200000
104-10400-10311
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG: 2/75
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY.
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PAGE 01
TOR:1519027 JAN 76
SECRET 151705Z JAN 76 STAFF
28
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT
ST AFF
1
2
3
$
IN 795558
LOND
68796
CITE LONDON 68796
TO: DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLKMBALL
NELSON FROM MEYER
4.
REF:
1.
ROGER CHANNEL 09548
4086
CABILT
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REFERENCE FROM DEPARTMENT INFORMS EMBASSY THAT SENATOR
CT
BU
Lat
Закви
Which Harr
HART OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTEND ING CONFERENCE AT
DITCHLEY 30 JANUARY TU 1 FEBRUARY. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT EMBASSY
ARRANGE WITH DEREK TONKIN FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF
INTEREST TO HIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE DIVISION OF
LABOR BETWEEN PAT SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTEL-
LI GENCE AND COUNTERINTEL LI GENCE. HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS
. ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLIT-
RICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. IN
ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND
COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS.
SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT
AND HOW IT WORKS.
"
2. TONKIN HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY EMBASSY OFFICER AND TONKIN HAS
SECRET
* Not Received.
13-00000
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PAGE 02-02
TØR:1519022 JAN 76
"
IN 795558
LOND 68796
ADVISED THAT BRITS WILL DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION SENATOR
HART WANTS BUT THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE
AVAILABLE, HE IS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH SIR LEONARD
HOOPER AND RICHARD SYKES FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY AND WITH MR. ROBERT ARMSTRONG AT THE HOME OFFICE ON THE
WORKINGS OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS. ACT.: THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN
THE SCHEDULE AND EMBASSY WILL BE ADVISED BY MR. TONKIN AT A LATER
DATE,
3. THERE IS NO INDICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC THAT CIA
HAS BEEN INFORMED BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE
OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER.
4. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET.
SECRET
13-00000
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T 602263
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STAFF PRECEDENCE
1.
2
5
.3
6
IN 794546
TOR11500522 JAN 76
CNBR 21033
SECRET 1423022 JAN 70 STAFF
CITE CANBERRA 21033
TOI DIRECTOR
RYBAT TAPPER PLMHCONGA CODEL ADD ABBO
UPON ARRIVAL OF THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE
12TH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED COS AND ARRANGED FOR STATION:
BRIEFING AT 0830/13TH (THE CONTRY TEAM BRIEFING WAS SCHEDULED
FOR 0930), CARY MENTIONED THAT THE INTEL BRIEFS HAD BEEN
GIVEN "TAIL END" TREATMENT AT PREVIOUS STOPS AND CONGRESSMAN
ADDABBO HAD INDIKATED THAT HE WANTED TO BE SURE AND REMEDY
THAT ON THE CANBERRA STO PO VER.
2,
CONGRESSMEN ADDABBO, ROBINSON AND EDWARDS, ACCOMPANIED
BY STAFFERS SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY ARRIVED AT THE
EMBASSY AT 0830. WITH CUNNEELY PRESENT, COS GAVE THEM DETAILED
BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY HE AD QUARTERS. DISCUSSION COVERED THE
MAKE-UP OF THE STATION AND BASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN
AUSTRALIA, THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HOS IN MANAGE-
MENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF LIA ISON,
STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES,
OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO
SECRET.
Grallel
13-00000
7-71 MFG. 2/75
CABLE BY DISSEM
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PER
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED
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STAFF
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PAGE 02
TORI150052Z JAN 76
DETAI
IN 794546
CNBR 21033
PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE, SPECIFIC DETAINS OF HOW WE ACCOMP-
LISH OUR OPS TASKING- SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT.
WITH TARGETS AND USE OF LIAISON - STATION BUDGET, ETC., ACTUAL
EXAMPLES WERE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE POINT.
FOR EXAMPLE, THE PDWHIZ CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION
FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUAL, PRIMARY TARGET. IT WAS A LIVELY
SESSION, WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS THE "LIVE
WIRES" OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF
4.
ROUTINE NATURE
PRIMARILY RELATED TO INCIDENTAL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE,
·CONGRESS MAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT HE FELT IT RATHER EASY TO IDENTIFY
THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS OF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY
HAPPEN TO BE INTERFACED ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY
COS RESPONSE WAS THAT SUCH IS OFTEN TRUE, BUT THAT STATIONS AND
HQS. MA NA GEMENT ARE FOCUSING ON THAT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND THAT THE
WELCH INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS IN THAT
RE GA RD.
3. ALL BUT A FEW MINUTES OF THE ENTIRE HOUR WAS
SPENT IN DISCUSSING STATION OPS. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED
THAT THE GROUP WAS "WITTING" AND A FEW QUESTIONS AND.
ISSUES ERE ADDRESSED ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT
SECRET
13-00000
7-71.MFG. 2/75
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
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TOTAL COPIES
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IN 794546
ON BR
21033
TOR11500522 JAN 76
27, (IN-793209)
SNODGRASS WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THAT EXCHANGE, AND
IS REPORTED IN SEPARATE CABLE (CANBERRA 21027)
SNODGRASS REQUEST STATION HAD ARRANGED A SPECIAL MEETING
WITH A SELECT GROUP OF GON OFFICIALS. THE DETAILS OF THAT
MEETING AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF
THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE ARE ALSO DETAILED IN CANBERRA 21029.ON
BECAUSE OF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THOSE
MEETINGS, SUGGEST CEA AND C/EA/PMI REVIEW REFERENCED
CABLE. THE CABLE WAS GIVEN RESTRICTED HANDLING BY STATION
BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS CONTENT..
4, THE MEETING LASTED THE FULL HOUR AND THE CONGREMS-
MEN INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL-SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD.
BEEN CONVERED. COS STRESSED THAT WE WERE AVAILABLE TO
CONTINUE ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE DAY
WAS COMPLETED, BUT THEY INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN
ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER STATION CONTACT
WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VISIT. THE STAFFERS
DEPARTED ON THEIR "V IS IT" IN THE EMBASSY CONVA IR ON SCHEDULE,
AND WILL RETURN DIRECT TO SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH,
ARRIVING AT ABOUT 2300, E2, IMPDE T.
SECRET
)*
13-00000
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
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бериг
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BY
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T 595025
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☑
PAGE 01-01
IN 791659
TOR:122154Z JAN 76.
CNER 21007
SECRET 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF
CITE CANBERRA 21007
TO: JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR..
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO
REFS: A.
.
JAKARTA 35686 (IN 787635)
B. JAKARTA 35661
(IN790579)
CANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING
ON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE
WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL.
REGARDS. E2 IMPDET.
SECRET
13-00000
FORM 3020b
7-/1 MFG. 2/75
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY.
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,
4 PER SOP 112
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
C/2A3
RF. FILE.
N
BY
AT
10
TOTAL COPIES
S E CRET
-
RUN BY
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EA3: DDO, CS/RE, SA/000, VOLE
ACTION #
F
0
T 593616
FAGE 01
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
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STAFF
1
4
2
5
3
6
IN 791004.
EIA024
TOR 121111Z JAN 76
JKRT
35674
SE CHE T 120939Z JAN 76 STAFF
CITE JAKARTA 35674
я
-TO: DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLMHCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO
REF:
JAKARTA 35661 (790579)
1. AT RECEPTION AT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF 11 JANUARY,
REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT STATION
BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN. GOOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE
FRANK ANSWERS TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS.
2. MR. SNODGRASS ALSO VOLUNTERRED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD
IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED
AND PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS.
HE ADDED THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY
AGENCY OFFICERS THAT THEY HAD BEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR
TEN YEARS OR MORE AND HAD NOT YET RECRUITED ONE. HE ALLUDED TO
THIS AS THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY PAID FOR SEEKING
THE HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT EVER FINDING IT. COS POINTED OUT TO MR
SNUDGRASS THAT SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK
OF UNE STATION, WHICH MIGHT NOT RESULT IN RECRUITMENT WOULD BE
THE VERY BASIS ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION IS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL
SECRET
13-00000
7-71 MFG..2/75
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RECRUITMENT APPROACH,
FAGE 02
TO R: 121111Z JAN 76
IN 791004
JK RT. 35674
IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, ALSO POINTED
OUT THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF A SINGLE SOVIET COULD AND DOES RESULT
IN A MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A MORE
A
RELISTIC ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO MEET IT. MR. SNOD GRASS ADMITTED
THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS UPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN LESS
CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT WITH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN JAKARTA
WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER
FEEL FOR OUR ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS.
MR.. CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH
MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD GONE
DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING GIVEN AN ACCURATE
AND INTERESTING INSIGHT.
THUS IT SEEMS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH TO THE DELEGATION
DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY LETHARGIC
ABOUT IT.
5. NEW SUBJECT: DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC
INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING OF CODEL DIGGS? E2, IMPDET.
SECRET
13-00000
FORM 3020b
7-71: MFG. 2/75
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
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2850P 112
UNIT
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TOTAL COPIES 10
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592728
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PAGE 01
TOR:1122332 JAN 76
RUN BY
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IN 790651
CNBR 21000
SECRET 112220Z JAN 76 STAFF
CITE CANBERRA 21000
TO: IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD
REF:
WELLINGTON 15837/107875721
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800.
AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL,
2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY
THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT:
45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY'
THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD
ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC.
3.
HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO
HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO BRIGADIER GILBERT.
BEST REGARDS.. E2, IMPDET.
SECRET.
13-00000
FORM 3020b
7-71 MFG. 2/75
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
28 PER SOP112
TOTAL COPIES
10
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SECRET
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
CEA3
ACTION #
RF FILE
.VR.
N
F
DCY/REVIEW STEFF
Sappe 2/OLC.
: CS/RF, DDO. S
°
592741
EIA165
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..
REDENCE
4'
2
5.
3
6
790652
TOR:1123132 JAN 76
CNBR 21001
SECRET 112305Z JAN 75 STAFF
CITE CANBERRA 21001
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT)
SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT
1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD
ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT
HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH¨
SQUASH DIRECTOR GENERAL, D/JIO AND SOTERN/44, EACH FOR ABOUT 45
MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN
WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE
MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT.
2.
INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON,
DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY
FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. JACK MAURY'S PRESENCE
WAS AN ASSET...
3.
DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED
THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET.
SECRET

