12.00000
104-10333-10014
ASSINATION
REVIEW
RECO
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
OARD
Department of Defense
1600 Defense Pentagon
June 9, 1997
Stewart F. Aly
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT Colonel James R. Moore, Jr., U.S.A.
Associate Deputy General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
Washington, DC 20301-1600
Re:
Information Management Officer,
DCSPER (DAPA-ZXI)
300 Army Pentagon, Room 2D749
Washington, DC 20310-0300
Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Joseph Califano's Army
Papers under the JFK Act
Gentlemen:
The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to
declassify six boxes of Army records from the files of Joseph Califano. The files date
principally from the period 1962-63, during which Mr. Califano served as Army General
Counsel and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The records had been
deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration, where they were
recently located. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities
related to Cuba, is attached hereto. We have identified what appears to us to be
equities of numerous military entities in the Califano papers as well as equities of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Information
Agency, and others.
Deadlines
Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of
September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the
records.' We have slated the Califano papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997
meeting. The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a
prompt and efficient review of the Califano papers.
JFK
ACT
LEAST
RELE
2
'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to
September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of
the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may
be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.
Board Members: John R. Tunheim, Chair Henry F. Graff Kermit L. Hall William L. Joyce - Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell
13-00000
Messrs. Aly and Moore
June 9, 1997
Page 2
Preliminary Review of Califano Papers
The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has
tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in
subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection;
second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is
little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the
information in other contexts; and third, the Califano papers contain equities of
numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral
process, would be very difficult and time-consuming.? Thus, the logistical problem in
declassifying the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number
of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason,
and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an
urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.
Proposal
In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an
alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found
effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of the Califano
papers. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23,
1997, where all agencies with equities in the Califano papers be concurrently present for
a declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own
equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other
agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort
greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with
each other and quickly to resolve questions.
Because the Califano papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6
meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all
agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make
determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Army and the
'Ms. Toni Bowie, of the Army Declassification Activity, spent three days
reviewing some of the records and making recommendations for referrals to other
agencies both within and outside of the military. Although Ms. Bowie worked
energetically for three days, it was our sense afterwards that, if we continue at the same
pace, the agencies with equities will likely not be able to complete their reviews before
the August deadline arrives.
13-00000
Messrs. Aly and Moore
June 9, 1997
Page 3
Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will
take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the
records while Army and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to
be present.
We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might
have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a
plan that will provide all agencies with equities in the Califano papers to have an
opportunity to review and declassify their equities.
I look forward to discussing this issue with you.
Sincerely,
H
T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel
Attachment
CC:
Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noring, State
Richard S. Werksman, USIA
William Leary, NSC
Carol Keeley, FBI
13-00000
JOSEPH CALIFANO PAPERS (6 boxes)
Identified by Steve Tilley at NARA, these 6 boxes of papers, almost exclusively from
1962-63, were either generated by, or addressed to Joseph Califano, who at this time
was Department of the Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary of
the Army. Most of the documents are short summaries of proposed policy positions, or
letters of transmittal, with voluminous appendices attached. Each of the 6 boxes
contains approximately 1500-2000 pages of material.
Representative Topics:
(1) ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs-the
"Cottrell Committee”) meetings on future U.S. policy toward Cuba. These
- documents are generally background papers prepared prior to meetings,
minutes of meetings, or follow-on discussion of action items assigned at
meetings of the ICCCA.
(2)
(3)
Contingency plans for Cuban invasion by the U.S. military in the event of
a Cuban uprising.
Psychological warfare against Cuba.
(4) Diplomatic initiatives intended to increase isolation of Cuba.
(6)
མྱི་རྒྱུ སྒྱུ ཏྱཾ 。 8
(5)
Biographies, and evaluations of Cuban exile leaders.
Intelligence reports and estimates on reported events inside Cuba.
(7) Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and
suggestions for possible future actions.
Apparent Equities:
Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities,
usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon staff review, it is estimated
that 80% of the documents have State equities, 60% Joint Staff or OSD, 60% NSC,
60% CIA, 15% Army, Navy or Air Force, perhaps 10% DIA, and a small
percentage of USIA, Justice, Treasury and FBI.
Horne e:\wp-docs\Califano.wpd
File: 4.0.4
13-00000
JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)
Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the
Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer,
Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962
and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical
understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe
may be relevant to the assassination.
Topics:
(1)
(2)
ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)
meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert
paramilitary operations against Cuba.
(3) Cuban coup planning.
.
(4) Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
(5)
OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).
(6)
U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.
Apparent Equities:
Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document-usually
State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared
to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration
with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified
documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB
staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;
upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.
Horne e:\wp-docs\Jointstaff.wpd
File: 4.0.4
13-00000
SSINATION
VIEW
RECORDS
BOAR
June 9, 1997
Stewart F. Aly
Associate Deputy General Counsel
Office of General Counsel
Department of Defense
1600 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1600
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457
QARAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
Mr. Edmund McBride.
Chief, Information Management
Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Staff
The Pentagon, Room 2B917
Washington, DC 20318-0400
Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Selected Papers of JCS
Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler, and Selected JCS Central Files
under the JFK Act
Gentlemen:
The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to
declassify approximately 147 records previously flagged by the Joint Staff from both the
JCS Central Files, and the papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler. The
files date principally from the period 1961-64. The records were flagged during
searches directed by Mr. Edmund McBride (Chief, Information Management Division,
Joint Staff) at the request of the ARRB staff. With one exception, ARRB staff feels that
all records flagged by Mr. McBride's working group are relevant to the historical
understanding or context of the assassination of President Kennedy. A description of
the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, or to Vietnam
policy, is attached hereto. We have identified what appear to us to be equities of
numerous military entities in these papers, as well as equities of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, and others.
Deadlines
Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board's current sunset date of
September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the
records. We have slated these papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting.
'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to
September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of
the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may
BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell
13-00000
Messrs. Aly and McBride
June 9, 1997
Page 2
The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt
and efficient review of these selected papers of Joint Chiefs Lemnitzer, Taylor, and
Wheeler, and the Joint Staff Central Files.²
Preliminary Review of Papers of JCS Chairmen and Joint Staff Central Files
:
The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has
tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in
subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection;
second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is
little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the
information in other contexts; and third, these papers contain equities of numerous
military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral process, would
be very difficult and time-consuming. Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the
records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that
will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short
time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to
make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.
Proposal
In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an
alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found
effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of these papers
of the three aforementioned JCS Chairmen and the JCS Central Files. We would like to
schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies
with equities in these JCS/Joint Staff papers be concurrently present for a
declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own
be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.
'The Joint Staff's Initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board, dated
February 6, 1997, identified in detail the process by which these records were located-
namely, which files were searched, and who participated in the searches. Mr. Edmund
McBride, Chief of the Joint Staff Information Management Division, indicated in this
statement that the Joint Staff was standing by to expeditiously process these records for
declassification in collaboration with other agencies when the ARRB was ready. ARRB
staff has only recently completed its initial review of these records, which constitute
selectively flagged folders within 40 boxes of JCS and Joint Staff records.
13-00000
Messrs. Aly and McBride
June 9, 1997
Page 3
equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other
agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort
greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with
each other and quickly to resolve questions.
Because these papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6 meeting,
we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies
with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make
determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Joint Staff and the
Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will
take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the
records while the Joint Staff and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military.
entities to be present.
We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might
have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a
plan that will provide all agencies with equities in these Joint Staff/JCS papers to have
an opportunity to review and declassify their equities.
I look forward to discussing this issue with you.
Sincerely,
T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel
Attachment
CC:
Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noring, State
William Leary, NSC
13-00000
JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)
st
Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the
Pentagon has reviewed 
40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer,
Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler 
for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962
and 1963
, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical
understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe
may be 
relevant to the assassination.
Topics:
(1)
ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)
meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert
paramilitary operations against Cuba.
Cuban coup planning.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).
U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.
Vietnam.coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
(6)
Apparent Equities:
Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document-usually
State, OSD and/
or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared
to 
expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration
with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified
documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB
staff on which of 
the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;
upon receipt 
of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.
Horne e:\wp-docs\Jointstaff.wpd
File: 4.0.4
13-00000
WED 17:08 FAX 202 724 0457
ARRB
SINATION
RECORDS
BOARD
MEMORANDUM
Via Facsimile
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 ▪ Fax: (202) 724–0457
July 2, 1997
TO:
Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG
FROM:
001
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
SUBJECT:
Doug Horne, Assassination Records Review Board
Declassification Session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS Records
1. The joint declassification session mentioned in our letters to the Army (re: the Joseph
Califano Papers) and to the Joint Secretariat (re: Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen
Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and selected JCS Central Files) of June 9, 1997 is
scheduled to take place during the four-day window Monday, July 21-Thursday, July
24, inclusive. The first session will commence at 9:00 A.M. Monday morning, July 21, at
the ARRB offices in room 207 of the Bicentennial Building, located at 600 E Street, NW
(at the corner of E Street NW and 6th Street).
2. Our offices are located equidistant from the following three Metro stations:
Archives/Navy Memorial (Yellow Line); Judiciary Square (Red Line); and Gallery Place
(Red Line). Parking Garages are located in the basement of the Bicentennial Building,
and also across the street from us in the basement of the ARRP building.
-
3. Please fax the names, SSNs, and clearance information for CIA attendees to Tracy
Shycoff on our staff at fax number (202) 724-0457 prior to close-of-business on
Wednesday, July 16, 1997. Please indicate on your visit request that the period of the
visit is through the end of calendar year 1997, since it is anticipated that our efforts to
expedite declassification of these documents will take more than one session to
accomplish.
4. We look forward to working cooperatively with all of our partners in this enterprise.
Board Members; John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall - William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

13-00000
Confidential
Memorandum For: David G Marwell
Executive Director
Subject:
18 July 1997
Assassination Records Review Board
CIA Reviewers
Clearance Certifications
1. The CIA review team for the joint declassification
session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS records
scheduled for July 21-24 is composed of the following
individuals:
Charles A. Briggs
SSN 161-22-9115
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG
Kathleen Puchnick
SSN 161-26-1452
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG
Richard D. Kovar
SSN 194-22-0138
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG
☐ Eileen M. Wukitch
SSN 178-36-7636
S/DO/IMS
(Mary V. Amoia
SSN 579-42-8195
IC/DO/IMS
William Perkins
IC/DO/IMS.
SSN 082-30-4664
2. The Agency reviewers listed above have the
appropriate clearances to review Joseph Califano's Army
Papers and the selected JCS records and files. Official
certification of the individuals' clearances will follow.
If you have any questions concerning clearances in my
absence, please contact Barbara Standley, 703-613-1806
CL BY:
611637
CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: COV 2-82
FAX:d by Barbara
AM- 31 July Sy
Confidential
J. Barry Harrelson
Project Officer,
CIA JFK Review
13-00000
1 08/05/87
TUE 17:24 FAX 202 724 0457
BINATION
ARRB
RECO
MEMORANDUM
Via Facsimile
August 5, 1997
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457
•
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
TO:
Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG
FROM:
Doug Horne, Assassination Records Review Board
Дми
SUBJECT:
Invitation to Next Declassification Session for Califano Papers and JCS
Records
1. I am writing to notify you that the next working session for joint declassification
review of subject records in accordance with the standards of the JFK Act is scheduled
for Tuesday, October 7 through Thursday, October 9, inclusive, in the ARRB conference
room in our second floor offices at 600 E Street, N.W.
2. Our goals for this second session are to complete joint review of the JCS papers, and
to open up for review two more boxes in the Califano collection. This session will also
allow selected agencies (which were not able to complete review of documents available
at the first session) an opportunity to catch up.
3. We see a need for representatives of the CIA to continue to attend these sessions
until they are completed.
4. Names and clearances need to be faxed to us only if the CIA attendees for this
October session are different from those clearances passed to ARRB in July. Our point-
of-contact and fax number for clearances is Tracy Shycoff, at (202) 724-0457.
5. For planning purposes, following this October session, our plans are to host one
session per month, of 2 to 3 days duration each time, until the declassification review of
the selected JCS papers and the Califano collection is completed. Agencies which
require more time are welcome to make individual appointments to review these
documents in-between the monthly, group sessions.
BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce •Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTON: David G. Marwell
001
13-00000
SSASS!
SINATION
REVIEW
RECORDS
BOARD
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 18, 1997
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457
NEWS RELEASE
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT
CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
(202) 724-0088, EXT. 253
JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RELEASES MILITARY
RECORDS RELATED TO U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64
The Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency overseeing
the identification, review, and release of records related to the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, today released approximately 1,500 pages of previously classified
military records from 1962-64 that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba.
"These documents further expand the historical record by illustrating the United States
government's deep interest in developing a policy that would force Castro from power
during the early 1960's," said Dr. Anna Nelson, a member of the Review Board. "We
now have a new window into the policy options toward Cuba that were being
considered and debated at the highest levels of the military services."
The mandate of the Review Board is to make the record surrounding the assassination
of President Kennedy as complete as possible. The Board has aggressively sought to
uncover records on U.S. foreign policy that put the assassination into its historical
context.
The Review Board worked cooperatively with representatives from the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to
locate records stored at NARA that met the definition of being "assassination related."
The documents are from the files at kennel Satisanonwho served as General Counsel to
the Secretary of the Army, the files of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor
and Wheeler, and the central files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The records have been transferred to NARA for inclusion in the JFK Collection, which is
housed at the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland. These documents are now
available to researchers.
Copies of selected documents are available from the Assassination Records Review
Board, 600 E Street, NW, Second Floor, Washington, DC 20530; telephone number: (202)
724-0088.
-more-
BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Samoluk
13-00000
2
The Assassination Records Review Board was established by the JFK Act, which was
signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were
appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and sworn in on April
11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify,
secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President
Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be
made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates.
The Review Board consists of the following members:
Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; U.S. District Court Judge, District of Minnesota.
Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University.
Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio
State University.
Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special
Collections at Princeton University.
Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American
University.
-30-
13-00000
RECORDS
BOARD
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457
ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD RECORDS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 18, 1997
CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
(202) 724-0088, EXT. 253
SELECTED DOCUMENTS FROM MILITARY RECORDS ON U.S. POLICY
TOWARD CUBA FROM 1962-64
Attached are six selected documents from approximately 1,500 pages of military
· records that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-64. The records are being
released today by the Assassination Records Review Board. Sections of the documents
that may be of particular interest to the reader are marked by arrows in the margin on
the right side of the relevant pages.
List of Selected Documents
1. Excerpts from 198-10004-10020
i
Note: The Record Information Form (document cover sheet) for the compilation of
documents in this group is dated 3/1/63, but the excerpted documents are from
February 1962.
"Possible Actions To Provoke, Harass, Or Disrupt Cuba"
2. Excerpts from 202-10002-10104
February 7, 1962, March 9, 1962, March 12, 1962, March 13, 1962, April 10, 1962
"Northwoods" documents
3. Excerpts from 202-10002-10018
May 1, 1963
"Courses of Action Related to Cuba"
4. Excerpts from 198-10004-10011
December 11, 1963
Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Secretary of the Army - "Training of
Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua"
5. Excerpts from 202-10002-10010
December 19, 1963
"Meeting with President on Cuba"
BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce •Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Samoluk
13-00000
6. Excerpts from 202-10002-10117
January 31, 1964
"A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba"
-30-
13-00000
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY: ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10020
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR: MULTIPLE
FROM:
TO :
Cuba Selected Documents
#1
TITLE :
DATE: 03/01/63
PAGES: 135
SUBJECTS: PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA
POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
ACTIONS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES
CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, CUBA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
BLOCKADE OF CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS: OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS: OPEN
TE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS
: Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 7. Package of proposed
actions 
to be used against Cuba, including operations
to apply 
pressure to the Cuban regime to oust Castro
and potential reaction to US involvement.
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED-
13-00000
SELDE
ULUMLI
1.
POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT
Operation SMASHER:
- CUBA-
a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and
commercial communications facilities in Cuba.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of
a "
special" vacuum 
tube into selected communications equipment. The tube,
which is available, is virtually 
undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is
due to the insertion of 
a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The
chemical, when 
heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor.
2.
Operation FREE RIDE:
a. Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension amongst
the 
Cuban people.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American
or 
KLM one-way airline 
tickets good for passage to Mexico City, Caracas,
etc. (none to the U.S.). Tickets 
could be intermixed with other leaflets
planned to be dropped. 
The number of tickets dropped could be increased.
The validity of the tickets 
would have to be restricted to a time period.
3.
Operation TURN ABOUT:
a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that
his 
value to the 
revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are
being made for his "removal".
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the
crecendo 
increasing until it 
culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism
or hardware.
:
Reproduction of this document in whole
with
or in part is prohibited
permission of the issuing office.
Special Handling of this paper is requested.
Access should be limited to individuals requiring
the information herein in order to onery out their
official duties.
Ind5/1
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_ of
Ī་
pages.
copys.
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TOP SEG
4. Operation DEFECTOR:
a. Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to
defect with equipment.
b. Concept: This activity when properly planned and implemented has the
effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate
reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also
creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished
by intelligence means and promise of rewards.
5. Operation BREAK-UP:
a. Objective: To clandestinely introduce corrosive materials to cause
aircraft, vehicle or boat accidents.
b. Concept: This activity, if possible should be aimed primarily toward the Sey
Soviet-provided aircraft. If properly accomplished it would degrade confidence
in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously
affect combat capability.
6.
Operation COVER-UP:
a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government of
Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely
a cover.
b. Concept: It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this should
be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation DIRTY TRICK.
7.
Operation DIRTY TRICK:
a. Objective: The objective is to provide irrevocable proof that, should
the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists
et al Cuba.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of
evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.
8.
Operation FULL-UP:
a. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the
Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated.
2
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SECKET
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b. Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological
agent into jet fuel storage facilities. This agent flourishes in jet fuel and
grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.
9.
Operation PHANTOM:
a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that
clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ capa-
bilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches
and air drops have been made in other areas.
10.
Operation BINGO:
a. Objective: The objective is to create an incident which has the appearance.
of an attack on U.S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for
use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.
b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the
confines of the Guantanamo Base. SNAKES simulate an actual fire-fight and
upon hearing such a sound it is entirely feasible that the immediate reaction
on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper
preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate planning the base
at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number to sustain itself
until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other.
It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following
would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat:
areas.
(1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo.
(2) Word flashed to the President..
(3) President orders counterattack to include:
Ind 5/3
(a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets are Cuban airfields.
(b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communi-
cation in Cuba.
(c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected
targets/landing areas.
(d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to
pre-selected targets.
(e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and
further interdict lines of communication.
:
(f) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields,
road/rail terminals, etc.
SECRET

13-00000
OLUHLT
(g) Resupply and replacement activities.
Properly executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a
matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months.
11. Operation GOOD TIMES:
a. Objective: To disillusion the Cuban population with Castro image by
distribution of fake photographic material.
-
b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such as an obese Castro
with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the
Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table briming over with the most
delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as
!!My ration is different. " Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and
´then distribute over the countryside by air drops or agents. This should put
even a Commie Dictator in the proper perspective with the underprivileged
masses.
12. Operation HEAT IS ON:
a. Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that
certain dyed-in-the-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus causing a
detrimental tightening of security.
b. Concept: It is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally
acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing
all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated
Castro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the
Castro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning
to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons. Security crackdown should
help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on
routine training activities.
4
Inel 5/4
BOP SECRET
UNCLASS
13-00000
LURET
OPERATION: Invisible Bomb
OBJECTIVE:
1. To create the impression that isolated bombings are taking place
in Cuba thus maximizing harrassment and confusion of the Castro govern-
ment.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:
2. The Air Force can utilize the operational characteristics of F-101
or other Century series aircraft to create the impression that anti-Castro
opposition is continuing. The aircraft operational characteristic to be
exploited is the "sonic-boom."
3. The "sonic-boom" can be employed in several different ways such
as an individual boom at selected spots or a continuous boom and performed
at either high or low altitudes. It will cause not only apprehension but
varying degrees of malicious damage as well, i. e. break all the windows
on a street in Havana.
4. The "sonic-hoom" effect can be maximized by planning missions
for execution during the early morning hours when the populace is sleeping.
The Cuban people are generally unfamiliar with this phenomenon, therefore
it is felt that the impact for a time would be most beneficial.
5.
The directional aspects of the "sonic-boom" also make it feasible
for use in simulating U.S. Naval gun-fire in the immediate vicinity of the
Cuban land mass.
6. This operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible
evidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort and
expense.
Special Handling of this paper is requested.
Access should be limited to individuals requiring
the information herein. in order to carry out their
official duties.
sproduction of this document in wholə
or in part is prohibited except with
permission of the issuing office.
Inch 6
This document consists of
Copy # 1 of 3
_
pages.
13-00000
Operation "HORN SWOGGLE"
Objective:
1. To crash or force down Cuban MIG aircraft with an all weather
intercept 
capability 
by communications intrusion.
Concept of Operations:
2. Closely monitor MIG air/ground communications for the purpose
of 
determining frequency and 
terminology usage for practice or real GCI
operations.
3. By use of overriding transmitters and either a decoy aircraft or
solid 
weather conditions, 
override Cuban controller and have Cuban refugee
pilot issue instructions which tun MIG out 
of fuel or towards Florida,
Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a 
carrier, etc.
UNCLASSIFIED
eproduction of this document in whole
or in part is prohibited except with
permission of the issuing office.
Ind 3
Special Handling of this paper is requested.
