157-10011-10093
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10093
RECORDS SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Date: 10/06/93
Page: 1
ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM: ROETHE, JAMES, N.
TO : FILE
TITLE :
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH PAPICH, SAM J.
DATE: 03/05/75
PAGES: 18
SUBJECTS :
PAPICH, SAM J. (INTERVIEW)
Ready
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/29/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
to rll.
COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 294, Folder 15
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During this period Papich developed a good relationship with Jim Angleton
of Counterintelligence and found that he could work effectively with Angleton.
In the early 1960's the relationship between the two agencies was probably
the best that it ever got. While some flaps continued to occur, both
agencies seemed to be making an effort to learn the responsibilities and
jurisdiction of the other.
Relationships. Between 1965 and 1970
During the Johnson Administration there was a deterioration or a cut in
the number of projects directed towards the Soviets. Hoover's desire to
become engaged in extensive counterintelligence work lessened. Many of
the FBI's programs to identify illegal aliens attempting to penetrate
the U. S. Government broke down. Hoover became extremely cautious and
conservative in the area of counterintelligence, which greatly disturbed
Papich, who felt strongly about the Soviet threat and who was convinced
that strong counter-measures were necessary. For example, Papich tried
to promote consideration for the recruitment of a top-level Soviet official
as a CIA agent. This was to be a joint CIA-FBI operation,but it was slapped
down by Hoover. Further, a proposed joint operation involving sensitive
electronic coverage of suspected Soviet activities was rejected.
During 1967 and early 1968 Papich saw no signs from Hoover that the pro-
grams and projects that Papich felt so necessary would be reinstituted.
Papich was receiving the message that his relationship with Hoover was
coming to an end. Papich was physically and mentally worn out trying to
keep the two agencies working together. In 1968 Papich wrote a polite
letter to Hoover expressing his concern with what was happening in the
area of counterintelligence. He appealed to Hoover to reinitiate some
of the effective programs aimed at Soviet penetration of the United States.
While Hoover was extremely angry at Papich for writing such a letter, he
did not fire him to the surprise of many. Further appeals by Papich to
Hoover to reinstate programs were of no avail. From that point on, the
relationship between Papich and Hoover chilled and any idea that Papich
brought to Hoover from the CIA concerning joint counterintelligence efforts
was generally rejected and accompanied by a critical remark.
While Papich's 1968 letter had brought no change in Hoover's attitude,
Hoover did keep Papich on as liaison. In the Fall of 1969 Papich con-
fided to his wife that he was seriously considering retiring in the Spring
of 1970. By the first of the year he realized that his career was effec-
tively at an end and that he could no longer effectively accomplish his
responsibilities as liaison between FBI and CIA. He decided to submit his
letter of resignation, to be effective in early April of 1970.
IB
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EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBI
Efforts by Papich
Under Hoover there was little exchange of ideas at the highest levels
of the CIA and FBI. This was merely Hoover's style. Papich was able
to get people exchanging ideas at the working level and this was done
with Hoover's approval.
Papich supported CIA innovative approaches to targets of mutual interest
to both agencies and frequently became involved in conflicts with Hoover.
for such interest and action. When any CIA promoted projects were ap-
proved, the responsibility was placed on Papich to assure that there
would not be any invasion of FBI jurisdiction or violation of agreements.
For instance, the CIA through the Domestic Operations Division (now the
Foreign Resources Division) was always looking for foreigners in the
United States to recruit as agents abroad The FBI also hat an interest
in these foreign officials if it was discovered that the official was
working for an opposition service. In the 1960's the CIA came to Papich
to see how the Domestic Operations Division could recruit without con-.
flicting with the Bureau. Papich set up a program and sent it to Hoover
recommending approval, but Hoover indicated that he was concerned with
possible CIA invasion of the FBI's jurisdiction, It was therefore agreed
between the CIA and the FBI that CIA could continue to recruit foreigners
in the United States if they would immediately contact the FBI upon re-
cruiting an individual and furnish Papich with all information obtained
from that individual which pertained to internal affairs. Further, the
individual was to be made available to the FBI if he possessed substan-
tial information within the FBI's jurisdiction. This program culminated
in a Memorandum of Understanding between the CIA and the FBI dated Feb-
ruary 7, 1966. The program apparently worked well and much valuable in
formation was given to the FBI which satisfied Hoover. Perhaps more
importantly, new CIA/FBI relations at the field level were developed.
However, Papich was well aware at the time the program was set up that
if it flapped, Hoover could immediately kill the project.
Papich also advocated the exchange of lecturers between CIA and FBI to
give the two agencies some understanding of what the other agency was
doing. Such an exchange of lecturers and training facilities did not
come about until about the time that Papich retired.
Papich also suggested an actual trade of personnel for short periods of
time so that personnel from one agency could become familiar with the
various problems that faced personnel from the other agency on the working
level. This suggestion was never approved while Papich worked for the FBI.
IB
Papich reiterated the fact that he had a very good working relationship
with Jim Angleton. He feels that this relationship was probably respon-
sible for the FBI's arrest of the Russian spy Rudolph Abel. Apparently a Soviet
agent came to the CIA with information on Able. The FBI was contacted
concerning the debriefing of this agent, but Hoover wanted nothing to do
with it. Papich cooperated with Angleton, and the information obtained
led to Able's arrest and conviction.
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The following grey areas were delineated by Papich:
1. The question of whether the FBI should recruit agents in the United
States for use by 
the CIA overseas or whether this should be left
to the CIA.
