104-10225-10027
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
14-00000
MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CFA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERŲ,
FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: RR PSYCH WARFARE GENERAL:
COUNTRY CHILE
INCLUSIVE DATES: FEBRUARY 1973-74
CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:
DELETIONS, IF ANY:
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SUBJECT
TSICH NATALE GENERAL
RECEIVED RETURNED REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
DATE
DATE
NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
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VWNUMBER MHSPAWN Y
REF: SANTIAGO 30693 |IN 4046041 (BEING RELAYED ADDRESSESES) Y
1. REF BEING RELAYED ADDRESSEES IS REPORT 31 OCT ANNOUNCEMENT
:
SUGGEST
BY GENERAL PINOCHET DECLARING FREEDOM OF PRESS IN CHILE.
RATHER THAN REPLAYING EL MERCURIO ARTICLE TRANSCRIBED IN REF YOU USE
THAT MERELY AS BASIS FOR EDITORIAL COMMENT. PINOCHET'S STATEMENT PUTS
EMPHASIS ON CONTENTION THAT PRESS COENSORSHIP CHAS NOT EXISTED IN
THAT ARGUMENT UNFORTUNATELY WILL
CHILE UNDER JUNTA NOR DOES IT NOW.
HAVE LITTLE CREDIBILITY OUTSIDE CHILE SO RECOMMEND EDITORIAL COMMENT
EMPHASIZE THESE POINTE: Y
A. CHILEAN PRESIDENT HAS DECLARED THERE WILL BE NO PRIOR
CENSORSHIP IN CHILE. Y
B. PINOCHET DECLARED THAT JUNTA IS WAIVING PRIOR CENSORSHIP
OF PRESS DESPITE FACT THAT STATE OF EMERGENCY CONTINUES IN CHILE. Y
C. JUNTA ACTION APPEARS REEFLECT CONFIDENCE ES IN ITS
AGILITY TO MAINTAIN STABILITY OF POLITICAL SITUATION 4
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
Psych fil
and
COURDINATING OFFICERS
21. ALING OF
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"DREYERTIARENTATIONTRASTOP THIS GESTURE OF CONFIDENCE WITH
BEAU'S CONFISCATION OF PRIVATELY OWNED PRESSATUOZKONTHS AGO
2. BUENOS AIRES: CAN NTTHRIFTY-1 GARRANGE PICK UP FOR ANSA
WIRE? Y
3. GUAYAQUIL, QUITO: SUGGEST YOU HAVE PJVANDYKE-3 OR
PJNETWORK-1 TIME THEIR COMMENTS TO COINCIDE WITH OAS MEETING. Y
FILE: 200-120-356. E-2 IMPDET.H
4.
DATE:
ORIG:
5 NOVEMBER 1974
E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT:
EXT:
C/LA/CA
1553,
AC/LA
RELLASIAT COPIER
Banan
DC/LA/CAM
By
C/LA/NU
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[]
pers
70:
8
AO INDEE
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RYBAT VUNUNGER Y
Ai
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1. YOUR OBSERVATIONS CONFIRM THOSE COS. GIVEN NO NEED MAKE
RADICAL CHANGE IN CURRENT POLICY AND PRACTICE SUGGEST GOC DE
INFLUENCED TO ISSUE PUBLIC STATEMENT DECLARING THAT JUNTA HAS
RESTORED CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL STABILITY TO EXTENT THAT PRIOR CEN-
SORSHIP OF FRESS NO LONGER DEENED NECESSARY. TO GUIDE THE WARY AT
HARE SPOKESMAN MIGHT ADD, LAUS GOVERNING CRIMINAL LIBEL WILL CONTINUE
TO SE ENFORCED. Y
FEEL
2. FOR FULL IMPACT, OF COURSE, IT WOULD BE IDLE FOR GOC TO
ARGUE THAT UP TO THIS POINT THERE HAS BEEN NO PRIOR CENSORSHIP.
STATUS QUO ANTE SHOULD DE IGNORED AND EMPHASIS PLACED ON FACT THAT
CONDITIONS NOW SUCH THAT CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOUNIZED CONDITION OF
PRESS FREEDOM CAN OBTAIN. W
3. FILE:
200-120-356.A
Psych file
CATE:
21 OCT 74/
C/LA/SB/E!!
des:
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TO: PRIORITY LONDON INFO SANTIAGO, ROME.ŻY
RYBAI MHSPAWN REDLEG Y
REF:
LONDON 54017 |IN 390115) Y
О
28
4
PRIDE
1(11)
SICH CT.4.
-
1. ACCORDING AP RELEASE DATELINED MOSCOW 17 OCTOBER, SOVIETS HAVE
DENIED VALIDITY OF STORY THAT RED CROSS EMPLOYEE IN CHILE TO
NEGOTIATE PRISONER EXCHANGE. WISH USE THIS DENIAL AS PEG REVIEW
PREVIOUS SOVIET PRISONER EXCHANGES CABBEL COMES TO MIND? WHICH ALSO
HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT IN STRICT SECRECY AND TO SPECULATE ON WHAT
CORVALAN AND OTHERS KNOW THAT WOULD MAKE THEM SO IMPORTANT TO SOVIET
GOVERNMENT. BELIEVE ROBERT MOSS, IF HE STILL HAS ACCESS TO LONDON
MEDIA, WOULD BE GOOD CHOICE WRITE SUCH ARTICLE BECAUSE OF HIS
KNOWLEDGE OF CHILE AND ABILITY USE HIS BACKGROUND FOR SPECULATION ON
KINDS OF INFORMATION CORVALAN HAS THAT COULD EMBARRASS SOVIETS. CAN
MENTION SOVIET CLANDESTINE FUNDING ALLENDE'S ELECTIONS, TACTICAL
PCCH ALLIANCE WITH SOCIALISTS, CUBAN AND SOVIET AID TO ARMED PCCH
20
UNIONS, LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR EVENTUAL PCCH PUTSCH TO OVERTHORU ALLENDE.
Y
A. BUENOS AIRES TELAM (IN SPANISH) REPORTED 17 OCT THAT RED
CROSS ENVOY IS DENIS FELDMEYER AND THAT HE CARRIED TO CHILE SOVIET
DATE:
☐☑
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
R
()
ELEARING OFFER 4.
RECORD COPY
COURDINATING OFFICES
CLASSIFICATION LA REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
15-126-3
14 Oct 741
158-41
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74.88
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UNION'S ACCEPTANCE OF CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY JUNTA WHEREBY THE SOVIET:
UNION MUST FREE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AS FREED BY
CHILE. WHEN GRUNO DOPPLER, INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE
IN CHILE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT FELDMEYER'S MISSION, HE DENIED THAT HE
BUT LATER WHEN ASKED WHETHER IT WAS
WAS ON THAT TYPE OF MISSION.
TRUE THAT FELDMEYER CARRIED WITH HIM THE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE, HE
ANSWERED, "THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION.
IT IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.
Y
THE CHILEAN AUTHORITIES ARE THE OBNES TO CONFIRM IT."
.B. AP, MOSCOW 17 OCTOBER:
"THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DENOUNCED
AS &'A FORGERY' A CHILEAN NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS
APPARENTLY WILLING TO RELEASE SOME POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RETURN FOR
RELEASE OF IMPRISONED LEFTISTS IN CHILE. Y
"SERGEI BULANTSEV, A COMMENTATOR FOR THE OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY
TASS SAID THURSDAY THE LA SEGUNDA STORY HAD BEEN CONCOCTED' BY
FASCIST-MINDED GENERALS' WHO SEEK TO DIVERT WORELD ATTENTION FROM THE
ATROCITIES AND ARBITRARINESS THERE.' Y
"GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET, CHIEF OF STATE OF CHILE, SAID CHILE
WOULD LIBERATE RELEASE ALL ITS PRISONERS IF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
CODE FIN
AUTHENTICATING OFFICE
CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI
E 2
CL BY:
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14-00000
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15.30
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1079: FILE
DATE-
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0
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611750
0
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#
AGREED TO LIBERATE AN EQUAL NUMBER OF THEIR PRISONERS. 4
"DESPITE DOCUMENTED CHARGES BY INTERNATIONAL #GROUPS AND
DISSIDENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION THAT PERSONS ARE PREOSBECUTED HERE
FOR THEIR POLITICAL BELIEFS, MOSCOW INSISTS THAT THERE ARE NO
POLITICAL PRISCHERS IN THE SOVIET UNION.” Y¨¨
2. PLS CABLE TEXT ARTICLE TO HQS FOR REPLAY. Y
4.
FILE: DEFER. E-2 IMPDET.H
EUR/BC
E/IP
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
18 OCTOBER 1974
MARTIN MILLER
E/CA
LA/CA
EXT:
9011 !
C/LA/SB
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
15-126-3
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.
32.
TOTAL CONC:
22
HUND
SECRET
CABLE BECEN BY
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ACTION UNIT
CEUR6
1
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FILE
VR
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T 499138
ACTION
बिल.
C/553, C/PS/263, C/01/202!
C/OSG/LC,
EIA362'
PAGE 01
TOR:1718122 OCT 74
SECRET 1715372 OCT 74 OCT 74 STAFF
CITE LONDON 54817
TO: DIRECTOR, ROME INFO SANTIAGO.
RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG
REF. A.
DIRECTOR 604965)
"
☑
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
STAFF
IN 392115
(LOND 54017
10/50/89-1
1,
B. DIRECTO 609942
PREUTEMS STORY DATELINED SANTIAGO IN 17 OCTOBER "TIMES"
IS HEADLINED "RUSSIA RESPOND-ING-TO-CHILE-CALL TO FREE PRISONERS."
HIGHLIGHTS AS FOLLOWS:
"THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARING TO RELEASE A LIMITED
NUMBER OF TOP POLITICAL PRISONERS IN RESPONSE TO A
CHALLENGE BY THE CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA, INFORMED
SOURCES SAID TODAY.
"A RED CROSS EMMISSARY WAS DUE TO ARRIVE HERE TONIGHT
FROM GENEVA WITH A LIST OF 100 CHILEAN PRISONERS THE
RUSSIANS WANT RELEASED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FREEDOM GIVEN
TO ITS OWN DETAINEES, THE SOURCES SAID.
THERE WAS NO
OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OR DENIAL OF THE REPORT FROM EITHER
GOVERNMENT OR RED CROSS OFFICIALS."
ARTICLE RECOUNTS PINOCHET CHALLENGE TO MOSCOW AND HAVANA AND
REUGAR LUPY
15-126-3
14-00000
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED.
_ ADYANCE COPY SUED
ACTION UNIT
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FILE
VR
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ACTION
°
T 499138
514352
TOTAL COPIES
NUN BY
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISBUING OFFICE 10 PROHIBITED
STAFF
2
PAGE 82
TOR11718122 CCT 74
POINTS OUT CHILE HAS SINCE FREED MORE THAN 300 DETAINEES
WITH MUNTIL NOW, NO APPARENT RESPONSE,"
LEADS THE KREMLIN LIST,
IN 390115
LOND 54017.
ALSO ADDS LUIS CORVALEN
2, APART FROM NEW DIMENSION ADDED TO REF PROPOSALS BY
ABOVE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (AT) COULD BE
AS NOTED REF AT HAS VERY PRESCRIBED
INDUCED TO TAKE UP ISSUE.
APPROACHES AND TECHNIQUES WHICH IT USES TO HANDLE, VIA A CHAIN-
OF (DIVIDUAL SPONSERSE, INDIVIDUAL CASES. WHILE THEY MAY
OCCASIONALLY USE PUBLICITY IF ALL ELSE FAILS THEY BASICALLY REGARD
IT AS A DISTINCT INHIBITION TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR BEHIND THE
AI'S POSITION ON THE CHILEAN
SCENES PERSON TO PERSON TECHNIQUE.
CHALLENGE WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE NEGATIVELY INFLUENCED BY ITS
HAVING ONLY VERY RECENTLY ACCEPTED A MOSCOW CHAPTER DESPITE THE
STRONG OBJECTIONS OF SOME OF ITS KEY LEADERS. SINCE OUR ASSETS
WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN FORCING THIS ISSUE THEY ARE NOT IN A
SECURE POSITION TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS ONE ESPECIALLY GIVEN
THE EXTREME UNPOPULARITY OF THE OVERALL CHILE STORY.
3.
WE CAN CONTINUE TO BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOME
FORM OF MEDIA PLACEMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH REF GOALS BUT WE HAVE
TO ESTIMATE THAT CHANCES OF ANY OF OUR ASSETS BEING ABLE TO

:
14-00000
MOTAL (747
NUN BY
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ว
PAGE 03-03
TCR:1718122 OCT 74
IN 392115
LOND 54017
CATALYZE ANY ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY BY GROUPS WHOSE VOICE
WOULD COUNT. ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED AND WOULD INVOLVE MORE RISKS
THAN THE ODDS WOULD PROBABLY JUSTIFY, WE HAVE BROUGHT
SCHWERSUN'S ATTENTION TO THE SITUATION INCLUDING THE PARA ONE
STORY. HE NUTED THAT AI EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAS RECENTLY
VOTED IN NEW AND TO SOME EXTENT UNTRIED MEMBERSHIP.
ALTHOUGH
NEW COMPUSITON COMMITTEE MAY IN LONG RUN BE LESS INCLINED
TO AVOID ACTION WHICH PUTS PRESSURE ON SOVIETS, SUCH ISSUES
PRESENTLY ALL THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN AI IN VIEW NEWNESS
COMMITTEE AND NOT LIKELY RECEIVE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTENTION UNTIL.
COMMITTEE SHAKES DOWN. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.
4. FILE DEFERM E2 IMPDET
SECRET
15-126-3
14-00000
OUTGOING MESSAGE
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1523272 SES JEUR 6
CLA8 AND 1/1553 E/PS/E G3
TO:
ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO. Y
00
PAGES
MEGAS REPERENCE NUMBER
609942
0
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#
RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y
REF: DIRECTOR 6049635 Y
1. GIVEN PERISHABILITY REF IDEAS, REQUEST YOUR COMMENT ON
FEASIBILITY OF APPROACHES TO DEFLOWER AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AS
OUTLINED. WELCOME ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS ON MEANS LIMIT FURTHER
ANTI-8KHERALD PROPAGANDA IN RELATION TO CHILE AND ANTI-JUNTA
CONNECTED WITH
PROPAGANDA IN RELATION TO TREATMENT OF POLITICAL PRISONERS. Y
2. FILE DEFER. E-2 IMPDET.N
B☑
MARTIN E. MILLER
DATE:
15 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
LA/CA
9011
C/BEBEUR CAS
CLASSIFICATION
RECORD COPY
C/E/BC
C/E/I
Jelenellen
R& Dncy
C/EUR/CA ✓
GORDINATING OFFICES
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
16/3134
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1500+74
LATING
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0215072
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INFO: FILE C/IN/AN, ClEUR6. clSES, clss3, 0
SHOE
MESSAGE REFERENCE HUMBER
604965
DISSEM BY: 38
NO INDE
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1775
0
SP FILES
#
C/PS/EG 3, C/OPS/INt2,
closalic,
TO: ROME, LONDON, INFO SANTIAGO.
RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG Y
INTERNATIO
1. INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF CHILEAN JUNTA AND MORE RECENTLY OF
BKHERALD HAVE BEEN ORCHESTRATED TO DRAMATIC PROPORTIONS. HQS BELIEVES
EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF GENERAL PINOCHET'S OFFER TO EXCHANGE A
NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET AND/OR
CUBAN PRISONERS IS OPPORTUNITY TO BLUNT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. IF THE
USSR AND CHILE CAN BE LUMPED TOGETHER IN POPULAR MIND AS EACH HAVING
POLITICAL PRISONERS, THE SITUATION CAN BE EXPLOITED TO DIVERT SOME OF
ATTENTION FROM JUNTA'S SUPPOSED MISDEEDS TO SOVIET HANDLING OF
POLITICAL PRISONERS. A REPORT FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATES THAT
THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE CONCERNED OVER THE PRESSURES THAT COUBLD
DEVELOP FROM THE OFFER. 4
2. THE EXCHANGE OFFER HAS ASPECTS THAT WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO
NUMEROUS GROUPS IN EUROPE BUT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTION,
PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CHILE'S EXTREME UNPOPULARITY AND THE LACK OF BOTH
A NEUTRAL. SPONSOR AND SUFFICIENT PUBLICITY. EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS
SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE OFFER TO RELEASE IMPORTANT CHILEAN
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RECORD COPY
RELEASING OFFICE
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
15-126-3
2 Oct 74
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
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STAFF
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INFO:
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DIRECTOR
684965
MOG
0 NO MORE
0
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#
IP PILES
COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS, WHATEVER THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE
OTHER HALF OF THE EXCHANGE. LEFTISTS OF NUMEROUS SHADES INCLUDING
THE BERTRAND RUSSELL GROUPS SHOULD ALSO FAVOR THE RELEASE OF THESE
PRISONERS, YET BE LESS TROUBLED BY THE DISCOMFITURE OF THE SOVIETS
AND CUBANS. SECOND, THE OFFER IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GROUPS LIKE
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO BRING DIRECT PRESURE ON THE USSR TO RELEASE
FINALLY, THE OFFER SHOULD
SOME PROMINENT INTELLECTUAL PRISONERS.
ATTRACT SOME HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FROM THOSE WHO FAVOR RELEASE OF ALL
POLITICAL PRISONERS ON PRINCIPLE. IN FACT, PROPERLY DEVELOPED, THE
EXCHANGE IS POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE TO ALMOST THE ENTIRE POLITICAL
SPECTRUM. Y
SUGGEST
3. ROME APPROACH DEFLOWER TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN GET HIS
GROUP INTERESTED IN TAKING PRACTICAL STEPS TO GET PRISONERS RELEASED
ON EXCHANGE BAS15.
FROM CHILEAN JUNTA PERHAPS IF HE CAN PICTURE HIMSELF AS SAVING THE
PRISONERS (COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS IN CHILE AND IMPORTANT .
INTELLECTUALS IN THE USSR) FROM A ENFASCIST REGIME ON THE ONE BHAND
AND FROM A STALINIST COUNTRY ON THE OTHER HE CAN BECOME SUFFICIENTLY
INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE EXCHANGE.
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DEFLOWER DEVELOP MAXIMUM EUROPEAN INTERBEST IN THE POSSIBILITIES THAT
THE EXCHANGE OFFERS AND MAXIMUM PUBLICITY OF HIS EFFORTS. 4
4. FOR LONDON: REQUEST STATION SEEK MEANS OF INTERESTING
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL IN SOME ASPECT OF THE EXCHANGE IDEA.
:
WHILE
AMNESTY OPS SOMETIMES VERY QUIBETLY. PURSUED, PUBLICITY IS IMPORTANT
IN THIS CASE. PERHAPS LINKING SPECIFIC PRISONERS FOR EXCHANGE MIGHT
CAPTURE PUBLIC IMAGINATION. Y
5.
FILER DEFER. . E-2 IMPDET.H
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RYSAT VUNUMBER Y
REF:
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Psych
C/WH/U>
•WH/4 Sec
1. RECOMMEND YOU CONSIDER ENLISTING SUITABLE VUNUMBER ASSET TO
PERSUADE JUNTA TO RELAX ITS RESTRICTIONS CH FREE PRESS.
SUCH MOVE WOULD BE THESE: Y
OBJECTIVES OF
A.. DEMONSTRATE TO WORLD THAT PINGCHET GOVT FIRMLY IN
POWER IN CHILE AND THAT IT FUNCTIONS NOW WITH AT LEAST TACIT CONSENT
OF MAJORITY OF CHILEANSI
8. GIVE SUGESTANTIAL DEMONSTRATION OF JUNTA'S COMMITMENT TO
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND THEREBY DEFUSE ONE OF MORE EXPE SHIVE GRIEVANCES
OF WORLD PRESS AGAINST CHILE REGINE. Y
URE
2. TO AVOID APPEARING TO CAPITULATE TO PRESS, FROM CUBANS PEP
REF, SUGGEST CHILEAN NOVE IN RESPONSE TO THIS INFLUENCE SHOULD NOT
FOLLOW UPON CRITICIAN ERANATING FROM CUBAN DOMINATED JOURNALISTS
CONFERENCE IN CARACAS. GESTURE, IF ADDRESSED TO ANYONE. SHOULD GE
HARE TO LAPS TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONALLE PRESTIGE THAT QURANUS
ORGANIZATION AND THEREON TO KEINFORCE ITS
SEAV
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UNIT
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PSYCH
ARTICLE BY DAVID F. BELNAP. ON EROSION OF DEMOCRACY IN CHILE
UNDER ALLENDE WHICH APPEARED IN LOS ANGELES TIMES ON 27 SEPT
74. SUGGEST YOU PASS FOLLOWING EXCERPTS TO LIAISON AND AGGE□NTS
OF INFLUENCE FOR BACKGROUND.
NOTE FIRST FIVE PARAGRAPHS ARE
MERELY REHASH ALLEGED CIA COVERT FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO PRESS
AND PARTIES IN OPPOSITION TO ALLENDE REGIME. THEIR
REITERATION NOT PARTICULARLY WORTHWHILE IN THIS CONTEXT.
WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ASSESSMENT REACTION THIS DAT
USED. Y
ABRIDGED TEXT FOLLOWS: Y
DATE
WHEN
A NO SER POR EL EXAGERADO VOLUMEN DEL VERBAL QUE
CARACTERIZO LA ACTUACION DE LOS DOS SANDOS EN EL LARGO Y ENCONADO
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ENFRENTAMIENTO CHILENO, LOS ATAQUES LANZADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR
CONTRA SUS ENEMIGOS EN LA POLITICA Y EN LOS MEDIOS DE DIFUSION RARAS
VECES SE LLEVARON A CABO FRONTAL O ABIERTAMENTE.
CASI SIEMPRE FUERON
Y EN LO TOCANTE A LOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS,
DE CARACTER ECONOMICO.
CASI NUNCA SE LLEGO, POR EJEMPLO, AL EXTREMO DE LA CENSURA DIRECTA. Y
LA PRENSA OPOSICIONISTA PUDO ESCRIBIR Y DECIR LO QUE LE PARECIO
DURANTE LOS CASI TRES ANOS QUE EL ALLENDISMO SE MANTUVO EN EL PODER.
LA DUDA SIEMPRE FUE SI DICHOS MEDIOS LOGRARIAN & NO SOBREVIVIR
ECONOMICAMENTE Y SEGUIR MANIFESTANDO SU CRITERIS. V
SOLO TRES MESES DESPUES DE HABER ASUMIDO ALLENDE LA PRESIDENCIA,
LA PRENSA ESCRITA OBTUVO UN PRESAGIO DE LO QUE PODRIA SUCEDERLE AL
MONOPOLIZAR EL GOBIERNO LA IMPRESION DE REVISTAS Y LIBROS EN EL PAIS.
ESTO SE CONSUMO MEDIANTE LA ADQUISICION DE UNA FIRMA EDITORIAL QUE
HABIA SIDO DEBILITADA PREVIAMENTE POR UNA PROLONGADA HUELGA DIRIGIDA
POR LOS COMUNISTAS, Y POR UN ARBITRAJE EN EL QUE ACTUO COMO MEDIADOR
OTRO COMUNISTA, CUYO FALLO COLOCO A LA EMPRESA AL EBORDE DE LA
QUIEBRA. 4
DATE:
ASIMISMO, LAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, QUE SIEMPRE HAN SIDO UN
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING COP
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INSTRUMENTO POLITICO IMPORTANTE EN CHILE, TUVIERON UN INDICIO DE alo
QUE LES AGUARDABA, INCLUSO ANTES DE LA TOMA DE POSESION DEL NUEVO
PRESIDENTE. LOS PERITOS EN COMUNICACIONES DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA
LES INDICARON QUE EFECTUARAN REBAJAS EN SU PERSONAL INFORMATIVO PARA
DARLES CABIDA LOS PERIODISTAS MARXISTAS DESIGNADOS POR EL PARTIDO,
SO PENA DE PERDER MAS TARDE, SUS LICENCIAS PARA TRANSMITIR. Y
KOFCHYŁATEL,GÖBBENINO EZZEAZANUNLEAN LE-HAGNEPAL BAJO LA
FERULA ALLENDISTA, LAS ENTIDADES ESTATALES-- Y LAS INDUSTRIAS PRIVADAS,
A MEDIDA QUE IBAN CAYENDO EN MANOS DEL GOBIERNO-- LE DABAN
PUBLICIDAD UNICAMENTE A AQUELLOS MEDIOS INFORMATIVOS QUE PERTENECIAN A
ENTRE ESTOS
LA UNIDAD POPULAR BO QUE APOYABAN AL REGIMEN.
FIGURABAON, EN EL MOMENTO DE DESPLOMARSE EL ALLENDISMO, APROXIMADA-
MENTE LA MITAD DE LAS RADICEMISORAS DEL PAIS (UNA DE LAS CUALES, LA
MAYOR, ERA PROPIEDAD DE SALVADOR ALLENDER Y CINCO DE LOS. ONCE
PERIODICOS DIARIOS QUE SE PUBLICABAN EN ESTA CAPITAL. Y
LA TELEVISION COMERCIAL CHILEONA ESTA TOTALMENTE SOSTENBIDA POR EL
ESTADO O POR EL SECTOR UNIVERSITARIO, DE MODO QUE NO DEPENDE POR
COMPLETO DE LA PUBLICIDAD PARA SUBSISTIR.
POR ANADIDURA, DURANTE UNA
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
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GRAN PARTE DE LA GESTION PRESIDENCIAL DE ALLENDE CASI TODA LA TELE-
VISION DE CHILE ESTABA CONTROLADA POR LOS MARXISTAS O POR SUS
SIMPATIZANTES. ESTA SITUACION CAMBIO SOLO CUANDO LA UNIVERSIDAD
CATOLICA DE SANTIAGO LE ARRANSCO EL DOMINIO DE SU CANAL DE TV A LOS.
ALLENDISTAS Y SE UNIO A LA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE VALPARAISO EN
UN ESFUERZO POR LLEVARLE UNA PROGRAMACION NO-MARXISTA A TODA LA
CIUDADANIA, UTILIZANDO ESTACIONES DE RELEVO DE MICROONDA DE
ELABORACION CASERA.. TRUNFARON EN ESTE EMPENO EN UNA MEDIDA ASOMBROSA
MIENTRAS SALVAGAN LOS OBSTACULOS DE TODO TIPO, AUN FISICOS, QUE EL
REGIMEN LES INTERPONIA PARA IMPEDIRSELO. Y
EL MERCURIO, EL PERIODICO MAS GRANDE DEL PAIS, HABIA PERDIDO EL
SESENTA PORCIENTO DE SU VOLUMEN PUBLICITARIO NORMAL A MEDIADOS DE
1971, Y CUALQUIER ESTACION RADIAL CORRIENTE, NO AFILIADA A LA UNIDAD
POPULAR, PROMEDIABA UN OCHENTA PEORCIENTO DE PERDIDAS SEMEJANTES. Y
ESTA EROSION PUBLICITARIA CONTINUO HACIENDO ESTRAGOS A MEDIDA QUE
LAS PEQUENAS EMPRESAS INDEPENDIENTES FUERON SUSPENDIENDO. SUS
ANUNCIOS AL IRSE AGOTANDO SUS EXISTENCIAS DE MERCANCIAS O AL
SOBREPASAR POR MUCHO LA DEMANDA A LOS ABSTECIMIENTOS DISPONSIBLES.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASIN
COUNDUMATING OFFICERS
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Y A LO LARGO DE TODO ESTE PERIODO ELEVABANSE CONJUNTAMENTE LOS COSTOS
DE PUBLICACION Y TRANSMISION, IMPELIDOS POR LA INFLACION DE DOS
CIFRAS QUE ARRASABA AL PAIS Y QUE ASCENDIO A TRES A PARTIR DE 1972.
LAS AUTORIDADES GUBERNAMENTALES NEGABAN ENTRETANTO TODAS LAS
SOLICITUDES DE LICENCIA PARA IMPORTAR PIEZAS DE REPUESTO Y EQUIPOS
DE REEMPLAZO PARA LAS PLANTAS QUE SE DETERIORABAN, Y EN EL CASO DE LAS.
RADIOEMISORAS, DE ELEMENTOS TAN ESENCIALES COMO SON LAS UNIDADES
GRABADORAS Y LAS CINTAS MAGNETOFONICAS. Y
EN CUANTO A EL MERCURIO Y A MUCHAS ESTACIONES DE RADIO, LOS
SINDICATOS MANEJADOS POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR TRATABAN DE INVENTAR
PRETEXTOS PARA QUE EL GOBIERNO PROCEDIERA A ADUENARSE DE SUS EMPRESAS
RECTORAS. LA DE EL MERCURIO, QUE PUBLICA TRES ROTATIVOS DIARIOS EN
ESTA CAPITAL Y OTROS CINCO EN DISTINTAS PARTES DE LA NACION, FUE
OBJETO DE INVESTIGACIONES FISCALES, DE ACUSACIONES DE NEGOCIAR
ILEGALMENTE EN DIVISAS Y DE INSULTOS PERSONALMENTE LANZADOS CONTRA
ELLA POR ALLENDE. የ
PERO EL ESFUERZO MAS VIGOROSO QUE REALIZARA EL REGIMEN PARA
TRATAR DE MANIPULAR A LA PRENSA ESCRITA OPOSICIONISTA FUE LAS
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
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COLMUNATING OPP
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INCESANTES TENTATIVAS DE APODERARSE DE LA UNICA ENTIDAD PAPELERA
INDEPENDIENTE, PROVEEDORA DE PAPEL PERIODICO PARA TODAS LAS
PUBLICACIONES NO PERTENECIENTES A LA UNIDAD POPULAR, ASI COMO TAMBIEN
PARA LAS QUE SEGUIAN LOS DICTAMENES DE LA COALICION GOBERNANTE. Y
EL GOBIERNO TRATO PRIMERO DE ADQUIRIR LA MAYORIA DE LAS ACCIONES
DE LA EMPRESA, COMPRANDOSELAS A SUS 16,000 ACCIONISTAS.
a
LUEGO
INTENTO PERSUADIR AL CONGRESO PARA QUE STABLECIERA UN MONOPOLIO
ESTATAL SOBRE EL PAPEBL PERIODICO, Y FINALMENTE ENSAYO LA ELABORACION
DE UN PRETEXTO PARA DECRETAR LA EXPROPIACION DE LA COMPANIA, TACTICA
QUE HABIA FUNCIONADO CON OTRAS INDUSTRIAS. 4
UNA VEZ FRACASADAS TODAS ESTAS INICIATIVAS, EMPRENDIOSE LA DEL
ASEDIO ECONOMICO. NO SE MITIGARON LOS CONTROLES DE PRECIOS IMPUESTOS
A LOS ARTICULOS DE PAPEL PARA MANTENER EL EQUILIBRIO ALTERADO POR EL
ALZA DE LOS COSTOS DE PRODUCCION. ELLO HIZO QUE LA FIRMA PAPELERA
DECLARA UNA PERDIDA DE 9,100,000 DOLARES DURANTE LOS DOCE MESES QUE
FINALIZARON EL 30 DE JUNIO DE 1972, PERDIDAS QUE AUMENTARON A UN
RITMO DE 120,000 DOLARES DIARIOS MAS TARØDE EN ESE MISMO ANO. Y
SEGUN MANIEFESTARON LOS SINDICATOS DE LA PROPIA EMPRESA, LA
DATE:
ORIG:
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AUTORIZACION PARAB SUBIR LOS PRECIOS CONCEDIDA POR EL REGIMEN EN
OCTUBRE DE 1972 PROPORCIONO MENOS DE LA MITAD DEL ALIVIO ECONOMICO
QUE SE NECESITABA. Y
POR OTRA PARTE, AL COMENZAR EL ANO 1972, LA SITUACION DE LAS
DOS VECES DURANTE
ESTACIONES DE RADIO NO-ALLENDISTAS ERA DESEPERADA.
ESE ANO EL CONGRESO APROBO UN IMPUESTO ESPECIAL PARA AYUDAR A COSTEAR
TODAS LAS EMISORAS, VETANDO AMBAS INICIATIVAS EL PRESIDENTE DE LA
REPÚBLICA. 4
EN SEPTIEMBRE, DESPUES DEL SEGUNDO DE ESTOS VETOS, PARECIA QUE
LAS CUATRO ESTACIONES MAS IMPORTANTES DE ESTA CAPITAL NO ADSCRITAS A
NO OBSTANTE ESTO, SOBREVIVIERON Y
LA UNIDAD OPOPULAR SUCUMBIRIAN.
FORMARON PARTE DE UNA RED VOLUNTARIA DE EMISORAS APODADA "CADENA
DEMOCRATICA," LA CUAL LE BRINDO A LA OPOSICION ABNTIALLENDIESTA UNA
TRIBUNA DE EXPRESION PARA COMPETIR CON EL FRENTE DE ESTACIONES
ORGANIZADO SIMILARMENTE POR LA UNIDAD POPULAR A TRAVES DE TODA LA
NACION. Y
1
SALVARONSE IGUALMENTE LA EMPRESA PAPELERA INDEPENDIENTE Y EL
MERCURIÓ. TAMBIEN ESCAPARON CON VIDA EL DIARIO LA: PRENSA,
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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ADQUIRIDO POR INTERESES DEMOCRATACRISTIANOS DESPUES DE LA ELECCION
DE ALLENDE PERO ANTES DE SU TOMA DE POSESION, Y EL ROTATIVO TRIBUNA
FUNDADO POR EL PARTIDO NACIONAL EN LOS COMIENZOS DE LA PRESIDENCIA
ALLENDISTA. ES DE PRESUMIRSE QUE AMBOS ORGANOS OBTUVIERAN RESPALDO
ECONOMICO DE SUS PARTIDOS RESPECTIVOS O A TRAVES DE ELLOS, YA QUE
NINGUNO DE LOS DOS PUBLICABA MUCHOS ANUNCIOS. (TANTO LA PRENSA COMO
TRIBUNA FUERON CLAUSURADOS POR LA JUNTA QUE DESALOJO DEL PODER A
ALLENDE, COMO PARTE DE SU DECISION DE DECLARAR EN "RECESO” A LA
POLITICA.4
LA UNIDAD POPULAR EMPLEO TAMBIEN LAS TEĆNICAS DE HOSTIGAMIENTO`
ECONOMICO Y DE DIVIDIR PARA CONQUISTAR CONTRA LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS
DE OPOSICION, DIEZMANDO CON ESTA ULTIMA TECTICA AL TRADICIONAL
PARTIDO RADICAL CHILENO, Y ESFORZANDOSE POR HACER ZOZOBRAR AL PARTIDO
NACIONAL, DE TENDENCIA DERECHISTA, DESTRUYENDO EL PODERIO ECONOMICO
DE SUS ELEMENTOS PRINCIPALES. 4
COMO EN CHILE LA LEY NO EXIGE QUE SE DE CUENTA DEL APOYO
ECONOMICO DESTINADO A LA POLITICBA, RESULTA DIFICIL AVERIGUAR COMO SE
DESENVOLVIERON ECONOMICAMENTE BAJO EL ALLENDISMO LOS PARTIBADOS EN SI.Y
DATE:
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EN LA ESFERA POLITICA, EL OBJETIVO PRIMORDIAL DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR
ERBA EL PARTIDO DOMOCRATBA-CRISTIANO, EL MAS GRANDE DE TODOS LOS
PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE LA NACION. DE LAS SEIS AGRUPACIONES INTEGRANTES
DE LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOS CUMUNISTAS SOBRE TODO SE PERCATARON DE LO
ESENCIAL QUE RESULTABA PARA ESTABILIZAR AL GOBIERNS MINORITARIO DE
ESA COALICION GANARSE EL APOYO DE LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA, O SI NO
DIVIDIRLA. Y
PERO A NO SER POR LA PEQUENA FRAGMENTACION OCURRIDA POCOS DIAS
DESPUES DE LAS ELECCIONES PRESIDENCIALES DE 1770, LOS DEMOCRATA-
CRISTIANOS MANTUVIERON INTACTA SU UNIDAD, EVOLUCIONANDO GRADUALMENTE
DE UNA POSICION DE ADVERSARIOS LBEALES DEL GOBIERNO A OTRA DE BBB
OPOSICION IRREDUCTIBLE. Y
TRATANDO DE RESCATAR A BALLENDE, CUYO PROPIO PARTIDO SOCIALISTA,.
DE FILIACION MARXISTA, REPRESENTABA EL MAS NUTRIDO DE LOS ELEMENTOS
IRRACIONALES QUE CONFORMABAN LA UNIDAD POPULAR, LOGS COMUNISTAS
LLEGARON INCLUSO A PEDIRLE AYUDA A LA IGLESIA CATOLICA, ROGANDOLE
QUE MEDIARA CON LA DEMOCRACIA CRISTIANA PARA CONTRIBUIR A APUNTALAR
AL REGIMEN CUANDO ESTE SE VENIA ABAJO. Y
DATE:
ORIG:
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MERAGE NUMBER
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MAS ERA YA DEMASIADO TARDE. HACIA MUCHO TIEMPO QUE SALVADOR
ALLENDE HABIA SELLADO SU SUERTE CON LOS DEMOCRATA-CRISTIANOS, AL
FALTAR SISTEMATICAMENTE A TODAS LAS PROMESAS QUE LES HICIERA A
CAMBIO DE LOS VOTOS QUE NECESITABAD PARA QUE EL CONGRESO
DETERMINARA SU ELECCION A LA PRIMERA MAGISTRATURA, Y AL CONFESARLE:
CINICAMENTE AL INTELECTUAL SOCIALISTA FRANCES REGIS DEDRAY EN UNA
ENTREVISTA QUE HABIA FORMULADO ESAS PROMESAS EXCLUSIVAMENTE PARA
ASEGURAR SU NOMBRAMIENTO COMO PRESIDENTE. Y
2.
NO FILE. E-25 INPDET.H
DATE:
ORIG:
10 OCTOBER 1974
E. JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT:
C/LA/CA
EXT:
1553
C/LA
2:16376 O
CLASSIFICATION
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AUTHENTICATING
IMPDET
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INFO: FILE IPIAN, PS/EG4, E94:
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8538
CA
DISSEM DY
29
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WHIC
EA/C04, EAluNOI, LAB, NEIO, PER
EUR8, AF8, SE8,
#
BANGKOK, JAKARTA, HONG KONG, MANILA, RANGOON, SAIGON, SEOUL,
SURABAYA, TAIPEI, TOKYO, VIENTIANE, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO,
@PORT AU PRINCE, RIO DE JANEIRO, SAO PAULO, COLOMBO, DACCA,
NEW DELHI, BONN, BONN BASE, BRUSSELS, BERN, BERLIN, THE HAGUE,
HAMBURG, LISBON, LONDON, PARIS, ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, KHARTOUM,
LAGOS, LUSAKA, MONROVIA, NAIROBI.Y
BOOK CABLE Y
QRPEG 069Y
•
Duilly
FPSYCH
"WATERGATE" A COMMON PHENOMENON IN USSR. ("NY TIMES,"
fel
9 OCTOBER). SOVIET HISTORIAN AND POLITICAL DISSIDENT ROY MEDVEDEV
HAS CHARGED SOVIET PRESS WITH SUPPRESSING NEWS ABOUT WATERGATE
"BECAUSE REGIME FEARS REVEALING TO SOVIET PUBLIC HOW INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY, FREE PRESS AND ELECTED LEGISLATIVE BODIES CAN RESTRAIN
EXECUTIVE POWER...WATERGATE-TYPE ABUSES ARE COMMON IN USSR, BUT
SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT IS SECURELY SHIELDED NOT ONLY FROM FALSE CHARGES
BUT ALSO FROM LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATION OF REAL ABUSES OF POWER...FOR
EXAMPLE...ABORTIVE ATTEMPT BY PROSECUTOR IN GEORGIAN REPUBLIC TO GET
PERMISSION TO SEARCH APARTMENT AND INTERROGATE FAMILY OF REPUBLIC'S
DATE: 10 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG * BARNA SPRAGUE: SMF
UNIT: CAG/PSB
EXT: 1254
BB
CINNAS
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0
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OF PAGES
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
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#21
#
FORMER LEADER MZHAVANADZE, WHO WAS TOPPLED IN SEPTEMBER 1972 AMID
CHARGES OF WHOLESALE CORRUPTION AND GRAFT THAT CHARACTERIZED HIS
RULE...ALTHOUGH THERE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THIS
TYPE OF INVESTIGATION, HIGHER PARTY OFFICIALS WOULD NOT PERMIT IT."Y
2. EAST GERMANS REAFFIRM SEPARATION FROM WEST ON 25TH ANNI-`
VERSARY. JOHN GOSHKO WRITES IN "WASHINGTON POST" OF & OCTOBER THAT.
EAST GERMANY'S "NEW SENSE OF ASSERTIVENESS" WAS DEMONSTRATED ON
7 OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF STATE BY LARGEST PARADE EVER
"THOUSANDS OF JACK-BOOTED
STAGED BY EAST GERMAN PEOPLE'S ARNY:
TROBOPS MADE STREETS OF EAST BERLIN ECHO TO THUD OF TRADITIONAL
PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP...SEEMINGLY ENDLESS WAVE OF SOLDIERS IN
RIGIDLY DISCIPLINED RANKS...HOLDING OF PARADE IN EAST BERLIN
CONSTITUTED DEFIANCE OF FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OF
BERLIN. ..IN PROTEST, 12 NATO NATIONS WHICH RECOGNIZE EAST "GERMANY,
REFUSED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO CELEBRATIONS IN EAST BERLIN..
WHICH HIGHEST IN SOVIET BLOC
EAST GERMAN STANDARD OF LIVING IS STILL THIRTY PERCENT BELOW THAT OF
...WEST GERMANY...DESPITE LIVING STANDARDS EAST GERMANY IS RERICIORS
ONE OF MOST CLOSED SOCIETIES IN SOVIET BLOC
MORE REGIMENTED IN
BSE
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
ING OFFICER
COURT OFFICERS
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO
TED
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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#
MANY WAYS THAN SOVIET UNION ITSELF...EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT OWES ITS
PRESENT SUCCESS TO BERLIN WALL AND CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF WALL
ALONG ITS 860-MILE BORDER WITH WEST GERMANY."Y
3. EGYPT CANCELS ORDER FOR SOVIET PLANES.
CAIRO, 29 SEPTEMBER.
WEEKLY NEWSPAPER "AKHBAR AL-YOM REPORTS THAT EGYPT HAS DECIDED. TO
CANCEL ITS ORDER FOR EIGHT RUSSIAN-BUILT TU-154 JET AIRLINERS, “CITING
"NUMEROUS AND MAJOR DEFECTS" IN AIRCRAFT'S PERFORMANCE THAT
JEOPARDIZE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS.
ONE OF PLANES CRASHED IN FLAMES
DURING TRAINING FLIGHT 10 JULY, KILLING TWO EGYPTIANS AND FOUR SOVIET
CREWMEN. EXACT CAUSE OF ACCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OTHER
PLANES OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN GROUNDED.
NEWSPAPER SHAID EGYPTIAN
AVIATION ORGANIZATION WOULD FILE CLAIMS WITH THE SOVIET EXPORT FIRM,
"FAVIA", FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF $7.5 MILLION ALREADY PAID ON THE $47.5
MILLION DEAL.Y
4.
NEUE
NO CUBAN/SOVIET RESPONSE ON SETTING PRISONERS FREE.
ZUERCHER ZEITUNG CARRIED AFP REPORT FROM SANTIAGO, 24 SEPTEMBER, THAT
GENERAL PINOCHET, CHIEF OF CHILBEAN JUNTA, HAD SAID NEITHER CUBA NOR
SOVIET UNION HAD RESPONDED TO CHILEAN CHALLENGE OF 011 SEPTEMBER TO
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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PAGE
4
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609538
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776
#
RELEASE SAME NUMBER OF PRISONERS AS CHILE WAS RELEASING.' PINOCHET
ALSO SAID FOREIGN MINISTRY AND CHILEAN EMBASSIES ARE RECEIVING
HUNDREDS OF LETTERS DAILY FROM RELATIVES OF SOVIET PRISONERS, AND
THAT THESE LETTERS WERE BEING FORWARDED TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS.
HE ALSO REVEALED, HE WOULD RECEIVE DELEGATION FROM BUENOS AIRES OF.
UKRAINIANS-IN-EXILE WHO WOULD GIVE CHILEAN OFFICIALS INFORMATION ON
SOME FIFTY UKRAINIANS WHO ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN USSR.Y
.
S. EDITORIAL IN MEXICO CITY INDEPENDENT DAILY, "LA PRENSA,”
25 SEPTEMBER, ACCUSED KGB OF SPYING AND INTERVENING IN LATIN AMERICAN
AFFAIRS. COMMENTING ON PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT
AGAINST CIA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA, EDITORIALIST WROTE THAT THE
" ...THAT SINISTER RED POLITICAL
KGB SHOULD GET OUT OF LATIN AMERICA.
ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS COMMITTED SO MANY DASTARDLY CRIBMES IN OUR
COUNTRY SUCH AS THE ASSASSINATION OF TROTSKY.
KGB HAS ESTABLISHED
BOOK PUBLISHERS USED BY THE FASCIST LEFTISTS TO INFILTRATE PARTIES,
MEETINGS AND LITERARY GATHERINGS. KGB USED THE PRESS AND GROUPS OF
ARTISTS, INTELLECTUALS, WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS TO SING THE PRAISES
... THE KGE SHOULD GET OUT WITH ITS THOUSANDS
OF A RED DICTATORSHIP:
2
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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CONF:
INFO:
FILE
609538
OF SPIES SPREAD THROUGHOUT OUR HEMISPHERE.
REPUBLIC OF
"4
b. IPU COUNCIL RECOGNIZES SOUTH VIETNAM.
0
0
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IP FILES
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#
TOKYO NEWSPAPERS OF
2 OCTOBER REPORT EXTENSIVELY ON OPENING OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL
MEETING AND SAID HEATED DEBATE TOOK PLACE IN FIRST SESSION OVER
.
SEATING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION.
"MAINICHI" STORY SAID SOVIETS
AND RUMANIANS IMMEDIATELY CHALLENGED "QUALIFICATIONS" OF SOUTH
VIETNAMESE AND DEMANDED THAT LATTER BE EXPELLED FROM CONFERENCE AND
THAT PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) BE SEATED IN THEIR
PLACE. "MAINICHI" SAID THAT ROLL CALL VOTE WAS HELD, AND SOUTH.
VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WAS SELECTED "BY OVERWHELMING MAJORITY" TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE.
EDITORIAL IN "ASAHI" SAID THAT BITTER
CONTROVERSIES WOULD ARISE AT THIS SESSION OF IPU, WHICH HAS MORE THAN
SIXTY NATIONS PARTICIPATING, INCLUDING BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.
BUT THAT "IT IS...SIGNIFICANT IN ITSELF THAT PARLIAMENTARIANS OF
WORLD EXCHANGE UNRESERVED OPINIONS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS."Y
CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS APPEAL FOR HELP AGAINST COMMUNIST ATROCI-
"TWO MOSLEM ORGANIZA-
TIES.
?.
PHNOM PENH, 27 SEPTEMBER (SAIGON POST}:
TIONS IN CAMBODIA, SPEAKING FOR ALMOST A MILLION KHMER MOSLEMS, HAVE
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDRATING OFFIC
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:
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CAS
•
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PAGS
OF PAGES
PERENCE NUMER
0
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609538
0
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0
To
PER
0
105
#
APPEALED TO ALL ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES TO SEND DELEGATIONS TO CAMBODIA
FOR FIRSTHAND VIEW OF THE M'INFERNO' CREATED BY INDOCHINESE
COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS, WHENEVER COMMUNISTS
CAPTURED A VILLAGE, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF MOSLEN FAITH WERE
MARCHED TO A CONCENTRATION CAMP AND THEIR HOMES WERE BURNED TO THE
GROUND. THE OLD AND WEAK WERE KILLED: THE HEALTHY WERE FORCED TO
TO HELP DEFEND
GIVE UP THEIR RELIGION AND WORK FOR THE COMMUNISTS.
THEIR RELIGION AND THEIR ADOPTED COUNTRY AGAINST COMMUNIST DEPRE-
DATIONS, KHMER MOSLEMS ORGANIZED A BRIGADE, NOW PART OF THE CAMBODIAN
ARMED FORCES, AND MANY MOSLEMS HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES ON THE BATTLE
FIELD. IN THEIR APPEAL, CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS BEGGED FELLOW MOSLEMS
ALL OVER WORLD TO UNITE IN EFFORT TO COMPEL NORTH VIETNAMESE AND
OTHER INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS TO CEASE BLOODSHED IN INDOCHINA.
IRAN INCENSED BY NORTH KOREAN BEHAVIOR. TEHRAN, 9-12
SEPTEMBER (TEHRAN JOURNAL AND KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL):
8.
TWO OF TEHRAN'S
LEADING NEWSPAPERS CARRIED REPORTS ON HOW NORTH KOREAN ROWDYISM HAD
ATHLETES
MARRED ASIAN GAMES, AND CRITICIZED THEIR BEHAVIOR. ONE REPORT CARRIED
HEADLINE, "WHENEVER THERE'S TROUBLE, THERE'S A NORTH KOREAN."
DATE:
ORIG:
AFTER
BSB
UNIT
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICES
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATIO
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
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FILE
•
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0
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AFTERNO
PER
0 A
#
NORTH KOREAN OLYMPIC SILVER MEDALIST BOXER LOST BOUT, NORTH KOREAN
COACHES, MANAGER AND NEWSMEN ATTACKED INDONESIAN REFEREE, THEN
ENGAGED IN BATTLE WITH POLICE AT MOHAMMED REZA SHAH STADIUM. RULES
COMMITTEE UPHELD DECISION ON BOUT, THEN CENSURED NORTH KOREAN
PROTESTERS FOR PUNCHING JUDGES AND BREAKING FURNITURE. SIX TRUCK-
LOADS OF POLICE WERE NEEDED TO RESTORE ORDER. NORTH KOREAN FENCING
AND SOCCER TEAMS REFUSED TO COMPETE AGAINST ISRAELIS, AND BOTH MEN'S
AND WOMEN'S BASKETBALL TEAMS REFUSED TO PLAY SOUTH KOREANS. WHEN
NORTH KOREA'S VOLLEYBALL PLAYERS DID CONSENT TO TAKE ON SOUTH KOREAN
TEAM, NEWSMEN CONCLUDED NORTH KOREANS HAD AGREED ONLY BECAUSE THERE
WAS TO BE A NET BETWEEN THEM! MOST SENSATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE
CONCERNED NORTH KOREAN WEIGHTLIFTER WHO, STRIPPED OF HIS THREE AWARDS
WHEN DRUG TESTS PROVED POSITIVE, OBJECTED VIOLENTLY AND REFUSED TO
RETURN GOLD MEDALS. E2 IMPDET H
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
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RYBAT VUNUMBER Y
REF: .A. BOGOTA 24797 |IN 3692471
3. DIRECTOR 604965 Y
PAGE
من
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608611
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PGA
a
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WH/4 Sary
1.
PRISONER EXCHANGE PROPOSAL : IS TEXT SANTIAGO
FABAGS/IN153640)
CABLE 6009, 2
FOLLOWING FOR YOUR BACKGROUND USE IN BRIEFING PJFIFTYÓNE
OCT:
RECENT PUBLIC LETTER TO CARDINAL RAUL SILVA REQUESTED HIS
ASSISTANCE IN OCTAINING RELEASE OF JURI GRIGOVIEVICH PRONIN, CURRENTLY
DETAINED IN USSR. LETTER FROM DETAINEE'S WIFE, A CHILEAN CITIZEN
NAMED MARIA ELIANA E. DE PRONIN, WAS GIVEN PROOMINENT LOCAL PRESS
COVERAGE SEPT 26. TEXT OF LETTER WAS WRITTEN IN SOMETIMES IRONICAL
TONE, APPEALING TO CADRDINAL'S "NOBLE CHRISTIAN HEART TOWARDS CHILEAN
POLITICAL DETAINEES."
CONTINUING, DETAINEES'S WIFE SAID SHE BELIEVES
AN AUTHORITY SUCH AS THE CARDINAL, "WHO HAS SO MANY TIMES DEFENDED
THE DETAINEES OF THE LEFT," COULD INFLUENCE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO
RELEASE HER HUSBAND, SAID MARRIED PRONIN IN JANUARY 1968, AND
HUSBAND SINCE AUGUST 1968 DETAINED IN 'UUTA CAMP FOR HAVING TRIED TO
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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"12. CARDINAL RESPONDED PUBLIC (OCT 1) IN FORM OF LETTER TO
CONSERVATIVE "EL MERCURIO," REITERATING HIS INTENTION TO USE ALL HIS
STRENGTH TO HELP THOSE WHO SUFFER," REGARDLESS OF OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS."
'IN RESPONSE, CARDINAL ASSURED WIFE AND PUBLIC THAT
HE WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE ON DETAINEE'S BEHALF, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO
RELATIONS WITH USSR AND IS NOT OPTIMISTIC. Y
3. COMMENT. PRESS COVERAGE OF LETTER EXCHANGE, AND PERHAPS
REQUEST ITSELF, IS OBVIOUS CONTINUATION OF PRESS HARASSMENT OF
CARDINAL FOR HIS CRITICISM OF GOC HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE, AND FOR HIS
SILENCE DURING CHILEAN HUE AND CRY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN
USSR AND CUBA. IN HIS RESPONSE, CARDINAL SOFTLY REBUKED CRITICS AND
GOC BY STATING, "MOREOVER I BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR TO YOU CEL MERCURIO▸
THAT THE CARDINAL'S REQUESTS TO AUTHORITIES, EVEN THOSE WITH MORE
INTIMATE TIES TO HIM, ARE NOT ALWAYS WELL RECEIVED.
"
4.
NO FILE. E-2 IMPDET.Á
DATE:
9 OCTOBER 1974
ORIG:
EVA JAMES MCTIGHE
UNIT:
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PAGE 21
SEPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
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IN 362715
TOR:171642Z SEP 74
54G0
30338
SECRET 1715442 SEP 74 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO 32338
!
TO: PRIURITY DIRECTOR.
RYHAT
REF:
1.
SANTIAGO 32318 (,0361362)
IN FEATURED EDITORIAL CAPTIONED "KENNEDY ON THE ANTI-
CHILEAN CAMPAIGN" EL MERCURIO OF 16 SEPTEMBER DESCRIBES
REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON AS SECOND (LUGARTENIENTE) OF
SENATOR KENNEDY. EL MERCURIO OUTLINES GEJECTIVES OF
HARRINGTON REVELATIONS AS:
TO GIVE AMMUNITION TO THE
POLITICAL INTERESTS OF (SENATOR) KENNEDY;
A)
31 TO CONTINUE THE
ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN WHICH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM HEADS
AND HAS GREATLY INFILTRATED THE ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL
164
CIRCLES SUPPORTING KENNEDY; C) DIRECT FIRE AT THE CHILEAN DAILY
WHOSE PUBLICATIONS AND OPINIONS SEEM TO HAVE THE STRONGEST
IMPACT INTERNATIONALLY.
: 2. EL MERCURIO FURTHER COMMENTS THAT HARRINGTON ATTACK IS
AN ATTEMPT TO IMPEDE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CHILE (SIC)
AND DIRECTLY CONNECTS WITH WORLD-WIDE SOVIET CAMPAIGN "TO STRANGLE
OUR GOVERNMENT EVEN AT THE COST OF (CAUSING) HUNGER FOR
RECORD COPY
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PAGE 32
TOR:1716402 SEP 74
IN 362715
SAGO 30338
THE CHILEAN PEOPLE WHILE THE GRANERIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE
EMPTIED FOR RUSSIA."
3. AFTER TOUCHING SEVERAL OTHER BASES, EL MERCURIO CONCLUDES
BY DENYING THAT THERE HAS EVER BEEN ANY "UNCONFESSABLE"
INCOME IN ITS HISTORY, EL MERCURIO'S BOOKS WERE SUBJECT TO MOST
THOROUGH, AND HOSTILE SCRUTINY DURING THE MARXIST REGIME WITHOUT
ANYONE BEING ABLE TO SPECIFY IRREGULARITEIES. THEREFORE, EL
MERCURIO REJECTS "WITH LEGITIMATE DISDAIN THE IRRESPONSIBLE
CHARGES MADE BY A CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF MR. KENNEDY AND
FEELS AUTHORIZED TO CONJECTURE THAT THE ATTACK IS THE FRUIT
OF JOURNALISTIC IRRESPONSIBILITY OR OF THE ANIMOSITY OF THE
ADVISORS OF A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WHO IS STOPPED SINCE
SEVERAL YEARS AGO IN HIS AMBITIONS BY THE MORAL EXAMINATION
4.
OF HIS ACTIONS TO WHICH HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED IN HIS COUNTRY",
PRESIDENT FORD'S STATEMENTS ON CHILE FROM HIS 16 SEPTEMBER
NEWS CONFERENCE WERE CARRIED. IN FULL BY "EL MERCURIO" UNDER FRONT
PAGE HEADLING "FORD: U.S. HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH FALL OF ALLENDE,"
THERE WAS NO EDITORIAL COMMENT IN "EL MERCURIO" AND NO NEWS OR
EDITORIAL COVERAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IN "LA TERCERA".
SECRET
:
14-00000
FUHM 1026
7.11 374
CABLE NEC DISSE for
PERSON/UN
PERBON/UNIT NOTIFIED
_ ADVANCE CONT JURO SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
RF
FILE
VA
N
F
ACTION
0
T 422494
E14951
TOTAL C
SECRET
NUNY
REPRODUCTION DY OTHER THAN
ISAVING OFFICE IN PROHIBITED
STAFF
MRS.
PAGE: 23-83
TOR:17154
SEP 74
IN 362715
SAGO 30338
ALLENDE'S ATTACK AGAINST SECRETARY KISSINGER WAS CARRIED IN
"LA TERCEMA" BUT NOT IN "EL MERCURIO".
5, IN TAKING THE EXAGGERATED POSITION IT HAS ON THE REVEL-
TIONS, EL MERCURIO HAS LEFT ITSELF VULNERABLE TO BEING EMBARRASSED
AND CONTRADICTED BY STATEMENTS (SUCH AS THE PRESIDENT'S) THAT ARE
MORE ACCURATE PRESENTATIONS OF WHAT WENT ON IN CHILE PRE-COUF.
EL MERCURIO MAY, WELL HAVE TAKES THIS POSITION BECAUSE, BESIDES
THEIR RIGHT-WING VIEWS, THE CURRENT MANAGEMENT IS GENUINELY
IGNORANT OF THE FUNDING THAT TOOK PLACE WHEN FUBRIG-2 WAS RUNNING
THE SHOW. FUBRIG-2 WHO SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO CHILE 18 SEPTEMBER,
HAS TOLD COS THAT NO ONE CURRENTLY AT EL MERCURIO KNOWS OF FUND-
ING. EVEN CURRENT MINISTER OF ECONOMY LENIZ DOES NOT KNOW DETAILS
BUT HAD SUSPICION ABOUT INFUSION OF BUNDS THAT TOOK PLACE IN U.P.
BUNDS
ERA, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO MONITOR INTERNAL EL MERCURIO REACTION
THROUGH FUBRIG-2.
:
6.
FILE: CEFER. E2 IMPDET
SECRET
14-00000
ante sto DISSEN BY
.32
PER
TONAL COTE
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COPY ISSUER ELOITED
ACTION UNIT
SECRET
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9/5830/05/993
• WH/8 "C/Ops/INTZ, DOO, C/OSG/ic,
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† 419128 -!4568
i
ECTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI
STAFF
PAGE 01
IN 361362
TOR:1615362 SEP 74
SAGO
30318
SECRET 1615103 SEP 74 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO 30318
TO:
DIRECTOR,
RYBAT
REFS: A.
SANTIAGO 33293 Lip 355699).
8. SANTIAGO EMBASSY 5628
(#41039)
1. PIEL MERCURIO" OF 14 SEPTEMBER 1974 DEVOTED ENTIRE PAGE 29
TO HARRINGTON REVELATIONS ABOUT CIA FUNDING IN CHILE UNDER
HEADLINE "KENNEDY PLAN AGAINST EL MERCURIO".
COVERAGE
INCLUDED COMPLETE TEXT OF HARRINGTON LETTER TO MR. THOMAS
MORGAN AND REPRINTS OF SEYMOUR HERSCH ARTICLE FROM "NEW
YORK TIMES” AND AP DISPATCH FROM "WASHINGTON STAR", LATTER
IDENTIFYING "EL MERCURIO" AS CHILEAN NEWSPAPER ALLEGEDLY
RECEIVING FUNDS FROM CIA. ALSO INCLUDED A 13 SEPTEMBER AP
ITEM DATE LINED WASHINGTON QUOTING DIRECTOR COLBY THAT
"CIA WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY COUP".
2. DO NOT KNOW REASONS THY MOTIVATED "EL MERCURIO"
TO PUBLISH EXTENSIVE COVERAGE. OF HARRINGTON REVELATIONS.
SPECULATE THEY DECIDED TO TAKE OFFENSIVE TO ATTEMPT TO
MITIGATE DAMAGING NATURE OF THE MATERIAL AGAINST "EL
SECRET
241/3651
B
RECORD COPY
15-126-3
16 Sep 7-1

