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Date: 09/24/98
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
RECORD NUMBER'
206-10001-10001
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM:
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION
TITLE : MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD ON SEPTEMBER 12-13, 1963
DATE : 09/12/63
PAGES : 33
SUBJECTS :
AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13, 1963 MEETING
SUMMARY OF SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13, 1963 MEETING
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B,
1C.
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :-08/06/98 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS
:
2025 Release under the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992
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[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
206-10001-10001
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NW-88621
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2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD on SEPTEMBER 12 13, 1963
-
206-16001 1000|
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF SEPTEMBER 12
13, 1963.
ITEM
TIME
September 12, 1963
9:00 - 11:00
The Chairman's Time
SUBJECT
-
11:00 12:00
Administrative Announcements
Counterintelligence and Counterespionage:
Dunlap espionage case at NSA
Defection to USSR of former NSA em-
ployee Hamilton
Damage to U.S. classified informatior:
and intelligence techniques resulting
from recent Soviet espionage operations
in West Germany, Sweden and the U.K.
TH:CE:KECEKMEKCRECERCAT developments involving USSR
Alsop article on CIA and Defense
Intelligence capabilities for detecting
violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty
Photo reconnaissance satellite developments
Highlights of intelligence community reports
to White House in response to earlier Board
recommendations
Report of Clifford Panel
Intelligence Community Capabilities for Detecting
Violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty
Dr. Doyle Northrup, Technical Director,
Air Force Technical Application Center
12:00 12:15 Executive Session
Discussions with Director,
Agency
Lt. General Gordon Blake, USAF
12:15
1:00
Lunch
-
The White House Mess
58
-
1:00. 1:45
National Security
16.
1:45 2:45
2:45 - 3:15
-8%
3:15
4:15
4:15.
4:45
Counterintelligence Programs of CIA
Mr. James Angelton, CIA
Mr. Rayers & Rocca
Executive Session
Counterintelligence Steff, CIA
Status Report on the Organization and Programs
of the National Reconnaissance Office
Dr. Brockway MacMillan, Director, NRO
Review of SIGINT and Related Intelligence
Activities in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the U.K.
Dr. Baker
Jobs
with he late
*nist taken upat Round to
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ITEM.
TIME
10.
4:45 - 5:45
11.
5:45 - 6:00
12.
6:00 - 6:15
TOP SECRET
SUBJECT
Consideration of Revised SIGINT Report of
Board's Communications Panel
Dr. Baker
Status Report on Covert Action Operations
Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel
Status Report on
gence Activities
Murphy Panel
September 13, 1963
State Department Intelli-
13.
9:00 - 9:30
The Chairman's Time
14.
9:30 - 10:15
15.
10:15
16.
12:15
-
1:00
17.
1:00 - 1:30.
Covert Action and Intelligence Operations
Relating to Cuba
Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, CIA
12:15 Discussion with the Director of Central
Intelligence
Mr. John McCone
Lunch The White House Mess
"
Discussion with the President's Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Executive Session
Preparation of Draft Report to be Submitted to
the President at a Later Date, Following Appro-
priate Review and Coordination with the Board
Members.
18.
1:30 2:00
-
19.
2:00
6:00
not taken up out
Board Inte
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 19, 1963.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT:
Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
September 12 - 13, 1963.
At 9:00 a.m., September 12, 1963, the Board began a two day meeting to
in the Board's offices, Executive Office Building Present Were Board
members Clifford, Pace, Doolittle, Baker, Langér, Murphy and Gray; and
also present were Messrs. Coyne and Ash.
In executive session, Chairman Clifford recalled that at the Maste
meeting the Board discussed ways and means of increasing its effectiveness,
and it had been agreed that ample time would be allotted for the discussion
of subjects covered throughout Board meetings. At this morning's session"
two hours had been set aside, the Chairman announced, for discussion of the
various subject matters referred to in the first item on the agenda.
Turning to some administrative matters,
made reference to
Mr. Coyne's August 5 memorandum regarding a request made to the Special"
Counsel to the President for guidance to Eoard members in complying with
newly-revised Federal legislation governing conflicts of interest, and
revised regulations calling for the submission of statements of financial.
interest (Board members having already submitted the latter some time ago
in compliance with the previous law and Presidential instructions).
Chairman asked Mr. Ash to summalize the memorandum just received by Mr. Coyne
from Assistant Special Counsel White under date of September 10, 1963,
suggesting the procedure which should now be followed under the new law.
The
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The Board meeting was joined at this point by..
Raymond G. Rocca (substituting for Mr. James Angleton of CIA).
for a briefing of Board members on CIA's counterintelligence
program.
Mr. Rocca began his briefing with the statement that
CIA does not have the entire world-wide responsibility:
for counterintelligence (CI). To illustrate this point,
he exhibited a chart dated September 1962 entitled "U. S.
Organization for Counterintelligence showing the various
elements of the numerous U. S. departments and agencies whose
functions and responsibilities bear some relationship to
counterintelligence. Within CIA itself the CI function is
compartmented under the Deputy DCI for Plans. The headquarters.
staff consists of 85 officers and 66 clerical personnel
(although there is a large number of CIA headquarters personnel
assigned to other intelligence activities which are related
to CIA's CI programs). At CIA stations overseas, CI functions
are performed by various CIA personnel in such areas as Penetration,
Provocation, Double Agents, Technical Surveillances, Protective
CI Services, Interrogations, and Deception.
Mr. Rocca stated that studies and recommendations made
by General Doolittle some 10 years ago had a great deal to do
with the fact that there is a separation in CIA of the handling
of CI activities and positive espionage operations.
