2.00000
104-10332-10014
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
SUMMARY OF AUGUST 1996 REVIEW BOARD ACTIONS ON
SECURITY CLASSIFIED HSCA TESTIMONY OF
まず
JOHN SCELSO
(180-10131-10330)
page; line Board ActionModification detail dat/sub.lang.
19; 9, 11, 22
P.
52; 5-6
M
Protect first four
words of line 5;
release rest of line.
Review 05/1997, "CIA
Employee."
10/2017, "Operational
Details."
52; 11
R
(see release on
p.141)
52; 21 & 23
R & R
53; 6
55; 25
R.
P
56; 4-7
56; 19-23
56; 25
57:2
Σ
Σ
P
P.
57; 4-7
P
Release line 4;
protect all of line 5;
release lines 6 & 7
postpone from 4th
word in line 19
through the third
word in line 21;
release rest of lines
21-23
10/2017 "Describes
technical operation."
10/2017, "Describes
intelligence operation in
Mexico City."
10/2017, "Describes
intelligence operation in
Mexico City."
10/2017 "Describes
technical operation."
10/2017 "Describes
individuals."
10/2017 "Describes
technical operation."
13-00000
pace line
57; 10-11
まず
Board Action
Σ
Modification detail
Release line 10,
postpone 1st, 2nd,
and 4th - 6th words.
on line 11.
date sub lane.
10/2017, "Describes
intelligence operations"
"Describes a group of
people."
2
57; 14
R
57; 17-19
P
57; 20-23
Σ
57;24
P
58;2-3
P
64; 18-21 &
22
R
68; 13
P
83; 14-15
P
8318
P
83; 22-23
P
83;25
P
84; 1-2
P
protect last three
words on line 20;
release lines 21-23.
10/2017 "Describes
technical operation."
10/2017, "Describes
intelligence operation"
10/2017, "Describes
intelligence operation"
Release 2017,
"Describes intelligence
operation."
Scelso language and
identifier.
10/2017 "Describes
individual."
Release date 08/2006;
"Crypt."
10/2017 "Describes
meeting."
Release 2017, "No
suitable substitute
language"
Release 2017, "No
suitable substitute
language"
13-00000
page line
Board Action
Modification detail
84; 7-11
P.
date sub lanes
Release 2017, "No
suitable substitute
language"
84; 13-14
R
84; 17
P
10/2017 "No suitable
substitute language."
84; 19
P
85; 10
P
10/2017 "Describes
technical operation."
Release date 08/2006.
"crypt"
85; 19
P
"crypt"
86; 12
P
Release date 08/2006.
86; 15
P
87; 8
9
P
91; 6-7
P
8-9
"crypt"
10/2017. "describes
personnel
Scelso language and
date.
Release date 08/2006.
"description."
9
106; 11
P
Release date 08/2006.
"crypt"
140; 20
R
140; 23
P
Release date 08/2006,
"Operational Detail"
141; 5-6
R
141; 9
P
168; 24
R
17519
R
Release 2017, "CIA
Installation in Western
Hemisphere 17"
.
3
13-00000
Board Action
Modification detail
181; 13
P
185; 10-11
R
185; 20
R
185; 22-24
R
notes/index:
p. 1
P
CIA team disk 8\ scel_act.wpd
date sub lange.
Scelso date. Sub.lang.
"location"
Review 05/1997 "CIA
Employee."
13-00000
SECRET
27 September 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Executive Director
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Assassination Records Review Board
John F. Pereira
Central Intelligence Agency
Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
Testimony and Lopez Report
F
(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA
once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues
discussed below.)
1. (S) Issue. This memo is to request that the JFK
Board reconsider its decision to release certain information
contained in the HSCA testimony of John Scelso and in the
Lopez Report. Specifically CIA requests that the phrases
"political action program" (pg. 64 Scelso Testimony, pg.
177, 178 Lopez Report); "Mexican police" (pg. 85 Scelso
Testimony); and "is exposed by Agee in his book" (pg. 141
Scelso Testimony) (be postponed from release. We also offer
some suggestions for substitute language which we believe
will not detract from the JFK assassination story, yet still
protect the information at issue.
I. Mexican Political Action Program
"We were running, at that time, a vast political action
program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from
its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and
it succeeded. I don't know whether you informed yourself
about the magnitude of our political action program there at
the time absolutely enormous"
--
(Scelso, 64; Lopez, pp. 177, 178)
2. (S) From the early 1950's to the mid-1960's,
Mexico City Station conducted a political action campaign to
minimize leftist influence on and within the Mexican
Government. The campaign utilized student groups, a front
group of progressive businessmen, and Catholic lay group
writers and operatives in political action and media
placement efforts. The Station currently does not have a
political action program designed to influence Mexican
SECRET
CL BY 2224130
CL REASON 1.5 (c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LOC 3-82
LIA 3-82,HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
Testimony and Lopez Report
politics, nor has it undertaken such activity anytime in the
recent past. Nevertheless, any public confirmation by the
U.S. Government of those activities would risk an adverse
reaction. Such adverse reaction would impact on current
Mexico City Station operations and be harmful to U.S.
interests.
CHA
Divison officers)
3. (S) As has been described to the Board in previous
briefings by the Menice branch chief, Mexicans guard their
sovereignty carefully. Nothing will infuriate them more
than allegations of CIA meddling in their internal politics.
In fact, earlier this year, the Mexican Government postponed
a visit to Mexico by the DCI for fear that it might be
perceived (and exploited) by the Mexican media and political
opposition as the CIA being called in to assist with
handling the problem of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army.
4. (S) The fact that the CIA activity to which the
Mexicans would object occurred more than 30 years ago will
not lessen the reaction. Release of the Scelso comments
would risk an adverse reaction from the Mexicans, which
would likely include calls for an examination by the Mexican
Government of current CIA activities. This could lead to
increased scrutiny of Station operations and personnel and
could jeopardize our unilateral activities. It could also
have a chilling effect on activities conducted jointly with
the Mexican services, who will be reluctant to engage in
programs that could become subject to public scrutiny and
political debate.
5. (S) Furthermore, the fact that these statements
were made by Scelso amounts to an official confirmation of
the underlying facts, making it very difficult for CIA to
protect the same or similar information from further release
in the future. Speculation in books, articles, and other
publications, or disclosures by Congress are often perceived
by the public as evidence that that information is in the
public domain and therefore is no longer classified. The
CIA has nevertheless been able to legally protect the
information from unauthorized disclosure. The courts have
held that because there has been no official confirmation,
(i.e. declassification by the appropriate CIA official) the
CIA may continue to protect from release the
the information at issue even when there has been widespread
public discussion on the issue in question.
be
6. (S) In this case, should there by a question raised
as to the classification status of documents on the
political program referred to by Scelso, it would be
difficult to convince a court that such information had not
been declassified because of the release by the Board.
Scelso was a long-time CIA employee who was in charge of the
investigation by the Agency into the assassination of the
2
SECRET
fitb?
chopped
Jap.
statement
dropped
referenc
to
FOIA
(chann
ས་ས
Sam
Jubal Com
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
Testimony and Lopez Report
President, and his testimony was taken under oath, with the
knowledge of the Agency, and in a classified setting.
Furthermore, the attached letter to Louis Stokes, Chairman
of the Select Committee on Assassination from former Acting
DCI Frank Carlucci also indicates that Scelso was acting as
an official of the CIA. The DCI states that any classified
testimony made by Agency staff before the Committees would
be considered "authorized provision" of the information.
This was to ensure that "all persons respond fully and
truthfully" to the Committee. Carlucci's letter, especially
taken together with the first few pages of Scelso's
testimony, make it clear that Scelso was speaking as an
official of the CIA.
7.
(S) A court would, therefore, probably find that
Scelso's statements were not just merely speculation by a
former Agency employee, but in fact, were official
confirmation of the political action program. Anything
suggesting official confirmation of classified information
would lead a judge to the conclusion that the information at
issue had been declassified by the CIA. This would make it
very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this
information from unauthorized disclosure. When confusion
arises as to the classification status of information, it
could lead to complicated legal proceedings and protracted
and unnecessary litigation at great expense to all parties.
II. Liaison with Mexico
"We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had
Mexican police"...We had a whole reporting set up there with
that, two of them, who watched things like that. (Scelso pg.
185).
8. (S) Release by the Board of Scelso's comments about
the Mexican police in conjunction with surveillance coverage
of the Mexico City airport could similarly have a chilling
effect on our current liaison relationship with the Mexicans.
The Station has worked, and continues to work, with liaison
against compatible targets, including tracking the arrival
and departure at the Mexico City airport of targets of
interest. Although the targets have obviously changed since
the time that Scelso is speaking of, these surveillance
operations are ongoing. The success of these current joint
operations could be threatened by any revelation today of
Mexican cooperation with the CIA in the past.
9. (S) CIA objects to this release on similar grounds
as stated in the prior section - disclosure of the Scelso
comments would constitute official acknowledgment by CIA of
the assistance provided by Mexican liaison to the Agency.
Such acknowledgment could affect not only current operations
SECRET
New H
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
Testimony and Lopez Report
described above, but also result in reluctance by Mexican
liaison to provide similar assistance in the future. The
Mexican Government would likely be subject to criticism by
groups and individuals opposed on nationalism and
sovereignty grounds to such close cooperation with the U.S.
Government and, even more so, with the CIA. The continued
success of CIA cooperation with the Mexicans, whether it be
with the President the intelligence service, or the pottee, any
depends on the fact that those relationships are, and
continue to be, secret.
10.
(S) CIA requests that the Board continue to
withhold this phrase from release and substitute in "other
sources" or something similar to this. Omitting the fact
that the airport information was obtained from Mexican
counterparts would probably leave the impression that the
information was obtained unilaterally. Although this still
presents some risk to national security, it does achieve
some level of protection to the Station's equities with
liaison.
other
Marien
govern
entity/
III. Phillip Agee
That
(S) "That is, the variety and number of telephone
taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other
technical operations is exposed by Agee in his book.
exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world by a lot..."
(Scelso, pg. 141)
As
11. (S) CIA objects to the release of the highlighted
phrase because, for reasons described in Section 1, it
amounts to official CIA confirmation of the existence of a
teltap operation conducted jointly with the Mexicans and
with close collaboration with the President of Mexico.
this Board is well aware, CIA has consistently requested,
the protection of liaison involvement in this teltap
operation. As the Board has agreed with CIA's position on
this matter, the only issue is whether this statement
reveals what we have agreed meets the criteria for continued
protection under the JFK Act.