14-00000
370
A SEC DIBSEM DY
PLA
SON UNIT NOTIFIED
ANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED
TION UNIT
PI
FILE.
VR.
f
RF
N
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•ION •
°
† 419188
EXA558
TOTAL COPIES
PUN DY
SECRET
DEPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING CFFICE IS PROHIBITED
STAFF
PAGE 2
TOR:1615352 SEP 74
IN 361362
SAGO 33318
MERCURIO" ITSELF, THE HEADLINE AND A SHORT EDITORIAL COMMENT
INTRODUCING ABOVE COVERAGE DESCRIBES THESE DEVELOPMENTS
AS "NEW AND GROTESQUE EPISODE IN THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN"
AND ATTEMPTS TO TIE REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON CLOSELY TO
SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (WHO HAS SINCE THE COUP BEEN UNDER
STEADY ATTACK HERE FOR HIS CRITICISM OF THE MILITARY INTER-
"EL MERUCIRO" MAKES
VENTION AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS IN CHILE).
CONNECTION WITH RECENT REVELATIONS REP. HARRINGTON BY
Ciftent
"EL MERCURIGNAGE AN ARTICLE FROM "MC CALLS" WHICH DEALT WITH
CHAPPAQUIDICK IN A MANNER UNFAVORABLE TO SENATOR KENNEDY.
3. "EL MERCURIO" RESPONSE, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE NET EFFECT
OF RAISING MORE QUESTIONS HERE THAN IT ANSWERS. THIS INCREASED
PUBLICITY WILL INCREASE PRESSURE ON AND POSSIBLY. SCRUITINY OF
STATION ASSETS INVOLVED AND MAY AFFECT THOSE NOT DIRECTLY
INVOLVED. ON 13 SEPTEMBER, FUPOCKET-1 WAS QUESTIOND BY
NEWSWEEK REPORTER HERE ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDING.
FUPOCKET-I DENIED ALL KNOWLEDGE OF ANY FUNDING FROM FOREIGN
SOURCES. DETAILS FOLL SEPARATE CASLE.
4. REQUEST HOS KEEP STATION UP-TO-DATE ON ANY PLANS OR
CONCRETE ACTIONS TO CONTINUE INVESTIGATION OF REVELATIONS.
-SE C-RE T.
14-00000
3.74
VOLE SEC DISSEM BY
PER
TOTAL
SECRET
CENSON UNIT NOTIFIED..
ANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
BY
AT
RF
FILE
VR
N
F
ACTION.
о
REPRODUCTION Y OTHER THE
ISSUING OFFICE IS Prouiditat
STAFF
7 419106
EIA668
PAGE .03-03
IN 361362
TOR:1615362 SEP 74.
SAGO
30318
5. FILE! DEFER,
E2 IMPDET
SECRET
14-00000
7.71 MSG. 3/74
CABLE BEGUISSEM BY
PEN
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
_ AUYANCE COSTR
ACTION UNIT.
N
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VR
TOTAL COPIES -21
SECRET
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[148: 4ps/563 10/82
ACTION
9/83/563
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER 1
IOSUING OFFICE 18 PROMIBI
✓ STAFF
4
411313
EIA140
PAGE 01
IN 358699
TOR11218062 SEP 74
SAGO
30293
SECRET 121711Z SEP 74 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO, 30293
TO: DIRECTOR.
RYBAT
REFSI A. DIRECTOR 595482
1.
8,
SANTIAGO 38253 (IN 354910)
0
150.90
wysecil
FOLLOWING STATION AGENTS WERE CONTACTED, PERIOD 8-18
SEPTEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCE REVELATIONS. THEIR
COMMENTS AND REACTIONS FOLLOW.
2. FUERMINE-1 CONCERNED BUT RELIEVED THAT NO NAMES WERE
MENTIONED. COMMENTED THAT TIMING WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BAD
SINCE IT COINCIDED EXACTLY WITH EDUARDO FREI'S ARRIVAL IN THE
U.S. AND HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS HAD BEEN DELIBERATE.
FUERMINE-1 ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE FURTHER
INVESTIGATION OR MEDIA PLAY IN THE U.S. REPLIED THAT WE
DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD KEEP HIM INFORMED,
HE IS TRAVELING TO
GERMANY ON 22 SEPTEMBER AT INVITATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION INSTITUTE (WEST GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS).
DURING HIS TRIP HE WILL CHECK HIS NUMBERED ACCOUNT FOR THE
ARRIVAL OF RECENT FUNDS. IN VIEW OF REF DEVELOPMENTS, HE
RECORD COPP
15-126-3
12 Sep 74
2/2
1
14-00000
7.71 MFG 1-76
CADLE SEC UISSEM B
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED
_ ADVANCE.COMY_LESURE STO
ACTION UNIT
RF FILE
VR
N
F
ACTION O
BY
TOTAL COPIES
FUN BY
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER 1
ISSUING OFFICE IS PHOHIBI
STAFF
2
$
T 411313
EI4140
PAGE 02
TORI1218062 SEP 74
IN 359697
SAGO 38293
HE
DOES NOT PLAN TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER MONIES INTO CHILE.
RETURNING CHILE VIA NEW YORK AND CHICAGO AND PLANS TO MEET
WITH FREI 15 OCTOBER IN NEW YORK. FUERMINE-1 EXPRESSED THE
OPINION THAT THE JUNTA WILL NEITHER RAISE THE MATTER WITH
EMBASSY NOR PURSUE FURTHER SINCE IT IS NOT IN THEIR
INTEREST TO DO SO.
2, FUBRIG-2 RECEIVED NEWS CALMLY BUT WAS MOST CONCERNED
ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF EFFECTS OF THE REVELATIONS AND EXPRESSED
OPINION THAT SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE CHANGED
PREV
FUBRIG-1
TO WENT SUCH LEAKS. HE WAS RELIEVED THAT EL MURCURIO WAS NOT
MENTIONED BY NAME (BUT WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT IT WILL NOT BE
EASILY IDENTIFIED IN ANY SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY),
THOUGHT IT QUITE POSSIBLE JUNTA MAY WONDER IF USG STILL NOT IN
SOME WAY SUPPORTING PDC, WHICH OF COURSE JUNTA WOULD FIND
MOST UNACCEPTABLE.
4.
FUERMINE-5 ALSO TOOK THE NEWS CALMLY ABOUT REVELATION
OF 59,808 ITEM FOR TRAVEL OF PDC LEADERS. WHILE SHAKING HIS
HEAD ABOUT THE LEAKING OF SUCH MATTERS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE
REVELATION. UNLESS IT IS MADE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC BY SUBSEQUENT
INVESTIGATIONS AND PUBLICITY, WILL NOT CAUSE HIM A PROBLEM.
E-C
=
་་
14-00000
2374
CABLE SEC DISSEM DY
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ARVANGE_GREE ISSUED_BLOÏÏQU.
ACTION UNIT
RE
FILE
VR
N
ACTION
☐☐
† 411313
EIA140
COPIES
SECRET
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER 1
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI
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PAGE 03
TGR11218862 SEP 74
IN 358699
SAGO
30293
CONSIDERS THE FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE DELEGATION AS
BEING PDC AND (INCORRECTLY) AS MAKING A TOUR OF LATIN
AMERICAN RATHER THAN EUROPEAN CAPITALS WILL LEAD AWAY FROM
PROPER IDENTIFICATION, SINCE THE FUNDS THAT PASSED THROUGH HIS
HANDS WERE APPROXIMATELY $4,000 AT THE THEN LOCAL FREE MARKET
RATE (AS OPPOSED TO STATION SPENDING RATE), HE FEELS THAT THIS
WILL ALSO HELP HIDE PROPER IDENTIFICATION EVEN WITHIN THE PDC
OF THIS FUNDING.
5. FUPOCKET-1 WAS INFORMED OF DISCLOSURE OF $25.000 FOR
PURCHASE OF RADIO STATION ON 8 SEPTEMBER. WAS VISIBLY
DISTURBED UPON HEARING NEWS AND COMMENTED "YOU PEOPLE NEED
TO CHANGE YOUR SYSTEM SO THAT SUCH NEWS DOES
NOT GET OUT." STATED THAT NO ONE WITHIN HIS GROUP
KNEW THAT HE GAVE MONEY ON THE SIDE TO PURCHASE THIS RADIO
STATION AND THAT NO RECORDS WERE MADE OF HIS PART IN THE DEAL.
HE REMARKED THAT THE FORMER OWNER OF THE STATION IS A
SOCIALIST AND UNLIKELY TO DISCUSS THE TERMS OF THE SALE SINCE
ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSACTION INVOLVED. FUPOCKET-1 PROMISED TO KEEP
US ADVISED OF ANY BLOW-BACK.
6.
'
ON 10 SEPTEMBER? FUBARGAIN-1 SAID THAT GENERAL PINOCHET
SECRET
thes
14-00000
CALEBEC GIDGEM
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED
_ ADVANCE.COM/LUE_QUEU
BY AS.
ACTION UNIT
1
HF
FILE
VF!
N
F
ACTION
°
T 411313
EIA148
TOTAL COPIET
SECRET
AlphoUCTION BY OTHER
ISSUS OFFICE IS PROMI
STAFF
PAGE 84
TOR1121626Z SEP 74
ME
IN 358699
SAGO 32293
DID NOT SEEM VERY UPSET BUT COMMENTED IN FUBARGAI0-1'S
PRESENCE THAT THE DISCLOSURE "SEEMED TO BE A DUEY THING TO
DO." FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FUBAEGAIN-2,
ME SHOWED HIS UNHAPPINESS AT WHAT HE FEELS IS GROWING EVIDENCE
OF USG INCOMPREHENSION OF GOC. SAID HE
AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE TRAVELED TO STATES
AND ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE WAY USG FINCTIONS COULD PARTIALL
UNDERSTAND CURRENT U.S.G. ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS. SAID MOST
JUNIOR OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE INCREASINGLY UPSET AND
CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY FEEL IS U.S.
FAILURE TO BE A "GOOD FRIEND" OF CHILE DESPITE THE IMPORTANT
SACRIFICES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE HERE IN THE WORLD ANTI-
COMMUNIST STRUGGLE.
7. ACCORDING TO FUBARGAIN-1, MOST CHILEAN OFFICERS VIEW THE
REVELATIONS AND THEIR TIMING AS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY A
SECTOR OF U.S.G. (ALBEIT THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH)
TO DELIBERATELY DAMAGE JUNTA AND FALSELY CAST DOUST
ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND ROLE IN BRINGING DOWN ALLENDE.
OFFICERS
HAVE ADDED THIS LATEST BLOW TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE U.S. FOOT-
DRAGGING ON SUPPLYING CHILE ARMS URGENTLY NEEDED FOR DEFENSE
1
)
14-00000
LIM
win
771 MM: 370
CABLE SEC DISSEN DV
PER
A COPIES
PUN BY
PERDON UNIT NOTIFIED
_ ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOITED.
ACTION UNIT
RF FILE
VR
N
F
ACTION
SECRET
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER 1
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI
STAFF
EIA140
PAGE 05-05
TORI121806Z SEP 74
IN 358699
SAGO 38293
AGAINST PERU AND U.S. FAILURE NOT ONLY TO ASSIST, BUT ACTUALLY
TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS, PROBLEMS OF CHILEAN IMAGE
ABROAD. SUM IS THAT CHILEAN OFFICER CORPS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY BAFFELED AND RESENTFUL ABOUT U.S. ACCORDING TO THIS
SOURCE.
8.
FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPOET
SECRET
14-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
Trothy
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS For
MEDIA IN ALLENDE'S CHILE
Psyche foli
HIGHLIGHTS
Since President Allende's electoral victory in 1970, the Government
propaganda 
apparatus has mounted a coordinated campaign against
the opposition 
communications media focusing on the prestigious
El Mercurio 
newspaper chain and key opposition radios.
range goal 
is to create conditions that will insure Government
The 
long-
control over the media so that an emasculated opposition will operate
intuitively and 
through self-censorship within an approved framework.
The opposition radio stations bear the brunt of an array of legal
and illegal devices 
designed to intimidate them. These devices
include the 
threat of violence, favoritism in the distribution of
essential 
Government advertising revenue, temporary closures,
and Government-
fomented strikes.
--
Chile's national television the only country-wide channel -- has
become an 
important propaganda instrument for the Government.
But it 
is being challenged by a Catholic University channel which is
attempting 
to expand its service beyond the Santiago area.
A major confrontation between the Government and the opposition,
lasting more 
than a year, has taken place at the Papelera, Chile's
only important 
private newsprint producer, with the company
supported 
by the opposition media stymying repeated Government
efforts to take over 
the firm. The paper company claims that
Government 
price policies have brought it close to bankruptcy.
Despite officially-sanctioned harassment, the opposition media
have continued 
to function, taking advantage of the fluid political
situation currently 
prevailing in Chile, and have become increasingly
effective in 
exploiting the Government's economic failures and the
growing 
dissension within the ruling Marxist coalition,
Nevertheless, the opposition's economic base that sustains its media
is being slowly 
undermined as the Government expands its control
over the 
Chilean economy. Many opposition media are reportedly
already in difficult 
financial straits. The Chilean Communist Party,
seeking to strengthen 
its voice in the March 1973 Congressional
elections, 
has already purchased five beleaguered radio stations
(
one a former 
opposition station) in southern Chile.
•
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
ii
14-00000
14-00000
"
CONFIDENTIAL
III.
THE ALLENDE PROCESS
-
HOW THE MEDIA ARE TREATED
Allende's treatment of the opposition media and his utilization of
the 
pro-Government media offer 
revealing insights into the unique
claim that Chile will carry out a 
Socialist revolution within the frame-
work of traditional bourgeois and 
democratic institutions without
social cost.
"Any Chilean government possesses wide powers that can be employed
to 
control and intimidate media opponents 
given sufficient will power and
cynicism to do so, despite the fact that media 
freedoms in Chile are
twice-guaranteed, both in the 1925 
constitution and in a statute of
constitutional guarantees 
agreed to by Allende's Popular Unity coalition
and the Christian Democrats (PDC) as a 
condition for PDC support for
Allende in the congressional run-off 
held cubsequent to the Presidential
election in September 1970.
What are some of these powers? Any Chilean executive under
_ provisions 
of the State Internal 
Security Law may establish emergency
zones by decree headed by military 
commanders empowering the State
to enforce news censorship and to restrict 
access to newsprint supplies.
A law on publicity abuses empowers the 
government to petition the
courts to suspend access to news 
and information. (Laws on the books
that pose potential threats to freedom 
of radio information are more
severe and more frequently utilized
. See Section III. B. Radio,)
Furthermore, through the 
judicious parceling out of advertising from.
State and autonomous State firms any 
government can discriminate
against opposition media by denying 
or restricting this key source of
revenue.
Unlike predecessor governments which utilized existing laws and
accepted 
practices to reward political 
associates and benefit business
partners, the Allende Government 
has consistently and frequently
applied these measures to harass, 
to intimidate, and to undermine the
morale of political and class 
opponents in the media. These tactics
are applied throughout the country.
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
S

14-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
:
"
A basic organizational technique for the UP coalition has been the
establishment of UP committees (CUP -- Comité de Unidad Popular) -
composed of newsmen who are militant members of parties belonging
to the Government coalition or independent supporters of UP policies
in newspapers, radios, magazines, and in journalistic bodies. The
CUP's have been most active at the union level: demanding exorbitant
wage increases, insisting that UP employees be given the right to
express their opinion on editorial pages, disrupting legitimate union
meetings, forming rump unions, and leaking internal company data to
the leftist press and to the Government.
The goal of certain Unidad Popular militants regarding freedom of
the press was most explicitly and revealingly stated by the organizing
committee for a conference of leftist journalists which was held in
Santiago in April 1971. The committee issued the following statement
prior to the conference:
... we believe that we must fight for true freedom of
the press, which will only be possible when there is
true economic independence. We maintain that Chile
will have true freedom of the press only when the means
of mass communication are part of the area of social
property, that is, (when they) belong to all Chileans,
The press, radio, television, and the theater must be
tools at the service of liberation and culture of our
people and not a private business, an ideological
battering ram of the national and foreign minority
(under-
(the capitalists) as is presently the case.
lining added)
í
Another statement said "the mission of journalists is to support and
defend the People's Government (the UP) together with all the workers.
The declaration also underlined the support of UP newsmen for
"Viet Nam, Cuba, and all the people that are building Socialism,"
and threw a bouquet at Cuba's Prensa Latina agency for its "objective"
reporting of the Chilean phenomenon. Allende himself lent legitimacy
to the mission of UP journalists in a speech kicking off the conference
when he stated that "committed" newsmen must act as the "vanguard"
of the revolution by "elevating the political level of the people.'
Reiterating a theme expressed on many other occasions, Allende
asserted that his Government would respect freedom of information
while at the same time he lamented his Government's "excessive
tolerance" for the opposition media.
"
"
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
6
14-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
A.
Press
In the key Santiago metropolitan area, there are five major
opposition daily newspapers and one important neutral daily,
La Tercera de la Hora.
TABLE 2. MAJOR OPPOSITION AND NEUTRAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS
Title
Estimated
Circulation
Political
Orientation
Independent, conservative
El Mercurio
160,000
Las Noticias Ultimas
120,000
Part of the Mercurio chain
La Prensa
25,000
La Segunda
60,000
La Tribuna
25,000
Christian Democratic (PDC)
Part of the Mercurio chain
National Party (PR) interests
La Tercera de la Hora
190,000
Independent
A favorite target of the Government and it's propaganda apparatus
has been the conservative, independent daily El Mercurio, dean of the
Chilean press and chief representative of the largest and most influential
newspaper chain in the country. Tarred regularly as "pro-U.S." and
as a "gringo newspaper written in Spanish" potent accusations in
Chile El Mercurio has borne the brunt ofjevery conceivable kind of
pressure short of outright seizure.
--
--
On numerous occasions the paper has been implicated along with
other opposition media in alleged seditious plots carried out in concert
with foreign (i. e., U.S.) interests to overthrow the Government.
Advertisers have been "requested" not to do business with the Mercurio
chain, which has been accused of foreign exchange irregularities by
tax authorities, by Government supporters on the paper's own staff, and
by Allende himself at public rallies. Allende, too, periodically reacts'
8
to critical Mercurio editorials with charges that Chile and the
Presidential office have been "insulted," that the Mercurio chain
indulges in "libertinism unprecedented in Chilean journalistic history,
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
7
14-00000
CONFIDENTAL
and that the chain is "faithful to its tradition of infamy." The
Government propaganda apparatus follows suit.
The PDC organ La Prensa and the National Party tabloid
La Tribuna are secondary targets for the UP propaganda apparatus
because their circulation is limited. Pressures employed against
these dailies are aimed generally at the political parties behind them
in contrast to the Mercurio chain where pressures are intended as a
warning signal to the "free" media as an institution.
The
☐ Independent La Tercera receiven, distinct treatment.
Government exerts minimal pressures on the paper in return for
favorable editorial treatment of Allende policies (sec Section VI.
A. The Opposition Media Reaction). This tactic has paid dividends
for Allende and for Tercera's owner, Germán Pico Canas. Allende
obtains favorable publicity in a mans-circulation paper that maintains
comparative objectivity in its news columns, thus lending credence to
Allende's claims that he will respect traditional Chilean freedoms
while making the transition to Socialism, Freed frorn the need for
the strident partisanship so characteristic of the rest of the press,
Tercera steadily builds its circulation with a public seeking some
relief from the verbal civil war. As a result Pico, who has been head
of the Chilean newspaper association, has defended the Allende
Government's press policies in international forums. The under-
standing with the Government, however, is an uneasy one; Tercera
is not sufficiently malleable for the Socialist Party, the principal party
in the Government coalition.
9
B. Radio
Radio continues to be the most important medium of communication
in Chile. The latest available figures compiled by the World Radio-TV
Handbook give Chile a total of 137 stations, including 29 in the capital
city. Santiago (See Table 3). The number of receivers is estimated at
3 million, or one for every third person. In a country 2,600 miles long
radio's strategic importance is understood by both Government and
opposition. The Government has resorted to a variety of devices
designed to intimidate opposition radio stations: requests by Allende
advisers that opposition stations hire designated leftist commentators;
threats of violence; favoritism in the distribution of needed government
advertising revenues; temporary closures; and strikes fomented by
CUP committees.
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
8
14-00000
TABLE 3.
CONFIDENTIAL
IMPORTANT RADIO STATIONS
Station
Radio Agricultura
Radio Balmaceda
Radio Cooperativa
Radio Corporación
Radio M
Radio Luis Recabarrea
Radio Magallanes
Radio Minería
Radio Pacifico
Radio Portales
Radio Santiago
Radio UTE
Political
Orientation
National Party (PN)
Christian Democratic (PDC)
PDC with PN elements
Socialist Party
University of Chile station
controlled by Marxists
Chilean labor federation (CUT)
station; Communist-controlled
(See Note No. 10)
Communist Party
Independent with PDC and PN elements.
Radical Party (UP)
Socialist Party
Catholic Church interests
State Technical University station
controlled by Communists
Partial blame for leftist infiltration of Chilean stations must rest
with "bourgeois" radio owners. Long before Allende became president
the Chilean businessmen and politicians who owned radio stations
made it a practice to hire leftist commentators because they believed
that leftists were superior professionals and helped to increase
listenership. When the UP came to power it tapped an existing source
of manpower.
In addition, the Government frequently utilized existing regulations
to gain its ends. Radio concessions are granted by a Government
entity (Servicios Electricos) attached to the Interior Ministry. The
same entity can cancel or transfer such concessions. Regulations
promulgated during World War II state that "In case of internal
disturbance, catastrophe or war radio stations are subject to the
rules, control, and censorship that the Government may adopt."
Under this type of emergency regulation, all radio stations were
placed under an obligatory Government network -- not an unusual
practice for the Allende Government when a modified martial
law was decreed in 21 of Chile's 25 provinces during the October-
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
CONFIDENTIAL
9
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CONFIDENTIAL
November 1972 truck drivers strike (See Note No. 18). Another
regulation decrees that stations must interrupt their transmissions.
whenever the 
Interior Minister judges it to be necessary in the
interest 
of the internal security of the State. Still another regulation
authorizes the 
Central Bank to control the importation of equipment
and spare 
parts for radio, television, and the press,
The Government moved quickly after the 1970 presidential
election to obtain control of key stations. The Socialist Party
gained 
control of Radio Portales, Chile's most popular station,
and purchased 
Radio Corporación from El Mercurio (Portales has
subsequently slipped in popularity), The Communist Party purchased
Magallenes, an important 
Santiago station. The Communist Party
recently 
also purchased Radio Simón Bolívar (formerly pro-
opposition) in Concepción (as well as four other stations in southern
Chile 
in preparation for the Congressional elections in March 1973).
The 
rightist National Party daily La Tribuna quoted the former
owner as saying that "the age of privately-owned mass media
(in Chile
) in over" with only the Government, strong economic
consortiums, and the most powerful political parties capable of
sustaining 
media operations. La Tribuna says the Communist Party
is now 
the most powerful (single) broadcaster in southern Chile.
-- 3
PDC-oriented Radios Balmaceda and Cooperativa, however, have
to date successfully resisted Government enticements and pressures
(see Section 
VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). Balmaceda
radio station 
which over the years had earned a reputation for objec-
tive newscasts 
-- has been the number one target of the UP in the
radio 
field. It has suffered more temporary closures than any radio
facility. The 
station was shut down, for example, 17 hours in
June 
1971 for broadcasting an alleged "alarmist" report during the
State of 
Emergency decreed after the assassination of Perez Zujovic,
a former interior 
minister in the Frei Government. At the same
time 
a 
UP station, Portales, received nothing more than an admoni-
tion for 
transmitting "alarmist" news more acceptable to UP
propagandists. During the August-September 1971 period Radio
Balmaceda 
was shut down on three separate occasions under
similar pretexts (see Note No. 10).
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
10
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In radio as in the press the Government has used CUP
committees to formulate exaggerated wage demands, to foment
strikes, and to form rump unions. CUP unions at Radio Pacifico,
for example, forced the owner to sell out to a cooperative formed
by employees when wage demands could not be met,
station subsequently was purchased by the Radical Party
member of the UP coalition.
The radio
The principal Government weapon, however, is its control
over public service advertising, which traditionally has provided
the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stations. The Government
has dangled the prospect of advertisements in return for favorable
news treatment, but the bait has not been picked up by the major
opposition radios which recognize that their independence is at
stake. The economic squeeze makes the future of Chilean
independent radios appear bleak.
C.
Television
Since its inception in Chile in 1962, television has made great
strides, but the medium still lags behind radio, especially in the
provinces where technical conditions for viewing are poor. Accord-
ing to the best estimates available, there are 350, 000 sets in
Santiago and a total of 500,000 sets in the country. Chile is served
by the following television channels: 1) A national network with
some 21 outlets throughout the country; 2) the Catholic, University
channel in Santiago; 3) a separate Catholic University channel in
Valparaíso; and 4) the University of Chilg channel in Santiago,
-->>
The Government clearly recognizes television's importance as
a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction of an Allende
confidante, newsman Augusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected.
member of the ultra-left MIR Movement of the Revolutionary
Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel
into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition.
Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations
intended to smear political and class opponents, and a steady drum-
fire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming
became standard fare,
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
11
=
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CONFIDENTIAL
At the same time network authorities made it difficult under a
variety of pretexts for opposition spokesmen to air their views in
contravention of the State television statute, For example, the
authorities frequently obliged all television channels and radios to
carry official statements and denied opposition spokesmen equal
time, resorting to the legal fiction that the official statements were
transmitted voluntarily.
A popular political chat show "A Tres Bandas," in which opposi-
tion representatives freely debated UP representatives (the only such
show carried nationally), was cancelled in August 1972 after two
years of UP agitation against it.
by alleging that the program had poor listenership and by pointing to
The Government defended the step
a ruling granting all political parties equal time to express their
views on twice-weekly 20-minute slots.
format provided several hours of open-ended and frequent face-to-
The original chat show
face confrontation, usually embarrassing to the Government,
The University of Chile station has consistently asserted the
Marxist line since its inception, but the two remaining university
channels have successfully fought Government control to date (See
Section VI. C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms),
None of the university channels, however, is national in scope.
D. Magazines and Book Publishing
--
Early in 1971 the Government purchased the plant and equipment
of the PDC-controlled Zig-Zag publishing empire
modern in Latin America.
one of the most
prolonged negotiations, provoked originally by the excessive demands
The GOC announced the purchase after
of a Communist-led union.
Government purchased Zig-Zag's plant and equipment, the company's
Under the terms of the accord the
national line of comics, and several magazines while Zig-Zag
retained several mass-circulation magazines (Ercilla and Vea being
the most important) under a two-year contract with the Chilean
Treasury. The Zig-Zag infrastructure formed the basis for the
newly-established Government-owned Quimantu National Publishing
Enterprise. The accord with Zig-Zag has been scrupulously
observed to date.
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
12
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CONFIDENTIAL
Quimantu quickly began turning out magazines, comic books,
and textbooks pushing UP policies. Comic books like Firme
were designed for mass consumption and aimed at adults with
low cultural levels, while others like Ramona were aimed at the
teen-age market. Cabrochico, another/comic book, was geared to
pre-teens. The format of some Quimantu products closely resembled
competing Zig-Zag products. The weekly Ahora, for example, was.
designed to compete with Ercilla. After eight months Ahora collapsed,
rejected in the market place by Chileans who were turned off by heavy-
handed political propaganda.
E. Films
The Government's film production company, Chile Films, became
the UP's principal propaganda arm in the film field. Rival Chilean
private producers went out of business, squeezed by rising production
costs and discriminatory tax and exchange rate treatment that denied
them needed equipment and spare parts from abroad. Chile Films
signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban
Cinematographic Institute (ICAIC) (See Section V. C. Exchange of
Persons, Visitors, and Exchange Agreements).
Chile Films also initiated agreements with the experimental film
institute (leftist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the
Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Govern-
ment information office, the film department of the Communist-
dominated CUT (Central Unica de Trajabadores the major labor
organization), the national television network, and the University of
Chile television station. The stated purpose of the accords was to
"develop the new Chilean film industry.
--
Its products are intended to glorify the roles of workers, peasants,
and students in the march to Chilean-style Socialism, romanticize the
proletarian role of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and
attack the "bourgeoisie" and their "imperialist" allies. Despite an
intense publicity buildup, however, few films actually appeared in
the 1970-72 period. Most of the films that were produced appeared to
be pieced together from newsreel film taken during the Allende
presidential campaign or from post-election political rallies.
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
13
I
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CONFIDENTIAL
The Government's delay in making public the results of June 1972
elections 
for top posts 
in the Communist-dominated CUT labor
federation also 
damaged Government credibility,
media 
scored heavily in a barrage of charges of irregularities and
vote fraud with a 
public that takes justified price in clean elections.
B.
The Papelera Confrontation
The opposition
The Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles Y Cartones (known as
the 
Papelera), 
Chile's major private producer of newsprint, became
another propaganda 
battleground cast by the opposition in terms of
"freedom versus Marxist 
totalitarianism.".
In October 1971, the Government, carrying out a long-standing
pledge
, announced 
that CORFO (the Government Development
Corporation) 
had opened negotiations to buy out the Papelera through
the purchase of its stock. 
The opposition media imminediately launched
a campaign to warn 
the public that the free press would be crippled
if newsprint 
distribution were placed at the mercy of Government
suppliers. At the same 
time, the opposition media pleaded with
private 
shareholders to refuse to sell to the Government.
a "freedom 
fund" was created enabling private persons to buy up
In 
addition,
Papelera shares to 
prevent the company from falling into Government
hands.
For several months pro- and anti-Government media carried out
daily 
an intensive 
propaganda battle in advertisements, news stories,
and editorials. Both sides 
resorted to the familiar numbers game:
the pro-Allende media 
claimed that the Government was besieged by
willing shareholders 
eager to sell out; the opposition asserted that
shareholders were 
resisting temptation. Government propagandists
argued that newsprint 
production was essential to the State and must
be controlled 
by the State; the opposition said Papelera must remain
in private hands as a 
patriotic duty.
--
Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Papelera shareholders,
the 
Government has not 
hesitated to use other measures
controls
, labor-induced production shortages, and strong-arm tactics
· price
to prevent the delivery of raw 
material to the plant. The Government
: 
press also 
circulated rumors that Jorge Alessandri (former President
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
26
14-00000
CONFIDENTIAL
of Chile and a leading shareholder and board chairman of the Papelera)
had made a deal with Allende to give the Government control over the
Papelera to weaken the will of private shareholders and their supporters,
That the Papelera still withstand: these combined pressures a year
later is a tribute to a determined defense of the firm by an opposition
Congress, to the loyalty of the bulk of the Papelera employees, and to
an aroused and alerted opposition media.
--
The battle for control of the Papelera will continue and the odds
are not good for the company, Kepeated requests for price increases
sufficient to absorb cost increases forced on the firm in part by
Government economic policies -- were not met, and the firm declared
in September 1972 that it could not meet loan payments due to the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDF). Finally, in December 1972
the Government authorized new price increases averaging 45 per cent,
which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint. The
Papelera gains some breathing space but Government pressures on the
The price increase itself may
company are certain to continue.
viewed as a form of pressure.
be
The battle has spilled over into the halls of the Chilean Congress.
Partly to protect the Papelera's independent status, the PDC sponsored
a "three areas" constitutional amendment designed to give Congress
some control over which businesses can be incorporated as social-
property by the Government. (The Papelera is one of the firms
appearing on the Government's original list of 91 firms to be absorbed
still a
by the Government as social property.) The amendment
· bitter bone of contention between the Government and the opposition
would, among other points, declare null and void CORFO's attempted
purchase of Papelera stock in the absence of Congressional approval,
--
13
C.
University Confrontation and Television Freedoms
Growing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the
University of Chile in April 1972 and by stiffening opposition
attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over
effects in television programming at two channels run by Catholic
University. Increasing opposition effectiveness even raised the
possibility that the Marxist-controlled University of Chile channel for
the first time in its existence might be obliged to inject some
objectivity into its output.
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
27

