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157-10014-10018
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER 05-H-02
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM: BUNDY, MCGEORGE
TO :
TITLE :
DATE: 07/11/75
PAGES
SUBJECTS
:
168
: BUNDY, MCGEORGE
ROSTOW, WALT
CASTRO, FIDEL
CIA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
TRANSCRIPT
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
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Bundy
ORIGINAL
Vol. 1 OF
NATIONAL
to Criminal
The United States Senate
Report of Proceedings
INVENTORIED!,
DN 2/16/77
BC
Hearing held before
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities
Friday, July 11, 1975
t
Washington, D. C.
(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)
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INFORMATION
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TESTIMONY OF
3 McGeorge Bundy
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EXHIBITS
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Bundy No. 1
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Bundy No. 2A
Bundy No. 2B
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Bundy No. 2C
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Bundy No. 2D
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Bundy No. 2
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Bundy No. 3
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Bundy No.
3A
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Bundy No. 3B
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Bundy No. 4
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Bundy No. 5
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Bundy No. 6'
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Bundy No. 6-A
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Bundy No. 6-B
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Bundy No. 6-C
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Bundy No. 6-D
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Bundy No. 6-E
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Bundy No. 6-F
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Bundy No. 6-G
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Bundy No. 6-11
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Bundy No. 6-I
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Bundy No. 7
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COMMITTEE MEETING
Friday, July 11, 1975
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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:40 a.m.,
in Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman)
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presiding.
Present:
Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,
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Mondale, Morgan,
Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker, Mathias and
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Schweiker.
Also present:
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Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief
Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles
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Lombard, Patrick Shea, David Aaron, Robert Kelley, Frederick
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Baron and Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Members.
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The Chairman.
The hearing will please come to order.
Mr. Bundy, would you please stand and take the oath.
Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Bundy. I do.
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The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.
TESTIMONY OF MCGEORGE BUNDY
Mr. Schwarz. Would you state your full name and address
for the record, please?
Mr. Bundy. My name is McGeorge Bundy.
I live in New
York. My home address is 1040 Fifth Avenue.
Mr. Schwarz. And you are currently the Chairman or the
President of the Ford Foundation?
Mr. Bundy. The President of the Ford Foundation.
Mr. Schwarz. In the Kennedy Administration what position
did you hold?
Mr. Bundy. I was Special Assistant for National Secur-
ity Affairs.
Mr. Schwarz.
And you held that all the way through the
Kennedy Administration and for how many years in the Johnson
Administration?
Mr. Bundy. I held that office from the beginning of the
Kennedy Administration to the end of February 1966.
Mr. Schwarz.
Prior to commencing work with the Kennedy
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Administration, had you had anything to do with the Central
Intelligence Agency?
Mr. Bundy. I had a brother who worked for many years in
I occasionally talked with
the Central Intelligence Agency.
members of the Agency during the forties and the fifties, both
about substantive questions of what one thought about the
conditions in the Soviet Union, and occasionally also about
efforts that they were then making to recruit talented
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graduates of colleges.
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To put some-
Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned your brother.
thing of a different kind in the record than we have gotten
recently, would you recount the position taken by Allan Dulles
13 in connection with the problem that your brother had in the
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1950's.
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Mr. Bundy.
Well, my brother came under attack from
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And the ground was,
Senator Joseph McCarthy.
as I recall
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as sensitive as
it, in general that he had been a friend and supporter of
Alger liss and was therefore not to be trusted in a place
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Allan Dulles --
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quite characteristic of him
and my impression is that this was
took an extremely firm stand
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on this matter, and stood by his estimate that my brother was
in fact in no
trary.
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And the defense was successful, and my brother
continued in the Central Intelligence Agency until the Kennedy
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sense a security risk, rather, to the con-
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Administration came in, at which time he moved over to the
Defense Department.
Mr. Schwarz. We have indicated to you that we are going
to discuss the countries of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and
Vietnam, although not much on Vietnam. And the majority and
minority staff have shown you some documents of that period,
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some 15 years ago. Before I get to those three countries,
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I would like to ask you some questions about a subject
called Executive Action. Have you ever heard of the
subject
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called Executive Action?
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Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.
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which I heard of it.
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Mr. Schwarz. When did you first hear of it?
Mr. Bundy. Well, as I have told your staff, that is a
difficulty for me, because I cannot pinpoint the time at
My impression was that it was
in the early months of 1961.
Mr. Schwarz. And do you have a recollection as to the
real
some time
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context in which you heard about it, the person from whom you
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full recollection of the subject of Executive Action in the
early 1961?
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Mr. Bundy. Would it help if I try to describe in a
general way what I now understand of this matter, the
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part which is recollection and the part which is clarified
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by discussions with the staff and what I now think about it?
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Mr. Schwarz.
Would you distinguish, though, the part
2 that is recollection and the part that is based upon other
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matters?
Mr. Bundy. That is exactly what I would like to do.
The part that is recollection is very vague.
And I
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sation on this subject.
would say that I have no recollection of more than one conver-
And the impression that sticks in
8 my mind is that I was told about it in a general way.
And
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it was described to me as an effort to study through the
possibilities by which one might act against an individual
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about that
three
one, that it was
--
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Two,
in a context other than that of espionage and counter-espionage,
a context more political.
Mr. Schwarz. When you say "act against an individual",
act in what fashion?
Mr. Bundy. Act in a variety of fashions, as I recollect
it, but up to and including killing the individual.
The two things that I think are clear in my recollection
a concept presented
or described to me I was in effect being briefed on it.
that it was entirely an untargetted
that it
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was in no
sense a plan to do anything to anyone.
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And third, and I think quite important, that it was
not anoperation which had any specific target.
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Mr. Schwarz. You said you were in effect briefed on it.
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By whom?
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Mr. Bundy.
That is what I don't know. I cannot
recollect who it was.
And I think it inapproprate to guess
when I have no recollection.
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Mr. Schwarz.
What time? I don't mean what time of day,
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but what time?
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Mr. Bundy.
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months of 1961.
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As I say, sometime I think in the early
And searching memory is an uncertain busi-
ness, but it sticks in my mind that I heard about it in the
rooms of the Executive Office Building.
And that
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would place it in time, because I moved from the Executive
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Office Building to the West Basement of the White House sometime
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after the Bay of Pigs, perhaps in May.
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Mr. Schwarz.
So based on that fact you place it in
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Mr. Bundy.
time sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs and sometime after--
After my arrival in Washington.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Mr. Bundy.
it more closely, because I think it was after I
About the 10th of January.
And when did you arrive in Washington?
I would place
was in the
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Office of the Special Assistant, which, of course,
was occupied
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until the 20th of January by others.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Mr. Schwarz. So you place it after the 20th of January,
but before the Bay of Pigs, which was April 14 or 17?
Mr. Bundy. That is right.
Did it come up in a context where you
urged that such a capacity be created?
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Mr. Bundy. No.
Mr. Schwarz. What context did it come up in?
Mr. Bundy. It came up in a context in which it was being
described to me by someone else. And that is really about
as far as I can take it with precision.
Mr. Schwarz.
as a capacity in being?
WAs it described to you by someone else
Mr. Bundy.
As a capacity
and this is not something
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I want to be too certain about, Mr. Schwarz, but my recollec-
tion would be that it was a capacity coming into being.
Mr. Schwarz.
Now, receiving that information, did you
take any steps to discourage or dissuade the person, whoever
it was, who was describing to you the capacity coming
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Mr. Bundy. What I recollect is that I was satisfied with
the description I received on two points.
First, that this was not an operational activity, and
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would not become such without two conditions:
first, that
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there be a desire or a
request or a guidance that there
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should be planning against some specific individual; and
second, that there should be a decision to move against an
individual.
Being satisfied that these two things were not happen-
and I am now giving you a reconstruction rather than
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a precise recollection
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I am confident that what I did was
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to place this notion in the category of hypotheticals, of
things with no current urgency to them, and in that sense
not a question that cried for attention in the sense that
If I may make a straightforward compari-
so many others did.
son, we were, I think, even before the inauguration, but
certainly very quickly thereafter, very heavily engaged in
a real question of choice, which was the question of choices
do with the Cuban brigade which led
eventually to the Bay of Pigs.
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around what would you
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16.
And that occupied a very
large amount of time and attention, as did the crisis in Berlin
and the crisis in Laos.
In the same period there were briefings on contingency
plans for the uses of nuclear weapons, other weapons, and a
and here were reports that came
whole swarm of, sort of,
naturally to the Special Assistant's office, which was also
being reorganized.
So,
I think that what I did was simply to put this one
aside. I cannot claim to have thought about it seriously,
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because it was in the flow of business that would come
to the
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Special Assistant's office.
Mr. Schwarz.
I want to see if we can be more precise
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on dates to check on what other evidence we have.
We have
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other evidence that discussions of this matter were going
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on in the Central Intelligence Agency on the 25th and 26th
of January 1961.
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Now, are you able to testify with respect to the likeli-
hood of the conversation you have recounted taking place
prior to the 25th or the 26th of January 1961.
Mr. Bundy. I would rate it very, very unlikely.
This is a matter I have thought about since you did mention
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those dates to me. And I would say that the chance that
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within the first four days after being sworn in I would have
been drawn to consider this question is, from my side, as
near zero as I can put it. I had been teaching international
relations over a period of ten years. I was deeply interested
in many of the immediate problems, most notably the problem of
the crisis in Berlin and the concomitant question of relations
with the Soviet Union. And I was preoccupied with all of
the things that happened when you moved to Washington from
helping the Secretary to buy a house, and working out a
staff, and I was under instruction from the President to
reorganize the White House National Security staff.
subject was far out of my mind, and I would not have brought
I doubt that anyone wouldhave brought it to
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it up.
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me in those early days.
The Chairman. May I interrupt for a moment.
This
As I understand your testimony, Mr. Bundy, you were
briefed on the concept of Executive capability sometime early
in 1961, and you can't remember now who it was who briefed you.
Do you recall whether or not you instructed anyone, at
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the CIA to develop such a capability?
Mr. Bundy. I am sure I gave no instruction.
But it is
only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any
impediment after I was briefed.
The Chairman. But your best recollection is that some-
body toldyou that such a capability was being developed?
Mr. Bundy. I don't want to be too firm on that, but that
would be my best recollection.
The Chairman. We received testimony from Mr. Bissell..
Are you acquainted with Mr. Bissell?
Mr. Bundy. Yes, sir. I have known him a long time, and
12 he has been a great friend of mine.
The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz,- since you are very familiar
with the record, are you going to take Mr. Bundy through the
record of Mr. Bissell's testimony?
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Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Bissell testified
The Chairman. And we have the transcript.
If it would
helpful for Mr. Bundy to look directly at the transcript.
I think he should have it.
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Bissell's testimony was, first, that
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in the first instance he said he did not recall any specific
conversation. Then, however, he said, after having reviewed
certain notes by Mr. Harvey, he concluded that if Mr. Harvey's
note indicated, as they did, that he, Bissell, told Harvey
in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to set
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up an Executive Action capability, then he had no reason to
And then he went on through a series
2 doubt that testimony.
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of comments to end up saying that he would have been given
that urging by either Rostow or Bundy, more likely Rostow.
First, let's focus on Rostow.
Was Rostow involved in
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the briefing?
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Mr. Bundy.
No
--
now,
that I can't tell you out of my
recollection, but only out of my knowledge of the way the
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office was organized.
The first things we did, Walt Rostow
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and I, was to work out an informal but nevertheless reasonably
And the whole business of
clear-cut division of labor.
what I thought of as special group business, namely, matters
that related to covert action, and would, if they came for
division, come through the special group, fell on my side
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of that division.
I don't recall that. Mr. Rostow was
ever
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involved in any matter of this sort.
The Chairman.
It is fair to say that this was Mr. Rostow
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testimony.
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Bissel is, as you say, a friend of
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Executive Action capability.
yours of long standing, and still is a friend of yours?
Mr. Bundy. Yes, he is.
Mr. Schwarz. Wehave his testimony which, while it did
have gradations within it, ended up saying that
he believed either you or Mr. Rostow urged him to set up the
And you have testified that the
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fact is that you were given a briefing, and you didn't urge it,
but on the other hand you didn't say it should stop.
How can you explain, if you can,
the testimony of your
friend Mr. Bissell, and the contrast between that and
your testimony?
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mony
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Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understand Mr. Bissell's testi-
and I should add, so that there will be no misunder-
standing, that I have not only the advantage of discussions with
9 you, but I have talked with him about it
as I understand
that testimony from that conversation, he was trying to ex-
no reason to question the report that he had received
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plain a situation in which he had no reason to question an Agency
history to the effect that he first gave instructions on this
And in that context
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and he had
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White House encouragement
--
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it is in that context that his
speculations about Mr. Rostow and about me seem to fall.
I would be surprised, if his memory were refreshed
with respect to the dates of January which you have des-
19 cribed to me, if he were to believe that any initiative in
this enterprise would come in the first instance from the
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Kennedy Administration.
The Chairman. Mr. Bundy, our transcript of the
Bissell testimony makes it clear that Mr. Bissell himself
He said in effect,
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does not dispute the documented record.
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if Harvey says that I told him that I had been twice instructed
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by the White House to develop an Executive capability, I
have no basis on which to dispute that record.
Then when we asked him, very well, who in the White
House told you, and when were you told, he replied, it
must have been early in 1960, and I don't recall who told me,
but it must have been either Rostow or Bundy.
He then recounts that he had numerous conversations
with both of you during the period, and concludes that the
instruction must have come either from you or from Mr. Rostow.
Now, Mr. Rostow tells us he never gave such an instruc-
tion, and in fact has no memory of every having discussed
such an instruction.
Mr. Bundy. He would have in fact have had no authority
to give such an instruction.
:
The Chairman. That is right.
And he pointed that out.
Mr. Bundy. And in fact I wouldn't have the authority
to give any such instruction, and I would have been only
the channel to give such instruction.
Senator Baker.
Who would have had the authority?
Mr. Bundy. If the authority were required outside the
AGency it would have to have been the President himself.
The Chairman. What I would like to ask you
Mr. Bundy. Could I continue with Senator Baker's
25 question for one second.
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My own impression as to this matter
and I have already
testified to the fact that I am relying on a recollection of
a meeting of which there is no record
is that had I been
briefed on this essentially hypothetical internal, undirected
5 character, it did not appear to me to be a matter that required
6 further authority outside the CIA.
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That may or may not have
been right, but that is the quick judgment I appear to have
Because I certainly did not raise the question with
reached.
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others.
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Senator Baker. Do you recall that, Mr. Bundy, or is that
your surmise?
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Mr. Bundy. That is my reconstruction more than my
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I know I did not raise it, I did not press the question, and
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I did not feel, therefore, that it was
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a question that needed
further analysis, and it did not, so far as I know, get
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further consideration inthe White House.
My own recollection
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is that I didn'thear the words again in any serious con-
text that I can recall until this year.
The Chairman. And you cannot recall who it was who
briefed you?
Mr. Bundy. I really cannot.
Mr. Schwarz. Can you narrow the field?
It would have to have
Mr. Bundy. I can narrow the field.
been a senior officer at the Agency, or someone with previous
understanding in the White House.
I have no reason to suppose
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that it was the latter, but I cannot exclude that.
The Chairman. Might it have been Bissell himself?
Mr. Bundy. It surely might have been.
The Chairman. Based upon your best recollection of that
briefing, you have already testified that you interpose no
objection?
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the character of the enterprise.
Mr. Bundy. I am pretty sure I satisfied myself as
But I did not interpose an
to
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objection.
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The Chairman.
Do you recall, then, having reported the
1
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briefing to the President?
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Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.
The Chairman. Did it strike you
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were you told that this was
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before I ask that
question, based upon your best recollection of the briefing,
a new capability that was being
developed, or were you told simply that the Agency possessed
such a capability?
Mr. Bundy. I would put it that the Agency was working on
such a capability, but without any great sense of precision.
Were you given the impression at
The Chairman.
that briefing that the Agency was seeking your authority or
the authority of the White House?
Mr. Bundy. I think they were testing my reaction, as
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I now look back on it.
But I do not recall that they were
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seeking authority.
If it had come to me as a matter of White
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House authority, I know from the context
--
my own concept
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of my job what I would have done.
The Chairman.
What would you have done?
Mr. Bundy. I would have had to take the matter to the
President, because I had no independent authority.
The Chairman.
And you have testified that you did not
take the matter to the President?
Mr. Bundy. As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, this is a subject dealing, as it
does, with the development of a capability to kill that would
have been of the character that if you had been asked for
authority you would have discussed with the President?
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Mr. Bundy.
That is right.
The Chairman.
And furthermore, is it not a subject of
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a character that you would be very likely to recall?
Mr. Bundy.
recall it. If I were the initiating or deciding agent, I
If I had been asked for authority I would
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would recall that I had had that role.
You speak of the seriousness of it.
capability to kill.
It deals with a
One of the sobering facts about coming
into the government from outside into a sensitive position
like that one is the number of things on which you are briefed
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23
which deal with the capability to kill.
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nuclear weapons
25
Contingency plans
for protecting West Berlin, contingency plans for the use of
shelf plans, a shade more remote, perhaps,
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for the use of different kinds of gases
an operational plan
2
for the invasion of Cuba
these were uncertainties as to
10
whether there would have to be military landings in Laos.
In
3
4 the context of 1961 and I am not in any sense trying to un-
--
5
derstate the seriousness of the context of 1975-- this was a
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hypothetical kind of a thing with two strong locks between
it and any decision. And I simply didn't pay it the attention
8
then that we are paying to it now.
We are right to pay
9
that attention now.
10
The Chairman.
I understand that very
well.
And this
11
Committee is endeavoring in every way it can to place this
12
whole issue within the context of the time.
Nevertheless, we
13
are faced with a very real dilemma. We know that at the very
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time you were being briefed the Agency was not only interested
in developing a capability, but was in fact engaged in a
series of attempts to assassinate Castro, and had been in-
volved in other murder plots and murder attempts against the
leaders of certain foreign governments.
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The question we are endeavoring to answer is whether
the Agency had been authorized by the policy makers of the
government to engage in this activity, or whether it was
operating fast and loose on a wild gambit of its own in an
area of extreme sensitivity that could have the most serious
repercussions upon the government of the U.S. and its
reputation in the world.
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We are told by Mr. Bissell, who apparently was not only
a very good friend of yours, but also a very good friend of Mr.
Rostow's
q
Mr. Bundy.
That is right.
1
5
The Chairman.
a man whose credibility as a witness
6
would seem to have to be respected
that he was at least
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8
is
engaged in developing such a capability on direct instructions
from the White House.
But when we pressed him for specifics, his testimony
He can't remember just who it was who
told him, he can't dispute the record, which says that in effect,
he so advised Mr. Harvey when he engaged Mr. Harvey to develop
And everyone else of high authority in
the Administration that we have questioned so far testifies
becomes very vague.
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the capability.
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that it was not the policy of the Administration to engage in
assassination, and no such attempts were ever authorized,
and indeed, with the exception of one occasion in the Special
even surfaced for discussion.
Group, the subject never
And when it did, if it did, it was quickly shot down.
