AGENCY : PFIAB
Date
09/24/98
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
Page : 1
RECORD NUMBER :
RECORDS SERIES ::
206-10001-10004
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR :
PFIAB
FROM
ΤΟ
TITLE
MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD ON JUNE 25-26, 1963
DATE : 06/25/63
PAGES :
SUBJECTS :
8
AGENDA FOR JUNE 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING
SUMMARY OF JUNE 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :
TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/98
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
08/01/2024
2025 Release under the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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MEETING OF THE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON
June 25 26, 1963
-
2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act
of 1992
206-10001-10004
TOP SECRET
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OP JUNE 25.
-
26, 1963
ITEM
TIME
1.
9:00
10:00
2.
10:00 10:15
3.
10:15 11:00
4
11:00
-
11:30
SUBJECT
June 25, 1963 (all be present)
The Chairman's Time
Mr. Clifford
Report on OXCART Incident
General Doolittle
Status Report on Organization and Opera-
tions of CIA in non-Covert 
Action Areas
Doolittle Panel
Briefing on Organization, Management and.
Operation of the Bureau of 
Intelligence
and Research (INR), Department 
of State
,
Mr. George C. Denney, Jr.
Deputy Director, INR, State
Mr. Allan Evans, INR Staff
TNo supporting
pepic prepared
for
Status Report on State Department
Intelligence Activities
5.
11:30 12:00
Murphy Panel
6.
12:00 - 12:30
Status Report on Signals Intelligence.
(SIGINT) Activities
Baker Panel,
Metropolitan Club (Anderson Room
Second Floor)
7.
12:40
2:00
Lunch
8.
2:00
2:30
2.
2:00 - 2:15.
Budget Bureau Views on
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2:30 3:00
10.
3:00 3:30
For material
Management and Budgetary Control of
Intelligence
Mr. Gary Pettibone, Budget Bureau Staff.
Mr. Irving Lewis, Budget 
Bureau Staff
2:15
2:30 Over all Budgeting for
Intelligence
Pace Panel
Executive Session Discussion of DCJ's
Comments on Report and Recommendations
Growing Out of the Board's 
Cuba Review
Discussion with the Director, National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Mr. Brockway McMillan, Under Secretary,
Panel Department of the Air Force
assignments see BR of Painel Miscons
2
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of lich and Cone
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ITEM
TIME
11.
3:30-5:00-
Mhme
12.
7:00
SUBJECT.
Discussion with the Director of Central
Intelligence
derstanding Mr. McCone
Dinner at Mr. Clifford's Residence
9421 Rockville Pike, Bethesda, Maryland
June 26, 1963.
13.
9:00 - 9:30
14.
9:30 10:30
NOT
TAKEN
"OP 15.
16.
17.
10:30 11:00
11:00 11:30
11:30 - 12:00
-
12:30
Executive Session.
Status Report on Defense Intelligence
Activities (other than SIGINT and NRO)
Gray Panel
Status Report on Covert Action Activities
Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel
Status Report on NRO Activities
Land-Doolittle Panel.
Status Report on DCI's Coordination Role
and on Intelligence Community Relation-
ships with and Support of the White House
Clifford Panel
Executive Session
18.
12:00
19.
12:30
1:30
Lunch
20.
1:30 - End of
Day
a.
Boo melons
Sen Revised
6/
26aganda
b.
The White House Mess
Consideration of Chairman's Draft:
Communications Concerning Future
Status Reports of DCI, CIA, State
and Defense
Discussion of Board's SIGINT Panel Report
c. Discussion of the question of recommend-
ing a ninth/Board member
d.
e.
Discussion of frequency of future Board
meetings
Discussion of future business of the
Board and the Board's Panels
Determination of next Board meeting date
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This document cost of
THE WHITE HOUSE
Na
_ of
WASHINGTON
2
...8.5
Coplos, Serie
June 28, 1963
pages
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board June 25-26, 1963
י{
The Board convened in its offices at 297 Executive Office
Building, 9:00 A.M., June 25, 1963, on the first day of its
two-day meeting. Those present were Board Chairman Clark
Clifford and Members Gray, Langer, Murphy, Doolittle, Land,
Langer, and Pace; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.
Chairman Clifford began the meeting with the observation
that the Board has been in existence for two years, and has
been very active during that time. Mr. Clifford thought
that it was exceedingly appropriate at this time to look
back on the two years! work of the Board, to evaluate the
work, and to arrive at conclusions concerning areas where
the Board can expand its usefulness to the President.
