20000A
104-10431-10006
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
SECRET/SENSITIVE
hand carried to fecy's
office 1 Feb 45
31 January 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
The Secretary of Defense
James R. Schlesinger
Analysis of Soviet Policy towards the United States
by an ex-Member of the KGB
1. Several weeks ago I talked to Bill Nelson, DDO,*
regarding a more thoughtful use of our Soviet KGB Source's knowl-
edge of fundamental Soviet Bloc policy. The information relates
to the clandestine programs of the KGB sponsored by the
Central Committee in its reorientation in May of 1959 against the
United States as the "main enemy. My suggestion was to submit a
number of your speeches and solicit Source's critique as seen
through the eyes of an ex-KGB officer. Mr. Nelson stated that he
had no objection as long as there was a description of the
Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily repre-
sent the views of CIA. I should add that the FBI and other serv-
ices are on record to the effect that they have never been able
to disprove Source's factual information although they do not
necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A).
2. Attachment B sets forth the highlights and chronology of
his professional career in the KGB. This alone does not convey the
true significance of his defection to the Agency in December 1961.
From 1953 until 1961 various circumstances and events led to his
disaffection with the system and hardened his determination to
defect should his family be reunited. His concern was for his
*Bill has taken sick leave for the next ten days and has not 054519.
seen this letter.
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Impossible to Determine
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young daughter who lived with her grandparents in Russia. In
1961 she was permitted to visit Source and his wife abroad,
and this triggered his defection. Overall, the case is one
where we unwittingly had an agent in place in the KGB who was
breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB, both in the
First and in the Second Chief Directorate. His purpose was
to obtain information of great value to the West should he
have the opportunity to defect.
3. By way of special talents, he is essentially an
analyst and historian. He was frequently called upon by senior
members of the service to study and make recommendations where
there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one depart-
ment. In his drive to gain more knowledge outside of his par-
ticular sphere, he managed on one occasion to be appointed to
the Inspector General's team which gave him access to the logs
of KGB production indicating the overall espionage production
obtained by the KGB. The investigation was initiated by the
Politburo who complained of the delay in receiving the product
derived from espionage, such as British Admiralty, Cables and
Plans, NATO documents, etc. This gave Source freedom to in-
spect the processing of secret information and to trace its
handling from the moment it arrived in Moscow, the translation of
the product and its preparation for the Politburo. Unfortunately,
the names of agents were not indicated, but it enabled Source,
after his defection, to identify the actual documents which were
identified by Western services on the basis of his description.
This, in turn, led to investigative action and important counter-
intelligence successes in the West.
4. Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and
security services under our aegis. He has imparted first-hand
knowledge of major covert political programs from the days of
LENIN to 1961. This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply
into the archives and records of the activities of Soviet intelli-
gence services beginning with the Revolution. Equally important
was his long tenure in the Higher Counterintelligence School
where he was able to milk KGB officers from many departments of
the Service abroad who were brought back for short periods of
retraining.
5. Because the Administration, the State Department and
the Agency, in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their
views regarding the policy of Detente, I believe that a prelimi-
nary unofficial reading of these materials by an expert in your
Department might generate an interest in the Source and his views.
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This could lead to a symposium in which he would be invited to
participate and respond to adversary views. His reaction to
such a proposal is unknown. He has always resisted control in
the sense of being an agent of any given country. Further, he
does make demands for classified information and position papers
including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to
any particular problem. Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches
were obtained from him using only unclassified information.
6. His production has run into several thousands of pages
of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had
with other foreign intelligence and security services. The
range of his information is so vast and detailed that we are
hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet
events. We have learned from experience that if we give him a
problem with an adequate data base, he will computerize and re-
arrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new
subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting
his thesis, he often reveals new information of value.
1.
Attachment C is a sensitive report received from our
Israeli liaison; Attachment D is an assessment regarding the
activities, role, modus operandi and reason for
-
Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (which
is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated); and
Attachment E is a rough draft of his review of the following
books SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM
AND CAPITALISM A SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your
tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter. We intend to follow up
on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are
partly drawn from a draft manuscript which he has in his posses-
sion. The manuscript runs to over two thousand pages. He guards
it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time. He
has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are of unique
interest because of the classified information (based on documents)
which he read in Moscow.
8. By way of digression, a bird's eye view is set forth
below of Source's theme.
9. The major reorganization (which produced the KGB
Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the
KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN suc-
ceeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV,
who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head
the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by a
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special committee headed by SHELEPIN who worked under the
Central Committee to investigate activities and policies of the
KGB and GRU. They concluded that the Intelligence Services had
not carried out deStalinization which required that the services
follow the Leninist concepts of intelligence and its role in
political action. By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were
credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was
accomplished by suppressing enemies at home, mounting successful
penetration operations into Western governments, the manipulation
of agents of influence and conducting massive disinformation pro-
grams by feeding deception to the West through their intelligence
services. Under STALIN the services degenerated into instruments
of personal terror to preserve his cult of personality and lost
sight of the overall political, economic, and military objectives
of the Soviets.
10. Before STALIN's death, there were anti-Stalinist ele-
ments who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find
a Leninist solution to post-war problems continued after his
death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into
the KGB and other police organizations by enlisting the talents
of the Leninist/Marxist Institute. It was his objective to have
the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the
crimes of STALIN and the activities of the police state. The
course which was set would have ultimately led to the trials of
KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the leadership who were prominent
in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and "boot-
lickers.