13-00000
FORM 3020b
7-77 MFG. 2/75
Br47
PERSOR 112
TOTAL COPIES
$10-
SECRET
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
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2
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ACTION #
N
FILE
BY
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CS/RF
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SADDO OLC
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T 592369.
EIA799
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
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STAFFPRECEDENCE
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PAGE 01
IN 790579
TOR:111013Z JAN 76
JKRT
35661
SECRET 1109372 JAN 76 STAFF
CITE JAKARTA 35661.
TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, SYDNEY.
•
NIACT CANBERRA
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO
1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND
MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE.
ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD
CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET,
ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS,
RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT. STABILITY AND
ΑΙ
INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORM RION,
MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF COVER WORK
PERFORMED BY OFFICIALLY COVERED OFFICERS, MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY,
INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES, DIA ROLE IN INDONESIA,
AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING. -
2.
QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP
CU
SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS,
A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE
IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE
SECRET
13-00000
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PAGE 02-02
TOR:111013Z JAN 76
CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).
IN 790579
JKRT
35661
3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL.
NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH
POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE
EI
HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THR
OUTLOOK.
4°
OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY.
PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART. OF THEIR TRIP.
E2, IMPDET.
SECRET
13-00000
7-71 MFG. 2/75'
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
TOTAL COPIES 10-1
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RUN Y
* DCV/Review STAFF, CSRF
SAIDDO POLC
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EA 3
ACTION #
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1
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DDQ+
100,
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PAGE 01-01
IN 789314
TOR:#91229Z JAN 76
CNBR
20992
SECRET 0900332 JAN 76 STAFF
CITE CANBERRA 20992
TO: WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PL·MHCUNGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD.
REF:
1
WELLINGTON 15837
787572)
COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP
ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE.
2. REGARDS. E2, IMPDET.
SECRET
13-00000
OUTGOING
ESSAGE
15-2
OMF
0
AGE
CLASSIFICATION
0
SECRET
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
COI
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF
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0.
TOG
0
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CONF:
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TO:
DATE-TIME GROUP
OCI
CITE
082336Z DIRECTOR
INFO: FILE DCI Review.
, CS/RF,
0
Review Staff,
"DDO, SATADE, D/OLC,
PRIORITY JAKARTA INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.Y
RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y
REF:
JAKARTA 35600 |IN 787573*) Y
0
PAUS
OF MASS
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
INDEX
789926
NO INDEX
RETURN TO
IP FILES
DISSEM BY:
22
PER SOP
# 112
Wh Wallen
copy
1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN
MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP
DISCUSSIONS HERE.4
2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS.
OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF
IFPUBLISHED:
IN JAKARTA SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT
WITH INDONESIAN LIAISON AND WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT PLUS
CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES
IN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON ÉCONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
IN INDONESIA WILL, IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE US DAMAGE IN INDONESIA.
ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL
PROTECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. MEETING WITH YOGA, IF
PUBLISHED, WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH.4.
THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED"
3.
VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE.
HEADQUARTERS
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CLASSIFICATION SM REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
SECRET
** AUTHENTICATING OFFICEN
E 2 IMPDET
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13-00000
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DATE-TIME GROUP
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.
5
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PAGE.
OF
Mass
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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
CONF:
INFO: FILE
DIRECTOR
.789926
INDEX
DISSEM BY:
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RETURN TO
PER
IP FILES
WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION
OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED-Y
4. FOR CANBERRA, WELLINGTON: IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES
REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/
BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS
AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION AS JAKARTA MATERIAL. E2. IMPDET.
P
DATE:
ORIG:
8 JAN 76
B.J.HOUSTON
UNIT: DCEA
EXT:
9373
E
Bill Z
WILLIAM E. NELSON DDO
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
OLC MR. WHITE {DRAFT}
SA/DDO MR. WALLER (TELECOORD]
CEA/PMI UNFOS R.R
COORDINATING OFFICERS
Dishnally
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY
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SECRE T. 080352Z JAN 76 STAFF
CITE JAKARTA 356 06.
fite
/
Senates
Englewmen
مني
TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA ROUTINE WELLINGTON.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF: JAKARTA 035600
(787573)
CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON BRIEFED AT COS RESIDENCE
NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR
INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUA-
TION IN INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ROLE OF
INDONESIAN MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANI-
ZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION. THEY WERE OPENLY
CRITICAL OF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED EARLIER IN
THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND
GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD
SAID. COS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY.
ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF
THE TOTAL INDONESIAN "NATIONAL RESILIENCE" PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST
ENCROACHMENT. THE CONGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC
MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES
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RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS,
2. THE TWO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND
WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN INDONESIA. THEY APPEARED HIGHLY
INTERESTED WHEN COS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT
APPEARED TO BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD
CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY. NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD
OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN A SHORT BRIEFING ON IT. BOTH
MADE MENTION OF INDONESIA'S CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION
CONDEMNING U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GUAM. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO WONPAT, WHO IS THE REPRESEN-
TATIVE FROM GUAM. THEY SAID MR. WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE
OF DIPLOMACY NOT TO BRING UP THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT, BUT
THAT HE HAD CONFESSED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF
IN THIS MATTER. COS REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT
REGRETTED THAT MR. WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE
SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TO LET OUR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS
KNOW THAT WE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS
ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT
TO THE ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO, WHO HAD REACTED BY INSTRUCTING
W
:
THE INDONESIAN U.N. DELEGATION TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM JAKARTA
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BEFORE ACT ING ON ANY SUCH IS SUE AGAIN. WE ALSO NOTED THAT
PRÉSIDENT SUHARTO HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE INDONESIAN UN.
DELEGATION VOTE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MADE HIS DISPLEASURE KNOWN
TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.
3. DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE
CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC STUTEMENTS OF PRESIDENT
MARCOS AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEMAND ING THE REMOVAL OF U.S.
MILITARY BASES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED THAT
THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND DID
NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE
LEADERSHIP. AS YOGA PUT IT, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND
NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY, BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER
REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAIVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC
STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S. AND NATURALLY AFFECTED.
CONGRESS. CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO FIGHT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES
WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT. HE
ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO, THE ASKED FOR
COS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS OR LET
HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN. COS SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO
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35606
DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION
THAT IT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD FOR
CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT.
COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS
THAT IT DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY: THAT THEY.
DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY PUBLICLY SINCE THE PUBLIC
STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE ONES WERE NOT.
4. THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS.
GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE U.S.
IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
THEY
ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND
ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION, AND.
THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY, CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE.
HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN SUKARNO ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE
CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED,
"LOOK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED) DID TO US!". THEY EXPRESSED
VERY LITTLE OF THEIR UPINIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH
BOTH SEEMED TO ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL
OF MR. HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE, THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.
EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE CONDOR OF MR. COLBY,
..).
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GENERALLY IT APPEARED THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR
CONVERSATION WITH COS, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE
RESULTS OF THEIR VIS IT UP TO THAT TIME. SINCE THEY SAID THEY HAD
NOT FOUND OUT MUCH FROM THE INDONESIANS THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW
BEFORE. STRONGLY ENDORSE HEADQUARTERS ADVICE TO STREAT WITH THESE
GENTLEMEN SEPARATLEY FROM CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, WHOSE INTERESTS
SEEM QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THEIRS'. E2, IMPDET.
*Advised of contact with Congressmen Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange
briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on
7 January.
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PAGE 01
IN 787573.
TUR:080007Z JAN 76
JKRT 35600
SECRET 070944Z JAN 76 STAFF
CITE JAKARTA 35600
TO: DIRECTOR INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF: A.
DIRECTOR 788143
B. DIRECTOR 788139
C.
DIRECTOR 788390
D.
DIRECTOR 785722
S
1. MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SHORTLY AFTER HIS
ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED TO BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY. ALSO
C
と
CONTACTED WONGRESSMEN WILSON AND D/RKINSON AND LATER MR. TED
LUNGER, AND WILL BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY.
2. MILFORD BRIEFING COMPRISED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY
FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLINED REF/D. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED
WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WE
WERE VERY
ป
CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES.
3. MILFORD WAS SERIORS, ATTENTIVE AND INTERESTED LISTENER,
HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND
, AND CONTROL, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY AND MORALE OF
STATION PERSONNEL. HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS OF STATION PERSONNEL,
OVERALL BUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED
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PAGE 02
TORI080007Z JAN 76
w
IN 787573
JKRT 35600
IN STATION'S LIAISON PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONERIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS ATTITUDE
WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH.
ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELIVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL
ATTITUDES WERE LARGELY BASED ON IGNORANCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE
CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LUOKING AT THE AGENCY'S WOLD CATS" AND
THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW
OF THE AGENCY IF THEY TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE
MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY
BY THE DDG. HE ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC
INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION.
OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. COS OUTLINED A
FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE
HIM.
PAGNSE JAKARTA 35620
4.
ب عمر
OFF THE RECORD, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SAID HE HAD IN MIND
PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A
SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED. THIS
COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN
GY
RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOR, AND
SECRET
2
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PAGE 03
TORI080007Z JAN 76
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JKRT 35600
THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF
CONGRESS, ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS
A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROM THE NORM AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE
ER
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. ALSO, UNLIKE OTHES COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT ON A STRICT BIGOTED
COULD NOT BE
BASIS AND MCWD NRL NYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE
THE
MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE.THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE AND O'Q
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. HES ADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE
SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE PROSENT CONGRESS. HE POOH-POOHED THE IDEA
YI
RE
NO
OF A JOINT COMMITTEE SAEENG THAT IT WOULD HAVEMRO LEGISLATION
но
AUTIGRITY AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DOG BITING AT OUR HEELS.
}
5. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED FOR COS, VIEWS ON THIS
LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH GOS WOULD CARE
TO MAKE ON OR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND.
NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO AVOID RESPONSIBLE
OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRES,
OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRES, 
BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST
Some
HAVE SVE SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WE WOULD
ATI
BE OUT OF BUSINESS, COS OFFERED NO RECOMMENDOFRONS ON THE BASIS
THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT
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IN 787573
TOR:080007Z JAN 76
JKRT
35600
TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION.
6.
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATON ACTIVITIES. COS
POINTED OUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES,
BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.
Н
7. FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, COS ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN
MILDORD, TOGETHER WITH CHARGE RIVES AND THE ENTIRE DELEGATION. TO
A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE
OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED GENERAL YOGA IF YOGA
FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM
U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD ANY CRITICISM OF U.S.
INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN INDONESIAN AFFAIRS. GENERAL YOGA
REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED TO DEVELOP BAKIN SOMEWHAT
FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF BAKIN ARE
CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT. IN CERTAIN CASES IT IS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE
WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT
INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. YOGA CONTINUED
✓
THAT BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATIE IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH
^
AS THE SOVIETS. THIS IS A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO
A SPECIFIC GOAL. YOGA ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON
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IN 787573
JKRT 35600
P
RELATIONSHIPS ITH THE BRITISH. THE AUSTRALIANS, THE JALANESE,
A
WEST GERMANS, AND ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS. HE SAID SPECIFICALLY
HE DID NOT ADDRESS
c
THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH RIA WERE EXCELLENT.
HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.
8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED
K
MARY WHO WAS WELL TAKEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT.
SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING
FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER
AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI-TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE.
HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT
IS WELL TO SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM.
도
A
9. MILFORD ASKD FOR A NON-CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION
BRIEFING AND OF MEETING WITH ZOGA TO BE SENT TO AGENCY AND PSSED
TOAGENCY Λ
ON TO HIM. THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED IT
HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD GO INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD.
WILL PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST.
10.
OVERALL BELIVE THIS WAS A PLUS. MILDORD EXPRESSED
Λ
COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEFING AND AGAIN REPEATED
THAT
IF OTHERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES THEY TOO
WOALD BE IMPRESSED.
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K
11.
P
TOR10800072 JAN 76
1
4
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WILL RECORTSELARATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING
WHEN IT IS COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT. E2, IMPDET.
IN 787573
JKRT .35600
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d
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T 583972
EIA590
TORI0721292 JAN 76
CNBR 20980.
SECRET 0721002 JAN 76 STAFF
CITE CANBERRA 20980
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD
REF:
1.
DIRECTOR 787555
APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY.
ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH SQTERN REP
(PROBABLY SQTERN/44, D/JIO AND SQUASH/D-G.
2. COS AND BONHAM DISCUSSIONS" TENTATIVELY SET FOR
0830-10001 ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH
EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME
FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES, CAN
EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET,
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PAGE #1
TORI0800012 JAN 76
SECRET 070240Z JAN 76 STAFF
CITE WELLINGTON 15837
TO:
CANBERRA INFO DIRECTOR,
STAFF
1
.2
3
4
5
рев
IN 787572
WELL 15837
Levates tedent
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD
REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959
B. DIRECTOR 787555
PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS WELLINGTON CAN ARRANGE
15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH NZ SECURITY INTELLI-
GENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER H. E. GILBERT, AT CONGRESSMAN
MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY WELLINGTON BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION
DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY
PREFER TO MEET WITH COS AND BRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN
CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT.
TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR
FLIGHT TO MT. COOK WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH
GILBERT. .PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN
CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT.
E2IMPDET
SECRET
13-00000
OUTGOIN MESSAGE
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
ACP
10-7
OMF
0
AGE
CLASSIFICATION
COI
0
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
TOG
MRO
DCI
0
0
ROUTINO
.4
•
7
。
°
PAGE
ОР
PAGES
STAFF
CONF:
c/EA
3
INFO:
DATE TIME GROUP
:
0223482
DIRECTOR
CITE
FILE Del (REVIEW STAFF
DDD, CS/RF SADDO
000/00 6/01C
TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.4.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y
REF: DIRECTOR 787555 |*|
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
INDEX
787959
NO INDEX
RETURN TO
DISSEM BY:27
PER SOC
IP BICES
# 112.
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON
OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH
LIAISON. E2, IMPDET.d
*TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE.
DATE:
2 JAN 76
ORIG: B.J. HOUSTON
UNIT: DCEA
·EXT: 9373 Hausto
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA
STHEODORE
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
Rch
OLC
CEA/PMI-
SPREK realiz telecord
COORDINATING OFFICERS
Houch
BILL J. HOUSTON DCEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2 IMPDET
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DATE-TIME GROUP
03212OZ
CITE
DIRECTOR
а
DCI / Review STAFF, DDO, CS/RF
DDO/DO, SA/DDO C/EA3
TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO.Y
RYBAT PLMHCONGAY.
REFS: A. DIRECTOR 785722 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO] ` |*|
1.
B.
DIRECTOR 787555, {NOT NEEDED TOKYO} |**14
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
INDEX
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112
BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, HE
°
EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDEES AS FOLLOWS:Y
JAKARTA
-
MORNING 7 JANUARY ·
CANBERRA
-
10 JANUARY
WELLINGTON - EVENING 14 JANUARY 4
2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING, MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (PIKE COMMITTEE}, HAS BEEN MOST.
INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS CONCERNED
ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTÉE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI, ONLY
MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEË
DRAWS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED HQS ON A NUMBER OF
OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS. HE
RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST
TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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788139
AS POSSIBLE. TO ASSIST HIM WRITE MINORITY REPORT.
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FILES
ACCORDINGLY, HE
WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR IMPORTANCE
THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURES. RECOGNIZE.
SHORT NOTICE, BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDEES MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE
LIAISON CONTACTS.4
3. FOR JAKARTA: PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND WILSON/DICKINSON CON-
TACTS SEPARATELY AND AVOID OBVIOUS SITUATION OF SINGLING MILFORD OUT
FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT.Y
Mr. Love BONHAM
4. FOR CANBERRA: MILFORD DOES EXPECT MEET TAND DISCUSS HIS
(BONHAM'S)
BONHAM IN CANBERRA. HE WILL DEVOTE DAY OF
ACTIVITY WITH MR..
10 JANUARY TO STATION AND NASA. REQUEST STATION COORDINATE WITH NASA
REP WHO PLANS TAKE MILFORD VISIT FACILITY AT TIPENBILO. IF SO,
SUGGEST STATION ARRANGE HAVE MRS. MILFORD TOUR NEARBY ZOO. IF ANY
CONFLICT SCHEDULING WITH NASA, MILFORD SAYS HE WANTS AGENCY TO TAKE
PRIORITY.Y
5. FOR WELLINGTON
MILFORD UNDERSTANDS HIS STAY WELLINGTON
SHORT AND WILLING DEVOTE EVENING TO STATION.Y
TOKYO IS REST STOP AND MILFORD EXPECTS NO
b. FOR TOKYO:
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
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CL BY:
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788139
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CONTACT.4
7. REQUEST ACTION ADDEES COORDINATE STATION PLANS WITH EMBASSY
SCHEDULING FOR GROUP TO GIVE MILFORD OPPORTUNITY MEET SENIOR FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESS-
ED, HOWEVER, AGENCY BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY. HQS HAS PROVIDED MILFORD
NAMES COS'S IN JAKARTA, CANBERRA, AND WELLINGTON. REQUEST STATIONES
CONTACT MILFORD. AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO MILFORD CAN PLAN:
NON-AGENCY PART OF SCHEDULE. SUGGEST STATIONNOFFICER ASSIST MRS.
MILFORD SINCE SHE MAY NOT WISH TO TAG ALONG WITH LARGER GROUP WITHOUT
HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET.H
*GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.
**CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE.
DATE:
3 JANUARY 76
ORIG: R. CHIN
UNIT: OLC
EXT: .9010
Ани
✓ HEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
DEP. DIR/DDS&T
OLC.
-
R. CHIN
-
C. DUCKETT {DRAFT}
DRAFT},
Hauste
HOUSTON, DCEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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CL BY: 058088
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• Sep 112
TOTAL COPIES
10
RUN BY
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
1
JEA3
ACTION
N
F
FILE.
T 572990
EIA882
BY
AT
VR. Del/REVIEW STAFF, DDD, CS/RF
5/2009/LC
PAGE 01
STAFF
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3
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IN 782959
TORI0208402 JAN 76
JKRT 35549
SECRET 020756Z JAN 76 STAFF
CITE JAKARTA 35549 (SHIMA ACTING)
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN
REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787555
B. DIRECTOR 785722
1. CHARGE MIKE RIVES HAS BEEN ADVISED CONGRESSMAN MIL-
FORDIS REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEFING PER REF A. WILL ARRANGE
BRIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMAN'S ARRIVAL.
WE
2. ON 2 JANUARY HAFAWN/1 TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY
THAT CABLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY BAKIN FROM HACLAUSE/1.
PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON PRESIDENT
SUHARTO. HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT GENERAL MURDANI BRIEF THE
GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION. BAKIN HAS SENT CABLE
TO MURDANI. TO RETURN TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK TO
PARTICIPATE IN BRIEFINGS. BRIEFING: OF CONGRESSMEN AND
THEIR STAFF MEMBERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT BAKIN HOS ON
7 JANUARY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS
BRIEFING STATION ARRANGED BAKIN BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS
From CHARGE,
E2 IMPPEL
SECRET
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INFO: FILE DCIC REVIEW STAFF)
CS/RF DOO SALO
DOOIDO P/OLC
TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.Y
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y
PAGE
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# 112
REF:
DIRECTOR 785722 (*) Y
1.
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE:4
ETD JAKARTA
1200
8 JAN FOR BALI Y
ETD BALI
0800
9 JAN FOR CANBERRA
ETA CANBERRA
1740
9. JAN
ETA WELLINGTON
1515
14 JAN
ETD WELLINGTON
1000
15 JAN FOR MT. COOK Y
ETD MT. COOK
1400
15 JAN FOR CHRIST CHURCH
1500 15 JAN
09
16
2330
JAN FOR HAWAII Y
ETA CHRIST CHURCH
ETD CHRIST CHURCH.
NOTE: THIS SEPARATE TRIP TO THAT OF SNODGRASS, PRESTON, CARY
MENTIONED DIRECTOR 778574.Y.
2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH
COS, JAKARTA 10 JANUARY, COS, CANBERRA 13 JANUARY AND WITH COS,
WELLINGTON, 15 JANUARY. REVISED SCHEDULE WILL ALTER HIS DESIRES
MEETING WITH HIM ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL FORWARD NEW
THIS CASE.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICEN
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET:
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 054913
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SCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS WITH COS' AT THAT TIME.Y
3. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS CEA AND OLC (MR. ROBERT CHIN}
BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 19 DECEMBER 1975:4
A- NINETEEN DECEMBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT
REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD COULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW
TERMS ON WHAT THE CIA STATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND
INDONESIA WERE DOING IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS.4
B. AUSTRALIA: THERE WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRA,
MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. THIS REPRESENTATION CONSISTED OF ABOUT
SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC MISSION OF PURSUING SOVIET,
CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE IN AUSTRALIA.
WAS STRESSED THAT THESE DENIED AREA TARGETS WERE PURSUED BOTH
UNILATERALLY AND IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN
IT
LIAISON SERVICE. THERE WERE 53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, 66 CHINESE,
8 HUNGARIANS, 22 CZECHS, 3 BULGARIANS, 59 YUGOSLAVS, 9 RUMANIANS
AND 17 NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS. IT WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT
BRIEFING THAT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH UNILATERAL AND JOINT
4,,
OPERATIONS WAS THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER'
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
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EUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN-PLACE AGENTS WHO WOULD WORK FOR US NOT ONLY
IN AUSTRALIA BUT UPON THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. ALSO
STRESSED CIA'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM
RECRUITED PENETRATIONS OF THE SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN
PRESENCE IN AUSTRALIA. HE WAS INFORMED OF OUR DESIRE TO RUN.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ARRANGE THE DEFECTION OF KNOWLEDGE-
ABLE SOURCES. OUR INTEREST IN BUILDING UP PERSONNEL INDICES ON
THOSE INDIVIDUALS FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN AUSTRALIA BUT
WHO WERE NOT RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATION-
SHIPS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS UNDER-
SCORED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY MIGHT BE
RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN LEARN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES
THE TARGET AND WHAT MAKES THEM TICK AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE BRIEFING
OF REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD ON AUSTRALIA ALSO TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE
BROAD ASPECTS OF CIA'S LIAISON WITH ASIO, ASIS AND JI0.4
"
:
C. NEW ZEALAND: HE WAS ADVISED THAT CIA HAD THREE
PEOPLE IN WELLINGTON WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING JOINT OPERATIONS.
WITH THE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AGAINST THE SOVIET, PRC
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. E 2
IMPDET
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AND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN NEW ZEALAND. HE WAS GIVEN RUNDOWN
ON NUMBERS OF SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN WHO WERE CURRENTLY.
IN NEW ZEALAND. THE SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS WAS ALSO
DISCUSSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS OUTLINED IN PARA 3B ON
AUSTRALIA. Y
D. INDONESIA: CIA MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAKARTA,
MEDAN AND SURABAYA. CIA HAD APPROXIMATELY 28 PEOPLE IN INDONESIA.
THESE FIGURES WERE COMPARED AGAINST THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE
IN INDONESIA. A DISCUSSION OF THE PRC TARGET AS SEEN FROM PER-
SPECTIVE OF INDONESIA FOCUSED ON LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST
CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL FROM CHINA TO
INDONESIA. THERE WAS ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AND
VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN INDONESIA. THE BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED ON
INDONESIA AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET IN TERMS OF HOST COUNTRY
ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
NARCOTICS TERAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF INDONESIA. A BRIEF COMMENT
WAS ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA LIAISON WITH BAKIN, THE INDONESIAN
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE TOTALITY OF
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT
RELEASING OFFICER
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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2 གཝཱཧྨཀ་ཏྭཱ
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STATION'S EFFORTS IN INDONESIA WAS DESCRIBED IN BROAD MANAGEMENT
TERMS AND SOME EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED
FROM CIA ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA. CEA ALSO FOCUSED BRIEFLY ON OUR
ABILITY TO USE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO PURSUE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
INTERESTS IN INDONESIA.Y
E. COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE
BRIEFINGS, ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF
INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS STATIONS AND INDICATED
THAT BRIEFINGS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT HE HAD WANTED TO
DISCUSS.Y
F. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF
INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSI-
BLE, PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH MEMBERS
OF AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICES. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD MADE POINT
THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE
COMMITTEE DUTIES BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON LIAISON SERVICES'.
REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA.
REPRESENTATIVE
MILFORD WAS ADVISED THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS,
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
SECRET.
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058913
13-00000
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AGE
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PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, WITH ONE OR TWO SENIOR LIAISON PERSON-
ALITIES.Y
4i REGARDING REFERENCE PARA THREE F, SINCE CONGRESSMAN
MILFORD SPECIFICALLY WISHES DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES
IN HIS MINORITY REPORT, HAVE NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION
OF OUR DEALINGS WITH LIAISON SERVICES. STATIONS CAN ALSO ARRANGE
MEETING WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS ON DISCREET BASIS IF
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REQUESTS. E2. IMPDET.H
* GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP.
DATE: 31 DEC 75.
ORIG:
B.HOUSTON
UNIT: DCEA
EXT:
9373
OLC Rchin
DDS&T C
SA/DDO
EA/PMI
Havelo
HOUSTON, DCEA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER.
E 2
CLARY:
IMPDET
-51937
Yoush
HEODORE Y. SHACKLEY, CEA
RELEASING OFFICER
✓ ASAINCATION
BI'L
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
པ***
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2421432
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DCI
WALKER
DIRECTOR
CITE
FILE DCI / REVIEW STAFF, CS/LF,
DOO, SA/2000, poolpo
DIOLC
TO: PRIORITY CANBERRA, JAKARTA, WELLINGTON-Y
RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y
REFS: A.
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#.112
ĊANBERRA 20866 |IN 774560*1 (RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON}
B. DIRECTOR 784159 (**) {RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON}. Y
Large MumBER
1. THIRTEEN MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO JAKARTA, CANBERRA,
SYDNEY, AND WELLINGTON., GROUP WILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR
TRIP. THEREFORE, NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED
TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND
TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS.
NONE
WILSON, ARE MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WO
ARE 
GOING AT This TIME, NOVE 
FRANK SLATINSHER
OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. IE LATER REQUESTED
Chick Counsel of commiller Sullyelekead AND travelling
BY HEADQUARTERS TO MEET WITH GROUP CONTACT CAN BE MADE THROUGH
With SrovP AND EXPEGT RU MAY CONTACT YOU IF
COMMITTEE STAFF ASSISTANT SLATINSHEK WHO TRAVELLING WITH GROUP
INTEREST DEVELOPS.
2. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (DEMOCRAT, TEXAS} WHO
29
نه
ла
IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE CHOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE) WILL ACCOMPANY. THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS.
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIM.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
24 DEC 75
B.J.HOUSTON.
CONGRESSMAN
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY: 058913

