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CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH
NOSENKE: (835 PALE STUDY
(VOL. 1): PAGES 1-84
(VOL:1)
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(PARTS I, II, III & IV
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NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
14-00000
TOP SECRET
The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
TOP SECRET
February 1967
:
;
1
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The Bona Fides of NOSENKO
I.
INTRODUCTION
II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
III.
A.
Introduction
B.
First Geneva Phase (June 1962)
Pace
1
3
3
3
c. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)
D.
Post-Defection Handling (February 1964 to Present) 4
OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva
8
8
B.
Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva
11
1.
TDY in 1962
11
2. The 1964 TDY
15
C.
Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO
16
1.
Introduction
16
2.
Collaboration in 1962
16
a. Readiness to Report to CIA
b.
Attitude Toward Defection
C.
Motivation
3.
Decision to Defect (January 1964)
D.
1.
6.
4. The Letter of July 1964
Pattern of Activity in Geneva
Introduction
2. Official Duties in Geneva
3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency
4.
Association with TSYMBAL
5. Association with Other Soviets
31
32
Availability for Meetings with CIA
33
Timing of Defection.
34
222222
16
20
20
24
30
30
w w w
30
30
F.
The Recall Telegram
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38
ー
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1.
2.
3.
G.
Soviet Official Reactions
H.. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family
I.
Repercussions Within the KGB
SENSITIVE SOURCE
Page
40
42
44
44
SENSITIVE SOURCE
SOURCE
46
46
IV.
4. KGB Handlers of Agents
NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S LIFE
47
48
A.
Introduction
48
"..
B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography
48
C.
.
Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB
79
1.
Family Life
79
1'
2.
Venereal Disease
80
3.
Affiliation with Communist Party Organs
81
4.
Statements to Others by NOSENKO
82
✓ D.
Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO
83
-
84
v.
NOSENKO's KGB CAREER
85
A. Introduction
85
B.
Entry into the KGB
86
1. Date of Entry
86
2.
Circumstances and Procedures of Entry
89
C.
To June 1955 (American Department)
93
1.
Introduction
93
2.
Operations Against Correspondents
93
a.
KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY,
and WHITNEY
93
b.
Agents Reporting on Correspondents
94
95
C. Information from Other Sources
Operations Against Military Attache Personnel 96
3.
8. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches
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98
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Page
b.
NOSENKO's Targets
99
(i)
MICKELSON
100
(11)
MEARNS
100
(iii)
RICHARDS
100
(iv)
FELCHLIN
101
(v)
BENSON
103
(vi)
STROUD
103
(vii) MULE
104
(viii) PNG of BENSON, STROUD and MULE
104
(ix)
CARDELLA
106
(x)
VAN LAETHEM
106
D.
June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)
107
1.
Introduction
107
2.
Soviet Homosexual Agents
107
3.
Other Soviet Agents
109
4.
Operations with Foreign Visitors
112
a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)
112
b.
Recruitment of BURGI (1956)
113
jj
C. Approach to
(1957)
120
d.
Contact with
and
(1957)
121
e.
Recruitment of
(1957)
121
g.
f. Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)
Compromise of KRAFT (1958)
h. Recruitment of DREW (1959)
122
123
123
1.
Recruitment of
'(1959)
124
J.
Recruitment of
(1959)
124
k. Recruitment of
(1959)
124
1. Recruitment of
(1959)
125
m.
Compromise of BARRETT (1959) ..
126
Compromise of WILLERFORD (1959)
127
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Page
5.
The FRIPPEL Case (1959-63)
129
a.
NOSENKO's Information
129
b.
FRIPPEL's Information
133
6.
Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963)
136
a.
Statements to the FBI
137
b.
Statements to CIA
141
(t)
KGB Interest in OSWALD
141
7
(ii)
KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD
142
(iii)
OSWALD's Marriage and Departure
from the USSR
142
(iv)
OSWALD's Visit to the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico
143
(v)
NOSENKO's Comments on Possible
144
KGB Involvement in the Assassination
7.
Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge
of Tourist Operations
145
a.
Information from NOSENKO
145
b.
KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE
146
C.
GOLITSYN's Tourist Document
147
8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958)
150
E.
January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department) 152
1.
Introduction
152
2.
NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy
Section
153
3.
Duties and Knowledgeability
157
a.
Introduction
157
b.
Functions as Deputy Chief and Acting
Chief of Section
158
(i)
Access
158
(ii)
Duties
159
(iii)
Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's
Absence
163
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Page
C.
Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations
164
(i)
Introduction
164
(11)
Approach to STORSBERG
166
(a)
NOSENKO's Information
168
(b)
Information from STORSBERG
177
(c)
Information from PREISFREUND
179
(d)
Information from GOLITSYN
182
(e)
Information from Other Sources 184
(iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk
186
Cases
(a)
Introduction
186
(b)
False Identity for Travel
186
(c)
The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER
Case)
:
187
(a) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND 196
Case)
(iv)
KGB-Polish UB Activities Against
MORONE
201
(a)
Introduction
(b) NOSENKO's Information
201
201
(c)
Information from Other Sources 206
ૐ
iv)
Developmental Operation Against
209
ZUJUS
(a) Introduction
(b) Information from NOSENKO
209
209
.(c)
Information from Other Sources 211
(vi)
Approach to KEYSERS
213
(a)
Introduction
213
(b) Information from NOSENKO
213
(c) Information from Other Sources 216
d.
NOSENKO's Responsibilities for Coverage
220
of ABIDIAN
(1) Introduction
220
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(ii) Duties as Case Officer
Page
220
227
e.
(iii) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings
(iv)
ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin 231
Street Dead Drop
Supervisor of Activities Against American 236
Service Attaches
Knowledge of the Target
f.
(i)
(ii)
Introduction
Physical Premises
(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy.Cover
240
240
240
242
g.
Electronic Operations Against the U.S.
Embassy
248
(i)
Introduction
248
(ii)
Microphones in the Chancery
248
(a) NOSENKO's Sources
249
(b) Number and Locations of
Microphones
252
(c)
Receptivity and Audibility of
Microphones
257
(a) Amount, Type, and Value of
Production
260
(iii) Microphones in the North Wing
267
(iv)
Monitoring/Jamming Beam
270
h. Handler of KGB Agents
272
4.
Overseas Assignments
274
a.
Attempt to Obtain Assignment to Ethiopia
(1960)
274
b.
U.S. Visa Application (1960)
274
C.
The Cuba TDY (1960)
276
d. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case
279
5.
Transfer to the Tourist Department
284
F.
January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department) 285
1. Date of Transfer
285
2.
Functions and Activities .
285
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3.
NOSENKO's Agents
287
a. Arsene FRIPPEL
287
b.
Johan PREISFREUND
288
C.
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV
288
d.
293
e.
Marina RYTOVA
289
4.
Approach to W. E. JOHNSON
289
ā.
NOSENKO's Information
289
b.
Information from JOHNSON
292
5.
Attempt to Recruit PRAUNS
293
a.
Information from NOSENKO
293
b.
Information from BRAUNS
294
6.
The SVENCHANSKIY Case
295
a.
Information from NOSENKO
295
b.
Information from Other Sources
296
7.
KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent
295
a.
Information from NOSENKO
298
b.
Information from Other Sources Concerning 300
ΚΟΤΕΝ
SENSIT THE SOURCE
C.
Peporting on
302
8. Arrest of BARGHOORN
a.
b.
Information from NOSENKO
304
304
Information from BARGHOORN
308
9.
GRU Agent:
John Andrew SHUBIN
310
a.
Introduction
310
b.
NOSENKO's Information
310
C.
Information from Sensitive Source
311
d. Information from Other Sources
312
10.
BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis
313
Introduction
313
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b.
Soviet Sources During the Crisis
315
C.
NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV
316
d.
Information from WED
Sensitive Source
318
G.
1. Rank
2. Awards and Decorations
NOSENKO's KGB Promotions and Awards
319
319
322
H.
NOSENKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV
327
1.
Information from NOSENKO
327
327
3. Summary
b. Details
327
2.
Information from RA SENSITIVE SOURCE
336
I.
Confirmation from Cther Sources
338
1.
Introduction
338
2.
SENSITIVE SOURCE
338
3.
sensitive source
340
4.
sensitive source
341
5.
Source
342
5. GAMKRELIDZE
342
343
7.
COLITSYN
:
8.
Source
345
9.
Case Officer for Robert Lee JOHNSON
347
10.
Case Officer for
347
11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV
347
349
VI.
PRODUCTION
A.
Positive Intelligence Information
349
B. Soviet Intelligence Personalities
350
C.
KGB Headquarters
352
1.
Structure and Functions
2. Modus Operandi
3. Staff Procedures
352
359
360
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D.
KGB Activities.
361
1. Operations Against Americans
+
361
2. Tabulation of American Leads
363
a;
Successful Recruitment Approaches
363
b. Development Operations
379
C.
Unsuccessful Approaches
398
a.
Investigations
402
3.
Selected Cases of Recruited Americans
411
a. "SASHA"
411
(i)
NOSENKO's Information on the
Agent
411
(ii)
NOSENKO's Sourcing
412
(iii) GOLITSYN's Lead to "SASHA"
412b
b.
"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)
413
(i)
Introduction
413
(ii) NOSENKO's Information 1962
-
413
(iii) NOSENKO's Information
-
1964
416
(iv) NOSENKO's Sourcing
419
(v)
Results of Investigations
419
C.
KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee
JOHNSON)
427
(i)
Introduction
427
(ii)
The Lead from NOSENKO
428
(iii)
NOSENKO's Sourcing
433
(iv)
JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH
436
:
(v)
Information from Other Sources
437
(a) JOHNSON's Statements
440
(b) MINTKENBAUGH's Statements
450
(c) Hedwig JOHNSON's Statements
457
(d) Mental Condition of Hedwig
JOHNSON
459
(e) Soviet Concern about Mrs.
JOHNSON's Illness
460
10
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ཡ ཡ ཡསཙྩནྡྷོ ན སྶ ཛྫ
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Lo
Page
(vi) Damage by JOHNSON to U.S.
461
Interests
4.
Unsuccessful Approaches to U.S. Citizens
463
a. The HARMSTONE Case
463
(i)
Introduction
463
(ii)
Information from NOS ENKO
464
(iii)
Information from Other Sources
465
b.
Edward Ellis SMITH
468
(:)
Information from NOSENKO
468
(ii) Information from GOLITSYN
463
(iii)
Information from SMITH
469
C.
The BINDER Case
470
(i)
Information from NOSENKO
470
(ii) Information from BINDER
470
- 5. Operations Involving Other Westerners
474
a.
Tabulation
474
(1)
Introduction
474
(ii) Agent Leads
475
(a)
Afghanistan (1)
475
10)
Argentina (2)
475
(c)
Australia (1)
476
(a)
Austria (3)
476
(e)
Belgium (6)
477
(£)
Brazil (2)
479
(g) Canada (5)
479
(h)
Egypt (1)
481
(i) Finland (9)
481
..j) France (9)
483
(k)
Germany (9)
486
(1)
Greece (1)
487
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(m) India (2)
488
(n)
Indonesia (1)
488
(0)
Iran (1)
488
(p)
Israel (2)
489
(q)
Italy (6)
490
(r)
Japan (8)
491
(s)
Mexico (2)
493
(+)
The Netherlands (2)
494
(u)
Norway (1)
494
(v)
Peru (1)
495
(w) Sweden (3)
495
(x)
Switzerland (2)
496
(y) Tunisia (1)
496
(z) United Kingdom (7)
496
(aa) Uruguay (1)
498
(bb) Venezuela (1)
498
(iii)
Investigations and Development
499
Cases
b.
The VASSALL Case
503
(i)
Information from NOSENKO
503
(ii) Information from GOLITSYN
505
(iii)
Information from VASSALL
507
C.
The Illegal
509
(i)
Introduction
509
(ii)
Information from NOSENKO
510
(iii) Activities in Germany
510
(iv)
Operation in Canada
512
The BELITSKIY Operation
517
8.
Introduction
b.
(1)
517
information from NOSENKO
517
Statements in 1962
517
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(ii) Statements in 1964
(iii) BELITSKIY Photograph
520
521
C.
Information from Other Sources
522
7.
KGB Investigations
530
a.
Compromise of POPOV
530
(i)
Introduction
530
(ii)
CIA Operation with POPOV
530
(iii)
Cause and Date of Compromise
532
(a)
Information from NOS ENKO
532
SENGITIVE
SOURCE
(b)
Information from
532
(c)
Infromation from the
533
CHEREPANOV Papers
(a)
Information from GOLITSYN
533
b.
Compromise of PENKOVSKIY
535
(i)
Introduction
535
(ii)
Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Case
535
(iii)
Statements by NOSENKO
536
(a)
536
(b)
Reports on the Compromise
538
(iv)
Information from,
(v)
(vi) Information from
(vii) Information from
Information from SENSITIVE
544
SOURCE
SENSITIVE
544
SOURCE
545 Source
SOURCE
545
(viii) Information from
546
(ix)
Information from Official KGB
Report
546
(x)
Information from WYNNE
546
C.
Compromise of CHEREPANOV
548
(i)
Introduction
548
(ii) Earlier Information on CHEREPANOV
548
(111) Reports by Americans
553
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(iv) Information from NOSENKO
554
COURCE
(v)
Information from
557
(vi) Information from a sensitive
BASFLAK source
(vii) Information from IS REDE
559 tree
561
(vili) Information from sensitive
561 SOURC
(ix) Contents of CHEREPANOV Package
561
(x)
NOSENKO's Comments on the
CHEREPAROV Papers
565
a.
Reports on KAZAN-KCMAREK
569
(i)
Introduction
569
(ii)
Statement by NOSENKO
569
(iii)
Statement by
569
e.
Alfred SLEFINGER:
Suspected Source of
571
the FBI
(i)
Introduction
(i)
NOSENKO's Information
SENSITIVE SOURCE
(iii)
Information
571
571
572
(iv) SLESINGER's Information.
573
8.
Technical Penetrations of the West German
574
Embassy
a.
Introduction
574
b.
Information from NOSENKO
576
C.
The
578
d. Evidence of Technical Penetration
580
9.
Cryptologic Successes Against the U.S.
Embassy
583
a.
Introduction
583
b.
Information from NOSENKO
585
(i) Breaking U.S. Ciphers
585
(ii). Handling Deciphered Cables
587
(iii)
U.S. Evaluations
Methods of Cryptologic Attack.
588
591
(i).
NSA Report
591
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Pace
(ii) USIB Security Committee Report
593
E.
NOSENKO and COLITSYN
594
1.
Introduction
594
2. Background Information on GOLITSYNI
594
3.
GOLITSYN Leads and Information from NOSENKO
595
a.
Microphones in the U.S. Embassy
595
b.
Other Leads Corroborated by NOSENKO
596
C.
Leads Conflicting with NOSENKO Reports
597
d.
Leads to Operations Against U.S. Embassy
Not Covered by NOSENKO
597
4. NOSENKO's Information on GOLITSYN
599
F.
Surveillance of Soviets in the United States
600
1. Information from NOSENKO
600
2.
Information from Other Sources
601
a.
GOLITSYN
601
b.
W sensitive source
602
C.
CHEREPANOV Document
602
VII.
SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO
603
A.
Opinions on Intelligence and Personality
603
1.
Graphological Analysis
603
2.
Reports by Psychologist
605
a.
Psychological Testing Results
605
b. Alternative Psychological Explanations
609
C.
Psychological Interrogation
611
3.
Report by Psychiatrist
613
B.
Views of Intelligence Personnel
615
1.
Statement by DERYABIN
615
a. Introduction
615
b.
DERYABIN's Comments
616
2. Remarks by CIA Handlers
625
Introduction
625
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15
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b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings
626
C.
NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrogation
627
(1)
Introduction
627
(11) Manner of Recounting Events
627
(iii) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other
Defenses
628
630
1
630
d.
Additional Observations
(i)
(ii)
Inquisitiveness about CIA
Acceptance of Contrary Information 631
from Other Sources
e.
Discussions with NOSENKO about his own
Performance
631
c.
Polygraph Testing
632
1. Test in April 1964
632
2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD
638
a.
Introduction
638
b.
Results
638
16
:
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VIII.
NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES:
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
642
642
A.
Introduction
B.
Evaluation of Production
643
643
1.
Introduction
2.
KGB Organization, Personalities, Methods
644
3.
Operational Leads
645
645
a.
Introduction
b.
Operations Involving Americans
646
(i)
Completeness, Accurary, Detail and
Consistency of Reporting
647
(ii)
Damage to the Soviets
650
(iii)
Importance or Usefulness
652
C.
Operations Involving Other Westerners
654
(i)
Introduction
654
654
(ii)
Discussion
4.
Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassy
657
657
a.
Introduction
657
b.
Discussion
659
c.
Remarks
660
5.
The BELITSKIY Case
660
a. Introduction
660
b. Discussion
661
C.
Remarks
663
6.
KGB Investigations
a.
Compromise of POPOV
663
(i)
Introduction
663
(ii)
Discussion
663
སཱ ཙ ཙ ཙ རིནཾ ཨུ ཏཾ, ' སཱམཱ, ཙྩ བྷ'
(iii)
Remarks
665
Compromise of PENKOVSKIY
666
(i)
Introduction
.666
(ii)
Discussion
666
(iii)
Remarks
669
Compromise of CHEREPANOV
570
(i)
Introduction
670
(ii)
The Operational Plan in Draft
670
(iii)
The Summary on LANGELLE
672
674
(iv)
Remarks
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C.
Evaluation of Sourcing
1.
Introduction
2. Discussion
675
675
675
2.
3. Remarks
D.
1.
Introduction
2. Naval GRU Service
Introduction
677
Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career
678
678
679
679
3.
b. Discussion
C. Remarks
Entry into the KGB
a.
Eligibility
b. Date of Entry
679
681
683
683
683
C.
Circumstances of Entry
684
d.
Remarks
685
4.
Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section
686
a.
Introduction
685
b. Work Against American Correspondents
686
C. Work Against Army Attaches
686
d.
Additional Reporting
e.
Remarks
5.
a.
690
690
Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960)
692
Introduction
692
b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958)
692
(i)
General
692
(ii)
The BURGI Case
693
C. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section
695
a. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent
695
Personnel
Knowledge of Section's Activities
695
(i)
BLAKE
695
(ii)
GOLITSYN Document
696
.(iii)
Tourist Agents
696
E.
NOSENKO's Tourist Paper
697
The OSWALD Case
697
FOD SECRET 18
HOSENKO's Operational Activities (1958-1959)
698
(i)
General
638
(ii)
The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
698
(iii)
Homosexual Entrapment Operations
699
(iv)
The Agent FRIPPEL
700
i.