11. MALENKOV was unfortunately outmaneuverd by the collec-
tive which voted against him on issues, particularly regarding
Germany. Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide
let loose by MALENKOV; therefore, in order to survive, he had
to "steal" the process of de-Stalinization and shape it to his
own ends and the survival of himself and his friends. This led
eventually to the "secret speech" regarding STALIN's crimes in
which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his followers.
This led to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which
forced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs
which represented a return to LENIN.
12. In May 1959, a secret, six-day series of meetings was
held for Government bureaucrats possessing a COMINT security
clearance. It was attended by approximately two thousand members
from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand
down and explain in Leninist terms the decisions of the
Central Committee relating to the deStalinization of the intelli-
gence services and to set forth policies which would result in
their reorganization and reorientation.
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13. The principal speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by.
General GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as well as many
other senior officials of the Government and Services. SHELEPIN
Igave a broad analysis of the world situation stressing that the
USSR and the USA had reached an atomic stalemate. Accepting this
to be a fact, he stated that all plans for war such as stay-
behind net-workers should be abandoned. He outlined programs and
reforms for the Intelligence Services which were accomplished
under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be
in harness with all other departments of the Government. He
stressed that each intelligence operation should be designed to
help achieve broad political objectives. Noting that the letter
• "p" (Politika) had been obliterated from OGPU by STALIN,
SHELEPIN announced the creation of the Department of Disinformation
within the KGB but subject to the control and direction of the
Central Committee. The Department's task was to use all organs
of Government to implement strategic disinformation in accordance
with directives. This was meant to include all channels to the
West; namely, diplomatic, press, military, cultural and economic.
This was in addition to the use of double agents and provocateurs.
14. In discussing the various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded
on the wisdom of pursuing peaceful coexistence in the developed
countries and wars of national liberation in the underdeveloped
countries, noting that these courses of action were not contra-
dictory.
15. Shortly thereafter, the Central Committee charged the
KGB with the recruitment of two thousand additional S&T staff
officers in order to exploit on a broad basis the opening to the
West. The purpose for this increase was to gain Western technology
as well as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents of in-
fluence in the Western scientific world. It should be noted that
one of the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and
GRU had always been their successful acquisition of scientific
secrets and R&D from the West. SHELEPIN noted that the change
of balance of military power could only be achieved through this
additional strength of acquiring the technological and strategic
secrets of the West. This would also strike at the USA and hasten
its isolation.
16. According to the Source, he learned in 1961 that the KGB
had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for
S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that
about one thousand slots remained to be filled. In 1961 he and
some six hundred KGB officers attended an important lecture given
by a senior general of the Defense Ministry. The lecture was to
outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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He stressed that the objective of the Soviet and the Bloc was
not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the
United States and swing the balance of military power to the
Soviets.
17. The general stated that the USSR was fourteen years
behind the United States in electronic technology but that the
gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the following
fields:
a. A greatly increased espionage effort
because of the addition of one thousand staff
officers to the S&T of the KGB and the Academy
of Sciences;
b. Disinformation, i.e., programs to mis-
lead the United States and the West regarding
Soviet technology which would lead the Western
scientific community into expensive and time-
wasting blind alleys of R&D;
C. To acquire new technology through
trade agreements; and
d. To make treaties and other diplomatic
arrangements by which the Soviets and Bloc would
acquire information and which would permit Soviet
scientists to gain access to the United States
scientific community for the purpose of spotting
potentials for the KGB and GRU. Most important,
he said, was that treaties could be used to
block the natural technological growth of the
Western powers, in particular, the United States.
18. As noted above, the lecture on shortcomings of Soviet
technology in electronics was delivered in 1961. Attachment F
is a National Intelligence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated
16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's information
regarding the aforementioned lecture. The National Intelligence
Bulletin begins with the following:
"Leading officials of the Soviet electronics
industry have told visiting US experts that the
Soviet Union is four or five years behind the
United States in integrated circuit technology.
The US experts, who tested Soviet equipment. in
this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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7
Integrated circuits are needed to meet the size,
weight, power, and reliability of modern military
equipment as well as the needs of many civil
electronic systems."
Admittedly, the question of electronics covers only one phase of the
question of military power, and we have not been able to pursue this
question of technology further, given our ever-shrinking assets.
19. Since my days are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to
dispatch these papers for analysis and comment by your expert before
my time runs out.
20. As previously noted, this package represents a unique dis-
semination, unofficial in character. It is requested that this
exercise be tightly held and that we consider modalities for the
future exploitation and/or discussions of the product and the Source.
We and our allies regard Source to be the most valuable Soviet
defector since World War II.
21. At your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledge-
ment of the above and a reaction from your reader. In the event that
these papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would ap-
preciate their return for the use of my successor.
Kindest personal regards from,
Attachments: as stated
John Angleton
James Angleton
SECRET/SENSITIVE
13-00000
U.S.S.R.
Report No.:
Subject:
Source:
1-6444
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION
Born 1938 in RIGA, has an academic education and is a
sociologist by profession. He acquired his academic
training in Moscow and Baku. In 1962 he worked for
about six months with the M.V.D. in Baku and after that;
until 1963, he worked as a lecturer in philosophy in
Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the
University of Moscow. From 1967 until December 1973
when he left the U.S.S.R., he worked in Yaroslavi
and in Baku. He was a member of the Sociology Asso-
ciation of the U.S.S.R. From 1964 he was an active
member of the Communist Party in Azerbaydzhan and was
a member of its Central Committee. He was closely
associated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhani
Party. He cooperated willingly and made the impression.
of being a highly intelligent and educated man with
analytical ability, good perception and excellent memory.