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CONFIDENTIAL
Incumbent University of Chile Rector Edgardo Boeninger, an
independent with Christian Democratic sympathies, gained 51.9 per cent
of the vote for rector in 
April against three other contenders repre-
senting the UP 
coalition and leftist splinter groups, including the
MIR.
An independent-PDC state alto gained control of the previously
Marxist
-controlled 
Superior Nomative Council. The victory was
billed by 
the opposition media as another victory for democracy and
pluralism over 
Marxist totalitarianism. 
14.
In the process Rector
Boeninger became a hero of the opposition media and a symbol of
"democratic" 
defiance of Government efforts to impose its will on
an 
independent university. The opposition's rallying cry became
"Defend a 
democratic and pluralist university." Translated into
media terms it 
became "We want a democratic and pluralistic
university TV channel,"
Rallying behind that slogan, opposition supporters at the two
Catholic 
Universities 
(Santiago and Valparaíso) began to ease out
leftist 
influence in the news departments of the two university
channels. UP supporters, however, remain at the technician level
at the 
Santiago channel and can be expected to create problems for
their 
opponents. Opposition authorities who now control the channel
are proceeding cautiously against them,
--
A more significant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward
television freedoms has been the Government's persistent refusal to
permit 
university television stations to extend their networks
throughout Chile. In September 1972, President Allende blocked the
opposition's most recent attempt to obtain legislative sanction for
such an extension by vetoing selected items in a PDC-introduced bill;
The Government claimed 
that its own bill
pending before Congress
and allowing universities to establish stations only within the
territory in which the seat of each university is located -- would
create a 
national network for all recognized universities on an
"equal 
and non-discriminatory" basis, What the Government did
not say was 
that the bill if passed would preserve the State Network's
position as the only single channel that can be viewed by a national
television 
audience. Presumably the Government bill also would
permit the 
Communist-dominated State Technical University to
operate a 
television station in Santiago in competition with Santiago's
Catholic University 
channel which, according to available public
opinion 
surveys, is viewed by approximately 69 per cent of the
capital's audience. 15
CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973
28
:
14-00000
COM DENTIAL,
Ercilla
October 5, 1972
Demonstrators Protest President Allende's Veto of Bill Permitting
• University. (Santiago) to Extend Its Television (Channel 13) Throughout Chile.
In subsequent developments the Catholic University at Santiago
as nevertheless extended its television service to the Concepción
netropolitan area, third most important in Chile, via a television
epeater in Talcahuano. The Government has ordered that the
epeater cease operation as the University lacks a concession under
1958 law to function in that area. The University has refused to
omply, claiming that the 1970 National Television Act, which
uthorizes the universities to operate television channels, is the
overning statute and that it needs no additional concession to
perate in any part of Chile.. Meanwhile the repeater is still
anctioning (as of February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political)
ebate continues.
CONFIDENTIAL
-4-73 February 27, 1973
29
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
By Paul E. Sigmund
W
by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. He received.
the support of the centrist Christian Democratic
Party (PDC) in the run-off in return for his agree-
ment to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of
Democratic Guarantees protecting freedoms of ex.
pression, education and religion, and guaranteeing
the independence of the military from political con-
trol. The text of the statute, which was added to
the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allende's elec
tion, reflected the fears of non-Marxist groups that
the new Marxist President would use the consider.
able power of the Chilean executive to undercut and
eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist take-
orld attention has moved away from Santiago front-running candidates he was elected president
since the bloody overthrow of Salvador
Allende last September, but the questions
that were raised at that time still need answering.
Where should the primary responsibility. be placed
for the tragic events on and after September 11,
1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a
fascist counterrevolution aided and abetted by the
forces of Imperialism? Was it, as the Right asserts,
the only available response to Allende's attempt to
establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a
mixture of guile and force? Did it mark the "death
of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by
democratic means, and was it thereby one more
demonstration that Marxism must use force to ac-
'complish its goals? Were there internal and external
political and economic factors which made it im-
possible for Allende's experiment to succeed, or
was the downfall of the Unidad Popular (Popular
Unity) coalition government the consequence of a
series of ideologically-influenced analyses and mis.
taken policy choices which, if they had been differ.
ent, might have produced another result? A review
of the course of the Allende government with the
ald of the considerable new material that has be-
come available in recent months may help to answer
these questions.
Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out
that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote
In a three-way race.' What they do not mention is
that in the congressional run-off between the two
Mr. Sigmund is Professor of Politics at Princeton
University. Among his published works are Models
of Political Change in Latin America, 1970, and
The Idcologies of the Developing Nations (2nd rev.)
ed., 1972). He has visited Chile nine times since
1963, most recently in January 1974 to do research
on a forthcoming book dealing with Chilean politics.
over.
Political and Economic Strategy
When he took office, Allende promised that he
would follow a "second model" of Marxism-the
via Chilena to socialism, "with meat pies and red
wine." To prove that this model was "anticipated
by the classics of Marxism," he quoted from
Friedrich Engels on the possibility of
... a peaceful evolution from the old society to the
new in countries where the representatives of the
Allende's supporters in the Popular Unity coalition consisted of
his own Socialist Party (Partido Socialista-PS), the Communist
Party (Partido Comunista-PC), the main body of the Radical Party
(Partido Radical-PR), the leftist Catholic "Movement of Popular
United Action" (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unida-MAPU), and
two other smaller groups. The largest opposition groups wore the
centrist Christian Democratic Party (Partia Democrata Cristiano-
POC) and the rightist National Party (Partido Nacional-PN)..
In retrospect, it is ironic that the Chilean Senate never acted on a
constitutional amendment proposed early in 1970 to establish a
second-round popular election, which would have provided the
President thus elected (probably the right-wing candidate, Jorge
Alessandri) with a clear popular mandate.
45
14-00000
Ailende in Retrospect
people have all power and in accord with the consti-
tution can do what they desire when they have the
majority of the nation behind them."
Yet it was precisely the question of majority sup.
port that was Allende's central problem in his de-
sign to carry out a peaceful transition to "socialism
with democracy, pluralism and liberty." The parties
In his coalition were in a distinct minority in the
Congress, and although there was no doubt about the
legitimacy of his election by that body, his victory
had only been possible because of the conditional
support of the Christian Democrats. The PDC, it'
should be noted, included both Radomiro Tornic,
the party's 1970 presidential candidate, who had
gone to Allende's house to congratulate him the
day after the popular election, clearly inferring his
future support, and conservatives like Senator Juan
de Dios Carmona, who had fought within the party
to prevent it from voting for Allende in the run-off.
In the immediate aftermath of the election the PDC
was controlled by the Tornic forces, who claimed
to be in favor of "communitarian" socialism, nation
alization of copper, acceleration of agrarian reform,
and reduction of Chile's dependencia on the United
States. One way, then, for Allende to achieve his.
acknowledged goal of majority support for the
transition to socialism would have been to try to
arrive at an understanding with the Christian Demo-
crats on the points in his program with which they
were In agreement. This might have provoked the
secession of some of the rightist members of the
PDC, but if an accord had been reached with the
party's leaders, it would likely have given Allende
a majority in the Congress for at least part of his
program.
Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to
terms with the party which he had termed "the new
face of reaction" during the campaign, Allende chose
an alternative strategy. The next congressional elec-
tions were not scheduled to take place until March
1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in
the event of a conflict with the Congress over the
text of a constitutional amendment, the President
could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course.
adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popu-
lar support for his coalition and then propose a
constitutional amendment which, in accordance with
the Popular Unity electoral program, would replace
the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral
• El Mercurio (Santiago), Nov. 6, 1970, p. 23.
46
Salvador Allende speaks of his plans for Chile at
the 23rd Congress of the Socialist Party, held in
January 1971, three months after his election as
President of Chile.
-Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.
house, to be elected Immediately following the ap.
proval of the amendment. The Congress would be
certain to reject the amendment, but if Allende
had the support of a majority in the country, he
could win the plebiscite and secure control of the
unicameral legislature that would then be estab-
lished.
Allende's strategy for the expansion of electoral
support was an economic one which drew as much
from John Maynard Keynes as it did from Karl Marx,
The Chilean economy, already operating below
capacity, had gone into a profound recession as a
result of Allende's election. The response of Pedro
Vuskovic, Allende's Minister of Economics, was to
"prime the pump" by adopting a deficit budget, in-
creasing public expenditures, and redistributing in-
come by skewing the annual wage readjustment for
the preceding year's inflation (35 percent in 1970)
in favor of the low-income sector of the population
(the lowest income groups received a 40-percent in-
crease). The utilization of unused industrial ca.
pacity, combined with strict enforcement of price
controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and re-
fusal to devalue the Chilean escudo in relation to
the dollar, were expected to contain possible infla-
tionary pressures which might result. (The Allende
government also had a cushion of nearly $400
million in foreign reserves left to it by the Frei
government as a result of high international prices
for copper, Chile's principal export.)
The strategy also contained a Marxist element-
14-00000
accentuation of the class struggle. At the same time
that appeals were made to the pocketbooks of the
lower-
class Chileans, there was also to be an effort
to increase their class consciousness (concienti
zación) 
through government publications and the
use of 
the media to remove the elements of "false
consciousness" instilled by "bourgeois" propaganda.
Expressing the diametric opposite of a claim often
voiced by 
his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Allende
caid in a press conference just after his installation,
"
I am 
not president of all Chileans." And in his first
"State 
of the Nation" message to the Congress he
asserted:
... the People's Government (Gobierno Popular) is
inspired in its policy by a premise that is artificially
denied by 
some-the existence of classes and social
sectors with antagonistic and opposing interests."
Allende's economic advisers anticipated an addi:
tional source of revenue for the government from
the "
exploitative" profits of the industries that were.
to be 
nationalized by the new government. The par-
tially American-
owned copper mines were to be
taken 
over by a constitutional amendment-both to
lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of
the Frei Chileanization agreements of 1967 and
1969, and 
because a general consensus in Chile
favored 
nationalization.' Other companies were to
be 
nationalized after a controlling interest was gained
through the 
purchase of shares on the open market
by the 
government development agency. The latter
course seemed 
facilitated by the fact that the price
of shares had been depressed since the elections,
and further 
economic pressures could be created
by allowing 
wage increases but forbidding any rise
in prices
. The legal adviser to the government,
Eduardo Novoa
, also outlined other "legal loopholes"
in existing 
Chilean law which could be used for
"temporary" takeovers of companies, including
"intervention
" because of labor disputes and "requi-
sition" 
because of a "breakdown in supply of an
article of prime 
necessity."
Salvador Allende, "The Chilean Way to Socialism," in Paul E.
Sigmund
, Ed., The 
Ideologies of the Developing Nations, 2nd rev. ed.,
New York, Praeger, 1972
, p. 450.
Frel's Chileanization program had involved the purchase by the
Chilean 
state of a controlling 
Interest in the large copper mines
owned by the Kennecott 
and Anaconda companies. The agreements
has also provided that 
Chie's payments to the American companies
were to be invested in 
the expansion of copper production and
refining in Chile, 
earning the country additional revenue in the
1970's to pay 
back the loans contracted to finance the purchases.
W
The takeover of large sectors of Chile's basic
industry and trade, as promised in the Popular Unity
economic and political strategy aimed at achieving
program, was thus seen as an essential part of an
and maintaining 
power. Combined with a rapid
legislation-the 1967 agrarian reform law-but ex-
acceleration of agrarian reform (again using 
existing
ploiting provisions such as one authorizing the
expropriation 
of "abandoned or badly-farmed land,"
with one percent payment in cash and the rest in
bands)
, the planned takeover meant that even if
the 
effort to create a unicameral left-dominated
legislature failed, the Allende government could
destroy the economic base of the "capitalist" oppo-
sition 
through a series of "irreversible" faits accom.
plis (hechos consumados) which would give the
SE TOMA
LA RECERVA
FORESTAR
VAL EXPLORAT
A Chilean peasant guards the gate of a farm south
of Santiago 
which was seized from its owners on the
pretext 
that it was "operated unproductively" (mal
explotada).
-Photo by Alagal Castellos.
47
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
government control of the economy and of the excess
profits that the private sector had used for luxury
consumption or had sent out of the country as profit
remittances to foreign companies. At the same time, I
the fact that the policy remained within the letter,
it not the spirit, of the law meant that intervention
by the military was unlikely.
Allende's constitutionalist and legalist strategy
was not universally accepted within his coalition.
Most of his own Socialist Party-beginning with its
newly elected General Secretary, Senator Carlos
Altamirano--and several other groups further to the
left, such as the MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda
Revolucionaria-Movement of the Revolutionary
Left) and the VOP (Vanguardia Organizada del
Pueblo Organized Vanguard of the People), were
openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying on elec
tions and "bourgeois legality" to achieve power and
advised preparation for an armed confrontation with
the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as inevi
table. Allende's effort to portray the transition to
socialism as peaceful in character was not assisted
by the publication of his conversations with French
revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971.
in these, Debray declared that "in the last, analysis
and until further notice, political power comes out
of the end of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated
that his differences with apostles of violence like Ché
Guevara were only "tactical," because the Chilean
situation required that he observe legality "for the
time being." Allende himself organized an armed
personal bodyguard, the so-called GAP (Grupo de
Amigos Personales), and--we now know-as carly
as December 1971 received reports on the illegal
importation and distribution of arms to the MIR and
to his bodyguards.'
While there were thus Intermittent hints of revo-
lutionary alternatives, Allende's basic economic
strategy was "socialist consumerism," combined
with a rapid expansion of state control in industry,
trade and agriculture, and his basic political strategy
So Regis Debray, The Chilcan Revolution: Conversations with
ALAMAN York, Random, 1971, pp. 52, 77, 91, and 97. El Mercurio
(internators Edition) Feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces the report,
1 in the presidential palace.
•On and Consumerism" see Paul E. Sigmund, "Two Years
of Popular Unity." Problems of Communism (Washington, DC),
Wormer Cecember 1972, pp. 38.51.
1
t
A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary of the Allende presidency-in the
foreground, a picture of Latin revolutionary Che Guevara.
1:
.
-Photo by Claus Mayer for Black Por.
C
48
14-00000
was an expansion of the electoral base of the Allende
coalition by an appeal to the material interests and
the class consciousness of the lower classes. It was
the interaction of the various elements of this politi-
cal and economic strategy that finally produced the
breakdown of Chilean constitutionalism and the
intervention of the armed forces that the extreme left
of the Allende coalition had been predicting all along.
Initial Success
At the outset, the new economic policy was
astoundingly successful, although it had within it
the seeds of future disaster. Income redistribution
stimulated demand, while price controls and an arti
ficially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a
consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971
the Sociedad de Fomente Fabril (Association for the
Development of Manufacturing), representing
Chilean business and industry, admitted that produc-
tion had increased by 6.3 percent over the figure
of 12 months before, and by May that figure had
reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Economics
of the University of Chile later reported that unem.
ployment in the Santiago area dropped from 8.3
percent in December 1970 to 5.2 percent in June
1971 and declined further to an unusually low 3.8
percent by the end of the year. The Consumer Price
Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970
and had only increased by 6 percent by the time
of the municipal elections of April 1971-its lowest
rise in many years. At the same time, salaries and
wages increased by 27 percent in real terms.
This wave of economic prosperity-combined
with the absence of the political repression that
some rightists had predicted would result from a
victory by the Marxists-led many, particularly in
low Income groups, to vote for the candidates of the
Popular Unity coalition in the April municipal elec-
tions. Allende's own Socialist Party bettered its elec-
toral showing in the 1969 congressional elections by
nearly 100 percent (a jump from 12 percent to 22
percent of the total), and the candidates of all the
parties supporting Allende received about 50 per-
cent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent
which 
the President himself had received only seven
months before. Yet, gratifying as the results were,
the 
coalition was still a few votes short of the abso-
lute majority that Allende required to win a plebi-
Iscite on a constitutional amendment. He was later
I criticized for not calling the plebiscite at the time
when the regime's popularity was at its highest
point,' but in retrospect it does not appear at all
certain that he would have won-particularly since
by the time that the constitutional prerequisites for
such a vote had been fulfilled, the economic and
political situation would have been much less favor-
able.
The period after the municipal elections now ap-
pears to have been crucial for the long-term survival
of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the
Christian Democrats, had elected a compromise
leadership which was not committed to either of the
'party's' wings, and the short-run economic and politi
cal indicators were favorable. Yet, instead of taking
action on the economic front to stem the loss of
foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary pres-
sures and on the political front to prevent the
movement of the Christian Democrats into an alli-
ance with the right-wing opposition parties-the
regime continued its previous policies, confidently
assuming that in the long run "the people" would
support it and ignoring the warnings of "bourgeois"
economists 
that the loss of foreign reserves, the ex-
Spansion of demand, and the sharp decline in invest-
ment would produce disastrous consequences in the
following year.
Political Polarization
The hardening of the Christian Democratic posi-
tion began in mid-1971. It was accelerated in June
by the assassination of the former Christian Demo-
cratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by
extremists, at least one of whom had been released
from prison by Allende upon his accession to power.
A month later in a by-election in Valparaíso, the
victorious Christian Democratic candidate received
the support of the Right. The tacit alliance with the
Right led to the secession from the PDC of eight
deputies and a number of other party leaders to form
the pro-Allende Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left).
This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the
other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of
the seven Radical senators (including two former
presidential candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies
left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the Partido
de la Izquierda Radical (Party of the Radical Left-
PIR) in protest against the Marxist orientation of a
See, eg., Paul M. Sweezy, "Chile: The Question of Power,"
Monthly Review (New York, London) December 1973, pp. 1.11.
49
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
PR policy resolution which the dissidents described
as "completely removed from the characteristic and
distinctive ideology of our party" and opposed to
"the interest of the middle social strata" whom the.
party had always represented. For a time, the PIR
continued to support the Allende government, but
within a year it had entered the ranks of the opposi-
tion.
In July 1971, the Christian Democrats had voted
In favor of the constitutional amendment national.
izing the copper mines, but from that point forward,
the pattern was one of polarization of Chilean politics
and society into two opposing blocks. The Allende
forces controlled the executive and pursued an in-
creasingly vigorous ideological purge of those who
were not entirely sympathetic to the government.
The opposition controlled the legislature, and in
October 1971. the Christian Democrats and the
rightist parties attempted to assert legislative con-
trol over the expansion of the public sector by voting
in favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the
use of the intervention and requisition procedures
and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises
to the "social" or mixed sectors be carried out in
accordance with specific legislation adopted by the
Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an
amendment on the "Three Areas of Property," be-
came the focus of a continuing deadlock between
the President and Congress that lasted until
Allende's overthrow in September 1973.
Allende's refusal to accept the amendment or to
call a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the
Congress appeared to the congressional opposition
to be a decisive indication of his determination to
bypass the legislature in carrying out the Popular
Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of
the amendment onward, the Christian Democrats
began to cooperate with the rightist parties in op-
posing the executive. One method was to impeach
ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforce-
ment of the law. The first of many such impeach-
ments took place in January 1972. Another method
was to present a united electoral front against the
government. Informal cooperation between the
rightist parties and the Christian Democrats led to
striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972,
and a month later these groups formed the Demo-
cratic Confederation (Confederación Democrática―
CODE) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congres-
sional elections. A third area of cooperation was in
• El Mercurio, Aug. 8, 1971, p. 37.
|
50
marches and cernonstrations against the government,
the most famous of which was the March of Empty
Pots in December 1971, in which thousands of
housewives, mostly of middle-class background,
marched, banging pots to protest food shortages.
Those shortages had developed because the pre-
dicted economic difficulties resulting from the
Vuskovic policy began to emerge in late 1971: The
balance-of-payments surplus had been depleted at
such an alarming rate (in 1971 there was a deficit
of $315 million, while in 1970. there had been a
surplus of 891 million) that in November 1971 the
Allende government called a moratorium on payment
of its foreign debts. Chile had already experienced
difficulties in securing loans from the Inter-American
Development Bank, the World Bank and the Export-
Import Bank as a result of its failure to compensate
the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies
for the nationalization of their major mines. The
debt moratorium was bound to make it considerably
more difficult for Chile to secure foreign credits,
particularly for the short term." In December 1971,
the Chilean government finally permitted a partial
devaluation of the Chilean escudo so as to decrease
the distortions created by its overvaluation, but this
created pressure on prices of goods manufactured
with imported components. Shortages of certain food
items especially cooking oil, detergents, sugar,
toothpaste, and cigarettes-were ascribed by the
government to upper-class hoarding and to increased
consumption by low-income groups; however, the
dislocations in the countryside associated with the
very rapid expansion of the agrarian reform (Allende
took over almost as much land in his first year in
office as Frei had in six years) clearly had something
to do with the problem as well, and the situation
could be expected to get worse with the harvest in
early 1972. A 100-percent increase in the money
supply as a result of the government's deficit spend-
ing was also beginning to produce inflationary pres-
sures now that the unused capacity of Chilean indus-
try had been taken up by the 1971 expansion. Most
important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said
it had declined by 7.7 percent, but opposition
economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent)
meant that the spectacular growth rate achieved in
1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972.
Yet the degree of the incipient crisis was not
⚫ On the inaccuracy of the term "invisible blockade" to describe
the Allende government's credit problems, see Paul E. Sigmund,
"The Invisible Bate and the Overthrow of Allensa," Fore 67
Affairs (New York), January 1974, pp. 322-40.
14-00000
DS SALAMAN
Workers occupying a plant outside of Santiago pro-
claim their intention to hold it to the death. The
initials of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) are
painted on the wall by the gate.
-Photo by Maggi Costellos.
Immediately evident from the figures for 1971. In-
dustrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, agrarian
production (based on plantings before Allende's
accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent,
and unemployment had dropped to record lows. The
Communist Party in a report to a Popular Unity
"conclave" in early 1972 warned that "very strong
inflationary pressures could make our situation
acute," but the government took no action to deal
with the problem. The continuing optimism ci gov
ernment policymakers at this time was expressed
at a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the Uni-
Iversity of Sussex and the Chilean Planning Office in
March 1972. In the course of discussion Radomiro
Tomic, the defeated Christian Democratic presiden-
tial candidate, asserted that the Allende government
I had committed a "fatal political error" in failing to
establish an "institutional majority" in the Congress
through a "far-reaching agreement between socialists
inspired by Christianity and those inspired by
Marxism—that is, between the Christian Democrats
and Popular Unity-in the period following the 1970
presidential election." Allende's representatives con-
fidently replied that "with a gradual heightening of
the political consciousness of the proletariat, there
seemed to be no obstacles in the internal logic of
the Chilean bourgeois state to prevent the workers'
[winning sufficient strength to gain control of the
legislature as well as the executive." "
On the political front, there were individuals and.
groups on both sides who attempted to stem the
movement toward polarization, which they correctly
foresaw would lead to the breakdown of Chilean
institutions. Two important efforts to arrive at a com.
promise on the issue of the constitutional amend-
ment on the "Three Areas of Property" were made in
the first part of 1972. In April the Left Radicals, who
had entered the Allende government in January,
carried on lengthy negotiations with the Christian
Democrats to hammer out a satisfactory agreement
on this issue, only to have it rejected by the top
command of the Popular Unity coalition parties. The
Left Radicals responded by leaving the government
and joining the opposition, a move Allende described
as "a stab in the back."" A second set of negotia-
tions in June between the head of the Christian
Democratic Party and Allende's Minister of Justice
broke down when the time limit set by the Christian
Democrats expired and the PDC leadership refused
to extend it.
The two sets of negotiations seem to have col-
lapsed for related reasons. In April the left wing of
the Popular Unity coalition was unwilling to accept
a compromise which would slow down or stop the
forward movement of the government nationalization
program, while in June the right wing of the
Christian Democrats could point to an impending
by-election ir, mid-July as a reason for discontinuing
discussions. Both cases illustrated a general prob-
lem posed by the Chilean multiparty system. Once
political conflict became polarized, the extremes
held the rest of the opposing ecalitions hostage and
prevented what could have been a convergence of
views in the center.
The negotiations were interspersed with a series
of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations by
the government and the opposition which always
stopped just short of open violence. Several ob-
servers, including the American Ambassador to
J. Ann Zammit and Gabrial Palma, Theo.ean Road to
Socialism, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1973, po. 38, 2472
The Communist Party report appears in El Mercurio (International
Edition Jan. 31-Feb. 6, 1972, p. 4.
11 Partida izquierda Radical, Trayectona Poroca de PIR (Political
Path of the PIR), Santiago, 1972, p. 79.
51
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
ス
| Chile, Nathaniel Davis, remarked on the pattern of | political arena: Several additional ministers were
"brinkmanship" that the Chileans exhibited." Social
and political tensions increased-but as long as
economic deterioration was not reflected in runaway
Inflation, the Chilean political system seemned able
to contain them.
The Turning Point
The strains in the system only became unman-
ageable in mid-1972, when the lid blew off the
fragile Chilean economy and let loose the pressures
that had been building up for at least a year. As the
deficit in government spending rose, particularly
because of its subsidies to the "social area," its
foreign reserves dropped nearly to zero, and the
growth of industrial output slowed down. Allende
replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic with Carlos
Matus and appointed Orlando Millas as Finance
Minister. The Matus-Millas team sought to "find
stability at another level," ordering a drastic cur.
rency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized
sector, and permitting limited agricultural price in-
creases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of-
living Index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the
end of June to 99.8 percent at the end of September.
A wage readjustment to compensate for the increase
In the cost of living only accelerated the inflation,
so that by the end of the year the official consumer
price index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1),
In September, industrial output began to drop in
absolute terms (i.e., not merely in terms of the rate
of Increase)—a drop that continued every month
thereafter until the September 1973 coup." Agri-
cultural production (excluding livestock) also com.
menced to decline, and mineral production regis-
tered precipitous drops, although copper production
rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that
a number of new mines came into operation. (On
other elements of the worsening economic situation,
see Table 2.)
Chile's economic problems were paralleled in the
impeached, including the Minister of Interior, who
was charged with abetting the illegal importation
of arms from Cuba in March. (The Allende govern.
ment claimed that suspect shipments from Cuba--
"bultos Cubanos"-were "works of art," but after
the September 1973 coup, the government White
Bok published an inventory of over 2,000 pounds
of arms sent from Cuba in 13 crates which customs
Table 1: Monthly Fluctuations in Consumer Prices
and Industrial Output under Allenda.
1979
Consumer Price Index Industrial Output *
Month
Oct.
35.6
-8.0
Nov.
35.3
4.3
Dec.
34.9
-0.3
1971
Jan.
28.1
-4.5
Feb.
22.8
-7.3
March
20.1
6.3
April
20.2
1.6
May
21.0
13.5
June
21.1
10.7
July
19.1
6.7
Aug.
17.4
10.7
Sept.
15.6
25.5
Oct.
16.5
22.6
Nov.
18.8
22.1
Dec.
22.1
19.5
1972
Jan.
24.8
18.5
Feb.
32.0
11.9
March
34:0
10.2
April
38.1
12.6
May
40.0
11.4
June
40.1
2.5
July
45.9
5.0
Aug.
77.2
3.6
Sept.
114.3
-7.8
Oct
142.9
-7.7
Nov.
149.9
-8.1
Dec.
163.4
-11.1
1973
Jan.
180.3
-6.8
Feb.
174.1
-4.7
March
183.3
-2.8
April
195.5
-11.3
May
233.5
-11.0
June
283.4
-14.8
July
323.2
-10.7
Aug.
303.6
-11.9
Sept.
286.0
-22:9
Oct.
528.4
18.0
Nov.
528.9
5.1.
A secret cable from US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to the
State Department, published in Jack Anderson's column in The
washington Post (Washington, DC) on March 28, 1972, commented
that "the Chileans have a great ability to rush to the brink, embrace
each other, and back off." On the same point see Mauricio Solaún
and Fernando Cepeda, Allende's Chile: On the Politics of
Brinkmanship, Bogota, Universidad de Los Andes, 1972.
"The Allende government blamed the drop in production on the
October 1972 strike, but this ignored the fact that production declines
began before October.
•Percentage of change from the same month of the previous year.
SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (National Institute of
Statistics). Santiago: Sociedad de Fomento Fabril. (Association for the
Development of Manufacturing), Santiago.
52

14-00000
Table 2: Some Indices of the Chilean Economy, 1970-72
Gross domestic product (% change)
Investment (% change)
Real wages and salaries (% change)
Exports ($ million)
Imports ($ million)
SOURCE: Department of Economics, University of Chile.
1970
1971'
1972
3.7
8.3
1.4
86
-24.2
-8.5
13.0
30.0
-9.0
1129
1045
853
1020
1124
1287
had been forbidden to inspect.") The judiciary | was not as adversely affected, since workers at
joined in the conflict, protesting the failure of the
Ministry of Justice to carry out court orders, while
progovernment demonstraters denounced the viejos
de mierda--"filthy old men"-in the Supreme
Court. As it became apparent that there was no real
possibility of resolving their differences, the two
sides turned to the armed forces as impartial arbi-
ters, and the national holidays in mid-September
1972 were marked by rival efforts of the Congress
and the President to ingratiate themselves with the
military.
The political Involvement of the military was
accelerated by the next step in the Chilean tragedy-
the October 1972 strike. Respectively termed the
"employers' lockout" and "the national strike" by
pro- and anti-Allende forces, it began far from
Santiago, in the remote southern province of Aysen,
with a strike by small truckers. (Referred to by the
government press as the "truck-owners," the mem
bership of the truckers' gremio-guild-was almest
entirely composed of owners of one or two trucks
who feared an announced plan to establish a state
trucking agency which would have had priority
access to new trucks and spare parts). The strike
quickly spread across the nation, as the truckers
were joined by bus and taxi drivers, shopkeepers,
doctors, nurses, dentists, airline pilots, engineers
and part of the peasantry. The Christian Democrats
and the rightist parties supported the strikers, and
the work stoppage dragged on for over a month
I resulting in an estimated loss of $150-200 million
In production. Agriculture was particularly hard hit
because the strike took place in the midst of the
planting season; indeed, there is no doubt that part.
though not all, of the 25-percent drop in the 1973
harvest was the consequence of the strike. Industry
1* Secretaria General del Goblerno, Libro Blanco (White Baa!
Santiago, 1973, pp. 103-08.
ternpted to keep factories going despite manage-
ment's efforts to cease production-and the October
Strike saw the emergency of "Industrial Belts"
(Cordones) and "Communal Commands," which
seemed to embody the type of spontaneous "popular
power" that leftist theorists had spoken of as the
basis of a genuine revolutionary class consciousness
to replace the materialistic "economism" that had
characterized Chilean workers until this time."
When the workers seized closed factories, the plants
were usually "intervened" by the government, so
that an important result of the October strike was a
considerable expansion of the government-controlled
sector of industry and trade.
The most important outcome of the strike, how-
ever, was the direct involvement of the military in
the Allende cabinet. A condition of the settlement
of the strike was that the military take over key cabi-
net posts. This resulted most notably in the assign-
ment of the Ministry of the Interior to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army, General Carics Prats,
so as to assure that the congressional elections
scheduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely
and impartially.
The involvement of the military and the prepara-
tions for the March elections brought about a lull
in the escalation of political conflict in Chile. Inevi.
1 The Cordones were more or less spontaneously organized
committees of workers from seized factories which coordinated
production and distribution in a given industrial area. The Communal
Commands (Comanacs Comunales) were organized by the Cordones
to mobilize the local population in the surrounding area. They
included representatives of neighborhood committees (juntas de
Vecinos), mothers' groups (centros de mares, price control and
distribution committees (juntas de abastecimiento y precios), and
other groups. On the persistence of worker "economism," see James
Petras, "Crate: Nationalization, Socioeconomic Change and Popular
Participation," Studies in Comparative international Development
(Beverly Hills, Calif), Spring 1973, pp. 2451, also available in
James Petras, Ed, Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution,
New York, Wiley, 1973, Chap. 2.
.
53
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
EL CONDONES
Sean
LEACIST
Symptomatic of leftist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Sannego wall poster denounces the country's
Supreme Court as "Protectors of Fascist Sedition."
tably, however, it also produced political divisions
within the military itself, which had hitherto been
relatively aloof from the process of polarization. It
was soon apparent, for instance, that General Prats
was willing to give the government the benefit of
the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions
or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy
was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January
Admiral Ismael Huerta resigned from the cabinet
over plans for the initiation of what he took to be
a food-rationing system. It is now also known that
the first plans for a possible coup were made by
intermediate-level officers at the end of 1972."
Food distribution became a critical issue as the
black market continued to expand, with much of
Chile's agricultural production going into illegal
channels because of the government's refusal to
increase the official prices paid for agricultural pro-
duce. The result was, in effect, two separate price
systems a subsidized, state-owned distribution
system oriented primarily toward the low-income
groups and a flourishing black market aimed at
middle and upper-income groups. The expansion
The New York Times (New York), Sept. 27, 1973.
- Photo by Juan de Onis for The New York Times
of the covers of government-appointed Supply and
Distributor Committees (JAPS) to deal with the
black-market problem led the opposition to charge
political manipulation of food distribution; nonethe-
less, the government seemed powerless to combat
black-mare operations.
The March 1973 Elections
The congressional elections in March did not re-
solve anying Chile's right-wing parties had hoped
that food shortages and econornic difficulties would
produce a two-thirds majority against the govern-
ment, which might in turn permit the impeachment
of the President, but the results, while showing
an antigourment majority of 56 percent, gave
the Allende regime 44 percent-a larger vote than
most observers had predicted. The opposition
pointed at that the vote of the pro-government
forces had declined from the 50 percent they had
registered in the 1971 municipal elections, while
the government compared its 44 percent with the
35 percent that Allende had received in 1970. In
fact, the any proper basis for comparison was the
E
125
tr.
re
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in:
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Fri
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Univ
repo
54
14-00000
Apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower along a security wall built around their Santi-
ago neighborhood; a Socialist slogan on the outside 
of the wall counters with "We Will Win.”
-Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.
1969 congressional elections. On that basis, the | have stemmed the erosion of support, at least amcrg
leftist parties had suffered a slight loss in votes but
i had achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain opposi
tionists later argued that the Left would have suf
fered much greater losses had it not been for a
wernment-assisted electoral fraud involving some
200.000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented
in support of the argument are unconvincing."
i
While the government's interpretation of the elec.
tons as proof that it was expanding its popular sup-
fort was not accurate, the election results indicated
that at least it had not lost popularity as rapidly as
previous governments faced with similar economic
reverses Despite a wage readjustment in October,
teal wages had declined 7 percent in 1972, and rag-
inflation continued to consume the wage increase.
In early 1973. However, the combination of dis-
couminatory distribution of government-produced
Pods and appeals to class consciousness seemed to
of the Investigating Committee of the CONNE
4. Lea Schel, reproduces in the Libro Bianco, D. 200-33.
As in 1973 omit the 21-10-24 year on pr
lave teen 100 young to vote in 1970. They CARNISSO
alty the number of "fraudulent" voters estimato in the
the masses of the poor.
Unfortunately for the government's longer-range
interests, the deliberate accentuation of class
consciousness had an opposite effect on the midale
class, driving middle-class areas to organize them-
selves into "Neighborhood Committees" to 
defend
themselves. It also, for the first time, led many to
arm themselves for a possible confrontation, which
seemed more likely now that the safety valve of an
impending election was no longer present. A gỡ
ernment proposal to limit full wage readjustments
to those making less than three times the minimum
wage did nothing to reassure the hostile middle-
income groups.
Before the elections, it had been rumored that
there might be another attempt in March at an
accommodation between the regime and the opposi
.
tion forces, possibly under the auspices of the
military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly
prevented by the publication, two days after the
elections, of a government decree calling 
for the
initiation in June of a single national unified school
system, which would follow a common curriculum.
including compulsory courses in socialism and work
55
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
periods in factories. The ensuing uproar involved
the Catholic Church for the first time in formal oppo-.
sition to the government and mobilized thousands
of secondary school students in violent demonstra
tions in downtown Santiago. Stories of fierce argu-
ments over the school proposals among the top
military officers (the military had left the cabinet
after the elections) filtered into the national press,
and a military delegation held a formal meeting
with the Education Ministry to express their opposi
tion. The controversy subsided only when the gov.
ernment announced that the proposal had been
postponed, pending further discussion.
Within the government, the debate continued on
whether to "consolidate in order to advance" (the
Communist position) or to "advance without com.
promise" (the Socialist stance). One Indication of
how the decate was resolved was the decision by
the government to use a constitutionally-authorized
"decree of insistence" allowing the cabinet to over-
ride the rulings of the Controller General of Chile,
Hector Humeres, who had disallowed the requisi-
and to compel the distribution of land in the "re-
formed" sector to the peasantry affer a transitional
period of two years. (The government had once again
used a loophole in the 1967 law to postpone in-
definately the distribution of expropriated land by
individual title.)
In May the official price index jumped 20 percent,
indicating that the inflation was moving into a new
hyperinflationary stage. The one effort that the gov-
ernment had made to hold the line-its refusal to
grant a full cost-of-living wage increase to the El
Teniente copper miners on the grounds that under
their contract they had already received partial cost-
of-living increases--led to a bruising two-and-a-half
month strike, which included a miners' march on
Santiago, mass rallies, and simultaneous one-day
general strikes for and against the government in
mid-June. By that time, Allende was once more
ready to resort to military Involvernent in the cabinet
to restore social peace.
tioning of some of the factories taken over during a Stage-Decline and Fall
the October 1972 strike. Conflicts also continued
with the judiciary over the executive's refusal to
obey court orders to return seized properties. On
May 26, the Supreme Court sent a public letter to
the President denouncing
the illegal attitude of the administration
[its] open and continual rebellion against judicial
orders... which signifies a crisis of the rule of law
[and] the imminent breakdown of the juridical struc-
ture of the country."
The stalemate between the executive and the
Congress over the constitutional amendment on the
"Three Areas of Property" was compounded when
the Constitutional Tribunal refused to take jurisdic-
tion over the disputed question of whether, in the
absence of a prebiscite, the Congress could override
the President's item vetoes by a majority or by a
two-thirds vote." A second constitutional conflict
along the same lines developed when the opposition
majority in Congress voted in favor of an amendment
to give farms under 40 hectares (about 100 acres)
in size an absolute guarantee against expropriation
Libro Blanco, p. 215.
The term "item" refects the fact that the Chilean president,
unlike his US counterpart, can veto or even rewrite individual sections
of proposed laws
56
On June 29, the last act of the Chilean tragedy
began with an abortive revolt by the Second Armored
Regiment in Santiago. Apparently, several army
units had been in contact with Patria y Libertad, a
right-wing political organization, and had planned to
seize President Allende at his residence and to
occupy the presidential palace. The revolt was
canceled one day before it was to occur, but when
one of the officers of the Second Armored Regiment
was arrested and held in the Defense Ministry, the
Regiment decided to free him and in the process to
seize the presidential palace as originally planned.
General Prats, the Army Commander, used the other
military units in Santiago to put down the revolt in
a few hours-most of which were spent in negotia-
tion rather than shooting-but not before President
Allende has gone on the air to urge "the people” to
take over all industries and enterprises as a response
to the uprising of "a small group of rebellious mili-
tary men." The Central Labor Federation also urged
the workers to occupy the factories, and in one day
the number of companies taken over by the govern-
ment rose from 283 to 526. The "Industrial Belts"
that had sprung up at the time of the October strike
now achieved new importance. The spread of "peo-
ple's power (poder popular) had been seen by
Allende as a deterrent to a possible future coup.
but it created many additional problems for the i
14-00000
A. 703
Workers in hardhats and bearing pitchforks march
in Santiago in support of the Allende administration
during brief nationwide strikes by pro- and anti-
Marxist elements in mid-June 1973.
-Wide World Photos
government. Production declined sharply after the
Lakeovers, the opposition got fresh fuel for its claim
that the expansion of state control of industry was.
teing carried out through extralegal channels, and
• "Bryter popular"-as expressed in the worker occu-
Cations appeared to sonie extent to pose a possible
threat of an alternative to the power of the central
government
After the June 29 revolt, Allende made new efforts.
to secure military involvement in the government,
but his 
negotiations with the armed forces were
✓ successful." Instead, they embarked on a policy
of 
vigorous enforcement of the Arms Control Law, a
| Pleasure which had been adopted in October 1972
but only sporadically enforced thereafter. This law
authorized any, military or police commanders to
carry 
out arms searches if there was "a presumption
If the clandestine existence of illegal firearms." *
The right wing Patria y Libertad organization had
row 
announced publicly that it was going under-
"focating accounts of those negotiations appear in Ercilla
lolub 
11-17, 1973, pp. 7-10.
776, o Oficial (Santiago), Oct. 21, 1972. By a
Brew 
has 
come to Allence's desk in the midst of the
nove, and 
since it had the strong support of the armed
Was Once to sign it despite the opposition of the
bow and the 
MIR.
ground in an attempt to overthrow the government
by force, and military intelligence was also aware
of the initiation of arms training by all the govern.
ment parties, even the centrist Radicals." In the
course of their crackdown, the military found arms
caches in factories in Santiago and Concepción, and
the king of a worker in one such arms raid pro-
voked protects from the leftist partles.
At this point, the Chilean Communist Party and
"the Catholic Church both concluded independently
that the only solution to the Impasse in Chite was
one more attempt at an agreement between the
Allende government parties and the Christian Demo-
crats. The Communists initiated a campaign against
civil war almost simultaneously with a statement by
the Chilean hierarchy calling for a renewal of dia-
logue. Probably in response to these pressures on
both sides, two lengthy discussions took place on
July 31 between UP and PDC representatives. Both
Allende and the Christian Democrats agreed on the
necessity of enforcement of the Arms Control Law,
but disagreement continued on the constitutional
reformis. Allende offered to sign the amendment on
the "Three Areas of Property" in return for a con-
stitutional amendment specifying that the Congress
could only override presidential vetoes of constitu-
tional amendments by a two-thirds vote. He also
proposed the establishment of joint committees to
work out further agreements. However, the Christian
Democrats denounced these proposals as "dilatory"
and broke off the negotiations.
A few days before the dialogue was initiated, the
truckers began another strike, which was to last
from July 26 until the coup on September 11. As in
October, the truckers were joined by the other
gremios. Coming at a time when the 12-month
deficits and subsidies to the nationalized Industries
inflation rate, fueled by massive government 
budget
.
and agriculture, had reached 323 percent--and in
a situation where inventories had not yet been built
up from the October strike-the truckers' action
created much more serious problems for the govern-
ment than the earlier strike. This new crisis once
again raised the question of military participation
in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his
fellow commanders that it was their patriotic duty
to re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike.
"Allende's personal bodyguard had organized courses in arms
training at his vacation nouse outside of Santiago. The MAPU Regan
arms-training in December 1972, and the Radicals did so in July 1973.
The 
armed forces were aware of this at least by the end of July.
See documents in Libro Blanco, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196-200.
57
.
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
Trucks stand idle outside Valparaiso, Chile on Sep-
tember 8, 1973, the 44th day of a paralyžing trans-
portation strike.
-UPI.
On August 9 Allende swore in what he called
"national security cabinet," with General Prats as
Defense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz
as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would
deal with the striking truckers), and the heads of
the Navy and of the National Police in other cabinet
posts.
Almost coincident with the entrance of the mil-
Itary into the cabinet, the naval establishment be-
came involved in a serious conflict with the left wing
of the Allende coalition. On August 7, the naval
Intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot
to carry out an enlisted men's revolt on August 11 in
Valparaiso and Concepción. The announcement
accused PS Secretary General Carlos Altamirano,
MAPU leader Oscar Garreton, and Miguel Enriques.
head of the MIR, of being the "intellectual authors"
of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the con-
gressional immunity of the first two, who sat respec-
tively in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.
Two days before the September coup, Altamirano
admitted that he had encouraged navymen to resist
their coup-minded (goipista) officers."
This attempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service
command from below was combined with maneuvers
It was an indication of the continuing press freedom in Chile that
newsstands in downtown Chile at this time contained a left-wing
publication headlined, "Soldiers, Disobey Your Officers," and a
magazine of the extreme Right with the headlines, "The Right of
Rebellion," "Rebellion and its Goals," and "Resistance to the Tyrant."
by Allende to replace officers unsympathetic to him.
When General Ruiz resigned his cabinet post on
August 17 in protest against his lack of sufficient
power to settle the strike, Allende compelled him
to add that his; departure from the cabinet "im-
plicitly" carried with it his retirement as Air Force
Commander. This was correctly seen as an Allende
tactic to remove an officer opposed to him, and it'
met serious resistance from within the Air Force,
provoking a series of actions which ultimately led
directly to the September 11 coup.
On August 20, top Air Force officers met to decide.
whether to resist Allende's action. By evening. Ruiz
had persuaded them to accept it on the condition
that Allende appoint the second-ranking officer.
General Gustavo Leigh, as Air Force Commander and
name another Air Force general to the cabinet (so
that Allende could not repeat the same maneuver
with Leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking
military officers, including those of six generals..
gathered in front of General Prats' house to present
a letter asking for his resignation. When the demon-
stration was broken up by police tear gas, it pro-
voked such dissension in the armed forces that on
the following day General Prats decided to resign
both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He
was joined by two other generals who, with Prats,
had led the military forces that had quelled the
tank-regiment revolt in June.
The resignation of what appeared to be the last
defenders of Allende in the army now meant that
all three services were opposed to the President. It
coincided with the adoption on the same day of a
"sense of the house" (acuerdo) resolution by the
Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and
the military ministers, drawing their attention to
"the serious breakdown of the constitutional and
legal order."" The resolution criticized the Allende
government for repeatedly bypassing the legislature
through the use of legal loopholes and for refusing
to promulgate the constitutional reforms vcted by
the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial
orders, encouraging illegal seizure of property, perse.
cuting opposition labor groups, and supporting
illegal paramilitary organizations. In conclusion, it
stated that the listed actions constituted a "serious
breakdown of the constitutional and legal order of
the Republic" and urged the military ministers to
"put an end to the de facto situations listed above
which violate the Constitution and the law" or be
Libro Blanco, pp. 239-42.
.
58
14-00000
3
guilty of "compromising the national and profes-
sional character of the armed forces."
In its original form, the resolution had declared
the Allende government to be illegitinate, but the
acuerdo had later been softened in order to secure
the support of the Christian Democrats. Yet its effect
I was still to give a congressional green light to the
military
, and Allende immediately so interpreted it.
He replied to the motion by accusing the Congress
of "promoting a coup d'état by asking the military
forces to make governmental judgments inde-
pendently of the authority and direction of the
President"; he also pointed out that according to
the Constitution the only way that the Congress.
could decide on the legality of the President's con-
duct of 
his office was through. Impeachment by a
two-thirds 
vote."
The congressional vote was echoed by several
professional associations. The Medical Association
called on their "colleague" Allende to resign-a
request that was echoed by the Federation of Pro-
fessionals (CUPROCH)---and resignation petitions
were 
circulated in Santiago. The Lawyers' Association
Issued a 
declaration which-"without attributing a
malevolent intention" to the President_asserted an
"incompatibility between the institutional framework
within which he is supposed to exercise his office.
and the 
actions which he feels obliged to carry out
| 
in his 
program." Arguing that Allende "would appear
to be 
incapacitated (impedido) in the exercise of his
functions as he understands them," the statement
suggested that he could be removed from office
under Article 43 of the Constitution, which author-
izes the Congress to declare presidential incapacity."
The Coup
Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup
I was 
made is 
not yet certain, but it evidently was
reached 
in the days following Prats' resignation.
The armed 
forces had contingency plans for the
control of vital 
points throughout the country in case
of any 
emergency, and it only required a signal to
"It Mercurio (International Edition) Aug. 20-26, 1973, p. 5. The
an of the Christian 
Democratic Party told the New York Times
" "
heither we nor the 
armed forces favor anything but a
solution to Chile's political crisis" but emphasized that
the only way 
to avoid a 
breakdown of the Constitution was the
acment of 
military men in at least six cabinet posts, as well as
unsersecretary 
positions and as heads of the chief govern.
agencies 
The New York Times, Aug. 27, 1973, p. 12.
Mercurio (
International Edition), Aug. 26-Sept. 1, 1973, p. 7.
put them into operation. Hence the actual seizure of
control 
required little preparation.
After the resignations of the third week of August,
Allende restructured his cabinet without the top
military commanders but still retained representa-
tives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over
Minister of the Interior his Socialist colleague Carlos
the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as
Briones, who was known to be interested in another
attempt at accommodation with the Christian Demo-
crats. The president also canceled a projected trip
to the 
Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers.
rival demonstrations in connection with the third
The government and the opposition again 
staged
anniversary of the 1970 presidential elections..
On the weekend before the coup, the Christian
Democrats called all provincial party leaders to a
meeting at 
which a proposal was adopted for the
simultaneous resignation of the Congress and the
President 
and for new elections to resolve the con-
8971
Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander-in-Chief of the
Chilean Army and Minister of Defense, leaves the
President Palace on August 15, 1973, after a
conference on the transport crisis.
-OPL
59
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
Salvador Allende hurries through the corridors of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on
the morning of September 11, 1973, shortly before taking his own life during the military coup d'état.
flict between the executive and legislative branches.
During the same weekend, Allende met with the
leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and called for
the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct of office.
Although this step was reportedly opposed by the
Socialists, Briones subsequently asserted that
Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a
radio address at noon on the day of the coup."
Meantime, after a stormy session with Allende on
September 7, the military commanders proceeded on
Sunday, September 9, to draft the text of the
pronunciamiento issued on September 11. They did
not secure the agreement of the National Police
until early on the morning of the coup itself, and
only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniority had
taken over the position of police commander."
On September 10, Navy units set sail from
Valparaíso for previously scheduled maneuvers, but
that evening they returned to port and by early
morning of the 11th had seized control of that city.
Concepción, the third-ranking city in Chile and a
information from the author's personal interviews with Patricio
Aylwin, Jan. 11, 1974, and Carlos Briones, Jan. 14, 1974.
** Accounts of pre-coup military activities appear in the Christian
Science Monitor (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973: The wail Street kunna
(New York), Sept. 25, 1973. Le Monde (Paris), Dec. 19, 1971 and
Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After," Encounter (Lonasu, March
1974, pp. 72-80.
-Photo by The New York Times.
known center of leftist activism, was taken over with-
out a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer.
To justify their action, the military. commanders
broadcast a communiqué to the nation. While ad-
mitting that the Allende government had initially
come to power by legal means, they announced that
it had "fallen into flagrant illegitimacy" by violating
fundamental rights, by "artificially fomenting the
class struggle," by refusing to implement the de-
cisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the
Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in
agricultural, commercial and industrial activity in
the country, and by bringing about a state of in-
flation and anarchy which "threaten the internal and
external security of the country." The coup leaders
concluded:
These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical
doctrine. . . to justify our intervention to depose a
government which is illegitimate, immoral, and un-
representative of the overwhelming sentiment of the
nation."
At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one
but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to
defend him, Alleride broadcast his last message to
Libro Bianco, pp. 248-49.
60
14-00000
the Chilean people over the single pi.. Allende rádio
station that had not yet been shut down by the
military. He began:
This is surely the last time that I will be able to speak
to you. . . .
. My words are not spoken in bitterness
but disappointment. In the face of these events /
can only say to the workers, "I am not going to
resign." At this historic juncture I will pay with my
life for the loyalty of the people.
Blaming "foreign capital, Imperialism, and reaction"
for persuading the armed forces to break with their
tradition, he said:
History will judge them. ... My voice will no longer
come to you, but it does not matter. You will con-
tinue to hear it; it will always be among you. At the
least, you will remember me as an honorable man
who was loyal to the revolution."
At 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those
who wished to do so to leave the building, and-
except for his personal secretary-all the women,
Including Allende's pregnant daughter, left. The
military also offered the President and his family
safe conduct out of the country if he would sur-
render. Allende rejected the offer. The Air Force
then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which re-.
peatedly hit the palace with rockets and set fire to
large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m.,
Allende decided to discontinue the resistance, and
the members who had been with him left the build-
ing in single file, led by the secretary carrying a
white flag. Allende stayed behind and, sitting on
a sofa in a reception room on the second floor, put
two bullets into his head. The automatic rifle that he
used was a gift from Fidel Castro."
Conclusions
Since the coup, comments in the world press
representing widely divergent political postures have
cited the Chilean case as proof that the hope of
achieving Marxist socialism through democratic
Imeans is a vain one. Yet most people have failed to
I note two fundamental errors of the Allende policy.
neither of which was essentially related to the
attempt to establish democratic socialism:
(1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from
Engels that Allende cited at the beginning of his
administration to justify
course states as a pre-
requisite "the support of the majority of the people."
Allende acted as if he had that support; but even
at the highest point of his popularity in the April
1971 elections, he never achieved it. Moreover, his
policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at ex-
panding his electoral base, was more successful in
pitting professional and middle-class groups against
him than in widening his support among workers,
peasants and low-income groups.
2) Marxist economists and policymakers have
always placed primary emphasis on investment and
the expansion of the productive capacity of the
economy. By contrast, the Allende policymakers
emphasized increases in consumption and combined
this with a headlong rush to take over industry and
agriculture-a course far removed from the "two
steps forward, one step back" of Lenin. The conse-
quences of these policies after their deceptive initial
success were massive government deficits, runaway
inflation, and a near-breakdown of the economy.
(The argument that Allende's economic problems
were the result of a shortage of foreign credit does
not really hold water, since they were caused by
policies initiated before the foreign squeeze and
since, in any event, Allende's regime managed to
secure enough foreign credits from Latin American,
European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase
the Chilean foreign debt from $2.6 billion to $3.4
billion in less than three years. Much of the new
indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin
American countries. Surprisingly, Chile's debt to the
USSR, China and Eastern Europe Increased only from
$9 million to $40 million between 1970 and
1973.")
a Translated from the transcript of the tape recording of the speech
published in Ricardo Boizard, El Ultimo Dia de Allende (The Last
Day of Allende). Santiago, Editorial de Pacifico, 1973, pp. 53-55.
On Allende's suicide, see the medical report in El Mercurio
(International Edition), Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1973, pp. 1 and 7. The
eyewitness testimony of one of the President's personal physicians,
who entered the room immediately thereafter, is published in Ercilla,
Jan. 28, 1974 pp. 10-13. Allendo's widow has asserted that
witnesses told her they had seen bullet wounds in his chest and
stomach. A supposed account by a personal bodyguard circulated
in Mexico and elsewhere describing his murder contains numerous
factual errors and describes events which could not have taken
place because of the physical design of the building. On this and
many other myths of Left and Right concerning the overthrow of
Allende, see Paul E. Sigmund, "Allende through the Myths,"
Worldview (New York) April 1974 pp. 16-21.
Secretaria, Comité Interamericano de ta Alianza para el Progreso
(CIAP). El Esfuerzo Interno y las Necesidades de Financiamiento
Externo para el Desarrollo de Chile (Domestic Efforts and the Needs
for External Financing for the Development of Chile), Washington, DC,
1974, p. V.9.
61
i
14-00000
Allende in Retrospect
Specific aspects of the Chilean system also made
the Allende experiment a particularly difficult one.
He was able to come to power in the first place
because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the
democratic system and because the Marxist parties
were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and
the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many
instruments for state control of the economy which
had been developed by previous administrations
since the 1930's. However, he was required to
operate within an institutional system which included
frequent and staggered elections, proportional rep-
resentation, and a multiparty system which made
majority rule very difficult and often gave veto pow.
ers to the extremes of Right and Left. The economy
had been characterized for nearly a century by a
chronic tendency to inflation, and successive govern-
ments had consistently ignored agriculture in the
Interest of securing urban electoral support. The
most important systemic constraint of all, of course,
I was the existence of a professionalized and insti-
tutionally-loyal military which was unresponsive to
the ideological blandishments of the Left."
The immediate causes of the military intervention
are apparent from the preceding account. In the last
part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean
politics by both sides and became as polarized as
the rest of Chilean society-with the overwhelming
majority joining the opposition to Allende. The con-
flict over education in March-April 1973 height-
ened that polarization just at the time the military
were attempting to extricate themselves from politi-
cal Involvement. Then the expansion of arms
searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which
Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge
of civil war. Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing
military hierarchy by a combination of leftist activ-
ity among enlisted men and presidential maneuver-
ing with promotions and retirements provided the
classis scenario for a coup d'état.
The Socialists always believed that they could convert th
military to their outlook. This is strikingly revealed in Socialist Party
documents published in the Libro Blanco, pp. 124-30.
One can also relate Allenae's difficulties to the
inherent contradictions in the Marxist theory to which
he appealed.. At the same time that he proclaimed
his faith in a democratic, pluralist and libertarian.
transition to socialism, many of his Marxist-sup-
porters spoke and acted on the basis of a belief in
the inevitability of armed confrontation. With his
knowledge, they armed themselves and-what was
worse-talked incessantly about revolution. The re-
peated statements of Régis Debray and others that
the observance of the rules of "bourgeois" legality
was only a tactic until the balance of forces had
improved was hardly likely to persuade doubters of
the sincerity of Allende's commitment to democracy.
When the importation and distribution of arms was
combined with efforts to reorganize education along
ideological lines, to subvert military discipline, and
to rearrange the hierarchy of command, It is not
altogether surprising that the military finally took
action.
A positive evaluation of the Allende years would
certainly credit him with a sincere effort to raise
the living standards of low-income groups and to
involve them actively in the determination of their
own future. It would likewise stress the continued
existence of freedom of expression for all points of
view in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative
assessment would ask whether the low-income
groups in Chile genuinely benefited from an eco-
nomic policy which after the first half of 1972 pro-
duced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agri-
cultural and industrial production, and a reduction
in the real value of wages and salaries. Even more
critically, one could inquire who has suffered the
most in economic and in human terms as a result of
the breakdown of the Chilean system-the Marxist
politicians, many of whom were able to escape or
go into exile, or the workers, peasants and slum-
dwellers they claimed to represent, who are now
paying the price of the Allende regime's mistakes
in the form of the hardships imposed by sharply
reduced consumption and the strictures of dracon-
ian military rule.
62

