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104-10232-10019
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
01
INFO
DISPATCH
Chief of Station, JMWAVE
FROM
SUBE
Chief, WH Division
"JMZIP/Operational
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
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CLASSIFICATION..
SECRET
PROCESSING
Frict
POSTO
ACTVM
j
MARKED FOR
Contact with Dr. MIRO Cardona
NO INDEXING RECALIZED
ONLY QUALIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
CAN JUGA LESING
ABSTRACT
MICROFILM
For your information, transmitted herewith is a report of contact with
subject written by Theodore F. PASSAVOY, and a memo of WH/4 comments.
(END OF DISPATCH)
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19 Oct 61
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10 October 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Dr. NIRO Cardona on 6 October
1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a. m. for the meeting we had
set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced.
As during the first meeting, che remained outside in the car. Cur
☐ mosting lasted until 12:00 noon.
2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the
topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points aro:
a. Groupe conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support
should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.
b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council
aimed at:
(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West,
(2) Cubans in Mlami and other U. S. areas by:
(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.
(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.
(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion
Grista."
c. Underground Activities.
(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring
Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance
groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as
previously sent through the Italian Embassy).
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3.
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(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented
to me on 6 October.
Commando Plan
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Then Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine
action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as
Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain
Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO, He stated
that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.
With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba,
he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part
of them hore, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation
was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba
and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken
Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation
U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions,
equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to
have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men
to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and
material provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair.
(NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our ne eting at 15:30 on
6 October for transmission.)
4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to Escambray
Dr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request
to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but
to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly,
"I ask but never hear an answer. "
He said that the fighters there should
be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and
a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the
Eecambray group.
COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?
5. Information on Arms Received by Castro Regime
Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought
to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the
*
U. S. at the time of President FRONDI2]'s visit. He said the Ambassador
would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will
know. "
* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.
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Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy
of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc
(and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 por
cont, they would still be impressive.
He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily
with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, 000 being trained
✓ to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only
half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable. Thus, he said,
the langer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the
greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively,
to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make
Cubane, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible.
Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of
Castro-backed ragines in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer
worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference."
"In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S. "
6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and
Establish a Government on Cuban Soil
Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro
would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando
raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating
economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile
for nothing would c: me of it; that the only solution for defeating the
Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and estab-
lish a government on Cuban soll, ank recognition by all friendly countries
and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U. B,
be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. This would all have
to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fall. I recognise
that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary.
There will be many
risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have
loat all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated
that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation,
everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to
ceizo a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Cuantanamo, and immie-
diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional
government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition
(and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. 3.
assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in ade-
quate strength to ensure victory.
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Before such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be
softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the
mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional
government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council
and its unifying efforts.
Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think
that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that
strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that
of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government
levela. He proposed that he might elaborate a pian with his militar y
collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined
and considered.
Dr. MIO declared that he was convinced that this Communist
daggor in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action,
that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda,
sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention
in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary
regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed
Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.
"I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO.
"I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the
anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't con-
sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must
establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us. "The unta
del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed
to remain in Cuba. in a year, after the politicos of the countries re-
ceiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. 8. gold, they will say,
"Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past
with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the paople.
7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers
"
I queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and
lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all
reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He de-
clared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was
doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council
and MIRC and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Ministor
in the early days of the Castro goverument, had named LABAU to the
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Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any
Judicial position.
8.
Members of the Revolutionary Council
Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on
I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro-
He named the following as presently in the Consejo:
10 October.
posed to add.
Rescate
30 de Noviembre
MRR
Accion Democratica
20 de Mayo
AAA Independiente
MDC
Montecristi
He said he had invited to join:
MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria
and awaited their reply.
He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the
Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He be-
lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperato
should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together
under the Council.
He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine
and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that
the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).
9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba
Dr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine
rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to
Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had 
been
vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a
Secretary of the Argentins Embassy in Cuba was coming to see 
MIRO
today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night
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from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO
to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people,
inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent.
(FERNANDEZ said he had alroady written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says,
"Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th.
Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for the
SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted
12 minutes to address the mooting.
"
10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who
Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15
Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after
11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage
for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil. MIRO
probably will stay at the Park Chambera Hotel, but will advise Clark
of his location.
I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next
week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet
with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting
timo and place through Clark.
11. Propaganda Commission
I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization
and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is out-
side the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council
accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CAR RILLC had rosigned
as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle
it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.
12.
MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO
being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government
I asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-
Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head
of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were
to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution
is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former
regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He do-
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nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify
the anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given an
opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and
reestablishment of order in the island.
13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)
When questioned about his business and private telephones,
MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house, I have no office
except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfforson 2-4680).
So use the other phone (Jefferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me.
"
"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home
because all the activities there are driving my wife érasy. I want to
find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation -
merely a room for myself, one for my socretary, and one for meetings.
of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the
press, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRD
is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the
unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance.
"
14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile
Groups
After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the
channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the
Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I under-
stood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the
Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an
Activity Committee might be organised with a delegate from each of
these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo,
This would serve to coordinate their activities. give them a tie-in with
the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied.
that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to
the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough
background of these organisations to be able to discuss the matter
effectively.
15. Telophone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October
0
Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October,
I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and
asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by
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the ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one
of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He ex-
pressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU
and his adherents among the exiled lawyers, and judges. He added his
best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New
York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana do
Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact
Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that
Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if
this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations
I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would
be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise
to me.
16. Comment
During these first two meetings 1 endeavored to establish
myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing
up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals.
I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.
In future meetings, after I have gained further background and
have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific
issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be
required.
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