JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY
RECORD NUMBER
: HPSCI
:
135-10001-10283
RECORDS SERIES :
Date: 09/20/94
Page: 1
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT 8/20/98
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR
FROM
: CIA
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
: MURPHY, DAVID E.
TO : RECORD
TITLE :
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
Kp 12 apr 99
DATE : 03/12/64
PAGES: 6
SUBJECTS :
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: "MEETING WITH THE WARREN COMMISSION ON 12
MARCH 1964." (WITH ROUTING SHEET ATTACHED)
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
S
OPEN IN FULL
O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/19/94
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
Contained in file entitled, "Hoch/Warren Commission Paper"
"O/R (V-F)'
"
2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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OUTING AND RECORD SHEET
COUT
SUBJECT: Optional)
זהב
FROM:
Chief, SR
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
DDP
2.
3.
4.
5.
RECEIVED
DATE
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
EYES CHILLY
18 March 1964
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
to whom.
FORWARDED
лек
CSR
th
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
Draw a line across column after each comment.)
"
72y
Thand
Attached is the memorandum
for record of our discus-
sions with the Warren
Commission Staff. The
memorandum was reviewed in
draft by Mr. Rocca.
6.
7.
3.
9.
).
610DITIONS
USE PREVIOUS
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SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
154
DEM
Well line
Think
ما باید با ایران
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
12-8-9
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
(1763)
pages (8-12-94)
разу
UNCLASSIFIED
LIED 25
12 March 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with the Warren Commission on 12 March 1964
1. On 12 March 1964, Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Rocca
met with Mr. Rankin, Chief Counsel for the Warren Commission, Mr.
Willems, and other members of Mr. Rankin's staff. The purpose of
this meeting was to discuss the current status of the CIA contribution
to the work of the Warren Commission.
2. The first topic raised by Mr. Rankin concerned information
on Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union as reported by the FBI,
based on their interview of the defector,
This
discussion is reported in a separate memorandum.
information on
3. After disposing of the question of
Oswald, Mr. Rankin's staff showed us a detailed memorandum they had
prepared based on all of the information available to them, including
our own contribution concerning Oswald's stay in the USSR. This ma-
terial, together with some questions specifically related to the material
we provided, will be forwarded to us by Mr. Rankin's staff. It was then
suggested that a CIA officer most familiar with the material provided
by CIA on the USSR aspects of the Oswald case visit the Commission in
order to review on the spot the testimony given to the Commission by
Marina Oswald. We agreed to send the appropriate officer to review
this testimony but suggested that we wait until after receipt of the ma-
terial just shown to us.
4. Members of Mr. Rankin's staff then spoke about having found
a bɔok in Oswald's possessions which had certain letters cut out giving
the impression that this might have formed the base or key for a cipher
system. They asked whether it would be useful in our opinion to send
this book to NSA for review. We assured them that NSA was the appro-
priate Agency for this and Mr. Rocca commented that when this was
done reference might also be made to the portion of Lee Oswald's notes
which mentioned microdot. Another member of the Rankin staff
EYES ONLY
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/
OR
RELEASE 
OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS 
SANITIZED.
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commented on the fact that Oswald had obtained employment in this
country in a photographic firm through a Russian friend. He thought
this might have a possible bearing on any clandestine communications
systems he might have received from the Soviets.
5. Members of Mr. Rankin's staff then commented on the testi-
mony of Mrs. Oswald to the effect that the letters from her son regard-
ing his desire to return to the United States had the appearance of being
dictated since they contained none of his usual grammatical errors and
used legal language with which he would not have been familiar. In this
connection, the fact that Lee Oswald wrote to the Embassy requesting
help in arranging his return to the U.S. soon after receipt by the Embassy
of a telegram from the Department reporting on correspondence with
Oswald's mother seemed to indicate to members of Mr. Rankin's staff
that the Soviets might have had access in some fashion to the contents
of the telegram. They did not believe it was coincidental that Oswald's
letter to the Embassy came immediately on the heels of the telegram
from the Department. This led to a discussion of the appearance in the
press of another telegram or report, from the Embassy in Moscow to
the Department. Mr. Rankin said he would undertake to clarify 
this.
6. Mr. Willems noted that Mrs. Oswald had introduced a state-
ment to the effect that she suspected her son to be a CIA agent. Mr.
Willems asked whether in fact Oswald had been a CIA agent. Mr. Helms
replied that he had not been. Mr. Willems then asked if there were any,
way of proving this. Mr. Helms first remarked that in him and Mr.
Murphy the Commission had the two Clandestine Services officers who
certainly would know whether or not Oswald had been an agent for CIA
in the Soviet Union. He then said that the Commission would have to
Rankin
take his word for the fact that Oswald had not been an agent. Mr.
interjected the view that the Commission had not adopted this procedure
with other agencies and wondered whether there was not some way to
clarify this point more effectively for the Commission. One suggestion
he made was to have Mr. Dulles, who is familiar with CIA records
procedures, review the material which would normally be held on agents
and report to the Commission. Another suggestion was to follow the
lead of the Director of the FBI who forwarded an affidavit to the Com-
mission regarding the nature of FBI relations with Oswald.
7. A considerable part of the meeting from this point forward
consisted of a review by Mr. Rankin and his staff of the gaps in their
investigation to date. They noted that the most significant gap appeared
in the Mexican phase. For example, they had no record of Oswald's
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daily movements while in Mexico City nor could they confirm the date
of his departure or his mode of travel. The original assumption that
he had returned by bus could not be proven. Several possibilities were
discussed whereby the Commission could fill in the gaps of its investi-
gation of the Mexican phase. The suggestion was made that the most
effective way of resolving the questions they had would be to have a
member of the Commission visit Mexico City and discuss the issues on
the spot with those American and Mexican officials directly concerned.
