LA
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 1
File #:
62-116395
Serial Scope:
586- Bulky
Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025
95
62-
HQ-11633
Serial 586
BULKY
62-HQ-116359-E586
FBI CENTRAL RECORDS CENTER
-
HQ HEADQUARTERS
BOX 3565
Class/Case # Sub
Vol.
Serial #
0062 116395
1
586
2/13/85777
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 PP004741D
ONLY
#3565
INSPECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
AUGUST 17 SEPTEMBER 9,
-
NWY 88608 [Docld:32989638 Page 3
1971
"
RETAIN COPY
INSPECTION
8/6-9/8/2/
Recommend entire document be classified "Secret,"
XGDS 1, 2, 3.
Portions recommended for excision from attached have
been underlined in red or bracketed in rea in left pargin.
Generally, criteria for excision vere:
1. Information which could identify sources or
sensitive techniques
2.
Names of individuals or organizations whose
privacy requires protection
3. Information which would reveal our overall success
or lack of success in a given investigative area
40
Information from "third Agencies" or friendly
Foreign agencies
5.
Chief level
Identities of Bureau personnel below the Section
The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in general,
disclose the extent of our commitment in specific areas of
counterintelligence activity. We have given the Committee
Administrative Division figures regarding total manpower
involved in security investigations but, to my knowledge, re
have not given them a breakdom as to where these personnel
are assigned. A policy decision is necessary as to whether we
Want to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel"
sections of these inspection reports, precisely how much or
ho liccle manpower we have on specific types of investigations.
It is questionable whether the information regarding
criminal cases in the San Francisco report is germane to the
Committee's inquiry. It would not seem improper to me to
delete all references to criminal matters and merely substitute
a page saying that "pages
relate to criminal
investigations.'
#
to
NWWW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 4
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 5
=
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS
Ellsberg Case
East Coast Conspiracy
ACCOMPLISHMENTS ·
Internal Security Section
Research Section
New Left Section
Espionage Section
Extremist Intelligence Section
'Nationalities Intelligence Section
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION
PROGRAMS
Page
1
23
31
39
43
57
66
74
Security Index Program (Basic Revolutionary
Organizations)
89
91
Counterintelligence - White Hate Groups
93
Thumbnail Sketch Program
Security Informant Program (Basic Revolutionary
and New Left Organizations)
Security Index Program
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 6
94
97
Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued)
Emergency Detention Program
Technical and Microphone Surveillances
Survey Regarding Potential For Racial Violence
Page
97
1
98
99
New Left Movement
101
Key Activist Program
105
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).
107
Worker Student Alliance (WSA)
107
The Venceremos Brigade
110
PROSAB
ALEM Program
· BANPOP Program
CANIL Program
COKMA Program
110
114
115
116
117
DESECO Program
119
-
East West Exchange Program
121
Radio and Technical Equipment
123
Purchased by the Soviets
Black Extremist Matters
Black Nationalist Movement
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 7
125
127
Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued)
Black Panther Party
Black Revolutionary Party
Congress of African Peoples (CAP)
Page
132
136
137
International Black Workers Congress, aka Black
Workers Congress
139
Junta of Militant Organizations
140
Nation of Islam
142
Republic of New Africa.
144
Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
146
Communist Influence of Black Extremist Groups
148
Key Black Extremist Program
151
Extremist. Informants
Ghetto Informants
152
154
156
Counterintelligence Program - Black Extremists
Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and
International Organization Visas
158
Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border BOCOV
159
1
Security Index - Cuba
161
American Repatriate Program
164
Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries
165
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 8
1
Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued)
Page
International Organizations - Dangerous Aliens of Nations
Outside the Soviet Bloc
167
Chinese Aliens Entering the U. S.; Chinese Entering the
U. S. Claiming U. S. Citizenship
169
Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist
Intelligence Activities in the United States (CHICOIN)
Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United
States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments
·LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES FOREIGN LIAISON
Bern
Bonn
-
172
173
178
179
Buenos Aires
180
Hong Kong
180
London
181
Madrid
182
Mexico City
183
Ottawa
184
Paris
185
Rome
185
Tokyo
186
Beirut
187
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 9
Legal Attache Offices - Foreign Liaison (Continued)
Caracas
Copenhagen
La Paz
Managua
Tel Aviv
Chinese Communist Activities
Page
188
190
191
192
193
200
213
Subversive Activities Control Board
ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS
Dividing Domestic Intelligence Division Into Two
Divisions
215
Antiriot Laws and Bombing Matters
224
Computation of Case and Work Load in the Domestic
Intelligence Division
239
Potential Double Agent Program
244
PERSONNEL MATTERS
Adequacy of Personnel - Agent
Adequacy of Personnel - Clerical
249
300
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
Payments to Security Informants and Confidential
Sources
IW-88608-Deeld:32989638-Page-1:0
314

Suggestion Memorandum (Continued)
Survey Concerning Computerization of Security
Informant Indices
Supervision and Control of Security Informant
Development and Coverage by Internal Security and
· New Left Sections
1
Page
321
324
1
Utilization of Inserts in Reporting Investigative Results
in Criminal Cases by Legal Attaches
325
Black Nationalist Photograph Album
327
Young Socialist Alliance Internal Security - Communist
(Trotskyist)
329
Automation of Intelligence Data re New Left and
Extremist Individuals
331
Preparation of Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security
Type Investigations
334
Black Extremist Activities In Penal Institutions -
Extremist Matters
340
NW-88608 Reeld:32989638 Page 11
*ENW!
NW-88608- Flord #2989
Specific Division
ELLSBERG CASE
4-A-3
NSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
This case is currently being afforded
preferred supervisory and investigative
attention. You are requested to furnish the following information about the
case:
1. Brief narrative of basic investigation involving Ellsberg and provide
current status.
2. You have advised this case may be part of a greater conspiracy. Advise
what part you feel this and other leaks may be. It is realized the broad aspects
of this case may be yet unconfirmed conjecture; however, furnish narrative
of conjecture.
3. Advise what progress we have made and anticipate making in projecting
our investigation into areas described in number two.
4. Advise as best you can at this point how "big" this investigation may
become from a supervisory standpoint and indicate what impact an overall
successful investigation may have on Governmental processes in our system of
Government.
5. In regard to the administration of this investigation handled by the
Nationalities Intelligence Section and due to certain intricacies of supervision
the following information is requested individually from both Division Head
and Section Chief:
a. At the outset of the investigation, what instructions were issued
Section handling case?
issued?
b. What subsequent instructions or suggestions have been
c. What have been the manpower requirements of the case thus far
and how have you worked these out with this Section?
d. Division Head and Section Chief requested to make any further
comments considered appropriate at this time.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
MESTI
ZPOME
8/19/71
NW 88608 Poold:329896381 Page 13
I
ELLSBERG CASE
4-A-3
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL WRW
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
1. Initial investigation by Bureau opened 1/20/70 based on informa-
tion from step-mother of subject's former wife to the effect that subject, with
his children, took papers from his office at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica,
California, and copied them with intent that they be made available for Senators
Fulbright and Goodell. This information had come to knowledge of Carol
Ellsberg through the Ellsberg children. Initial investigation continued through
9/25/70 when basic facts were presented to Department of Justice with note that
no further action would be taken in the absence of a specific request from the
Department. No such request was received.
On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" commenced publishing a series
of articles purporting to report on the history of the U. S. decision-making process
concerning Vietnam policies for the period 1945-1967. "The New York Times"
claimed the articles were based on a study. later identified as a 47-volume history
entitled "United States Vietnam Relations During the Period 1945-1967,"
commonly known as the "McNamara Study." The "McNamara Study" was
prepared beginning in 1967 and was classified "Top Secret."
On 6/15/71 the Attorney General requested FBI to conduct all necessary
investigation into the matter relating to the publication of classified information
by "The New York Times." Our 1970 investigation and initial reports from
sources obtained in instant matter pinpointed Ellsberg as the prime suspect
responsible for the leak of classified data to news media. Extensive investigation
at Los Angeles pinned down the identities of individuals present in October,
1969, when Ellsberg duplicated classified documents available to him through his
employment at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Also revealed were his own
statements to his former wife that he, in fact, was converting the classified
documents to his own use to furnish them to various Congressional figures. The
Los Angeles investigation has resulted in Ellsberg's current indictment alleging
violation of Section 793(e), Title 18, U. S. Code (unauthorized possession of
documents involved and unlawful retention of same) and Section 641, Title 18
(conversion of the documents to his own use). The Los Angeles investigation was
the sole basis for this indictment and served as the basis for current imprisonment
on charge of contempt of court of Anthony J. Russo who was present on one
occasion when Ellsberg allegedly duplicated material in his possession.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
WRW:ams
4-A-3
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 14
2
- 2 -
Investigation at Washington, D. C., has pinned down Ellsberg's access
to the documents in question and has additionally revealed his early change from
"hawk" to "dove." It has also revealed his contacts with individuals at high
levels in Federal Government attempting to persuade them to put before American
public details of decisions underlying the U. S. policy in Vietnam.
Investigation at Boston has uncovered activity by Neil and Susan
Sheehan, employees of "The New York Times," in late March, 1971. This
activity has included extensive details of sessions where duplication of portions
of the "McNamara Study" were involved. Revealed have been details identifying
the printing companies utilized by the Sheehans, considerable travel between
these companies and apartments available to or utilized by Ellsberg. We have
uncovered extensive detail of Ellsberg's contacts from his Cambridge,
Massachusetts, residence with members of the news media. Also revealed has
been contact by Ellsberg with factions of the New Left and anti-Vietnam peace groups.
We have recently expanded our investigation in attempt to uncover details
of dissemination of the "McNamara Study" by Ellsberg to other newspapers in
which articles appeared attributed to the "McNamara Study." This investigation
has revealed at least three newsmen from the Washington, D. C., bureaus of
the newspapers involved were in the Boston and/or Cambridge area during the week
immediately prior to Ellsberg's surrender on 6/28/71. We have learned that at
least one newspaper had been contacted by an unknown individual in Boston who had
offered the "McNamara Study" instructing that if the newspaper involved wished to
avail itself of the offer, the classified documents could be picked up in Boston
after contacting a given telephone number in that area for more detailed instructions.
We are pursuing this facet of the investigation vigorously to pin down exact activities
of the newspaper personnel involved and when this is done, we contemplate
interviewing them for additional details.
Extensive investigation has been afforded the possibility that Ellsberg
benefited from considerable assistance from other individuals in his attempt to
disseminate the "McNamara Study" to the news media. Along these lines we have
detected early reports of Ellsberg's cooperation with elements of the War Resistors
League and have identified individuals in that organization described by Ellsberg
as the principal influences on his change to a militant opposition to the U. S. -
Vietnam policies. Investigation is continuing along these lines to establish if any
individuals in these dissident groups may have assisted Ellsberg in his alleged
violations of the statutes noted.
A relative of Mr. Haldeman at the White House, France Raine, reported
that while attending a football game in Los Angeles in October, 1970, he overheard
a conversation between two men sitting near him whom he believed to be prominent
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 15
3
-
- 3 -
in the Business Executives Movement for Vietnam (BEM). This conversation
involved the plan on the part of an unidentified individual to leak secret informa-
tion to the press in the Spring of 1971, with the unidentified individual being
mentioned as being an employee of Rand Corporation and having formerly served
as an advisor to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. Also mentioned by the
.conversants was the plan on the part of two White House aides to resign their
positions sometime during the Summer of 1971 and to make anti-Administration
revelations at that time regarding U. S. Vietnam policy. Ellsberg was known to
-
have appeared on at least two occasions as a speaker for BEM functions in
Los Angeles and Washington, D. C. A close associate of his in Los Angeles was
a former leader of the BEM chapter in that city. We have intensified our investiga-
tion of BEM and conducted extensive investigation to pin down identities of persons
seated near Raine during the game in question. We are continuing our investigation
along these lines to pinpoint a possible conspiracy existing as early as October,
1970, with ramifications of anti-Administration activity and revelation of classified
information.
We have recently received from Attorney General clarification of the
areas in which we can conduct investigation in this matter and, as a result, are
extending our interviews into news media circles where we feel we can uncover
individuals who will cooperate with us in revealing details of the Ellsberg
revelations and any conspiracy that may have existed involving him and others to
· expose to public scrutiny the classified information involved in this case.
2. At the outset of this investigation Assistant Director Brennan spoke
at a Division Chiefs' Conference and also directly to the Section Chief, Nationalities
Intelligence Section, regarding the possibility of a wide-scale conspiracy in which
Ellsberg could be involved. His observations along these lines were recorded in
a memorandum to all Division Chiefs dated 7/23/71 and captioned "Re: Organizational
Survey (Priorities and Manpower)." In this memorandum he commented upon the
fact that the Ellsberg case might be a landmark in historical significance in view
of the long-range potential regarding Governmental operations and the FBI's role
in relation thereto. He stated that the leak in this case represented a deliberate
and determined effort on the part of certain individuals to seriously disrupt and
destroy the Government's capacity to carry out effectively its foreign policy in
various areas.
Mr. Brennan noted that the past 15 to 20 years had witnessed the evolutior
of a new breed of fanatics who were determined to disrupt and destroy Governmental
operations and to alter this country's foreign policy. He further noted that the
movement supported by these fanatics bordered on treason which must be dealt
with if our current form of Government is to survive.
4
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 16
No
excis
During the early stages of the investigation in this case it became
quite evident that Ellsberg had received assistance in getting into the hands
of various newspapers the "McNamara Study." He admitted as much on
6/28/71 in responding to questions raised by reporters when he surrendered
himself at the Boston Courthouse following issuance of a complaint charging
him with violating the Espionage Statute. Accordingly, the thrust of our
investigation has been directed toward identifying any individual or individuals
or organization that may have assisted or conspired with Ellsberg. It was
noted that developments had indicated that at least part of the "McNamara Study”
was reportedly in the possession of the Institute for Policy Studies and that
while a page-by-page review of the Bureau's file on that Institute had not
revealed any information concerning Ellsberg, we had developed material in the
Ellsberg investigation showing connections between him and some of the Institute
employees.
On 7/6/71 the Director prepared a memorandum for Messrs. Tolson,
Sullivan, Brennan and Bishop to advise that the Honorable H. R. Haldeman,
Assistant to the President, had called the Director about the Ellsberg case.
The Director stated that Mr. Haldeman said the President wanted a report
on the case immediately to bring him up to date and then to keep him filled in,
and that the President was particularly interested in the complicity of individuals.
Ọn 7/6/71 with the Director's approval a conference was held with
Departmental attorneys during which Assistant Attorney General Robert C.
Mardian explained that information coming to his attention from Departments
of Defense and State officials indicated that a group at each of these Departments
may be involved in a ring to pass out classified information. He said that while
this may or may not be related to the Ellsberg case he was most désirous of
getting a complete rundown on Ellsberg's background to determine if any of his
associates may have come under suspicion in connection with other leaks. He
also said the President was vitally concerned not only with the Ellsberg case but
with all aspects of leaks of classified information of the Executive Branch.
We have not developed any hard evidence confirming that a wide-spread
organized conspiracy exists to leak Government information. We are aware,
however, of one thread common to certain of these leaks. That is, individuals
such as Ellsberg, who were either bitterly opposed to the U. S. - Vietnam policy
or in disagreement with other major foreign policy issues, have set themselves
up above the law, claiming the right to decide what should be released to the
public regardless of Executive Branch classification assigned to information.
Many of these individuals in common with Ellsberg have been affiliated with one
or more of the so-called "think tanks," such as Rand Corporation, have served
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 17
'5°
"
in a number of sensitive positions in the Executive Branch of the Government
and to a large extent are acquainted with one another, at least on a professional
basis. Communications to appropriate field offices dated 7/7 and 12/71 contained
instructions regarding the necessity for exploring the various facets of this
situation.
The conspiracy aspects of the Ellsberg case as revealed to date are
set forth in Item 3 below.
3. Speculation that Daniel Ellsberg conspired with others in obtaining,
reproducing and disclosing the "McNamara Study" has some basis in public
remarks made by him on 6/28/71 indicating that "It is implicit ... that other
individuals helped out in various ways, " and that he and the press share the
responsibility for the newspapers' obtaining the study. We have, however,
pursued the possibility of conspiracy from every conceivable angle and while
investigation has produced some circumstantial evidence to support this theory,
we have not found grounds to indicate existence of an over-all plot or conspiracy,
threading its way throughout Ellsberg's actions.
Count One of a two-count indictment returned by a Federal grand jury
on 6/28/71 charges Ellsberg with unauthorized possession, access to, and
control over copies of what, in effect, was the "McNamara Study," from about
September, 1969, to approximately October, 1969, while Count Two of this
indictment charges that during the same approximate time span Ellsberg
willfully, knowingly and unlawfully converted to his own use copies of these
documents. We have established Ellsberg legally had access to the Study in the
course of his employment with Rand Corporation at Santa Monica, California,
but that he also obtained and had in his possession 18 volumes of a preliminary
draft of the Study for at least nine months without the knowledge of the Top Secret
Control Officer at Rand in Santa Monica. Failure of Rand employees in Washington.
D. C., and at Santa Monica to adhere to established, in-house security procedures
accounts for the fact Ellsberg was able to conceal his possession of these 18
volumes, and while over-all possession by Ellsberg of the Study and its
preliminary draft volumes continues to be closely examined, no evidence exists
of conspiracy at this point of the case.
Count Two of the aforementioned indictment, relating to conversion
of these documents, is founded on information that Ellsberg reproduced a large
: quantity of classified documents in October, 1969, at the office of one Lynda Sinav.
in the Los Angeles area. Ellsberg's two children, present at this reproduction
session, have identified individuals who assisted Ellsberg in this task, but
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 18
interviews of these persons have developed nothing to indicate they were aware
of the nature of the items being reproduced or of what use Ellsberg intended
to make of the copies reproduced. Anthony Russo, a fellow employee of
Ellsberg's at Rand in Santa Monica, would have been in an excellent position to
have been aware of the ultimate purpose of Ellsberg's actions but has refused to
talk to the Federal grand jury in Los Angeles, and is currently in jail for
: contempt of court relating to this refusal.
Subsequent to the duplicating of documents in October, 1969, Ellsberg,
“by his own statements, claims to have made efforts to furnish copies of these
documents to Senator J. William Fulbright and former Senator Charles E. Goodell,
and Senator George S. McGovern may also have been approached by Ellsberg
' concerning making these documents public. Representative Paul N. McCloskey,
Jr., is also known to be in possession of documents which he publicly admits
were given to him by Ellsberg. Data available concerning this phase of Ellsberg's
actions also fails to indicate he acted in concert with anyone.
"
On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" published the first of a series
of articles purporting to have been based on the "McNamara Study," and a
number of other newspapers in the U. S. subsequently printed similar articles.
Investigation has placed Neil Sheehan, a reporter for "The New York Times, in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, during March and April, 1971, under an assumed
name, and we have determined Sheehan and his wife engaged in a number of
frantic copying sessions of documents during the period 3/21-23/71. Four
blurred Xerox copies discarded during this duplicating have been identified by
the National Security Agency as being reproductions of pages appearing in the
"McNamara Study." It is highly probable Sheehan and Ellsberg cooperated closely
in actions which enabled "The New York Times" to obtain the documents utilized
in articles published by this newspaper and we have recently uncovered evidence
indicating representatives of at least three other newspapers which have published.
articles based on the "McNamara Study" were in the Boston area in June, 1971,
for the apparent purpose of obtaining copies of these documents. A source closely
connected with one of these newspapers has advised that his newspaper obtained
the documents after receiving a telephone call from an unknown individual who
instructed that a reporter from the newspaper go to Cambridge and make the
necessary arrangements to obtain them by calling a certain, unidentified telephone
number. Investigation subsequently placed this reporter in Cambridge, but we
´have, to date, been unsuccessful in determining who furnished him with the
material in question. While the newspapermen thus involved may have cooperated
with Ellsberg in various ways in order to obtain the desired documents,
available evidence does not suggest they conspired with him in carrying out the
disclosure of these documents, but rather took advantage of his offer to furnish
them with the material.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 19
7.
-7.
We are, however, vigorously pursuing all leads relating to the
possession by "The New York Times" and other newspapers of the "McNamara
Study" and have proposed that the field be authorized to immediately initiate
interviews with friendly newsmen concerning this matter. We believe this area
of investigation offers excellent possibilities of effecting a major breakthrough
in this case.
There remains the suggestion Ellsberg may have received the coopera-
tion of or conspired with various New Left, anti-draft, anti-Vietnam war
elements, and this possibility has received the most penetrating examination.
We know Ellsberg to have been friendly with a number of individuals connected
with the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington, D. C., and evidence
exists that the IPS has been in possession for some time of documents which may
be identical with the "McNamara Study." We have also learned, in tracing the
development of Ellsberg's thinking from "hawk" to "dove," that from August,
1969, he became increasingly associated with a number of the more prominent
anti-war exponents in this country, many of whom occupy important posts at
Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We are in the
process of tying together all of this data, in an effort to surface, if possible,
any possible connection between these elements and Ellsberg in the disclosure
of the highly classified "McNamara Study," but information available to date
does not, as yet, substantiate or corroborate existence of a conspiracy in this
regard.
4. With particular regard to the President's concern expressed by
Mr. Haldeman to the Director, mentioned hereinbefore, with respect to the
complicity of individuals, and the instructions of the Attorney General that the
Bureau in each leak case identify the individuals responsible, it is quite clear
that we must resolve all allegations, especially those pertaining to possible
conspiracies, during the course of our inquiries. As noted in Item 1, our
inquiries have expanded to include not only the leak to "The New York Times"
but to encompass the eight other newspapers which carried portions of the
"McNamara Study.". Since its inception, the Ellsberg case has required expanding
supervisory attention here at the SOG.. Nine men are currently committed to the
case. There are no indications at this time that less supervisory attention will be
needed in the near future. In fact, all indications are that there may have to be
more commitments in this regard, particularly if the Department refers additional
leak matters to us for the intensive investigative attention which has been
requested in the past.
. A successful investigation followed by a successful prosecution would
certainly have a very important impact on Governmental processes, particularly
Leave
8
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 20

within the Executive Branch of our Government. When the Supreme Court
refused to grant injunctions sought by the Executive Branch against newspapers
publishing the "McNamara Study," this upheld the freedom of the press. The
question has not yet been litigated with respect to the right of the Executive
Branch to protect its secrets through its classification system.
Unless Ellsberg is prosecuted successfully, anyone within the
Executive Branch would apparently have the right to decide on his own initiative
· what information he wishes to place in the public domain by turning the informa-
tion over to the newspapers. Much of the sensitive negotiations of the Executive
Branch with foreign countries is dependent upon the secrecy with which they
are carried out. If through a classification system or some other means the
Executive Branch is not able to preclude the unauthorized disclosure of its
secrets it is felt the Branch will be weakened to the extent that it cannot effectively
inter
function on the/national scene certainly, and probably on the domestic scene in
some instances. Thus, the structure of the Executive Branch might well collapse.
An unsuccessful prosecution would buttress the considerable support,
particularly from the news media, for Ellsberg's contention that his disclosure
of the classified documents was basically motivated by conscience and by deep
concern that the public should be informed. It is closely related to the viewpoint
_held by a small but growing minority that an individual is free to follow the dictates
of his conscience and to be the final arbiter of the validity of our criminal and
civil statutes. If this thesis were to be supported, then it could apply to murder
and bombings of Government and private institutions where such acts are dictated
by conscience. It could follow that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
functions of the Nation are exercises in futility. This would be a road to anarchy.
From the above, it would appear that the outcome of the Ellsberg
case would have a direct bearing on the Executive Branch of our Government and
could affect the entire Governmental structure.
5(a). At the outset of the investigation, Assistant Director Brennan
instructed the Section Chief to afford special attention to this case and to let
him know of any manpower needs. He emphasized the importance of the case in
his mind and wanted it handled as a special.
Within a day or two Mr. Brennan introduced the Section Chief to
Departmental attorney James McGrath, who is a special assistant to Assistant
Attorney General Mardian. Mr. Brennan advised the Section Chief that McGrath
was the coordinator for Mardian of the various groups under Mardian engaged
in consideration of phases of the Ellsberg case. For example, he explained that
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 21
9
one group headed by Departmental attorney John Martin analyzed all investigative
results received by the Department in an effort to establish whether a case was
being made. Mr. Brennan advised the Section Chief that Mr. McGrath would be
in a position to furnish any information required by the Section Chief from the
Internal Security Division and instructed that copies of daily teletypes received
from our various offices be furnished through Mr. McGrath to the Internal Security
· Division as they came in.
..5(b). Approximately two weeks after this case was instituted, the
Section Chief asked Mr. Brennan if he would brief both the Section Chief and the
Section Number One Man on his concept of the magnitude of this case and its
various ramifications. This was done and Mr. Brennan again emphasized the
need for following all facets on a special basis.
Following the conference with Departmental attorneys 7/6/71,
mentioned hereinbefore, Mr. Brennan summoned Inspector D. E. Moore and
Section Chief Wannall to his office and instructed that a "book" be prepared on
Ellsberg covering his activities and associates during a period of a couple of
ར་ years. He explained what he wanted in this book and provided for an Agent from
Research Section to be assigned full time on its compilation.
On 7/15/71 Mr. Brennan instructed that a copy of each teletype received
at the SOG on this case be furnished to him.
On 7/28/71 Mr. Brennan summoned Inspector D. E. Moore, Section
Chief, Section Number One Man, and all Agents working on this case to his
office for a conference. In compliance with his request, he was briefed on
investigative results to date. He asked if serious consideration had been given
to the possibility that Ellsberg himself was not directly involved in turning over
the "McNamara Study" to "The New York Times," and instructed that we look
into this phase of the matter very carefully.
‘On 8/2/71 Mr. Brennan summoned to his office the Section Chief and
Case Supervisor Wagoner for the purpose of introducing them to Mr. G., G.
GG
Liddey of the White House. He explained that Mr. Liddey was coordinating all
White House interest in this matter. Mr. Liddey pointed out that the White
House wanted this case handled as a "Bureau special" and that a letter from the
White House to that effect would be forwarded.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 22°
10
- 10
5(c). At the present time there are nine Agent Supervisors assigned
to this matter.
Investigation was instituted 6/15/71 and from then until 6/23/71
manpower assignments were handled within the Section.
On 6/23/71 two additional Agents were placed in the Section on a loan
basis and they were assigned to operational desks, as Agents permanently assigned
to those desks from within the Section were assigned to the McLek case.
On 6/28/71 an Agent was assigned on a loan basis from Extremist
Intelligence Section and this loan Agent has been rotated on a weekly basis
since. He has been utilized to cover an operational desk while one of the
regularly assigned Agents in the Section (H. J. Morgan) has been assigned
full time to this case.
On 7/8/71 an Agent from Research Section was assigned full time to
prepare a "book" on Ellsberg and has worked on this exclusively with the
exception of an amual leave period of 8/2-13/71. He has not participated in any¨
other phase of the case on a day-to-day basis.
On 7/8/71 one man on weekly rotating basis was assigned temporarily
from the Espionage Section and continues to the present time. This loan Super-
visor has been utilized to cover an operational desk within the Section while the
regularly assigned Supervisor on the desk (J. R. Hagy) has been utilized full time
on instant case.
On 7/29/71 an Agent from within the Section (L. E. Belanger) was
assigned part time to handle special aspects of the Ellsberg case, relating
specifically to electronic surveillance checks on potential witnesses.
Memorandum Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson 8/4/71 captioned "Adequacy of
Personnel, Leak Cases, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)," recommended and
the Director approved that the number of Agents assigned to handle leak cases,
including Ellsberg case, be increased immediately from five to seven, these
two additional Agents to be diverted from other assignments in Domestic Intelli-
gence Division with at least one to be diverted from the CP, USA Unit. The
Director approved this. At that time we had five men working full time on
instant and related cases, including J. M. Sizoo, who was involved exclusively
in preparation of a "book" on Ellsberg.
On 8/9/71 in the absence of additional manpower from outside the
Section, the number of Agents committed to instant and related cases was increased
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 23
11
-.11
from five to seven by assigning full time from within the Section SA L. E.
Belanger and on a rotating basis one Agent from the Middle and South American
Unit (B. M. Perez). Perez was replaced by SA W. W. Hamilton on 8/16/71.
On 8/13/71 two additional Agents were provided from outside the
Section, one on a full-time basis and one on a rotating weekly basis. The Agent
assigned on a full-time basis (T. J. Seabaugh) was immediately assigned to
the McLek case. The Agent assigned on the weekly rotating basis was
assigned to assist on one of the regular operational desks within the Section.
and an Agent who had been continuously on loan with the exception of an annual
leave period of 8/6-16/71 (J. P. Benedict) was assigned full time to instant
matters.
In summary, manpower from outside the Section have been assigned
on a temporary basis on 6/23/71 (two Agents); 6/28/71 (one Agent); 7/8/71
(two Agents); and 8/13/71 (two Agents). Three of these loan Agents are now
working full time on McLek case while four are assisting in covering operational
desks that exist within this Section. Six Agents from within this Section are
assigned full time to McLek case.
.
5(d). From above discussion, it will be noted that this case is
directed at developing evidence concerning violations of Federal statutes under
which we have investigative jurisdiction and our principal efforts have been
directed toward this responsibility. There are also far reaching aspects of the
case which require investigative attention and because they are so diversified
there is a necessity for directing efforts in the first instance along those channels
which are of greatest importance. These channels relate especially to the
possibility of a conspiracy, if in fact one exists, on the part of individuals to
acquire and release without authorization classified material of the Executive
Branch of the Government.
As noted above, evidence has been developed which would support
those prosecutive aspects which to date have been considered by the Department
and efforts are currently underway to resolve the potential conspiracy aspects.
The principal problems which have arisen with respect to supervision
of this case have related to efforts on the part of Assistant Attorney General
Mardian and attorneys within his Division to (1) conduct investigative activity
on their own and (2) to direct our investigative activities frequently into areas
tangential to the main thrust of the case. With respect to investigative efforts
by Mardian, the following are cited as examples:
NW 88608 Docid:32989638. Page 24
12
12
On 6/29/71 Mardian telephonically advised he was sending a Depart-
mental attorney to see Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., who had received
from Ellsberg some copies of classified documents. He said the Departmental
attorney would discuss with Mathias the possibility of Mathias' turning these
documents over to him. Mardian asked if we wanted to have an Agent accompany
the attorney. The Director concurred that no Agent accompany the attorney,
stating, "Let Mardian's emissary accept them."
On 7/21/71 when Agents of Washington Field Office endeavored to
interview Mr. Charles W. Cooke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare, they were advised by Cooke that he would not submit to
interview in the absence of clearance granted by the Deputy Attorney General.
This was in pursuance of a lead which had been referred to us by Mardian and
when the Cooke interview was attempted it was learned for the first time that two
attorneys from the Internal Security Division had been designated to conduct
the interview with Cooke.
On 8/10/71 one of Mardian's attorneys telephoned to say that he was
going to interview an informant the next day in connection with this case and asked
if the Bureau would arrange a place where he could meet securely with the
informant and whether the Bureau desired to have an Agent present during the
interview. In concurring that Bureau should not accede to these requests, the
Director noted, "If Mardian's outfit would refrain from what are basically
investigative activities and leave it to the Bureau there would be less friction."
"
On 8/12/71 the Bureau received through misrouting a communication
which Mardian had addressed to the Attorney General to summarize current
information in what he described as "Our continuing investigation into the
acquisition of the 'McNamara Study' by the 'New York Times." The Director
inquired whether Mardian's outfit was conducting their own investigation in this
matter, as indicated by the contents of the memorandum. As a matter of fact,
material summarized by Mardian was nothing more than information extracted
from Bureau teletypes showing FBI investigative results.
With respect to Mardian's efforts to direct our investigative activities,
the following are the most recent examples:
By letters dated 8/12 and 8/23/71 we received from Mardian lengthy
instructions for conducting of investigation in the Ellsberg matter. It is quite
evident from a review of these communications that the requests contained therein
are the results of disorganized review of the material furnished to Department
by the Bureau.
NW 88608 .Docld:32989638 Page 25
13.
-
13
For example, both letters contained requests to conduct investiga-
tion previously conducted and reported to the Department. Certain other
requests contained therein would more logically fall within the province of the
Special Task Force Committee established by the Department of Defense to
analyze Rand Corporation security procedures. Other requested investigation
had previously been initiated by the Bureau and other investigative requests were
not on their face germane to the violations or potential violations of law. Certain
of the requested investigation appeared to be based on unsupported assumptions
and theories of the invdvement of other individuals in the leak of the "Pentagon
Papers" but offered no basis or reasons for the requested investigation.
;
The most recent letter, 8/23/71, contained request for investigation
of Ellsberg's travel. We have been developing this information since the
inception of our investigation and it has been furnished to the Department on an
almost daily basis. This letter also requested inquiries concerning certain
telephone calls by Ellsberg, investigation concerning most of which had also
been previously initiated. Mardian also stated Department files had no informa-
tion on Leonard S. Rodberg, whose name has recently come up in this case as the
possible source of the "McNamara Study" material which will be published by
the Beacon Press in Boston. We have in this and other cases furnished information
on Rodberg in approximately a dozen communications.
The analyses of these lengthy letters from Mardian requires the
expenditure of a. considerable amount of Agent time. They indicate that Mardian's
group, apparently in efforts to direct our investigation; are propounding questions,
some of which are relevant but many of which are not relevant to the main thrust
of our investigation, some of which should be referred elsewhere, and others of
which have been previously answered.
In accordance with instructions issued by the Assistant Director, we
are furnishing to Mardian copies of the daily teletypes from our field offices.
These teletypes contain "raw" investigative results not coordinated. The
coordination of these results regularly appears in our investigative reports
which are also furnished to Mardian. We feel that the reports resolve many of
the questions which have been propounded by Mardian in the past and it would
enhance our investigative efforts to eliminate dissemination of the daily teletypes
in the future and give to the Department investigative results in report form,
supplemented by a weekly summary letter which we regularly forward to him.
:
14
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 26
ELLSBERG CASE
4-A-3
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
I generally concur with the comments of Mr. Wannall
as to the progress and status of this case from an investigative
standpoint. I have reminded Mr. Wannall that the development of
direct evidence should not be obscured by the broadening of the
scope of this case. He has been advised that his objective must
consistently be the development of substantial admissible evidence
necessary to establish a conviction as to Federal violations
charged in the Los Angeles indictment of Ellsberg and others which
may develop from other corollary investigations being conducted.
From the outset, as stated by Mr. Wannall, I expressed
the importance of this case and instructed him to advise me of
any manpower needs. The question of manpower is discussed under
the caption "Adequacy of Personnel" found in 6E of this report and
was the subject of my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan 7/29/71 captioned
"Proposed Adjustments of Work Assignments, DID," memorandum of
W. R. Wannall to Mr. Felt 8/12/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel,
DID," and my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan 8/12/71 captioned "Adequacy
of Personnel, Leak Cases, DID."
In reference to Mr. Wannall's concluding suggestion in
his writeup, the procedure of furnishing daily teletypes to the
Department in major cases is not unusual. The high level interest
of the Department, which will eventually be responsible for the
prosecution of this case, as well as the interest of the White
House dictates that teletypes in this matter be disseminated
consistent with the Director's instructions, copy attached. It
appears we should clarify the Department's use of these "raw"
investigative results as set forth in our teletypes and suggest
their detailed reviews be conducted from Bureau investigative
reports, which are the normal communication for such use. Mr. Wannall
will be instructed to advise the Department by letter with regard
to the foregoing pointing out that our weekly summary letters and
investigative reports will resolve many of the questions they raise
as to information in our teletypes.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/27/71
CDB:1ml
4-A-3
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 27
کیا
TED STATES DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL KOREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 29:35
STICE
April 15, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SULLIVAIT
MR. BRENNAN'
MR. ROSEN
I have tried to lay down intelligent guidolines as
to what should be serijand what should not be sent to the Internal
Security Division of the Department. In the kot several days I
have noted a mumbor of mexoranda addressed to the Attorney
General and the Deputy Attorney General about metters about
which the Internal Security Division should have boon advised
and I have had to cendittese back and request that memoranis
be appropriately addressed to the Assistant Attorney General
of the Internal Security Division. Apparently 1 bave failed in
pointing out the guidolisen 1 desired, so henceforth, you should
send everything, including the kitchen stove if it comes in, to
the Interral Security Division. It is hopelose to get a considered
understanding of my wishes in this matter, which i holleve in
Iargely due to some degree of stubbornede because of the recent
disciplinary action I had to take when we failed to advise the
Attorney General about the Media burglary.
Therefore, as I havo indicated, henceforth you will
Bend everything to the Internal Security Division that in eny
way relates directly or indirectly to the work and jurisdiction
of that
vision.
:
Very truly yours,
J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director
JEH:EDM (7)
16
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 28
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(R. E. White:bhg, 9/7/71).
This case involves the publishing of parts
of the "McNamara Study" in June, 1971,
by "The New York Times. " The evidence
to date strongly indicates Daniel Ellsberg is responsible for furnishing the
classified data to representatives of this newspaper, and he has been indicted
by a Federal Grand Jury for the unauthorized possession and conversion of
these documents. This is the case simply stated; however, this matter is
far from being so simple. From its inception, this case has been complicated
by the enormity of the work to be completed and problems inherent in this
unusual investigation.
In regard to the amount of work involved, a survey was made
to establish how many communications were dated during the period of a
single week (Saturdays and Sundays included). As a result of this survey,
the following represents the number of communications dated during the
weeks noted below:
INCOMING
Teletypes Airtels Reports Letters
7/11-17/71
107
21
5
2
8/1-7/71
81
26
5
3
8/8-14/71
88
82
24
4
2
OUTGOING
Teletypes Airtels Letters
7/11-17/71
8
4
8
8/1-7/71
14
0
8
8/8-14/71
19
3
10
7/11-17/71
8/1-7/71
8/8-14/71
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 29
INTRA-SOG
Memo
15
7
15
17
The above-noted chart is believed to be representative of the
high volume of communications received daily. Many of these communications
were lengthy and/or complicated requiring close analysis by one or more
supervisors assigned to this "Special." Also, a check of the work devoted to
the preparation of daily summary memos and of weekly summaries disclosed
a supervisor would arrive at the office at approximately 5:30 a.m. each morning,
Monday through Friday, to have the daily memos dictated and typed by 8:15 a.m.
the same day, and the Supervisor responsible for the weekly summary due each
Monday would spend approximately 6 hours preparing this communication on
the prior Sunday. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that many responses to the
letters from the Attorney General's Office require extensive research.
With the approval by the Attorney General to interview newspaper-
men, it is anticipated that the work load will increase rather than decrease in
the immediate future. Initially there will be at least 75 newspapermen to be
interviewed and numerous additional leads will be developed from these inter-
views. This investigation involves numerous facets and requires extensive
work and supervision.
Presently there are 9 Supervisors assigned to this case and their
responsibilities are as follows:
E. R. Harrell, Unit Chief, reviews all outgoing correspondence,
reviews incoming reports in Ellsberg case; supervises preparation of daily
summary memorandum, weekly White House memorandum in Ellsberg case,
SALT Lek case (leak of classified information concerning Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks appearing in "The New York Times"), and the Toll Lek
case (leak from State Department cables concerning alleged misconduct of
Bert M. Tollefson, Jr.); assists in setting out leads from daily teletype
correspondence from field.
J. R. Wagoner, as case Agent in McLek, responsible for review
of all incoming reports as to adequacy of reporting and leads; maintains and
supervises operation of lead box in Ellsberg case; responsible for follow-up
communications on outstanding leads; has basic responsibility for preparation
of weekly White House summary; assists in preparation of daily memorandum
summarizing prior day's investigative activity in the field.
J. R. Hagy, as case Agent, has all supervisory responsibility
for Toll Lek; conducts research on all New Left aspects of Ellsberg investi-
gation and responsible for preparation of comprehensive analysis of New
Left implication in the case; responsible for setting out leads relative to New
Left associates and contacts by Ellsberg; responsible for following field
investigation; corroborating attendance by Ellsberg at New Left functions;
assists in leads obtained from daily teletypes in McLek and Toll Lek cases;
18
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 30

assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum; and assists in prepara-
tion of weekly White House summary.
H. J. Morgan, as case Agent, has primary responsibility for
supervision of SALT Lek case; reviews all incoming correspondence and
sets out pertinent leads relative to SALT Lek; assists in preparation of daily
“memorandum summarizing investigation in all three major leak cases afore-
mentioned; assists in review of daily teletype traffic in all three major leak
cases; review of dissemination of weekly reports in SALT Lek; assists in
preparation of White House summary.
L. E. Belanger handles all ELSUR checks; reviews, correlates
and conducts necessary research relative to all material received from
Department of Defense in Ellsberg investigation; responsible for backup file
reviews in connection with New Left contacts by Ellsberg; assists in preparation
of weekly White House memorandum; assists in preparation of daily summary
memorandum.
T. J. Seabaugh assigned exclusively to a comprehensive study,
charting and research into extensive travel performed by Daniel Ellsberg;
responsible for setting out leads to insure complete coverage of all details
of travel facets of investigation.
J. P. Benedict responsible for extensive file reviews regarding
numerous news media personnel and personalities involved in Ellsberg
investigation to ascertain their susceptibility to interview as cooperative
sources; conducting extensive research and charting of the considerable
telephone traffic involved in this matter, including traffic from Daniel
Ellsberg, Anthony Russo, the Sheehans, "The New York Times," the
Washington bureaus of all newspapers involved, traffic from various hotels
utilized by Ellsberg and his contacts, and all other individuals whose
telephone traffic has been subpoenaed as a result of Departmental action via
Grand Jury subpoena.
W. W.
V. 
Hamilton assists in preparation of daily summary memo-
randum; responsible for review and appropriate preparation of all summary
teletypes for dissemination to Department of Justice; file reviews on the
numerous news personalities being considered for interviews as potential
cooperative sources in the Ellsberg investigation; handling of correspondence
connected with leads obtained from daily teletypes; assists in preparation of
White House summary.
19
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 31
J. M. Sizoo assigned exclusively to the research and preparation
of an extensive biographical write-up on Ellsberg. In this regard, facts con-
cerning Ellsberg's life, behavioral patterns, associates, education, political
views, personality transformations, family, and influences will be studied
and analyzed.
In addition to the above specific assignments, each member of
the unit on a daily basis is required to participate in Section, Unit and/or
Branch conferences for resolution of investigative facets of the Ellsberg,
Toll Lek and SALT Lek investigations.
Some of the problems involved in this investigation are:
(1) Whether Ellsberg was alone responsible for this crime, or
whether he was part of a small or large-scale conspiracy.
(2) Whether the purpose was for idealistic reasons (anti-Vietnam
War beliefs), to discredit the Executive Branch of the Government, or to
make available classified information to a foreign nation.
(3) Investigations have been conducted by agencies other than
the FBI: State Department, Department of Defense, NSA and the Attorney
General's Office, and it is the Bureau's responsibility to review and analyze these
investigations.
(4) To determine what other persons and newspapers received
these documents and from whom they received this data.
(5) Innumerable interviews involve newspapermen, Government
officials, and persons having far left leanings, against U. S. policy in Vietnam
and antagonistic toward the present Administration. These are all delicate
interviews.
(6) To determine whether the New Left and/or any anti-Vietnam
peace groups are involved in this case.
(7) All logical avenues of investigation to bring this case to a
successful prosecution must be explored. An unsuccessful prosecution would
open the door for anyone at whim to disclose classified information which
could easily endanger the stability of the Executive Branch and impair our
relations with other nations.
20
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 32
(8) The White House and the Attorney General's Office are closely
following this matter and all other leak cases, and in this respect the Attorney
General's Office has sent numerous communications requesting certain leads
be covered by the FBI. These requests must be analyzed by DID and the
appropriate communications answered, which is a time-consuming administrative
procedure.
In regard to the last situation noted above, you are aware that
the Department is reviewing for lead purposes the daily teletypes we furnish
them. Thereafter, they send us a communication requesting us to conduct
these leads. This must be stopped. Such a procedure is unproductive and
time consuming, resulting in additional unnecessary communications to the
Department. You are instructed to immediately advise the Department that
the purpose of the daily teletypes is to make them cognizant of the devebpments
in this case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investi-
gation based on these communications.
With the importance of this case, the urgency of the problems
to be resolved, the immediacy of the work to be performed, and the volume ·
of communications received daily, there appears sufficient work at the
present for nine Supervisors. However, you must constantly evaluate the
work load to assure that the assigned manpower is fully justified. Also, much
of the present work is exploratory, which involves researching and analyzing
and thereafter assuring that the many facets are immediately and fully
probed. Once these exploratory aspects are sufficiently investigated, this
case will be directed toward more specific objectives which will narrow the
investigative field. As this transition period is entered, immediate con-
sideration should be given to reducing the manpower assigned to this matter.
Also, it is incumbent upon you to make certain that all logical investigation
is expeditiously and fully conducted in order that the Bureau will not be
subjected to criticism by any person or agency.
A review of this matter indicates that you should continue affording
it top priority supervision and direction.
Comments of Assistant Director and Section Chief Wannall requested.
21
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 33
ADDENDUM
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALI
(WRW:ams 9/7/71)
The analysis and observations of
the Inspector have been noted.
We will continue affording top priority
supervision and direction to this case. In addition, we will immediately advise
the Department that the purpose of daily dissemination of teletypes to the
Internal Security Division is to make that Division cognizant of developments in
the case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investigation
based on these communications.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(CDB: mls 9/7/71)
I concur with the above.
22
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 34
:
EAST COAST CONSPIRACY
4-A-4
JASPECTO
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
At the time of the last inspection this
matter was being afforded urgent
supervision and investigation for the purpose of identifying all of the
conspirators and perfecting cases for prosecution against them.
You are requested to provide a brief narrative summary of this investigation
and bring it up to date. Indicate in your response the number of subjects
on whom we have developed prosecutive cases, the number yet to be developed
and in each instance indicate what you feel are the possibilities of successful
prosecution.
In this regard, identify any cases in which successful prosecution is in
doubt and indicate what action is being taken to erase the doubt.
What is the current status of prosecution of these cases and when do you
feel these cases will be adjudicated?
From a supervisory standpoint, advise how much manpower is being
expended presently on the supervision of this (these) cases and indicate when
you feel these men can be reassigned to other work.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD
The investigation of the
East Coast Conspiracy to
Save Lives (EASTCON) is concerned with plots in Washington, D. C.,
to blow up the tunnels housing the heating system servicing
Government buildings and to kidnap a high Government official.
Individuals connected with these plots are all associated with
the Berrigan antiwar movement. An indictment was returned during
8/24/71
FBG/GHM:plm
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ESM:wmj
4-A-4
EM
John:~
23
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 35
the last inspection (1/12/71) at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which
charged six individuals with complicity in these plots and two
of these six were charged additionally with a violation of the
contraband statute in that they caused unauthorized letters to
be exchanged into and out of the Federal Penitentiary & Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania. There were also seven individuals named in the
indictment as unindicted co-conspirators.
Our investigation into this matter continued, and on
4/30/71, a superseding indictment was returned which expanded the
charges and strengthened our case. Eight individuals were included
in this indictment as defendants, and the number of unindicted
co-conspirators was reduced to four. The superseding indictment
includes those charges listed above and added the conspiracy
aspects of the selected Selective Service break-in cases in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Rochester, New York; Wilmington,
Dover, and Georgetown, Delaware. Two additional counts added to
the superseding indictment involve three individuals and charged
them with the mailing of a threatening communication.
In addition to the substantive case, potential witnesses
have been either cited for civil contempt of court or indicted for
criminal contempt of court in connection with their refusal to
answer questions before the Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) in Harrisburg
after being granted immunity. Five individuals were cited for civil
contempt, and four individuals were indicted for criminal contempt.
Two of these cases are currently the subject of a petition by the
Government to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of
certiorari, and the other cases are being held in abeyance until
the Supreme Court renders its decision.
From the investigation conducted to date and the comments
of the prosecutive staff of the Department, there does not appear
to be any reason to believe ……. that prosecution of this case
will not be successful.
The substantive EASTCON case is currently in the pretrial
stage with numerous motions of both the Government and the defense
still pending before the court. At present, it appears that the
court will be unable to set this matter for trial until January,
1972.
Even though we are well on our way to trial, due to the
complexities of charges in the indictment and the broad scope of
the violations involved, there exists additional facets of investi-
gation of a continuing nature which will possibly increase as the
trial date approaches.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 36
24
For example, in the Fall of 1970 we undertook to
determine through an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) project
whether EASTCON principals had established a long distance
telephone communication network. The basis for this theory was
information received from our informant, PH 1211-S, who advised
that fictitious telephone credit card numbers were being utilized
by members of the Berrigan antiwar movement to facilitate contacts.
This project disclosed voluminous calls between EASTCON principals
and between them and sympathizers from their own telephones and
also corroborate the fraudulent use of fictitious telephone credit
card numbers. This information was of value to the Department in
the examination of witnesses before the FGJ since it placed
witnesses in a position of either admitting contact between each
other on specific dates, committing perjury, or claiming the
Fifth Amendment. This project has more recently been extended
and is now being utilized to identify individuals involved in the
Washington, D. C., plots of the EASTCON case through "nonhit"
telephone toll calls between EASTCON activists and persons not
previously known to have been active in the movement. It is
believed that recent information from this project, developed
further by investigation, has identified, a Capitol Hill elevator
operator who was recruited for these plots. The project is a
continuing one, and the investigation of pertinent developments
hopefully will identify an engineer who was consulted on the
tunnel plot, as well as other individuals involved in the
Washington, D. C., action. The very technical nature of the
raw material developed by the ADP project has resulted in
individuals at the Bureau and certain offices such as Philadelphia,
New York, Baltimore, and WFO having become well versed and
particularly adroit in the interpretation of such complicated
information.
-
The investigation of EASTCON includes the handling of
two informants; the first, PH 1211-S, is the individual who will
be responsible for the introduction of the most convincing
evidence against all of the defendants the letters between
Philip Berrigan and Elizabeth McAlister which relate to every
count in the indictment. Since the testimony of this informant
before the FGJ, he has become theoretically the responsibility of
the Department, as a Government witness, but of necessity, the
Bureau has coordinated his activities, etc., because of his
peculiar status until he testifies at trial. He is currently
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 37
25
living many miles from Harrisburg under an assumed identity and is
gainfully employed through the assistance of the Bureau. All of
these problems have been coordinated through the Bureau to insure
the security of this valuable source. As an example, the informant's
father recently died and unfriendly members of the news media
became aware of funeral arrangements. By instructions of the
Bureau and through very competent handling by the field, the
security of this informant was maintained in spite of the presence
of unfriendly members of the press at the funeral. It will be
necessary to continue to coordinate any other problems of this
nature until his testimony is heard during trial. In this regard,
as the trial date approaches, other problems develop requiring
Bureau assistance such as arrangements for "in depth" conferences
with the Department's prosecutive team under secure circumstances.
This will be a very important conference since the informant has
only been interviewed (briefly) by the Department on one occasion,
and no opportunity has existed since his appearance before the FGJ
to further explore his testimony.
வாட்
We have also developed another informant, PH 1223-S, who
is a close friend of Philip Berrigan and active sympathizers in
the Berrigan antiwar movement. He is the only individual who has
obtained any identification of possible MEDBURG suspects from
John Peter Grady (arrested in the Camden Federal Building break-in
8/22/71). Grady indirectly claimed credit for that action and by
inference named other people who are considered prime suspects.
The informant has recently accepted a position of running a
newspaper at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on behalf of The Defense
Committee, the legal, bail bond, and public relations arm of the
Berrigan antiwar movement. He is a unique and cunning individual
who is now in a vital position to keep us informed of the on-the-
scene and behind-the-scene activities in Harrisburg during the
EASTCON trial. One extremely important example of the valuable
information this informant has furnished resulted in our initiating
(as a corollary investigation to EASTCON) an Espionage X-type
case based upon information he received from an ardent Berrigan
supporter who has stated the intention to obtain classified
documents from the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas,
to be publicized for the benefit of the antiwar movement in the
same manner as those circulated by Daniel Ellsberg.
With respect to The Defense Committee, investigation is
being coordinated as to the activities of this loose-knit group
due to its direct relationship to the EASTCON case. There has
evolved a national organization, and the activities of local
groups, as they become organized, will be followed by the Bureau
for intelligence information. As an indication of the potential
of this body, recognizing that its real push for funds
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 38
26
will reportedly not begin until the Fall of 1971, information
has been received that they already have substantial funds in
their coffers.
N
From information developed by PH 1223-S, it was determined
that John Peter Grady was planning an "action" which from an
analysis of the facts known at the Bureau appeared to centered
in the New Jersey area. After observations in this regard were
furnished to the field, investigation culminated in his being
located in the Camden, New Jersey, area. The investigation which
followed resulted in the arrest of 20 individuals on 8/22/71 in
the act of destroying and stealing draft board records in the
Camden Federal Building. The individuals arrested included Peter
Fordi (an original member of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save
Lives), Paul Couming, and John Swinglish, both indicted at
Harrisburg for criminal contempt after refusing to testify
before the EASTCON FGJ when granted immunity from prosecution.
PH 1211-S determined Swinglish was the "recruiter" for the
Washington, D. C., plots in the EASTCON case. It is to be
expected that other individuals who are EASTCON activists will
also be indicted at Camden. The evidence already obtained in
that case discloses other EASTCON activists were responsible for
the Selective Service draft board break-in at Trenton, New Jersey,
5/21/71. Likewise, the obviously coordinated Buffalo, New York,
draft board break-in on the night of 8/21-22/71 involved
sympathizers of the EASTCON movement.
In
Much of the foregoing represents the continuing
intelligence coverage of the Berrigan antiwar movement, absolutely
necessary to the Bureau's interests, aside from the important
development of admissible evidence in the EASTCON prosecution.
Further, many pretrial motions (by defense counsel) have been
ruled on by the court, and many others are still outstanding.
anticipation of the court ruling on a motion for Discovery and
Inspection as provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Government, in order to expedite such matters, has previously
This
allowed the inspection of certain evidence in this case.
has been done at various field offices under Departmental super-
vision. The lists of evidence made available, other arrangements
and details with regard to such inspection, has been handled by
guidance from the Bureau. Approximately one half of this evidence
has thus far been inspected with hundreds of items of evidence
still to be inspected in Washington, D. C., Philadelphia, and
Baltimore. The court has ruled in favor of the defense broadly
interpreting the right of Discovery and Inspection, particularly
as to photographic evidence, Laboratory, and Identification
Division reports. The Department has requested such material
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 39
27
to be made available for inspection at the Department in the
near future, and this project is being coordinated by the Bureau.
There are estimated approximately 1,000 photographs submitted by
11 offices. The Laboratory (document examinations) and Identification
Division reports will be voluminous since they include not only
those prepared in connection with the EASTCON case itself, but
also all of those prepared in connection with six Selective
Service Act cases included as conspiracy charges in the EASTCON
indictment. It is apparent that the evidence from the three
offices covering these six Selective Service Act cases will be
voluminous and require close coordination by the Bureau with the
Department into the EASTCON case for a successful prosecution
at trial.
At present, two supervisors are assigned full-time, and
one supervisor spends approximately one half of his time in the
supervision of this case. This investigation continues to generate
a great deal of paper not only on the substantive case but also in
connection with the other matters directly related thereto. It
is anticipated the time of two and a half Agents will be the absolute
minimum required to effectively handle this matter through the
completion of the trial. Depending upon the volume of work
generated by necessary requests of the Department in the pretrial
and trial stages, additional manpower may be necessary at various
times.
The Inspector has specifically inquired as to when these
men can be reassigned to other work. It is to be noted that since
the return of the superseding indictment on 4/30/71, two other
full-time supervisors have been reassigned to other work within
the Division.
It is not anticipated that the two supervisors assigned
full-time to this case will be released prior to the conclusion
of the trial in this matter.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(JAS:1rs)
8-24-71
have read the attached and concur
in the views expressed by Section.
Chief Shackelford.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 40
28

ADDENDUM ·
INSPECTORE. S. MILLER
(ESM:wmj
8/26/71)
You should insure that every action
is taken to insure successful
prosecution in this matter.
Assistant Director please note.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(JAS:mls 8/30/71)
-
The Inspector's comments
The
have been noted.
Bureau may be assured that
every possible action is being taken in the interests of
successful prosecution.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 41
29
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
4-E
!
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
Briefly set forth the noteworthy
accomplishments of your Division,
with a section breakdown, since the last inspection, which ended on 1/26/71.
This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical accomplish-
ments. Specifically where you have devised a program for a definite purpose
furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplishments on this program.
This will give you an opportunity to set forth any Division achievements pertain -
ing to the Bureau's progress, welfare, efficiency or any other items not covered
elsewhere in this inspection.
A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include
identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references to
such matters should be in general terms.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(JAS:mls 8/20/71)
do
Attached are individual
write-ups from each Section
in the Division pertaining
to the accomplishments of that particular Section.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/17/71
NW 88608 FM9638 Page 42
30
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY V
SU
4-E
Attached are memoranda setting out noteworthy
accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the
last inspection.
This Section is responsible for supervision of
investigations of the Communist Party, USA, its fronts, pro-
Chinese communist groups, selected Trotskyist-communist
groups, Klan and white hate groups, international organizations
affiliated with the world communist movement and international
New Left extremist movement, individuals affiliated with these
organizations and movements, as well as sedition cases. Our
purpose is to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these
subversive organizations and individuals under various statutes
relating to the internal security of the Nation and to gather
intelligence of interest to Government officials and other
agencies. The Section also supervises the development and
administration of security informants in basic revolutionary
organizations and other subversive and New Left groups. Where
appropriate, the Section directs counterintelligence operations
against subversive groups and individuals in cases under our
supervision.
NW 88608 D32989638 TELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT
The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves
from the case entitled, "Solo, IS C." Due to the
sensitive nature of this case, it will be orally discussed
with the Inspector.
In essence, this case involves sources developing
intelligence information of the highest quality concerning
the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) the Soviet Union and its
satellites, and the world communist movement. Since its
inception, 38 successful missions to communist countries have
been completed. Information develoned by this oneration from
high-level contacts in the world communist movement is continually
disseminated to the highest levels of our Government and, in many
instances, is information not available from another source.
Examples of this since early 1971 include the following: Soviets
requested CPUSA to provide analysis of public opinion in U.S.
regarding Nixon Administration and U.S.-Soviet relations to be
used by General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev, in speech before 24th Congress
of CPSU in March, 1971, and essence of analysis was provided;
during the 24th Congress, it was learned Soviets doubted whether
U.S. was serious on disarmament and they were concerned over
U.S.-Chinese communist improved relations; Soviet countermeasures
to counteract include planned vast propaganda campaign against
U.S., initiation of a European Security Conference to isolate
U.S., and improvement of Soviet relations with Japan; General
Secretary, CPUSA, Gus Hall, planned visit to North Vietnam
and Laos Spring of 1971, thereafter returning to U.S. to hold
mass rallies to raise antiwar movement in U.S. to a new high;
visit was set for 5/15-20/71; however, North Vietnamese
canceled same, angering Hall who felt this resulted from
Chinese communist pressure; information concerning possible
split in CPUSA along racial lines; details concerning meeting
of CPUSA leaders and Soviet Ambassador to U.S. Anatoliy F.
Dobrynin, at which time Dobrynin stated hope for world peace
would be improved if President Nixon were re-elected in 1972.
All of this information was furnished the White House
and other interested officials of our Government, usually by
teletype. Central Intelligence Agency has expressed great inter-
est in information developed by this operation and on July 24,
1970, requested permission to include pertinent data developed
by our operation in a "Top Secret No Foreign/Controlled
Dissemination lassified document for senior U.S. Intelligence
Board officials.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
PCM: sfw
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 44
32
The two principal informants in this operation
have received the "Order of Lenin," with the title "Hero
of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets. This is the highest
award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was given
our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the
international communist movement."
i
Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA
represents a sustained major accomplishment. At the time
of the last inspection, we had 11 informants who were
officially members of the CPUSA National Committee. This
number remains the same. In addition, we have another informant
who is an ex officio member of the National Committee because
of the sensitive nature of his Party assignments. This latter
source is also a member of the Political Committee which, in
effect, runs the Party. This top-level coverage is responsible
for furnishing information regarding policy-making matters
on a day-to-day basis as they occur.
T
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
PCM: sfw
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 45
-
2
-
33
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND PRO-CHICOM UNIT
A prime responsibility of the Bureau and the intel-
ligence community is to develop intelligence relating to efforts
of foreign hostile governments, organizations, and individuals
who influence, direct, or dominate the domestic subversive and
extremist movements. There has been considerable evidence
compiled over the years of this foreign influence. Since the
last inspection, the following noteworthy achievements in our
investigations relating to foreign influence have been
accomplished:
20
In March, 1971, a coalition of leftist individuals
including subversives and extremists under the sponsorship of
the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, American Friends
Service Committee, and Fellowship of Reconciliation traveled to
Paris where they were in contact with the North Vietnamese and
other elements antagonistic to the U.S. We developed two informants
to participate in this travel and as a result, identified all
170 people in attendance, their activities, contacts, and
objectives. All information developed was afforded dissemination
to appropriate Government agencies and we were commended by one
intelligence agency for the excellent coverage.
20
The World Peace Council is the leading Soviet-
dominated international effort to discredit and subvert U.S.
domestic and foreign policy. Upon determining the World Peace
Council would hold a General Session in Budapest, Hungary, in
May, 1971, an effort was made to obtain informant coverage. An
informant was developed for the travel and coverage resulted in
the identification of all American participants including the
Communist Party, USA, delegation and the activities of these
individuals at the meeting. All pertinent documents relating
to the Conference were obtained, as were the contacts and
activities of American subversives at the Conference. Widespread
dissemination of intelligence relating to this Conference was
made and both the White House and Central Intelligence Agency
favorably commented on its exceptional value.
W
3. During the past six months, the Unit has afforded
specific coverage to the travel of U.S. citizens to three hostile
communist countries: North Vietnam, North Korea, and Communist
China. All individuals traveling to these countries during 1970
have been identified and, where pertinent, investigations have
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
DR:sfw
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 46
3
34
been opened.
Careful records have been maintained regarding
U.S. citizens who have visited these countries during the
current year and arrangements have been made to receive
quarterly reports from another intelligence agency which will
enable us to double check our files and insure cases are opened
on visitors to these hostile countries, when warranted. We feel
this is a strong achievement because, as noted below, we have
developed evidence that Americans are currently being recruited
for intelligence assignments in these countries.
4. Early in 1971 it was determined an informant who
had participated in Venceremos Brigade travel to Cuba had
established a rapport with North Koreans in that country.
Through careful direction of this informant, he was able to
effect an invitation from the North Koreans to visit their
country at their expense. He departed the U.S. with a group
of three other Americans and traveled to Korea via Paris and
Algiers. In Korea he was recruited by the North Koreans for
an intelligence assignment, furnished funds, and a code. This
is the first individual affiliated with the domestic subversive
movement who, a acting in a capacity for the U.S. Government, has
been able to penetra
Korch. We believe this informant
will be able to furnish exceptionally valuable intelligence
relating to foreign intelligence and political influence of the
North Koreans in the domestic subversive movement.
Manth
.5.
Through cooperation with the British Security
Service we have developed, during the past six months, direct
connection between an individual who was associated with the
Weatherman in the U.S. and bombing activities in England.
British intelligence is extremely interested in this matter
and we are carefully following it for developments.
Through intensified investigation of the Revolutionary
Union (RU) and Venceremos Party (VP), we have been able to identify
over 200 hard-core Marxist-Leninists who have all indicated
violence-prone propensities. Of particular note is the fact
that our closely supervised investigations in this area have
developed an informant on the National Committee of the RU and
have resulted in identification of an extremely militant RU
group in Eugene, Oregon. The Department has expressed extreme
interest in our RU investigation and has indicated a desire to
explore prosecutions at the first opportunity.
In late 1970 Mark Lawrence Wefers, the student body
president of the University of New Hampshire, traveled with a
National Student Association group to North Vietnam. While
there he made recorded speeches encouraging the servicemen in
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
DR: sfw
NW 88608 Dottd 32989638 Page 47
4
کوئی
South Vietnam to lay down their arms or turn their guns on the
real "pigs." Wefers' incendiary comments were broadcast over
Radio Hanoi. Intensive investigation has been and is continuing.
to be conducted and the Department has indicated an interest to
prosecute Wefers under the sedition statutes at an early date.
This will represent the first prosecution under the sedition
statutes since the 1950's.
A suit was instituted against the Director and two
Special Agents of the Memphis Office seeking preliminary
injunction against the FBI and punitive and compensatory
damages amounting to over $100,000 against the Director and
the Agents. The suit was instituted by the Southern Conference
Educational Fund claiming harassment and intimidation of war
resisters. Former communists, extremists, and subversives
were involved as plaintiffs. In July the plaintiffs dropped
their plea for a preliminary injunction. Excellent information
identifying the principal plaintiff, on whose statements the
false allegations were based, as having a criminal record
involving furnishing of false information and theft, has been
furnished to the Department as well as the fact that he is the
subject of a current outstanding State Bench Warrant. It is
anticipated when this matter is argued before the court, the
plea for punitive damages will be dropped, much to the embar-
rassment of the communist subversives and extremists involved.
The Unit endeavors to keep track of all efforts to
discredit the U.S. military effort through organization of
antiwar coffeehouses, oriented groups, and publications. Last
January we intensified investigation on Peoples House, a
coffeehouse operated by subversives in Clarksville, Tennessee.
Excellent information has been developed, all the principal
subversives participating have been identified, and details
have been furnished to the Department and interested military
intelligence agencies. The House Committee on Internal Security
has taken an interest in this coffeehouse and it is expected to
be the subject of a Congressional hearing which will publicly
expose the involvement, tactics, and objectives of the extremist
elements behind this subversive endeavor.
I
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
DR: sfw
4-E
-
5
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 48
36
Sin
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT
4-E
The FBI has continued its investigation of 18
Klan-type organizations including 255 klaverns (units)
throughout the United States which had a slight increase
in membership from 4,300 a year ago to approximately
4,500 at present. This increase in membership is primarily
attributed to renewed interest in Klan-type organizations
brought about by Federal directives regarding school busing
in order to achieve racial balance in public schools.
In recent months the UKA and Shelton have under-
taken a major campaign aimed at harassing the FBI. The
initial step of the campaign was named by Shelton as
"Operation Polly" in which he sought to obtain polygraph
machines to help "weed out FBI pimps." We have taken steps
to assure he is not successful by instructing our key
informants to talk it down and, if necessary, to ultimately
refuse to take such an exam. We have also discreetly
contacted a potential supplier to be assured we are aware
of any positive action taken by Shelton in this regard.
"
Further, as a result of our hard-hitting investi-
gation and interviews of Klansmen, Shelton printed a series
of articles in the monthly UKA publication "The Fiery Cross,"
entitled "Exposing the CIA and FBI, in which Shelton
vehemently attacked the Bureau as a "Gestapo-like police
force" and the Director as "a man who has sold out his
country for his prided FBI." Picketing of the Norfolk and
Richmond FBI Offices to protest interviews of Klansmen by
FBI Agents as infringement of the individual rights of Klan
members also took place recently and Klansmen were instructed
to attempt to secure photographs and identities of our Agents
in order that this information could be published in 'The
Fiery Cross" with the intent that the FBI be embarrassed and
our Agents transferred. This information was furnished to
appropriate field offices and to the Department. To date
our Agents have avoided having their photographs taken by
the Klan.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LLA:co/bcw
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 49
-6-
37
Violence has been noticeably absent among Klan-type
organizations during the past year. This is due in the main
to our effective informant program. We have been able to
direct our informants to positions of leadership throughout
the country, and these informants have been extremely success-
ful in forming nonviolent Klan policy. We have also been able
to keep local authorities advised of potential Klan violence
in time to thwart such action.
head of Minutemen,
Since last inspection, information was also developed
through Joan Gourley, former mistress of Robert DePugh, con-
cerning murder of Walter Barnes, former Minutemen member who
was allegedly murdered and buried by DePugh while in underground
hide-out in New Mexico prior to his arrest by the FBI. Gourley
traveled to New Mexico to locate gravesite in company of local
authorities who granted her immunity. Gravesite disclosed only
four small bones identified by coroner as coming from foot of
human victim. Gourley furnished statement to New Mexico
authorities and, in addition, stated DePugh had indicated in
July, 1970, while imprisoned, that body. had been removed from
original gravesite, but she did not believe him at that time.
Local District Attorney, while believing Gourley's story, felt
prosecution not feasible without body. During July, 1971,
SD 1155-R, a Minutemen informant of this Bureau furnished
information and explosives reportedly to be utilized in the
bombings of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division (ATFD)
and Internal Revenue Service offices in the California area,
resulting in the arrest of several individuals, including
informant, by ATFD, thus preventing the bombings.
Subsequent to last inspection, dissemination has
been made concerning weapons, possible violence and demon-
strations of these groups which has resulted in the curtailment
of activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white
hate group organizations in some areas. In several cases,
confiscation of weapons has been made by ATFD of the Treasury
Department based on our information. We have also made
apprehensions of extremist subjects for illegal possession
of firearms following conviction of a felony, a violation
under our jurisdiction.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LLA:co/bcW
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 50
7
38

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
exclm.
4-E
SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: There follows a summary of
accomplishments of the Research
Section since the last inspection:
Central Research Unit
This Unit performs a wide range of research and
writing assignments and preparation of various documents
and special reports. These include the following:
An extensive special assignment on new left research
for the Director.
A special report which is kept up to date on FBI
usage of electronic surveillances.
The "FBI Current Intelligence Analysis" issued
approximately every week summarizes significant items of
interest in subversive field.
"FRI Summary of Extremist Activities" issued weekly
summarizes significant items relating to black extremists.
"The Extremist Speaks" is a monthly compilation
showing extremist views taken from their publications.
A pamphlet entitled "The Black Panther" was prepared
for public distribution.
A pamphlet entitled "1970: Year of the Urban
"Guerrilla" was prepared for distribution.
The monograph entitled "The CPUSA Annual Intelligence
Digest" was issued in February.
A number of papers were prepared for the Intelligence
Evaluation Committee.
A number of book reviews of interest were prepared.
Special reports are prepared on a continuing basis
for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special
Committee.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
MSR:amt
4-E
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 51
39
2
The Unit coordinated the preparation of material
for the Division's participation in the conference with
police officials concerning attacks on police and prepared
a special packet of material for distribution to those police
officials in attendance.
This Unit also was responsible for coordination of
preparation of damage assessments relating to Domestic
Intelligence Division documents stolen in the burglary of
the former Media, Pennsylvania, Resident Agency, and handling
other aspects of the Medburg case as related to this Division.
the
In addition, the Unit also collected and prepared
material for various articles, speeches, and surveys. Personnel
of the Unit have handled lectures on subjects of communism,
new left, and racial extremism. These have consisted of
classified lectures to Bureau's New Agents and In-Service
classes, appearances before other intelligence agencies and
National Academy classes and appearances before outside groups.
Special Records Unit
This Unit is primarily responsible for records
keeping for emergency planning. Further details concerning
programs handled by this Unit are set forth in Section 4-H.
Civil Disorder Reporting Unit
This Unit, formerly called the Racial Reporting Unit,
has continued to coordinate all phases of disturbances, violence
and other developments where race is a factor as well as infor-
mation bearing on the potential for violence throughout the
country. Material being reported on a daily basis by the field
offices is reviewed, coordinated and disseminated to interested
officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are
furnished to the White House, Attorney General, and other
high officials. Statistical data on civil disorders, school
disorders and attacks on police is extracted from communications
received from the field and is maintained in this Unit for use
in the preparation of special papers. Detailed statistical
data is prepared for automatic data processing.
This Unit also prepares on demand certain studies
and briefs concerning specific subject matters relating to
racial extremists and racial situations. Examples of these
are a detailed study on the extent of foreign influence on
the black extremist movement completed in February of this
year.
A current document on this subject matter is presently
NW 88608 Doeld:32989638 Page 52
40
- 3
being prepared for early dissemination.
In June, 1971,
a comprehensive document on the potential for violence in
the Nation during the Summer of 1971 was prepared for high-
level dissemination.
In addition to the above, this Unit prepares a
monthly "FBI Digest of Civil Disorders" briefly summarizing
all disorders occurring in the previous month growing out of
racial unrest. The incidents are listed geographically and
chronologically so that the White House and other recipients
can tell at a glance the general nature of incidents and
problems and where they are.
Current Intelligence Reporting Unit
This Unit, formerly known as the New Left Reporting
Unit, coordinates coverage of activities relating to all
New Left, student, and antiwar demonstrations, as well as
other civil disturbances arising from issues other than
racial in nature. A daily teletype summary on demonstrations
and other disruptive activity is prepared for dissemination
to the White House, the Attorney General and other interested
Government officials.
Continuing and timely dissemination is made concerning
major demonstrations in addition to the teletype summary and
advance information concerning possible demonstrations is
furnished Government officials (principally the President
and Vice President) traveling throughout the country.
:
Since the last inspection, this Unit has covered
the following major demonstrations:
Marches on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco,
California, on 3/20/71 sponsored by the Progressive Labor
Party (PLP) to protest unemployment,
A series of disruptive demonstrations held in
Washington, D. C., during the period 4/1-5/71 sponsored by
People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and May Day
Collectives. During this series of demonstrations, some
12,000 arrests were made.
A series of demonstrations in Washington, D. C.,
sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)
during the period 4/18-23/71 to protest continued U.S.
involvement in Vietnam.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 53
3
41
A massive demonstration in Washington, D. C., on
4/24/71 sponsored by the National Peace Action Coalition
(NPAC). A similar demonstration was held in San Francisco.
The Washington, D. C., demonstration attracted an estimated
400,000 persons.
A March for Victory demonstration sponsored by the
Reverend Carl McIntire held in Washington, D. C., 5/8/71 to
protest withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.
A "smoke-in" sponsored by the Hay Day Collectives
in Washington, D. C., 7/4/71.
Nationwide demonstrations during the period
8/6-9/71 sponsored by NPAC and PCPJ, as well as other peace
groups to protest the war in Vietnam and to commemorate the
atomic bombing of Japan.
This Unit also prepared studies and briefs when
they are called upon to do so and regularly issues the
monthly "FBI Intelligence Calendar of Major Events." Also
statistics are maintained concerning the disorders for use
as needed.
.42
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 54.
:
-
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
NEW LEFT SECTION
лез
SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORDY Attached are comments
from each unit setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments
of the New Left Section since the last Inspection. This
Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations
of the New Left movement, including terrorist groups and in-
dividuals engaged in bombings, arson and assassinations,
and other New Left groups and individuals both on college
campuses and off campus. Investigations concerning New Left
publications are also supervised in this Section, as ære
sabotage investigations, and Protest and Trotskyist groups.
DID INSPECTION
8/18/71
DPW:jlm
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 55
43
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT WEST
East, supervise
A
The primary objective in this Unit has been and
continues to be the goal of overcoming the threat to American
institutions presented by violence prone extremists, such as
those within the revolutionary Weatherman organization. This
Unit and the Special Investigation Unit
security investigations of the Weatherman group and its
individual members. Through coordination with the General
Investigative Division, which has handled certain criminal
investigations involving Weatherman members, and with the Special
Investigative Division, which has supervised the investigation
of Weatherman fugitives, substantial accomplishments in the
task of neutralizing these extremists have been achieved.
number of Weatherman leaders have been indicted on Federal
charges involving violations of the Federal Anti-riot, gun control
and bombing statutes. Many leaders and activists in the
Weatherman organization have gone underground and the organization
is currently composed of a few hundred adherents including
those underground and above ground. Its underground existence
and the fugitive status of its leaders have isolated Weatherman
from the mass of American youth. Consequently, Weatherman
has experienced a considerable reduction in strength, based
on the number of its present adherents and its influence
among young people.
Weatherman, though a small group, continues to be
extremely dangerous in view of its violent and destructive
tactics. It is noted that Weatherman has claimed credit for
a number of bombings, including the bombing of the national
Capitol building on 3/1/71.
Weatherman continues to receive intensive investigation.
In recent months, a Weatherman bomb making factory has been
discovered at 1038 A Pine Street, San Francisco, California, and
subsequent investigation there has uncovered a number of persons,
including attorneys, who are acting in a covert support role
for Weatherman. The Department of Justice has now indicated in
a letter to the Bureau that it will institute Federal Grand
Jury proceedings concerning activities at this Pine Street address,
with the prospect of further indictments and further discourage-
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
HM: smp
4-E
-
2
-
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 56
44
ment of Weatherman sympathizers. Approval has been obtained
for this Unit to supervise this Pine Street case in view
of its intimate connection with the overall Weatherman
investigation.
-
Approval has also been obtained for this Unit
to supervise a New Left Violence case in Tucson, Arizona,
which involves Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms
(UPRF) charges. This Tucson case concerns five New Left
extremists, three of whom have now been indicted by a Federal
Grand Jury. Two of these have been apprehended and the
third is a fugitive. Another subject in this case has been
sentenced to jail for contempt of court for refusing to
testify before the Grand Jury.
An example of the salutary effect of vigorous
investigation and prosecution of New Left extremists is seen
in the Seattle area. There, a radical group called the
Seattle Liberation Front (SLF), which was composed of
former Weatherman members, had fomented continuing violence.
Then SLF leaders were tried in Federal court on anti-riot
charges. This trial ended in a mistrial but the SLF leaders
were cited for contempt of court. Since that mistrial in
December, 1970, SLF has been disbanded and most SLF members
have left Seattle. There has been a noticeable reduction
in New Left violence in Seattle.
In the several cases referred to above, it is noted
that in each instance information crucial to the prosecution
of New Left extremists was provided by New Left informants.
In recent months significant accomplishments were
made in a case involving two extremists in Ohio through the
use of a tesur installation. These two extremists were
Nancy Kurshan and Howard Emmer, who were leaders of the
Youth International Party (YIP). Between February and June,
1971, a tesur covered the activities of Kurshan, Emmer, and
others with outstanding success. This source provided advance
information concerning the plans of May Day leader Rennie Davis
for the recent May Day national action. The source also provided
extensive information on planned demonstrations and strikes at
Kent State University on May 3 and 4, 1971, the anniversary of
the killing of Kent State students by the National Guard in
May 1970. This source furnished information concerning
activities and movements of suspects in the Capbom case and other
New Left extremists. This source also developed information on
plans for the Women's March on Washington on April 10, 1971.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 57
-
3
-
کی میرے
As a result of dissemination of advance information developed
by this source, authorities were able to further control
these demonstrations and reduce the violence arising out of
such activity.
With reference to the complicated Weatherman
investigation, much progress has been made recently in the
development of information on the technical aspects of the
actual operation of the Weatherman underground, particularly
its use and methods of obtaining false identities, its
courier system, its use of radical attorneys in covert
support roles and in the movement of its support personnel.
Effort is continually being made to develop new techniques
and approaches to facilitate this investigation. A "stop
index" program in NCIC, for Bureau use only, concerning
extremists on Priority I of the Security Index was initiated
in June, 1971. This program enables our field offices to
receive prompt notice by teletype when police agencies make
inquiries about these subjects. In addition, new procedures
have recently been devised whereby the Identification Division
can better disseminate to the field arrest information on
Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file.
This is accomplished by periodic submission by the field of
Security Flash Notices to determine if fingerprints have been
received since the last check.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 58
4
46
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT-EAST
Incidents of sabotage currently being investigated
by the Bureau. are, for the most part, the "home grown variety"
occasioned by attacks against the military and related
operations on the part of New Leftists, dissidents, and
elements opposed to U.S. participation in the Vietnam War.
There are under investigation at the present time
9 sabotage initiated investigations with prosecution pending,
involving 21 subjects who are charged with various violations
including Attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government
Property, Antiriot Law violations, Civil Rights violations,
Violation of National Firearms Act, Possession of Destructive
Device, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle,
Contempt of Court and Conspiracy.
Since last inspection and as a result of sabotage
investigations, 10 individuals have either been tried in
Federal court and found guilty or have entered guilty pleas.
Three of these individuals have been sentenced to a total of
30 years while the remaining 7 are awaiting sentencing.
Additionally, since last inspection, and as a result of
sabotage investigations, 6 additional individuals have been
indicted but not yet brought to trial. Two of these 6 are
currently in a fugitive status. It should be noted that as
a direct result of this Bureau's sabotage investigations, 5
subjects are currently included in the Bureau's Most Wanted
Fugitives List and Identification Orders are currently in
effect concerning another 3 subjects.
T
TJM:cae
8/18/71
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 59
-
- 5 -
47
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
VENCEREMOS BRIGADE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT EAST
4-E
!
The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being
June, 1969, as a coalition of representatives from various
New Left organizations including Students for a Democratic
Society, Young Socialist Alliance, the militant Black
Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left organiza-
tions including the Communist Party, Progressive Labor
Party and Socialist Workers Party.
Four contingents have traveled to Cuba since
November, 1969. The first group was composed of 216
young Americans who obtained their own transportation to
Cuba in defiance of the State Department ban on travel to
that country. These young revolutionaries were returned..
to Canada on 2/12/70 at the expense of the Cuban Government
which converted a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship.
The second contingent of 687 sympathetic American youths
were loaded aboard this boat for its return trip to Cuba.
This group, like the first contingent, worked in the
sugar cane fields until its return by the same means of
transportation on April 28, 1970. In August, 1970, the
third contingent of the VB, made up of 407 persons,
journeyed to the Isle of Youth where they participated
in a Cuban agricultural experiment of planting and ferti-
lizing citrus trees. This group returned to the U. S.
mid-October, 1970. The fourth contingent of 233 young
Americans traveled by air to Cuba during the last week of
March, 1971, and were returned to Canada by Cuban ship on
May 29, 1971.
Each group worked approximately 7 hours a day,
5 days a week, and in their free time were afforded the
opportunity of absorbing communist propaganda offered by
the Cubans, North Koreans and North Vietnamese. They
were reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were
here to show "solidarity with the socialist struggle, to
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
YES FBS:bjn
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 60
- 6
-
48

:
smash the U. S. blockade, and to make a breach in the
facade of the U. S. imperialist monster." i
Each of the more than 1500 brigade members has
been the subject of a security investigation which includes
the identification and obtaining of background data as
well as a personal interview with each brigade member.
These investigations are being made to determine the
immediate danger presented by these young revolutionaries
and also to ascertain the long-range role they will take
in the revolutionary movement in the U. S. Upon comple-
tion of the investigation and the interview of each of
these individuals, the field must recommend either the
inclusion or noninclusion of the subject in the Security
Index. In addition the field must continue to report
every 90 days for a period of one year on the activities
and whereabouts of each brigade member.
The intelligence responsibilities of the Bureau
in regard to the VR have been handled through the placing
of Bureau informants in the ranks of the various contingents.
Accurate on-the-scene reports concerning the training and
activities of these groups in Cuba have been furnished to
the intelligence community and factual responses have been
made to congressional and other legitimate inquiries re-
garding these young supporters of the Castro Regime. As
a result of our investigations, more than 275 VB partici-
pants have been placed on the Security Index and it has
been noted that about 25% of those individuals currently
being intensively investigated as extremists in the New
Left section, are ex-VB members.
Plans for a fifth contingent of the VB have been
formulated. This new group is tentatively scheduled to
depart for Cuba in early January, 1972, and is to be
comprised of 225-250 individuals politically oriented to
the socialist cause.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 61
-7-
49
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS
-
NEW LEFT UNIT
Among the primary responsibilities of this unit
is the identification and investigation of individuals who,
because of activities or affiliation with one or more
violence-prone revolutionary groups, are dangerous or
potentially dangerous to the internal security of the
nation. In most instances, this unit handles initial
stages of the investigation and carries it through to
completion. In some instances where individuals are
determined to be of an extremist nature, those cases
are referred to the units in this section handling
extremist cases. At the conclusion of each investigation
or at the phase of the investigation when it is determined
that the individual therein could be considered a danger
to the internal security of the country, an evaluation is
made and, if appropriate, the individual's name is
included on the Security Index.
The immense volume of cases handled in this
unit is clearly exhibited by the fact that since the
last inspection approximately 5000 cases have been
handled in this unit. To be exact, 5418 cases have
· been opened and 4951 cases have been closed.
T
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
-LUNT WHE:rsm
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 62
-
.8 .
50
PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT
This Unit is responsible for the investigation of
antiwar protest groups and key activists connected therewith,
as well as the Eastcon case. Accomplishments of the Unit
worthy of note are as follows:
EASTCON
Our
As a result of our investigation of the plots to blow
up the underground tunnels housing the heating system servicing
Government buildings in Washington, D. C., and to kidnap a
high Government official, an indictment was returned at
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on 1-12-71 covering six individuals
as defendants and seven unindicted co-conspirators.
investigation into this matter continued, and on 4-30-71 a
superseding indictment was returned at Harrisburg which added
two additional defendants and reduced the number of unindicted
co-conspirators to four. In addition, five individuals have
been cited for civil contempt for refusal to testify before
the Federal Grand Jury regarding this matter, and four individuals
have been indicted for criminal contempt. By letter dated
2-25-71 to the Director, Assistant Attorney General Robert C.
Mardian advised of his appreciation for cooperation extended
by the Bureau in this case and singled out the efforts of six
members of the Domestic Intelligence Division, as well as two
Agents of the Philadelphia Office.
Of paramount importance to the successful prosecution
of this case is our principal witness, Boyd Frederick Douglas.
He testified before the Grand Jury in January, 1971; and
subsequently assumed a new identity and has been living under
appropriate cover in Des Moines. Iowa. Inasmuch as he is a
witness rather than an informant, the Department is primarily
responsible for his welfare and his cover. We maintain liaison
between the witness and the Department in order to insure that
the Bureau's interests are properly looked after. The death
of the informant's father in July, 1971, created a situation
whereby the informant's identity and location could have been
ascertained by irresponsible members of the press. Through
the concerted efforts of the Omaha Office, the informant and
his wife attended the funeral with no adverse effects. Assistant
Attorney General Mardian, by letter dated 7-21-71, praised the
high degree of proficiency of five Agents of the Omaha Office
in protecting the identity of the witness.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-18-71
HT
of
FBG plm
(4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 63
-
9 -
-
51
The development of a highly placed informant,
PH 1223-S, within the pro-Berrigan forces is also a significant
accomplishment. This individual has gained the confidence of
leaders in the Berrigan movement and is privy to information
not available from any other source. The informant has furnished
a wealth of information regarding fund raising and strategy
and tactics planned by movement leaders to propagandize
their position and to attempt to gain public support for
the Berrigan cause. In the course of this coverage, the
informant furnished information concerning plans of the group
for action in the event parole was not granted to Philip and
Daniel Berrigan on 7-28-71. He also furnished plans of the
group to mount an attack on the Bureau of Prisons which
culminated in a hunger-work strike at the Federal Correctional
Institution, Danbury, Connecticut, on 8/6-7/71. This action
resulted in the transfer of eleven inmates to the Medical
Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri. We
furnished plans of this proposed action to the Bureau of
Prisons, and in a letter to the Attorney General dated
8-11-71, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons noted that
the action of the inmates confirmed our intelligence reports
received several weeks prior.
PH 1223-S also furnished information concerning the
intention of the group to embarrass the administration by
having Daniel Berrigan prepare the text for a Mass composed
by musical conductor Leonard Bernstein. This Mass is to be
part of the dedication ceremonies for the Kennedy Center for
the Performing Arts in Washington, D. C., and is to be performed
on 9-9-71. The words prepared by Daniel Berrigan were to have
been in Latin and were to follow an antiwar theme.
The group
anticipated the President and high ranking administration
officials would applaud the work and subsequent publicity
would be to the effect that they had applauded antiadministration
views. This information was furnished the White House and,
according to the news media, the President has declined to
attend the ceremonies on 9-9-71.
PH 1223-S has also furnished information showing the
Berrigan supporters are interested in obtaining classified
material such as that publicized by Daniel Ellsberg in an
effort to embarrass the Government. The individual who is
to attempt to get these papers is Linda Shaw Finlay, an
ardent supporter of the Berrigan cause. Her target is the
Lyndon B. Johnson Library at the University of Texas, Austin,
which is the repository for former President Johnson's papers.
We have a separate espionage investigation underway regarding
this situation.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 64
-
10
-
2 کی
ANTIWAR MOVEMENT
This
This Unit is responsible for the investigation of
dissident protest groups in order that their potential threat
to the internal security of the country can be assessed.
includes development of informant coverage and the dissemination
of timely intelligence information, as well as possible
violations of Federal laws.
The organizations concerned are the communist
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), its youth group, the Young
Socialist Alliance (YSA), and the Student Mobilization
Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) which is controlled
by the SWP/YSA. All three of these groups utilize the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) as a vehicle to project their
antiwar message. The Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice
(PCPJ), continuation group of the New Mobilization Committee
to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), also exercises considerable
influence in the antiwar movement and is a target for
infiltration by the Communist Party, USA (CP). The May Day
Collective (MDC), organized by Rennie Davis, is a militant
group which split from the PCPJ following the May, 1971,
demonstrations in Washington, D. C. Also of considerable
interest is the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) which
came into prominence during the Washington demonstrations.
We have disseminated on a daily basis hundreds of reports and
memoranda concerning the activities of these and other groups,
as well as information regarding principal activists. This
dissemination has been augmented by the preparation of several
CINALS pertinent to specific demonstrations, conferences, or
activities.
Of particular value has been our coverage of national
conferences and conventions sponsored by various groups which
are used to plan future antiwar activity and demonstrations.
We have been able to cover these sessions most effectively and
have furnished other interested Government agencies with
advance information of their plans. Included in these
conferences were the following:
--
2/19-21/71 National student antiwar conference,
Washington, D. C., sponsored by SMC.
5/15/71
.6/25-27/71
SMC National Steering Committee meeting.
PCPJ national conference, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 65
- 11
-
53
7/2-4/71
GD
Sw
NPAC national antiwar convention,
New York City.
8/8-15/71 SWP national convention, Oberlin, Ohio,
which also included Student Activist
Educational Conference of the YSA.
8/13-17/71
MDC national conference, Atlanta,
Georgia, preceded by regional conferences
in Washington, D. C., and Fayetteville,
Arkansas.
With regard to the MDC national conference, our
informant coverage led to the apprehension of three leaders of
the New York MDC contingent by the New York City Police
Department for possession of firearms. Our informant determined
the exact location in a specific vehicle where a shotgun, 22
caliber rifle, and 357 Smith and Wesson revolver, all loaded,
were recovered. In addition, in excess of 500 rounds of
ammunition for these weapons were seized.
Our investigation of the Committee of Liaison with
Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIFAM)
produced significant intelligence information with regard to
the exchange of letters between prisoners of war in North
Vietnam and their families within the U.S. By letter dated
8-9-71, the Directorate of Special Investigations, U.S.
Air Force, advised that this information was of "considerable
assistance", in an intelligence collection program concerned
with prisoners of war.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 66
-
12
-
54
}
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT
Included in the work of the New Left Groups Unit are
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with
the exception of the Weatherman), other New Left campus
groups, the Key Activist program, New Left Movement reports,
New Left publications, and the maintenance of a library of
research material on the New Left for use of Bureau
officials in connection with approved speaking commitments.
In 1969, the Worker Student Alliance (WSA),
Weatherman, and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) factions
of SDS split into separate groups. Accomplishments concerning
Weatherman are reported elsewhere in this survey. The RYM
faction of SDS is now practically defunct. Currently,
the largest faction of SDS is the WSA faction, which is
dominated by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive
Labor Party (PLP).
Approximately twenty Bureau informants attended the
SDS/WSA National Convention in Chicago, December 26-30, 1970.
This convention was dominated by PLP controlled leadership;
however, dissent was widespread, much of which was led by
our informants. Since the last Inspection, this dissent has
spread further and has resulted in additional factionalism
within the 'SDS/WSA.
During the past winter, the SDS/WSA has continuously
attempted to inject itself into labor disputes without success,
due mainly to factionalism. The objective of the SDS/WSA is
to build ties with workers inasmuch as in the old Marxist-
Leninist tradition, they view the students-workers as the
vanguard of the revolution. In this regard, the SDS/WSA set
up a Summer Project with the twofold objective of a massive
recruitment program and the fostering of a general strike,
nationwide, through infiltration of industry and unions.
have been on top of this program from its inception and have
kept all interested Govem ment agencies advised of developments
on a continuing basis. In addition, again largely due to
factionalization, the SDS/WSA Summer Project program has not
had significant success in any of its twenty-one target cities.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
DPW:jlm
4-E
We
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 67
-
13
-
گوگ
New Left Movement reports submitted quarterly by
each field office have enabled us to furnish interested
agencies timely and informative documents on the activities
of the New Left movement. This is a substantial contribution
to the objective that responsible Government officials
be alerted concerning the nature and extent of this aspect
of subversive activities and the threat it presents to our
democratic society.
By conducting an intensive review of many New Left
publications which range from the pornographic to the clearly
revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these
publications%; their subversive activities and whether or not
they urge violence; and sources of funds. Since these
publications are the voice of the New Left and are influencial
in recruiting youth, pertinent factors concerning them are
disseminated to interested officials and agencies. Since
our review of these "underground" publications has revealed
many of them frequently come into being and become defunct
within a short time, we are alert to the birth of new publications
by perusing various underground news service lists as well
as other documents and books which report new publications in
this field.
A library of research material on the New Left is
maintained for use of Bureau officials in connection with
approved speaking engagements before Government officials and
responsible citizens. In this manner, we have assisted these
Government officials and responsible citizens to more fully
understand the subversive and anarchist manifestations of the
New Left movement.
Through the key activist program, we have focused
investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left movement
with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate
statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible. This program
has proved successful in that we have been able to closely
follow the activities of these individuals and furnish interested
agencies and high Government officials with information concerning
their subversive and agitational activities. Of particular note
is the fact that more than half of the 73 individuals designated
as key activists are subjects of some type of prosecutive action.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 68
-
14 -
56
1
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
4-E
Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section
The primary mission of this Section involves
counterintelligence operations against Soviet-Bloc Intel-
ligence Services (SBIS). Counterintelligence, by definition
and in practice, is a reaction to initiative displayed by
a hostile intelligence service. This factor largely inhibits
bold and aggressive initiatives on our part and the major
part of our efforts is spent in routine, programmatic, non-
remunerative work and patient, painstaking analysis of
information developed. Positive counterintelligence
achievement in the final analysis depends on the ability to
detect and exploit in a timely fashion circumstances
which arise naturally--contriving, to the extent this is
feasible, to anticipate, encourage, or modify circumstances
to our own advantage or the disadvantage of the SBIS.
In this perspective, the accomplishments listed
below are most noteworthy. These are highlighted by the
current operation of four defectors-in-place and the
identification of three "illegal" agents since the last
inspection. From both a quantitative and qualitative view-
point, these successes represent an extremely high level
of accomplishment in these two vital areas.
In keeping with the Inspector's instructions,
brevity will be stressed in the examples portrayed. Security
and the "need-to-know" principle also requires limitation
of detailed information on many cases discussed. These
matters, however, are identified sufficiently so that any
additional data desired may be obtained from the individual
file. Accomplishments cited are restricted to the most
significant and/or representative.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL.pdr
04-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 69
57
1
4-E
I.
Defectors-in-Place (DIP)
The most valuable asset which counterintelligence
can acquire is the recruitment of a Soviet-bloc official
who is an active intelligence officer or who otherwise has
access to intelligence information. Such a source can
produce information of incalculable value not obtainable
from any other source. Highest priority and emphasis is
Although we
assigned to cases which have such potential.
· have had success in this area in the past, at the time
of the last inspection we had no DIP. Currently we are
operating four sources in this category, which are briefly
described below.
EXPAN
IRONCLAD is a sensitive, highly placed DIP who
furnishes, on a continuing basis, a large volume of high
level information concerning operations of Soviet Intelligence
Services (SIS). He has identified hundreds of SIS officers
and furnished information concerning approximately 250
intelligence operations. Some of his information involves.
penetrations of other Government agencies as well as substantial
information which has been of high interest to the White
House. The value of information he has furnished and has a
potential to furnish is beyond estimate.
He
WINGTIP is a DIP who is in a position to furnish
information concerning Polish intelligence activities.
was recently recruited and his potential is still being
exploited.
KIELBASA is a DIP who is a Polish intelligence
officer whose recruitment was recently effected. He is
under continuing development.
SPINNAKER is a DIP in the Yugoslav field who has
furnished information on Yugoslav intelligence activities
pertaining to identities of intelligence agents, their
sources and targets. Dissemination of pertinent information
furnished by him has been made to interested U. S. agencies.
1
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL:pdr/eco
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page
-
2
-
لاکی

