157-10005-10236
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Date: 10/04/93
Page: 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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RECORD NUMBER: 157-10005-10236
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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R445
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
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FROM:
TO :
TITLE :
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/TRANSCRIPT
DATE: 07/08/75
PAGES: 257
SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS
EXHIBITS ATTACHED IN THE FORM OF MEMOS/NEWS ARTICLES
DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT/EXHIBITS
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS: REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/04/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
BOX 251-5
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NW 50955 DocId: 32202426
Page 1
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
WARD & PAUL
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
TOP SECRET
110
1
2
10
3
Mr. Schwarz.
These are minutes of the Special Group which
you attended, and it states: "Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on
progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of
intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and
5 he Madrid clandestine interrogation center. He outlined
6
8
various difficulties encountered and said that three agent teams
had been infiltrated."
Now did Mr. Harvey, at that meeting, state anything do
you recollect Mr. Harvey making that report?
9
10
General Lansdale. In general terms, yes.
11
Mr. Schwarz. Did he state anything relating to the
passage of pills to persons to accomplish the assassination of
Fidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting?
General Lansdale. No. As a matter of fact, we were very
proud that he had gotten these teams in, that they had been
infiltrated, and so forth, and collecting intelligence.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Mr. Schwarz.
20
12 2
Mr. Schwarz. Were they the first teams?
General Lansdale.
Yes.
Did he say anything at that meeting that
you recall about the subject of assassinations?
General Lansdale.
Nothing.
21
23
22
23
24
25
Mr. Schwarz. Would you give the witness the May 7th '62
memorandum of General Taylor, Subject, Report of Progress to
Higher Authority?
Now, Senators, that is supposedly slipped in your notebooks
NW 50955 DocId: 32202426 Page 2
TOP SECRET
Program Review by
Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale,
Chief of Operations
SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
18 January 1962
FILB
N. B.
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
1(0)
much 23
St
(9 pooe)
DocId: 32202426
)
THE CUBA PROJECT
I.
OBJECTIVE
FILE
N. B.
The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist
regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the
United States can live in peace.
II. CONCEPT OF OPERATION
Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban
people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute
a new government with which the United States can live in peace.
The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement
established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction to-
The
wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment.
political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure
of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological
operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime,
and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for
sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.
The failure of the U.S. -sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook
the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in support-
ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against
the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American
countries. Further, the foreigness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny
imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the
Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to
Such an
defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion.
anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement
within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.
The preparation phase must result in a political action organization
in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal
communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own
action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have
the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this
fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans
are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what
appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)
The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of
the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a
fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major
goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movemer
FLO
N. B.
Excluded from automatic
regrading:
DOD Dir.
5200.10 does not apply.
Page FK
ск
PAPERS
74-03-19-14
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE R
E
22 MAY 15 1962, C
This document contains
Copy No:
SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET
Youles.
NTS BRANCH
of +4
ATTORNEY GENERAC
8.
NW 50955
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
H. TV intrusion.
Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts
has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to
attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and
parade demonstrations.
I. Special sabotage support
Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility
of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship-
ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated
action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results
(stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA
is introducing Lubzola corrosive additive, to Cuban locomotive
diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium. It will be 4-
months before the first locomotives break down. CIA expects to be able
to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February to attempt introduc-
tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba.
J. Military actions
Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan
for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help
when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will
permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions,
and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a
people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense
also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments
of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.
K. Major elements of the population
Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities
(with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations
inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly
operations through the Church to reach the women and families, and
through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include
enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration
is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts.
This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can
put it into place.
L. Outlook
10
Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a
period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required
clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up.'
After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be
to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support
for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate
which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action.
This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of
the Cuba project's goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its
potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine
if it cannot make the greater effort required.
RFK Papers
4
SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET
NW 50955 DocId: 32202426
Page
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
V.
TARGET SCHEDULE
NW 50955 DocId: 32202426
A.
Intelligence
Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).
Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made
an 
effective operation for collection 
and processing of intelligence (CIA
with support of Defense, State, 
I&NS, FBI).
Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than
Miami 
area.
CIA to survey 
other refugee points (Puerto Rico, Venezuela,
etc.) and on a 
priority basis 
to ensure maximum coverage of all such
source points. 15 
February target date.
Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets,
with 
priority on agents 
inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 Feb-
ruary. Also included is 
coverage of intelligence through third country
sources, particularly those 
having diplomatic relations with Cuba.
