200000
104-10534-10173
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
SECRET
1.
Attached is Annex A
Statements of Soviet Officials
About NOSENKO which is part of the summary entitled,
Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich
NOSENKO, (copy number 7) dated 1 October 1968. The
aforementioned summary was forwarded for your review on
13 March 1978.
2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are
deleted since it contains information which bears on the
security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related
thereto.
3. We request return of the study (copy 7) and Annex A
when your review has been completed.
Attachment: As Stated Above
Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003
WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED
SECRET
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
13-00000
'
TOP SECRET
1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret
study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
Defector
-
Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for
your review.
2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages
containing information which bears on the security of
ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.
3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A
and Attachment when your review has been completed.
Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
357
WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED
TOP SECRET
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
13-00000-
Top Secret
CONTENTS
PAGE
VIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964)
(Cont.).
KGB Operations
Deputy Chief of Seventh Department
(July 1962-January 1964)
Investigation of SLESINGER
GRU Agent SHUBIN.
291
292
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY
292
293
Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN.
295
296
Arrest of BARGHOORN
298
Investigation of OSWALD
303
Residence in USSR
303
Request to Return to USSR
305
Post-Assassination Review of KGB File
307
The CHEREPANOV Papers
309
Contents
314
NOSENKO's Travel Document
315
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)
316
Purpose of Trip
317
Visits to KGB Legal Residency
318
Availability for Meetings with CIA
NOSENKO's Written Notes
318
319
NOSENKO's Defection
320
The Recall Telegram
324
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among
Operations
Operational Activities (July 1962-
January 1964)
Information Furnished the KGB by
George BLAKE
KGB Study of American Intelligence
325
326
American Tourists
326
327
از
Tourist Operations
NOSENKO's Information
Summary
327
330
331
Summary and Conclusion
331
(vi)
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IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE
335
Relationship with General GRIBANOV
335
Communist Party Status
Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures
Awards and Decorations
Sourcing
Ranks
338
342
345
349
350
X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT
ΧΙ SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
Annex A
-
Statements of Soviet Officials About
NOSENKO
° 355
357
361
Annex B
-
Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text
399
Index of Personalities
437
(vii)
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(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)
Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO
The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
officials' statements about him since his defection coin-
cides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description. According
to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelli-
gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively,
defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he
served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
were overcome through the patronage of KGB General GRIBANOV,
and in connection with operations against Americans he
occupied positions of progressively greater trust and
responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence)
Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection
wrought severe damage "for years to come to the KGB
because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American
targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and
disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of
many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to
assassinate him.
These statements are related in chronological order in
Annex A.
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Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.
In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow
Special Naval School required prior completion of the
Seventh Class] NOSENKO- said that when the war broke out he
and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he
completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned
to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the
Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he
completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943
NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School (then in Baku).
After just six months in Baku, without completing the
Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to
Moscow.
Comment:
NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran
away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and
that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku
and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of
Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.
NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the
Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he
resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO
received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being
hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.
Comment:
NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by
a jealous naval officer whom he then protected
by stating that the wound was self-inflicted,
and that he actually did accidently shoot him-
☐ quoted
a sensitive source self.
to
the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid
being sent to the front while attending a naval
college in 1942.
a KGB offic
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(Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized,
Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered
to CIA that he had known the son of the
Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in
Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.
NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-
building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed
the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.
Birth to 1945:
Summary and Conclusion
NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
his early life. However, this portion of his claimed
biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his
father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the
schools he claims to have attended.
Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics
(fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's
claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO
and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945
are accepted as true.
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NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute
course was of four years' duration and that he entered the
Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years'
duration and that because he failed a state examination he
was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'
duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it
was of five years' duration but he failed an examination
which delayed his graduation for three months.
Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB
upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
The duration of the Institute course and the
date of NOSENKO's completion are material to
the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service,
which he said followed almost immediately upon
his departure from the Institute.
-
Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 ca. 1953)
NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at
the Institute of International Relations he entered the
Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post,
finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the
intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
A sensitive source
is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO
served in the RU. According to
NOSENKO attended
the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU
Information Department for about a year before securing a
transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO
denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and
has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports)
Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held
Reports assignments.,
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A sensitive source
two
♡ has quoted/KGB officers
respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947
or 1949.