14-00000
A513
We remittemmisphere.
SOVIET ANAINST, London
15 August 1974
Kremlin's Hand in Allende's Chile
by JAMES
Why did Salvador Allende's revolutionary gov-
ernment end in a bloodbath despite Soviet sup-
port and the plaudits of the world's left-wing
extremists, who saw in Chile a new puth for
Socialism's march to power? -
James Theberge, who is Director of the Latin
American Department of the Georgetown Uni-
versity Center for Strategic and International
Studies, shows how Moscow, the "big brother".
though eager to exploit this opening in Latin
America to the full, disagreed with Allende's
headlong methods, and while warning him of the
growing economic chaos denied him enough
financial aid.
In 1935, Moscow dispatched Eudocio Ravines,
a brilliant Peruvian Communist organizer, to Chilo
to implement the "united front" and "anti-fascist
popular frent" strategy that had replaced, the
ultra-loft strategy of the Comintern. Since that
time the Chilean Communist party generally has
followed a strategy of broad aliance and limited
aims, although the Cuban revolution led to a
radicalisation of party strat
The Chilean Communist party, one of the most
loyal pro-Soviet parties in Latin America, gava
unqualified support to the Soviet bloc invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1980. While its fortunes
have shifted through the years as a result of
domestic and international developments, it un-
stintingly supported the twists and turns of Soviet
foreign policy and repeated Moscow's themes of
anti-imperialism and class warfare.
The party, at least prior to the military Inter-
Evertion of September, 1973. was the best organ-
ised and strongest in Latin America. Between
1956 and 1960 it formed on unsesy alliance for
electoral purposes with the Sociclist Party, its
more militant Marxist rival on the Left. But in
1969 the Communists decided that a much more
broadly based alliance of talt-wing forces was
necessary for the transformation of the country
into a socialist state and they played a key role
in the founding of the Popular Unity Front (a
coalition of six leftist partins) at the end of that
year. After the 1970 electoral victory of the
Popular Unity Front under Salvador Allende the
Communists became the single most influential
force within the coalition. It was a for batter
organised and disciplined participant than its
closest rival, the more ideclogically unstable and
militant Socialist Party.
The ultimate aim of the party did not waver
throughout the Allanda period. The Communists
hoped to be able to take advantage of the weak:
ness of the democratic institutions to install a
"dictatorship of the proletaria:" under their
direction. Their Secretary-General, Eduardo
Labarca, made this clear in his Corvalin 27
Hores (Santiago, Editorial Cunty, 1972), in
which he declared: "For to put from capital-
1'
THEBERGE
تاحة
Isin to Socialism necessarily requires that the
proletariat be converted into the loading class.
into the determining social force"..
The Communist strategy. shared by Salvador
Allends and the "moderate" wing of the Socialist
Party, was to "ourthrow" the bourgeois state
and constitution, using the legal device of the
plebiscite, an interview with. Régis Debray in
1971 Allends caid: "As for the bourgeois state at
the present morrent, we are seeking to overcome
it. To overthrow it" (Régis Debray, The Chilean
Revolution, Conversations with Allende, New
York, Random House, 1971 p.82).
Mass mobilisation, Infiltration of Chilean in-
stitutions and tactical alliances with the opposi..
tion were to be employed to generate sufficient
popular support. Congress was to be replaced by a
"popular assembly" and the existing legal system
by "populer tribunals." President Allende's
piedge to uphold the "Statute of Guarantees"
(designed to commit his government to preserve
Chile's democratic freedoms and institutions in
exchange for Congressional support) was simply
a "tactical recessity" to gain power, as he ex-
plained later.
The Chilean Communists and their allies. In
Moscow were uneasy about the ideological im-
plications of the via Chilena as advocated by
Salvador Allende (Debray, p.119). The Com-
munist party refused to endorse the via, Chilena
as a uniquely Chilean path to socialism, which
implied that it might not necessarily assume the
leading role after complete power was gained by
the Popular Unity coalition. The Chilcan party
supported Moscow's doctrine of the via pacifica,
which accepted fice elections and popular piural.
ism as a short-term tactical device under Chilean
conditions but aimed in the long run at installing.
a Soviet-style Communist dictatorship. The via
pacifica was not as "pacific" as the slogan im.
plied: it embraced all forms of class conflict and
violence short of armed insurrection and civil
war in the process of establishing the "dictator-
ship of the proletariat."
Misleading Image
The via Chilena proclaimed by Allende scon
after his election was widely misundersteed in
the West. The image that was officially propa-
gated was that of a uniquely Chilean path to a
new type of Marxist-humanist socialism, where
basic liberties, economic pluralism and free
elections were respected by all. Western liberals
were led to believe that the Allende government
was constructing a new Western-European type
of democratic socialism in Chile. This image
clashed with the reality of Salvador Allende's
revolutionary ambition to use Chito's pluralist
democracy to destroy it. He seemed to have
abandoned the via Chilena formula during the last
year of his government. Not only cid. he rarely
34
Www
14-00000
employ it in his speeches but the importance of
preserving "democracy, pluralism and liberty"
was conspicuously absent.
The government's policy was very much to
Moscow's liking: seizure of US investments, the
espousal of the doctrine of "idoutegical plural-
Ism" (relations with all states regardless of
Ideology and internal political character), closer
relations with the socialist camp, and the foster-
Ing of an "anti-imperialist (anti-US) front in
Latin America.
Under the Allende regime, foreign policy was
reoriented, and the previously close ties with tha
United States were replaced by strong political,
economic and scientific ties with the "socialist
countries," above all with Cuba and the USSR.
The first trip of the Foreign Minister, Clodomiro
Almeyda, outside of Latin America was to the
USSR and Eastern Europe, in May-June, 1971.
President Allende visited Moscow in December,
1972. Strong ideological and personal ties linked
the Chiloan Communist party leaders with the
Soviet party leadership and Salvador Allende with
Fidul Castro.
President Allende's description of the USSR
as Chila's "big brother" (hermano mayor) was
no more figure of speech but reflected the expect
ation of his government that the USSR would be-
come the most important socialist ally of the
revolution and the main economic bulwark of the
regime. Moscow did, in fact. become the most
Important source of secialist camp economic aid
and credits to the Popular Unity government,
totalling $620.0 million ($:56.5 million in short.
term bank credit and $463.5 million in project
ald and supplier credits) in the 1971-73 period.
The USSR authorised $260.5 million in credits
($98.5 million in short-term credit and $162.0
million in economic ald) to the Allende regime.
most of which was never utilised. This was far
from the massive help Allende needed. But Mos-
cow was under no illusion that its economic co-
operation would decisively influence the
Immediate prospects for radical social and
economic transformation, although it no doubt
helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United
States.
Soviet influence expanded rapidly as a result
of the Chilean Communist party's loyalty to the
USSR and the expansion of Soviet-Chilean
economic, technical. scientific, cultural, and
fisheries cooperation made possible by the
victory of the Communist-Socialist regime. But
Moscow became increasingly alarmed at the
deterioration of the economic situation, the
violent clashes of the ultra-left and the ultra-right,
and the growing organisation of opposition forces.
particularly after the Popular Unity government
failed in the March, 1973. elections to obtain the
majority electoral support required to transform
See Deuda Esterna de Court. Tamo V. Departamento de
Créditos Externos. CORFO, Santiago, 1973, for full de-
tails.
the political and economic structure by peachful,
constitutional means.
Nevertheless, Moscow was not willing to pro-
vide the massive short-term commodity assist.
ance (such as foodstuffs) or untied convertible
currency credits which the regime needed to
finance the import of food, spare parts. and
machinery to alleviate local shortages, Moscow's
$99.5 million in short-term bank credits was no
doubt helpful but paled into insignificance before
the need to finance Child's import requirements,
which, for food alone, were running at the rate of
about $700 million a year when the Allende
regime collapsed. The Soviet leadership told
Chilean Communist and Popular Unity officials
that the main effort to improve the economic situ
ation would have to be trade by the Allerde o
Moscow repeatedly stressed that the
Popular Unity government must reverse the
calamitous decline in production and product.
ivity to have a chance of winning over a majority
of the Chileans to the cause of socialism.
ernment .
Refusing to give Aliendo the hard currency
credits he needed to improve his worsening
chances for survival, Moscow contented itself
with organising solidarity meetings at home and
abroad in the hope that these demonstrations
would "reach the care of the Chilean people"
(Moscow Radio. 13 August 1973). Allende's loyal
ally and "big brother" was willing to sell Soviet
machinery and equipment to him—that is, ex-
pand Soviet exports finensed by long-term credits
- but denied him the short-term hard currency
credits he desperately needed.
A combination of circunstances - Moscow's
costly entanglement in Cuba, economic difficulties
at home, shortages of grain and foreign exchange
- led the USSR to eschew massive short-term
aid to Chile and to counsel a policy of self-help
to the Allende regime - a theme repeated fre-
quently by the Chilean Communist party leader.
ship when referring to Soviet assistance. In the
final analysis Moscow watched idly while the via
pacifica was destroyed by the disastrous
economic policies, the circumvention of the laws,
and the tacit encouragement of the ultra-left by
President Allende and the Popular Unity govern.
ment.
Moscow pursued a dual strategy in Chile. At
the level of state-to-state relations it acted
cautiously, adopted a non-interventionist posture,
and encouraged anti-Americanism and independ.
ence from the United States. Since it realised
that the internal balance of forces did not favour
the armed struggle, the Popular Unity leadership
was urged to maintain internal unity, reject the
"provocativa and adventurous" overtures of the
ultra-left, avoid actions that might provoke a civil
war or military intervention, adopt a more rational
economic policy, and consolidate the initial gains
of the revolution.
At the same time, Moscow did nothing to re-
strain direct Cuban involvement in the Chilean
revolution. Protected by a friendly. Marxist-
daminated government and its Marxist President,
Cuba transported large quantities of Soviet and
Czechoslovak-supplied weapons to the radical left
in Chile on the Cuban airline and merchant ships.
14-00000
It also established a guerrilla training base and
coordinating centre in Chile. The large intöliig.
ence team in the Cuben Embassy in Santiago
maintained liaison with the liberation movement
in Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay, Cuba's Soviet.
contratied intelligence service. Dirección General
do Inteligencia (DGM), se had close ties with
the Chilean, ultra-leftist and other revolutionary
exile groups, providing them with training, arms
and funds for the armed struggle in Chile and
other Latin Amarican countrics.
Revolutionaries Trained
Soviet army personnel were directly involved
in the training of worker-revolutionaries for urban
guerrilla warfare. This occurred during 1972-73.
at El Belloto, near Valparaiso, where the USSR
had installed a factory for the manufacture of
prefabricated housing. The firm (KPD) employed.
sixteen Russians, four of whom were engineers
and technicians; the remaining twalve, were
Soviet army officers. After working hours, these
twelve officers instructed a hard-core of specially-
selected worker-revolutionaries in the use of
arms, street fighting, and urban guerrilla' tactics.
The Russian-built factory was kept under constant
surveillance by Chile's naval intelligence. On the
morning of 11 September 1973, naval intelligence
arrested the Russians and three days later ex-
polled them from the country".
This clandestine involvement in training
guerrillas in Chile was an exception to Moscow's
official line of giving full support to the legal and
peaceful path to socialison. But the Soviet leader.
ship operates on the principle that since every
eventuality cannot be foressen it is botter to take
advance measures which might "contradict" the
official line than to be sorry later. In Chile there
clearly were some advantages in having some
armed revolutionaries under direct Soviet control:
Moscow would be able to retain some measure of
Influence over the ultra-left, particularly import-
ant in the event that this faction was able to seize
power. As it turned out, Russia's "united front"
tactics failed, and the armed struggle was aborted
by the Chilean military.
Soviet Industrial Espionage
The Soviet Union made every effort to extract
the maximum advantage from its technical assist
ance programme. It assigned 46 technicians to
the nationalised copper industry to help raise
productivity, all of whom were engaged in in-
dustrial espionage. They were far more interested
In gaining first-hand knowledge of the advanced
US mining equipment and methods of operation
than in assisting Chilash development. Andrés
Zauschquevich, executiva vice-president of the
cupper corporation, told me in December 1973
that the specialists during their two-year stay
contributed nothing to the improvement of mining
operations and were mainly uccupied in gathering
specifications of American equipment, obtaining
Information on mining techniques and organica-
tion, and collecting data on costs and product-
ivity.
Moscow was also especially interested in
fisheries and fishery-related (occanographic.
hydrographic and marine biological research)
assistance to Chilo. Fisheries aid gave the
Aussion's access to Chilean parts for its fishing.
oceanographic and other vessel
mit
the Chileans with a Soviet maritime presence.
The growing presence in Chilean waters, around
the Capa and in cub-Antarctic waters provided a
cover for gathering intelligence and cogano.
graphic data of use to the Soviet pavy.
The Soviet Union offered to supply $300
million in military equipment to Allende in 1971,
but the military refused the offer and decided to
continue to obtain arms from the United States
and other Western suppliers. The anti-Communist
military wero disturbed by the deepening
economic and political violonce under the Popular
Unity government, and were anxicus not to
weaken their military ties with the United States
and Western Europe by turning to the Soviet
Union for arms. Muscow had hoped to establish
en important procedent for supplying arms to non-
Communist countries in Latin America and further
weaken Washington's already strained relations
with the Latin American military, Despite the cool.
ness of official US-Chilean relations, the United
States continued to maintain friendly relations
with the Chilean military.
The Kremlin was very much aware of the weak-
ness of the Allende regime. Not only was it a
minority government (in 1970, 35% and, in 1973,
43% of the electorato supported the Popular
Unity coalition) but the armed forces and power.
ful national police were strongly anti-Communist.
Since the "democratic forces" lacked full
political and economic power, Moscow favoured
a gradual take-over by the Communists and
avoidance of civil war or military confrontation
at all costs. Both the ultra-left and ultra-right
opponents of Allenda were attacked regularly in.
the Soviet prass. But the Movernent of the Revo-
lutionary Left (MIR), an ultra-left group that pur-
sued the armed path and hoped to defeat the
opposition forces in a violent confrontation, was
singled out for particularly scathing criticism. It
was charged with "revolutionary adventurism".
contributing to political instability and harming
the prospects of survival of the Popular Unity
government.
From mid-1972 onwards, Moscow realised
that the opposition to the Allende governinent was
growing and widespread. It was only the shrewd
and dilatory personality of Allenda-chilled in
maintaining a balance between the disruptive
forces within his own government--that held to-
gether the disintegrating fabric of society. There
was Soviet criticism of the irrational economic
management, declining agricultural and industrial
production, accelerating inflation, and the
worsening balance of paymen's.
Soviet observers advised a slower take-over
of the economy, nationalising the large firms first
but leaving the smaller and medium-sized firms
alone for the tima being. In the last months before
the military coup they saw the handwriting on tha
wall and urged a consolidation of the economic
gains already achieved, collaboration with the
(especially
opposition political parties
the
Christian Democrats), and avoidance of armed
conflict.
Ercilla (Santiago). 10-16 October 1973, and author's
interviews with the Chilean military high commend. Dec.
14-00000
Collapse of Socialist Model'
The Soviet policy vis-a-vis Chile emphasised
cooperation in the political field, the forging of
an anti-US front with Chile, Peru and Cuba, and
expansion of trade and aid relations while re
fraining from polemics and interfering in Chile's
internal affairs (mainly through its influence over
the Chilean Communist Party). The Chilcan Com
munists were given moral and material support
for widening the base of support of the regime.
but it made no difference to the final outcome.
The weakness of the Allende regime, its fateful
Internal contradictions, official connivance in the
arming and violence of the ultra-left, the Weimar-
type inflation and food shortages, the growing
political polarisation and violence, and the fate-
ful alienation of the armed forces were the do-
cisive conditions that triggered the coup d'état
that led to Aliende's downfall and replacement by
a military junts on 11 Septernber, 1973.
Moscow was deeply disturbed but not especi
ally surprised. TASS admitted on 20 September
1973 that the "Chilean experierice was bitter and
dramatic," and Fidel Castro declared that he was
'vory upset by events in Chile" (the new military
junta had immediately broken off relations with
Havana). Moscow severed diplomatic relations
with Santiago and withdrow its ambassador and
embassy staff because of alleged persecution of
Soviet officials by the junta. After less then a
week in power, Chile's new iliitary government
began to teal the full blast of Sovint displeasure
and frustration, expressed in a well-orchestrated
and sustained propaganda campaign aimed at
isolating and discruditing the regina,
The Soviet media accused the junta of "per-
secuting leit-wingers with unparalleled cruelty"
(Moscow Radio, 13 September 1973). Thero
were reports in Pravda on 26 September that "the
streets of Santiago were flowing with bico" and
the radio socke of "tens of thousands of Chilean
democrats" killed. Salvador Allende was altern-
atively reported to have been "murdered in cold
WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1974
Argentine
Manager
Murdered
BUENOS AIRES-Gun-
men killed the labor rela-
tions manager of a French
owned auto plant in Cor.
doba yesterday, and Presi
dent Mana Estela Peron
spoke out against the recent
"cowardly and mercenary
assassinations" In Argen
tina.
The extreme leftist Peros
1st Armed Forces chimed
responsibility for the ath
of IKA Renault offical R
cardo Goya, 55, saying it
was "the Peronist workers'
answer to the enemies o!
our class."
A two-month slowdown at
the Renault plant climaxed
Monday with ouster of left-
Ist leaders of the auto un
ion. Workers battled police
last night on the streets of
Cordoba.
Mrs. Peron, In her first
speech from the palace bal.
cony that her late husband,
President Juan D. Peron of.
ten used
a rostrum,
declared:
"Many people link that
because I am a woman I
cannot rule... but with this
fragile appearance I have
committed inyself.” Her ile-
nunciation of the political
kings came in a talk ear-
lier with provincial gover
nois.
blood" or to have died a hero's death, resisting
the rebels to the very end. Allenda's residence
was alleged to have been "wiped off the face of
the earth." The junta was shooting at women and
children in an attempt to intimidate the people.
Or. 29 October TASS indignantly blamed the CIA,
Chilean "reaction" and "American monopolics"
for organising the military coup. And according
to a Moscow broadcast even Leonid Brezhnev,
not known for his devotion to Western democ
racy, expressed horror at the "monstrous, com.
pletely open violation of a country's constitution,
the unceremonious flouting of the democratic
traditions of an entire nation."
The overthrow of the Allende government was
a bitter but not entirely unexpected setback for
Moscow's united front tactics in Latin America,
and had adverse repercussions for Marxist
parties elsewhere in the West, Communists and
Socialists in France and Italy who had earlier
pointed to Chile as a model of the peaceful trans-
ition to socialism moved to disengage themselves
from the Allende disaster. Instead of leading to
socialism, united front tactics in Chila ushered
I in a period of unparalleled political violence,
encrmous suffering for Child's workers and
middin class, and the worst economic crisis in
its history.
Sovint designs for Chile to serve as the van.
guard of the anti-US front in Latin Arnerica ended
in a complete fiasco and left a deep impression
on the non-Communist political parties and the
armed forces in the region. It reminded them of
the grave risks of entering into an allianco with
totalitarian parties. Despite protestations to the
contrary, Marxist governments are driven in-
exorably to violate pledges to uphold the con-
stitution, to destroy the private sector of the
economy, and ultimately to install a totalitarian
dictatorship.
Authoritative statements of the Chilean Communist
Party's position under the Altence regime can be found
in Labarca's Corvalan 27 Horas and Luis Corvalan's
Camino de Victoria, (Santiago, 1971),
NEW YORK TIMES
28 August 1974
SPARSE AUDIENCE
HEARS MRS. PERON
Only a Few Thousand Attend
Her First Public Rally
By JONATHAN KANDELL
Sonal to The New York Tim
Quan
Domingo Perón, had'
drawh stores of thousands of:
supporters on numerous occa
OCCA
sions.
The event was marred by the:
Government's mounting probe
ems with efterving industrial
workers in Cordoba, 430 miles
northwest of the capital.
Early this morning, ardentio
ified terrorists gunned down the
labor relations manager of Ika-
Renault, a leading car manu
facturer in Cordoba, as he
BUENOS AIRES, Aug. 27-.drove to the main plant that.
Only a few thousand trade un has been in the center of a bit,
ionists gathered today to hear ter workers' strike.
President Isabel Martinez re
The killing of the Argentine
Peron, in her hist pubie rally executive, Ricardo Goya, 55'
since she took office, speak in years old, followed a clish list:
the hire Plaza de a night bewe a left wing auto;
where r the husband
workers. and then that
14-00000
:
left two trade unionists springs. ply with his doctrine, no mat gathered an enormous personal were urging Mrs. Peròn to hold]
ly wounded.
iter who falls and no mester turlowing before her death in a major public rally to
The rally was ostensibly called what the cost." Mr Peron. 1952.
strengthen her image in the
to publicize the Goverment B
During the two months she "I know that many think face of rising terrorist activity.
decision last week to nationes,
power, he has because I am a woman, 1 labor unrest and economic
alize the distribution and sie has been in
of petroleum products. Un Mught to transinam ner image cannot take over the helm," problems.
Despite the poor turnout, at
now, Shell, and
from that of a bereaved widow said 
Mrs. Peron. still dressed.
one of the lengthy black today's rally, television an-i
aries had shared the local sale 12 forceful ensef executive in
of oil products with the State able to guide a nation disced dresses she has donned since nouncers remarked that the
into numerous rightist, leftist her husband's death. "But I crowds were "multitudinous."
]
Petroleum Company,
and moderate factions.
have two arms, and in one and at least one commentator
Assertion of Leadership : She has held wetypublicized land I have Perón and in the spoke of "hundreas of thous
But Mrs. Perón devoted most: Cabinet menings and reunions other Eva Perón,"
jands" of people on hand. But
opposition politicians,
of her speech to defend her with
At times her voice cracked a walk throch the plaza con-
claim to leadership of the Pe. Congressinen
military with emotion and she shook her firmed that only the street in
fonist movement, which has 2rops.
entended arms, recalling gefront of the ping Government
been in growing disarray since Many of her speeches are entended arms, recallingHHH; house was filed. The camerash
of the television stations-1'
General Perin's death on July 1, heavily faced with references tures used by Eva Perón.
There have been rumors in which have recently been
"Do not debt for a moment made and slogans by Gen-
that Isabel Perón, his enteral Peron and his second with, the fast three weks that con-cently brought under state
Perre who servative Peronist leaders cor trot-focused กา trade
and disciple, will faithfullyom La Duarte de
BALTIMORE SUN
28 August 1974
and
Forecast is cloudy for
By KICHAND, O'MARA
Rin de Janeiro Mureau of The Sun
Rio de Janeiro-Opposition is
growing against the contin
tion in office of President Hugo
Banzer of Bolivia. But
ers are divided over wheter
General Danzer will end his
tenure legally, through vicc
tions promised for next year,
or by the usual mechanic for
transfering power in Bolivia-
the coup d'etal.
Bolivia's Banzer
Funionists and avoided photo-
graphing the empty stretches
One of the organizers of the
rally asserted that it was suc-j
cessful considering that only:
two unions the light and pow-l
er union and the state petul-
eum workers-were supposed]
to attend. But he acknowledged|
that "Peron would never havej
addressed so smail a crowd."
The chief focus of political
Cordoba, the second largest)
rest in the country has been
in Falange demanded in:me these nificers who plotted and
date elections. The Falanges exccuted the unsuccessful coup city. Last February, a right-
declaration repudiated amme against his government June 5. wing police coup, apparently
diately by another member; A pamphlet was circulated backed by General Perin, re-
party of the Front, a smaller recently to all military units in moved the elected left-wing
group nained after the late La Paz, allegedly produced by Peronist governor from power..
president. Rene Parmentos. a group of young officers who During 
the upheaval, right-
wing trade unionists also
Even as the civilian ele- have taken inspiration from
Liral Mate
Last week, General Hanzer sis
supported their counterparts in Portugal wrested control of the local
celebrated the beginning of as President Banzer's distinctly who last April led a successful 
labor federation from leftists.
fourth year in the presidency tightwing and intensely, anti- coup against the 
authoritari
by dancing in the streets du Comineinist regime were fal- an regime 
there.
jing a massive celebration of ling out, there were reports of
the coup d'etat that depored dissension
Gen. Juan Jose Torres Aug. tory.
just 21. 1971.
1
within the
mili
demo-
union at Ika-Renault-s con-
cern with mixed Argentine and
beside French capital - after labor:
miners. workers leaders called a strike in sup-
purt of higher wages.
Since then, Cordoba has been
the scene of repeateri incidents
of political violence. A few
The pamphlet read, in part. days ago, the Labor Ministry da
Banzer's repression against cided to remove itgal recognis
his own institution [the Army]tion froir the lefust-controlled
Although President Bunzer has persuaded those
Even as he was celebrating, received the perfuntry superate officers to fight
making speeches about the port of the cominanders of the pesino
durability of the Nationalist armed services during last and students.
The clashes with the police
Popular Front the citie week's fete, it is evident to After the attempted coup of
June 3. many of the officers last night resulted when offi-
cers moved to dislodge labor
involved were either jailed or leaders from the union head-
sent to exile to Paraguay
and Argentina. According to
reports from Argentina, many
of these officers have been
returning to Bolivia clandes-'
military coalition through yources here. and from reports
which he has governed-in froin Bolivia, that the military
powerful Bolivian Miners is divided over the president,
Union declared itself virtually and his policies.
at war with the regime. And It is believed that the young
the Front apparently was dis er officers are being alien-
¡integrating.
ated increasingly by the presi-
This week one party in the dent. Spectically, they oppose
coalition, the Nationalist Eob, his refusal to grant amnesty to
THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Aug. 23, 1974
tinely.
Argentine Left
Clings to Hold
On University
By Joseph Novitski
BUENOS AIR:'S—The en-
trance and billways of the
University of Buenos Aires
by a Cultural Revolution
Wall newspapers full
1
quarters.
meetings" hang from the
high ceilings to the floors.
Corners and columns are
plastered with posters that
urge the defense of the rev.
olution or quote Gen. Juan
D. Peron, the Argentine po-
pulist leader who died in uf-
fice as president on July 1.
Outside, people walk past
without seeming to notice.
But inside, behind the poy
ters, the young people who
believed. Pérong's return to
power in Argentina Jast
year meant a giant step to
ward socialism are trying to
hold on to their last strong
hold the university.
Showly. but inexorably,
The government fer. behin-h
".
i
!
1
university aiministration
and student body. Peronist
professors say that Presi-
dent Maria Estela Peron,
the leader's widow and suc-
cersor. is following a line
laid down by Peron: To ease
the Merxist left eat of the
- Perorist movement. This
means winning dark control
of the University of Buenos
of aliaest 200.00 makes it
Aires whose student body
be far the largest in the
country--from the Peronist
lettwing
The university has been a
Scelarian political battle.
ground Se mine than a
year. Entrance policies, the
currinalen med abons
Hration à des
14-00000
or
The university, an urban
campus with old and semi-
modern buildings scattered
throughout the city, is
ganized alon;: European
lines. Eleven separate facul
ties, like separate colleges,
educate lawyers. doctors,
agronomists and liberal pro-
fessionals. Each gives two
years of basic college educa-
tion. Seven years ago, after
a violent university purge
by Argentina's military gov.
ernment, many parts of the
separate curricula
shaped to American models.
were
When the Peronists re
turned to power last May.
young leftist leaders loyal to
Peron were given the unl
versity as their share of the
new government. It changed
almost overnight.
Entrance
examinations
were abolished and all high
school graduates were of.
fered admission. One year
later, 85.000 new students
had entered and the enroll-
ment had doubled.
connec
"There are so many peo-
ple now, it seems that even
the rats from the basement
take exains," said a fourth
year philosophy student.
Professors with
tions to the military govern-
ment or fore in companies
were dismissed. Fourteen
were fired from the faculty
of economics alone. The uni
versity broke off assistance
and exchange agreements
with the Ford Foundation.
the University of California
and Rutgers, and opened
new programs with universi
ties in Peru, Algeria and
Mexico.
Courses of study were
changed. Traditional philos.
ophy courses were replaced,
In part, by studies of South
American politicians and
Peron's doctrine. In an in-
troductory architecture
•
course, a slide show alter-
nates view of a new Sta
ton telte with pictures
of the capital's shantyto'sh
and is followed by a discus
sion of American imperial.
ism in Argentina.
"Last year we had Sama.
elson, this year we had Len-
in" said a second year stu
dent of economics. "I's re-
ally interesting. We learned
how Samuelson's book (An
Introduction to Econoinies
by Paul A. Samuelson, an in-
troductory text widely used:
in the United States and
some foreign countries)
used a!! those graphs and
curves to prove that imperi
alism was necessary. Oh, not
directly, but subtly, you
know."
"We took out Samuelson
but we did not replace lim
with Lenin or Marx," Oscar
Sbarra Mitre, the 33-year-old
dean of the economics tae.
ulty, said during an inter-
view. He explained that
there is now no single text-
hook for the two-year intro-
ductory course, but rather a
reading list with a majority
of Latin American authors.
Marx well as John May
nard Keynes-shows up as
an individual theorist, but
not at the last word.
execu-
The shift from studies de-
signed to produce
tives for giant companies to
a more populist and na
tional outlook. Sharra Mitre
said. is better exemplified
by
the course calied
"History of the Union Move.
ment and Labor Relations,"
which replaced a course un
personnel management.
It was not educational pol-
icy, however, but pure poli.
ties that turned the univer.
sity luto a left-wing redoubt
defying the Peronist govern.
ment.
basic university
law, laying down the rules
for Buenos Aires and the
eight tier campuses of the
national university system,
passed express by a large
majority late last year with
the support from non-Peron-
ist parties. The law embod
ied the basic changes that
had begun at Buenos Aires.
Meanwhile, a majority
faction in the Peronist
youth movement backed by
two urban guerrilla groups.
that had fought the military!
government under Peron's
banner, had made the uni-
versity here their power
base. They proclaimed a
government program that
smacked heartily of Mark
Ism-Leninism and, in effect,,
challenged Peron for leader
ship of his movement.
"Luck, these people are
anything but Peronists,"
Gen. Perun said last Febru
ary, when he first began try:
ing to separate his move-
ment's youth wing from the
leaders born of the guerrilla
movement who call them-
selves Montoneros.
.
"Before thinking about
getting organized,we've got
to think how it can be a true
organization and not a sack
full of cats who will start
showing their claws pretty
soon." Peron told leaders of
the youth wing. He asked
them to reorganize them.
selves and expel the Marx.
ists. That's why this purifi-
cation is necessary," he said.
The purification Регол
wanted has been thwarted,
in part by government reluc
tance to drive the whole
youth wing into open revolt.
and in part by students
from the University of Bue-
nos Aires. Twice. since
April. they have marched
into the streets to protest
the appointment of new
deans and have forced the
government to back down. : |
A week ago they took over
10 of the 11 faculties in a
move to hold onto the tem.
porary university rector,
Raul Laguzzi. 32, a professor
of pharmacy who is loyal to
the Montoneros. And, inside
the faculties, it often seems
as if one is inside Peron's
"sack of cats."
At the medical faculty re-
cently. students who still
proclaim loyalty to Peron
started playing the Peronist
marching song on a loud-
speaker system. A faction
that stands further to the
left put on the Internatio:
nale, the Communist hymn,
and turned up the volume
on their own sound system.
The Peronists turned up.
their volume, and so it went,
to ear-shattering levels.
"It isn't bad once you get
above the second floor."
professor of neurobiology
said.
Slowly the university cri
Isis seems to be heading for
sume kind of resolution. A
week ago, President Maria
Estela Peron named a new
minister of education. He is
expected to name a rew
rector. Student street demon-
strations have been quickly
and sharply put down by po-
lice. The same demonstra:
tions were tolerated by her
late husband.
There have been some
hints that the government
will try to defuse the crisis
by unraveling Peronist poli.
tics and the quarrel with the
Montoneros from university
policies.
"We're waiting to see who
the new rector will be." said
a young professor. "That
should clear up something.
In the meantime, if you're
thinking of building a house
in Argentina, get an old ar
chitect."
14-00000
CChesk
Western Hemisphere
ENCOUNTER, London
January 1974
U
Allende
& the Myth Makers
David Holden
Political Realism & Revolutionary Romance
INFIZLING AS IT MAY SEEM to say so when the
bloodshed of the Chilean coup d'état is
still so keenly remembered and the generals who
made it are riding" unpleasantly high, the fact
remains that Salvador Allende died a lucky
man. In life he was a failure. Both his policies
and his country were shattered long before the
end. But in death he achieved success beyond his
dreams. Instandy canonised as the Western
world's newest left-wing martyr, he became
overnight the most potent political cult-figure
since his old friend, Che Guevara.
To some extent, of course, the congregation
had already been prepared for this posthumous
elevation. In the three years of Allende's admini-
stration the "Chilean experiment" and the
"Chilean road to socialism" had become fav.
ourite topics of discussion among left-wing
groups in Europe, where Chile's supposed
resemblance to Italy or France had encouraged
the belief that Europe might, for once, foliow in
Latin America's footsteps instead of the other
way about. Many aspiring revolutionaries from
Europe and the United States had actually
joined their Latin American counterparts in
Chile in much the same spirit as their. dropped-
out contemporaries had hitch-hiked to Nepal
hoping for a glimpse of Paradise in action. By
the time of the September coup the military junta
claimed there were as many as 15,000 foreigners
of all kinds in Chile, actively supporting-some-
times with violence-the "socialist revolution."
DAVID HOLDEN has travelled in Chile on several
recent assignments as Chief Foreign Corres
pondent for the "Sunday Times." Among kis
segular contributions to ENCOUNTER are "South
African Notebook" (August 1970). "Day Trip
to Zanzibar" (September 1972) and "Ethiopia
Forty Years On" (February 1973).
These specially interested groups or indivi
duals obviously provided a ready network for
international propaganda in the aftermath of
Allende's death. But the shocked and, at times,
almost bysterical reaction to the coup went far
beyond such committed parties to embrace
many of the West's ordinary liberals and social
democrats. For them, as much as for the self-
styled revolutionaries, it seemed, a bright light
of world-wide hope had been extinguished in
Santiago; and from Washington to Rome, via
Paris, Bonn and London, anguished cries of
Foul" rent the air.
Revolt Against the Ballot Box" for which the
Chilean armed forces could offer no excuse
(The Guardian, 12'9/73); as a "Disaster in
Chile" that would "set back the cause of social-
iamn and democracy everywhere" (New States
man, 14/9;73); and as "The Death of a Hope"
comparable, even, to the Russian invasion of
Czechoslovakia that ended Alexander Dubock's
régime in 1968 (The Observer, 16/9/73).
Within 24 hours of the first, bare news of the
coup the General-Secretary of the British Labour
Party, Mr Ron Hayward, was writing officially
to one of Allende's former colleagues to say that
it was difficult to express the sense of horror and
anger felt by the British Labour movement "as
the aspirations of the working people of Chile-
shared by so many others around the world-
are destroyed at the hands of a few arrogant and
ignorant officers acting at the behest of those
who believe their right to rule is unchallengeable".
(The Times, 13/9/73). Mr Lea Murray, General-
Secretary of the Trades Union Council, expressed
his shock and abhorrence with equal speed and
vigour. And Mrs Judith Hart, speaking as a
member of the Labour Party's National Execus-
tive, unleashed a torrent of assertions so passionate
as to suggest that her mind had come close to
· being overthrown with Allende's government.
They ranged from the declaration that "the
democratic will of the people of Chile" had been
defeated by capitalist "collusion" (The Guardian,
17/9/73) to "for Socialists of this generation
Chile is our Spain" and "This is the most vicious
fascism we have seen in generations" (The
Guardian, 19/9/73).
When the Labour Party Conference met at
Blackpool three weeks later these instant re-
actions had hardened into established orthodoxy.
The former Chilean Ambassador in London was
given a standing ovation when he became the
first non-delegate to address a Party Conference
since two Spanish Republicans were allowed to
do so in the 1930s. Resolutions were then carried
utterly condemning the military coup and the
precipitate action of the British Government in
recognising the military junta; demanding the
recall of the British Ambassador from Santiago
and the withholding from the military régime of
all aid, loans, and credits; and calling on the
Labour Movement to campaign for the restora
tion of democracy in Chile and to offer financial
and other assistance to the Popular Unity
(Allende's) movement (The Times, 5/10/73). My
Italica
THE OUTCRY DN BRITAIN was typical-and
instantaneom
S AN ILLUSTRATION of the
14-00000
from
the reasons for this fierce reaction would repay
study. Probably they included a happy chance of
timing. Several of the rest fashionable matters
of Western political protest had passed into
history or been shadowed by disillusionmeat la
the year or two before Allende's down
Viet Nam and Greece to Black Power and the
Student Movement. Allende's dramatic end
supplied a new cause just when it was wanted.
Familiar double standards were certainly in-
- volved. Nobody at the Labour Party Conference,
for example, thought it necessary to ask why
such a royal welcome should be offered to the
representative of a government which had in-
cluded one of the very few Communist partics
outside Eastern Europe to approve the Russian
invasion of Czechoslovakia. A Paviovian res
ponse to the very idea of "revolution" was also
clearly in evidence-and nude all the more eager,
It seemed, by the fact that this particular revolu
tion had been taking place at such a safe distance.
in such sublimely foreign parts. There was
perhaps, a characteristic love of worldly failure,
too for it was dificult to read some of the more
extravagant expressions of grief at Allende's
death without sensing a touch of gratification at
the idea that Good hind once more succumbed to
Evil and so delivered another martyr unto
Heaven before he could be corrupted by the
practical demands of life on Earth. But most of
all, perhaps, the response seemed to stem from..
Ignorance and wishful thinking-always the two
most powerful sources of political romanticism-
which left the facts of life in Allende's Chile
either unknown or ignored and the Geld wide
open, therefore, to the creation of instant myth.
Hence the composite picture, now accepted
throughout a wide spectrum of Western liberal
and left-wing opinion, of Allende as a genuine
social democrat of impeccable constitutional
propriety who met his end at the hands of a
fascist conspiracy on behalf of a minority "ruling
class" aided and abetted by the United States
of America.
To replace this romantic vision with something
approaching reality may already be impossible,
for myths undoubtedly possess a life of their own
immune to rational challenge. To attempt to do
so also may entail some risk of abuse, for it
I seems to be a common assumption nowadays
that anyone who seeks a rational explanation of
a military coup d'état (unless it happens to
represent a left-wing interest) is necessarily a
fascist beast.
I SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN, therefore, that I am
concerned here with Allende's Chile and not with
what has taken its place. I hold no brief for
military juntas, nor for the summary executions,
mass imprisonments, censorship or whatever that
the Chilean junta may have inspired or tolerated
during its early months of power. Indeed, because
I happen to know and like Chile as a country and
count a number of Chileans among my friends I
feel some personal sadness at the country's
present plight. But I feel no surprise nor, I am
afraid, much moral shock. Military men will be
military men, the world over; and in any case
Chile was left in such a mess by Allends that
some vindictiveness, alas, was only to be expected
when ho fell
Nor am I concerned with Chilean might-have-
beens. I accept that the country needed prouin
social reform and I believe that it 30
Doald
28
; have been achieved without violence by a
democratic govemment that was ready to work
pragmatically within the constitution and with a
proper respect for what the economic and
political fabric of Chile would stand.
But that is not the point any more. What I am
concerned about is how the country came to its
present pass. And without withing to speak ill of
the dead, it seems to me necessary to say outright
for the sake of the living that the Chilean coup
was largely Allende's own fault and that the myths
with which it has been surrounded on the Left aro
not merely a falsification of Chilean history but
a potential danger to the future of liberal and
social democratic politics in the Western world
as well. Indeed, what is most disturbing to me
about the fashionable Western reactions to events
in Chile is their revelation of the degree to which
revolutionary romanticism has combined with
left-wing cynicism in recent years to corrupt our
• own politics. It is certainly "to accident" that,
for example, the British Labour Party which to
uncritically adopts Allende's cause is also the
party which has permitted its self-avowed
Marxists and utopian socialists to gain factional
positions of unprecedented power.
I will leave others to pursue that theme,
however. All I want to do is to try to set some of.
the Chilean record straight-or at any rate,
straighter-by looking in some detail at three of
the main myths that now surround the end of
Allende and his famous experiment..
1. The American
Intervention Myth
THIS FOUND its most virulent expression in
T
the equation of Allende's downfall with that
of Dubcek. Yet in the absence of any American
armed assault to compare with the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia-let alone the fact that
whereas Dubcek's Parliament supported him
against the Russians, a majority of Allende's
Congress invited him to resign-there were only:
stereotype suppositions to sustain it
In general, the American intervention myth
seemed to derive from that. characteristic Latin
American and left-wing scapegoat complex which
insists that the Yunquis are responsible for every-
thing (except, of course, anything good). Gar-
nished with historical fact (Guatemala, the Bay of
Pigs, etc.) this is frequently transmuted in Latin
American affairs into a plausible anti-American
smear; and the state of Washington politics in
1973 was, of course, guaranteed to give such a
_smear extra credence this time. The New States
man offered a fine example. "The likelihood is
that the trail will lead back to the Pentagon", it
assured its readers, "if a proper investigation can
ever be mounted. But in default of this it does
seem possible to say that Nixonism and its allies
were already too heavily implicated in the
* Addicts of the ITT conspiracy theory might like
to work out, incidentally, why ITT in Chile was never !
Laken over by Aliende, even after the notorious
memorandum became public property. Was it
perhaps, because its operations there were mustly
losing money and Allende did not want to share its
financial embarrassmeats? Or was it that he knew the
company had given bun an exactive political stick to
beat his opponents with and be did not want to throw
kaway by kicking the company out? Either way.
ITT appareat immunity from reprisal did not
suggest that to took a chaticage very seriously.
i
!
:
"..
subversion of Allende for them to be exonerated :
now” (14,9,73). The change is almost ectoplas
mically vague yet simultaneously all-embracing
But what does it actually rest oa?
First, presumably, the celebrated memorandum
of ITT which suggested ways of preventing
Allende from assuming the Presidency in 1970
and of toppling his régime if he did so. There is,
of course, no doubt of this memorandum's
authenticity, nor of its appalling folly; and with
such organisations admittedly pushing their
conspiratorial notions at the heart of American
politics it is not surprising that suspicions of
Yanquí skulduggery were aroused. But there is a
major snag for anyone who sees the memorandum
as evidence of actual dirty work: simply, that all.
Inquiries so far indicate that its recommendations
were never adopted. They were studied by the
CIA, where one department produced a con-
tingency plan based upon them: But neither the
memorandum nor the plan seems to have received.
assent at any higher level; and given the kind of
public exposure to which the workings of the
White House, the CIA and most other things in
Washington have been treated during the Water-
gate crisis (including the allegations of Nixon's
personal involvement with ITT), I am hard-
pressed to believe that if such assent had been
given it could have been kept quict until now.'
Secondly, in support of the American Inter
vention theory, it is pointed out that the U.S.
maintained its contacts with the Chilean armed.
forces and continued to supply them with arms
when other American aid to Chule was sus
pended. Therefore, so the implication goes, the t
Pentagon was deliberately keeping open the
option of inspiring a military coup against an
unwelcome government. But this is obviously a
two-edged argument. For one thing, an army
that is still getting its toys to play with is usually
rather more than less likely to endure the follies
of its ruling politicians gladly. And for another,
what would have been said if the Americans had
actually suspended arms shipments to forces
whose commanders were serving in Allende's
cabinet? The outery about "Yanqui imperialism"
and “Pentagon politics" may easily be imagined.
'
Thirdly, the strangulation of foreign aid and
credit is laid at Washington's door as a major
weapon in a cold war against Allende from the
start. At first glance this has more substance to it.
The U.S. certainly suspended further commercial
credits of its own to Chile after Aliende had
nationalised, the American-owned copper mines
on terms amounting to confiscation. As the major
power in the World Bank and the IMF the U.S.
also argued there against further aid for Chile;
and to the extent that it was successful it must have
added to Allende's financial difficulties. But it
was not able to prevent other. Western countries
(e.g. Holland and Sweden) from continuing to
offer credit; it never persuaded Britain to close
down its small aid programme; it did not exclude
the re-scheduling of most of Chile's foreign debt
repayments in 1972, and it had not prevented the
discussion (incomplete at the time of the coup)
of a similar re-scheduling for 1973. In short, the
U.S. influence may have limited Western aid and
credit but it was far from being able to condemn
Allende's Chile to economic purdah. In any case,
Chile was not one of the under-developed world's
hard cases, totally dependent on external aid and
credits for its survival. The wealth of its coper
mines alone ensured that in Dormal times it was
not more than marginally "aid-worthy", and
with sensible economic management it ought to
have en able to withstand a good deal of
external pressure. Unfortunately, nobody with
even a nodding acquaintance with economics
could have classified the management of the
Allende government as anything but disastrous
To a great extent it placed itself beyond the pale
for any but the most trusting-or dedicated--of
creditors. But even if that had not been so, and if
the blame for Chile's economic difficulties could
have been laid fairly and squarely at Washington's
door, Allende would surely have had small cause i
for complaint. It was, after all, his administration :
which announced its immediate determination to
“expropriate imperialist capital... realise a policy
of self-financing... and review, denunce and i
repudiate, as the case may be, treaties or agrees >.
ments limiting our sovereignty, specifically the
reciprocal assistance treaties, the mutual aid
pacts, and others, between Chile and the United i
States" (The People's Unity-Basic PrograTUTIS
of Government, 1970).
It was also his administration which promised i
to "repudiate the agreements between us and the
International Monetary Fund" (The People's
Government-First 40 Steps, 1970). These dold
Intentions were never fully realised, it is true;
but they were expressed as official policy before
the United States or any other "imperialist"
power had actually done anything to embarrass
Allende's government. In other words; it was
Allende who decided to pick the quarrel. It seems
nalve, to say the least, to complain that his
chosen opponents took defensive measures. What
else were they expected to do?
action, nevertheless, might be better em
ployed in asking why Allende got so little support
from most of the governments which professed to
be his friends. Except for Cuba, which offered en
thusiastic (but not always practical) advice to
Allende, as well as supplying arms and training
for his militant Left, the world's established Marx-
ist governments were consistently cool to the
"Chilean experiment." The farthest the Soviet
Union would go to show its approval was to
open a 12-year credit in roubles for Chilean
imports of Russian industrial goods and to agree
to take a limited amount of Chilean copper for
a year or two in repayment. But the hard currency
loans that Chile really needed to plug the gaps
that quickly opened betweer, Allende's economic
promises and performance were never forth-
coming from any Marxist source. Nor was that
surprising. In the nature of things, Maxxist
countries rarely have hard currency to spare and
they were unlikely to devote what little they might
have to bailing out a régime which seemed intrat
upon over-reaching itself in every direction.
Conceivably, Allende would have done better
for himself and his country if he had simply
abandoned the "free" world market altogether
and taken Chile at once into the controlled trade
bloc of the Communist world in the hope of
getting total Soviet support. But that would hav
meant imposing a completely centralised nocy.
and strict political control inside Chills-in short,
'abandoning the romantic pretence of "500-
stitutional revolution" for the more customly
29
revolution by decree. To his credit, perhaps,
Alende was now Ming (or unable to do that;
00000-
14-00000
but even if he had, it might not have worked.
To support Castro's Cuba is believed to have
cost Moscow the equivalent of about $1 million.
A day for many years. To support a similar régio
in Chile would probably have cost even more.
There was never the slightest sign that Mr.
Brezhnev, or anyone else in the Kremlin, 
was
ready to accept such a burden.
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the Idca
of an American conspiracy to overthrow Allende
is both unproven and unnecessary to explain 
his
downfall. I am not saying, of course, that
Washington was not mlieved to see him go;
although I think some American officials would
have preferred to see him stumble on for sometime
longer in the hope that growing disillusionment
would infect even his stoutest supporters and
accordingly diminish, the chances of his being
mado a martyr when nemesis finally overtook
him. But in general the American attitude scems.
to have been a predictably cautious one:
Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive
Officiously to keep alive…………
A realistic Chilean government embarked on its'
"road to socialism" would surely have bargained
for that much, and (on a truly Marxist analysis:
such as Alende professed) it should have expected:
much more-that America would move in for the
kill as soon as possible. Yet while adopting a
deliberately provocative stance, Allende took no
steps to protect himself against possible American
reprisals, declined to compromise for the sake
of other Western help, and failed to provide
grounds even for his supposed Marxist friends
to help him.
It was magnificent, perhaps, but it was not
politics. At the very least, Allende must to
convicted here of a lack of realism that would
probably have been fatal to any statesman any-
where.
T
2. The Ruling Class
Conspiracy Myth
THE PICTURE of Allende being overthrown
by what has been variously described as a
"revolt of the privileged," a series of "bosses'
strikes" or a "conspiracy of the traditional ruling
class" contains so many misconceptions that it is
hard to know where to begin to sort them out
One idea, however, seerns basic to them all:
that Allende and his Popular Unity coalition
were somehow the uniquely legitimate repro-
sentatives of "the People's Will" That such an
odd belief should have gained any currency
whatever outside purely propagandist circles is a
mark of the confusion that surrounds the
Chilean experience in the minds of many non-
Chileans. To judge from published comments,
such as those referring to the "defeat of the
democratic will", some of Allende's sympathisers
abroad seem even to believe that he not merely
enjoyed a massive popular majority of the vote
but was also the first President of his country to
do so.
⚫ Yet the facts are beyond dispute. Chile was
and had beca for many years a functioning
democracy with a constitution which vested
executive power in the President and legislative
power in Congress. Both in theory and in practice,
Do doubt, there were serious weaknesses
-
as
reveal: d, for instance, in the inability of previous
1
:
government to press through social reforms i
swiftly so many Chilcars would have wished.
But by common convent the system was the best
and most stable in Latin America and it had
enabled Allende himself to contest the Presidency
unsupefully three times before he finally won
it at his fath attempt in 1970. There was no
doubt of the legitimacy of that victory. But, i
unfortunately for those who saw it as a unique ;
expression of "the people's will", it was gained 1.
only through a narrow plurality in which Allendo
obtained just over 36% of the poll. His nearest !
rival, only a couple of percentage points behind,
was the candidate of the conservative National
Party, whose members in Congress opposed
Allende from the start. Another 28% went to the
third candidate, a radical reformist from the
Christian Democrat party, many of whose
memben in Congress at first gave Allenda the
benefit of the Coubt, hoping he would modify
hit avowed Marxin in practice to a kind of
reformism compatible with their own ideas and
H
the existing constitution.
In the mid-term Congressional élections of
March 1973, the Popular Unity coalition raised
its share of the vote to 44% (although this time
the "legitimacy" was suspect owing to opposition
allegations of substantial cloctoral fraud). But
the opposition parties retained a large majority:
In Congress where, by that time, most of tho
Christian Democrats had joined the Nationalists
in outright antagoniun to the President. On these
facts it seems plain that, so far froin representing
"the People's Will", Allende never actually ro
presented more than a substantial minority
interest. Only if "the People" are identified as
being those who voted for Allende, while the rest
-the majority-are relegated to the status of
"non-people" can any other interpretation be
sustained. But that, of course, is just what
is implied by the myth of the "ruling class
conspiracy."
IP THERE WAS a "ruling class" in Chile it was that
of the politicians and the surrounding establish
ment drawn roo:dy from the narrow upper end of
Chile's prosperous middle class. Allende himself
and many of his ministers and leading supporters
were as much part of that group as, were their
political opponents. But, ironically, it was a group
that often suffered less than others from Allende's
socialism because its members on both sides
generally possessed enough cash or property to
exploit the black market at home or slip into
Breeable exile if things got too rough-in any
case, to survive (like Allende himself until his
death) in very reasonable comfort. But the people
who did most to overthrow Allende were rarely
of this group at all. With the possible exception
of some naval officers, the armed forces were
very much apart from the establislunent of any
political colour; and even after Allende brought
the service commanders into his government they
remained aloof from, and remarkably little
known by, those relatively small circles in Santiago
which were accustomed to set the country's.
political tone.
Indeed, as events since the coup d'état have
shown, Chile's military man-like their counter:
parts elsewhere--were probably as contemptuous
of the politicians (and as ignorant of politics) as i
the politicians were of them. They had stayed
outside politics for nearly 40 years, and if Allenda
-:
:

