198-10009-10099
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System
Date:
6/24/201
AGENCY:
ARMY
RECORD NUMBER:
198-10009-10099
RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
ORIGINATOR : MULTIPLE
FROM:
TO:
TITLE:
DATE:
02/00/1963
PAGES:
153
SUBJECTS:
Identification Form
Agency Information
Document Information
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA
PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN
CUBA 1962
CUBAN SUBVERSION
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT TYPE:
CLASSIFICATION:
RESTRICTIONS:
CURRENT STATUS:
DATE OF LAST REVIEW:
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS:
Secret
IB
Redact
07/15/1998
Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony
concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in
Cuba, etc.
v9.1
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 1
JFK Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
☐ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority.
☐ Refer To.
Review Date,
85/11/2015 By Ker
22
CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II
NO. SUBJECT:
1.
2.
Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA
before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC
Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the
Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator
Stennis
DATE:
Undated
7 Jan 63
3.
SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte
11 Feb 63
4.
SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte
12 Feb 63
5.
6.
SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte
SecNav testimony before HASC
13 Feb 63.
18 Feb 63
7.
Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState
with attached statement by Mr. Martin before
the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject
of communist subversion of the hemisphere
19 Feb 63
8.
SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A. M.)
19 Feb 63
9.
SecNav testimony before HASC
19 Feb 63
i
10.
Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell
D. Taylor, ChJCS
20 Feb 63
11.
Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC
20 Feb 63
12.
- SecDef testimony before SASC
21 Feb 63
13.
Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC
21 Feb 63
14.
SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba)
22 Feb 63
15.
Statement by the Dir CIA for use of the staff of the
Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator
Stennis (Cuban Subversion in LA)
16.
Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent
Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations - U.S. Senate
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.26 Feb 63
(Transmittal
Slip)
13 March 63
CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II (Cont'd)
NO.
17.
SUBJECT:
DATE:
18.
19.
20.
Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert
Subj: Cuba with Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13 and 14 included as attachments
.
Study on Cuba as a Base for
--prepared by Bob
Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara
at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def
Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis
Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US
Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano
w/draft of President's message atchd
Sub
Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm
on Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military
Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8)
8 Mar 63
Undated
29 Mar 63
Undtd
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RANSMITTAL SLIP
TO:
ROOM NO.
3E985
REMARKS:
2
DATE
26 Feb 6(
Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance
BUILDING
Pentagon
FROM:
ROOM NO.
CIA
FORM NO.241
1 FEB 55
SWORD
-07 10:00 AM °63
OFFICE
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
William A. Tidwell
BUILDING
EXTENSION
6614
Code143
GPO: 1957-0-439445
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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35
khs
286
PER
RECEIVEU
COUPUINATION &*
DIVIS
STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE
STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS
OSA, ASG Control No. 519
SECRET
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25 February 1963
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
I. Introduction
The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the
daily record of events in Latin America, and reports
from our intelligence, sources within Communist and
other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-
phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel
Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com-
munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow
and seize control of the governments in Latin America.
Even before the October missile crisis--and with
increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been
exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and
terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban
support takes many different forms, but its main thrust
is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the
training, and the communications and technical assist-
ance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.
In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from
other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we
will pay your way, we will train you in underground
organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sab-
otage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you
get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we
will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup-
port, send you propaganda materials for your movement,
training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret
communications methods, and perhaps funds and special-
ized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as
we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cu-
ban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad-
visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them:
"If you succeed in establishing something effective
by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland,
if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con-
front regular armed forces, then we may consider more
concrete forms of assistance."
So far, it should be noted, none of the movements
in South America has reached this final stage--and in
fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had
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to fight a pitched battle with regular military for-
mations which might have required more advanced weap-
ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns.
In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version
of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-
ing revolution wherever it flourishes.
We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cu-
ban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part
in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We
know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier,
from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We
know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that
some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped
with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.
Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's pri-
ority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the
recent meeting of Communist front organizations for
Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both
emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in
speeches in January. One of our established sources
of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Vene-
zuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee
agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the pres-
ent situation in Venezuela is out of the question."
This same source reported that Communist guerrilla
and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed un-
der a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates
activities with the other militant extremist groups in
Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the
Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or-
ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist-
ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter
ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate
shootings. These were also designed to dissuade Pres-
ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this,
of course, they failed.
The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized.
The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done
with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has
reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go
out at night in some sections of the capital. But it
is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that
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this level of activity is not the sort of thing that
will bring down the government unless the president
or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN
has not reached a point where it stands up to the
armed forces, or seizes and holds government build-
ings.
We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train-
ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any
other country. Our estimate is that more than 200
Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of
these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and
others were rounded up and given long prison sentences
when they committed themselves prematurely last spring
in a countryside where the rural population strongly
supports the Betancourt administration. One of our
best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela
tells us that at present the unified command has less
than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated
groups of 15 to 25 men each.
II.
The Cuban Plan
For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push-
ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin
American revolution, with the implication that nothing
more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro ac-
tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on
July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue
making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera
of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American
continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro
said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over-
turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be
in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months,
Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both
in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Com-
munists which have been repeated to us, have been in-
sisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve
power in Latin America only by force.
The Cuban effort at present is far more serious
than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that
the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into
such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic-
aragua and the Dominican Republic during the first
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eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today
the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more
covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-
craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced
Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including
veteran Spanish Communists.
The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa-
ganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha-
vana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of
public record. It may be worth noting that the postal
and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on
the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda
coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes
into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the
airport or in the post office and destroyed.
The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla
trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form
of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the
texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che
Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents
have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet,
about two and a half by four inches, called "150 ques-
tions on guerrilla warfare, " written by a Spanish Civil
War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba,
and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with
100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's
books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and
mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and in-
cludes drawings on how to place demolition charges as
well as charts for calculating the force of various
explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's
book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of
Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-
guerrilla organization in Colombia.
All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla
must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how
to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary
preparations from materials that he can obtain easily
and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that
his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come
from "the enemy - that is, from the security forces
in his homeland.
"1--
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III. Training
We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps
as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962,
from all the other Latin American countries with
the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideo-
logical indoctrination or guerrilla warfare train-
ing or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the
limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.
The largest contingents have come from Vene-
zuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some
of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed
to let it appear that the trainees had merely at-
tended some conference or celebration and done a
little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as
a year, and may include intensive training in such
things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological
warfare.
We have devoted a great deal of effort to
monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the
main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao.
(Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM
may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great
lengths to conceal the fact that some of these
trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they
stayed. However, we know a great deal about this
travel from our penetrations of the Communist par-
ties, from controlled agents we have been able to
maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and
from cooperative travel control authorities in
Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in
Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate
piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes
home, will only show that he has been in Mexico.
We have a record, however, of those who fly on to
Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of
travel through Montevideo before the quarantine,
the Cubans furnished passports under other names
for travel by way of Curacao.
We derive some of our figures from travel con-
trol points, and another set from the information
we receive from penetration agents of established
reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the
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Latin American governments are also able to maintain
fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to
have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-
checking from lists of names furnished us by several
of our agents who have undergone training, and in
confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in
Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we
come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known
to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962.
We have to make allowance for some who did not re-
ceive guerrilla training, and allowance in the op-
posite direction for those whose names have escaped
our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjust-
ments by the cross-checking information mentioned
above.
Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home,
by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using
Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships
as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This
is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in
some cases permits further indoctrination and train-
ing in Bloc countries.
Under the circumstances we consider that our
estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees
in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that
the scope and volume of this training is being stepped
up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.
The basic training covers cross-country movement:
of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general
guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took
such a four-week course more than a year ago, under
cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned
to his Havana hotel every few days during the course
to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An
Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then
was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great
deal of detail on the type of training. He reports
that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The
Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their Interna-
tional Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into na-
tional units from a particular country, in effect
forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to
the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."
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A trainee who recently returned to Peru after
several months of training in Cuba, said that all
his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and
other similar demolition targets on detailed maps
of Peru. They were also required to fill out a
lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibil-
ities for subversion of police, methods for illegal
entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air sup-
ply, possible points of attack against police and
military posts, and similar information necessary
for directing subversion and insurrection.
Numerous reports come to us indicating that in
such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru,
where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either
in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu-
bans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors
or advisors for these forces. These reports are in-
variably second-hand, and we have not been able to
confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned
out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas
referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and
was training others, rather than a Cuban national.
However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals
were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya,
Peru, last December, which culminated in several
million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of
the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company.
One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed
invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by
land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature con-
tributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to
crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the
complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that
they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban in-
structors, but found there were none. This came to
light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent,
relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in
the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in
Peru in November.
IV. Weapons
In general, the Cubans appear to be following
the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision
of arms.
We have strong evidence, from numerous
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sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare
students and their leaders to obtain their own weap-
ons at home.
One of our agents who was in the original group
of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively
in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle
and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His
group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian
guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture
from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Ar-
gentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors
told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because
there was a plentiful source of supply for any de-
termined guerrilla movement in its own homeland.
Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and
Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have
been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing
to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance.
Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is
reported to us by our agents in these same groups.
We have recently again checked with all of our
stations in Latin America to review what evidence we
have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio
transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba.
(In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen
last fall that this was unnecessary)) In 1962, Cuba
furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smug-
gled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees
who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident
last March had been issued kits containing a Czech
rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin.
Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla
hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen
locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country.
We do not have a single case where we are certain
of the Cuban origin of captured arms.
This is not to say that we are positive weapons
have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a
long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, in-
numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones,
and inadequate security forces to control all such
channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been
telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send
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them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that
he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units,
but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making
this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment.
In summary, we have evidence that in principle
Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons
to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have
no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do
so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat-
ing uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless
to say, this is a matter that we consider of most ser-
ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that
comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to
Latin American countries.
V. Funding
Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin
America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our
evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers
carrying cash. The following are a few examples of
these operations.
A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned
from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several
witnesses to have large quantities of US currency
stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suit-
case. There is no law against bringing currency into
Venezuela, so that authorities could not even deter-
mine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was cap-
tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.
A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-
carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in Sep-
tember, 1961, when weather forced the plane to over-
fly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to
be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was
bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.
Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla
training camp in the mountains west of Quito and ar-
rested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary
Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted
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having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together
with funds to support their activities. One item
of $44,000 was publicized in the press..
A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected
last November has given us a specific account of pro-
cedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weap-
ons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also
have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers
by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American
front groups to pay for political and propaganda ac-
tivity. In some countries where the Cubans still have
diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats show-
ing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-
group propaganda.
In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to
receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked
up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying
to some of those same guerrilla training camps ex-
posed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man
admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him
the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla
camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the
communications between the pro-Commanist Peasant Leagues,
which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.
The principle that guerrillas must be self-sus-
taining has obviously been applied to finances as well.
Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob-
beries in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most
spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub-
urb last year which netted almost $100,000. From
the participants, who have been caught, we know that
the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guer-
rillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot
fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals
has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed
to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo
Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank
in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000
by men wearing FALN armbands.
VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts
International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations
maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all
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times, with regularly scheduled and special broad-
casts to specific countries as well as general trans-
missions to all Latin America. The general theme
of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is
awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op-
portunity for revolutionary action against the "cor-
rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism"
which allegedly supports them. Within the last two
months there has been an increase in the aggressive-
ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.
The official Cuban international service called
‘Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda out-
let. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta-
tion broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50
minutes of propaganda in languages which include
Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and
Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediter-
ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.
Radio Havana's international service was in-
augurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly
since that time and is now Latin America's first in-
ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours.
Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:
Haitian Creole to Haiti
Arabic to the Mediterranean area
7 hr
5 hr 15 min
English to Europe
9 hr 20 min
English to the Western Hemis-
phere
17 hr 30 min
French to Europe
French to Canada
French to Mediterranean
Portuguese to Brazil
Spanish to Europe
Spanish to the Americas.
- 9 hr 20 min
3 hr 20 min
3 hr 30 min
7 hr
16 hr 55 min
108 hr 30 min
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In addition to the regularly scheduled inter-
national service, Radio Havana has been known to
broadcast special programs in order to take advan-
tage of unique political situations. When serious
disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in
late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a
self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was
located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the
overthrow of the Dominican government. The station
went off after about a week, but not before direc-
tion finder bearings and other technical clues in-
dicated that it had been transmitting from Radio
Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.
Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities
available to political groups from other Latin Ameri-
can countries so they can beam programs to their home-
lands. These programs, which have the evident intent
of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are
presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week
schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re-
public. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua
and Honduras until last September when they were
replaced by a single program with wider targets now
programmed nightly. These special programs are ex-
emplified by the programs transmitted to the Domini-
can Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto"
by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on
the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist
agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re-
public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist
group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National
Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican
university students to demonstrate against the Con-
stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.
:
There are also two special programs beamed to
the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one
hour a week transmission in English aimed at US
Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice
of Cuba, " is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a
wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in
Florida and also in many parts of southern United
States.
The technical facilities of Radio Havana are
at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles
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southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four
shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the
past as many as five have been observed on the air
at the same time. These transmitters range in power
from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to
be heard all over the world. Programs are being
sent from studios to the transmitter site by means
of microwave relays.
VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion
Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has ob-
viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos-
cow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It
has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping
but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split be-
tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--
call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step
back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin.