12. (S) For the Board's convenience, several relevant
pages from Agee's book (Inside the Company: CIA Diary) are
attached. These pages explain in great detail the teltap
operation and the fact that it was conducted jointly between
the CIA and the Mexicans. Although such disclosures by
former employees are disturbing, they do not amount to
official confirmation of the underlying information.
Standing by itself, Agee's book can be dismissed by the
Agency as speculation, and do not compromise CIA's ability
to keep the information classified. Scelso's testimony,
however, amounts to official confirmation of Agee's book,
4
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
Testimony and Lopez Report
and does effect the Agency's ability to protect the
information from further release. Equally troubling is the
fact that Scelso's testimony could be read to confirm not
only what is accurate in Agee's book, but also what is
inaccurate.
12. (S) Furthermore, the language used by Scelso is.
clear. The use of the phrase "exposed by Agee in his book"
does not allow for any other interpretation except that
Agee's description of the teltap is accurate. If Scelso had
used other language, such as "has been written about
elsewhere", the existence of the joint teltap operation
would be protected. We request that the Board protect the
phrase as it is and use the above substitute language. Such
substitute language would not alter the story of the JFK
Assassination, yet would still allow for the protection of
the joint operation.
13. (S) While the connection between Agee's book and
Scelso's testimony may at first seem attenuated, anyone
involved in the review process conducted by this Board will
know that it is not. Many individuals follow the decisions
of this Board closely, and Agee's writings about the CIA are
also well known. It is to be expected that those who read
the Scelso report would then turn to Agee's book.
John F. Pereira
5
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
J. Barry Harrelson
Linda C. Cipriani
09/26/96 12:22:04 PM
Agee Memo - New draft
Here it is... with Jeremy's improvements. Please read it carefully as I had to rush through this. Some of Jeremy's comments were slight
wording changes so as not to offend "the Board" so you may not notice much change. The biggest substantive change was on my FOIA
section (I have skillfully crafted this section to avoid the use of that four letter word!). Please note there is one more paragraph now
because I did add a bit about Scelso being an "official". And don't forget to attach to Stokes-DCI letter which I will fax back to you.
Have fun - and let me know if you need help.
W
AGEEMEMO.DOC
CC:
SECRET

13-00000
SECRET
23 August 1996
Note For:
From:
Subject:
Fred Wickham, DO
Eleanor Neiman, DO
Mike Luce, DO/Mexico
Valerie Patterson, DO/EA
Christine Hegeman, DO/EA
Linda Cipriani, OGC
J. Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG
Meeting with ARRB Staff
1. Thursday afternoon I met with Dave Marwell,
Executive Director for the ARRB, and two of his staff,
Jeremy Gunn and Mary McAuliffe. I briefed them on the four
releases in the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony that had
been identified as potential appeal items, and on the
Agency's concerns re the Australian documents I requested
that the Board reconsider the release of the statements
Mexico City political action programs, Scelso's comment on
Agee, the reference to the Mexican Police as a source and
Warrenton as site of the Agency's Record Center.
on
2. Marwell agreed to send a "staff recommendation" to
the Board recommending that they delay the release of these
four items to hear additional evidence from the Agency. The
rest of the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony would be
released on schedule. If the Board accepts the staff's
recommendation, the four items will be addressed at the next.
Washington meeting (27 September). If the Board rejects the
staff's recommendation, then we have the option of appealing
to the President. Marwell and Gunn seemed confident that
the Board would agree to delay the release.
3. Gunn requested that the Agency's additional
evidence on these four items (if provided in writing) be to
the ARRB staff by 23 September. The Agency can also brief
the Board members at the 27 September meeting. As I
understand it, DO/Mexico (Mike L.) will be preparing
evidence memos on "political action programs” and “Mexican
police" issues and OGC (Linda C.) will take the lead on
Agee. I will contact the DA/IRO (Don Hatch) on the Warrenton
issue.
4. Concerning the Australian documents, Marwell agreed
to delay Board action until the 16 October meeting. The
Agency's proposal on these documents should be sent to the
ARRB staff as soon as possible.
CL By: 611637 CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: MULTIPLE
SECRET
13-00000
Testimony of then Retired Do officer
John SCELSO (pseudonym)
to the HSCA, 16 May 1978
political action
program
"1
largest teltap coverage; 30 lines
a
is exposed by Ages in his book“
The phrase, if released, could tie
together what we've been trying
to protect - primarily joint teltap
With the Mexicans and close col-
laboration with the President of
Mexico. It also gives credence
to the many allegations of Agee,
which the Agency has neither
confirmed nor denied.
coverage of the airport
in addition to (Mexican Police
being
a liaison relationship, it
Shows our access to airport
Control items
P.64
PP. 52,53,56,57
P. 141
P. 18.5
Please review the attached pages as determined
by the Assassinations Records Review Board members
Yellow highlighted passages are as CIA submitted
information to the Board, redacted
Bracketed passages FYI as Board upheld deletions
13-00000
Hives HSCA (RG 233)
300 7TH STREET, S.V. NEPORTUES BUILDING, PASIANCTON, D. c. 20024 (202) 554-2345
1-64
3
Q.
been handled in any different manner?
'Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissimina-
tion of information about him, but I do not think that any
operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or
to contact him or to try to force him back to the United
States.
Mr. Goldsmith.
What about in terms of
--
how would the
་ ་
"
"
Ռ
SYD
"
dissemination have been treated differently?
Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have
disseminated any additional information that we got.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the
Mexico City station for failure to send this information?
Mr. Scelso.
No.
:
That was not because we were trying to:
go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of
What you are trying to do is engage, as I used
the business.
to say, in important illegal manipulations of society,
secretly.
We were running, at that time, a vast political action
program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from
20 Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it
succeeded. I do not know whether you informed yourself
25
about the magnitude of our political action program there at
the time
--
absolutely enormous.
We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satel-
lites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of
101845
SECRET
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
appea
13-00000
(Fix AW) un...
300 7TH STREET, S.V.
REPORTERS HUILDING, VASHTHGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
JEVNA
1-52
0.
(3)
“ኦ
9
1.3
_
"
")
"..
ia
Mr. Scelo. Yes.
Now, why did they not report everything they found out?
Mr. Goldsmith. Answer your own question.
Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by
principally Mexican supervision of an American, or Mexican-
American. These people were just inundated with information
and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to
Washington.
The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on,
C which only were divulged after the assassination.
"
20
21
13
23
25
enormous problem.
It is an
Mexico had one of the biggest and most
active telephone intercept operations in the whole world
and the job of processing this material is just impossible.
Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step,
ناه
although I was not going to do this at this time. I am going
to modify the line of inquiry somewhat.
Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were
in the Mexico City station?
Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the Soviet.
Mr. Scelo. I think there are about 30 lines being tapped
altogether:
That is just the number that sticks in my mind.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Thirty meaning a total of thirty from ok
both the Soviet and the Cuban?
Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects.
SECRET
101833
24
25
13-00000
es HSCA (RG 233)
300 7TH STREET, S.V. REPORTIPS BUILDING, PASHTIGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
8
ia
་
"
"
"
==
.
ස
"
200
0.
23
SECRET
1-53
Mr. Goldsmith.
Would the security suspects to related
to the Soviet or Cuban?
Mr. Scelo. Some of them were American Communists
living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J.
Edgar Hoover.
Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty lines how many, at your
best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans?
Mr. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they
had.
Mr. Goldsmith. You think just about every outside
phone?
Mr. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines.
Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you?
Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based on my recollection,
going back 15 years.
Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, your earlier comment was
that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City
was one of the most extensive in the world?
Mr. Scelo. Yes.
And of course, they taped a great
deal which they could not exploit. They could not later
listen to it; they did not have time. They used to listen
to it sort of spottily, you see, and attempt then to exploit
what was the most important.
Mr.
Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as
to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the
13
SECRET
001834
13-00000
Echives HSCA (RG 233)
365421
1-56
2
3
(2)
a
10
300 7TH STREET, S.M. REPORTERS BILLEDINE, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024 (202) 55%-2345
8
m
13
1
21
24
25
(Pause)
Mr. Scelo. Yes.
Mr.
Goldsmith. I have a few questions to ask you on
that. This refers to the envoy operation that was the
joint operation conducted by the Mexicans and the Americans
and I believe this indicates that there were 30 lines, in;
fact, connected at one time, so that your early testimony
was, in all likelihood, accurate.
I am going to have to ask you also to read the section
marked number 3, Oswald coverage.
Mr. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask?
Mr. Goldsmith.
General Report.
This is taken from the 1977 Inspector
Mr. Scelo. I see.
Mr. Goldsmith.
Please read the section marked Oswald
Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162.
(Pause)
On page 161, the section where it says: "Oswald Cover-
age. In mid-62,
Mexican officer in charge of the envoy,
2. [the
ok
the joint tap operation, asked the American officer at the ok
✓ for
envoy listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet,
Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible.
coverage.
The question I have for you is as follows. It would
seem, from the earlier paragraph, that [the liaison operation
ok
k
SECRET
101837
13-00000
National Archives HSCA (RG 233)
"
304 7TH STREET, S.V. REPORTERS BUILDING, MASHTIRITON, D. C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
☐
"
)
་
"
の、
ལ
20
ff
"1
1
(*)
OLVAGI
was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary
1-57
for the Mexican officer in charged to ask
the
he American officer :
for the telephone numbers?
Mr. Scelo. The Mexicans were probably tapping other
things at that time, not these targets. They were tapping/
དོམྦཱ སྒོ་མ་ས་ནི་སྣ
other Mexicans, and so on. We had our own unilateral tap
operations J
the
Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.
Mr. Scelo.
Mr. Goldsmith.
on those important targets.
So, are you saying that prior to 1962
[with
Jdid
operations
Liaison 
operations 
with the Mexicans did not cover the
Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies?
Mr. Scelo. That is what that says. I do not really
recall.
That would have been in mid-627 That was just
about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk.
And I do not recall what the previous status was.
I do recall that they certainly did ask
--[they
they suddenly
disclosed the intent to tap certain lines which we were ·
tapping unilaterally.
Mr. Goldsmith.
It indicates that the liaison operation
had taps on 30 lines. If it was not the Soviet, Cuban and
satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have
been.
Mr. Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects;
Mexican Communist Party people.
There were three or four or
001838
SECRET
13-00000
Reproduced from the holdings of the National Archives HSCA (RG 233)
I
300 7TH STREET, S.V. REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHTIGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
1)
5
0
15
1
"
וי
16
1
w
DIUNE
1-141
Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City's station's operations
one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency?
It was then. That is; the variety and
Mr. Scelso.