'
himself had not dragged Chem into the whirlpool
they might have been content to remain that way.
But their position was made intolerable by the
President's own decisions. On the one hand Uvy
were encouraged to turn a blind eye to the steady
growth of illegal, para-military forces under the
command of the President's friends or others who
were more extreme in their revolutionary com
mitment. On the other hand they were required
to serve in his cabinet to maintain "law and
order" and reassure the country of the President's
constitutional propriety. On top of that they
were threatened by attempts from within the
President's own circle to subvert their authority
within their own forces, as in the naval coo
spiracy uncovered in July 1973, and the public
call for a naval insurrection by Allende's friend |
and fellow leader of the Socialist Party, Senator
· Carlos Altamirano, made only three days before
the coup.
A surer way can hardly be imagined of pro-
voking mutiny among responsible others, and
! It is only surprising in retrospect, that it did not
1 happen sooner-as in most Latin American
countries it surely would have done. To ascribe
the mutiny thereafter to the machinations of
• "the ruling clas" is to understand nothing.
• either of military men in general or of Chile's mili
1 tary in particular.
SIMILARLY, THE 90-CALLED “Bosses" strikes" whl:b
proceded the military coup were, in fact, nothing.
of the kind. The lorry men who paralysed half,
or more, of Chile's transport by their month-long
strike in September-October 1972, and their even
longer strike in July-September 1973, were mostly
owner-drivers who would have fitted fairly readily
into the Teamsters' Union in the United States.
3. They displayed the fierce economic and social pro-
tectionism typical of what in Europe or North
America would be called the lower middle class,
and they saw themselves threatened by galloping
inflation and by what they believed to be the
Government's intention to destroy their way of
life through state control or ownership of their
services. Along with the small shopkeepers who
supported them-not forgetting the queue-weary
housewives whose famous "Saucepan March" in
Santiago was the most dramatic early sign of
revolt-they might be classed as the Poujadistes
of Chile. But by no stretch of the imagination
could they be described as representatives of a
"boss" or "ruling" class, or even as being
especially "privileged" in a social or economic
sense. Moreover, they owed little, if any, allegiance
to the traditional political groupings of Chilean
politics, although they obviously welcomed any
support they could get from them. On the
contrary, they tended to cut across the traditional
spectrum and look to new leaders, whether of
right or left. Thus, their principal spokesman,
Senor Leon Vilarin, was actually a member of
Allende's Socialist Party while others of the
leadership came from the Nationalist Party ranks
'Although even that was not unthinkable towards
the end, such was the chaos the economy had fallen
into. The last time I left Chile, a week or so before the
coup, I drove over the Andes to Argentina and at the
Chilean customs post at the summit of the pass I
found officials taking a large Amencan car to pieces
and laying upon the snow-covered ground around it
one ton of copper ingots that had been hidden in
various nooks and crannies of the chassis. It would
have been worth around U.S. $200 in cash in
Argentina a fortune, by then, in Chilean terms, of
about four mille escudos on the black market.
or frova no party at all.
The members of the various professional
associations, like doctors, dentists, lawyers and
airline pilots, which joined the second transport
strike, were likewise not "bosses" although they
_ were certainly, in Chilean terms, rather more
"privileged" Their protest was probably more
ideological than that of the lorry-men and the
shopkeepers-it was usually their wives, for
example, who objected most forcibly to the
·Government's politically-inspired changes in the
school curriculum-but it was also provoked by
sheer exasperation and fear at the growing
threat to their professional status posed by the
Government's combination of administrative
inefficiency and dubious social priorities. For
example, Chile's economic collapse and inflation
not only threatened many doctors financially
but seriously frustrated their work. Some early
reports from Santiago after the roup made the
point that hospitals were appealing urgently
for bandages and drugs to treat the wounded,
as if that indicated that the number of casualties
must be overwhelmingly high. But bandages,
drugs, and other medical supplies had been only
sporadically obtainable in Chile for many months
beforehand. The daily round of the pharmacies
in search of the simplest medicines had become a
regular feature of Santiago life; and foreign
embassies had been driven to stock-pile their own
supplies, imported through the diplomatic bag.
for the treatment of the most normal ailments
among their staffs. It was partly in the hope of
ending that situation that many otherwise
conscientious doctors finally joined the movement
to get Allende out.、
TOR SHOULD IT BE FORGOTTEN that some of the
NOR
most damaging strikes of all were those of
Chile's most influential blue-collar workers-the
copper-miners. The last lorry-men's strike was
immediately preceded by a two months' strike for
higher wages by miners at El Teniente, the coun-
try's biggest mine. Because copper accounts for
three-quarters of Chile's foreign earnings, that
strike probably cost the country far more in real
terms than the transport strike, whose costs to a
great extenf could be absorbed internally. Indeed,
as one West European diplomat remarked to me
in Santiago, the money lost in those two months
at El. Teniente would have more than repaid
Chile's entire debt to his government-a debt
which Allende at that moment was trying to ro-
schedule for the second consecutive year.
It is true that the copper-miners were the élite
of Chile's blue-collar class and, no doubt,
wanted to keep it that way. To that extent,
perhaps, they may be deemed "privileged"—
like, say, coal miners or motor car workers in
Britain; although I doubt if that is what members
of the British Labour Party, or the New Statesman,
can have had in mind in embracing the "privi
leged" thesis. But a more important reason for the
miners' restiveness, I believe, is that although
they were the most vital of all Chile's manual
workers they suffered far more than most of
- their erstwhile comrades from the country's
shattering economic decline under Allende. Up- i
like farm and factory workers, they could not
supplement their official wages by selling the
fruits of their labour on the black market. The
farm worker who could take home a sark
00000-
14-00000
'
potatoes, a few chickens, or even a side of bed,
could make a good living on the black market;
even if his official wages remained stationary
while inflation roared plead. The factory worker
who was entitled to buy a proportion of hi
factory's output at official fixed, prices could
(and did) teil that at six or ten times what lead
paid as soon as he lift the factory gate. But
miners could hardly find ready buyers for a stolen
11
truck-load of copper ore.*
Thus the copper-miners were thrust, in effect,
into the same position as the lorry-men, the shop-
keepers, and virtually all of Chile's salaried
professional men and women: they were left.
more or less defenceless against the most vicious
inflation the country had ever experienced.
SOME APOLOGISTS for Allende have maintaised
that the degree of inflation was exaggerated or,
at any rate, little worse than was customary in.
Chile and elsewhere in Latin America. The truth
is that it was far beyond anything normally
endured in that continent. As little as nine
months after Allende came to power, when I
first visited Chile, the escudo had already failen
from 20 to 40 against the U.S. dollar on the free,
or black, market. Eighteen months later, on my
second visit, the Government's own figuei put
the rate of inflation at 130% in a year, the money
ue was going up by 10% a month and the
escudo had fallen to about 350 to the black U.S.
dollar. By August 1973, the official inflation rate
was 323% and rising fast, and the excudo was
worth only 2,000 to the dollar-an effective
devaluation in less than three years of 10,000%!
Nor is it enough to attribute these catastrophic
rates to such adventitious or inalicious factors
as and again I refer to published arguments
falling world copper prices, the normal difficulties
of maintaining industrial and farm output in a
time of radical political change, or deliberate
American intervention.
On the last of these three I have already said
enough, I hope, to show that it was far from
decisive and that it was,, anyway, largely self-
invited. As to falling copper prices, the fact is
that after a fall in the first year of Allende's
Government, prices recovered until by the time
of his overthrow they were 80% above the level
at the time of his election. Had they not risen
so steeply he would almost certainly have falleg
sooner and probably would not have secured his
selative, short-lived success in the mid-term
elections of March 1973. The difficulties of main-
taining output in a time of change, however, were
real-unfortunately, far more so than Allende
ever seemed to realise.
To take just two examples: copper and milk.
Expropriation of the copper mines from their
American owners would, no doubt, have led in
itself to the withdrawal of American technicians
as well as of American management with some
consequent risk of losing production temporarily,.
at least. But this might have been overcome by
the promotion of trained Chilean managers and
technicians, of whom there was no shortage.
Alas, for Chile's national income, Allende not
merely nationalised but deliberately politicised
the mines as well. Jobs for the party boys were
handed out in thousands while trained Chileans
emigrated so that, after three years of Popular
Unity Government, mining manpower and costs
had risen by more than a third while mining
:
32
caignit was down by about the event
71 take ma the second example because it
ww specifically mentioned in Popular Unity
coction or with muaranized "every
Chilean childhauspart of milk daly.” Ilze
in the novel's propiate of
reform, intended to break the power of Chile's)
remaining landlords and open the way to c
operative of state farming, might have b
expected to result in some shortfall in Gairy pros
Cation for a year or two while the toothing
problems were word out. In fact, however, milk
production dropped as if someone had simply
punched a hole in the bottom of every churn in
the land. At are large cooperative Cairy in ¦
Termo, one of the main milk-producing areas of 1
Chile, the average daily winter intake of milk
(was about 50) allops in 1970. By 1973 it ·
was down to 7,00), Nor was this surprising.
Apart from the fact that legal land reform had
Loom accompanied by widespread and un-.
checked illegal land seizures so that too many
farms were in the hands of people utterly without
experience, the prices established for milk-es
for most other farm products-were simply
economic nonte. Presumably in the top of
getting half-a-quart of milk for every child on the
cheap, the government decreed that a gallon of
milk would fetch less than half the price of one
7. Inevitably, nobody was interested in pro-
during milk and cows were slaughtered wholesale
for beef-legally or illegally-or driven tre LA
mountains to Argentina while Allende was
forced to scour the world for dried milk imports
that, thanks to his policy in the copper mines,
be no longer had foreign currency to pay for.
SUCH POLYS were repeated everywhere as the
Tomantic gestures of self-styled revolution were
preferred to facing the facts of life. While overall
production in both agriculture and industry fell
disastrously, Allende simultaneously attempted to
redistribute the national wealth by giving Chile's
poorer classes more money to spend. They were
his constituency and they were properly grateful,
for many of thern certainly had never had much
before. But you can't redistribute what you have
already thrown away; and as output vanished,
so domestic quetes grew longer, foreign debts
piled up, and the budget deficit expanded like a
hydrogen balloon. A year before the final collapse
I asked one of Allende's chief economic advisers
what they were going to do to control a situation:
that was already locking critical. He replied,
with commendable candour, that he really didn't
know. "I know," he said, "what we ought to co-
we should impose an austerity régime tomasToW,
freeze wages, and ration essential supplies. But
how can we? We would destroy our own political
base..."
Precisely. In the end, rather than do that they
plunged on down the primrose path of promises
and illusions and practically destroyed the
country. The "ruling class conspiracy" was
the gloss that they and their supporters put upon
the reality of their own miscalculations.
3. The Myth of the
Constitutional Revolutionary
ERE WE COME to the crux of Abende's
H policies and character about which, finally,
די
14-00000
"all the other arguments revolve. Was he a
genuine constitutionalist? Was he a true revolu
tionary? Was he--could he ever have been--both?
Allende himself, of course, admitted no
doubta Repeatedly, he insisted that he was a
revolutionary and a Marxist, and that he intended
to establish at least the preconditions for what
he told Régis Debray would be "total, scientific
Marxist socialism." Equally repeatedly, he pro-
claimed his faith that he could achieve this end
by constitutional nieans, through the ballot box
and all it implied. That was, after all, to te the
distinctive "Chilean road to socialism" of which
so muy poople outside Chile cherished such
high hopes.
But no hindsight is required to see that both
theory and practice were riddled with contra-
dictions. Revolutions are born of, or generate,
sectional conflict-a fact of political life that
Allende acknowledged every tune he spoke of
"Overthrowing" what he called the "bourgeois"
state. But a democratic constitution rests upon
consensus-a basic acceptance of the fact that
the State represents more than a merely sectional
interest. The second permits retorn, but the fust
denies it; and there is no way of reconciling the
two.
All Allende's practical difficulties followed
from this simple distinction. Tiken seriously, his
constitutionalism meant that his programane
could only succeed if a majority would actually
vote for it. But, elected as he was with only just
over a third of the popular vote and with a large
majority of Congress against hin, Allende had
neither a democratic nor an administratively
effective mandate for his revolution. Indeed, in a
parliamentary rather than a presidential demo-
cracy, he would probably never have been able to
begin.
If he was to succeed within his six-year term of
office even in opening the door to revolution, let
alone establishing it as accomplished fact, he
had to transform his ininority into a majority.
But how to do it? For, if words nieant anything.
Allende's had to mean that he intended to replace
the existing, reformable constitution of Chile
with another that would be, of its Marxist
nature, irreversible. In other words, a system that
was admittedly democratic was to be used to
build another that would be effectively dictatorial.
This was asking the majority to hang itself from
its own gallows; and, not surprisingly, it declined
ALLENDE'S ATTEMPTS to overcome this basic
illogicality in his position were precisely what
ensured his ultimate downfall. Refusing to
abandon either his revolutionary rhetoric or his
professed constitutionalism he was forced to rely
more and more upon political illusionism. His
sleight-of-hand was often remarkable, as he
sought to outwit the opposition majority in.
Congress by exploiting the letter of the constitu
tion, using every legal loophole to force upon them
measures they did not want. But in the process,
inevitably, he destroyed the constitution's spirit,
so that his opponents became as ruthless as he
Indeed, as I discovered for myself on a visit to
southern Chile nine months after Allende's efections,
local police forces there were under specific instruc
tions not to attempt to restore the farms to their legal
owners. Soe also Robert Moss's report in ENCOUNTER
"Aliende's Chile", August 1973, and Alistair lorne's
"Commandante Pepe", July 1978.
33
i
was. At the start he won considerable opposition
support in Congress for needed change like the
nationalisation of the copper mines, Land reform, :
and the state's takeover of banks and major
Industrie-evidence that the democratic con-
sentun could and would work within the existing
constitution. But, at the end, not a single member ·
of the opposition majority would cast a vote in:
hia support. They voted unanimously to condemn.
his "habitual illegalities" and were even joined
by the Supreme Court in accusing him of dis
regarding the rule of law. He hand cut away the
middle ground of Chilean politics, wrecked the
democratie consensur, and begotten the reality
of counter-revolution through his own addiction ·
to revolutionary slogans.
Equally inevitable was the economic break..
down, which came from Allende's attempts to
enlarge hus popular base outside the political
institutions. Here his plan was two-fold: to buy
political support autong "the People" through
massive wage increases and other beats and at
Ue same tune to squeeze the middle class into.
submission, or even flight from the country,
through wholesale nationalisation of their Inter-
ests and the appointment of his own men to all
significant civil-service jobs. The two simply
cancelled each other out; for while the first part
of the plan raised vast new expectations and
demands, the second diminished the country's
capacity to meet them. The whirling spiral of
inflation followed as a necessary result of
Allende's political confusions.
THE BASIC CONTRADICTIONS were compounded
by the fragmented nature of Allende's support.
His Popular Unity coalition was far from united.
It majority element was Allende's own Socialist
Party-a body that bore little resemblance
beyond its name to most of the democratic
socialist parties of Europe which so enthusias
tically espoused its cause. It was, in fact, &
revolutionary Marxist party that began as a
splinter of the more bureaucratic and Stalinist
Chilean Communist party in the 1930s, and in
recent years had acquired a fiery "New Left"
wing as well. Several of its leaders, like Senator
Altamirano, and many of its rank and file, con-
stantly urged Allende to "speed up the revolution"
without much regard for constitutional niceties.
The smallest element of the coalition was the
Christian radicals of various persuasions, some
of whom hoped to offer a bridge to the centre
of Chilean politics by cooperating with the left
wing of the Christian Democrats, but none of
whan ever attained positions of real influence.
The coalition's sheet anchor was the Communist
Party which, as business and administration
slipped into chaos, became increasingly im
portant as a source of discipline and strategic.
thinking.
I
WOULD HAVE BEEN hard enough to drive
this troika anyway without either overstepping
the constitutional limits of government or anta-
gonising one or other of its elements and thereby
jeopardising the only "democratic" base the
revolution had. But Allende had also to contend
with the still more militant left outside the coali-
tion, led by the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR), which insisted on revolution now,
and by violence if necessary-as, in MIR's view,
it was
Here Allende's professed constitutionalism was
14-00000
revealed as, at best equivocal. His officially
rejected MIt's violence, yet he never permitted
the Arury to root out their para-inilitary groups.
When they stigmatised his land-reform pro-
gramme as "inadequate" and seized hundreds of
farts at gun-point he rebuked them in occasional
spooches but did nothing to reverse their actions.'
When they hijacked lorry-loads of valuable
I manufactures, to raise funds by selling them on i
the black market, he rarely tried to redress the i
crime. The left said this was because the MIR
_truly represented "the People" against whom
1: Allende dared not act. But the truth, I fear, was
more squalid for one thing, the MIR had close
friends in the Socialist Party and in Allende's
own entourage whom the President did not want
to offend. For another, as long as their activities
did not actually split the Popular Unity coalition,
it was often convenient to see them pushing along
the revolution by unconstitutional means while
Allende denounced them in his role as a
constitutionalist.
It was not as if Allende was unable to deal
with the MIR when he had to. For example,
when a Mirksta force blockaded the Philips
television factory in Santiago in 1973 after an
unsuccessful attempt to hijack a lorry-load of
TV sets, they were allowed by the Government
to remain unmolested for ten days, although a
police post was just across the road. Yet when
diplomatic representations were made by the
Dutch chargé d'affaires with the hint that his
country's financial aid might have to be recon- I
sidered if this harassment of a Dutch enterprize:
continued, the Mirisias were hustled away
without a shot in 24 hours.
A SIMILAR EQUIVOCATION was evident in Allende's
adoption of a personal armed bodyguard-the
first in memory to accompany a Chilean President.
It is true that the extreme Right in Chile was
quick to threaten violence as a response to
Allende's proclaimed revolution, and Allendo
himself always maintained that he needed pro-
tection. But right-wing para-military groups were
never as big or as highly organised as those on
the Left; and, in any case, the proper reaction of a
constitutionally-minded President would surely
have been to call upon his state security forces to
protect him.
Instead, Allende formed a personal unit,
known as "the Group of Friends of the Pro-
sident." Trained, armed, and partly manned by
"Cubans, it was led by known revolutionaries,
sympathetic to the MIR, including Alleade's
son-in-law. The existence of such a group at the
very centre of the State was not merely a pro-
vocation to the established security forces and an
affront to Chilean tradition, it was also an implied
rejection of the principle of constitutional rule.
DOUBTS ABOUT the real depth of 'Allende's con-
stitutionalism were raised also by his personal
history and his language, both of which suggested
a romantic attachment to violence. He was
after all, a founder and first president of the
Latin American Solidarity Organisation, created
in Havana in the 196% and dedicated to the
encouragement of armed insurrection throughout
the continent. He promised to "paint Santiago
with blood" in 1970 if Congress declined to
ratify his election as President, and he repeatedly i
tried to intimidate the opposition, inside and
outside Congress, with the threat of civil war.
These were not the actions or the sentiments of a
man dedicated to constitutional change, except
as a matter of expediency.
On the other hand, it was hard to see Allende
as a genuine revolutionary. He never looked
anything but the complete bourgeois gentleman.
A bon viveur, Corid but well-groomed, a snappy
dresser, with a twinkling eye for the ladies and a
good deal of personal charm, his strongest
political card was his skill in tactical manoeuvre.
But as a strategist, a thinker, a man with a real
message, he was unconvincing. Towards the end,
as he appeared with increasing frequency on the
presidential balcony in Santiago to address
chanting crowds of his supporters with revolu-
tionary platitudes, he seemed to me to lose all
contact with reality, to have become an actor in
love with his revolutionary part rather than a
serious leader who knew where he was going.
1.
IN RETROSPECT, I am inclined to think this was
always the truth of the matter with Allende.
Basically, he was a political romantic, dealing in
sensations rather than sense. He enjoyed his hour
upon the stage but he never properly assessed
_ the forces he was dealing with, either for or
against him. He raised expectations on his own
side without commanding the means to satisfy
them, and he encouraged opposition on the
other side by his use of a revolutionary rhetoric
whose threats he also could not fulfil.
At best he was muddle-headed; and time may
show that he was deliberately deceitful. Certainly
he managed to deceive a lot of people, including
himself. But in the end reality taught its own, hard
lessons. That you can't be a democrat and a
revolutionary at least, not in a society that is
already admittedly democratic. That you can't
be anti-American and expect the Americans to
help you. That you can't pose as the people's
leader and kick most people in the teeth. That
you can't conscript soldiers into politics and
expect them to remain apolitical. That you can't
have inflation roaring out of sight and maintain a
base for social welfare. That, in short, the real
world is not Cloud-cuckoo-land. Down here,
you just can't have your cake and eat it.
It is sad that such elementary lessons should
have to be taught yet again at such tragic cost in
Chile. But it is alarming that so many people
elsewhere should evidently fail to grasp that they
are the lessons.
34
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KULTUR
Allendes misstag
__
Den svenska debatten är ensidig. Man har på ett
lysande sätt dokumenterat juntaus grymheter men
man drar ingen lärdom av utvecklingen i Allendes
Chile. Det är viktigt att kunna kritisera det som var fel
i utvecklingen, annars kan man inte lära sig någonting.
Om man tystar ner varje form av debatt om det som
var före kippen, använder man sig av
censurtänkande som är på samma linje som juntans.,
säger Andres Küng, journalist och författare som
besökt Chile före, under och efter Allendes til. Han
har nu också givit ut en debattbok, Att så socialism
och skörda fascism.
- Salvador Allende och "folkres
geringen" Unidad Popular tolklig
enhet) emotsågs med stort intresse
även utomlands, Man skulle lintli
gen få wat på flera grundlaggande
fragen Kan socialismen genomföras
på fredlig väg i Latinamerika? Är
marxismen i praktiken forenlig med
politick demokrati? Kan en social
revolution genomföras med bevarad
politisk demokrati?
Folkfrontens prógram hade
fyra naturtillgångar, framst kopparn,
2) okad takt i jordreformsarbetet, 3)
forstatigande av de storsta bank-
och industriföretagen och 1) snabb
ekonomisk tillväxt och omfordel.
ning av inkouster och förmogenhe
fer samt kamp mot inflationen.
Koppar viktig.
- Kopparn svarar för upp till fyra
femtedelar av landets export och
mellan en femtedel och en tredjedel
av statsintäkterna. Under åten före
första världskriget gick gruvorna
över i nordamerikansk ago, I slutet
av 1960-talet nationaliserades de till
hälften av den kristdemokratiska
Frei-regimen. Staten övertog 51
procent av aktierna. Men Freis
"chilenisering av kopparn visade
sig slutligen andå mest lonsam fór
de amerikanska foretagen. Kopparn
forstatligades genom ett tillagg till
grundlagen 1971. Frågan om ersätt.
ning till de forma amerikanska
ligärna hansköts till hogste statsrevi-
men Aliende.och hans.
regering ansåg att de inte hade råd
att betala kontant ersättning i dollar.
MOOTH
Jordbruket svarar for mindre
än en fjärdedel av sysselsattningen,
vilket är mindre an i de flesta
latinamerikanska och andra u-lan-
der. Flera jordreformlagar antogs
Jore Allende en av dem 1967 dà man
bestande att alla pordegendomar
over 80 "bashektai" kunde tang-
sinlosas, fen bashektar en hektar
förstklassig konstbevattnad jordį.
-
Takten i jordreformarbetet
kade under Allendes presidenttid.
Under hans första år tvångsinlöstes
nastan lika mycket jord som under
hela den föregående sexåriga presis
demperioden. Alla stora jordegen-.
dona uppass ha förstatligats
1973.
En följd av jordreformen var att
lantarbetarna organiserades fackligt.
En annan var jordockupationerna.
De okade mo gånger redan under
Allendes forsta år jämfört med under
Freis tid. Jordagarna började gå till
motangrepp.
-
Produktionen sjönk - k
exproprierade gårdarna hade inte
tillräckligt med maskinser, redskap.
kreatur och utsäde. Den sjunkande
tillgangen på insmedel och den
stigande efterfrågan folde till for-
sirining problem och prisste
gningar.
- horjan genomforde Aliende
en rad atgärder for att skapa en
jämnare fordeining av formogenhe
ril
Andres Küng, journalist och
författare, säger att Chile-de-
batten är ensidig. "Det är
viktigt att även kunna kritise
ra det som var fel på Allendes
tid annars kan man inte lära
sig någonting".
svarta hörsaffärer och hamstring.
163
Penningvärdet sjónk med
procent.
Under min vistelse i Santiago i
början av 1973 var enbart cigarrett-
Koerna i centrum ett par kvarler
langa, berattar Andres King.
Förlorade stödet
let
- De ekonomiska problemen
medförde politiska problem. Allen-
de forlorade medelklassens stöd och
arbetareklassens stod minskade. I
Kongressvalen behovde han majoris
Jet var en nödvändig
forutsalling for att han skulle kunna
fortsatta alt genomfora sitt program
och stifta sina lagat. Han fick bara
44 procent. Makikampen kongress
parlament president fortsatte.
Ingen ville ge vika for den andre.
Allende dress till åtgärder som inte
var förenliga med demokratiska
principer och gällande lagar.
-
→ Denna utveckling tyder på att
varje försök att mot flertalets vilja
Ivinga fram en extrem politik
medir risker för pothrisering av
samhället som bara skulle gynna
odemokratiska riktningar. En ag.
gressiv klasspolitik, vare sig den an
reaktionar eller. revolutionar, kan
framkalla en utveckling mot en
sosialistisk eller fascistisk diktatur,
konstaterar Andres Küng.
--
Men inga missforhållanden
och musstag under Allendes tid kan
anvanday soin ursäkt för kuppen och
det blodbad som sedan folde. Man
kun ha olika uppfattningar om
Allendes politik, men vage sann
demokrat måste kanna avsky för den
nuvarande multarjuntan.
Flitig författare
Andres Kung in fodd i Gavle