Accordingly, Mr. Clifford said, he has purposely kept to a
minimum the appearances of briefers from outside during this
meeting, and Board business would be confined mostly to con-
sideration of reports by the various Board Panels. On the
following day the Chairman indicated that he would set aside
time for a a discussion of the usefulness of Panel reports
with a view to seeing whether there might not be increased
use made of Panels in pursuing the Board's functions. If
this procedure proved useful, the Chairman thought that perhaps
there would be fewer formal meetings of the whole Board and
that the Panels could prepare proposed reports to the President
to be considered at formal meetings of the Board, thereby
avoiding a last-minute rush in the preparation of reports
to the President.
The Chairman then turned to a number of items which he
had drawn up for discussion with the Board, with the assistance.
of Mr. Coyne.
First, the Chairman read to Board members the letter.
which had been written to Mr. Clifford on June 5 by Dr.
Killian, thanking the Board for the gift which he had received
on the occasion of his resignation as Chairman of the Board.
HANDLE VIA COMINT, CHANNELS ONLY
This document contains information
IDEALIST, CORONA,
referring to CXCARE.
Property of:
The President's Foreign
CXCART TAGBOARD Intelligence Advisory Board
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Handle via BYEMAN
Control System
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He told
Turning to the Board-suggested item regarding the status of current
efforts to mount clandestine collection and covert operations against Cuba,
the DCI referred to the close attention being given to these matters.
the Board that since March of this year Mr. Fitzgerald of CIA has been heading.
up the Agency's headquarters element directly concerned with clandestine
activities against Cuba. Agents have been placed in Cuba for CIA by Argentina,
A total of 104 new agents:
France, Spain, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Britain.
of all types are in operation, 41 of them in Cuba where three "black", illegal
teams are working. As yet there have been no penetrations of the Castro regime
or military installations. CIA gets reports from these agents and liaison
observers but the Agency has "no agents sitting on the Cuban General Staff".
Mr. McCone said that we do not know how many Soviets are in Cuba, although
it can be estimated that there are 12,000 to 13,000 still there and possibly.
all scattered over the island. He informed the Board that pursuant to
approvals by the Special Group, the NSC and the President there are active
programs for intensified intelligence collection on Cuba,
more,
as well as efforts
to promote disaffection in the Cuban military; hampering the Cuban economy;
and sabotage.
☐
Mr. Clifford asked for background on the recent news stories about
Cuban exiles claiming that invasion teams had been sent into Cuba.
Mr. McCone
stated that these claims were national stories by Cuban exiles in Miami with.
The DCI added that CIA assessed
a view to obtaining U. S. military intervention."
the development accurately the night that word was first received about it.
He went on to say that an approved U. S. program calls for a long term effort
over two years aimed at disaffecting the Cuban military from Castro, and it is
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76.
expected that this effort will result in press releases, and Soviet protests
at the UN and elsewhere.
However, Mr. McCone expressed the belief that there
is already some disaffection within Cuban military circles, and if the CIA
effort succeeds the result will be an overthrow of Castro but it will also
mean a military dictatorship in Cuba for a time.
Mr. McCone suggested that it might be profitable for the Board to receive
a briefing on Cuban matters from Mr. Fitzgerald of CIA, at the next Board meeting
Mr. Clifford agreed that this would be desirable.
Mr. Gray observed that newspaper accounts and items in the Central
Intelligence Bulletin have been in disagreement on the Soviet turnover of the
armored camps to the Cubans. Mr. McCone thought that CIA's assessment is the
correct one.
Mr. Pace inquired about the quality of U-2 photography being obtained
from missions over Cuba. Mr McCone replied that in the present season of
summer storms there is more cloud cover and shadows which means fewer sightings
of the 30 critical target points of top interest to the CIA, and he noted that
there wa8 a 15-day period of such bad weather recently. At present U-2 missions
are flown daily and sometimes twice daily, all of them direct overflights.
The objective, he said, is to get a mosaic of the whole island every 7 days
In answer to General Doolittle's question, Mr. McCone said that special
authorization is still required for the sending of low-level missions over Cuba.
Answering a question by Dr. Langer, the DCI said that no evidence of camouflage
had been seen. He added that each day CIA issues an analysis of otic!
reporte received from refugee agent and other sources
such reports of all kinds which cannot be checked out
and there are innumerable
For example a refugee.
from Cuba arrived in Miami with the story that he had seen an enormous submarine.
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77
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base at a location near Banes.
But an examination of photography of the
village in question shows only some fishing shacks and the presence of a shoal
which would prevent the entry of any vessels other than shallow draft fishing
boats.
Mr. Pace asked whether useful information had been obtained from CIA's
own recovered agents. Mr. McCone said yes, definitely.
Turning to the subject of OXCART, the DCI said that ten are on order,
The remaining three will be
ren have been delivered and six have been flown.
delivered one at a time in July, August, and September.
sequent development of Air Force interceptor and reconnaissance versions of
OXCART.
Plans call for sub-
Mr. McCone
As for the crash of the OXCART last month, the DCI reported the facts
substantially as previously given to the Board by General Doolittle.
indicated that no security breach had occurred; when picked up by the persons
who came up in a jeep the pilot succeeded in steering them away from the crash
scene; the State Police secured the area; all pieces of the plane were removed
within 30 hours; the only news photos made were retrieved before the film was
processed or published; and only an innocuous news story appeared in the press.
Mr. McCone said that the Board of Inquiry found that false instrument readings
were caused by frozen pitot tubes. It appeared that there was some pilot error;
corrective recommendations have been made; and meanwhile OXCART will be flown
under conditions of clear visibility.
In answer to Mr. Pace's question, the DCI said that the overall cost of
project OXCART is $750 million (of which $300 million is engine cost), and that
project TAGBOARD will require an additional expenditure of $85 million.
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1
(Dr. Baker departed the Board meeting at this point.)
Taking up the sixth item suggested by the Board for discussion, the DCI
government.
said that he felt that there were no security implications in the Profumo case
in Britain. Mr. McCone said it was thought that it would be contrary to Soviet
procedure for Ivanov to attempt to use Keeler for espionage purposes, although
there might have been a Soviet attempt at political action against the MacMillan
In answer to Mr. Coyne's question, Mr. McCone said that the British
had cocperated fully with CIA in regard to the Profumo case with respect to any
U. S. people involved, but that the British have rightfully withheld information
Mr. McCone informed the Board that
on the implication of other Britishers.
within a couple of days the Labor Party in England will break the case involving
Philby who turns out to be the "third man" in the Burgess-MacLean case, and who
The DCI added that
in the late 1940's was in liaison with the CIA and FBI.
MacMillan has been sitting on this case for a long time and CIA has tried in
the past to get the British to surface it.
Turning to the next item listed as of interest to the Board, Mr. McCone,
said that the Penkovskiy espionage case in the USSR had no implications for
British or U. S. Intelligence security.
The DCI noted that we suffered a
perious loss of valuable source with the execution of this individual who pro-
vided over 8,000 pages of very important documents during the period 1960-1962.
Mr. McCone related that the Soviet Colonel had been recruited by CIA but the
British were brought in when it developed that contacts could best be made when
the Soviet officer was in London escorting visiting military and trade missions.
Therefore, Mr. McCone went on to say, CIA got MI-6 to share in the reporting
aspects and means were set up whereby information could be delivered by
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The DCI
Penkovskiy (for example, dropping a roll of tinfoil wrapped microfilm into a
baby carriage pushed by the wife of n Britisher in a London park).
said that apparently the Soviet officer's cooperation was motivated by an
emotional resentment of the fact that he had been passed over in promotions.
According to Mr." McCone, the/officer was probably uncovered as a result of
Soviet penetration of British intelligence, and it is known that he had no
access to CIA or FBI. Mr. Coyne asked whether CIA or Penkovskiy had initiated
the contact with CIA, and whether he could have been planted. Mr. McCone replied
that CIA was of course worried about the possibility of a plant but decided
that such was not the case.
11
the
Taking up the next item on the status of Board recommendations growing'
out of the Hanson Baldwin article of July 1962, the DCI informed the Board
that the FBI completed its investigation but did not positively identify the
source of the leak and therefore dropped the matter. As to the proposal for
controls on press contacts as a means of protecting intelligence matters,
DCI said that State and Defense put in a system of control procedures which
set off the furor over "management of the news which is still raging.
finally dropped its system; the Defense Department retained its procedures; and
CIA already was following a control system and still does.
Board's proposal of a special investigative group to investigate unauthorized.
disclosures, Mr. McCone said that he suggested this to State and Defense but
the "managed news" furor was at its height so nothing was heard from those
departments about the proposal. Meanwhile unknown to anyone outside CIA, the
State
With regard to the
Agency's Office of Security is developing a mechanism to cover any serious leaks.
occuring in the security field should the President request action.
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