Access should be limited toiduals requiring
the information herein in cider in their
official duties.
pages
This document consists of
Copy # 1 of 3 copys.
13-00000
CHEALT
Operation TRUE BLUE
1. Objective: To degrade Castro and his government in the eyes of the
Cuban people by communications intrusion.
Concept of Operations:
2. By utilizing high powered transmitters in the vicinity of Cuba
(Florida, Inagwa, Jamaica, aboard Naval ship) which have the capability of
overriding commercial Cuban radio and TV stations, periodically degrade
Castro and other government figures in the minds of the Cuban people.
3. The technique of communications intrusion could be exploited by pre-
taping or live broadcasts of anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda at
station breaks, Castro speeches, etc. This idea envisions the use of a
Cuban refugee to make such broadcasts and naturally would require close
monitoring of stations to be worked. Any number of thoughts could be
injected such as:
a.
"Cuba Si, Russia No."
b. Communism exploits the masses.
C.
Communism is ruthless totalitarianism.
d. Castro and henchment feast off the land while we are rationed.
e.
Castro and his reign of terror.
f.
Castro is a lunatic and should be put away.
g.
Castro is the cause of all our troubles.
h. Rise up against the pig Castro, etc. etc.
4. If approved this operation could become a continuous project, perhaps
under control of USIA.
ENCLASSIFIED
Special Handling of this paper is requested.
Access should be limited to individuals requiring
the information herein in crat to carry it their
official duties.
production of this document in whole
r in part is prohibited oncept with
permission of the isaning office.
Jet 2
This document consists of
Copy #
pages.
✓ of 3 copys.
13-00000
DEPARTE
TY SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
2 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Subject: Ideas in Support of Project
The enclosed ideas are submitted for your consideration and
possible use in furtherance of the 
objectives of the Cuba
Project. I think some of them 
have promise and should you
desire our group to develop any of 
them in more detail, we
will do so.
6 encls
1.
2.
3.
Sinnz 6
4.
5.
W
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brigadier General USA
DOD Representative
Caribbean Survey Group
Operation Smasher(2Pages) (TS).
Operation 
True Blue(1Page) (TS),
Operation "Horn Swoggle" (1Page) (TS)
Operation "No 
Love Lost" (1Page). (TS)
Possible Actions 
to Provide,
disrupt (4Pages) (TS)
Harrass,
6. Operation Invisible Bomb (1Page) (TS)
or
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13-00000
Operation "NO LOVE LOST"
1. Objective: To confuse and harrass Castro Cuban Pilots by use of
radio conversations.
2. Concept of Operations: Fly Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft
in proximity of Cuba at periodic intervals while communication monitoring
Cuban air/ground frequencies utilized for airdrome control. Cuban refugee
pilot in sterile aircraft would personally know many of the pilots still flying
for Castro. Refugee pilot would get into argument with Castro pilots over
radio thus distracting confusing, etc. Would be real trouble for Castro
pilots in actual weather conditions. Argument could go, "I'll get you you.
Red son-of-a-gun," and call by name if appropriate.
Reproduction of this d whole
or in pars
permission of
.
gul H
Special Handling of this paper in requested.
Access should be lifted to
as requiring
the information herein in order to carry out their
official duties.
This document consists of
Copy # - of
FR395.
08055.
13-00000
OLGNET
།
I. Operation SMASHER.
1. Objective: Disrupt or disable military and commercial communications
facilities in Cuba.
2. Technical Requirements:
a.
Detailed information on both commercial and military communi-
cations facilities and capabilities, to include inside and outside plant
construction, system networks, equipment details (i. e. circuitry, tubes, etc.)
location and type of repeator stations. This information is required to
construct a refined device.
b. A vacuum tube modified in such a manner as to cause a short
circuit. This is possible by inducing silicon carbide (?) into the base of the
tube. When the tube becomes hot the silicon carbide liquifies and becomes
a conductor; when the tube coòls the matter returns to a solid non-conductive
Such a device (vacuum tube) is available.
state.
3. Targets:
a. Cuban Telephone Company. The company provides local and long
distance telephone service throughout Cuba and also international telephone
service.
b. Radio Corporation of Cuba Avenida Carlos. The company provides
radiotelephone service to American and European countries. It also provides
radiotelegraph service and includes leased teleprinter channels. In conjunc-
tion with AT&T the company inaugurated over-the-horizon microwave radio
service between Cuba and Florida in 1957. This latter made available two-way
TV channels.
C. Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Founded by
IT&T and AT&T, providing six (6) submarine cables linking Havana and Key
West. Facility operates in conjunction with microwave link.
d.
Commercial Radio and Television Stations.
e. Military Radio and Land-line Facilities. These include point-to-
point command and administrative systems, air/ground facilities, navigational
aids. Obviously certain commercial facilities provide service to the military
therefore disrupting or disabling commercial facilities will affect military
communications capabilities. Special Handling of this paper is requested.
production of this document in whole
r in part is prohibited except with
permission of the issuing office.
Ind 1/1
Access should be limited to individuals requiring
the information herein in order to carry out their
official duties.
This document consists of
Copy # 2 3
2
pages.
13-00000
.2
OLONET
4. Concept of Operation:
a. The tube must be introduced clandestinely into appropriate
equipments
.
b. Introduction can be accomplished through the use of known assets
either 
directly or by contact with an 
employee of a company who would have
access and who would receive proper 
remuneration.
Inch 1/2
:
13-00000
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
. RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Cuba Selected Documents
#2
ORIGINATOR: JCS
FROM:
TO :
TITLE : NORTHWOODS
DATE: 00/00/62
PAGES: 197
SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
UPRISINGS IN CUBA
COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
CARIBBEAN SECURITY
PATROL POSTS
INVASION OF CUBA
JUSTIFICATION FOR U: S. MILITARY INTERVENTION
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
ATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code
Name Northwoods, 
containing JCS Papers related to JCS
recommendation to invade 
Cuba and
US military intervention.
pretexts to justify
[R]
-
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
-
13-00000
JCS 1969/303
7 February 1962
Page 2144
UNCLASSIFIED
COPY NO.
1
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (s)
A report on the above subject is submitted for considera-
tion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat
SPOREN
EXCLUDED FROM GD3
JCS 1969/303
2144
UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000
TOP.
UNCLASSIFIED
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,
Chief of Operations, Cuba Project
Subject: Cuba Project:
Reference:
Memorandum from Your Office for
BrigGen W. H. Craig, USA, subj:
"Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62
1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of
the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake
and role in the removal of the Communist regime in Cuba, has
been determined based upon the following factors:
2. National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during
the routing of 9 May 1961.
b. Current intelligence estimates of the situation in
Cuba.
Operations against the Castro regime will be covert,
at least initially.
d. Time favors the Castro government.
2. The basis military implications of Castro's Communist
governmen are as follows:
a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly
serious threat to its security. This increases our national
vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed.
or shifted to meet this threat.
b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective
base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout
the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the
possibility that additional Latin American countries will
come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would
demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United
States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist
control of additional countries would or could result in:
SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NORFORN
LIMITED PISTIBORET
13-00000
--
HARDLINNE
wort
(1) Increased Communist capability for attack
other nations of the Western Hemisphere.
capability for UNCLASSIFIED
.
(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading
Communism throughout Latin America.
(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases,
training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources
of strategic materials necessary to our military
capability.
(4) An increased threat to US usage and control
of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage..
3. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist
government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly
increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the
Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the
hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if
courses of action within the capability of the Communists
are considered:
a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air
bases in Cuba.
b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of
ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could
furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the
nuclear warheads.
4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of
Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible
with the minimum security requirements of the Western
Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly
support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of
ousting the Communist regime and installing a government
acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of
Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is
recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without
precipitating general war, and without serious effect on
world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:
UNCLASSIFIED
2
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING
Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
13-00000
TOP
i
UNCLASSIFIED
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOFORN
LINTARD DISTRIBUTION
a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent,
humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the
United States is responding to an appeal for assistance from
a government
representative of the Cuban people.
it is announced incident to the overt military
action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are
moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding
free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon;
as the new government advises that they have the capability
to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS
nations.
0. If the military operation is conducted as quickly
as possible and with sufficient force to that the Communist
Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support
of the Castro regine is reduced to a manimum.
c. or if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against
US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon
which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable
portions of a, b, and c above apply.
5. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly
provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular
movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation,
personnel and bases.
UNCLASSIFIED
3
Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
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ww
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JCS 1969/321
12 March 1962
Page 2165
UNCLASSIFIED
COPY NO.
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
-
NORTHWOODS (S)
A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat
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2165
UNCLASSIFIED
T
13-00000
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 85, D.C.
NOEQDA.
UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject:
13 March 1962
Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
5:
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached
Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
responds to a request of that office for brief but precise
description of pretexts which would provide justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the
proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there
will be similar submissions from other agencies and that
these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a
time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be
considered on a case-by-case basis.
3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be
given the primary responsibility for developing military
and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is
recommended that this responsibility for both overt and
covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON
May 14
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
1 Enclosure
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project
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UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
JR
Re 1964/333"
TOP
UFORN
NOPECIAL HANDLING
JCSM-272-62
10 April 1962
MEMORANDUM FÖR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ·
Subject: Cuba
5:
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban
problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they
see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present
communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings
or external political, economic or psychological pressures.
Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the
United States will be required to overthrow the present
communist regime.
The
2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence
of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere.
present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of
operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against
Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin
America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions
of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this com
munist government increases the probability that one or
more other nations in Latin America will become communist
or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the
problems currently facing the United States and the Organiza-
tion of American States. While considered unlikely, it is
possible for the Sino-Soviet mos to establish military
bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloo
periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US
defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet
the threat.
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloo.
They are provided with the opportunity to continue with
their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing
internal security measures by police state methods decrease
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; DOD DIR 5200.10
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SYSTEMATICALLY
BY. JCS OF 2 Maxst
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
TOP SECRET
MANULIKU
UNCLASSIFIED
the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The
steady: improvement in military defenses strengthens the
resistance which must be overcome in the event of US
military intervention and could lengthen the time required.
to secure control of the government and the island. The
continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a
growing mucleus for a communist underground after the
elimination of the present government. This creates a
problem for the future which is steadily increasing in.
magnitude.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United
States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without
risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention
can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist
opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces
available would assure rapid essential military control of
Cuba. Continued police action would be required.
5. In view of the increasing military and subversive
threat to the United States and the nations of the Western
Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early
military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United
States. They also recommend that such intervention be
undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the
release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently
on active duty.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
TOP SECRET MOP
Isese
HANDLING
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
9 March 1962
-
VI LUIAL
ANDEINE
UNCLASSIFIED
OF
COPY
COPIES
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
CUBA PROJECT (TS)
The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 13 March 1962.
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NAFARN
13-00000
♥KVALITA OPEGIAL MANDLIKS NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)
THE PROBLEM
1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project:
Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise
description of pretexts which they consider would providė
Justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext
for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political
decision which then would lead to military action.
3. Cognizande has been taken of a suggested course of
action proposed ** by the US Navy relating to generated
instances in the Guantanamo area.
4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
.5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
are based on the premise that US military intervention will
result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
place the United States in the position of suffering justif-
iable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations
forum should be favorably affected by developing the inter-
national image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible,
and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere.
6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the
present time it will continue to hold good only as long as
there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is
Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations,'
Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated
5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from
Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to
Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962,
on file in General Craig's office.
i
2
UNCLASSIFIED
- TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING
13-00000
---th
UNCLASSIFIED
NUTUKN
as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR
to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,
since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
frame of the next few months.
CONCLUSION
7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,
integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the
objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
3
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFARN

13-00000
ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
UNCLASSIFIED
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
submission suitable only for planning purposes.
They are
arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are
intended to provide a point of departure for the development
of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate justification for US military
intervention in Cuba).
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 °,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
reactions.
Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):
(1) Start rumors (many). Use olandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
M
7
UNCLASSIFIED
SPECIAL HANDLING
TOP SECRET
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
HORORI
13-00000
UNCLASSIFIED
"NOTURN
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or vicinity of Quantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
--
napthalene.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
for mook-victims (may be lieu of (10)). ·
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident-
in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add oredibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent
crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
:
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
8
TOP SECRET
13-00000
CAIRULIN
"NUTURN"
UNCLASSIFIED
The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida.(real or simulated).
We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Ouban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely' ·
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example," advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at. night.
Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
•
•
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions..
An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify-
ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
UNCLASSIFIED
9
13-00000
**RULING “MOTORN
UNCLASSIF
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and
numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original status. The drone airoraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Cuba. the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
"
10
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
TAP REA
UNCLASSIFIED
KALDU
13-00000
„UNCLASSIFIED...
NUTUKN
stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what
has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to
"sell" the incident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched
in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida.
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban MIGS.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
he had been jumped by MIGS and was going down. No other
calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly
west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper
people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The
pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have
disappeared.
+
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
**
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched
and parts of aircraft found.
i
11
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
拜
UNCLASSIFIED
13-00000
DEGRET & SPECIAL HARDLIKS
ENCLOSURE B
FACTS ERARING ON THE PROBLEM
"NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIE
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated*
that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be
undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
acts against US forces or property which would serve as an
incident upon which to base overt intervention.
2. The need for positive action in the event that current
covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 7 March 1962, as follows:
11
---
determination that a credible internal
revolt is impossible of attainment during the next
9-10 months will require a decision by the United States
to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for
positive US military action."
3. It is understood that the Department of State also is
preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313
12
UNCLASSIFIED
Enclosure B
13-00000
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER: 202-10002-10018
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963
AGENCY FILE NUMBER JCS 2304/189
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Cuba Selected Documents
#3
ORIGINATOR: JCS
FROM: J-5
TO:
TITLE :
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II)
DATE : 05/01/63
PAGES : 36
SUBJECTS
: POLICY, CUBA
REVOLT IN CUBA
COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
OPLAN 312
OPLAN 316
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION
© RESTRICTIONS:
UNCLASSIFIED
OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
TE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs.
and Joint Staff 
discussing courses of action toward
Cuba.
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED
13-00000
to the
CHEERS OF STAKK
COORDINATION
This pacer has been procenaeakESTABLOY
nda (2) of Boldey, Memorandamise
BOM AUTOM
ENG AND DE
FION
13-00000
COURSES OF ACTION
In response to a
Chiefs of Staff, to pro
concerning the requir
fomenting a revolt in
uest
from the Chairman
Woint
d the
engineering
dated
requir
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past
format
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FACTS BEART
Joint:
The Chairman
25 March 1963*, requested
ments to plan and incite
part therein, "In view.
agents into Cuba and of
Cuba, it will always be
timed uprising in prope
consider
an incider
ng to generate and
Involving many Cubans of do
3. CINCLANT has forwa
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Cuban nationals.
forces"
discussion, see Enel
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* Enclosure to JCS 2304/176
** Attachment to JCS 2304/171
*** Attachment to JCS 2304/168
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
JCS 2304/189
(Rev: 5/13/63)
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SE
22
13-00000
United's
dability to
United States shou
(a) engineer
the Casti
Cuba.:
7. Engineered provocations would
in control, timing, simplicity
ity than would
oult to generate
greater advantage
10
11
12
be precluded.
13
14
widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local
fomented revolt. It would be most dis
uprising as a contrived incident should
8. The United States should:
Initiate a coordinated pro
:3
for overt US military interventi
In support of the above unde
build Cuban resistano
with the intensificati
sabotage in Cuba, and the creation.
guerrilla activity.
At a propitious
action to remove the Car
9. It would appear necessary
zation be given the
developing
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commencing
18
collection and
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framework for
24
25
27
flexibly phased: 17
military
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the
28
11. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (5412 30
Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57:*31
29
* Enclosure to JCS 1969/217.
JCS 2304/189
(Rev. 5/13/63)
UNCLASSIFIED
CRET

13-00000
CONS
13 recommended mat
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13-00000
ENCESSURE É
DRAKI
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Subjecte Couries of Accion felated to cuba
Joint Chiefs of staff have considered:
Ight be taken by the United States
US mia fubry dribervention in caDA'S
discussion in the Appendix heret
our in your capacity as Executive Agent
or Defense Lens Policy to suba
JUDED FROM
GRADING AND DEG
losure
13-00000
TOP SECRE
SENS
UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
APPENDIX
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
1. Purpose. This report is in response to a request from
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider the desira-
bility and requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. It
includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series
of incidents as a cause for invasion and consideration of
pertinent comments received from CINCLANT.
2. Summary. Study of the desirability and the requirements
of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of
engineering an incident or a series of incidents rather than
trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving
many Cubans of doubtful reliability leads to the conclusions
that:
a. It is unlikely that an effective spontaneous revolt
will occur in the near future.
b. Any uprising without US overt support is likely to
be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet
military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's
increasingly efficient internal security operations.
c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro
communist regime will risk a direct provocation that
could be used as a pretext for US intervention.
d. Unless the United States intervenes militarily, the
Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its
efforts and ability to spread international communism will
increase.
e. The United States should intervene militarily in
Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly
-TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
1
Appendix
(Rev. 5/13/63)
TOP SECRET
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SENSITIVE
URLERSSIFIED
perpetrated by the Castro regime to serve as the cause of
Invasion or (b) foment a revolt within Cuba which would
call for US military intervention.
f. Engineered provocation would provide greater advantages
in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a
fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a
widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local
uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.
g. The United States should:
(1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pre-
text for US military intervention in Cuba.
(2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly
phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, com-
mending with the intensification of intelligence collec-
tion and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a frame-
work for guerrilla activity.
(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military
action to remove the Castro communist government.
h. Implementation of the above would involve many
agencies of the United States Government. It would appear
necessary that one governmental organization should. be
given the primary responsibility for developing such a
national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate
in the development of this national plan.
1. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group
(5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of
NSAM 57.
J. CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba
while containing much merit, should be re-examined both
for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity
it envisages.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
(Rev. 5/13/63)
2
UPCLASSIFIED
Appendix
TOP SECRET
13-00000
1
SECRET
SENSITIVES
UNCLASSIFIED
b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment
of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as
directed.
c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with
contingency plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and.
directed by the President. The primary purpose of the US
military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of
the Castro communist government and to assist in the establish
ment of a new, non-communist government acceptable to the
United States.
20. The implementation of any of the suggested courses of
action in this study would involve many agencies of the United
States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that
one single governmental organization be given the primary
responsibility for developing a national plan.
21. Because of the extensive military operations involved,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development
of this national plan. In addition, for a contrived revolt,
they should be assigned the specific responsibility for develop-
ing the military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This
would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination
under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by the United States were
an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces
by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as
the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCIANT has developed a
specific concept for political and military action in Cuba.
CINCLANT CONCEPT
22. The CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in
Cuba, followed by overt, large-scale US military operations.
The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18
months. Supporting operations by CIA, State, and USIA will
be required.
TOP SECRET ORNOTT
(Rev. 5/13/63)
12
UNCLASSIFIED
Appendix
TOP SECRET
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SECHET ■ SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET
23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA
as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development
of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban
Government (FCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and
the development of a suitable cover plan.
24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by
CINCLANT of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 January 1964. This plan calls
for infiltrating of UW forces into Cuba for area assessment,
establishing guerrilla bases, developing military units,
establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion.
On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would
accelerate subversive operations to create conditions favorable
for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for
employment of conventional forces.
25. CINCLANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization
of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Execution of
CINCLANT OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by
. D-Day OPLAN 316, about 3 August 1964..
26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should
be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to
exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's
excellent counterguerrilla ability. This time requirement appears
to be excessive, but it could be shortened.. The criteria for
United States recognition of a new government could be met in
this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:
a. Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery.
b. Was administering it with general acceptance by the
population; and,
c. Was prepared to honor international obligations:
TOP SECRE
(Rev. 5/13/63)
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13
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Appendix
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27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are
approximately:
(1) Headquarters, Joint
6 Off
42 EM
Unconventional Warfare Task
Force, Atlantic (JUWTFA)
(2) UW Operating Base
36 Off
482 KM
(3) Support Units
15 Off
331 EM
(4) Special Forces
:.
(5) Submarines
(6) APD
(7) SEAL Teams
(8) Air Commandos
1 Group Headquarter
(reinf.)
2 Companies (reinf.
2
1
1
(9) CIA Forces
•
150 Personnel
20 Aircraft
4 Air Control Teams
Internal and External
assets as required by
CINCIANT.
28. CINCLANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time,
however, a nucleus JUWTFA staff is included within the CINCLANT
staff and has the capability for preparing UW plans for normal
contingencies. Planning or conducting UW operations of the
magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond
current capabilities.
29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the
activation of the JUWTFA as a separate organization and the
assignment to it of full wartime headquarters complement of
48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be
required. Approval of any concept in principle or for
planning purposes, however, would not necessitate the
TOP SECRET
(Rev. 5/13/63)
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14
Appendix
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HOSTCRET
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OP SECRET
activation of a separate headquarters. In this case, CINCLANT
would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate
recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept recommended, con-
cerning the use of Cuban nationals in UW operations, that "AB
practical, the Military Services should initially form their
Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units . . .". It is
considered that the creation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Force" in
anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316 is
a risk which cannot be justified and should not be undertaken.
There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be
formed into small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated
that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be
used in this role. It would be appropriate for the CIA in a
supporting role to select and train the individuals forming them
into teams of appropriate size to be made available for joint use
by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary.
31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, see
JCSM-350-63.
