14-00000
104-10193-10160
CL
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS
FILE TITLE NUMBER/VOLUME: NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
(WEST GERMANY 4 ITS ACTION GRCUP
HITLER WELLE.
INCLUSIVE DATES:
1
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:
DELETIONS, IF ANY:
DATE
DATE
ROOM:
RECEIVED RETURNED
19558978
REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
PHOOSE ORR
Phoebe on
NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
NED
14-00000
NPD
National femokratische Partel Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)
Combined Deutsche Rechtspartei, Deutsche Reichspartei, the split off Sozialistiche
Reichspartel and the Deutsche Partei.
In August 1964 von Thaden arranged a meeting with other right-wingers to promote
unification of all nationalist forces. Friedrich Thielen served as both front
man and financial backer. A committee of 10 drafted a constitution which was
accepted in November 1964 by representatives of the DRP, DP, GLP and the DVNP (Deutsche-
National Volkspartei). The DRP officially disolved in December 1965 although the
NPD had, in fact, long been the nationalist party. At the 21 l'arch 1967 meeting
of the NPD Executive Committee, the more moderato Thielen (former Deutsche Partei)
was ousted from the NPD by the more extreme von Thaden forces (DRP).. There was
no major rush to leave the NPD,however. Recent reporting hes indicated that those
who did leave the NPD,even including Thielen, are being invited back into the NPD.
11-00000
NED SCOFS CARD
1. Bundestag Elections 1965 NFD's first Effort
2. 13 March 1966, communal Elections, Schleswig-
Holstein (NFD Has directive
not to participate. A few did)
3. 13 March 1966, Bavarian Communal Elections
NPD major effort concentrated
only in Franconia.
:
664,157 votes = 2$
In 11 communities where
NFD ran candidates,
averaged 10.5% of vota
compared with 6% in same.
towns in 1965.
1.6 % of total Bavarian
vote but:
Middle Franconia =
Ansbach
-
5.16
Erlangen - 8.26
Nürnberg- 7.35
Sowhabach-5.65
Upper Franconia
Bayreuth
Coburg
Kulmbach
-
8.53
5.3%
5.58
-
+ 2 village mayors
3.9 % (1.8% in 1965)
no candidates elected
24. 27 March 1966 Hamburg Burgerschaft Election
5. 10 July 1966 Northrhein-Westphalia Landtag Election
No NFD candidates elected none entered.
6. 16 October 1966 Hamlin Byelection (Communal Concil)
7
6 November 1966 Hesse Landtag Elections
7. 20 November 1966 Bavarian Landtag Elections
8.
23 April 1967 Rheinland-Palatine
9.
23 April 1967 Schleswig-Holstein
10.
4 June 1967
11. 11 October 1967
ท
12. 25 April 1968
Lower Saxony
Bremen Burgerschaft
Baden-Wuerttemberg
}
8.4% (*65=
) 2 seats
221,500 votes = 7.9%+
8 Seats in Landtag
Marburg, Wiesbaden, Barnstadt
and Giessen =ca 10%
FT/M
= 8.4%
votes= 7.4%
15 Seats in Landtag
4 Seats, 5.9% of vote
4 Seats, 5.7 % of vote
10 Seats, 7 % of vote
8 Seats, 8.8 % of vote
12 Seats, 9.8 % of vote
13.
38 Sept 1969
Federov
Suits, 4.3% of vote
14-00000
JUNE 8, 1974
The Hitler Boom
by Charles Lam Markmann
Heidelberg
Had he inved Adolf Hitler would have been 83 years
old on April 20. And it was on this April 20 that the
forces responsible for the ouster of Chancellor Willy
Brandt for things must be called by their right names
- had almost finished preparing West Germany for
her start on the short march back to the past One
hears everywhere "If we only had a strong man
again." On the fashionable North Sea resort island of
Sylt, Hitler's birthday was celebrated in the best Na-
tional Socialist style by several dozen Germans, none
gest 15, and all of them arrested on
sing circulated or displayed Nazi sym-
young men wore brown shirts and swastika
conds; the guls frumped themselves up in the
dowdy blue skirts and white middy blouses of the
Bund deutscher Madein (League of German Girls), the
auxiliary of the Hitler Jugend. The walls of the room in
which they held their party were decorated with pic-
tures of Hitler and other National Socialist emblems
for which they had scoured Schleswig-Holstein. After
they had listened to records of Hitler's and other Nazi
leaders' speeches and of old party march music, they
drank a toast to the Fuhrer.
When they were arrested, one of the young men
said the party had been planned merely as "ein guter
Gag. Perhaps so But for millions of other Germans
the re-creation of "the Nazi time" is serious business*
for some, because they want those good old days back,
and for a lewe because they tear the others may very
easily get their wish when the Federal Republic of
Germany must at last put its democracy to the test.
The fear is heightened by the steady and at times spec-
tacular rise in what is called du. Hitlerwelle-the Hitler
wave, or Hitler boom-which has kept pace with the
economic crisis, price ievels and unemployment The
number of jobless has doubled since December
It is as much a Hitler and Hitler-associated boom as
a Nazi boom This is not to say that Nazi thinking has
no following in West Germany-quite the contrary,
as the letters-to-the-editor columns of newspapers
demonstrate. In Bavaria-Nurnberg (indeed where
else?), in a 17th-century Franconian castle, a 25-man
"army" of youths trains regularly, with the same steel
helmets and rides that the Wehrmacht used 1.om 1939
to 1945. Their leader is a sign-painter named Karl-
Charles Lay Markmann, crític, translator and journal-
ist, as at work on a book about the two German republics.
JE
17 GAME
шрач
Heinz Hoitmann, whose goals are simple: the destruc-
bon of communisif and big capitál, the end of partia-
mentary rule, government by an unclected elite, the
annexation of Austria (which, as the Weimar Consti-
tution makes clear in Article 61, was also the goal of
the first German “republic"), and the roundication of
the Foxieral Republic of. Germany and the German-
Democratic Republic.
There is a core of some 120,000 regular readers of the
National Zeitung, which for two decades has been
whitewashing the Nazi era, "proving" that the only
concentration and extermination camps were those
built grter the war by German prisoners under Ameri-
can orders, for propaganda purposes (there are even
pictures); promoting a brisk trade in Nazi medals, uni-
forms weapons and other memorabilia, as well as
books and recordings of speeches party congresses,
narrations or military campaigns (victorious one.),
and engaging in a taily subtle anti-Semitism. There
is no need for bratancy, after all the Jews were only the
first and most conspicuous of Naca targets. Twelve
or so million non-Jews murdered by the Germans died
just as painfully-facts that are almost daily branded
as "lies in letters to newspapers, occasioailly in demi-
onstrations, less infrequently in swastika-daubings
and cemetery vandalism
But these things-the Sylt birthday party. Hoff-
mann's army (which ought to be taken seriously-
the Nazi party's strength rose to seven members when
Hitler joined it), the National Zetting the “annquan-
ans whose windows and shops are filled exclusively
with Wilhelmine and especially National Socialist
abus d vertu are only symptoms of the Hitler.
wille The real thing is far more wide, pread, tar deeper
and more respectable" in West Berlin alone there are
more than 500 cars bearing registration plates that,
after the mondatory "B" (for Berlin), carry such letter
combines as SS. SA, HJ. KZ before the various
numurals. These designations-tor Staumschatzstaffel
(Elite Guardi, Sturmabterling (Stonta Troops), Hatter
Jugend, Konzentration-lager (concentration camp) –
have not been issued zoutinely. They are issued by
request, and Karl Koenig, the Social Democrat who
heads the city's Economics Department, the issuing
onice, explains that under West German law such re-
quests cannot be retused. (I am not for one moment
insplying that the law should be revised: one does not
fight ideas, or even brute hatreds, with muzzles.) The
14-00000
same kinds of plates are visible in many other parts of
Federal Germany..
There are now in print literally thousands of paper--
back titles dealing with every possible aspect of the
Third Reich and its personalities. There are serious,
analytical histories that sacritice success for integrity;
on the other hand two big, exhaustive, expensive bio;
graphies of Hitler are selling more than well; and pne
of them, by Joachim C. Fest, an editor of the arch-
reactionary Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, hás göne
"well past 275.000 copies at almost $20 apiece-the
publishers have 25.000 more ready and waiting in
the warehouse. This book makes much of Hitler's
"modernity,"httle of his barbarities: he was necessary
to his time. The other, which is much more overtly an
apologia-is by Werner Maser, who teaches the Hitler
era at the University of Munich. It has sold 30,000
copies. It endeavors to create the impression that, had
he not had certain problems arising out of misguided
medication in 1938, Hitler would have done more good
(and less harm).
In addition there are the big hardcover editions of
THE NEW REPUBLIC
Hitler's speeches (four volumes) and Propaganda Min-
aster Paul Joseph Goebbels' (two volumes), four new
books about Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy who is now,
at 80, the last prisoner in Spandau, innumerable radio
and television programs dealing with various aspects
and personalues of the period; and, most lately, a fort-
nightly publication, Das dritte Keich; planned to cover
the whole NS-Ża for popular.consumption in two
years, and then expire.
The Alles-especially the Americans-for a long
time forbade any mention whatever of the Hitler
period, and West Germany, once it became a more or
less independent state, continued these bans for years.
Even more than other peoples, Germans have the
touching notion that censorship and repression will
effectively eliminate ideas and facts; and, against this,
neither the left nor the right has the faintest concept
of civil liberties. Thus it is still torbidden, even though
the German Communist party has been legalized
again, te form a “Nazi" or "National Socialist” party,
Consequently the old SA and SS men organized the
totally Nabi Nationaldemokratische Parter Deutschlands,
In England and in the US there has been a revival of
interest in the Hitler era paralleling the orie in West
Germany At least 12 English and American publish-
ers have capitalized on this interest. Here's a sampling
ot their recent books:
Pictures: Sieg Heil!, an illustrated history of Germany
from Bismark to Hitter, by Stefan Lorant (Norton),
more than 700 photographs and a literate text Hitler
Close-up (Macmillan), interesting because these are
the pictures taken by Hitler's friend Heinrich Hoff-
mann, with commentary by confidant and diarist
Henry Picker.
History: Hitler's Rise to Power. The Nazi Movement in
Bavaria, 1923-1933. by Geoffrey Pridham (Harper &
Row). In-depth answer to the question, what made
people support Hitler in the early '20s Careful and
scholarly.
Military: Hitter's War Arms. The Establishment of the
New Order, by Norman Rich (Norton) The second
volume of a huge, hugely detailed study dealing with
Hitler's foreign policies The Rise and Fall of the Luft-
waje. by David Irving (Little, Brown), the life of Field
Marshall Erhard Milch who was second in command
to Goering and who survived to tell much of this to the
author. The Admiral's WD Pack, by Jean Noli (Double-
day), containing authentic first-hand accounts of
U-boat (Grev Wolves) actions. Battle Over the Reich,
by Altred Ince (Cambridge University Press), con-
tains pictures and text about the bombing and strating
of German cities and towas. Part of the revival be-
cause it is Germany seen as destroyed from the air.
Hitler's Strategy, 1940-1341 the Balkan Clue, by Martin
van Creveld (Cambridge University Press), a new view
of Hitler's interest in the Mediterranean and his rela-
tions with Raly
Religion: Pe German Church Struggle and the Holo-
caust (Wayne University Press), a collection of essays
that grew out et the First International Scholars' Con-
ference in 197I.
Refugees: Band Refuge, by A. J. Sherman (University
of Caltonia Press) An interesting study of how
Britain changed her policy aboid refugees from the
Third Reich nom 1933 to 1939 and why.
Persons Target Heydrich, by Miroslav Ivanov (Mac-
millan). May-by-play account of the assassination of
Czech occupation head Reinhard Heydrich and the
Nazi revenge that culminated in Lidice Hiller. by
Joachim i est (tarcourt Brace Jovanovich), the English
translation by Richard and Clara Winston of the biog-
raphy in which: Fest concludes that it Hitter had died
or been killed in 1935 "few would hesitate to call him
one of the greatest of German statesmen." which may
be why the book is seven-éightos over before we come
to the Hitler of the war years Werner Maser's Hitler
Legend Myth and Realty (Harper & Row). Enormously
detaried with so many tazis they obscure the man end
his works
Future: To be published by Viking in August, already
published in England (Secker & Warburg). The Lone-
liest Man in the World, the "inside story of the 30-year
imprisonment kadolt Hess." inside because the
author, Eugene K wird, was former commandant of
Spandau Frsor and seems to have won Hess' confi-
dence Despite as promises it says very little that has
not already been known or surmised.
- The Editors
14-00000
JUNE 8, 1974.
which, after some initial successes, took cover in the
hardly inhospitable Christian Democratic and Chris-
tian Social Unions but has recently announced its'
determination to purge itself of this (taint." In
addition in spite of the constitutional ban (Article,
18) on any use of civil liberties to endanger the unde
tined "free democratic basic order," the state of Lower
Saxony y alone has 34 active Fascist and Nazi organiza-
tions, publishing houses, and mail-order book dis
tributors. No one knows how many members, and
customers they have because they operate furtively,
as the rather stupid law compels them to do Mut
(Courage), a monthly magazine addressing a frankly
Fascist if not Nazi program to the young in that state,
has a circulation of 10,000 and is regarded by the
Lower Saxon Minister of the Interior as potentially or
latently dangerous.
Everywhere there is curiosity about those mysteri-
ous 12 years. The teachers who taught then are still
teaching, unless superannuated, but very few of them
- dare to teach what they used to teach, or even to talk -
about "the past." That is why Daš driftě Reich was
founded this year: to make money out of that curiosity.
The idea was that of Hans-Peter Dietze, now its man-
aging editor, according to his editor-in-chief, Dr.
Christian Zentner, who stakes a pious claim to a de-
site to show his young compatriots how the Third
Reich carne to pass, in order to prevent its ever hap
pening again. After four issues, Dr. Zentner is not so
sure that his publisher, the big Hamburg house of
John Jahr Verlag KG, will do much more than break
even, because, he told me, what millions of people are
insatiably interested in is not "the abstractions" of
nazism and its history but its personalities, and in
particular Adolf Hitler. These, he says, are "simple""
people who do not read books but who watch televi
sion and read magazines, and it was they whom he set
out to capture-to clarify the past for them.
His magazine is expensive- about $1.50 a copy. A
tremendous advertising campaign, of dubious taste,
resulted in first-issue sales some 150,000 above the
250,000 copies that the editors and publishers ex-
pected. The second issue sold between 330 000 and
340.000 copies, the third something over 250,000 so
far, and the fourth - which is still on the newsstands-
more than 200,000. The overwhelming majority of the
purchasers and subscribers, Zentner admits, seems to
include few of those young people he was looking for.
the real circulation is among the people old enough to
remember, the Nazis who write furious letters to the
editor because he tarnishes their legends. Both Dietze,
and Zentner fold me that the greatest sales of Das
dritte Reich are not in cities but out in the country and
the small towns, in Bavaria and Franconia especially.
One of the reasons for the phenomenal success of a
television program called "Ein Herz und eine Scele”.
("One Heart and One Soul") is its enthusiastically en-
.
19'
's also
joved derogations of the sub-men, by name: the Slavs,
the Jews, the Latins, the Levantines A German exag-
geration of "All-in the Family, the program plays a
on the hysterical dread of "the Communists" that has
been endemic here ever since, the general staff real-
ized in 1918 that it had made a terrible mistake in
helping Lenin in 1917 Ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt was
a constant target because of his illegitimate birth and
his "traitorous" conduct trom 1935 to 1945, when he
fought against nazisin, as well as his “selling out” to
"the Reds." The program regularly attracts 60-65 per-
cent of the national audience, and only an occasional
editorial writer or commentator dares to see its popu-
larity for the danger it is. Its "lett-liberal" creator.
Wolfgang Menge, claims it to be a satire and so recog-
nized because people say its protagonist, Alted Tet-
zlaff, sounds just like Franz Josef Strauss, the head of .
the CSU: but then in each regional election this year
more of them votetor the Strausses.
In mid-March the Bavarian Siate Radio and Televi-
sion broadcast a long interview with Hitler's (and
Franklin Roosevelt's) old friend, Ernst (Putzi) Hanf-
staengl, who is now 87 Though in the end-through a
rather gruesome practical joke- he felt he had to flee
to the United States in 1937, and was materially as-
sisted by Roosevelt, his old Harvard classmate, in
gaining entry (later he became an adviser on policy to
the American forces!). Hanistaengl spent his whole
time on camera telling what fine fellows Hitler, Goer-
ing, Goebbels, Himmler and the others really were,
when all was said and done-and masters of their
trades to boet: fine soldiets, geniuses at propaganda,
und so weiter. Their Weimar predecessors he belittled
and dismissed as nothings, though he admitted he
had never known much about their aspirations or
their achievements. Moreover in spite of having, with
his wife and sister. lavishly and almost single-
mindedly supported Hitler from the days before the
1923 Munchen. Puers to his own abrupt departure for,
the decadent democracy, Hentstaengi insisted that he
had never thought for a moment that the unremitting
vuulent anti-Semitisca of his friend and futo would
ever amount to anything serious ("some of my best
friends were..."), or that his protege would ever have
been "stupid enough to start a war ”
The real danger of a Huder renascence, in the view
of Dr. Hugo Marx, a scholar who suffered under the
original, lies in the combination of a romantic nostal·
gia and the millennial German faith in authoritarian
rule as the solution to all problems. Weimar, after all,
failed primanly, as both William B. Shirer and Karl
Dietrich Bracher have shown, because no one, includ-
ing the Social Democrats who proclaimed it out of
desperation when they could find neither a Hohen-
zollern nor any other loyalty to accept the throne,
wanted a republić. When the economic crash came
after 1929, the millennial search for the "strong man"
lost its last restraint.
14-00000
Intelligence Information Report
motorials information Rocking the Notorio of the Unwed States within the morning
The tea USC Site 793 and 7 then of resolation of, which in any
od person is prohibited by law,
DIRECTORATE FOR
ELAS'S
SECRET
NO FOREIGN-DISSEM
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
COUNTRY West Germany
DOI
March 072
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
REPORT NO. CS-311/01424-72
DATE DISTR. 14 March 1972-
SUBJECT Intention of the Executive Committee of
the National Democratic Party to Urge
Non-participation of the Party in Baden-
Wuerttemberg Election
PA
WP 24
ACQ
SOURCE
0
Germany, Hamburg
(10 March 1972)
!
