Others are noncriminal in origin and largely pertain to
their having served in the Armed Forces or having been appli-
cants for various positions. These fingerprint cards have
been submitted to the FBI by Federal agencies, as well as by
local, county, and state criminal justice agencies, throughout
the United States.
Fingerprint records are maintained by the FBI's
Identification Division, and they are kept entirely separate
and apart from all other files and records of the FBI.
HOW INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN REACHES FBI FILES:
There are two basic types of information regarding
Congressmen and Senators in FBI files:
(1) Information which the FBI has solicited during
investigations involving the Congressman or Senator as either
a subject or a victim. This includes information of
pertinence to the case which the lawmaker himself has
furnished to the FBI.
(2)
Unsolicited Information.
There are many sources of the unsolicited information
that is included in FBI files:
་
(a)
(b)
(c)
(a)
It is volunteered by citizens who are being
interviewed during investigations of matters
having no relationship to any of our Nation's
lawmakers.
It is volunteered in communications sent to the
FBI by individuals and organizations.
It is included in news articles and other reports
publicly disseminated by our Nation's news media
which come to the FBI's attention.
It is received from FBI confidential informants
and, very infrequently, from telephone taps not
directed at a Congressman which have been
installed with authority of a Federal Court
and/or authority of the Attorney General.
-
5
mote with the $20 third w
9*v9#*q*ས་ག་ང་ར
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 212
(e)
In the case of information contained on finger-
print cards, it is sent to the FBI's Identifica-
tion Division by authorized contributors,
including criminal justice agencies throughout
the United States.
HOW AND WHERE INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN IS MAINTAINED:
Information regarding Congressmen and Senators is
included in the official FBI files--totaling more than
6,500,000 in number--that are maintained by the Files and
Communications Division on an upper floor of the J. Edgar
Hoover FBI Building.
The area where these files are maintained is staffed
and supervised 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assure
continuous security.
General Index
The essential key to the effective use of these FBI
files is the Bureau's General Index which consists of 58
million index cards and which is located on a different floor
from the files themselves in the J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.
To determine what files (if any at all) contain information
regarding an individual Senator or Congressman, it is
necessary to search the name of that lawmaker in the General
Index.
°
The General Index is staffed and supervised 24 hours
'a day, 7 days a week, to assure continuous security.
Rules Governing Use of Files
These official FBI files are available only to FBI
personnel--and they are available on a "need-to-know" basis
only.
The Files and Communications Division maintains a
record of files that have been charged out by Headquarters
personnel. Such files must be returned to the Files and
Communications Division as soon as possible; and during the
period that a file is charged out, it cannot be left even
momentarily in an unlocked room. If retained overnight,
the file must be kept in a locked cabinet inside a locked
room.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 213
-6-
The charge-out record is temporary in nature and
is destroyed five days after the file has been returned to
the Files and Communications Division.
WHY THE FBI RETAINS INFORMATION REGARDING CONGRESSMEN:
The information regarding Congressmen and Senators
that is maintained in FBI files can be divided into three
major categories:
(1) The results of investigations (criminal-,
security, and applicant-type) involving a Congressman or
Senator as a subject or victim;
(2) Information regarding a Congressman or Senator--
in addition to that gathered during investigation(s) of the
lawmaker involved--which the FBI has disseminated to other
Federal agencies (such as to the Internal Revenue Service if, for
example, the information involves a tax-related matter) and/or to
state and local law enforcement agencies (such as the police
department covering the lawmaker's home community if, for example,
the information involves an alleged threat against the lawmaker's
house or other property); and
*(3)
(3) Other information that the FBI receives from,
or receives about, a Congressman or Senator that is included
in the FBI's files--without having been either investigated
or disseminated by the FBI.
The reasons this information is retained in FBI
files can be explained in legal and administrative terms,
as well as in practical terms.
Legal and Administrative Reasons
All investigative files and other records of the
FBI involving Congressmen or Senators are within a class
of records which--under the FBI Records Retention Plan
developed in 1969 by the National Archives and Records
Service of the General Services Administration--are con-
sidered of enduring archival value to ensure their preser-
vation.
This FBI Records Retention Plan was prepared under
the authority contained in the Federal Records Act of 1950,
which is contained in Title 44 of the United States Code.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 214
-7
.
Included among the FBI records to be retained
under the Records Retention Plan formulated by the National
Archives and Records Service are those which would have
historical value and would document policies, procedures,
functions, legislative and budget matters, and the like--
and reports of investigations of both civil and criminal
activities, including "crimes involving, and other records,
concerning, the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the
United States, members of and delegates elected to the
Congresses of the United States, cabinet heads, judges and
other officials appointed by the President.
"1
In establishing the FBI Records Retention Plan,
the National Archives and Records Service noted, "Ordinarily
the records of a Federal agency that are worthy of permanent
retention amount to a rather small percentage of the total
volume of records generated. Many of the records produced
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, relate to
a number of controversial if not important aspects of the
history of the United States, particularly to the role of
the Federal Government in its relation to its citizens.
To be sure, many years will pass before these records can
be made available to the public for historical and other
serious research. Nevertheless, the archival value of these
records will not decrease nor will interest in them dissipate."
In addition, the FBI is also required by the
Federal Records Act to make records containing adequate and
proper documentation of its administration and operations
which, among other things, are designed to furnish informa-
tion necessary to protect the legal and financial interėst
of the Government and of persons directly affected by FBI
activities.
Practical Reasons for Retaining Information
Logic, reason, and lessons learned from more than
six decades of law enforcement experience dictate that the
FBI should maintain records of investigations it has conducted
(category #1 cited at the top of page 7) and records of
information it has disseminated to other agencies (category #2
on page 7).
Such records enable the FBI to answer questions or
challenges (including those arising in judicial or administra-
tive proceedings) involving investigations FBI Agents have
conducted and, or information the FBI has disseminated to other
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 215
8
whing m
•
agencies.
Such records also enable the FBI to furnish additional
copies of investigative reports or other information that has
been disseminated--should additional copies be needed by the
original recipients or by other official agencies. Furthermore,
the information contained in these files often proves of
assistance in future investigations.
Less obvious may be the reasons why the FBI retains
the third category of information about Congressmen and
Senators (data that has neither been investigated nor
disseminated by the FBI) cited on page 7.
If such information is of an administrative nature--
that is, if the information indicates the lawmaker is interested
in a specific FBI investigation, a specific area of the FBI's
jurisdiction, or specific FBI policies, practices and procedures--
it is filed for:
(1) the information and advice of FBI employees in
connection with future contacts or correspondence with that
Congressman or Senator;
(2) consideration of FBI personnel in connection
with possible future changes in FBI policies, practices, and
procedures.
If the information is of a personal nature--that is,
if it reflects upon the loyalty, character, or integrity of a
lawmaker--it is included in FBI files for the following reasons:
(1) The information may prove of value when a
present or former Congressman or Senator is considered for
a position in the Executive or Judicial Branch of Government
which requires that the FBI conduct a background investiga-
tion of him.
(2) The information could prove of value in
solving future crimes committed against the Congressman or
Senator--or against members of that lawmaker's family.
(A person who berates and defames a lawmaker would be a
logical suspect if that lawmaker--or another Congressman
or Senator whose views coincide with his--becomes the
target of actual or threatened violence.)
(3) The information could aid the FBI in solving
crimes committed against other persons. (For example, the
handwriting, typewriting, stationery, and/or distinctive
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 216
-
9 -
.
phraseology in a letter defaming a Congressman could assist
the FBI in linking the writer of that letter to a subsequent
extortion note or written bomb threat that does not involve
any member of Congress.)
(4) The information frequently provides valuable.
insight into the character, stability, and reliability of
the person who has furnished it to the FBI. Thereby, it is
of value and assistance to the FBI in future contacts with,'
contacts by, or inquiries regarding, this individual.
(5) The information provides a useful administra-
tive check on the performance of FBI field offices--
particularly with regard to the important consideration of
whether they are being fully responsive to the public needs.
Supervisory personnel regularly review complaints or
allegations received from the public to insure that the
appropriate action was taken--if, in fact, action was called
for.
WHAT IS REQUIRED TO DESTROY FILE INFORMATION:
Barring a new law of Congress and/or receipt of a
revised FBI Records Retention Plan from the National Archives
and Records Service, the FBI cannot unilaterally undertake
the destruction of information regarding Congressmen and
Senators in its files.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 217
-
- 10 -
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Addressee: Senate Select Committee
☐ LTR ☑ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 7-21-75
U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental
Caption of Document: Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities. Concerning 3 questions asked by that
Subcommittee.
Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by:
Received by:
Title:
Saulkalaly
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FB!
Date:
7/24/75
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED.
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALATE
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 218
ENCLOSURE 62-116393--470
N
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
FROM:
FBI
TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
2. DATE PROVIDED
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
SSC
7/21/75
4.
HSC
IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
5.
Memorandum and enclosura
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
SSC oral request on 7/16/75
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Operating procedures
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
FBI information-gathering practices with respect
to members of Congress
62-116395
FMK: fmk
(4)
3791 (6-75)
#MDR16
ALL INFORMA
DANT 10/2100 SP-ZALM/STE
ARBON
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
TREAT AS YELLOW
5. Work
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 219
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
62-116395-470
INSTRUCTIONS
185-10099
Type or print clearly in ink.
• Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing.
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required.
pages may be attached if necessary.
Additional
NW 88296 DocId:32989624 Page 220
И

Intelligence Community Staff
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.. 20505
BI
Te gestiral
Germe
な
by 75
DCI/IC 75-2613
29 July 1975
read from
Cia 7/34/75
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Members of the USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating
Group
SUBJECT
:
Security Clearances
ALL TELINFORMATION CONTAINED
ENIS UNCLASSIFIED
·11-22.00 BY SPA ALM/776
Attached is an updated listing of staff personnel certified
by the Staff Director/Senate Select Committee as meeting the
requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified
information up to and including TOP SECRET. Some of these
individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of
DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.
Attachment
| ENCLOSURE treat as
100-Div 9
Harriet mowitt
John M. Clarke
for
고
Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
REC-88
12-116345
areginal
9 AUG 5 1975
62-116395
469
P
84
AUG 5 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 221
IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES
29 JUL 1975
Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as
meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.
Name
Compartmented
Clearance
Designated Briefed
-469.
Date and
Place of Birth.
Social
Security No.
(SI, TK, B).
Aaron, Daviḍ
B 4/15
8-21-38
Ill.
550-44-7971;
Leder, William
B. 4/17
:9-8-31
NJ..
545-30-3377:
TF Badge:
Bayly, John
B 5/19
1-26-44.
DC
578-60-2305
Banoff, Barbara :
B-6/26
12-20-45.
Cal.:
561-68-9123
Barkey, Howard
B 6/2.
1-26-17.
Mo.
490-01-6758
Baron, Frederick.
B 5/19
12-2-47
Conn..
494-54-5241..
Benz, Charity I.
B 5/23
7-23-46.
NY
Betts, Richard K.
B 7/1
8-15-47
Pa.
053-38-7410
016-38-2619.
Birdsell, Wayne
5-2-06
DC
578-03-1841
Bloomfield, Susan
B 7/14
12-23-51
Ohio
256-92-0341
Bouschard, Samuel
В 6/10
3-12-24
Maine
007-18-3292
Brissett, Belva
B 6/10
6-23-41
Ok.
440-44-6374
Brooks, Nancy
B 5/23°
2-14-40
Ky
313-38-6773
*Brown, C. Harold
6-6-38
Ohio
278-34-3428
☐ Brown, Maxine
·B. 6/26..
8-8-28
:
Ida...
568-40-3123
emoe16.
ALL SI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HERZINIS TIN
DAB1 
2210
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 222.