32. The force levels in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 are adequate
to cope with the improved Cuban military capability and the
presence of Soviet troops on the island. :
33. The experience of the JUWTFA during the Cuban crisis in
October 1962, indicates that the present military supply system
in the CONUS will be unable immediately to provide equipment and
supplies in the required configuration for projected UW operations
in Cuba. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equip-
ment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP GEOREF- NSITIVE
(Rev. 5/13/63)
15
Appendix
TTY) 173.bye
13-00000
TOP SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
34. The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT does not.
provide an exact plan in detail for contriving a revolt in
Cuba. However, his general concept would provide for:
"a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist
dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion,
unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and
finally full-scale invasion in that order, if necessary.
b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point. in the
process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures
require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful
revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government
favorable to US interests.
c. An ambiguous atmosphere during the critical phases
in its development which would not present the Soviets with
a direct confrontation of power until events would preclude
timely action on their part to prevent our intended result
in Cuba.
d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being
dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary
intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban
Government in exile and the final, decisive military action.
e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements
in the US for political and military support without
depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success
of the plan.
f. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all
US military posture, until the final decisive stages of
the plan are ready for execution, thus reducing maldeployment
time.
g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish
the defeat of Castro communism.
h. A definite time scale of events culminating in the
defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing
the groundwork for the installation of a government compatible
with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October
1964."
TOP SECRET --SENSITIVE
UPELOSSIFIFA)
13-00000
AGENCY: ARMY
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10011
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Cuba Selected Documents
#4
ORIGINATOR: ARMY
FROM: R. D. ALBRO
то : OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
TITLE : TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA
DATE 
: 12/11/63
PAGES : 11
SUBJECTS
: ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS
ARTIME, MANUEL
CUBAN BRIGADE
KENNEDY, ROBERT
CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
TE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo regarding
training of Cubans 
in Nicaragua, recriutment efforts
of Manuel 
Artime, meeting between Artime and Robert
Kennedy, and Cubans 
in US Army.
[R]
ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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SUB JBUT
ACSI-CX
CEODET
BLONET
20310
11 DEC 1963
FRESHETARY OF THE ARMY
HR. JOSEPH CALIFANO, GENERAL COUNSEL
zees in Nicaragus (8)
...
19 Nov 63, above sub
b. Intelligende. Report #2870006563, 9 Aug 63, Subject:
Prominent Cuban Exfled Länders visit Nicaragua (U), from USARMA, Nicaragua
Buerto
eport #2870009363, 31 Oct 63, Subject:
iles (U), from USARMA, Nicaragua
d Summary of Information, 1 Nov 63, 112th INTC Gp, Subject:
Cuban Officer Training Program (U).
e. Hemandum for Record, ACSI-CX, 19 Nov 63, Subject:
Cuban Brigade Member (U)
2. (s) Re rence 1a, prepared at the request of your office, advised
that 
query by
within the U. S. Embassy 
there, revealed no
P. McPhail, 0-30613
, USA Retired, the former
in anyway Involved 
in the training of Cuban
indication th
Chief
refuge
3. (C) During the above inquiry, the USARMA, Managua called attention
to two 
intelligence reports he had furnished (
references lb. and lc above)
reporting Nicaraguan press comment on the 
visit of exiled Cuban refugge
leaders Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, Dr. Carlos 
PRIO Socarras, Dr. Manuel
Antonio DE VARONA, Dr. Francisco FERNANDEZ 
Pla, Dr. Laureano BATISTA, Dr.
Orlando PUENTES, RE, Miguel DR LEON, and 
Roberto RODRIGUEZ to Nicaragua
during July and August 1963. The USARMA's 
comment on the newspaper
speculation and rumors concerning this visit was 
that he "does not have
any firm information or indicators that 
anti-Castro forces are being trained
in Nicaragua."
OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO.
WARNING NOTICE
BENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
28737
KORGLASSIFIED BY ARMY
DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY
SEADET
|OLORLIBR
ASC
DATE: 705 17 948-490-63
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIEP
DOD DIR 5200.10
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་
བ་་་
ACSI-CX
SUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (8)
Reference 1d. from the A. C. of S, G-
Guel ARTIER Bussa,
Lovision to resis
11 DEC 1963
Army reports
reference is inclosed for your information. COMARC, Fourth Army and 3rd
revolutionary camp in Nicaragua. A copy of this
Army have been directed to continue to report on the 
alleged recruiting
activity by ARTIHE
.
Reference is. reports information received from Ft, Holabird,
Corner. Guben Brighde member, 2nd Lt. Jose Haul 
AROMA Gonzales,
beam 
invited by 2nd Lt. Eneido OLIVA (
former ascond in
the 
Bay of Piga) to visit Washington
, D. d. on 18 Nov 63 to
The Attorney General
badly was the G-2, of, srigadas
oned from 
Washington ha did
VARON
Mr. Kennedy, but did say that he had met with Lt. OLIVA. The actual
purpose of the meeting is not known. A copy 
of reference le. is inclosed
for your 
information. Mr. Robert Kennedy did confer 
on 17 Nov 63 with
Manuel ASTIG Suess
, Roberto SAN ROMAN aka Roberto 
Perer SAN ROMAN, Jone
SAN ROMAN aka 
Jose Peres SAN ROMAN, and Karique Jose 
EUIZ William Alfert.
They ate ALBO
22 November 
1963. There is no indication that Ft. Holabird student VARÓNA
seduted to meet with Mr. Robert 
Kennedy buy
on either 21 or
was present.
6. (C) This office has no information whether Mr. Kennedy is aware
of 
ARTIME's alleged recruiting activity. The 
information in paragraphs 3
through 
5 above, 
and the inclosures hereto, are furnished 
in the event
that they may be 
of some pertinence to your 
inquiry regarding Colonel
McPhail, 
reference is. above.
DEL CHIEF OF RIVER
DEC 15 Sb.e3
KVIг& BEC ZEC
BECEIVED
NO NOTICE
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND NEFNDES INVOLVED
Sga) R. D. Albro, Col GS
R. D. ALERO
Colonel, GS
Director of Foreign Intelligence
2
OLOTET
88° M9 S S1 51530
OLLIBE
ҮМЯА ЗНІ 10 ҮЛАТЕ
૬.૧૨ü
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DOD DIR 5200.10
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AGENCY : JCS
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM.
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10010
RECORDS SERIES : TAYLOR PAPERS
GENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR:
JCS
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Cuba Selected Documents
#5
FROM EARLE G. WHEELER
TO:
TITLE : MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963
DATE 
: 12/19/63
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
OPERATIONS, CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS: OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
E OF LAST REVIEW : 07/31/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS
: Wheeler, Box 193. Memorandum reporting meeting with
President 
on Cuba. 1 Document.
[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED -
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JUL231997
SERCITIVE
19 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with President on Cuba, 1100 hrs, 19 Dec 1963
1. The following persons were present at the meeting:
White House:
State:
Defense:.
CIA:.
Treasury:.
USIA:
The President
Mr. McGeorge Bundy.
Mr. Smith
.Mr. Thompson
Mr. Ball
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Martin
Mr. Crimmins
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. Vance
General Wheeler
General Carter
Mr. FitzGerald
Mr. Helms
Mr. Dillon
.Mr. Wilson
2. Mr. FitzGerald briefed the President on Agency operations
covering 
the 
following areas:
a. Collection of -intelligence.
b. Propaganda activities.
c. Economic denial actions.
d. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.
e. Sabotage and harrassment activities.
f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.
XCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIN 5200. DO NOT APPLY
SENSITIVE
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3. a. The President was most interested in economic denial
actions. He was informed that talks would be undertaken in the
immediate future with representatives of the Canadian and British
governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials
by Canadian and British firms to Cuba. It was stated that Spanish firms
are likewise active in this area, as well as a number of essentially
fly-by-night firms located in a number of foreign countries. No
putable American firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact,
have been helpful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging
in this traffic. Apparently, State regards the Canadian, the British
and the Spanish efforts as being the real trouble spots. The President
directed that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governmenta
of firms concerned to dissuade them from this practice.
b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated that exploitation
of Cuban military disaffection is a long term undertaking. While there.
are disaffected Cuban military men in important posts, they have not,
to date, made any contacts with each other nor formed any sort of group.
However, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any successful operation to
overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported
by the Cuban military if it is to have any real likelihood of success.
c. During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the
President expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at
this time for two reasons:
(1) Current attempts to get OAS agreement to various
actions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and
(2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new
administration's policies toward Cuba, and it might influence unfavorably
the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions in Soviet military
personnel in Cuba..
4. Mr. Helms briefed on the significance of the arms cache
discovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of
the OAS survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to date, of
their survey.
He stated that the group apparently had accepted that
the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the
survey group was asking of the Venezuelan government further informa-
tion regarding propaganda activities directed against the Venezuelan
government, etc. He does not expect that the commission will report
2
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UNCLASSIFIED
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CLIVI
to the CAS prior to 10 January 1964. In the meantime, our effort
is devcted to ascertaining the maximum that the OAS is prepared
to do as a result of the Venezuela affair. They are hopeful that the
CAS will support an increased surveillance system. He thinks it is
too early to expect a complete break in economic and travel relations
between OAS countries and Cuba.
:
5. There was come discussion of further actions we might
take to increase pressures and harrassments at an appropriate time.
Among other items mentioned were the effect of low level reconnaissance
flight from time to time and the desirability of executing such flights
at intervals to maintain the viability of our "right" to do so. While the
President did not express disapprobation, neither did he express
approval. In fact, no real decisions were taken at this meeting which
must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session.
COPIES TO:
Chairman, JCS #1
CSAF #3
کے مجھے CO
Signed - Earle G. Wheeler
EARLE G. WHEELER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
CMC S
Director Jt Staff (Atta: SACSA) *
Army General Counsel #7
cg#?
DES 752
#9 or
2 #9 ors sc.
#
στο που
INCLASSIFIED
SENSITIVE
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10117
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
JCSM-77-64
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
Cuba Selected Documents
#6
ORIGINATOR: JCS
FROM JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ΤΟ : SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TITLE: A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBA
DATE : 01/31/64
PAGES :
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :
OPENING CRITERIA:
COMMENTS :
58
POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
COUP IN CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
: UNCLASSIFIED
: OPEN IN FULL
OPEN
10/07/97
JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Memo for Chairman, JCS
regarding contingency plans in the event of a coup in
Cuba.
[R]
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TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
UNCLASSIFIED
SM-161-64
31 January 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC
Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)
1. Transmitted herewith is a conceptual proposal, subject as above,
which 
has been developed jointly 
by the Department of State, the Depart-.
ment of Defense, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may,
supported 
by the United 
States, achieve US national objectives by the
elimination of the 
communist regime and establishment of a Cuban
government acceptable 
to the United States.
3. The proposal provides for US military intervention in a flexible
manner 
covering a 
spectrum ranging from provision of logistic support
to full execution of OPLANS 312, and 
316. Conditions under which military
intervention at a level LESS than that 
of OPLAN 316 might be undertaken
are generally in consonance with 
those described in JCS Message 8970,
.DTG 070155Z March 1963.
4. It is desired that CINC LANT prepare a separate contingency plan
to 
support a coup in Cuba within the context 
of conditions. described in.
the attachment hereto.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: .
MJ angclido
M. J. INGELIDO
Brig Gen, USAF
Secretary
Attachment
UNCLASSIFIED
GROUP 1.
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
Copy
, 11 of 22 copies, each of 1 page, Series A
:
"Iftant
persi
"
SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
+: terry out the duties.
суде.
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DEPARTME
AMERICA
TOP SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
CENSITIVE
IN REPLY REFER TO:
UNCLASSIFIED
DEC 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)
#
Reference: JCSM 809-63, Subject as above, dated October 21,
1963.
**
Enclosed herewith are three copies of the plan on the above
subject 
which has 
been prepared jointly on a restricted basis by
representatives 
of the Departments of State and Defense in coordina-
tion with 
the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan, which has been
revised to reflect 
generally the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
contained in reference, provides a conceptual basis for US response
to a Cuban military 
coup and has been approved by the Secretaries
of State and Defense 
and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency as
a basis for 
appropriate detailed planning. Mr. McGeorge Bundy has
been advised of the 
foregoing and requested to inform the President
of the existence 
of the plan on a suitable occasion. It is anticipated
that the Secretaries 
of State and Defense may subsequently be
requested 
to brief the President on its outline.
In accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph
8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans
be revised as 
necessary to reflect the concept of military operations
described in 
the plan and that you advise me when this has been accom-
plished.
agra
In accordance wi
page 22 of the plan,
representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordination with
representatives 
of the Departments of State and Defense will develop a
plan for the 
introduction of the "Special Team" into Cuba which will
subsequently be circulated for appropriate action and further detailed
planning by agencies concerned.
* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205-1
** Appendix to Enclosure B to
JCS 2304/205-2
Enclosure: (3 cys)
As Stated
: Vance
Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of the Army
SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
Wird No.1/5.0354 TOP SECRET
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*** UNCLASSIFIED*¨*
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UNCLASSIFIED
A CONTINGENCY PLAN. FOR A COUP IN CUBA
1. Problem. To provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in
Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in
replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United
States.
2.
Assumptions,
a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous
contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting
certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt
will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1)
below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met.
Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders, in
secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence
and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming
US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or,
less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable
criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or
obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Govern-.
ment, hoping that the US will intervene.
NO
b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight
hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into
Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain in-
formation to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the
US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.
This document contains 22 pages.
Copy No. of
Series
-
copies.
OSA, ASC Control NoT/S 0354
SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
19 OCT 1989
BY JCS ON
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
Re 2304/205-3 CLASSIFIED

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QUSITIVE
c. US intervention would be based on:
UNCLASSIFIED
(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government
set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action.
would not await formal OAS approval), or
(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had
started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the in-
surgents met generally the criteria for support, or
(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.
d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable,
recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the situation exist-
ent at the time:
(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order
to survive.
(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Government, however
rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to
provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if
Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).
(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.
.
(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably
including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support
and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.
'
e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy af-
fecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.
(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale.
invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-
introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP SÉCRET SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET
which could be used as a pretext for such action.
UNCLASSIFIED
(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage un-
organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too
easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of
any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US
aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, &
planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban
military forces.
(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces,
either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations,
would result in immediate implementation of OPLANS 312 and 316.
3. Sequence of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this
paper is based on the following general sequence of events:
a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to
and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval
would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time.
(In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge,
the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special
team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering in-
formation made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible
for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit
forces needed to sustain it.)
b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on
a pre-arranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the
US would:
3
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:
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219
UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET DESITIVE
(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information;
which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. This
team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would
make contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start
of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if
The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty-
four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be
not.
possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event,
American
reliable reports from trained observers in Cuba would be of great value
to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit
its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to
the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and
expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT,
would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Govern-
ment if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately
to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made
to intervene.) :
(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade
of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the
blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the
implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.
c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source in-
telligence assessment including the special team's report, would be
made to the President. This would be the critical decision because,
once made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth,
UNCLASSIFIED
4
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TOP SECRET DITIVE
the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup.
tions would include:
These ac-
(1) The assumption by CINCIANT of command of all military
and para-military operations in Cuba.
(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel for the
purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison
with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support
by airdrop or submarine, In the event that the US delayed public an-
nouncement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would
be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active
US involvement in Cuba.
(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team
to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has
not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order
to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS.
As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce
publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade
to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral,
interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta
del Esta meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC es-
tablished a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that
support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually,
the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air
Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a
warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph J.a. below).
5
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UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET MOTIVE
(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of por-
tions or all of CINCLANT CPLANS 312 and 316.
d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for
help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support
the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or
responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support
for the coup.
In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the
Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the
other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and recon-
naissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents
that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention
while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support.
At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces re-
quired for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announc-
ing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate
overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility
that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be suffi-
cient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a
significant element of the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable
that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as
required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would im-
plement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as required.
Facts Bearing on the Problem.
4.
a.
The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveil-
lance network, both internally and with respect tot he air and sea
UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET DITIVE
SENSITIVE
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CSOWGE
CONTROL = 0-13-
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SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING HOFORN
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
wwwwwwx
Vida's
13 MAAS196 DEJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECTS DOCUMENT
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Opera-
tions, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation
MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but
precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider would provide justification for US military
intervention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are for-
warded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning
purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar sub-
missions from other agencies and that these inputs will be
used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan.
individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-
case basis.
The
3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for
US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a
logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other
seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate
objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban
rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed
at other countries as well as the United States. The plan
would also properly integrate and time phase the courses
of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the
execution of this plan would be to place the United States
in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances
from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to
develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace
in the Western Hemisphere.
4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the
Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-
phased that projects would be operable within the next few
months.
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•
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is recommeded that primary responsibility
for developing military and para-military aspects of the
plan for both overt and covert military operations be as-
signed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Willia
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group
Enclosure
Pretexts to Justify
Military Intervention.
in Cuba
2
HP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT
Subject:
Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise
description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider would provide justification for US military inter-
vention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.
It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from
other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis
for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects
can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.
3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for
US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical
build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and
irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
countries as well as the United States. The plan would also
properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of
this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent
position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and
irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-
national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
Hemisphere.
EP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM
4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban
problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that
projects would be operable within the next few months.
5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility
for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan
for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
:
Enclosure
Pretexts to: Justify Military Intervention
in Cuba
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM-
ENCLOSURE
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are
arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are
intended to provide a point of departure for the development
of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate justification for US military
intervention in Cuba).
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 °,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
3
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires
--
napthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident
in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent
orew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM
The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night.
Soviet Bloo incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify-
ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
5
•
TOP
SECRET SPECIAL
SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and
numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
Acces apptinen i
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM
stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what
has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to
"sell" the incident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched
in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida.
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban MIGS.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
he had been jumped by MIGS and was going down. No other
calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly
west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper
people, quickly stored and given a new tail mumber. The
pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have
disappeared.
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they knew.
Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched
and parts of aircraft found.
.7.
CRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
9 March 1962
OF
COPIES
COPY
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
'
on
CUBA PROJECT (TS)
The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 13 March 1962.
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK: NOFORN
JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)
THE PROBLEM
1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise
description of pretexts which they consider would provide
Justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext
for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political
decision which then would lead to military action.
3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of
action proposed ** by the US Navy relating to generated
instances in the Guantanamo area.
4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
.5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
are based on the premise that US military intervention will
result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
place the United States in the position of suffering justif-
iable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations
forum should be favorably affected by developing the inter-
national image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible,
and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere.
6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the
present time it will continue to hold good only as long as
there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is
* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated
5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from
Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to
Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962,
on file in General Craig's office.
2
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR
to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,
since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
frame of the next few months.
CONCLUSION
7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,
integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the
objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
3
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
42
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached
Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise
description of pretexts which would provide justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed
memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable
for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be
similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs
will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan.
Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
D
3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be
given the primary responsibility for developing military and
para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended
that this responsibility for both overt and covert military
operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
MC
A
* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba
Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March
1962, on file in Gen Craig's office
Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN-
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA. PROJECT
Subject:
Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise
description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider would provide justification for US military inter-
vention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.
It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from
other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis
for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects
can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.
XD
3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for
US military intervention. Such a plan profild enable a logical
build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and
irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
countries as well as the United States. The plan would also
properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of
this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent
position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and
irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-
national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
Hemisphere.
5
Appendix to
Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN

13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING
NOFORN
4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban
problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that
projects would be operable within the next few months.
5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility
for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan
for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Х
W
Akh
6
Appendix to
Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK NOFORN
ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are
arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are
intended to provide a point of departure for the development
of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate justification for US military
intervention in Cuba).
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
Our military
reactions.
Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized.
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).
7
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM-
Mi
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOTORN
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance.
for mook-victims (may be lieu of (10)). ·
napthalene.
Conduct funerals
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba..
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident
in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent
Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation.
crew.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
8
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIN: NOFORN
The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
We
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
similated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic).
know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night.
Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify-
ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
oivil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
Jamaioa, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
route to cross Cuba.
be chosen only to cause the flight plan
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and
numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual
aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
10
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFARN
13-00000
TOP SECRETO SPECIAL HANDLING NOTORN
stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what
has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to
"sell" the incident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched
in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida.
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban MIGS.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other
calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly
west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper
people, quickly stored and given a new tail mumber. The
pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have
disappeared.
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched
and parts of aircraft found.
11
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORM
13-00000
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLIK? NOFORN
ENCLOSURE B
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated'
that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be
undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
acts against US forces or property which would serve as an
incident upon' which to base overt intervention.
2. The need for positive action in the event that current
covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 7 March 1962, as follows:
11 -
-
determination that a credible internal
revolt is impossible of attainment during the next
9-10 months will require a decision by the United States
to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for
positive US military action."
3. It is understood that the Department of State also is
preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313
12
Enclosure B
TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NAFARN
13-00000
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321
12 March 1962
Page 2165
TO SEGRET
COPY NO.
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (8)
A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
P. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321
2165
TOP SECRET
13-00000
Helen
Put these all
under one tab a
draft material used
Preparation of DOD.
смий
in connection
W/ Thurston report
prepared 20-24 
Feb 
63
Thanks.
Coll
13-00000
* DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Helen
Теле а
a lot
Undated drafts
They
bese
are all about
20-25 Fet
Please do
the best you
сам
with thei
..