The significance of NOSENKO's RU service is the fact
that he claims it launched his intelligence career and
served as the means through which he secured appointment
to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more
years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a
significant period of his adult life for which he should
have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to
determining the time from which his claims about KGB service
can be judged credible.
NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his
1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of
his initial retractions and his first admission that he had
earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU
service was consequently prominent in interrogations in
1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations,
challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted
adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the
Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as
challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-
ments with respect to his RU service. The extent of the
still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in
NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.
NOSENKO's Information-1982
NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations
in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.
[He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In
September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad,
Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
no one would think he would take advantage of his father's
position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception
unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite
Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by
monitoring the communications of American units operating in
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DRAWERKEN KANULARIZENTVK KIT KRONG
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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> FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practi-
cally nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited
him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB
nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to Mos-
cow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the
FRIPPEL case.)
Comment:
a sensitive source-
FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice
in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts
he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962.
which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known
to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union
at that time, and there is no apparent reason
why he would make a false claim on this matter.
According to
FRIPPEL, who is now
in New York City, is a current target of the ☐N
Soviet intelligence service,
Johannes PREISFREUND
The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American
Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and
thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em-
bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take
PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh De-
partment. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however,
he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO
met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,
but did not use him in any operations.
Comment:
PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB
agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175,
and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent
return visits to Moscow, it was only because
NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and
drinking.
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who was [erroneously) considered to be a CIA officer.
SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961,
but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-
intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M.
GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he
had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United
States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent] by
KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV
liked life in the Unites States, American products, and
money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good"
and (not wanting to work as an agent".
NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that
service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV
was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being
an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his
trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and
furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of
the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According
to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.
Comment:
a sensitive source
SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United
States since 1942, when he was assigned to the
Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-
tended the 1945 Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
tended a number of sessions of the UN General.
Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet
Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV iden-
tified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is
certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
identified him as "an employee of the
KGB" and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN
have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's
face "was familiar". An FBI source, however,
in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat"
and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged
in no Soviet intelligence activity until that
time.
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NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions
of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then
watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American
contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform counter surveillance
tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,
while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had
forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO
revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and
checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared
materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's
conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion,
and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-
turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.
Comment:
Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still
"under suspicion", according to
a sensitive source.
Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation
NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-
man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as
such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the
entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.
TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left
Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.]
To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO
had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB
who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never re-
ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates
in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants
provided him.)
NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days
and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he
pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most
of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was
known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings
at any time.
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Yu. I. GUK
Implying that their friendship was of long standing,
NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly
every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a
few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to
the residency and was able to elicit information about some
of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big
friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
only "strong officer" in the residency.
Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A'.
because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was
dismissed from the KGB.
M.S. TSYMBAL
In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and
identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the
KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with
him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.
In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with
TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some
candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back-
ground would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals:
Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-
quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer
to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be
assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had
dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied
by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,
NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency
in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was
granted access in 1964.
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NOSENKO's Information
SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
Chief Directorate because of his business transactions
with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in
whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The
First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that
SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the
Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned
another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he
might make some contacts or do something interesting"
while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to
resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an
agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had
a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the
American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent
of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly
with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet
Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.
SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN.
directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who.
could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication
of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted.
to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,
no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
Soviet Union before, several times.
A sensitive source
Comment:
had reported to the
FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to
be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer
"might be trying to develop
SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some
other agent capacity."
NOSENKO's information was substantially
correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER,
reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a
Soviet official who exhibited "intimate
knowledge" of his business in New York
City and had asked whether SLESINGER had
"ever been bothered by the FBI.'
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Comment:
(Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI. that.
he was in touch with a Moscow photographic
shop proprietor, and he described evidence
of KGB interest in him during his visit to
Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the
Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in
contact with a number of Soviet officials
from the United Nations.
NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned
of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate
case.
(KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent
NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the
USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO
identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a quide for
Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of
Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested
on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that (KOTEN
was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific
and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the
agent's name, but from the description he provided he is
believed identical with
a KGB S&T
agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report
from
a sensitive source.
NOSENKO's Information
contacts
KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist
Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World Wär
to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among
dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens,
particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in
another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners
with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service
has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these
many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second
Directorates had concluded that (KOTEN might be a "provocation
agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the
Communist Party in the United States.