4-E
II. Double Agents
A double agent is an individual under Bureau
control who has been recruited and given intelligence assign-
ments by SBIS. Double agent development is given great
emphasis since this is a primary method to obtain valuable
information concerning hostile intelligence operations,
targets, techniques and personnel. At the time of the last
inspection, this Section listed 138 double agents, 296
potential double agents, and 49 inactive double agents.
Figures for August 1, 1971, are 133, 291, and 47 for the
respective categories. Apart from statistics, the most
significant accomplishment lies in the quality of the double
agent operations which has developed since the last inspection.
A representative number of these situations are set forth
below.
CHOWLINE is a double agent which began in 1958.
Through the years this operation has grown steadily in
significance and productivity. The source has been paid
over $52,000 by the Soviets while passing carefully cleared
material, some of which was deceptive in nature. A deception
concept concerning nonexistent US military capability
has been accepted by the Soviets and their attempts to
counteract this capability have reportedly caused them to
commit $1.5 billion in their defense budget Most significant
developments were the identification of two Soviet illegal
agents in the U. S. as a direct product of the CHOWLINE
operation (see Palmetto and Ixora).
The SNOOD operation involves a Soviet agent who
was uncovered through information received in 1962 from a DIP.
We initiated interviews with this individual on a pretext
of interest in the source of funds deposited by him which
we knew to have originated with the Soviets. After extensive
interviews source admitted his involvement as an agent for
SIS and agreed to cooperate with the Bureau. During June,
1971, he met with a Soviet contact and through corroborative
information from DIP, we know that Soviets still accept
him as one of their most trusted and valuable U. S. agents.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL: pdr
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 71
3
-
59
4-E
BASELINE is a double agent operated against
Hungarian Intelligence Services (HIS), who is reportedly
Considered to be the top Hungarian agent in the U S
Although HIS has been most reluctant to have personal contact
with this source in the US we were able to induce such
a meeting on January 28, 1971, in New York City and identified
a Third Secretary of the Hungarian United Nations Mission
Informant has been told he will handle HIS agents in the U. S.
CANDY is a double agent operation directed against
HIS on intermittent basis for 14 years. HIS interest was.
dormant from 1966 to 1970, when this operation was reactivated
by HIS HIS has attempted to have source meet with them
abroad, but under our direction he has resisted this presure.
We are still attempting to manipulate this operation to
bring about intelligence meetings in the U. S.
In 1968 HLS, under cover of the East-West Exchange
Program, dispatched a 29-year-old Hungarian national (LA5478-PSI)
to the U. S. on an intelligence mission. This individual
is now under our control. Under HIS instructions he was
to seek permanent residence in this country, Ofurther his
intelligence mission. This is being done under our control.
AQ 366-S is a double agent serving with US. Air
Force in New Mexico. He has been operated against the GRU
(Soviet Military Intelligence). He receives radio messages
originating with GRU radio in Havana Cuba. In June, 1971
he had a meet in Juarez, Mexico, and the Soviet principal
was identified as an official from the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico City Considerable information has been developed
in this case concerning Soviet capabilities and communications
systems.
In three double agent operations in the U., S. - Mexican
_border area we have identified four Soviet officials assigned
to Mexico City as intelligence officers. In addition, we
have uncovered a Soviet illegal agent. (EP 628-S; EP 656–S;
SA 888-S).
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL: pdr
4-E
NW288608 Docd92989638 Page 72
1
4 -
60
4-E
III. Soviet Illegal Operations
These operations are staffed by officers or agents
of SIS who enter the U. S. and operate without any connection
with the legal bases, i. e., the intelligence residencies
staffed by intelligence personnel under cover of official
position located at the Soviet Embassy and Mission to the
United Nations. In view of the completely clandestine nature
of these operations, they are the most difficult to detect.
We have in the past achieved some success in detecting several
illegal operations. Since the last inspection, three such
agents have been identified in the cases outlined below.
PALMETTO is an investigation of an individual
detected removing espionage material from a dead drop filled
by the CHOWLINE source in March, 1971. This individual was
successfully identified through intensive, discreet investi-
gation as a Mexican national currently doing graduate work
at a western university in the U.
Intensive investigation
is underway in this case to determine additional information
concerning this individual's activities with a view to ..
uncovering other Soviet agents in the U. S. whom he may be
servicing.
In another outgrowth of the CHOWLINE case, we have
identified the IXORA subject as a Soviet illegal agent. This
individual is an Austrian national who entered the U. S.
in 1968 as a permanent resident and resides and is employed
in the New York City area. Identity of this person was
furnished the CHOWLINE informant as an emergency contact
to be made only in event a war is imminent. Intensive investi-
gation is also underway in this case to determine the extent
of this individual's activities and contacts.
In a double agent operation (referred to above),
a Soviet illegal agent has been identified as a resident of
Juarez, Mexico, who has been used in servicing Soviet agents
in the U. S.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL: pdr
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 73
. 5.
61
4-E
IV.
Counterintelligence and Special Operations
In this category, on a highly selective basis
we take initiative in actions which are designed to disrupt,
deter or otherwise disadvantage the operations of SBIS. We
employ our own resources and whenever feasible, those of other
U. S. agencies. Brief examples of activity in this category
since the last inspection are set forth.
A former Soviet exchange student in the U. S
reappeared as an official assigned to the Soviet United
Nations Mission. During his previous visit in the U. S.
he had recruited a fellow student, whom we had identified
as a result of information furnished by a DIP. When the
Soviet recontacted this American we were in a position to
control the latter's actions. At our direction the double
agent wrote a letter to the Soviet United Nations Ambassador
complaining about the treatment he had received and the
indiscretions committed by the Soviet. The Soviet has been
reprimanded and there are indications that his assignment
to the U. S. will be cut short.
A Soviet defector who formally operated as a KGB
officer in the USSR was recently used by us to contacta
Czech professor temporarily in the U. S. as an East-West
exchange participant. The professor S wife is a Soviet
national who was known to our defector source as an
agent for the KGB in the Soviet Union The Czech was suspected
of being affiliated with Czech intelligence. An approach
was made and although the Czech couple seriously considered
the proposition for defection put to them, they finally
decided against such action and returned to Czechoslovakia
During our contacts some information of low level intelligence
significance was developed.
The Soviet Government is currently engaged in
securing property in San Francisco to house the office and
personnel of the Consulate Genėral. Through conferences
held with State Department we have been able to exert an
·DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL:pdr
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 74
-6-
62
4-E
influence on the choice of properties made available to the
Soviets. As a result of our action it appears almost certain
that the Soviets are settling on a property considered by us
to offer the best advantage for counterintelligence coverage.
In late January, 1971, we furnished information to
State Department and White House concerning activities of
a very aggressive KGB officer in Washington, D. C. who
was attempting to obtain equipment involved in a classified
communications system used by White House and other agencies.
We suggested to State that subject be declared persona
nongrata and Statë, after securing concurrence of White House,
decided instead to personally admonish a representative of
the Soviet Embassy concerning these activities. This action
resulted in curtailing the Soviet's intelligence activities
and probably resulted in his early recall.
A Soviet attached to the staff of the new Consulate
General in San Francisco came to our attention as a KGB
officer who had formerly been stationed in China. He had
been declared persona nongrata and expelled from Peking
with some publicity. This information was furnished by us to
a cooperative newspaper source in San Francisco and resulted
in a
newspaper article which repeated the charges. Considerable
embarrassment was caused and long range curtailment of this
Soviet's intelligence activities is hoped for.
v.
Prosecutive Action
One objective of counterintelligence investigations
is prosecution. Since most intelligence officers have
diplomatic immunity, this objective is rarely attained.
A Soviet intelligence officer operating under cover
of employment at the United Nations Secretariat has requested
classified information from a double agent regarding the
F-14 aircraft being manufactured by Grumman. The facts have
been presented to the Department of Justice and Department of
State and both have approved prosecutive action. The Soviet
was scheduled for arrest during May, 1971, but this action
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL: pdr
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 75
-7-
63
4-E
was held in abeyance pending final approval of the White
House, which had requested a temporary delay. Soviet has
been on summer leave and recently returned to the U. S.
We are currently seeking concurrence from the White House
so that arrest may take place at the next meeting scheduled
for 9/13/71.
VI.
Dissemination of Significant Intelligence Data
One of the products of our counterintelligence
operations is the development of intelligence data of interest
to other U. S. agencies. The following are examples of
significant data which has been disseminated on a high level
since the last inspection.
.1.
Dissemination to National Security Agency
regarding an unknown subject connected with that Agency who
was reported to us as cooperating with the KGB.
2. Dissemination to Atomic Energy Commission
concerning a high official of that Agency who was being
cultivated by the Soviets for intelligence purposes.
3. Dissemination to State, CIA, and the White House
of information we developed concerning the delivery to the
Soviet Embassy on June 17, 1971, of a package containing a
copy of the "Pentagon Papers.
"A.
"
Dissemination to White House, CIA, and State
concerning an intelligence approach made by the Soviets to
a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.
5. Dissemination to the White House of information
we developed concerning the receipt by Soviet intelligence
¨ of information concerning Dr. Kissinger's trip to China prior
to the release of this information by the President. This
information was obtained from an American agent of the KGB
in Washington, D. C..
6. Dissemination on high level to White House and
CIA concerning Soviet intelligence targets relating to the
Strategic Arms. Limitation. Talks then in progress.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL: pdr
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 76
8 -
64
4-E
7. Information in the CHOWLINE and PALMETTO cases
has been disseminated to Dr. Kissinger and the Attorney
General. Dr. Kissinger has commended the Director and
the FBI in this matter and specifically requested that he
be kept informed of any additional developments
.
VII.
Soviet Information
Collation System (SICS)
SICS is the system in which we have utilized
automatic data processing equipment to record data
concerning Soviet officials in the U. S. Since the last
inspection, a continuing expansion has been made in this
system and we are looking to the inclusion of Satellite
personnel in the near future. This is a time consuming
project which holds a tremendous potential, already partially
realized, for reducing administrative work and making our
overall investigative operations more efficient and successful.
Detailed write-up is included in Section 5-Q of the inspection
report.
VIII. Recovery
$9,288.76 has been claimed as a recovery in the
SNOOD case. This is the amount paid Internal Revenue Service
as tax on income belatedly reported by subject due to action
by the Bureau.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL:pdr
4-E
*NV 88608* Dold92989638-Page 77
- 9
-
65
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
4-E
SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION
The significant accomplishments of the Extremist
Intelligence Section can be seen most clearly in the accomplish-
ments through our investigative efforts as well as the accomplish-
ments achieved through the extremist informants.
Since the last inspection we have supervised the
"
"Newkill Special.' This case involves unprovoked attack on
two New York City (NYC) police officers, 5/21/71, by two Negro
male assailants. Both officers were shot and killed. Prior
to this shooting on 5/19/71 two NYC officers were machine gunned
and seriously wounded as they attempted to stop a speeding car
occupied by Negro males. Anonymous letters were received by
news media in NYC claiming credit for these shootings.
The Director met with the President and the Attorney
General regarding the killing of the two officers as this
incident received nationwide publicity. The Director instructed
an all-out effort be made to effect Bureau solution.
Intensive investigation has been conducted to identify
assailants with investigation conducted abroad and in over 40
field offices. Over 2000 people have been interviewed. The
Identification Division has compared the fingerprints of over
700 persons with latent evidence and the Laboratory Division has
conducted about 400 separate examinations of ballistics and
other type evidence in this case.
Since its inception, we have concentrated on members
of the violence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) as suspects.
This has paid off since four persons were arrested in NYC on
6/5/71 while attempting an armed robbery. Two of the individuals
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
8/19/71
JGD:acs
4-E
NW-88608 Doeld:32989638-Rage 78-
66
arrested were Bureau fugitives.
We had previously identified
the two Bureau fugitives from fingerprints from material
submitted by them to news media in May claiming credit for the
murders. The two Bureau fugitives, Richard Moore and
Edward Joseph, were BPP members who were reportedly in Algeria.
A machine gun utilized in armed robbery and in possession of
Moore was determined to be same weapon used in machine gunning
of two NYC police officers on 5/19/71. Moore has been indicted
by Queens County, New York, Grand Jury for attempted murder of
the two officers. He and Joseph remain in custody of local
officials.
Our intense investigation has in some respects
decimated the BPP in NYC.
We have kept them on the defensive
and in hiding. Our investigation and interview program has
resulted in developing a witness who is an associate of the
prime suspects in this case.
Based upon her testimony of acts of violence, she
identified seven Panthers who participated in killing a Negro
BPP leader in NYC. Of the seven, three had previously been
arrested in the above-mentioned armed robbery 6/5/71.
remaining four became Bureau fugitives for Unlawful Flight
to Avoid Prosecution for murder.
The
On 8/7/71 a Panther informant of our Detroit Office
under instructions to locate the four fugitives located
Michael Dennis Hill; one of the four, who was accompanied by
an associate. Based upon informant's report, Hill and
Anthony Nicholas La Borde were arrested, both armed with
firearms, and La Borde also had a live hand grenade in his
possession. A Federal Grand Jury has indicted Hill and La Borde
with possession of destructive device and La Borde also charged
with harboring Hill.
Hill is reportedly the "trigger man" in shooting of
two officers on 5/19/71 and our witness has stated Hill was
extremely upset for his failure to actually kill the officers
and is a likely suspect in killing the two officers two nights
later on 5/21/71. Hill is described as the "hit man" of BPP
67
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 79
and was the planner and "hit man" in armed robberies and acts
of violence committed by BPP. La Borde was also indicted on
armed robbery charges on 8/16/71 in NYC having been identified
as the person who held up a bar during July, 1971.
Hill and La Borde are prime suspects in the killing.
on 5/21/71 and lineup is being arranged for our crime scene
witnesses to view these two.
3
cace cik on
We have kept the White House and the Attorney General
apprised of all pertinent developments in this case and on five
occasions Mr. John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs the White House, has advised the
Director by letter of his appreciation of being kept fully
informed on this case.
and
na a been able to folder closely
Through the investigative efforts of the field and
the various Bureau programs, we have been able to follow closely
the development and activity of the BPP which revealed as of
June, 1971, a total membership of 710 in 39 branches located
in 37 cities..
onalist Counterintelligence
midon as in effect for several pears.
Program
ここ
=
33..
was disc The Bureau's Black Nationalist Counterintelligence
Program (COINTELPRO), which was in effect for several years,
was discontinued 4/27/71. Prior to discontinuance, counter-
intelligence activity directed toward disruption of the BPP was
carried out at an accelerated rate taking advantage of and
exploiting any appropriate situation. Emphasis was placed on
creating distrust between Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of
Defense, and Eldridge Cleaver, BPP Minister of Information, a
fugitive in Algeria. These efforts resulted in a break between
Newton and Cleaver on 2/26/71 which soon grew into an irrecon-
cilable split and a name-calling contest between the two of -
them. Through our mass media program, we disseminated publicity
concerning the split within the party as well as the fact that
Newton lived in a $650-a-month apartment while rank and file
Panthers went hungry.
to discredit
The publicity concerning the internal factionalism
as well as Newton's high living definitely served to discredit
the BPP and caused further factionalism. The financial
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 80

supporters were disenchanted bringing to a halt the flow of...
donations into the organization. The resulting strain added
to the paranoia of Newton causing him to create complete chaos.
within BPP national headquarters. Newton, in an effort to
justify his position and to criticize Cleaver and his dissident
followers, claimed that Cleaver and his appetite for violence
were the root of all of the BPP problems im the recent past.
Newton maintained the BPP was really nonviolent but was led
astray by Cleaver and that he, Newton, will now return the
organization to a position of nonviolence and community work.
In summation, our COINTELPRO efforts split the BPP,
cut off their supplies of outside funds and created chaos within.
As a result of the ever increasing information being
reported by our informants regarding the acquisition of weapons
by black extremist groups, on 5/17/71 an airtel was sent to all
SACS setting forth instructions regarding the handling of such
information. This airtel sets out in detail the possible gun
law violations under the National Firearms Act, State Firearms
Control Act and the unlawful possession or receipt of firearms.
The field was instructed that we have secondary investigative
jurisdiction in such matters and that information developed by
our informant coverage regarding possible gun law violations
should be handled by us and vigorously pursued looking to the
ultimate prosecution of the black extremists involved.
The Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) was organized
in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970. The leader of
this group was Alfred Dwight Amos Featherstone, an articulate
black extremist and an admitted communist who had in the past
visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. Through the outstanding informant
coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive investi-
gative techniques used, this dangerous extremist organization
has been completely destroyed and is no longer a factor in the
extremist activities in the Miami area. Our informant coverage
developed information regarding the participation by BAMM leaders
and members in fire bombings in the Miami area including a
bombing at the University of Miami. Through this coverage and
other investigations an excellent criminal case was developed
69
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 81
regarding the teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices
by BAMM leaders. In December, 1970, Federal Grand Jury in Miami,
Florida, rendered indictment charging Featherstone and two other
BAMM leaders with violation of the new antiriot laws. All
three subjects have been found guilty in Federal court Miami.
Featherstone and Charles Riley, Jr., another BAMM leader, have
been sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for
periods of four and two and a half years respectively. The
third subject, after testifying for the Federal Government, was
placed on probation.
Earlier this year, one of our informants being operated
by the Richmond Office reported on a conspiracy by leaders of
the Washington, D. C., Chapter of the BPP and leaders of the
Richmond Information Center. (RIC), an affiliate of the BPP, to
steal and transport weapons from Richmond, Virginia, to
Washington, D. C. This informant reported on the theft of such
weapons in Richmond and their subsequent illegal transportation
to Washington, D. C., by this group.
As a result of this information developed and other
investigation, two of the BPP leaders in Washington and three
RIC leaders in Richmond, Virginia, were subsequently indicted
by a Federal Grand Jury.
Our informant testified in Federal court as the
principal Government witness resulting in the conviction of
'the two Washington, D. C., leaders and two of the RIC leaders.
The trial for the fifth individual involved is scheduled for
8/20/71 in Richmond. The sentencing of the convicted leaders
is scheduled in the near future.
As a result of the conviction obtained based on the
'excellent information furnished by our informant, the RIC has
been completely destroyed and conviction of the two Washington
BPP leaders has been highly significant in curtailing the
activity of the Washington, D. C., BPP Chapter.
The continued operation and development of extremist
informants has resulted in a steady flow of valuable intelligence
information, which information has brought about the apprehension
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 82
70
of badly wanted extremist fugitives, confiscation of explosives
and firearms in possession of extremists, the prevention of
violence and the saving of lives. In addition, these informants
have been responsible for bringing about the arrest of 630
individuals since the last inspection, 145 of these individuals
were Bureau fugitives, as well as being responsible for the
recovery of $327,760.53.
Concerning the development of information as to black
extremist activities outside the United States effecting the
United States, we have placed an informant in Canada under the
direction of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This operation
is commented on in detail in the extremist informant write-up.
Some of the concrete examples of our informant and
investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following:
Ghetto informants in June, 1971, developed information
concerning the motive and circumstances leading up to an
unsuccessful attempted fire bombing of a Jackson, Mississippi,
police vehicle%; identified a local subject involved in assault
and theft of a revolver of a Cincinnati, Ohio, police officer,
which information resulted in the arrest of the subject by the
police department; furnished information which was instrumental
in arranging for the surrender to FBI Special Agents of a 16-
year-old male who was badly wanted by the Buffalo Police
Department in connection with a shooting incident.
Omaha informants advised of the location of several
weapons which were owned by members of the Black Revolutionary
Party in Omaha and which were subsequently seized by the Omaha
Police Department; Houston informants furnished information which
was the basis of a raid by the Houston Police Department on the
headquarters of the Peoples Party II, which resulted in the
arrest of nine individuals, eight of whom were charged with
burglary and firearms theft, and the recovery of numerous
weapons.
Detroit extremist informants advised concerning a
BPP member who was involved in a holdup killing in Detroit.
He also advised that this individual was carrying the same
7/
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 83
i
pistol used in the killing, which enabled the Detroit police
to arrest the BPP member, recover the pistol and determine that
this weapon was used in the killing referred to above.
A Tampa informant furnished information concerning
identity of two Negro males who placed a fire bomb in a garage
in Tampa, Florida.
A Miami ghetto informant was instrumental in obtaining
advance information concerning problems in a local high school.
It is noted there was a walkout by students at this high school
and as a result several Negro students were arrested. A
Washington Field informant obtained information concerning
Stokely Carmichael's trip to the United States from Africa and
this information was verified by the New York Division.
Detroit informant provided information which saved
two lives. This informant, who was a member of the BPP, was
instrumental in saving the lives of two BPP members who were
being disciplined by the BPP and his information when furnished
to local police was responsible for arrest of seven BPP members
who were charged with kidnaping and assault to do bodily harm..
less than murder.
A Memphis informant furnished information which
prevented a. shootout between members of the BPP chapter and
the Memphis Police Department.
Extremist intelligence information gathered through
our informants and investigations makes up a major portion of
the Bureau's sophisticated document which is disseminated to the
White House and other high-level Government agencies. This
document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" furnishes
the White House and other agencies with a digest of the extremist
problem in the United States.
The quality.of our informants can also be judged by
the fact that since the last inspection 16 Special Agents have
been recommended for either incentive awards or letters of
commendation for their work in developing and handling these
informants. In addition, 11 extremist informants were given bonus
awards for valuable information furnished and services rendered.
72
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 84
In relating to the accomplishments of the Extremist
Intelligence Section, comment must be made concerning the
contributions regularly being made by the Inspection Division
during their analysis of extremist matters: in the various field
divisions. In addition to acting upon information furnished to
them by this Section, the Inspection Staff, through their on-the-
spot review of extremist matters in the field, are often able to
detect weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and
offer constructive assistance to the office involved in
strengthening their operation.
The information furnished in the Inspection reports
is used by this Section to do a comprehensive analysis of every
field office operation and to furnish the results of the analysis
to the field divisions by communications captioned "Administrative
Review. These reviews have been most helpful in strengthening
the various field office operations.
"
Since the last inspection, informant coverage has
improved in the Boston, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Newark
and New Haven field divisions and this improvement can be
attributed in part to the Inspector's analysis of the above
operations.
73
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 85
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
4-E
There is attached a summary of significant accomplishments
of this Section set forth by individual units. Specific tangible accomplish-
ments resulting from programs supervised by this Section are outlined
in write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated herein.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
AJD:ams
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 86
74
SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT
4
FBI liaison Agents stationed abroad in 17
foreign posts have facilitated and encouraged the prompt
handling by foreign agencies of FBI requests for
investigation in the countries covered by those agencies.
The productivity of this liaison during the first six
months of 1971 was demonstrated by the location in those
countries of 779 FBI fugitives, 35 fugitives wanted by
other agencies, and 573 Selective Service delinquents
for a total of 1,387 persons wanted in the U. S. Eighty-
eight automobiles, stolen in the U. S., were recovered
abroad during the same six months and the total estimated
value of stolen property and funds recovered abroad was
$596,442.
Requests for U. S. information and investigations
within the U. S. are handled on a reciprocal basis for the
foreign agencies with which we are in contact. This
cooperation has played a large part in maintaining our
dominant position in international police work and has
encouraged a spirit of cooperation between the countries
* concerned. During the first seven months in 1971, we
handled a total of 1,773 investigations under our Foreign
Police Cooperation program. In one of these cases initiated
as an FPC matter but transformed into an Interstate
Transportation of Stolen Property case, New York City Agents
were successful in locating the famous painting by El Greco
"La Asuncion de la Virgen," which had been stolen in Spain
in 1936 and brought into the U. S. in 1968 through Mexico.
This painting, a Spanish national art treasure, is estimated
as worth a minimum of one million dollars and its location
has received exceptionally wide publicity in Spain and
resulted in expressions of gratitude to our Legal Attache
for FBI cooperation.
35
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 87
E
The expansion of our operations abroad was under-
taken at the instruction of the President for the specific
purpose of developing high-level political intelligence and
each such item submitted is identified by the code word
"HILEV." After a slow start in January, when the new
offices were just getting underway, the production of HILEV
items has increased to the point that during July, 1971, 73
such items were submitted of which 53 or 72.6% were actually
disseminated to Dr. Kissinger and the Attorney General.
Through August 17, 1971, a total of 245 items have been so
disseminated. By letter March 3, 1971, Dr. Kissinger,
` referring to our work, stated "it is gratifying that efforts
thus far have been so fruitful" and "your contributions in
the foreign area are deeply appreciated." In June, 1971,
the President informed the Director that he desired that we
again expand our foreign liaison in view of the valuable
information which had been procured by the Bureau in its
operations abroad.
Agents of the Unit receive telephone calls from
the other agencies in the Executive Brancn who need
information or have problems they wish to discuss with the
FBI. Some of these are referred to the interested division
but every effort is made to resolve them without un-
`necessarily involving Bureau officials. As an example,
in May, 1971, we received an Army proposal for the checking
of all fingerprints submitted by applicants for enlistment
or induction into. the Armed Forces. Special Agent Schwartz
immediately discussed this proposal with the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Policy and a
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army and
was able to convince these officials that no change in the
present procedures was necessary or desirable. As a result
of the efforts of Special Agent Schwartz, the Bureau was
saved a large volume of fingerprint classification and
searching, and he was commended by the Director for his
successful handling of this proposal,
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 88.
--2-76
CUBAN UNIT
4-E
:
This Unit has responsibility for neutralizing Cuban
intelligence and subversive Puerto Rican independence activities
against the United States. The Cuban Mission to the United
Nations (CMUN), New York City, is the focal point for Cuban
spying operations, but Puerto Rican terroristic endeavors
are carried out by several groups, some being strictly local ·
San Juan operations and others, under Cuban direction, carrying
out incendiary bombings and acts of sabotage in the New York
City area, as well as in Puerto Rico.
Cuban Intelligence Matters
We currently have 11 active, 211 potential and one
inactive double agents in the Cuban intelligence field. Through
a concerted effort mounted against the CMUN in February, 1970,
we had developed 24 DESECO-type sources at the time of the last
inspection. Since that date, 19 other similar sources have been
cultivated, and each is being used in some capacity on a continuing
or intermittent basis in our efforts to establish blanket coverage
of the known intelligence officials at the CMUN (9 out of a 15
man complement) and to develop a defector-in-place there.
Recently we have developed documentary proof that an
Attache at the CMUN is illegally purchasing television cameras
in violation of United States regulations, and State Department
is considering persona non grata action based on this data.
One of our sources has obtained the repair contract for CMUN
automobiles which assures us continuing access to them.
In March, 1971, the Director's approval was obtained to
carry out a concerted defection effort against a CMUN Second
Secretary, using a Special Agent of the New York Office who has
a Latin American background and who has gained the complete
confidence of the Cuban intelligence official through his facility
with the Spanish language and his finesse in posing as a
Washington, D. C. businessman who is looking ahead to the time
when United States will reestablish trade relations with Cuba.
State Department is preparing back-up material for this operation.
The White House has been offered this arrangement as a vehicle
'to feed disinformation to the Cuban Government, and it has
responded with enthusiasm that serious consideration is being
given to use of this communication channel.
NW-88608-Doeld:32989638 Page 89
4-E
In other positive moves we have arranged for a
friendly newspaperman, who writes for Spanish-language newspapers
in New York City, to prepare feature articles on Cuban defectors
who have settled happily in the United States. In conjunction
with State Department, we received concurrence of Secretary
General U Thant of the United Nations to bar two strong-arm-type
Cuban intelligence officials from United States territory even
though neither had ever been in the United States or performed
any known acts of violence against United States property or
citizens. Mr. U Thant pointed out that this was a landmark
action, as the United States had never before presented a case
which warranted entry denials in the history of the United Nations.
Our around-the-clock coverage of Cuban intelligence
activities has allowed us to identify, with a minimum of effort,
the various extremist, New Left and subversive Puerto Rican
independence leaders who maintain contact with the CMUN.
valuable double agents in the Miami area have gained the complete
confidence of a top Cuban collaborator based in New York City,
and they are able to provide full details concerning Cuban
Government military and civilian targets in the Miami area.
of these double agents is being groomed to make clandestine trips
to New York City, and it is anticipated that we will receive
_ valuable data concerning other Cuban Government targets when
these trips materialize..
Two
One
The field offices responsible for covering Cuban
intelligence activities have consistently taken an imaginative
approach to the problem, and supervisory personnel in the field
and at the Seat of Government consistently strive to insure that
all available tools are furnished the investigating Agents.
Subversive Puerto Rican Independence Matters
The terroristic Puerto Rican proindependence movement,
responsible for over 230 incendiary bombings in Puerto Rico and
over 40 in the New York City area since 1967, is a very real
menace to major United States installations and to the security
of Puerto Rico, as well as to the United States. While only a
small minority of persons desiring independence for Puerto Rico
is involved, we now have approximately 1,000 individuals marked
for special handling in case of a national emergency, and a
majority of these have been associated in some way with violent
acts against public or private property.
"The largest of the extremist Puerto Rican independence
groups is the Puerto Rican Independence Movement (MPIPR), while
others practicing violence are the Puerto Rican Socialist Workers
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 90

i
4-E
Party (PSO), Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA),
Armed Commandos for Liberation (CAL), and the Nationalist Party
of Puerto Rico (NPPR), the oldest of the revolutionary groups.
MIRA and CAL, in particular, are dominated by native Puerto
Ricans who had many years of sabotage training in Cuba, returned
surreptitiously to Puerto Rico and led the wave of major
explosions which heavily damaged United States installations
in metropolitan Puerto Rican areas. Property loss resulting
from such acts of violence since 1967 has been estimated at over
$15 million with an economic loss of over $100 million.
In addition to the previous apprehension of
Filiberto Ojeda Rios, Cuban espionage agent and leader of several
major bombing expeditions, the FBI was instrumental in the
arrest by Police of Puerto Rico (POPR) of Narciso Rabell
Martinez and Roberto Jose Todd Pagan, two other long-time espionage
agents with extensive sabotage training in Cuba. Following
the deaths of two police officials and an ROTC cadet during a
riot in March, 1971, at the University of Puerto Rico, one of
our informants was able to identify and bring about the arrest
of a Federation of University Students for Independence (FUPI)
leader involved in the killings. FUPI is a radical college
student group which advocates violence in bringing about indepen-
dence for Puerto Rico.
Our sources in the Puerto Rican indepen dence field
have given us information concerning subversives traveling
between Puerto Rico and New York City to transport incendiary
devices for use in acts of sabotage. Also a close rapport has
been established between POPR and our San Juan Office in recent
months. The resulting arrests and seizure of explosives, as
well as intelligence material, have slowed down the acts of
violence noticeably during the first seven months of 1971.
We are quite apprehensive that the National Conference
of Governors has been scheduled for September 12-15, 1971, at
San Juan. Realizing the volatile nature of the Puerto Rican
independence movement, we have directed an airtel to all offices
pointing up the powder keg situation and asking that every effort
be made to obtain advance information concerning planned acts
of violence to be carried out against participating officials.
We are watching this situation closely and are prepared to give
the POPR all logical assistance in helping to curtail any such
plans.
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 91
79
MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT
4
-
GJ
E
!
This Unit is primarily responsible for the
overall supervision and direction of the FBI's activities
¨relating to countries in the Western Hemisphere commonly
referred to as the Latin American nations. Such
activities involve Espionage, Internal Security,
Registration Act, Neutrality Matters and the collection
and dissemination of foreign intelligence data. In
addition, the Unit handles anti-Castro activities, pro-
Castro organizations and individuals, Cuban Security
Index matters and cases and Cuban travel, immigrant and
refugee matters. The unit is also responsible for the
supervision of cases involving Spanish American and other
ethnic groups.
The President and other policy makers have
indicated a continuing interest in political intelligence
information from areas in South and Central America and
the Carribean. The critical need for such data from
these areas, which are in constant political turmoil,
prompted us to augument our office in Buenos Aires and
to establish new offices in La Paz, Bolivia%3B Managua,
Nicaragua; and Caracas, Venezuela. These offices coupled
with our offices in Mexico and Buenos Aires give us
representation in the areas from which political
intelligence data is urgently needed. To further develop
such information, we have established sensitive coverage
in Panamanian and Chilean fields.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 92
80
We have on a continuing basis been able to
provide the President and other responsible officials
with information of the type needed. With increasing
frequency our Legal Attaches have been able to provide
high level intelligence information which has been given
exclusively to the White House and the Attorney General.
One such item, for example, provided by the Legal Attache
in La Paz on 5/20/71 and disseminated on the same date to
the White House and the Attorney General dealt with plans
of the Bolivian Government to request the withdrawal of
the Peace Corps from that country. Subsequently on
5/22/71, the Bolivian Government did request the withdrawal
of this group from the country. A representative of the
National Security Council commented favorably concerning
this data and the Legal Attache was commended by the
Director for developing the source who was able to produce
this type of information.
The Unit continues to be successful in thwarting
the plans of militant anti-Çastro groups which have sought
to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and property of
foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba. Successful
development of key informants who have infiltrated anti-
Castro groups under Bureau direction has enabled the
Bureau to keep abreast of their activities. Cuban exilé
activities are embarrassing to the U. S. Government and
could lead to a major confrontation between the U. S. and
the Soviet Union which has assumed the role of Cuba's
protector. An example of our success in this area was the
arrest by appropriate authorities of four members of
Alpha 66, militant anti-Castro group, on 7/11/71 and the
'seizure of machine guns, ammunition, explosives, hand
grenades, other weapons and a boat. Seizure of this
material has hurt Alpha 66's capability to conduct raids
on Cuba. Action taken in this instance was based on data
furnished by FBI informant.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 93
-2-81
CHINESE UNIT
4-E ·
During February, 1971, we identified Robert Moling
Teng (65-73910) as the individual reported by Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) as having had clandestine contact with
a Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence officer in Ottawa
Canada, on 2/2/71. Teng has outstanding credentials as a
former Chinese Nationalist diplomat and a former United States
Government employee. His background makes him an ideal type
for covert use by the Chinese Communist Intelligence Service.
Since February, 1971, Teng has attempted to gain employment
on the White House staff, with State Department, with
Department of Justice, and with a contractor handling work
for National Aeronautics and Space Administration. We learned .
of these efforts through a sensitive source and were able to
alert responsible officials concerning Teng;
.
In July, 1971, with Director's approval, a desk-level
conference regarding Chicom matters was held at the Bureau
with our RCMP counterparts. The conference was most rewarding
and informative and the results were furnished to the Director,
who instructed that a memorandum, based on results of the
conference, be prepared for Dr. Kissinger at the White House.
This memorandum was sent to Dr. Kissinger, who replied with a
personal letter of thanks to the Director. Dr. Kissinger noted
that the Bureau's timely coverage of these matters is most
important, and he requested to be further advised of these
developments as they occur.
An analysis of our existing method of handling cases
on Chinese seaman deserters was made during February and March,
1971. This study resulted in a recommendation, approved, to
streamline handling of these matters. Annual savings of
$16,160 realized from this new procedure (see Bureau letter to
Albany dated 3/22/71 captioned "Chinese Seamen Deserting in
the U. S., IS CH," 105-129735).
In view of the recent increase in the number of con-
tact cases growing out of the establishment of a
at Ottawa. Canada, it was recommended and
Legat Ottawa,
approve com Embassy
submit communications in unknown subject contact
cases in a manner which would allow prompt. relay to appropriate
field offices inasmuch as identification of unknown subjects
is of extreme importance at the outset.
EXO:dgo
8/19/71
4-E
NW.88608 Docid:32989638. Page 94
82
In view of the increase in the number of contact
.
cases mentioned above, Legat, Ottawa, has been requested to
devise a form he can utilize in furnishing pertinent infor-
mation to the Bureau. The present manner of submission of
this data does cause some administrative problems here..
During August, 1971, one of our sources began a trip
scheduled to last almost three weeks during which he will con-
tact a number of pro-Chicom individuals in the United States
and Canada and will culminate in an effort to establish contact
with Chicom intelligence officers in Ottawa. Travel to Canada
is with the concurrence of RCMP, and RCMP will provide coverage
in order that we can evaluate the results of the source's
efforts.
During the last three months, two other sources
being directed against the Chicoms traveled to Hong Kong where
they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts.
Another source, who is under Bureau direction and
who is employed at the United Nations (UN) is now in
Red China on home leave. This travel was made at no cost to
the Bureau and when debriefed, it is expected that this source
will be able to provide us with up-to-date information regarding
conditions in Red China and possibly valuable political intelli-
gence...
During July, 1971, Paul Lin, described by RCMP as
the foremost Chicom agent of influence in Canada, visited
Cambridge, Massachusetts, to consult with Harvard University
officials. His schedule also called for a meeting with
Senator Kennedy who has exhibited a keen interest in U. S.
relations with Red China. One of our sources was able to main-
tain personal contact with Lin during this visit, and Lin has
asked the source to carry tasks for him. It should be noted
that RCMP has described Lin as the person most likely to be
involved in any future discussions in the United States
relating to Chicom efforts to ensure entry into the UN.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 95
2-83
NATIONALITIES UNIT
4
-
E
Israeli and Middle East Investigations
Information from these investigations continues
'to be of extreme interest to the White House, the Secretary
of State, and high-level officials within the intelligence
community. We have continued to furnish information from
our sensitive coverage in the Israeli field under a
program of dissemination which has been assigned the
security designation of "SCOPE." "SCOPE" information is
disseminated only to select individuals at the White House
and Department of State and to a previously cleared chain
of command within agencies of the intelligence community.
Data primarily relates to attempts by officials of the
Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction and support
within United States Government circles for continued.
support of the Israeli Government politically and
economically, as well as affording military equipment.
The personalities involved in these dealings with Israeli
officials have included prominent members of the
United States Congress, as well as individuals in the
Exective Branch. With regard to the information we have
furnished, favorable comment has been received from
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger at the White House, the Secretary
of State and other dignitaries within the intelligence
community relative to its timeliness and value in
formulating United States Government policy and keeping
abreast of the continuing tense situation in the
Middle East.
This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for
extremely sensitive operations undertaken in cooperation
with the National Security Agency designed to penetrate
diplomatic communications of foreign governments. We are
currently conducting six, such operations, all of which are
most successful and responsive to high national priority
requirements in the production of cryptanalytic and
intelligence data. Two of the above-described operations
were accomplished since January, 1971.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 96
.84.
.4
☑]
E
In view of the sensitivity of these particular
operations, it is suggested that I or my Number One Man
be consulted for details.
Investigation of Unauthorized Disclosure of
Classified Information to "The New York Times:
by Daniel Ellsberg
On June 15, 1971, the Attorney General requested
the FBI conduct all necessary investigation into the
publication of classified information by "The New York
Times." Our continuing investigation on a "special" basis
into this matter has, from its inception, identified
Daniel Ellsberg, Senior Research Associate, Center of
International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, as being the principal
suspect in this matter. Investigation has revealed that
Ellsberg had access to the material involved while employed
at Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California; reproduced
classified documents in Los Angeles, California, in
October, 1969; and subsequently made copies of this material
available to various members of Congress who failed to make
the data public. Strong circumstantial evidence has been
developed indicating that in March, 1971, he made copies
of the information available to representatives of "The New
York Times" for reproduction.
On June 28, 1971, a Federal Grand Jury at
Los Angeles returned a two-count indictment charging Ellsberg
with violation of Section 793 (E) of the Espionage Statute
in that he unlawfully retained classified documents and
failed to deliver them to appropriate Government officials.
He was also charged with violation of Section 641 of the
Theft of Government Property Statute in that he converted
to his own use certain documents having a value of excess
of $100.
:
Investigation revealed that Anthony Russo, former
employee at Rand Corporation and associate of Ellsberg,
assisted Ellsberg in the reproduction of documents in
October, 1969. He was immunized from prosecution and
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 97
2
F
4 E
subsequently refused to testify before a Federal Grand Jury.
As a result, he was held in contempt and was committed to
jail on 8/16/71 until such time as he purges himself by
testifying.
· Considerable evidence has been developed
indicating employees of "The New York Times" have also
violated Section 793(E) of the Espionage Statute in
regard to their unauthorized possession of classified
information and refusal to deliver the information to
appropriate officials of the United States Government upon
demand.
The summary of facts in the Ellsberg matter, as
stated above, derived from a mass of details uncovered by
extensive investigation handled on a "special" basis in
four of the Bureau's major offices and represents lesser
degrees of investigative activity in virtually every Bureau
continental office, as well as several Legal Attaches. The
Unit has successfully coped with the supervisory
responsibilities of this investigation to date and it's
servicing of the numerous inquiries in this matter has
contributed to the Bureau's stature in the eyes of the
highest levels of the Executive Branch who have evidenced
concern in the overall problem of the leak of classified
information to unauthorized persons. Ramifications of the
Ellsberg investigation could foreseeably touch every level
of Government operation in view of the necessary revisions
in the handling of classified data pointed up as being
required because of shortcomings uncovered in this
investigation. The need to uncover such shortcomings and
to uncover any indication of a concentrated conspiracy to
subvert the national security by violation of classification
rules continues to be a matter of considerable concern in
our investigation of Ellsberg and shares equally with the
Unit's recognized responsibility for overseeing the
investigation looking toward successful prosecution of
Daniel Ellsberg and others involved in this matter.
86
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 98.
i
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
4-H
You are requested to furnish
information regarding various
Surveys, projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This infor-
mation should include identity of the project or program, background and
date of inception, scope and desired objectives, positive results achieved
since last inspection, extent and nature of current supervision, current
justification for continuance, and frequency of evaluation and date of last
justification. Identify any surveys, projects or programs you have in
operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any
surveys, projects and programs completed or discontinued since the last
inspection. Identify only investigative-type matters in this category.
Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned
and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic
are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are
specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs
instituted since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you
may wish to comment on:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Security Index Program.
Security Informants.
Extremist Matters. (Black extremist groups)
Extremist Informants.
White Extremist Groups.
Technical and Microphone Surveillances.
Counterintelligence.
Communist Infiltration of Extremist Groups.
New Left Movement.
Espionage.
Any other program deemed pertinent.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(JAS:mls
above.
8/20/71)
Attached are individual
write-ups from each of the
Sections concerning the
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
18/17/71
ESM:wmj
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 99
87
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
4-H
SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY:
Ay
In connection with the
Inspector's request under
above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following
handled by the Internal Security Section:
(1)
Security Index Program
(2)
Security Informant Program
...(7)
Counterintelligence Program
White Hate Groups
-
Disruption of
(11) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent
(a) Thumbnail Sketch Program
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LLA:CO
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 100
88

SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
4-H
BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION
Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals
who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat
to the national security began prior to World War II. The
actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with
lists of individuals considered for detention in the event of
a threat to the national security.
SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES
This program is field-wide in scope. The goal of the
Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals
who because of their membership and activity and/or association
with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially
dangerous to the internal security of the country. The program
includes the collection of sufficient information relating to
the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension
and detention in the event of a national emergency. Another
goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the
event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize
possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion. The SI is
broken down into three Priority groupings, the cards being tabbed
either Priority I, II or III in accordance with the relative
factor of dangerousness. Most dangerous individuals are tabbed
Priority I.
POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION
By way of background, in February, 1969, as a matter of
temporary expediency, the Executives Conference approved a
moratorium on certain Security Matter - Communist investigations
and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III
Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971.
By memorandum October 29, 1970, from the Executives Conference
to Mr. Tolson, approved by the Director, the moratorium was
lifted. At the time there were approximately 10,690 individuals
on the SI who were of the Priority II and III types. Virtually
no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7,000
of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
SFP: rrd
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 101
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM
4-H
1
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
February, 1969. Many of these persons had changed residence
and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown. It can
thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an aggressive,
timely and precise step toward fulfilling our current
responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of these
individuals. Implementation was directed by airtel November 3,
1970, to all offices, and in doing so we took a realistic step
in permitting the field to stagger the reopening of these cases
so that they would be spread out over the period November 3, 1970,
to June 30, 1971. This was considered essential in view of our
approximation that it would be necessary to reopen about 7,000
of the Priority II and III types. Our experience in the nine
months since moratorium was lifted has demonstrated the wisdom
of the lifting of the moratorium as it was found that many of
these subjects had changed residence and/or employment, thus
necessitating substantial investigation to determine new
whereabouts. There are presently pending a number of these cases
for the precise purpose of determining whereabouts.
EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION
Responsibility for administrative handling of the SI
rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section.
Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate
supervisory personnel. I personally follow this matter closely
to insure it is current and that necessary changes are made
where desirable. This program receives constant supervision.
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE
This is a major internal security program based upon
Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be
implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize
acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.
FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION
The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated.
most recent justification is contained in memorandum from
R. D. Cotter to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated January 12, 1971.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
- SFP: rrd
4-H
The
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 102
5
-
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
-
WHITE HATE GROUPS
4-H
BACKGROUND, DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES
This program was initiated in September, 1964,
for the purpose of counteracting and neutralizing white
extremist organizations, leaders and adherents. During
period January, February, and March of 1971, there were
17 field offices involved in this program and as specific
situations arose, other divisions participated.
THE UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC.,
(UKA)
Under the leadership of John Paul Rogers,
Grand Dragon Realm of Florida, the UKA in that area
has become increasingly aggressive in recent months
and has been afforded generally favorable coverage by
the news media in Florida. In addition, Rogers has been
infuriated by recent interviews of Klansmen by the FBI
and has been increasingly vehement in his verbal attacks
against FBI Agents. As a result, Rogers has been considered
a primary subject for counterintelligence activity. Tampa
has instructed its informants to discredit Rogers wherever
possible without creating suspicion.
•
John Paul Rogers above has also recently
devoted practically all of his energy to the UKA to the
exclusion of his wife and job, having hired a retired
barber to handle most of his business; yet he purchased
a $19,000 home. Tampa is seeking ways to create suspicion
of Rogers by other Klansmen.
Imperial Wizard, Robert M. Shelton of the UKA
has for some time been attempting, without success, to
purchase polygraph machines in order to "weed out FBI
informants." Chicago, with Bureau authority, interviewed
Walter Van De Werkin, past president of the American Society
of Polygraph Examiners, in an effort to ascertain who we
should logically contact in the polygraph field to prevent
Shelton and the UKA from purchasing this machine.
Interview,
which was handled in a discreet manner and in complete
confidence, revealed that we should not expand this endeavor
further at this time due to the large number of individuals
and companies involved. In the event we learn of a specific
firm or individual the UKA desires to contact for this
purpose, further consideration will be given to this matter.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
LLA:co
4-H i
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 103
-
- 6 .
-
او
During March, 1971, Washington Field Office
was authorized to interview Robert J. Lee, admitted
National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) official
allegedly involved in raid on Mobilization Committee to
End the War in Vietnam to cast suspicion on Jesse Clayborn
Stephens, self-styled east coast coordinator for Minutemen
and to disrupt cooperative relationship between respective
organizations and effect possible defection of Lee.
Interview appeared to be successful in that rapport was
established with Lee which may be beneficial in the future.
Lee volunteered information concerning NSWPP matters not
previously known to the Bureau and indicated he would be
receptive for further contacts. It is felt this matter
has long range potential.
CURRENT STATUS OF PROGRAM
While counterintelligence of Klan and white
hate groups is an ongoing thing all counterintelligence
programs as such which were operated by this division
were discontinued by airtel to all field offices 4/27/71.
In exceptional instances where counterintelligence action
appears warranted, recommendations are now submitted to
the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it
pertains. These recommendations are then considered on
an individual basis.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
LLA:co
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 104
-
7
-
THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM
4-H
This program was initiated and authorized by
SAC Letter 53-72 (J) dated October 27, 1953, to insure
that the field is using current characterizations of
subversive organizations and to provide uniformity in
characterizing such organizations. Those characterizations
deemed to be of field-wide interest are now to be
furnished to the field by letter to all offices on an
annual basis rather than by SAC Letter as was formerly
the practice, in accordance with approval of suggestion
in memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr dated December 7,
1970.
The background and value of this program is
the same as it was at the time of last inspection. Since
June 1, 1971, we have been receiving and processing the
annual submission of thumbnail sketches. To date
thumbnail sketches on 387 separate organizations have
been received and these are being processed by appropriate
supervisory personnel at the Bureau. Those of field-wide
¡interest, of which there are 70 at this time, will be
furnished to the field by letter to all offices. Others
are being returned to submitting field offices as they
are approved. This program was last reviewed and analyzed
and its continuance approved by memorandum R. L. Shackelford
to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970. Annual
approval will again be requested when the current project
is completed.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HEM:cb
-H
8 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 105
93
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY AND NEW LEFT ORGANIZATIONS
At the time of the last inspection in January,
1971, the Internal Security Section handled informants
only in the basic revolutionary organizations and related
groups. There was no Security Informant Unit as such,
informants being handled on subversive organization
desks. On June 16, 1971, a Security Informant Unit was
formed and this Unit now handles informants in the
New Left field as well as in basic revolutionary
organizations and related groups.
4-H
At last inspection there were 264 member informants
in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA); at present there are
226, a decrease of 38. At last inspection there were 31
member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP);
at present there are 48, an increase of 17. As of
July 31, 1971, date of latest monthly tabulation, the
Security Informant unit handled a total of 795 security
informants and 671 potential security informants, a total
of 1,466. This includes 630 informant cases transferred
from the New Left Section to the Security Informant Unit
in the Internal Security Section on June 16, 1971.
There has been continuing recognition of the
fact there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate
informant coverage. However, economy has increasingly
become a primary factor. In line with the President's
message on August 15, 1971, tightening economic controls
and our continuing efforts to hold down expenditures, the
field is being instructed by letter to all offices to cut
down payments to security and extremist informants and
sources by five percent. To assure uniformity and fairness
in the application of this cutback throughout the field,
each office was instructed to follow this formula:
Total expenditures, for all such informants and sources
for the six month period ending July 31, 1971; reduce
'this total by five percent; divide the resulting figure
by six (months). The resulting figure is to be the
guideline for each office.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HEM:cb
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 106
94
SECURITY INFORMANT, PROGRAM
HEM:cb
8/19/71
This instruction is not a mandate to reduce
payments across the board on all informants and sources.
Offices are to evaluate expenditures within the
determined guideline amount and adjust individual
payments accordingly.
These instructions do not mean the Bureau will
cease authorizing payments where new informants are
developed and fully justified. It is incumbent on all
offices to evaluate these matters within the guideline
figure. There are to be no increases in payments to
informants and sources for the next 90 days, in line
with the Director's instructions.
Each office was instructed to advise the Bureau
by return airtel of the guideline figure determined. By
close of business September 30, 1971, the Bureau is to be.
advised by each office that these instructions have been
complied with and that expenditures have been reduced by
the five percent factor. On the basis of our expenditures
during the past fiscal year, the five percent reduction
will result in an annual saving of approximately $129,000.
Security informant development receives continuous
supervision. It is not technically a program justified
semiannually or annually but rather a fundamental procedure
in our investigative operations that requires and receives
vigorous day to day attention.
The Security Informant Unit maintains an up-to-date
index of Security Informants and potential security informants.
It correlates personal and operating data (such as name,
address, code, file and symbol number) concerning these
informants, which it receives from the Division's investigative
sections, and places such material on FD-348s, three by five
cards that constitute the index. This index is maintained
on discontinued as well as current informants.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HEM:cb
4-H
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 107
95
SECURITY INFORMANT. PROGRAM
HEM:cb 8/19/71
At the time of last inspection in January, 1971,
a total of 1,159 security informants was being operated.
As of July 31, 1971, the number had increased to 1,182,
or an increase of 23. During the same period the number
of potential security informants increased from 765 to
841, or an increase of 76
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HEM:cb
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 108
3
-
96
1
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
RACAN
Section Chief R. D. Cottor:
Security Index (SI) Program
4-H
Following are applicable activities.
of Research Section.
Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security
Section (4-H), which has investigative responsibility under this
program. Research Section, Special Records Unit, maintains
records applicable to the SI and is responsible for coordinating
program. In line with this responsibility, Research Section
prepared a memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan, dated
1/12/71, re-evaluating SI.
:
As of 12/15/70 there were in the Index 3,450 persons
of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,614 rank-and-
file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12,064.
Of these,
831 and 4,718, respectively, are communists--a total of 5,549
or 46 percent. As of 7/15/71 there were in the Index 4,013
persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 2,680.
rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12, 693.
Of these, 825 and 4,329, respectively, are communists--a total
of 5,154 or 40.6 percent..
Emergency Detention Program
The Emergency Detention Program (EDP), which is
field-wide, involves the planning for apprehension and detention
of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national
defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of a national
○ emergency and for the search and seizure of contraband. The
EDP is not a program as such but is based on Title II of the
Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950. The basic responsibility
for the operation and implementation of the EDP rests with the
Attorney General. Detailed plans regarding the EDP are drawn
up and included in the "Attorney General's Portfolio, copies
of which are in the Bureau's possession.
"
This program has been maintained in an up-to-date
status. Administrative plans for the implementation of the
program in each office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro
Survey." Lists of individuals to be detained are furnished to
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
MSR:amt
4-H
97
88608 Docid:32989638 Page 109
2
of the Internal Security Division of the Department each month
and the listing of places to be searched under authority of
the Master Search Warrant are maintained on a current basis.
The Seat of Government and all field divisions maintain
essential records for successful implementation of the EDP.
Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to
the U. S. Attorneys and U. S. Marshals upon implementation.
This program is coordinated by Special Records Unit,
Research Section. Primary responsibility rests with the
Department and changes can be made only upon approval of the
Department. We merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable
changes. Periodic checks are made to insure that all records
connected with the EDP, stored away from Headquarters city,*:.
are current. Field division surveys are kept up to date and
the Bureau is advised semiannually of the status.
Legislation has been introduced in the 92nd Congress
to repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. In the event Title II
should be repealed at a future date under new legislation,
the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally.
will continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic
responsibility for protecting this Nation's internal security.
This program is under constant supervision and
re-evaluation so that any necessary changes and streamlining
may be made. A memorandum justifying the continuance of this
program was last submitted on 1/12/71.
Technical and Microphone Surveillances
There has been no significant change regarding the
utilization of these techniques in the internal security field
since the last inspection. As of 8/16/71, we have 30 telephone
surveillances (tesurs) in Bureau's internal security cases.
also have two tesurs in operation at the request of the State
Department.
We
We are conducting four microphone surveillances
(misurs) in internal security field, four misur installations
are being operated at the request of the National Security
Agency (NSA) and one at the request of Central Intelligence
Agency. In addition, 62 teletype facilities are being covered
at the written request of NSA.
*Only such records presently maintained away from SOG or
field office headquarters are located at Quantico, Virginia.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 110
98

Survey Regarding Potential for Racial Violence
This program was initiated in 1964 under the title
"Possible Racial Violence, Major Urban Areas." It requires
each field office to conduct a continuing survey of localities
having a potential for violence based on current racial con-
ditions. Objective is twofold--to insure Bureau receives a
current, realistic, and comprehensive picture of existing
conditions which may lead to violence, and to obtain advance
information of developments clearly pointing to the possibility
of violence.
The field submits semiannual reports summarizing
information received. Of course, pertinent information is
submited on a timely basis depending upon the circumstances
involved. The survey provides the basis for a cogent analysis
of potential for violence and pertinat information is dissemi-
nated to the White House, Attorney General, and other Government
agencies. In the spring of each year an analysis entitled
"Potential for Violence in Major Cities in Summer" is prepared
and disseminated on a high level in the Government.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 111
99
i
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
NEW LEFT SECTION
-
SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD! Attached are comments
concerning surveys, projects and/or intensification
programs in effect against the New Left Movement. This
section is responsible for the supervision of investiga-
tions of the New Left Movement, including terrorist
groups and individuals engaged in bombings, arson and
assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals
both on college campuses and off campus. Investigations
concerning New Left publications are also supervised in
this section, as are sabotage investigations, and protest
and Trotskyist groups.
!
:
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
DPW:jlm
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 112
100
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H
New Left Movement
Special Investigations Unit West
The following surveys, projects and/or intensification
programs are in effect against the New Left movement:
New Left Extremists
By letter to all field offices dated 2/13/70,
the field was advised that the violence-prone Weatherman
group planned to go underground and to direct "strategic
sabotage" at military and police installations. The field
was instructed to vigorously investigate the Weatherman group
and to advise appropriate local police agencies of Weatherman
plans. By airtel to all offices dated 3/19/70, the field was
advised of Weatherman plans for extreme violence. The field
was instructed to locate and identify Weatherman communes
and activists. Intensive investigation of Weatherman leaders
was ordered.
By airtel to Chicago dated 3/24/70, that office
was instructed to initiate investigations and interview all
individuals arrested in Chicago during a Weatherman rampage
in October, 1969, where such investigations had not already
been undertaken. More than 280 persons had been arrested,
most of whom were either members of or closely associated
with the Weatherman group. In connection with cases of
bombing or arson which appeared to have New Left or black
extremist connotations, SAC Letter 70-18 (C), dated 4/7/70,
captioned "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism Bombing
Matters" provided the field with guidance. In those cases
where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists or where the
Department has advised that no investigation is warranted,
the Bureau must be immediately advised concerning involvement
of subversive groups or individuals suspected in the incident
and recommendation made concerning additional investigation.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HM:jta/bjn
-
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 113
-2-
101
By teletype to all offices dated 4/17/70, the
field was advised of specific areas of investigations to be
made against New Left terrorist groups and standards were
set for investigations of communes. The field was also
instructed to develop necessary informant coverage of these
communes and groups so that advanced knowledge of planned
violence could be obtained, preventive action initiated,
prosecution undertaken where possible.
and
By Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/13/70,
instructions were given concerning implementation of investi-
gations of New Left terrorism which were begun with available
manpower and further implementation was to be as rapid as
possible. All adherents to the Weatherman ideology which
advocated a Marxist-Leninist revolution and the use of
terroristic tactics in furtherance of revolution are made
subjects of these investigations. These subjects are to be
considered for Priority I of the Security Index and when
placed on Priority I, the Bureau must be advised every 45
days of their current residence and other pertinent information
developed. Each office was instructed to submit a monthly
airtel beginning 6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities of
communes or organizations%;B (2) number of cases opened during
month on individuals in these categories; (3) total number of
cases under investigation; (4) informant coverage utilized
against these communes and organizations; and, (5) a brief
summary of New Left violence in area during preceding month
and action taken.
By Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70, the
'field was furnished a copy of a Departmental letter concerning
specific areas of interest to the Department of Justice in
campus disorders looking toward possible prosecutive action.
The field was specifically instructed to develop information
concerning New Left involvement in campus violence and
concerning agitational activities prior to and during violent
campus disorders by subversive groups.
:
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 114
"
I
3
102
:
By airtel to all offices dated 7/16/70, the field
was advised that New Left terrorism was continuing through
bombings, arsons, and other violence and that each Special
Agent in Charge must personally insure that sufficient
personnel are assigned to handle these matters and to
investigating New Left terrorists.
SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70, captioned "New Left
Movement Violence, Internal Security Miscellaneous
(Weatherman)" instructed the field to develop better informant
coverage of Weatherman and other terrorist groups. By airtel
to all offices dated 9/3/70, captioned "Attacks on Police,
Extremist Activity" the field was instructed that in view of
increased attacks on the police, it could be expected there
will also be physical attacks against the FBI and that all
Special Agent personnel should be fully cognizant of this
possibility. To obtain complete intelligence data concerning
any extremist influence in attacks on police, the field was
instructed to institute appropriate investigation when
information was received concerning an impending attack on
police and informants directed to develop full facts concerning
the attack.
SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70, captioned "New
'Left and Black Extremist Terrorism Informant Coverage"
instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive
policy of developing new productive informants who can
infiltrate terrorist groups.
-
SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70, captioned "New
Left Movement Police Training Matters" advised the field
that in view of recent violence by New Left terrorists, the
Bureau will consider requests for SACS or ASACs to brief
local law enforcement command and supervisory personnel
regarding New Left extremism and violence. These briefings
would be at law enforcement meetings and conferences where
attendance is restricted to full-time duly constituted law
enforcement officials.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 115
4
-
103
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised that
a special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and
other New Left terrorists has been initiated. The field was
instructed to submit to the Bureau the identity of New Left terror-
ists whose fingerprints should be included in this special file.
By airtel to all offices dated 6/15/71 the field was
advised that a new "stop index" program had been instituted in
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This program is
for Bureau use only and concerns extremists who are in Priority I
of the Security Index and who are not already carried in the
NCIC Wanted Persons file. Through this program, the field
obtains prompt notice from NCIC by teletype whenever a police
agency makes inquiry concerning one of these extremists, which
enables the field to better follow the activities and movements
of extremists.
By SAC Letter 71-37 (E) dated 8/10/71, captioned
"Security Flash Notices Regarding Security Index Subjects" the
field was advised of new procedures which will enable the
Identification Division to better disseminate arrest information
on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file
in the Identification Division. This is accomplished by
periodic submission by the field of Security Flash Notices
(FD-165) which determine if fingerprints of a Security Index
subject have been received since the last check and if so, a
stop is placed in the fingerprint record to assure that the
field is advised of all subsequent fingerprint submissions.
The Security Flash Notice is periodically submitted at different
intervals depending on the priority of the subject's Security
Index status.
Intensified investigation of New Left extremists
has led to numerous prosecutions and indictments of extremist
leaders. To provide further guidance for the field in these
matters, SAC Letter 71-10 (E) dated 3/9/71 and captioned
"Security Informants Judicial Matters" advised the field of
procedures to be followed in handling informants who are
developing information on New Left groups and individuals who
are in contact with these New Left activists or with their
attorneys.
5
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 116
104
;
The Department of Justice has advised that
informants may be utilized in furnishing information
concerning the location of fugitives or the location of
other New Left activists even though such utilization may
result in the informant inadvertently learning of defense
plans or strategy. The field has been instructed that when
an informant is present in a conversation between an attorney
and an individual under indictment he should, if possible,
leave, or if this is not possible, he is not to report the
substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Since radical
attorneys are deeply involved with New Left extremists, not
only in their legal defense but in their other activities, the
above procedures are most helpful in extremist investigations.
Intensified investigation of New Left extremists
has severely disrupted their operations and limited their
influence. Numerous Weatherman leaders have been indicted
and subsequently arrested or remain in fugitive status.
The Weatherman organization has gone underground and is
isolated from contact with the mass of American youth. The
number of adherents to Weatherman is significantly less as a
result of these prosecutions and investigations. The
Weatherman group continues to be most dangerous in view of
its adherence to violent tactics and continuous effort is
being made to develop new approaches and techniques to
facilitate this investigation.
Key Activists
By airtel to all offices dated 10/23/68, the Key
Activist program was intensified and expanded. The field
was instructed to maintain high-level informant coverage on
individuals designated as key activists in the New Left
movement. At the present time there are 73 key activists
under investigation.
T
- 6 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 117
105
A Key Activist album containing photographs and
biographical data on each key activist has been furnished to
all offices. This album is maintained in a current status
and has proved invaluable in following activities and travel
of New Left key activists. By airtel dated 3/10/69 to all
offices the field was instructed to submit reports each
three months on key activists. The field was also instructed
to prepare communications suitable for dissemination when
these key activists filled a speaking engagement and whenever
they made statements indicating a propensity for violence or
urging student agitation. The purpose of this program is to
secure testimony and evidence concerning violations of
statutes particularly where these key activists are involved
in campus disorders. The field has also been instructed to
develop detailed information on sources of funds used by
key activists and to closely follow their travel. Handwriting
specimens of each key activist must be obtained and placed
in the National Security File maintained by the laboratory.
The key activist program has been most successful.
We have been enabled to closely follow the activities of
these individuals and to provide other interested agencies
with pertinent information. It is noted that more than half
of the individuals designated as key activists are subjects
of some type of prosecutive action.
i
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 118
7
106
NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS)
WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE (WSA)
In Bureau airtels 5/24/71, 6/2/71 and 6/3/71,
appropriate field offices were alerted to the SDS/WSA Summer
Project and its twofold objective consisting of a massive
recruitment program in 21 target cities and the fostering of
a general strike, nationwide, through infiltration of
industry and labor unions. Instructions were given to
appropriate offices to take aggressive measures to expand their
informant coverage during the SDS/WSA recruitment effort,
and to develop and furnish information concerning the SDS/WSA
Summer Projects in their territories. Numerous SDS/WSA
members have been identified as having moved into cities
other than those in which they usually operate, in connection
with the SDS/WSA Summer Project...
New University Conference (NUC)
The NUC, composed of radical professors, graduate
students and teachers, is committed to the growth of a
revolutionary socialist movement in the U.S., with educational
institutions and professional associations being their primary
targets. In Bureau airtel 6/4/71, the attention of Chicago
Division, office of origin, was directed to the fact that the
NUC claimed 42 national chapters plus fifteen pre-chapter
groupings, with 675 national members, and anticipated further
expansion. Chicago Division was instructed to insure appro-
priate leads were set out to confirm the existence of all
NUC chapters and to conduct appropriate investigations in
accordance with Bureau instructions relating to investigations
of organizations connected with institutions of learning.
It was further instructed these investigations should include
information concerning the leaders and leading activists,
aims and objectives and the activities of these chapters.
New Left Movement Reports
By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated
10/28/68, a program was instituted to obtain a comprehensive
study of the whole New Left movement. Offices were instructed
to prepare summary reports on the New Left movement in their
8
-
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
JNO: jlm
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 119
107
territories and to follow these reports with a report each
quarter, similarly captioned, showing the status of the
movement and its activity during the preceeding three-
month period. These reports have enabled the Bureau and
the submitting field offices to assess the potential
dangerousness of the New Left movement, determine from one
document the divisive or unifying issues within the movement
and whether the activity is increasing, decreasing or
continuing at the level indicated in the previous report.
Since individual reports have not been required on the many
small local New Left groups in each territory in lieu of
adequate LHM, inclusion of pertinent data concerning these
groups in the quarterly report alleviates the need for
regularly submitted reports and puts the activities in a
better perspective within each field division. Additionally,
these reports have presented on a continuing basis a clear
cut picture of the entire New Left movement which identifies
its leaders, sources of funds, propaganda outlets, and shows
the extent to which the New Left movement has been influenced
by domestic and foreign subversive elements. This program
has enabled the Bureau and the field to make a self analysis
of all facets of our investigation of the New Left movement
so we may expand and intensify our investigation of those
phases indicating a need thereof. These reports have served
as a valuable research tool at the Bureau and afford the
individual field divisions an opportunity to evaluate the
direction and success of their investigations in the New Left
movement.
New Left Movement
-
Finances
Deputy
airs S... requested,
In February, 1970, Mr. Egil
Assistant to the President for Domest
for the President, available information concerning income
sources of various revolutionary groups. Since that time,
information of this nature has been gathered and transmitted
periodically by memoranda to the White House, Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney
General, Internal Security Division, after approval by the
Director,
Key Activist Program
The Key Activist Program, described in detail in the
Special Investigations Unit West write-up, is coordinated by
the New Left Groups Unit.
-
-
g
-
No
deletion
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 120
108

New Left Movement
-
Publications
By letter dated 11/5/68 to all offices under the
caption of "New Left Movement, Publications, Internal Security
Miscellaneous," the field was instructed to cover the
principal propaganda mills of the New Left which are
described as "underground" newspapers. This survey has
been particularly beneficial in view of the fact that the
New Left, to a great extent, depends on the written word
to spread its propaganda. The survey has disclosed that
in excess of 200 papers are published on a regular basis
with a central theme being criticism of the "establishment"
in general and law enforcement, the draft and the Vietnam
War in particular. Youth, particularly students, are the
main target of these publications, which are effective
vehicles for agitation and recruitment in that they reach
a large portion of the student population. Additionally,
the survey has revealed the papers are in poor financial
condition and often miss publication dates due to lack of
funds. Funds are generally received from advertising,
subscriptions, donations and benefits. Volunteer labor is
used in most instances and many times the staff of the
publication resides collectively in a commune.
A survey of underground publications is currently
being conducted by the New Left Groups Unit, the purpose of
which is to determine if trend information can be developed.
Trend information is being developed during the course of
this survey and information obtained will be incorporated
into an educational-type document. Based on this survey, it
appears the New Left movement is at a crossroads and is
groping for a sense of unity and direction. This unity,
if developed, will no doubt include future activity in
political channels. These newspapers, which are often written
in the foulest language, are a major influence on the youth
in this country and are the strident propaganda voice of the
New Left movement.
Informant Development
-
New Left Groups
-
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning
informant development in New Left groups directed each SAC
to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete analysis of
his informant coverage in New Left groups, clearly setting
forth the weaknesses and productive steps being taken to
rectify these weaknesses. As a result a clear-cut view of
each division's informant coverage was obtained as well as an
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 121
-
10 ·
-
109
analysis of where programs needed shoring up. Those offices
found to be deficient in their coverage were directed to
submit periodic communications detailing their coverage
and setting out what steps are being taken to increase the
coverage in terms of quantity and quality.
-
The Counterintelligence Program New Left was
discontinued by Bureau airtel to all offices dated 4/28/71
in view of the fact that sensitive intelligence techniques
and disruptive activities were involved and absolute security
was difficult to achieve.
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT EAST
The Venceremos Brigade
-
The field was authorized by airtel to all offices,
dated 5/11/70, to interview all Venceremos Brigade (VB) members
on SAC authority except in those instances where the subject is
under 21, currently a student, professor, has some connection
with an institution of learning or i̇s a journalist. Bureau
· approval is still needed concerning the latter individuals.
·
Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 5/15/70, instructed
the field to immediately intensify investigations of all VB
returnees from Cuba, ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt
interviews and submit current reports with Security Index recom-
mendation. In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy
to a violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and willingness to
participate in that revolution by these VB members, the field
was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every 90
days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III and
non-Security Index returnees. In case of Priority I Security
Index subjects, this information is to be furnished the Bureau
every 45 days.
Prosab
Current Bureau instructions require development of
adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States
Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative responsi-
bilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal security fields
can be properly discharged. Semiannual reports are submitted by
each office having a Strategic Air Command Base or an Inter-
continental Ballistic Missile Base within its territory. A
review of semiannual reports submitted by the field as of 7/1/71
disclosed that a total of 1,225 informants have been developed.
-
11
-
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
CF:cae
NW 88608 Cid 32989638 Page 122
PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT
May Day Collective (MDC)
Prior to May, 1971, MDC was the hard-core youth activist
group of the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and was
the main force behind massive civil disobedience in Washington, D.C.
There has been a definite split between the two groups over the
question of violence which is favored by MDC. Following regional
conferences in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and Washington, D.C., MDC
held a national conference in Atlanta, Georgia, 8/13-17/71 to map
its future course and to plan antiwar activity for the Fall of 1971.
By airtel to all offices dated 7-26-71, the field was instructed
to determine the existence of MDC organizations in the respective
divisions and to furnish all available information to Bureau by
8-30-71 with comments regarding extent of coverage. Potential for
violence by MDC was emphasized, and the field was alerted to
possibility of violations of Federal laws.
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)
Letter to all offices dated 8-3-71 instructed each office
to initiate a survey to determine existence of VVAW. This action
was necessary in the light of increasing indication that the VVAW
may be a target for infiltration by subversive groups such as the
Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party and their
respective youth groups. VVAW has also been involved in aiding and
financing U.S. deserters, including false identity papers and
reportedly in one area has a cache of arms. VVAW has become
increasingly active in the antiwar field and must be considered
a prime target for infiltration.
East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (EASTCON)
This is an extremely important investigation requiring
constant supervision and review at the Seat of Government. It
involves plots to blow up the tunnels, housing, heating systems
servicing Government buildings and to kidnap a high Government
official. Conspiracy aspects of selected Selective Service
break in cases are included in the indictment as well as violations
involving the contraband and issuing threatening communications
statutes. The Eastcon case is the subject of a write-up in
Section 4-A-4.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
FBG: plm
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 123
-
12.
-
MI
SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS
-
NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT
Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 11/3/70,
instructed the field to resume verification of residence
and employment in Priority II and Priority III Security
Index cases and to resume periodic report writing in
proportionate number in Priority II Security Index cases
so that all such cases would be opened by 6/30/71.
As a result, annual reports in Priority II
Security Index cases are being received pursuant to
existing instructions and where verification of
residence and employment shows a change, appropriate
changes are being made on Security Index cards.
Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 11/4/70,
instructed the field to initiate investigation of
all SDS members as well as members of procommunist,
militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow
SDS advocacy of revolution and violence and that
each individual investigated should be considered
for the Security Index. Results of investigations in
these cases are being received and supervised in this
section. Activities in each instance are evaluated
and where it is found the subject could be considered
a danger to the internal security of this country in
the event of a national emergency, the individual's
name is included on the Security Index.
-
-
SAC Letter 71-35 (D), dated 7/27/71, instructed
the field to discontinue use of Internal Security
Miscellaneous, Security Matter Miscellaneous, and
Security Matter Anarchist as characters in security
investigations. Instructions for using new characters
were set out. This action was necessary in order to
facilitate routine of mail at the Bureau and to more
properly describe the characters of security investiga-
tions.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
WHF rsm
13
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 124
118
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR
INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
4-H
Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section
The following programs discussed immediately
hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the
Espionage Section: Alem Program, Bureau file 65-69532;
Banpop Program, Bureau file 65-70741; Cokma Program,
Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program, Bureau file 65-70719;
DESECO Program, Bureau file. 105-71688; East-West Exchange
Program, Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical
Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LW: bkr
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 125
113
ALEM PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-69532
:
4-H
1. ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover
Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. S.
under assumed identities as 1. alien husbands of American
wives or 2. as male immigrants on first preference
petitions because of certain professional and technical
skills. The basis of this program is information furnished
by the Fedora informant. This program was initiated in
August, 1965. Individuals entering the U. S. under
the above two categories have been determined through
a machine run of Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form G-188 punch cards The Bureau has reimbursed the
Immigration and Naturaliza
incurred in sorting these cards for immigrants entering the
U. S. between the years 1960-1965
2.
3.
4.
T
Service ΤΟΥ
enses
Approximately 2100 cases have been opened under this program
since its inception, of which 77 are now pending. We have
__not uncovered any illegals to date although we have been
able to identify through this program a valuable KGB agent
who entered the U. S. as an immigrant from Belgium
(Buckboard case Bufile 65-68188)
ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases
Unit, by SA A P. Litrento.. The responsibility of reviewing
the pertinent G-188 cards and initiating investigations is
placed with the Washington Field Office. The procedures
followed in opening cases do not require the use of much
personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office.
According to the Fedora informant, the KGB has used the
techniques set forth above in dispatching KGB "illegals
to the U. S.. During 1960-1965, four KGB illegals"
reportedly arrived in the U. S. under category number one
according to information the Fedora informant was able
o obtain from a KGB officer in the New York Residency
5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis. It was last
evaluated on December 24, 1970.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
APL tdp
Are
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 126
114
!
i
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
.
BANPOP PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-70741
4-H
BANPOP is the code name for a program initiated in
August, 1966, in an attempt to identify illegals in
the U. S. who may be receiving funds through Swiss
banks. The basis for the program was an analysis of
four Soviet illegal cases between 1955 and 1966 in which
the Banque Populaire Swisse of Switzerland was used by
the Soviets to fund illegals. The transfers are screened
with the following criteria: (1) the person or individual
beneficiary is named; (2) the amount the transfer is
between $300 and $5000 and (3) the last name of the person
ordering and receiving the funds is the same or the money
is directed to a specific bank account.
-
..
The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago and
Philadelphia Offices.
When one of the offices locates an individual who might
be a possible suspect. the Bureau is advised by letter
and a copy is sent to the appropriate field office requesting
investigation to identify this person. The title includes
the name of the subject and the code name of the program
to insure that all mail is handled by the same Supervisor.
At the present time, there are 7 pending cases. For the
six-month period ending 4/1/71, Philadelphia reviewed 2950
transfers, has two pending cases and used two Agent hours per
month. Chicago reviewed 1000 transactions, opened no cases
and used six Agent hours per month. New York Office reviewed
6050 transactions, opened 8 cases and used 15 Agent hours
per month.
This program is supervised by SA J.P. Lee of the Special
Cases Unit, Espionage Section.
All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the
program on a six-month basis. The program was last justified.
by memorandum of April 1, 1971. .
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
JPL:tdp
8/19/71
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 127
کی در
CANIL PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-70719
4-H
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to
uncover Soviet illegals who may have arrived in
Canada as European immigrants and thereafter entered
the U. S on immigrant visas obtained at one of the
American consulates in Canada. This program is based
on the Cowslip case which involved a Soviet illegal
husband and wife team who used this method of entry.
Legat, Ottawa, effected arrangements with various
American consulates in Canada to obtain the
Immigration Visa and Alien Registration (IVAR) forms.
filed by European immigrants prior to their destruction
by the consulates. It is consulate practice to retain
these forms for 16 to 18 months then to destroy them...
Legat, Ottawa forwards these forms to the New York.
Office where they are reviewed. To develop suspects,
the New York Office uses criteria developed from analysis
of the Cowslip case.
Since inception of this program in June, 1966, 35 cases
were opened. There are 7 cases pending. No illegals
have been uncovered to date. The procedures followed
in this program do not require the use of much personnel
or many man hours by the New York Office.
CANIL, is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special
Cases Unit, by SA A.P. Litrento.
The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most
difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security
field. It is felt this program still has a good
potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical
and has a sound basis. Past experience has shown that
Soviet intelligence will use the same modus operandi
continuously, if successful.
This program was evaluated in February, 1971. Legat,
Ottawa, has suggested discontinuance of this program
and New York's comments have been requested by Bulet 8/5/71.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
APL: tdp
4-H
116
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 128
COKMA PROGRAM
65-73750
4-H
1.
Title is code word for physical surveillance
coverage of known meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelli-
gence in the past several years. The New York Office
instituted this program in July, 1970. This program receives'
close supervisory attention, is evaluated on a continuing
basis and was subject of justification memorandum dated
8/16/71. In view of the success of this program by the
__New York Office, consideration has been given to its implementation
by the Washington Field Office, however, the absence of subway
transportation facilities used extensively by the Soviets in
New York City precludes its adaption by the Washington Field
Office.
2.
7+
The New York Office has catalogued known meeting
areas as a result of past physical surveillances of Soviet intelli-
gence officers, information received from defectors-in-place and
double agents operating against Soviet intelligence officers.
is almost impossible to conduct a discreet phy
physical surveillance
of a trained intelligence officer and this program pla
places our
Agents in an area where there is a likelihood of a Soviet meet
without surveillance hazards that could thwart meetings.
objective is to identify American agents meeting Soviet intelligence
officers under clandestine circumstances.
Our
.3.
The New York Office utilized one four-man team initially
in connection with this program. During the initial six months
of this program, seven Soviet intelligence officers were observed
in the area selected for coverage (Jamaica area of the Queens,
New York,) on 22 occasions. Two individuals were observed in
22v®-5
contact with Soviets and one individual contacted a Polish
official. Based on the results obtained, coverage was expanded
to the Flushing and Woodside section of the Queens, as well as
the Rego Park section of the Queens, adding an addition four-man
team. Since January known or suspected Soviet intelligence officers
have been observed on 38 occasions accompanied by unknown
individual or individuals on five occasions in the area covered
by this program. We have determined through our Ironclad source
the Soviets have placed the Jamaica section of the Queen off limits
for meetings. While we are still affording this area some coverage
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
BER:CC
4-H
1.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 129
117.
COKMA PROGRAM
4-H
we are now concentrating on the other selected sites
mentioned above. One of the most interesting developments
of recent date has been the detection of a known Committee for
State Security (KGB) officer who during his tour of duty in
the United States has made approaches to Soviets who defected
to this country, visiting a residence in the Jamaica area.
occupant of this residence is currently the subject of an
investigation and it is anticipated he will be interviewed to
determine the nature of his contacts with the Soviets.
4.
-
મોટર સા
-the
་་་་་
The
This program is supervised by Special Agent F. J. Cassidy,
Soviet Unit-New York, Espionage Section. Expense and time in
handling this program is negligible at Seat of Government. Since
program in field consist of surveillance activities there must be
close supervision at field level.
5.
This program is sound and has enabled us to uncover
Soviet intelligence activities with minimum expenditure of
manpower, It has also given us additional insight into Soviet
modus operandi. Manpower limitations have restricted our
full utilization of this investigative technique. Special Agent
personnel assigned to this program must be familiar with Soviets
assigned to the New York area and must be experienced in
surveillance procedures.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
BFR cgc
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 130
118

DESECO PROGRAM
Bufile 105-71688
4-H
1. The Deseco Program (program for development
of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc
officials) originated as result of conference between field
and Bureau representatives in December, 1957. Purpose is
to select and develop individuals to be placed in contact
with Soviet-bloc intelligence officers as a means of (1)
penetrating Soviet-bloc intelligence%3B (2) exerting control
by keeping intelligence officers occupied with running our
sources; and (3) assisting in possible defection of bloc
intelligence officers.
2. Nineteen offices are engaged regularly in
this program and other offices on occasion conduct investi-
gations to develop background on selected sources. Greatest
activity has been in New York, Washington Field, Chicago and
San Francisco which cover Soviet-bloc establishments. The
19 offices are authorized to conduct "sounding-out" inter-
views of prospective sources without prior Bureau authority.
Follow-up interviews with potential Deseco sources are con-
ducted on a UACB basis. New York and Washington Field
submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of
the program.
The other 17 offices submit summaries on a
semi-annual basis.
3. Between the last inspection and July 15, 1971,
approximately a 6-month period, 26 Deseco subjects were placed
in contact with Soviet-bloc officials. Of these, four have
developed to the status of security informants or double
agents.
4.
ம
This program is correlated in the Espionage
Section, Coordination Unit by Special Agent Lish Whitson.
The program is handled in the field by Special Agents
assigned to Soviet-bloc investigations who are familiar
with the habits, weaknesses and intelligence targets of bloc
personnel and are qualified to select and develop the type
of individuals needed in this program. Unusual or sensitive
cases in this program are routed to the Division front office
for approval. All rules, policies and procedures regarding
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LW: bkr
4-H
119
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 131
DESECO PROGRAM
interviews, developments and handling of Deseco sources
are contained in Section 105 0, pages 42-44, Manual of
Instructions.
5. This program is re-evaluated on an annual
basis. It was last justified by memorandum W. A. Branigan
to C. D. Brennan, dated March 29, 1971. Limitations on
other investigative techniques have underscored the value
of this program demonstrated in the individuals developed
as security informants or double agents. Selectees have
enabled us to uncover and pin-point Soviet-bloc intelligence
targets, identify Soviet-bloc intelligence officers and
furnish information of value in considering defection
approaches. During the month of March, 1971, a double
agent, developed through the Deseco program, was instru-
mental in enabling the Bureau to identify a Soviet illegal
operating in the guise of a graduate student in
Salt Lake City. Direction of this program against Soviet-
bloc intelligence orricers will continue to be pressed to
insure improvement in our coverage of Soviet-bloc intel-
ligence operations.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LW: bkr
CONE
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 132
100
EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM
Bufile: 105-42300
4-H
This program originated in 1955 in an attempt to
provide internal security safeguards regarding the admission
of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence regards
the visits of East-West Exchange Agreement participants as
opportunities to promote intelligence activity.
As a result of the 1970 Inspection revisions were
made in the investigative action taken in this field. The
change was made as a result of other manpower commitments.
SAC Letter 70-25 provided that no investigations will be
conducted of groups or individuals participating in the East-
West Exchange Program in the absence of any information
indicating affiliation with Soviet intelligence. Bufiles
are checked on all Soviet participants and where information
is developed showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then
opened and the field instructed to conduct necessary investiga-
tion.
During the period of January-June, 1971, 982
individuals were scheduled to enter the U. S. under the provisions
of this exchange program and of this number, we had information
indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 25 of these
individuals.
With regard to Soviet exchange students there are
currently 32 in the U. S. Based on information furnished by
defector sources and investigations of Soviet students previously
in the U. S., we have determined that Soviet intelligence
utilizes these students in an intelligence capacity, principally
as spotters. In view of this, we afford these students active
investigation. We have also found that a number of these students
return to the U. S. for assignment at one of the Soviet establish-
ments and in most instances, contacts which they made while in
the U. S. as students are generally reactivated. The case of
Yuriy Aleksandrovich Gostintsev is an example of an individual
entering the U. S. under the East-West Exchange Program as a
graduate student and engaging in intelligence activities.
Ironclad, our sensitive defector in place advised that Gostintsev
who entered the U. S. 5/9/71 for a period of six months to do
research at three American universities was working for Dr.
Martin Summerfield at a laboratory at Princeton University.
According to our source Gostintsev on 7/2/71, turned over a
portfolio of 1,000 pages to a Soviet intelligence officer who
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
"RESTING VO
UPL: tdp
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 133
121
RE:
EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM
took the documents to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations
photographed them and returned them to Gostintsev. Similar
operations took place on 7/16 and 7/23/71 Gostintsev
originally entered the U. S. in 9/69 under the East-West
Scientific Exchange Agreement for three months to work under
Dr. Summerfield. He left the U. S. in 12/69 and returned again
in 5/71.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
NW 88608 2989638 Page 134
4-H
RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS
105-36365
1.
Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have
central repository for information developed in connection
with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to
radio and technical equipment purchased by them.
20
Washington Field and New York Offices furnish infor-
mation developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis.
Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State,
Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic
Energy Commission, Bureau of International Commerce,
United States Department of Commerce and where pertinent,
to the National Security Agency (NSA). Material submitted
includes name of Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description
and cost of the items purchased. It involves maintenance of
three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington Field and
New York Offices. Program established to achieve following
objectives: disseminate to interested Government agencies
information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the
United States by Soviet officials%; determine whether Soviet
intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding material
appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control
list; and to permit discreet markings by FBI Laboratory of
certain
danrechnical equipment furnished to Soviets through overt
04,
or covert means which would permit its identification at some
future time
3.
Since January, 1971, Program has disclosed continuing
purchases by Soviet nationals of Grundig Satellite Multiband
portable radios. During 3/71 one KGB officer in Washington
purchased 12 of these radios at one time. Soviet husband
and wife illegal team previously in U. S. used one of these
radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which con-
tained their operating instructions. Program made it possible
to secure serial numbers for possible future identification.
Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable
estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments
and security devices being operated. Program also disclosed
detailed information concerning two new antennae systems purchased
by Soviets from company in Nebraska. It appears one of these
will be used at new Consulate General in San Francisco when
permanent location for that establishment secured. Details
concerning such installations are of interest, not only to FBI
Laboratory, but to State Department and NSA in connection with
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ECP:eco
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 135
123
RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS
4-H
its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities.
Intelligence agencies of the military, such as Navy and Air Force,
Took to Bureau fo details concerning purchases this type
made by Soviets since it enables reasonable estimate of their
ability to monitor and intercept U. S. military communications.
During 7771, Program identified Soviet interest in purchase of
sophisticated electronic apparatus in New York which can
utilized for radar or communications satellite tracking.
They
had not requested export license from Commerce Department for
this article.
may be intended for clandestine use in U. S..
for satellite tracking designed to improve accuracy of Soviet
ICBM guidance systems. We have notified White House and interested
Government agencies concerning this activity which is being
conducted clandestinely from Soviet establishment in Washington,
D. C.
4.
-
Program supervised by Special Agent Eugene C. Peterson,
Soviet Unit Washington, Espionage Section. Expense and time
utilized in handling program is negligible. Dissemination of
material submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices
requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor
and no weaknesses in program are apparent. Administrative
tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Soviet
Unit - Washington, Espionage Section.
.5.
、Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence
Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination
of material developed. Possession
on 
of some equipment on which
discreet markings were previously placed by FBI Laboratory or
item with serial number showing original acquisition by Soviets
could serve to identify possessor with involvement in Soviet
intelligence activity. Program is evaluated annually to determine
justification for continuance.
6.
Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971.
Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and
each year thereafter, if still of continuing value.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ECP:eco
NW 88608 Doçld p2989638 Page 136
124
SURVEYS, PROJECTS, AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
4-H
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION
BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS
Racial matters investigations were intensified through
establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67.
By memorandum dated 7/14/71 it was recommended, and
the Director approved, that the Racial Intelligence Section
would, thereafter, be known as the Extremist Intelligence Section
and the character of cases supervised would be changed from
Racial Matters to Extremist Matters. This action was taken as
the majority of extremist activity in U.S. is not based solely
on racial hatred but based on a desire to overthrow U.S.
Government by revolution.
This section handles extremist matters investigations
involving black extremist organizations and individuals.
Objectives are to identify organizations and individuals that are
involved in extremist activities, that advocate or had actually
committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that
advocate revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate
Federal laws. The dangerousness to the U.S. of such individuals
must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they
should be included in the Security Index. The extent of
foreign influence or influence of the Communist Party or other
domestic revolutionary groups among black extremists, especially
black extremist organizations, is a prime objective. To
accomplish these objectives, sources have been developed who
can furnish quality and timely information concerning individual
extremists and extremist organizations. Such sources likewise
have forewarned us of potential violence and enabled the Bureau
to stay on top of the black extremist situation. These sources
have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities of
alerting local authorities, and of keeping other Government
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WHA: cal
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 137
125
agencies dependent upon us for information informed of
pertinent developments and advance intelligence, including
data concerning potential violence.
Our informant coverage has made it possible for us
to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House,
the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an
interest. Additional information pertaining to black extremist
intelligence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for
Racial Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the
Research Section.
Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly reviewed
at the Seat of Government to insure that essential information
is being obtained on a timely basis and that it is being promptly
disseminated in the field, as well as at the Seat of Government.
The activities of black extremists continue to place
a heavy demand upon the Bureau's manpower and resources.
There are numerous black extremist groups throughout
the nation, the majority of which are local in nature and
relatively small in membership. These groups, however, either
directly or indirectly, advocate defiance of the law, hostility
toward constituted authority and, in some instances, advocate
outright destruction of Government and establishment of a
Marxist-Leninist form of Government. The activities of these
groups constitute a constant threat to the internal security
of the country through their propensity for violence, hatred
of and outright opposition to our form of Government.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 138
126
-----
BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Bufile 157-8415
4-H
Black extremism is concentrated in organized activities
of 64 groups, some of which have chapters in major cities through-
out the U.S. The five major nationwide groups have chapters
in 139 cities. Hard-core membership in these black extremist
groups totals in excess of 8,300. This membership figure,
however, disguises the real following of extremist groups in
black areas of our cities and the extent of influence and
leadership they exercise. This real support, especially from
young blacks, is surfaced during confrontations with police
and the Establishment. In fact, hostility toward the police
by black extremist groups, as well as by black youths, continues
unabated in many of our major cities.
Set out hereinafter are summaries concerning the key
black extremist organizations that are presently under active
and penetrative investigation.
Computerized Telephone Number File (CTNF) was expanded
on 2/26/71 to include telephone numbers of black, New Left and
other ethnic extremists. As a result, black extremist groups,
black extremist Security Index subjects and individuals included
in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album have been entered
into the CTNF. This has proven to be extremely valuable investiga-
tive tool and has saved the field considerable investigative
time in ascertaining subscribers of telephone numbers since
"hits" are made on 15.5 percent of numbers checked against the
file.
The Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA) was
established on 3/8/69 to assist in identification of militant
black extremists who travel extensively.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WHA: cal
4-H
NW 88608 Dócid:32989638 Page 139
127
The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes
a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist
organizations, militant black nationalists who are known to travel
and black extremists who are Bureau fugitives. Each office pre-
pares a form on such individuals within its territory and the
form is then furnished to the Bureau and all offices where it is
maintained in a complete album. In the event of travel by any
of these individuals, the office covering the area being visited
already has a photograph and biographical sketch of the individual
immediately available. The album is also furnished to the Legats
in Ottawa and Mexico City and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
and Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel.
Over 470 extremists are currently carried in this album. Informa-
tion concerning fugitives was included to insure each office has
a photograph and biographic sketch immediately available for its
use in conducting investigation to locate or apprehend them.
To insure broad circulation among investigative personnel
and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization of informants,
especially extremist sources, we initiated the Black Extremist
Bureau Fugitives List in June, 1970. This list, which is prepared
quarterly and sent each field office and selected Legats,
identifies those Bureau fugitives who by reason of their activities
or organizational affiliations are black extremists. For the
months in which no quarterly list is prepared, all offices and
selected Legats are advised of deletions and additions to this
list. Currently there are 64 fugitives listed, 20 of whom are
IO fugitives. This list has given greater emphasis to the
location of these fugitives, particularly among Special Agents
handling extremist matters and extremist informants and has been
effective in affording greater exposure of these fugitives among
extremist informants, Thirty-two of these fugitives have been
arrested since the list was initiated.
i
Bureau airtel 11/12/70 advised the field of formation
of Black Extremist Section of Single Fingerprint File in Latent
Fingerprint Section of the Identification Division.
Field was
instructed to insure all black extremists who have a propensity
for violence or who would logically be considered suspects in
serious crimes in which the Bureau may have an interest were
included in the Black Extremist Section.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 140
128

By airtel dated 3/19/71, captioned "Black Extremist
Section of Single Fingerprint File, Identification Matters,
Racial Matters, " all offices were instructed to give greater
emphasis to this program on a continuing basis due to increasing
participation of black extremists in crimes of violence and
continued reports from knowledgeable sources of plans of these
extremists to participate in bombings, hijackings, kidnapings
and other crimes of violence. As a result of this communication
and aggressive supervision by Extremist Intelligence Section
supervisors, the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint
File has doubled. The value of this valuable investigative
tool was demonstrated in the special investigation being handled
by this section known as Newkill. This case involves the murder
of two New York City police officers on 5/21/71. Latents
forwarded by our New York Office for comparison against this
file resulted in the identification of two Black Panther Party
(BPP) members and directly led to the solution of the machine
gunning of two New York City police officers on 5/19/71. This
information has also resulted in these individuals being
developed as suspects in the Newkill murder. Supervisors are
constantly alert to insure logical black extremists are included
in this file.
In view of the high percentage of black extremists who
have been reported to have weapons in their possession, the field
by letter 3/18/71 captioned "Firearms Acts"" and by airtel
5/17/71 captioned "National Firearms Act, State Firearms
Control Assistance Act, Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Fire-
arms, Racial Matters," emphasized that active investigation
should be initiated concerning firearms violations stemming
from Bureau investigations over matters within our primary
jurisdiction, including racial (now extremist) matters investiga-
tions. Field was instructed to vigorously pursue possible.
violations arising out of extremist matters investigations.
investigations will lead to statistical accomplishments and to
the neutralization of black extremists. It was emphasized that
all Agents assigned to extremist matters should thoroughly review
all of the criminal statutes involving Federal gun law violations
so that they would be in a position to recognize and vigorously
pursue possible violations coming to their attention during
extremist matters investigations.
Such
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 141
129
Numerous investigations have been initiated by the
field as a result of these instructions and recently four BPP
leaders in Richmond or Washington, D. C., were convicted for
Federal gun violations and one is awaiting trial. With the
emphasis being placed on violations of Federal gun laws by black
extremists, the number of convictions will increase and add to
the Bureau's statistical accomplishments as well as neutralizing
black extremists.
On
Investigation disclosed in Fall of 1970 that increased
campus disorders involving black students posed a definite threat
to the nation's stability and indicated the need for increase in
both quality and quantity of intelligence concerning Black Student
Unions (BSU) and similar groups which were targets for influence
and control by violence-prone BPP and other extremists.
10/29/70 the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct
discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources,
on BSU and similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to
determine if the activities of these groups and individuals
warrant further active investigation. On 11/4/70 instructions
were sent to the field to implement the program authorized by
the Executive Conference.
*The results of these discreet preliminary inquiries
were analyzed and it was concluded that our responsibilities
could adequately be handled by limiting our inquiries to black
student groups on college campuses which have engaged in violent
and lawless activities or are reported by knowledgeable sources
to be moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness. As
a result, field offices were instructed by letter dated 7/26/71
that, thereafter, discreet preliminary inquiries on black student
groups on college campuses should be limited to those groups
which have engaged in violence and/or lawless activities or are
moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness. Results of
any preliminary inquiries conducted through established sources
only in accordance with the above provisions must be reported to
the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination along with recommenda-
tions regarding whether an active investigation of the group
and/or its leaders is warranted. The field was instructed that
138
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 142
if established sources report a black student group is moving
toward, or being influenced in the direction of, violence and
lawlessness, although no such activity has occurred, the facts.
are to be furnished the Bureau with field office recommendations
regarding active investigation. No active investigation of an
organization connected with an institution of learning is
conducted without prior Bureau authority.
The following pages set forth summaries concerning
the key black extremist organizations that are presently under
active and penetrative investigation.
ལྕ
131
NW 88608 Dócld:32989638 Page 143
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
4H
The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black extremist
organization, continues to be extremely active throughout the
country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California, for
the obstensible purpose of patrolling the black community to
prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known as
the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.
It expanded rapidly throughout the United States
during 1967-68, then suffered a gradual decline during 1969.
Revitalized in December, 1969, and throughout the 1970s, it
expanded until there were approximately 48 branches of the BPP
with an estimated 1,000 hard-core members supported by many
thousands of sympathizers as of December, 1970. Another gradual
decline began in 1971; and as of June, 1971, the Party had 710
hard-core members in 39 branches representing 37 cities.
In February, 1971, the differences between Huey P.
Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, and Eldridge Cleaver, then RPP
Minister of Information, a fugitive in Algeria, rose to the
surface; and Newton expelled Cleaver and his followers. About
100 BPP members in New York and New Jersey declared allegiance to
Cleaver and became known as the BPP-Cleaver Faction.
The official goal of the BPP has always been the violent
overthrow of the United States Government and its replacement with
a Marxist-Leninist system. The BPP has openly advocated urban
guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government leaders and other
forms of violent terrorism. Since its inception, the BPP has
aimed its most vicious invectives against law enforcement and
particularly local police. "Off the pigs," BPP jargon for "kill the
cop" is the battle cry of the organization. Newton now claims the
BPP was led astray by Cleaver in his quest for violence when
actually the BPP is a nonviolent, community serving organization.
In spite of Newton's peace loving front, the truth is that Newton
and his BPP are just as much anarchists as ever. On 6-30-71 a
Washington, D. C. BPP leader and follower of Newton stated "the
ultimate goal of the BPP is the complete destruction of the
United States Government and its replacement with Marxist-Leninist
socialism."
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-19-71
PMB RNB:bad
4H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 144
132
1
Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967
and since that time has expanded as the organization itself
expanded.
By letter to all offices dated 2-27-70, approved by
the Director, offices having BPP investigations were instructed
to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every six months in
compliance with instructions in the Manual of Instructions.
Previously, offices were submitting quarterly reports on the
BPP. The changes made on the basis of a recommendation by a
Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to eliminate
some paper work in the field.
All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation
arë required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the status and
activities of the BPP within its territory. This survey was
commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968, and changed
to a monthly summary on the approval of the Director by letter
to all offices dated 2-27-70. This change is a result of a
recommendation by the Racial Informants Conference of field
supervisors to cut down paper work in the field. The monthly
summary relieves the field of some paper work and at the same
time keeps the Bureau and the field up to date on BPP developments.
San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case
continues to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the BPP.
Because of the excellence of this summary and the need for such
an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed by Bureau.
airtel 1-21-70 to furnish copies of its summary to all continental
offices which is the current practice.
All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation
were instructed by airtel 6-17-70 to submit a monthly summary on
the financial activities of each BPP branch. This financial
summary includes data.on sources of income, foreign funding,
expenses, the mechanics of local finance operations, and the steps
being taken by each office to develop full financial data.
summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all financial
developments regarding the BPP on a national and international basis.
This
133
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 145
San Francisco was instructed 8-19-70 to submit monthly lists of
nationwide bank accounts and expenses for BPP. This survey was
devised by San Francisco; and since it is very helpful in
establishing the "big picture" it is being required monthly.
The Black Panther Party has formed a corporation known
as Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Inc. (SCPI) to control
all BPP funds and assets and to act as purchaser and/or lessee of
any property utilized by the BPP. The corporation and its
activities are under intensive investigation which has revealed
that its activities are centered in San Francisco and New York.
By airtels 1-7 and 1-19-71 to San Francisco and New York, these
offices were instructed to submit a weekly summary of all pertinent
developments concerning the corporation during the previous week
plus a monthly review of SCPI bank accounts. These summaries keep
the Bureau aware of SCPI operations and also enables us to
regularly fulfill our dissemination requirements.
It is noted that there are currently 25 field offices
conducting active investigations of the BPP. Our intensive
investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, members
and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed
information concerning its operations and activities including
organization plans, funding programs, extent of control by
headquarters and foreign support and internal factionalism.
All field offices having a BPP investigation were
required by Bureau airtel 10-3-68 to submit a monthly report
containing evidentiary data required by the Department, and they
were also required by Bureau airtel 6-25-69 to maintain records of
and to use permanent T symbol numbers to identify all concealed
sources in BPP organization reports. Both of these requirements
were based on Department requests. The Department advised that the
need on which these requests were based no longer existed, and the
field offices were instructed by Bureau airtel 5-17-71 to
discontinue both programs.
134
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 146
By Bureau airtel 11-6-70, all continental offices were
instructed to submit a biweekly airtel regarding underground BPP
operations within each field office. This specific requirement
was removed by Bureau airtel 4-29-71. However, all offices were
admonished to keep the Bureau advised of any developments in this
area.
"The Black Panther" newspaper, official organ of the BPP,
had been printed in San Francisco since 1967 until recently when
the printing was changed to New York City. The Bureau receives
a sufficient quantity of the paper from New York to disseminate it
to interested agencies and all Legal Attaches. New York also
furnishes one copy of each weekly issue to all field offices.
newspaper in the past has been the best indication of current
Party line; therefore, this program is essential to our
intelligence gathering efforts.
This
Our ultimate objective is the prosecution of the BPP
as an organization or by individual members for any violations of
Federal or State laws. As in the past, we will continue to
disseminate to local authorities any information we may receive.
concerning possible local violations. A secondary objective is to
more completely develop information concerning the activities and
objectives of the BPP for intelligence purposes.
In July, 1969, the Attorney General established a
special task force for the specific purpose of developing a
prosecutive theory against the BPP. Attorneys of this task force,
known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have interviewed many
of our informants in furtherance of this purpose.
It is recommended that the intensive investigation
of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as
above be continued.
135
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 147
BLACK REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
157-15276
The Black Revolutionary Party is an all black
revolutionary, political organization which was formed in
April, 1971, at an internal meeting of the pro-Red China
Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) (CP of C-ML).
Among 16 people present were four Americans including
well-known black extremist, Charles Knox, former Black Panther
Party leader in Des Moines, Iowa.
The BRP was formed within the CP of C-ML to
organize blacks in the United States and Canada operating
from headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. The BRP follows
the political line of communist Chinese leader MAO Tse-tung
and publishes a newspaper which serves as its vehicle for
disseminating its revolutionary dogma known as the "Black
Revolutionary," the first issue of which appeared in May, 1971.
The BRP intends to maintain its existence secret
until firmly established which is estimated at taking from
one and one-half to two years. It intends to draw recruits
from both sides of the current Black Panther Party factionalism
and its proposed revolutionary program will reportedly be
based on the issue of racial suppression. This is to be
accomplished by the formation of armed self-defense units to
"fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly, capitalist
class."
On July 12, 1971, Charles Knox and an additional
Omaha black extremist were detained temporarily by United States
Customs officials in Detroit while returning to the
United States from Canada. Search of their vehicle by Customs.
officials determined Knox and his companion were in possession
of numerous pamphlets and leaflets of a pro-communist nature.
Investigations of the BRP and its identified
leaders and members are being aggressively pursued and, where
necessary closely coordinated with Royal Canadian Mounted
Police via Legat, Ottawa
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
4-H
136
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 148
CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP)
157-16554
CAP was formed as an international black separatist
organization as the result of the convening of the fourth
annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States
and Atlanta, Georgia, during September, 1970. The organization,
which is heavily infiltrated at the leadership level by black
extremists, advocates the unity of blacks and the establishment
of a black nation via the revolutionary ideology of Pan-
Africanism as espoused by CAP supporter and well-known black
revolutionary, Stokely Carmichael.
Kenz
CAP is now active in 15 cities across the Nation and
is vigorously pursuing its objectives in this country as well
as establishing rapport and lines of communication with black
groups and individuals abroad. Recent information indicates
two United States CAP representatives plan a trip in the future
to Tanzania for the purpose of establishing a CAP organization
in that country.
by
CAP's domestic extremist element, headed by black
revolutionaries Hayward Henry and LeRoi Jones, call for the
extensive use of disruption and violence, if necessary,
blacks in order to create Independent Black Institutions as
are necessary to accomplish CAP's revolutionary objectives by
mass action programs utilizing "direction, dedication, and
discipline."
CAP held a Western Regional Conference in San Diego,
California, during June, 1971, during which it was recommended
a national committee be established to consider the possibility
of establishing a black paramilitary organization which would
furnish support in the form of a united front action with all
"liberation struggles" in the United States and internationally.
CAP is currently engaged in efforts at forming an
all-black political party in the United States to nominate and
elect black officials at local, state, and national levels
who, it is felt, will support CAP's plans at establishing a
separate black nation. The organization has planned an
Eastern Regional Conference in Newark, New Jersey, for
September, 1971, and has tentatively scheduled another inter-
national meeting in early 1972.
137
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 149
i
Investigations of the CAP, its black extremist
leaders and members, are receiving most close supervision.
Pertinent information developed in regard to their activities
is being disseminated to the Department and interested
Government agencies and officials.
!
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 150
138
1