868911-79
ENCLOSURE
Name
Compartmented
Clearance
Designated Briefed
(SI, TK,B)
Date and
Place of Birth
Social
Security No.
29. JUL 1975
Bushong, David
Carpenter, Margaret.
Carter, Barry
B 71/4.
8-10-47.
Ohio
289-40-1203
B. 5/19
8-27-44
Cal.
555-62-6129
B 4/24
12-14-42
Cal.
·567-56-8854
Cresnick, Barbara
nick,
B 7/14
4-18-46
WI
390-46-2235
Culbreth, Elizabeth
Davis, Lynn
Dawson, Thomas
* Dawson, Rhett
B 7/2
6-23-42
NC
240-64-9040.
B 4/17(Port) 9-6-43
Fl.
042-36-9155
TF Badge
B.6/26
9-9-52
Minn.
471-60-1688
B.5/19
: 12-9-43
Ill.
351-34-4329
1. DeMarco, James.
B 6/26.
3-12-43
W. Va.
286-36-9097.
Dennin; Joseph Francis
·B.6/23
6-9-43
NY
567-62-5353
DeOreo, Mary
B 6/26
6-13-47
Ohio
287-42-6258
✓
Genova, Joseph E.
B 6/26
2-22-45
Del.
222-28-5430
Dick, James.
B 6/26
7-25-47.
Mass.
029-36-6745
Dillon, Molly
B 6/10.
4-16-51
Va.
150-38-4588
'Doolittle, Patricia……….
8-12-43
NC
213-42-6360
Dwyer, Daniel
B 7/14
8-24-52
Ma.
023-44-8792
Elliff, John
B. 5/23
6-30-41
DC.
345-34-2468 ·
Epstein, Michael Taylor
B.6/26
3-10-37
Mass.
026-28-6318
Erno, Joan
NW 88296' Docid:32989624, Page 223
8-30-46
DC
215-46-2988.
Name
Compartmented
Clearance
Designated Briefed
Date and
Place of Birth
Social
Security No.
29 JUL 1975
(SI, TK, B)
Fenn, Peter
B 4/24
12-12-47
Ma.
213-50-1123
Ford, Harold
B 6/26
3-23-21.
Cal.
550-16-4630:
Gitenstein, Mark Henry
B 5/28
3-7-46
Ala.
420-60-8767
Grant, Bruce
B 7/2
6-16-16.
Neb.
507-20-1311
Greissing, Edward
∙B 7/14
11-27-50
Germany
296-50-4113
·Harrigan, Arthur
'B 5/19
.3-16-44
NY
141-34-1031
Hatry, Audrey Helen
B 5/19.
6-10-23
Md..
•216-14-8691.
Inderfurth, Mark K.
B 4/29
9-29-46
"NC
245-74-5617
TF Badge.
Iverson, Portia
.B 7/14..
10-22-50
W.Va..
-233-84-0847
>
Jefferson, Arthur M.:
B 6/26
3-16-44
NY
141-34-1031
Johnson, Dorothy
6-8-25
Or.
540-20-6413
Johnson, Loch
B 4/29
2-21-42
N. Zealand
566-62-0478
ralekas, Annę
B 5/28
11-6-46
Ma.
023-36-4329
.Kayden, Jeffrey
Kelley, Robert
Kieves, Lawrence
B 7/14
3-22-51
NY
065-40-7277
B 5/19
10-29-40 Ind.
559-54-1348
B 5/19
1-4-48
068-38-6464
Kirbow, Charles`
..B 4/24
10-2-22
252-12-5112
TF Badge.
Kirchheimer, Joseph
6-3-17
359-03-7843
ང་
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 224
29 JUL 1975.
Name
Koppal, Diane
LaVoy, Diane
Compartmented
Clearance
Designated Briefed
Date and
Place of Birth
Social
Security No.
(SI, TK, B)
..B 6/26
6-24-48
NC
219-48-0018.
·B 6/10
11-10-48:
Venezuela
*165-40-3119
Liebengood, Howard.
12-29-42
9-42
In.
307-44-9707
Lombard, Charles
B4/24
6-2-30
France'
578-44-9471 Badge
Lynch, Mary
·3-16-26
W. Va...
250-38-1344:
MacDonald, Naldeen
10-19-51
Brazil
225-78-8708
Madigan, Michael James
'B 4/15
4-18-43
DC.
042-34-3797.
TF Badge
Marshall, Benjamin
B 4/17
5-4-19
ΝΕ
485-28-4503
Marshall, Burke
10-1-22"
NJ
:,577-44-5241
Mascioli, Cynthia
B 6/26
1-4-51
NY
112-44-7636
Mason, Judy
'B 6/10
1-6-46
DC
578-60-7280
Maxwell, Elliot Everett
B 4/15
7-24-46
NY.
133-34-4225.
TF Badge
i
Mayo, Betty
B 6/26
2-13-22
Ohio
277-14-4062
Mecham, Martha Evans:
B. 5/23
2-11-40
Cal.'
528-48-6848
Miller, William G..
B 4/15
8-15-31
.NY
109-26-4349.
Monaco, Patricia
B 5/23
10-17-35 NJ
157-26-8100:
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 225
29. JUL 1975
Name
Compartmented
Clearance
Designated Briefed
Date and
Place of Birth
Social
Security No.
(SI, TK, B)
Moore, Janet
Murphy, Michael
O'Flaherty, James Daniel
B 5/23
4-9-43
Iowa.
484-52-9820
10-13-54 Tex.
231-86-8829.
B4/15
11-4-42
Ill.
239-62-8495
Badge
.Orloff, Jan
B 6/26
.11-14-47
Caļ.
.558-74-8394
Owens, Drena
B 6/21
12-8-42
NC
242-68-3271'
Peterson, John F.
·B.6/26.
6-15-41
t. Cal.
565-56-7707
Pitts, Susan
B 6/10
10-24-53
, Postal, Andrew
Pyle, Christopher
Quanbeck, Elton'
B 7/23
5-11-48
B 6/26
11-24-39
Canada
NY
Mass.,
020-40-7638
128-40-4695
019-30-9898
:B 5/19
·5-15-26
N. Dak.
501-14-4534
.. Ralston, Theodore
B 7/23
8-25-48
Wash..
538-48-4673
Rhea, Gordon
..B 6/26
3-10-45
Va.
412-74-7901.
R. ard, Eric.
Ricks, Walter'
B 7/10
12-27-49
NY
128-40-7430
B 6/26
12-27-46
Ga..
244-74-4304
Romberg, Alan
B 4/22
12-1-38
NY.
107-30-8583
Rowe, James
B 5/19
16-6-51
DC
579-62-6719
.Schneider, Ruth
B 5/23
10-31-44
Conn.
008-32-0180
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. III
B.4/15
4-20-35
NY
084-30-2047
Seidel, Lester
B 6/26
7-17-44
·DC.
216-38-5204
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 226
Name
Compartmented
Clearance
Designated Briefed
(SI, TK, B)
Date and
Place of Birth.
Social
Security No.
29 JUL 1975
Shea, Patrick
Shelburn, Frank
B 4/15
2-28-48
Utah
528-64-19
64-1965
5-30-13
Va.
338-24-6934..
mith, Elizabeth
B. 5/19
6-21-49
NY
076-42-0199
Smith, John L.
"B 6/26
··3-3-39.
Ky...
400-52-5800
Smith, Stephanie
3-23-54
Ohio
282-58-6476
Smothers, Curtis'
B 5/16
8-26-43
Md.
220-38-9869
Badge
Snider, Lewis Brittle
'B 4/24.
1-12-45
NC.
246-72-0956
Talley, Martha
B 6/26
9-7-50
NC
245-88-1368
Thoben, Florence
6-2-10.
Ind.
313-12-1857
Thomas, Robert,
∙12-16-25°· Md.
219-14-5186
Towell, Mary
B 6/10
4-25-44
Tenn.
566-64-7628
Treverton, Gregory;
B 6/2
1-21-47
Colo.
524-62-2459
Trueheart, William
· Turner, James
Tschirgi, James:
Vance, James.
Wallach, Paul.
B6/2
12-18-18
Va.
: 225-20-6411.
B 7/14
6-29-53
Cal.
215-64-7255
B 6/26
2-23-25
Wyo.
:520-16-7290
B. 7/23
4-6-36
Ohio
078-28-3950
B6/26
5-24-47
NY
149-36-2999
Ward, Fred
11-20-40
DC
225-50-9983
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 227.
Name
White, William
Compartmented
Clearance
Designated Briefed
Date and.
Place of Birth
Social
Security No.
29 JUL 1975
(SI, TK, B)
B 7/10
.8-8-39
Pa.
168-30-9147′
Wides, Burton. Victor
B 4/17
6-14-41'
NJ
139-30-1936
TF Badge
Wiik, Carol Ann
'B 5/23
4-21-51
Mass.
017-40-7170
Wilson, Otis
B.6/10
5-16-20
Vạ.
557-14-5461*.
Zimmerman, Peter Brown
already briefed
3-26-46
Ill.
227-60-1093
Zimmerman, Phebe.
12-1-50
Ohio
271-54-1724
NW 88296. Docid:32980624 Page 228
TO
:
FROM
of
SUBJECT
Седальшантажено
Let 
to A 67/25/75
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
JULY 1973 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
: Edward H. Levi
am
Attorney General
tul
DATE:
FBI
July 16, 1975
Тусла
ALL FEITWORYCATIOT CONTAINED
LEUWEUNCLASSIFIED
TA 10/2/00 BY SE2 ALM /TG
United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.
The United States Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Acti-
vities (the "Church Committee") has recently requested
certain information regarding the functions of the Attorney
General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making
for internal security and intelligence activities. I would
appreciate it if you would prepare by July 25, 1975 the full-
est possible response to the following questions:
1. What standards and procedures has the
Attorney General adopted for the collec-
tion, analysis, use, and dissemination of
organized crime intelligence?
2.
To what extent have communications between
the White House and the FBI or other agencies
under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General
bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent
should such communications be channeled through
the Attorney General?
rough
EXP. PROC.
30 JULI7 1975
2 XifestoMcHale, Div. 9, with
Mallows for their mifent, cob³fir)25
7/18/756
9:30am
2Xscofes to hicuson Sect. - reply to be
by cob 7/23/25 on date 7/25.
7/18/758
2Xse to PV. Daly 7/18/758
84 A
5010-110
Xied to Writell Com Staff
(H. swart) by LFS.
1975
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 229
REC-88
42-116395--468
62-116395
8-5
34 JUL 17 1975
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
S
Wa
FIVE
www
NR 007 AI COD ED
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Jul 20 1975
10:16 PM NITEL JULY 30, 1975 LETYPE
TO:
DIRECTOR
FROM: ATLANTA
SENSTUDY 75
.
(62-116395)
(62-2854)
BUDED: JULY 31,1975.
FMDE 16
ABX INFORMATION CONTAYNID
TREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Итрашнем
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Cour
DATE 16/2100 BY SP-2 ALM/JTE Telephone an
RE BUREAU NITEL TO ATLANTA, JULY 25, 1975.
Director See
Creffe
IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST SET FORTH, EXTENSIVE FILE REVIEW
AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE WILL ENTAIL TIME WHICH
WILL NOT ALLOW ATLANTA TO MEET THE JULY 31, 1975, DEADLINE.
ATLANTA ANTICIPATES RECOVERY AND XEROXING OF MATERIAL
REQUESTED AND SUBMISSION OF A IRTEL TRANSMITT ING SAME BY THE
CLOSE OF BUSINESS, JULY 31, 1975, WHICH SHOULD REACH THE
BUREAU BY AUGUST 2, 1975.
END
FLS HOLD FOR ONE MORE
고
5-
AUG 5
1975
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 230
REC-88
3.