2 Activities with respect to defectors and the debriefing of defectors
“in the United States
. (At present the FBI generally lets CIA do the
‘debriefing as long as 
the FBI is given access to the man within a
reasonable time. On 
occasion the bone fides of defectors have been
disputed by CIA and the FBI
(S)
3 The question of who is responsible for continued supervision over
defectors once they 
have been resettled in the United States.
doesn't 
really have the manpower to monitor the many defectors pres-
FBI
ently in the United 
States. Papich feels that these individuals
could go 
sour and should be watched by some one.
T(S)
4. The question of who should provide cover in the United States for
CIA 
operations overseas.
5. The handling of agents suspected by CIA to be Communist agents over-
seas who travel to the 
United States.
6. Inadequate communication between the two agencies in resolving
bona fides of 
defectors of interest to both agencies.
7. See the subheadings below.
Papich believes that in fairness to the men in the field a more clear-cut
delineation 
of jurisdiction is needed. He did state that from time to
time 
documents were put forth by Hoover concerning the FBI's jurisdiction in
particular 
areas. Generally such a guideline would be issued following
a particular 
flap in an operation involving both the FBI and the CIA.
Papich could not point to any specific document but suggested that we
ask Kelley 
for this type of information.
Papich did feel that there were some areas of jurisdiction that were clear-
cut. For 
instance, CIA is not to investigate violations of the law in the
United States
. However, it is not Papich's opinion that the determining
factor of jurisdiction 
is a strictly geographic one. (At least it shouldn't
be.)
Espionage Matters
Papich felt strongly that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate
any possible violations of the espionage laws. He could point to no case
where the FBI 
refused to undertake this responsibility where reasonable
evidence 
of espionage existed, even if the suspect was an employee of the
CIA. 
In some instances, the CIA might come to the FBI with information
1
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IB
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Ober's Operation: (continued)
- 15
Inciden-
had the personnel, and the FBI would have become aware of such acti-
vity on a massive scale. 
However, Papich did receive a continuing
supply of information from 
Ober. Most of this information related
to the relationship 
between domestic and foreign groups.
tally, 
information pertinent to internal security may have been
picked up and 
passed' on to the CIA. Papich is also aware that some
of Ober's recruits were 
gathering information in the United States
as well as overseas on 
occasions when the student's travels ended
and he or 
she returned to the States. This information was also
passed on 
to Papich. Papich acknowledged that on occasion the FBI
would provide 
CIA with an introduction to a sympathetic student in
a dissident 
group.
2. Project MERRIMAC Office of Security)
(s)
Papich knows almost nothing of efforts to penetrate dissident groups
by the Office of Security
. He feels that if such a project had been
extensive, the FBI would 
have become aware of it, as FBI had a large
Washington Field 
Office and was very interested in the dissident
groups and 
constantly monitoring them. Papich could not recall an
incident where a CIA 
asset working for Women's Strike for Peace was
turned over to the FBI. 
He did recall occasions when Ober's group
turned over assets to the FBI 
when the asset returned from overseas
and no longer 
wished to work abroad. Papich believes that only a
small amount of 
information on dissidents was ever sent to the FBI
from the Office 
of Security.
Papich states that during this entire period of the dissidents, the atmos-
phere was such that something 
had to be done by someone to learn what the
more militant of these 
dissident groups were planning. Riots, bombings,
and destruction of property 
were rampant. Citizens and newspapers were
screaming for action to bring this unrest to an end.
time 
for all Federal agencies.
It was a difficult
Criminal Cases
Papich is not aware of any instances when the CIA has undertaken law en-
forcement tasks in the 
United States. This does not mean that there was
not some 
cooperation between the FBI and CIA in criminal cases.
instance, Angleton's overseas agents would frequently obtain information
For
connecting Americans 
with criminal activities in the U.S.
contact the FBI and together Papich and Angleton would develop the CIA's
Angleton would
source of information 
to assist the FBI. A good example of this led to
the arrest and 
conviction of a New York City official during the Lindsay
Administration.
(1) (B)
per
CIA
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Penetration of Embassies in the United States
Papich has no knowledge of any CIA efforts to obtain positive intelli-
gence by penetrating foreign embassies in the United States, although
they did on occasion attempt to recruit Embassy personel for activities
overseas, pursuant to the FBI/CIA Memorandum of Understanding of Feb. 7
1966 Papich believes that if the CIA attempted to gain positive in-
telligence information through these embassies, this was an improper
action which should have been performed by the FBI.
Information Obtained From Tax Returns
(s)
Papich is unaware of any instance where CIA has made use of tax returns
to obtain information on Americans.
PAPICH'S PHILOSOPHY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS
It is Papich's belief that while the intelligence services of the United
States presently obtain great amounts of information through new techno-
logical developments, they are still unable to read the minds of the
leaders of foreign countries. Consequently, they must attempt to pene-
trate through clandestine efforts. The only way to successfully penetrate
is to permit those conducting the operation to go about their business
unburdened by numerous reporting requirements. Papich's philosophy is
"If you want the job done right, give me X number of men and leave me
alone." He questions whether this philosophy can be adopted in the United
States in 1975, as faith in the leadership is an essential factor. He be
lieves that such operations can be controlled and overseen by the Director.
of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the President.
Papich indicated that the differences between Hoover and Sullivan have
nothing to do with CIA. Hoover was convinced that all dissident groups
were directed by the Communist Party, whereas Sullivan disagreed. These
differences affected the Hoover-Sullivan relationship only after Papich
retired.
Papich believes that the FBI lost stability when A. H. Belmont (the No. 3
man at the time) retired in 1967. He presently resides in Palo Alto,
California. Belmont was loyal to Hoover, but he had excellent rapport
with the agents and could put things in their proper perspective.
fact, Belmont was most useful in resolving differences between CIA and Hoover.
Belmont's successors (DeLoach and Sullivan) could not measure up.
In
JNR/vmr
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CC:
D. Belin
Senior Counsels
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