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It was emphasized by Mr. Rocca that the CI program of
Soviet
CIA is directed against the Soviet bloc espionage apparatus which
is operating against the United States, and the primary objective
of the CI effort is to obtain intelligence concerning
bloc attempts to effect espionage penetrations of the United
States. Mr. Rocca also explained to the Board that within
CIA the responsibility for personnel security and physical
security rests with the CIA Office of Security which is located
In the area of the Deputy DCI for Support, whereas the CF
program is located in the area of the Deputy DCI for Plans.
It became apparent in the discussion with Mr. Rocca
that Board members were primarily interested in the nature
and effectiveness of CIA personnel security programs (in com-
(parison to the NSA system which did not result in an identification
Sergeant Dunlap during the three years which he acted as
Soviet agent while employed in a sensitive area at NSA head.
(quarters). Accordingly, Mr. Rocca received a number of
questions from Board members which involved responsibilities
of the CIA Security Office and which
Rocca could not answer
Within this limitation,
on the basis of first-hand knowledge.
however, Mr. Rocca endeavored to be of assistance to the Board.
in response to various members! questions which he answered
to the effect that (1) efforts to uncover a
"a 
"Dunlap" in CIA
would involve the personnel security and physical security protective
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measures administered by CIA's Office of Security whose programs
include thorough background investigations and the use of
polygraph interviews, (2) the identification of a "Dunlap" In
CIA might also result from the CIA's CI program carriedson
result.
outside the United States in an effort to cover foreign intele
Mr Rocca
ligence efforts to penetrate the United States, (3) re-investigations
of CIA personnel are conducted at 5-year intervals
said that he would have to refer to the CIA Security Office questions
as to whether all CIA personnel are polygraphed and whether
they are periodically re-polygraphed, (4) the best hope of
successful. CI coverage of Soviet bloc penetration efforts is
the inducement and wise exploitation of defectors, (5) the
objective of Soviet bloc espionage penetration efforts is to
"go for the jugglar vein," that is, to find and use people who-
are in a position to produce valuable information "in the clear'
thereby overcoming the problem of
from communications channels Whbtairing such information
are increasingly safeguarded
with
by encryption and other protective measures, (6) although the
United States has made some efforts to use blackmail against
Soviet bloc personnel for CI and intelligence purposes"
some success, these efforts have failed insofar as Soviet
personnel are concerned and (7) the key to improving the
effectiveness of CIA's CI effort is not a larget budget, but
the obtaining of CI people having the specialized knack required
and there is also a need for common training of all U. S. Government]
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personnel overseas in order that they may have adequate aware-
ness of the nature of the Soviet penetration threat.
In answer to Mr. Coyne's question, Mr. Rocca said that
although there is no evidence of over-all penetration of
U. S. Government agencies, we must assume that such penetrations
are being effected, and we should recognize that the size and
complexity of our Governmental organization and the (members
of departments and agencies which are targets for Soviet bloc
penetration efforts make us "a sitting duck."
Upon Mr. Rocca's departure at 3:30 PM., the Board resumed
in executive session.
Referring to Mr. Rocca's appearance before the Board,
Chairman Clifford said it was apparent that the Board had been
hearing from a representative of the wrong, CIA area, as indicated
by the fact that Mr. Rocca had found it necessary to say that
most of the Board members! questions, fell in the area of com-.
petence and knowledge of the CIA Security Office headed by Mr.
Bannerman, Mr. Gray agreed that Mr. Rocca had been unable to
respond to the questions in which the Board was particularly"
interested.
Chairman Clifford referred to General Blake's appearance
before the Board earlier in the day, and Mr. Clifford pointed
out that the NSA Director had emphasized his confidence in the
thousands of good and reliable people who are employed at NSA.
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33
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Mr. Pace said that he was concerned about the heavy
Investment of time and money on security without a program u
to make it clear what the threat is. The absence of publica
awareness of the threat has in Mr. Pacels opinion resulted sa
in a popular notion that the word "traitor" is no longer.
antopprobrious term in peace time, and the peace time impact.
(General Doolittle observed
of treason is less than in war time.
that the impact of treason is punishment by death, which is ab
pretty firm impact.)
Next, the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Desmond Ritz
gerald (head of the CIA headquarters group concentrating on
Cuba) and his assistant, Mr. Bruce Clark, who were present to
brief the Board on covert actions being directed against the 000.
Castro government. Chairman Clifford asked the CIA representa
tive to confine the discussion to 25 Minutes in view of changes
which had been required in the Board's schedule.
Mr. Clark informed the Board that CIA has kept a close
watch on the situation in order to reach an estimate on the number
of Soviet forces in Cuba. Recently, he said, the telligence
community arrived at its estimate, and at the last Presidential
Press Conference the President had answered questions on the
subject without getting into numbers, an approach which Mr.
Clark favored. He said that CIA estimates there are from 6,000.
to 10,000 Soviet personnel in Cuba, and the range of this estimate
is indicative of the difficulty of estimating the number of Soviet
ground forces. The Soviets control and operate the SAM system
and related communications. There are no longer any Soviet.
553
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dicters ganding do
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ground units as such because they were removed along with the
missiles and IL-28's in February. Cubans now control and
operate all the MIG aircraft although the Cubans continue to
Also the Cubans control
receive training from Soviet pilots.
the helicopters and use them effectively in counterinsurgency.
activity. Cruise missile sites and the KOMAR boats are
operated by Cubans.