Nevertheless, the CIA was in fact embarked upon such
attempts during the period under review.
22
Now, we are led to conclude either that we
are not
being told the truth concerning the policy of the Administration,
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which is very hard for me
to accept, given the reputation of
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the witnesses that have come before us, for integrity and
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truthfulness, or that the CIA was running wild, and acting on
its own initiative, engaging in murder plots, murder attempts,
and not informing, let alone securing the authority from,
those in government who held the responsibility, which in a way
5
is even more frightening.
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Now, you tell us that you remember being briefed.
You
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don't remember advising the President.
It didn't seem
too
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important at the time. Did you ever follow
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up on whether such
a capability had in fact been perfected by the agency?
Mr. Bundy. I don't recall pursuing the matter at all,
Mr. Chairman, any more than I would have pursued any other
shelf capability on which no question was being pushed to me,
either from below or above.
If I may go back and comment on one aspect of your,
I think, important and impressive description of
the difficulty the Committee faces, I am sure that if in the
early months of 1961 I had known what I now know, in part from
18 the newspapers and in part from discussions with your staff,
about what was really in train, I would have had a very
19
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different approach.
Senator Mondale.
Mr. Chairman.
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The Chairman.
Senator Mondale.
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Senator Mondale. Yesterday Secretary Rusk testified be-
24
fore us. And some of the minutes or notes made following one
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of themeetings of the Special Group Augmented at least suggest
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that the question of assassination occurred.
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And, Mr. Rusk
said, did you think anyone would bring that up at a town
meeting? And by that I gather he meant that these meetings
had large attendance from all different groups and prinicples
and staff assistants and so on, and as a result, if there
6
were matters of exceeding delicacy, that was not the forum
7
at which such matters would be discussed.
Would you comment on that?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.
My impression would be that the
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Secretary was probably referring to the much discussed meeting
of August 10, 1962.
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Senator Mondale. Right.
13
Mr. Bundy. That was a large meeting, 16 or 18 people.
14
And the comment
seems to be pertinent to that meeting.
The
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mind, for example, in early 1961, was
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Senator Mondale.
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Special Group as such, the one which I would have had in
set up under a national
security regulation of some sort whose number was 54/12.
That was the Special Group.
Mr. Bundy. That was the Special Group. And the Special
Group in and
small group.
of itself was quite a
Senator Mondale.
But people would volunteer to attend
22
Mr. Bundy. No.
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Senator Mondale. They would not?
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Mr. Bundy. No.
The meeting of August 10 is a very
25 special meeting in a variety of respects.
That included
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The Chairman. You were present at that meeting?
Mr. Bundy. I was present. My memory is entirely
a refreshed memory on this, I had no recollection of the
meeting until recent months. But I have found a scratch
pad that I apparently doodled on on that date, and it
:
shows who was there, and not much else.
Mr. Schwarz. There were some beautiful drawings.
Mr. Bundy. There were.
9
They were not very beautiful
drawings.
10
The Special Group Augmented met in August
and this
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does coincide with my general recollection of the matter
in response to concerns wihch were first, I think, and most
energetically pressed by Mr. McCone with respect to, what the
hell are the Russians doing in Cuba.
And that was the center
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of that meeting, and the center of later meetings, and the cen-
ter of a national security action memorandum of considerable
complexity which was put out toward the end of
August, most
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It
of which dealt with this question, how do we know what they
do if they do it, and so forth,
are going to do, what do we
with respect to missiles in Cuba.
was therefore in a sense much more than an ordinary
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MONGOOSE meeting, let alone a Special Group meeting.
And
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while I quite agree with the Secretary that that meeting as
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tion is implausible in the extreme.
a planning session for anything as horrendous as assassina-
Quite serious covert
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actions were discussed in the Special Group. And as your
Committee pursues its studies of covert action it will find
that that group is the nodal point for policy decisions, good
And that was quite a small
or bad, well or badly handled.
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group.
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Senator Mondale. The reason I ask that is that it seems
to me that the Chairman's question pursues the two alternatives,
either what we now know to have occurred was ordered at the
highest level, or at a very high level, such as the Special
Group Augmented, or they operated on their own, in which case
they were out of control and irresponsible, or there was some
extra communications system that went around the formal struc-
ture that we have been examining, and would account for the sen
of authority that these operators testified to when they
were with us.
Now, their testimony was not very specific.
They said,
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we thought we had authority, and we think we heard from
somebody, and so on.
What are the changes, based upon your experience, that
there was such extra official communications and order passin
I might say
Senator Baker. Before Mr. Bundy answers,
to Senator Mondale that I am struck by the first paragraph
of the Inspector General's report, which we don't have here
now, I don't believe, but as I remember it, it says, it is
difficult to reconstruct history of assassination plots, becaus
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of the high sensitivity of the subject matter, no written
2
records were kept, and it was not discussed at open meetings.
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That is generally what was said.
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And it seems to me that is
implying, then, that as a matter of policy there was no
formalization of this sort of communication.
I am sorry to interrupt.
Senator Mondale.
Yes.
And in that August 10 meeting two or three principals
testified that it did come up. And in fact it is not reflected
in the notes.
Mr. Bundy. Perhaps the best way for me to begin at least
with an answer to your question is to describe my
13
own sense
14
my own understanding of the way in which covert
operations of all types were brought forward.
And this was
15
perhaps the most important and the most constantly reiterated
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fact of the process that I was exposed to when I began to
consider this whole range of subjects on coming to Washington.
And whether it was with Mr. Gordon Gray, my predecessor, or
with Allen Dulles, or with incoming and outgoing friends in
the Department of State, or with Mr. Bissell, or with anyone
else concerned with these matters, what I learned then and
what I applied throughout my time there to the best of my
ability was that all covert operations, whether intelligence
operations, clandestine political activity, and clandestine
propaganda activity, and clandestine subversion, or sabotage,
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which did occur in the case of Cuba, all of them took their
authority from and came for their authority to the 54/12
group.
And when there was a question in such a meeting as to
whether the matter required further judgment, it was the
responsibility of the Chairman of that group to make sure that
that was checked out.
The papers will usually say, higher authority, et cetera,
et cetera, and the President's name will often not appear
any more than the precise character of the operation is likely
to appear in the minutes for the reasons that Senator Baker
has spoken of.
But I never knew of any operation of this kind of any
sort, with one exception, which is quite different, which did
not have that channel. The exception is the Bay of Pigs,
which was so big, so complicated, and overflowed in so many
directions, and in which the President himself was involved in
so many ways, as he fully recognized and explained at the time,
that it did not go through this Committee process, it went
through a quite Presidential process, and everybody involved
knew that.
But with that one exception, I would have told you up
until the beginning of this current public discussion, that
24
was the way it went, and that nothing went outside it, and
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that the Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agencies, with
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I' their more sensitive intelligence operations, were meticulous
2
in that respect.
Now, I clearly am wrong. But that is what I would have
4 told you.
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Senator Mondale. Well, are you wrong?
6
In other words, what you testified to
7
Mr. Bundy. Excuse me, I misstate myself.
I beg your
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pardon for interrupting.
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I am wrong in that things happened that didn't go through
that group.
Senator Mondale. Yes.
In other words, that is the big question, either they were
acting on authority, which apparently flowed around channels
The Chairman. Covertly --
Senator Mondale. Covertly or they were acting on their
own, and our attempts to find direct authority in these official
meetings led us nowhere.
And your testimony is that you find it very unlikely
that there was this covert way of communicating authority.
Mr. Bundy. My testimony was that I wouldn't
20
have believed it existed.
I have to consider the same
al-
21
ternative that the Chairman has so clearly pointed out.
I
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don't find it agreeable to conclude that the Agency was
rogue elephant at a time when I strongly believe it was not.
Senator Mondale. We asked General Taylor that question,
a
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and he said he found it incredible to believe that they
would have gone around the Special Group Augmented with such.
Mr. Bundy. General Taylor, of course -- and this is an
important point was a-pointed to this responsibility after
5
the Bay of Pigs, after a review of the failures that led to
6
the Bay of Pigs, and after a conclusion had been reached that
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it would strengthen the White House to have a man with a parti-
cular responsibility for the oversight of intelligence opera-
(
tions. He was called military representative to the President,
but in the announcement of his appointment I happened to
look it up the other day President Kennedy made it clear that
he would be his representative for intelligence matters.
And he did in fact take over the chairmanship during the time
that he was military representative of all of the Special
Groups, 54/12, the Special Group Counterinsurgency, and the
16 Special Group Augmented, MONGOOSE. And when he said
if he has testified that his expectation would have been
that nothing was going to go around him, he is saying exactly
what I thought through the same period.
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Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, in that respect
21
The Chairman.
Before I forget the question, let
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me ask, since you were at the August 10 meeting, and since
we have received testimony buttressed by certain documentary
evidence that the subject of assassination of Castro did
come up at that meeting, do you have any recollection of
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subject coming up or being discussed?
Mr. Bundy. I don't recollect the meeting.
And I
don't recollect the subject ever coming up in a meeting of
4 that size, or indeed in any I don't have any recollection
of it coming up, although I do have a general recollection of
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there being times at which this possibility was heard of. I
wouldn't want to testify that I never heard anyone say,
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there is somebody thinking about this, because that would be
different from my vague recollection.
But I have no recollection of that meeting, and there-
fore none of any specific statement made by anyone in it.
The Chairman. Senator Baker?
Senator Baker. In that connection, before I go to the
question I had in mind, is it fair to say, Mr. Bundy, that
all, or virtually all, of your testimony this morning, about
MONGOOSE, about the August 10 meeting, and about the general
situation, is from reconstructed memory rather than first
impression memory?
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years
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Mr. Bundy. I didn't want to go that far, Senator Baker.
My knowledge, my sense of what 54/12 and Special Group
Augmented wore, and where they stood in the line of authority,
is very clear, and is not reconstructed.
I spent five
except for the time when General Taylor was there,
I was the chairman of these things.
Senator Baker. Let's take a piece at a time, then.
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On the question of the Executive Action capability, I
believe referred to as the ZRRIFLE project
Mr. Bundy. Imust say that if I had known that was its
name I would have looked harder, Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. It is a fairly picturesque name as
to Executive Action Capability, or ZRRIFLE, do you have a
separate recollection?
Mr. Bundy. I have a recollection of what I think of
is one, I don't want to say there wasn't more, but of
one discussion of the matter. And I know I was informed of
it in some fashion at the time.
Senator Baker. Do you remember by whom?
Mr. Bundy. That is my difficulty, as I said earlier,
I don't know.
Senator Baker. The reason I ask is, from the other
documentation I have, which consists primarily of the
Inspector General of the CIA's report, and maybe other
material that I can't think of at the moment, it is clear
and unmistakeable that they think of RZRIFLE or Executive Ac-
tion Capability as a White House initiative, or a White House
request of considerable insistence from the White House that
they get on with the job.
Mr. Bundy. That is totally inconsistent with my un-
reconstructed recollection.
Senator Baker. Let me track that carefully.
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Do you recall that there was not?
Mr. Bundy. I can only speak for myself here, and for
my colleague Rostow, and my knowledge of his assignments.
I recall that his assignments would have made it wildly out
of place, and totally out of character, for him to initiate a
6
matter of this kind.
And I recall that I did not.
7
And I
recall that quite independently of any reconstruction of
8
recent months.
9
Senator Baker.
I would like to limit this, then,
10
11
12
just to your assignment.
Was it your general assignment to take care of so-
called covert operations?
13
Mr. Bundy.
It was my assignment
may I take a minute
14
on this?
15
Senator Baker.
Yes, sir.
16
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an idea myself.
Mr. Bundy. There were two ways in which I could become
involved in covert
I will have to say that I have no recollec-
three ways.
I might have thought up
19
tion that I
ever did.
It was not a subject in which I had
20
an independent personal motivating interest.
So, there were
21
two ways in which I could get involved in it.
One was by
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a proposal upward from the Agency or the Defense Intelligence
Services, which would come to the Special Group.
And the other was when the President had an interest--
and I did have an interest
from time to time in these
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matters. He had a great interest at different points in
1961, 1962, in doing more about Cuba.
wanted to do was covert.
And part of the more he
And he would say so to me. And
I would say so to somebody else.
Senator Baker. Can you give us examples of that?
Mr. Bundy. No, I can't.
I can only say that the kind
of things he was talking about was, why do all these raids not
They say they can do something about the oil
8
get us anywhere?
9
refineries, why don't they?
These are purely hypothetical,
10
Senator Baker, but they would be in a category,
subversion
11
and sabotage.
12
Senator Baker. WAs it Harvey that was spoken of as our
13
007?
14
15
16
Mr. Schwarz. Once yesterday.
Senator Baker. Do you remember when Mr. Harvey was
brought to see the President at the Oval Office?
17
Mr. Bundy. I have been told about that, but I
am afraid that is non-refreshed recollection.
I don't know
18
19
anything about it.
Senator Baker.
Would that have been the character of
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2 2 2 2
the things that the President was interested in, 007?
Mr. Bundy. I am not going to try to repair the record
at this late stage and say that the President never read
23
Ian Fleming.
24
Senator Baker.
Or ever seen Ian Fleming?
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Mr. Bundy. I don't think the President ever acted Ian
Fleming.
Senator Baker. I think that is right.
But I think it
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is important for us, Mr. Bundy, to try to establish, as the
Chairman said, the range of available information or evi-
dence that sheds some light on the three alternative possi-
bilities, and the type of things that the President interested
himself in is terribly important in that respect.
I believe that you said you had no information or no
recollection of what particular situation, or what other
deals that were made he was interested in.
Mr. Bundy. I will put it more concretely than that.
The President said, can't we do something more about Cuba?
Why don't you get ahold of these people who are dealing with
this and see if they can't do better, and pass the word
that I am interested, that kind of thing.
Senator Baker. Do I understand that to mean that he never
spoke of a particular practice?
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Mr. Bundy. I can't tell you that, because I know, the
record indeed reminds me, that particular actions that are
related to Cuba that came up through the group of ten
went to him, and some were approved and some were not.
So, he clearly looked at them.
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I would have to have the documents there in order to
be precise, and I don't have them with me.
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Mr. Bundy.
has provided.
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Senator Baker.
Which documents?
Documents which the Committee staff
Mr. Schwarz. We have them.
Senator Baker.
Tell me what they are.
Mr.
November 30, 1961, Tab
Schwarz.
-- is that Tab H.
or Tab 4 about the November 30, 1961, which authorizes
MONGOOSE?
9
Mr. Kelley.
Tab 4.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Senator Baker.
May 5, '62, Lansdale Tab 21.
Do you have a copy of this memorandum, Mr. Bundy?
Mr. Kelley.
He will have it in a moment.
Mr. Bundy. One place these documents did not go is
into the memorabilia of former members.
Mr. Kelley. We are talking about Tab 4.
Senator Baker. Mine says, see Lansdale Tab 4.
Let's stop there, if I may.
18
Mr. Kelley.
Yes.
November 30, 1961.
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Senator Baker. I would really prefer if someone gave
Mr. Bundy a copy of the same material I am working on.
Mr. Kelley. All right, that is the chronology.
Mr. Bundy. November 30, 1961?
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Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
It is on page 3, the third
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item.
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Mr. Bundy. I have it.
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Senator Baker.
President Kennedy's decision to begin
MONGOOSE. Is it clear, Mr. Bundy, that President Kennedy made
the decision to initiate the MONGOOSE program?
Mr. Bundy. No question.
Senator Baker. I notice in the staff interpretation
under the column "Issues and Questions" that they alleged
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that you recall probably writing this memorandum.
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The
Mr. Bundy. That is really a logical inference.
President would not himself have written a long memorandum of
instructions of this kind. It is possible that General
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Taylor wrote it.
But I think it is more likely that I did.
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But in any event, whichever of us did so was doing it as a
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his decision.
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Senator Baker. So at least to this extent there is
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no question about the chain of command, or the chance to
control it, the President authorized it?
Mr. Bundy. Just to underline that point, as I recall
the paper which was shown to me, it is one from Mrs. Lincoln
to General Taylor saying, the President wants you to have
this as a description of the decisions.
Senator Baker.
Mr. Bundy. I think the covering memorandum on that
document is from Mrs. Lincoln to General Taylor, and it says,
Would you repeat that?
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the President wants you to have this as a record of his
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Senator Baker. Thank you, sir..
Do you have an independent recollection of the meeting
or the encounter with President Kennedy in connection with
MONGOOSE?
Mr. Bundy.. Not a specific meeting, but of the process
which led to this decision, yes.
Senator Baker. Describe for me, if you will, what
MONGOOSE was intended to be?
Mr. Bundy. Well, MONGOOSE in a general way was the
whole set of things to be concerned with mostly, but not only,
covert activities against the Communist regime in Cuba.
Senator Baker. The chronology also quotes the memo as
saying, one, we will use our available assets to go ahead
with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow
the Communist regime.
Can you elaborate on that?
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program.
Mr. Bundy. Not without documentary assistance beyond
It was to be a fairly wide ranging
what I have just said.
I believe that what that really sort of implies
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to me is that all departments are to cooperate, that the
Committee is to review possibilities, proposals,
them out, and that the thing is to be coordinated by the
this summary doesn't
Committee, whose chairman will be
say so, but my recollection is that the chairman was to be
to seek
ز
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General Taylor, and it does say that General Lansdale
was to be the Chief of Operations.
The Chairman. I have some questions at this point, please.
"The NSC 54/12 Group
Item 4 of this memorandum reads:
will be kept closely informed of activities, and will be
available for advice and recommendation".
Does this suggest to you that the regular channel was
supposed to operate with respect to MONGOOSE, that is to say,
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a central role was to be played by the Special Group in
connection with its activities?
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it now.
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Mr. Bundy. It is a puzzling sentence to me as I read
And I can't give you a precise answer on that.
think the general answer has to be that the 54/12 Group continu
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through this period. General Taylor was the chairman of
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both. The overlapping of membership was extensive.
And
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I think you would get a more precise answer as to the exact
relation from General Taylor than I am in a position to give.
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you.
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The Chairman. I have a very clear memory of General
And his testimony was that the Special
Taylor's testimony.
Group Augmented was the group that had charge of operation
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operations, were to be brought to the Special Group Aug-
mented for its approval.
And the approval of that Group
was necessary before any such plans were actually implemented.
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Mr. Bundy.
would certainly be clear on that, Mr.
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further requirement that it go from the Special Group
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Augmented to the Special Group..
And I have no precise view
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The Chairman.
I see.
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Now, when you refer to the NSC 54/12 Group
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Group.
Mr. Bundy. That is what I think of as the Special Group.
The Chairman. That is what you think of as the Special
I asked the question because the language is a little
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fuzzy.
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Mr. Bundy. It is.
The Chairman. This language might suggest that there is
an independent line of authority, and that the Special Group
Augmented or the Special Group was simply to be kept informed,
and its advice and recommendations would be taken under advise-
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Mr. Bundy. I think myself, Mr. Chairman, that
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we don't have a very serious problem here, because I would
agree with General Taylor's recollection that the Special
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Group Augmented was the Cuba group.
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two or three.
Now, the Special Group is simply the same people less
And the only real operational value of this
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paragraph is that perhaps the staff officer who serviced the
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54/12 would be available in a decision to the staff officer
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persons are usimply a smaller number of the very people
that both General Taylor and I recollect as having the main
responsibility.
The Chairman. So according to your best remembrance,
you would agree with the testimony we have received from
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General Taylor?
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Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would.
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The Chairman.
Mr. Smothers?
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Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, perhaps we could get some help
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in how the recollections come together here.
I might pursue
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for just a moment some of the background regarding other
sources of information you may have had regarding the subject
matter of his testimony.
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You indicated earlier that you had talked with Mr.
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Bissell about his testimony.
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Did you talk with persons other than Mr. Bissell?
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Mr. Bundy. Oh, yes.
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Mr. Smothers. Did you talk with Mr. McNamara?
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Mr. Bundy. Yes, indeed.
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Mr. Smothers. Regarding these events?
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Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Smothers.
Have you spoken with Mr. Gilpatric?
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Mr. Bundy. NO, I don't think I have.
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Mr. Smothers. Mr. Rusk?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Smothers. Mr. McCone?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Smothers. Are there others?
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Mr. Bundy. I am sure there are.
Mr. Rostow.
Mr.
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Goodwin.
There may well be others, Mr. Schlesinger and Mr.
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Dungam who has very little to do with it, but I talked
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Dominican Republic.
Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise a few questions regard-
ing those discussions, and perhaps it will be somewhat helpful
to us in trying to piece this together.
Has any documentary evidence passed between you and
the persons previously mentioned regarding the subject
matter of these hearings?
Mr. Bundy. Not that I know of.
Mr. Smothers. Did Mr. McCone provide you any documentary
evidence?
Mr. Bundy.
No.
Mr. Smother. Did you receive any documentary evidence
from any source other than the staff?
Mr. Bundy.
No
I beg your pardon. When I testified
before the Rockefeller Commission I asked through that
Commission whether I could look at NCS files particularly in
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order to clarify my recollection of the 6th of August 1962.
And I was allowed to look at the NSAM files. And my memory was
refreshed by NSAM-1, which I believe the committee has.
Mr. Smothers.
Have you made a similar request to
persons now within the Agency for on the White House staff?
Mr. Bundy. No.
Mr. Smothers. Could we go back into your conversation
with Mr. Bissell? . Could you describe for the Committee, please,
your reaction when Mr. Bissell indicated to you that he had
in
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testimony before this Committee told the Committee that
either you or Mr. Rostow had asked him to establish an Execu-
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tive Action Capability?
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others placed this event in February 1961.
Mr. Bundy. He didn't report it that way to me.
reported it to me that the testimony that had been given by
Testimony by
He
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others indicated that he had said to them that he had been
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encouraged to do this by the White House, and that in casting
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names of Rostow and Bundy.
around as to who might have encouraged, he had given the
I think this is roughly what
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he said to me.
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The Chairman. That was the character of his testimony?
Mr. Bundy. I told him that I thought he must
be wrong about Rostow, because that wasn't the way it worked,
and that my own recollection was not that we had encouraged
him, but that I had at some stage been informed about it.
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We then went on to
discussion of what it was. And
we agreed that whatever else it was, it was not an operation
3 plan, and it was not targeted against anyone.
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Mr. Smothers. What was his reaction to your comment
that he had been informed as opposed to initiating?
Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that we had a very extended
I don't recall his reaction, and I don't
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discussion on it.
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recall exactly how I put the point.
The Chairman. Let me just ask at that point, the way you
have characterized Bissell's testimony correspnds with my
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memory of it.
It is hard for me, however, to understand
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how Mr. Bissell
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why Mr. Bissell would have directed Mr.
Harvey to develop such a capability, and apparently represented
if the documents are to be believed, to Mr. Harvey that he had
been twice instructed to do this by the White House,
if he
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Do you think that Mr. Bissell would have undertaken
on his own initiative to develop such a capability and
simply represented to his subordinate that he was doing so on
instructions from the White House?
Mr. Bundy. I think there is a prior question, Mr.
Chairman, which is the credibility of the witness from whom he
is taking this recollection.
The Chairman. That is fair.
Though Mr. Bissell himself did not seem disposed
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Mr. Bundy.
Bissell may not recollect that I did
not give him this instruction, but I do, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Did Mr. Bissell at any time during the
period under question; or at any later time, ever inform
you of CIA activities or involvement in assassination attempts
against any foreign leader?
Mr. Bundy. No.
The Chairman.
Doesn't it strike you as strange, since
Mr. Bissell was aware of such attempts, that he would not
have told him?
Mr. Bundy. Well, I don't want, for reasons that I s
have already explained, to speculate as to why he did or did
not. I was operating, working on the assumption that I
would know that kind of thing if it existed.
The Chairman.Senator Mathias?
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Senator Mathias.
Mr. Chairman, I don't want to leave
17
the record, or Mr. Bundy's mind, or in the alternative, my
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tion and notes in the first instance.
mind, in a state of confusion as to what exactly Mr. Bissell's
recollection was.
Now, he was depending somewhat on Mr. Harvey's recollec-
But as I recall, he
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on proceeding with the development of the Executive Action
And that was a matter of independent recollection,
Capability.
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it didn't depend on anybody else's notes or anybody else's
refreshing his recollection.
Mr. Bundy. That he didn't say to me, and I have no way
of commenting on it.
The Chairman. I think we must carefully review the
record on that score.
Senator Baker. It may be necessary to ask him to come
back for that purpose.
May I ask a question there?
Mr. Bundy, do you have any recollection of any specific
covert plans that would involve poisons, hypdermic syringes,
or other potentially lethal devices in conjunction with acti-
vities against Cuba?
Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific plan.
I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection
that I heard the word poison at some point in connection with
a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I
have been able to take it in my own memory.
Senator Baker. Can you remember who may have men-
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tioned it to you and what the purposes of the poison may have
Mr. Bundy. Nothing at all about it in detail.
Senator Baker. A poison pen?
Mr. Bundy. No, some kind of poison about which one
thing that does stick in my mind is that it seems totally
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impractical because it was going to kill a large group of
people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort.
Senator Baker. Do you remember whether the plan was
4 declared non-feasible or infeasible by the Department of
5
Defense?
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Mr. Bundy. No, I have no such recollection.
Senator Baker. Do you remember anything about a hypodermic
syringe to carry poisons in a ballpoint pen?
Mr. Bundy. That is the sort of thing that I was asked
10
the other day, and I said I remember it, and then it seems to
11
me about ten seconds later was that what I was remembering was
12
murder mysteries and nothing related to Cuba.
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Senator Baker.
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I have no
recollection of connecting anything like that to Cuba.
I have another question, but I will
wait, if you have something else.
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The Chairman.
Go ahead, sir.
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Senator Baker.
Do you feel that you have a good insight
into the relationship between the President and his brother
Robert Kennedy in this respect, that is, having to do with
Cuba operations, and Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms?
Mr. Bundy. I have a pretty good picture of the relation-
ship between President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy on Cuba,
and on many other things. It is a recollection which grows
stronger as the administration goes on, because I got to
know them better, and, of course, they got to know me better,
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and the relationship tends to become closer, my relation with
I had known the President for many, many
2 both of them.
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years, and the Attorney General much more briefly.
I do not have any clear picture of the relationship
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between the Attorney General and Mr..
6
Helms. My curbstone
judgment would have been that it was not close.
7
Senator Baker.
Based on your insight, did the Presi-
dent delegate to Robert Kennedy substantial aspects of Cuba
9
policy during the period we are speaking of?
10
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Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't put it that way,
Senator
11
Baker. He certainly counted on the Attorney General to be
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a kind of gingerman on a great many subjects, of which Cuba
and counterinsurgency were the two that came more closely with-
in my area of interest.
Senator Baker. Counterinsurgency meaning what?
Mr. Bundy. Counterinsurgency meaning all those efforts
like the Green Berets and organizing to be able to assist
countries threatened by Communist subversion internally.
Senator Baker. Are you speaking of counterinsurgency
as it led to Cuba, or as a general capability?
Mr. Bundy. There was a separate committee, the Special
And the Attorney General
Committee on CI, counterinsurgency.
was an active member of that.
And I used to see him playing
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making more progress.
Senator Baker. Who was on that committee?
Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I can't decide from recollection.
General Taylor was again the Chairman, but the membership was
different.
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group?
Senator Baker. Do you have minutes or records of that
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Mr. Schwarz.
No.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request
that with Mr. Bundy's assistance after this hearing that we iden
tify as much as we can what that group is, and make a fomral
request for documentation.
Mr. Aaron. We have reviewed some of that material at
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It is essentially in fact the
the John F. Kennedy Library.
group that reviewed paramilitary operations and potential
insurgency situations.in a number of countries.
insurgency list.
There was an
It did not seem to relate to the subject
18
we are speaking of here. So we did not request the documents.
But we could have gotten them.
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Senator Baker. Will you do that, please?
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Is that agreeable, Mr. Chairman?
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The Chairman. What is your request?
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Senator Baker. I would like documentation or any records
relating to the counterinsurgency group during the period in
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question.
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The Chairman Let me suggest that we designate a mem-
ber of the committee staff to undertake that review, and
report back to the committee.
Would that be satisfactory?
Senator Baker. That is fine. I just want to know if
there is any worthwhile documentation.
7
The Chairman. Yes.
Because it may be entirely ancillary
8
to this issue.
9
Senator Baker.
Let me ask Mr. Bundy this.
Would that
10
group have been important toward American policy during this
Mr. Bundy. The CI Group?
Senator Baker. Yes.
Mr. Bundy. I would think only most marginally,
11
period?
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Senator Baker, simply because the existence of other groups,
the Special Group Augmented or the MONGOOSE Group, was so
clearly dominant and was the Central Committee for that sub-
ject.
Senator Baker. The gingerbread man concept?
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Mr. Bundy. The gingerman concept.
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Senator Baker. The gingerman concept.
There is a
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difference.
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Do I directly infer from that description that the
President would authorize Robert Kennedy to urge and expedite
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along to produce a result?
Mr. Bundy. In a general way that is right. But the
3 form it took in the areas in which I was concerned was in one
sense quite informal. I know of no instance where the Attorney
4
5
General tried to replace the normal channel
for the moment from the covert question and the Cuban ques-
let's stay away
7
tion, which I know you will want to talk about more precisely
8
but if he felt, as he often did, that American policy in
9
Africa, for example, was insufficiently sensitive to the aspir-
10
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ations of black people in Africa, he wouldn't fire off a kick, he
would come in and say, why can't you people do something about
the State Department on news and stuff.
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Senator Baker. There is some evidence
THE GRAD
we had direct
14 testimony that Mr. Helms, who was DDP at the time in ques-
15
tion, rather than DCI, clearly thought that the authority of
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cluding assassination.
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And when pressed on the source of that authority he de-
signed to say that anyone specifically told him that, but
that he talked to Robert Kennedy frequently about it. Would
this be in the gingerman concept you are speaking of?
Mr. Bundy. Now we are right at the specific point I
would like to make. But everything I knew about Bobby Kennedy
when he was goading and spurring people on is that he never
took away from the existing channel of authority its authority
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Senator Baker.
Would what I describe be consistent
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with whatyou describe?
Mr. Bundy. Not if it is interpreted as meaning that he
was providing a separate channel of authority.
Senator Baker. What I meant was just what it was, and
that is, Helms described for us meeting with Kennedy apparently
to stimulate the Agency's activities to produce the overthrow
of the Castro regime, and that he met regularly with Kennedy
in this respect.
Mr. Bundy. I don't know how often they met or what was
12 said, I know nothing about that. I would have said, just in
13 passing, that the Attorney General's relationship to the Direc-
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tor of Central Intelligence was much closer and more impor-
tant than his relationship to Mr. Helms.
Senator Baker. I am correct, am I, that Helms at the
time was DDP and not DCI?
Mr. Schwarz. That is right.
Senator Baker. Do you have any idea why he would have
met regularly with the DDP rather than the DCI?
Mr. Bundy. I have no idea that he did. I know that he
.
met often and intimately and easily with the Director of
Central Intelligence, who was a close personal friend of his.
Senator Baker. You are speaking of Mr. McCone?
Mr. Bundy. Mr. McCone.
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The Chairman: I think that since the point is impor-
tant, that when the Committee Staff complete its review of the
evidence it ought to be reminded to look closely at that Helms
4 testimony and identify exactly what words Helms might have
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used to describe his relationship with Robert Kennedy.
Senator Baker. And the time involved and what position
Helms occupied at the time.
The Chairman.
I have another question.
Mr. Bundy, we also have it from Mr. Bissell that at one
time he called in an officer, a subordinate, O'Donnell,
that at one time Mr. Bissell called in a subordinate whose
name was Mr. O'Donnell, and asked Mr. O'Donnell if he would
be willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba.
Mr. O'Connell testifies that he said he would not be
willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, because
he had moral compunctions against killing.
Mr. O'Donnell further testifies that he was then or
thereafter dispatched to the Congo, where he was informed that
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had come to the CIA
Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I missed that last.
The Chairman. He was informed that some poison had
arrived at the CIA headquarters in the Congo.
When we asked Mr. Bissell on what authority he had asked
O'Connell as to his willingness to undertake the assassination
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of Lumumba, he could not provide us with that authority,
except to say that he may have done it on his own initiative.
Do you have any reaction to that?
Mr. Bundy. Where is it in time?
Senator Church.
It was in the fall of 1960.
It was
not during the Kennedy Administration, it preceded the Kennedy
Administration. But I asked you the question, because it
strikes me as being a very disturbing piece of testimony, that
any man so positioned, in the CIA could not identify higher
authority for such an action, and would under oath say that it
might have been on his own initiative.
Mr. Bundy. I can't add to your comment on that, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Morgan. Let me ask him a question or two, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Morgan?
Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you recall very vividly
talking with the President on many occasions about Cuba,
is that right?
Mr. Bundy. I recall vividly that I talked to him on many
occasions, I am not very good on remembering specific dis-
cussions.
Senator Morgan. You told us a few minutes ago that he was
constantly prodding, and why don't you do this, and why doesn't
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so and so work?'
Mr. Bundy. If I may correct that, I said he prodded me
from time to time, not all the time.
Senator Morgan.
Quite frequently?
Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't put it that often. It might have.
been three or four times.
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Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you were head of the Security
Council, you were his assistant?
Senator.
You are trying to give such an accurate
picture that you are not giving much of a picture at all.
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Mr. Bundy.
I am trying to give an accurate picture of
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the number of times,
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Senator Morgan.
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Are you telling this committee that throughout the time
you assumed your duties, throughout the Cuban crisis, and all
the MONGOOSE operations, that you might have talked to him two
or three times about it?
Mr. Bundy. No.
Could I separate and try and clarify my answer?
Senator Morgan. Yes.
Mr. Bundy. I talked to the President, I suppose, many,
many times in the context of the events that led up to and
followed the Bay of Pigs. I talked to him dozens of times,
maybe even hundreds of times, in the context of the events that
led up to and followed the Cuban missile crisis. Those are the
two great moments of Presidential concern over Cuba during the
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time I was in Washington. I talked to him much less.
I can't
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give you a number-- on these intervening matters. And that is
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Senator Morgan. You were something between himself and
the National Security Council, were you not?
Mr. Bundy. That isn't exactly the way it works.
Senator Morgan. Just tell me what did you do.
Mr. Bundy. I am trying to.
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Senator Morgan.
I have been listening all morning, Mr.
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Bundy, and I just don't get it.
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Let me go to one other question.
Was it true a while
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ago when you said that Robert Kennedy was constantly prodding
people? Why can't we do more?
Mr. Bundy. Yes, that is certainly true.
Senator Morgan.
I have no other questions.
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Senator Mondale.
Could I ask one, Mr. Chairman?
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The Chairman.
Senator Mondale.
Senator Mondale. I don't like to ask this question,
but I think it is important.
Have you talked to others involved during this period
when you may have been testifying before us and before the
Rockefeller Commission, say, in the last five months about
this testimony?
Mr. Bundy. I answered that question.
Yes, I have.
Senator Mondale. Would you repeat it briefly for us?
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Mr. Smothers: I was about to pursue that line,
Senator Mondale.
Senator Mondale. Go ahead.
Mr. Smothers. I believe you indicated previously, Mr.
Bundy, that you talked to Mr. Bissell, Mr. McNamara, Mr. McCone,
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Mr. Rostow, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Schleinger, and others that may
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not be on that list. And you indicated that you had spoken to
Mr. Bissell after his testimony regarding executive action.
Mr. Bundy. That is right.
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Mr. Smothers.
Had you spoken with him also before that
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testimony?
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Mr. Smothers.
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Mr. Bundy. No.
Did he call you or did you call him?
Mr. Bundy. I don't honestly recall. I think I said the
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actually what
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to call you.
Mr. Smothers.
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your conversations with Mr. McNamara?
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Mr.
Mr. Bundy. There have been a number of them.
McNamara and I not only have been close friends, but are very
Can we go to your conversations with Mr.
McNamara. When did you first talk with him about these matters.
being testified to?
Mr. Bundy. I think pretty much as soon as it hit the papers.
Mr. Smothers. Can you give the Committee the sense of
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closely associated now
I see him and talk with him fre-
quently, both about substance of matters of international
development, and about the business of the Ford Foundation.
So, I have talked to him a number of times both on the
telephone and face to face. The essence of the conversation
is the exploration of questions raised or doubts raised babout
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the conviction we both share, which is that no one in the Kennedy
Administration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, ever
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Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss with him, or did he raise
with you specifically, the fact that he had received from
Mr. McCone a memorandum from Mr. McCone in 1967?
Mr. Bundy. Yes, he told me that.
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Did you discuss the substance of that
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such a meeting limited to three, four, or five.
memorandum?
Mr. Bundy. I discussed it initially with Mr. McCone.
Did you discuss it with Mr. McNamara?
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Mr. Smothers.
Mr. Bundy. He mentioned it to me. I don't recall much
about it.
Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the meeting of August 10
in Secretary Rusk's office?
Mr. Bundy. That was the first discussed because the
newspapers said that there had been a meeting of three, four
or five of us, and the question was whether there had been
And we were able
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to satisfy ourselves that that was wrong.
Mr. Smothers.
That was wrong. What do you recall to
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have been Mr. McNamara's reaction of the August 10 meeting?
Mr. Bundy. He didn't seem to have any that I can recall,
at least I don't recall that he told me of any reaction of
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Mr. Smothers.
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Do you recall the substance of his
comment regarding the 1967 McCone report?
Mr. Bundy.
No.
I don't think he commented on it.
He
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told me what it said.
Mr. Smothers.
With regard to your conversation with
Mr. McCone, when did this occur, approximately?
Mr. Bundy. That occurred earlier on.
Mr. Smothers.
Before the Rockefeller Commission inquiry?
Mr. Bundy. I don't know exactly when it was. But it
was within the context of the Rockefeller Commission
inquiry and not this inquiry.
Are you talking about more than one
conversation?
Mr. Bundy. No, I think I talked to him on the phone
and then I had a meeting with him.
Mr. Smothers. In either the phone conversation or the
meeting did you discuss Mr. McCone's 1967 report?
Mr. Bundy. He told me that he had heard of it. I don't
think he had then seen it.
Mr. Smothers.
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Mr. Smothers.
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You don't think he had then seen it?
Mr. Bundy. He had then seen it as of 1975. He obviously
saw it in 1967.
Can you give us a feeling for the approx-
imate time when this conversation occurred?
Mr. Bundy. I could probably work it out from my own
calendar, but I don't have it in my head.
But at this time he had not seen the
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Mr. Smothers.
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report?
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Mr. Bundy. He had not seen the report in 1975. But
since it is a report that as understand it, it is a
report that he made in 1967, and he had seen it then.
Mr. Smothers. Did he indicate to you that he was
making an effort to get that report?
Mr. Bundy. I think he told me that he had been in touch
with the Agency and would be seeing the report, but I don't
really recall.
Mr. Smothers. To go into your conversation with Mr.
Rostow, would you indicate to the Committee, please, the
substance of that conversation?
him after my conversation
Mr. Bundy. Yes. I called
with Mr. Bissell, because it seemed to me that he ought to
be informed, and the two of them ought to talke with each
other about that testimony.
Mr. Smothers. At the time you called him it was your
impression that Mr. Bissell had not talked with Mr. Rostow?
mony?
Mr. Bundy. But was planning to.
Mr. Smothers. And this was after Mr. Bissell's testi-
Mr. Bundy. That if right.
Mr. Smothers. Did you and Mr. Rostow discuss the fact
that both you and Mr. Rostow had been named as potential
sources for the Exective Action authorization?
Mr. Bundy. My emphasis in talking about Mr. Rostow was
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the fact that he had been mentioned, because it seemed to me
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interested in getting it straightened out.
Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversation with Mr.
Goodwin. Did you call him or did he call you?
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Mr. Bundy. I called him.
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Mr. Smothers. And the nature of that conversation?
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Mr. Bundy. That conversation was about the Dominican
Republic, because of my complete failure of recollection as
to who or what the White House line of action, responsibility
and concern was with respect to the Dominican Republic in
1961. And I called him, and I called Dungan, and I called
Schlesinger, because they were the the who had been very
much involved in things like the Alliance for Progress, and
new appointments to embassies in Latin America, and Latin
American Policy generally, except for the Bay of Pigs.
And
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I wanted to see if they had recollections about events in.
that spring that were more extensive than mine. I didn't learn
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very much, but that was the purpose of the call.
Mr. Smothers. And it it your testimony that your first
exposure to the documentary evidence beyond these recollections
was when either the Rockefeller Commission staff or this
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Mr. Bundy. I want to be precise about the Rockefeller
They did not show me the documents, the
Commission staff.
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White House Staff showed me the documents.
Mr. Smothers The White House Staff showed you the
documents?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Smothers. Under what circumstance did the White House
Was it at your request,
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Mr. Bundy. My request.
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Mr. Smothers. When did it occur?
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Mr. Bundy. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings.
Mr. Smothers. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Smothers. And prior to your testimony?
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Mr. Bundy. Yes.
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Mr. Smothers.
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Who provided these documents to you?
Mr. Bundy. I never have testified on this is not a
serious matter, because there is no secret about it. But I
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have always taken the position that White House decisions
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House.
are for the White House to discuss, and I perfer to hold to
that position now.
Mr. Smothers. Are you saying that you do not feel at
liberty
Mr. Bundy. No, I am not saying, I am saying that I would
request the committee to address that question with the White
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The Chairman What is the question?
Mr. Smothers.
The question is who in the White House
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provided Mr. Bundy with documents relevant to this investigation.
4 And I believe his position is that he would prefer not to
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disclose that matter, or that that is a matter for the
Committee's determination.
Mr. Bundy. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman, because you
were out of the room, that I have always taken the position
and permission was given.
would rather not discuss it, because I think it is for the
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to discuss.
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I always asked permission to see documentation
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I looked at the document, but I
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White House to discuss it.
The Chairman. What is the document?
Mr. Bundy. I just described it, it is National Security
Action Memorandum No. 1, we showed us the National Security
Action file, which I believe your staff has.
Mr. Schwarz. We have it here.
Mr.
Smothers. My question was, who had the request been
made to, and showed him the document?
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Mr. Bundy. My point is that I have tried historically
not to discuss this kind of question when it is something
that concerns the White House, but to leave it to the White
House to discuss it, and I would prefer to hold to that
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(Off the record.)
Mr. Smothers. This quite frankly, Mr. Bundy,
this
is of concern to the
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Committee.
You mentioned conversations with Mr. Schlesinger. Again,
were those initiated by you?
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Mr. Bundy. The most recent one, he called me.
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think there were earlier ones, but I don't know.
And I
I can't be
precise. I must say I don't know that I understand the line
of questioning. These are very important matters, and
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people closely involved in them should be trying to get a
clear sense of what each other remembers after this many
years, it seems to me this would be entirely natural.
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Mr. Smothers. I don't question the fact that it is
I think one of the difficult things
for this Committee to do is to separate out, if you will,
natural, Mr. Bundy.
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the independent recollections from the documentary evidence
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we have shown you, and from conversations with others
Mr. Bundy. You are quite right.
And I have tried
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quite carefully to tell you my recollection.
Mr. Smothers. We are merely trying now to establish
those relationships so that when we get the point in the
record there is some question regarding the nature of the
recollection that might be of some assistance to us.
That
is not an attack on your veracity, it is not an attempt to
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see if there has been any effort at collusion
or whatever,
but merely to give us some guidelines in looking at the
record.
Do you recall, Mr. Bundy, from these conversations that
we have just mentioned, any matters which have been raised
by the participants that may be inconsistent with the
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documentary record as you have seen it?
We know, of course,
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that Mr. McNamara's recollection appears to be inconsistent
with the documentary evidence regarding the August 10
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Mr. Bundy. Well, so was mine. And I have no such
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a clearcut and comprehensive answer.
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recollection.
Mr. Smothers. I am speaking now of the recollection of
others, if you will.
Mr. Bundy. I can't really recite on that, because I
haven't made the kind of comparison document by document
and conversation by conversation that would allow me to make
But I don't have any
recollection of sharp divergency of that sort.
The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to pick up on one
thing that you testified to that was left hanging and then
come back through your involvement with Cuba and starting
from the beginning. You testified that to your knowledge
no authorization for an assassination was given.
I want to
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come at the subject from another direction.
Were you ever
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actually under way with respect to Mr.
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Castro?
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Mr. Bundy.
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Castro?
Absolutely not.
Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that the
Central Intelligence Agency had hired the Mafia to assassinate
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Mr. Bundy. No.
Mr.
Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that during
the MONGOOSE program Mr. Harvey was engaged in assassination
efforts upon Fidel Castro?
Mr. Bundy.
No.
Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in the
fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was passing
assassination devices to a Cuban military officer?
Mr. Bundy. No.
Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in the
fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in
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an assassination effort with respect to Fidel Castro?
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Mr. Bundy.
No.
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Mr. Schwarz. Now, after the Bay of Pigs, was there a
reevaluation or reconsideration of what the policy toward Cuba
should be? And would you turn in that connection to Tab B,
of the Bundy Book 1 of 2
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Senator Tower. May I raise a purely technical point.
I
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think we use the term, the
Mafia was hired to assassinate Castro, I think that was
inaccurate, because I don't think we have anything that
know it is not intentional, but
indicates that we contacted the syndicate as such, and I think
if we use, "individuals likely associated with the Mafia,"
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or something like that
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it is a little technical.
Mr. Schwarz. Let me restate the question to make sure
that there is not a problem with the scope of my question.
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And Senator Tower is correct.
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Were you ever told that the Agency had contacted a man
called John Roselli?
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Mr. Bundy. No.
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Mr. Schwarz. A man called Sam Giancana?
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Mr. Bundy. No.
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Mr. Schwarz. A man called Santos Traficante?
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Mr. Bundy. No.
Mr. Schwarz. Any person who was a criminal or allegedly
a criminal for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro?
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Mr. Bundy. No.
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Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection whatsoever
related to the subject we have been exploring in that group
of questions?
we mb
Mr. Bundy. No you are familiar with the fact that
refreshed my recollection of activities associated with the
Mafia in a law enforcement context in Florida in 1964.
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Mr. Schwarz.
down right now.
Since you raised it, let's just pin that
What happened in 1964 with respect to the
Mavia and Cuba, to the best or your recollection?'
we will just mark some documents.
And then
Mr. Bundy. Let me be clear that my recollection here is
Perhaps you would rather come back to
entirely refreshed.
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it?
Mr. Schwarz.
Let's put it in the record here, since we
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have raised the subject.
Let's mark as Bundy Exhibit 1 the Helms memo to DCA
on the Cuban exile plan dated June 10, 1964.
(Document referred to is marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)
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As Bundy Exhibit 2A
the minutes of the
Mr. Schwarz.
meeting of the 303 Committee dated June 22, 1964.
(Document referred to is marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 2A for identification.)
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Mr Schwarz.
As Bundy Exhibit 2B the minutes of the
303 Committee of 18 June 1964.
(Document referred to is marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 2B for
identification.)
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Mr Schwarz
And Bundy Exhibit 2C the minutes of the
303 Committee of July 31, 1964.
(Document referred to is marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 2C for
identification:).
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Mr. Schwarz.
And as Bundy Exhibit 2D the memorandum
for the Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to
the President, "Status of FBI Investigation re Plans by Cuban
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Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders,"
dated
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August 19, 1964.
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(Document referred to is marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 2D for
identification.)
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Mr. Bundy, based upon your having had an
opportunity prior to the testimony, and now again if you seek
to do so, to refresh your recollection, will you recount for
the Committee what happened in the summer of 1964 in connect-
ion with this matter?
Mr. Bundy. Well, it is a relatively small matter in the
context of what you are discussing, but what happened in the
summer of 1964 was that it came to our attention that there
were relations between Cuban refugees in Cuba and people
9
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apparently associated with the Mafia.
And this did not seem
11
to be a good idea.
And this was in a period in which
12
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sentiment had been steadily growing for some time against
activities by Cuban refugees that were wholly outside the
control and not really in the interest of the U.S., and that
they should be associated with a criminal group.
And so when the matter came to the Special Group, the
decision was made to refer it to the Department of Justice
17
as a matter of internal American law enforcement.
That was
18
done.
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20
And the Department said that it was going after the
matter, which it then did, and reported back.
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The reports don't give any conclusive picture of what
really was going on, but they do show that the Bureau went
to a number of people asking around about these matters,
and
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as far as I know, it then faded away.
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Mr. Schwarz.
In the context of that discussion did
anybody from the Central Intelligence Agency or anybody
else inform you that in earlier years there had been
4
a relationship with
to use Senator Tower's caution
5
with persons alledgedly involved with the criminal syndicate
in order to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castor?
Mr. Bundy.
No.
8
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It is at Tab B of the Senator's Book 1 of 2.
12
Mr. Schwarz.
Now, going back to the post-Bay of Pigs
period, would you put before the witness and mark as Exhibit
2 the National Security minutes of a meeting held May 5, 1961.
This reflects,
am I correct, Mr. Bundy, a discussion of Cuba, held with the
L
13
President and high officials of the government who are all
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listed on the front page?
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Mr. Bundy.
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Mr. Schwarz.
agreed, following the discussion that U.S. policy toward Cuba
should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the
measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end,
the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to
further action?
Correct.
And Cuba was discussed, and it was
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.Mr. Schwarz.
to at that point?
Mr. Bundy. My only way of doing that with any accuracy
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Mr.
Bundy.
Right.
Now, can you describe the measures agreed
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is to in effect to quote from or summarize this document,
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Mr. Schwarz.
The document speaks for itself, then.
And
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you can add nothing to it?
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Mr. Bundy.
No.
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Mr. Schwarz.
But can you say that the measures did or
did not include assassination?
Mr. Bundy.
There is nothing in my recollection and
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nothing in the document that seems to me to imply assassin-
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ation.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Now,
following this instruction, was
12
Cuban policy reviewed again in the fall of 1961?
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Mr. Bundy.
Yes.
Mr. Schwarz.
15
And ultimately out of the fall review
in 1961 came the so-called MONGOOSE program; is that correct?
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Mr. Bundy.
That is right.
Mr. Schwarz.
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in Cuba.
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Now, prior to discussing upon the MONGOOSE
program, did you consider a lot of other options?
I think we were
and this is a hard
Mr. Bundy.
question, but I think what we were doing was working toward
an organization that would be able to take charge of the
complicated, varied inter-departmental kinds of things involved
We have been concentrating this morning on covert
actions, but there were also propaganda problems, economic
problems, and Cuban refugee problems in Miami, and a number
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of others that did not all fall within one jurisdiction.
1
Anytime you get that kind of problem you have an organization
problem. And the solution of 1961, which took sometime to
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Mr. Schwarz.
4
work out, as the passage of time suggests, was the creation
5
of a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of General
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Taylor and with General Lansdale as its operating officer.
Mr. Schwarz. Now, in the course of the review that did
take place prior to the establishment of that Special Committee
which then got called the MONGOOSE program, was one of the
matters which was considered the assassination of Mr. Castro?
Mr. Bundy. As I have already said, I can not tell you
But I recall no sustained
that this question never came up.
discussion of that matter in that period.
Whether you recall a sustained discussion
15
or not
16
Mr. Bundy.
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I don't recall a discussion that I can pin-
point anywhere, but over the period of 1961 to 1963 the
subject was mentioned from time to time by different individ-
19
uals, never to me that I can recall by the President.
But
it did come up.
20
Mr. Schwarz.
And it may have come up in this period in
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the fall of 1961 as something to consider, is that correct?
Mr. Bundy. As something to talk about rather than to
consider, would be my answer.
Mr. Schwarz.
Would you put before the witness as Bundy
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Exhibit 3 the National Security Action Memorandum No. 100,
:
dated October 5, 1961, Tab C of the Senator's Bundy Book 1.
And as Bundy Exhibit 3A the minutes of the Special Group
meeting dated October 6, 1961, which is at Lansdale Tab 2.
(Document referred to is marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)
(Document referred to is marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)
(Document referred to is marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 3A for identification.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Would you give a copy of the other document,
the Parrott document, to all the Senators too?
And finally, as Bundy Exhibit 3B a memorandum which we
have retyped from an indistinct original dated October 5,
Cuba, signed by Mr. Parrott.
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1961 For the Record,
Subject:
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And the indistinct original is attached.
(Document referred to is marked as
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Bundy Exhibit No. 3B for identification)
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Mr.Schwarz.
you the question
Mr. Bundy, to summarize
before I ask
in NSAM No. 100 you sent to the Secretary
3 of State the following note:
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"In
conformation of oral
instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State
Woodward, a plan is desired to the indicated contingency in
Cuba". Do you have an independent recollection of what that
indicated contingency was?
Mr. Bundy. Before seeing this document?
Mr. Schwarz.
Before seeing the documents.
10
Mr. Bundy.
No.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Exhibit 3A and 3B, do you agree that the contingency referred
to in 3A and the contingency referred to in 3B are related
to NSAM No. 100?
Having looked at not only Exhibit 3, but
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Mr. Bundy.
Yes, I do.
Mr. Schwarz.
Now,
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the contingency referred to in 3B,
which is the earlier of the two following documents, is
said by Mr. Parrott to be a plan against the contingency that
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Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban
scent. And I am going to come to some of the other parts
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of that document with respect to the President's interest or
not.
And the contingency in 3A, which is the minutes of the
Special Group, as characterized as follows: "Mr. Parrott also
told the Group that two other exercises are in progress in
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connection with Cuba, the preparation of
contingency plan
in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the
Cuban scene, and an updating of the overall plan for
covert operations".
Now, after having reviewed those documents, and in the
light of your testimony that it is possible that the
consideration of the possibility of assassination which you
say did occur at some point, occurred in the fall of 1961,
do you agree that at that time the contingency under consider-
ation here was the possibility of the assassination of Castro?
No, I would put it another way.
Mr. Bundy.
gency here is, what would we do if Castro were no longer
there. So that the question of how Castro ceased to be
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there is left out of this set of papers.
15
The contin-
Clearly one of
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the possibilities would be assassination, but only one of
them. What we are talking about here, as I read the docu-
ments, is a plan against the contingency that I am not reading
from the Parrott memorandum, against the contingency that
Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban
NSAM 100, whose language is indirect, nonetheless
indicates, to me at least, rereading it, that the President
wanted to know what was likely to happen if Castro were no
He was, in other words, trying to get a picture
longer there.
scene.
of whether that would really change things, and if so, in
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what way.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Just one detail that Mr. Smothers suggested
to me. Is NSAM 100 what the White House showed you, or is
it another document?
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to see the documents relating to
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Mr. Bundy.. No, 181. But let me be precise. I asked
from the National Security
files relating to August 1962. And they gave me the NSAM
file identified as the significant memorandum, NSAM 181.
the contingency to be examined,
8
Mr. Schwarz.
NOW,
therefore, was what would happen
By Ge
would it help the U.S.,
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that is the question, if Castro were to disappear?
11
Mr. Bundy. What would it be like if Castro were to
12
disappear? The question is open ended.
Mr. Schwarz.
What was the conclusion?
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Mr.
Bundy.
I don't remember.
My unaided sense of the
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matter is that intelligent political analysis would have
suggested in 1961 or at any time later that the removal of a
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single individual in a revolution complex and general as this
would have quite unpredictable and not necessarily helpful
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effects.
Mr. Schwarz. You said that while you were clear the
assassination was not in fact authorized, you believe that
at some point it was examined, is that a fair characterization
Mr. Bundy. That isn't the word I used. Talk about.
Talk about. And this exercise constitutes
Mr. Schwarz.
an analysis of what Cuba/the U.S. would be like if Castro were
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removed.
Mr. Bundy.
Mr. Schwarz.
It constitutes a request for such an analysis.
Was the analysis made?
Mr. Bundy. I don't have any recollection.
Mr. Schwarz. If one were exploring the possibility of
assassination, I take it this kind of analysis is the sort
of analysis one would wish to make if one was not simply
ruling assassination out as a matter of principle in the first
instance.
Mr. Bundy. Let me put it another way. If people were
suggesting this to you, and you were curious about whether
it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it
without going any further with that notion itself would be
to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they
thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer.
You will notice that this National Security Action
Memorandum is not addressed to the Central Intelligence
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Agency, less still to the covert part of the Agency, but
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rather to the Secretary of State. And specifically clearly
the action of certain is Assistant Secretary Woodward.
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WWW >>
and you
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Mr. Schwarz. Now, document 3B indicates
have had an opportunity to review this one before, I think
Mr. Bundy. Which one are we now talking about?
Mr. Schwarz. 3B, Mr. Parrott's memo.
24
Mr. Bundy. Yes. I have a clearer copy now than I had
25
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Mr. Schwarz.
1
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yesterday, for which I am grateful
It indicates that there was
a Presidential
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interest in the matter.
And then General Taylor told Mr.
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Parrott that he prefered that the State Department, or Mr.
Woodward in the State Department, not be told about the
Presidential interest in the matter.
Presidential interest in the matter?
doubt that there was, I take it.