FIELD NO.
EGG-1825
An official West German security service at the Land level.
Analogous information from other West German services should
not be construed as confirmation. The sub-source is an NPD
official who had access to the information.
3
2
1; The executive committee of the West German National
Democratic Party (NPD) will meet on 18 March with officials
of the Baden-Wuerttemberg NPD organization and attempt to
persuade the Land organization not to contest the 23 April
Land election. The executive committee will point out that
If the NPD does not run candidates in this election, the
chances for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to obtain a
majority in the Baden-Wuerttemberg election will be enhanced.
This would enable the CDU to retain its Bundesrat majority
and improve the chances of defeating the Eastern treaties of
the Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party government.
2. The background of the executive committee's desire
to avoid contesting the Baden-Wuerttemberg election is its
estimate that the NPD would capture only two per cent of the
vote this year compared with 9.4 per cent in the last
election, a result which the executive committee is most
anxious to avoid.
3. Field Dissem; Sent to Bonn and Berlin.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
STATE
(classification)
DIA
ARMY NAVY
AIR
NSA
CRS
(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
F'INTEL
E/G/R
/G/R/ED 1
E/G/R/LB
E
TOTALS
IE 2, CI 2, FI 3. FR 1. EUR 6
NOT FOR AISON
LIAISON
5432.
1
EGG-1825
Hamburg-21038
IN 557585
CAEROTIC/3.
COORDINATING RELEASING
HM
JM
14-00000
OF
፡፡
TUCS INFORMATI REPORT
OPO LOIS BARNAAL/kmb
UNIT SE/G/R
[EXT. 7118
1
DATE DECEMBER 1971.
CONT
EUR 11
FI 5, IN. CSDO, DO:4.
DATE DISTRIBUTED
`1 DECEMBER 1971
DISSEMINATION.
WE'R
1.2
E/G/R/SP 2.4-1
B/G/R 12
E/G/W 1
BE/G/R/BD-1-E/F/R_2°
E/G/R/JE-1
E/G/R/LB-L
REVALUATIONT
REQUESTED
STATE
OF
ARMY
#064
(When filled in
NAYY
p
NO HIATSON
AIR
HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS (Place X in appropriate space. List electrical addrestres.)
C RECOMMEND EXO
A
BASIC DOCUMENT NOT
MADE AVAILABLE DCI
E
S
RELAY CABLE ATTACHED
SHOW IW
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
ROUTING
.
TDCS-314/2017
☑ROUTINE
PRECEDENCE-
SASED ON (FED. APT. PROIJ
EGG-1781
HAMBURG 20722
IN 479259
CAERCTIC/3
LIAISON *
WP 2.4
1
W
DISSEM ELECTRICALLY
☐☐ TO,
SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
OTHER.
EXCLUSIVE FOR USIB
USIB PERSONAL ATIN
ZRWAHOO CABLE SENT
NOT FOR LIAISON
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
CS INTERNAL USE ONLY
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
John R. Math
G/R
CLASSIFICATION
JOHN HAPOTHER
SECRET
(When Filled in)
COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
RELEASING OFFICER
60
C/E/R
HANS
ing
AYS
LOSES
COPY NO.
FORM IK-2 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
3-49
(13-10-44-47)
14-00000
°
ROUTINE
DIRECTORATE OP
PLANS
Intelligence Information Cable
IN 479259
5 PAGES
PAGE 1 OF
STATE/INE DIA NMCC/MC (SCOPICS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONF CPS XXXXX
TREAS
XXXNXXXX
efering the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws Title 18, U.S.C. Sci. 793 and 774, the
revel tion of which in any
to on nousurized sierson is prohibited by low.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
CITE TDCS
-314/12543-71
DIST 1 DECEMBER 1971
COUNTRY WEST GERMANY
DO!
SUBJECT
NOVEMBER 1971
SUMMARY OF ADOLF VON THADDEN'S
3 DECEMBER SPEECH TO THE NORTH-
WEST MINING ASSOCIATION
ACQ
SOURCE
GERMANY, HAMBURG (23 NOVEMBER 1971)
FIELD NO. EGG-1721
AN OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SECURITY SERVICE AT THE LAND
LEVEL. ANALOGOUS INFORMATION FROM OTHER WEST GERMAN
SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS CONFIRMATION. THE SUB-
SOURCE IS AN NPD OFFICIAL WHO HAD ACCESS TO A COPY OF THE
DRAFT SPEECH.
1. (FIELD COMMENT:
ADOLF VON
THADDE N, FORMER
NATIONAL CHAIRMAN OF THE WEST GERMAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
PARTY (NPD), HAS BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK TO THE ANNUAL
GENERAL MEETING OF THE NORTHWEST MINING ASSOCIATION,
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON, ON 3 DECEMBER ON THE TOPIC: A
EUROPEAN'S VIEW OF THE AMERICAN CURRENCY PROBLEM.. SEE
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL HAMBURG TELEGRAM 767, 10
NOVEMBER 1971. DESPITE VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION
FROM HIS NPD POST HE STILL PLANS TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND
SECRET
teles feat.onl
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
frition contrals?
14-00000
TDCS-314/125413-71
PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES
•
• SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(clastrattoni:
(dissem controls)
TO PRESENT THE SPEECH WHICH IS SUMMARIZED BELOW.)
2. VON THADDEN BEGINS BY TRACING THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES' RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY FROM WORLD
.
•
WAR I TO THE PRESENT, DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO
THE 1929 STOCK MARKÉT CRASH. HE GIVES CREDIT TO THE
UNITED STATES FOR HELPING EUROPE BACK ON ITS FEET AFTER
WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN. BUT POINTS OUT
THAT THE NATIONS WHICH WERE HELPED USED THE AID TO BUILD
AN EXPORT BASE WHICH NOW IS CONTRIBUTING TO AMERICA'S
FINANCIAL TROUBLES. HE SAYS THAT GERMANY AND OTHER ·
COUNTRIES BECAME INFECTED WITH AN "EXPORT HYSTERIA"
AFTER THE WAR WHICH HAD SHORT TERM BENEFITS FOR WORLD
TRADE, BUT WHICH IN THE LONG RUN DAMAGED THE DOMESTIC
ECONOMIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES.
3. THE 15 AUGUST 1971 SPEECH BY PRESIDENT NIXON IS
COMPARED WITH THE 24 OCTOBER 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH,
AND VON THADDEN SAYS THAT THE SPEECH WILL HAVE JUST AS
PROFOUND AN EFFECT ON THE WORLD'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM AS DID
THE CRASH. HE DEPICTS THE SPEECH AND THE RESULTING CONTROLS
AS SPELLING THE END OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ESTABLISHED
AT BRETTON-WOODS.
54321
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classtation
fde control)
54344

14-00000
IDCS -314/12543-71
PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(elastication )
(dissem "conéjela)
4. IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE TYPE OF WORLD ECONOMIC
SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD FOLLOW THE CURRENT AMERICAN CONTROLS
AND FLOATING OF THE DOLLAR, VON THADDEN DRAWS HEAVILY FROM
THE 23 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE OF FRENCH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU..
HE SAYS THAT THE DOLLAR CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED THE
SINGLE WORLD CURRENCY. THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF EUROPE
MAKES IT NECESSARY THAT A EUROPEAN RESERVE CURRENCY BE
AVAILABLE AS A SECOND WORLD CURRENCY. THIS CANNOT BE
THE BRITISH POUND AS MANY PEOPLE AT ONE TIME WOULD HAVE
BELIEVED, BUT MUST BE A CURRENCY ACCEPTED BY BOTH FRANCE
AND GERMANY AND ADMINISTERED BY A COMMON GERMAN-FRENCH
BANK SUPPORTED BY GOLD. ALL EUROPEAN STATES WOULD USE
THIS BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS.
VON THADDEN VIEWS POMPIDOU'S SPEECH AS A SIGNAL TO THE
UNITED STATES THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WILLING TO STAY
PERMANENTLY UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON, AND
AS PROVIDING AN OUTLINE OF THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC ORDER
EUROPE SHOULD HAVE IN THE FUTURE. HE CRITICIZES THE WEST
GERMAN GOVERNMENT FOR NOT TAKING A SIMILAR STAND, SAYING
THAT WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE STATE TO PUT ECONOMIC
PRESSURE ON OTHER STATES, THE SITUATION CAN LEAD TO
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification)
(dissem controls)
54321
4
5432
14-00000
་་
TDCS
-314/12543-71
PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
natio
dissem con
POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE PROFITABLE
ONLY TO THE COMMUNISTS.
5. VON THADDEN SEES TWO ALTERNATÍVES IN THE PRESENT
SITUATION, I.E., EITHER A RETURN TO FIRM PARITY WITH A
DEVALUED DOLLAR, OR A CHANGE TO FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES
AGREED TO BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND GUARANTEED BY
INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES. HE BELIEVES THE DOLLAR MUST BE
DEVALUED BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT EXPECT EUROPEANS-
TO CONTINUE TO BUY THE DOLLAR AT A RATE WHICH IS NOT
LEGALLY FIXED. HE VIEWS FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AS
DESIRABLE FOR EUROPE. BUT NOT REALIZABLE AT PRESENT
BECAUSE THIS SYSTEM WOULD EXCLUDE THE "THIRD WORLD"
AND THUS WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES.
6.
SUMMARIZING, VON THADDEN STRESSES THE NECESSITY
FOR THE FREE WORLD TO REMAIN STRONG AND FOR EACH EUROPEAN
COUNTRY TO RETAIN ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DIGNITY TO
PREVENT DOMINATION BY COMMUNIST AND FAR-LEFT FORCES. HE
CRITICIZES THOSE WHO SAY THAT AMERICA IS NO LONGER NEEDED
AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE USSR. DECLARING THAT THERE IS
NO OTHER COUNTRY WHICH CAN SERVE IN THIS CAPACITY, ESPECIALLY
NOT PRESENT DAY WEST GERMANY. HE SAYS THAT THE WEST
{
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
54324.
telessfecti
(dissem controls)
54321
:
14-00000
IN 413438
TDCS -311/12543-71
PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
lasteation)
(disiem controls)
GERMAN PEOPLE, THROUGH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND LEADERS
WHO ARE FRIENDLY TO COMMUNISM, HAVE LOST THEIR NATIONAL
CHARACTER AND ARE TOO WEAK TO OPPOSE THE USSR. HE ENDS
BY CALLING FOR A CHARACTER RENAISSANCE IN THE FREE WORLD
TO MAKE IT STRONG ENOUGH TO COUNTER COMMUNISM. (HEADQUARTERS
COMMENT: THE STATEMENT OF VON THADDEN IN SPOKANE MAY
ATTRACT PRESS INTEREST DUE TO THE NOTORIETY HE GAINED IN
RECENT YEARS AS LEADER OF A GERMAN NATIONALIST PARTY
WIDELY DESCRIBED AS NEO-NAZI. IN FACT, THE PARTY. HAS
DECLINED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO THE POINT WHERE IT
IS THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION, AND VON THADDEN'S RECENT
RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY DEPRIVES HIM OF ANY POLITICAL
PLATFORM IN WEST GERMANY.)
7. FIELD DISSEN:
NONE (SENT BONN).
-3
1
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
°
felagnetion)
(dissem controlsi
5
4
3
2
16722-
14-00000
Intelligerice Information Report-
This material containing the Novenal Defense of the United States wohin the ring
of the Espionage les 15 USC. 790 and 124,transmission or insaties of wh
manne: to on howther je cene is pretibited by law.
DIRECTORATE OP
PLANS
SECRET
NO FOREIGN. DISSEM
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
COUNTRY
West Germany
DOI
SUBJECT
March 1971
Intention of Adolf Von Thadden
to Resign As Chairman of the
National Democratic Party
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
REPORT NO. CS-311/01861-71
DATE DISTR. 10 March 1971
•2JP 24
ACQ
SOURCE
Germany, Hamburg (8 March 1971)
FIELD NO. KGG-1682
An official West German Security Service concerned with
right and left radical organizations, from sources described
as NPD officials. who have access to the information.
Similar information received through, other West German
intelligence channels should not be construed as confirmation.
->
1. In early March 1971 Adolf Von Thadden
indicated to close associates including members of the
Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party of
Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
NPD) that he plans to resign as Chairman of the XPD in
the near future. Von Thadden has not announced the date
when he plans to resign but close associates believe
it will be sometime during the period 1 April to 1 June
1971.
2. Von Thadden's decision has been prompted by his
discouragement over prospects for the NPD, serious financial
difficulties of the party and by severe internal bickering
within the NPD Executive Committee during the past several
weeks. Von Thadden is basically more moderate than many
members of the Executive Committee. Among other disagreements,
Von Thadden has opposed certain aspects of the "Resistance
Action" (Aktion Widerstand) in which NPD members have
recently staged demonstrations which erupted into violence.
Von Thadden was also personally humiliated when his sister
and other relatives asked him not to attend the funeral
of Von Thadden's brother-in-law, the well-known historian
Percy Schramm who died in Goettingen in January 1971.
-
543210
STATE
(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification)
DIA
ARMY
(distam controls
NAVY
AIR
NSA
ces
11 CA/INT
CA/PEG
બ
E/R
E/G/R
E/G/R/JE I
E/G/R/BM 1
E/G/R (WP .4)
TOTALS
IK 2. CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6. CA 3
LIAISON
32
5432-
EGG-1682
HAMBURG 19934
IN 282656
CABROFIC
ORDINATING ALLESTING
HM: JM:
sam
14-00000-1
i
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
CS-311/01861-71
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
3.. (Source Comment: Von Thadden's resignation
will in all probability moan the end of the NPD as an
effective political organization. With the possible
exception of the Bavarian District Chairman of the NPD.
Dr. Siegfried Poeh 1. m a'n n, the NPD lacks effective
and dynamic leaders. Pochlmann, however, has health
problems and also does not have the stature of Von Thadden.
The disintegration of the NPD will probably result in a
number of smaller right-wing groups coming into existence,
some of which, like the recent "Aktion Widerstand" may
have a propensity for violence. After the NPD disin-
tegrates, most of its former supporters will probably
cast their votes for one of the three major political
parties in West Germany. The CDU and CSU stand to gain
most of these votes.)
4. Field Dissem: None.
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
FORM A USE PREVIOUS
10-40
mititials
EBATIN DIFFI
1209
14-00000
INI
LIGE
elligence Information Resort
Ponal contains information affecting themes of the United States within the min
the Espinoge tows Title 18, USC. Se on nonmision or revelation of which in my
moner to unauthorised person: to prohibited by tow
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANA
NO FORSIEN DISSEM
THIS IS' AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT ANALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
SECRET
COUNTRY West Germany
DOI.
SUBJECT
Mid-February 1970
REPORT NO.
CS-311/02895-70
DATE DISTR. 3 April 1970-
Analysis of the West German National
Democratic Party's Election Chances
and Cohesiveness
ACQ
SOURCE
4
2
1
•
Germany (27 February 1970)
FIELD NO. OGA 953
A medium-level West German government official who follows the
activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD), from an NPD.
official who attended the party congress. The report is the
NPD official's analysis of the party's situation in the wake
of the congress. The information is also passed to an official
West German service, from which similar information should not
be construed as confirmation.
1. Adolf von Thadden. NPD chairman, remains firmly in
control of the party following the 14-15 February 1970 NPD congress
in Wertheim.
2.
Skepticism about the future of the NPD is increasing among
party leaders. The NPD is definitely planning to wage vigorous cam-
paigns in all 1970 Land elections, but there appears to be little
chance that the party will do even as well in these elections as it
did in the 1969 Bundestag elections, when it failed to obtain five
percent of the total vote.
3. At the congress, several prominent NPD leaders emphasized
the need for party unity; these appeals were well received by the
delegates. There are many unresolved questions and problems, how-.
ever, which will continue to plague the party. For instance, the
"national-conservative" concept, which was adopted in the manifesto
issued by the congress, came under strong attack. One group, which
includes both older and younger members, rejects the concept of the
NPD as a conservative party, because they consider, that this term
conveys the idea that the party is an out-of-date and reactionary
political group. On the other hand, the proponents of the national-
conservative concept consider themselves as upholding "positive
values" in the face of manifestations of disintegration. Von Thadden
is the party's unifying force, and one delegate accurately summarized
the situation by saying: "Von Thadden, by virtue of the charisma of 4
his speeches, succeeded in bridging the many cracks in the party."
4.
Embassy Bean, USBER.
Field Dissem:
(dissam controls)
1947
NAYT
AIR
NSA
R$
(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification)
DIA
STATE
3
E/G/W
E/G/R
C/E/G/N
ER
F/G/R/BP 2.4
[IE 2,CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 6
OGA-953
CATERROR
NO LIAISON
500401MATING PELEAD
LIAISON
HM:CHW
lah
(20)
14-00000
51.
Inteligence Information Repor
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning
of the tenage Lows, Te 10. USC 703 and the transmission of revelation of which it any
manner to outhorized person is prohibited by law.
DIRECTORATE OF
PLAMA
COUNTRY'
DOI
SUBJECT
ACQ
SOURCE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
West Germany
June 1968, 1 September 1969
West German Ministry of Interior
Evaluation of the Prospects of
Banning the National Democratic
Party
Germany (1 September 1969)
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
REPORT NO. CS-311/08556-69
DATE DISTR. 26 September 1969)
FIELD NO. OGA-913
A medium-level West German government official who follows
the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had
access to the study during his official duties. The informa-
tion was extracted from the original document and is believed
to be an accurate summary of its highlights.
Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior
prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the West German
National Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given
be low describes the major charges which the government could bring
against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make
against these charges, and the probable political results which
would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the
NPD.
According to the source, this study is still considered the
basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and
is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land)
officials. End of Summary.
