104-10187-10103
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce
MEMORANDUM
CUBAN DEFECTOR
SUBJECT:
Operation
WHISH #64.749
15 October 1984
2.4
Peralta)
Briefing in Guatemala of Chief of State Peraita
11.
06.08.06.08,74
The briefing was held in a small luxurious
government conference room on the afternoon of Friday
October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. (Chief of state
Colonel Peralta, Minister of Government Colonel Serrano
and Intelligence Chief Colonel Porres attended for the Guate-
malan.
TWO CIA OFFICERS WERE PRESENT
SENIOR CIA OFFICER
cavity!
At the request of the
prefaced the operational briafing with a brief description
of how the U. S. Intelligence comidiunity operates, of the
role of CLA, of the need for compartmentation and security,
and specifically of how the foregoing considerations inaite
it imperative for the Guatemalam) to adopt security pre-
cautions which will ensure that the information we provide
and the joint operations we undertake aro compartmented
within the Guatemalen government (and, in fact, discussed
by the Guatemalan government exclusively with our re- 24
presentatives in the fleid),
3. Following the introductory remarks outlined
above, I briefed the group on the DGI structure, “the DGI
operational techniques, and specifically on DGI aims and
operations in Guatemala The president lent close attention
throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely,
including the DCI intelligence requirements for (Guatemisia) ||
and the Ɛalvadoran "Caso Zapoto" que.)
:
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4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained
our aims in exploiting the internation
indige
In this connection I asked for close couperation
and coordination of activities, promising that wo shall
do our sutmost and making reference to our travel lists
and watch list.
shy a
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h. The effectiveness of his own actions against
guerrillas la Guatemala) and his determination
to "meet violence with violence; "
1. Recognition of the importance of the information
covered in tas briefing and of its exploitation;
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Reference to the case of the Alexican courier)
working for Cabas intelligence and now detained
Quatemala
Acceptance of security restrictions and his
decision to hold the inforination to those present.
7. In replying to the remarks of Colonel Peralta, 6
I said that we appreciate the cooperation of Guatemala in the
DAS and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation
of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter
of using fores against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was
not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the
United States Government are based on careful study of
detailed information treluding information on Soviet intentions
and capabilities.
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06
8. At the conclusion of the meeting, (Peralta__
asked for a copy of the DG requirements (which he already
had geno over closely) and tous the copy with him to study
further..
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5. With reference to
case, because
of the developments and plans in Salvador)) I explained
briefly the status of the DALTON cue and the possibility
of his being transferred to Cuatemala) || (This was ta line
with the discussion in calvados)hich included car R
the resident and the President's intelligence 06.08
advisor, Colonel MEDRAN and that the Guatemala)!!
government take no action unless requested by President 06
RIVERA or Colonel MEDRANO and said that, I DALTON) 06
la transferred, “ous of our people probably would talk to
ob (DALTON la Guatemala) ()
06.08.
3. The Chief of State Peralta made a rather
limpassioned speech in which he covered the following points:
His own long experience in the OAS, la Cida
and in Central America;
His early warningn abxit Castro--which
were disregarded; .
e. The artont to which Quatemala) has lived up
to its obligations in the SAS; to which it has
cooperated in efforts against Castro; and to
which it has looked toward U.S. leadership;
d. The failure of the U. S. to take aggressive
action against Cabs and the need for taking a
hard line, including the use of force in support of
millitary activity by the free Cubans and the other
American countries;
His appreciation that the Soviets will not be
willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba;
1. Condemnation of Mexlec for her dealings with
Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations la
the QAS, and for permifting the Castroites to
œperate out of bisxico against other American
countries;
g. The need for action against Mexico;
SEGRET
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