American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only
seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival
servants in its Latin American subversion.
Castro's views on what is good for socialism
and revolution in Latin America are more in line with
those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets.
Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are
totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite
of differences over tactics and timing between var-
ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de-
liver the Latin American countries into the Commu-
nists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conser-
vative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent
on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible
and by subversion rather than by force.
Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly
increasing. An excellent example of this was the set-
ting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in
the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose
of this institute is to raise the study of the prob-
lems of Latin America, which in their own statements
the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest
possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese
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languages is to be stressed in the institute and
throughout the school system. A list of subjects
on which this institute intends to publish shows
that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for
Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance pro-
gram in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. We
have been reliably informed that posters have been
placed in some Colombian universities referring to
the problems of the "national liberation and work-
ers' movements in Latin American countries" as top-
ics which will be studied by the institute. Re-
sults of these studies will be published in the
near future in a magazine called America Latina,
intended especially for distribution in Latin America.
A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the in-
stitute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will
in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic ex-
pansion of the USA" in Latin America. The institute
also expects to enter into close contact with leading
Latin American scientists and academicians during
1963.
One of the most important Communist assets in
Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic
and Cuban missions. These missions are used to fur-
ther Communist subversive activities even in coun-
tries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions.
The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well,
have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argen-
tina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations
with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba
maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia,
Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists have no
diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba.
That fact alone would make Cuban missions important
to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries.
Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru--have no official ties
whatever with any bloc country.
Uruguay offers a good example of how the Com-
munists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor-
tance the Communists attach to them. We have found
that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are
not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity
against the government. In this case even the Cu-
bans appear to be much more interested in retaining
the good will of the government so that they can con-
tinue to use the country as a base of operations
:
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against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplo-
matic missions, however, are active in supporting
local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to re-
tain enough leverage within the country so as to
prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a
break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan
government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly
tolerant of the activities of these missions and
of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of
the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic mis-
sions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel.
In addition, couriers and travellers can go back
and forth between this city and the bloc countries
and Cuba at any time.
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ANNEX A ARGENTINA
A participant has given us a detailed account
of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course
given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July
to December 1962. Instruction included such sub-
jects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, com-
munications, construction of defenses, guerrilla
strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and
open order drill. The trainees practiced with
Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns,
Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a
57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group
reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were
given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean,
and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.
Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that
they had raided a warehouse which had served as head-
quarters for terrorists working with both the Peron-
ists and Communists. According to the police, the
gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into
Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel
of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and
had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds,
weapons, and explosives.
A special Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay,
provides false documentation for Argentines and
Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla train-
ing.
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Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a po-
lice patrol stopped to investigate, they found he
was carrying a number of rifles in his car.
In the last week of January, another of the ori-
ginal batch of trainees in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues
Lima, was arrested by national security police at an
airport. He was carrying a suitcase full of ammuni-
tion for some of the camps which apparently are still
operating. Jeronimo Rodrigues at first refused to
talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted; announced
he would tell his whole story. So far, according to
the press, he has revealed that a woman attorney in
Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had
bought another farm to continue the Peasant League
guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for
the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in
his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends
to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the
farm, and work it.
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ANNEX B BRAZIL
Co
Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now
have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement
in subversion directed against Brazil. These are the
so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authori-
ties when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial dele-
gation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro
on 27 November.
The documents, a letter and attachments from
"Gerardo" to "Petronio," comprised a report from a Cu-
ban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover
name, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it
plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by
Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to
set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the
framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization.
The report, which relays complaints of some of the
guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear
that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued
by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cu-
ban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved.
Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police
official checking on possible clandestine landing fields
in the interior, ran across evidence of the training
camps and arranged to have some of them raided even be-
fore the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up
no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps
happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-
Petronio correspondence. The Varig document provided
the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources
matched their details perfectly, and it has become im-
possible for the Communists and the Peasant League to
obtain serious consideration for any claim that the docu-
ments might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their
authenticity.
The Peasant League operation, which was staffed
by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take
guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues
to provide evidence against Cuba. Although the Cubans
apparently have done their best to avoid all contact
with the guerrilla organization since the exposé, Bra-
zilian police continue to turn up further ramifications
of the operation. The second-in-command of the Peasant
League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir
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ANNEX C CHILE
On 28 October 1962, at the height of the mis-
sile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly
in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean
police who searched the apartment found four members
of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6
cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite,
38
fuses, and one small bomb already assembled.
One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had
his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed
with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these,
Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares,
have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence of-
ficers. The Chilean police told the press that the
group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and
residence, US firms, and local public utilities. This
incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana
broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack
US property and installations wherever possible in
Latin America.
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ANNEX D
CHER
ECUADOR
Well-placed and reliable agents have reported
that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had
given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolution-
ary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare
training.
More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including
three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean para-
troopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp
at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles
west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to
Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez
Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain
Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive
guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.
When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January
arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders in-
volved with the guerrilla operation in order to re-
store full Communist control, newspapers reported that
the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists
of wasting Cuban funds.
Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio
Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962,
was reported to have photographs showing him under-
going guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel
Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee
and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians,
was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed
a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by
Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also
shown a key which he boasts is the ignition key for
a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon
as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.
Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at
least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for
guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees
listed by name.
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ANNEX E PERU
www.
The ruling military junta in Peru started in
February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists,
including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indict-
ment, the government charges that the extremists have
attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla
forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in
San Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted
in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-
spaced pages. The security forces have given us no
evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is
ample evidence of Cuban involvement.
零零
The trials center on the activities of the Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organiza-
tion for extremist militants founded by De La Puente
Uceda in 1961. De La Puente had just returned from
Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the
revolution in Peru with economic and technical help
from Fidel Castro. This phrase from the indictment
conforms with reports our agents received at the time
from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of
the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched
by the junta early in January. We believe he is in
Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, a
which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian
associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.
Although the government did not move against
the Communists and other extremist groups with any
great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion
goes back at least as far as March 1962. Peruvian
police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains
into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible
only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously
raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from
which trainees were being sent to the camp. As a re-
sult, they found complete guerrilla kits including
Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for
dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates,
and two radio transmitters brought in from Cuba. The
custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact
a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this
incident were released, but have been picked up again
in the January roundup and are to be included in the
mass trials.
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An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba
last fall has provided a detailed account of his
training, lists of other trainees he could identify,
and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans
apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it
is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla war-
fare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint
possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large
map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information
on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to
subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry
into and travel in Peru, the problems of setting up
business firms to cover espionage and agent opera-
tions, and information on location of and access to
police and military installations.
Three major guerrilla groups, according to
good reports from our agents and from Peruvian po-
lice, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for
coordinated action. This may be one factor that per-
suaded the junta to move against the extremists.
The main guerrilla strength at present is a
force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate
to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla
force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peru-
vian authorities to have received his guerrilla train-
ing in Argentina. If in fact he has 2,000 men, this
figure includes landless peasants and Indians,
largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to
believe that more than a small proportion are trained
and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are
almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are
with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops be-
cause the local police detachments have been unable
to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and
agent reports have established that the guerrillas
are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bo-
livian military and smuggled across the frontier
into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Com-
munist share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.
As one example of the activities of the co-
ordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the
Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guer-
rillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the
village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima,
and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas
with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three
local banks and retreated to the hills.
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ANNEX F VENEZUELA
Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban
subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing.
Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking
Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963,
told various visiting Latin American Communists that
Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin
America. Venezuela is receiving priority attention
from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt re-
gime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods.
It would appear from the meager evidence avail-
able in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists
have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban
involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic cam-
paign which is being waged in the country. The wave
of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela
has physically exhausted the handful of competent men
in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or
no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban in-
volvement.
Support from Havana can be inferred, however,
if only from the expert character of the sabotage
carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was
discovered that the Communists have begun to use
shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines.
Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explo-
sives.
The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Com-
munist Party, which is directly charged with the mis-
sion for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has
been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts
of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with ad-
vanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges,
pipelines and pumping stations. All of these acts
have been well planned and professionally executed.
There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist
sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and
November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana
to attack all American installations in Venezuela as
a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.
Last November a Venezuelan military court tried
139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto
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Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences.
Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba.
One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time
been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban army
maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large
sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several
trips there. He was also the recipient of large
quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda.
Venezuelan police early in January raided a
house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Com-
munist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba,
and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reach-
ing Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested
attempting to enter the house. The armed forces
have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be
located on the grounds of the Central University in
Caracas, communicating with another station which they
believe to be in Cuba.
Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader
in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revo-
lutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for
procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When
the man himself was arrested, police found a radio
transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car.
We have received reports from a reliable source
that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramili-
tary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last
September for assistance. Castro reportedly had prom-
ised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. How-
ever, Castro is reported to have given Martinez
$50,000 instead, and offered to train some of Martinez'
men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable
to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not
permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was
further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia
Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000
to finance sabotage operations against North American
business installations in Venezuela. Mrs. Martinez was
visiting in Cuba at the time that she received these
funds.
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B-9
The Caltan
Ceres
Then
INVESTIGATION OF
THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM
INTERIM REPORT BY
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE
Of The
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
Under The Authority Of
S. Res. 75
(88th Cong., 1st Sess.)
On
THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
5812 (8)
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OATSD (LA) CONTROL NUMBER
A
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Richard B. Russell, Georgia, Chairman
John Stennis, Mississippi
Harry Flood Byrd, Virginia
Stuart Symington, Missouri
Henry M. Jackson, Washington
Sam J. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina
Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
Clair Engle, California
Howard W. Cannon, Nevada
Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusette
Margaret Chase Smith, Maine
J. Glenn Beall, Maryland
Barry Goldwater, Arizona
Clifford P. Case, New Jersey
Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia
Stephen M. Young, Ohio
Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii
Harry L. Wingate, Jr. Chief Clerk
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE
John Stennis, Mississippi, Chairman
Stuart Symington, Missouri
Henry M. Jackson, Washington
Strom Thurmond,
Carolina
Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusetts
Margaret Chase Smith, Maine
Barry Goldwater, Arizona
James T. Kendall, Chief Counsel
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
U. S. Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
Committee on Armed Services,
Honorable Richard B. Russell,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U. S. Senate
May
1963.
My Dear Mr. Chairman:
There is transmitted herewith an interim report by the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate
Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.
In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received
testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the
Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report
transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military
developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection
with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have
been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.
The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry
into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more
subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.
It is necessary that this interim report to the full
Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the
Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security
purposes and will have the report printed and released to the
public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security
matters have been deleted.
Respectfully,
JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.
SECRET
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CONTENTS
INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
Page
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
Introductory Statement.
Summary of Major Findings
Situation Prior to Mid-July, 1962.
((A) Cuban Forces.
(B) Intelligence Activities and Operations
Situation From Mid-July to October 22, 1962...
(A) Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment.
(B) Identification of Specific Weapons
and Equipment.
(1) SA-2 Sites.
(2) Cruise Missiles.
(3) MIG-21 Fighters..
(4) IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers.
(5) Medium Range and Intermediate:
Range Missiles.
•
(C) Failure to Identify Soviet Organized
Combat Units....
(D) Alleged Photographic Gap....
(E
(F
Transfer of U-2. Flights From CIA to SAC.
Intelligence Activities and Operations
Generally...
Situation From October 22, 1962, to Time of
Removal of IL-28 Bombers..
(A) Intelligence Activities and Operations
Generally..ové
(B) Identification of Organized Soviet
Combat Units.....
(C) Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers
Current Military Situation in Cuba.....
(A) Intelligence Activities and Operations
Generally....
(B) Nature and Capabilities of Forces and
Equipment Now in Cuba....
(1) Types and Numbers of Weapons.
•
137785
10
10
11
11
11
13
15
16
17
1222222222 222 ~ mm2 22 mm
21
21
22
23
23
(2) Strength and Capabilities of Forces.... 26
(3) Reports of Concealed Strategic
Weapons in Cuba....
(4) Withdrawal of Soviet Personnal.
(C) Summary of Threat Arising From Soviet
Presence in Cuba.....
(D) Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion.
Concluding Statement...
30
31
32
34
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INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUF
I.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are
now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic
and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba and President
Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive
weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.
However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation has not
subsided. There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still
maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other
underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in
numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports
also abound with respect to the use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agita-
tional and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.
The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation into the entire subject
matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still
continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at
this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments
and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early
1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discus-
sion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included
in a subsequent report.
Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections
of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of
State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the
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Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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It is used in this report, however, in a
somewhat more limited sense! Where the term appears in this report it primarily
refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other
agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the
extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or
operations discussed.
Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive
bearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen.
Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General
Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear
Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General
Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Air
Force.
The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written
reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have
also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Security
of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolution-
ary Council.
In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation
and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official
positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent
approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.
Information has also been received from individual Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives.
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This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from
the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee. It does, however,
include some information from other sources.
Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any
overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings,
based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence
activities during the military buildup have been incorporated. Our general
recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all
activities taking place in Cuba.
II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some
areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems
were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance
characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather
and an almost completely closed society.
2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this
capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence
of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those
involved in this mission.
3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting
intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several
substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of
the information and data which was accumulated.
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4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence com-
munity to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with
Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence
judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were:
(a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on
October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that
organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our
plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were neces-
sarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous
Cuban defense forces.