13-00000
Mr Vance
يتوني
itio
COMBATTING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
1. Introduction
While there is:
effort to export subversion
Latin America, from and through Cuba, there
is agreement, at the least, that the program embodies grave potential
hazards for the tranquility of the Hemisphere. Beyond this, there is also
general acknowledgement that the subversion problem is not a new one,
Maxico City have been
Communi
that the one bridgende in klantevideo and Ale
sources of infection to much of Latin Amerian for two decades or more.
Finally, there is evidence that the U.S. appreciates those realities, as
exhibited in the depth of an-going U.S. programs in all of Latin America,
aimed at blunting the Communist subversive thrusts into the continent.
The question created by the President's underscoring of the problem is
whether or not our efforts in this area are adequate -- as to scope, as to
coordination, and as to intensity. It is the view of the Committee that they
are not. Further, It is the view of the Committee that steps aimed solely at
impeding the flow of students and subversives and from Cuba will not, of
themselves, greatly abate the problem. There must be companion efforts
designed both to degrade the basic capability for Cuban-based subversion, as
well as efforts to develop a more effective resistance capacity among the
Latin American states. The sections to follow are designed with these two
requirements in mind.
SECRET
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SECRET
First, with respect to preventing the export of Communist subversion
by or through Cuba, there is a summary of what we are doing now, and what
do in the future.
Sapie
Fisting the Latin American nations to resist
the impact of Communist subversion, there is a summary of our current
programs and a listing of specific additional things which we can do; in other
words, a treatment of the subversive question from two points of view --
therapy as regards Cubas prophylaxis as regards Latin America at large.
mimist Subversion By and Throus]
1. Programs Now in Motion.
The following existing programs are all having some adverse effect
on the basic capabilities of the Communists to organize, train, teach, equip,
underwrite and export subversive strength into Latin America from Cuba:
a. Recommaissance and Surveillance activities, which unite to
· provide information and to represent a continuing deterrent to subversive
movemanšt
(1) Picket ship patrol of the Windward Passage.
This action contributes to the restriction of illicit Cuban sea
traffic to Haiti and Dominican Republic area.
(2) Aircraft patrol flights out of Guantanamo.
These flights, augmenting surface surveillance, keep watch for
small-craft, fishing and merchant shipping operating in the Caribbean south
of Cuba, and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.
For
SECRET
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(3)` U. S. Military execution of specific counter-subversive tasks.
This involves action taken in response to specific needs, as
a to Central Americ
the 1962 attempts
These were countered, and probably shorted, by the presence of U.S. Navy
destruyara patrolling the coastal arena of Costa Rica at the request of the
government of that country,
(4) Overflight.
Although pah
changes in Cuban military capabilities, those fights serve as a reminder of
U.B. vigilance and determination.
(5) Communications Intelligence.
All of the above are supported by and given a sense of
direction from the great volume of material provided through the facilities
of the Communications Intelligence system.
b. Propaganda « Radio and Television.
(1) The Voice of Americ
conducts 2-3/4 hours of short wave
broadcasts to Cuba daily. These serva, in some degres, to expose to the
Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.
(2) Armed Forces radio and television broadcasts from the Guantaname
Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Gommunism by the orientation
of their programs.
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TOP SECRET
(3) It seq.. (additions on this subject should be provided by USA).
c. Intelligence Collection.
(1) There is countinuous intelligence collection on subversive
penalty for
the Cubans,
mployed in the Guantanan
supplied by CLA).
orum of World Opinion.
from Hamisphere organizations exhibitas
sive activity in her neighboring states.
removal of Soviet combat forces
that they continue the pressure on the USSR, and
› subject of subversion before the world.
unt Political Actions Aimed at Impeding Travel into and out of
Cubs.
(This is to be provided by Stato)
2. Programs Which May ha Und
It is clear that thous activities which relate to the denial of agent
however,
klon në propaganda porva directly to diminish the
nat subvašsion from Cuha. It to necessary.
Stamplata other actions which, while lass directly related to
subversiom, still surve to wanken Cuba and its Communist dictatorship,
and thus to eliminate the problem at its source. It is for this reason that
there is presented herein a spectrum of actions related directly to Cuba.
While it is clear that some nations listed may exceed the horizons
fonsibility. In terms of scope, vigor, or the requirements of international
relations, it is nevertheles esidemed necessary that they be sat forth in
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their entirety, in order that
options.
a. Extend Surveillance of Cuba and the
(1) Intensively monitor, observe and
cheduled:
transportation -- both scheduled and nën
Communist
ibbean area
جوانی مومنی
i-national politico-military program
cooperative Latin American state of suspected
Its territorial waters.
(2) · Exploit fully the intelligence oppos
system passing through Havana,
· of interrupting the system for security vei
b. Intensify Psychological Actions:
(1) Create problems for the
programs by an intensified psychological
and airborne TV emphasising the hardships
by the Campesinos while subversive trainées à
(2) Publicise the contrast
instructors and those of the Cuban pesan
(3) Increase greatly the amount
to Cuba, and intensify emphasis on the
on the Cuban people by the Castro suby
(4) Conduct airborne television
people and Latin American students in G
Castro-ssubversive efforts are designe
Hemisphere.
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c. Intensify Physical Intelligence Gathering Efforts.
(1) Hy non-attributable means -- Cubans and third country.
for to acquire much more hard
training conducted in
Movement of Personnel.
on the nature
of exportatio
Thamesh and lateral and bilateral politient arrangements with
Latin American statas, enck to impede the movement of pozauns into and
anded by State).
omie Capability of Castro Cuba
to Train and Repast Subveralvos.
It is evident that ready funds, in considerable quantity, are
required to conduct a subversive training program, not to speak of other
costly factors me arms, demolitions, fual, food, propaganda, etc. Specific
actions aimed at reducing the Cuban's resources will thus have a direct
effect upon their ability to pursue their program of subversion, will cause
them to turn to their ata. armni problems and will give the Russians pause
wogram which is costly and marginally
productive. Likewise, every actian which contributes to instability, unrest,
apprehension and dissension between Russian and Cuban will reduce
correspondingly both their ability and their opportunity to drive forward on
a program of subversive training and exportation. The following actions
will contribute to this endi
SECRET
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(1) Attrit Cuban resources
SECRET
(s) Purchase the defection of personnel, uirorafi,
Conduct
rasqurans, upon which
actions should exto
nhle ncțions against petroleum,
Cuba's economy depends. These
· from direct destruction to sabotage
smbuation of garsions and storag
Uigence Indientions (sireraft fights,
agenta, clear radio trajamisetom, banch Jumpers) cruse Githan military
forces to stand continually as high alert level and thus to consumo supplies
which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.
(2) Diminish Cukan financial resources.
(*) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency in
large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to
undermine confidence.
Russians.
sion between. Cubans and
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Programs now in beings.
SECRET
In appraising the programs which are now in progress it is necessary
* yet necelerated to
their full thrust and, taken all together, they have certainly not fortified
nar allies to the point where subversion can be said to be under full control.
US Military Miñorte».
United States miliary forces are now participating in a broad
which contribute
strengthening the ability of the countries to expose and put
down subversive activity. Of these, the principal are:
(1) Counterinsurgency, anti-subversion and prychological operations
training through the medium of military missions and scolile training teams.
(2) Provision of equipment and material on short notice for use -
in the face of subversion or subversive threats.
(3) The conduct of emergency training programs in mob and rios
(4) Provision of farmal counterinsurgency education for Latin
American ofñsars and enlisted men in United States Service schools and
sendemics.
(5) Provision of civi e action training and assistance.
(6) Ancillary military efforts aimed at strengthening the ability
virias to resist subversions:
(a) United States provision of maintenance support and
assistance for Latin American naval and air units.
DET
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SECRET
(b) Officer exchange programs.
(e) Language training for Latin American military students.
(d) International Army, Navy and Air Force Defense Conferences.
(7) Troop information:
The United States military is embarked on a program aimed at ma
the Latin American military aware of the realities of Communism and
Communist subversion. This includes:
(s) · Translation into Spanish Kad printing of 50, 000 wata of the
series of ten pamphlets entitled, "Democracy varsus Communism.
14
(b) Development of an audio/visual film strip based on the
"Democracy versus Communism pamphlets for the illiterate Latin American
enlisted men. One Hundred and eighty of these films and records have been
sent to GINGARIB for further distribution to the Latin American services.
(8) Thirteen-hundred copies of the USLA pamphlet "Tactices y
Directivas Contra La Farsa Communistar are being procured for distribution
among the Latin American military, a
b. The Politico-Economic Effort (to be supplied by State).
c. The Propaganda Effort (to be supplied by USLA).
d. The Intelligence and Non-attributable Efforts(to be supplied by CLA).
2. Programs Which May Be Initiated:
As in the case of Section II, the programs outlined below are within
- reasonable technical and practicnl
However, as they cross the
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complete spectrum of actions, it is realized that some may be found,
unsuitable, on political or ethar grounds:
(1) Establish a Caribbean sea and coastal surveillance program
which provides for multilateral onchange of information and multilateral
participation in an alerting systems each country to be responsible for
patrolling its own coast,
system and provide selective auchange of intelligence between subscriber
nations.
(3) Continus the improvement of US communications in Latin
America, at high priority, to contribute to the effectiveness of the alerting .
system.
b. Multinational Counterinsurgency Force.
Brigade for
ore the fonsibility of organizing an QAS Counterinsurgency
Amaries to combat the effects of
subversion. Much a proposal, made at this time, would exhibit the arious
determination of the U. §. to support vigorously an anti-subversion program.
c. Training and Orientation.
Provide for a greatly expanded out-of-country training and
orientation program for key segments of each Latin American country's
population mech mas

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(1) Enlisted and officer military personnel to be schooled in
Panama and/or the United States.
(2) Police personnel
the United States,
(3) Newspaper personnal to be nahsalad -
the United States.
schools.
(4) Nurses (auale and female) to be trained in the United States.
(6) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training
The thrust of
the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and education isvel of the
people involved but, even more, to expose the Latine to US influence, to show
them our country, to persuade them by close association that our view in
corrent, and thus to stiffen their resalve to combat subversion in any form,
d. Troop Information Program
Expand greatly the current Latin American troup information
program in order to educate the Latin American servicemont (and their
civilian contemporaries) to the subversive danger they fad
e. News and Propaganda.
(1) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduit an information
program within each country in Latin America using those themanas
(a) An exposition of facts on subversive training, movement of
subversives and general subversivo programs,
(b) Objectives of the Communisto
(c) Communist methods of oper
SECRÉL.
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རྫ གཅ
SRET
(d) Facts on the decrease in living standards within Cuba since
the rise of Castro.
(a) Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.
Many Latin American papara, even the anti-communist ones,
are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-
readers and Unotypare are bought with :
munist money. Circulation
of these papera is artificially inflated by low prices and underwkiṭṭan by
communist funds,
imust match this financial investment
in news control in order to convey the truth to the Latin who, like the America:
believes what he reads.
(3) Distribute Anti-Communist Laborature
Books and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality.
of communism should be printëd in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed
through inexpensive commerical sale,
1. Travel Contrala (in bo furnished by State).
6. Improve Our Counterinsurgency Programs
We should accelerate and broaden counterinsurgéncy programs in
each country of Latin America, driving for a renitatic "Internal Defense Flan"
for every country and urging Latin American countries to ask for US counter-
insurgency training assistance, for military, paramilitary and police forces,
Beyond this we should place specific emphasis upon developing civic action
programs in the areas of greatest need.
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J. Non-attributable actions
(1) Instigate and stage selected terrorist insidents in Latin
American countries, designed to implicate Castro.
(2) Arrange for eaches of Savist Grech
to be "discovered'
in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba.
IV. Conclusion.
It is the belief of the Committee that the actions outlined in the
preceding sections comprise a series of steps which in some areas will stem
and in others attack the program of
sion in betin
America. Each individual action embodies some element of usefulness in
itself, and any combination of actions may generate correspondingly favorable
results. There is no profound relationship which demands the combining of
any specific set of actions.
It is recommended, therefore, that an early selection be made of those
actions listed above whose execution is compatible with mational obligations
and dedications in other areas and which are within U.5, capabilities, and
that they be put quickly into effect since the longer the suby
afinences
in the Hemisphere are permitted to mature, the more difficult will be their
ultimate elimination.
And finally, recognizing the diverse nature of the Gold War activities
involved, it is strongly recommended that a single point in the Government
be designated and assigned responsibility for supervising execution of the
total program.
TOP SECRET
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K
TOP SECRET
While we generally concur with the paper prepared by the
Department of State, we do not believe that the proposals contained
therein present a sufficiently wide spectrum of options or activities
to impede and stop Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America.
Specifically, we recommend the following additional actions:
(1)
Measures to attrit Cuban resources:
(a) Purchase the defection of personnel,
aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.
(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against
petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends.
These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to
sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers
and storage.
(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft
flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban
military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus to
consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive
training.
(d) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency
in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to
undermine confidence.
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PREF 7
_ .
SECDET
(2) The designation of a single point in the Govern-
ment to be held responsible for supervising the execution of the total
program.
(3)
An intensified and broadened news and propaganda
program, including the following:
(a) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct
an information program within each country in Latin America using
these themes:
1. An exposition of acts on subversive
training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.
2. Objectives of the Communists within
each country.
3. Communist methods of operation.
4. Facts on the decrease in living standards
within Cuba since the rise of Castro.
5. Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.
(b) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press
Many Latin American papers, even the anti-
communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their
columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist
money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices
and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match
· this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth
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T
SECK
to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads:
(c) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature
Books and pamphlets, in large numbers,
exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and
Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.
(4)
Greatly expanded training and orientation in the
United States for key segments of each Latin American country's
population, such as:
(a) Enlisted as well as officer military personnel
to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.
or in the United States.
the United States.
United States.
(b) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama
(c) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within
(d) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the
(e) Civilian technicians to be trained in United
States training schools.
The thrust of such an expanded training program,
taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and
. education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the
Latins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them by
SECRET
PER
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TOP SECRET
close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their
resolve to combat subversion in any form.
HOP SECRET
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1.
AN ACTION PROGRAM
COMBATTING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA
Introduction
hile there is not total agreement on the magnitude
of the mist effort to expert subversion to Latin
America,
least,
and through Cưa, there is agreement, at the
embodies grave potential hazards for
the
the tranquility of the Hemisphere. Beyond this, there is
also, general asknaşt sment that the subversion problem
is not a new one, that the Communist bridgeheads in
Montevideo and Merise City have been sourées of Infection
to mich
tin America for
decades or more.
Finally,
there is evidence that the U.S. appreciates these realities,
as exhibited in the depth of on-going U.8, programs in all
of Latin America, aimed at blunting the Communist subversive
thrusts into the continent.
The question created by the President's underscoring
of the problem is whether or not our efforts in this area
are adequate as to scope,
intensity.
is the view
to coordination, and as to
this Committee that they are
not. Further, it in the view of the Committee that steps
aimed solet at impeding the fer of students and subversives
to and from guba will not, of themselves; greatly abate the
problem.
must be companion efforts designed both to
degrade the basic capability Cuban-based subversion, as
well as
capacity among the Latin American states. The sections to
follow are designed with these two requirements in mind.
to develop a more effective resistance
First, with respect to preventing the export of Commu-
nist subversion by or through tuba, there is a stammary of
what we are doing now, and what we can do in the future.
13-00000
SEGRET
Second, with respect to assisting the Latin American
nations to resist the impact of Communist subversion, there
in a summary of our current programs and a listing of
specific additional things which we can do; in other words,
a treatment of the subversive question from two points of
therapy as regards Cuba, prophylaxis as regards Latin
America at large.
view
-
II. Measures to Impede the Eries of Communist Subversion
By and Thetush
Programs Now in Nation.
The following existing programs are all having some
adverse ých on the basic capabilities of the Communists.
to organize, train, beach, equip, underwrite and expert
subversive strength into Latin America from Cubas
Reconnaissance and Surveillance activities, which
provide information and to represent à continuing
deterrent to subversive möremonti
unite
(2) Pickes ship
This action
Elicit Cuban sea
Republic area.
of the Windward Passage.
Abutes to the restriction
raffia to Haïti and Dominican
Aircraft patrol flights out of Guantanamo,
These flights, augmenting surface surveillance,
keep watch for small ers 6. fishing and merchant
shipping 'operating in the Caribbean south of Cuba,
and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.
U.S. Military
subversive tasks.
jeution of specific counter-
13-00000
This involves action taken in response to
specific needs, as during the 1962 attempts to expert
Cuban revolutio des to Central America. These
were countered, and probably aborted, by the presence
of 1.5. Mw destroyers patrolling the coastal areas
Cesta Rian at request of the government of
that country.
(4) Overflight.
Although primarily designed to observe and
document
these flights
determinatio.
(5) Comm
cham military capabiliti
reminder of U.S. vigilance
lligence.
i
ALL the above are supported by and given
sense of direction from the great volume of
material provided through the facilities of the
Communications Intelligense system.
Propaganda Radio and Television.
(1) The Voice of America now conducts 2-3/4 heire
short-have broadenst
same degree, to expose to
daily. These serve,
Cuban people the
activities of the Castro regime.
Armed Forces radio and television brandnants
From the Guantanamo Naval Base seek daily to combat
spread of Commuda by the orientation of their
(3) Et seq. (additions on this subject should
provided by
Intelligence
(1) There in
Eection
the Quantanamo Bay
Base.
(2) Et seq.,
employed
uld be mupplied by CIA.)
3

13-00000
The Forum of World Opinion.
· (1), Elimination of Cuba from Hemisphere organi-
sations exhibits the penalty for conductive subversive
nativity in her neighboring states.
(2) U.S.-Soviet talks regarding removal of Soviet
combat forces from Cidba are productive in that they
continue the pressure on the USSR and the Cubans,
keep the subject of subversion before the world.
Current Folitical Actions Almed at Impeding Travel
and out of Cuba.
provided by State)
the dental
ganda
to export
to conte
clear that those activities which relate
agent movement and the suppression of propa»
directly to diminish the Commist capability
ersion from Cuba. It is necessary, however,
other actions which, while less directly
related to subversion, still serve to weaken Cuba and its
Commmist dictatorship, and thus to eliminate the problem
at its sous It is for this reason that there is
presented
to Cuba.
exceed the
or the ret
"
á full spectrum of actions related directly
While it is clear that some actions listed may
of feasibility, in terms of scope,
of international relations, it is never
theless ofnsidered necessary that they be set forth in their
entirety,
-
order that the President may contemplate the
optitans.
Extend Surveillance of Cuba and the Caribbean.
(1) Monitor,
and report upon
Free
contigue
$local
both scheduled and
Develop an agreed
taky program providing
Latin American
Its territory,
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him?
(2) Consider, at a time whan the criticality
the situation distates, re-instituting the
marunting of Caba giying as a reason evidence of
of agentin and materials of subversion
and through Gubit,
Intensify
(1)
subversive
chological Actions,
the Cantro regime and
by an intensified psycho-
Ingical effort emphasizing the hardships and
Warings being endured by the Campenings while
subversive trainees given favered treatment.
the contrast between living con-
Instimators and those of Guber
(2) Publ
ditions
peasants.
(3) Increase grently the amount of VOA broad-
cast time tailored Cuba, and Intemnify emphasis
the gradation
suffering brought on the
Cahan people by the Castro subversive effort.
(4) Condunt atrborne television broadensts
the Cuban people and Latin American students in
dwalling on the theme that Castro's outerNË VI
Ente
(1) By
destroy the tranquility
ical Intelligence Gathering
inters -
Cubans and third
avor to.
quire much more hard intelli-
genne on the nature and scope of subversive training
#dnducted in Cuba and methods of expartation.
Movement of Personnel,
Though multilateral and bilateral political
swrangements with Iatin American states, seek to
Impede the movement of persons Into and out of Cub
to be expanded by State.)
13-00000
Biminish the Physical and Economie Capability
of Castro Cuba to Train and Export Subversivės,
It is evident that ready funds, in considerable
quantity, are required to conduct a subversive training
not to speak of other cantly facture -
démolițians, fuel, food, psopaganda, ete. Specific
tiems aimed at reduning the Cubans' resources will
tina have a direct effect upon their ability to pursue
their program of subversion, will come then to turn
their esta internal problems and will give the Rungians
stadion of pumaning a program which is
marginally productive. Likerise, every
instability, umrest, apps
heusfen and dissension between Russian and Cuban will
(1)
(a)
their ability and their
on a program of subversive
Poligning actions will
impost, feur and muspicion in the Contro
a mall
they would waste va
mat lives and
the dynamie
(b) Intrainen
inexpensive
inexpensive sabotage
utilized by only
ts, in the aggrt
resenfees, take Comm
attention of the regime
numbers of small
and ammamition inte tha
would asume grave unrest
the fastre régime and among the Russians, and
would remilt, inevitably, in costly search opera.
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(2) Attrit Guhan resourged.
(a) Purchase the defection of personnel,
craft, ships, boats and other valuable items.
(b) Comfurti ann-attributable actions against
petroleum resturees, upon which much of Cuba's
economy depends. These actions should artend all
from direct destruction to sabotage
the
mal basterial contamination of
specific
planes
"Tible agents
beard jumping
(s) by mamm of intelligence indications
cause Cuban military forces to stand contimally
a high alert level und thus te consume mupplies
which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive,
training.
(3) Diminish Cuban financial resources.
(a) Introdured counterfeit currently in large
n
quantities.
stort the Cuban Financial posture,
(4) Create sumpleton and dissension between Cubana
and Russians.