Mr. Helms noted that it would be possible for a member of the Com-
mission to visit our Chief of Station who would then be able to work out
with the Warren Commission staff member the best way to handle inter-
views with Mexican police officials, particularly if it is desired that
these interviews be informal in nature. Our Chief of Station would also
be able to put the Warren Commission staff member in contact with the
FBI officials and Immigration and Naturalization Service officers stationed
in Mexico City. Mr. Helms cautioned that our Chief of Station (would be 32
under State Department cover) and that it would be proper to advise the
Department of the planned visit and upon arrival to meet briefly with the
Ambassador or Minister Counselor before proceeding to work out details
with the CIA Chief of Station.
8. In connection with the Mexican phase of the investigation, mem-
bers of Mr. Rankin's staff questioned Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca regarding
the extent of the CIA file on Oswald for the period 8 October to 22 November
1963. They questioned the sanitized extracts which they had been shown
and wondered if there were not more. Mr. Rocca summarized the ma-
terials that had come to the attention of the Secret Service, or had been
disseminated to the Secret Service, immediately after the assassination.
Mr. Rocca said there was not additional substantive information and that
the sanitized version seen by the Commission constituted the sum of our
holdings. Mr. Helms then explained that as a matter of practice we did
not release actual copies of our messages because they contained code-
words and digraphs which would be unintelligible to a person not familiar
with them. He added, however, that he would be happy to show the file
with the original messages to any staff member of the Warren Commission
who might come to visit him at Langley.
9. The question of why no action was taken by other agencies of
the government after their receipt of CIA information that Oswald was
in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City was next
discussed. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff clearly felt that this
was a crucial question which needed careful review. They appeared to
V/R√
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(
believe that the information on Oswald was unusual enough to have
caused recipients to take special measures which might conceivably
have led to a closer scrutiny of Lee Harvey Oswald and his movements.
Mr. Helms pointed out that the information on Oswald's visit to the
Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City came from telephone inter-
cepts which were placed on both embassies. These intercepts were
recorded on tape and reviewed by persons at our Station for any infor-
mation affecting U. S. security. Such information is routinely passed
to other agencies and entered in CIA files. Given the enormous bulk
which is involved, the tapes are not kept on file but erased after a brief
period of time. Thus the information on Oswald was similar to that
provided on other American citizens who might have made contacts of
this type. In Oswald's case, it was the combination of visits to both
Cuban and Soviet Embassies which caused the Mexico City Station to
report this to Headquarters and Oswald's record of defection to the
Soviet Union which prompted the Headquarters dissemination. At the
conclusion of his remarks on this subject, Mr. Helms specified that
the information he had given Mr. Rankin was extremely sensitive and
that the very existence of these telephone intercepts had to be very
carefully protected.
10. The Commission, Mr. Rankin said, would be interested in
any information held by CIA on Jack Ruby. Mr. Rankin said the Com-
mission staff had prepared a roundup on Ruby, a copy of which he handed
Mr. Helms. He said he would appreciate any file reflections or comments
that CIA analysts might make on this material. Mr. Rankin and members.
of his staff then discussed Ruby's confirmed trip to Havana in 1959. The
Commission has received information from an unspecified source that
Ruby was in Havana again in 1963 under a Czech passport. Mr. Rankin
asked whether CIA could provide any assistance in verifying this story.
Mr. Helms replied that CIA would be limited in its possibility of assist-
ing, to air manifest checks in Mexico. These would be carried out he
said.
11. Mr. Helms was then asked if CIA had done any follow up to
its original telegraphic dissemination of the information on Oswald's
visits to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. Mr. Helms
replied that there had been no CIA action following our initial dissemi-
nation. Mr. Willems then asked if there were any liaison problems
faced by CIA in its efforts to deal with other agencies in matters affect-
ing internal security. Mr. Helms replied that there were always under-
standable human problems in conducting any liaison on any subject but
སདཞ་
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that by and large the procedures for dealing with internal security and
counterespionage information which needed to be brought to the attention
of other agencies were effective.
12. Mr. Willems then asked if CIA's. intelligence collection system
was automated. Mr. Helms replied that we did in fact have a machine
records system for recovering file information which was unique in that
it had been designed specifically with the requirements of the CIA Clandes-
tine Services in mind. Thus, any information reposing in our files could
be recovered by means of this machine system rapidly and efficiently. Mr.
Helms invited Mr. Rankin and members of his staff to visit the Langley
Headquarters and inspect the machine records system which he had des-
cribed.
13. In speaking of the broader question of protection for the Pres-
ident, Mr. Rankin asked about our procedures for working with the Secret
Service when the President travels abroad. Mr. Helms described how
the system works and cited examples from the past to illustrate. He com-
mented on some of the South American trips and on the visit to West Berlin
to show the way in which the effectiveness and competence of the local
police force plays a key role in efforts to insure the President's safety.
14. Mr. Willems asked if we could check on a memorandum sent
to Mr. Karamessines on 12 February regarding one of the pictures identi-
fied by Mrs. Oswald as that of Jack Ruby. These pictures were from.
clandestine photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City
which was provided by the FBI and then cropped to make a display to show
to Mrs. Oswald soon after the President's assassination. The Commission
has not been able to determine which of these pictures was shown Mrs.
Oswald. Mr. Rocca will follow up on this.
Dan Memphy
David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division,
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