(b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially under-
estimated throughout the crisis. On October 22nd, our intelligence people
estimated that there were 8000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that,
at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on
the island.
(c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on
October 14th that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles
had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14th negative
judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment
as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed
were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing
factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to
discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.
5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges
and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to
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October 14th. The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion
that such charges are unfounded.
6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2
high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14th were also closely
inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to
support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from
the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock
or friction between the agencies.
7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion
that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However,
they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that
offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They
also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from
penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that,
based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about
the matter.
Military-connected activi-
8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the
Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment
of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports
continue to insist that they are being so utilized.
ties have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of
the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the
storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage
of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a
substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence
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confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.
9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been
withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic
missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this is illustrated by
the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equip-
ment pre-located, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could
be made operational in a matter of hours.
10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet
personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving,
according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of 4000
to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelli-
gence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as
"technical reasons," the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is
unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the
Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate.
There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as
to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree
that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with
the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.
11. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate
that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of
hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall,
we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any
real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the
opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.
12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban
forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe
opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any
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internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear
that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require
large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.
13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the
Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the
United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in
Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive
evidence.
14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring,
aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout
the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous
threat to the peace and security of the Americas.
III.
SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962
A. Cuban Forces
It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of 1962,
the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve
of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability
of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it
was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training,
they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat
team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units
larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained
primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any
attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500
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Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba.
By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the
acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in
It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40
propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.
bloc countries.
The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially coastal patrol type.
Several of these craft in the sub-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been
received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed
Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.
It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July,
1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba
for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then
the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and
equipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World
War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether
the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this
time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then
constituted.
B. Intelligence Activities and Operations
The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962,
consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnais-
sance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from
refugees, exiles, and other human sources.
For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of
Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early 1962, two flights
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were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the
number of flights was increased.
Also, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic
flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters
but not over the Island of Cuba itself.
In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports
were collected and assessed. Included in these reports were many which con-
tained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet
ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the
greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation
of such activities.
In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the
intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities
and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to
Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month.
The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization
However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment
of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the
activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or
strategic weapons were discovered.
of Cuba.
The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba
were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that
it might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be
supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.
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IV.
SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962
A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment
In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant
change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet
Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger,
increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average
of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped
to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during
the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.
While our intelligence people were aware from this and other informa-
tion that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and
impact was not clear to the intelligence community.
During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile
activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as
scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent
and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confir-
mation of them.
At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships
were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel
being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in
small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known
to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore
could not be confirmed.
Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of
the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that
some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim,
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physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of
fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and
other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals,
the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence com-
munity adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and
trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with
improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include signifi-
cant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized
into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information
brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet "per-
sonnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000.
B.
Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment
1. SA-2 Sites About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated
by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention
on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high
altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, estab-
lished positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at
two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from
August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system
can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a
slant range of about 25 miles.
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2. Cruise Missiles A coastal defense cruise missile installation
was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional
cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping
missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th
KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile launchers each were identified in Cuba.
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Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air
Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962, the pre-
sence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture
obtained on September 5, 1962.
4. IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelli-
gence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle)
light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on
September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's
aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was
disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.
5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles As has already been
indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed
reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity
in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It
is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile,
which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identi-
fied, still appears large to the untrained observer.
However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced
into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse
the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion--
apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was a suspect
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a
result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October
14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and
emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range
ballistic missile complex.
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Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many
ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announce -
ment that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evi-
dence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic
missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned
to introduce.
Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance
missions flown after October 14. Six MRBM sites were located, all of which
had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling
of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated
that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational
before being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become
operational by December 15.
The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100
miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles
C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units
As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of
the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwith-
standing the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophis-
ticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the pre-
sence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25
when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a re-
analysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were,
in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba.
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The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people
to be about 5,000 men.
In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba
was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on
October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelli
gence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand.
The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-
up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This
is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One
factor in the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in
October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally
loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and
that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger
ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is believed that additional
Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to
doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great
quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.
The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units
in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present
there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our
plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantial-
ly complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading
forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter
is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained,
powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking
power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States
commanders until several days subsequent to October 25.
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In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascer-
tained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our for-
ces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher
price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba than had been anticipated.
Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of
the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily
armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his
actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from
the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles.
D. Alleged Photographic Gap
There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in
our photographic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5
October
to Stumber 14. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and
have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of
the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be
sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here..
The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted
in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.
On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and
eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central por-
tion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference
to the eastern end of the island.
A flight was planned for September 10th but this was not flown.
On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions,
it was not wholly successful.
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Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights
were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These
flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighte
as requiring early attention.
Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14. On October
12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2
high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October 14, it flew
the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic
missiles in Cuba.
E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC
There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a con-
flict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Com-
mand (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights.
These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA
and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the func
tion of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that
this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.
These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been
found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any
conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photographi
coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being
operated by CIA prior to October 14.
Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the
two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whom
the flights should be flown.
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The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of
the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites
in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight which
was flown on October 14th was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the
possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it
was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be conduct.
ed by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reason.
able and proper.
It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the
one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without
explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern. However, after
inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no signifi-
cance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.
F.
Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over
Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September.
The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been out-
lined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October 14th were flown by the CIA.
After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there
was a concentrated effort to determine the precise nature of the missile buildup
and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the mis
sile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command fle
a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiate
until October 23, the day following the President's message.
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During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over
international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using
refugees, exiles, and other human sources.
In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Sub-
committee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, how-
ever, our intelligence did quite well. The MRBMs were discovered while they
were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a
very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they
were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had
been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were iden-
tified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before
they became operational in a very compressed and limited period of time despite
adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost
completely closed society.
The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited
by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis
commencing in mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles
had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2
plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and
Major Anderson was killed.
CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photo-
graphic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence
operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisors
and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the
presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet
government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part
in the united action of the Organization of American States and world accep-
tance of the correctness of our position.
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Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only
a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important one
It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period
of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deploy.
ment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and
other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other
sources.
The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have
done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and infor-
mation. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears
to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreove
there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence com-
munity to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had
been gathered.
In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the
most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available.
This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the
worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence.
There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence
people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports: This was based on
the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as mili-
tary observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible
among those things which were within their power of observation as to time,
place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest
of the Cuban sources.
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Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets
would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that suc
a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them.
The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent
events. The danger that such pre-conceptions will control the weighing of the
facts as events unfold is evident.
The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligenc
judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A
few of these will be mentioned.
The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that
organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba until pho-
tographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related
fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated
throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.
It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate
that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic con-
firmation was obtained on October 14th. It appears that, on this point, the
analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it
would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba.
In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given
proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile:
complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to
the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile
installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for
the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.
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V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS
A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23,
1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted
effort to obtain detailed information both about the entire island and selected.
targets.
During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Com-
mand flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through Nov-
ember 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air
Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties.
B.
Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Combat Units
As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th pro-
vided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored
task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distributed
to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was
thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized
by the Cuban forces.
C. Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers
To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October
crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic
missiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment,
and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.
A comprehensive and concentrated aerial reconnaissance and fleet obser
vation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equip-
ment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accom-
panied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over
Cuba and Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.
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The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of
the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites
to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it
arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.
As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic mis-
siles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed
by the USSR. However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to
the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible tha
despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.
VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA
A.
Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally
Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers
the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of
the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue
on a regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been
no further attempt to interfere with our aerial reconnaissance.
for this one incident amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights re-
mains a matter for speculation.
The reason
The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources
available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the ill-fated
Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveil-
lance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and sur-
face ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic recon-
naissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the
aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that
radar range permits.
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A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might
become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated ru-
mors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related
to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial
fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe
that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines.
Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide
temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly ex-
tend their time on station away from bloc nation ports, and to facilitate thei
operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficient
depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxa-
tion facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home
for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of
the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods con-
siderably. The use of shore-based long range communication systems and infor-
mation from surface and shore-based radio and radar nets would greatly facili-
tate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempt:
to evade detection.
B.
Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba
1. Types and Numbers of Weapons As previously mentioned, it was tes-
tified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion
level with the effective modern weapons for such units, including rifles, ma-
chine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an
organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized
equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.
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They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light
antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft.
How much of
the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned
above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated.
tiful numbers.
The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plen-
There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit
perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar
to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed. Their fire control system is
also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a
large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite
complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive
training, including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to
replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites
for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites,
are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in
by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are
manned by Soviets is apparently not known.
There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about
30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part
of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment
of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews. As an added feature
of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba,
far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching
sites.
It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have
been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and
thus failed to reach Cuba.
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The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-
speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses.
These boats are
each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated
to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but
Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are appar-
ently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expe-
dition.
The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with
almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of
these weapons,
of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motor-
ized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in
surprisingly large numbers. As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed
to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships
of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy
tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of
almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200
57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field
artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost
100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple laun-
chers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already
in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor
vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.
To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Army tactical missiles
The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10
and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles,
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which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST
JOHN.
According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approxi-
mately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet
fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar
to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios neces-
sary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system,
SA-2 and fighter.
2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces
The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same
level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in
the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.
The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by
their organization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to sup-
press an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents
obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help
given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern
highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United
States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organiza-
tion which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced
battalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long
duration.
The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to
consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other
coastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been
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27
somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is
not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol
'
activities.
The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of
about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters,
about 18 propeller-driven tactical bombers, a considerable quantity of antiair-
craft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters.
The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to have been
turned over to the Cubans.
The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The
assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics.
The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to action
against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real
air cover or air defense capability.
The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intel-
ligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000
are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile
sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting
Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments.
About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which
includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated
7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army contin-
gent in Cuba.
At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of
the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official
estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some
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4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accu-
racy varies even within the intelligence community.
Other sources present con-
siderably higher estimates --some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in
mind the substantial underestimation of last October, we can only conclude that
no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles --knows how many Russian
troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.
The
The
In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with
the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense.
air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness.
coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the
Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary
launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This
gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft.
The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well
coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could
offer severe opposition to any attack. This opposition would be sufficient
to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any
desired air-borne effort in order to be sure of success. The public evidence
of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combina-
tion of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in
the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.
Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe
that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States
or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may
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or may not be now in Cuba.
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We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack
It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of
provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and
present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic
Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the
smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery.
Light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons,
grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter,
Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced
and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a cen-
trally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace
to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. The use of Cuba as a
base for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.
3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba
Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the
strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed
in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these
reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all
strategic weapons are withdrawn.
It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to
the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is
grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of
the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a
result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The
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This
current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on
the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary.
of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14.
There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns
in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and con-
cealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It is also true
that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our
intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact
utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic
missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.
The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with res-
pect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best
be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assump-
tion that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel
were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readi-
ness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of
Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba,
the danger is clear and obvious.
hours.
The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already
been discussed.
4. Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel
Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to
5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first
of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons"
the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba
remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that
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there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also
some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the num-
ber of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected
arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated
their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-
imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we
have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the
matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does
not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction
in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence
that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have
been withdrawn.
C. Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba
Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence
presents to the Americas is as follows:
in Cuba
1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and
agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity
to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin
America.
2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been
withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduc-
tion of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet
forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.
3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR..
4。
The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities
based on Cuba.
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5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originat-
ing from Cuba.
6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict
our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and elec-
tronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States
and the Caribbean.
7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes
launched against the United States from the Soviet Union.
8. Advanced Soviet submarine bases could be established in Cuban ports
with very little effort.
9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a further
reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.
10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin
American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage
techniques.
11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation's
image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability
to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean
if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our very doorstep.
A consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity
of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.
D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion
The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen
to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insur-
1
gents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the
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Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide
evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently
immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper
to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under present circumstances,
that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the peo-
ple in Cuba, will wither and shrink. The communization of the younger ele-
ment creates simultaneously an increasingly militant communist nation.
The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary
psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as
a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of free-
dom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces
standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the
Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to
insurgent forces.
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VII.
CONCLUDING STATEMENT
Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public
debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic
weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being
maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The
matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the
real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this
hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.
we can be
The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and
spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and
sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible.
The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may
be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolu-
tionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may
fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist
goal of isolating the United States has been attained.
Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods
and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates.
With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent.
The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to
violent intervention.
Whatever its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is
conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the
purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is
to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them
with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and
moral control of subjugated peoples.
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This aim and goal has already been ahcieved in Cuba. It will be achieved
elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We
must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national
¨self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western
Hemisphere.
The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting
menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever
alert and vigilant to all of its sinister implications. We must exercise
the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available
resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that
unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised.
The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the
highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that
the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be
eliminated at an early date.
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Mr Califano
Col Patchell ?
March 29, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State
SUBJECT:
Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report
to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962
Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached draft
has been reviewed and the Department of Defense has no objection
to it, subject to the following changes:
1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24."
Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy
records.
2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25"
to "24." Reason: Accuracy.
3.
Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before
word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic"
before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.