62-116375
9
AUG 5 1976
62-116595-
віньт
467

LAYER OF INVESTON
MMUNICATIONS SECTION
NR 004 SF CODE
1246 PM URGENT 7/14/75 MCC-
14/7
TO
DIRECTOR
FROM SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)
ATTN
4P
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
-
MR.
CREGAR
M+34
UNITED STATES SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IS EXAMINING
INTELLIGENCE
Ar
Dep. A.D.-Adm. _
Dep.-A.D.-Inv._
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Jortion
Int
Labonitory
Plan. & Eval.
Spe. Inv.
Tr. inng
OPERATIONSal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
MEASURES
DIRECTED AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) IN THE LATE
1960S AND EARLY 1970S IN SAN FRANCISCO OAKLAND, LOS ANGELES
AND SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, BY THE FIELD OFFICES OF THE FBI.
RE BUREAU NITEL JULY 9, 1975.
Sutur
Sund
--
9/
"
FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS AND
PERSONNEL CONTACTED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION RELATIVE TO
THIS COINTELPRO:
IN NOVEMBER 1968, UNKNOWN OFFICERS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO
POLICE DEPARTMENT WERE CONTACTED IN ORDER TO GIVE WILFRED 5.
.
-
-
діть
HOLIDAY, ALSO KNOWN AS CAPTAIN CRUTCH, SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AT
CITY PRISON. SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER DECEMBER 2, 1968,
ENTITLED "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST
GROUP, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE (BLACK PANTHER PARTY), BUFILE 100-448006.
}
EX-106
CA#475-6203
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
x
HATE
„RECE3 62-111-57466
DATE/2/1/83 BY SP-2 TAP/RBE
8.4 AUG 6 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 231
MADAST
SEX
on
SAY 1173
3 JUL 21 1975
PAGE TWO
SF 62-6887
IN JANUARY 1969, UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS, BERKELEY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, WERE ADVISED THAT RICHARD AND SAM NAPIER WERE
MEMBERS OF THE BPP. THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT AFTER AN ARMORED CAR WAS HELD UP AND
A GUARD MURDERED AND THE GETAWAY CAR WAS FOUND TO BE REGISTERED
TO RICHARD NAPIER. SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU
JANUARY 13, 1969, ENTITLED "COINTELPRO
GROUPS (BLACK PANTHER PARTY).
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE
IN EARLY 1969, AN UNKNOWN OFFICER, SHERIFF'S OFFICE,
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, AT OAKLAND, WAS ADVISED OF THE USE
BY A FILM COMPANY (MGM) OF BLACK PANTHERS AS "PROPS" IN THEIR
FILMING OF BERKELEY RIOT SCÈNES. THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE IN TURN
FURNISHED THIS INFORMATION TO THE BERKELEY PRESS. SEE SAN
FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU MARCH 10, 1969, ENTITLED
"COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE, BLACK PANTHER PARTY."
-
HATE GROUP,
IN APRIL 1969, INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE BPP WAS
PLANNING A MEETING BETWEEN SOME OF THEIR LEADERS AND SOME OF THE
PEOPLE WHO HAD LEFT THE PARTY IN AN EFFORT TO GET THEM BACK
TOGETHER.
THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO RICHARDYWAG NER,
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 232
:
PAGE THREE
SF 62-6887
OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, ON APRIL 18, 1969, WHO, IN TURN,
APPARENTLY FED THE INFORMATION TO THE BLACK PANTHER RENEGADES
WHO CONSTRUED THIS APPARENTLY AS A "SET UP" AND DID NOT ATTEND.
THIS INCIDENT IS RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO SERIAL 157-601-201.
ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1969, SERGEANT STAN WHITE, OAKLAND POLICE
DEPARTMENT, INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WAS ADVISED THAT INFORMATION
HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT THOMAS JOLLY, A BPP MEMBER, WAS PLANNING
TO CONTACT PROBATION OFFICER IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, TO
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS THE UNCLE OF BELVA NEWSON, ANOTHER bpp
MEMBER WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED.
JOLLY, WHO IS NOT NEWSON'S UNCLE,
PLANNED TO ARRANGE FOR HER RELEASE TO THEM. THIS MATTER IS
RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO FILE 157-601-356.
SAN FRANCISCO FILE DOES NOT REFLECT MEDIA PERSONNEL
WERE CONTACTED IN RELATION TO THIS PROGRAM.
✓ SA RAYMOND N. BYERS, LAST KNOWN BY SAN FRANCISCO TO BE
ASSISTANT LEGAT, TOYKYO, WAS NAMED COORDINATOR OF THE COINTELPRO
BPP ON APRIL 3, 1968. THE CASE WAS REASSIGNED APRIL 18, 1968,
TO FORMER LSA WILLIAM COHENDET WHO PRESENTLY RESIDES AT 1557 BALBOA
WAY, BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA 94010. THIS MATTER WAS REASSIGNED
TO SA LEO S BRENNELSEN MAY 16, 1969. THE MATTER WAS CLOSED ON
MAY 1, 1971.
ך.
PLS MAKE READ LAST PARAGRAPH 2-ND-LINE 3RD-WORD READ-TOKYO-REPT-TOKYO
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 233
PAGE FOUR
SF 62-6887
-
BPP
THIS MATTER WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA ALBERT P. CLARK
FROM APRIL 3, 1968 TO MAY 9, 1970. CLARK PRESENTLY RESIDES
66 ELM AVENUE, LARKSPUR, CALIFORNIA 94939. COINTELPRO
WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA DAVID EA TODD FROM FEBRUARY 9, 1970
TO MAY 1, 1971, TODD RESIDES AT 20 COZZOLINO DRIVE, MILLBRATE,
CALIFORNIA 94030.
END
LER FWAUTXX WAIT A MINUTE ON 3RD-PAGE 2, DXX-2, 2ND-TOL
LAST LINE LAST 294-
WORD-READ-MILLBRAE REPT MILLBRAE-
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 234
NRØ18 BS CODED
8:03PM NITEL JULY 24, 1975
TO: DIRECTOR 62-116395
FROM: BOSTON 66-4177
ATTN: INTD, (SA W. O. CREGAR)
CENSTUDY, 1975.
།
RETAINED
JUL (1275
REC-5Z
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm..
Dep.A.D-Inv
Asst. Dif
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. W.KW/115
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
christyan
ON JULY 24, 1975, JOHN F. KEHOE, JR., (FORMER SA)
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.,
ADVISED THAT ON JULY 23, 1975, HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE
PAUL WAL
#MDR16
KILL INE WYMAN COND
PAT: 10/2/00 SP2 ALMlYTE:
CALL FROM PAUL WALLACH, WHO STATED HE WAS A STAFF MEMBER
川
OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES. WALLACH GAVE HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER AS
WALLACH
202-224-1700. WALLACH ASKED KEHOE IF HE WAS A FORMER SPECIAL
AGENT OF FBI AND KEHOE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.
THEN INQUIRED WHETHER KEHOE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER COVERT INTELLIGENCE
.GATHERING ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK CITY IN THE 1960'S.
204
REC-52
J B
62-116395465.
KEHOE TOLD WALLACH THAT HE HAD BEEN AN SA ASSIGNED TO
THE NEW YORK OFFICE IN 1946 AND 1947. WALLACH STA TED
5 JUL 2.1575
☑- YOU DIDN'T GO BACK THERE TO DO SOME JOB DURING THE 60'S
DID YOU?" KEHOE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE.
AUG AD 1975
A1975
'Pine full
SA
WALLACH THEN
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 235
:c:67-
5T
Clan
PERS/MSC. UNIT
PAGE TWO
BS 66-4177
ASKED IF KEHOE KNEW OF ANY OTHER SA'S NAMED KEHOE WHO
WERE ASSIGNED TO NEW YORK OFFICE DURING THE 1960'S AND
WHO WERE NOW RETIRED. KEHOE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE,
AT WHICH TIME WALLACH CONCLUDED THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.
THE ABOVE IS FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ.
END
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 236
1-2
, 2.
ΤΟ
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
*MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. W. R. Wannall
FROM
: N. O.
regal
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 175
1
-
1
2
-
-
DATE:
1
1
1
1
-
-
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz
7/11/75
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. J. G. Deegan
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
When
-
Mr. R. L. Shackelford
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Laboratory
Plans & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
This memorandum recommends that the Director raise the
question of privacy and source protection with Senators of the
Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his anticipated
meeting in Executive Session with the SSC tentatively scheduled
for the week of 7/14/75.
By letter dated 7/9/75, Senators Frank Church and
John Tower of SSC requested the Attorney General and the
Director to appear before the Committee in Executive Session
during the week of 7/14/75. The purpose of this meeting is
discuss the matter of concern to Mr. Kelley and steps which
might be taken to expedite the response to requests for documents)
essential to the Committee inquiry.
The Senstudy staff of the Intelligence Division is
preparing for the Director's use copies of each of the written
requests received from SSC annotated with the dates of our
response to each request%; the date it was delivered to the
Department; and the date it was delivered to the SSC staff.
There remains, however, a serious problem precipitated
by three recent written requests of the SSC dated 6/30/75 (received
by the Bureau on 7/7/75); 7/1/75 (received by the Bureau on
7/8/75); and 7/8/75 (received by the FBI on 7/9/75). All three
of these requests appear, in part, to disregard the privacy of
certain individuals or requests the identity of sources
cooperating with the FBI.
Enclosure
REC-88
6241659-464
CONTINUED
-
OVER
WOC:emg/dsh
(9)
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
RECY IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP2 ALM/116
AUG 5 1975
NWP88296 Docid:32989624 Page 237
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
SENSTUDY '75
RE:
In this regard, in an exchange of letters dated
3/11 and 12/75, William Colby in his role as the Director
of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Church stating.
that "I am particularly appreciative of your recognition
that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities
must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select
Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such
matters as the identities of our sensitive sources.
should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from
the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect
certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,
might impair the privacy rights of the individuals."
By letter dated 3/12/75, Senator Church stated as
follows, "It is the Committee's understanding that the members
of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any
or all information which the Committee deems necessary for its
inquiry. We recognize, however, that the Committee inquiry
may touch on sensitive areas, such as the identities of CIA
personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose
disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the
event that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive
areas, which matters we have already discussed in our meeting
of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggested
quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee
decide it requires more information in these specific areas.
The 6/30/75 SSC letter requests among other things,
a list of all police departments and personnel contacted
relative to a particular COINTELPRO operation%; a list of all
media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and
the media affiliation.
The 7/1/75 SSC letter requests a list of all persons
outside the FBI (including, but not limited to, employees'
relatives, friendly media personnel, members of clergy,
federal, state and local law enforcement and other officials)
contacted in relation to four persons who were subjects of
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 238
2
-
CONTINUED OVER
M
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 175
COINTELPRO operations. This same letter also notes that one
Morris Starsky, one of the four persons referred to above,
was made known to the FBI during a conference on 6/12/75, as
a person who would be the subject of a case study by the SSC.
This is not so. Inquiry was made of those Bureau supervisors
who attended the conference and a review of the memorandum
written following the conference was made. Neither the
memorandum nor the recollection of Bureau supervisors attending
the conference indicates the name Morris Starsky was mentioned
by SSC staff personnel.
The 7/8/75 SSC letter requests among other things:
(1) all memoranda and other materials which relate to a meeting
between the President and Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph,
Whitney Young, Mrs. Dorothy Haight, James Farmer and Jack
Greenberg on 11/19/64; (2) a copy of a November, 1964, telegram
from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to Director Hoover and all
notes, memoranda, and any other materials reflecting the
disposition of, or actions taken as a result of the receipt
of, said telegram; (3) all memoranda and other materials which
relate to a meeting between the President and Dr. King on
2/9/65; (4) all other materials which relate to the transfer of
former Special Agent Robert C. Nichols to the Oklahoma Office of
the FBI in June, 1969; (5) all forms and attachments including
forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide For Investigative
Personnel, from 1959 until retirement for former Special
Agents Robert C. Nichols and Alan Sentinella.