4-00000
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70912211837 MAY 74
HELS 22459
i A b 8007497 MAY 74 STAFF
Life Mersins 26459
HAS
T: 01460704 INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO,
BLUMEN „RɔYGM
A.
::. IN EVEN OT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION
TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/
૩-૧-૧૯૬ .
AND A FASCIS
CUMLAUT "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISH
WHICH SELMSUALLY BALANCED, COMING
ACCORDING
FA YOUNG S⑉Ede.
SWEDISH-LANGUAGE CAL
▾ "
MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNION
VUDSTAD59LADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED
SMILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS, THE
: 7
SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS MOVE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL
ALLENDERS ECONOMIC POLICTED AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONONIC
PROBLEMS UNDER AULENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT
POLÍTICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WEAG
MINCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LANG"..
KUNG NOTES THAT MAGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY
UA REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIAL189-
ON FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT. HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE
DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP
:
CUNFIDENTIAL
14-00000
5 1946
277 43
PI
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062013.
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* 4 3 1
PAGE 82-827
10R10811032 MAY 70
STAFF
2072016tubnú bd
TH 235575
873M
23433
AND
150
0000
THAT FOLLOWED.
2. WUNG (OPU: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) 15 FORMER (1969-72)
OR FOR SWEDISH RAUTO'S 086
NOW LIVES IN HALMO. MAS
AUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALTA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC
GRAPES
FILE LEFERT. 62 PET.
CONFIDENTI
DET
14-00000
AL
CABLE BEC DISSEN BY Z PER
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY SUED SLOTTED.
ACTION UNIT
4/WH8
'
RF. FILE
VR
N
18
F
ACTION
°
T 172681
E1A126
TOTAL COPIES
28
SECRET
RUN BY
C/IP/ON C/EURS C/S53
C/PS/E63 C/OSE/IC COPS
PAGE 01-01
TOR1271631Z JUN 74
SECRET 0715442 JUN 74 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO 29396
TO: DIRECTOR INFO PARIS.
RYBAT HYSAGE
REFS:
A.
1.
B.
PARIS 48989 (273492)
DIRECTOR 559514
PRODUCTION BY OTH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PRO
STAFF
2
3
IN 274496
SAGO 29396
STATION CONCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT. IF ALLENDE ACTUALLY
DID WANT TO SURRENDER. JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING
FACT.
2. FILE: 56-6-42/3, 281-927986. E2 IMPDET
SECRET
CA
し
TI FUOMEN
:
14-00000
پیایا
CABLE SEC DIBSEM BY
PER
TOTAL COPIES 27.1
SECRET
UN BY
PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED
'NOTIFIED
.
_ ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
luts
1
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FILE
9553
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PRODUCTION BY OTHER T
1.SUING OFFICE IS PROHIBI
STAFF
C/FPLAN YOURG COPS/INTS: S
9/15/363
3
PAGE 01
IN 273492..
TOR:062019Z JUN 74
PARI
48989
Tib.
TUOMEN.
C/WH/6
DC/V/M/S
WHICH
WH/
SECRET 0618242 JUN 74 STAFF
CITE PARIS 46989
TO: DIRECTOR INFC SANTIAGO.
RYBAT HYSAGE
REF: DIRECTOR,559514
WHICH
WH/6/bed
* 1, DEFER SANTIAGO RE PARA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE
GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY.
WHETHER ALLENDE KILLED WHILE FIGHTING OR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER.
JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LOW IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING
WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND
AGAINST JUNTA SHOULD IT EMERGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER.
2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED
ALLOW HIM SURRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT BE ANOTHER STORY BUT THIS
NOT CLEAR FROM REF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE
SUCH VERSION STICK BECAUSE OF HIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL
PALACE.
3. FILE:/55-6-42/31 201-987986. E2, IMPDET
SECRET
14-00000
10
DISPATCH
Chief of Station, Helsinki
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.
C/WH Division
FROM
Acting Chief of Station, Santiago
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
|CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM
SUBJECT
"
FUOMEN Psych
ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES
•Ref:
HELSINKI 22455
If available, we would appreciate receiving four
copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference.
Distribution:
-
2 COS Helsinki To out Porch
1 C/WHD
CROSS REFERENCE TO
HAI
E2 IMPDET.
Leslie H. BERBERIAN
RECORD COPY
DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
HCSA-18904
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
DATE
3 Hay 1974
HOS FILE NUMBER 15-124-52
"Befer
14-00000
NETHERLANDS
CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES
Editorial by N. van Nieuwenhuysen;
Dutch, 19 April 1974, p 5
Reformatorisch Dagblad,
The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be
having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms.
seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they
still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of
their Marxist president is definitely over and that their
country is now being ruled by a small group of reactionaries
who are trying to keep the people under control through
terrorism, repression, and torture. Such problems will take
you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were
quick to take advantage of it.
Welfare
What is the situation? Most of the approximately
250 refugees with a high school or university education do
not work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis
ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on
the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and
lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up
another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive
free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and
compensation for each trip they have to take.
Do you get the idea that they are better off than
many old people in the Netherlands? You are probably right,
because 
the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare;
they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been
allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile.
So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.
14-00000
Considering that this small group of pampered exiles
is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach,
it may be useful to point out a few facts. These are facts
which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague but for
some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.
Facts
The great majority of the refugees are not even
Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and
Uruguay. They came to Chile as a result of illegal and
revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in
these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate
consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.
They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende
showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as
president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to
declare amnesty for all those who "were members of terrorist
underground organizations," those who during the last months
of his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank
robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft
of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and attempted
murder.
The fact that some of those revolutionaries received
Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of
granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries.
These refugees with a high school or higher level education
seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result
they soon found their way to important key positions in the
government.
The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in
Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant
Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutionaries,
from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.
Definition
In the Berner Tageblatt, a Swiss newspaper which
is known for not exaggerating, Dr. Mario Puelma, from the
University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept
of political refugee is only of limited value when applied.
to Chile. Whatever one's attitude toward the military junta
:
14-00000
may be, one thing is certainı the Chilean refugees were not
pursued only because of their ideology, their status, or
their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian defini-
tion for a refugee. For the most part they are people who,
in their own country, could be legally charged with crimes
which are punishable under any Judicial system.
These refugees carried out activities in Chilo which
were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are
specialists in violence. This is why they sought asylum in
the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many
foreigners among them.
"
8463
CS01 8014/2087-W
14-00000
VRIJDAG 17 APRIL 1974
Francisco heeft
angekondigd try-
e negera zullen
en gefouilleerd
het spoor te ko-
den op moetuan-
mjf maanden.
fen zonder pare
het trottoir neer
-montage is sa-
leiding van ver-
klaringen.
te zijn beland,
betere verhou
gesprek tussen.
scu bericht het
AP alechts dat
in partij-ifeer”.
Brezinjevs ont-
dere communis-
de kwalificaties
k en vriend-
Roemenie ver-
an inning over
militaire bond-
egermanoeuvres
n het Russische
isoleren.
Hei
Ameri-
in buitenlandse
lag exportver-
krachtens
urd
dochteronder-
grote Ameri-
brieken auto's
Deze
Cuba.
waarschijnlijk
eiking van het
de organisatie
en tegen Cubal
mbargo
V.S.-economie
loopt terug
WASHINGTON - De Amerikaanse
tegering heeft dondering bekend ge
maakt 
dat de nationale economie vou!
krachtiger is teruggelopen, In het eers
ste 
kwartaal van dit jaar, dan was
verwacht. Prijzen stegen bovendien
met 
meer dan tien procent,
Het bruto nationale produkt von.
nindende in het eerste kwartaal met
een jaar-percentage van 5,8 Dit is de
Gerste keer sinds 1970 dat het bruto
nationale produkt is verminderd en
het is de scherpate daling in 16 jaar.
De 
vermindering van het bruto natio-
nale produkt met 3.8 prosent meet
vergeleken worden met een schatting
van tussen de 3 en 4 procenit, zoals
die 
door de regering was gedaan. In
het 
laatste kwartaal van het vorts
jaar nam het bruto nationale produkt
toe 
met 1,6 procent.
MINISTERS KRIJGEN HUISARREST -
Ethiopische leger uit
scherpe verwijten
ETHIOPISCH INGER
ADDIS AREA - Premier Endal-
kachew Maken van Ethiopië heeft
donderdag bekendgemaakt dat de le-
den van de regering die eind februart
door de strkrachten gedwongen
werd at te treden, huisarrest hebben
egen:
Volgens de Shopische radio heeft
Makkonen gezegd op een bijeen-
komst in Ads Abeba van rond 2.000
officieren en manschappen. De pre-
mier zou naar de bijeenkomst ont-
boden in der de strijdkrachten die
hem hadden laten weten dat het leger
gedwongen zo in te grijpen als
er niet onmiddelik tegen de minis-
ters went opprieden.
Het leger verwis de ministers dat
zij het land in cea economische chaos
hebben gestart.
zich op onwettige
wijze verrijkt bedden en na hun af-
treden hebben samengezworen om
verdeeldheid te zien
PLANNEN
Makonnen gav de bijeenkomst
een uitvoer vitezetting van de
hervorming van zijn rege-
ring. Ha preot de stresachten voor
hun voorbees gedrag en deed een
beroep op hen voorbeeld te geven.
van de tuch: de bong is voor het
land in de moke cagen die nog
zullen komen De premier zou het
huisarrest van de voormalige minis-
ters bekend hebben gemaakt
Liberaal
Kennedy aan
het woord
torn
hem de vraag werd gesteld waarom
con
arme Ethiopiër die en brocd
heeft gestolen, onmiddellijk de ge-
vangene ingaat, terwijl de ex-minis-
ters die ernstige misdaden zouden
hebben begaan, niet voor de recht-
bank worden gedaagd en maar on-
gehinderd op straat rondlopen.
Makonnen zei dat er een commissie
Is benoemd die een onderzoek moet
Instellen naar het gedrag van
voormalige ministers.
de
POLITIE
In de stad Asmara heeft de politie
bekendgemaakt dat zij geen routine-
werk meer zal verrichten, omdat haar
els
tot ontslag van het landelijke
hoofd van de politie, luitenant-zene-
raal Yilma Shibeshi, niet is ingewil-
ligd. Voorts hebben de 1.200 spoor-
wegmannen die woensdag in staking
zijn gegaan, de vrachtauto's tegennge-
houden die goederen van Asmara
naar de haverstad Massawa zouden
brengen.
Arbeidsonrust
in Canada
het
het
OTTAWA - De posterijen,
commerciele luchtverkeer ea
scheepvaartverkeer op de St.-Law-
rence river in Canada zijn verlamd
door een staking die het land dage-
lijks enkele miljoenen dollars kost
De arbeidsrust duurt nu al meer
dan een week en zal volgens de Ca-
nadese parlementaire oppositie de
Inflatie. She momenteel jaarlijks 10
procent bestraagt, bevorderen.
Door wie stakingen is de helft
van alle postkantoren in het land
gesloten ten gevolge van solidaris
telastak
De nivellsheden be
Opgemerkt
Chili
ود
worden
Chileense vluchtelingen in
Nederland schijnen „aanpassings-
problemen te hebben. Dis nogal
langdurige verejne blijkt on-
dermeer veroorzaakt
doordat zij het nog steeds plet
kunnen verkroppen dat de socialis-
dische droom van de Marxistische
president definitief voorbl] Även dat
hun land nu beheerst wordt door
een kleine groep reactionairen die
met terreur, onderdrukking en fol-
teringen probeert het volk onder de
dulm te houden. Met zo'n lange vol.
sin kom je een heel eind in Ne-
derland en dit hadden deze idealls.
ten al gauw in de gaten.
VERZORGING
Want wat is het geval?, Werken
doen de meeste van de ongeveer 250
vluchtelingen Van middelbaar en
universitair niveau niet. Ongeveer
de helft van hen is ondergebracht in
het Huis ter Schie" in Overschle,
waar zij op het terras genieten van
de zon of volleybal spelen in de
fuln. Kost en inwoning ziju gratie
enaan het einde van de week van.
gen al ook nog eens vijfentwintig
Kulden zakgeld. Daarbij krijgen zij,
nog gratis taalcursussen,
rit-P
tenkaart voor de buis en een vergoe
ding voor elke reis die zij moeten
maken.
Door
ren
N. van Nieuwenhuysen
U vindt dat zij het beter hebben
als menig Nederlands bejaarde?
Waarschijnlijk hebt u gelijk, want
de Chileense hallingen behoeven
niet van de bijstand te leven: []
worden namelijk gefinancierd door
de geblokkeerde gelden voor ont-
wikkelingshulp aan hun vaderland
Chili. Zo ziet u maar hoe goed ons
belastinggeld wordt besteed.
Daar dit for de watten gelegile
groepje ballingen zelfs hier nog met
volle maag de revolutie predikt is
het misschien nuttig enige feiten te
noemen. Feiten die op het ministerie
In Den Haag welbekend zijn, maar
om de een of andere reden nooit de
pers in Nederland halen.
FEITEN
De vluchtelingen hebben voor het
overgrote drel niet reas de Chi-
leense nationaliteit. Zij zijn afkom-
14-00000

14-00000
BELGRADO
14 Amerkaufise
senator Edward Kennely heeft dom-
derdago blend op een persconferentie
in de Zuidslavische houldstad Hei
grado
vlootectennten 267
NAVO veroordeeld die onlangs in het
noorden van de Adriatische Zee Ajn
gehouden.
de
Deze oefeningen hebben het geschill
tussen Italia en Zuidslavić tezer de
zogenaamde zone B ten zuiden van
Test verscherpt. Kennedy mem
het geen afdoende reden dat de
fening niet kon worden afgelast on.
dat al verscheidene maanden te.
voren in voorbereiding waren geno-
Senator
Amerikaanse
}
Torn
donderdag na een bezoek van drie
dagen, tijdens hetwelk hij bespre
kingen voerde met ender ineer pre
sident Tito, naar
doorgereisd. Hij zet
Instruk" te zijn van
met het Zaldslavische staatshoofd.
lijk halfrond
the Sovjet-Unte
zeer onder de
in gesprezzen
ver Cuba
hington
en donder-
En ministers
alfrond in
ženodigd op
folgend jaar
in van het wes-
exico-stad twee
gar had zich niet
uw in de prul-
1. Minister Kis-
lijk zeker van
nigde Staten in
te zijn in verle-
vragen omtrent
bijeenkomst te
enkoinst wordt
n de organisatie
Paén op vrijdag in
EMBARGO
que waarmee de
komst hebben af-
over Cuba ge-
hts economische
neden. Niettemin
memers dat het
ultaat van de
hington is, dat de
eld lijken te zijn
rgobeleid tegen
matigen. Wat de
en de verschillen
Enerika en de La-
den gebleven te
var afschaffing
immeringen, maar
nalaten te voorkomen dat de invoAY
ult Latijns-Amerika nog meer san
16-
beperkingen onderhevig wordt
maski
20 werknemers schorste oradat ay i-
shirts droegen, waarop het publiek
werd verzocht de Canadese posternen
te boycotten. De werknemers willen
leoncisen stellen, maar de overheid
weigert te onderhandelen totdat ie-
dereen weer aan het werk is.
138 loodsen op de St-Lawrence ri-
vler, die voor alle scheepvaartverkeer
zorgen tussen Montreal on Quick
zijn al een week in staking omdat zij
een onmiddelijke loonsverhoging ri-
sen van 20 000 tot 38.000 dollar per
jaar. De regering heeft hen ap
dollar geboten over een perisie van
drie jaar en zoekt momenteel naar
to
de loisen
mogelijkheden
dwingen het werk to hervatten.
om
O het luchthaven personeel eist
loonsverhoging van rond de sao đól-
lar. De acht grootste luchthavens van
het land hebben de afgelopen wrek
Vender
gewerkt.
ep halve kracht
dreigt een staking van de verkeersici
ders.
Irak krijgt
parlement
BAGDAD Irak krijgt voor het
eerst sedert de revolutie van 1958 een
volksvertegenwoordiging. Het presi
dium van het progressleve naționale
front" heeft hiertoe besloten, zo is
donderdag bekendgemaakt. Wanneer
de volksvertegenwoordiging er komt
en of die tot stand zal komen voor al
gemene verkiezingen, is nog niet be
sloten. In Bagdad staat een grot
gebouw voor een nationale vergade-
ring maar het is nog nooit gebruikt.
De socialistische Baas-partij en de
communisten werken samen in het
progressieve nationale front.
GOUDPRODUKTIE ACHTERUIT
Grote onrust onder
mijnwerkers in Z.-Afrika
JOHANNESBURG - In de afgelopen weken is moord en doodslag in de
Zuldafrikaanse goudmlinen onder de zwarte mijnwerkers tot een zorgbarende
omvang uitgegroeid. De jongste balans van bloedige stamtwisten tussen gast-
arbeiders uit Lesotho en de Xhosa's in de goudmijn Carletonville, bij Johannes-
burg, luidt: tien doden en drie en zestig gewonden.
De meeste slachtoffers waren gru-
welijk verminkt. Slaapplaatsen wer-
den vernield, met benzine overgoten
en in brand gestoken. Vluchtende
mijnwerkers zijn volgens ooggetuigen
doodgeschoten.
Tienduizend Baaho's hebben sinds
februari hun werkterrein in Zuid-
Afrika in de steek gelaten en zijn
naar hun veilige bergachtige vader-
land Lesotho teruggekeerd. Vele an-
dere zijn van plan ook naar Lesotho
terug te gaan. Na de Basotho's vrezen
thans de mijnwerkers uit Malawi aan
de beurt te zijn.
INSPRAAK
Woordvoerders
de
van
zwarte
mijnwerkers verklaren, dat de mijn-
werkers niets in te brengen hebben
tegenover de blanke leiding van de
mijnen en niets asa de arbeidsom-
zegt te weten waarom de mijnwer
kers elkaar doodslaan. Hun verte
genwoordigers weten het niet en ik
betwijfel, of de arbeiders zelf het wel
weten", aldus de bedrijfsleider.
Velen menen, dat
ingewortelde
stammen-vijandschap de oorsaak is
van de onlusten. Daarbij komt dat bij
de huidige woningnood een nietge
aanleiding voldoende is om de haat
tegen de gastarbeiders tot een explo
sie te brengen. De mijnmaatschap
pijen hebben zich tot dusver verzet
tegen de eis. de zwarte mijnwerkers
te groeperen naar de streken waar N
vandaan komen. Zij menen, da: dan
nog grotere onlusten zouden ontstaan
Het ลงน zelfs tot slachtpartijen"
kunnen komen. Intussen gas: de
goudproduktie achteruit. In Lesotho
zit de regering met het probleem van
de bradeloos geworden teruggekeer
atch in desc Zuid 1-5 Midden.
Amerikaanse landen die berig
gehouden met onwellige su revolus
tionaire gedragingen IZVOR stj
de uiteindelijke consegærles nirt
wensten te dragen.
In het Chill van Allende voelden
f sich thuis omdat Alevde begrip
toonde your hun gedras. Gign eerste
daad als president, toen dđži in no.
vember 1970 geinstalleved was be.
stond namelijk uit het sondigen
van amnestie voor al dieteren, die
alld waren van een treeuristische
ondergrondse organisatie, voor hen
die in de factste maanden väder äljn
voorganger waren aangelined your
het beroven van bank geweld.
dadler overvallen 19 zeitbedie
ningswinkels, diefstal vax wapens
uit militaire depots, ontweringen en
moordaanslagen.
Dat sommigen van deze revolu-
tionairen Chileens
matleke
status kregen is ook veeklaarbaar
als men weet dat de regering van
Allende een beleid voerde dat er op
gericht was om juist verðäjfsver-
gunningen te geven aan dit type
revolutionairen. Deze vichielingen ·
van middelbaar en here niveau
bleken namelijk in
geen
Laanpassingsmoelllſkäedea" te heb-
ben. Zij vonden dan ook weldra bun
weg naar belangrijke deer Hosities
In de regering.
Stapeloze nachten hallen do
"vervolgden" In Chili ook ziet. om.
dat alj ich beschermd voelden door
een tot de tanden geopend mill-
tant-Marxistisch soldatenänger. Zo'n
10.000 revolutionairen whale wind-
streken stonden hen te beschik-
king.
DEFINITIEF
In het Berner Tage een
Zwitserse krant die sich ziet aan
overdrijving schuldig maakt,
schrijft dr. Mario Puelma van de
Freiburgse Universiteit: Het CON-
cept van de politieke chteling
kan met betrekking tot CME slechts
in seer beperkte mate gelden. Hoe
men ook mag staan tegenover de
militaire junta, een ding ker: de
Chileense vluchtelingen weeden niet
alleen vervolgd voor hun üšrologie,
status of afkomst. Dit laaste is de
traditionele humanitaire defenitle
van een vervolgde. Voor de groot-
ste deel zijn het mensen de in hun
eigen land wettelijk aangeklaagd
kunnen worden voor mishalen die
ander elk rechtsbeste strafbaar
Edin
ما
Deze vluchtelingen werden
Chili daden uit die in strijd waren
met de grondwet. In fet uận het.
specialisten in geweld. Om deze
redenen zochten zij asiel ap de bul-
tenlandse ambassades m Santiago
en daarom bevinden zich zoveel
buitenlanders onder hrun."
•
14-00000
UUIGUING
BIGHAT CONTENUS UN
10
0
M.
1CH
MESSAGE
35-3°
0 0
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f
OMF 0
CLASSIFI
499
SECRET
MESSAGE_100
STAFF
спо
ОР
MAOSE
MUNER
CONF:
: EURT INFO:
FILE
30224OZ
DIRECTOR
18/AN, WHT) 55 5, 03/INT
.PS/EG4, 056/10, 015/1765
TO: DONN BASE INFO BONN, SANTIAGO, HAMBURG.Y
FUONYX CAGUARRY TOFOCUS Y
REFS: A. BONN BASE-31991 JIN 262014)
8. DIRECTOR 518657 4
M
556799
DISSEM BYLY
Batuan D PER
C/W/H/6
☐ ..
DC/WH/6
W/H/6/SA
V/H/C/FI
W/H/C/ER
WH/C/Sedy.
4/6/6
- FORMEN
1. FOR REF A FEATURE, SUGGEST BASE PROVIDE CAQUARRY WITH
APPROPRIATE INFO ON REBUFUGEES AVAILABLE IN NUMEROUS HAS TRACE CABLES
SENT BOWlk. WE ARE UNABLES IDENTIFY ANY REFUGEES LIVING IN GERMANY
UNDER FALSE IDENTITY.Y
2. AIRMAILING TO BROUTSAS BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON LEFTIST BRBOÐ
EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME, INCLUDING:Y
A.
LCBEFORE PRESS SUMMARIES OF FRONT ACTIVITIES.Y
2. NEWS BULLETING PUBLISHED BY BRITISH CHILE SOLIDARITY
COMMITTEE, WHICH CONTAINS "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION AND A
SECTION GIVING CHILEAN REFUGEE QUOTAS BY COUNTRY.Y
C. ARTICLES RE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON CHILE, HELD ROME,
APRIL 74.4
2. MAY 1974 WIENER TAGEBUCH ARTICLE ON CHILE BLACK BOOK.Y
APRIL 1974 FRANKFURT-STADT RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE RE CHILEAN
1
EBO.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
: EXT:
CLASSICATION
RELEASING CAKES
CORINATING OPPIDS
AUTHENTICATING CPFICER
REPHODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2
CL BY:
IMPDET
14-00000
SIGNAL CENTERUSE ONLY
AI, P
OMF 0
CLASON ATKIN
400
A
0
0
SECRET
AHANAN #STAY, A1';
STAFF
CONF:
7479
0
INFO:
FILE
་་་
0 0
NAO
DATE FINE GROUP
cito
DIRECTOR
PACE
94348
ESSAGE REFERENC
0
SIDES
DISSEM BY:
0
D
0
RETURN TO PER
556999
SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. 4
3. WE ARE UNABLE SUGGEST KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON OF STATURE FOR
INTERVIEW ON LEFTIST-EFFORT DISCREDDBIT REGIME. AS ALTERNATIVE,
SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR NETWORK REPORTER MIGHT SEEK INTERVIEW OF DR. MARIO
PUELMA, PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY AT FREIBURG UNIVERSITY, WHO
WROTE TWO-PART ARTICLE IN 08015-16 JANUARY ISSUES OF BERN DAILY
BERNER TAGELATT ON SUBJECT CHILEAN REFUGEES. IN ARTICLES PUELMA
GIVES BACKGROUND OF TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN CHILE AS IT DEVELOPED AS
RESULT OF ALLENDE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CITES EXAMPLES OF "REFU-
GEES" AND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THAT "TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF
POLITICAL REFUGEE, WITH RESPECT TO CHILE, CAN BE APPLIED ONLY IN VERY.
QUOTES FROM
LIMITED SENSE..." (SEE QRPEG 8026, REF B. FOR STUITARY ARTICLES. W
4. SUGGEST FEATURE INCLUDE POINT THAT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT
D
CHILEAN REGIME IS ENCOURAGED, IF NOT.ORCHESTRATED, BY SOVIET FRONTS
AND THAT PUBLICITY GENERATED BY "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN CE.G., "INTER-
NATIONAL NEWS" SECTION OF BRITISH COMMITTEE BULLETIN HAS INTIMI-
DATING EFFECT PRECLUDING OBJECTIVITY. BENEATH SUPERFICIAL SHOW OF
"SOLIDARITY," EUROPEAN LEFTISTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING CRIMINAL/
DATE:
FER
i
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
concas
CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION
-
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFIC
ƆTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIB.
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY:
14-00000
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SUNAL CENTERUSE UM.
105
MESSAGE
OMF
0
LATION
0 0 0 0 0
SECRET
MASSAGE MANÍN ING INDICATŪR
STAFF
CONF:
INFO: FILE
Ad
PAGE
baff Five GRUP
WESEAGE MONDE NUES
DIRECTOR
DISSEM BY:
0
0 MONIQ
PER
556999
0 FAS 8
TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN
ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND
REASSESSING THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH NON-
COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT
ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH VIETNAM NO LONGER AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRE-
SENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENDERING UNITY BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-
COMMUNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE.Y
5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON EXTREME LEFTIST B
VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR ZDF REPORTER MIGHT CONTACT
"SOCIALIST BUREAU," SPONSOR OF SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT
257016)
(227179)
24-27 APRIL. (SEE BONN 31174 AND BBONN 31869). FOR INFORMATION OR
POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON JUNTA VIEWS, SUGGEST CONTACT DEUTSCH-CHILENIS-
CHER BUND (SEE BERLIN 81306, OCT 73}.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EUR
6.
FILE:
for
30 MAY 1974
2
200-126-107/11. E2 IMPDET.N
AC/SS/CAG/PSB
E/ROG
E/G
WH/6
fabava baldum
WN/CA Maga
CONNIE MOORE: SRM
E/CAG
66405/1389
Checuece
RELEASING OFFICER
ION
ECRET
676994)
C/E/CAG
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
AUSTINATING OFFICE
E 2
CL BY:
IMPOET
004244
:
14-00000
CABLE SEC DIDSEM BY
9...
TOTAL COPIES
SECRET
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
AQYANCE COPY ISSUED S
ACTION UNIP
EAY
ACTION
RF
FILE
N
F
بتر ح
RUN DY
REPRODUCTION SY OTHER TH
IBPING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE
STAFF
A.1.
VR
osolic cisi witsg
SB8, OSGloc clOPS.
1
2
PAN
3
+
▼ 149793
514850
PAGE 01
IN 265992
TOR:3011442 MAY 74
BANG 59314
C/WH/6.
SECRET 3011122 MAY 74 STAFF
CITE BANGKOK 59314
TOI DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO.
REDLEG AEFIS-
DC/WH/6
ما
WH/C/SA
WH/6/FI.
WH/6/RR.
REFSI A. A 5965;
260348)
WH/6/Secy Fil : FUOMEN
B. DiSector 554557
1
MILTON C. REPOUSH AND RALPH K. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETEKI
ON 25 MAY AND PASSED REF BINFO. TOLGIEN HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH
GALETZKI ON 29 MAY TO DIscuss His ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.
2, GALETEN MET CUNNING AT HOME OF ROBERT B. HARTFORD. U.S.
CITIZEN EMPLOYED IN POPULATION DIVISION OF ECAFE' HARTFORD IS
PRO-ALLENDE AND ORGANIZED SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTED
PERSONS TO MEET CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.
CUNNING IS DESCRIBED AS ABOUT FORTY YEARS OLD. BLACK HAIR, FULL
BEARD AND AVERAGE BUILD. HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BY UNITED
NATIONS AT CENTRO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (CELADE) IN
SANTIAGO, WE ARRIVED CHILE IN OCTOBER 1972 WITH HIS WIFE. CUNNING
DEPARTED 84X340- 27 MAY FOR DELHI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK AND
PLANNED RETURN SANTIAGO APPROX 22 JUNE.
3.
CUNNING ALKED VERY LITTLE ABOUT ALLENDE REGIME AND
SECRET
14-00000
TOTAL COPIES
RUN BY
CABLE SEC DISDEM OV
PER
SECRET
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED.
_ ARVANCE COPY IBFUED SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
RF
FILE
VR
ACTION
F
0
T 149793
814650
PAGE 22
T09:321144Z MAY 74
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
IPUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITI
STAFF
51
o
IN 265992
BANG 59314
CONCENTRATED ON DISPARAGING PRESENT REGIME.
CLAIMED THERE THOUSANDS
OF REPRISAL KILLINGS BY ARMY, FUN AWAY INFLATION, SHORTAGE OF GOODS
AND GENERAL REPRESSION BY REGIME.
CUNNING VERY SUBJECTIVE IN
WHEN GALETZKI
ASKED CUNNING HOW HE KNEW THERE "THOUSANDS OF KILLINGS", CUNNING
CLAIMED "THERE IS CIA REPORT WHICH STATES OVER TWENTY THOUSAND HAD
BEEN KILLED." GALETEKI FOUND PORTIONS OF REF 6 INFO USEFUL IN REFUTING
CUNNING STATEMENTS. HOWEVER GALETEKI'S TEMPER GOT THE BEST OF HIM HALF
WAS THROUGH MEETING AND FRIEND SUGGESTED THAT HE REFRAIN FROM
ARGUING WITH CUNNING WEST THE SITUATION BECOME VIOLENT.
STATEMENTS AND HAD FEW FACTS TO BACK UP STATEMENTS.
4. GALETZKI TELEXED REPORT ON CUNNING TO HIS EMBASSY IN TOKYO.
HE TOLD TOLGIEN WOULD PASS HIM ANY FEED BACK, INFO ON CUNNING HE MIGHT
RECEIVE.
5, REQUEST POA AND 201 ON GALETZKI TO DEVELOP AND RECRUIT AS
TOLGIEN WILL UTILIZE
MOLIMBER ASSET TARGETTED PRIMARILY ON AEFISH.
COVER AS AIR FORCE CIVILIAN ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY AS ANALYST DURING
DEVELOPMENT.
6.
FIL:
22.-795277, 201-GALETZKI.
E2, IMPOET.
SECRET
:
14-00000
CABLE S&C DISSEN BY
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED
.38
TOTAL COPIES
201
PUN DY
PROUINTI
SECR 21
LADYAL COPED SLOP
ACTION UNIT AUTORE FILE VR
AL
☐☐
chirlaw, cl≤3. clis/co 3...
N
F
ACTION
о
T 148171
DDO...
E1A272
SECRET 2921408 MAY
CITE SANTI450 29314
TO:
DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PSYCH
REF:
DIRECTOR 553537
1,
PAGE 01-01
IN GA
TOR:292157 MAY 24
C/WH/6. ☐
DC/WH/6.
4
74 STAFF
WH/6/SA
Retentok.
WH/6/FI
WH/6/RR.
WH/6/Sec'y
Fil. FUOMEN
FUERMINE-3 HAS CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT WITH LOCAL
OFFICES OF MAJOR WIRE SERVICES.
NE TASKING HIM WITH COMPRE
HENSIVE LIST OF REPS HERE AS WELL AS SPOTTING AND ASSESSMENT
JAFO ONTWHO MIGHT BE DISPOSED TO COLLABORATE WITH U.S. GOVERN
MENT.
2.
3.
STATION ALSO EXPLOWING PEF WITH FUTRUNK-1 AND FUACME-16,
NO FILE. 62 IMPOET
SECRET
14-00000
27 MFG. 11.72
CABLE SEC D13DEM BY 2.
PERSOJI/UNIT NOTIFIED.
ARANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED.
ACTION UNIT
1
RF.
EUR 8
N
F
ACTION
PER
FILE.
VR
10'A COMES
CONFIDEN
MEPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHINIERE
BY
TAN, WHS, SS.S.,.
STAFF
T 242756
EIA997
PAGE 01-21
IN 263354
TORI 282955Z MAY 74
HELS
22538
CONFIDENTIAL 2823512 MAY 74 STAFF
CITE HELSINKI 22538
TO: SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.
FUOMEN PSYCH
REF: HCSA 18924
WHEN
HOWEVER,
LARGEST LOCAL BOOK STORE HAS BOOK ON ORDER,
RECEIVED, STATION CAN BUY AND POUCH COPIES PER PEF.
WISH POINT OUT, IF SANTIAGO NOT ALREADY AWARE, THAT BOOK IN
SWEDISH, IF COPIES STILL DESIRED AND SANTIAGO WISHES OBTAIN
EARLIER, SUGGEST STOCKHOLM STATION BE ASKED BUY SINCE BOOK
SHOULD BE READILY AVAILABLE IN SWEDEN.
2. FILE DEFER, E2 IMPDET,
RECORD COPY
CONFIDENTIAL
11/2
325K
15-124-52
28 May 74
14-00000
CABLE SEC DINST
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED
LADYANCE C18FULDSTO
ACTION UNIT
N
EURB
F
ACTION
°
TOTAL COFIEA
302
SECRET
REPRODUCTION OF OTHER THAP
IGDUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
FILE
VR
AL
DAN WHB BS5
PSLEGY OPSTINT
STAFF
7.137606
E1A005
PAGE 01
TOR:2417162 MAY 74
C/WH/6
SECRET 2416272 MAY 74 STAFF
CITE BONN BASE 31991
DC/WH/6_
WH/5/SA
IN 262014
BNN8 31991
TO: DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO. BONN, HAMBURG.
FUONYX CAQUARRY TOFOCUS
REF BONN BASE 31516 (0 (24/838)
WH/8/FL
WH/6/RR.
WH/6/Sec'y
1. CAQUARRY ADVISED OF MAGAZIN PLANNING ANOTHER FEATURE
ON CHILE FOCUSING ON CHILEAN POLITICAL REFUGEES IN WEST GERMANY.
CAQUARRY WOULD LIKE EXPOSE REVOLUTIONARY/CRIMINAL BACKGROUND OF
SOME OF REFUGEES AND IDENTIFY ANY LIVING IN GERMANY UNDER FALSE
IDENTITY. ALSO INTERESTED FOCUSING ON WORLD-WIDE LEFTIST
EFFORT DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME. AS PART FEATURE CAQUARRY
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE 2OF INTERVIEW A PERSON KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOVE.
IDEALLY SUBJECT SHOULD BE PERSON OF SOME STATURE. INTERVIEW
CAN BE MADE LATIN AMERICA, NORTH AMERICA, OR IN EUROPE.
SECURITY NOT A PROBLEM AS CAQUARRY WILL SIMPLY ASSIGN NETWORK
REPORTER TO MAKE INTERVIEW ON NONWITTING BASIS USING QUESTIONS
CAGUARRY WILL PROVIDE.
2. ALSO APPRECIATE ANY SACKGROUND MATERIAL ON THIS SUBJECT
WHICH COULD BE PASSED TO CAGUARRY, GERMAN LANGUAGE MATERIAL
MOST USEFUL SINCE CAQUARRY HAS NO ENGLISH OR SPANISH CAPABILITY.
SECRET
Fl
FJOMEN'
14-00000
CABLE REDISKEMAY
PERSON UNIT NOTI
ADVANCE CO SU SLOTTED _
ACTION UNIT
Ret
FILE
N
ACTION •
DY
AL_
VK
TOTAL COPIES
BUN BY
SECRET
ASPRODUCTION BY OTHER THA
186UING OPPICS 10 PROHIBITS
STAFF
T 137600
EIA065
PAGE 02-02
TOR:2417162 MAY 74
IN 262014
BNNB
31991
3. RE PARA 2 REF, STILL ON "PER DU" BASIS MATTHOEFER
RECENTLY CONTACTED CAQUARRY TO ASK HIM MAKE PUBLIC RETRACTION
OF PARA 2 STATEMENT. CAQUARRY REFUSED AND SUGGESTED MATTHOEFER
INSTITUTE LIBEL SUIT, MATTHOEFER QUICKLY BACKED DOWN.
INCIDENTALLY, IN APPARENT BONE TO LEFT-WING SPD. MOS WILL
NOTE THAT MATTHOEFER HAS BEEN APPOINTED MINISTER OF RESEARCH
LAND TECHNOLOGY UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT.
4.
FILE:
201-0230705; X-REF 201-0903816.
82-IMPDET,
C
SECRET

14-00000
"
CABLE DEC DIDDEM DV 2
PERSON: UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTIED
ACTION UNIT
EUR 8 N
PLA
TOTAL COPIES
33-1
RUN BY
SECRET
1
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FILE
VR
IPAN, SS5, SB8, WH
i
2
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ACTION •
°
7 105861
E14160
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIDITI
STAFF
'
PAGE 21-01
IN 251122
TOR:1410 2JZ MAY 74
STOC 15691
SECRET 142938Z MAY 74 STAFF
CITE STOCKHOLM 15691
TO: DIRECTOR INFO HELSINKI.
FUOMEN PSYCH
REFI
A. DIRECTOR 549305
3.
1.
HELSINKI 22455 (239973)
NO STATION TRACES KYUNG.
2,
NO FILE. E2 IMPDET
C/WH/6
کے
DC/WH/6
WH/6/SA
m
WH/6/FI
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Sec'y
SECRET
Fil FUOMEN
14-00000
CABLE EC
και με 38
PERSON/UNIT NOTIF
_ ADVANCE COPY STURD SCOTICO
33-2
SUN BY
STOTAL COFFES
SECRET
DY ALL_
VR PLAN, WAS.
S55
01/082, P5/864, OGG/OC clops.
-
ACTION UNIT
RF
FILE
EURB
N
P
ACTION.
°
T 103782
EIA146
2
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
LOQUING OFFICE 10 PROHIBITED
STAFF
PAGE 01
IN 258476
TOR:1318512 MAY 74
E
SAGO
29117
C/W11/6.
SECRET 1316212 MAY 74 STAFF
DC/WH/6.
CITE SANTIAGO 29117 (JABAUT ACTING)
WH/6/SA
TOI PARIS INFO DIRECTOR,
WH/6/11
TOFUCUS UNSOHER
REFI A.
DIRECTOR 549348
WH/6/RR
WH/6/Secy.
a.
PARIS 48390 (IK 250170)
AGREE WITH REF B RECOMMENDATION TO AWAIT OUTCOME
OF FRENCH ELECTION BEFORE DECIDING IF AND HOW TO ASSIST
UNSOBER-1, IN MAKING THAT DECISION. THE FOLLOWING POINTS
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED!
A,
WHILE STATION HAS CAPABILITY VIA FUTRUNK-1 (IDEN
FOR PARIS), RECENTLY RECRUITED SALARIED AGENT, TO ASSIST
UNSOBER-1 IN OBTAINING INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. IT
SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT OUR INTERVENTION NO MATTER
NOW SUBTLE, WOULD VERY PROBARLY IDENTIFY UNSOBER-1 TO
FUTRUNK-1 AS AGENCY SOLLABORATOR.
8. THE CHILEAN GOVT IS VERY SENSITIVE TO FOREIGN
PRESS CRITICISM AND WOULD LOOK UNHAPPILY ON ANY TIV. PROGRAM
WHICH REFLECTS BADLY ON GOVT, REGARDLESS OF NOW SLIGHT THE
CRITICISM MIGHT BE.
IIl.
FUOMEN
CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO OBTAIN
SECRET
14-00000
!
CABLE BEC DISSEM BY
PEA
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED.
ADYANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
DX
AT
1
RF. FILE
YR.
N
F
ACTION •
°
T 105782
EIA146
ISTAL COPIEB
RUN BY
SECRET
REPRODUCTION OF OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
STAFF
41
PAGE 82-02
TOR1131891Z MAY 74
FUTRUNK-1'S ASSISTANCE FOR ANY PROGRAM WHICH COULD PROVE
EMBARRASSING TO HIM.
IN 252476
SAGJ 29117
2.
FILEI
221-872997. E2 IMPOET
i
SECRET
L
14-00000
408
UUIGUING
SIGNAL CENTERS CHILLY
Co
ACP
OMF 0
CLASSIFICATION
0 0 0
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING OICA FOR
STAFF
CONF:
MESSAGE
700
MAO
0
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SANTIAGO INFO PARIS.Y
TOFOCUS UNSOBER Y
REF: OFAA-2356, 9 APRIL 74 [NOT NEEDED SANTIAGO Y
1. TOFOCUS ACTIVITY SEEKS TO DEVELOP. ASSETS TO INFLUENCE NEWS
AND OTHER PROGRAMMING WITH POLITICAL CONTENT IN EUROPEAN TV SERVICES.
IN FRANCE THIS HAS BEEN PARTICULARELY TOUGH NUT TO CRACK, BUT PARIS
STATION HAS MADE RECENT PROGRESS WITH UNSOBER/b. THIS FORMER STAFF
3 JOURNALIST FOR PRETIGIOUS FRENCH NEWS WEEKLY L'EXPRESS RECENTLY
COMPLETED A 30-MINUTE REPORTAGE ON CURRENT EVENTS IN WEST GERMANY.
IT WAS WELL RECEIVED AND RESULTED IN HIS BEING TAPPED TO. DO SECOND
30-MINUTE PROGRAM. AS UNSOBER/1 APPEARS TO BE ON WAY TO POSITION OF
SUBSTANCE WITHIN FRENCH TELEVISION, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST HIS
RISE AND INSURE THAT PARIS STATION'S MOST PROMISING TOFOCUS ASSET
ACHIEVES MOST INFLUENTIAL STATUS (POSSIBLE. TO THIS END IT WOULD BE
OF VALUE IF UNSOBER/1 COULD DO PROGRAM ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN
CHILE.Y
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
WHEN
WALKER
WI1/6/Cody
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FUOMEN
DELEASING OFFICER
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2.
THE REPORTAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE DESIGNED FOR 30-MINUTE
AIRING, AND WOULD HOPEFULLY CONTAIN FILMED INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL
WHILE WE BELIEVE THIS WOULD
PINOCHET AND VISIT TO DAWSON ISLAND.
BE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED TO FRENCH JOURNALIST BY THE HEAD OF
RULING JUNTA (THUS BIG BOOST FOR UNSOBER/1), WE UNDERSTAND PINOCHET
HAS GRANTED OTHER INTERVIEWS AND ALLOWED FILMING ON DAWSON ISLAND.
PROPOSAL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DISCUSSED WITH UNSOBER/1, AND HE HAS
SAID REPORTAGE WOULD BE FAVORABLE BUT NOT TOTALLY UNCRITICAL--BEST
TREATMENT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT COULD HOPE FOR IN FRANCE.Y
3. TO OBTAIN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AND OTHER JUNTA
LEADERS AND/OR PERMISSION FILM CONDITIONS ON DAUSON ISLAND AND
ELSEWHERE IN CHILE, UNSOBER/1 HAS ASKED FOR BKHERALD ASSISTANCE.
UNSOBER/1 IS CONFIDENT THAT SUPERIORS WOULD APPROVE PROGRAM IF
UNSOBER/1 COULD ASSURE THEM THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED INTERVIEWS, ETC.Y
4. PLEASE ADVISE WHAT ASSISTANCE SANTIAGO STATION CAN PROVIDE
TO UNSOBER/b.4
5. FILE: 201-872997. E2 IMPDET.H
DATE:
8 MAY 1974.
ORIG: DAN WAGNER:LD
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TO:
STOCKHOLM INFO HELSINKI, SANTIAGO.
FUOMEN PSYCH Y
REF:
HELSINKI 22455 【IN 2399731 Y
1. A FORMER SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER. CAECLUSTER}
REPORTED THAT THE NAME OF ONE ANDRES ALEKSANDROVICH KY UNG,
BORN 1945, NATURALIZED SWEDISH CITIZEN, APPEARED ON SOVIET VISA
NO REASON GIVEN FOR THIS
BLACKLIST AND HE TO BE DENIED VISA TO USSR.
DENIAL BY MFA. (DOI: MID-1971). NO OTHER TRACE HQS FILES. Y
STOCKHOLM: PLS FURNISH TRACES SUBJECT REF. Y
2.
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PAGE #1
IN 250170
TOR:1315422 MAY 74
PART 40390
C/WA/6
DC/V/A/6.
WH/6/36
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WH/C/E
FUCHEN
WH/CARR
WH/6/Sedy.
SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF
CITE PARIS 48390
TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.
TOFUCUS UNSOBER
REF: DIRECTOR 549349
1. IF SCCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO
PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO 8KHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).
2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES
OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE
i
!
GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS CHE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE
WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS
CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY C09 30 MAY TO
COINCIDE WITH TOY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.
3. FILE: 221-872997. E-2 IMPOET
:
SECRET
:
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IN 250170
TUR:1315422 MAY 74
PARI
48390
SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF
CITE PARIS 48390
TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.
TOFUCUS UNSOBER
REF: DIRECTOR 549349
1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST, DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO
PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).
2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES.
OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE
GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS (HE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS), CLIMATE
WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINOCHET. IN THIS
CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO
COINCIDE WITH TOY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.
3. FILE: 201-872997. E-2 IMPDET
SECRET
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E1A678
PAGE 01
IN 250170
TOR:1315422 MAY 74
PARI
48390
SECRET 131335Z MAY 74 STAFF
CITE PARIS 48390
TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.
TOFUCUS UNSOBER
REF: DIRECTOR 549349
1. IF SOCIALIST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
IS ELECTED ON 19 MAY, IT MOST DOUBTFUL THAT UNSOBER/1 COULD DO
PROGRAM ON CHILE THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BKHERALD (OR TO PINOCHET).
2. THEREFORE RECOMMEND SANTIAGO CONSIDER REF WITHIN CONFINES.
OF STATION UNTIL RESULTS OF ELECTION KNOWN. IF MAJORITY CANDIDATE
GISCARD D'ESTAING WINS CHE HAS SLIGHT LEAD IN POLLS); CLIMATE
WILL BE EXCELLENT FOR FAVORABLE TREATMENT OF PINGCHET. IN THIS
CASE, WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE RESPONSE TO REF BY COB 30 MAY TO
COINCIDE WITH TOY TO PARIS OF HOS TOFUCUS OFFICER.
3. FILE: 221-872997. E-2 IMPOET
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PAGE CL
T 106017
EIAC20
TOR:110024Z MAY 74
SECRET 8314292 MAY 74 STAFF
C/WH/6.
DC/WH/6
CITE 50NN BASE 31516
WH/8/3A
WHICH
TO: DIRECTOR. INFO BONN, PARIS,
CATHATCH CAQUARRY TOFOCUS FUOYNX
REF: BONN BASE 31234 (IN 230053
WH/6/RR.
WH/6/Sec'y
211838-A
IN 246248-
BNNB 31516
#132 DUPE & CORRECTED
میرا
FOR WASH S/C NOTLE.
TMEN
OMEN
FUR
1. 1 MAY ZDF MAGAZIN WITH CAQUARRY AS MODERATOR CARRIED
15 MINUTE FEATURE ON CHILE, A THEME LONG DISCUSSED WITH CAQUARRY.
MAIN PART FEATURE WAS INTERVIEW WITH SPD PARLIAMENTARIAN,
FRIEDRICH BEERMANN (SUBJECT REF) WHO RECENTLY RETURNED
FROM VISIT CHILE AND SPOKE WITH GENERAL PINOCHET. BEERMANN
STRESSED THAT ALLENDE GOVERNMENT HAD RULED ILLEGALLY, CONDITIONS
NOT AS BAD AS THEY SEEM AND THAT OVERALL CHILEAN POPULATION
FAVORED ALLENDE'S OVERTHROW. SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT INTERVIEW
WITH SPD POLITICIAN AND SPD, AS INFLUENCED BY ITS LEFT WING,
HAS BEEN STRONGLY ANTI-JUNTA.
1
:
2. HANS MATTHOEFER, LEFT WING SPD PARLIAMEN-
TARIAN AND STATE SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION, HAS BEEN
LEADING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO JUNTA AND ALSO TRYING BLOCK
ECONOMIC AID. DRAWING ON FUARL/5 BACKGROUND INFO (SEE EGN-5363,
NOV 73) WE HAVE DISCUSSED MATTHOEFER IN DETAIL WITH CAQUARRY
SECRET