Remarks
702
6.
U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961)
705
3.
Introduction
705
b.
Entry into the Section
705
C.
Punctions as Deputy Chief
706
a.
Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief
707
C.
Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical
709
Security
f.
Knowledgeability about American intelligence
709
Personnel
G.
Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Ope .tions 709
(1)
The STORSBERG Case
711
(ii)
The JENNER Case
713
(111)
The GARLAND Case
714
(iv)
The MCRONE Case
715
(v)
The KEYSERS Case
717
(vi)
Other Code Clerk Cases
718
h.
Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN
720
i.
Reporting on ABIDIAN's Visit to the Pushkin
Street Dead Drop
722
j.
Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache 725
Operations
k.
TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case
The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY
1.
Personal Handling of Agents
(i)
YEFREMOV and VOLKOV
(ii)
PRIPPEL
(iii)
DMITRIYEV
(iv)
RYTOVA
(v)
LEVINA
(vi)
Johan PREISFREUND
(vii)
Transfer to the Tourist Department
19
72€
727
7.29
729
729
729
729
729
730
731

14-00000
a.
Tourist Department 11962-1964)
Introduction
733
b. Absences from Moscow
733
C.
Personal Participation in Operations
734
(i)
The W.E. JOHNSON Provocation
734
(ii)
The BARGHCORN Provocation-Arrest
735
(iii)
The Approach to BRAUNS
736
(iv)
The Arrest of KOTEN
737
d.
(i)
Agents Handled by NOSENKO
FRIPPEL
738
739
(ii)
SVENCHANSKIY
739
e.
The OSWALD Investication
740
f.
The CHEREPANOV Investigation
740
g. Remarks
741
E.
Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography
742
1. KGB Awards and Ranks
742
a.
Awards
742
b.
Ranks
742
C. Remarks
743
2.
Affiliation with Communist Party Organs
744
a. Introduction
744
b. Discussion
744
3.
C. Remarks
Schooling
a.
b. Discussion
744
746
Introduction
746
746
C. Remarks
748
F.
Appraisals of NOSENKO, His Motivation, and Other
Operational Circumstances –
749
1.
Introduction
749
2.
NOSENKO
749
3. Motivation
750
:
4.
Operational Circumstances
751
a.
Presence in Geneva (1962)
751
b. Presence in Geneva (1964)
751
14-00000
અશોક
ཝཱ ཏྟག ཡུཔཏཏཝཱདྷ ཡཎྜིཏྭཱ ཙ ཝིཀཱ
ཙཏྟཱ། ཨ༧, ཏ ཐཱཝ ཝུམྨུདྡྷ
c.
Accs to KGB Residency and Availability
d.
Timing of 1962 Contact
752
e.
Willingness to Meet CIA
753
f.
The Recall Telegram
753
g.
Remarks
753
G.
Sources Supporting NOSENKO
756
1.
Introduction
756
2.
Corretoration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career
756
3. Remarks
757
H.
Alternative Explanations
759
1. Introduction
759
2.
First Alternative
759
a.
Faulty Memory
759
b.
Selective Memory
759
C.
Embellishment.
761
d. Combination of Above
762
e.
Insanity
763
3.
Second Alternative
763
4.
Third Alternative
763
5. Remarks
764
I.
Summary of Conclusions
765
TOP SECET 21
14-00000
ILLUSTRATIONS
Photograph of NOSENKO and his father,
the Minister of Shipbuilding
Photograph of NOSENKO and NCSENKO's Family
Finnish Travel Manifests: March-April 1960
Finnish Travel Manifest: November 1960
TDY Authorization
Translation of TDY Authorization
Facing Page 11
Facing Page 43
Facing Page 194
Facing Page 197
Facing Page 319
· Facing Page 320
TOP SECRET
22
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1.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This review presents the facts and observations which bear
on the bona fides of the Soviet defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.
The highlights of NOSE:KO's biography, as he has given it to
CIA, are as follows: He was born 30 October 1927, the first son
of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, shipyard worker who in 1939 was to
become Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. After graduating in 1951
from the Institute of International Relations in Moscow, where
he specialized in international law and the English language,
NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the
Soviet Navy, serving first as a translator assigned to the intel-
ligence staff of the Seventh (Far Eastern) Fleet and then as a
senior translator and political officer at an intelligence unit
of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. In mid-March 1953, immediately
following STALIN's death, NOSENKO left the Naval GRU to become a
junior case officer in the KGB. He was assigned to the U.S.
Embassy Section of the American- Department, KGB Second Chief
Directorate, from 1953 to mid-1955. During this period he was
initially responsible for operational activity surrounding Am-
erican journalists in Moscow and later for operations against
U.S. Army Attaches at the Embassy. When transferred to the newly
organized Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate in
1955, NOSENKO had as his targets visitors to the Soviet Union
from the United States and the countries of the British Common-
wealth. Having handled a number of successful tourist opera-
tions, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the
section responsible for operations against American, British,
and Canadian nationals. Eighteen months later NOSENKO returned
to the U.S. Embassy Section as its Deputy Chief. Between January
1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activ-
ities against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and personally super-
vised operations against the Embassy Security Officer, the
Second Chief Directorate's most important counterintelligence
target at the time, and against American code clerks, collec-
tively the Directorate's most important recruitment targets.
At the end of December 1961 NOSENKO again was transferred to
the Tourist Department, this time as Chief of the American-
British-Canadian Section. Six months later he was made Deputy
Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its
First Deputy Chief.
From the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962,
NOSENKO's status has been under examination. Only now, three
years following his defection in February 1964, is a definitive
study of the bona fides question possible: the voluminous and
diverse reports by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information,
required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investiga-
tion, and evaluation. NOSENKO's own testimony, interspersed with
representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his
reports, constitutes a large part of the evidence. This review
also draws upon statements and actions by other Soviets, colla-
tions with materials from other sources, and opinions by special-
ists of various kinds. These factual elements are presented
without comment or interpretation, except in the penultimate
section of the review where the evidence on the bona fides of
NOSENKO is evaluated and analyzed.
TOP SECRET
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2.
This review is presented in the following format:
Part II:
Part III:
Part IV:
Part V:
Part VI:
Part VII:
Part VIII:
Part IX:
A summary of developments in the NOSENKO case from
1962 to the present, including his clandestine
meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent
debriefings and interrogations.
-
A discussion of the operational circumstances of
NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection
two years later. Included is discussion of CIA's
information concerning NOSENKO prior to his first
contact in Geneva, NOSENKO's explanation of the
reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964,
NOSENKO's motivations first for establishing clandes-
tine contact with American Intelligence and later for
defecting to the United States, NOSENKO's pattern of
activity in Geneva in 1962 and 1954, and the reactions
of the Soviets, both official and unofficial, to the
defection,
The non-KGB aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before
and after he joined Soviet State Security Service,
as he described them and as others have reported them.
The positions and responsibilities of NOSENKO in the
KGB, the operations with which he was associated,
his travels abroad the awards and promotions which
he received and other Soviet sources' statements
on these points.
NOSENKO s production, especially in counterintelli-
gence matters not discussed in the preceding section.
Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads
are summarized.
Specialists assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA
graphologist who studied his handwriting; by the
CIA psychologist and psychiatrist who examined him;
by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA
case officers who handled him; and by the CIA poly-
graph operator who tested him.
Interpretation of the evidence and conclusions about
the bona fides of NOSENKO.
The implications of the conclusions in Part VIII for
certain other sources,
There are several sources currently or formerly associated
with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred
to in this review. They include the following:
Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who
defected in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December
1961.
sensitive source
sensitive source
TOP SECRET
14-00000
20.
Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a KGB officer
whose case is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.
source
ས་བ ོན་མ་
former
Directorate.
agent of the KGB Second Chiff
All pertinent material received by CIA prior to 15 January
1967 has been taken into account in this review of NOSENKO'S
bona fides.
TOP SECRET
14-00000
II.
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Introduction
From the CIA side, the NOSENKO case can be divided into
three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second
Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection
handling of NOSENKO from February 1964 to date. The rest of.
Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly.
B.
First Geneva Phase (June 1962)
The NOSENKO case opened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of
the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Dis-
armament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him
by sight from conference meetings, approached U.S. Foreign Ser-
vice Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get to-
gether for a talk the following day. In the late afternoon of
6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he
would like to talk to him privately as soon as possible. He
told MARK that he was "not going to pump him for information,
but simply wanted to tell him some things. A luncheon meeting
was arranged for 9 June, although the Soviet clearly preferred
an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explain-
ing that he thought the approach so unusual that it might be
an offer of cooperation or defection. He said he believed the
Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet
delegation to the arms talks.
H
At the 9 June luncheon with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that
he, NOSENKO, was a KGB counterintelligence officer sent to
Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew
that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he was
connected with American Intelligence.* He needed approximately
900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which
he squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered
for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American
Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former
U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent and, as of
1962, was "near ciphers" in the Washington area; the second was
the identity of a Soviet in Moscow who, although ostensibly a
CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Al-
though NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale
of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me
alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in
Moscow, but I come out about once a year. NOSENKO also gave
MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and profes-
sional past. MARK explained that although he was not an intel-
ligence officer, he could place NOSENKO in contact with the
Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.
"
MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that
evening, and a three-hour meeting followed at a CIA safehouse in
Geneva. Describing himself as a KGB Major experienced in opera-
tions against the American Embassy in Moscow and against tourists
and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA
Another Soviet source,
has also reported that the
KGB suspected MARK to be an American Intelligence officer;
although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a num-
ber of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while
stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
* મનમ
TOP SECHET
14-00000
TPTP
གནུགར།
officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to
sell two items of information. He said that the need for money
was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the en-
suing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the
Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, never-
theless, that he had no intention of becoming an American agent--
this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would
have no further contact with CIA,
Despite this original reticence, NOSENKO supplied consider-
able biographic information on himself and also discussed in
general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB
He understood,
organization and operational methods in Moscow,
as he had told MARK earlier in the day. that CIA would want more
information than the two items which he originally offered, and
he agreed to meet again two days later.
NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva
in June 1962. always in the same safehouse. With the second
meeting on 11 June. his initial reservations disappeared almost
entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organi-
zation and operations. most of his information being concerned
with the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for counterintel-
ligence and security within the USSR. NOSENKO seemed to be what
he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with
knowledge of important KGB operations,
NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to
do everything within the limits imposed by personal security con-
siderations to collect information of interest; the areas of CIA
interest had been outlined to him, The only restrictions he
placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit
operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request
that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence
to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA. via an address he was
given, when he came to the West again,
C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964).
NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet delegation to a later ses-
sion of the Disarmament Conference (one having gone by in the
interim without his participation), arriving in Geneva on
19 January 1964. The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accom-
modation address announcing his presence. At the first of the
new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had
decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his
continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that
he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the
West in the foreseeable future. Although he implied that he
wanted to defect as soon as possible. he agreed to remain in
place in Geneva for at least two or three weeks while arrange-
ments for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO
had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in
scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity collected in the
18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings
were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, yary-
ing in length from one and a half to six hours.
D.
Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)
On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively
selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that a cable had
been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate re-
turn to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to
TUP SECRET
14-00000
the Soviet Union. Exfiltration plans were then implemented,
and WOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same
night. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The de-
cision was reached on 11 February to bring. NOSENKO to the
United States, and in the early evening of 12 February he and
his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft,
thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.
At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO
met on 14 February with representatives of their respective
Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of
his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no
desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions
of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and
rights as a citizen of the USSR.
CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 Febru-
ary, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of
the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a
marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and
uncooperative, refusing to answer some of the questions of his
debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife in Washington and
nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior,
and disputes with his security escort. He explained these
actions by saying that he was under great tension as a result of
his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the
disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against
this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vaca-
tion. On 12 Marcn, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a
CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week
vacation in Hawaii. There his behavior deterioriated still fur-
ther: He drank heavily and almost constantly; he engaged in
sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude
in public places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on
one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant
tip).
During NOSENKO's absence, consultations were held with
the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements
and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would
bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police
arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were be-
coming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Govern-
ment, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The
FBI on 1 April said it would "not interpose objection" to the
CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting
Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House
were also notified of the CIA plan at this time.
In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another.
safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only for a poly-
graph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a rou-
tine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he
See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this
cable.
107 SHAY
3!
14-00000
*L*****! 6* **** ༣༧༦
༥
༈ecemnytymv
6.
"reacted significantly" to questions concerning his intentions
in defecting to the United States and other related matters.
He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which
Since this
thenceforward was his regular place of residence.
time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been
under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to
news media.
Detailed interrogation of NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964
in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to
give in debriefings, and to clarify contradictions in what he
had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was termi-
nated on 24 April 1964.
Despite the searching nature of the questions and the im-
plicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved him-
self willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to
him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of
his bona fides had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation
was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were intro-
duced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile man-
The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-Novem-
ber 1964.
ner.
After further consultations with the FBI, a new round of
NOSENKO was
hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965.
questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interro-
gators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three
men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous re-
ports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had
been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in
his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been
basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States
This interro-
solely for the reasons he had originally given.
gation was broken off on 5 March 1965.
Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964
and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated
on the period of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section
of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from
January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting
this particular period were the comparatively large amount of
collateral information available against which NOSENKO's state-
ments could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and
its personnel as the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate
targets; their importance from the standpoint of American
security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the acti-
vities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its
Deputy Chief.
In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in
February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-
called "protocols," most of which concern the period of his
claimed service in the American Department. These were written
by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate
See Part VII.C. for a further discussion of the polygraph.
tests.

14-00000
གས་
7.
NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific sub-
jects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as
documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled
and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning
particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each
protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indi-
cate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was
allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any
(Amendments were
questions and make any changes that he wished.
entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.)
NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing
the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there
He
and whether there were any more changes he wished to make.
was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and
" at the end of
understood this report and certify it as correct,
'
the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later,
he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two
of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such
a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do
80,
he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presenta-
tion which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the
use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965:
"My life story is absolutely correct. Anything I have signed
is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing
when I am signing any paper.
This is an official document, and
I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being abso-
lutely correct.
"
In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail
on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the
KGB, in an attempt to gain additional insights into his charac-
ter and personality.
3
cer.
Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 14 August
1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB offi-
These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian,
were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience
in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's per-
sonal and professional background.
There were no further debriefings or interrogations until
18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the
case of Lee Harvey OSWALD.
During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for
seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his
identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB opera-
tions. Questioning was in both Russian and English.
TOP 8
14-00000
A.
OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva
NOSENKO's name first came to the attention of CIA in October
1960 when he applied at the American Embassy in Moscow for a visa
to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delega-
tion. The following month CIA obtained copies of his passport
photograph at two separate points on his TDY route to Cuba.
There was no indication of intelligence affiliation, and when
NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in
Geneva in March 1962. he was accorded no more than the interest
routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets
travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but
before establishing contact with CIA, NOSENKO was involved in
at least two incidents which brought him to the special notice
of the British, Swiss, American, and possibly the West German
services.
The first of these occurred in April 1962. At a cocktail
party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female secretary employed by the
British Foreign Office. He saw her several days later in the
corridors of the Palais des Nations and asked her to have dinner
with him, and a date was made for several evenings later. Ac-
cording to the secretary's later account as reported by her
superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia,
and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally
amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a
desert island." The girl felt that NOSENKO probably was not
interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be
genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO
she was able to report that "he had been in submarines during
the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of
Commander. He was a member of the Communist Party. His father
was in the Ministry of Shipping. He himself had served in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 and had apparently
visited England but had not been stationed there." NOSENKO
also told her that he was acquainted with
of the
3 publishing house in London. ** When NOSENKO became too
persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact
to her superiors, was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland,
and later resigned from the Foreign Office.
This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention
of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without
details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.
*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) con-
cerning recruitment approaches to Americans in Moscow prior to
his first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these re-
ports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. The name
NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports.
:
was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip
to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the alias NIKOLAYEV in his
contacts with and, in CIA debriefings, gave this as the
reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips
he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO
by true name. (See Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of
14-00000
Recording to this reporty after a time it became evident th
NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in
information to which she had access in the course of her duties."
A official in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely
tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain
"disarmament secrets" from her.
At his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, NOSENKO
described the same incident, in the context of reporting a pos-
"I decided
able KGB penetration of British counterintelligence:
And this had nothing
to try to take this English girl to bed.
to do with work. No, it was simply (sex)... And Yurka [Yuriy
GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneval said to me:
'Listen, Yura. Be careful, because we have people even in
British counterintelligence. NOSENKO described the incident
as follows:
1 "
a
"After I had been here a week or two there was
reception for members of the delegation and at it I saw
a certain English girl. Then RUSK gave a reception and she
was there again. I came to the reception, she saw me,
and I went up to her. She said that it was very nice to
make my acquaintance, and that's all. M.S. ROGOV (TSYMBAL)
was there. He said to me: 'Yura, it looks to me like you
are going to bed with that girl.' I answered: 'What do
you mean, Mikhail Stepanovich? She just interests me.'
I had already decided to try to get her in Red...But,
listen further. After this she used to go to the Disarma-
ment Conferences. Well, to make it short, I asked this
girl for a date. She is Scottish, Scottish, not English,
and works in an office here. We agreed to reet at a
restaurant. I asked my friends which restaurant here is
We went to the restau-
the best, where there isn't a crowd.
rant and sat there all evening--all alone. There were just
the two of us. The restaurant is under the ground and is
called 'Day and Night' in Russian, *Jour et Nuit.
We
sat there and then she asked me where we could reet again.
A day later we met again. Again in the restaurant and then
we took a walk. She got me bothered and then gave me the
brush-off. I called her once. She wasn't at home. I
called again. Again she was out. I called a third time.
She wasn't there. She thought that I was an intelligence
officer and that I was interested in her for this reason.
This, honestly, wasn't so. I had only one thing in mind.
She was quite a woman... But the English girl felt that
she was being developed. I met three times with her.
Three times we were at the restaurant and she told them
She
Ther superiors] this. She knew that I am Russian.
told them this and they [NOSENKO whistled, apparently sig-
nifying that they terminated the relationship) at once.
She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from
the very beginning. In short, I told her a lot of things--
Well, we were
well, you know--so to get her into bed.
'How about going
walking on the quay and I said to her:
up to your place?' she answered: 'I can't.' 'Why?' I
She
said, 'I'll take off my shoes and come on tiptoe.
answered: 'Is it possible for me to come to you?'
said: 'You can't come to my place. There would be a
knock on the door at once. The Swiss would tell the
Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.
So all I could do was have her next to the parapet.
the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but
I
But
TOP SECRET
14-00000
she is no longer here. She got into trouble and I fes
sorry for her because maybe they have fired her. Because
they--the Foreign Office--keep only... Speaking honestly,
as a human being, I am concerned that they might fire.
her. Because there was nothing more to it than this one
thing.'