B.
Political
Task 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban
government 
officials, to 
fracture the regime from within.
must be 
imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to
This effort
be worth at least a million 
U.S. dollars. This can be the key to our
political action goal and 
must be mounted without delay as a major CIA
project.
Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Decep-
tion 
actions, to help fracture 
the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense,
State and FBI are to collaborate 
on this.
Task 7 By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for
initiating 
popular 
movement within Cuba. This must include localities
selected inside 
Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltra-
tion, activity 
assignments, and political platform. One section must
deal with the "
underground," assess its true status and plans to use it.
Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S.
Embassies 
in Latin 
America exploit all opportunities to enlist local
sympathy for the 
Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the
Communist regime 
in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this
assignment by 13 
February, so further planning can be programmed.
Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational
assets 
in the Caribbean 
area, including capabilities of local governments
or groups to mount 
operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's
goals. Plans for 
early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.
Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the
Caribbean 
area to achieve the 
Project's political action goals. The
objective of 
working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such
as workers, farmers
) is underscored. Due 19 February.
RFK Papers
Page 5
5
SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET
CIA HAS NO OS
DECLASS
ΤΟ
AMENT
FILE
KS B.
AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND
/
OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
12. роды
of march 22 94
10)
OLENSE
܂
ULUILI
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE
RECEIVED
JAN 29 1962
27 N
ANNENERAL
FILE
N. B.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed
Noting that you will be away from the country most of the
month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project
for which we should provide. Certain proposals should have
evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to
be made if our Project is to win its goal and the bureaucratic
machine has too many people captive to it, one way or another.
--
It is my hope that you will make someone specifically
responsible to speak for your determined course and have the
role of being your "presence" as far as possible. This demands
a personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and
reasonably direct access to the President. Perhaps Dick Good-
win could fulfill this role. Secretary McNamara is an alternate
suggestion; he has so many irons in the fire that I hesitated men-
tioning him.
You might be considering General Taylor, but I do
not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine
military bureaucrat at heart.
As you know, I remain convinced that our goal can be won.
Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U.S. agencies to work hard at
it, the goal can be won through their efforts. Yet, their efforts
haven't been impressive to date, and I still feel that we might
uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional pro-
gram we are spurring.
exh. #4
It may be a special effort which professional labor operators
can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may
be through ethnic-language groups; Spain has an untapped action
potential. It could be a warming-up of the always lively youth
element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially
used. It could be with the families through the Church, with families
FILE
N. B.
TOP SECRET
H4-08-19-19
22
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE R
JUN 6 1962
RECORDS BRANCH
E
FILL
Mb
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; BOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
This document contains 2 pages..
ATTORNEY GENERAL
PJ
of
_copies. Series A
RFK Papers
NW 50955 DocId: 32202426 Page 6
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
1.
ACTIVITY
Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel
to Soviets.
F.
SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN
PURPOSE
To deny supply to Soviets and to hinder
Cuba's ability to pay for Bloc imports.
2.
Sabotage fuel supply.
To cripple transportation.
3.
Sabotage communications.
4. Sabotage power supply.
To dramatize and encourage the
spirit of resistance.
To increase strain on regime and
bring daily business to a standstill,
by dramatic action all people will
note.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
CONSIDERATIONS
This can be an early sabotage action on the
Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based
outside Cuba. Destruction of transformers,
coolant pumps and towers seems more
feasible than blocking the channel.
Effect
can be supported later by denial of Canadian
spare parts.
Effects of CIA program of lubricating oil
additive is expected on locomotive stin June-
July. Much more can be done with fuel
contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel
fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer
real opportunity for more vigorous program.
Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based
outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio
transmitter (believed now used to jam U.S.
broadcasts). Attacks mounted only when
operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave
net 
should be dealt with when there are suf-
ficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide
with a critical need, in August-September.
This should be a concerted attack, as feasible
in July-August, on power plants at Havana,
Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara,
Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas. It is of a type
requiring 
detailed planning and special equip-
ment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba.
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
march 22
94
1 (b), (e)
NW 50955
DocId: 32202426
Page 7
00163
PROPERTY OF
NW 50955
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Page 8
AIRBOLT
THE WHITE HOU
4. *
ACTIVITY
Caribbean Admission Center,
Opa Locka, Florida, fully
activated by 15 March 1962.
5. * Periodic intelligence esti-
mates, as required by progress
of operations.
