2000an
104-10338-10018
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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OCI No. 1586/64
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 June 1964
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America
Since July 1963
CI-
1.2
1.
Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America
are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent
major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and
Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when
Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely
in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevi-
tability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the
hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however,
Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to vio-
lence and have emphasized other policy priorities.
Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in
Latin America remains high.
2.
In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro re-
captured much of the militant tone of his speeches
in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards
Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance
for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin
America. He claimed that what has been done in
Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many
Latin American countries." The hemisphere's mili-
tants, he said, must take advantage of conditions
presently favoring revolution and "open the breach."
On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperial-
ists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution,"
the Cubans believe that before that could be accom-
plished "many other revolutions like ours will ap-
pear on the continent." On 24 November, Che
Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the
hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is
part of our daily preoccupation."
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3. What emerged from these and other Cuban
pronouncements was the apparent conviction of
Castro and his aides that further Communist revolu-
tions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba
can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own
interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be
initiated wherever possible and as soon as pos-
sible. It is logical to assume that despite recent
official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic
Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders
continue to believe that the very presence of their
regime will inspire other Latin American revolu-
tionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue
to give assistance to these efforts.
4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemi-
sphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since
the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a
Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example,
OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending;
despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign,
constitutional government in Venezuela was success-
fully transferred following President Leoni's dra-
matic election victory last December; and the out-
breaks of violence in Panama last January failed to
upset constitutional processes there. The April re-
volt in which President Goulart of Brazil was over-
thrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These
reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that
a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro
may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary
tactics when he visited the USSR Tast January. This
year has been designated "the year of the economy."
This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed
commercial and industrial goods from West
also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its
public expressions of support for revolution. More-
over, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy
on revolution now may pay dividends after the US
elections in November. He probably assumes that
conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his
terms--will be more favorable then.
5. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the
accompanying country-by-country index shows that
Cuba has continued since the first of the year to
promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro
groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (be-
fore the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British
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Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least
two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as
restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In
an interview published in an Italian newspaper in
March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national
liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to
violence. He emphasized that violence would be
"necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries,
for "there is no other way. In an April interview
in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very,
very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin
America by employing peaceful means.
"
"
6. A number of reliable clandestine sources
have provided information on the many facets of
Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most
serious form of subversion from Havana is its train-
ing of other Latin Americans in the practical arts
of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received
such training in 1962. It is estimated that several
hundred the known 2.431 Ext Americans who
traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such train-
ing. It has been learned that "scholarship students"
who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" re-
ceive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction
encompasses the use and management of communications
equipment; the techniques of military intelligence,
including methods of establishing intelligence net-
works to obtain information from peasants; training
in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small
arms, which are readily available in most Latin
American countries; training in explosives, and
training in guerrilla tactics, including instruc-
tion on how to operate independently in the country-
side for extended periods of time. A separate train-
ing school reportedly trains Communist youth from
other Latin American countries. The school's one-
year course is divided between the study of Commu-
nist theory and practical training in political
agitation and subversive activities. Reports from
returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are de-
veloping extensive files on most Latin American
countries on subjects pertinent to the planning
and development of further subversive activity.
Detailed questionnaires submitted to 11 Argen!
trainees requested comments on possible air drop
zones, weather conditions, locations of military
bases, competence of local authorities, border and
frontier controls, and a long list of similar ques-
tions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic
knowledge
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7. Latin Americans returning to their coun-
tries after having received training in Cuba often
take a round-about route to conceal the fact that
they have been in Cuba.
CONFERILLED flights to Prague. They then go through
Europe to some other Latin American country, from
which they enter their own. Cuba gives these
travelers documents which show no indication that
they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare
trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments
and are given special training in clandestine.com-
munications, which permits them to maintain a con-
tact with Cuba after they have returned home.
8.
In addition, Latin Americans who receive
guerrilla warfare and other types of training in
Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass
on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are
known to have been conducting such training in
Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and else-
where. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary ef-
fort in Latin America has a potential for steady
growth even if there should be a lessening in the
actual training program in Cuba.