"
The second event bringing NOSENKO to special notice occurred
at about the same time that NOSENKO established contact with
CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drove
him to contact David MARK. On 15 June 1962 (ten days after
NOSENKO approached MARK)
to the
the
permanent representative of
in Geneva, told his
host at luncheon, American Ambassador TUBBY, that two girls
from the Ba-Ta-Clan Club, a strip-tease bar in Geneva, had come
consulate apparently seeking visas. The girls
had told of two Soviets, one about 30 and the other about 40,
who had visited the club recently (no date was provided by
According to the girls, E 4 said, the
two Soviets had attempted to pass themselves off as Americans
and had spent "hundreds" of francs drinking at the club. The
name which
gave Ambassador TUBBY for one of these
Soviets "sounded like TISENKOV." From their descriptions, the
two Soviets were almost certainly NOSENKO and his friend A.K. KIS-
LOV. *
At his first meeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a week
and a half earlier he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single night
of drinking and women with KISLOV. The necessity of repaying
this money, taken from KGB operational funds, was the immediate
cause of his contact with CIA, according to NOSENKO.
ཐཱཐ ཙ, པས', ཙ, ཙྪཱ ཙ ཏཾ ཀཱཝཱ, ཙ ལོ॰ ༣ c_
*See Part III.D. for further information on KISLOV.
TOP SECRET
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1
Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva (1962 and 1964)
1. TDY in 1962
When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva for the first time on
10 March 1962, he was listed officially as a Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs "export" with the Delegation to the disarmament
talks. Early during his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962,
NOSENKO was asked to explain precisely why he had been sent out
to Geneva. He replied as follows: "Right now, I came to pro-
vide counterintelligence support to the Disarmament Delegation....
There is a special (KGB) department for delegations, a special
one, recently created. And the chief of this department is
simultaneously a deputy chief of the [Second Chief] Directorate.
He is both chief of the department and deputy chief of the
directorate so that there will be a person who can be held re-
sponsible if anything happens. Understand? The chief of the
directorate (0.M. GRIBANOV) hated to sign all sorts of recom
mendations and so on, when someone can run off in Belgium or
wherever he may be. This happened more than once, and he was
summoned before the [CPSU! Central Committee. Therefore, he
decided to create a new position. The person holding it is
simultaneously chief of the department and deputy chief of the
directorate and personally signs off on all matters concerning
exits from the USSR. This was in order to avoid being called
on the carpet...so that blame would fall not on the chief of
the directorate, but on his deputy, who is in charge of this
department and who signed off.
"This department," NOSENKO continued, "is concerned with
departures abroad, that is, it checks all Soviet citizens who
intend to travel abroad, both alone and as members of delegations.
Since GOLITSYN [defected] in Finland, we have an order that no
delegation is to be let out without an operational worker, not
a single delegation... With me it happened as follows: I was
not planning to go. They told me: 'You are going.' I said:
'I can't. I have a section. I have 15 people there, all
operating people. Am I supposed to dump them? What can I do?'
'No, you are going, was the reply. 'And what did the chief
order?' I asked. The chief [NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV
when he spoke of the "chief".) said: 'GROMYKO is going this
time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody
on an appropriate level must go with him. Not a case officer.
not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a
section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department
chief.' Well, I was the most junior section chief. I was
called in to my chief, my immediate chief, who is concerned
with the Seventh Department. They had told him that it would
be for a month and on this basis he gave me permission.
I have been here since 10 March."
And
Later during this second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that
in addition to his security officer functions in Geneva, he had
a special assignment to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor
to the Soviet Delegation.* SHAKHOV had been noted in contact
*CIA records show that SHAKHOV has served in and visited the
United States on numerous occasions since 1942, when he was
assigned at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He
14-00000
with David MARK, believed by the KGB to be a CIA officer;
NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that
SHAKHOV might be an American agent. NOSENKO described the
He
various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva.
first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications
that he passed it on to American contacts. Next, SHAKHOV was
told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by
NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers
checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans
about the meeting. Finally, NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the
location of a KGB "dead drop" and checked back five days later
to see whether the specially prepared materials which had been
placed in it had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's con-
clusion from all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was ab-
solutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report
this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters.
On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOV had
previously served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the
United States and that during this period he acted as an agent-
recruiter for the KGB. In 1966 NOSENKO named one person whom
SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United States,
SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO, was not and never
had been a KGB officer. Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to
travel abroad when he was suspected of being an American agent,
NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips
abroad. "There was no proof, only suspicions," and furthermore,
SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the
Soviet Delegation, S.K. TSARAPKIN.
NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to
Geneva during the February 1965 interrogations.
His answers
were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as
being correct on 26 February 1965. The protocol states:
"GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva
in 1962. I think that the fitness report written about me for
this trip was signed by [F.D.] BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy
Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the
Seventh Tourist] Department. I did not personally discuss
this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow. My
candidacy for this assignment was supported by [S.G.] BANNIKOV,
the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who super-
vised the work of the Eleventh (Soviet Delegations Department
which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV. BANNIKOV was
concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on
attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San
Francisco, the 1955 Paris Summit Conference, and many disarmament
conferences over the years, and he has attended a number of ses-
sions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV arrived
in New York as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963.
The Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that.
SHAKHOV's face is familiar to them; RASTVOROV identified him as
an MVD officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in
Moscow; and
Identified him as an "employee of the
☐ said that SHAKHOV is "clean, a
'pure diplomat'" and that, to his knowledge, SHAKHOV was not en-
gaged in any Soviet intelligence activity at that time.
KGB."
,
\however,
*For further particulars on
Part VI.D.6.
sensitive source.
see
TOP SEOPER
sensi
SON
14-00000
13.
this trip because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of possibly being.
When the Eleventh
a Western agent, was to be in the delegation.
Department was looking for a case officer to make this trip
they wanted to have a chief of section 
because of the 
serious-
ness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked 
in the Seventh
Department (V.D.) CHELNOKOV agreed that I should 
take the 
as-
signment. There was no background or neighborhood investigation
conducted on me in connection with my being approved 
for this
trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh 
Department
,
by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief 
Directorate, by
the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the 
Central
Committee of the CPSU."
NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this
trip immediately after assuming the duties of 
the Chief of 
the
American Tourist Section, on the eve of the 
tourist season,
He explained 
that it
and at a time when he had no deputy.
was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and
CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided 
to let him 
go
as a "treat."
a member
During interrogations of October 1966 NOSENKO was ques-
tioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security
officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily
know the identity of all other KGB officers serving 
with the
There 
were only,
Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva.
besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S.
TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively
identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers:
A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington and in Moscow in 
what
appears to have been KGB operational activity; 
V.G. 
FILATOV, who
served as an alternate handler in the KGB 
operation with the
NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY,
of the permanent Soviet Delegation who handled a
.
NOSENKO included
double agent during this same conference
.)
GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962
and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by 
an 
offi-
cer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department 
of
the Second Chief Directorate. KISLOV, according 
to 
NOSENKO,
was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria-Germany-
Scandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief 
Directorate
and was used in operations against the West German 
Embassy
there. NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a 
KGB 
operational
contact during his earlier tour in the United States but 
was
He characterized FILA-
neither then nor later a KGB officer.
TOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, official and stated that
he is "definitely not an intelligence officer."
NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations
After saying on the morning
on his investigation of SHAKHOV..
of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the
NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a per-
manent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive 
drink-
ing. (See Part V.E.4.a)
TOP GREET
14-00000**
"Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate that the SHAKHOV“
investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva
in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to
check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV. You can't
separate these tasks."
In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the
suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from earlier inves-
tigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He
said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations De-
partment of the Second Chief Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had
conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but
SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him.
Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided
to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and
NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up.'
་
་ Before leaving Mos-
cow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV
case with SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Dele-
gations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he
also read various materials on the case, including an investi-
gative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these
preparations provided the basis for the questioning which
followed:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?
He was working with different delegations at
different conferences and, being in Geneva,
it was noticed that there was something which
can be described as a connection with David
MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also,
little, little, little things before.
When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did
it begin?
In '60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK.
I don't remember who reported it. The report
was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was
known to the Second Chief Directorate as the
Rezident [CIA Chief of Station) in Moscow.
After Moscow he went to Geneva, and it was con-
sidered he must be the Rezident in Geneva.
All the KGB officers going there were told to
pay attention to him.
Question:
What about the report?
NOSENKO:
Maybe the officers saw the two going to the
toilet. Maybe there was a contact. The file
said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry
He
*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow,
although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA.
had no CIA missions in Geneva in 1962. Within the context of
discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October
1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to be
present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was
the only one he cited.
TSP OPGET
བྷཱཏུ!!!༧༤+ #s!
14-00000
3
2. The 1964 TDY
out measures to check... There were many little,
little things. MARK maybe turned his head a
certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.)
GOLUBEV, formerly of the Fourteenth (Counterin-
telligence Department, was in the Soviet Delo-
gation with SHAKHOV.* He noticed little details.
When the officers in the United States decided
to terminate SHAKHOV (as an agent), they wrote
a report on him which said he was liking life
in the U.S.--American products, money. He was.
pictured as not good and, in addition, he was
not wanting to work as an agent.
NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was
also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Dis-
armament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer
for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again
he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSENKO reported that
he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal
number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was
instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEV, an inter-
preter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 and 1961 and who,
the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself.
Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities
were general in nature.
NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations
how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on
26 February 1965 states: "GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to
do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The fitness report
on me for this trip was signed by [F.D.) BOBKOV. For the 1964
trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the
CPSU was required for me or for any other members of the dele-
gation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was my own
personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the
question with [V.D.] CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received
his agreement. I had also talked about this with [M. V. ]
KHLOBUSTOV) and (G.) PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations
Department]. After it had been decided that I would go, in
about the beginning of January 1964, (N.T.] ZHARIKOV, the Chief
of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be
required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and
[A.G.] KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's
immediate supervisor] supported me for the assignment as a
personal favor to me." With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge of
his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said that he
feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said,
It was
"What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go.
for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRI-
BANOV, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact,
knew anything about it.
-
tive source
*GOLUBEV was also identified by
as a First Chief Directo-
rate counterintelligence officer. According to he was
one of several KGB officers forced to leave the United States
in 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO. There is no re-
cord in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.
14-00000
r W!** ¥}p@o© p ****
☐
C.
Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO
1. Introduction
NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in
the KGB, his standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his
family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence
in 1962 and to defect to the United States in 1964. He initially
told CIA that he had been unusually successful during his ten-
year career as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest
friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the
KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO family held a high social
position, and their economic situation was "luxurious by Soviet
standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and
harmonious. He spoke with fondness and pride about his two
daughters, of his wife's tolerance and understanding, of the
companionship she gave him. He expressed love and a sense of
responsibility for his widowed mother, who heavily depended
The elder
upon him after the death of his father in 1956.
NOSENKO won his son's admiration for having worked his way up
from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of
Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO name is honored
in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been
renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has
been erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO
thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoy-
able career in the KGB.
'2.
Collaboration in 1962
At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his
reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting
with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give de-
tails on the KGB Second Chief Directorate and other operations,
and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in
1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.)
He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety
was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to American
Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency
in Geneva and his disaffection for the Soviet regime.
a.
Readiness to Report to CIA
During his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he
realized, even before talking to representatives of American
Intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two
items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more.
He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the same
day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue
took place:
NOSENKO:
Case
You see, I am not planning to be your agent...
and don't think that I am going to work with
you in Moscow. No. No...
As you have said, I am an intelligence officer
Officer: as are you. And I think that we will understand
NOSENKO:
one another.
You want to place our relationship on an agent
basis.
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14-00000
17.
Case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
Case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
Case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
Of course.
Never in my life I will go in contact (with
CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life.
I also know about Langelle and POPOV; * I know
this matter.. When it was abroad it was fine,
but when you decided to meet him in Moscow...
You want more than I came with the intention
of saying. You want to change this to a long-
term relationship. Understand me. I am now
the chief of a section. Before my departure
[from Moscow) a decision was being reached--
and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow--
I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a
department. Do you understand what this is?
Why are you telling me this?
Because I wanted to come [to CIA] only for a
business deal, to give you these two cases,
to receive money for this, and that's all.
Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come
abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps
I will give you something. God knows. But
I don't want to do this now. I don't want
to and I am not prepared within myself for this...
I am giving two interesting cases. The most
interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the
two most interesting ones. in the first of
them "ANDREY"**), I took no part. In the second
[BELITSKIY***] I took part, even here.
I want you to understand that these two matters
that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great
importance to us. But I don't have to tell you
that. You know that. But we are not going to
play like children. You know perfectly well
that it is worth every franc... What I want
to tell you is this: of course I will ask you
more, and of course 1 want to know as much as
you know.
If you refuse to answer, that's your
business.
I will tell what I am able to tell. What I
know, I will tell. Of course, you yourself
understand that there are things concerning our
internal system that I cannot report to you.
You yourself understand this.
*The compromise of the CIA source in the GRU, P.S. POPOV, is
discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.⑈
**The case of "ANDREY," the KGB cryptonym for the agent Dayle
SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.
***BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in
Part VI.D.6
14-00000
When the CIA officer said that he understood NOSENKO had
been in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, without
further prompting, gave a detailed statement of his own personal
past and his professional career. In this statement he described
his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB
and generally the functions and operating techniques of the
various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which
he had served, along with the inclusive dates of his service
in each. This account was very similar to that given MARK
earlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussed
several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the
Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University
professor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the other
an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerk.
NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.
The question of his further assistance was then raised
again: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the
Yale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agree-
ment involved only two pieces of information and ignoring the
fact that he had already given considerably more:
NOSENKO:
I have told you enough for this day, and I will
tell you only these two cases which I wanted to
tell you, and it is enough for this day.
Case
Officer:
How do you imagine that this is enough?
know that we work much the same way.
You
NOSENKO:
Yes.
Case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
Case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
You know what interests us, of course.
I know it. Today I gave only two things.
Let's meet one another (again).
Good. But let me say this: What you tell me
Is your business. I am not going to try to
bring any pressure at all...There is no argu-
'Please
ment about it. I am not going to say:
see us in Moscow. I don't want to see you
in Moscow because it's too difficult. It is
completely impossible. That's it. No more on
that subject.
.
I said to David (MARK) before meeting you that
I don't want to meet anyone anymore,
not anyone.
All right. *Agreed.
In another place. I don't know whether I will
come back here in a month or not...I personally
don't want to, either, because my wife will be
moaning at home. But I am afraid they will make
me come, because I know the delegation. I know
*Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts V.D.4.b. and V.E.3.c.,
respectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time.
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14-00000
Case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
Case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
Case
Officer:
NOSENKO:
the circumstances
They may
In that case we can meet.
You know that I would not bring any pressure.
That's something we understand because we are
both in this business. You and I are in the
same business, so you can't--
Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so
now? So that I will say something more to
you. I said: 'Let's meet again. Maybe I
will tell [more]. Now I will give you only
these two items because we have made a deal.
I will tell you about these two cases. Let's
meet again, if you insist. I understand that
you want more. Well, I will think a bit about
what I know.
That's all right.
We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must
understand me. This has not come to me simply.
I had time to think for a long time. I thought
for a long time. You see, it's very difficult
for me, very difficult for me. And after I go
it will also be very difficult for me.
But you knew that when you came. Why did you
come to us? Why to the American rezidentura
[CIA Station) and not to the British?
I came here because you are strong, strong...
You don't have to explain to me. I know what
makes me go. I told you it is hard for me.
I still need to think. That's all. But I
can no longer take a step back because the step
forward has already been taken. I won't re-
fuse if we meet before my departure.
If you
like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday
is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have
to be there with my own [people].
This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two
leads which NOSENKO had come to sell; the BELITSKIY and the
"ANDREY" cases."
As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case
officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested
that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as
it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime.
He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get
everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because
of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent re-
cord of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell
you anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you some-
thing. But not today. I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not
LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your
future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE
was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another
person was responsible for the compromise. Next time.
"
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7
or of the degree of this cooperation was never raise aga n.
"At the very start of the second meeting; on 11 June, he saidr
"I am tortured all the time by a single thought. Everything
now depends upon you, only on you. The slightest careless move
by your people and it will be the end of me. Although he
sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO
expressed his primary personal concern as being his own secu-
rity vis-a-vis the KGB.
b. Attitude Toward Defection __
•
While willing to meet with CIA representatives during
future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would
occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused to consider
defection except in circumstances where his personal security
would be endangered. His devotion to his wife and children and
the probability that the KGB would take reprisals against them
if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations behind this
refusal. (Without elaborating on the reasons, NOSENKO said on
another occasion that he would not want to leave the USSR even
on a permanent KG3 assignment and accompanied by his family.)
Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence
on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed
to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not
defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done.
c.
Motivation
NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to
contact American Intelligence because he was in trouble over
the loss of KGB operational funds, for which he had to account
prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union. His KGB
career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money,
NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was
willing to sell two items of information to MARK. The amount
needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210,
and this was the price asked for the information.
NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers
during subsequent meetings are given below:
9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NO-
SENKO asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted
to meet with American Intelligence. He then very briefly re-
peated what he had told MARK concerning the loss of his opera-
tional funds. The case officer remarked that there must be
something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not,
in fact, his main motivation: "I have been working in this
business for a long time and I know what I am doing. I have
heard more than is written (in the newspapers]. A reorganization
has been started in the USSR. In short, they have begun to do
away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy. But this is pre-
mature. Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams
and our industry is at the point of collapse because this re-
organization, this innovation, is too early. And this is not
just me, a young man, talking. I mingle with ministers, with my
father's friends, and I hear what they are saying. And how much
does a worker earn? · 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80.
And he doesn't sense any improvement (in his position) within the
total population. These are empty words only. We have exceeded
the United States in per capita production of butter and milk.
But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are
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It
ow raising the prices for butter? You know you feel this
internal resentment (nadlom), and you feel that some big mistakes
have been permitted, that management as a whole is somehow off
on the wrong track. Also, look at the serious situation in
Czechoslovakia now, in Germany--in the GDR. It is very serious..
In Poland they have just had a poor harvest. Everywhere there
they have had floods. These rains are also very seficus.
means that the system, the whole socialist system cannot (cope?--
one word on the tape cannot be distinguished here).
Do you
understand what is wrong? Faith in the future is being lost.
Why have I told you this? Because under other circumstances
perhaps I would not have come to this. So this is the reason
for what 
has happened to me. This is perhaps the incident that
drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me.
God knows."