C
辈
4. Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert "by December 6”
before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28. Eliminate
the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that
all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their
removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by
along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships
carrying them back to the USSR. Reason: Provide additional
positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal
being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon
information provided by the USSR.
#
"
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Page 71
Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before
"stronger. "Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased
awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats
resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
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N
L
DEPARTMENT
UNITED
STATES
OF
DEFENSE
OF AMERICA
C
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
28 March 1963
U17,171/P-2
SUBJECT:
TO:
Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft
Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN
During 1962
General Counsel
Department of Defense
Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and
the following comments are submitted:
1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason:
Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.
Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24."
Accuracy.
2.
Reason:
11
3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word
"November" and observed" before "42, and "ballistic" before
"missiles. Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.
h
4. Page 37, Lines 13 15: Insert "by December 6" before
"its promise" and "42" before 'IL-28.' Eliminate the sentence
"and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in
number) had left, and substitute "their removal being confirmed
by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on
the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR.'
Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with
reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed
observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.
5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before
"stronger. Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased
awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted
from crisis, particularly in the OAS.
кук 7ваные
JOSEPH F CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
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DEPARTMENT
UNITED ST
OF
BES DEFENSE
OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
28 March 1963
U17, 171/P-2
SUBJECT:
TO:
Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft
Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN
During 1962
General Counsel
Department of Defense
Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and
the following comments are submitted:
1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason:
Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.
2.
Reason:
Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24.
Accuracy.
3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word
"November" "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before
"missiles. Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.
11
4. Page 37, Lines 13 15: Insert "by December 6" before
"its promise and "42" before "IL-28. Eliminate the sentence
"and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in
number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed
by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on
the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR.
Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with
reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed
observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.
11:
5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before
"stronger. Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased
awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted
from crisis, particularly in the OAS.
JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director
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DEPARTMEN
OF
DEFENS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
10:40
3/28/63
March 27, 1963
am
phoned Col. "Tiny
Moore & he'll
have 
DIA
look at it
& regent 
to 
me
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-
dent's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United
Nations during 1962.
The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to
me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if
you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by
1200 hours on March 29, 1963.
плаве
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
Attachment
As Stated
.CC:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)
вез
2490
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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
⚫ 5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
mm Calif
Mini
DATE: March 27, 1963
ΤΟ
: CCA Mr. Hurwitch
FROM : RPA
William G. Bowdle Wa
SUBJECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report
To Congress on US Participation in UN During 1962.
UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has preparad the attached draft chapter:
on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on
US participation in the UN.
Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have
been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about
this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with
the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through
CCA channels. Could you please arrange for this to be done as quickly.
as possible as the report is now overdue?
ARA/RPA: WGBowdler:jjv
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Mr. Califano
March 27, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-
dent's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United
Nations during 1962.
The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to
me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if
you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by
1200 hours on March 29, 1963.
Attachment
As Stated
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)
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Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
DRAFT PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1962
SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA
G
Soviet Buildup
On October 22, President Kennedy announced to the nation and to the world
the "secret, swift and extraordinary buildup" by the Soviet Union of offensive
missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States was taking to
cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the
President the previous Tuesday morning (October 16) and, during the week that
followed, surveillance was stepped up, confirming evidence evaluated, a course
of action decided upon, friendly governments notified and consulted, the
members and machinery of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) brought
into the picture, and American defenses in the Caribbean strengthened and put
of the alert.
The President revealed that a serious threat against the peace and
security of the Americas was being secretly mounted by the Soviet Union on
the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMS) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,000 nautical miles had been
rapidly and secretly installed and additional sites not yet completed were
designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBHs) capable of
travelling twice as far and thus posing a nuclear threat to most of the major
cities of the Western Hemisphere. This urgent transformation of Cuba into a
strategic base with nuclear striking capacity constituted an explicit threat
to the peace and security of the Americas in defiance of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947, "the traditions of this
nation and hemisphere, and the Charter of the United Nations. This Soviet
action contradicted the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both
/publicly and
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-
2
publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain
its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor the world.
community, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate deception
and offensive threat represented by the clandestine deployment of strategic
nuclear weapons.
}
To meet this threat the United States was taking immediately the
following steps: 1) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all
offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba was being initiated and,
should offensive military preparations continue, "further action will be
justified;" 2) the United States declared that it would regard any nuclear
missile launched from Cuba against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by
the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
Union; 3) Guantanamo was being reinforced; 4) the Council of the Organization.
of American States was being convened to apply the Rio Treaty in support of
hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United Nations, the
United States was requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council.
Finally, the President called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate
this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to
stable relations between our two nations."
U.S. Objective
This was a difficult and dangerous effort on which the United States
had set out, the President concluded, "but the greatest danger of all would
be to do nothing." "On the military side, steps were taken to strengthen
defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces in a posture to
apply the quarantine.. The Department of Defense had ordered all tours of
duty of Navy and Marine personnel extended until further notice; the
/Guantanamo naval
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0133
3
Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in
the Southeastern portion of the United States; and military deployment put
5,000 marines and 40 naval vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a
training exercise. Following resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation
of the Council of the Organization of American States (described below) the
President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Cuba as of
'
10 A.M. on October 24. The Department of Defense ordered the interdiction
of 25 Soviet merchant vessels known to be headed for Cuba. At 8 A.M. on
known to be hear
October 25 the first interception of a Soviet ship, the oil tanker Bucharest,
took place, and the ship was allowed to proceed. 12 of the 25 Soviet vessels
heading for Cuba turned around and no encounter with a
vessel occurred during the Cuba affair.
contraband-carrying
From the beginning it was clear that in the political and diplomatic
realm U.S. policy had two immediate tasks, The first and most proximate
task of U.S. diplomacy was to show that the Soviets had in fact used guile
ip Fact used
and deception to explace in Cuba offensive nuclear weapons, and that our evidence
was conclusive. The second was to halt further shipments and bring about
rapidly and effectively the removal of the offensive weapons, under U.N.
supervision, before the quarantine could be lifted. The United States was
prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various formulae but not
to abandon this goal.
From the start, both the Organization of American States and the United
Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere ware
used to underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet
Union that elimination of the offensive weapons was a purpose to which the
hemisphere was solidly committed.
From the start, too, it was clear that
/the United Nations
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4
-
It was,
The
the United Nations would have a crucial role. It was the forum in which the
evidence of Soviet guilt could be most convincingly exposed to a world-wide
audience, world opinion mobilized, and the world verdict pronounced.
also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communications.
United Nations served as a site where U.S. and Soviet negotiators could
easily meet. The Secretary-General himself supplied an important,
between the parties particularly during the first days when tension was
highest. Thirdly, although Cuba prevented their employment, the United Nations
proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable mechanisms for inspection
and verification of dismantling and removal of the offensive weapons and for
:
link
safeguards against their reintroduction. The United Nations was also prepared
f
to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities. Simultaneously with
the President's speech, therefore, the United States took diplomatic steps to
set in motion the political machinery of the O.A.S. and the U.N.
O.A.S. Action
In Washington the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization
of American Ștates (C.O.A.S.) sent a note to the Acting Chairman requesting
the immediate convocation of the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation
under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty).
This article provides for immediate consultation on measures to be taken for the
pomson defense and for the maintenance of peace and security of the Continent
then “the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty
political independence of any American States should be affected by ap
Aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental conflict,
or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."
/The O.A.S.
pr
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>
.5°
The O.A.S. Council met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk sitting as the U.S. Representative described the nature of the threat
to this hemisphere and the coueasures which the United States considered
it essential for the inter-American system to tako. He stated that the Soviet
intervention in this hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as
never before the determination of the American Governments to carry, out
hemispheric commitments solemnly assumed in inter-American treaties and
resolutions for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of the
hemisphere against extra-continental aggression or intervention." He proposed
that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ of Consultation,
without delay "call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba
of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and
recommend
that the member states of the Organization of American States take the
necessary measures to ensure that Cuba does not continue to receive additional
offensive weapons ... and if necessary to prevent the offensive capacity already
acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the peace and security
of the hemisphere."
The Secretary noted that the United States was simultaneously asking
the U.N. Security Council to act in the matter. He observed: The threat
is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as
we are now doing, as a hemisphere. But the threat originates from outside
the hemisphere and it is appropriate that the extra-continental power which
challenges our inter-American commitments ... be dealt with in the forum in
which that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the
Security Council of the United Nations be requested to call upon this member
/to refrain
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i
<
6
دے
to refrain from his aggressive actions against us and seek to enforce upon
him its decisions.
Meanwhile, without awaiting the outcome of the United
Nations approach, we must ensure that our hemisphere is effectively
quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military
power in our midst."
4
Following a general discussion of the danger confronting the hemisphere
the Council voted 19 to 0 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instructions) to
constitute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation (C.O.A.S./O.C.).
Then, at the suggestion of the U.S. Representative, the Organ of Consultation
adjourned for several hours to permit a number of delegations to consult their
governments and receive instructions on the draft resolution presented by the
United States to deal with the threat confronting the hemisphere.
*
Debate centered
The Organ of Consultation reconvened that same afternoon.
on the draft resolution. As each representative spoke, it became evident that
the American republics were solidly united in their determination to resist
this most dangerous threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. A few
delegations were not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions
of the resolution, attributable for the most part to domestic constitutional
considerations, but when the resolution as a whole was put to a vote, the support
was unanimous. In one of the historic decisions of the inter-American system
the Organ of Consultation: (1) called for "the immediate dismantling and
withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive
capability, and (2) recommended that "the member states, in accordance with
Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take
all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force;
/which they
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27
which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot
continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related
supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to
prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming
an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution
also expressed "the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with
the Resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations
observers to Cuba at the earliest moment.'
Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American
States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant to the recommendations contained
in the second paragraph of the resolution adopted, President Kennedy issued
the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons
and associated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard
Time on October 24. The proclamation stated that the Secretary of Defense
"shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited
material to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States
in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American
The Secretary of Defense was authorized to designate prohibited or
restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that "any vessel or craft
which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to
identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to
stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed.
Any vessel that refused to comply with directions might be taken into
custody. In carrying out the order force was not to be used except
in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions or
states."
*
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/regulations
8 -
regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communicate with the
vessel or craft, or in self-defense.
In the days immediately following, twelve other American republics offered
assistance in support of the quarantine operation: Argentina, Dominican
Republic, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval
units, posing the problem of coordination of forces. Consequently, on November 5,
the C.O.A.S./o.C. recommended that the contributing member states take among
themselves the technical measures necessary to establish an officient and
coordinated action.
Pursuant to this recommendation, the governments of Argentina,
the Dominican Republic and the United States on November 9 notified the
C.Ó.A.S./o.c. of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine
Force into which they were integrating their respective naval units and placing
officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the
Combined Quarantine Force.
Security Council Consideration
Simultaneously with the call for a meeting of the O.A.S. Council, Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson in New York requested the President of the Security Council
to call an urgent meeting of the Council
that month the Soviet Representative
SCI
"The
deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused
by the secret establishment in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
of launching bases and the installation of long-range ballistic missiles capable
of carrying thermonuclear warheads to most of North and South America."
United States, he wrote, now has incontrovertible evidence that the U.S.$.R.
has been installing in Cuba a whole series of facilities for launching offensive
nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons themselves."
The establishment
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 85
. 9 -
The establishment of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, "constitutes
a grave threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere and of the whole
world." It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he concluded,
"to bring about the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet
missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United
Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which is being
put into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to
confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to
the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world."
Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution which called for the
immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other
1
offensive weapons, and which authorized the sending to Cuba of a U.N. observer
The resolution
corps to assure and report on compliance with the resolution.
called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of military shipments to Cuba when
the above terms were complied with and recommanded that the United States
and the U.S.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat."
The Security Council held four meetings on October 23, 24, and 25. By
the time the first meeting opened on the afternoon of October 23, the Soviet
Union and Cuba had introduced two parallel letters to the President of the
Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Council
in an attempt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S.
countermeasures and "aggressive action" against Cuba constituted the real
threat to peace in the Caribbean. Under Rule 37 of the Council's provisional
rules of procedure, the Cuban Representative was invited to participate in the
discussion of the mattor before the Security Council.
g
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*h-* ge ° » **/}
Ambassador
10
Ambassador Stevenson's opening speech put the issue in the perspective
of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionism. He traced the "vast plan of
piecemeal aggression" and "the basic drive to abolish the world of the
Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and which
had not been altered by the present Soviet Government. Contrasting the
history of Soviet expansionism and rejection of the principles of the Charter
with the United States record of loyal support for the Organization and "the
world of the Charter," Ambassador Stevenson regretted that some sabors
"seemed to believe that the cold war is a private war between two great super
的
powers. "It is not a private struggle," he insisted, "it is a world civil
Har D
the
a
a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world
contest between the world of the Charter and the world of Communist conformity.
"The Castro regime," he pointed out, "has aided and abetted an invasion of this
pemisphere" and "has given the Soviet Union a staging area in this hemisphere"
by inviting "an extra-continental, anti-democratic and expansionist power into
the bosom of the American family" and by making itself "an accomplice in the
communist enterprise of world domination." The Soviet Union, he continued,
had secretly transformed Cuba into a formidable missile and strategic airbase,
armed with the deadliest, most far-reaching modern nuclear weapons, in an
attempt to put all the Americas under a "nuclear gun" and to intensify the
"Soviet diplomacy of blackmail.” The day of forbearance is past, he concluded.