In air defense there are some 2,300 to 3,000 Soviet
military tech cians, but these personnel are not likely to
be the kind to bear arms against an insurrection in Cuba,
Mr. Clark stated. It was on July 12 that Cubans began to
receive Soviet training in SAM site operations, and the
training will extend over 10 months.
Therefore in April 1964,
Cubans will be prepared to take over the SAM sites and related
communications. Some 300 Soviet personnel are estimated to
be engaged in training Cubans in the operation of 12 patrol
boats.
Some 800 Soviets are assigned to cruise missile.
activities. And Soviet ground forces number between 2,000 and
4,000, Mr. Clark stated.
The
As for communications, Mr. Clark said that all Soviet
naval links are down, but a Moscow-Havana link remains
traffic on this scrambler circuit cannot be read by us.
although useful information is obtained through traffic analysis
procedures, and we do intercept Cuban VHF voice traffic.
5%
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In answer to a question from Mr. Clifford, Mr. Clark
said that there have been no substantial new arrivals of
Soviet personnel in Cuba. However, CIA does not get enough
information on loadings and unloadings from vessels because
of Cuban port security measures.
Mr. Clark said that from 3,000 to 4,000 Soviets would.
be expected to conduct MAAG-type operations in Cuba. In
answer to Dr. Langer's question, he said that CIA has no knowledge
of the number of Soviet agricultural advisers in Cuba.
Mr. Fitzgerald began his presentation with the remark
that this was a good day to be talking to the Board because
yesterday CIA was in a position to disseminate the best intelligence
report received to date on the situation in Cuba. He showed
Board members a copy of the agent report which he said had come
from a "high level Commandante" in the Cuban army who is a
reliable source. Mr. Fitzgerald also read from another CIA
agent\report which quoted a source as saying that not even Fidel
Castro can enter Soviet military installations in Cuba, anyone.
who reports knowledge of the level of Soviet forces in Cuba is
lying.
Mr. Fitzgerald said that the level of CIA resources directed
against Cuba includes 467 CIA personnel at headquarters and in
Miami, and 45 CIA personnel at CIA stations overseas. There are
also 595 foreign sources, mostly Cubans.
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At the present time, Mr. Fitzgerald said, CIA has a
number of integrated covert operations which were approved by
the Standing Group and by the President. The six-part program
a long-range one geared to a period of 18 months, and it
The elements:
is within the framework of U. S. policy toward Cubas
of the integrated program are:
(1) Intelligence collection, both strategic and operational,
Propaganda actions to stimulate resistance efforts and
(2)
sabotage within Cuba.i
(3) Action to stimulate disaffection in the Cuban military.
which CIA considers is the strongest group which can be expected
to successfully seek the overthrow of Castro.:
(4)
A program of economic denial on an increasing basis
The Cuban economy is already suffering. Ninety per cent of Cuban
industry uses U. S. machinery, and replacement parts cannot be
obtained from the United States. (Mr. Fitzgerald agreed with
Mn. Murphy that Cuba can look to Canada for needed materials.)
Mr. Clifford asked Mr Fitzgerald who is responsible for
the raids reportedly launched against Cuba in recent times.
The answer was that CIA is responsible for only a relatively.
On two occasions
few of the raids that have been publicized.
August 17 and 19, CIA put ship-borne teams into Cuba, but CIA
isn't responsible for the bombing raids with planes which have
been staged by Cuban
☐ exiles from the Bahamas.
(CIA thinks
these raids are ineffective and would prefer that they be stopped.
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NW
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Best available image
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A smallish paid is planned by CIA in Orionto Provinom in.
Septembor, and there will be probings of coastal defenson
all month-long.
In answer to Mr. Clifford's question; Mr. Fitzgerald"
gald that if the teams are captured they will no doubt
to the Castro government that they were CIA-brained.
Mr. Mirply asked whether CIA has a long-range plan which
thinks will be effective in following through on a Bucks**
of Castr
that the
latifity and the
within Cuba.
thing about.
stimate
the wasth
gh
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thinks will be effective in following through on a s
Od cverthrow på Castro vithin Cuba,
SESS
Fitzgeral
people is
568x57
their
that the remarkable thing about the fiber people he dAI
volatility
and their tendency to be heartened by sabotage
tity and stair
acts against Castre.
The long range plan, Mr. Fitzgerald said,
Dong range
stimulate Cuban resistance to
བ
Land's
S
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query
Was about
to succeed
Soviet
Borden
forces
formed
powerful enough to put it down
answer
to
an intervention (?)
Cuba would not be
ތ އ
He noted that Cuban military
000 · militia.
forces number 150,000 plus 75,000
111. Murphy asked if CIA had anyone
ار یا کر حراست مینی بیری
replace
mid as a
Fitzgerald replied that there is
and Mr. 
Fitzgerald.
این
and but there are three exile groups being considered. (?)
•ment for
Castro
none
He
dded that CIA
15.
working with State Department on.
replacement and CIA prefers that leader
considered.
Messis.
Fitzgerald
a
exile
and Clark ? concluded and departed at
?
Best available image.
Copy of p. 5.7 with text written above.