(
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
PURPOSE
115 March 1962 (cont)
To collect intelligence required for the
operations, to identify and earmark in-
telligence assets as refugees arrive,
and to provide security against Com -
munist agent operations.
To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current
estimates can be considered at national
policy levels.
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
124194
1(0
бу 312.
CONSIDERATIONS
This operation, in response to early recommendation
as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at
utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with
a new building completed and occupied, and with a
staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February
and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center.
(CLA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice,
State, USIA.)
As the operations develop, there will be both increased
intelligence collection and a need for as current an In-
telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.
It is likely that a more informal method of producing an
Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than
now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be
followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence sum-
maries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly
report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA
responsibility, with support of others as required.)
OTHER OPERATIONS
6. * Continue negotiating for
British help in contaminating
locomotive lubricants.
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
7. * Two teams of agents dis-
patched to Cuba.
*
To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.
16
"
31 March 1962
To collect intelligence.
British assistance is required to undertake a successful
sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating
lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months
is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking
down, once the contaminant is introduced.
00208
One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include
personnel who have had resistance training and some past
experience.
Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3/24194
ACTIVITY
8. Establish 2 additional third-
country resident agents in
Cuba.
9. By 31 March, have 105 agents
selected and 50 agents trained.
10. Develop intelligence potential
of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.
11. Develop additional interroga-
tion centers in other areas by
31 March 1962.
OTHER OPERATIONS
None.
16
31 March 1962 (cont.)
PURPOSE
To collect intelligence.
To ready agent operations.
To exploit the intelligence possi-
bilities of former residents of
Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now
in the United States.
To collect intelligence in a Latin
atmosphere, at different levels than
now seem possible in the continental
U.S., to spot additional intelligence
assets and to provide security
against Communist agent operations.
CONSIDERATIONS
Possible future use in communications and support.
Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose
of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions
controlling these factors. If the recruitment and train-
ing are for resistance activities, the task of recruit-
ment and training will be much less difficult than if
they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes
only.
There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other
U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church,
and business interests provoke unusual personal ties
inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential
exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail-
able. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this
effort. )
As Opa Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate
other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A
center is being activated in Spain Negotiations with
local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers,
if possible, in Mexico City, Caracas, and Lba San
Juan, Puerto Rico,
go, Chile, are being sur-
(CIA responsibility with sup-
veyed for possible centers.
port by others as necessary.)
00209
**
Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
TOP SECRET
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
33
MEXH. #12
12 March 1962
1
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)
From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale
Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
of 3/24/94
As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I,
a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems,
necding resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special
Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.
1. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small
groups of Cuban nationals on the US Air Force Bombing Range, Avon
Park, Florida, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area
is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents
who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem
and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S.
Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and
interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure
(in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to
unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination
is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should
be trained on U.S. Government installations.
There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in
the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use
The same
for similar training and operational purposes in the future.
policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government
properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert
infiltration into Cuba.
2 Arming of Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on
the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as
they are located; assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting
to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is
00199
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TOP SECRET
This document contains
Copy No. 1
of 7
NW 50955 DocId: 32202426 Page 10

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATIENTION TOR is somiting
RELEASE 
OF THIS DOCUMENT 11a
of CYMERT
3
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
1(e)
71
1
3 May 1962
EXH-#13
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on
Project Mongoose, 3 May 1962
PRESENT:
1.
General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric,
General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craig;
Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey
NW 50955 DocId: 32202426 Page 11
The
General Lansdale gave an interim report on the progress
of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army. He said
the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable
individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected.
Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large
number. General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training
of such Cubans are being looked into.
It was agreed that such a cadre of Cubans would be an asset
to the U.S., which might be used in a number of ways. General
Lansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in this
connection the matter of holding the individuals and giving them
useful employment after they are trained is an important and a
difficult one.
2. Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent
teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the
Opa-locka interrogation center and the Madrid clandestine interroga-
tion center. He outlined various difficulties encountered, and said
that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets
are in place. Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources
are also in place. A significant development is that Major Duque has
refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely.
intelligence-gathering missions. (This sort of attitude had been
forecast earlier as a possibility, but it now assumes particular im-
portance in view of Duque's stature.)
3. Mr. Harvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude
into Havana TV Aprograms. The Group asked that a check be made, as
soon as possible; on how effective these operations were. They also
asked that a copy of the scripts used be made available.
The Group
felt that it is worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now
being done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not
perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time..
CC: General Lansdale
destroyed 4/9/63-mm
Stropk
Thomas A. Parrott
PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE