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with a limited number of people. We believe the direction of the
station is of high caliber, but not all the station effort is
carefully directed at priority targets. Under current personnel
ceilings, there is little hope of increasing the manpower avail-
able for this critical effort. Thus, both Headquarters and the
station must carefully place emphasis on assignment of priorities
and upon selective execution of the activities to meet those
priorities.
Organization for Operations
5. The Mexico City Station approaches the classic type station
in opportunities and in operations. It has high-level liaison
operations, unilateral operations, joint operations with the host
government, and Soviet, Satellite, Cuban, and indigenous Communist
Party operations. It has local collaborative liaison with other
U.S. agencies: the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the military.
To accomplish this wide range of tasks, the station is organized
into the Soviet Branch, Cuban Branch, Satellite Branch, Covert
Action Branch, Communist Party Branch, and an operational catch-all
which is called the "Operational Support Branch." This latter
branch is headed by a senior operations officer who has two assist-
ants, but the branch in reality is an extension of the chief of
station's personal clandestine capabilities, giving force and
effect to that facet of the chief of station's personality as an
operator. The deputy chief of station, in addition to his admin-
istrative duties, also personally handles the operations of three
projects.
Cuban Operations
6. Mexico City is the only direct air link which Cuba has
with the Western Hemisphere. It is the major transit point for
all air travel to and from Cuba. Approximately 150 persons per
week travel each way to and from Havana via Mexico City. This
fact plays a prime role in shaping the station's operational activi-
ties. For example, over 10]per cent of the station's FI reporting
on Cuban activities in the past year dealt with travel, both Cuban
and non-Cuban, between Mexico City and Havana.
The station has no agents reporting from in place in Cuba.
Two operations have had problems in loss of communications, but
have some promise of future success. One egent, a Cuban refugee
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now working in Mexico City, had recruited three sub-agents before
leaving Cuba but his charmel of communications with then has been
severed. Another station agent is in a good position in Cuba to
obtain intelligence from foreign telephone communications. The
station vill attempt to re -establish contact with hin through
legal traveler to Cuba. The station has · muber of sources with
access to Cubs in third country nationals who are debriefed each
time they return to Mexico City from Cuba. Best of these is a
Western European
the source of some 15 disseminated intelli-
gence reports last year. He travels to Cuba four or five times a
and is contacted by a station officer after each visit.
cration, presently under development, is aimed at exploiting
presence of a religious order. Å recruited agent will be in
high levels of the Mission. It is expected that the Mission
will have secure commmications facilities as is the case in other
countries. Primary control, however, will be maintained by Mexico
City Station through contact with the agent each time he travels
to Mexico City fro
9. A major objective of station operations is the recruit-
ment of personnel in the Cuban Rubasay. There are about 20 Cubans
on the embassy staff of when six are believed to be members of the 24.
Gaban Intelligence Service94/As with operations directed against
the Soviet Embensy, [þes Hliance is placed upon surveillance
through telephons, photo, physical, and madio operations as well
as on access agents. The effort has bem rezurded with some suc-
cess(albeit limited, the official has been recruited, but his
generally low due to lack of access to information of
reluctance to accept operational assign- 24
tance and
Mexi woman cumloyee in the embassy is also a station
but she
congs to elassified documents and provides
mly meager inf
ment pitch to another officer
unsuccessful and
bsequently recalled to Cube]] Through
Station efforts "hot mike" successfully placed in a key office.
Unfortunately, the target officer moved, and his old office is now
being occupied by an officer of lesser potential, who is the super-
visor of the recruited officers] This audio device is at the moment
of little value except to provide an excellent check of the agent's] 08
activities..
10. As might be expected, Maxico City has Constant
of refugees from Cuba, estimated at about 350 per month.
Through
an American contract agent the station runs the Cuban Refugee Re-
ception and Orientation Center which screens refugees for possible.
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operational leads and debriefs those with information of intelli-
gence value. Heretofore this project has suffered from lack of
adequate 
facilities and trained personnel. Only 29 positive in-
telligence 
reports were disseminated by Headquarters during the
past year. It is plumed to correct these deficiencies and expand
capabilities 
to the end that the intelligence product will be in-
proved and 
the operational leads increased. An experienced officer
from the JISAVE 
refugee center has been detailed to the station to
in training
nal there.
11. The station's Cuban case officers must devote a subi
tial effort to responding to requests for support from other
stations, chiefiz JIHAVE, with involvement in Cuban operations.
.24 Approximately 47 per cent of the station's cable traffic is con-
cerned with Cuben operations. This volume alone in testimony to
the relative effort which must be devoted to the support of Cuban
operations originating in other CIA stations. The Cuban case
officers in Mexico City feel that the requirements to¨keep abreast
of day 
to day activities and to handle the volume of paper left
insufficient 
time for planning and development of an effective
tation 
operational. Fr
12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy,
and the results, while limited, are as satisfactory as may be ex-
pected in 
view of the target. Given Mexico City's Strategic loca-
tion astride 
the only direct air link to Cubs, more success should
be achieved 
in(recruiting agents in place in Caba. This target
has been assigned as Priority 1 to many Latin Américan countries
and, if 
it is to be achieved at all, it is logical to expect that
it will 
be done in Mexico City.] To the extent possible, the Cuban
"
case officers 
should be freed from the excessive support to other
stations so they can comenutrate on this target. The Chief, WH
Division, should direct other stations to carefully screen Cuban
requirements on Mexico City, with a view toward reduction of such
requirements.
It is recommended
The Chief, WH Division:
Instruct the Chief of Station, Mexico City,
to concentrate Cuban case officer efforts on develop-
ing agent assets resident in Cuba; and,
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evidence that the ambassador would strongly object to Agency support
for II& propagands activities. In addition, of a total anmal
budget of $16,000, $6,000 goes for the salary of a U.8. businessman
cutout (LIHUFF-1) while $6,000 goes to the support of H3RO and
$4,000 to support other activities of the IIHE. This is un incrdi.
nately high sun for the services of a cutout in proportion to the
total cost of the proposed project. These points, taken together,
constitute a valid basis for terminating operations in connection
th
It is recommended that:
The Chief, WH Fivision, disapprove proposal
of Chief of Station, Mexico, for Project LIFT and
direct him to terminste operations in ecumection
therewith.
18. The station has a highly successful project directed at
the rural and peasant targets. The principal agent is a Catholic
priest through whose efforts an extensive network of regional organi
sations have been established including youth groups, credit unions,
agricultural co-ops and peasant unions. Soms 26 regional centers of
the Mexican Institute for Social Studies, a project mechanism, have
been set up and 12,000 people vere enrolled in special training
courves during the year. This operation is now largely self-sufficient
but the station should contime to give it sumpert and direction.
The project shown promise of expending into Guatemala where the
Archbishop of Cantemia has asked for assistance and training
set up a similar organisation. In view of the present lack of
Agency-sponsored peasant projects in Guatemals, every effort should
be made to exploit this possibility.
It is recommended that:
The Chief, WH Division, expand Project LIHOODLE
to include assistance in establishing a similar
covert action project targeted on pensent grou
Soviet Operations
Ho. T1
19. Mexico is one of the four Latin American countries which
maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union thereby per-
mitting the establishment of diplomatic installations in these
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countries. Because of the relative ineffectiveness of the Mexican
police and 
security services, Soviet sctivities in Mexico are not
subjected to 
the same scrutiny as they are in the U.S by the FBI
and in Canada 
by the Royal Canadian Pounted Police. Soviet person-
nel in Mexico thus have a 
freedom of movement which facilitates the
conduct 
of clandestine operations targeted not only against the U.8.
but also against 
other Latin American countries where there is no
Bovist official 
presence. In addition, Mexico's long border with
the U.S. has 
only minimm guards. Treval between the U.B. and
Mexico is 
heavy and clandestine border crossing can be relstivaly
simple. The 
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, therefore, essummas more
than the usual interent 
normally attached to similar Soviet in-
stallations 
as targets for U.S. intelligence.
20. Soviet operations conducted by the station are directed
24 primarily at the personnal of the embassy. At the present time,
there are fifty-one 
officers attached to the embassy of whom thirty-
24 
three] 
have been identified as members of either the HUB or the CRU.