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The DCI then referred to the problem of CIA a limited access.
problem of 
CIA limited
to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there are sources in
the USSR who would be willing to work with the CIA if the Agency:
had personnel on the scene to operate these sources. Mr. McCone
noted that there are only four CIA people in the Embassy, along
with some 17 U.S. military personnel
contrast, Mr. McCone:
noted, in the U.S. there are 185 Soviet and 93 Soviet satellite
intelligence officials operating against the U.S. in the Washington
D. C. and New York (UN) areas. The DCI stated that on the question
of placing additional CIA personnel under official cover in the
Embassy at Moscow, the Ambassador has steadfastly held that the risk
of damage from exposure of such personnel is so severe that it is
not worth the gamble. Therefore, Mr. McCone said, CIA has only four
men in the Moscow Embassy and they would all have to work on any
one case Recalling that several CIA operatives had to be taken
out of Moscow when the Penkovskiy case blew up, the DCI empha-
sized that CIA needs to augment its personnel there.
to Mr. Clifford's inquiry as to what steps were being taken by the
DCI to obtain authorization for the assignment of additional CIA
personnel to the Embassy in Moscow, Mr. McCone said that he has had
However, housing
conversations with the head of the State Department.
In answer.
for U.S. personnel is limited in Moscow and the net result of in-
creasing CIA personnel there would probably necessitate the re-
moval of a State Department political officer or some other State
Department representative.
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Mr. McCone referred to the Vietnam situation as being very bad, with:
The
a disintegration of relations between the Diem regime and the Vietnamese and
the U. S. The situation is so bad we may have to get out of the war..
U. S. could live with Diem's antagonism but he has lost popular support and
winning the war would be & hollow victory. The U. S. has had no success in
getting Diem to mend his policy. The shooting into a crowd of Buddhists and
the deaths of 8 of them began an impossible situation, and the August raids on
the pagodas were the last straw." If the Diem regime were to be disposed of,
there's no one to replace him, and even though a military coup were pulled
off; CIA does not believe it could stay in power. CIA is maintaining contact
with the military to keep watch on them (but there is no CIA support as has
been publicly alleged).
The DCI said that there have been received disturbing reports that Nhu
is making a deal woth the North Vietnamese (who would pay any price to get
the U. S. out of the war. The French Ambassador left Saigon for Paris last
war.
night. Mr. McCone added that our President and the Executive Committee of
the NSC have been meeting regularly on the problem. There are differences of
opinion in our Government and in the U. S. Embassy at Saigon as to the best
solution.
get out.
Some think if we' can get Diem to do reforms we can win the war and
Others think Diem should be overthrown.
In answer to Mr. Clifford, the DCI said that State Department and CIA
collaboration is close on the Vietnam situation. He added however that there
was no coordination of the hastily composed August 24 cablegram from the
State Department telling the Embassy to begin thinking about "unloading the
Nhus and that a change of the regime was in the offing.
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cover
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Mr. Clifford invited the DCI to take up any other matters he wished to
Mr. McCone said there were a few that time didn't permit him to cover,
but he would furnish the Board memoranda on "Deep Cover" and "Soviet Trawlers".
As to scheduled CORONA launchings care should be taken as to their.
frequency having in mind that CORONA shots cost $9 million each and GAMBIT
$12 million,
mr. McCone of
Mr. Gray mentioned to the DCI a recent remark made by Alexis Johnson to
some of the Board members to the effect that although the U. S. can put a man
on the moon. for a billion dollars, we can't place an agent in Castro's office.
Mr. Gray said that he would like to hear Mr. McCone's comments to the Board
some time a3 to the prospect of CIA penetrating the USSR and Cuban Governments.
Mr. Coyne
Dunlap's wife
if unlimited millions or billions of dollars were available. Mr. Clifford
agreed that the Board should hear from the DCI on this at the next Board
meeting. Mr. McCone's visit completed, he departed the Board meeting at 12:15.
Following lunch, the Board resumed in executive session.
reported some information just received in the Dunlap case.
produced another Government document which her husband had apparently removed
from NSA. She said she found it in a strong box to which her husband was not
supposed to have had a key. NSA Director Blake had informed Mr. Coyne that
the document was from NSA to overseas stations on steps to be taken in tests
of procedures with respect to intercepts of Soviet scrambler traffic.
Dr. Baker noted that this is serious, because our only hope for exploiting
Soviet scrambler communications is to take advantage of operator and encryption
mistakes, so any reminder to the Soviets that NSA personnel are looking for
""busts" will be very bad.
Dr. Baker said that the DCI's remark about Dunlap being at the cross-
roads of NSA information is untrue, because in fact Dunlap had access only
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to the crossroads of NSA activity against Soviet SIGINT.
Also Dr. Baker,
said that the DCI's comments on CIA's WALNUT data system were exaggerated,
for in fact the project has proved to be a useless disaster to say the least,
and it is certainly not a "leading edge" to automation as the DCI had claimed.
Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne had recently received word on the inadequacy of the
WALNUT system from Mr. Griffith of IBM, privately..
Chairman Clifford agreed with Mr. Coyne's suggestion that at the next
Board meeting the DCI be asked to report on the status of coordinated effort
in the intelligence community with a view to achieving. data processing
capability in the intelligence field.
D
8
Mr. McGeorge Bundy joined the Board meeting at 1:30 and addressed himself
addressed
to the items which had been listed in Mr. Clifford's memorandum to Mr. Bundyac
dated September 11, 1963 (attached as a part of these minutes).
Also,
This is
First Mr. Bundy expressed the view that there have been significant
improvements in intelligence community support to the White House.
particularly true with respect to current intelligence topics specially covered
by CIA's OCI. These submissions are useful to the President and White House
staff members because they are more timely than NIE's and supply the ne
for information without having to wait for the results of the necessaril
slower process of turning out finished estimates.
Also, Mr. Bundy said the White House is getting good ad hoc reporting
from Department of State intelligence (INR). Some of it goes to the President
and it is of value to staff members in discussions, with the President. Also,
DIA's material forwarded to General Clifton is a useful supplement to more
formally prepared estimates.