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NOSENKO's Information
SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-
traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet
Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958
or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of
duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN
was the target of Seventh Department case officer
A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was
placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance
observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense
automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They
very furtively said that they were interested in him,
from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.
་་
In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name
and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office
and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according
to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by
others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for
having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's
interest in SHUBIN.
a sensitive source
Comment:
identified an
Earlier,
agent apparently identical with SHUBIN'
and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel
to the USSR in summer 1961 and in
September 1963.
SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport
between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
the Soviet Union during that period it was
not as an American tourist under his true
name. Consequently, he could not then have
been the tourist target of the Seventh
Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.
If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring
to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further
contradiction: NOSENKO could not have
noticed his name while reviewing tourist
lists in the Seventh Department, because
he claims he was in the American Department
at the time.
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NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-
PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep
woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the
seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku,
where he was on his way to the Iranian border.
A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying
S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-
cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow,
interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed
to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked
why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and
besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some
money in return for the documents. He confessed that on
4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist
who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he
had given the documents to the American in the entrance
hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also
housed.
Because CIIEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two
fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the
Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock
surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB
that if he had detected his surveillants he would have
written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest
against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then
would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
of his guilt.
sensitive sources,
Comment:
Other sources, including
have also reported various aspects of the
CHEREPANOV incident.
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the
CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to
his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department at the time.
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The Recall Telegram
NOSENKO's Information
On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB
Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with
CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those
times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of
4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there
were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning
of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the
Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and
found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived,
instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to partici-
pate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the
substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence-
forth in CIA custody.
Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's
assertion regarding the existence of the recall
telegram. According to Special Intelligence,
there were enciphered communications from Moscow
to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and
later, but there was none from 1815 on 3
February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours
after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.
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(SEVENTII DEPARTMENT
January 1962-January 1964)
R
NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram
NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations
in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that
it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while
being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been
no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he
signed the following statement:
"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact
in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in
Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in
Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said
at the time that this telegram said that I was
recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB
activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I
maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent
interviews and interrogations by American authorities
in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed.
No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that
the story was a lie. I myself invented this tele-
gram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous
and afraid that my contacts with American Intelli-
gence might be noticed."
Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations
The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964
(see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB
operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as
tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited
in the description of these operations in Annex B, these
operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service
in 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department.
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(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT
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January 1962-January 1964)
Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964:
Summary
To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO
describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of (SVENCHANSKIY
the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations
of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV,
his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment
to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as
he described and they were as he described (there are substan-
tial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB
elements other than the Ŝeventḥ Department), they are atypical
with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Depart-
ment operations. They do not accurately characterize, as
NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against
tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department
service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to
Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier
assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was
not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization
indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy
Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would
have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions
which he claimed to have held.
KGB Counterintelligence Operations
Among American Tourists
1962-1963
Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed
awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to
326
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(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)
Other Sources 1964 and 1965
a sensitive source
As indicated in Annex A,
reported
several items of information he stated he obtained from
various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV
was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's
defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired
because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that
GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his
protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to
Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO
ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO'S
father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief
despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence,
and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party
because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's
procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.
NOSENKO's Information
-
Post 1964
Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to
refer to this special and personal relationship, which
touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service.
Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain
this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted
or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by
other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted
from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote
the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given
(Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness
reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women
provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two
occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);
recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO
(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit-
ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);
NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in
1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador
DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES
NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
successively senior positions of authority from which he
derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and
results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet
Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim,
he provides an impressive array of information about KGB
personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent
that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his
bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-
gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO'S
claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was
a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive
positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust
despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the
greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence",
paralyzed the work of
KGB
The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known
facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects
the test to which his accounts were put: whether his
accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known
fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has
from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held.
In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own
accounts?
357
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Copy
10
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TOP SECRET
1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study
entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
Defector
-
Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier
for your review.
2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are
deleted since it contains information which bears on the
security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related
thereto.
3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A
when your review has been completed.
Attachment: As Stated Above
WARNING NOTICE
INVOLVED
-
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
TOP SECRET
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340
13-00000
Top Secret
Annex A
Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO
4 February 1964
NOSENKO defected in Geneva.
6 February 1964
The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified
the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that
NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as
4 February. They speculated privately between themselves
that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an
mobile accident.
8 February 1964
auto-
An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva
reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert
temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four
days.
9 February 1964
Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports
attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO
had disappeared.
10 February 1964
The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources
as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.
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10 February 1964 (continued)
A U.S. Department of State press release was issued
identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his
request for political asylum in the United States.
According to a sensitive source,
Because of his
long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of
important information which he could impart to intelligence
agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be
acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them.
He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number
of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American
and British nationals.
According to a sensitive source,
The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning
KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence
operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities
working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly
familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly
knew some KGB personalities in other countries.
Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in
Geneva; he asserted that some others, known
by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not,
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(Annex A)
10 February 1964 (continued)
According to a sensitive source
His
NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for
approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an
employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow.
father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the
Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry.
There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the
Ukraine.
Comment:
NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until
1953, when he entered the KGB,
According to a sensitive source,
several. KGS
It appeared quite certain to
officers that
NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.
Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been
a KGB lieutenant colonel.
According to a sensitive source,
from KCB officers
The
photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of
NOSENKO. One worked with NOSENKO for several years
in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as
a person who
likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond
of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally
well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the
Second Chief Directorate.
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10 February 1964 (continued)
Comment:
a
sensitive source
The photograph accompanying American
and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection
was by error not that of NOSENKO but of
Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom
and NOSENKO both
identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the
Geneva Disarmament Conference.
y
Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB
officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that
NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working
against American citizens.
Comment:
Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962
(before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of
Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference.
NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not
at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.
11 February 1964
Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department
of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask
how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release,
and to demand an immediate interview with him.
12 February 1964
S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the
Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference
in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for
permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts
to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be
taken to return NOSENKO to
Soviet custody.
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(Annex A)
12 February 1964 Qcontinued)
At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the
Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted
the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappea-
rance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities
in locating NOSENKO.
The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered
to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to
Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the
means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.
The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in
order to obtain assurance that the defection had been
voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with
Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as
possible.
NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.
12-13 February 1964
14 February 1964
In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to
Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply
of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington
and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a
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14 February 1964 (continued)
"gross provocation by American Intelligence organs".
GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release
from American custody.
The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at
the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately after-
wards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and
Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington.
NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had
defected of his own free will after careful consideration
and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union.
response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced
his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.
18 February 1964
In
Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told
a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of Inter-
national Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV,
NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background,
was the son of
a Minister in the Government, was notorious
for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".
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According to a sensitive source,
NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate
for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the
employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure
of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief
Directorate.
NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief
of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone
directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees
in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had
these phone books.
expressed the A KGB officer
opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and
CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he
knows so much about the methods of work of the First and
Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many
individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad.
a KGB office
said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and
British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning
defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much
more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence
operations of the KGB."
Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB
telephone book referred
to above.
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According to a sensitive source,
whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether
in
response to a question
the defection might be a
KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter.
he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.
22 February 1964
According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB
officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel
stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, and with his
help agents were developed among these Americans. It is
assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and
location of microphones
the Embassy.
Comment:
Although NOSENKO knew that there were micro-
phones in three general locations in the
Embassy, his specific information regarding
the number and location of microphones was
limited to that contained in a written list
brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he
claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.
24 February 1964
Women claiming to he the wife and mother of NOSENKO
visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time,
expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his
family and country and requesting a personal meeting with
him.
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• Seesec
24 February 1964 (continued)
Comment:
NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife
and mother on the basis of physical descrip-
tions. On only one previous occasion have
members of a defector's family called on 8
foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the
defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in
England in 1963, his wife appeared at the
British Embassy to make inquiries about him.
According to a sensitive source,
KUROCHKIN (fnu),
a KGB S&T officer scheduled for assignment to Washington,
will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the
course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often
visited the department where NOSENKO worked and,
result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".
as a
Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor
referred to
the
name.
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February 1964
Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in
the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO'3
defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval
preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in
1944-1946.
Comment:
ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of
the dates involved differs from those claimád
by NOSENKO.
KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to A
CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO,
whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his
wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV
later said on another occasion that he had friends who
knew NOSENKO well.)