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4
7
2
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6
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785722
0
2
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#
MILFORD'S INTEREST AS STATED BY HIM WILL BE IN SEEING HOW THE
INTELLIGENCE PROCESS WORKS FROM THE GROUND UP. HE WANTS TO ACQUIRE
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PROCESS SO THAT WHEN THE FINAL
COMMITTEE REPORT IS MADE HE CAN USE HIS INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT IT
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES NOT LIKE FORMAL
IS A BALANCED. ONE.
BRIEFINGS AND DOES NOT WANT CHARTS.Y
3. SINCE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS VERY INTERESTED.
IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW THE AGENCY FUNCTIONS, IT
IS LIKELY THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT
OF STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT.
A. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES:
STATIONS PROBABLY CAN
DEAL WITH THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE
PROCESS FROM THE GROUND UP BY BRIEFING HIM ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY
OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS. STATION CAN OUTLINE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE
PROCESS I.E., HOW STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HEADQUARTERS AND COMMENTS
ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S
WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL
TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW'DISCUSSION
DATE:
ORIG:
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#
· DOWN TO AG'S OF SPECIFIC INTEREST.
THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD
INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING OF FAN'S, ETC.Y
Bi
AGENT ACQUISITION:
STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET
STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ARE CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL.
·TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT
AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT
PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE.
AND POA PROCESS.Y
N
C. AGENT AUTHENTICATION: ∙DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD
AUTHENTICATED.
ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHORIZED ONCE RECRUITED.
STRESS SHOULD
BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION SECURITY OF
MEETINGS, ETC.Y
ACQUISITION OF
D. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION:
INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEM-
INATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE. SHOULD
ALSO BE REVIEWED. ØNA MMBGER@HO NQBJBQ6NDAN BOQUED-MEN@G203869
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FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON:
IP FILES
SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION
ON INTERNAL TARGET IS BY PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION
FROM LIAISON, FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS. {FYI: OBJECTIVE K
HẠS BEEN DROPPED FROM CANBERRA OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE
ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING.} THRUST OF PROGRAM IS RECRUITMENT
OF SOVS AND CHINESE, USING LIAISON AS
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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EXTENSION OF CIA, FOR. COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR.
POINT
OUT DO NOT RECRUIT AUSTRALIANS OR NEW ZEALANDERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC
APPROVAL OF GOVTS CONCERNED.4.
STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT:
E. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM:
OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY
AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRQ PART I AND 2,
CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC
PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS: ON LATTER,
STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY. REVIEWS
WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON.4
F. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE.
SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD.
IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW
ON CASE HISTORY. SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY
MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT..
AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION.
APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE
USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS.Y
DATE:
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UNIT:
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785722
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4. WHERE APPLICABLE {SUCH AS JAKARTA BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO
DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR
CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS.Y
IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE.
5. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON:
USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT
ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. HE WOULD ALSO.
BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL
CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES, VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES."
b. FOR JAKARTA: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF SUHARTO
REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE
STIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF
THE REGION.Y
7. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS,
CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574.4
8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE.Y
9.
SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS
OF VISIT. BD♥ BØ⠀⠀@BA ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: Y
DATE:
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JAKARTA ↳ JAN, ETD 9 JAN Y
CANBERRA 9 JAN
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SYDNEY 11 JAN, ETD 14 JAN Y
WELLINGTON 14 JAN, ETD 16 JAN EZ, IMPDET.H
*
INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.
** HQS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA.
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494891. EIA755
PAGE 01
TORI280501Z NOV 75
PRECEDENCE
4
2
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IN 754484
SEOU
25948
SECRET 280348Z NOV 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25948
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF: SEOUL 25761
1.
(36898)
fite
т
Conguitoarel
Perigiets indics
FOLLOWING LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD G.
STILWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, AND
folde
FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST TO BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT.
GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, COMMANDER, I CORPS, CAMP RED CLOUDD
FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER.
GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH WAS REWORKED INTO
THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS
REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS. THE
LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE
AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN
MILFORD. THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO COS BY GENERAL
HOLLINGSWORTH.`
2. QUOTE " DEAR MR. MILFORD:
SECRET
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PAGE 02
TOR:280501Z NOV 75
IN 754484
SEOU 25.948
GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE INTEREST
YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA. I AM ONLY SORRY.
THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE
FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER DETAIL.
THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND MY.
VIEWS.
AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF
INTELLIGENCE - AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS À FUNDAMENTAL
INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT, SHOULD
HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECOURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MOST
EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE.
ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE US INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA IS VIABLE.
THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES,
I.E., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(DİA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY IN
CONCERT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS
WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED AND
EFFICIENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE. WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED WITH THE
DEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED.
TO THOSE NATIONAL AGENCIES; AND WE HAVE EQUALLY HIGH RESPECT FOR OUR
SECRET
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TORI280501Z NOV. 75
IN 754484
SEOU 25948
OWN PEOPLE. THIS TEAM IS RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL
OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE.
LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL
ASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FOR..
RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE. BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THE
ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN
THE RANGE FANS OF HIS EMPLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WE MUST CONSTANTLY BE
ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD TIP US OFF
TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, RECAUSE OF HIS READINESS AND
THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING.
OF SUPPLIES, WE DO NOT HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WE
WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS, IT IS
MORE PROBABLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THIS,
US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO
QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE
AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES
TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.
NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE US INVALUABLE
INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY. YET WE
SECRET
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PAGE 04
TOR:280501Z NOV 75
IN 754484
SEOU
STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUAL
LOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND. CONTROL
STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE
25948.
EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY, AND ELECTRONIC
EME SU
INTELLIGFMZ CJUPP
SUPPLY A A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'S.
CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS.
UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING
WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSED
NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY
MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF
INFORMATION.
THE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINE
INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED.
TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED
FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON
STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS
NATURE IS THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED
CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMZ. THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND
EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE A MEANS OF
SECRET

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EIA755
PAGE 05
TOR:280501Z NOV 75
DISCOVERING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US.
:
IN 754484
SEOU 25948.
IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED A HIGH:
ALTITUDE PLATFORM TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS
TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S
ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTED SYSTEM INCLUDES A DOWN. LINK
CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA.
COLLECTED. OUR PROPUSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND
NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE DOWN
LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS,
WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL.
WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION:
SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES. NONETHELESS, GENERAL
HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR
PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST.
INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE
YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE,
AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES
IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND HELP
TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT
NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.
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PAGE 06-06
IN 754484
TOR:280501Z NOV 75
SEOU 25948
SINCERELY YOURS,
"UNQUOTE
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1
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IN. 736898
TOR1100349Z NOV 75
SEQU
25761
SECRET 100322Z NOV 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25761
TO: DIRECTOR.
File mindr
f
лении.
Congres
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF: SEOUL 25730 (IN 732789
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 264382 (ROGER CHANNEL)
10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT:
*
MILFORD. REF: SEOUL 8531. 1.
LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN
LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARD ED
TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED
PARA 5. REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE, OWING TO
SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION" IN LETTER
LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE,
* NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.
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10 Nov 75 1348
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PAGE 01
TOR:310345Z OCT 75
SECRET 310314Z OCT 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25687
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF:
SEOUL 25649
1.
(724591).
Senate
cmgeisional
Vaell
6
IN 728294
SEDU 25687
File
REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION
34 Ост
WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY
ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS
BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED
HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZI (SEOUL 25657).
2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE
DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. R. SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY
TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION
WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AEZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL
PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY
OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.
3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED
COPY OF SEOUL 25388 LESS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN
DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY
AGE OR WE 01.
REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE 1-83 94
23 78B REVIEW
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PAGE 02-02
TUR:310345Z OCT 75
STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE.
THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW
FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND
SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE
REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS.
COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC
DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA.
4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE
OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL.
HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE.
E2, IMPDET.
IN 728294
SEOU
25687
CS COMMENT:*COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than
six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (D, Texas)
on 25 October 1975.
*Bons SVCD
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TOR1280440Z OCT 75
SEOU
25649
SECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 256.49 SECTION 1 OF 4.
TO:
DIRECTOR.
ke 1-44 4
RYBAT PLMH CONG A
REF:
A
SEOUL 23646
(723138)
B. DIRECTOR 759641
FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING
MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS
WITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D-TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975.
BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND
DISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFORE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING
ROOM.
1,
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION
BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON.
IN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENT À ASSESSMENT, HE STATED
THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE
REPORT WILL STATE THAT:
A. DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN
MULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION.
B. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS
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IN FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE,
C. NEW LEGISLATION AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLE
JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED.
2. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE
INQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN HIS OPINION
THERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBJECTIVITY. TIME FACTORS
DID NOT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS TO PERSONALLY
OR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS. THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO
THAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERS
OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF". HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH
THIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH
COMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT
ONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE,
HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS
APPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT
ONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP
OF THIS PROPOSAL. HE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS
YET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE.
HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED
LIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES. HE IS
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TOR:280440Z OCT 75
ACTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS HIS
STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR
SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD COME UP WITH THE RIGHT MAN,
3. COS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR COLBY WOULD BE
THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE
WAS NOW OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES.
COS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS
NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT
A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED',
HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN
AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND IS GOOD COPY, HOWEVER,
OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO
THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE
ASSIGNMENT.
4. THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IS TO FORM A
COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF
THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE
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TOR128044ØZ OCT 75
OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE
✓ MANNER, THE CONGRESSMAN IS PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT.
THE HOUSE, COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE
MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE,
ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED
BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE
TO BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY
THE HOUSE MEMBERS.
5. THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS
TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY, THE CONGRESSMAN
WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE
SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE
SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE
VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "BAD" LEGISLATION, IF
CONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPIRED MANIPULATION OF
THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL
HEADLINES, HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW
WHICH WAS WORSE,
6,
THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT, WHICH HE
SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE
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TOR:280440Z OCT 75
A DISSENTING MINORITY REPORT FOCUSING IN A POSITIVE
MANNER ON THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION. RATHER THAN.
THE HISTORICAL ISSUES THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED
IN A NON-OBJECTIVE MANNER. HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER
IS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES NOT. A WORKING MONTH, THIS
GIVES HIM ONLY THIRTY DAYS TO PUT TOGETHER A REPORT.
SINCE HE IS A MEMBER OF THREE HOUSE COMMITTEES AND
CHAIRMAN OF ONE SUB-COMMITTEE WITH NOT EVEN ONE STAFF
ASSISTANT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE HE IS FINDING IT
ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT.
HE TURNED ASIDE THE SUGGESTION THAT FAVORABLE WITNESSES
BE CALLED AS IMPRACTICAL. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT
IF HE ASKED GENERAL WALTERS OR PRESTIGIOUS AND
KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONALITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS
TO APPEAR, THEY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE
AND BALANCED PRESENTATION, THE COMMITTEE'S LINE OF
QUESTIONING WOULD BE CONFINED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE
"DEAD CATS" OF TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO. HE ALSO FORESAW
NO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING THE MAJORITY VIEWS OR THE
MAJORITY REPORT. HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT SAM ADAMS'
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ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL
PERMITTED, HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL
INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE
COULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT. IF NOT, HE INTENDED TO
EMPHASIZE THIS POINT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.
THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING A
MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE
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TOR:280502Z OCT 75
SE OV
25649
SECRET 280300Z UCT 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 OF 4
TO: DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
HAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A
CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL,
AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE
"ALL THE WAY TO THE FORTY COMMITTEE". HE STATED
THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS
ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED
THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A.
COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND
ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT TO
IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER
REMEDIAL ACTIONS. COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY
RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN
A THOROUGH IN-COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER TO ASSURE
HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS.
THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE
BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL
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TORI280502Z OCT. 75
WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. CHOW
ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS
VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF
FOCUS AND THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING
CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT HIS INABILITY TO FIND A "HANDLE".)
8.. THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A
MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED
MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS
DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT
AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED. HOWEVER,
SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE
HSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLGNGED (ACCORDING TO
THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A
COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING
AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY).
9. COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF
REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN
WOULD BE RECPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION.
GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD
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TOR: 280502Z OCT 75
DEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED
BEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHART
THE COURSE. IN SO DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR
THAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-A-VIS THE
INTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW
COORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD.
COS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY
AND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE
COLLECTION PORGRAMS. IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF
MILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES COS IN DUE COURSE
SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT.
PROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION.
TELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY J-2, CAPTAIN ALBERT
M. HUNT, THE DEPUTY J-2 COLONEL ARTHUR W. LONG AND
THE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR. DELMAR C. LANG INTO
THE DISCUSSION. THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANNELS
WERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROLE WAS ENDORSED BY
THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE.
COS EXPLAINED THE DCID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE
DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE,
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TOR1280502Z OCT 75
REGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIMOR
PROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN
OBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCID'S UPON HIS RETURN TO
WASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD
NEVER HEARD OF THE DCID'S, HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION
AND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLOW UP UPON HIS
RETURN.
10.
THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE
WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED
THE MULTICHANNEL NATURE OF REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE
DICISION COULD BE TAKEN. COL, LONG, THE DEPUTY.
J-2, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF
MULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS, POINTING OUT THE
SPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE
EMPLOYED. HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER
OF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND: TO DELAY THE
MORE RAPID TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE; TO STIFLE
DISSENTING VIEWS; AND TO CREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED
SUPER-AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE
TO CONTROL AND REVIEW. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY
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STRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED
A PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL
REPORTING. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE PERSUASIVE
ON HIS "WILD-EYED" LIBERAL PEERS,
11. COS REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT
WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE
DCI TO FURTHER REFINE: THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION
SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE
COORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY.
IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC, MRS, EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS
ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN
AMERICA. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS
THE DCI TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES
AND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE
HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE
QUESTIONS,
THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS
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TOR: 280502Z OCT 75
A MAJOR ADDITIONAL STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY.
COS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT
STEP TAKEN BY THE DCI IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL
WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES
ALLOCATION COMMITTEE (IRAC) WHICH PERMITS THE DCI
TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS OF THE
RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE CONGRESSMAN
WAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IR AC.
12. COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL
PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC
SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON.
AS WELL AS THE FIELD. LOCAL COORDINATION WAS
EXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S
REPORTING WAS STRESSED. COS STATED THAT HE WAS
UNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER
IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER.
HAD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE REPORT
FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS. LOCALLY, COS
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IN 724581-
TORI280423Z OCT 75
SEQU
25649
SECRET 2803002 OCT.75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 3 OF. 4
TO: DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLMH CO NG A
NOTED THAT WE DO NOT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE
AMBASSADOR'S OR THE CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST
OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE SUBJECT
MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD PLACE
THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERIALLY
ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT. IT WAS NOTED THAT
SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE
REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY
ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E.G., THE OFFICE OF THE
CINCUNC IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO
COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBJECT
MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS
OF THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY.
COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD
CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS
RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEMINATE SUCH
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TORI280423Z OCT 75
INTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT,
CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL
LEVEL SYSTEM.
13, THE COS'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR
COORDINATION OF MILITARY CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE
ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY
J-2, COLONEL LONG, WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES
SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY, STRONGLY.
ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER
DCID 5/1.
14, THE CONGRESS MAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT
HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND
WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT
FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE
SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM. COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE
THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND
EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY
SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE
ENTIRE COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS
DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES
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25649
TORI280423Z OCT 75
TO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED.
15,
AL THOUGH COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE
CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG
BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT
COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO
STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE PROPOSED U-2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM
AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE
AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES. LANG
ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL
FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION.
THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE
SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA. COS
ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER
STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD.
COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIBILITY AND
FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE
SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT
WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER
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IN 7245-81
SEQU 25649
EFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE
TWO ORGANIZATIONS. INDEED THE UNIQUE NATURE OF NSA
RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMEWHAT
ESOTERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO
ORGANIZATIONS, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT SPAN
OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS
COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION, BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED
THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESIRED DUPLICATIVE
TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY EXPLOITATION
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT
RESPONSIBILITY. MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED
CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND SAW NEITHER
MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILY
ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED.
16.
DC.OS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING
OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESS MAN'S
INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S
DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE
HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN
:
ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY, THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN
SECRET
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IN
72450
25649
T 414508
EIA815
PAGE E
TORI280423Z OCT 75.
MILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE
RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS ON THE 26TH. THE CONG RE SS MAN
LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL
AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO FORWARD A LETTER ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHICH
WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.
17, IN A STATION-ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH
LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS
PARTICIPATED, THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATED THE NATURE OF
HIS CONCERNS IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
A MINORITY REPORT, HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH
WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY
COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT
HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY
BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSA, HOLLINGSWORTH
TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN. THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION,
WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY
SECRET
SEOU
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TORI280423Z OCT 75
SCHLESINGER WHO HAD POSED THE SAME QUESTION.
THE
GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL,
PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON
NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIM. HE COMPLETELY
DISCOUNTED U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING
THE ARMY DID NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE
AND DID NOT DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS.
HE NOTED THAT HIS SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST
BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT.
HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT..
NO INTEL OFFICER. WHEREAS HIS FORMER G-2 HAD BEEN
REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN
THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED
COLONEL AS A REPLACEMENT,
HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST
CIA AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE
FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN
VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA, HOLLINGSWORTH
ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING,
NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY-ORIENTED SOCIETY
SECRET
2457
IN 724581
SEQU 25649
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EI A8 19
PAGE
IN 724565
TOR:280427Z OCT 75
SEOU
25649
SECRET 2803002 OCT 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25649 FINAL SECTION OF 4
TO!
DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
AND THAT HE HAD FOUND OUR MILITARY/POLITICAL
REPORTING QUITE HELPFUL. THE GENERAL DECLINED
TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL
TECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF
UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION,
BUT HE VOLUNTEERED TO PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND
COMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE
WOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND "THEN LET
THE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION
PROBLEM"; CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST
HELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION
TO HIS REPORT,
18, IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCOS,
THE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE
DDCI BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS
WELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USIB STUDY ON KOREA
SECRET
:
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20
PAGE 2
TOR:280427Z OCT 75
REQUIREMENTS, HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE
HIS REPORT ON THE USIB AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN
PROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FROM
THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH
STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS
TO DEVELOP A POSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH.
DEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY
OBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE
UNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED
FOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR. HE BELIEVED
THE DDCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING
TOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE.
19. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE
DAVID C. TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT
OF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE.
HE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS MINORITY, ALBEIT
THREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS
ACCEPTANCE. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE
RAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE
SECRET
IN 724585
SEOU 25649
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21-21
EI A819
PAGE 03-03
72450
IN 7245-05-
TOR:280427Z OCT 75
SEOU 25649
COMMITTEE STAFF.
20. ADDITION DISCUSSION IS SCHEDULED WITH
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD FOR 28 OCTOBER.
WILL ADVISE,
E2, IMPDET.
:
SECRET
13-00000
OUTGOING
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
OMF
0
CLASSIFICATION
AGE
COI
ACP
0
0
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF
CONF:
4/4A3
INFO:
TO: PANAMA CITY.4
TOG
MESSAGE
0.
ΤΡΕ
0
MA-O
1
DCI
ROUTING
"
DATE-TIME GROUP
28000AZ
DIRECTOR
FILE DCI REVIEW STAFF
CITE
DDO, DDC/DO, SA/000
RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y
as/RF
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°
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OF
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760703
DISSEM BY:
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PER
صفى
# 112.
REF: PANAMA CITY 34339 IN 72313514
.1. HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD
WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS: NO FURTHER
STATION ACTION NECESSARY. AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY
FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION.4.
2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET.H
OCT 29 57
LA COMMENT: REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE ON 1972 CASE OF MAIL INTERCEPTS
INADVERTENTLY SENT TO. PANAMA.
'75
28 OCT 75
DATE:
ORIG:
BARBARA GRAHAM: EME
C/LA/CAM/PA
UNIT:
1805
EXT:
SA/DDO
NORM SHEPANEK (TELECOORD}
Armame
C/LA/CAM
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY 054524
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CLASSIFICATION
45%
13-00000
OUTGOING MESSAGE
SIGNAL CENTER USEINLY
AGE
Co
ACP
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9-1
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF
CONF:
C/EA 3 INFO:
FILE
DATE-TIME GROUP
242332Z
DGI
3
.
2
CITE
DIRECTOR
DCI/REVIEW STAFF,
DDO, 000/00 S1/000
°
°
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OF
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бор
11-2
TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KOBE, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,
SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN. 4
RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y
REF:
DIRECTOR 759843
Y
1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE. RELATING TO IDENTITY
MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM
PLMHCONGA. Y
2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT
THEIR DISCRETION USE THE DIVISIONS {PLMPTACT} PRIVACY CHANNEL. Y
TION
3.
ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE
SENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2, IMPDET.H
CEA/OEM:
EA/DDO:
R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT}
MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD}
DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: CEA/ESEC
UNIT: S.M. LABAR
EXT: 1709
THE OD
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
SECRET
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY: 005088
13-00000
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AGE
OUTGOING MESSAGE
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
COI
0
ACP
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0
TPE
0
21
MRO
Dci
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF
CONF:
C/E83
DATE-TIME GROUP
242332Z
ROUTING
DIRECTOR
CITE
3. INFO: FILE DCI
DCI
/RENEW STAFF CS/RE
000, 000/00, SAT
·DD
.
6
0
,
°
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OF
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Sop
# 112
TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI KOBE, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA,
SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN. 4
RYBAT ADMIN. PLMHCONGA Y
DIRECTOR 7598424
REF:
1.
IDENTITY IS:
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY.
2. NO FILE. EZ, IMPDET.H
DATE:
24 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: CEA/ESEC
UNIT: S.M. LABAR
EXT: 1709
THEODORE
HI SODORE H
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASS FICATION
✓ ECRET
SHACKLEY, CEA
CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL (IN DRAFT}
EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS (TELECOORD}.
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2
CL BY:
IMPDET
005088
13-00000
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AGE
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0
10
00
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3
7
8
9
PAGE.
OF
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OME
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CONE
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FILE
DATE-TIME GROUP
241922Z
CITE
DIRECTOR
DCY/RENEW STAFF, CARF,
0
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759641
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.0
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1120
IMMEDIATE SEOUL. Y
RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y
REF:
A. SEOUL 25645 |IN 7228031
B. SEOUL 25646 |IN 723138| Y
1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN
REF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION
ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE SEOUL STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH
FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: Y
A.
BACKGROUND. HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS
KEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA
FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE
FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD
STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. Y
BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT
B. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE.
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF
STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW
MANAGEMENT. BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE
DATE: 24 OCT 75
ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM
UNIT: C/EA
EXT: 1428
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
SECRET
IMPDET
CL BY: 061991
28