INTERNATIONAL BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS, aka
BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS
Bufile 157-21532
.
The International Black Workers Congress (IBWC),
which is in its formative stages, is dominated by James
Forman, an official in the black revolutionary Student
National Coordinating Committee. The IBWC makes its
headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, at the same locale as
that of League of Revolutionary Black Workers, a black
extremist labor union in that city.
IBWC is involved in the organizing of black
workers and students to further the revolutionary struggle
in the United States and other parts of the world as well
as for the purpose of building unity among all third world
peoples. IBWC's stated objective in organizing black
workers is to bring about a national work stoppage, thus
severely damaging the United States economy. James Forman
has repeatedly stressed the necessity for blacks to be
organized to change the capitalistic system to that of a
Marxist-Leninist society through seizure of state power.
The IBWC held a regional meeting in Gary, Indiana,
in June, 1971, at which discussions centered around organizing
black workers into a Marxist-Leninist society and preparations
for a drive to organize blacks employed in the steel industry
and in the "U. S. Post Office. It was indicated that IBWC
would receive assistance from the pro-Chinese Communist Progressive
Labor Party (PLP) in the form of advice concerning organizing
activities.
-
"
An IBWC conference tentatively scheduled to be held
in Detroit on August 21 22, 1971, has apparently been
canceled. Indications are that the conference site has been
shifted to Chicago, Illinois, where the conference will be
scheduled within two weeks.
It is particularly significant to note IBWC leader
James Forman, together with other United States black extremists,
including affiliates of the League of Revolutionary Black
· Workers, recently undertook travel abroad which was to include
visits to North Korea, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and
Algeria.
h
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 151
139
:
JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS
BUFILE 157-9903
4-H
The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a
black extremist organization with headquarters in
St. Petersburg, Florida. This group continues to be the
leading organization of all black militant groups in the
State of Florida. It was founded in St. Petersburg during
May, 1968, with 85 ghetto youths as a nucleus who believed
liberation of black people will not come about through
"normal channels." The organization has affiliated groups
in Louisville, Kentucky, and other cities in Florida. They
have attempted to organize on a national basis but have
experienced little success except with the establishment of
a chapter in Boston, Massachusetts.
The founder and leader of this organization is
Joseph Waller, Jr., an articulate Negro who holds the position
of "Chairman" and states that he intends to have all black
militant groups in Florida designated as affiliates of JOMO.
The organization's voice and propaganda organ is
"The Burning Spear" which is published on a monthly basis..
This publication has urged blacks to buy arms and to be
prepared to fight white America. In this connection, JOMO
members have participated in racial disturbances, fire bombings,
and have been involved in attacks on police through the use of
violence. Members reportedly blew up a radio station in Tampa,
Florida, and participated in a plot to break out two black
"political prisoners" from a Florida prison. Members have
also been arrested for the commission of murders and robberies.
The organization has accumulated a large cache of
weapons, and its members are taught guerrilla warfare and
receive fiṛearms training.
Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection
8/17/71
HAN:maz
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 152
140
Junta of Militant Organizations
Bufile 157-9903
Recently JOMO has been reincorporated under
"The International Junta of Militant Organizations" and
now appears to be attempting to make contact with
organizations abroad and has embraced Stokely Carmichael's
concept of Pan-Africanism.
JOMO has received contributions from all over
the United States and recently was almost successful in
receiving a large contribution from a church group in
New York; however, this latter contribution was ultimately
not received.
141
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 153
j
NATION OF ISLAM
Bufile 25-330971
The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an independent semi-
religious group consisting of an adult, hard-core, all black
membership of 6,000 members. Muhammad's Temple Number 2 of the
Holy Temples of Islam, Chicago, Illinois, is the national head-
quarters of this organization consisting of 108 groups in the
U.S. and one in Bermuda. In seven U.S. cities it operates
University of Islam schools for 200 to 600 children at each
school. Local groups convene weekly, and once each year a
national convention is held in Chicago which is attended by
5,000 to 6,000 individuals.
The NOI remains under leadership of Elijah Muhammed
who is the self-proclaimed Messenger of Allah and "Supreme Ruler
of the Universe." Leaders continue to stress creation of a
separate black nation; complete segregation of the races; hatred
of the white man; and development of a black economic community.
The group opposes the war in Vietnam, teaches members to evade
the draft, and strongly supports the Arabs in their conflict
with Israel in the Middle East.
Although for years the leaders of the NOI have taught
members to refrain from carrying weapons and engaging in acts
of violence and open attacks on the white man, as recently as
July, 1971, the NOI Mosque, Tyler, Texas, planned the execution
of radio disc jockey and his associate for having previously
killed a fellow NOI member. Subsequently, seven members of
this mosque were involved in killing one of these men. Local
police recovered three pistols and a rifle from among members
of this group.
The highly inflammatory antiwhite ideology
espoused by the NOI continues to make this group a highly volatile
extremist organization.
wealth.
The organization is reaching new heights in accumulating
Three-fourths of a million dollars monthly flows in
and out of bank accounts at a national level. Corporations
Exay
147
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 154
have been formed to operate food processing plants, acquire
land in the U.S. and in Bermuda, and acquire and maintain a
fleet of jet airplanes.
This group continues the propagation of its beliefs
through distributing 400,000 copies weekly of its newspaper,
"Muhammad Speaks," and radio broadcasts throughout the country.
We have conducted a continuous security and/or
extremist type investigation of this group since 1953 in
‘accordance with Department directives. Each group is reported
on semiannually, and the leaders, functionaries, and those
involved in violence or extremist activities are subject to
active investigation. The Department by letter dated 7/28/66
requested our investigation of this organization be continued.
143
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 155
REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA
Bufile 157-9079
The Republic of New Africa (RNA) was formed in Detroit,
Michigan, in March, 1968, by followers of Malcolm X, assassinated
black extremist. It has chapters in nine U.S. cities and a
current hard-core membership of approximately 116 individuals.
RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard Henry,
long-time extremists in the Detroit area. When first formed,
RNA named as its President-in-exile Robert Franklin Williams,
violence-prone black extremist then living in China. Williams
who has since returned to the U.S., has resigned his position
as head of the RNA due to his own legal problems and dissension
existing within the organization.
RNA was established to create a black nation within
the U.S. demanding from the U.S. Government the States of Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, in addition
to individual reparations of $10,000 per black citizen as payment
for 400 years of ancestral slave labor.
RNA's organizational structure is revolutionary in
character and its leaders have proposed efforts be made for inter-
national recognition and financial assistance from Cuba, Red China
and the black nations of the world. RNA, in September, 1970, made
a formal agreement of mutual revolutionary and financial support
with the leader of the Black Power Movement in Surinam.
RNA established a black army known as the Black Legion
whose function was to protect the persons and property and to
attack the enemies (police) of that nation. Training programs
were instituted and uniforms complete with leopard skin epaulets
were designed as the official dress for the Black Legionaires.
RNA maintains its national headquarters in Detroit,
Michigan, despite the fact that since early 1970, two factions
have arisen within the organization. One faction, led by Richard
Henry, is attempting to establish a national headquarters in
New Orleans, Louisiana. This faction is the most active and
militant of the two groups and has called for intensification of
RNA activities throughout the U.S. The other group, under the
NW 88608 Doeld:32989638 Page 156
144
leadership of Milton Henry in Detroit, has been relatively
inactive for some time. The Milton Henry Faction, however, has
scheduled a national RNA convention to be held in Dayton, Ohio,
September 4 through 6, 1971, which activity could herald renewed
revolutionary activity by this group.
The Richard Henry Faction has been extremely active
in the past several months in attempting to obtain land and
establish a black nation in Hinds County, Mississippi. During
July, 1971, this faction held a "peoples court" to hear RNA's
case against a black farmer and owner of the land claimed by
RNA which was consecrated as the group's capitol in March 3, 1971.
The black farmer has reneged on a former offer to sell his land
to RNA. The RNA group found the farmer guilty and threatens to
seize the land by force, if necessary.
The RNA's propensity for violent action is demonstrated
by the fact that on August 18, 1971, local police officers in
Jackson, Mississippi, accompanied by Bureau Agents raided an
RNA site seeking four subjects for whom warrants were outstanding,
one of whom was wanted for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution
(UFAP) for murder in Detroit. A shoot-out occurred during which
two police officers and a Bureau Agent were wounded. One police
officer subsequently died of a head wound. Eleven RNA members,
including Richard Henry, have been arrested by local authorities
and the UFAP subject is still being sought. A subsequent search
of the raided RNA headquarters determined it was a virtual
arsenal of weapons of all types including homemade bombs and
Molotov cocktails. The front door of this building had been
booby-trapped and it had an escape tunnel leading from its rear
which was accessible via a trap door in the building's interior
and a trench-bunker similar to that utilized by the Viet Cong
in the war in South Vietnam.
I
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 157
145
STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)
100-439190
SNCC was originally organized in Atlanta, Georgia,
in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee. Prior to the election of Stokely Carmichael as
its Chairman in May, 1966, the organization operated as a
nonmembership civil rights organization with both white and
black participation. Carmichael, on assuming the Chairmanship
of SNCC, immediately eliminated all whites from participation
and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented
group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary
action and the overthrow of the United States Government, a
position which the organization maintains today.
H. Rap Brown, Bureau fugitive and well-known black
extremist who served as National Chairman for a time following
Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967, again assumed
the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969. At
that time, it was announced SNCC was eliminating the word
"nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters
were also moved from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City.
Under Brown's direction, SNCC moved to restructure
and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence
as a black extremist organization. The national leadership
issued directives on the reorganization of the national
office in New York City, as well as the local organizations
and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary
Economic Council, an Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council, a
Research Council, and others which make up a body within SNCC
known as the Revolutionary Political Council.
As a result of H. Rap Brown's flight in May, 1970,
to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local
charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently
under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt. Hunt
also serves as head of the organization's Revolutionary
Political Council. Frances Beal is the National Political
Education Officer. Hunt and Beal are the only two national
officers of SNCC.
and
In July, 1971, a reorganizational meeting was held
in Atlanta, Georgia. SNCC cadres gathered from several
states and were directed by Hunt to study, understand,
then practice principles set forth in "Contradictions" by
Mao Tse-tung and "Dialectical and Historical Materialism"
by Joseph Stalin. SNCC members in San Antonio, Texas, are
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
RSY:ies
NW 88608 Doeld 32989638 Page 158
146
Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
already receiving extensive political education in communist
ideology of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The decision was made to
establish a State Bureau of SNCC in every state and to move
the national headquarters from New York City to Atlanta. SNCC
will support various black revolutionary labor groups and will
attempt to rally those under 25 years of age into a new Revo--
lutionary Youth Organization. The cadres discussed establish-
ment of a short-wave communication system utilizing code as a
more secure alternative to telephone and mail systems.
Investigations of SNCC, its leaders, affiliates, and-
their activities continue to receive close supervision. Infor-
mation of pertinence concerning the organization continues to
be disseminated to the White House, the Department and other
interested Government agencies and officials.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 159
147
hit
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OF BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS
100-442529
This intensification was initiated in August,
1964. The subject matter was previously reported in a
subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume
and importance of this information made it necessary to
follow this communist influence in a separate investigation.
This investigation includes not only the influence of the
Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups,
splinter groups and others including the New Left.
The overall objective in this and related
investigations is to protect the internal security of
the United States by submitting information relating to
possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for
prosecution. We also have the responsibility to develop
intelligence information and disseminate to interested
Government agencies. Additionally, we take measures to
neutralize the communist influence in the black extremist
field whenever feasible.
Reports are submitted quarterly and the investi❤
gation is evaluated upon receipt of each report. Pertinent
information is disseminated to the White House and the
Attorney General.
The year 1970 saw continued influence by
communists and other subversives in extremist groups.
In fact, the communist attempts to influence the black
extremist Black Panther Party were so insistent that the
Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist
Párty. This has not diminished in any way the Communist
Party's efforts to influence and support the Black Panther
Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers
whether they want it or not.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 160
148

There are those in the Communist Party who oppose
or are extremely reluctant to support the Black Panther
Party especially those in the Black Panther Party who call
for "revolutionary suicide." Charlene Mitchell, Secretary
of the Black Liberation of the Communist Party, is
reportedly attempting to split the Communist Party and form
a Black Panther Communist Party which believes in violent
and dramatic action. Her group is reportedly waiting for
Angela Davis, admitted Communist Party member currently
incarcerated in California awaiting trial in connection
with the kidnapping and murder of a judge in California
during an attempted escape by prisoners from the courtroom,
to be released at which time Davis will become public
leader of the new party. The Communist Party is girding
itself to oppose the split.
In June, 1971, a group led by James Rufus Forman,
Coordinator of International Affairs for the black extremist
Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC), visited
Hanoi ostensibly to establish rapport between the
North Vietnamese and black people in the United States.
The group's trip was also to include Algiers, Guinea, and
Tanzania to reestablish old contacts for SNCC and initiate
new ones.
"SNCC Monthly," the publication of SNCC, in its
March, 1971, issue, contained an article about "Third
World People," united by "common historical oppression."
People in Cuba, Vietnam, Guinea, and the Palestinian
guerrillas were mentioned as having cut off the tentacles
of "the monster," imperialism. Another article in the same
issue was printed to politicize the readers on the Arab-
Israeli conflict and clarify the similarity between the
Arab position and that of other "people of color" throughout
the world.
"
Curtis Nelson Powell, Black Panther Party member
involved in restructuring of Black Panther Party Cleaver
Faction, while in Stockholm, Sweden, in early August, 1971,
149
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 161
inquired about the possibility of obtaining small arms on
behalf of Eldridge Cleaver for the Black Panther Party. He
specifically mentioned machine guns, pistols and bazookas and
stated there would be no difficulty in getting these items
into the United States. His request was rejected. Powell
subsequently traveled to Algeria, headquarters of the Black
Panther Party International Section, and then on to Tanzania.
He met with the Tanzanian Minister for Economic Affairs and
Development Planning and requested permission to open a
Black Panther Party office in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
Although the Tanzanian Minister was sympathetic, he doubted
the Tanzanian Government would grant such permission at
this time.
Write-ups concerning the Black Revolutionary
Party and the International Black Workers Congress are
incorporated in this survey. Such write-ups document the
pro-Red China Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist)
influence over the Black Revolutionary Party and the
Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the International Black
Workers Congress.
150
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 162
KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM
4-H
Key Black Extremist (KBE) Program initiated 12/23/70
with Director's approval to intensify investigative coverage
of selected black extremists throughout United States who are
extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism
and violence. Ninety individuals are currently on the KBE
list, including such persons as Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton
and David Hilliard.
Objective of program is to develop complete and
detailed information on the day-to-day activities and future
plans of KBE individuals. Investigative summary report is
required followed by investigative report every 90 days.
All KBE individuals are included in Priority I of
Security Index. Each is included in the Black Nationalist
Photograph Album. All aspects of their finances are determined.
Their handwriting specimens are placed in the National Security
File in the Laboratory Division. Their fingerprints are
included in the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint
File in the Identification Division. Particular attention is
paid to their travel. Possible criminal violations are
vigorously pursued. Emphasis is placed on obtaining record of
their inflammatory statements. High level of informant coverage
on each individual is required.
Supervision of KBE investigations is handled on the
individual desks and additions to and deletions from KBE list
must be approved by Bureau. Inasmuch as KBE individuals are of
the type whose investigation would ordinarily require close
supervision by Bureau supervisors, the administration and
supervision of this program entails only a minimum amount of
time above that which would ordinarily be expended on the
supervision of the cases of these persons.
Continuation of this program will be justified in
December, 1971.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
HEH:acs
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 163
151
EXTREMIST INFORMANTS
4-H
The prime purpose of development and utilization
of extremist informants and sources is to provide intelligence
and evidenciary information concerning black and white
extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are
also called upon to furnish information concerning situations
affecting civil unrest in all parts of the country.
Supervision of extremist informants at the Seat of
Government includes review and approval of new informants
and confidential sources, review of progress of informants,
review of payments being made to informants, analysis of
informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nation-
wide informant coverage of the various extremist organizations,
coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such
as Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremist groups:
conventions, supervision of operations for the development of
top-echelon BPP informants, and other special projects such as
development of information concerning black extremist under-
ground escape routes and coordinating utilization of informants
abroad with other agencies. All procedures are constantly
·evaluated, in an effort to increase the efficiency of our
operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision
with a minimum of paper work.
As of 7/31/71 we are operating a total of 7,477
extremist informants compared with a total of 7,184 at the
time of the last Inspection. This is an increase of 293
informants. Concerning the above informants, 583 informants
report on black extremist organizations and 353 informants
report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan. We
are operating 6,541 ghetto informants who provide general
information within the black ghetto areas of our cities as
compared to 6,224 ghetto informants at the time of the last
Inspection which represents an increase of 317 ghetto informants.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
JGD:maz
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 164
152
In line with the fluctuating membership in the
various black extremist organizations, we have constantly
adjusted our informant coverage. This can be seen very
clearly with the most violent of the black extremist groups,
the Black Panther Party. At the time of the last Inspection
BPP membership was 1,000, and we afforded coverage of these
1,000 members with 173 informants which represents 17.3 percent
of the membership. The present membership is 710, and we have
156 informants reporting on these individuals which represents
21.7 percent of the membership. This is a net increase of
informant coverage to total membership of 4.4 since the last
Inspection. This also indicates our aims and purposes of
penetrating these organizations with the most qualified
informants and keeping within the policy of operating the
informant program in a very efficient manner.
At the time of the last Inspection we were operating
376 informants furnishing information concerning white extremist
organizations, and as of 7/31/71 we are operating 353 informants.
This is in keeping with the current membership of the Klan and
white hate organizations.
By memorandum dated 2/19/71 from G. C. Moore to
-
Mr. C. D..Brennan captioned "Penetration of Black Extremist
Groups in Canada, Racial Matters" it was recommended and
approved that this Bureau attempt to penetrate the back extremist
activities in Canada due to the close working relationship
being developed between the extremists in that country and the
United States. We made available to the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) a top source of the Baltimore Division. By
letter dated 7/20/71 from Legat, Ottawa, it was set out that
the RCMP advised they have been extremely pleased with the
progress s made by our source in that he has furnished information
concerning future plans for acts of violence and the establishment
of guerrilla warfare training by black extremist groups in the
Toronto, Canada, area,
RCMP indicated that Halifax, Nova Scotia, is fast
becoming a focal point of black extremist activity in Canada.
153
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 165
RCMP pointed out that the above area is visited frequently
by black extremist figures from the United States and
admitted that they have experienced considerable difficulty
in the recruitment of suitable sources in the Halifax area.
RCMP requested of the Bureau another source of the caliber
of the one presently operating in Canada.
By memorandum dated 7/29/71 it was recommended
and approved that we solicit of the field the identities of
informants who may be able to travel to Canada. This
project is presently being followed very closely.
By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to
Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned "Racial Informant Development,
Black Panther Party (BPP), Racial Matters" it was recommended
and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco
Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a top-
level informant in the BPP'. By letter dated 8/17/71
San Francisco was instructed that captioned program is being
discontinued. Review of this program showed that all avenues
leading to the possible development of high-level BPP informants
have been explored and the groundwork laid for the development
of top-echelon leaders who might defect. Therefore, it was
believed that it was no longer necessary to have two
Special Agents assigned exclusively to this program.
will bring about a savings in manpower; however, San Francisco
is under instructions to continue aggressive efforts to
penetrate the top echelon of the BPP. This is being closely
followed at the Seat of Government.
This
GHETTO INFORMANTS
The ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67
to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening
posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. A ghetto informant
is an individual living or working in the ghetto area who is
available to furnish information concerning conditions which
may create civil unrest.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 166
154
Since 1967 this program has been significantly
modified in that this vast network of informants have been
changed from listening posts to individuals who are actively
seeking extremist information as well as information concerning
violations of Federal and local statutes.
We have noted numerous incidents where ghetto
informants are being converted by the field to regular
extremist informants in that they have been graduated into
positions where they can report on a regular basis concerning
the activities of individual extremists and/or extremist
organizations. As a valuable by-product we are also achieving
criminal statistics through contacts with our ghetto informants.
This program was justified by memorandum dated 7/4/71 from
G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan captioned "Ghetto Informant
Program, Racial Matters" and is scheduled to be rejustified
in July, 1972.
T
:
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 167
کو کیر
4-H
-
BLACK EXTREMISTS
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
Bufile 100-448006
Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists
was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70. This
program was a supplement to our black extremist investigative
activities and involved a variety of sensitive intelligence
techniques which were afforded close supervision at the Seat
of Government. No action could be instituted under this
program without prior Bureau authorization.
To afford additional security to our sensitive
techniques and operations, all counterintelligence programs,
including this program, were discontinued and the field was
so advised by airtel 4/28/71.
Although this program was discontinued, the field
was advised if exceptional instances arose wherein it was
considered counterintelligence action is warranted, that
recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the
specific case caption involved. These recommendations will
then be considered on an individual basis. The field was
also reminded that prior Bureau authority is required before
initiating any activity of a counterintelligence nature.
·Significant results since last inspection as a
result of this program are set forth under "Accomplishments 4E"
elsewhere in this report.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WHA: pjc
4-H
Willo
156
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 168
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H
شد
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION:
//
· There are attached
separate write-ups
regarding the following programs supervised in the
Nationalities Intelligence Section:
1. Name checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic
and International Organization Visas
2.
Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border
(BOCOV)
Security Index-Cuba
4. American Repatriate Program
Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign
Countries
Chinese Aliens Entering the U. S.%3B Chinese
Entering U. S. Claiming U..S. Citizenship
Counterintelligence Operations Against.
Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities
in the United States
Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by
United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic
Establishments
* DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
* 8/19/71
EXO:dgo
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 169
157:
4-H
NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS
This program was initiated in January, 1952, as a means of
keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive
nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering
the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the
Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the
Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of
foreign officials where their activity requires such action.
The basis for this program is found in the procedure by
Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form
advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is
sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate
agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results
being channelized to the FBI. We correlate this information with data
.from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General. In those
instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain
clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions
to the field for active investigation.
Since the program was initiated, 794, 570 Immigration and
Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have
undertaken 474 investigations based on results thereof.
The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in
the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by
trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section
and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by
substantive desk supervisors within the Division. Based on the limited
number of active investigations opened since the inception of this program,
the cost of the program consists mainly of name check expenditures. The
program continues to serve a necessary purpose in our overall intelligence
coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons
having a capability for intelligence activities or who may pose a security
threat to the United States.
The program is justified annually, with the last justification
having been made February 18, 1971.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
ERH:bjp.
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 170
158

Substitute
PROGRAM
COMMUNIST COVERAGE ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER
BOCOV
BUFILE: 100-356015
4 H
I.
Background and Date of Inception
BOCOV was initiated by the Director in 1948
to fill a void in adequacy of coverage in the 25-mile
zone south of the U. S. - Mexican border by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service
II. Scope and Desired Objectives
Three border offices, El Paso, San Antonio,
and San Diego, as well as the office of the Legal Attache,
Mexico, participate in this program. Ten Agents and
two Assistant Legal Attaches devote a portion of their
time directing some 200 sources and informants.
Population of the zone areas involved is approximately
1,700,000 persons of which some 2,400 have been identified
as either members or sympathizers of major Mexican
subversive groups.
III.
Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection
Program has furnished valuable information
relative to threat against U. S. by Mexican subversives
residing and or operating in the border area.
Investigative results are furnished to all levels of
interested U. S. Government intelligence community.
Program continues to keep us advised of potential
trouble areas and allows for appropriate counter-measures.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
BMP:emj
4
-
· H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 171
159
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 172
IV.
Extent and Nature of Current Supervision
Periodic reports on individuals and organizations
as well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are
analyzed and correlated by SA Bernardo M. Perez. Involved
is review of incoming letters, memoranda, reports and
semiannual progress letters detailing informant coverage
and subversive strength. Analysis of this material
provides a basis for detecting weaknesses and making
arrangements for counterintelligence moves.
V.
Current Justification for Continuance
BOCOV continues to fill the above-described
intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with
other intelligence programs originating in the border
area, in particular the SECOMEX program.
VI. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification
Program is evaluated annually and was last
justified January 8, 1971.
1
2
-
160°
་གསལ --་"-་* 4**k----བ་
BOCOV
Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly
sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in
effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this
operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive
elements entering the U. S. Although this operation is no
longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was
once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities
of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not only
with regard to the internal security of the U. S., but also
in investigating criminal matters of an international nature,
Furthermore, unauthorized disclosure of details of this
operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who
cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing
abroad.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 173
Substituted for pages 159×160
in co
сори
to SSC
SECURITY INDEX
LOVE
CUBA
4 - H
Background and Date of Inception
This program was instituted in November, 1960.
By that date it was obvious that Cuba, whose Government
had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January, 1959,
was a communist state posing a real and present threat
to the internal security of the United States. In 1962,
at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, an Agent
Supervisor at the Bureau was assigned the specific
responsibility for administering this program to assure
the apprehension and special handling of the individuals
included therein in the event of a limited emergency
involving Cuba.
Scope and Desired Objectives
-
As of July 15, 1971, there were 409 individuals
included in the Security Index Cuba Program, divided
into two categories:
1.
2.
Individuals placed on the
Security Index solely on
account of their pro-
Cuban activities (Cuban
Special Section 93
persons).
-
Persons already on the
Security Index because of
other subversive connections
and activities who would
warrant special attention
in the event of hostilities
with Cuba (Security Index
subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban"
316 individuals).
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
VHN:emj
-
"H"
161
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 174
:
Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date
record of location and activities of individuals included
therein, by means of established Security Index procedures
and reporting, in order that we are in a position to move
swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of
these persons become necessary.
Positive Results Achieved
Determination as to the validity of an
individual's inclusion in this program is constantly
under review. Since the program was last justified on
April 7, 1971, the number of persons on the Cuban Section
of the Index has been reduced from 95 to 93. These 93
persons are judged to be hard-core pro-Cubans, action
against whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory.
Of these 93, 28 are Cuban aliens. Each subject of pending
security investigations with Cuban ramifications is
considered for inclusion in the Index.
Extent and Nature of Current Supervision
The Agent Supervisor responsible for this
program is required to review each investigative
communication in current cases of pro-Cuban individuals
to determine whether the individual meets the criteria
for inclusion in the Index, as outlined in the Manual of
Instructions. He must make a decision as to the degree
of dangerousness of the individual under the Priority
Apprehension Program and rule on the field's recommendations
regarding these matters. He initiates procedures with
the Security Index Desk of the Domestic Intelligence
Division and Voucher Statistical Section of the
Administrative Division regarding the placing of an
individual on the Index, his removal and the assignment
or change in apprehension priority.
If the individual involved is an alien,
correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the
Department is required to assure the preparation of a
pre-positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and
Naturalization Service. Action is also taken with the
Department to cancel the arrest warrant if the alien is
removed from the Index.
162
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 175
2
-
Current Justification
The threat to the internal security of the
United States from communist Cuba has not lessened in
recent years. A workable priority apprehension system
which receives current and continuing attention is
mandatory. This program, as presently organized and
handled, is fully justified.
Frequencies of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation
This program is evaluated on a semiannual
The most recent review and evaluation was dated
1971.
basis.
April 7,
163
3
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 176
1
AMERICAN REPATRIATE PROGRAM
!
4 - H
The American Repatriate Program which was
instituted in February, 1962, to specify procedure
to be followed upon receipt of information that U.S.
citizens residing in Cuba had been issued Swiss
Protection Passports by Swiss Embassy in Havana, Cuba,
for travel to U. S was discontinued by memorandum
W. R. Wannall to Mr. C. D. Brennan, dated March 25,
1971.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
VHN: emi
-
H
164
NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page-177
4-H
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Bufile: 65-63113)
1. Background, Scope and Objectives
Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive
intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations.
Expansion of the program took place in 1955 and 1959 and during 1962
and 1963, as well as in 1970, additional coverage was approved.
:
The program has four principal phases as follows:
a.
Regular notification to the FBI by other U.S. agencies
regarding arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel
from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists
chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal
expense.
b. Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments
of selected non-Soviet bloc countries with the approval of
State Department and the Attorney General. We currently
have special coverage on six diplomatic establishments
of four non-Soviet bloc countries. Countries currently
covered are Panama, Cuba, Israel and the United Arab
Republic. Our cost in operating this phase of the program
is related to translation of the intelligence product and
salary of personnel who man special coverage equipment.
Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the
special coverage is justified. This justification is based
on the value of the data developed.
c. This phase relates to the development of live sources
within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet bloc
countries as well as the development of individuals so
closely connected with official establishments they are
able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence informa-
tion. We now have 39 actual and 14 potential live sources
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
ERH:bip
4-H
165
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 178
d.
4-H
at the establishments of 24 non-Soviet bloc countries.
The principal cost involved in this phase relates to
Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and
time spent in handling these sources.
This phase relates to our intensification of efforts
by our legal attache offices abroad to develop and
instantaneously report high-level intelligence informa-
tion susceptible to immediate transmission to the
White House for consideration by appropriate officials
involved in determining national policy on critical
international issues.
Since the last inspection we have instituted a program operating
under the code word of "HILEV" which provides for specific channels of
· transmission and dissemination along the lines noted above. The
expansion of our operations abroad, at the instruction of the President,
has resulted in the development of considerable expertise on the part of
our legal attaches in developing the type of information required in this
area and the resulting product of their efforts has resulted in laudatory
comments by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and other high-level members of
the Executive Branch.
1.
2. Positive Results Achieved
This program has enabled us to continue to produce a steady
flow of substantive information of an intelligence nature for the White House
and the highest level of the intelligence community. The program has been
particularly productive in our coverage of such critical areas of tension
as the Middle East crisis, the continuing crisis in Panama, and the recurring
areas of tension created in South America by the frequent overthrow and/or
establishment of regimes in that continent, some of which are strongly
anti-American in political leaning. In other fringe nationality areas, the
program has served as a basis for obtaining information which has served
as a basis for advice to various high-level Government officials necessary
for policy decisions within the international political arena. The majority
of these data are not otherwise obtainable.
The daily flow of information from our sources in the various
facets of this program to the highest levels of Government has succeeded
in firmly establishing the FBI as a lucrative source of foreign intelligence.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 179
166
4-H
This ability to produce such information has been recognized, as noted,
by Dr. Kissinger at the White House and by various officials of the
Central Intelligence Agency in frequent contact with the Bureau.
Specific comments regarding the HILEV program and its productivity
may be found in the work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E,
Accomplishments - Special Coordination Unit.
3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision
The program as it relates to all friendly foreign countries
(except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the
○ Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors
assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section.
4. Current Justification for Continuation
This program continues to produce information of substantial
value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign
political information of vital interest to the White House and members
of the intelligence community. The information continues to illustrate
the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative
to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a
valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this
program be continued.
5. Periodic Justification
Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by
memorandum dated 5/5/71.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
-
DANGEROUS
ALIENS OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC
Program was initiated in April, 1951, to create a centralized
compilation of undesirable and potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic
immunity against whom State Department can, when wartime emergency
arises, initiate steps for deportation or lifting of their diplomatic immunity.
The program applies only to aliens from countries outside the
Soviet bloc employed in the United States in international organizations
within provisions of International Organizations Immunities Act. The
167
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 180

4-H
program is similar in intent to the Emergency Detention Program
and the PRODIP Program; however, it involves an entirely different
type of individual.
The program is a control device only and involves no investigative
activity. Twenty-three individuals (as of 8/18/71) are included on the list,
with New York Office responsible for nineteen and Washington Field
Office responsible for four.
Current program requires only an annual letter with deletions
or additions being made by separate letter as subjects involved qualify
for elimination or inclusion. Substantive desk supervisors review field
submissions to verify need for inclusion of individuals on list.
..
Program continues to serve a useful purpose as a precautionary
measure for U.S. security in time of emergency. It is justified annually,
with last justification having been made 2/21/71.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 181
168
CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE U. S..
(Bufile 105-135923)
4-H
CHINESE ENTERING THE U.S.
'CLAIMING U.S. CITIZENSHIP
- (Bufile 105-12752)
Inasmuch as the criteria and objectives regarding
the above two programs are similar, both are included in
this write-up.
Investigations under the Chinese alien program
were instituted 1/26/65 and investigations relating to
Chinese entering the U. S. claiming U. S. citizenship
were initiated 9/14/65.
we
Both of the above programs are designed to uncover,
through investigation, ethnic Chinese who may enter the U. S.
under the guise of a legitimate alien and/or U. S. citizen.
but who, in fact, may be covert intelligence agents of
Communist China. Prior to inception of these programs,
were made aware of emphasis placed by Chinese communist
(Chicom) intelligence organizations on the need to introduce
illegal agents into the U. S. Provided sufficient indoctrina-
tion and training are given, the legal alien channel is.
undoubtedly the easiest way to accomplish the desire of the
Chicoms to plant their agents in this country..
Under existing immigration laws, up to 10,000
Chinese aliens may be admitted to the U. S. for permanent
residence annually. Under an additional program initiated
in 1971, another 250 Chinese aliens may be admitted to the
U. S. monthly as Conditional Entrants. All of these aliens
have backgrounds closely connecting them with Communist China
and some leave behind on the mainland immediate family members
or very close relatives. Our experience in this field over
the years indicates that alien entrants into the U. S. who may
be selected for intelligence assignments would probably have
resided in a communist country while in the 19 to 45-year age
group and would probably have at least 8 years of formal
education. Accordingly, our investigations of aliens are
limited to those who fit the above criteria.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
FXO:dgo
4-H
NW.88608 Docid:32989638 Page 182
169
4-H
The key to investigations of this type is the
initial interview which is conducted after the field office
covering the alien's residence has developed sufficient
background information on the subject. These interviews are
designed to have the subject personally verify information
The may have furnished to U. S. authorities at some time in
the past and in cases where significant discrepancies are
disclosed through the interview, we will intensify the investi-
gation, looking toward the possibility that the subject is now
unable to recall a previous cover story. In the event the
initial interview is satisfactory, the case is closed subject
to being reopened after two years for a second interview. The
second interview, which is conducted for the same purpose as
the first interview, will determine whether or not additional
action is to be taken. If the second interview is satisfactory,
no subsequent action is taken with regard to the subject.
Cases investigated under the citizenship program are handled
in a similar manner.
Our investigations in both these areas produce
intelligence information of various types which is valuable
to other U. S. agencies having a primary interest in develop-
ments in mainland China. The two programs have produced
tangible results in that a number of sources in the Chinese
field have been developed through interviews.,
Chinese alien cases originate with Legal Attache
Hong Kong, who views appropriate records and thereafter submits
pertinent data to the Bureau regarding those aliens who fit
the criteria for investigation or any others whose backgrounds
äre deemed to be so unusual that investigation may be justi-
fied even though they do not fit the criteria. Cases in the
cïtizenship category are initiated by the Washington Field
Office after review of passport records. Alien and citizenship
cases are handled on the Desks of two Supervisors and consti-
'tute only a portion of the work on each Desk. Results of
investigation are carefully reviewed and evaluated in line with
‘our objective of determining if the subject is or may bẹ of
investigative interest,
It is felt that these two programs are fully justi-
fied for continuation since they cover areas which may be ·
utilized by the Chicoms to introduce illegal agents into this
country. No other U. S. investigative agency carries out
investigative activity along this line. In addition, these
programs provide us with sources and positive intelligence of
170
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 183
3.
4-H
interest to other U. S. agencies. No additional manpower.
is necessary to carry out our responsibilities under these
· programs.
These programs are evaluated and justified annually.
Both programs were considered justified based on Division
inspection write-up 1/12/71.
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 184
1?1
.COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST
CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-
TIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN)
(Bufile 105-135614)
Captioned program was initiated in May, 1965,
combat Chinese communist (Chicom) efforts to initiate
intelligence operations and develop intelligence data in
the United States.
to
Analysis indicates that our current efforts
relating to development of informants, particularly double
agents, is an activity which we normally carry out in
connection with our intelligence responsibilities. Since
CHICOIN was previously defined as a means by which we were
creating situations and placing our informants in contact
with Chicoms abroad, with the aim of their being recruited
by the Chicoms, it is felt we are accomplishing the same
objective through source and double agent development in
individual cases.
4-H
We are constantly aware of the need to employ
counterintelligence methods designed toward penetration of
Chicom intelligence, particularly since a Chicom official
establishment has opened in Canada and with the knowledge
that the Chicoms will probably enter the United Nations within
the next 14 months. Along these lines, we are continuing,
on an individual basis, development of sources who can be
directed toward the penetration mentioned above.
Accordingly, it is felt that use of the term
CHICOIN in connection with our basic efforts, is no longer
necessary. CHICOIN, as a program, is therefore discontinued.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EXO-dgo
172
NW 88608 Dold:32989638 Page 185
VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND
CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS
OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS
4-H
Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives.
This program was initiated in 8/65 in an effort
to uncover Chinese communist (Chicom) activities in the
United States. The identities of individuals, both
citizens and noncitizens who are residents of this country,
were furnished to us by United States intelligence agencies
and friendly foreign intelligence services. These individuals
either attempted to enter Communist China or contacted the
diplomatic establishments of the People's Republic of China
(PRC) throughout the world. Since 1965, the number of diplo-
matic establishments maintained by the PRC has increased many
times, particularly during the past year when many countries
recognized the PRC.
."
This program is field-wide and not directly connected
with any other investigative program. The objectives include.
identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be
engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom
establishments. It is essential that visitors to Communist China
and PRC Embassies in foreign countries be identified to deter-
mine if they have access to classified material or could be
utilized for an intelligence or espionage assignment upon their
return to the United States. During recent months, the
United States Government has lifted the ban on travel to
Communist China. However, the PRC has been very selective in
the issuance of travel documents to United States citizens and,
up until now,
has restricted the issuance of these documents to
chiefly a few newspapermen, some scholars, known pro-Chicom
sympathizers and a very limited number of ethnic Chinese.
During the past month, the Department of State and the Justice
Department have indicated that the travel restrictions will be
lifted on permanent resident aliens in the United States who
wish to visit Communist China, Outer Mongolia and Albania.
Previously, the restrictions on United States citizens limited
the number who actually entered China as well as the number of
visitors to PRC diplomatic establishments. The lifting of the
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
JEM: smn/dgo
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 186
12.3
2
4-H
restrictions on United States citizens and the proposed
amendment to the law concerning permanent resident aliens
will greatly increase the number of investigations under
this program.
Many of the individuals traveling to China
from the United States will be legitimate merchants, scholars.
and tourists. However, they will be subjected to possible
approaches for intelligence purposes. In addition, we will
possibly be able to utilize legitimate travelers as walk-ins.
Therefore, it is essential that we fully identify all those
who enter China or contact PRC diplomatic establishments
abroad. The ethnic Chinese is of greatest interest to the
Chicoms as a visitor, particularly if he has relatives
residing on the Chinese mainland. Based upon the experiences
of friendly foreign intelligence agencies, particularly RCMP
we have learned that the Chicoms primarily recruit as intell
gence agents the ethnic Chinese.
2.
Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection.
Investigations since the last inspection have
greatly increased. Many of the investigations are in the
initial stages of identifying the individuals. In February,
1971, the Chicoms established an Embassy in Ottawa, Canada.
During that month, 14 United States residents contacted the
Embassy. During June, 156 residents contacted the Embassy
in addition to contacts with the Chicom propaganda news
agency, New China News Agency. Included among these people
are ethnic Chinese, national political figures in the
United States, China scholars, journalists and merchants.
The increase from February through June of over 1,000 percent
indicates the acceleration of the problem facing the Bureau
in this program. During July, there was a substantial increase
over June. The Chicoms have taken on a new look and are
"encouraging visitors to the Embassy in Ottawa. Our common
border, which is so easily crossed, offers no resistance, and
it is through the excellent cooperation of the RCMP that we
are able to obtain the names and addresses of individuals
contacting the Embassy or the New China News Agency (NCNA).
It is expected that in the future the number of contacts will
increase both at Ottawa as well as at the China Travel Service
in Hong Kong and the various Embassies of the PRC in foreign
countries. The present policies of the President and the
Department of State speaking for the United States Government
અને એવા ગામ થી ય
NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page-187
174
4-H
will continue to encourage visitors, any of which is a possi-
ble subject for recruitment by Chicom intelligence for hard
espionage, intelligence activities or propagandizing the
American people.
3%
Extent and Nature of Current Supervision.
Portions of this program are handled by three
Bureau supervisors. However, the visitors to China are
¨ correlated by one supervisor and the contacts with Chicom
diplomatic establishments are correlated by a second super-
visor. This has become necessary because of the increased
work load based upon information furnished by RCMP through.
Legat, Ottawa. Investigations are conducted to fully
identify the individuals primarily through established.
sources, if possible, to determine their current residence
and particularly their employment. Identification of
employment is essential to determine if the individual has
access to classified information or if he is in some field.
of endeavor which is of particular interest to the Chicoms.
Each case is evaluated on its individual merits and cases
are not opened on individuals on whom sufficient background
information is available, such as nationally known journa-
lists, scholars or political figures.
Current Justification for Continuation.
RCMP has advised as recently as July, 1971, that
they feel that at
50 percent of the Chinese communist
intelligence effort in Canada will be directed against the
United States. The wife of a Chicom intelligence officer
of the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa has stated that the Embassy
staff in Canada will be large because "we will be responsible
for the United State's as well as Canada.“ It is absolutely
necessary that this program be continued to identify all
contacts both in Canada as well as at other. PRC diplomatic
establishments throughout the world. In addition,
Legat, Hong Kong, has submitted a form which has been approved
to forward to the Bureau the identities of those individuals
who are American citizens or permanent resident aliens who
cross the border of Hong Kong into Communist China at Lo Wu.
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 188
کچھ دیر
4-H
In addition, identity of visitors will give us a fertile
field for development of sources which we may utilize as
walk-ins, particularly at the Embassy in Ottawa. RCMP has.
greatly encouraged this procedure.
5.
How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification.
This program is evaluated annually and the last
date of justification took place on 1/12/71.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 189
176
LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES
FOREIGN LIAISON
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
4-H-1
In order that the overall foreign liaison
can be fully and currently evaluated, you
are requested to furnish your comments concerning each Legal Attache Office
presently operating (17); former Legal Attache Offices which you have proposed
to be reopened (3); and proposed new Legal Attache Offices (3).
In providing this information, you are requested to be specific as to: (1)
productivity (including intelligence) of each existing office (provide examples);
(2) comment as to adequacy of personnel assigned (fully document if additions, de-
letions or changes recommended); (3) make specific recommendations regarding
continuing or discontinuing each of existing offices.
You are also requested to state your current recommendations regarding
each former and new Legal Attache Office proposed above.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall
requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: C. D. BRENNAN:
(CDB:mls 8/25/71)
I concur with the attached
comprehensive analysis of
Section Chief Wannall in
regard to our Legal Attache operations abroad. The Inspector should
particularly note Wannall's concluding observation that any future
expansion abroad will be resisted by the Department of State and
Central Intelligence Agency and unless specifically ordered by
the White House, will require approval from State and Bureau of
the Budget. As Mr. Wannall points out, we are not in a position
to balance the value of the information expected against the costs,
and I would suggest the Inspector insure that a copy of Mr. Wannall's
overall analysis is furnished to the Administrative Division
inasmuch as the Director on 8/23/71 approved the recommendation that
the Administrative Division should coordinate and handle all requests
for increased staffing, as well as the creation of new Legal Attache
posts.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
18/19/71
ESM:wmj
4-H-1
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 190
177

LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES
FOREIGN LIAISON
4-H-1
COMMENTS OF SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL:
,
In response to the
Inspector's inquiry,
comments follow concerning (1) the 11 foreign offices in
operation prior to the expansion in December, 1970, (2) the
6 new offices opened in December, 1970, and (3) the 6
additional offices which we proposed be opened in response
to the Director's inquiry in May, 1971. With respect to
categories (1) and (2) it is noted that these 17 offices
have just undergone inspection, most of them during the
current month. As very few of the inspection reports are
yet available, these comments are necessarily based upon those
facets of the work which it is possible to observe from the
Seat of Government.
(1) Offices in Operation Prior to Expansion
BERN
Our operations in Switzerland are most delicate
because of the fierce independence of the Swiss, who would
not permit the use of "Legal Attache" as it was considered
too widely identified with the FBI. As a result, our
representative is known in the Embassy and in Switzerland
merely as an Attache. The office has become increasingly
important in the criminal field very recently as a result of
the large scale thefts of securities in the United States
and their transportation to and attempted sale or hypothecation
in Switzerland. In addition, it has long been the goal to
obtain access to information concerning bank accounts opened
in Switzerland by subjects of our investigations. Progress
has been slow but we have been able to secure limited
information and the cooperation received is the direct result
of the personal liaison of our Legal Attache.
Productivity
During fiscal 1971, the office located 7 fugitives
and arranged 4 "informal deportations." Its pending case load
as of 6/30/71 was 83 which is approximately average on a per
agent basis in the foreign field. Through 8/23/71 Bern had
submitted 7 HILEV items of which 5 were actually disseminated.
This is the smallest number of submissions of any Legal Attache
and the second smallest number of acceptable items.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
4-H-1
8/23/71
NW 88608 D98998 Page 191
178
1
2
-NG
4-H-1
Personnel
Adequate.
No increase envisioned.
Recommendation
Continue.
BONN
This is a very important European office covering
Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. There is a high
volume of both criminal and security work. The large
United State military presence in Germany is both an
espionage target and a source of Bureau work. The military
intercept program furnishes our office copies of correspondence
passing through Germany to and from Iron Curtain countries
and the volume of this is so great as to require extra
clerical assistance.. The Legal Attache has served in Germany
since 1951 and is universely respected and given full ·
cooperation.
· Productivity
In fiscal 1971 20 persons wanted in the United States
were located in the Bonn territory and 5 stolen cars were
recovered. The Legal Attache is currently working a ring
case which will result in location of an additional number.
Through 8/23/71 he has submitted 18 HILEV items of which 7
have been disseminated. This is considerably below average
and this matter was discussed with the Legal Attache during
his visit to Washington on home leave recently. He has shown
improvement as evidenced by the fact that he has submitted 4
items already during August of which 3 have been used. His
pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 355 which is considerably
above average on a per agent basis.
Personnel
A third agent was added to Bonn in December, 1970,
at the time Austria was added to its territory. It is felt
this is adequate.
Recommendation
Continue.
179
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 192
:
3
4-H-1
BUENOS AIRES
For several years this was a one-man office
attempting to cover not only Argentina but also Brazil,
some 1,200 miles away and larger than the United States.
Although we had a very capable Legal Attache, he could
barely touch the high spots in his territory and maintained
a very low case load. Two additional agents were assigned
in December, 1970, and Paraguay was added to the Legal
Attache's responsibilities as was intelligence reporting
on Chile. We believe the results have justified this
move although one agent is still trying to cover Brazil
on a road trip basis.
Productivity
During fiscal 1971, 38 persons wanted in the
United States were located in the territory. The pending
case load as of 6/30/71 was 294 and above average on a
per agent basis. As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted
47 HILEV items of which 21 have been used and 2 are still
pending. This is well above the average.
Personnel
One agent and one clerk could be transferred from
Buenos Aires if an office were to be opened in Rio de Janeiro.
Under present circumstances, the personnel is adequate but
three agents and three clerks would not be needed if Brazil
was removed from their territory.
Recommendation
Continue. At present, this is our only point of
coverage for an enormous area of South America.
HONG KONG
Originally opened to provide coverage of Chinese
communist activities, Hong Kong fell heir to the entire
Southwest Pacific area when our office in Manila was closed.
We believe the area has a high potential both for cases
pertaining to the Bureau's domestic jurisdiction and for
items of high-level intelligence. The intermittent road
trips, however, do not permit adequate development of contacts
who can be relied upon to look out for our interests. In
addition, the Legal Attache has required an abnormal amount
NW-88608 Docld:32989638_Page_193
120
4-H-1
of supervision in regard to administrative matters. He
experiences great difficulty in meeting deadlines and
has been censured twice already this year for delays in
reporting. He has an outstanding personality, speaks
readily and fluently, and has a good background in Chinese
matters. Nevertheless, very few of his HILEV submissions
have been acceptable and he has evidenced a lack of
understanding of what constitutes intelligence of interest
to the White House. It was suggested that these matters
be inquired into by the Inspector together with the Legal
Attache's relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) so far as the passage of information to and from
British sources is concerned. The results of the inspection
are not yet known.
Productivity
Fifty-four persons wanted in the United States
were located by the office during fiscal 1971. Eight informal
deportations" were arranged. The case load as of 6/30/71
was 178 which is approximately average un à per agent basis.
As of 8/23/71, the Legal Attache had submitted 27 items for
HILEV dissemination of which 7 were considered acceptable.
Personnel
The present personnel complement is not considered
adequate to discharge the Bureau's responsibilities, including
HILEV in Southeast Asia. We have, however, recommended that
three additional offices be opened in this area. If these
offices are opened, the complement of two agents and two
clerks should be able to handle the work in Hong Kong and,
if necessary, provide relief to any one-man office opened
in the area.
Recommendation
Continue. The resumption of relations with
Communist China will make this office increasingly important.
LONDON
-
This is our most productive office in Western
Europe and handles a heavy volume of criminal cases. Our
office has developed a very close relationship with Scotland
181
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 194
4-H-1
Yard and its Special Branch with the result that we
receive splendid cooperation in both criminal and security
investigations in the London area. There are always a
large number of Americans in England and Ireland and there
will always be a need for our representation there.
Productivity
As of 6/30/71, London had 333 -pending cases,
the largest number per agent of any office except Ottawa.
Ninety-one persons wanted in the United States were located
by the office during fiscal 1971 and 4 "informal deportations"
were arranged despite the British insistence upon formal
legal procedures. As of 8/23/71, London had submitted 20
items for HILEV dissemination 11 of which were accepted.
This is slightly below average.
Personnel
We have recommended that consideration be given
to assigning an additional agent to London and if approved,.
this will still leave London with an above average number
of cases per man. We believe that the Bureau gets high value
for its investment in the London Office.
Recommendation
Continue.
MADRID
An increasing number of American travelers are
visiting Spain and they have included fugitives and other
United States criminals. The present Legal Attache has
developed strong contacts in Spain, including Prince Juan
Carlos, the heir apparent to General Franco. Although
operating alone, the Legal Attache has done a particularly
good job both in his contacts and the administration of
his office.
· Productivity
Twenty-four persons wanted in the United States
were located by the Legal Attache during fiscal 1971. His
case load as of 6/30/71 was 115 which is substantially above
average on a per agent basis. To date, he has submitted 28
items for HILEV dissemination of which 17 have been accepted
with 2 still pending. This is above average.
NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 195-
182
4-H-1
Personnel
We recently recommended that one agent and one
clerk be added to Madrid in the event of a future expansion.
While the present complement can handle the normal FBI
cases, the emphasis on HILEV items can best be satisfied
by an additional agent.
Recommendation
Continue.
MEXICO CITY
Our operation in Mexico is unique in that we
are actively developing informants and working most closely
with the cooperative Mexican officers who handle our cases.
there. This is our largest office both in terms of case
load and personnel. Unlike Canada where practically all
our work is handled by one agency, we are dealing with a
number of different agencies in Mexico most of which lack
the training and sophistication of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) hence the disparity in the personnel
required to handle our work north and south of the border.
In an effort to streamline our operations in Mexico, the
Legal Attache has been instructed to reduce the number of
informants he is operating and to cut back on his investigation
in certain areas such as the American Communist Group in
Mexico.
Productivity
Two hundred and eighteen persons wanted in the
United States were located by the Mexico City Office during
fiscal 1971. Thirty "informal deportations"were arranged and
53 stolen automobiles were recovered. The case load as of
6/30/71 was 627 which is below average on a per agent basis.
As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 37 HILEV items of
which 28 were actually disseminated. This is substantially
above average.
Personnel
We feel the present complement is adequate until
the Legal Attache recommends additional "Resident Agencies."
The large expanse of territory and the necessity of working
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 196
183
7
4-H-1
closely with Mexican police require our agents to be. on
the scene for anything but relatively routine investigations.
The Legal Attache has for some time been considering
possibility of opening one or more additional "Resident
Agencies" to afford faster coverage and more thorough
investigations in areas which now require extended road trips.
Recommendation
Continue.
OTTAWA
With Mexico City. this is one of our two most
important and productive offices. The establishment of
a. Chinese Communist Diplomatic Mission in Canada, the
asylum afforded our deserters and Selective Service fugitives,
and the relatively open border make Canada an area of
intense FBI interest. We are fortunate in having RCMP with
nation-wide security jurisdiction and nearly nation-wide
police jurisdiction to handle our investigations. While
we have a two-man office in Ottawa, RCMP has a three-man
office in Washington because of the number of United States
agencies with which they do business. Our relations with
RCMP are outstanding and they are the closest counterpart
of the FBI of any foreign investigative agency.
Productivity
The case load as of 6/30/71 was 548 which is by
far the highest on a per agent basis. During fiscal 1971,
the office located 994 FBI fugitives, 37 fugitives for other
agencies, 755 Selective Service delinquents, and recovered
92 stolen automobiles. Ninety "informal deportations" were
effected. As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 22 HILEV
items of which 10 were used. This is below average.
Personnel
The sheer volume of work makes the problem in
Ottawa primarily clerical. As a streamlining measure, RCMP
has printed routing slips with spaces for our titles and
file numbers which the Legal Attache uses in forwarding RCMP
work to the Bureau. An additional clerk has recently been
furnished Ottawa and it is expected that the recent inspection
will have noted the effect of this increase.
Recommendation
Continue.
-NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 197
184
•
00
4-H-1
PARIS
This is a major continental office to which an
additional Agent was assigned at the time of the recent
expansion in order to concentrate on development of high-
level intelligence. Our Legat enjoys the confidence of the
French investigative agencies and is able to secure
cooperation which is denied to the Central Intelligence
Agency as a result of the latter's involvement in a wire
tapping incident during the 1960's. The departure of the
American military from France has somewhat reduced the
volume of criminal matters, but the establishment of NATO
Headquarters in Brussels, also in Paris territory, has
continued the flow of security matters. A substantial
number of friends of the Bureau visit Paris each year and
require time and attention from our Legat.
Productivity
During fiscal 1971, 23 persons wanted in the
United States were located by Legat, Paris. His case load
as of 6/30/71 was 244, which is average on a per Agent basis.
As of 8/23/71, Paris has submitted 38 HILEV items, of which
21 have been used and one is pending. This is above average.
:
Personnel
No increase in personnel is envisaged for Paris.
This office provides both clerical and Agent relief to Madrid.
Recommendation
Continue.
2
ROME
In addition to Italy, Rome covers Greece, Turkey,
and Cyprus on a road trip basis. The office has not yet
reached its full potential in the development of political
intelligence, but a very satisfactory relationship exists
with the Italian investigative agencies; and we are receiving
coverage of organized crime figures and other criminals who
have relocated in Italy. It is expected that the Legat
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 198
185
4-H-1
will expand his contacts in Italian cities other than Rome,
such as Naples, Milan, Florence, and Venice, in order to
widen his capabilities in the criminal field and improve
his collection of HILEV intelligence items..
Productivity
During fiscal 1971, 14 persons wanted in the
United States were located by the office and one informal
deportation was arranged. As of 6/30/71, there were 145
pending cases, slightly below average on a per Agent basis.
As of 8/23/71, 13 HILEV items had been submitted, of which
9 were used. This is below average.
Personnel
We believe the personnel are adequate but not
excessive.
Recommendation
Continue.
TOKYO
In addition to Japan, Tokyo covers South Korea
and Formosa. The latter presents a particularly delicate
situation as the United States moves toward recognition of
· Communist China. Our Nationalist Chinese contacts, however,¨
have promised to continue their cooperation despite what.
they view as an unsympathetic move by the United States
Government. Despite the language barrier in both South
Korea and Formosa, our representatives have been consistently
successful in getting the work of the Bureau handled in
adequate fashion. As the United States military commitment
in Japan is reduced and as the economic goals of the
United States and Japan draw farther apart, it is increasingly
important that we have a liaison capability in Tokyo.
Productivity
During fiscal 1971, Tokyo located 23 persons
wanted in the United States and arranged three informal
deportations. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 279,
186
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 199
10
4-H-1
substantially above average on a per Agent basis and the
third highest of the foreign offices on that basis. Tokyo
has submitted 40 items for HILEV. dissemination, of which
17 have been used. This is slightly above average.
Personnel
We have recommended that one Agent and one clerk
be added to Tokyo in the event of further expansion. This
would permit more frequent visits to Taiwan and South Korea
and would also permit widening of contacts within Japan.
itself, which is necessary if increased emphasis is to be
placed upon HILEV production.
Recommendation
Continue.
(2) New Offices Opened in December, 1970
The following six offices were opened in December
1970, for the specific purpose of developing HILEV intelli-
gence. Four of these offices were opened in entirely new
territory while two were assigned areas previously handled
by other Legats. In considering these six offices, it must
be recognized that they were primarily intended as intelli-
gence collectors and not as sources of normal Bureau cases.
We have been pleased, however, to note that several of these
offices are making a substantial contribution to the Bureau's
domestic jurisdiction in addition to their HILEV work.
BEIRUT
This is a one-man post established in new
territory where there had previously been little need for
coverage. The Legat has developed several very. productive
sources of political intelligence and at the present time
is the highest producer of HILEV items. He has been commended
for this. Nevertheless, should there be any reduction in
.White House interest in HILEV items, we could not justify
continuation of this office.
Productivity
One FBI fugitive and one Selective Service delin-
quent were located by this office between January and June,
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 200
18?

-
il
4-H-1
1971. As of 6/30/71, there was a pending case load of
27, which is the smallest case load of any foreign office.
Beirut has submitted 61 HILEV items, of which 31 have
been used and three are still pending. This is the largest
number of items used submitted by any office.
Personnel
Present complement is fully adequate and cannot
be reduced. Vacation relief for the Legat should come
from Rome and for the clerk from Tel Aviv (we cannot send
Assistant Legat Rubenstein to relieve in Beirut because
the political situation).
ΟΙ
Recommendation
In view of the high production of HILEV items,
the office should be continued.
CARACAS
This office was opened to cover the large area
of northern South America, together with the numerous
territories and independent countries in the West Indies.
It is essentially a road trip office and affords the Bureau
coverage in an area where we have been totally dependent
upon the Department of State and the Central Intelligence
Agency for the handling of our leads. Our Legat, who
started out with a semihostile Ambassador, has won the
latter's respect and has made a gratifying start at
development of the large and scattered area assigned to
him. In addition to the Latin-American countries, he is
covering French, British, and Dutch possessions; and the
effectiveness of his liaison is demonstrated by his ability
to devise channels of communication to his contacts
throughout his area.
Productivity
During the first six months of 1971, Caracas
located 11 FBI fugitives, one fugitive for another agency,
and three Selective Service delinquents, while arranging
one informal deportation. His case load 6/30/71 was 72,
which is well below average on a per agent basis but is.
expected to increase with the further development of his
territory. He has submitted 25 HILEV items, of which 12
have been used. This is slightly below average.
:
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 201
188
- 12
4-H-1
Personnel
In view of the road trip nature of this territory,
two Agents will be necessary to insure continued coverage.
While the present case load is low, this is a brand new
office in completely new territory and we expect improvement.
Recommendation
This office should be continued. without regard
to the emphasis on HILEVS.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 202
189
-
13
4-H-1
COPENHAGEN
This office was opened to exploit the potential
of the Scandinavian countries handled on a road trip basis
from London prior to the expansion in December, 1970. A
large number of deserters, Selective Service subjects, and
other fugitives have been granted asylum in Sweden and
the liberality of the laws in Denmark has served as a
magnet for youth from the United States. In addition, the
entire area is attuned to moves from the Soviet Union and
it was hoped that there would be a reasonable volume of
regular Bureau work together with a steady flow of political
intelligence. The potential of the office has not yet
been reached. The unfortunate security breach which
resulted in the change of Legal Attaches has put an
experienced man in charge but he has been there less than
two months and has not yet been able to bring the office
into line. There has already been a marked improvement
in the rate of HILEV submissions and we expect the office
to be more successful under new management.
Productivity
Twenty-eight persons wanted in the United States
were located by the Legal Attache during the first six months
of 1971. One "informal deportation" was arranged. The case
load as of 6/30/71 (prior to arrival of the new Legal Attache)
was 43 representing the smallest per agent assignment of any
Legal Attache. Through July, 1971, Copenhagen had submitted
8 HILEVS of which 2 were used. Already in August, 4 submissions
have been received for a total of 12 and 3 have been used for
a total of 5 with 1 still pending. This is the smallest
HILEV production of any Legal Attache and Bulet 8/4/71
pointed this out and insisted upon improvement. Results thus
far in August indicate that the Legal Attache is responding.
Personnel
While the present case load does not, on the surface,
justify continuation of a two-man office, we believe the
potential for far greater achievement exists in the Scandinavian
countries and we feel that the new Legal Attache should be
given an opportunity to exploit this potential.
190
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 203
-
14 .
4-H-1
Recommendation
We recommend that the office be continued in
its present status for an additional six months at the
end of which time consideration should be given as to its
personnel complement.
LA PAZ
Coverage of Bolivia and Peru was initiated
for the sole purpose of developing HILEV data and cannot
be justified on any other grounds. The Legal Attache
has done an outstanding job under very difficult
circumstances.
The government (until 8/22/71) was pro-
communist and basically anti-United States. The Legal
Attache is living inside a barbed wire fence with a full-
time guard at his door. We have had to armor plate his
car and furnish him a two-way radio to insure full-time
communications with his Embassy. The altitude is such that
persons with other than completely strong hearts and lungs
should not be permitted to visit there. The office gives
us coverage in an area we have not visited since the days
of SIS but normal Bureau work there is minimal.
Productivity
During the first six months of 1971, the Legal
Attache located 1 FBI fugitive and 3 Selective Service
delinquents. His case load as of 6/30/71 was 45 which is
well below average on a per agent basis. He has submitted
24 HILEV items of which 14 have been used which is about
average. He has twice furnished advance information
concerning important political developments including the
current coup and he has received commendation from the
Director for the material he has furnished.
Personnel
The work load certainly cannot justify any increase
in personnel but it cannot be decreased without closing the
office.
Recommendation
It is recommended that operations continue in
La Paz for another six months at the end of which time a close
hard look should be given to closing the office. It is
possible that a more friendly regime in Bolivia will result in
an increase in HILEV items but it will have no bearing on his
over-all case load.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 204
191
15
4-H-1
MANAGUA
This is an office opened in the right area but
in the wrong place. There is Bureau business in Central
America and we had long considered recommending an office
there prior to the President's request in 1970. We did
not want to open in Managua, however, but in San Jose,
Costa Rica, where the living conditions are far superior.
We were forced to settle for Managua when the Ambassador
to Costa Rica objected to our opening there. As a result,
we have two men living under difficult circumstances
resulting in varied domestic problems including education
of their children, and morale in our Managua Office is
probably lower than in any other foreign post. It was
expected that Central America would prove a fertile source
of HILEV items because of the constantly changing political
alignments in the various governments. This has not been
the case and Bulet 6/4/71 informed the Legal Attache of
our disappointment in his production. At the start of
June he had only submitted 2 items, 1 of which had been
used. He is showing improvement as indicated by the submission
of three items in June, four in July, and five in August,
as of 8/23/71. The Legal Attache has been placed on probation
aș a result of administrative deficiencies discovered by
the Inspector and it is expected that this will have a salutary
effect not only in his administration but also in the
contribution of his office to the work of the Bureau.
Productivity
During the first six months of 1971, 14 persons
wanted in the United States were located in Central America,
‹ 5 "informal deportations" were arranged, and 10 stolen
automobiles were recovered. The Managua case load as of
6/30/71 was 65 which is far below average. A total of 14
HILEV items have been received of which 9 have been accepted.
This total is below average but his current submission rate
is well above average.
Personnel
The 7 Central American countries have enough
substantive Bureau work to justify the present complement
of this office, if the potential is fully exploited.
watching this situation closely and expect marked improvement.
We are
197
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 205
16 -
ave
4-H-1
Recommendation
It is recommended that this office continue.
It is possible that a change in leadership may be necessary
as indicated by the Inspector's findings and recommendations
concerning this will be made as soon as it can be determined
whether or not there has been an improvement.
TEL AVIV
This office was opened solely as a source of
HILEV material and it has proved fertile in this respect.
There have been some unexpected fringe benefits in that an
organized crime figure has taken refuge in Tel Aviv and
the Legal Attache has been able to secure the cooperation
of the Israeli police in affording coverage to the anti-Soviet
Jewish Defense League, which has proven so troublesome in
the New York City area. As the office has only been open
during the current year, it is too early to assess accurately
either its potential or its achievements.
Productivity
Eight persons wanted in the United States have
been located in Israel and 3 "informal deportations" arranged.
The case load as of 6/30/71 was 69, which is considerably
below average on a per agent basis. Forty-four HILEV items
have been submitted of which 27 have been used with 1 pending.
This is substantially above average, and the Director recently
noted the Legal Attache's excellent production and he has
been recommended for commendation.
Personnel
It is too early to make an accurate assessment as
to future personnel needs. One agent could handle the present
case load but we do not feel that the full potential of the
area has yet been reached and any reduction would result
in two one-man offices at the end of the Mediterranean with
accompanying problems of relief.
Recommendation
Continue for the time being.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 206
193
17
4-H-1
(3) New Offices Recommended If Further Expansion Undertaken
we
In response to the Director's request,
recommended by memorandum 5/28/71 that six additional offices
be opened for the specific purpose of increasing our
production of high-level intelligence of interest to the
White House. Three of these would be offices formerly
operated but presently closed, while three would be
completely new offices. The following are the three former
Legat offices which we proposed be opened:
MANILA
We recommended that one Agent and one clerk be
assigned to Manila to relieve Hong Kong of its present
road trip coverage and to provide closer following of
political developments in the Philippines, which area is
apparently drawing farther away from its former close
alignment with the United States. We have a number of
applicant-type loads in the Philippines, and the handling
of these could be expedited by a representative on the
scene.
RIO DE JANEIRO
We proposed that two Agents and two clerks be
assigned to reopen our office in this important population
center of Brazil, a country larger than the United States.
We are presently trying to cover this area from Buenos
Aires, which is over 1,200 miles away, and we are passing
up the opportunity to develop political intelligence items
concerning developments in this huge country which, like
most of Latin America, is in the throes of deciding between
communism and capitalism.
SANTO DOMINGO
We proposed that one Agent and one clerk be
assigned to reopen our office at the capital of the
Dominican Republic. This would be entirely for the purpose
of developing HILEV items, although there is a modicum of
Bureau work in the area which is presently handled on a
road trip basis from San Juan. We developed a number of
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 207
194
18
4-H-1
informants and sources during our period of operation there,
and we feel that these could be reactivated to become a
productive source of HILEV material.
The following are the three new offices which we
proposed be opened, each to have a complement of 2 Agents
and 2 clerks:
CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA
This office could cover Australia and New Zealand
thereby relieving Hong Kong from its present futile efforts
to cover the area by road trip and give on-scene coverage
in this huge area where our work has been increasing. We
presently are trying to cover 35 leads in the area which
indicates there is a nucleus of essential Bureau business
upon which an office can be predicated. Here again,
however, the primary function of the new office would be
production of HILEV items.
KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA
This office would cover Thailand, Malaysia
and Singapore, presently handled out of Hong Kong, and
would initiate coverage in Indonesia, where we have no
coverage other than through State and the Central
Intelligence Agency. There is now a nucleus of 20 Bureau
cases pending, insufficient to justify the opening of an
office, but the high interest in Southeast Asia would
indicate that any production of political intelligence
should include coverage in this area. Opening of the two
foregoing offices, plus Manila, would relieve Hong Kong
of all road trips and permit that office to concentrate
on the important security matters involved in the new
relationship between Communist China and the United States.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 208
195
}
* 7.
19
4-H-1
NEW DELHI, INDIA
This office would open completely new territory
affording coverage of India, East and West Pakistan, and
Nepal. The potential for political intelligence here is
high, but there would be very little substantive Bureau.
work in the area.
Our recommendation for opening of the six
foregoing offices was made strictly in response to the
Director's request. We cannot justify opening of these
offices on the basis of substantive Bureau business, but
it is our judgment that these offer the most productive.
locations for the development of political intelligence.
* Any expansion abroad will be resisted by State and the
Central Intelligence Agency; and unless specifically ordered.
by the White House, will require approval from Budget ana
State who maintain a personnel ceiling for each
Department's representatives abroad. We are not in a
position to balance the value of the information expected
against the costs.
196
NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 209
ADDENDUM OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION E.S. MILLER:wmj 8/26/71
You are requested to clarify and document your
observations "that any future expansion abroad will be resisted by
the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and unless
specifically ordered by the White House will require approval from
State and the Bureau of the Budget."
Comments of Assistant Di rector Brennan requested.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 210
197

LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES
FOREIGN LIAISON
4-H-1
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN The quoted observation
(GAD: hc 8/27/71)
concerning anticipated.
problems to be encountered
in connection with any future expansion is based solely upon
our experience during the December, 1970, expansion, together
with regulations which have been promulgated applicable to
United States personnel overseas. In December, 1970, we asked
to open an office in San Jose, Costa Rica, but ended up in
Managua, Nicaragua, a much less desirable location, because
of what was termed the "objective of lower United States
profile" in Costa Rica. We asked to open an office in
Saigon, Vietnam, and were met with intolerable restrictions
imposed by the Ambassador, with the result that we canceled
our request. In connection with opening in Caracas, Venezuela,
the Ambassador there demanded that we agree to coordinate any
intelligence activities with the Central Intelligence Agency
under the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence
·Directive 5 and that our representative measure up to a certain
standard in his ability in Spanish. In fact, the Ambassador
in Caracas said he would send our man back on the same plane
if he did not possess the desired ability. Even before we
had made a formal request, State indicated their desire that
we not open an office in Helsinki, Finland, because of the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) then in progress.
´ Reference to approval by State and Budget is
actually reference to the procedures established for any
increase in overseas personnel. Such procedures are of long
standing being known under the Johnson Administration as
"BALPA" (Balance of Payments) and initially during the Nixon
Administration as "OPRED" (Overseas Personnel Reduction).
A "National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee,"
which includes representation from Budget and State,
establishes fixed ceilings on all United States civilian
employees abroad. Under the rules established by this
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/27/71
GAD: hc
4-H-1
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 211
198.
2
4-H-1
committee any increase in these ceilings must be either
(a) a result of "special studies" or at White House direction;
or (b) by a request for a ceiling increase by proposal to
the committee explaining the requirement and demonstrating
its consistency with national policy and approved program
plans. The present FBI ceiling is 88, and regular reports
concerning our overseas positions are made to the committee
through the Department by the Administrative Division.
The above has been set forth in some detail in
response to the Inspector's request. The Director has stated
that any expansion will be discussed with Dr. Kissinger at
the White House before any action is taken. White House
approval supersedes red tape developed by other agencies.
We are confident that the President's desires can be rapidly and
efficiently satisfied onces he gives the word.
199
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 212
CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
4-H-3
Since the last inspection there have
been certain significant developments
You
in the overall problems of meeting our responsibilities to this work.
are requested to furnish briefly such developments and also provide your
appraisal of the situation as presently see it. Obviously, there are strong
indications that increases of investigative manpower in the field and
imaginative supervision and direction here will be necessary. What has
been accomplished since last inspection and what are your plans for the
immediate future? Be specific in advising of programs currently being
considered for recommended implementation.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
DEM:mjt 8/23/71
'There is no doubt that our
work in the Chinese field
will increase both at the SOG and in the field. Attached are
comments by Section Chief Wannall with which I concur.
Proposals for implementing programs discussed will be
recommended by appropriate memoranda.
채
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
171
NW 88608 Docd989638 Page, 213,
200
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
At the outset it should
be noted that Western
nations have been
isolated from
Communist China for more than twenty years. The Chinese
communists (Chicoms) have established themselves officially
in countries of the same or similar political persuasion and,
therefore, we receive little or no data concerning the Chicoms
which is relevant to our investigative responsibilities in the
security field. We have been fortunate, however, to receive
from Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) much data relating
to their experience with the Chicoms who are now firmly offi-
cially established in Canada. The programs and methods we use
or may implement in the future to deal with the Chicoms must,
in some measure, be based on our prior experience in the
'security and intelligence fields and an analysis of the data
"we have received from the RCMP.
Recent Developments and Appraisals Thereof
Since last inspection (1/8-26/71), the following.
significant developments have occurred:
* Fright
1. The Chicom Embassy in Canada has become opera-
tional. The Embassy staff numbers 26, of whom nine (33 percent)
are known or suspected intelligence officers. The significance
of the aforementioned figures is obvious when we recall the
report of an RCMP source who quoted the wife of an Embassy
official as stating "The (Chicom) staff will necessarily be
large as it will be responsible for the United States as well
as Canada." In addition, RCMP has advised, based on its
intensified and expanded coverage of the Chicoms
that at
least 50 percent of Chicom effort in the intelligence field
having a Canadian base will be directed against the United States.
RCMP has confidentially advised us that the Canadian External
Affairs Office is willing to allow the Chicom official staff in
Canada a maximum of 60 persons. This approximates the number
of individuals staffing Soviet OIIIclal tablishment in Canada.
In appraising the above, we must heed the warning
flags and prepare for a severe test of our resourcefulness.
We cannot expect less than a substantial effort by the Chicoms
to mount a variety of intelligence operations against this
country from Canada. This situation will exist at least as long
as no official Chicom establishment is located in this country.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
FX0:dgo
4-H-3
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 214
201
2
4-H-3
2. Restrictions on travel of U. S. citizens to
Red China have been lifted entirely, and there is presently
under study by Department of State and the Attorney General
a. recommendation that the prohibition on travel of permanent
resident aliens to Red China also be lifted.
While the Chicoms have not allowed wholesale entry
of Occidentals into their country, recent events suggest
they are slowly but surely revising policy to permit more
Westerners to visit the mainland. We are aware that the
Chicoms have openly supported revolutionaries who operate in
the U. S., and the desirability of personal contact with such
types as well as with others who would work for the Chicoms
is obvious. The new United States policy regarding travel of
U. S. citizens to Red China will most assuredly prompt overt
travel by individuals of Chicom persuasion as well as by
persons who could well be subjected to an intelligence recruit-
'ment approach albeit unwittingly. While this area may not
immediately present problems of the magnitude expected in other
areas involving the Chicoms, we must realistically consider
that U. S. citizens traveling to Red China deserve a careful
look from an investigative standpoint, either as potential
( sources, one-time interviews. for intelligence purposes; or as
individuals who may have been recruited by the Chicoms during
their visit to Red China.
With regard to the possibility that restrictions on
travel of resident aliens to Red China will be lifted soon,
there are in the United States many thousands of Chinese aliens
having permanent resident status, most of whom have family
I members or close relatives residing on the mainland. If travel
restrictions on these individuals are lifted, we are faced with
an even greater danger of having Chicom-recruited individuals
- returning here. On its face, such a situation would pose an
enormous investigative problem for the Bureau.
3. Within the last few weeks, Secretary of State
Rogers announced U. S. policy as regards admission of
Communist China to the United Nations (UN). Simply stated,
Administration policy is to not oppose UN membership for the
Chicoms while not agreeing to the ouster of Nationalist China
(Taiwan) from the UN. There has been much talk of a "two China
policy,' " but this is incidental to the real problem we face.
With the removal of U. S. opposition, it is likely Red China
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 215
202
4-H-3
will be admitted to UN membership and that its representatives
will appear in New York City between October, 1971, and
September, 1972. When this almost certain development takes
place, we will be faced with grave internal security/intelligence
problems.
* In` appraising the above situation and noting that the
Chicoms, should they gain UN membership, would be entitled to
the largest delegation and largest percentage of UN Secretariat
employees of any member nation, we would clearly require a sub-
stantial increase in the number of Agents handling Chinese work
in the New York Office. Such an increase would include assign-
ments to that office of as many Chinese-speaking Special Agent
personnel as may be available and examination of the need to
train additional Agents in the Chinese language. Dependent on
the size of a Chicom UN delegation, it might be necessary to
establish a Chinese Section in New York Office. Should a sub-
stantial increase in case load in the Chicom field come about as
a result of Chicom entry into the UN, it would also suggest an
increase in the number of Supervisors in this field at the
Seat of Government.
.
With regard to the investigative aspect of Chicom
entry into the UN, it is felt that the Chicoms, on arrival, will
proceed cautiously at the outset in any program of covert or
overt intelligence activity. That intelligence efforts will be
undertaken, there is no doubt inasmuch as information in our
files and sound logic demand the conclusion that the Chicoms will
rely on a variety of methods by which to gather information to
assist in the planning and execution of political moves as well
as to combat or neutralize technical and scientific progress
and military moves made by this and other countries. The Chicoms,
with a base at the UN, might limit early intelligence efforts
to political matters until they have their feet on the ground.
Knowledge of their collection of such intelligence, however,
could be of as much benefit to this country as would knowledge of
· Chicoms efforts to collect other types of intelligence..
The inevitability of the appearance of a Chicom
delegation at the UN requires that we marshall all the assets
we have in this field in order to be in a position to have
broad quality coverage in the informant area and the ability to
spring into quick and effective action from an investigative
standpoint.
4. On 7/15/71, President Nixon announced his plan to
visit Red China before May, 1972. The FBI may well be called
203
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 216
4-H-3.
upon in months ahead to provide intelligence support in
connection with the President's trip.
The step taken by President Nixon emphasizes the
importance our Government places on the status of Red China
as a world power. It is felt we should be in a position to
provide the White House with as much intelligence as we can
·logically gather in the event such a request is levied upon us.
Accomplishments Since Last Inspection (1/8-26/71)
Our cooperative efforts with RCMP paid off during
February, 1971, when we identified an unknown subject who made
a clandestine contact with a Chicom intelligence officer in
Ottawa. RCMP, through its coverage, recognized at the outset
that preliminary contacts by the unknown subject were most
unusual because of security precautions demanded by him.
Within hours after our investigation was initiated, we identi-
fied the unknown subject as a Washington, D. C., resident
holding impressive credentials in political circles. Our sub-
sequent coverage in this case disclosed efforts made by the
subject to gain employment on the White House staff as well as
jobs with State and Justice Departments. We promptly alerted
the White House and appropriate officials of other agencies.
In July, 1971, with the Director's approval, a
desk-level conference was held at the Bureau with our RCMP
counterparts. The results were most productive and, at the
Director's instruction, we sent a memorandum to Dr. Kissinger
setting out the highlights of the conference. Dr. Kissinger,
in a personal letter to the Director, expressed his thanks for
the information and noted that the Bureau's timely coverage of
these matters is most important. He requested he be advised of
significant developments as they occur.
Two of our sources who are being developed to fulfill
double agent roles traveled from the U. S. to Hong Kong, where
they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts. Another
source, who is employed at the UN, is now in Communist China,
and this trip was made at no cost to the Bureau. We expect to
obtain valuable current intelligence information from this source
upon her return to this country. Yet another source was directed
to undertake a three-week period of travel. during which he was
to contact pro-Chicom individuals on the West Coasts of the U. S.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 217
204
4-H-3
1
and Canada. These contacts were planned to serve as a basis
for his contact with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa as the last
phase of his trip...
Nine individuals are being considered for use along
DESECO lines with the expectation that we will be able to
target them against the Chicoms, either in Canada or in the
U. S.
State Department approval has been obtained to inter-
view and/or re-establish contact with 16 employees of the
United Nations Secretariat who, it is felt, offer potential to
assist us in the future or in an early effort connected with
a joint operation with RCMP
Two suggestions were submitted with a view toward
streamlining administrative and investigative procedures in
the Chicom field. Both were adopted and annual savings
“indicated to be $16,160.
Future Plans
In connection with foreseeable additional security
and intelligence responsibility as regards Chicom activities
the following is set forth:
1. We have an Index of over 600 names of Chinese
aliens who have been interviewed in the past and who are
graduates of universities and/or graduate schools in Red China.
"We see this group as a reservoir from which we could develop
a number of sources who could be directed against the Chicoms
in the future or, if facts so indicate, could be utilized in
connection with existing efforts to penetrate Chicom intelli-
gence operations. This would involve opening cases on these
individuals, providing instructions to the field offices
involved, looking toward interviews for the purpose of deter-
mining informant potential and willingness to assist us.
2. Five field offices are currently involved in an
effort relating to ethnic Chinese scientists having security
clearances. Each office involved has been instructed to limit
efforts to ten such individuals, in the hope that we may
find some who would be willing to initiate a contact with the
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 218
205
4-H-3
Chicoms for the purpose of making themselves available for
possible recruitment by Chicom Intelligence.
We have a list of approximately 3500 ethnic Chinese
scientists and/or technicians who have security clearances.
Because of manpower limitations, we have not included other
offices in this program nor have we allowed more than 50 cases
of this type to be opened. It would be desirable to expand
`this effort to include other offices and to increase the
number of individuals involved in each office to perhaps 50.
Again, our object is to develop a nucleus of sources who would
be of present or future value in our counterintelligence opera-
tions against the Chicoms.
3. We would like to consider the use of ethnic
Chinese Special Agents as well as nonethnic Chinese-speaking
Special Agents who l could, in an undeṛcover capacity, be
targeted against the Chicoms in Canada or against any Chicom
establishment which may be located in this country in the
future. Such an operation would require substantial indoctri-
nation, direction, and development of cover employment and
identity, and would be in essence a most appropriate and secure
means by which to mount an operation designed to develop a
defector in place.
4. Since the door to travel by U. S. citizens to.
Red China is wide open, we should expand our efforts in this
area to fully identify each traveler (other than legislators
and news media types) for the purpose of considering these
individuals for interviews in order to gather positive intelli-
gence or to identify any traveler who may have been subjected
to a recruitment approach by the Chicoms. :
5. We should consider instructing a limited number
of field offices to begin efforts to develop sources who could
be used in a "walk-in" program directed against the Chicoms
in Canada as well as any Chicom establishment formed in this
country. Here, we would not have to look toward ethnic Chinese
but could selectively approach types who might be of interest
to the Chicoms including military personnel because of their
backgrounds in fields in which the Chicoms have expressed an
interest.
6. "In Chinese alien cases where a hostage situation
exists, we should revamp current instructions to require a
reinterview of such persons one year after the initial interview
206
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 219
27
4-H-3
(current practice calls for reinterview two years after ini-
tial interview). This is felt desirable since the alien who
has immediate family and/or relatives residing in Red China
is most susceptible to a recruitment approach and is more
likely to be the type who has entered the United States on an
intelligence mission.
7. We should consider issuing instructions to
closely examine our UN sources to determine which may be
logically directed to initiate contact with the Chicom Embassy
in Canada. Contacts of this type, although they may indicate
no immediate interest on the part of the Chicoms, may well
serve as a basis for a later approach by the Chicoms, either
before or after Chicom entry into the UN."
8.
t
National Security Agency ( (NSA) representatives
are of the opinion that the possibility exists, that Chinese
Intelligence Service is beaming broadcasts to agents in the
United
or in border countries (Canada Mexico Under
Bureau instructions, our San Diego Office recently monitored
broadcasts on the basis of predictions made by NGA. Broadcasts
undoubtedly emanating from Red China were heard during this
monitoring and the clarity of the signal on our West Coast was
(excellent. Discussion with NSA led NSA representatives to
observe that the broadcasts mentioned above might be connected
with an illegal agent network, and they agreed to make a further
study of this situation and provide us with additional
sensitive material they have uncovered in order to determine if
some tie-in could be developed. While this effort is a new one,
and does not definitely establish that an illegal Chicom opera-
tion exists in this country, it is an indication that we should
undertake action designed to uncover such a situation. In the
absence of more specific data, we should consider at this time
having field offices check warranty cards submitted by pur-
'chasers of certain radio equipment, primarily radio receivers
capable of tuning in on broadcasts such as those mentioned
above. This would involve identification of the equipment, its
manufacturer and subsequent instructions to the field to check
warranty cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining
names of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards. Inquiry
should include developing background information on the pur-
chaser and, in cases where warranted, conducting interviews.
20.7:
NW-88608-Doeld:32989638-Page-220-

ADDENDUM
W
INSPECTOR E. S. MИLLER:/
(ESM:wmj 8/26/71/
You have advised that items one through
nine in this write-up will be fully im-
plemented by separate memorandum in
each case consistent with the availability of manpower.
It would appear that present developments indicate that
further delay in implementation of some of these programs may seriously
retard our response to important investigative responsibilities.
You are requested to advise specifically when such
programs will be implemented and what manpower requirements are
necessary to do so.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief
Wannall requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(CDB: mls 9/1/71)
of
I believe the five areas
outlined by W. R. Wannall
constitute a valid base from
which to expand our coverage of anticipated Chicom intelligence
and subversion which will be directed against this country when
diplomatic relations are established and/or United Nations membership
is established for the Chicoms. It is desirable to initiate these
programs as soon as possible, prior to being faced with the Chicom
activity.
My position concerning available manpower to accomplish
this is covered under the write-up captioned "Adequacy of
Personnel," 6E. As you are aware, the proposed work load adjust-
ments contained in my memorandum dated 7/29/71 will make available
some additional personnel, and further adjustments may well be
made possible by close examination of case count figures under
the new tightened procedures for counting pending cases. A mid-
month case count was prepared for the Inspection Staff as of
8/20/71, and an end of the month case count is currently being
prepared.
If these figures confirm a lower case load for
Nationalities Intelligence (8/20/71 figure is 275 case load
average and well below other Sections), I believe at least one
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/1/71
4-H-3
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 221
208
man from within that Section should be made available to implement
this program.
If the Inspector feels two men should be made immediately
available to this program from within the Domestic Intelligence
Division complement and the nine men currently utilized by
Wannall on the Ellsberg case are necessary and productive, a
thorough review of case loads and other gauges of work load will be
made, Section by Section, and another man added.
T
1
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/1/71
4-H-3
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 222.
209
ليfن
·SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
In connection with our
objective of being
prepared to counteract
and/or neutralize the
Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence and subversion effort
we expect will be mounted against this country, it is proposed
that the following action be recommended for implementation
'immediately. In each case, a separate memorandum containing
appropriate recommendation will be submitted within the next
ten days.
.1. Initiate investigations on 300 of the over 600
individuals listed in our Chinese Universities and Graduate
Schools Index. This effort would be aimed at developing quality
sources we can direct against the Chicoms as well as developing
intelligence from among a group of well-educated Chinese aliens.
Based on our initial accomplishments in this area, additional
cases on the balance of more than 300 names in the above Index
would be opened for the purposes indicated above.
:
2. Initiate investigations on 500 ethnic Chinese
"scientists who have security clearances. This represents an
expansion of our current effort which we have heretofore
limited to five field offices representing a total of 50
individuals in the above category. The objective of this effort
is to identify ethnic Chinese scientists who would, under Bureau
direction, be willing to initiate contacts with Chicoms for the
purpose of making themselves available for possible recruitment
by Chicom intelligence.
We have a listing of over 3500 ethnic Chinese
scientists who have security clearances, and opening 500 cases
would be our initial attempt to expand source development in
this área. Depending on the success of this effort, additional
cases would be considered for opening for the purpose indicated
above.
3. Expand our investigations relating to United States
residents who visit Communist China to include development of
background information on each visitor and, except in cases
where the purpose of the visit appears legitimate on its face,
to consider these individuals for interview. Such expansion is
the obvious follow-up to the recent lifting of restrictions on
travel by U. S. citizens to Red China. Experience in the
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
EXO.dgo
8/31/71
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 223
210
security field has shown that intelligence recruitment of
individuals visiting communist countries is an established
practice. These investigation and/or interviews would not
include subjects of pending cases handled in other Sections
in this Division. Examples of the latter would be travel
to Red China by New Left types or black extremists who are
subjects of continuing investigation.
4. Close examination of the situation as regards
our sources in the Chinese field. now employed at or having
access to the United Nations who could be directed against
the Chicoms immediately. This must be a critical examination
closely supervised with the expectation that some of our
existing sources and others who may be developed could be
directed in early contacts with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa,
Canada. Our objective here is to develop within the
United Nations itself sources who can supply us with quality
information on the Chicoms, who will almost certainly enter
the United Nations within the next year.
5. Initiate a survey of offices having ethnic
Chinese-speaking Special Agents assigned to determine whether
or not any of these Special Agents can be directed toward an
operation against the Chicoms involving an undercover role.
The purpose here is to establish an appropriate and secure
means for utilizing one or more Special Agents for development
of a defector in place among the Chicoms.
Implementation of the above will require a substan-
tial amount of research for the purpose of issuing instructions
to field offices. It is felt that in order to provide adequate
supervision regarding the above numbered items, two Supervisors
should be added to the existing complement (3) of the
Chinese Unit.
Consideration has been given to all item's (9) pre-
viously mentioned as being within the area of future plans for
meeting our responsibilities in the Chicom field. It is felt
that immediate implementation of the above 5 items should be
accomplished while the remaining items herein before discussed
will be considered for implementation in light of continuing
.developments in this field. We believe we have selected for
Cimmediate implementation those matters which will bring about
the most substantial positive accomplishments in areas of current
critical need.
2/1
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 224
4-H-3
9. Foreign intelligence agencies have concluded
that one of the weakest links in Chicom intelligence opera-
tions is in the field of communications. We should, there-
fore, consider renewing the Chiclet and Chiprop programs,
both of which were discontinued in 1965. Through these pro-
grams, we had a secure means to review communications between
the United States and Red China and from them we acquired.
data on both ethnic Chinese and Caucasians which was of
security interest to us.
The matters discussed above are set forth in light
of our current knowledge in the Chicom field. It is realized
that continuing developments in this area may suggest new
efforts which could be initiated or could suggest further
expansion of our existing programs. Such recommendations would,
´ of course, be made on a timely basis.
Items 1 through 9 above will be fully implemented
by separate memorandum in each case consistent with the
ávailability of manpower.
212
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 225
q
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
4-H-5
It is understood that additional work
is anticipated as a result of
Executive Order 11605 and subsequent Congressional action. You are requested
to advise what action you have taken to brace for this additional work and how
much volume you anticipate. Also advise as specifically as possible which
Units will be affected the greatest, and to what extent.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
The implementation of
Executive Order 11605 will
affect primarily the work of the New Left Section, Extremist
Intelligence Section and Internal Security Section.
I have conferred with the Section Chiefs of the afore-
mentioned Sections and instructed them to initiate a review
of each of the cases which the Department has indicated it intends
to proceed against to determine what additional investigation is
required to develop the evidence necessary to present to the
SACB. Administrative procedures for handling these cases have
been worked out and since the cases are supervised in three
different Sections, a Division Coordinator, who has had previous
experience in preparing cases for presentation to the SACB, has
been designated to insure that the cases are handled in a
uniform manner in each of the three Sections.
So far, the Department has indicated that it intends
to initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party, Progressive
Labor Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Ku Klux Klan; however,
we have not as yet had any specific requirements levied upon
us by the Department in these cases. Based on past experience,
it can be anticipated the services of one supervisor, full time,
will be required to prepare each of these cases for presentation
to the SACB.
f SCWT: dj
°CWT: djr 8/26/71
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
ESM:wmj
4-H-5
해
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 226
213
The language of Executive Order 11605 is very
broad and generally coincides with the basis for our
investigation of extremist groups. Conceivably, consistent
with manpower available, proceedings could be initiated on
most of the organizations we have under investigation although
the Department has not indicated at this time that they will
undertake any wholesale action.
For additional observations concerning the
anticipated impact of Executive Order 11605 on the work
of this Division, see the Adequacy of personnel write-ups
of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence Section
and the Internal Security Section.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 227
214
ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS
NW 88608 Doeld.329
I
538, Page 228
ADMINISTRATIVE
DIVIDING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
INTO TWO DIVISIONS
5-A-la
INSPECTOR E.S. MILLER:
Assistant to the Director Sullivan has
suggested that Domestic Intelligence
Division (DID) be divided into two separate divisions. In order that this matter
can be analyzed during this inspection you are requested to furnish:
1. Complete table of organization for each of two new Divisions as you would
organize them if suggestion were adopted. Do not use names of supervisors,
Section Chiefs, Front Office administrators. Use only position designations,
Section and Unit designations and number of Agents and clerks designated for
each Unit and Section.
2. In the event you feel work now being handled by another Division should
be realigned in the event above suggestion adopted, so indicate under appropriate
new division.
3. Following each of the two tables of organization for the above new
divisions, set out Section by Section and where appropriate, Unit by Unit,
your reasoning for placement in division. In this regard, it will be necessary
to take into account and balance both volume of work and nature of work being
handled.
4. Indicate advantages in adoption of above suggestion.
5. Set out disadvantages you feel apparent in dividing DID. Also indicate
how such can be overcome and resolved.
6. Since adoption of above would involve possible realignment of space in
some instances, you are requested to advise what new space would be necessary
and what other movement of personnel and equipment would be involved.
Comments of Assistant Director requested,
See a
attached of
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ESM:wmj
5-A-la
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 229
215
DIVIDING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
INTO TWO DIVISIONS
5-A-1a
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: 1. In accordance with
the instructions of
the Inspector there are set forth below two proposed tables
of organization for the new Divisions which would be created
by dividing the current Division into two Divisions. These
Divisions would be named Domestic Intelligence Division and
Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division respectively.
PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
Domestic Intelligence Division
Assistant Director
Inspector
2 secretaries
1 clerk-stenographer
4 p.m. to Midnight Supervisor (Agent)
10 clerks (Includes security patrol
and Front Office mail room)
Division Front Office Total: 3 Agents
13 clerks
Front Office
2 Agents
2 clerks
New Left Section
Special Investigations Unit-East
6 Agents
5 Clerks
New Left Groups Unit
4. Agents
4 clerks
Subversive Individuals-New Left
6 Agents
6 clerks
Unit
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
GCM: mlm
5-A-la
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 230
216

Special Investigations Unit-West
Protest and Trotskyist Groups
Unit
4 Agents
5 clerks
5 Agents
5 clerks
Section Total: 27 Agents
28 clerks
Extremist Intelligence Section
Front Office
2 Agents
-
Black Nationalist-White Hate
Unit-East
6 Agents
2 clerks
7 clerks
Black Nationalist-White Hate
Black Nationalist-White Hate
Unit-West
Unit-Central
5 Agents
4 Agents
5 clerks
3 clerks
Black Nationalist-White Hate-South
and Extremist Informant
5 Agents
7 clerks
Unit
Antiriot and Bombing Unit
4 Agents (4 Agents & 2 clerks
3 clerks to be transferred
from General
Investigative Div.)
Section Total:
26 Agents
27 clerks
Front Office
2 Agents
2 clerks
Internal Security Section
International New Left and
2 Agents
2 clerks
Sedition Unit
Civil Disorder Reporting Unit
2 Agents
4 clerks (2 clerks also handle
NW-88608-Docid:32989638-Page-curity Index)
Communist Party, USA Unit
2 Agents
3 clerks
Subversive Individuals Unit
4 Agents
4 clerks
Security Informant Unit
· 3 Agents
6 clerks
217
Current Intelligence Reporting Unit
Steno Pool
2 Agents
2 Clerks
14 clerks
Section Total:
17 Agents
37 clerks
DIVISON PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION
73 Agents
105 clerks
PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION
Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division
Assistant Director
Inspector
2 secretaries
1 clerk-stenographer
Midnight to 8 a.m. Supervisor (Agent)
9 clerks (Includes security patrol and
Front Office mail room)
Division Front Office Total: 3 Agents
12 clerks
Espionage Section
Front Office
2 Agents
2 clerks
Coordination Unit
3 Agents
5 clerks
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 232
Soviet Unit
-
New York
4 Agents
5 clerks
Soviet Unit
-
Washington
218
3 Agents
4 clerks
i
Special Cases Unit
2 Agents
6 clerks
Section Total:
18 Agents
28 clerks
Satellite Unit
4 Agents
6 clerks
1
}
Front Office
2 Agents
2 clerks
Nationalities Intelligence Section
Special Coordination Unit
5 Agents
11 Clerks
Cuban Unit
3 Agents
3 clerks
Middle and South American Unit
(South & Central America, Caribbea
countries and ethnic groups)
3 Agents
4 clerks
Nationality Unit (All other non-
4 Agents
5 clerks
Chinese Unit
6 Agents
communist countries
☑
4 clerks
Section Total:
23 Agents
29clerks
Front Office
Research Section
2 Agents (Section Chief R. D.
2 clerks Cotter on loan to
Intelligence Evaluation
Committee)
Special Records Unit
1 Agent
3 clerks
Central Research Unit
5 Agents
8 clerks
Steno Pool
14 clerks
Section Total:
8Agents
27 clerks
NW 88608_Docid:32989638 Page 233
219
DIVISION PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION
52 Agents
96 clerks
2. It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and
bombing cases currently in General Investigative Division
has been included in table of organization of proposed
Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned
to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and
two clerks are now assigned to this Unit in the General
Investigative Division and should, of course, be transferred
to the new Division.
This is a most logical move and will afford tighter
and more effective supervision of antiriot and bombing vio-
lations in view of fact that extremists and terrorists mostly
involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelli-
gence Division (DID). Accordingly, in addition to avoiding..
duplicative supervisory action, it follows that DID is better
prepared to handle these criminal investigations and final
prosecutive actions.
3. The line of reasoning utilized in the breakdowns
as set forth above in the tables of organization was to separate
the work into two categories as nearly as possible domestic
and foreign.
-
The proposed Domestic Intelligence Division is
composed of New Left, Extremist Intelligence and Internal
Security Sections. All work of these Sections is domestic
oriented consisting of domestic subversive and extremist
organizations such as Communist Party, Socialist Workers
Party, black extremists, New Left and anti-war groups as
well as individuals affiliated therewith.
one
On the other hand, the proposed Counterespionage
Foreign Intelligence Division is composed of the Espionage
and Nationalities Intelligence Sections which supervise
investigations which for the most part have definite foreign
ramifications. The work of these Sections is foreign oriented
consisting of such investigations as Soviet and satellite
establishments and individuals as well as other foreign
nationality groups and nationals, including Chinese communists.
The Nationalities Intelligence Section will continue to super-
vise Legal Attaches and domestic Liaison through the Special
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 234
20
Coordination Unit. Other miscellaneous investigative matters
involving extremist groups with foreign nationality ties such
as Mexican-Americans, Spanish-Americans, and Puerto Ricans
will continue to be assigned to the Nationalities Intelligence
Section.
The Research Section has been placed in the Counter-
espionage - Foreign Intelligence Division in order to balance
the workload as well as to provide for expansion for research-
type work in espionage and foreign intelligence areas or for
the manpower therein to be used as the Assistant Director sees
most advantageous to carry out his responsibilities. It is
recognized that this will cut DID short but it is felt DID
will be able to handle any needed research at a Section level.
The New Left and Civil Disorder Reporting Units,
currently in the Research Section, will be placed in Internal
Security Section as data pertains solely to domestic groups.
Likewise, administration of Security Index (SI) will be shifted
from Research Section to the Internal Security Section as most
of the cases on the SI are supervised in the DID.
In realigning work, we have provided for transfer
of three Agents from Sections within the proposed Domestic
Intelligence Division to the Nationalities Intelligence
Section of other new Division. This has been accomplished
by absorbing Klan and White Hate cases (2 men) into Extremist
Intelligence Section and releasing one Agent from the current
four-man Security Informant Unit of the Internal Security
Section.
The proposed reorganization will result in the
following Agent - clerical count:
Domestic Intelligence Division
73 Agents
105 clerks
This includes four Agents and two
clerks to be transferred from General
Investigative Division to handle.
antiriot and bombing matters.
221
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 235
1
Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division
52 Agents
96 clerks
This includes raising the overall Agent
complement of current Division personnel
by one to provide for a new Assistant
Director.
4. The advantage of the suggestion to form two
separate Divisions out of the current Division is that it
would provide for smaller Divisions thus allowing for tighter
and more effective supervision.
5. The disadvantages in dividing the current Division
far outweigh the advantages as can be seen from the following
observations:
(a) The nature of the work of DID does not
readily lend itself to division. The interrelationship
of foreign influence in domestic subversion cases
is well established and requires close coordination
within the Division. If split, something would
be lost in the process, as is now the case with
antiriot and explosives and incendiary devices
cases, predominantly involving extremists who
are DID subjects being handled by General
Investigative Division. Our goal should be to
obtain maximum utilization of the knowledge and
expertise of supervisory personnel, and division
of DID would obviously result in diffusion of related
talents and a less efficient use of available
manpower.
(b) Budgetary considerations and administrative
efficiency would be affected by imposing an additional
Divisional superstructure (mail room, mail delivery
clerks, Division Head and staff, with their equipment,
odd-hour duty Agents, supply clerks, and steno pool, etc.)
to handle the work presently being handled efficiently
by existing DID. The creation of an additional high-
level job (Division Head and staff) would be contrary
to the President's economic freeze. Apparently the
-NW-88608-Doeld:32989638 Page 236
222
i
suggestion of Assistant to the Director W. C. Sullivan to
divide the Division referred to by the Inspector is that
set forth in memorandum from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson
dated June 28, 1971. On that memorandum the Director stated,
"I do not approve.
We do not have any provision for another
Assistant Director and all hearings before Budget Bureau and
Congress have been concluded for Fiscal Year 1972." In light
of the current national economic picture, the Director's
comment is even more meaningful today.
These disadvantages, with the exception of the
economy factor, can be overcome to a large extent by utilizing
current space in 9th and D Street building with a minimum of
carpentry work involved. The Executive office space can
easily be arranged to handle another Assistant Director and
staff. The Mail Room and Steno Pool would require alterations
involving additions of partitions. Extra-duty shifts involving
4 p.m. to Midnight and Midnight to 8 a.m. can be arranged to
service both Divisions from operational and security stand-
points. On the other hand, the biggest disadvantage is that
the split definitely will serve to lessen coordination of
cases having foreign ramifications as so many of our domestic
extremist cases do. This disadvantage likewise can be overcome
to a large extent if we make up our minds to be extra careful
to make certain that coordination between the new Division
is such that Bureau is not embarrassed. This could cause
a certain slow down in the handling of mail and result in
duplicative handling in some instances.
6. It is felt current space is adequate to house the
two Divisions with slight alterations as previously set out.
Equipment for a new Assistant Director should not present any
significant problem.
!
223
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 237
ANTI-RIOT LAWS AND BOMBING MATTERS
SPECT
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
5-A-l b
In discussions, you have advised that
in your opinion there appears a
great deal of logic in realigning supervision of above cases from General
Investigative Division to Domestic Intelligence Division.
You are requested to advise in greater detail documentation of
your reasoning and your recommendations in this regard.
For your information, on receipt of your response to this
write-up it will be furnished to General Investigative Division for their
observations and recommendations.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
By memorandum 8/30/68 from
Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson,
Inspection Division did an in-depth survey with respect to similar
problem relative to transfer of substantive violations of
Antiriot Laws and bombing cases involving subversive matters from
GID to DID.. Survey ascertained proposed transfer involved two
categories supervised by GID which were so interrelated with
gathering of intelligence in racial and security field that
overlapping supervisory responsibilities constantly occurred.
Accordingly, Inspection Division recommended transfer of these
cases to DID to avoid duplication of supervisory review and to
promote efficiency. Transfer not effected as Director stated he
was opposed to transfer of these duties. A copy of Mr. Felt's
8/30/68 memorandum is attached together with a cover memorandum
from Mr. Felt dated 9/4/68.
イ
Developments since 9/4/68 dictate that we take another
good look at this problem.
Activities of extremists and terrorists have
definitely escalated to the point that the overall situation
is a matter of increasing concern to the public and the
8/20/71
CWT: djr
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
الله
8/19/71
ESM:wmj
5-A-1 b
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 238
224
administration. Since terrorist activities such as bombings,
riots and the like are in violation of statutes under Bureau's
investigative responsibility it behooves us to make certain
that our supervision is as tight and effective as possible.
Inasmuch as DID is actively investigating the
terrorists who are in violation of these laws, it follows
that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal
investigations and handle final prosecutive actions. Not
only would duplicative supervisory action be avoided but
the DID supervisor has at his fingertips a feel of the case,
necessary background data and a full knowledge of sources who
can develop needed evidence.
In 1968, criminal prosecutions of these violations
were handled for most part by Department's Criminal Division
but now the Department has moved to invest the Internal Security
Division with the overall responsibility of prosecuting terrorist
activities regarding above-mentioned matters. Similar reorgani-
zation on our part would certainly enhance more effective
supervision. Of course, any transfer of cases to DID would
require transfer of personnel from GID now handling these matters.
In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that
supervisory responsibility for all violations of Antiriot Laws
and substantive violations of Explosive and Incendiary Devices
Act (Bombing Matters) involving extremist and political
terrorists be transferred from GID to DID together with
required Agent personnel.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 239
2
225
དྷུ********¥P**{[%P"!*tt#Pང"]ཀ་{ས»ས༥༠Yp?=áF'ག་མm?་!\་འ/h!*
K
September 4, 1968
Mr. Tolson:
We have carefully re-evaluated the
preposal to shift subversive bombing cases and
antiriot cases from Mr. Rosen's Division to
Mr. Sullivan's Division but find ourselves coming
back to the original conclusion.
Messrs. DeLoach, Rosen and Sullivan,
are strongly in favor. We recognize this does not
resolve a wide variety of cases where supervisory
responsibility could everlap, but these are the two
areas where constant overlap occurs and where we
have great need for continuity of supervision.
=
The memorandum clearly spells out
that antiriot cases are handled in the Criminal
Division of the Department, racial bombings in the
Civil Rights Division and nationalist bombings in
the Internal Security Division.
JLORCH
Law.
w Mark Felt!
9/4/68
ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON:
I am opposed to placing supervisory responsi-
bility for these violations under the Domestic
Intelligence Division.
CT:DSS proam appaped to thei
dustrias. N
لمون فستانه و ماه
AP 107
226
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 240
ALEN ER* fuck

OPTIONAL KO, NO 10
MAY
DHION
GSA GEN 3. 10. 22
UNITED STATE
5010-106
FOVERNMENT
Memorandum
ΤΟ
MR. TOLSON
FROM
:
W. M. FELT
SUBJECT:
Talter
Debenh
Mah: _
Bishop
Casper
Callm
Conte
Fel:
Gale
DATE: August 30, 1968
Rosen
Sulleres
Tere!
Trotter
Tele. Po-
Holmes
Candy
PROPOSED TRANSFER OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY
FOR CERTAIN CASES FROM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
TO DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
General Investigative Division (GID) and Domestic Intelligence Division (II
propose that supervisory responsibility for substantive violations of the new Antiri
Laws and for bombing cases involving subversive matters should be transferred f
GID to DID. Mr. DeLoach recommended and the Director approved that Inspectio
Division examine matter to be certain that responsibilities are sharply and definite
(fixed.
'
In-depth Inspection survey reflects problem of overlapping supervisory
responsibilities between divisions cannot be eliminated unless all investigative ai
intelligence functions are centered in a single division --not feasible because of
sheer volume. There are many investigative situations where occasional overlap
occurs, e. g. the close connection between criminal cases handled by GID and th
Criminal Intelligence Program supervised by another division. However, propose
transfer involves two categories now supervised by GID which are so inter-relate
with the gathering of intelligence in the racial and security fields that overlap
constantly occurs. Accordingly, these two categories (relatively small in case
volume) should be transferred to DID, as proposed, to avoid duplication of super-
visory review and to promote efficiency.
ANTIRIOT LAWS
These laws were enacted on 4/11/68 and prohibit incitement to riot and
related violent acts connected with riots and civil disorders. Since enactment oni
11 substantive cases have been opened; however, extensive intelligence gathering
is continuously directed by DID relative to organizations and individuals likely to
engage in riots such as Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown and other agitators.
throughout the country. Individual acts arising from riots and constituting possit.
violations of Antiriot Laws are not practicably separable without causing duplicall
of supervisory review and loss of continuity in the development of cases.
Antiriot Laws are handled by the Criminal Division of the Department. H
now disseminates intelligence material to the Criminal Division and works with
Mr. DeLoach
NW 88608 Docid:82989638cRage 241
1- Mr. Sullivan
M
1 Mr. Mohr
227
1 - Mr. Tavel
رار دارد
103
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
For Certain Cases from General Investigtive Division
to Domestic Intelligence Division
that Division on specific violations such as current sedition case against Stokely
Carmichael and prior requests of Criminal Division concerning activities of H. Rap
Brown. Since enactment, 11 specific cases have arisen, the most recent being in
connection with allegations of police brutality during the Democratic Convention in
Chicago involving injury to over 70 police officers.
BOMBING MATTERS
The same principle of duplicate supervisory review is involved in those
bombing cases that arise from the activities of subversive organizations and
individuals which are supervised on a day-to-day basis by DID. Examples are fore
nationalist groups, Ku Klux Klan, militant black nationalist groups and New Left
groups. These cases should definitely be supervised by DID for maximum efficienc
All other bombing cases will remain with GID.
The Internal Security Division of the Department now has responsibility or
these foreign nationalist groups as well as the Klan and black nationalist organi-
_zations. Mr. Yeagley's Division is also charged with the development of criminal
violations in the recent bombings by the so-called Cuban Power group. The Civi
Rights Division of the Department usually has jurisdiction over other bombing case:
arising from white and black male groups, but again DID has Haison with that Divisi
on intelligence matters affecting these groups and has engaged in specific investi-
gations to observe and photograph demonstrations at request of Civil Rights Divisio
Guidelines to delineate the proposed consolidation of supervision have bee
drawn and are set forth in an appropriate SAC Letter to so inform the field (attache
for approval).
EF FECT ON WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL
The chang proposed herein deal only in the two specific categories of As
riot Laws and certain Bombing Matters cases. Special cases that arise in the civil
rights field such as the murder of Martin Luther King and the murder of the three
civil rights workers in Mississippi will not be affected by the proposed changes.
Review of all pending cases that are affected by these changes discloses only one.
group (Il cases) that should now be transferred these are the recent bombings
instituted by the Cuban Power group.
Analysis of all work load factors represented in the proposed switch of su
visory responsibilities indicates that, if approved, it would be appropriate at the
same time to reduce personnel complement of Civil Rights Section (GID) by one Ag
supervisor and increase complement of Racial Intelligence Section (DID) by one Ag
supervisor.
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 242
!
228
2-
CONTINUED - OVER
感
Memorandum to Mr.. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
For Certain Cases From General Investigative Division
to Domestic Intelligence Division
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That effective close of business 9/16/68 DID have supervisory responsi
bility over all violations of Antiriot Laws and over those Bombing Matters violation
within guidelines set forth herein.
gmm wies
2. That Supervisory responsibility for the specific pending cases (Cuban
Power group of bombing cases) identified in this memorandum be transferred to
DID effective 9/16/68.
Wel
3. That Agent personnel complement of GID be reduced by one and that of
DID increased by one. If approved, to be handled by Mr. Mohr's office.
4. That attached SAC Letter be approved.
From
mel
from
W
wel
др
ド
که در دانشگاه
3
DETAILS CONTINUED O
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 243
-229
Memorandum to M. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
for Certain Cases From General Investigative
Division to Domestic Intelligence Division
DETAILS
BACKGROUND
By memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 8/2/68, it was jointly
proposed by Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) and General Investigative Divisio:|
(GID) that supervisory responsibility for the new Antiriot Laws investigations
(classification 176) and certain types of bombing matter cases be transferred from
GID to DID. With respect to the new FBI jurisdiction in Antiriot Laws, it was poin
out in this memorandum that extremist organizations and individuals who will likely
be engaged in riots and racial disturbances are the subject of continuing racial
investigations supervised by DID. Similarly many of the bombing cases arise out
of work handled in DID such as bombing of diplomatic establishments and bombings
arising out of activities of groups in the racial field and internal security field.
Following submission of this memorandum, Assistant to the Director DeLoach
proposed and it was approved that Inspection Division thoroughly survey the entire
question in order to draw appropriate guidelines and clearly define responsibilities
to achieve orderly transition of the proposed reassignment of supervisory responsi
bility in these matters.
Thorough analysis has been made by Inspection Staff of all aspects of the
proposal and means to accomplish it in the most practicable manner, including
reviews of representative cases that have been handled under these categories and
the overall volume and work load represented. The logic of the proposed re-
assignments appears unassailable. In both categories of cases the principle involv
is the same, namely; that individual violations of applicable statutes arising from
the activities of subversive organizations or groups should be supervised within the
same division (DID) that has the basic and continuing responsibility for supervision
of the overall investigations of these organizations and groups as well as of the
members thereof and the development of informants within the groups. The obviou
benefit to be derived from the reassignment of these categories is the avoidance of
duplication of supervisory reviews of these interrelated matters and the ready
identification of individuals who may be involved in a specific violation with person
already under investigation from an intelligence standpoint. Informants who may
be utilized in specific violations or who are developed in the course of investigation
of such violations must of necessity be closely correlated with the supervision of
these informant programs which now rests with DID. Furthermore, violations of
the new Antiriot Laws may well be revealed in the course of general supervision
of racial intelligence matters..
DETAILS
CONTINUED - OVER
-4-
:::238
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 244
Memorandum to MM Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
for Certain Cases from General Investigative
Division to Domestic Intelligence Division
ANTIRIOT LAWS
Contained in Public Law 90-284 enacted 4/11/68 (Civil Rights Act of 1960)
were certain new additions to Title 18, representing criminal statutes for which
investigative jurisdiction has been assigned FBI. Other provisions of this Act
extended and enlarged existing civil rights legislation, the investigative jurisdiction
for which primarily remains in the Civil Rights Section and is not involved in the
subject matter herein discussed. The three pertinent statutes are as follows:
1. Section 245-b (3) of Chapter 13, Title 18, which makes it a
violation for any person to use force or threat of force to
wilfully injure, intimidate or interfere with any person engaged
in a business affecting interstate commerce during or incident
to a riot or civil disorder or attempting to perform
any of these acts.
2. Section 2101, Chapter 102, Title 18, makes it a violation to
travel interstate or to use the mail, telegraph, telephone,
radio, television or other facility of interstate commerce to
incite a riot or organize, promote, encourage, participate
in or carry on a riot or commit any act of violence in
furtherance of a riot or aid or abet any person in inciting
or participating in a riot.
3. Section 231, Chapter 12, Title 18, makes it a violation to teach
or demonstrate the use, application or making of a firearm
or explosive or incendiary device or technique causing injury
or death intending or having reason to know that same will be
used in connection with a civil disorder which may interfere
with commerce or with a federally protected function or the
transportation in interstate commerce of such devices with
similar intent or the commission of any act to interfere with
any law enforcément officer or fireman engaged in official
duties in connection with civil disorder or a federally protected
function.
The foregoing three statutes have been designated by the Bureau as having
the character of Antiriot Laws and are all included in the new classification 176.
No other violations are included in this character or classification. Thus the
- 5 ·
-
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 245
·3%
DETAILS
CONTINUED - OVER
1
•
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
for Certain Cases from General Investigative
Division to Domestic Intelligence Division
reassignment of the entire classification to DID should present no problems with
respect to any division of responsibility or routing of communications. Experience
gained thus far under apparent violations which the Bureau has been requested by ti
Department to investigate supports the close correlation of such violations with
racial intelligence maters now handled by DID. 11 specific cases have been opened
thus far and are now pending. The most recent involves allegations of police brutal
during Democratic Convention in Chicago involving injury to over 70 police officers.
Review of these cases disclosed them to be noncomplex in nature and in view of the
current status of supervision and investigation, it appears most practicable for GE
to retain the specific supervision of these 11 cases to their conclusion. Thus super-
visory responsibility under this classification will be fixed at a clear cut-off point
after which all new cases arising will automatically be routed to and supervised by
DID from inception. No further guidelines appear necessary in this classification.
BOMBING MATTERS
1
A variety of different types of cases arises under this category and it will
hereafter represent a split classification with those cases applicable to the overall
fields of supervision in DID being handled by that Division and the remainder
continuing under supervision of GD. Accatlingly, specific guidelines have been
drawn to delineate this division of supervisory responsibility and encompassed in
an SAC Letter in order that the field may make appropriate designation on com-
munications to facilitate routing at the Seat of Government. Upon adoption of the
guidelines and the dual character coincidental therewith proper routing will
automatically be achieved of new matters arising (this coordinated with Files and
Communications Division).
Inspection Staff analyzed the various types of bombing cases handled during
Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 and reviewed representative sampling of specific pending
files. There are ty major areas herein which appear proper and logical to delega
future supervisory responsibility to DID. These are bombing matters arising from
foreign nationalistic interests and those arising from racial intelligence interests.
The reasons are the same as heretofore cited, namely the overall familiarity
within DID of aims and activities of organizations and groups involved as well as
the following of activities of individual members of such groups and the respon-
sibility for the informant programs applicable to them. Other types of bombing
cases not falling within the guidelines set forth hereinafter will remain with GID
as in the past. Bombing matter violations (including threats) represent violations
of Section 837, Chapter 9, Title 18. The violation is the interstate transportation
of explosives with intent they be used for destruction of real or personal property
which property is used for the objectives specified in the statute (educational,
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 246
- 6 -
2.32
DETAILS CONTINUED - OVER
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
for Certain Cases from General Investigative
Division to Domestic Intelligence Division
business, civic, etc.). Threats or false reports also constitute violations within ti
statute and the entire discussion within this memorandum includes threats or false
reports under the use of the term bombing matters. Although the Department
frequently resorts to other statutes for prosecutive considerations, this appears
to have no significant bearing on the question of supervisory responsibility which
is directed toward the full development of the investigation to establish identity
of the perpetrators of the bombing violation and evidence to support prosecution.
:
In the vast majority of potential bombing violations that arise from the
field, the Department is promptly advised and appropriate dissemination made
without there being a substantial supervisory responsibility thereafter for the
following of investigations because relatively few are opened by the Department
for full investigation. For example, in FY 1968 there were approximately 15 bombi
matter cases opened for full investigation at the Department's request whereas
approximately 170 instances occurred of dissemination of initial information to the
Department with no subsequent investigation requested. Of the 15 bombing matier
cases opened for full investigation during FY 1968, nine were in the racial field
(apparently Klan inspired), five in the foreign nationaust iieid and one unrelated
to DID responsibility.
The following guidelines are proposed for determination of supervisory
responsibility in bombing matter cases that hereafter will lie with DID (all others.
remaining with GID). Bombing matters (including threats) wherein:
1. The victim is a diplomatic or other establishment of a foreign
government (such as embassy, consulate, official or quasi-
official tourist agency, purchasing agency, etc.).
2. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bombing
was instigated by a foreign nationalistic organization, group or
coalition (such as recent series of bombings by so-called Cuban
power groups), or member thereof.
3. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bombing
was instigated by a subversive organization (such as Communist
Party, Socialist Workers Party, or Students for a Democratic
Society), or member thereof.
་
4. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that bombing was
instigated by a white or black extremist group (such as Minutemen,
Ku Klux Klan, Nation of Islam or Black Panthers Party), or member
thereof.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 247
-
.7
233
DETAILS CONTINUED - OVER
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
for Certain Cases from General Investigative
Division to Dome stic Intelligence Division
· Those cases which fall under the foregoing guidelines will hereafter bear
a dual character in addition to Bombing Matters or Bombing Matters - Threats, name
the appropriate designation for the type of apparent instigator and/or victim in
order to accomplish routing to the appropriate unit and section within DID such as
Internal Security - R, Racial Matters - Klan, or Internal Security - Cuba. The
foregoing guidelines have been incorporated in an appropriate SAC Letter together
with instructions concerning use of dual character which is attached for approval.
The supervision of a particular case will remain the responsibility of the
Division originally assuming it even though subsequent developments bring it
within the purview of the type normally handled by the other Division, unless in the
mutual judgment of the respective Assistant Directors, Bureau interests are bettor
served by transferring the case.
In making the proposed transfer of the limited group of cases discussed
herein, no problem appears to be presented insofar as liaison with appropriate Divisi
of the Department is concerned. The Criminal Division has responsibility for Antiri
Laws. DID now regularly disseminates intelligence material to that Division and uzd
closely with it on certain specific violations, such as the current sedition case agains
Stokely Carmichael as well as previous requests to follow activities of H. Rap Bronz.
The Internal Security Division of the Department has responsibility over the foreign
nationalist groups as well as the Klan and black nationalist organizations and has als
been charged with the development of criminal violations in the recent bombings by the
Cuban Power group. It is this Division headed by Mr. Yeagley with which DID corsic
deals on all subversive and espionage matters. The Civil Rights Division of the De
ment usually has jurisdiction over other bombing cases arising from white and black
hate groups, but again DID has regular liaison with that Division on intelligence matic
affecting these groups and has engaged in specific investigations to observe and photo-
graph demonstrations at the request of the Civil Rights Division.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSITION AND SPECIFIC PENDING CASES
To achieve an orderly transition and to permit coordination of policy,
instructions, etc., among the supervisors at the working level prior to the effective
date of transfer it is proposed that such effective date be applicable to all matters
arising after the close of business 9/16/68. From review by Inspection Staff of the
current pending cases now within GID which would under the new guidelines hereafter
fall within the supervisory responsibility of DID, it appears that none of these
pending cases should be physically transferred for remaining supervision to con-
clusion except for one group of eleven cases. This group constitutes relatively recer
cases arising from the series of bombings and attempted bombings in Florida.
New York, Chicago, Newark and Los Angeles directed at diplomatic establishments
and other offices of foreign governments who maintain relations with Cuba. Credit
for many of the bombings has been claimed by "Cuban Power, a similar term to
Black Power and several militant anti-Castro refugee organizations and individuals
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 248
11
-3-34 DETAILS CONTINUED - OVER
Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
for Certain Cases from General Investigative
Division to Domestic Intelligence Division
are suspects in these bombings. There has been extremely close coordination
between GID and DID in these specific cases and DID is thoroughly conversant with
the details of the imividual investigations. Because of this and also in view of the
likelihood of additional such bombings arising in the future by the same group or
groups it appears feasible and practicable to transfer the eleven pending cases now ic
DID as well as any new ones by the same group arising in the days ahead. These
eleven cases are Bureau files 174-688, 174-689, 174-749, 174-759, 174-760, 174–761,
174-76% 174-767, plus three new cases which have not been assigned Bureau file
numbers, namely bombing of Mexican Airlines Office, Miami, 8/17/68; Bombing
of West Side Liberal Club, New York, 8/19/68, and Bombing of Air France Airlines,
Los Angeles, California, 7/19/68.
WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL
The Bombing - Civil Rights Act of 1964 Unit of Civil Rights Section, GID,
is composed of 6 Agent supervisors including Unit Chief and in addition to general
bombing matters (those not falling under above guidelines) has supervisory
responsibility over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Federal Train Wieck Statute, an
Discrimination in Housing (Civil Rights Act of 1968). The latter violation which was
established in the same Public Law as the Antiriot Laws has had only very recent
experience and appears may well generate a substantial number of cases in the
future. However, from analysis of total work load of the unit as well as of the
entire Civil Rights Section, both from a standpoint of ratios of individual cases
supervised for FY 1968 and percentage of manpower time expended, it appears
that the transfer of supervisory responsibility for those cases as outlined in this
memorandum will constitute the approximate full time of one Agent supervisor
and accordingly it is being recommended that GID Agent complement be reduced by
one.
Within DID e new Antiriot Laws and the majority of the bombing matter
cases which will be transferred will increase supervisory responsibility in the
Racial Intelligence Section. Other bombing matter cases will be spread among
various units such as Special Investigations Unit of Internal Security Section, Cuban
Special Cases Unit of Latin American Section, etc., and based upon past experience
will not be of such volume as to require additional Agent supervisory personnel in
those other individual units. Accordingly, it appears appropriate at this time to
authorize increase of complement of DID by one Agent supervisor.
235
88608 Docid:32989638 Page 249
DO NOT FILE - RETURN TO NMĮ 5750
INTO BEHERS
Mr. DeLoc
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
•
MR. TOLSON:
RE:
August 15, 1968
SUGGESTED TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR SUPERVISION OF CASES INVOLVING
RIOT LAWS AND CERTAIN BOMBING MATTERS
FROM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION TO
THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
I have for some time felt that a lack of clear
cut responsibility existed in the handling of captioned
matters.
Mr. Callchon
Mr. Conged
Mr. Fer
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tave!
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room_
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy
To be brief, it would seem logical that the enforcement
of anti-riot legislation would obviously belong to the same
Division that is supervising the investigations and development
of informants and intelligence regarding the Ku Klux Klan, hate
groups and racial organizations. The question arises as to
whether or not the transfer of certain bombing matter investiga-
tions should also be made to the Domestic Intelligence Division.
Quite naturally, the General Investigative Division, because of
the supervision of certain type cases in this category, should
retain overall supervision in this field. However, considuration
should be given to the Domestic Intelligence Division handling
that category of cases wherein that Division's development of
informants and intelligence would greatly aid in the continuance
of supervision of this type case.
In view of the "gray area" involved in such supervision,
I asked Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan to study this matter carefully
so that appropriate recommendations could be made to you and the
Director regarding a shift of responsibility. The findings of
Rosen and Sullivan will be found attached to this memorandum. I
am, however, not yet satisfied that responsibility is sharply and
definitely fixed.
I uld like to recommend that the Inspection Division
make a survey of this entire matter and then present recommenda-
tions which will definitely tie down this matter once and for.
all.
This survey should be expedited in view of the new legisla-
tion passed by Congress for which the FBI will obviously have
heavy responsibilities in the future.
Respectfully,
Enclosure.
CDD: hmm
(3)
1
-
1
DeLoach
Felt
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 250
236
کی بہت
C. D. DeLOACH
M
8/29/69
the kitte
$129
/68

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:wmj 8/23/71)
For the information of General Investi -
gative Division, by separate write-up
Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)
was advised that Assistant to the Director Sullivan bas suggested that DID be
divided into two separate Divisions. In order that suggestion could be analyzed
during current inspection, DID was requested to furnish certain observations
regarding suggestion. Among these, Division was asked "In the event you feel
work now being handled by another Division should be realigned in the event
above suggestion adopted, so indicate under appropriate new Division."
DID responded, "It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and bombing
cases currently in General Investigative Division has been included in table of
organization of proposed Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned
to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and two clerks are now
assigned to this Unit in the General Investigative Division and should, of course,
be transferred to the new Division.
"This is the most logical move and will afford tighter and more effective
supervision of antiriot and bombing violations in view of fact that extremists and
terrorists mostly involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelligence
Division (DID). Accordingly, in addition to avoiding duplicative supervisory
action, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations
and final prosecutive actions. "
A separate white write-up captioned "Anti-Riot Laws and Bombing Matters"
was prepared and DID asked specifically to comment regarding these matters.
.This addendum is part of that write-up.
You are requested to furnish your views of Mr. Sullivan's suggestion both
as to the present structure of DID and as to the handling in the event DID is
split. For your information, DID has proposed ARL and Bombing Matters
be handled in the Extremist Intelligence Section.
Comments of Assistant Director Rosen requested. It would be appreicated
if you would expedite this request.
237
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 251
ADDENDUM
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROSEN:
(AR:ige)
✓ 18 chu
or is reorganized into two divisions.
The following comments are equally
applicable whether the Domestic
Intelligence Division remains intact
1
Transferring these cases to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) would
eliminate much duplication of handling cases and would result in increased
efficiency; however, this would require transferring to DID all bombing and
antiriot cases as distinguished from transferring only those cases known to
involve "extremists and political terrorists." As a practical matter substantially
all antiriot laws investigations involve extremists and political terrorists. With
regard to bombings, substantially all investigations deal at the outset with unknown
subjects and it would be most impractical to attempt to delineate between bombings
which do or do not involve terrorists. Since the act of bombing is in itself an act
of terror it is logical to assume at the outset that terrorists are involved and the
types of bombings delegated to the FBI by the Department's guidelines are limited
to those targets most likely to be selected by political terrorists. (These targets
pertain to Government property or functions, Federally funded projects,
diplomatic establishments, colleges and universities, and those probably
perpetrated by terrorists.)
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested
(ESM:wmj
concerning Assistant Director Rosen's remarks.
8/25/71)
ADDENDUM:
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
I concur with Mr. Rosen's
comments.
RES: djr
8/27/71
238
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 252
COMPUTATION OF CASE AND WORK LOAD IN THE
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
5-A-1 c
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: I have been advised that a new system of
computing case and work load has been
implemented within your Division. Describe and state reason for implementation.
It would appear that utilization of this system will result in a decrease
in case load figures but not necessarily in the work load picture. You are
requested to advise by Section and Unit basis the number of cases it is
anticipated that the case load will decline in each instance. Use a "before"
and "after" approach. Case load figures 7/31/71 will be satisfactory for use
as known base (before). Be as specific as possible.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
48/20/71
ESM:wmj
5-A-1 c
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 253
239
ADDENDUM: 5-A-1c
In February, 1971, I issued
instructions that each Section
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(MSR:amt)
Chief submit monthly case load figures for his Section to the
Branch Chiefs to be furnished to me with the Branch Chief's.
analysis as a basis for establishing a logical and current
method of periodically assessing work loads and manpower
needs within the Division. Inasmuch as it was intended
these figures would serve as a guide for possible manpower
changes to meet fluctuating and ever-changing problems, it was
essential that figures presented be accurate and equally
essential that like matters be tabulated uniformly.
On August 6, 1971, I instructed that a study be made
to insure consistency not only in the counting of the cases
but in the presentation of the monthly reports. As a result
of this study, guidelines were firmly established concerning
case counts within the various Sections. Changes from prior
figures principally relate to cases involving (1) security
informants (2) Security Index cases (3) certain organizations
and other matters requiring only periodic reports.
Under the standardized procedures for case counts
within the Division, informant cases, whether relating to
security informants or PSIS, once initial approval by the
Bureau for designation has been granted and where active
day-to-day supervision is not necessary, are no longer retained
in a pending status but are closed and placed on an administrative
tickler to be reopened at the appropriate time to follow for
the periodic justification letters required. Cases involving
Security Index subjects as well as certain organizations and
other matters requiring only the submission of periodic reports
at no less than six month intervals, are now opened on a uniform
basis 15 days after the due date of the periodic report in
order that appropriate followup may be made to insure submission
of report.
A format was devised for the Section Chiefs to submit
the monthly data required and to account for each Agent in the
Section and his current assignments as well as total and
average case load figures by Unit and by Section.
r
240
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 254
Pursuant to your request, there follows a tabulation
of the case load by Unit and by Section as of 7/31/71 and as
of 8/20/71. Total case load for the Division decreased from
29,565 to 25,417--a decrease of 4,148 cases. Some small
part of this decrease can be attributed to normal month by
month fluctuation in case load; most of it is attributable
to the changed procedures concerning case count as will be
readily evident by the significant decreases in case loads
in those Units handling principally informant cases, Klan ·
cases, and organizational-type cases. This reduction in case
load resulting from the changed case count procedures, of course,
in no way decreases the work load on the individual desks. It
is believed the current procedures for counting cases is more
accurate and equitable and places the case load figures in
perspective insofar as these figures are a factor in judging
Coverall work load.
:
This in brief constitutes the basis for implementing
the new system of computing case and work load in the Division,
In the overall, it is directly related to our manpower problems
and I have included a more detailed write-up bearing on this
new system in its relationship to the Division's overall
capacity and capability to fulfill its responsibilities in the
"Adequacy of Personnel" write-up (6-E) which also bears on the
matter.
241.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 255
Caseload figures
7/31/71 8/20/71
Change
Espionage Section
Special Cases Unit
751
735
Soviet
-
Washington Unit
967
842
Soviet
-
New York Unit
1223
973
Coordination Unit
1226
1022
Satellite Unit
1408
1261
Section Total
5575
4833
-742
Nationalities Intelligence Section
Special Coordination Unit
(No cases assigned)
Cuban Unit
1074
776
Chinese Unit
1125
1025
Middle & South America Unit
920
598
Nationality Unit
697
632
Section Total
3816
3031
(Handled by Clerk)
342.
1333
4158
3364
-794
Extremist Intelligence Section
Black Nationalist
-
East Unit
1501
1423
Black Nationalist West Unit
-
0924
845
1254
1332
Black Nationalist - Central
Racial Informant, Black
Nationalist South
-
1749
1564
Section Total
5428
5164
-264
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 256
247
Caseload figures
7/31/71
8/20/71
Change
New Left Section
Special Investigations
East
1719
1564
Special Investigations
-
West
1495
1343
New Left Groups
879
812
Subversive Individuals New Left
2492
2538
Protest and Trotskyist Groups
574
.588
Section Total
7159
6845
-314
Internal Security Section
Communist Party, USA
548
272**
*International New Left and
Sedition Unit
912
.871**
Klan and White Hate Groups Unit
1683
511
Security Informant Unit
1466.
869
Subversive Individuals Unit
2636
2688
Section Total
7245
5211
-2034
Research Section'
No cases assigned
Division Total
29,565
25.417
-4148.
**Unit now Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit
**1 Supervisor and 253 cases transfered from CPUSA Unit to
Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit 8/13/71
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 257
243
POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM
ESPIONAGE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
5-A-1-d
ZM ACTOR
NSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
"Double Agent" (DA) is a commonly and frequently
used term in the field of espionage and counter -
intelligence. In the Bureau's activities in these fields, DAs are a distinctive
group of Security Informants (SIS) utilized against foreign intelligence operations
in the United States. "Potential Double Agent" (PDA) is a unique term used by
DID to identify an individual under development as a DA; one who is in contact
with a foreign intelligence officer but who has not yet been solicited by his foreign
contact to perform clandestinely or covertly for the benefit of the foreign intelligence
group.
During this inspection a representative number of files were
reviewed to determine the extent of supervision afforded PDAs. A similar
review, was conducted last inspection. It is realized, however, that a comparison
is not possible in view of recent DID instructions regarding the administrative handling
of all SI and PSI files.
Subsequent to last inspection DID established procedure whereby
those SI cases requiring day-to-day supervision or PSIs still under investigation
should remain in active status; informant-type cases requiring only periodic
review are closed and placed on administrative tickler, to be made pending 15
days after the six-month justification letter is due. DA and PDA files are
included in these categories.
During the last inspection 237 files were reviewed. Included
in that group were PSIS and DESECOs, and not limited to PDAs. All of the files
were then in a pending status. During this inspection there were 65 files on
PDAs in a pending status and 212 PDA files in a closed status. These were strictly
PDA files and did not ind ude other PSIS or DESECOs. It has been determined
· that at any given time there will probably be approximately 70 such cases in a
pending status, if the number of such investigations in the field remains constant.
-
Of the 65 pending files, 58, or 89%, were reviewed. Of these,
22, or 38% contained specific instructions, directions or other guidance to the field
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/27/71
JON:wmj
5-A-1-d
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 258
2441
-2-
since last inspection. At the time of last inspection of 237 files reviewed, less than
10, or 4%, contained such outgoing communications.
Also during this inspection 62 closed files on PDAs were
reviewed at random. Of these, 12 or 19%, contained outgoing communications
of the type described above since last inspection. It was observed that since
last inspection a majority of the closed files contained only the six-month
justification letter and were closed in accordance with Division instructions
described above.
Due to current Division instructions, only those PDAs
requiring day-to-day supervision or those on whom six-month justifications
are due are considered pending at any given time. Hence, it is logical that a
larger percentage of the closed PDA files will contain only the justification
letters and no outgoing correspondence since last inspection.
It is well recognized that the field of DAs is a highly specialized
one. Its success, both at the Seat of Government and in the field, requires
skillful handling, patience, finesse and careful aggressiveness. In reviewing the
PDA files, it was observed that many excellent candidates, with varying back -
grounds, have reached various stages of development with excellent potential for
use as actual DAs. Specifically, these cases are:
.
105-113525
105-141001
105-201286
105-207600
105-26896
134-11898
134-15414
134-18458
134-19684
134-19961
134-20321
.
134-20912
The quality of these PDAs would, in itself, suggest substantial
potential and, in turn, need for greater supervision. The above-listed cases
should be kept in a pending status, carefully reviewed, with guidance and instructions
furnished to the field. The field should be instructed to assume a more aggressive.
position in these cases and followed closely to insure proper attention is given to
development of these persons as PDAs.
Review of PDA files shows evidence of closer supervision
since last inspection. The percentage of files, including instructions and guidance
to the field, rose from 4% to 38%. However, to realize greater accomplishments
in this area of responsibility and to use our PDAs to the fullest extent, there is
still need for improvement in supervision of these cases.
Comments of Section Chief W. A. Branigan, Inspector D. E.
Moore, and Assistant Director Brennan requested.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 259
245
W
3
Section Chief William A. Branigan
Branig
(CGS EWL:pdr 8/30/71)
The comments of the Inspector
regarding the marked improve-
ment in supervision of our
work is most. gratifying. As was noted during the last inspection,
evidence of supervision appearing in the PDA informant file is not
always a completely accurate gauge of the supervisory attention
being given each case. The informant file is designed, by pro-
visions of the Manual of Instructions, to be a repository for
information regarding the background and administrative handling
of the source. Information reflecting operational activities and
instructions more often appears in the active investigative file
of the Soviet-bloc principal with whom the PDA is in contact.
In view of this significant factor, it is felt that the
marked increase in supervision (from 4% to 38%) detected through
review of informant files alone, is a most favorable trend and one
which every effort will be made to sustain.
Twelve specific cases have been cited as quality PDAs
which, by their very nature, suggested a need for greater super-
vision due to the substantial potential of each. The Inspector
has instructed that these cases be kept in a pending status,
carefully reviewed, with guidance and instructions furnished to the
field to assume a more aggressive position in these cases. These
instructions are appreciated and will be followed. As the
Inspector has noted, the development of double agents is a highly
specialized field requiring special faculties, not the least of
which is careful aggressiveness. As these comments recognize,
aggressiveness in the development of a double agent is inhibited
by the practical necessity to restrict our manipulation of the
sources to actions which appear naturally responsive to the
initiatives displayed and opportunities offered by the Soviet-bloc
representative with whom the source is in contact. Particularly
is this true during the development phase before the source has
been accepted as bona fide by his principal. Any unnatural or
gratuitous action to hasten or strengthen the relationship is
viewed with utmost skepticism and could result in compromise of
our interest and rejection of the source. This is not to say we
must eschew any initiatives; but that any such options must be
pursued only after careful consideration of all the complex and
variable factors peculiar to each individual case.
:
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 260
246

4
Section Chief William A. Branigan
(CGS: EWL: pdr
8/30/71)
Within this perspective the 12 cases referred by
the Inspector will be kept open for intensive review to insure
that all possible action not already taken to enhance and
exploit the potential of each source has been considered
and, where appropriate, additional instructions issued to
the field.
It is noted that 10 of the 12 PDA cases referred to
were in a closed status in accordance with recent DID instructions
regarding the administrative handling of all SI and PSI files.
Briefly under these procedures such cases are placed in a
closed status and are reopened only at such time as a justi-
fication letter is due. These criteria will continue to be
applied to PDA cases with exceptions, on a selective basis,
in those situations which fall within the category defined
by the Inspector..
Inspector D. E. Moore read
(DEM:bsf 8/31/71)
The continual need for quality double agents
is certainly recognized in our counterintelligence efforts
against Soviet bloc intelligence and the cases referred to
by the Inspector as excellent candidates will be given
careful and aggressive handling.
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
(DEM:bsf 8/31/71)
The comments of the Inspector have been noted.
and his instructions will be closely followed.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 261
247
PERSONNEL MATTERS
1
PERSONNEL
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 262
HATTESS
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
Please tabulate by Sections and Units
the current Agent and clerical
personnel complement of your Division as of the close of business 8/17/71.
Show actual and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the
Division Front Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay
should not be considered in the overall tabulation.
1. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority has
been obtained to fill.
*
2. Identify all personnel under transfer into or out of the Division
as of 8/17/71 as well as those who have submitted letters of resignation as of
that date. (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of resignation.)
3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized
personnel as of 8/17/71.
4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if
additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification.
5. Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected since
the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means.
6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel.
7. In the write-up on adequacy of personnel by Sections, describe
criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section
or Unit. Each Section write-up should constitute a separate part of the overall.
Divisional write-up.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/17/71
ESM:wmj
6-E
-NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 263.
248
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(CDB:amk)
8/30/71
Attached find the Section
write-ups concerning each
category of information
requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel.
These comments are current as of August 17, 1971.
The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office
consist of one Assistant Director, two Inspectors, two Special
Agent Supervisors, five stenographic employees and twenty
clerical employees. This complement includes the personnel
directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division
teletype room and Mail Room and Messenger Service, and the
Security Patrol force in addition to five Agents.
.
The overall authorized personnel complement of the
Division at the beginning of Inspection was 120 Special Agents
and 199 clerks, compared to an authorized complement of 116
Special Agents and 190 clerks at the time of the last Inspection.
As of August 17, 1971, we had 119 Special Agents
assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). This
includes 2 Special Agents who are assigned on a temporary loan
basis to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee in the Department
of Justice (IEC). Since August 17, 1971, SA Dean N. Lloyd
reported to the Research Section as a replacement for SA Bernard A.
Wells who retired on 7/30/71. We are awaiting the replacement
for SA Victor R. Schaefer who was transferred to Salt Lake City
on 7/23/71 as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of that office.
SA George M. Quinn has been designated as SA Schaefer's
replacement but has not as yet reported to his assignment. With
the reporting of SA Quinn, our assigned complement will be 121 in
view of the fact that SA Garnett T. Tunstall (on loan to IEC
from Extremist Intelligence Section) has been replaced and we
include SA Tunstall in our total assigned complement.
As of August 17, 1971, we had 204 clerical employees
assigned to DID. This is because recent replacements have
reported to replace employees under transfer or resignation who
have not left as yet. Since August 17, 1971, we had two
additional clerks, GS-4, report to the Division. However, we
have had two resignations submitted which will absorb them.
We have one Section with an additional employee assigned which is
dependent entirely upon the approval of a new position involving
no increase in grade or salary.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 264
249.
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
This Division consists of six Sections. The attached
write-ups of the Section Chiefs disclose adequate authorized
Agent complement with exception of R. D. Cotter, Research; and
W. R. Wannall, Nationalities Intelligence Sections. Authorized
is underscored since Agent personnel are on loan to the Nationalities
Intelligence Section because of the McLek Case as follows:
Espionage (1), Extremist Intelligence (2), Internal Security (2),
Research (1), and New Left (1).
Concerning comment in write-up of R. D. Cotter, Research,
Item 6 refers to assignment of Cotter on a temporary basis to
Department and need for complete staffing of that Front Office.
Originally Cotter's assignment to the Department was not considered
to be full time in that he was to be in the same building, readily
available for consultation, and capable of handling special problems
which might arise. However, the situation is not desirable for a
long term arrangement and the term of that assignment is not known.
Recognizing this, the adjustment of work assignments detailed in
my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan of 7/29/71 proposed elimination of
one Section, making Section Chief Arbor Gray available to take over the
Research Section. This would eliminate that problem with no
additional personnel required. That proposal also makes No. 1
Man Callahan of Internal Security Section available for case
assignment.
•
.
Concerning write-up of Section Chief W. R. Wannall,
several points must be considered. Wannall's suggested build-up
of the Chinese Unit to five men from present complement of three
at this time to "handle the current work in the Unit and expand
into areas which are considered necessary
" is reflective of
a provincial outlook and a limited concept of the relative
importance of proposed work in his area of responsibility in
relation to the overall limitation of Bureau manpower and resources.
Obviously some differentiation must be made to establish priorities.
We must first cope with the immediate problems at hand before
assigning manpower to projected problems.
Concerning Wannall's reference to needing a man for the
Foreign Liaison Desk, my observations contained in my memorandum
to Mr.Sullivan dated 8/16/71, which is attached to Wannall's
write-up, still apply: I would add to that an observation that
much of the material received from our Legats is actually handled
on the related substantive intelligence desks responsible for the
respective countries and not by the Foreign Liaison Desk. With
the current special cases requiring extensive manpower commitments,
I believe that desk can continue as is until the manpower situation
is alleviated somewhat.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:mls
6-E
258
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 265
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
As to Wannall's comments concerning manpower on the
Ellsberg case, under write-up captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4A3,
the personnel assigned to Ellsberg is certainly adequate and he
does not at this point request additional personnel for that case.
There are two interrelated but separate problems to be
dealt with here. The first, and broadest, is divisionwide
adequacy of personnel and the Director has repeatedly stated
the concept that major case specials must be handled with existing
Division personnel. I agree with this wholeheartedly and have
attempted to comply with that concept.
Also related here is the situation which uniquely affects the
Domestic Intelligence Division in that our basic area of responsi-
bility has been subjected to shifting patterns of work. Essentially,
the rise of the black extremist was largely met with reduction
in other work areas. The newer expanding threat of New Left
terrorist activities is similarly being met by reduction of
personnel committed to other areas of work of less urgent priorities.
Obviously, there are practical limits to the elasticity
of manpower and our overall increase in caseload is indicative
of considerable strain on our manpower capabilities. Facts
concerning this increase are contained under "Pending Work and
Delinquency," 4-D-1.
I believe, however, we can adequately cope with our
responsibilities with existing personnel. In order to accomplish
this, considerable study and review of existing administrative
practices have been made at my direction since taking over this
Division 8/1/70. In order to put available personnel where
highest priorities existed, a major reorganization was effected
12/70 and our last inspection approved that action. The Director's
letter dated 2/12/71 advising me of the Inspection Staff findings
included the comment, "Continue to pay careful attention to
imbalances in work load throughout the Division and take necessary
action to correct these situations, as you did recently in your
reorganization."
With this in mind, and drawing on facts developed
during the reorganization and subsequent inspection, I directed
a memorandum to Branch Chiefs J. A. Sizoo and D. E. Moore dated
2/19/71 pointing to (1) the need for case count to reflect active
matters, (2) their responsibility to know what is going on in
their respective Branches and (3) specifically instructing them
to submit a monthly analysis of the work load of their Branches.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB: mls
6-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 266
251
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
The need for uniformity in case count submitted by Sections was
stressed to them, as was the need to establish a logical and
current basis for a regular and periodic assessment of work loads
and manpower needs within the Division.
Because of (1) a continued shift in manpower needs, and
(2) a growing imbalance in caseloads between Sections and
manpower demands of special cases, by memorandum to all Branch
and Section Chiefs, I instructed Section Chiefs G. C. Moore and
R. L. Shackelford to conduct a thorough survey of the Division
and make suitable recommendations for manpower adjustments to
cope with current needs of the Division. My memorandum to
Mr. Sullivan dated 7/29/71 detailed their findings and recommended
they be approved.
Addendum of Inspection Division 7/30/71 approved this
except for assignment of Special Coordination Unit to Research
Section, recommending it be retained in Nationalities Intelligence
Section. Mr. Felt's memorandum to Mr. Tolson dated 8/4/71
recommended proposed adjustment of work assignments in Domestic
Intelligence Division be deferred pending his study and Director
noted, "OK. Expedite." We are awaiting a decision.
Based on figures developed during the survey of G. C.
Moore and R. L. Shackelford, it was obvious my previous instructions
to the Branch Chiefs had not been effectively carried out, because
case count figures still were not as meaningful or consistent
between Sections as they should have been. To correct this
situation and to establish what I intended in my original
memorandum to the Branch Chiefs on this subject, I instructed
two Supervisors, with Inspection Staff experience, to do a complete
survey of case counting procedures and prepare tight recommenda-
tions to achieve the objectives previously sought.
This was done, and after discussion of their findings
with Branch and Section Chiefs, these new procedures were adopted
beginning 8/13/71. The results of this procedural change is
detailed in "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, and I believes
validates the recommended work adjustments contained in my
memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 7/29/71.
It must be strongly pointed out here this procedural
change does not bear on work load, but rather deals solely with
tabulation of case count into a more accurate gauge of pending
work and where the work is by desk, Unit, and Section. The
work remains the same.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:mls
6-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 267
252
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
The proposed work adjustments contained in my
6-E
memorandum of 7/29/71 essentially took manpower from work
presently in the Internal Security Section (Klan and White
Hate cases and Informant matters) and made them available to
other more heavily loaded work areas. The Front Office staff
of Internal Security Section will be available for other assignment
as well. It also called for Nationalities Intelligence to absorb
one of the five men on Ellsberg from that Section's complement
because of relatively low caseload.
Details set forth in "Pending Work and Delinquency,"
4-D-1, disclose caseload decreased in Nationalities Intelligence
and Internal Security Sections by 19% and 28% respectively, which
is proportionately high compared to other Sections.
Espionage Section was proposed to receive a one-half
man's time to compensate for the Ironclad case. This is consistent
with that Section's 13% decrease in case count under the new
procedure.
-
That write-up also discloses a case count under the
new procedure of 275 cases per Agent for the Nationalities
Intelligence Section compared as follows: Espionage 303;
Extremist Intelligence 303; New Left - 334%; Internal Security
401.
These figures are based on Supervisors assigned to case
desks and do not include men on specials in any Section.
-
I do not believe the problems faced by Nationalities
Intelligence Section far outweigh those of other Sections to
justify that low figure and, therefore, believe my original
recommendation that Nationalities Intelligence absorb one man from
existing complement was justified. W. R. Wannall's comments in
write-up captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, relative to manpower
presently utilized on this case validate this further as he has
now utilized manpower in his Section on this case. Obviously,
tangential issues will arise from time-to-time in an investigation
of this type and can and should be handled on an emergency basis
within the Section handling the special. This has been the
traditional practice and should be followed.
The second problem is essentially intra-divisional in
nature and deals with a Division Head's responsibility and authority
to effectively utilize resources available to him to cope with
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:mls
6-E
253
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 268
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
the area of responsibility levied upon him. As detailed in
Wannall's write-up captioned, Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, from the
beginning of this case I made manpower available for the Ellsberg
case as requested by him. As this investigation progressed,
however, Wannall continued to levy demands for manpower which I
believed unwarranted in view of (1) his failure to effectively
adjust and use his existing manpower at a time when he had a
proportionately low case load and (2) his granting extensive
leave to personnel in his Section while continuing to levy manpower
demands.
Wannall now claims to have nine men assigned to the
Ellsberg case. I invite comparison of the handling of the Ellsberg
Case to Eastcon. Eastcon at no time has had over 5 men assigned
full time to it, even though the case is of the very highest
priority and of a magnitude and complexity seldom matched in
Bureau investigations. In addition to the basic and complex
conspiracy itself, the case incorporates six separate substantive
investigations (draft board entries) which had to be brought
up to trial standard for prosecution of Eastcon. There are at
least 85 volumes to the Eastcon file alone at this time. Eastcon
was absorbed within the responsible Section until it was firmly
established that Section's case load could not continue to absorb
the impact of Eastcon. No requests for additional manpower were
refused by me on Eastcon, and those requests made were fully
supported by facts, justified and granted.
In my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/12/71, captioned
"Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, Domestic Intelligence Division
(DID)," I candidly stated my position and evaluation of Wannall's
demands for manpower (copy attached). Attention is invited to
page 2, paragraph 4, concerning the 5 highly qualified and ex-
perienced men available to Wannall, none of whom were being
utilized by him on the Ellsberg case. Attention is also invited
to page 2, paragraph 5, which details Wannall's claim to Mr. Felt
of "enormous" problems and need for still 2 more men. Note that
part of that "enormous" problem was resolved in one week with one
interview. Concerning the first reference your attention is
directed to my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/16/71 captioned
"Adequacy of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID),"
(copy attached) which attaches a memorandum from Wannall to me
requesting an additional Supervisor for the Special Coordination
Unit. Concerning the second reference above, and the tenor of the
entire memorandum, your attention is invited to Wannall's write-up
in this report captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, page 10,
paragraph 1, wherein he states 9 men are now assigned to that
case.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
3: mls
CDB:
| NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 269
254
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
These two references and Wannall's responses to them
clearly draw the issues: (1) Whether he used good judgment and
considered the Bureau and Division overall responsibilities
in balance with his own desires for manpower in making his
requests; (2) When weaknesses in his position were pointed out
whether he attempted to cover them by making even more demands
for manpower hoping this would somehow give them credence and
(3) Whether he or the Division Head should judge the Division's
resources and capabilities and determine their allocation and
priority of need consistent with the Bureau's overall capabilities.
In summary, the work load of the Domestic Intelligence
Division as exemplified by case loads set forth under "Pending
Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, are very high. Being mindful of
the practical limits of Bureau resources, I believe the currently
proposed adjustment of work assignments detailed in my above
referred to memorandum of 7/29/71 will allow the Domestic
Intelligence Division to function effectively with existing
manpower. The new method of tabulating case count affords me a
better administrative device to obtain-maximum utilization of
existing manpower and periodic adjustments within the Division will
no doubt be warranted and made.
The observations of the Inspection Staff as to the
validity of manpower committed to the Ellsberg case, as well as
overall manpower needs of the Domestic Intelligence Division, are
welcomed.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Pag@127;0mls
6
-
E
255

Extra
t
Er. E. C. Sullivan
Breaza
ADENIACT OF FIXGONMEL
ESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (BID)
August 12, 1971
Receno 9/6/7) from Ke. Felt to fr. Folsea captioned as above,
Felt recounted and the Director approved that the number of Agents
bandling leak cases in DID be increased immediately fron 5 to 7 using
DLD BANDGAMEI”, Er. Felt also recommended that the proposed adjustmoat
02 singever in UID to deferred pending his study, The Director agreed
and noted “Expedite. The following is offered for consideration:
This involves two problems:
!
(1) the proposed manpower adjustments recommended in memorandum
from 0.0.remax to 9-Cullivan on 1/20/71. The Inspection Dirisian
Goácurred with the proposed changes in that manoraadus except for noting
the Special Coordination Unit which coordinated Legs! Attache maiters
out of the Kationalities latelligence section. The Director agrood,
tentative to final approval of the organizational chartB. The charts
were submitted by memorandum C. D.brendan to Sullivan 8/3/71 which led
to Mr. Yolt'a Bonorunduma of 8/4/71 recommending a further study.
(2) The second probles involves manpower seeds for the Ilsberg
and other leak cases which have arisen since 0/15/71. These are handled
in the Ixtionalities Intelligence Seętion under Section Chief W.Ä.#annall.
Then the Attorney General requested we investigate the Ellsberg
Cabe on 6/15/71 I advised Vannall this was a matter of the highest
priority and intrr ted him to use sufficient manpower to kaadle it.
We advised sso after ais initial assessment that he would need the
essistsace of 3 additional supervisors. These were immediately temporarik
renssigned to him from other sections. He subsequently said the probles
was expanding and he would need 2 additional supervisors. These scre
also promptly temporarily reassigned to hia from other sections.
This placed a heavy overall burden on all sections and led to
By recommendations in sy menerandum of 7/20/71 for zanpower · chauƑca
within DID to jasure that marpover was being used on priority item.
Enclosure
CDB:lul (8)
*
Hol
• K. Sullivan
14. Folt
- 1. N.P.Callatsz
live bod
- kr. D. G. Koore .
1 - C. D. frenuan
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 271
i
(CONTINUED – OVER)
خانوده
256
Bet
Memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan
Re: ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
Mr. Felt's memorandum 8/4/71 indicates he discussed the manpower
problem on the leak cases with Wannall who said his problems had now
become so great he would need 2 more men for a total of 7.
Z
In line with Mr. Felt's stated intention to initiate an overall
study of the matter, I had Mr. Wannall submit to me an overall analysis
of his manpower and work load as it relates to the leak cases in his
section. Set forth are the case load figures for Mr. Wannall's section
from March 1 August 1, 1971;
-
March 1
324
April 1
323
May 1
313
June 1
291
292
204
July 1
August 1
When the Ellsberg case first broke, Wannall assured me he was
using his existing manpower to the fullest extent possible and needed
temporarily assistance from other sections to carry on the other heavy
burdens of his section, but the case load figures now available for the
six-week period from 5/15/71 to 8/1/71 show that all Wanhall did was pul
his own men on the special (5 men) and borrow manpower 15 men) from other
sections to keep his other problems in hand at the sacrifice of other
sections with equally or even more burdensome problems.
This is shown by the fact that for June and July the case load
average in Wannall's section while handling the Ellsberg case was 292
and 294 respectively as contrasted to a Division case load average for
all sections during the same period of 339 and 335. This does not even
take into consideration that he has 5 highly experienced and qualified
supervisors in the Special Coordination Unit whon he does not include in
his case load count. He could have drawn on at least one of these men
for special assignment in an emergency but did not.
Actually, it is now clear that Wannall responded in the initial
stage of his problem with a panicky, premature request for additional
manpower as he subsequently did through his observation to Mr. Felt that
he needed still 2 more men. In effect, Wanuall put DID in the untenable
position of giving Mr. Felt an off-the-cuff assessment of what he
considered to be an "enormous" problem and a need for still 2 more men
unsupported by facts and oblivious to the problems of the Division as
a whole. As a matter of fact, one of the leak cases which caused Wannall
great alarm was referred to us by the Department on 8/2/71. By letter
dated 8/9/71 Wannall advised the Department that we had condicted one
interview which showed that prosecution could not be entertained and
accordingly would conduct no further investigation in the absence of
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 272
1
(CONTINUED OVER)
257
Memorandum. C. D. Brennau to W. C. Sullivan
Re: ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
specific instructions.
Therefore, one part of Wannall's "enormous"
problem was resolved in one week with one interview and one letter to.
the Department.
of equal concern to me is Wannall's handling of leave requests
during the period of 6/15/71 to 8/5/71. When confronted with the Ellsber:
case, he had discussed leave with me and had suggested that if it was
necessary for him to cancel leave requests in his section he felt leave
should be cancelled throughout the entire Division. I told him it would
be ridiculous to cancel leave Division-wide because one section had a
problem. I advised him leave throughout the Division would be approved
on the basis of sound judgment in relation to overall Division work load
and in accordance with the Director's instructions concerning individuals
involved on major cases.
:
I have ascertained that since 6/15/71 Wannall has approved leave
for 12 supervisors in his section totaling 763 hours. This is an average
of nearly 8 days per man for each of those 12. He approved these exter-
sive leave requests during the samo period that he advised his problems
were so "enormous" that he needed 7 additional men.
OBSERVATIONS:
Historically, the Bureau has learned to live with specials of
various kinds. I agree with the concept that such specials are a test
of the responsible official's ability to handle them within the frame-
work of the Bureau's overall responsibilities and capabilities. In like
manner, I expect no less from supervisory personnel under me and will
not condone unwarranted attempts to grab manpower within the Division
regardless of whether the attempts are based on an inability to think
clearly, an incapacity to adjust to a stress situation, or oversight
resulting from a provincial attitude and outlook.
DID has absorbed into its periphery of responsibilities many new
problem areas involving racial and new left extremists in recent years.
These problems have taxed our ingenuity and resulted in across-the-board
heavy work load increases brought about by the need to flexibly realiga
manpower to meet new challenges. When other priorities of the Bureau
have precluded additional manpower being added to DID, I have attempted
to take the positive approach of making internal adjustments to fulfill
our responsibilities with available resources.
In this vain, there is attached a copy of a memorandum I prepared
for all Branch and Section Chiefs of DID dated 7/23/71 which resulted
in my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan of 7/29/71 recommending DID manpower
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 273
- 3
(CONTINUED OVER)
23
Memorandum C. D. Prennan to W. C. Sullivan
Re: ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
adjustments.
I feel it will serve to show why the Inspection Division
with a minor exception approved our proposed manpower adjustments.
Perhaps it will serve also to facilitate the study Mr. Felt indicated
he was initiating. I hope it will resolve any doubts the Director or
others may have about what we are trying to do with our manpower resources
in DID and why we are trying to do it.
RECOMBINATIONS:
(1) Pending the Director's final approval of the proposed
manpower adjustments within DID, the 5 men temporarily assigned to
the Ellsberg case remain as assigned.
(2) Any additional personnel to be assigned to the Ellsberg or
other leak cases at this time should come from within the Nationalities
Intelligence Section in view of the relatively lower case load in that
section.
'
(3) That Inspector D. B. Moore personally assume overall direction
of the Ellsberg and leak cases to insure Wannall's proper utilization of
manpower in the direction of our objectives. This should include daily
conferences with Wannall and his men on the Ellsberg and leak cases and
2 weekly progress report to me from Inspector Moore.
No. Since it has been stated (irresponsibly) that if
Brennan was taken off. Ellsberg ease it would be lost
Brennace is to remain until case is concluded. H
(4) That Mr. Felt as instructed by the Director expedite his
study of recommended DID manpower adjustments so that desirable changes
can be effected without further delay to enable us to put our manpower
on our most important problems.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 274*
259
F. C. Sullivan
C. D. Brendaa
ADEQUACT OF FRASOWNEL
DOUSTIC INTELLIGINCE DIVISION (DIS)
August 16, 1971
Be attacked memoranduma Kansall to Brennan 8/12/71 requesting
one additional supervisor be approved from outside DID for the Foreign
Liaison Desk (210) because of a heavy increase in work volume.
ཟླ
I agree expansion of our Legat offices has produced work increase
which gould justify additional supervisor on FLD. Lowever, in regard
to Vannall's recommendation concurred in by the tranch Chief, Inspector
0. E. Nuore, that it should come from outside DID, I am mindful of
the Impection Division's survey of work in DID during week of 7/13/71
following request for additional supervisor in Espionage Doction. The
inspector concluded that the present supervisory capabilities of DID
are adequate to handle existing work.
t
The Inspection Division'e analysis of work in DID as of 7/1/71
compared with last inspection in January, 1971, revealed a stability
of overall responsibilities from a case load standpoint shown by
the fact average case load per supervisor in January was 322 and in
July 330. Tannall's average case load in January per supervisor was
279 and in July 204-an average rise of only 3 cases in the Division
and of only 16 cases in Kannall's section in six months.
Ordinarily, I would point out to both Inspector Moore and Bannall
these factors mitigate against Pequesting additional supervisors from
outside DID. Inspector koore had access to these facts and should have
explained to wannall the need to follow traditional patterns in requesting
an additional man," J., adjusting within the Division's overall zan-
power aud work load irancwork of capabilities and responsibilities.
The obvious answer is for Wanmall to reassign a man from within his
section to the FID. This would (1) alleviate the work load there and,
(2) bring his case load closer to the Division's supervisory average
per man. At the end of 90 days he could then reassess his situation
and consider any action the facts then warrant.
However, the significance placed on our recent Legat expansion
may be an overriding factor to the Impection Division or Kr. felt who
Enclosure
COD:1ml (9}.
་
1 - Kr
•
Sullivan
Nohr
Callahan
**Munger
- C.D.Arenzan
• D.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 275.
260
Hemorandum C.D. Erencza to W. C. Sullivas
He: ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)
may feel the facts presented by Nanuall are such to outweigh all other
cousiderations. I feel it would be well for Hr. Felt to consider this
request in conjunction with the unnpower adjustment survey he is to
initiate and I will be guided accordingly.
I have initiated some new guidelines for determining Division
manpower assignments and case lands. I bolieva these will provide a
still better basis for DID to insure its manpower is being most
effectively used on priority matters. Kr..Felt may desire to usa
these guidelines immediately as a usasure for his study.
XOTENDATION:
That Mr. Felt consider the request of Hannall for a supervizor
from outside DID ią conjunction with his study.
any additional personnel
for Wannalls Section must
come from within 
the did
.
#
261
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 276,
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
6-E
SECTION CHIEF A. W. GRAY:
• ay
As of close of business 8/17/71
the authorized personnel of the
17 Special Agents, 7 Secretaries,
Internal Security Section was
and 13 Clerks. A breakdown by Units follows:
FRONT OFFICE
AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL
AS OF COB 8/17/71
1
Section Chief
Secretary
Number One Man
Secretary
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT
Supervisors
Secretary
1
1
1
1
1
Clerks
FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND
PRO-CHICOM UNIT
Supervisors
Secretary
Clerks
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT
¨Supervisors
Secretary
Clerks
SECURITY INFORMANT UNIT
Supervisors
Secretary
Clerks
3 (SA Benedict assigned
1
2
212
temporarily Nationali-
ties Intelligence)
4 (SA Seabaugh assigned
temporarily Nationali-
ties Intelligence)
1
5
SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT
Supervisors
Secretary
Clerks
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
NW 88608-D32889638 (age)277
262
5 (SA WL Smith extended
sick leave beginning
6/25/71)
1
1. None
2.
None
3.
None
4.
None
SPECIFIC COMMENTS
BENTERK
5. During the period since the last inspection
manpower savings have been effected in that the following
Supervisors for the periods indicated have been assigned
elsewhere in the Division. Supervisor James P. Benedict
has been assigned elsewhere in the Division for the entire
period since the last inspection except for approximately
12 days that he was working in the Internal Security Section.
Most of this period he was on temporary assignment in the
New Left Section on the Special concerning the East Coast
Conspiracy to Save Lives case. More recently he has been
on temporary assignment to the Nationalities Intelligence
Section on the McLek Special. Since 8/13/71 Supervisor
Tony J. Seabaugh has also been on temporary assignment in
the Nationalities Intelligence Section on the McLek Special.
6. When Special Agent supervisory personnel
currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections,
are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle
existing case load. There is, however, an area of pending
work which could greatly increase the supervisory work load
and require expeditious file reviews, analysis of cases,
availability of witnesses, reviews of informant reports and
preparation of correspondence. Funds were recently appropriated
by Congress for the implementation of Executive Order 11605
which broadened the powers of the Subversive Activities Control
Board (SACB) to enable the Board to hold hearings and designate
violence-prone extremist organizations as subversive. The
Department has indicated that it intends to initiate proceedings
before the SACB as soon as possible and there are a number of
organizations being handled in the Internal Security Section,
such as the Revolutionary Union and Progressive Labor Party,
which are likely to be selected for presentation. Based on past
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
SFP:ebc
6-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 278
263
experience, the preparation of a case for presentation
to the SACB requires the services of one Supervisor on
a full-time basis. Thus, it is anticipated that the
Department's action pursuant to Executive Order 11605
will substantially increase the work load of the Internal
Security Section.
7.
In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent
and clerical personnel the following criteria were used:
case load
mail count
name checks
complexity of cases and supervision involved
deadline matters
special assignments
experienced supervisors
Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in
Charge (reviewing mail, conferring with employees, organizing
Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignments
handled.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
SFP:ebc
6-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 279
264
.ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:
RECH
6-E
As of close of business 8/17/71,
the complement of this Section
was as follows: Special Agents 12, secretaries 6, and clerks 13, for a
total of 31. This is broken down by unit as follows:
་་
Section Front Office - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary (Stenography),
1 Secretary (Typing), 1 Clerk (Typing - GS-5).
One Special Agent on permanent detached
assignment to Department of Justice.
Central Research Unit - 5 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 3 Super-
visory Clerks (technical publications writers),
1 Clerk (publications coordinator), 1 Clerk
(omnibus).
Civil Disorder Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary,
1 Clerk (omnibus).
Current Intelligence Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary,
1 Supervisory Clerk (technical publications
writer), 1 Clerk (omnibus).
Special Records Unit - 1 Special Agent, 1 Secretary, 4 Clerks.
The following responses are numbered to correspond with
Inspector's specific questions:
1. Position of Section Chief is technically vacant, with no
authority to fill. Section Chief R. D. Cotter, with approval of the
Director, has been on permanent detached assignment with the Department
of Justice since 6/1/71. Number One Man T. J. Smith has acted in
capacity of Section Chief.
One Special Agent position in Current Intelligence Reporting
• Unit has been vacant since retirement of SA B. A. Wells, effective 7/30/71.
Authority granted to fill position and SA D. N. Lloyd will report 8/18/71
as SA Wells' replacement.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/17/71
TJS:amt
6-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 280
265

2. SA Dean N. Lloyd is under transfer to the Division from
the San Antonio Office. Transfer letter was dated 6/30/71. He has
arrived in Washington and will report for assignment 8/18/71.
Mrs. Jacqueline Kelset Elliott, Clerk GS-4, assigned to
Current Intelligence Reporting Unit, resigned effective 8/24/71. Letter
acknowledging resignation was dated 8/3/71.
Miss Joyce Webb, Secretary, GS-5, assigned to Current
Intelligence Reporting Unit, resigned effective 8/20/71. Letter
acknowledging resignation was dated 7/28/71.
3. There is one GS-4 Clerk surplus to the Section complement.
This is located in the Current Intelligence Reporting Unit and is due to
fact that replacement for Mrs. Elliott (above) received prior to effective date
of resignation, 8/24/71.
4. Current clerical personnel complement is considered..
adequate but not excessive to the needs of the Section.
5. There have been no manpower savings effected through
streamlining procedures since date of last inspection. One Special
Agent who had been on loan to Internal Security Section was transferred
permanently to that Section effective 5/24/71, with no replacement to
be provided. Overall Section complement was thereby reduced by one
Special Agent and the work load occasioned by this reduction was absorbed
by existing Agent complement with assistance from Supervisory Clerks
(Technical Publications Writers).
6. Due to nature of permanent assignment of Section Chief
R. D. Cotter to the Department of Justice, full burden and responsibility
´for running the Section and handling Section Front Office functions has
fallen on the Number One Man, T. J. Smith. A replacement for
Mr. Cotter is very definitely deemed necessary so that an acting
Number One Man can be designated to relieve SA Smith in the Section
Front Office. In the interest of continuity of responsibility and authority
it is felt that designation of an acting Number One Man is a must. A
replacement was approved by the Director for the other Agent named
along with Mr. Cotter for detached permanent assignment to the
Department. Personnel of the Section cannot be considered adequate
so long as there is only one Special Agent handling Front Office
responsibilities of the Section.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638" Page 281
266
7. Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this
Section includes a number of diverse factors. As pointed out in prior
inspections, case load figures are not applicable, neither are there any
other simple qualitative measurements of the Section's work. Research
Section is essentially the service arm of the Division and handles a
wide variety of assignments involving research, study and analysis. Of
primary importance is production of a variety of documents aimed at
providing the White House, Attorney General, other high level Government
officials and Bureau officials current intelligence information relating to
the broad spectrum of the Division's work. In addition to the writing of
highly condensed intelligence summaries, digests, and analyses in
pamphlet form for high level dissemination, the Section provides a daily
teletype summary of racial disorders and developments and of antiwar,
campus disorders and other disturbances growing out of various protest
activity. The Section also handles all matters which involve the Division
as a whole, where the matter crosses section lines. Director's specials
involving such matters as wire taps, nonspecific topical subjects such as
guidelines for internal security investigations, and similar matters are
handled and/or coordinated in the Section.
The adequacy of personnel of the Section depends on the
demands leveled by the White House or by Bureau officials for the
specialized studies and other material which the Section is geared to
produce on short notice. Demands for intelligence data were extremely
heavy from the White House prior to and during the election campaign
I last year. It can reasonably be expected that even greater demands will
be placed on the Bureau during the months ahead, and such demands will
invariably involve the elements of extremism, terrorism, racial and
new left agitation and other internal security problems. It is to be noted
that this Section actually wrote one speech for Vice President Agnew and
provided the material for inclusion in several others. We also provided
Mr. Agnew with a special brief which was kept updated, for use in
appearing before various groups.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 282
267
New Left Groups Unit
Protest and Trotskyist
Groups Unit
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
NEW LEFT SECTION
FORD MA
SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD
6-E
There is set forth below
a tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the
New Left Section as of close of business, August 17, 1971.
Authorized
Assigned
4 Agents
4 Clerks
3 Agents
5 Clerks
4 Agents
4 Clerks
3 Agents
5 Clerks
Special Investigations
East Unit
6 Agents
6 Agents
5 Clerks
5 Clerks
Special Investigations
West Unit
-
5 Agents
5 Agents
5 Clerks
5 Clerks
Subversive Individuals
6 Agents
6 Agents
New Left Unit
Front Office
6 Clerks
7 Clerks
2 Agents
2 Agents
2 Clerks
2 Clerks
Total
1.
2.
26 Agents
27 Clerks
53 Employees
26 Agents
28 Clerks
54 Employees
There are no vacant positions in the New Left Section.
There are no transfers pending in or out of the Section,
nor are there any letters of resignation in the Section pending
as of August 17, 1971.
3. As of August 17, 1971, this Section is one secretary over the
authorized complement. This secretary is temporarily assigned to
the GS-6 secretary position in the Section Front Office, which
was vacated by the reassignment of the incumbent to a proposed
GS-6 clerical position in the Subversive Individuals New Left
Unit. Upon approval of the proposed clerical position, the
extra secretary will be utilized to fill the GS-6 secretary
vacancy in the Front Office.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
oat
RLS cae
6-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 283
268
Adequacy of Personnel
New Left Section 6-E
4. At time of last inspection, this Section had a complement
of 24 clerical personnel as compared to present assigned
complement of 28 clerical personnel. This increase was
'occasioned by the transfer of the Protest and Trotskyist
Groups Unit with accompanying personnel from Internal Security
Section to the New Left Section.
Congress recently appropriated funds for implementation of
Executive Order 11605 which broadened power of Subversive
Activities Control Board (SACB) to designate violence prone
extremist organizations as subversive. The Department has
indicated it intends to initiate these proceedings as soon as
possible (See R. L. Shackelford memorandum to Mr. C. D.
Brennan, August 16, 1971, captioned "Executive Order 11605").
This Section handles a number of organizations which will
undoubtedly be selected by the Department for presentation
before the SACB. Based on past experience, the preparation
of cases for presentation to the SACB creates a considerable
increase in work of a clerical nature. If the Department's
intention in this regard is implemented, it will be necessary
to obtain an additional clerk in the future, however, we are
not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this time.
5. The New Left Section, as of January, 1971, had an
authorized complement of 22 Agents and 23 clerks. Current
assigned complement is 26 Agents and 28 clerks. This increase
in complement, as noted above, was occasioned by the transfer
of the Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit from the Internal
Security Section to the New Left Section.
6.
The caseload being handled by the New Left Section (average
371 cases per Agent as of August 1, 1971) is considered excessive.
We are, at the present time, making a conscientious effort to
reduce this caseload to desirable level by weeding out and
closing cases which do not require additional investigation.
If, in spite of our efforts, the upward trend continues, it may
be necessary to request additional Agent personnel to handle
the excessive caseload in this Section.
As noted in number 4 above, it is anticipated that as a
result of recent Congressional action, the Department intends to
soon present violence prone extremist organizations before the
SACB for designation as subversive. Such presentations will,
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 284
-
2
c
269
i
Adequacy of Personnel
New Left Section 6-E
i
of necessity, include several organizations currently handled
by this Section. Based on past experience, the preparation of
a case for presentation before the SACB requires the services
of one supervisor on a full-time basis. No request is being
made at this time for additional Agent personnel. However,
based on the above, it appears that a request for one additional
Agent will be necessary when the above proceedings are
instituted.
7. Adequacy of personnel in the New Left Section is constantly
evaluated on basis of caseload and type of cases handled by
each Unit, review of delinquency reports, number of requests
received from Department and other agencies, and review of the
overall objectives of the Section. When it is noted, because
of special circumstances, that an excessive amount of work
is temporarily assigned to one Unit, personnel from other Units
are utilized to alleviate the situation.
3
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 285
270
SECTION CHIEF W. A.
ESPIONAGE SECTION
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
BRANIC
ANIGAN
i
(1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section
as of the close of business August 17, 1971, is as follows:
AGENT
CLERK
SECRETARY
Front Office
2
0
2
CLERK-STENO
0
Soviet Unit -
Washington
3
2
1
1
Soviet Unit
-
New York
4*
3
1
1
Special Cases Unit
2
5**
.
10
Coordination Unit
3
3***
1
1
Satellite Unit
4
5
1
*Special Agent George M. Quinn was designated to replace Special Agent
Victor R. Schaefer. Special Agent Quinn is currently assigned to the
Inspection Division; date of reporting to the Espionage Section is
not known.
**Intelligence Analyst, GS-10, Mary E. Triplett, performing work in
lieu of Special Agent.
***Clerk, GS-7, A. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of
Special Agent.
(2) By letter dated July 28, 1971, Special Agent
George M. Quinn was ordered for assignment to the Domestic
Intelligence Division.
By letter dated August 17, 1971, Dale P. Ramacciato
submitted his resignation to be effective at close of business
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-19-71
WAB:hke
6-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 286
271
.
-
=
a
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
August 20, 1971. Letter acknowledging resignation has not
been received.
(3) As of August 17, 1971, there was a shortage
of one Special Agent in the Soviet Unit New York. As of
August 17, 1971, there was no overage of authorized personnel
in the Espionage Section.
(4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate but
not excessive at the present time.
(5). Since the last inspection the Special Agent
complement of the Espionage Section has been reduced by two.
At the time of the last inspection the Espionage Section had a
total case load of 5,089 cases, of which 141 were handled by
clerical personnel in lieu of Agent personnel.
There was,
therefore, an average of 275 pending investigations per Agent
Supervisor. As of July 31, 1971, the Espionage Section had a
total of 5,575 cases, of which 270 were handled by clerical
personnel. This provided an average of 331 pending investigations
for each Agent Supervisor.
(6) By memorandum June 4, 1971, a request was made to
increase the Special Agent complement by one Special Agent.
This was predicated on an increase in the volume and complexity
of investigations handled. The request was denied. By memorandum
July 14, 1971, I asked to increase the Special Agent complement
by one in order that the Ironclad case could be assigned the
full-time job of one Special Agent. Ironclad is a unique source
of the Bureau and it is important that information from this source
is given the analysis and consideration that it deserves. This
request was denied, and, the Special Agent complement of the
Espionage Section was fixed at 18. In light of President Nixon's
recent request to cut back, no request for additional Special Agent
personnel is being made and the present complement is considered
adequate.
(7)
Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of
personnel includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity
of the cases, and the importance of the investigation.
In the Soviet Units
-
Washington and New York, we are
currently handling 2,190 cases among an authorized complement of
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-19-71
WAB:hke
6-E
-2-
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 287
272
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
seven Special Agents.
The greatest majority of our double agent
cases are assigned in these Units and these are among the most
complex investigations. The operation of a double agent requires
minute supervision to insure that the objectives of the investi-
gation are achieved. The Soviet Unit - Washington also supervises
two illegal agent cases, and the Soviet Unit New York has the
overall supervision of the Ironclad source.
-
The Satellite Unit, which supervises the investigations
in the Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav nationality
fields, has a total of 1,408 investigations, including the informants
and double agents that are being directed against the Soviet-bloc
establishments and personnel. There is, therefore, an average of
352 investigations in this Unit.
The Coordination Unit is currently handling 1,226
investigations, of which 178 are assigned to a Clerk in lieu of
an Agent. Considering that this Unit has the responsibility for
a number of special subjects and special operations, including
the adaptation of our records to automatic data processing
equipment, the case load is considered very high.
In our Special Cases Unit there are currently 751
investigations, of which 92 are handled by a Clerk in lieu of
an. Agent. These investigations are divided among two Special
Agents. The figure of 751 compares favorably with the total of
768 at the time of the last inspection, which number was divided
among three Special Agents.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-19-71
WAB:hke
6-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 288
3
273
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
MOORE a
SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION
The current authorized personnel complement of the
Extremist Intelligence Section as of the close of business
August 18, 1971, is 22 Agents and 23 clerical personnel. This
is broken down as follows according to Units within the Section:
Front Office
· Section Chief
Number One Man
Secretary to Section
Chief
Secretary to Number
One Man
Black Nationalist Unit East
-
-
1
1
-
1
-
1
6. Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
7 clerical personnel
Black Nationalist Unit
-
Central
4. Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
3 clerical personnel
Black Nationalist Unit
-
West
5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
5 clerical personnel
Black Nationalist
-
South and Racial Informant Unit
.5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
6 clerical personnel
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
TDR:mlm
6-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 289
274
.
(1) There are no clerical or supervisory vacancies
in the Section.
Section.
personnel.
(2) No one is under transfer into or out of the
1
(3) There is no shortage or overage of authorized
(4) The clerical personnel assigned to the Section
is considered adequate at this time.
(5) The streamlining of our operations wherever
possible to effect manpower savings is under continual
evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since
the last inspection include: (1) Abolishment of the Agitator
Index on 4/21/71 as an analysis revealed that it was no longer
the necessary administrative tool that it once was; (2) After
consultation with the Department, discontinued submission of
monthly evidentiary reports concerning the Black Panther Party
on May 14, 1971. At the time this program was discontinued,
23 field offices were submitting monthly evidentiary reports
averaging 37 pages in length; (3) Limited the scope of inves-
tigations of black student groups on college campuses to
those groups which have engaged in violence and/or lawless
activities or are moving toward violence or lawlessness by
letter to all offices 7/26/71; (4) Assigned additional duties
to clerical personnel in effort to reduce the workload of
Special Agent Supervisors. Specifically, a clerk is now
handling the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List, correlates
the receipt and review of publications and newspapers dealing
with the black nationalist movement, reviews and forwards
to appropriate field offices information received from the
military on black extremist in the Armed Forces, and handles
certain correspondence with the National Security Agency
concerning matters of mutual interest.
In addition, we continue to utilize our teletype
dissemination facilities to the maximum extent possible
NW 88608_Docld:32989638 Page 290
275

(6) The Special Agent complement is 22 including
the Section Chief and Number One Man, an increase of one
since the last inspection. The Division was reorganized
December 17, 1970, on the basis of approximate case load
per Supervisor of 279. This figure was based on the
October 1, 1970, case load figures. As of January 1, 1971,
the case load stood at 349 per Supervisor and a request for
two additional Special Agent Supervisors was approved. The
opening of cases on Black Student Union-type organizations
and leaders thereof on college campuses across the Nation
in December, 1970, showed up in our case load figures during
the early months of 1971. These cases have been handled and
closed by the end of the 1970-1971 school year. As of
August 1, 1971, the case load stood at 5,428 or an average
of 271 per Supervisor assigned. These cases represent hard-
core extremist individuals and organizations and require
extensive supervision.
Additional factors dealing with the adequacy of
personnel is a special that was received in the Section on
May 29, 1971, involving the killing of two police officers
in New York City on May 21, 1971, which the President instructed
the FBI to investigate and solve. The supervision of this
investigation occupies the full time of one Supervisor. In
addition, one Supervisor was placed on loan to the Nationalities
Intelligence Section on July 19, 1971, and a second Supervisor
was placed on loan to that Section on August 13, 1971.
With the return of these two Supervisors to the
Section, I consider the supervisory personnel as adequate.
There are several factors that would indicate that
our work in the black extremist field will increase in the
immediate future. With the reopening of school in the
immediate future, we can foresee an influx of cases involving
extremist Black Student UNion-type groups and leaders thereof.
1
Executive Order 11605 signed by the President on
July 2, 1971, expanded the activities of the Subversive
Activities Control Board (SACB). The Department has advised
276
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 291
that a Section has been formed within the Internal Security
Division of the Department to file petitions before the SACB
pursuant to Executive Order 11605 and that the Department
is interested in proceeding as quickly as possible against
such parties as the Black Panther Party and the Ku Klux Klan
among others. Such proceedings will materially increase
the workload of the Section.
Under the proposed reorganization of the Division
which is under consideration at this time, this Section, if
such reorganization is approved, will handle all Klan and
white-hate organizations, individuals and informants with
the present supervisory complement. In this connection,
the informant cases are adoptable to full assimilation into
our present extremist informant setup and a great deal of
the work in connection with the handling of these informants
will be assigned the responsibility of two grade 6 clerical
employees in the Black Nationalist South and Racial Informant
Unit. In order to absorb the Klan and white-hate organiza-
tions and individuals, they will be assigned in accordance
with the geographic breakdown we are presently using within
the four Units in the Section.
-
Black extremist activity in this country is
developing more and more in international aspects.
Residents
of other countries including U. S. citizens and noncitizens
are involved in clandestine and overt operational activity
among racial extremists. We have targeted Central Intelligence
Agency as well as our Legal Attaches abroad for the develop-
ment of data regarding foreign influence in the black
extremist movement. We have levied requirements and are
expanding on such requirements on the National Security
Agency which has vast capabilities in developing the type
of information needed.
(7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take into
consideration not only the case load which is compiled on a.
monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts taken
on a quarterly basis. Many of our cases on key figures in
the black extremist movement such as Huey P. Newton, Eldridge
Cleaver, James Forman, LeRoi Jones, and others require a
considerable amount of supervisory attention.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 292
277
Analysis of current developments in the racial
field, preparation of special studies, requests from other
Government agencies, and so forth all require considerable
supervisory.time and are taken into consideration in evaluating
the adequacy of supervisory personnel.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 293
278
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
As of close of business 8/17/71 Section complement was:
Authorized Actual
Special Agents
20
20*
Secretaries (Steno)
.8..
8.
Secretary (Typing)
I
· Stenographer (Supervisory)
1
Clerical (Supervisory)
1:
1.
Stenographers
26.
26****
Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7)
20.
21***
Totals
77
78
Special.
*Does not include 7 Agents on loan from other Sections for McLek
*Includes one GS-5 Stenographer (Barbara J. Raney) out of assign-
ment, working outside Bureau on loan to Intelligence Evaluation. Committee.
***Includes one GS-4 Clerk (Kendall Wayne Shull) assigned
temporarily to Section 7/22/71 for training purposes.
Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary
(Stenography) and one Secretary (Typing)..
Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno-
graphy), one Clerk (GS-5). and one Clerk (GS-4)
Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary
(Stenography), one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4).
Special Coordination Unit consists of five Special Agents, three
Secretaries (Stenography), one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and three
Clerks (GS-4).
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WRW:ams
NW 88608 Bold:32989638 Page 294
279
2
6-E
Chinese Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary
(Stenography), and three Clerks (GS-4).
Middle and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents,
one Secretary (Stenography), and three Clerks (GS-4).
Division Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor
(Clerk), one Assistant Supervisor (Stenographic), one Clerk-Stenographer
(GS-5), and 25 Clerk-Stenographers (GS-4).
While the foregoing represents the organizational structure of the
Section as authorized, the actual structure has been affected by the McLek
and related specials since 6/15/71. There are seven Agents assigned on a
temporary, and in part rotating, basis to this Section from other sections within
the Division. These men, together with the 20 Agents regularly assigned to
the Section, are assigned as follows:
Section Front Office - two (no change).
-
'?
Cuban Unit three (two regular, one on temporary rotating assign-
:ment--David A. Brumble of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/13/71).
Nationality Unit - three (one regular and two on temporary assignment--
James H. Kavanagh of New Left Section reported 7/19/71, and John L. Adams
of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/9/71). This is one less than.
normal unit Agent complement.
Special Coordination Unit - five (no change).
Chinese Unit - two (regular). This is one less than normal unit
Agent complement.
-
Middle and South American Unit three (two regular and one on
temporary rotating assignment--Wilfred R. Schlarman of Espionage Section
reported 8/16/71).
McLek and Related Specials - nine (as follows):
Eugene R. Harrell (of this Section)
James R. Wagoner (of this Section)
Jesse R. Hagy (of this Section)
Herbert J. Morgan (of this Section)
Lionel E. Belanger (of this Section)
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 295
280
3
6-E
William W. Hamilton (of this Section)
Joseph M. Sizoo (of Research Section)
Tony J. Seabaugh (of Internal Security Section)
James P. Benedict (of Internal Security Section)
Harrell, Wagoner and Hamilton are regularly assigned to the
Nationality Unit, Morgan to the Middle and South American Unit, Belanger
to the Cuban Unit and Hagy to the Chinese Unit.
(1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 8/17/71,
although one transfer out was pending and one resignation was pending.
(2) By letter dated 8/16/71 Linda Marie Blum, Clerk-Stenographer,
GS-4, was transferred to Phoenix Office. Carol A. Maslow has resigned
effective close of business 8/27/71. Letter acknowledging this was dated 8/2/71.
(3) Kendall Wayne Shull, Clerk, GS-4, was assigned to Section
7/22/71 for training purposes pending clerical opening within Division to which
he would be permanently assigned.
(4) The additional work involved in the handling of McLek and
related specials has to date required the assignment of nine Agents. There
has been additional clerical work involved which to date has been handled by
.clerks regularly assigned to the Nationality Unit plus the clerical assistance
rendered by Kendall Wayne Shull from 7/22/71 to 8/17/71 and by Wayne T.
Smith who, for training purposes, was assigned to this Section from 7/7 to 8/3/71.
If reorganization results in setting up a special unit to handle McLek and related
matters, we would require a GS-5 Secretary (Stenography) for the Unit Chief
and a minimum of three clerical employees, one to handle lead cards, one to
handle dissemination and the third to handle indices searches, file requests
and related matters. We would endeavor to fill two of the three clerical positions
from clerical complement presently in the Section by diverting one clerk from
the present Nationality Unit and one clerk from the Middle and South American
Unit. We would request that the clerical position which has existed since 7/7/71
for training purposes be made permanent by an increase in the clerical
complement. This would result in adding to the over-all Section complement
one Secretary (Stenography), GS-5, and one Clerk, GS-4.
(5) The principal manpower savings effected since last inspection
was brought about through a voluntary reduction of over-all case load within
the Section to preclude the necessity for requesting an additional Agent for
assignment to the 13 operational desks within the Section (those existing in
all units except the Front Office, the Special Coordination Unit, and the Division
Stenographic Pool Unit). The case load reduction was effected by streamlining
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 296
281
6-E
procedures regarding the handling of cases relating to deserting Chinese
seamen (a reduction of approximately 160 cases) and restricting the opening
of investigations of the Jewish Defense League to high-level national leaders
(which resulted in a reduction of approximately 70 cases). Memoranda captioned
"Case Load Reduction, Nationalities Intelligence Section," dated 4/15 and
5/5/71 attached.
(6) Our regular Agent complement is 20 and we have seven men on
loan from other sections. Of these 27 men, nine are presently assigned to
McLek and related specials, six from the regular Agent complement from this
Section and three of the loan Agents. The assignment of the manpower from
this Section has resulted in the temporary reduction of the complements of the
Nationality Unit and the Chinese Unit by one Agent each. While it is felt we can
continue running these two units on a temporary basis in the immediate future
with one less man assigned to each, we will not be able to expand efforts in the
Chinese communist field which, at this time, is considered critical. To do
this, the Chinese Unit should be built to an Agent complement of five. This
would permit us to handle the current work in the unit and expand into areas
which are considered necessary at this time and which are outlined in detail
in the attached write-up dated 8/18/71 and captioned "Chinese Matters."
·By memorandum dated 8/12/71 one additional Agent Supervisor
was requested for assignment to the Foreign Liaison Desk. A copy of this
memorandum is attached, together with a copy of a cover memorandum dated
8/16/71 from Assistant Director Brennan to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Adequacy
of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)."
((7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include
continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts,
complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and
intelligence requirements, personnel capabilities, and past experience in
shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 297
282
April 15, 1971
CASE LOAD REDUCTION
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
:
We intend to reduce our current case load from 4197 to 3739,
a reduction of 458 active cases and a reduction in the average case load for the 13
Agents handling case supervision from 322 to 287.
This reduction is in part contingent upon re-establishing the moratorium
on SI cases and would be effected as follows:
Middle and South American Unit - By re-establishing the moratorium
cases, 30 pending cases would be closed. This Unit has a current case load of.
976 active cases and reduction will result in a net case load of 946.
on
Chinese Unit - The recently approved streamlining procedures will result
in approximately 30 days' time in the closing of 160 cases on deserting seamen This
Unit has 1028 current active cases and with reduction will have a net of 363 active-casce.
Nationality Unit - We intend to restrict the investigation of the Jewish.
Defense League to the high-level national leaders which will result in reduction of 43
active cases. Unit has current case load of 917 active cases and with reduction referred
to above will have an active case load of 774.
Cuban Unit - Upon re-establishment of moratorium on SI cases the case
load in this Unit would be reduced by 125 pending active investigations. The current
case load of 1276 will be reduced to 1151.
In addition, re-establishment of the moratorium will result in eliminating
approximately 600 SI cages) which are presently carried in an inactive status.
5x
The reduction in the Chinese Unit will be accomplished within a 30-day
period. The reduction of SI cases upon re-establishment of the moratorium and the
remaining reduction will be effected upon your concurrence.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 298
283
:
May 5, 1971
CASE LOAD REDUCTIONS
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
••
Pursuant to your request for observations concerning our comments
in attached 4-15-71 informal memorandum, following is submitted:
We concur in the re-establishment of the moratorium on SI cases
which will result in some 150 pending active investigations being discontinued.
We have previously noted that instructions have been outstanding for
some time which will result in streamlining procedures in handling cases on
deserting Chinese seamen. During April, 34 such cases have been closed, and
it is anticipated during the month of May about(125) more such cases will be
discontinued in the normal course of events.
The step which we have discussed in much detall relates to changing
criteria for opening cases on individuals connected with, the Jewish Defense League.
(JDL). The violent nature of many such individuals was the basis for our
instructing several months ago that each member who has actively participated in
and supported the demonstrations, acts of violence, ds. of the group be made
subject of an individual investigation. This amounted to about 800 individual
cases on some 8000 alleged members of the JDL at that time. The membership
has increased tremendously during the interim and if we continue under this
criteria, we estimate within the next year anywhere from 600 to 1000 additional
cases would have to be opened.
Despite the fact we feel we will be taking a risk in not pinpointing
someone who later turns out to be violence-prone activist, we suggest that
at this time we revert to opening cases on (1) each JDL organization or subsidiary
organization; (2) individuals serving in a leadership capacity of such organizations;
and (3) other persons connected with the JDL who by past actions have shown
propensity for violence or connection with activities involving violence or terrorism.
This will result in our dropping from 70-80 cases in the immediate future.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 299
284
CHINESE MATTERS
August 18, 1971
On the security and intelligence scene;
1972.
Communist China has emerged as one of the most important
countries handled in this Section. This fact was
dramatically emphasized by President Nixon's July 15, 1971,
announcement that he will visit Red China before May,
Available information, including an announcement by
Secretary of State Rogers, indicates that Red China's entry
into the United Nations is imminent and will probably be an
¨¨¨accomplished fact within the next 14 months.
For the pur-
pose of securing more and better intelligence on Red China
and Red Chinese sympathizers%; to develop more sources who can
provide needed information%; and to have a reservoir of sources
we may utilize in intelligence operations against the Chinese
communists (Chicoms), it is felt the following investigative
areas should be activated and/or expanded:
1 Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools Index
The above Index consists of cards on more than 600 individuals
who have been interviewed under our Chinese Alien Program and
who have attended institutions of higher learning in Red China.
* It is felt that these individuals, because of their educational
background, would be the types we should approach in order to
determine their potential for use in operations against the
Chicoms. This would require opening cases on each individual,
reviewing Bureau file in each case, and thereafter setting out
leads and instructions to the field in order to initiate the
type of inquiry felt necessary in each case. The objective of
this effort would be to identify those individuals whose
activities we can direct against either the existing Chicom
establishment in Canada or against Chicom establishments which
are expected to be opened in this country in the near future.
2. Implementation of a program in which we would
select four or more Special Agents for indoctrination and
training, looking toward their utilization in an undercover
capacity against the existing Chicom official establishment in
Canada or against any Chicom establishment which may be located
in the United States in the future.
285
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 300