•
9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba
is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central
and South American-based extremist groups. Only
in the case of the arms cache discovered in Vene-
zuela on 1 November, however, has there been in-
controvertible proof of Cuban complicity in such
efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive
arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the
hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-
established patterns of arms smuggling between
nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does
possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo
planes which are well-suited to gun-running or
air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used
for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have
always stressed the importance of Latin American
revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from
local sources. Moreover, some financing from
Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.
10. Another important aspect of Havana's ef-
forts in Latin America is centered on supporting
and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana
has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide
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labor organization which could serve as a platform
for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban
labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of
Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its con-
stituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends
Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such
a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if
in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with
the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's sup-
port for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth
Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This
conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now
is attempting to organize another hemisphere "soli-
darity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in
This proposed congress--which, however, is
being officially discouraged by the Canadian govern-
∙ment--would be modeled on a similar effort staged
in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.
July.
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ANNEX
Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion
1.
Argentina
Clandestine reporting for the past year con-
firms that the Cubans are cooperating with small
extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to estab-
lish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina.
Extreme-left wing Peronists
Americo, Baritos.
and Hecto
Halon have been in close liaison with Cuban
agents B
Machen, and elsewhere. (Gallego
appears to be the principal support agent of a
group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peron-
ists believed to be directed and supported by the
Cuban embassy Dr Montevideo.
Last January, Gallego traveled to the provinces
of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where
Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla
camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested
in that raid are known to have had guerrilla war-
fare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items
found at these camps was a book written by Jorge
Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a
director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be
"Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge
of the small guerrilla bands discovered in north-
ern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL
rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas pos-
sessed the same specifications as those found in
the 1 November Venezuelan arms cache. It is be-
lieved to be of Cuban origen.
Yes trave
Subversive
BEZOI
2. Bolivia
Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been
centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro
sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice
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President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La
Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his sup-
porters some arms and money to aid his bitter strug-
gle with President Paz Estenssoro for political
domination of the country
Lovernmen
Kemisizleaders, Cuban
Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban government
believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat
cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups.
He said Havana was prepared to supply the required
arms.
Fel table
as told
ここま
gave him two boxes of arms to be distrubuted among
the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time
were in revolt against his government
Try of Lean that
Cuban government was willing to provide financial
and material support to Lechin for his campaign
to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential
elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban
agents in early April to discuss his financial
needs and to determine what he was prepared to of-
fer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.
In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist
Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which
aspires to establish a terrorist organization on
the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of Na-
tional Liberation, was organized last year with
the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the
Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught
in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the
home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force
and near the residence of the US Ambassador.
The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia
as a staging area from which to send trained sub-
versives into neighboring countires. It is pos-
sible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in
northern Argentina may have come across the border
from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been
a favorite transit area for terrorists returning
to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare
training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Com-
munist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led
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police to an arms cache which was to be used to sup-
port guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authori-
ties have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-
Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year.
BOFLY
1964
3.
Brazil
Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba
was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil
providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda
support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operat-
ing primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro,
Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's
Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel
Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-
in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately
described Brizola as having the best prospects for
starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The
ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao
from late 1963 until the April overthrow.
Febmfa
Source ret
of Cuban
sistance to finance his expanding press
and radio activities and to "buy some arms" from his
Popular Mobilization Front. The same sounce reported
•
meneies to buy arms In addition, a usually
reliable
Combassy Lu Mexico City reports that about 10 days
before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Ha-
vana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster
the Brizola forces. Four Cuban couriers reportedly
took the money to Brazil
Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda
operation in Brazil, primarily through the local
office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member
in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that
the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba,
The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues
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had increased to the point where they covered all
major cities%;B Rio alone had seven. Similar or-
ganizations existed at the national level, such
as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National
Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also
broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.
Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an
excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-
Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of
the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL) –
which is planned to replace the moribund Confedera-
tion of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in
Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delega-
tion to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American
Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on
9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew,
who brought a letter from the President warmly sup-
porting the conference. Brazil was also used as
a transit area for some Latin American subversives
returning to their countries after having received
training in Cuba.