B
prohler
number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo operations
and other technical operations is exposed by Agee in his
book. That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world
by a lot. There is no other station in the world that has
that good operations.
cam Ca
Then car
Caracas. That got to be real good. Nothing
like it in Europe.
=
Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to draw your attention to a
cable which, unfortunately, I do not have with me. The cable
is referred to in Book 5 of the Senate report, written by
Thomas Karamessinas to the Mexico City station in which he
indicated and said the arrest of Sylvia Deran would jeepordize
U.S. freedom of action.
Do you remember that cable?
iz
Mr. Scelso.
m
Yes.
20
13
23
24
Mr. Goldsmith.
Do you know why it was sent?
Mr. Scelso. At that time, we were not sure that Oswald
might not have been a Cuban agent, and the arrest of a
foreign consular person was quite a serious matter under
international law.
Although Sylvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, I believe,
25
nevertheless, I did not think
--
Karamessinas may not have
SECRET
001923
i
COME
13.00000
Appendix 1
Alphabetical and numerical listing of CIA employees,
agents and 
collaborators and organizations controlled,
financed and 
influenced by the CIA.
ACOSTA VELASCO, JORGE. Nephew of Ecuadorean President, Jose
Maria Velasco. Minister 
of the Treasury and Minister of
Government. Informant and 
political-action agent of the Quito
station.
AGENCIA ORBE LATINOAMERICANO. Feature news service serving
most of Latin America. 
Financed and controlled by the CIA through
the Santiago, Chile, station.
AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT. INC. (LAAD). Provided cover for CIA
officer Bruce Berckmans, 
q.v.
AGUERRONDO, MARIO. Uruguayan Army colonel and former Monte-
video Chief of Police. Close station 
liaison collaborator.
AIR AMERICA. CIA-Owned airline for paramilitary operations, mainly
in the Far East.
ALARCON, ALBERTO, Guayaquil businessman and Liberal Party activ-
ist. Principal agent for CIA 
student operations in Ecuador. Crypto-
nym: ECLOSE.
ALBORNOZ, ALFREDO. Ecuadorean Minister of Government (internal
security). Close collaborator 
of the Quito station.
ALLEN, JOHN. CIA operations officer at Camp Peary training base,
formerly assigned in the Near East.
ALLIANCE FOR ANTI-TOTALITARIAN EDUCATION. Propaganda
mechanism of the Montevideo 
station.
ALMEIDA, WILSON. Publisher and editor of Voz Universitaria, q.v., a
university student newspaper
. Propaganda agent for the Quito
station.
ALONZO OLIVE, RAUL. Cuban engineer in sugar industry. Member of
commercial delegation to 
Brazil and Uruguay. Recruited by the CIA
in Montevideo before return to 
Cuba.
AMADOR MARQUEZ, Enrique. Labour and political-action agent of
Guayaquil base. Minister of 
Economy.
AMAYA QUINTANA, ENRIQUE. Leader of the Peruvian Movement of
the Revolutionary 
Left (MIR), recruited in Guayaquil as a penetra-
tion agent. Resettled by the CIA in 
Mexico.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES. The US 
member of the Public Service International
599
13-00000
...
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM AND CHEMICAL
WORKERS (IFFCW). The rrs for this industry set up 
originally by
the CIA through the US Oil Workers International 
Union.
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PLANTATION, AGRICULTURAL
AND ALLIED WORKERS (IFFSAW). The 
international trade secret-
ariat for rural work. Used by the CIA for labour 
operations.
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS
. 
Organization.
used by the CEA for propaganda.operations
.
INTERNATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY. CIA-controlled police training
school under Axe cover in Washington 
DC. Formerly the Inter-
American Police Academy founded in Panama 
by the Panama
station.
INTERNATIONALPOLICESERVICES SCHOOL. CIA training school for
police in Washington under commercial 
cover.
INTERNATIONAL STUDENT CONFERENCE (ISC). See COORDINAT-
ING SECRETARIAT OF NATIONAL UNIONS 
OF STUDENTS (COSEC).
INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS. A generic 
description of
the international trade-amion organizations 
having as members the
national unions of workers in a particular industry
. There are 15-20
ITS's most of which have been used by the CIA for 
labour operations.
Some have headquarters in Europe, others in 
the US but close rela-
tions maintained with the ICFTU in Brussels
.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS FEDERATION (ITF). The
international trade secretariat for transport 
industries. Used by the
CIA for labour operations. See JOAQUIN (JACK) 
OTERO.
JACOME, FRANCINE. Asian married to 
Ecuadorean. 
Quito agent
who wrote cover letters Luis Toroella
, q.v., and served as tran-
scriber and courier for telephone-tap 
operation. Cryptonym:
ECDOXY.
JARAMILLO, KIME. Velasquista leader and Quito station penetration
agent.
JAUREGUI, ARTURO. Secretary-General of the Inter-American
Regional Labor Organization (ORIT), 
q.v., in Mexico City. CIA
agent.
JAUREGUIZA Mondeo police commissioner in charge of move-
ments of us-domic population. 
Montevideo station liaison
collaborat
JONES, DERIE Agent of the Montevideo station used in operation to
break the code system of the Embassy 
of the United Arab Republic
(Egyp
KARAMESISKES, TEOS Assistant Deputy Director for Plans and
later Degene Director for Plans
.
612
KAUFMAN, WALTER J. Chief of Mexico branch of Western Hemi-
sphere Division.
.
KINDSCHI, JACK. CIA operations officer in Stockholm using non-
official cover of Washington DC public relations firm Robert Mullen
Co. Assigned to Mexico City with same cover.
KING, COLONEL, J. C. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the..
DDP.
KLADENSKY, OTTO. Quito Oldsmobile dealer and station agent for
intelligence on the Czech diplomatic mission. Also the cutout to
Reinaldo Varea Donoso, Ecuadorean Vice-President, q.v. Crypto-
nym: ECTOSOME later DICTOSOME.
LABOR COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION. Propaganda mech-
anism of the Montevideo station.
LADD, RAYMOND. Quito station administrative officer also in charge
of certain operations.
LADENBURG, ARTHUR. CIA operations officer in Mexico City under
non-official cover. Later assigned to Santiago, Chile.
LIBIDINAL. Mexico City station postal intercept operation. True
cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.
LICALLA. One of three observation posts overlooking the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City. Names of agents forgotten.
LICOBRA. Cryptonym for operations targeted by Mexico City station
against the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the
Mexican Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Government.
LICOWL-1. Owner of small grocery store near Soviet Embassy, Mexico
City. CIA agent. True name forgotten.
LICOZY-1. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True
name forgotten.
LICOZY-3. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True
name forgotten.
LICOZY-5. Double-agent of the Mexico City station against the KGB.
True name forgotica.
LIDENY. Mexico City station unilateral telephone-tapping operation.
True cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.
LIEMBRACE. Mexico City station surveillance team. Names of team
members unknown.
LIENVOY. Joint telephone-tapping operation between Mexico City
station and Mexican security service. Names of agents un-
known.
LIFIRE, Mexico City station travel control and general investigations
team. True names unknown.
LILINK. An operation in Mexico City to provide non-official cover for
613

13-00000
nym: LISAMPAN) is still in the 'interference-complaint-tes
stage.
Another important operation directed against the Cubans
sophisticated provocation that won the CIA Intelligence Mel
for Stan Archenhold, the case officer who conceived it
operation consisted of a series of letters sent to the Cuban intelis
gence service in their Mexico City Embassy from a person wh
purported to be a CIA officer trying to help them. The letter
purport to implicate Joaquin Ordoqui, a respected, old-guar
leader of the Cuban Communist Party and a high-ranking mis
tary leader, as a CIA agent. The letters are based on information:
from Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the Guatemalan exile and penetra
tion agent, who was closely associated with Ordoqui and Marcos
Rodriguez when all three lived in Mexico City during the late
1950s. The letters continue to be sent to Cuban intelligence al
though Ordoqui was arrested in 1964, and the desired contro
versy and dissension in the Cuban revolutionary leadership
followed.
As the cover of Sherry, the chief of the Cuban operations sec
tion, is in the Embassy consular section, he has been able to meet
several of the Cuban consular officers directly. However, his main
agent for direct assessment of the Cubans is Leander Vourvoulias
Consul of Greece and President of the Consular Corps.
Support Operations
The support operations must also be detailed. The joint opera
tion for telephone tapping, LIENVOY, is effected in cooperation
With the Mexican authorities and has a capacity for about forty
lines. The station provides the equipment, the technical assistance,
couriers and transcribers, while the Mexicans make the connec
tions in the exchanges and maintain the listening posts. In addi
tion to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic missions
and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIENVOY also covers
special cases. For years the telephones of ex-President Cárdenas
and his daughter have been tapped, and recently tapping bas
started on that of Luis Quintanilla, a Mexican intellectual who is
planning a trip to Hanoi with the publisher of the Miami New
and with a fellow of the Center for the Study of Democratic
532
Anstitutions in Santa Barbara. Reports on plans for this trip are
Pent immediately to the White House.
The station also has its own unilateral telephone-tapping
operation which is limited to special cases where the involvement
of the Mexicans is thought to be undesirable. Connections for this
operation are made outside the exchanges by telephone company
engineers who work as station agents, as in the case of the bugging
of the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN). However this is restricted as
far as possible in order to avoid damaging relations with the
Mexicans in the event of discovery.
Travel control, general investigations and occasional surveil-
fance are the duties of a six-man team called LIFIRE. They obtain
flight-travel lists from the airport, which are passed daily to the
station and take photographs of passengers to and from com-
munist countries and of their passports as they pass through
immigration.
Another eight-man surveillance team, known as LIEMBRACE,
has vehicles (including a Volkswagen photo-van) and radio-
communications equipment and is mainly concerned with Soviet/
satellite and Cuban targets. It is administered by Jim Anderson,
who also controls another eight-man team (LIRICE), similarly
equipped, which deals with the Mexican revolutionaries and other
miscellaneous targets.
Postal interception is mainly directed towards the mail from
communist countries, but can occasionally be used to get corres-
pondence from selected Mexican addresses.
As in every station, a variety of agents assists in support tasks
which they perform in the course of their ordinary jobs. For
processing the immigration papers for station non-official cover
personnel, for example, Judd Austin, ‡ one of the US lawyers in
Goodrich, Dalton, Little and Riquelme (the principal law firm
serving American subsidiaries) is used. The Executive Vice-
President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico
City, Al Wichtrich, + channels political information to the station
that he picks up in his normal work with American and Mexican
businessmen. For technical support the station has an officer of
TSD under Embassy cover with a workshop and qualifications
in audio, flaps and seals, and photography.