It may be assumed that 
dependents and nonintelligence persoanel,
by performing 
various support functions, mell the total of those
engaged in 
intelligence assignments. In its operations against the
Soviets, the station 
is heavily dependent upon technical collec.
tion through 
telephone taps, photographie coverage of the embassy,
physical 
surveillance, and hidden microphones. These operations
24 
produce masses 
of information/ently on the activities of the Soviet 24
personnel, such 
as telephone conversations with persons outside the
embassy, [
Complete] photographic records of the ecuing and going of
24 [Ell persons-Soviet and non-Soviet--at the embassy, contents of
embassy personnel outside the 
embassy, etc. Because of the strict
security 
indoctrination of Soviet oversees personnel, the bulk of
this 
information[is low-level and not dissexinable positive in.
24 telligence. Its chief value, aside from occasional items of intelli- 24
gance interest or operational import, 
derives from its commilation 24
in depth to reveal 
patterdal of activities and contactà, indicative
of intelligence 
missions of associations, and to disclose behaviorial
characteristics of 
individual Soviets which might be symptomatic
of 
a 
vulnerability to recruitment.]
and dad,
gained
entified Borist officers in the
"into their modus operandi in
executing intelligence antigrements. This in itself is of value
from a ectunterintelligence point of view even though exploitation
against Soviets 
has been limited. Also, by collating the mes of
collected 
data into personality reports on persons attached to the
mbassy, the 
station hopes to be able to detect, foster, and even-
tually 
exploit any vulnerability to recruitment or detection--the
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ber one priority of Soviet operations here
the world.
elsewhere in
21. The station is seeking to supplement its collection
through technical mens with a progrm to acquire at least one
ess agent for each member of the Soviet Embassy staff. T
as agents serve two purposes: first, they provide addi-
nal information on the activities and personalities of tho
ith whom they are in contact; and escond, they afford a cha
for "getting at” a Soviet individual should it be found advantageous
to bring some sort of recruitment pressure to bear on him. Con-
sideration is now being given by the station to expanding the
effort to recruit Mexican nationals who are kneam, through tech-
nical collection sources, to have been in touch with the Soviets
on intelligence missions and to work through then to develop in-
formation on Soviet clandestine activities. Additional case officer
strength will be needed if this approach is to be effective.
The station currently has six double-egent operations.
Like most such cases they move alovly. chief purpose in
running these operations is to direct the agents into the U.S.
where, in cooperation with the FBI, they might be used to identify
Soviet illegals. Three of these double agents have all received
intelligence assignments from the Soviets of em as yet undefined
nature in the U.S. Anoth appears destined for some Soviet
sigment in the Philigaines. Since the Soviets have no official
representation in the Philippines, it is hoped that this agent
be put in touch with illegals. Still another is considered
poer double agent operation by the station, but shows somm
promise of developing into a penetration of the Mexican Foreign
Ministry. The sixth is rated very low as a station operation,
and is being contimed only at the specific request of the U.§.
The station's technical collection assets provide useful
moms for checking these double agents in their contacts with
Lets.
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23. To evaluate prope
Soviet operations at Nexico.
City, which rely heavily on expensive technical collection devices)
would involve a nie onbesement of the whole concept of Soviet
operations, which is beyond the scope of this report. Despite the
exploitation of material collected by technical-sean] for/over ten
years at the station, the primary objective of recruiting a Soviet
24 national has not been achieved. Although the station's knowledge
of Soviet intelligence activities centered about the Embassy in ]
Mexico City has been greatly fidened, it has led to little positive
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[action to counter these activities) as they might affect U.S.
Interests. While all the 8.8.8.R. diplomatic missions are targets
of vital importance for U.8. intelligence, the Soviet Embassy in
Mexico City has special significance becmise of its proximity to
the U.S. The Mexico City Station has attacked this target with
determination and imgination. The Chief, SR Division, and his
principal officers hump commended highly the Soviet operations in
Mexico City Station. The failure
testimony
&e fur to achieve
of esourcefulnes
new methods,
until
success are developed, the
24
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ed at the present level.