Comment:
NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or
photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied
knowing him.
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February-March 1964
According to a sensitive source:
A KGB commission
was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused
by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission w88
very large, formed from different departments of the KGB.
The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that
NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear
matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many
details about life of the leaders of the country, in the
government... that he knew very much about internal relations
between the people working in the KGB, that he had many
close friends among them and [spent] days and nights
together with them. The whole history of his life was
studied step by step very carefully.'
"
TS No. 197124
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March 1969
According to a sensitive
officers
source,
(from conversations with various unnamed KGB
NOSENKO knows many
of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and
departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Head-
quarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel
who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs
and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO
has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.
Comment:
NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms
until the January-March 1965 interrogations,
when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally
in the "chiefs' dining room".
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23 March 1964
The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of
NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in
Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required
some definite statement in writing from her husband so that
she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO
children.
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27 March 1964
According to a sensitive source
:
chiefs
(from various unnamed KGB officers
There seems to be unanimous opinion among
✓ certain
KGB
that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tre-
mendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a de-
puty chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief
Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel
directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the iden-
tities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Head-
quarters... NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory
listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file
employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by
KGB "chiefs"
that if NOSENKO
some
were merely able to make these two directories available
to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged
for the present and for several years to come.
Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB direc-
tories described.
31 March 1964
KGB officers I.I. PETUKHOV nad P.P.. BORISOV in Canada
told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intel-
ligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating
materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets
with passport photographs so that "escape" documents could
be prepared for himself and his family. (SPRECHER asked
whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recent-
ly publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it,
asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".
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31 March 1964 (continued)
Comment:
When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February
1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENRO had.
in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he
had had some connection with NOSENHO, and
NOSENKO may have known something of what the
KGB was doing in Canada,
NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name
was unknown to him, who apparently is identical
to SPRECHER,
March 1964
According to a sensitive source who
was
briefed (in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief
Directorate officer of the American Department; Personnel
of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until his
defection, were so shocked at the event that they would not
mention it at all.
a sensitive source
Comment: In this and other contexts
has stated
or implied that NOSENKO served in the American
Department in 1963-1964 NOSENKO asserts he
left the American Department in January 1962.
and served in the Seventh Department until his
defection.
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April-May 1964
KGB officer G. N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert, Lee
JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather
than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one
of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United
States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer
had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme
caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts
with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify
JOHNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had
which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See
P 24for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)
May 1964: According to a sensitive source.
officers
(from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB
:) : Two commissions have
been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to :
✓ determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN,
and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt
to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency
of the KGB.
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20 May 1964
-
Top Secret
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
: The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only
40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually,
about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the
Embassy, NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information
to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being
found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40
microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge
of the remaining ones.
-
12 June 1964
Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American
Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom
he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate
with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow
to be someone they are well rid of.
22 June 1964
According to a sensitive source
Some
(from various unnamed KGB officers
The consensus among KGB employees
is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the
effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence.
NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either
GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on
several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel
stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help
agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is
assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to
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22 June 1964
(continued)
the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be
familiar with the number of microphones which had been
installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of
these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a depart-
ment, NOSENKO would normally have had access
to a telephone
directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the
KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one
in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO
travelled in 3 rather influential circle of friends in
Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All
comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an
"important catch" for American Intelligence, but no
the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO
had concerning the KGB.
29 June 1964
: GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance):
these
one in
NOSENKO, the son
of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer
who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh
Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while
on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two
or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953,
and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959.
When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO
replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department.
NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953.
until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for
KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during
1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section
until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsi-
bilities or may have been working against other Embassy
personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the
American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or
1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and
was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not
work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate
American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited
the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early
1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been
in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief.
C. I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the
Section during this period.
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:
29 June 1964 (continued)
Comment:
NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in
1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department
until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy
Section as Deputy Chief.. NOSENKO did not
identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied
since defection that he has ever met or even
seen him.
June 1964
According to a sensitive source
✓
"Just after" NOSENKO'ɛ
defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the
CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the
Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarm-
ament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of
the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts.
The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA,
a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty
Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from
their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair.
V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet
Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely
exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to
Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known
to
had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended
NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the
chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed,
would also lose his job..
