178-10004-10053
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178-10004-10053
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MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)
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TITLE:
DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PFIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962
12/10/1962
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3
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COMMENTS:
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
PFIAB
OPERATION MONGOOSE
MC CONE, JOHN
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
MEMORANDUM
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10 December 1962
THE WHITE HO
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD..
SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, 7 December 1962
i
1. After concluding the discussion on Cuba, the Director told the
Board that he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we
were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the
end of December. He said that one had reached MACH 2. 16 at 60, 000 feet.
There had been some trouble with the J-58 engines, but all problems were
soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on
the engines, and noted that we had had 75 hours in the air with 18 hours on
the J-58 engine. He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to
insure that the project was receiving top priority. Dr. Killian asked if Pratt
and Whitney had their first team in and the DCI said yes, but one of the
problems was that Hamilton Standard didn't have access to everything in
Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way.
Dr. Baker asked if there had been a solution to the fuel pump
problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached.
2.
The
Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working on an alternative fuel pump.
DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small
as we had hoped for, it was being worked on.
SCI
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3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some
difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordina-
tion. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets
of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence
budget was 90% of the over all effort. He said that he had discussed this with
Secretary McNamara. Dr. Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should
review the whole intelligence budget. The DCI noted that intelligence in
Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA
and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CIA was only
10% of the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense was spending
$3,844,000,000 on intelligence and CIA only $363,000,000. This was an.
increase from $2, 250, 000, 000 in the past, but Defense had put all reconnais-
sance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did
not believe this was correct, and thought it should be deleted.
4. Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the
Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about $50, 000, 000 less than
what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the
Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to
be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in
NPIC, and as a result the budget was $425, 000, 000 versus $405, 000, 000.
The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to $381,000,000 and taken $20,000,000
for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this
unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point
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Mr. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on several
occasions, and asked what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly the
MONGOOSE project and how it was set up. He said that after his discussion
with the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided to
utilize all resources to unseat Castro.
He went on to mention some of the
activities of the project. Mr. McCone then said he did not favor continuing
sabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed about
the future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the next few days,
and that the Russians might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way of
Dr. Langer asked if it
explaining why the SAM sites were being left there.
might not be for fear of an invasion; the Director said he did not think so
because our military forces could eliminate the SAM sites without much
trouble.
5. Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement.
He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must
have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively
week by week and month by month. The DCI said this was wrong because the
appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of
Congress to whom we were responsible. He noted that CIA could handle the
project more clandestinely. He had discussed this matter with the Secretary
of Defense but had reached no agreement. Defense is withholding
$140,000,000 and asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance
The Director said that such a decision cannot be made retro-
the money.
Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library
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