Bimse the Russians are doubtless a major factor
training progresh condnated in Cuba,
111 diminish
their inter relat:
the
training
face an
Initiate a Russian Language program beamed
designed to Attract Russian listenes.
Lémne is established, undertake to
the huantane question time purpose of, wisdom
.
and personnel risk implyed by their preser
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III. Me
Latin
2.
(b) Exploit the presence of the Red Armý in
Cuba by
ing a wedge between the Soviet soldier
instructers and the Cuban population. Efforts to
attain this chfective would tholude the use of
live double agents, planted rumors, incidents
created by guerrilla insurgents, and prepaganda
designed to dalies
the hardship of the peasant
with the Soviet intrusins ཟེེ་
(a) Deveẵng artion'plans for Cubarı
and destroy Russian technicians. Offer
through elandestine sources, for destruction
Russian personnel.
(Additional nations, missed directly at the
pand alstribution potential in
ad be added by other agencies, in their
competence).
traze
me the Capabilitie
ist Communist Subversion
um in beings
sing the grograms which are now in progress
it is necessary to reflect that, extensive though they are,
many have not yet accelerated to their full thrust and, taken
all together, they have certainly not fortified our allies to
the point where subversion can be paid to be under full oämbrol,
US Military Efforts.
United States military forces are now partici-
in a broad spectrum of military and extra-military
san in Latin America, all of which contribute
ngthening the ability of the countries to exposa
put down subversive activity.
insipal ares
these, the
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(1) Commberinsurgenty,
i-subversion and pay-
hological operations training, through the medium
my missions and mobile training teams.
Provision
equipment and material on short
for use in the face of subversion or subversive
(3) The conduct
and rich control.
(4) Provision
tion for Latin Ameri
United States Servic
training programa in
a1 counterinsurgency educk
officers and enlisted men in
hoots and seadentes.
(5) Provision of efvto notion training and
assistance.
(6) Ancillary military efforts aimed at strengthen-
ing the ability of Latin American countries to resist
subversions
(a) United Staten provision of maintenance
support and assistans
Latin American mayal
air units.
(b) Officer
(6) Language trad
for Latin American
(4)
Army, Navy and Air Force
Defense Confe
(e) Cooperative mapping operations.
Troop information
The United States military is embarked on a
aimed at making the Latin American military
of the realities of Communism and Commandst
This inimicas
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(a) Translation into Spanish and printing of
50,000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets
entitled, "Democracy versus Communism",
(b) Development of an audio/visual film strip
based on the "Democracy versus Communism” pamphlets
for the illiterate Latin American enlisted men.
One-hundred and
have been sent to
of these films and records
NOARIB für further distributien
to the Latin American services.
(c) Thirteen hund
copies of the USIA pamphlet
#rackices y Directions Contra La Farsa Communista
being procured
tribution among the
13
American military.
State).
itico-Economia Erfurt (to be supplied by
Fropaganda. Effort (to be supplied by USKA).
The Intelligence and Ten-attributable Efforts
(to be supplied by CIA),
below are
However,
Which My Be
the case of Section II, the programs outlined
ressonable technical and practical competence.
arbus the complete spectrum of actiems, it
found muſtable, on political
is realized that expe
or other gatuandas
a. Surveillances
(1) Establish a
Ebean sea and coastal surveil
am which provides for multilateral exchange
Information and miltilateral participation in an
alerting systems each country to be responsible for
ling its dim
Require a US
ölligence input into the
Caribbean alertin
igence between subscriber nations.
and provide for exchanging
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(3) Contime the improvement of US communications
in Latin America, at high priority, to contribute
effectiveness of the alerting system.
b. Multinational Counterinsurgency Force.
Counterins
Latin Amer
Buch
the fenokedlity of organizing an QAS
eney Brigade for emplament throughout
combat the effects of subversion.
proposal, made at this time, would exhibit the
seritis determination of the U.S. to support vigorously
and Orient
for a greatly expanded out-of-country
training and orientation program for kay segments
each Latin American country's population such as:
(1) Enlisted and officer military personnel to be
oled in Par
Ar the United States.
Police permennél to be sohealed in Parama ør
States.
(3)
pered to be semoled within the
ted States.
Правов
and female) to be trained in
(5) Civilian tech
be trained in United
such
expanded training
place in the
States, is not just to
the skill and education level of the people imatured
but, even
to shipe
the Latins to US influence,
to parmunda them by close
is current, and this to stiffen
resolve to combat subversion in any
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SISCRET
Troop Information Program «
Expand greatly the current Latin American troop
information program in order to educate the Latin bai
Ameziona servicemen (and their adviliam contemporaries)
subversive
they face.
News and Propag
(1) Underwrite,
information progra
necessary, and cominct an
Antries using these themess
(a) An
each country in Latin
of feats on subversive
ing, moirement of subversives, and general sub-.
versive programa
(b) Objectives of the Communists within each
(c) Communist methods of operation,
(d) Feets on the decrease in living standards
within Cuba since the rise of Castro.
(e) Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.
(2) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Comment Press
Mary Latin American papers, even the anti-
communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents
and many of their columnists, proof-readers and
linotypers are bought with communist money. Circu
lation of these papers in artifically inflated by Iow
prices and underwritten by communist funds. The
States must mit this financial investment in
control in order to convey the truth to the
who, like the Imerican, believes what he reads.
(3) Distribute -Communist Literature
In large numbers,.
should be printed in Spanial
stributed through inexpensive
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rearited
specific
Travel controls
To be fameled by atte
(1) We should strive for an AS embargo on travel
and fram Cuba. If unable to achieve a majority
decision in the CMS we should pursue the matter on
bilateral basis, outside of the framework of the 08S,
and inject these Cuban isolationist criteria into
acceptance requirem
of the "Alliance for Progress
(2) We should inthiste measures against Cuba
directed at preventing Latin Americans from entering
Cuba or returning to their cam countries and prevent
the travel of Cuban sonnel and goods to other
tin American cou
be used as A
The "Alliance for Progress
ver, adding these requirements
acceptability criteria.
(3) We should pretins
adition of
arrangements which pamit
who are
and
Improve Our Counterinsurgency· Programa
should accelerate and broaden counterins
in each emetry of Latin America,
for a realistic "Internal Defense Plan" for every country
Latin American countries to ask for US counter-
training assistance, for military, parami 11 tary
forces.
sor Land and Political Reform
emity action Cough OAS channels
land and political reform
buying
Aferics in order
to reduce the susceptibili ies of the "have-nots to
commntist subversion.
Labor and Youth Reforms-
rage reforms to ameliorate the frustrati
aber and youth.
With Taber,
4th youth
it is a matter of orientation.

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SECRET
Unless sufficient reform is made to satisfy the aspir-
ations of the laborer; and unless sufficient evidence
is presented to embryonic intellectuals that castrofsm
in the greater of the political/ecomenic evils faoing
them, Castro will time to find a fertile bed for
J.
agents,
seek and destroy the
and subversive
Labor and youth
Amertean target countries.
stives would includes
(a) Publicized
apparatus.
(b) Fren
plans and ap-
streamment authority.
Comnterespiimage against Suture subversive
stage selected terrorist
countries, designed to
(4) Autunge
of Soviet Czech
discovered" in selected Latin American countri
amggled in
ཡཙྩཱཎཉྩ བྷཱཡ---!ཋཱ
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and
which
as thei
IV. Conclusion
in un crear are stem
and other
attuth program
It is the conviction of the Committee that the actions
preceding mentions somprise a propper which,
outlined
offere
sly reversing the
cess-of Cuba-based Communist subversion in Latin America,
Each individual action embodies some element of usefulness
in itself, and any combination of actions my generate
correspondingly favorable remilts. There is no profound re-
lationship whic demands the combining of any specific set
of actions
It
egommended,
that an early selection
be made these nations listed above úhose execution is
ompatible n national obligations and dedications in
."
other areas, and that they be put quickly into effect since
the longer the subversive influences in the Hemisphere are
pesnitted
the se difficult will be their ulti-
mate eliminnet
And
recognizing
diverse nature of the
Cold War aptivities involved, it is recommended that a
single point in the devement be designated and assigned
responsibility for
executten of the total
gram.
mut imputat
15
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Originating Agency:
Subject:
Date:
Curb/Intingency Placeming
3/11/63
Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)
DIA
Navy
ONI
OSD
Joint Staff
☑
USAF
NSC
State Dept 1
CIA
Other
(Please specify below)
CIA
The Department of State has no objection to the
release or declassification of this 
document in full
under 
the 
provisions of the JFK 
Assassination Record.
Collection Act of 1992 (
PL102-526)
Reviewed on
7/211/97
13-00000
OSD/
ISA
Captain Zumwalt/DRAFT # 2
March 11, 1963
IX.A.3.d. General Pressures to Create a Contingency
In order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban
regime without harming the United States image and with minimum distortion
of bilateral US-USSR relationships, there must be careful coordination and
phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There must be a plan capable
of getting us from where we are now to where we want to go, by gradually
increasing pressures until the objective is achieved. These pressures
should be designed to create opportunities and contingency situations
for further exploitation, along the way.
:
The optimum orchestration of such a Cuban program must obviously be
developed as the future unfolds. But in order to provide overall guidance
within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort is required.
This plan is divided into eight headings with a gradually increasing level
of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through
the various phases is visualized as taking place in a coordinated but not
necessarily symmetrical manner. In other words, we may be in the most
vigorous phase of propaganda while not yet having reached the final phase
with regard to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the
respective phase in either category would be coordinated as part of an
overall governmental orchestration.
A program scenario capable of producing a decisive change or
exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follows.
US Posture
Initially the US image should be that of willingness
to do all that is necessary to keep Castro's military threat nil and his
subversive threat to the Western Hemisphere at an acceptably low level.
It should be characterized as one during which the USG, having been.
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i
extremely reasonable despite Castro's intransigence, is waiting for signs
of more favorable change in Cuba.
.
Later the US image should change to one in which the US is being
"led" by the majority of the QAS into QAS initiated and sponsored
pressures against Cuba. These would consist of measures less than those
certain to overthrow Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, in
the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro
or provide an occasion for decisive action. Pressures would be applied
in such fashion as to represent both a carrot to the Cuban people to get
rid of Castro regime and a stick toward the present regime. Still later
the US stance should become publicly, "at last" to join the QAS majority
in seeking vigorous pressures on the Castro regime without yet irrevocably
committing US prestige to decisive action.
Finally, if and when the orchestration and circumstances have
brought the US position to such a point that decisive action is possible,
and if earlier pressures have not eliminated Castro or do not give promise
him
of eliminating some decisive action might be considered. This need not
be an invasion by US forces and could be re-imposition of total blockade
or a disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances.
QAS Action
- -
The USG will need to devote major attention to the
strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional
opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly
along several lines, quite apart from the covert effort to organize the
majority on specific issues. This effort to achieve solidarity should
consist of frequent briefings of the OAS nations through all appropriate
· channels, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the QAS, efforts
to set up an QAS military organization with occasional commitment of troops
TA SECRET
A
:
th
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for training, and all other feasible developments of regional themes, such
as intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of the
region. It is very necessary, in view of the general LA situation to
.
continue all measures necessary to isolate Castro.
Initial QAS action should be the enlargement of the bases for the
invocation of the Rio Treaty. This broadening should be against the con-
timed presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the USSR indicate.
that this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continued
subversive activity. Concomitantly, the recent study of the Special
Consultative Committee on Security should be given wide publicity and
the US should press for implementation of its recommendations,
The OAS, in the near future, probably after publication of the results
of the foregoing study and enlargement of the basis for invoking the Rio
Treaty to include subversion, should again formally warn Cuba against
promotion of any more subversive activities. The QAS should formally
state that should Cuban subversive activities rise above some (unspecified)
level, a "new condition" would exist which would justify decisive action
against Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which could be
attributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority QAS support
should be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence theme.
Bilateral approaches and economic quid pro quos should be used to win
Brazil to the U.S. view within QAS.
Still later, at an appropriate time, the QAS should make an official
finding, from its studies initiated earlier, that the Castro regime has
continued, despite warnings, to conduct aggressive and subversive actions
in Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or
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'White Paper should be promulgated through the OAS. Later a "new condition"
should be found formally to exist, following which the US would state
that the earlier US-USSR modus vivendi regarding Cuba has come to an end.
Following the above, an QAS vote should call for the remaining LA nations
to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all members to restrict
their nationals from travel to Cuba. Castro should be officially labeled
as a major threat to the hemisphere and to the objective of the Alliance
for Progress.
The QAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes
warlike activity and proclaim a prohibition against any warlike activity
being conducted by Cuba within an océan and land area around the entire LA
continental and Caribbean area. Intervention of aircraft and ships
carrying arms, subversive agents, propaganda materials, etc. could be
authorized timely
Still later at an appropriate time the QAS should vote, under the
Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could take the
form of a resolution for all members to take such action including the
use of force as individually considered appropriate or to endorse any
specific decisive action to which the members had agreed.
The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the QAS and warn that
the situation may get worse. Later, as a result of "QAS insistence" the
Free World should be urged to extend or re-affirm trade embargos to all
items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; to apply shipping
restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to include Cuba on the list of
countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited;
free world industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cuba
THE
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crucial spare parts and equipment which are not on the COCOM list.
Still later the US should increase the vigor with which she seeks,
through. briefings, pressures, etc., to increase the effectiveness of all
economic measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to
limit their airline services to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to
Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. At an appropriate point in the orchestration,
food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, with US using¨
its influence to extend this embargo throughout the Free World.
The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application
of a blockade to Cuba. This could be a phased weapon consisting of a
blockade on POL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow.
Surveillance over Cuba
--
Until it becomes apparent that the Soviet
Union has no intention of removing any additional military personnel,
aerial surveillance should be limited to appropriate high altitude
coverage with low level surveillance avoided except for thoroughly
suspicious indications.
Later, at a suitable point in the orchestration, occasional low
altitude surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such
fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuban people; while avoiding
AA defenses.
Still later, suitably timed, the United States/OAS should initiate
very frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be increased in
intensity to the point at which our aircraft would literally seek out
AA defense sites in search of provocative acts or, in the absence of
Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image.
In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should
be at saturation levels.
......
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Regional Surveillance
--
The QAS or the Caribbean nations should take
the initiative in organizing, as a part of a Caribbean security arrange-
ment, a surface ship and aerial surveillance of the coastal and offshore
waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively
moved out from the shores of the nations being protected into the Caribbean
approaches to Cuba, tying in with an QAS proclaimed zone in which movement
of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Toward the
end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cuba. `
There should be increasing surveillance and control of land boundaries.
There should be improved systematic exchange of intelligence on subversive.
activity.
Propaganda There should be established immediately a radio station
(Radio Free Cuba), probably in Florida, using covert funds, with
regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuban political
groups. Its content should be the middle converse between VOA and
Radio Swan.
Initially, through public statements, VOA, etc., maintain the
theme of the U.S. "watchful waiting" for change in the Castro regime.
Maintain the currently enhanced VOA wave facility beamed to Cuba. High-
light positive results in Latin America of the Alliance for Progress. We
should warn Cuba unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the
consequences of continued subversion and of Castro's present track. Still
later, prior to any decisive action, if taken, this theme should go out
officially over VOA and in announcements of public officials.
Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations.
Infiltrate Cuban exile publications. Play up, on all media, the threat
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of Castro to the regimes of the Western Hemisphere and the objectives
of Alliance for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came to
power on a pledge to provide political freedom.
Remind them of the social
Contrast their present
goals he held up while he destroyed that freedom.
economic chaos with those economic goals of land and housing reform..
Remind them that he preached nationalism while delivering their country
to the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal was
accompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask what Castro has left
to offer. Conclude that only the mutual fear of retribution among
his elite remains to hold them in power. Use slogans such as "L 64"
' (Liberty in '64), etc.
Still later initiate through public broadcast, training in the
rudiments of seditions activity.
Still later urge the many small revolutionary-cells to make contact
with neighboring groups. Warn and threaten the Castro regime through
all media; exhort the people to organize to join enlarged resistance groups;
seek to build up resistance heroes. Endeavor to deflate Castro through
these broadcasts. Stress the freedom of the Cuban people, post-Castro, to
choose their own political and social structure.
Subversion
--
There should be an initial period of no increase in
subversive efforts by the U.S.', until the bilateral phase of the Cuban
affair is completed and it is clear that the Soviet Union will remove
no additional military personnel.
After that time minimal covert contacts should be established within
Cuba for the distribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts of
defiance and sabotage should be initiated. For example, exhort groups
-7-
f

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of 3 or 4 friends, without establishing external rebel affiliation, to
-paint L'64, etc., on walls or to confit isolated acts of sabotage. The
purpose. would be to establish rebel connotation and to generate leadership.
This would lead to the establishment of rudimentary cellular training
in seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical items should be initiated
to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders
should be identified. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should
continue. The number of Cuban exiles taken into the United States Armed
Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significantly
increased. A similar program for "freedom fighters for Cuba" should be
undertaken for volunteers from other LA nations. At a later point in the
crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should
be encouraged. All covert effort should be exerted toward coordinating
the cells, pockets, and groups resisting Castro, inside and outside Cuba.
This would be a transition period from sporadic acts in isolation into
organized subversion. Fuel and food supplies should be sabotaged. An
organized supply system should be put into effect with large numbers of
fishing craft situated around the island to make both scheduled supply.
of deliveries and deliveries of opportunity. As various groups are identi-
fied in revolt, they should be worked into the supply system. New LA and
Cuban fighters training outside. Cuba, should be introduced in the same way
into these organized movements within Cuba. There should be frequent
leaks of planned US invasion and appropriate denials to frustrate the
suspicious Castro. Fleet and air "training" demonstrations should be
scheduled off Cuba. At the same time it should be made clear to rebel
leaders that an externally launched invasion is not to be expected until
a revolution has come from within, with external logistic assistance.
- 8 -
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It should be emphasized to the retel leaders that the U.S. does not expect
the clock to be turned back with regard to social conditions.
Still later a complete orchestration should be woven together,
coming to a crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the main-
stream:s discussed in the categories above. Propaganda should reach the
maximum denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holding up the
prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their
resistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of
all available externally trained resistance fighters, provision of maximum
logistic support, etc. At the aproprict time, if this resistance movement
needs the assistance of external forces there should be an OAS structured
air strike, related to an appropriate Castro mis-step, to disarm Cuban
offensive and defensive power and to destroy all POL storage. This attack
should be coordinated with all-out sabotage.
An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if re-
quired to save the resistance, once the all-out internal resistance
efforts has been initiated.
Criteria
--
The pressures discussed in all categories above should
:
be appropriately coordinated. The period of moderation should end after
one or two months when it is apparent that no further Soviet military
personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures should then commence,
lasting for a period of two to three months, until some episode of
:
..
escalation by Castro or other appropriate event, makes further pressures
feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, QAS major insistance should
lead to escalation of pressures. After another short period, again pre-
ferable triggered by an appropriate Castro episode or alternatively by a
majority QAS vote still more vigorous pressures should be initiated.
- 9 - M
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.4
If Castro has initiated a suitable war-like act, such as fixing
on surveillance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the maximum
immediately rather than gradually.
- 10 -
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PARTAGE
Secret
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-613C/sg
Ser 000950P61
MAR 1 1963
.
-Downgraded to CONF upon removal of enclosures
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J..A. CALIFANO, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
SECRETARY. OF THE ARMY
Subj:
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban
Affairs: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion (U)
Ref: (a) Your Memo No. 13 of 28 FEB 1963
Encl: (1) through (8) Proposed actions (TS)
1. As requested by reference (a), specific and direct actions
designed to resolve problems of Cuban subversion are sub-
mitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (8).
Mill. Wench
W.FA WENDT
Director Strategic Plans Division
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
PAGE NO 1 _OF 1 PAGES
COPY NO. 1 OF 10 COPIES
Reproduction of this document in
whole or in part is prohibited
except with permissica of the
Issuing office or higher authority.
Secret
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Top Secret
SEGRET
A.
D.
PROPOSED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT
BE TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE US,
BILATERALLY, OR THROUGH THE OAS, TO
IMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE
TRAINEES TO AND FROM CUBA
Institute effective procedures to insure that U.S. citizens
do not travel to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
Continue U.S. restriction against U.S. airline service
to Cuba. (This is important to avoid giving other air-
lines an excuse to reestablish air service) (unilateral
U.S. action).
Thoroughly examine Latin American constitutions and laws
to determine the legal capability or impediment to control.
of travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral
U.S. action).
Arrange for adverse publicity on individuals who are
known to have undergone subversive training in Cuba (uni-
lateral U.S. action).
E. Spread rumors of epidemics in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
.K.
Sabotage aircraft proceeding to and from Cuba (unilateral
U.S. action).
Increase U.S. efforts to establish identity of all Latin
Americans travelling to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S.
action).\.
Encourage Latin American countries to pass new legislation,
or enforce existing legislation, restricting the travel
of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
Persuade Latin American governments to prevent re-entry.
to their country of persons suspected to have been
trained in subversion in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).
Persuade LA countries to tighten border security measures
by appropriate authority (unilateral U.S. action). Supply
equipment and POL for patrol and surveillance. See
enclosure (6);
Cubana's Britannia aircraft are in disrepair (2 or 3 of 5
are operational). Under existing agreements, Cuba must
Reproduction of this document in
whole or in part is prohibited
except with permission of the
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DRYNGRADING
DOD DIR $200.10 DOES NOT APPLY,
issuing office or higher authority.'
ENCLOSURE (✓) to CNO Ser/Memo_000950P6/
Secret
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Top Secret
L.