CIA's Deputy DCI/Intelligence reports at Mr. Bundy's morning staff
meetings and if a particular intelligence memorandum is needed it is asked for,
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largely the initiative is with State, Defense, and CIA in making these:
current intelligence submissions
In short, Mr. Bundy said that the means of access to intelligence are
good, for policy purposes.
As to the second item on the Board's list, Mr. Bundy said he would have
to throw back to the Board the question as to any modifications considered
desirable in providing intelligence community support to the White House
(in the light of the Board's Cuba report). Mr. Bundy thought that he would
not be as good a witness on the Board on this.
Dr. Land remarked that this morning the Board heard optimistically-
worded reports by CIA on the responsiveness of Cubans to small sabotage efforts,
but when the CIA representatives were asked about a long range plan for use in
case of a coup in Cuba, they indicated that they had none. Dr. Land also
wondered whether we would have advance intelligence on a coup in time for
our Government to act on it. Mr. Bundy said that we do have an intelligence
input on the question of whether a coup would result in unacceptable Soviet
reaction, and the tentative judgment that there would not be.
Mr. Clifford recalled remarks by the CIA representatives to the effect
that if agent teams now being sent into Cuba are caught, CIA will get the
blame as it does in the case of non-CIA covert actions detected by the Castro
regime. Mr. Bundy agreed that this is not a very good defense when agent
teams are caught and their activities are attributed to CIA by Castro.
Mr. Bundy said that the Standing Group file on Cuba is large and Mr. Coyne.
might well look through it.
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า
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Mr. Murphy wondered whether the intelligence effort is adequately tied
in to the policy process, and he cited the August 24 State Department message
to Saigon representatives indicating a policy change. Mr. Bundy said that the
State Department message was not very well coordinated in its preparation,
but there was no failure of intelligence involved.
Next, as to the adequacy of intelligence community production of timely,
cumulative assessments of current intelligence and indicator-type data, for
example in the South Vietnam situation, Mr. Bundy said that the intelligence
record on problems developing there since last May is pretty good. The
difficulty is that when you get into a matter involving daily operational-type
policy decisions, it is not easy to keep track of the very latest developments.
From now on, Mr. Bundy said that steps will be taken to make sure that the
Standing Group and Executive Committee of the NSC have the same daily "new news!":
as their various intelligence officers do. The principal question regarding
Vietnam is what does Diem actually think he is doing.. Raw intelligence'
material is not lacking, Mr. Bundy said, but assessment is the problem.
As to the fourth question listed by the Board, Mr. Bundy said that it
would cause a problem if the Board were to be made recipients of the daily.
CIA Presidential Check List, because the Board would then be getting something
to which the rest of the White House family does not have access. Mr. Bundy.
said that he analyzes the Check List on a daily basis and this has resulted.
in the President getting sharper information. However, Mr. Bundy said that
it would be a good thing if Mr. Coyne would look over past Check Lists for
periods of perhaps a month, with a view to analyzing the submissions.
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As to the fifth and last item in Mr. Clifford's list (inviting
suggestions for increasing the Board's access to covert action mattexs and
Special Group activities) Mr. Bundy said that he frankly did not know the
Board's present method of covering NSC 5412/2 matters. Dr. Langer said that
the Board Panel on the subject gets briefings from time to time on covert
action operations. Mr. Bundy stated that he himself looks to CIA for reports
asked for concerning the status of particular programs, but he did not want
to have in his Ifice a compilation of all of such sensitive activities.
But if the Board appoints a Panel to do a review of all covert actions to
date, or of selected programs, he stands ready to meet the Board's needs.
Mr. Clifford said that he or Mr. Coyne would be in touch with Mr. Bundy
regarding the desired review of NSC 5412/2 activities.
."
r
Chairman Clifford then turned to the subject of the Nuclear Test Ban.
Treaty, noting that the Board had looked at U. S. intelligence capability
to detect violations.. He said that it appeared thus far that the U. S.
capability is largely based on the acquisition and enlargement of detection
systems in the future. Mr. Buncy said that he is concerned about the U. S.
capability to apply intelligence safeguards against the treaty violations,
but is unwilling to sign a blank check for detection programs. So the Board
should keep aware of the question as to the worth of adopting certain additional
detection systems, and in Mr. Bundy's view we need more than we now have.
Dr. Baker bserved that only two or three systems are well established, and
all of the 13 or so under consideration are probably not necessary. He added
that thus for only about 30 percent of previous Soviet tests have been learned
of in advance through SIGINT, although some 60 to 90 per cent alerting could
be achieved through better SIGINT take and better use of the take.
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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
September 11, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD
SUBJECT:
Covert Action Operations
The Board Panel on Covert Action Operations (Messrs. Murphy
Gray and Lenger) was formed for the purpose of keeping the
Board fully advised on the status of the planning and execution
of covert action operations.
On previous occasions, the Panel's activities have included
a review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group (with respect
to Cuba only), and briefings by the Secretary to the Special
Group and by CIA officials. Most recently, on September 6, 1963,
the Panel again consulted with CIA officials and was briefed.
on a variety of developments in the covert action field. The
Panel Chairman, Mr. Murphy, Will make an oral report to the
Board on the foregoing.
J. Patrick Coyne
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
Minnade
- TOP SECRET
September 10, 1963
SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action Operations
The Board Panel met in the Board's offices on September 6.
1963. Panel mombers present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman;
Mr. Gordon (tray; and Dr. William Langer. Mossrs. Coyne and
Ash also attended the meeting.