533
13-00000
that they were engaged in political activities. The Chinese haden
fact, been using the NCNA office for propaganda and support?
pro-Chinese revolutionary organizations in Mexico and Centri
America.
Central American Exiles
Mexico has traditionally been a haven for political exiles from
Central American countries including communists and other
extreme leftists. Several Central American parties, including the
Guatemalans, maintain liaison sections in Mexico City in order
to keep lines open to the Soviets, Cubans and others. They
operate semi-clandestinely for the most part in order to avoid
repression from the Mexican government.
Washington DC
20 December 1966
Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the US, its size
and proximity, and the abundance of enemy activities, the
Mexico City station is the largest in the hemisphere. Altogether
the station has some fifteen operations officers under State
Department cover in the Embassy political section, plus about
twelve more officers under assorted non-official covers outside the
Embassy. In addition, a sizeable support staff of communications
officers, technical services, intelligence assistants, records clerks
and secretaries bring the overall station personnel total to around
fifty.
Liaison Operations
Dominating the station operational programme is the LITEMPO
project which is administered by Winston Scott, + the Chief of
Station in Mexico City since 1956, with the assistance of Annie
Goodpasture,‡ a case officer who has also been at the station for
some years. This project embraces a complicated series of opera-
tional support programmes to the various Mexican civilian
security forces for the purpose of intelligence exchange, joint
524
operations and constant upgrading of Mexican internal intelli-
gence collection and public security functions.
At the top of the LITEMPO operation is the Mexican President,
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, who has worked extremely closely with the
station since he became Minister of Government in the previous
administration of Adolfo Lopez Mateos† (1958-64). Scott had
also developed a very close working relationship with Lopez
Mateos, and, since Diaz Ordaz became President two years ago,
Scott has been working closely with the current Minister of
Government, Luis Echeverria. Thus the LITEMPO project
focuses at the top on the President and the current Minister of
Government who will be the second consecutive choice of PRI
kaders to pass from internal security to the presidency.
Scott's chummy relationship with Diaz Ordaz none the less has
its problems. In 1964 Fulton Freeman went to Mexico City as
Ambassador to crown a Foreign Service career that had started
in the same Embassy in the 1930s. He is expected to retire after
the 1968 Olympic Games. At the time of his assignment to Mexico
City Freeman's expectations of meaningful diplomatic relations
with Diaz Ordaz collided with the President's preference for deal-
ing with Scott, and Freeman was relegated to protocol contacts
with the President while his diplomatic talents focused on the
Foreign Minister. The problem of who would deal with the Presi-
dent was confused somewhat by the Ambassador's insistence, not
long after arrival, on a detailed briefing about the station opera-
tional programme, which Scott refused. Eventually both Scott
and the Ambassador visited the White House, where President
Johnson settled matters according to the wishes of the Agency
and of his friend Diaz Ordaz. Scott continued, of course, to work
with the President and the Ambassador never got the full briefing
he had demanded. Since then the relations between Scott and the
Ambassador have warmed, but the Ambassador forbids any
station operations directed against the Mexican Foreign Ministry.
While Scott frequently meets the President and the Minister of
Government, two non-official cover case officers handle the day-
to-day contact with the chiefs of the security services subordinate
to Echeverria. One of these officers is a former FBI agent who
worked in the legal attaché's office in the Mexico City Embassy
-
the legal attaché is usually the FBI office in an American
525
13-00000
are
embassy. The FBI officer had left the FBI to come with the station
but pains have been taken to conceal his CIA employment
order to avoid the bad blood that would result from the ci
'stealing' of an FBI officer. The two non-official cover officers and
the equivalent of an AID Public Safety mission but in Mexico this
function is performed secretly by the station in deference to Mexi
can nationalist sensitivities - as is the case in Argentina. Through
the LITEMPO project we are currently providing advice and equip
ment for a new secret communications network to function be
tween Diaz Ordaz's office and principal cities in the rest of the
country. Other joint operations with the Mexican security ser
vices include travel control, telephone tapping and repressive
action.
The station also prepares a daily intelligence summary for Diaz
Ordaz with a section on activities of Mexican revolutionary orga-
nizations and communist diplomatic missions and a section on
international developments based on information from head-
quarters. Other reports, often relating to a single subject, are
passed to Diaz Ordaz, Echeverria and top security officials. These
reports, like the daily round-up, include information from station
unilateral penetration agents with due camouflaging to protect the
identity of the sources. The station is much better than are the
Mexican services, and is thus of great assistance to the authorities
in planning for raids, arrests and other repressive action.
Liaison between Scott and the Mexican military intelligence
services consists mainly of exchange of information, in order to
keep a foot in the door for future eventualities. The US military
attachés, moreover, are in constant contact with their Mexican
military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received
regularly by the station.
Stan Watson, the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station, has
been meeting with a South Korean CIA officer who was recently
sent under diplomatic cover to monitor North Korean soundings
for establishment of missions in Mexico and Central America
Communist Party Operations
The station CP section consists of two case officers, Wade
Thomas and Ben Ramirez, both under Embassy cover, plus
526
two case officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob
Driscoll, a retired operations officer now working under con-
a tract, and Julian Zambianco who was transferred from Guayaquil
to Mexico City about a year ago. These officers are in charge of
agent and technical penetrations against the revolutionary organi-
zations of importance. The quality of this intelligence is high,
although not as high as it was before 1963. In late 1962 Carlos
Manuel Pellecer, the station's most important communist party
penetration-agent, broke openly with communism by publishing
a book. He was a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party
(PGT) and had been Minister of Labor in the Arbenz government
during the 1950s. However, after the Agency-sponsored over-
throw of the Arbenz government Pellecer made his way to Mexico
City where for years he was the station's best source (cryptonym
LINLUCK) on all the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, not
just the Guatemalan exiles. His book, of course, was financed by
the station and distributed by the Agency all over Latin America.
Pellecer is still being used by the Mexico City station as a propa-
ganda agent, as with other former penetration agents who form-
ally break with communism without revealing their years of work
as spies - Eudocio Ravines, the well-known Peruvian defector
from communism is a parallel case. Another book by Pellecer,
also financed by the station, has just appeared. This book is a
continuation of CIA exploitation of the Marcos Rodriguez and
Joaquin Ordoqui cases in Cuba, and is aimed at denigration of the
Cuban revolution.
The station also collects information about communists from
the US living in Mexico. Many of them arrived during the Mc-
Carthy period and some have subsequently become Mexican
citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI,
which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico
City (ACGMC). Information collected about them includes that
obtained through the LIENVOY telephone-tapping operation des-
cribed below.
The station also receives copies of reports from FBI penetration
operations against Mexican revolutionary organizations. Mexico
is the only country in Latin America, except Puerto Rico, where
the FBI continued operations against the local left when the CIA
took over in 1947. The FBI intelligence is of high quality.
527
13-00000
Soviet/Satellite Operations
The station runs between fifteen and twenty access agents
The largest section in the station is that covering Soviet/satell liability. Several of these agents are suspected of having been
gainst the Soviets with varying degrees of effectiveness and
recruited by the Soviets for use as 
double agents against the
nation. Two of the 
most important of the current access-agents
Katherine Manjarrez, + Secretary of the Foreign Press Associa-
tion
, and her husband - 
both of whom are targeted against the
Soviet press attaché and the Tass correspondent. Others are
LCOWL-1‡ and LIOVAL-1.‡
operations. It has four case officers, three intelligence assistant
and a 
secretary, all under Embassy cover, and four case offices
under non-official cover. It is headed by Paul Dillont and the
other official cover case officers are Donald Vogel, Cynth
Hausman and Robert Steele. 
A number of sensitive operation
are underway.
The station has two observation posts in front of the Soviet)
Embassy, which cover the 
entrances, plus a third observation post
in the back of the Embassy to provide 
coverage of the gardens
The LICALLA observation post in the back is the closest of five
houses bordering the 
Embassy property - all five are owned by
the station. Several years ago films 
were made of Soviets con-
versing in the garden, but 
attempts by Russian lip-readers to dis-
cover their conversations were 
unsuccessful. From one of the
front op's, radio contact is 
maintained with the LIEMBRACE
surveillance team for 
signalling when a particular Soviet surveil
lance target leaves the Embassy
, his route and other data. Photos
are regularly taken from all 
the OP's of Soviets and their families
and all visitors to the 
Embassy. When visitors use vehicles, photo-
graphs are taken of their 
licence plates for tracing. Occasionally
the LICALLA OP is used for 
electronic monitoring, since it is
close to the Embassy, but 
so far attempts to pick up radiations
from Soviet cryptographic 
equipment have been unsuccess-
ful.
In addition to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, several other
support operations include 
coverage of the Soviets. Through the
CIENVOY operation, 
Soviet telephones are constantly monitored,
and through the LIFIRE 
travel-control operation photographs of
travel documents are 
obtained along with data on arrivals and
departures. Monitoring 
of Mexican diplomatic communications
reveals requests for 
Mexican visas by Soviet officials, including
the diplomatic couriers. In 
addition, NSA is also monitoring
several communications 
systems involving 'burst' transmissions
from the USSR to as yet 
unidentified agents believed to be in
Mexico possibly Soviet 
intelligence officers assigned abroad as
'illegals', with false identity 
and non-official cover.
528
-
duding their soft drinks
-
LICOWL-1 is the owner of a tiny grocery store situated in front
of the Soviet Embassy where the Soviets buy odds and ends in-
TSD is studying ways of bugging a
wooden soft-drink case or the bottles themselves. More import-
ant, LICOWL-1 is involved at the moment in an operation against
the Embassy zavhoz (administrative officer), who spends consider-
able time chatting with the agent. Because Silnikov, the zavhoz,
has been on the prowl for a lover - or so he said to LICOWL-1-
the station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait: An
appropriate girl was obtained through BESABER,‡ an agent who
is normally targeted against Polish intelligence officers and who
runs a ceramics business specializing in souvenirs. By loitering at
LICOWL-1's store the girl attracted Silnikov's attention, and a
bot necking session in a back room at the store led to several
serious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby
obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov's virility is as-
tonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording and
photographing the sessions without the knowledge of the girl.
Although promiscuity among Soviets is not abnormal, relation-
ships with local girls are forbidden. Eventually it will be decided
whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disrup-
tion by sending tapes and photos to the Embassy if the blackmail
is refused.
LIOVAL-1 is not as interesting a case but is more important.