"If the United States and the other nations of the western Hemisphere should
accept this new phase of aggression, we would be delinquent in our obligations
to world peace." He could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded
itself into supposing the United States lacked the nerve and will to use its
and he voiced the hope that the Soviets would call an end to this new.
/phase of
power,
NW 50955 DocId:32424709 Page 87.
phase of aggression.
122
11
1
He urged the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal
of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba.
Ambassador Stevenson then informed the Security Council, in accordance
with Article 54 of the Charter, that the Council of the O.A.S. had adopted a
resolution by 19 affirmative votes (as noted above) calling for the dismantling
and withdrawal of the offensive weapons, recommending that member states of the
O.A.S. take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the
continent, and expressing the hope that the Security Council will "dispatch U.N.
observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."
Ambassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Security Council
which defined the themes for the debate during the rest of the week:
(1) The Soviet action in sending thousands of military technicians to
its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet bombers capable of delivering
nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and
preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing
these things through deceit and under the cloak of secrecy, were in defiance
of the security commitments of the Organization of American States and in
violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a manifest threat
to this hemisphere and to the whole world.
(2) The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in
consonance with the U.N. Charter and had the unanimous backing of the
Organization of American States.
(3) The Security Council should remove the threat by calling, as the
resolution proposed, for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba
of all missiles and all offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the
Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a U.N. observer corps to assure and
/report in
い
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 88
12
report in compliance with this resolution; calling for termination of the
quarantine upon U.N. certification of such compliance; and urgently recommending
that the United States and the Soviet Union confer promptly on measures to
remove the existing threat to the security and the peace of the world and
report therein to the Security Council.
Following Ambassador Stevenson's presentation, the Cuban and Soviet
Representatives made their initial statements. The Cuban Representative,
Mr. Garcia-Inchaustegui, denounced the naval "blockade" as an "act of war"
and declared that the Cuban people had answered the "armed attack" with
general mobilization. He asked the Council to call for the immediate
withdrawal of all troops, ships and planes deployed on the approaches to
The
Cuban shores, and for the cessation of all "interventionist” measuFOS.
Cuban Representative also contended that the United States had no right to
ask for dismantling and disarmament and that "logically, U.E. observers should
be sent to the U.S. bases from which invaders and pirates emerge to punish
and harass a small state." He insisted that Cuba will not accept any kind
of observers in matters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction."
The Soviet Representative, Ambassador Zorin, declared that the United
States charges were "a clumsy attempt to cover up aggressive actions" in Cuba.
He described the U.S. quarantine as a "new and extremely dangerous set of
aggression" and as "undisguised piracy." During this first encounter, while
avoiding direct reference to the presence of Soviet missiles or bombers in
Cuba, Ambassador Zorin declared that accusations that the Soviet Union had
"set up offensive armaments in Cuba" were false, and officially confirmed the
statement already made by the Soviet Union in this connection, that the Soviet
Government has not directed and is not directing to Cuba any offensive armaments."
He also recalled the statement of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 89
/Andrei Gromyko
· 13
I
Andrei Gromyko in the General Assembly just a month previously (September 21, 1962)
that any sober-minded Esu knows that Cube is not ... building up her forees to
such a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States
threat to any state of the Western Hemisphere."
000
or else a
Ambassador Zorin submitted to the Security Council a statement published
1
by the Soviet Government that day which addressed a "serious warming to the
United States Government, to advise it that, in carrying out the measures
announced by President Kennedy, it is taking on itself a heavy responsibility
for the fate of the world;" declared that the Soviet Government will do
"everything in its power to frustrate the aggressive designs of U.S.
imperialistic circles;" and appealed to all governments and peoples to raise
their voices in protest against the "aggressive acts" of the United States and
strongly to condemn such acts. He introduced a draft resolution condeaning
the "actions of the Government of the United States designed to violate the
Charter of the United Nations and to intensify the threat of war.
resolution insisted that the United States "repeal its decision on the control
of ships of other states going towards the shores of Cuba," and called upon
the United States, Cuba, and U.S.S.R. "to establish contacts and enter into
nsgotiations for the purpose of normalizing the situation and thereby removing
the threat of war.'
° The Soviet
At the request of the Representative of Chana the meeting was adjourned
to the following morning so that representatives might consult with other
delegations outside the Council.
The Next Morning: October 24.
The next morning, the Security Commell heard the Representative of
Venezuela, Hr. Sosa-Rodriguez, associate the Latin American nations with the
action taken by the United States pursuant to the 0.A.S. resolution. He noted
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 90
that it has

14 -
-
that "it has been proved that the Soviet Union has set up in Cuba rocket bases
that might deliver nuclear missiles to about 1,000 miles distance, and that,
apparently, it is at present setting up others for rockets with a range of up
to 2,200 miles." This had created an atmosphere of insecurity and concern in
the ecuntries of the American hemisphere which felt themselves directly
threatened by such weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Venezualan Representative
emphasized, were no longer defensive but offensive, and "they are of a magnitude
1
that might be sufficient to wipe out any of the American republics and drag the
to pipe out
world into the holocaust of nuclear var. He described the apprehension felt
throughout the continent at Cuban subversive activities, including the
introduction of agents, propaganda, and weapons to equip guerrilla forces in
American republics. Ambassador Sosa-Rodriguez recalled the resolution adopted
by the Organization of Amarican States and declared that he was speaking for the
entire continent in asking the Security Council to take measures to stop nuclear
weapons from arriving in Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of
nuclear rockets in Cuba dismantled.
Sir Patrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by no
stretch even of the Soviet imagination could a nuclear missile with a range of
2,200 miles in Cuba be called defensive, and recalled assurances on this point
by Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Dorticos of Ceba at the General
Assembly the previous month. While the Soviet Government were acting their
lie," he stated, "the orders were being given, plans laid and preparations
being made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who can possibly believe in
the honesty of the Soviet Government's intentions in these circumstances?"
The United Kingdom, he concluded, considered that the United States acted
properly by ecaing to the Security Council at the first possible massat.
the Security Council must take immediate and urgent steps to restore confidence
Now
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/in the Western
· 15
in the Western Hemisphere by having these offensive missiles dismantled and
withdrawn. The United Kingdom fully supported the U.S. resolution before the
Council.
1
The Representative of Rumania, Mr. Malitza, supported the Soviet position.
The Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Aiken, underlined world concern with the
growth of Soviet intervention in Cuba. He appreciated Cuban concern with its
national security, "but it is a far cry from that to a military buildup of the
kind which the Cuban Government now appears to have embarked upca pith the
He sould not understand why the
massive assistance of the Soviet Union."
1
Soviet Union should have chosen this moment to establish new missile and bomber
bases on the island of Cuba?" The Foreign Minister believed he perceived same
1
common ground in the U.S. statement to the Security Council of October 22 which
declared U.S. willingness "to confer with the Soviet Union on measures to
remove the existing threat to security of the Western Hemisphere," and in the
Soviet draft resolution which proposed that the United States, U.S.S.R. and
Cuba establish contacts and enter into negotiations.
1
The Security Council reconvened that evening, some forty-eight hours
after President Kemedy's historic speech. The naval quarantine bad gone into
effect at 10:00 A.M. that morning. Members knew that if a Soviet ship attempted
to run the quarantine the result would be serious. They also knew that the
President had indicated that the quarantine was an "immediate step" which
would be followed by "further action" if the Soviet missiles were not removed.
At this meeting the Comcil heard statements by those members who had not
yet spoken: France, China, Chile, United Arab Republic, and Chana.
addition to expressions of support for the U.S. resolution by France and China,
the highlights of the meeting were the statement of Chile, the United Arab
In
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/Republic-Chana
. 16 -
Republic-Chang "restraint resolution," and the first formal intervention of
the Secretary-General. Ambassador Seydoux, the Nepresentative of Franco,
noted that "the appearance of foreign nuclear missiles on Cuban soil...cannot
be considered as other than a serious initiative aimed at creating a neu war
front in a region which up to now has been free from such threats." He stated
that the U.S. had demonstrated clearly that it is seeking a peaceful solution
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and that the solution
barter of the Baited
proposed by the U.S. was desirable in the interest of the countries concerned
and "in order to banish once and for all the dangers with which world peace
is threatened by the recent developments in Cuba." Ambassador Lin, for the
Republic of China, noted that it was particularly disturbing to see Cuba
transformed, as a result of Sino-Soviet intervention, into an armed base for
communist penstration of the Americas. He declared that the measures initiated
by the United States designed to call an immediate halt to the shipment of
military material to Cuba were justified and supported the U.S. draft
resolution as a reasonable and peaceful solution.
Speaking for Chile, Ambassador Schweitzer endorsed the security measures
of the regional system and expressed support for the U.S. draft resolution.
He welcomed the authorization that the U.S. draft resolution gave to the
Secretary-General to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. "Unfortunately," ho
At such a
said, "the Representative of Cuba yesterday rejected this idea.
decisive moment as this, we believe Cube should trust the methods of the United
Nations for putting out the flames of conflict and for ensuring peacs.
smeh method could be to casure the United Nations presence in a zone of
We make a fervent and heartfelt appeal to Cuba to accept such
conflict
0000
One
a procedure."
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The United Arab
17
:
The United Arab Republic Representative, Mr. Mahmoud Rizd, declared that
his country "cannot condone the unilateral decision of the United States of
He recalled that
America to exercise the quarantine" which he characterized as contrary to
international law and likely to increase world tension.
Dr. Dorticos had told the General Assembly that the reapons Cuba had acquired
were "defensive in nature" and called for "normalization of relations betusen
Cuba and the United States. At the same time he reaffirmed U.A.R. policies
against the spread of nuclear weapons. He urged all parties to refrain fræ
tension-aggravating action and called for negotiations. The Chamian
Representative, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, took a similar position, stating that he
had no "incontrovertible proof...as to the offensive character of military
developments in Ceba" and therefore could not condone the quarantine. He also
called for negotiations to resolve the crisis on the basis of "mutual respect
for sovereign rights." The U.A.R.-Ghana joint draft resolution requested the
Secretary-General "to promptly confer with the parties directly concerned on
immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace, and
to moralize the situation in the Caribbeang" and called on the parties
concerned to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance
to the Secretary-Comoral, and "to refrain keanwhile from any action which may
directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation." The formula proposed
was thus limited to a general appeal for mediation by the Secretary-General,
but provided neither for the suspension of the Soviet offensive buildup nor
for U.N. involvement in inspection and verification.
Thant Proposal of October 24
At the close of the mating, the Secretary-General revealed that he had
just addressed
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j
18
Just addressed an urgent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev
which proposed "the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and
also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching
of ships bound for Cuba.* Thaat believed that such voluntary suspension for 2
period of two to three weeks would greatly ease the situation and give time to
the parties to "rest and discuss." He offered to "make myself available to
all parties for whatever services I may be able to perform."
In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev,
the Secretary-General took the occasion of the Security Council meeting to
address an urgent appeal to the President and Promier of Cuba, declaring that
it would also contributo greatly to the same cud if the construction and
development of major military facilities and installations in Cube would be
suspended during the period of negotiations." He then appealed to "the parties
concerned” to enter into megotiations immediately, "even this night,"
irrespective of other procedures, with the first subject to be discussed being
the "modalities" to achieve his suggestions. Significant in U Thant's intervention
were his offer to make himcal? available to U.S. and Soviet negotiators "for
whatever services" he might perform and the concrate suggestion for "suspension"
of Soviet arms shipments and of the construction and developpent of major
military installations in exchange for the suspension of the quarantine.
1.
The next day, President Kennedy's reply reminded the Secretary-General
that the throat was created by the secrot introduction of offensive respons.
into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons.? The President
noted that the Secretary-General had thade certain suggestions and...invited
groliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be
assured and indicated that "Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 95
these
19
these arrangements with you." Premier Thrushchev's reply welcomed U Thant's
initiative and characterized the situation was highly dangerous and calling
for the immediate intervention by the United Nations.
12
When the Security Council reconvened Thursday afternoon for what proved
to be the last formal meeting on the Cuban crisis, Ambassador Stevenson
welcomed both the course adopted by the Soviet Union the prèvicus day to
avoid direct confrontations in the acne of quarantine and the report that
Khrushchev had agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary-General.
Nevertheless, the situation remained serious and Ambassador Stevenson set the
theme in his opening remark by inviting the Council to address itself to "the
realities of the situation posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power
in Cuba."
$
} .
Ambassador Stevenson cautioned the Council not to forget that Ave are
here today...for one single reason: because the Soviet Union secretly
introduced this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of Cuba
while assuring the world that nothing was further from its thoughts."
Already the Commmists had attempted to distort the record by arguing that
it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly
installing these weapons in Cuba, "but that it was the United States which
created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This
the first fine, I confess," the U.S. Representative contimped, "that I
have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary but the discovery
the burglary." He noted that some representatives in the Counell say that
they do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba
installations capable of firing mclear missiles over ranges from 1,000
2,000 miles. If further doubt remained on this score the United States would
gladly
'
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 96
ཝཱ ནི , ཨ ནཱ །
20
gladly exhibit photographic evidence to prove the truth of the charges.
One by one Ambassador Stevenson demolished the argements that Ambassador
As for the
Zorin had presented at the first Security Council meeting.
"thirty-five bases in foreign countries" which the Soviet Representative had
mentioned, the fact was that there were suah missiles with the forces of
and that
only three of our allies -- the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey,
these were established by the decision of Heads of Government in December 1957
which was compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior
Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the
countries of Western Europe." Why was it necessary for the Western Hemisphere
pations to act with such speed? The "speed and stealth” of the Soviet
offensive buildup in Cuba demonstrated the premeditated attempt by the Soviet
If the United States
Union "to confront this hemisphere with a fait accompli,"
had not acted promptly and had delayed its counteraction, "the nuclearization
of Cuba would have been quickly completed." He stressed that the United
States had acted promptly to put into process "the political machinery which
we pray will achieve a solution to this grave crisis. The one action in
the last few days which had strengthened the peace was the determination to
stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere. The United States
was now in the Security Council, Ambassador Stevensor, noted, because it
wished the machinery of the United Nations "to take over to reduce these
tensions and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to
peace and to ensure the removal from this humisphere of offensive nuclear
weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine.'
When Zorin again attempted to delude the Council about the facts of
the Soviet offensive builduip, a dramatic encounter occurred between
/Stevenson and
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 97
21
Stevenson and Zorin, which exposed the truth beyond doubt.
STEVENSON: Wall, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador: We do
have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear and incontrovertible. And
let me say something else: Those weapons must be taken out of Cuba.
Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, you said
trespass on credulity that excels your best
J
with a
that our position had changed
'
since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion
You
and a majority of the United Nations, Wall, let me say to you, sir:
are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyons whatsoever. He came
here today to indicate our willingness to discuss U Thant's proposals
that is the only change that has taken place.
CC3
and
But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You,
the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union,
have upset the balance of power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have
created this new danger not the United States....
Finally, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny
the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly
become defensive weapons. But today
again, if I heard you correctly
you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist
:
CL CP
and
you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. All right, sir,
let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that
the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range
missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation.
Yes or no?
ZORIN: I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not
wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a.
prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 98
/STEVENSON:
22
-
and I
STEVENSON: You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and
you can answer "yes" or "no". You have denied that they exist
want to know whether I have understood you correctly.
ZORIN: Will you please continue your statement, sir? You will have
your answer in due course.
Inasmuch as Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present
conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba.
This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and maps
pinpointing the details and location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aircraft and of
Soviet missile bases, complete with launching sites and supporting equipment,
*in short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible
When Zorin's reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet
Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the
Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he
had identified in order to authenticate the evidenca.
weapons.
(
The proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana,
to postpone further work of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was
adopted without objection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. to consult with the Secretary-General on his suggestions of the
previous day. The Security Council thus adjourned but remained "seized"
of the problem while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the
formal chamber of the Security Council to the informal chambers of the
Secretary-General.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 99
/Weekend Negotiations:
-
23
1
Weekend Negotiations:
The Kennedy-Khrushcher Letters
применичестРАНА И
That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters
between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba
crisis. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Kennedy.
making certain proposals on the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.
On October 27, another letter from Khrushchev, which was broadcast before
delivery, also expressed willingness to withdraw the weapons but proposed
to link the question of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba te the unrelated
issue of strategic weapons in Turkey. The USSR would "agrae to remove
from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means; we agree
Your repre-
to carry this out and made a pledge in the United Nations.
sentative will made a declaration to the effect that the United States
of America, on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the
Soviet State, will remove its similar means from Turkey...After that
persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council may check on
the spot the fulfillment of the pledge made by either side." Of course.
he added, "the authorisation of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey
would be necessary for the entry into those countries of these agents."
In addition, Khrushchow proposed that the United States and the USSR
„tive pledges against invasion of Cuba and Turkey respectively and solemn
promises to respect the sovereignty and the inviolability of the frontiers
of these countries.
This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejected by the
United States. A statement issued by the White House that day noted
that several inconsistent and conflicting proposals had been made by
the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.
NW 50955- DocId: 32424709 Page 100
The proposal

NW 50955
24 =
The proposal involved the security of nations outside the Western
Hemisphere and it was the Western Hemisphere nations alone that were
the subject of the threat which produced the crisis. The position of
the United States, the statement read, was that "as an urgent preliminary
to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bages must stop;
offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of
offensive weapons to Cuba must cease »– all under effective international
verification." As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside
this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and its allies
had long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation,
on both sides. These efforts could continue as soon as the present Soviet-
created threat was ended.
President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of the same day
(October 27) replied to Khrushchev's letter of October 26.
"As I read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of
your proposals which seem generally acceptable as I understand them are
as follows:
"1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba
under appropriate U. N. observation and supervision;' and undertake,
with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such
weapons systems into Cuba.
C.
"2. We, on our part, would agree upon establishment of adequate
arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out
and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly
G
the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurance
against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations
of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.
DocId: 32424709 Page 101
- 25 -
i
Assuming work csemed on offensive missile bases in Cuba and all weapons
systeme in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered inoperable, under
effective UN arrangements, the President was prepared to have representatives
in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Secretary-General
for a permanent solution along the lines suggested in Chairman Khrushchev's
letter of October 26...
On Sunday, October 28 Chairman. Khrushchev broadcast the text of
CQ
his reply. In addition to earlier instructions to discontinue further work
on weapons construction sites, he said, the Soviet Government "has given
a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and
to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated:
"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your
message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion
of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the
part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your bane
Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such
message.
a kind to Cuba disappear.
"It is for this reason that we instructed our officere
these means
as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet
officere
C
to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of
the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to
the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,
we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives
to verify the dismantling of these means.
“Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on
dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict."
NW 50955
DocId: 32424709 Page 102
/Chairman
26
Chairman Khrushchev sent a copy of this message to U Thant "to enable
At the same
you to familiarize yourself with our position, which we regard as exhaustive
and which will help you to discharge your noble functions."
time, he informed the United States and the United Nations, that in connection
with the negotiations U Thant was conducting with representatives of the USSR,
the United States, and Cuba, the Soviet Government was sending First Deputy
Foreign Minister V, F. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his "noble
efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation."
President Kennedy replied at once to the broadcast message of October 28
even before the official text reached him, and welcomed it as "an important
contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:
"The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary-General U Thant
have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to
you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on
the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried
out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through
the United Nations as your message saya, so that the United States
in tum can remove the quarantine Esasures now in effect. I have
"
already made arrangements to report all these matters to the
Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest
in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area."
"I agree with you, the President concluded, that we must devote
urgent attention to the problem of disarmament...I think we should
give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a
#
NW 50955
DocId: 32424709
Page 103
/nuclear test ban.
27
nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider
measures or disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an
early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss
these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva
or elsewhere.
92
A. U.S. statement issued the same day welcomed the Khrushchev response
and stated: "We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the
Caribbean area. "
Weekend Negotiations in New York
Meanwhile steps continued in New York to reach agreement on practical
means of avoiding conflict at sea and on arrangements to carry out the
Secretary-General's suggestion for stopping work on the offensive bases and
screening further shipments as conditions of suspending the quarantine.
gea.
He
The initial aim of the Secretary-General was to avoid an incident at
What concerned him most, he had written on October 25 to Chairman
Khrushchev, was that a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United
States vessels "would destroy any possibility of the discussions I have
suggested as a prelude to negotiations on a peaceful settlement."
therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be instructed
to stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order "to
The next
permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement."
day (October 26), the Secretary-General addressed a parallel letter to
President Kennedy, informing him of his approach to Chairman Khrushchev
and requesting that "instructions may be issued the United States' vessels
in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with
NW 50955
DocId: 32424709 Page 104
/Soviet ships
=
28
Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of an
outward incident. .89 He expressed the further hope that such cosparation
could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of
which the quarantine measures could be called off as soon as possible.
Premier Khrushchev accepted the proposal and "ordered the masters of
Soviet vessels bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception 'area, as
President Kennedy welcomed U Thant's efforts for a
yen recommend.
satisfactory solution and stated that if the Soviet Government accepta
and abides by his request that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba
stay out of the interception area during the period of preliminary discussion;
"you may be assured that this Government will accept and abide by your
request that our vessels in the Caribbean do everything possible to avoid
direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to
minimize the risk of any untoward incident!" At the same time the President
underlined that this was a matter of great urgency in view of the fact
that certain Soviet ships were still proceeding toward Cuba and the
interception area.
Screening Shipments
As the white buss statement on October 27 made clear, the urgent
preliminary to the consideration of any proposals for a solution was that
work on the Cuban bases stop, the offensive weapons be rendered inoperable,
and further shipment of wospone to Cuba must cease--all under effective.
international verification. After that means must be found to get the
missiles and other offensive weapons removed and their removal verified and
to institute adequate safeguards against their reintroduction.
NW 50955
DocId: 32424709 Page 105
The immediate
2
29
The immediate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the
initial phase, was to work out a system for incoming shipments to ensure
that no further offensive weapons were being introduced. The UN asked
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to serve as its agent
☐
in inspecting incoming vessels to make sure that no more Soviet weapons
were coming in to Cuba. The operation would be expected to continue for
about one month and would be entrusted to some thirty inspectors which
the ICRC would undertake to recruit. Mr. Paul Ruegger, former president
of the ICRC, arrived in New York early in November to discuss with the UN
whether and under what circumstances the ICRC could undertake this task.
In releases issued in Geneva on November 5 and November 13, the ICRC
pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with
the formal agreement of "the three parties concerned."
issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "eventual action by the
ICRC would be based on previous consent being given by the three states.
concerned" and the methods of control would have to be clarified in future
discussions. Premier Castro refused to give his consent to the proposed
The statement
scheme. Before final arrangements could be made it was, in any event,
realized that the system envisaged would no longer be required and that
the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely
on other means, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments
of offensive weapons.
Havana Talks
The main obstacle to progress on establishing the conditions for a
settlement was the attitude of the Cuban government. On October 26 U Thant
/wrote Prime Minister
NW 50955
DocId: 32424709 Page 106
0
30
wrote Prime Minister Castro renewing his appeal that he (Castre) direct that
"the construction and development of major military facilities and
installations in Cuba, and especially installations designed to launch
medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, be suspended
during the period of negotiations which are now underway.”
ance.
Dr. Castro's reply came the next day and proved to be a hedged accept-
He rejected "the presumption of the United States to determine what
action we are entitled to take within our country, what kind of arms we
consider appropriate for our defense." Cuba was prepared to accept "the
compromises that you request as efforts in favor of peace, provided that
at the same time, while negotiations are in progress, the United States
Government desists from threats and aggressive actions against Cuba,
including naval blockade of the country." Read literally, Dr. Castro was
saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending
the quarantine. At the same time, his letter contained another note:
"...Should you consider it useful to the cause of peace, our government
would be glad to receive you in our country as Secretary-General of the
United Nations, with a view to direct discussions on the present crisis."
U Thant replied the next day noting that Castro was prepared to accept.
the suggestion he had made provided the United States Government "desists
.
from threats.against Cuba including the naval blockade!! while negotiations
were in progress. He accepted the invitation to visit Cuba early in the
coming week and to "bring a few aides with me to leave some of them behind
فت
to continue our common effort towards a peaceful solution of the problem.
To facilitate his task the United States had agreed to suspend its naval
quarantine and aerial surveillance during the Secretary-General's visit to
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 107
Havana.
1
31
Havana. At this point, the United Nations was working on the assumption
that the visit to Cuba would be concerned with working out modalities of
U.N. observation and inspection and "reciprocal measures to assure the
peace in the Caribbean."
The issue was further clouded by Castro's "statement of conditions"
issued in Havana on October 28. "The guarantees of which President Kennedy
speaks against the invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elimination
also of the naval blockade," he declared, "and adoption, among others, of
the following measures:
1.
End of the economic blockade and "all measures of commercial
and economic pressure" exercised by the United States against
Cuba;
2. End of "all subversive activities" and the organization or support
30
of invasions;
End of "pirate attacks" from bases in the United States and
Puerto Rico;
4. End of "violations of air and naval space" by the United States;
5. United States withdrawal from the naval bags at Guantanamo and its
Preturn to Cuba."
This statement of conditions was clearly unacceptable and adumbrated
its intransigent position that the Cuban authorities would take during the
Havana talks. U Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier General
Rikhye and small military staff, flew to Havana on October 30 and held
talks with Cuban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N.
supervision of removal of the offensive weapons and to discuss the other
modalities for carrying out the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of October 27-28.
/Although general
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 108
32-
Although general agreement was reached that the United Nations should
participate in settlement of the Cuban crisis and the talks were characterized
as "fruitful," the Cuban authorities balked at all proposals for U.N.
inspection of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction.
Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28
statement. These demands were obviously beyond the scope of the,
Secretary-General's purpose in negotiating with the Cubane, and no agreement
was reached.
The Secretary-General and his party returned to New York the next day,
where, it was understood; talks between the Secretary-General and Cuban
representatives would continue. Premier Castre, however, did state that he
would not interfere with the Soviet removal of the missiles. The missiles
"
are "not ours", he said in a radio speech on November 1 in which he
reported on his talks with U Thant, but he rejected any form of international
inspection on the withdrawal of Soviet weapons. He specifically turned
down a proposal that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
carry out the inspection task. He also rejected other forms of UN inspection.
On Friday, November 2, Soviet First Deputy Promier Anastal I. Mikoyan
arrived in New York on his way to Havana and issued a statement supporting
Premier Castro's demands and warmly endorsing the Cuban regime.
Surveillance and Dismantling Continued
When U Thant left Havana without a mutually satisfactory formula,
President Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to
Cuba and authorized resumption of close aerial surveillance of the island
to determine whether dismantling of Soviet missile bases was proceeding
as reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of November 2, the
NW 50955
DocId: 32424709 Page 109
/President reported
:
33
President reported in a short television and radio broadcast that the
"Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, the missiles are being
crated and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." The
President said the information was based on aerial photographs and added
that the United States intended to follow closely the completion of this.
work through various means, including aerial surveillance, until "an equally
satisfactory international means of verification is effected."
i
He also
said that while the quarantine remained in effect, he was hopeful that
adequate procedures could be developed for international inspection of
Cuba-bound cargoes.
The International Committee of the Red Cross could be
"an appropriate agent" for carrying out this inspection.
New York Negotiations: Verification and TL-28s
ร
Meanwhile, talks proceeded in New York between Ambassadør Stevenson
and Mr. John J. McCloy for the United States and Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working out the details of
the scheme for ICRC inspection of incoming shipments (described above), the
negotiators spent the next three weeks in considering two main issues.
Until November 12 the central concern of the negotiators was to make sure
that the offensive missile system had left Cuba and to work out a satis
factory system for verification that dismantling and removal had in fact
taken place. Associated with this was the problem of longer-term safe-
guards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons. From November 12
to November 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problem of removal
of the Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba.
On verification, it was clear that what the President had termed
"an equally satisfactory international means of verification" required an
adequate UN system of inspection to make sure that the offensive weapons
1
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 110
had in fact

34
had in fact been removed, to guard against hiding, and to prevent
reintroduction of such weapons,
Various schemes were considered
and the USSR made clear its willingness to have UN verification take place.
Castro adamantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the
UN or under its auspices for removal of the weapons. US negotiators
continued to make it clear to the Soviet negotiators that US aerial
surveillance would continue so long as there was no adequate UN system of
inspection. When it became clear that Castro would not give his consent
to UN inspection or verification of shipments from his ports, the negotiators
turned to devising a system for US inspection at sea of outgoing ships
carrying the dismantled missiles. The US navel vessels would come "alongside"
departing Soviet vessels which would be loaded in such a way as to enable
}
the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid
progress was made in dismantling and loading the missiles and by November
the US had counted 42 departing missiles by this procedure. Failing UN
verification and safeguards, the US continued its own system of surveillance
under the existing OAS resolution to make sure that offensive weapons
were not reintroduced.
On November 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators
took up again the question of the removal of IL-28s and made it clear
that the United States could not consider lifting the quarantine until
the bombers were withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their
part of the bargain by dismantling and removing the missiles and were
pressing for lifting of the quarantine and a U.S. non-invasion pledge.
The US position was that the bombers were defined as offensive
weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23 and that they.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 111
were included as
-35.
were included as such in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of October 27-28.
The United States made it clear that it could not consider lifting the
quarantine until the Soviets agreed to remove the IL-28s within a short time.
Partial Settlement:
November 20
On November 20, Dr. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wished
to remove the berbers he would not object. That day an agreement was reached
between Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the IL-28c would be withdrawn.
U Thant was notified the same day by Ambassador Stevenson and Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov. Soviet agreement to remove the bombers payed the way
for the lifting of the quarantine. The partial settlement had taken just
four weeks to accomplish.
"
At his press conference that evening, President Kennedy announced
that he had that day been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the
IL-28 bombers in Cuba would be withdrawn in thirty days, and that these
planes could be observed and counted as they departed. "Inasmuch as this
ར
goes a long way towards reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere.
four weeks ago," the President announced, "I have this afternoon instructed
The President
the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine."
then recalled the agreement he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev
October 27-28, including the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had
complied with all his pledges, "we would remove our naval quarantine and
98 Evidence to date indicated that
give assurance against invasion of Cuba.
all known offensive missile sites had been dismantled, he stated, and sea
inspection by the navy had confirmed that the missiles had been withdrawn.
But, he warned, "important parts" of the agreement "remain to be carried
out.
The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to
NW 50955
DocId: 32424709 Page 112
/verify whether all
0
36 -
verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting
safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of
offensive weapons back into Cuba." The United States, therefore, had no
choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in
Cuba. The United States, he said, will continue its efforts to achieve
"adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and
verification of Cube." Later, in reply to a question, he defined adequate
safeguards as "an inspection which would provide us with assurances that
there are not in the island weapons capable of offensive action against
United States or neighboring countries and that they will not be reintroduced,"
Regarding guarantees against invasion, the President stated that these
were contingent on adequate verification and safeguards for the future.
1
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from
Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under
adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used
for the export of aggressive Communist purposea, there will be
peace in the Caribbean, And, as I said in September, "We shall
noither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere."
The United States, he stressed, would not abandon the political,
economic, and other efforts to hald subversion from Cuba nor its purpose
"But these
and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be fully free.
policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion
of the island.
67
Inter-American Quarantine Force Terminates Operations
Following the lifting of the quarantine, the three governments whose
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 113
/naval units had
37
naval unite had participated in the inter-American combined quarantine
force
تتاليه
i.e., Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United States
notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. on November 30 that the operations of the
quarantine force had been terminated. During this period, it had not been
necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and
other types of assistance made by other hemispheric determination and
solidarity.
As the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union
in New York progressed, the United States kept the C.0.A.S./0.Ç. fully
informed of developments. The C.O.A.S./0.C. in the meantime withheld
taking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks were
completed.
Continued Negotiations
The Soviet Government carried out its promise to withdraw the IL-28
bombers, and, by December 6, the United States was informed that all bombers
(42 in number) had left. No progress, however, was made during the rest
of the month in achieving the "adequate international arrangements for the
task of inspection and verification in Cuba" that the President had
mentioned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding.
Deputy Premier Mikoyan's three-hour conversations with the President on
November 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did not advance
the final solution. The question was turned over again to the delegations
in New York.
By mid-December several important loose ends still remained. No.
:
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 114
/adequate,
1.
38
adequate, U.N.-supervised arrangements for verification of removal of
offensive weapons and safeguards against their reintroduction had been
achieved. The U. S. assurance against invasion or supporting an invasion of
Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons were not
present or reintroduced into Cuba and that Cuba refrained from aggressive
acts against the Western Hemisphere.
Soviet Troops
i
The withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Cuba was also a matter of
deep concern to the United States. As the President stated at his
press conference of November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet
combat units and other Soviet units were associated with the protection
of offensive weapons systems and would also be withdrawn in dus course.
The U.S. position was that removal of the offensive weapons systems made the
presence of Soviet troops to defend such weapons no longer necessary.
Efforts to secure their removal continued into 1963.
Security Council Consideration Concluded
The formula for terminating Security Council consideration of the
Cuban crisis was finally agreed between the governments of the United
States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. It represented a standstill
rather than a final settlement.
The two governments agreed to send a
joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to
the Security Council for information of its members.
letter read:
The text of the
"On behalf of the Governments of the United States and the
Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for
your efforts in assisting our governments to avert the serious
threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.
"While it has not been possible for cur governments to
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resolve all the
- 39 -
resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this
affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding
reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the
extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it
is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention
of the Security Council at this time.
"The Governments of the Cited States of America and of the
Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the
threat of war in connection with this crisis will lead toward the
adjustment of other differences between them and the general
easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war.
87
The same day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative of Cuba,
Carlos M. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he
requested be transmitted to United Nations members, expressing a dissenting
view on the conclusion of the affair. Cuba, the letter declared, "doss
not consider as effective any agreement other than one thich would include
consideration of five points or measures, which as minimum guarantees to
peace in the Caribbean, our Prime Minister Fidel Castro stresses in his
declaration of 28 October, 1962...."
As the Security Council concluded its consideration of the Cuban
item, the situation remained as follows:
The United
1. The Soviet Union had withdrawn its offensive missiles,
its bombers, and some of its military personnel.
States and participating American Republics had lifted the
quarantine.
2.
The Cubans had refused to accept on site inspection and
post-removal verification or to agree on a system of continuing
safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons under
United Nations auspices.
3.
pa cris
In the absence of adequate inspection and safeguards, the
United States continued other methods of surveillance of military
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 116
/activities in
i
40
activities in Cuba in the interests of hemispheric security.
40 The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in
Cuba constituted an unacceptable intervention of foreign
military power in the Western Hemisphere, Efforts continued
with the USSR to obtain their removal as agreed,
i
5. The United States continued to be seriously concerned about
Cuban subversive efforts directed against other American Republics.
6. The United States position with regard to assurance against
invasion remained that stated by the President on November 20, 23
outlined above.
?。
With the conclusion of the New York talks and the joint US-USSR
letter terminating Security Council consideration of the matter,
responsibility of further action remained with the OAS Organ of
Consultation in its hemispheric context.
Conclusion: Complementary Roles of Bilateral, Regionals, and UN Diplomacy
The Cuban affair demonstrated the utility and possibilities for inter-
action of the various diplomatic and military instruments available to the
United States in a crisis. Orchestration of bilaterial diplomacy, regional
arrangements, and the United Nations system marked the handling of the
crisis throughout. In particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique
demonstration of coordination between a regional system and the world
organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the O.A.Ş. and the
United Nations, depending on the task to be performed and the governments
directly involved. The 0.A.5. system successfully met the test of
NW 50955 DocId:32424709 Page 117
/workability by
41
<333
workability by demonstrating conclusively the solidarity and determination
of the American Republics when their security is endangered.
The rapid,
decisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty
strengthened the hand of the United States in making its case before world
opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in
negotiating with the Soviets.
The United Nations played a three-fold role: as a forum for exposing
Soviet duplicity and for enlisting diplomatic support of the United States
position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for
negotiation; and, as an institution willing and able, on short notice,
to provide inspection and verification services.
(1) The United States provided an unparalleled forum for presenting
the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to representatives of
109 nations and through communications media directly to world public
opinion. Ambassador Stevenson's speeches of October 23 and 25 in the
Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations to
delegations both inside and outside the chamber, presented incontrovertible
evidence in a dramatic and effective manner and thus helped in convincing
the world of the facts. In addition, the United Nations provided a
forum in which the American Republics could impress on the world and
on the Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue.
(2) The Secretary-General provided an effective point of contact,
notably in the tense days at the outset of the crisis and valuable
suggestions for avoiding direct confrontation. The Secretary-General's
intervention on the second day of Security Council debate, in which
he called for suspension of arms shipments and of construction and
development of military installations in exchange for suspension of
Nocid: 32424709 Page 11 tháng hai
the quarantine
42
the quarantine led to the formula under which Soviet ships' stayed away
from the interception area and on that condition the United States agreed
Khrushchev gave
to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation.
unprecedented agreement to the idea of U.N. inspection and verification
of arme removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was
Cindem
1
ready and capable of organizing a corps of observers and a system of.
inspection in rapid order.
Both the United Nations and the Organization of American States proved
their utility and vigor and emerged stronger from the ordeal.
QX SO
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DEPARTMENT
UNITED
OF
DEF
OF AMERICA
STATES OF
SECRET EN WITH ATTACHMENTS
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
March 8, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH
SUBJECT: Cuba
As a follow-up to my memorandum to you on February 15,
1963, I am attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in
testimony given by the Department of Defense to congressional
committees. They continue from the latest date of each committee
excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed
Services Committee transcripts.
Not all testimony has been screened for Cuba references
Inasmuch as all transcripts are not available. Thus the House
Armed Services Committee has been covered up to February 21,
the DOD Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to-
February 13, and the Senate Armed Services Committee to
February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee has not yet begun its hearings.
As transcripts become available, I will send the requested
items to you.
SIGNED
David E. McGiffert
Assistant to the Secretary
(Legislative Affairs)
11 Attachments
4 HASC Transcript excerpte
3 DoD SC, HAppae Transcripts excerpts
4 SASC Transcript excerpts
5644 (2)
cc:(S/Attachments included)
Mr. McNaughton, GC
Mr. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst.
Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA)
SECRET
WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS
Mr. Lennartson, PA
Mr. Califano, OSA <
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STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROBERT S. MCNAMARA TO THE PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
U. S. SENATE
13 March 1963
Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted
my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my
views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of
General Dynamics Corporation as prime contractor for this versatile new
addition to our Defense arsenal.
My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the
Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based
on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an air-
plane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more depend-
able both in training missions and in actual combat.
The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in
my judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the
Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of obtaining a
single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:
The least expensive, time-consuming research and
development effort before production.
The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.
-
The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.
The highest level of experience in building fighter-type
aircraft.
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q
The greatest use of proven design techniques and
methods.
The most understanding of the requirements and
difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and
producing a fighter-type aircraft.
When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first
identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 -
1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by
six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable
without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to
whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or
whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be
continued in order to meet the military requirements.
Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall
of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by
the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:
"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully
design and produce this weapon system.
"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development
design configurations to the using Agencies involved
Navy.
TAC and the
"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,
and changes can be expected during the development period.
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2
"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft
will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in
carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.
"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed,
and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will
markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability.
"
The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal,
and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both
proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to
meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation
with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing pro-
posal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single
design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the
differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied
a more realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to
select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded
that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could
be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military
requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considera-
tions entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part
of the record.
me to:
When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed
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3
i
1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military
requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.
cost.
2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible
Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in
both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear
forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory
forces and to increase their flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those
weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of
nuclear surprise attack.
At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-
nuclear forces
ground, sea, and air so that we can cope with the
many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure
that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, pro-
curement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly in-
creased.
Concurrently with these increases in our fighting strength we have
attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of
the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy
period of development, their tremendous combat power and their
enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon
systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key
decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.
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1
In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have com-
monly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when
the program started, and in some instances more.
for such overruns have been:
Some of the reasons
1. We have insisted that weapon systems meet perform-
ance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.
2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost
estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied
many times during the program.
3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what
it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered
that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in
what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract
is awarded.
4. We have too often employed inadequate and
unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting in-
sufficient weight on seasoned experience in the design and production
of similar weapons.
5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and
other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce
cost.
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20
5
N
Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to
attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been
launched, which should produce savings of at least $3 billion per year by the
end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount
to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed
price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program
definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-profit organiza-
tions as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.
5
At my request the problem of how we select contractors has been under
study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense
Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's
business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our
current source selection procedures can be improved.
One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that
weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where
this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements.
The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious. They result in
substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but
throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic support, maintenance,,
training programs, and operations.
The disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be
observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a
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6
rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high.
The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive
With the present rapid rate of technological change,
spare parts inventories.
the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already
obsolete and practically worthless.
When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was
developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105.
At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the
F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common
missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation
with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became con-
vinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the
Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force
reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common
tactical fighter.
The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new.
'I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority
of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be done. As late
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7
as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been
working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both
Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated
requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.
While this attitude, based on years of going separate ways,
was understandable, I did not consider it was a realistic approach,
considering the versatility and capabilities that could be built into a
modern aircraft because of advances in technology. I was also
convinced that, if we could achieve a single tactical fighter, we would
save at least one billion dollars, in development, production, maintenance
and operating costs. In short, after study and review, I believed that
the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both
Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and
economically desirable. I directed that we continue to work toward
this objective. Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept
myself fully advised of the development of the TFX as it progressed
over the succeeding 14 months.
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Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of
the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you
in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision.
On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop
a single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the
Navy fleet air defense mission. From the outset, the emphasis
was on development of a weapons system that provided minimum
divergence between the Navy and Air Force versions. My specific
guideline in this regard was: "Changes to the Air Force tactical
version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall
be held to a minimum. 11 This is a recurring theme throughout the
procurement actions which followed.
Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were
issued in October, 1961, and proposals were submitted by six firms
two months the reafter.
A Source Selection Board was organized with members
appointed by the Navy and the Air Force, and they were instructed
to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting
chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Aeronautical
Systems Division.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 130

To assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was
established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force
officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the
detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the areas
of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management
strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft
carriers.
The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the Source
Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by
appropriate commands within the Navy and the Air Force, as well as
by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief
of Naval Operations, and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and
Air Force who made their recommendations to me.
Of the six proposals considered in December and January, those of
Boeing Company and General Dynamics Corporation were determined by
the Evaluation Group to be significantly better. But it was recognized
that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it
would be acceptable. Although the Boeing design was given the higher
rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the
higher rating in the technical area, the Evaluation Group recom-
mended that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General
Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military
requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General
.10
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 131
Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior
Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs
was acceptable without very substantial change.
A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board
which recommended that further work to achieve a satisfactory
design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that
substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine
was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the
radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting
capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Source Selection
Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the
limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be
acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommenda-
tion was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force
Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force
Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsi-
bility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection
of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and
General Dynamics, as suggested by the Evaluation Group.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 132
11
The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for
Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence
of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua-
tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to both companies
for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized
that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted,
would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by
extending the competition for an additional period "time and dollars are thereby
more apt to be saved than lost in the long run. "It considered that competition
should produce realistic cost estimates, further assurance of the validity
of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design.
Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the
Navy and Air Force recommended to me that study contracts be awarded
to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that:
a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly
superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up
to stated Service requirements.
b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General
Electric engine (on which the Boeing design had been based) because of
the low probability of its development in the time required, since not
even a prototype existed at the time.
12
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 133
C.
The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs
and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design
standpoints.
I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and
Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost
estimates.
The two companies submitted new proposals on April 2, 1962, and
the second evaluation was conducted in April and May. The Evaluation
∙Group concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correct-
ing identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy
from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability
to remain on station for adequate periods of time.
The difference of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged
more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and over-
shadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since
the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor
the General Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorse-
ments transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by him to the
Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to
· achieve a joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the
Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing submission. The qualified
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.13.
concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the
over all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact, Admiral Anderson
stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can
indeed be met."
Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was premature
to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally
selected. "
The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in
view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by
the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and
wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine
courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the
Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting
divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft,
resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined.
Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasiz-
ing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by
reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent
in a joint program.
At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals
which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy
member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of
the new proposals met the Navy's requirements. The Board also noted that
14
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}
the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions
that would be necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been
determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recom-
mended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and
the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing,
should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design
definition" phase. The expressed need for the continuation of the
definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the
third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.
Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it
appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy require-
ments, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully under-
stood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to
develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the needs of both the Navy.
and the Air Force.
Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air
Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from
which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective
versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and
the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the
contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled.
Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce cost by maximizing similarities
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15
in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use of common equipments
and structures.
To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary
of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining
fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in
accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962,
explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any
contract would be awarded. These were:
"1. Satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that a significant
improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the
winning design.
"2. Minimum divergence from a common design compatible
with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the
inherent savings of a joint program.
"3. Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for
development and procurement of the complete TFX weapon system, which
costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military
strength by the weapon system.
"
These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used
in judging and weighing the two proposals
wwwwww
- Boeing and General Dynamics.
They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation
Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its
comments and conclusions.
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 137
16.
The two companies submitted their new proposals in September
1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the
Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.
At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general
conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by
the Air Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson, Chief of
Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:
"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully
design and produce this weapon system.
"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development
design configurations to the using Agencies involved
TAC and the Navy.
"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,
and changes can be expected during the development period.
i
"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft
will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in
carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.
"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and
when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly
improve existing fleet air defense capability.'
11
The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors.
When I reviewed the report, I could see why. The question was a very close one.
In the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design
as having "a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge
in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel
17
NW 50955 DocId: 32424709 Page 138
Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas.
The General Dynamics
design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuvera-
bility at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated
penetration aids system. For deceleration, it uses dive brakes in the
air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited
deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in ferry capability,
conventional weapon carriage, loiter capability, and in landing perform-
ance. It has the advantage in low-altitude maneuvering capability. For
deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent
deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort."
In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher
score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable
from the users' viewpoint.
In the "Production, Management and Cost' area, General Dynamics
was rated higher than Boeing. In "Scheduling," General Dynamics presented
It was somewhat more detailed and better time phased.
the better program.
In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of
maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal
received a slightly higher rating over-all.
It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in
Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air
Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their
tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the degree to which
the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. You
will recall that those two conditions were: (1) minimum divergence from a
.
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common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs.
It should be emphasized that these two conditions would understandably loom
less important in the eyes of the Source Selection Board than operational
capability. These are conditions more properly the concern of those
charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are
equally a part of my determination of what is in the national interest.
When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint
the same.
The Report
of minimum divergence from a common design, I was immediately struck
by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors.
found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very
high degree of identical structure for the Navy and Air Force versions..
On the other hand, the Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less
than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were
In fact the Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect,
proposing two different airplanes from a structures point of view. The
same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of
identical parts in the General Dynamics design a particularly crucial
point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development
process to retain identity of parts, while, on the other hand, small
divergences in the early stages tend to grow as development proceeds.
In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of
minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral
technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.
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It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role
as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made
about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that
the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could
be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic pur-
pose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two. Two airplanes increase
costs at every stage beginning with development itself.
As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by
Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter,
and fatigue analyses; etc.)%;B separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs;
and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions."
Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required
earlier in the production process. Supply and logistics problems become compli-
cated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the
logistics area.
These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving
as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates,
common technical manuals, and the like.
If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects
of saving one billion dollars would have evaporated. The issue of minimum diver-
gence is fundamental. The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality.
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lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point
were clear and consistent.
Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed
the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk,
who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Direc-
tor of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, dis-
cussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging
development and production programs, it became clear to me that the
General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approạch
than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully acceptable.
There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated
the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in
my mind.
The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers
for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing
touch down. To date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight
on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on super-
sonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commer-
cial jet transports and cargo-type aircraft in which the engines are mounted on
outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter
aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made.
This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline
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and aft of the tail surfaces. The Boeing design uses two engines nestled
in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directly alongside
the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. The full effect of this hot
gas efflux is unknown.
Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability
was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in
addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight
testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design
would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early opera-
tional date for the TFX,
In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evalua-
tion Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the
development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this
problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate
in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust
reverser design and development.
I
Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically
proven and offer a more straight forward approach to meeting the stated
military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the
military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must
be weighed against their possible advantages. I want to point out that in
selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply
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thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility to under-
take this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall
program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.
The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce
more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant instal-
lation with top-mounted inlets. The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that
Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the
Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the air
flow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during
high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this
distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately,
and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under
the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.
In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through"
installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a
good selection for the TFX aircraft one which should give the best
trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems.
The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object
damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that
the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not
be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.
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The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater
development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-
through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium
in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat
resistant applications and where high stress levels in thick plates are not
involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the
fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use
in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises
the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report
further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details,
especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be
quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded
the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel
Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing
companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems
Division, it was not advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject
to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating
If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and
heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that
not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but
to such use.
additional costs would be incurred.
In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing
loading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra
wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing
relatively unusual applications of an exotic metal.
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These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the
overall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that
this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the
competition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen
more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational
features which exceeded the required performance characteristics.
approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped
General Electric engine for its initial submission.
This
Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed
insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems
associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in super-
sonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all
susceptible of solution. But my judgment, reinforced by the Fourth
Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact,
complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly
greater development effort to be expanded by Boeing in their solution.
But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than
that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater
complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between
the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser
experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter
aircraft. This anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the
Boeing proposal.
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I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic.cost estimates in the
Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was
overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously
low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and
production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate
the complexities of developing the TFX. This is understandable because
Boeing's past experience in aircraft development and production has been
with bombers and transport aircraft experience which is largely inapplicable
to TFX estimating.
I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition
demonstrably credible understanding of costs Boeing's proposal was
deficient.
The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They
attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in
their judgment was more accurate. They also made adjustments for the
General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but
not nearly so much so as Boeing's.
The
The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical
factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs.
application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally
low proposal. Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a lack
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:
of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are
subject to substantial errors.
Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group
could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing
and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or
less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation
of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which
is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by
the application of statistical factors.
The question has been raised as to why costs are important when
both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts. There
are several reasons.
In a development contract for a complex new weapon system like the
TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of
change orders is borne by the government. Consequently, when two pro-
posals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General
Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with
consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred.
Aside from the matter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of
change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be
carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.
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It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of
the contractor and not the government. Nonetheless, if after several years
of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to be far in excess
of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would
be in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take
every possible cost saving alternative. These alternatives could have a
serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.
In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force
efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expendi-
ture is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that
we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way
we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has
not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of
the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well
as the contractor.
Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and
development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production
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program is to follow.
There is no future price commitment for this pro-
duction program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research
and development contracts, the price of the production program, which
for all practical purposes would be committed to the development con-
tractor, would probably be affected.
When we talk about the TFX program, we are talking National Defense.
This aircraft is to be an important element in our military force; it must
be operational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled. The more
straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well
versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters,
and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designer, developer, and pro-
ducer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer
to our needs.
I have detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment
that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of ob-
taining a satisfactory aircraft on the desired time schedule and within
the dollars programmed.
Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy
Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in
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November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently,
coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:
First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid
concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of
the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided to move ahead with the
development of the TFX aircraft.
Second, our best judgment of the many factors involved let us to
the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award.
Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad
bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts
again before we arrived at a final decision.
Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we decided to
award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.
There remains one more important aspect of this case which I
believe should be thoroughly understood. Fundamentally, we are
dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific
technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment
is what is at issue.
In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are
pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing
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contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost
within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation
Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or
would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board,
using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared
to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational
areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of
costs. This recommendation, understandably, was seconded by the Navy
and Air Staffs, since these officers are most vitally interested in obtaining
the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion,
this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons
systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it
has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.
There is only one way I know to minimize the compounding of error
that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply
the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation,
but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the
best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises
held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of
military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.
That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition
is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue
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"
through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach
great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements
is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program
definition phase until I was satisfied that the military requirements of
both the Navy and Air Force had been met. That I attach great importance
to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is,
I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the
contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations
on the task to be achieved.
I do not feel that this is a case which presents a civilian--military
conflict but rather one of placing emphasis where it must be placed.
In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I
considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian
advisors as well as other available evidence, but I had the final
responsibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my
decision were:
Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs
met stated military requirements and would provide
significant improvements in combat capabilities of
the Navy and the Air Force.
The General Dynamics proposal resulted in
minimum divergence from a common design
compatible with the separate mission of the Navy
and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings
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and increased dependability inherent in a joint
program.
The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more
realistic understanding of costs.
As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the
decision was mine.
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