3.
Implementation of an effort in selected offices
whereby individuals, present sources included, could be
developed for the purpose of establishing a walk-in program
directed against the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) representatives advised, during a July,
1971, conference they would cooperate fully in an effort of
this type
4. Consideration should be given to renewing the
Chiclet and Chiprop Programs, both of which were discontinued
in 1965. These programs provided us with a secure means to
obtain communications between the United States and Red China
and, from these communications, we secured valuable intelli-
'gence and background information on both ethnic Chinese and.
∙Caucasians of security interest to us.
5. In connection with travel of U. S. citizens to
Red China, it should be noted that all prior restrictions on
such travel imposed by the U. S. Government have been lifted.
The result of this action is that U. S. citizens who desire
to travel to Red China no longer need to accomplish such
**travel clandestinely. The door is now open, and we may expect,
in the near future, a substantial increase in such travel by
U. S. citizens. It is felt we should fully identify each
U. S citizen traveling to Red China and in selected cases
should conduct appropriate interviews, since our experience in
the security field historically indicates that U. S. visitors
to communist countries are frequently approached by the
'intelligence services of those countries for recruitment. This
problem may be further magnified if and when permanent resident
aliens are authorized to travel from the U. S. to Red China.
Such a proposal is now under consideration by the Attorney General
and the Department of State and favorable consideration could
result in travel to Red China of many thousands of ethnic
Chinese who have permanent resident status in the U. S. and who
would desire to travel to Red China to visit families living
there. In these cases, a clear hostage situation exists and
such situations are often exploited by hostile intelligence
services.
6.
Immigration laws relating to Chinese aliens
entering the U. S. have been broadened substantially and in
early 1971, the Conditional Entry Program was begun. This
program permits entry into the U. S. of up to 250 Chinese .
aliens per month, who were heretofore ineligible under our
immigration laws. These aliens, in most cases; have families
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 301
2
286
residing on the China mainland, thereby creating a hostage
situation which could be used as a lever by the Chicoms to
gain cooperation.
It is felt desirable at this time to revamp our
instructions regarding reinterviews of Chinese aliens in`
cases where a hostage situation exists. At the present time,
our policy is to reinterview a Chinese alien two years after
the initial interview. It is felt that these instructions
should be modified to require that a second interview of a
Chinese alien having members of his immediate family in
Red China should occur one year after the initial interview.
:
7: We should expand our present source development
program at the United Nations, looking toward development of
individuals connected with the United Nations who would be
willing, under Bureau direction, to initiate contact with
Chicom official representatives in Canada. Based on informa-
tion provided by RCMP, contacts of this type, even if no
recruitment by the Chicoms is obvious, would serve to form a
reservoir of individuals the Chicoms might well contact and/or
operate upon their entry into the United Nations.
8. Our Chinese Scientists Program now involves five
field offices, each of which is doing background inquiries on
ten ethnic Chinese scientists who have security clearances.
The purpose of this program is to select appropriate individuals
from the above group of 50 to target against the Chicoms. We
· have a list of over 3500 ethnic Chinese who fit the criteria
we are now using regarding the 50 individuals now under investi-
gation. It is felt that continued development of good sources
to direct against the Chicoms warrants expansion of this
program, looking toward possible contact with almost all of the
3500 scientists on the above lists. The individuals on this
list, being ethnic Chinese and being employed in the scientific
and technical fields, would be most attractive to the Chicoms
for intelligence purposes.
9. National Security Agency representatives are of
the opinion that the possibility exists that Chinese Intelligence
Service is beaming broadcasts to agents in the United States
or in border countries (Canada or Mexico). Our San Diego Office
recently monitored broadcasts felt by National Security Agency
to have come from China, and the clarity of the signal on our
West Coast was excellent. While this does not prove that an
3
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 302
287
illegal Chicom operation exists on our West Coast, it is an
. indication that we should undertake action designed to
uncover such a possibility. In the absence of more specific
data, we should consider at this time checking warranty cards
submitted by purchasers of certain radio equipment, primarily
radio receivers, which are capable of tuning in on broadcasts
such as those mentioned above. This would involve identifica-
tion of the equipment, its manufacturer, and subsequent
instructions to appropriate field offices to check warranty
cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining names
of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards. Subsequent
inquiry should include developing background on the purchaser.
and, in cases where Bureau interests may be served, perhaps
conducting interviews.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 303
288
T. V. C. Pullivan
°
•
August 10, 1971
COURTIG INTELLIGEZCE DIVISION (DID)
Te attached venerandan gaanall to Broanan 8/12/71 sequesting
pss additionsi supervises ke approved from autuide DID for too Foreiga
Liaison ess (719) beczusy of a heavy increase to work volum.
3
#
I agres examaton of our Legat offices Nos producsd work increase
which would justily additional supervisor on FLS. Beever, in senare
to Pousall's sacomandadios concurred in by the Granah Chiol, Inspector
D. £. boore, that it mould come from outside 189, I sa uindful of
the erection Division's currey of work is DND during week of 7/10/71
following romusat for soúlilonal superviser in isplozsge #oction. The
Inspector conclufsd) that the present supervisory capabilities of DID
are adquate to Naadle gzisting sark,
The Inspection Olvision's analysis of mæk in DXD as of 7/1/71
compared with inst anspection in January, 1971, rvcaled a stability
of overall suspoastbilities from a case load standpoint shown by
the leet average 2836 load per supervisor in January 258 324 8D2 20
July 200. Wanall's averago case lead in Jamry per supervisor vas
276 and in July 904A⠀ ✯F27822 rice of only 5 Clogs in the Division
and of culs 16 cassa in tsmall's section in six month. (206 cari
2)
Ordinarily, I would point out to both Inspector Moore and Maanell
these factare silipate agalust requesting addisional supervizora fron
Ianpector bero had accses to tacuo facts and suculd havo
explained to brutall tas need to follow traditioanl patterns da requestioŲ
an additiou81 408, 5.0., &djusting sithin the Division's overall maae
Powar Bad verb loud irsæturk of capabilities and responsibilities.
The obvious answer is for vascall to reasZIGU A KAN £son within his
section to the P10. This would (1) alleviate the work load there and,
(3) Priax his ease load closer to the Division's supervisory average
At the end of 90 days he could then reassess his situation
and consider any action the facts then MISZRE,
Dovover, tho significznos placed on our rement Legat expenzion
may ba na barriding factor to the Inspection Division or Ir. Felt who
Saclocure
Ellivan
LP, Year
བྷཔརྩ རྡོ ༡༢
G.D.00:32
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 304
289
151
Besoranda G.D. Pranman to P. C, fullivan
ADEQUACY OF PRISCITEL
BONISTIC KVIKMIGZIAD DIVISION (BID)
may feel the facts presented by Vanunil pre guch to outweigh all ather
considerations. Jeel it muld be well for Ir. Feli to consider this
request in coajunction with the mumpower adjsinent survey be is to
suítiate and I will be guided accordingly.
I have initiated some new guidelines for determinies Mavision
manposer assignments and case logs, I believe these will provide &
#4111 botter Nois for D3D to Amure àte naspower ia being nost
sticstively used on priority sitors. K, Talt way desire to use
these guidelines dumediately.no a measure for his study.
TEX F. Melt consider the sogæst of Hazmat te
D10 in conjunction with his study.
from cutik
Any
additional personnel
for Wannall's section must
from within the D.J.D.
come
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 305
290
Mr. C. D. Brennan
W. R. Wannall
1
1
1
1
food food from's fuck
Q
*
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
-
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Ponder
8/12/71
\ 1 - Mr. Brennan
Mr. Wannall
1
TNO
Mr. Day
x*x*
FOREIGN LIAISON DESK (FLD)
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID).
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL
Fully mindful of the urgent matters requiring
additional personnel in the DID (East Coast Conspiracy) and
particularly the Nationalities Intelligence Section (Illsberg
and other leak cases), we must ask for help in the supervision
of our foreign offices. While our Legat operations are not in
the public eye, they do constitute an important area of car
work which must not be overlooked in view of the evaluation
being placed upon them by the White House,
In January, 1971, during the inspection of this
Division, we pointed out that the expansion of our foreign
liaison offices from 11 to 17 had come at a time when the two
FLD Supervisors had been barely able to keep up with the flow
of paper let alone actually examine and analyse it in order to
afford constructive supervision to the foreign offices. Te
noted the heavy demands made on the time of these two
Supervisors in welcoming and supervising the visits to the
Bureau of the many foreign dignitaries who are valuable and
cooperative contacts of our Legats and the 62% increase over
the past ten years in the Foreign Police Cooperation cases being
handled. We pointed out that the Supervisors should be pre-
paring memoranda to keep the Director fully apprised of the
work being done by our Agents abroad but just did not have time
to do this. As a result of the inspection, memorandum 2/1/71
from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson secured approval for addition of one
man for assignment to the FID. He reported 2/22/71. Contem
poraneously, it became necessary to assign one Agent Supervisor
on a rotating basis to the New Left Section on a temporary basis
to assist in the East Coast Couspiracy ense. An Agent from the
FLD was selected for this temporary assignment, effective
4/26/71, which assignment was made permanent when all temporary
assignments were converted to permanent assignments, effective
5/21/71. In effect, therefore, the additional man was available
on the FLD only during the two months from 2/22 to 4/26/71.
CAD:dgo
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 306
CONTINUED
-
OVER
291
HSKOTNOQIE) TO IT. 4. U. WTOONBA'
RE:
VORCIGY LIAISON DESK (FLD).
NATICALITICS INTELLIGENCE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL.
In the meantime, between December, 1970, when the
her foreign officos ware opened and July, 1871, the latest
wonth for which figurdo are available, there has been a
noarly 60% increase is the amount of paper being produced
by our foralga offices and requiring review on the SID),
Are Kost zeluctant to sak for help at a time when the
Bureau's resources are strained on so many fronts but we
Would be derelict in our duty if we did not point out that
the situation which the Inspectors in January felt justified
additional assistanse has since become 9700 VO29. 新街 宗機
badly nood is a ma sith a background of experience shroad
plw a language ability who would be able to take hold
Anradiately without extensive training. As an example, wo
gon think of Special Agent John Morris, now in the domestic
field, sho gas forced to ack to be returned to the U. S. due
to his wise's condition following the death of their
Såret-born child. There are undoubtedly others of equal
capability and potential,
Hang foreign officials who visit Varbiastoa. Ho est
speak English or are not fluent in it. We now have a
Enpervisor fluent in Spanish and the addition of a Franch
or Cerzan capability would greatly reduce our heed for
tatarpreters from the Washington Field Of£167 nad elsestera
in the erean, The Division presently bna ege Sporvisor
with French and gone with Gerang, There are others sith
Snch languages as #panish, Japanese, Chinese, Polish, and
the like. 12 no one with experience in foreign liaison 227
be sada available, one of these language trained men could be
used provided a replacement from outside the Division is .
furnished. There is so say in which help can be provica
within the Divisioe without a replacement. No bave clipinated
and streamlined programs and so are now desigsing Supervisors
og a rotation basis to sasiat on the leak cases, leasing their
per neat aæeigzzante sonetizes for weeks at a time.
RECOMMENDATION:
That an additional Superviser be approved for assign
utut to tho 710, to come from outside the Division, increasing
the Division Ágest complement by one.
✔ 2 os
292
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 307
-
Mr. Day
Retyped page
of memo W. R. Wannall to
re: same subject
C. D. Brennan
dated 8/12/7T
RE:
Homorandum to Mr. C. D. Bronnan
FORNIG LIAISON DESK (FLD)
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
DOBESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL
ADDENDUM: BY D. S. NGORE
DEI:aeb 8/14/71
Pursuant to your request, this is to advise that there
are two supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division with
Legal Attache experience, Robert A. Becuing who is now
assigned to the FLD, and Jessie R. Sam Nasz was assigned to
this deck but is now assigned to the halobarg_Special. Both
Bermingham and Hagy speak Spanish.
There are 23 other supervisors in the division with
Language ability. None speak German and only one, John I.
Quelletts, speaks French. The language ability of the otherN
are in Russian,. Japanese, Italian, Komanian, Pollab, Bulgarian,
Albanian, Portugueso, Hungarian, Yiddish and Chinese.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 308
293
ADDENDUM
E
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:wmj 9/3/71)
During the course of instant inspection an in-depth
survey was made relative to the adequacy of
personnel, both Agent and clerical, within the
DID. The primary purpose of this survey was to determine the best possible
allocation of manpower bearing in mind the desirability to reallocate manpower
to top priority assignments.
ADEQUACY OF AGENT
PERSONNEL
Set forth below is a chart graphically illustrating where it is felt
reductions can be made in Agent complement:
Internal Security and Research Branch
Internal Security Section
Subversive Individuals Unit - 1
Security Informant Unit - 2
Klan and White Hate Groups Unit – 2
Research Section - 1
New Left Section
Subversive Individuals Unit - 1
Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch
Extremist Intelligence Section 2
-
Nationalities Intelligence Section
.
Middle and South American Unit - 1
Nationality Unit -1
TOTAL
11
Comments and observations justifying the above-mentioned reductions
in force can be found below under the individul Section and Unit captions.
294
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 309
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
Subversive Individuals Unit
This Unit has an Agent complement of 5. At the time of the last
inspection it was a 3-man Unit; however, one was assigned on a special in another
Unit, leaving actually two Agents to handle approximately 1300 cases, or 650
per man. Since the last inspection the case load has increased to approximately
2600. Consequently, it would appear that 4 men averaging 650 cases per man
could handle the work of this Unit. This position is further strengthened as it
can be anticipated that the case load will decrease since the deadline of lifting
the moratorium expired 6/30/71 and the bulk of investigations have been brought
up to date or will be brought up to date in the near future. By memorandum dated
8/26/71 it was recommended that SA John N. Quellette be returned to the Internal
Security Section due to the slackening of activity in the EASTCON case. Quellette
was formerly assigned to this Unit and the reduction could be accomplished by
reassignment of him (or another Agent) to more pressing duties elsewhere.
Security Informant Unit
,
This Unit presently has 4 supervisors assigned; however, one has been
on temporary assignment outside the Unit since June 1971. The case load as
of 8/71 for this Unit was 869 and would result in about 217 cases per Agent in
a 4-man Unit, and 290 cases per Agent in a 3-man Unit. Further, you have
indicated one of the factors affecting the productivity of the Unit is the necessity
of obtaining authority by memorandum for the utilization of students and/or
teachers as security informants. It was determined that 122 memos have been
prepared since the last inspection requesting such approval. This is approximate
1 memo per workday, which does not appear to be an excessive work load. Since
this Unit was formed it has functioned with 3 Special Agent Supervisors. This
does not appear to have effected the efficiency of the operation and in view of the
work and case load it is felt that the Unit could function quite satisfactorily with
2 Special Agent Supervisors.
Klan and White Hate Groups Unit
Under the reorganization of DID proposed by Assistant Director
Brennan in his memorandum of 8/3/71 it was indicated this Unit's cases could be
absorbed by the Extre mist Intelligence Section. This would free two Special
Agents for other assignment. It is felt this could be accomplished even if the
proposed reorganization does not become an actuality.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 310
295

RESEARCH SECTION
It is noted under the proposed reorganization of 8/3/71 a supervisor from
this Section would be reallocated to another. It is felt this could be accomplished
regardless of the reorganization. It is noted in this regard that this Section is
presently operating efficiently with an Agent supervisor assigned to the Ellsberg
case. Addressing ourselves to the lack of a Section Chief, it is felt your
recommendations regarding filling Mr. Cotter's vacated position should be handled
by separate memorandum. The replacement request for SA Marion S. Ramey's
transferral to another Division is being handled separately.
NEW LEFT SECTION
Subversive Individuals Unit
This Unit has an authorized complement of 6 Agents but is presently
adequately handling the work with 5, one being assigned full time to a special.
Even though the case load is high, approximately 2500, leaving 500 cases
per man, many of the matters are quite routine and can be handled with bare
minimum of supervision. Because of this, Agents assigned to this Unit are able
to handle a large number of cases and it is felt that the Agent presently assigned
to the special should not be returned.
ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL BRANCH
Extremist Intelligence Section
During the last inspection you requested two more supervisors due
to the fact that your case load had increased to a total of 6642, breaking down
to 349 cases per supervisor. Your request was authorized. During May, 1971,
one supervisor was permanently transferred from your Section leaving you
a complement of 20 supervisors plus Section Chief and Number One Man (total
22). No replacement has been requested for this supervisor. Since 7/19/71
you have had one man on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on a rotating
basis and as of 8/9/71 a second man on loan. There has been a definite decrease
in your case load since the last inspection. However, a slight increase would
be anticipated due to the absorbing of the Klan and White Hate Groups matters.
For the last 6 weeks you have been without the services of 1 supervisor on a
· rotating basis and for the last 3 weeks a second one. However, the Unit has
still operated efficiently. As there is an imbalance as to cases and the number
of men assigned it is felt that 2 supervisors could be transferred out of the
Section leaving 20 (including Section Chief and Number One Man) to handle
the necessary assignments (including Klan and White Hate).
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 311
296
1
Nationalities Intelligence Section
Middle and South American Unit
As of the close of business 8/20/71 the 3-man Cuban Unit had
a case load of 776 and the Middle and South American Unit, also consisting of
3 men, had 598 cases. These two Units, the work of which is closely related
and frequently overlaps, had a total case load of 1374 for 6 men for an average
case load of 229. If the total case load of these two Units were handled by 5
men the average load would be 275, which appears more equitable in view of the
overall commitments and work load of the Division. In view of the above, it is
felt that the personnel of the Middle and South American Unit could be cut by one
man. With 5 incumbents and with the inter-relation and natural overlapping of these
two Units future fluctuation in the work load could be equitably handled between the
two Units.
Nationality Unit
Under normal conditions it is believed that this 4-man Unit
could be operated by 3 Supervisors. At present, there are 3 supervisors
assigned this Unit's cases (exclusive of special) and the case load as of 8/20/71
was 632 cases which represents 158 cases per Agent for a 4-man Unit, or 211
per Agent for a 3-man Unit. Consequently it is felt that 3 supervisors could
adequately handle the work of this Unit.
As can be seen, a pool of 11 men has been created. Treating those
assigned on special to the Ellsberg case (9) as a separate entity,
2 men
are available for general assignment. One man could be assigned to the
Chinese Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section and the one supervisor
from the Foreign Influence and Pro-CHICOM Unit of the Internal Security
Section along with his cases (492). (Note this Agent is not included in the 11. )
What is left of the Foreign Influence Unit could be consolidated with that of the
CPUSA Unit. The other supervisor from the pool of 11 could be assigned to
the Special Coordination Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.
This realignment would result in a considerable decline in personnel
within the Internal Security Section. However, a balancing of work load could
be accomplished through reassignment of the three-man Protest and Trotskyist
Groups Unit from the New Left Section to the Internal Security Section where it
was in the recent past. Further, as you are aware, a proposal is presently
being considered to reassign Antiriot Laws plus Explosives and Incendiary
Devices cases from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 312
297
Division. While it is realized that logically these should be placed in the
New Left or Extremist Intelligence Section, to balance work load, they
could be considered for assignment to the Internal Security Section if proposal
is approved. The Research and New Left Sections would each be decreased
by one Special Agent Supervisor, the Extremist Intelligence Section by two.
The Nationalities Intelligence Section, excluding the Front Office, would be
increased by one Special Agent Supervisor.
OBSERVATIONS:
Considerable time has been devoted to this phase of the inspection to
assess as accurately as possible manpower requirements of the various Units
and Sections. In addition to ticklers and file reviews your outgoing mail was
reviewed for one work week.
During the course of this mail survey covering a five-day work period,
715 pieces of mail or 143 pieces 1 day were generated and reviewed. Of
this number, 268 pieces or 37% were directed to the Front Office for review
and 497 pieces or 63% went directly to the field or other agencies without
Front Office review. This indicates an average of 6 pieces of outgoing mail
per Agent are being prepared per work week. 55.6% of the total pieces of
mail were of a routine nature, setting forth a minimum degree of supervision
and direction. 36.1% contained a moderate degree of supervision and 8.3%
contained a considerable degree of supervisory instruction or direction.
Of the average of six pieces of mail per Agent 3.3 pieces were of a
routine nature requiring minimal supervision; 2.2 pieces moderate supervision
and . 5 pieces (1/2 letter, etc.) considerable supervisory instruction or
direction per week.
Examples of minimum supervisory content would be communications
permitting routine interview or informant payment (stamp). An example
of moderate supervisory content would be a letter to the Attorney General
with cover memo bringing AG up to date in a particular case. As example
of supervisory content of considerable degree would be instructions to interview
key witnesses on top priority cases setting out pertinent points to cover in the
interview or would furnish supervisory direction of a substantive investigation.
298
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 313
It is realized the above survey reveals only a small part of the
Division's production; however, it gives some insight into the amount of
actual supervision and direction being afforded the field as an overall
consideration. It is not felt or implied that a "letter writing" program for the sake
of writing letters be instituted as obviously this does not relate to supervision.
It may indicate, however, among other things, the amount of intensity of positive
supervision being afforded, as an over view and is being furnished for your
information as well as for mine.
The above analysis (manpower) reveals in your Division a need for
9 men on the McLek case, 2 for Chinese matters and one for Special
Coordination Unit. On a priority basis, inspection surveys reveal the manpower
is available as indicated. It is felt your Chinese program must "get going now"
in view of impending developments.
In addition, our proposals will allow you to assign men permanently
to McLek and make other necessary shifts in manpower to get away from
the temporary assignment basis you now have and which is disruptive to aïl
Sections involved. It is also acknowledged some of the realignment
indicated has been proposed by your Division in studies made by you prior
to this inspection.
299
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 314
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
CLERICAL
An analysis was also made of adequacy of clerical personnel within your
Division and after careful study it was determined that a reduction of 11 clerical
personnel is possible. This reduction could be made through attrition. The
reductions possible are graphically set forth in the chart below:
Internal Security and Research Branch
Internal Security Section
Klan and White Hate Groups - 3
New Left Section
-
1
Special Investigations - East – 1
Special Investigations - West - 1
Subversive Individuals - New Left – 1
Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch
Espionage Section
F
Special Cases - 1
Officials - New York - 1
Officials - WFO -1
Satellite - 1
Nationalities Intelligence Section
Middle and South American - 1
Our findings in most instances are based on a thorough review of the work
of the individual units plus case load allocations. The justification for the above -
mentioned reductions is set forth below under the individual Unit and Section
designation:
INTERNAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH BRANCH
Internal Security Section
Klan and White Hate Groups
Pursuant to the above proposal that this Unit be absorbed by the
Extremist Intelligence Section the two clerks and one secretary can be considered excess
inasmuch as the work presently being performed by these persons can adequately be
performed by the clerical personnel in the new Section.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 315
300
:
New Left Section
Special Investigations Unit - East
The surplus clerk presently work in g in this Unit is not
needed inasmuch as the four clerks permanently assigned to this Unit were
. adequately handling the work before he reported.
Special Investigations Unit - West
It is felt three clerks could handle the work in this Unit
inasmuch as three clerks in Special Investigations Unit - East handle a
comparative work load. The East Unit has four clerks; however, one clerk
handles Sabotage cases and the West Unit does not handle these matters.
Subversive Individuals New Left Unit
-
Although the case load in this Unit is high the work is routine
and can be handled quickly. The Special Clerk (GS-6 Reviewer) handles much
of the reviewing of communications thus saving clerical time. This Unit is
operating with one less Agent who is on loan to the McLek case. Due to a
comparison of the clerical work load of the Subversive Individuals Unit in the
Internal Security Section it is felt this Unit could operate with one less clerk.
ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
Espionage Section
Special Cases Unit
It is felt based upon the case load of this Unit being handled
by clerks, that with the assistance of the stenographer, this Unit could
adequately operate and function with one less clerical employee.
Officials - New York Unit
It is felt the clerk-stenographer assigned to this Unit could
handle the IRONCLAD indices in addition to taking dictation from supervisors.
This would leave the Unit with 2 stenographers for 3 supervisors and thereby
release the clerk who is presently handling the IRONCLAD indices.
Officials - WFO Unit
Based on the case load of this Unit, it is felt the clerk-steno-
grapher presently assigned could assist in clerical work, thereby releasing one
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 316
301
i
of the clerks presently assigned to this Unit.
Satellite Unit
This Unit presently has three regular clerks and two Special
Clerks. It is felt that one of the Special Clerks could assist in the regular
clerical duties, thereby releasing one clerk from this Unit.
Nationalities Intelligence Section
Middle and South American Unit
Based on the case load of this Unit it is recommended that
one clerk be released inasmuch as there does not appear to be sufficient work
for three clerks.
Comments of Assistant Director regarding Agent and clerical
adequacy requested.
307
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 317
'
ADDENDUM
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(CDB: djr 9/8/71)
I have thoroughly studied
the Inspector's comments
regarding adequacy of
personnel, both Agent and clerical, and have the following
observations to make:
1
I certainly recognize full well the need for
reorganizing and reallocating personnel to provide manpower
assistance to the Nationalities Intelligence Section which is
handling the McLek case. In fact, the proposed reorganization
of the Division as set forth in my memorandum of August 3,
1971, was based on the priority needs which arose from the McLek
case and which continue to be critical. As set forth in that
memorandum, manpower was to permanently be assigned to the
Nationalities Intelligence Section in order to avoid disruption
caused by handling this important case with temporary assignments.
In meeting the priority responsibilities in the
"
McLek case as well as in other critical areas, I am also
mindful that we do not have a surplus of manpower but are
undoubtedly faced with the supervision of more complex cases in
the security field with fewer Agents than at any other time in
the Bureau's history. Crises brought about by terroristic acts
of black extremists, Weathermen, antiwar activists, and other
extremists are increasing in intensity and from all indications
will continue to place heavy demands upon the Bureau.
Likewise,
the potential of Chinese Communist espionage activity in this
country is readily apparent and the increased activity of
Soviet Agents is a fact. These facts, coupled with special case
commitments, have stretched available manpower to the limit of
elasticity.
T
In making such manpower shifts, we must recognize that
there will be a weakening of the supervision of the area from
which the personnel are transferred and we must be prepared to
accept this, at least on a temporary basis, because in the long
run such weakening could be most harmful as well as embarrassing.
For example, the Inspector has indicated that two
supervisors could be transferred out of the Extremist Intelligence
Section and, in addition, that Section should absorb all Klan
and white hate cases (now being handled by two men in another
Section). Actually, this means absorption of the work of four
men by the remaining men in the Section (18). Put another way,
the work load has been increased by almost 25 per cent.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 318
303
As will be noted in the table set out hereinafter,
case loads are excessive in very sensitive areas of the Bureau's
responsibilities, e.g., Soviet espionage and black and New
Left extremists who are daily escalating their revolutionary
activity in our streets.
The utilization of manpower on specials, such as
the current nine men on McLek, will receive extremely close
scrutiny and will be reallocated to these other pressing work
areas as soon as possible as I do not believe the current
case loads allow adequate supervision for any extended period
of time.
No one realizes the potential threat which the
Red Chinese pose to the security of this country better than
I. We must recognize, however, that there has been considerable
planning on the Bureau's part dating back to the 1950s when we
had first indications that the United States might recognize
Red China. But the fact is that we have more important
priorities at this particular time evidenced by bombings,
assassinations, arsons and other terroristic acts daily
occurring by extremist elements within our investigative
responsibilities. We are faced right now with a very serious
internal security threat which demands immediate attention.
This does not minimize the Red Chinese threat at all but we
must recognize it is still a "potential" and until diplomatic
channels are opened and active espionage activity begins again
we must put "first things first." I believe affording one man
to that work area is the limit of our available resources at
this time.
With respect to the clerical reduction of 11 clerks,
which is to occur by attrition, I feel that a reduction of
this magnitude will definitely result in a hardship on the work
of the Division. I have repeatedly stressed that wherever
possible Agents should be relieved of as many duties as possible
by competent clerical personnel, thus resulting in considerable
savings of Agent manpower throughout the Division. A reduction
of the number of clerks, as recommended by the Inspector,
certainly will hamper our past streamlining efforts.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 319
304
Set forth below, by Branch, are more specific
observations with respect to the Inspector's comments and
recommendations; however, in summary, I desire to point out
that we cannot reassign manpower of the quantity involved for
an extended period of time and eliminate entirely by
attrition 11 clerks without such action having a deleterious
effect in certain areas of our operations. I am strongly
opposed to such lessening of our coverage in these areas but
if such recommendations are approved and ordered, I will do
my best to see that our responsibilities are fulfilled to the
maximum degree possible under the circumstances.
The following comments are made concerning
reallocation of Agent personnel to top priorities regarding
the Internal Security and Research Branch. The Inspector
recommends seven supervisors be reallocated from this Branch
to other work areas. Based on day-to-day experience in
these work areas and having available end of August case
count figures, the following alternatives are recommended
to make seven supervisors available.
Research Section;
The present supervisor assigned
to the Ellsberg case is a talented writer experienced in
complicated research projects and preparation of research
papers. He is utilized full time on the Ellsberg case in
this capacity and on his own time continues to handle some
speeches and research matters. Research Section will make a
second supervisor available for the Ellsberg case and the
original supervisor will return to Research Section as soon as
his project is completed on Ellsberg This is predicated on
the assumption a replacement will be provided this Section for
SA Ramey who was transferred to another Division.
Internal Security Section: Will make four
supervisors available instead of five as recommended by the
Inspector.
This is predicated on experience and present case
load regarding the Subversive Individuals Unit primarily and
also the Security Informant Unit. August 31, 1971, case count
for the Subversive Individuals Unit is 2,663 cases, in addition,
523 cases were opened and 496 cases were closed during August
in this Unit. This would be an average case load of 666 cases
per Agent, not including the opening and closing mail flow.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 320
305

In
The Security Informant Unit would be handling 904 cases,
averaging 452 cases when reduced to two supervisors.
Under the new case count system, these informant cases
are largely cases with mail in hand requiring attention
and close supervision because of funds being involved
as well as the general sensitivity of these cases.
the event of sick or annual leave, one man could not
possibly keep mail current and work loads in other units
would, as a practical matter, preclude use of other
personnel to carry out the work. The supervisor retained
would reduce the case load in the Subversive Individuals
Unit to a more reasonable and practical 533 case load
average and also allow for a limited degree of flexibility
in the informant matters from time to time as necessary.
This provides the seven men from this Branch. (This
includes one man from the New Left Section, as indicated.)
New Left Section:
as recommended.
Will make one man available
Regarding reallocation of Agent personnel to
top priorities regarding the Espionage Branch, the
following comments are made:
Extremist Intelligence Section will make two
supervisors available and absorb the 559 Klan and White
Hate cases with no Agent personnel. It must be borne
in mind this, in effect, constitutes a net reduction of
four supervisors to black extremist matters at a time
when these activities are on a definite upswing. This
can be lived with on a short term emergency basis and
as manpower becomes available from the inevitable winddown
of McLek, appropriate recommendations will be considered
within the Division as to reallocation of that manpower
with this in mind consistent with overall Division needs
at that time.
Nationalities Intelligence Section will make two
men available as recommended. With regard to the two.
Units being reduced, it is pointed out that the Middle
and South American Unit is responsible for matters
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 321
306
relating to 32 countries. There are five Legal Attache
(Legat) Offices located in countries handled by the Unit
and each of these offices, except Mexico, covers more
than one country. The Nationality Unit is responsible
for matters relating to 101 countries. Eleven Legat
Offices are located in the area of responsibility of this
Unit and most of these Legat Offices cover more than one
country.
There is a high volume of material which is
received daily in these Units consisting of intelligence
information from other agencies and news media material.
All of this material must be reviewed in order that the
supervisors will be in position not only to handle inquiries
from any source relating to matters of Bureau responsibility
in the nationalities intelligence field but also to process
the high level intelligence (HILEV) items which are
received from Legats. The latter is a very heavy
responsibility since we recognize that if one high-level
item goes to the President and he acts on it, and it
proves to be incorrect, not only the Bureau but the
White House itself might encounter serious problems.
During month of August, of 106 HILEV items received from
Legats, 51 were processed by the Nationality Unit and
34 by the Middle and South American Unit. Each of the
two units disseminated 30 HILEV items. Dissemination
of each HILEV item consumes approximately one hour of a
supervisor's time.
With regard to the Nationality Unit, which has the
lowest average case load per supervisor, other matters
handled in the Unit not reflected by caseload are:
providing for installation and maintenance of continued
coverage in sensitive areas essential to the fulfillment
of requests of the National Security Agency (Telex.
Coverage, 64 at present); establishing and maintaining
highly sensitive coverage also for National Security Agency,
relating to electronic penetration of communications
equipment; supervising and coordinating on a recurring
basis coverage relating to the various United Nations
General Assembly sessions (which includes close working
relationship with Secret Service); maintenance of all
Bureau liaison with National Security Agency.
It must be borne in mind the reduction of four case
supervisors from the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence
Branch and seven case supervisors from the Internal Security and
3069
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 322
Research Branch are accepted to meet an emergency situation
(McLek case) but these reductions are not considered consistent
with adequate supervision nor offer necessary flexibility within
Sections to meet emergencies and specials as they arise when
viewed in terms of an extended period of time. It is expected
the McLek case, as with all specials, will ultimately wind down.
At that time and as personnel are available for reallocation,
appropriate recommendations will be made and considered within
the Division as to their commitment based on work loads at the
time consistent with the overall needs of the Division.
Supervisory Case Load Averages
The following chart graphically displays case loads
per Section (excluding men on special or non-case assignment)
as of August 31, 1971, and with the proposed shift of manpower
contained herein which closely adheres to the Inspector's
recommendations.
Add or
Delete
Present
Proposed
SAS
Cases
Nationalities Intelligence 286
315
-1
0
Extremist Intelligence
298
331
0
+559
Espionage
334
312
+1
0
Internal Security
444
477
-2
-559
•
New Left
333
333
0
0
Research
-
-2
Division
335
341
-1
It must be borne in mind the "Add or Delete" column
pertains only to supervisors now included in case count
computations as being assigned to regular case load duties and
does not portray total movement as recommended. Some of those
included in the recommendations are already on special assignment
(McLek, etc.). For example, Extremist Intelligence and New Left
Sections will merely make permanent the personnel on loan to
McLek and, therefore, are listed as zero. Espionage will get a
man back and is listed as +1.
308
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 323
Nationalities Intelligence Section is giving up two
men from present assignment, one to the Chinese Unit and one
to Special Coordination Unit. The latter is a non-case
assignment and deletes one man from computation of average case
load in the Section which brings that Section more in line with
the present Division average of 335 cases per case supervisor
under the new rules for case count. This also results in one
less supervisor committed to case supervision and alters the
Division average per case supervisor to 341 cases.
It is recognized the Internal Security Section has a
high average case load per Agent, however, that Section has
less organization cases and proportionately more individual
matters requiring less supervisory attention than other Sections,
This will be followed closely and depending on approval of
transferring EID and ARL cases to this Division and/or
resolution of Eastcon and appropriate recommendation will be
made to adjust a block of work internally within the Division
to create a better balance there.
309
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 324
}
As to the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence
Branch clerical reduction recommendations, the following
comments are made.
Nationalities Intelligence will reduce one clerk
as recommended.
i
In the Espionage Section there are 16 substantive
desk supervisors with 13 clerks actually performing the work
for these supervisors, a ratio of .81 per supervisor. To
reduce this number by four would result in the ratio .56 or
roughly 1/2 clerk per supervisor.
-
-
The Clerk-Stenographer position provides the
incumbent to perform clerical work only 20 per cent of her
time. The use of a Clerk-Stenographer in the Special Cases,
Officials New York, and Officials Washington Field Units
thus would not absorb the extra work placed on the remaining
clerks in these Units and such is not considered feasible.
The use of a Special Clerk now handling cases in lieu of a
Special Agent supervisor in the Satellite Unit to handle clerical
functions for a Supervisor would defeat the purpose of
establishing this position and would place an unfair burden
of responsibility on that Special Clerk who should be free to
concentrate on the supervision of her own cases.
In summary, it is felt that the present clerical
assignment is the minimum number necessary to handle the
voluminous work associated with 5,575 cases currently
assigned to this Section.
The Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the
case load of 559 cases but will need a minimum of one clerk
to accompany these cases. This Section was not recommended
by the Inspector to reduce clerical complement and it is
not felt practical to absorb 559 cases and no clerical
personnel. This is particularly true when it is considered
no Agent personnel are being received with these cases.
I believe the above reductions, totalling three, are in
good faith with the Inspection Staff's and my own desire to
obtain maximum utilization of personnel and continue an
efficient and practical operation. Further reduction would
merely result in Agents performing clerical functions, and with
the continued escalation in case loads and current special cases
being handled, I do not believe further reductions can be made
within the bounds of good personnel management and best
utilization of clerical vs. Agent manpower.
310
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 325
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
CLERICAL
i
1
The following comments are made concerning reduction
of clerical personnel in the Internal Security and Research
Branch.
Internal Security Section: In the past, it has been
necessary on a frequent basis to afford considerable clerical
assistance from the Klan and White Hate Groups Unit to the
Subversive Individuals Unit because of the extremely heavy
clerical duties involved in the escalating case loads carried
in this Unit, coupled with 523 cases opened and 496 cases
closed during the past month, for example. It is necessary
and warranted to retain two of the three clerical personnel in
the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization
in the Subversive Individuals Unit. If this is not done, it
will result in an impractical clerical work load, with nowhere
to draw upon clerical help and result in supervisors being
additionally burdened with clerical functions, which they can
ill afford to handle. This would also be consistent and in line
with the assignment of Agent personnel in this Unit detailed
previously and allow one clerk per Agent, which is adequate
but not excessive for the type of work involved.
-
-
New Left Section: It is believed the Special
Investigations East and Special Investigations West Units
can function with one less clerk each as recommended by the
Inspector. It is not believed good management, however, to
reduce a clerk in the Subversive Individuals New Left Unit.
With one supervisor reduced, the clerical work remains the same
and retention of the clerk would allow one clerk per Agent,
which is adequate but not excessive for the type of work
involved. With the very heavy case loads in this Unit, coupled
with 768 cases opened and 776 cases closed within the past
month, for example, clerks are extremely busy. Reduction in
clerical staff merely means Agents will have to perform clerical
functions which is uneconomical and hardly practical with the
work loads involved.
Bearing in mind Agent manpower reductions in the
Internal Security and Research Branch, it is believed the Branch
can operate with efficiency and in good faith with the
Inspection Staff and Divisions desire to use manpower to its
fullest and make the above three clerical reductions.
$
3/$
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 326
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:bhg, 9/9/71)
Your comments and proposals with
respect to the reallocation of Agent
personnel within the Division appear
logical and are acceptable. However, exception must be made with
respect to clerical employees.
You state it is necessary and warranted to retain 2 of the 3 clerical
personnel in the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization
in the Subversive Individuals Unit of the Internal Security Section. Based
upon figures available the case load within the Subversive Individuals Unit
approximates 2700 cases handled at present by three clerical employees
giving an average case load per clerk of approximately 900 cases. Retaining
one of the Klan clerks would result in an average case load per clerk of
675 cases which is not felt unreasonable or intolerable a burden. Further,
it is not felt that less than 1 clerk per Agent is too great a load for the Unit.
Turning now to the Espionage Section based on our survey it was felt
that 4 clerical positions could be voided through attrition, based primarily
on greater utilization of clerk-stenographers on clerical duties. You state
that, the clerk-stenographer position provides the incumbent to perform
clerical work only 20% of her time. At present there are 10 secretaries
and clerk-stenographers available for transcription of communications.
A survey of communications conducted during this inspection revealed that
the Espionage Section dispatched 121 pieces of correspondence during a
5-day period, which results in approximately 12 communications per
secretary or slightly over 2 communications per day per employee. This
does not indicate a great work load on the secretarial force and consequently
it is felt that clerk-stenographers could be freed for clerical functions where
necessary.
In view of this it is felt that at least two clerical positions
could be dissolved through attrition within this section.
With respect to the Extremist Intelligence Section, you indicate that
the case load of 559 cases can be absorbed but a minimum of one clerk
will be needed to handle these cases. Based upon case load figures available
should this clerk not be made available the average case load per clerk
within the Black Nationalist East Unit would increase from approximately
470 to 660 cases. Black Nationalist - Central from approximately 715 to
940. Black Nationalist - South from approximately 780 to 1000, and the
Black Nationalist - West from approximately 210 to 350 cases per clerk.
Particular note should be made of the average case load per clerk increase
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 327
312
1
within the Black Nationalist - West Unit should the cases be absorbed there
with no added clerical employees. In view of the above it is felt that the
Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the additional cases without an added
clerk.
Based on the above it can be seen that at least 7 clerical positions could
be dissolved without an unreasonable burden being placed on the remaining.
318
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 328
T
SUGGESTION MEMORANDA
SUGGESTION
NW 88608 'Docld:32989638 Page 329
MEMORANDA
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
RE: PAYMENTS TO SECURITY INFORMANTS
AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES
FOR E. S. MILLER:
Present regulations allow for payments up
to $400 with SAC authority on a COD basis
individuals being developed as informants on security matters. (Manual
of Instructions, Section 107, page 14.) Once the individual is paid $400 and
it appears he will furnish information on a regular basis, recommendation
could be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis." Such authorization
is through usage of FD-401. After the initial payments are approved, every
6 months an FD-401 is submitted requesting continuance, and, if approved,
is stamped "approved" at the Bureau and returned. (Manual of Instructions,
Section 107, page 15.)
In view of current Government-wide economy move and the Bureau's
own economy program, it is imperative that the field exercise great care and
scrutiny in payments to informants to assure that payments on a "regular
basis" are fully justified and are not serving as an administrative crutch and
expedient in lieu of payments under SAC authority.
A survey has been made of 80 files of informants who are presently
being paid on a regular basis with respect to the date the informant was
approved as a PSI, the date approval was given to pay him on a regular basis,
and the amount paid the source under SAC authority before Bureau authority
was sought to pay him on a regular basis.
In the following 34 informant files authority was granted to pay the
source on a regular basis before the field used the full amount that could
have been paid under SAC authority, representing 42.5% of the total cases
reviewed:
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/3/71
JMM:bhg
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 330
314

i
- 2 -
134-6062*
134-19815*
134-20126
170-4092
134-6201*
134-19383
134-20310
134-18123*
134-4628*
170-4295
134-20026
134-21762
134-10548*
134-20302
134-19732
134-21218
134-20170
134-19115
134-18818
170-4355
134-6316*
134-19168
134-20998
134-21305
134-21561
134-20038*
134-20997
134-21179
134-20687
134-21173
134-17812
134-20051
134-13545*
134-19931
Those files marked with an asterisk indicate that only token amounts
had been paid under SAC authority ranging from $25 to less than $100.
This analysis would indicate SACS are abdicating authority to
approve paying sources the full amount allowed before seeking Bureau per-
mission to pay on a regular basis.
In the following 17 instances the Bureau approved the field's com-
munication seeking approval of an individual as a PSI in which the same com- `
munication also asked approval to pay the source on a regular basis;
134-10532
134-8857
134-13507
134-14523
105-188201
134-20302
134-20608
134-12826
170-4355
134-21179
134-20170
134-19228
134-21516
134-19815
134-19383
134-20175
170-4295
In the following 19 cases the Bureau approved sources being paid on
a regular basis within 45 days of their being approved as a PSI:
134-6201
134-20445
134-19967
134-20089
170-768
134-17689
134-20833
134-21762
134-20687
134-20773
134-20051
134-17337
134-19168
134-21584
134-16923
134-21622
134-18818
134-18059
134-17762
These 36 cases (17 +19) represent 45% of those files reviewed and
indicate the field's undesirable practice of asking approval to pay sources on
a regular basis upon obtaining approval to develop the source as a PSI. It
does not appear that contacts with these individuals are over a sufficient
period of time to conclude the source is furnishing data on a regular basis
to justify paying him on a regular basis.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 331
315
- 3 -
A representative number of informant files were checked where the
full amount under SAC authority was not utilized and it was determined pay-
ments were over a 3.3 month period, for an average monthly payment of
$73.00 for each source. Subsequent to receiving approval to pay the source
on a regular basis each source received an average of $152 over the next
6-month period. It is concluded that if payments had continued for a longer
period under SAC authority before paying on a regular basis, an average of
approximately $80 less per month would have been expended in each case.
On an annual basis this would be $960. Estimating that as few as 33% of the
present number of Security Informants including New Left, Old Left (CPUSA),
Extremists, Klan and other White Hate Groups have been developed in the
past two years of the 1507 total number of Security Informants presently being
paid on a regular basis, this could be projected into $240,000 less having been
spent each year on these sources.
Consequently, it appears every effort should be expended to insure
that payments to informants on a regular basis should be initiated only after
the source has furnished data on a continuing basis for at least 6 months and
after he has been paid the full amount under SAC authority on a COD basis
for value received. There should be no objection to the field's obtaining
Bureau authority to pay source up to another $400 SAC authority before paying
on a regular basis. Certainly, the request to approve an individual as a PSI
should not be coupled in the same communication with a request to pay that
individual on a regular basis. (Of course, in exceptional and unusual cases
facts could warrant conclusion that some sources could be paid on a regular
basis in a shorter period of time.) This will also help to preclude informant's
obvious conclusion that he is being paid on a salary basis because of the
similar amounts paid to him each month.
In addition, all communications approving the initial payments on
a regular basis to security informants outed through Mr. Tolson's Office
for review and approval.
It is felt a wider usage of payments under SAC authority to security
informants, will in the long run, serve to substantially reduce total payments
to them and further implement efforts to curtail costs in accordance with the
Director's and President's recent directives on economy.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
316
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 332
дет
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
(JAS: ebc 9/8/71)
Security and extremist
informants are essential
to the Bureau's investi-
gative responsibilities. They operate largely in controversial
areas of old line and new left revolutionary organizations and
individuals as well as in the volatile fields of black and white
extremism and racial dissension. They are fraught with controversy
and potential for embarrassment to the Bureau. Extended experience
has taught us the absolute necessity for tight, effective, cen-
tralized control of these informants by SOG.
Fundamentally, whether an informant is paid under SAC
authority or on a regular basis by SOG the same standards of
justification are to be applied. The distinguishing element is the
flexibility of on-the-scene, spot payment authority available to
the SAC on a daily basis without the formality of time-consuming
correspondence with Bureau headquarters. Money is paid in both
situations on a c.o.d basis and full value must be received before
nayments are made. Initial payments to a developing informant under
SAC authority, usually made on an expedient emergency basis, are
not reviewed and evaluated at the SOG. The judgment of the SAC
prevails. Generally the Bureau approves payments on a regular
basis only when emergency and exceptional local conditions no
longer prevail, when the informant is active, productive and gives
promise of continuing to be so.
Should the currently authorized initial SAC-authorized
$400 be expended rapidly--as is frequently the case--
--there is no
objection to the field's obtaining Bureau authority to pay a
second $400 to an informant under SAC authority. This does
require justification through submission of full facts in the
matter for SOG judgment, similar to the justification required
each six months for informants paid on a regular basis.
Authorization for SAC authority to permit such payments
up to six months before the field requests regular payments from
the Bureau as suggested by the Inspector, could dilute both the
central and consistent control of payments at the Bureau and could
cause an increase in paper work required to implement the
procedure. SAC authority currently has no fixed time limit for
expenditures and in many cases this authorization could be
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 333
318
expended before the termination of a six-month development
period thus requiring additional paper work in the field
and resultant supervisory work at the Bureau.
It is extremely difficult to draw meaningful
conclusions concerning any savings between payments under
SAC authority and costs accrued under delayed SOG approval
of payments on a regular basis. The informant while operating
under SAC authority is in a developmental stage. It can be
expected that at any given point in his development whether
. he continues on SAC authority or is approved for regular
payments, expenditures to him will increase. It is the natural
and practical order of informant development.
The sooner a developing security or extremist
informant can be brought under SOG control the more effective
and consistent becomes his supervision. The SAC remains
accountable, of course, for the informant's handling, the
validity of his expenditures, and the worth of his information.
Additional supervision, based on broad field needs and applied
with consistency to the over-all policies of the Bureau,
necessarily is furnished by SOG supervisors and officials.
This amounts to far more effective field-wide supervision of
these sensitive matters.
Strict economy continues to be the rule in Bureau
supervision of security and extremist informants. During the
period 4/1/70 through 6/70 for example as a result of reviewing
regular payments to informants $4392 was saved. During the
period 1/1/71 through 3/1/71 $5156 was saved. More recently
on 8/20/71 a letter to all offices instructed them to cut back
five per cent in their total payments to security and extremist
informants--a projected saving of $129,000.
It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the
over-all sensitivity of security and extremist informants, current
procedures allowing for initial payments under SAC authority with
a shift to Bureau approval of payments on a regular basis as the
informant progresses and develops productivity, provide the most
effective and consistent field-wide supervision for the over-all
needs of the Bureau.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 334
-2-
317
:
While there is no objection to the Inspector's
suggestion that all communications approving initial payments
on a regular basis to these informants be routed through
Mr.. Tolson's office for review and approval it must be pointed
out, of course, that this creates a substantial increase in the
preparation and review of related correspondence, not previously
required. In view of this forseeable increase in work load,
it is respectfully suggested that we continue to handle initial
payment correspondence under existing regulations.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 335
- 3 .
-
319
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:bhg, 9/8/71)
Your comments have been noted
and you will be advised as to any
further action necessary.
Assistant Director please note.
gar
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
(JAS:sjr 9-8-71)
The above observations
by the Inspector have
been noted.
320
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 336
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
SURVEY CONCERNING COMPUTERIZATION OF
SECURITY INFORMANT INDICES
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: During this inspection, it was noted.
that the Securi ty Informant Index is
under the supervision of the Security Informant Unit, Internal Security
Section. This Index contains certain data concerning security and potential
security informants but does not include the extremist, probationary
extremist, or extremist-ghetto informants. It must be maintained on a
timely basis. As of 8/24/71, the Index had approximately 2026 informants.
This Index is maintained by 2 GS-5 clerks, one GS-3 clerk, and 30% of the
time of a GS-4 stenographer on a full time basis. This means that 3 1/3
employees are utilized to maintain this Index at an annual cost of
approximately $20,000.
SAC Letter 71 21 (C) dated 5/18/71 instructs the field to give
à symbol number designation to all individuals being developed as any type
of a Bureau source of information. This required the field to submit
secure teletypes to the Bureau concerning every source under development
and has resulted in a backlog of work in the Index of approximately 45 to 60 days.
In each instance, the clerical staff is required to pull and alter 2 cards (FD 348)
on each existing source or make 2 cards on any new sources. Subsequent
communications add or delete from the original information which requires
the cards to be again pulled and appropriate changes recorded.
* " ༤༧
It would appear that this Index would benefit from being
computerized which would result in a savings of clerical time and personnel.
In addition to the informants now handled by the Index, other informant indexes
could probably be computerized with a similar savings.
At the time of the last inspection, the Inspector suggested that
record keeping operations throughout the Division should be considered for
computerizing where feasible. It is suggested that immediate steps be taken
through surveys and conferences to determine if it is plausible and/or
practical to computerize and expand informant indexes similar to that
already done to the Securi ty. and Agitator Indexes. Consideration should be
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/3/71
RHM:mea
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 337
321
given to the initial and continuing costs and redesigning the source information
: card (FD 348). The security of this information must be considered as
data concerning informant matters is highly sensitive.
Comments of Unit Chief Grigalus; Section Chiefs Gray,
Shackelford, G. C. Moore, Branigan, and Wannall; and Assistant Director
Brennan are requested.
NW-88608_Docid:32989638 Page 338.
322
UNIT CHIEF GRIGALUS AND SECTION CHIEFS GRAY, SHACKELFORD,
G. C. MOORE, BRANIGAN AND WANNALL: The Security Informant
Index contains certain data concerning present and former
informants and sources. This data basically consists of
the identity of the informant with limited background
information. The primary reason for such an index is to
have a central repository containing the number and
identities of informants. This information is readily
accessible. Informal discussions have been held in the
past concerning feasibility of computerizing the Security
Informant Index as well as the Extremist Informant Index.
During course of these discussions, there were two prime
considerations; namely, the ready accessibility of
information on the indexes as well as the saving of
manpower and cost to the Bureau. Previous discussions
did not result in a positive recommendation to computerizing
the above indexes. It is noted that the present indexes
are serving the Bureau's purpose. In order to insure that
all avenues of savings are considered, the Inspector's
suggestion will be carried out. Surveys and conferences
with our expert personnel in the automatic data processing
field will be conducted to determine if such an operation
is feasible, practical and economical, keeping in mind
the accessibility of the information and the security of
informants. It is proposed, therefore, that this
suggestion be immediately acted upon.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(JAS: cb - 9/7/71)
I agree that it would
be desirable to carry
out this suggestion.
I will follow this matter closely to determine if such an
operation is feasible.
323
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 339
:
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANT
DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY INTERNAL SECURITY
AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS
NSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
At the time of the last inspection a
suggestion was submitted (pages 227
233) pointing out advantages in implementation of a program in this area of
operation which would make our approach to both above types of informants
and Extremist (Racial) informants uniform. You agreed to implement for
one year; however, your subsequent efforts to initiate the program were lost
in a "security of transmitting problem. "
Your Extremist Intelligence Section solved the same problem by having
the field send their informant reports to the Bureau by secure toletype and
it is understood that method of handling is satisfactory. The overall
Extremist Informant Program also appears productive.
It is recommended that you again favorably consider the prior suggestion
and tailor implementation after its counterpart in the Extremist Section.
Administration of such a program should be more efficiently handled now
since you have reinstituted handling of these informants by a Security
Informant Unit.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(JAS;cb 8/27/71)
-
This suggestion will be
favorably considered.
A careful analysis will
be conducted to tailor the suggestion to the needs of the
Sections affected, keeping uniformity in mind. This matter
will be closely followed by me.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/26/71
ESM:wmj
324
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 340

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING
INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL
CASES BY LEGAL ATTACHES
ஆடி
SPECTOR EDWARD S.
ECTOR
MILLER:
The Foreign Operations Policy
Manual, Section 10, page 1,
provides that Legal Attaches should submit investigative
results by cover letter or cover page,on FD-263, letterhead
memorandum, or informant evaluation memorandum. The Manual
of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 21,
provides that when reporting information in criminal and
civil type cases received from the Bureau's Legal Attache,
the information should be attributed to a confidential
source abroad. In reports the source would be identified
on the administrative page.
During the course of the recent inspection of our
Legal Attache Offices, it was noted that generally Legal
Attaches would furnish investigative results in criminal
cases by airtel or letter where more expeditious means of
communications was not necessary. In some instances, these
· communications would be rather lengthy. Upon receipt of
these communications by the respective field office and
if preparation of a report was desired, the information from
the Legal Attache would have to be retyped, attributed to a
¨ confidential source abroad, and the identity of the source
set out on the administrative page of the report. This
rather burdensome task could be dispensed with if the Legal
Attache would prepare an insert setting forth information
: and attributing it to a confidential source abroad. The
insert would be transmitted by airtel or letter with the
identity of the source set out.
The above is being brought to your attention for
appropriate comment and if felt beneficial, the Foreign
Operations Policy Manual should be amended to include inserts
as the fourth means of reporting investigative results by the
Legal Attaches.
Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant
Director Brennan are requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
JFH:bsf
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 341
کی دونی
UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING
INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL
CASES BY LEGAL ATTACHES
S
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
Nationalities Intelligence Section
GAD: hc 8/20/71
The procedure pro-
posed by the
Inspector could be
utilized by our foreign offices in those cases where they
recognize that an investigative report must be prepared
and where the information developed abroad is suitable
for inclusion in such a report. We do not believe, however,
that across-the-board instructions should be issued requiring
this procedure in all instances, nor do we believe that such
· a requirement was visualized by the Inspector inasmuch as
he suggests amendment of the Foreign Operations Policy
Manual to include inserts as one of four means of reporting
investigative results by the Legal Attaches.
In fact,
Legal Attaches now prepare FD-302s in certain cases when
specifically requested by the field. These are, of course,
restricted to cases in which testimony or evidence from
abroad is anticipated.
:
The minimal clerical staff abroad is insufficient
to prepare inserts or FD-302s in more than a relatively few
cases. The high volume handled by most of our Legal Attaches
requires them to use every possible streamlining device to
reduce the clerical burden. In Ottawa, for example, our
Legal Attache utilizes a specially printed RCMP routing
slip to forward RCMP prepared letterhead memoranda. Any
requirement that Ottawa prepare inserts or FD-302s in any
volume would be impractical. We propose, therefore, to
amend the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include
inserts as a fourth means of reporting without levying a
requirement that it be utilized on a wholesale basis.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D.BRENNAN
DEM:mit 8/23/71
The Inspector's suggestions
and the comments of Section
Chief Wannall have been noted and we will amend the Foreign
Operations Policy Manual to include the Inspector's suggestion.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
GAD: hc
NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page-342
326
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
BLACK NATIONALIST PHOTOGRAPH ALBUM
NSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The Black Nationalist Photograph Album
(BNPA) was approved and established
In 1968 and at this time contains the photograph and biographical
data of 472 black extremists who travel extensively in this
country and abroad. Each field office plus Legal Attaches,
Ottawa and Mexico City, maintain this Album to assist in coverage
of movement of black extremist individuals in the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. The Album appears to be an excellent
investigative aid by making immediately available photograph
and background data on individuals traveling from one Division
to another or out of the country whose activities must be
followed.
A review of files discloses at least 10 individuals
who are included in the BNPA traveled to Paris in the recent
past. It is noted a favorite route of Black Panthers traveling
to Algeria is through Paris. In view of the increased activity
on the part of the Cleaver Faction of the Black Panther Party,
it can be assumed that travel of individuals affiliated with the
Cleaver Faction to and from Cleaver's headquarters in Algeria
will continue or increase. In view of these travels, the
Legal Attache, Paris, could utilize the BNPA to facilitate
expedite coverage of these extremists while in France.
A review of the BNPA itself reveals that some of the
photographs attached to the FD-432 in this file do not have the
names of the individuals photographed on the back of the photo-
graph. These photographs should have the individual's name on
the back in the event the photographs become detached from the
FD-432.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
BNPA.
}
1.
That Legat, Paris, be provided with a copy of the
2. If a further pattern of travel develops into an
area covered by another Legal Attache, consideration should
then be given to making available a copy of the BNPA to that
Legal Attache.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
STIC
8/23/71
JTR:wmj/mkl
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 343
327
ren
3.
That a review be made of all FD-432's contained
in the BNPA to insure that all photographs are identified
with the name of the individual described on the specific form.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief
George C. Moore requested.
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION:
☐
The BNPA has been reviewed
and subject's name placed on
the back of all photographs where not previously done.
Legal Attache, Paris, will promptly be provided a copy of
the BNPA. If in the future it appears that the BNPA will be
of value to other Legal Attaches, consideration will be given
then to making available the BNPA to that Legal Attache.
GCM:acs
8/26/71
gor
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:
CDB:acs
8/26/71
- 2
328
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 344
concur with the above.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
RE: YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE
INTERNAL SECURITY
INSPECTORE. S. MILLER:
-
COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)
1
From a review of the matters being
handled by the New Left Section, it is
evident that the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the youth group of the
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), is the fastest growing subversive youth
group in this country. In August, 1970, membership was estimated to be
1100. During the SWP convention which was held in August, 1971, it was
determined that YSA membership had grown to 1500 members.
It is noted YSA played an important role in the activities of the
National Peace Action Coalition during the April - May, 1971, antiwar
demonstrations in Washington, D. C.
YSA has numerous chapters throughout the United States, primarily
on campuses. In addition, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the
War in Vietnam (SMC) has chapters on many campuses. The SMC is
nothing more than a front group for the YSA and is dominated and controlled
by YSA.
YSA claims it had recruited 450 new members into its ranks during
the Spring of 1971.
Its leaders have called for aggressive YSA recruiting among colleges
this fall and have set a goal of at least doubling their present membership.
YSA leaders have called for student strikes on campuses this fall
in order to close them down and attempt to organize them for antiwar work.
The SWP is attempting to place its candidates on ballots in 32 states
and YSA is being called on to assist in a vigorous election campaign. SWP
and YSA plan to use this campaign as a means of recruiting new members
to their ranks. It is noted YSA is planning to hold its national convention
in Houston, Texas, late this fall.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/2/71
TMJ:wmj
Я
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 345
329
سة
-2-
In view of the above and because of existing criteria which was
approved by the Department that membership in YSA is sufficient to place
an individual on the Security Index, the New Left Section should consider
issuing instructions to the field that sufficient effort be expended on their
investigations of YSA activities to insure that all YSA members are
identified and investigated for possible inclusion in the Security Index.
Comments of Section Chief Shackelford and Assistant Director
Brennan requested.
SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD
I fully concur with the
Inspector's observations
concerning this matter. We are carefully analyzing the informant
reports which are now being received concerning the results of
the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) National Convention and Young
Socialist Alliance (YSA) Educational Conference which was held
8/8-15/71. Considerable valuable information has been developed
concerning YSA's future plans and activities, including its plans
for an intensive recruiting campaign this fall. In addition,
YSA is continuing to play an extremely important role in the
activities of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) and
continues to dominate and control the nation-wide activities
of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in
Vietnam (SMC).
With appropriate approval, we will furnish all field
offices with the latest known plans and activities of YSA and
will instruct them to vigorously pursue their investigations of
the YSA and to insure all YSA members are identified and,
thereafter, to submit appropriate recommendations for placing
their names in the Security Index pursuant to existing Bureau
instructions.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
I concur. With
appropriate approval,
the field will be issued specific instructions.
330
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 346
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
RE: AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA
RE NEW LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS
SPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
The Espionage Section in close cooperation with
the Voucher -Statistical Section Administrative
Division, has designed and implemented an automated system known as the Soviet
Information Collation System. It is essentially a repository of pertinent data on
Soviet officials assigned to the U. S. Through the fast and easy manipulation of
this data by the computer, outputs arranged by important elements of information
can be readily and reliably obtained for Bureau use or dissemination to outside
agencies. The Espionage Section attests to the fact it has "streamlined our
operations, promoted uniformity and assured the highest level of accuracy. At
the same time, it has resulted in a substantial savings in time, money and man-
power, both in the field and at SOG."
€
It would seem reasonable a similar repository of information could be
collected regarding New Left and Extremist individuals. This would parallel
the SICS operation.
Various reports could be selected from this data such as an alphabetical
listing of Key Activist, New Left, and Extremist individuals. Other alternatives
would include listings by phone number according to geographical areas, listings
by addresses according to geographical areas, or listings by demonstrations in
which certain individuals have participated. Summary reports or listings, if
required for dissemination to the field offices or other interested agencies, could
be efficiently prepared under such a system. There are numerous other alternative
that come to mind; however, any consideration for such a program must clearly
take into account the need and benefit for such automation.
Comments of Section Chiefs Moore and Shackelford and Assistant
Director Brennan requested..
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/1/71
GNC wmj
331
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 347
i
RE:
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA
RE NEW LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS
да
SECTION CHIEFS MOORE and SHACKELFORD!
ACKELFORD MS
As indicated elsewhere
under Automatic Data
Processing (ADP), 5-Q, automatic data banks are utilized
extensively by the Extremist Intelligence and New Left Sections
in connection with the Computerized Telephone Number Filc
(CTNF). CTNF lists telephone numbers known to be utilized by
black, New Left and other ethnic extremist groups and individuals.
Telephone numbers included in CTNF are listed according to
geographic areas. In addition, a special project utilizing ADP
is being operated in connection with the EASTCON case. In this
EASTCON project, ADP analyses of telephone calls between EASTCON
subjects are made and also new subjects are identified through
ADD analyses of EASTCON toll calls.
At present, over 12,700 individuals making up the
Security Index (SI) have been incorporated into the Bureau's
computerized data bank and this data is available to all offices
through ADP. In connection with this ADP, SI project, identifying
data concerning each subject, as well as his residence and
business addresses, are included therein along with other pertinent
items such as his organizational affiliation. Over 20 separate
print-outs are prepared monthly for administrative and investi-
gative use of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the field.
The facilities of NCIC have also been utilized to
aid our investigations of New Left and extremist individuals.
"Stop Index" programs for Bureau use only at NCIC have been
devised which furnish notice of any police inquiry concerning
missing Venceremos Brigade subjects and all Priority I, SI
subjects who are extremists, unless they are already included in
the NCIC Wanted Persons File.
As indicated, much effort has been made to avail our-
selves of opportunities provided by ADP. The Inspector's
suggestion that further effort be made to expand our use of ADP
facilities, taking into consideration the need and benefit for
such automation, appears to have merit; this will be studied and
appropriate recommendations made as to its adaptability.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/2/71
✓ HM: sad.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 348
-
2
-
332
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR BRENNAN
concur with the above comments.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/2/71
HM:sad
$
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 349
3
333.
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
چیز
EM
SPRC
PREPARATION OF INTERVIEW REPORTS (FD-302)
IN SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATIONS
ENSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER:
From a review of the FBI
Handbook, Manual of Rules
and Regulations, and Manual of Instructions provisions
in regard to security type investigations, more particularly
espionage matters, Registration Act, security investigations,
internal security nationalistic tendencies matters,
security informants, and racial matters, it was noted that
no mention is made that information which may be the
subject of later testimony in judicial or administrative
type hearings must be made a matter of record on an
interview report (FD-302),
In this connection the Manual of Rules and
Regulations, Part II, Section 4. page 4a, makes reference
to the preparation of interview reports in security type
cases. Due to the discovery procedures existent in our
judicial system, the preparation of these interview reports
is most necessary particularly when dealing with information
of a testimonial nature received from security informants.
It is felt that quite possibly the seeming reluctance on the
part of investigative agents handling security matters to
prepare FD-302's may be due to the lack of mention of this
in the Manual and Handbook provisions dealing with security
investigations.
In view of the above, it is suggested that those
provisions of the Manual and Handbook having to do with
security type investigations be thoroughly reviewed and
amended where necessary to set forth the fact that when
information is received from security subjects, security
informants, or other individuals which may become the
subject of later testimony, an FD-302 should be prepared.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
JFH:bsf
E ADDED THE AMED THE HOTTESTY THE HO
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 350
334

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN,
The following are my
comments requested in
Inspector's Suggestion Memorandum entitled "Preparation of
Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security Type Investigations:"
Inspector notes at outset that from a review of the
FBI Handbook, Manual of Rules and Regulations and Manual of
Instructions in regard to the various types of security
investigations, no mention is made that information which may
be the subject of later testimony in judicial or administrative
type hearings must be made a matter of record on an interview
report (FD-302). Inspector does recognize that the Manual of
Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 4a, makes
reference to the preparation of interview reports in security
type cases.
In Section 4, Part II of the Manual of Rules and
Regulations, which Section pertains to Communications, there
is a subheading entitled "Reporting Information That May
Become Testimony," which is covered on pages 4 and 4a. It
is specifically stated on page 4, paragraphs 2b and c, that
FD-302s should be used when information is obtained which may
be the subject of testimony. At the very top of page 4a, a
specific reference is made to security-type cases and the use
of an FD-302 in these cases. The requirement for using an
FD-302 is further reiterated in paragraph 6 on page 4a.
Part I of the Handbook has a section commencing on
page 36, item 48, entitled "Reporting Information That May
Become Testimony." This is the counterpart to the Manual of
Rules and Regulations provisions cited immediately above.
The requirement for the use of an FD-302 is enunciated in item
number 48.
Of particular significance is the fact that both the
Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Handbook provide in
their respective Indices for the requirements discussed above.
In the Manual, the material is indexed under "Reporting
information that may become testimony" as well as under
"Testimony--reporting information that may become."
Handbook index has the same two references. It is therefore
obvious that the requirements for the use of an FD-302 are
logically and easily retrievable by reference to either or both
the Manual and Handbook.
The
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/24/71
SFP: rrd
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 351
335.
i
1
A cursory spot check of some criminal violations in
the Manual of Instructions notes that there is no specific
mention made for some violations and it is quite likely that
the specific requirement for use of an FD-302 is not spelled
out for each of the many, many criminal violations covered in
the various sections of the Manual of Instructions. The
requirement is covered in the Manual of Rules and Regulations
and the Handbook as are many other requirements which pertain
to the Bureau's work generally. A primary function of the
Manual of Rules and Regulations is to have in one place general
requirements that are applicable across the board in our work.
The Section relating to Communications referred to above is a
good example.
It was observed by the Inspector that "quite possibly
the seeming reluctance on the part of investigative agents
handling security matters to prepare FD-302's may be due to
the lack of mention of this in the Manual and Handbook
provisions dealing with security investigations." It is
respectfully observed that we have not noted any "seeming
reluctance" on the part of investigative Agents handling work
in the security field. We have found that the requirements
for the use of an FD-302 are being generally complied with and
when any shortcomings might be noted they are dealt with on
an individual case basis. In short, we have had no problems
in this area of our operations. It may be that the Inspector's
observations are based on noting rather few FD-302s in security
reports as compared with reports in the criminal field.
this be the case, it is observed that by and large our
obtaining of information in the security field is of an
intelligence nature with prosecutable situations being generally
the exception. In other words, situations where information
might become testimony are rather limited.
A further aspect of the Inspector's Suggestion
If
Memorandum relates to the preparation of FD-302s when obtaining
information from security informants. In this respect it is
observed that a great many of our security informants prepare
written reports which are firsthand accounts and thus preferable
to FD-302s which are secondhand accounts. Thus, the informants'
reports are even more valuable than FD-302s and are available
for the same purpose as are the FD-302s. When an informant
furnishes information orally which is not backed up by a written
report from the informant and the information may become a
matter of testimony, the Agent is under the same requirement to
execute an FD-302. We have not observed any failings to speak
of in this regard.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/24/71
SFP:rrd
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 352
336
In conclusion, it is my studied judgement that
there is no necessity for augmenting the requirement
concerning FD-302s in the various Manuals presently being
utilized in the FBI.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/24/71
SFP:rrd
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 353
337
1
1
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
J. F. Hanlon:wmj 8/27/71)
The primary intent of this suggestion was to point
up a possible problem developing as a result of
the increased number of criminal violations
being encountered by Special Agents handling security work. An excellent
illustration of this can be found in case captioned "Peoples Coalition for Peace
and Justice; IS-Miscellaneous," Bufile 100-459771. In WFO report of SA James F.
Whalen dated 5/7/71, serial 423, page 5, is found a narrative of events at a
demonstration on November 21, 1970, at New York. This information was not
placed on an FD-302 and became an issue at a preliminary hearing. As the
contents of this report were not on FD-302s it was necessary to excise pertinent
portions of the report and considerable issue of this was made at the preliminary
hearing. A further indication of this most necessary indoctrination of security
Agents in the use of FD-302s can be found in the EASTCON case. Your attention
is invited to an airtel under that caption dated 8/25/71 calling for an in-depth
interview of a key witness. In this airtel the supervisor felt it necessary to
instruct that the results of this interview be placed on an FD-302.
In light of the above, it is felt you should take whatever
action deemed necessary to bring to the attention of Special Agents working
security matters the necessity of placing information which could be testimony
on FD-302s. It is felt the matter should definitely be highlighted and then followed
in the individual cases.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested.
338
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 354
ger
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
Domestic Intelligence
Division is appreciative
of the observations and suggestions set forth in the
Inspector's Addendum. Accordingly, I am instructing all
Section Chiefs to stress this matter with all supervisory
personnel in the Division. Further, all of our supervisors
who regularly lecture to In Service classes and New Agents
classes will stress this matter. We will of course follow
the field in the individual cases where it is obvious or
even appears that the required action is not being taken in
the preparation of necessary FD-302s.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/27/71
* SFP:rrd
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 355
339
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
BLACK EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN PEŅAL INSTITUTIONS
EXTREMIST MATTERS
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
By airtel to all continental offices
8/26/71 under the above-mentioned
caption, all offices were requested to determine the extent of activity
and/or influence attributable to black extremists within penal institutions.
This was undoubtedly a result of the attempted prison break at San Quentin
Prison in California in which black extremist George Lester Jackson was
killed. Reports have indicated that Jackson had hidden a gun in his afro
haircut. Further, press releases indicate that when the maximum security
cell block was searched an afro hair-style wig was found.
Due to the numerous arrests made by our Agents, it is felt
that the field should be alerted to the secreting of weapons in this manner.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.
ASSISTANT, DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
&
I concur with the
suggestion of the
Inspector. The Extremist
Intelligence Section is preparing an airtel to all offices
alerting them to the possibility of secreting weapons as noted
above.
CDB:bad
གན་མདན། མ་***** *****ས ཆ
8-26-71
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/26/71
OFL:wmj
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 356
340
INSPECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 357
JANUARY 8-26, 1971
•
Page 5. why
ок
not leave in Haldeman
and Mardian as
acting in an
are
they
official capacity?
Page 7 PPz. Congressmen's name
ок
раде
око
раде 9
Page
Page
10
12
Page 13
-
-
debited here but not on
page 2 TP1. why?
#4. Haldeman - include?
Last IP - include names?
PP₁
ditts
Last TP - Liddy - include?
Mardian (lust PP)?
Mardian?
Page 14
mardian?
Pages 23-27 why not have in Berrigan?
Ellshing?
Berrigan? Ellsburg?
delete only info after
quate ends
?
page 26
Leave in
Page 52
Page 54
Page 68
パ
TPs Ehrlichman? "
PP3
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 358
Page
5
YES, BUTZ
Shouldn't "Israelo in
1st line be deleted?
In a separate paper, 550
SCOPE IS, & we
SSC has asked what
to tell them
Israeli. However, I think we should excise here.
PP₂ line 4. shouldn't
52
dijelomatic Communications
be deleted?
Gage
веде
109
Ac Ryan
Bocou not
Page
139
Witts re
we should discuss the
Boca program with
Wannall -re inclusion.
included in programs write-up.
Cointe Gurs
NW 88608 Docld:32989638-Page-359
}
DID. INSPECTION
1/8-36/71
RETAIN COpr
coer
Recommend entire document be classified "Secret,'
XGDS 1, 2, 3.
Portions recommended for excision from attached have
been underlined in red or bracketed in red in left margin.
Generally, criteria for excision were:
1. Information which could identify sources or
sensitive techniques
2. Names of individuals or organizations whose
privacy requires protection
3.
Information which would reveal our overall success
or lack of success in a given investigative area
Information from "Third Agencies" or friendly
4.
foreign agencies
5.
Chief level
Identities of Bureau personnel below the Section
The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in general,
disclose the extent of our commitment in specific areas of
counterintelligence activity. We have given the Committee
Administrative Division figures regarding total manpower
involved in security investigations but, to my knowledge, we
have not given them a breakdown as to where these personnel
are assigned. A policy decision is necessary as to whether we
want to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel"
sections of these inspection reports, precisely how much or
ho little manpower we have on specific types of investigations.
It is questionable whether the information regarding
criminal c
criminal 
cases in the San Francisco report is germane to the
Committee's inquiry. It would not seem improper to me to
delete all references to criminal matters and merely substitytę
a page saying that pages
relate to criminal
investigations."
me
to
i
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 360

NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 361
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
18-29 %
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS
Substantive Errors
•
East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives
Accomplishments
Internal Security Section
Research Section.
New Left Section.
.
Espionage Section
Page
9
12202233
24
•
.
43
•
50
Racial Intelligence Section
Nationalities Intelligence Section
Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs
Security Index Program
(Basic Revolutionary Organizations)
Security Informant Program
(Basic Revolutionary Organizations)
Counterintelligence Program
•
Disruption of White Hate Groups
Thumbnail Sketch Program
New Left Movement
•
Potential for Racial Violence
Security Index Program
Emergency Detention Program
•
64
•
64
66
67
67
.
70
•
71.
79
80
81
82
82
.
84
.
85
86
.
88
90
92
•
•
95
Security Informants
Technical and Microphone Surveillances.
ALEM Program
CANIL Program
•
DESECO Program.
East-West Exchange Program.
COKMA Program
Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased
by Soviets
BANPOP Program
Visitors to Communist China and Contacts
by U.S. Residents of Chinese Diplomatic
Establishments . .
Chinese Aliens Entering U.S. and Chinese
Entering U.S. Claiming U.S. Citizenship
Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign
Countries International Organizations
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 362
96
99
•
•
⚫.
102
Table of Contents (Continued)
Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside
Soviet-Bloc
CHICOIN
BOCOV .
Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic
and International Organization Visas
Security Index
Cuba .
American Repatriate Program
Cuban Refugee Program
Racial Matters.
Black Nationalist Movement.
Black Panther Party
Congress of African Peoples
Republic of New Africa.
SNCC
Junta of Militant Organizations
Nation of Islam .
•
•
Page
•
104
.105
•
.107
.
109
.111
.114
•
116
.117
• 119
.122
.126
.128
. 130
. 132
. 134
135
Communist Influence of Racial Groups.
Counterintelligence Program Black Extremists138
Key Black Extremist Program
. 144
•
•
- Black Student Groups on College Campuses. .145
Racial Informants
.
.
•
•
146
ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS
Administrative Write-Ups
Potential Double Agent Program
Espionage Section
Domestic Intelligence Division
.149
Coverage of Known Meet Areas (COKMA) Program 161
PERSONNEL MATTERS
Personnel Interviewed
•
Adequacy of Personnel
.
167
168
SUGGESTION MEMORANDA-
Addition of Suitable Designation
Racial Informants For Seat of Government Routing 205
Articles Concerning Activities of Racial Extremists
Research Section ...
208
Eqbal Ahmad
.
211
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 363
1/8-26/71
Table of Contents '(Continued)
Chinese Matters
Defector Program
Maximum Utilization of Ghetto Informants
Revision of Racial Informant Status Report
Form FD-405
•
-
Supervision and Control of Security Informant
Development and Coverage by Internal Security
and New Left Sections .
Venceremos Brigade
SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UPS
Robert P., Bokinsky
PSI-PO (134-19651).
Jan Adam Klasa
IS-PO
(105-186986)
Eric Nelson, PSI
IS-R (134-19669)
Vladimir G. Azaryan
IS-R (ATC-KGB)
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 364
Page
216
218
220
222
•
227
234
241
247
SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 365
Specific
SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS
4-B
INSPECTOR E.S. MILLER:
During the course of the inspection,
two substantive errors were detected
in files reviewed. Both of these errors involved inadequacies
in the supervision of Espionage related cases.
You should consider a further review and evaluation
of these matters in this area of your operation.
Assistant Director Brennan note.
Noted-ef
T
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
BDW.sfw
1/26/71
4-B
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 366
EAST COAST CONSPIRACY
4-A-1-a
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
You are requested to furnish. a very
brief narrative background r this
case from its beginning until the present time. In addition, you should
specifically outline the case developed on each subject showing probable
cause established as of this time. You are also requested to advise when
these cases will be presented to the Federal Grand Jury and indicate the
prospects in each instance for a return of a true bill.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
ESM:wmj
4-A-1-a
casentanter
EM
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 367
2
مع
4-A-1-a
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
C. D. BRENNAN
EAST COAST CONSPIRACY
کال
The East Coast Conspiracy is
a loosely knit movement com-
posed primarily of Catholic priests and nuns, teachers, students
and former students and others who have manifested opposition to
the Vietnam war by acts of violence against Government agencies
and private corporations identified as defense contractors. The
main thrust of their efforts has been vandalism of draft boards.
The Philadelphia Office developed an informant in
Lewisburg Penitentiary who was a confidant of Philip Berrigan
a Catholic priest serving time for destruction of Selective
Service records. Investigation by prison authorities determined
this informant had been transmitting messages in and out of
prison in a clandestine manner between Berrigan and Sister
Elizabeth McAlister
lister
, a nun associated with the Religious Order
of the Sacred Heart of Mary, Tarryiown New York. In addition
to transmitting letters to and from Berrigan, the informant met
on several occasions with followers of Berrigan such as Neil
McLaughlin and Joseph Wenderoth, unassigned Catholic priests
in Baltimore Maryland. Through these individuals he met
others associated with the movement.
Information contained in the letters and obtained as a
result of personal contacts of the informant produced information
showing this group intended to call attention to their anti-Vietnam
war position by blowing up the underground heating and electrical
systems servicing Government buildings in Washington, D. C., and
to kidnap a high Government official. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was
mentioned as a possible victim. The proposed target date for
these actions was February 22, 1971.
Following the arrest on September 6, 1970, of several
individuals associated with this movement for the destruction of
draft board records in Rochester, New York, which action included
extensive vandalism to the office of the U.S. Attorney as well as
our Rochester Resident Agency, the informant learned that the
leading activists in the movement intended to expand their
activities to include attacks against FBI offices. Informant also
learned from McAlister that the group intended to undertake some
sabotage-type action at Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey, on
an undisclosed date.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-11-71
FBG plm
4-A-1-a
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 368
3
East Coast Conspiracy
Because of the basic responsibility of this Division
for investigations involving subversive antiwar groups, overall
responsibility for this investigation was assumed by memorandum
dated September 10, 1970. This, of course, did not include
individual Selective Service violations existing in various
stages of prosecution or subsequent substantive violations in
which affiliates of this group were suspected of being involved.
This investigation has been specifically targeted to
two areas of prosecutive potential. First, to develop sufficient
evidence to prosecute leadership of this broad conspiracy to
impede the Government's functioning and conduct of the Vietnam
war. In this vein, a comprehensive review of pertinent material
discloses 16 related incidents from October 27, 1967, at Baltimore,
Maryland, to Rochester, New York, on September 6, 1970. Of 97
individuals involved in 16 incidents during this period, 25
persons have been established as being involved in three or more
of these incidents. This particular phase of the investigation
is most detailed and complex; however, in terms of far-reaching
damage to the movement, it is most significant. For example,
we have set up an extensive Automatic Data Processing (ADP)
project which resulted in a print-out showing over 300 telephone
calls of interest between telephone numbers utilized by these
conspirators and which corroborate information from the informant
regarding calls he received from principal conspirators.
Second, we are developing sufficient evidence to prosecute
the perpetrators of the plots to kidnap Presidential advisor
Henry A. Kissinger and to blow up the tunnels which contain steam
and electrical conduits between Government buildings in Washington, D.C.
Because of publicity given the plots to kidnap Kissinger
and to blow up the tunnels in Washington, D. C., it is imperative
this phase of the investigation be vigorously pressed toward
prosecutive action. Consistent with this objective the Federal
Grand Jury has been hearing evidence in this matter since December 18,
1970, and according to Departmental attorney Guy L. Goodwin will
return indictments concerning the above-mentioned plots on
January 12, 1971
Goodwin states the Federal grand jury will
continue to hear evidence regarding other facets of this complex
2.
4
NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 369
East Coast Conspiracy
matter and probably will return additional indictments at a later
date.
According to Goodwin, the Grand Jury will return indictments
ફામાં રeole
against six conspirators named below and seven individuals,
including Daniel Berrigan, will be named as unindicted co-conspirators
at this time. Those to be indicted are Philip Berrigan, Elizabeth
McAlister Joseph Wenderoth, Neil McLaughlin, Eqbal Ahmad, and
Anthony Scoblick.
Philip Berrigan:
Laboratory examination determined he authored letters
regarding plots to kidnap a high Government official and to blow
up tunnel system which were clandestinely transmitted out of
Lewisburg Penitentiary.
Elizabeth McAlister:
Laboratory determined she wrote letters to Philip
Berrigan regarding above plots. Investigation, including ADP
project, has also established her contacts with other conspirators.
Considered a leading activist in the movement.
Joseph Reese Wenderoth:
Leading activist of the movement and reported coordinator
of plot to blow up tunnel system, with responsibility for recruiting
necessary personnel. Met and discussed plan with informant. Auto-
mobile registered to Wenderoth and Neil McLaughlin observed at farm
in Northern Maryland reported by informant as training site used by
conspirators.
Neil Raymond McLaughlin:
plot.
Leading activist in the movement involved with bombing
Met with informant to discuss plot.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 370
--
کی

East Coast Conspiracy
Eqbal Ahmad:
Ahmad is Pakistani citizen and permanent resident alien.
He is a principal figure in the kidnaping plot. ADP project has
linked him with Wenderoth and McLaughlin.
Anthony Scoblick:
Involved in the bombing plot. He has met with informant
and discussed plot and ADP project produced calls between informant
and Scoblick's telephone.
ADDENDUM
INSPECTORS. MILLER:
1/18/ Wi
JAA/ERF: maz
This case was formally received by the
Domestic Intelligence Division on
9/10/70 and responsibility for same
assumed by memorandum of R. L. Shackelford
to C. D. Brennan dated 9/10/70. It is presently supervised by
Supervisor James F
James 
F. McGuire and overall supervision afforded by
Unit Supervisor Fred B. Griffith.
It is acknowledged that it was necessary to issue
instructions to the field cautioning them about conducting extensive
background investigations on members close to this conspiracy
prior to the presentation of facts of this case to the Grand Jury
to preclude the possibility of compromising an informant.
However,
the following suggested investigative action is being set forth for
your consideration inasmuch as it is of paramount importance that
you continue to press this matter vigorously. These suggestions
are not to be considered as all inclusive, but are being set forth
for your consideration and appropriate action:
1.
You should insure that the field aggressively
intensifies its investigation of this conspiracy including detailed
comprehensive background investigations on all subjects both
directly and indirectly associated with the ECCSL. It should be
emphasized, however, that utmost discretion and good judgment should
be exercised in the conduct of investigations of the principal
conspirators so that unfounded charges of harrassment cannot be
leveled against the Bureau.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
JAA/EFF:maz
-m
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 371.
During the conduct of these background investi-
gations the field should be particularly alert to every
potential opportunity for developing member informants in
not only the ECCSL but also in other sympathetic and
splinter groups which develop or spin off from the vortex
of this group.
It is noted that you have pointed out elsewhere
in this report that 97 individuals have been involved
in 16 separate and distinct organized incidents and attacks
on Government agencies and private corporations. Twenty-
five persons were involved in three or more such incidents.
2. The field should be appropriately instructed
to keep the Bureau fully advised of all demonstrations,
vigils, harrassment tactics, etc., conducted by sympathetic
groups and followers of the ECCSL. Such vigils and demon-
strations should be afforded sufficient appropriate coverage
to develop identities and background of leading activists
and sponsors of such sympathetic activities.
During these background investigations, particular
emphasis should be placed on developing sources of funds
and financing of the principal conspirators. A review of
this file noted that the subjects appear to travel frequently,
make numerous long-distance phone calls, rent cars, etc.,
yet outwardly, appear to have limited sources of income.
3. The field should be alerted to the distinct
possibility that other groups similar to the ECCSL are
formed as a result of the indictments returned in this
matter. Field offices should also be alerted to other
retaliatory actions by sympathetic groups attempting
to capitalize on the "persecution" theory thereby
exploiting the recent indictments as a sympathetic
rallying point for more conspiratorial activities.
Assistant Director note.
NW-88608 Docid:32989638 Page 372
EAST COAST CONSPIRACY
4-A-1-a
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
-
The suggestions and
comments of the Inspector
in this matter are pertinent, appreciated, and are being
complied with. Because this case is of national signifi-
cance and has received nation-wide publicity, you may be
assured it will continue to receive expeditious handling,
close supervision, and my personal attention.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
CDB:jlm
4-A-1-a
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 373
дай
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
4-E
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
Briefly set forth the noteworthy
accomplishments of your Division,
with a section breakdown, since the last inspection, which ended on 4/17/70.
This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical
accomplishments. Specifically where you have devised a program for a
definite purpose furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplish-
ments on this program. This will give you an opportunity to set forth any
Division achievements pertaining to the Bureau's progress, welfare,
efficiency or any other items not covered elsewhere in this inspection.
A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include
identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references
to such matters should be in general terms.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(JAS:mls 1/14/71)
Attached are individual
write-ups from each Section
in the Division pertaining
to the accomplishments of that particular Section.
al
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
ESM:wmj
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 374
q
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY
4-E
Attached are memoranda setting out the noteworthy
accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the
last inspection.
This Section is responsible for the supervision
of investigations of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), its
fronts; pro-Chinese communist groups; Trotskyist groups;
Klan and white hate groups; protest groups; international
organizations affiliated with the world communist movement,
the world Trotskyist movement and international New Left
movement, individuals affiliated with these organizations
and movements, as well as sedition cases. Our purpose is
to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these subversive
organizations and individuals under various statutes relating
to the internal security of the nation. This Section also
supervises development of security informants in basic
revolutionary organizations and, where appropriate, directs
counterintelligence operations against subversive groups
and individuals in cases under our supervision.
DID Inspection
1/12/71
RCP mkl
4-E
NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page 375
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT
The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves
C." Due to the
from the case entitled, "Solo, IS_
-3
sensitive nature of this case, it will be orally discussed
with the Inspector.
W
tha
In essence, this case involves sources developing
intelligence information of the highest quality concerning
the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), the Soviet Union and its
satellites, and the world communist movement. Since its
inception, 37 successful missions to communist countries
have been completed. Information developed by this
operation from high-level contacts in the world communist
movement is continually disseminated to the highest levels
of our Government and, in many instances, is information
not available from another source. Examples include the
following: the current struggle among the leadership of the
Soviet Union as of Spring 1970, and early Winter, 1970,
particular
struggle for nower during the
upcoming 24th Congress of the Communist Party of
of 
the
Soviet Union (CPSU); a message sent the Government of
North Vietnam by the CPUSA. giving suggestions on how
North Vietnam could aid antiwar protest groups in the
United States; the Soviet reaction to the treaty signed by
West Germany with the Soviets, along with secret portions of
this treaty which have not yet been made public; the initiation
of a worldwide propaganda campaign by the Soviets to counteract
and weaken the United States position in the Strategic Arms
Limitation talks; and details on the reorganization which is
supposed to take place within the CPSU and the Soviet Government
after the 24th Congress of the CPSU to be held in March, 1971...
.9
All of this information was furnished the White-
House and other interested officials of our Government,
usually by teletype. Central Intelligence Agency has
expressed great interest in information developed by this
operation and on July 24, 1970, requested permission to
include pertinent data developed by our operation. in a
"Top Secret/No Foreign/Controlled Dissemination" classified
document for senior U. S. Intelligence Board officials.
DID Inspection
1/12/71
RCP:mkl
4-E
•
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 376
M
The two principal informants in this operation
have received the "Order of Lenin," with the title
"Hero of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets. This is the
highest award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was
given our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the
international communist movement."
Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA
represents a sustained major accomplishment. At the time
of the last inspection, we had 11 informants who were
officially members of the CPUSA National Committee. At
the present time, this overall number remains the same,
but we have exchanged two informants to give us a better
geographical breakdown. In addition, we have another
informant who is an ex officio member of the National
Committee because of the sensitive nature of his Party
assignments. This latter source is also a member of the
Political Committee which, in effect, runs the Party.
This top-level coverage is responsible for furnishing
information regarding policy-making matters on a day-to-day
basis as they occur.
DID Inspection
1/12/71
RCP:mkl
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 377
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT
4-E
This unit was formerly known as the Protest Groups
and International New Left Unit. As of December 16, 1970, a
separate International New Left Unit was organized which took over
investigations pertaining to this particular work. Since the
last inspection, the intensified investigation of cases has
continued to produce positive results.
Selective supervision has enabled us to have advance
knowledge of New Left leaders, conferences, and demonstrations.
Through this advance knowledge, we have been able to furnish the
White House and other interested Government agencies information
on a daily basis regarding pertinent activities of individuals
and groups of interest to us. We have disseminated voluminous
letterhead memoranda, reports, and teletypes concerning plans of
leaders of these groups which were most timely, particularly where
violence was a possibility. On the basis of material furnished¨¨
by this unit, two Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) were
published pertaining to the Student Mobilization Committee to
End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and the New Mobilization Committee
to End the War in Vietnam (NMC).
These investigations furnished complete coverage of the
major antiwar demonstrations in May and October, 1970, as well as
sectional and national meetings at which plans for these demon-
strations were formulated. This coverage afforded detailed
knowledge of the major shift in the antiwar movement, and the
view of its leadership pertaining to the degree and amount of
militant tactics to be employed. We were able to follow closely
the emergence of the National Coalition Against War, Racism, and
Repression (NCAWRR) out of the once powerful NMC and the attempts
of the Trotskyist groups to exercise greater influence within the
antiwar movement through the formation of the National Peace Action
Council (NPAC). The NCAWRR has proposed a national action for
May, 1971, whereby efforts will be made to close down Washington,
D. C., by the use of militant tactics. The NPAC plans national
demonstrations in April, 1971, which may very well undermine the
impact of the NCAWRR action.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
JJS: plm
4-E
BG
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 378
-
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
actit
INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT
(Prior to 12/16/70, part of Protest Groups and International
New Left Unit.)
A prime responsibility of the Bureau and the
intelligence community is to develop intelligence relating
to efforts of foreign governments, organizations, and
individuals to influence, direct, or dominate the New
Left movement in the U.S. In this regard, over the years,
there have been a number of international-type conferences
often sponsored by international front-type groups frequently
under the direction or control of the Soviet Union.
Late last summer this Bureau received information
that the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam (SCV), an organiza-
tion established in 1967 which is controlled by the Soviet
dominated World Council for Peace, intended to hold a World
Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in Stockholm,
Sweden, 11/28-30/70. As the SCV, since its inception, has
been a major sounding board for anti-U.S. propaganda, partic-
ularly that of the North Vietnamese, we dispatched WE 1777-5
to attend the World Conference. The informant's attendance
proved of exceptional value. She not only attended preparatory
meetings and post-conference meetings,
but
It 
also participated
in all sessions of the World Conference identifying the entire
American delegation, other international organizations involved,
and foreign delegations including those representing the
Cambodian Government in exile, the Provisional Revolutionary
(communist) Government of South Vietnam, the North
the North 
Vi
Vietnamese,
and 1 communists from Laos. Informant was able to develop the
activity of the American delegation which was led by
Bellinger, a notorious New Left militant, and the obviously
directed plans of the Conference to discredit the U.S. at the
Paris peace talks. Informant also developed the nature of
the international propaganda attack to be directed at the
U.S., worldwide action planned in support of the communist
position in Vietnam, and plans to "expose" the "criminal"
position and actions of the U.S. as relate to Vietnam.
Our coverage of this Conference was of value to
officials of other Government agencies and undoubtedly
assisted in the formulation of positive U.S. policies
relative to the U.S. position in Vietnam, The excellent
coverage also resulted in our being able to directly pin-
point the foreign influence of the domestic subversive
movement and resulted in a number of important investigations.
DID INSPECTION
1/12/71
DR:sfw
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 379
-X-
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUP UNIT
4-E
Membership in Klan-type organizations and other
white hate groups has experienced a continuous decline for
the past four years. The Klan reached a post-World War II
membership high of approximately 14,000 in 1966. From that
point on, there has been a continuing decline in membership.
At the present time, we have 18 Klan organizations made up of
225 Klaverns (units). There are, of course, in addition to
the membership, many thousands of sympathizers. Investigation
in the white extremist field for organizations other than the
Klan is centered around the Minutemen, the National States
Rights Party (NSRP), and the National Socialist White People's
Party (NSWPP). There are numerous other small groups which
likewise fall within this category. This reduction in Klan
and other white hate group membership is attributable to the
continuous attention given these investigations by the Seat of
Government and the field, with specific attention given to hard-
bitting investigations, counterintelligence programs directed
at them, and penetration of these groups at all levels by our
racial informants.
.
The year 1970 showed a continuing decline in the
membership and effectiveness of the various Klan and white
hate groups throughout the U.S. As of January, 1970, Klan
membership totaled approximately 5,300. Our present figures
indicate that Klan membership now totals approximately 4,300.
The largest Klan group is the United Klans of America, Inc.,
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA) under the direction of
Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton. The membership of this
group in January, 1970, was approximately 4,100 whereas it
now numbers 3,500 members, or approximately 80% of the member-
ship of all Klan organizations. These recent figures
represent an approximate decrease in overall Klan membership
of 17% and 15% decrease in UKA membership. Membership in
white hate organizations other than the Klan which has always
been relatively smaller membership-wise has likewise experienced
a relatively similar decline.
With the arrest of Robert DePugh, N National Coordinator
of the Minutemen, in July, 1969, and his subsequent conviction
for Federal Firearms Act violation and incarceration, this group
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-12-71
JVW:1jw
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 380
-
8 -

has virtually fallen apart and there is practically
no organized activity. Membership is approximately
180, but individuals remain violence prone.
The National States Rights Party under the
direction of J. B. Stoner is likewise experiencing
difficulty in increasing either membership or activity
and consequently is planning to move its headquarters
from Savannah, Georgia, to Atlanta, Georgia. In the
meantime this organization continues to grind out anti-
Negro and anti-Jewish propaganda in crude fashion in
their publications and speeches. Membership is
approximately 150.
The National Socialist White People's Party
(NSWPP) (formerly the American Nazi Party) has its
headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, which is the
center for its activities. There is moderate activity
in Los Angeles and Chicago. Recently a serious split in the
leadership has occurred as a result of counterintelligence
action taken on the part of the Bureau through use of racial
informants. Here again membership continues to decline.
They appear to be content with publishing a variety
of anti-Negro, anti-Jewish publications and preparing
their "White Power" telephone messages. Membership is
approximately 125.
The above is set forth to show the general
accomplishments made by this Unit in the Klan and white
hate field during the past year. Some specific examples
of accomplishments are hereafter set forth:
In February, 1970, we furnished information to
the White House, the Army, Secret Service, Internal Revenue
Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions
of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit,
which we received from racial informants of our Tampa
Division who advised that the United Florida KKK had
printed 15,000 protest letters which were being made
available to the public for mailing to President Nixon
in connection with school desegregation. We also furnished
a copy of the actual protest letter for the benefit of
the White House and other agencies.
On February 20, 1970, Robert DePugh, National
Coordinator of the Minutemen, mentioned above, was sentenced
to four years imprisonment following conviction for bond
default. It is noted DePugh was previously convicted and
released on bond for Federal Firearms Act violation.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 381
-
好
-
16
1
In March, 1970, we again advised the White House,
the Attorney General, the Army, Secret Service, Internal
Revenue Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Division
of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit,
of information learned from racial informants of our Mobile
Division relative to another letter which was made available
to the public by the UKA for mailing to President Nixon as
a protest in connection with school desegregation in Alabama .
This was similar to the information previously furnished
relative to the other letter which was made available to the
public by the United Florida KKK. A copy of this letter was
also furnished to the White House, the Attorney General,
Secret Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights
Divisions of the Department and the Inter-Division Information
Unit.
**
In July, 1970, as a result of our investigation,
two individuals associated with a paramilitary right wing
group called "The Raiders," Ferri Loyd Hayes and Kenneth Ray
McMaster, were arrested by Bureau Agents in connection with
the bombing of 36 school busses at Longview, Texas, on July 4,
1970.
A Federal court had ordered bussing in connection with
school integration. A special Federal Grand Jury at Tyler,
Texas, on July 23, 1970, returned a true bill of indictment
charging the two individuals on two counts; count one, viola-
tion of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 241 (Civil Rights Act,
1964), and count two, violation of Title 18, U.S. Code,
S. 1509 (Obstruction of Court Order). These two individuals
had also been found to have placed "flashlight bombs" in two
Negro residential areas. Both these individuals were held in
lieu of $125,000 bond each; later reduced to $25,000 each.
They are still awaiting trial.
In July, 1970, as a result of a counterintelligence
technique utilized in connection with the counterintelligence
program directed at the Klan, Exalted Cyclops Thomas Stipes,
of Mascot Klavern 778, Mascot, Tennessee, was eliminated from
this top position and subsequently banished from the UKA.
As a result of this counterintelligence action, membership in
this Klavern has fallen off appreciably. -
On 9–25-70 Robert DePugh was found guilty in U.S.
District Court, Albuquerque, New Mexico, under Federal Firearms
Act for possession of various destructive devices at the
time of his arrest in New Mexico. He received a ten-year
sentence on 10-9-70 on these charges. He is presently
serving his sentence at the U.S: Penitentiary, Leavenworth,
Kansas.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 382
-S
n
In September, 1970, as a result of counterintelligence
action taken, two of our racial informants in the Little Rock
Division were instrumental in successfully causing the
defeat of a Klansman who was running for Sheriff in Jefferson
County, Arkansas, This unsuccessful candidate was Victor
Calvert Exalted Cyclops, Pine Bluff Klavern, Association of
Arkansas Klans. During his campaign Calvert attempted to
hide his Klan affiliation because he hoped to receive a good
percentage of the Negro vote in his area. Our informants had
discreetly spread the truth through the Negro community that
Calvert was actually an active Klansman. As a result of this
action Calvert was overwhelmingly defeated.
In September, 1970, we advised the President, the
Vice President and the Attorney General of current information
concerning Klan activity in the U.S.; the decline in Klan
membership; techniques the Klan was instituting to attempt
to increase its income and the fact that a black box,
resembling a coffin, was being shipped to the President by
a group called "United Parents of Duval County." Florida.
This was being sent to the President in connection with a
protest against school integration in Jacksonville, Florida.
In furnishing this information, we advised that the individual
who paid for the shipping was identified as a member of the
U.S. Klans, Knights of the KKK, Inc.
In September, 1970, we advised the President,
the Vice President and the Attorney General of the fact
that Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton of the UKA was going
to request an appointment with the Attorney General to discuss
the latest interpretations of civil rights laws. We further
advised that Shelton was preparing copies of a "night letter"
which he was going to make available to the news media in the
Washington, D. C., area to publicize the fact he desired an
appointment. This information was learned from a top level
racial informant of our Birmingham Office who advised that
Shelton was making this request allegedly because it, in
Shelton's mind, concerned the welfare of people of Alabama
in addition to those of other states. Our informant advised
that Shelton would point out in his letter that appointments
for black leaders had been granted and he was requesting
equal opportunity, treatment and courtesy, on behalf of the
white people of his community. Our informant also revealed
that Shelton did not expect to receive an appointment with
the Attorney General but was doing this merely to receive
publicity as a result of this action. The appointment never
came about.
- 8 -
-NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 383
18
www
In November, 1970, as a result of counterintelli-
gence measures taken, we were successful in causing the
resignation of W. Melvin Sexton, the Imperial Kligrapp
(National Secretary, UKA). This was of particular importance
in that he actually ran the UKA during the time Shelton was
in prison.
The 1970 National Klonvokation of the UKA was held
at the Ramada Inn, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, on November 28-29,
1970. At this Klonvokation, Robert M. Shelton was again
elected Imperial Wizard to serve for three years. During a
speech he made at the Klonvokation, Shelton stated (and has
since reiterated his feelings to high-ranking members of the
UKA who are racial informants of this Bureau) that he
definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and possibly
to utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan officials
and members in order to ferret out FBI informants. Shelton,
in 1967, also had plans to utilize a polygraph machine and
truth serum on Klan members in order to learn the identity of
FBI informants. At that time, we used counterintelligence
techniques in various forms including a press release in order
to discourage Shelton in this regard. It is to be noted that
many of our sensitive racial informants are in high-ranking,
positions within the UKA.
In order to again discourage Shelton in his
desires in this regard, it was recommended on 1/5/71 that
a press release be provided to reliable news sources through
Assistant Director Bishop's office. Our desire is that we
will discredit Shelton and frustrate his attempts by exposing
his desires to the glare of publicity. The news release
pointed out that Shelton is losing control of his subordinates
and that Shelton is attempting to maintain control of the
Klan by threats against anyone who criticizes him. The news
release also pointed out that the Klan, which expresses
patriotism and democratic ideals, must resort to gestapo-like
tactics to hold its members in line.
The above are highlights of results of Bureau
investigations into these matters. Many other disseminations
made throughout 1970 have resulted in the curtailment of
activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white hate
group organizations.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 384
- 5-
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
;
SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:
4-E
Accomplishments of Research
Section since last inspection
follow.
Central Research Unit
This Unit has continued to perform a wide range of
research and writing assignments, preparing various documents
and special reports, most of which have been disseminated
outside the Bureau as well as to our field offices. These
have included the following:
An extensive special assignment on New Left
research for the Director.
Statement by Director for use before President's
Commission on Campus Unrest.
Issues (14) of Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL),
a periodic intelligence letter summarizing significant items
of interest in the security field.
Issues (9) of The Extremist Speaks, a monthly
compilation which shows the extremist views of right, left,
and racially-oriented groups and individuals in the United States.
Monographs (7) setting out in-depth studies of
significant factors in the security-intelligence field.
A comprehensive survey concerning the potential for
racial violence, four (4) special reports for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), and miscellaneous research assign-
ments for the Division.
In addition, a number of special studies have been
prepared in response to requests from the White House. These
include:
A "Top Secret" study on domestic intelligence for the
Inter-Agency Committee for Intelligence.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
LJB:amt.
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 385
An extensive brief, "Special Report, Nationwide
Civil Disturbances" at the request of Vice President Agnew
(revised periodically).
;
A study, "*Stop the Bombing' Campaign: A Communist
Cause, "at request of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, concerning foreign influence in the 1964-68 campaign
seeking a halt to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.
"Top Secret" blind memoranda (3) for a special
intelligence evaluation committee on extremist and terrorist
groups in the U.S.
A "Secret". paper for the U.S. Intelligence Board
analyzing "Racism, Radicalism, and Nationalism in the Caribbean."
This Unit has also collected and prepared material
for various articles, speeches, and surveys, and has prepared
special memoranda for the information of Bureau officials.
Personnel of this Unit have handled lectures on the subjects
of communism, the New Left movement, and racial extremism.
These have consisted of classified lectures to Bureau's New
Agents and In-Service classes, appearances before other
intelligence agencies and National Academy classes, and a
number of nonclassified lectures before civic, church, and
law enforcement groups. Since last inspection, a total of 42
speeches have been handled involving outside groups.
Special Records Unit
Primarily responsible for records keeping, this Unit
is also engaged in emergency planning. In addition, beginning
in September, 1970, the Unit has prepared the Division's
portion of the "Brief For Director's Use In Connection With
Attorney General's Staff Conference, Thursdays, at 5 p.m.
"
Also beginning in September, 1970, this Unit has
prepared the "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities, a weekly
summary of racial extremist activities, which is disseminated
to the White House, top Government officials, the intelligence
community, and each field office, The White House has been
highly commendatory of this paper, praising the content, format,
and style. The Director approved an incentive award for the
Agent who prepares the summary.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 386
New Left Reporting Unit
This Unit, which coordinates covering of all New Left,
student, and antiwar demonstrations throughout the country, has
handled the reporting of the following major disruptions or
demonstrations since the last inspection.
National demonstrations 4/14 −15/70 to protest the
war and the payment of war taxes.
National Environmental Actions, which was held
throughout the U.S. on 4/22/70.
Intensified and widespread student disruptions which
occurred throughout the U.S. during the last part of April and
during May, 1970.
A March on Washington on 5/9/70 to protest the
invasion of Cambodia.
on 5/16/70.
Nationwide demonstrations to protest the military,
A Yippies smoke-in at Washington, D. C., on 7/4/70.
This also involved attempted disruption by the Yippies of the
Honor America Day ceremonies.
The People's Army Jamboree, which was held at
Portland, Oregon, 8/28-9/3/70, for the purpose of disrupting
the National American Legion Convention.
The March for Victory, which was held at Washington, D. C.,
on 10/31/70 by Dr. Carl McIntire.
Demonstration against President Nixon, San Jose,
California, 10/29/70.
Timely dissemination was made to the White House
and the Attorney General, as well as other interested officials
and agencies of the Executive Branch, concerning these demon-
strations as well as nationwide agitation occurring on a daily
basis throughout the country. Frequently, advance information
was furnished to such officials and agencies pointing out likely
trouble spots and predicting the possibility of violence.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 387
22
In addition, a timely study concerning disruptive
attacks on the courts was prepared and disseminated to high-
level officials and interested agencies.
Racial Reporting Unit
This Unit, formerly called the Riot and Racial
Disturbance Unit, has continued to coordinate all phases
of racial disturbances and violence and other racial
developments as well as information bearing on the potential
for violence throughout the country. Voluminous material
being reported on a daily basis by the field offices is
reviewed, coordinated, and disseminated to interested
officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are
furnished to the White House, Attorney General, and other
high-level officials. In the past year more than 5,500
memoranda and teletypes have been disseminated. Statistical
data on racial disorders, school disorders, and attachS ON
police are maintained in this Unit for use in the preparation
of special papers.
This Unit also prepares highly useful research
studies concerning developments in the racial field. Since
the last inspection, these have included special papers on
the black action movement at racially harassed University of
Michigan; a review of newly formed black extremist groups;
numerous papers concerning provocative articles appearing in
the Black Panther Party newspaper; a special paper for the
Vice President concerning racial disturbances in Mississippi
and Georgia; a study on racial disturbances in secondary
schools in the 1969-70 school year; and a detailed account of
advance information concerning the potential for violence in
support of the Black Panther Party in New Haven, Connecticut,
prepared for the Departmental Evaluation Committee. A detailed
study on the extent of foreign influence in the black extremist
movement, similar to that disseminated just after the last
inspection, is presently being prepared for early dissemination.
In addition to the above, instructions in the
Manual of Instructions and the FBI Handbook concerning the
handling of general racial matters were completely revised
and streamlined by this Unit since the last inspection.
NW 88608 Dócld:32989638 Page 388
SECTION CHIEF
-
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
NEW LEFT SECTION
FORDA
R. L. SHACKELFORD
4-E
Attached are individual
memoranda from each unit
setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments of the
New Left Section since the last inspection. This Section
is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the
New Left Movement including terrorist groups and individuals
engaging in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other
New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and
off campus. The development of New Left informants and
investigations of New Left publications are also supervised
in this Section as are sabotage investigations and counter-
intelligence operations against the New Left.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
HM: jlm
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 389
K
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT
The work of this unit concerns Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with the exception of
Weatherman), other New Left campus groups, the Key Activist
program, New Left Movement reports, New Left publications,
New Left informants, and the maintenance of a library of
"hand-out" material on the New Left for dissemination on a
high level to Government officials and responsible citizens.
In 1969 Worker Student Alliance (WSA), Weatherman,
and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) factions of SDS split
into separate groups. Accomplishments concerning Weatherman
are reported elsewhere in this survey. The RYM faction of
SDS is now practically defunct. Currently, the largest faction
of SDS is WSA faction. WSA is dominated by the pro-Chinese,
Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party; and, while not as
violent as Weatherman, is avowedly a revolutionary group.
Our efforts to achieve informant coverage in WSA
showed results when WSA held its National Convention in
Chicago in December, 1970. Approximately 20 Bureau informants
attended this convention, and extensive information on
activities at the convention was promptly reported and
disseminated. Through informants, we have encouraged faction-
alism in WSA. At the convention, dissident groups led by one
of our sources threatened a new split in SDS/WSA which may
occur in the near future. Such dissension will reduce the
possibility that SDS might once again become a massive student
organization as it was before its division in 1969.
Through the Key Activist program, we have focused
investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left
movement with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under
appropriate statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
HM maz
ƒ‘4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 390