The agent is an American who teaches English in Mexico City
and is an ardent fisherman. Through fishing he became acquain-
ted with Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and a known senior
KGB officer - possibly the Mexico City rezident (KGB chief). Yats-
kov and the agent spend one or two week-ends per month off in
the mountains fishing and have developed a very close friendship.
529
13-00000
When Yatskov is transferred back to Moscow - he has alrea
been in Mexico for some years - we shall decide whether to try to
defect him 
through LIOVAL-1. Recently Peter Deriabin, the
well-known 
KGB defector from the 1950s who is now a US citizen
and full-
time CIA employee, went to Mexico City to study the
voluminous 
reports on Yatskov written by LIOVAL-1. He con
cluded that there is a strong possibility that LIOVAL-1 has been
recruited by Yatskov and is reporting on Paul Dillon, the station
officer in charge of this case. Nevertheless, the operation con
tinues while the counter-intelligence aspects are studied further
The station double-agent cases against the Soviets, LICOZY-1
LICOZY-3‡ and LICOZY-5,‡ are all being wound up for lack
of productivity or problems of control. One of these agents
LICOZY-3, is an American living in Philadelphia who was re
cruited by the Soviets while a student in Mexico, but who reported
the recruitment and worked for the Mexico City station. He
worked for the FBI after returning to the US.
the Soviet case
officer was a UN official at one time - but recently Soviet interest
in him has fallen off and the FBI turned the case back over to the
Agency for termination.
-
Against the Czechs and the Poles many of the same types of
operation are targeted. Access agents, observation posts, tele-
phone tapping, surveillance and travel control are continuous
although with somewhat less intensity than against the Soviets.
In the Yugoslav Embassy the code clerk has been recruited by the
CIA as has one of the Embassy's secretaries.
Until the New China News Agency (NCNA) office was closed
last month by the Mexican government, the Soviet/satellite sec
tion of the station was responsible for following the movements
of the Chinese communists. Telephone intercepts through
LIENVOY and occasional surveillance by the LIRICE team were
directed against them, but the most important intelligence col-
lected against them was from the bugging of their offices. The
audio operation was supported by the Far East Division in head-
quarters, who sent an operations officer and transcribers to
Mexico City. Now that the NCNA offices are closed, the audio
equipment will be removed and the station will continue to
follow up the many leads coming from the bugging operation.
530
Liban Operations
Cuban operations section consists of two case officers,
The
Francis Sherry and Joe Piccolo, and a secretary under Embassy
Cover and one case officer under non-official cover. An observa-
tion post for photographic coverage and radio contact with the
LIEMBRACE Surveillance team is functioning, as well as LIENVOY
telephone monitoring and LIFIRE airport travel control. Through
the LIFIRE team the station obtains regular clandestine access
to the Prensa Latina pouch from Havana, and copies of corres-
pondence between PL headquarters in Havana and its correspon-
dents throughout the hemisphere are forwarded to the stations
concerned.
Through the LITEMPO liaison operation the Mexican immi-
gration service provides special coverage of all travellers to and
from Havana on the frequent Cubana flights. Each traveller is
photographed and his passport is stamped with arrival or depar-
ture cachets indicating Havana travel. The purpose is to frustrate
the Cuban practice of issuing visas on separate slips of paper in-
stead of in the passport so as to obscure travel. Prior to each
Cubana departure the station is notified of all passengers so that
name checks can be made. In the case of US citizens, the Mexican
service obliges by preventing departure when requested by the
station.
The most important current operation targeted against the
Cuban mission is an attempted audio penetration using the tele-
phone system. Telephone company engineers working in the
LIDENY tapping operation will eventually install new wall-boxes
for the Embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters
with switches will have been cast by TSD. At the moment,
however, the engineers are causing deliberate interference in
Embassy telephones by technical means in the exchange. Each
time the Embassy calls the telephone company to complain of
interference on the lines, the engineers report back that every-
thing in the exchange is in order. Eventually, as the interference
continues, the engineers will check street connections and finally
arrive to check the instruments in the Embassy. They will find the
wall-boxes "defective' and will replace them with the bugged
boxes cast by TSD. Right now, however, this operation (crypto-
531
13-00000
Reproduced from the holdings of the National Archives HSCA (RG 233)
300 7TH STREET, S.V. REPORTUES BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024 (202) 554-2345
1-185
(-)
3
0.
"
ས
"
...
"
16
50
Mr. Goldsmith.
happened all the time?
Mr. Scelso.
What do you mean, things like this
Planes were held for travellers who would
otherwise miss them, for Cuban officials, and so on.
Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever actually investigate,
this particular matter?
Mr. Scelso. It investigated to the extent that there
was nothing left to investigate. The plane was gone. The
man was on it. He had not identified himself before he left.
We had very complete coverage of the Mexico City Airport:
and watched the Cuban flights closely, but where it sometimes
happened that an important Cuban official would come late,
he would go directly to the plane without going through
travel controls.
=
At that time, the man was gone. There was no picture
of him. Nobody looked at his passport.
Period.
Mr. Goldsmith. You did not bother to ask any Cuban
employees in the Airport about the man?
Mr. Scelso. We did not have any source of Cuban
20
employees.
21
13
25
We only had Mexican police.
← son
Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of them questioned about him?
Yes, this was a routine thing. We had a
Mr. Scelso.
whole reporting set up there with that, two of them, who
watched things like this. But the report from them was that
the man had just gone on the plane and they did not know who
SECRET
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY
001967
ok
13-00000
The Lopez Report
HSCA Summ
Summary
of Oswald and the CIA
Mexico City
Warrenton site
The installation, under Anny cover,
is a CIA facility. It is the
Archives for cut holdings.
teltap coverage of 30 lines
identification of Soviet officials
targetted
Identification of Cuban officials
targetted
political action program
P. 44
P. 54 and others ok
P. 56, 71
ok
ok
P.58
P. 177, 178
:
13-00000
Classification: NET
SCUNCT
(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA controlled documents.)
-44-
:
DOVD
811
was in operation on only four of those days. This
. Committee has not been able to establish or disprove
the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those'
days when there was no coverage from LIMITED because'
the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were
not made available for review. That material was
requested but has not been made available.141/
explanation of why this material is missing was
requested on 7/25/78.142/
An
The CIA's explanation stated
that the photographs and logs "may have been destroyed
in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the
folders for the destroyed material were reused to
forward more recent photographic material to
Headquarters for retention.“143/ The folders which
once contained the production were located at the
National Archives' Warrenton Records Center but,
according to the CIA's explanation, the folders
contained production material from 1967.144/ Because
the CIA has not provided the photographic production
and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no
precise determination detailing the effectiveness of
the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made.
2600710
Classification:
DCI
160
Classified by
13-00000
16
Classification: UP SECRET
(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA controlled documents.)
-54-
VISIRA
surveillance project.189/
Even though Mr. Scott was
the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer
functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.190/
An American technician was stationed in the listening
post to maintain the equipment and to protect the
Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's
duties in this operation ranged from meeting with
the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes.
of daily supervision of the operation to handling the
collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.192/
Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968.193/
With the exception of the technician, the listening
post and the transcription room of this base were
staffed by Mexican Army officers 194/ This listening
post covered up to thirty lines at one time. 195/
b. Analysis and Reporting of Information
Obtained
Clease of
je names
employees
sho retired.
[Mr. Herbert Manel1 was responsible for the
analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet
inder cover+ transcripts. 196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a
itponed for
Please
daily basis by [Barbara Manell. Mrs. Manell would
until
May 1997
200000
Classification:
ལ་ཏུ
170
1
sified by derivation:
13-00000 இல்ளை
M
Classification:
TOP SECRET
(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA controlled documents.)
=56-
It should be noted, though, that an examination of
the project files shows that Americans in contact
with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely
reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination
to the intelligence community.203/
3.
Telephone Lines Covered
This Committee has made an attempt to determine
which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban
diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic
intercept operation in September and October of 1963.
The monthly operational report of this project for
the month of September lists the following phones
as targets of the operation:204/
KEAKO
ok
ها ليلة النشا
1
14-42-37
Cuban Embassy
14-92-14
Cuban Embassy
25-07-95
Cuban Embassy
14-13-26
Cuban Embassy
15-60-55
15-61-55
15-69-87
15-61-07
15-12-64
Soviet Embassy (Chancery
Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
Soviet Embassy (Military Attache).
Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at
the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September
1963.205/
2000722
The monthly report for October says that
Classification:
172

13-00000
}
Classification: InD
TUT SEGAL
(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA controlled documents.)
»-71-
in a chronological file.292/
One copy of the Cuban
transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on
a weekly basis.293/
(g) Format of Transcripts
The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff
produced was much the same as those of the Spanish.
language transcripts described above.294/
Mr.
Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.295/
Many of Mr. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation
"(previously transcribed)" after the meter number
referring to the reel footage location of a
conversation.297/
Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this
notation meant that the conversation had already been
transcribed from a tap on another embassy phone:
"Previously transcribed" means, for instance,
I went to the embassy first and the embassy
number was 605055. Now this number 501264
belonged to the film's office. So consequently
if that particular call went out of the main
building to the films office and it had been
transcribed before, that is exactly what I
would do, put down "previously transcribed".
So there was no question of doing it twice.298/
Classification:
2008137
TUP
amas
Wieurwes
Wemains
Wi
Vilwisch
WILLMANO
Vinitaen
--
Caufied by derivation:
187 |
Koit-
13-00000
Classification: LONCI
☑
ए
(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA-controlled documents.)
-58-
subject to the intercept operation.
It should be
noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in
the Cuban compound in 1964.212/
They were:
The Ambassador's private telephone
14-42-37
25-07-95
The Chancery
14-13-26
The Chancery
25-09-14
The Commercial Office
11-28-47
The Consulate
One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban
operations in Mexico City remembered that there were
taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate.213/ It is
possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed
in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after
a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963.214/
As the above notes, an examination of the project
files fails to support: Mr. Phillips' memory,
although those files do show that the Consulate
telephone was tapped in 1964.
4. Production from Operation
The intercept listening post operated from
approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.215/
Classification:
2004524
પ
174
Classified by derivation:
13-00000⚫
#
Classification:
(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA-controlled documents.)
177
Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit
to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet
one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa,
if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would
his case prior to the assassination have been
handled in any different manner?
A: It would have been in the case of dissemina-
tion of information about him, but I do not
think that any operational action would have
taken to apprehend him or to contact him or
to try to force him back to the United States.
Q:
..how would the dissemination have been
treated differently?
A: Well, it simply means that we would have dis-
seminated any additional information that we
got. 657/
It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or
not this additional information about Oswald was reported
to Headquarters.