First, was there a
You have no reason to
I am sorry, I was reading a note, and I
Mr. Bundy.
didn't hear the last part of the question.
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Mr. Schwarz.
I asked really two questions, the first
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of which is a direct question, was there a Presidential
interest in the matter?
14
Mr. Bundy. There was
a Presidential
--
there was
no
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doubt in my mind that when I write in a National Security
Action Memorandum a plan as desired, that the desire is not
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mine.
18
Mr. Schwarz.
And the desire is in fact the Presidents?
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Mr. Bundy.
Yes.
Mr. Schwarz.
Now, have you any other recollection of
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Mr. Bundy.
22
calling your attention to the fall of 1969?
Could I go back and comment on your earlier
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question.
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You correctly pointed out that there was concern to
keep the President's name out of this process of request,
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although you correctly point out that the President was the
one who wanted to know. My impression here is that whatever
3 concern we have, General Taylor or I, in the frame of this
language, it was precisely to insulate the President from
4
any false inference that what he was asking about was
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assassination. It is easy to confuse the question.
What
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are things going to be like after Castro, with the other
question, and we were trying to focus attention on the
information he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen
if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the
frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it.
That is the distinction, I think.
Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any further recollection of
discussion of this matter in this fall of 1961? And by this
matter I mean either the broader inquiry into what it would
be like if Castro disappeared, or a scenario arising of the
specific subject of assassination.
Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.
19
Mr. Schwarz.
Had you ever heard before I asked you
20
about the last night about a conversation, an alledged conver-
sation, between the President and the Journalist Theodore
2.1
Schwartz, and or Mr. Goodwin in this timeframe?
22
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Mr. Bundy? I saw that in the newspapers.
Mr. Schwarz.
Or in Esquire magazine?
24
Mr. Bundy.
Wherever I saw it, I saw it in print.
25
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Mr. Schwarz. But you have no independent recollection
of that or of the fact that Mr. Schultz met with the President?
Mr. Bundy. No. But I will say this
observation
and it is a random
if I were planning an action of great sensitivity
I wouldn't discuss it with any journalist, I don't think.
Mr. Schwarz. The record from Mr. Schwartz is that the
President said he was opposed to assassination, but that he
brought it up in a conversation with Mr. Schwartz, saying
that he was being encouraged to order assassination.
Now, you have said that you do recall that the subject
was talked about, your words, at some point, and that it
might have been in the fall of 1961.
Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't want to say that it was only in
any given period.
Mr. Schwarz. But that one of the points in which it
might have been discussed was the fall of 1961.
Mr. Bundy. Certainly.
Mr. Schwarz. We are going to come to another period
which relates to you.
Mr. Bundy. May I interrupt one second.
Could we go off the record for a moment?
The Chairman.
Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Chairman. Let's put that on the record.
Would you restate what I have just stated?
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Mr. Bundy. Going back to your earlier, question, I
have a message through the courtesy of the Committee from the
3 White House that there is no objection to answering the
4
question as to how the White House came to show me the NSC file.
5
When I learned of some of the interests of the Rockefeller
6
Commission, it seemed to me that it would be useful if I
7
could refresh my recollection.
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I telephoned Dr. Kissinger,
who it seemed to me would be the right person both in his
capacity as Special Assistant and the capacity as Secretary
of State, and he called me back to say that General Scocroft
would show me the documents I needed, and he did not.
12
Mr. Smothers. Just one question.
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This file contained what, now, other than the NSAM?
The only file that I had time to go through
Mr. Bundy.
that I can recollect was the NSAM file, which is a relatively
16
short one.
17
Mr. Smothers.
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For which time period?
Mr. Bundy. For the period surrounding August 1962.
Mr. Smothers. It was given to us as an existing file,
or matters that had been pulled, or organized
1
Mr. Bundy. No, they gave me the whole file, they were
22
all documents that I have been involved with, it was nothing
23
new to me. But the ones I was looking for were the ones
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relating to this subject.
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Mr. Smothers. Were these only your documents?
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Mr. Bundy.
Mr. Smothers.
signed by you?
TOP SECRET
As far as I recollect.
And by your documents, I mean documents
Mr. Bundy.
They wouldn't be all signed by me, not
every NSMA was signed by me.
But they would all be documents
5
for which I had responsibility.
6
Mr. Smothers.
And the timeframe was
7
Mr. Bundy.
Sufficiently before and after to give me
a
8
picture of the political context of August 1962 in relation
9
to Cuba.
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Mr.
Smothers. And do you recall when you saw this file?
Mr. Bundy. Well, as I say, it was in the context of my
And that would
appearance before the Rockeferrer Commission.
be early this year.
I don't have the dates, and I don't
14
ང་་
want to make a mistake on it.
Mr.
Smothers. I am not trying to pin the date down.
would be helpful if you remember.
But we can ask.
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Schwarz.
I want to make sure that we have what we
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with it.
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have done so for accurately summarized, and that you agree
Can I use discussion of an assassination, will you
accept that?
Mr. Bundy. It implies more seriousness and more
sustained argument than I recollect.
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Mr. Schwarz. So your records are, with respect to
persons asking about--
Mr. Bundy. Or talking about.
Mr. Schwarz.
or talking about assassination, that
did occur, that it probably occurred on more than one occasion?
Mr. Bundy.
Yes.
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Mr. Schwarz.
And that one of the occasions may have
been in the fall of 1961?
Mr. Bundy.
What I recollect about the fall of 1961 is
this question, what would happen if he is not there?
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Mr. Schwarz.
Which would be a relevant question to ask
if one was talking about assassination.
Mr. Bundy.
Yes.
But I have no independent recollection
of talks about assassination, Mr. Schwarz, and I musn't lead
you by saying that I did.
Mr. Schwarz. In any event, passing from talking about or
discussions or contingencies, to authorizations for action,
and specifically focusing on this concrete period, was
assassination authorized in the fall of 1961?
Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.
21
Mr. Schwarz.
In fact what was authorized in the fall of
22
1961?
23
Mr. Bundy.
Well, we have a long document on that, I
think.
24
Mr. Schwarz.
And that is the MONGOOSE program?
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Mr. Bundy.
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Mr. Schwarz.
And that is the MONGOOSE programs.
In connection with the MONGOOSE program,
you had some dialogue about the Attorney General which was
Let me ask you one additional question on
4
quite extensive.
5
that subject.
What was the relationship personally and pro-
6
fessionally between the Attorney General and General Maxwell
7
Taylor?
8
Mr. Bundy. It was very close.
I think that they first
9
met in a hardworking sense when they were
I think they
10
were both members of the committee to look into what happened
11
after the Bay of Pigs, or if the Attorney General was not
12
a member he was certainly closely interested.
13
Mr. Schwarz.
He was a member.
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Mr. Bundy. And I am sure the Attorney General was
one of the people strongly favoring the appointment of General
Taylor as the President's military advisor.
They were both
active and ardent tennis players, they liked each other, and
(
18
they visited back and forth.
One of the Kennedy children
.19
is named for General Taylor, I think.
There was a relation of
20
real trust and confidence between them.
And the measure of
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its strength is that I think it easily survived later very
shart differences over Vietnam.
Mr. Schwarz.
Now recognizing that, what I am asking for
you is a matter of opinion and not a fact, given your under-
standing of that relationship, will you give us your opinion
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the likelihood that Robert Kennedy, in the face of Maxwell.
Taylor's Chairmanship of the Special Group Augmented
Maxwell Taylor understood to be the Chairman of the Special
Group Augmented?
Mr. Bundy. It certainly is my understanding.
Mr. Schwarz.
-- was
Would Robert Kennedy in your opinion,
in the fact of Maxwell Taylor's Chairmanship of the Special
Group Augmented, have developed a bach-channel relationship
with someone else for the purpose of assassinating Fidel
9
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Castro?
Mr. Bundy.
No.
11
Mr.
Schwarz.
Now, in connection with MONGOOSE, you were
12
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a member of the Special Group Augmented, were you?
Mr. Bundy.
I was.
I wasn't its most faithful attender,
14
but I was a member.
15
Mr. Schwarz.
To the extent that you did attend, would
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you describe the nature of the meetings, what kind of items
were brought before you, what was the process for decision
making?
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documentary reconstruction.
think I can do it.
training them, how united are they, whose the leader, and
what kind of operations against the island are we able to
mount, specific proposals, just because I have seen it in
TOP SECRET
Mr. Bundy.
It is very difficult to do that without
But in the broadest sense, I
The kinds of things would be Cuban exiles
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the last two or three days -- I saw a sabotage program which
involved, I think, oil facilities, transportation facilities,
3 and a couple of other categories.
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exfiltration was a
frequent problem. I don't recall that we worried so much
about getting the agents in, but there seems always to be
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a great problem about getting them out.
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And that sort of
thing that I mentioned, propaganda, there was the one island
enterprise
was Florida doing much good, and how much
does it cost and things of that sort.
Mr. Schwarz. At any MONGOOSE meeting did Mr. Harvey
state that he had taken steps to assassinate Fidel Castro?
Mr. Bundy. I never heard anything from Mr. Harvey in
any context in any meeting at any time on that subject.
Mr. Schwarz. And it was clear that the President was
the person basically in control, perhaps not of the details,
but of the general program; is that right?
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Mr. Bundy. The President had worked it.
day operations where in the hands of different departments
for different categories of programs. The coordinator was
General Lansdale, and the Chairman of the Committee was General
The day to
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Taylor.
Mr. Schwarz.
Would you turn to Lansdale Tab 38, please?
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Where is the August 8 document that transmits
the new
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guidelines for MONGOOSE?
Mr. Kelley. That is Lansdale Tab 20.
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Mr. Schwarz. The new guidelines, I mean the August
guidelines.
Mr. Kelley. 38.
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Was there a change in or about August between what was
characterized as Phase I of Operation MONGOOSE and a step-up
activities under the MONGOOSE?
Mr. Bundy. It appeared to be so from the documents I have
been reviewing. I couldn't give you an independent recollection
on that point.
Mr. Schwarz. You have got no reason to doubt that there
was some step-up commencing in August?
Mr. Bundy. I think that sounds reasonable. I just
don't have any expertise other than as a reader many years
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later.
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you have previously testified
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Mr. Schwarz. Now, with respect to the August 10 meeting,
I am not sure you have
w
do you recall the subject of assassinations being brought up?
Mr. Bundy. In the August 10 meeting? No.
Mr. Schwarz. Specifically, do you recall Mr. McNamara
ever bringing the subject of assassinations up?
Mr. Bundy. No.
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Mr. Schwarz. We have shown you notes of Mr. Harvey on
August 14, and General Lansdale's memorandum of August 13
that refers to the liquidation of leaders and certain things
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whited out. Do you remember seeing those?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.
:90
me.
Mr. Schwarz. Do they refresh your recollection?
Mr. Bundy. No. They give me no they do not persuade
I simply don't from that suddenly have any flash, so and
so said that, not at all.
Mr. Schwarz. But you don't have any reason to question
them, you just don't have a recollection, is that fair?
Mr. Bundy. I simply tell you that I was in a large
meeting in which a great many subjects were discussed, and
I have no recollection of that.
Mr. Schwarz. I will pass around Mr. Bundy's notes from
the meeting. If someone thinks they should be marked we can
do that.
Mr. Bundy. If the Committee is feeling charitable I hope
they may not go into them.
Mr. Schwarz. I don't think they will, but I thought we
would pass them around in case they were.
The Chairman. Let the Senators see them.
Mr. Schwarz. We will make one observation, though.
Both
Mr. Rusk's calendar and Mr. Bundy's notes do not indicate
Mr. Lansdale's being present at the meeting, although the
minutes of the meeting do. And I take it you have no
independent. recollection of whether or not he was not there.
Mr. Bundy. I have no objection to entering anything in
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anything that memorandum that the Committee thinks is
relevant. It simply illustrates what the hand will do
while the mind is elsewhere.
The Chairman. Can you identify what you meant by the
words, "Worms who were opposing".
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Mr. Bundy.
"Worms" was a Cuban word, gusanos, and
it
was their own word for themselves, Cubans in opposition to
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Castor.
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(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Bundy, would you mark with a B your
notes of the August 10 meeting.
And Mr. Reporter, will you mark that as Bundy Exhibit 4.
(Document referred to was marked as
Bundy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)
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The Chairman. Going back to the doodle sheet, the
last item in your handwritten underlined
Mr. Bundy. The Lansdale concept?
The Chairman. Is that concept?
do you have this?
Mr. Bundy. Concept. I don't wonder you ask.
The Chairman. Do you recall what you meant by that?
Mr. Bundy. My guess
— —
we wi
and this is a reconstruction
really is that that has to do with the Lansdale plan which
we were referring to a minute ago, his long memorandum of
10
August 8, outlining all the things that might now be done
11
under the MONGOOSE.
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Mr. Smothers. Would that have been planned plus?
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Mr. Bundy. We argue about plans this is again
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reconstruction
axe dize
and I think I saw it in some discussion
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we argued about plans A and B and C, and settled on so-called
B Plus, which I hope you have for the record, because that
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would show what the decision was.
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Mr. Schwarz. We do have it.
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The Chairman.
This was the 10th day of August 1962. And
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that was about the time that some concern was given to be
expressed as to the possibility that the Russians were moving
moving missiles into Cuba. You have on the
memorandum, I think, "USSR will put missiles". Do you recall
into Cuba
what you meant by that?
Mr. Bundy. I think what that is, a hand following
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somebody elses and the somebody else would most likely to
be Mr. McCone.
The Chairman.:: All right.
Where are we, Mr. Schwarz.
50
Mr.
Schwarz.
In NSAM 181
6'
as Exhibit 5.
You will find
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which will you please mark
it at Lansdale Tab 41.
(Document referred to was marked
as Lansdale Exhibit No. 5 for
identification.)
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Mr. Schwarz. Do you have that in front of you, Mr.
Bundy?
Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.
Mr. Schwarz. This reflects a number of options or
study that the President called for in the light of the
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evidence of new block activities in Cuba.
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Was that evidence
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connected with the missiles?
Mr. Bundy. Well, there was quite a buildup reported
in the press and in the intelligence initially of Soviet
military personnel, of Soviet surface-to-air missiles.
And
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the Director of Central Intelligence
the crucial question was, what for and what is coming.
who was proved in
And
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the end to be right
was almost alone in his belief that
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this was going to lead to a nuclear capability in Cuba that
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could hit the U.S. And he raised these questions in the
month of August in a number of different ways.
And the
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National Security meeting from which this memorandum emerged
reviewed those problems, and as the memorandum itself shows,
the heavy emphasis of the President's concern and of the
Group's concern on the likelihood that developed and what
should be done about it, or in preparation for it, in August.
Mr. Schwarz. The memorandum has quite a range of matters
to be considered. And they range from, if I can use the
characterization, on the soft side, Item 1, which was consider-
ation of the U.S.: pulling its missiles near the Soviet Union out
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of Turkey, two, on the hard side, Items 7 and 8
, which
are military possibilities of invasion or some other military
possibilities in connection with Cuba.
Now, is that a
typical exercise that that White House, the President and
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yourself would go through to look at a number of options
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ranging from the soft to the very tough?
Mr. Bundy.
Yes.
Let me say in passing that there was nothing soft about
the problem of getting the Jupiter missiles out of Cuba.
Mr. Schwarz.
Conciliatory, would that be the word?
Mr. Bundy. It problem of actually getting them out
which we came to in the following year was one which
demanded great diplomatic energy and finesse on the part of
14
the State and Defense Departments.
But you are right.
A
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wide range of issues charactically would be discussed.
And
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the President had a habit of trying to look at problems from
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many angles.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Were you fully in touch with the President
19
in connection with what became the missile crisis.
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Mr. Bundy.
Yes.
Mr. Schwarz.
Was there any discussion of assassinating
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Fidel Castro during that period?
Mr. Bundy.
None.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Was there agreement reached that as part
of the solution to the missile crisis that related to U.S.
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action vis-a-vis Cuba
pledge. There was
There was
(so-called no invasion
an undertaking on our side that if the
offensive capabilities
and there was an argument on what
those were were removed, we on our side would undertake
KG-D
I don't want to present this language as if it is deeply
mathmatically precise but there was an undertaking on our
side that there would not be an assassination of Cuba..
The Chairman. Was that ever published?
Mr. Bundy. Yes. If my language is inconsistent with
what was published, then what was published should take
precedence, because I am only trying to report that.
Mr. Schwarz. Did this agreement exclude the sabotage
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Mr. Bundy.
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U.S. Government.
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of Cuban facilities?
Not in my view or in anyones' view in the
Just to give you an example of things it
did not exclude, it did not exclude continued surveillance,
which is not perfectly normal in relations between friendly
states, that you overfly and check out what they are doing.
But surveillance was an explicit and public part of the
necessary concern for U.S. satisfaction with the resolution
of the Cuban missile crisis.
Mr. Schwarz. Recognizing again that this is calling for
an opinion, during the course of the missile crisis did
anything happen with respect to the attitudes and actions of
either the President or the Attorney General that in your
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opinion bears upon the likelihood that at other times one
or the other of them ordered the assassination of Fidel
Castro?
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Mr. Bundy. Well, yes. There are a great many things that
enter into my judgment about whether the President or the
Attorney General would ever have done that, and I would like
to say, Mr. Chairman, that the most important point I want to
make, just from where I stand personally is that ï find the
notion that they separately, privately encouraged, ordered,
arranged efforts at assassination totally inconsistent with
And as an example, I would cite
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the role played by the Attorney
and only one among very many
General in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most
emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike
or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor
of the more careful approach which was eventually adopted by
the President in the form of a quarrantine or a blockade.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Bundy, let me put what may be
the same question a little different way.
You came to know both the President and the Attorney
General rather intimately in the period of your long associa-
tion with them, did you not?
Mr. Bundy. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman.
Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you
believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during
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that whole period,
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either one of them would have authorized
the assassination of Fidel Castro?
Mr. Bundy. I most emphatically do not.
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Let me make a more general point that comes at it from
another way.
If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do
something about Cuba, there was.
There was an effort, both from
the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his
style to keep the government active in looking for ways to
7
weaken the Cuban regime.
There was. But if you, as I under-
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stand it, and not even those who pressed the matter most closely
as having essentially been inspired by the White House can tell
you that anyone ever said to them, go and kill anyone.
Let me say one other thing about these two men, and that is
that there was something that they really wanted done, they did
not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I would
say about their character, their purposes and their nature and
the way they confronted international affairs that I find it
incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitly
I also feel that if,
or implicitly an assassination of Castro.
contrary to everything that I know about their character,
they
had had such a decision and such a purpose, people would not
have been in any doubt about it.
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The Chairman. Then have you any way to explain to the
Committee, or any explanation to give to the Committee, as
to
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why Mr. Helms would testify that he was under, or that he had
no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to
not only develop schemes, but to engage in active attempts to
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assassinate Castro?
Mr. Bundy. I have no explanation of that.
Senator Mondale.
Part of our attempt to solve this riddle
of what would appear to be a record at the highest level, which
5
is at least not directly an order of an assassination plot or
6.
attempt, and square it with the fact that attempts were made, is
7
to seek to understand the personalities and motivations and
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methods of operation of people further down the chain of
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command.