OBSERVATION:
It would appear the above-cited requests do, in fact,
violate the privacy of individuals and possibly place in jeopardy
the identity of persons who cooperated with the FBI. Consistent
with the agreement in the exchange of letters between Colby and
Church dated 3/11 and 12/75, it is believed the Director should
raise these questions with the SSC and attempt to get relief
from the requirement of revealing the names of FBI sources or
violating the privacy of individuals. Certainly the request for
information on former Special Agents Nichols and Sentinella goes
to the heart of the privacy issue and appears to be a blatant
disregard for their privacy.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 239
1
3
-
ACTION CONTINUED
-
OVER
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
SENSTUDY 175
RE:
ACTION:
If approved, the attached letter to the Attorney
General will be sent advising him of the Director's intention
to raise these issues with the SSC on the occasion of his
appearance with the Attorney General during the week of
7/14/75.
not sent
with combly
Роман 
Деншна
7/16/75
дна
дна ви дотр
Рем
поров
шель
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 240
-
4

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
"MAY 1862 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
: The Attorney General
FROM : Director, FBI
SUBJECT: U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
DATE:
July 15,
1975
By letter dated July 9, 1975, Senators Frank Church
and John Tower requested our appearance in Executive Session
before the Senate Select Committee to discuss matters of
concern to me and steps which might be taken to expedite
responses to requests for documents essential to the
Committee's inquiry.
It is my intention to raise the question of privacy
as well as the protection of sources at this forthcoming
meeting. In the most recent requests of the Senate Select
Committee dated June 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which are
in the possession of Mr. O'Connor, the Committee appears to
disregard the rights of certain individuals' privacy, going
so far as to ask for copies of the annual performance ratings
of certain former Special/Agents of the FBI.
It is my intention to request the Committee to
relieve the FBI from the obligation of violating the
privacy rights of individuals or placing in jeopardy
the identities of cooperating sources of this Bureau.
1
-
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
Not sent
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,
HEREIN 
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2100 BY MM/16
File W/ To
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
NW 88296-Docld:32989624 Page 241
1
The Attorney General
No food faint
2
Director, FBI
1
1
1
1
-
1 1 1
food friend food found
11 11
A
Mr. N. P. Callahan
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. J. A. Mintz July 15, 1975
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. J. G. Deegan
Mr. R. L. Shackelford
Mr. W. O. Cregar
#MOR16
10/2/003
C
13. SP-ZALM/JTG
Assoc. Dir.
QUO FEVELIN
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
gal Coun.
ephone Rm.
ector Sec'y
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
By letter dated July 9, 1975, Senators Frank Church
and John Tower requested our appearance in Executive Session
before the Senate Select Committee to discuss matters of
concern to me and steps which might be taken to expedite
responses to requests for documents essential to the
Committee's inquiry.
It is my intention to raise the question of privacy
as well as the protection of sources at this forthcoming
meeting. In the most recent requests of the Senate Select
Committee dated June 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which are
in the possession of Mr. O'Connor, the Committee appears to
disregard the rights of certain individuals' privacy, going
so far as to ask for copies of the annual performance ratings
of certain former Special/Agents of the FBI.
It is my intention to request the Committee to
relieve the FBI from the obligation of violating the
privacy rights of individuals or placing in jeopardy
the identities of cooperating sources of this Bureau.
1
THE
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention:
WOC: emg/dsh
(12)
NOTE:
K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
not sent
зардал
See W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum
dated 7/11/75, captioned "SENSTUDY 175,
WOC: emg/dsh.
-
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
KMW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 242
"
fileref
prepared by
рем
wol
woul
GPO 954-546
4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)
Date of Mail
6/14/75
Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.
Subject
JUNE MAIL
SENSTUDY 75
#mpe 16
ON THIS
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED FORM
PIS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BYSBJ ALM/ZTG
79 AUG 4 1975
Removed By
File Number
62-116395-463
Permanent Serial Charge Out
DOJ/FBI
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 243
༈ - --,;་མ་
ITATION
COMUNCATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 61973
DAT
TETYPE
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm...
Dep.-A.D. Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Km.
Director Sec'y
--
NR 001 SF CODE
10:56 AM URGENT 6/16/75 MCC
ΤΟ
DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM SAN VRANCISCO (62-6887)
ATTN M. O. CREGAR, INTD
SENSTUDY 75.
RE SACRAMENTO TELETYPE INSTANT DATE.
REVIEW OF SAN FRANCISCO ELSUR INDICES SHOWS NO OVERHEARS
ON MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
END
VLJ FBIHQ CLR
MDR 16
1937: 10/12/00 SP-2: ALM/ATE
4 AUG 4
1975
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 244
REC-88
62-111-375
JUL29 1975
462
NR 015 WF CODED
940 PM NITEL JUNE 16, 1975 WWC
'TO :
DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
* FROM: SAC, WFO (62-10744) (P )
ATTE
ATTENTION INTD. W.0. CREGAR.
SENSTUDY 75.
REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JUNE 13, 1975.
BASED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE
WFO IS UNABLE TO LOCATE ANY INFORMATION REGARDING ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. DURING PERIOD
INDICATED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATION.
END.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident
Inspection
Inca RWKH
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
21433
시
1
#MOR 16
1 10/2/00 SPJAL MIHE
84 AUS 4 1975
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 245
13Ր 00
EC
62-11.6395
℗ AÚG 4 1976
461
NR 001 SC CODE
10:30 AM URGENT 6/16/75 VLS
TO
DIRECTOR (62–116395)
SAN FRANCISCO
FROM SACRAMENTO (62-489)
ATTN: INTD__ (W 0. CREGAR)
SENSTUDY 75.
.
VESTIGATION
COLEMNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 16775
Rim
TELFRIPE
"RE BUREAU TEL TO DETROIT, JUNE 13, 1975.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm
Dep.-A.D.-Inv
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
--
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
W.Co. Califor
412372H
REVIEW OF SACRAMENTO INDICES REFLECTS NO INFO RE ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, APRIL 23-24, 1964, SENATOR HOTEL, SACRAMENTO, CALIF.
SACRAMENTO DIVISION ESTABLISHED 1967.
FOR INFO SAN FRANCISCO, RETEL STATED IN CONNECTION WITH SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST, FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY RETURN TELETYPE
ATTN: INTD
•
•
0 CREGAR:
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE INDICES AT FBIHQ DO NOT INDICATE OVER-
HEARS ON KNOWN TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
FOR ABOVE DATE AND LOCATION.
SAN FRANCISCO REVIEW ELSURE INDICES AND FURNISH FBIHQ FIRST DATE
KING OVERHEARD ON ABOVE TECHNICAL INSTALLATION.
HEARD, SO ADVISE.
END
VLJ FBIHQ CLR
84 AUG 4 1975
#торів
་་་
10/2/00 SP2 ALI
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 246
REC-88
IF HE WAS NOT
REGRE 62-116-395-
7 JUL-20 1975
1
460
4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)
Date of Mail
6/16/75
Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.
ON THIS
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
IS UNCLASSIFIED
Form
DATE 10/2/00 BY SPZ ALM/116.
Subject
JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75
Removed By
79 AUG 4 1975
File Number
62-116395-459
Permanent Serial Charge Out
DOJ/FBI
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 247
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
Mr.
Clev
FROM
:
R. J. McCarthy
Car
SUBJECT:
DATE:
July 21, 1975
í
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm..
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
-
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eva
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Вас
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
-
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Reference is made to the Attorney General's letter,
July 16, 1975, captioned as above, requesting information
relating to the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination
of organized crime intelligence.
On June 25, 1974, the Director testified before
the FBI Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary ·
Committee that the Bureau has "no statutory authority to
collect intelligence per se" but that it operates under the
general umbrella of 28 U.S.C. 533 (3), which authorizes the
Attorney General to appoint officials "to conduct...investiga-
tions regarding official matters...as may be directed by the
Attorney General." A listing of any directives issued by
the Department or the Attorney General with respect to organized
crime should be available in the office of the Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.
With respect to the FBI, all our investigations in
the organized crime field are aimed at one ultimate objective:
prosecution.
During the course of our on 1/16
62-114395
I
45,8
hoodlums and the various criminal syndicates operating through-
out the United States, we naturally acquire considerable data
regarding the structure of the organized underworld, the
identities of its principal leaders, the extent of its in-
fluence, its primary sources of income, its payoffs to corrupt
officials, and the operations of its vast communications-networks.
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1
1
1
1
-
-
be
-
Mr. S. F. Phillips
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. McCarthy
Mr. McHale
JEM: bkh
(6)5551
4881165 1975
'Docid:32989624 Page 248
#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED.
TEREN 
(5 UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BX SP-2 ALm/776
9 AUG 4 1975
Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re:
United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities
Most of this information is obtained from paid
informants, from other law enforcement officers, from alert
citizens, and from court-approved electronic surveillances
installed under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus
·Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
None of it, however, is intelligence for intelligence's
sake. The experience of the FBI over the years has shown that
criminal syndicates exist for the sole purpose of conducting
illegal operations and that anyone belonging to them may
reasonably be presumed to be engaged in one or more of these
activities. Therefore, our investigations of the organized
underworld are not aimed at developing general nonspecific
data but at establishing which criminal violations its members
are engaged in and then proving these violations in a court
of law.
Obviously, not every case opened, every lead followed,
or every bit of information received is going to wind up in
Federal court. On the contrary, much of this material relates
to offenses outside the investigative jurisdiction of the
FBI. When such is the case, we immediately disseminate the
information to the appropriate Federal, state, or local agency.
As a result, information uncovered by the FBI during the past
five years alone has enabled the recipient agencies to make
more than 17,000 organized crime arrests; confiscate over
$151,000,000 worth of illicit drugs and narcotics, $9,000,000
worth of cash, property, weapons, and wagering paraphernalia,
and $6,000,000 worth of counterfeit bills; and assess tax
liens against $19,000,000 worth of property arising out of
Federal gambling cases.
In addition, a considerable portion of the organized
crime intelligence information developed by the FBI is for-
warded to the various Federal Strike Forces coordinating
racket investigations throughout the country and to the
Criminal Division of the Department, which has entered this
information in its computerized data bank called "Racketéer
Profile.*
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 249
-2-
Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re:
United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities
RECOMMENDATION:
That, upon approval, this memorandum be routed to
Supervisor S. F. Phillips, of the Intelligence Division,
who is coordinating the Bureau's reply to the Attorney
General's inquiry.
SFP
PLM
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 250
wiew/TM
-3-
дит
JEM
me
Рем
джа

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)
Date of Mail
7/28/75
Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.
See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.
#MDR 16
On This
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED FORM
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/3/00 BY SP-2 ALMISTE
Subject
JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75
Removed By
79 AUG 4 1975
File Number
62-116395-457
Permanent Serial Charge Out
DOJ/FBI
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 251
FFMDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED,
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2 moveme
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD InA
Asst. Dir.:!
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Cous
Telephone Rm.
Director, Sec'y
PLAINTEXT
TELETYPE
TO: SAC LOUISVILLE
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI
SENSTUDY 75
1
-
Mr. Mintz
1
-
URGENT
9/25/75
Mr. Wannal FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
1 - Mr. Cregar COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
1
-
Mr. Hotis
-
1 – Mr. Daly
SEP 25 1975
TELETYPE
RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL TO LOUISVILLE, 9/24/75.
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE STANLEY S. CZARNECKI OF THE
LOUISVILLE OFFICE BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW CON-
CERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE BUREAU'S INVESTIGATION OF
KEY ACTIVISTS - NEW LEFT. THIS WILL BE A STAFF INTERVIEW
CONDUCTED BY STAFF MEMBER JOHN SMITH. SMITH REQUESTED
THAT THE INTERVIEW TAKE PLACE IN LOUISVILLE ON FRIDAY,
9/26/75, IF POSSIBLE.
SAC CZARNECKI SHOULD TELEPHONICALLY CONTACT LEGAL
COUNSEL DIVISION UPON RECEIPT OF THIS COMMUNICATION TO BE
REC-4 62-116395-
BRIEFED CONCERNING THE INTERVIEW AND ARRANGE FOR
62-116395-426X
APPROPRIATE BRIEFING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.
Personnel File - Stanley S. Czarnecki
MC OCT 1.1975
NOTE: John Smith, Senate Select Committee staff member, requested the
interview of SAC Czarnecki concerning the Bureau's investigation of Key
Activists - New Left: This communication will serve as approval for the
waiver of the existing employee agreement signed by SAC Czarnecki.
Referenced telephone call alerted SAC Czarnecki.
PVD:kis (9)
聊
MAIL ROOM
дна
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 8829 CP:32989624 Page 252
Per
mazin
9065
95-14
:
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM : Legal Counsel
дат
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
ALG INFORMATION CONTAINED,
GIMISSTI SI NIN
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP-2ALM/776
912014
DATE: 7-24-75
Assoc. Dirt
Dep. AD Adm
ADVA
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Di
Admin
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intelt!
Laborator
Legal Cou
Plan. & Eva
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
4063
Pursuant to a request from SA Thomas J. McNiff
SA Daly of this Division contacted Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special
Counsel for Intelligence Coordination for the Department, on 7-22-75
concerning the current policy regarding excisions which may properly
be made on documents being furnished to the Senate Select Committee
for their review in Bureau space and the policy concerning notes being
taken during the Committee staffers review of such materials.
고
Shaheen stated that there is no agreement currently in
operation concerning excisions, however, he felt that excisions should
be properly restricted to the protection of sources, sensitive techniques
or methods concerning sensitive ongoing operations. He noted that this
is in general conformity with the proposed agreement concerning this matter
which was being reviewed at the White House. Regarding the question
raised concerning the taking of notes, Shaheen indicated that the proposed
new agreement allowed for the taking of notes on these documents which
notes may be taken to the Senate Select Committee offices. In fact,
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, K. William O'Connor, who
was present during this discussion pointed out it was the intent of the
aforementioned proposed agreement that "screened documents" may be
removed by the Committee staff members to the Senate Select Committee
offices. With this in mind, Shaheen stated we should allow the staff
notes
members to take 
notes 
and remove same to their offices. 62-166395
conversation.
SA McNiff was orally advised of the results of thiЯAUG 4 1975
RECOMMENDATION:
ستی
456
For information.
1
Mr. Wannall
1
-
Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1
-
Mr. Hotis
Қ
дна
Рем
5-Im
1 - Mr. Daly
PVD dkg (7)
844164 195
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 23 Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Page
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
Mr. W.R. Wannall
ful/
FROM
· J.W. Redfield/
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
PURPOSE:
SECRET
1 Mr. W.R. Wannall
-
1
-
Mr. R.L. Shackelford
DATE: July 29, 1975
1
-
1
1
-
1
-
Mr. W.O. Cregar
Mr. W.A. Branigan
Mr. J.W. Redfield
Mr. J.F. McGuire
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspecti
Intel
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
To comment on items extracted from a 693-page
document prepared by CIA citing certain instances wherein
CIA believes its activities may have exceeded its legal
mandate.
BACKGROUND:
Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated
7/24/75, captioned as above, described the above-mentioned,
CIA document and requested a review of certain items
mentioned therein in order to fully identify the subject
matter thereof and to assess whether same may involve any '
compromise of FBI counterintelligence operations.
"
고
CIA item captioned "Antlers, relates that CIA
arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European
country by commercial transportation and gained entry into
the U.S. without leaving any trace of the defector's true
identity. FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information
concerning the word "Antlers," in the context described by
CIA.
More than likely, "Antlers" is a CIA in-house code word
used for the handling of a valuable and sensitive defector
source. While we have no information relative to "Antlers,"
it is noted that we do have access currently to two CIA
defector sources respectively code named TORTIS and TUMBLE,
both of whom were Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) officers
whose whereabouts have been carefully concealed as both of
these defectors are targets of the RIS. Specifically, the RIS .
has indicated a desire to kidnap and/or kill the two defectors
mentioned herein. It is possible the CIA item referred to as
"Antlers" may relate to either TORTIS or TUMBLE. It is firmly
believed that public disclosure of the CIA item mentioned
beyond that described in the attachment to W.O Cregar
memorandum of 7/24/75, could adversely affect the safety and
75
SECUR
security of TORTIS or TUMBLE, if in fact, either one SAU 1975
defector described in the CIA item.
62-116395
JFM:bcw
(7)
bow
SECRET
Classified by 2721
REC-88
CONTINUED OVER
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2, 3 and 4
Date of Declassification Indefinite
888267989624 Page 254
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
·455
5-Am
SECRET
Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395
CIA item described as Project WESTPOINTER apparently
involved the examination of mail to the U.S. from Mainland
China during certain specific months of 1969, 1970 and 1971.
CIA indicated that Project WESTPOINTER was similar to Project
SRPOINTER. FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information
concerning Project WESTPOINTER. Memorandum from Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, dated 4/1/75,
captioned "Jane Fonda v. L. Patrick Gray, et al.; Civil Action
No. 73-2442-MML (C.D. Cal.)," describes a CIA covert operation
known as SRPOINTER which involved examination of mail to and
from the Soviet Union which was discontinued in 2/73.
Apparently, CIA had examined certain mail addressed to Jane
Fonda in connection with its SRPOINTER activity. While we
were not aware of CIA's Project WESTPOINTER, it is noted that
this Bureau did periodically examine mail coming from the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong to the U.S.
and mail from the U.S. to the PRC and Hong Kong during the
period 1956-1966. This activity, which was permanently dis-
continued 1/24/66, was carried under the code names CHIPROP
and CHICLET. Public disclosure of the CIA item referred to
above as Project WESTPOINTER might lead to a more detailed
public examination of this Bureau's periodic control of mail
in the CHIPROP and CHICLET operations.
ACTION:
JFM
For information in connection with Senstudy 75.
TJM
джи
PLM
whel
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 255
SECRET
-2-
1/26/75
Cia
Med from
.
خلال
File Tick
with
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DCI/IC-75-0126
23 July 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc
SUBJECT:
Coordinating Group
Key Words for Central Indexing
Key
-75"
Sensturdy -75
Future key wording of information furnished to thẻ
Community Central Index should include names of Agencies.
These will be helpful in identifying information in the
material which relates to another Agency's activities.
Harriet Towest
Harriett Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group
#MDR 16
BXANAD
CL1012.100 SP2 ALM LITE
NK 1829 3 4 1975
Botid:32989624 Page 256
REC-88
62-116395-454
AUG 115
Fele
62.116315
Delimina
X2
The Attorney General
Difector,
Director, FBI
о
1
N fornt faint
2
-
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. H. N. Bassett
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
July 22,
1 Mr. W. R. Wannall
-
-
1
1
-
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. J. P. Thomas
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
1975
リ
شرا
7/23/75-
CHAILSTO
912924
CAL INSORMATION CONTAINED
10/2/00 3 SP-
Cal
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
R
Director Secy
1
Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated
May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting
certain documents and other information from the FBI.
Attached for your approval and forwarding to
SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds in part
to one of the requests contained in above SSC letter.
A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for
your records.
Enclosures (2)
62-116395
-
REC-88
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
JPT:1hb /hb
(11)
D
ENCLOSURE
MAILROOM
AUG 475
обол
TELETYPE UNIT
ETYP
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 257
62-116375-
9 AUG 1975
нивуше
HNB.
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Рем
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GPO 1975 O-569-920
Assoc. Dir.
62-116395
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
112
-
-
Mr. J. B. Adams
Mr. H. N. Bassett
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
1
-
1
1
-
-
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
July 22, 1975
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. J. P. Thomas
U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING
TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
#MDR16
10/2/00 SP-2 ALM/JTG
Reference is made to letter, with attached
appendices, dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General
from the Chairman of captioned Committee, requesting certain
documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
Appendix B, Item I, Number 5 of referenced
appendices requested this Bureau to provide Committee Staff
access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for
the past ten years with respect to the following FDI field
offices: New York City; Chicago; San Francisco; Los Angeles;
San Diego; Sacramento; Springfield, Illinois; Buffalo;
Atlanta; and Columbia, South Carolina; Number 6 requested
this Bureau to provide the annual inspection reports and
related surveys for the past ten years pertaining to the FBI
Intelligence Division.
At a conference held on May 30, 1975, between
Messrs. John T. Elliff and Mark Gitenstein of the Senate
Select Committee; Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department
of Justice; and Messrs. William O. Cregar and Elmer 17.
Larson of the FBI, it was agreed, in response to above request,
that this Bureau would make available to appropriate personnel
of the SSC Staff, for review at FBIHQ, copies of the reports
JPT:1hb
(10)
MAIL ROOM
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TELETYPE UNIT
ENCLOSURE 112-1163
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 258
_
4 PO
GPO 54-546
RE:
Further Documents Pertaining to
the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
of the two inspections conducted of the Domestic Intelligence
Division, FBI Headquarters, during 1971, and of the
inspection of the San Francisco Field Office of the FBI
during October, 1970.
Pertinent documents, believed responsive to above
agreement, are now ready for review at FBI Headquarters by
appropriate personnel of the SSC Staff. You will note that
portions of the San Francisco inspection report which relate
solely to investigations of criminal matters, with no
security ramifications, have been eliminated from the report.
Should the SSC deem such material pertinent to its mandate,
however, it can be made available for review by the SSC Staff,
upon written request.
1
-
The Attorney General
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 259
2 -
5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
Addressee: Senate Select Committee
LTR
LHM
7-22-75
☐ Memo ☐ Report dated
U. S. Senate Select Committeeto Study Governm Oper-
Caption of Document: ations. Re: Further Documents Pertain-
"ing to the FBI and Dept. of Justice. Policies and Pro-
cedures. 5-14-75 request Appendix B, Item I, #5.
Originating Office: FBI
Delivered by:
P
Received by:
症
Title:
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 260
Date:
7/24/75
FMDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED.
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/00 BY SP 2 ALM1776
ENCLOSURE 662-116595
453

E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
BEFORE COMPLETING.
TO:
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
FROM:
FBI
Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index
SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees
1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available
for review but not transmitted, so note.)
2. DATE PROVIDED
DOCUMENT
BRIEFING
INTERVIEW
FOR REVIEW
TESTIMONY
OTHER
3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)
器
SSC
7/22/75
HSC
4. IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)
Memorandum
5.
IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other-
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)
530 letter 5/14/75, Appendix B, Iten I, 05
6. CLASSIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (enter
U, C, S, TS or
Codeword)
U
7. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)
Operating procedures
#MDR16
8. SUMMARY (see reverse side before completing this item)
ن
10/2100 SP2ALM 1716.
Made available to appropriate personnel of the SSC
Staff, for review at FBIEQ, copies of the reports of
the two inspections conducted of the Domestic Intelligence
Division, FBI Headquarters, during 1971, and of the
inspection of the San Francisco Field Office of the FBI
during October, 1970
62-116395
FMK: fmk
(4)
ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75
3791 (6-75)
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 261
TREAT AS YELLOW
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
ENCLOSURE 62-₤16395
5. WOG
-
009/8
453
INSTRUCTIONS
Type or print clearly in ink.
Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
• Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
"FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.