In all likelihood it was not. The Chief
of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station
was ever criticized for this failure to report in the
face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters.
He said:
No.
That was not because we were trying to go
easy on them, it is simply because it is in the
nature of the business. What you are trying to
do is engage, as I used to say, in important il-
legal manipulations of society, secretly.
We were running, at that time, a vast poli-
tical action program in Mexico City to try to
swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction
to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded.
Classification: PAR A
appe
gen
293
13-00000.
857598870
BLA
WERKWAT
حالات من الله
Classification:
(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA controlled documents.)
- 178
I do not know whether you informed yourself about
the magnitude of our political action program at
the time--absolutely enormous.
We were trying to follow the Soviets and
all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same
time, the main thrust of the Station's effort
was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and
satellite people. 658/
Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's
handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination
can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when
he was asked how he would characterize that handling:
"At the very best, it is not professional, at the best." 659/
V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning
Oswald After the Assassination
A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph
of the Mexico Mystery Man
Even though some people in the Station clearly dis-
associated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453
from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is
clear that some people still considered it possible for
some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In Octo-
ber, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Win-
ston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the
Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending
Classification:
as
soon as possible
"copies of only visitor to
294
! Classified by derivation:
|
13-00000
SECRET
From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani
Whittem
NOTE FOR:
FROM:
DATE:
SUBJECT:
CL By 2224130
CL Reason 1.5(c)
DECL On X1
DRV FM Hum 4-82
John F. Pereira
J. Barry Harrelson
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Johnny L. Goins @ DO
Fred Crawford @ DO
Linda C. Cipriani
04/24/96 12:15:25 PM
Interview with John W. (S)
Attached is an MFR summarizing my meeting with Mr. Whitten. On a more personal note, Mr. Whitten is an extremely
charming and interesting gentleman. The meeting with him went much better than I had hoped, but it was also rather emotionally
distressing for both Jeremy and I. Mr. Whitten broke down several times during the meeting and was obviously feeling very scared.
Although Jeremy is sure that the Board will do the right thing here, we both agreed that Mr. Whitten is without doubt someone who
should be protected even if it means going to the President.
暨
WHITTMFR.DOC
CC:
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
17 May 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Interview with John Whitten (S)
1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,
Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Review Board, and I spoke
with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in (Vienna). Gunn
conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and
his prior testimony before the HSČA. Mr. Whitten was eager to
help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to
the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although
Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and
then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten
about 1900. (S)
2.
Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the
release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry
with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and
betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of
being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on
This left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map,
he
pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be
serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA
become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out
the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where
many Middle Easterners would congregate. He then pointed out
these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it
clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any
attack. (S)
3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for
almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
completely different life now in Vienna He and his wife have
lived in Vienna approximately 25 years. He is a member of
various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent
Vienna Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music
(his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals
for his work in the arts in Vienna which we saw when we went to
his apartment. (S)
4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that
he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by
stating he worked for the State Department He believes this
:
SECRET
2224130
1.5(c)
CL BY:
CL REASON:
DECL ON:
DRV FM:
X1
HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)
could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria. He stated on
several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would
have to leave Austria. On other occasions, he stated that he
would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his
services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.
He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
believed were his options should his name be released by the
Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of
action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)
'
5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him
and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this
process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to
us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would
turn out well. (S)
6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn
about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree
to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he
could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next
meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for
anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that
should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing
Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on
which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)
Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD
2
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)
DCI/OGC/LD/LCipriani:/76124
Distribution:
Original
1
-
-
Original
Registry
Lit File
(17 May 96)
3
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
24 April 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Interview with John Whitten (S)
1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,
Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Review Board, and I spoke
with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in Vienna Gunn
conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and
his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to
help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to
the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although
Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and
then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten
about 1900. (S) ·
2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the
release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry
with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and
betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of
being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on
his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he
pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be
serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA
become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out
the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where
many Middle Easterners would congregate. He then pointed out
these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it
clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any
attack. (S)
3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for
almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
completely different life now in Vienna He and his wife have
lived in Vienna approximately 25 years. He is a member of
various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent
Vienna Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music
(his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals
for his work in the arts in Vienna which we saw when we went to
his apartment. (S)
4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that
he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by
stating he worked for the State Department ✓ He believes this
SECRET
CL BY: 22241307
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM:
HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S).
could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria. He stated on
several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would
have to leave (Austria) On other occasions, he stated that he
would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his
services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.
He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
believed were his options should his name be released by the
Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of
action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)
5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him
and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and C:CHICK as his allies in this
process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to
us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would
turn out well. (S)
6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn
about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree
to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he
could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next
meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for
anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that
should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing
Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on
which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)
Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD
2
SECRET

13-00000
SECRET
24 April 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Interview with John Whitten (S)
1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,
Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Review Board, and I spoke
with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in Vienna. Gunn
conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and
his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to
help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to
the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
⠀ useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although
Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and
then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten
about 1900. (S) ·
2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the
release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry
with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and
betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of
being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on
his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he
pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be
serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA
become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out
the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where
many Middle Easterners would congregate, He then pointed out
these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it
clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any
attack. (S)
3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for
almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
completely different life now in Vienna He and his wife have
lived in Vienna approximately 25 years. He is a member of
various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent
Vienna Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music
(his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals
for his work in the arts in Vienna which we saw when we went to
his apartment. (S)
4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that
he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by
stating he worked for the State Department). He believes this
SECRET
CL BY:
2224130
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON:
DRV FM:
X1
HUM 4-82
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)
could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria He stated on
several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would
have to leave Austria. On other occasions, he stated that he
would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his
services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.
He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
believed were his options should his name be released by the
Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of
action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)
5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him
and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this
process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to
us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would
turn out well. (S)
6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn
about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree
to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he
could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next
meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for
anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that
should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing
Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on
which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)
Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD
2
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Eleanor Neiman
FROM:
Sue A. Burggraf
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Edit cable
CATEGORIES:
20 November 1995
Per our telecon, here is a copy of the cable that came in on Friday
from Vienna.
Document displayed with Header, Body, and Footer zones
Categorize cable
Print this cable
ROUTE SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT
ROUTE COMMENTS:
SECRET 171648Z NOV 95 STAFF
CITE VIENNA 28456
TO:
DIRECTOR.
FOR: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL,
OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD
SLUGS: WNINTEL
SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT
REF: A. DIRECTOR 493642
TEXT:
1.
95 2040015
B. DIRECTOR 493658 95 2040060
ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.
2. ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995, C/O NOBLEHORSE DELIVERED REF TEAR LINE
INFORMATION AS REQUESTED. REF IDEN THEN ASKED FOR TIME TO FORMULATE
"HIS THOUGHTS AND SUBMIT THEM ON PAPER. ALTHOUGH NOBLEHORSE
EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD PREFER HE PASS THE RESPONSE DIRECTLY TO C/o,
HE WAS APPARENTLY SO ANGERED OVER THE CONTENTS OF REF, THAT HE LATER
TRIED TO CONTACT BERT MILLS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT SUCCESS. ON 15
NOVEMBER, REF IDEN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE IN WRITING, WHICH
IS BEING POUCHED TO HQS VIA TM 902-825:
NOV 14, 1995
TO BERT MILLS;
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
I OBJECT VIOLENTLY TO THE REVELATION OF MY NAME REGARDLESS OF
THE LAW. HERE ARE SOME REASONS:
1. I EMIGRATED TO AUSTRIA TWICE, FIRST IN 1971 AND AGAIN IN 1983.
BOTH TIMES I HAD TO FILL OUT AND SWEAR TO LENGTHY FORMS ABOUT MY
BACKGROUND. I USED MY RETIRED STATE COVER BOTH TIMES, THEREBY
COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW. "MY OLD FRIENDS IN HIGH
PLACES WHO
WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT ME HAVE ALL RETIRED OR,
EVEN MORE, DIED. AUSTRIAN JUSTICE IS NOTORIOUSLY IMMUTABLE. DO YOU
WANT ME TO GO TO JAIL?
2. LIVING SINCE RETIREMENT IN AUSTRIA FROM 1971 TO 1980 AND FROM
1983 TO THE PRESENT, I HAVE ACHIEVED HIGH POSITIONS IN VIENNA'S
MUSICAL BODIES, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE JOHANN STRAUSS SOCIETY AND
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE VIENNA MEN'S SINGING SOCIETY, AND I AM
PERSONALLY KNOWN TO SEVERAL RECENT AUSTRIAN PRESIDENTS, MANY
REPORTERS AND RADIO FIGURES. I SUFFERED A DISABLING STROKE IN
DECEMBER 1993 AND MY WIFE AND I, BOTH 75, CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST HERE
BECAUSE OUR 2000 SQ. FT. APARTMENT IS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF 2
POST OFFICES, SEVERAL SMALL SUPER MARKETS, MY FAMILY PHYSICIAN, OUR
DENTIST, MY UROLOGIST, AND AN EYE DOCTOR AND OPTICIAN. WE ARE
WITHIN WHEEL CHAIR DISTANCE OF THE CONCERT HALLS AND THE OPERA.
WHERE CAN YOU DUPLICATE THIS FOR ME?
3. DURING MY ACTIVE CAREER IN VIENNA AROUND 1959 I INTERROGATED AND
BROKE AN INTELLIGENCE SWINDLER WHO HAD BEEN A NAZI ASSASSIN. I
PROMISED HIM SECRECY IF HE CONFESSED, BUT THE US ARMY PUT OUT A
"BURN NOTICE" ON HIM, FORCING HIM TO MOVE TO GERMANY. I AM SURE HE
-WOULD LOVE TO FIND ME AND SHOOT ME.
4. VIENNA IS FULL OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL
ASSASSINATIONS, EVEN OF A CITY COUNCILMAN, BY THEM IN RECENT YEARS.
UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW, I, AS A FOREIGNER, CANNOT EVEN GET A PISTOL
LICENSE. YOU MUST KNOW ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF OUR
COLLEAGUES AROUND THE WORLD.
4. I HAVE TWICE TESTIFIED BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ABOUT
THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. THEIR FULL REPORTS SIMPLY CALLED ME THE
"DESK OFFICER" AND THAT HAS SEEMED TO SATISFY EVERYONE. NEEDLESS TO
SAY, IF YOU DO EXPOSE MY NAME, I WILL NOT EVER TALK TO ANY
JOURNALISTS OR SO-CALLED HISTORIANS.
5. IF MY NAME IS EXPOSED, I WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE VIENNA,
WITH THE WHOLE HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE, PICTURES, LIBRARY, CLOTHING,
ETC. WHICH I PACKED AND PAID TO HAVE MOVED OVER HERE IN 1983.