24
Probably the most significant contribution which the
station's operations minst the Soviets in Mexico City has made 08
to the U.S. security has been peripheral to the Agency's mission
embassy has long
cans who went for one reason
magnet for disaffected Ameri-
nother to establish contact with
the Bovists. Through its technical] coverage
the station has been able
to thwart a mumber of such
the Soviet Embassy, 24
and, through ubsequent sation,
several of whom might have
done untold damme to U.S. interests had they not been apprehended. 24
In this respect, the station works closely with the FBI. The
Warren Commission's report on the assassination of President
Kennedy made reference to information collected by station
in connection with Orvald's activities in Maxico City.
98
The Batellite Branch, which is staffed by ES Division
parscanol, has been diverting mich of its recent time from its EE
sts to Commist-Chinese presence in Mexico City. Although
is no official government representation by the Peking regine,
New China Keve Agency (ICHA) has several people in Mexico City.
least three of these individuals have been identified as CHICON
lligence officers. Project HTPESO is an audio operation against
ree rooms of their offices, and their telephone lines tapped
ler the LIFEAT Project. Some of their unil has been examined
through the LIKAYAK Project. The row results of these operations
been forwarded back to Headquarters. The Mexico City Station
no capability for the translation of the material. As of the
time of the inspection, the station had heard nothing from Headquarter
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responsible to control from the female operations officer who has
recently been transferred to LILIK control. It is possible That
this operation will be transferred to covert action project,
where some improvement is expected.
j
41. The station has a unilateral physical surveillance team,
five of whom have been on the team for more than three years.
Only one case of trouble has shown up in this project. One agent
terminated because he talked too much and tried to black-
Gate officer. The use of the polygraph has been mont
control of this team, which has been generally-
Technical Operations
The station is heavily committed in technical field
with a large audio operation (run joi
Jointly with the Mexican Govern- 24
ment (LIKNVOY), as well as a unilateral audio operation (LIFEAT), 24
The station has been imaginative in approaches to problems and
villing to examine and experiment with the unsual. in example of
this is the communications link between the station and the princi- 24
pal agent of LILANK, which will be discussed later.
43. The LIENVOY operation, previously mentioned in connection
with Soviet operations, resulted from an approach six years ago 24
from President Lopes Mateos] After considerable discussions, the
operation was approved, providing the Mexican Government would in- 29, 24
cinde Soviet and Satellite targets, and such other communist targets
as were obvious to the Mexican Government to be of concern to the 29
United States. This project is manned by elected Mexican Army 24
personnel, who are carefully screened and paid high incentive wages,
08 reducing their vulnerability to bribery. Other privileges add to
The high esprit de corps essential to such an operation. The unit
is managed by a career agent who transmits the take regularly to
the station by clandestine means. This project has been fruitful
in intelligence reports and has been of value in operational leads
and in CE/C information. The project also has a visual surveil-
Lance and a photo-surveillance capability. It was this project
which provided data on the actions of Lee Harvey Oswald in his
famous visit to Naxico City.
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Obviously, the station cannot be content to have the
Mexican Government knowledgeable of all its anti-communist opera-
tions. Therefore, the station has continued its unilateral audio
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RETURN TO GIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
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Exclude routine travel information and CI/CE
information from DCS and C3 reports; and,
d. Use the cable channel only for reports that
perishable or are of special intelligence interest.
Organisation for Administration
56. As in his direction of operations, the chief of station
maintaine close personal hold upon the administrative life of
his station Such delegation as he makes does not include the
granting of
anthority to a subordinate. For example, although
the deputy has been delegated authority over Registry, which
will be discuss in detail later, in reality the chief contimes
daily activities which have a marked effect on the Registry.
station has a small, hard-working support section, handling fin
cial and property matters, and the usual fine communications
section.
57. Morale and health were generally good, although for
city as modern as Mexico there is an unusual amount of abdominal
disorder known in Mexico City as "Montezuma's Revenge.” The
embassy furnishes adequate medicines, and medicines are grailable
on the open market, although not always to be trusted. One inci-
dent was recently uncovered in which sulfur was capsuled and sold
an antibiotic. Medical facilities have recently been improved
by the opening of a new hospital which meets United States standards.
Physicians and surgeons are well trained and quite competent.