Source
Comment:
by a sensitive source
MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly stationed in X
New York City, was said by.
to be one
of those from the CPSU Central Committee who
conducted interviews with KGB personnel going
abroad.
identified MEDVEDEV,
Another sensitive source
383
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10
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(Annex A)
June 1964 (continued)
Comment:
Top Secret
(Continued)
a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the
United Nations, ag the Communist Party organizer
and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that
MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he
worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a
KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.
29 July 1964
According to a sensitive source,
(from unnamed sources, presumably KGB officers
An investigating commission of the
CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances
surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible
for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate
employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled
from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant
general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like
an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken
since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed
on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief
of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection,
GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or
less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps
to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB.. It was felt
that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to
defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled
from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK
[BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees
expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of
NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO
details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV,
ત KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for
Moscow because the Investigating commission had determined
that Yu. I. CUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told
NOSENKO that COLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal
Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB
:
384
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(Annex A)
Top Secret
29 July 1964 (continued)
Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO
and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB
and thereafter did not associate with one another in the
course of their daily activities.
Comment:
NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims
that CRIBANOV had been instrumental in his
advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identi-
fied by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he
had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO
said he had never worked with him at KGB Head-
quarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the
First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the
USSR on 28 August 1964.
:
July-August 1964
According to a sensitive source:
The first
information
about
NOSENKO was
from KGB Headquarters which reported
the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed
to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The
letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very
great and some new forms of work should be created to be
efficient in the future". The Legal Residency hád not
before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's
escape".
385
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(Annex A)
Top Secret
November 1964
Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian
people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet
mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American
acquaintance that they had not been told officially but
they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in
Moscow. It was in this way,, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he
learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance.
According to the "grapevine", the defection was very
damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the:
Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities
of all Soviet agents in the United States.
386
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(Annex A)
Top Secret
November 1964 (continued)
Comment:
December 1964
GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections
with Soviet Intelligence because of his
statements, actions, and unusual freedom of
solitary movement while on visits to the United
States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment
attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed
the opportunity to meet with an American
Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet
Intelligence officers he had met with their
American counterparts'. During that 1964
meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject
of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a
traitor to his country".
a
source
Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the
time of his defection, told
that he had been
interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection,
and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which
NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK
the dismissal of large numbers of
KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what
source reported to
RESHETNYAK said,
thought the KGB might go so far
source
387
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December 1964
(continued)
ag to send someone to the United States to locate and kill
NOSENKO. (
later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB
officer.)
Source
Comment:
NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the
staff of the Disarmament Delegation.
f
29 January 1965
According to a sensitive source
(from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers
: It is common knowledge among
KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and
CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a
result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being
considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary
statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief
Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained
considerable 'compromising information", concerning NOSENKO;
if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from
consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary
material, ran a line through all of it, and added the nota-
tion: "Send him to Geneva. The general feeling is that
GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO'S
deficiencies because of GRIBANQV's long-time friendship
with NOSENKO's father.
"
Comment:
NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV
was responsible for sending him to Geneva in
1964, but after retracting his claim that
GRIBANOV had played any special role in his
assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved
the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father
and GRIBANOV were acquainted.
388
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Cópy
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(Annex A)
Top Secret
8 February 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
the KGB officer
: Prior to NOSENKO's
defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the
Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh
(Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, on three
separate occasions participated in conferences between
"important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the
Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these.
Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank
of captain in the KGB.
attributed this (the
disparity between job and rank) to the influence which
GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.
the KGB officer
the KGB officer
Comment:
NOSENKO
NOSENKO has never identified
always claimed that he had been a lieutenant
colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he
retracted that claim and asserted that he had
been only a captain.
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
GRIBANOV has been dismissed from
the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on
a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after
NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other
people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of
GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second
Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief
Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief
Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment
has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the
CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.)
SHCHERBAK.
Tax
389
TS No. 197124
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Top Secret
(Annex A)
8 February 1965 (continued)
Comment:
GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact
with a senior Western diplomat until late
autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's
defection), when he turned over that contact
to another KGB officer.
9 February 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
The amount of damage caused
by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew
few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad,
but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by
virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved
for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.