13-00000
OUTGOING MESSAGE
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
Col
0
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0 0
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SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
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0 0 0
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2
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OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD
FROM HQS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD
DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.
THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN KOREAN CONTEXT, TO FOCUS ON
KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN
TO AG-4 OR AG-7. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE
COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'S, ETC. Y
C. AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING
CON AG-4 OR AG-7, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET
ARE
STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES IS CONDUCTED,
POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING,
ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION
OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS; THERE SHOULD BE EXAMI-
NATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. 4.
D. AGENT AUTHENTICATION. DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN
SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED.
STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTI-
CATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. Y
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
REPROD ION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS DHIBITED
SECRET
E2
CL BY:
IMPDET
061991
20
13-00000
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ACP
OMF
0
AGE
CLASSIFICATION.
0
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✓ SAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
.0
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7
B
B
°
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m
STAFF
-CONF:
INFO: FILE
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITE
DIRECTOR
759641
E. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION.
.0
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#
ACQUISITION OF
INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL
DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION
CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. Y
F. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING. WITH RE-
CRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING
REQUIRED BY AGENCY. FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E.,
PRQ PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC
ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD.
PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED
FEED BACK
ON PRO FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY
BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. Y
6. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY
ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW
OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW
ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY
MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF
AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
28
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2
_ SECRET
CL BY:
IMPDET
061991
13-00000
AGE
OUTGOING MESSAGE
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
COI
OMF
CLASSIFICATION
0 0
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF
CONF:
ACP
TOG
0
0
INFO: FILE
TPE
MRO
0 0
DCI
DATE-TIME GROUP
ROUTING
4
2
3
8
3
•
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4
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DIRECTOR
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
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#
PROTECTION.
THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS
AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR SEOUL. Y
2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE
UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS.
ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE.
ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY
AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S. THIS MIGHT
WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS
OR FAILURES. Y
3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS
UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC
∙GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY
PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. Y
4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH
BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTI-
GATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY.
AC/EA/JK
E-2, IMPDET.H
DC/EA-
C/EA/COPS-
DATE: 24 OCT 75
A/DDO-
ORIG: TGSHACKLEY:DCM C/REVIEW STAFF-
UNIT: C/EA
C/OLC-
EXT:
1428
I studley
DDO
RELEASING OFFICER
THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CLASSIFICAT.ON
REPROL
✓ TION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS OHIBITED E 2
. AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
IMPDET
SECRET
CL BY: 061991
13-00000
Senator's Trand File
LE BEC DISSEM BY
PER
Sof
TOTAL COPIES
10.2 HUN
ļ
GON UNIT NOTIFIED.
ANGE COPY INPURDIBLOTIKO. ...
HUN UNIT
RF. FILE
EA3
N
F
ION •
DDO,
T 408492
EIA951
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BY __ Ai
SECRET
Sei (REVIEW STAFF) CSRf,
SADDO, DOLC
f
PAGE 01
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STAFE
PRECEDENCE
1
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6.
IN.722803
TORI240650Z OCT 75
SEOU
25645
SECRET 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25645
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.
NIACT DIRECTOR
RYBAT CODEL
REF: A. DIRECTOR 758492
B.
:
DIRECTOR 758427.
1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23.OCTOBER
AT ROKG INVITATION. DUE HOSPITALIZATION OF COS, DCOS
CONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE
BRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER
COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN
WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED
POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD
BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A
DETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD.
HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION
SCHEDULE AS OF 0900 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS.
S
WHILE PARAMETERS OF HI INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN
INITIAL CONVERSATION, HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONE/F NOT
SECRET
13-00000
ABLE SEL. DISSEM BY
Mt. H
¡PERSON. UINT NOTIFIE LY
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED
BY
AT
SACTION UNIT
1
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FILE
VR
N
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ACTION
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HUN BY
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1BBUING OPPICE IS PRONIDITED
STAFF
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4
2
5
3
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T 408492
EIA951
PAGE 02-02.
TORI24065ØZ OCT 75
SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES,
2.
REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER
ES
IN 722803
SEOV 25645
OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS REIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION.
REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH
LATER DURING THEIR FIVE DAY STAY.
3.
COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER.
WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD GITHER
AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED BE CONFINED FOR
THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN,
ONE WEEK RECUPERATION.
AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR
HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS.
4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 0800 LOCAL 25
OCTOBER AS REP. MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED
PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS.
E2 IMPDET
SECRET
13-00000
OUTGOING MESSAGE
ROUTING
4
7
·
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
Col
ACP
OMF
0
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2317417 DIRECTOR
24/Review
CITE
DC/ REVIEW STAFF, Co/2f,
000/00,
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ADMIN Y
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER.
758926
DISSEM BY:
0
INDEX
0
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0
IP FILES # 112
ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA. Y
1. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG.Y
2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE
PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION
WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HQS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF
PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET.H
DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD
UNIT: NE/COPS
EXT:
R-1562
C/NE
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RELEASING OFFICER
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8
2
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3
CITE
DIRECTOR
1/REVIEW STA
CONF:
DIFY/NE
INFO:
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3
DDO, 200/20,
°
PAGE
OF
PAGES
1
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER.
INDEX
758927
DISSEM BY
0
C/RF
NO INDEX
0
RETURN TO
PER
0
IP FILES
#
112
TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA-Y
ADMIN Y.
REF:
DIRECTOR
758926
IDEN:
PLMHCONGA
E2. IMPDET.d
DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD
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UNIT:
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DATE-TIME GROUP
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0.
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000 000/00
PAGE
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PAGES
1
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
INDEX
758109
NO INDEX
RETURN TO
0
IP FILES
DISSEM BY:
PER
Sep
#3 112
TO: ROME.Y
RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y
FOR ACOS AND OZGA Y
1. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTRY
*PROJECT 29 OCTOBER.. REQUEST. MR. OZGA PLAN. REVIEW PLDEFINE MATERIAL
WITH CHIEF EUROPE ON 27 OCTOBER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT
LATER THAN AFTERNOON 28 OCTOBER. Y
2. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT. TRAFFIC
RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES
OF. UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC
AT. YOUR DISCRETION. E2, IMPDET.H
file
CATE:
ORIGE
UNITE
NEXT:
21 OCTOBER 1975
PHILIP F. FENDIG
DC/EUR
1233
to Wells
YC/SUR
ELEWING OFFICER
CS.CATION
SA/DDO PRAFTY
COORDINATING OFFICERS
DC/EUR IN DRAFTH
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€ 2
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DATE-TIME GROUP
211745Z
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MRO
DCI
DIRECTOR
CITE
DCI (REVIEW STAFF).
CS/RF, DDO. SADDO.
TO: LONDON. BONN.4
RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y
PAGE
OF
PAGES
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
INDEX
757742
NO INDEX
DISSEM BY:
جوجو
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0
IP PILES
MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON.
PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED
TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF
UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLêMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC
AT YOUR DISCRETION. EZ IMPDET.H
. DATE:
ORIG:
21 OCTOBER 75
UNIT:
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PHILIP F. FENDIG
DC/EUR
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for CYEUR
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TO:
1 DDO
.2
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3
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4
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5
C/SS
6
C/CCS
7C/CH
8 C/AF
.9 C/DCD
10 C/DIVD
11
C/EA
12
C/EUR
13
C/FR
14 C/NE
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET
15 C/SE
16 C/LA
17. SA/DDO CT-5
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIALS
SUSPENSE DATE
10 NOV 1975
REMARKS
Прив
Senator Church?
SIGNATURE
SA/ADDO
FORM 3671 USE PREVIOUS
4.75
EDITIONS.
7 OCT 75 13:49
DATE
17 OCT 1975
(40)

13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs
SUBJECT
: The Director's Greeting Card List
17 OCT 1975
75-5707
1. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom
the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit your list
to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 10 November 1975.
2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You
may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence
services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are
of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most
cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has
met here or abroad.
3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended
names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate
Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.
Distribution:
C/AF
C/SE
C/EA
C/CCS
C/EUR
C/CI
C/DCD
C/OPS
C/DIVD
C/PS
C/FR
C/SS
C/LA/
SA/DDO
C/NE
SPG/DDO
0.
Eti
Peter V. Raudenbush
SA/ADDO
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 037796
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs
SUBJECT
: DDCI's Greeting Card List
17 OCT 1975
Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list
for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all
significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in
the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of
business 10 November 1975.
Bad Radk
Peter V. Raudenbush
SA/ADDO
Distribution:
C/AF
C/SE
C/EA
C/CCS
C/EUR
C/CI
C/DCD
C/OPS
C/DIVD
C/PS
C/FR
C/SS
C/LA
C/NE
SA/DDO
SPG/DDO
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY"
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 037796
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
TERNAL
ONLY
SUBJECT: (Optional).
FROM:
☐ CONT ENTIAL
CONDENTIAL
SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET,
Philip F. Fendig
DC/EUR
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and'
.building)
SAY DDO
2.
3.
Joan
8.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
EXTENSION NÓ.
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
DATE
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom.
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
FYI
"Jenatorial
trip file in
my soft.
17 Oct 75
exk
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
ABLE SEC.DISSEM BY
PER
EUR 3
ERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
CTION UNIT
DYANCE COPYJESUED SLOTTED.
3/ EUR 3
ACTION
TOTAL COPIES
6 - SAUN
SECRET
RUN BY-
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
STAFF
RF
FILE
$75
1
4
2
5
T 389706
EI A620
BY.
AL
VR OCT 17 DOM'
ACTION COPY
EYES ONLY
PAGE 01
TOR:161931Z OCT 75
SECRET 161650Z OCT 75 STAFF:
CITE LONDON 66194
TO: DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLKMBALL
REF A.
DIRECTOR 752556
B.
1.
DIRECTOR 754586
3
CLEUR
DC/E/NW.
CIE/BC.
IN 716119
LOND 66194
Add FL
I send copy TSA/DDO.
AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND
FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO
HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE
OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF
THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE
INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION
AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE
EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL
FIGURES.
2.
IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING,
AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:
A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED
WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS
REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY.
SECRETS
13-00000
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
· PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ARYANCE COPY LEGUED/SLOTTER
ACTION UNIT
1
RF
FILE
VR
N
F
ACTION
TOTAL COPIES
RUN BY
SECRET
REPRODUCTION I
ISSUING OFFICE
STAFF
1
2
5
3
T 389706
EIA620
PAGE 02
TOR1161931Z OCT 75
COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF
IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD
PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR.
COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK
CONSIDERABLY,
IN 71611
LOND 661
8. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINAATED
WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE
CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION
TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD
SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH
SITUATION.
C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE
DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A
PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO
GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN
OFFICE.
⠀ D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE
U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION
OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT
HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON
SECRET.
13-00000
.ABLE BEC DIESEM BY
PER
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTER.
LAY
FILE..
VR
ACTION UNIT
.1
RF.
N
F
ACTION #
°.
T 389706
EIA620
101AL COPIES
RUN
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
STAFF
1
4
2
5
3
6
COLLECTION OPERATION,
PAGE 03:
TOR:1619312 OCT 75
AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS
IN 716119.
LOND 66194
POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER
AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER
IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT
PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE
WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS.
COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS
INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS
MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS. HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WIIH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO
BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE,
OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY
OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.
E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH
THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON
THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN
THE U.K.
3.
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE
THE FOLLOWING POINTS)
A,
THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND
SECRET
13-00000
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
PER
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED
BY
AT
ACTION UNIT
RF.
FILE
VR
N
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ACTION
TOTAL COPIES
RUN BY
SECRET
T 389706
EIA620
PAGE 04.
TOR:1619312 OCT 75
CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON.
REPRODUCTION BY
ISSUING OFFICE 18
STAFF
1
2
3
5
IN 716119
LOND
6615
THE PAD BEEN REASSURED
BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE
PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION
OF THHE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US. AARON SAID
HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS
THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.
B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE
DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT.
THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY
EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH
REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE
OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD
BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME
PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY.
AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS
PROBLEM.
.....
He
he sched
C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO I
WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF W
DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE
SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH
SECRET
13-00000
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY:
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
ARYANCE COPY JEBUED SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
1
RF.
FILE
VR
N
ACTION •
TOTAL COPIES
RUN BY
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO
STAFF
1
4
2
5
3
6
T 389706
EI A620
PAGE 05-05
IN 716119.
TORI161931Z OCT 75
LOND
66194
COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.
4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT
THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT.
OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED
THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE
CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE
HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED
THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED
OUT IN COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET
:
SECRET
13-00000
TO:
UNCLASSIFIED
..
DDO
2 ADDO
4: COPS
5 CASS
7 CACI
8C/A
9. C/DCD
12
13 C/F
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET
ACTION
Jall
REMARKS
SUSPENSE DATE
SIGNATURE
367 USE
14-7.5
17 OCT 75 16 16
SECRET
DATE
INITIALS
PREVIOUS
TONS
EA/DDO
DATE
170ct.75
(40)
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
I CONFIDENTIAL
TO:
1 DDO
2
ADDO
3
C/PLANS
4
C/OPS
5
C/SS
6
C/CCS
7
C/CI
8
C/AF
9 C/DCD
10
C/DIVD
REMARKS:
SIGNATURE
11 C/EA
.12. C/EUR
13 C/FR
14 C/NE
15
C/SE
16
C/LA
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
ROUTING SHEET
SA/DDO MR. Waller
CT-5.
FORM 3671 USE
4-75
PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
17 OCT 75 16:16
SUSPENSE DATE
ACTION
INFO
DATE
SECRET
INITIALS
ui
m
my
Levators travel
921
DATE
EA/DDO
17 Oct.75
(40)