Validity of Information: November 1973
Reliability: B/2-3
13-00000
U.S.S.R.
$8
Subject:
THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA
1. On this subject, Source can report on the opinions of people like
KHALIPOV, ALIYEV, SUKHODEYEV, GVISHYANI (KOSYGIN's son-in-law), OSIPOV
and Polkovnik-General BYCHENKO (FNU) (Commander of the P.V.O. in the
BAKU Area). The following is a gist of the main ideas:
a. The danger of war with China is not taken seriously in official
circles of the U.S.S.R. and particularly in military circles.
General KHALIPOV said more than once that common interests
b.
.
outweigh the differences between the two Communist countries.
The majority in those circles are of the opinion that the
spreading of warnings about war with China is a deliberate
piece of dis-information by the Soviet authorities in order
to justify the keeping of a large mobilized force. It was
often said that neither China nor the Soviet Union fear an
attack by the other side. China needs anti-Soviet propaganda
for her own internal purposes and the U.S.S.R., in order to
keep millions of mobilized soldiers.
In those circles it is thought that war with China is impossible
for the following reasons:
(1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons, it would take a
tremendous effort to destroy just the military potential
of China. KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 200 atomic bombs.
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19
(2) War with China would in fact be a war of mutual attrition
and even in the case of a formal Soviet victory and a
change-over in Chinese leadership the U.S.S.R. will be
unable to feed the hungry masses of China. According to
GVISHYANI, there are a hundred million hungry people în
China, and in the U.S.S.R. there is not enough food for
the population. A Soviet victory would thus double the
needs of the Soviet Union. In this respect and would put
too great a strain on her economy..
2. From some conversations mainly with KHALIPOV, Source concluded that
the Soviet Union is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than
with China; here are his. reasons:
a.
The substitution of old weapons for new ones takes place first and
foremost in the western parts of the Soviet Union, and not on the
border with China, except in the VLADIVOSTOK area, and this not be-
cause it is near to China, but, mainly, because it is near to the
U.S.A.
b. According to KHALIPOV, two or three days will be enough for the
Soviet Army to conquer Western Europe and he elaborated:
England has about 920 tanks and 1500 planes;
France
-
about 900 tanks and about 1500 planes;
Germany - about 500 tanks and about 1000 planes;
All this put together is but about a sixth of what the U.S.S.R.
can put in the field against the West within 2 or 3 days; and
until the West decides on counter-measures it will be too late.
3. According to Source, who bases his opinion on his conversations with the
8/m people, not only is the Soviet Union in no fear of a war with China, but
e even thinks China will join her in a war against the West

13-00000
U.S.S.R.
Subject:
ANDROPOV, GRECHKO AND GROMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO
1. Many Soviet personalities, close to Government circles, are of the
opinion that ANDROPOV's, GRECHKO's and GROMYKO's inclusion in the Polit-
buro should be examined against the backgroun of two tendencies current
within Soviet ruling circles with regard to U.S.S.R. policy towards China
and the U.S.A..
a. A policy of detente with China is supported, according to these
personalities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN. These two think that the
Soviet Union should strive for closer relations with China by
adopting a tough policy towards the capitalist countries; a
policy of detente with the West weakens the Soviet position in
the International Communist Movement and at the same time strengthens
the ideological attitudes of China.
b.
A policy of detente with the West
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, GRECHKO, ANDROPOV and particularly
-
KIRILENKO. on the other hand
support a policy of detente with
the West in general and with the U.S.A. In particular. This group.
stresses the need for the modernization of Soviet production pro-
cesses. After this vital objective is achieved, the U.S.S.R. should
adopt an even tougher policy towards the West than in the past..
2. Thus the membership of the three in the Politburo is designed to
grengthen BREZHNEV's position. It should be remembered that these three
On a personal debt to BREZHNEV: it was BREZHNEV who made them what they
It should also be kept in mind that the membership in the
are now!
../.
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.8
Ablitburo of the Minister of War, the Head of the K.G.B. and of the Foreign
Winister, has a special significance; it is an indication that BREZHNEV is
about to make most important decisions and needs the support of the Armed
forces, the K.G.B. and of the Foreign Office.
The general opinion in circles of the intelligentzia, and particularly in
scientific circles, is that a war against the West is being planned.
According to this opinion, BREZHNEV's admission of these three Ministers
to the Politburo is a very unusual act in the history of the Soviet Union.
A similar step was taken only once before, when STALIN admitted VOROSHILOV,
POLOTOV and BERIA to the Politburo about two months before the outbreak
of war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany.
13-00000
Potochi
Cazal
DEVELOPMENTAL AND RECRUITMENT APPROACHES TO AMERICANS
THE SOVIET SECURITY THREAT. IN THE DETENTE PERIOD
"
1. The aura of detente in the Soviet and Bloc relations dur-
ing the last year and a half, we believe, has created a favorable
climate for recruitment and penetration in the West.
This paper
deals with the problems as we see them. There are related counter-
intelligence issues which involve internal security: the leakage
and exchange of economic, scientific and political information;
the sale of technological information; and the impact of disinfor-
mation and agents of influence on American policy. As has been
noted in our previous forums, since 1961 when KAGO brought us
documentary evidence* that Soviet intelligence had launched a full-
scale penetration effort against the "Main Enemy,' we have seen a
steady and continuing Soviet effort to effect penetrations of the
U.S. Government. Detente has done nothing to blunt this effort.
Soviet intelligence has worked steadily on the American target and
has been quick to seize upon the openings to the West which-
KRUSHCHEV Was the first to label "Detente." BREZHNEV has made the
word the cliche of the moment. It has been clear to Soviet intel-
ligence, as it has been apparent to Western counterintelligence,
that Soviet policy designed to exploit Western technology and,
hopefully, change the balance of military power has created new
opportunities for Soviet espionage.
2. These new opportunities may be characterized as a plethora
of choices: a harvest almost unprecedented since the New Economic
Policy (N.E.P.) period and the 1958 Central Committee decision to
assign to the KGB a new vital role in the policy to exploit the
West by returning to the principles of LENIN. Soviet intelligence
now finds more Americans, both official and unofficial:
a. Anxious to exchange all types of information;
b. Willing to discuss virtually any subject;
C. Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and
potentially viable dissident movement in the USSR which can
be influenced if only the American people-to-people concept
could prevail;
*Referred to and quoted in Attachment A.
02926
SECRET
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d. Convinced that there is a bonanza for the American
businessman in the USSR and that "business" can alter the
Soviet lifestyle and reduce governmental, i.e., CP control;
e. Believing that the Cold War was a myth created by
America;
f. Anxious to atone for the "sins" of Vietnam and
interventionist policies;
g. Anxious about China and nuclear weapons;
n.
Believing there is more merit to direct USSR-USA
negotiation if America attempts to negotiate in tandem with
its Western allies or other nations;
i. Ready to believe there are many, if not legions, of
Soviet citizens, particularly the young "intellectuals,":
who are willing to cooperate with the West to advance free-
dom for the Russians;
j. Ignorant about Soviet ideological consistency and
purpose.
3. Addressing ourselves only to manifestations of the Soviet
security threat outside the U.S., we are concerned that the climate
for penetration, particularly for the recruitment of Americans, has
become too permissive. The attitudes outlined have not only made
America more vulnerable but have made the counterintelligence job
more difficult. Not only has Soviet-American contact increased in
geometric proportions, but there is also increasing evidence that
the always relatively loose security check rein on official Ameri-
cans has lengthened even more. As discussed elsewhere, it is ap-
parent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence, when
coupled with domestic attacks of whatever origin against American
intelligence and security organs, have had a direct bearing on
opportunities for Soviet intelligence to attempt to develop and
recruit Americans.
-
4. In an attempt to cope with the problem of Soviet and Bloc
recruitments and penetrations, we have since August 1965 -
collected statistics and case data on a government-wide basis of
recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and
foreign employees of the United States Government. Our objective
has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such information
in order to:
a. Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc, Cuban
and Chinese Communist services;
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b. Identify U.S. Government employees who are being
targetted by these adversary services;
C. Determine the scope of activity of these adversary
services by area, date and modus operandi;
d. Determine the scope of targetting against any
specific U.S. Government agency;
Help us understand the extent of foreign intelligence.
efforts against the U.S. Government and to obtain other per-
spectives about possible disinformation and deception
operations;
f. Facilitate management of double agent cases;
g.
Furnish counterintelligence and operational guidance.
to our field stations in their efforts to mount. aggressive
operations against the adversary;
h. Provide the Agency and other U.S. Government agencies,
as appropriate, information about the scope and type of pene-
tration efforts being made against U.S. Government installa-
tions abroad.
5. Our evaluated cases* of penetration and recruitment at-
tempts over the last nine years by the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and
Chinese Communist services are as follows:
1965.
1966
117
131
1967
72
1968.
97
1969.
86
1970-
60
1971
56
1972
.78
1973
45
Total
742)
2 solid
penetration and
rent out ramps
per with.
ри
*The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is
the single case of penetration or the recruitment incident as es-
tablished by evaluation of confirmed reports, unconfirmed or cir-
cumstantial information, and other specific reporting and informa-
tion.
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Over the whole period the penetration and recruitment ef
forts have been fairly stably distributed by service as follows:
6.
Soviet
Bloc
Cuban
Chicom
.
58% of the cases
37%
"
4%
1%
7. Over the range of cases, recruitment and penetration ef-
forts have been directed at U.S. officer personnel in 30% of the
cases, other staff in 5%, communications personnel in 5%, enlisted
ranks in 9%, local employees in 30%** others in 22% of the cases.
8. Looking more particularly at our information on Soviet
and associated recruitment and penetration efforts for the Detente
period--the past four years--there is the following distribution
of adversary service case effort:
Soviet
Bloc
.1970
1971
+41
29
32.
21
1972.
47.
28.
1973
131
12.
Yearly.
Cub an
CPP
Totals
60
56:
78
45
9. It is clear that Soviet penetration and recruitment opera-
tions, up to and including the last year, against U.S. Government
installations and representatives abroad have not been materially
affected or inhibited by "Detente." Some representative cases
since 1968 are cited in Attachment B. The cases have been sani-
tized to protect the innocent. They are included solely to suggest
the range, precision and persistence of the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and
Chinese Communist penetrations effort.