1. (Field Comment: For several years, West German political
and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court
ban on the NPD. On 13 November 1968, Ernst Benda, West German
Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg Kicsinger
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against
the NPD. Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, and the sub-
ject became embroiled in West German politics. Cn 23 April 1969,
the Federal Cabinet decided not to seek a court ban of the NPD, at
least until after the September elections; This decision was
prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains
and apparently was losing popular support.)
CECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
STATE
(classification)
DIA
ARMY
(dissem controls)
NAVY
AIR
NSA
CRS
(For Field Distribution see final parograph)
C/E/R
E/G/R
E/G/W
2 E/G/R/C
2E/G/RNF 2/4)
1 E/BERLIN 2
[\C/E/G/W
E/G/R/P
11
1
TOTALS
IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 8(2)
FORM
11-M
OBSOLETE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
OGA-913
CATERROR
54321
NO LIAISON COORDINATING RELEASING
LIAISON
ELEASING
FIM:CH:
srow
(30)
14-00000
Page 2 of 3 Pages
CS-311/08556-69
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEN
2. In June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared
a 50-page study of the prospects for banning the NPD entitled
"Considerations Regarding a Ban of the National Democratic Party."
The study was well prepared and carefully written. It is still
considered the basic Interior Ministry paper on the NPD and is
being studied by senior officials of both the federal and state
governments. It avoids giving an opinion on
Spects of öb-
taining a court
the content of
the
against the NPD, but'
Study, it at the authors believed that the courts
would probably reject a government proposal to ban the NPD.
(Field Comment: If the study is still considered current, it is
unclear how it fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there
was sufficient evidence to obtain a ban against the NPD.)
3. The study summarized the case which could be brought
against the NPD as follows:
a. It could be shown that there was a similarity
between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers
Party (NSDAP) which has been outlawed.
bi It could be argued that the goals, and parts of
the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the prin-
ciples of a free democratic state.
The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be pre-
sented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without
a hearing. .
4. The study lists the following points which the NPD could
be expected to use in its defense:
a. The party could prove that it has given firm instruc-
(tions to its members not to engage in rowdyism or violence.
b. It could show that a sizeable number of former
NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part
of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.
C. It could point out many features of its program
which are in accord with democratic principles.
d. It could show that its elected representatives
have worked with other parties and have not disrupted the
Landtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which
they participate.
e. It could point out that other political parties
have many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could
claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not
opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.
f. It would charge that the government's charges were
one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.
་*
g. It would claim that not all of Professor Ernst
Anrich S points were included in the party plat-
form. (Field Comment: Anrich is a former university'
professor. from Darmstadt whose proposals were apparently more
extreme than those incorporated in the party platform.)
.
h. It could claim that the increased violence
(Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is
the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.
5432-
SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
14-00000
SECRET/NO FORE, IN DISSEM
5.
Page 3 of 3 Pages
CS-311/08556-69
The study states that it would be very difficult to re-
fute these NPD defenses in court. The government would have to
admit that since early 1968 there have been very few statements
made by NPD leaders, or incidents caused by the NPD, which could
be used to support the government's case. Objectively, it would
have to be admitted that many incidents of violence in which the
NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.
6. The study predicts the following probable results should
the government win its case against the NPD:
The NPD would probably respect the prohibition.
It is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to go under-
ground as the illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.
NPD members and sympathizers would not change their
opinions because of a ban. Many would join other groups
or parties and continue to work for their political beliefs.
c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a cam-
paign for the banning of the new German Communist Party
(DKP) and other leftist groups.
d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign
countries.
7.
The study concludes that if the government should lose a
case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid
evidence (Beweisschwierigkeiten). In such an event, the following
adverse effects would occur:
.
8. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable
publicity.
b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some
success in keeping former Nazis out of key positions would
be halted....
c. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the
NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of
the stigma of being associated with a party which could be
declared illegal, would join the party or become active
supporters.
d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members.
(Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried
because the party's membership has not increased signifi-
cantly during the past 18 months.)
8. Field Dissem:
Embassy Bonn, USBER.
5432-
5
SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
14-00000
"
1834
DISPATCH
Chief of Bane, Berlin
Chief of Station, Geranny
Chief, European Division
CALL/INTEL
NPD Activities.
ACTION ALQUINED RETEM NID"
REF:
SECRET
EGBT-14589, dated 9 September. 1969
Pat
༥༈C་t་་་ཛུ
jas auth
2.
WP
We are very pleased with the quality of the informa-
tion on the NED
NPD 
which has been made available through CATERROR..
It is particularly useful during this pre-election period, but
we also appreciate not having to wait 6 to 8 weeks for CAWHISPER
to digest the material and pass it on.
**
2. After looking over the Reference, we are inclined
to stick with the requirements mentioned in DIRECTOR 39284 for.
items worthy of intel dissemination. In this context Bonn
State Department Telegram 12253 dated 17 September quotes
Foreign Minister Brandt as saying that there has been evidence
that the East Germans, undoubtedly with Soviet approval, had
given financial support to von Thadden. While we are inclined
to think that Brandt's comment may be wishful thinking,
evidence of East German financing for the NPD would be of great
interest and utility. Material not bearing on the requirements
in DIRECTOR 39284 should be forwarded now to Headquarters for
review. The NPD), as you know, is a subject of interest beyond
its proportions as a political force, and we are grateful for
the timely opportunity to keep up with the ins and outs of it.
:
bonuts concláto
S
Harriet G. COCOLLATO
-
2
-
COB/Berlin
COS/Germany
Group I
'
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification
CROSS REFERENCE TO
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
DATE
3.0-SEP-1969
EGBS-6522
25 September 1969
HQS FILE NUMBER.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
OFFICE
ORIGINATING
TYPIST
2
1
-
E/G/R
E/G/IS
E/G/R Cassandra Horton sro
1
E/REG/Chrono.
COORDINATING
OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
1
-
C/EUR/R
C/E/G/R
EXT.
6196
"OFFICER'S MAVE
C/E/G/R
Le/E/OR 26 ligt 62 del Planposta
RELEASING
OFFICE SW
OFFIC. SIGNATURE
C/E/R

14-00000
:
Intelligence Information Report
This material contains informoving Nationalfed States within the mooning
of the aorage 13, SC. Sein 793 and 794, the motion of which in any
marner to canowhorised person is prohibed by low.
wing and
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
PAGE 1 OF 2
PAGES
REPORT NO. CS-311/08430-69
COUNTRY
West Germany
DOI
Early August 1969
SUBJECT
DATE DISTR.
22 September 1969
WP 2.4
Miscellaneous Information on the
National Democratic Party
ACQ
Germany, Hamburg (15 August 1969)
SOURCE
S
4
3
q
FIELD NO. EGG-1444
Member of the National Democratic Party in Schleswig-Holstein
whose reliability has not yet been established. He obtained
the information from two district officials of the Party.
1. According to a ranking official of the Kiel district
of the National Democratic Party (NPD), Karl-Heinz
Knipph a 1 s, the chairman of the Kiel district of the
NPD, and Adolf von Thadden, the national chairman
of the NPD, are personal enemies. (Source Comment:
In
January 1969 Knipphals was elected to be his party district's
candidate for the West German Parliament. Knipphals, a Kiel
lawyer, is in his early 50's. He was severely wounded during
World War II and has only one arm.)
2. Von Thadden is aware of, and unhappy about, the fact
that Knipphals, prior to joining the NPD, participated in
Easter Marches and received unfavorable publicity. Further-
more, von Thadden is concerned about Knipphals' strong and
ruthless political ambitions. He has referred to Knipphals
as a "second Hitler", and he welcomes and encourages the fact
that there is strong opposition to Knipphals even within the
Kiel district of the party. Von Thadden, for the above
reasons, would very much like to see Knipphals remain on the
district level and is anxious to keep him out of the West
German Parliament.
3. The same official who made the remarks about von
Thadden and Knipphals. also stated that many wealthy industrial-
ists contribute funds to the NPD anonymously, because they do
not wish their association or sympathy with the party to
become known.
4. The chairman of another NPD district in Schleswig-
Holstein stated that, in view of the fact that each new
S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification)
(Jissom contrais!
STATE
ΓΙΑ
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
NSA
CRS
(For Field Dumbensee final paragraph)
C/E/R
E/G/R
E/G/R/P
E/G/R/C 1
E/G/W
NO LIAISON
TOTALS
LIAISON
*
IE 2. CI 2. FI 3. DO 1. EUR 6
EGG-1444
CAINFER
COORDINATING RELEASING
HM:CH:
Brow
4.1
33
22
11
14-00000
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
PAGE 2
OF 2 PAGES
cs-311/08430-69
Session of the West German Parliament is opened by its oldest
member, the NPD will insure that the oldest member of the next
Parliament will be an NPD man. (Headquarters Comment: The
possibility that an NPD Deputy might open the Bundestag has
already been considered by the CDU. See CS-311708164-69!)
5. Field Dissem: None (sent Bonn, Berlin)
3
2
1
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
3432-
14-00000
4
3
2
Intelligence Information port
This motoristas information officing the National Defense of the United States within the meaning
of the face Laws Lite 18 USC. Sen and 794 the mass of revelation of which in my
manner to
feed person is prohibited by low,
-
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
REPORT NO. CS LT-313/01123-69
COUNTRY
West Germany
DOI
1 January 1969
SUBJECT
ACQ
SOURCE
German Government Evidence against
the National Democratic Party (NPD).
Germany, Bonn (26 March 1969)
DATE DISTR.
July 1969
WP2.4
RELD NO. EGN-4107
An official West German security service.
1. A 77-page German-language report, describing the
National Democratic Party (NPD) and presenting documentary
and testimonial evidence of possibly unconstitutional aspects
of the NPD, has been deposited in the files of the CIA Docu-
ment and Pictorial Services Division, from which copies may
be obtained upon request.. The report is the shorter of two
versions prepared by the Federal Office for the Protection of
the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz). This
shorter version is said to be complete in substance and is
the version which was made available to West German Cabinet
members in preparation for Cabinet discussion of whether the
NPD should be banned. The longer, two-volume version has not
been obtained..
2. Appraisal of the legal validity of the evidence
against the NPD was omitted from the report at the order
of the Minister of the Interior, who reserved to himself an
assessment of the NPD's legality. Also, pages 9 to 13--a
section entitled Chief Features of the Ideology (Grundzuege
der Ideologie)--
--was omitted from the report at the request
of the Minister of the Interior. (Headquarters Comment:
The evidence in the report appears to be overt and less than
conclusive. The West German Cabinet decided in the spring
of 1969 not to request a ban of the NPD; substantial doubt
existed as to whether there were sufficient grounds to obtain
a legal ban of the NPD. The omissions from the text, referred
to in this paragraph, may reflect realization by the Interior
Ministry of the weakness of the case against the NPD.)
4.
Field Dissemination:
U. S. Embassy Bonn (limited).
3
Distribution of Attachment:
CRS/ADD
CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification)
STATE
DIA
ARMY
(dissom parall
NAVY
AIR
NSA
CAS
(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
C/E'R
C/E/G
E/G/INT
E/G/CE
E/G/R
TOTALS
[1E/G/R_ (WP2. 4)
1E/G/R/L
મેં
E/G/R/P
1E/Bonn
-
2
IE 2, CI 2, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 9(2)
LIAISON
32
CAWHISPER
EGN-4107
COORDINATING
BELEASING
HM: JL
rmm
14-00000
S
4
Intelligence Information Report
DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS
SECRET
This material containe information offering the National Defense of the United States within the meaning
of the age of 18. USC. Sere. 193 and 794 the transmission of revelation of 
which in any
manner to c wowthorized person is prohibited by k
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
CS-311/06103 -69.
REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR
7 July 1969
DOI
'COUNTRY West Berlin/West Germany
March to Mid-May 1969
SUBJECT
ACQ.
SOURCE
Status Report on Problems, Activities
and Plans of the West Berlin National
Democratic Party
Germany, Berlin
(March
-
Mid-May 1969)
WP 2.4
FIELD.NO.
EGB-24,611
Intercepted communications, supplemented by information from a
member of the West Berlin National Democratic Party (NPD) with
close contacts among members of the Berlin NPD Executive Council
and a record of accurate reporting.
Summary: The Berlin NPD has been plagued by a split between the
Berlin City leadership, which is loyal to the Party's national leaders,
and the "Loyalists" headed by the Berlin district leaders, who opposed
the dissolution of the Berlin NPD ordered by National Party Chairman
Adolf von Thadden in October 1968. Court action led to the thwarting
of the plan for dissolution. In an effort to keep the Berlin Party
alive, in mid-March von Thadden ordered a cessation of open Party ac-
tivities until after the September parliamentary elections. Subse-
quently, von Thadden arranged a postponement of a scheduled Berlin
Party convention until October, because of the possibility of a ban
on the Berlin NPD by the Allies and the threat of trouble from the
militant left. At the end of March, Berlin City NPD Chief Rudolf
Kendzia resigned in an effort to promote party unity in Berlin, but
he remains active behind the scenes. Since early April, the Berlin
NPD leadership has followed von Thadden's guidelines. The influence
of the Loyalists has been greatly reduced, and in accordance with
von Thadden's instructions party activities have been circumspect.
Both the Berlin and the National leadership are hoping that the NPD
will obtain 25 to 35 Bundestag seats in September, which, they feel,
will make the party more acceptable to right-wing voters in Berlin
and enhance NPD chances during the 1971 Berlin communal elections.
Berlin is planning to send volunteer workers to campaign for the NPD
in West Germany, especially in North Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD strong-
hold. End of Summary.
1}
1. (Field Comment: In October 1968, the West Berlin NPD had
approximately 480 dues-paying members. According to a senior party
official, more than 100 members have officially dropped their
SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
STATE
DIA
ARMY
NAVY AIR
NSA
CAS
(For Field Distribution are final paragraph)
[C/E/R
E/G/K
EG/R/L
EGR/P
TE/G/CE
CAVINT T
2 E/G/INT 1 CA/PROP 12
1E/SI
11
1 CIOP EU
2
EGR (WP24) ▼ 1
TOTALS
LIAISON
IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, DO 1, EUR 9, CA 3
*
EGB-24,611
CAYANK
CAVANISH
COORDINATING RELEASING
HN/JL
ram
14-00000
CS-311 06103-69
membership and others are dropping out quietly, In March the paid-up
membership was about 300.)
2.
Following the abortive attempt by the National Democratic
Party (NPD) leadership to force the Berlin NPD to dissolve itself for
tactical reasons in October 1968, routine party activity resumed al-
most immediately. It was characterized by a split between the leader-
ship of the Berlin City (Landesverband) party unit and that of dis-
trict (Kreisverband) party units. The former are generally loyal to
National Party Chairman Adolf von Thadden and the national leadership
in Hanover and their broader tactical concepts, while the latter, re-
ferred to as the "Loyalists" (Satzungstreue), defend the letter of the
Berlin NPD statutes. The Loyalists initially objected primarily to
the method of the attempted dissolution, but the friction with the
City Executive Committee (Landesvorstand) headed by Rudolf Kendzia
led to total mutual mistrust, disloyal statements to the press, and
efforts to get each other expelled from the party by a party court
(Schiedsgericht).
3. At a general membership meeting in Berlin on 15 March 1969,
von Thadden attempted to achieve a truce within the party and ordered
that there be no "political organizational activity" until after the
September 1969 parliamentary elections. At this meeting von Thadden
approved the scheduling of a Berlin party convention (Landesparteitag)
for 26 April 1969, at which a new and hopefully more stable city
Exécutive Committee was to be elected.
4. The 15 March meeting provided an indication that the Berlin
NPD may well stick together under von Thadden's guidance until 1971,
in spite of the friction between city and district leadership. Al-'
though the eight spokesmen for the local leadership, who took the
floor after Kendzia's situation report and von Thadden's keynote
speech, approved the action of the Berlin NPD districts in opposing
the self-dissolution of the local party, and no one contradicted them,
all but 31 of the 140 members present then voted for a resolution con-
demning District Chiefs Johann Ratzek (Schoeneberg) and Philipp
Goelles (Wilmersdorf), leaders of the Loyalists, for anti-party ac-
tivity. This vote amounted to a vote of confidence in the tactics of
the Berlin City leadership, and according to members present was due
solely to von Thadden's presence and influence. In the view of these
members, a meeting without the attendance of representatives of the
Hanover headquarters would have led to a no-confidence vote in the
Kendzia leadership. During the meeting, von Thadden also rejected
'Kendzia's "Berlin Program, which called for a softer line on East
Germany and on German reunification.
5... At the 15 March session, left-wing, anti-NPD protestors
assaulted a number of NPD members and forced the NPD twice to change
its meeting site. This leftist action and the obvious fact that the
militant left has a penetration of the Berlin NPD have had a seri-
ously dampening effect on the NPD's willingness to meet in the open.
The party is now tentatively planning to hold future meetings on a
rented excursion boat whose location would not be announced until the
time of the meeting.
6. The Berlin NPD has made strenuous efforts to determine which
left-wing organizations made up the task force which tried to disrupt
the 15 March meeting. The Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) claimed
the honor, but the NPD investigation showed definitely that all but a
handful of the protestors were an organized group dispatched by the
Spandau branch of the West Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SEW) whose
actions are part of a long-range program of harassment by the East
Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED).
7. Because of the subsequent possible threats of prohibition
by the Allies (signalled by a letter from Governing Mayor Klaus
Schuetz to the Allies asking that the NPD in Berlin be banned) and of
further counter-demonstrations by the militant left, on 27 March
- von Thadden wrote a letter to the Berlin City leadership asking that 4
5.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
1
14-00000
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Page 3 of 4 PAGES
CS-311/06103-69
the Berlin party convention be postponed until October 1969, the
normal expiration date of the term of the present city Executive
Committee and well after the national elections. The letter, which
was read at several district meetings, also stipulated that the city
and district organizations were to restrict themselves to routine
monthly meetings with no speeches and no invited guests until next
October.
8. In a tactical move to promote party unity, Party Chief
Kendzia resigned on 28 March. In response to von Thadden's letter,
the Berlin district par unit leadership, which otherwise remained
intact, called a session of the Berlin Party Council (Landesausschuss)
on 10 April to approve the postponement of the party convention.
(Field Comment: The Party Council consists of the Executive Committee
plus the 12 district leaders.) Walter Seëzen, a member of the na-
tional leadership, was present. The situation was ticklish because
the Berlin NPD statutes provide that if full membership meetings in
four of the 12 districts had voted for holding of the party conven-
tion in April, the postponement motion would fail; there was a dis-
tinct danger
that
occur. At the 10 April meeting, the
district leaders grumbled but approved the postponement until
11 October.
9.. On Kendzia's resignation, Guenther Mensel, a member of the
Executive Committee, was selected as Acting Pa. ty Chief and Speaker
of the Party Council until a new Executive Committee is elected in
October. Mensel, an attorney, was hesitant about accepting the job
because of its possible effect on his practice, and did not commit
himself until the 10 April executive meeting. Mensel's age (62) and
stability were the main reasons for his selection. The only other
replacement considered was Guenter Kleinert, also on the Executive
Committee, whom Kendzia did not trust. Mensel's duties are to con-
sist of calling and chairing pro-forma monthly Executive Committee
meetings and of presiding at the party congress next October.
10. Kendzia considers his resignation a temporary tactical re-
treat caused by disagreements with the NPD national and Berlin dis-
trict leaders, by von Thadden's public rejection of his "Berlin
Program," loss of business because of unfavorable publicity, and a
hit-and-run car accident involving a bicyclist on 27 March. Kendzia
promised Mensel to remain active behind the scenes and set up a
vacant office in his place of business as party headquarters, with
desks for himself and Executive Committee members Frank Schwerdt,
Joachim. Rebuschat and Hans Werner Andreas, the de facto heads of the
Berlin NPD.
11. Kendzia and a majority of the NPD leaders hope that the fall
elections will bring some 25 to 35 NPD members into the Bundestag.
This, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to potential
right-wing voters in Berlin and thus enable the NPD to make a showing
in the 1971 Berlin communal elections. (Source Comment: The Berlin
NPD's major problem in Berlin is to keep its membership intact and
its machinery functioning until 1971. Whether Kendzia will hold to
his promise to direct the Berlin NPD from behind the scenes indefi-
nitely, and whether he will emerge as leader in 1971, are open ques-
tions, because Kendzia has shown an interest in the current program
and policies of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and particularly in
its "General-Contract" concept, which fits in with his "Berlin
Program."
A close friend of Kendzia's, (fnu) Nerchert, resigned from
the NPD to protest its participation in the presidential election in
Berlin on 5 March and has already made overtures to the FDP.)
'
12.
Since Kendzia's resignation and the 10 April executive meet-
ing, the Berlin City Executive Committee (under Kendzia's behind-the-
scenes tutelage) has kept the Berlin NPD functioning and loyal to the
Hanover leadership. Executive Committee members (especially Schwerdt,
Rebuschat and Andreas) have attended annual election meetings in all
12 party :districts. Through their influence, pro-von Thadden or
neutral District Executive Committees have been elected in each case.s
The district officers who led the opposition to the self-dissolution 4
3
2
1 SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
3
2
1
14-00000
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Page 4 of 4 PAGES
CS-311/06103-69
of the Berlin NPD last fall have been effectively expelled or neu-
tralized. As of early May, Loyalist influence had been greatly re-
duced. Although there is now no significant internal opposition
group, there was a call pending for formation of an informal group
representing both the city organization and the districts to propose
organizational changes. Routine monthly district meetings with
"guests" from West Germany, whenever possible, are to be continued,
under the watchful eye of the pro-tem Executive Committee, until
next October when the party convention of the Berlin NPD will elect
a new leadership.
13.
Schuetz' attempts to have the NPD banned in Berlin have
not been taken seriously. Local party activists are preparing to
support the NPD election campaign in West Germany by sending volun-
teer workers. A letter appealing for such help states that the de-
cisive electoral campaign which will determine whether or not. the
NPD gets into the Bundestag will be waged in North Rhine-Westphalia.
Air fare and living expense subsidies are being offered to volun-
teers who are to distribute leaflets, put up posters and ring door-
bells.. (Field Comment: The NPD made inroads in North Rhine-
Westphalia during the economic recession of 1965-66, and the NPD
national leadership is counting heavily on salvaging their foothold
in the Bielefeld-Ruhr area.)
14. The main NPD weapons in the national election campaign are
to be pamphlets describing the party's election platform. One is
to be distributed between 1 and 15 June; a follow-up pamphlet, be-
tween 15 and 30 August; and a third pamphlet on the eve of the elec-
tion. Each will be printed in 15,000,000 copies. Distribution will
be handled by two firms--Velbringer Company and Erdmann Company.
$
-
15% Ruediger Krauss, head of the NPD's student organization,
the National University League (Nationaler Hochschulbund
NHB),
has moved from Berlin to Bonn to assume the post of chairman of the
Bonn City NPD Executive Committee. Von Thadden plans to use the
tactic of moving reliable leaders into critical areas after the
elections. For example, he plans to move a Bavarian NPD officer to
Berlin and assume the chairmanship of the Berlin NPD. In an attempt
to obtain legal recognition for the NHB in Berlin, (fnu) von Hindy,
a Hungarian law student and good friend of Krauss, is to be ap-
pointed Krauss' successor.
. 16. Field Dissem:
USBER, DCSI/USCOB (Also sent Bonn).
:
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
2
14-00000
SBCBET
NO FOREIGN DISSEN
Voekt 1969
HA
West Germany
June 1968
West German Ministry of Interior
Evaluation of the Prospects of
Banning the National Democratic
Party
Germany (1 September 1969)
OGA-813
A medium-level West German government official who follows
the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had
access to the study during his official duties. The infor-
mation was extracted from the original document and is be-
lieved to be an accurate summary of its highlights.
Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior
prepared a basic study of the prospects of banning the West German
National Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given
below describes the major charges which the government could bring
against the NFD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make
against these charges, and the probable political results which
would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the
HPD. According to the source, this study is still considered the
basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NFD and
is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land)
officials. End of Summary.
1. (Field Comment: For several years, West German political
and goverouent leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court
ban on the NPD. Ou 13 November 1968, Brust Bends, West Gerann
Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant bringing a suit against
the NPD. Klesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, and the sub-
ject became embroiled in Rest German politica. On 23 April 1969,
the Federal Cabinet decided not to seek a court ban of the NPD, at
least until after the September elections. This decision was
prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains
and apparently was losing popular support.)
SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEN
14-00000
S N CRT/NO FORNÍGN DISSEN
Page 2
2. In June 1968, the West Geratia Interior Ministry prepared
a 50-page study of the prospects for being the NPD enticed
"Considerations Regarding a ban of the National Democratic Party."
The study was well prepared and carefully written, It is still
considered the basic Interior luistry paper on the NPD and is
being studied by senior officials of both the federal and state
governments. It avoids giving an opinion on the prospects of ob-
taining a court decision against the NFD, but from the content of
the study, it is clear that the authors believed that the courts
would probably reject a government proposal to bau the NPD.
*(Field Comment: If the study is still considered current, it is
unclear how it fits with Benda's November 1968 statement that there
was sufficient evidence to obtain a ban agalust the NPD. There
have been other reports, however, that the evidence was not as
clear-cut as Benda would have had the Chancellor believe. See, for
example, 3GN-3894.)
3. The study summarized the case which could be brought
against the NPU as follows:
a.
It could be shown that there was a similarity
between the NPD and the National Socialist Geran Workers
Party (NSDAP) which has been outlawed...
b. It could be argued that the goalu, and parte of
the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the prin-
ciples of a free democratic state.
i
The study concludes that a sufficiently strong case could be pre-
sented to prevent the case being throwe out by the courts without
a bearing.
4. The study lists the following points which the NPD could
be expected to use in its defense:
a. The party could prove that it has given firm instruc-
tious to its subers to engage in my or violeants.
b. It could show that a sizeable number of former
NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part
of the Selbstreinigung (self-cleaning) process.
C. It could point out many features of its progren
which are in accord with democratic principles.
d. It could show that its elected representatives
have worked with other parties and have not disrupted the
Lendtage (state diets) and other elected bodies in which
they participate.
e. It could point out that other political parties
bave many ex-Nazis and ex-communists as bers and could
claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not
opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.
f. It would charge that the government's charges were
one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of date.
g. It would claim that not all of Professor (fau)
Anrich "s points were included in the party plat-
form. (Field Comment: Anrich is appareatly a rightist
whose proposals were more extrest than those incorporated
in the party platform.)
i. It could claim that the increased violence
(Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is
the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.
RTING FORKIGN DISSER
14-00000
1
SECRE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Fage 3
5. The study states that it would be very difficult to re-
fute these NPD defcases in court. The government would have to
adait that since early 1968 there have been very few statements
made by NPD leaders, or incidents caused by the NPD, which could
the government's case. Objectively, it would
be used to support that many incidents of violence in which the
have to be admitted
NPD has been involved were initiated by opponents of the party.
6. The study predicts the following probable résults should
the government win its case against the NPD:
8. The NPD would probably respect the prohibition.
It is very unlikely that the NPD would attempt to go under-
ground as the Illegal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) did.
NPD members and sympathizers would not change their
opinions because of a ban. Many would join, other groups
or parties and continue to work for their political beliefs.
.
c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a cam-
paign for the banning of the new German Communist Party
(DKP) and other leftist groups.
A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreigs
d.
countries.
7. The study concludes that if the government should lose a
case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid
evidence (Deweisschwierigkeiten). la such an event, the following
adverse affects vould occur:
3. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable
publicity.
b.
The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had some
success in keeping former Nuzis out of key positions would
be halted.
c. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the
NO, but who have refrained from open support because of
the stigma of being associated with a party which could be
declared illegal, would join the party or become active
supporters.
d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members,
(Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried
because the party's membership has not increased signifi-
cantly during the past 18 months.)
8. Field Dissem:
Sabassy Bonn, USBER.
S
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

14-00000
:
AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
West Germany's National Democrats and the Grand Coalition
Secret
No
919
31 May 1968.
No. 0022/68A
14-00000
SECRET
WEST GERMANY'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATS AND THE GRAND COALITION
=
Germany's far-right National Democratic Party
(NPD) showed another increase in strength in recent
elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, while the Social
Democrats (SPD) lost heavily. This outcome in a
traditionally liberal and prosperous state appears
to stem in part from the dissatisfaction of many
Socialists and trade unionists in the SPD with
their party's cabinet cooperation with the Christian
☐ Democrats (CDU). Another factor was the discontent
of farmers and refugees with the policies of the
Grand Coalition in Bonn. Concern over student dis-
orders contributed to the NPD gains, but this was
not as decisive as some have supposed. Despite
these gains, the NPD is unlikely to achieve a
growth comparable to that of the Nazi Party in the
early 1930s.
The outcome in Baden-Wuerttemberg confirmed
the belief of many Socialists that their coopera-
tion with the CDU at both the national and state
level is proving to be unprofitable for the party.
As a result, they have already decided at the state
level not to renew cabinet cooperation with the
CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg, thus making prospects
for the Bonn coalition appear less favorable.
Nevertheless, SPD leaders in Bonn remain committed
to the Grand Coalition and serious instability at
the federal level seems unlikely. Over the long
run the outcome of this latest election may have
certain implications nationally, including the
possibility that Bonn leaders may be encouraged
to take a more nationalist line.
:
The NPD's Success
The West German state elec-
tions in Baden-Wuerttemberg on
28 April brought the far-right
National Democratic Party (NPD)
9.8 percent of the vote, the
most impressive total it has yet
attained in any state. About 71
percent of the voters turned
out, approximately three percent
more than in the last Baden-
Wuerttemberg state election in
1954, but 15 percent less than
in the 1965 federal election.
Christian Democratic Union
(CDC) strength fell slightly to
44.1 percent (1964:
46.2 per-
cent), while the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD) achieved a
vote of only 29.1 percent (1964:
SECRET
Page 1
SPECIAL REPORT
31 May 68
14-00000
SECRET
PARTIES IN
BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG
19.68
127 Seats
SPO
37
CDU
60
18
1964
90630 5 68
ཱ་-
FDP
NPD 12
120 Seats
SPD
CDU
59
47.
FDP 14
37.3 percent). The liberal Free
Democratic Party (FDP), made a
slight gain, winning 14.4 percent
of the vote (1964: 13.1 percent).
Against the background of last
October's Bremen elections, in
which the National Democratic
Party won what was then a record
percentage of 8.9, the Baden-
Wuerttemberg results brought re-
newed cries of alarm over the
dangers of neo-Nazism in the Fed-
eral Republic. More important,
the results also raised doubts
as to the future of a coalition
government by the Christian Dem-
ocrats and Social Democrats, not
only in Baden-Wuerttemberg but
at the federal government level
as well.
Baden-Wuerttemberg:
A Test Case
Baden and Wuerttemberg tra-
ditionally have been strongholds
of liberal, nonsocialist democ-
racy in Germany. In the early
1930s, the Nazi vote in this
area was almost always appreci-
ably lower than elsewhere in
Germany. The hotbeds of Nazism
lay in other regions, for ex-
ample in Franconia, East Prussia,
and Schleswig-Holstein.
The economic and social pic-
ture in Baden-Wuerttemberg would
lead to expectations of stability
there. The proportion of the
population now employed in in-
dustry is higher than in any
other state. The economy of the
state was virtually untouched by
the recent West German recession,
during which unemployment never
exceeded one percent. Per cap-
ita income is above average.
Protestants and Catholics are
almost evenly balanced in pop-
ulation, while the proportion of
protestants in the Federal Re-
public is slightly higher.
A few observers correctly
forecast the outcome, but the
general expectation was that the
vote for the National Democratic
Party would be lower than in
Bremen. The two major West Ger-
man polling organizations had
predicted in March that the NPD
would receive five percent of the
vote.
Federal-level politicians
had campaigned actively in the
state. Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger,
a popular native son, made a
three-day speaking tour, in which
he sharply attacked "arrogant,
thoughtless, and dangerous na-
tionalism.' He stressed this
theme in the Hohenlohe area,
where the NPD later received its
highest vote in the state. Willy
Brandt also appeared to speak for
the Social Democrats.
SECRET
Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT
31 May 68
14-00000
}
SECRET
NPD Representation in West German States
5.8%.(4 seats)
23 April '67
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN
HAMBUR
BREMEN
8.8%
\(+ seats)
Oct. 67
LOWER
SAXONY
NORTH RHINE.
WESTPHALIA
7.9% (8 seats)
6 Nov '06
HESSE
6.9% (+ seats)
23 Apni '67
RIENLLAND.
PALATINATE
SAAR
90520 5 08
7% (10 seats)
+ June '67
9.8 (12 seats)
38 (0 seats)
27 March 6.
7.4% (15 seats)
Mr. W
28 April '68
BADEN-
WUERTTEMBERG
BANARIA
SECRET
Page 3
SPECIAL REPORT
31 May 68
14-00000
SECRET
The participation by na-
tional figures reflected a feel-
ing in Bonn that this state eleċ-
tion, the last before the 1969
federal election, might influence
national politics. The analogy
to the federal scene was pointed
up by the existence in Baden-
Wuerttemberg of a coalition of
Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats, similar to that in
Bonn.
Reaction to Student Riots
In looking for explanations
of the NPD gains,' German observ-
ers have emphasized the public
reaction against the Easter stu-
dent rioting, and dissatisfaction
with the federal grand coalition.
Conservatives lean to the former
explanation, while students and
trade unionists stress the latter.
The NPD did not receive less than
6 percent in any electoral dis-
.trict. This suggests that the
sentiment expressed by the vote.
is widespread, and may extend
throughout the FRG.
Reaction to student rioting
probably contributed something,
but this aspect seems to have
been exaggerated as a factor in
NPD gains. In Heidelberg, the
NPD vote rose to 11.9 percent,
but in three other university
towns, the party's vote fell.
below the state average of 9.8
percent. In industrial Esslingen,
where there had been two stu-
dent riots, the NPD only attained
9 percent. Some voters may have
been influenced by student dem-
onstrations to transfer their
votes from the SPD to the CDU,
whose spokesmen have generally ad-
vocated a stern treatment of
rioters.
[At the same time, the "néw.
left" certainly failed to wing
popular support. The Democratic
Left, supported by radical stu-
dents, won only 2.3 percent in
the state as a whole, while mak-
ing better showings in certain
university and industrial local-
ities. While the Democratic
Left's state-wide average was bet-
ter than the far left had at-
tained in recent elections under
other names, it fell below the
last, low figure gained by the
Communists before they became
illegal: 3.2 percent.
Hostility to the Grand Coalition?
There is dissatisfaction
with the coalition within the
CDU, and it can be assumed that
some of the party's right wing
voted for the National' Democrats.
The Socialists, however, suffered
the greater loss. Left-of-center
Socialists often complain that
the party has compromised its
principles and lost public favor.
There is an undercurrent of feel-
ing in these quarters that the
party has endangered German democ-
racy by abandoning its long-
time position of opposition and
entering into collaboration with
the CDU.
Although the SPD has pro-
vided much of the impetus to the.
grand coalition's economic and
foreign policies, and although
the coalition in Baden-Wuerttem-
berg has generally functioned
well, dissatisfaction undoubtedly
exists among idealistic members
of the left and among tradition-
ally class-conscious union mem-
bers. Middle class voters of
this persuasion probably turned
SECRET
Page 4
SPECIAL REPORT
31 May 68-
14-00000
Pel
SECRET
to the Free Democratic Party,
which has assumed the role of
respectable opposition. The
connection between this left-¨¨
liberal criticism and the NPD
gains on 28 April is not imme-
diately apparent..
Some commentators including
some Socialists, conclude that`
many SPD voters defected to the
NPD. The respected Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung fudged some
of the election data to support
its argument that workers had
gone over to the NPD, but a more
careful analysis has shown that
the NPD did indeed win above-av-
erage support in some working-
class neighborhoods.
Many old Socialists and
trade unionists, such as Willi
Bleicher, the powerful boss of
the metalworkers in this state,
are cool to the coalition and
hostile to intellectuals, and
some of them are repelled by an-
archic student leftism. Even so,
most workers are unlikely under
conditions of full employment to.
cast what they would consider a
neo-Nazi vote; certainly Bleicher
would never favor such action.
SFD electoral losses would seem
to be due less to defection to
the NPD than to the failure of
lower-level SPD functionaries,
apathetic, or even hostile toward
the coalition, to get out the
vote, and to the failure of many
trade union and normally SPD
voters to go to the polls.
In traditionally socialist
Mannheim, only 58 percent of
those entitled to vote turned out.
SPD percentages dropped 14 per-
cent in one district and 13 per-
cent in another. The percentage
of NPD strength rose to 12.1,
10.9, and 11.2 in the three city
districts, but working class
votes would not be needed to pro-
vide these percentages, espe-
cially in the face of a low SPD
turnout. These votes probably
came mainly from the CDU, the
FDP, or from those who had not
voted before.
NPD Activity Pays Off
The NPD organization worked
hard during the campaign, con-
ducting more meetings than all
the other parties put together.
The party has overcome its former
inexperience and disunity, and
is developing into a well-oiled
political machine. The organ-
ization fields speakers and pro-
vides canned speeches and prop-
aganda materials to local groups.
The NPD's heritage is not purely
Nazi. It encompasses more re-
spectable antecedents, such as
the Deutschnationaler (German
Nationalists) and other conser-
vative elements. In the inter-
ests of avoiding a government
ban, the National Democratic
Party shuns blatantly Nazi
appeals and tactics.
Adolf von Thadden, the na-
tional leader of the NPD, is a
smooth personality from a Junker
family who denies charges that
he was an active Nazi. He seems
to model himself more on De
Gaulle than on Hitler. The
Baden-Wuerttemberg leader of the
party, Wilhelm Gutmann, is a
former Nazi. During "the good
old days," he was Buergermeister
of Tiengen on the Swiss border,
where he sponsored anti-Semitic
SECRET
Page 5
SPECIAL REPORT
31 May 68
14-00000
SECRET
activities in 1938. . He refused
to permit the raising of white
flags when the Allied forces ar-
rived in 1945. Despite his past,
he won 15,000 votes in Karlsruhe.
In one commune in the northern
end of the state, the NPD gained
an absolute majority with 55 per-
cent of the vote; this was the
home of an NPD candidate named.
Valentin Goetz, who had been
voted out as Buergermeister two
years before.
The NPD won its greatest
relative successes in three
northern districts: Oehringen
(14.8 percent), Crailsheim (14.5
percent), and Tauberbischofsheim
(14.3 percent). The first two of
these districts are largely prot-
estant; the latter is predomi-
nantly Catholic. This northern
area, and especially its Hohen-
lohe section, is filled with dis-
satisfied small farmers, who now
face Common Market competition
and who have recently suffered
the loss of a state subsidy on
milk. Rural dissatisfaction pro-
vides opportunities for the NPD,
but this is not a promising base
for a mass movement, particularly
since the farm population in the
"Federal Republic has dropped in
the last ten years from 20 per-
cent to 11 percent. Another im-
portant voting factor in this.
northern area is the relatively
high proportion of refugees, who
were probably aroused by recent
statements by Willy Brandt about
the Oder-Neisse line and by the
failure of the CDU to react more
forcefully against Brandt.
As was the case in the
early 1930s, overwhelmingly
Catholic areas, where the Church
influences its members politi-
cally, had the lowest right ex-
tremist vote. One overwhelm-
ingly Protestant district,
Froudenstadt, also produced a
ADOLF VON THADDEN
Page 6
SECRET
WILHELM GUTMANN
SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
14-00000
SECRET
low NPD vote. A postelection
poll of 1967 voters in Bromen
showed that, unlike the Hitler
movement, the National Democrats
do not yet attract many women
and youth. More than two thirds
of the voters for the party,
were males, and the strongest
participation was in the 45 to
.60 age bracket.
FDP Gains and Losses
Ralf
The FDP profited from its
position in the opposition.
Dahrendorf, a sociologist from
the University of Konstanz with
an international reputation, has
recently entered the party and
has assumed a leading role, in-
fluencing the FDP in a loftward
direction and attracting left-
liberal support. In the Stuttgart
district where he was a candidate,
the party vote rose by 6 percent.
On the other hand, the new pat-
tern is not acceptable to many
old members of this tradition-
ally business-oriented party, who
looking askance at Dahrendorf's
readiness to debate and discuss
with Rudi Dutschke and other rad-
ical students. Two of the three
districts with heaviest NPD gains
also showed heavy FDP losses, as
did some other former FDP areas
of strength.
Perspectives on the Vote
The over-all picture appears
to be that while both the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Free Demo-
crats lost to the NPD, they gained
at the expense of the Socialists.
The Socialists suffered from
apathy and incurred some loss to
both the NPD and Democratic Left.
The NPD probably garnered some
new and uncommitted votes. It
is fortunate for the SPD leaders
in Bonn that the annual party
congress came before the Baden-
Wuerttemberg election. It is
hardly likely that the congress
would now defeat a motion with-
holding, endorsement of the coali-
tion, as it did by a four-vote
margin in March. Assuming the
SPD remains faithful to the
Bonn coalition now, the prospects
are for further erosion of its
strength and for greater diffi-
culties within its ranks.
Meanwhile, the NPD probably
will continue to grow in in-
fluence. It now is probably
stronger in some other areas
than in Baden-Wuerttemberg.
change from proportional rep-
resentation to single-member....
constituencies, which might have
Baden-
Wuerttemberg
Mannheim
A
Tauber
bischofsheim
Heidelberg
Ochringen
Heilbronn.
Crailsheim
.Karlsruhe
Pforzheim
„STUTTGART
Esslingen
Freudenstadt
Tuchingen
Ulm
Freiburg
Tiengen
Constanz
90621 5-68
SECRET
Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
SECRET
served to block NPD growth, has
now become even less acceptable
than before to the SPD, which,
would have lost three-fifths of
its Baden-Wuerttemberg seats
under this system.
A ban of the NPD appears
unlikely unless the party com-
mits some flagrant violation of
accepted rules. A Bonn press of-
fice spokesman has stated that
the government will seek a po- .
:litical debate with the NPD, and
not a ban. On present form, the
NPD may get 40 scats in the 1969
Bundestag elections. An attempt
to set a higher minimum per-
centage of votes (present mini-
mum: five percent) for Bundestag.
representation would arouse..
violent FPD opposition, and does
not seem to be under serious con-
sideration at the moment. It
would violate German tradition,
and might produce a reaction in
favor of the NPD, enabling it
to overstep even the new margin.
Although the growth of
the NPD is disturbing, alarm does
not seem to be warranted. In the
early 1930s, Germany suffered
from depression and high unem-
ployment, and had bitter memories
of a recent inflation which wiped
out savings. Powerful elements
in the government and society,
including President von Hinden-
berg, the army, the courts, and
heavy industry, were highly re-
actionary and either cool or hos-
tile to republican democracy--as
were the professors and students.
Racism was rampant and more or
less respectable, and unwilling-
ness to accept defeat in World
War I provided endless opportu-
nities for demagoguery. All
these conditions are now vir-
tually absent. The defeat in
1945, and subsequent disclosures,
work to discredit any real Nazi.
manifestations.. Moreover, the
fact that no other state will
elect a new assembly before the
1969 federal elections may help
to prevent a real bandwagon de-
velopment. It must be emphasized
that the NPD is still a small
party, if no longer a mere splin-
ter group.
The Coalition Problem
German observers tend to be
more worried about the effect of
the NPD showing on foreign opin-
ion than about the increase in
NPD strength itself, and their
greatest concern is over the pros-
pects for the grand coalition,
resulting from the SPD losses.
A Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD conven-
tion voted on 18 May against con-
tinuing the coalition in Stuttgart,
and the old state SPD leaders
resigned. This would seem to
make the prospects for the Bonn
coalition less favorable.
At the same time, the FDP
appears not to be in a mood to
return to a coalition in either
Bonn or Stuttgart. Dahrendorf
has suggested that there might be
a CDU minority government in the
state. State CDU leaders may,
however, prefer to call new elec-
tions if a coalition cannot be
formed. In this event, they
would appeal for an absolute ma-
jority from the voters.
If they
got it and if the NPD vote de-
clined, this would be encouraging,
but new elections might also have
a less favorable outcome.
Page 8
SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT. 31 May 69
14.00000
SECRET
If the 1969 federal election
follows the pattern of the 28-
April election, the same problems
will arise in Born. With this
kind of a breakdown of the vote,
the FDP and the SPD together can-
not form a majority, and a re-
fusal on the part of both of
them to join the CDU means that
✓ the latter cannot organize a ma-`
jority government either--unless
the CDU invites NPD collabora-.
tion, which it is far from ready
to do.
○ A collapse of the grand
coalition in Bonn either before
. or after 1969 and a return by:
the SPD to opposition positions
would signify more than a passing
cabinet crisis. In the past,
parties tended to harden into
intransigence, committed to par-
ticular ideological and material
interests, and unable to reach
pragmatic compromises with each
other. In recent years, West
German politicians have tried to
break with this tradition and
to work on the consensus prin-.
ciple. A failure of these ef-
forts would have serious impli-
cations. If--as does not seem
likely at present--the three
major parties were unable to
form a majority government, this
might lead to severe instability
and the discrediting of par-
liamentary government.
Bonn and Weimar
Many misleading analogies
have been drawn between the Bonn
and Weimar republics. One Weimar
precedent may help, however, to
explain why some observers view -
the coalition problem seriously.
In March 1930, another grand
coalition with SPD participation
collapsed over the question of
cuts in unemployment insurance,
leading to the formation of a
conservative majority government
under Heinrich Bruening. Bruening
was later replaced by the reac-
tionary Franz von Papen, who in
turn was followed first by a wire-
pulling general, Kurt von Schlei-
cher, and then by Adolf Hitler.
The worst aspect of the SPD with-
drawal was that it made the par-
liament ineffective and power-
less.
Once minority government was
embarked on, supported by presi-
dential prérogatives, there was
no effective test for legitimacy
except the will of Hindenburg by
then susceptible and old. The
Nazis ultimately came to power,
not by a majority vote, but through
the paralysis and impotence of the
constitutional system and through
intrigues in the presidential
palace on the part of those, espe-
cially Papen and Schleicher, who
thought they could "use" Nazi
mass support.
In contrast to the 30s,
the presidential powers now are
far weaker,* and aside from all
the other factors inhibiting a
recurrence, the Weimar precedent
itself must influence SPD leaders
in Bonn. They are completely
committed personally to the pres-
ent coalition. A decision to
go into opposition is unlikely
under Brandt and Wehner.
"The absence of executive emergency powers is not of course without dangers. In a bitter parliamentary deadlock, an
illegal assumption of power, perhaps by extragovernmental elements, might be the only way out.
SECRET
Page 9
SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68

14-00000
SECRET
Another possibility might
be a left-wing withdrawal from
the SPD, although the leadership
for a dissident faction has yet
to emerge. This might provide
a healthy outlet for criticism
of the system without a turn to
minority rule. Unlike the early
1930s, virtually all West Ger-
man politicians now would do their
best to maintain a functioning
constitutional system. Real.
dangers will probably not arise
unless, as in the late Weimar
period, the government finds it-
self confronted with economic
or political problems which seem
to defy compromise settlement or
rational solution:
Immediate Prospects
Assuming that the Bonn co-'
alition lasts until the 1969
elections, its leading members
may still modify their policies
somewhat in the light of the
Baden-Wuerttemberg experience.
The adverse vote of the refugees
in the recent election could act
as a brake on the policy of de-
tente with Czechoslovakia and
Poland; although there is no sign
of this as yet. Chancellor Kie-
singer has attributed NPD gains
partly to "years of agitation
against our own history and against
healthy self-confidence, which
suggests that he may try to sound
a more nationalistic note.
"
То
the extent to which the results
continue to be attributed to
student activities, this will
-strengthen the demand for firm-
ness. Even before the election,
Brandt sent a telegram to SPD
state headquarters, advising that
speakers should react "completely
hard" against student demonstra-
tions.
Although the antistudent re-
action does not seem to have been
as important a factor as some have
'believed it to be, constant vio-
lence and provocation on the part
of the students, accompanied by
constant press attention, could
lead to severe official or unof-
ficial counteraction. This, in
turn, could bring more serious
student violence, perhaps with
the support of other elements.
Some matters of student con-
cern have appeal for others. Thus
students and many trade unionists
oppose emergency laws, and this
question is again being agitated.
Because of the Nazi experience,
there is widespread aversion among
left-of-center elements to the
use of force in the name of "or-
der," however great the provoca-
tion. But also because of the
Nazi experience, a really large
increase in NPD votes does not
seem likely in the 1969 election,
or in an earlier new election in
Baden-Wuerttemberg, should that
come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SECRET
Page 10
SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
14-00000
Secret
C
Secret
PAT PA
14-00000
,
Drafagtig Elections 1×65
SCAFESCAD
Nip's first Effort
2. 13 March 1986, examinal Elections, Schlori
Holstein Activa
not to participata, & few did)
3. 13 March 12 Canal Elections
for effect ochentrated
only in Franconis.
ADD
4, 27 March 1966 Hasburg Burgerschaft sítotten
5. 10 July 1966 Northrhein-Westphalia Lanitag Election
No NTD candidates eleçied nono, antared,
6. 16 Outobar 1806 Malin Byelection(Cosmmal Concil)
7.
6 Novembar 1966 Hasso fandtag Elections
7. 20 November 146 Bavarian fanitag Elesticas
2.
23 April 1967 Rheinland-Palatine
23 April 1967 Schleswig-Holstein
10. 4 Jun 1987
11.
•
Iover Saxony
11 October 187 Bremen Burgerschaft
12. 28-Aril 1983
Baden-Wuerttemberg
654,157 votes
In 11
200 ray
mities where
datos,
10.5% of vote
Am with 65 in a
155.
1.6 % of total Esvarian
vete batt
Mis #
Anstal
-
5.15
- 3.25
Numbers 7.
Sevalach-5.66
Uppsala
Bayrouth - 8.43
Coburg -5.38
bach - 5,0$
3 + 3 sillage majors
3.9% (1.55 in 1965)
to listes olectedl
8.65 (5 ) 2 seats
Bay.500 votea = 7,95+
8 as in milag
Harburg, Wiesbaden, Parusts
and Glasson a 10%
7C/N = $.43
votos: 7.46
15 State in Landing
4, 6.9 % of votel
4 Seats, 5.7 % of rota
10 Seat, 7% at roto
S Spate, 8.8 $ of rote
12 519, 9.8 % of roto
14-00000
FELLIGENCE
AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Secret
No Foreign Dissem
The National Democratic Party in West Germany
Special Report
WEEKLY REVIEW
Secret
N
310
9 June 1967
SC No. 00773/67B
14-00000
SECRET
THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN WEST GERMANY
The poor showing of the ultranationalistic
National Democratic Party (NPD) in recent elections
in several West German states clearly disproves the
party's claim of providing an acceptable alternative
to the policies and programs of the country's major
parties. The NPD's failure to maintain the momentum
suggested by the successes scored in two state
elections last fall is directly attributable both
to its own well-publicized internal dissension and
to voter preference for the Christian Democrats and
Socialists deriving from the image of vigor and
decisiveness imparted by their "grand coalition"
under Chancellor Kiesinger. Barring some serious
reversal in the fortunes of the Kiesinger government--
which is unlikely--it is doubtful; that the NPD will
be any more successful than other fringe groups have
been in seeking to rally latent right-radical senti-
ment in Germany and revive it as a dynamic political
force.
Election Setbacks
The NPD has claimed wide
attention both in Germany and
abroad and led many observers
to conclude that it was a force
to be reckoned with. Within two
and a half years of its founding
in November 1964, the party
elected representatives to the
legislatures in five of West
Germany's ten states (11 counting
West Berlin). In elections this
April the party was expected to
obtain close to 10 percent of
the vote in Rhineland-Palatinate
and 12 to 15 percent in Schleswig-
Holstein but actually won only
four seats in each parliament
with 6.9 and 5.8 percent of the
vote respectively. In the 4 June
election in the party's "home
base bastion" of Lower Saxony,
the NPD's performance was simi-
larly unimpressive--7 percent
of the vote and 10 Landtag seats..
Emphasis by party leaders
on their success in gaining rep-
resentation in all the states
where the party has competed
during the past year has not
masked their disappointment that
the NPD's momentum of growth has
leveled off. The party's failure
to make a good showing in
Schleswig-Holstein and Lower
Saxony--areas considered particu-
larly susceptible to nationalist
appeals--is especially damaging,
and raises fundamental doubt
about the party's future pros-
.pects.
0
SECRET
Page 1
SPECIAL REPORT
9 Jun 67
14-00000
SECRET
NPD Representation in West German States
PREMEN
LOWER
SAXONY
NORTH RHINE
WESTPHALIA
7.9% (8 seats)
6.9% (4 seats)
RHINELAND,
HESSE
PALATINATE
SAAR
86840
6 07
5.8% (4 seats)
SCHILAWIG-
HOLSTER.
HAMBURO
7% (10 seats)
BADEN-
WUERTTEMBERG
SECRET
7.41 (15 seats)
BAVARIA
}
14-00000
SECRET
Origins and Early Successes
Formed from the remnants of..
the defunct German Reich Party
(DRP)--one of a number of ultra-
nationalistic splinter groups
which have dotted the political
landscape of postwar Germany--the
NPD quickly established a polit-
ical apparatus capable of func-
tioning throughout the country.
The new party soon distinguished
itself by its relative success
in attracting the support of other
ultranationalistic elements and a
variety of political malcontents.
Earlier attempts by other groups
to unite disparate nationalists
invariably had foundered on per-
sonal rivalries and tactical dis-
agreements. Some were no more
than platforms for self-expres-
sion by leaders advocating a
particular set of extremist no-
tions. Even the most successful,
the Socialist Reich Party (SRP),
which at its high water mark
obtained 11 percent of the vote
in the Lower Saxony Landtag elec-
tions in 1951, was unable to
establish effective working rela-
tions with rival rightist groups
before it was outlawed by the
West German supreme court in
1952.
During its first year, the
NPD encountered many of the prob-
lems experienced by its predeces-
sors. The party was unable to put
on an effective campaign for the
September 1965 national elections
and obtained only 2 percent of
the votes--short of the 5-percent
minimum required for representa-
tion in the Bundestag. In local
elections in Bavaria and Schleswig-
Holstein in March 1966, however,
the NPD showed that it could com-
mand pockets of strength. In the
Bavarian cities of Nuremberg and
Bayreuth, it received between 7
and 10 percent of the vote and
elected representatives to the lo-
cal governing councils. These
gains were facilitated by concen-
trating the party's efforts in
selected areas such as the Protes-
tant centers of Middle and Upper
Franconia in heavily Catholic
Bavaria.
The first clear demonstra-
tion that the NPD could attract
more than the ultranationalist
vote came two weeks later in
Hamburg, where the party nearly
doubled its vote as compared with
the Bundestag election the year
before. Although the NPD failed
to elect any deputies, the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Socialists
were concerned about its ability
to secure even 3.9 percent of
the vote. The threat to the tra-
ditional third party, the conserva-
tive Free Democrats (FDP) became
apparent. The FDP fell a third
below its 1965 vote and lost 4 of
its 12 seats in the Hamburg city
council. Profiting from a decline
in the economy which was already
under way and the increasing pub-
lic disenchantment with the lead-
ership of then Chancellor Erhard
in Bonn, the NPD accelerated both
its organizational effort and its
public relations campaign.
The stage was then set for
the party's breakthrough in the
Hesse and Bavaria state elections
SECRET
Page 3
SPECIAL REPORT
9 Jun 67
14-00000
SECRET
last fall in which it won 7.9 and
7.4 percent of the vote and
elected 8 and 15 deputies respec-
tively. In Bavaria the NPD
emerged as the only small party
in the Landtag, causing the FDP
to lose its representation in the
legislature for the first time in
its history. By underlining the
weakness of the FCP, the election
outcome contributed to the forma-
tion of the grand coalition gov-
ernment in Bonn by the Christian
Democrats and the Socialists.
For the major parties, the
NPD's successes had disturbing
implications. In contrast to its
various predecessors, the NPD
appeared capable of mobilizing
urban as well as rural support
and of altering the general trend
long evident in most West German
elections toward a two-party
system. In Hesse, the combined
vote of the Christian Democrats
and Socialists was a lower per-
centage of the total vote than in
the previous election four years
earlier. Still more significantly,
however, Hesse and Bavaria pro-
vided further evidence of the
NPD's ability to attract "pro-
test" votes from various dis-
affected lower-middle-class ele-
ments including small businessmen
and farmers unhappy with their
lot in present-day Germany.
Basic Characteristics and
Sources of Support
In spite of its direct
lineage from the old German
Reich Party, the NPD has tried
to dispel the impression among
the general public that it is the
spiritual heir of Hitler's Na- |
tional Socialists. The party has
sought acceptance as a legitimate
political party and insists that
it intends to function within the
established democratic order.
Party spokesmen maintain that it
differs from the established par-
ties primarily in its allegedly
superior devotion to the national
interest, which they accuse the
governing parties in Bonn of
having failed to protect. The
NPD says it offers the voter a
genuine choice between bankrupt
policies of the major parties and
a return to national morality.
As much as some NPD support-
ers might wish to play down the
party's Nazi associations, how-
ever, it has been clearly estab-
lished that the leadership con-
sists of a nucleus of former
Nazis, who have been active in
neo-Nazi parties throughout the
postwar years. According to
police reports, some 2,000 of
the estimated 25,000 members of
the NPD belonged to the Nazi party
before 1933. This ratio is roughly
eight times that for the public
as a whole. The party has lost
libel suits in which it has chal-
lenged charges of neo-Nazism.
The German Interior Ministry
notes the parallels in political
outlook and philosophy between
the NPD and the Nazis, and main-
tains that the party's activities
"approach" unconstitutionality.
In the words of one former party
member, the NPD is made up of
people "who have forgotten nothing
and learned nothing" from Germany's
past.
SECRET
Page 4
SPECIAL REPORT
9 Jun 67
14-00000
SECRET
The Bonn government is gen-
erally reluctant, however, to ban
the NPD, believing that it would
be imprudent to drive the ultra-
rightists underground. If the
NPD were to score impressive new
successes in future elections,
Showever, the resulting concern
in the major parties might prompt
a reconsideration of this policy.
Interior Minister Luecke favors
banning the party as soon as
enough evidence can be obtained
to assure successful court action.
It is also possible that new
NPD gains would motivate the
established parties to make pro-
posed changes in the electoral
law that would make it more dif-
ficult for the NPD to obtain
Bundestag representation.
Although the NPD program is
strongly reminiscent of Hitlerian
National Socialism, the party's
electoral supporters in Hesse
and Bavaria also include persons
• who have no prior Nazi affilia-
tions or any particular suscepti-
bility to Nazism per se. It has
managed to attract impulsive
youngsters, as well as political
malcontents of all ages. Its
membership includes individuals
from a broad range of occupations.
The NPD's special appeal among
the lower-middle-class, and par-
ticularly among the small business-
men and farmers is reinforced by
the economic squeeze these groups
are experiencing as a result of
government economy measures.
Hesse and Bavaria, the party did
especially well in areas noted
for traditional German nationalism
In
and in areas which are predomi-
nantly Protestant. Many NPD ad-
herents are expellees from the
territories lost at the end of
World War II.
The makeup of the formal
NPD membership is not radically
different in age or occupation
group from a cross section of the
general public. However, there
are certain characteristics of
NPD supporters which set them
apart from supporters of the
three major parties. The NPD
tends to attract a somewhat larger
number of older persons as well
as young adults, and the number
of lower middle class members,
including pensioners, is dis-
proportionately large. Formal
membership among students, how-
ever, is very small and only 350
of a total of 244,000 university
students are on the party rolls..
There is no evidence that
the NPD receives significant
financial support from German
industrialists. It is, however,
able to operate in the black.
The sound state of its finances
is in part a result of its prac-
tice of charging admission to its
rallies. This serves the double
function of making the rank and
file feel that they have a stake
in the party and of making it
necessary for its opponents to
pay for the right to heckle. The
party also derives considerable
sums from membership dues, sub-
scriptions to party publications,
and donations from members and
sympathizers.
SECRET
Page 5
SPECIAL REPORT
9 Jun 67
14-00000
SECRET
Party leader Von Thadden at Second NPD Congress
at Karlsruhe, June 1966
NPD audience: a characteristic cross section
66827 667 CIA
SECRET

14-00000
SECRET
Rumors of clandestine fi-
nancial support from the Commu-
nists or from sympathizers among
Nazi emigrants to Latin America
have not been confirmed.
Despite NPD claims of wide-
spread sympathy in the West German
armed forces, there is no evidence
of this. German security offi-.
cials estimate that no more than
2 percent of armed forces members
are card-carrying NPD members.
Since the NPD is a legal political
organization, military leaders
are constrained from openly in-
fluencing members of the armed
forces to oppose it.
Many Germans are probably
reluctant openly to admit their
support for an organization like
the NPD. It is significant, how-
ever, that only 6 percent of
respondents to a national opinion
poll in January 1967 indicated a
preference for the NPD.
Leadership Problems
The most notable single
handicap confronting the NPD is
the weakness of its leadership.
None of its leaders possesses any
great talent or stature. Cer-
tainly no individual with Hitler's
demagogic genius has yet ap-
peared. The absence of strong
leadership in what has been called
a "fuehrer-oriented party" has
left it divided and weakened by
factionalism. This was clearly
demonstrated in March 1967 wher
then party chairman Fritz Thielen
and Deputy Chairman Adolf von
Thadden engaged in a public feud
which further damaged the party's
reputation. An outgrowth of long-
standing personal antagonism, the
dispute was triggered by Thielen's
resistance to Von Thadden's at-
tempted take-over as party chair-
man in Lower Saxony. Thielen
claimed that Von Thadden's elec-
tion to the state chairmanship
had been illegal and would hurt
the party's reputation.
The par-
ty's federal executive, however,
turned the tables on Thielen and
not only voted to reinstate Von
Thadden but also to drop Thielen
from the national chairmanship and
expel him from the party. Thielen
clung to the helm under a temporary.
court order until finally throwing
in the sponge in early May with
an announcement of his formation
of a new, rival party, the Na-
tional Peoples Party (NVP).
More of an archconservative
than a neo-Nazi, Thielen was never
more than a figurehead. Real au-
thority and leadership--as well as
ideological guidance--was provided
by Von Thadden. Von Thadden is.
a 45-year-old native of Pomerania,
a member of a prominent and aris-
tocratic Prussian family, a number
of whose members were prominent
in the anti-Nazi resistance. Al-
though Von Thadden applied for
Nazi party membership he appar-
ently was never formally admitted.
An ardent nationalist, Von Thadden
aspires to become a German De
Gaulle rather than a re-creator of
the German Reich.
Other leaders of some promi-
nence include Otto Hess, party
propaganda chief, and Waldemar
Schuetz, editor of the NPD's
SECRET
Page 7
SPECIAL REPORT
9 Jun 67
14-00000
SECRET
official weekly, Deutsche
Nachrichten. Both were active
Nazis.
Thielen's departure clears
the way for Von Thadden formally
to take over leadership of the
NPD. It is doubtful that Thielen
has the personal force or follow-
ing to organize a party with
significant strength. The impact
of the new party on the NPD will
probably be small since the bulk
of the NPD membership appears to
prefer the leadership and ideology
of the Von Thadden group.
the other hand, the strengthening
of extremist tendencies within the
NPD signaled by the triumph of
Von Thadden may hurt the party's
interests in the long run. The
result is also likely to assist
those actively seeking a formal
government crackdown on the party.
Program
On
In addition to its leadership
difficulties, another failing of
the NPD is its inability as yet to
offer a clear, positive program
relevant to existing problems.
Xenophobic and opportunistic, the
NPD feeds upon nostalgia for an
older German nationalism, discon-
tent with the existing social or-
der, and Germany's international
standing and frustration over the
fact that reunification remains
as distant a prospect as ever.
Its stated objectives are ill de-
fined, when not deliberately am-
biguous, and are sometimes incon-
sistent. Its electoral approach
is generally negative and destruc-
tively critical rather than af-
firmative. Its principal targets
include foreign interests and cul-
ture which undermine old values
and "de-Germanize the fatherland."
It attacks the renunciation by
those in power of what the NPD
regards as justified Germán ob-
jectives. It deplores what it'
considers the miseducation and
corruption of youth, "crime in the
streets, foreign aid, and the
competition of foreign workers..
"
The NPD demands an end to
German dependence on the US and
calls for the revival of German
national consciousness. It at-
tempts to draw a parallel between
West German - US relations and
those between the East German
regime and the USSR. In order to
free Germany from foreign domina-
tion, NPD spokesmen maintain,
American "occupation" forces must
go, although not before the with-
drawal of Russian troops, which
the NPD would have occur simultane-
ously with that of US troops.
Germany must again become master
of its own fate, party leaders in-
sist, and the "lie" of war guilt
and war crimes trials must be
ended and a new German general
staff created. A key demand is
that the reunification of Germany
cannot be limited to uniting West
and East Germany but must include
the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse
border now held by Poland. Al-
though it does not advocate the
use of force to achieve this ob-
jective, the party holds out hope
that recovery will be possible by
a Machiavellian deal of some scrt.
NPD spokesmen at present renounce
a national nuclear capability for
Germany.
SECRET
Page 8
SFECIAL REPORT
9 Jun 67
14-00000
SECRET
"
The party puts forth slogans
proclaiming "Germany for the Ger-
mans" and "Europe for the Euro-
peans. Indeed, the NPD favors
a united Europe somewhat along the
lines advocated by De Gaulle.
Europe, it holds, should be com-
pletely independent of the US,
and possess its own nuclear deter-
rent. It should be built on a
Franco-German alliance that smaller
European countries sooner or later
would have to join. The NPD would
welcome the decay of NATO as sig-
naling the end of sterile policies
which do not serve Germany's real
interests.
In seeking to gain the broad-
est popular acceptance, the party
avoids affirming the more extreme
aspects of Nazi ideology. There
is, for example, no obvious anti-
Semitism in the party program
and Jews technically could become
party members. The private atti-
tudes of the leadership, however,
are said to resemble traditional
Nazi anti-Semitism closely.
NPD makes vague references, more-
over, to the importance of "blood
ties, rejects evidence relating
to the Nazi extermination policy,
makes derogatory references to
the Jews in the party press, and
denounces aid to Israel.
The
In recent campaigning in
Lower Saxony, NPD spokesmen
shifted tactics somewhat by no
longer stressing issues obviously
associated with the Nazi period
such as war guilt and reparations.
Instead, they sought to exploit
current grievances including
the economic recession, unemploy-
ment, lack of progress on reuni-
fication, and what they called
the unreliability of NATO.
Future Prospects
The NPD's failure to main-
tain the momentum of last fall's
successes in this year's state
elections in Schleswig-Holstein,
Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower
Saxony is a serious blow to the
party's hopes. The squabble
among the leadership apparently
reinforced the feeling among un-
committed elements that casting
a protest vote for the NPD was
not worthwhile under present cir-
cumstances. The widespread dis-
content among farmers over gov-
ernment economy measures did not
result in a significant shift of
votes to the NPD. Moreover,
there has been a strong resur-
gence of general confidence in
the Bonn government. Although
the NPD benefited last fall from
the popular dissatisfaction with
the Erhard government, the grand
coalition headed by CDU Chancellor
Kiesinger has displayed vigor and
decisiveness which has been re-
warded at the polls.
Even if the NPD were to fol-
low its forerunners into oblivion
it would not mark the end of right-
ist extremism. A portion of the
German electorate will remain re-
ceptive to this kind of appeal.
In the absence of a party such as
the NPD, right-wing voters tend
to give their support to one of
the insignificant splinter par-
ties, or to one of the more con-
servative established parties,
such as the FDP, when they vote
at all.
SECRET
Page 9
SPECIAL REPORT
9 Jun 6.7
14-00000
SECRET
It is possible--although in-
creasingly unlikely--that the NPD
could turn out to resemble other
parties of a national-conserva-
tive stamp. Despite the radical
views of some of their members,
such groups have managed to op-
erate without subversive mani-
festations. The German Party (DP),
for example, which had been rep-
resented in several North German
state legislatures and in the
Bundestag conducted itself in a
responsible fashion.
The NPD at present draws a
good deal of this traditional
right-wing vote from the old Refu-
gee Party, the DP, and small con-
servative regional parties such
as the Bavarian Party. The total
extremist vote, however, has in-
creased very little since the
establishment of the NPD. Es-
timates of the extent of hard-core
ultranationalist sentiment in
Germany vary between 5 and 15 per-
cent of the electorate. Under
present conditions this does not
constitute a threat to German dem-
ocratic institutions and is not
greater than the degree of ex-
tremist sentiment in other West-
ern European countries.
Outlook
Assuming the NPD survives
the current period of internal
strife, its potential for further
growth beyond its present 6- to
8-percent range appears to be
limited under conditions now pre-
vailing in West Germany.. The NPD
is still capable of capitalizing
on circumstances which might pre-
sent themselves as a result of a
protracted economic recession or
major political blunders which
would discredit the present gov-
ernment leadership. The outcome
of recent state elections, how-
ever, tends to confirm that the
overwhelming majority of German
voters continues to prefer the
moderate, albeit increasingly
independent and nationalist, pol-
icies of the major parties and
the government, and rejects the
radical alternatives advocated
by the NPD. (SECRET)
SECRET
Page 10
SPECIAL REPORT
9 Jun 67
14-00000
Secret
Secret
14-00000
INFORMATION
PORT INFORMATION REPORT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains. Information äffecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Explonate Laws. Tille
14. U.S.C. Sees 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM
COUNTRY
West Germany
SUBJECT
REPORT NO.
CS DB-312/00003-67
5 JAN 1967
Bfy Program to Monitor and Counter DATE DISTR.
the Activities of the National
Democratic Party
NO. PAGES
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO
PLACE &
23 November 1966
DATE ACQ. Germany, Bonn (25 November 1966)
SOURCE
FIELD REPORT NO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
A qualified American official from a senior official of the
West Gorman Federal Office for the Protection of the Con-
stitution (BIV). This official is responsible for monitoring.
the activities of right radical organizations throughout
West Germany. The information is probably true.
1. (Summary: The West German Federal Office for the Protection
of the Constitution (BIV) and its regional affiliates
(LfV) have undertaken a program to monitor and counter
the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD).
Included in this program are efforts to penetrate the NPD
at all its levels, to monitor its membership and finances,
and to counter its influence.)
.. 2.
3.
Report: For a number of years the BIV has been engaged in
penetrating and monitoring the activities of right radical
organizations. Since the establishment of the NPD in,
1964, the BfV has made a concerted effort to penetrate it
at both the national and regional levels. This effort has
resulted in the recruitment of about 60 sources with access
to the NPD organizations at all levels. In several cases
the BfV or LfV have been able to recruit local NPD county
chairmen and in six Laender have access to the minutes and
files of the Land organizations. The BfV has also penetrated
the national headquarters of the NPD in Hannover.
Through its penetration of the national organization, the
BfV has been able to obtain and photograph the entire mem-
bership rolls, which currently contain about 20,000 names.
The national list has been augmented by additional member-
ship applications obtained via penetrations of the
Land organizations. The BfV is currently in the process
of tracing all of these membership applications against
the master Nazi Party membership files at the American
STATE #
DIA
ARMY
#
NAVY
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ONTROLLED DISSEN
AIR π
/Continued/
NSA
440X
OCR
130031
Efuded from automatic
downgrading and
bextination
5
4
3
2
(Note, field distribution-indicaled by "".)
INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
EGN-3098
CAVATA-1
[FI/D/E
E/R
E/CR/R
E/G/R
[1 E/G/INT
1 E/G/CE
2 E/SAS
1
E/G/R/W
121
NO LIAISON
COORDINATING
LIAISON
, CI 2, FI 4, EUR 9, DO/H 1.