13-00000
SECRET 1617262 OCT 75 STAFF
CITE BONN 43387
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.
RYBAT
REF: DIRECTOR 752556
о
IN-716059
1. MR. DAVID AARON OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFED BY
STIGGINS, HIBBERT AND DEUTINGER FOR TWO HOURS MORNING 15. OCTOBER.
AARON. HAD LUNCH WITH HIBBERT AND NEWLY ARRIVED ARMY ATTACHE:
WITH
HE
፣
HILLENBRAND AFTERNOON IS OCTOBER BEFORE DEPARTING FOR LONDON.
2. LARGE PART OF MORNING BRIEFING DEVOTED TO MILITARY.
INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS IN GERMANY AARON ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF HOWS
AND TO WHAT EXTENT COS, SUPERVISED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
WHICH EXPLAINED TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL. AARON ASKED NUMBER
QUESTIONS ABOUT COORDINATION PROCESS AND HOW THIS IMPLEMENTED.
HE WANTED KNOW IF THE COORDINATION PROCESS EXTENDED TO A REVIEW
OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF THE VALUE OF MILITARY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
AS REFLECTED IN ITS PRODUCT AND TOLD THAT OUR COORDINATION OF
MILITARY ACTIVITIES GENERALLY CONFINED TO INSURING THAT MILITARY.
TRADECRAFT MET OUR STANDARDS, AND THAT POLITICAL RISKS ACCEPT-
ABLE; IN PRACTICE, WE DID NOT REVIEW PRODUCTION OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS.:
WE MENTIONED THAT MILITARY COLLECTION. IN RECENT YEARS
WAS ON RELATIVELY MODEST SCALE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FLAPS
IN RECENT YEARS.
3 MR. AARON SAID THAT THE SENATORS ON HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN
SURPRISED TO FIND THAT MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COLL-
ECTION ACTIVITY SINCE THIS NOT COVERED IN ANY LEGISLATION, BUT
(ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY AUTHORIZED IN NONSKIDS. STIGGINS
MADE POINT THAT MILITARY IN GERMANY STRUCTURED ALONG COMBAT
INTELLIGENCE LINES AND IN EFFECT ENGAGED IN MILITARY COLLECTION OF
TACTICAL NATURE AS TRAINING EXERCISE APPROPRIATE TO THEIR
POTENTIAL WARTIME MISSION. MR. AARON SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED
MILITARY ORS AND PERSONNEL COULD BE ASSIGNED TO CIA OPERATIONAL
13-00000
PAGE BOWN.43387 S E CR. ET
CONTROL IN FIELD. WE OPINED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN
WHICH COORDINATION. HAS TRENDED OVER THE YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS
PROBABLY FEEL HIS CONTROL; UNDERMINED THEREBY,
¿
4 TURNING TO BKHERALD OPS, MR. AARON SAID HE RECALLED
FROM WASHINGTON BRIEFING THAT GERMAN STATION HAD SIZEABLE ALLOT-
MENT FOR OFFICER ENGAGED. IN POLITICAL COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL
BASIS. WE EXPLAINED THAT MONIES IN THIS PROJECT ALMOST EX-
CLUSIVELY FOR SALARY AND EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF OFFICER”. (HERZFANZ,
NOT MENTIONED BY NAME) AND NOT USED FOR. AGENT PAYMENT OR OTHER
PURPOSES. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AARON.
7
5. HE ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT "FANCY" POLITICAL SOURCES,
ALONG: LINE THAT THESE COULD PERHAPS BE HANDLED AS NORMALÝ
DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ASKED WHETHER THESE CONTACTS DID NOT
REPRESENT HIGH RISK IF EXPOSED. STIGGINS EXPLAIND AT SOME LENGTH
THAT THESE SOURCES VERY FEW-IN NUMBER, AND WERE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL
FACTORS, INCLUDING MANY YEARS CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC CIA
OFFICERS, MAKING POINT THAT AGENTS CONFIDENCE IN CIA BASED ON
MANY YEARS ASSOCIATION. WE ESTIMATED FLAP POTENTIAL SLIGHT
THESE LONG-STANDING CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED AS OLD
FRIENDSHIPS FOR REASON THAT THEY WERE, IN FACT SUCH, THESE
RELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO STATE DEPARTMENT
OFFICERS. WE MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE LOWER-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL
OPERATIONS ACTUALLY: REPRESENTED HIGHER RISK AND CITED GENERAL
OUTLINE OF "HILTON AFFAIR” (WITHOUT NAMES A EXAMPLE HOW
DEVELOPMENTAL CASE COULD BE TROUBLESOME. EMPHASIZED THERE HAD
'BEEN FEW OF THESE OVER YEARS.
6. AARON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT FEDREP REACTION IN-
EVENT OUR INCOMPATIBLE SOURCES EXPOSED WE RESPONDED THAT IN
GENERAL GERMANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EMBARRASSING US AND THAT THIS
KEY ELEMENT, PLUS:FACTOR THAT WE HANDLED ALL INCOMPATIBLE ACTIVITY
VERY CAREFULLY, LED US TO CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE NOT RUNNING
RISK MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT BY CONDUCTING LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE
OPERATIONS. POINTED OUT THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS,
ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THOSE AREAS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS
AND SOME ECONOMIC FIELDS WHERE GERMANS NOT COMPLETELY CANDID
WITH US EMBASSY RE THEIR ACTIVITIES.
13-00000
1
PAGE 3 BONN 43387 SE & E T
7. MRS AARON ASKED ABOUT EXTENT WE KEPT AMBASSADOR INFORMED
ON OUR ACTIVITIES IN WEST GERMAN FIELD. WE REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR
SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND THEREFORE KNEW WHERE SOURCES,
LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID NOT CLEAR WITH HIM ON INDIVIDUAL
CONTACTS, MAKING REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHODS". PROVISION OF
OUR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. POINTED OUT THAT EACH
CASE TREATED SEPARATELY BUT THAT AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY/CON-
SULATES HAVE NOT HAD INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTAL CONTACT WITH
YOUNGER POLITICAL FIGURES OUTSIDE BONN AREA. ON: OTHER HAND HE
CLEARLY QUITE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH RESULT THAT WE
GENERALLY ASSUMED HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE ON FONMIN...
8.
MR AARON INQUIRED RE STATION CASE OFFICER STRENGTH AND
GIVEN FIGURES CITED IN POSITION REPORT DATED OCTOBER 74 (FORWARDED
HOS BY TM DATED 25 SEPT 74.) WE EXPLAINED THAT BREAKDOWN. SOMEWHAT
ARBITRARY AND SAID THAT FOR NUMBER OFFICERS (THOSE ENGAGED IN
LIAISON, SUPPORT, ANALYSIS, FOR INSTANCES IT NOT ALWAYS EASY TO
CATEGORIZE THEIR EFFORTS.
9. HE PROBED IN SOME DETAIL ON OUR NOC STRENGTH AND WE
ANSWERED CANDIDLY., MR. AARON SEEMED SURPRISED AT SMALL NUMBERS
INDC OFFICERS IN STATION AND SAID HAD HEARD OPINION FROM SOME CIA
OFFICERS THAT NOC PREFERABLE TO OFFICIAL COVER. WE SAID FELT
THIS DEFENDENT ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HERE IN
GERMANY ARMY COVER READILY AVAILABLE, GENERALLY QUITE SATISFACTORY
AND COST CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN NDC COVER. AARON ASKED SEVERAL
QUESTIONS RE REASONS WE WOULD PUT OFFICER IN GERMANY UNDER NOC.
WE EXPLAINED NOC PRIMARILY USED. FOR. PERSONNEL WE PLANNED KEEP
ASSIGNED GERMANY. SEVERAL YEARS AND WHERE NOG PROBABLY MORE SECURE
AND FOR INSTANCES WHERE IT PROVIDED BETTER ACCESS. WHEN HE PUSHED
FOR FURTHER EXAMPLES WE MENTIONED HAD RECENTLY CONSIDERED PUTTING
OFFICER UNDER STUDENT COVER IN HEIDELBERG WHERE OFFICIAL CHINESE-
STUDENTS SIGNIFICANT TARGET REPRESENTED BUT THAT THIS PLAN DROPPED
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS. WE MADE NO MENTION: USE JOURNALIST.
COVER AND DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY COVER FIRMS BY NAME.
10. AARON ASKED STIGGINS WHICH OF WHAT AARONS ENVISAGED AS THREE
PRINCIPAL DUTIES TOOK MOST TIME. AARON OUTLINED COS DUTIES AS
MANAGEMENT OF STATION, EMBASSY RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATION
OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. STIGGINS SAID MANAGEMENT OF
13-00000
}
PAGE 4 BONN 43387 SECRE
STATION CLEARLY REQUIRED MOST TIME AND FURTHER THAT WITHIN STATION,
THE EFFORT AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS CONSUMED THE MAJOR PART OF HIS
TIME AND EFFORT.
11. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AARON PRIOR.
TO HIS SESSION WITH HIM. EZ IMPIET.
SECRET
13-00000
CABLE SEC DISSED
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
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FICE IS PROHIBIT
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TOR:161937Z OCT 75
SECRET 161856Z OCT 75 STAFF
CITE BONN 43389
IN 716124
BONN 43389
R
TO:
RYBAT
PRIORITY DIRECTOR.
REF BONN 4
43367 (IN716059)
1.
WEN
онав
Para
AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND
ONE-HALF SESSION WITH MR. AARON ON 15 OCT. DISCUSSION COVERED
THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL
SOURCES" IN BONN; (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND (C) DEGREE
TO WHICH AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES.
2. ON POINT GMA. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION
POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONG-STANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE
EARLY POST WAR/OCCUPATION ERA. THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL
FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS
AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE..
THAT IS, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS
COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL
CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY
WITHER AWAY. BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATION-
SHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT.
SECRET
13-00000
1 MFG. 2./75
ABLE SEC. DISSEM E
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
ADVANCE COPY 18SUED/SLOTTED
BY
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IN 716124
BONN
43389
THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VALUE
SINCE THE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMB AS SY
CONTACTS.
REGARDING PARA 1.B, AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO AARON
THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER
INVOLVED IN LARGE-SCALE COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE
ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS.
COS EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO
COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE
STATION, AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S
REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD
CONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF
HERZFANZ WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE.
4. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS
OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF
COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME
OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE
IDENTITIES OF ANY OF THEM, HE FOUND THE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE
HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PER-
SONALLY FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT
SECRET
13-00000
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PER
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IN 716124
BON N
43389
COS WOULD ADVISE HIM OF ANYTHING HE OUGHT TO KNOW.
LOOKING
BACK ON THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, THE
AMBASSADOR SAID HE CONCLUDES THAT IN FACT THE AMBASSADORS IN
BONN HAD BEEN KEPT APPROPRIATELY ADVISED AND THE ABSENCE OF
FLAPS WOULD SUBSTANTIATE THE JUDGMENT EXERCISED BY THE RE-
SPECTIVE STATION CHIEFS OVER THE YEARS.
5, MR. AARON DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE AMBASSADOR
THE FEASIBILITY OF CHARGING THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATER DIRECT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT.
AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IF IT WERE ASSIGNED TO HIM AS A MISSION
HE WOULD MANIFESTLY HAVE TO DISCHARGE IT AND WOULD AS HE SAW IT
PROBABLY NEED A STAFF OF AT LEAST TWO COMPETENT OFFICERS TO
GARRY OUT THE PRACTICAL STAFF WORK ON HIS BEHALF. MR. AARON THEN
RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THE AMBASSA-
DOR MADE THE PERTINENT OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THE
GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. IF IT WAS DECIDED TO SUBORDINATE CLAN-
DESTINE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD DIRECTLY TO THE
THE
APPROPRIATE
NAA
LEAST A NUMBER OF
GEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE MADE.
IMPRESSION BY MR. AARON THAT AT
E SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ARE
13-00000
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TOR:1619372 OCT 75
IN 716124
BONN 43389
GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF
INVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINE
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, E2 IMPDET.
SECRET
13-00000
:
FILE
EIA898
EYES ONLY"
PAGE 01
STA
1.
2
3
"
715761
BONN 43369
*Recommend dissemination
To D/OLC & DCI (Review
TOR:1615142 OCT 75
1613222 OCT 75 STAFF
CITE BONN 43369
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLKMBALL
1.
M
AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 OCTOBER,
SAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF
SELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK
FORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID
HE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY
SCHEDULED.
2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS
CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING
DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT
HAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GDING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED.".
SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF
WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.
3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR
GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY
SEGRET
13-00000
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PER
RSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,
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T 388983
EIA898
TOTAL COPIES
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STAFF
4
1
2
5
3
6
IN 715761
TOR:161514Z OCT 75
BONN 43369
COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON
TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE
COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 66TH MIG. MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR
COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY.
EZ IMPDET.

13-00000
UNIT NOTIFIED
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TOTAL COPIES
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SECRET
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PAGE 01
TOR:161931Z OCT 75
SECRET 161650Z OCT 75 STAFF
CITE LONDON 66194
TO: DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLKMBALL
REF A.
DIRECTOR 752556
B.
DIRECTOR 754586
RIPROD
TESDING
STAFF
1
2
3
IN 716119
LOND
66094
Свори
To Wall
WEA
1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND
FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO
HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE
OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF
THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE
INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION
AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE
EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL
FIGURES.
2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING,
AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:
A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED
WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR.
REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY
SECRET
COS
13-00000
حرية
>
་
AUTION
==
CUN BY
120
STAFF
1
2
3
389706
E1A520
PAGE 02
TOR:1619312 OCT 75
IN 716119
LOND 66194
IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD
PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR, COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF
COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK
CONSIDERABLY,
8. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINAATED
WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE
CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION
TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD
SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH
SITUATION.
C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE
DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A
PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO
GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN
OFFICE.
D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE
U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION.
OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT
HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON
SECRET
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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
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PAGE 03
TOR:1619312 OCT 75
AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS
IN 716119
LOND 66194
POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER
AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER
IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT
PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE
WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS.
COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS
INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS
MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO
BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE,
OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT. MANY
OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.
E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH
THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON
THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN
THE U.K.
THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE
OWING POINTS\
TISH WERE
CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND
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.TOR:161931Z OCT 75
KLPMC
ISSUING OFFICES;
STAFF
}
2
3
IN 716119
LOND 6619
CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON.
THE PAD BEEN REASSURED
BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE
PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION
OF THHE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID
HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS
THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.
B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE
DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT.
THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY
EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH
REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE
OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD
BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME
PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY.
AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS
PROBLEM.
C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO
WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF
DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE
SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH
SECRET
13-00000
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IN 716119
LOND 66194
COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.
4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT
THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT
OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED
THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE
CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE
HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED
THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED
OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET
13-00000
6.0ce75
1658
Review Staff:
Date 6. October 1975
ΤΟ
:
CIA Task Force
FROM
: The Review Staff, Walter Elder
SUBJECT:
SSC/HSC Request
RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905
75/3149/a
Marge: File
The attached letter requests an orientation briefing
for David Aaron who is travelling again, this time to
Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Comments: it meeting Britanie dany
on 8 1975 by Dete
2nd Briefing - 10 oct 75 by Fendig.
Action
Info
SC/DCI
✗
A/DDA.
X
A/DDI
X
A/DDO
A/DDS&T
X
OGC
X
OLC
Χ
IG
X
Χ
B. Evans
SA
topet
13-00000
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMA
PHILIP A, HART, MICH,
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, NY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWANZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL,
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
REVIEW STAFF
75-3149
Wlnited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 54TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
October 5, 1975
Mr. Seymour Bolten
Assistant to the Director
Room 6D0120
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia
Dear Mr. Bolten:
This letter is to request an orientation briefing for
a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of
the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to
make this month.
.
Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected that
he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal
Republic of Germany October 13-15%; and in London October 16
and 17.
The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-
CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with
the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military com-
manders.. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be
reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador
U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the
Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.
Sincerely,
Biss
William G. Miller
copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department
GL:HA50 LE 100
13-00000
FRANK HURCH, IDAHO, C)'
JOHN G. TOWER TEXAS, VICE
PHILIPA, HART, MICH.
AVALTER P. MONDALE, MAN
WALTER D. HUDOLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GANY HART, COLO.
IAN
HMAN
HOWARD H, DAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MO.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
Jlnited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO 5. RES. 21, SITH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
October 3, 1975
REVIEW STAFF
75-3150
Mr. William G. Hyland
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Hyland:
This letter is to request an orientation briefing
for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a
member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has
'been asked to make this month.
Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected
that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal
Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October
16 and 17..
The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-
CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with
the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military com-
manders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be
reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador
'U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the
Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.
Sincerely,
William G. Miller
copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA
SL.H5OZE 130
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
JATERNAL
ONLY
CONENTIAL
SECRET
SUBJECT: (Optional). -
FROM:
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
John Walla
2B-1415.
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
EXTENSION
NO.
9135
9013
DATE
RECEIVED
2.
Ms. Rogerio 10
Polan
Walle
Fill
5.
7.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORMA 610
3-62
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
DATE
FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
26 September
1975
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
MR Mateli
же
T
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Attached is
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Soginia
7 OCT 75 IN 50.
SECRET
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☐ CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000,
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IN 695650
TORI 242029Z SEP 75
MONT
21403
>+2
SECRET 241945Z SEP 75 STAFF
CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 SECTION 1 OF 2
TO
IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.
# 1
NACT BUENOS AIRES
FRY BAT PLVWCADET
1. COS HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE-
MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER, GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE
BUSINESS-LIKE; QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN
HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS
THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION IS FUNCTIONING
IN URUGUAY. HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL, MOST
IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM
COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR
SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION
OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".
COS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK
TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED
20
IT WITH THEM.
THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONS
WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS. COS SAID
3.
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MONT 21403
AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLICTICAL NATURE
IN URUGUAY WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO
MOUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS. WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS
LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS, AARON ASKED IF WE
HAD ON-GOING PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS. COS SAID WE
DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED
MATTER, ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULL Y AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH
COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED SO. COS ADDED HE HAD NOT
SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE
COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO.
4, BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND
OF THINGS WE' COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH
PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS
WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE
WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF
ANY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS
DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE
PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADORS WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE
INFORM THE POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF
OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP?
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TORI 242029Z SEP 75
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IN 695650
MONT 21403
COS ANSWERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT. HOW TO HANDLE
HIS OVERT CONTACT BUT, DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSO
DISCUSS THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUT
DEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWER: THE SAME,
"
5, THIS LED TO DISCUSSION OF INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER.
HAVING JUST FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHART
SAID DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED AND
THEREFORE WE WERE PROSCRIBED FROM RECUITING THEM. COS POINTED
OUT SOURCE REGISTER IS FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATT
HERE IS PROCSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HIS
SOURCES ARE IN INTER-AGENCY SURCE REGISTER. COS ADDED THAT
MANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIR
AGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION IN
THE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER.
6. TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL" OVER DEA'S
OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DCID. COS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY
WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO
TRY TO DO SO. WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES,
PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSITANCE, ENCOURAGE LIAISON TO COOPERATE FULLY
WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN IS
་
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IN 695650
MONT
21403
BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOW
ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR
7,
AS TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.
TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON
THE OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE WAS ADVISED
LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT
LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST
SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS
MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE
OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENCEE OF
A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBALBLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE
NO FLAP POTENTIAL, AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY
ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT
WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT,
8. AARON AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD
NON-COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS
OF INFLUENCEM. THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON
THEIR REQUEXT, THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE
PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER: TWO OR
SECRET
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IN 695650
PING
"TOR1242029Z SEP 75
MONT 21403
THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS
ENOUGH
KIND OF THING FOR YEARS.) WE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN
KIND
TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL "
WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON. WHILE THEY UNDERSOTOOD
THIS POINT THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE
WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF
A SENIOR URUGUAYAN GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT OF INFLUENCE:
SOVIE
ANSWER: NO. DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED AGENTS OF INFLUENCE IN
MATER
URUGUAY. ANSWER: NO. ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES.
THEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME
WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF
INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY
COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U.S. INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER:
TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME; WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO
OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY
IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF
INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF
MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT
THREATEN THE STABILITY OF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE U.S.
COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY. WE ANSEWEREED THAT URUGUAY IS
SECRET
:
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CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN
IN 695650
MONT 21403
INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FIRIEND OF THE U.S.
AARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF
OTHER STATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, I.E. TO COUNTER SOVIET
INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT
KNOW, CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART
POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF
A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER, WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS
UROQUEN
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PAGE 1
IN 695658
TOR: 242034Z SEP 75
MONT 21403
SECRET 241945Z SEPT 75 STAFF
CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2
TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.
NIACT BUENOS AIRES
HE DID
RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. ANSWER: NO.
TRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY
CONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH
COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD
THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES,
TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT
TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY.
NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE
OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO
RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT.
PRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE
AMBASSADOR TO BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR
OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL.
9. SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN
POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET, HOPE
PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER
SECRET
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TOR:242034Z SEP 75
So
IN 695658
MONT 21403
OBJECTIVES). HOW IS OVER-ALL BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE
WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET
BOVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED
WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES), WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING
THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT
ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT
HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF
BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY'
UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWERI NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. AARON
IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.
10.
:
IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED
OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE
RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA?
ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY
HQS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION, CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID
WE ARE AT PRESENT. UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND
NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN
THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX.
WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT
HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE
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11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON NOCS WE ADVISED WE H
NO NE IN URUGUAY, E2, IMPDET,
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TOR1231523Z SEP 75
SECRET 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF
+2
CITE BRASILIA 24723. SECTION 1 OF 2
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.
RYBAT PLVWCADET
1.
HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART
AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO
: OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S
ACTIVITIES.
3.
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
Salddo
J. WALLER
#2
AND MONDAY.
2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN
DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT
OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY
AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS
OPERATIONS--E.G. LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN
PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM
STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF
QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER
OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL
ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS,
FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET
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TOR:231523Z SEP 75
THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUIATED IN THE OD.
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
PERIODIC
REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE. THEM OF WHAT WE
HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS
FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISED AGAINST
THESE PRIORITIES, A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN
WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN
HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON
THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE
TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS
(RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O.
THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE
HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT
RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE
HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF
ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE
OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS
HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT
SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE,.
HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF
SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD
SECRET