10. This is not the end of the problem. Our data consists es
sentially of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily
reported by American personnel. The 1973 case figures (and those
for 1974, thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators of the
persistence of Soviet and Bloc penetration efforts in spite of, or
because of, Detente permissiveness. However we acknowledge that
we have no way yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the
reporting mood of the official Americans who are being targetted.
*This covers only local employees outside of Iron Curtain in-
stallations. Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron
Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the control
of their respective security services and are therefore not con-
sidered in this calculation.
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5
11. Soviet Bloc modus operandi--the operational techniques
used against Americans--include all the known gambits and have
changed little over the past decade. There have been slight tacti-
cal shifts both abroad and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of
the "spirit of Detente," for example, but the basic N/O remains
what it was in the 1920's and 1930's.
12. In addition to diplomatic and official access to U.S.
officials, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers frequent the places-
bars, restaurants, clubs and other international, national and
local organizations--that provide them with opportunities to meet
American personnel or U.S. Government employees. In their recruit-
ment efforts, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the
theme of peace, friendship, and mutual cooperation and they have
offered the bait of exchanging information to develop "common"
interests and cooperation to obtain information. They have utilized:
the ploy of professional advancement or business interests for one
or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy informa-
tion to try to remove the stigma of espionage in their development
negotiations as well as in some recruitment attempts. They con-
tinue in their efforts to obtain access to both American and in-
digenous female employees throughout the world by using officers or
local indigenous male and female agents to cultivate these target
personalities. Recently they have used the language lesson gambit--
even with CIA personnel. Local personnel, ranging from servants to
higher officials, have been recruited and targetted either to ob-
tain employment with Americans or to develop personal as well as
official access to American officials. They have attempted to
recruit foreign local employees to report about the interests and
activities of their American employers. They employ sex and
financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat,
seek out personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportuni-
ties, make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate or
nationalistic grounds, utilize audio and other technical mechanisms,
etc.
13. This summary examination of the recent case evidence of
the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort
against official Americans abroad is not the whole Detente story.
There is also a great interest by the Soviets in recruiting U.S.
students abroad. The primary objective of that recruitment effort
is to guide the student eventually to obtain employment with the
U.S. Government. Such efforts are only indicative of the fact that
the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S. Government, via
students, as a continuing and long-range program.
14. A recent additional dimension to the problem of Soviet
and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access the Soviets
have developed to American businessmen--many of whom are privy to
SECRET
13-00000
U.S. Government secrets through defense-related contracts--who
travel to the USSR and entertain Soviet trade delegations in the
U.S. The concern we have previously expressed about the role of
Lt. General Yevgeniy N. PITOVRANOV and the Soviet intelligence
officers in the foreign trade business was well founded and, in
fact, we believe was somewhat understated. It is now evident that
PITOVRANOV controls most if not all of the activities going on
where American business encounters Soviet trade officials, in the
International Trade Center to be built in Moscow, in exhibits in
the USSR and abroad, in the patents and licensing agreements, in
the supervision of the travel of trade delegations to the U.S.
and the like.
15.
Reports which reveal that the KGB is active among American
businessmen are beginning to surface. Not too surprisingly, these
reports indicate that their techniques are both subtle and blatant.
One of the most blatant approaches to American business involves
Igor ARTEMYEV, who is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.
ARTEMYEV claims to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships
between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries and licensing
agreements between U.S. and foreign companies. In the course of
his research, ARTEMYEV sends detailed questionnaires to U.S. com-
panies. The questionnaires are the kind required by our Securities
and Exchange Commission. While some companies do not respond,
there are those that do. ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to
talk with officials. On one occasion he replied to a question
about the level of classification of the meeting by saying it was
"confidential.” With that kind of access, who needs to recruit in
the classic sense.
nse.
16. PITOVRANOV's people are very evident in various trade
delegations under their Chamber of Commerce cover, and they are
applying what appear to be classic assessment techniques. It has
been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range and
are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick pitch,
although these devices are being employed against some American
businessmen who visit Moscow. There are also strong indications
that the Soviets are using recruited agents among the rapidly ex-
panding demi-monde of fixers, many Russian-speaking, who gain
employment as the in-house experts who "know how to deal with the
Russians" and who find employment with American firms as guides
and advisors accompanying U.S. delegations to Moscow.
Attachments
Crm
13-00000
The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's)
professional career:
September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the
1945-1946:
1946-1948:
1948-1950:
Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where
he remained until July 1945. At that time
Subject left the Artillery School before
completion of the course and enrolled in a
Counterintelligence School.
Student at the one year course, Military
Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH,"
Moscow.
Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case
Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section
(otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony
security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-
ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign
Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Head-
quarters in Moscow. During the period
November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held
the title of Referent and his office was
designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the
Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI
(Committee for Information), but his functions
were unchanged.
Student at the two-year course, Higher
Intelligence School of the KI. Subject
studied general subjects and the English
language; he was one of 30 students who
specialized in counterintelligence during
the second year of the course.
03035
13-00000
.1950-1951:
Desk officer, Operation
Case Officer,
supervising SK activities in China,
assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Depart-
ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-
quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having
:
reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.
September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as
a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section,
November 1951:
December 1951:
March 1952:
Counterintelligence Department of the First
Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.
Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational
Case Officer."
The KI, was dissolved and former state security
elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's
functions continued the same, but, in the
reorganization, he was assigned to the CI
Section of the American Department of the
Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the
First Chief Directorate of the MGB.
Subject and an unidentified young colleague
wrote a joint letter through the Central
Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making
suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of
Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence work.