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We have heard quite a few evaluations of Mr. Harvey as
a free-wheeling, James Bond kind of operator, and it has been
suggested through some disquiet and apprehension at higher
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levels about the nature of his conduct.
And I would
--
I don'
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have always admired.
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some Cuban newspaper charging that the
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know. I am beginning to have doubts about Mr. Helms whom I
There is, for example, a memorandum that
is in the record to Mr. Rusk in response to a memo which the
Secretary wrote Mr. Helms following an article appearing in
Mafia had been hired and
used by the CIA to assassinate Castro, in which Helms specifi-
cally and categorically denies flat out that any such relation-
ship existed when in fact it did and when in fact Mr. Helms was
part of it.
Now, how do we sort this out?
Is Mr. Helms someone who
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might have, on his own, gone beyond the authority conferred
25
upon him by persons higher up?
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Mr. Bundy.
Well, if you had asked me that question a
year ago, Senator, I would have said in my experience with him
3 he was not such an officer, but I have no way of dealing with
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the kind of thing you have just described.
Senator Mondale. It shatters me because I have always
respected him. Because we know that these assassination attempts
occurred. We know that Mr. Helms was a part of it. We have
testimony that Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey met and agreed not to
tell Mr. McCone what they were doing. And then we have a
.10
document here
dem dite
well, that was Cubella
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memo from Helms to Rusk which, in Minnesota
like a lie. Now, I just don't know. Maybe there are other
and then we have a
language looks
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explanations.
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མག་
The Chairman.
The memo to Rusk had to do with Cubella
15
rather than the Mafia.
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Senator Mondale. Is that it? It was not the Mafia?
Mr. Schwarz. It was Cubella, except if you just substitute
Cubella for the word Mafia.
The Chairman. What you said otherwise is correct.
Senator Mondale. But he was involved personally with
Cubella, wasn't he? And he knew that, and this memo said no.
Is there a plausible explanation?
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Mr. Madigan.
Helms has one.
24
Senator Baker.
Helms' position is that he did not lie,
25
that he did not have anything to do with the Cubella incident,
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Mr. Madigan.
I think Helms claimed that Cubella is in
102
the strict context of the memos, operating on his own.
The Chairman.
Well, I believe rather than speculate, we
had better look back carefully, and that ought to be another
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subject for Mr. Helms when he returns.
7
Senator Mondale.
Well, then I will stand corrected.
Senator Hart of Michigan.
I want to make the same record note that I suspend the
Would you yield?
10
comment I made about that document yesterday.
I thought it was
11
a flat-out lie.
Senator Mondale.
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I did too. I withdraw that, and I think
it would be good if the staff would write us a little memo.
Senator Baker. Fritz might like to know that yesterday I
asked Counsel if they, as a combined staff operation, would
prepare for us, and I believe they agreed to do this, prepare
for us two briefs, one citing the testimony and the exhibit
evidence, that would support an inference that the authority
was Presidential; and another brief, citing the record and the
exhibit evidence citing the inference that it was not.
There
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is an abundance of both, to be frank with you.
So that we
21
can lay them down side by side and make our own separate
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judgment.
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Do I understand the staff is going to do it?
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The Chairman.
That is right.
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Now
I have a couple of items of business, and you have
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been testifying for quite
long while.
think you ought to
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be given a break, Mr. Bundy.
Mr. Bundy. Do you want me to come back, Mr. Chairman?
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The Chairman.
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Yes, please, if you want to take a break
for about five or ten minutes and then be available out in the
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anteroom, that will give us a chance to take care of this
business.
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(Pause)
(Whereupon at 11:17 a.m. the witness left the hearing
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The Chairman. We seem to have a developing problem for
reasons unexplained with the Justice Department.
I have
already mentioned one aspect of that problem, in connection with
the failure of the Department to supply most of the material
that we have requested, though that request was put to the
Department two months ago, and it has been decided already by
the Committee that Mr. Levy and Mr. Kelley should be brought
8 before the Committee in the hopes that these delays can be
overcome.
The first question before the Committee is when that can
be done. It is suggested that the Attorney General has Tuesday
If it is all right with the Committee, I
would like to schedule his appearance, together with that of
Mr. Kelley, for Tuesday morning.
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morning available.
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Senator Baker.
Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to intrude my
16
personal convenience into this consideration unduly, but if
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the Attorney General could do it at Tuesday noon, say, it would
help me. I have a commitment in Tennessee Monday night.
If
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I catch the Tuesday morning plane I can't get here until 11:50.
If that's not possible, I will cancel Monday.
The Chairman. This is procedural in character, so it is
I think
Committee schedule, Tuesday
22
not altogether important that every member be present.
that from the standpoint of this
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would it not?
morning, the Attorney General and Mr. Kelley would be good,
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Mr. Miller.
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Senator Baker.
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morning.
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Yes.
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Well, why don't you leave it Tuesday
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The Chairman.. We are only informed that he whas Tuesday
morning available.
Mr. Gitenstein.. I spoke to Doug Marvin, one of his
Executive Assistants, and he said Tuesday was a possibility,
Wednesday is a problem because he has a Cabinet meeting and
he wasn't sure about Tuesday and he was going to get back to
us in the next hour or two.
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The Chairman.
Well, let's see if we can't set it up
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Tuesday.
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Senator Baker. If you can set it up Tuesday afternoon and
nobody objects, that would be better for me.
The Chairman. Well, if we can, we'll set it up Tuesday
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afternoon.
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Senator Mathias.
What is that for?
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The Chairman. That is for Levy and Kelley to appear for
the purpose of telling us why they can't, or why it has taken.
two months and we still are waiting for the documents, most
of the documents we requested.
Senator Mathias. Well, I won't be here, but that's no
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reason.
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morning?
NW 509JJ DOCTⱭ:52423406 Page 108
Senator Baker. Are you going to be here Tuesday
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Senator Mathias.
Don't worry about it.
The Chairman. All right.
The second thing I would like to bring up in this connec-
4 tion is that I was informed yesterday by the staff that the
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FBI has undoubtedly received instructions that none of its
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agents are to be interrogated or interviewed by the staff of
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this Committee. I would like someone who knows the details and
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can be very specific to tell the Committee the exact status of
that situation, how we have been informed and if we can rely on
that information as being authoritative..
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Mr. Elliff.
Yesterday morning at 9:00 o'clock or shortly
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thereafter, I received a phone call from the FBI's liaison with
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I was informed that
I had to address this request to the Justice Department in order
to secure approval for these staff interviews.
I then called our liaison in the Justice Department,
Special Counsel William O'Conner, and he told me I might as
well submit these requests in writing, because the Justice
Department would take at least ten days to give us an answer
on these requests and he didn't know what the answer was going
to be.
I then explored with him what some of the reasons might be
for this delay and what the problems seemed to be, and the
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this Committee with respect to a series of interviews that had
been arranged with the Bureau some relating to tha Huston Plan,
some relating to Martin Luther King matters.
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explanation that he gave me verbally was that the fact that
'the Committee had notified the Department in its letter of
June 27th that certain cases that we were investigating were.
abuse cases meant that any interviews that would be conducted
in connection with those matters would be considered by the
Department to be demand interviews, and therefore this brought
into play the provisions of the Federal Regulations which
require the Attorney General's approval..
Then the question as to whether the Attorney General would
First was that since we
approve or not involved two issues.
had indicated the likelihood of an abuse in a particular area
that the Department itself would have to consider whether it
should institute a criminal investigation of that matter, and
then, if so, whether our interview would interfere with that
ongoing criminal investigation.
And second, that the Department considered that any inter-
views undertaken by the Committee in such cases might inadver-
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tently immunize the subject of the interview, and he referred
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generally to some cases and we have attempted to do legal
research on those cases and find this to be a very shaky position
but they have good lawyers over there and if they want to come
up with a sophisticated argument, we expect that they could be
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The Chairman.
Lawyers can make an argument over anything.
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Mr. Elliff.
That's so.
And so the final conclusion is
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that he did anticipater that subpoenas would be required
in every instance and this position is very difficult for us to
accept because interviews, the low-key interview in the non-
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oath, via subpoena, is just absolutely essential for an effective
investitation.
So this is where we stand on this issue.
We later received a letter pertaining to an earlier
request for interviews relating to FBI COINTELPRO disruptive
activities where we had asked for certain interviews, and this
:
letter did not go into specifics, but merely stated that there
were problems that would have to be resolved, that the charac-
terization of an area of the Committee inquiry as abuse might
significantly alter arrangements of access to witnesses who
are present employees of the Department.
The Chairman. In other words, the thrust of all of this
is that the more serious the nature of the inquiry, the more
difficult it will be to obtain the information, that if we are
concerned about a possible illegality or abuse, then the
Department will make it as difficult as possible for us to
secure the information.
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Mr. Elliff..
I might add that it seems
be in the nature
of the documents also, the more serious the allegation, the more
resistance there is to providing us
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They have given us a good many documents Theynés.
have not given us the documents on the controversial matters.
They've given us plenty of documentation on less controversial
matters.
The Chairman. I think it is ironic that the resistance we
get from the Justice Department is so much more substantial than
the resistance we have gotten from the CIA.
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Senator Baker.
That's not necessarily so.
I agree with
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can think of a request for documentation from the CIA that is
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now more than a month old and they haven't had the good grace
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to tell us no. They have told us nothing.
The Chairman. But on the whole we've gotten a greater
measure of cooperation from the CIA.
Senator Schweiker. I wonder, does either counsel know,
Mr. Chairman, whether the Attorney General or the FBI Director
initially confirmed whether they made any commitments to
Congress about supplying documents or materials to the
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Committee?
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Senator Mathias.
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Hart.
Mr. Miller. Senator Mathias can tell you, and Senator
Senator Schweiker. Might there be a statement in their
testimony in confirmation, in agreeing to furnish Congress with
materials of this nature?
Yes, those statements were made, but let
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me say, since my opinion has been asked, that I had a most
discouraging talk with the Attorney General a couple of weeks
ago. I went down to talk to him about privacy legislation and
the Department of Justice at the moment is taking about as hard
a line as any kind that I know of in the last fifteen years.
Its whole kind of attitude
Senator Tower.. I just wonder if we shouldn't take this up
with them.
The Chairman. I think we should, but I think we should
also, in advance of that, in view of the kinds of signals we
are now getting from the Justice Department, indicate that we
12 believe that these objections that they are raising, or questions
that they are raising, are a serious impediment procedurally
כי!
to our Committee and that we have every intention of interviewing
such agents as may be necessary, and that if necessary, we will
subpoena them.
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Mr. Elliff. Our feeling is it is preferable not to
proceed by subpoena, but we do have a subpoena for one FBI
agent which we brought with us today which we would like to
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proceed with.
The Chairman. Can you give us the facts of that case?
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Mr. Epstein. This is an agent who is presently in' Atlanta
Georgia, and the information we've received from other witnesses
was that in 1964, I believe, he visited a newspaper editor in
Atlanta, closed the door, put his hat on the desk, and said he
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1 noted from reading The Constitution that we were picturing
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Dr. King as a moral leader and, something of a hero and then this
3 agent went on to talk in great detail about Dr. King's personal
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to the circumstances surrounding that visit to a newspaperman,
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was, whether there was any documentation
Senator Baker. Who was the newspaper man?
Mr. Epstein. His name was Eugene Patterson and he was
with the Atlanta Constitution at that time.
newspaper in Florida.
He's now with a
The Chairman. Do you believe the subpoena now to be
necessary because of what you have been told by the Justice
Department?
Mr. Elliff. We have other agents which we would like to
proceed with at the interview level, so we would like to proceed
at both levels to get their reaction to both types of requests.
What is their reaction to a subpoena going to be, what is
their reaction to a renewed request to interview going to be?
So we crystallize each issue.
Senator Tower. I still think it might be good for us to
hold that up until we talk about it, since they are coming in
Tuesday morning or Tuesday sometime, it's not going to push
'things too far.
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Senator Hart of Michigan. Would it be useful, at least,
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if it is the feeling of the Committee to authorize you people,
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3 or Bill, today, to say that the Committee barely suppressed its
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outrage and that it won't do, and we will see you Tuesday?
Don't wait till Tuesday.
The Chairman. I think something should be said, actually.
Senator Hart of Michigan.
Well, it prejudges the hell out
of it, but unless we get an extension to 1980 for this Committee
The Chairman. I think you're right.
Something needs to be
said publicly that the Committee is determined that we feel
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that not only has time
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we've already said, we've already
made public the letter we have sent.
I think a follow-up needs
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to be that we are concerned that impediments that are now being
suggested which would interfere with the Committee's right to
interrogate witnesses, we do not intend to allow the Committee's
work to be obstructed and if necessary we will be prepared to
hope that that would not
subpoena witnesses though we would
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have to be the case.
Senator Baker.
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And we are going to try to work it out
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from Tueday.
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The Chairman. We're going to try to work it out from
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Tuesday.
Senator Baker.
I have a business matter.
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The Chairman. So does Senator Mondale.
Senator Mondale.
Just one point.
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There is this troublesome dictum in U.S. vs. Nixon about
what might be nondiscoverable, all of which seems to bear on
sort of foreign policy matters.
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that
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Am I correct
I think we're going to hear a lot about
but am I correct in reading that decision that it
really almost standal wholly that they have the duty to
produce all of the documentation and that case holds for that
proposition, so that in our CIA matters, while they might raise
some of this dictum, the FBI has no such defense, unless we're
really trodding on those same grounds.
Mr. Epstein. Of course, there is another issue in the
Bureau materials, because we're on the issue of investigative
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files, which has never been really litigated, and that
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is the propriety of Executive Privilege when it comes to that.
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I might add that the importance of the issue of going
to subpoena on these really raises that, because if we go to
subpoena on documents, then that is going to be worthless unless
we know in advance that we are going to win in court in a short
period of time, including whether we have jurisdiction to be
there.
Senator Mondale. In other words, you are saying they are
going to raise the Executive Privilege defense, but that was
the Nixon defense.
Mr. Epstein. I think that they would love for us to be in
the position of having to issue a subpoena for documents,
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because then it would be a year.
Mr. Schwarz. The problem is the Ervin Committee was found
not to have jurisdiction to issue the subpoena.
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The Chairman.
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step on that.
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Well, we know we're going to do the next
Now, may I raise one other point
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Senator Baker.
That's not quite true. The Ervin Committee
wasn't found to have no jurisdiction or standing to seek the
documents or to issue subpoenas, but they failed to carry the
burden of proving that it was required under the mandate of
their inquiry.
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Now, I have another matter, Frank.
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The Chairman. We have two or three matters.
Can I
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Senator Mondale.
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recognize Senator Mondale first, because he had asked it.
A few days ago, when the White House
people were here, they showed us a document which we have in
our files which disclosed that President Nixon in 1970 had
ordered the delivery of three machine guns to some people in
Chile and had done so with instructions that that order should
go directly to some subordinate officials in CIA and should be
done without advising the official channels. And it is thought
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that they were directed against a General Schneider, who was
He was a Constitutionalist.
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a top official in the Chilean government opposed to a coup.
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Schneider was killed, and there was a machine gun in the
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1 possession of those who did so.
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Now what I would like is, while we finish this cycle on
$115
assassinations, that we include among our studies of alleged
assassinations this matter and we request the documentation, of
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all appropriate documents under the category of assassination.
Mr. Schwarz. Senator, when that document came to our
attention, we questioned a person who expands upon the allega-
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tions contained in the documents. I wrote a letter to the
White House and the CIA. We wanted forthwith to receive
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copies of all such documents relating to the passage of weapons.
We have had no response from the CIA.
Mr. Hills, we met with in the White House a week ago
Tuesday or Wednesday, and I said we must have the documents and
'he said you cannot have them until you have the briefing on
Chile, because we refuse to accept this as an assassination
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plan.
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The Chairman. May I make this suggestion, Senator
Mondale?
First of all, I believe that it is absolutely imperative
that the Committee complete its investigation on the issue of
the assassination of foreign government leaders before the
recess and issue its report. That puts us under great pressure,
but if we don't do it, I am going to ask the Committee to stay
on the job. I would like very much to go to China, that is my
first opportunity in forty years to go to China, and I have
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such a trip laid on, but I am going to set it aside and ask
the Committee to continue its work right into the recess until
this is done. Otherwise, we are in a hopeless situation.
Senator Schweiker. I think, Mr. Chairman, if we don't
finish it by then, we never will.
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The Chairman. We never willl
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I think we should look into this assassination, it is an
assassination.
I think it's part of our responsibility to
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look into it.
But it is not an assassination, whatever the
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CIA input may have been, it is not an assassination of a head
of state, and so therefore I don't want it to further delay
the completion of this phase of our inquiry.
Now with that in mind, I am in full accord with what
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Senator Mondale says.
Senator Schweiker.
Could we put it to another phase and
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not in this phase?
The Chairman. Yes, we are going to have a phase on Chile,
anyway. It would fit into the Chilean case.
Senator Mondale. It is significant because if we accept
their interpretation that it is not assassination, then we
avoid an understanding that we had that these documents, all
supposed to be available then we get into a discovery problem.
In other words, I know what we're getting at, and I would
guess that we should proceed as rapidly as possible, but we
shouldn't hold up the cycle of
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Senator Schweiker:
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Well Fritz, there is another question
2 along the same lines, and that is why I don't want to see it
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cloud this issue, and that is the Glomar Explorer, stopped by
the NLRB proceeding was shown to have stopped in Chile just
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about a week or so before Allende was killed, just by coincidence
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for mechanical repairs. I would like to find out that one,
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too.
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But this is a whole new thing. This puts us into the
9 Chile thing.
Because I'm just as interested as you are. I
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proposition with Chile.
The Chairman. And Fritz, we can say that the Committee
regards it in the category of assassination, but we can differ-
14 entiate it from the initial report, which does deal with
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foreign leaders.
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a new subject
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Senator Hart of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, before you go to
and I am uneasy raising this
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but your
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tions and issue our report before we go on recess. I think that
disposes too readily of the problem that is going to confront
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us in a very few weeks, and that is having heard all of this,
now what do we do? I don't think we have decided yet how we
are going to present, once we open the doors, we've got to know
how we are going to handle it. I don't think we ought to lock
25 'ourselves in at the moment to a written report, as we leave town.
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the first of August.
Senator Baker.
I agree with you 100 percent.
The Chairman. This Committee has got to get its business
done and I know the purpose of the delay downtown is to make it
as difficult as possible for us to cope with our work. We will
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be engulfed completely if we cannot deal with this phase of
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our work in the time that we have given it and put it over until
the fall. What I'm suggesting is not just simply the report of
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the Committee.
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We are going to complete our witnesses,
we have time to issue such a report.
I am also suggesting the recommendations the Committee will
make with respect to this issue. We have to put this behind
us. It is just folly not to do it, because we must get on with
the other phases of the report and there is no reason we cannot
do it. If we can't do it by the end of this month, then we're
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not going to be any more advantaged or any better advantaged
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to then go out on our recess and come back and take it up anew
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in the fall. It is a very clear-cut issue.
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Senator Hart of Michigan. But what is not clear-cut to
me is how we report to our peers.
The Chairman. We will take that up.