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IN 694147
BRIL 24723
UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE
THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT
EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.
41 THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH
AARON AND TURE HEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES
OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS
(SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE
THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN
CONTACTING NOCS (NO. DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER
SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH
THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN
THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN
GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).
5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE
PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/O SPENT HIS DAY,
THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID
WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME
INDIVIDUAL CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE
CONTROL). WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS
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TOR:231523Z SEP 75
DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF
LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--T EL ET APS,
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
(SURVEILLANCE, ETC,--AGAINST HARD TARGETS).
COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME.
DISCUSSIONS ON
DESPITE HQS
BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE
(DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP.
MUGH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR
SPOLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO
THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN
SPÓL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS
SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION,
* THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO
PAGE 3 BRASILIA 24723-SÉG E
UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS
EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS
AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY
RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE
CHILEAN VARIETY.
6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO
* KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY
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TOR: 231523Z SEP 75.
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T
HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT
SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT
OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF
SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY,
COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS
WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE,
"
PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE
AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.)
(AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND
ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)
7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND
TURE HAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE'
DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY
TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO
STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL
SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST
SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO
ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR
SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE
SECRET
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TOR:231523Z SEP 75
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR
HTEMS-SUCH. AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES
MIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO
SUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL.
OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO
(TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL
BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS
REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN
SENSITVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED.
THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN
SECRET
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IN 694101
TOR:2315082 SEP 75
BRIL
24723.
SECRET231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF
CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO
TO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.
RYBAT PLVWCADET **
BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS
CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE
AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL
ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE
CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.
8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF
THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE
POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL
OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE
PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS
PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A
CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED
ACCORDINGE).
9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE
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TOR:231508Z SEP 75
COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE
IN 69417
BRIL
24723
BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN
FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR-
.IAL DUTIES.
10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE
NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR
UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL,
11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE
CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.
THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE
SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN
SAY, STATE.
12.
VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO
EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA
WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION
TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID
CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN
WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE
HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)
13.
ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS
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TOR:2315082 SEP 75
IN 69
6941 $7
BRIL
WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH
SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO
AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY
U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO
MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF
AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,
ETC.
14.
AARON
"EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER
PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD
BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF
OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,
THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 50PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL
E
WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK
DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH
THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION
“AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.
15° AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE
PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED
MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD
A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER
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TOR:231508Z SEP 75
TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO. EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN
THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)
16.
ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION.
AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND
TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE
ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING,
AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING:
AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE
FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY
NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF
IN
6941 $7
BRIL 24723
GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACHED (CERCETCE) THE
MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY
WORKED.
17.
AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY.
WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO
HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK
AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE
SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO.
MONTEVIDEO
AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON
IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS
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TOR:2315082 SEP 75
A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL
PRODUCT.
694107
IN 694.
BRIL 24723
18.
AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY
THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE
OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF
THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF
MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH
MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET..
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" EYES ONLY"
PAGE 01
IN 699994
TOR:291627Z SEP 75
BUEN 34519
SECRET 291547Z SEP 75 STAFF
CITE BUENOS AIRES 34519
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.
RYBAT PLVWCADET
REF BUENOS AIRES 34511
(2698265)*
1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF
EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT,
AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB, COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER
ROOM. (UPON DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR
CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS
BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM
PRIVATELY. COS WAS CALLED IN, HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW
MINUTES OF DISCUSSION. IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB
WHETHER HE THOUGH HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION
PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY.
AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED
HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD. AARON
THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION
REPORTING. ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR
CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUT
SECRET

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TOR:291627Z SEP 75
IN 699594
BUEN 34519
HQS APPROVAL. OTHER INFO COULD BE SHOWN AT DESCRETION OF COS.
SUBJ OF ROGERS LETTER RE SHOWING INTEL REPORTS TO AMB PRIOR TO
DISSEMINATION WAS THEN RAISED BY AMB. AMB SAID HE TOOK POSITION THIS
WAS POLICY MATTER WHICH HAD TO BE SOLVED IN WASHINGTON AND HAD SO
INFORMED. ROGERS. (COS SAW DRAFT OF LETTER TO ROGERS TO THIS EFFECT.)
AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING AMB HANDED COS A NEWS ITEM (HAVANA
MERIDIANO 80 IN SPANISH 1-15 JUL 75 PP 5-6, ARTICLE BY CARLOS MARIA
GUTIERREZ ENTITLED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HILL SEEN AS CIA AGENT IN
ARGENTINA) AND ASKED THAT ARTICLE BE SHOWN TO VISITORS IN CAR, AMB
TRUEHEART READ ARTICLE AND COMMENTED SOMETHING TO EFFECT THAT
ARTICLE DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE ANYTHING TO BE VERY CONCERNED
ABOUT. MR. AARON DID NOT READ IT. POUCHING COPY. (AMB SUBSE-
QUENTLY TOLD COS ARTICLE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN WASHINGTON BY
ARTICLE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT RYAN.)
2. ON WAY TO AIRPORT AFTER MEETING WITH AMB, TRUEHEART
MENTIONED AMB'S REQUEST TO SEE THEIR CREDENTIALS. SINCE THEY HAD
NONE, THEY SHOWED THEIR PASSPORTS. (AMB LATER TOLD COS HE HAD
ASKED TO SEE CREDENTIALS SINCE HE WANTED TO SEE FOR HIMSELF EXACTLY
WHAT THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY WERE.) COS INFERRED THAT
VISITORS WERE TAKEN ABACK BY AMB'S REQUEST BUT MEETING WITH AMB
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WAS NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS.
PAGE 03
TOR:291627Z SEP 75
IN 699594.
BUEN 34519
CAMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION,)
3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF
DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY
MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND
BUSINESSLIKE.
AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS
AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE. HE
SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES
INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE.
AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED
WITH BKHERALD OPERATION IN ARGENTINA.
i
ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A
AMB BELIEVES STATE
BKHERALD
QUARREL WITH BKHERALD IS THAT OF COMMUNICATIONS:
DEPT SHOULD CONTROL ITS OWN COMMUNICATIONS; HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO
BKHERALD HAVING ITS OWN COMMO, ALSO. REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF
BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF
TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHERALD ACTIVITIES
IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW.
VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT. AMB SAID HE HAD
HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN
SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED
THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM
SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST
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TOR:291627Z SEP 75
IN 699594
BUEN 34519
CUBANS. ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT SPORLON
EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH AFRICA. AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OF
HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS.
EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT
BY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF
BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.
4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DCOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING
26 SEP. ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE
DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE
FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:
(A) HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-
BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLE
IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS. IN THE
FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.
i
(B) HE SAID HE THOUGH BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY POLITICAL
SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD.
(C)
HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE
PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE, WAS SENIOR
OFFICER. HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE,
HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT FUTURE STATIONS HE WILL
VISIT OF PECKING ORDER..
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TOR:291627Z SEP 75
IN 699594
BUEN
34519
VISITORS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 27 SEP AT 2130 HOURS ON
SCHEDULE
60 AMB SAID HE HAD A GOOD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHARD
SAMPSON IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REPORTED
DIRECTOR: 744995.
NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.
CS Comment: *Aaron and Trueheart's 26 September conversations with COS
and DCOS.
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IN 697014
BUEN 34503
SECRE T 252234Z SEP 75 STAFF.
CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION
OF 2
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.
RYBAT PLVWCADET.
REF
DIRECTOR 745626
1. COS AND DCOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR:
WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN
ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR,
EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT
SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING TTHE TWO VISITORS MET
PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED
PRIVATELY WITH SMITH. (AARON BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.)
COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP.
AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE. CAT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART
2.
EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL
WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE,
AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.). AARON ASKED MOST OF
QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND
COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-
BKHERALD. (E.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)
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TOR:252337Z SEP 75
IN 697014
BUEN 34503
3. IN DISCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON
ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE. TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY
PLACES" WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS
TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT
PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS,
POINTED OUT ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID
SOME SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FOR INTERNAL HANDLING, ALSO
POINTED OUT CI VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS
OFFICERS. NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION
VALUE OF BKHERALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE
HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD.
JUSTIFY BKHERALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION.
ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME
REQUIRED ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW GOOD SOURCES
WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP. TRUEHEART ASKED FOR
EXAMPLES, AND WE REFERRED THEM TO HQS FOR DETAILS. TRUEHEART SAID
WE
IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHERALD NOW IN AS SOVIET PHASE", WHEREAS IN
EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER PHASES. WE SAID
SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGET, AND OUR APPROACH TO THEM HAS
BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS,
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TORI252337Z SEP 75
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34503
BUEN
4. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH
AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE
CONTROL OVER, OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS.
SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT
PROPOSAL OF GOVT OFFICIAL PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWER: AMB
WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED,
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR. ASKED WHO DETERMINES
IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED. ANSWER: cos. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD
PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER:
HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUCTION EXISTED, WE
WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD
ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER. AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION
AND ITS MISSION. ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO
WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE-
HEART.)
5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON
LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (I.E., PRIMARILY BY HQS OR
THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR
THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION
COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.
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BUEN 34503
ANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS ON CONTINUING
BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW
ON INTERNAL TARGET. WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORT-
ING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS. VISITORS PROBED
DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND
FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE
WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT
INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR
PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION
AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE
SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HQS
DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB. RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT
FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED
OFFICERS DO ALSO.
6.
IN RESPONSE. THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE
LIAISON RELATIONSHIP, WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED
BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION
CL
OFFICERS DELCARED TO LIAISON. ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH
BRITISH INTEL REP. ANSWER: YEST, BUT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATION-
SHIP.
THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATION-
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PAGE 05
TOR 252337Z SEP 75
IN 697014
BUEN 34503
ANSWER:
SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSON
TO ANOTHER. ASKED WHETHER THERE SDECE REP IN BUENOS AIRES.
WE NOT AWARE OF ANY. NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTS
AND SUBJECT. OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED.
7. SUBJECT OF NOCS NOT RAISED.
WE
8. ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER:
NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS UNDER AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM.
STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONTINGENCY NATURE
OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING
NEW AGENTS. ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRICE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF
OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT.
SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS
OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES
IN POLITICAL SCENE.
9. FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING. WE
EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION
CUT BY OVER 30 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE
OFFICERS WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS
IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS.
WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EA
EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM
).
>
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IN 697014
BUEN
34503
TOR:252337Z SEP 75
CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. OD OBJECTIVES AND
PRIORITIES WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD INSELF NOT PROVIDED.
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14.
IN 6970
TOR1252301Z SEP 75
BUEN 34503
SECRET 252234Z SEP 74 STAFF
!
CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2
.:
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.
RYBAT PLVWCADET
10, CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE
DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS (MONTONEROS AND ERP) AND
STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS. AARON SAID THAT
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM
ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. (AMB AWARE
OF COVERAGE BY PUTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD
MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR.) WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS
CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO.
WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON
:
SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE
WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE
THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT.
NO, FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.
ANSWER:
11. EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM
ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART. BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES
STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING
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PAGE
TOR:252301Z SEP 75
IN 6970
BUEN 34503
UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE
WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM.
IN NEXT CABLE.
THESE WILL BE COVERED
12. WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS.
E2 IMPDET
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PAGE 01-01
TOR: 291957Z SEP 75
SECRET 2919 25Z SEPT 75 STAFF
CI TE BRASILIA 24777
TO : BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECT OR.
RY BAT PL VW CADET
REFI
699594)
BUENOS AIRES 34519/IN 699594
4
2
5
3
6
REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT
BY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRİMMINS
HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE."
FY I, A MB AS SA DO R CR IM MINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNS ON,
DCM. WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEART'S VISIT TO
BRAS ILIA. IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA,
CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED TO
BE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE
OFFICERS. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET
IN 69 9882
BRIL
24777
ÉLABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS. E2, IMPDET.
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TORI231523Z SEP 75
22
SECRET 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF
CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.
RYBAT PLVWCADET.
1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART
AFTERNOON 22 SEPT.
TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO
OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S
ACTIVITIES.
2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT
OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.
3.
AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS
OPERATIONS--E.G. LINE OF COMMAND FROM HOS AND STATION'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN
PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM
STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF
QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER
OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL
ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS,
".
FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET
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TOR:2315232 SEP 75
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC
REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE
HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS
FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISED AGAINST
THESE PRIORITIES, A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN
WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN
HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON
THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE
TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS
(RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/0.
THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE
HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT
RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE, HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE
HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF
ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE
OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS
HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT
SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE,
HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF
SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD
SECRE
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TOR:231523Z SEP 75
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE
THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT
EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.
THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH
AARON AND TURE HEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES
OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS
(SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE
THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN
CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER
SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH
THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN
THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN
GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).
5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE
PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/O SPENT HIS DAY,
THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID
WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME
INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE
CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS
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TOR:231523Z SEP 75
DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF
LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISO N- -T EL ET AP S,
SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS).
DISCUSSIONS ON
COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS
BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP.
MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR
POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO
THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN
POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS
SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE F N SUCH ACTION,
THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO
PAGE 3 OR LTA 24723 S ÉG E
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS
EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS
AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY
RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE
CHILEAN VARIETY.
6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR. TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO
KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY
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HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T
HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT
SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT
OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF
SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY
COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT: INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS
WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE,
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE
AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.)
(AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND
ASKED FOR PARTICULARS, )
7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND
TURE HAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE
DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY
TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HOS WITH INFO TO
STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL
SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST
SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO
ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR
SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE
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TORI231523Z SEP 75
IN 694147
BRIL 24723
THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR
ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES
VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO
SUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL
OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO
TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL
BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS
REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN
SENSITVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED.
THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN
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PAGE
IN
694101
TOR:2315082 SEP 75
BRIL 24723
SECRET 231409Z SEPT. 75 STAFF
CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.
RYBAT PLVWCADET
BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS
CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE
AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL
ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY.. SECURITY WAS THE
CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.
8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF
THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE
POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL
OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE
PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS
PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A
CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED
ACCORDINGLY).
9, AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE
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TOR:2315082 SEP 75
.COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE
IN
694167
BRIL 24723
BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN
FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR-
IAL DUTIES.
10.
THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE
NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR
UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.
BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE
CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.
THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE
11.
SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN
SAY, STATE.
12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO
EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA
WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION
TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID
CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN
WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE
HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)
13.
ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS
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IN 694
BRIL
69417
24723
TOR:2315082 SEP 75.
WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES.
THEY WERE BOTH
SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO
AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY
U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO
MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF
AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,
ETC.
14.
AARON
EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER
PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD
BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF
ACTUALLY
OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,
THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 50PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL
E
WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THAT WORK
DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH
THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION
AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.
15.
AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE
PAST AND PROBED ABOUT. HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED
MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD
A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER
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69410
BRIL 24723
T 329420
EIA971
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TOR:2315082 SEP 75
TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN
THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)
16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION.
AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND
TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE
ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING,
AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING
AT. THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE
FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY
NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF
GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (D) THE
MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY
WORKED.
17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY,
WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO
HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK
AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE
SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO.
MONTEVIDEO
AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND. THAT AARON
IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, IS
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TOR:231508Z SEP 75.
A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL
PRODUCT.
18.
IN 694117
BRIL 24723
AT DINNER. ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY:
THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE
OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF
THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF
MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH
MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.
SECRET
13-00000
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
:
fill under
sse travel
SECRET
20 August 1975
Chief, LA Division
Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing
the Intention of SSC Staffers to
Visit Latin America
1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the
SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing
travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC
Staffers. This is for your information.
You will
be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary
is established.
2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving
guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should
be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers
before they go and a notification of the stations
involved as to what the guidelines are.
Attachment
As stated above
Distribution:
Orig & 1
Addressee w/att
2
-
SA/DDO
John H. Waller
SA/DDO
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055636
13-00000
SUBJECT:
Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad
There have been already and there will continue to be members
of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and
talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential
that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security
problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.
MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE
ABROAD. FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE
INSTALLATIONS.
Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad,
for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low
profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection
from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities
behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection.
Thẹ mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence
of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those
countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and
other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government,
care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions
4/25/75
13-00000
II.
.2
that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure
of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the
United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public :
exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet.
nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other
than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members
and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press,
nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating
officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining
to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be
distasteful to the host government.
In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet
arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence
activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers
within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the
SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business
at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding
on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.
THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE
VISIT.
All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his
knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.
13-00000
III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE
IV.
CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.
It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational
details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will
only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities,
the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment,
relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all
cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical
surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.
Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to
see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between
the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered
by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and
operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the
host government
MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT
PERSONNEL.
Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service
scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be
to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be
done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be .
revealed to Members or staff of the SSc.
13-00000
V.
VI
MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES
WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.
Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC:
politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that
"
their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the
information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most
sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them,
they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters
with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters
were under investigation could well cause the host service to
reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence
¨activities.
MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.
In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection
sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.
Congressional representatives, especially where there is public
knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests.
If such
a visit is considered essential, a special request must be
negotiated with the host country in advance.
13-00000
.5
VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND
STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives
of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as
The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the
appropriate.
visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location,
the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case
and the considerations which preclude the discussion of
operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.
Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that
they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition
intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff
"
members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly
travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.