BECAUSE OF MY STROKE, I WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANY PACKING AND THE
MOVE WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE. WHERE CAN I RESETTLE IN A 2000 SQ FT.
APT. SO CONVENIENTLY LOCATED.
6.
MY WIFE AND I LOVE LIVING HERE FOR MANY REASONS, AND LEAVING
WOULD BE A CRUEL AND NEEDLESS FATE.
7. I REGARD THIS LAW AS DISHONORABLE AND UNWORTHY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA. IF YOU DECIDE AGAINST ME, I WANT TO APPEAR
BEFORE THE BOARD AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT, WHOM I HAPPEN TO ADMIRE. I
WILL PAY MY OWN WAY BACK TO DO SO. I SERVED IN WWII AND NEVER
SPARED MYSELF; IN THE OUTFIT I WORKED HARD, WAS FEARLESS IN DEALING
WITH MY SUPERIORS (CORD MEYER AND DICK HELMS CAN TESTIFY TO THAT)
AND MY ADVERSARIES. I WOULDN'T EVEN THINK OF THREATENING TO EXPOSE
THINGS TO PRESSURE YOU. I WILL BE EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY OR TWO,
FAMILIAR WITH OUR AFFAIRS, TO REPRESENT ME. I WILL NOT DENY, THAT I
CONSIDER YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE IMPLEMENTING THIS LAW TO BE ENGAGING
IN DISHONORABLE CONDUCT, UNWORTHY OF OUR GOVERNMENT SERVICE.
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
8. IN THE LATE 1960'S WHILE SERVING IN VIENNA UNDER TOM
KARAMISSINIS, I WAS ORDERED BY HQ TO REVEAL TO AUSTRIAN MILITARY
-INTELLIGENCE THAT A LOW-RANKING AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SERVING AS THEIR
INFORMANT IN BUDAPEST HAD ALSO BEEN RECRUITED BY US AND WAS REPORTI
NG TO Us. I REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THIS ORDER AND OFFERED MY
RESIGNATION. TO ME, IT WAS DISHONORABLE TO BETRAY A YOUNG AGENT WHO
HAD ACCEPTED OUR RECRUITMENT AND PUT FAITH IN OUR PROMISE OF
SECRECY. TO MY MIND AN AGENCY WITHOUT PRINCIPLES CANNOT SURVIVE AND
INDEED SHOULD NOT SURVIVE. TOM KARAMISSINIS, PERHAPS ONE OF THE
LAST HONORABLE MEN TO SERVE WITH US IN HIGH POSITION, FIRED A STRONG
CABLE BACK AND THE SHAMEFUL ORDER WAS RETRACTED.
9. I HAVE INVESTED ABOUT $50,000 IN MY APARTMENT, IN KEY MONEY AND
IMPROVEMENTS IF I LEAVE, I WILL LOSE ALL OR MOST OF THIS. OUR
LAST MOVE TO VIENNA COST ME ABOUT $15,000 IN SEA FREIGHT AND
INSURANCE. I WILL NEVER GET ON MY KNEES AND ASK TO BE MADE WHOLE IF
YOU EXPOSE ME, BUT I MAY REPORT TO THE COURTS. I AM A RETIRED
MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA BAR.
10. LET ME REGALE YOU WITH AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HISTORIANS
MINDLESS DRIVE TO KNOW EVERYTHING CAN LEAD TO A PROUD COUNTRY'S
DISGRACING ITSELF. DURING WWII WHEN WE WERE INTERROGATING GERMAN
POW'S, WE PROMISED THEM NO ONE WOULD EVER LEARN THEY HAD "SPILLED
THEIR GUTS," AND WE ALL BELIEVED WE WERE BEING HONEST. BUT ALMOST
25 YEARS AFTER WWII THE BRITISH DECLASSIFIED ALL THE ADI(K) REPORTS
(THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE CALLED, AND EVEN THE "ROOM CONVERSATIONS,"
TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS POWS HAD IN THEIR ROOMS, EVEN
INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE SPEECHES MADE BY HIGH-RANKING
LUFTWAFFE OFFICERS TO THEIR HIGH-RANKING FELLOW POW'S AT
"COCKFOSTERS" MANSION. NEWCOMERS WERE VISITED BY THE OLD HANDS FOR
A MONTH TO MAKE SURE THEY WEREN'T STOOL PIGEONS, BEFORE THEY WERE
GIVEN THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THEIR FELLOW OFFICERS ON SOME
IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR. THE EXCELLENT BRITISH MIKES PICKED IT
ALL UP.
IN RECENT YEARS, AT LEAST ONE LUFTWAFFE VETERAN ASSOCIATION,
THAT OF J.G.2, THE RICHTHOFEN GESCHWADER, SENT PEOPLE TO LONDON TO
GET COPIES OF THE INTERROGATION REPORTS OF THEIR PILOTS. THEY DID
IT CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WERE SO SHOCKED AT THE VAST AMOUNT OF VITAL
DATA REVEALED BY THEIR BUDDIES THAT, IN ACUTE REVULSION, THEY
STOPPED LOOKING. I ASSUMED THEN THAT "EVERYONE" HAD "TALKED," WHICH
IS TRUE.
11. I AM 75 YEARS OLD PARTLY PARALYZED ON MY LEFT SIDE FROM A
STROKE IN DEC. 1993.. I WAS NEARLY FULLY REHABILITATED WHEN, IN MAY
1994, I WAS HIT BY CONSTANT MUSCLE SPASMS ALL UP AND DOWN MY LEFT
SIDE. THIS RATHER RARE CONDITION, BASICALLY A SUDDEN SUPER-HUMAN
TIGHTENING OF ALL THE MUSCLES, WITH AFTER EFFECTS LASTING UNTIL THE
NEXT SPASM, HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO STAND UP,
WALK, OR EVEN SIT UP FOR VERY LONG. IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN ALL THE
MANY MEDICINES ARE HERE, WILL BEGIN A 20-WEEK HOMEOPATHIC CURE FOR
THE SPASMS UNDER DR. SCHRAMM, A LEADING SPECIALIST HERE. I CAN'T
VERY WELL LEAVE FOR 20 WEEKS.
YOU WILL BE CONTACTED MOMENTARILY BY ONE OF MY ATTORNEYS. I
WILL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH MY CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS.
WITH BITTER RESOLVE,
(SIGNED - REF BIDEN)
3. REF IDEN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PUT THE ABOVE INTO
"CABALESE,
" BUT BECAME TOO TIRED TO FINISH IT. NONETHELESS, REF
IDEN ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ALSO BE PASSED:
SECRET
13-00000.
SECRET
1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL
2. REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO AUSTRIA TWICE, 1971
AND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS THUS
COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW. HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO
COVERED FOR HIM NOW DEAD. WOULD FACE SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND
DEPORTATION.
3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS
AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL.
4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE IT IN
HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO 21, AND OWN
FARES.
5.
SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC 93. WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO
CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST
OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN Z1.
6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE
ASSASSINATED SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY GETS
THREATENING PHONE CALLS. AS FOREIGNER SUBJ DENIED AUSTRIAN PISTOL
PERMIT. SUBJ ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWI
NDLER HE INTERROGATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING HIM SECRECY;
BUT US ARMY PUT OUT BURN NOTICE, FORCING NAZI TO MOVE TO GERMANY.
7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES,
TERMED "DESK OFFICER, " OWN ROLE MINOR. ALTHO PUT IN CHARGE OF
AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS THEN DDO, HIS WORK WAS SABOTAGED BY
ANGLETON WHO WITHHELD HUNDREDS OF BEST FBI REPORTS AND CONFERRED
DAILY WITH FBI WITHOUT PRESENCE OF SUBJ, ALL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION
OF HELMS ORDERS.
8.
SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY. EVEN IF
SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING.
4 FILE:
CL BY: 618711
CL REASON:
DECL ON: X1
785-120-034.
1.5 (C)
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
END OF MESSAGE
CC:
SECRET
SECRET
13-00000
EYES ONLY
CIA
INTERNAL USE ONLY
CL BY:
Nov 14, 1995
618711
To Bart Milli
SECRET
CL REASON:
DECL ON:
كيل
DRV FROM: Huin
to the revelation of very naime
I object violently
regardless of the later, Here
wire some reasons:
cover
Twice under festrian
I emigrated to Austria toxice, first in 1971 and again?
(in 1983)
. Both time I had to 
fill out and swer to lengthy
forms about 
my background. I used my retired State
bill 
time, thereby committing page wher might have been
law? My old friends in high
able 
to protect me have all retired
Austin joustic is notoriously immutable. Do
go to fail?
have all retired or even more, dill.
-you want me
な
2. Luwing since retirement in Austin from 1971*1980
and from 1983 to the present, I have achieved high
positions in varisis musical bodies, Board of Director
The Johann Strauss Society and luce President 
of
the Purine Mini Singing Society, and I am personally
brown & several recent austan President
reporter and radio figures, I suffered a disabling stroke
wife and I both 75, cm
in December 1993 and
continou to spist here because our 2000 sq. ft. apartment
is withing walking distance of 2 post offices, several small
my family physician,
super markets,
urologist, and an
our
Mary
"dentist, my
We
doctor and optician,
within wheel chair distance of the concert hall and
Where can you duplicate this for me?
the
opera.
3. During my
acture
I interrogated and Proke an
Career
in
Visionarrom 1959
intelligence swindler whe
secrecy he
had been a Nazi assassin. I promised him 
socrvy if be
confessed, but the US Army put out a burn notrer":"
un to move to
my.
シ
I am some
13-00000
SECRET
N
CIAZ
INTERNAL USE ONLY
by
been several assosiation, even of er wolf councilman, big
Then in recent years. Under austrian 
law,
foragier,
as a
can not even get a pistol liccuse. You must bene
about the kidnapping and killing of our colleagues
around the world:
4. I have tivice testified before House and Sonat
commither about the Kennedy association Their full
reports simply called in the desk officer" and that he
seemed to satisfy everyone. Needs of ray, if you
do expose my name,
journalist
5. 
If my
&
not even
any
have
or so-called historians.
name in exposed I will obviously
-leave Sienna, with the whole house fall,
fumiture, picture, library, clating, etc. which of packed
and paid to have moved our hire in 1983, Became
of my stroke, I will be unable to do any packing and
the
be very
very 
expensive. Where can I
results in an 2000 sq ft. apt. so community
more wall.
located.