I
11 June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself
raised the issue of motivation. His case officer had just said
that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particu-
lar request when NOSENKO said: "Speaking of respect, how can
there be respect? I don't even respect myself for what I have
done. But, but, take the press bulletin, the communique of
the Summit Conference in Moscow on various questions. Again
lies, lies, lies, to show that we have had great successes.
can't see them (the successes). No, excuse me, I know somewhat
more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work under this
system. I can see what is being done and what is not being done.
Lies, more lies. This was my mood. I say, 'How much is it pos-
sible to deceive the people, the Soviet people? How far can
you go?' Our people are very poor. It is somewhat difficult
to arouse a people such as this. If we stir ourselves up we
will know how to stand up for ourselves. But I feel for my
people. How often can you say that things will be good; how
often can you say that we have achieved big successes? Where
are they? Show me them. I can see no trace of them. This is
what I say...that there is resentment in my soul. Do you under-
stand? A terrible resentment. I love my country. You may say
that this is 
nothing. But I tell you that I cannot act like
GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROV, because I want to be there.
I want to be with my family. That's all. But I feel that not
only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are
faults throughout the entire system of socialism. What I mean
is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Po-
land, things are bad with KADAR (in Hungary), they are starving
in China. This means that there are great mistakes.
Well,
that's all. What did you want to ask me, please?"
At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money
was unimportant as a motive for a continuing relationship: "My
name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices. Understand?
It would be the end of me. I am not afraid of this. The devil
with them. Because I have had such a life. I lost my father,
everything. Why do I say this? I did not come to you simply
because I needed money. I don't need it. I came because I am
resentful inside. Do you understand this internal resentment?
I do not believe in what is being done. I do not believe in
this. Listen to me. Let me speak honestly. Have I not had the
chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man. He
had a dacha and a state-owned automobile. I have my own Volga
[automobile]. My mother was given a dacha for life. It's.
luxurious. Her apartment is enormous--150 square meters.
America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous. We
For
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Always had a lot of money, especially during the war.A salary:
of 15,000 or 20,000-plus--25,000. There was much money. She is
a rich woman. She has paintings by Ayvazovskiy, Makovskiy. Even
if she had insufficient money, she could always sell her posses-
sions. What do I want to say? That I've never wanted for money.
Never...As I said, perhaps the thing which drove me to you was not
money, but this great, great resentment.
14 June 1962: The subject of motivation was not discussed
during the third and fourth meetings with NOSENKO. As he was
about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final
session, however, NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequi-
ties existing inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for
cooperating with CIA, his basic sympathy for the American people.
NOSENKO said that he realized that the reason he had given for
coming to us, his need for money, was "not good." Before he
and his case officers parted, NOSENKO said, he wanted to em-
phasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had
"always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people."
explained that it was not the technical progress of the United
States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of
living of the American people. It was rather the openness and
directness with which the Americans whom he had met and seen
handled themselves. As examples he cited his American targets
in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in
Geneva.
He
Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situa-
tion in the USSR on a few other occasions, he did not relate
these remarks specifically to his motives for volunteering to
CIA. The above excerpts are representative of his total state-
ment on motivation during the 1962 meetings.
3.
Decision to Defect (January 1964)
On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second
Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long
and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had
decided to defect. He once again criticized the Communist regime
along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immedi-
ate motivation seemed to have nothing to do with this. NOSENKO
explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of
First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB
Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and
responsibilities of his new job, there would be few opportunities,
if any,
for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he
had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the
United States at once, leaving his family behind. • He foresaw no
possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the
USSR for the "next twenty years." NOSENKO told CIA that "the
hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, care-
fully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector,
and he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet some
ciety, no harm would come to them.
Whereas NOSENKO declared his intent to defect immediately,
the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded
him to remain in place for at least two or three weeks on the
grounds that, first, CIA would benefit much from this, and
second, arrangements for his transfer to and reception in the
United States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA
Headquarters.
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During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request
of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future
in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would
prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintel-
ligence matters because he was a specialist in this field; he
would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and
recruiting other Soviets.
"
The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively
to debriefings on the activities of the KGB Second Chief Direc-
torate. Although his impending defection was mentioned, his
reasons for taking this step were not discussed. In the mean-
time, NOSENKO's first CIA handler flew to Washington for dis-
cussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told
NOSENKO that the CIA leadership had asked why, specifically,
NOSENKO had decided to come to the United States at that time.
The answer was that NOSENKO, "after coming back and seeing that
there was no more chance to come to the West, or little more
chance, felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make
his life with the Americans. Therefore, he was going to seize
the opportunity while he had it. Asked about this, NOSENKO con-
firmed that this was his reason; and added: "I may never have
another chance, and in addition, I've had sufficient time since
our last meeting here in Geneva [1962] to weigh everything and to
consider everything." Later in this same meeting, NOSENKO again
mentioned his lack of interest in money and his feelings about
deserting his family: "I understand [that it will be difficult
to adjust to a new life in America] and know that for some time
I will be sick within. And I know that a certain period of
time must elapse before this can heal. I even spoke to you
bluntly about my [financial) security. I am absolutely un-
mercenary and have never had any appreciation for money or
wealth... My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family.
This is the most basic and most difficult spot of all. And I
know perfectly well that I must go through an illness over
this. For this the only and the best doctor is time. I don't
expect to have a new family there. Of course,
I don't know--
but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel now. I have a
strong liking for children--not only for my own, but for all
children and, losing my own, I am fully conscious how I must
suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know
one can get used to almost anything."
At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for
approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 Febru-
ary was selected for the defection.
NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not- mentioned
for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned
the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once. Ar-
riving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been or-
dered to return to Moscow the following day and, therefore, had
to leave Switzerland before morning. He stated his reasons
formally in an asylum request, written at the time:
"This decision was made by me, not now, at the
moment I write this request, but several years ago.
Having worked for many years in the KGB and knowing
more than the average Soviet citizen about the policy of
the Soviet government, about the direction which this
government has chosen to take, and about the law and
order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that
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4.
live in this country and work for the welfare of
this government.
The Letter of July 1964
The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his
motives for first contacting CIA and -låter defecting to the
United States is contained in a letter to his CIA case officer
in July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of
all those reasons and root causes which led to the decision
to leave the Soviet Union" and further explained that "every-
thing put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser
details which to a greater or lesser degree played their
role." Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this letter
"to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the
decision was born, grew, and hardened within me to completely
alter the course of my life." This letter is presented below
in its entirety. Most of the biographical and operational
details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other
parts of this paper.
"1. My life, my childhood and youth passed in
very comfortable circumstances since the position of
my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking
for anything. And the only difficult periods of my
life (before the death of my father) were:
study in
the naval schools in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad;
and the beginning of my working life, the period in
the Far East (1950-1952). The opportunity to be
always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount
of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the
car given me by my family and also my father's car,
the opportunity to travel to the South and to vaca-
tion in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth;
all this unquestionably left its mark on me and be-
came something of a habit. After the death of my
father, my successful progress in my work gave me a
higher salary, and although I did not have all that
which I had while my father was alive, still I did not
experience any serious difficulties. But already I
wanted to live still better.
"2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire
life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home
in the family--it was always pounded into my head
that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen,
etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question
his words or his deeds because everything that he
said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic.
The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it
was considered and explained that the people who
suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938,
suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937,
1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV.
even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN.
Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain
document given me by my father. This was a secret
letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the
'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all
communists but only to members and candidate members
of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this
letter which described in detail how these people,
Not
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important specialists in the field of medicine, were
brought to such a condition that they condemned them-
selves; that is, they confessed to things which had
never happened, to things which they had never done.
They were simply forced to give the evidence which was
needed by the investigators. The secret letters on
the cult of STALIN and much that I heard in the KGB
about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and
forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to
look at everything more critically. Already I no
longer had faith in all those ideas which for years
had been pressed into my head.
"3.
The new leaders (KHRUSHCHEV and Company)
used the same methods but already diluted with the
water of democracy, with playing up to the people
and attempts to convince them that a new era would
arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party
was always going to concern itself with the welfare
of the people. In fact, it was a struggle for power
and the use of all means in this struggle, even
microphones (they listened to the conversations of
BERIYA and his friends; later they listened to the
conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and
others). . KHRUSHCHEV's endless blabbing about suc-
cesses, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures
about how the USSR had passed the USA in the produc-
tion of butter and milk, when in the stores they were
available only infrequently. The endless promises
of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is
taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-
evaluate not only the events which were taking place
in the country, but already the entire ideology of
the Party, its external and internal course.
.
" 4.
The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000
to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this
popular indignation was suppressed by troops with many
casualties. This also made a deep impression on me.
When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev,
from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood
well the real relation of the workers both to the
leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same
time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat,
what they have and what they can buy with their wages.
"5.
I heard a great deal from my father about
the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the
development and the course of construction in industry,
about his complete illiteracy in engineering techno-
logy and industrial economics, about incorrect deci-
sions in regard to many industries, and this was not
only the opinion of my father, but also of other impor-
tant leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV,
VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But no one dared to
open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father
tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain deci-
sion would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff
from KHRUSHCHEV that he was profoundly shaken and in
the opinion of my mother this brought him to his ill-
ness in 1956 and his death in August 1956.
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The events in Germany and especially in
Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy
of communist ideology. What was especially important
for me was the fact that in these countries it was:
a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the
entire people who could no longer endure a regime
Here it is necessary to
imposed on them by force.
emphasize that the life of the people in these coun-
tries was much better than that of the people in the
USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czecho-
slovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live
better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).
"7.
The split of the international communist
movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed
my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory
built on sand and that it is practiced according to
the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given
stage of life and that in reality full material wel-
fare would never be enjoyed by the people but only
by the leadership and the Party and the government.
"8.
the
Working in the KGB I came to understand
much and became conscious of the contradiction between
Such
the internal and external course of the USSR.
questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons,
position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these
are used only in the interest of propaganda and as
a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by
the communist party. (I was myself present at 
the
negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the
Soviet delegation.)
"9.
My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the
true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people
live, how much they earn, how they can dress 
and 
live
on their wages, and I paid special attention 
to the
life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists,
engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the
enormous armies of unemployed in the 
countries of 
the
West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and 
the 'un-
believably difficult life' flew immediately out of
my head.
And that which I met with in my work, the
sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where
and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda
.
Many of my acquaintances--GUK, CHURANOV and 
others--
think back with great pleasure about life abroad
.
It was
I joined the Party
#10. I entered the KOMSOMOL completely without
'thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and
I became a Komsomolnik like all the others
.
different in regards to the Party:
in 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was
working in the KGB and already at that time there was
a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me.
continually insisted on this, saying that without the
Party I would never move ahead and 
would not have
success in life. But I myself understood and saw
that I would not be able to work in the 
KGB unless 
I
Was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere
else, I would truly never move ahead in 
my career
My father
"
:
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the
· མལ! ",:", ་
unless I entered the Party. But from the very be
ginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated
All the
all the Party talmudism and dogmatism.
Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially
when I became the deputy chief of the section, the
chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the
department, because then I had to speak at these
meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my
soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedi-
cated to the Party and its course.
"11.
In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks
became worse. The question of a change of climate
was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an
officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct
counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists
there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally
talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work
references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries
were already filled out, the photos had been submitted;
that is, all the formalities had been accomplished.
But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of
the KGB began to protest against my going with my
family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from
the house check made at my place of residence they
received information that I sometimes came home in
a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels
with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was neces-
sary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963
the illness has become better) and also it would
have been advantageous from the financial point of
view.
From this time on I understood that Personnel
Would not let me go abroad with my family.
as
"12. Knowing many officers in the FCD, I began
to understand that being sent abroad is entirely
determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and
success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of
the person's autobiography and complete assurance
to his limitless dedication to the Party and the
government. But not only being sent abroad but the
assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief
Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons
indicated by me and also on good relations with the
badership and good connections with workers in Central
Personnel.
"13. I lived about 11 years with my wife and our
life was not a hell. It is true that there were
quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact
that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude to-
wards my delays at work and also when I would be de-
layed with some of my friends and acquaintances after
work and would come home with a few drinks under my
belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only
the fact that they are taken care of financially until
they grow up and have received an education to some
extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the
USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial
security? After the death of my father, the family
received a large monetary allowance, plus the money
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that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc.
mother many times offered to divide all this in
three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I
suggested that we not do this before her death. And;
of course, my mother will not leave my children without
attention, and my share of the property and the money
will be given to my children.
"14. If the defections of PETROV, RASTVOROV and
DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular
thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLI"-
SYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and
a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think
very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary
to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also
great strength of will. And already I put to myself
the question, will I be able to act thus in view of
the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had
accumulated inside of me?
I
"15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before
my departure I myself of my own desire entered into
contact with you. The reason for this was the loss
of money received by me for operational expenses.
would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of
money before my departure and there was nobody to
borrow from (at this time GUK was himself in finan-
cial difficulty and at the same time he was already
preparing for his return home). To tell the truth
about the loss of the money would have meant that it
would be necessary to explain where and in what cir-
cumstances it had been lost. This would have risked
expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from
the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some
sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of
all, they might think that I had appropriated the
And this would be for me
money, that is, stolen it.
the worst of all and I would, of course, in such
event have told the truth.
"16. To tell the truth, it was only after my
return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not
immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness
And
of my contact with you and its full meaning.
although I did not give you any promises or assurances
about our continued contact in the future, I under-
stood that you sooner or later would set yourself the
task of continuing our contact. And here it was that'
weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have
indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the
decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity
and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip.
abroad.
"17.
Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some
sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could
be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period
up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which
would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment
to the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Depart-
ment in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than
before. But at the same time this assignment almost
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:
excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and fe was”
only with great difficulty that I was able to get away
for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to con-
vince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince
BOBKOV and in 1963 to convince KOVALENKO. In this I
advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the
money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which
I bought for my daughter had proven very successful
and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry
out one more series of treatments; that this trip
would not be a long one and that since I was already
the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able
to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip
would probably be my last. Of course, all this was
said at convenient moments and outside of work.
Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which
deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms
with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which
when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him
a number of presents.
"18. The publication in 1963 by the foreign press
of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the
newspaper Times it said outright that the English
learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned
about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the
leadership of the FCD, as I learned from GUK, CHURANOV,
and TARABRIN, came to the conclusion that here the
Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the
same time the FCD was not completely sure of this.
But the publication in the American press of Alsop's
articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely.
This ar-
ticle in one spot said plainly that as far as is known
the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at
From
the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB.
this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to
feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my con-
tact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the
KGB.
*19.
During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I
got a pass in the Second Department and went in order
to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough
to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself
and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort
of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how
PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his ap-
pearance and I understood that everything which had
been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person
they were trying to make him out to be (that he was
morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into
a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter.
And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling
of greater confidence in the correctness of the deci-
sion taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.
26 July 1964
Signed: Yu. NOSENKO"
TOP SECRET
Do
1.
ROSENKO'S Activities in
Introduction
The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for
meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here
in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigned
to him for these trips, his visits to the KGB Legal Residency,
Although
and his personal association with other Soviets.
NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his days and nights
in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to
do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his
freedom of movement by saying: "I can come and go as I please
almost 
the
(Ambassador) ZORIN knows who I am,
at any time.
entire delegation knows who I am, because I don't need to pre-
They know that I 
am
tend. Nobody pays any attention to me.
not a Ministry of Foreign Affailis man (at the conference
For this
sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers.
reason I can leave the conference at any time, or I do not come
CIA made no attempt
at all, and no one will say a word to me."
to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1964, and there
is no evidence from other sources confirming or disproving
NOSENKO's statements about his activities while away from the
CIA safehouse.
2.
Official Duties in Geneva
In 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the
94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as
such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the
entire delegation.* To assist him in carrying out these security
officer functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of
coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delega-
tion. In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of check-
ing on suspicions attached to one of the delegation members,
P. F. SHAKHOV** but by the time he established contact with CIA,
he said, this assignment had already been completed.
In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to
handle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet
There was no specific
delegation, as he had done in 1962.
mission such as the one concerning SHAKHOV in 1962.
NOSENKO has described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but
he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks
of other delegation members in 1962 and 1964, or that he re-
ceived any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from
the KGB cooptees who were supposed to be reporting 
to him.
Likewise, NOSENKO has not said that he prepared communications
for KGB Headquarters regarding his clandestine assignments in
Geneva.
3.
Visits to the KGB Legal Residency
Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to
the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for
more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV,
would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.
I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL also arrived with the delega-
tion in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO
contacted CIA.
303140
✰✰ SHAKHOV is discussed further in Part III.3.1.
TOP SECRET
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GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference,
and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962 NOSENKO
gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members
of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's
request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part
of the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought
together to hear NOSENKO. (In return for helping the Legal
Residency to perform counter-surveillance on several occasions,
NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the
use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry
out other private errands.)
Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily
visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO
stated that it was his close relationship with M.S. TSYMBAL*
which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal
Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. "According to
the strict rules, "NOSENKO told CIA, "an officer in a status
such as mine should not even go to the Residency. In this case
it is only because I am deputy chief of a department and GAV-
RICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than
his), and because I have such a sympathetic personal relation-
ship with TSYMBAL." He then went on to say that TSYMBAL "sort
of escorted me to the Residency. They could have simply said:
'You are here on a mission, we have our own mission, and we
have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was
not the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.
4. Association with TSYMBAL
At the second meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered
information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions
in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in
Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this
relationship.
In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship
was close, explained that it was TSYMBAL (again in Geneva at
the same time) who gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal
Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off
on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL went to Bern
and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome.
NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960
or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates
for recruitment and came across some whose background would
have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Director-
ate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament
Conference, I got to know him a little better more from the
human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for some reason.
We had met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall·
or in the dining room. He used to say: 'Stop in and see me,
and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to
hang around the Special Directorate what am I supposed to be
doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, come on, stop in.' But I
-
TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under the last-name alias
"ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the
Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate. Since
1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for
ROGOV, and GOLITSYN reported in 1961 that TSYMBAL was
Chief of the European Department, KGB First Chief
Directorate..
TOP SECRET
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In
didn't." NOSENKO also said that TSYMBAL had asked him several
times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and had
suggested that he might be assigned to the United States.
fact, NOSENKO added, he had got into some difficulty with O. M.
GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, by virtue of
TSYMBAL's efforts in 1962 to have NOSENKO transferred and his
leaving the impression with GRIBANOV that NOSENKO (who was still
in Geneva) had agreed to this action.
Questioned in April 1964 about his association with TSYMBAL,
NOSENKO stated that he met TSYMBAL for the first time several
days before their departure for Geneva. Besides saying again
that he saw TSYMBAL almost daily at the Legal Residency and
that TSYMBAL's assistance enabled him to enter the Legal Resi-
dency, NOSENKO reported that in 1962 he went out with TSYMBAL
several times a week to eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were
joined by I. S. MAYOROV, * sometimes by A. K. KISLOV (see next
section), and sometimes the two ate alone. During the 1966
interrogations, NOSENKO said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL
on a daily basis in 1962, he saw him only twice in 1964. once
when TSYMBAL travelled to Geneva from Bern for one or two days
and later when NOSENKO saw TSYMBAL off for Rome from Lausanne.
5.
Association with Other Soviets
NOSENKO said in 1962 that the other Soviets he saw most
often were A. K. KISLOV and Yu. I. GUK.** KISLOV, with NOSENKO
was one of the four members of the Soviet delegation staying
at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva, and was said to be head of the
American Section of TASS and a genuine correspondent.*** During
the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV was.
not a KGB officer and made no reference of his having any
affiliation with the KGB. NOSENKO did say, however, that he
had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double
agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY**** to use as a notional source of
information on Soviet disarmament policy; BELITSKIY was to
pass this information to his CIA contacts. NOSENKO made
numerous references to drinking and carousing with KISLOV,
specifically with regard to a night in early June when
NOSENKO was robbed of or squandered his operational funds,
which brought him to CIA - and on the night of 10 June 1962
when NOSENKC squandered 2000 Swiss francs (the money CIA had
given him) on wine and women.
In giving NOSENKO the
money to defray these personal expenses, the CIA handlers
expressed to him their concern over the dangers to his security
arising from KISLOV's knowledge of this inexplicable source of
income. NOSENKO replied that there was no need to be concerned'
since KISLOV was "too drunk to know what is going on," and in
any event he constituted no threat.
;
-
MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in
order to have operational meetings with agents.
Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of
the "ANDREY" case (see Part VI.D.3.b.). GUK was also a
friend of GOLITSYN, who reported extensively on GUK's
* career in the KG3 including his service in the United
States.
In October 1966 NOSENKO named all the Soviets living at
the Ariane, without mentioning KISLOV.
**** The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in
Part VI.D.6.
*****See Parts II.B. and II.C.2.c.
TOP SERRET
14-00000
1*1964™ NOSENKO confirmed that he had "spent much time with
KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become
very friendly. For the first time, NCSENKO reported that
KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while in the United
States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer
in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order
to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and
that after returning from Geneva KISLOV had been recruited as
a KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had
prepared.
Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his "big,
big friend" GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident
in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Resi-
dency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOS-
ENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in
Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few
drinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit infor-
mation about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO
told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the
activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer
had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to
KGB Headquarters. When questioned later in 1964 about his
relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK
well only during his 1962 TDY in Geneva.
6.
Availability for Meetings with CIA
In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed
displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon
(at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence)
until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did
take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed for three hours,
and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled
for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours.
NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim
he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours
altogether. He offered to meet again on the day of his de-
parture, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endan-
gering his security.
From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection
on 4 February, NOSENKO was met a total of 13 times, the sessions
lasting for five or six hours. He was able to come to the CIA
safehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped
at the request of the CIA handlers. By mutual consent, most
of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions
NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went
on until past midnight. 1. NOSENKO appeared to be totally at
the disposal of CIA, to be the master of his time, and to have
no other demands for his attention except for the visits to
the KGB Legal Residency, "looking in" on an occasional session
of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.
TOP SECRET
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34.
E. Timing of Defection
After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 of his decision to
defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when CIA gave
operational and administrative reasons for him to stay in
place until the middle of February. During the week that fol-
lowed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February
in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports in-
dicating that less information of value would be forthcoming
than CIA had at first thought. On 4 February, however,
NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a
conference on foreign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore
placed himself in CIA custody on that date. * Details on
the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following
paragraphs.
At the 24 January meeting the CIA case officers agreed
in principle with NOSENKO's decision to defect. NOSENKO
felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva
without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions be-
hind; he assumed that CIA could exfiltrate him from Switzer-
land to the United States. He wanted to carry out this
plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged
him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least
three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this re-
quest were:
"
The desire to get information on the local KGB
Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Dis-
armament Conference while he still had access to this
information;
•
The value of having NOSENKO present when 0.M.
GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a
曲曲
visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;*
The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's
in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the
Soviet representation in Geneva;
-
The necessity of making arrangements, accept-
able to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.
The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain
in place for a short time longer are chronicled below:
* The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the con-
ference on tourism is discussed further in Part III.F.
.
** GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources,
the sponsor of NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security.
Several
Qe sources, have reported that GRIBANOV
was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's de-.
fection (Part III.I.). NOSENKO's relationship with
GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H.
TOP SERRET
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26 January 1964: In a three-and-a-half hour meeting,
NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was
necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the
GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as
possible thereafter.
28 January 1964: NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might
not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman
SEMICHASTNYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to
travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably
have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end
of the week.
30 January 1964: At the seventh meeting of the series,
NOSENKO said that there now appeared to be little likelihood
that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.* Therefore, he
wanted to defect right away. As reasons he cited the
emotional strain of any further delay and the fact. that he
and his case officers were wasting their time working
against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worth-
while or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of
value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because
"TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will say until he
is told by Moscow the day before." The CIA handlers, however,
delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's
agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to
install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal
Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical
aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for
the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February,
because he probably would not be missed until the following
Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO
again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a
trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans.
31 January 1964: NOSENKO reported the results of his
reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with
the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone
transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he
had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building
used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the
scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain
in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers, which
he was told were enroute from Washington. He explained that
he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an
imminent move by the delegation from its hotel to the Soviet
villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would
be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had
been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer
from Moscow.
From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where
he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by
NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer. There is
no evidence that he visited Switzerland.
* See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV.
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1 February 1964: At NOSENKO's request, it was firmly
agreed that the Jelection would take place in the morning'
of 8 February. NOSENKO said that he assumed that exfil-
tration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence
His case officers .con-
by plane to the United States.*
firmed that this was correct.
3. February 1964: NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials.
The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, S February.
4 February 1964: NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safe-
house from his hotel room in the early afternoon and said:
"I want to come now and not go back." After arriving he
explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency fol.
-lowing the morning session of the Disarmament Conference,
he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately
to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the
Soviet Union.** The residency was arranging for a ticket for
NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day, and a
replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as
security officer for the Soviet Delegation in Geneva; he was
not told who the replacement would be. Before he had left
for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Govern-
ment had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign
tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a number of new
cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. SEMICHASTNYY
had now decided that it was time to call a conference to
discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the in-
creased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been
placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed
to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling
of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either
by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or
the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was
the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO,
the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a rel-
atively new man in this line of operations, having been
NOSENKO also
there only four or five years, perhaps less.
told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just be-
fore the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet
villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a
Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the
next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at
that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss
border before morning.' NOSENKO felt, however, that there
would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva
for a time following his disappearance, and that there would
be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet un-
certainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel
room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe-
house. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss
"
** See Part III.F.
TOP SECRET
N!!ཀན། ༧ལ་

14-00000
37.
authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early
on the 6th.
NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February
and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press
publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immedi-
ate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central In-
telligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as
possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February.
TOP SECRET
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33.
F..
The Recall Telegram
On arriving at the safehouse at 1515 on 4 February 1964
NOSENKO related that on the preceding day, 3 February, he had
been to the KGB Legal Pesidency during the day and again in
the evening. ("e had met with CTA from 1200 to 1800 hours
on 3 February.) He related that as of that time "everything
was quiet and peaceful," and he received four personal letters
from Moscow. NOSINKO said that on the morning of 4 February
he had again stopped in at the Residency, but "nothing was
going on. Later in the morning, however, after attending
a session of the Disarmament Conference, NOSENKO learned that
the coded telegram described above had arrived from Moscow
ordering him to returnately to Moscow to participate
in the RGL conference on tourism.
"
Special intelligence indicates, however, that no cable
traffic at all was sent from Moscow to Geneva from the late
afternoon of 3 February 1964 until the morning of 5 February,
the day after the defection. (Two priority cables of unusual
length, 247 and 207 groups, were transmitted to Geneva at
1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there was
no traffic on 4 February; and the next message passed was a
routine cable originated by Moscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.)
On 26 October 1966, while being questioned about the
circumstances of his defection, NOSENKO was asked about this
telegram which recalled him to Moscow. NOSENKO said that
there was no such telegram, and that he had invented it in
order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous
and afraid his contacts with American Intelligence in Geneva
might be noticed by Soviet authorities. After detailed
questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a
statement with the following wording.
"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in
Geneva that a telegram from KGB Headquarters in Moscow
TOP SECRET
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had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva
recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the
time that this telegram said that I was recalled
to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity
I maintained
against tourists for the 1964 season.
this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews
and interrogations by American authorities in 1964
and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No tele-
I admit that the story
gram was received in Geneva.
was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order
to hasten my defection. I was nervous and 
afraid
that my contacts with American Intelligence might be
noticed."
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G.
Soviet Official Reactions
The Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Dis-
armament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern
shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSENKO had dis-
appeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they
speculated that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in
*
a car accident. Two more days passed without Soviet authorities.
making any additional public or private statements on the 
subject
.
Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's 
de-
fection are presented below in chronological order:
8 February: A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to
Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to
Geneva, had been missing for four days.
རྙ.
9 February: Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried
reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO
had disappeared.
→
10 February: Unidentified. Soviet sources were quoted in
the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected.
A U. S. Department of State press release was issued iden-
tifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request
for political asylum in the United States.
11 February: The Department of State was advised informally
by Ambassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be
delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland,
request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.
17 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Dele-
gation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press
conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities
for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts
to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken
to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.
At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the
Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted
the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappear-
ance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in
locating NOSENKO.
The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to
1 the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to
Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately.
Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed
from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until
1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the
Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to
Moscow. Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February,
the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February.
Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine pre-
cedence, were sent to Moscow on 6 February; thereafter there
was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning
of 10 February.
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Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the
means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.
The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in
order to obtain assurance that the defection had been volun-
tary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss.
and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.
(NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same
evening.)
13 February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking
to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary.
14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned
to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read
him a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State
Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the
whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a "gross provocation
by American Intelligance organs. GROMYKO repeated the demand
for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.
The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL,
interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon.
The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled
by Minister Counselor G. M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador
DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F.
ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a
member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament
Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met him.)
NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected
of his own free will after careful consideration and that he
had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to
KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and
rights as a Soviet citizen.
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42.
H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family
Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO
called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions
between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on
the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities,
said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this
in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed dis-
belief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his
country. They sought a personal meeting with him in the United
States or anywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned
to the Embassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs.
NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in
writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future
and that of the NOSENKO children.
NOSENKO proposed to respond to his family's letters by
writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KGB
consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of
these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in
the United States and to sever all ties with his family and
homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in
the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he
would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and
tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West
by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although
NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his
wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in
Moscow on 7 April 1964.
From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives
until mid-1966, when Yurly Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet
journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the
French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would
Only once before had members of a defector's family called
at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of
Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his
wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about
him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under
KGB control.
** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet
Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-
correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited
Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965,
at the invitation of Life magazine, as a photographer for
Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to
be accompanied by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter
but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV
is believed to be identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of
1964, was employed part-time for the United Press Inter-
national correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both
NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).
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ག, ཀཞན་ས་ཀ་ པP4 4"གཤ་ ་
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like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed
that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a
"Soviet secret agent." As KOROLEV spoke only broken French
and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the
matter at that time.
On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the
Paris Match offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted
as his interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's
wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and
he submitted a one-page document in English which gave a short.
account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part:
"NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and
12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prose-
cuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defec-
tion). Very soon the wife will apply to the International
Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is
possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife
has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious
that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way
represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said
that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family in Moscow could
be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others
knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspon-
dent.*
According to information available to CIA, a divorce from
a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered
to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon
the wife's request. There is no known precedent for either
Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any
previous Soviet defection.
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SECRET
Photographs submitted to PARIS MATCH (See Part III.H.)
Subject (circa 1963)
4.15
Subject's wife, elder daughter and younger daughter (circa 1965)
SECRET
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"
"SECRET
C
Photograph of Subject from
passport used for temporary
assignments to England in
1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8)
Photograph of Subject from pass-
port used on assignment to Geneva
in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)
n
3
:
Subject (February 1964)
Subject's father, the Minister
of Shipbuilding (1953)
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44.
I.
Repercussions within the KGB
1. HIER sensitive source
sive source
According to it was the "unanimous opinion" of
the KGB leadership and of KGB officers 33
that "NOSENKO could do a tremendous amount of herm to the
KGB," and that this damage would be severe for "several-
years to come. As a direct result,
"
new
regulations were promulgated to increase KGB operational
security in Moscow and abroad.
In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal
from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and the recall of
many officers abroad
known to and presumably compromised by NOSENKO. *
Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, in
July 1964, ☑said that 15 KCB officers had already been
fired. Among them were CRIBANOV** and a number of his deputies
•
See Part V.H. regarding NOSENKO's relationship with
GRIBANOV.
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sempitive source
including one General BANNIK.* Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV's
personal friend and protege, men stated it had been decided
that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOGENKO's plans and
was therefore ultimately responsible. 1% reported further
that GRIBANOV had been dismissed from the KGB
and the Communist Party immediately after the defection, ad-
ding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENKO's 1964
trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a sum-
mary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which
contained enough" compromising material" to prevent such a
trip under normal conditions. **
3 reported.
having learned that GRIBANOV was the chief of security at
a military plant outside Moscow and is considered a "nothing."
Others dismissed from the KGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRIN,
Chief of the British Department, First Chief Directorate.****
sensitive
Sex-co
According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who sup-
ported his candidacy for the 1964 trip to Geneva; as
far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved.
Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip had
been approved by GRIBANOV.
Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with
a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the
autumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in which
GRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of the
Second Chief Directorate.
In
In 1962 NOSENKO told CIA: "GRIBANOV and I are very friendly
socially and we have often caroused together unofficially..
He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together.
Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked speci-
fically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV
after working hours. He replied that he had done so on one
occasion and that TARABRIN was present at the time.
February 1965 NOSENKO was asked the same question and this
time answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially,
most recently in October or November 1963; TARABRIN, he said,
was the only other person present on these three occasions;
all three outings began as drinking parties in Moscow res-.
taurants and the latter two ended at the homes of girls
NOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although
that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the
time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position
only until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newly
established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the
First Chief Directorate.
indicated
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ང་ ཡ,2
2.
source
told CIA in
At the time of NOSENKO's defection,
1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the
West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the
NOSE KO case and partly for other reasons not specified to
that the
One of his handlers informed
NOSENKO matter was very serious, that the KGB was on a
"major alert" as a result, and that all missions had been
halted to make readjustments.
.3.
source
In Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection,
reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S.MEDVEDEV from the
Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee* travelled to
Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet
d: legates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV under-
scored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater
vigilance against such acts.
also reported that
the defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA,
a KGB secretary in Geneva, and among the Soviets there it was
rumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad
would be transferred from their assignments in consequence of
the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the
permanent Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to
HR that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and
therefore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I. GUK
said
, who had known and reported on GUK for years, was
discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's
travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of
the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his
job. (This would be A.G. KOVALENKO who, according to NOSENKO,
was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the de-
fection.)
MEDVEDEV, a AGB officer formerly stationed in New York City,
was said
to be one of those from the CPSU Central
Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel going
abroad.
identified MEDVEDEV, then a Coun-
selor at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, as the
Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB,
"but his role is not important and he works mainly with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."
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47.
!
4. KGB Handlers of Agents
A reflection of NOSENKO's defection was seen in KGB's
handling of
the subject of a lead received from
NOSENKO and
asuble agent. *
on 31 March 1964,
was questioned by two of the KGB officers about possible sur-
veillance and was asked to provide passport photographs so
that "escape" documents could be supplied to him and his family.
At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that
was being put on reserve status for an unspecified period and
told him that this decision had been made about two months
At the
earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKO's defection).
next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet handlers admitted to
Al-
that they had "some connection" with NOSENKO.
though NOSENKO probably could not identify
agent, they said, there was a possibility that he knew "what
we (the KGB) are doing in Canada."
as a KGB
Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JOHNSON was told of
NOSENKO's defection by his KGB case officer and was instructed
to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intel-
ligence. Although the Soviet told JOHNSON that there was
nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the de-
fection, JOHNSON said.**
See Part VI.D.5.c. for full details of the
See Part VI.D.3.c. for a discussion of the JOHNSON case.
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A.
NON-KGB ASPECTS OP NOSENKO'S BIPE
Introduction
The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his own state-
ments to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated
(as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first
below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the period preceeding his
entry into the 108, then follows a summary of his statements
about his non-professional life since becoming a KGB officer, and
'Ifinally there is presented a review of what other sources have
said on these subjects. A separate section of this paper, Part V,
discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB.
B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography
Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defec-
tion furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early.
personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the prin-
cipal source on this topic. He volunteered information during
the 1962 meetings, during debriefings in early 1964, and under
interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1966. These vari-
ous accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following
table, and they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO's
birth to his alleged entry into the KCB. The first column in
the table contains statements which NOSENKO made during the June
1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts
of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NOSENKO's own
words. The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964
interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before
and during that interrogation. Most of the information given
in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO,
mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that
year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation
and from DERYABIN's interrogation in July and August has also
been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's ques-
tioning and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his state-
ments to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of
remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobiography submitted to CIA
at that time. The final column presents the results of the
October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO's early
life. From column to column appear inconsistencies and contra-
dictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO,
although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October
1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The
table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about
certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier
statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting
his life.
This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in
Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circum-
stances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has
given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.
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TOP SECRET
June 1962
"I was born in
4 Nikolayev, my father
worked as a senior
mechanic at a plant
and took evening
courses. Then he
graduated from the
Nikolayev Ship-
building Institute."
"My father was
8 sent to Leningrad,
to the Sudomekh
plant, a small
plant in Lenin-
grad. He was at
the plant for half
a year and then be-
came director.
This was 1936-1937.
Then he was sent
to the Baltic
Shipyard in Lenin-
grad as Chief En-
ganeer. He was
there less than a
year.
"
1964
Born 30 October
1927 in Nikolayev,
Ukraine, USSR, where
he lived with family
until 1934.
In 1934, at age
six, entered the
"zero" (nulevoy)
class, equivalent
to kindergarten,
in Nikolayev.
Moved to Lenin-
grad in 1935,
where father was
first appointed
chief engineer and
later director of
Sudomekh. Lived
at several ad-
dresses and at-
tended several
schools. [Note:
Soviet press
stated elder NOS
SENKO was chief
engincer of "se-
veral enterprises”
in Leningrad during
49.
1965
Born 1927 in Niko-
layev where father
was a student at the
Shipbuilding Insti-
tute. Father from
simple peasant back-
ground, while
mother's parents
were nobility.
(May)
Entered the
"zero" class in
Nikolayev in Septem-
ber 1934, two months
before his seventh
birthday.
(May)
At-
Moved to Lenin-
grad, probably in
spring of 1935.
tended three years
of school there,
completing First
Class in 1935-36,
Second Class in
1936-37, and Third
Class in 1937-38.
(May)
April 1966
"I, NOSENKO,
Yuriy Ivanovich,
was born 30 Octo-
ber 1927 in Niko-
layev, an oblast
center in the
Ukrainian Repub-
lic of Soviet
Russia."
"In September
1934, in Niko-
layev, I entered
the 'zero' class.
My father was
already in. Ienin-
grad, where he
was working at
the Sudomekh
Shipyard."
October 1966
Born 1927 in Niko❤
layev, the son of
Ivan Isidorovicn
NOSENKO and Tamara
Georgievna NOSENKO.
Lived in Leningrad
from 1935 to 1938.
"Shortly there-
after he [father)
found an apartment
and, interrupting
my studies, I
travelled to Lenin-
grad with my mother.
I did not begin
studies in the First
Class until Septem-
ber 1935 as there
were no 'zero'
classes in the Lenin-
grad schools.
I
finished the Third
Class in Leningrad
in 1938."
TOP SECRET
June 1962
*"In 1938 my
father was assigned
to Moscow as Deputy
Peoples' Commissar.
I was only a little
boy. In 1939 he
was appointed
Peoples' Commissar,
later Minister, of
the Shipbuilding
Industry and re-
1964
1935-1937; became di-
rector of Baltic
Shipyard in 1938.]
NOSENKO's father
was appointed First
Deputy to the
Peoples' Commissar
of the Shipbuilding
Industry and then
became Commissar.
Family returned to
Moscow, and NOSENKO
entered 10-year
school located on
50.
1965
In 1938 the elder
NOSENKO was named
First Deputy to the
Peoples' Commissar
of Shipbuilding and
the family returned
to Moscow.
NOSENKO
April 1966
October 1966
"In 1938 my
father was summoned
to Moscow and he be-
gan to work in the
Peoples' Commissariat
of the Shipbuilding
Industry.
Having
KERE
mained such until
Ulitsa Bol'shaya
his death in 1956."
Polyanka.
[Note:
Soviet press re-
ported that I.I.
NOSENKO became
Deputy Commissar in
1939 and Commissar
in 1940.1.
Completed the
Sixth Class at
School No. 585.
Went to Sochi with
parents for vaca-
tion and was there
when war broke out.
Returned to Moscow
the next day.
entered a school on
Bol'shaya Polyanka.
He completed the
finished the Third
Class, I moved to
Moscow with my
of the summer.
Pourth Class in 1938- mother at the end
1939 and the fifth
class in 1939-1940.
(May)
NOSENKO finished
the Sixth Class at
the 10-year school
on Bol'shaya Pol-
yanka during the
1940-1941 academic
year. Then he
travelled on vaca-
tion to Sochi,
where the family
stayed at a "rest
home" of the Coun-
cil Ministers.
Learned of war's
outbreak on the
radio while there
"In 1941 I completed
the Sixth Class at
the 585th middle
school and went to
Sochi for a vacation
with my father and
mother. On 21 June,
during our vacation
in the south, the war
began and for this
reason my parents and
I returned to Moscow
the next day."
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June 1962
1964
"I studied
first in a school
of the Navy.
There I sailed
aboard boats and
dutters." [NO
date given.]
Enrolled in
Moscow Special
Naval School, but
studies did not be-
gin in Moscow be-
cause of the war
and immediate plans
to evacuate the
school. In Sep-
tember 1941 NOSEN-
KO spent one week
digging trenches
with a group from
the school, and on
10 October he
travelled with the
rest of the school
to Kuybyshev.
There he began his
studies in the
Seventh Class.
In June 1942
completed the
Seventh Class at
the Moscow Special
Naval School in
Kuybyshev. Re-
51.
1965
and returned to
Moscow the next day
by train. (May)
Enrolled in the
Moscow Special Naval
School which was
evacuated to Kuyby-
shev, attended the
1941-42 school year
in Kuybyshev.
(May)
1942
In summer
returned from Kuy-
byshev to Moscow on
leave. While there
somehow learned
that Special Naval
School to be moved
from Kuybyshev to
Achinsk, Siberia.
Did not want to go
so far away from
home, so enrolled in
April 1966
October 1966
"In October 1941
my mother and I
were evacuated to
Chelyabinsk, where
I completed the
Seventh Class in
June 1942." (Note:
NOSENKO here added
a year to his life
which he had not
mentioned earlier.
To accommodate this
change he subtracted
a year from the
time he spent at the
Naval Preparatory
School in Baku. See
below.]
In
"
"I completed the
Seventh Class in
Chelyabinsk.
the beginning of
the summer of 1942
I moved from Chel-
yabinsk to Gor'kiy
and soon after this
returned to Moscow.
In Moscow I was ac-
cepted in the Spe-
cial Naval School
which in August
1942 was evacuated
FARK
turned to Moscow in
July with about
three other boys
from the school.
Prevailed on father
to allow transfer
to "real military
school" and enrolled Leningrad Naval Prep
in the Leningrad
School, Baku.
Spent to Kuybyshev.
There
Went to Chelya-
binsk from Moscow in
1941, after the start
of the war.
Was in Gor'kiy for
a time in the summer
of 1942.
14-00000
October 1966'
June 1962
1964
Naval Preparatory
School which had
been evacuated
from Leningrad to
Baku. Spent summer
vacation at home in
Moscow with parents.
After 3 1/2
months in Moscow,
left by train for
Baku with a group
of about 30 other
students in Octo-
ber.. The trip
lasted 14 days.
Route not recalled.
Arriving in Baku
joined Prep School
and spent about
a month in "quaran-
tine." Then as-
signed to the Ninth
Training Company,
in the Third Course,
equivalent to the
Eighth Class.
[Note: The Moscow-
Rostov railroad
line was cut by the
Germans by this
time. The only pos-
sible route at this
time would have been
a long and circuitous
one via Tashkent ]
52.
1965
summer with parents
in Moscow. (May)
Went to Baku by
train in October.
Trip took two weeks.
Spent first four to
six months in Baku
in "quarantine,"
which was similar to
American bootcamp.
Enrolled in the First
Course, equivalent
to the Eighth Class.
(May)
April 1966
I entered the Eighth
Class."
[In Kuybyshev; see
above entry.]
C
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པ་
14-000
June 1962
per
1964
Took military
oath. [Note: NO-
SENKO was 15 years
old at this time,
by law too young to
take oath. This
point stressed in
April 1964 inter-
rogations.]
Completed Third
Course (Eighth
Class) in June
1943. Took no
vacation but spent
summer working at
the school in Baku.
In September 1943
began new school
year in the Second
Course, equivalent
to Ninth Class.
53.
1965
Took military
oath at end of
"quarantine" period.
Oath administered to
make boys feel a
part of service al-
though too young.
Oath taken between
15th and 16th birth-
days, i.e., after
October 1942 and be-
fore November 1943.
NOSENKO certain he
celebrated 15th
birthday in Baku in
1942. (May)
Completed First
Course in June and
spent summer of 1943
at school. Entered
Second Course at the
Naval Prep School in
Baku in September
1943. (May)
April 1966
[Studying in
Kuybyshev. See
above entries.]
[Completed
Eighth Class in
Kuybyshev.]
"During the summer
of 1943 I returned
to Moscow on vaca-
tion. The Special
Naval School was to
be evacuated from
Kuybyshev to
Achinsk and there-
fore, not wanting
to go to Achinsk, I
enrolled in the
Naval Preparatory
School in Baku.
October 1966
"I took the mili-
tary oath in Baku. I
was 15 years old at the
time. This was in
1943."
[No month given;]
Along with 15 or
20 classmates,
NOSENKO submitted a
collective letter:
asking to be sent
Since 1942 NO-
SENKO had had an
"obsession" about
getting into the
war. Students from
"While at the
Naval Prep School
in Baku, in Octo-
ber 1943, I joined
the KOMSOMOL.
"
TOP BECHEY
14-000
June 1962
1964
to the front be-
cause they had
heard that stu-
dents at the Frunze
Higher Naval School
Request
had gone.
caused an uproar
and investigations.
Permission denied.
Joined KOMSOMOL.
54.
1965
the Frunze Higher
School had gone to
the front in 1942
and some of the
older boys at the
Prep School went in
early 1943. Fired
up, NOSENKO and
about eight others
filed a petition to
be allowed to fight.
(May)
April 1966
October 1966
[See above entry.]
inning of 1944)
In January, to-
gether with class-
mate Yura RAD-
CHENKO, NOSENKO
went to the city
military commis-
sariat in Baku to
inquire about
joining a Marine
detachment. They
were turned down
and thereupon ran
away from the Naval
Prep School. Tra-
velling by boxcar,
the two went to
Stantsiya Lazarev-
skaya via Tbilisi
and from there
walked to Tuapse in
search of the mili-
· After receiving a
scolding from school
authorities for
having submitted the
petition, NOSENKO and
several other boys
began to plot to run
away to the front.
When the time came in
early 1944 only one
other boy, RADCHENKO,
would accompany him.
The two slipped out
of school, made their
way to the railway
station, and found a
freight train heading
toward Tuapse. On
arriving in Tuapse
they were arrested
almost immediately
"I studied in Baku
only for half the
school year because
I ran away from :
school, home to Mos-
cow, in the begin-
ning of 19441”
.
The story about
going to or toward
the front was a lie,
NOSENKO said.
TOP SECRET

14-000
DATE
June 1962
April 1966
October 1966.
1964
tary front.
Ar-
riving in Tuapse,
they were arrested
and were then re-
turned to Baku under
guard. In Baku,
they managed to es-
cape again before
55.
1965
at the station, sever-
al days later they
were returned to Baku
where they managed to
escape. They then
travelled to Moscow
using false documents
and were arrested at
being returned to the: the train station on
Prep School. After arrival. (May)
hiding a few days at
the home of a girl-
friend, NOSENKO and
RADCHENKO travelled
to Moscow by train,
using forged docu-
mentation obtained
by a friend in the
Naval Prep School.
They were arrested at
the Moscow Railroad
Station by military
police who had been
alerted by authori-
ties in Baku. NO-
SENKO's father bailed
him out. [Note:
Previous accounts
varied widely. NO-
SENKO originally said
he had participated
in the battle for
Novorossiysk with his
entire class from the
"Frunze Higher Naval
School. This battle
actually took place in
September 1942. On a
later occasion, NOSENKO
TOP SECRET
14-00000-
June 1962
1965
said that he and
RADCHENKO saw com-
bat near Tuapse.]
Took Ninth Class
exams after studying
as an "external stu-
dent" at the Gorniy
Institute in Moscow.
Passed these and
through father's in-
fluence was trans-
ferred back to the
Naval Prep School,
which had just moved
back to Leningrad
from Baku. Tra-
velled to Leningrad
to join his class in
September.
Studies did not.
start at once. NO-
SENKO and others
lived in Narva and
worked in the woods.
56.
1965
April 1966
October 1966
Did not want to
return to Baku as
ashamed to face class-
mates after failure
to get to front. Re-
mained at home and
attended adult educa-
"In Moscow I
finished the Ninth
Class as an exter-
nal student at
Gorniy Institute
and at the end of
the summer of 1944...
Naval School in Len-
ingrad and travelled
there in the month
of August."
tion courses at Gorniy was enrolled in the
Institute and had
special tutors in math
and Russian grammar.
Finished Ninth Class
in spring or summer
and travelled in fall
to Leningrad to rejoin
class in Prep School.
(May)
Arriving in Lenin-
grad NOSENKO was as-
signed to a group
made up of stragglers
and was sent to the
forest near Lenin-
grad to cut wood for
the winter supply at
the school. Condi-
tions were terrible--
the work was hard and
the weather was cold,
damp, and miserable.
(May)
TOP SECRET
14-000
June 1962
TOP SECRET
1964
Studies in Tenth
Class of Naval Pre-
paratory School com-
menced in November
1944.
At the end of
April 1945, NOSENKO
was chot in the hand
at a party by a
jealous young offi-
cer and was hospita-
suing investigation
he protected the
real culprit by pre-
tending that he had
ahot himself acci-
dentally while
cleaning a gun. He
never saw the offi-
cer again.
57.
1965
About three or
four days before the
boys were to return
to Leningrad a car
was cent for NOSEN-
KO. He returned to
Leningrad to stay
in the Hotel Astoria
with his father who
was visiting with a
delegation. After
this he went back to
school, sometime in
November. (May)
April 1966
October 1966
"In the be-
ginning of 1945 I
accidentally shot
myself through the
hand and spent
Sometime in Febru-
ary or March, a fe-
male acquaintance of
an unknown Navy offi-
cer began to flirt
with NOSENKO. The of-about a month re-
lized. In the en ficer became angry, cuperating in the
drew his gun and shot Navy hospital."
NOSENKO through the
hand. The officer
was apologetic, and
NOSENKO promised not
to report the inci-
dent. The wound
grew worse, however,
and NOSENKO was forced
to enter the hospital.
Ha told the doctor
that he had accident-
ally shot himself with
a souvenir: gun. He
was hospitalized for
about three weeks.
(May)
NOSENKO shot him-
self through the hand.
This was absolutely ac-
cidental and was not
an attempt to avoid
military duty. [Note:
NOSENKO made this state-
ment in response to
that
a direct question. The
question was based on
a report from S
source
NOSENKO shot himself
to avoid being sent to
the front while at-
tending a "naval collage
in Leningrad in 1942."]
14-000
TOP SECRET
DATE
May-
June
1944
June 1962
"I finished the
Naval School, then
was in the Navy. I
fought," (boyeval--
presumably in World
War II). "In 1945
I was demobilized."
1964
While in the hos-
pital, NOSENKO ap-
plied for release
from military ser-
vice. This was as-
sisted by father's
friends. After
release from the
hospital he did not
want to return to
school. He called
his father and then
spent a week with
friends of the
family in Leningrad
before getting a
room in a dormitory
at the Leningrad
Shipbuilding Tekh-
nikum. Despite
---
58.
1965
In the hospital
NOSENKO decided he
could not return to
school as he was
ashamed of the type
of girls he had been
with the night of
the accident and
could not stand the
thought of being
made an example of
by the school KOMSO-
MOL organization.
He left the hospital
in civilian clothes
and stayed with a
friend of his father.
He obtained a state-
ment that he had
attended the Naval
failure to return to Prep School, which
As
the Naval Prep
was just a report of
School, NOSENKO was his courses and an
credited with satis- average of his marks
factory completion up to that time.
of the school year the son of a minister
(Tenth Class). In it was then easy for
June he passed the him to enter the
exams for the Second Shipbuilding Tekh-
Course at the Ship- nikum whefer, with
building Tekhnikum. special tutoring, he
He then went to the was able to complete
District Military
the Tenth Class in
Commissariat and was the summer. (May)
demobilized. He
received his mili-
tary reserve regis-
tration and a certi-
ficate of satisfac-
tory completion of
}
April 1966
"After this [hand
shooting] incident I.
did not want to go
back to the school
and began to study
at the Shipbuilding
Tekhnikum in Lenin-
grad, in the Second
Course, in order to
complete the Tenth
Class. In May or
June 1945, with the
help of the Director
of the Tekhnikum, I
received documenta-
tion certifying that
I had completed the
Second Course which
made it possible for
me to enter the In-
stitute (of Inter-
national Relations)
and I returned to my
parents in Moscow.
October 1966
A
14-0000
TE
June 1962
1964
1965
April 1966
October 1966
59.
"After the war I
went to study at
the Institute of
International Rela-
tions...In 1945 I
was demobilized.
ten year's schooling.
[Note: A biographi-.
cal statement was
drawn up on the basis
of NOSENKO's state-
ments in January-
February 1964 and ap-
proved by NOSENKO as
correct in February
1964. This state™
ment said that he com-
pleted his 10-year ed-
ucation at the Baku
school in the spring
of 1943 and thereby
became eligible to
enter a higher edu-
cational institution.
From 1943 to 1945, the
statement continued,
NOSENBO attended the
Frunze Higher Naval
School (a counterpart
of Annapolis). After
three years there,
he decided to leave
the Navy, was demobi-
lized and entered the
Institute of Interna-
tional Relations. In
October 1966, NOSENKO
said he had lied about
attending Frunze Academy.]
NOSENKO decided
he did not want to
study further at the
Shipbuilding Tekhni-
kum and returned to
Moscow where he
NOSENKO decided he
would like a career
in the foreign ser-
vice and returned to
Moscow, where he
passed the entrance
"In July 1945 I
entered the Insti-
tute of International
Relations."
ly
948
TOP SECRET
14-00000
June 1962
བཧཱ 1 ཏཱ 1:|:ཀ བྲ ག 1༧༠ ༢༠
60.
1964
passed the entrance
examinations for
the Institute of
International Re-
lations (IIR).
exam consisted only
of a composition,
dictation, and an
interview.
The
Travelled to
Germany with his
father who was
leading a delega-
tion. For the pur-
pose of the trip
only, NOSENKO was
issued a uniform
and documents
showing him to be a
senior lieutenant.
When he returned to
Moscow he continued
to pass himself off
as an officer who
had seen combat in
the war and eventu-
ally got into
trouble at the in-
stitute because of
this. Began studies
in Faculty of In-
ternational Law and
English language in
September.
1965
April 1966
October 1966
exams for the IIR.
(May)
Travelled to East
Germany in August 1945
with father's delega-
tion. Given tempo-
rary commission as
senior lieutenant for
the trip. Continued to
wear uniform on return,
even to classes at the
institute. Entered in-
stitute on return from
Germany and chose to
specialize in English
language and U.S. area
studies for reasons he
could not recall. (May)
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TOP SECRET
DATE
June 1962
June
1946
eptember
1946
June
1947
eptember
1947
Late
1947
[NOSENKO was talk-
about his present
wife.] "This is my.
second wife. I was
married before... I
cannot say that I
1964.
Completed first
year at Institute
of International
Relations.
Began second
year at IIR.
61.
Completed second
Com-
year at IIR.
missioned junior
lieutenant in Re-
serves.
(
Began third year
at IIR.
While studying
at the IIR NOSENKO
was dating Augus-
tina Konstantinovna
TELEGINA, the
daughter of a lieu-
tenant general.