32
RELEASING
HM
es: us
14-00000
SECRET
CONTROLLED DISSEM
1
5
4
3
2.
Page 2
5.
6.
CSDB-312/00003-67
controlled Berlin Document Center. Although this tracing
nctivity has not been completed and is handicapped by lack
of personnel at the Berlin Document Center, the BfV estimates
its current file on the NPD is far more accurate than the
files at the NPD headquarters. Because of its access to
the Berlin Document Center, the BIV will eventually have
a better estimate of the number of NPD members who are
former Nazi Party members than does the NPD itself.
The BiV is also making a concerted effort to obtain docu-
mentary evidence on the NPD's sources of income. The recruit-
ment efforts to do this are directed at spotting and recruit-
ing clerical help who work in NPD offices and have access
to files. Information in the BfV's possession to date,
which includes considerable documentary evidence regarding
finances, indicates that the party is not receiving any
substantial financial assistance from abroad. The principal
sources of funds are as follows:
a. The monthly DM 3. membership dues. For the
20,000 members, this amounts to DM 60,000 per month
or DM 720,000 a year.
b.
, Subscription fees for publications.
c. Single donations from financially well-to-do
members and supporters.
d. Admission fees for political rallies. The BfV
has registered, since May 1966 when the NPD began its
campaign in Bavaria, a total of more than 2000 polit-
ical rallies in Bavaria. Although at times more than
one third of those attending such rallies were
estimated to be opposed to the NPD, everyone attending
the rally paid an admission fee. The BfV estimates
that the NPD has been able through the above sources
of income to collect from DM 3,000,000 to DM 4,000,000.
The LfV are watching this funding quite closely,
particularly for evidence of financing from Communist
countries. Thus far they have been unable to sub-
stantiate the existence of any such support. Although
there is no firm evidence of actual financial support
of the NPD from Communist sources, the BfV is aware
of an interest on the part of the Eastern intelligence
services to penetrate the NPD and monitor its activities.
At the instigation of Federal Minister of Interior Luecke,
the BfV has undertaken to establish a confidential all-party
committee consisting of members of the Social Democratic
Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Trade Union Movement (DGB)
to counter the NPD in Rheinland-Pfalz prior to the upcoming
elections in spring 1967. All of the parties have agreed
to participate and this activity is moving ahead. Recently
at a two-day conference chaired by the BIV in`a village
on the Mosel River, it was decided not only to counteract
NPD propaganda during the election campaign, but also to
undertake orientation lectures for all officials in the .
Rheinland-Pfalz and other local governments who have shown
NPD leanings. These courses will be launched as soon as
the campaign gets underway. A similar propaganda and
ofientation activity is also being planned for the elections
in Schleswig-Holstein.in 1967.
The BfV has persuaded the DGB to set up an action group
aimed at organizing the Labor movement into countering the
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM
/Continued/
4
#322n
1
14-00000
1
Page 31
SSCRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM
CSDB-312/00003-67
influence of the NPD. The BfV is assisting the DGB in
working out methods for the infiltration of workers into
NPD organizations to report and counteract their influence
within factories and workers councils. The BV has also
established contact with the German Industrial Institute
in Cologne, which is sponsored by the German equivalent of
the U.S. National Association of Manufacturers. The BfY
used as an argument with the industrialists the fact that.
increasing influence of the NPD in German industry would
have a negative effect upon foreign trade.
:
The BFV undertook a survey of the election results at the
village and county level in Land Hesse. This survey showed
that the NPD had substantial success in areas containing
German military installations. It was further determined
that the NPD had considerable appeal among non-commissioned
professional soldiers who feel they have failed to find
acceptance in the postwar German society. This negative
attitude has been less among Bundeswehr officers and draftees
than among non-commissioned officers, who feel themselves under-
-paid and lacking in social acceptance. The BfV has contacted
the security organizations of the Bundeswehr to under-
take a program of orientation to counter the influence of
the NPD within the Bundeswehr.
Headquarters Comment: CS-3.11/16288-66 from a different
source reported that the President of the West German
Association of Military Reservists had stated that a
large percentage of older reserve officers and non-
commissioned officers had voted for the NPD in the Land
Hesse election.
5
SECRET
3
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM
SAMN.
3
2
14-00000
Anlage
Stellenbesetzung des Bundesparteivorstandes der NPD
(Stand: 1.10.1966)
Parteivorsitzender:
THIELEN, Friedrich (Fritz) geb. 25.9.16 in Bremen,
wohnhalt: Bremen-Schönebeck, Brauteichen 19
Beruf: Betonfabrikant
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Gründungsmitglied der CDU,
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften,
1957 Mitglied und später Landesvorsitzender der
"Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen.
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
:
1. Stellvertreter:
GUTMANN, Wilhelm, geb. 9.6.1900 in Basel,
wohnhaft: Karlsruhe, Kaiserallee 30
Beruf: Angestellter
1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Baden-Württemberg
der NPD
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit/
"Gesamtdeutsche Parter" (GDP/BRE),
ehem. Funktionär des "Bundesverbandes ehem.Internierter-
und Entnazifizierungsgeschädigter" (BIE).
NSDAP: 1.3.1932
1933 Bürgermeister in Tiengen
von THADDEN, Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,
wohnhart: Benthe, Larchenweg 6
Beruf: Chefredakteur
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1949 Mitglied der "Deutschen Rechts-Partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion
"Nationale Rechte",
1950 Matgl. u. Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichspartei"(DRP),
1955-1959 Mitglied des niedersächsischen Landtages.
NSDAP: 1.9.1939
WINTER, Franz Florian, geb. 23.3.1923 in Amberg,
wohnhaft: Tegernsee, Bahnhofstr. 11
Beruf: Metzgermeister u. Fachredakteur
1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD
Frühere Organisationszugehorigkeit:
CSU-Mitglied u. Mitglied der Landesleitung
GDP-Mitglied u. Mitglied des Vorstandes des Landesaus-
schusses und des Kreisverbandes
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
14-00000
III. Prasidium:
BROUWER,Otto. Theodor, geb. 31.5.1906 in Paris,
wonnhaft: Bremen-Vegesack, Gerhard-Rohlfs-Str. 61,
Beruf: Kaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bremen der NPD.
Frühere Organicationszugehörigkeit:
"Deutsche Parter" (DP),
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaft
NSDAP: 1.8.1931
HESS, Otto, geb. 19.12.1908 in Rossdorf,
wohnhaft: Bissendorf, weidendamm,
Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann,
Frühere Orgatanationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied u. Funktionar der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),
NSDAP: 1.8.1930
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1958 Referent im Berichts- und R echtsamt der
obersten SA-Führung, SA-Obersturmbannführer.
-14
LANKER, Dr. Karl, geb. 22.9.1913 in Theesen,
wohnhaft: Bielefeld, Paderborner Weg 24 a
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Notar
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Nordrhein-Westf.d.NPD
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine
NADAP: 1.5.1933
SCHUTZ, Waldemar, geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,
wohnhaft: Gottingen, Felix-Klein-Str. 4
Beruf: Schriftleiter u. Verlagsinhaber
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DKP-Mitglied und Funktionar
NSDAP: 1.11.1936,
1979 Eintritt in die HJ,
1934 Adjutant des Gau-Pressechefs,
1937 Kreiswart u. Gaureferent "Kraft durch
Freude" (KdF),
1938-1939 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,
anschließend Beauftragter der NSDAP im Gau Hessen,
SS-Hauptsturmführer der Waffen-SS
SCHNEIMER, Horst-Günther, geb. 11.2.1913 in Essen,
wohnhaft: hamburg-Grob-Flottbek, Hochrad 7,
Beruf: Reedereibesitzer
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Hamburg der NPD
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine
NSDAP: 1.4.1932
SS-Hauptsturmführer und Adjutant
Legationsrat im Auswärtigen Amt

14-00000
Wohnhaft:
Beruf: Dipl. Politologe
to,hecer, Hochstr. 6,
des, der GP und der NE-Freunde.
Prune Organisation
MSDAY: nicht Mitglied
WINKELMANN, F, Seb. 21.5.1909 in wittingen/Krs.Ġifhörn
wonnkatt: we tackmannstr. 4
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Notar
Prühere Organisati
Senorigkeits
Mitglied der When Parter" (CF) und
Mitglied des niedersachsuchen Landtages
NGDAP: nicht Mitglied
IV. Parteivorstand:
a) gewahlte Mitgliedera
i
BRANDES, Anneliene, geb. 7.10.07 in Hargarten/Lothiringen
wohnhaft: Heaterg, Enzianstr. 7
Frühere Organisationazugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionar
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
LAUR, Peter, geb. 30.11.1940 in Löhnhorst,
wohnhalt: hannover, Auf dem Larchenberge 15,
Beruf: Student
Frühere Organisationszugehorigkeit: keine
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
MAT DORN, E11, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
wohnhalt: Grounitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
Beruf: Kaufmann
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionar
NSDAP: 1.8.1930
1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)
1936 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben
1937 Reichsschulungsleiter im Amt für Technik, Munchen.
PRINZ zu SALM, Karl, geb. 8.11.1911 in Coesfeld,
Wohnhaft: Breitscheid ü.Düsseld., Kahlenbergweg 7
Beruf: Kaufmann/Oberst a.D.
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
14-00000
1038, Gertraud, geb. 18.2.1917 in Prettin,
wohnhaft: Luneburg. In der 
Techt 1
Beruf: Hausfrau
Deutschen Kinderschutz-
Frihere Orgaminationszurehörigkeit:
Granderin und Leiterin des
bundes" Oldenburg
PRP-Mitglied und Funktionär
NSDAP: 1.9.1938
b) Sonstige Angeht rage ces Parteivorstandes:
And Adolf, geb. 2117.1906 in Saarbrucken,
wenhaft: 
Saarbrucken, Enkircher Weg 23
Beruf: Versicherungsaufmann
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Saarland der NPD
Fruhere Organtrationszugehörigkeit: nicht 
bekannt
NSDAP: 1.6.1933
MAI, Fritz, geb. 26.10.1914 in Osthofen,
wohnhaft: Outhofen
, Mainzer Str. 20
Beruf: Winzer/Weinhandler
Vorsitzender des LV Rheinland-Pfalz der NPD
Fruhere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRF-Mitglied und Funktionar
NSDAP: 1.3.1933
SS-Sturmbannführer
FARBENDER, Heinrich, geb. 24.5.1899 in Solingen,
wohnhaft: Rothenburg
/Fulda, Oberer Hausberg 4
Beruf: Kaufmann
Not tender
es Landesverbandes Hessen der NPD
:
Frukere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1918 Mitglied der "Deutsch
-Nationalen
-Volkspartei" (DNVP)
1946 FDP-Mitglied und 
Mitglied des hessischen Landtages,
1949 Mitglied des Bundestages,
1955 Ubertritt zur "Deutschen Partei" (DP) u. Mitglied
der Fraktion der 
DP im Deutschen Bundestag.
NSDAP: 1.10.1931
Austritt erfolgte in November 1932
KUHNE, Dr. jur. Lothar, geb. 2.1.1908 in Steinbach/Thur.,
Wohnhaft: Hannover
, Im Moore 12,
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt,
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Niedersachsen der NPD
Fruhere Organisationszugehorigkeit:
POP-Mitglied u. stellv. Landesvorsitzender
NSDAP: 1.12.1931
1934 Reichssicherheitshauptant.
1936 Referent in der "Fartelamtlichen Prüfungskommis-
sion" im Stab 
des Stellvertreters des Führero,
1937 Buro des Botschafters 
von Ribbentrop,
SS-Untersturmführer
5
14-00000
LOBER, Karl-Ermat, geb. 6.8.1927 in Namslau/Schl.,
wohnhaft: Schleswig, kolonnenweg 31, .
Beruf: Backer und Jugendpfleger
Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Schleswig-Holstein der NPD
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:"
SKP-Mitglied und Funktionär,
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär auf Kreisebene.
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
V. Ämter im Präsidium:
Organisationsabteilungs Adolf v. THADDEN (s.Stellvertreter)
Finanzabteilung: Otto Theodor BROUWER (s.Präsidium)
Rechtsabteilung: Fritz WINKELMANN (s.Präsidium)
Propaganda- u. Schulungsabteilung: Otto HESS (s.Präsidium)
Pressenbteilung: Waldemar SCHUTZ (s. Präsidium)
Referat .b.V.: Fritz WINKELMANN (3.Präsidium)
VI. Referenten in Parteivorstand:
Außenpolitik:
von THADDEN, Adolf (a. Stellvertreter)
Innenpolitik:
HERRMANNDÜRFER, Benno, geb. 20.3.1916 in Altötting,
wohnhaft: Munchen, Heckenstaller Str. 178,
Beruf: Senatorat
Mitglied des geschäftsführenden Vorstandes des Landes-
verbandes Bayern der NPD,
Vorsitzender des Bezirksverbandes Oberbayern der NPD.
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt
NSDAP: 1.1.1938
HJ-Mitglied seit 1933
Agrarpolitik:
RUDOLPH, Heinz, geb. 7.6.1922 in Elberberg,
wohnhaft: Klein-Ilde 5,
Bof: Burgermeister, Dipl. Landwirt, Hauptmann d.R.
Referent für Agrarfragen im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
Redner auf Landegebene im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
1. Vorsitzender im Kreisverband Hildesheim der NPD.
Fruhere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
C-Mitglied
NSDAP: 1.9.1940
14-00000
Wirtschafts-, Finanz- und Steuerpolitik:
PABBENDER, Heinrich (s. Parteivorstand)
Verkehrspolitik:
SCHWEIMER, Horst-Günther (S. Präsidium)
Jugendfragen:
LOBER, Karl-Ernst (s. Parteivorstand)
Sozialpolitik:
KNUPFER, Kurt, geb. 7.6.1913 in Rippien,
wonnhalt: Neuenhaus, Jahnstr. 2,
Beruf: Elektromonteur
Geschäftsführer und Kassenleiter im Kreisverband
Grafschaft Bentheim der NPD
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionär
NSDAP: 1.5.1930
Frauen- und Familienfragen:
WINKELVOSS; Gertraud (s. Parteivorstand)
Kulturpolitik:
DEHNEN, Dr. Dietrich, geb. 19.4.1924 in Duisburg,
wonnnaît: Julsburg-Meiderich, Haferacker 13
Beruf: Oberstudienrat
2. stellv. Vorsitzender im LV Nordrhein-Westf. d.NPD
Landesreuner des LV Nordrhein-Westfalen der NPD
Prinere Organisationszugehörigkeit: nicht bekannt
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
Vertriebenenfragen:
GUTMANN, Wilhelm (s. Stellvertreter)
Arbeitskreis Bundeswehr:
'
NITSCHE, Dieter, geb. 4.7.1934 in Zittau,
wohnhaft: Oldenburg, (z.z. Putlos)
Beruf: Hauptmann der Bundeswehr
NPD-Stadtrat im Stadtparlament Oldenburg
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
AKON- Mitglied
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
7.
14-00000
VII.
Sonstige Funktionen in Parteivorstand
Leiter der Abteilung Kasse:
SCHUTZ, Waldemar (s. Präsidium)
Leiter der Revisionsabteilung in der Finanzabta lung:
ECHIMMEROHN. Dr. Heing, geb. 22.1.1911 in Chemnitz,
wohnnaît: Hannover, Raimundstr. 1
Beruf: Versicherungs-Kaufmann
Prühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SRF-Mitglied und Funktionär.
DRP-Mitglied und Funktionar
NSDAP: 1.6.1950
SS-Obersturmbannführer
Bundesgeschaftsführer:
SCHWARZ, Martin, geb. 16.9.192 in Oels/Schles.
wohnnaît: Porz-Ensen, Charlottenstr. 14
Beruf:Hauptmann d.Bw. a.D.
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit: keine
NSDAP: 1.5.1932
14-00000
Gesellschaf
des Verlages
"Deutsend machrichten" (DH) GmbH.
SCHUTZ, Walg, geb. 9.10.1913 in Dausenau,
wonnnaft: Gottingen, Felix-Klein-str. 4
Beruf: Senriftleiter und Verlagsinhaber
Frünere Organisationssugehörigkeit:
DRP
-
Mitglied und Funktionär
NSDAP: 1.11.1936,
1929 Eintritt in die J,
19.4 jutant des Gau-Pressechefs,
1937 Kreiswart und Gaureferent "Kraft durch
Freude" (KUF),
1958
-
1959 Junker der Ordensburg Vogelsang,
anschliebend beauftragter der NSDAP in Gau Hessen,
SS-Hauptsturmführer des Waffen-SS.
von THADDEN, molf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,
Wohnmalt: Benthe, Larenenweg 6
Beruf: Chefredakteur
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
1949. Mitglied der "Deutschen Rechts-Partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion
"Nationale Rechte",
1950 hitglied und Funktionär der "Deutschen Reichs-
partei" (DRP),
ללני1
-
1959 Mitglied des niedersachsischen Landtages.
NSDAP: 1.9.1999
HESS, Otto, geo. 19.12.1908 in Rossaorf,
wohnhaft: Bissendorf, Weidendamm,
Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufmann, .
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitgl. u. Funktionar der "Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP)
NSDAP:
MATER
-
1.8.1930
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1998 Referent im Berichts- und Rechtsamt der
obersten SA-Fuhrung,
SA-Obersturmbannführer.
DORN, Emil, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
wonmmalt: Grobaitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
Beruf: Kaufmann
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
DRRE Mitglied und Funktionar
NSDAP: 1.8.1950
:
i
1954 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)
1956 Leiter der Gauschulungsburg Gau Schwaben
1957 Reichsschulungsleiter im Amt für Technik,
München
i
14-00000
WORK: en
geb. 24.5.1910 in Ferlin,
menberg, Tennelsar. 23
tion
ugehörigke
Mitglied und Funktionar
1.5.1928
Referitsleiter der Haupttreunandstelle Ost, Berlin
MHLAKESOHN. Dr. Heinz, geb. 22.1.1911 in Chemnitz,
wort: Hannover, kiministr. 1
Beruf: Versienerungsafmann
Mature O
DRO
-
onbg, rehörigkeit:
Mitglied und rundtionar
Mitglied und Funktionär
BP: 1.6.1950
SS-Obersturmbannfunrer
ven HdNožno, Prof. Dr. Hans-Bernhard,gen. 30.5.1903
in Protzig/Pommern.
wohnnaft: Wuppertal-Venwinkel, Am Osterholz 55
Beraf: Universitats-Professor
.Wv.
aur Zeit Lehrer an einer Privatschule
Here Organisationsgehörigkeit:
-
Mitglied und Funktionar
1.2.1931
Gamtaleiter der ASAP (Gau Ostpreußen)
Gaandanstatten-atsleiter,
gaudetentenbonafunrer.