M.
N.
•
SECRET
seek Mexican concurrence in using new equipment (IL-18)
on the Havana-Mexico City route. We should persuade
Mexico to refuse the new aircraft on grounds of safety,
facilities, or other reasons. We should also encourage
Great Britain or other sources to cut off spare parts
(unilateral U.S. action).
Encourage hemispheric countries to deny unscheduled
traffic stops to Cubana airlines (unilateral U.S. action).
Persuade friendly governments in LA and elsewhere to
harass ships and aircraft traveling to Cuba with admini-m
strative delays (minute examination of air worthiness
certificates, customs, documents, etc.) (unilateral U.S.
action).
Seek arrangement whereby other Latin American countries
would cooperate with Mexican efforts to deny travel their
nationals to and from Cuba via Mexico (see Mexico City
Tel 2221) (bilateral U.S. action).
2
GRET
Secret
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Fensitivé
SECRET
Col. J. K. Patchell
18 April 1963
-
X75727
"
6. POLICY CONC
COVERT ACTIONS DIR
INTRODUCTION
AGAINST CUBA
The purpose of this paper is to provide, within security
limitations, a useful guide for the consideration of clandesting,
and covert actions as a part of a future projection of U. 6.
The paper is designed to be as objective as possible
compromising many details of highly sensitive information. For
this reason, the paper focusses on general principles. The study
is not intended to be critical. It is not designed to justify
nor to predict the future.
The discussion of the factors conditioning U. S. policy in
the realm of the clandestine and covert may seem elementary and
somewhat philosophical; however, these factors provide the general
parameters within which future actions can be considered. Any
attempt to determine the proportionate influence of any particular
conditioner would be speculative.
MAJOR CONDITIONING FACTORS
for conditionl
factors
clandestine and co
I past U. 8. policy in th
areas. This is not an exhaustive list, but
it describes briefly a few of the elements which must be considered
in the process of making valid and conclusive determinations:
a. Objective.
It is most desirable to determine the U. 8.
objective in precise terms. When the objective is clarified and
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
PIA
13-00000
३
SECRET
understood, actions can be developed to achieve that objective. The
extent of the U. S. commitment, as reflected by the determination
of the objective, is an important factor in the determination of the
commitment of U. S. resources and has great significance in the
It must be
nderstood that the creation of a resistance
under the situation currently obtaining in Cuba probably envisages
an ultimate U. S. commitment to direct military action. There can
be no advanced guarantee of the success or the security of auch an
operation, nor is there
which may be suse
estimates indicate litt
revolt without significa
Support
calistic brake upon the ultimate outcome
rapid escalation. Current intelligence:
thood of the success of a Guban intuired
rnal support.
U. 8. or multilateral.
are general misconceptions and certain grave risks inherent
(a) seeking a solution to the Guba dilemma wholly by clandestine
* covert means, (b) placing disproportionate reliance on clandestine
and covert activity, (c) developing clandestine or covert actions in
isolation of or significantly in advance of U. S. policy, and (d) develop-
ing actions for the sake of action alone or in order to capitalize on
some intriguing gimmickery.
Obviously, the determination of U. S. objectives is
beyond the realm of the clandestine and covert and cannot be con-
sidered in the context of Cube alone. Serious judgments must be
made in relation to the broad world environment. Actions against
Cuba may be detrimental to U. 8. aims by causing intensified security
eractions elsewhere, or the unnecessary
suspects, potential agents
b. Risks.
A good "rule of thumb" with respect to clandestine
or covert actions is that the risks entailed are in direct proportion
to the usefulness of the operations.
c. Attribution and Deniability.
U. S. leadership will always be concerned with
attributed to the
stine or covers
SECRET
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It is reasonable to assume that Cuba will attribute to the U. 8.
(at the time of Cuba's choosing) any actions, real or manufactured,
which they desire. Assuming that the U. 8, will receive the blame
flexibility for action.
Deniability, while quite relevant, is a relative factor,
to disassociate participants,
very effort can be
sanitized materiel, and
efforts, when carried
the operation.
balance to
In summa
subjected to judgmenta
including the curious s
Involvements. Theoretical
reasonable balance between
rate from covert bases. Such
tend to jeopardize
ade to
denlability, " as
etermination of deniability is
rels of those who have access,
develop personal emotional
the solution appears to be to week
žost complete deniability (an
example in which few actions can be taken and the associated admin-
istrative or security precautions outweigh or jeopardize the opera-
tion itself) and reasonable safeguards to insure that the proof of
U. S. implication cannot be developed.
In this connection there is a mandatory requirement
for unanimity of denial on the part of U. S. officials. This unanimity
must obtain despite the
Castro/Communist prop
ally
dissension
secure operation.
Agnitude, persistence, or accuracy of the
machine. The stated denials of U.
comoted official tements
al U. S governme
compromise
It should be pointed out that as a result of U. S.
accepted complicity in Vēž flights and the Bay of Pigs operation,
the U. S. is in a significantly more sensitive position with respect
to clandestine and covert actions. U. S. admissions tend to
:
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greater credibility to the accusations of the Castro or Sino/Soviet
Bloc and alert our enemies to the possibility that the U. S. may
undertake actions of a less conventional nature.
VtalMlity.
It may be desirable to undertake actions which
achieve little press coverage (visibility or noise level). It is
difficult to determine with any accuracy beforehand the extent of
the publicity to be achieved. The Castro Regime generally can
control the timing and magnitude of public release. The world
press for the most part is not subject to U, S. control except i
the U. S. may achieve success through counter-propaganda.
It is reasonable to conclude that & progressively
increasing or static molde level is the most acceptable. Ac
atically increased noise level may be acceptable when accompanied
by significant (bendline) overt items which serve to distract the
attention of the public.
e. Morality and Selectivity.
There is a natural reluctance to undertake
clandestine or covert actions which result in the death or serious
injury to innocent Cubans. Meaningful actions will certainly
cause harm to certain elements, but some of the destructive actions
which could be undertaken may be counterproductive in that they
strike at the wrong targets. Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve
the desired degree of selectivity in uncontrolled operations, imple-·
mented in secrecy.
The creation of food, clothing and medical shortages
´and the sabotage of storage or distribution facilities undoubtedly may
hurt the economy but those committed to the Castro Regime may
suffer relatively little. Such actions may do little but weaken an
inactive or apathetic populace while increasing the internal security
mechanism.
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There are obvious moral judgments attached to
many of the proposals for actions directed against Cuba. When
the judgments of various individuals differ, the resulting U. S.
position probably reflects the least common denominator. . Many
proposals may be unacceptable because the deniability factor is
too low or the proposals may be of a nature that premature com-
mitment and subsequent disclosure would not be desirable since
the weapon may be worthy of a more far reaching impact. There
is an understandable frustration in the U. 8. resorting to the ap-
plication of sophisticated clandestine weapons against a small
state which theoretically could be brought to its knees in a rela«
tively short period of time through the application of conventional
weapons.
There is an imposing array of intriguing or
amusing “tricks" which are of no real or lasting consequence.
These could subject the U. S. to adverse criticism on moral
grounds or extend the parameters of warfare to new dimensions.
4. Recruitment and Exile Politics.
The recruiting problem deserves consideration
in any paper considering clandestine and covert actions. Obviously,
the recruitment of a sole individual involves a system of screening
which theoretically must not be compromised either in the process
of sorting or during the subsequent utilization and post-utilization
periods. There is a marked tendency for Cubans to talk, to brag,
or to infer participation in secret operations. Individuals personally
and scores of exile organizations are quick to capitalize on the real
or imaginary activities of their members. These Cuban exile organ-
isations compete for recognition, prestige and material support
which they hope will stem from their participation in clandestins or
covert activities. There is a constant flow of proposals for action
and requests for assistance or official recognition. Some individuals
and organisations merely desire to publicize their affiliations with
some member of the U. S. Government.
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綠
તારાઓ
It is not feasible to investigate in details all
of the proposals for action submitted by individuals and groups..,
Experience has indicated that generally the exile claims are
without foundation and the preponderance of their proposals are
not feasible. As a matter of practice such individuals or groups
are not satisfied with a single rebuff, but make their offers to in-
dividuals in CIA, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice
or with members, of Congress, the press, and other non-govern«
mental individuals or agencies. A specific action or proposal
may have had merit at one point, but from a security standpoint,
the persistence of the proposer may have negated the potential
of his proposal and could have compromised an otherwise
workable scheme.
In order to minimize affiliation with endle
groups, the most apparent solution which is suggested frequently
envisages the recruitment of Cubans who have no political affilia
tions. While this may be possible, experience has indicated that
it is not probable. Those Cubans in the U. S. who have associated
with U. S. personnel and those who speak English are generally
marked. Those whose language capabilities and economic stature
combine to limit their social mobility are more likely to turn to,
accept and become involved in the social, political or cultural
cloisters of Cubans in the U. S.
There are additional political and psychological
problems in seeking recruits from among Cubans who have fled
and generally desire to remain united with families and friends.
Their motivation to participate in activities against Castro gener
ally can be measured in terms of their assimilation and econom
success in the U. 8. Experience has shown that internal opp
ists may resent external Cuban leadership. As the exile group:
compete for political prestige and material support, so
representatives of the internal resistance groups.
The problems of exiles attempting to determine
the extent of U. S. commitment and associated security implications
are discussed elsewhere in this paper.
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--
SECRE
Timing.
Obviously, the successful execution of well-
planned clandestine or covert operations is time consuming.” Recruité
ment, isolation and training cannot be accomplished in a matter of
days. There is no standby reservoir of multi-purpose agents. The
operations themselves call for split second timing and are subject both
to nature's elements (weather, tides, moon, season) and other unauti-
cipated and unpredictable circumstances (Cuban alerts, contact with
patrols, compromise of internal contacts, actions of anti-Castro
groups, or other world events).
Timing problems are compounded by the increased
ients and the requirements for synchronised actions,
More effective operations can be undertaken when
there is some general contimity in the program and there is an oppor-
tunity to plas in greatest detail. From a practical standpoint, it is
extremely difficult to maintáin individual or group motivation and aggres-
siveness when operations are delayed, aborted, canalled or subjected to
‚continual modification.
ASSETS
In considering U. S. assets for covert and clandestine operations
against Cuba, it is well to review briefly in an historical context, the
situation which faces the U. 8.
Prior to Castro's assumption of power, U. S. efforts in the field
of intelligence and clandestine operations in Latin America lagged behind
efforts in other more immediate problem areas of the world. At the time
Castro assumed control in Cuba, there was much open controversy on the
question of Castro's subservience to communism, but generally it was
assumed that the change of government in Cuba was in the well-known
Latin tradition. Later, it was realized that the change of government
was not just a change in personalities, but a revolutionary change in
governmental system. At this point, early in 1960, plans were developed
to assist the people of Cuba in overthrowing their government. This plan
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culminated in the abortive Bay of Pigs Operation in late April 1961.
It has been conceded that the Bay of Pigs Operation caused many dis-
sidante and potential resistance groups to expose themselves and be
rolled up in the Cuban security operations which ca
fateful operation.
During the six month period which followed the events of April
1961, the U. S. was not in a position to expose itself further to any
suggestion of clandestine actions against Cuba. The experts involved
in that operation were reassigned and little or no effort was made to
further endanger any residual assets in Guba which may have survived
the Cuban security operations of the spring and summer of 1961.
By Life 1963, another effort was orga
available for operations in Gubi
an inventory revealed that the few reliable assets in the target area
were essentially intelligence agents and could not be spared for con-
version to clandestine operations. Gastro had consolidated his security
mechanism to the point that by early 1962 it was quite dear that lures.
tions of agents in useful areas would be most precarious. The large
reservair of motivated Cubans who had participated in the Bay of Pigs
Operation were either imprisoned or had lost their cover. They were
no longer an available source for clandestine operations. During the
first nine months of 1962, the emphasis was placed on intelligence
gathering rather than clandestine operations or political action in the
target area.
Because of certain operational difficulties mast of the opera-
tional missions undertaken during the spring and summer of 1962
were
apromised. Castro's accusation, coupl
the publle
and "emfessions" of "U. S. agente"
the operational program to be periodically discontinued. No attempt
was made during or immediately after the missile crisis to continue
the program.
ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The role of the Department of Defense in clandestine and covert
areas has been the subject of much controversy both within the Depart-
ment of Defense and within the Central Intelligence Agency.
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By charter the Department of Defense does not pla
role in the fields of clandestine or covert operations,
Department of Defense is not specifically precluded from assuming
a principle role and, in fact, there is specific authority for the
Department of Defense to assume such a role when the scope of a
_ particular operation exceeds the capabilities of the Central Intelli
gence Agency. From U. 8. lessons learned in Laos and Guha (during
the Bay of Pige Operation) the size of these operations were considerad
beyond the capabilities of the CIA. (At least the resources of men,
money and materiel available to CIA were strained severely). In such
circumstances when DoD asréta far exceed
GIA it m
Preferable to give DoD the primary role and responsibility and hire
CIA render required support. Again security becomes a major factši
when an operation reaches such a magnitude that DoD is forced to
assume the responsibility. Many argue, with some justification, that
when the operation is of a magnitude that the DoD must assume the
responsibility, it is at the paint of lesing its cover or élandestine
wrappings and DoD may suffer the consequences.
Except for participation during World War II, few individuals
in the Department of Defense were concerned with clandestine opera-
tions prior to 1960. Experiences of the military in Germany, Laos,
Guba and Vietnam served to underline many of the capabilities and
limitations of the military in these fields. There are many emotional
organisational chaflict of interest aspects involved in a considerațion
of the role the military should assume. Ons view is that the military
can and should assume a greater role immediately. Supporters of this
view base their arguments on some demonstrated inefficiencies com-
mitted under GIA management in the past, the planning experience of
DoD, and the breadth and depth of resources in men, money and
materiel available to the Department of Defense. Some of the more
emotional support of this view stems from the military's frustration
of GIA's apparent inability to take bold actions (probably combined
with some inborn jingoism).
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proponents in DoD of a more cautions
sensitive to the commitment of U. S. military resour
unconventional field at the expense of implicit responsibilities in
the conventional area. There is some opposition on moralistic
grounds and there is concern that the inability to maintain security
in any sizeable covert or clandestins operation could subsequently:
reflect adversely on the military establishment or the professional
military as a group. Other objections include a reluctance to
assume the responsibilities and risks entailed in operations of this
nature and a preference to play a supporting role to the "profes❤
„sionaliam“ of CIA. Some bureaucratic or organisational lethargy
may also influence military views.
In the past, the military has played an essential role in three
major categories » money, men and material. From the fiscal stand-
point, the Department of Defense can provide väst expenditures with
relatively great flexibility,
The vast resources in manpower of the DoD (with military
technical and linguistic skills, overseas experience, physical con-
ditioning and personal dedication and aggressiveness) provides a
very lucrative potential for DoD participation in clandestine and
covert actions. The major problem in this connection is the separa-
tion of the individual from the military Service. The mechanics of
individual cover, dummy records, and the administrative processing
is essentially no great problem. The difficulties appear in the con-
sideration of family and military associations. It is relatively easy
to quickly isolate and "sheep dip" an air crew or a small bost crew
for one short mission; however, this process is not easily extended
for any protracted period. There is usually a requirement to consider
carefully the pay and allowances of military personnel operating
independently or in conjunction with CIA personnel on clandestine
and covert operations.
The material assets of the Department of Defense can play a
major role in GIA's overall operation. DoD can provide cover for
many of CIA's training, supply and storage installations: DoD is
involved in surveillance activities. The DoD inventory of aircraft
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and ships with trained crews are adaptable to infiltration and exfiltra-
tion missions. DoD stocks of arms, foodstuffs and equipment along
ĐọDừa chility to sanitise, package and ship for serial or
by quantities of supplies is a significant asset.
There is a general misunderstanding concerning the use of
Army Special Forces units, Navy SEAL teams, Air Force Jungle Jim
organizations or Marine Corps special units in covert and clandestine
operations. While it is entirely possible and feasible to convert
individuals or units for clandestine or covert operations, the basic
mission of Special Forces originally was oriented toward the organiza-
tion of resistance forces in support of overt military operations. Subse-
quently, the charter of Special Forces was expanded to incorporate
counter-insurgency operations in friendly territory. Both of thead
missions are essentially overt in nature and there is a lack of experience
and doctrine for the commitment of Special Forces in clandestine or
covert operations. This generally applies to units of the other mili-
tary Services. Any major reorientation of the mission of these units
will detract from their current requirements and could jeopardise,
for example, the ability of our Special Forces to assist in the organiza-
tion of a resistance in Cuba in support of a conventional military opera+
tion there.
5.
INTELLIGENCE
It is essential to an understanding of the problem to realise
that since late 1961, all U. S. intelligence estimates have indivated
that there is little likelihood of an internally sparked Cuban résistance
to be of any significance. According to CIA there is little possibility
of getting advance information of any uprising without this information
also reaching officials of the Castro Regime. It is also estimated that
there is little likelihood that any resistance groups would be able to
"hold out" in any organized form for more than a week or two. Castro
personally is quite aware of the potential of a guerrilla resistance and
moves ruthlessly, committing disproportionate forces to ensure that
the spark does not mature.
11
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עביןשם
}
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There has been a lack of useful intelligence on Cuba. This
has caused the U. 8. to place primary importance en clandestine
igence operations with a corresponding lack of emphasis on
her clandestine operations. In order to undertake operations,
vast amounts of current operational intelligence are needed. The
priority for this operational type intelligence has been relegated
to a relatively unimportant station in the spectrum of our intelli-
gence requirements for Cuba. This is particularly true when there
are limited assets and so much pressure to obtain reliable informa-
tion or confirmation on sophisticated conventional weapons or Soviet
activities. Normally,“ different methods of operation are employed
in a different physical environment for those seeking operational
intelligence,
It should be pointed out that the lack of intelligence has been
used as a crutch in not pressing for more clandestine operations
actions. This view can be justified, but no commander who commits
forces on the battlefield ever knows all he wants to know about his
enemy. Somewhere in between lies the answer. There must be an
acceptance of certain gaps in operational intelligence and consequently
some additional operational risks; otherwise, no meaningful actions
will ever be taken.
6.
PARAMETERS OF FUTURE ACTION
This portion of the paper is designed to indicate in general
terms the latitude of clandestine and covert actions based upon past
experience and those pertinent factors which might serve to limit
or modify U. 8, action in these areas. This should not be interpreted
to indicate the limits of future actions.
Clandestine and covert activities prior to and during the Bay
of Pigs operation can be characterized as bold and far reaching. The
future orientation of U. S. activity in this field is conditioned largely
by the failure of that operation. Clandestine and covert actions since
April 1961 can be summarized as being cautious, intermittent, and low
level. The current attention directed towards "things Cuban" places
even more stringent requirements on U. S. activities in the clandestine
and covert environment.
12
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Following are examples of the types of activities which could
be undertaken. This is not an exhaustive list, but is presented to
Illustrate the types of activity which might be considered.
Intelligence and Counterintelligence
(1) Interrogation of refugees.
(2)
Counterintelligence in U. S.
(3)
Legal travellers.
(4) Glandestine intelligence
(5)
Air and naval surveillance.
(6)
(2)
Communications surveillance.
External sources (where Cuhm is repre-
sented officially or quasi-officially or where refugees and
travellers can be reached).
(8)
(9)
Intelligence provided by third countries.
Defectors (inside or outside Cuba). It is
important to note that the security mechanism in Cuba renders
suspected potential defectors relatively inaccessible. The
development of a defector program requires vast amounts of
operational intelligence which has not been available. "There
are additional problems in seeking defections from among those
who have families. The Cuhan security apparatus combines
with geography to further restrict attempts on the part of many
who might defect if there was any reason to believe they could
leave Cuba. Those who have sought asylum in other embassies
in Havana have been refused exit visas for such prolonged periods
that their information, when finally released, is practically useless.
(10) Penetrations (inside or outside Cuba). Extreme
caution must be used to prevent the compromise of any penetrations
which can be made. Penetrations in the communist apparatus out-
side of Cuba may be of little utility or Cuban requirements of such
low priority as to limit the scope of such attempts..
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Propaganda and Psychological Operations
(1) Radio and television directe
fblack, white or grey).
(2) Printed material (mail, airdrop, or packed
with other material destined for Cuba). Airdrop is severely
´limited by Cube's air defense capability.
(3)… Radio and television and printed material
to Latin America.
(5)
Counterpr
Rumor, threat, or other campaigns using all
available communication assets, to include telephone. Propaganda
should reach the proper target, should be consistent (Cuba versus
other parts of Latin America). Psychological actions could include
air dropping of foodstuffs and medicine, Russian langsinge broad-
casts, large scale military actions near Cuba of a deception
nature, rumors and "plants" of information, etc.
Political Actions
(L)
Inside Cuba to instigate demonstrations,
establish a resistance net, or to take a particular action.
Cubana.
(2) External to instigate demonstrations against
(3) Tours of Cuban exiles to Latin America and
elsewhere (educators, jurists, labor leaders, women, youth,
‘entertainers, religious and cultural groups, etc.). NOTE: Many
of the above-actions can be accomplished overtly.
Economic Actions
(1) Sabotage of agriculture, power, industry,
internal or external transport, communications, administration,
or storage facilities.
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Covert operations to prevent sale of pur-
chase of items destined for Cubs or coming from Cuba. · (Sugar,
tropicals, etc.) NOTE: Since the Sino-Soviet commitment to
Cuba is preponderant, a large portion is not susceptible to U. 8.
action; however, the remaining trade with the Free World,
although relatively minor, is critical to Cuba and provides
the U. S. with a incrative target.
(3) Counterfeiting. Because Quba has essentially
a barter market and mass distribution is difficult, this may not
represent a useful activity. There are other very far reaching
implications which must be considered against a relatively meager
and short lived gain.
Sabotage and Harrassing Actions
(1) Sabotage of leaders homes, offices and
military installations. (Economic sabotage included in para-
graph d above),
(2)
Actions designed to withdraw people from
harvest or to overwork military elements. (To include actions
from rumors to major military exercises).
(3)
Radio or television intrusion or Jamming.
(4) Bribing, embarrassing, blackmailing, assass-
coercing and kidnapping leaders.
(S) Attack, seisure, search or harrassment and
sabotage of air and naval traffic.
(6) Attack, intimidation and harrassment of Cuban
representatives abroad.
L
Paramilitary Operations
(1) Raids.
(2) Prison breaks.
(3)
Weapons caches.
(4)
Reconnaissance in force.
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7.
Provocations or auto provocations. Contrived
rations can be undertaken; however, it appears preferable
to capitalize on real provocations which occur almost dálly
in some form. Through political and psychological handling
many of these real provocations can be developed into provoca-
tive acts.
FUTURE OPTIONS
A discussion of future options should be related specifically
to the overall objective and should consider the factors' indicated in
paragraph 2 abo
There may be advantages to taking clandestine actions fór
actions sake alone in order to (a) demonstrate and publicize contimed
Cuban resistance, (b) keep the resistance potential alive, (c) accede
to demands for a spectacular action, (d) indicate a reprisal för actions
by the Cuban Regime, (e) test, probe, deceive or harrass the internal
security mechanism in Cuba and (f) establish a psychological climate
for other overt actions.
.
So long as Castro remains the "David" and the U. 8. remains
the "Goliath," the U. S. will have a major problem of image making
in Cuba, Latin America and the world. Since April 1962, there are
indications that the fascination for "Fidelisme" has waned significantly
but to the Cubans, the Latin Americans and many other new-born states,
Castro is still the "David" and the only Latin who has successfully
challenged the North American giant. The recognition and support of
a resistance leader (real or imaginary) in Cuba would only provide a
partial solution to this problem.
'As the economic situation in Cuba becomes more intolerable,
the U. S. may expect greater dissension and more manifestations of
unrest, to include outbreaks of violence. At some point, the U. S.
could be called upon to support openly such an effort. Obviously, it
would be extremely embarrassing to the U. S. to be unable to respond
before the resistance is crushed completely. In any event, it would be
extremely difficult for the U. S. to support such a resistance in a clan-
destine or covert manner for more than a few days. Such support could
serve to alert Cuba to U. 8. intentions.
16
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RSDET
SLUNKE
Theoretically, the most desirable event which could take.
plade would envisage a major split of Cuban leadership involving
relatively proportionate military and internal security forces. It
is difficult under present circumstances to visualize a Cuban leader
of such stature even considering such a move, since he has no real
assurance of immediate U. S. military, economic and political sup-
port so vital to his tenure and so necessary to prevent a counter coup
from those deriving strength from the heavy Sine-Soviet economic
orientation of the present regime.
“The U. S. continues to be extremely vulnerable to acts of
auto provocation by the Cuban Regime. It is not beyond the realm
of possibility to have Cuban directed attacks of Guban military ele-
ments (disguised as exiles or U. S. personnel) on soft and emotional
targets in Cuba.. Such an action could serve to help Castro consolidate
internally and to seriously embarrass the U. 8. internationally.
8.
SUMMARY
The U. 8. finds itself in an uncomfortable position of waiting
for the breaks in Cubs and not knowing precisely when or how the
breaks will occur. As time goes on the changes for an internally
inspired revolt become increasingly more remote. Barring a major
political schism in which major elements of the security forces are
split, there is little promise of an internally sparked revolt of suf-
ficient magnitude to permit the U. S. to muster multilateral representa-
tion or support and intervene on behalf of this resistance.
According to authoritative sources, the U. S. will receive Hitle
or not advance notice of such an uprising and according to intelligence
estimates there is little likelihood of such an uprising surviving for
more than a few days. Also, it has been indicated that there is little
likelihood of such a resistance could gain control of a radio station
to request outside assistance. (It is recognized, however, that this
probably would be one of the principle aims of any such action group. }
17.
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I
So long as the Sino-Soviet Bloc continues to subsidize Cuba,
the internal economic situation will probably not became intolerable
for those committed to the Castro Regime. The Sino-Soviet Bloc
would stand to suffer severely if they undertook
in their support of Cuba.
reduction
Castro has cautiously avoided provocative actions of sufficient
magnitude to incur the wholesale wrath of the U. 8. or to provide a
juridical basis for overt intervention. To Castro's liking, U. 8. options
have been narrowed to U. S. instigated open conflict economic pressures
or to a time-consuming and frustrating multilateral approach utilising
the QAS mechanism.
The U. S. may again be afforded the opportun
overt actions (such as blockade or other stringent measures). Unless
preplanning on this or other actions is accomplished beforalland, covert
actions in support of these overt measures will be limited to only those
opportunities upon which the U. S. can capitalize with the means at its
disposal at the time.
From the standpoint of the Cuban Regime, there appears to be
little likelihood that any clandestine actions will be taken directly
against the U. S. However, the recent aircraft attacks or warnings
against U. S. boats indicates the possibility of uncontrolled action on
the part of individuals of the Castro Regime.
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☐
☐
ANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meating of
FROM:
Coordinator of Cuba Affairs
February 1963, 4 P.M.)
->
SUBJECT:
Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba
Objectives
The basic program adopted by the Executive Committee on January
25, 1963 sets forth major objectives for our policy toward Cuba. It als
commits us to "be prepared to increase the political, economic, psycho-
logical and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present
themselves or can be created."
This memorandum outlines a program that will meet the psychologica.
requirements of our overall policy.
Role of Psychological Operations
:
A successful psychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a
propaganda exercise or an informational program. It should cover actio
and statements--all that is said or done solely or primarily for psycho'
logical effect. This definition sets off psychological activities from
those actions undertaken primarily for their direct value--whether in th
fields of intelligence, military, political, or economic action.
One of the tasks of psychological operations is to exploi ɔther
a_vities to maximum advantage, or to seek to minimize any negative as
pects of such activities. In designing and carrying out action program
directed at Cuba, it shall be the task of the Coordinator and his Group
004, 780 Color 5065
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to balance possibly conflicting interests and to determine which, in any
given circumstance, shall have priority.
Strategy and Tactics
We must keep in mind constantly the relationship between what happens ·
in Cuba and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Communists.
We should seek to insure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way
that will:
a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime;
b) demonstrate to the Cuban people and to the world at large that
communism is not a solution for the problems of a developing
country;
c) discredit Castro and his associates and their methods of opera-
tion throughout the Americas;
d) insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and
the satellites adds substantially to the mounting evidence that
efforts to export communist revolution are unsuccessful and ex-
cessively costly.
Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the
end of the communist regime in Cuba. But pending achievement of this,
we can move toward the other objectives. And they, after all, are of
major importance to our overall strategic purposes.
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We have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains
Communist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the
Communist cause generally. This strategic concept is one which the
:
Communists have tried to use against us.
Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept.
It calls for the utilization of every available weapon in our aresenal
and engagement, day-in and day-out, in a multi-faceted struggle at all
levels.
Our initial aim should be to weaken steadily the capability, con-
fidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspond-
ingly, to strengthen our side. We need not, indeed ought not, stake every-
thing on one great effort. Nor should we concentrate on simply building
up our forces and husbanding them "until the right time comes" for a final
showdown.
Instead, our effort should be directed toward achieving an unbroken
series of small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro
elements and failures on the part of the regime itself. Our aim should
be that the end of each day would see the position and prospects of the
Castro regime and little worse than they had been at sunrise.
A factory breakdown because of a shoŕtage of spare parts or sabotage, ·
an increase in absenteeism, lengthened queues at the food stores, failure
to get a field planted--whether because of neglect or lack of seed, a
ODCAICHT
13-00000
resort to terrorist methods against the populace, an unexplained fire,
creation of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance
.
'
of antiregime slogans on walls, a defection from the armed forcess-these
and similar things, whether major or minor, and over and over again on
a mounting scale, will have a cumulative impact, In the long
run, they
can be equivalent to a major victory.
The important thing is to keep the pressure on, to never give the
regime a respite, to see that the series of small defeats and setbacks
is unbroken and unending. Our purpose is to create a situation in which
the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and heart, in which they
come to accept the certainty of eventual defeat.
.
Meanwhile, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist
world. Assistance to the regime would increasingly be regarded as a
"rat hole" operation. The "example of Cuba" would become the reverse of
expectations; fidelismo would become a term of opprobrium.
In short, the goal is to bring about the elimination of the Castro
regime without resort to direct and massive force. We cannot rule our
"
the possibility that some reliance on force may become necessary to insur
final victory for anti-Castro forces. But the greater and more effec-
tive is the effort herein outlined, the more we are likely to insure that
overt force requirements will be minimal.
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SECRET
Specific programs to carry out this kind of approach to the Cuban
problem are submitted in Annexes A and B.
Audiences and Targets
The psychological program should be directed at the following primary
audiences or target groups:
1) the Cuba people. Our goal should be to encourage dissatisfaction
with the present and hope for the future once Castroism is eli-
minminated.
It should be made clear that the next chapter of Cuba's
history must be written by the Cubans. But they should know that
they will have friendly support from others.
2) the Castro regime. Our goal should be to create dissension, doubi
and hopelessness inside the ruling clique.
3) Latin America. In programs directed at the peoples and govern-
ments of the hemisphere, our goal should be to weaken the influ-
ence of the Cuban regime and its propaganda, to encourage solid-
arity within the OAS family, to counter Cuban influence in key
groups (youth, labor, intellectuals), to encourage actions that
counteract Cuban programs of subversion and insurrection.
4) the Soviet Union and other. Communist states. To picture Cuba
as a steady drain on already limited resources, to insure that i
is such a drain, to encourage the Soviets to limit and eventuall
eliminate their involvement in Cuba.
-SECRET
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SECCES
5) Other countries. To insure understanding of what is involved
in the Cuban situation, to use Cuba to disprove that communism
provides useful answers to the needs of developing countries,
to expose the continuing danger of communist efforts to export
revolution.
6) the Home Base. To provide the. American people and the Congress
with the full facts of the Cuban situation within the limits of
legitimate security considerations.
Assets
The psychological program toward Cuba should utilize the full range
of the Government's capabilities for action and information. These in-
clude, among others: a) public statements by the President and other
officials;
b) informational assets such as the public affairs an
Congressional relations agencies of State,
Defense and other agencies;
c) the Government's research and analysis facilities;
d) overseas information programs in all media,
especially the facilities of the U.S. Information
Agency;
e) the diplomatic mechanism for both formal and
informal contacts;
f) capabilities for unattributed programs of action
and information.

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Coordination and Guidance
In carrying out the kind of many-sided offensive described herein,
i
i
it will be necessary to provide for coordinating various programs. We
!
must be sure that what we do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere.
It will be necessary to provide careful and regular policy guidance to
those responsible for action. This task is assigned to the Coordinator
for Cuban Affairs. He should establish the necessary machinery on an
inter-departmental basis.
U.S. Posture toward Cuba
The picture we should seek to create is one of a confident and de-
cisive United States moving forward in cooperation with its other friends,
dealing with the Cuban situation but not exclusively preoccupied with
Castro. We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion. We should take
note of developments in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly. Our
answer to claims, charges or attacks should be swift. Our machinery must
be geared to permit answers to Castro and his henchmen immediately and
effectively. If he makes a speech tonight, our reply should be on the
airwaves tomorrow at the latest.
Cur approach should not be defensive. We should not confine ourselve
to answering Castro but as much as possible force him onto the defensive.
We should insure that he is required to do the answering, the explaining,
the disagreeing as much as possible.
Attachments:
Annex A
-
Guidelines for Attributable Programs
Annex B Guidelines for Unattributable Programs B 1 1 1953
-
i
TITT
53m
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ANNIX A
Guidelines for Attributable Programs
Current Requirements
1. There should be a statement, preferably by the President, ex-
plaining overall U.S. policy toward the Cuban question. It would provide
clarification of where we stand on Cuba and how we hope to see the future
develop. It would provide the basis for statements, private and public,
for all other officials concerned. It would inform the Cubans how we re-
gard their future; tell Latin Americans how we see the problem and our
view of their role; underline' to the Soviet bloc our determination to
oppose communism in this hemisphere; further clarify for our own people
the seriousness of the problem and our determination to support the cause
of freedom in Cuba with all feasible means.
The Coordinator should arrange for preparation of such a statement
and submit a draft to the White House.
2. It is our policy to seek elimination, or at least material re-
duction, of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Efforts now underway
to achieve this end should be given a reasonable chance. If they fail
to produce the desired result within a reasonable time, we should be pre-
pared to move forward along other lines. The Coordinator should develop
a program to meet this contingency. Meanwhile, the continuing presence
of Soviet forces should be described as an exacerbating influence in
East-West relations and a symbol of foreign domination and control in Cuba.
**ts 0051
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CITADIN
3.
Clarification of our position on "non-invasion" would be desira-
bla. This could be covered in 1 above. It should be clear that we do not
regard invasion of Cuba by the United States as a desirable or useful
course. But the possibility of such action in given circumstances cannot
The door should be left open for any action that we and
be eliminated.
.
our allies in the hemisphere may regard as necessary in the future to
counter aggressive moves by the Cuban regime.
4. We need to have clearly in mind our position regarding a possi-
ble internal revolt. This, too, could be covered in 1 above. We should
avoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to
encourage an open revolt. We should avoid for the present anything that
could be read as a firm pledge to come to the aid of anyone who moves
against Castro.
We should make clear, however, that we are prepared to
support and cooperate with any elements who succeed in ending communist
dominance in Cuba and who are committed to establishing in Cuba a free
and democratic government responsive to the desires of its own people.
5. We should exploit by available means all evidence of internal
discontent and opposition. Defections from the Cuban regime should be
exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are
mat.
.6. The Coordinator should arrange for up-to-date surveys of the
following:
SECRET
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a) programs now underway in the psychological field;
b) U.S. capabilities in this field with a view to exposing any
obvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a signi-
ficant psychological effort against Cuba;
c) Castro's propaganda machine--how does it work? how much effort
goes into it? how can we weaken it?
d) major lines of the Cuban propaganda offensive--favorite themes,
techniques, principal targets, etc.;
.
e) current position of Castro and his regime in Latin America--
main areas of influence, by country and by groups.
i
:
f) the past record on leaflet drops--how effective, advantages of
plane vs. balloon drops, comparison of delivery by other means,
possibilities of such a program being used to attack us in the
UN or among the Cuban people.
Themes for Information Programs
Information media should exploit the following themes to the max-
imum extent practicable. Hard data supporting these themes should be
spotted on a day-to-day basis and used. Commentaries and discussions
should be tailored to take full advantage of these attitudes.
(To Cuban audiences)
1. Castroism is doomed; it is on the slippery slope to oblivion.
100p
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SECKER
2.
Cuba is an unwilling instrument of Soviet policy, subject to
the whims and moods of a foreign power.
3. Moscow will use Cuba as it sees fit and for its own purposes,
40
5.
giving help and withdrawing it to suit the Kremlin's desires.
Castro has isolated his country from its traditional friends,
from the hemisphere in which its roots of history, culture,
religion, and well-being are.sunk. _
Communism has failed to solve the problems of Cuba--has lowered >
rather than raised its standard of living.
6. The Cuban revolution has been perverted and betrayed.
7. Freedom, independence and diversity are the "wave of the future."
(To Latin American audiences)
1.
Use the above as appropriate.
2. Castro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion,
espionage and sabotage against neighboring states.
3. Castroism promises bloodshed, terror and economic stagnation.
4. The Hemisphere's most promising course is vigorous efforts to ?
achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress.
(To Soviet and Bloc audiences)
1.
The above as appropriate.
13-00000
2. Cuba represents a steady drain on already limited Soviet and
3.
bloc resources; every shipment to Cuba means things do not appear
on Soviet shelves.
Castro really supports the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using
Soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow's policy.
The above lists do not pretend to be exhaustive. They are but the
beginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit in our information and
propaganda offensive.
Sicians
13-00000
ANNEX B
It is the judgement of the Coordinator that this annex covering
intelligence and covert actions should be submitted separately after the
Executive Committee reaches a conclusion on the overall psychological
program and the attributable activities set forth in Annex A.
TS_0051
SECRET
See par
4
2
above
13-00000
FOR:
TOP SECRET
DOCUMENT RECORD
(AR 380-5)
OFFICE OR HEADQUARTERS OF ORIGINATOR
wwwww..com
DATE RECEIVED
ભા
DATE OF DOCUMENT NUMBER OF COPIES
COPY NUMBER(S)
2-11-63
none
LOCAL TS CONTROL NUMBER (If applicable)
TS 0051
TYPE OF DOCUMENT AND ADDRESSEE(S)
Mr. Califano
UNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT OR SHORT title
Draft Memo for NSC Exec. Comte
Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba
NUMBER AND DESCRIPTION OF INCLOSURES TO DOCUMENT Ɑndicate addition and/or deletion of inclosures with dates)
Annex A (5 pgs) and Annex B (1 pg)
COPY NO.
DISTRIBUTION DATA
ADDRESSEE (Print or type)
DATE OF DISTRIBUTION
COPY NO.
ADDRESSEE (Print or type)
CHECK
☐ ACTION ☐ INFORMATION
TO
INTRA-OFFICE ROUTING DATA
SUSPENSE DATE
CHECK
TO
*
Mr. Califano-
NAMES OF ALL PERSONS HANDLING ATTACHED DOCUMENT OR WHO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF ITS CONTENT WILL BE LISTED BELOW
NAME (Print or type)
NAME (Print or type)
A. Carter
DATE
2-11-63
DATE
FORM
DA.. 969
1 MAY 60
EDITION OF 1 JAN 58 IS OBSOLETE.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES
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SECRET Sensitiv
SUBJECT: Future Cuban Leadership
13 may 1963
INTRODUCTION
Following is a proposal for the creation of an imaginary
Cuban leader. This proposal is presented primarily to fill gaps
existing in the present policy study. It will become obvious that
this proposal can be utilized in conjunction with current programs
as well as many of those programs proposed for the future. It
may be necessary to address this proposal or a similar proposal
separately and in advance of the policy study; however, in the
event no pressing requirement exists, it is suggested that this
proposal be considered in conjunction with the policy study and
handled on a closely held basis.
REASON FOR PROPOSAL
Following are listed a number of indications that the leader-
ship question will be addressed in the near future:
a. With the termination of U.S. support to the Cuban
Revolutionary Council (CRC) a vacuum has been created. Various
exile groups in the U.S. and elsewhere will be vying for recognition
and support in an attempt to fill this void.
b. There has been constant pressure on the U.S.
and on other Latin American countries to recognize a government
in exile. This proposal could serve to lessen or eliminate much
of this political and psychological pressure.
c. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering
among exile groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems
of Cuban exile unification.
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d. The proposal could emphasize the development of
a native "David" in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath." This
could serve the U.S. image by making Castro the "Goliath" rather
than the "David" who opposes the "North American Giant. "
e. This proposal could serve to prevent the U.S. fṛom
making premature commitments to a leader or a particular exile group
and could be used as a device to test exile response.
f.
This proposal could retain for the U.S. the ability
to control future selections of leaders or groups (timing and political
ideologies).
g.
This proposal could permit the U.S. on a progres-
sive basis to influence the idealogies of the resistance and thus to
influence the platform of a future Cuban Government.
h. The publicity associated with the prolonged existence
of a resistance in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of the de
facto recognition of the present Cuban Regime.
OBJECTIVE
To create an imaginary leader or image of resistance in Cuba.
This image would serve as a focal point for resistance directed against
Castro by Cubans or Latin Americans.
DEVELOPMENT
An imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed
utilizing a popular name from Cuban history, a name associated with
resistance in Cuba or a newly devised name. The name selected
· should typify a person who is friendly to the Cuban people, is anti-
communist, is willing to fight against the Regime, and is little-but
tough. There is no requirement for a detailed staff study in order
2
SCORET
Sensitive

13-00000
SECRET Sonsitive
"
to determine this name. "The Little Bull," "The Little Worm,
"The Friendly Worm," "The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant, "
or any such name which is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish
could suffice. Over a period of several months the name could be
"dropped" or leaked through U.S. officialdom, in diplomatic channels,
in intelligence channels or within the Cuban exile community. Specific
acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual or mem-
bers of his group. Communications could be arranged between this
individual and his subordinates to be picked up either by Castro's
censors or by radio intercept in Cuba or in the U.S.
After a period of time, all unexplained incidents and actions
for which credit has not been seized by some other exile group would
automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point in
time it could be leaked that the U.S. is, in fact, supporting this
imaginary person. Similarly, other Latin American countries may,
without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern.
During the course of this operation it is quite possible that the
Castro Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were
terminated, that the individual was captured, that he was being pur -
sued, or that he was an imaginary faker or fraud. Such acțion would
only serve to further publicize the actions of the individual and so long
as resistance in general continued the fame of our "Cuban Kilroy"
would spread. Humorous antics could be credited to our imaginary
friend and rumors of his exploits of bravery (ala Zoro) could be
circulated.