• If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
-
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 262
till
"
WR006 SE CODED
4:50 PM NITEL 7/21/75 SLA
TO
DIRECTOR (62-116395)
FROM SEATTLE (66-2894)
SENSTUDY 75
FEDERAL **VESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 91 197
TELETYPE
RE-BUREAU NITEL, JULY 17, 1975.
Assoc. Dir.
Dep.-A.D.-Adm..
Dep.-A.D.-Inv..
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Tr. ining
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director See'y
FORMER EMPLOYEE, LEROY W. SHEETS NO LONGER MAINTAINS RESIDENCE
MPLOYEE
ogan
#. Naftan
"P.yi Daly
AT MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON. HE HAS PURCHASED AN AIRSTREAM TRAILER
AND ON JUNE 10, 1975, HE AND HIS WIFE LEFT THE AREA FOR AN
EXTENDED FOUR-MONTHS CROSSCOUNTRY TRIP, PRIOR TO LEAVING, SHEETS
ADVISED SRA JOHN E. CONNOR, EVERETT, WASHINGTON, THAT HE WOULD BE
TRAVELING CONTINUOUSLY UNTIL MID-OCTOBER, 1975, WHEN HE WOULD RETURN
TO THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. CURRENT LOCATION OF SHEETS IS
UNKNOWN.
ษ
&
¥309
AJO 
& J B
P
SHEETS IS BELIEVED TO STILL HAVE A MARRIED STEPDAUGHTER, NAME
UNKNOWN, IN THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. SHE MAY HAVE AN
ITINERARY FOR SHEETS THAT COULD. LOCATE HIM FOR A POSSIBLE INTERVIEW.
IF BUREAU DESIRES HER CONTACTED, A REVIEW OF PERSONNEL FILE OF
SHEETS AT HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE HER NAME AND ADDRESS.
END
HOLD
;
MSY FBIHQ
COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECON
CC; 67-
N820cl: 12759624 Page 263
L
REC-88
62-11639)
8.45
(SHEETS)
#MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTIW
HERE IS A
..
5 JUL 1975
DAY 10/2/00 SP2 ALM/JTG
KINGS
Six Mast
452
CODE
TO SACS LOS ANGELES
SAN DIEGO
SAN FRANCISCO
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
TELETYPE
3
WILL
NITEL
Mr. J. A. Mintz
JULY 30,
(1
-
Mr. Hotis)
1975
ASAC Barger, SD,
teleph. ado. 5:40 pm
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNFY
COPY RETAINED IN
25/be/
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv. _
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
SENSTUDY 75
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
1
1
1
1
fund formal fami fond
-
-
-
-
(1
Mr. Daly)
Mr. E. W. Walsh
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. S. F. Phillips
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF MEMBER LESTER SEIDEL
HAS FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR INTERVIEWS
IN YOUR OFFICE:
SAN DIEGO 7-30-75 SAS EARL M. PETERSEN,
#MOR!
DATE 10/2/00 SP-2-ALM/JTG
LAWRENCE F. WIRICK; LOS ANGELES 8-5-75 WALLACE E. WARD, RICHARD
A. BLOESER, 8-7-75 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHARDT; SAN
FRANCISCO 8-11-75 LEO S. BRENNEISEN, 8/11-12/75 SAC CHARLES W.
BATES. PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW IS TO BE COINTELPRO AND BUREAU
INVESTIGATION OF TIE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. ADDITIONALLY SAC
BATES WILL BE INTERVIEWED CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE OF "KOUSTON PLAN”
BY SSC STAFF MEMBER LOCK JOIINSON.
I HAVE WAIVED YOUR EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF
EACH SHOULD NOTE THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO
THESE INTERVIEWS.
COUNSEL; HOWEVER, THIE FBI IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE PRIVATE COUNSEL.
THERE ARE CERTAIN PRIVILEGED AREAS CONCERNING WHICH SAS WOULD
PVD/SFP: mjg45
.(10)
451
REC-88 12-1443223
9 AUG 4 1975
SEE NOTE PAGE THREE
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. _
Director Sec'y
All
JUL 30 1975
9430 un
TELELYRE TELETYPE UNIT
MATE ROOM
8488296 Bocid2989624 Page 264
Per
в
لشد
We
GPO 1975 0 $69-920
PAGE TWO
62-116395
NOT BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS.
AREAS CONCERN INFORMATION
WHICH MIGHT DIVULGE IDENTITIES OF FBI SOURCES; INFORMATION
RELATING TO SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES; INFORMATION WHICH
MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING FDI INVESTIGATIONS; AND INFORMA–
TION WHICH ORIGINATED WITH OTHER AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
SAN FRANCISCO NOTE RELEASE ALSO APPLIES TO FORMER SAS
ALBERT P. CLARK AND WILLIAM A. COHENDET WHO, ALONG WITH OTHER
EX-SAS ON WEST COAST, MAY ALSO BE INTERVIEWED. CLARK AND COHENDET
HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED FOREGOING ADVICE REGARDING PRIVATE COUNSEL
AND PRIVILEGED AREAS AND HAVE ASKED FOR CONSULTATION ASSISTANCE
WHICH BUREAU IS APPROVING AS BELOW.
NORMALLY, FBIHQ WOULD SUPPLY REPRESENTATIVE TO BE ON-THE-
SCENE FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES. HOWEVER, DISTANCE AND TIME
SCOPE MAKES THIS NOT FEASIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE.
THE RANKING FBI OFFICIAL IN EACH OFFICE WILL SERVE FOR
CONSULTATION PURPOSES. IN HIS ABSENCE, AN SAC IN LOS ANGELES OR
ASAC IN SAN DIEGO AND SAN FRANCISCO MAY SO SERVE. PURPOSE OF
CONSULTANT, WHO WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT INTERVIEW BUT AVAILABLE
NEARBY, WILL BE TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT PERSON BEING
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 265
-
2
-
PAGE THREE
62-116395
INTERVIEWED IS ASKED QUESTIONS IN ONE OF THE PRIVILEGED AREAS
OR QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE SPECIFIED PARAMETERS OF THE INTERVIEW
(COINTELPRO/BLACK PANTHER PARTY). SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE WHICH
CONSULTANT REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT HANDLE, SUGGEST IMMEDIATE
TELEPHONE CALL TO LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION.
SHOULD ADDITIONAL FORMER SAS CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR ASSISTANCE,
COORDINATE WITH THEM WAIVER FROM EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT THROUGH
LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND FURNISH CONSULTATION SERVICES AS
REQUESTED.
NOTE THAN RANKING OFFICIAL SERVING IN CONSULTANT
POSITION DOES NOT REPRESENT THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE AS PRIVATE
COUNSEL.
NOTE:
The referenced 5/2/75 teletype apprised all offices of
our cooperation with the SSC and furnished general background re
Bureau's servicing of its requests. Because of time element
relating to the first interview to take place in San Diego 7/30/75,
we are telephoning necessary instructions to that office. We
previously by teletype 7/9/75 advised current and former employees
on West Coast of SSC's intentions regarding these interviews. We
also previously released SAC Bates for purpose of interview re
Cointelpro/BPP and are now extending release to include interview
re "Houston Plan, as requested by SSC Staff Member Johnson 7/25/75.
**
Former SAS Clark and Cohendet previously given necessary
advice by Legal Counsel Division as indicated above and offer
made for consultation services which they requested,
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 266
3
1
TO
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
MR. CALLAHAN
FROM
: H. N. BASSETT
SUBJECT:
SENSTUDY 75
прод
DATE:
fand book"
6/9/75
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
нову
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
8th
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
egal County
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y -
91208#
CENI VINOD NOINTILLVERI TIV
10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM./JTG
RAIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
In response to a Senate Select Committee request for
guidelines utilized by the Inspection Division, memorandum
H. N. Bassett to W. R. Wannall dated 6/2/75, captioned as above,
noted there would be no objection to a review of the Handbooks
for Headquarters and field office inspections by Committee Staff
members provided the review was conducted in FBI space with an
Inspection Division representative present.
On 7/8/75 Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the Select Committee Staff
reviewed the FBIHQ Inspection Manual in the presence of SA
Fred B. Griffith. Mr. Gitenstein was specifically advised these
Manuals are used solely as guidelines for the Inspection Staff and
are not binding on anyone but staff members. They cannot be used
to document any deficiencies noted during an inspection. He was told
such action would have to be based on applicable provisions in either
the Manual of Instructions or the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
During the review it was noted Mr. Gitenstein made notes regarding
the following Sections:
1. Section 2 (Recording the Inspection Findings), pages 5 and 6
which deal with the assembly and distribution of inspection reports and
work papers.
2. Section 4 (Specific Division Operations), pages 4 and 5 which are
concerned with surveys and audits.
RECZ 62:11689
3. Section 8 (Inspector's Summaries), pages 1, 2 and 4 which deal
with the summary for the Director, the letter to the Division Head from
the Director and personnel write-ups.
6 JUL 18 1975
Mr. Gitenstein stated he would return at a later date to review the
field manual.
ACTION: None.
for information.
•
•
1 - Messrs. Adams, Wannall, Cregar
846 6FBG75mj
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NW 88296 Docíd2989624 BUS, Savings Bonds Regularly on
261
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450
TEMPL
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
: Legal/
ounsel
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#MDRIE
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
SATU IS UNCLASSIFIED
AUTO 10/2/00 BY SP-2 ALM 1776
DATE: 7-7-75
Hatefron
Assoc.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst Dir,
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Infell.
Laboratory
Flans & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y -
By memorandum, 6-18-75, you were advised the
Department was considering preparing summaries of existing summaries
of the so-called "Kissinger 17" wiretaps to be furnished the Senate
Select Committee (SSC). The Department was awaiting our approval
of this mode of response to the Committee. The referenced memorandum
recommended we advise the Department that we agreed on the preparation
of the summaries with the provision that we be allowed to review same
prior to the Department seeking Court approval for making them available
to the Senate Select Committee. This recommendation was approved.
Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination in the Department, inquired of Special Agent Paul V. Daly
as to when the aforementioned summaries would be completed. He was
informed it was the Bureau's understanding the Department would prepare
the summaries. Mr. Shaheen, after consulting with K. William O'Connor,
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, stated it was the Department's
desire that the Bureau prepare the summaries. He advised the Departmental
attorneys concerned with the litigation arising from these wiretaps will
review the summaries and seek Court approval prior to furnishing to the
Committee.
RECOMMENDATION:
REC-2 62-11637
14 JUL 18 1975
Intelligence Division with the assistance of Legal Counsel
prepare the necessary summaries for forwarding to the Committee.
1
-
Mr. Wannall
1
-
Mr. Cregar
1
1
-
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Hotis
1
-
Mr. Peterson
1
-
Mr. Daly
(PVD:kis (8)
NO 4 S 1978
NW 882960 Docid:32989624 Page 268
griz
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5-
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
.449
диа
11-Poli
#MDR16
10/8/00
SP-2 ALM/JIG
CODE
TO LEGAT LONDON
FROM DIRECTOR FBI
CABLEGRAM
1-Legal Counsel Office
(Attn: Mr. Daly)
1-Foreign Liaison.
1-Mr. Cregar
pract
URGENT
9
Per with
7/28/75
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
1-Mr. Helgeson
Unfind
MARK GITENSTEIN, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE, WHICH IS CURRENTLY EXAMINING PRO-
CEDURES OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, HAS ADVISED THAT
THE COMMITTEE HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN HOW OTHER
COUNTRIES HANDLE THEIR DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS;
THAT IS, THOSE INVESTIGATIONS ANALOGOUS TO OUR EXTREM-
IST AND SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS. GITENSTEIN IS LEAVING
FOR LONDON AUGUST SIX NEXT AND HAS INDICATED A DESIRE TO
MEET WITH APPROPRIATE BRITISH OFFICIALS ANY TIME AUGUST
ELEVEN OR TWELVE NEXT FOR A GENERAL BRIEFING IF THIS IS
POSSIBLE. HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO LEGAT SITTING IN ON SUCH
BRIEFING.