During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed
by Mr. Richard Helras (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants,
Mr. Cord Neyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of CIA's head-
quarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings
were as follows:
British Guiana
MESSRS HELMS and MEYER
For a 79-day period ending in July, the anti-Jagan Trades
Union Congress maintained a general strike which was directed
against the Jagan regime, and had wide support among agrarian
and industrial workers in protest against an oppressive Labor
Bill proposed by Communist-oriented Jagan. CIA worked out
with George Meany a program of CIA financial support ($435,000)
to the strike under ne cover of "AFL-CIO contributions.
A CIA cover representative ran the strike program.. The activity
was tricky because the United States and the British desired
to avoid violence; and the situation was complicated by the
fact that the British Governor-General oppesed the strike.
CIA assesses the operation as a success because even though
Jagan was not unseated, the oppressive Labor Bill was withdrawn
and the TUC survived.
The strike activity took place against a background of
agreement between President Kennedy and MacMillan that the
British will not pull out of Gulana for an indefinite future
period, in the hope that a Communist government will not fill
the vacuun when the British do withdraw.
Cuban influence in the strike was in the form of a
$1 million advance from Cuba to the Guiana Import-Export
Corporation (an arm of Jagen's East Indian Peoples Progressive
Party) which in turn was borrowed by the Jagan regime.
Soviet help was indicated by a rumored transfer of over
$100,000 to Jagan's Party through banka.
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CIA at present is providing $5,000 to the PNC Party made
up of anti-Jagan Africans in Quiana, and CIA is sending a Negro
cover representative from New York to aid the African Party,
(CIA considers that Mrs. Jagan, a known Communist from
Chicago, is the brains and guts of the Jagan operation,)
Haiti.
CIA has surveyed the intentions and capabilities of
various Haitian exile g
groups and has supplied them with token
amounts of money to test them out. Efforts of the groups to
form a united front have failed, and in the Dominican Republic.
Juan Bosch has reversed his intention to help unseat Devalier
for the present. Ten days ago CIA dropped 100 rifles and
ammunition to one Haitian exile group which has been given.
Banotuary by a Dominican Republic commander stationed on the
border
Dominican Republic
In this country there is a lack of democratic institutions,
political party structure, labor unions, or cooperatives of an
effective nature. Juan Bosch spends more time debating charges
by political opponents than in performing the administrative
job of running the country.
Bosch is an extreme conservative, economically, and refuses
to spend moneys in excess of assured revenues. A twenty per cent
unemployment figura is a major problem. Bosch has strengthened
his Cabinet at the urging of the U. S. Ambassador, and has made
peace with church elements (with CIA's help).
the Army,
Opposition to Bosch is from the right and from parts of
_ He has met individual Communist moves as they arise
(e.g., an attempted infiltration of the Planning Commission),
but he is not pursuing an over-all anti-Communist program or
nrusade. Although Bosch is considered by CIA to be anti-Castro.
and anti-Soviet, he has not clamped down on returning trainees
from Cuba.
The twenty per cent unemployment situation provides the
basis for a coup in the months ahead. Meanwhile the Army
strong-man Embert (one of Trujillo's assassins) waits in the
wings.
Vietnam
CIA's role in Vietnam during the past two years has been
two-folds
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(1) Total support of the war against the Viet Cong, in-
eluding the training of some 43,000 irregulare (now turned over
to U. S. Special Forces); support to the mountain people in
operations against the Viet Cong; and CIA training of U. S.
Special Forces in South Vietnam.
{2} CIA support of infiltration operations in North
Vietnam, (Not a great success. High losses of teams.)
In response to/question based on recent U. S. press allega-
tions that CIA is attempting to overthrow the Diem government &
"CIA has ever engaged in any such operations whatsoever
"
no instigation of the Buddhisto nothing. CIA considers
that anti-CIA expressions of this kind originate with Madame
Nhu. The Viet Cong has been working on the Buddhists, but the
Buddhist leader who took sanctuary in the U. S. Embassy has
indicated that the Buddhist activity is motivated by a desire
to unify what is a loosely-joined, individual-Pagoda-type religious
movement.
August 20 saw the temple raids, martial law, and then the
arrests of students. One US. reaction was an August 24 cable-
gran from the State Department (presumably hastily prepared)
which, in nice diplomatic language to State Department representa-
i. Cos
tives in Saigon, gave the word to "unload the Nhus".
indicate to the anti-Diem plotters among the Generals that
they should get moving. However, the Generals proved to be lack-
ing in any intention to pursue their previously-professed anti-Diem
sentiments, CIA considers that the August 24 State Department
cablegram was the result of a miscalculation of the General's
true capabilities and intentions. CIA understands that subsequently
the Executive Committee of the NSC has met frequently on the sub-
ject, and more recent State Department cables have reflected
a revision of the girlier "unload the Nhus" message.
As yet the political situation in South Vietnam has not
had an adverse effect on the military effort, nor any increa
Viet Cong moves to capitalize on the situation. (Mr. Helms
departed at this point.)
Italy
With approval by the Special PSC 5412/2 Group, the Christian'
Democratic Party was supported by CIA to the tune of $1 million
in the campaign leading to the June elections (plus $600,000
to other political elements in Italy), CIA's rationale for the
loss of CDP strength in the elections is that (1) there was E
loss of votes among the workers from the south who were given
the Communist treatment when they moved to the northern citiess:
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(2) Fafani, and (3) the Papal audience given to Khrushchev's
son-in-law had an effect on anti-Communist religious Italians,
including wives of the workers who had previously been able to
persuade their husbands to vote against the Communist candidates..