6. My wife and I love living hire for many,
and leaving would be a
and this law
7.
Ane,
reasun,
cruel and needton fate.
dishonorable and
дождь
unworthing of the United States of Agrica. If you.
decide against
I want to expert the Board and
even the President, who 
happen & 
ad me. I will
whond
bok to do so, I served in WWII
pay my
and never
Wide
appler
my yasions
・own way.
(Cord Meyer
spared myself; in the output I worked hard,
fearless in dealing with
and Dick Helms can testify to that) and my
I wouldn't even think of threatening to expose things
I will be employing
to pressure you.
adversariz.
an attorn
affire; to represent man.
-two, familiar with our
I will not deny, that I consider
you
and
every one else implementing this law to be
Michonable conduct, inworthing of
13-00000
3 SECRET.
8. In the late 1960's while serving in
Waz
CIA
INTERNAL USE ONLY
Anne under
مجھے
an their informat
Carry
To
us and
out this
it was
Tom Krassines, I was andered by HQ
- reveal to Austrian Military Intern that a low-
rambing 
Austrian diplomat serving an
im Budapest had also been recounted by
reporting & ver. I refused
order and offered my resignation.
dishonorable to betray a zjoning agent who had
yazt
our recentment and put 
forth 
in our
accepted
promise of secrecy. To my mind an agency
primaples
not survive. Tom Karavesser, perhyn one of
the last honorable men to serve with us in high
position, froid a strony call bad and the shameful
without
cannot survive and indeed should
order was retrated,
ре
my.
I have inverted about $50,000 in
apartment, in bey money and improvement:
I leave, I will lose all or most of this
last move to Vilnia] cast me about $15,000 in
I will never get on my
freight and inserrance. 
I will
knees and ash to be made whole if you expose
resort to the courts. I am a retired
лек
but I may
member of the Virginia Bara
10. Let me
vegale you
те
y
with an example of how
the historian's mindless down to know everything can
lead to a proud country's disgring itself
WWII when we were interrogating ger pros we
then no one would everyb
promied 
learn
bang.
spilled this gort and we all behind we was long I
year British
" to. ADIK) reporte (that what the
13-00000
4
CIA
SECRET INTERNAL USE ONLY
of the conversations POWs had in their rooms,
even including the extremets
mansion, Newcomers
valuable
speecher
officem
་
make by high-ranking Luftraffic of their
high-rambing fellow POWs at Cochran
Пешхотен were
were 
vided by the old
a month to make sure they werent stool
pigeon, before they were given the powerlege by
addressing their fellow officer
hande for
6.
on some important
aspect of the war. The excellent brittis mikes picked
it all up,
one
Luftwaffe
In recent years, at least
veteran association, that of J.G. 2, The Richthofa
to get
Geschwader, sent people & London 
&
copsis of the interrogation reports of their pilots. They
did it dronologically and were so shocked at
the vast armand of vital data Tweaked by their
buddies that, in acento cousin, this stopped.
looking:
"erenzone had
I assured them that "
tached" which is
tone
75 yan
71, 7
міжу
lift side
ald party paralyze.
shoot in Dec. 1993.
May
I was nearly fully rehabilitated when, in
1974, I was hit by constant made spore all
left side. This 
rather rare
up and down my
condition, basicitly a sudden super traghting
I all the muscle, with after effects lasting units.
have made it increasingly
the next spore stand
difficult for me to stand up, with, or even sit
игра
for
very long.
A
In a few days, when all
are here, will begin
cure, for the spasen
beadin.
medicins
20 werk homeopathic
so. Der Schram

13-00000
5 SECRET
CIA
INTERNAL USE ONLY
You will be contacted moment by
I will also be in
attorneys.
Congresman
torich with
and Senaton
With bitter resolve,
ors.
из
f my
Whilled
John M. Whichd
13-00000
SECRET
CIA
INTERNAL USE ONLY
1. SAW SUBI IN HIS APT NOV 14, CORDIAL
☑
2.
SUBJ HAS PRE WRITTEN PLEA TO REMAIN UNDER COVER,
PRIVATELY
REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED TO AUSTRIA TWICE,
1971 AND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON
SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS THUS COMMITTING PERJURY
TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW
, HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO
COVERED FOR HIM NOW DEAD, WOULD FACE SCANDAL
TRIAL, JAIL, AND DEPORTATION.
3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES,
RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS AND MILITARY, GREAT
SCANDAL POTENTIAL.
4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND
WOULD LOSE IT IN HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS
EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO ZI, AND OWN FARES,
5. 
SUBJ NOW 75 HAD 
CRIPPLING STROKE DEC 93,
WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO CARRY ON BECAUSE
STORES,
DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST OFFICE
ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT
DUPLICATE THIS IN ZI,
6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC
Groups HERE WHO HAVE ASSASSINATED
DENIED
SUBJ
SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY
T 
GETS THREATENING 
PHONE CALLS, AS FOREIGNER
SUBS REFUSED AUSTRIAN PISTOL PERMIT)
ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI
ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWINDLER HE INTERRO-
25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING
GATED AND BROKE
HIM SECRECY; BUT ARMY PH US ARMY PUT
OUT BURN NOTICE, FORING NAZI TO MOVE TO.
GERMANY
7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE
AND 
SENATE COMMITTEES, TERMED "DESK
OFFICER, OWN 
ROLE MINOR, ALTHO PUT IN
CHARGE 
OF AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS.
THEN DDO HIS WAR
13-00000
WITH FBI WITHOUT PESENCE OF SUBS, ALL IN
FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF HELMS ORDERS,
8.
SULBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN
TO EXPOSE AGENCY, EVEN IF SURFACED WILL
DENY EVERYTHING
D
13-00000
Subj: On Scelso testimony
Date: Oct 12 TueSun 19961995 18:46 EDT
From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM
X-From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM (ed dolan)
To: dickkovar@aol.com (Dick Kovar)
Dick, this is what Chuck Briggs requested.
Date: 06-Oct-96 02:36 EDT
From: [The name of this person is unimportant]
Subj: Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire
Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire
By Michael Dorman
(c) 1996, Newsday
The chief CIA investigator of President John F. Kennedy's assassination has
testified that another high CIA official - noted for seeking conspiracies -
disobeyed orders in repeatedly conferring with the Warren Commission shortly
after the murder. The witness also said a colleague once told him that the CIA
official, the late
James Angleton, "has ties to the Mafia."
Almost 33 years after the assassination, the identity of the witness, who held
various top-secret CIA jobs, is considered so sensitive that federal authorities
insist on withholding his true name. He is known only by the alias "John
Scelso."
While Scelso testified before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in
1978, his 192-page testimony was kept secret until now. It has just been sent to
the National Archives by the Assassination Records Review Board, a federal
agency that screens assassination documents and makes public those that do not
endanger national security.
Sceiso's testimony, which criticized operations of the CIA, FBI, Secret Service
and other agencies, likely will renew debates, especially among conspiracy
theorists, on the assassination and how it was investigated.
When Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, Scelso was chief of a CIA
13-00000
10/8/1996
America Online: Dick Kovar
Page 1
branch
responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America. Richard Helms, the CIA
chief of clandestine services and later the agency's director, placed Scelso in
charge of the assassination investigation. Angleton, a counterintelligence
official with close ties to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, “immediately went
into action to do all the investigating," Scelso testified, criticizing the
move sharply.
"Helms called a meeting at which Angleton and a lot of others were present and
told everybody that I was in charge and that no one should have any
conversations with anyone about the Kennedy case without my being present -
which was violated from the word 'go' by Angleton, who dealt with the FBI and
the Warren Commission and (Warren Commission member and former CIA Director
Allen) Dulles himself. ... Angleton ignored Helms' orders. I tried to get Helms
to make him obey and Helms said, "You go tell him.'”
Angleton, who died in 1987, spent much of his career searching for conspiracies
- believing that there was a Communist mole in the CIA - and was presumed by
other CIA officers to have tried to press a conspiracy theory on the Warren
Commission. The commission found no evidence of a conspiracy. Angleton was
fired
in 1975. Years later, a mole was found - Aldrich Ames - but he had entered the
CIA after Angleton's dismissal.
At one point in the 1978 House testimony, committee attorney Michael Goldsmith
asked, “Do you have any reason to believe that Angleton might have had ties to
organized crime?"
"Yes," replied Scelso, who is now retired and lives abroad, government sources
said. He said the Justice Department once asked the CIA to determine the true
names of people holding numbered bank accounts in Panama because the Mafia was
hiding Las Vegas “skim" money there. “We were in an excellent position to do
this and told them so - whereupon Angleton vetoed it and said, 'That is the
bureau's (FBI's) business." " Scelso said he discussed the situation with
another CIA officer. "And he smiled a foxy smile and said, 'Well, that's
Angleton's excuse. The real reason is that Angleton himself has ties to the
Mafia and he would not
want to double-cross them.'”'
On another subject, Scelso gave Kennedy conspiracy theorists a slight piece of
13-00000
10/8/1996
America Online: Dick Kovar
Page 2
ammunition. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, was known to have told
investigators that Lee Harvey Oswald - identified by the Warren Commission as
Kennedy's assassin - was not a Soviet agent. But Scelso said: "I later heard
that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level.
That Information was imparted to me by CIA officers."
Based on the information CIA headquarters had on Oswald before the assassination
- chiefly that he had been in the Marine Corps and defected to the Soviet Union,
then returned - Scelso said he saw no reason to pay him special heed. "Oswald
just seemed to me to be a small-potatoes defector," he said. But he conceded
that significant information about Oswald - known to CIA agents in Mexico City,
for example - had not reached headquarters before the assassination.
It dealt chiefly with Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in
Mexico City and his attempts to obtain a Cuban visa two months before the
assassination. Scelso said the information failed to reach Washington because of
simple overwork and bureaucratic delays in the Mexico City office. He revealed
that all the outside telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban embassies were
tapped by American agents and that calls Oswald made to them were recorded.
After Oswald was arrested, Scelso revealed, agents compared audiotapes made
while he was in custody with the wiretaps and determined that he was the same
man who had visited the embassies.
Distribution:
To: j dolan >[74030,3022]
Dickford Cohn > [76226,1572]
Headers
From 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM Tue Oct 8 18:45:41 1996
Return-Path: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM
Received: from ari-img-4.compuserve.com (arl-img-4.compuserve.com
[149.174.217.134]) by emin09.mail.aol.com (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id
SAA12122 for <dickkovar@aol.com>; Tue, 8 Oct 1996 18:45:40 -0400
Received: by arl-img-4.compuserve.com (8.6.10/5.950515)
1