In late April, the dissident Communist Party
of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line,
was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained
leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao
Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged
by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in
Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them
direct support.
d to Cuba in,
4. British Guiana
The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly
pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana,
In contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the
hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to
bring down the existing regime.
Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative
in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and
economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party
(PPP) Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana
ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.
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Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these
ships also transport arms to British Guiana which
allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.
The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Com-
munist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of
Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Ex-
port (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment of 300,000
to the manager of GIMPEX (in September, ostensibly
for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable
source. It is unclear, however, whether the money
was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds
in the past both to the government and to the PPP
publishing house. Another source reports that the
publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan
for PPP salaries and expenses.
Georgetown Holice officials believe Cuban-
trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic
violence which has occurred during the months-long
strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union%; it is
attempting to gain an official endorsement by the
Guianese sugar industry. A senior polite official
has told the US Consul General that six or eight
Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support
for this group's growing terrorist efforts in George-
town. Another source reports some Guianese were
receiving guerrilla training in the interior of
the country in November 1963, presumably for the
newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army.
5. Chile
The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on sup-
port for the presidential campaign of Salvadore
Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist-
dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP),
and he has a chance of being elected in the September
presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba
on several occasions; his campaign manager was in
Havana in January. While there, he was promised
financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually
reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently
said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin Ameri-
can country to enter our camp."
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Chile
a rece
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A clandestine source he has good contacts with,
cuba reported in February that
med Student said some 40 Chileans
would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The
Source said these Chileans had received political
training in Cuba and were returning with funds from
the Cuban government for Allende's presidential
campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identi-
fied 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the
past three years as "subversives," but we have no
evidence of any organized guerrilla training of
Chilean groups in Cuba.
6. Colombia
Cuba has been providing funds to subversives.
in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker-
Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front
for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are
building up the newly activated National Liberation
Front (FLN)%;B and the recently organized National
Liberation Movement have been the principal recip-
ients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source
reported
Colombia to evaluate the FLN and its prospects
and to pass funds for further activity.
Cuba has established some contact with bandit
gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army
troops who are fighting the bandits have found
Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits.
Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training
in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had
substantial success so far in directing bandit
activity for political ends.
Bis
Costa Rica
The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP)
continues to send members for subversive training
Some of these militant returnees have
in Cuba.
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begun training small groups of party members, but
they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-
government action. Much of the pro-Castro acti-
vity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed
against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained
revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on oc-
casion crossed into Nicaragua. The police in-
spector at a town in the Pacific banana zone re-
ported in early February that two unidentified
Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica at-
tempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in
support of Panamanian charges against the US.
The Costa Rican Society for Friendship with
Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed”
to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution
and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other
Latin American countries, is an important Havana
asset in San Jose.
8. Dominican Republic
The country's two militant pro-Communist or-
ganizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ)
and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faith-
ful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly
voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ
guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence
of Cuban material support for this effort. The
quick response from Radio Havana suggests, how-
ever, the existence of a communications link with
one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country.
Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican
Republic also was reflected during the transit
workers strike in early May.
One Dominican who has received guerrilla train-
ing in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary
Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old
APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new or-
ganization is to promote urban terrorism. A ter-
rorist captured by police in mid-March is said to
have told police that this group is receiving arms
and guidance from Castro.
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9. Ecuador
Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the
Ecuadorean government's careful monitoring of
anti-government activities has hampered Cuban ef-
forts there. When the junta began to exile Com-
munists and pro-Castro extremists last fall,
Several took up residence in Havana.
exileszesiding in BULLVla told a clandestine source
in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving
guerrilla warfare training before returning to
Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities.
Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction
of the Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE), is re-
portedly planning a trip to Havana in late May
to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have
laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by
then so that he can "prove his good faith" to the
Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.
Other clandestine sources report Cuban aid
has been offered to supporters of former presi-
dent Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being of-
fered to followers of former president Arosemena.
10. El Salvador
There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-
supported subversion in El Salvador during the
past 10 months. The Castro government probably
helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party
(PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for
guidance and training. Havana radio, heard
clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda
line which can be echoed in locally published
Communist publications.
Havana has at least one well-trained Salvadoran
intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on
selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a
year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare
but in clandestine communications.