Meanwhile the Special Group has authorized CIA to spend $125,000
to support the CDP inc current developments looking toward the
establishment of a center-left government coalition.
Bolivia
The Special Group has authorized a unique effort by CIA
in support of Paz Estancero's program to "rationalize the
tin mines -- ie., a project calling for the firing of surplus
tin miners and resettling them in new jobs. This will take
some time, but may result in breaking the leftist influence among.
the Bolivian miners.
Brazil
Goulart is engaged in coordinated efforts to (1) discredit
the legislature, (2) obtain. backing of the Army, and (3) make
a demagogic appeal to the Brazilian people as the only leader
who can serve their interests.
CIA is carrying out covert action in the labor movement
and CIA believes that Communist control can be weakened.
In student groups, a number of CIA operations are going and
assets are in place (e.g., in the top executive committee of
the Students' Federation). However, there is no large-scale
CIA political operation in Brazil now.
MR, FITZGERALD
(On the subject of Cuba)
In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for
a package of covert actions against Cuba. The covert program
assumes that means short of military action are to be attempted:
on the premise that at the present rate of progress, the Castro
regime will be even more firmly entrenched because the passage.
of time runs in Castro's favor.
Mr. Pitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved CSA
covert actions, remarking that if they seemed familiar proposals
which were previously 
under consideration, it should be kept i
"they have now been approved as "interdependent
" 
actions
call for (1) covert collection of intelligence,
(2) propaganda action to stimulate "low-key sabotage", (3) stimulate
disaffection among the Cuban military, (4) an economic denial.
- TOP SECRET-
TOP SECRET
program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for
Industrial machinery, and other products needed by Cuba
,
(5) a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6
) 
support
of anti-Castro autonomous groups, by giving them money 
and
the means to act, but under an arrangement which 
insures 
against
attribution to the United States, and which precludes 
operations
.
from V. S. or British soil. (The CIA philosophy is 
to back only
the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups
, and
the military is felt to be the best bet.)
To folt to be the best be
The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to
internal sabotage actions. CIA mounts about 
10 "black"
operations, a month, and Castro security forces have taken their
toll among the CIA teams. Three operations were 
conducted on
August 17 and 18, and among other things the 
objective is to
give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military
officers who see no professional future under Castro 
who is
unloading military elements which aided him 
in his initial
seizure of the government. (The Special Group, fir. 
Bundy 
and
other White House staff note the successful mounting 
of CIA's
sabotage operations and have asked for more to be 
conducted.
CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressures 
for
these operations to be increased beyond the present effective
capacity which CIA has at this time.)
Again, referring to the Cuban economy, it is hurting badly.
The United States has a monopoly on the spare parts for industrial
machinery needed by Cuba, and the USSR cannot 
supply them.
The Cuban electrical industry is particularly hard hit 
in 
this
respect. Castro's re-emphasis on an agricultural 
step-up 
means
increased efforts to produce sugar, a crop which presents 
a 
good
Babotage target. Finally, the Soviet aid at a rate 
of $1 million
a day (military and economic) is not 
enough to keep the Cuban
Cubans ero not starving but they 
do not eat
economy going oven in the larger cities. CIA finds that a major
" comfortably'
problem for their "black" teams is food re-supply in areas where
the Cubana are hard put to feed themselves.
put to feed themes
CIA assets being used against Cuba:
Staff: 384 (Washington and Miami)
U. S. contractor personnel: 83
Foreign nationals: 525 (mostly Cubans)
Personnel at overseas posts: 45
DD/I staff: 12
NPIC1 a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba:
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CIA considers that of all nationalities, the Cubans are
the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best informa-
tion comes from non-Cuban agents.
There are 108 agents in Cuba, including friendly diplomatic
personnel. There are two illegal teams working, one of which
has 200 sub-agents. There are 44 legal travelers working;
60
agents in Cuban shipping; and there are 31 
penetrations 
of
Cuban installations abroad.
As to Soviet shipping into Cuba, CIA has an agent in
every port, but observers cannot say what is in the crates
they see being off-loaded.
Since January CIA has disseminated 150 photographs taken
Also CIA has furnished 
its
by agents on-the-ground in Cuba.
agents in Cuba more and better radio equipment.
12,000 Soviet
CIA's estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba:
troops; 150 Chinese (mostly diplomatic personnel); an unknown
number of Soviet civilian technicians; and "
a lot" of Czech 
and
other bloc technicians worlding with the Cuban military forces
.
CIA considers that in the past 9 months progress has
been made in (1) intelligence collection with respect to Cuba,
CIA
and (2) effectiveness of the economic denial program.
feels that the "X" factor is the volatility of the Cuban people
whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change over-
night if they see evidence of successful sabotage operations
against the Cuban government.
CIA penetration of the Cuban military got under way in
April. An agent brought out Cuban Army major and he is being
The major says that 
there is
sent ack into Cubs next week. the military of the idea og.
a medium level acceptance among
overthrowing Castro, but although this view is held by
individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating
it to others within Cuba. The wife of the chief of training of
the Cuban Army is a CIA source. Defectors are naming military
personnel to be contacted. There is, however, a fear of the
Castro security system.
The subject of specific kinds and amounts of Soviet military
equipment in Cuba is an area of the worst exaggeration and reporting
However, 
there is no evidence of
by nonprofessional observers.
offensive missiles. There are 47 MIG-21's operated by Cubun pilots.