حة المتكسية
At the present time, we have designated 75 individuals as
Key Activists. Of this number, 40 are currently the subject
of prosecutive action. This has definitely severely disrupted
the entire New Left movement as well as component New Left
organizations.
Through the New Left Movement reports prepared
quarterly by each field office, we have provided to interested
agencies timely and informative documents on the activities
of the New Left movement, thus making a substantial contribution
to the objective that responsible officials be fully aware of
the threat the New Left presents to our democratic society.
By closely following a myriad of New Left publications
ranging from those merely pornographic to those clearly
revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these
publications; their propensity for violence and subversive
activities; sources of funds; and through dissemination have
advised interested officials and agencies. Since these
publications frequently appear and disappear within a short
time, we are alert to the birth of new publications by following
various underground news service lists as well as other
documents and books which report new publications in this
field.
We have recognized that in the past, informant coverage
of New Left groups has not been adequate and accordingly have
given great emphasis to this aspect of our responsibility. As
a result, informant coverage in this area has been dramatically
increased. At present, we have 900 informants and sources of
all types providing coverage of the New Left. This number
includes 178 security informants and 410 potential security
informants.
Since the last inspection, New Left informants have
provided information which has: led to the indictment of a
number of New Left leaders on Federal and local charges;
located fugitives including some Weatherman fugitives; provided
advance information on numerous New Left demonstrations including
plans for violence; and furnished detailed information on the
organization, membership, and activities of a broad range of
New Left groups.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 391
-
-
The assistance of New Left informants has been
invaluable, and we are continuing to emphasize the development
of additional quality informants in this field.
Through the maintenance of a repository of "hand-out"
materials and publications on the New Left for distribution
to Government officials and responsible citizens, we have
assisted these important individuals to more fully understand
the subversive ramifications of the New Left movement.
-z.
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 392
27
:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT WEST
On
Since the Summer of 1969, New Left extremists
have become increasingly identified as Marxist-Leninist
revolutionaries, and have utilized extreme violence in
effort to achieve their purpose. In the period since the
last inspection, the prosecution of these revolutionaries
has continued to be one of our primary objectives, to the
end that individual terrorists are neutralized and their
organizations are isolated; leaderless; and finally defunct.
We have bad significant accomplishments in this regard.
April 2, 1970, 12 leaders of Weatherman (the most violent
faction of Students for a Democratic Society) were indicted
in Chicago on Federal Antiriot Law (ARL) charges. Other
Weathermas leaders were indicted on local charges and became
Bureau fugitives. The Weatherman organization has gone
undergrouma and has taken extreme measures to avoid apprehension.
Nevertheless, five of these Weatherman leaders have been
located by the FBI as a result of investigations by Agents
on New Le squads in the field and through the efforts of
New Left Informants.
On July 23, 1970, in Detroit, Michigan, indictments
were obtained against 13 Weatherman leaders for violation of
Federal bumbing and gun control statutes. Five of these
individuals have since been arrested or have surrendered.
Other Weatherman leaders remain in fugitive status
and intenskive efforts to locate them continue. Already these
indictments and arrests have had a noticeable effect on the
Weatherman organization. Bernardine Dohrn, a Weatherman
leader wher in May, 1970, had declared a state of war against
the U. S. announced in December, 1970, that Weatherman had
made a "litary error" in tending to consider only "bombings
and picking up the gun as revolutionary." Weatherman has
learned, Sohrn said, that a group of "outlaws" who are
isolated From the youth communities cannot grow to include
large numbers of people.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
HM:maz/j
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 393
28
Weatherman and their ilk will doubtless try to
organize wider support in the broad youth culture, most of
which is not presently committed to violence. By the
continuation of energetic efforts to prosecute the instigators
of violence, we can increase the isolation of terrorist groups
and reduce their influence on youth. This objective is being
forcefully pursued wherever possible. In Seattle, a group
of seven violence-prone individuals with Weatherman connections
were tried in November and December, 1970, on Federal ARL;
Conspiracy; and Destruction of Government Property charges.
A mistrial in this case was declared December 10, 1970; however,
due to the defendants' misconduct in court, all seven were
cited for contempt. These Seattle indictments were made possible
through New Left informant coverage.
The East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives, led by the
notorious Berrigan brothers, has been the subject of intensive
investigation since the last inspection. This group, which
is masked as a religion-oriented peace group, has actually
plotted kidnaping and violence. This matter has been presented
to a Federal Grand Jury with the result that six individuals,
including Philip Berrigan were indicted on January 12, 1971.
Seven other individuals, including Daniel Berrigan, were named
by the Grand Jury as unindicted coconspirators.
Information set forth above referring to New Left
extremists and the Weatherman organization also applies to
work handled by the Special Investigations Unit
East.
-
T
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 394
1:
-
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
VENCEREMOS BRIGADE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT EAST
-
4-E
The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being
June, 1969, as a coalition of representatives from various
New Left organizations including Students for a Democratic
Society, Trotskyist Youth Socialist Alliance, the militant
Black Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left
organizations including the Communist Party, Progressive
Labor Party and Socialist Workers Party.
Three contingents have traveled to Cuba since
November, 1969. The first group was composed of 216 young
Americans who obtained their own transportation to Cuba in
defiance of the State Department ban on travel to that
country. These young revolutionaries were returned to
Canada at the expense of the Cuban Government which converted
a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship. This boat
arrived in St. John, Canada, on February 12, 1970, and
immediately loaded 687 sympathetic American youths aboard
for its return trip to Cuba. This group, like the first
contingent, worked in the sugar cane fields until its
return by the same means of transportation on April 28,
1970. In August, 1970, the third contingent of the VB,
made up of 407 persons, journeyed to the Isle of Youth
where they participated in a Cuban agricultural experiment
of planting and fertilizing citrus trees. This group
returned to the U. S. mid-October, 1970.
Each group worked approximately 7 hours a day,
5 days a week, and in their free time were afforded the
opportunity of absorbing communist propaganda offered by
the Cubans, North Koreans and North Vietnamese. They were
reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were here to
show "solidarity with the socialist struggle, to smash the
U. S. blockade, and to make a breach in the facade of the
U. S. imperialist monster.
"
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
FBS: amk
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 395
Each of the more than 1300 brigade members has been
the subject of a security investigation which includes the
identification and obtaining of background data as well as
a personal interview with each brigade member. These
investigations are being made to determine the immediate
danger presented by these young revolutionaries and also
to ascertain the long-range role they will take in the
revolutionary movement in the U. S. Upon completion of
the investigation and the interview of each of these
individuals, the field must recommend either the inclusion
or noninclusion of the subject in the Security Index. In
addition the field must continue to report every 90 days
for a period of one year on the activities and whereabouts
of each brigade member.
Five approved Bureau informants accompanied the
second VB, and the third VB also included in its ranks four
Bureau approved informants. These sources have materially
assisted the Bureau in discharging its intelligence responsibilities.
While the security investigations of all brigade members are.
not completed, more than 100 VB participants have been placed
in the Security Index and as we conclude these investigations
it is anticipated numerous others will also be listed in
this Index.
The fourth contingent of the VB is currently
being organized and recruiting emphasis is being placed on
"quality individuals" who have open outlooks and socialist
backgrounds. This group is tentatively scheduled to depart
for Cuba March 1, 1971, and is to be comprised of
approximately 300 individuals. Information set forth above
referring to the Venceremos Brigade also applies to work
handled by the Special Investigations Unit
West.
-
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 396
رجی
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SABOTAGE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
1
-
EAST UNIT
4-E
Incidents of Sabotage have been on the rise since
the mid-1960's, occasioned primarily by growing opposition
throughout the country to the Selective Service System, the
Armed Forces, and in particular to the war in Vietnam.
There are under investigation at the present
time 7 Sabotage cases with prosecution pending involving 29
subjects who are charged with 43 separate violations
including attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government
Property, Anti-Riot Law violation, Civil Rights violations,
violation of the National Firearms Act, Interstate Transporta-
tion of Stolen Motor Vehicles, and Conspiracy. In connection
with one of the above investigations, one subject in
October, 1970, was found guilty and sentenced to five years,
which sentence is being appealed, and another subject in
November, 1970, pleaded guilty and is scheduled to be
sentenced, sometime in January, 1971.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
AxTJM.cae
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 397
でも
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
4-E
SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRANIGAN
ESPIONAGE SECTION
1. Persona Non Grata and other Removal Actions
Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov was a correspondent in
New York City for the Soviet newspaper "Prayda from June,
1968, to July 7, 1970. Based on the results of FBI investigation,
· on the latter date he was expelled after the Department of State
informed the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., on June 24,
1970, that Orekhov had engaged in activities incompatible with
his status as a journalist. His departure from the United States
was requested. Orekhov departed July 7, 1970, depriving the
Soviets of the presence in the U. S. of a very active intelli-
gence officer.
R
In a similar case, also as a result of our investi-
gations, on November 6, 1970, State informed the Soviets of the
expulsion from the U. S. of Leonid Nikolayevich Zhegalov, a
Washington, D. C., correspondent for the Soviet news agency
"Tass."
This action was in direct reciprocity for the expulsion
from the USSR of a U. S. correspondent.
In an interesting and successful counterintelligence
operation, the Soviets were forced to remove Yevgeniy Y, Yelshin
a KGB officer, from the United Nations Secretariat and send him
home. Yelshin had been in contact with sources under our control
in the aerospace field. In September, 1970, the "arrest" of one
of our sources during a meet with Yelshin was staged. Subsequently,
Yelshin was contacted by our Agents concerning his intelligence
activities. Although Yelshin had not completed the term of his
contract with the UN Secretariat, he returned home with his
family, at Soviet expense, on 11/1/70.
In a pending case, our investigation has established
violation of U. S. immigration laws by an individual known to be
a KGB agent. He has denied affiliation with the Soviets, but has
admitted immigration fraud. INS and State have initiated action
to have him dismissed from the UN Secretariat and expelled from
the U. S.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 398
4-E
Information we furnished to the Department of State
apparently has prevented the return to the United States of two
Polish commercial officials formerly assigned to New York City.
We told State how the one, a Polish military intelligence
officer, with the assistance of the other had since mid-1969
been very active in trying to purchase electronic equipment of
defense significance and ship it to Poland in violation of
export licensing requirements. On 3/27/70, State informed the
Polish Ambassador to the U. S. that the activities of these two
Poles must cease. Both left the country. We have subsequently
learned through our sources that one, expected to return to
. U. S., has been reassigned and will not return. The other has
not returned. Thus, the usefulness of two Polish agents in the
U. S. was destroyed by our investigations.
2. Double Agents
One measure of our effectiveness in countering the
activities of the intelligence personnel among the hundreds of
communist bloc representatives in the U. S. is our ability to
continue to develop and operate double agents against hostile
agents. This is a matter of vital concern and continuous
attention in the Espionage Section. Since the last inspection
we have continued to improve our position in this regard, as
the following chart shows:
Active
Country
Double Agents
Potential
Double Agents
Inactive
4/1/70 12/1/70 Change
4/1 12/1 Chg
Double Agents
4/1 12/1 Chg.
Soviet
Albania
67
74
+7
5
Bulgaria
Czech
East German
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Yugoslavia
170302021
12356021
5
16
6
+5
700507420 |
207
227 +20
34
0
0 0
5
5
0
13
14:
+1
4
3
2
-1
+1
5
3 -2
25
25
+2
7 10 +3
12
10 -2
Totals
128
138
+10
277 296 +19
49
700200720
0123532012
OHH352001 20
33 -1
-2
49 0
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld
NW 88608 Bodid:32989638 Page 399
4-E
It is obvious that despite the sophistication and
security-consciousness of the Soviet Intelligence Services, our
efforts to direct double agents against them continue to meet
with conspicuous success. Examples of the productivity of our
double agent operations appear elsewhere herein.
Some declines in the number of double agent operations
against the intelligence services of countries other than the
USSR handled by this section have occurred since the last
inspection. In part, this may be a reflection of a change of
emphasis in direction of our efforts, which has resulted in a
reduction of the number of supervisors assigned to satellite,
Albanian and Yugoslav matters. (In 4/70 nine full-time and one
part-time supervisor were handling this work;
are four supervisors assigned to
this work full time and three
part time. However, reference to the above chart shows that
the bulk of the drop in the number of active and potential
double agents has been in the Czech field. This is attributable
primarily to two factors.
SAKEFALERANZARENE LASTNINE present there
Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia (CSSR) by
Soviet bloc armed forces in August, 1968, which resulted in the
fall of the liberal Alexander Dubcek regime, the Communist Party
of the CSSR began a critical analysis of all party members who
had supported Dubcek. This analysis included individuals
assigned to diplomatic posts in Washington and New York and
resulted in the recall of about two-thirds of such personnel.
A number were expelled or suspended from the Party. Of those
recalled, several have not yet been replaced. The Chief Czech
Intelligence Service (CIS) Resident in Washington was one of the
latter. An extremely well placed source has reported that the
purge, which began early in 1970, caused great anxiety among all
the Czech personnel in Washington and New York and that morale
dropped to rock bottom and, as consequence, little intelligence
work was carried on during the current year. Naturally, with
the CIS agents missing or dormant, our opportunities to target
double agents against them diminished. This unsettled political
situation, together with the overt defection of a CIS officer
in Washington on 6/29/70, resulted in the CIS assuming a
defensive posture and maintaining contact only with persons
considered by them to be fully trustworthy. Indicative of the
quality of our remaining double agents is the fact that CIS has
held meets with two of our sources in the immediate past..
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT: pld
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 400

4-E
The above chart, showing numbers of double agents at
the time of the last inspection and at present tells only part
of the story. It does not show that there is a continual
process of review and analysis of double agent matters and
close attention to field activity in this regard. We are
constantly striving to weed out any "deadwood" and to introduce
fresh blood into our counterespionage efforts. Presentation
of precise figures on the turnover among double agents during
the period since the last inspection is not feasible, because
various offices have different reporting dates on which they
inform the Bureau of additions and deletions of double agents
in the various nationality fields. However, the following
available figures clearly indicate desirable turnover. In the
Soviet field, from March 1, 1970, to December 1, 1970, we added
41 active and potential double agents; a net increase of 30
In the other countries currently supervised in the Espionage
Section, we added 28 active and potential double agents and
dropped 17. a net gain of 11. Several of those dropped were
used up in counterintelligence actions which terminated their
active usefulness, and some left the country.
•
3.
Counterintelligence and Other Significant Operations
In our eyes, counterintelligence activity is activity
designed to disrupt and hamper the operations of an opposition
intelligence service. Although it may involve harassment at
times, it is for the most part much more serious and worthy of
our efforts only when it inflicts actual damage on the effective-
ness of the enemy. To this end, we employ our own capabilities
and, whenever indicated and possible, those of other U. S. and
other Government agencies. Following are some examples of this
activity since the last inspection.
Upon instruction from us, one of our double agents
told his Soviet handler, Vladimir Azaryan, an Amtorg Trading
Corporation employee, that the FBI interviewed him and he
admitted he had been contacting Azaryan and also his predecessor,
Yuri Kitaev, a United Nations Secretariat employee. The double.
agent blamed Azaryan's ineptness for FBI interest. Azaryan
obviously reported the matter to his superiors. Shortly there-
after, both Soviets left the United States, thus disrupting the
Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:nld
NW 88608-32989638 Page 401
4-E
:
As a result of Bureau counterintelligence action,
an Aeroflot official who was a GRU officer was hurriedly
removed from the U. S. under Soviet guard by the Soviets. In
addition, an Intourist official, a suspected KGB officer, was
also recalled from the U. S. because he was also blamed by the
Soviets for the security breach involving the aforementioned
Aeroflot official. Thus, one counterintelligence operation
caused the removal from the U. S. of two Soviet Intelligence
Service operatives.
In another operation a Soviet official assigned to
Washington, a known KGB officer, was the principal in a Bureau
double agent operation. With State Department clearance we
confronted him during a meet with the double agent. He rejected
our initial invitation to defect but analysis of information
subsequently received indicated that he had not reported the
approach. Again we contacted him and that time he acknowledged
that he had personal problems and agreed to be contacted in the
future. He has returned to the USSR on home leave and has
agreed to meet
again when he comes back to the II s.
There are indications that the delay in his return is due to
his wife's illness. This operation continues to offer the
possibility of his recruitment either here or abroad.
On the basis of information developed through one of
our operations, two Argentinians were arrested in October,
1970, in Argentina as illegal Soviet agents. Our information
is that they were targeted to ultimately operate in and against
the U. S. Our effective handling of this matter stopped them
before they even entered this country.
Based on information received from a well placed
source, we recently identified a U. S. agent of the Soviets.
In initial contact he has indicated a desire to cooperate with
us and we plan to use him in a counterintelligence action
against his Soviet principal In another case, we developed
sufficient information concerning the intelligence operations
of Yuriy P. Vetrov that the U. S. Ambassador to the UN was able
to inform his Soviet counterpart concerning Vetrov's activities.
Vetrov was not the subject of persona non grata action because
State did not want to give the Soviets the opportunity to
expel one of our diplomats from Moscow and Vetrov was due to
leave the U. S. However, the detailed information in our
ambassador's possession must have caused considerable disruption
of Soviet intelligence activities in the United Nations when our
ambassador disclosed our knowledge of it.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 402
་༢༡
4-E
By letter to the Director 6/10/70%, the U. S.
Air Force expressed its appreciation for the invaluable
contribution of Bureau personnel in supporting an OSI
counterintelligence operation involving an East German
Intel ligence Service (EGIS) officer who came to the U.” S.
to service an Air Force double agent. We had been cooperating
with Air Force in this case since 1965.
Information was obtained by one of our double
agents against EGIS that EGIS has for some time been
interested in penetrating State Department and is particularly
interested in a State Department employee with whom our
source is acquainted.
We have furnished pertinent details
to State and in December, 1970, State indicated that it was
taking action to defensively brief the employee without
pinpointing or jeopardizing our source. Such action should
put us one step ahead in any attempt by EGIS or another bloc
intelligence service to approach the employee.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 403
4-E
On July 1, 1970, the State Department announced
that Antonin Nenko, former Second Secretary, Czech Embassy,
Washington, had defected and requested political asylum in
the U. S. Nenko's action caused the termination of a
highly successful and valuable operation we had been conduct-
ing against the CIS for some time. Nenko, a major in the
Scientific and Technical Department of the CIS, had been
working exclusively in the intelligence field since 1956
both in the United States and abroad. Prior to his overt
defection, Nenko had been under our control furnishing
detailed, highly significant information concerning Czech
operations against the U. S. Although his overt defection
is public knowledge, his activities as our defector-in-
place have not been revealed, but the valuable information
he furnished has been made available to interested
Government agencies.
In 1969 a Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS)
agent came to the U. S. as an immigrant, He has been under
FBI control almost since his arrival. He was sent by HIS
with instructions that he would ultimately take over the
direction of HIS illegal agents in the United States. He
has had several meetings with HIS handlers and the operation
involving him includes the use of clandestine communications,
meets in third countries, secret message drops and other
sophisticated espionage techniques.
Not all of our responsibilities in the Espionage
Section involve activity against hostile intelligence
services. Among the immigrants from communist countries
are many whose hostility to their former communist homelands
is such, that given the opportunity, they would take
violent action against representatives of their countries
of origin. We have effected coverage of these nationality
groups designed to permit us to alert responsible outside
agencies to threats from such people. One example of our
effectiveness in this regard occurred in connection with the
visit of Yugoslav President Tito to Belgium in October,
1970. The Belgian Security Service (BSS) requested our
cooperation in its efforts to protect Tito. In November
1970, through Legat, Paris, we received a letter thanking
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT: as
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 404
4-E
the Bureau for its invaluable assistance in contributing to
its successful handling, without serious incident, of the
Tito visit. Because of our extensive coverage of anti-Tito
Yugoslavs in the U. S., we had been able to furnish con-
siderable information to the Belgians on possible trouble-
makers and to furnish prompt responses to specific inquiries.
Returning to our more usual counterespionage work,
we developed and operated as a defector-in-place from
July, 1969, until November, 1970, a Soviet official assigned
to a Soviet establishment in New York City. This source,
although not affiliated with Soviet intelligence, was able
to furnish information of counterintelligence value and to
identify members of the Soviet intelligence community. The
source left the United States in November, 1970, but
subsequently Our New York Office received a communication
from the source through a special channel. The communication
indicated a possibility that the source may be able to cooperate
with the U. S. Government in the future. This possibility
is, of course, dependent upon the source's future Soviet
assignments.
In October, 1970, the Internal Security Division
of the Department informed us that the Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security was concerned with the
espionage and intelligence activities of Soviets employed
at the United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC). We were requested
to prepare a paper concerning such activities.
The paper
was furnished to the Department and to State during November,
1970. We have now been informed that based on our
information U. S. Ambassador Phillips at the United Nations
is considering placing certain restrictions in effect
concerning the travel of Soviet nationals assigned to
UNSEC. Should this take place, our efforts in this matter
could definitely lead to more effective and efficient
coverage of these Soviet intelligence personnel by the
Bureau.
Coverage of a Soviet establishment, Washington, D.C.,
revealed Soviets had constructed a ten-foot-square
opening in the roof, covered by a door on rollers. Monitor-
ing detected a pattern of opening of the roof Use of
th
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:as
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 405
4-E
sophisticated laboratory technical equipment enabled the
National Security Agency (NSA) to determine Soviets were
using the opening in the roof in an operation to improve
accuracy of guidance system of Soviet Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles targeted against the United States.
and the Defense Intelligence Agency have stated that this
extremely valuable positive intelligence had not previously
been developed any place in the world.
NSA
Another counterintelligence operation which has
been conducted against the Soviets since 1966 took a novel
turn since the last inspection. We had been using this
operation to pass disinformation to the Soviets using
material provided by the Air Force. In May, 1970, we
arranged for a Bureau Agent to meet with a Soviet, in
place of the former double agent. This May meeting was the
product of prior arrangements engineered to have the
new Soviet handler accept our Agent as his predecessor's
former contact. The Soviet who appeared at the May meeting
had not been previously known to be an intelligence officer.
He gave the double agent instructions for future operations
and we continued to pass Air Force material. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff are interested and involved in supporting
this operation. Since we substituted an FBI Agent for the
original double agent, we have obtained sophisticated
espionage paraphernalia not previously acquired in our other
operations against the Soviets and, we have received over
$5,000 of Soviet funds.
In another sensitive double agent operation,
conducted against the Soviets for almost 12 years, we
have been passing disinformation supplied by the Joint
Chief of Staff to the Soviets. Army analysis of the
results of this operation indicates that it has caused
the Soviets to commit one and a half billion dollars to
an attempt to counteract the purported U. S. military
capability described in the material we have passed. As
recently as December 1970 word has been received from
the Soviets that they plan to continue this operation
and may use an illegal agent to do so. We have also
received from the Soviets in this operation over $42,000.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT: as
4-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 406
112
4-E
4.
Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and Other
Prosecutive Action
On April 17, 1970, the Internal Security Division
of the Department, based on our investigation, agreed to
solicit the registration of Robert Charles Owens III under
the FARA, as an agent of the USSR.
On October 21, 1970, the registration of Endre
Kertesz under Title 50, U. S. Code, Sections 851-857, in
which he described his assignment for the Hungarian
Intelligence Service (HIS) was secured by the Department.
This was the result of our investigation of Kertesz,
Hungarian immigrant who admitted he had been given an assign-
ment by HIS to gather information concerning missile sites
in the U. S.
In our exploitation of a defector from the
Yugoslav Intelligence Service (YIS), we obtained information
that the Yugoslavs had recruited a French military intelligence
employee. Based on our information and follow-up investigation
by French authorities, the French official, Eugene Rousseau,
was convicted of espionage in April, 1970, In December,.
1970, the Supreme Court in Paris, France, upheld his sentence
of 15 years.
5. Recoveries
In many of our double agent operations the double
agents receive payments from the foreign intelligence
service well in excess of our expenses in conducting the
operations. As such operations are concluded, we turn over
the balance of monies received to the U. S. Treasury. Since
the last inspection, we have turned over to the Treasury, as
a result of these operations, over $16,000.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT: as
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 407
42
i
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION
The key to developing racial information on a regular
and current basis is the operation and development of quality
informants along with intensified investigation. In this
regard we have increased the number of our racial informants
since the last Inspection by 1,699 which brings our total
number of informants to 7,184. In addition, we are continually
intensifying our investigations and in line with our need for
closer coverage of key black extremists, we instituted by airtel
dated 12-23-70 the Key Black Extremist Program.
Racial informants have been furnishing a steady flow
of valuable racial information which information has brought
about the apprehension of badly wanted extremist fugitives,
the confiscation of explosives and firearms in the possession of
extremists, the prevention of violence and the saving of lives.
In addition, these informants furnished valuable racial
intelligence on a regular basis which intelligence included
information concerning foreign influence, the Black Panther Party
(BPP) underground as well as discussions by extremists as to
South American style kidnapping of government officials and threats
to kill the President.
ד
It is significant to note that since the last Inspection
racial informants have been responsible for bringing about the
arrest of 510 individuals, 342 of which were local arrests and
168 Federal arrests as well as being responsible for the recovery
of $330,179.03.
In order to improve our investigations and racial
informant coverage in addition to our regular supervision
furnished from the Seat of Government we held a two-day conference
with racial supervisors from 39 field offices plus two legal
attaches. The topics discussed at the conference covered the
entire spectrum of the problems inherent in investigating and
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
1-12-71
JGD:bad
4-E
-NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 408
!
developing informants in the BPP as well as related extremist
matters. These topics included detailed discussion concerning
the need for full penetration of extremist groups to obtain
information concerning terroristic activities which may be
aimed against Government officials. In addition, the conference
took note that maximum attention should be given to the extremist
activities in Canada in connection with our investigations as well
`as intensifying our investigations having international
ramifications.
The above items, along with other items affecting
counterintelligence against extremists, the BPP underground
activities and intensified investigations were fully discussed.
Concrete suggestions were obtained from this conference and were
subjects of individual memoranda which were approved thereby
increasing the efficiency of our investigations and informant
development.
follows:
Some of the above-approved suggestions are as
1. Proposal to identify escape routes utilized by
black extremists to flee the United States by utilizing a Bureau
racial informant as a decoy.
2. Intensify BPP underground investigations including
making available to select field offices copies of the film
"The Battle of Algiers," which sets forth guerrilla warfare
tactics used successfully by the National Liberation Front
and which is now being studied and copied by the BPP.
3. Granting approval for Special Agents in Charge
on their own initiative to authorize use of concealed recording
devices by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public
appearances by black and New Left extremists except where such
· appearances are at educational institutions.
4. Obtaining approval to reproduce an article by
Victor Riesel, noted labor columnist, which article was highly
critical of the BPP and set forth a proposal by a union member
that unions affiliated with the freight handlers who handle
the BPP newspaper shipments refuse to handle these papers.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 409
5. Obtaining approval for a racial and New Left
extremist activities In-Service classes.
6. Obtaining approval for the deletion of the
Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List from the Black Nationalist
Movement in the United States Racial Calendar and transmitting
this to the field by separate letter in order to give greater
emphasis to these fugitive investigations.
7. Obtaining approval for revising the Agitator Index
by deleting those individuals who are also included on the
Security Index.
In addition to the above, there are other suggestions
made by the attendees at the conference and approved by the
Director which will assist in streamlining the overall
investigative and informant development operation as well as
making these operations more effective.
i
Some of the concrete examples of our informant and
investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following:
Through our investigations, we have currently
identified and closely scrutinized the activities of the 43
branches of the BPP which covers an area of 31 states and the
District of Columbia. These investigations reveal that the BPP
membership has increased to 1,000 hard-core members which is an
increase of 250 in the last six months.
As a result of our investigations and informant
penetration along with the cooperation with local authorities,
408 BPP members have been arrested on either Federal or local
charges during 1970.
Racial informants in the Los Angeles and Chicago
Divisions were successful in penetrating the BPP underground and
now will be in a position to furnish information on BPP
underground activities.
In connection with underground activities, a Dallas
racial informant furnished the information which brought about
the arrest of Elmer Gerard Pratt, a Los Angeles BPP leader and
an alleged leader in the underground. Pratt's arrest along with
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 410
45

the arrest of four other of his associates enabled us to
obtain possession of documents apparently relating to the BPP
underground and should give us knowledge concerning it and the
possible identities of others involved in this underground
operation.
In early June, 1970, efforts were made to establish
a National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) chapter, which is
another name for a BPP chapter in Tampa, Florida. Through
aggressive investigation, including thorough interrogation of
all known members, the development of a top-level informant
and effective use of information provided by this informant,
Tampa Office was successful in decimating this group to the .
point where it is now floundering, nameless and without
leadership and there is no indication of support for the BPP
in that area.
The Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) was organized
in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970. The leader of
this group was Alfred Dwight Amos Featherston, an articulate
black extremist and an admitted communist who has in the past,
visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. Through the outstanding informant
coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive
investigative techniques used, this organization for all intent
and purposes, rendered inactive by the latter part of 1970.
During 1970, BAMM engaged in an intensive recruiting program
in the Miami area directed toward young blacks, formed an action
group which participated in a number of fire bombings in the
Miami area including one such bombing at the University of Miami.
Through informant coverage and other investigative activities,
the Miami Division developed an excellent case involving the
teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices and in December
the Departmental Attorneys presented this matter to a Federal
Grand Jury in Miami resulting in Featherston, Charles Reiley and
Jerome Trapp being indicted under the new antiriot laws dealing
with the teaching and making of incendiary devices. This is the
first such case brought under the new statute charging black
extremists with this particular violation.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 411
A Detroit racial informant furnished advanced
information regarding planned ambush of Detroit police officers
which, when furnished to Detroit Police Department, enabled them
to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officers
and resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of
a cache of weapons.
Informant also furnished information
resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau Agents of
approximately 50 sticks of dynamite available to BPP and likely
resulted in saving of lives and preventing possible property
damage.
A Chicago racial informant furnished information which
identified an individual who is a member of the BPP as the person
who raped and shot a middle aged white housewife and then pistol
whipped her husband in Chicago on 12-25-70. The same Chicago
informant furnished information which resulted in the
identification of an individual who was responsible for the
murder of a police officer in Carbondale, Illinois.
A Springfield ghetto informant furnished information
concerning an individual who was attempting to sell explosives
for $2,000. This information enabled local authorities to
apprehend the individual and confiscate 100 lbs. of explosives.
A Boston racial informant made a verbatim recording
of a speech by a BPP member where he indicated the Panthers
should utilize South American style kidnappings in order to
effect the release of Panther political prisoners.
A Norfolk racial informant furnished daily information
relating to a demonstration at Norfolk State College 5/8-18/70.
During this demonstration she reported the Student Government
President at the college threatened to kill President Nixon and
observed another student burning the American flag. Based on
this information, Secret Service is considering prosecution against
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 412
117
the Student Government President and local police are
prosecuting the student who burned the flag.
A New York informant furnished the identities of
black extremists who were scheduled to depart the U.S. for
Al Fatah camp in the Middle East for possible guerrilla
training.
In discussing the accomplishments of the Racial
Intelligence Section, it is felt that comment should be made
concerning the contributions regularly being made by the
Inspection Division during their analysis of the racial
investigations in the various field divisions. In addition
to acting upon information furnished to them by this Section,
the Inspection Staff through their on-the-spot review of racial
intelligence matters in the field are often able to detect
weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and offer
constructive assistance to the office involved in strengthening
their operations.
In reviewing the racial surveys prepared by the
Inspection Division, we regularly note concrete guidance being
afforded field offices. Examples can be found in recent
instructions given during the inspection of the Mobile Office
to direct two existing informants to seek membership in the
Nation of Islam (NOI). These instructions were implemented and
both informants currently report on NOI activities and have
membership applications pending.
During a recent Cleveland inspection, the Inspectors
gave instructions for the Cleveland Office to develop informants
in a leadership position with the Cleveland National Committee
to Combat Fascism (NCCF). As a result of these instructions,
Cleveland has been successful in developing two informants within
this organization both of whom are furnishing valuable information
on the structural composition of the organization, staff members
and proposed activities. One of these informants is a member of
the security cadre of the Cleveland NCCF and as such has
furnished valuable information concerning firearms in possession
of members of this group.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 413
Racial intelligence gathered through our informants
This
and investigations makes up a major portion of the Bureau's
sophisticated document which is disseminated to the
White House and other high level Government agencies.
document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities"
furnishes the White House and other agencies with a digest
of the racial picture.
The quality of our racial informants can also be
judged by the fact that since the last Inspection, 26 Special
Agents in various field divisions were recommended for incentive
awards for their work in developing informants and 15 racial
informants were given bonus awards for valuable information
they furnished and services performed.
▬▬▬ ▬
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 414
419
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALLure
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
O. Connell
4-E
There is attached a summary of significant
accomplishments of this Section set forth by individual
Units. Specific tangible accomplishments resulting from
programs supervised by this Section are outlined in
write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated
herein.
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
NW 88608 Docid:376 Page 415
וחופי/i
19-1
Nationality Unit
4-E
Israeli and Middle East Investigations
Prior to the beginning of the 25th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly, this Unit recognized the vulnerability of
the large concentration of foreign diplomats attending the Session to
acts of terrorism and demonstrations originating with groups dissenting
with the incumbent regimes of the countries represented. We issued
appropriate instructions to the field to alert sources and provide
information immediately which would indicate a threat to the physical
security or well being of these dignitaries who were coming to the
United States for the Commemorative Session of the United Nations.
Subsequent to this action, the White House similarly recognized the
potential danger of embarrassment to the United States as host country
for the United Nations if incidents occurred, and called on the Bureau
to cooperate fully with United States Secret Service to uncover such
incidents and provide full security for the chiefs of state and missions
resident in New York City during the commemorative celebration.
We established a system of liaison with United States Secret Service
command post in New York City, as well as intensifying our liaison
with New York City police and United States Mission to the United Nations.
A flow of information from our sources was furnished to the interested
agencies locally and to the intelligence community at a national level
which resulted in laudatory comments by Secret Service liaison
personnel who commented favorably on the Bureau's assistance in
completing the Presidentially ordered mission of United States
Secret Service in providing security for the officials mentioned.
During the same period of the 25th General Assembly of
the United Nations, we furnished a continuing flow of information to the
United States United Nations Mission regarding the the tense Middle East
situation and developments related to peace talks instituted by the
United States and carried out by United Nations officials. The data
furnished to the United States United Nations Mission resulted in the
United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles W. Yost,
advising the Director by letter dated 11/13/70 of his desire to pay
special tribute to Agents of this Bureau who had provided him with
swift and accurate reports which he had found helpful and which provided
him with privileged insight and perspective into the maneuverings
during the 25th Session.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 416
1
.
"
4-E
1
In the Israeli field we have continued to furnish information
from our sensitive coverage under a program of dissemination which
has been assigned the security designation of "SCOPE. "SCOPE"
information is furnished only to select individuals at the White House
and to a previously cleared chain of command within agencies of the
intelligence community. These data relate to attempts by officials of
the Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction within United States
Government circles for Israeli Government support including economic
and military assistance. The personalities involved in these dealings
have included prominent members of the United States Congress as well
as individuals within the executive arm of our Government. Favorable
comment has been forthcoming from Dr. Kissinger at the White House,
from the Secretary of State and from other dignitaries within the
intelligence community who have been privy to this "SCOPE" information
relative to its timeliness and value to them in formulating policy decisions
within our Government.
Miscellaneous Programs
This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for extremely
sensitive operations undertaken in cooperation with the National
Security Agency (NSA) designed to enhance our nation's capability
to infiltrate the diplomatic communications of foreign governments.
Our first significant breakthrough in this area occurred in 1968 and
resulted in NSA estimate of $200,000 annually in evaluating the
product of our coverage. We have realized continued success in this
sensitive area with two additional successes since the last inspection
for a total of four nationality areas being totally covered by the Bureau
at this time. Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Acting Director, NSA, by
letter dated 11/10/70, commented most favorably on the productivity
of our program in this area, noting that our coverage provided
information of priority concern to the NSA which would be otherwise
unobtainable to the United States Government. In view of the extreme
sensitivity of this information, it is suggested that either I or my
Number One Man be consulted for further details.
In the miscellaneous espionage area a decided accomplishment
was attained with close of investigation relating to Vernon Edward
Thompson of Santa Barbara, California. In September and October,
1970, high officials of the intelligence and military communities,
cabinet members, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and Mr. Herbert J. Klein
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 417
4-E
of the White House Staff and other highly placed United States Government
officials began receiving cryptogram messages which, after decryption,
disclosed implication of bombings of certain major cities on 11/29/70.
Content of the messages revealed that the writer was privy to intelligence
information and possibly had knowledge of United States nuclear weapon
deployment. The receipt of these messages was the object of extreme
concern by the recipients and resulted in our investigation.
Through outstandingly aggressive and imaginative investigation
and with a dearth of investigative leads, the Los Angeles Office
successfully identified the typewriter on which the messages were
being prepared as being located in a library in the Santa Barbara, area.
Discreet and productive surveillance was conducted, which resulted in
identification of Thompson and his neutralization as a point of anxiety
and concern on the part of the highest level of officials in the executive
branch and in the intelligence community. We are now awaiting a
decision as to prosecution after review of the details of this matter
by the Criminal Division of the Department.
The President has noted the paucity of positive intelligence
information available to him for high-level policy decisions. We
have recognized our responsibilities in this area through intensified
coverage in the nationality fields supervised by this Unit as illustrated
in the increase of establishments being afforded sensitive coverage
and through the increase of our live informant coverage targeted
against the nations involved. Three of the six new foreign liaison
posts established recently by the Bureau involve countries within
the area of responsibility of this Unit and information from those
liaison posts should add to the production of our foreign intelligence
information in response to President Nixon's requirements.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 418
|
j
CUBAN UNIT
Our sustained pressure on Cuban Intelligence
Service (CuIS) operations in the U.S. resulted in the recall
to Cuba of three very experienced CuIS officers in April, 1970.
They had been serving as officials of the Cuban Mission to the
United Nations (CMUN) and their withdrawal was in line with
information provided by a CIA source to the effect that the
Cuban Government planned to recall any personnel whom it
believed were susceptible to persona non grata action by the
U.S. State Department.
**
Based on FBI information, a leading Puerto Rican
terrorist in New York City (Carlos Feliciano Vasquez), was
apprehended by the New York City Police Department on May 16,
1970, while in the process of placing a bomb in an Armed Forces
recruiting station.
After being confronted by us in early August, 1970,
a very attractive and sexually permissive employee of the
South African Embassy, Washington, D.C., admitted her deep
involvement with the CuIS. She had furnished the Cubans data
concerning American and foreign officials with whom she was in
social contact. After becoming sexually involved with a State
Department protocol officer in March, 1970, she was able to gain
entree to diplomatic functions where she met ranking officials
and employees of the U.S. and foreign governments. Our investi-
gation indicated she was unable to establish contact with her
principal to furnish information concerning the dignitaries she
met following her involvement with the protocol officer and she
voluntarily returned home to South Africa shortly after our
interview of her. Her name is Jennifer Enid Miles.
A San Juan Office source was primarily responsible
for developing information leading to the conviction on 8/26/70
of four Socialist Workers Party (PSO) leaders in Puerto Rico.
The information developed by our source enabled the Police of
Puerto Rico to arrest a total of nine PSO members. The PSO has
been active in the wave of bombings taking place in Puerto Rico
and the arrests were for violations of the Puerto Rican Explosives
Law.
Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection
1/12/71
RAM: dlw
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 419
54
During the Summer of 1970 a countérintelligence
program aimed at creating dissension was instituted by our
San Juan Office against the activist Puerto Rican Socialist
League (LSP). On October 10, 1970, a high-placed Miami
security informant reported the LSP was showing signs of
grinding to a halt and that it recently experienced a severe
split away from its youth group. Our counterintelligence
move was directly responsible for the havoc occurring in the
LSP.
As a result of disclosures made by Jennifer Enid
_ Miles and other corroborative evidence developed by New York
and Washington Field Office, we were able to have State Depart-
ment declare persona non grata the two highest ranking CuIS
officials in the U.S. on October 9, 1970. Counsellor Rogelio
Rodriguez Lopez and First Secretary Orlando Prendes Gutierrez
of the CMUN were the individuals involved and they made a total
of seven against whom similar action has been taken by State
Department since February, 1968, based on FBI investigations of
CMUN personnel.
On October 10, 1970, Filiberto Ojeda Rios, a known
Cuban espionage agent and a Bureau fugitive, was apprehended
by FBI agents and the Police of Puerto Rico. Ojeda, leader of
the Puerto Rican Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA),
had been the prime mover behind the wave of violence and
terrorist bombings which has occurred for many months in Puerto
Rico. Documents found at his hideout definitely confirmed the
close collaboration between the Cuban Government and Puerto
Rican terrorist groups.
On October 19, 1970, an intensification program was
instituted by our Miami Office based on instructions from the
Bureau aimed at identifying CuIS agents in the Miami area who are
believed to be tipping off Castro concerning infiltration
efforts by anti-Castro refugees in the U.S. A coordinator had
been made responsible for directing these efforts and progress
has been made in eliminating certain suspects as well as
developing valuable background regarding other logical suspects.
In December, 1970, an actual member of t the clandestine
MIRA organization, previously mentioned, was developed as an
informant. This is the first informant to be in a position to
get inside information regarding the group's plans and we
previously had to depend on "fringe" sources to cover this very
dangerous terrorist group.
NW 88608 Dócld:32989638 Page 420
2
-

Since our intensification program directed against
the CMUN was begun in February, 1970, we have been able to
institute some sensitive coverage for a period of six months,
have installed equipment which can monitor handie-talkie
radios used by CuIS personnel, have learned that CuIS personnel
carry arms at all times, and have developed sources in a
position to keep us advised as to the activities of such
personnel on a 24-hour basis.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 421
"
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
•MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT
4-E
The President and other policy makers have
a continuing interest in current political matters
affecting Central and South America. We have provided
officials in the Executive Branch of the Government
on a continuing basis with information concerning the
activities of political figures and leftist groups in
a number of Latin American nations. Of particular
significance was information concerning the activities
of Arnulfo Arias Madrid, deposed Panamanian President.
residing in Miami. Florida, who is planning the over-
throw of the current Panamanian Government. In an
effort to provide the President and other policy makers
with even more such information, we have recently
expanded our coverage in the Chilean, Peruvian and
Bolivian fields.
The unit continues to be successful in
thwarting plans of militant anti-Castro groups which
have sought to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and
property of foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba.
Successful development of key informants who have
infiltrated anti-Castro groups under Bureau direction
has enabled the Bureau to keep abreast of their activities
and often to have advance knowledge of the plans of these
groups enabling us to take appropriate action to prevent
such activities. An outstanding example of our success
in this area was the thwarting of two militant anti-Castro
1 attempts in July, 1970, to infiltrate Cuba and the seizure
of boats, arms, ammunition and miscellaneous military
equipment valued at $64,500 by U. S. authorities.
¼
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
VHN:emj
4-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 422
THE CHINESE UNIT
4-E
As a result of our close cooperation with RCMP,
that agency, in 12/70, provided us with details of one of
its double agent operations which clearly depicted intensi-
fication of Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence efforts
directed against the United States. We learned that the
Chicoms have funded travel of the RCMP source to New York
and Washington, D.C., where the source undertook to fulfill
intelligence contacts and development of data for the Chicoms.
As a result of getting this information, we learned that
Chicoms desire to lay the foundation to get "our people"
(Chicoms) into the United States under suitable cover,
probably when the Chicom Embassy opens in Canada in the very
near future. The Director's letter to the Commissioner,
RCMP, expressed appreciation for RCMP information.
During August, 1970, three of our Chinese informants
made contacts with Chicom intelligence representatives in
Hong Kong and Canada, and it is believed they were affirma
tively assessed for recruitment Another source has made
¨several trips to Vancouver, Canada, and San Francisco where
he has made strides to penetrate Chicom groups which would be
essential bases for future Chicom operations directed against
the United States.
come
In August, 1970, National Security Agency (NSA)
· advised of increased interceptions of radio transmissions
from Red China directed to illegal agents possibly in the
United States. Immediate instructions were directed to appro-
priate field offices and efforts are under way to pinpoint
areas of reception with the expectation that illegal agents
will be uncovered.
Investigations have developed data indicating possi-
´ble Chicom intelligence net formed in New York City utilizing
Chinese seamen deserters as mail drops and/or couriers.
The
We identified a Chinese alien residing in New Jersey
as an individual who provided an intelligence report to the
New China News Agency (NCNA) representative in Canada
_NCNA representative has previously been identified as a Chicom
Intelligence Service officer. The alien indicated he had a
sub-agent working for him in New York City.
EXO.dgo
1/13/71
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 423
- 2
4-E
In view of the apparent upsurge in Chicom activity
we furnished a detailed memorandum to Dr. Kissinger at the
White House and to the Attorney General under date of 9/30/70.
Our memorandum outlined the recent activities of Chicom in
the intelligence field and pointed out increasing Chicom
support for New Left and Black militant revolutionaries in
this country.
We furnished information to State, Central Intelligence
Agency and Secret Service which led to strengthening of guard
(and security around CHIANG Ching-Kuo, Deputy Prime Minister
of Nationalist China and son of CHIANG Kai-shek, who was in the
United States during April, 1970. As a result of this increased
security, an attempt by two anti-Chinese nationalist individuals
to assassinate CHIANG was thwarted.
Our investigations of the World United Formosans
for Independence (WUFI) and Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM)
developed information of growing. Chicom interest in these
groups indicating Chicoms might desire to cooperate with them
to bring about the downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government.
Positive information has been developed regarding the
intelligence activities of pro-Chicom individuals assigned
to the United Nations Secretariat: Our close coverage
determined that the three most active of these individuals
recently traveled to Europe, and coverage of their activities
has been requested through contacts of Legat, Bern.
sted through contac
We have initiated an effort in four key field offices
to develop sources among ethnic Chinese scientists having
security clearance and who are logical Chicom targets. We
were assisted in this effort by Defense Industrial Security
Office
We brought to attention of the White House and
Secretary of State Rogers information regarding an anti-Chinese
nationalist individual who had escaped house arrest in Taiwan,
fled to Sweden and who later applied for U. S. visa. His
presence in the United States could have adversely affected
United States-Chinese Nationalist relations. Secretary of
State Rogers took personal note of this information in a letter
to the Director 10/28/70.
Other investigations indicated intensified Chicom
interest in and support of radicals in the United States.
59
NW 88608 Doeld 32989638-Page 424
$
SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT
During December, 1970, six new foreign offices were
established. As a result of personnel moves, 19 Special Agents
and 16 clerks were transferred to foreign offices each requiring
passport, visa, and Department of State and Embassy notifica-
tion. The numerous contacts with State and the outgoing
letters (two for each person transferred) were handled in
this Unit, together with the memoranda and notification to
the White House regarding various phases of the operation.
A special one-week indoctrination session was arranged and
attended by most of the new Special Agent personnel. The
Director's instructions that the expansion take place were
issued 11-20-70. Each of the new offices was open and opera-
ting during December, 1970.
Through liaison with appropriate officials at the
White House, the interest of those officials in proposed
legislation which would provide increased retirement benefits
for FBI personnel has been maintained. The advice of these
officials concerning channels to be used in promoting this
legislation was secured and has been followed.
Since the last inspection, SA Haynes, has expedited
and coordinated visits of the Director to the White House on
approximately six occasions. This has included meeting the
Director, taking him to the meeting site, introducing him to
persons present if not known to him, and assuring his return
to his car by the most direct route following the meeting.
Through carefully controlled contacts with the
Commission on Campus Unrest, it was possible to secure a
copy of their report in advance in order to insure that there
were no unfavorable comments concerning the FBI. The left-
wing staff of this Commission was very active in areas of
direct interest to the Bureau, and SA Haynes was able to avoid
any conflict and there were no derogatory references to our
work made by this group.
جدير بالباك البال معاملين معلمان
· Direct personal liaison was established during the
period with Washington representatives of two additional
countries: The Union of South Africa and Japan. The repre-
sentative of the Bureau for State Security of the former a
and
of the National Police Agency of the latter are now working
directly with representatives of the Unit.
32
NW 88608 D32989638 Page 425
Swiss Police asked Bureau assistance in establishing
the location of Yoseph Gargy, W.a, who had secured more than
$400,000 in an armed robbery of a jewelry store in Zurich.
The loot was recovered in Italy, and investigation under the
Foreign Police Cooperation character resulted in the location
of Gargy in the United States. We arranged for his arrest by
other authorities so that he might be held for extradițion.
During the calendar year 1970, Agents on the Foreign
Liaison Desk handled 822 foreign visitors. These included
not only special tours of Bureau facilities but also, in many
instances, special conferences with Bureau officials, including
the Director, and other courtesies for these contacts of our
Legal Attache personnel.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 426
i
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
You are requested to furnish
information regarding various
4-H
surveys, projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This infor-
mation should include identity of the project or program, background and
date of inception, scope and desired objectives, positive results achieved
since last inspection, extent and nature of current supervision, current
justification for continuance, and frequency of evaluation and date of last
justification. Identify any surveys, projects or programs you have in
operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any
surveys, projects and programs completed or discontinued since the last
inspection. Identify only investigative -type matters in this category.
Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned
and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic
are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are
specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs
instituted since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you
may wish to comment on:
1. Security Index Program.
2. Security Informants.
3. Racial Matters.
4. Racial Informants.
5. Technical and Microphone Surveillances.
6. Counterintelligence.
7. Minutemen, Klan and other hate groups.
8. Nation of Islam.
9. Communist infiltration of racial groups.
10. New Left Movement.
11. Espionage.
12. Any other program deemed pertinent.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
1/15/71)
Attached are write-ups from
each Section concerning the
above.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(JAS:mls
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
NW 88508. DBSN13298938 Page 427
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
1
4-H
:
SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY:
P
In connection with the
Inspector's request under
above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following
handled by the Internal Security Section:
(1) Security Index Program
(2) Security Informant Program
(6) & (7) Counterintelligence Program
White Hate Groups
ame
Disruption of
(12)
Other Programs Deemed Pertinent
(a) Thumbnail Sketch Program
;
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
_SEP:1mi
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 428
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
4-H
BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION
Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals
who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat
to the national security began prior to World War II. The
actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with
lists of individuals considered for detention in the event
of a threat to the national security.
SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES
This program is field-wide in scope. The goal of the
Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals
who because of their membership and activity and/or association
with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially
dangerous to the internal security of the country. The program
includes the collection of sufficient information relating to
the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension
and detention in the event of a national emergency. Another
goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the
event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize
possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion.
POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION
By way of background, in February, 1969, as a matter
of temporary expediency, the Executives Conference approved
a moratorium on certain Security Matter Communist investigations
and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III
Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971.
By memorandum October 29, 1970, from the Executives Conference
to Mr. Tolson, approved by the Director, the moratorium was
lifted. At the time there were approximately 10,690 individuals
on the SI who were of the Priority II and III types. Virtually
no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7,000
of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
SFP 1mj
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 429
64
SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
4-H
1
February, 1969. Many of these persons had changed residence
and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown. It can
thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an
aggressive, timely and precise step toward fulfilling our current
responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of
these individuals. Implementation was directed by airtel
November 3, 1970, to all offices, and in doing so we took a
realistic step in permitting the field to stagger the reopening
of these cases so that they would be spread out over the period
6 November 3, 1970, to June 30, 1971. This was considered
essential in view of our approximation that it would be necessary
to reopen approximately 7,000 of the Priority II and III types.
EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION
Responsibility for administrative handling of the SI
rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section.
Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate
supervisory personnel. I personnally follow this matter closely
to insure it is current and that necessary changes are made
where desirable. This program receives constant supervision.
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE
This is a major internal security program based upon
Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be
implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize
acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.
FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION
The
The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated.
most recent justification is contained in memorandum from
Charles D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan dated January 8, 1970, and
as of instant date (January 12, 1971) a current rejustification
memorandum is in preparation.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
SFP:1mj
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 430

1
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS
4-H
|
At the time of the last inspection in April, 1970, we
had 279 member security informants in the Communist Party, USA
(CPUSA), while at the present time we have 264 member informants
in the CPUSA, a decrease of 15. In addition, there are 31
member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); the
number of SWP informants at last inspection is not known.
On December 16, 1970, a reorganization of Sections
within the Division resulted in a realignment of informant
handling and record keeping, with the result that only informants
in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups are now
handled in the Internal Security Section. As of December 16,
1970, there were 578 informants in basic revolutionary organiza-
tions and related groups. The number at last inspection is not
known.
"
There has been continuing recognition of the fact that
there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant
coverage in basic revolutionary organizations. In this regard,
SAC Letter 70-40 dated August 4, 1970, captioned "Racial and
Security Informants, pointed out in-depth quality informants
in these fields are more imperative than ever under present
conditions in view of the upsurge in violence. SAC Letter
70-48 dated September 15, 1970, captioned "Security and Racial
Informants," pointed out that never in our history have we
been confronted with as critical a need for informant coverage.
This SAC Letter authorized development of informants between
the ages of 18 and 21, thus presenting the field with a
tremendous opportunity to expand informant coverage not only
among violence-prone New Left and radical groups, but also in
the basic revolutionary groups as well. There can be no doubt
but that these instructions have stimulated development of
informants.
Security informant development receives continuous
supervision. It is not technically a program justified
annually, but rather a fundamental procedure in our investigative
operations that requires and receives vigorous day-to-day
attention.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
HEM:mkl
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 431
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM DISRUPTION OF WHITE HATE GROUPS
-
BACKGROUND, DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES
This program was initiated in September, 1964, for
the purpose of exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing
activities of white extremist organizations, their leaders and
adherents. There are currently 17 field offices regularly
participating in this program and as specific situations arise
other divisions also participate.
POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED
The following are highlights of accomplishments
achieved through this program since last inspection: A racial
informant of the Birmingham Division has been able to influence
Robert Shelton, leader of the largest Klan group, United Klans
of America, Inc., (UKA), to be more moderate in his speeches
by opposing violence and stressing need for law and order as
well as continuing his acts against communism. This has been
effective in toning down Klan violence.
Midwest coordinator of National Socialist White
People's Party, formerly known as American Nazi Party, was
expelled from that organization after publicity furnished under
this program disclosed he was of Jewish descent.
Through manipulation of informants, anonymous letters
and utilization of friendly press services we were successful
in creating a split in the UKA in North Carolina. This split
was brought about when a rally of dissident Klansmen in
September, 1969, showed their disaffection with the UKA leader-
ship by burning their Klan membership cards. This split was
highlighted in front page news stories in North Carolina
newspapers.
4-H
During 1970 National Klonvokation, Robert Shelton,
who was again elected Imperial Wizard, made a speech indicating
his feelings that high ranking members of the UKA may be disloyal
and that he definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
JALIA: 1m3.
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 432
4-H
possibly utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan
officers and members to ferret out FBI informants. As a result,
we recently furnished reliable news sources with information in
belief that public exposure will deter considerably from any
future enactment of these plans. It is too early to determine
results of this move at this time.
As a result of counterintelligence action taken
through racial informants in the Knoxville Division, we were
successful in having the Exalted Cyclops of Mascot Klavern #778,
Mascot, Tennessee, Thomas Stipes, eliminated from this top
position and were able to have him subsequently banished from
the Klan. This was brought about by having our racial informants
create dissension within the ranks of this Klavern.
Through the use of two racial informants of our
Little Rock Division, we were successful in causing the defeat
of a Klansmen who was campaigning to be elected as sheriff of
Jefferson County, Arkansas. This individual Victor Calvert.
Exalted Cyclops, Pine Bluff Klavern, Association of Arkansas
Klans, in conducting his campaign attempted to hide his Klan
affiliations because he hoped to receive a good percentage of
the Negro vote in his area. Our informants were successful
in discreetly letting out the word of his secret Klan membership.
As a result of counterintelligence action taken,
W. Melvin Sexton, Imperial Kligrapp (National Secretary) of the
UKA, the largest Klan organization in the country, resigned from
his position. Both Sexton and his wife, in addition to being
Klan members, were employed in the National Office of the
United Klans of America. This is particularly significant in
that for many years Sexton had been "number one man" to Imperial
Wizard Robert M. Shelton of the UKA and actually ran the UKA
while Shelton was in prison following his conviction for
Contempt of Congress. This resignation was brought about by
our informants planting the seeds of distrust regarding Sexton
and exposing the fact that Sexton had a serious drinking problem.
CURRENT SUPERVISION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE
The counterintelligence program requires little
additional manpower since these extremists are under continuous
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
LLA: 1mj
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 433
4-H
investigation. All counterintelligence proposals are submitted
to the Bureau for approval and positive results achieved from
this program, when balanced against the relatively small
expenditure of Agent and supervisory time, indicates that its
continuance is justified. This program is re-evaluated annually
and was last re-evaluated by memorandum G. C. Moore to
W. C. Sullivan dated July 20, 1970.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
LLA: 1mj
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 434
THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM
1
4-H
This program was initiated and authorized by
SAC Letter 53-72(J) dated October 27, 1953, to insure that
the field is using current characterizations of subversive
organizations and to provide uniformity in characterizing
such organizations. Those characterizations deemed to be of
field-wide interest are now to be furnished to the field by
letter to all offices on an annual basis rather than by
SAC Letter as was formerly the practice, in accordance with
approval of suggestion in memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr
dated December 7, 1970.
The background and value of this program is the same
as it was at the time of the write-ups for the 1970 inspection.
Upon receipt of the annual letters from the field in June, 1970,
422 separate characterizations were received and reviewed by
appropriate supervisory personnel at the Bureau. Those of
field-wide interest were furnished to the field by SAC Letter
70-62 dated November 3, 1970. The remaining characterizations
were returned to interested field offices following their
approval by the Bureau. This program was last reviewed and
analyzed and its continuance approved by memorandum R. L.
Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
HEM:1mj
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 435
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H
New Left Movement
Section Chief: R. L. Shackelford
.
us
The following surveys, projects and/or intensification
' programs are in effect against the New Left movement:
By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices, dated
10/23/68, the field was instructed to expand its Key Activist
programs and these programs were intensified. Each office
was instructed to submit its recommendations on individuals
considered as Key Activists. The field was instructed to
maintain high-level informant coverage on these individuals.
The purpose of this program is to render Key Activists
ineffective and thereby drastically reduce their influence
in the New Left movement. At the present time there are 75 Key
Activists under intensive investigation. A Key Activist Album
which contains photographs and biographical data on each Key
Activist has been assembled and has been furnished to all offices.
The Key Activist Album is maintained in a current status, 40
are subjects of prosecutive action. The Album has proven to
be invaluable in following the activities and travels of New
Left activists, both for the Seat of Government and for the
field.
By airtel dated 3/10/69 to SAC, Albany, and all offices,
the field was instructed to submit summary reports every three
months on those individuals designated as Key Activists. The
field was also instructed to prepare an appropriate communication
suitable for dissemination in the event any of these individuals
held a speaking engagement and whenever they made a statement
indicating a propensity for violence or urging student agitation.
The purpose of this program was to develop information in
respect to the securing of testimony and evidence concerning
violations of statutes within the Bureau's jurisdiction in
connection with leaders involved with campus disorders.
By letter to all offices dated 5/5/69, the field was
instructed that when it is ascertained that a Key Activist is
scheduled to speak on campus, in addition to the coverage of
his appearance, they should determine through established
sources the amount received by him and the source of the funds.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WNP:dir
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 436
21
The purpose of this is (1) to provide for a central-
ized reporting of New Left activity in this field; (2) to
enable us to keep abreast of funds utilized to finance these
inflammatory speeches; (3) to enable us to take advantage of
situations which could embarrass the New Left or stifle
future activity; (4) to facilitate the necessary evaluation and
analysis by the Bureau and other interested agencies. By
letter dated 12/23/69 to all field offices, information concerning
financial aspects of the New Left were emphasized, and the
field was instructed to develop solid information concerning
the travelling of Key Activists.
By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated
10/28/68, a program was instituted to obtain a comprehensive
study of the whole New Left movement. Offices were instructed
to prepare summary reports on the New Left movement in their
territories. The purpose of these reports was to obtain a
comprehensive study of the movement in order to assess its
potential dangerousness. Following the submission of the
original summary reports, offices were instructed to submit such
reports on a quarterly basis with an appropriate breakdown of
the material in the report: These reports enable the Bureau to
maintain recent and comprehensive information concerning various
aspects of the New Left movement: These reports are disseminated
to interested agencies to enable them to maintain a clear picture
of New Left movement.
SAC Letter 70-11 (E) dated 3/3/70 instructed field to
discontinue submission of quarterly letter listing identities
of New Left movement groups under investigation, coverage
afforded each group and programs of each office to develop
necessary coverage. This information in order to streamline
paper work is now to be set forth in cover pages of New Left
quarterly report.
By airtel to all offices dated 12/9/70 instructions
were reiterated to the field concerning the preparation and
content of New Left movement quarterly reports: The organizations
to be included in this report were noted as well as the sub-
headings to be utilized. A brief analysis of the current status
of New Left activity in each Division is to be included in the
cover pages of the report as well as the number of individual
cases opened and closed concerning SDS members as well as members
of pro-communist, militant New Left-type campus organizations
who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence.
= 2 =
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 437
By letter dated 11/5/68, to SAC, Albany, and all
offices, under the caption of "New Left Movement, Publications,
Internal Security Miscellaneous, " the field was instructed
to cover the principal propaganda mills of the New Left which
are described as the "underground" newspapers. The field was
instructed to conduct a detailed survey of these publications
and to submit information concerning these obscene, seditious
and inflammatory newspapers. At the present time, there are
over 200 such publications being circulated. Cases on various
of these newspapers which are deemed important to the New Left
movement have been opened.
By airtel dated 3/16/70 to all offices, a survey
was instituted to determine the amount of financial support
given to New Left groups by tax-exempt charitable foundations,
prominent or wealthy individuals, and politically oriented groups.
The field was instructed to furnish results of this survey in
form suitable for dissemination,
By letter to all Special Agents in Charge, dated
2/13/70, the field was advised that the militant and violence-
prone Weatherman faction of the SDS planned to go underground
and to direct "strategic sabotage" at military and police
installations. The field was instructed to advise appropriate
local police agencies of the aims of the Weatherman faction and
of the necessity to vigorously investigate the Weatherman group.
By airtel to all field offices dated 3/19/70 the
field was advised of the plans of the Weatherman faction of
the SDS to form commando-type units to engage in bombing, arson
and assassination. The field was instructed to make every effort
to locate and identify Weatherman communes and their activists.
A list of major Weatherman activists was furnished to the field
which instructed intensive investigation to determine their
whereabouts and to advise the Bureau and office of origin on a
weekly basis. The field was instructed to utilize a caution
statement that Weatherman activists should be considered dangerous
for their known propensity for violence.
Bureau airtel to select offices handling bulk of
Weatherman investigations dated 3/24/70 reiterated instructions
in airtel to all offices 3/19/70 and specifically noted that
New Left communes were to be located and participants identified
to determine if they were violence prone. The offices were
instructed to have Special Agents assigned to these investigations
to be reminded of their prosecutive potential and to consider
establishing a special squad to fully comply with Bureau
instructions to intensify these investigations.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 438
-
3
Bureau airtel to Chicago 3/24/70 instructed that
office to promptly initiate investigations and interview all
individuals who were arrested in Chicago during National
Action week 10/8-11/69 if such investigations not already
undertaken. Over 280 individuals were arrested, most of
which were either members of or closely associated with
Weatherman group. Chicago airtel to numerous offices 4/9/70
restated Bureau instructions.
-
"
SAC Letter 70-18 (C) dated 4/7/70 under caption
"New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism Bombing Matters
set forth instructions to be followed in bombing and attempted
bombing matters. In those instances of bombing or arson which
appear to have New Left or black extremist connotations or
motivation and where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists
or the Department has advised no investigation is warranted,
the Bureau is to be immediately advised setting forth pertinent
data regarding involvement of subversive groups or individuals
suspected in the incident as well as a recommendation for any
additional investigation warranted.
Teletype to all SACS 4/17/70 set forth specific
areas of investigations to be covered by field in its
investigations against New Left terrorist groups and
individuals and also set forth the definition of a commune
for purposes of Bureau investigations and instructed field
to conduct sufficient investigation of all members of the
commune when they are members of a commune falling within
Bureau standards for investigation. The field also was
instructed to develop that informant coverage necessary of
all communes and/or groups so that advance knowledge of
any planned violence could be obtained to insure preventive action
be initiated and `prosecutive action brought to bear where
possible.
By airtel to all offices 5/11/70 the field was
authorized to interview all Venceremos Brigade (VB) members
on SAC authority on completion of investigation except in
those instances where the subject is under 21, currently a
student, professor, has some connection with an institution
of learning or is a journalist. Bureau approval is still
needed concerning the latter individuals.
-
4
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 439
74
All
Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70 instructed
the field to begin implementation of investigations of
New Left terrorism promptly with available manpower and
scale of implementation should be as rapid as possible.
adherents to Weatherman ideology of advocating a Marxist-
Leninist revolution now and use terroristic tactics in
furtherance of revolution are to be subjects of these
investigations. All of these subjects are to be considered
for Priority I of the Security Index, interviewed and the
Bureau advised every 45 days by letter of those placed in
Priority I of their current residence and any other pertinent
information developed. To facilitate handling at the Bureau,
all reports and other communications within defined categories
are to include word (Weatherman) in character. This airtel
also instructed each office to submit monthly airtel beginning
6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities and locations of communes
or organizations under investigation; (2) number of cases opened
during month on individuals in these categories; (3) total
number of individual cases under investigation; (4) informant
coverage used against communes or organizations; and, (5) brief
summary of New Left-oriented violence in area during preceding
month and action taken.
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 concerning
the VB instructed all offices to immediately intensify
investigations of all returnees from Cuba with this Brigade,
ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt interviews and
submit current reports with Security Index recommendation.
In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy to a
violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and willingness to
participate in that revolution by these VB members, the field
was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every
90 days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III
and non-Security Index returnees. In case of Priority I
Security Index subjects, this information is to be furnished
the Bureau every 45 days.
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 forwarded
the field a copy of a Departmental letter concerning the specific
areas of interest to the Department in campus disorders looking
toward possible prosecutive action. The field was specifically
instructed to develop information concerning New Left involvement
in campus violence and all agitational activities prior to and
during violent campus disorders by subversive groups and such
information must be fully determined and reported.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 440
- 5 -
-

SAC Letter 70-30 (D) dated 6/2/70 reiterated
prior instructions of moratorium on Security Matter
Communist investigations. Recent field inspections
indicated some offices needed clarification of this
moratorium. The SAC Letter noted instructions concerning
moratorium only applied to routine communist investigations
and not those individuals belonging to such groups as the
Weatherman, Progressive Labor Party, Socialist Workers Party
and Young Socialist Alliance.
Bureau airtel to all offices 7/16/70 noted that
New Left terrorism is continuing through bombings, arsons
and other forms of violence and each SAC must personally
insure sufficient personnel are assigned to handle these
matters as well as investigating individuals involved and
those following Weatherman ideology of utilization of
violent revolutionary tactics against our Government.
Bureau airtel to select offices dated 8/20/70
handling Key Activists were instructed to promptly submit
to the Bureau sufficient handwriting specimens of cach
Key Activist and the specimen is to be placed in the
National Security File maintained by the Laboratory.
was done in view of the propensity for violence of these
individuals and the fact a number of them are currently
Bureau fugitives.
This
SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70 captioned "New Left
Violence, Internal Security
-
-
Movement
Miscellaneous
(Weatherman)" refers to strategic sabotage plans of
Weatherman against military and police installations and
"Declaration of War" by Weatherman underground and instructs
all security personnel to develop better informant coverage.
This development should concern informants and sources who
can furnish advance information regarding activities of
Weatherman and other terrorist groups and was specifically
stressed.
T
By airtel to all offices dated 9/3/70 captioned
"Attacks on Police, Extremist Activity" the field was
instructed, because of increased attacks on police, that
it can be expected there will also be physical attacks.
against the FBI and it should be insured that all Speciál
Agent personnel are fully cognizant of this possibility.
If information is received targeting police, appropriate
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 441
-
6
-
The
investigation must be immediately instituted and informants
directed to develop full facts concerning the attack.
purpose of these investigations is to obtain complete
intelligence data concerning any extremist influence.
SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70 under caption
"New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Informant Coverage"
instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive
policy of developing new productive informants who can
infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations, their
collectives, communes and staffs of their underground newspapers.
Constructive plans to implement this program are to be
included in Item 4 of the monthly airtel on "New Left Movement-
Violence" which was outlined in Bureau airtel to all offices
5/13/70.
Bureau airtel to all offices 10/1/70 instructed the
field to replace the word (Weatherman) as noted in Bureau
airtel to all offices 5/13/70 with the word (Extremist). This
was done to insure prompt and efficient routing at the Bureau
as well as proper handling in the field. A new caution
statement was also to be included in all correspondence in
respect to those individuals involved in Weatherman and other
New Left extremist activities.
-
SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70 captioned "New
Left Movement Police Training Matters" advised the field
that in view of recent developments concerning violence caused
by New Left terrorists, the Bureau will consider requests
from the field for SACS or ASACs to brief local law enforcement
command and supervisory personnel regarding New Left extremism
and violence at law enforcement meetings and conferences where
attendance is restricted to full-time duly constituted law
enforcement officials.
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/3/70 advised
the field that the moratorium of suspension of report writing
in Priority II Security Index cases and suspension of
verification of residence and employment in Priority II and
Priority III cases is rescinded. Offices were instructed to
reopen a proportionate number of cases each month and insure
all were open by 6/30/71. Furthermore, residence and
employment on all of these subjects is to be verified,
reports submitted in Priority II cases and LHM submitted in
Priority III cases where necessary.
annual
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 442
-
-7.
-
77
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/4/70
instructed the field to initiate investigation of all members
of SDS and members of pro-communist, militant New Left-type
campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution
and violence. Each individual under investigation should be
considered for the Security Index.
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning
informant development in New Left groups noted that each SAC
was to make this matter his personal concern in order that
penetration of these groups by top quality informants will
be accomplished in the immediate future. Each SAC was
directed to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete
analysis of his informant coverage in New Left groups clearly
setting forth the weaknesses and productive steps being taken
to rectify these weaknesses.
Current Bureau instructions require development of
adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States
Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative
responsibilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal
security fields can be properly discharged. Semiannual reports
are submitted by each office having a Strategic Air Command Base
or an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Base within its
territory. A review of semiannual reports submitted by the
field as of 7/1/70 disclosed that a total of 1,281 informants
have been developed.
-
Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised field
that special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and
other New Left terrorists has been started. Field is instructed
to immediately review files for identity of individuals who fit
category of a New Left terrorist and whose fingerprints should be
included in this special single fingerprint file. Names of these
individuals were to be submitted to Bureau with sufficient
identifying data and as new names come to attention of office
promptly furnish the Bureau.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 443
-
8
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
4-H
Section Chief R. D. Cotter: Following are applicable activities
of Research Section.
Survey Regarding Potential for Racial Violence
"
This survey program was formerly under the title
"Possible Racial Violence, Major Urban Areas.
The program
was initiated in 1964 in order that the Bureau would be aware
of potential danger spots in the U. S. The present program
requires each field division to conduct a continuing survey in
their respective territories covering all localities having a
potential for racial violence based on current racial conditions.
The objective is to insure that the Bureau receives a realistic
and comprehensive picture of existing racial conditions in these
areas on a current basis and to obtain advance information of any
impending racial developments which clearly point to the
possibility of mob violence.
Quarterly reports submitted by field in line with this
survey represent information obtained through contacts with
local government and police officials, leaders of racial groups,
and a cross section of informants and sources.
The survey
enables us to be thoroughly knowledgeable of racial develop-
ments and potential trouble spots and provides timely and
pertinent information which is disseminated to the White
House, Attorney General, and other Government agencies.
Information developed is also used for an analysis of the
potential for violence in the U. S., which is prepared in the
spring of each year, just prior to the most active months,
in this field, and which is disséminated on a high level.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
LJB:ekn
4-H
NW-88608-Doeld:32989638-Page-444-
- 2 -
1
Security Index (SI) Program
Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security
Section (4-H), which has investigative responsibility under this
program. Research Section, Special Records Unit, maintains
records applicable to the SI and is responsible for coordinating
program. In line with this responsibility, Research Section
prepared a memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan
, dated
1/12/71, re-evaluating SI.
As of 4/15/70 there were in the Index 2,794 persons
of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,352 rank-and-
file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 11,146
. Of these,
848 and 4,770, respectively, are communists--a total of
5,618 or 50.4 percent. As of 12/15/70 there were 
in 
the
Index 3,450 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II)
and 8,614 rank-and-file subjects (Priority ITT) for 
a total
of 12,064. Of these, 831 and 4,718, respectively, are
communists--a total of 5,549 or 46 percent.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 445
:'
Emergency Detention Program
3
The Emergency Detention Program (EDP), which is field-wide,
involves the planning for apprehension and detention of persons
considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public
safety of the U. S. in time of a national emergency and for the
search and seizure of contraband. The EDP is not a program as
such but is based on Title II of the Internal Security Act (ISA)
of 1950. The basic responsibility for the operation and implementa-
tion of the EDP rests with the Attorney General. Detailed plans
regarding the EDP are drawn up and included in the "Attorney
General's Portfolio," copies of which are in the Bureau's possession.
This program has been maintained in an up-to-date status.
Administrative plans for the implementation of the program in each
office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro Survey. Lists of
individuals to be detained are furnished to the Internal Security
Division of the Department each month and the listing of places to
be searched under authority of the Master Search Warrant are main-
tained on a current basis. The Seat of Government and all field
divisions, with the exception of Honolulu, maintain essential
records at safe locations for successful implementation of the EDP.
Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to the
U. S. Attorneys and U. S. Marshals upon implementation.
We
This program is coordinated by Special Records Unit,
Research Section. Primary responsibility rests with the Department
and changes can be made only upon approval of the Department.
merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable changes. Periodic
checks are made to insure that all records connected with the EDP,
stored away from Headquarters cities, are current. Field division
surveys are kept up to date and the Bureau is advised semiannually
of the status.
- Legislation was previously introduced in Congress to
repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. When the 91st Congress ended,
no affirmative action had been taken in this regard. In the event
Title II should be repealed at a future date under new legislation,
the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally will
continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic responsibil-
ity for protecting this Nation's internal security.
This program is under constant supervision and
re-evaluation so that any necessary changes and streamlining
may be made. A memorandum justifying the continuance of this
program was last submitted on 1/12/71.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638-Page-446-
81
Security Informants
-'4 -
Special Records Unit maintains an up-to-date index of
Security Informants and Potential Security Informants. It
correlates personal and operating data (such as name, address,
code, file and symbol number) concerning these informants,
which it receives from the Division's investigative sections,
and places such material on FD-348s, three by five cards
that constitute the index. This index is maintained on
discontinued as well as current informants.
At the time of the inspection in April, 1970, a total
of 1,141 Security Informants were being operated. As of 1/12/71 ·
the number had increased to 1,159 for a total increase of 18.
During the same period, the number of Potential Security Informants
had increased from 616 to 765 for a total increase of 149.
Technical and Microphone Surveillances
There has been no significant change regarding the
utilization of these techniques in the internal security field
since the last inspection. As of 1/12/71, we have 40 telephone
surveillances (tesurs) in Bureau's internal security cases and
seven awaiting installation. We also have six tesurs in
operation at the request of the State Department.
We are conducting six microphone surveillances (misurs)
in internal security field, and four misur installations are
being operated at the request of the National Security Agency
(NSA). In addition, 64 teletype facilities are being covered at
the written request of NSA.
82
W 88608 Docid:92989038 Page:
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR
INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section
T
Macarand
4-H
1
The following programs discussed immediately
hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the
Espionage Section: Alem Program, Bureau file 65-69532;
Banpop Program, Bureau file 65-70741; Cokma Program,
Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program, Bureau file 65-70719;
DESECO Program, Bureau file 105-71688; East-West Exchange
Program, Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical
Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365.
Following the inspection of April, 1970, the
Counterintelligence Program was discontinued and a GS-14
Supervisor was made available for assignment elsewhere.
No write-up has been submitted for the Rega Program since
this is now being phased out.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-13-70
WAB:hke
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 448
83
:
ALEM PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-69532
4-H
1.
2.
3.
ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover
Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. S.
under assumed identities as 1. alien husbands of American
wives or 2. as male immigrants on first preference
petitions because of certain professional and technical
skills. The basis of this program is information furnished
by the Fedora informant This program was initiated in
August, 1965. Individuals entering the U. S. under
the above two categories have been determined through
a machine run of Immigration and Naturalization Service
Form G-188 punch cards. The Bureau has reimbursed t the
Immigration and Naturalization Service for expenses.
incurred in sorting these cards for immigrants entering the
U. S. between the years 1960-1965,
Approximately 1960 cases have been opened under this program
since its inception, of which 106 are now pending. We have
not uncovered any illegals to date although we have been
able to identify through this program a valuable KGB agent
who went to the U. S. as an immigrant from Belgium
(Buckboard case Bufile 65-68188).
ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases
Unit, by SA A.P. Litrento. The responsibility of reviewing
the pertinent G-188 cards and initiating investigations is
placed with the Washington Field Office. The procedures
followed in opening cases do not require the use of much
personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office.
4. According to the Fedora informant, the KGB has used the
techniques set forth above in dispatching KGB "illegals"
to the U. S. During 1960-1965, four KGB "illegals"
reportedly arrived in the US under category number one
according to information the Fedora informant was able
to obtain from a KGB officer in the New York Residency.
*
5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
APL:tdp
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 449
CANIL PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-70719
4-H
1
1.
CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to
uncover Soviet illegals who may have arrived in
Canada as European immigrants and thereafter entered
the U. S. on immigrant visas obtained at one of the
American consulates in Canada. This program is based
on the Cowslip case which involved a Soviet illegal
husband and wife team who used this method of entry
Legat, Ottawa, effected arrangements with various
American consulates in Canada obtain the
Immigration Visa and Alien Registration (IVAR) forms
filed by European Immigrants prior to their destruction
by the consulates. It is consulate practice to retain
these forms for 16 to 18 months then to destroy them.
Legat, Ottawa, forwards these forms to the New York
Office where they are reviewed. To develop suspects,
the New York Office uses criteria developed from analysis.
of the Cowslip case.
2. Since inception of this program in June, 1966, 27 cases
were opened. There are no cases pending. No illegals
have been uncovered to date. The procedures followed
in this program do not require the use of much personnel
or many man hours by the New York Office.
3.
4.
5.
CANIL is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special
Cases Unit, by SA A. P. Litrento.
The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most
difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security
field. It is felt this program still has a good
potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical
and has a sound basis. Past experience has shown that
Soviet intelligence will use the same modus operandi
continuously, if successful.
This program is evaluated on an annual basis.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
APL:tdp
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 450

7
DESECO PROGRAM
Bufile 105-71688
4-H
The Deseco Program (program for development of
selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc
officials) was conceived in an espionage conference in
December, 1957. Its objective was to intensify the
development of informants and double agents to penetrate
Soviet-bloc intelligence and for use in sensitive defection
approaches.
Between the last inspection and December 1, 1970,
approximately an 8-month period, 37 Deseco subjects were
placed in contact with Soviet-bloc officials and 8 of these
have developed to the status of security informants or
double agents.
The majority of work is concentrated in the
New York, Washington, D. C., and Chicago areas where Soviet-
bloc establishments are located. A Soviet Consulate General
is scheduled to become operative in San Francisco during
1971, and a skeleton staff of four Soviet officials with
five dependents is seeking appropriate buildings for this
establishment.
San Francisco and other West Coast offices are
currently developing a "pool" of Deseco sources for eventual
use against Soviet intelligence officers who will operate out
of the Soviet Consulate General. Due to the increased number
of Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States and their
relative freedom of travel, particularly to technical and
scientific conventions, a total of 19 offices have been
authorized to conduct "sounding-out" interviews of prospective
sources without prior Bureau authority. Follow-up interviews
with potential Deseco sources are conducted on a UACB basis.
Unusual and highly sensitive cases are routed to the division
front office for approval.
The New York, Washington Field and Chicago Offices
submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of the
program. The other 16 offices submit summaries on a semi-
annual basis. This program substantially assists us to
penetrate and neutralize Soviet-bloc intelligence. The results
achieved thus far warrant the program's continuance. It is
the best means of penetration available considering the
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
LW:as
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 451
DESECO PROGRAM
8
It
limitations on other sensitive investigative techniques.
affords us a pool of human resources available for use against
Soviet-bloc intelligence personnel in political, economic and
particularly scientific fields in which the intelligence services
of the bloc have shown extreme interest. This program has been
reevaluated on an annual basis. It was last justified by
memorandum dated 10/22/69, but by the action of the Executive
Conference approved by the Director on memorandum of 10/29/70,
Washington and New York were instructed that every Special Agent
in those offices handling investigations of Soviet personnel
should immediately open on and develop two completely new
Deseco subjects. These instructions were sent to the field
by airtel of 11/2/70.
The program will next be justified by memorandum in
March, 1971, when progress letters summarizing the results of
the program will be due from all participating offices. This
program is correlated in the Espionage Section Coordination
Unit by Special Agent L. Whitson.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
2177
NW 88608 Dould 2989638 Page 452
i
EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM
Bufile: 105-42300
4-H
This Program originated in 1955 to provide
internal security safeguards regarding the admission
of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence
regards visits of the East-West Exchange Agreement
participants as opportunities to promote intelligence
activity.
As a result of the last inspection SAC Letter 70-25
was prepared which set forth revisions of our investigative
action in the field. This change was made as a result of
other manpower commitments. The instructions in that SAC
Letter provided that no investigations will be conducted
of groups or individuals participating in the East-West
Exchange Program in the absence of any information indicating
affiliation with Soviet intelligence. Bufiles are checked on
all Soviet participants and where information is developed
showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then opened and
the field is instructed to conduct the necessary investigation.
During the period of June-December, 1970, 525
individuals entered the United States under the provisions
of this exchange agreement and of this number, we had information
indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 28 of these
individuals.
With regard to Soviet exchange students there are
currently 31 in the United States. Based on information
furnished by defector sources and investigations of Soviet
students previously in the United States, we have determined
that the Soviet Intelligence Services utilizes these students
in an intelligence capacity, principally as "spotters." In
view of this, we afford these students active investigation.
We have also found that a number of these students return to
the United States for assignment at one of the Soviet establish-
ments and in most instances, contacts which they made while in
the United States as students are generally reactivated. For
example, Mikhail Fomichev, currently assigned to the Soviet
Mission to the United Nations as a Third Secretary, was in the
United States as an exchange student in 1966. Through a defector
source we learned that he had recruited an American agent for
the KGB and extensive investigation under the code word "Nikotinę"
(Bufile: 65-70250) has resulted in the identification of this
agent in December, 1970. He has admitted his recruitment a and
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPL:cgc
4-H
NW 88608-Docid:32989638-Page-453-
10
EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM
meetings with Fomichev since his return to the United States.
One of the possibilities being considered by the KGB for this
individual is to have him obtain employment as a Bureau Agent.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPL cgc
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 454
3
1.
2.
BANPOP PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-70741
BANPOP is the code name for a Bureau program through
which an attempt is made to identify Soviet illegal
agents who may be utilizing a Swiss bank to transfer
funds to themselves. The program is based on an analysis
of four Soviet illegal agent cases between 1955-1966
in which funds were furnished through the Banque Populaire
Suisse in Switzerland. The transfers of funds are
reviewed with the following criteria: (1) the person or
individual beneficiary is named; (2) the amount of the
transfer is between $300 and $5000 and (3) the last name
of the person ordering and receiving the funds is the
same or the money is directed to a specific bank account.
The program was initiated by Bureau letter of August 26,
1966.
3.
The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago
and Philadelpnia vifices. The Philadelphia Office originally
had the program in effect from September, 1966, until
May, 1968, when it was discontinued. However, it was
renewed in that office in February, 1970.
When an office locates an individual who might be considered
a subject, it writes a letter to the Bureau with a copy
to the appropriate field office and requests that inves-
tigation be undertaken to identify this person. The title
includes the name of the subject and the code name of the
program in order that all cases will be handled by the
same supervisor. At the present time, there are six pending
cases. The New York Office utilized 12 Agent hours per
month in handling 10,100 records for a six-month period
ending August 31, 1970. The Philadelphia Office utilized
four Agent hours per month and the Chicago Office utilized
three Agent hours per month in handling its program.
4. This program is supervised by SA J. P. Lee of the Special
Cases Unit, Espionage Section:
5.
All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the
program on a six-month basis, submitting letters by March 1
and September 1 of each year.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
JPL tdp
1/12/71
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 455
COKMA PROGRAM
4-H
65-73750
1.
Title is code word for physical surveillance
coverage of known meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelli-
gence in the past several years. The New York Office
instituted this program in July, 1970.
2.
New York Office has catalogued known meeting areas
as a result of past physical surveillances of Soviet intelli-
gence officers and information received from defectors-in-place
and double agents operating against Soviet intelligence officers.
Soviet intelligence officers are trained to detect surveillances.
and accordingly are extremely astute in detecting such coverage.
It is almost impossible to conduct a discreet physical surveil-
Lance of them which will result in uncovering an intelligence
operation. This program places our Special Agents in areas
where there is likelihood of Soviet meet without hazard of
prior surveillance which would thwart meeting. Almost all
Soviet intelligence officers spend approximately one to three
hours in "dry cleaning" themselves to insure they are not under
surveillance when meeting an agent. When the Soviet arrives
at the meeting area, he is confident that he is not under
surveillance. Our objective in this program is to identify
American agents meeting Soviet intelligence officers under
clandestine circumstances.
3°
New York, utilizing one team consisting of four
Special Agents, afforded physical surveillance coverage to
three consecutive subway stops in Queens, New York, which
were known to have been frequented by Soviet intelligence
officers in the past. From July through October, 1970, six
Soviet intelligence officers were observed in these areas on
16 occasions. Two significant cases have been developed out
of this coverage and New York has current authority to interview
one of the subjects observed in clandestine contact with a known
Soviet Committee for State Security officer. On 11/10/70,
New York was authorized to further implement this program and
advised that it intended to cover two other known meeting areas
in Queens, New York, during early evening hours on weekdays
and on Saturdays which S. Similar to the coverage previously
afforded.
4.
s
Program supervised by Special Agent George M. Quinn,
Officials Unit New York, Espionage Section. Expenses and time
in handling program is negligible at Seat of Government. Since
program in field consists of surveillance activities, there must
be close supervision at field level.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
NW 88608 Doc32989638 Page 456
S
4-H
COKMA PROGRAM
5.
-
Program offers excellent potential on basis of
results achieved during short period it has been in operation.
It must be noted that Soviets were not as active as usual
during September November, 1970, because of Twenty-Fifth
United Nations Anniversary celebration and meeting of
United Nations General Assembly. Soviet intelligence has
in the past been extremely reluctant to engage in intelligence
activities during such periods because detection at such time
could be extremely embarrassing to Soviet Government. Manpower
limitations have restricted our full utilization of this
investigative technique. Special Agent personnel assigned
to this program must be familiar with Soviets assigned to
the New York area and must also be experienced in surveillance
procedures.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
GMQ:aeb
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 457
1'
4-H
RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS
105-36365
1.
Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have
central repository for information developed in connection
with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to
radio and technical equipment purchased by them.
2.
Washington Field and New York Offices furnish infor-
mation developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis.
Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State,
Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic
Energy Commission, and Bureau of International Commerce,
United States Department of Commerce. Material submitted
includes name of Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description
and cost of the items purchased. It involves maintenance of
three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington Field and
New York Offices. Program established to acnieve following
objectives: disseminate to interested Government agencies
information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the
United States by Soviet officials; determine whether Soviet
intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding material
appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control
list; and to permit discreet markings by FBI Laboratory of
certain technical equipment furnished to Soviets through overt
or covert means which would permit its identification at some
future time.
3.
EXTE
Since April, 1970, Program has disclosed continuing
purchases by Soviet nationals of Grundig Satellite Multiband
portable radios. During 9/70 one KGB officer in Washington
purchased 30 of these radios at one time. Soviet husband
and wife illegal team recently in U. S. used one of these
radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which con-
tained their operating instructions. Program made it possible
to secure serial numbers for possible future identification.
Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable
estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments
and security devices being operated. Program also disclosed type
of transmitting equipment and antenna system purchased by
Soviets, apparently for installation at Consulate General in
San Francisco when that establishment becomes operational.
information is of interest not only to FBI Laboratory but to
State Department and National Security Agency in connection with
its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities.
4.
This
Program supervised by Special Agent Eugene C. Peterson,
Officials Unit Washington, Espionage Section. Expense and time
-NW_88608_D2000 ¥ÉIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS
4-H
utilized in handling program is negligible. Dissemination of
material submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices
requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor
and no weaknesses in program are apparent. Administrative
tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Officials
Unit Washington, Espionage Section.
5.
-
Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence
Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination
of material developed. Possession
Session 
of some equipment on which
discreet markings were previously placed by FBI Laboratory could
serve to identify possessor with involvement in Soviet intelligence
activity. Program is evaluated annually to determine justification
for continuance.
6.
Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971.
Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and
each year thereafter, if still of continuing value.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
ECP:eco
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 459
93
SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H
метр
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION:
There are attached
separate write-ups
regarding the following programs supervised in the
Nationalities Intelligence Section:
10
.2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by
United States Residents of Chinese
Diplomatic Establishments
Chinese Aliens Entering the United States and
Chinese Entering the United States Claiming
United States Citizenship
Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign
Countries
Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese
Communist Intelligence Activities in the
United States (Chicoin)
Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border
(BOCOV)
Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and
International Organization Visas
7. Security Index
-
Cuba
8. American Repatriate Program
9.
International Organizations
-
Dangerous Aliens
of Nations Outside the Soviet Bloc
T
-NW-88608-Docid:32989638 Page 460