13-00000
CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
ER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
✓ MINN.
LESTON, KY.
AN, N.C.
COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN,
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD,
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL
Mr. Seymour Bolten
Assistant to the Director
Room 6D0120.
Central Intelligence Agency
Langley, Virginia
Boyle Seysann
Dear Mr. Bolten:
Alnited States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
August 12, 1975
File
„BEUEW STAFF
75-2399
: C/LA+ 3 LAffects
may
completed briefing
on 
17 Sept 1975.
This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff.
for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two
members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been
asked to make next month.
Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will
be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September.
It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and
Montevideo. If time permits, they might also visit another con-
sular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires.
The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA
relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers.
propriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.
As ap-
Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with
officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is
concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.
Sincerely yours,
Bill
William G. Miller
copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department
13-00000
AGE
OMF
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714410
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PER
IP FILES
TO:
PRIORITY LONDON.4
REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975 Y
1.
SENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
DHB
{ASC} AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGAT-
ING CIA, IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR
ITH
FORCE JET AND WE AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR
TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER
HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND CINCUSNAVEUR ON 7 JULY, 4
.
1
2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE
:
THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND BOTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE . .
ACTIVITY IN U.K. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION
:
SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING.IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE.
YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH
BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.
STATIONS
⠀ SHOULD NOT OFFER. ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND BRITISH
SERVICE CONTACTS.Y
2
3.
FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES:
HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDLINES FOR
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
LEASING OFFICER
AT
AUTHENTICATING ORENTA
REPRODUCT
:
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CONF:
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TUL
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☑
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0
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CITE
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DIRECTOR
71410
INDEX
NO INDEX
”:。་
RETURN TO
DISSEM BY:
PER
ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS.
IP FILES
ALTHOUGH NOT
#
FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE
THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED
TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OFS AND
ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.Ė., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES
OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCALİ
MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE
SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS 1
ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR
GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST
GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS¦
AS EXTREMELY SENSITZE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT
BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT.
E2 IMPDET.H
DATE: 2 JULY 1975
ORIG: GEORGE B. HOLMES
UNIT:
EXT:
EURBC
1413
{TELECOORD}
SA/DDO
-
WALLER
iNSUBSTANCE
EURBC
RELEASING OFFICER
OLC - MILLER R. CHIN
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BỶ OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET.
1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY: 012591
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AC-
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STAFF
CONF: EUR 8
INFO:
DATE-TIME GROUP
0117562
CITE
DIRECTOR
FILE, IP/AN, OLC, 01/092
PS/E62, DDG SDO/DO
SA/DDO
0
0
0
TO:
IMMEDIATE BONN, MUNICH. Y
Niact Bown Munich.
ICS, PS/PG
0
IP FILES
#
LIAISON Y
REF:
MUNICH 30382 (IN 6215671 Y
DAB
1. AS YOU AWARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE CASC} SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOWER IS
TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND
WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY
BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. Y
2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL
TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE
ACTIVITY IN THE FRG. SHOULD HE DO SO, THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT
SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED, BUT, IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING,
THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM
WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE.
WITH THE BND, OMITTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE
AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY: THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO
ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS FRG LIAISON CONTACTS.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
SECRET
E 2
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SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
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#
THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE
IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. 4
IN THE
th
HQS. IS
3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES:
CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS
DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS
BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE
OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD
ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL
TERMS. I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR
PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY {CONSULATE) AND LOCAL MILITARY
SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY.
STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC
TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON
INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE
THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE.
POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE
E2 IMPDET.H
CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
1 JULY 1975 cpea
GALEN PEARY/HP Solot KNULIO
E/G/CIL KJU STAFE"
EXT: 1582
SA1000 Waller mndraft
الكرة
وا
Miller
46 Mutter
KYLE MILLER
DC/E
RELEASING
R
PRODUCT
THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CLASSIFICATION
SECR
CONFIDENTIAL
☐ SECRET
13-00000
☐ UNCLASSIFIED
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEL
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
C/SS/CAG
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
1.
2.
.3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
:
EXTENSION NO.
3D0004
DATE
R9125
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
FORWARDED
RECEIVED
29 JUL 1975
2B1415
Mr. John Waller
SA/DDO
Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff 6 D 0120
FORM
3-62
610
USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
28 July 1975
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Ory shoron
Gridwisin
to
BIRECTOR
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
-
SECRET
SENSITIVE
28 July 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
VIA:
SUBJECT:
Review Staff
Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO
Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at
Right-Wing Governments.
1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper
providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing
governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select
Committee.
2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive
by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to
today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could
impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other dis-
closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our
past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military
base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have
broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper-
ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and
Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about
which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if abso-
lutely necessary.
!
3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use
(with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist
the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-
vided to you directly by LA Division.
4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information
to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would
appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances
of any use of this material outside of the Agency.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055377
13-00000
SECRET
SENSITIVE
5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies
of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional
background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision
of this material to the Select Committee.
Drueld / Liscell
Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff
Attachments, a/s
SECRET
2
SENSITIVE
13-00000
BECKET
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff
VIA:
SUBJECT:
28 July 1975
Mr. John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO
Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at
Right-Wing Governments
1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper
providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing
governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select
Committee.
2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive
by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to
today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could
impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other dis-
closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our
past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military..
base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have
broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper-
ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and
Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about
which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if abso-
lutely necessary.
3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use
(with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist
the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-
vided to you directly by LA Division.
4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information
to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would
appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances
of any use of this material outside of the Agency.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055377
13-00000
Sulton &
SENSITIVE
5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies
of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional
background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision
of this material to the Select Committee.
Attachments, a/s
/s/ Donald J. Purcell
Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff
SECRET.
2
SENSITIVE

13-00000
ULUTIEI
SENSITIVE
Covert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing Regimes
CATEGORY I
1. ETHIOPIA: A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor
movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support
was to encourage the development of the labor movement as a democratic
force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in Ethiopia.
The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved.
budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination
in CY 1973 was $291,006. Covert support to the Ethiopian labor movement
was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970,
on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.
2. SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was
begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of
strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the
most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly demo-
cratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to
facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and
tenant farmers.
3. GUATEMALA: In 1972-73, the Guatemala City Station with access
to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military
action against Belize.
4. HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and
means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest pro-
ject was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for
the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to
Haiti from Radio Habana."
5. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the
successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of
General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-
wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.
6. GERMANY: From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-
Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its
plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement
and its European counterparts.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
A
13-00000
SECRET
SENSITIVE
!
CATEGORY II
1. SOUTH AFRICA: In 1959, after consultation with the Special
Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of $165,000 to a leading
South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a
new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective
was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by
having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The
activity was terminated in 1962.
2. SOUTH AFRICA: A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage
the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed
apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization.
State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of $311,705
was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968.
3. KOREA: In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action
project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis
the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in
anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group
of National Assembly members.
4. KOREA: The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed
to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more
participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase
their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved
the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a news-
letter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project,
but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.
5. ARGENTINA: Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were
directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin
America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which
was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in
the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never
caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.
6. BRAZIL: From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart
and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to
1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished
Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to
the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian
military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly
after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG
were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.
2
SECRET
SENSITIVE
13-00000
SECRET
SENSITIVE
7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated
in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for
military actions against his neighbors.
8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train
15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build
an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special
Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian
Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth,
political and labor elements.
3
SECRET
STACITIVE
سنا
13-00000
JEUNET
·
22 JUL 1975
Special Assistant to DDO
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. John Waller
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Summary of Covert Action Operations
Against Right-Wing Governments
SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,
Same Subject.
We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the
following comments on those paragraphs which concern
European Division.
13. GERMANY. While this case is somewhat
bizarre and does not represent a productive operation,
we pose no objection to its being presented to the
Senate Select Committee.
14. SPAIN. We have no objection to the
presentation of these programs to the Senate Select
Committee for review although we share concern expressed
by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detri-
mental to the base negotiations.
sigetâ/William W. Wells
William W. Wells
Chief, European Division
DDO/DC/E/NW: MFBuell: tj (22 July 75)
Distribution:
Orig. & 1
-
Addressee
1
-
SS/CAG
E2 IMPDET
1
1
1
1
CL BY 061414
-
-
-.
C/EUR
DC/E/NW
E/G
E/IB
SECRET
:
13-00000
SECRET/SENSITIVE
25 JUL 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff
SUBJECT
: Covert Action Operations Against Right
Wing Regimes
1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the
three covert action operations in Africa, cited in your
memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.
2. In the case of Ethiopia, we understand from your
discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the labor project
has not been eliminated from your list but that the Director
will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman
and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The
Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing
procedural errors in the presentation and review of this
project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure
to two former assets who have been jailed by the new Ethiopian
regime.
3. The Ethiopian labor program was undertaken
without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently,
the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August
1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council,
asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before.
He was told that for projects costing $20,000 or less, it had
been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was
sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it
before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303
Committee should examine all political action projects.
Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee
for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.
4. In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest
in 1974 and continued detention of two Ethiopian labor leaders
who are former assets under this project, and accusations in
E2 IMPDET
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the Ethiopian press that the trade union organization received
support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA
interest in the labor organization potentially dangerous to
our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested
because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets
nor the labor organization have been accused of CIA involvement.
An admission now of CIA support to Ethiopian labor or to the
two Ethiopian labor leaders in jail could be a sentence of
death for them.
5. In the case of South Africa, CIA support to a leading
South African political figure to encourage the creation of a
new political party remains a very sensitive matter. The
principal agent is still a leading and respected spokesman
for the opposition party in South Africa and is a leading member
of the South African parliament. Exposure of the operation
could lead to his identification which would be extremely
damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our govern-
ment's relations in South Africa. For these reasons, we believe,
it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this
operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select
Committee only.
6. The European philanthropic organization which was used
to fund the development of a multiracial trade union organiza-
tion in South Africa was the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES),
located in Germany. The South African labor officials and
organizations which received funds from FES were not aware
that the actual origin of the funds was the United States
Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government
or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government
involvement where none is known to have existed, FES was used
to support a number of other covert action operations in Africa
and elsewhere and exposure of the foundation would have
ramifications other than in South Africa. The Director should
be briefed on FES and its range of activities on behalf of CIA
if he has not already been informed.
Attachments:
As Stated Above¨¨
Clifton R. Stra
Strather
Clifton R. Strathern
Deputy Chief, Africa Division
2
SECRET/SENSITIVE
13-00000
SECRET
21 JUL 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
Special Assistant to the DDO
: Covert Action Operations Against
Right Wing Governments
: Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated
18 July 1975
Subject: "Summary of Covert Action
Operations Against Right Wing Governments"
1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible
use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern
centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to
Reference as "were mounted against" "right wing governments"..
None of the EA operations DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which
took place in Korea) and TUMIX (which took place in Vietnam) --
were or should be so described as being mounted against the government
then in power.
In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these
--
operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government hand
was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of
the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing
advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these
elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking
participation in the governmental process.
2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the
DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that
it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with
opposition elements in South Korea. As noted above, the purpose of
this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to
assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its
effort to establish a two-party system in South Korea.
The Agency today
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014848
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SECRET
maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in South Korea
and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador
in Korea as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs, Department of State.
3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations
were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee.
cc: DC/Operations Staff
C/SS/CAG
Robert D. Brown, Jr.,
Acting Chief, East Asia Division
2
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
Juny 20.
SUBJECT:
Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad
There have been already and there will continue to
be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
following specific guidelines are considered important:
Members of the SSC and members of its staff
should not publicly appear to be abroad for
purposes of investigating CIA installations.
CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
some form of cover, have and need varying
degrees of protection from exposure. At
one extreme are Stations behind the iron
curtain or in other particularly sensitive
areas which need maximum protection. At
the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
close liaison with the host government and
are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
Stations existing under strict cover conditions
in sensitive environments, the very presence of
SSC members could be highly provocative by.
flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But
even in countries in which we enjoy a good
liaison with the host country's security
service, there remains a need to be discreet.
Many countries whose services want to be
cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
investigation abroad would in almost all
cases be distastefull to a host government.
SECRET
13-00000
SEGRET
In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged
for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
with senior officers within the covering Embassy
provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
Station contacts on a discreet basis.
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
question Station personnel on specific operational
detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the
place where operational details are conveyed to
the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
lines are best understood, where the most complete
and authentic records are kept (many Stations
finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
have periodically destroyed their files). There
is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
not discuss operations in general terms opera-
tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
operational environment, relationships with the
Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
--
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
personnel frequently are under hostile or
local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
in touch with SSC members would be to run an
unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
could be done to agent morale and motivation
if they were to think their role had been
revealed to members of Congress.
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
in most cases be in contact with members of
host country's intelligence or security services.
Many services will find contact with the SSC
politically difficult and will avoid it. They
further regard that their relationships with CIA,
the information they pass us and the sort of
cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
SEGRET

13-00000
:
SECRET
3
No matter what assurances are given them,
they would find it difficult and awkward to
discuss these matters with the SSC or its
staff, and the very fact that such matters
were under investigation could well cause
them to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
perhaps be made in special cases.
Members of the SSC and their staff should
not visit foreign technical intelligence
installations. Again there may be exceptions
to this which can be arranged, but in most
countries in which we operate joint technical
collection sites, the host service would be
opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
SEGRET
13-00000
To
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CITE LONDON 628897
TO:
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RYBAT
REF
DIRECTOR 712872
WE
717
REPRODUCTION BY OTH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHER136
STAFF
1
4
2
5
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IN 620738
LOND
628897
wh
DIPS
1. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS
THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED
IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE
ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPRUACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY
OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS
OF 1975.
2,
AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT
HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT
SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT
SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE. IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE,
RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY
IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE
v
TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 38 JUNE. SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN
PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN
SECRET
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IN 620738
LOND 628897
TRIP, U.K. EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE
THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR
YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS.
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TOR12716512 JUN 75
SECRET 271217Z JUN 75 STAFF
CITE BONN 41001
TO: DIRECTOR.
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER T
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBIT
STAFF
4
2
5
3
6
IN 619528
BONN
41001
RYBAT
FROM GRAVER
REF DIRECTOR 708791
1.
IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR
MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER
WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE
AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT, IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL
CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE
NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF
BERLIN, I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE BERLIN AND
MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT
DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN.
2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT
CONTACT WITH THE BND" SINCE, AS HQS AWARE, THE BND IS LOCATED
IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7
ABOUT 'SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST
RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT WESTPORT IS A
SECRET
:
13-00000
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STAFF
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4
2
5
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IN 619528
BONN 41001
TOR:271651% JUN 75
PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS,
THERE
IS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS
IN FRANKFURT, AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORT
ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR
PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN
ADDITION TU BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.
3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST
ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,
REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK
IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,
IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS
OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.
4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN
AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED. E2 IMPDET,
· SECRET
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PER
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YEUR
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TOTAL COPIES
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BY A AT| 145
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YEUR 6 N
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2
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62823
SECRET 271112Z JUN 75 STAFF
CITE LONDON 62823
TOI IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.
8,
RYBAT
REF A. DIRECTOR 708791
STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE (NC*
.31413.
P
C.
STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE
(KC *
}
1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.
REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING
London
28 JUNE
2
DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON
VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY.
EXCEPT MRS.
MONDALE.
NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY
REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT
WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION.
DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS
LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY?
3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMP DET
* NO RECORD, IN CASLE SECRETARIAT
SECRET
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AGE
OUTGO
COL
GOING MESSAGE
100
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14-1
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0 0 0
DCI
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
ACP
0 0 0
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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF
DNF C/EURG
CONF:
TO: LONDON. Y
RYBAT Y
INFO: FILE
DATE-TIME GROUP
2522257
ROD,
2
°
CITE
DIRECTOR
PRE CLIP/AN, DAS DDAO.
olc, c/SS3; c/ps/eG2.
0/21/003
REFS: A.
LONDON 62701 |IN 616087|
B.
LONDON 62615 IN 6135901 Y
.
8
PAGL
OF
PAGES
0
0
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
711716
DISSEM BY:
INDEX
NO INDEX
RETURN TO
IP FILES
PER
2
"DHB
JW.
Copy
sent
AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT
NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE
✰ MEMBERS OF THE CODEL. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS,
в
WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR-
ANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S
KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN
HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS.
SHOULD THE SUBJECT
ARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY.
RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING
SOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT
ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED
AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E², IMPDET.H
DATE:
25 JUNE 1975
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
WILLIAM W. WELLS
C/EUR
1912
h. the well
WILLIAM W. WELLS, C7EUR
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
COORDINATING OFFICERS
Hi Miller
JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
CL BY:
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IN 616087
TORI 241622Z JUN 75
LOND
62701
SECRET. 241451Z JUN 75 STAFF
CITE LONDON 62701
TO:
DIRECTOR.
RYBAT
REF A.
DIRECTOR 708791
f
R
B. LONDON 62615
013590)
WEN
PHB
1, RE PARA 5 REF A, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, jic.
INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM
SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS, SYKES AND SIR LEONARD
HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE.
ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTRO IS EXERCISED OVER
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL
SECRETS ACT WORKS.
2. SYKES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE
ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT
SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR
REPS.
3, WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.
E2. IMPDET
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
Review Staff:
24 June 1975
75/1009
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
:
Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk
to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe
This is for your information concerning Senator Gary
Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator
is traveling in Europe.
The agent is QJWIN. He was first approached in 1958
through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service.
At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in
various European countries. Later he became the major
asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made a brief
visit to the Congo, but took no actions.
On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate
Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters
reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others.
QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read.
So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the
time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have
not contacted him since.
We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select
Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains
· unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller.
It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could
talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of
the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and
of the host government who might wonder about the propriety
of investigations being conducted on their territory and
involving one of their citizens.
In any event, an approach of this nature would be
of interest to the Department of State, and the senator
might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.
Walt Elder
Walter Elder
CB: 007789
E2 IMPDET
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed
Contact With QJWYN
1..
2.
3.
4.
Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the
risk of his exposure to his local government and the press.
Because of his former activities and relationships he
might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible
prosecution for espionage at home from his local govern-
ment and harassment from the media.
Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have
further cause to believe that the American intelligence
service is incapable of protecting its informants from dis-
closure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions
involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former
informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.
Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in
liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional
and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about
the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with
the CIA.
It is possible that the local government involved might
lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the
unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee
interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty
without requesting formal permission.
SECRET
6/24/75
Classilled by.
Em
014359
geral
dash of EO. 11652
Cadu), (3), (3)
Automatically declared ca
Date Impossible to Deterinico