September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR
Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour
meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,
MALENKOV, and BERIYA.. STALIN thanked the two
officers for their suggestions, discussed
intelligence matters in detail and asked them
to send him a letter with specific proposals

13-00000
March 1953:
October 1953:
August 1954:
for necessary reorganizations, together
with the names of recommended chiefs.
In a subsequent letter they recommended
Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison
for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy
Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy
chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.
STALIN met Subject and his friend a second
time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and
appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-
rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A
Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB
was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence
Department with an Emigre desk and seven geo-
graphical desks. Subject was appointed by
OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk,
supervising approximately 15 staff persons.
When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control
of the State Security apparatus, which he
combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he
replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.
Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the
Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of
the Second (new designation for foreign
Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. ⠀ Subject
supervised activities against emigres in
Austria and Germany.
Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in
Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer
in the Emigre Operations Group.
Subject was transferred to the British Sub-
Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the
KGB residency in Vienna.
His duties were of a
counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned
with penetration of foreign intelligence services.
13-00000
1955-1959:
One of 170 students at ading the four
year internal security-counterintelligence
course, the KGB Higher School Juridical
Institute. He presented and successfully
defended his thesis on the subject of SK
activities among Soviet delegations and
tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-
ceived his diploma in August 1959.
his school tour Subject also spent several
weeks in on-the-job training as a student
assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's
Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief
Directorate, with access to operational files
on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow
who were KGB targets.
During
September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational
Case Officer responsible for NATO information
April 1960:
within the Treaty Organizations Direction,
Information (Reports) Department, First
-
(Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters,
Moscow. His function was to translate, edit
and summarize information reports obtained by
KGB agents abroad and to disseminate the
pertinent information to the Central Committee
of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including
KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information
with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the
Minister of Defense. At one time, during a
CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about
the delays in translation and processing and
Subject was assigned to study the situation.
Thus he examined registry logs showing the
titles of agent information reports, the place
acquired, the date received and the date of
dissemination of the finished Russian intelli-
gence reports to the government.
Subject was transferred to the American Section
13-00000
August 1960:
15 December 1961:
of the CI Department of the First Chief
Directorate, KGB, to prepare for assign-
ment to the KGB residency under Soviet
Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as
the CI officer working against foreign
intelligence services.
Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in
Helsinki, under the name KLİMOV (his true
name was compromised through the 1954
defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and
with the cover title of Third Secretary.
Subject, with his wife and young daughter
defected to the U.S. Government which granted
them political asylum.
28 December 1961:
Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY
along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.
1962:
Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers,
officials from other US Agencies and teams of
Intelligence Officers from Free World nations.
Subject provided much valuable information on
the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,
aims and efforts against the Free World.
Subject, however, proved to be a difficult
handling problem, especially as a result of
his personality and his constant demands for
regular meetings with high-level US officials
such as the President, the Attorney-General,
the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a
policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the
Attorney-General.
2 July 1962:
9 July 1962:
22 August 1962:
Subject met again with the Attorney-General
and Mr. HELMS.
Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.
Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the
White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW,
Director of USIA.
13-00000
15 Nov. 1962:
27 Nov. 1962:
An FBI source reported hat the KGB was aware
of Subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered
all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately
any information which they may obtain regard-
ing Subject.
Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested
14 December 1962:
21 Feb. 1963
:
Spring 1963:
8 August 1963:
22 August 1963:
23 August 1963:
4 Sept. 1963:
October 1963-
April 1964:
1964/1965:
June 1965:
August 1968:
treatment by the Agency.
Subject met again with the DCI.
Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on
SS Sylvania for England.
Subject worked with the British.
Subject returned to the U.S.A.
Subject met the Attorney-General again.
Subject met the DCI again.
Subject met the DCI again and stated that he
wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and
the Intelligence Community.
Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in
the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to
some extent.
Subject, according to a Dutch official,
visited The Netherlands.
Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP)
in the N.Y.C. area.
Subject in contact with the British regarding
possible publication of his book.
October 1968:
An FBI source indicated that he had no
July 1970
current information concerning the KGB
attitude regarding Subject but the source
stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location
it might undertake to eliminate him.
Subject was in contact with Agency personnel
and visited Florida.
13-00000
March 1972:
A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew
April 1972:
September 1972
that Subject had been sentenced to death
by the KGB. An article regarding this
sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after
1964.
Subject was in touch with CIA officials.
A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy
of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents
of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors,
Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of
Punitive Units and Other Criminals under
Search Warrants.
In this List the KGB listed
Subject and his wife as under the sentence of
death for revealing Soviet State secrets.
13-00000
The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's)
professional career:
September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the
1945-1946:
1946-1948:
1948-1950:
Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where
he remained until July 1945. At that time
Subject left the Artillery School before
..
completion of the course and enrolled in a
Counterintelligence School.
Student at the one year course, Military
Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH,
Moscow.
"
Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case
Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section
(otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony
security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-
ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign
Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Head-
quarters in Moscow. During the period
November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held
the title of Referent and his office was
designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the
Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI
(Committee for Information), but his functions
were unchanged.
Student at the two-year course, Higher
Intelligence School of the KI. Subject
studied general subjects and the English
language; he was one of 30 students who
specialized in counterintelligence during
the second year of the course.
03035
13-00000
.1950-1951:
Desk officer, Operation 1 Case Officer,
supervising SK activities in China,
assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Depart-
ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-
quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having
reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.
September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as
November 1951:
December 1951:
March 1952:
a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section,
Counterintelligence Department of the First
Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.
Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational
Case Officer."
The KI, was dissolved and former state security
elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's
functions continued the same, but, in the
reorganization, he was assigned to the CI
Section of the American Department of the
Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the
First Chief Directorate of the MGB.
Subject and an unidentified young colleague
wrote a joint letter through the Central
Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making
suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of
Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence work.
September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR
Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour
meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,
MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two
officers for their suggestions, discussed
intelligence matters in detail and asked them
to send him a letter with specific proposals.
13-00000
March 1953:
October 1953:
August 1954:
for necessary reorganizations, together
with the names of recommended chiefs.
In a subsequent letter they recommended
Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison
for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy
Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy
chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.
STALIN met Subject and his friend a second
time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and
appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-
rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A
Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB
was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence
Department with an Emigre desk and seven geo-
graphical desks. Subject was appointed by
OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk,.
supervising approximately 15 staff persons.
When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control
of the State Security apparatus, which he
combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he
replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.
Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the
Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of
the Second (new designation for foreign
Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject
supervised activities against emigres in
Austria and Germany.
Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in
Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer
in the Emigre Operations Group..
Subject was transferred to the British Sub-
Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the
KGB residency in Vienna.
His duties were of a
counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned.
with penetration of foreign intelligence services.
13-00000
1955-1959:
One of 170 students at ~ing the four
year internal security-counterintelligence
course, the KGB Higher School Juridical
Institute. He presented and successfully
defended his thesis on the subject of SK
activities among Soviet delegations and
tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-
ceived his diploma in August 1959. During
his school tour Subject also spent several
weeks in on-the-job training as a student
assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's
Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief
Directorate, with access to operational files
on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow
who were KGB targets.
September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational
Case Officer responsible for NATO information
April 1960:
within the Treaty Organizations Direction,
Information (Reports) Department, First
(Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters,
Moscow. His function was to translate, edit
...
and summarize information reports obtained by
KGB agents abroad and to disseminate the
pertinent information to the Central Committee
of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including
KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information
with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the
Minister of Defense. At one time, during a
CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about
the delays in translation and processing and
Subject was assigned to study the situation.
Thus he examined registry logs showing the
titles of agent information reports, the place
acquired, the date received and the date of
dissemination of the finished Russian intelli-
gence reports to the government.'
Subject was transferred to the American Section
13-00000
August 1960:
15 December 1961:
Directorate, KGB, to p₁re for assign-
ment to the KGB residency under Soviet
Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as
the CI officer working against foreign
intelligence services.
Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in
Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true
name was compromised through the 1954
defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and
with the cover title of Third Secretary.
Subject, with his wife and young daughter.
defected to the U.S. Government which granted
them political asylum.
28 December 1961:
Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY
along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.
1962:
Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers,
officials from other US Agencies and teams of
Intelligence Officers from Free World nations.
Subject provided much valuable information on
the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,
aims and efforts against the Free World.
Subject, however, proved to be a difficult
handling problem, especially as a result of
his personality and his constant demands for
regular meetings with high-level US officials
such as the President, the Attorney-General,
the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a
policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the
2 July 1962:
9 July 1962:
22 August 1962:
Attorney-General.
Subject met again with the Attorney-General
and Mr. HELMS.
Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.
Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the
White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW,
Director of USIA.

13-00000
15 Nov. 1962:
27 Nov. 1962:
An FBI source reported at the KGB was aware
of Subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered
all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately
any information which they may obtain regard-
ing Subject.
Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested
14 December 1962:
21 Feb. 1963
:
Spring 1963:
8 August 1963:
22 August 1963:
23 August 1963:
4 Sept.
1963:
October 1963-
April 1964:
1964/1965:
June 1965:
August 1968:
treatment by the Agency.
Subject met again with the DCI.
Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on
SS Sylvania for England.
Subject worked with the British.
Subject returned to the U.S.A.
Subject met the Attorney-General again.
Subject met the DCI again.
Subject met the DCI again and stated that he
wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and
the Intelligence Community.
•
Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in
the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to
some extent.
Subject, according to a Dutch official,
visited The Netherlands.
Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP).
in the N.Y.C. area.
Subject in contact with the British regarding
possible publication of his book.
October 1968:
An FBI source indicated that he had no
July 1970
current information concerning the KGB
attitude regarding Subject but the source
stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location
it might undertake to eliminate him.
Subject was in contact with Agency personnel
and visited Florida.
13-00000
April 1972:
September 1972
that Subject had been sentenced to death
by the KGB. An article regarding this
sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after
1964.
Subject was in touch with CIA officials.
A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy
of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents
of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors,
Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of
Punitive Units and Other Criminals under
Search Warrants.
In this List the KGB listed
Subject and his wife as under the sentence of
death for revealing Soviet State secrets..
13-00000
The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's)
professional career:
September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the
1945-1946:
1946-1948:
1948-1950:
Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where
he remained until July 1945. At that time
Subject left the Artillery School before
completion of the course and enrolled in a
Counterintelligence School.
Student at the one year course, Military
Counterintelligence School, GUKR/"SMERSH,
Moscow.
Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case
Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section
(otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony -
security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-
ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign
Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. Head-
quarters in Moscow. During the period
November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held
the title of Referent and his office was
designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the
Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI
(Committee for Information), but his functions
were unchanged.