Like many
other Cuban agents, he is not actually working
in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from
which he deals with Salvadoran operations across
the border on direct instructions from a Cuban
intelligence officer.
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11.
veled
Guatemala
Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance
to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for
over two years. While we have no firm evidence of
substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandes-
tine sources reported
extremist
me of his followers
The prevIOUS year and returned
mance their activit
addition another source reports one of
ગબ
emad
nowledged by the
banstrained ex-
Mexican Marxist journalist
Victor RT Galan, often used by Castro as an agent
in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is
said to have urged him to work more closely with
the Guatemalan Communists.
Strong anti-Subversive measures by the Peralta
Government have curtailed, but have by no means
eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala.
The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with
special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guer-
rillas are still at large in the mountainous areas
of the country. They maintain reliable communica-
tions and contacts and have the capability to stage
damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.
At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have
traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandes-
tine reporting, it is estimated that another 50
traveled secretly and that these received training
in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination.
12.
Haiti
Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to
two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.
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A French-language transmission is aimed at the
educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed
to the masses. The speaker has been identified
as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist
exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broad-
casts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier.
Some Haitians may have received guerrilla train-
ing in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any
such trainees have returned to Haiti. The long-
time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals
in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for
sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so
desire.
three HarUT
13. Honduras
traveled to Cuba in
Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras
appears to be directed toward support of similar
activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala.
The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an
effective internal security force, and the presence
of long-established routes for smuggling into
neighboring countries make Honduras well suited
for such a role.
Two recent clandestine sources report the
Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of
the Honduran Communist Party to establish an ef-
fective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are
said to favor the establishment of a new organiza-
tion with no direct ties to orthodox Communist
groups. The Cubans are said to have selected
Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to
begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to
investigate their readiness for armed action
against Honduras' military government.
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14. Mexico
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The Castro regime has been careful in the past
to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in
-view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its
embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico.
The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico
City as well as individual Mexican nationals and
exiled Central American residents there to support
subversive activities elsewhere in Central America.
The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico
Galan are a case in point.
Havana may find it difficult, however, to
avoid exploiting the endemic peasant unrest which
is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine
ban embassy
source
ported
Independi
☐ (CCI)
e Communist Led
which has been
The US consul
behind much of the peasant unrest.
general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban
consul there was openly preaching revolution and
distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he
had stepped up the tempo of his activities consider-
ably in recent months.
Lea
12 Mexicans traveled to Cuba in 1963;
fbreked, to Cuba from January through April of
year.
15. Nicaragua
Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua
have been channeled principally through the National
Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revo-
lutionary organization. Most of this group's guer-
rilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along
with members of various other Nicaraguan revolu-
tionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the
form of financial support, training, and guidance,
but details are lacking regarding its current size
or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched
an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern
Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organ-
ization some of its key personnel. Since then,
the FLN has been the object of harassment by both
Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has
shown no capability to make another move soon.
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tos Cuba
16. Panama
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ns are known to have traveled
Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly
to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in
Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11
January incidents, Havana had been increasing its
pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in
starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary
leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the
National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as
the threatened banana workers' strike in October
1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government
campaign. Planning quickened after the early
November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly
other Castro agents. Some of the approximately
100 Panamanians believed to have received training
in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare
courses in December and again in May.
Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban
efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May
1963 national elections. Havana is reliably re-
ported to have provided some funds for campaign
assistance to selected deputorial candidates of
the Radical Action Party (PAR).
Geven Panamanian extremis
In late March iter having s
returned to Panama
varying periods
of time training in Cuba. FO of these were VAN
members. Another group of recently-returned trainees
was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking
to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama
and to launch revolutionary activities in the near
future.
Sixty one Panamanians traveled to Cuba in 1963.
17. Paraguay
Cuban subversive efforts directed against
Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and
training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part
In Montevideo, Uruguay. The Paraguayan Communist
Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the
United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are
the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and
-12-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
-SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
attention, which is given through the Cuban embassy
Montevideo. Some FULNA members have received
guerrilla training in Cuba.
A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the
Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since
mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping
two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the
program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.
Only six Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in 1963.
However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled
to Havana.
18.
Peru
The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for
armed revolution against the Belaunde government is
the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a
militant pro-Castro organization composed of some
1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 450
and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla train-
Ing abroad. most of them in Cuba. Police raids in
January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable
for initiating anti-government action, but the move-
ment is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized.
It has the potential for carrying out a subversive
campaign of considerable disruptiveness, Luis de
la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on
several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.
Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of
lesser importance, but such assistance has been
limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the
Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by
Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated
bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of
the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN)
is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba
for subversive training. Principal FLN leader
Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.
Castro-inspired extremists have exploited re-
curring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past
several months and they have been behind much of
the illegal peasant land incursions which have oc-
curred there.
-13-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
13-00000
hroug
19.
-SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
hree Peruvians are known to have
nº 1963× 16 traveled to Cuba :
this year
Uruguay
We have no evidence of Cuban support for revo-
lutionary activity directed at subverting the
Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to
Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans
and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on
subversive contacts with dissidents from neighbor-
ing countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans,
and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo
has been particularly useful as a transit point for
air travel to Cuba of travelers wishing to conceal
their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been
useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban
propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propa-
ganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of
a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among
Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.
traveled to Cuba
At least 153 uguayans are known to have
traveled to Cuba in 1963
through April of this year
20. Venezuela
The current level of Cuban activity in Vene-
zuela is considered fairly low. International
reprecussions stemming fron the unprecedented dis-
covery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela
on November 1963, the failure of the terrorist
campaign to disrupt the December national elections,
and the presently increased capabilities of the
Venezuelan military and security forces will prob-
ably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the
short run. There is no reason to believe, however,
that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high
priority on Cuba's target list for subversion.
Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed
Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly
will continue, and may even increase.
The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activi-
ties, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963.
The decision in late April of the central committee
of the Communist party to continue using violence
−14-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
-SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
as a political instrument probably presages a gradual
increase of terrorist incidents. Riots in mid-May
led by Communist-dominated students took place in
Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same
time, one successful student-led robbery of a post
office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery
of the university payroll.
Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means
in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist
activities.
-15-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
to Cuba zin
this

13-00000
SECRET
KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963
SECRET
NATIONALITY
January February
To From To From
March
To From
April
To From
May
To From To From
June
ARGENTINA
BOLIVIA
1
7
4
3
3
5
6
0
2
5
3
2
14
0
5
3 21
5
BRAZIL
To From To From
18 27 47 34 12 21 13 14 57 12 4 5 6 0 4 0 37 0 4 9 5 3 15' 1 222
126
11 19 22 13 9 6 18 7 10 5 1 6 25 0 0 24 121 0 2 162 00002 219 242
July
August
To From To From To From
September
October
To From
November
Το From
December
1963
17
2
1
7
0
69 48
བླླ
BR. GUIANA
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
1
0
0
7
10
0
0
1
0
0 10
0 26
25 51
CHILE
31
44
26
20
20
13
42
20
20
8
9 14
3
8
COLOMBIA
54
39
7
12 13
a
7 15
3 7
22
20
-
22 47 175 1
9 70
a
54
18
7 355 316
29
COSTA RICA
23 5
9 0 0 29 1 0 1110803120080501411004
47 56
1
1
14
17
1
8 14
5
1
10 4
182 122
.
DOM. REPUBLIC
0
21
0 0
0
16
ECUADOR
20
0 20
5
6
2
1
1
1
2
0 2
37
-
-
a
8
19 0 11 0
0
0
3 3
74 24
0
0 2
7
0
3 4
4 0
1
EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA
HAITI
10 1 · 31
24
4
2
0
0 121 20
720000540004411030600100.
30 18
0
5
15
0
2
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
18
18
-
0
0 0
0 0
0
0
10
-
-
26
28
12
64 23
0
3 0
2 0
3 0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
1 0
23 22
HONDURAS
11 12 200001101801000800007000
50 39
-
-
-
0
0
-
0
38
6
JAMAICA
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
-
-
0
-
33
0
2
0
0
MEXICO
100
000
81
22 о
26
38
37
18
34 54
14
42
65 28
NICARAGUA
23 27 49 72 512 530
470000 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 000110011 9
34
63
84
36
24 71
སྱཱ
12
PANAMA
4
1
20
20
0
2
1
23 2
0
3 0
15
0
0
0
10
13
-
3
0 0
0
3
61
24
PARAGUAY
2
3
0
4
0
2
0 0
0 0
-
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6 9
.