Early June 1965
According to a sensitive source
MF (from conversations with KGB officers
: Major General BANNIKOV is currently
temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having
replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he
supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a
small city outside Moscow ag the chief of security at an
unimportant military plant and 19 now a "nothing".
390
TS No. 197124
Top Secret
Capy
+
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1
(Annex A)
Top Secret
a sen-
sitive
☐ source
15 July 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer
who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting
of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters
was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the
circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second
(British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A.
TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV
and other officers also attended the meeting. According to
official statements made at the meeting, after the defection
of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to
determine which employees knew him and the nature of their
relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said
he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited
contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, how-
ever, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO
was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there.
described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was
afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing
vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB
and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.
Comment:
NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met
GRIBANOV 8ocially only three times during his
KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was
present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls
for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or
November 1963 in circumstances similar to those
referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was
Chief of the British Department from 1958 to
1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service
No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence
Department of the First Chief Directorate.
391
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i
(Annex A)
Top Secret
Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source
: As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many
08161cers ware nated, expelled from the Party, and
from th NOE These Included KGB Chairman SEROT, and Second
Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the
Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially
friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and
they were "buddies and night buddies".
Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in
1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.
Winter 1965-1966
Source, a
self-professed former KGB Second
said
Source
Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a
colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science
and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962.
that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations
against the American Embassy in Moscow):
NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother
was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering".
NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected
somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said
he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the
microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.
392
Top Secret
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Source
(Annex A)
Top Secret
Winter 1965-1966 (continued)
Comment:
Source's
allegation is the single report
source describing NOSENKO as other than
a KGB officer.
from any
March 1966
According to a sensitive source,
(from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO,
who was not personally known to
✓, was an important Source
boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in
the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU
Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps
for a year.
NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person
while in the GRU and "not very good".
He was to have been
discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very
influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was
able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion
of persons to whom
talked that NOSENKO had given
very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection
and that NOSENKO had had great acces8 to KGB information
which included all means of KGB coverage of people in
Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on
NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the
microphones.
393
Top Secret
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10
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March 1966 (continued)
Top Secret
Comment:
Source
NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer
to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy
(which he, like
called the GRU
Military Academy), by choice accepting assign-
ment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in
1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic
Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO
did attend the school, he could not have
served as he claimed in the GRU.
is
Source
the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged
NOSENKO served in the GRU.
394
Top Secret
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(Annex A)
Top Secret
395
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(Annex A)
Top Secret
Mid-1966
Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited
Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine
Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve
as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he
begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet
secret agent". As KOROLEV spoke only broken French and
English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the
matter at that time.
Comment:
KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV
who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for
the United Press International Moscow corres-
pondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and
(GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB
Second Chief Directorate KOROLEV has travelled
previously to Brussels as a correspondent for
the Soviet publication Sputnik, and to Japan
and the United States as a correspondent for
Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by
an official Soviet press representative of
information on a "Soviet secret agent", which
turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without
precedent.
October 1966
Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with
an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editors to
provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret
agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their
396
Top Secret
TS No. 197124
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(Annex A)
Top Secret
October 1966 (continued)
life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background
statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated:
"NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police
organization, defected to the USA without his family about
two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.:
it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of
the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important
positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and
also was closely acquainted with the country's leading
families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife,
35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and
a younger brother.
The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about
the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply
to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and
compensation. It is possible that this case will be given
much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he
defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA.
KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and
family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and
indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family
could be obtained and that interviews with them and with
others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match
correspondent.
"
Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union,
who is legally considered to be an enemy of the
state, is granted automatically upon the wife's
request.
28 January 1967
According to a sensitive source
(from personal knowledge):
knowledge of KGB organization,
his explanation, he would call
knew these matters better than
at KGB Headquarters longer.
Source
Referring to his own
said if NOSENKO heard
a child, since NOSENKO
because he had served
397
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(Annex A)
Top Secret
February 1967
According to a sensitive source
(from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow):
NOSENKO worked only in RU Information Department of the GRU,
and only for about five or six months, after which he went
to the KGB.
May 1967
According to a sensitive source
The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole
system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew
all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew
all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all
the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.
According to a sensitive source
: When
NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked
only the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly
there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of
which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went
to the KCB.