Örtentlicher Professor der Staatswissenschaften
Rektor der Albertus-Universitat in Königsberg.
Walter, geb. v.10.1908 in Bresiau,
lit: mamaung-altona, Arnoldstr. 24
gestellter
tionsaugenorigkeit:
Mitglied und Funktionar
„3042: 1.4.1952
Reter, geb. 22.10.1950 in Greifswald,
wommmmit: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Spreuergasse 45
Beruf: hechtsanwalt
mere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Mitglied und Funktionar
nicht Mitglied
14-00000
:
SEETZEN. Walter, geb. 25.11.1916 in Hamburg,
wonnmalt: Bremen, Kulenkampffallee 162
Beruf: Kaufmann
Frühere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
SHP
DRP
-
Mitglied und Funktionär
Mitglied und Funktionär
NSDAP: 1.4.1936
THIELEN, Friedrien (Fritz), geb. 25.9.1916 in Bremen,
wonnnaft: Bremen-Schönebeck, Brauteichen 19
Beruf: Beton-brikunt
Frunere Organisationszujenorigkeit:
Gründungsmitglied der CDU.
Mitglied der Bremer Burgerschaften,
1957 Mitglied und später Landesvorsitzender der
"Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen
NSDAP: nicht Mitglied
BROUWER, Otto Thector, geb. 31.5.1906 in Paris,
wonnhaft: Bremen-Vegesach, Gerhard-Rohlfs-Str. 61
Beruf: Kaufmann
Frunere Organisationszugehörigkeit:
Deutsche Partel"
(NP)
Mitglied der Bremer Bürgerschaften.
NSDAP: 1.8.1931
:
14-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
18 July 1963
GERMANY AFTER THE WAR, A BACKGROUND READING: LIST
BOOKS
Not
ABOSCH, HRINZ.
to Adenauer.
The menace of the miracle: Germany from Hitler
London, Collet's, 1962. 277p. DD259.4683 1963
DIC; DD259.AIRS CIA.
ARNIZ, HELMUT. Germany in a nutshell. 2d ed., rev. and enl.
Bonn, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government
of Germany, 1960. 116p. DD43.AB 1960 DLC.
AVAILABL
BENGTSON, JOHN ROBERT.
thousand year Reich.
Library, 1962.¯¯¯155p.
DD256.5.837
DIC.
·RITHELL, JETHRO, ed.
Nazi war aims; the plans for the
Rock Island, Ill., Augustana College
(Augustana Library publications, no.30)
Germany, a companion to German studies.
London, Methuen, 1955. 578p.
DD61.86 1955 CIA.
5th ed., rev. and enl.
DD61.B56 1955 DLC;
BOSSENBROOK, WILLIAM JOHN.
The German mind.
Detroit, Wayne
State University Press, 1961. 469p. DD76.8677 DIC.
BRANT, STEFAN, pseud. East German rising. London, Thames and
Hudson, 1955. 202p. DD261.4.8713 DLC; DD261.4.585 CIA.
BULLOCK, ALAN LOUIS CHARLES. Hitler; a study in tyranny.
ed. New York, Harper, 1960. 776p. DD247.85B85 DLC;
DD247.H5B85 1960 CIA.
CLAY, LUCIUS DU BIGNON. Decision in Germany.
Garden City,
N. Y., Doubleday, 1950. 522. DD257.C55 DLC;
DD257.06 CIA.
COLLIER, DAVID S., and KURT GLASER., eds.
i
Rev.
Berlin and the future
of Eastern Europe. Chicago, Regnery, 1963. 251p. (Foundation
for Foreign Affairs series, no.7) DR48.5.C6 DIC;
D843.07
CIA.
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
17
14-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONANT, JAMES BRYANT.
Germany and freedom; a personal appraisal.
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958. 117p. (The
Godkin lectures at Harvard University, 1958) DD259.2.064
DIC; DD259.2062 CIA.
CROCE, BENEDETTO. Germany and Europe, a spiritual dissension.
New York, Random House, 1955. 83p. DD76.074 DLC.
DAVIDSON, EUGENE. The death and life of Germany; an account
of the American occupation. London, J. Cape, 1959. 4220.
DD257.D33 DIC; DD257 D3385 CIA.
DEHIO, LUDWIG. Germany and world politics in the twentieth
century. New York, Knopf, 1959. 141p. DD232.D413 DLC;
DD232.D5 CIA.
DICKINSON, ROBERT ERIC. Germany; a general and regional
geography. 2d ed. London, Methuen; New York, Dutton, 1961.
716p. DD43.D5 DLC; DD43.D5 1961 CIA.
DLC has 1953 ed. only.
DILL, MARSHALL. Germany; a modern history. Ann Arbor, University
of Michigan Press, 1961. 467p. DD89.D5 DIC; DD89.D5
DONNER, JOERN. Report from Berlin.
Bloomington, Indiana
CIA..
University Press, 1961. 284p. DD881.D633 DIC; DD881.D62
CIA.
Translation from the Swedish.
DORNBERG, JOHN.
1961. 3020.
-DULLES, ALLEN WELSH.
Schizophrenic Germany. New York, Macmillan,
DD259.2.06 DIC; DD259.2.D6 CIA.
Germany's underground. New York, Macmillan,
1947. 207p. DD256.D8 DLC; 11838.D8 CIA.
A simple, clear account of the opposition to Hitler during the
war.
EPSTEIN, FRITZ THEODOR. Germany and the United States: basic
patterns of conflict and understanding. Lawrence, Kansas, 1959.
284-314p. E183.8.63ES DLC.
"Reprinted from Issues and Conflicts, University of Kansas Press,
374p. 1959."
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14-00000
A100
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ERHARD, LUUWIG. Prosperity through competition. Hew York,
Praeger, 1958. 260p. HC286.5.17313 DIC.
BYCK, FRICH. A history of the Weimar Republic.
Harvard University Press, 1962- DD237.8913
FLENCEY, Ralph Modern (perman History (1953)
FREUND, GERALD.
Cambridge,
DIC.
Germany between two worlds. New York, Harcourt,
Brace, 1961. 296p. DD259.4.78 CIA.
GERMANY (FEDERAL REPUBLIC) CONSTITUTION, 1961.
The basic law of
the Federal Republic of Germany; amendments as of 31 December.
1961. New York, German Information Center, 1961. 62p.
JN3971.A3A5 1961 CIA.
GOERLITZ, WALTER. History of the German general staff, 1657-1945.
New York, Praeger, 1953. 508p. DD101.G614 1953 DLC;
DD101.661 195385 CIA.
GOLAY John.
The Founding of the Federal Repable of Germany (1958)
GOTTLIEB, MANUEL. The German peace settlement and the Berlin
crisis. New York, Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1960. 275p.
DD257.068 DLC; .DD257.668 CIA.
GT. BRIT. FOREIGN OFFICE.
Selected documents on Germany and
the question of Berlin, 1944-1961. London, HMSO, 1961. 483p.
(Its Germany, 1961, no.2. Ct. Brit. Parliament. Papers by
command, cmnd. 1552) DD257.4.075 1961 DLC.
GROSSER, ALFRED.
The colossus again; Western Germany from defeat
New York, Praeger, 1955. 249p. DD257.07413
CIA.
to rearmament.
DIC; DD257.0785
HEIDENHEIMER, ARNOLD J.
Crowell, 1961. 224p.
HELLER, DEANE, and DAVID HELLER. The Berlin Wall. New York,
Walker, 1962. 242p. DD881.H39 DIC; DD881.842 CIA.
The governments of Germany. New York,
JN3971.A58H4 DLC; JN3971.A58H4
HERTZ, FRIEDRICH OTTO.
Development of the German public mind;
a social history of German political sentiments, aspirations,
and ideas. London, Allen & Unwin, 1957. 524p.
DD112.844 DLC.
HEYDECKER, JOE JULIUS, and JOHANNES LEEB. The Nuremberg trial;
a history of Nazi Germany. New York, World Pub. Co., 1962.
398p. K1836.1.03H615 CIA.
CIA.
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
:
:
14-00000
HISCOCKS, RICHARD.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Democracy in Western Germany. London, New
York, Oxford University Press, 1957. 324p. DD259.4.H5 DIC;
DD259.4.86 CIA.
BOETTI WILHEIM. The secret front; the story of Nazi political
espionage. New York, Praeger, 1954. 327p. DD256.5.1563
DIC; 1832.5.16985 CIA.
Translation from the German.
HOLBORN, HAJO. A history of modern Germany. New York, A. Knopf,
1959- DD175.H62 DLC.
v.1: The Reformation.
HOLBROOK, SABRA. Capital without a country: The challenge of
Berlin. New York, Coward-McCann, 1961.
HORNE, ALISTAIR. - Return to power; a report on the new Germany.
New York, Praeger, 1956. 415p. DD259.4.865 1956 DLC;
DD259.4.18 1956 CIA.
HUKBENER, THEODORE.
The schools of West Germany; a study of
German elementary and secondary schools. New York, New York
University Press, 1962. 181p. LA721.82.88 DLC;
LA721.82.88 CIA.
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES.
The Third Reich; a study published under the auspices of the
International Council for Fhilosophy and Humanistic Studies
and with the assistance of UNESCO. New York, Praeger, 1955.
910p. DD256.5.158 1955a DIC; DD256.5.15 CIA.
New
JARMAN, THOMAS LECKIE. The rise and fall of Nazi Germany.
York, New York University Press, 1956. 388p. DD256.5.33 1956
DIC; DD256.5.33 CIA.
JOHNSON, UNE. Speculations about Jakob. New York, Grove, 1962.
A novel reflecting life during the last decades in Germany.
KITZINGER, UWE W. German electoral politics, a study of the 1957
campaign. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960. 365p. JN3971.A95K5
DIC; J113971.1956 1957.K7 CIA.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
५
14-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
KOCHAN, LIONEL. The struggle for Germany, 1914-1945. Edinburgh,
University Press; Chicago, Aldine Pub. Co., 1963. 150p.
DD240.K57 DIC; 0443.87 CIA.
KOHN, HANS.
The mind of Germany; the education of a nation.
New York, Scribner, 1960. 370p. DD76.859 DIC; -DD76.K59
KRIEGER, LEONARD. The German idea of freedom; history of a
political tradition. Boston, Beacon Press, 1957. 540p.
DD112.K82 DIC.
LAQUEUR, WALTER ·ŽE'EV.
Young Germany; a history of the German
youth movement. London, Routledge & Paul, 1962. 253p.
HM19.13 DIC; HQ799.0513 CIA.
New York,
LIDDELL HART, BASIL HENRY. The German generals talk.
Morrow, 1948. 308p. 0757.15 1948 DLC; D757.15 CIA.
NATO
3 LOEWENSTEIN, Prince HUBERTUS, and VOLKMAR VON ZUEHLSDORFF.
and the defense of the West. New York, Praeger, 1962. 383p.
UA646.3.18E5 CIA.
LOWIE, ROBERT HARRY. Toward understanding Germany. Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1954. 396p. HN445.168 DLC;
HN445.16 CIA.
✓✓ MCINNIS, EDGAR, RICHARD HISCOCKS, and ROBERT SPENCER.
-
of postwar Germany. London, Dent, 1960. 195p.
DIC; DD257.M35 1960 CIA.
MCCLELLAN, GRANT S., ed.
The shaping
DD257.M35 1960a
The two Germanies. New York, Wilson,
1959. 184p. (The Reference shelf, v.31, no.1)
DD257.M27 DIC;. DD257.M2 CIA.
MANDER, JOHN.
Berlin, hostage for the West.
Books, 1962. 124p.
(A Penguin special, 8209)
DIC; DD881.M2 CIA.
Baltimore, Penguin
DD881.M27
New York, Simon
MANVELL, ROGER, and HEINRICH FRAKKEL. Goering.
& Schuster, 1962. 442p. DD247.G67M3 DLC; DD247.067M2 CIA.
MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH. The German catastrophe; reflections and
recollections. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950. 121p.
DD256.5.M42 DIC; DD256.5.1485 CIA.
Translation from the German.
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CIA.
14-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MERKATZ, HANS JOACHIM VON, and WOLFGANG METZNER, eds. Germany
today: facts and figures. Frankfurt a.N., A. Metzner, 1954.
413p. DD259.M372 DIC; DD259.M372 CIA.
METCALF, JOHN C.Our stake in Germany. Washington, Washington
College Press, 1961. 96p. DD259.2.M42 DLC.
MEAL, FRED WARNER. War and peace and Germany.. New York, W. W.
Norton, 1962. 166p. DD257.25.N38 DIC; DD257.25.13 CIA.
MESSELRODE, FRANZ VON. Germany's other half; a journalist's
appraisal of East Germany. London, New York, Abelard-Schuman,
1963. 207p. DD261.N45 DIC; DD261.2.4 CIA.
PASSANT, ERNEST JAMES. Short history of Germany 1815-1945.
London, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1959. 255p.
DD232.P35 DLC; DS; DD232.P2 CIA.
PINNEY, KDWARD L..
Western Germany.
Federalism, bureaucracy and party politics in
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press,
1963. 268p. JN3971.A77P5 DLC.
PINSON, KOPPEL SHUB. Modern Germany, its history and civilization.
New York, Macmillan, 1954. 637p. DD203.P5 1944
DD203.P5 1954 CIA.
DIC;
A useful survey, particularly of the intellectual background.
PLISCHKE, EIMER. Contemporary government of Germany. Boston;
Houghton Mifflin, 1961: 248 p. JH3971.A5P55 DIC;
JN3971.A5P7 CIA.
POLLOCK, JAMES KERR, and others.
Germany in power and eclipse; the
background of German development. New York, Van Nostrand, 1952.
661p. DD89.P64 DLC; DD89.P6 CIA.
DD257.25.86 DIC;
POUNDS, NORMAN JOHN GREVILLE. Divided Germany and Perlin.
Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1962. 128 p.
DD257.25.P7 CIA.
PRITTIE, Hon. TERENCE CORNELIUS FARMER. Germany dividal. Boston,
Little, Brown, 1960. 380p. DD257.P72 1961 DIC;
-
DD257.P7 CIA.
DIC has English ed.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
14-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE OHLY
REINHARDT, KURT FRANK.
Germany: 2000 years. Rev. ed.
F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1961. 2v. DD89.R36 1961
DD89.R36 1961 CIA.
DIC;
ROBSON, CHARLES B., ed. Berlin--pivot of German destiny.
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1960. 233p.
DD881.84553 DLC; DD881.R62 CIA.
New York,
Chapel
ROTHFELS, HANS. The German opposition to Hitler, an appraisal.
2d rev. ed. Chicago, Regnery, 1962. 166p. (Foundation for
foreign affairs series, no.6). DD256.3.16 1962 DIC;
Y1838.R84 1962 CIA.
SHIRER, WILLIAM LAWRENCE.
The rise and fall of the Third Reich;
a history of Nazi Germany. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960.
1245p. DD256.5.848 DIC; DD256.5.855 CIA.
This is issued also as a paperback ed.
New York, Carnegie
(International
SMITH, BRUCE LANNES R. The governance of Berlin.
Endowment for International Peace, 1959. 171-230p.
conciliation, no.525) JX1907.A8 no.525 DLC.
SNYDER, LOUIS LEO. Basic history of modern Germany. Princeton,
N. J., Van Nostrand, 1957. 192p. DD175.858 DLC;
DD175.858 CIA.
SPERIER, HANS. German rearmament and atomic war; the views of
German military and political leaders. Evanston, Ill., Row,
Peterson, 1957. 272p. UA710.856 DLC; UA710.57 CIA.
-
SPETER, HANS, and W. PHILLIPS DAVISON, eds. West German leadership
and foreign policy. Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson, 1957. 323p.
DD259.4.86 DLC; DD259.487 CIA.
STAHL, WALTER, ed. The politics of postwar Germany. New York,
Praeger for Atlantic-Bruecke, 1963. 480p. DD259.4.88 DLC;
DD259.4.871 CIA.
STERN, FRITZ RICHARD. Cultural despair and the politics of
discontent; a study of the rise of the "Germanic" ideology.
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961. 367p.
DD76.872 1961
DLC.
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ཁ་ -,
14-00000
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
STOLPER, WOLFGANG. F. The structure of the East German seceday
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960. 478p. ECE AĞST
DIC; HC287.A257 CIA.
TAYLOR, ALAN JOHN PERCIVALE.
The course of German history; a survey
of the development of Germany since 1815. New York, Coward McCann,
1946. 230p. DD203.13 1946 DLC.
TINTENS, TATE HARKHS. The new Germany and the old Naxis. Nev York,
Random House, 1961. 286p. DD259.2.T4 DLC; DD259.2.3 CIA.
THAYER, CHARLES WHEELER. The unquiet Germans. New York, Harper,
1957. 275p. DD257.745 DLC.
VERMEIL, EDMOND. Germany in the twentieth century; a political
and cultural history of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.
New York, Praeger, 1956. 288p. DD232.V413 1956 DIS;
DD232.V5R5 CIA.
VIERECK, PETER ROBERT EDWIN. Metapolitics, the roots of the Basi
mind. New York, Capricorn Books, 1961. 364p. (A Capricor
book, CAP45) DD253.V5 1961 DIC.
WHEELER-BENNETT, JOHN WHERLER. ·
The nemesis of power. London,
12.456
New York, Macmillan, 1953. 829p. DD240.W5 DIC;
CIA.
Revised ed. 1963
WOHLRABE, RAYMOND A., and WERNER KRUSCH.
The land and people of
Germany. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1957. 118p. DD17.06 DLC.
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
3