PERU
6
2
2
4
3
1
5
8
15
3
3 5
4 0
2
a
1
2
0
0
1
2
1 2
33 38
URUGUAY
19 19
16 14
8 8 80529017 15
10 16
56 6 3271063
158 130
VENEZUELA
26
9 9
2 3
9 9 8 0 4 4 8 0 22 0
3 0
37 0
11 10 6030
0
139 35
33
MONTHLY TOTALS 354 296 212 150 124 149 223 88 163 144 73 103 319 47 104 214 587 64
2430 1863
76 380 69 99 126 132
The peaks in January, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the "26 July " movement, and to the international
architects' congress in October.
640219 3
SECRET
13-00000
PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA
-
JANUARY 1964
NATIONALITY
JANUARY
TO
FROM
ARGENTINA
9
3
BOLIVIA
3
1
1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-
nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the
Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.
BRAZIL
0
0
BR. GUIANA
0
29 December 1963
CHILE
14
15
COLOMBIA
0
COSTA RICA
11
13
-
-
not previously reported unknown.
Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban
Revolution.
An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added
to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for
December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to
Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.
3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan
charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to
Habana for 2 January celebration.
5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.
DOM. REP.
0
l
1 attended Architects Congress
ECUADOR
8
0
EL SALVADOR
0
0
GUATEMALA
0
0
HAITI
0
0
HONDURAS
0
1
JAMAICA
0
0
MEXICO
87
45
NICARAGUA
1
PANAMA
1
1
PARAGUAY
0
0
PERU
5
3
SURINAM
0
0
TRINIDAD
0
0
URUGUAY.
0
7
VENEZUELA
5
0
TOTALS
148
91
SECRET
SECRET
13-00000
PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA
-
JANUARY 1964
NATIONALITY
JANUARY
ΤΟ
FROM
ARGENTINA
9
3
BOLIVIA
3
1
BRAZIL
0
0
BR. GUIANA
1
0
CHILE
14
15
COLOMBIA
4
0
COSTA RICA
11
13
1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-
nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the
Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.
29 December 1963
-
-
not previously reported unknown.
Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban
Revolution.
An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added
to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for
December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to
Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.
3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan
charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to
5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.
Habana for 2 January celebration.
DOM. REP.
0
1
1 attended Architects Congress
ECUADOR
8
0
EL SALVADOR
0
0
GUATEMALA
0
0
HAITI
0
0
HONDURAS
0
1
JAMAICA
0
0
MEXICO
87
45
NICARAGUA
0
1
PANAMA
1
1
PARAGUAY
0
0
PERU
5
3
SURINAM
0
0
TRINIDAD
0
0
URUGUAY
0
7
VENEZUELA
5
0
TOTALS
148
91
SECRET
SECRET
13-00000
KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA MARCH APRIL 1964
NATIONALITY
ONALI
MARCH-APRIL
ΤΟ
FROM
ARGENTINA
11
10
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
000
2
0
BR. GUIANA
2
2
CHILE
14
37
COLOMBIA
7
COSTA RICA
3
DOM. REP.
ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA
153
7
2
8
PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party
leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO
delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban
Construction Ministry.
3- Attending May Day Celebration.
0
4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16-
Returning are members of delegation from School
of Economy of University of Chile.
1- En route to East Germany. 2- In attempt to
obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara.
4- Returning from 26th July Celebration.
2- Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning
from military training in Cuba.
HAITI
HONDURAS
000
0
0
JAMAICA
0
0
MEXICO
32
24
NICARAGUA
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
SURINAM
TRINIDAD
122000pk
3- Attending May Day Celebrations.
1
14
3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action
9
0
ō
URUGUAY
14
11
VENEZUELA
17
TOTAL S 130
121
SECRET