Senator Schweiker. We discussed that at one meeting. We
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had a little informal meeting.
Maybe you missed that, Phil.
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The Chairman. There is nothing that could be gained by
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putting it off or defering it or postponing it.
It is very
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clear that we are working at a highly intensified pace in
2 order to get the necessary evidence, and then there is no reason
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why we can't address ourselves to this question.
Senator Hart of Michigan. The only reason that I raise
that is that I am as anxious to conclude this chapter, but this
Committes, as a Committee, then must decide the ultimate
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question: do you have open hearings?
Do you go to a closed
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Senate?
The Chairman.
That will be a top item of consideration for
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the Committee. I have only deferred this discussion thinking
that we had best get all of the evidence first. That is all.
Then we will take it up at an appropriate time and discuss it.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the situation
to be then it is your hope that we will finish our Executive
Session testimony before the August recess, but not a report
to the Senate?
The Chairman. No, that is not my position. My position is
that we should complete the testimony and make our report and
recommendation on this issue.
Senator Baker. But without prejudice to a future determina-
tion of whether we have public hearings?
The Chairman. Oh, yes, that's always open to us. But I
let me make it -- let's not have any misunderstanding there.
It is always open to this Committee to decide whether
public hearings on this or any other issue should be arranged in
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the fall. Obviously, we cannot have them until fall.
My personal position is against public hearings on the
2
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issue of assassination. But what I am proposing is that the
4 Committee make its report, and I think that is a question the
5 Committee will have to take up and decide, and I think the
appropriate way to disclose these facts, and I personally believe
6
they must be disclosed, is through a report of the Committee
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that is made public, and I think that report should be made
before the recess.
Senator Baker. I don't think we can do that.
Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, physically we have got three
Whether we can hear all of these witnesses and sit down
and prepare the report and have the Committee agree on the
report, report it to the Senate and have the Senate act on it
in three weeks is questionable in my mind. I, like you, want
to do it, but I wonder if we can do a workmanlike job and do
it in that time.
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for is now in the process of preparation.
The Chairman. Well, let me say this, that the very request
that Senator Baker has made, and I hope we don't get into a too
Discussion on this issue because we cannot decide
prolonged
it right now, but the very report that Senator Baker has asked
That report gives,
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by necessity, as much of the meat, the briefs that Senator
Baker has asked for, as much of the report, laying out the
factual, the evidence that the Committee has seen. And I think
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it, but I know that our position will be much worse in every
way if we fail to do it.
Now without trying to decide that now, let us proceed.
Senator Schweiker. May I make one comment on that, Mr.
Chairman?
I have had vacillating feelings on public hearings, and I
I think we should go
think what I have come down on is this.
ahead and issue a preliminary report without public hearings.
I think we should put the matter of public hearings in abeyance
until we get into the Chile thing and some of the other areas
of so-called assassinations that may not be Presidential
assassinations per se and leave the Committee option that we
may well want to elect to go into what happened in Chile
publicly and bring up that assassination if that is what we
determined.
I have trouble determining at this point in time whether
we should have public hearings, and I think we ought to keep
that option open as we go along.
The Chairman. I have no argument with the Senator on that
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Senator Schweiker.
I know.
As I say, it reconciles with
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your views and it protects the rights of those who say they
want public hearings.
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The Chairman. I have no argument with that.
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Senator Baker has another matter.
Senator Baker. It won't take but a brief moment.
I think I owe the Committee a report on the statement
that I made to the Press a few moments ago. I did not intend
to make a statement, but that it becomes impossible to avoid
when you step outside in these circumstances.
The Chairman. It is a good thing for you that Senator
Morgan is not present.
Senator Baker. As some of you may know, the news last
night and again this morning carried a story to the effect that
a Colonel, a retired Colonel in the Air Force by the name of
Fletcher Prowdy, has alleged by Alexander Butterfield was an
associate or an employee or a plant of something of the sort of
the CIA when he was at the White House.
I was asked if I had any comment on that. I was asked if
I was surprised by that, and my reply was I had heard that
story before. I had never commented on it because I had no
proof of it. And it's really so. As you know, in this town
if you don't have confirmation of it you get into deep
trouble.
Second, that I think it is worthy of looking into, and I
said I thought the Prowdy statement added a new dimension to
the rumors and I thought that it did warrant further investiga-
tion, that I would recommend that to this Committee at the
appropriate time.
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The Chairman.
That is fine, and I have also said that I
2 would ask the Committee for an investigation of this charge,
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and Bill Miller tells me we have already received from the
4 Agency a preliminary report that is not satisfactory.
We are
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pursuing it and getting further information.
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Senator Schweiker?
Senator Schweiker. I have a brief matter I would like to
seek the Committee's advice on.
Could we go off the record a
The Chairman. Yes.
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator Hart of Colorado.
an item of business also.
minute?
I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have
14
15
When I was in Europe last week and pursuant to the
direction of the Chairman and staff I tried to contact our
16
friend QJWIN to try to wrap up that link of the chain with, I
17
must say, the complete cooperation of the CIA and Mr. Colby,
18
19
who in fact sent a person over there to help uncover this
individual.
We know who he is and where he is.
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The CIA American contact talked to him, largely for the
reason that he feels extreme loyalty still to the Agency and to
22
one or two particular people that he worked with and through.
+
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He opted not to meet with me or anybody else. The feeling is,
both on my part and Mr. Colby's, that if we got his contact in
that chain to get in touch with him directly that he would talk
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to us, and I leave it to the Committee whether this is
important enough for us to pursue and it would probably involve
a couple of people going back over.
Senator Baker. What is your recommendation?
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Senator Hart of Colorado.
My own feeling, based almost
purely on the principle that no stone should be left unturned
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is that we should do it.
There are some unanswered questions.
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He was here in the
states in 163, he was not confined to one operation and we
don't know what he was doing.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would recommend that we
commission Senator Hart to do that for us.
Senator Hart of Colorado. It would take the cooperation
of one of the witnesses we've had here before to do it.
What is your recommendation, Senator
14
The Chairman.
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Hart, I'm sorry?
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Senator Hart of Colorado.
That we should do it, that we
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should get the cooperation of Mr. O'Donnell.
The Chairman. That we should do what?
Senator Baker. Interview QJWIN in Europe.
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Senator Mathias.
Which means somebody has to do it and
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take O'Donnell with him.
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Senator Baker.
Take Mathias and Hart.
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cover
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The Chairman. It is a very sensitive matter, if his
well, one thing this Committee must worry about
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Senator Schweiker What would you hope to get out of
2 it, Gary?
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(Senator Hart of Colorado.
What his orders were, what his
4 scope of authority was, what he was doing over and above
wap Com
well
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what he was doing in the Congo, what he was doing over and
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The Chairman.
above his Congo operations, why he was in Florida in 1963.
Well, Gary, when you told me this, you
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told me that this man had said to the CIA go between who was
trying to arrange this interview that first of all he preferred
not to be questioned, and secondly, if he were questioned, he
would lie.
Senator Hart of Colorado. That was on the basis of the
appointment we were trying to arrange then, and that was purely
because of his loyalties to the Agency. The case was not
presented well to him. What I am saying is if we took back his
contact for whom he feels loyalty and the fellow should talk,
I think the feeling of the person who had made the original
contact is that he would talk.
It was not presented to him in the way that the Agency
wanted him to do it.
The Chairman.
is to the Committee?
How valuable do you think this information
I'll tell you my concern. My concern is
the one thing I have feared more than anything else, in this
investigation is that we take some action that allows them to
say that we have blown the cover of some valuable agent abroad,
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and this is what they feared all along, and the whole intelli-
gence apparatus would be gravely weakened and the men in the
field would be jeopardized by investigation of this kind.
We take that chance with this kind of
and what do we
learn from it? Is it worth that chance?
Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, that question could be
7
asked of any witness that we have in here.
Number two, the CIA,
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Mr. Colby and the Chief of Station in Amsterdam
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have no doubts
that this can be carried out without any security breach what-
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soever. Now that's the CIA. He has not worked for them in
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ten years.
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The Chairman. And the CIA would be the first to jump
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upon the breach and say, we told you so.
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Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, I leave it to the
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Committee. I can't tell you what we're going to find out, it
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may be zero.
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Senator Mathias. The Station Chief does not raise that as
one of the dangers.
Senator Baker. Yes, they did.
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Senator Hart of Colorado.
Nor does Colby.
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Mr. Wides. Mr. Chairman, excuse me. The paper that
suggests the possibility that Mr. Win might have been in the
United States in 1963 is a paper involving the activity records
of William Harvey who will be here this afternoon and that may
be that you can get more testimony under oath from him that will
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shed some light as to whether he was just using QJWIN as a cover
which is what he told me, the designation for billing, or
whether he's willing to give out some more testimony.
The Chairman.
Well, let us get that additional informa-
5
6
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tion
Senator Baker. One further point, Mr. Chairman, that might
be of interest if my memory is correct, and I believe it is
correct, is that the major commercial cover for the Agency in
9 Amsterdam was run by the Mullin Company
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Senator Hart of Colorado. Frank, he's not worked for the
Agency in ten years.
29
He's not an active agent.
and
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The Chairman.
Suppose that he were to tell us something
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Then
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we have to bring him here for cross-examination, then we have
blown his cover.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say one other thing?
I meant to say it, and I frankly forgot, just so my colleagues
know what I'm about and not that I'm doing it behind their
back.
I got a call last night from one of the editors of Harper's
magazine in Europe relaying to me that Bernard Barker wanted to
22
talk to me, and he thinks about the Butterfield situation, and
23
I intended to call him, but I wanted you to know that.
22
24.
The Chairman.
That's fine.
25
Let's defer decision right now, on that decision, Senator
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(Whereupon, at 12:00 noon the witness re-entered the
hearing room.)
The Chairman. All right.
You understand that the oath still applies to this part
of the testimony?
Mr. Schwarz.will renew the questioning.
Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to call your attention now
to 1963, the Missile Crisis is over. Was there another reassess-
9 ment of Cuban policy in the winter and spring of '63?
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Mr. Bundy. Yes, there was.
Mr. Schwarz. Again, did that reassessment of Cuban policy
involve a lot of reassessment of a lot of options?
Mr. Bundy. That is my refreshed recollection.
Mr. Schwarz. All right.
We've shown you a lot of documents, mostly by you in that
period, but some to you as well, and was one of the options the
consideration of the possibility that Mr. Castro might defect
or might be communicated to in a way that would bring him around
more closely to the United States?
Mr. Bundy. The question of opening communications with
Fidel Castro arises in 1963, I think at more than one time,
22 and without having my attention drawn to specific documents, I
23 wouldn't be able to spell that out very much.
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Mr. Schwarz. But you agree that it is in there, and it
is in there?
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Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. Now did you also consider, in the spring of
1963, as you had in the fall of 1961, what would happen if
Castro died or were killed?
Mr. Bundy. What we did, we certainly posed the question,
the precise form is not clear to me, but what I now know from the
documents you have shown me, is we posed to the Director of the
Office of National Estimates, a Dr. Sherman Kent
Mr. Schwarz. And what did Dr. Sherman Kent say in response
to that inquiry?
Mr. Bundy. Well, I would have to look at his response.
Mr. Schwarz. All right.
I would like to then mark a string of documents so you
can have that in front of you.
All right, would you mark as item 6, Bundy item 6, the
Bundy memorandum to the President dated January 4, 1963, which
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appears at Bundy Tab K.
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(The document referred to
was marked Bundy Exhibit
No. 6 for identification.)
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Mr. Schwarz. I'll mark a string, Mr. Bundy, and if Mr.
Kelley could put it in front of you, we'll then talk about
them.
As Bundy Exhibit 6-A, the memorandum for the record,
Meeting on Cuba, 3 April '63, between the President, the Attorney
General, yourself and five or six other people.
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Mr. Bundy. Right.
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Mr Schwarz. As Bundy
April 11, 1963.
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the Special Group minutes of
(The document referred to
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No. 6-B for identification.)
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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 6-C, the memorandum also
2 dated April 11, 1963 from Mr. Gordon Chase to yourself, headed
3 Cuban Policy.
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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-D, the minutes of a meeting of
the Special Group, 18 April 1963
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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-E the Summary Record of NSC
2 Standing Group Meeting, April 23, 1963.
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As Bundy 6-1
Mr. Schwarz.
the memorandum for Mr. Bundy,
Subject, Cuba Policy, dated April 23, 1963.
(The document referred
to was marked Bundy
Exhibit 6-F for
identification.)
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Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-G, the Agenda for the meeting of
the Standing Group, meeting Tuesday, April 30th, the document
being dated April 29th and signed by you.
(The document referred
to was marked Bundy
Exhibit 6-G for
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6-H the memorandum for members of the
Standing Group dated May 2, 1963.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Finally, as Bundy 6-1, the Central
A
Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, May 13th,
1963, draft memorandum, Subject: Developments in Cuba and
Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death.
(The document referred
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Mr. Schwarz. NOW,
have you had a chance to read them
2 again, Mr. Bundy?
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Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Schwarz. In summary, Mr. Bundy, is it a fair charac-
terization of these papers that you were, iand the Standing..
Group was, examining the question of what the situation would
be if Castro were to die?
Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were examining,
certainly.
10
Mr. Schwarz.
That was .a. gamut of matters I tried to
11
pose at the beginning of this line of questioning?
12
Mr. Bundy.
Yes.
13
Mr. Schwarz. That was one of the things you were consider.
14
ing?
15
Mr. Bundy.
Right.
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Mr. Schwarz. This was a period of time, as the fall of
1961 may also have been, when people asked about or talked
about assassinations as a means of causing Mr. Castro's death.
Mr. Bundy. I am not aware of much conversation on that
subject in the spring of '63, so I would have to take your
word on that.
Mr. Schwarz. I am asking you, I have no word on that.
Mr. Bundy.
No, I don't think there was much discussion in
the spring of '63 on that subject.
Mr. Schwarz.
Well, let's see if we can agree on some
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things first.
Can we further agree that the ultimate conclusion was that
Castro's death would not be desirable for the United States?
Mr. Bundy. The recommendation, or the assessment,
which
comes back from the Office of National Estimates, makes it
clear that the odds would be that, upon Castro's death, his
brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with
Soviet backing and help take over control.
Then it goes on to say that there might be divisions and
splits, but that it was unlikely that anti-Communist forces
would be able to take over without extensive U.S. help and
probably U.S. military intervention.
11
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Mr. Schwarz.
All right.
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Now, I would like to avoid having to go through every
single document.
16
Mr. Bundy.
So would I.
17
Mr. Schwarz.
18
this statement.
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And see if I could get you to agree with
You do agree that you were looking at a
situation that would exist as if Castro were killed?
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were looking at.
And in connection with that, was his being
'killed by assassination one of the ways which you understood
he might be killed?
24
Mr. Bundy..
I don't have any recollection of that point,
25
of it being on our minds.
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Mr. Schwarz.
All right.
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Then why were you looking at the question of his being
killed? Was there something known?
Mr. Bundy. I really don't have any independent of it.
My sense of events in 1963 is that the internal pressure from
within the Administration to "do something about Cuba" was
7
very much lower.
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There was, however, external pressure.
There
was political pressure in the United States, critics of the
Administration were making speeches about how not enough was
being done and we must get rid of the Castro regime, and as I
think I may have said earlier, and I would like to say now,
13
I think that one reason for getting an estimate of this kind
was to get it on record from the point of view of those who
14
did not think we should be fussing with questions of assassina-
15
tion or anything like it, that it was not a sound policy,
16
leaving aside its moral meaning and wider political meaning
from the point of view of the narrow objectives we had in Cuba.
17
Mr. Schwarz.
Who was taking the position that assassina-
18
tion could be
19
Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.
20
Mr. Schwarz.
But someone was?
21
Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.
22
Mr. Schwarz.
You have no recollection of any position
23
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25
being taken pro or con?
Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific
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conversation or position that triggered this particular
2
inquiry.
3
The Chairman.
4
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Well, isn't it perfectly plausible that
this inquiry sought to examine what the situation would be in
the event of Castro's death by whatever means it might occur?
Does it necessarily follow that because the Administration
was making such a plausible inquiry against such a contingency
that might arise at any time that therefore it was within the
mind of the Administration to kill Castro?
I don't see the
10
connection.
11
Mr. Bundy. Well, you make my point, Mr. Chairman.
That's
12
just my point.
Mr. Schwarz.
Now in connection with that, would you look
at your own Agenda for the April 19th meeting, 6-G?
13
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2.
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20
Under item 1 you distinguish between item 1 and item
Item 1 is the possible use of contingencies for the
achievement of wider political objectives; and item 2 is programs
that might be initiated by the United States government.
I call your attention to the fact that the reference to
the possible death of Castro is one of the items under item
1 and not under item 2.
Mr. Bundy. That is correct.
20
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22
Mr. Schwarz.
And do you regard that as relevant to the
23
24
མང་ཞུས་
exchange you had with the Chairman just now?
Mr. Bundy. It seems to me it bears out the Chairman's
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point, that you have a number of possible things that might
2 happen, that you would then have something to do something
10
3
about, or to act in the light of. The other are the things
4 that you might do without waiting for some contingency to
5
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arise.
Mr. Schwarz. Now the only remaining question I have on
this group of documents is, how was it that the subject of the
death of Castro do you investigate the possibilities of the
death of foreign leaders as a regular matter?
Mr. Bundy. Well, the question "After: Stalin, What?" was
the staple of discussions in the 1940's, everywhere, academies
and I would assume inside the United States government; the
question after DeGaulle was a question about Western European
14
policy for a great many years. And one could pick
smaller
15
16
figures, more and less controversial, and have the same kind of
question coming up, in a situation in which a particular
individual
17
is as dominant a figure in a set of events which
18
19
it had the two, quite contrasting but heavy consequences of the
Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, it doesn't seem to me to
20
21
be an irrational question to ask, without any relation as
whether the United States itself would have any active advisory:
to
22
role or any role whatever in having that event come to pass.
23
Mr. Schwarz. All right.
24
25
which is the page
---
Would you mark as Exhibit 7 the September 20 document
which states the assassination of Castro
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was excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom.
(The document referred
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Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, would you take over the ques-
tioning of Mr. Bundy, with the permission of the Chairman, on
that particular series of documents, which is at the heading,
September 20th '63 on the chronology.
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Mr. Kelley.
Yes.
Let me show Mr. Bundy the documents.
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Well, first, will you tell us where the
documents are, because I couldn't find them under the heading
you gave us.
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Mr. Kelley.
Yes.
In Bundy Book 2, there is at Tab A the memorandum dated
July 25th, 1963 from Mr. George Denney to Mr. Crimmins,
entitled "Cuba, Possible Courses of Action.
At Tab B of Bundy Book 2 is a memorandum dated September
20th, 1963, from Gordon Chase to Mr. Bundy, and this memorandum
summarizes the Denney memorandum of July 25th.
Mr. Bundy, did you review these documents with members of
the staff earlier this week?
Mr. Bundy.
Yes, I did.
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Mr. Kelley.
Do you have any independent recollection of
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these documents?
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Mr. Bundy.
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Well, as I read a document of this kind, which
comes to me from a member of my own staff, I am very often
reminded and I am in this case, that this is a document which
I did review and that it reflects his arguments as I then heard
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Mr. Kelley.