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PAGE 32-02
TOR:1100243 MAY 74
IN 241838
¢48
BAND
31516
QUESTIONING HIS MOTIVATION IN STRONG SUPPORT ALLENDE AND EVEN
STRONGER CONDEMNATION OF JUNTA. BY COINCIDENCE CAQUARRY ON
PER "DU" BASIS WITH MATTHOEFER (NOT FOR SAME POLITICAL IDEALS)
AND WELL AWARE MATTHOEFER BACKGROUND INVOLVMENT LEFT WING
ACTIVITIES. END OF CHILE FEATURE CARRIED STATEMENT BY CAQUARRY
THAT IT STRANGE MATTHOEFER CONDONED ALLENDE GOVT USE OF FORCE
AS NECESSARY WHILE HE IS PRESENTLY VOCIFEROUS IN CONDEMNING
JUNTA ACTIVITIES. STATEMENT SERVED EMPHASIZE SPD NON-OBJECTIVITY
IN DEALING WITH CHILE.
3. REQUEST TRACES ON MATTHOEFER. SUGGEST OPEN
221 SINCE HE ONE OF MOST INFLUENTIAL LEFT WING SPDERS AND WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY BE INVOLVED IN ANY FUTURE POWER STRUGGLES BETWEEN
RIGHT AND LEFT WINGS OF SPD.
4. FILE: 221-2230705 X-REF 221-
E2 IMPOET
WASH S/C NOTE: PARIS ADDED INFO ADDEE PER MOS REQUEST.
SECRET
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
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E1A232
PAGE 01
4
IN 239973
TOR:221103Z MAY 74
HELS 22455
CONFIDENTIAL 8289492 MAY 74 STAFF
CITE HELSINKI 22455
TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO,
FUOMEN PSYCH
0
1.
IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES, CALL ATTENTION
!
TO NEHYT PUBLIOTE
PUBLISHED SOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/
5901
'AUTHOR ANDRES KU'N G (UMLAUT. "U") ENTITLED "TO SOW SOCIALISM
836/0.53
5308
T
C
D
With
WH/6
AND REAP FASCISM", WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING
FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO 1 MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH
SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED
CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE
SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS "ONE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL
ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT
POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE
"INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS".
KUNG NOTES THAT "AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY
OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST
OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE
DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP
CONEL
RECORD COPY
15-124-52
2 May 74
14-00000
TOTAL COPIES
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STAFF
4
PAGE 02-02
IN 239973
TOR:2211032 MAY 74
HELS 22455
AND THE BLOODBATH THAT FOLLOWED".
HAS
2. KUNG (DP08: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72)
EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO.
PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC
STATES.
3. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET,
CONFIDENTIAL
1
J
14-00000
FORM 30.06
171 MFG. 11-73
CABLE SEC DISSEM D
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TOTAL COPIES 25-1
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PAGE CI
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2
3
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STAFF
IN 231132
TOR:231149Z APR Ja
HAMB
24795
SECRET 232953Z APR 74 STAFF
CITE HAMBURG 24795 (SWARECHILD ACTING)
TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE, SANTIAGO.
FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL
REF:
DIRECTOR 540262
1.
0
WELCOME RECEIVING SPECIAL GRIEF FOR PURPOSES INDICATED IN
REF.
2. RELUCTANT TO LEAVE MEDIA FIELD ON CHILE TO SOVIETS AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS. SUGGEST THEREFORE HOS KEEP OPEN MIND ON SELECTIVE
PLACEMENTS SHORT OF GENERAL PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME.
3. SINCE WOMEN LIKELY TO CONTINUE PLAYING PIVOTAL ROLE IN
FURTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, BELIEVE THEIR VIEWS AND REACTIONS
OUGHT BE GIVEN MORE PLAY. AS AN EXAMPLE. COULD POSSIBLY ENGINEER
ARTICLE IN GERMAN MAGAZINE "DER STERN" (CIRCULATION 1,500,000),
WHICH THUS FAR IN VANGUARD OF ANTI-JUNTA PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN,
THROUGH MRS. VERA VA CEK.
4. FILE: 15-124-46/3.
E2 IMPDET.
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23 Ариг 24
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☐ PROPUCTION BY OTHER THAN
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AGENCY MESSAGE
PAGE 01
TN 104643
FOR 1041011Z DEC 73
HAMB
23013
☑
PATTING TOO MAN
7'n
SECRET #409212 DEC 73 STAFF
CITE HAMBURG 23918
DIRECTOR INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.
TO: DIRECTOR
MHCRUNCH CASPECIAL FUOMEN "CHITTY.
1. BASE INTERESTED IN "DOS ANOS DE PENETRACION SOVIETICA EN
CHILE" (PORTADA 39) AS VEHICLE TO ENLIGHTEN GERMAN AUDIENCE RE
EXTENT OF SOVIET/CUBAN INFILTRATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC FABRIC OF
CHILE.
,
2. STUDY COULD BE FLESHED OUT TO ENCOMPASS POLITICO/MILITARY
ASPECTS THIS PENETRATION, ESPECIALLY PERCEPTIONS GAINED BY TWO
NAVAL PURCHASING MISSIONS. THE LAST VISITING USSR JUST PRIOR TO
ALLENDE'S DOWNFALL WHEN CHILEAN NAVY REPS GIVEN RUNAROUND AND
TREATED WITH BARE CIVILITY, IT MAY ALSO BE USEFUL TO MENTION THAT
SOVIETS ARE ALLEGED TO HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY ALLENDE (NOT CHILEAN
ARMED FORCES) WITH ARMAMENTS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF DEFENDING HIS
REGIME. ALLENDERS MOSCOW VISIT AND UNAVAILING, PLEA FOR SOVIET
SALVAGING OPERATION IS CRUCIAL ASPECT OF AMBIGUOUS SOVIET ROLE
WHICH EUROPEAN LEFT HAS CONVENIENTLY SWEPT UNDER THE RUG,
3.
REUCEST HOS COMMENTS SE FEASIBILITY OF TURNING OUT FINISHED
PRODUCT TO MEET EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS WHICH AT PRESENT PREEMPTED.
SECRE
RECORD COPY
04 DE(73
15-12.52
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REPRODUCTION BY PYTHBU TRAN
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...
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892
PAGE 02-02
TO F: 0410112 DEC 73
IN 104043
HAMB 23918
IF AFFIRMATIVE,
BY LEFTIST-GENERATED COPY ON CHILEAN DEVELOPMENTS.
SHALL TAKE SOUNDINGS ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
VEHICLE.
. 4. FILE DEFER. E2 IMPDET.
}
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PAGE
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444010
DISSEM BY:
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"
TO: PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO, THE
HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON. DERM INFO
SANTIAGO.
RYBAT FUOMEN FUORACLE
REF:
DIRECTOR 465768
1.
2.
DOC. MICRO. SER.
NOV 1 1973
MICROFILMED
FOLLOWING OF INTEREST AS FOLLOW-UP TO REF.
зр
ACCORDING WASHINGTON POST 12 OCTOBER, "THE CITTERNESS DE-
TWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND CHILE ERUPTED INTO A BATTLE OF
OBSENITIES AND THREATS LAST NIGHT, DISRUPTING A LATE SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
MINISTER RAUL ROA CALLED THE CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE A
WHORE,' AND ANOTHER CUSAN DIPLOMAT REPORTEDLY DISPLAYED A PISTOL.
3.
AT HEIGHT OF THE DISTURBANCE, CUBAN FOREIGN
• SONG? OF A
778
"DISPUTE BEGAN WHEN ROA DEVOTED MORE THAN HALF OF HIS SPEECH
IN GENERAL DEBATE EARLIER IN THE DAY TO AN ATTACK ON THE NEW CHILEAN
MILITARY JUNTA. CHILEAN AMBASSADOR RAUL BAZAN DAVILA TOOK PODIUM
DURING THE NIGHT-TIME SESSION TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT OF REPLY.-JAZAN
SUICIDE
INSISTED THAT LATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE HAD COMMITTEED 
SUICIDE
AND SAID 'CASTROISM' MUST TAKE A LARGE PART OF THE BLAME. HE AD-
4
015
3
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
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D-15-124-53
RECORD COPY
RELEASING OPPKER
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1200873
AUTHENTICATING OFFICE
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
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057556
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2
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0
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MITTED AND REGRETTED AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF SEL DEATHS IN CONNECTION
WITH CHILEAN COUP, BUT ADDED THAT CHILEANS RESPECTED HUMAN LIFE,
WHILE 'IN CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO HIMSELF HAD, AS HIS DAILY PASTINE, THE
WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFORE THE FIRING SQUAD UALL, TO WHICH HE
EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS....
4. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SEAT AND DASHED DOWN THE
AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUM, SHOUTING 'FAG', 'SONG OF A WHORE' AND OTHER-
OTHER CUBANS FOLLOWED HIM.
INSULTS AT BAZAN, IN SPANISH.
NICARAGUAN
DELEGATION, SEATED IN FRONT NEAR ROSTRUM, ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS.
A DIPLOMAT WHO WAS THERE
OTHER LATINS FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL.
SAID A CUBAN SHOWED HE WAS CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH
PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO....
"1
то
5. U.N. GUARDS SWARMED TO THE ROSTRUM AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED.
FIVE LATIN AMERICANS CAME TO THE ROSTRUM
ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER.
LATER TO CALL THE CUBANS GANGSTERS' AND CHALLENGED THE RIGHT OF A
DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS.
U.S. ANBASSADOR JOHN A.
SCALI SAID ROA 'HAS ONCE AGAIN SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER
VULGARITY... THE OUTHODED VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA.'n
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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*REF ATTACHED.
DATE:
ORIG:
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23 Ul. Keur
12 OCTOBER 1973
WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
ADC/CH/L
6556/9155
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() I
"
PRIORITY BRASILIA, MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, MONTEVIDEO, TOKYO,
TO:
THE HAGUE, ROME, BONN, HAMBURG, PARIS, LCPIPIT, LONDON, BERN INFO
SANTIAGO.
RYDAT FUOMEN FUORACLE
1.
нр
SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS
RECEIVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY, BELIEVE FOLLOWING MAY BE USEFUL TO
ADDRESSEES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS
WHO MAY BE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY
OVERT, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ITS USE BY PRESS ASSETS SO LONG
AS STORY NOT PASSED OR USED VERBATIM.
2. ON 9 OCTOBER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE-ADMIRAL ISMAEL
HUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOUR PRESENTATION BEFORE UNGA
TO EXPLAIN "FACTS WHICH OBLIGED ARMED FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE
CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF NATIONAL
RESTORATION." AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD BECOME VICTIM
OF A "HOST FALSE, MOST MALEVOLENT, MOST VICIOUS AND VERY WELL-
ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN. "
232
3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT ALLENDE'S MINORITY REGIME HAD
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
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4.
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BEEN STEERING COUNTRY IN DIRECTION OF A TOTALITARIAN TAKEOVER
INSTIGATED AND SUPPORTED LARGELY BY CUBA; THAT CUBA INTERVENED IN
CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHILE SECRETLY INFILTRATING ARMS,
INSTRUCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR PARAMILITARY GROUPS, INTENDED TO BECOME
A "PARALLEL ARMY TO OPPOSE ARMED FORCES; THAT CHILEAN MILITARY ACTED
ONLY AFTER FAILURE OF ALL OTHER EFFORTS BY PARLIAMENT, JUDICIARY,
PROFESSIONALS AND WORKERS TO BLOCK DRIFT TOWARD CIVIL WAR AND CHAOS.
HE STRESSED THAT HIS GOVT IS NOT POLITICALLY AMBITIOUS AND ITS GOAL
IS TO SET CHILE BACK ON ITS HISTORIC PATH; AFTER GOAL ACHIEVED, "WE
WILL NOT HESITATE TO RETURN TO OUR BARRACKS AND TO OUR SHIPS."
4.
HUERTA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLENDE REGIME, THE FIRST ELECTED
MARXIST GOVT IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE, HAD AROUSED ENTHUSIASM IN
MANY, BUT "IT IS ONE THING, GENTLEMEN, TO EVALUATE A FOREIGN
EXPERIENCE FROM AFAR, SEATED IN COMFORTABLE ARMCHAIRS OR IN DISCUSSION
AROUND A WELL-SERVED TABLE. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER TO LIVE IT." HE DE-
TAILED A HISTORY OF EVENTS OF LAST THREE YEARS, POINTING OUT THAT
DESPITE AGREEMENTS BY ALLENDE REGIME, LATTER MOVED TO UNDERMINE
EXISTING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL MACHINERY OF COUNTRY, ATTEMPTING DO
DATE:
ORIG:
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AWAY WITH DEMOCRATIC IDEALS FOR WHICH COUNTRY STOOD.
HE SAID MEDIA
WAS HARASSED, THERE WERE ILLEGAL INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN TAKEOVERS,
POLITICANS AND VILLAGERS WERE ASSASSINATED. HE CHARGED THAT
FOREIGN AGENTS, SENT PRINCIPALLY BY CUBA, HAD SECRETLY BROUGHT
ENOUGH UEAPONS TO CHILE TO EQUIP 20.000 MEN.
SOVIET MADE SIDEARMS, MACHINE GUNS, ANTITARNK GUNS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS,
CANNONS AND EXPLOSIVES HAD BEEN SHIPPED IN
--
HE DECLARED THAT
- SOME PACKED AS WORKS
OF ART AND SOME DISGUISED AS GIFTS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.
5. AT ONE POINT, TO SUPPORT CLAIM OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT, HUERTA
READ TEXT OF 29 JULY 1973 HAND-WRITTEN LETTER FROM CASTRO ADDRESSED
TO "DEAR SALVADOR.” LETTER ASSURED ALLENDE THAT CHILEAN WORKING
CLASS HAD BEEN FOREWARNED AND WAS "READY FOR ACTION" IF HIS REGIME
WERE THREATENED. HUERTA SAID THAT LETTER CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED
CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS AND HER SUPPORT OF THE
"ILLEGAL METHODS" OF THE ALLENDE REGIME.
6. IN VITRIOLIC REPLY TO HUERTA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL
ROA CALLED HUERTA "TRAITOROUS EX-MINISTER OF ALLENDE AND SERGEANT OF
SIMILAR LIES AND DISTORTIONS OF FACT CAN BE FOUND IN
GOEBBLES."
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICE
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CL439-PHATION
15
124-
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HISTORY OF NASI GERMANY, HE DECLARED.
0 SALES
#
THEN, SURPRISINGLY, HE WENT
ON TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO HUERTA'S CHARGES BY ADMITTING THAT CUBAN
CUNS HAD IN FACT BEEN SENT INTO CHILE BUT THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT
AT ALLENDE'S REQUEST. NOR DID ROA DENY THE AUTHENTICITY OF CASTRO'S
LETTER TO ALLENDE WHICH HUERTA HAD PRODUCED: ROA SAID THAT THE
LETTER WAS NO SECRET.
7.
FILE:
15-124-521 15-124-53. 20: IMPDET.
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
C/EUR
C/UHDA
DATE:
11 OCTOBER 1973
WILLIAM M. KENT: SMB
ADC/WH/6
6556/9155
Carpreend
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Gil
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130
PRIORITY SANTIAGO.
RYBAT FUOMEN
0
0
PAGE
wate..we OUL
1315082
CITE
DIRECTOR
45 SAGEDER
TIPLAN, DOC/20
6/583, 9/125/663
456203
DISSEMAY: 29
PER
REFS: A. SANTIAGO 26489 (IN 0313501.
8.
SANTIAGO 26512 |IN 0317221
1.
PROPOSE USE REFS FOR FUOMEN. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND
CAVEATS.
2.
FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.N
*REFS ATTACHED.
DATE:
13 SEPTEMBER 1973
WH1/6 CI-4
1109/6 CT-4
15-174-32
ORIG:
WILLIAM M. KENT: SMB
UNIT:
ADC/UH/6
EXT:
6556/9055
COPY
13 SEP73
15124-52
2-
CHD
COATING CATALANS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2
CLY:
IMFDET
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14-00000
1/4-ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THUS BOX.
OUTGOING MESSAGE
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0 0
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0 PADER 0 NO INDER
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TO:
0
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FILE.
DATE TIME GROUP
1319612
MRO
26-5-
Cite
DIRECTOR
PLAN) SSS. P5/864, 056/162.
Cl. CITOP. Ors/Int. Doo,
PAGE
00
PAGES
MESSAGENCE DA
454587
DISSEM BY: 38
PER
INMEDIATE ARGENTINA, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE,
SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PORT AU
PRINCE, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY, MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY,
:
P
HUAH MAN
DESCR
ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, PORT AU SPAIN, MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS
INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO.
BOOK CABLE
OFUOMEN
.
FUOMEN SUMMARY OF COMP EVENTS
1. FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND AND FOR PASSING LOCAL
AUTHORITIES AS YOU SEE FIT:
427
Eu11/6
2. FOUR-MAN MILITARY JUNTA THAT REVOLTED. AGAINST MARXIST RE-
GIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON IL SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED FULL CONTROL OF
THE COUNTRY, WITH EXCEPTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN CAPITAL. ON
12 SEPT THERE WAS FIRGHTING IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO BETWEEN TROOPS AND
SNIPERS HOLED UP IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS WHERE
ALLENDE SUPPORTERS WERE BARRICADED IN FACTORIES.
.
AND NIGHT
^
SPORADIC FIRING AND
EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT DAY BUT STRICT CURFEW KEPT OBSERVERS
FROM WITNESSING ACTION. CURFEW EXTENDED TO NOON 13 SEPT.
3. AUTHORITIES ESTIMATED DEATH TOLL TO BE OVER 250 MILITARY
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RECORD COPY
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CLASSIFICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
15-124-52
1350873
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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☐ NO INDEE
AND. CIVILIANS.
BY 14 SEPTEMBER.
454587
DISSEM BY:
PER
།
THEY EXPECTED TO ELIMINATE LAST POCKETS RESISTANCE
NEWSPAPERS
3. JUNTA-CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS AND ONE TV STATION
OPERATING. PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY.
PLANNED RESHUME LIMITED EDITIONS 13 SEPT BUT ARE SUBJECT TO CENSOR-
SHIP.
4.
JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT ALLENDE COMMITTED SUICIDE
IN LA MONEDA AND TROOPS ENTERING THE BUILDING FOUND HIS BODY IN A
DINING ROOM.
5. JUNTA TV PROGRAM SHOWED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET MADE
AUTOMATIC WEAPONS COLLECTED AT LA □MONEDA AND AT ALLENDE RESIDENCE
ON TOMAS MORO STREET AFTER FIGHTING.
b. JUNTA PRESIDED OVER BY GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET CARMY), AN
INTELLIGENT, PROFESSIONAL OFFICER WITH NO KNOWN POLITICAL TIES;
ADMIRAL JOSE MERINO (NAVY), WHO IS INCLOINED TOWARDS NATIONAL PARTY
(CONSERVATIVE}; GEN. GUSTAVO LEIGH (AIR FORCE), A STRONG LEADER
WHO FORMER SUPPORTER RADICAL PARTY AND KNOWN TO DISLIKE CHRISTIAN
OF
A
DEMOCRATES; AND GENBERAL CESAR MENDOZA, {CARABINERO CHIEF) WHO HAS
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
Date OFFICERS
ADTHENTICATUFFED
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3
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#
0 ps
CLOSE TIES TO MILITARY AND APPARENTLY HELPED PLAN COUP.
7.
JUNTA NAMED FOLLOWING CABINET 12 SEPT:
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
MINISTER OF INTERIOR
-
MAJ GEN OSCAR BONGILLA CARMY},
WHO SERVED AS PRESIDENT FREI'S SENIOR MILITARY AIDE FOR
TWO YEARS.
MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
-
REAR ADMIRAL ISMAEL
HUERTA (NAVY), HIGHLY RESPECTED IN NAVY AND ONE OF
INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF COUP.
MINISTER OF ECONOMY MAJ GEN ROLANDO GONZALEZ (ARMY>,
REPORTED TO BE A U.P. SUPPORTER ABOUT 1971.
MINISTER OF EDUCATION
-
JOSE NAVARRO TOBAR, A
CIVILIAN BIOLOGY AND BOTANY PROFESSOR OF UNKNOWN POLITICS.
MINISTER OF JUSTICE
-
GONZALO PRIETO GANDARA, CIVILIAN
LAWYER.
MINISTER OF DEFENSE
-
VICE ADM. PATRICIO CARVAJAL,
FORMERLY CHIEF OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CSTAFF, REPORTED
INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1971.
MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
-
BRIG
.
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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454587
PER
0
PORTO
0 MIN
0 m
0 NO POWE
GEN SERGIO FIGUEROA CAIR FORCE), REPORTED IN EARLY 1972
TO BE AMONG ANTI-U.P. AIR FORCE COLONELS.
MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE
-
COL SERGIO CRESPO CRET. AIR
FORCE), AGRICULTURAL AND CIVIL ENGINEER.
MINISTER OF LABOR - GEN MARIO MACKAY {CARABINEROS},
ANTI-U.P. OFFICER NAMED IN JULY AS COMMANDER IN CONCEP-
CION.
-
COL ALBERTO SPOERER CAIR
MINISTER OF PUBLIC HEALTH
FORCE), FORMER CIVILIAN SURGETION DESCRIBED AS HARD
WORKER.
-
MINISTER OF MINING GEN ARTURO YOVANE {CARABINEROS},
WHO WAS SCHEDULDED TO BE RETIRED BY ALLENDE IN AUGUST,
CLOSE TO MILITARY.
MINISTER OF HOUSING BRIG GEN ARTURO VIVERO, HARD-
WORKING STAFF OFFICER WHOSE PERFORMANCE UNDER PRESSURE
SOMEWHAT WEAK.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
CLASSICATIO
SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT
-
COL PEDRO EUING
(ARMY), DESCRIBED AS INTELLIGENT, PATRIOTIC, CONSERVATIVE.
LESING OFFICES
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
⚫ E 2 ☐ IMPOFT
SECRET
CL BY: 057556
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107
100
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18
DATE-TIME GROUP
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MESSAGE REFERENCE AUGER
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0
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454587
PER
#
UNDERSECRETARY OF INTERIOR
-
LTH COL ENRIQUE MONTERO
(AIR FORCE) FORMER LEGAL OFFICER IN AIR FORCE.
MINISTER OF LANDS AND COLONIZATION
-
GEN DIEGO PARRA
RETIRED CARABINERO OFFICER, ON WHOM LITTLE IS KNOWN.
MINISTER OF FINANCE
-
REAR ADM LORENZO ORTUZAR,
LITTLE KNOWN OFFICER.
8. JUNTA HAS BROKEN RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND WILL PROBABLY BR
BREAK WITH OTHER SOVIET BLOC STATES. IT WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR
STRENGTHEN TRADITIONALLY FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. AND SEEK AID AND
DEBT RELIEF FOR INTERIM.
१. JUNTA WILL PROBABLY DECLARE COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST. AND SMALL
LEFTIST PARTIES SUCH AS MIR ILLEGAL AND DISSOLVE CUT LABOR CONFEDERA-
TION. THEY DO NOT PLAN WORK WITH POLITICAL PARTIES BUAT MAY CONSULT
WITH THEM. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS EXPECTED TO EXPRESS
SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA AS IS THE OTHER MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL
GROUP, NATIONAL PARTY. STRIOKING TRUCKERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUILDS
HAVE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH COUP AND CALLED OFF STRIKE.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
:
10. FILE: 15-124-52. E 2, IMPDET.H
13 SEPTEMBER 1973
WILLIAM CLYONE,DSO
C/WH/L/RR,
7710/1069
Blast
WHD
15-124-52
RELEASING OFFICER
:
COORD COFICESS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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041-1-
1920442
05-1
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DIRECTOR
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TO: AMBURG INFO SANTIAGO, BONN.Y
FUOMEA PSYCH CASPECIAL
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REF: RANGKOG 24759 (IN 225831) Y
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3. AT THIS POINT DO NOT BELIEVE OKHERALD ATTEMPT IMPROVE
CHILEAN IMAGE IN GERMAN MEDIA STANDS MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCESS.
PER
PREFER
WE WOULD BE
LET DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN RUN ITS COURSE.
WILLING SUPPLY SPECIAL BRIEF DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE CAREFULLY SELECTED
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE OPEN TO PERSUASION AND WHOSE VIEWS WOULD CARRY
REAL HEIGHT, BUT WE DO NOT FEEL BKHERALD SHOULD ENGAGE IN GENERAL
PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF CHILEAN REGIME SINCE LATTER APPROACH BOTH
INEFFECTUAL AND NIGHT WELL BACKFIRE.Y
2.
FILE: 15-124-46/3.
EZ IMPDET H
P
KEITH GARDINER:NO
DATE:
13 APRIL 1974
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
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6556/9155
C/EUR
RSS OFFICES
CLASENICATION
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RECORD COPY
E/G/W
to
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19 Apr74
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T
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(WAAS) P.S/CG4
STAFF
PAGE 01
IN 225831
TOR:1713262 APR 74
HAMB
24759
SECRET 171253Z APR 74 STAFF
CITE HAMBURG 24759
TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.
FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL
E
1. CHIL'S IMAGE AS REFLECTED IN WEST GERMAN MEDIA COMMEN-
TARIES HAS REACHED ALL-TIME LOW AND EVEN CONSERVATIVELY INCLINED.
OUTLETS BY AND LARGE, NO LONGER BOTHER TO TELL "THE OTHER SIDE."
EASTERN RADIO STATIONS MAINTAIN RELENTLESS DRUMFIRE OF ANTI-CHILEAN
PROPAGANDA AND THERE NO APPARENT DEARTH OF INFO TO SUSTAIN
RATHER EFFECTIVE DENIGRATION CAMPAIGN.
2. IN SPITE OF DISMAL AUSPICES TO TURN TIDE, (UNLESS JUNTA
DECIDES TO SHOW SOME DECENT REGARD FOR OPINIONS OF MANKIND), WE
CAN STILL PROMOTE FAIRER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPERATIVES OF CHILEAN
SITUATION TO WHICH JUNTA APPARENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO RESPOND.
TOWARD THAT END. REQUIRE SOME TYPE OF OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF PREDICTABLE TRENDS.
APPRAISAL CHECK:
3,
FILE DEFER. È2 IMPOET.
SECRET
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14-00000
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PER
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PAGE 01-01
IN 888779
TOR:0421402 APR 73
SAGO
24516
SECRET 0421182 APR 73 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO 24516
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,
REFS!
A. SANTIAGO 24477
8.
1.
DIRECTOR 391223
(in 878 105).
IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS REF & INFO IF IT
WERE SURFACED GR IF IT CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.P.
GOVERNMENT, STATION RECOMMENDS AGAINST FUOMEN EXPLOITATION
AT THIS TIME,
2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET
RECORD COPY
SECRET
AN Ko
AB ✗
✗
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15-124-52
04 APR 73
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
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STAFF
1
2
4
PAGE 1
IN 136884
TOR:1417172 JAN 74
SAGO 27899
SECRET. 1415502 JAN 74 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO 27899
TO: DIRECTOR, PARIS, HELSINK!. BONN, TOKYO, LONDON.
RYBAT FUUMEN
REF: *DIRECTOR 499469
-
∙15-124-52
"...OTHER PRICE RISES
1, WISH TO OFFER FOLLOWING SUGGESTED CHANGES IN REF.
WHICH BASED ON LATEST INFO AVAILABLE LOCALLY. PARA 31
"...CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO FOR IMPORTS/EXPORTS BY
SLIGHTLY OVER 100 PERCENT IN AN EFFORT TO CURB IMPORT DEMAND,
ENCOURAGE EXPORTS AND EASE PRESSURES..."
BROUGHT INFLATION FOR THE YEAR TO 588 PERCENT..." (FOR DIRECTOR:
WHILE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES BY BOTH EMBASSY AND IMF IN NOVEMBER
PLACED INFLATION FOR THE KEAR AT PROBABLY BETWEEN 750 AND 800
PERCENT. THE END-OF-THE-YEAR FIGURE OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICAL
INSTITUTE WAS 508.1 SE= SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 0173
OF 11 JANUARY.)
2. PARA 4 LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ "THE MASSIVE 3,5
BILLION DOLLAR FUREIGN deal..." PARA 7: "MONTHLY COPPER
PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 56 PERCENT OVER
THE AVERAGE DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1973 AND PRODUCTION
> E CRET
TRAVEL PREGNAN
ABSTRACT
630
DOCH WYCH
17.
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KAM 121.49
REST
15321
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14 Ja.. 74
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
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STAFF
T 807548
PAGE 82-82
TOR!1417172 JAN 74
IN 136884
SAGO 27899
WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD OF AT LEAST 850,000 TONS IN 1974..."
3.
NO FILE. EZ IMPDET
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0
CLASSIFICATION
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#
TO: PARIS, HELSINKI, SONN, TOKYO, LONDON INFO SANTIAGO.
RYBAT FUOMEN
1.
FOLLOWING SUNNARY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN
CHILE AT BEGINNING OF 1974 MAY BE USEFUL FOR ORAL BRIEFINGS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WHO INTERESTED IN CHILE
☑
STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.
2. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC. THE NEW
MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED MAJOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND HASH
PANES
ESTE
MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO 'REORGANIZE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MORE Will
EFFICIENTLY, TO CREATE AN APOLITICAL CIVIL SERVICE, AND TO CORRECT
THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE
SOCIALISM. ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH AUSTERE, ARE SOUND AND
OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN
ECONOMY. THE STRICT SECURITY MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE JUNTA HAVE
BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PREVENTING ANY LARGE-SCALE VIOLENCE OR TERRORISM
AND ARE LIKELY TO BE CONTINUED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
3. THE JUNTA MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP OF 13 SEPTEMBER TO
RENOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
13
ALLEASING OFFICER
сегэст
RECORD COPY
11 Jan74
.15-124-52
COORDINATING OFFICERS
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65755L
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0
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499969
CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB
IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON THE COUNTRY'S MEAGER FOREIGN
EXCHANGE RESERVES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88%
IN OCTOBER, AND OTHER PRICE RISES PUSHED INFLATION TO SOME 770%
FOR THE YEAR.
4.
THE JUNTA HAS NOW AGREED TO FOLLOW THE STABILIZATION
1973 31.
PROGRAM PROPOSED BY AN IMF TEAM WHICH VISITED CHILE IN LATE 
1979.
THIS PROGRAM CALLS FOR TIGHTER FEDERAL SPENDING AND FOR LIMITING
THIS IMF PROGRAM IS FEASIBLE BUT MAY .
INFLATION TO 100% IN 1974.
BE SOMEWHAT OVER-OPTIMISTIC, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WORLD-WIDE ENERGY
CRISIS WILL SOON FORCE CHILE TO RAISE FUEL PRICES, THUS EXACCER-
BATING THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING INFLATION.
ADHERENCE TO THE IMF
PROPOSAL HAS, HOWEVER, IMPROVED CHILE'S COREDIT RATING, AS HAS THE
SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CHILE'S
1971-1972 DEBT. CHILE IS THUS IN A RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION FOR
THE OPENING OF THE PARIS CLUB TALKS IN FEBRUARY.
THE MASSIVE #4
BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGN DEBT, HOWEVER, WILL CAUSE CHILE BALANCE OF
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
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0
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7.
INFO:
FILE
4/99469.
0
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0
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0
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0 APPKES
#
· COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN 50%
OVER. LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AND PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY REACH A RECORD
750,000 TONS IN 1974 DESPITE SPORADIC SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND
SERVICEABLE VEHICLES. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO
RECOVER FULLY UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SO THAT AGRICULTURAL
IMPORTS, PARTICULARLY GRAIN, WELL CONTINUE TO BE A DRAIN ON CHILE'S
FOREIGN RESERVES.
8. THE JUNTA HAS DEMONSTRATED GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF
FOREIGN EQUITY AND HAS LINED UP SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO
ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAY-
MENTS GAP.THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN TO SETTLE OUT-
STANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS EMANATING FROM ALLENDE NATIONALIZA-
TIONS, STATING THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE
PRIVATE SECTOR, OR AS IN THE CASE OF LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY
COMPENSATE PREVIOUS OWNERS. FORMER PRIVATE BANKS WILL ALSO BE
RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OWNERS, BUT PROBABLY WITH SONE FORMULA
THERE ARE ALSO
INVOLVING WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BANK MANAGEMENT.
STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AND PRIVATE
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COMING OFFICEMS
THENTICATING OFFICE
SEASON AP
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
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FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW SUBSTANTIALLY DURING
0
# .
1974.
9.
INTERNALLY, THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUST-
MENT OF EXCHANGE RATE HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISH-
ING BLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, THE
BURDEN OF AUSTERITY ON CHILEAN CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE
HEALTHY INCREASES IN WAGES AND RENEWED CONFIDENCE BY BUSINESSMEN,
WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST
NECESSITIES, AND WORKING CLASS LABOR IS TAKING A WAIT AND SEE
ATTITUDE. THERE IS, HOWEVER, NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA
FOR ITS PROGRAMS. SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS, PARTICULARLY THE
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) ARE GRUMBLING, BUT THIS DISSATIS-
FACTION IS LARGELY DUE TO GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SET UP NEW NON-
POLITICAL-PARTY MECHANISMS FOR REACHING THE PUBLIC.
10.
GOVERNMENT "RECESSING" OF CONGRESS AND ALL POLITICAL
PARTIES HAS CREATED A POLITICAL VACUUM IN CHILE. THE GOVERNMENT
WHICH HOLDS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR CHILE'S
CURRENT PLIGHT, IS TRYING TO FILL THIS VOID BY AN INTENSE USE OF
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COGAD MO
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REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1 PROMIBITED
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499469
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0
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0
iini
CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES.
THIS
#
PHENOMENON IS MOST APPARENT IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN
SUCH TECHNICAL FIELDS AS PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING.
THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE GROUP OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS HEADED BY RAUL SAEZ, FOR EXAMPLE
IS WELL KNOWN. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS AN ADVISORY BOARD
DEOMINATED BY THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WHILE THE MINISTRY OF
HOUSING'S BOARD IS LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENT-
ING PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION FIRMS. SIMILARLY, ALMOST EVERY MINISTRY
AND MANY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES HAVE PERMANENT CIVILIAN ADVISORY
BOARDS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GROUPS WHOSE WELFARE IS
AFFECTED BY THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.
0
11. IN ADDITION TO THESE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS, THERE ARE A
LARGE NUMBER OF "STUDY COMMISSIONS" THROUGH WHICH CIVILIANS CAN
EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE. BEST KNOWN OF THESE IS THE GROUP IF INTER-
NATIONAL LAWYERS WHICH IS DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION, BUT THERE
ARE OTHER GROUPS WORKING ON A NEW MINING CODE, STUDYING THE EDUCA-
TIONAL SEYSTEM, COLLECTING INFORMATION ON UAEMPLOYMENT, WRITING A
STATUTE FOR WORKER PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, AND
DETE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
LEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICENS
AUTHENTRATING OFFICER
CLASSICATION
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
E 2
SECRET
IMPDET
CL BY: 097556
:
.