Insofar as social life is concerned, morals in the station vas
excellent. Mexico City offers some of the finest social activities
in the world, from honkywbank to ra. There is local television,
radio, and a great interest in is. There is a great deal of
outdoor activity avail
imming, temis, golf, exploration
of ruins, and vast city parks. Some sporte activities are compara-
tively expensiv
berch in country clubs is prohibitive ex-
cept for person
96. One of the ncipal administrative problems fasing the
Chief of Station, Mexico City, his Registry. The Registry
handles the station files which are more complete than in any
other station in the WK Division. There are more than 9,000 per-
sonality files and a vast accumilation of 3×5 card files (mostly
biographic) which contime to increase at the rate of 23 linear
inches per month. The station's present level of activity pre-
cludes any reduction in the card index file, but aperture cards
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are assisting in some reduction of the personality files. The
Registry also handles the pouching. This task is also the largest
in the WH Division, particularly in lateral pouching. On one occa-
sion, at Headquarters' request, Mexico City handled the lateral
pouching to 35 stations and bases of one document.
The problems of the Registry are compounded by the lack o
of training provided personnel assigned to the Registry. Person-
nel problems in the Registry are many and diversified. First of
all, with the limited mumber of personnel and the great burden of
work, , a large amount of overtime has been required. Secondly, it
has been difficult to get people to accept an assignment to the
Mexico City Registry because the tasks are dull, tedious, and infi-
nitely demanding of the individuals' time. The morale in this
section was poor. We made several recommendations to the chief of
station pointing out to him a conscientious effort must be made by
all members of the station to reduce the workload in the Registry.
In this connection, we suggested that individual case officers ac-
cept the responsibility for periodic cleaning of files which they
used, and of which they have the most intimate knowledge. We
further recommended that maximm discrimination be used in determin-
ing material which should be filed and that wherever possible the
sheer bulk of the filing be reduced. We further recommended that
overtime be made voluntarily whenever possible, but that in any
event personnel be provided with a full weekend off from time to
time.
60. The chief of the Registry is the only senior person as-
signed to the Registry and has no deputy or other person competent
to take his place during his temporary absence. The chief at the
time of our inspection had taken very little time off, including
weekends in the two years of his tour. We feel that one of the
positions in the Registry should be re-evaluated for possible upgrad-
ing to includes the duties of deputy chief of Registry.
It is recommended thatı
The Chief, WH Division, request the Director of
Personnel to conduct a review of the function of
Deputy Chief, Registry, Mexico City Station, to deter-
mine whether or not such a position should be estab-
lished in an appropriate grade.
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61. We found the Registry to be a controversial matter between
Headquartere and the chief of station. The newly assigned deputy
chief of station, whe primarily had supervisory responsibility over
the chief of Registry, was making a determined effort to reduce the
workload in the Registry and to seek means of relying upon Read-
quarters' files rather than station files. We vere told that on
several occasions, Headquarters had reached the point of demanding
that Mexico City reduce its Registry to a size comparable other
stations. Each time such a decision was reached, there would be
concurrent flap which would prove the value of Mexico City's
ability to instantly retrieve information from their files. One
of the most noteworthy of such flaps took place in November 1963,
when Mexico City's files brought forth detailed information
Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet Rabassies in
Mexico City.
not
Raxico City's operseil
particularly ite
technical operations ALENVOI and LIFEAT produce [voluminous files] 24
Until some system is devised for this [information to be quickly 24
24 digested and retrieved in Headquarters, we believe that there is
no alternative to the present system Mexico City is employing.
However, we believe that a determined effort must be in Headquarters
for processing and retrieval of such information.
24
The Chief, WH Division, in collaboration with the
Chief, Records Integration Division, device a system
for reducing the volume of files held in Neries City,
while maintaining a capability for rapid retrieval
from Headquarters of information essential to present
and future operations in Mexico.
b. 19
63. Mexico City is one of the great metropolises of the world
and the booming economy of Mexico is reflected in its housing. It
is difficult to find housing which compares exactly with United
States housing because the Spanish tradition of servants' quarters,
rge space, and grand entertainment are a basic way of life.
However, in such a great city, there is naturally a large selection
housing within this limitation. There are good apartments, but
ich apartments usually are more expensive than allowances will
permit for single occupancy. Housing for officers and families is
generally quite good, not plentiful, but with prudent selection,
adequate housing can be found within reasonable range of the
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