13-00000
SECRET
Exec va Registry
75-6905
Review Staff:
20 June 1975
75/868
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
This is for your information concerning Senator Gary
Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while
traveling in Europe.
You should know that we have been told that the
Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch
with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they
learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already
advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff
of a potential problem area in connection with such a
proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course,
a subject of interest to the local intelligence service.
and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence
service would agree that a United States senator, especially
a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately
conduct such investigations within its territory without
clearance to do so.
In any event, an approach of this nature would be
of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of
State and the senator might be well advised to consult
with them before proceeding.
For your information, the agant referred to is
QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about
1961.
احر
Walter Elder
EV
CB:
007789
E2 IMPDET
Alderhandcarried
orig to DCT.
SECRET
j
13-00000
Doo He
6/25 D00
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
ADVO
501000
-
к
More facts, per your
request, on the QJWIN
matter.
Talking points for your
use with Sen. Gary Hart
are included.
H. Koch 6-24-75
(DATE)
FORM NO.
1 AUG 54
101
REPLACES FORM 10-101
WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47
13-00000
PROPOSED DOD.
CHANGES SHOWN
HERE, PP 2 and 5
WITHIN THE HEAVY
BRACKETS,
SUBJECT:
GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND
THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD
There have been already and there will continue to be members
of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and
talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential
that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security
problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.
I.
MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE
ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE
INSTALLATIONS.
Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad,
for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining
a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of
protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S... intelligence
activities behind the iron curtain.
These clearly need maximum
protection. Ther mere visit of SSC representatives could be
noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the
country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence
efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from
close liaison with the host government, care is required to
avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that
25 June - latest version, incorporationg
proposed changes by DoD.
13-00000
C
could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure
of such liaison.
:
Several foreign governments or entities thereof
now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence
!
agreements-exchanges maintain strong neutral or anti-U.S. foreign
policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore
In many
dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure.
cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss
of unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection
methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive.
To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be
preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be
given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No
deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor
should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating
officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity
pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all
cases be distasteful to the host government.
In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas,
discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S.
intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with
senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are
contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself
to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his
return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.
13-00000
II.
THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE
OF THE VISIT.
All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because
of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding..
SHII. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE
CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.
It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational
details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements
will only discuss operations in general terms--operational
priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational
environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches,
etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in
physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.
Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to
see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between
the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered
by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and
operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of
the host government.
IV.
MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.
Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local
service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members
13-00000
V.
would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious.
damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their
identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.
MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES
WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.
Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the
SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard
that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the
information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most
sensitive matters.
Regardless what assurances are given them,
they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters
with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters
were under investigation could well cause the host service to
reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence
activities.
VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL
INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.
In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection
sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.
Congressional representatives, especially where there is public
knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests.
If such
13-00000
5
a visit is considered essential, a special request must be
negotiated with the host country in advance.
Senate Select Committee principals and staff should
understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence
installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence
installations or foreign intelligence installations supported
by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former
is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the
latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government
involved.
VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF,
PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representa-
tives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.),
as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize
the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each
location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities
in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion
of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.
Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that
they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition
intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff
members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly
travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.
13-00000
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PAGE 01
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CITE LONDON 62615
TO!
DIRECTOR,
RYBAT
REF A.
DIRECTOR 707518
B.
3
6
IN 613590
LOND 62615
PHB
д
DIRECTOR 708791
1, THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S
PROPOSED VISIT, AND AMBASSADOR AND MINISTER HAVE BOTH BEEN
ALERTED.
2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR
MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS
ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO
COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL
KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE
ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TOUS I
A. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF
HAVE?
ASSISTANTS
Bi TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED
ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED
WITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANCTS?
ci TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD
SECRET
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2
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3
6
IN 613590
LOND 62615.
SPECIFIC CA PROJECTS BE DESCRIBED.
ASSUME THERE IS NOT OBJECTIONS
TO POINTING OUT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO
TOHAWKBIT, AS A WAY OF DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THE
COURSE OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION. D. IF THE STATION
IS TO BE RESPONSBIBLE FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.
WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING SO INFORMED. E2 IMPDET..
brothe
HYL
15
mil s
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OMF
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TO:
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FILE
DATE-TIME GROUP
181733Z
2
OCI
спе
DIRECTOR
EUR 6 INFO: CliplAN, 0, Droloo,
C/PS/EG2, P/CLC, plics.
c/cilor 3,
°
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OF
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MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
INDEX
708791
NO INDEX
RETURN TO
0 IP FILES
LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS INFO OSLO, HELSINKI. Y
RYBATY
REF:
DIRECTOR 707518 (NOT NEEDED OSLO, HELSINKI
WEN
0th
DISSEM BY:
PER
1. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY
JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.}
2.
SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS
HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED
OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES.
TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS (1 DAY} AND BONN (2 DAYS}. NO DECISION
DIRECTLY FROM)
CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR
YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED VIENNA.Y
3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS
TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES
AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING
SPECIFICS. Y
4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
:
OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER
THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2
CL BY:
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#
AIRCRAFT.Y
5. FOR LONDON.
MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY
SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT.- SENATOR MONDALE HAS
ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (AND PROBABLY MI-6}
ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND
AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE
NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR.Y
6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT
GERMAN EMBASSY AND THE BND XY)
CONTACT WITH THE
7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN
VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND
HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN
THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO.COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND
MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY. IN PARIS
THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. Y
8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT.
TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT
YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET.H
DATE: 17 JUNE 1975
WILLIAM W. WELLS
ORIG:
UNIT:
C/EUR
EXT:
101 W. Well
WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
E.H. KNOCHE
COORDINATING OFFICERS
Ettheoche
JOHN WALLER, SA/DDO
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
IMPDET
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
CL BY:
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13-00000
:
SECRET
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
DATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100
Room 2E-45
SUBJECT:
Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with
Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's
staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed
Trip to Europe
1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary,
while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:
a. 30 June
-
1 July: London
b.
Monday, 7 June:
Vienna, for one day
C.
Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been
determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the
Paris stop, one day.
In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit
Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however,
has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need
Station contact.
2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the
party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to
discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations
with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions,
etc. Their basic interests are related to "command and control".
It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a
Station which concentrates on "East West" operations (read third
country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized London was a
liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer.
-
SECRET
E2 IMPDET
CL BY 055636
13-00000
SECRET
- 2 -
Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world"
operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the inter-
relations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.
3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon
of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in
London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices
in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control".
Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act
works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron
stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but
promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to
work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know, than to involve
the Agency's go-between.
4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German
Embassy.
--
5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign
governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could
adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason,
we did not favor involving foreign governments at whatever
level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with
foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose
of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned
that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.
6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences
or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was
connected with Select Committee investigations.
7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with
Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He
also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence
services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference
to "Naval Intelligence".
8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still
tentative and subject to change.
SECRET
13-00000
SECRET
- 3 -
9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft
in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal.
Mr. Waller replied negatively.
10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader
would be a member of the Senator's party.
Distribution:
1
-
· Mr.
Knoche
1
- Mr. Wells
1
-
Miss Page
1
-
- Mr. Leader
"
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3
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IN 608574
TORI160921Z JUN 75
VIEN
26077
SECRET 166853Z JUN 75 STAFF
CITE VIENNA 26877
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT
REF: DIRECTOR 797518
1.
Д
OHB
งา
ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE
ON STATION'S POSITION WITHIN EMBASSY, PRIMARY TARGETS,
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF
COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL
COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF.
2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF
AIDE,
MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF
SAEM NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE
SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENNANT COMMANDER.
3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.
SECRET
13-00000
པ་་་་
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TOO
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DATE-TIME GROUP
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7
ទ
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OF
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1
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
707518
DISSEM BY:
38
141651Z
DIRECTOR.
0
INDEX
CONF: C/EUR 6
INFO: FILE DCI, D/DCI, (DDO) CS/RF, OLC
C/IP/AN, DDO/D0, c/c1/083, clOPS, C/LSN/ID.
C/PS/EG2,
0
NO INDEX
0
RETURN TO
PER
IP FRES
TO:
PRIORITY LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS.Y
RYBAT Y
SUBJECT:
THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE
AT THE END OF THE MONTH. Y
1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY. WISHES TO VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS
TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR
MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY.
PRESUMABLY
THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS.4.
:
2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL
AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE
'
ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTI-
GATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER,
MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. Y
3.
REQUEST OF
HEADQUARTERS WILL SUGGEST TO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE
OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR
YET"
HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT KNOW,
HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE.Y
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2
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INPO:
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707518
MEGBAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
INDEX
.NO INDEX
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PER
☐ IP FILES
YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S
INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT.
PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON
ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER CIA CHANNELS OR THE ROGER CHANNEL.
LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR
MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. Y
5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART
“30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, ARRIVING LONDON 1 JULY: 2 JULY
VIENNA; 3-4 JULY - BONN: 5-6 JULY
9 JULY
b.
RETURN TO THE U.S. Y
PARIS; 7-8 JULY
-
LONDON:
REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR
BRIEFING THE SENATOR. Y
7. FOR BONN. SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT TO WESTPORT. Y
8.
HEADQUARTERS. WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE
:
B
AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDETH
9. MORE specific guiDANCE ON operational discussions to
Follow.
E.H. KNOCHE-
LC-
Exfuache
Rosschen
DATE: 13 JUNE 1975
ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS1
UNIT: C/EUR
EXT: 1012
WELLS?
us coll
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION
SA/DDO
f
COORDINATING OFFICERS
William E
DDO
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
CL BY:
IMPDET
: 012866
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad
There have been already and there will continue to
be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
following specific guidelines are considered important:
Members of the SSC and members of its staff
should not publicly appear to be abroad for
purposes of investigating CIA installations.
CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
some form of cover, have and need varying
degrees of protection from exposure. At
one extreme are Stations behind the iron
curtain or in other particularly sensitive
areas which need maximum protection. At
the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
close liaison with the host government and
are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
Stations existing under strict cover conditions
in sensitive environments, the very presence of
SSC members could be highly provocative by
flaunting the fact of CIA's presence.
even in countries in which we enjoy a good
liaison with the host country's security
service, there remains a need to be discreet.
Many countries whose services want to be
cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
investigation abroad would in almost all
cases be distastefull to a host government.
But
SECRET
13-00000
2
SECRET
In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged
for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
with senior officers within the covering Embassy
provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
Station contacts on a discreet basis.
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
question Station personnel on specific operational
detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the
place where operational details are conveyed to
the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
lines are best understood, where the most complete
and authentic records are kept (many Stations
finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
have periodically destroyed their files). There
is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
not discuss operations in general terms opera-
tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
operational environment, relationships with the
Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
--
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
personnel frequently are under hostile or
local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
in touch with SSC members would be to run an
unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
could be done to agent morale and motivation
if they were to think their role had been
revealed to members of Congress.
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
in most cases be in contact with members of
host country's intelligence or security services.
Many services will find contact with the SSC
politically difficult and will avoid it. They
further regard that their relationships with CIA,
the information they pass us and the sort of
cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
SECRET
13-00000
こ
SEURE!
3 -
No matter what assurances are given them,
they would find it difficult and awkward to
discuss these matters with the SSC or its
staff, and the very fact that such matters
were under investigation could well cause
them to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
perhaps be made in special cases.
Members of the SSC and their staff should
not visit foreign technical intelligence
installations. Again there may be exceptions
to this which can be arranged, but in most
countries in which we operate joint technical
collection sites, the host service would be
opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
SEGRET

13-00000
SUBJECT:
Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad
There have been already and there will continue to
be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
following specific guidelines are considered important:
Members of the SSC and members of its staff
should not publicly appear to be abroad for
purposes of investigating CIA installations.
CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
some form of cover, have and need varying
degrees of protection from exposure. At
one extreme are Stations behind the iron
curtain or in other particularly sensitive
areas which need maximum protection. At
the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
close liaison with the host government and
are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
Stations existing under strict cover conditions
in sensitive environments, the very presence of
SSC members could be highly provocative by
flaunting the fact of CIA's presence.
even in countries in which we enjoy a good
liaison with the host country's security
service, there remains a need to be discreet.
Many countries whose services want to be
cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
investigation abroad would in almost all
cases be distastefull to a host government.
But
13-00000
2 -
In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged
for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
with senior officers within the covering Embassy
provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
Station contacts on a discreet basis.
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
question Station personnel on specific operational
detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the
place where operational details are conveyed to
the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
lines are best understood, where the most complete
and authentic records are kept (many Stations
finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
have periodically destroyed their files). There
is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
not discuss operations in general terms opera-
tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
operational environment, relationships with the
Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
--
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
personnel frequently are under hostile or
local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
in touch with SSC members would be to run an
unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
could be done to agent morale and motivation
if they were to think their role had been
revealed to members of Congress.
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
in most cases be in contact with members of
host country's intelligence or security services.
Many services will find contact with the SSC
politically difficult and will avoid it. They
further regard that their relationships with CIA,
the information they pass us and the sort of
cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
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- 3-
No matter what assurances are given them,
they would find it difficult and awkward to
discuss these matters with the SSC or its
staff, and the very fact that such matters
were under investigation could well cause
them to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
perhaps be made in special cases.
Members of the SSC and their staff should
not visit foreign technical intelligence
installations. Again there may be exceptions
to this which can be arranged, but in most
countries in which we operate joint technical
collection sites, the host service would be
opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
2
13-00000
6/18/75
SUBJECT:
Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad
There have been already and there will continue to be members
of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and
talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that
we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems.
The following specific guidelines are applicable.
I.
MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR
TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE
INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.
Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for
example) are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low
profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection
from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities:
behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection.
The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence
of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those
countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and
other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government,
care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions
13-00000
that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure
of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the
United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public
exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business
should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to
help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact
should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC
matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the
press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad
would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.
In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet
arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence
activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers
within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the
SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business.
at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a
basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.
II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE
OF THE VISIT..
All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his
knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.
13-00000
3.
III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.
It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational
details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will
only discuss operations in general terms
--
operational priorities,
•
the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment,
relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all
cases,
such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings.
which meet appropriate security standards.
Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to
see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the
U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the
host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally,
and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.
IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT
PERSONNEL.
Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service
scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be
13-00000
to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be
done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be
revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.
V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY
SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.
Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC
politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their
relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they
pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters.
Regardless, what assurances are given them, they would find it
difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or
staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation
✓
could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.
VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.
In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites,
the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional
:
representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the
Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered
13-00000
5
essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country
in advance.
VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS
AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives
of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as
appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the
visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the
restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and
the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details,
names and terms in an overseas environment.
* Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that
they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition
intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff:
members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly
travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.
13-00000
SECRET
SUBJECT:
Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad
B
There have been already and there will continue to
be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
following specific guidelines are considered important:
Members of the SSC and members of its staff
should not publicly appear to be abroad for
purposes of investigating CIA installations.
CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
some form of cover, have and need varying
degrees of protection from exposure. At
one extreme are Stations behind the iron
curtain or in other particularly sensitive
areas which need maximum protection. At
the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
close liaison with the host government and
are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
Stations existing under strict cover conditions
in sensitive environments, the very presence of
SSC members could be highly provocative by
flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But
even in countries in which we enjoy a good
liaison with the host country's security
service, there remains a need to be discreet.
Many countries whose services want to be
cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
investigation abroad would in almost all
cases be distastefull to a host government.
SECRET
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تا
SECRET
- 2 -
F
In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged
for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
with senior officers within the covering Embassy
provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
Station contacts on a discreet basis.
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
question Station personnel on specific operational
detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the
place where operational details are conveyed to
the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
lines are best understood, where the most compl
plete
and authentic records are kept (many Stations
finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
have periodically destroyed their files). There
is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
not discuss operations in general terms opera-
tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
operational environment, relationships with the
Embassy, the service attaches, etc.
--
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
personnel frequently are under hostile or
local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
in touch with SSC members would be to run an
unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
could be done to agent morale and motivation
if they were to think their role had been
revealed to members of Congress.
Members of the SSC and their staff should not
in most cases be in contact with members of
host country's intelligence or security services.
Many services will find contact with the SSC
politically difficult and will avoid it. They
further regard that their relationships with CIA,
the information they pass us and the sort of
cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
SECRET

13-00000
SECRET
3 -
No matter what assurances are given them,
they would find it difficult and awkward to
discuss these matters with the SSC or its
staff, and the very fact that such matters
were under investigation could well cause
them to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
perhaps be made in special cases.
Members of the SSC and their staff should
not visit foreign technical intelligence
installations. Again there may be exceptions
to this which can be arranged, but in most
countries in which we operate joint technical
collection sites, the host service would be
opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
SEGRET