1965
April 1966
October 1966
With help of tem-
porary documents used
for the trip to Ger-
many, NOSENKO managed
to exempt himself from
compulsory military
training during his
first two years at IIR.
When it was found that
his claims of active
duty were false, he
was commissioned a jun-
ior lieutenant in the
Reserves along with
his classmates. (May)
In third year at
IIR NOSENKO began to
specialize in Inter-
national law. (May)
"I was a friend
and companion of
TELEGINA for some
months before her
father was arrested
in connection with
STALIN's campaign
In 1947 commis-
sioned a junior lieu-
tenant in the re-
serves. Diu not under-
go any military train-
ing. After complet-
ing second year at
the Institute, began
to do military trans-
lations to avoid
military service.
"While I was
studying at the In-
stitute, at the end
of 1947, I married
Augustina Konstanti-
novna TELEGINA, who
was born in 1929"
14-00000
F.
June 1962
loved her a great
deal... The war had
just ended. I
wanted peace. I
wanted a quiet
corner. I wanted
someone to look
after, ma...and
so we became ac-
quainted. We
saw each other for
about two weeks.
Let's get married.
I married her.
That's all.' [Note:
NOSENKO did not
date this marriage
other than to im-
ply it was right
after the war;
it is included
here to place it
in the context of
later statements.]
"One Monday...at
18 10 o'clock (I came
home early from
work). Suddenly I
heard--I approached
on tietoe--What is
this? In my bed,
who is lying with
my wife? Her older
brother. Well, I
slammed the door,
left, and did not go
back. Never went...
back. That was all.
$
1964
TELEGIN was ar-
rested by STALIN,
and NOSENKO married
Augustina soon
afterwards, in about
November 1947.
Broke off mar-
riage after several
months when he found
his wife in flaw*
grante delicto with
her brother. The
two were separated,
but not divorced, at
this time. [Note:
As with other dates
connected with the
TELEGINA marriage,
NOSENKO has been im-
precise here: in
62.
1965-
ET
against associates
of Marshall ZHUKOV.
However, we never
planned to marry.
After the arrest,
however, I decided
to marry her in
order to show my
strength of char-
acter. I cannot re-
member the date of
the marriage, which
was my first. I
think that it hap-
pened in 1947, but
do not know what
season or how long
after the arrest
of TELEGIN. (In-
terrogation Pro-
tocol signed in
February 1965.).
"
"One morning--
April 1966
October 1966
"I lived with my
I cannot remember the first wife until 1949."
date or season, but
it was in the first
half of 1948--I came
early and unexpected
from my studies at
the Institute of In-
ternation Relations ±
to the apartment of my
wife's mother where
I sometimes met my
wife, and surprised
her in sexual inter-
TOP SECRET
-14-00000**
✓_____
April 1966
October 1966
June 1962
Bye bye...Well,
you can imagine my
horror." [Note:
Portions of the
tape of this con-
versation are un-
readable. It is
clearly implied that
this scene took
place at NOSENKO's
own home.]·
"A child was
born who might
have been mine and
who might not have
been mine. God
knows. There was
still no child when
That's
I left. Well, I
helped out. I
Bent money.
all. But I didn't
see either her or
the child.” [Note:
NOSENKO provided no
date for the above.]
1964
April 1964 he said
on another occa-
sion that he found
his wife with her
brother sometime
prior to June 1947.]
Completed third
year at IIR.
63.
1965
course with her
brother. I walked
out without comment.
The next day I re-
turned to our apart-
ment where my wife
and I continued to
live together, al-
though our relation-
ship was strained.
I stayed with her
because she was
pregnant at the time.
(Protocol signed
February 1965.)
Girl with hare
lip and cleft
palate born to TELE-
GINA. NOSENKO de-
cided deformity was
due to her incest-
uous relationship
with her brother.
Subsequently gave
his wife a little
money to help sup-
port the child, but
never considered it
his. Marriage
cooled still further,
but NOSNEKO continued
to live in the apart-
ment. (May)
"
8
8
:
TOP SECRET
14-000
June 1962
1964
Began fourth year
at IIR.
64.
1965
April 1966
October 1966
Completed fourth
year at IIR.
Successfully de-
fended his thesis on
the subject of "Dip-
lomatic Immunity."
Completed English
language studies.
In March or
April 1950 NOSENKO
was interviewed by
the assignments
commission of the
IIR and was tenta-
tively assigned to
the GRU. In May
1950 he went to the
NOSENKO was through
with courses at the
Institute in January
1950 and had already
defended his thesis
on "Diplomatic Immu-
nity." The last
half-year at the In-
stitute was relatively
free because the
students were given
time to prepare for
the state exams which
were requited for
graduation. (May)
Before taking his
final state exams,
NOSENKO went before
the placement board.
Here they talked
about his possible
assignments and al-
though no definite
decision was reached
"In the spring
of 1950 before
the beginning of
the state examina-
tions a personnel
placement commis-
sion was created at
the Institute and
The Placement Com-
mission sent NOSENKO
to the MGB where he was
told he was not a
suitable candidate.
reason was for "little
I was drunk
things.
several times, only an
I declared to it my average student, etc.
The
TOP SECRET

TOP SEGRET
June 1962
1964
GRU Personnel De-
partment for an
interview with
Colonel KALOSHIN
on the instructions
of the chief of
the "secret unit"
at the IIR.
65.
1965
it was suggested he
go into the Navy.
After this, but
before the state
exams, NOSENKO
visited a special
section of the Navy
Ministry to give
them special docu-
ments for a secu-
rity check. A1-
though it was not
stated, NOSENKO be-
lieved he was slated
for Navy Intelli-
gence. (May)
April 1966
wish to work in
some sort of mili-
tary organization.
Soon thereafter
the chief of the
Institute's special
section gave me a
telephone number
and told me to call
it. The number was
K-6...and I rea-
lized that the MGB
was interested
in me since these
numbers belonged·
to the MGB.
called the number
and was told to
come to the MGB...
the conversation
(at the MGB] con-
cerned my bio-
graphy and my
knowledge of the
English language..
Nothing was said
about where it was.
intended for me to
work.... Later the
chief of the In-
stitute's special
section told me my.
qualifications. were
not suitable_for
the MGB."
October 1966
NOSENKO said he did
not mention this
earlier because his
interrogators would
not have believed that
the MGB first turned
him down and they later
accepted him in 1953.
14-000
*j©17+ ༧ m©3A**%, tAux-"
June 1962
"I finished
the Institute of
International Ra-
lations in 1950,
after this I
worked in the GRU
of the Navy."
1964
Took state
exams for comple-
tion of the Insti-
tute. Passed
three of them but
flunked Marxism-
Leninism. Advised
GRU and was told to
call back when he
had his IIR diplo-
ma. He was allowed
to take the Navy
physical exam,
which lasted three
days.
Passed exams on
second try and re-
ceived diploma of
completion of IIR.
Contacted Colonel
KALOSHIN of GRU Per-
sonnel. Submitted
66.
1965
After failing
the state exam
NOSENKO had someone
in his father's
office call the
GRU to see what he
should do. It
turned out that the
security check
would take a long
time and NOSENKO
was told to check
back after he had
passed the exam.
(May)
NOSENKO checked
back with GRU Per-
sonnel after passing
his exams. (May)
April 1966
"During the
summer of 1950,
while the state
exams were under-
way, I began to
process for entry
into the Navy GRU.
My processing
took place through
Colonel KALOSHIN,
the Chief of the
GRU Personnel De-
partment.
Up
until March 1951
I repeatedly
visited the Minis-
try of the Navy...
I filled out
questionaires in
duplicate, wrote
two autobiographies
and submitted
copies of my diplo-
ma. [Note: NO-
SENKO in his 1966
autobiography did
not mention
having failed the
exam in Marxism-
Leninism.]
"I submitted
copies of my diplo-
ma to GRU Personnel.'
(See above entry.)
NOSENKO processing
for GRU entry.
October 1966
TOP SECRET
10000
གཏྠཱ4rail!!v*
67.
TOP SECRET
June 1962
"When they of-
fered me (assign-
ments in) Moscow,
Leningrad and the
Far East I took
the Far East so
that nobody could
say that Yuriy NO-
SENKO took advan-
1964
diploma, trans-
cript of grades,
and other neces-
sary papers.
[Note: Previously
in 1964 NOSENKO
stated that hie
graduated from the
IIR, which at that
time was a four-
year course, in
mid-1949 and "just
loafed around" for
a year. He later
changed the com-
pletion date to
late 1949 or early
1950. Then he
changed this to
say that he failed
exams in 1949 and
had been forced to
wait an entire
year before he
could retake them
in 1950. Finally
he gave the version
above.]
Entered on ac-
tive duty with the
Navy on 17-19 Sep-
tember 1950, when
he received orders
transferring him
from a junior lieu-
tenant in the Re-
serves to a junior
1965
April 1966
October 19H
In the autumn of
1950 received orders
transferring him
from the Reserve to
Offered
active duty.
a choice of duty
posts, NOSENKO chose
to go to the Far East
"in order to prove he
(See above entries.]
Still processing for
GRU entry.
140
14-00000
June 1962
1964
tage of his father's lieutenant on ac-
position."
"I worked in
the field of in-
formation in the
Far East, in the
(city of Sovetskaya
Gavan...in the
field of informa-
tion--radio inter-
cept, etc. All
(your movements,
when you moved
vessels to Che-
(mul'po, Korea,
the Korean opera-
tion...we know all
the ships there be-
cause you talked on
the air. You
transmitted. We
knew each division,
its name, its num-
ber, everything...
tive duty. Re-
ceived orders to
the Intelligence
Staff of the Seventh
Far East Fleet.
[Note: In an ear-
lier version, NO-
SENKO said he en-
tered the GRU in
1949, having fin-
ished the Insti-
tute of Interna-
tional Relations
the same year.]
On approxi-
mately 1 October
1950 NOSENKO left
Moscow by train for
the Far East. The
68.
1965
was now ready to
make a man of him-
self...in the country
;
God forgot."
Strip to Bukhta ·
Postovaya (near
Sovetskaya Gavan),
where his unit was
stationed, took nine
or ten days. As-
signed to work in
the Information
Section under Cap-
tain Second Rank
KHAYTOV. Duties
included transla-
tions from Ameri-
can Naval litera-
ture and making
summaries of
American Navy OB in
(May)
Arriving at his
duty station NO-
SENKO was assigned
to the Information
Section. He liked
the work and did a
good job despite
the rigorous con-
ditions. During his
service here he re-
ceived special
mention as an out-
standing officer.
There were 300 to
350 intercept opera-
tors there. NO-
SENKO and other
officers analyzed
the take as well as
information received
from Sakhalin and
Vladivostok. (May)
April 1966
October 1966
[See above entries]
Still processing
for GRU entry.
14-00000
June 1962
1 and we reported
this to Moscow.
don't know what
I
I was done with this
information after
. this.
So, we were
concerned with.
information."
1964
Far East. There was
a unit involved in
radio intercept of
American Naval car-
gets in Korean area,
but NOSENKO was not
personally concerned
with this work.
69.
1965
April 1966
October 1966
TOP SECRET
Promoted to the
rank of lieutenant.
After about seven
months in the Far
"On 12 March 1951
two orders were is-
East, NOSENKO was pro-sued by the Naval
moted to lieutenant.
This was April 1951.
Normally one is pro-
moted from junior
licutenant to lieu-
tenant only after a
year's service in
grade. This can be
reduced to six months
in the Far East.
(May)
Ministry; one con-
cerning my enlistment
in the Navy and the
other assigning me
as a translator to
the Intelligence
Unit of the Seventh
Fleet (Military Unit
70176). The following
day at KALOSHIN'S
instructions I re-
ported to the Moscow
City Military Com-
mission where I was.
issued my passport
and my voyenyy bilet.
The Commission also
issued me temporary
duty orders and tra-
vel documents. On
16 or 17 March I left
Moscow for my duty.
post. I arrived at
Bukhta Postavaya at
the end of March and
"I lied when I
said I started in the
GRU in 1950. It was.
really March 1951.
[Note: No effort
was made to obtain
a reason for this
lie or to question.
NOSENKO on its im-
plications for his
earlier statements
about promotions, etc,)
"I was on active
duty in Sovetskaya
Gavan--Bukhta Posto-
vaya from 1951 to
1953."
14-00000
595"
70.
DATE
June 1962
1964
1965
April 1966
began work in the
Information De-
partment of the
Intelligence Unit
of the Seventh
Fleet.
End of
1951
January-
February
1952
NOSENKO involved
in apprentice work
in the Agent-Intel-
ligence Section at
Bukhta Postovaya.
This involved going
out to sea on sub-
chasers to pick up
and drop off, and
conducting meetings
with agents from
Hokkaido and Sak-
halin. NOSENKO did
not actually meet
agents, but was
merely along to learn
how they were picked
up at sea.
Filed action by
mail to divorce TELE-
GINA in Moscow court
and published inten-
tion notice in a local
Sovetskaya Gavan news-
paper in January or
February.
NOSENKO was
planning to divorce
his wife before he
left Moscow but did
not start proceedings
because he was afraid
she would bring
charges against him
in the KOMSOMOL.
Sometime in late 1951
or early 1952 he
published his notice
.
October 1966
TOP SECRET
14-00000
DATE
June 1962
1964
71.
1965
April 1966
October 1966
April
1952
Left Bukhta
Postovaya and re-
turned to Moscow
on leave. Arrived
at the end of
April and reported
to KALOSHIN. Re-
quested transfer
from the Far East.
of intent in a local
newspaper and for-
warded the neces-
sary papers to Mos-
COW.
(May)
On 1 May 1952
NOSENKO's father was
to observe his 50th
birthday. NOSENKO's
two-year tour in the
Far East would not
be up until October
or November 1952, and
he was not entitled
to any leave until
it was ended. How-
ever, his section
chief was very under-
standing and ar-
ranged for him to
leave in April so
that he could be in
Moscow for the birth-
day celebration.
NOSENKO flew to
Khabarovsk where he
had a "two-day
drunken orgy" with
another Naval offi-
cer. He then con-
tinued on to Moscow
in time for the May
Day and birthday
celebrations. The
next day he reported
to the Navy Ministry
and was told to re-
"At the end of
April 1952 I left
Sovetskaya Gavan on
leave, arriving in
Moscow on 28 April."
TOP SECRET
14-00000
June 1962
1964
72.
1965
April 1966
October 1966
"I worked in the
ar East until 1952,
hen suddenly I
Fell 111. In the
Far East.
It was
Then I
arrived in Moscow,
They began
this way.
I went to the
doctor.
to x-ray me.
They
Clear lungs, ahso-
lutely.
examined me one day,
two days, three
days. Clear, abso-
lutely clear.
Then
by accident, right
under my collar-
bone, a small, small,
little spot was
found and it turned
out to be on a'
blood vessel. It
turned out to be at
a very early stage.
At that time they
had just discovered
streptomycin and I
was confined at
the Hertzen Sani-
torium near Mos-
dow. I was there
for two months.
felt fine but they
I
NOSENKO was on
leave during May
and June 1952 and
lived during this
time at the home
of his parents at
No. 4 Ulitsa
Gor'kogo in Mos-
He received
COW.
one month leave
for his 1951 ser-
vice in the Far
East and the
other for his
1952 service
there. [Note:
NOSENKO did not
mention having had
tuberculosis
during any inter-
turn at the end of
his leave for reas-
signment. (May)
NOSENKO was on
leave during May
and June. No de-
cision had been
reached with re-
gard to whether
he would return to
Sovetskaya Gavan
or not and he was
"at the disposal"
of the Naval Minis-
try during this
period. After the
leave, NOSENKO
waited another
month until his as-
signment was de-
(May)
cided upon.
[Note: NOSENKO did
not mention having
rogations or state- been hospitalized
ments in 1964.
Ac- in this period.]
cording to his 1966
statements, he
spent only one
year, March 1951 to
April 1952, in the
Far East.]
In
"While on leave
I became ill with
tuberculosis and
spent almost two
months in a sani-
torium near Mos-
[Note:
COW."
another statement,
written a week
earlier, NOSENKO
said that in
Sovetskaya Gavan
"drunkeness and
the severe condi-
tions had their
effect on my
health and led to
an outbreak of
tuberculosis in
May 1952."}]
NOSENKO confirmed
that he was at the
Herzen Sanitorium
during this period
and said that as a
result of his illness
he was "coughing
up a half a glass of
blood at a time.
His treatment con-
sisted of shots of
streptomycin.
"
བྷ་
TOP SECRET
14-00000
TBP SECRET
DATE
Mid-
1952
July-
August
1952
73.
June 1962
1964
1965
April 1966
October 1966.
gave me shots of
streptomycin every
hour for two months
and stopped this
disease at once.
After this I had
check-ups for five.
years, was car-
ried on their books
until 1957. It was
nothing.
"
"They offered
me the opportunity
to study in the
Military-Diploma-
tic Academy. I
went and took a look
at the courses they
had to offer--Marx-
ism, Philosophy,
History, and so on.
Well, what did I
need this for? I
already knew this.
I said: 'No, I
won't go.'"
"After my ill-
ness and after the
Far East I received
orders to the Bal-
tic. On the Bal-
tic there is a city
which was formerly
-43.
Following his
regular leave
NOSENKO was or-
dered by the Navy
to proceed to
Berlin and Rostok,
but refused to go
During the summer
of 1952 NOSENKO was
offered assignments
to the Military-
Diplomatic Academy,
to a special Navy
espionage school,
and to Germany, but
turned all of them
down for various
reasons. He re-
jected the opportun-
ity to attend the
Military-Diplomatic
Academy because he
had already had
96 per cent of the
courses in the In-
stitute. (May)
NOSENKO received
"During the
orders to Sovetsk and month of July the
arrived there in late
August or early Sep-
tember 1952. In
Sovetsk NOSENKO was
assigned a political
Personnel Depart
ment of the GRU
reached a deci-
sion concerning
the place of my
NOSENKO was offered
an opportunity to
attend the Military-
Diplomatic Academy,
but did not want to go.
Besides, he failed the.
physical examinations
for entrance when sugar
was discovered in his
faeces. NOSENKO drank
too much.
NOSENKO was shown
a map of Kalinin-
gradskaya Oblast
showing Primorsk to be
where he said Sovetsk
should be located.
NOSENKO continued to
00000
TOP SECHET
June 1962
the German city of
Pillau and is now
called Primorsk."
There NOSENKO was
involved in the
formation of
"agent-observation
posts." Suitable
candidates were
selected from
among the crews of
ships.
They were
then formed into
groups of three
men each and were
trained in radio-
operation, demo-
lition, etc.