Cubans are at the SA-2 sites and are being trained to operate them.
We don't know what is in the caves, exactly. Neither CIA agents
nor Cubans (nor even Castro) has access to the Soviet armored camps.
TOP SECRET
A R. Ash
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SECRET
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, ADVISORY BOARD
September 11, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD
SUBJECT: Covert Action and Intelligence Operations Against Cuba-
Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, who heads up a Cuba task force within
the DD/P area at CIA, has been asked to join the Board meeting for
one hour for the purpose of reporting on covert action and intelligence
operations relating to Cuba.
When Mr. Fitzgerald last appeared before the Board on April 23,1
1963, to brief members on this subject, his presentation included.
reference, among other things, to (1) the numbers of agents, teams,
reports, etc., involved in the CIA clandestine agent effort against Cuba,
with less detail on the substantive intelligence collection results being
obtained thereby; (2) the fact that CIA had no policy guidance for Y
"positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature,
"1 and that
the policy guidance available to CIA in this area was concerned with
creating low key" resistance and "subtle sabotage" (e.g., leaflet drops
and shorting out electric power lines); and (3) the fact that a decision
regarding such policy guidance was to be obtained later in April 1963.
In the course of Mr. Fitzgerald's appearance before the Board,
members may wish to raise questions about the following:
(1) The extent to which policy guidance has been provided to CIA,
and by whom, pertaining to the execution of positive, major covert
action programs against Cuba.
(2) The results of efforts to mount clandestine agent operations
designed to (a) obtain on the ground photography of intelligence targets
in Cuba, and (b) attempt intercept of emanations from Soviet encryption
machines (as recommended by the Board to the President).
(3) A description of covert actions against Cuba which (a) have
been approved and are under way or are scheduled for future execution,
(b) have been proposed by CIA but for which approval has not been
obtained.
and
J. Patrick Coyne,
SECRET

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
TOP SECRET
September 6, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD
SUBJECT:
Discussions With The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman has invited Mr. McCone to meet with the Board
and has requested that he be prepared at the meeting to discuss
the following subjects:
1. Coordination of U. S. foreign intelligence activities.
(Identification of major problems, gaps, and deficiencies.
encountered by the DCI in the implementation of the Presi-
dent's memorandum of January 16, 1962, concerning coordina-
tion and guidance of the total U. S. foreign intelligence
effort; and remedial actions taken or contemplated.)
2 National intelligence estimating process.
(Status and results of survey looking to possible improves
ments in organization, procedures and product.)
3: Current intelligence assessments and spot reporting on
crisis situations
(The DCI's comments on the adequacy of present arrangements.
for providing the President and members of his staff with
such assessments and reports.)
Counterintelligence posture of U. S. foreign intelligence
agencies.
(DCI's appraisal of current effectiveness. DCI's views on
methods for strengthening posture, in light of damage to U. S.
classified information, intelligence and sources, resulting
from recent Soviet espionage operations in several NATO.
countries.):
National Reconnaissance Office".
(DCI's views on adequacy of current organization; operations
and funding; status of OXCART and TAGBOARD programs; status of
efforts to eliminate Agena-related failures.)
6 Cuba.
(DCI's appraisal of the adequacy of U. S. clandestine Intelligence
collection activities and U. S. covert operations currently direc-
ted against Cuba and his appraisal of the current status of Soviet-
bloc personnel in Cuba.)
7. Deep Cover
(DCI's suggestions on measures to facilitate intelligence community.
efforts to improve deep cover intelligence assets overseas.)
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Intelligence collection activities of Soviet trawlers operating
off U. S. coasts.
9. Renewed efforts in the Congress to establish a Joint Watch Dog
Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
10: Such other topics as the DCI inay wish to raise.
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BEY 0038/63
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
TOP SECRET-
Subjects Suggested By Board Members For Discussion
By the Director of Central Intelligence When Ho
Meets With The Board On September 13, 1963
1. Coordination of U. S. foreign intelligence activities.
(Identification of major problems, gaps and deficiencies
encountered by the DCI in the imple
dent's memorandum of January 16, entation of the Presi-
concerning coordin-
ation and guidance of the total U. 8. foreign intelligence
offort; and remedial actions taken or contemplated.)
2. National Intelligence estimating process.
(Status and results of survey, looking to possible improve-
ments in organization, procedures and product.)
3.
Current intelligence assessments and spot reporting on
crisis situations.
(The DCI's comments on the adequacy of present arrangements
for providing the President and members of his staff with
such assessments and reports.)
Counterintelligence posture of U. S. foreign intelligence
agencies.
(DCI's appraisal of current effectiveness. DCI's views on
methods for strengthening posture, in light of damage to U. S.
classified information, intelligence and sources resulting
from recent Soviet espionage operations in several NATO
countries.)
5. National Reconnaissance Office.
(DCI's views on adequacy of current organization; Operations
and funding; status of OXCART and TAGBOARD programs; status of
efforts to eliminate gena-related failures.)
Cuba.
(DCI's appraisal of the adequacy of U. S. clandestine intelligence
collection activities and U. S. covert operations currently direc-
ted against Cuba and his appraisal of the current status of Soviet-
bloc personnel in Cuba.)
7. Deep cover.
(DCI's suggestions on measures to facilitate intelligence community
efforts to improve deap cover intelligence assets overseas.)
8.
Intelligence collection activities of Soviet trawlers operating
off U. B. coasts.
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9 Renewed efforts in the Congress to establish a Joint Watch Dog
Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
10. Buch other topics as the DCI may wish to raise.
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