Who was Mr. Gordon Chase?
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Mr. Bundy.
Well, he was an assistant of mine at the time
with special responsibilities for Cuban affairs, and perhaps
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more widely in Latin America.
He was at that time a foreign
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Mr. Kelley. Did he have any responsibility for covert
actions?
Mr. Bundy. No.)
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Mr. Kelley. Did he provide staff assistance
to you with
respect to the Special Group or the Special Group (Augmented)?
Mr. Bundy. Well, he may have done in some exceptional
case when I needed his opinion on a matter, but in ordinary
cases he would not have been party to Special Group work.
Mr. Kelley. What kind of things did he do with the
What did that involve?
16 special responsibility for Cuba?
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Mr. Bundy. He would be keeping in touch with the Cuban
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Task Force, which by this time was in the Department of State,
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the MONGOOSE operation having been disbanded.
He would have
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been responsible for keeping me alert to matters that were
proceeding in that Task Force that might have an implication for
the White House.
Mr. Kelley. Who was the head of the Cuban Task Force?
Mr. Bundy. Well I don't want to get this wrong, but I
think by this time it was Mr. Crimmins.
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Mr. Kelley.
Mr. Crimmins was in the State Department and
he was a foreign service officer?
Mr. Bundy.
That is right.
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Mr. Kelley.
The Cuban Task Force, what was that?
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Well, it was the successor to the MONGOOSE
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Mr. Bundy.
group, but much less oriented toward secret operations than
MONGOOSE, and the review of secret operations then came back
under the complete control of the Special Group, by now, I
think, called the 303 Committee, which was a lineal successor
of 5412.
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I call your attention now to Mr. Denney's
Mr. Kelley.
mémorandum, which is at Tab A in Book 2, and it is true, is
it not that the memorandum is to Mr. Crimmins?
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Mr. Bundy.
Right.
Senator Tower.
Do you have any independent recollection
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Mr. Kelley.
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of this memorandum?
Mr. Bundy. I have no knowledge that I ever saw it, and I
did not find it familiar when I looked at it the other day.
It is true, is it not, that Mr. Chase's memo
to you summarizes this much longer memorandum by Mr.
Denney?
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Mr. Bundy.
Is that what it is?
Mr. Schwarz.
Does it do that, Mr. Kelley, because Chase
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Mr. Kelley.
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memorandum starts by saying, here is a summary of Paul Sakwa's
I think that is an error in Mr. Chase's memo,
because it is clear that what is being summarized here is Mr.
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Denney's memorandum.
Mr. Bundy. Let me suggest that you focus on Mr. Chase's
memorandum with respect to my recollection and responsibility,
that is clearly the operative document.
Mr. Kelley. With respect to Mr. Chase's memorandum, in
his summary of the rationale of proposals, he states, as second.
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him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded
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to avoid Castro's martyrdom."
Do you have any recollection of why he would exclude
assassination?
Does that imply to you, or do you recollect,
whether Castro's assassination was being considered and here
is a staff paper excluding it, because someone asked them to
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consider it?
Mr. Bundy.
No, I think it's a simple statement of what
I would regard as a rationale assessment of the situation by
whoever the original author was, and certainly by the staff
man with respect to a subject that emerges directly from the
notion that he is an operational target, whatever that means
and goes on to say, but we don't mean assassination, because
it would make him a martyr, what other reasons against that
there may be. It doesn't seem to me that you can read the
statement that assassination is excluded as an inference that
somebody else is including it.
Mr. Kelley.
That's all.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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it is excluded.
Mr. Kelley.
That's right.
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In any event, Mr. Bundy, the document says
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Mr. Schwarz. Now at that period of time in the fall of
1963, were you aware that through the offices of Ambassador
Atwood, or Mr. Atwood, as he may have then been called, and
through the offices of a French journalist called Jean Daniel,
another effort was being made to establish contact with Mr.
Castro?
Mr. Bundy. I remember the Atwood effort, as I recollect
I don't recollect specifically
that he came to see me about it.
Jean Daniel, although it strikes a chord as you mention it.
Mr. Schwarz. What the purpose, very briefly, of Mr.
Atwood's effort?
Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understood it, he had been approached
by someone he knew from Cuba and had been given to understand
that there was interest in, Castro had an interest in, opening
communication, and he was exploring with us whether he could be
encouraged to undertake such an explanation.
Mr. Schwarz. And did you encourage him?
Mr. Bundy. The exact form of our message to him, or our
if you want to call it, the instruction to him, the President's
decision, I can no longer recollect, but my impression is that
we were interested, and that we did want him to explore it without
engaging the President any more than he could help.
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Mr. Schwarz. But was the President in fact informed and
in fact approved the actions taken?
Mr. Bundy. That is my understanding.
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Mr. Schwarz.
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Is it your understanding or your recollection?
Mr. Bundy. It is my recollection, but it is a recollection
that is refreshed by what I have learned and hearing more about
it in the last few days.
Mr. Schwarz. Now, were you told, in the fall of 1963,
9 that assassination devices had been requested by a Cuban for
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the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro, and that assassination
devices were offered to the Cuban in the fall of 19637
Mr. Bundy.
No.
Mr. Schwarz. Now again, here, calling for a matter of
opinion, as a matter of opinion, do you believe that at the
same time, at a possible rapprochement with Mr. Castro was being
pursued, the President would have authorized or permitted the
passage of assassination devices intended for their use on
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Mr. Castro?
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Mr. Bundy.
Absolutely not.
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Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Castro.
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The Chairman. Is there more?
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Mr. Schwarz. Well, on Trujillo and Diem, with respect to
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Diem
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Mr.
Smothers.
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Well, if you're going on to something else,
there are a couple of things.
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Going back to an earlier memorandum which I don't believe
is in the Bundy materials, but it has been talked about
previously in a Committee hearing, a memorandum which will be
identified as a Memorandum for the Record, dated 16 October
1962, a memorandum signed by Mr. Richard Helms.
(The document referred
to was marked Bundy
Exhibit No. 8 for
identification.)
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Mr. Smothers.
Mr. Bundy, I am going to read through this
memorandum and ask you a couple of questions about that. It's
a memorandum from Helms for the record on MONGOOSE.
Reading from this memorandum, Mr. Bundy, reading from
Paragraph 2: "The Attorney General" -- well, let me read the
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entire paragraph.
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"The Attorney General opened the meeting"
we're talking
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about a MONGOOSE meeting¨. by expressing the general dissatis-
faction of the President," --"'dissatisfaction of the President'
Ga q
in quotes "with Operation MONGOOSE.'
Mr. Bundy. What date are we at?
The date?
Mr. Smothers. The date of the memorandum is 16 October
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1962.
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"He pointed out that the Operation had been underway for a
year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been
no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been
He indicated that there had been
attempted had failed twice.
noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of
intelligence, but that other actions had failed to influence.
He spoke of the
significantly the course of events in Cuba.
weekly meetings of top officials on this problem, and again
noted the small accomplishments, despite the fact that Secre-
taries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and he
personally had all been charged by the President with finding
a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal
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appointment by the President a year ago.
"The Attorney General then stated that in view of this
lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more
personal attention. In order to do this, he would hold a meeting
every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representa-
tives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwich,
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Ryan and General Johnson)."
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NOW,
the best of our information, Mr. Bundy, is that these
meetings were in fact held on a daily basis as indicated, and
group noted.
Were you aware of such meetings?
that they did involve Lansdale and these members of the working
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Mr. Bundy. I have no independent recollection of them, but
that does not sound implausible to me at all.
Mr. Smothers. It doesn't sound implausible to me that the
Attorney General Lansdale and members of the working group to
develop MONGOOSE activities with him?
Mr. Bundy. To report to him how they were getting on,
and
to see if he couldn't, by listening to those reports and keeping
keeping his lively concern in their consciousness
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a lively
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Mr. Smothers. This is your interpretation of giving more
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personal attention to it?
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Mr. Smothers. You say you had no knowledge of these in
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move the thing more rapidly.
Mr. Bundy. Exactly.
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Mr. Bundy. I didn't say that. I said I had no independent
3 recollection of them.
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Mr. Smothers.
point?
They did not come to your attention at that
Mr. Bundy. I didn't say say that. I don't know that they
did, but I don't know that they didn't.
Mr. Smothers. But your recollection at this point is that
they did not come to your attention?
Mr. Bundy. That is not my recollection. I don't recall
that one way or the other.
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Okay.
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Let me ask you then about your knowledge of the Lansdale
situation.
Do you know General Lansdale?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Smothers. Do you know his reputation for truth and
honesty?
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Mr. Bundy. I don't think I have any
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his reputation for
truth and honesty, if you ask me the question as one asks it
about, you know, all kinds of people, I have no reason to
question it. I have doubts about some of the things I have
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Mr. Smothers. Well, let me put it this way.
25 believe General Lansdale under oath?
Would you
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Mr. Bundy. It would depend on what he said.
Mr. Smothers. It would depend upon what he said.
Is your experience that General Lansdale is trustworthy
only on a selective basis?
Mr. Bundy. You are asking me questions about matters
essentially in which his testimony, as I have seen it reported.
Mr. Smothers. No, I am not asking you about his testimony.
I am asking you if you would believe him under oath, based on
your knowledge.
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Mr. Bundy.
It would depend upon what he said, and if it
was a matter on which I had my own knowledge.
Mr. Smothers. Without regard to matters that General
Lansdale has testified to before this Committee, based on your
knowledge of him, your working relationship with him, your
knowledge of what other people know of General Lansdale, his
reputation in the community, if you will, would you believe him
under oath?
Mr. Bundy. I would currently have to say that I could not
give you a definite affirmative answer to that question.
Mr. Smothers. That's fine.
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Now, let's go back to the period of General Lansdale's
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appointment.
General Lansdale was appointed as the coordinator of the
Special Group, the Chief of Operations.
After General Taylor's efforts had been under effort for
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1 some time, six months, seven months, General Taylor comes in,
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I believe, in July after he completes his Bay of Pigs examina-
tion, General Lansdale is appointed by the President at the end
of November.
Do you have any present recollection of the circumstances
surrounding that appointment?
Mr. Bundy. None that goes beyond what I discussed earlier.
To the best of your knowledge or recollection,
Mr. Smothers.
did the appointment of this Chief of Staff or Chief of Operations
reflect any lack of confidence in General Taylor on the part of
either the Attorney General or the President?
Mr. Bundy. No, the opposite. General Taylor had heavy
responsibilities in his general responsibility as military
representative of the President. He was made Chairman of the
Committee to keep oversight on this. It was inappropriate
entirely in terms of his rank and his other duties that he
should be the day to day action officer.
Mr. Smothers. Are you familiar with the degree of General
Taylor's involvement with the development of the Special
Group (Augmented) agendas? Was this done by General Taylor?
Was it really General Lansdale's responsibility?
Mr. Bundy. I don't have any knowledge of the details of
the operations of the staff. It was clear to me, and I think
to everyone else, that the man in charge of that operation, of
that Committee, was General Taylor.
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Mr. Smothers.
Okay..
Just one final series of questions.
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If we might, Mr. Bundy, go back to our conversations
regarding your request to see documents prior to your testimony
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before the Rockefeller Commission, when you talked to Mr.
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Kissinger, precisely what did you request of him?
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Mr. Bundy. I said to him
and I thought that there were going to be questions with respect
to which it would be much easier for me to give helpful and more
accurate answers if I could have access to appropriate documents
since I have taken no documents of that character, no official
documents of that character, from the White House.
And he said
he entirely agreed and he made the appropriate arrangements.
Did you ask for a timeframe for these
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Mr. Smothers.
documents?
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Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that I did, but when I came to
look more closely at what I needed to see, as I told you
earlier, it related specifically to the period around August
1962.
Mr. Smothers. Did the White House make the selection of
documents for you?
Mr. Bundy. No. The White House handed me a file of
documents which covered the period.
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Mr. Smothers.
They handed you a file of documents covering
roughly the August 1962 period?
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Mr. Bundy.
That's right.
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Had you made a request for documents
covering this August '62 timeframe?
Mr. Bundy. I must have told him the rough period with
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Again, I don't understand the drift of
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Well, the drift of my question is, if indeed
you selected the August 1962 documents, why did you select
that?
Mr. Bundy. Because Counsel to the Rockefeller Commission
had directed my attention to the period.
Mr. Smothers. To August 1962?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.
Mr. Smothers. In the file that centered roughly on this
point in this timeframe, included NSA memo 181, was the file
put together by the White House pursuant to this guidance?
Mr. Bundy. The file that came into my hands, whether
they put it together or whether it was a file drawn off the
shelf, I can't tell you. You'll have to ask them.
file?
Mr. Smothers. Did it appear to you to be an off-the-shelf
Mr. Bundy. I don't know what it was.
The Chairman.
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questions, Curtis?
What is the object of this series of
Well, I am trying to determine, Mr. Chairman,
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happened.
The Chairman.
Don't we have that now in the record?
It just seems to me like we're going over the same series of
questions.
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Mr.
Smothers.
Well, since we don't know what was in the
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file
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Mr. Bundy. Well, I thought I said the file was a file of
9 National Security Action memoranda, a file which you already
10 have here.
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Mr. Smothers. Relating to August, 1962?
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Mr. Smothers. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
tape 2b
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Mr. Schwarz. On the Trujillo matter
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Mr. Bundy. Sure.
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Mr. Schwarz. You know Mr. Trujillo was killed.
Did you
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know or do you know that the persons who killed him had
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obtained some weapons from the United States?
Mr. Bundy. I did not know, and do not now know, of my
own knowledge that that was the case.
I did know, or at least I believe I must have been on
notice because of documents again that you have shown me, that
weapons by a decision of the Special Group in early January
had been or were being passed to Dominican dissidents.
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Mr. Schwarz.
Were you involved in the sending of a telegram
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to the Domincan Republic, either two or three days prior to the
actual assassination of Mr. Trujillo?
Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of it, and when I saw
those telegrams in discussions with your staff, they stirred no
recollection on my part.
Mr. Schwarz. Is it fair to state that Mr. Richard Goodwin
is the best witness on those subjects from the White House for
that period of time?
Mr. Bundy. It appears that way to me, although that
appears more from the fact that important documents seem to
have been addressed to him than because of my own recollection
that he was interested in the matters and because of my phone
conversation with him, he showed a considerable familiarity
with events in the Domincan Republic, political events during
that spring.
Mr. Schwarz. Well, you got a memo from Mr. Bissell in
February, 17th February '61. It is Tab R of the Trujillo
Book 1 of 2, in which you were informed that the dissidents
had been told by the United States that it was prepared to
provide them with a limited supply of arms and equipment.
When you got such information, did it trigger in your mind
anything to the effect of, let's be concerned about how they're.
going to use those weapons, or did you just accept the informa-
tion and do nothing about it?
Mr. Bundy. It is clear that the information was sent to
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me and it was clear, in that sense, that I had become responsi-
ble for knowing what was in the document, but I have to say that
as I reread it I have no recollection that I ever, in fact, did
read it at the time. Whether that was because of the flow, the
5
very heavy flow of other documents or because I passed it to
6
someone else or because I just simply didn't get to it, I cannot
7
tell you, but I have no recollection' that I saw it.
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Mr. Schwarz. You did make a request for a briefing paper?
Mr. Bundy. It must have been done, and it was either done
in my name or I did it.
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you don't remember
Are you capable of making a comment on my question, which
was having received information that arms had been supplied
Mr. Bundy. Having that information on my desk, anyway.
Mr. Schwarz.
Okay.
In the light of hindsight, should persons in your position
when they receive such information inquire into the purpose for
which the arms are to be used?
Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would
--
and my own guess on this, and
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it's not much better than that, is that the decision which had
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in the Special Group, was partly reviewed in some fashion, with
the Special Group as reconstituted after the change in
Administration. So I would have to say that I suppose I knew
that weapons were being introduced into the Dominican Republic
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and I would have to add that I did not, or I have no recollection
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inquiry to find out just what, who, when where and so on did
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because as I understand the evidence that has now been developed,
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authority appears to have expected or believed was going on.
Would you agree with one further point,
Mr. Schwarz.
that it is very difficult for the United States to control
events once it has made a decision to cooperate with dissident
elements, and in particular once it's made a decision to
cooperate with dissident elements by providing them with arms?
one thing, I don't want to
Mr. Bundy. I think that
generalize here, but I think I would agree with the generali-
zation, let me put it that way, if I could add that in the case
of the Dominican Republic, I think one has also to recognize
retrospectively that there was no way to have any communication
with dissidents that would not involve recognition that, if you
propose to be an effective dissident in that country under that
ruler, you would probably be contemplating fairly violent
action.
Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Trujillo.
One question of Vietnam.
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You were involved in the question of the possible coup in
Vietnam that actually took place?
Mr. Bundyrz. Yes.
Mr.
Schwarz. And you were substantially involved in that
as a matter of personal
Mr. Bundy.
I was working closely with the President and
was probably the draftsman under his instruction of some of
the cables that went out.
Mr. Schwarz. Now Diem was killed. It does not appear to
me from the record that the United States wanted him killed..
Is that fair?
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Mr. Bundy. That is correct.
Mr. Schwarz. But the United States did want him deposed
if a coup could be. successful?
Is that correct?
Mr. Bundy. The United States, really had two views. Right
up to the end, the United States hoped, hoped against hope, as
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it became more and more difficult to communicate with Diem,
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that he would see the, or come to share the kinds of argument,
that were made to him, primarily by Ambassador Lodge, and that
a change in his government and almïower; much lower, role for
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his brother and sister-in-law would assist him in recapturing
public confidence.
That was always the preferred solution.
As prospects for that became more and more dim, the United
States did come to take the view that there might be no alter-
native to a coup, and it certainly had the view that if there
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was going to be a coup
ieve the language somewhere in
one of the cables is that it was in the interests of the United
States that it should succeed
Mr' Schwarz. Now on the day of the coup, Ambassador
Lodge told Mr. Diem that he would provide help to get him out
of the country and do so by airplane, but he couldn't have the
plane for twenty-four hours. Addid you know of the twenty-four
hour point?
Mr. Bundy. I don't remember that we did.
Mr. Schwarza B, don't you find it incomprehensible that
the United States was not able to supply an airplane for
twenty-four hours?
Mr Bundy.
where the plane was going to go, what kind of plane
I don't really know because it depends o
think I'm competent to answer that question
don't
What occurs to me is, there were lots of other ways of
offering asylum for a twenty-four hour period, and I don'
think I really find, that a very significant point.
The Chairman'
further questions?
If there are no further questions, I want to thank you
for your testimony, it has been long, a very long morning, and
it has been very helpful testimony. We appreciate it very
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much.
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Mr. Bundy.
And I am thankful to you, Mr. Chairman
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Mr. Chairman, if it is not inappropriate and there i is no
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objection I have a brief statement that I intend to make to
the Press which will simply re-emphasize to them what I think
I have said a number of times this morning about my view of
the role of President Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy.
up to you. I certainly would
The Chairman I leave
not want to interpose any objection.
Thank you very much.
(Whereupon at 12:42 o'clock p.m. the Committee recessed.)
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