5 June 1967
According to a sensitive source
: There had been some
KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in
Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts
which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to
investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of
SHAKHOV.
Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962
to investigate SHAKHOV.
398
Top Secret
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Copy
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SECRET
:
ANNEX A
-
STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS
ABOUT NOSENKO
SECRE
Exca
declacuation
13-00000
ANNEX A
STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO
Pages 361 - 398 of the previous summary contain statements
by Soviet officials including several sources in regard to NOSENKO.
These remarks cover the period of February 1964 to June 1967.
by
None of the quoted information with the exception of a statement
a Source (a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agen
who stated NOSENKO was not a KGB
officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB, raiscs a
question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether he was
actually a KGB officer. It is not considered that the remark by
SOURCE
can be given any particular weight or that it repre-
sents any material evidence he was not a KGB officer.
Of the cited information from Soviets in regard to NOSENKO,
the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are
sensitive Source #1, sensitive Source #3
cited elsewhere, is the information from
and
sensitive Source #2
and probably in that order.
Source #2
Source #1, Source #3
H and
e had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their
comments were based on information from third parties or obtained
Source #1
through conversation. There are discrepancies between what
Source #2
and
have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has
SECRET
de
d
13-00000
said, but under the given circumstances of how
Source #1
and
Source #2
acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected.
No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted
Source #2, Source #3 and Source #1
and
that
that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.
It is felt that information from
have furnished no information
Source #1, Source #3 and Source #2
and
is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case,
but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO
is not a bona fide defector should not be considered as absolute proof
he was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO
was or was not dispatched should be based on a full consideration of
all available information. It must be realized there is a possibility
Source #1, Source #3
NOSENKO could have been dispatched by the KGB and
Source #2
and
be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that
NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona
Source #1, Source #3 or Source #2.
fides of the
or
NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received
in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in
connection with an expected conference on tourist matters.
The telegram,
13-00000
according to NOSENKO in interviews prior to October 1966, had been
received in the Residentura the morning of the same day he met his
CLA contacts and stated he had defected.
In October 1966, NOSENKO responded to a casual mention of
the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous state-
ments on the subject. NOSENKO stated, and has subsequently maintained,
11
that there was not a "recall telegram. He has explained that he invented
the "recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal
safety in remaining "in place" for a longer time. NOSENKO has stated
he thought the alleged "recall telegram" would be accepted by CIA as
a logical reason for his precipitate defection.
3
SECRET
13-00000
152257
13-00000
Certain of the discrepancies noted in the previous summary
Source #1
Source #2
between information from
and
and from NOSENKO
have been clarified and certain discrepancies could not be clarified.
In some instances the information from
Source #1 and Source #2
and
The judgment is based on the hearsay nature
Source #1 and Source #2
and
adjudged to be inaccurate.
of the reporting by
measured against the absence
of any reason to question this part of his life as related by NOSENKO.
Source
Examples are information from CLA
that NOSENKO had been
う
13-00000
Source #2
affiliated with the KGB since about 1947 and information from
that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOS ENKO
worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow.
certain discrepancies between information furnished by
Source #1 and Source #3 in
and
There are also
Source #2,
in regard to the life and career of NOSENKO
prior to 1964.
from
In regard to discrepancies previously noted between information
Source #1
as to certain KGB officers whom
Source #1
understood
NOSENKO had personally met and concerning whom NOSENKO had pre-
viously indicated no knowledge, a satisfactory explanation has been
obtained for certain of the discrepancies during current interviews with
NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explana-
tion is not available but there is just as adequate reason to believe
Source #1
had obtained incorrect or incomplete information as there
is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his failure to recognize
a name and/or photograph.
As an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now
been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had
Source #1
never commented on the KGB telephone book which
ported NOSENKO,
had re-
had in his possession.
During current interviews, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning
ó
SECRET
13-00000
how an officer in the SCD would obtain the telephone number of an
FCD officer, gave a detailed report including information that there
was at least one complete SCD telephone directory in each room
occupied by SCD officers. In addition, NOSENKO stated he had access
to a directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of the
Department and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefs
in the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.
It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between the
information furnished by
concerning the telephone directory
Source #1
and the description furnished by NOSENKO. This is quite logical
since
Source #1
could hardly give an accurate description of a telephone
directory which he had never seen.
SECRET