14-00000
OUTGOING
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100
0
0
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PACTO
6
DATE TIME GROUP
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0
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0
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499469
0
I PILES
#
DELVING INTO A DOZEN OTHER TOPICS.
12.
ALTHOUGH SOME CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HOLD INFLUENTIAL GOVERN-
MENT POSITIONS, MOST CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE EITHER CONSERVATIVE OR
APOLITICAL. LACK OF MORE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION BY CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATS MAY CREATE PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE,
ESPECIALLY SINCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING WORKERS, CAMPESINOS
AND POBLADORES (WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED EITHER THE CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC) OR THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT) ARE SO FAR
THE GOVERNMENT HAS
INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON ADVISORY COUNCILS.
ESTABLISHED UNITS ADDRESSED TO YOUTH, WOMEN, GUILDS AND NEIGHBOR-
HOOD CIVIC GROUPS IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT, AND
HOPES THAT THESE WILL SERVE AS VEHICLES FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-PEOPLE
COMMUNICATION.
13.
THE JUNTA LEADERS VIEW WITH DISTRUST ALL PDC EFFORTS TO
WIN NEW POLITICAL ADHERENTS FROM THE WORKING CLASSES WHICH FORMERLY
SUPPORTED ALLENDE'S UP COALITION AND REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THE
PDC IS NOT RESPECTING THE POLITICAL RECESS.
THE JUNTA IS
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PDC'S LEFT WING
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICED
COORDINATOKEAS
ATING OFFER
CLASSICA
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS RECHUTED
SECRET
CL BY:
HAPDIT
057556
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OUTGOING . .SSAGE
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INFO: FILE
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PAGE
OF
PACES
DATE-TIME GROUP
CITO
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
DIRECTOR
0
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DISSEM BY:
0
NO UNDES
0
TURN TO
PER
499469
0 IPPLES
#
WILL AID THE FORMER UP PARTIES IN RETURN FOR FUTURE ELECTORAL
SUPPORT.
14. ONE PROBLEM OF MAJOR CONCERN TO THE JUNTA IS THE POSSIBILITY
THAT PERU MAY ATTACK CHILE SOME TIME PRIOR TO 1979, THE 100TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR BETWEEN CHILE AND PERU, IN ORDER TO REGAIN
THE CHILEANS ARE WORRIED BY
SOME OF THE TERRITORY LOST IN THAT WAR.
THE SOVIET SALE OF ARMS TO PERU AND FEAR THAT THE USSR MAY BE TRY-
ING TO CREATE ANOTHER UNSTABLE MIDDLE EAST TYPE" OF CLIMATE IN
LATIN AMERICA.
15.
THE JUNTA IS ALSO CONCERNED BY COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO CREATE
INTERNAL DISCONTENT AND TO MOUNT AN INTERNAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT.
THE JUNTA EXPECTS THAT THE FORMER UP PARTIES, LED BY THE COMMUNISTS,
WILL SET UP A UNIFIED FRONT FOR CAUSING CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES AND
POLITICAL DISCONTENT, AND WILL TRY TO MANIPULATE THE PHDC INTO
TWO FRONTS FOR CHILEAN RESISTANCE
OPPOSING THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT.
ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN ARGENTINA AND SEVERAL ARE DEING SET UP IN
EUROPE.
lb.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DESPITE THE PROBLEMS NOTED ABOVE, THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT IS
15-124-52
IMPOET
CL BY: 057556
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIONED
E 2
CLASSIFICA
SECRFT
14-00000
OMF
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LO
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←
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INDER
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.
0
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#
IN FIRM CONTROL IN CHILE AND HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN
REORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT AND IN ENLISTING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
RITS PROGRAMS. PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ARE
THE BEST WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED FROM A COUNTRY. WHOSE
ENTIRE ECONOMY WAS A SHAMBLES IN SEPTEMBER 1973.
17. FILE:
15-124-52.
E2, IMPDET.H
DATE: 10 JANUARY 1974
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT
JEANNE LINTON:LSS
C/WH/6/SA
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Спо
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XR/AN, EU48, 555
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TO: HAMBURG INFO BONN, SANTIAGO.
FUOMEN CASPECIAL CAFECET
PAGE
09
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(63)
DARES
1. FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF CHILEAN ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OF RISK
FACTORS INVOLVED IN MAKING INVESTMENTS IN CHILE PREPARED FOR PASSAGE
TO HERMES BANK PER REF PARA 1 REQUEST.
A. THE RULING JUNTA IN CHILE IS MOVING AGGRESSIVELY TO
REBUILD THE ECONOMY BY ADOPTING A HARSH AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND IN-
STITUTING POLICIES DESIGNED TO RETURN CHILE TO A MARKET ECONOMY.
B. SANTIAGO MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE COUP TO REMOVE PRICE.
CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC COMMODITIES, WHILE THE CENTRAL BANK
EFFECTIVELY DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME 60% IN AN EFFORT TO CURB
IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON SANTIAGO'S MEAGER FOREIGN EX-
CHANGE RESERVAES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S COST OF LIVING JUMPED 88%
IN OCTOBER, BRINGING INFLATION TO NEARLY 450% FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS
OF THE YEAR. ANTICIPATED PRICE RISES DURING THE REST OF 1973 IS EX-
PECTED TO PUSH INFLATION TO SOME 750% FOR THE YEAR.
c. THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RECORD COPY
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICE
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
له
048EC73
15-1244
15-126-57
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EXCHANGE RATES HAS PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE ONCE FLOURISHING BLACK
MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE.
WHILE EXCHANGE RATES
CHANGED AND PRICES ROSE, THE GROWTH IN THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS BEEN
SHARPLY CURTAILED, CAUSING A RELATIVE SCARCITY OF LOCAL CURRENCY AND
A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH FOR BUSINESSMEN.
.D. THE BURDEN ON CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY.
DESPITE A
HEALTHY INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM WAGE, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS ARĖ
FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE BAREST NECESSITIES.
AUSTERITY HAS BEEN EXACERBATED IN MANY CASES BY DISMISSALS OF
RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY SUSPECT EMPLOYEES HIRED
UNDER THE ALLENDE REGIME. AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM HAS
BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM IS UNDER CON-
SIDERATION.
E. THE JUNTA IS ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND BUSINESS IS SHOWING RENEWED CONFIDENCE.
CONSUMERS AND LABOR, HOWEVER, ARE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE.
ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA OR ITS PROGRAMS HAS MATERIALIZED,
EVEN THOUGH SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE GRUMBLING AND PREDICTING
DATE:
NO
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
ING OFFICER
NATHAN JAGERS
AUTHENTICATING OFFICES
REPRODUC
BY OTHER THAN TRE ISSUING OFFICE IS PR
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NUMBER
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FAILURE FOR THE JUNTA.
F. CHILE STILL FACES LARGE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICITS
IN BOTH 1973 AND 1974 EVEN IF DEBT-REPAYMENTS ARE RESCHEDULED IN BOTH
YEARS. WITH A MASSIVE 04 BILLION FOREIGN DEBT HANGING OVER SANTIAGO'S
HEAD, IT WILL AT LEAST BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE CHILE'S BALANCE-OF-
PAYMENTS POSITION IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY.
G. HOWEVER, COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE
THAN 50% ABOVE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AS A RESULT OF A 9% LENGTHENING OF
THE WORK WEEK AND IMPROVED MINE MANAGEMENT. PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY
REACH A RECORD 750,000 TONS NEXT YEAR DESPITE CONTINUING SHORTAGES OF
SPARE PARTS AND SERVICEABLE VEHICLES.
H. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CONTINUE TO BE THE LARGEST DRAIN
ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE RECOVERY OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS A
PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF THE JUNTA. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, IS NOT EX-
PECTED TO FULLY RECOVER UNTIL THE 1974/75.HARVEST SINCE MOST CROPS
ALREADY ARE PLANTED AND ARE WELL INTO THEIR GROWING SEASONS. THUS,
CHILE WILL CONTINUE TO IMPORT GRAIN IN LARGE QUANTITIES DURING 1974.
I. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEMS OF ADEQUATE SHORT RUN SUPPLIES
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICES
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
FORM
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
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487650
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#
OF RAW MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS MUST BE SOLVED TO BOOST PRODUCTION
QUICKLY, LONG RUN GROWTH WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHILE'S ABILITY TO
ATTRACT ADEQUATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ATTRACTION OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW –
INVESTMENT WILL DEPEND ON THE JUNTA'S ABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD
FAITH IN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN EQUITY AS ATHEIR ABILITY TO INSTILL
CONFIDENCE IN CHILE'S PROSPECTS FOR STABLE RECOVERY AND GROWTH. A
CRITICAL FIRST STEP IS TIMELY SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION
CLAIMS EMANATING FROM THE ALLENDE NATIONALIZATIONS. THE JUNTA HAS
STATED THAT IT WILL EITHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRMS TO THE PRIVATE
SECTOR OR, AS IN THE CASE OF THE LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY
COMPENSATE THE PREVIOUS OWNERS. SOME 90 FIRMS ARE ALREADY IN THE
PROCESS OF REVERSION.
J. THUS FAR THE JUNTA HAS SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SUF-
FICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL CAPITAL
GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE
STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFICENCE,
1. 
AND PRIVATE FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW DRAMATICALLY DURING THE
NEXT 12 MONTHS.
DATE:
ORIG:
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#
K. THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR CHIBLE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTI-
MISTIC AS THE JUNTA TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY
THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM.
THE PROGRAMS,
THOUGH AUSTERE, ARE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION
FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE MAJOR POLICY
CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE OVER THE DEGREE AND
TIMING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES RATHER THAN PROBLEMS OF BASIC POLICY
ORIENTATION.
L. THE EMERGING DOMINANCE OF RAUL SAEZ AS SENIOR ECONOMIC
ADVISOR IS PROBABLY FOR THE BEST SINCE THE JUNTA'S AUSTERITY PROGRAM
MUST BE TEMPERED IF POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND
STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. MEANWHILE, CHILE IS PREPARING TO
SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES AND COMPLETE BILATERAL NE-
GOTIATIONS ON 1971/72 DEBT SERVICE IN ACCORD WITH THE 1972 PARIS
CLUB AGREEMENTS. TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES WILL GO FAR
IN IMPROVING INVESTOR AND CREDITOR CONFIDENCE IN CHILE.
2. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGESTED TO ELICIT HERMES' VIEWS
ON CHILE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF.
DATE:
ORIGI
UNIT:
EXT:
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICE
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15-124-52
15-126-52
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A. HOW MUCH AND WHAT KINDS OF PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT FROM GERMAN AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES IS EXPECTED TO
ENTER CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHS?
B. • DO BANK OFFICIALS EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL PRIVATE AND/OR
OFFICIAL GERMAN CREDITS TO BE EXTENDED TO CHILE DURING NEXT 12 MONTHSP
WHAT TYPES OF CREDITS WOULD THESE BE, I.E. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
RELIEF, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, TIED AND UNTIED TRADE CREDITS?
C. DO BANK OFFICIALS SEE THE WIDESPREAD ADVERSE PUBLIC
REACTION IN EUROPE TO THE NEW CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AS SIGNIFICANTLY
AFFECTING FUTURE INVESTMENT AND AID DECISIONS FOR CHILE?
3. HERMES' REACTION TO ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS WILL
BE OF INTEREST.
4.
FILE: 15-126-52. E2, IMPDET.H
*REF ATTACHED.
JEANNE LINTON: SMB
DATE:
4 DECEMBER 1973
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
C/WH/6/SA
6609/1069
C/EUR
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TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA,
.
MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR,
MANAGUA.
RYBAT FUOMEN
REF:
DIRECTOR-458246
1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS, STIPU-
LATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.
IN LIMA.
SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING
12. SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SUPPORT BY LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST
PARTIES FOR RESISTANCE IN CHILE.
3. BACKGROUND: IT WAS INDICATED IN AN EARLIER BRIEFING
(REFF THAT SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU (PCP/SOVIET INTENDED TO
SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN ANY RESISTANCE
MOVEMENT IN CHILE.
4. THE FIRST WORD OF CHILEAN COUP WAS RECEIVED BY PCP/SOVIET
FROM CHILEAN EMBASSY IN LIMA. CENTRAL COMMITTEE CALLED AN EMERGENCY
✓
MEETING WHEN IT APPEARED THAT EVENTS IN CHILE WERE GOING AGAINST
ti
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·26 Sep 73
RECOTTERY WH/6 CT-4-15-124-52
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ALLENGE REGIME.
UHILE WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM HOSCOW, CENTRAL
COMMITTEE DECIDED TAKE CERTAIN MEASURES SUCH AS SENDING SIX
ORGANIZERS INTO CHILE. THESE ORGANIZERS WERE MEMBERS OF PERUVIAN
COMUNIST YOUTH, WHO USED PASSPORTS OBTAINED EARLIER FROM CHILEAN
EMBASSY IN CASE OF SUCH AN ENERGENCY.
PASSPORTS WERE LEGITIMATE,
GUT PATA IN THEM, INCLUDING NANES, WERE FALSE. THE PERUVIANS WERE
TO CROSS INTO CHILE AT THE TACNA/ARICA BORDER POINT AND WERE TO BE
ACCOMPANIED BY A NUMBER OF BOLIVIANS AND BRAZILIANS.
5. ON 15 SEPTEMBER, TWO UNIDENTIFIED MEN WHO WERE LATIN
AMERICANS BUT NOT PERUVIANS BROUGHT TO PCP/SOVIET HEADQUARTERS
INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION {CPSU}.
INSTRUCTIONS WERE DELIVERED TO MEMBERS OF. P.CP/SOVIET CENTRAL
COMMITTEE AND INMEDIATELY DISCUSSED BY PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING
JORGE DEL PRADO CHAVEZ (PCP/SOVIET SEC GEN), FELIX ARIAS SCHREIBER
SPCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION MEMBER}, GUILLERNO HERRERA
MONTESINOS (ALSO MEMBER OF PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION), AND
ONE OF THE TWO COURIERS DELIVERING THE INSTRUCTIONS WHO USED:
THE ALIAS "FIGUEROA." FOLLOWING DISCUSSION THESE PARTY LEADERS
DATE:
CRIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
1 SFFICES
SECRET
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INFO:
FILE
...
DARLEM SHOU
GITE
DIRECTOR
3
PAGES
354 MELEMENTE NUWREA
459557
0
75523
DISSEM BY:
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:
0 4243 #.
DEGAN PREPARING INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTY MEMBERS TO AID IN SUPPORT
THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE (PCCH).. INITIAL
INSTRUCTIONS TO PCP/SOVIET MEMBERS WERE TO ARRANGE FOR LODGING FOR
MEMBERS OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WHO WERE ARRIVING
IN LINA, TO OBTAIN MAPS OF CHILE, FALSE DOCUMENTATION, ETC.
6. SECOND STAGE OF SUPPORT TO CHILE WAS TO BEGIN DURING WEEK
OF 23 SEPTEMBER WHEN COMMUNISTS AND OTHERS WERE TO ARRIVE FROM
COUNTRIES,
VENEZUELA, PANAMA, COLOMBIA, CUBA AND OTHER
ALL WERE TO BE
LODGED IN LIMA, AND, LATER, GIVEN FALSE DOCUMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION
TO CHILEAN BORDER. THEIR PRINCIPAL TASK IN CHILE WAS TO ASSIST
IN REORGANIZATION OF PCCH FOLLOWING COUP D'ETAT, AS WELL AS IN PRO-
DUCTION OF CLANDESTINE PROPAGANDA.. THEY ALSO WERE TO STUDY POSSI-
CILITY OF AIDING IN MOUNTING CONCERTED ARMED RESISTANCE TO MILITARY
REGINE, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE. THERE WAS NO
NEED TO SEND ARMS, SINCE THERE STILL ENOUGH WEAPONS HIDDEN IN CHILE
TO NAKÉ SUCH RISK UNNECESSARY.
1
}
7. CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNISTS WERE TO NEET IN LIMA
ON 25 SEPTEMBER TO CONSIDER SENDING PERSONS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE
CATE:
OPIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
15-124-52
IMPORT
CL SY.057054
MALANG OFFICE
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17
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GUERRILLA GROUPS THERE AND TO AID CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.
SOME DELEGATES
TO MELTING ARRIVED EARLY IN ORDER ATTEND REGIONAL MEETING OF INTER-
NATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO) WHICH BEGAN 19 SEPT. JUAN CAMPOS
1
CAMPOS, CHILEAN, SECRETARY. FORLATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS OF WORLD FEDER-
ATION OF TRADE UNIONS (UFTU), WHO IS IN LINA FOR ILO NEETING, HELD
PRESS CONFERENCE ON 13 SEPTEMBER DURING WHICH HE CALLED ON ALL WORLD
TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS TO MOUNT PUBLIC OPINION CRUSADE AGAINST
CHILEAN JUNTA.
.8. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET Å
DATE:
UNIT:
EXT:
26 SEPTEMBER 1973 KAT
WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
ABC/21/6
655679355
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INFO: FILE
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CISES AIMAN
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459023
DISSEM OY: 9
0
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PER
0
IP FILES
TO: PRIORITY LIMA.
RYBAT FUOMEN
REFS: A.. PANAMA CITY 25754 IN 0353091
B.
8. LIMA 26010 |IN 0381801
1. REF A WAS USED FOR FUOMEN. AS FOLLOW-UP WOULD LIKE USE REF
LIMA 76010,
SUBJECT YOUR CONCURRENCE AND CAVEATS. WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN
EXILE IN LINA AND DELETE REFERENCES TO SOURCES IN REPORT (PIP PENE-
TRATION AGENT AND HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL OF PERUVIAN SERVICE WHO IS
PROFESSIONAL INTEL OFFICER) AND ALTER TEXT ACCORDINGLY.
VISE.
2. FILE: 15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.N
*REFS ATTACHED.
PLEASE AD-
DATE:
QHIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
25 SEPTEMBER 1973
WILLIAM M. KENT:SMB
ADC/WH/b
6556/915S
RECORD
WALL CT-Y
15-424-52
25 J. 13
C/UHD
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#
To:'
PRIORITY DONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS,
LONDON.
RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN
REF: BONN 24475 (IN 037592)
0
1. IN GENERAL TERMS BUSINESSES LEGALLY NATIONALIZED_SUCH_AS_
COPPER COMPANIES, BANKS AND ITT HAVE DECOME GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND
WILL NOT BE RETURNED, WHILE BUSINESSES WHICH WERE INTERVENED,
INCLUDING MOST DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING FIRMS, MAY BE RETURNED TO
THEIR FORNER OWNERS. THE SAME GENERAL CRITERIA APPLY TO PROPERTY:
LARGE FARMS LEGALLY EXPROPRIATED WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO THEIR
FORMER OWNERS, WHILE FARMS ILLEGALLY OCCUPIED PROBABLY WILL BE
RETURNED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT TO CUR KNOWLEDGE NO
LIST EXISTS WHICH SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIES WHICH BUSINESSES OR
PROPERTIES FALL INTO WHICH CATEGORY. WE HAVE NO FURTHER DETAILS
THIS SUBJECT.
"
2.
FILE:
15-124-52. ER, IMPLET.N
DATE:
24 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG:
JEANNE LINTON: LSS
15-124-5.2
UNIT:
EXT:
WH/L/SA
6609/1059
Л.
</
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WH/6 C
24
73
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//
TOTAL COPIES
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_ - WEW ON 15201
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED S
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FILE.
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• TIMAN, GEURE, 955 3.
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ACTION
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T 551709
PAGE 01
IN 337598
TOR:24145WZ SEP 73
BONN 26475
SECRET 241415Z SEP 73 STAFF
CITE BONN 26475
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS,
LONDON.
RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN
REF: A. DIRECTOR 458535
B DIRECTOR 456615
3 Loyal property of jess
C. BONN 25432 035549)
1. PARA 38 REF 3 STATES PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH
HAVE BECOME QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE
RETURNED OWNERS. REF C REQUESTED IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC
PROPERTIES INVOLVED. NOT CLEAR FROM FEF A WHETHER EXPROPRIATED
AND REQUISITIONED PROPERTIES CONSIDERED QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE
PROPERTIES OF GOVT SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS PARA 39 REF B. IN
OTHER WORDS. WHAT IF ANY FIRMS IN SOCIAL AREA HAVE NOT RECONE
LEGAL PROPERITY OF GOVERNMENT AND WHAT FIRMS HAVE BEEN TAKEN
OVER OR INTERVENED WITHOUT BECOMING LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVERN -
MENT.
2. PLS CLARIFY AND IF POSSIBLE PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
OF FIRMS INVOLVED.
SECRET
REGOOD COPY
в
11/6 C7-4
15-124-52.
24 Sep 73
14-00000
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1
2
3
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
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"
PAGE 32-02
IN 037598
TOR:2414502 SEP 73
BONN
25475
3. FILE: 15-124-52. E2 IMPDET
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0
#
9/885 C/PS/EG3.
PRIORITY BONN INFO MEXICO CITY, CHARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS,
LONDON.
RYBAT FUOMEN CAGER
REFS: A. BONUMN 26432 (IN 0355491 1*1
B. DIRECTOR 456615 1**1
1. ""SOCIAL AREA" IS TERM OFOR STATE-CONTROLLED SECTOR OF
ECQUONY STATE CONTROL OVER WIDE VARIETY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES WAS
SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DURING ALLENDE REGIME.
THROUGH PURCHASES,
EXPROPRIATIONS, REQUISITIONS, AND INTERVENTIONS OF PRIVATE SECTOR
ENTERPRISES, THE GOC BY MID-1973 HAD CONTROL OVER PRODUCTION OF
: GOODS AND SERVICES ACCOUNTING FOR ALMOST HALF OF CHILE'S GDP, COM-
PARED TO AN ESTIMATED 20% AT END OF THE FREI ADMINISTRATION IN
1970.
2. SINCE TAKING OFFICE, ALLENDE GOVT HAD TAKEN OVER AT
LEAST 400 FIRMS. THE EXECUTIVE HAD SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON VARIOUS
OCCASIONS
OCCASIONS 
BILLS THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE INCREASES IN SCOPE AND RANGE
OF GOVT-CONTROLLED SECTOR, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT
SECOTOR'S LIMITS SHOULD BE.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
ALLENDE GOVT, THEREFORE, HAD CONTINUED
RECORD COPY
COGADINETTO
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DATE-TIME GROUP
171
MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
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458535
0
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0
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#
TO REQUISITION AND INTERVENE PRIVATE SECTOR ENTERPRISES AS IT
CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED.
3. FILE: 15-1204-52. E 2, IMPDET H
*INTEND USE (REF B) FUOMEN. PLS IDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA"
PROPERTIES.
**FUOMEN ON ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.
DATE:
ORIG:
22 SEPTEMBER 1973
WILLIAM KENT;DSO
ADC/WH
UNIT:
ADC/WH/B
EXT:
COORDINATION OPeças
REPRODUCTIO, BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUJING OFFICE IS PROTE
ASKEURZSÁ
CLASSIFICATION
сес RF T
A Wedemey
G/WHD
ENTRATING OFFICER
1E 2
CL BY:
IMPDET
057556
14-00000
AGE
OUTGOING MESSAGE
SIGNAL CENTERUSE ON'.
cor
ACP
700
TPE
0 0 0 0 0
OMF 0
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
MESSAGE MANDINGOCATOR
STAFF
DATE-TIME GROUP
221719Z
MAO
25-2
спо
DIRECTOR
1
PAGES
MESSAGEDENCE NUM
458522
DISSEM RY:
"
-
TO:
CONF:
4/118
INFO:
FILE C/P/AN C/FA4, C/EURG.
+4/00. C/553. C/CPS/INT 2
0
M
0
0
RETURN 10
PER 78
0
IP PH.16
#
PRIORITY CARACAS, BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, LONDON, BONN, BERN,
MONTEVIDEO, TONKYO, ROME.
RYEAT FUOMEN
FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS,
STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.
WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES.
SOURCE: MEXICAN JOURNALIST
2. SUBJECT: REMARKS BY CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN MEXICO
AFTER THE 11 SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE.
3. SHORTLY AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE, A CUBAN EMBASSY-
OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CUBAN DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
(DGI IN MEXICO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVT WAS IMPRESSED SWITH THE
GOOD ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OVERTHROW OF THE
ALLENDE REGIME ON 13 SEPTEMBER.
4.
HE SAID THE CUBAN GOVT AND CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO WERE
NOT SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTEMPT AGAINST THE ALLENDE GOVT WAS
MADE BECAUSE THEY HAD LONG PERCEIVED THAT ALLENDE, WHILE A GOOD
MARXIST LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD HIS ENEMIES.
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
THE
5. HE SAID CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO HAD PLANS PREPARED
PREPARED
>> Sex ?3
174-52.
-
AUTHENTIC Fess
RECORD COPY
WH/6 CT-4
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICIAS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
F 2
IMPOET
CI. BY:
SECRET
057556
CLASSIFICA POM

14-00000
OUTGOING MESSAGE
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
102
ACP
OMF
0
CLASSIFICATION
AGE
SECRET
0
MESSAGE MANULING INDICATOR
CONF:
0
100
TPE
00
INFO:
FILE
DATE-TIME GROUP
спо
•
PAGE
2
من
PAGES
MESSAGE REFERENCENUMER
ស
458522
0
DISSEN BY:
MGA
0
NO OSS
0
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PER
0
→ FILIS
#
...
LONG BEFORE 11 SEPTEMBER CUBAN
IN CASE OF ALLENDE OVERTHROW.
EMBASSY BEGAN DISTRIBUTING LATEST MODEL AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES,
AND EVEN ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO CHILEAN
WORKER CADRES WITH WHOM CUBAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR
LONG TIME. MUNITIONS ALSO HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO CUBAN CADRES IN
CHILE WOHO HAD BEEN ACTIVE AMONG WORKERS. IT IS THEY WHO NOW MUST
BEAR MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREPARING THE INEVITABLE COUNTER-COUP
AGAINST MILITARY JUNTA. THIS IS EXPECTED TO TAKE TIME AND TRAINING,
BUT MEANS ARE AVAILABLE AND CUBAN WEAPONRY IS FAR SUPERIOR TO THAT OF
· CHILEAN ARMED FORCES.
6. FILE:
15-124-520. E 2, IMPDET.H
DATE:
21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
WILDGLLIAM KENT:DSO
ADC/WH/b
5515/90192
ChUNICOG. O. Biler
opes J. Genalin
C/EUR/SA
EA/JKO/Jaliz
me
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CLASSLATION
REPRODUCTIC Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROM
: SECRET
William fil. Kang
C.WH2b
OFFICES
E2: IMPDET
CL. BY:
8057556
14-00000
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONL
AGE
c.o
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ACP
THE
0
0
MOO
20
ד.
OP
PAGES
INDICATOA
STAFF
CONF: -
H & INFO:
2122587
CAB
DIRECTOR
1.35/20.
FILE CIPTIN SAU/20, -1553
c/osclic2 clois
MESSAGE REENCE NUMBER
458246
DISSEM BY:
0
MIDE
0
NO INDEE
0
PER
RETURN TO
0
ཁོས་་་
#
"43
TO: PRIORITY CARACAS, LA PAZ, QUITO, BOGOTA, MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA,
MEXICO CITY, BUENOS AIRES, GUATEMALA CITY, SAN SALVADOR, MANAGUA.
RYBAT FUOMEN
1. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN GRIEFINGS, STIPU-
LATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION. . SOURCE: CHILEAN CITIZEN RESIDING
IN LIMA.
2. SUBJECT: MEETING IN LIMA OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBBVERSIVE
ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE.
3. ON OR ABOUT 22 SEPTEMBER A MEETING IS TO BE HELD IN LIMA ON
OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMBERICAN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE
PURPOSE OF MAKING PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE
GUERRILLA GROUPS AND TO HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.
4.
THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU IS DISCUSSING THE
POSSIBILITY OF SENDING GROUPS TO CHILE TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE ANY
CHILEANS WHO ARE STILL OFFERING RESISTANCE TO THE NEW MILITARY JUNTA.
THE PARTY INTENDS TO SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA
FIGHTERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO
JOIN RESISTANCE FORCES BIN CHILE.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
RECORD COPY
RELEASING OFFICES
COORDINATING OFFICERS
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
5-124-52
21
Lep 73
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
CL BY:
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SECRET
OPERAGINATOR
MO
DATE-TIME GROUP
CATE
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
CONF:
INFO:
FILE
5. FILE: 15-124-52.
1937) Кай
21 SEPTEMBER 197
WILLIAM KENT: DSO
ADC/WH/6
5515/9192
PAGE
من
MESSAGE UNDER
Mote
0
DISSEM BY:
0
NO INDE
453246
0
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PER
0
#
E 2, IMPDET.H
DC/WH/3-
D. Meilveg.
V\\C/WHD
[RELEASING OFFICER
COORDINATING OFFICERS
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
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for
(Ш.М. Кей
C/WH/b
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TOTAL CONIES
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FILE.
Wh) 24/01/533/8
/R/INR 9/10.
PAGE 01-01
TOR: 2119172 SEP 73
SECRET 211911Z SEP 73 STAFF
CITE PANAMA CITY 25771
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,
RYBAT FUOMEN
REF A. * DIRECTOR 457922
روه
PANAMA CITY 2575 035 309.
$(035309)
CONCUR REF A.
3.
1,
2.
FILE:
15-124-52.
E2 IMPDET
24
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
AGENCY MESSAGE
4
IN 036120
PACY
25771
RECORD COPY
SECR
W11/6 074
15-124-52
21 Sp. 13
14-00000
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02/841
4/10/AN)
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
AGENCY MESSAGE
2
S
N
F
°
T 547383
RECEDENCE
PAGE 01-01
-IN-036065
TOP12118112 SEP 73
MEXI
25263
SECRE J.211828Z SEP 73 STAFF
CITE MEXICO CITY 25263
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,
RYBAT FUOMEN
REF
DIRECTOR 457888
1, CONCUR. NO CAVEATS.
2.
FILE!
15-124-52. E2 IMPOET
15
RESCED GOPY,
2.
124-
52
бер 73
14-00000
OUTGOIN
MESSAGE
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
103
0
bia
100
0 0
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CLASSICA
0
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SECRET
MESSAGE MICAFOR
STAFF
CONF:
INFO: FILE
0 mor ☐
0 MTUM
0 omn
DATE TIME GROUP
21172SZ
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CITE
DIRECTOR.
6/13/ Dose 1/3.33
457922.
DISSEM BY: 12
PER
0/13/E7S 1/13/INTS. 8/10)
من
PAGE
TO: PRIORITY PANAMA CITY.
RYBAT FUOMEN
REF: PANAMA CITY_25754 (IN 0353091
3.
PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL ALTER TEXT TO SHOW LIMA
AS PLACE ACQUIRED, OMMITTING REFERENCE TO TRAVEL OF QUIJADA OR HIS
PARTICIPATION AT MEETING.
WILL SOURCE TO CHILEAN EXILE IN LIMA,
SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE AND ANY CAVEATS.
2. FILE:
15-124-52.
E2. IMPDET.H
*MEETING IN LIMA OF LATAM SOCIALIST ORGS TO MAKE PLANS SEND MILITANTS
TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE GUERRILLA 
GROUPS AND HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
21 SEPTEMBER 1973
WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS
ADC/8H/b
6556/9155
དང ོས་ ད་ ང་ ་ ་ ་ ་ ་
C/UHD
MANG OFFICE
CLASSONN
RECORD COPY
WHE
COORDINATING Lisas
111/6 CT-Y
15-124-52.
•
21 Sup 73
Chistes SMlivery
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
SECRET
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY: 057556
14-00000
OUTGOING
MESSAGE
OMF
0
0
DIGNAL CRUTCAUSE
со
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SECRET
MENSAGEMANDLING INDICATOR
STAFF
CONF:
1/248
NO INDE
0
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☐ P
TO:
M..
0 0
INFO: FILE
1PO
COUP
2016127
0
20-1
PAQE
DP
PAGES
cne
MASSAGE PLA
DIRECTOR
1 1/352 gatos
3/01 PIX/DO
PRIORITY MEXICO CITY.
RYBAT FUOMEN
REF: "MEXICO CITY 25240 (IN 035305|
457888
DISSEM BY:
PER
#
1. PROPOSE USE REF FOR FUOMEN, WILL ON MIT NAME OF MANUEL
CORTINA AND REFER TO HIN ONLY AS OFFICER IN CUBAN EMBASSY WHO
MEMBER OF DGI. WILL SOURCE TO MEXICAN JOURNALIST WITH GOOD CON-¨
TACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES, SAME SUBJECT. PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE
AND ANY CAVEATS.'
2.
FILE:
15-124-52. E2, IMPDET N
DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1973
ORIG: WILLIAM M. KENT:LSS'
UNIT: ADC/WH/6
EXT:
6556/9155
AC/UHD
C/UHD.
RELEASING OFFICER
CLASENICATION
✓ COPY
COORD-WATER Creas
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
SECRET
will/6
WHl/6 CT-4:
15- 124-52
21 S= 73
Resmiler
AC/WH/31
AUTHENTICATION OFFICER
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY: 057556
14-00000
GABLE BEC DISSEM BY 1
PER
TOTAL COPIES
RUN
SE CR
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.
_ ADVANCE. COPY ISSUED BORTED
EUR 3-1115
REPRODICTION BY OTHER THAN
IS-VING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
AGENCY MESSAGE
ACTION UNIT
1
CLEURS
ACTIONS
097
°
546182
RF. FILE.
VR.
Clifton, clSs3 clWH18
1
4
N
2
S
6
F
PAGE 21-01
IN 235549
TORI211212Z SEP 73
BONN 26432
SECRET. 210956Z SEP. 73 STAFF
CITE BONN 26432
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, PARIS,
LONDON.
0
RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN
REF:
DIRECTOR 456615
1. INTEND USE FUOMEN INFO REF. TO INCREASE. USEFULNESS,
PLS AIDENTIFY "SOCIAL AREA" PROPERTIES REFERRED TO PARA 38.
REF.
2. FILE 15-124-52.
82-IMPDET
SECRET
RECORD COPY
D
W-6 CI-4
15-124-52
21 Jet 73
14-00000
OUTGOING MESSAGE
SIGNAL GENITALE ONLY
OMF
0
LIBRIFICATION
ALE
5.0
•
703
TPE
0 0 0 0 0
SECRET
•
l
ICATOR
DATE TIME GROUP
CITO
STAFF
CONF:
162384Z
DIRECTOR
0
INCO
MISSALONTERENCE NUMBER
455635
DISSEM BYS,
INFO: FILE S
0
NO INDEE
51503
0
SETUNG T
PER
0
1001153
#
TO:
PRIORITY MEXICO CITY, CARACAS, BRASILIA, BONN, PARIS, LONDON.
RYBAT FUOMEN
1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS,
STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLITATION. SOURCE: CHILEAN BUSINESSMAN
WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN MILITARY JUNTA GOVERNMENT.
2. SUBJECT: "ECONOMIC PLANS OF CHILEAN MILITARY JUNTA.
3. ON 15 SEPTEMBER GENERAL SERGIO NUNO, MINISTER VICE PRESIDENT
OF CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CORFOR, CUTLINED MILITARY JUNTA'S.
ECONOMIC PLANS AS FOLLOWS:
A. ALL OF FIRMS AND COMPANIES WHICH HAVE DEEN EITHER TAKEN
OVER OR INTERVENED BUT WHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY OWNED BY GOVERNMENT,
WILL BE RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL OWNERS:
B.
"IN
,
THOSE PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" WHICH HAVE BECOME
LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT BE RETURNED TO PREVIOUS OWNERS. NUNO
SAID HE BELIEVES THAT A GIVEN PERCENTAGE OF OWNERSHIP OF THESE
PROPERTIES, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 40 OR SOX, SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
TO THE WORKERS, AND REMAINING PERCENTAGE SHOULD BE SOLD AS SHARES
TO THE PUBLIC.
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
པ་་
B
WH16 CI=4 18 SEP 73
15-124-52
ECOND.COPY
LEA
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
CLASS CATION
SECRET
AUTHENTIC OPER
E 2
IMPDET
CL BY: 057556
14-00000
OUTGOING MESSAGE
OMF
0
CLASIFICATION
AGE
TIONAL CENTERUSE ONLY
com
W.
10
tre
0 0 0 0 0
SECRET
MESSAGE HANDLING INDULATOR
DATE-TIME GROUP
CONF:
INFO: FILE
03ɑ
MESSAGE
PAGES
2
0
DISSEM BY:
456615
0 44314288
0
ALAN
PER
0
13
TO THE PUBLIC.
ACCORDING TO NUNON PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF THESE INDUSTRIES
4.
HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN WORKING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
THEY
ARE TO REQUEST ANY HELP THEY NEED FROM ARMED FORCES, AND IN EVENT
OF ANY PROBLEMS, THEY ARE TO CONTACT GENERAL NUNG, WHO WILL ATTEMPT
TO HELP THEM.
5. GENERAL NUNO SAID THAT CORFO HAS IN EFFECT ASSUMED THE
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. GENERAL
NUNO AND CORFO WILL WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
SOCIETY (SOFOFA), WHICH HAS APPOINTED EUGENIO HEIREMANS AS SOFOFA
COORDINATOR WITH CORFO.
b. FILE:
15-124-52. E2, IMPDET.H
DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
:
EXT:
18 SEPTENBER 1973
WILLIAM M. KENT: SIB
ADC/UH/6
655679155
CYEUR
Jo
CICATION
ma
SA/WH/5120
C/WH
CURATING STRAPS
REPRODUCTI
Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUNG CHCE IS PDF
SECRET
'C/UHD
#2
ING CER
IMPDET
Y357556

14-00000
14-00000
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY.
PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED
28
PER_
TOTAL COPIES 2131
SECRETO
SUED SLOTTED WH CD OY MAS 2000 %
ADVANCE SSP ISSUED AFTED
ACTION UNT
6/4148
ACTION &
732
1 RF.
N
F
о
T 538842
FILE.
VR
I
8/18/84 6/583, 9/25/863
4/089/INT
PAGE 01-01
PEPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
INSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
AGENCY MESSAGE
S
6
IN 032783
TOR:181935Z SEP 73
SAGO
26529
SECRET 181856Z SEP 73 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO 26529
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR,
(IN 0.31351)
RYBAT FUOMEN
REF: DIRECTOR 456203
1.
CONCUR USE OF SANTIAGO 26489 (HCS 9836) FOR
FUOMEN.
NO SPECIALCAVEATS.
(IN 031722)
2, PREFER NOT USE SANTIAGO 26512 (HCS 9839) BECAUSE
OF SOURCE SENSITIVITY.
INFO WAS GIVEN DIRECTLY AND PRIVATELY
TO FUERMINE-3 BY FUABLE-2.
3.
NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.
SECRET
RECORD COPY
W116 CT-4
18 SEP73
B
15-124-52
14-00000
121
DISSEM BY
PER
19
JFB
TOTAL COPIER
RUN BY
SECRET
E2, IMPDET
CL. BY: 007622
AGENCY MESSAGE
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
WH 11
ACTION
'
179
DV
AT
2
FILE, VR, DDO, DDO/00, IP/AN, IW, OPS/INT 5, SS 4,
PS/EG 2, CI; CI/OP, FR.4, SS/SOG 3.
PAGE DI
TORI172145Z SEP 73
SECRET 171950Z SEP 73 INTEL
'
'
41 634176
SAGO 25512
TDFIR-314.075/1-75
HCS-9839
CITE SANTIAGO 26512
TO: DIRECTOR,
INTEL
Ome
SUPDATA! SOURCE! FUERMINE-3 FROM IDEN. NO INDEX.
15-9-4, CL BY 009560,
FILEDI
1719582
SECRET
FILE:
73
14-00000.
CENTRAL
DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS
Intelligence Information Cable
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED.
STATE INR 
NMCC/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA TREAS SOO ONE CRS
NSC/S
IN
031722
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of 8.0. 11632 Exemption Category 58 (1), (2). Impossible to Determine Date
of Automatic Declassification.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
COUNTRY:
CHILE
DOI
15 SEPTEMBER 1973
CITE TDFIR-314/07571-73
DIST 17 SEPTEMBER 1973
SUBJECTI
ACQ.
SOURCE!
PLANS OF EDUARDO FREI, FORMER PRESIDENT OF CHILE
AND LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO LEAVE CH
CHILE, SANTIAGO (16 SEPTEMBER 1973) FIELD NO. HCS-9839.
AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
WHOSE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY PLACES HIM IN THE
CENTER OF THE PARTY'S IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM. HE HAS
GOOD ACCESS TO BOTH THE RIGHT- AND LEFT-WING SECTORS
OF THE PDC. MUCH OF HIS PREVIOUS REPORTING HAS BEEN
CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND SOURCES.
1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1973 FORMER PRESIDENT EDUARDO
FREI.
A LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), TOLD OTHER
PDC 
LEADERS THAT HE CONSIDERED IT WISEST FOR HIM TO LEAVE
CHILE 
IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND FOR HIM TO REMAIN ABROAD UNTIL THE
DIRECTIONS 
OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY
SECRET
14-00000
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification)
dissem controla)
IN 03/22
TDFIR -314 07571-17
PAGE 7 OF PAGES
SITUATION BECOMES MORE STABLIZED,
THE
2 % (SOURCE COMMENTI MOST OF THE PDC LEADERS ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE
TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION BY LEFTIST EXTREMISTS AND THAT THEY
MAY BECOME THE POLITICAL TARGETS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
THEY ARE CONCERNED PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFERING
OF IMPORTANT POSTS TO RIGHTISTS SUCH AS ORLANDO SA ENZ.
PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY (SOFOFA). WHO
HAS BEEN NAMED AS ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS; AND LEON VILARIN, HEAD OF THE TRUCK OWNERS
FEDERATION, WHO WAS OFFERED THE POST OF MINISTER OF PUBLIC
WORKS, WHICH HE REFUSED. WHILE SAENE HAS A NUMBER OF FRIENDLY
CONTACTS WITH PDC MEMBERS, HE IS REGARDED BY THE PDC LEADERS
AS BASICALLY OPPOSED TO THE POC AND INTERESTED IN ITS ELIMINATION
AS A VIABLE POLITICAL ENTITY,)
3.
FREI SAID THAT WHILE HE IS CONSIDERING LEAVING THE COUNTRY
OF HIS OWN WILL, HE WOULD PREFER TO BE REQUESTED TO LEAVE BY THE
MILITARY GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO PROTECT HIS POLITICAL FUTURE.
HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
AND HE WOULD PREFER THAT HIS DEPARTURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE
SECRET
14-00000
IN
031722
TDFIR
-314/07571-73
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification)
(dum controle)
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
IN FEAR FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY,
4.
FIELD DISSEMI EMBASSY, DEFATT AT SANTIAGO,
REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.9. 11652, EXEMPTION
CATEOGRY 58 (2),
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
SECRET
14-00000
CABLE SEC DISDEM BY.
28
PER
TOTAL COPIES
31-1
RUBY
SECRET
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,
ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED
ACTION UNIT
WHY
ACTION ✓
184
BY AT
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PAGE 01-01
TOR:1718432 SEP 73
IN 031535
SAGO
26500
SECRET 1718142 SEP 73 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO 26500
TO: PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR..
FUORACLE FUOMEN
(IN 031341)
REES: A. MEXICO CITY 25196 CIN0313
B.
SANTIAGO 26464 CINC
(030951)
1% CONCUR PARA ONE REF A REQUEST.
2.
FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.
SECRET
C/WH/6
DC/WKS
WH/6H
WH/C/RR
WH/6/Sec'y
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AGENCY MESSAGE
1
1 RF.
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VR 10/84 58 13/194
2
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PAGE 01-01
TOR:1715582 SEP 73
SECRET 1715412 SEP 73 STAFF
CITE MEXICO CITY 25196
TO: PRIORITY SANTIAGO INFO DIRECTOR.
FUORACLE
REF. SANTIAGO 26464
(030457)
IN 031341
MEXI
Claise
WI
WH//y
1. BELIEVE GIST OF REF WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF PASSED
TO PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA AS IF IT WERE A FUOMEN ITEM, REQUEST
SANTIAGO CONCURRENCE.
2. FOR DIRECTOR:
SYMPATHY FOR ALLENDE.
OFFICIAL MEXICAN GOVT POLICY IS COMPLETE
PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA MET MRS, ALLENDE AT
AIRPORT 16 SEPT AND HAD ALREADY DECREED THREE DAYS OF OFFICIAL
MAWRNING FOR DEATH OF PRESIDENT ALLENDE 17-19 SEPT. UNLESS WE
00
!
CAN GET INFORMATION ON TRUE FACTS IN CHILE TO PRESIDENT
ECHEVERRIA DIRECTLY WH, THE LITTLE MEDIA PLAY WHICH MEXICO CITY
PRESENTLY CAPABLE OF MUSTERING WILL BE LOST IN AVALANCHE OF
SPONTANEOUS, PLANTED AND GOVT APPROVED PRO-ALLENDE MATERIAL
APPEARING LOCALLY. THE CONSENSUS OF MANY MEXICANS IS THAT THE
U.S. AND CIA IN PARTICULAR MASTERMINDED THE COUP.
3. FILE: 15-124-53/3. E2 IMPDET.
25196
SECRET
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PAGE 01-01
TOR:15:5472 SEP 73
SECRET 1515362 SEP 73 STAFF
C
CITE MEXICO CITY 25191
TO: DIRECTOR.
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITE
AGENCY MESSAT
is
161
IN 032412
MEXI -25191
कि
XOCOELISK FUOMEN
REF: DIRECTOR 454587
WIN/GARR
WH/6/Soc'y
1. GIST OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REF WAS PASSED
TO KDOBELISK-1 THROUGH KCGLACIER-3 ON 12 SEPT 2.3. ON
14 SEPT KDGLACIER-3 TOLD GRANDGENT THAT KDOBELISK-1 WAS
VERY APPRECIATIVE OF THIS REPORT. KDOBELISK-1 IS RECEIVING
NO INFORMATION FROM HIS EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO AT THIS TIME AND
HAS TO DEPEND ON NEWS RELEASES FROM CHILE AND ARGENTINA
WHICH HE CONSIDERS TO BE OF DUBIOUS ACCURACY.
2. FILE: 52-8-91/3. 53. IMPOET.
(2)
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PRECEDENCE
BY
SECRET 132233Z SEP 73 STAFF
CITE SANTIAGO 26421
TOTAL CARE.
SEC:
AT
FURE Ess
BY
1
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AGENCY MESSAGE
S
6
PAGE 21
TOR:1323242 SEP 73
IN 228495
SAGO
26421
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR PRIORITY BUENOS AIRES, LA PAZ, BRASILIA,
BOGOTA, SAN JOSE: SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO, WH/MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY,
GEORGETOWN, TEGUCIGALPA, KINGSTON, MEXICO CITY. MANAGUA, PANAMA CITY,
ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, MONTEVIDEO, CARACAS, LONDON, PARIS,
LCPIPIT, BONN.
1. EL MERCURIO, A MAJOR CONSERVATIVE SANTIAGO DAILY, APPEARED
TODAY (13 SEPTEMBER) CARRYING FOR MOST PART OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS
BY THE CHILEAN JUNTA. THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL AND ARTICLES, HOWEVER,
APPEAR WORTH REPLAYING:
A: HACIA LA RECUPERACION NACIONAL
CON DISTINTOS LENGUAJES Y CRITERIOS, LAS PERSONALIDADES
POLITICAS, LOS DIRIGENTES GREMIALES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES MAS
INFLUYENTES RECLAMABAN UN CAMBIO PROFUNDO EN LA DIRECCION CEL PAIS.
TANTO LA OPINION PUBLIC NACIONAL COMO LA EXTRANJERA HABIAN
LLEGADO A LA EVIDENCIA DE QUE CHILE ENTRABA EN UN PROCESO FATALL
QUE DEBIA LLEVARLO A LA DICTADURA MARXISTA O A LA GUERRA CIVIL
LA INTERVENCION DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS, VINO EN ESTE CASO R
Wills
A LIBERAR A LA CIUDADANIA DE LA INMINENTE DICTADURA MARXISTA
-SECRET.
RECORD COPY.
15-124-52
13 SEP 23

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.
S
6
PAGE 02
TOR:1323242 SEP 73
IN 028495
SAGO 26421
Y A SALVAR A CHILE DEL ANIQUILAMIENTO POLITICC, SOCIAL, Y ECONOMICO.
SE ABREN AHORA PERSPECTIVAS DE RECUPERACION MEDIANTE UN
INTENSO Y DISCIPLINADO ESFUERZO QUE RESTABLEZCA EL HABITO.DEL
TRABAJO. NORMALICE LAS FAENAS. DETENGA LA DESTRUCCION DEL PATRIMONIO
NACIONALLY REINICIE EL PROCESO DE CAPITALIZACION INDISPENSABLE
AL FUTURO BIENESTAR.
CON INNEGABLE SACRIFICIO Y ABNEGATION, LAS FUERZAS:
ARMADAS HAS CUMPLIDO SU PAPEL DE SALVAGUARDIA ULTIMA DE LA
INSTITUCIONALIDAD. PERO LA DURA TAREA QUE IMPONE RESTANAR LAS
HERIDAS Y REANUDAR LA MARCHA DE LA NACION EXIGE EL APOYO RESUELTO
DE AQUELLA MAYORIZ CUIDADANA QUE, EN TODOS LOS TONOS, HA PEDIDO
UNA HONDA RECTIFICACION.
EL QUEBRANTAMIENTO CONSTITUCIONAL PROVOCADO POR EL MARXISMO
NO PUDO SOLDARSE CON LAS SOLAS INICIATIVAS DE LOS PARTIDOS
POLITICOS. LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS NO DESEABAN NI
HAD DESEADO NUNCA TOMAR SOBRE SI LA RESPONSIBILIDAD DE CONDUCIR
LOS DESTINOS DE LA NACION, PERO EL DRAMATICO FRACASO DE LA UNIDAD
POPULAR Y LAS LIMITACIONES DEL CUADRO POLITICO OPOSITOR PARA
CONSEGUIR EL INDISPENSABLE CAMBIO DE RUMB0 FORZARON LA SITUACION
HASTA EL PUNTC EN QUE SE ENCUENTRA.
i
SE CRELI
HU
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4
2
3
6
PAGE 23
TOR:1323242 SEP 73
IN 028495
SAGO 25421
CHILE TIENE UN GOBIERNO MILITAR, FORMADO POR LOS SENORES
COMANDANTES EN JEFE DE LAS TRES RAMAS DE LA DEFENSE NACIONAL
Y EL SENOR GENERAL DIRECTOR DE CARABINEROS. LA JUNTA MILITAR
HA ASUMIDO EL MANDO SUPREMO. RESPETANDO EXPRESAMENTE LAS ATRI-
BUCIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL, CONTANDO CON LA ASESORIA DE LA
CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA Y DISPONIENDO EL RECESO DEL
PARLAMENTO DE ESTE MODO LA JUNTA CREE ENCONTRAR EL CAMINO
ADECUADO PARA INSTAURAR LA INSTITUCIONALIDAD QUE SE REQUIERE.
LAS RESERVAS QUE ESTA POSICION DE LA JUNTA PUEDAN INSPIRAR
A CIER OS SECTORES POLITICOS NO PUEDEN SER TAN ABSOLUTAS QUE
LLEGUEN HASTA NEGAR EL CONCURSO DE TODOS LOS CHILENOS AL ESFUERZO
DE RECONSTRUCCION DE SU PATRIA. POR EL CONTRARIO, A TRAVES
DE LA JUNTA, ES CHILE MISMO. EL QUE JUEGA LA CARTA DEFINITIVA
PARA TRIUNFAR DEL ODIO. DE LA DESUNION, DEL DESALIENTO Y DE LA
DECADENCIA. LA LABOR IMPONE LA ACCION DE TODAS LAS CAPACIDADES
Y LA COLABORACION DE TODA LA CUIDADANIA, ESPECIALMENTE DE
AQUELLOS CHILENOS QUE POR SU INDIFERENTISMO. SU INDECISION.
SU EGOISMO C SU PEREZA HAN GENERADO LAS CONDICIONES QUE PER-
MITIERON EL DESARROLLO DE LA. IDEOLOGIA MARXISTA Y SU LLEGADA
AL PODER EN 1970 GRACIAS A LA DIVISION DE LAS FUERZAS DEMOCRATICAS.
SECRET
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TOTAL COPIES
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AGENCY MESSAGE
PAGE 04
TOR:1323242 SEP 73
IN 028495
SAGO 26421
EL PAIS HA VIVIDO VIRTUALMENTE AL MARGEN DE LA CONSTITUCION
Y ABSORBIENDO GRANDES DOSIS DE IDEOLOGIA EXTRANJERA ACOMPANDA
TAMBIEN DE GUERRILLEROS EXTRANJEROS, A NADIE PUEDE
SURPRENDER QUE EL REMEDIO A TAN DESESPERADA SITUACION SEA DE
CARACTER EXTRAORDINARIO Y SE LE ADMINISTRE PROPORCIONADAMENTE
À LA VIOLENCIA QUE OPONGA EL MAL ANTE DE SER DOMINADO.
EN MEDIO DE LAS DIFICULTADES, LO UNICO QUE RECLAMA EL PATRIOTIS–
MO ES TRABAJO. ESPIRITU DE SOLIDARIDAD Y COLABORACION PARA EL
ESTABLECIMIENTO DEL ORDEN INSTITUCIONAL.
8. EXPRESO PRESIDENTE DE CORTE SUPREMA
DEL PODER JUDICIAL.
D- COMPLACENCIAL
EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREME, ENRIQUE URRUTIA MANZANO.
ENTREGO LA SIGUIENTE DECLARACION:
"EL PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA, EN CONOCIMIENTO DEL
PROPOSITO DEL NUEVO GOBIERNO DE RESPETAR Y HACER CUMPLIR LAS
DECISIONES DEL PODER JUDICIAL SIN EXAMEN PROVIO DE SU LEGALIDAD,
COMO LO ORDENA EL ARTÍCULO 11 DEL CODIGO ORGANICO DE TRIBUNALES,
MANIFIESTA PUBLICAMENTE POR ELLO SU MAS INTIMA COMPLACENCIA
EN NOMBRE DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA DE CHILE. Y ESPERA
QUE EL PODER JUDICIAL COMPLA CON SU DEBER, COMO LO HA HECHO LASTA
SECRET
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AL
FILE.
VR .
PAGE 05
TOR:1323242 SEP 73
AHORA, SANTIAGO, 12 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1973, FIRMAI
URRUTIA MANZANO, PRESIDENTE DE LA CORTE SUPREMA",
C. ACTIVIDADES DE FF.AA. Y CARABINEROS --
158 CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS EXPULSADOS AYER DEL PAIS
ALLANADA UNIVERSIDAD TECNICA DEL ESTADO.
PERSONAS.
REDUCCION DE EXTREMISTAS.
IN 028495
SAGO 26421
ENRIQUE
TENDICION DE 600
INCAUTACION DE ARMAS EN INDUSTRIAS E INSTITUCIONES BANCARIAS.
CONTROL DE LA MONEDA. TOMAS MORO Y "CANAVERAL" EN EL ARRAYAN.
CIENTO CINCUENTA CUBANOS EXTREMISTAS FUERON EXPULSADOS
AYER DEL PAIS POR LA JUNTA MILITAR DE GOBIERNO, SEGUN EL BANDO
NO. 26 QUE DETALLA LAS ACTIVADES PRINCIPALES DESARROLLADAS POR
LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS Y CARABINEROS EN LAS ULTIMAS HORAS EN LA
GUARNICION DE SANTIAGO.
LA COMUNICACION SENALA QUE FUE ALLANADA LA UNIVERSIDAD
TECNICA DEL ESTADO. DONDE SE RINDIERON 600 PERSONAS, Y SE
ENCONTRO GRAN CANTIDAD DE ARMAMENTO, ASI COMO INDUSTRIAS,
ENTIDADES BANCARLAS Y OTROS RECINTOS EN LOS CUALES LOS EFECTIVOS
MILITARES SE INCAUTARON DE ARMAS Y EXPLOSIVOs...
2. FILE:
15-124-52: E2 !MPDET
SECRET
15-124-52