At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this
individual stands for. (It will become obvious that he is opposed to
the Regime in Cuba.) It could be possible to indicate little-by-little
his political platform in very general terms -- realizing that the
mistique and the "generalness" connected with his operation is, in
fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and others
may demand that he proclaim his complete political views or even
that he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable,
3
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arrangements could be made to have selected individuals meet
with his appointed representative. His instructions and words
could be relayed to the public by many means.
As his political platform becomes more apparent within
the exile groups, it may be possible to determine those willing to
follow his leadership (to gain Cuban independence under his terms)
or those who are unwilling to accept his leadership. The lines of
controversy among exiles can be drawn more clearly. Undesirable
leaders and exile groups can be eliminated from the competition
through his disavowals.
Eventually, a member of the resistance in Cuba may gain
sufficient stature to assume or to be given the title of this imaginary
leader. This, of course, will depend in large measure on individual
leadership ability and the ability to "fill the boots" of this anti-Castro
image.
While this scheme is replete with gimmickery, its imple-
mentation could be undertaken in a relatively short period of time.
Sensitivity of this scheme is such that the knowledge should be held
on the tightest basis and if implemented, those proposing should
not be informed. In the event the scheme is compromised, (unless
knowledge is widespread) there is little need for plausible deniability;
however, once used and compromised the scheme can hardly be
reinstated. A major advantage is that this image can be created
over a long period of time or developed rapidly without a political
or economic commitment on the part of the U.S. There may be a
point at which the U.S. could no longer disavow collaboration with
this imaginary person. This point, however, is so distant that
during any point in the intervening period it would be possible for
the U.S. to disengage easily without suffering embarrassment or
loss of prestige.
OLONLI
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CONCLUSION
Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it
appears that the U.S. should immediately undertake to implement
this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what
additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change
the image during the subsequent 30 or 60 day period.
James Patchell
K. Patchell
Lt Colonel,
USA
50
5
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འ་*
SECRET
22 May 1962.
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
From:
Subject:
Lt. Colonel Patchell
Psychological Operations Group
Following is a brief "run-down" of meeting on psychological
operations at State, 21 May 1962. The meetings are normally held
each Monday at 1430. Attendees include: Bob Smith or Kermit Brown
(USIA); Seymour Bolton (CIA); Colonel Wade Robert (DOD); Harvey
Summ (Cuba Desk Officer - State); Bob Hurwitch, Dick Phillips (Public
Affairs Advisor of Martin's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs State)
and Leon Curtis (Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Subjects discussed included:
->
State).
(1) Priorities of work
•
in that order.
Cuba, Western Hemisphere, U.S.
(2) Publication of document on conditions in Cuban Univer-
sities received from Cuban exile group (DRE) CIA to check authenticity
and whether document is outdated.
-
(3) Radio SWAN
-
CLA studying proposed changes.
(4) USIA reported three commentaries put out on Cuban
Independence Day.
(5) On the Armstrong Circle Theater, USIA states this
"hung up" for $15,000 cost of translation. It was decided in meeting to
push on to get it translated - and in the meanwhile to get Miro Cardona's
speech into wide circulation.
(6) State suggested that speeches in Cuba (Rodriguez, Castro,
and others) within past week indicated moves away from collectivization
to free enterprise and mentioned antipathy of people to idea and name of
cooperatives. USIA to push on this and to prepare releases on it.
SENSITIVE
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REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
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(7) CIA to declassify the Soviet nickel contract with Cuba
which exposes Soviet colonialism for wide distribution in Latin America
through Embassies and USIA and for use by CIA in Cuba.
(8) CLA
•
I wants more stuff in the vein of ridicule, satire,
humor to get away from invective and hit the regime and individuals
low key stuff to develop ridicule.
.
(9) CIA to find out from refugees what appeals best, what
they read, what they listen to, etc.
(10) USIA and CIA to play up the March USIA survey which
shows Castro's popularity in Latim America on the decline.
(11) On 26th of July, State suggested cave be used to avoid
discussing 26th of July movement as Commy - to clearly differentiate
between original 26th of July movement and its principles - and the be-
trayal. CIA requested State's guidance on policy and State's help on
providing material. State provided the attached and indicated that its use
is within policy (I have noted some particularly hard hitting stúff - if used
properly).
(12) A number of important events and dates in June and July
were discussed to include Caribbean Games, Peace Festival, Khrushchev
Rocket statement, and Castro's "Cordillera of the Andes" statement.
USIA and CIA to prepare information on these.
(13) State asked CIA to prepare a catalogue of admission of
failures of the Castro Regime, a list of production promises, and a report
of bloc people in key positions. All were asked to bring ideas into next
week's meeting to be used to exploit 26th of July to our advantage.
(14) This office will be placed on distribution of minutes of
the meetings.
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:
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
1 June 1962
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
From:
Subject:
Lt. Col. Patchell
Psychological Operations Group
Meeting held at 1430 hours on 28 May 62 with Mr. Hurwitch
and Mr. Simm of State, Bolton of CIA, Smith of USIA, and myself
attending. Following is a summary of subjects discussed:
(1) CIA asked State to provide a clarification of personalities
and groups to be supported this came up in connection with a dis-
cussion of CRC and newspaper stories on its change in leadership.
-
(2) The Armstrong Circle Theater movie has been okayed
for Spanish language publication and distribution.
-
(3) On the "Eyewitness to History" program of 25 May 62 -
because of the type of movie USIA to look at carefully and deter-
mine whether useful for replay (I will be invited to attend).
(4) CIA using theme for farmers not to produce - okayed.
(5) On declassification of Cuba - Soviet trade agreement -
CIA has been unable to obtain, but should produce soon.
(6) CIA guidance now being prepared for paych war to list
priorities as follows: (a) Cuba, (b) Latin America, (c) rest of world.
Draft copies will be brought to next meeting for informal review.
•
(7) On the DRE publication "White Book on University Problems
in Cuba" 2,000 copies each are being printed in Chile in English,
French, and Spanish. CIA to take action to make available in summary
form for Latin newspapers and student publications.
•
presently going
(8) On the CRC publication "Cuba Nueva"
only to exile community. CIA to look into getting it into Latin America
and Cuba - money appears to be no problem.
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(9) State suggested exploitation by USIA and CIA of items
appearing in the FBIS daily summary. (Housing and labor made
arrangements to put us on distribution.)
(10) CIA brought up the unhappy impact of Moscoso's speec
inferring
Cuba should be forgotten and that we should get on
the Alliance For Progress. State indicated that a correction was being
made to show that Moscoso was misquoted.
(11) State suggested that Castro's 11 April speech (which was
not released until May) had many exploitable points. -O corruption -
failure to suggest unity - labor -- State sent to CIA for research people
to work on.
(12) Item appearing in Cuban paper concerning people who
"transgress the norm" being sent to training camps - USIA to
action.
(13) CIA after looking at symbols etc. has about decided that
the "worm" is preferable to the "fish" and that it has been popularized¨¨
by Castro and we should take advantage of it. Both CIA and USIA will
develop further the worm idea. Lt. Col. Patchell suggested relating
it to such expressions as "the worm will turn" - if applicable in Cuba
and associating it will biblical quotations such as "Their worm shall
not die, and their fire shall not be quenched" -- Isa 6624 or "As a moth
doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood, so the sadness of a man
consumeth the heart" Prov. 25. 20. USIA to take action.
COMMENT:
....
-
In the two previous meetings I have developed sufficient rapport
so that I can now get actions taken without too much question. This
next meeting I propose to introduce a system of suspense dates so that
the "we are looking into" or "we are considering" are replaced by
"we will meet the suspense" this may be difficult at first, but feel
it can be managed.
-->
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FOR SECRET
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
6 June 1962
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE -
From: Lt. Colonel Patchell
Subject: Psychological Operations Group
Meeting held 1430-1450 on 4 June 1962. Attended by Mr.
Hurwitch
, Mr. 
Phillips, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Curtis (State),
Mr. Bolton (CIA
), Mr. Smith (USIA), and myself. Following is
a summary of discussion 
items:
(1) USIA will provide advance notice of TV programs
scheduled 
re Cuba.
(2) Free Cuban Group (DRE) has arranged for strong
representation at African International Student Meeting in Canada
27-28 June. 
They will surface copies of report on student conditions
in Cuba. They asked 
for no advance publicity - then big "follow up"
State and CIA 
coordinating to include preparation of releases
to 
U.S. 
press.
--
(3) CIA has looked at CRC's mailing lists for various types
of info, to 
include 
the publication "Cuba Nueva." They find lists
most elaborate, 
complete and well organized for each purpose.
(4) USIA reports they are on top of stories pointing out
loss of rights by workers in Cuba. USIA provided sample copies of
their daily wire output 
and of weekly mail output for me to look at in
greater detail. (I will 
report separately on this.)
(5) Much exploitable info in Castro's speech on housing
corruption
, 
unavailability etc. USIA and CIA to exploit.
--
--
.
(6) CIA reported that the Latin American edition of Time
Magazine was in English that Time Magazine in spanish was a
Latin publication (Bogota) 
using same format, but not useful for purpose
of exploiting Blas Roca story
.
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(7) Reports of hunger strikes etc. at Isle of Pines prison
to be played up by USIA. (Berne's cable 527).
(8) Copies of cartoon books and other publications we
requested by Lt. Col. Patchell.
(9) USIA requested to provide info on the public opinion
poll conducted and schedules for future polls.
Seymour Bolton privately asked me to inform you that subject to
any comment from you, he was using the approach on psy war that
the means of delivery would not be tied to attribution. Although it
might be more convenient to work completely through the CRC, he
believed that we should reserve flexibility by organizing the "pipelines"
and then putting stuff in from CRC, or other Cuban organizations, as
well as stuff created by the U.S., with or without signatures or attri-
bution. He feels that such control would best insure that we sent in
just what was needed and no more or no less.
2
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
12 June 1962
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
From:
Subject:
Lt. Col. Patchell
Psychological Operations Group
Meeting held 1430-1600 on 11 June 1962. Attended by Mr.
Hurwitch, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Wells (substituting for Mr. Curtis
from R&I-State); Mr. Bolton (CIA); Mr. Smith (USIA); and Lt. Col.
Patchell. Following is a summary of discussion items.
(1) CIA has translated and declassified Soviet-Cuban
Trade Agreement and passed to Mr. Hurwitch for publication and
use.
(2) Lt. Col. Patchell pointed out that the Cuban increase
of delegates to 330 to Helsinki Eighth World Youth and Student Festival
"for reasons of an imperative nature" should be acted upon and full
use made of report on student conditions which will be surfaced at the
Canadian regional meeting. Bolton assured me that action was being
taken. NOTE: After the meeting Bolton said the same group of
people were working on both and that "extensive" work was being done
on Helsinki. I asked him to be sure it was on Cubans in Helsinki
not just Helsinki.
--
(3) USIA agreed to look at clippings on Cuba with view
to broader distribution in Latin America -- as requested by Lt. Col.
Patchell.
(4) CIA will present a document next week on guidance
with respect to Cuba.
and when do we see?
(5) State (Mr. Summ) indicated a Cuban report indicated
that Havana was going back to horse-drawn trolleys because of motor
transport shortages. Mr. Wells added that previously horse-drawn
transport was not permitted in Havana. All to look into this for possible
exploitation.
•
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(6) Lt. Col. Patchell brought up comparison between
Hitler's speech after the unsuccessful Beer Hall Pustch and Castro's
"History Will Absolve Me Speech" following his abortive attempt.
CIA will look into this both for research and whether suitable for
propaganda purposes.
--
(7) Since the title "Doctor" adds some respect to Castro's
name -- all agencies will push toward referring to him primarily as
a noun the Prime Minister or secondarily as Fidel Castro. hot acting to A.
of more
respect!
specialists
(8) A USIA report indicated that Cuba had increased its
radio propaganda output by 60% over the past few months. USIA
stated that FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has added
Cuba to the list of Bloc Countries, which subjects Cuba to periodic
research and analysis reports and broadcast trends. (See FBIS Report,
"Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting" Number 355,
dated 6 June 1962.)
--
(9) CIA reported additional people had been placed in
their research department to make content analyses on Cuba.
(10) State has received two articles from New Delhi written.
by an Indian reporter who visited Cuba in the early months of 1959 and
recently revisited Cuba. These reports are good for the "before" and
"after" content and will be publicized. State asked USIA to look for
others who visited in the early days of the Castro Regime who might
be encouraged on a selective basis to return and make a comparison.
Is Craig aware
Does
Navy
have
complaint
What 
are
they?
--
(11) State indicated that Cuba had presented a series of
complaints against U.S. actions at Guantanamo and it looked as though
Cuba was building up a case against the U.S. for future use in the U.N.
or world opinion medias. State has asked Navy to provide similar
pinformation for use by State and will present information to the group
'for possible exploitation.
Салистый
12 Jumb
Made Queré
(12) USIA unable to report on Miro Cardona's speech in
Costa Rica. CIA reported that it had been carried in papers in Costa
Rica and had been broadcast by the Voice of America and several Miami
Spanish language stations.
Any mention of keeping
alive by quoting others than
(13) State suggested the next meeting be held at USIA for miro?
the purpose of briefing the group on the functioning of USIA -- in (iew I aucund
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
From: Lt. Col. Patchell
Subject: Psychological Operations Group
18 June 1962
The meeting held 1430-1600 on 18 June was attended by Mr.
Hurwitch, Mr. Bart Wells, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Phillips (State),
Mr. Bolton (CIA), Mr. Bob Smith (USIA), and Lt. Col Patchell.
Following are items of interest.
(1.) CIA distributed copies of a student booklet (English and
French versions attached). Thirty-thousand copies were printed
in Spanish, French, English, and Portuguese in Chile **. sponsored
by a Latin American student organization, and primarily for Latin
audiences. The booklets will be used on tour of Latins in Afrikaa
and were distributed throughout Latin America and at international
youth and student meetings in Quebec and Helsinki. Some coples
will be mailed into Cuba.
(2.) CIA presented draft guidelines for overseas posts re
Cuba. The group made some minor changes. The guidelines are PRIMARILY
D26 July..
FOR USE
(3.) State will put out a similar circulat to its posts, and USIA
will consider doing the same.
(4.) Roundup reports of overseas stations on actions are due
within 7 days after 26 July. They are to cable significant actions
immediately.
(5.) Hurwitch distributed copies of a draft cable intended to
exploit Cardenas incident (copy attached).
(6.) Lt. Col. Patchell asked full exploitation of Mexican
defector -n suggesting appearance before OAS Committee, trip
through Latin America, etc.
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(7.) The Group was informed that Mr. Grant (St. Louis
Post-Dispatch), Tad Szulc, and a number of other newsmen
were attempting to get into Havana for the 26 July celebration.
Depending on the individual situation, these people will be
briefed and debriefed by State and, in some casan, GIA
State will obtain copies of reports from the British,
Italian, West German and other Allied Embassies in Havana
for distribution to members of this group.
(9.) CIA asked to have Cuban Embassy representatives in
other Latin American states confronted with Castro promises
and asked for comment for publication refusals and "no com-
ments" to be publicised.
(10) USIA reported that Cardenas incident played two times
Saturday evening and four times Sunday over VOA.
(11.). USIA provided film on Carpenter flight for use on TV
at Guantanamo.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
26 June 1962
SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
From: Lt. Col. Patchell
Subject: Psychological Operations Group
Meeting held at 1430 on 25 June 1962 was attended by Mr. Hurwitch
(State), Mr. Robert Follestad (substituting for Harvey Summ-State),
Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilton (substituting for Seymour Bolten-CIA),
and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following items discussed:
a. State to seek anti-Castro press clippings from other Latin
American countries for replay.
b. USIA is distributing confidential memorandum, "The Impact
of Castro on Mexican Public Opinion and Some Indications of Attitudes
Toward the U.S. and the USSR" (LA-3, Feb 62). This report, although
dated Feb 62, is just now coming out - it reportedly shows a significant
decrease of Castro popularity in Mexico.
c. CIA was asked whether the reports of Cuban communist
interference with other Latin communist parties could be exploited.
d. Decided to direct propaganda into Cuba which is designed to
destroy the image of Cuban success throughout the hemisphere. Also to
direct propaganda designed to stress that Cuba is being "used",by the USSR.
e. State pointed out the value of President's trip to Mexico this
week end to point up US-Mexico solidarity. (Noted that Hurwitch withdrew
considerably from his initial position Cuba not mentioned as a point of
solidarity).
-
f. CIA is translating Theodore Draper's book into Spanish for
dissemination as a paper-back in Latin America.
g. Decided to play back into Cuba administrative "goofs" by
Cubans on transportation arrangements for youths of other Latin countries
to celebrations. (Some left penniless and stranded in Caribbean).
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h. The Cultural people in State are seized with problem of
Jamaican Games. I suggested other athletes for free Cuba or other
personalities. -- That we should at least make an inventory to see
what we have available. It is noted that Cubans are "out to win"
What is now being accomplished is not good enough.
☐ 1. CIA working with Navy on declassification of USSR-Cuba
Trade Agreement.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
3 July 1962
LANSI
SDALE
: (has seen)
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL
From: .Lt. Col. Patchell
дид
Subject: Psychological Operations Group
Meeting held from 1100. to. 1300. on 3 July 1962 with the
following in attendance: Bob Smith (USIA), Seymour Bolten (CLA),
Bob Hurwitch, Bob Fallestad, Al Carter, and Bart Wells (State)
and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following are highlights of discussion.
:
a. State is providing copies of report from British
Ambassador to Cuba MARCHAND. Report made after absence
3 months from his post in Cuba. Copzattached she wedlined
b. State has received letters explaining details of
Cardenas incident.- passed to CIA and USIA for action.
Portions
C. CIA to obtain more information on outbreak in ALCANO
which is being suppressed by Cuba.
d.
CIA provided copies of study on promises and failures
of Castro regime.- it has been distributed to CIA stations overseas.
State and USIA to look at with view to providing copies to international
organizations and State and USIA representatives overseas.
cop.jattudu
e. In view of uncertainty expressed in messages from
Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and UAR about stability of
Cuban economy and attempts to collect funds to assist Cuba - CIA
to play on theme of Cuba as poor investment etc.. behind iron curtain.
f. Defector who was formerly, Cuban.economic attache in
Moscow being debriefed - he was held for 16 months in Argentine
Embassy in Havana and for this reason much of his information is
dated. CIA to expedite his assessment.
still being
g. On Cuban economic defector from Mexico -
interrogated and assessed with view to looking at his ability to stand
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up to cross-examination under OAS. State stressed need to
expedite in order to gain impact. CIA can provide no estimate
of time 
when assessment will be completed. In Miami, his press
conference 
indicated Castro control of the Mexican provincial police.
-
.h. On question of intervention - Mexican papers stating
this is Mexican victory on Cuban issue this is being replayed by
U.S. papers
leaves a poor impression. State said this is being
discussed with President and will be covered by: Lincoln White at
.press.conference today. CIA and USIA agreed that more should be
done. State 
could not answer on Cuban talks- unknown, how deeply
Cuba was 
covered and whether the question of diversion of U. S.
good 
or movement of people were discussed. Any hint of Mexican
victory will 
be demoralizing to people in Cuba - exile community -
and Latin America 
in general.
i. Following the meeting Mr. Hurwitch indicated that
State and CIA representatives would meet with CAB officials con-
cerning.PAA flights to Havana.
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Our Hand int
itcol Patchill.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C..
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
From:
Subject:
Lt. Col. Patchell
188.
Psychological Operations Group
EL
11 July 1962
Wollowing is brief of meeting held from 1430-1530 on 9 July 62
the following in attendance: Robert Hurwitch, Harvey Summ,
Juan Gurrell, and Al Carter (State), Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilton
' (CIA), and Lt. Col. Patchell.
Swiss article.
A Swiss publication has a very fine article.in
detail on Cuba - by Swiss reporter who spent several months in
Cuba USIA to replay.
Clipping service. Good immediate reaction to clipping service
being provided..
26th of July.
Group agreed to "jack up" machinery for informa-
tion on activities and L. A. reaction to 26th of July.
CRC Political Platform. State provided members with copies
of a CRC political platform (attached). Little publicity has been
attached to document. CIA will check to see if it is a document
for internal or external distribution. (Note: Following the meeting,
I asked Mr. Hurwitch to consider this in connection with his guide-
lines paper, depending upon its validity and usefulness. He stated
he believed the two were in consonance, but would check:)
Cuban Protests. Discussion of Cuban protests. Believed that
the publication of protests may be leading up to justification for
receipt of defensive weapons. (Note: This fits in with Mr. Bill
Harvey's earlier remarks on the same general subject.) State is
responding to protests and queries in low key.
:
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British Newsman.
Will meet with State representatives at
1430 on 11 July. Others invited. This individual was formerly
a Communist.
Chinese Opium Technicians. On report of Chinese techni-
cians 
to assist Cubans 
in opium growing. Lt. Col. Patchell sug-
gested CIA get 
declassified and publicized as quickly as possible.
Overall Evaluation. All to take a look at orientation of group
its purpose
, 
missions, methods of carrying out tasks to see what
changes are 
required for period starting 1 August 1962, or after
new NIE is 
published.
Note: From the time that I joined the group on 21 May, the
group's 
orientation 
has changed from a general Latin American
psychological 
operations group to one focused on Cuba. My own
personal 
objective is now to get the output extended beyond Latin
America into 
NATO, the uncommitted areas, eastern Europe,
Japan, etc.
x
Visit of James B. Donovan. Following the meeting, Mr.
Hurwitch gave me the attached memorandum of conversation with
Mr. Donovan.
X
Capy sent to w
Намед
· Hardey 16 July 62
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