:
PROGRAM
'
1.
VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND
CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS
OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS
(Bufile 105-144424)
4-H
Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives.
Program was initiated in 8/65 in connection with
efforts to cover Chinese Communist (Chicom) activities in
the United States. Through cooperation of both United States
intelligence agencies and friendly foreign intelligence services,
the identities of United States residents are furnished to us
who attempt to enter Communist China or contact People's
Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic establishments in certain
countries throughout the world.
This program is field-wide and not directly connected
with any other investigative program. The objectives include
identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be
engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom
establishments. The identity of these visitors is absolutely
necessary in order to determine if they have access to classified
material or if they could be utilized effectively by the Chicoms
when they return to the United States. Some of these individuals
have excellent potential for informant development. We have
utilized contacts with Chicom diplomatic establishments in the
development of selected sources who are attractive to the Chicoms
and have been developed as double agents. By SAC Letter No.
70-26 dated 5/12/70, we restricted our investigations to cover
actual visitors to China. This procedure was initiated to
conserve manpower inasmuch as State Department had relaxed travel
restrictions to China on 3/16/70 in order to allow travel to
PRC for any "legitimate purpose." The President recently directed
that a committee prepare recommendations for additional steps
which may be taken to relax restrictions on travel to and promote
further trade with the PRC. This highly confidential directive,
if accepted, will permit many people to be eligible to travel to
China if the Chinese will grant travel permits. Up to the present
time, however, the Chicoms have only granted travel permits to
pro-Chicom propagandists such as Edgar Snow.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
_JEM: cal
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 461
2.
Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection.
Investigations since the last Inspection have totaled
95. Many of these individuals were interviewed; however, it
has been determined that none were allowed to enter Communist
China. During the cultural revolution which ended during 1970,
very few United States residents were allowed to enter
Communist China including a number of United Nations employees
who had previously made numerous trips to Communist China.
There is every indication, however, that the Chicoms have taken
on a "new look" internationally and are attempting to gain the
friendship of the western world. This program has not reached
its great potential due to the xenophobia which existed during
the past three years. Communist China is expected to open an
embassy at Ottawa, Canada, in 1/71 as result of Canadian
recognition. This will make it far easier for United States
residents to cross the border into Canada and either seek a
travel permit to visit Communist China or make contact with
Chicom intelligence representatives at the embassy in Ottawa.
3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision.
This program is handled by one Bureau supervisor who
correlates information as received from either United States
intelligence agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services
and directs the office covering the individual's residence and
employment to conduct necessary investigation according to the
Manual of Instructions. Investigations are conducted to fully
identify the individuals, determine current residence and
employment and ascertain whether he has access to classified
information. In absence of any unusual circumstances indicating
need for further action, the case is closed. Each case is
closely supervised and evaluated on its individual merits.
4.
Current Justification for Continuation.
The potential of this program is far greater than
what has been realized in the way of results to date. As
mentioned above, the Canadian recognition of the PRC has given
Communist China a foothold in North America. RCMP advises
that they feel that 50 percent of the Chinese Communist
intelligence effort will be directed toward the United States.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 462
-
2.
-
At the present time, the restrictions for crossing the border
from the United States to Canada are practically nonexistent
for a United States resident with proper documentation. There-
fore, it is imperative that we continue such a program so that
when RCMP reports individuals contacting the PRC Embassy in
Ottawa we may fully identify these individuals.
5.
How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification.
This program is evaluated annually and was last
justified on 12/31/69. At that time, it was stated that
the program would be evaluated and justified during 1/71;
this is currently being undertaken.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 463
SH
3
-
CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES
(Bufile 105-135923)
i
CHINESE ENTERING THE UNITED STATES
CLAIMING UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
(Bufile 105-12752)
These two programs have similar criteria for
investigation and, therefore, are being handled under
one write-up.
4-H
1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives
The
The alien program was instituted on 1/26/65
and the program concerning Chinese entering the United States
claiming United States citizenship began on 9/14/65.
.Both programs were originated in an effort to identify
Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence operatives who
may be sent to the United States in deep cover.
In 1955,
Chicom intelligence emphasized the need to deploy deep
cover illegal agents abroad and specifically in the
United States. The number of cases currently investigated under
the citizen program has been approximately 15 to 20 annually;
only one, however, has been opened since last inspection.
These individuals offer the Chicoms an ideal situation for
placing an illegal into the United States who has assumed the
identity of a Chinese whose father or grandfather was a
United States citizen. These individuals, once they arrive in
the United States, are never checked on by any agency.
Chinese aliens, a number of whom are students "temporarily,"
entering the United States to attend universities, have
decreased in number during the past two years from approximately
2,000 per month to 600 per month. Recent relaxation of immigra-
tion regulations will now permit a great increase in the numbers
allowed to enter the United States during 1971. Since the
inception of both programs, we have simplified the criteria for
investigating citizens and aliens keeping in mind the necessity
for conserving manpower in our investigations, but also
fulfilling our responsibilities. The scope and investigation
of these two programs are identical. The prime objective of
these two programs is the identification of intelligence agents;
however, the two programs have been responsible for the
development of positive intelligence information as well as a
continuing increase in source coverage of Chinese matters, not
only in our heavily populated Chinese localities, but also
covering the lesser Chinese communities throughout the
United States.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
JEM: sem
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 464
•
2. Positive Results Achieved Since the Last Inspection
Since the last inspection 151 cases have been
opened on Chinese aliens and only one case on Chinese
claiming United States citizenship. During this period
197 alien cases have been closed and eight cases involving
citizens were closed. Information developed during these
investigations has been disseminated to the intelligence
community. To date, no Chicom intelligence agent has been
uncovered by these two programs; however, we have steadily
increased our source coverage and collected positive intelli-
gence which has been disseminated to the intelligence
community. This is a long-range program and it is expected
it will pay dividends during the coming year with the establish-
ment of a Chinese Communist embassy in Canada.
3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision
The alien cases most of which originate from our
Legat in Hong Kong, are supervised by three supervisors
according to the geographic location the alien is
destined to in the United States. The citizen cases are
also supervised by three supervisors according to
geographic location and these cases are furnished to us as
a result of Passport Records being checked by WFO.
Cases in both programs are closely supervised to make
certain that each subject falls within the criteria and that
when the cases are reopened for investigation after two
years the case is evaluated to determine if the subject
may possibly be an intelligence agent.
4. Current Justification for Continuation
These two programs cover two vulnerable areas
whereby the Chicoms could penetrate the United States by
utilizing either aliens or individuals claiming United States
citizenship who have been fully trained in Communist China
and entered Hong Kong subsequent to 1/1/55. The screening
process at United States Consulate General's office in
Hong Kong is meager and current proposals for relaxation
of rules will make it easier for the Chicoms to filter
agents into the United States through the easiest route,
that is, an alien or a citizen fully documented. These two
programs also are one of the best sources for the
development of informants and the gathering of positive
intelligence information. These programs are fully justified
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 465
for continuation and no additional manpower or expenditure
requests are needed at this time for the continuation of
these two programs.
5.
Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification
These programs are evaluated annually. The
alien program was last justified on 1/22/70 and the citizen
program will be justified with the alien program on 1/22/71.
On 9/18/70, a memorandum was submitted indicating that the
citizen program would be coordinated with and justified
with the alien program during January, 1971.
T
-NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 466
i
4-H
1.
INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF
FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Bufile: 65-63113)
Background, Scope and Objectives
Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive
intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations.
Expansion of the program took place in 1955 and 1959 and during 1962
and 1963, as well as in 1970, additional coverage was approved.
The program has three principal phases as follows:
a.
b.
C.
Regular notification to the FBI by other U.S. agencies
regarding arrival in U.S. of intelligence personnel
from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists
chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal
expense.
Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments
of selected non-Soviet bloc countries with the approval of
State Department and the Attorney General. We currently
have special coverage on eleven diplomatic establishments
of seven non-Soviet bloc countries and three additional
installations as recently approved by the Attorney General.
Countries currently covered are Panamà, Israel, Jordan,
the United Arab Republic, Chile, Bolivia and Peru. “Our
cost in operating this phase of the program is related to
translation of the intelligence product and salary of
personnel who man special coverage equipment. Costs are
analyzed on an individual basis each time the special
coverage is justified. This justification is based on the
value of the data developed.
This phase relates to the development of live sources
within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet bloc
countries as well as the development of individuals so
closely connected with official establishments they are
able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence informa-
tion. We now have 47 actual and 22 potential live sources
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
ERH:bjp
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 467
4-H
1
1
at the establishments of 25 non-Soviet-bloc countries.
The principal cost involved in this phase relates to
Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and
time spent in handling these sources.
2. Positive Results Achieved
This program has enabled us to provide the White House and
the highest level of the intelligence community a continuing flow of valuable
foreign political information affecting the national and international interests
of the U.S. The program was particularly productive in our coverage of
such critical areas of tension as the Middle East crisis, the continuing
crisis in Panama, and the recurrent political crises created in
South America through the unseating and establishment of regimes in the
various countries covered. In the areas mentioned, as well as in other
fringe nationality areas, this program has served as a basis for obtaining
information which has provided U.S. Government with current data regarding
the international political scene and has contributed otherwise unobtainable
information for the benefit of those responsible for policy decisions at the
highest level of our Government. An example of the importance of this
information is illustrated in the comments of the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, Charles W. Yost, made by him in a letter dated 11/13/70
to the Director. Ambassador Yost noted that the support given to the
U.S. United Nations Mission by the Bureau was deeply appreciated by him
and had afforded him privileged insight and perspective.
don't
eprice
The quality of this program is further attested to by realization
by the White House of the capabilities of the FBI to produce positive foreign
political intelligence with resulting instructions to the Bureau to expand
this capability abroad in select liaison positions. As a result of these
instructions, our capability in furnishing foreign political information
was expanded through the opening of six new liaison posts in Beirut,
Lebanon; Caracas, Venezuela; La Paz, Bolivia; Copenhagen, Denmark;
Managua, Nicaragua; and Tel Aviv, Israel. With this expansion, our
overseas liaison Agents were increased from 28 to 42 with supporting
clerical personnel being increased in number from 32 to 46. This move
has increased the number of our foreign posts from 11 to 17. (More
detailed comment regarding increase in liaison abroad is set forth in the
work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E, Accomplishments
Special Coordination Unit. )
-
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 468
3.
Extent and Nature of Current Supervision
4-H
4.
5.
The program as it relates to all friendly foreign countries
(except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the
Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors
assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section.
Current Justification for Continuation
This program continues to produce information of substantial
value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign
political information of vital interest to the White House and members
of the intelligence community. The information continues to illustrate
the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative
to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a
valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this
program be continued.
Periodic Justification
Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by
memorandum dated 5/8/70.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - DANGEROUS
ALIENS OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC
Program was initiated in April, 1951, to create a centralized
compilation of undesirable and potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic
immunity against whom State Department can, when wartime emergency
arises, initiate steps for deportation or lifting of their diplomatic immunity.
The program applies only to aliens from countries outside the
Soviet bloc employed in the United States in international organizations
within provisions of International Organizations Immunities Act. The
program is similar in intent to the Emergency Detention Program and the
PRODIP Program; however, it involves an entirely different type of
individual.
The program is a control device only and involves no investigative
activity. Twenty-five individuals (as of 11/5/70) are included on the list
with New York Office responsible for twenty and Washington Field Office
responsible for five.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 469
4-H
Current program requires only an annual letter with deletions
or additions being made by separate letter as subjects involved qualify
for elimination or inclusion. Substantive desk supervisors review field
submissions to verify need for inclusion of individuals on list.
Program continues to serve a useful purpose as a precautionary
measure for U.S. security in time of emergency. It is justified annually
with last justification having been made 2/6/70.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 470

PROGRAM
4-H
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN)
(Bufile 105-135614)
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
1.
Background and Date of Inception
Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence service,
lacking base from which to operate in United States, must
rely on illegal and third-country operations to develop
intelligence data in U. S. Chicoin was instituted in May, 1965,
to combat these efforts.¨
2. Scope and Desired Objectives
To create situations and place our informants in
contact with known Chicom agents in foreign countries, with
ultimate aim being Chicom recruitment of our assets for illegal
operation within U. S., resulting in penetration of Chicom
intelligence activities inside our borders.
3. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection
In August, 1970, we directed Los Angeles informant,
code name DINA, to travel to Canada to initiate contact with
representatives of New China News Agency (NCNA) who are known
Chicom intelligence agents. Source succeeded in making such
contact and arousing interest of NCNA personnel. As bonus,
source also encountered a double agent (code name ICED TEA)
operated by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) who has assign-
ment from NCNA principal to recruit illegal agent in U. S., and
who now intends to propose recruitment of DINA to icoms
Seattle source, code name JUDD, has developed close
association with key Chicom sympathizer in Vancouver,
British Columbia, Canada, and during period was invited to visit
two Chicom ships in port at Vancouver Source also made trip to
JRH:dgo
1/12/71
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 471
کی دے کر
2
4-H
San Francisco for his Chicom friends, taking with him books
and messages for individuals there from pro-Chicom individuals
286:32:ལོཝཏཏྟེ
in Canada.
Two other sources NY 5896-S and SF 2739-S main-
tained personal contact with personnel of China Travel Service
*(CTS) in Hong Kong during period. CTS is Chicom agency
specializing in arrangement trips to mainland China, and front
for Chicom Intelligence.
4. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision
Chicoin Program is handled by one Bureau Supervisor
who correlates activities of field offices involved to insure
proper direction of informants and control of specialized
double agent operations. Close supervision of cases is maintained.
5. Current Justification for Continuance
Counterintelligence and penetration of Chicom
intelligence operations is long-term process. Sources developed
to date under this program present excellent potential for such
penetration, especially in light of fact Chicoms expected to
open Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, in next thirty to sixty days,
with strong possibility Consulates will also be opened in
border cities such as Vancouver. RCMP expects at least 50% of
all future Chicom operations in Canada will be directed against
United States, and present sources loom large in penetration of
such operations. Further, strong possibility exists Red China‍
will finally gain admittance to United Nations during Fall, 1971,
a move which makes development of quality sources in this field
most imperative.
on 5/7/70.
6. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last
Justification
Program justified annually, last justification being
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 472
اشته ای احمد ساد
4-H
PROGRAM
COMMUNIST COVERAGE ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER
BUFILE:
BOCOV
100-356015
Background and Date of Inception
BOCOV was initiated by the Director in 1948 to
fill a void in adequacy of coverage in the 25 mile border
zone south of the U. S.-Mexican border by the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.
Scope and Desired Objectives
Three border offices, El Paso, San Antonio and
San Diego, as well as the office of the Legal Attache,
Mexico, participate. Ten Agents and two Assistant Legal
Attaches devote a portion of their time, directing some
212 sources and informants. The population of the zone
areas involved is approximately 1,700,000 individuals of
which 2.371 are either members or sympathizers of major
Mexican subversive groups.
Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection
Program has furnished valuable information
relative to threat against U. S. by Mexican subversives
residing in the border area. Investigative results are
furnished to all levels of interested U. S. Government
intelligence community. Program continues to keep us
advised of potential trouble areas and allows for
appropriate counter-measures.
Domestic Intelligence Division
1/12/71
JEG:emj
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 473
į
Extent and Nature of Current Supervision
Periodic reports on individuals and organizations
as well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are analyzed
and correlated by SA Joseph E. Gauzens, Jr. Involved is
review of incoming letters, memoranda, reports and semi-
annual progress letters detailing informant coverage and
subversive strength. Analysis of this material provides a
basis for detecting weaknesses and making arrangements for
counter-intelligence moves.
Cutbacks initiated by the Bureau for the purpose
of conserving manpower and streamlining operations have
substantially reduced manpower and number of informants
utilized. Agents and Legal Attaches participating were
reduced from 16 to 12; informants and sources utilized
from 312 to 212. These reductions resulted in annual
savings of $19,934.65 and total manpower currently utilized
on the program is 1.72 Agents. Effectiveness of BOCOV and
our ability to re-expand the program should future
circumstances warrant were not impaired by the cutbacks
cited.
Current Justification for Continuance
BOCOV continues to fill the above-described
intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with
other intelligence programs originating in the border area,
in particular the SECOMEX program.
Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification
Program is evaluated annually and was last
justified 10/2/70.
- 2 -
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 474
"
i
BOCOV
Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly
sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in
effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this
operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive ·
elements entering the U. S. Although this operation is no
longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was
once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities
of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not only
with regard to the internal security of the U. S., but also
in investigating criminal matters of an international nature.
.Furthermore, unauthorized disclosure of details of this
operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who
cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing
abroad.
:
i
substituted for
to SSC
in
сору
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 475
Pages 107+108
4-H
NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS
1
This program was initiated in January, 1952, as a means of
keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive
nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering
the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the
Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the
Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of
foreign officials where their activity requires such action.
The basis for this program is found in the procedure by
Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form
advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is
sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate
agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results
being channelized to the FRI We correlate this information with data
from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General. In those
instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain
clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions
to the field for active investigation.
Since the program was initiated, 617, 290 Immigration and
´Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have
undertaken 452 investigations based on results thereof.
The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in
the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by
trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section
and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by
substantive desk supervisors within the Division. Based on the limited
number of active investigations opened since the inception of this program,
the cost of the program consists mainly of name check expenditures. The
program continues to serve a necessary purpose in our overall intelligence
coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons
having a capability for intelligence activities or who may pose a security
threat to the United States.
The program is justified annually, with the last justification
having been made February 9, 1970.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
VERH:bjp
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 476
SECURITY INDEX
-
CUBA
(Bufile 100-358086-210)
4-H
Background and Date of Inception
This program was instituted in November, 1960.
By that date it was obvious that Cuba, whose Government
had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January, 1959,
was a communist state posing a real and present threat
to the internal security of the U. S. In 1962, at the
time of the Cuban missile crisis, a Supervisor at the
Bureau was assigned the specific responsibility for
administering this program to assure the apprehension and
special handling of the individuals included therein in
the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba.
Scope and Desired Objectives
As of 12/15/70, there were 419 individuals
included in the Security Index Cuba Program, divided
into two categories:
-
1. Individuals placed on the Security Index
solely on account of their pro-Cuban activities. (Cuban
Special Section 96 persons).
-
2. Persons already on the Security Index
because of other subversive connections and activity who
would warrant special attention in the event of hostilities
with Cuba (Security Index subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban"
323 individuals).
-
Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date
record of location and activities of individuals included
therein, by means of established Security Index procedures
and reporting, in order that we are in a position to move
swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of
these persons become necessary.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
1/11/71
AHS: emj
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 477
1
Positive Results Achieved
Determination as to the validity of an individual's
inclusion in this program is constantly under review. Since
the last inspection, critical attention has been given this
matter with the result that the number of persons on the
Cuban Special Section of the Index has been reduced from
193 as of 3/16/70 to 96 as of 12/15/70. These 96 persons
are judged to be the hard-core pro-Cubans, action against
whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory. Of these 96,
27 are Cuban aliens. Each subject of pending security
investigation with Cuban ramifications is considered for
inclusion in the Index.
Extent and Nature of Current Supervision
The Supervisor responsible for this program is
required to review each investigative communication in
current cases of pro-Cuban individuals to determine whether
the individual meets the criteria for inclusion in the Index,
as outlined in the Manual of Instructions. He must make a
decision as to the degree of dangerousness of the individual
under the Priority Apprehension Program and rule on the
field's recommendations regarding these matters. He initiates
procedures with the Security Index Desk of the Domestic
Intelligence Division and the Voucher Statistical Section
of the Administrative Division regarding the placing of an
individual on the Index, his removal, and assignment or
change in Priority.
If the individual involved is an alien,
correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the
Department is required to assure the preparation of a pre-
positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Action is also taken with the Department to cancel
the arrest warrant if the alien is removed from the Index.
On 10/29/70, the Director approved the lifting of
the moratorium on report writing and certain investigative
procedures in security cases on individuals. This will
require the field to reopen by 6/30/71 and conduct investi-
gation in cases on some 372 individuals involved in this
program who have not received recent investigative attention.
The Bureau will receive in the upcoming months summary
reports, letterhead memoranda and other communications in
virtually all of these cases. The moratorium, in effect
2
-
-NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 478
since February, 1969, has limited investigative and re-
porting activity in this field. As of 1/11/71 there were
18 active and 78 inactive case in the Cuban Special
Section of the Security Index (19% of the 96 case total)
and at the time of the last inspection there were 25
active and 168 inactive cases (13% of the 193 case total),
Current Justification
A
The threat to the internal security of the U. S.
from communist Cuba has not lessened in recent years.
workable priority apprehension system which receives
current and continuing attention is mandatory. Instant
program, as presently organized and handled, is fully
justified.
Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation.
This program is evaluated on a semi-annual basis.
The most recent semi-annual review and evaluation was
dated 10/8/70.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 479
AMERICAN REPATRIATE PROGRAM
4-H
BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION
a
Program was instituted
on February 28, 1962, to specify procedure to be followed
upon receipt of information that U. S. citizen residing in
Cuba had been issued a Swiss Protection Passport by Swiss
Embassy in Havana Cuba, for travel to U. S. Few Americans,
however received such passports prior to 1966 when the
State Department estimated 800-900 U. S. citizens were still
in Cuba and desired to return to the U. S. In February,
1967, when it appeared these U. S. citizens might be permitted
to leave Cuba en mass, instructions were issued to field out-
lining investigation to be conducted relative to individual
repatriates.
2-3
SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES
-
Specific objectives of program
are verification of repatriate's identity; ascertaining
whether the individual has or had Cuban intelligence contact,
training or assignment, or possesses intelligence infor-
mation; and instructing individuals to alert us to any future
intelligence contact. Program is field wide.
POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED
-
From August, 1969, to July, 1970,
eleven flights brought an average of 18 citizens out of Cuba
per flight. These repatriates were accompanied by a total
of 425 relatives and/or close friends, all of whom were
Cuban aliens. Some 300 U. S. citizens remain in Cuba awaiting
repatriation. There have been no repatriation flights since
July 31, 1970.
As a
Program has alerted us to return to this country
of Security Index subjects, Castro sympathizers, · individuals
who traveled to Cuba without State Department authorization
and individuals affiliated with Communist Party, USA.
result of interviews conducted with repatriates, worthwhile
data concerning conditions in Cuba has been obtained and
disseminated to the U. S. Intelligence Community.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
VHN:emj
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 480

Ak
1
EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION
-
Program is
supervised by one Seat of Government Agent who devotes a
portion of his time. All cases are afforded careful
supervision in an effort to detect presence of a repatriate
who may have been recruited by the Cuban Intelligence
Service for activity in this country. Thirty-two cases are
pending.
-
CURRENT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE Fidel Castro has
consistently used the mass exodus of individuals from Cuba
to infiltrate intelligence agents into the U. S. Program
offers excellent potential for detecting such individuals
who reenter this country under the protective coverage of
their citizenship. We feel that the program is fully
justified.
An
FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION AND DATE OF LAST JUSTIFICATION
annual evaluation is made. The program was last justified
on September 1, 1970.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 481
2
-
CUBAN REFUGEE PROGRAM
4-H
The Cuban Refugee Program, which had as its
objective the detection of Cuban intelligence agents
possibly being infiltrated into the U. S. via refugee
channels, was discontinued by SAC Letter 70-25,
5/5/70, paragraph C.
dated
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
VHN:emj
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 482
1
:
SURVEYS, PROJECTS, AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS
де
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE,
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION
RACIAL MATTERS
1
4-H
Racial matters investigations were intensified through
establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67. ·
This Section handles racial matters investigations involving
black extremist organizations and individuals. Objectives are
to identify organizations and individuals that are involved in
extremist activities, that advocate or had actually committed
or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that advocate
revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate Federal
laws. The dangerousness to the United States of such individuals
must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they
should be included in the Security Index or the Agitator Index.
The extent of foreign influence or influence of the Communist
Party or other domestic revolutionary groups among racial
extremists, especially black extremist organizations, is a prime
objective. To accomplish these objectives, sources have been
developed who can furnish quality and timely information concerning
individual extremists and extremist organizations. Such sources
likewise have forewarned us of potential violence and enabled
the Bureau to stay on top of the racial situation. These
sources have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities
of alerting local authorities and to keep other Government
agencies dependent upon us for information informed of
pertinent developments including information concerning
potential violence.
Our informant coverage has made it possible for us
to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House,
the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an
interest. Additional information pertaining to racial intelli-
gence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for Racial
Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the Research
Section.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WHA: sef
NW 88608 Docid:42989638 Page 483
Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly
reviewed at the Seat of Government to insure that essential
information is being obtained on a timely basis and that
it is being promptly disseminated in the field, as well as
at the Seat of Government.
The Director on 11/27/70 in testimony before the
Senate Appropriation Committee for the purpose of securing
additional Special Agents emphasized again the violent and
revolutionary nature of the Black Panther Party (BPP). He
testified there has been an alarming increase in the number
of black extremist attacks against law enforcement officers;
BPP publications consistently advocate violence, including
assassination and kidnapings, to achieve overthrow of the
Establishment; BPP leaders have participated in crimes of
violence; and Black Panthers have substantial connections
with hostile foreign elements, notably the communist
regime in North Korea and Arab terrorists in Algeria.
Increasing ties between Arab terrorists and Black Panthers,
according to the Director, raise the ominous possibility
that militants may seek to ape Arab tactics, including air-
plane hijackings, to gain the release of jailed Panther
members.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 484
BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Bufile 157-8415
4-H
Since 1/7/69 all offices have submitted semiannual
reports presenting concisely a complete picture of black
extremist activity in its area. This enabled us to identify
groups and individuals involved in black extremist activities,
to develope quality informants who report on such activities
and to initiate intensified and penetrative investigations of
such individuals and groups.
Since the desired objectives
for which these reports were originally designed had been
realized, since field informs us on a timely basis in substan-
tive cases of pertinent data concerning this movement and to
insure manpower is utilized on priority matters, the Director
on 7/6/70 authorized discontinuance of these reports.
On 3/8/69 the Black Nationalist Photographic Album
(BNPA) was established to assist in identification of militant
black extremists who travel extensively.
The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes
a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist
organizations and militant black nationalists who are known
to travel. Each office prepares a form on such individuals
within its territory and the form is then furnished to the
Bureau and all offices where it is maintained in a complete
album. In the event of travel by any of these individuals,
the office covering the area being visited already has a
photograph and biographical sketch of the individual immediately
available. The album is also furnished to the Legats in Ottawa
and Mexico City and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and
Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel.
Over 300 extremists are currently carried in this album.
In view of importance of an individual's fingerprint
classification for identification purposes, the field by letter
dated 5/8/70 was instructed to include such data in biographical
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
4-H
WHA: sef
1/12/71
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 485
sketch concerning each individual included in the BNPA
and to amend those sketches then included in the Album
to show such data.
The BNPA was also broadened to include black
extremists who are Bureau fugitives. This insured each
office having a photograph and biographical sketch immediately
available for use in conducting investigation to locate such
fugitives or in apprehending them.
By SAC Letter 70-65, item (D), dated 11/17/70, the
field was advised that, henceforth, deletions of individuals
from the BNPA would require Bureau authorization since Bureau
did not agree with some deletions made by field which resulted
in unwarranted action by all field offices.
To insure broad circulation among investigative
personnel and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization
of informants especially racial sources, we initiated the
Black Extremist Bureau Fugitives list in June, 1970. This
list, which is prepared monthly and sent each field office
and selected Legats, identifies those Bureau fugitives who
by reason of their activities or organizational affiliations
are black extremists. Currently there are 45 fugitives carried
on the list, 9 of whom are IO fugitives. Twenty of these
fugitives are reportedly living outside the U.S. This list
has given greater emphasis to the location of these fugitives,
particularly among Special Agents handling racial matters and
racial informants and has been effective in affording greater
exposure of these fugitives among racial informants. Fifteen
of these fugitives have been arrested since the list was
initiated, with 5 being arrested in December, 1970. One of
those arrested in December is the reported leader of the
Black Panther Party (BPP) underground.
Racial Intelligence Section prepares monthly a
Racial Calendar pertaining to the Black Nationalist Movement
in this country. This Calendar identifies scheduled racial
events throughout the country which are more than local in
nature as well as all major scheduled events which could
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 486
120
logically develop into a racial event. Purpose of the
Calendar is to assist field in coverage of these events in
view of widespread travel on the part of black nationalists
in attendance at such affairs and to take part in demonstra-
tions commemorating certain anniversaries of interest to
blacks. A listing of recently published publications and
articles concerning the black nationalist movement is also
set forth in the Calendar. Publications included are public
source and are identified to assist the field in keeping on
top of writing by and about black nationalists and the black
nationalist movement.
Black extremist activities are concentrated in organized
activities of over 66 groups, some of which have chapters in
major cities throughout this country. The violence-prone Black
Panther Party, for example, has 48 branches throughout U.S.
Hard-core membership in these black extremist groups totals
about 9,600. This membership figure, however, disguises real
following of extremist groups in black areas of our cities
and extent of influence and leadership they exercise. These
organizations, and particularly BPP, have substantial sympathetic
support, especially from young blacks, which is frequently
surfaced during confrontations with police.
Extent of black extremist strength is illustrated by
Louis Harris Poll which was set forth in 4/6/70 issue of "Time."
The Poll projects that nine per cent of all blacks, some two
million Americans, call themselvės "revolutionaries" and believe
only a "readiness to use violence" will achieve equality.
Twenty-five per cent have "a great deal" of respect for the
BPP. Most alarming is that 40 per cent of those in the age
group 14-21 years old believe violence is necessary to achieve
equality.
•
The following pages set forth summaries concerning the
key black extremist organizations that are presently under
active and penetrative investigation.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 487
121
1
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
4H
The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black extremist
organization, continues to be extremely active throughout
the country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California,
for the obstensible purpose of patrolling the black community
to prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known
as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.
It expanded rapidly throughout the United States
during 1967-68, then suffered a gradual decline during 1969.
Revitalized in December, 1969, and throughout the 1970s it
has again currently expanded until today there are approximately
48 branches of the BPP with an estimated 1,000 hard-core
members supported by many thousands of sympathizers. It also
has an international office in Algiers, Algeria. The branches
include 17 chapters and 31 affiliated groups that masquerade
under the names of National Committee to Combat Fascism or
Black Community Information Center.
The ultimate goal of the BPP is the violent overthrow
of the United States Government and its replacement with a
Marxist-Leninist system. The BPP openly advocates urban
guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government leaders and
other forms of violent terrorism. Since its inception, the
BPP has aimed its most vicious invectives against law
enforcement and particularly local police. "Off the pigs,"
BPP jargon for "kill the cop" is the battle cry of the
organization. The weekly Panther newspaper, "The Black Panther"
and its other publications and propaganda paraphernalia are
abound with articles and cartoons encouraging lethal attacks
against police and other forms of authority.
Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967
and since that time has expanded as the organization itself
expanded.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
ABF:drl F
4H
-NW-88608-Docid:32989638 Page 488
By letter to all offices dated 2/27/70, approved
by the Director, offices having BPP investigations were
instructed to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every
six months in compliance with instructions in the Manual of
Instructions. Previously offices were submitting quarterly
reports on the BPP. The changes made on the basis of a
recommendation by a Racial Informants Conference of field
supervisors to eliminate some paper work in the field.
All field offices having a BPP investigation are
also required to submit a monthly report containing evidentiary
data required by the Department. Original instructions in
this regard were issued by Bureau airtel 12/3/68 and the
continued submission of this monthly report is necessary in
view of possible prosecution of the BPP.
All field offices conducting an active BPP investi-
gation are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the
status and activities of the BPP within its territory. This
survey was commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968,
and changed to a monthly summary on the approval of the
Director by letter to all offices dated 2/27/70.
This change
is a result of a recommendation by the Racial Informants
Conference of field supervisors to cut down paper work in the
field. The monthly summary relieves the field of some paper
work and at the same time keeps the Bureau and the field up to
date on BPP developments.
San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case
continues to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the
BPP.
Because of the excellence of this summary and the need
for such an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed
by Bureau airtel 1/21/70 to furnish copies of its summary to
all continental offices which is the current practice.
All field offices conducting an active BPP investi-
gation were instructed by airtel 6/17/70 to submit a monthly
summary on the financial activities of each BPP branch. This
financial summary includes data on sources of income, foreig
funding, expenses, the mechanics of local finance operations
ign
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 489
and the steps being taken by each office to develop full
financial data. This summary enables the Bureau to keep
abreast of all financial developments regarding the BPP
on a national and international basis.
By airtel to all continental offices 11/6/70 all
field offices conducting an active BPP investigation were
instructed to submit a biweekly airtel containing specific
comments regarding underground BPP operations within the
area of each field office. This includes progress in the
identity and interviewing of expelled BPP members who, it
has been determined, are the logical candidates for member-
ship in the BPP underground. The underground operation of
the BPP has an ultimate goal of terroristic guerrilla
warfare. It is a recent development in the operation of
the BPP which is the subject of an intensive investigation.
The biweekly summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of
all developments in the underground and to intelligently
coordinate the investigation thereof.
In recent months the Black Panther Party has formed
a corporation known as Stronghold Consolidated Productions,
Inc. (SCPI) to control all BPP funds and assets and to act as
purchaser and/or lessee of any property utilized by the BPP.
The corporation and its activities are under intensive investi-
gation which has revealed that its activities are centered in
San Francisco and New York. By airtel 1/7/71 to San Francisco
and New York, these offices were instructed to submit a
weekly summary in form suitable for dissemination of all
pertinent developments concerning the corporation during the
previous week. This summary keeps the Bureau aware of SCPI
operations and also enables us to regularly fulfill our
dissemination requirements.
It is noted that there are currently 32 field offices
conducting active investigations of the BPP. Our intensive
investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, members
and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed
information concerning its operations and activities including
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 490
124

organization plans, funding programs, extent of control by
headquarters and foreign support. In addition, evidentiary
information that could support prosecution is regularly
furnished to the Department.
Our ultimate objective is of course the prosecution
of the BPP for violations of Federal criminal, civil rights
and security statutes. A secondary objective is to more
completely develop details of the BPP for intelligence
purposes.
In July, 1969, the Attorney General established
a special task force for the specific purpose of developing
a prosecutive theory against the BPP. Attorneys of this
task force, known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have
interviewed many of our informants in furtherance of this
purpose and have instituted a continuing Federal Grand Jury
in San Francisco. Ten of our informants have testified
before this Federal Grand Jury and its is anticipated that
others will be called.
It is recommended that the intensive investigation
of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as
above be continued.
T
$
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 491
CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP)
157-16554
The CAP was formed as an international revolutionary
organization as the result of the convening of the fourth
annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States
in Atlanta, Georgia, September 3-7, 1970. This gathering
was unique in that it was attended by approximately 2,500
blacks of so-called moderate and militant persuasion, as well
as a large number of extremists. Representatives attended
from 35 states and 21 different nations, including Canada,
Australia, various independent nations of Africa, and the
Caribbean area.
A number of the workshops at the CAP were dominated
by extremist elements who urged the creation of massive coopera-
tive programs and institutions designed to destroy any progress
made toward integration of the races by complete rejection
of white society, the formation of a separatist black nation,
national African parties, and, ultimately, a World African
Party.
These objectives are to be achieved through the
unification, cooperation, and interdependence of blacks
wherever they reside, regardless of their "imposed" nationali-
ties, and under the revolutionary ideological banner of
Pan-Africanism of the well-known black extremist Stokely
Carmichael.
Specifically, CAP's domestic extremist element,
headed by black revolutionaries Hayward Henry and LeRoi Jones
from Newark, New Jersey, calls for extensive use of disruptive
tactics against all segments of white-dominated institutions
and organizations, including the police and the military.
Since its founding in Atlanta, CAP has held a
number of regional meetings in various sections of the
United States for the purpose of setting up its national
organization and in furtherance of its revolutionary programs.
As a result, CAP is currently activating in at least 17
different cities with its national headquarters and Chairman
Hayward Henry located in Boston, Massachusetts. LeRoi Jones,
however, appears to be the dominant figure in the organization.
Current CAP planning indicates the organization
intends to move aggressively through deceptive ! programs
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
PEN: mk1
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 492
126
¡Congress of African Peoples (CAP)
to establish black political power through four basic activities
which are:
(1)
(2)
influencing of black political candidates;
organization of the black community;
formation of coalitions with all dissident
(3)
(4)
and extremist groups whether white or black
so long as CAP benefits from same; and
the massive use of disruptive tactics.
CAP has emerged as yet another deadly threat to
racial harmony and, as a result of its programs and ties with
foreign extremist elements and well-known revolutionary
Stokely Carmichael must also be considered an imposing
threat to the national security.
Investigations of the CAP. its leaders, and extremist
affiliates are receiving most close supervision. Pertinent
data developed in regard to their activities is being
disseminated to the Department and to interested Government
agencies and officials.
r
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 493
127
REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA
Bufile 157-9079
i
4-H
The Republic of New Africa (RNA), formed in
Detroit, Michigan in March, 1968 by followers of
Malcolm X, assassinated black extremist, has chapters
in ten U.S. cities and a current hard-core membership
of 100-130 individuals.
RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard
Henry, black extremists of long standing in the Detroit,
Michigan, area. When first formed, the RNA named as its
President in exile Robert Franklin Williams, violence-
prone black extremist then residing in China. Williams
has since returned to the U.S. but has resigned from his
position as head of the RNA due to his own legal problems
and dissension existing within the organization.
RNA was established to create a black nation
within the U.S. demanding from the U.S. Government the
States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and
South Carolina, in addition to individual reparations
of $10,000 per black citizen as payment for 400 years
of ancestral slave labor.
RNA's organizational structure was designed to
be revolutionary in character and its founders proposed
that efforts be made for international recognition and
financial assistance from Cuba, Red China and the black
nations of the world. RNA established a black army known
as the Black Legion whose duty was to protect the persons
and property and to attack the enemies (the police) of that
nation. Training programs were instituted and uniforms
complete with the leopard skin epaulets were disigned as
the official dress for the Black Legionnaires.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
GIT:sef
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 494
High point in the RNA's activities occurred
during a national convention in Detroit, Michigan, in
March 1969, when members of the Black Legion engaged in
armed confrontation with Detroit police resulting in the
death of one policeman and the serious wounding of another.
The RNA is currently split with dissension with two distinct
factions. The Richard Henry Faction with headquarters in
New Orleans, Louisiana, is the most active and militant
of the two groups.
The other faction is headed by Milton
Henry with headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. Current
plans of Richard Henry call for an intensification of
RNA activities throughout the U.S.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 495
129
:
STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)
100-439190
:
SNCC was originally organized in Atlanta, Georgia,
in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee. Prior to the election of Stokely Carmichael as
its Chairman in May, 1966, the organization operated as a
nonmembership civil rights organization with both white and
black participation. Carmichael, on assuming the Chairmanship
of SNCC, immediately eliminated all whites from participation
and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented
group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary
action and the overthrow of the United States Government, a
position which the organization maintains today.
H. Rap Brown, Bureau fugitive and well-known black
extremist who served as National Chairman for a time following
Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967, again assumed
the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969. At
that time, it was announced SNCC was eliminating the word
"Nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters
were also moved from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City.
Under Brown's direction, SNCC moved to restructure
and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence
as a black extremist organization. The national leadership
issued directives on the reorganization of the national
office in New York City, as well as the local organizations
and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary
Economic Council, an Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council, a
Research Council, and others which make up a body within SNCC
known as the Revolutionary Political Council.
Included among new organizational procedures are
plans for raising the number of active participants in local
cadres, the obtaining and training in the use of weapons,
the purchase of land for ostensible use in an Agrarian Reform
Plan to aid black tenant farmers but which will also serve
as a weapons training site. Training manuals on revolutionary
activities, including guerrilla warfare and the medical care
of wounded or injured persons, have been prepared and are to
be disseminated to local SNCC chapters in furtherance of this
reorganization.
As a result of H. Rap Brown's flight in May, 1970,
to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
PEN:mkl
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 496
Pri
176
Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently
under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt.
Hunt also serves as head of the organization's Revolutionary
Political Council.
Hunt has successfully directed the opening of a
"coffeehouse" known as the Third Eye Lounge in Augusta,
Georgia. This facility, in line with SNCC's historical
anti-Vietnam War posture, is to serve as a propaganda center
from which to foment anti-Vietnam War sentiments among black
military personnel at Fort Gordon, Georgia, as well as among
the black civilian population in that area. In addition,
Hunt has initiated publication and distribution of a
revolutionary news organ known as "National SNCC. Aggressive
programs are underway to obtain new SNCC activists, and in an
effort to capture the support of black females, the organization
recently formed The Third World Women's Alliance under the
leadership of Fran Beal, a member of SNCC's Revolutionary
Political Council.
$1
Strong evidence of progress in connection with the
organization's plans to initiate guerrilla warfare tactics
is given by development of recent information indicating Hunt
and other SNCC leaders are in the process of selecting a
number of candidates to receive such training in North Korea.
These individuals, on completion of training, will serve as
instructors in various parts of the country, thus providing
SNCC with a well-trained, hard-core cadre of personnel capable
of initiating acts of terror against individuals and institu-
tions of Government in furtherance of their revolutionary
objectives.
Investigations of SNCC, its leaders, affiliates,
and their activities continue to receive close supervision.
Information of pertinence concerning the organization
continues to be disseminated to the Department and other
interested Government agencies and officials.
H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 497
131
JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS
BUFILE 157-9903
}
4-H
i
The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a black
extremist organization with headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida.
It is the leading organization for all black militant groups in
Florida. JOMO was founded in St. Petersburg during May, 1968, with
85 ghetto youths, who believed liberation of black people will not
come about through "normal channels." The organization has
affiliated groups in Louisville, Kentucky and Gainesville, Florida.
During December, 1970, leaders of JOMO decided to expand their
operation throughout the nation. Attempts are currently being
made to create chapters in Boston, Massachusetts and Miami, Florida.
Joseph Waller, Jr., the articulate founder of JOMO, and present
chairman of the organization intends to have all black militant
groups in Florida designated as organization chapters.
The organization's voice and propaganda are carried
out through the publication "The Burning Spear." This publication
has urged blacks to buy arms and to be prepared to fight white
America. In this connection, JOMO members have participated in
racial demonstrations, used fire bombs and have been involved in
attacks on police through use of violence. Members reportedly
blew up a radio station in Tampa, Florida, and recently participated
in a plot to break out two black political prisoners from a
Florida prison. Eight members of the organization were arrested
in 1970 for committing three murders and 15 armed robberies. One
of the murders was committed to obtain money to pay a water bill
for JOMO headquarters.
n
The organization is in the process of accumulating weapons
and making plans for members to be taught guerrilla warfare and
firearms training. In this connection leaders are interested in
establishing contact with revolutionary African groups. Waller
desires to create within the organization "Simba Warriors" who
would act whenever violence might be necessary in order to "bring
down the white man." During December, 1970, Waller reportedly
had in his possession two Thompson sub-machine guns.
Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection
1/11/71
CAF: dlb
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 498
Junta of Militant Organizations
Bufile 157-9903
1
JOMO receives extensive contributions from all over the
United States. It has association with the Black Panther Party
and other black extremist groups as well as other New Left groups.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 499
1
NATION OF ISLAM
Bufile 25-330971
4-H
The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an all-Negro,
semireligious organization headed by Elijah Muhammad
self-proclaimed messenger of Allah. Under Muhammad's
leadership, the NOI has grown up into a nationwide
organization with a well-disciplined and devoted member-
ship of almost 6,000 comprised of approximately 50
numbered mosques and approximately 50 unnumbered groups.
The NOI continues to teach antiwhite, anti-
United States philosophy of hate aimed at a complete
separation of the races. It opposes any form of
integration and at the same time has remained aloof from
other black extremist groups who favor violence. During
racial disturbances, NOI members are given instructions
to not get involved in the rioting. The NOI also opposes
the war in Vietnam as a war against other non-whites and
implies in its teachings that members should not serve
in the United States Armed Forces as they can only serve
one master, Elijah Muhammad. It also supports the Arabs
in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East. The NOI
also publishes a weekly newspaper known as "Muhammad Speaks," which
contains vicious antiwhite propaganda. An average of 475,000
copies of this newspaper are distributed each week in the black
communities and ghetto areas throughout the United States.
We have conducted a continuous security and/or
'racial-type investigation of this organization since 1953
in accordance with directives of the Department. Each
active NOI group is reported on semiannually and the
·functionaries and leaders of the organization are those
being investigated. The Department by letter dated 7/28/66
requested our investigation of this organization be continued.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
4-H
CEE:sef
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 500
еес
134

MX
Communist Influence of Racial Groups
100-442529
This intensification was initiated in August,
1964. The subject matter was previously reported in a
subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume
and importance of this information made it necessary to
follow this communist influence in a separate investigation.
This investigation includes not only the influence of the
Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups,
splinter groups and others including the New Left.
The overall objective in this and related
investigations is to protect the internal security of
the United States by submitting information relating to
possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for
prosecution. We also have the responsibility to develop
intelligence information and disseminate to interested
Government agencies. Where feasible, certain counter-
intelligence measures are employed to neutralize the
communist influence in the racial field.
Reports are submitted quarterly and the investi-
gation is evaluated upon receipt of each report. Pertinent
´information is disseminated to the White House and the
Attorney General.
The year 1970 saw continued influence by
communists and other subversives in extremist groups.
In fact, the communist attempts to influence the black
extremist Black Panther Party were so insistent that the
Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist
Party. This has not diminished in any way the Communist
Party's efforts to influence and support the Black Panther
Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers
whether they want it or not.
One illustration of the communist influence on
the violence-prone Black Panther Party is the situation in
which Huey Newton, Panther Supreme Commander, found himself
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION .
1/11/71
CEG:ekw
(4-H)
NW 88608/Docid:32989638 Page 501
35
in connection with a film on Angela Davis, the communist and
black revolutionary being held in California on murder
charges. The Communist Party, USA, sponsored a motion
picture on Davis and invited Newton to film the introduction
to the film. Newton conferred with Eldridge Cleaver, exiled
Information Minister of the Panthers, and told Cleaver he
positively would not film the introduction because it appeared
he would be required to follow the Communist Party line and,
according to Newton, the Panthers did not follow anyone's
line. Despite Newton's seemingly hard stand on this, the
Communist Party found ways to make him relent, and three days
later he agreed to the communist request, muttering that he
would be "dåmned if he did and damned if he didn't." As
violent as they are, the Panthers are no match for the
sophistication of the experienced communist intrigue.
The communist hoodwinking is not confined to the
Black Panther Party. The Communist Party's well-oiled
propaganda machine has started to artfully transform Angela
Davis, the accomplice in the brutal murder of a judge in
California, into a national monument and into a growing
source of funds. Not new at this sort of thing, the
communists are well on their way to surpassing the monetary
returns they have received from other racial and ethnic
causes they have exploited, such as the Scottsboro boys,
• nine young blacks convicted twice in the 1930s in Alabama
for raping two white girls on a freight train.
The communist influence in the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC), the organization of the late
Martin Luther King, Jr., has continued since King's death.
Although Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a communist, amicably terminated
his position as aide to the SCLC President in December, 1970,
his influence continues as does that of Stanley Levison and
Harry Wachtel who also have communist backgrounds. Levison
handles the SCLC fund-raising. In the past Levison and
Wachtel operated behind the scenes%;B today they are listed
in SCLC literature as directors of the SCLC.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
CEG:ekw
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 502
136
In the past year, as anticipated, there has been
a continued merging of racial activists and extremists with
pro-Chinese communist groups, Trotskyites, the Students for
a Democratic Society, and similar groups. In October, 1970,
Elbert Howard, a Black Panther Party functionary, stated that
the Black Panther Party is composed of Marxist-Leninist
revolutionaries and no longer confines its interest to
black power or black nationalism. He added that in the
future the Panthers will encompass all revolutionaries
regardless of race. We can expect this merger to continue.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
CEG:ekw
4-H
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 503
137
4-H
-
BLACK EXTREMISTS
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
Bufile 100-448006
Counterintelligence in the black extremist field is
a supplement to our investigative activities that cannot be
identified as a function of this Bureau because of its
clandestine nature. The goals of it are to prevent violence
and other illegal activities by black extremists and black
extremist organizations, to prevent the growth and/or unifica-
tion of black extremist groups, to prevent such groups from
gaining respectability and to preclude the rising of a leader
who might unify and electrify various extremist factions and
individuals.
To achieve these objectives, techniques are employed
to neutralize organizations and individuals involved in
extremist activities that are a threat to the internal security
of this country. These techniques are aimed to embarrass,
expose or otherwise neutralize these organizations and individuals.
Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists
was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70.
Counterintelligence operations are supervised on
individual case desks as a logical adjunct of our investigative
activities. In addition, one supervisor is designated coordinator
to insure that operations initiated in different offices do not
conflict. A quarterly letter is submitted for each participating
division showing operations under consideration and results
gained. All communications authorizing the institution of any
counterintelligence operaions are routed through Assistant to
the Director William C. Sullivan; no operations are initiated
by the field without Bureau approval.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WHA: sef
4-H
With
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 504
Counterintelligence operations and techniques were
thoroughly discussed with field representatives attending the
October 22 and 23, 1970, conference at the Bureau concerning
the Black Panther Party (BPP). The conference concluded
counterintelligence was an effective tool and there was a
definite need for counterintelligence operations to neutralize
black extremist activities.
The effect on black extremists of some authorized
counterintelligence operations are difficult to assess, but
a substantial number effected since last inspection have had
measurable consequences and some of these included the
following:
Four articles revealing extremist nature of BPP
based on information furnished a news media source in
Mississippi resulted in the closing of the BPP chapter in
Cleveland, Mississippi. Agents of the Jackson Office were
commended by the Director for this operation,
Following the arrests of BPP leadership in New Haven
after torture-murder of BPP member in May, 1969, a Black
Panther from Boston was sent to New Haven to rebuild that
chapter. He proved to be an energetic organizer who built
a closely knit and highly disciplined organization that
effectively brought about mass demonstrations, attracted
additional membership and which posed a serious threat to
established Government. To neutralize this dynamic leader,
New Haven was authorized to forward an anonymous letter to
national BPP headquarters in California alleging he had
embezzled BPP funds. Since then, numerous reports have been
received indicating he had fallen into disfavor with BPP
leaders and his motives were suspect. This resulted in his
transfer to an insignificant BPP chapter in North Carolina.
In Rochester, New York, an anonymous letter sent
to the Superintendent of Schools resulted in cancellation of
subscriptions to the obscene, hate-filled, extremist newspaper
of the BPP by a high school. These newspapers had been used
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 505
179
T
in classrooms and costs of subscriptions had been charged
to the school system.
Philadelphia division was authorized to send a
letter to BPP national headquarters bearing an excellent
facsimile of signature of a former BPP officer in Philadelphia
who had been expelled a week previously due to problems with
BPP leadership in Philadelphia. The letter accused Philadelphia
BPP members of stealing clothing, food and drugs collected for
poor children.
All of these accusations, incidentally, were
true.
Since this letter was sent, Philadelphia BPP chapter has
experienced severe problems with BPP headquarters, has been
chastised repeatedly and prevented from participating in some
BPP activities. Several members were disciplined by transfers.
Subsequently, this situation was exploited by an authorized
mailing of an anonymous letter to Huey P. Newton, Supreme
Commander and co-founder of BFF, which criticized the meetings fell
under BPP auspices in Philadelphia September 5-7, 1970,
concerning the planning for BPP-sponsored Revolutionary People's
Constitutional Convention. These counterintelligence operations
were primarily responsible for expulsion of head of the Phila-
delphia BPP and many of his followers from BPP on 10/16/70.
These individuals have formed an independent local group in
Philadelphia which contends with BPP for local support in that
city. Thus, another result of this operation has been the
splintering of Philadelphia BPP chapter.
To exploit a split in BPP leadership in Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, Charlotte was authorized to prepare
and send a leaflet to residents in vincinity of BPP headquarters.`
The leaflet insinuated the head of one BPP faction had pocketed
donations secured for BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The
leaflet caused consternation among BPP personnel and resulted in
young Negro males poking fun at this BPP leader and accusing him
of being a parasite. A decrease in financial donations to BPP
followed the distribution of this leaflet.
Los Angeles set up a television expose of BPP in
which George Putnam, newscaster KTTV-Los Angeles, California,
noted that spread of Panther hoodlum-type revolutionary activity
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 506
140
!
was a serious internal security threat, with law enforcement
as its immediate target. He utilized the Director's compre-
hensive testimony on the BPP before the House Sub-Committee
on Appropriations on 3/5/70 in bringing out the revolutionary
and terroristic threat presented by BPP and its leaders. He
concluded the program with the opinion that "we are subsidizing
our own destruction if we allow this to continue."
To drive a wedge between BPP and many of its
contributors, data concerning the anti-Zionist and anti-Semetic
nature of BPP was furnished a news media source. As a result
articles were published during June and July, 1970, in various
newspapers throughout U.S., including "Long Island Press,"
Long Island, New York; "Daily News," Springfield, Massachusetts;
and "Mobile Register," Mobile, Alabama. These articles
discussed the close alliance developed between BPP and Al Fatah,
an Arab terrorist organization waging guerrilla warfare against
Israel. These articles emphasized that numerous pro-Arab and
anti-Israeli articles have been published in the BPP newspaper
and some of the latter articles called for the complete distruc-
tion of Israel.
The above articles as well as many other counterintelli-
gence operations authorized since last inspection have contributed
materially to drying up of contributions to BPP. Loss of revenue
is one of the BPP's greatest problems and perhaps the best
illustration is the drop in the size and circulation of the
BPP newspaper, the Party's primary propaganda device. This
paper has declined from 20 or more pages to 12 in its 1/2/71
issue and circulation at the end of the year was less than
100,000 after a high of 183,000 in October, 1970.
Counterintelligence action has also contributed or
led to disruptions, dissension and factionalism in the BPP, the
most important of the black extremist organizations. Sources
have reported internal strife has developed among top BPP
leaders and there is a growing distrust among them of one
another. For example, Albert Howard, national leader who has
.been supervising BPP activities on East Coast, and Robert Bay,
a BPP leader in New York, have been recalled to national BPP
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 507
-
headquarters in California, where they were disciplined and
severely criticized. In addition, SF 3421-R* on 12/26/70
reported a degree of dissension between Eldridge Cleaver
Minister of Information who is fugitive from justice and
residing in Algeria, and Huey P. Newton. Informant learned
Cleaver was extremely upset because BPP headquarters and
particularly Newton are not keeping in touch with him and are
not keeping him advised of key developments. This matter is
being closely and aggressively followed for purpose of
additional exploitation of these circumstances under this
program.
Effective means of neutralizing black extremist
groups is by drying up their sources of funds. We authorized
the New York division to advise the Episcopal Church Center
by anonymous letters that a $67,000 requested grant from the
Episcopal Church Screening Board in New York, New York, to
finance the Liberation School in Atlanta, Georgia, was in
fact intended for use of Student National Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) as the school was an operation of SNCC, a
black extremist organization, and SNCC in seeking the grant had
concealed its connection with the school. This operation
resulted in the Church placing such low priority on this
request that financial assistance for the school was precluded
and the Liberation School was so advised. Since SNCC is in
poor financial condition, this denial of funds was a blow to
its endeavors to revitalize itself. The Director noted
"excellent" on 9/3/70 memorandum which advised of this
successful counterintelligence operation.
A highly successful counterintelligence operation
exposed to college administrators the unethical and deceptive
use made of college funds by Black Student Organization,
Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, Michigan, to purchase literature
concerning the creation of explosive devices and concerning
guerrilla warfare. As a result of this operation, college
confiscated such literature, admonished Black Student Organi-
zation leaders and tightened administrative procedures to
preclude similar misuse of its funds.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 508
The Jackson Office was authorized to furnish data
concerning Republic of New Africa (RNA), a violence-prone
black extremist separatist organization, to a cooperative
newspaper source, resulting in the publication of an
excellent article exposing the violent nature of this
organization on the front page of the only state-wide
evening newspaper in Mississippi. This publicity on the
evening before the RNA regional conference was to begin,
jolted RNA leaders. In addition, Negro participants from
Jackson area were shocked to learn of the violent nature
of this group and withdrew their support. The scheduled
agenda was shelved and the conference was completely
disrupted. Agents of the Jackson Office and Domestic
Intelligence Division Supervisor were commended by the
Director for this operation.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 509
:
THE KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM
This
On December 23, 1970, the Key Black Extremist
Program was initiated, with the Director's approval, to
intensify our coverage of certain black extremists who are
extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism
and violence. As the program started about 90 were included.
With Bureau approval others may be added by the field.
program is to provide intensified coverage of the day-to-day
activities and future plans of these people and to assure
that all possible violations of law on their parts are
vigorously investigated when they are within our jurisdiction
and are referred promptly to the appropriate agency when they
are not.
An investigative summary report on all these
people is due by February 15, 1971. Thereafter an investi-
gative report is to be submitted every 90 days.
of
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISON INSPECTION
1/12/71
CEG: ekw
(4-H)
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 510

BLACK STUDENT GROUPS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
On October 29, 1970, the Executive Conference
approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries,
limited to established sources, on Black Student Unions and
similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to determine
if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant
further active investigation. On November 4, 1970,
instructions were sent to the field to implement this
program. The number of campuses involved is about 500,
representing approximately 750 black student groups.
officers will represent about 2,500 cases and the key
activists another 250. The potential for new cases in this
program will approximate 3,500 cases. This program includes
junior colleges and two-year colleges as well as four-year
colleges.
The
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
CEG:ekw
(4-H)
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 511
RACIAL INFORMANTS
4-H
The prime purpose of development and utilization
of racial informants and sources is to provide intelligence
and evidentiary information concerning black and white racial
extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are
also called upon to furnish information concerning the general
racial situation in all parts of the country.
Supervision of racial informants at Seat of
.Government includes review and approval of new informants and
confidential sources, review of progress of informant every
six months, review of payments being made to informants,
analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis
of nationwide informant coverage of an organization, coordination
of informant coverage of specific functions such as the national
convention of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and supervision
of special projects such as development of top echelon BPP
informant, using informant to develop information concerning
a black extremist underground escape route and coordinating
utilization of informants abroad with other agencies. All
procedures are constantly evaluated in an effort to increase
the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with
the necessary supervision and assistance with a minimum of
paper work.
As of 1/12/71 we are operating a total of 7,184
racial informants, compared with a total of 5,485 at time of
last inspection. This is an increase of 1,699 informants.
584 informants report on black extremist organizations. .376
informants report on white extremist organizations such as
the Klan. (In line with recent reorganization of Domestic
Intelligence Division supervision of racial informants
furnishing information on white extremists will shortly be
transferred to the Internal Security Section.) We are
operating 6,224 ghetto informants who provide general
information within the black ghetto areas of our cities.
Informant coverage of black extremist groups has
been increased since the last inspection with a significant
increase being noted in our coverage of the BPP. At the time
of the last inspection we operated 119 informants reporting
on BPP as compared with 173 as of 1/12/71, which represents
an increase of 54 informants.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
HEH:amk
4-H
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 512
Our ghetto informants have materially increased
from 4,605 at the time of the last inspection to 6,224
as of 1/12/71, which represents an increase of 1,619
At the time of the last inspection we were
operating 438 informants furnishing information concerning
white extremist organizations and as of 1/12/71 we are
operating 376 such informants, which represents a decrease
of 62 This is to be expected as a result of the continuing
decline of Klan and other white extremist activities.
By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to
Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Racial Informant Development,
Black Panther Party (BPP), Racial Matters, it was recommended
and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco
Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a
top-level informant in the BPP. It was also approved that
$1,000 could be expended for the purpose of developing a
top-level informant. As part of this program we have been
in contact with a national BPP leader on several occasions,
and while he has not agreed to cooperate with this Bureau he
remains friendly to the contacting Agents and further efforts.
are contemplated to induce his cooperation. In addition we
have been successful in obtaining the cooperation of another
national BPP leader's wife, and through her cooperation we
have made contact with this leader. Again the leader has
not indicated a willingness to cooperate; however, additional
contacts will be initiated with him. This operation was
specifically designed to develop top-level informant in the
top echelon of the BPP which is critically needed. We will
continue to pursue the development of a top-level informant
until it is accomplished.
GHETTO INFORMANTS
Ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67
to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening
posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. Ghetto informants
were those persons living or working in the ghetto areas who
furnished information concerning general racial conditions in
their areas. As the field has gained experience in the
handling of ghetto informants their value has steadily increased.
Ghetto informants today are being utilized by field offices to
attend public meetings held by extremists, to survey extremist
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 513
bookstores, to verify residences and employments of Agitator
and Security Index subjects living or working in ghetto areas
and to identify individuals responsible for extremist
activities tending to increase racial tensions in the ghetto
areas. We are also noting numerous instances wherein ghetto
informants are being converted by the field to regular racial
informants furnishing information on black extremist
organizations and individuals. As a valuable by-product
we are also picking up criminal statistics through our contacts
with ghetto informants. The ghetto informant program was last
justified by memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
dated 7/17/70, captioned "Ghetto Informant Program, Racial
Matters," and is scheduled to be rejustified in July, 1971.
TRAINING
A two-day conference of field supervisors handling
racial matters investigations was held at Seat of Government
9/17-18/70. Representatives from 39 offices and two Legal
Attaches attended. The conference dealt specifically with
investigation of the BPP and informant development therein.
A number of recommendations and suggestions resulted from
this conference and were implemented. Suggestions approved
as results of the conference are the subject of a separate
write-up. Those in attendance were in agreement that the
conference had been most beneficial to both field and Seat
of Government personnel participating.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 514
148
1
ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 515
ADMINISTRATIVE ME MORANDUM
POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM
ESPIONAGE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
INSPECTORES. MILLER:
DRALLER
This program is designed to develop
double agents who can give us vital
information from their knowledge of plans and illegal operations of our enemies
within the United States. A potential double agent by your definition is one in
contact with representatives of a foreign government under Bureau control but
has not been requested to give information or given assignments.
During the course of this inspection, the Inspector asked for and received
a list of 298 active potential double agents. A review of 237 files (80%) indicated
the following:
a. These files deal primarily with PSIS and some SIS who have limited
social, situational and business contacts with Soviet and Satellite nationals.
Most of these nationals are allegedly intelligence agents, suspected intelligence
agents or persons who are contacts of these nationals.
b. Generally the people selected for development as potential double agents
are correspondents and journalists who come in contact with Tass news agency
officials and employees; American businessmen who purchase Russian products
or sell American products through Amtorg or other Russian companies operating
in the United States; neighbors and building managers where nationals reside;
naturalized American citizens of Slavic derivation who are contacted by suspected
intelligence agents; naturalized American citizens who travel to Russia and
satellite countries; leaders. of Slavic-American societies, organizations and
publications; American citizens taking educational and business tours in Russia
and other Iron Curtain countries; and prominent members of technical and
scientific societies who have an interest in similar scientific work and publications
by Russian and satellite country professionals.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
ESM:wmj
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 516
110
-2-
c. Generally a thorough background investigation is completed on each
individual selected to be a potential double agent before the Bureau authorizes
him to be interviewed to determine if he is receptive and willing to assist
and cooperate with the Bureau. These investigations are not completed within a
specified period. Several instances were noted wherein the national returned
to his native country before the informant could develop suitable rapport. Review
indicated several of these cases remain active although the national returned to
his native country.
d. After the Bureau has authorized the field office to develop the potential
double agent, the field office sends in progress reports each 6 months (FD-401).
In most instances only a slight social acquaintanceship is established over an
extensive period. Field and SOG supervision of these cases appears to be
mechanical and perfunctory and lacksimaginative, aggressive and timely
direction.
e. During the year 1970 there was an average of three communications
per file received from the field. Most of these were semiannual reports.
Communications from SOG to the field averaged less than one letter per
file and in almost all instances this was a very short letter authorizing in-
vestigation and development of potential double agent. There were less than 10
cases noted where specific instructions, directions or other guidance was
furnished to the field in developing these potential double agents.
f. 110 of the cases were reviewed at random for the specific purpose of
· determining generally how long they had been pending. 4 cases had been pending
prior to 1960; 3 were open in 1961; 6 in 1962; 7 in 1963; 6 in 1964; 5 in 1965; 10
in 1966; 12 in 1967; 10 in 1968; 22 in 1969; and 25 in 1970. The average case has
been opened 3 1/2 years and there has been an average of one piece of outgoing
correspondence from the Bureau in each file.
-
A
Very little outgoing correspondence concerning instructions or directions
were noted in these 110 files. For example, 5 of the files reviewed had no out-
going correspondence in them since 1967. One file was reviewed in which the
last outgoing correspondence was in 1962. 65 of these 110 files did not have any
outgoing correspondence in the last 12-month period (1970).
Review of this program as indicated by the above observations, reveals
that virtually no direction is given the program. Separate write-ups have
been prepared on two individual cases where supervision has been most inadequate.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 517
150
- 3 -
As a general consideration, it is felt that you have 298 cases pending in what
appears on the surface to be an important program but in reality are mere
"numbers" from a supervision standpoint.
You are requested to explain why this condition exists, what is your
justification for this type of handling, and what action you anticipate necessary
to correct.
Comments of Inspector D. E. Moore and Assistant Director C. D. Brennan.
requested.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 518
اتر
4
INSPECTOR DONALD E. MOORE
(1-24-71 CGS: EWL: DEM/djw:ekn)
The comments and observations
of the Inspector dealing with
a "POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT
PROGRAM" have been carefully reviewed and the following comments
are responsive to the questions raised:
For purposes of clarification it is important that
the terminology and designations used be defined. The
designation "Potential Double Agent" (PDA) is a descriptive
term denoting an individual usually already approved by the
Bureau as a Potential Security Informant (PSI) or as a Security
Informant (SI). The approval of a PSI or SI is based on his
current or potential capabilities to furnish information of
intelligence or security interest. If individuals in either
of these categories have an association with a Soviet-bloc official,
for statistical purposes they are considered as PDA's. This
labeling is incidental to their primary designation as a Bureau-
approved PSI or SI, and their administrative handling at the Bureau
conforms with overall Bureau policy and instructions relating
to all Bureau approved sources, whether or not they are
considered to be PDA's, and this designation does not alter
the administrative handling of these cases.
Justifications for Bureau-approved PSI's and SI's
are required on a six-month basis following definitely
established form. The primary purpose of this justification
is administrative in nature to insure the individual
involved continues to meet Bureau standards. Substantive
information which may have been furnished is reported in
detail in the 134 file maintained by the Office of Origin
as required by Bureau regulations. This information is
then reported to the Bureau under appropriate substantive
captions. Normally the only occasion when substantive
data received from a source appears in the informant case
file is in the semi-annual justification letter in extremely
abbreviated form. See Section 107K, paragraph 7, page 13,
Manual of Instructions which states,
1
"Correspondence in security informant and
potential security informant matters should
be strictly limited to administrative handling
of informant and should not contain information
more properly furnished under substantive case
caption.
ft
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 519
- 5
-
Regarding specific comments in paragraph c.,
as pointed out, the primary designation of an individual
as a PSI or SI is his ability to furnish information of
intelligence interest, which may or may not depend upon
his association with one Soviet-bloc national. This
association almost without exception becomes productive
only when the Soviet-bloc official initiates action to
exploit this relationship. The fact that the Soviet-bloc
national departs this country, first, does not end their
relationship, and secondly, does not end the potential
that exists in the relationship. Very often there is a
follow-up contact by another Communist-bloc official based
on the apparently disrupted initial relationship.
Characteristic of the patient, long-range planning and
execution of Soviet-bloc intelligence, this reactivation
may occur at some indeterminate future date. We must be
alert to this concrete possibility in order to fully exploit
the potential that exists in such cases. Therefore,
contacts with the source, in cases of this type, must
continue for a reasonable period.
Concerning paragraph d., in cases where the
potential for development of an individual as a double
agent is based exclusively on a social acquaintanceship
with a specific Soviet-bloc official, the initiative for
this development rests almost entirely with that Soviet-
bloc official. Experience has taught us that attempts
on our part to maniuplate our sources to hasten his
development are most often recognized by the hostile
intelligence officer as a provocation. When direction
is necessary and practical, it must be developed in the
overall context of the Soviet-bloc official's investigation,
and such direction is apparent in the substantive case
files. These factors will account for what appears to
be "mechanical and perfunctory" supervision which "lacks
imaginative, aggressive and timely direction, in the
informant case file.
"
Paragraph e. refers to the lack of communications
in the informant files reviewed. The nature and purpose
of the informant file has been previously explained, and
in this context it can be understood that operational
instructions usually appear in the substantive files and
not in the administrative file of the informant.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 520
153

- 6 -
Paragraph f notes many instances of cases
concerning "PDA's" have been opened for varying periods
of time, and, again, the lack of extensive outgoing
communications noted. It is again stressed that the
designation of "PDA" is an arbitrary one, these files are
evaluated and administered on an individual basis in
accordance with Bureau requirements related to PSI's and
SI's, and not solely on their double-agent potential.
These requirements are met in these cases.
The Inspector has commented in his Survey that
"virtually no direction is given the program. The
foregoing comments have established 1.) the designation
of PDA to a SI or PSI does not require administrative
supervision or handling by SOG over and above that required
for any SI or PSI, 2.) if direction and instruction is
necessary and practical in a particular case, such is
given in the overall supervision and handling of the
substantive case file of the Soviet-bloc national involved,
3.) in accordance with current Bureau policy and instructions
relating to the handling of these files, they contain a
minimal amount of information relating to the productivity
of the source, and 4.) the labeling and designation of a
SI and PSI as a PDA is an administrative device adopted
for the purpose of emphasizing the need for Double-Agents.
There is no program as such, for the handling of these
cases.
To the general consideration expressed that the
298 cases are mere numbers from a supervisory standpoint,
the above comments clearly indicate such is not the case.
These cases are not opened and maintained as a program.
They are opened on individual merit and maintained in
accordance with Bureau standards under the same requirements
as all other PSI and SI cases at the SOG.
In summary, it appears that the criticisms leveled
in this particular Survey are due to a misconception involving
terminology. "PDA" is a label. It carries no requirement
for administrative handling over and above supervision afforded
the case as a PSI or SI. These cases are basic and vital
investigative tools. Administration of such cases are
guided by rigid Bureau standards; the comments made by
Inspector do not indicate these standards have been breached.
Thus, no corrective action is considered necessary and none is
recommended. This does not mean that I will not continue to
exert every effort to see that qualified informants will
continue to be developed and that carefully considered and
logical means will be employed to have these informants
NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page-521-
154
1
7
developed to the point they are accepted by Soviet-bloc
officials and become operational Double-Agents.
I am
pleased we have increased the number of active Double-
Agents since the last inspection and will closely
follow our progress in this field.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN/
(DEM:ekn
1-24-71)
I have carefully noted
the comments of the
Inspector and also those
of Mr. Moore. I certainly am aware that Double-Agents active
against Soviet-bloc officials are a vital part of our
counterespionage work. I share the views expressed by
Mr. Moore and assure the Inspector I will closely follow
the development of informants in this field and see that
proper guidance is given the field to increase the number
of active Double-Agents.
R
ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER
(ESM:mjt 1/25/71)
Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we
have in the Bureau today and during this inspection our review
of your program was made with this attitude. I have reviewed
with great interest the accomplishments and progress which you
have made; however, there were certain aspects of your operation
which have caused concern. Specifically, your handling of
"Potential Double Agents" does not nearly result from a review
standpoint with the feeling that this phase of work is compatible
with the challenges presented. Elsewhere in this inspection we
have discussed development of Double Agents in place as being
highly desirable goals in our work, yet, we have lacked success
in this as evidenced by an extended "dry" period of almost nine
years.
I feel that perhaps foreign intelligence may not be that
good and that by improving ourselves we may be able to accomplish
our goals. In the above write-up it was my feeling that your
Potential Double Agent program needs considerable attention from
a critical self-analysis standpoint for the purpose of strengthening
it consistent with its potential for providing valuable assistance
both here and in the field.
Assistant Director note.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 522
155
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
(1/25/71
WAB:hke)
この
The comments of the Inspector are noted.
I most certainly share the Inspector's view that
Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we have
in the Bureau today. I have and am continually stressing the
development of good double agents. The Inspector referred to
"Double Agents-in-place," and in view of the context of his
remarks, I concluded he is referring to "Defectors-in-place,"
and I know of no higher goal in our work than developing them.
To my knowledge, the first Soviet Defector-in-place
the Bureau ever developed was Kaarlo Tuomi an illegal agent
who was a Captain in the Soviet Army, and who was developed in
March, 1959. We operated him for approximately four and one-half
years. Next, in 1961-1962 we developed Tophat, a Lieutenant.
Colonel in the Soviet Army who operated in this country until
his return to the Soviet Union in 1962. While in the Soviet Union,
he cooperated and furnished valuable information which was
recovered by the CIA from deaddrops in M
in 
Moscow. In 1966, Tophat
e.
was assigned to Burma and was contacted by the Bureau in that
country With the Director's approval, he was turned over to CIA
and operated by them (and also for us since they serviced require-
ments for us) until 1969. Tophat has now returned to the Soviet
Union, and to our knowledge, he is still a cooperative Defector-in-
place and may come to the West again.
In tober, 1961, we developed through investigation
and interrogation the Gunson Defector-in-place, who was a member
of the illegal apparatus for the Soviet Military Intelligence
Service. In May 1962 he returned to the Soviet Union, and if
he can leave that country, we can expect that he will be in
contact with us again.
In 1962,
we began operations with the Fedora source,
a Colonel in the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB)
He furnished voluminous information on KGB operations including
the data which resulted in the arrest and conviction of Igor
Ivanov and John William Butenko. In May, 1967, he returned t
to
the Soviet Union but was again contacted by the Bureau in Canada
in 1968 where he was visiting for a short period. In September
1969, Fedora visited in New York and was again in touch with
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 523
156
i
Bureau Agents. To our knowledge, Fedora is still a viable
source, and if he will not be reassigned in the United States
certainly we can anticipate contact with him at scientific
symposiums elsewhere in the Western world.
In 1962 we developed the Nicknack Defector-in-place,
who was a technical man connected with Soviet military intelligence.
Nicknack returned to the Soviet Union in 1964, anticipating
that his next overseas assignment would be with the Soviet
Military Office in Washington, D. C.
In 1963, we compromised the Miter source, who was
a co-opted agent of the KGB and who furnished political information
which was disseminated at the highest level. He returned to the
Soviet Union in October, 1964.
Contact was first made with the Shamrock source in
January, 1967. At one time he was the Acting Resident of the
KGB in New York. He furnished information concerning 102 KGB
operations. Based upon information furnished by Shamrock, the
identification of an illegal agent huchand and wife team has
been effected. They are presently located in Argentina.
During the summer of 1969, an Agent of the New York
Office successfully developed the Harlo source, who acted as
a Defector-in-place from July, 1969, to November, 1970. The
Harlo source was in a position to furnish information of value
and to identify members of the Soviet intelligence community.
The source left the United States in November, 1970, under
circumstances which may indicate a willingness "Turther
cooperate if the opportunity presented itself.
While the above is a listing of Defectors-in-place
· achievements in the Soviet field, we have been equally successful
with the Satellite intelligence services. Commencing in 1963,
we developed the Prime source, who was a Polish code clerk at
the Polish United Nations Mission. He furnished cipher pads
and keys which enabled National Security Agency to break the
Polish code. That Agency described his operation as the
intelligence superhaul of the century.
MADEM
in the Polish field
In addition to two Defectors-in-place/during the
ensuing years, we now operate the Panther source, who is presently
in-place in the United Nations Secretariat in New York.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 524
157
--
10 -
he
We developed Gimme, a member of the Czechoslovakian
Intelligence Service, in 1962 and operated him until he
returned to Czechoslovakia in November, 1963. Thereafter,
was in continual clandestine contact with the CIA until his
return to Washington in January, 1969 where he was again
operated successfully until his overt defection in June, 1970.
WF 1373-S was a Yugoslav diplomat and intelligence
officer who was successfully recruited and operated from
July, 1962 until September, 1965. He was believed to be the
first professional intelligence Yugoslav officer recruited anywhere
in the world.
are
From early July, 1966, through the first week in
November, 1966, we were in contact with an extremely sensitive
Defector-in-place in the Washington, D. C., area. Knowledge
of this Defector-in-place is and has been limited to very few
Bureau personnel. Only four men in the Espionage Section are
aware of his past cooperation While in contact this Defector-in-
place furnished extremely valuable counterintelligence and has
the potential for reassignment to the United States.
currently operating a double agent developed by this source in an
effort to bring about his reassignment to this country In
addition we have taken action against those Soviet intelligence
officers in the same department as this source in an effort to
force their recall, thus opening up the way for source to be
reassigned to the US. as their replacement. Should we succeed
his knowledge would give us an insight into the KGB legal
apparatus in the U.S. that we have never previously had.
·
In addition, we have been in contact with numerous
Soviet-bloc officials both through double agents who were
carefully directed by us and by Bureau Agents. At the present
time we are in contact with Henryk Cieslak, an employee of the
Polish Embassy. Agents have talked to him several times and
have an appointment to clandestinely meet with him this
Saturday, January 29, 1971, at National Airport. He has
indicated willingness to cooperate with us but has some
reservations in view of his family situation. We expect to
overcome this. In addition, in New York, Alexander Adam
Messing-Mierzejewski, Chief of the Representation and Liaison
Unit, Office of Interagency Affairs, United Nations Secretariat,
(a Pole) has been contacted and expressed agreement to cooperate
and we are continuing our contacts with him and hope to develop
him fully.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 525
158
-
11 -
-
These are just two of many contacts we have
made during recent years, in the Satellite field.
In the Soviet field we have been particularly
anxious to develop Defectors-in-place and have made
numerous contacts. During 1970 we had an Agent meet
clandestinely on three occasions with Balentin P.
Nizhelskiy, third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, who
is a known KGB officer and we had several brush meetings
with him. He returned to the Soviet Union on normal home
leave in late September, 1970, but prior to his departure
arrangements were made for subsequent meetings with him
when he returned. He has not returned and information
recently received indicates this is due to serious illness
of his wife in the USSR. While the reported illness of
his wife may be only a cover by the KGB to keep us from
knowing he reported his contacts, the illness of his wife
may be very real and if so and he returns to this
country subsequently we have excellent ground work already
laid.
R
After a long period of working against Yuriy P.
Lisnevskiy, a known GRU Agent and head of AEROFLOT Office
in New York, we developed excellent information about him
and established a close relationship with him. We secured
very detailed personal information about Lisnevskiy
and in October contacted him and while he was badly shaken
because of the detailed operation we had run against him
he did not commit himself to cooperate and after thinking
about the matter for a period of time apparently decided
to report to his superiors and was whisked back to the
Soviet Union.
*
Lisnevskiy and Nizhelskiy are examples of
efforts we have made and are continuing to make in this
field. I am setting forth this very sensitive information
so that the Inspector will be aware that we have been and
most certainly will continue to do everything possible to
accomplish our goals. I feel we have very dedicated and
knowledgeable men working in this field and we are
constantly analyzing the overall field in the light of
changing world conditions to see that we take advantage of
every opportunity. The Inspector may be assured we will
continue to do so.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 526
159
Ein
M
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM
COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS
-
(COKMA) PROGRAM
During the course of this inspection, a volume of
material was reviewed, part of which were cases and investi-
gations dealing with the above program in the New York Office.
The program was instituted in July, 1970, by a team of
Special Agents in the Jamaica-Queens area in an effort to
observe clandestine activity there based on an analysis of
previous activity in that area. SPIA letters dated 8/14/70
and 9/4/70 from New York reported the observation of numerous
Soviet intelligence officers in the area during July and
August, and three individuals were identified in contact with
Soviet intelligence officers under suspicious circumstances
The theate
• "
•
It appears that the successes of the recent and
current New York efforts in these matters still have not been
brought to the attention of the Washington Field Office in
the form of instructions or directions to analyze their
situation for possible implementation of the program (if not
already being done) in the Washington area..
For this reason, you are being requested to advise
of supervisory procedures you have to insure the dissemination
of new techniques and the "cross-fertilization" of ideas to
appropriate offices.
It is realized that New York furnishes copies of
communications to Washington Field Office. What provisions
do you have at the Seat of Government to insure adequate,
aggressive attention and supervision is provided to the field
in matters such as this?
Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan,
Inspector Donald E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D.
Brennan requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ESM:mkl
1/21/71
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 527
:
160
ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM
COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS (COKMA) PROGRAM
Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section
I
The Inspector's comments regarding the success of
captioned program in the New York Office have been noted and
are valid. Bureau has furnished New York a communication
offering suggestions and asking for its comments and
recommendations regarding expansion of the program. No
instructions or directions have been issued to WFO concerning
possible implementation of this program in that office, although
as the Inspector notes WFO has been made aware of the activity
conducted by the New York Office, since the conditions on which
the program is based are applicable only in the New York area
by reason of conditions peculiar to that office alone; i.ē.,
fact that analysis of activities by Soviet intelligence officers
has disclosed they use areas in the vicinity of certain subway
stops for meetings with agents either for the convenience of
their sources or the security offered to both by the subway in
traveling to or from meet areas. No subway exists in Washington,
D. C. Travel in the Washington area is primarily by automobile,
due to the lack of any appreciable rapid transit system, while
in New York the primary means of transportation is the subway
system. Since conditions peculiar to New York do not exist in
Washington, D. C., it was not deemed necessary to issue instructions
or directions to WFO concerning this particular program.
were
Another factor considered by Bureau was knowledge of
prior use by WEO of programs directed against geographic and
other known factors concerning Soviet intelligence operations
peculiar to Washington as opposed to New York.
Several years
ago a program was used wherein all thoroughfares from the District,
where Soviets resided almost exclusively at that time,
checked during hours we knew they conducted meets in the suburban
areas and might be detected traveling to such areas via these
routes for this purpose. This was discontinued due to lack of
productivity. More recently, WFO used a "Sweeper Program" wherein
all Special Agents assigned to Soviet investigations checked all
shopping centers in the metropolitan area (District, Virginia and
Maryland suburbs.) after an analysis disclosed a preponderance of
usage by Soviets of such locations for intelligence meets.
is the same concept on which the COKMA Program is based. It
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ECP eco
1/22/71
潜
This
161
-NW-88608-Docld:32989638 Page 528
2
operated from about 1967 to 1968 and was implemented on the basis
of conditions detected as existing in WFO but which were not
applicable in New York; therefore, instructions were not issued
to New York for implementation of similar program but it was kept
informed of developments in the same manner that New York is now
informing WFO of developments occurring in instant matter. "Sweeper"
was discontinued due to lack of positive accomplishments such as
those which have been disclosed in the COKMA Program. From about
1968 to 1969, "Blitz Program" was used by WFO to check residences
of the more active Soviet intelligence officers to determine the
presence or absence of their automobiles with the expectation of
disclosing patterns which might afforded more intensive
attention to ascertain nature of activity being conducted during
these periods when their presence could not be accounted for.
"Blitz" program was also discontinued during weekdays by WFO due
to lack of positive accomplishments and, incidental thereto, man-
power limitations or need to apply personnel to areas offering more
firm possibilities for producing positive results; however, the
principle is still utilized in connection with weekend physical,
surveillance scheduling.
Recognizing the value of accounting for all Soviets
during as much of the day as possible, especially when they were
away from our sophisticated coverage at the establishment where
they are assigned, Bureau pointed out to both New York ice and
WFO the valuable information disclosed through "Blitz" of their
residences and instructed both offices to develop established
neighborhood sources who could furnish information regarding
arrivals and departures, use of automobile and odometer readings,
as a means of insuring continued receipt of the information which
would no longer be available following reevaluation and modification
of the program. This instruction was also based on the fact that
Soviets now reside throughout the periphery of suburban D. C. due
to changing socio-economic conditions making it practically
impossible to cover these widespread locations with any degree of
sufficiency without some added technique.
Tw
During December, 1970, Espionage Section recommended
.distribution to all Bureau personnel at Seat of Government, WFO
and the adjacent Resident Agencies of Baltimore and Alexandria of
small card appropriately coded listing license numbers of vehicles
used by the ten most active Soviet intelligence officers.. This
was approved by Director. Rationale here was to add several
hundred pairs of eyes to cover individuals who are extremely
conscious of and adept at detecting surveillances. Personnel
observing these cars would not conduct any activity other than to
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ECP:eco
-NW-88608-Docid:229189688 Page 529
3
f
report pertinent information concerning observation
of the vehicle to WFO by routing slip for compilation
and determination of suspicious patterns which should be
resolved through concentrated surveillance coverage
on the basis of available information (again the basic
COKMA philosophy). This is being used on a trial basis
in WFO to test its productivity and value. If found
to be of assistance, consideration will be given to
implementing in New York Office; however, in this
instance again, the program is designed to exploit
conditions prevelant in Washington, D. C., rather than
New York where Bureau personnel do not reside in same
general area as Soviets and therefore, might not be
expected to produce positive results. Means of
transportation available in both areas, previously
mentioned, was also considered.
SPIA letters themselves are a vehicle for
"cross-fertilization" of ideas between recipient and
submitting offices. They contain monthly, detailed
summaries of intelligence activities which have occurred
in the submitting offices. They are routed to each
Espionage Section Supervisor for review. If significant
information is contained in submission from WFO which
might be applicable to New York, or vice versa, Bureau
Supervisor directs attention of appropriate office:
to the information by means of communication in the
substantive file involved. Weekly Section Conferences
allow for a more current discussion of significant or
unusual developments as they occur in individual cases
providing a more immediate vehicle for directing attention
of one office to developments in another which might
be applicable to a current or prior investigation.
Periodically, Espionage Section learns from other
⠀ intelligence organizations, foreign and domestic, of new in-
telligence techniques or changes in MO by Soviets which should
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ECP:eco
1/22771
163
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 530

-
4 -
11
be considered by offices having a Soviet establishment or
particular investigative situation. This information is immediately
furnished to interested offices by Supervisor having responsibility
for coordination of the SPIA-SATPIA matters or by the substantive
supervisor handling the particular investigation to which it
pertains. Determination in this regard is made by Section Front
Office which issues appropriate instructions and follows prompt
compliance. Examples are notification from British and CIA
regarding Soviet capability to use "dial-a-message telephones
(time, weather, prayer, AA etc.,) with sophisticated device on
their telephone as means of clandestine communications. On another
occasion British told us about Soviet use of compact broad-band
scanning receiver by personnel supporting intelligence officer,
during meet as means of detecting radio transmissions in area
which might indicate counterintelligence service interest in that
particular activity. Both New York and WFO were alerted to these
circumstances for consideration in their coverage of Soviet
establishments and covering double agent meetings.
All mailers pertaining to programs such as captioned
are routed through Section Front Office to insure adequate and
aggressive attention and supervision is provided to field, and
make certain no possibility is overlooked to exploit such situations
for maximum counterintelligence benefits on field-wide basis,
consistent with feasibility or applicability.
Moore
Inspector D. E. Moorę
DEM:1mb
1/23/71
I share Mr. Branigan's views that Cokma is not
applicable to WEO in view of the different conditions existing
in the two cities. Noting the other comments of the inspector
and the information set forth by Mr. Branigan, I would like
to advise that in communications I read, in contacts with
personnal of New York and WFO and supervisors at the Seat of
Government and in contacts with representatives of cooperative
foreign intelligence agencies, I am most alert to situations
and procedures that can be adopted by us. In conferences
with Section Chiefs in the Branch, I stress the need to be
alert for procedures that may have worked in one area of our
operations and can be adopted to other areas.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ECP:eco
1/22/71
NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page-531-
164
----
Assistant Director C. D.
DEM: 1mb
1/23/71
5 -
rennan
BOR
20
I have carefully noted the inspector's comments
and also the comments of Mr. Branigan and Mr. Moore. I
am most alert to the development of new ideas and the need
for "cross-fertilization" of ideas and stress this in my
conferences with all Section Chiefs at the Division. I
not only seek ideas about the operations of a Section Chief
within the Section, but for ideas of operations anywhere
within the Division and throughout the Bureau. I am
constantly alert in my many contacts with representatives
of other Government agencies, foreign liaison contacts
and representatives of business for ideas which can be
successfully utilized in our work and will continue this.
In discussions with SACs, I constantly stress the challenging
conditions the Bureau faces and the need for new ideas and
new applications. I most certainly will continue to stress
this.
ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER
(ESM:sjr 1/25/71)
-
It is my understanding that the COKMA concept is
not "new" in the New York Office but, as indicated has had
recent successes. It is realized COKMA deals with subway
travel of our subjects.;, however, the concept was that to
which I alluded in the above write-up. It was my feeling
perhaps due to internal conditions in the Soviet Union and
the Polish situation etc., that Soviet Intelligence may now
be more active and consequently "pressing" for some reason
thus making it possible for us to have significant success
in New York in a relatively short period of time.
For this reason, it was my feeling that the matter
should have been highlighted by SOG which has the responsibility
for coordination and direction of field activities.
1
I do not agree with the concept that one field
division is different from another when we are dealing with
as important a topic as Soviet espionage.
Assistant Director Brennan and Inspector Moore note.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 532
165
-
.6.
INSPECTOR D. E. MOOREW
DEM:mjt
1/25/71
I certainly agree with the Inspector that one
field division is no different than another in connection
with the topic as important as Soviet Espionage. The
point that Mr. Branigan and I were attempting to make is
that we have to recognize the difference in methods of
operation in Soviet intelligence officers in New York
and WFO. The Inspector may be assured that I will
follow the operations of Soviet-bloc intelligence officers
in New York, WFO and also in San Francisco in view of the
establishment of a consulate there. I will continue to be
most alert to any successful procedures utilized in one
office that may be productive in another and will certainly
see that the procedures are applied where feasible.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
DEM:mjt
1/25/71
I concur with Inspector Moore.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 533
166
:
1
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 534
PERSONNEL MATTERS
".
PERSONNEL
E
PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
(SPECTOR E.S. MILLER:
6-A-4
In addition to review of work
performance, various personnel,
by reason of supervisory position held, were interviewed
during the course of this inspection by a member of the
Inspection Staff. The interviews and review of work performance
of these personnel have disclosed no substantial delinquencies
of matters requiring recommendations for any specific action.
The personnel are:
Employee
Category
Richard D. Cotter.
Section Chief
George C. Moore
Section Chief
Robert L. Shackelford
Section Chief
W. Raymond Wannall
Conrad W. Thompson
Lambert L. Anderson
Frank B. Still, Jr.
Robert C. Putnam
David Ryan
Joseph M. Sizoo
Ervin L. Recer
„Louis J. Brune Jr.
C
Edwin Enright
Section Chief
Approved Bureau Speaker
Approved Bureau Speaker
Approved Bureau Speaker
Approved Bureau Speaker
Approved Bureau Speaker
Approved Bureau Speaker
Approved Bureau Speaker
Approved Bureau Speaker
Recommended for Advancement
Assistant Director Brennan please note.
hoted B
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
JVB:sfw
6-A-4
1/21/71
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 535
INSPECTOR
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
MILLER:
6-E
Please tabulate by Sections and Units
the current Agent and clerical personnel
complement of your Division as of the close of business 1/8/71. Show actual
and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the Division Front
Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay should not be
considered in the overall tabulation.
1. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority has been
obtained to fill.
2. Identify all personnel under transfer into or out of the Division
as of 1/8/71 as well as those who have submitted letters of resignation as
of that date. (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of
resignation.)
3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized
personnel as of 1/8/71.
4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if
additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification.
5. Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected since
the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means.
6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel.
7. In the write-up on adequacy of personnel by Sections, describe
criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section
or Unit. Each Section write-up should constitute a separate part of the overall
Divisional write-up.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
ESM:wmj
\6-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 536
118
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached find the Section
ABK:jgr 1/15/71
write-ups concerning each
category of information
requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel.
These comments are current as of 1/8/71:
The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office
consists of one Assistant Director, two Inspectors, two
Special Agent Supervisors, five stenographic employees and
19 clerical employees. This complement includes the personnel
directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division
teletype room, Mail Room and messenger service, the Security .
Patrol Force in addition to five Agents. I have not as yet
requested a replacement for a GS-4 clerical position in the
Front Office, which was created with the resignation of
James A. Pettingill on 12/24/70. I am attempting to absorb
the work of this position with the present personnel comple-
ment in the Front Office. This is on a trial basis and if it
isn't satisfactory, i will recommend a replacement.
The overall authorized personnel complement of the
Division at the beginning of the inspection was 116 Special
Agents and 190 clerks compared to an authorized complement
of 126 Agents and 186 clerks at the time of the last
inspection. We now have assigned to the Division 116 Agents
and 188 clerks. The clerical vacancies being the aforementioned
GS-4 position in the Front Office and a vacancy in the Mail
Room, which was created when a clerical position in the
Internal Security Section was filled.
At the present time we have outstanding requests
for two Agents to replace Special Agents George M. Quinn
and C. Edwin Enright, who are under transfer to the Inspection
Division. We also have requests for two GS-2 Mail Clerks
for the Division Mail Room to replace the clerk who was trans-
ferred to the Internal Security Section and the second to replace
the GS-3 clerk who will be reassigned or rotated when the
replacement is made available to the Division. The Racial
Intelligence Section has submitted a request for an additional
clerk for the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant
Unit. In addition, this Section is now making a request for two
additional Agent Supervisors because of the heavy increase in the
case load in the black extremist field. (Justification in
Section write-up attached).
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 537
169
1
The request for a clerk by the Internal Security Section for
a newly approved clerical position mentioned in its write-up
has been filled. The Espionage Section may find it necessary
to request an additional clerk to handle extra duties assigned
to a clerk who is already heavily assigned, if the present
system (now on a trial basis) proves unworkable. The New Left
Section may find it necessary to request an additional Agent
and clerk if the present trend of heavy increase in case
load continues. We are watching this closely. As you will
note in the write-up by the Nationalities Intelligence Section
we are making a request for two additional Agent Supervisors
at this time. This is necessary due to the recent increase
in foreign legats from 11 to 17, increasing our legat personnel
from 60 to 88.
To recapitulate, our requests for additional personnel
are:
Front office
Racial Intelligence
Espionage Section
Nationalities Intelligence
Section
Two GS-2 clerks
• One GS-4 clerk
One Agent Supervisor
to replace Supervisor
Enright.
Two additional Agent
Supervisors.
One Agent Supervisor
to replace Agent Quinn.
Two additional Agent
Supervisors.
As you
I firmly believe that our limited requests for
additional personnel at this time are fully justified.
will note in the attached write-ups, we are not asking for
additional personnel until, after on a trial basis, we have
The increase
found it absolutely necessary and fully justified.
of terroristic tactics by the Weatherman faction of the
Students for a Democratic Society and militant organizations
such as the Black Panther Party and the Jewish Defense League
has made it absolutely imperative that intensive investigation
be conducted to identify, locate all members of these militant
organizations and secure evidence for prosecution, if we are
to meet our grave responsibilities in the extremely vital field
of internal security. This has increased the work load of the
Racial Intelligence Section, the New Left Section, and the
Nationalities Intelligence Section. Because of this increase
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 538
in work and my interest in conserving manpower wherever possible,
we recently reorganized the Division in order to make the most
efficient use of our manpower. I conscientiously believe I
have now trimmed my manpower to the bone. Under my direction,
Branch and Section Chiefs continually evaluate personnel
adequacy in order to assure we get the job done with a
maximum amount of efficiency with the minimum amount of
personnel. I conscientiously believe I have done this and I
will continue to pursue this policy.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 539
171
:
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
SECTION CHIEF A. W. GRAY:
7 : AYAS
6-E
JAs of 1/8/71 the authorized personnel
of the Internal Security Section was
15 Special Agents, 7 Secretaries, and 9 Clerks. A breakdown by
Units follows:
FRONT OFFICE
Section Chief
Secretary
Number One Man
Secretary
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT
Supervisors
Secretary
Clerks
SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT
Supervisors
Secretary
Clerks
AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL
AS OF 1/8/71
1
1
1
1
f
312
2 (1 new requested
but not yet
assigned)
312
PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT
Supervisors
3 (1
-
Secretary
Clerks
McGuire
temporarily
assigned New
Left Section)
1
2
(1
-
Hanning
temporarily
assigned New
Left Section)
INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT
Supervisors
Secretary
Clerk
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT
Supervisors
Secretary
Clerks
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
/DFXC:bcw
-NW-88608-Docld:32989638_Page_540
172
2.
217
222
.2