GITENSTEIN'S REQUEST HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH JOHN
JOHN
✓ (s)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm. _
Director
HEH:enm
(6)
MATHROOM
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
REC-36 62-116-375-448
JUL 291975
MCS TEX406
TELETYPE
JM
dex/m
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 28 Docid:32989624 Page 269
HEI
10.
19 JUL 31 1975
fibe
CABLEGRAM TO LONDON
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
[PARKER, COUNSELOR, MI-5, WASHINGTON, WHO SUGGESTS
YOU CONTACT MI-5 LIAISON TO DETERMINE HOW THIS SHOULD
BE HANDLED. BUREAU SUGGESTS THAT IN ADDITION YOU
CONTACT SCOTLAND YARD IF YOU FEEL IT APPROPRIATE. ) ($)
HANDLE AND SUCAB ARRANGEMENTS, ATTENTION:
HELGESON, INTD.
NOTE: Gitenstein made the above oral request to Inspector
Helgeson during a meeting 7/25/75. This is being
coordinated with Supervisor Paul Daly with the Office
of Legal Counsel.
2-
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 270

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
:
Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
:
Legal Counsel
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT-COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
ACCESS TO WITNESSES
DATE: 7/18/75
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Co
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y _
912064
DATE 10/2/00 3X SPALMITE
ALL INFORMATION COMPAS
TERMIT IS UNCLASSIFIED
At 11:40 a. m. on July 18, 1975, K. William O'Connor,
Special Counsel in the Deputy Attorney General's Office, telephonically
advised me that his negotiations with the Committee concerning more
restrictive limitations on Committee access to witnesses were not
successful. He said that the Department has determined that the
procedure in effect previously whereby the FBI Director would receive
a request for the availability of FBI personnel for interview and would
determine whether such personnel should be released from applicable
secrecy agreements would be reinstituted.
I asked Mr. O'Connor whether this meant that the Department
no longer regarded all requests for interview of present or former employees
as "demand" situations requiring the specific authorization of the Department
as if a subpoena had been issued. Mr. O'Connor said that the Department
would not consider such requests in that manner and that the FBI should
make all determinations necessary for the appearance of witnesses for
interview.
RECOMMENDATION:
EX-106
REC-36
62. 116335-446
For information. We will continue to discuss requests for
interview with individuals named by the Committee in their requests,
and authorize waivers of the secrecy agreements on a case-by-case
basis.
-
1 Mr. Wannall
1
-
Mr. Cregar
1
-
Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd
(5)
за тра
1330
51 AUG 04 1975
NW 88296Docld:32989624 Page 271
пре
Ena
ma
JUL 31 1975
Pum
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LEGAL COUN
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
54688 80514 73518
OWGAINED
10.24-80 SP4JRulet
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Directon Seciny 4
CODE
TELETYPE
ΤΟ SAC, ATLANTA
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
Q
-
1
1
-
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Wannall
Mr. W.O. Cregar
(Attn: S.F. Phillips)
NITEL
1 Mr. Deegan
1 Mr. Nugent
Этом
✓ SENSTUDY 175, BUDED: 7/31/75.
JULY 25, 1975
VESTIGATION
UNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 25 1975
TELLTYRE
FBIHQ IS PRESENTLY COMPILING PERTINENT DOCUMENTS PERTAIN-
ING TO CAPTIONED MATTER AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC).
INCLUDED IN THE SSC'S REQUEST IS ONE CONCERNING ALL MEMO-
RANDA AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS INDICATING OR REFLECTING THE
INCEPTION OF (A) ALL HEADQUARTERS FILES AND (B) ALL ATLANTA
DIVISION FILES CONCERNING MARTIN LUTHER KING AND ORGANIZATIONAL
FILE CAPTIONED "COMINFIL OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE," (SCLC), TOGETHER WITH THE BASIS AND AUTHORITY FO
OPENING SUCH FILES.
COPYILED
SSC STAFF PERSONNEL HAVE ADVISED THE ABOVE REQUEST REFERS
NOT ONLY TO COMMUNICATIONS WHICH INITIATED ACTIVE INVESTIGA-
TION OF KING AND THE SCLC, BUT SHOULD INCLUDE SUCH ITEMS
WHETHER THEY BE OFFICE MEMORANDA OR OTHER MATERIALS (I
PEN: adn/tdp
(9)
1
100-106670 (KING
FEDERAL 100-438
ON
CLC)
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
QUI 2,5 1975
L
TELETYPE
TAL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
NW 88296 Bocid:32989624 Page 272
REC:21
ST-103
HEHEH
-
JUL 29 1975
445
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
106/30/60/62/15
W.
1-063755
PL
Ich
GPO 954-545
☑
PAGE TWO
NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS) WHICH FORMED THE BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING
THESE FILES PRIOR TO THE TIME ACTIVE INVESTIGATION WAS
INITIATED.
ATLANTA DIVISION PROMPTLY REVIEW ABOVE MATTERS AND
FURNISH FBIHQ WITH THREE CLEAR XEROXES OF ITEMS WHICH ARE
RESPONSIVE TO THE SSC'S REQUEST. THESE ITEMS SHOULD BE
XEROXED AS THEY APPEAR IN YOUR FILES. ANY EXCISIONS OF
DATA APPEARING THEREIN WILL BE HANDLED BY FBIHQ PRIOR TO
THE TIME THESE MATERIALS ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SSC.
IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO FURNISH HEADQUARTERS WITH
COPIES OF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO INSTITUTING ACTIVE
INVESTIGATION IN THESE CASES WHICH EMANATED FROM FBIHQ.
WHERE SUCH IS THE CASE A SIMPLE STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT
SHOULD BE MADE AND THE DATE AND CAPTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED.
EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY COVER AIRTEL IN ABOVE CAPTION
BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS 7/31/75.
NOTE:
Teletype being directed to the AT Division to obtain
information which is responsive to a request by the Senate
Select Committee. Bureau deadline deemed necessary in view
of request by this Committee.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 273
OPTIONAL FORM NO 10
MAY 1962 EDITION'
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
: Legal Counsel
Dam
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75
#MOR16
GENIVIMOD NOIL VAGANI Tiv
N IS UNCLASSIFIED
DAT: 10/2/00 BYS
BY SP-2-ALM-/-776
DATE: 7-18-75
Новобутов
Assoc. Dir. _
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD inv.
Asst. 'Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst..
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Regul Coub
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y
Attached is a memorandum from K. William O'Connor,
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice,
dated 7-18-75 requesting our observations concerning the type of access
certain Members of the Senate Select Committee would have to FBI
files concerning those Senators. This memorandum was received at
11:14 a. m., 7-18-75, and we were requested to furnish our response
no later than 1 p.m. on 7–18–75.
After consultation with Assistant Directors-Deputy
Associate Directors Adams and Jenkins, Mr. O'Connor was telephonically
advised by SA Paul V. Daly that it was this Bureau's position that
Option 3 with certain modifications would be this Bureau's choice.
Option 3, with modifications would read, "The file is assembled and the
Senator given access to it, with certain portions or papers withheld
and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the
documents. "
RECOMMENDATION:
Enclosure
For information.
1
-
Mr. Adams Enclosure
-
1
-
1
1
1
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
Mr. Wannall - Enclosure
Mr. Mintz- Enclosure
Mr. Cregar - Enclosure
Mr. Farrington
-
Enclosure
Mr. Hotis - Enclosure
Mr. Daly Enclosure
PVD:kjs (9)
VD:kis
-
N
REC-21
102=113'
95
--444
ST-103
SF
да
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JUL 31 1975
13/1/807
11-
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晒
84 4 1975
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
NW 88296-Docld:32989624 Page 274
MERICAN
REVOLUTION
BICE
A BEGUIT
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEÑÉRAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
JUL 18 1975
TO:
See Distribution
FROM:
K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination
#MDR 16
ALL #SPORTATION CONTAGID
10/2/00157 SP 2 ALM 1776
SUBJECT: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained
by the FBI
Certain members of the Senate Select Committee have requested
access to their personal files. The preferred mode of access is the
subject of pending consideration by the Attorney General.
As you
know, under the mandate of the Senate Select Committee, access to
the personal file of a member of the Senate Select Committee may be
had without any consideration of Freedom of Information Act issues.
The Attorney General has considered several options, and has
asked that you consider them and indicate hereon your view; he has
asked that these views be delivered to me not later than 1:00 p.m.,
this afternoon so that he may promptly consider them. The options
considered are not exclusive. If you have any suggestions other
than the options indicated, please attach it to your response.
Responses should be delivered to me in Room 4213, Main Justice,
by the time indicated. Thank you for your cooperation.
OPTIONS
Option 1: Departmental staff examine the documents in the file and
delete any references to sensitive sources or ongoing criminal inves
tigation; thereafter, the file is made accessible to the Senator under
controlled circumstances at the Department of Justice.
Approved
Comment:
Disapproved
62 116395-
ENCLOSURE
444 1:45 Kwilliam
O' Commor adried
by PVD
are
electia option 3 with
odification
mo
NW '88296 Docld:32989624 Page 275
2.
Option 2:
Same as Option 1, except that a xerox of the documents as
excised is delivered to the Senator.
Comment:
Approved
Disapproved
Option 3: The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it,
with certain papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of
the reasons for withholding of the documents.
Approved
Disapproved
Comment:
-portions
or
Option 4:
The Senator is furnished his entire individual file
without any excisions or deletions, for review at the Department
of Justice.
Comment:
Approved
Distribution:
Deputy Attorney General
Solicitor General
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division
Mr. Pottinger, CRD
Mr. Scalia, OLC
Mr. Uhlmann, OLA
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 276
Disapproved
Το
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GO
RNMENT
Memorandum
: Mr. J. B. Adams
FROM
: Legal Counsel
Sea
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
INFORMATION CONTAINED
HAIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
#MDR16
DATE 10/2/00 BXSP-2 ALM
DATE: 6/27/75
Hateerd
ALLEGATION BY JOHN ELLIFF CONCERNING
INTERFERENCE WITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD
Dep. AD
Asst. Din
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan & Eval
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y.
At 5:14 p. m., on 6/27/75, K. William O'Connor, Special
Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, advised me that he had received
a call from John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee complaining of
what he described as an attempt to interferewith the Committee's investi-
gation by supplying information to the press that the Committee had been
furnished material which it had declined to use or to inquire into because
of its sensitive nature. O'Connor said that Elliff claimed that a journalist
who is friendly with the Committee had advised the Committee that he had
information from a Justice Department official that the Committee had been
furnished information originating in the FBI that Communist funds were
used to finance. Martin Luther King; that King had been related to the CP, USA
and that the Senate Select Committee had treated this matter as a "hot potato"
and that the information also indicated that "King laughed all the way to the
bank.
"
O'Connor said that Elliff protested the apparent disclosures
by the Justice Department to the press and claimed that it appeared an
effort was being made to interferewith the Committee's work. O'Connor
told Elliff he had no knowledge of anyone in the Justice Department furnishing
any such information to the press and further, he told him that he did not
believe that information concerning CP funding of King had been furnished
to the Committee.
ST-101 REC-18
62-116395-
#43
JUL 15 1975.
O'Connor said that he did not believe that the FBI had furnished
such information to the news media but he wanted us to be aware of»Elliff's
complaint. O'Connor said that it is possible that during interviews conducted
by staff of the Committee, they have received statements indicating that
Communist funds were used by King, but he does not believe that any docu-
mentation of that has been furnished to the Committee as yet.
RECOMMENDATION:
For information.