After this the
groups split up
and their mem-
hers went their
geparate ways. In
case of war the
groups were to be
reformed and sent
Behind enemy lines
on sabotage and
intelligence mis-
sions. [Note:
The former German
city of Pillau is
now called Baltiysk
not Primorsk; the
Latter is a small
Village nearby.)
1964
when he learned that
the Naval Intelli-
gence Points (MRP's)
in Germany were
closing down
and that his final
assignment was not
definite. He then
tock more leave
(unauthorized)
until about 29 July
(when he left for
Bartysk and re-
ported for duty to
the Intelligence
Staff of the Fourth
Baltic Fleet.
He was assigned to
a Naval Intelli-
2. gence Point being
set up in Sovetsk,
up
a small town near
Baltiysk. There he
prepared area
training materials
for and carried
supplies to agents,
but did not actually
deal with or train
them directly.
[Note:
Previously
during the April
1964 interrogations
NOSENKO said that he
had received training
near Moscow and was
then sent to Rostok
and Sassnitz before
74.
1965
officer's job and
helped train
sailors for wartime
agent missions.
His main task was
to prepare the
training plan for
the sailors, to
instruct them in
subjects such as
"The Foreign Policy
" and
of the USSR,
generally to see to
their needs. (May)
April 1966
further assignment
and I was ordered
to the Naval Intel-
ligence Point of
the Fourth Baltic
October 1966
say that he was as-
signed to Sovetsk
in the summer of
1952.
He was asked
why, as a son of a
minister
Fleet Intelligence patient under treat-
Kaliningradskaya
Oblast.
Sovetsk
is located before
you go out on the.
spit of land where
Baltiysk (Pillau)
stands. I arrived
in Sovetsk in
August 1952 and
began to work in
the Naval Intelli-
gence Unit as a
senior translator.
Shortly before
my arrival the In-
telligence Point
had been moved
from Rostok, in
Germany, to Sovetsk.
[Note: It was
clear from NOSENKO'S
earlier descrip-
tions that the
"Sovetsk" which NO-
SENKO described is,
in fact, Primorsk,
a small village on
The
the coast.
only place called
Sovetsk in Kalinin-
gradskaya Oblast
ment for tuberculo-
sis, he was not as-
signed to the Black
Sea or somewhere
else with a healthy
climate. NOSENKO
explained that there
were no positions
available "elsewhere.

14-00000
giverparty mae omnmanggi
October 1966
June 1962
No date given
for divorce.
2
1964
He
going to 'Bal-
tiysk/Sovetsk.
then said this was
a lie and gave
the version above.
The reason for the
lie, NOSENKO said,
was that he knew
we "wouldn't be-
lieve the truth"--
that he had suc-
cessfully refused
the assignment to
Germany.]
In mid-August or
September 1952 NC-
SENKO returned to
Moscow from the Bal-
tic for 7 to 10
days to complete
divorce proceedings
he had initiated
in the Far East.
This was not
counted as leave,
but as official
business. He then
returned to Sov-
etsk.
75.
1965
April 1966
is about 40 kilo-
meters inland, and
NOSENKO himself
had said in 1962.
that he served. in
Primorsk.
"Sometime after my
return to Moscow from
Sovetskaya Gavan, I
carried through with
my intention to
divorce. My di-
vorce was noted in
my Officer's Book-
let and nowhere
else. I turned this
document in to the
KGB Personnel office
when I began my KGB
Service and since
then have had no re-
cord of the divorce.
I continued to pay
alimony to Augustina..
TELEGINA (one quarter
of my salary) until
I left the USSR in
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
ry
953
June 1962
[See next entry.]
"In the be-
ginning of 1953
I came to Moscow
from Primorsk).
his was '53, in
the beginning.
1964
NOSENKO did
not like his work
in Sovetsk [sic]
and wanted to re-
turn to Moscow to
arrange for a
transfer. He
asked for annual
leave which the
unit commander re-
fused to give him
as he had none due.
NOSENKO thereupon
went to Admiral
GOLOVKO in Bal-
tiysk and with his
help obtained
leave because of
the elder NOSENKO's
influential po-
sition. NOSENKO
then returned to
Moscow shortly
before New Year's.
"I arrived back
in Moscow in Decem-
ber 1952, just be-
fore New Year's. I
had vacation for
the month of Janu-
76.
1965
1964. She kept the
name NOSENKO even after
she remarried." [Note:
This is placed here for
comparison with his
1964 statement.]*
NOSENKO disliked
his job as a politi-
cal officer and was
disdainful of the
low educational level
of those he was
called upon to train,
as well as of the
"whole stupid" pro-
gram. He remained
in Sovetsk only
until December 1952,
when he obtained
leave to spend the
holidays with his
parents in Moscow.
(May)
In January NOSEN-
KO and his parents
went to visit the
family of General
KOBULOV at KOBULOV's
dacha in Usov. NO-
April 1966
October 1966
"I remained in
Sovetsk a short time
and returned to Mos-
cow at the end of
the year [1952] with
the aim of changing
my place of work...
While in Sovetsk I
received the rank of
lieutenant of the
Administrative Ser-
vice." [Note: Sec
1965 entry for the
spring of 1951.]
"On 1 January 1953
my parents and I were
guests at the dacha
of KOBULOV who at
that time was working
in GUSIMZ in East Ber-
NOSENKO was divorced from TELEGINA during his leave before going to Sovetsk (May and June 19521.
June 1962
in January. Well
I came on leave to
Moscow. I was
there at my father's
dacha, near Moscow.
KOBULOV came to
visit us at the
dacha...a conver-
sation started.
He asked: 'What
are you doing?'
I answered: 'I
am working in the
GRU... I came home
on leave.' KOBU-
LOV asked: 'How
do you like your
work?' I said:
'Speaking frankly,
I don't. 'Well,
he said, 'you
better come work
with us.... Look,
drop in to see me
for a minute some-
time.' KOBULOV
was First Deputy
to BERIA and a
great friend of my
father's."
-964
ary. At the end
of January, at the
end of my vacation
I went back to GRU
Personnel and saw
KALOSHIN...I told
him I did not like
my job, all that
typing, and he
said: Well,
wait a while.
Look around.'
was at the dispo-
sal of the Person-
nel Department all
of February.
I
I
had no work at all.
And since I was
not working, I
did not get any
pay for this month.
During this vacation
I was living with
my father and mother
on Gor'kiy Street."
77.
1965
SENKO and KOBULOV
discussed. NOS ENKO's.
dissatisfaction
with his Sovetsk
assignment and KOBU-
LOV suggested the
possibility of
NOSENKO getting.
into State Security
work.
April 1966
lin with the WISMUTH
company. This was the
first time. I met:
October 1966
**
(May)
KOBULOV; I don't re-
member how the con-
versation came around
to me, but I told
KOBULOV about my
work in the Naval
GRU and my desire to
change my place of
work. He promised to
find me a place in the
MGB, but this promise
was empty conversation."
e
"After the New
Year I went to this
sanitorium, Kubinka,
75 or 78 kilometers
from Moscow, and I
was there January
"I met my [second]
wife (Lyudmila
KOZHEVNIKOVA]. for the
first time at the
Herzen "House of
Rest," one of the
"From the end of
January to the middle
of March I was under
treatment at the
sanitorium near Mos-
cow where I had been
רי ועוד
TOP SECRET
June 1962
1964
and part of Febru-
ary. After that I
was home." [Note:
This statement was
made on 8 April.
As no attempt was
made to reconcile
it with the pre-
vious entry, made
on 6 April, and be-
cause NOSENKO of-
fered no explana-
tion, both are
included here.]
78.
1965
"Houses of Rest" of
the Council of Minis-
ters. I was resting
there for several
days. She was there
too. It's about
65-70 kilometers
from Moscow, not far
from Kubinka. I
was waiting for my
status to be re-
_ solved...I didn't
want to stay alone
at the dacha [his
father's]. She was
studying philology
in the third course.
at Moscow State Uni-
versity. She had
been seriously ill
with tuberculosis
when she was 17 and
still required treat-
ments." (Interro-
gation, 12 February
1965) [Note: NOSEN-
KO's explanation
of his presence at
the "House of Rest"
was given in response
to the specific
question: "What
April 1966
during the summer of
1952. Here I became
acquainted with my
second wife, Lyudmila
Yulianovna KOZHEV-
NIKOVA.
were you doing there?"]*
October 1966
.
TOP SECRET
1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a louse of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it.
tried Dyatkino and met her.
Red Star, on 14 January 1967, reported that seven "special naval schools" were establisheä
in 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow, Vladivostok, Gorkiy, Kiev, Odessa, and Baku. There is no indication that any of
See June 1942 entry:
14-00000
:
79.
i
C.
1.
Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB
Family Life
The Soviet internal passport which NOSENKO carried to
Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila
KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953. (They married approximately
six months after he says he first met her at a sanatorium or.
"rest home" outside Moscow and about three 
months after he
says he joined the KGB.) Immediately after their marriage
the couple moved into the 
home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at
Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtain-
ing their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 
1955.*
KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Nikolayevich KOZHEVNIKOV, 
a
metallurgical engineer by training, who held the position of
First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific 
Research Com-
mittee (GKKNIR) of the RSFSR at the time of NOSENKO's defec-
tion. **
NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second
marriage. According to his passport, the eldest of these,
Oksana, was born on 21 August 1954' and the other, Tamara, on
13 July 1958.*** NOSENKO in 1962 displayed to his CIA handlers
a photograph of the two girls and 
their mother and made a par-
ticular point of noting the close physical resemblance between
-
On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questioned on the various
He said that, from the
apartments he occupied in Moscow.
time of his marriage to TELEGINA until his departure for
his first GRU post in the Far East, he lived in an apart-
ment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment,
he said, in 1950, when his Navy orders came through.
Having made this statement, NOSENKO was then asked why
the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at
the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could
not explain but that he was considered to have vacated 
the
house in 1950. (He later said he moved to the 
Far East in
1951 see Section IV.B.) NOSENKO then said that the
previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita
ISHCHENKO. Although the phone then in the apartment was
switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO
never bothered to have the change entered in the Moscow
phone book; he said that this would have required a visit
to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms
,
etc.; besides he added, he did not use the telephone any-
way. Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defec-
tion in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed
under the name of ISHCHENKO. He has repeated this story
The 1961 Moscow phone
during subsequent questionings.
directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list
ISHCHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya
Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa.
The GKKNIR of the RSFSR is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked
under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR.
NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth
as 1957. In 1962 he told CIA that the older daughter was
then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, how-
ever,
he said she began school in the fall of 1962.
A
TOP SECRET
14-00000
Oksana and himself. He said that he and his wife refer to her
as his "double" (kopiya). His wife, in a letter after the
defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya.
NOSENKO's father, the Shipbuilding Minister, died of
stomach cancer in August 1956, three years after NOSENKO says
he entered the KGB Second Chief Directorate. The period of
time surrounding his father's death was, according to NOSENKO,
a turning point in his personal and professional life. It was
then that he "found himself" after an irresponsible past,
drinking and wenching, and indifference to his work.
2.
Venereal Disease
The incident which NOSENKO has most often cited as an
example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956
involved his illegal use of KGB alias documents to cover treat-
ment for a case of gonorrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time
his wife was pregnant with their first child. The CIA psycho-
logist who questioned NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the follow-
ing summary of NOSENKO's statements about this incident, which
are about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interroga-
tion):
Later
Since his
"A girl friend he had known in Leningrad since 1945 came
to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954. She called him, and he
spent some time with her. She was not a prostitute, and he
had slept with her before, so he thought nothing of it.
he developed what he feared was a venereal disease.
wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the
danger of infecting her. He searched frantically around Moscow
for a private doctor who treated such diseases, but could not
find one.
Some of his friends at the office suggested a central
clinic that would require no documents. He went here but when
confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of
showing his KGB certificate or using a false passport he had
for business. He tried to talk the doctor into letting him
go home to get his documents, but the doctor said he would have
to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he
might not come back. He was required to take treatment of a
communicable disease. He was forced to give the false document.
He came back for treatment about three times and was ordered
to report back in two weeks for a final check.
They also
demanded the name of the girl, but he claimed he had only just
met her and did not know who she was. He forgot to go back
and a nurse visited the safehouse about two times and left
a note for him to report. However, he did not go to the safe-
house so knew nothing of the note. In the false passport was
a listing of where the named person worked, a fictitious
factory. As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request
for information got into the hands of the section which made
the documents. NOSENKO was called before the deputy chief of
the Directorate and severely criticized. He explained what
had happened and was given five days of house arrest. However,
the chief of his section had also gotten word of the infraction
and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even
talking to him. He told his wife he was going on a trip and
moved into the administrative room near the office to serve
his term. In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party
TOP SECRET
14-00000
81..
Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him
the whole story.
NOSENKO's father never told either NOSENKO's
wife or mother of the incident, but did chide NOSENKO about
it. The incident was brought before the Komsomol and discussed.
A written reprimand for immoral conduct-unauthorized use of
This was 
also
official documents was placed in his record.
a final warning meaning that any other infraction would result
in expulsion. He made the statement that he had been punished
He could not immediately apply
for this incident many times.
for party membership; the incident was brought up repeatedly
in Komsomol meetings and even in party meetings (after he was
accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being
(The Deputy-
promoted from Senior Lieutenant to Captain.
Director who gave him five days was a member of the promotion
commission.)"
Although there have been slight changes and contradictions
in NOGENKO's numerous accounts of this story (the house arrest
was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 days) it remained
basically consistent until the October 1966 interrogations
when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea
In 1954,
from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather than 1954.
he said, he again was infected, this time by a prostitute whom
he picked up in the vicinity of the Leningrad Railroad Station
in Moscow. When the KGB required that he reveal the source,
NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the original girl
from Leningrad. During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO
also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal
disease on two other occasions while studying at the Institute
of International Affairs.
He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as
a junior KGB case officer, he personally recruited Richard
BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation carried
out by the newly-created Tourist Department of the Second Chief
Directorate.* "And in 1956," NOSENKO said in 1964, "before
my father's death, I was made a candidate for membership in
the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned
the rank of Senior Case Officer. I developed a pride in my-
self, (a feeling) that I can do things. You know how it is.
When a person feels that he can, that he has some support,
then he works much better. He has more initiative and so
forth."
3,
Affiliation with Communist Party Organs
NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Communist
Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he
joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku.
This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it
without much thought, mainly because all his friends were
See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruit-
ment operation. Until 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that
he had received an award for his participation in this
operation. In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted
this and said that he never received any KGB award for the
BURGI or any other operation.
TOP SECRET
www
14-00000
joining..
82.
When NOSENKO entered the KGB in the spring of 1953,
he transferred routinely to the Komsomol organization there
and became Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the
Second Chief Directorate. This was a small organization
consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees; he
remained its secretary until June or July 1954, when he got
into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents.
According to NOSENKO, "Immediately after this incident the
Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately
A week later, a
removed from the position of Secretary.'
"strict reprimand" was entered in NOSENKO's Komsomol records.
In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO
At that time,
was forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.*
the "strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier
was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to
He was not per-
leave the organization with a clean record.
mitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however.
NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows:
"Now I had to prove myself. Not being a candidate for Party
membership, I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness,
to prove myself. I also asked the Party Organization of the
Second Chief Directorate for some 'public service' (obshchest-
venniy) assignments. I collected newspapers. For a year,
NOSENKO "made good" by running errands and performing other
such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for
Party membership. He applied in January 1956 and was accepted
as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year;
full membership was granted in 1957. For over a year, from
October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had the
distinction of being the only employee of the KGB who was
neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant.
4.
Statements to Others by NOSENKO
Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had
talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons
involved in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this
paper. NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS
that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREIS-
FREUND, a Finnish citizen used in the recruitment approach to
a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his
father was dead but his mother was living, he had served in
the Navy, and he had two children. PREISFREUND met the
"little girls" and later reported to CIA that, although
NOSENKO was a "woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very
much. *** With one KGB agent in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL,
NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his
✓ According to the Statutes (Ustay) of the Komsomol in effect
in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that time
was 25. On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded
in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday.
When
this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965,
NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol
in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the
maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special
exceptions were made in his case.
** See Part V.F.9.
***PREISFREUND is discussed in detail in Part V.E.4.a.
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83.
service in the Soviet Navy; he dwelt at length on his father's
work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the
alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father
On one occasion
had been employed in the town of Nikolayev.
NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL's home. * NOSENKO told
his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had
two daughters.
D.
Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO
Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported
and other portions contradicted by the statements of several
Soviets following the defection. The Soviets' remarks dealing
with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with
reference to other aspects of the background of NOSENKO:
Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who
later went to the U.S. Embassy after his defection) in-
clude a reference to one of the daughters as his "double"
and two other personal letters in his possession at the
time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and G. I. DUCHKOV,
referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife and children.
A KGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told
a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came
from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children,
and earned a good salary. TULAYEV later told the agent
that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well."**
A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALEV,
said to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had
a good family background, was the son of a Minister in
the government, was notorious for his "adventurous"
nature, and was "famous for his character.
-
"
The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said
he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO in
1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school
and of the dates involved, however, differs from
NOSENKO's. Sensitive source
reported NOSENKO is the son of a former
Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot
himself to avoid going to the front with the rest of his
class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and
contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his
father's influence avoided damage to his career.
from conversations with fellow officers
has indicated that he does not know NOSENKO.
FRIPPEL is discussed more fully in Part V.D.5.
He
In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either
by name or photograph and said he didn't know him.
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84.
However, his
A said that when NOSENKO was a young man, he
attended the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spent
a short timė, perhaps a year, in the 
Information: Department
.
NOSENKO 
had been a "very undisciplined
at GRU Headquarters.
person" while in the GRU and "not very good, "
tinued, and he was discharged 
from the GRU.
father, an "influential person in the Ministry of Ship-
building, was able to get NOSENKO transferred 
to the 
KGB.
said he did not know NOSENKO 
personally, but
learned this information from "various persons" (unnamed)
in Moscow.
-
"
The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV
and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of 
Paris Match in
October 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that 
NOSENKO was
"closely acquainted with the country's 
leaders, families
,
and homes" and that his "father who 
died several years
ago was an important official in the 
Party and state
organs."
The document went on 
to say that "NOSENKO's
family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 
10 and 
12,
mother and a brother (younger)." 
KOROLEV and ROSENTAL
also provided photographs purporting 
to be of NOSENKO's
wife and daughters.
source
said she heard from her KGB friend
V. G. SVIRIN that NOSENKO's father was a Minister or a
General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was Jewish
་་ She
and "was always involved in some blackmarketeering.
" 
not a
also said that she heard NOSENKO was a "
civilian;
KGB officer, but was connected somehow with 
the 
KGB. (She
could not explain this connection other than to say that
all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are 
either
officers or "relatives" of the KGB.)
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