Student at the two-year course, Higher
Intelligence School of the KI.
Subject
studied general subjects and the English
language; he was one of 30 students who
specialized in counterintelligence during
the second year of the course.
03035
13-00000
.1950-1951:
Desk officer, Operation
Case Officer,
"supervising SK activities in China,
assigned to the SK Section, Eastern Depart-
-
ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-
quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having
reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.
September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as
a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section,
November 1951:
December 1951:
March 1952:
Counterintelligence Department of the First
Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.
Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational
Case Officer."
The KI, was dissolved and former state security
elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's
functions continued the same, but, in the
reorganization, he was assigned to the CI
Section of the American Department of the
Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the
First Chief Directorate of the MGB.
Subject and an unidentified young colleague
wrote a joint letter through the Central
Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making
suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of
Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence work.
September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR
Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour
meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,
MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two
officers for their suggestions, discussed
intelligence matters in detail and asked them
to send him a letter with specific proposals.
13-00000
March 1953:
October 1953:
August 1954:
for necessary reorganizations, together
with the names of recommended chiefs.
In a subsequent letter they recommended
Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison
for "political crimes,'
" and Yevgeniy
.
Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy
chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.
STALIN met Subject and his friend a second
time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and
appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-
rate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A
Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB
was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence
Department with an Emigre desk and seven geo-
graphical desks. Subject was appointed by
OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk,
supervising approximately 15 staff persons.
When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control
of the State Security apparatus, which he
combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he
replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.
Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the
Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of
the Second (new designation for foreign
Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject
supervised activities against emigres in
Austria and Germany.
Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in
Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer
in the Emigre Operations Group.
Subject was transferred to the British Sub-
Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the
KGB residency in Vienna.
His duties were of a
counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned
with penetration of foreign intelligence services.
13-00000
1955-1959:
One of 170 students at ing the four
year internal security-counterintelligence
course, the KGB Higher School Juridical
Institute. He presented and successfully
defended his thesis on the subject of SK.
activities among Soviet delegations and
tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-
ceived his diploma in August 1959. During
his school tour Subject also spent several
weeks in on-the-job training as a student
assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's
Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief
Directorate, with access to operational files
on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow
who were KGB targets.
-
September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational
Case Officer responsible for NATO information
April 1960:
within the Treaty Organizations Direction,
Information (Reports) Department, First
(Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters,
Moscow. His function was to translate, edit
and summarize information reports obtained by
KGB agents abroad and to disseminate the
pertinent information to the Central Committee
of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including
KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information
with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the
Minister of Defense. At one time, during a
CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about
the delays in translation and processing and
Subject was assigned to study the situation.
Thus he examined registry logs showing the
titles of agent information reports, the place.
acquired, the date received and the date of
dissemination of the finished Russian intelli-
gence reports to the government.
Subject was transferred to the American Section
13-00000
August 1960:
15 December 1961:
of the CI Department of the First Chief
Directorate, KGB, to pipare for assign-
ment to the KGB residency under Soviet
Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as
the CI officer working against foreign
intelligence services.
Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in
Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true
name was compromised through the 1954
defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and
with the cover title of Third Secretary.
Subject, with his wife and young daughter
defected to the U.S. Government which granted
them political asylum.
28 December 1961:
1962:
Subject met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY
along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.
Subject was debriefed by CIA Officers,
officials from other US Agencies and teams of
Intelligence Officers from Free World nations.
Subject provided much valuable information on
the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,
aims and efforts against the Free World..
Subject, however, proved to be a difficult
handling problem, especially as a result of
his personality and his constant demands for
regular meetings with high-level US officials
such as the President, the Attorney-General,
the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a
policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the
Attorney-General.
2 July 1962:
Subject met again with the Attorney-General
and Mr. HELMS.
Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.
9 July 1962:
22 August 1962:
Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the
White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW,
Director of USIA.
13-00000
15 Nov. 1962:
27 Nov. 1962:
An FBI source reported it the KGB was aware
of Subject's presence in the U.S.A. and ordered
all Soviet IS personnel to report immediately
any information which they may obtain regard-
ing Subject.
Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested
14 December 1962:
21 Feb. 1963
:
Spring 1963:
8 August 1963:
22 August 1963:
23 August 1963:
4 Sept.
1963:
October 1963-
April 1964:
1964/1965:
June 1965:
August 1968:
treatment by the Agency.
Subject met again with the DCI.
Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on
SS Sylvania for England.
Subject worked with the British.
Subject returned to the U.S.A.
Subject met the Attorney-General again.
Subject met the DCI again.
Subject met the DCI again and stated that he
wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and
the Intelligence Community.
Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in
the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to
some extent.
Subject, according to a Dutch official,
visited The Netherlands.
Subject interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP)
in the N.Y.C. area.
Subject in contact with the British regarding
possible publication of his book.
October 1968:
An FBI source indicated that he had no
July 1970
current information concerning the KGB
attitude regarding Subject but the source
stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location
it might undertake to eliminate him.
Subject was in contact with Agency personnel
and visited Florida.
13-00000
March 1972-
A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew
April 1972:
September 1972
that Subject had been sentenced to death
by the KGB. An article regarding this
sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after
1964.
Subject was in touch with CIA officials.
A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy
of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents
of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors,
Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of
Punitive Units and Other Criminals under
Search Warrants.
In this List the KGB listed
Subject and his wife as under the sentence of
death for revealing Soviet State secrets.