LEGAL CO
SEE ADDENDUM, PAGE 2
1
-
Mr. Moore
1
Mr. Wannall
Mr. Hotis
Mr. Daly.
- Mr. Min US Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
NW 88286-Dodid:A29896247 Rage 277
одна
ADDENDUM
-
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
SFP:1hb
7/2/75
INTD has received no report or has any information
concerning the alleged leak referred to in this memorandum.
Concerning to the allegation in this memorandum
that information originated with the FBI that communist
funds were used to finance Martin Luther King, Jr., and that
King had been "related" to the CPUSA, the following is noted.
We have never had any information that communist funds,
literally, were used to finance King. We did have reliable
reports that King was helped in a financial way, particularly
as to advice regarding fund raising, by a close advisor,
Stanley David Levison, who was a secret member of the CPUSA.
However, none of our reports are known to have claimed that
"communist funds" were financing King. King was never known
to have been a member of the CPUSA. It is true that he had
a number of close associates such as Levison who at the time
were either current or past CPUSA members.
INTD is unable to pinpoint the report that "King
laughed all the way to the bank."
www/2006
Are
два
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NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 278
بہت
- 2 -
2
I
1
1
-
-
me
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1Z Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. T. E. Burns
July 25, 1975
The Attorney General
Director, FBI
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COILLITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com. _
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices,
the SSC requested certain documents and other information
from the FBI.
Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
Committee is the original of a memorandum with an
enclosure which is in response to one of the Committee's
requests.
A copy of this memorandum with its enclosure is
being furnished for your records.
Enclosures (4)
62-116395
1
ST 112
REC-65
The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
TEB: lek/lhblhb
(9)
3 ENCLOSURE
Inspection NNR
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. _
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
-
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
#MDR16
SP.JALM/HE
2012/00 SP-2A1.1/316
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
442X
ward was
Director Sec'y
MAIL ROOM ☑
TELETYPE UNIT
105 1076
NW 18296 Docid:32989624 Page 279
GPO 951-346
62-116395
JUGA
Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1
Mr. J. B. Hotis)
Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. O. Cregar
Mr. T. E. Burns
2
-
1
1
1
-
July 25, 1975
UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)
RE:
FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
THE FBI AND DEPARTZENT OF JUSTICE
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
#MDR16
ORAIND
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
rector Sec'y
7. 10/23/00 582ALM/216
·
Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and
other information from the FBI,
Item number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix B of refer-
enced communication requested Committee Staff access to all
indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated
by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the present.
Attached to this memorandum is a list of all
retrievable programs, projects, surveys and procedures
employed in connection with domestic intelligence operations
of the FBI which may be of interest to you. There were a
number of other programs, projects, surveys and procedures
employed in connection with foreign counterintelligence
operations of the FBI which are not included. In the event
you desire information concerning these latter items, which
include extremely sensitive matters, we would be pleased to
discuss then with SSC Staff Henbors at FDI Headquarters.
Enclosure
-
The Attorney General
TEB: lek/lhbhb
(8)
MAIL ROOM
KW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 280
ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG
TELETYPE UNIT
ENCLOSULE
6.2
SEE NOTE PAGE 2
Рам
44
GPO 954-546

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
NOTE:
TOP SECRET
The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List
(PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra,
were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of
available INTD inspection reports and files.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPL
1.
2.
3"
5.
G.
-
Developing
Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries
positive intelligence information regarding personnel in the
United States from non-Soviet-bloc countries.
International Organization Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside
the Soviet-bloc - Centralized compilation of potentially danger-
ous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the U. S. State
Department could initiate steps to deport or to lift
diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.
-
Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International
Organization Visas FBI maintaining results of name checks
conducted by various members of U. S. intelligence community
based on information provided to such intelligence organizations
by INS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.
Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel).
Alem Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States.
-
-
Anagram Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in
the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials.
Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi-
information such as that regarding Anagram and electronic
eillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given
enators Church and Tower).
RWW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 281
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2.
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
NOTE CONTINUED:
TOP
TOP SECRET
Banpop Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer
of funds through Swiss banks.
-
Chinese Aliens Entering the United States
-
Identification
of ethnic Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
intelligence assignments.
Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in the United States
Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese
background as foreign counterintelligence assets to be
targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC)
personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada.
Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship
Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
intelligence assignments.
-
Chinese University and Graduate School Index List of
Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or
graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are
considered potential candidates for development as U.S.
assets.
-
Specialized physical surveillance directed against
foreign intelligence officers.
Cokma
Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in the
United States from Europe through Canada.
Canil
-
14.
Chicoin
15.
-
Counterintelligence activities to thwart
efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country.
Forest
-
Screening of records of foreign students at New York
University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover
Soviet illegals.
KW 8296 No:32989624 Page 282
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3 -
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
16.
17.
18.
NOTE CONTINUED:
Proho
-
SECRET
Program to detect homosexuals who have been compromised
or recruited by Soviet intelligence.
Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents
with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments Investigations
conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established
criteria.
Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries Interviews of selected
U. S. tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet-bloc
intelligence.
-
Technical penetration of Soviet establishments in the
United States.
19. Orkid
20*
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Cloverleaf Technical penetration of new Soviet residential
complex, Riverdale, New York City.
Sam Survey Screening of mail to selected European cities.
Gus Survey
Screening of mail originating in New York,
New York, destined for specific postal zones.
Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets
Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence
and counterintelligence purposes.
M
Rega Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S.
as aliens during certain years.
Secomex
-
Expanded Mexican border coverage to include
development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 283
T
SECRET
4.
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
NOTE CONTINUED:
SECRET
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
Sobir Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and
repatriates in an attempt to identify those previously
recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence.
-
Socap Review of certain records to identify Soviet
illegals who have applied for documentation as U.S.
residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide
cover identity.
Vietnamese Refugee
Efforts to uncover possible
infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow
to the United States.
Walklok
Screening of requests for birth certificates under
an established criteria to identify such requests which
may have originated with Soviet intelligence.
Technical and Microphone Surveillance Survey of telephone
and microphone installations functioning at certain times.
Al Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project means of identifying
Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADP
equipment.
Cuban Refugee
-
Detection of Cuban intelligence agents
who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee
channels.
-
Development of selected contacts to be directed
against Soviet-bloc officials.
Deseco
East-West Exchange
-
Provided internal security safeguards
regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite
nationals.
Z Coverage Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission
to the United Nations.
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 284
TX
SECRET
m
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice
Policies and Procedures
en
36.
37.
38.
NOTE CONTINUED:
Chiprop
-
TOP SECRET
Screening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong
and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Chiclet
-
Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong
and the PRC.
Alchemy
-
"notional" Pro-Marxist Leninist Maoist domestic
revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets directed at
uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States.
39.
Geology
-
40.
41.
42.
Verification of individuals entering selected
foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify
Soviet illegals.
Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political
intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad for the
information of the White House.
Oarbit
-
Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.S.
military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S.
Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents.
Phrenology Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly
resided in a specific foreign country and whose present
whereabouts are unknown.
Classified by 6283, XGDS 1, 2 and 3, Indefinite.
TOP SECRET
- 6 -
NM 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 285
1.
2.
3.
PROGRAMS PROJECTS, SURVEYS, and PROCEDURES
Administrative Index (Adex)
-
List of individuals who posed.
a realistic direct, and current danger to the national
security of the United States.
Agitator Index
PEA
List of individuals who have demonstrated
by their actions that they have a propensity for fomenting
racial discord.
American Repatriate Specific procedure to be followed
concerning United States (U.S.) citizens who were issued
Swiss protection passports to return to the U.S. from
Cuba.
Covers
4. Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File
black extremists who have propensity for violence or who could
be considered logical suspects in various crimes in which
Bureau might have an interest.
5. Black Student Groups on College Campuses Discreet preliminary
inquiries, limited to established sources, on black student
organizations and their leaders.
6.
7.
3.
9.
10.
11.
12.
#MDR 16
Bocov Communist coverage along the Mexican border.
Characterization Descriptive statements concerning
certain organizations which have been subject to
investigation.
Cointelpro Counterintelligence programs directed against
domestic subversive activities.
-
Periodic
Communist Influence in Black Extremist Groups
reports relative to communist influence in black extremist groups.
Communist Influence in Racial Matters Periodic reports
relative to communist influence in racial matters.
Computerized Telephone Number File - Computerized programing
of telephone numbers utilized by extremists and
revolutionaries and other individuals suspected of
involvement in interstate gambling activities.
Emergency Detention Provided for apprehension and detention
of persons considered potentially injurious to the national
defense and public safety of the U.S. in time of national
emergency.
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
CLASSIFI
LS: 10/6/00 BY SP-2ALM/196
RINIS
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 286
I
442 find
13.
14.
15.
16.
Extremist Informant Development of sources to provide
intelligence and evidentiary information concerning extremist
individuals and organizations.
Chotto Informant Development of individuals living or working
in Chotto areas who can furnish information with particular
emphasis on situations which may create civil unrest.
Similar Terrorist Groups
-
Intensification of Investigation of Weatherman and Other
Use of full resources of FBI and
use of innovative methods to achieve a more comprehensive
coverage of such groups.
Key Activist
Investigation of individuals who were extremely
active and vocal in their statements denouncing the U.S.
and calling for civil disobedience and other forms of
unlawful and disruptive acts.
-
17. Key Extremist Provided intensified coverage of selected
extremists who were known to be active and who had
previously evidenced the potential for fomenting violence
or revolutionary activitico.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Intensified
Location of Non-Fugitive Weatherman Memboro
efforts to locate non-fugitive Weatherman members.
RA
New Left Extremist False Identity Attempt to provide
effective dissemination of voluminous data concerning
false identities used by Weatherman personnel and other
New Loft extremists.
-
New Left Movement Finances Periodic information made
available to the USDJ and the White House regarding income
source of various revolutionary groups.
New Left Movement Publications
circulated by New Left Movement.
-
Coverage of Publications being
Potential for Racial Violence Survey of localities having
potential for racial violence based on current social conditions.
Potential for Violence and Civil Unrest Periodic assessment
of potential for violence and civil unrest throughout the
U.S. with emphasis on situations involving racial factors.
Prisacts Extremist, revolutionary, terrorist, and
subversive activities in penal institutions.
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 287
2
25.
26.
Prosab Protection of Strategic Air Command and inter-
continental ballistic missile bases of the U.S. Air Force.
Revolutionary Activities Violence Periodic reports
appraising potential dangerousness of the various
revolutionary groups.
27.
Security Index
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
-
List of individuals who were believed to be
dangerous to the internal security of the U.S. during
times of emergency.
35.
Development of sources to provide intelli-
gence and evidentiary information concerning security matters.
Security Informant
and
Security of Special Agent Personnel Communication to all offices
dated September 17, 1973, alerting field to information that
revolutionary and extremist activists and organizations have
instituted a program of collecting intelligence data against law
enforcement personnel and agencies. It directed field to
advise FBI Headquarters if information developed that such organ-
izations and individuals are actively engaged in confrontation
and harassment of FDI personnel.
Spectar
-
(Special Target for Informant Development)
Development of quality informants to penetrate revolutionary
underground.
Stop Index Program on Administrative Index Subjects
Placing Adex Category 1 individuals in the "stop index"
operated by the Computer Systems Division in order to promptly
determine inquiries received from local police concerning such
subjects.
Underground Newspapers Collection of copies of various
revolutionary newspapers.
-
Venceremos Brigade Individuals subjected to background
investigation with view toward determining possible Adex
inclusion and analysis to determine whether or not subject
could be targeted against hostile intelligence agencies.
Weatherman Fugitive (Weatherfug) Investigations
locate Weatherfugs.
Weatherman Automobile Hot Sheet
HDD
Efforts to
Compilation of Weatherman
vehicles for use by surveillance personnel.
NW 8846 Jod:22989624 Page 288
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