SPECIFIC COMMENTS
1. In Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit, one
Special Agent Supervisor (McGuire) and one clerk (Hanning)
temporarily assigned New Left Section. Supervisor in Charge
of same Unit (Griffith) also spending majority of his time
in New Left Section assisting on special. An additional
Supervisor from International New Left Unit (Benedict) and
one clerk from Klan and White Hate Groups Unit (Dean) are
also working majority of their time on New Left Section
special.
2.
3.
4.
No pending transfers or resignations.
See number 1 above.
We have requested one additional clerical employee
for the Communist Party, USA, Unit (request not yet filled)
because of substantial need due to increase in Unit case load
from 572 to 1076 as a result of reorganization. We are currently
assessing need for another clerical employee in Klan and White
Hate Groups Unit to handle large volume of mail involved in
supervision of several hundred Klan and White Hate group informants.
5.
For
Considering that Internal Security Section, as it
is now constituted, was established December 16, 1970, approxi-
mately three weeks ago, no meaningful comments regarding manpower
savings as related to this Section can be made. We are carrying
´a substantial case load, with increases in several areas.
example, the case load of the Communist Party, USA, Unit as a
result of the reorganization increased from 572 to 1076 with no
increase in personnel. Additionally, two Supervisors assigned to
this Section (Griffith and McGuire) are on temporary loan to the
New Left Section along with a clerical employee (Hanning).
Additionally, a third Supervisor (Benedict) and a second clerical
employee (Dean) are spending the majority of their working time
on assignment to New Left Section special. For all practical
purposes, the work of three Supervisors and two clerical employees
is being absorbed on a daily basis within the present personnel
complement which, of course, is a tangible manpower savings.
all Units we are constantly involved in attempting to eliminate
or curtail the volume of paperwork being handled, reducing
programs and projects to bare essentials and wherever possible,
keeping the case load volume at a manageable figure.
Another example of manpower conservation exists in
the Subversive Individuals Basic Revolutionary Groups Unit
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
DFXC:bcw
6-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 541
In
which handles approximately 1,400 pending cases and is
responsible for over 7,000 subjects on the Bureau's Special
Indices. A moratorium on routine communist investigations
in effect at the time of the last inspection, which curtailed
the work of this Unit, has been removed and the case load
increases daily. The removal of the moratorium warranted
the expansion of this Unit from a two to three-man Unit at
the time of reorganization but for all practical purposes,
the Unit has functioned as a two-man Unit with the third
man (Schwartz) on loan for the majority of the period to the
Research Section for a special project.
6. When Special Agent supervisory personnel
currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections,
are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle
existing case load.
7. In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent
and clerical personnel the following criteria were used:
case load
mail count
name checks
complexity of cases and supervision involved
deadline matters
special assignments
experienced supervisors
Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in
Charge (reviewing mail, conferring with employees, organizing
Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignments
handled.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
DFXC: bcw
6-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 542
174
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
NEW LEFT SECTION 6E
SECTION CHIEF R. L.
a tabulation of the
New Left Section as
New Left Groups Unit
SHACKELFORE:
There is set forth below
actual and authorized personnel in the
of close of business, January 8, 1971.
Authorized
6 Agents
4 Clerks
1 Super Clerk
1 Secretary
Subversive Individuals
-
5 Agents
New Left Unit
Special Investigations
West Unit
Special Investigations
East Unit
-
Special Assignment
-
4 Clerks
1 Secretary
4-Agents.
4 Clerks
1 Secretary
5 Agents
4 Clerks
1 Secretary
Assigned
6 Agents
4 Clerks
1. Super Clerk
1 Secretary
4 Agents
4 Clerks
1 Secretary
3 Agents
4 Clerks
1 Secretary
5 Agents
4 Clerks
1 Secretary
1 Agent*
1 Clerk*
Front Office
Total
2 Agents
2 Secretaries
22 Agents
16 Clerks
1 Super
6 Secretaries
45 employees
2 Agents
2 Secretaries
21 Agents
17 Clerks
1 Super Clerk
6 Secretaries
45 employees
1. There are no vacant positions in the New Left Section.
2. Two Agents under transfer in: SA J. L. Hogan assigned to
Special Investigations West Unit and SA B. M. Perez assigned
to Subversive Individuals New Left Unit. No resignations.
-
-
*One Agent and one clerk on temporary assignment handling major
case involving East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
NW 88608 638 Page 543
67
1
-
3. Special Investigations West Unit has one Agent and one
clerk on loan from the Internal Security Section.
4.
Activities by New Left terrorists during the past year
has been marked by an increase in acts of violence and
conspiracies toward violence. The Weatherman group and
other such groups have made it imperative that we institute
continuing intensive investigations. By approved airtel to
SAC, Albany, and all offices dated 11/4/70, the field was
instructed to initiate investigation of all members of the
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and members of
procommunist militant New Left type campus organizations
which follow SDS advocacy of violence and revolution.
is estimated that this will involve some 6,500 new investi-
gations. If this trend continues, it will be necessary to
obtain an additional clerk in the future; however, we are
not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this
time.
It
5. At the time of the last inspection, this Section had
22 Agents and 27 clerical employees authorized of which
22 Agents and 25 clerical employees were assigned.
As a
result of the realignment of the Division in December, 1970,
this Section currently has 22 Agents and 23 clerical employees
authorized.
6. As noted in number 4 above, the increase in terroristic
activities by New Left militants has increased the burden
of this Section. . On the basis of the above, if this trend
continues, it appears that it will be necessary to obtain one
additional Agent in the future.
7. Personnel adequacy in the New Left. Section is constantly
evaluated on the basis of the productivity of each unit,
requests received from the Department and other agencies
and the overall objectives of the Section. The delinquent
work in each unit is closely followed and in special situations
where an excessive amount of work is assigned to one unit
supervisory personnel from other units are utilized.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 544
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
¡
SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:
As of close of business 1/8/71,
the complement of this Section
was as follows: Special Agents 13, secretaries 5, and clerks 15, for a
total of 33. This is broken down by unit as follows:
Section Front Office - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (Stenography),
1 secretary (typing)
Central Research Unit
-
5 Special Agents, 1 secretary,
2 supervisory clerks (technical publications
writers), 1 clerk (publications coordinator),
1 clerk (typing)
Racial Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary,
1 supervisory clerk (technical publications
writer), 2 clerks
New Left Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary,
1 supervisory clerk (technical publications
writer), 1 clerk
Special Records Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (assigned but
not authorized, see #3 below), 6 clerks
The following responses are numbered to correspond with
Inspector's specific questions:
1. There are no vacant positions.
2. There are no personnel on transfer into or out of Section at
this time and no pending resignations.
3. Only shortage or overage of authorized personnel is in Special
Records Unit. Position of secretary in this unit has been approved by Director
contingent upon final action by Position Classification Office which is now
pending.
4. Current clerical personnel complement is considered adequate
but not excessive.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
RDC: mea
6-E
CARG
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 545
!
'
- 2 -
-
5. Since last inspection we have reduced one Agent from the
complement of the Racial Reporting Unit as a result of various streamlining
measures adopted relative to reporting requirements. This streamlining
involved the elimination of a substantial number of letterhead memoranda and
airtels previously required from each field office with regard to racial
conditions and the elimination of daily cover memorandum to our outgoing
racial teletype to the White House.
6. The authorized Agent complement for Section is considered
adequate but not excessive at this time.
7. Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this Section
includes a number of diverse factors. Case load figures are not applicable
to work of this Section nor are there any other simple, quantitative measure-
ments of Section's work. Work of this Section involves primarily research
and evaluation and the preparation of a variety of documents aimed at providing
intelligence to the White House, the Attorney General, other interested
agencies and Bureau officials. This Section seeks to summarize into
comprehensive and meaningful "package" form information relating to current
topics of intelligence interest and concern. The finished product is
provided not only to other intelligence agencies and policy-making officials
of the Government but, where appropriate, to our field offices for their
information and guidance. The type of documents prepared varies from
daily teletype summaries regarding racial disturbances and student agitation,
to detailed monographs containing in-depth research into various facets of
our work.
During the past year there has been a continuing demand for
various intelligence summaries and this Section has been faced with a
number of expedite projects on behalf of Bureau officials, including the
Director, the White House, the Vice President's Office, and the Attorney
General. Basis for this heavy work load has primarily been interest and
concern in the explosive issues concerning racial and student disorders.
The great majority of our projects have revolved around the preparation
of material either for internal FBI use or for outside dissemination with
respect to these issues.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 546
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRANIGAN
ESPIONAGE SECTION
(1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section
as of January 8, 1971, is as follows:
6-E
Front Office
Officials Unit
Washington
Officials Unit
New York
Special Cases Unit
AGENT
CLERK
SECRETARY
www.
CLERK-STENO
2
0
2
0
-
3
2*
1
1
5**
3
1
1
02
****
1
ri
0
Coordination Unit
3
2****
1
1
Satellite Unit
4
5
from?
0
*Two GS-4 Clerks (Barbara Ann Holland and Keith R. White) resigned
close of business January 8, 1971. J. Gail Whitson, GS-3", and
Virginia A. Lensch, GS-4, reported for trial assignment on
January 11, 1971.
**SA George M. Quinn, under transfer to Inspection Division, to
depart close of business January 22, 1971. Replacement requested.
***Intelligence Analyst, GS-10, Mary E. Triplett, performing work
in lieu of Special Agent.
F
*Clerk, GS-7, A. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of
Special Agent.
(2) By letter dated December 22, 1970, Special Agent
George M. Quinn was transferred to the Inspection Division.
He will depart by the close of business January 22, 1971.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-13-71
WAB:hke
6-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 547
179
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
Barbara Ann Holland and Keith R. White submitted resignations
close of business January 8, 1971. Replacements were received
as enumerated in item one above.
(3) As of January 8, 1971, there was a shortage of
two GS-4 Clerk in the Officials Unit Washington, but this
was remedied on January 11, when replacements were received
as indicated in item one above. A replacement has been requested
for Special Agent George M. Quinn in the Officials Unit New York,
but none has been designated at this time. There is no overage
of authorized personnel in the Espionage Section.
-M
(4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate at the
present time. With the reorganization of the Division, and
combining Soviet and Soviet-bloc investigations in the Espionage
Section, an extremely heavy burden has been placed on the clerical
personnel handling the assignment cards for the Section (there are
now 5,046 cases). This situation is being watched and it may be
that it is unworkable to place the responsibility for maintaining
the assignment cards in a GS-4 employee who is already heavily
assigned. If this proves to be a fact, a recommendation will be
made to add a Clerk at a GS-3 level who would exclusively handle
the assignment cards.
(5) Following the 1970 inspection, personnel handling
Soviet investigations was reduced by two Special Agents, GS-14.
Following the inspection, personnel handling Soviet-bloc
investigations were reduced by one Special Agent, GS-14, and
one Clerk, GS-4. At the time of the reorganization of the
Division in December, 1970, personnel handling Soviet-bloc
investigations were reduced by four Special Agents (one GS-15;
three GS-14) and five clerical personnel (one GS-5 and four GS-4).
(6) Special Agent personnel is considered adequate.
(7)
Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of
personnel includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity
of the cases, and the importance of the investigations.
In the Officials Unit, both Washington and New York,
we handle the greatest volume of complex investigations since
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-13-71
WAB:hke
6-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 548
2
-
-
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
these cases include the bulk of our double agent operations.
As of December 1, 1970, there were 74 active double agents in the
Soviet field. This is the largest number of double agents we
have ever achieved. At the time of the last inspection as of
April 1, 1970, there were 67 active double agents. The current
number of 74 is compared most favorably with the number of actual
double agents three years ago (12/1/67), when there were 47 active
double agents. At that time there were 18 case Agents handling
Soviet matters. At the time of the last inspection, there were
16 case Agents in the Soviet field, and the current load is being
carried by less than 14 case Agents. Three of the 14 are assigned
part time to the handling of Soviet-bloc matters.
www.te
With the reorganization of the Division in December, 1970,
the volume and work load for the Supervisers in the Espionage
Section were materially increased. Four Agent Supervisors who
were formerly assigned to the Sino-Satellite Section were
transferred to the Espionage Section and brought with them in
excess of 2,000 cases. The only possible way that this volume
could be handled was by redistributing the work within the
Coordination Unit and the Special Cases Unit. The volume of
investigations in these Units is extremely heavy considering the
number of special projects and special operations which are
normally assigned in the Units.
In the Satellite Unit handling Polish, Romanian,
Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav investigative matters, we currently
have 1,293 active cases divided among four Special Agents.
In our Soviet-bloc counterintelligence work, we were as of
December 1, 1970, operating 64 active double agents.
This should
be compared with the figure at the time of our last inspection,
April 1, 1970, when there were 61 active double agents,
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-13-71
WAB:hke
6-E
3.
-
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 549
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
1
SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE/
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION
i
The current authorized personnel complement of
the Racial Intelligence Section as of the close of business,
January 8, 1971, is 21 Agents and 22 clerical personnel with
a request pending for one additional clerk for the Black
Nationalist South and Racial Informant Unit. This is
broken down as follows according to Units within the Section:
Front Office
-
Section Chief
Number One Man
Secretary of
Section Chief
-
-
1
1
1
Secretary (Stenography) - 1
to Number One Man
Black Nationalist Unit East
5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
7 clerical personnel
Black Nationalist Unit
Central
4 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge*
3 clerical personnel
*one Supervisor under transfer to Inspection Division
Black Nationalist Unit
-
West
5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
5 clerical personnel
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
TDR:bjr
6-E
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 550

Black Nationalist
-
South and Racial Informant Unit
5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
5 clerical personnel
1) There are no clerical vacancies in the
Section; however, as it was noted previously, a request
has been submitted for an additional clerk for the Black
Nationalist South and Racial Informant Unit which would
-
· increase our complement to 23 if approved.
POTENT
2) Special Agent Supervisor C. Edwin Enright
is under transfer to the Inspection Division, transfer
letter dated January 8, 1971. A replacement is being
requested.
3) With the transfer of Special Agent Enright
there will exist a shortage of one Supervisor in the
Black Nationalist Unit Central.
-
4) The clerical personnel complement is inade-
quate and will be barely adequate if the request for one
additional clerk is approved. The workload of the Section
continues to increase and shows no signs of tapering off.
We will continue to closely watch the clerical situation
and make appropriate recommendations as required by any
substantial change in the clerical workload.
5) The streamlining of our operations wherever
possible to effect manpower savings is under continual
evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since
the last Inspection include: 1) The discontinuance by each
field division of semiannual reports concerning the black
nationalist movement (Bureau file 157-8415). This was accom-
plished July 6, 1970. 2) On November 3, 1970, the Agitator
Index was revised to delete those who were also included on
the Security Index. 3) On November 5, 1970, existing
instructions were modified concerning recordings of black
NW-88608 Docld:32989638 Page 551
and New Left public appearances to allow the SAC to
authorize use of concealed recording devices by a
Special Agent or a proven source in covering public
appearances by black and New Left extremists except
such appearances at educational institutions. Pre-
viously, prior Bureau approval was necessary.
In addition, we continue to utilize our
teletype dissemination facilities to the maximum
extent possible.
6) The Special Agent complement of 21 is
the same as at the time of the last Inspection.
The Division was reorganized December 17,
1970, on the basis of approximate caseload per Supervisor
of 279. This figure was based on the October 1, 1970,
caseload figures. Since that time there has been a
heavy increase in the caseload in the black extremist
field where at present the average caseload as of
January 1, 1971, stood at 349 per Supervisor. At the
time of the last Inspection, the caseload of the Section
stood at 5,946 including Klan and white hate-type cases.
Under the reorganization this Section lost the Klan and
white hate cases and as of January 1, 1971, the caseload
encompassing black extremist individuals and organizations
including racial informants in these organizations stood
at 6,642, an increase of 696 cases since the date of the
last Inspection.
There is a dire need for additional Special Agent
supervisory personnel to handle our heavy responsibilities
in the black extremist field, if we are to afford these cases
the attention that they deserve. Based upon the Division
reorganization figures, an additional four Supervisors would
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 552
184
be required; however, we have tightened our belt and
taken streamlining measures wherever possible and are
requesting only two Special Agent Supervisors at the
present time. We will attempt to accomplish our
objectives with two additional Supervisors.
There are several factors that would indicate
our work in the black extremist field will continue to
increase. The increasing militancy of black extremists
on college campuses caused us to require the field (by
airtel 11/4/70) to open cases on all black student groups
on college campuses as well as cases on the leaders
thereof, There are numerous such groups throughout the
United States. The Black Panther Party is growing and in
September, 1970, opened up an international section in
Algiers. In addition a grand jury is sitting in California
with witnesses being heard in efforts to develop a prosecutive
theory against the Black Panther Party, The work in connection
therewith and other aspects of the Black Panther Party invest-
igation consumes almost the full time of one Supervisor.
Black extremist activity in this country is
rapidly developing more and more in international aspects.
Residents of other countries, including United States
citizens and non-citizens, are involved in clandestine and
overt operational and propaganda activity among racial
extremists. We have targeted CIA as well as our Legal
Attaches abroad for the development of data regarding
foreign influences in the black extremist movement. The
National Security Agency has vast capabilities in developing
the type of. information needed and we have alerted that
Agency to our basic needs and have made arrangements for
future assistance.
A prime factor in the rapid increase in our
caseload has been our technical coverage of the Black
Panther Party. At the time of the last Inspection we
had six such technical surveillances in operation.
presently have 12 installed, one awaiting installation,
We
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 553
and one awaiting approval. This special coverage provides
on a daily basis a wealth of intelligence information and
is most productive source for the opening of numerous new
cases in the black extremist field. With the added coverage
we can expect a continuing increase in the caseload.
In view of the above factors, there exists a dire
need for two additional Special Agent Supervisors at this
time.
(7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take
into consideration not only the caseload which is compiled
on a monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts
taken on a quarterly basis. Many of our cases on key figures
in the black extremist movement such as David Hilliard.
Huey P. Newton, Elbert Howard, Le Roi Jones, Eldridge Cleaver,
Emory Douglas, and others require a considerable amount of
supervisory attention.
As previously noted, the Department is attempting
to develop a prosecutive theory against the Black Panther
Party and as a result it has been necessary to assign one
Supervisor almost exclusively to handle investigation of
this organization. The investigations of other organizations
require a great deal of supervisory attention and direction.
Analyses of current developments in the racial field, special
requests from other Government agencies, preparation of
special studies, and initiation of special projects all
require the expenditure of considerable supervisory time
and are taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy
of personnel.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 554
ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
6-E
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
As of close of business 1/8/71 Section complement was:
Authorized
Actual
Special Agents
Secretaries (Steno)
Secretary (Typing)
20
20
8
8
1
1
Stenographer (Supervisory) 1
Clerical (Supervisory)
Stenographers
1
1
1
26
26
Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7)
19
19
Totals
76
76
Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary
(Steno) and one Secretary (Typing).
Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno),
one Clerk (GS-5) and one Clerk (GS-4).
Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno),
one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4).
Special Coordination Unit consists of five Special Agents, three
Secretaries (Steno), one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and two Clerks
(GS-4).
Chinese Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno)
and three Clerks (GS-4).
Middle and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents, .
one Secretary (Steno), and three Clerks (GS-4).
Division Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor
(Steno), one Assistant Supervisor (Clerk) and 26 Clerk-Stenographers, GS-4.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WRW:ams
6-E
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 555
1
-2.
-
6-E
(1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 1/8/71,
although one resignation was pending (described in item 2 below).
(2) Miss Agnes M. Klima, Clerk-Stenographer, GS-4, assigned
to Stenographic Pool, submitted her resignation effective 1/14/71 and
acknowledgement of same was dated 1/6/71. This stenographic position
was approved to be filled by assigning a GS-4 Clerk (Miss Barbara A. Hatcher)
who had passed the stenographic test and request for replacement for
Miss Hatcher dated 1/8/71 was submitted. Miss Hatcher actually was
transferred to the stenographic position in the pool as of beginning of business
1/11/71 when her replacement, Miss Cheryl D. Carpenter, reported to this
Section for assignment.
(3) There was no shortage or overage of authorized personnel
as of close of business 1/8/71.
(4) Authorized clerical personnel complement is considered
adequate but not excessive.
(5) As result of last inspection authorized Agent complement was
reduced from 17 to 15. This manpower savings was effected by discontinuing
two programs and streamlining a third one. Supporting memoranda in this
regard have been submitted as attachments to yellow write-up 5-A-4on
Section and Unit Analysis dated 1/12/71.
Memorandum to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors 70-13 dated
7/29/70 noted that the Liaison Section of Domestic Intelligence Division was
being abolished effective immediately. This resulted in a cut-back of one
Section Chief plus eight supervisory Special Agents who were engaged in
domestic liaison functions. Calls from other U. S. agencies formerly handled
by these nine men are now handled by Agent personnel throughout the Bureau
who are principally concerned with the subject matter of the call. By far,
the majority of such calls are handled by Agent personnel presently assigned
to Nationalities Intelligence Section. In addition, representatives of other
agencies who were contacted in their offices prior to discontinuance of
Liaison Section frequently call at Domestic Intelligence Division for
consultation. Arrangements were made for couriers representing certain
other sensitive agencies, such as National Security Agency and Central
Intelligence Agency, to call at Domestic Intelligence Division for the purpose
of delivering or receiving mail requiring protective services of armed couriers.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 556
- 3
-
6-E
Thus, many of the functions formerly performed by Special Agent personnel
are handled by currently assigned personnel within the Division, resulting in
the savings of the time of the nine Agents released.
As a result of the Division-wide reorganization effected 12/16/70
this Section absorbed without offsetting Special Agent personnel work
relating to Chinese matters formerly assigned to three Special Agent
Supervisors in the Sino-Satellite Section (now abolished). This resulted in
an increased case load of over 25 percent.
(6) While there are 20 Agents assigned to the Section, two are
assigned to the Section Front Office and five to the Special Coordination
Unit, which handles remaining domestic liaison functions and all foreign
liaison functions; thus, there are 13 Agents assigned to desks on which cases
are handled. The case load per Agent since the last inspection has increased
from 193 to 278, a 44 percent increase. This has been the result of cutting
back two Agents as result of the last inspection and the assignment of Chinese
work to the Section effective with the Division reorganization 12/16/70. There
has been insufficient time since the latter date to establish whether the
significant increase in case load per man will adversely affect the efficient
operation of the Section. At this time, however, no additional Agent personnel
is being requested for assignment to desks handling cases but the matter
will be closely followed and if recommendations in this connection are
considered appropriate in the future they will be submitted with justifying data.
At the present time there are five supervisory Special Agents
assigned to the Special Coordination Unit and the heavy increase in work load
on the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD) in that Unit (to which two of the five Agents
are assigned) has resulted in a situation warranting the assignment of two
additional Special Agents to the desk. In connection with this, following is
submitted:
In December, 1970, our foreign liaison offices were expanded from
11 to 17. It has come at a time when the two FLD Supervisors have been
barely able to keep up with the flow of paper let alone actually examine and
analyze it in order to afford active and constructive supervision to our
foreign offices. This problem arises from two causes, (1) the heavy demands
made on the time of these two Supervisors in welcoming and personally
supervising the visits to the Bureau of the many foreign dignitaries who
are valuable and cooperative contacts of our Legal Attaches--such visitors
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 557
1
- 4.
6-E
currently average 27 per month; and (2) the appreciable increase (62 percent)
in the past ten years of the Foreign Police Cooperation cases we handle.
The Legal Attache expansion in December, 1970, increased Bureau
personnel abroad from 60 to 88, of which latter number 42 are Special Agents.
The latest case load figures available for the 11 Legal Attache offices then
existing are for 10/31/70, at which time the 11 offices carried a total of
3,020 cases. In October, 1960, five Special Agent Supervisors were assigned
to the FLD, one of whom devoted a portion of his time to Buplans matters,
which matters have now been transferred to another Section. At that time
the case load for all foreign offices was 1693.
In October, 1960, we had 166 Foreign Police Cooperation cases on
the FLD. In October, 1970, there were 273. This large increase in Foreign
Police Cooperation cases was absorbed as a result of the delegation to a
clerical employee of supervisory responsibility for about 95 percent of the
cases. This clerical employee, who is in Grade GS-7, is most efficient and
quite capable but cannot be expected to have the experience of an Agent to
recognize promptly potentially embarrassing situations arising.
As we now have six new Legal Attache offices, we can expect both
the case load and the Foreign Police Cooperation requests to increase substantially.
The FLD Supervisors should be watching mail flow to determine
the promptness with which Legal Attaches respond to requests; the thoroughness
of handling such cases; and the adequacy of foreign agency contacts in a
position to afford the Bureau the desired degree of cooperation. The FLD
Supervisors should be preparing memoranda reflecting Legal Attache accomplish-
ments in order to keep the Director fully apprised of the truly excellent work
being done by our Agents abroad. As the situation now stands, the two present
FLD Supervisors just do not have time to do this and we are incurring the
risk of failing to afford direction and guidance in this very important area
of the Bureau's operations.
To comply with Bureau requirements our 42 men abroad must
seek cooperation of foreign agencies. In reciprocity they must accept
requests for investigations in the U. S. regarding matters as simple as running
down bad debtors to complex investigations involving the location of murder
suspects. The two present FLD Supervisors at this time, because of the
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 558
100
- 5 -
سمت تم لسلامة
6-E
heavy demands on them, are unable to afford the necessary direction and
assistance to the clerical employee handling Foreign Police Cooperation
cases.
To afford the necessary and proper guidance to our foreign operations,
particularly to the six new offices which have now been established and which
will make heavy demands for immediate support, and to overcome the
present heavy work load described above, two additional Agent Supervisors,
preferably men having potential for foreign assignment, should be approved
for the FLD at this time.
(7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include
continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts,
complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and
intelligence requirements, patterns of delinquency, personnel capabilities,
and past experience in shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 559
101
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:wmj
1/22/71)
supervision of work in your Division.
During the course of this inspection
thorough analyses of work were performed
which have given some insight in the
Taken into consideration was your recent reorganization of the Division
which appears to have accomplished a better balance of work between branches.
1
In this write-up you have requested replacement Agents for SAs C. E.
Enright and G. M. Quinn, both assigned in your Espionage and Racial Branch.
In addition, you have requested two additional Agents for the Racial Intelligence
Section and two Agents for the Special Coordination Unit.
Division case load was surveyed by categories from the field administrative
reports for a 12-month period (January through December, 1970) to establish.
trends over this period. Dasically, portinent trends indicated increases of
70.2% in Internal Securityand New Left cases during the 12 month period; a
57.4% increase in racial matters; 34.9% in Security Informants; a decline of
33% in Espionage (65) and decline of 13. 3% in Internal Security - Nationalistic
Tendency (105) cases.
In addition, case loads by Section were reconstructed (in view of Division
reorganization) and compared with case loads at the time of the last inspection
as indicated in the following:
Espionage
Racial
Nationalities
Intelligence
Internal Security
New Left
Research
Last Inspection
5846
4746
2944
3658
6551
No cases
Current Inspection
-5038 (-808)
6642 (+1896)
3620 (+676) (Does not include
5318 (+1660) Spec. Coordina-
6421 (-130) tion Unit)
To further analyze case and work load the Research Section and Special
Coordination Unit were excluded from computations and manpower was considered
on the basis of 50 men in the Espionage Racial Intelligence Branch and 33 men
in the Internal Security Branch (Section Chiefs and Number One Men also excluded).
Total case load in Espionage Branch currently is 15, 300 and 11, 739 in Internal
Security; case load per supervisor in Espionage determined to be 14% lower than
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 560

his counterpart in Internal Security (306 vs. 356). It is noted in this regard that
the Racial Intelligence case load raises the Espionage Branch figures, since the
Nationalities Intelligence Section has an average of only 278 and Espionage
Section of only 280 cases per man. The average in Racial Intelligence Section
is 350.
1
We next conducted surveys to determine whether the complexity of cases in
Espionage and Nationalities work was appreciably more complex to justify the
above-noted differences in case load.
All pending 65 classification cases (total 327) were reviewed and it was
determined a total of 539 items of correspondence containing instructions
or direction emanating from SOG were contained in these files or an average
of 1. 6 pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period. Over half of this was
somewhat routine and very short.
We also reviewed the 100 most important (105s) cases and determined an
average of 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at SOG in these files.
62% of this was considered somewhat routine.
We reviewed over 80% of your 298 Potential Double Agent cases and
determined the average case was 3 1/2 years old and contained only 1 piece
of correspondence in over 3 years (subject of separate write-up).
Other surveys revealed current active cases in these categories had an
average of only 3+ pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period.
It is felt that degree of supervision and the amount of instruction and
direction given our cases can be measured in one way by the frequency of
correspondence necessitated by the individual cases.
Another survey of mail signed out at Section level revealed that approximately
57% of your outgoing mail emanates from the combined efforts of your New Left
and Racial Sections. Espionage Section contributed about 8.7% and Nationalities
Intelligence about 15%.
On the basis of the above studies and reviews of files, I conclude that, if
anything, due to the intensity of the action that it requires more input to supervise
Racial and New Left than it does cases assigned in the Espionage and Nationalities
Sections.
For this reason, I feel you still have an imbalance in your Division which should
be corrected. That is, you still have 5 men working Espionage and Nationalities
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 561
93
work who should be shifted to other work to balance your
assignments. I do not feel that you need two more men in the
Special Coordination Unit at this time since increased work
load considerations due to the additional Legats has not yet
happened. When and if it does, you should make necessary
intra-Branch transfers.
I agree with your recommended replacements for SAs Enright
and Quinn; however, replacement for Quinn should be assigned to
the Racial Section and not the Espionage Section. I am submitting
separate recommendations regarding this.
Any further additions to the Racial Intelligence Section
should be made from within the Espionage Branch from the
pertinent Sections.
To recap, I feel as a result of this inspection that your
present quota of 116 men is adequate. I feel the replacements
requested are justified but I do not agree with your request
for 4 additional Agents.
Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested:
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(DEM:ekn
branches.
-
1/23/71)
'The Inspector has noted
our recent reorganization
to accomplish a better
balance of work between
The reorganization was based on memorandum 10/9/70, Sizoo
to Brennan, requesting 6 additional Agent Supervisors and
memorandum 10/14/70, Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, denying this
request. Mr. Felt's memorandum noted there were 18921 cases
(excluding large volume of informants and Communist Party, USA,
matters) and based on our set up at that time the average case
load per Agent was 305 in the Internal Security Branch and 225
in the Espionage Branch.
Details of the approach utilized in our reorganization,
12/16/70, are set forth in the attachment. With 116 Division
Agent complement and 83 desk agents (same figures utilized
during current inspection) we distributed the Division case-
load (22,857 as of 10/31/70, or an average of 275 per desk
agent) as equitably as possible. This resulted in apportion-
ment of caseload among the six present sections as follows:
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 562
194
Desk
Section
Agents
Cases
Average Cases
Per Agent
Internal Security
13
3627
279
Nationalities Intelligence
13
3692
284
Racial Intelligence
19
4948
260
New Left
20
5491
275
Espionage
18
5099
283
Research
0
0
0
Totals
83
22857
275
During the reorganization all work as well as cases formerly
handled in three sections in the Espionage Branch was consolidated into
two sections. All cases and work formerly handled in two operational
sections in the Internal Security Branch were spread among three sections
with the creation of the New Left Section as a separate entity. This
resulted in additional Agents for New Left work.
Since 10/31/70 (caseload figures utilized for reorganization
purposes) caseloads in each section have changed as follows:
Section
10/31/70
Current
Inspection
Espionage
5099
5038
Racial Intelligence
4948
6642
Nationalities Intelligence
3692
3620
Internal Security
3627
5318
New Left
5491
6421
Research
0
0
Net Change
-61
+1694
-28
+1691
+930
0
The slight reductions in caseloads in the Espionage and
Nationalities Intelligence Sections have left the average cases per Agent
at 280 and 278, respectively, both above the norm of 275 established for
reorganizational purposes.
T
:
The Inspector has noted the number of outgoing pieces of
correspondence in the 65 classification cases, the 100 most important
105 classification cases, and a review of 80 percent of 298 "potential double
agent" cases. The vast majority of the cases handled in the Espionage
and Nationalities Intelligence Sections are 105 classification cases.
Recognizing the Inspector reviewed the most important cases and determined
that on an average 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at the Seat of
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 563
195
Government in these files, I would estimate that a conservative minimum of
over two pieces of correspondence originated at Seat of Government in each
of the 105 classification group as a whole. With an average caseload of
280 per Supervisor, this would mean that 560 outgoing communications
would be submitted each year. Minus weekends and holidays, there are
252 workdays in a year and I would estimate an average of 32 days per
man would be accounted for by annual leave, sick leave, inspection assign-
ments, tour assignments, firearms and physical examinations. This would
leave 220 days for productive work per Supervisor. This would mean
that each Supervisor would be required to review the necessary files and
dictate approximately two and one-half communications per day. I feel this
is perhaps a conservative estimate inasmuch as many of the cases involved
relate to foreign diplomats and in each case, at the inception, we have to
prepare a communication to Department of State setting forth basic facts
about the individual and obtaining authority to investigate, and, thereafter,
issue appropriate instructions to the field. Thus, in these cases, there
are two outgoing communications prepared at the very inception.
In addition to measuring work on the basis of outgoing corres-
pondence, I think note must be taken of the fact that the Espionage and
Nationalities Intelligence Sections have a responsibility with regard to over
130 countries. The vast majority, of course, are of concern to the
Nationalities Intelligence Section. Supervisors on the various desks have
to be aware of conditions existing which affect the Bureau's responsibilities
in the intelligence field and this encompasses the review of much intelligence
material which shows up in the incoming mail count, all of which must be
´. properly reviewed and coordinated.
During the inspection a mail count was kept for five days and
the results, of course, are available to the Inspector. In this connection,
during the five-day period, each Supervisor in the Espionage Section
received an average of 255 pieces of regular incoming mail (such as, Seat
of Government memoranda, letterhead memoranda, teletypes, airtels,
cables, letters from field, and letters from outside agencies) for a total
of 378 pages. Other incoming mail (such as intelligence reports and cables
from other agencies, Bureau Source 6 and Bureau Source 200 items,
publications, visa notifications and similar such items) averaged 40 items
per Agent in the Espionage Section and the pages totaled 213. With regard
to outgoing mail, there was an average per man of 11 items and 18 pages
of dictated material and 79 items and 157 pages of outgoing nondictated,
all of which involved preparation of material for dissemination to other
agencies. In the Nationalities Intelligence Section, the comparable average
figures per Supervisor were 213 items and 416 pages of incoming regular
mail, 109 items and 440 pages of other incoming mail, 22 items and 40
pages of outgoing dictated mail, and 68 items and 169 pages of outgoing
nondictated mail.
196
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 564.
SUPERVISORY NON-INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL
Special Coordination Unit'
New Left Report Unit
5
Racial Report Unit
Special Records Unit
Central Research Unit
2
ལམཡ5
16
Front Offices (Sections & Division) 17
(Proposed 12-8 man) (4-12 shift)
:
TOTAL HON-INVESTIGATIVE
PERSONNEL
TOTAL DIVISION COMPLEMENT
Loss Total Non-livesti-
gative personnel
33
116
33.
TOTAL AVAILABLE INVESTI--
GATIVE PERSONNEL
83
DIVISION CASE LOAD AVERAGE (10/1/70).
Total Division Case Count
Total Investigative Personnel
22.857
83
Division. Average Case Load
275
197
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 565
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
Cases
Men
Average
Front Office
0
2
Communist Party, USA
Unit
382
191-
Basic Revolutionary
Individual Unit
1517.
506
:
International New Left
.26**
Unit
64살...
223
Klan & White Hate Groups
726
2.
363
Unit
Security Informant Units
Est.
One additional man
332***
166
.3627
15
279
*SIC from Research Section
** Ad Hoc, etc..
*** Does not include 266 routine CP informant cases.
198
NW-88608 Decld:32989638 Page 566
!
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE
Cases
Men
Average
Front Office
2
0
Cuban Unit
657
3
219
Middle & South, American
Unit
622
3
207.
Nationalities Unit
926
4
1252
Ethnic Groups Unit
(Incl. CH.)
1487
3.
496
Special Coordination
Unit
5
0.
*Net Case Supervisors
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 567
3692
20
284
13*
199
_ _
M
"
RACIAL SECTION
Front Office
Three Black Nationalist
Units
Cases
Men
Average
2.
.0
4380
16
274
Racial Informant Unit
568
3.
189
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 568
200
4948
21
260
NEW LEFT SECTION
J
Cases
Men
Average
2
0
Front Office
Security Informant Unit
(Est.)
567*
_ New Left Individuals Unit
1464
New Left Groups Unit
952
Special Investigations
Unit
Sabotage
189
488
238
2341
8
293
-167
1.
167
5491.
22
275
* 600 (Est) cases to Internal Security Section with those
organizations transferred.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 569
E
201
ELINE TRASE ENA
ESPIONAGE SECTION
Cases
Men
Average
Front Office
0
2
0
Four Soviet & Two
5099
18
283
Satellite Units
5099
20
283
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 570
202

RESEARCH SECTION
Front Office
Central. Research Unit
Cases
'Men
Average
0
2
5
сл
Ο
Racial and New Left
Reporting Unit*
0.
Special Records Unit**
Ο
2
0
:
10
13***
0
*Combining two units frees one SIC to handle informants
in Internal Security Section.
**Will assume record keeping function for Security Informants,
****This low complement of Agent personnel should stand up
when super clerks (4) are taken into account.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 571
:
1
The fact that the work on a desk is measured by more than just
| caseload can best be illustrated by citing figures of incoming and outgoing
mail for Special Coordination Unit, Nationalities Intelligence Section, for
which no case load is reported. In that Unit there were 1173 items
consisting of 1777 pages of regular incoming mail; 52 items consisting
of 137 pages of other incoming mail; 117 items consisting of 233 pages of
outgoing dictated mail; and 290 items consisting of 456 pages of outgoing
nondictated mail.
As can be seen from the above, since the time of reorganization
when equity in caseloads was established and manpower assignments made,
there has been no decrease in the amount of work responsibilities in the
Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections. The December, 1970,
reorganization resulted in the assignment of significant extra work to those
two Sections. The substantial increases in caseloads in Racial Intelligence,
Internal Security and New Left Sections have resulted from the opening of
new investigations on members of basic revolutionary groups and the
removal of the moratorium on Security Index reporting, approved by the
Director, plus increased efforts in these areas by the field.
I feel a strong responsibility in our work in the Domestic
Intelligence Division in connection with the national security of our country
and am concerned with the ever increasing number of officials from
communist countries assigned to the U. S. In addition, the President
has recently expressed his urgent need for better high-level coverage
which has resulted in expansion of our operations abroad and where possible
in the U. S.
Foregoing was taken into consideration in connection with my
request for additional personnel and you may be assured that whatever decision
is reached I and the men in my Division will do our utmost to fulfill our
responsibilities in all areas.
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:djr 1/25/71)
г
The information furnished
by you will be taken into
consideration in further
evaluating your request for
additional men and you will be advised of the Bureau's decision
in this matter.
Assistant Director note.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
1/25/71
Noted.
DEM:mjt
204
NW88608 Docld:32989638 Page 572
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 573
SUGGESTION MEMORANDA
}
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
ADDITION OF SUITABLE DESIGNATION
TO CAPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS PER-
TAINING TO CERTAIN RACIAL INFORM-
ANTS TO INSURE PROPER ROUTING OF
SUCH CORRESPONDENCE AT SOG.
INSPECTOR E. MILLER:
Prior to the reorganization of the
Domestic Intelligence Division on
12-16-70, all informants reporting
on racial matters and white hate groups (including Ku Klux
Klan) were supervised by the Racial Informant and White
Hate Unit of the Racial Intelligence Section. All such
informants are designated as Racial Informants. Subsequent
to the reorganization of this Division, supervision of
substantive matters pertaining to white hate groups and
corresponding informants (596) is handled by the Klan and
White Hate Groups Unit of the Internal Security Section.
Supervision of black nationalist organizations and related
informant cases (564) continues to be handled in the Racial
Intelligence Section.
As a result of the above, the Racial Intelligence
Section is receiving mail concerning racial informants who
are reporting on white hate group activity. This mail
should be reviewed and handled by the Internal Security
Section. At the present time, it is not possible to
determine to which section such mail should be routed without
reviewing the content of the incoming correspondence since
the caption of communications pertaining to all racial
informants indicate only that a racial source is involved.
The type of activity on which the informant reports
nationalist as opposed to white hate groups is not set
forth in the caption.
--
black
In view of the fact that over 40% of the cases
pertaining to racial sources involve white hate groups, it
would appear desirable to identify such matters clearly in
the caption of communications submitted to the Bureau by the
field. This will permit such mail to be routed directly to
the Internal Security Section and will save an appreciable
amount of time in getting the mail to the section where it
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-22-71
HRH: 1jw
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 574
205
will be handled. Such an addition to the caption will
also preclude the necessity for the content of communica-
tions of this nature to be reviewed in the Racial
Intelligence Section.
It is believed the desired routing could be
effected by adding a characterization, such as White Hate
Group (abbreviated WHG), to the caption of correspondence
concerning informants who are reporting on the activities
of such groups. Under existing procedure communications
concerning racial informants reporting on white hate groups
are submitted under a caption such as: CO 1234-R. Under
the suggested procedure the communication would be captioned:
CO 1234-R
(WHG).
Comments of Section Chiefs Gray and Moore and
Assistant Director Brennan are requested.
2
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 575
206
g
SECTION CHIEF A.W. GRAY: Inspector's suggestion is a good
one and should be adopted. However, in conformance with
both existing "character" structure of Bureau case titles
and a recommended change regarding security informant titles
(memorandum A.W. Gray to C.D. Brennan, captioned "Security
Informants; IS Communist; New Left, " dated 1/21/71), it
is proposed that the character designation Racial Matters
be included. Incoming communications concerning white hate
group informants only would thus bear the title: CO 1234-R
RM WHG
The Internal Security Section, if the Inspector
concurs, will implement this change with appropriate
instructions to the field.
}
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
AWG:bcw
ORE SCHOR
SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE With respect to the Klan and
white hate informants I concur with the above.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
AWG:dlb·
3
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 576
207
INSPECTOR ED
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
ARTICLES CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF
OR EDWARD
RACIAL EXTREMISTS
RESEARCH SECTION
MILLER: The Research Section prepares a
number of timely monographs and
other studies dealing with the
activities of racial extremists. These papers, as well as
the daily teletype summary and the weekly "Summary of Extremist
Activities,'
"
serve to keep Bureau personnel, appropriate
government officials, and the intelligence community advised on
the up-to-date situation involving these matters.
Much information received is from public sources or
'otherwise of a non-confidential nature. The, Bureau is in a
unique position to collate and place in perspective the in-
formation concerning activities of these violence-prone ex-
tremists. This data could be used for preparation of articles
for publication in magazines, journals, and newspapers which
would serve to expose these individuals and organizations for .
what they are. Such articles would give the public an insight'
into the true nature of these extremists who would destroy our
system of government and our society. This would serve to
diminish public sympathy and support for their activities and
would strengthen public support of law enforcement in general.
Although the Bureau has prepared and/or been in-
strumental in the publication of a number of articles concerning
the campus revolutionaries of the New Left and of white hate
groups, the only recent material we have made available to the
public concerning racial extremist activities is that set forth
in the Appropriations testimony. There is a definite need for
good, timely articles for public consumption placing in per-
spective and showing the true nature of the activities of racial
extremists. The Crime Records Division has sources available
to facilitate publication of such material.
SUGGESTION
It is suggested that Research Section, with the
assistance of and in coordination with the Crime Records Division,
correlate the preparation and publication of articles dealing
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
MSR: mcm/mkz
Misk
NW 88308 Docld:32989638 Page 577
208
Suggestion Memorandum
Articles Concerning Activities of
Racial Extremists
Research Section
with the activities of racial extremists. Care should be
taken to use only material of a non-confidential nature which
would not be detrimental to Bureau operations. Consideration
should be given to a study of the Black Panther Party along
the lines of the article entitled "A Study of Marxist Revolutionary
Violence; SDS, 1962-1969" which effectively exposed the SDS.
Other articles, perhaps shorter and more limited in scope, on
specific activities and groups also should be considered at an
early date.
Comments of Section Chief R. D. Cotter and
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested.
едст
SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:
_ (TJS/mea 1/21/71)
The Inspector's suggestion
has merit. It is believed that
Research Section would be able
to gather together material which would be of value in educating the public
to the real nature of extremists such as the Black Panther Party. Research
Section will, consistent with current work assignments, begin preparation
of material which, in coordination with Crime Records Division, can be
made public.
T
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
MSR: mcm/mkz
ARTENENDRACTICES FRECHSTONES
. 2
-
209
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 578
gar
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I think the Inspector's
(TJS/mea 1/21/71)
suggestion is very worthwhile.
We believe that wherever
possible the truenature of extremists should be publicized. Within the
limits of available manpower, we will furnish Crime Records Division
with as much unclassified material as possible for public consumption,
T
- 3 -
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 579
210
CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP
EQBAL AHMAD
SECURITY MATTER MISCELLANEOUS
BUREAU FILE: 100-448675
SPECTO
ICTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: This case was originally
opened on 1/25/68 based
upon Albany letter to the Director dated 1/19/68,
requesting Bureau authority to institute an investigation
of the subject based upon his antidraft and anti-Vietnam
protest activities. At the time, subject was also
considered to be a campus leader and agitator at Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York, where he was employed as
an assistant professor in the school of Industrial and
Labor Relations.
Ahmad has subsequently become involved in the
East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL) and is
presently under indictment as one of the coconspirators
in this matter. (The ECCSL involves a conspiracy by a
dissident group of priests, nuns, teachers, students and
former students who have displayed opposition to the
.Vietnam War by committing acts of violence against
Government agencies, including selective service boards
and private corporations.) The leaders of the ECCSL,
one of whom is Ahmad, planned to destroy underground
electric and heating systems serving Government buildings
in Washington, D. C. The group also has reportedly
planned to kidnap a high Government official and Ahmad
was a key figure in this phase.
Set forth below is a brief summary of background
information taken from the subject's file:
Personal History
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
indicate that Eqbal Ahmad
records at Buffalo, New York, in
was born December 30 1930 at Irki, Bhiar, India, and is
a citizen of Pakistan. His parents are listed as
Ataur Rahman father and Khatooh Rahman, mother.
is described as male 5'7" 135 pounds, brown eyes,
པར་
Subject
black
hair, brown complexion, scar on left hand. In 1969 he was
single and was assigned Alien Registration Number
(ARN) A13183502.. INS records disclose that on February 3, 1967,
Ahmad's status was adjusted to that of a permanent resident
alien.
NW 88608 Doc:32989638 Pagligence Division Inspection

Eqbal Ahmad
INS
INS records further indicate that Ahmad first came
to the United States in September, 1957, on a trip
financed by a Fulbright Travel Grant and that Occidental
College at Los Angeles, California, provided this
fellowship. His sponsor was the Institute of International
Education. In September, 1958, Ahmad transferred to
Princeton University on a university fellowship and
remained there until September, 1961, when he left the
United States to take up residence in North Africa.
records indicate that Ahmad last arrived in the United States
at New York City on September 21, 1963, destined for
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, on a teaching
fellowship. INS files also set forth prior residences at
Lahore, Pakistan; Los Angeles, California; Tunis, Tunisia;
Urbana, Illinois, and Ithaca, New York. Former employments
include "lecturer in Modern History" at Forman Christian
College and the Pakistan Military Academy in Pakistan as
well as teaching assignments at Princeton University,
University of Illinois and Cornell University.
He was registered in absentia during 1961 and 1962
and during this time was in Morocco and Tunisia.
He was
awarded a Ph.D. degree on June 13, 1967, by Princeton
University.
On January 14, 1969, the Chicago Office determined
that Ahmad was employed at the time by the Adlai E. Stevenson
Institute of International Affairs (ASIIA), 5757 South
Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Ahmad was listed as a
recipient of funds for study in Vietnam for the period
1968-69.
In July, 1968, the Albany Division reported that
information was developed indicating that the subject proposed
to travel to North and South Vietnam. It is further noted
that Ahmad was leaving Cornell University because of failure
to have his contract renewed. He indicated in a published
article of the "Cornell Daily Sun" that he would travel to
North and South Vietnam during the 1968-69 academic year
as a fellow of the Center for International Studies of the
University of Chicago. The article further reported that
Ahmad would carry press cards from a Pakistani newspaper and
two Algerian newspapers. He was identified as a person active
in the antiwar movement at Cornell University.
NW-88608-Docld:32989638-Page 581-
212
Eqbal Ahmad
On July 12, 1968, Ahmad's former landlord at
Ithaca, New York, advised that the subject told him that
he would travel to Vietnam in September, 1968, in order
to study and report upon the war. Ahmad reportedly said
that this study would be within his field of interest
since he has been conducting research on guerrilla warfare
and revolutions.
Language Ability
Subject reportedly speaks fluent English, Urdu,
French, Arabic, Persian and Hindustani.
Revolutionary Background
"
On May 8, 1965, an issue of the "Daily Illini,
a daily student newspaper published at the University of
Illinois, Champaign-Urbana campus, Illinois, listed the
participants in a local "teach-in" on the war in Vietnam
to be held on Mary 15, 1965. One of the speakers was
identified as Eqbal Ahmad, assistant professor of political
science who was described as an expert on guerrilla and
internal warfare who had worked with the anti-French FLN
guerrillas during the Algerian independence struggle and
who reportedly had studied guerrilla movements all over
the world.
Ahmad's file cites numerous instances of Ahmad's
involvement in antidraft and anti-Vietnam demonstrations
and activities as well as numerous anti-American statements
made by him. During his subsequent association with the
ECCSL, Ahmad has been one of the prime movers in the plot
to kidnap a high Government official and appears to have
played an increasingly important role as a leader and
advisor of the ECCSL.
In view of the foregoing information, the following
suggestions are set forth for your consideration and
appropriate action:
1. Eqbal Ahmad appears to have the potential
qualities (background, intelligence, education, experience
and linguistic ability) of a foreign intelligence agent.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 582
- 213
Eqbal Ahmad
It is suggested that consideration be given to issuing
instructions to the field to institute an intensive
full field investigation of this subject particularly
with respect to his national origin, travel and residences
in foreign countries and involvement in foreign political
activities.
If investigation abroad so justifies, it is
suggested that consideration be given to intensifying
our investigation of the subject to include the establishment
of sources or informants close to him. Physical
surveillance and the development of highly confidential
sources should not be overlooked in effecting full
coverage of Ahmad's current activities.
This background investigation should insure that
emphasis is placed on developing information concerning
Ahmad's income and financial affairs, verification of
subject's travel to South and/or North Vietnam in
1968-69 and subject's activities in the Los Angeles,
California, area during the period of his attendance at
Occidental College at Los Angeles.
You should insure the field aggressively intensifies
this background investigation, yet it should be emphasized
that utmost discretion and good judgment should be
exercised to avoid unfounded charges of "harassment" being
directed against the Bureau.
The above suggestions are not to be considered as
all-inclusive%; however, you should insure that this matter
receives close personal supervision.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 583
214
lipper
SUPERVISOR WILLIAM J. MC DONNELL:
Suggestions of the
Inspector have been
noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be
pursued and the field will be instructed to intensify its investigation
in this matter, utilizing the utmost discretion in view of pending
prosecution against the subject. For this reason, no effort will be
made, pending prosecution, to institute sensitive coverage or other
overt activity which might prejudice the prosecution, result in a
charge of harassment or otherwise be a source of embarrassment to
the Bureau. Following final prosecutive action of subject, all investiga-
tive measures and techniques will be considered in line with the
Inspector's suggestions to determine the nationalistic orientation and
activities of the subject.
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL:
Suggestions of the
Inspector have been
noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be
pursued and the field instructed to intensify its investigation of subject,
consistent with the fact that at this time prosecution is pending and
therefore discretion must be exercised. This matter will be closely
followed.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
Inspector's comments.
are noted and appreciated
and prompt action will be taken to implement his suggestions along the
lines set forth above by the Supervisor and Section Chief.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 584
215
!
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
CHINESE MATTERS
INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER; The DESECO Program (development
of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc
officials) has been operated with considerable success
since it was implemented as a result of an espionage conference
in 1957. As a result of this program, a substantial number
of security informants and double agents have been developed.
Simultaneous with the imminent opening of the Chinese
Communist (Chicom) Embassy in Canada in early February, 1971,
we can expect more intelligence operations by the Chicoms
in the U.S. Information already furnished by the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police indicates that possibly fifty per cent
of the intelligence activity generated by the Chicoms in
Canada will be directed at the U.S
It
It is recognized that certain steps have previously
been taken with a view toward developing double agents and
informants among the Chicoms. These include contacts with
certain Chinese scientists working in strategic technical
fields in the U.S., as well as efforts to develop some ethnic
Chinese sources who might be targeted against the Chicoms.
would appear that these programs should be expanded and
intensified with a view toward developing an aggressive effort
directed at the Chicoms and patterned after the DESECO program.
This program should include persons who by the nature of their
occupation, national origin, or otherwise might be logical
targets of the Chicoms or would have occasion or opportunity
to be in touch with the Chicoms. This program would include
journalists, students, educators, politicians, librarians,
travel agents and the like.
Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant
Director C. D. Brennan requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1419-71
FDT:1rs
الله
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 585
214
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
1/20/71
FXO:dgo
The intelligence/espionage threat posed by the
Chicoms, particularly in view of the opening of the Chicom
Embassy in Canada during 2/71, is recognized.
In line with the Inspector's suggestion, we will
intensify our current efforts aimed at penetration of Chicom
intelligence through development of methods and techniques
similar to those utilized in the DESECO Program, We will
extend this operation on a highly selective basis and will
strive to come up with sources who will be in a position
to disrupt or neutralize Chicom intelligence efforts directed
against the U. S.
In connection with possible operations in Canada,
we will, of course, work closely with RCMP which has been
most cooperative with us in the past.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
1/20/71
DEM:mit
The Inspector's suggestion will certainly be followed.
In addition, with the strong probability the Chicoms will be
admitted to the United Nations in the near future, DESECO's
in the Chinese field will be most useful to target against
Chicom officials who will be assigned to the Chicom United
Nations Mission and who will be employed in the Secretariat.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 586
217
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
DEFECTOR PROGRAM
}
INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER:
The development of a Soviet
intelligence officer as a defector-in-place who wilI
advise us of hostile intelligence activities and plans
is an urgent and paramount requirement of the Bureau.
We have failed to achieve this objective in
almost ten years despite our pro
programs and investigative
activities. This suggests we take a fresh approach to the
problem.
The present "Defector Program" operates as follows:
"Defector committees" consisting of Espionage desk Supervisors
in both the New York and Washington Field Offices select
five Soviet intelligence officers (with Bureau approval) as
defection targets. This selection is based on a variety of
reasons which indicate the Soviets have defection potential.
These Soviets are then marked for priority attention and
"defection teams" consisting of four men in each office are
cxclusively assigned to assist the five case Agents in con-..
ducting physical surveillances and to apply increased
investigative attention to these Soviet targets which will
hopefully lead towards a successful defection approach.
It is unlikely that only four men and five case
Agents would be able to obtain complete information relating
to the daylight, evening and weekend activities, contacts
and behavior of the five Soviet targets to present a true
picture of their character and psychological makeup essential
(to a successful defection approach.
"
It is suggested that serious consideration be
afforded to decreasing the number of selected Soviet targets
to two or three and to increase the number of Special Agents
It is more likely that ten to
on each defection team.
fifteen highly motivated Agents can be successful in a total
all-out team effort to bring about the defection of the
targeted Soviet. This effort would include physical sur-
veillances; the placing of Deseco, social, and double agent
informants close to the target, the development of a close
friendship with the target by an Agent under appropriate
cover; thorough psychological study; and whatever other
imaginative and unorthodox procedures may be required to
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
HDC mkl
1/20/71
Ell
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 587
218
create the best possible situation to enable the Soviet
target to defect. This all-out effort on the part of each
team should be highly professional and treated as a Bureau
"special" with resolve and overriding determination to
succeed.
It is fully realized that your manpower directed
against Soviet intelligence has been decreased. It is also
realized that it is an extremely difficult job to defect a
trained Soviet intelligence officer. Extremely difficult
jobs require extraordinary and sometimes unorthodox methods.
You should afford this proposal serious consideration and
survey the New York and Washington Field Offices for their
ideas regarding this proposal.
Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan and
Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.
&
OR
SECTION CHIEF WILLIAM A. BRANIĠAN
1/21/71
(WAB:hke)
The suggestion of the Inspector is appreciated,
and it is our feeling that it has merit. Steps will be taken
to promptly initiate the survey of the New York and Washington
Field Offices.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
1/21/71
DEM:mjt
We are certainly cognizant of the importance of
developing a defector-in-place in the Soviet field and will
immediately initiate the survey suggested by the Inspector.
T
- 2 -
219
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 588
.
Fin
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF GHETTO INFORMANTS
INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER:
Since the implementation
of the Ghetto Informant
Program in 1967, it has developed into a productive source of
accomplishments for the Bureau. Experience has shown that in
addition to being mere listening posts for black extremist
action, these informants, when motivated by specific assign-
ments, also furnish valuable criminal information.
As a
result of conferences held at the Seat of Government, the
field was instructed in March, 1970, to give more positive
assignments to ghetto informants. The Director noted, "This
is most important."
The number of ghetto informants now stands at more
than 6,200 and it is essential that we continually make certain
we are achieving maximum results from this vast reservoir of
information. It is believed one additional step toward this
goal would be the giving of more specific assignments to these
ghetto informants, especially concerning black extremists
living in their locality, such as subjects on the Security
Index and selected Agitator Index subjects with extremist
tendencies. Such assignments would include the development
of detailed information concerning black extremist targets
such as data relating to their daily activities, sources of income,
and information as to whether the black extremists are operating
in violation of Federal or local statutes. Ghetto informants
would be assigned to black extremist targets with whom they are
acquainted or who reside or work in the same area. It is also
probable that in many instances ghetto informants could also
be targeted against similar subjects of interest to the New
Left Program.
Based on our experience to date, there appears to
be little doubt but what these additional specific assignments,
if fully implemented throughout the field, would not only
increase our intelligence coverage of black extremists, but
could also be the vehicle for putting more of these militants
in jail on criminal charges. The success of this approach
would, of course, be commensurate with the enthusiasm of the
individual Agents in the field and it is necessary that pressure
be kept on it. A suggested means for checking on the Program's
progress at the Seat of Government would be to amend Form
FD-405 under the heading "Racial Informant Accomplishments"
to require the field to specifically list major accomplishments
attributable to ghetto informants during the previous month.
Comments of Section Chief G.C. Moore, Section Chief
R.L. Shackelford, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennen requested.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
NW-88608 Docd32989638 Page 589
ADDENDUM
MOORE FOR
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MO
1/21/71
I agree that the suggestion made by the Inspector
has merit and should further strengthen the productivity
of our Ghetto Informant Program and increase our concrete
accomplishments. Necessary instructions will be issued
to the field to implement the suggestion as set forth by
the Inspector.
ur
I concur with the above
SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD:
suggestion.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D. BRENIA concur with the
I concur with
above suggestion and as stated above the appropriate
suggestion will be issued to comply with the Inspector's
suggestion.
T
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
JGD: dlb
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 590
221

سین کا
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
REVISION OF RACIAL INFORMANT
STATUS REPORT FORM FD-405
INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Racial Intelligence Section
currently utilizes Form FD-405 (copy attached), captioned
"Status Report, Racial Informants, Extremist Groups
(White-Black); Racial Matters." The form is submitted by
the field quarterly, and it requires a detailed breakdown of
militant black extremist groups, ghetto area, and indicates
the specific informant coverage, including member informants,
for each group and area, in addition to information required
for white extremist groups. A complete listing is furnished
quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the
field as they occur during interim months.
-
The FD-405s are handled centrally by the Black
Nationalist South and Racial Informant Unit and are
furnished to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive
case on each organization listed for timely evaluation of
informant development and coverage in each field office.
This enables the Bureau Supervisor to detect weaknesses quickly
and take appropriate corrective measures.
It is suggested that in order to provide tighter
accountability for member informant development and coverage,
FD-405 be revised to include an additional section to state
as follows:
"Explain why you do not have member informants in
those groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a.
"Indicate what specific action is being taken to
develop member informants in those groups and advise when
member informant coverage is anticipated for each group.
Comments of Section Chief George C. Moore and
Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are requested.
"
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
HDC: mkl
해
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 591
2
:
FD-405 (Rev. 4-23-70)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. *.
MAY 19TION
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
3010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Director, FBI
ΤΟ
FROM
SAC,
:
SUBJECT:
STATUS REPORT
DATE:
NOTE: Items 1 through 9 list
total numbers; items 10 through
12 list dollar value; fumish
details FD-405b
RACIAL INFORMANTS
EXTREMIST GROUPS (WHITE-BLACK)
RACIAL MATTERS
Re:
1. Informants
a. Listed at beginning of month
b. Added
c. Deleted
d. Listed at end of month
2. Informants (Probationary)
a. Listed at beginning of month
b. Added
c. Deleted
d. Listed at end of.month
3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively
to the development of racial informants
All racial informants
other than ghetto
Ghetto Informants
White Extremist
Black Extremist
4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and
individuals under SAC authority.
Services
Expenses
Total
STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases
6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 5)
7. Subjects. Located, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6)
8. Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies
9. Subjects Arrested, State and Local
10. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases
11. Merchandise Recovered. State and Local
12. Merchandise Recovered, other Federal Agencies
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 592
223
Furnish completo listing quartorly - by the 10th of January, April, July, October; romaining months fumish only portinont changes.
Name, location and number
members of black extremist
& white hate groups includ-
ing identities of local
chapters & groups on col-
lege campuses.
Identities of informants
& sources providing
coverage. Underline
member informant.
Identities of individuals
or groups who have parti-
cipated in or are active
in planning acts of racial
violence.
Identities of informants and
sources providing coverage
of the individual or groups
in preceding column.
Identify ghetto areas & esti-
mate the population in each
area.
Fumish the number of
ghetto informants fumishing
coverage of each area.
FD-405 (Ruv. 4-28-69)
#Pic#ray*TM་་་་་་་་*ན *ORWAY, ག༢༠༠༥༠༧:ས་༧དན་གཡདཔ༥༥་པན ད — ཐཱཅ5 ག*#ས ༧ 2
p
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 593
FD-4056 (Rev. +-23-70)
the way T
RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
(Summarize Informant Accomplishments for Previous Month re Racial Intelligence Information.)
DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED ON FD-405
(Include (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or Bufile #; (4) Type of Accomplishment.)
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 594
13+
ADDENDUM
ви
DORE
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
1/20/71
The suggestion made by the Inspector will definitely
enable the Racial Intelligence Section to afford closer
supervision to the important task of developing quality
racial informants especially member informants in extremist
organizations.
Our present practice of reviewing the FD-405 and
then communicating to the field when it is noted there is
no member informant in extremist organizations will be
streamlined by the suggestion made by the Inspector.
In
view of the above, appropriate instructions will be issued
to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D BRENNAN. I concur with the
above views and as stated above the appropriate instructions
will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.
T
}
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/19/71
JGD:pdr
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 595
f
226
SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY
INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY
INTERNAL SECURITY AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS
☐ INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER:
Each field office currently
submits an annual report on all security informants and
confidential sources, advising which informants are paid
regularly. The report lists the subversive organizations
currently under investigation by that office and includes
the following basic information: address of organization,
character of case, field file number, Bureau file number,
approximate membership. The report also lists informant
coverage of each organization as follows: officers
Rank and File other.
-
DED
In addition, quarterly reports on the "New Left
Movement" are submitted by the field. These reports list
informant coverage of New Left groups but do not specify
which are member informants.
Additionally, Bureau airtel to all offices dated
11/5/70, captioned "Informant Development, Black Panther
Party, New Left Groups, " ordered a complete analysis of
informant coverage in the Black Panther Party and New Left
groups by each office in the field. This is not a regularly
scheduled analysis.
It is noted that the Racial Intelligence Section
currently utilizes FD-405, (copy attached), captioned
"Status Report, Racial Informants, Extremist Groups (White-
Black); Racial Matters." It is submitted by the field
quarterly and requires a detailed breakdown of militant
black extremist groups, ghetto area, and indicates the
specific informant coverage, including member informants,
for each group and area, in addition to information required
for white extremist groups. A complete listing is furnished
quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the field
as they occur during the interim months.
-
The FD-405s are handled centrally in the Black
Nationalist South and Racial Informant Unit and are routed
to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive case on each
organization listed for timely evaluation of informant development
and coverage in each field office. This enables the Bureau
Supervisor to detect weaknesses and take timely corrective measures.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
HDC :mkl
88608 Docid:32989638 Page 596
227
The immediacy of the need for member informant
coverage in all extremist organizations is obvious if the
Bureau is to be forewarned of plans for bombings, kidnappings,
demonstrations, and other acts of violence in this country.
\
It is suggested that the New Left and Internal
Security Sections devise a form similar to the FD-405,designed
to fit the unique requirements of those Sections, which will
assist Supervisors to more accurately evaluate and control
informant development and coverage in the field. The form
should require specific information on member informant develop-
ment and coverage in each revolutionary, New Left, extremist,
and protest group under investigation in each field office.
In devising the new form, the New Left and Internal Security
Sections should bear in mind the suggestion which has been
proposed separately for the Racial Intelligence Section
to revise FD-405 by adding a section to read as follows:
"Explain why you do not have member informants in
these groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a.
"Indicate what specific action is being taken to
develop member informants in those groups and advise when
member informant coverage is anticipated for each group."
FD-405 also lists statistical accomplishments
attributable to racial and ghetto informants. FD-374 is
used for criminal informants. This information is tabulated
by computer in the Voucher-Statistical Section and is
available for immediate reference, including use by the
Director in his Budget Testimony.
While not ordinarily engaged in criminal activity
to the same extent as criminal, racial, or ghetto informants,
it is nevertheless true that security informants, especially
in the New Left field, are increasingly responsible for
statistical accomplishments each year. These include
location of Bureau fuģitives, recovery of stolen merchandise,
and other similar data. It can be reasonably anticipated
that they will be responsible for additional statistical
accomplishments in the future. There is no current procedure
for compiling and recording this type of statistical data
by the New Left or Internal Security Sections.
2
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 597
228
де
It is suggested that in order for the Bureau to
receive full credit for statistical accomplishments attributable
to all FBI informants, the new form devised by the New Left
and Internal Security Sections should include statistical
accomplishment data as currently required on FD-405.
Comments of Section Chiefs Arbor W. Gray, Robert
J. Shackelford and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are
requested.
पादित
My
SECTION CHIEFS SHACKELFORD, WANNALL AND GRAY: The Inspector's
suggestion appears to have merit. The New Left, Nationalities
Intelligence and Internal Security Sections agree that FD-405
could be adapted to fit security informant evaluation in the
New Left movement and in basic revolutionary organizations and
related groups. It is proposed that representatives of each
of these three sections implement the Inspector's suggestion
by revising the form for security use and preparing the
necessary instructions to the field requiring quarterly sub-
mission of this informant status report concerning organizations
under investigation. Coordination, routing and statistical
compilation of the incoming forms would be the responsibility
of the Special Records Unit of the Research Section which
maintains security informant records but the substantive
sections involved would be responsible for evaluation and any
necessary action on the basis of their content. It is believed
further that should this procedure meet our needs for evaluation
of member security informants, we should consider the elimination
of the annual security informant report now submitted by each
field office. It is proposed, therefore, that this suggestion
be implemented for a six-month trial period (two submissions)
to determine its feasibility and whether it does meet our needs
for member informant evaluation. At the end of that trial
period, the results will be analyzed and a commensurate
recommendation submitted.
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(JAS: sjr - 1/21/71). .
I agree that it would be
desirable to carry out this
suggestion at least on a
trial basis to determine its feasibility. I will follow this
.matter and at the end of the trial period the procedure will be
carefully analyzed to determine whether or not it should be
continued.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 598
-
3
-
229
FD-405 (Rev. 4-23-70)
OPTIONAL FORM N.. 10
MAY 62 EDITION:
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
Director, FBI
ΤΟ
:
FROM
SAC,
:
SUBJECT:
STATUS REPORT
RACIAL INFORMANTS
EXTREMIST GROUPS (WHITE-BLACK)
RACIAL MATTERS
Re:
DATE:
NOTE: Items 1 through 9 list
total numbers; items 10 through
12 list dollar value; fumish
details FD-405b
1. Informants
a. Listed at beginning of month
b. Added
c. Deleted
d. Listed at end of month
2. Informants (Probationary)
a. Listed at beginning of month
b. Added
c. Deleted
d. Listed at end of month
3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively
to the development of racial informants
All racial informants
other than ghetto
Ghetto Informants
White Extremist
Black Extremist
4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and
individuals under SAC authority.
Services
Expenses
Total
STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases
6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 5)
'
7. Subjects Located, FBI Cases (not included in items 5 or 6)
8. Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies
9. Subjects Arrested, State and Local
10. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases
11. Merchandise Recovered, State and Local
12. Merchandise Recovered, other Federal Agencies
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 599
મ
th
230
* 42% (44)
L'urme've splete listing quarterly - by the 10th of Janunry, April, July, Octobor; r maining months furnish only pertinent chungos,
Name, location and number
members of black extremist
& white hate groups includ-
ing identities of local
-chapters & groups on col-
lege campuses.
Identities of informants
& sources providing
coverage. Underline
member informant.
Identities of individuals
or groups who have parti-
cipated in or are active
in planning acts of racial
violence.
Identities of informants and
sources providing coverage
of the individual or groups
in preceding column.
Identify ghetto areas & esti-
mate the population in each
area.
Fumish the number of
ghetto informants furnishing
coverage of each area.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 600
231

FD-403b (Rev. 4-23-70)
RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
(Summarize Informant Accomplishments for Previous Month re Racial Intelligence Information.)
DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED ON FD-405
(include (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or Bufile #; (4) Type of Accomplishment.)
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 601
282
ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: Your concurrence with this
suggestion on a trial basis is considered forward-looking,
particularly since you have used this type of handling with
marked success in your Racial Intelligence Program.
It is felt, however, that a six months' period is
not an adequate period to measure the effectiveness, considering
the time required to reach full implementation of the program
in the field. For this reason, it is strongly suggested
you make your trial period at least one year.
requested.
Comments of Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan
kyk
ADDENDUM
NAY
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNANÁ
(JAS: sjr
-
1/22/71)
evaluate it at the end of one year.
In line with the Inspector's
suggestion, we will implement
the program involved and
T
He
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
HDC: mkl
1/22/71
NW 88608 Dòcld:32989638 Page 602
1
4
233
VENCEREMOS BRIGADE
INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Venceremos Brigade (VB)
originated with a group of
Americans who traveled to Cuba in January, 1969, to take
part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the
Cuban revolution. The national organization of the VB
obtained support from a wide spectrum of leftist organizations
including the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, and
the Progressive Labor Party, as well as violent revolutionary
groups such as the Black Panther Party, La Raza (a militant
Mexican-American civil rights group), and the Weatherman
faction of the Students for a Democratic Society.
The idea of aiding Fidel Castro in meeting his
proposed quota of harvesting ten million tons of cane sugar
for 1970 quickly took the fancy of the young revolutionaries.
Two hundred sixteen young Americans went to Cuba in November,
1969, to cut sugar cane and returned on February 11, 1970.
The second contingent of 687 American youths left New Brunswick,
Canada, on February 12, 1970, aboard a converted Cuban cattle
boat and returned on April 28, 1970. The third contingent of
407 individuals sailed for Cuba aboard the Conrado Benitez
on August 25, 1970. They returned to New Brunswick, Canada,
on October 21, 1970. Presently a fourth group is being formed
to leave on or about March 1, 1971, to stay in Cuba until
approximately May 15, 1971.
While no evidence has been received that those persons
who traveled to Cuba received guerrilla warfare training in
Cuba, they were constantly told that they were the vanguard of
the revolution in the United States. They were told the only
way to defeat the imperialistic Government of the United States,
which must be overthrown, is through revolution.
Under the current instructions individual cases are
opened to locate, interview, and recommend placement on the
Security Index on each person who traveled to Cuba. The SAC
may authorize the interview except where the person is under
21 years, is currently a student or professor, has some connection
with an institute of learning, or is a journalist. In these
instances Bureau authority must be obtained for the interview.
Investigation of these persons, under the current instructions,
is that the case remain open for one year with 90-day verifications
of residence and employment after their interview. The purpose
is to determine whether their inclusion on the Security Index
after the interview is warranted.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
PJD:maz
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 603.
234
Venceremos Brigade
To date, less than half of the VB members have been
located and a large portion of those located have been
uncooperative insofar as the interview is concerned. Over
100 of these persons have been placed on the Security Index,
and it is anticipated that numerous others will be listed.
Many have been arrested for engaging in acts of violence since
their return, have participated in anti-Vietnam demonstrations,
or demonstrated at trials involving members of the Black Panther
Party or the persons involved in the October, 1969, "days of
rage" indictments in Chicago, Illinois.
It is proposed that prior to closing any of the VB
cases after the interview and a year of following the
individual's activity on a 90-day reporting basis, he be
interviewed a second time. For those who were initially
cooperative, we should make every effort possible to convert
these persons as informants. Those who were initially
uncooporative should be considered for Priority II handling,
and those who have met the requirements for Security Index
inclusion in the initial stage should be re-evaluated to insure
they still meet those requirements.
Since the members of the VB have made blatantly
false statements in their passport applications by not
disclosing their true destination, a technical violation of
the law exists. In addition, many of the applications
contained either false or out-of-date information including
incorrect or old addresses and places of employment. These
technical violations and items of incorrect information should
be brought to the attention of Assistant Attorney General
Robert C. Mardian who has recently been appointed in charge of
the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice.
He, together with Attorney General John N. Mitchell and
James O. Eastland, United States Senator from Mississippi,
has publicly indicated they were considering some antisubversion
bills making it a crime to give aid and comfort to the enemy,
particularly the North Vietnamese who had representatives in
Cuba to meet the VB, and toughening the law against advocating
the overthrow of the Government. The passport violations could
certainly be reviewed and brought under their consideration for
prosecution under current laws or for new legislative proposals.
Inasmuch as some of the VB members have indicated
they were going underground and the fact that a majority have
.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 604
2
-
235.
1
.
Venceremos Brigade
not been located for interview, you should consider placing
name stops in the Identification División so that if these
persons are arrested or an inquiry is made by local law
enforcement authorities this fact will be immediately brought
to the attention of the Bureau. In addition, a stop file is
now being set up by the NCIC Unit for persons other than
fugitives concerning whom the Bureau has an interest. This
file will require, in addition to the name and birth date of
the individual, as many other items of identification as
possible such as his fingerprint classification, Social
Security number, military service number, Selective Service
number, and the like.
Every effort should be made to utilize stops with
the Identification Division and the NCIC Unit on these persons.
We should continue to impress upon the field the
need for informants among the VB groups and insure that
coverage of the fourth contingent is at least at the level
of the second contingent (five informants) and the third
contingent (four informants). Be sure that all efforts are
made to have informants previously refused for passage with
the prior contingents, as well as those nine informants who
have previously traveled with the second and third contingents,
be considered for the currently proposed trip. Also, sufficient
other new informants should be proposed so that coverage of
this latest contingent will be adequate for the Bureau's
intelligence needs.
Comments of Assistant Director requested.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 605
.3
236
VENCEREMOS BRIGADE
:
ہو
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D. BRENNAN:` The Inspector's keen
analysis and thoughtful
suggestions in regard to the investigation of the
Venceremos Brigade (VB) is sincerely appreciated. In
connection with the above, the following observations by
this Division are set forth:
1.
As the Inspector is aware, security
investigations are being conducted concerning each participant ·
of the VB. These investigations require that background
data including any prior subversive activities be ascertained,
each individual participant be considered for interview, and
that the field make a recommendation as to the inclusion of
each VB subject on the Security Index (SI). Upon conclusion
of the above, the field is to advise the Bureau each 90 days
for a period of one year as to the whereabouts and activities
of Priority II, Priority III, and any non-SI subjects who are
VB returnees. Priority I VB subjects are regarded as
extremists and this Bureau is notified each 45 days of their
activities and whereabouts.
2.
As to the difficulty in locating VB returnees,
it is to be noted that the first and second contingents of
the VB were comprised of approximately 900 individuals made
up of young revolutionaries who were college dropouts leading
nomadic and communal existences. This mode of living inherently
makes the Bureau's job of locating these subjects for purpose of
interview more difficult. In contrast, investigation to date
of the third contingent, which was composed mostly of
established college students; indicates that these individuals
will be more easily located. Since the third contingent
returned to the U.S. approximately 90 days ago, these
investigations as to background data are now being completed
and the initial interviews will be promptly conducted.
3. The suggestion that these subjects be reinterviewed
upon the expiration of above-mentioned one year period, will
be given serious consideration and instructions to this
effect will be issued to the field upon approval of the
Director. Efforts will be made to develop as informants those
VB subjects who are cooperative and the need for further
investigative attention regarding uncooperative individuals
will be evaluated on the merits of each individual case.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
TJM:cae
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 606
Venceremos Brigade
-
4. Regarding foreign travel such as that in which
the VB is engaged, it is recognized that the best interests
of this country would undoubtedly be served by prohibition
of such travel. The Internal Security Act of 1950 contained
sanctions restricting travel on the part of Communist Party
members. After extended litigation, the Supreme Court in
June, 1958, ruled in the Kent and Briehl vs. Dulles passport
case that the State Department could no longer deny passports
to individuals with past history of subversive affiliations.
In June, 1964, the Supreme Court in the Flynn Aptheher
passport case ruled that the right of U.S. citizens to travel
abroad is protected by the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment. In January, 1967, in the Laub decision specifically
dealing with travel to Cuba, the Supreme Court ruled that the
State Department could not confiscate an individuals passport
simply because the individual traveled to Cuba without
State Department sanction. In December, 1967, in the Lynd
decision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, ruled
that anyone can travel to a restricted country if they did not use
their passport to enter that country.
A number of bills have been introduced into Congress
in recent years to remedy the above situation, most of which
have never cleared committee. The Senate currently has a
bill, the Eastland Bill, before the Senate to impose criminal
penalties for violation of travel restrictions. A pending
bill, H.R. 1493, was in December, 1969, introduced to restrict
travel in violation of area restrictions. This bill has been
sponsored by approximately 20 Congressmen. In view of the
above, this Division has not considered it warranted to suggest
additional legislation along these lines.
5. As to technical violations regarding false or
erroneous statements made by members of the VB on passport
applications, all information developed along these lines has
been furnished both to the Department of Justice and the
Department of State for whatever action they deem feasible.
To date neither Department has requested that additional action
be taken in this matter.
6.
The Inspector's suggestion regarding the placing
of name stops with the Identification Division and the NCIC
Unit for information concerning hard-to-locate VB members, is
well taken. This Division will coordinate this matter with
NCIC to determine what information is necessary to place
such stops and the manner in which this can best be effected.
Instructions will be issued to the field regarding
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 607
238
"
Venceremos Brigade
implementation of this suggestion.
7.
The VB is currently formulating plans for a
fourth contingent to travel to Cuba approximately March 1,
1971. By airtel dated January 6, 1971, interested field
divisions were instructed to immediately initiate an
aggressive campaign to obtain informants to travel to Cuba
as part of this contingent. These offices were instructed
to advise the Bureau no later than 1/29/71 and weekly
thereafter as to their progress in this matter. This
Division is acutely aware of the importance of such informant
coverage and will afford this program close attention.
ISPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
WPJD: bah
1/22/71
ADDENDUM
You should bear in mind that the
attitude and instructions expressed
by the President, the Director, and
many of the legislators in Congress
have been to curtail the militant
actions and the violent activities on the part of a significant
group of young people in the United States today. The thinking
of the Supreme Court of the United States with its several
recent changes may be along the lines of suppressing the
activities of those who so openly espouse the overthrow of all
forms of democratic authority in the United States. In
addition, the Internal Security Division of the Department
of Justice has been specifically enlarged and strengthened to
deal with these matters. It is recognized that individual
violations of the passport laws have been brought to the
attention of the Department of Justice in prior times. It
might be well to consider presenting the matter in its entirety
to the Department showing the number and frequency of violations
for their consideration and study.
t
We cannot overlook or minimize the fact that over
1,300 individuals have willingly and freely gone to Cuba,
contrary to the State Department's specific instructions.
These persons left in many instances with the impression that
they would be trained in the use of revolutionary weapons
including explosives and incendiary devices. They were subjected
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 608
239
during their Cuban stay to all manner of propaganda. On
their return to the United States many have gone underground
and disappeared completely; others have become involved in
crime, violence, and general disruptive activities; still
more have refused to cooperate in any manner with the duly
constituted authorities as they were so instructed by the
leadership. We cannot afford to overlook these known 1,300
potential Cuban insurgents.
1
Assistant Director C. D. Brennan please note.
ADDENDUM
The Inspector's observation
with reference to the VB
cases has been noted and
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(JAS:sjr
-
1/22/71)
the Bureau may be assured that these matters are being pressed,
and we will press the field to furnish these cases vigorous
investigative attention.
T
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 609
240
i
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 610
SUBSTANTIVE WRITE-UPS

INSPECTOR E
SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP
ROBERT P. BOKINSKY
PSI - PO
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - WASHINGTON FIELD
WFO FILE 134-9096
BUREAU FILE 134-19651
MILLER:
The Washington Field Office by letter to
the Bureau dated 12/31/69 advised that the
subject, a body shop mechanic employed by Amatucci Chevrolet Company, Wheaton.
Maryland, was interviewed on 12/30/69, concerning his recent contact with Jan
Adam Klasa, Assistant Military, Naval and Air Attache, Polish Embassy,
Washington, D. C., who has been designated a known intelligence agent with
defection potential. The subject appeared to be frank and cooperative during the
interview and indicated his desire to assist the FBI. Accordingly, the
Washington Field Office felt the subject had definite informant potential.
In the same communication the Washington Field Office furnished the
Bureau with sufficient background data relative to subject and his wife and
requested the Bureau to check indices.
The Bureau advised the Washington Field Office on 1/7/70 that Bureau files
contained no record of the subject or his wife.
The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 3/17/70 furnished
results of background investigation concerning the subject and requested authority
to recontact the subject and attempt to develop him as an informant in the Polish
field.
The Bureau by letter to the Washington Field Office dated 4/1/70 granted
authority to recontact the subject in accordance with provisions of Section 107
of the Manual of Instructions. The Bureau further instructed the Washington
Field Office to furnish results of recontact with the subject along with recommenda -
tions concerning future utilization of subject.
The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 6/30/70 advised
the Bureau that the subject had not been recontacted by Klasa of the Polish Embassy.
but due to subject's continued cooperative attitude and willingness to assist the
FBI, again requested the Bureau to grant authority to develop the subject as a
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
ESM:wmj
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 611
241
-2-
PSI in the Polish field.
The Bureau by letter to Washington Field Office dated 7/7/70 designated
the subject as a Bureau-approved PSI and again instructed that he be developed
in accordance with instructions contained in Section 107, Manual of Instructions.
file.
The above comprises a summary of all correspondence to date in 134-19651
JAN ADAM KLASA
IS - PO
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - WASHINGTON FIELD
WFO FILE 105-92157
BUREAU FILE 105-186986
The U. S. Department of State advised the Bureau in October, 1968,
that the subject was scheduled to be assigned to the Embassy of the Polish
People's Republic, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Military, Naval and
Air Attache Subject subsequently arrived in Washington, D. C., on May
19.6.9
By communication to WFO dated 6/20/69 the Bureau instructed that coverage
of subject be intensified to determine the identities of any Agents he may be
operating.
By communication dated 8/4/69 WFO advised Baltimore, Chicago, Los
Angeles and Seattle Field Offices concerning identity and background of subject,
furnished each office with a photograph of subject, and set forth additional
investigative leads. The same WFO communication requested Bureau authority
to conduct active investigation of subject including Fisurs when deemed appropriate,
following clearance with U. S. Department of State.
On 9/2/69 the Bureau, with approval of U. S. Department of State, instructed
WFO to proceed with the investigation.
Subsequent to 9/2/69 WFO and those offices listed above conducted active
investigation of subject and promptly furnished results in a form suitable for
dissemination to the Bureau.
In a progress memorandum to the Bureau dated 6/8/70, WFO advised that "PSI
Bokinsky has agreed to attempt to contact Klasa on a social basis." This
information is not substantiated in the PSI file (134-19651) nor was the proposal
to use the PSI acknowledged in any communication from the Bureau.
NW 88608 Docld 32988638 Page 612
Aucuner press letter from WFD dated 9/8/70 morala that the DOT
-3.
Bokinsky, is now employed by Fenner Pontiac in Rockville, Maryland. It is
noted that this information is not in the PSI file, the Baltimore Division was
not advised, and no action was taken by the Bureau.
It is noted that the last Bureau communication to WFO in this matter is
dated 9/2/69 granting authority to conduct Fisurs as may be necessary to
determine if subject is engaged in intelligence activities.
It would appear that this entire investigation to date has lacked proper
supervision at the Bureau level.
You are requested to advise the following:
1. Explain your overall supervisory policy in directing the development
of Potential Double Agents directed against a known intelligence agent.
2. Why you failed to promptly and aggressively instruct the washingion
Field Office to fully utilize PSI Bokinsky against Klasa, a known intelligence
agent.
TYSTA SA BA
3. Why you failed to properly instruct the office of origin to disseminate
to Baltimore Office and verify a change in employment by PSI Bokinsky.
Explanations Requested:
1. Unit Chief Howard H. Wallace, Jr., is requested to explain
why in his overall supervision of these cases he failed to detect the above
delinquencies.
2. Comments of Section Chief Arbor W. Gray, Inspector
D. E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 613
243
--
UNIT CHIEF HOWARD H. WALLACE, JR.A
HHW:bcw
1/22/71
·
The Inspector's comments
relate to the attempted
development of a security
informant, an automobile mechanic, for the purpose of providing
better coverage of the activities of a Polish intelligence
officer assigned to the Polish Embassy. This development is
proceeding because the mechanic is in contact with the intelli-
gence officer in connection with repair of the officer's
automobile.
It is our policy to develop as many assets of all
types as necessary to provide coverage of the activities of
active Polish intelligence personnel. The Manual of Instructions,
Section 107A, page 3, defines various types of sources (confi-
dential sources, potential security informants, security informants,
and double agents) developed for use in these types of investi-
gations. The term "potential double agent" is not a status
defined in the Manual. It is rather an administrative term
used to distinguish a source being used against an intelligence
officer when the source has not as yet been solicited to handle
assignments for that officer but appears to have the potential
for such functions if requested.
Bokinsky was designated a potential security informant
by the Bureau on 7/7/70. The Manual of Instructions, Section
107K, 7, page 13, provides that correspondence in security
informant and potential security informant cases should be
strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant
and should not contain information more properly furnished under
the substantive case caption. The six-month justification for
the subject's status as a potential security informant (per SAC
Letter 68-47, 8/20/68) is contained in WFO letter 1/19/71.
The relationship of Bokinsky to Klasa is developing
in a normal pattern and at a pace consistent with avoiding
suspicion that he is under our control. Bureau supervision
has determined this through the case on Klasa, the Polish
intelligence officer against whom the potential security informant
is targeted. In that regard, a 90-day evaluation letter in the
Klasa case was submitted by WFO on 9/8/70 which stated that
attempts were continuing to have the potential security informant
placed in contact with Klasa. The potential security informant
was to contact Klasa and advise him of his new employment at
Fenner Pontiac, Rockville, Maryland. Again, by 90-day evaluation
letter dated 12/7/70 WFO advised the potential security informant
had been in contact with Klasa concerning an automobile repair.
As a result, Klasa had requested potential security informant
to handle the repair of Polish Embassy's automobiles whenever
necessary. It was stated that the potential security
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 614
244
5
-
informant would attempt to maintain contact with Klasa through
the entre of automobile service. It is respectfully submitted
that a review of both cases, the potential security informant
and the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted,
shows that these matters were afforded proper supervision at
the Seat of Government.
2. The field has and must have the primary responsi-
bility for development and direction of potential security
informants against communist intelligence officers. The nature
and intensity of the direction of such potential security
informants must be commensurate with the apparent authenticity
of the informant's relationship to and course of conduct with
the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted. Over the.
years it has been firmly established from both investigative
experience and information obtained from defectors that anyone
who is aggressively cultivating an intelligence officer is
automatically suspected as being under the control of opposition
intelligence and, therefore, a provocateur. In instant case
Bokinsky's logical entre to Klasa is Klasa's need for mechanical
work on his and the Embassy's automobiles. "Given time and
cultivation as is being done according to 90-day letters being
received in the Klasa case he may develop a rapport or relation-
ship with Klasa that could result in his being upgraded to a
security informant. Reviews of the Bokinsky file and the 90-day
letters in the Klasa file show this matter is progressing
normally and at a tempo in line with the facts of the relation-
ship existing as well as normal experience in these matters.
Therefore, it is believed there is no lack of proper supervision
at the Seat of Gevernment.
༣.
It is respectfully submitted that there was no
necessity for the Seat of Government to instruct the office of
origin to disseminate to Baltimore information concerning
Bokinsky and to obtain verification of his employment change
as these items were covered in investigation. As a matter of
long-standing policy WFO has the responsibility for developing
and handling source coverage against communist intelligence
officers assigned to diplomatic establishments in the Washington,
D.C., area even though the source may live or work in suburban
Maryland or Virginia. Review of the Bokinsky file shows that
WFO by letter dated 3/17/70 to the Bureau stated that there was
no record of information concerning Bokinsky available to the
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 615
245
- 6 -
Baltimore Office. This indicated to the Bureau Supervisor
at the time that an interoffice communication had been sent
to Baltimore by WFO. A check with WFO on 1/22/71 disclosed
that by interoffice letter 11/6/69 it had advised Baltimore
that Bokinsky was being considered for development as a
potential security informant by WFO. His employment,
residence and date of birth were set forth and indices check
was requested. By interoffice letter 12/12/69 Baltimore
advised WFO that its indices were negative. Subsequent
verification of Bokinsky's change of employment was unnecessary
when same was brought to the attention of the Bureau in 90-day
evaluation letter submitted under the Klasa caption on 9/8/70,
and again in 90-day evaluation letter of 12/7/70. No separate
communication was required for the informant file regarding
the change of employment because that information would be
furnished in the normal six-month justification submitted
by WFO and it does appear in the six-month justification
dated 1/19/71.
SECTION CHIEF A.W. GRAY: WI
AWG: bew
1/22/71
procedures and at a pace
ments and our experience
submit that there was no
Seat of Government.
Inspector D. E. Moore
1/23/71
DEM:1mb
concur with the explanation of
SA Wallace. In accordance with
existing instructions, normal
consistent with security require-
in these matters, I respectfully
lack of proper supervision at the
I concur with the above comments of SA Wallace
and Section Chief Gray. I feel that PSI Bokinsky must
make any cultivation of Klasa appear entirely normal and
WFO, by letter dated 12/7/70 in the Klasa caption, stated
that Bokinsky will continue to contact Klasa concerning
auto repairs and will attempt to establish a social
relationship.
Assistant Director C.D. Brennan
1/23/71
DEM:1mb
گا
I concur with the above comments.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 616
246
SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP
ERIC NELSON, PSI
IS - R
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - NEWARK
NEWARK FILE -134-3757
BUREAU FILE - 134-19669
1
INSPECTOR E
MILLER:
Captioned investigation was instituted
by the Newark Division based upon a
11
communication to the Bureau dated 12/18/69 in the case entitled "Vladimir G.
Azaryan; IS-R (ATC-KGB); Bureau file 105-184321; Newark file 105-25293.
This communication seeks Bureau authority to interview subject to assess
his potential as a security informant or double agent.
The subject, a naturalized American citizen, is employed as the chief chemist
at Kaysam Corporation of America, Paterson, New Jersey, and reported to
have had numerous contacts with Azaryan, who is chief engineer at Amtorg and a
known KGB officer.
· By communication to Newark, the Bureau on 1/6/70 instructed that office
to interview subject "in accordance with existing instructions relating to
interviews of security subjects" to evaluate his potential with regard to furnishing
information regarding Azaryan. The Bureau further instructed Newark in the
same communication to furnish results in a form suitable for dissemination.
Newark by communication to the Bureau dated 2/12/70 set forth background
information relative to subject (in memorandum form, not suitable for dissemination
as instructed by the Bureau) and stating information contained therein would be
furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan caption.
On 3/31/70 the Newark Office advised under the Azaryan caption and not the
case caption, that Nelson had been interviewed.
The above constitutes a summary of all correspondence contained in
captioned file to date.
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
ESM:wmj
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 617
-2-
VLADIMIR G. AZARYAN
ISR (ATC - KGB)
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - NEW YORK
NEW YORK OFFICE FILE - 105-97980
NEWARK OFFICE FILE - 105-25293
BUREAU FILE - 105-184321
The subject of this investigation first came to the attention of the Bureau
in August, 1968, via a U. S. Department of State communication advising that
the subject had been issued a visa to enter the U. S. as an employee of the Amtorg
Trading Corporation, NYC, New York. At that time Bureau communication to NYO
dated 8/14/68 instructed that office to be alert to subject's arrival and handle
in accordance with Section 105 K, Manual of Instructions.
Subsequent to that time the NYO and auxiliary offices conducted extensive
investigation including discreet Fisurs and kept the Bureau advised of their
progress by letter dated 12/9/68. In this same communication, a request was
made of the Bureau to contact U. S. Department of State for authority for
intensified investigation of subject including surveillances when necessary. The
Bureau by communication to U. S. Department of State dated 1/3/69 sought such
authority which was subsequently granted by State 1/22/69. The subject has been
under constant investigation by the NYO since that time with a free exchange of
information between the NYO and the Bureau.
The Newark Office advised the Bureau by communication dated 3/31/70
that Nelson, the PSI, had been interviewed, the results of which were furnished
the Bureau in LHM form dated 4/8/70. The results of the interview were furnished
U. S. Department of State, CIA, Commerce and the U. S. Information Agency.
On 4/17/70 Newark Office again furnished results of contact by PSI Nelson
with the subject in LHM form suitable for dissemination.
On 6/17/70 Newark reported another contact by PSI Nelson with the subject.
The NYO advised the Bureau by LHM dated 6/26/70 that on the evening of
6/14/70 the subject was observed boarding Aeroflot for a flight to Moscow.
Although a concentrated investigative effort was put forth by the New York
and Newark Offices in the investigation, it is noted that no specific directions
were given PSI Nelson by the New York or Newark Offices or the Bureau from
January, 1970, to the time subject left for Moscow in June, 1970, in spite of
the fact that Nelson and the subject had mutual professional backgrounds (chemists)
and from a review of the files appeared to speak the same language.
248
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 618
3
It is noted that this case was originally opened as a PSI and
potential double agent case. It is still in a pending status and
is still being reported by you as a potential double agent case,
when in fact the individual (Azaryan) against whom Nelson was directed
departed the U.S. in June, 1970.
A review of the Nelson file fails to contain any instructions or
directions regarding the development of Nelson as a double agent and
in addition a review of the Azaryan file similarly contains no infor-
mation or instructions from the Bureau in this regard. There appears
to be a definite weakness in the overall administration and supervision
of this "potențial double agent" at the Seat of Government.
You are requested to advise the following:
What is your overall supervisory policy in connection with
developing potential security informants directed against a double
agent?
1.
2. Why you continue to carry this case (Nelson) in a pending
status when the subject whom he was directed against (Azaryan) left
the U.S. for Russia in June, 1970.
3.
Why you failed to instruct and aggressively direct the
office of origin in the Nelson case against the double agent target
Azaryan.
4. Why you have the Nelson case listed as a potential double
agent when in effect he was being developed as a PSI.
Explanations Requested:
1. Case supervisor and Unit Chief Bowen F. Rose for
failure to detect the above delinquencies in your overall supervision
of the Nelson matter.
2. Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan,
Inspector D. E. Moore and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan
requested.
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 619
249
-
SA Bowen Rose
(1-22-71 BFR:as)
The case of Eric Nelson, PSI, IS-R,
was assigned to me on 12/17/70,
therefore, I was not responsible
for instruction or direction of the
office of origin in this matter
prior to that date and it has not come up for review on tickler
as yet. With regard to the case of Vladimir G. Azaryan, IS-R,
this case is closed and has never been assigned to me.
With regard to questions raised by the Inspector,
the following is set out.
It is presumed question one relates to our super-
visory policy with regard to the development of informants
to be targeted against Soviet officials and/or Soviet agents,
not against our double agents. It is our policy to encourage
informant development of as many individuals as possible
against a Soviet target to provide the widest spectrum of
information concerning his social, business and personal life
in order to develop data essential for in depth defection
analysis. In addition, we seek to identify those individuals
whom the Soviets appear to be selecting for recruitment and
to develop them to act in our behalf against the Soviets.
Such highly controlled actions serve either to involve the
Soviets in time consuming and costly operations in which they
can only receive carefully selected and screened information
or disinformation or may provide us the basis for effective
counterintelligence actions against the Soviets, as is so
well illustrated in the Azaryan case. Our supervision in
the development of informants is accomplished through the
close review and analysis of the periodic progress letters
submitted on Soviet officials; the direction which we afford
to contact cases and to the cases resulting from the DESECO
Program.
As the result of an excellent counterintelligence
effort formulated and carried out by the New York Office
with Bureau guidance and direction, a defection approach
was made to Azaryan by NY 5179-S on 6/4/70. This informant
had previously been handled by Yuriy K. Kitaev, another
experienced, aggressive KGB officer. As a result of this
action, both Soviets departed the U. S. almost immediately.
The loss of these two experienced operatives most certainly
caused a serious disruption in the activities of the
New York Residency of the KGB.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 620
250

-
5 -
-
We have learned through defector sources that in
instances such as described above, the entire activity of
the KGB officers involved as well as the Residency as a
whole are subjected to most careful scrutiny to determine
if there has been a penetration; if the operation was
mishandled and what, if anything, can be salvaged from
other operations which were being run by the officers
involved. Such a review may take many months. No doubt
Azaryan's contacts with Nelson have been the subject of
such careful study. Inasmuch as we did not involve Nelson
in our approach to Azaryan, there is no reason to believe
that the KGB does not still consider Nelson as a potential,
agent.
It would be logical for the Soviets to have
Nelson's development continued by Azaryan's replacement,
who would by now have been in the U. S. for a relatively
short period of time. Historically, a newly arrived KGB
operative takes some months to get acclimated to the
environment in which he will work and, therefore, does
not jump right in to take over a net of agents.
Handerpore
The Nelson case has been maintained in a pending
status as it was felt he still possesses potential as a
source against the Soviets. At this point the only ones
who know if this is true are the KGB. If we were to
attempt to initiate contact between Nelson and the Soviets,
they would be convinced he is a plant and lose all interest
in him. The only course of action we can pursue at this
time is to wait for the Soviets to make a move.
Newark's most recent communication in this
matter advised that Nelson is alert to our interests and
they are maintaining contact with him. This is essential
to insure we have full knowledge and control of any future
Soviet initiatives. Experience has shown the Soviets will
allow situations such as this to remain dormant for as
long as eight years. It is not suggested that this matter
will be kept pending for this length of time; however,
for reasons indicated it is incumbent upon us to continue
to follow this matter for a reasonable period of time.
A review of the Azaryan file will show aggressive
supervision by Seat of Government supervisors, including
specific instructions to the field. As a prime defection
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 621
'A
6
target, all facets of the investigation of his activities
were carefully considered. NY 5179-S was selected as the
vehicle to carry out our defection approach.
Nelson, a
contact of Azaryan, was interviewed and was cooperative.
His operation as a source against Azaryan was proceeding
in proper fashion, and having decided on the utilization
of NY 5179-S to make the approach to Azaryan, there was
no need to expedite Nelson's development. By not involving
Nelson in this operation we have not unnecessarily revealed
our interests in him and preserved a potential asset.
With regard to question four, the designations of
an individual as a Potential Security Informant and as a
potential double agent are not mutually exclusive. Potential
Security Informant is the term defined in the Manual of
Instructions for an individual in position to become active
in intelligence activities and administrative supervision is
in accord with provisions of the Manual of Instructions.
On the other hand, potential double agent is merely an
arbitrary designation we apply to an individual who is in
contact with a Soviet-bloc official, but in which the
relationship has not yet developed into one of a coveri
intelligence nature. Such a relationship is well
illustrated in Azaryan's overt business contacts with
Nelson on behalf of Amtorg, the Soviet trading company.
That such a relationship may abruptly change in character
to a covert intelligence operation is well documented in
countless cases which have arisen out of "innocent" business
oriented contacts. For this reason the arbitrary designation
of potential double agent was given to Nelson.
In connection with the observation that the Bureau
instructed the Newark Office to interview Nelson and furnish
results in a form suitable for dissemination the Newark
Office furnished background information and advised
information would be furnished in LHM form under the Azarvan
caption. The only occasion when substantive data received
from a source appears in the informant case file is in the
semiannual justification letter in abbreviated form. See
Section 107K, paragraph 7, page 13, Manual of Instructions,
which states:
"Correspondence in security informant and
potential informant matters should be
strictly limited to administrative handling
of informant and should not contain
information more properly furnished under
substantive case caption."
NW 88608 Docld:32989638 Page 622
252
7
I have noted the Inspector's comments and I will
continue to provide the type of direction and supervision
to which those comments are directed.
Section Chief W. A. Branigan
(1/22/71
WAB:hke)
}
I have noted the explanation of Unit Chief
Bowen F. Rose together with his comments, and these
comments are in keeping with long-established policies
for following field investigations in individual
counterintelligence investigations.
Inspector D. E. Moore
1/23/71
DEM:1mb
I have carefully noted Mr. Rose's comments
and agree with them. Eric Nelson is 2 chemist who has
been in contact with the Soviets and I feel he will be
of continuing interest to them and that he presents
potential for use against Soviet intelligence.
Assistant Director O. D. Brennan
.1/23/71
DEM:1mb
I concur with the above comment and wish to
àgsure the inspector I will closely follow our progress
in developing informants to use against Soviet intelligence
and the direction of their activities.
NW 88608 Docid:32989638 Page 623
253